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THUCYDIDES 


JOWETT 


VOL.  I. 


Honfcon 

HENRY     FROWDE 


OXFORD     UNIVERSITY     PRESS     •WAREHOUSE 
7    PATERNOSTER   ROW 


THUCYDIDES 

TRANSLATED    INTO    ENGLISH 

WITH    INTRODUCTION,    MARGINAL     ANALYSIS, 
NOTES,    AND    INDICES 


BY 


B.    JOWETT,    M.A. 

MASTER   OF   BALLIOL   COLLEGE 

REGIUS   PROFESSOR   OF  GREEK   IN   THE   UNIVERSITY  OF  OXFORD 
DOCTOR   IN  THEOLOGY  OF  THE  UNIVERSITY  OF  LEYDEN 


IN    TWO    VOLUMES 
VOL.   I,    CONTAINING    THE    TEXT 


AT  THE  CLARENDON  PRESS 
1881 

[All  rights  reserved} 


TO  THE 

RIGHT  HONOURABLE  VISCOUNT  SHERBROOKE, 

ONE  OF  THE 

BEST  GREEK  SCHOLARS  IN  ENGLAND, 

WHOSE 
GENUINE   LOVE   OF  ANCIENT   CLASSICAL   LITERATURE 

(THOUGH  SOMETIMES  DISSEMBLED) 
IS  AS  WELL  KNOWN  TO  HIS  FRIENDS, 

AS  THE  KINDNESS  OF  HIS  HEART, 
AND  THE  CHARM  OF  HIS  CONVERSATION. 


INTRODUCTION. 


THE  text  which  has  been  followed  in  this  trans- 
lation (except  where  a  departure  from  it  is  indicated 
at  the  foot  of  the  page)  is  that  of  the  first  smaller 
edition  of  Poppo  (1843-1851),  which  adheres  more 
closely  to  the  authority  of  the  MSS.  than  the  later 
edition  begun  by  Poppo  and  continued  by  Stahl. 
It  was  originally  intended  that  the  work  should 
contain  a  series  of  essays  on  subjects  connected 
with  Thucydides.  But  the  accomplishment  of  this 
part  of  the  design  has  been  unavoidably  delayed. 
The  writer  hopes  to  complete  what  is  wanting  in 
the  course  of  a  year  or  two. 

He  gratefully  acknowledges  the  valuable  help  of 
more  than  one  friend ;  first,  and  above  all,  of  W.  H. 
Forbes,  Fellow  of  Balliol  College,  who  during  several 
years  has  been  his  unwearied  and  disinterested 
fellow-labourer  in  a  long  and  necessarily  tedious 
work.  Few  persons  take  as  much  conscientious 
pains  about  their  own  writings  as  he  has  taken 
about  those  of  another.  To  his  admirable  scholar- 
ship is  due  mainly  the  degree  of  accuracy  which 
the  translator  has  been  able  to  attain ;  and  he  is 
indebted  to  him  for  many  excellent  remarks  and 
suggestions.  The  essay  on  Inscriptions  in  the 


viii  INTRODUCTION. 

second  volume  has  been  in  great  measure  compiled 
from  data  which  he  has  collected  and  analysed. 
The  translator  will  always  reckon  the  days  which 
they  have  passed  together  in  the  study  of  Thucy- 
dides  to  have  been  among  the  happiest  and  most 
useful  of  his  life. 

To  his  friend  Professor  Campbell  of  St.  Andrews, 
besides  many  other  obligations,  his  best  thanks  are 
due  for  the  correction  of  several  errors  in  the  notes. 

The  full  and  well-arranged  index  to  the  text  is 
the  work  of  Mr.  Matthew  Knight,  who  has  given 
an  amount  of  thought  and  care  to  it  rarely  bestowed 
on  such  ungracious  tasks. 

The  translator  has  had  the  advantage  of  being 
anticipated  by  Mr.  Crawley,  late  Fellow  of  Wor- 
cester College,  and  in  part  by  Mr.  Wilkins,  Fellow 
of  Merton  College.  He  has  not  refrained  from 
consulting  their  translations  in  several  passages, 
and  desires  to  express  his  gratitude  for  the  assist- 
ance which  he  has  received  from  them.  He  has 
also  occasionally  referred  to  the  clear  and  elegant 
French  translation  of  Betant,  but  much  more  fre- 
quently to  his  invaluable  lexicon.  The  old  version 
of  Hobbes,  though  bearing  a  famous  name,  is  very 
rough  and  inaccurate,  and  has  been  sometimes 
praised  a  good  deal  beyond  its  real  merits.  An 
interest  would  attach  to  Dr.  Smith's  translation,  if 
it  could  be  believed  that  Lord  Chatham  (who,  it 
may  be  remembered,  gave  special  instructions  that 
his  son  William  Pitt  should  read  Thucydides  at 
College)  had  contributed  to  the  work  '  the  Funeral 


INTRODUCTION.  ix 

Oration/     But  the  hand  of  the  great  Orator  is  no- 
where discernible  in  the  performance. 

The  edition  of  Dr.  Arnold  has  given  a  powerful 
stimulus  to  the  study  of  Thucydides  in  England. 
Himself  inspired  with  the  love  of  his  author,  he 
inspired  the  love  of  him  in  others.  He  certainly 
possessed  that  quality  of  a  Commentator  from  which 
an  ancient  writer  gains  so  much,  the  gift  of  in- 
telligent appreciation.  He  first  showed  how  Thucy- 
dides might  be  translated  with  elegance  and  accuracy. 
Though  not  a  great  philologer  or  a  learned  enquirer, 
and  adding  little  to  actual  knowledge,  he  created  an 
interest  about  geography  and  archaeology,  and  even 
about  the  interpretation  of  difficult  passages,  such 
as  never  existed  before  among  his  countrymen. 
His  notes  are  often  models  of  good  English  and 
good  sense.  It  is  to  be  regretted  that,  amid  the 
variety  of  his  pursuits,  he  never  gained  an  intimate 
and  idiomatic  acquaintance  with  the  language  of 
Thucydides,  and  never  formed  a  sound  notion  of 
textual  criticism.  He  is  frequently  led  away  by 
fanciful  comparisons  of  things  Biblical  and  Classical, 
of  Greek  and  English  constructions,  and  of  events 
ancient  and  modern.  The  influence  of  Niebuhr 
over  him  is  perceptible  in  his  speculations  about 
ancient  Greek  races.  But  he  had  a  true  feeling  for 
Greek  history  and  life,  and  all  students  of  Thucy- 
dides have  reason  to  be  thankful  to  him.  When  a 
great  man  undertakes  the  office  of  an  interpreter  he 
throws  a  light  upon  the  page  which  the  merely  verbal 
critic  is  incapable  of  communicating,  and  it  would 

a  3 


x  INTRODUCTION. 

be  ungrateful  to  scan  too  closely  his  deficiencies  in 
scholarship. 

A  new  epoch  in  the  knowledge  of  Thucy- 
dides  was  made  by  Poppo' s  edition,  beginning  in 
the  year  1815  with  *  Commentationes  Criticae,'  and 
ending  in  the  year  1856  with  a  *  Commentatio  de 
Historia  Thucydidis.'  The  bulk  of  the  work  is 
contained  in  two  volumes  of  prolegomena,  and  in 
eight  volumes  of  text  and  scholia,  and  of  anno- 
tations on  them.  This  grand  edition  may  be  criti- 
cised on  the  grounds  of  old-fashioned  scholarship, 
of  imperfect  judgment  of  the  MSS.,  of  deficiency  in 
historical  imagination,  and  of  immoderate  prolixity. 
But  Poppo  has  the  great  merit  of  being  almost 
always  right.  There  is  no  trace  of  the  mind  and 
genius  of  Arnold  to  be  discovered  in  his  pages ; 
they  are  not  written  in  a  form  either  attractive  or 
suggestive  to  the  student  of  history.  Yet  the  true 
scholar  will  look  with  respect  and  admiration  on  the 
twelve  volumes,  not  merely  as  a  vast  thesaurus  in 
which  nearly  everything  illustrative  of  Thucydides 
has  been  accumulated,  but  because  the  editor  mani- 
fests a  real  insight  into  the  meaning  of  his  author. 
For  Poppo  was  the  first  who  saw  that  the  language 
of  Thucydides  had  a  law  of  its  own,  and  was  not 
merely  to  be  judged  of  by  the  precepts  of  gram- 
marians, whether  ancient  or  modern.  Taking  the 
accusations  of  Dionysius  of  Halicarnassus  as  his 
basis,  he  proceeds  to  show  that  the  supposed  irre- 
gularities of  Thucydides,  the  confusions  of  persons, 
genders,  numbers,  voices,  moods,  tenses,  are  not 


INTRODUCTION.  xi 

real  confusions  or  irregularities,  but  are  attributable 
to  an  imperfect  or  unfixed  state  of  grammar  or 
language,  and  have  a  principle  underlying  them. 
Either  they  follow  some  analogy  or  verbal  associa- 
tion ;  or  they  obey  the  sequence  of  thought  rather 
than  the  rules  of  grammar ;  or  they  are  due  to  some 
attraction  of  sound  or  sense ;  or  they  blend  the 
language  of  poetry  and  prose  at  a  time  when  the 
two  were  not  yet  accurately  distinguished.  Of  two 
legitimate  usages,  that  which  afterwards  fell  into 
disuse,  and  which  therefore  appears  to  be  irregular, 
is  sometimes  preferred.  Many  of  the  so-called  sole- 
cisms are  at  variance,  not  so  much  with  grammar,  as 
with  the  practice  of  later  Greek ;  or,  if  they  are  un- 
grammatical,  we  must  enlarge  our  notions  of  gram- 
mar that  we  may  be  able  to  embrace  them.  At  the 
same  time  it  would  be  maintained  by  Poppo  that 
Thucydides  has  rarely,  if  ever,  allowed  himself 
liberties  not  to  be  found  somewhere  in  other  writers. 
These  principles  he  bases  upon  a  large  induction  of 
examples,  and  partially  succeeds  by  the  help  of  them 
in  emancipating  himself  and  his  author  from  gram- 
matical superstitions. 

Poppo's  edition  is  eminently  distinguished  by 
sobriety  of  judgment.  Trained  in  the  school  of 
Hermann  (although  the  Master  in  later  life  forgot 
his  own  lesson),  he  had  been  early  warned  against 
the  licence  of  conjectural  emendation ;  and  his 
familiar  acquaintance  with  the  language  of  Thucy- 
dides enabled  him  to  see  that  conjecture  is  unne- 
cessary, where  a  scholar  of  a  more  general  type 


xii  INTRODUCTION. 

would  have  pronounced  against  the  genuineness  of 
the  text.  It  must  be  admitted  that  he  has  not  the 
gift  of  clear  exposition  or  of  exhibiting  the  parts 
of  an  argument  in  their  true  relation  to  one  another; 
and  in  winding  through  the  long  notes  of  the  larger 
edition  we  have  sometimes  a  difficulty  in  separating 
his  own  view  from  that  of  others  whom  he  is  con- 
futing. But  though  his  meaning  is  not  always 
apparent  on  the  surface,  there  is  to  be  found  at 
the  bottom  good  sense  and  true  philological  tact. 
The  life-time  devoted  by  him  to  the  study  of  Thucy- 
dides  was  by  no  means  wasted,  for  he  restored  to  a 
great  writer  natural  principles  of  interpretation. 

Later  editors  have  added  comparatively  little  to 
him,  and  would  probably  have  done  better  if  they 
had  followed  more  closely  in  his  footsteps.  The 
most  distinguished  of  his  successors,  Classen,  while 
equalling,  or  perhaps  exceeding  him,  in  subtle 
analysis  of  the  language,  falls  very  far  short  in 
soundness  of  judgment.  The  translator  is  never- 
theless bound  to  acknowledge  that  he  is  under  con- 
siderable obligations  to  his  work,  as  well  as  to  the 
useful  edition  of  Bb'hme.  Some  valuable  contribu- 
tions to  the  study  of  Thucydides  have  been  made  by 
the  minute  learning  of  Krliger  :  of  these  he  has  also 
availed  himself. 

The  language  of  Thucydides  presents  a  curious 
and  interesting  problem,  because  it  belongs  to  a 
period  when  the  uses  of  words  and  constructions 
were  not  yet  fixed,  and  an  original  writer  had  much 
greater  freedom  in  varying  them  than  was  possible 


INTRODUCTION.  xiii 

in  the  Alexandrian  times.  As  centuries  went  on, 
*  the  individual  withered '  and  '  the  world '  of  lan- 
guage 'was  more  and  more/  There  was  no  force 
of  mind  seeking  expression  for  itself,  trying  experi- 
ments, or  struggling  against  the  conventionalities 
which  were  imposed  upon  it.  The  daily  practice 
of  oratory,  the  precepts  of  a  thousand  grammarians, 
reduced  the  mighty  genius  of  Hellas  to  the  level  of 
a  later  generation.  Men  instead  of  wrestling  with 
language  and  logic,  fell  under  the  dominion  of  them. 
No  one  in  the  age  of  Aristotle  would  have  dared 
to  write  like  ^Eschylus  or  Thucydides  ;  as  no  one  in 
our  own  day  would  attempt  to  imitate  Shakespeare. 
Poetry  sooner  submitted  to  the  yoke  than  prose, 
which  had  hitherto  been  used  only  in  the  current 
eipo/mevt]  Ae'£f?,  and  was  incapable  of  expressing  the 
higher  thoughts  of  men,  in  the  age  when  the  heaven 
of  abstractions, 

'  Won  from  the  void  and  formless  infinite/ 
was  just  beginning  to  appear.  Thucydides  came 
under  the  influence  of  that  new  intellectual  world 
which  broke  upon  the  Greek  in  the  fifth  century 
before  Christ,  and  which  is  never  sufficiently  ap- 
preciated by  us  because  we  have  inherited  it  and 
habitually  live  in  it.  But  not  at  once  was  language 
adequate  to  receive  or  take  up  into  itself  the  ideas 
which  were  asking  for  expression.  The  forms  of 
speech  and  writing  were  slowly  adjusted  to  the 
mental  movement  of  the  age.  Words  had  to  be 
distinguished  from  things,  arguments  from  fallacies. 
The  grammatical  construction  and  the  logical  con- 


xiv  INTRODUCTION. 

nection  of  clauses  and  sentences  were  still  clumsy 
and  irregular,  especially  in  Attic,  though  the  sense 
of  art  was  not  wanting,  and  the  sophist  was  busy 
elaborating  his  new  rules  and  formulas,  which  had 
a  remarkable  fascination  for  the  minds  of  the 
Athenians. 

Hence  we  see  in  the  same  writer  the  perfection 
of  art  and  the  greatest  want  of  art,  good  taste  and 
errors  of  taste,  the  meagre  and  false  artificiality  of 
the  Sophist  combined  with  an  antique  beauty  and 
masterly  power  in  the  delineation  of  facts.  The 
speeches  of  Thucydides  everywhere  exhibit  the  an- 
titheses, the  climaxes,  the  plays  of  words,  the  point 
which  is  no  point,  of  the  rhetorician,  yet  retain  amid 
these  defects  of  form  a  weight  of  thought  to  which 
succeeding  historians  can  scarcely  show  the  like.  The 
narrative  on  the  other  hand  is  natural  and  simple, 
in  the  highest  degree  picturesque  and  dramatic, 
often  deeply  pathetic  by  its  very  severity,  generally 
intelligible,  and  only  getting  into  a  tangle  when  at- 
tempting to  express  political  and  philosophical 
reflections,  as  in  the  Corcyraean  sedition.  He  who 
considers  that  Thucydides  was  a  great  genius  writing 
in  an  ante-grammatical  age,  when  logic  was  just  be- 
ginning to  be  cultivated,  who  had  thoughts  far 
beyond  his  contemporaries,  and  who  had  great 
difficulty  in  the  arrangement  and  expression  of  them, 
who  is  anxious  but  not  always  able  to  escape  tauto- 
logy, will  not  be  surprised  at  his  personifications,  at 
his  confusion  of  negatives  and  affirmatives,  of  con- 
sequents and  antecedents,  at  his  imperfect  antitheses 


INTR  OD  UCTION.  x  v 

and  involved  parentheses,  at  his  employment  of  the 
participle  to  express  abstract  ideas  in  the  making,  at 
his  substitution  of  one  construction  for  another,  at 
his  repetition  of  a  word,  or  unmeaning  alteration  of 
it  for  the  sake  of  variety,  at  his  over-logical  form,  at 
his  forge tfuln ess  of  the  beginning  of  a  sentence  be- 
fore he  arrives  at  the  end  of  it.  The  solecisms  or 
barbarisms  of  which  he  is  supposed  to  be  guilty  are 
the  natural  phenomena  of  a  language  in  a  time  of 
transition  ;  and  though  not  always,  as  Poppo  main- 
tains, common  to  other  Greek  writers,  yet  having 
some  analogy  by  which  they  may  be  defended. 
They  are  also  to  be  ascribed  to  a  strong  individ- 
uality, which  subtilizes,  which  rationalizes,  which 
concentrates,  which  crowds  the  use  of  words,  which 
thinks  more  than  it  can  express  (^eXX^o^eVo)  yap 
eWe).  Dionysius  of  Halicarnassus  is  right  in  attri- 
buting the  obscurity  of  Thucydides  to  himself  as 
well  as  to  his  age ;  for  his  contemporaries  Antiphon, 
Andocides,  Lysias,  Xenophon  are  far  from  obscure. 
It  is  a  commonplace,  but  one  which  cannot  be 
too  often  repeated,  that  we  must  interpret  an  ancient 
writer  by  himself  and  by  his  own  age,  and  not  by 
modern  notions.  We  must  not  add  on  to  him  our 
mysteries  and  moralities,  or  translate  his  confused 
modes  of  thought  into  our  more  distinct  ones  (more 
distinct  at  least  to  us).  Neither  must  we  measure 
him  by  our  standards  of  right  and  wrong.  His  range 
of  view  may  be  limited,  but  we  cannot  safely  enlarge 
it.  Nor  can  we  argue  from  his  inconsistencies  or 
omission  of  details ;  nor  draw  inferences  from  his 


xvi  INTR  OD  UCTION. 

precise  words,  because  we  cannot  expect  him  to 
use  legal  accuracy.  The  whole  manner  of  ancient 
writing  was  different  from  our  own ;  we  do  not  know 
whether  the  words  or  sentences  of  Thucydides  were 
written  down  as  soon  as  they  occurred  to  the  mind, 
or  were  long  preserved  in  the  treasure-house  of 
memory.  At  what  time  the  successive  portions  of 
his  history  were  completed  must  for  ever  remain 
uncertain  to  us.  The  sources  from  which  the 
ancient  historian  gathered  his  narrative  are  very 
dissimilar  to  those  which  are  at  the  disposal  of  the 
modern,  the  first  meagre  and  oral,  the  latter  often 
overwhelming  the  compiler  by  the  very  mass  of 
his  written  and  printed  materials.  A  few  ancient  in- 
scriptions at  Athens  or  Delphi,  the  brief  narrative 
of  a  writer  like  Hellanicus  (i.  97),  whom  we  can 
easily  believe  to  have  been  'inaccurate  in  his  chrono- 
logy,' or  of  Antiochus  the  Syracusan  (though  there 
is  no  evidence  that  he  was  acquainted  with  the 
latter),  the  witness  to  events  which  was  afforded 
by  statues  and  buildings,  such  as  the  '  columns 
taken  from  sepulchres '  which  were  inserted  in  the 
walls  of  Athens,  the  decrees  of  the  senate,  people, 
and  magistrates,  the  best  old  traditions  (i.  9  init.)— 
these  are  about  all  the  subsidia  which  Thucydides 
had  to  use.  Modern  history  is  gathered  out  of  a 
multitude  of  books.  Thucydides  drew  his  narrative 
fresh  from  the  lips  of  men  after  hearing  the  dif- 
ferent accounts  of  the  contending  parties  (v.  26  fin.). 
Whether  his  views  are  true  or  false  we  can  only  de- 
termine by  internal  evidence ;  for  it  is  useless  to 


INTR  OD  UCTION.  xvii 

balance  them  against  the  ever-diminishing  truth  and 
ever-increasing  fiction  of  a  later  generation.  Nor 
can  we  supplement  the  one  by  the  other.  Thucy- 
dides  may  possibly  have  been  unjust  to  Cleon,  but 
the  suspicion  is  not  confirmed  by  the  statement  of 
Marcellinus  that  Cleon  was  the  proposer  of  the  decree 
by  which  he  was  banished  ;  for  such  an  anecdote 
is  more  likely  to  be  invented  than  not.  When,  as 
in  modern  histories  of  ancient  Greece,  the  good 
cloth  of  Herodotus  or  Thucydides  or  Xenophon 
is  patched  with  the  transparent  gauze  of  Diodorus 
and  Plutarch,  the  whole  garment  becomes  unequal 
and  ragged.  There  is  a  special  impropriety  in  com- 
bining the  fictions  of  later  writers  with  the  narrative 
of  Thucydides,  who  stands  absolutely  alone  among 
the  historians,  not  only  of  Hellas,  but  of  the  world, 
in  his  impartiality  and  love  of  truth. 

We  must  accept  ancient  historians  as  they  are, 
with  their  limited  ideas  and  restricted  means  of 
knowledge,  with  their  Hellenic  conceptions  of 
morality  and  of  nature.  They  are  disappointing, 
like  the  Elgin  marbles,  to  those  who  expect  to  find 
in  them  modern  sentimentalism  or  a  modern  political 
philosophy.  But,  like  the  Elgin  marbles,  to  those  who 
can  appreciate  their  simplicity,  their  beauty,  their 
originality,  they  will  seem  to  be  worth  all  the  rest. 

There  have  been  many  commentaries  on  the 
Classics  both  in  ancient  and  modern  times ;  and 
a  kind  of  commentary  on  them  is  furnished  by  the 
ideas  which  the  ancients  themselves  entertained 
about  their  great  writers.  But  most  of  the  ancient 


xviii  INTRODUCTION. 

commentaries,  and  some  of  the  modern,  rather  in- 
terpret to  us  the  age  in  which  they  were  written 
than  the  author  who  is  supposed  to  be  illustrated 
by  them.  The  treatise  of  Dionysius  of  Halicar- 
nassus  on  the  style  of  Thucydides,  except  in  so  far 
as  it  confirms  the  text  in  a  multitude  of  passages, 
adds  nothing  to  our  knowledge  of  the  book ; 
but  it  throws  a  striking  light  on  the  narrow  and 
feeble  intelligence  of  the  Graeco- Roman  rhetorician 
and  historian  of  the  first  century  B.C.,  and  of  the 
world  for  which  he  wrote.  Early  criticism  consists 
almost  entirely  in  adapting  the  past  to  the  present, 
in  obtruding  the  notions  of  a  later  age  upon  an 
earlier  one.  And  it  is  only  by  degrees  that  man- 
kind have  been  able  to  exclude  the  subjective 
element  which  is  always  reappearing,  and  have 
learned  to  interpret  an  author  from  himself,  or  in 
the  study  of  an  age  to  confine  themselves  to  the 
range  of  its  ideas. 

Hitherto  each  age  seems  to  have  required  its 
own  interpretation  or  adaptation  of  Scripture,  or 
of  the  Classics,  and  to  have  been  dissatisfied  with 
that  of  any  other.  It  may  be  asked  whether,  as 
philology  progresses  and  words  are  understood  to 
have  a  fixed  meaning — not  that  '  which  we  bring  to 
them/  but  that  which  is  contained  in  them — the  art 
of  interpretation  must  be  always  going  on,  like  the 
labour  of  the  Danaides,  pouring  into  a  sieve  know- 
ledge which  is  perpetually  flowing  out,  and  in  every 
generation  requiring  to  be  replenished.  Must  we 
during  every  ten  or  twenty  years  have  new  Com- 


INTRODUCTION.  xix 

mentaries  on  the  Gospels  and  Epistles,  new  editions 
of  Homer,  Thucydides,  Aristotle  ?  No  sooner  does 
one  appear  than  it  begins  to  be  forgotten,  and 
another  is  with  some  anxiety  expected.  Such  a 
perennial  stream  of  interpretation  tends  to  discredit 
itself,  and  may  suggest  the  thought  that  it  would  be 
better  to  reprint  old  books  instead  of  writing  new 
ones.  But  there  is  really  some  answer  to  be  made 
to  the  objection.  In  the  first  place,  we  have  not  so 
completely  got  rid  of  the  '  subjective  '  element  as  we 
are  sometimes  inclined  to  imagine.  And  after  all  the 
pains  and  labour  which  have  been  bestowed  upon 
them  by  German  and  English  scholars,  we  cannot 
be  said  even  now  to  have  editions  of  the  principal 
Classics  in  which  nothing  is  superfluous  and  nothing 
wanting.  The  old  failings  of  the  commentator, 
want  of  proportion,  ostentation  of  learning,  love  of 
emendation,  perverse  ingenuity,  the  habit  of  contro- 
versy, still  cling  to  him.  Secondly,  although  many 
old  editions  are  better  than  most  new  ones,  the 
subtle  advance  of  philological  criticism,  even  during 
the  last  thirty  or  forty  years,  does  make  the  cor- 
rection of  old-fashioned  opinions  necessary;  there  is 
hardly  any  book  written  in  this  century  which  does 
not  require  such  a  purgation  almost  equally  with 
those  of  preceding  centuries.  Little  if  anything  can 
now  be  added  to  the  sources  of  our  knowledge,  but 
there  is  a  higher  standard  of  evidence  by  which 
our  materials  have  to  be  estimated ;  and  more  dis- 
crimination is  needed  in  separating  what  is  really 
certain  from  matters  of  opinion  and  conjecture.  All 


xx  INTRODUCTION. 

criticism  requires  to  be  criticised  before  we  can  make 
a  nearer  approach  to  the  truth.  The  traditions  of 
famous  scholars  have  not  unfrequently  to  be  re- 
pudiated in  the  light  of  facts.  The  wheat  has  to  be 
separated  from  the  chaff;  the  voluminous  learning  of 
past  ages  to  be  recast  in  easier  and  more  manageable 
forms.  And  if  Greek  literature  is  not  to  pass  away, 
it  seems  to  be  necessary  that  in  every  age  some  one 
who  has  drunk  deeply  from  the  original  fountain 
should  renew  the  love  of  it  in  the  world,  and  once 
more  present  that  old  life,  with  its  great  ideas  and 
great  actions,  its  creations  in  politics  and  in  art, 
like  the  distant  remembrance  of  youth,  before  the 
delighted  eyes  of  mankind. 


NOTE. 

In  referring  to  the  dates  placed  in  the  margin  of  the  English 
text,  it  must  be  remembered  that  Thucydides'  '  year '  or  the  '  year 
of  the  war '  begins  about  three  months  after  the  corresponding  year 
B.C.,  and  about  three  months  before  the  corresponding  Olympic 
year.  For  example,  the  attempt  on  Potidaea  of  iv.  135  belongs 
to  422,  not  to  423  B.C.;  and  the  treaty  of  v.  47  to  Ol.  89.  4, 
not  to  Ol.  90.  i. 

For  the  list  of  Corrigenda  see  end  of  Volume  II. 


THUCYDIDES. 


BOOK     I. 

THUCYDIDES,  an  Athenian,  wrote  the  history  of  the  I.  I. 
war  in  which  the  Peloponnesians  and  the  Athenians 
fought  against  one  another.  He  began  to  write  when 
they  first  took  up  arms,  believing  that  it  would  be  great 
and  memorable  above  any  previous  war.  For  he  argued  Greatness 
that  both  states  were  then  at  the  full  height  of  their  war.  e 
military  power,  and  he  saw  the  rest  of  the  Hellenes 
either  siding  or  intending  to  side  with  one  or  other 
of  them.  No  movement  ever  stirred  Hellas  more 
deeply  than  this ;  it  was  shared  by  many  of  the  Bar- 
barians, and  might  be  said  even  to  affect  the  world  at 
large.  The  character  of  the  events  which  preceded, 
whether  immediately  or  in  more  remote  antiquity, 
owing  to  the  lapse  of  time  cannot  be  made  out  with 
certainty.  aBut,  judging  from  the  evidence  which  I 
am  able  to  trust  after  most  careful  enquiry a,  I  should 
imagine  that  former  ages  were  not  great  either  in  their 
wars  or  in  anything  else. 

The  country  which    is   now   called    Hellas  was   not       2. 
regularly  settled  b  in  ancient  times  b.     The  people  were  J.^  c°n" 

Hellas? 

a  Or,  connecting  Si/  with  fiaKporarov :  f  But  after  carrying  the 
enquiry  to  the  furthest  point  at  which  any  trustworthy  evidence 
can  be  obtained.' 

b  Or,  taking  oi>  Tra'Xat  closely  together :  ( until  recent  times.* 
*0  B 


2  EARLY  INHABITANTS   OF  HELLAS. 

I.  migratory,  and  readily  left  their  homes  whenever  they 
readiness  of  were  overpowered  by  numbers.  There  was  no  com- 
tribesto  merce,  and  they  could  not  safely  hold  intercourse  with 
SSheV  one  another  either  by  land  or  sea.  The  several  tribes 
moreCun-the  cultivated  their  own  soil  just  enough  to  obtain  a  main- 
settled;  tenance  from  it.  But  they  had  no  accumulations  of 

some  of  the  .  , 

poorer,  like  wealth,  and  did  not  plant  the  ground  ;   for,  being  with- 
out  walls,  they  were  never  sure  that  an  invader  might 


perous)r°!i"  not  come  and  despoil  them.  Living  in  this  manner  and 
knowing  that  they  could  anywhere  obtain  a  bare  sub- 
sistence, they  were  always  ready  to  migrate;  so  that 
they  had  neither  great  cities  nor  any  considerable 
resources.  The  richest  districts  were  most  constantly 
changing  their  inhabitants  ;  for  example,  the  countries 
which  are  now  called  Thessaly  and  Boeotia,  the  greater 
part  of  the  Peloponnesus  with  the  exception  of  Arcadia, 
and  all  the  best  parts  of  Hellas.  For  the  productive- 
ness of  the  land  a  increased  the  power  of  individuals  ; 
this  in  turn  was  a  source  of  quarrels  by  which  com- 
munities a  were  ruined,  while  at  the  same  time  they  were 
more  exposed  to  attacks  from  without.  Certainly  Attica, 
of  which  the  soil  was  poor  and  thin,  enjoyed  a  long  free- 
dom from  civil  strife,  and  therefore  retained  its  original 
inhabitants.  And  a  striking  confirmation  of  my  argu- 
ment is  afforded  by  the  fact  b  that  Attica  through  im- 
migration increased  in  population  more  than  any  other 
region.  For  the  leading  men  of  Hellas  b,  when  driven 
out  of  their  own  country  by  war  or  revolution,  sought  an 
asylum  at  Athens  ;  and  from  the  very  earliest  times,  being 
admitted  to  rights  of  citizenship,  so  greatly  increased 

a  Or,  'gave  to  some  communities  greater  power  ;  this  was  a  source 
of  quarrels,  by  which  they  '  etc. 

b  Or,  taking  cs  TO.  a\\a  in  another  sense  :  '  that  Attica  through 
immigration  increased  in  population  quite  out  of  proportion  to  her 
increase  in  other  respects;'  or,  supplying  rrjv  'EXAaSa  and  taking 
neroiKias  in  another  sense  :  '  And  here  is  a  striking  confirmation  of 
my  argument  that  the  constant  migrations  were  the  cause  which 
prevented  the  rest  of  Hellas  from  increasing  equally  with  Attica. 
The  leading  men  of  Hellas,'  etc. 


MINOS.  3 

the  number  of  inhabitants  that  Attica  became  incapable        I. 
of  containing  them,  and  was  at  last  obliged  to  send  out 
colonies  to  Ionia. 

The  feebleness  of  antiquity  is  further  proved  to  me        3. 
by  the  circumstance  that  there  appears  to  have  been  No  unity 
no  common  action  in    Hellas   before  the  Trojan  War.  early  in- 
And  I   am  inclined  to  think  that  the  very  name  was 


not  as  yet  given  to  the  whole  country,  and  in  fact  did       enes  or 
not  exist  at  all  before  the  time  of  Hellen,  the  son  of  Barbarians  ; 

or  common 

Deucalion  ;   the  different  tribes,  of  which  the  Pelasgian  action  in 

.  .    ,  .  •  i  Hellas  be- 

was  the  most  widely  spread,  gave  their  own  names  to  fore  the 


different  districts.  But  when  Hellen  and  his  sons  be- 
came  powerful  in  Phthiotis,  their  aid  was  invoked  by 
other  cities,  and  those  who  .associated  with  them 
gradually  began  to  be  called  Hellenes,  though  a  long 
time  elapsed  before  the  name  prevailed  over  the  whole 
country.  Of  this  Homer  affords  the  best  evidence  ;  for 
he,  although  he  lived  long  after  the  Trojan  War,  nowhere 
uses  this  name  collectively,  but  confines  it  to  the  followers 
of  Achilles  from  Phthiotis,  who  were  the  original  Hel- 
lenes ;  when  speaking  of  the  entire  Jiost  he  calls  them 
Danaans,  or  Argives,  or  Achaeans.  Neither  is  there  any 
mention  of  Barbarians  in  his  poems,  clearly  because  there 
were  as  yet  no  Hellenes  opposed  to  them  by  a  common 
distinctive  name.  Thus  athe  several  Hellenic  tribes  (and 
I  mean  by  the  term  Hellenes  those  who,  while  forming 
separate  communities,  had  a  common  language,  and  were 
afterwards  called  by  a  common  name)a,  owing  to  their 
weakness  and  isolation,  were  never  united  in  any  great 
enterprise  before  the  Trojan  War.  And  they  only  made 
the  expedition  against  Troy  after  they  had  gained  con- 
siderable experience  of  the  sea. 

Minos   is   the   first   to  whom    tradition   ascribes   the       4. 
possession  of  a  navy.     He  made  himself  master  of  a  Beginnings 

of  civilisa- 
tion :  Minos 

a  Or,  supplying  K\T]6ei>T€s  with  both  clauses:  'those  who  suc- 
cessively acquired  the  Hellenic  name,  which  first  spread  among  the 
several  tribes  speaking  the  same  language,  and  afterwards  became 
universal.' 

B  2 


4  PIRACY. 

I.       great  part  of  what  is  now  termed  the  Hellenic  sea ;  he 
conquers     conquered  the  Cyclades,  and  was  the  first  coloniser  of 

the  islands  r    ,  ...  .        „  .  .    A.         *  . 

and  clears    most  of  them,  expelling  the  Canans  and  appointing  his 
p?ratS01     own  sons  to  govern  in  them.     Lastly,  it  was  he  who, 
from  a  natural  desire  to  protect  his  growing  revenues, 
sought,  as  far  as  he  was  able,  to  clear  the  sea  of  pirates. 
5-  For  in  ancient  times  both  Hellenes  and  Barbarians,  as 

well  the  inhabitants  of  the  coast  as  of  the  islands,  when 
they  began  to  find  their  way  to  one  another  by  sea  had 
recourse  to  piracy.     They  were  commanded  by  powerful 
chiefs,  who  took  this  means  of  increasing  their  wealth 
and  providing  for  their  poorer  followers.     They  would 
fall  upon  the  unwalled  and  straggling  towns,  or  rather 
villages,  which  they  plundered,  and  maintained  them- 
selves by  the  plunder  of  them  ;    for,  as  yet,  such  an 
occupation  was  held  to  be  honourable  and  not  disgrace- 
ful.    This  is  proved  by  the  practice  of  certain  tribes  on 
the  mainland  who,  to  the  present  day,  glory  in  piratical 
exploits,  and  by  the  witness  of  the  ancient  poets,  in  whose 
verses  the  question  is  invariably  asked  of  newly-arrived 
voyagers,  whether  they  are  pirates  a ;  which  implies  that 
neither  those  who  are  questioned  disclaim,  nor  those 
who  are  interested  in  knowing  censure  the  occupation. 
The  land  too  was  infested  by  robbers ;  and  there  are 
parts  of  Hellas  in  which  the  old  practices  still  continue, 
as  for  example  among  the  Ozolian  Locrians,  Aetolians, 
Acarnanians,  and  the  adjacent  regions  of  the  continent. 
The  fashion  of  wearing  arms  among  these  continental 
6.       tribes  is  a  relic  of  their  old  predatory  habits.     For  in 
tomsCwhich  ancient  times  all  Hellenes  carried  weapons  because  their 
are  still  ex-  homes  were  undefended  and  intercourse  was  unsafe  ;  like 
some  parts  the  Barbarians  they  went  armed  in  their  every-day  life. 
trVl'dress  of And  the  continuance  of  the  custom  in  certain  parts  of 
Athenians    the  country  proves  that  it  once  prevailed  everywhere. 
Spartans.        The  Athenians  were  the  first  who  laid   aside  arms 
and  adopted  an  easier  and  more  luxurious  way  of  life. 
Quite  recently  the  old-fashioned  refinement  of  dress  still 
a  Od.  iii.  73  ff. ;  ix.  252  ;  Hymn  to  Apoll.  452  ff. 


OTHER  ANCIENT  CUSTOMS.  5 

lingered,  among  the  elder  men  of  their  richer  class,  who  I. 
wore  under-garments  of  linen,  and  bound  back  their  hair 
in  a  knot  with  golden  clasps  in  the  form  of  grasshoppers  ; 
and  the  same  customs  long  survived  among  the  elders  of 
Ionia,  having  been  derived  from  their  Athenian  ancestors. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  simple  dress  which  is  now  com- 
mon was  first  worn  at  Sparta  ;  and  there,  more  than  any- 
where else,  the  life  of  the  rich  was  assimilated  to  that  of 
the  people.  The  Lacedaemonians  too  were  the  first  who 
in  their  athletic  exercises  stripped  naked  and  rubbed 
themselves  over  with  oil.  But  this  was  not  the  ancient 
custom  ;  athletes  formerly,  even  when  they  were  con- 
tending at  Olympia,  wore  girdles  about  their  loins,  a 
practice  which  lasted  until  quite  lately,  and  still  prevails 
.among  Barbarians,  especially  those  of  Asia,  where  the 
combatants  at  boxing  and  wrestling  matches  wear  girdles. 
And  many  other  customs  which  are  now  confined  to  the 
Barbarians  might  be  shown  to  have  existed  formerly  in 
Hellas. 

In  later  times,  when  navigation  had  become  general        7- 
and  wealth  was   beginning   to  accumulate,  cities  were  Fortified 

towns  begin 

built  upon  the  sea-shore  and  fortified;   peninsulas  too  to  be  built  ; 
were  occupied  and  walled-ofif  with  a  view  to  commerce  land,  after- 


and  defence  against  the  neighbouring  tribes.  But  the 
older  towns  both  in  the  islands  and  on  the  continent,  in  shore- 
order  to  protect  themselves  against  the  piracy  which  so 
long  prevailed,  were  built  inland  ;  and  there  they  remain 
to  this  day.  For  the  piratical  tribes  plundered,  not  only 
one  another,  but  all  those  who,  without  being  sailors, 
lived  on  the  sea-coast. 

The  islanders  were  even  more  addicted  to  piracy  than        8, 
the  inhabitants  of  the  mainland.      They  were  mostly  The  pirates 
Carian  or  Phoenician  settlers.     This  is  proved  by  the  Sands  of 


fact  that  when  the  Athenians  purified  Delosa  during  the 
Peloponnesian  War  and   the  tombs  of  the  dead  were  origin 
opened,   more   than   half   of    them   were   found   to   be 
Carians.     They  were   known   by  the   fashion   of  their 
a  Gp.  iii.  104  init. 


6  THE    TROJAN  EXPEDITION. 

I.       arms  which  were  buried  with  them,  and  by  thejr  mode 
of  burial,  the  same  which  is  still  practised  among  them. 

After  Minos  had  established  his  navy,  communication 
by  sea  became  more  general.  For,  he  having  expelled 
the  pirates*  when  he  colonised  the  greater  part  of  the 
islands,  the  dwellers  on  the  sea-coast  began  to  grow 
richer  and  to  live  in  a  more  settled  manner  ;  and  some 
of  them,  finding  their  wealth  increase  beyond  their  ex- 
pectations, surrounded  their  towns  with  walls.  The  love 
of  gain  made  the  weaker  willing  to  serve  the  stronger, 
b  and  the  command  of  wealth  enabled  the  more  powerful 
•  to  subjugate  the  lesser  cities  b.  This  was  the  state  of 
society  which  was  beginning  to  prevail  at  the  time  of 
the  Trojan  War. 

9.  I  am  inclined  to  think  that  Agamemnon  succeeded 

Rise  of  the  in  collecting  the  expedition,  not  because  the  suitors  of 

Pelopidae  -TT1t1l  ,       -,  ,  ,  ,  —  , 

the  wealth  Helen  had  bound  themselves  by  oath  to  Tyndareus, 
thkhTIa-  kut  because  he  was  the  most  powerful  king  of  his  time. 
herk^dfrom  °  Those  Peloponnesians  who  possess  the  most  accurate 
Atreusand  traditions  say  thatc  originally  Pelops  gained  his  power 
enabled  hTm  by  the  great  wealth  which  he  brought  with  him  from 


Asia  into  a  Poor  country,  whereby  he  was  enabled, 
TthTroUght  although  a  stranger,  to  give  his  name  to  the  Pelo- 
ponnesus ;  and  that  still  greater  fortune  attended  his 
descendants  after  the  death  of  Eurystheus,  king  of 
Mycenae,  who  was  slain  in  Attica  by  the  Heraclidae. 
For  Atreus  the  son  of  Pelops  was  the  maternal  uncle 
of  Eurystheus,  who,  when  he  went  on  the  expedition, 
naturally  committed  to  his  charge  the  kingdom  of 
Mycenae.  Now  Atreus  had  been  banished  by  his  father 
on  account  of  the  murder  of  Chrysippus.  But  Eurys- 
theus never  returned  ;  and  the  Mycenaeans,  dreading 
the  Heraclidae,  were  ready  to  welcome  Atreus,  who  was 
considered  a  powerful  man  and  had  ingratiated  himself 

*  Gp.  i.  4. 

b  Or,  'and  incited  the  more  powerful,  who  now  had  wealth  at 
their  command,  to  subjugate  the  lesser  cities.' 

c  Or,  «  Those  who  possess  the  most  accurate  traditions  respecting 
the  history  of  Peloponnesus  say  that  '  etc. 


AGAMEMNON.  7 

with  the  multitude.     So  he  succeeded  to  the  throne  of        I. 
Mycenae  and  the  other  dominions  of  Eurystheus.     Thus 
the  house  of  Pelops  prevailed  over  that  of  Perseus. 

And  it  was,  as  I  believe,  because  Agamemnon  inherited 
this  power  and  also  because  he  was  the  greatest  naval 
potentate  of  his  time  that  he  was  able  to  assemble  the 
expedition  ;  and  the  other  princes  followed  him,  not  from 
good-will,  but  from  fear.  Of  the  chiefs  who  came  to 
Troy,  he,  if  the  witness  of  Homer  be  accepted,  brought 
the  greatest  number  of  ships  himself,  besides  supplying 
the  Arcadians  with  them.  In  the  '  Handing  down  of 
the  Sceptre'  he  is  described  as  'The  king  of  many 
islands,  and  of  all  Argos  a.'  But,  living  on  the  mainland, 
he  could  not  have  ruled  over  any  except  the  adjacent 
islands  (which  would  not  be  'many')  unless  he  had 
possessed  a  considerable  navy.  From  this  expedition 
we  must  form  our  conjectures  about  the  character  of 
still  earlier  times. 

When  it  is  said  that  Mycenae  was  but  a  small  place,      10. 
or  that  any  other  city  which  existed  in  those  days  is  That  the 
inconsiderable    in  our  own,  this  argument  will   hardly  greatness  of 
prove   that   the   expedition   was    not   as   great   as   the 
poets  relate  and   as  is  commonly  imagined.     Suppose 


the  city  of  Sparta  to  be  deserted,  and  nothing  left  but  estimated 
the  temples  and  the  ground-plan,  distant  ages  would  be  appear- 
very  unwilling  to  believe  that  the  power  of  the  Lacedae-  proved 
monians  was  at  all  equal  to  their  fame.     And  yet  they 


own  two-fifths  of  the  Peloponnesus,  and  are  acknow-  of  Athens 
ledged  leaders  of  the  whole,  as  well  as  of  numerous 
allies  in  the  rest  of  Hellas.  But  their  city  is  not 
regularly  built,  and  has  no  splendid  temples  or  other 
edifices  ;  it  rather  resembles  a  straggling  village  like 
the  ancient  towns  of  Hellas,  and  would  therefore  make 
a  poor  show.  Whereas,  if  the  same  fate  befell  the 
Athenians,  the  ruins  of  Athens  would  strike  the  eye, 
and  we  should  infer  their  power  to  have  been  twice 
as  great  as  it  really  is.  We  ought  not  then  to  be  unduly 
a  II.  ii.  108. 


8  NUMBERS    OF   THE    EXPEDITION. 

I.  sceptical.  The  greatness  of  cities  should  be  estimated 
Homer's ac-  by  their  real  power  and  not  by  appearances.  And  we 
number^  ma7  fairly  suppose  the  Trojan  expedition  to  have  been 
the  forces.  greater  than  any  which  preceded  it,  although  according 
to  Homer,  if  we  may  once  more  appeal  to  his  testimony, 
not  equal  to  those  of  our  own  day.  He  was  a  poet,  and 
may  therefore  be  expected  to  exaggerate ;  yet,  even 
upon  his  showing,  the  expedition  was  comparatively 
small.  For  it  numbered,  as  he  tells  us,  twelve  hundred 
ships,  those  of  the  Boeotians  a  carrying  one  hundred  and 
twenty  men  each,  those  of  Philoctetesb  fifty;  and  by  these 
numbers  he  may  be  presumed  to  indicate  the  largest  and 
the  smallest  ships  ;  else  why  in  the  catalogue  is  nothing 
said  about  the  size  of  any  others  ?  That  the  crews  were 
all  fighting  men  as  well  as  rowers  he  clearly  implies 
when  speaking  of  the  ships  of  Philoctetes ;  for  he  tells 
us  that  all  the  oarsmen  were  likewise  archers.  And  it 
is  not  to  be  supposed  that  many  who  were  not  sailors 
would  accompany  the  expedition,  except  the  kings  and 
principal  officers  ;  for  the  troops  had  to  cross  the  sea, 
bringing  with  them  the  materials  of  war,  in  vessels  with- 
out decks,  built  after  the  old  piratical  fashion.  Now  if 
we  take  a  mean  between  the  crews,  the  invading  forces 
will  appear  not  to  have  been  very  numerous  when  we  re- 
member that  they  were  drawn  from  the  whole  of  Hellas. 
1 1 .  The  cause  of  the  inferiority  was  not  so  much  the  want 

Considera-  of  men  as  the  want  of  money;  the  invading  army  was 
specting  the  limited  by  the  difficulty  of  obtaining  supplies  to  such  a 
War?11  number  as  might  be  expected  to  live  on  the  country  in 
which  they  were  to  fight.  After  their  arrival  at  Troy, 
when  they  had  won  a  battle  (as  they  clearly  did,  for 
otherwise  they  could  not  have  fortified  their  camp),  even 
then  they  appear  not  to  have  used  the  whole  of  their 
force,  but  to  have  been  driven  by  want  of  provisions  to 
the  cultivation  of  the  Chersonese  and  to  pillage.  And  in 
consequence  of  this  dispersion  of  their  forces,  the  Trojans 
were  enabled  to  hold  out  against  them  during  the  whole 

a  II.  ii.  509>5io.  b  II.  ii.  719,720. 


RETURN  OF   THE   HERACLIDAE.  9 

ten  years,  being  always  a  match  for  those  who  remained  I. 
on  the  spot.  Whereas  if  the  besieging  army  had  brought 
abundant  supplies,  and,  instead  of  betaking  themselves 
to  agriculture  or  pillage,  had  carried  on  the  war  per- 
sistently with  all  their  forces,  they  would  easily  have 
been  masters  of  the  field  and  have  taken  the  city; 
since,  even  divided  as  they  were,  and  with  only  a  part  of 
their  army  available  at  any  one  time,  they  held  their 
ground.  Or,  again,  they  might  have  regularly  invested 
Troy,  and  the  place  would  have  been  captured  in  less 
time  and  with  less  trouble.  Poverty  was  the  real  reason 
why  the  achievements  of  former  ages  were  insignificant, 
and  why  the  Trojan  War,  the  most  celebrated  of  them  all, 
when  brought  to  the  test  of  facts,  falls  short  of  its  fame 
and  of  the  prevailing  traditions  to  which  the  poets  have 
given  authority. 

Even   in  the  age   which   followed   the   Trojan  War,      12. 
Hellas  was  still  in  process  of  ferment  and  settlement,  Southward 

tit  •  f  c   i  ^i         -T-i  .movement 

and  had  no  time  for  peaceful  growth.     The  return  of  in  Hellas 


the  Hellenes  from  Troy  after  their  long  absence  led  to  T 
many  changes  :  quarrels  too  arose  in  nearly  every  city,  J 
and  those  who  were  expelled  by  them  went  and  founded  scend  out  of 
other  cities.     Thus  in  the  sixtieth  year  after  the  fall  of  Dorian  oc- 
Troy,  the  Boeotian  people,  having  been  expelled  from  th<fpeio-0 
Arne  by  the  Thessalians,  settled  in  the  country  formerly  C 


called  Cadmeis,  but  now  Boeotia  :  a  portion  of  the  tribe  Dorian 
already  dwelt  there,  and  some  of  these  had  joined  in  the 
Trojan  expedition.  In  the  eightieth  year  after  the  war, 
the  Dorians  led  by  the  Heraclidae  conquered  the  Pelo- 
ponnesus. A  considerable  time  elapsed  before  Hellas 
became  finally  settled  ;  after  a  while,  however,  she  re- 
covered tranquillity  and  began  to  send  out  colonies. 
The  Athenians  colonised  Ionia  and  most  of  the  islands  ; 
the  Peloponnesians  the  greater  part  of  Italy  and  Sicily, 
and  various  places  in  Hellas.  These  colonies  were  all 
founded  after  the  Trojan  War. 

As  Hellas  grew  more  powerful  and  the  acquisition  of 
wealth  became  more  and  more  rapid,  the  revenues  of  her  navies  in 


10  CORINTHIAN  AND    OTHER    NAVIES. 

I.  cities  increased,  and  in  most   of  them  tyrannies  were 

Hellas  :  established  ;  they  had  hitherto  been  ruled  by  hereditary 

Corcyra',  kings,  having  fixed  prerogatives.     The  Hellenes  likewise 

Same's,  began  to  build  navies  and  to  make  the  sea  their  element. 


Phocaea.     'pj^  Corinthians  are  said  to  have  first  adopted  something 
like  the  modern  style  of  ship-building,  and  the  oldest 
Hellenic  triremes  to  have  been  constructed  at  Corinth. 
A  Corinthian  ship-builder,  Ameinocles,  appears  to  have 
built  four  ships  for  the    Samians  ;  he  went  to   Samos 
about  three  hundred  years  before  the  end  of  the  Pelo-  B.C.  704. 
ponnesian  War.     And  the  earliest  naval  engagement  on 
record  is  that  between  the  Corinthians  and  Corcyraeans 
which  occurred  about  forty  years  later.     Corinth,  being  B.C.  664. 
seated  on  an  isthmus,  was   naturally  from  the  first  a 
centre  of  commerce  ;  for  the  Hellenes  within  and  with- 
out the  Peloponnese  in  the  old  days,  when  they  commu- 
nicated chiefly  by  land,  had  to  pass  through  her  territory 
in  order  to  reach  one  another.     Her  wealth  too  was  a 
source  of  power,  as  the  ancient  poets  testify,  who  speak 
of  'Corinth  the  richa.'    When  navigation  grew  more  com- 
mon, the  Corinthians,  having  already  acquired  a  fleet, 
were  able  to  put  down  piracy;   they  offered  a  market 
both  by  sea  and  land,  and  with  the  increase  of  riches 
the  power  of  their  city  increased  yet  more.     Later,  in  the  B.C.  559- 
time  of  Cyrus,  the  first  Persian  king,  and  of  Cambyses  oi9  55,  2- 
his  son,  the  lonians  had  a  large  navy;  they  fought  with  ^ 
Cyrus,  and  were  for  a  time  masters  of  the  sea  around  521. 
their  own  coasts.     Poly  crates,  too,  who  was  tyrant  of  64>'  4*'  ' 
Samos  in  the  reign  of  Cambyses,  had  a  powerful  navy  RC-  546- 
and  subdued  several  of  the  islands,  among  them  Rhenea,  QL  58,  3- 
which  he  dedicated  to  the  Delian  Apollo  b.     And  the60'3' 
Phocaeans,  when  they  were  colonising  Massalia,  defeated  B.C.  600. 
the  Carthaginians  in  a  sea-fight. 

J4-  These  were  the  most  powerful  navies,  and  even  these, 

friremel°f  which  came  into  existence  many  generations  after  the 
oHheAthe  TroJan  War>  aPPear  to  have  consisted  chiefly  of  fifty- 
nian  and  oared  vessels  and  galleys  of  war,  as  in  the  days  of  Troy  ; 

Aeginetan 

a  II.  ii.  570.  b  Cp.  iii.  104  init. 


WAR   BETWEEN   CHALCIS   AND    ERETRIA.     n 

as  yet  triremes  were  not  common.  But  a  little  before  I. 
•C.  485-  the  Persian  War  and  the  death  of  Darius,  who  succeeded 
Cambyses,  the  Sicilian  tyrants  and  the  Corcyraeans 
had  them  in  considerable  numbers.  No  other  maritime 
powers  of  any  consequence  arose  in  Hellas  before  the 
expedition  of  Xerxes.  The  Aeginetans,  Athenians,  and 
a  few  more  had  small  fleets,  and  these  mostly  consisted 
of  fifty-oared  galleys.  aEven  the  ships  which  the 
Athenians  built  quite  recently  at  the  instigation  of 
Themistocles,  when  they  were  at  war  with  the  Aegine- 
tans and  in  expectation  of  the  Barbarian,  even  these 
ships  with  which  they  fought  at  Salamis  were  not  com- 
pletely decked  a. 

So  inconsiderable  were  the  Hellenic  navies  in  recent      15. 
as  well  as  in  more  ancient  times.     And  yet  those  who  The  chief 

1-11.  .  i       '        i  power  of 

applied  their  energies  to  the  sea  obtained  a  great  acces-  Hellas 


sion  of  strength  by  the  increase  of  their  revenues  and 
the  extension  of  their  dominion.  For  they  attacked 
and  subjugated  the  islands,  especially  when  the  pressure 
of  population  was  felt  by  them.  Whereas  by  land,  no 
conflict  of  any  kind  which  brought  increase  of  power 
ever  occurred  ;  what  wars  they  had  were  mere  border 
feuds.  Foreign  and  distant  expeditions  of  conquest  the 
Hellenes  never  undertook  ;  they  were  not  as  yet  ranged 
under  the  command  of  the  great  states,  nor  did  they 
form  voluntary  leagues  or  make  expeditions  on  an  equal 
footing.  Their  wars  were  only  the  wars  of  the  several 
neighbouring  tribes  with  one  another.  It  was  in  the 
ancient  conflict  between  the  Chalcidians  and  the  Ere- 
trians  that  the  rest  of  Hellas  was  most  divided  and  took 
the  greatest  part  b. 

There  were  different  impediments  to  the  progress  of      1  6. 

the  different  states.     The    lonians  had   attained    great  impedi- 

ments to 
prosperity  when  Cyrus  and  the  Persians,  having  over-  progress  : 

a  Or,  '  It  was  quite  at  a  recent  period,  when  the  Athenians  were 
at  war  with  the  Aeginetans  and  in  expectation  of  the  Barbarian,  that 
Themistocles  persuaded  them  to  build  the  ships  with  which  they 
fought  at  Salamis  ;  and  even  these  were  not  completely  decked.' 

b  Herod,  v.  99. 


12  OVERTHROW  OF   THE    TYRANTS. 

I.        thrown  Croesus  and  subdued  the  countries  between  the  B.C.  546. 

(1)  The       river  Halys  and  the  sea,  made  war  against  them  and 
nsmgpo'  er  ensjavecj  the  citjes  on  faQ  mainland.     Some  time  after-  B.C.  493. 
Persians.     ^^^  Darius,  strong  in  the  possession  of  the  Phoenician 

fleet,  conquered  the  islands  also. 

17.  Nor  again  did  the  tyrants  of  the  Hellenic  cities  ex- 

(2)  The       tend  their  thoughts  beyond  their  own  interest,  that  is, 
andycrims   the  security  of  their  persons,  and  the  aggrandisement 
{JTres  of  "the  of  themselves  and  their  families.     They  were  extremely 
tyrants.       cautious  in  the  administration  of  their  government,  and 

nothing  considerable  was  ever  effected  by  them ;  they 
only  fought  with  their  neighbours,  as  in  Sicily,  where 
their  power  attained  its  greatest  height.  Thus  for  a 
long  time  everything  conspired  to  prevent  Hellas  from 
uniting  in  any  great  action  and  to  paralyse  enterprise 
in  the  individual  states. 

1 8.  At  length  the  tyrants  of  Athens  and  of  the  rest  of  B.C.  510. 
They  were    Hellas  (which  had  been  under  their  dominion  long  before 
overthrown  Athens),  at  least  the  greater  number  of  them,  and  with 
which'for'   ^e  exception  of  the  Sicilian  the  last  who   ever  ruled, 
d°redhears   were  Put  down  by  the  Lacedaemonians.     For  although 

has  been      Lacedaemon,  after  the  conquest a  of  the  country  by  the 
governed.     Dorians  who  now  inhabit  it,   remained  long  unsettled, 
and  indeed  longer  than  any  country  which  we  know, 
nevertheless  she  obtained  good  laws  at  an  earlier  period 
than  any  other,  and  has  never  been  subject  to  tyrants ; 
she  has  preserved  the   same   form   of   government  for 
rather  more  than  four  hundred  years,  reckoning  to  the  B.C.  804- 
end  of  the  Peloponnesian  War.    It  was  the  excellence  of  o!4'q5 
her  constitution  which  gave  her  power,  and  thus  enabled 
her  to  regulate  the  affairs  of  other  states.    Not  long  after 
the  overthrow  of  the  tyrants  by  the  Lacedaemonians,  the 
battle  of  Marathon  was  fought  between  the  Athenians  B.C.  490. 
and  the  Persians  ;  ten  years  later,  the  Barbarian  returned  OL  72>  3< 
with  the  vast  armament  which  was  to  enslave  Hellas,  oi.  75. 
In  the  greatness  of  the  impending  danger,  the  Lacedae- 
monians, who  were  the  most  powerful  state  in  Hellas, 
a  Reading 


THE   PERSIAN  WAR.  13    ' 

assumed  the  lead  of  the  confederates.     The  Athenians,        I. 

as  the  Persian  host  advanced,  resolved  to  forsake  their  The  Hel- 

lenes, who 
city,  broke  up  their  homes,  and,  taking  to  their  ships,  had  been 

became  sailors.     The  Barbarian  was  repelled  by  a  com-  resisting  the 
mon  effort;  but  soon  the  Hellenes,  aas  well  those  who  j^broke 
had  revolted  from  the  King  as  those  who  formed  the  UP  into  two 

.  confedera- 

origmal  confederacy  a,  took  different  sides  and  became  cies. 
the  allies,  either  of  the  Athenians  or  of  the  Lacedae- 
monians ;  for  these  were  now  the  two  leading  powers, 
the  one  strong  by  land  and  the  other  by  sea.  The 
league  between  them  was  of  short  duration  ;  they 
speedily  quarrelled  and,  with  their  respective  allies, 
went  to  war.  Any  of  the  other  Hellenes  who  had 
differences  of  their  own  now  resorted  to  one  or  other 
of  them.  So  that  from  the  Persian  to  the  Peloponnesian 
War,  the  Lacedaemonians  and  the  Athenians  were  per- 
petually fighting  or  making  peace,  either  with  one  another 
or  with  their  own  revolted  allies  ;  thus  they  attained  mili- 
tary efficiency,  and  learned  experience  in  the  school  of 
danger. 

The    Lacedaemonians   did    not    make    tributaries   of      19- 
those    who    acknowledged    their    leadership,   but    took 


care  that   they  should   be   governed   by  oligarchies   inoftheAthe- 

,'.'..  ,-,  r^,    '  nian  and 

the   exclusive   interest  of  Sparta.     The   Athenians,  on  Spartan 


the  other  hand,  after  a  time  deprived  the  subject  cities 
of  their  ships  and  made  all  of  them  pay  a  fixed  tri- 
bute, except  Chios  and  Lesbos  b.  And  the  single  power 
cof  Athens0  at  the  beginning  of  this  war  was  greater 
than  that  of  Athens  and  Sparta  together  at  their  great- 
est, while  the  confederacy  remained  intact. 

Such  are  the  results  of  my  enquiry  into  the  early  state       20. 
of  Hellas.     d  They  will  not  readily  be  believed  upon  a  Vulgar 

errors. 

a  Or,  'as  well  those  who  had  revolted  from  the  King,  as  those  who 
had  joined  with  him,' 

b  Cp.  i.  96,  99;  iii.  39  init.  ;  vi.  85  med.  ;  vii.  57  init. 

c  Or,  '  either  of  Athens  or  Sparta.' 

d  Or  (i),  'They  may  not  obtain  entire  credit,  even  when  the 
proofs  of  them  are  all  set  down  in  order.'  Or  (2),  taking  re/e/z^piw 
immediately  after  TrioreGorat  :  '  Such  are  the  results  of  my  enquiries, 


14  EMENDATIONS    OF  HISTORY. 

I.  bare  recital  of  all  the  proofs  of  themd.  Men  do  not  dis- 
criminate, and  are  too  ready  to  receive  ancient  traditions 
about  their  own  as  well  as  about  other  countries.  For 
example,  most  Athenians  think  that  Hipparchus  was 
actually  tyrant  when  he  was  slain  by  Harmodius  and  B.C.  514. 
Aristogeiton  ;  they  are  not  aware  that  Hippias  was  the 
eldest  of  the  sons  of  Peisistratus,  and  succeeded  him,  and 
that  Hipparchus  and  Thessalus  were  only  his  brothers  a. 
At  the  last  moment,  Harmodius  and  Aristogeiton  sud- 
denly suspected  that  Hippias  had  been  forewarned  by 
some  of  their  accomplices.  They  therefore  abstained 
from  attacking  him,  but,  wishing  to  do  something  before 
they  were  seized,  and  not  to  risk  their  lives  in  vain,  they 
slew  Hipparchus,  with  whom  they  fell  in  near  the  temple 
called  Leocorium  as  he  was  marshalling  the  Panathenaic 
procession.  There  are  many  other  matters,  not  obscured 
by  time,  but  contemporary,  about  which  the  other 
Hellenes  are  equally  mistaken.  For  example,  they 
imagine  that  the  kings  of  Lacedaemon  in  their  council 
have  not  one  but  two  votes  each  b,  and  that  in  the  army 
of  the  Lacedaemonians  there  is  a  division  called  the 
Pitanate  division  c  ;  whereas  they  never  had  anything  of 
the  sort.  So  little  trouble  do  men  take  in  the  search 
after  truth  ;  so  readily  do  they  accept  whatever  comes 
first  to  hand. 

2  1.          Yet  any  one  who  upon  the  grounds  which  I  have  given 
Uncertainty  arrives  at  some  such  conclusion  as  my  own  about  those 

of  early  J 

history.       ancient  times,  would  not  be  far  wrong.     He  must  not  be 
maTed  by     misled  by  the  exaggerated  fancies  of  the  poets,  or  by  the 


iat  tales  of  chroniclers  who  seek  to  please  the  ear  rather 
greaterthan  than  to  speak  the  truth.    Their  accounts  cannot  be  tested 

any  preced-  . 

ing  war.  by  him  ;  and  most  of  the  facts  in  the  lapse  of  ages  have 
passed  into  the  region  of  romance.  At  such  a  distance 
of  time  he  must  make  up  his  mind  to  be  satisfied  with 

though  the  early  history  of  Hellas  is  of  a  kind  which  forbids  im- 
plicit reliance  on  every  particular  of  the  evidence.'  Or  (3),  '  It  is 
difficult  to  set  down  all  the  proofs  in  order,  so  as  to  make  the 
account  credible.' 

a  Cp.  vi.  54  seqq.  b  Herod,  vi.  57.  c  Herod,  ix.  53. 


TRUTHFULNESS  OF  HIS  OWN  NARRATIVE.    15 

conclusions  resting  upon  the  clearest  evidence  which  can  I. 
be  had.  And,  though  men  will  always  judge  any  war  in 
which  they  are  actually  fighting  to  be  the  greatest  at  the 
time,  but,  after  it  is  over,  revert  to  their  admiration  of 
some  other  which  has  preceded,  still  the  Peloponnesian, 
if  estimated  by  the  actual  facts,  will  certainly  prove  to 
have  been  the  greatest  ever  known. 

As  to  the  speeches  which  were  made  either  before  or       22. 
during  the  war,  it  was  hard  for  me,  and  for  others  who  The 
reported  them  to  me,  to  recollect  the  exact  words.    I  have  could  not 
therefore  put  into  the  mouth  of  each  speaker  the  senti-  reported.7 


ments  proper  to  the  occasion,  expressed  as  I  thought  he 
would  be  likely  to  express  them,  while  at  the  same  time  ascertain 

the  truth 

I  endeavoured,  as  nearly  as  I  could,  to  give  the  general  about 
purport  of  what  was  actually  said.  Of  the  events  of  the 
war  I  have  not  ventured  to  speak  from  any  chance  infor- 
mation, nor  according  to  any  notion  of  my  own  ;  I  have 
described  nothing  but  what  I  either  saw  myself,  or  learned 
from  others  of  whom  I  made  the  most  careful  and  par- 
ticular enquiry.  The  task  was  a  laborious  one,  because 
eye-witnesses  of  the  same  occurrences  gave  different 
accounts  of  them,  as  they  remembered  or  were  interested 
in  the  actions  of  one  side  or  the  other.  And  very  likely 
the  strictly  historical  character  of  my  narrative  may  be 
disappointing  to  the  ear.  But  if  he  who  desires  to  have 
before  his  eyes  a  true  picture  of  the  events  which  have 
happened,  and  of  the  like  events  which  may  be  expected 
to  happen  hereafter  in  the  order  of  human  things,  shall 
pronounce  what  I  have  written  to  be  useful,  then  I  shall 
be  satisfied.  My  history  is  an  everlasting  possession,  not 
a  prize  composition  which  is  heard  and  forgotten. 

The  greatest  achievement  of  former  times  was   the       23. 
Persian  War  ;  yet  even  this  was  speedily  decided  in  two  Length  of 

the  war, 

battles  by  sea  and  two  by  land.     But  the  Peloponnesian  which  was 
War  was  a  protracted  struggle,  and  attended  by  calami-  aborts  ofX 
ties  such  as  Hellas  had  never  known  within  a  like  period  JjJjjJUJJif8' 
of  time.     Never  were  so  many  cities  captured  and  de-  and.  extra- 
populated  —  some    by   Barbarians,   others   by   Hellenes  Among  the 


i6 


CAUSES    OF  THE   WAR. 


I. 

latter  might 
be  enume- 
rated earth- 
quakes, 
eclipses, 
droughts, 
and  lastly, 
the  plague. 


24. 

The  story 
of  Epi- 
damnus. 
Civil  strife 
and  war 
with  the 
barbarians. 


themselves  fighting  against  one  another ;  and  several  of 
them  after  their  capture  were  repeopled  by  strangers. 
Never  were  exile  and  slaughter  more  frequent,  whether 
in  the  war  or  brought  about  by  civil  strife.  And  rumours, 
of  which  the  like  had  often  been  current  before,  but  rarely 
verified  by  fact,  now  appeared  to  be  well  grounded. 
There  were  earthquakes  unparalleled  in  their  extent  and 
fury,  and  eclipses  of  the  sun  more  numerous  than  are  re- 
corded to  have  happened  in  any  former  age  ;  there  were 
also  in  some  places  great  droughts  causing  famines,  and 
lastly  the  plague  which  did  immense  harm  and  destroyed 
numbers  of  the  people.  All  these  calamities  fell  upon 
Hellas  simultaneously  with  the  war,  which  began  when 
the  Athenians  and  Peloponnesians  violated  the  thirty 
years'  truce  concluded  by  them  after  the  recapture  of 
Euboea  a.  Why  they  broke  it  and  what  were  the  grounds 
of  quarrel  I  will  first  set  forth,  that  in  time  to  come  no 
man  may  be  at  a  loss  to  know  what  was  the  origin  of 
this  great  war.  The  real  though  unavowed  cause  I  believe 
to  have  been  the  growth  of  the  Athenian  power,  which 
terrified  the  Lacedaemonians  and  forced  them  into  war ; 
but  the  reasons  publicly  alleged  on  either  side  were  as 
follows. 

The  city  of  Epidamnus  is  situated  on  the  right  hand 
as  you  sail  up  the  Ionian  Gulf.  Near  it  dwelt  the 
Taulantians,  a  barbarian  tribe  of  the  Illyrian  race.  The 
place  was  colonised  by  the  Corcyraeans,  but  under  the 
leadership  of  a  Corinthian,  Phalius,  son  of  Eratocleides, 
who  was  of  the  lineage  of  Heracles ;  he  was  invited, 
according  to  ancient  custom,  from  the  mother  city,  and 
Corinthians  and  other  Dorians  joined  in  the  colony.  In 
process  of  time  Epidamnus  became  great  and  populous, 
but  there  followed  a  long  period  of  civil  commotion,  and 
the  city  is  said  to  have  been  brought  low  in  a  war  against 
the  neighbouring  barbarians,  and  to  have  lost  her  ancient 
power.  At  last,  shortly  before  the  Peloponnesian  War, 
the  notables  were  overthrown  and  driven  out  by  the 
a  Cp,  i.  115,  146. 


THE   EPIDAMNIANS  AT  CORINTH.  17 

B.C.  435  or  people ;    the  exiles  went  over   to  the  barbarians,  and,        I. 

O3i?86,  2  or  uniting  with  them,  plundered  the  remaining  inhabitants 

both  by  sea  and  land.     These,  rinding  themselves  hard  The  prayer 
pressed,  sent  an  embassy  to  the  mother-city  Corcyra,  damnians 
begging  the  Corcyraeans   not  to  leave  them   to   their  Jrr^eSed 
fate,  but  to  reconcile  them  to  the  exiles  and  put  down  by  lj|eir  . 

mother-city 

their  barbarian  enemies.  The  ambassadors  came,  and  Corcyra. 
sitting  as  suppliants  in  the  temple  of  Here  preferred 
their  request;  but  the  Corcyraeans  would  not  listen  to 
them,  and  they  returned  without  success.  The  Epidam-  25. 
nians,  finding  that  they  had  no  hope  of  assistance  from 
Corcyra,  knew  not  what  to  do,  and  sending  to  Delphi 
enquired  of  the  God  whether  they  should  deliver  up  the 
city  to  their  original  founders,  the  Corinthians,  and  en- 
deavour to  obtain  aid  from  them.  The  God  replied 
that  they  should,  and  bade  them  place  themselves  under 
the  leadership  of  the  Corinthians.  So  the  Epidam-  They  place 
nians  went  to  Corinth,  and  informing  the  Corinthians  under  the 
of  the  answer  which  the  oracle  had  given,  delivered 
up  the  city  to  them.  They  reminded  them  that  the 
original  leader  of  the  colony  was  a  citizen  of  Corinth; 
and  implored  the  Corinthians  to  come  and  help  them, 
and  not  leave  them  to  their  fate.  The  Corinthians 
took  up  their  cause,  partly  in  vindication  of  their  own 
rights  (for  they  considered  that  Epidamnus  belonged 
to  them  quite  as  much  as  to  the  Corcyraeans),  partly 
too  because  they  hated  the  Corcyraeans,  who  were 
their  own  colony  but  slighted  them.  In  their  common 
festivals  they  would  not  allow  them  the  customary  privi- 
leges of  founders,  and  at  their  sacrifices  denied  to  a 
Corinthian  the  right  of  receiving  first  the  lock  of  hair  cut 
from  the  head  of  the  victim,  an  honour  usually  granted 
by  colonies  to  a  representative  of  the  mother-country. 
In  fact  they  despised  the  Corinthians,  for  they  were  more 
than  a  match  for  them  in  military  strength,  and  as  rich 
as  any  state  then  existing  in  Hellas.  They  would  often 
boast  that  on  the  sea  they  were  very  far  superior  to 
them,  and  would  appropriate  to  themselves  the  naval 

C 


1 8  SIEGE    OF  EPIDAMNUS. 

I.       renown   of  the  Phaeacians,  who  were  the   ancient  in-  B.C.  435  o 
habitants  of  the  island.     Such  feelings  led  them  more  o3!4  86,  2  o 
and  more  to  strengthen  their  navy,  which  was  by  no  3> 
means  despicable ;  for  they  had  a  hundred  and  twenty 
triremes  when  the  war  broke  out. 

26.  Irritated  by  these  causes  of  offence,  the  Corinthians 
The  Cori^j  were  too  happy  to  assist  Epidamnus ;  accordingly  they 
troops  and  invited  any  one  who  was  willing  to  settle  there,  and  for 
Epidamnus.  the  protection  of  the  colonists  dispatched  with  them  Am- 
raeans°dey~  bracian  and  Leucadian  troops  and  a  force  of  their  own. 
mand  their  All  these  they  sent  by  land  as  far  as  Apollonia,  which 

dismissal ; 

on  being     is  a  colony  of  theirs,  fearing  that  if  they  went  by  sea 

refused  they 

besiege  the  the  Corcyraeans  might  oppose  their  passage.  Great  was 
the  rage  of  the  Corcyraeans  when  they  discovered  that 
the  settlers  and  the  troops  had  entered  Epidamnus  and 
that  the  colony  had  been  given  up  to  the  Corinthians. 
They  immediately  set  sail  with  five  and  twenty  ships, 
followed  by  a  second  fleet,  and  in  insulting  terms  bade 
the  Epidamnians  receive  the  exiled  oligarchs,  who  had 
gone  to  Corcyra  and  implored  the  Corcyraeans  to  re- 
store them,  appealing  to  the  tie  of  kindred  and  pointing 
to  the  sepulchres  of  their  common  ancestors*.  They  also 
bade  them  send  away  the  troops  and  the  new  settlers. 
But  the  Epidamnians  would  not  listen  to  their  demands. 
Whereupon  the  Corcyraeans  attacked  them  with  forty 
ships.  They  were  accompanied  by  the  exiles  whom  they 
were  to  restore,  and  had  the  assistance  of  the  native  II- 
lyrian  troops.  They  sat  down  before  the  city,  and  made 
proclamation  that  any  Epidamnian  who  chose,  and  the 
foreigners,  might  depart  in  safety,  but  that  all  who  re- 
mained would  be  treated  as  enemies.  Being  met  by  a 
refusal,  the  Corcyraeans  proceeded  to  invest  the  city, 
which  is  built  upon  an  isthmus. 

27.  When  the  news  reached  the  Corinthians   that  Epi- 
The^Corm-  damnus    was    besieged,    they   equipped    an    army   arid 
pare  for  war  proclaimed  that  a  colony  was  to  be  sent  thither;   all 
claim T"      who  wished  might  go  and  enjoy  equal  rights  of  citizen- 

a  Cp.  iii.  58  med.,  59  init. 


EMBASSY  FROM   CORCYRA    TO    CORINTH.     19 

RC.  435  or  ship  ;  but  any  one  who  was  unwilling  to  sail  at  once        I. 
SL  86  2  or  might  remain  at  Corinth,  and,  if  he  made  a  deposit  of  colony  to 

Epidamnus. 

fifty  Corinthian  drachmae,  might  still  have  a  share  in  Megara 
the  colony  a.      Many  sailed,  and    many  deposited   the  friendly 


money.  The  Corinthians  also  sent  and  requested  the 
Megarians  to  furnish  them  with  a  convoy  in  case  the  convoy. 
Corcyraeans  should  intercept  the  colonists  on  their 
voyage.  The  Megarians  accordingly  provided  eight 
ships,  and  the  Cephallenians  of  Pale  four  ;  the  Epi- 
daurians,  of  whom  they  made  a  similar  request,  five  ; 
the  Hermionians  one  ;  the  Troezenians  two  ;  the  Leu- 
cadians  ten  ;  and  the  Ambraciots  eight.  Of  the  Thebans 
and  Phliasians  they  begged  money,  and  of  the  Eleans 
money,  and  ships  without  crews.  On  their  own  account 
they  equipped  thirty  ships  and  three  thousand  hoplites. 

When  the  Corcyraeans   heard  of  their  preparations      28. 
they  came  to  Corinth,  taking  with  them  Lacedaemonian  The  Cor- 
and  Sicyonian  envoys,  and  summoned  the  Corinthians  propose  ar- 
to  withdraw  the  troops  and  the  colonists,  telling  them  offering1' 
that  they  had  nothing  to  do  with  Epidamnus.     If  they 


made  any  claim  to  it,  the  Corcyraeans  expressed  them-  given  to 

J  withdraw 

selves  willing  to  refer  the  cause  for  arbitration  to  such  their  troops 
Peloponnesian  states  as  both  parties  should  agree  upon, 
and  their  decision  was  to  be  final  ;  or,  they  were  willing 
to  leave  the  matter  in  the  hands  of  the  Delphian  oracle.  bot.h  to  re- 
But  they  deprecated  war,  and  declared  that,  if  war  there  Epidamnus 
must  be,  they  would  be  compelled  by  the  Corinthians 
in  self-defence  to  discard  their  present  friends  and  seek 
others  whom  they  would  rather  not,  for  help  they  must 
have.  The  Corinthians  replied  that  if  the  Corcyraeans 
would  withdraw  the  ships  and  the  barbarian  troops  they 
would  consider  the  matter,  but  that  it  would  not  do  for 
them  to  be  litigating  while  Epidamnus  and  the  colonists 
were  in  a  state  of  siege.  The  Corcyraeans  rejoined  that 
they  would  consent  to  this  proposal  if  the  Corinthians  on 

a  Fifty  Corinthian  drachmae  are  equivalent  to  eighty-three  Attic 
drachmae:  reckoning  the  Attic  drachma  at  9!^.,  the  sum  would 
amount  to  3/.  js.  6d. 

C  Z 


20  CAPTURE    OF  EPIDAMNUS. 

I.        their  part  would  withdraw  their  forces  from  Epidamnus  :  B.C.  435  or 
a  or  again,  they  were  willing  that  both  parties  should  01.  86,  2  or 
remain  a  on  the  spot,  and  that  a  truce  should  be  made  3' 
until  the  decision  was  given. 

29-  The  Corinthians  turned  a  deaf  ear  to  all  these  over- 
twans're-n"  tures'  anc^j  when  their  vessels  were  manned  and  their 
fuse,  and  allies  had  arrived,  they  sent  a  herald  before  them  to 

declare  war.  ••«•»»•« 

Sailing  to     declare  war,  and  set  sail  for  Epidamnus  with  seventy- 
theyare™13  ^ve  ships  and  two  thousand  hoplites,  intending  to  give 
Stacked  by  battle  to  the  Corcyraeans.     Their  fleet  was  commanded 
the^Corcy-  by  Aristeus  the  son  of  Pellichus,  Calibrates  the  son  of 
completely  Callias,  and  Timanor  the  son  of  Timanthes  ;  the  land 
forces  by  Archetimus  the  son  of  Eurytimus,  and  Isarchi- 
das  the  son  of  Isarchus.     When  they  arrived  at  Actium 
surrenders.  jn   the  territory  of  Anactorium,  at  the  mouth  of  the 
Ambracian  gulf,  where   the   temple   of  Apollo  stands, 
the  Corcyraeans  sent  a  herald  to  them  in  a  small  boat 
forbidding  them  to  come  on.     Meanwhile  their  crews 
got  on  board  ;  they  had  previously  equipped  their  fleet, 
strengthening  the  old  ships  with  cross-timbers,  so  as  to 
make  them  serviceable.     The  herald  brought  back  no 
message  of  peace  from  the  Corinthians.    The  Corcyraean 
ships,  numbering  eighty  (for  forty  out  of  the  hundred 
and  twenty  were  engaged  in  the  blockade  of  Epidamnus), 
were  now  fully  manned  ;   these  sailed  out  against  the 
Corinthians  and,  forming  line,  fought  and  won  a  complete 
victory  over  them,  and  destroyed  fifteen  of  their  ships. 
On  the  very  same  day  the  forces  besieging  Epidamnus 
succeeded  in  compelling  the  city  to  capitulate,  the  terms 
being  that  the  Corinthians  until  their  fate  was  deter- 
mined should  be  imprisoned  and  the  strangers  sold. 
3°-          After  the  sea-fight  the  Corcyraeans  raised  a  trophy 
on  Leucimme,  a   promontory  of  Corcyra,  and  put  to 


having  com-  death    all    their   prisoners    with   the    exception  of  the 

mand  of  the 

sea,  plunder  Corinthians,  whom  they  kept  in  chains.     The  defeated 
Corinth.5     Corinthians  and  their  allies  then  returned  home,  and 

a  Or,  l  or  again,  they  would  agree  to  arbitration  on  the  condition 
that  both  parties  should  remain  '  etc. 


CORINTHIAN  AND  CORCYRAEAN  EMBASSIES.  21 

B.C.  435  or  the  Corcyraeans  (who  were  now  masters  of  the  Ionian        I. 
S4  86,  2  or  sea)}  sailing  to  Leucas,  a  Corinthian  colony,  devastated  At  length 
the    country.     They    also    burnt    Cyllene,    where    the  thians  form 


Eleans  had  their  docks,  because  they  had  supplied  the 
Corinthians  with  money  and  ships.  And,  during  the 
greater  part  of  the  summer  after  the  battle,  they  retained 
the  command  of  the  sea  and  sailed  about  plundering  the 
allies  of  the  Corinthians.  But,  before  the  season  was 
over,  the  Corinthians,  perceiving  that  their  allies  were 
suffering,  sent  out  a  fleet  and  formed  a  camp  at  Actium 
and  near  the  promontory  of  Cheimerium  in  Thesprotia, 
that  they  might  protect  Leucas  and  other  friendly  places. 
The  Corcyraeans  with  their  fleet  and  army  stationed 
themselves  on  the  opposite  coast  at  Leucimme.  Neither 
party  attacked  the  other,  but  during  the  remainder  of 
the  summer  they  maintained  their  respective  positions, 
and  at  the  approach  of  winter  returned  home. 

B.C.  434,         For  the  whole  year  after  the  battle,  and  for  a  year      31 
01386,  3,  4.  after  that,  the  Corinthians,  exasperated  by  their  defeat, 

were  busy  in  building  ships.     They  took  the  utmost  pare  to 

,  renew  the 

pains   to  create   a  great  navy  :    rowers  were  collected  war,  and 
from  the  Peloponnesus  and  from  the  rest  of  Hellas  by  Scans  riny~ 
the  attraction  of  pay.     The  Corcyraeans  were  alarmed  jjjfj^^? 
at  the  report  of  their  preparations.     They  reflected  that  to  Athens, 

I  they  had  not  enrolled  themselves  in  the  league  either  of  they  are 

the  Athenians  or  of  the  Lacedaemonians,  and  that  allies  Corinthian7 
in  Hellas  they  had  none.      They  determined  to  go  to  env°ys- 
Athens,  join  the  Athenian  alliance,  and  get  what  help 
they  could  from  them.   The  Corinthians,  hearing  of  their 
intentions,  also  sent  ambassadors  to  Athens,  fearing  lest 
the  combination  of  the  Athenian  and  Corcyraean  navies 
might  prevent  them  from  bringing  the  war  to  a  satisfac- 
B.c.  433.     tory  termination.     Accordingly  an  assembly  was  held  at 
which  both  parties  came  forward  to  plead  their  respective 
causes  ;  and  first  the  Corcyraeans  spoke  as  follows  :  — 

'Men  of  Athens,  those  who,  like  ourselves,  come  to      32. 
others  who  are  not  their  allies  and  to  whom  they  have  Speech  of 

J  the  Corey- 

never  rendered  any  considerable  service  and  ask  help  raeans. 


2,2  SPEECH   OF  THE    CORCYRAEANS. 

I.       of  them,  are  bound  to  show,  in  the  first  place,  that  the  B.C.  433. 
Ourneu-     granting  of  their  request  is  expedient,  or  at  any  rate 
a^mistake,    not  inexpedient,  and,  secondly,  that  their  gratitude  will 
usto?aStedft  be  lasting.     If  they  fulfil  neither  requirement  they  have 
of  the ICo-Cy  no  -right  to  complain  of  a  refusal.    Now  the  Corcyraeans, 
rinthians     when  they  sent  us  hither  to  ask  for  an  alliance,  were 
allies.         confident  that  they  could  establish  to  your  satisfaction 
both  these  points.     But,  unfortunately,  we  have  had  a 
practice  alike  inconsistent  with  the  request  which  we 
are   about  to  make   and  contrary  to   our  own  interest 
at  the  present  moment : — Inconsistent ;  for  hitherto  we 
have  never,  if  we  could  avoid  it,  been  the  allies  of  others, 
and  now  we  come  and  ask  you  to  enter  into  an  alliance 
with   us : — Contrary  to  our  interest ;   for  through  this 
practice  we  find  ourselves  isolated  in  our  war  with  the 
Corinthians.     The  policy  of  not  making  alliances  lest 
they  should  endanger  us  at  another's  bidding,  instead 
of  being  wisdom,  as  we  once  fancied,  has  now  unmis- 
takably proved  to   be  weakness   and   folly.      True,  in 
the  last  naval  engagement  we  repelled  the  Corinthians 
single-handed.      But    now   they  are    on   the   point    of 
attacking  us  with  a  much  greater  force  which  they  have 
drawn   together   from   the  Peloponnesus   and  from   all 
Hellas.     We  know  that  we  are  too  weak  to  resist  them 
unaided,  and  may  expect  the  worst  if  we  fall  into  their 
hands.     We  are  therefore  compelled  to  ask  assistance  of 
you  and  of  all  the  world ;  and  you  must  not  be  hard 
upon  us  if  now,  renouncing  our  indolent  neutrality  which 
was  an  error  but  not  a  crime,  we  dare  to  be  inconsistent. 
33-          'To  you  at  this  moment  the  request  which  we  are 
the6Sikof    making  offers  a  glorious  opportunity.     In  the  first  place, 
Athens.who  yOU  w{\\  assist  the  oppressed  and  not  the  oppressors ; 

will  thus        J 

assist  the  secondly,  you  will  admit  us  to  your  alliance  at  a  time 
when  our  dearest  interests  are  at  stake,  and  will  lay  up 
a  treasure  of  gratitude  in  our  memories  which  will  have 

she  should  the  most  abiding  of  all  records.     Lastly,  we  have  a  navy 

not  reject  J  '  J 

the  offer  of  greater  than  any  but  your  own.     Reflect ;   what  good 
raean°navy.  fortune  can  be  more  extraordinary,  what  more  annoying 


SPEECH   OF  THE    CORCYRAEANS.  23 

B.C.  433-  to  your  enemies  than  the  voluntary  accession  of  a  power        I. 

Ol.  86,  4.   r  ,  ...  Ill-  r 

for  whose  alliance  you  would  have  given  any  amount  of 
money  and  could  never  have  been  too  thankful  ?  This 
power  now  places  herself  at  your  disposal ;  you  are  to 
incur  no  danger  and  no  expense,  and  she  brings  you  a 
good  name  in  the  world,  gratitude  from  those  who  seek 
your  aid,  and  an  increase  of  your  own  strength.  Few 
have  ever  had  all  these  advantages  offered  them  at  once ; 
equally  few  when  they  come  asking  an  alliance  are  able 
to  give  in  the  way  of  security  and  honour  as  much  as 
they  hope  to  receive. 

'And  if  any  one  thinks  that  the  war  in  which  our  services  For  war  is 
may  be  needed  will  never  arrive,  he  is  mistaken.  He  does  lmmment- 
not  see  that  the  Lacedaemonians,  fearing  the  growth  of 
your  empire,  are  eager  to  take  up  arms,  and  that  the 
Corinthians,  who  are  your  enemies,  are  all-powerful  with 
them.  They  begin  with  us,  but  they  will  go  on  to  you, 
that  we  may  not  stand  united  against  them  in  the  bond 
of  a  common  enmity;  they  will  not  miss  the  chance  of 
weakening  us  and  strengthening  themselves.  And  it  is 
our  business  to  strike  first,  we  offering  and  you  accepting 
our  alliance,  and  to  forestall  their  designs  instead  of 
waiting  to  counteract  them. 

'  If  they  say  that  we  are  their  colony  and  that  therefore      34. 
you  have  no  right  to  receive  us,  they  should  be  made  to  True,  we 
understand  that  all  colonies  honour  their  mother-city  Jony  of  the 
when  she  treats  them  well,  but  are  estranged  from  her 
by  injustice.     For  colonists  are  not   meant  to  be   the 
servants  but  the  equals  of  those  who  remain  at  home,  should  be 
And  the  injustice  of  their  conduct  to  us  is  manifest :  for         6 
we  proposed  an  arbitration  in  the  matter  of  Epidamnus, 
but  they  insisted  on  prosecuting  their  quarrel  by  arms 
and  would  not  hear  of  a  legal  trial a.   When  you  see  how 
they  treat  us  who  are  their  own  kinsmen,  take  warning  : 
if  they  try  deception,  do  not  be  misled  by  them ;  and  if 
they  make  a  direct  request  of  you,  refuse.    For  he  passes 
through  life  most  securely  who  has  least  reason  to  re- 
proach himself  with  complaisance  to  his  enemies. 
a  Cp.  i.  29  init. 


SPEECH   OF  THE    CORCYRAEANS. 


Corcyrae- 
ans  into 
alliance. 


I.  cBut  again,  you  will  not  break  the  treaty  with  the  Lace-  B.C.  433.' 

35.  daemoniansa  by  receiving  us  :  for  we  are  not  allies  either 
Reasons  of  you  or  of  them.  What  says  the  treaty? — 'Any  Hel- 
Athenians  lenic  city  which  is  the  ally  of  no  one  may  join  whichever 
ceiVe^he6"  league  it:  pleases.'  And  how  monstrous,  that  they  should 
man  their  ships,  not  only  from  their  own  confederacy,  but 
from  Hellas  in  general,  nay,  even  from  your  subjects, 
not6break  while  they  would  debar  us  from  the  alliance  which  natu- 
the  treaty.  rajjv  offers  ancj  frOm  every  other,  and  will  denounce  it 
as  a  crime  if  you  accede  to  our  request.  With  far  better 
reason  shall  we  complain  of  you  if  you  refuse.  For  you 
will  be  thrusting  away  us  who  are  not  your  enemies  and 
are  in  peril ;  and,  far  from  restraining  the  enemy  and 
the  aggressor,  you  will  be  allowing  him  to  gather  fresh 
forces  out  of  your  own  dominions.  How  unjust  is  this ! 
Surely  if  you  would  be  impartial  you  should  either 
prevent  the  Corinthians  from  hiring  soldiers  in  your 
dominions,  or  send  to  us  also  such  help  as  you  can  be 
induced  to  send  ;  but  it  would  be  best  of  all  if  you  would 
openly  receive  and  assist  us.  Many,  as  we  have  already 
intimated,  are  the  advantages  which  we  offer.  Above 
all,  our  enemies  are  your  enemies,  which  is  the  best 
guarantee  of  fidelity  in  an  ally;  and  they  are  not  weak 
but  well  able  to  injure  those  who  secede  from  them. 
Again,  when  the  proffered  alliance  is  that  of  a  maritime 
and  not  of  an  inland  power,  it  is  a  far  more  serious 
matter  to  refuse.  You  should,  if  possible,  allow  no  one 
to  have  a  fleet  but  yourselves ;  or,  if  this  is  impossible, 
whoever  is  strongest  at  sea,  make  him  your  friend. 

'Some  one  may  think  that  the  course  which  we  recom- 
They  can-    mend  is  expedient,  but  he  may  be  afraid  that  if  he  is 

not  anord 

to  be  convinced  by  our  arguments  he  will  break  the  treaty. 
'  To  him  we  reply,  that  if  he  will  only  strengthen  himself 
he  may  make  a  present  of  his  fears  to  the  enemy,  but 
of  the  three  ^^  ^  ^e  reject  the  alliance  he  will  be  weak,  and  then 
great  mari-  his  confidence,  however  reassuring  to  himself,  will  be 

time  powers  .  .  r   .  . 

of  Hellas,    anything  but  terrifying  to  enemies  who  are  strong.     It 

a  Cp.  i.  115  init. 


36. 


I 
SPEECH   OF  THE    CORINTHIANS.  2$ 

B.C.  433.  is  Athens  about  which  he  is  advising,  and  not  Corcyra  :  I. 
4'  will  he  be  providing  for  her  best  interests  if,  when  war  is 
imminent  and  almost  at  the  door,  he  is  so  anxious  about 
the  chances  of  the  hour  that  he  hesitates  to  attach  to  him 
a  state  which  cannot  be  made  a  friend  or  enemy  with- 
out momentous  consequences?  Corcyra,  besides  offering 
many  other  advantages,  is  conveniently  situated  for  the 
coast  voyage  to  Italy  and  Sicily;  it  stands  in  the  way 
of  any  fleet  coming  from  thence  to  the  Peloponnesus, 
and  can  also  protect  a  fleet  on  its  way  to  Sicily.  One 
word  more,  which  is  the  sum  of  all  we  have  to  say,  and 
should  convince  you  that  you  must  not  abandon  us. 
Hellas  has  only  three  considerable  navies : — there  is 
ours,  and  there  is  yours,  and  there  is  the  Corinthian. 
Now,  if  the  Corinthians  get  hold  of  ours,  and  you  allow 
the  two  to  become  one,  you  will  have  to  fight  against 
the  united  navies  of  Corcyra  and  the  Peloponnesus. 
But,  if  you  make  us  your  allies,  you  will  have  our  navy 
in  addition  to  your  own  ranged  at  your  side  in  the  im- 
pending conflict.' 

Thus  spoke  the  Corcyraeans :  the  Corinthians  replied 
as  follows : — 

*  Since  these  Corcyraeans  have  chosen  to  speak,  not      37. 
only  of  their  reception  into  your  alliance,  but  of  our The. neu- 
misdoings  and  of  the  unjust  war  which  has  been  forced  the  Corcy- 
upon  them  by  us,  we  too   must   touch   on   these   two 
points  before  we  proceed  to  our  main  argument,  that  you 
may  be  better  prepared  to  appreciate  our  claim  upon  ceal  their 

,  ,  r  .  crimes. 

you,  and  may  have  a  good  reason  for  rejecting  their  pe- 
tition. They  pretend  that  they  have  hitherto  refused  to 
make  alliances  from  a  wise  moderation,  but  they  really 
adopted  this  policy  from  a  mean  and  not  from  a  high 
motive.  They  did  not  want  to  have  an  ally  who  might 
go  and  tell  of  their  crimes,  and  who  would  put  them  to 
the  blush  whenever  they  called  him  in.  Their  insular 
position  makes  them  judges  of  their  own  offences  against 
others,  and  they  can  therefore  afford  to  dispense  with 
judges  appointed  under  treaties ;  for  they  hardly  ever 


SPEECH   OF    THE    CORINTHIANS. 


We  go  to 
war  with 
them  be- 
cause they 
have 
wronged 
and  in- 
sulted us. 


I.  visit  their  neighbours,  but  foreign  ships  are  constantly  B.C.  433. 
driven  to  their  shores  by  stress  of  weather.  And  all  the 
time  they  screen  themselves  under  the  specious  name  of 
neutrality,  making  believe  that  they  are  unwilling  to  be 
the  accomplices  of  other  men's  crimes.  But  the  truth  is 
that  they  wish  to  keep  their  own  criminal  courses  to 
themselves :  where  they  are  strong,  to  oppress ;  where 
they  cannot  be  found  out,  to  defraud ;  and  whatever  they 
may  contrive  to  appropriate,  never  to  be  ashamed.  If 
they  were  really  upright  men,  as  they  profess  to  be,  the 
greater  their  immunity  from  attack  the  more  clearly  they 
might  have  made  their  honesty  appear  by  a  willingness 
to  submit  differences  to  arbitration. 

38.  *  But  such  they  have  not  shown  themselves  either  to- 
wards us  or  towards  others.     Although  they  are   our 
colony  they  have  always  stood  aloof  from  us,  and  now 
they  are  fighting  against  us  on  the  plea  that  they  were 
not  sent  out  to  be  ill  used.     To  which  we  rejoin  that  we 
did  not  send  them  out  to  be  insulted  by  them,  but  that 
we  might  be  recognised  as   their  leaders   and  receive 
proper  respect.     At  any  rate  our  other  colonies  honour 
us ;  no  city  is  more  beloved  by  her  colonies  than  Corinth. 
That  we  are  popular  with  the  majority  proves  that  the 
Corcyraeans  have  no  reason  to  dislike  us ;  a  and,  if  it 
seems  extraordinary  that  we  should  go  to  war  with  them, 
our  defence  is  that  the  injury  which  they  are  doing  us  is 
unexampled  a.     Even  if  we  had  been  misled  by  passion, 
it  would  have  been  honourable  in  them  to  make  allow- 
ance for  us,  and  dishonourable  in  us  to  use  violence  when 
they  showed  moderation.     But  they  have  wronged  us 
over  and   over  again   in   their  insolence   and  pride  of 
wealth ;    and   now  there  is   our  colony  of  Epidamnus 
which  they  would  not  acknowledge  in  her  distress,  but 
when  we  came  to  her  rescue,  they  seized  and  are  now 
holding  by  force. 

39.  'They  pretend  that  they  first  offered  to  have  the  matter 

a  Or,  'and  there  is  nothing  extraordinary  in  our  going  to  war 
with  them,  for  they  are  doing  us  an  unexampled  injury.' 


SPEECH   OF  THE    CORINTHIANS.  27 

B.C.  433.  decided  by  arbitration.   The  appeal  to  justice  might  have        I. 
01.  86,  4.  gome  meaning  in  the  mouth  of  one  awho  before  he  had  re- 


course  to  arms  acted  honourably,  as  he  now  talks  fairly  a,  posearbi- 

.  r  .  .  .  tration  and 

but  not  when  it  is  made  from  a  position  of  security  and  requestyour 
advantage.  Whereas  these  men  began  by  laying  siege  when°they 
to  Epidamnus,  and  not  until  they  feared  our  vengeance 
did  they  put  forward  their  specious  offer  of  arbitration. 
And  as  if  the  wrong  which  they  have  themselves  done  at 
Epidamnus  were  not  enough,  they  now  come  hither  and 
ask  you  to  be,  not  their  allies,  but  their  accomplices  in 
crime,  and  would  have  you  receive  them  when  they  are 
at  enmity  with  us.  But  they  ought  to  have  come  when 
they  were  out  of  all  danger,  not  at  a  time  when  we  are 
smarting  under  an  injury  and  they  have  good  reason  to 
be  afraid.  You  have  never  derived  any  benefit  from  their 
power,  but  they  will  now  be  benefited  by  yours,  and, 
although  innocent  of  their  crimes,  you  will  equally  be 
held  responsible  by  us.  If  you  were  to  have  shared 
the  consequences  with  them,  they  ought  long  ago  to 
have  shared  the  power  with  you  b. 

*  We  have  shown  that  our  complaints  are  justified  and      40. 
that  our  adversaries  are  tyrannical  and  dishonest  ;  we  You  wil1 

7  break  the 

will  now  prove  to  you  that  you  have  no  right  to  receive  treaty  by 
them.     Admitting  that  the  treaty  allows  any  unenrolled  them?and 
cities  to  join  either  league,  this  provision  does  not  apply  ^/j^>u 
to  those  who  have  in  view  the  injury  of  others,  but  only  enemies. 
to  him  who  is  in  need  of  protection,  —  certainly  not  to 
one  who  forsakes  his  allegiance  and  who  will  bring  war 
instead  of  peace  to  those  who  receive  him,  or  rather,  if 
they  are  wise,  will  not  receive  him  on  such  terms.     And 
war  the  Corcyraeans  will  bring  to  you  if  you  listen  to 
them  and  not  to  us.     For  if  you  become  the  allies  of  the 

a  Or,  '  whose  actions  corresponded  to  his  professions,  before  he 
entered  on  the  struggle.' 

b  The  last  words  of  the  chapter  are  omitted  by  Poppo  on  the 
authority  of  several  of  the  best  MSS.  ;  they  may  perhaps  be  a  gloss. 
If  they  are  retained  they  may  be  translated  :  *  But  you  ought  not 
to  share  all  the  consequences  of  their  crimes,  while  in  the  crimes, 
and  in  them  alone,  you  have  no  part.' 


28  SPEECH   OF   THE    CORINTHIANS. 

I.        Corcyraeans  you  will  be  no  longer  at  peace  with  us,  but  B.C.  433. 
will  be  converted  into  enemies  ;  and  we  must,  if  you  take 
their  part,  in  defending  ourselves  against  them,  defend 
ourselves  against  you.    But  you  ought  in  common  justice 
to  stand  aloof  from  both ;  or,  if  you  must  join  either, 
you  should  join  us  and  go  to  war  with  them  ;  to  Corinth 
you  are  at  all  events  bound  by  treaty,  but  with  Corcyra 
you  never  even  entered  into  a  temporary  negotiation. 
We  did  not  And  do  not  set  the  precedent  of  receiving  the  rebellious 
yourUrebS-  subjects  of  others.     At  the  revolt  of  Samosa,  when  the  B.C.  440. 
je°c*S,Sand    otner  Peloponnesians  were  divided  upon  the  question  of  ° 
you  should  giving  aid  to  the  rebels,  we  voted  in  your  favour  and 

not  receive    *  '  J 

ours.  expressly  maintained  '  that  every  one  should  be  allowed 
to  chastise  his  own  allies.'  If  you  mean  to  receive  and 
assist  evil-doers,  we  shall  assuredly  gain  as  many  allies 
of  yours  as  you  will  of  ours ;  and  you  will  establish  a 
principle  which  will  tell  against  yourselves  more  than 
against  us. 

4  !  •  '  Such  are  the  grounds  of  right  which  we  urge  ;  and 
twent^shTs  ^e7  are  sufficient  according  to  Hellenic  law.  And  may 
in  the  Aegi-  we  venture  to  recall  to  your  minds  an  obligation  of  which 

netanwar.  . 

we  claim  the  repayment  in  our  present  need,  we  and  you 
being  not  enemies  who  seek  one  another's  hurt,  nor  yet 
friends  who  freely  give  and  take?  There  was  a  time  B.C.  491. 
before  the  Persian  invasion  when  you  were  in  want  of O1'  72'  2' 
ships  for  the  Aeginetan  war,  and  we  Corinthians  lent  you 
twenty:  the  service  which  we  then  rendered  to  you  gave 
you  the  victory  over  the  Aeginetans  b,  as  the  other,  which 
prevented  the  Peloponnesians  from  aiding  the  Samians, 
enabled  you  to  punish  Samos.  Both  benefits  were  con- 
ferred on  one  of  those  critical  occasions  when  men  in 
the  act  of  attacking  their  enemies  are  utterly  regardless 
of  everything  but  victory,  and  deem  him  who  assists 
them  a  friend  though  he  may  have  previously  been  a 
foe,  him  who  opposes  them  a  foe,  even  though  he  may 
happen  to  be  a  friend  ;  nay,  they  will  often  neglect 
their  own  interests  in  the  excitement  of  the  struggle. 
a  Gp.  i.  115.  b  Cp.  Herod,  vi.  89. 


SPEECH   OF  THE    CORINTHIANS.  29 

oiC8633'      '  Think  of  these  things  ;  let  the  younger  be  informed        I. 
of  them  by  their  elders,  and  resolve  all  of  you  to  render      42. 
like  (or  like.     Do  not  say  to  yourselves  that  this  is  just, 
but  that  in  the  event  of  war  something  else  is  expedient; 
for  the  true  path  of  expediency  is  the  path  of  right.    The 
war  with  which  the  Corcyraeans  would  frighten  you  into 
doing  wrong  is  distant,  and  may  never  come  ;  is  it  worth 
while  to  be  so  carried  away  by  the  prospect  of  it,  that 
you  bring  upon  yourselves  the  hatred  of  the  Corinthians 
which  is  both  near  and  certain  ?     Would   you  not  be 
wiser  in  seeking  to  mitigate  the  ill-feeling  which  your 
treatment  of  the  Megarians  has  already  inspired  a  ?     The 
later  kindness  done  in  season,  though  small  in  comparison, 
may  cancel  a  greater  previous  wrong.     And  do  not  be  TO  do  no 
attracted  by  their  offer  of  a  great  naval  alliance  ;  for  to  bettefthana 
do  no  wrong  to  a  neighbour  is  a  surer  source  of  strength  fJJ^I?^1 
than  to  gain  a  perilous  advantage  under  the  influence  of 
a  momentary  illusion. 

'We  are  now  ourselves  in  the  same  situation  in  which  43- 
you  were,  when  we  declared  at  Sparta  that  every  one  so 
placed  should  ]pe  allowed  to  chastise  his  own  allies  ;  and 
we  claim  to  receive  the  same  measure  at  your  hands.  You 
were  profited  by  our  vote,  and  we  ought  not  to  be  injured 
by  yours.  Pay  what  you  owe,  knowing  that  this  is  our 
time  of  need,  in  which  a  man's  best  friend  is  he  who  does 
him  a  service,  he  who  opposes  him,  his  worst  enemy. 
Do  not  receive  these  Corcyraeans  into  alliance  in  despite 
of  us,  and  do  not  support  them  in  injustice.  In  acting 
thus  you  will  act  rightly,  and  will  consult  your  own  true 
interests.' 

Such  were  the  words  of  the  Corinthians. 

The  Athenians  heard  both  sides,  and  they  held  two      44- 
assemblies  ;    in  the  first  of  them   they  were   more   in-  T.he  M^Q~ 

J  mans  after 

fluenced  by  the  words  of  the  Corinthians,  but  in  the  somehesita- 
second  they  changed  their  minds  and  inclined  towards  into  a  de- 


the  Corcyraeans.     They  would  not  go  so  far  as  to  make 
an  alliance  both  offensive  and  defensive  with  them  ;  for  Corcyra- 
»  Gp.  i.  67  fin. 


30     ALLIANCE    OF  ATHENS    WITH   CORCYRA. 

I.  then,  if  the  Corcyraeans  had  required  them  to  join  in  an  B.C.  432. 
expedition  against  Corinth,  the  treaty  with  the  Pelopon-  O1<  8?' 
nesians  would  have  been  broken.  But  they  concluded  a 
defensive  league,  by  which  the  two  states  promised  to 
aid  each  other  if  an  attack  were  made  on  the  territory 
or  on  the  allies  of  either.  For  they  knew  that  in  any 
case  the  war  with  Peloponnesus  was  inevitable,  and  they 
had  no  mind  to  let  Corcyra  and  her  navy  fall  into  the 
Motives  of  hands  of  the  Corinthians.  Their  plan  was  to  embroil 
nians.  *  them  more  and  more  with  one  another,  and  then,  when 
the  war  came,  the  Corinthians  and  the  other  naval  powers 
would  be  weaker.  They  also  considered  that  Corcyra 
was  conveniently  situated  for  the  coast  voyage  to  Italy 
and  Sicily. 

45.  Under  the  influence  of  these  feelings,  they  received 
They  send   the  Corcyraeans  into  alliance;  the  Corinthians  departed; 

ten  ships  to 

Corcyra,      and  the  Athenians  now  despatched  to  Corcyra  ten  ships 
orders  to6™  commanded  by  Lacedaemonius  the  son  of  Cimon,  Dio- 
defensive6    timus  the  son  of  Strombichus,  and  Proteas  the  son  of 
Epicles.    The  commanders  received  orders  not  to  engage 
with  the  Corinthians  unless  they  sailed  against  Corcyra 
or  to  any  place  belonging  to  the  Corcyraeans,  and  at- 
tempted to  land  there,  in  which  case  they  were  to  resist 
them  to  the  utmost.     These  orders  were  intended  to 
prevent  a  breach  of  the  treaty  a. 

46.  The  Corinthians,  when  their  preparations  were  com- 
TheCorin-  pleted,   sailed    against    Corcyra   with    a    hundred    and 

thian  fleet     *  .  °  ' 

sails  against  fifty  ships, — ten  Elean,  twelve  Meganan,  ten  Leucadian, 
|rra'  twenty-seven  Ambraciot,  one  from  Anactorium,  and 
ninety  of  their  own.  The  contingents  of  the  several 
cities  were  commanded  by  their  own  generals.  The 
Corinthian  commander  was  Xenocleides  the  son  of  Eu- 
thycles,  with  four  others.  The  fleet  sailed  from  Leucas, 
and,  arriving  at  the  mainland  opposite  Corcyra,  came 
to  anchor  at  Cheimerium  in  the  country  of  Thesprotia. 
bCheimerium  is  a  harbour b;  above  it,  at  some  distance 

a  Cp.  i.  40  init. 

b  Or,  '  Here  there  is  a  harbour.' 


SEA-FIGHT  NEAR    CHEIMERIUM.  31 

B.C.  432.  from  the  sea,  in  that  part  of  Thesprotia  called  Eleatis,  I. 
'  8?'  lies  the  city  of  Ephyre,  near  which  the  Acherusian  lake 
finds  a  way  into  the  sea  ;  the  river  Acheron,  whence 
the  name  is  derived,  flows  through  Thesprotia  and  falls 
into  the  lake.  Another  river,  the  Thyamis,  forms  the 
boundary  of  Thesprotia  and  Cestrine,  and  the  promontory 
of  Cheimerium  runs  out  between  these  two  rivers.  Here 
the  Corinthians  anchored  and  encamped. 

The  Corcyraeans,  observing  their  approach,  manned      47. 
a  hundred  and  ten  ships.     These,  which  were   placed  Disposition 
under  the  command  of  Meiciades,  Aesimides,  and  Eury-  forces. 
batus,  took  up  a  position  off  one  of  the  islands  called 
Sybota ;    the   ten  Athenian   ships    accompanied   them. 
The  land  forces  occupied  the  promontory  of  Leucimme, 
whither  a  thousand  Zacynthians  had  come  to  the  aid 
of  Corcyra.     The  Corinthians  on  their  part  were  sup- 
ported by  a  large  force  of  barbarians,  which  collected  on 
the  mainland ;  for  the  inhabitants  of  this  region  have 
always  been  well  disposed  towards  them. 

The  Corinthians  had  now  made  their  preparations,  and,  48. 
taking  with  them  three  days'  provisions,  put  off  by  night 
from  Cheimerium,  intending  to  give  battle :  at  break  of 
day  they  descried  the  Corcyraean  fleet,  which  had  also 
put  out  to  sea  and  was  sailing  to  meet  them.  As  soon 
as  they  saw  one  another,  they  ranged  themselves  in  order 
of  battle.  On  the  right  Corcyraean  wing  were  the  Athe- 
nian ships.  The  Corcyraeans  themselves  occupied  the 
centre  and  the  left  wing,  and  were  drawn  up  in  three 
divisions,  each  under  the  command  of  one  of  the  generals. 
On  the  right  wing  of  the  Corinthians  were  the  Megarian 
and  Ambraciot  ships,  in  the  centre  the  contingents  of  their 
other  allies ;  they  themselves  with  their  swiftest  vessels 
formed  the  left  wing,  which  was  opposed  to  the  Athenians 
and  to  the  right  division  of  the  Corcyraeans. 

The  standards  were  now  raised  on  both  sides,  and  the      49. 
two  fleets   met  and  fought.     The  decks  of  both  were  Character 
crowded  with  heavy  infantry,  with  archers  and  with  jave-  gagemem. 
lin  men ;  for  their  naval  arrangements  were  still  of  the 


32  SEA-FIGHT  NEAR    CHEIMERIUM. 

I.       old  clumsy  sort.   The  engagement  was  obstinate,  but  more  B.C.  432. 

courage  than  skill  was  displayed,  and  it  had  almost  the 

appearance  of  a  battle  by  land.     When  two  ships  once 

charged  one  another  it  was  hardly  possible  to  part  com- 

pany, for  the  throng  of  vessels  was  dense,  and  the  hopes  of 

victory  lay  chiefly  in  the  heavy-armed,  who  maintained  a 

steady  fight  upon  the  decks,  the  ships  meanwhile  remaining 

motionless.    There  were  no  attempts  to  break  the  enemy's 

line.   Brute  force  and  rage  made  up  for  the  want  of  tactics. 

Everywhere  the  battle  was  a  scene  of  tumult  and  confu- 

sion.    At  any  point  where  they  saw  the  Corcyraeans 

distressed,  the  Athenians  appeared  and  kept  the  enemy 

in  check;  but  the  generals,  who  were  afraid  of  disobeying 

their  instructions,  would  not  begin  the  attack  themselves.' 

Partial  sue-  The  Corinthians  suffered  most  on  their  right  wing.     For 

Corcyrae-    the  Corcyraeans  with  twenty  ships  routed  them,  drove 

iTft  wh!ghe    them  m  disorder  to  the  shore,  and  sailed  right  up  to  their 

correlate     encampment  ;  there  landing,  they  plundered  and  burnt 

defeat  on     the  deserted  tents.     In  this  part  of  the  battle  the  Corin- 

thians and  their  allies  were  worsted,  and  the  Corcyraeans 

prevailed.     But  the  left  wing  of  the  Corinthians,  where 

their  own  ships  were  stationed,  had  greatly  the  advan- 

tage,   because  the   Corcyraeans,   whose   numbers   were 

originally  inferior,  had  now  twenty  vessels  detached  in 

The  Athe-    the  pursuit.    When  the  Athenians  saw  the  distress  of  the 

nians  share    >~,  ,11 

in  the  en-     Corcyraeans,  they  began  to  assist  them  more  openly. 


gagement.     At    first    they    had    abstained    from   actual    collision,   but 

when  the  Corcyraeans  fled  outright  and  the  Corinthians 
pressed  them  hard,  then  every  man  fell  to  work;  all  dis- 
tinctions were  forgotten  ;  —  the  time  had  arrived  when 
Corinthian  and  Athenian  were  driven  to  attack  one 
another. 

50.  The  Corinthians,  having  put  to  flight  their  enemies, 
never  stopped  to  take  in  tow  the  hulls  of  the  vessels 
which  they  had  disabled,  but  fell  upon  the  men  ;  they 
rowed  up  and  down  and  slew  them,  giving  no  quarter,, 
and  unintentionally  killing  their  own  friends  ;  for  they 
were  not  aware  that  their  right  wing  had  been  defeated. 


MORE  ATHENIAN  VESSELS.  33 

B.C.  432.  There  were  so  many  ships  on  one  side  and  on  the  other,  I. 
and  they  covered  so  great  an  extent  of  water,  that,  when 
the  engagement  had  once  begun,  it  was  hard  among 
conquerors  and  conquered  to  distinguish  friend  from  foe. 
For  never  before  had  two  Hellenic  navies  so  numerous 
met  in  battle. 

When  the  Corinthians  had  chased  the  Corcyraeans  to 
the  shore,  they  turned  their  attention  to  their  own  wrecks 
and  dead  bodies.  Most  of  these  were  recovered  by  them 
and  conveyed  to  Sybota,  a  desert  harbour  of  Thesprotia, 
whither  their  barbarian  allies  had  come  to  support  them. 
They  then  formed  afresh  and  once  more  made  a  move- 
ment towards  the  Corcyraeans,  who,  taking  such  vessels 
as  had  not  been  disabled,  and  any  others  which  they  had 
in  their  docks,  together  with  the  Athenian  ships,  put  out 
to  meet  them,  dreading  a  descent  upon  Corcyra.  It  was 
now  late  in  the  day  and  the  Paean  had  been  already 
sounded  for  the  onset,  when  the  Corinthians  suddenly 
began  to  row  astern.  They  had  descried  sailing  towards  Sudden 
them  twenty  vessels  which  the  Athenians  had  sent  to  of  ?wTmy°e 
reinforce  the  former  ten,  fearing  what  had  actually  hap- 
pened,  that  the  Corcyraeans  would  be  defeated,  and 
that  the  original  squadron  would  be  insufficient  to  protect 
them. 

The  Corinthians,  who  had  the  first  view  of  these  vessels,      5 1 . 
suspecting  that  they  were  Athenian  and  that  there  were  The  two 
more  of  them  than  they  saw,  were  beginning  to  retreat,  separate. 
The  Corcyraeans,  owing  to  their  position,  could  not  see 
them,  and  they  wondered  why  the  Corinthians  rowed 
astern.     At  length  some  one  who  spied  the  advancing 
fleet  exclaimed,  'Yonder  are  ships  coming;'  and  then 
the  Corcyraeans,  as  it  was  getting  dark,  likewise  retired, 
and  the  Corinthians  turned  about  and  sailed  away.    Thus 
the  two  fleets  separated  after  a  battle  which  lasted  until 
nightfall.     The  twenty  ships  which  came  from  Athens 
under  the  command  of  Glaucon  the  son  of  Leagrus,  and 
Andocides  the  son  of  Leogoras,  made  their  way  through 
the  wrecks  and  corpses  and  sailed  into  the  Corcyraean 

D 


34  MESSAGE    OF  THE    CORINTHIANS. 

I.        station  at  Leucimme  almost  as  soon  as  they  were  sighted.  B.C.  432. 
At  first  in  the  darkness  the  Corcyraeans  feared  that  they 
were  enemies,  but  they  soon  recognised  them  and  the 
Athenian  vessels  came  to  anchor. 

52.          On  the  next  day  the  thirty  Athenian  and   all   the 
The  Conn-  Corcyraean  ships  which  were  fit  for  service,  wanting  to 
to  return     ascertain  whether  the  Corinthians  would  fight,  sailed  to 
the  harbour  at  Sybota  where  their  fleet  lay.     The  Corin- 
thians, putting  out  into  deep  water,  drew  up  their  ships 
in  line  and  so  remained,  but  they  did  not  intend  to  begin 
the  battle.    For  they  saw  that  fresh  ships,  which  had  re- 
ceived no  damage  in  the  action,  had  arrived  from  Athens, 
and  their  own  position  was  one  of  great  difficulty.    They 
had  to  guard  the  prisoners  in  their  vessels,  and  there  were 
no  means  of  refitting  in  such  a  desert  place.     They  were 
more  disposed  to  consider  how  they  should  get  home 
than  to  fight.    For  they  feared  that  the  Athenians,  deem- 
ing the  peace,  now  that  blows  had  been  exchanged,  to  be 
already  broken,  would  intercept  their  return. 
53'          They  therefore  determined  to  send  a  few  men  in  a  boat 
They  hold   without  a  flag  of  truce  to  the  Athenians,  and  so  test  their 

a  parley 

with  the      intentions.     The  men  were  to  deliver  the  following  mes- 

Athenians.  ,  ~  T          .,  A    1        •  i  t 

sage :  '  You  do  wrong,  Athenians,  to  begin  war  and 
violate  the  treaty.  We  were  only  chastising  our  enemies, 
and  you  come  with  a  hostile  force  and  place  yourselves 
between  us  and  them.  If  it  is  your  intention  to  hinder 
us  from  sailing  to  Corcyra,  or  whithersoever  we  choose, 
and  you  are  going  to  break  the  treaty,  take  us  first  and 
deal  with  us  as  enemies.'  Whereupon  all  the  Corcyraeans 
who  were  within  hearing  cried  out  '  Take  and  kill  them.' 
But  the  Athenians  replied:  'Men  of  Peloponnesus,  we  are 
not  beginning  war,  and  we  are  not  violating  the  treaty; 
we  are  only  aiding  the  Corcyraeans,  who  are  our  allies. 
If  you  mean  to  sail  against  Corcyra  or  any  place  belong- 
ing to  the  Corcyraeans,  we  will  do  our  utmost  to  prevent 
you,  but;  if  you  want  to  go  anywhere  else,  you  may.' 
54.  Reassured  by  this  reply,  the  Corinthians  prepared  to 
home,, first  setting  up  a  trophy  at  the  Sybota  which 


THE    CORCYRAEAN  CAPTIVES.  35 

B.c.  432.  is  on  the  mainland.    The  Corcyraeans  took  up  the  wrecks        I. 
7*     and  dead  bodies  which  were  carried  towards  them,  the  turn  h?me- 

capturing 

current  and  the  wind  which  had  risen  during  the  night  Anactorium 
having  scattered  them  in  all  directions.  They  then  set  voyage. 
up  a  rival  trophy  on  the  island  of  Sybota.  Both  parties 
claimed  the  victory,  but  on  different  grounds.  The 
Corinthians  had  retained  the  advantage  in  the  sea-fight 
until  nightfall,  and  had  thus  secured  a  greater  number  of 
wrecks  and  dead  bodies ;  they  had  taken  not  less  than  a 
thousand  prisoners  and  had  disabled  about  seventy  ships. 
The  Corcyraeans,  on  the  other  hand,  had  destroyed 
some  thirty  sail,  and  when  reinforced  by  the  Athenians 
had  taken  up  the  wrecks  and  dead  bodies  which  had 
drifted  in  their  direction ;  whereas  the  enemy  on  the 
evening  of  the  battle  had  rowed  astern  at  sight  of  the 
Athenian  ships,  and  after  their  arrival  had  not  come  out 
against  them  from  Sybota.  Upon  these  grounds  both 
sides  raised  trophies  and  claimed  the  victory.  On  their  55* 
homeward  voyage  the  Corinthians  took  by  stratagem 
Anactorium,  a  town  situated  at  the  mouth  of  the  Am- 
bracian  Gulf,  which  they  and  the  Corcyraeans  held  in 
common ;  there  they  placed  colonists  of  their  own,  and 
returned  to  Corinth.  Of  their  Corcyraean  captives  eight 
hundred  who  were  slaves  they  sold,  but  two  hundred  and 
fifty  they  detained  in  prison,  treating  them  with  much 
consideration,  in  the  hope  that,  when  they  returned,  they 
would  win  over  Corcyra  to  the  Corinthian  interests  a :  it 
so  happened  that  the  majority  of  them  were  among  the 
most  influential  men  of  the  state.  Thus  the  war  ended 
to  the  advantage  of  Corcyra,  and  the  Athenian  fleet  re- 
turned home.  This  was  the  first  among  the  causes  of 
the  Peloponnesian  war,  the  Corinthians  alleging  that  the 
Athenian  fleet  had  taken  part  with  the  Corcyraeans  and 
had  fought  against  them  in  defiance  of  the  treaty. 

There  soon  arose  another  cause  of  quarrel  between  the  56. 
Athenians  and  Peloponnesians.  Potidaea,  which  is  situ-  ^^ 
ated  on  the  isthmus  of  Pallene,  was  originally  a  Corinthian  The  Athe- 

a  Cp.  iii.  70. 
D  1 


36  DEFECTION  OF  PERDICCAS. 

I.       colony,  although  at  this  time  the  tributary  and  ally  of  B.C.  432. 
nianscom-  Athens.     Now  the  Corinthians  were  forming  plans  of    '  7* 

mand  the  •-«•**.•  i  i      1     • 

Potidaeans  vengeance,  and  the  Athenians,  who  suspected  their  m- 


tentions,  commanded  the  Potidaeans  to  raze  their  walls 
hos?a  6es      on  ^e  s^e  °^  Pa^ene  an<^  give  hostages  ;  also  to  send 
away  and  not  to  receive  for  the  future  the  magistrates 
whom  the  Corinthians  annually  sent  to  them.     For  they 
were  afraid  lest  the  Potidaeans  might  be  persuaded  by 
the  Corinthians  and  Perdiccas  to  revolt,  and  might  induce 
the  rest  of  Chalcidice  to  follow  their  example. 
57-  These   measures   of  precaution   were   taken   by  the 

Athenians  immediately  after  the  sea-fight  off  Corcyra. 


with  the      The  hostility  of  the  Corinthians  was  no  longer  doubtful, 
and  tries  to  and  Perdiccas,  king  of  Macedon,  the  son  of  Alexander, 
betweenFte-  hitherto  the  friend  and  ally  of  Athens,  had  now  become  an 
enemv-     ^e  had  quarrelled  with  the  Athenians  because 
they  had  made  an  alliance  with  his  brother  Philip  and 
with  Derdas,  who  were  leagued  against  him.     Alarmed 
by  their  attitude,  he  sent  envoys  to  Sparta  and  did  all  he 
could  to  stir  up  a  war  between  Athens  and  the  Pelopon- 
nese.    He  also  sought  the  alliance  of  Corinth,  for  he  had 
an  eye  to  the  revolt  of  Potidaea  ;  and  he  proposed  to 
the  Chalcidians  and  to  the  Bottiaeans  that  they  should 
join  in  the  revolt,  thinking,  that  if  he  had  the  assistance 
of  the  neighbouring  peoples,  the  difficulties  of  the  war 
would  be  diminished.     The  Athenians  became  aware  of 
his  designs  and  resolved  to  forestall  the  revolt  of  the 
cities.      They  were  already  intending  to  send  against 
Perdiccas  thirty  ships  and  a  thousand  hoplites  under  the 
command  of  Archestratus  the  son  of  Lycomedes,  and 
ten  others,  and  they  told  their  admirals  to  take  hostages 
from  the  Potidaeans  and  to  demolish  their  wall.     They 
were  also  to  keep  a  watch  over  the  towns  in  the  neigh- 
.  bourhood  and  prevent  any  attempt  at  rebellion. 
58.          Meanwhile  the  Potidaeans  sent  envoys  to  the  Athenians 
The  Poti-    in  the  hope  of  persuading  them  to  take  no  strong  mea- 

daeans  send  *  .  ,  f    ,     . 

envoys  to    sures  ;  but  at  the  same  time  other  envoys  of  theirs  accom- 
Sparta.  and  panied  a  Corinthian  embassy  to  Lacedaemon  and  exerted 


REVOLT   OF  POTIDAEA.  37 

B.C.  432.  themselves  to  procure  assistance  in  case  of  need.    A  long        I. 
negotiation  was  carried  on  at  Athens  which  ended  in  They  re- 


nothing,  and  made  no  difference  ;  the  ships  destined  for 
Macedonia  were  also  sent  against  Potidaea.  But  at  Lace-  frs0Smtance 
daemon  they  were  promised  by  the  magistrates  that  if  sParta- 
the  Athenians  attacked  Potidaea  they  would  invade  At- 
tica. So  they  seized  the  opportunity  and  revolted  :  the 
Chalcidians  and  Bottiaeans  swore  alliance  with  them  and 
joined  in  the  revolt.  Perdiccas  persuaded  the  Chalcidians 
to  abandon  and  pull  down  their  towns  on  the  sea-coast, 
and  settling  at  Olynthus  inland,  there  to  form  one  strong 
city.  On  their  removal  he  gave  them  part  of  his  own 
territory  of  Mygdonia  about  the  lake  Bolbe  to  cultivate 
while  the  contest  lasted.  So,  dismantling  their  cities,  they 
settled  up  the  country  and  made  preparation  for  war. 

The  Athenians,  when  the  thirty  ships  arrived  in  Chal-      59- 
cidice,  found   that   Potidaea   and  the  other  cities  had  The  Athe; 

nians  under 

already  revolted.    Whereupon  the  generals,  thinking  that  Archestra- 

.  tus  arrive  in  , 

they  were  not  strong  enough  without  more  troops  to  chaicidice. 


act  against  the  rebels  as  well  as  against  Perdiccas,  di- 
rected   their  attention  to  Macedonia,  which  was  their  cedoma- 
original  destination,  and  there  carried  on  a  regular  cam- 
paign in  concert  with  Philip  and  the  brothers  of  Derdas, 
who  had  invaded  the  country  from  the  interior. 

Now  that  Potidaea  had  revolted  and  the  Athenian      60. 
ships  were  on  the  coast  of  Macedonia,  the  Corinthians  The  Corin- 
grew  anxious  about  the  town  ;  they  felt  that  the  danger  troops  to 


came  home  to  them,  and  dispatched  thither  volunteers 

of  their  own  and  other  troops  whom  they  attracted  by  under  the, 

*  '   command 

pay  from  various  parts  of  the  Peloponnese,  numbering  of  Aristeus. 
in  all  sixteen  hundred  hoplites  and  four  hundred  light- 
armed.  Their  commander  was  Aristeus  the  son  of 
Adeimantus,  who  had  always  been  a  great  friend  of  the 
Potidaeans  ;  it  was  mainly  out  of  regard  for  him  that 
most  of  the  Corinthian  soldiers  volunteered  on  the  ex- 
pedition. They  arrived  in  Chaicidice  forty  days  after  the 
revolt  of  Potidaea. 

The  news  of  the  revolt  in  Chaicidice  quickly  reached      61. 


38  ARRIVAL    OF   THE  ATHENIANS. 

I.        Athens,  and  the  Athenians,  when  they  heard  that  Aris-  B.C.  432. 

Athenian     tcus  had  come  with  reinforcements,  sent  against  the  re- 
reinforce-  ft* 
ments  under  volted  towns  forty  ships  and  two  thousand  of  their  own 

rive  h?  *"     hoplites  under  the  command  of  Callias  the  son  of  Cal- 
5heAthe-a;  liades>  and  four  others.     The  expedition,  sailing  first  of 
nians  make  all  to  Macedonia,  found  that  the  former  thousand  had  just 
peace  with   taken  Therme  and  were  blockading  Pydna ;  they  joined  in 
and  move    the  siege  themselves ;  but  before  long  the  Athenian  army 
SdaeaP°"     were  constrained  to  come  to  an  understanding  and  make 
an  alliance  with  Perdiccas.    For  Potidaea,  now  that  Aris- 
teus  had  arrived,  urgently  demanded  their  presence ;  so 
they  prepared  to  quit  Macedonia.  They  first  marched  out 
of  their  way  to  Beroea,  which  they  attempted  to  take  with- 
out success.    Returning  to  their  route,  they  moved  on  by 
land  towards  Potidaea  with  three  thousand  hoplites  of 
their  own  and  a  large  force  of  allies ;  they  had  also  six 
hundred  Macedonian  horse,  who  fought  under  Philip  and 
Pausanias ;    meanwhile  their  ships,  in  number  seventy, 
sailed  along  the  coast.    Proceeding  by  slow  marches,  they 
arrived  on  the  third  day  at  Gigonus  and  there  encamped. 
62.          The  Potidaeans  and  the  Peloponnesian  force  under 
Engage-      Aristeus  had  now  taken  up  a  position  at  the  Isthmus 
Ethmusof  on    the   side    towards    Olynthus,   where    they   awaited 
Paiiene.       tke  commg  of  faQ  Athenians  ;  they  held  their  market 
outside  the  walls  of  Potidaea.     The  allies  had  chosen 
Aristeus  general  of  all  the  infantry,  and  of  the  cavalry 
Perdiccas,  for  he  had  no  sooner  joined  than  he  again 
deserted  the  Athenians  and  was  now  fighting  on  the 
side  of  the  Potidaeans,  having  appointed  lolaus  a  to  be 
his  lieutenant  at  homea.     The  plan  of  Aristeus  was  as 
follows : — His  own  army  was  to  remain  on  the  Isthmus 
and  watch  for  the  approach  of  the  Athenians,  while  the 
Chalcidians,  their  allies  from  beyond  the  Isthmus,  and  the 
two  hundred  horse  furnished  by  Perdiccas  were  stationed 
at  Olynthus  ;   and  as  soon  as  the  Athenians  attacked 
Aristeus  and  his  army,  they  were  to  fall  upon  them  in 

a  Or,  '  to  take  his  place  with  the  expedition ; '  cp.  infra,  TYJV  napa 
diaKo<riav  innov. 


A  THEN/AN  VICTOR  Y.  39 

B.c.  432.  the  rear  ;  thus  the  enemy  would  be  assailed  on  both        I. 

O1'87'  sides.  But  Callias  the  Athenian  general  and  his  col- 
leagues sent  the  Macedonian  horse  and  a  few  of  the 
allied  troops  towards  Olynthus  that  they  might  check 
any  movement  in  that  quarter,  while  they  themselves, 
quitting  their  position,  marched  against  Potidaea.  When 
they  had  reached  the  Isthmus  and  saw  the  enemy  pre- 
paring for  battle,  they  did  the  same.  The  two  armies 
soon  closed.  The  wing  led  by  Aristeus,  which  was 
composed  of  his  Corinthian  followers  and  other  picked 
troops,  routed  their  opponents  and  pursued  them  far 
away;  but  the  rest  of  the  army,  both  Potidaeans  and 
Peloponnesians,  were  defeated  by  the  Athenians  and 
fled  into  the  city. 

Aristeus,   when    he    returned    from   the   pursuit   and      63. 
perceived  that  the  other  wing  of  his  army  was  defeated,  The  army 
hesitated  whether  he  should  make  for  Olynthus  or  return  is  partially 
to  Potidaea.     Both  courses  were  hazardous  ;  but  at  last  he  succeeds 


he  determined  to  contract  his  troops  into  the  smallest 
compass  and  force  his  way  at  full  speed  into  Potidaea.  to  Potidaea. 
.Harassed  by  the  missiles  of  the  enemy  he  pushed  forward 
through  the  water  a  along  the  bank  in  front  of  the  sea-wall, 
not  without  loss  ;  but  he  contrived  to  save  the  greater 
part  of  his  army.  When  the  battle  began,  the  allies  of 
the  Potidaeans  in  Olynthus,  which  is  only  about  seven 
miles  b  distant,  and  is  visible  from  Potidaea,  seeing  the 
standards  raised,  came  out  a  little  way  to  support  their 
friends  ;  and  the  Macedonian  horse  drew  up  in  order  of 
battle  to  oppose  them.  But  victory  quickly  declared  for 
the  Athenians  ;  and  when  the  standards  were  torn  down 
the  Olynthian  auxiliaries  retired  within  the  walls,  and 
the  Macedonians  rejoined  the  Athenians  :  thus  on  neither 
side  did  the  cavalry  take  any  part  in  trie  action.  .The 
Athenians  raised  a  trophy  and  granted  the  Potidaeans 
a  truce  for  the  burial  of  their  dead.  Of  the  Potidaeans 

a  Cp.  Herod,  viii.  129. 

b  Sixty  stadia,  the  stadium  being  reckoned  at  two  hundred  and 
two  yards. 


40  BLOCKADE    OF  POTIDAEA. 

I.        and  their  allies,  there   fell   somewhat   less   than  three  B.C.  432. 
hundred  ;   of  the  Athenians,  a  hundred  and  fifty,  and 
their  general  Callias. 

64.          The  Athenians  instantly  blockaded  the  town  on  the 
TheAthe-    side  towards  the  Isthmus,  raising  a  wall,  which  they 

nians  block- 


ade Poti-  guarded  ;  but  the  side  towards  Pallene  was  left  open. 
firsfoniy  They  were  conscious  that  they  were  too  weak  both  to 
guard  the  ^thmus  and,  crossing  over  to  Pallene,  there 


isthmus  ;     to  build  another  wall  ;  they  feared  that  if  they  divided 

afterwards, 

by  the  help  their  forces,  they  would  be  attacked  by  the  Potidaeans 
and  their  allies.     Afterwards,  when  the  Athenians  at 

home  heard  that  on  the  side  towards  Pallene  Potidaea 
was  not  invested,  they  sent  out  sixteen  hundred  hoplites 
of  their  own  under  the  command  of  Phormio  the  son  of 
Asopius.  On  his  arrival  in  Pallene  he  made  Aphytis  his 
head-quarters,  and  brought  his  army  by  slow  marches  up 
to  Potidaea,  wasting  the  country  as  he  went  along.  No 
one  came  out  to  meet  him,  and  so  he  built  a  wall  towards 
Pallene.  Potidaea  was  now  closely  invested  on  both 
sides,  while  the  Athenian  ships,  cruising  about,  cut  off 
all  communication  from  the  sea. 

65.          Aristeus  despaired  of  saving  the  place  unless  aid  came 
Aristeus      from  Peloponnesus  or  he  was  relieved  in  some  unforeseen 

leaves  Po-  _    .  .  t  .  .  , 

tidaeaand   manner.     Being  anxious  to  husband  provisions,  he  pro- 
SevSr°out-  Posed  to  the  garrison  that  they  should  avail  themselves 


favourable  wind  and  sail  away,  leaving  be- 
hind five  hundred  men,  of  whom  he  offered  to  be  one. 
But  they  would  not  listen  to  him  ;  so,  wanting  to  do 
the  best  he  could,  and  to  further  the  Peloponnesian 
interests  beyond  the  walls,  he  sailed  out  undiscovered 
by  the  Athenian  guard-ships.  He  did  not  leave  the 
country,  but  assisted  the  Chalcidians  in  carrying  on  the 
war.  He  succeeded  in  cutting  off  a  large  force  of  Sermy- 
lians  by  an  ambuscade  which  he  laid  near  their  city  ;  he 
also  exerted  himself  to  obtain  aid  from  Peloponnesus. 
Phormio  with  his  sixteen  hundred  hoplites,  now  that 
Potidaea  was  invested,  ravaged  Chalcidice  and  Bottice, 
and  captured  several  places. 


MEETING    OF  ALLIES  AT  SPARTA.  41 

B.C.  432.  Such  were  the  causes  of  ill-feeling  which  at  this  time  I. 
7'  existed  between  the  Athenians  and  Peloponnesians :  66. 
the  Corinthians  complaining  that  the  Athenians  were 
blockading  their  colony  of  Potidaea,  which  was  occu- 
pied by  a  Corinthian  and  Peloponnesian  garrison ;  the 
Athenians  rejoining  that  the  Peloponnesians  had  excited 
to  revolt  a  state  which  was  an  ally  and  tributary  of 
theirs,  and  that  they  had  now  openly  joined  the  Poti- 
daeans,  and  were  fighting  on  their  side.  The  Pelopon- 
nesian war,  however,  had  not  yet  broken  out ;  the  peace 
still  continued ;  for  thus  far  the  Corinthians  had  acted 
alone. 

But  now,  seeing  Potidaea  besieged,  they  bestirred  them-      6  7. 
selves  in  earnest.     Corinthian  troops  were  shut  up  within  Excitement 
the  walls,  and  they  were  afraid  of  losing  the  town  ;  so  rinthians. 


without  delay  they  invited  the  allies  to  meet  at  Sparta. 
There  they  inveighed  against  the  Athenians,  whom  they 
affirmed  to  have  broken  the  treaty  and  to  have  wronged 
the  Peloponnesians.  The  Aeginetans  did  not  venture  to 
send  envoys  openly,  but  secretly  they  acted  with  the 
Corinthians,  and  were  among  the  chief  instigators  of 
the  war,  declaring  that  they  had  been  robbed  of  the 
independence  which  the  treaty  guaranteed  them.  The 
Lacedaemonians  themselves  then  a  proceeded  to  summon 
any  of  the  allies  who  had  similar  charges a  to  bring 
against  the  Athenians,  and  calling  their  own  ordinary 
assembly  told  them  to  speak.  Several  of  them  came 
forward  and  stated  their  wrongs.  The  Megarians  alleged, 
among  other  grounds  of  complaint,  that  they  were  ex- 
cluded from  all  harbours  within  the  Athenian  dominion 
and  from  the  Athenian  market,  contrary  to  the  treaty. 
The  Corinthians  waited  until  the  other  allies  had  stirred 
up  the  Lacedaemonians;  at  length  they  came  forward, 
and,  last  of  all,  spoke  as  follows  : — 

8  The  spirit  of  trust,  Lacedaemonians,  which  animates      68. 

a  Or,  adopting  the  inferior  reading  T&V  o-vpudxav  re  KOI  ei  TIS  : 
'  proceeded  to  summon  any  of  their  own  allies,  and  any  one  else, 
who  had  similar  charges/  etc. 


42,  SPEECH   OF  THE    CORINTHIANS. 

I.        your  own  political  and  social  life,  a  makes  you  distrust  B.C.  432. 
TheCorin-  others  who,  like  ourselves,  have  something  unpleasant 

thianscom-  '  5  6 

plain  of  the  to  say a,  and  this  temper  of  mind,  though  favourable  to 
Spartans,  e  moderation,  too  often  leaves  you  in  ignorance  of  what 
is  going  on  outside  your  own  country.  Time  after  time 
we  have  warned  you  of  the  mischief  which  the  Athenians 
would  do  to  us,  but  instead  of  taking  our  words  to  heart, 
you  chose  to  suspect  that  we  only  spoke  from  interested 
motives.  And  this  is  the  reason  why  you  have  brought 
the  allies  to  Sparta  too  late,  not  before  but  after  the  in- 
jury has  been  inflicted,  and  when  they  are  smarting  under 
the  sense  of  it.  Which  of  them  all  has  a  better  right  to 
speak  than  ourselves,  who  have  the  heaviest  accusations 
to  make,  outraged  as  we  are  by  the  Athenians,  and  neg- 
lected by  you  ?  If  the  crimes  which  they  are  commit- 
ting against  Hellas  were  being  done  in  a  corner,  then  you 
might  be  ignorant,  and  we  should  have  to  inform  you  of 
them  :  but  now,  what  need  of  many  words  ?  Some  of  us, 
as  you  see,  have  been  already  enslaved ;  they  are  at  this 
moment  intriguing  against  others,  notably  against  allies 
of  ours;  and  long  ago  they  had  made  all  their  pre- 
parations in  expectation  of  war.  Else  why  did  they 
seduce  from  her  allegiance  Corcyra,  which  they  still  hold 
in  defiance  of  us,  and  why  are  they  blockading  Potidaea, 
the  latter  a  most  advantageous  post  for  the  command 
of  the  Thracian  peninsula,  the  former  a  great  naval 
power  which  might  have  assisted  the  Peloponnesians  ? 
60.  'And  the  blame  of  all  this  rests  on  you;  for  you 

who  have     originally  allowed  them  to  fortify  their  city  after  the 
HelfaTby     Persian  War b,  and  afterwards  to  build  their  Long  Walls c ; 
ventme~her  anc^  to  ^s  nour  vou  nave  gone  on  defrauding  of  liberty 
enslave-       their  unfortunate  subjects,  and  are  now  beginning  to  take 
it  away  from  your  own  allies.     For  the  true  enslaver  of 
a  people  is  he  who  can  put  an  end  to  their  slavery  but 
has  no  care  about  it ;  and  all  the  more,  if  he  be  reputed 
the  champion  of  liberty  in  Hellas. — And  so  we  have  met 

a  Or,  '  makes  you  distrustful  of  us  when  we  bring  a  charge  against 
others.'  b  Gp.  i.  90-92.  c  Cp.  i.  107. 


SPEECH   OF    THE    CORINTHIANS.  43 

B.C.  432.  at  last,  but  with  what  difficulty !  and  even  now  we  have  I. 
L  37'  no  definite  object.  By  this  time  we  ought  to  have  been 
considering,  not  whether  we  are  wronged,  but  how  we  are 
to  be  revenged.  The  aggressor  is  not  now  threatening, 
but  advancing ;  he  has  made  up  his  mind,  while  we  are 
resolved  about  nothing.  And  we  know  too  well  how  by 
slow  degrees  and  with  stealthy  steps  the  Athenians  en- 
croach upon  their  neighbours.  While  they  think  that  you 
are  too  dull  to  observe  them,  they  are  more  careful,  but, 
when  they  know  that  you  wilfully  overlook  their  aggres- 
sions, they  will  strike  and  not  spare.  Of  all  Hellenes, 
Lacedaemonians,  you  are  the  only  people  who  never  do 
anything  :  on  the  approach  of  an  enemy  you  are  content 
to  defend  yourselves  against  him,  not  by  acts,  but  by 
intentions,  and  seek  to  overthrow  him,  not  in  the  infancy 
but  in  the  fulness  of  his  strength.  How  came  you  to  be 
considered  safe?  That  reputation  of  yours  was  never 
justified  by  facts.  We  all  know  that  the  Persian  made 
his  way  from  the  ends  of  the  earth  against  Peloponnesus 
before  you  encountered  him  in  a  worthy  manner;  and 
now  you  are  blind  to  the  doings  of  the  Athenians,  who 
are  not  at  a  distance  as  he  was,  but  close  at  hand. 
Instead  of  attacking  your  enemy,  you  wait  to  be  attacked, 
and  take  the  chances  of  a  struggle  which  has  been  de- 
ferred until  his  power  is  doubled.  And  you  know  that 
the  Barbarian  miscarried  chiefly  through  his  own  errors ; 
and  that  we  have  oftener  been  delivered  from  these  very 
Athenians  by  blunders  of  their  own,  than  by  any  aid 
from  you.  Some  have  already  been  ruined  by  the 
hopes  which  you  inspired  in  them ;  for  so  entirely  did 
they  trust  you  that  they  took  no  precautions  themselves. 
These  things  we  say  in  no  accusing  or  hostile  spirit — let 
that  be  understood — but  by  way  of  expostulation.  For 
men  expostulate  with  erring  friends,  they  bring  accusa- 
tion against  enemies  who  have  done  them  a  wrong. 

'And  surely  we  have  a  right  to  find  fault  with  our  70. 
neighbours,  if  any  one  ever  had.  There  are  important  £°nj£|^ 
interests  at  stake  to  which,  as  far  as  we  can  see,  man  and 


44  SPEECH   OF    THE    CORINTHIANS. 

I.  you  are  insensible.  And  you  have  never  considered  B.C.  432. 
Spartan  what  manner  of  men  are  these  Athenians a  with  whom 
you  will  have  to  fight,  and  how  utterly  unlike  your- 
selves. They  are  revolutionary,  equally  quick  in  the 
conception  and  in  the  execution  of  every  new  plan ; 
while  you  are  conservative — careful  only  to  keep  what 
you  have,  originating  nothing,  and  not  acting  even  when 
action  is  most  necessary.  They  are  bold  beyond  their 
strength ;  they  run  risks  which  prudence  would  con- 
demn ;  and  in  the  midst  of  misfortune  they  are  full  of 
hope.  Whereas  it  is  your  nature,  though  strong,  to  act 
feebly;  when  your  plans  are  most  prudent,  to  distrust 
them ;  and  when  calamities  come  upon  you,  to  think 
that  you  will  never  be  delivered  from  them.  They  are 
impetuous,  and  you  are  dilatory ;  they  are  always  abroad, 
and  you  are  always  at  home.  For  they  hope  to  gain 
something  by  leaving  their  homes ;  but  you  are  afraid 
that  any  new  enterprise  may  imperil  what  you  have 
already.  When  conquerors,  they  pursue  their  victory 
to  the  utmost ;  when  defeated,  they  fall  back  the  least. 
Their  bodies  they  devote  to  their  country  as  though 
they  belonged  to  other  men  ;  their  true  self  is  their  mind, 
which  is  most  truly  their  own  when  employed  in  her 
service.  When  they  do  not  carry  out  an  intention  which 
they  have  formed,  they  seem  to  have  sustained  a  personal 
bereavement ;  when  an  enterprise  succeeds,  they  have 
gained  a  mere  instalment  of  what  is  to  come;  but  if  they 
fail,  they  at  once  conceive  new  hopes  and  so  fill  up  the 
void.  With  them  alone  to  hope  is  to  have,  for  they  lose  not 
a  moment  in  the  execution  of  an  idea.  This  is  the  life- 
long task,  full  of  danger  and  toil,  which  they  are  always 
imposing  upon  themselves.  None  enjoy  their  good  things 
less,  because  they  are  always  seeking  for  more.  To  do 
their  duty  is  their  only  holiday,  and  they  deem  the  quiet 
of  inaction  to  be  as  disagreeable  as  the  most  tiresome 
business.  If  a  man  should  say  of  them,  in  a  word,  that 

a  For  descriptions  of  Athenian  character,  cp.  ii.  37  ff .  j  iii.  38; 
42,  43;  vi.  76;  87. 


SPEECH    OF    THE    CORINTHIANS.  45 

B.C.  432.  they  were  born  neither  to  have  peace  themselves  nor  to        I. 
allow  peace  to  other  men,  he  would  simply  speak  the  truth. 
*  In  the  face  of  such  an  enemy,  Lacedaemonians,  you 
persist  in  doing  nothing.     You  do  not  see  that  peace  is       7r 
best  secured  by  those  who  use  their  strength  justly,  but 


whose  attitude  shows  that  they  have  no  intention  of  sub-  must  lay 

mitting  to  wrong.     Justice  with  you  seems  to  consist  in  policy  of 

giving  no  annoyance  to  others  and  a  in  defending  your-  m 

selves  only  against  positive   injury*.      But  this  policy 

would  hardly  be  successful,  even  if  your  neighbours  were 

like  yourselves  ;  and  in  the  present  case,  as  we  pointed 

out  just  now,  your  ways  compared  with  theirs  are  old- 

fashioned.     And,  as  in  the  arts,  so  also  in  politics,  the 

new  must  always  prevail  over  the  old.     In  settled  times 

the  traditions  of  government  should  be  observed  :   but 

when  circumstances  are  changing  and  men  are  compelled 

to  meet  them,  much  originality  is  required.     The  Athe- 

nians have  had  a  wider  experience,  and  therefore  the 

administration  of  their  state  has  improved  faster  than 

yours.     But  here  let  your  procrastination  end  ;  send  an 

army  at  once  ,into  Attica  and  assist  your  allies,  espe- 

cially the  Potidaeans,  to  whom  your  word  is  pledged  b. 

Do  not  allow  friends  and  kindred  to  fall  into  the  hands 

of  their  worst  enemies  ;    or  drive  us  in  despair  to  seek 

the   alliance   of  others  ;    in   taking    such    a   course  we 

should  be  doing  nothing  wrong  either  before  the  Gods 

who  are  the  witnesses  of  our  oaths,  or  before  men  whose 

eyes  are  upon  us.     For  the  true  breakers  of  treaties0  are 

not  those  who,  when  forsaken,  turn  to  others,  but  those 

who  forsake  allies  whom  they  have  sworn  to  defend.  We 

will  remain  your  friends  if  you  choose  to  bestir  yourselves  ; 

for  we  should  be  guilty  of  an  impiety  if  we  deserted  you 

without  cause  ;  and  we  shall  not  easily  find  allies  equally 

congenial  to  us.     Take  heed  then  :  you  have  inherited 

from  your  fathers  the  leadership  of  Peloponnesus;  see 

that  her  greatness  suffers  no  diminution  at  your  hands/ 

a  Or,  'in  running  no  risk  even  in  self-defence.'       b  Cp.  {.58  med.  j 
c  Cp.  i.  123  fin. 


46  SPEECH   OF  THE  ATHENIANS. 

I.  Thus  spoke  the  Corinthians.     Now  there  happened  to  B.C.  432. 

j2.      be  staying  at  Lacedaemon  an  Athenian  embassy  which  ° 
Some  Athe-  had  come  on  other  business,  and  when  the  envoys  heard 
who  happen  what  the  Corinthians  had  said,  they  felt  bound  to  go  be- 
s°  arta  de-    ^ore  ^e  Lacedaemonian  assembly,  not  with  the  view  of 
sire  to  ad-    answering  the  accusations  brought  against  them  by  the 
assembly,     cities,  but  they  wanted  to  put  before  the  Lacedaemonians 
the  whole  question,  and  make  them  understand  that  they 
should  take  time  to  deliberate  and  not  be  rash.     They 
also  desired  to  set  forth  the  greatness  of  their  city,  re- 
minding the  elder  men  of  what  they  knew,  and  inform- 
ing the  younger  of  what  lay  beyond  their  experience. 
They  thought  that  their  words  would  sway  the  Lace- 
daemonians in  the  direction  of  peace.     So  they  came 
and  said  that,  if  they  might  be  allowed,  they  too  would 
like  to  address  the  people.   The  Lacedaemonians  invited 
them  to  come  forward,  and  they  spoke  as  follows  : — 
73'          'We  were  not  sent  here  to  argue  with  your  allies,  but 
on  a  special  mission ;  observing,  however,  that  no  small 
outcry  has  arisen  against  us,  we  have  come  forward,  not; 
to  answer  the  accusations  which  they  bring  (for  you  are 
not  judges  before  whom  either  we  or  they  have  to  plead), 
but  to  prevent  you  from  lending  too  ready  an  ear  to 
their  bad  advice  and  so  deciding  wrongly  about  a  very 
serious  question.    We  propose  also,  in  reply  to  the  wider 
charges  which  are  raised  against  us,  to  show  that  what 
we  have  acquired  we  hold  rightfully  and  that  our  city  is 
not  to  be  despised. 

They  recall  *  Of  the  ancient  deeds  handed  down  by  tradition  and 
which  no  eye  of  any  one  who  hears  us  ever  saw,  why 
should  we  sPeak  ?  But  of  the  Persian  War,  and  other 
War.  events  which  you  yourselves  remember,  speak  we  must, 
a  although  we  have  brought  them  forward  so  often  that 
the  repetition  of  them  is  disagreeable  to  us  a.  When  we 
faced  those  perils  we  did  so  for  the  common  benefit :  in 
the  solid  good  you  shared,  and  of  the  glory,  whatever 

a  Or,  '  although  it  may  be  disagreeable  to  you  to  hear  what  we 
are  always  bringing  forward.' 


SPEECH   OF  THE   ATHENIANS.  47 

B.C.  432.  good  there  may  be  in  that,  we  would  not  be  wholly  de-  I. 
" 87'  prived.  Our  words  are  not  designed  to  deprecate  hos- 
tility, but  to  set  forth  in  evidence  the  character  of  the 
city  with  which,  unless  you  are  very  careful,  you  will 
soon  be  involved  in  war.  We  tell  you  that  we,  first  and 
alone,  dared  to  engage  with  the  Barbarian  at  Marathon, 
and  that,  when  he  came  again,  being  too  weak  to  defend 
ourselves  by  land,  we  and  our  whole  people  embarked 
on  shipboard  and  shared  with  the  other  Hellenes  in  the 
victory  of  Salamis.  Thereby  he  was  prevented  from 
sailing  to  the  Peloponnesus  and  ravaging  city  after  city ; 
for  against  so  mighty  a  fleet  how  could  you  have  helped 
one  another?  He  himself  is  the  best  witness  of  our 
words ;  for  when  he  was  once  defeated  at  sea,  he  felt 
that  his  power  was  gone  and  quickly  retreated  with  the 
greater  part  of  his  army. 

'  The  event  proved  undeniably  that  the  fate  of  Hellas  74- 
depended  on  her  navy.  And  the  three  chief  elements  of 
success  were  contributed  by  us ;  namely,  the  greatest 
number  of  ships,  the  ablest  general,  the  most  devoted 
patriotism.  The  ships  in  all  numbered  four  hundred a, 
and  of  these,  our  own  contingent  amounted  to  nearly 
two-thirds.  To  the  influence  of  Themistocles  our  general 
it  was  chiefly  due  that  we  fought  in  the  strait,  which  was 
confessedly  our  salvation  ;  and  for  this  service  you  your- 
selves honoured  him  above  any  stranger  who  ever  visited 
you.  Thirdly,  we  displayed  the  most  extraordinary 
courage  and  devotion ;  there  was  no  one  to  help  us  by 
land  ;  for  up  to  our  frontier  those  who  lay  in  the  enemy's 
path  were  already  slaves  ;  so  we  determined  to  leave  our 
city  and  sacrifice  our  homes.  Even  in  that  extremity 
we  did  not  choose  to  desert  the  cause  of  the  allies  who 
still  resisted,  and  by  dispersing  ourselves  to  become  use- 
less to  them ;  but  we  embarked  and  fought,  taking  no 
offence  at  your  failure  to  assist  us  sooner.  We  maintain 
then  that  we  rendered  you  a  service  at  least  as  great  as 
you  rendered  us.  The  cities  from  which  you  came  to 
a  Reading  with  the  great  majority  of  MSS. 


48  SPEECH   OF  THE  ATHENIANS. 

I.  help  us  were  still  inhabited  and  you  might  hope  to  re-  B.C.  432. 
turn  to  them  ;  your  concern  was  for  yourselves  and  not 
for  us  ;  at  any  rate  you  remained  at  a  distance  while  we 
had  anything  to  lose.  But  we  went  forth  from  a  city 
which  was  no  more,  and  fought  for  one  of  which  there 
was  small  hope  ;  and  yet  we  saved  ourselves,  and  bore 
our  part  in  saving  you.  If,  in  order  to  preserve  our  land, 
like  other  states,  we  had  gone  over  to  the  Persians  at 
first,  or  afterwards  had  not  ventured  to  embark  because 
our  ruin  was  already  complete,  it  would  have  been  use- 
less for  you  with  your  weak  navy  to  fight  at  sea,  but 
everything  would  have  gone  quietly  just  as  the  Persian 
desired. 

75-          '  Considering,  Lacedaemonians,  the  energy  and  sagacity 
which  we  then  displayed,  do  we  deserve  to  be  so  bitterly 
hated  for     hated  by  the  other  Hellenes  merely  because  we  have  an 

having  .-./__  . 

saved  Hei-  empire  ?  That  empire  was  not  acquired  by  force  ;  but 
empire  was  you  would  riot  stay  and  make  an  end  of  the  Barbarian, 
padon.'but"  and  the  allies  came  °f  their  own  accord  and  asked  us  to 


their  leaders.  The  subsequent  development  of  our 
stances.  power  was  originally  forced  upon  us  by  circumstances  ; 
fear  was  our  first  motive  ;  afterwards  ambition,  and  then 
interest  stepped  in.  And  when  we  had  incurred  the 
hatred  of  most  of  our  allies  ;  when  some  of  them  had 
already  revolted  and  been  subjugated,  and  you  were  no 
longer  the  friends  to  us  which  you  once  had  been,  but 
suspicious  and  ill-disposed,  how  could  we  without  great 
risk  relax  our  hold  ?  For  the  cities  as  fast  as  they  fell 
away  from  us  would  have  gone  over  to  you.  And  no 
man  is  to  be  reproached  who  seizes  every  possible  ad- 
vantage when  the  danger  is  so  great. 

76,          c  At  all  events,  Lacedaemonians,  we  may  retort  that  you, 

The  Lace-    in  the  exercise  of  your  supremacy,  manage  the  cities  of 

woui^have3  Peloponnesus  to  suit  your  own  views  ;  and  that  if  you, 

than  th°rse  and  not  we'  ^ad  Persevered  in  the  command  of  the  allies 

were.          long  enough  to  be  hated,  you  would  have  been  quite  as 

intolerable  to  them  as  we  are,  and  would  have  been  com- 

pelled, for  the  sake  of  your  own  safety,  to  rule  with  a 


SPEECH   OF   THE    ATHENIANS.  49 

B.C.  432.  strong  hand.  An  empire  was  offered  to  us :  can  you  I. 
wonder  that,  acting  as  human  nature  always  will,  we  ac- 
cepted it  and  refused  to  give  it  up  again,  constrained  by 
three  all-powerful  motives,  ambition,  fear,  interest.  We 
are  not  the  first  who  have  aspired  to  rule  ;  the  world  has 
ever  held  that  the  weaker  must  be  kept  down  by  the 
stronger.  And  we  think  that  we  are  worthy  of  power ; 
and  there  was  a  time  when  you  thought  so  too ;  but  now, 
when  you  mean  expediency  you  talk  about  justice.  Did 
justice  ever  deter  any  one  from  taking  by  force  whatever 
he  could  ?  Men  who  indulge  the  natural  ambition  of 
empire  deserve  credit  if  they  are  in  any  degree  more 
careful  of  justice  than  they  need  be.  How  moderate  we 
are  would  speedily  appear  if  others  took  our  place ; 
indeed  our  very  moderation,  which  should  be  our  glory, 
has  been  unjustly  converted  into  a  reproach. 

'For  because  in  our  suits  with  our  allies,  regulated  by      77- 
treaty,  we  do  not  even  stand  upon  our  rights,  but  have  They  were 

J '  thought  to 

instituted  the  practice  of  deciding  them  at  Athens  and  be  litigious, 
by  Athenian  law,  we  are  supposed  to  be  litigious.    None  they  aifow- 
of  our  opponents  observe  why  others,  who  exercise  do-  subjects  a 
minion  elsewhere  and  are  less  moderate  than  we  are  in  law  otter 

than  the 

their  dealings  with  their  subjects,  escape  this  reproach,  law  of  the 
Why  is  it  ?  Because  men  who  practise  violence  have  no  s 
longer  any  need  of  law.  But  we  are  in  the  habit  of 
meeting  our  allies  on  terms  of  equality,  and,  therefore,  if 
through  some  legal  decision  of  ours,  or  exercise  of  our 
imperial  power,  contrary  to  their  own  ideas  of  right,  they 
suffer  ever  so  little,  they  are  not  grateful  for  our  modera- 
tion in  leaving  them  so  much,  but  are  far  more  offended 
at  their  trifling  loss  than  if  we  had  from  the  first  plun- 
dered them  in  the  face  of  day,  laying  aside  all  thought 
of  law.  For  then  they  would  themselves  have  admitted 
that  the  weaker  must  give  way  to  the  stronger.  Man- 
kind resent  injustice  more  than  violence,  because  the  one 
seems  to  be  an  unfair  advantage  taken  by  an  equal,  the 
other  is  the  irresistible  force  of  a  superior.  They  were 
patient  under  the  yoke  of  the  Persian,  who  inflicted  on 


50  SPEECH   OF   THE    ATHENIANS. 

I.       them  far  more  grievous  wrongs;  but  now  our  dominion  is  B.C.  432. 
The  ruler  of  odious  in  their  eyes.     And  no  wonder :  the  ruler  of  the 
aiwaysmi-   day  is  always  detested  by  his  subjects.    And  should  your 
popular.       empire  supplant  ours,  may  not  you  lose  the  good-will 
which  you  owe  to  the  fear  of  us  ?     Lose  it  you  certainly 
will,  if  you  mean  again  to  exhibit  the  temper  of  which  you 
gave  a  specimen  when,  for  a  short  time,  you  led  the  con- 
federacy against  the  Persian.     For  the  institutions  under 
which  you  live  are  incompatible  with  those  of  foreign 
states  ;   and  further,  when  any  of  you  goes  abroad,  he 
respects  neither  these  nor  any  other  Hellenic  laws  a. 

78.  '  Do  not  then  be  hasty  in  deciding  a  question  which  is 
The  Lace-    serious ;  and  do  not,  by  listening  to  the  misrepresenta- 

daemonians  A.  .  i    •    ^        r       i  i  11 

should  not  tions  and  complaints  ot  others,  bring  trouble  upon  your- 
fheSgT-1  selves.  Realise,  while  there  is  time,  the  inscrutable 
tion  of  nature  of  war ;  and  how  when  protracted  it  generally 

others. 

ends  in  becoming  a  mere  matter  of  chance,  over  which 
neither  of  us  can  have  any  control,  the  event  being 
equally  unknown  and  equally  hazardous  to  both.  The 
misfortune  is  that  in  their  hurry  to  go  to  war,  men  begin 
with  blows,  and  when  a  reverse  comes  upon  them,  then 
have  recourse  to  words.  But  neither  you,  nor  we,  have 
as  yet  committed  this  mistake ;  and  therefore  while  both 
of  us  can  still  choose  the  prudent  part,  we  tell  you  not  to 
break  the  peace  or  violate  your  oaths.  Let  our  differences 
be  determined  by  arbitration,  according  to  the  treaty.  If 
you  refuse  we  call  to  witness  the  Gods,  by  whom  you 
have  sworn,  that  you  are  the  authors  of  the  war ;  and 
we  will  do  our  best  to  strike  in  return.' 

79.  When   the   Lacedaemonians   had  heard   the   charges 
brought  by  the  allies  against  the  Athenians,  and  their 
rejoinder,   they   ordered   everybody  but   themselves   to 
withdraw,   and  deliberated  alone.     The   majority  were 
agreed  that  there   was   now   a   clear   case  against   the 
Athenians,   and   that   they   must    fight  at   once.      But 
Archidamus  their  king,  who  was  held   to  be  both  an 

a  For  the  misconduct  of  Spartan  officers  abroad,  cp.  i.  95  ;  i.  13°  ; 
iii.  32  ;  iii.  93  fin.;  viii.  84  init.     Contrast  Brasidas,  iv.  81. 


SPEECH   OF  ARCHIDAMUS.  51 

B.C.  432.  able  and  a  prudent  man,  came  forward  and  spoke  as        I. 

Ol.  87.       c  ,, 

follows  :  — 

'At  my  age,  Lacedaemonians,  I  have  had  experience      80. 
of  many  wars,  and  I  see  several  of  you  who  are  as  old  as  We  are  no 

.  match  for 

I  am,  and  who  will  not,  as  men  too  often  do,  desire  war  the  Athe- 
because  they  have  never  known  it,  or  in  the  belief  that  it  m 
is  either  a  good  or  a  safe  thing.  Any  one  who  calmly 
reflects  will  find  that  the  war  about  which  you  are  now 
deliberating  is  likely  to  be  a  very  great  one.  When  we 
encounter  our  neighbours  in  the  Peloponnese,  their  forces 
are  like  our  forces,  and  they  are  all  within  a  short  march.  - 
But  when  we  have  to  do  with  men  whose  country  is  a 
long  way  off,  and  who  are  most  skilful  seamen  and 
thoroughly  provided  with  the  means  of  war,  —  having 
wealth,  private  and  public,  ships,  horses,  infantry,  and 
a  population  larger  than  is  to  be  found  in  any  single 
Hellenic  territory,  not  to  speak  of  the  numerous  allies 
who  pay  them  tribute,  —  is  this  a  people  against  whom  we 
can  lightly  take  up  arms  or  plunge  into  a  contest  unpre- 
pared? To  what  do  we  trust?  To  our  navy?  There 
we  are  inferior  ;  and  to  exercise  and  train  ourselves  until 
we  are  a  match  for  them,  will  take  time.  To  our  money? 
Nay,  but  in  that  we  are  weaker  still  ;  we  have  none  in 
our  treasury,  and  we  are  never  willing  to  contribute  out 
of  our  private  means. 

'Perhaps  some  one  maybe  encouraged  by  the  superior      8  1. 
quality  and  numbers  of  our  infantry,  which  will  enable  We  have 
us  regularly  to  invade  and  ravage  their  lands.     But  their  ntes,  but 
empire  extends  to  distant  countries,  and  they  will  be  extends?!!* 
able  to  introduce  supplies  by  sea.     Or,  again,  we  may 


try  to  stir  up  revolts  among  their  allies.     But  these  are  by  which 

°  in-   t^1"  navy  *s 

mostly  islanders,  and  we  shall  have  to  employ  a  fleet  in  supported  ; 
their  defence,  as  well  as  in  our  own.     How  then  shall  we  ravage  their 
carry  on  the  war  ?     For  if  we  can  neither  defeat  them  at  j^sd  is  use" 
sea,  nor  deprive  them  of  the  revenues  by  which  their 
navy  is  maintained,  we  shall  get  the  worst  of  it.     And 
having  gone  so  far,  we  shall  no  longer  be  able  even  to 
make  peace  with  honour,  especially  if  we  are  believed  to 

E  2 


52  SPEECH   OF   ARCHIDAMUS. 

I.       have  begun  the  quarrel.     We  must  not  for  one  moment  B.C.  432. 
flatter  ourselves  that  if  we  do  but  ravage  their  country  the 
war  will  be  at  an  end.    Nay,  I  fear  that  we  shall  bequeath 
it   to  our  children  ;    for  the  Athenians  with  their  high 
spirit  will  never  barter  their  liberty  to  save  their  land, 
or  be  terrified  like  novices  at  the  sight  of  war. 
82.          'Not  that  I  would  have  you  shut  your  eyes  to  their 
Do  not  take  designs  and  abstain  from  unmasking  them,  or  tamely 

uparmsyet.        rr        .  .    .  ,,.  _^ 

suffer  them  to  injure  our  allies.  But  do  not  take  up  arms 
yet.  Let  us  first  send  and  remonstrate  with  them :  we 
need  not  let  them  know  positively  whether  we  intend  to 
go  to  war  or  not.  In  the  meantime  our  own  preparations 
may  be  going  forward ;  we  may  seek  for  allies  wherever 
we  can  find  them,  whether  in  Hellas  or  among  the  Bar- 
barians, who  will  supply  our  deficiencies  in  ships  and 
money.  Those  who,  like  ourselves,  are  exposed  to 
Athenian  intrigue  cannot  be  blamed  if  in  self-defence 
they  seek  the  aid  not  of  Hellenes  only,  but  of  Barbarians. 
And  we  must  develope  our  own  resources  to  the  utmost. 
If  they  listen  to  our  ambassadors,  well  and  good  ;  but,  if 
not,  in  two  or  three  years'  time  we  shall  be  in  a  stronger 
position,  should  we  then  determine  to  attack  them.  Per- 
haps too  when  they,  begin  to  see  that  we  are  getting 
ready,  a  and  that  our  words  are  to  be  interpreted  by  our 
actions a,  they  may  be  more  likely  to  yield ;  for  their 
fields  will  be  still  untouched  and  their  goods  undespoiled, 
and  it  will  be  in  their  power  to  save  them  by  their 
decision.  Think  of  their  land  simply  in  the  light  of  a 
hostage,  all  the  more  valuable  in  proportion  as  it  is 
better  cultivated  ;  you  should  spare  it  as  long  as  you 
can,  and  not  by  reducing  them  to  despair  make  their 
resistance  more  obstinate.  For  if  we  allow  ourselves  to 
be  stung  into  premature  action  by  the  reproaches  of  our 
allies,  and  waste  their  country  before  we  are  ready,  we 
shall  only  involve  Peloponnesus  in  more  and  more  diffi- 
culty and  disgrace.  Charges  brought  by  cities  or  persons 
against  one  another  can  be  satisfactorily  arranged ;  but 
a  Or,  'and  that  our  words  too  sound  a  note  of  war.'. 


SPEECH   OF   ARCHIDAMUS.  53 

B.C.  432.  when   a  great  confederacy,  in  order  to   satisfy  private        I. 
7'     grudges,  undertakes  a  war  of  which  no  man  can  foresee 
the  issue,  it  is  not  easy  to  terminate  it  with  honour. 

And  let  no  one  think  that  there  is  any  want  of  courage      83. 
in  cities  so  numerous  hesitating  to  attack  a  single  one.  There  is  no 

T«I          1  i        A    i  cowardice 

The  allies  of  the  Athenians  are  not  less  numerous  ;  they  in  hesita- 
pay  them  tribute  too  ;  and  war  is  not  an  affair  of  arms,  fighting 
but  of  money  which  gives  to  arms  their  use,  and  which  ^hens^but 
is  needed  above  all  things  when  a  continental  is  fighting  against  the 
against  a  maritime  power  :  let  us  find  money  first,  and  nian  em- 
then  we  may  safely  allow  our  minds  to  be  excited  by  the  pl 
speeches  of  our  allies.     We,  on  whom  the  future  respon- 
sibility, whether  for  good  or  evil,  will  chiefly  fall,  should 
calmly  reflect  on  the  consequences  which  may  follow. 

'Do  not  be  ashamed  of  the  slowness  and  procrastina-      84. 
tion  with  which  they  are  so  fond  of  charging  you  ;  if  you  TOO  much 

...  .  ...  .  .  haste,  too 

begin  the  war  in  haste,  you  will  end  it  at  your  leisure,  mile  speed. 


because  you  took  up  arms  without  sufficient  preparation.    ™  nd 
Remember  that  we  have  always  been  citizens  of  a  free  discipline 

are  the  se- 

and  most  illustrious  state,  and  that  for  us  the   policy  cret  of  our 
which  they  condemn  may  well  be  the  truest  good  sense  we  must' 
and  discretion.     It  is  a  policy  which  has  saved  us  from  "aiue'our" 
growing    insolent   in    prosperity   or   giving  way  under  ^"J^5' 
adversity,  like   other  men.     We  are  not  stimulated  by  must  not 
the  allurements   of  flattery  into   dangerous  courses  of  tuiL°n 
which  we  disapprove  ;  nor  are  we  goaded  by  offensive 
charges  into  compliance  with  any  man's  wishes.     Our 
habits  of  discipline  make  us  both  brave  and  wise;  brave, 
because  the  spirit  of  loyalty  quickens  the  sense  of  honour, 
and  the  sense  of  honour  inspires  courage  ;  wise,  because 
we  are  not  so  highly  educated  that  we  have  learned  to 
despise  the  laws,  and  are  too  severely  trained  and  of  too 
loyal  a  spirit  to  disobey  them.     We  have  not  acquired 
that   useless   over-intelligence  which  makes   a  man  an 
excellent  critic  of  an  enemy's  plans,  but  paralyses  him 
in  the  moment  of  action.     We  think  that  the  wits  of  our 
enemies  are  as  good  as  our  own,  and  that  the  element  of 
fortune  cannot  be  forecast  in  words.     Let  us  assume  that 


54      THE  SHORT  SPEECH  OF  STHENELAIDAS. 

I.       they  have  common  prudence,  and  let  our  preparations  be,  B.C.  432. 
not  words,  but  deeds.     Our  hopes  ought  not  to  rest  on  OL  8?' 
the  probability  of  their  making  mistakes,  but  on  our  own 
caution  and  foresight.     We  should  remember  that  one 
man  is  much  the  same  as  another,  and  that  he  is  best 
who  is  trained  in  the  severest  school. 

85.  'These  are  principles  which  our  fathers  have  handed 

We  can  af-  down  to  us,  and  we  maintain  to  our  lasting  benefit  ;  we 

ford  to  wait, 

and  should  must  not  lose  sight  of  them,  and  when  many  lives  and 


much  wealth,  many  cities  and  a  great  name  are  at  stake, 
we  must  not  be  hasty,  or  make  up  our  minds  in  a  few 
short  hours  ;  we  must  take  time.  We  can  afford  to  wait, 
when  others  cannot,  because  we  are  strong.  And  now, 
send  to  the  Athenians  and  remonstrate  with  them 
both  about  Potidaea,  and  about  the  other  wrongs  of 
which  your  allies  complain.  They  say  that  they  are 
willing  to  have  the  matter  tried  ;  and  against  one  who 
offers  to  submit  to  justice  you  must  not  proceed  as 
against  a  criminal  until  his  cause  has  been  heard.  In 
the  meantime  prepare  for  war.  This  decision  will  be 
the  best  for  yourselves  and  the  most  formidable  to  your 
enemies.' 

Thus  spoke  Archidamus.  Last  of  all,  Sthenelaidas,  at 
that  time  one  of  the  Ephors,  came  forward  and  addressed 
the  Lacedaemonians  as  follows  :  — 

35^  '  I  do  not  know  what  the  long  speeches  of  the  Athenians 
We  must  mean.  They  have  been  loud  in  their  own  praise,  but 
the7  do  not  pretend  to  say  that  they  are  dealing  honestly 
with  our  allies  and  with  the  Peloponnesus.  If  they  be- 
haved well  in  the  Persian  War  and  are  now  behaving 
badly  to  us  they  ought  to  be  punished  twice  over,  because 
they  were  once  good  men  and  have  become  bad.  But 
we  are  the  same  now  as  we  were  then,  and  we  shall  not 
do  our  duty  if  we  allow  our  allies  to  be  ill-used,  and  put 
off  helping  them,  for  they  cannot  put  off  their  troubles. 
Others  may  have  money  and  ships  and  horses,  but  we 
have  brave  allies  and  we  must  not  betray  them  to  the 
Athenians.  If  they  were  suffering  in  word  only,  by  words 


THE  TREATY  HAS  BEEN  BROKEN.     55 

B.C.  432.  and  legal  processes  their  wrongs  might  be  redressed  ;  but  I. 
now  there  is  not  a  moment  to  be  lost,  and  we  must  help 
them  with  all  our  might.  Let  no  one  tell  us  that  we 
should  take  time  to  think  when  we  are  suffering  injustice. 
Nay,  we  reply,  those  who  mean  to  do  injustice  should 
take  a  long  time  to  think.  Wherefore,  Lacedaemonians, 
prepare  for  war  as  the  honour  of  Sparta  demands.  With- 
stand the  advancing  power  of  Athens.  Do  not  let  us 
betray  our  allies,  but,  with  the  Gods  on  our  side,  let  us 
attack  the  evil-doer.' 

When  Sthenelaidas  had  thus  spoken  he,  being  Ephor,      87. 
himself  put   the   question   to   the   Lacedaemonian   as-  The  La- 

.  .  ........          ,       cedaemo- 

sembly.     Their  custom  is  to  signify  their  decision  by  nians, 
cries  and  not  by  voting.   But  he  professed  himself  unable 
to  tell  on  which  side  was  the  louder  cry,  and  wishing 


to  call  forth  a  demonstration  which  might  encourage  nians,  re- 
the  warlike  spirit,  he  said,  '  Whoever  of  you,  Lacedae-  to  war°  g< 
monians,  thinks  that  the  treaty  has  been  broken  and 
that  the  Athenians  are  in  the  wrong,  let  him  rise  and 
go  yonder'  (pointing  to  a  particular  spot),  'and  those  who 
think  otherwise  to  the  other  side/  So  the  assembly  rose 
and  divided,  and  it  was  determined  by  a  large  majority 
that  the  treaty  had  been  broken.  The  Lacedaemonians 
then  recalled  the  allies  and  told  them  that  in  their  judg- 
ment the  Athenians  were  guilty,  but  that  they  wished 
to  hold  a  general  assembly  of  the  allies  and  take  a  vote 
from  them  all  ;  then  the  war,  if  they  approved  of  it, 
might  be  undertaken  by  common  consent.  Having  ac- 
complished their  purpose,  the  Peloponnesians  returned 
home  ;  and  the  Athenian  envoys,  when  their  errand  was 
B.C.  445.  done,  returned  likewise.  Thirteen  years  of  the  thirty 
83>  4'  years'  peace  which  was  concluded  after  the  recovery  of 
Euboea  had  elapsed  and  the  fourteenth  year  had  begun 
when  the  Lacedaemonian  assembly  decided  that  the 
treaty  had  been  broken. 

In  arriving  at  this  decision  and  resolving  to  go  to  war,       88. 
the  Lacedaemonians  were  influenced,  not  so  much  by  the 
speeches  of  their  allies,  as  by  the  fear  of  the  Athenians 


RISE    OF  THE   ATHENIAN  EMPIRE. 


I. 


89. 


The  Athe- 
nians after 
the  retreat 
of  the 
Persians 
continue 
the  war. 


90. 

The  Lace- 
daemonians 
at  the  insti- 
gation of 
their  allies 
try  to  pre- 
vent the 
Athenians 
from  re- 
building 
their  walls. 


and  of  their  increasing  power  a.    For  they  saw  the  greater 
part  of  Hellas  already  subject  to  them. 

How  the  Athenians  attained  the  position  in  which  B.C.  479. 
they  rose  to  greatness  I  will  now  proceed  to  describe. 
When  the  Persians,  defeated  both  by  sea  and  land,  had  re- 
treated from  Europe,  and  the  remnant  of  the  fleet,  which 
had  escaped  to  Mycale,  had  there  perished,  Leotychides, 
the  Lacedaemonian  king,  who  had  commanded  the  Hel- 
lenes in  the  battle,  returned  home  with  the  allies  from  Pe- 
loponnesus. But  the  Athenians  and  their  allies  from  Ionia 
and  the  Hellespont,  who  had  recently  revolted  from  the 
king,  persevered  and  besieged  Sestos,  at  that  time  still 
in  the  hands  of  the  Persians.  Remaining  there  through 
the  winter  they  took  the  place,  which  the  Barbarians 
deserted.  The  allies  then  sailed  back  from  the  Helles- 
pont to  their  respective  homes.  Meanwhile  the  Athenian 
people,  now  quit  of  the  Barbarians,  fetched  their  wives, 
their  children,  and  the  remains  of  their  property  from 
the  places  in  which  they  had  been  deposited,  and  set  to 
work,  rebuilding  the  city  and  the  walls.  Of  the  old  line 
of  wall  but  a  small  part  was  left  standing.  Most  of  the 
houses  were  in  ruins,  a  few  only  remaining  in  which  the 
chief  men  of  the  Persians  had  lodged. 

The  Lacedaemonians  knew  what  would  happen  and 
sent  an  embassy  to  Athens.  They  would  rather  them- 
selves have  seen  neither  the  Athenians  nor  any  one  else 
protected  by  a  wall ;  but  their  main  motive  was  the 
importunity  of  their  allies,  who  dreaded  not  only  the 
Athenian  navy,  which  had  until  lately  been  quite  small, 
but  also  the  spirit  which  had  animated  them  in  the  Per- 
sian War.  So  the  Lacedaemonians  requested  them  not 
to  restore  their  walls b,  but  on  the  contrary  to  join  with 
them  in  razing  the  fortifications  of  other  towns  outside 
the  Peloponnesus  which  had  them  standing.  They  did 
not  reveal  their  real  wishes  or  the  suspicion  which  they 
entertained  of  the  Athenians,  but  argued  that  the  Bar- 
barian, if  he  again  attacked  them,  would  then  have  no 
a  Cp.  i.  23  fin.  l!  Cp.  i.  69  init. 


THE  ATHENIANS  REBUILD   THEIR  WALLS.    57 

B.C.  479-  strong  place  which  he  could  make  his  head-quarters  as  L 
01.75,  2,  3.  he  had  lately  made  Thebes.  Peloponnesus  would  be  a 
sufficient  retreat  for  all  Hellas  and  a  good  base  of  opera- 
tions. To  this  the  Athenians,  by  the  advice  of  Themis- 
tocles,  replied,  that  they  would  send  an  embassy  of  their 
own  to  discuss  the  matter,  and  so  got  rid  of  the  Spartan 
envoys.  He  then  proposed  that  he  should  himself  start 
at  once  for  Sparta,  and  that  they  should  give  him  col- 
leagues who  were  not  to  go  immediately,  but  were  to 
wait  until  the  wall  reached  the  lowest  height  which  could 
possibly  be  defended.  The  whole  people,  men,  women, 
and  children,  should  join  in  the  work,  and  they  must  spare 
no  building,  private  or  public,  which  could  be  of  use,  but 
demolish  them  all.  Having  given  these  instructions  and 
intimated  that  he  would  manage  affairs  at  Sparta,  he  de- 
parted. On  his  arrival  he  did  not  at  once  present  him- 
self officially  to  the  magistrates,  but  delayed  and  made 
excuses ;  and  when  any  of  them  asked  him  '  why  he  did 
not  appear  before  the  assembly,'  he  said  'that  he  was 
waiting  for  his  colleagues,  who  had  been  detained  by 
some  engagement ;  he  was  daily  expecting  them,  and 
wondered  that  they  had  not  appeared.' 

The  friendship  of  the  Lacedaemonian  magistrates  for      91. 
Themistocles  induced  them  to  believe  him ;   but  when  The  Lace- 

.  daemonians 

everybody  who  came  from  Athens  declared   positively  are  out- 
that  the  wall  was  building  and  had  already  reached  a  Themisto- 
considerable  height,  they  knew  not  what  to  think.     He,  cles- 
aware  of  their  suspicions,  desired  them  not  to  be  misled 
by  reports,  but  to  send  to  Athens  men  whom  they  could 
trust  out  of  their  own  number  who  would  see  for  them- 
selves and  bring  back  word.    They  agreed ;  and  he  at  the 
same  time  privately  instructed  the  Athenians  to  detain 
the  envoys  as  quietly  as  they  could,  and  not  let  them  go 
until  he  and  his  colleagues  had  got  safely  home.     For 
by  this  time  Habronichus  the  son  of  Lysicles,  and  Aris- 
tides  the  son  of  Lysimachus,  who  were  joined  with  him 
in  the  embassy,  had  arrived,  bringing  the  news  that  the 
wall  was  of  sufficient  height ;  and  he  was  afraid  that  the 


58  THEMISTOCLES    AT  SPARTA. 

I.  Lacedaemonians,  when  they  heard  the  truth,  might  not  6.0.479- 
allow  them  to  return.  So  the  Athenians  detained  the  01. 75,  2,  3. 
envoys,  and  Themistocles,  coming  before  the  Lacedae- 
monians, at  length  declared  in  so  many  words  that  Athens 
was  now  provided  with  walls  and  could  protect  her 
citizens ;  henceforward,  if  the  Lacedaemonians  or  their 
allies  wished  at  any  time  to  negotiate,  they  must  deal 
with  the  Athenians  as  with  men  who  knew  quite  well 
what  was  for  their  own  and  the  common  good.  When 
they  boldly  resolved  to  leave  their  city  and  go  on  board 
ship,  they  did  not  first  ask  the  advice  of  the  Lacedae- 
monians, and,  when  the  two  states  met  in  council,  their 
own  judgment  had  been  as  good  as  that  of  any  one. 
And  now  they  had  arrived  at  an  independent  opinion 
that  it  was  better  far,  and  would  be  more  advantageous 
both  for  themselves  and  for  the  whole  body  of  the  allies, 
that  their  city  should  have  a  wall ;  when  any  member  of 
a  confederacy  had  not  equal  military  advantages,  his 
counsel  could  not  be  of  equal  weight  or  worth.  Either 
all  the  allies  should  pull  down  their  walls,  or  they  should 
acknowledge  that  the  Athenians  were  in  the  right. 
Q2.  On  hearing  these  words  the  Lacedaemonians  did  not 

But  appear-  openly  quarrel  with  the  Athenians ;   for  they  professed 
maintained,  ^at  the  embassy  had  been  designed,  not  to  interfere  with 
f^rmcTen   ^iemj  kut  to  °^er  a  suggestion  for  the  public  good  ;  be- 
quan-ei.       sides  at  that  time  the  patriotism  which  the  Athenians 
had  displayed  in  the  Persian  War  had  created  a  warm 
feeling  of  friendliness  between  the  two  cities.    They  were 
annoyed  at  the  failure  of  their  purpose,  but  they  did  not 
show  it.     And  the  envoys  on  either  side  returned  home 
without  any  formal  complaint. 

93.  In  such  hurried  fashion  did  the  Athenians  rebuild  the 

walls  of  their  city.  To  this  day  the  structure  shows  evi- 
dence of  haste.  The  foundations  are  made  up  of  all 
sorts  of  stones,  in  some  places  unwrought,  and  laid  just 
as  each  worker  brought  them;  there  were  many  columns 
too,  taken  from  sepulchres,  and  many  old  stones  already 
cut,  inserted  in  the  work.  The  circuit  of  the  city  was 


COMPLETION  OF   THE   PIRAEUS.  59 

B.C.  478  or  extended  in  every  direction,  and  the  citizens,  in  their        I. 

p7i775,  3  or  ardour  to  complete  the  design,  spared  nothing. 

Themistocles  also  persuaded  the  Athenians  to  finish  Constmc- 

B.c.  481?    the  Piraeus,  of  which  he  had  made  a  beginning  in  his 

>1>74'4?  year  of  office  as  Archon.  The  situation  of  the  place, 
which  had  three  natural  havens,  was  excellent  ;  and  now 
that  the  Athenians  had  become  sailors,  he  thought  that  Athens. 
a  good  harbour  would  greatly  contribute  to  the  extension 
of  their  power.  For  he  first  dared  to  say  that  *  they  must 
make  the  sea  their  domain,'  and  he  lost  no  time  in  laying 
the  foundations  of  their  empire.  By  his  advice,  they 
built  the  wall  of  such  a  width  that  two  waggons  carrying 
the  stones  could  meet  and  pass  on  the  top  ;  this  width 
may  still  be  traced  at  the  Piraeus  ;  inside  there  was  no 
rubble  or  mortar,  but  the  whole  wall  was  made  up  of 
large  stones  hewn  square,  which  were  clamped  on  the 
outer  face  with  iron  and  lead.  The  height  was  not  more 
than  half  what  he  had  originally  intended  ;  he  had  hoped 
by  the  very  dimensions  of  the  wall  to  paralyse  the  de- 
signs of  an  enemy,  and  he  thought  that  a  handful  of  the 
least  efficient  citizens  would  suffice  for  its  defence,  while 
the  rest  might  man  the  fleet.  His  mind  was  turned  in 
this  direction,  as  I  conceive,  from  observing  that  the 
Persians  had  met  with  fewer  obstacles  by  sea  than  by 
land.  The  Piraeus  appeared  to  him  to  be  of  more  real 
consequence  than  the  upper  city.  He  was  fond  of  telling 
the  Athenians  that  if  they  were  hard  pressed  they  should 
go  down  to  the  Piraeus  and  fight  the  world  at  sea. 

Thus  the  Athenians  built  their  walls  and  restored  their 
city  immediately  after  the  retreat  of  the  Persians. 

Pausanias  the  son  of  Cleombrotus  was  now  sent  from      94. 
Peloponnesus  with  twenty  ships  in  command  of  the  Hel-  Cyprus  and 

J  Byzantium 

lenic  forces  ;  thirty  Athenian  ships  and  a  number  of  the  taken. 


allies  sailed  with  him.     They  first  made  an  expedition 
against  Cyprus,  of  which  they  subdued  the  greater  part  ; 
and   afterwards    against   Byzantium,  which  was  in  the  sanias 
hands  of  the  Persians,  and  was  taken  while  he  was  still 
in  command. 


60  PAUSANIAS  DEPOSED  FROM  HIS  COMMAND. 

I.  He  had  already  begun  to  be  oppressive,  and  the  allies  B.C.  477  or 

95.  were  offended  with  him,  especially  the  lonians  and  others  of  '7S>  4  or 

The  allies  who  had  been  recently  emancipated  from  the  king.     So  ?6- 

themselves  they  had  recourse  to  their  kinsmen  the  Athenians  and 


them  to  be  their  leaders,  and  to  protect  them 
against  Pausanias,  if  he  attempted  to  oppress  them.  The 
Athenians  took  the  matter  up  and  prepared  to  interfere, 
being  fully  resolved  to  manage  the  confederacy  in  their 
own  way.  In  the  meantime  the  Lacedaemonians  sum- 
moned Pausanias  to  Sparta,  intending  to  investigate 
certain  reports  which  had  reached  them  ;  for  he  was  ac- 
cused of  numerous  crimes  by  Hellenes  returning  from 
the  Hellespont,  and  appeared  to  exercise  his  command 
more  after  the  fashion  of  a  tyrant  than  of  a  general. 
His-  recall  occurred  at  the  very  time  when  the  hatred 
which  he  inspired  had  induced  the  allies,  with  the  ex- 
ception of  the  Peloponnesians,  to  transfer  themselves  to 
the  Athenians.  On  arriving  at  Lacedaemon  he  was 
punished  for  the  wrongs  which  he  had  done  to  particular 
persons,  but  he  had  been  also  accused  of  conspiring  with 
the  Persians,  and  of  this,  which  was  the  principal  charge 
and  was  generally  believed  to  be  proven,  he  was  ac- 
quitted. The  government  however  did  not  continue  him 
in  his  command,  but  sent  in  his  place  Dorcis  and  certain 
others  with  a  small  force.  To  these  the  allies  refused 
allegiance,  and  Dorcis,  seeing  the  state  of  affairs,  returned 
home.  Henceforth  the  Lacedaemonians  sent  out  no  more 
commanders,  for  they  were  afraid  that  those  whom  they 
appointed  would  be  corrupted,  as  they  had  found  to  be  the 
case  with  Pausanias;  they  had  had  enough  of  the  Persian 
War  ;  and  they  thought  that  the  Athenians  were  fully  able 
to  lead,  and  at  that  time  believed  them  to  be  their  friends. 
96.  Thus  the  Athenians  by  the  good-will  of  the  allies,  who 

Confedera-  detested  Pausanias,  obtained  the  leadership.     They  im- 
'  mediately  fixed  which  of  the  cities  should  supply  money 
and  which  of  them  ships  for  the  war  against  the  Bar- 
barians, the  avowed  object  being  to  compensate  them- 
selves and  the  allies  for  their  losses  by  devastating  the 


THE  ATHENIANS    LEAD    THE  ALLIES.        61 

B.C.  477  or  King's   country.     Then  was  first  instituted  at  Athens        I. 

01.  75,  4  or trie  office  of  Hellenic  treasurers  (Helleno-Tamiai),  who 
received  the  tribute,  for  so  the  impost  was  termed.  The 
amount  was  originally  fixed  at  460  talents3.  The  island 
of  Delos  was  the  treasury,  and  the  meetings  of  the  allies 
were  held  in  the  temple. 

At  first  the  allies  were  independent  and  deliberated  in      97- 
a  common   assembly  under  the  leadership    of  Athens.  T1?e ,inter- 

J  r  val  between 

But  in  the  interval  between  the  Persian  and  the  Pelo-  the  Persian 
ponnesian  Wars,  by  their  military  success  and  by  policy  ponnesian 
in  dealing  with  the  Barbarian,  with  their  own  rebellious  J^in^st 
allies  and  with  the  Peloponnesians  who  came  across  their  histories- 
path  from  time  to  time,  the  Athenians  made  immense 
strides  in  power.     I  have  gone  out  of  my  way  to  speak 
of  this  period  because  the  writers  who  have  preceded 
me  treat  either  of  Hellenic  affairs  previous  to  the  Persian 
invasion  or  of  that  invasion  itself;  the  intervening  portion 
of  history  has  been  omitted  by  all  of  them,  with  the  ex- 
ception  of  Hellanicus ;   and  he,  where  he  has  touched 
upon  it  in  his  Attic  history,  is  very  brief,  and  inaccurate 
in  his  chronology.     The  narrative  will  also  serve  to  ex- 
plain how  the  Athenian  empire  grew  up. 

B.C.  476-        First  of  all  under  the  leadership  of  Cimon,  the  son  of      g$t 
01.76-78,3.  Miltiades,  the  Athenians  besieged  and  took  from  theTheAthe- 
Persians  Eion  upon  the  Strymon,  and  sold  the  inhabit- 
ants  into  slavery.    The  same  fate  befell  Scyros,  an  island 
in  the  Aegean  inhabited  by  Dolopes  ;  this  they  colonised  Naxos. 
themselves.     They  also  carried  on  a  war  with  the  Cary- 
stians  of  Euboea,  who,  after  a  time,  capitulated ;  the  other 
Euboeans  took  no  part  in  the  war.     Then  the  Naxians 
revolted,  and  the  Athenians  made  war  against  them  and 
reduced  them  by  blockade.     This  was  the  first  of  the 
allied  cities  which  was  enslaved  contrary  to  Hellenic  law; 
the  turn  of  the  others  came  later. 

The  causes  which  led  to  the  defections  of  the  allies      99. 
were  of  different  kinds,  the  principal  being  their  neglect  Most  of  the 

.        .  alliescontri- 

to  pay  the  tribute  or  to  furnish  ships,  and,  in  some  cases,  tmte  money 
a  About  ;£i  10,400. 


62  WHO    BEGIN  TO    REVOLT. 

I.        failure  of  military  service.     For  the  Athenians  were  ex-  B.C.  476- 
insteadof    acting  and  oppressive,  using  coercive  measures  towards  01.76-78,3. 
men  who  were  neither  willing  nor  accustomed  to  work 
narcl.    And  for  various  reasons  they  soon  began  to  prove 
nians  be-     ]ess  agreeable  leaders  than  at  first.  They  no  longer  fought 
oppressive,  upon  an  equality  with  the  rest  of  the  confederates,  and 
they  had  no  difficulty  in  reducing  them  when  they  re- 
volted.   Now  the  allies  brought  all  this  upon  themselves; 
for  the  majority  of  them  disliked  military  service  and 
absence  from  home,  and  so  they  agreed  to  contribute  a 
regular  sum  of  money  instead  of  ships.     Whereby  the 
Athenian  navy  was  proportionally  increased,  while  they 
themselves  were  always  untrained  and  unprepared  for 
war  when  they  revolted. 

IOO.         A  little  later  the  Athenians  and  their  allies  fought  two  B.C.  466. 
The  Athe-   battles,  one  by  land  and  the  other  by  sea,  against  the     '  7  '  3' 

nians  con-  .  .  . 

querina     Persians,  at  the  river  Eurymedon  in  Pamphyha.     The 


Athenians,  under  the  command  of  Cimon  the  son  of 
medonUiy"  Miltiades,  on  the  same  day  conquered  in  both,  and  took 
Revolt  of  and  destroyed  Phoenician  vessels  numbering  in  all  two 
Attempted  hundred.  After  a  while  the  Thasians  revolted  ;  a  quarrel  B.C.  465. 

had  arisen  between  them  and  the  Athenians  about  the  ° 


pohs.  Thracian  market  and  the  mine  on  the  Thracian  coast 
opposite,  of  which  the  Thasians  received  the  profits.  The 
Athenians  sailed  to  Thasos  and,  gaining  a  victory  at  sea, 
landed  upon  the  island.  About  the  same  time  they  sent 
ten  thousand  of  their  own  people  and  of  their  allies  to 
the  Strymon,  intending  to  colonise  the  place  then  called 
the  Nine  Ways  and  now  Amphipolis.  They  gained 
possession  of  the  Nine  Ways,  which  were  inhabited  by 
the  Edoni,  but,  advancing  into  the  interior  of  Thrace, 
they  awere  destroyed  at  Drabescus  in  Edonia  by  the 
united  Thraciansa,  whose  country  was  threatened  by  the 
new  settlement. 

IOI.         The  Thasians,  now  defeated  and  blockaded,  had  re- 
course to  the  Lacedaemonians  and  entreated  them  to 

a  Or,  reading  avfjiTravres,  as  Poppo  is  inclined  to  do,  'were  de- 
stroyed to  a  man  by  the  Thracians.' 


THE    SIEGE    OF   THASOS    AND   ITHOME.        63 

B.C.  464.  invade  Attica.    Unknown  to  the  Athenians  they  agreed,        I. 
and  were  on  the  point  of  setting  out  when  the  great  Revolt  of 

the  Helots, 

earthquake  occurred  and  was  immediately  followed  by  who  seize 
the  revolt  of  the  Helots  and  the  Perioeci  of  Thuria  and  U 
Aethaea,  who  seized  Ithome.    These  Helots  were  mostly 
the  descendants  of  the   Messenians  who  had  been  en- 
slaved in  ancient  times,  and  hence  all  the  insurgents  were 
called  Messenians. 

B.C.  463.  While  the  Lacedaemonians  were  thus  engaged,  the 
'"  Thasians,  who  had  now  been  blockaded  for  more  than 
two  years,  came  to  terms  with  the  Athenians  ;  they 
pulled  down  their  walls  and  surrendered  their  ships;  they 
also  agreed  to  pay  what  was  required  of  them  whether 
in  the  shape  of  immediate  indemnity  or  of  tribute  for  the 
future  ;  and  they  gave  up  their  claim  to  the  mainland 
and  to  the  mine. 

B.C.  463-        The  siege  of  Ithome  proved  tedious,  and  the  Lacedae-      102. 

OK  70  2-4  rnonians  called  in,  among  other  allies,  the  Athenians,  The  Athe- 

.  .  ,-,.  nians  come. 

who  sent  to  their  aid  a  considerable  torce  under  Cimon.  to  the  as- 


The  Athenians  were  specially  invited  because  they  were 
reputed  to  be  skilful  in  siege  operations,  and  the  length 
of  the  blockade  proved  to  the  Lacedaemonians  their  own  being  sus- 
deficiency  in  that  sort  of  warfare  ;  else  why  had  they  them,  they 
not  taken  the  place  by  assault  ?  This  expedition  of  the 
Athenians  led  to  the  first  open  quarrel  between  them 
and  the  Lacedaemonians.  For  the  Lacedaemonians,  not 
succeeding  in  storming  the  place,  took  alarm  at  the  bold 
and  original  spirit  of  the  Athenians.  They  reflected  that 
they  were  aliens  in  race,  and  fearing  that,  if  they  were 
allowed  to  remain,  they  might  be  tempted  by  the  Helots 
in  Ithome  to  change  sides,  they  dismissed  them,  while 
they  retained  the  other  allies.  But  they  concealed  their 
mistrust,  and  merely  said  that  they  no  longer  needed 
their  services.  Now  the  Athenians  saw  that  their  dis- 
missal was  due  to  some  suspicion  which  had  arisen  and 
not  to  the  less  offensive  reason  which  was  openly  avowed  ; 
they  felt  keenly  that  such  a  slight  ought  not  to  have  been 
offered  them  by  the  Lacedaemonians  ;  and  so,  on  their 


64          ATHENIAN   EXPEDITION    TO    EGYPT. 

I.       return  home,  they  forthwith  abandoned  the  alliance  which  B.C.  463- 
they  had  made  with  them  against  the  Persians  and  went  01*79,  2~ 
over  to  their  Argive  enemies.     At  the  same  time  both  79>  4- 
Argos  and  Athens  bound  themselves  to  Thessaly  by  a 
common  oath  of  alliance. 

103.  In  the  tenth  year  of  the  siege  the  defenders  of  Ithome  B.C.  455. 
Fall  of        were  unable  to  hold  out  any  longer,  and  capitulated  to 

The  Athe-  the  Lacedaemonians.  The  terms  were  as  follows  :  They 
the^xUed16  wer^  to  leave  Peloponnesus  under  a  safe-conduct,  and 
Messenians  were  never  again  to  return ;  if  any  of  them  were  taken 

at  Naupac-  J 

tus.  on   Peloponnesian  soil,  he  was  to  be  the  slave  of  his 

captor.  Now  an  ancient  oracle  of  Delphi  was  current 
among  the  Lacedaemonians,  bidding  them  let  the  sup- 
pliant of  Ithomaean  Zeus  go  free.  So  the  Messenians 
left  Ithome  with  their  wives  and  children ;  and  the 
Athenians,  who  were  now  the  avowed  enemies  of  Sparta, 
gave  them  a  home  at  Naupactus,  a  place  which  they  had 
just  taken  from  the  Ozolian  Locrians. 

Athens  The  Athenians  obtained  the  alliance  of  the  Megarians,  B.C.  461- 

fmance  of  w^o  revolted  from  the  Lacedaemonians  because  the  Co-  o°'79i  4- 
vfelf  asT'  fS  rifl-thians  were  pressing  them  hard  in  a  war  arising  out  of  8o- 
Argos  and   a  question  of  frontiers.     Thus  they  gained  both  Megara 
and  Pegae ;  and  they  built  for  the  Megarians  the  long 
walls,  extending  from  the  city  to  the  port  of  Nisaea, 
which  they  garrisoned  themselves.    This  was  the  original 
and  the  main  cause   of  the  intense  hatred  which   the 
Corinthians  entertained  towards  the  Athenians. 

104.  Meanwhile  Inaros  the  son  of  Psammetichus,  king  of  B.C.  460. 
Egyptian     the   Libyans  who  border  on   Egypt,  had   induced  the       8o' 

greater  part  of  Egypt  to  revolt  from  Artaxerxes  the 
King.  He  began  the  rebellion  at  Mareia,  a  city  opposite 
the  island  of  Pharos,  and,  having  made  himself  ruler  of 
the  country,  called 'in  the  Athenians.  They  were  just 
then  carrying  on  war  against  Cyprus  with  two  hundred 
ships  of  their  own  and  of  their  allies ;  and,  quitting  the 
island,  they  went  to  his  aid.  They  sailed  from  the  sea 
into  the  Nile,  and,  getting  possession  of  two-thirds  of 
Memphis,  proceeded  to  attack  the  remaining  part  called 


VICTORIES    OF  THE  ATHENIANS.  65 

B.C.  46o-  the  White  Castle,  in  which  the  Persians  and  Medes  had        I. 
O5h  80,  i-  taken  refuge,  and  with  them  such  Egyptians  as  had  not 
4>  joined  in  the  revolt. 

An  Athenian  fleet  made  a  descent  upon  Halieis,  where     105. 
a  battle  took  place  against  some  Corinthian  and  Epidau-  The  Athe- 

c  r  mans  defeat 

rian  troops;  the  Athenians  gained  the  victory.     Soon  the  Aegine- 
afterwards  the  Athenians  fought  at  sea  off  Cecryphaleia  ture  seventy 


with  a  Peloponnesian  fleet,  which  they  defeated.    A  war 
next  broke  out  between  the  Aeginetans  and  the  Athe-  £egina. 

0  1  he  Corm- 

nians,  and  a  great  battle  was  fought  off  the  coast  of  thians  in- 
Aegina,  in  which  the  allies  of  both  parties  joined  ;  the  gara. 
Athenians  were  victorious,  and  captured  seventy  of  the 
enemy's  ships  ;  they  then  landed  on  Aegina  and,  under 
the  command  of  Leocrates  the  son  of  Stroebus,  besieged 
the  town.  Thereupon  the  Peloponnesians  sent  over  to 
the  assistance  of  the  Aeginetans  three  hundred  hoplites 
who  had  previously  been  assisting  the  Corinthians  and 
Epidaurians.  The  Corinthians  seized  a  on  the  heights  of 
Geraneia,  and  thence  made  a  descent  with  their  allies 
into  the  Megarian  territory,  thinking  that  the  Athenians, 
who  had  so  large  a  force  absent  in  Aegina  and  in  Egypt, 
would  be  unable  to  assist  the  Megarians  ;  or,  if  they  did, 
would  be  obliged  to  raise  the  siege  of  Aegina.  But  the 
Athenians,  without  moving  their  army  from  Aegina, 
sent  to  Megara  under  the  command  of  Myronides  a 
force  consisting  of  their  oldest  and  youngest  men,  who 
had  remained  at  home.  A  battle  was  fought,  which 
hung  equally  in  the  balance  ;  and  when  the  two  armies 
separated,  they  both  thought  that  they  had  gained  the 
victory.  The  Athenians,  who  did  however  get  rather 
the  better,  on  the  departure  of  the  Corinthians  erected 
a  trophy.  And  then  the  Corinthians,  irritated  by  the  re- 
proaches of  the  aged  men  in  the  city,  after  twelve  days' 
preparation  came  out  again,  and,  claiming  the  victory, 
raised  another  trophy.  Hereupon  the  Athenians  sallied 
out  of  Megara,  killed  those  who  were  erecting  the  trophy, 
and  charged  and  defeated  the  rest  of  the  army. 

a  Omitting  the  stop  after  K 
F 


66  LACEDAEMONIANS   IN  BOEOTIA. 

I.  The    Corinthians  now  retreated,   but   a  considerable  B.C.  460- 

106.  number  of  them  were  hard  pressed,  and  missing  their  oSi7>8o,  1-4 
They  suffer  way  got  into  an  enclosure  belonging  to  a  private  person 

in  their  which  was  surrounded  by  a  great  ditch  and  had  no  exit. 
The  Athenians,  perceiving  their  situation,  closed  the 
entrance  in  front  with  heavy-armed  troops,  and,  placing 
their  light  troops  in  a  circle  round,  stoned  all  who  had 
entered  the  enclosure.  This  was  a  great  blow  to  the 
Corinthians ;  but  still  the  main  body  of  their  army 
returned  home. 

107.  About  this  time  the  Athenians  began  to  build  their 
The  Athe-    long  walls  extending  to  the  sea,  one  to  the  harbour  of 

nians  build 

their  long    Phalerum,  and  the  other  to  the  Piraeus.     The  Phocians  B.C.  457. 

walls.  ,  ,.,.  .  1        T-N      •  .         .    ,     .  ..Ol.  80,  4. 

Battle  of  made  an  expedition  against  the  Dorians,  who  inhabit 
Tanagra.  Boeum,  Citinium,  and  Erineum,  and  are  the  mother 
people  of  the  Lacedaemonians  ;  one  of  these  towns  they 
took.  Thereupon  the  Lacedaemonians  under  the  com- 
mand of  Nicomedes  the  son  of  Cleombrotus,  who  was 
general  in  the  place  of  the  king  Pleistoanax  the  son  of 
Pausanias  (he  being  at  that  time  a  minor),  came  to  the 
assistance  of  the  Dorians  with  fifteen  hundred  hoplites 
of  their  own,  and,  of  their  allies,  ten  thousand,  and  com- 
pelled the  Phocians  to  make  terms  and  to  restore  the 
town.  They  then  thought  of  returning ;  but  there  were 
difficulties.  Either  they  might  go  by  sea  across  the 
Crisaean  Gulf,  in  which  case  the  Athenian  fleet  would  be 
sure  to  sail  round  and  intercept  them,  or  they  might  march 
over  Mount  Geraneia  ;  but  this  seemed  dangerous  when 
the  Athenians  were  holding  Megara  and  Pegae.  The  pass 
was  not  easy,  and  was  always  guarded  by  the  Athenians, 
who  were  obviously  intending  to  stop  them  by  that  route 
also.  So  they  determined  to  remain  in  Boeotia  and  con- 
sider how  they  could  best  get  home.  They  had  another 
motive  : — Certain  Athenians  were  privately  making  over- 
tures to  them,  in  the  hope  that  they  would  put  an  end  to 
the  democracy  and  the  building  of  the  long  walls.  But 
the  Athenians  were  aware  of  their  embarrassment,  and 
they  also  suspected  their  design  against  the  democracy. 


BATTLES  OF  TANAGRA   AND  OENOPHYTA.    67 


B.C.  457.  So  they  went  out  to  meet  them  with  their  whole  force,  I. 
'  including  a  thousand  Argives  and  contingents  from  the 
other  allies;  they  numbered  in  all  fourteen  thousand  men. 
Among  them  were  some  Thessalian  cavalry,  who  came 
to  their  aid  in  accordance  with  the  treaty a,  but  these 
deserted  to  the  Lacedaemonians  during  the  engagement. 

The  battle  was  fought  at  Tanagra  in  Boeotia,  and  the     108. 
Lacedaemonians  and  their  allies,  after  great  slaughter  on  Battle  of 
both  sides,  gained  the  victory.     They  then  marched  into  Surrender  ' 
the  Megarian  territory,  and,  cutting  down  the  fruit-trees,  of  Aegma 
returned  home  by  way  of  Geraneia  and  the  Isthmus. 

B.C.  456.  But  on  the  sixty-second  day  after  the  battle,  the  Athe- 
nians made  another  expedition  into  Boeotia  under  the 
command  of  Myronides,  and  there  was  a  battle  at  Oeno- 
phyta,  in  which  they  defeated  the  Boeotians  and  became 
masters  of  Boeotia  and  Phocis.  They  pulled  down  the 
walls  of  Tanagra  and  took  as  hostages  from  the  Opuntian 
Locrians  a  hundred  of  their  richest  citizens.  They  then 
completed  their  own  long  walls.  Soon  afterwards  the 
Aeginetans  came  to  terms  with  the  Athenians,  dis- 
mantling their  walls,  surrendering  their  ships,  and  agree- 

B.c.  455.  ing  to  pay  tribute  for  the  future.     The  Athenians,  under 

01  8l)  2'  the  command  of  Tolmides  the  son  of  Tolmaeus,  sailed 
round  Peloponnesus  and  burnt  the  Lacedaemonian  dock- 
yard b.  They  also  took  the  Corinthian  town  of  Chalcis, 
and5  making  a  descent  upon  Sicyon,  defeated  a  Sicyonian 
force. 

The  Athenians  and  their  allies  were  still  in  Egypt,     109. 
where  they  carried  on  the  war  with  varying  fortune.    At  After  an  in- 
first  they  were  masters  of  the  country.    The  King  sent  to  attempt  to 
Lacedaemon  Megabazus  a  Persian,  who  was  well  supplied 
with  money,  in  the  hope  that  he  might  persuade   the 
Peloponnesians  to  invade  Attica,  and  so  draw  off  the 
Athenians  from  Egypt.    He  had  no  success  ;  the  money  length  suc- 
was  being  spent  and  nothing   done ;  so,  with  what  re-  driving  the 
mained  of  it,  he  found  his  way  back  to  Asia.     The  King  ^e0nfians 
then  sent  into  Egypt  Megabyzus  the  son  of  Zopyrus,  a  Memphis. 
a  Gp.  i.  102  fin.  b  i.e.  Gythium. 

F  2 


68       END    OF  THE   EGYPTIAN  EXPEDITION. 

I.  Persian,  who  marched  overland  with  a  large  army  and 
defeated  the  Egyptians  and  their  allies.  He  drove  the 
Hellenes  out  of  Memphis,  and  finally  shut  them  up  in 
the  island  of  Prosopitis,  where  he  blockaded  them  during 
eighteen  months.  At  length  he  drained  the  canal  and 
diverted  the  water,  thus  leaving  their  ships  high  and  dry 
and  joining  nearly  the  whole  island  to  the  mainland. 
He  then  crossed  over  with  a  land  force,  and  took  the 
island. 

HO.         Thus,  after  six  years'  fighting,  the  cause  of  the  Hellenes 
Nearly  the  in  Egypt  was  lost.    A  few  survivors  of  their  great  army  B.C.  455. 

whole  of  the  c  .     .  .«•••<•_    TM  r+  \        i_       r        1.1.     Ol.  81,  2. 

expedition  found  their  way  through  Libya  to  Cyrene  ;  by  far  the 
larger  number  perished.  Egypt  again  submitted  to  the 
^ers^an  y°ke,  although  Amyrtaeus,  the  king  in  the  fens, 

triremes,  is  still  held  out.  He  escaped  capture  owing  fo  the  extent 
of  the  fens  and  the  bravery  of  their  inhabitants,  who  are 
the  most  warlike  of  all  the  Egyptians.  Inarus  the  king 
of  Libya,  the  chief  author  of  the  revolt,  was  betrayed  and 
impaled.  Fifty  additional  triremes,  which  had  been  sent 
by  the  Athenians  and  their  allies  to  relieve  their  other 
forces,  in  ignorance  of  what  had  happened,  sailed  into 
the  Mendesian  mouth  of  the  Nile.  But  they  were  at 
once  attacked  both  from  the  land  and  from  the  sea, 
and  the  greater  part  of  them  destroyed  by  the  Phoeni- 
cian fleet,  a  few  ships  only  escaping.  Thus  ended  the 
great  Egyptian  expedition  of  the  Athenians  and  their 
allies. 
ill.  About  this  time  Orestes,  the  exiled  son  of  the  Thes- 

Attempted   saiian  king  Echecratides,  persuaded  the  Athenians   to 

restoration  f  & 

of  Orestes,   restore  him.     Taking  with  them  a  force  of  the  Boeo- 

lian  exile,     tians  and    Phocians,  who   were   now   their  allies,  they 

marched  against  Pharsalus  in  Thessaly.      They  made 

themselves  masters  of  the  country  in  the  neighbourhood 

of  their  camp,  but  the  Thessalian  cavalry  stopped  any 

further  advance.     They  could  not  take  the  place,  and 

none  of  their  plans  succeeded ;    so  they  returned  and 

brought  back  Orestes. 

The  Athe-       A  short  time  afterwards  a  thousand  Athenians,  under 

nians  under 


FIVE    YEARS'   TRUCE.  69 

B.C.  454.  the  command  of  Pericles  the  son  of  Xanthippus,  em-        I. 
3'  barking  on   board  the  fleet  which  they  had  at  Pegae,  ?e[icles, 
now  in  their  possession,  coasted  along  to  Sicyon,  and  sicyonians. 
there  landing,  defeated  the  Sicyonians  who  came  out 
to  meet  them.     With  the  least  possible  delay  taking  on 
board  Achaean  troops  and  sailing  to  the  opposite  coast, 
they  attacked  and  besieged  Oeniadae,  a  town  of  Acar- 
nania  ;  but  failing  to  reduce  it,  they  returned  home. 

B.C.  450.      After  an  interval  of  three  years  a  five  years'  truce  was     112. 
concluded  between  the  Peloponnesians  and  Athenians.  Truce  for 
The  Athenians  now  abstained  from  war  in  Hellas  itself,  Expedition 
but  made  an  expedition  to  Cyprus  with  two  hundred 


ships  of  their  own  and  of  their  allies,  under  the  com-  sent  to 

Egypt. 

mand  of  Cimon.  Sixty  ships  were  detached  from  the  Death  of 
armament  and  sailed  to  Egypt,  at  the  request  of  Amyr-  Battles  at 
taeus  the  king  in  the  fens  ;  the  remainder  proceeded  to 

B.C.  449.  blockade  Citium.  Here  Cimon  died,  and  a  famine  arose 
4'  in  the  country;  so  the  fleet  quitted  Citium.  Arriving  off 
Salamis  in  Cyprus  they  fought  at  sea  and  also  on  land 
with  Phoenician  and  Cilician  forces.  Gaining  a  victory 
in  both  engagements,  they  returned  home,  accompanied 
by  the  ships  which  had  gone  out  with  them  and  had  now 
come  back  from  Egypt.  After  this  the  Lacedaemonians 
engaged  in  the  so-called  Sacred  War  and  took  posses- 
sion of  the  temple  of  Delphi,  which  they  handed  over  to 
the  Delphians.  But  no  sooner  had  they  retired  than  the 
Athenians  sent  an  expedition  and  recovered  the  temple, 
which  they  handed  over  to  the  Phocians. 

B.C.  447.      Some  time  afterwards  the  Athenians,  under  the  com- 

3>  2'  mand  of  Tolmides  the  son  of  Tolmaeus,  with  a  thousand  Pefe.at,  of 

tnc  AtnC" 

hoplites  of  their  own  and  contingents  of  their  allies,  made  nians  at 
an  expedition  against  Orchomenus,  Chaeronea,  and  cer-  Revolution 
tain  other  places  in  Boeotia  which  were  in  the  hands  m 
of  oligarchical  exiles  from  different  Boeotian  towns,  and 
still  remained  hostile  to  them.     They  took  Chaeronea, 
and  leaving  a  garrison  there,  departed.     But  while  they 
were  on  their  march,  the  exiles  who  had  occupied  Orcho- 
menus, some  Locrians.  some  Euboean  exiles  and  others 


70     INCREASING   DIFFICULTIES   OF  ATHENS. 

I.  of  the  same  party,  set  upon  them  at  Coronea  and  de-  B.C.  447. 
feated  them,  killing  many  and  taking  many  prisoners. 
The  Athenians  then  agreed  to  evacuate  Boeotia  upon 
condition  that  the  prisoners  should  be  restored.  And 
so  the  Boeotian  exiles  returned  to  their  homes,  and  all 
the  Boeotians  regained  their  independence. 

114.         Not  long  afterwards  Euboea  revolted  from  Athens.  B.C.  445. 
Revolt  of     Pericles  had  just  arrived  in  the  island  with  an  Athenian 

Euboea. 

Slaughter  army  when  the  news  came  that  Megara  had  likewise  re- 
Athenian  volted,  that  the  Peloponnesians  were  on  the  point  of  in- 
Megara  at  vading  Attica,  and  that  the  Megarians  had  slaughtered 
the  Athenian  garrison,  of  whom  a  few  only  had  escaped  to 


Retirement  Nisaea.    The  Megarians  had  introduced  a  force  of  Corin- 

of  the  Pelo-    .  ,  .  ~  .  .  i   T-    •  i         •  •    ,       ,  1 

ponnesians,  thians,  Sicyomans,  and  Epidaunans  into  the  city,  and  by 
SoverTof  their  helP  had  effected  the  revolt.  Pericles  in  haste  with- 
Euboea.  drew  his  army  from  Euboea.  The  Peloponnesians  then 
invaded  Attica  under  the  command  of  Pleistoanax  son 
of  Pausanias,  the  Lacedaemonian  king.  They  advanced 
as  far  as  Eleusis  and  Thria  but  no  further,  and  after 
ravaging  the  country,  returned  home.  Thereupon  the 
Athenians  under  the  command  of  Pericles  again  crossed 
over  to  Euboea  and  reduced  the  whole  country;  the 
Hestiaeans  they  ejected  from  their  homes  and  appropri- 
ated their  territory;  the  rest  of  the  island  they  settled 
by  agreement. 

115-  Soon  after  their  return  from  Euboea  they  made  a  truce 
nSnsAagree  *°r  tnirtv  years  with  the  Lacedaemonians  and  their  al- 
to restore  lies,  restoring  Nisaea,  Pegae,  Troezen  and  Achaia,  which 
held  by  were  the  places  held  by  them  in  Peloponnesus.  Six  years  B.C.  440. 
loponnesus"  la*er  the  Samians  and  Milesians  fell  out  about  the  posses- 
theVSamf-  sion  °^  Prien^>  anc*  the  Milesians,  who  were  getting  worsted 
ans,  who  in  the  war,  came  to  Athens  and  complained  loudly  of  the 

are  assisted   <-,  ~ 

by  the  bamians.  borne  private  citizens  of  Samos,  who  wanted 
Byzantians.  to  overthrow  the  government,  supported  their  complaint. 
Whereupon  the  Athenians,  sailing  to  Samos  with  forty 
ships,  established  a  democracy,  and  taking  as  hostages 
fifty  boys  and  fifty  men  whom  they  deposited  at  Lemnos, 
they  returned  leaving  a  garrison.  But  certain  of  the 


THIRTY  YEARS'   TRUCE.     REVOLT  OF  SAMOS.  71 

B.C.  440.  Samians  who  had  quitted  the  island  and  fled  to  the  main-  I. 
land  entered  into  an  alliance  with  the  principal  oligarchs 
who  remained  in  the  city,  and  with  Pissuthnes  the  son  of 
Hystaspes,  then  governor  of  Sardis,  and  collecting  troops 
to  the  number  of  seven  hundred  they  crossed  over  by 
night  to  Samos.  First  of  all  they  attacked  the  victorious 
populace  and  got  most  of  them  into  their  power ;  then 
they  stole  away  the  hostages  from  Lemnos,  and  finally 
revolted  from  Athens.  The  officers  and  garrison  of  the 
Athenians  whom  they  captured  were  delivered  by  them 
into  the  hands  of  Pissuthnes.  They  at  once  prepared  to 
make  an  expedition  against  Miletus.  The  Byzantians 
joined  in  their  revolt. 

When  the  Athenians  heard  of  the  insurrection  they     116. 
sailed  to  Samos  with  sixty  ships.     But  of  this  number  The  Athe- 

.  nians  defeat 

they  sent  away  sixteen,  some  towards  Cana  to  keep  a  theSamians 
look  out  for  the  Phoenician  fleet,  others  to  summon  aid  at 
from  Chios  and  Lesbos.  With  the  remaining  forty-four 
ships  they  fought  at  sea  under  the  command  of  Pericles 
and  nine  others,  near  the  island  of  Tragia,  against  seventy 
Samian  vessels,  all  sailing  from  Miletus,  of  which  twenty 
were  transports ;  the  Athenians  gained  the  victory.  After 
receiving  a  reinforcement  of  forty  ships  from  Athens  and 
of  twenty-five  from  Chios  and  Lesbos  they  disembarked, 
and  having  the  superiority  on  shore,  invested  the  city  with 
three  walls  ;  they  also  blockaded  it  by  sea.  At  the  same 
time  Pericles  took  sixty  ships  of  the  blockading  force  and 
sailed  hastily  towards  Caunus  in  Caria,  news  having  ar- 
rived that  a  Phoenician  fleet  was  approaching ;  Stesagoras 
and  others  had  already  gone  with  five  ships  from  Samos 
to  fetch  it. 

Meanwhile  the  Samians  made  a  sudden  sally,  and  at-     117. 
tacking  the  naval  station  of  the  Athenians  which  was  Temporary 

.  t          ,  success  and 

unprotected,  destroyed  the  guard-ships  and  engaged  and  final  subjec- 
defeated  the  other  vessels  which  put  out  to  meet  them, 
During  some  fourteen  days  they  were  masters  of  the  sea 
about  their  own  coasts,  and  carried  in  and  out  whatever 
they  pleased.      But  when  Pericles  returned,  they  were 


72     CAUSES    OF   THE    PELOPONNESIAN  WAR. 

I.  again  closely  blockaded ;  and  there  soon  arrived  from  B.C.  439. 
TheByzan-  Athens  forty  additional  ships  under  Thucydides,  Hag- 
Bubmit.  non,  and  Phormio,  twenty  more  under  Tlepolemus  and 
Anticles,  and  thirty  from  Chios  and  Lesbos.  The  Sa- 
mians  made  a  feeble  attempt  at  a  sea-fight,  but  soon 
they  were  unable  to  resist,  and  after  nine  months  were 
forced  to  surrender.  The  terms  of  capitulation  were  as 
follows : — They  were  to  raze  their  walls,  give  hostages, 
surrender  their  ships,  and  pay  a  full  indemnity  by  regu- 
lar instalments.  The  Byzantians  too  agreed  to  return  to 
their  allegiance. 

II 8.         Not  long  afterwards  occurred  the  affairs  of  Corcyra 
The  history  and  Potidaea,  which  have  been  already  narrated,  and  the 

is  resumed  , 

from  chap,   various  other  circumstances  which  led  to  the  Pelopon- 

OQ        The* 

Lacedae-  nesian  War.  Fifty  years  elapsed  between  the  retreat  of 
teving'de-  Xerxes  anc*  the  beginning  of  the  war  ;  during  these  years 
cidedtogo  took  place  all  those  operations  of  the  Hellenes  against 

to  war,  ob- 

tain  the  one  another  and  against  the  Barbarian  which  I  have 
of  the  been  describing.  The  Athenians  acquired  a  firmer  hold 
over  their  empire  and  the  city  itself  became  a  great 
power.  The  Lacedaemonians  saw  what  was  going  on, 
but  during  most  of  the  time  they  remained  inactive  and 
hardly  attempted  to  interfere.  They  had  never  been  of 
a  temper  prompt  to  make  war  unless  they  were  com- 
pelled ;  and  they  were  in  some  degree  embarrassed  by 
enemies  near  home.  But  the  Athenians  were  growing 
too  great  to  be  ignored  and  were  laying  hands  on  their 
allies.  They  could  now  bear  it  no  longer :  they  made 
up  their  minds  that  they  must  put  out  all  their  strength 
and  overthrow  the  Athenian  power  by  force  of  arms. 
And  therefore  they  commenced  the  Peloponnesian  War. 
They  had  already  voted  in  their  own  assembly  that  the 
treaty  had  been  broken  and  that  the  Athenians  were 
guilty a;  they  now  sent  to  Delphi  and  asked  the  god  if 
it  would  be  for  their  advantage  to  make  war.  He  is 
reported  to  have  answered  that,  if  they  did  their  best, 

a  But  cp.  vii.  1 8  med. 


THE   ALLIES    AT  SPARTA.  73 

B.C.  432.  they  would  be  conquerors,  and  that  he  himself,  invited        I. 
7*     or  uninvited,  would  take  their  part. 

So  they  again  summoned  the  allies,  intending  to  put  HQ- 
to  them  the  question  of  war  or  peace.  When  their  repre-  Activity  of 

.  .  the  Corin- 

sentatives  arrived,  an  assembly  was  held  ;  and  the  allies  thians  in 
said  what  they  had  to  say,  most  of  them  complaining  fhTwan  ° 
of  the  Athenians  and  demanding  that  the  war  should 
proceed.     The  Corinthians  had  already  gone  the  round 
of  the  cities  and  entreated  them  privately  to  vote  for 
the  war  ;  they  were  afraid  that  they  would  be  too  late 
to  save  Potidaea.     At  the  assembly  they  came  forward 
last  of  all  and  spoke  as  follows  :  — 

'  Fellow  allies,  we  can  no  longer  find  fault  with  the  I2O. 
Lacedaemonians  ;  they  have  themselves  resolved  upon  No  m°re 
war  and  have  brought  us  hither  to  confirm  their  de-  found  with 


cision.     And  they  have  done  well  ;  for  the  leaders  of  a 
confederacy,  while  they  do  not  neglect  the  interests  of  T.he  Athe~ 

ni 


their  own  state,  should  look  to  the  general  weal  :  as  they  dangerous  % 
are  first  in  honour,  they  should  be  first  in  the  fulfilment  Men  should 


of  their  duties.     Now  those  among  us  who  have   ever  to 
had  dealings  with  the  Athenians,  do  not  require  to  be  shoukTb 
warned  against  them  ;  but  such  as  live  inland  and  not  equally 
on  any  maritime  highway  should  clearly  understand  that,  cease  from 
if  they  do  not  protect  the  sea-board,  they  will  not  be  able  fishtins- 
to  carry  their  produce  to  the  sea,  or  to  receive  in  return 
the  goods  which  the  sea  gives  to  the  land.     They  should 
not  lend  a  careless  ear  to  our  words,  for  they  nearly 
concern  them  ;  they  should  remember  that,  if  they  de- 
sert the  cities  on  the  sea-shore,  the  danger  may  some 
day  reach  them,  and  that  they  are  consulting  for  their 
own  interests  quite  as  much  as  for  ours.    And  therefore 
let  no  one  hesitate  to  accept  war  in  exchange  for  peace. 
Wise  men  refuse  to  move  until  they  are  wronged,  but 
brave  men  as  soon  as  they  are  wronged  go  to  war,  and 
when  there  is  a  good  opportunity  make  peace  again. 
They   are    not   intoxicated    by   military   success  ;    but 
neither  will  they  tolerate  injustice  from  a  love  of  peace 
and  ease.     For  he  whom  pleasure  makes  a  coward  will 


74  SPEECH   OF   THE    CORINTHIANS. 

I.  quickly  lose,  if  he  continues  inactive,  the  delights  of  ease  B.C.  432. 
which  he  is  so  unwilling  to  renounce  ;  and  he  whose 
arrogance  is  stimulated  by  victory  does  not  see  how 
hollow  is  the  confidence  which  elates  him.  Many 
schemes  which  were  ill-advised  have  succeeded  through 
the  still  greater  folly  which  possessed  the  enemy,  and 
yet  more,  which  seemed  to  be  wisely  contrived,  have 
ended  in  foul  disaster.  The  execution  of  an  enterprise 
is  never  equal8  to  the  conception  of  it  in  the  confident 
mind  of  its  promoter  ;  for  men  are  safe  while  they  are 
thinking,  but,  when  the  time  of  action  comes,  then  they 
lose  their  presence  of  mind  and  fail. 

1  2  1.         'We,  however,  do  not  make  war  upon  the  Athenians 
We  are  su-  in  a  spirit  of  vain-glory,  but  from  a  sense  of  wrong  : 

periortothe    -  .  ,       .         .,.  t       ,  f 

Athenians    there  is  ample  justification,  and  when  we  obtain  redress, 
in  military5'  we  w^l  Put  UP  the  sword.     For  every  reason  we  are 


Jitin  and"  lively   to   succeed.     First,  because   we   are   superior  in 
our  fleet  will  numbers  and  in  military  skill  ;  secondly,  because  we  all 

soon  be  on  ,11-  i-r    ,1 

a  level  with  obey  as  one  man  the  orders  given  to  us.  If  they  are 
strong  at  sea,  we  too  will  provide  a  navy,  for  which  the 
means  can  be  supplied  partly  by  contributions  from  each 
state,  partly  out  of  the  funds  at  Delphi  and  Olympia.  A 
loan  will  be  granted  to  us,  and  by  the  offer  of  higher  pay  we 
can  draw  away  their  foreign  sailors.  The  Athenian  power 
consists  of  mercenaries,  and  not  of  their  own  citizens  ; 
but  our  soldiers  are  not  mercenaries,  and  therefore  cannot 
so  be  bought,  for  we  are  strong  in  men  if  poor  in  money. 
Let  them  be  beaten  in  a  single  naval  engagement  and 
they  are  probably  conquered  at  once  ;  but  suppose  they 
hold  out,  we  shall  then  have  more  time  in  which  to 
practise  at  sea.  As  soon  as  we  have  brought  our  skill  up 
to  the  level  of  theirs  our  courage  will  surely  give  us  the 
victory.  For  that  is  a  natural  gift  which  they  cannot 
learn,  but  their  superior  skill  is  a  thing  acquired,  b  which 
we  must  attain  by  practice  b. 

Butwemust      «  And  the  money  which  is  required  for  the  war,  we  will 

find  money. 


a  Reading 

b  Or,  'which  we  must  overcome  by  practice.' 


SPEECH    OF   THE    CORINTHIANS.  75 


B.C.  432.  provide  by  a  contribution.  What !  shall  their  allies  never  I. 
' 8?'  fail  in  paying  the  tribute  which  is  to  enslave  them,  and 
shall  we  refuse  to  give  freely  in  order  to  save  ourselves 
and  be  avenged  on  our  enemies,  or  rather  to  prevent 
the  money  which  we  refused  to  give  from  being  taken 
from  us  by  them  and  used  to  our  destruction  ? 

'These  are  some  of  the  means  by  which  the  war  may     122. 
be  carried  on;  but  there  are  others.     We  may  induce  By  gaining 

•     '  over  the™ 

their  allies  to  revolt, — a  sure  mode  of  cutting  off  the  allies  we 
revenues  in  which  the  strength  of  Athens  consists;  or^frre-0 
we  may  plant  a  fort  in  their  country;   and  there  are sources- 
many  expedients   which   will   hereafter   suggest   them- 
selves.    For  war,  least  of  all  things,  conforms  to  pre- 
scribed rules ;  it  strikes  out  a  path  for  itself  when  the 
moment  comes.     And  therefore  he  who  has  his  temper 
under  control  in  warfare  is  safer  far,  but  he  who  gets 
into  a  passion  is,  through  his  own  fault,  liable  to  the 
greater  fall. 

'If  this  were  merely  a  quarrel  between  one  of  us  and  ifwe quietly 
our  neighbours  about  a  boundary  line  it  would  not  shaJTcL^6 
matter ;  but  reflect :  -the  truth  is  that  the  Athenians  y™sio  be 
are  a  match  for  us  all,  and  much  more  than  a  match 
for  any  single  city.  And  if  we  ~  allow  ourselves  to  be 
divided  or  are  not  united  against  them  heart  and  soul 
— the  whole  confederacy  and  every  nation  and  city  in 
it — they  will  easily  overpower  us.  It  may  seem  a  hard 
saying,  but  you  may  be  sure  that  defeat  means  nothing 
but  downright  slavery,  and  the  bare  mention  of  such  a 
possibility  is  a  disgrace  to  the  Peloponnese  : — shall  so 
many  states  suffer  at  the  hands  of  one  ?  Men  will  say, 
some  that  we  deserve  our  fate,  others  that  we  are  too 
cowardly  to  resist :  and  we  shall  seem  a  degenerate 
race.  .For  our  fathers  were  the  liberators  of  Hellas,  but 
we  cannot  secure  even  our  own  liberty;  and  while  we 
make  a  point  of  overthrowing  the  rule  of  a  single  man 
in  this  or  that  city,  we  allow  a  city  which  is  a  tyrant 
to  be  set  up  in  the  midst  of  us.  Are  we  not  open  to 
one  of  three  most  serious  charges —folly,  cowardice,  or 


7  6  SPEECH   OF   THE    CORINTHIANS. 

I.        carelessness?     a  For  you   certainly  do  not  escape  such  B.C.  432. 
imputations  by  wrapping  yourselves  in  that  contemp-  ° 
tuous  wisdom  which  has  so  often  a  brought  men  to  ruin, 
as  in  the  end  to  be  pronounced  contemptible  folly. 

123.  '  But  why  should  we  dwell  reproachfully  upon  the  past, 
in  going  to  except  in  the  interest  of  the  present  ?    We  should  rather, 
haveythe      looking  to  the  future,  devote  our  energies  to  the  task 
feeling1  of  6  which  we  have  immediately  in  hand.     By  labour  to  win 
Iourside     virtue> — tnat  'ls  ^e  lesson  which  web  have  learnt  from 
and  you  will  our  fathers,  and  which  you  ought  not  to  unlearn,  because 

not  break 

the  treaty,  you  chance  to  have  some  trifling  advantage  over  them 
in  wealth  and  power ;  for  men  should  not  lose  in  the 
time  of  their  wealth  what  was  gained  by  them  in  their 
time  of  want.  There  are  many  reasons  why  you  may 
advance  with  confidence.  The  God  has  spoken  and  has 
promised  to  take  our  part  himself.  All  Hellas  will  fight 
at  our  side,  from  motives  either  of  fear  or  of  interest. 
And  you  will  not  break  the  treaty, — the  God  in  bidding 
you  go  to  war  pronounces  it  to  have  been  already  broken, 
— but  you  will  avenge  the  violation  of  it.  For  those  who 
attack  others,  not  those  who  defend  themselves,  are  the 
real  violators  of  treaties c. 

124.  '  On  every  ground  you  will  be  right  in  going  to  war: 
We  cannot  ft  js  our  united  advice  ;  d  and  if  you  believe  community 

go  on  as  we  J 

are.  of  interests  to  be  the  surest  ground  of  strength  both  to 

War  is  the    .     . .    .  ,      , 

way  to         individuals  and   states,  send  speedy  aidd  to  the  Poti- 

peace  inay1  daeans,  who  are  Dorians  and  now  besieged  by  lonians 

to  warWay   ^or  ^mes  have  changed),  and  recover  the  liberties  which 

the  rest  of  the  allies  have  lost.     We  cannot  go  on  as  we 

are :   for  some  of  us  are  already  suffering,  and  if  it  is 

known  that  we  have  met,  but  do  not  dare  to  defend 

ourselves,  others  will  soon  share  their  fate.     Acknow- 

a  Or,  '  For  we  cannot  suppose  that,  having  avoided  these  errors, 
you  have  wrapped  yourselves  in  that  contemptuous  wisdom,  which 
has  so  often'  etc. 

b  Reading  r^iiv.  c  Cp.  i.  71  fin. 

d  Reading  ravrd:  or,  with  all  the  MSS.  retaining  ravra:  'And  as 
it  is  most  certain  that  the  policy  which  we  recommend  is  for  our 
advantage  both  as  states  and  individuals,  send  speedy  aid '  etc. 


EMBASSIES    SENT   TO    AND    FRO.  77 

B.C.  432.  lodging  then,  allies,  that  there  is  no  alternative,  and  I. 
that  we  are  advising  you  for  the  best,  vote  for  war ; 
and  be  not  afraid  of  the  immediate  danger,  but  fix  your 
thoughts  on  the  durable  peace  which  will  follow.  For  by 
war  peace  is  assured,  but  to  remain  at  peace  when  you 
should  be  going  to  war  may  be  often  very  dangerous. 
The  tyrant  city  which  has  been  set  up  in  Hellas  is  a 
standing  menace  to  all  alike ;  she  rules  over  some  of 
us  already,  and  would  fain  rule  over  others.  Let  us 
attack  and  subdue  her,  that  we  may  ourselves  live  safely 
for  the  future  and  deliver  the  Hellenes  whom  she  has 
enslaved.' 

Such  were  the  words  of  the  Corinthians. 

The  Lacedaemonians,  having  heard  the  opinions  of  all     125. 
the  allies,  put  the  question  to  them  all,  one  after  the  other,  Nearly  a 

11       1-1  11  •  r  yearisspent- 

great  and  small  alike,  and  the  majority  voted  tor  war.  m  prepara- 
But,  although  they  had  come  to  this  decision,  they  were  tlon' 
not  ready,  and  could  not  take  up  arms  at  once ;  so  they 
determined  to  make  the  necessary  preparations,  each  for 
themselves,  with  the  least  possible  delay.     Still  nearly 
a  whole   year  was  passed   in   preparation  before  they 
invaded  Attica  and  commenced  open  hostilities. 

During  this  year  they  sent  embassies  to  Athens  and     126. 
made  various  complaints  that  their  grounds  for  going  The  story  of 

•  .    i  .  1         A    1        •          Cylon  told 

to  war  might  be  all  the  stronger  in  case  the  Athenians  in  expiana- 
refused  to  listen.      The  first  ambassadors  desired  the  ct?rse°of  the 
Athenians  to  drive  out  '  the  curse  of  the  Goddess.'     The  Goddess- 
B.C.  620?  curse  to  which  they  referred  was  as  follows: — In  the 
days  of  old  there  was  an  Athenian  named  Cylon,  who 
had  been  an  Olympic  victor;  he  was  powerful  and  of 
noble  birth ;  and  he  had  married  the  daughter  of  The- 
agenes,   a  Megarian  who  was   at   that  time  tyrant   of 
Megara.     In  answer  to  an  enquiry  which  Cylon  made 
at  Delphi,  the  God  told  him  to  seize  the  Acropolis  of 
Athens  at  the  greatest  festival  of  Zeus.     Thereupon  he 
obtained   forces   from  Theagenes,   and,   persuading   his 
friends   to  join   him,  when   the  time   of  the   Olympic 
festival  in  Peloponnesus  came  round,  he  took  possession 


78  THE    CURSE    OF   THE    GODDESS. 

of  the  Acropolis,  intending  to  make  himself  tyrant.  He 
thought  that  this  was  the  greatest  festival  of  Zeus,  and, 
having  been  an  Olympic  victor,  he  seemed  to  have  an 
interest  in  it.  But  whether  the  greatest  festival  spoken 
of  was  in  Attica  or  in  some  other  part  of  Hellas  was  a 
question  which  never  entered  into  his  mind,  and  the 
oracle  said  nothing  about  it.  (For  the  Athenians  also 
have  a  greatest  festival  of  Zeus — the  festival  of  Zeusa  the 
Gracious,  or  Diasia,  as  it  is  called — this  is  held  outside 
the  city  and  the  whole  people  sacrifice  at  it,  some, 
ordinary  victims,  others,  a  kind  of  offering  peculiar  to 
the  country.)  However,  Cylon  thought  that  his  inter- 
pretation was  right,  and  made  the  attempt  at  the  Olym- 
pic festival.  The  Athenians,  when  they  saw  what  had 
happened,  came  in  a  body  from  the  fields  and  invested 
the  Acropolis.  After  a  time  they  grew  tired  of  the 
siege  and  most  of  them  went  away,  committing  the 
guard  to  the  nine  Archons,  and  giving  them  full  powers 
to  do  what  they  thought  best  in  the  whole  matter ; 
for  in  those  days  public  affairs  were  chiefly  adminis- 
tered by  the  nine  Archons  b.  Cylon  and  his  companions 
were  in  great  distress  from  want  of  food  and  water.  So 
he  and  his  brother  made  their  escape ;  the  rest,  being 
hard  pressed,  and  some  of  them  ready  to  die  of  hunger, 
sat  as  suppliants  at  the  altar  which  is  in  the  Acropolis. 
When  the  Athenians,  to  whose  charge  the  guard  had 
been  committed,  saw  them  dying  in  the  temple,  they 
bade  them  rise,  promising  to  do  them  no  harm,  and 
then  led  them  away  and  put  them  to  death.  They  even 
slew  some  of  them  in  the  very  presence  of  the  awful 
Goddesses  at  whose  altars,  in  passing  by,  they  had 
sought  refuge.  The  murderers  and  their  descendants 
are  held  to  be  accursed,  and  offenders  against  the 
Goddess.  These  accursed  persons  were  banished  by 
the  Athenians  ;  and  Cleomenes,  the  Lacedaemonian  king, 
again  banished  them  from  Athens  in  a  time  of  civil 

a  Placing  the  comma  before  instead  of  after  Auitrta.  * 
b  Cp.  Herod,  v.  71. 


THE    CURSE    OF   TAENARUS.  79 

strife  by  the  help  of  the  opposite  faction,  expelling  the        I. 
living  and  disinterring  and   casting  forth  the  bones  of 
the  dead  a.     Nevertheless  they  afterwards  returned,  and 
to  this  day  their  race  still  survives  in  the  city. 

The  Lacedaemonians  desired  the  Athenians  to  drive     127. 
away  this  curse,  as  if  the  honour  of  the  Gods  were  their  This  curse 

attached  to 

first  object,  but  in  reality  because  they  knew  that  the  Pericles, 
curse  attached  to  Pericles,  the  son  of  Xanthippus,  by 
his  mother's  side,  and  they  thought  that  if  he  were 
banished  they  would  find  the  Athenians  more  manage- 
able. They  did  not  really  expect  that  he  would  be 
driven  into  exile,  but  hoped  to  discredit  him  with  the 
citizens  and  make  them  believe  that  his  misfortune  was 
to  a  certain  extent  the  cause  of  the  war.  For  he  was 
the  leader  of  the  state  and  the  most  powerful  man  of 
his  day,  and  his  policy  was  utterly  opposed  to  the 
Lacedaemonians.  He  would  not  suffer  the  Athenians 
to  give  way,  but  was  always  urging  upon  them  the 
necessity  of  war. 

The  Athenians  retaliated  by  demanding  that  the  Lace-     128. 
daemonians  should  drive  away  the  curse  of  Taenarus.  The  Athe- 
They  referred  to  the  murder  of  certain  Helots  who  had  taiiateby 
taken  refuge  in  the  temple  of  Poseidon  at  Taenarus ; 
these  the  Lacedaemonians,  having  first  raised  by  the 
hand,  had  then  led   away  and   slain.      The   Lacedae- away  other 

curses. 

monians  themselves  believe  this  act  of  theirs  to  have  The  curse 


been  the  cause  of  the  great  earthquake  which  visited 
Sparta  b.     The  Athenians  also  bade  them  drive  out  the  Pjf^ to 
curse  of  Athene  of  the  Brazen  House.     The  story  is  murder  of 

certain  sup- 

B.C.  477.  as   follows  : — When  Pausanias  the  Lacedaemonian  was  pliant 
>L  75>  4>  originally  summoned  by  the  Spartans  to  give  an  account  the  cJfrse  of 
of  his  command  at  the  Hellespont c,  and  had  been  tried  ^eBnuen 
and  acquitted,  he  was  no  longer  sent  out  in  a  public  House  was 
capacity,  but  he  hired  a  trireme  of  Hermione  on  his  own  the  death  of 
account  and  sailed  to  the  Hellespont,  pretending  that  he  in  the 
had  gone  thither  to  fight  in  the  cause  of  the  Hellenes. 
In  reality  he  wanted  to  prosecute  an  intrigue  with  the 
*  Cp.  Herod,  v.  70,  72.  b  Cp.  i.  101,  102.          c  Cp.  i.  95. 


80  STORY  OF  PAUSANIAS. 

I.        King,  by  which  he  hoped  to  obtain  the  empire  of  Hellas. 
He  had  already  taken  the  first  steps  after  the  retreat 
from  Cyprus,  when  he  captured  Byzantium.    The  city  B.C.  478  or 
was  at  that  time  held  by  the  Persians  and  by  certain  o\,'7Si  3  Or 
relatives   and   kinsmen   of  the  King,  who  were   taken  4- 
prisoners.     These  he  restored  to  the  King  without  the 
knowledge  of  the  allies,  to  whom  he  declared  that  they 
had  made  their  escape.     This   act  was  the  beginning 
of  the  whole  affair,  and  thereby  he  originally  placed  the 
King  under  an  obligation  to  him.     His  accomplice  was 
Gongylus  the  Eretrian,  to  whose  care  he  had  entrusted 
Byzantium  and  the  captives.     To  this  same  Gongylus 
he  also  gave  a  letter  addressed  to  the  King,  of  which,  as 
was  afterwards  discovered,  the  terms  were  as  follows : — 

'Pausanias,  the  Spartan  commander,  desiring  to  do 
you  a  service,  sends  you  back  these  captives  of  his  spear. 
And  I  propose,  if  you  have  no  objection,  to  marry  your 
daughter,  and  to  bring  Sparta  and  the  rest  of  Hellas 
under  your  sway.  I  think  that  I  can  accomplish  this  if 
you  and  I  take  counsel  together.  Should  you  approve 
of  my  proposal,  send  a  trusty  person  to  the  sea  and 
through  him  we  will  negotiate.'  Thus  far  the  letter. 
129.  Xerxes  was  pleased,  and  sent  Artabazus  the  son  of 
Pausank?  P^arnaces  to  ^e  sea,  commanding  him  to  assume  the 
government  of  the  satrapy  of  Dascylium  in  the  room  of 
Megabates.  An  answer  was  entrusted  to  him,  which  he 
was  to  send  as  quickly  as  possible  to  Pausanias  at  Byzan- 
tium ;  he  was  to  show  him  at  the  same  time  the  royal 
seal.  If  Pausanias  gave  him  any  order  about  his  own 
affairs,  he  was  to  execute  it  with  all  diligence  and  fidelity. 
Artabazus  came  down  to  the  sea,  as  he  was  desired,  and 
transmitted  the  letter.  The  answer  of  the  King  was  as 
follows : — 

'Thus  saith  Xerxes,  the  King,  to  Pausanias.  The  bene- 
fit which  thou  hast  done  me  in  saving  the  captives  who 
were  taken  at  Byzantium  beyond  the  sea  is  recorded  in 
my  house  for  ever,  and  thy  words  please  me.  Let  neither 
day  nor  night  hinder  thee  from  fulfilling  diligently  the 


PAUSANIAS    SUMMONED    TO    SPARTA.        81 

B.C.  477  or  promise  which'thou  hast  made  to  me  ;  spare  not  gold  or        I. 

oi.  75,  4  silver,  and  take  as  large  an  army  as  thou  wilt,  where- 
soever it  may  be  required.  I  have  sent  to  thee  Arta- 
bazus,  a  good  man  ;  act  with  him  for  my  honour  and 
welfare,  and  for  thine  own,  and  be  of  good  courage.' 

Pausanias  received  the  letter.     He  had  already  ac-     JOQ 
quired  a  high  reputation  among  the  Hellenes  when  in  Pausanias, 
command  at  Plataea,  and  now  he  was  so  great  that  he 


could  no  longer  contain  himself  or  live  like  other  men.  Prid<r; 

i  -n.  «i  manifests 

As  he  marched  out  of  Byzantium  he  wore  Persian  ap-  his  am- 
parel.     On  his  way  through  Thrace  he  was  attended  by  designs. 
a  body-guard  of  Medes  and  Egyptians,  and  he  had  his 
table  served  after  the  Persian  fashion.     He  could  not 
conceal  his  ambition,  but  indicated  by  little  things  the 
greater   designs  which   he  was  meditating.     He   made 
himself  difficult  of  access,  and  displayed  such  a  violent 
temper  towards  everybody  that  no  one  could  come  near 
him  ;   and  this  was  one  of  the  chief  reasons  why  the 
confederacy  transferred  themselves  to  the  Athenians. 

The  news  of  his  behaviour  soon  reached  the  Lacedae-  131. 
monians  ;  who  recalled  him  in  the  first  instance  on  this  He  is  re- 
ground  a.  And  now,  when  he  had  sailed  away  in  the  ship 
of  Hermione  without  leave,  and  was  evidently  carrying 


on  the  same  practices  ;  when  he  had  been  forced  out  of  monians 

-  .       ,       and  thrown 

Byzantium  and  the  gates  had  been  shut  against  him  by  into  prison, 
the  Athenians  ;  and  when,  instead  of  returning  to  Sparta,  comes°out 
he  settled  at  Colonae  in  Troas,  and  was  reported  to  the 
Ephors  to  be  negotiating  with  the  Barbarians,  and  to  be  trial. 
staying  there  for  no  good  purpose,  then  at  last  they  made 
up  their  minds  to  act.    They  sent  a  herald  to  him  with  a 
despatch  rolled  on  a  scytale,  commanding  him  to  follow 
the  officer  home,  and  saying  that,  if  he  refused,  Sparta 
would  declare  war  against  him.     He,  being  desirous  as 
far  as  he  could  to  avoid  suspicion  and  believing  that  he 
could  dispose  of  the  accusations  by  bribery,  returned  for 
the  second  time  to  Sparta.    On  his  return  he  was  at  once 
thrown  into  prison  by  the  Ephors,  who  have  the  power 
.  a  Cp.  i.  95  init. 
G 


82 


HIS   INTRIGUES   WITH    THE    HELOTS. 


I. 


132. 

Sufficient 

cannotbe 

AtTasfhis 


opens  a 

letter 

which  he 
carry0to 


finding  an 
his  own 

turns' 
informer, 


to  imprison  the  king  himself.  But  after  a  time  he  con- 
trived to  come  out,  and  challenged  any  one  who  asserted 
his  guilt  to  bring  him  to  trial. 

As  yet  however  neither  his  enemies  among  the  citizens 
nor  the  Spartan  government  had  any  trustworthy  evi- 
dence  such  as  would  have  justified  them  in  inflicting 
punishment  upon  a  member  of  the  royal  family  holding 

r°yal   °ffice    at    the   time>       F°r   he   WaS   tlle   guardian    as 

well  as  cousin  of  the  king,  Pleistarchus  son  of  Leonidas, 
who  was  still  a  minor.  But  his  disregard  of  propriety 
and  affectation  of  Barbarian  fashions  made  them  strongly 
susPect  that  he  was  dissatisfied  with  his  position  in  the 
state.  They  examined  into  any  violation  of  established 
usage  which  they  could  find  in  his  previous  life  ;  and  they 
rememberep!  among  other  things  how  in  past  times  he 
^ad  presumed  on  his  own  authority  to  inscribe  on  the 
tripod  at  Delphi,  which  the  Hellenes  dedicated  as  the 
firstfruits  of  their  victory  over  the  Persians,  this  elegiac 
couplet  :  — 

*  Pausanias,  captain  of  the  Hellenes,  having  destroyed  the  Persian 

host, 
Made  this  offering  to  Phoebus  for  a  memorial.' 

The  Lacedaemonians  at  once  effaced  the  lines  and  in- 
scribed on  the  tripod  the  names  of  the  cities  which  had 
taken  part  in  the  overthrow  of  the  Barbarian  and  in  the 
dedication  of  the  offering.  But  still  this  act  of  Pausa- 
nias gave  offence  at  the  time,  and  now  that  he  had 
again  fallen  under  suspicion,  seemed  to  receive  a  new 
light  from  his  present  designs.  They  were  also  in- 
formed that  he  was  intriguing  with  the  Helots  ;  and 
this  was  true,  for  he  had  promised  them  emancipation 
and  citizenship  if  they  would  join  him  in  an  insurrec- 
tion and  help  to  carry  out  his  whole  design.  Still  the 
magistrates  would  not  take  decided  measures  ;  they  even 
refused  to  believe  the  distinct  testimony  which  certain 
Helots  brought  against  him  ;  their  habit  having  always 
been  to  be  slow  in  taking  an  irrevocable  decision  against 


HE   IS   BETRAYED    BY  HIS   SERVANT.         83 

a  Spartan  without  incontestable  proof.  At  last  a  certain  I. 
man  of  Argilus,  who  had  been  a  favourite  and  was  still  a 
confidential  servant  of  Pausanias,  turned  informer.  He 
had  been  commissioned  by  him  to  carry  to  Artabazus 
the  last  letters  for  the  King,  but  the  thought  struck  him 
that  no  previous  messenger  had  ever  returned  ;  he  took 
alarm,  and  so,  having  counterfeited  the  seal  of  Pausanias 
in  order  to  avoid  discovery  if  he  were  mistaken,  or  if 
Pausanias,  wanting  to  make  some  alteration,  should  ask 
him  for  the  letter,  he  opened  it,  and  among  the  directions 
given  in  it  found  written,  as  he  had  suspected,  an  order 
for  his  own  death. 

He  showed  the  letter  to  the  Ephors,  who  were  now     133- 
more  inclined  to  believe,  but  still  they  wanted  to  hear  His  servant 

takes  sanc- 

somethmg  from  Pausanias  own  mouth  ;  and  so,  accord-  tuary  at 
ing  to  a  plan  preconcerted  with  them,  the  man  went  to  where  he' 
Taenarus  as  a  suppliant  and  there  put  up  a  hut  divided 


by  a  partition.     In  the  inner  part  of  the  hut  he  placed  £e  Ephors. 

•  Pausanias 

some  of  the  Ephors,  and  when  Pausanias  came  to  him  coming  to 
and  asked  him  why  he  was  a  suppliant,  the  whole  truth  reason*!*. 
was  at  once  revealed  to  them.     There  was  the  man  re-  ^^^ 
preaching  Pausanias  with  the  directions  which  he  had 
found  in  the  letter,  and  going  into  minute  details  about 
the  whole  affair  ;  he  protested  that  never  on  any  occa- 
sion had  he  brought  him  into  any  trouble  when  sent  on 
his  service  in  this  matter  to  the  King  :  why  then  should 
he  share  the  fate  of  the  other  messengers,  and  be  re- 
warded with  death  ?     And  there  was  Pausanias,  admit- 
ting the  truth  of  his  words,  and  telling  him  not  to  be 
angry  at  what  had  happened,  offering  to  raise  him  by 
the  hand  that  he  might  safely  leave  the  temple,  and 
bidding  him  go  about  the   business   at  once  and   not 
make  difficulties. 

The  Ephors,  who  had  heard  every  word,  went  away     1  34. 
for  the  present,  intending,  now  that  they  had  certain  T«e  Ephors 

J  attempt  to 

knowledge,  to  take  Pausanias  in  the  city.    It  is  said  that  arrest 
he  was  on  the  point  of  being  arrested  in  the  street,  when  He  flies  to' 
the  face  of  one  of  them  as  they  approached  revealed  to 

G  2, 


DEATH   OF  PAUSANIAS. 


I. 

and  is 
there  shut 
in  and 
starved 
to  death. 


135. 


Themisto- 
cles  is 
implicated 
in  the  plot, 
and  officers 
are  sent  to 
take  him. 


him  their  purpose,  and  another  who  was  friendly  warned 
him  by  a  hardly  perceptible  nod.  Whereupon  he  ran 
and  fled  to  the  temple  of  Athene  of  the  Brazen  House 
and  arrived  before  them,  for  the  precinct  was  not  far 
off.  There,  entering  into  a  small  house  which  be- 
longed to  the  temple,  that  he  might  not  suffer  from 
exposure  to  the  weather,  he  remained.  When  his  pur- 
suers, who  had  failed  in  overtaking  him,  came  up,  they 
unroofed  the  building,  and  having  made  sure  that  he  was 
within  and  could  not  get  out,  they  built  up  the  doors, 
and,  investing  the  place,  starved  him  to  death.  He  was 
on  the  point  of  expiring  in  the  temple  where  he  lay, 
when  they,  observing  his  condition,  brought  him  out ; 
he  was  still  breathing,  but  as  soon  as  he  was  brought 
out  he  died.  The  Spartans  were  going  to  cast  his  body 
into  the  Caeadas,  a  chasm  into  which  they  throw  male- 
factors, but  they  changed  their  minds  and  buried  him 
somewhere  in  the  neighbourhood.  The  God  of  Delphi 
afterwards  commanded  them  to  transfer  him  to  the  place 
where  -he  died,  and  he  now  lies  in  the  entrance  to  the 
precinct,  as  the  inscription  on  the  column  testifies.  The 
oracle  also  told  them  that  they  had  brought  a  curse 
upon  themselves,  and  must  offer  two  bodies  for  one  to 
Athene  of  the  Brazen  House.  Whereupon  they  made 
two  brazen  statues,  which  they  dedicated,  intending  them 
to  be  an  expiation  for  Pausanias. 

To  this  judgment  of  the  God  himself  the  Athenians 
referred  when  they  retorted  on  the  Lacedaemonians, 
telling  them  to  banish  the  curse. 

Now  the  evidence  which  proved  that  Pausanias  was  in 
league  with    Persia  implicated    Themistocles ;   and  the 
Lacedaemonians   sent   ambassadors   to    the    Athenians 
charging  him  likewise  with  treason,  and  demanding  that 
he   should    receive   the  same   punishment.     The  Athe-  B.C.  471. 
nians  agreed,  but  having  been  ostracised  he  was  living  O1<  77<  2- 
at  the   time  in  Argos,  whence  he  used   to  visit  other 
parts  of  the  Peloponnese.     The  Lacedaemonians  were 
very   ready  to  join   in   the   pursuit ;    so  they  and  the 


THEMISTOCLES   AND    ADMETUS.  85 

Athenians  sent   officers,  who  were  told  to   arrest  him        I. 
wherever  they  should  find  him. 

Themistocles   received   information  of  their  purpose,      136. 
and  fled  from  the  Peloponnesus  to  the  Corcyraeans,  who  He  seeks 
were  under  an  obligation  to  him.     The  Corcyraeans  said  among  the 
that  they  were  afraid  to  keep  him,  lest  they  should  incur 
the  enmity  of  Athens  and  Lacedaemon  ;   so  they  con- 

veyed  him  to  the  neighbouring  continent,  whither  he  was  and  Lace- 

daemon, 
followed  by  the  officers,  who  constantly  enquired  in  which  and  send 

direction  he  had   gone  and   pursued   him  everywhere, 
Owing  to  an  accident  he  was  compelled  to  stop  at  the 


house  of  Admetus,  king  of  the  Molossians,  who  was  not  of  Admetus, 
his  friend.  He  chanced  to  be  absent  from  home,  but  Molossians, 
Themistocles  presented  himself  as  a  suppliant  to  his  suppliant  a 
wife,  and  was  instructed  by  her  to  take  their  child  and 


sit  at  the  hearth.  Admetus  soon  returned,  and  then 
Themistocles  told  him  who  he  was,  adding  that  if  in 
past  times  he  had  opposed  any  request  which  Admetus 
had  made  to  the  Athenians,  he  ought  not  to  retaliate  on 
an  exile.  He  was  now  in  such  extremity  that  a  far 
weaker  adversary  than  he  could  do  him  a  mischief  ;  but 
a  noble  nature  should  not  be  revenged  by  taking  at 
adisadvantage  one  as  good  as  himself.  Themistocles 
further  argued  that  he  had  opposed  Admetus  in  some 
matter  of  business,  and  not  when  life  was  at  stake  ; 
but  that,  if  Admetus  delivered  him  up,  he  would  be 
consigning  him  to  death.  At  the  same  time  he  told 
him  who  his  pursuers  were  and  what  was  the  charge 
against  him. 

Admetus,  hearing  his  words,  raised  him  up,  together 
with  his  own  son,  from  the  place  where  he  sat  holding  Admetus 
the  child  in  his  arms,  which  was  the  most  solemn  form  of  j-£o^t™n 
supplication.      Not  long  afterwards  the  Athenians  and  *nd  when 

the  officers 

Lacedaemonians  came  and  pressed  him  to  give  up  the  arrive  in 
fugitive,  but  he  refused  ;  and  as  Themistocles  wanted  to 
go  to  the  King,  sent  him  on  foot  across  the  country  to  the 
sea  at  Pydna  (which  was  in  the  kingdom  of  Alexander), 
There  he  found   a  merchant  vessel  sailing  to  Ionia,  in 


86      THEMISTOCLES  AT  THE  PERSIAN  COURT. 

I.  which  he  embarked  ;  it  was  driven,  however,  by  a  storm  B.C.  466. 
to  the  station  of  the  Athenian  fleet  which  was  blockading 
Naxos.  He  was  unknown  to  his  fellow  passengers,  but, 
fearing  what  might  happen,  he  told  the  captain  who 
he  was  and  why  he  fled,  threatening  if  he  did  not  save 
his  life  to  say  that  he  had  been  bribed  to  take  him  on 
board.  The  only  hope  was  that  no  one  should  be  allowed 
to  leave  the  ship  while  they  had  to  remain  off  Naxos  ; 
if  he  complied  with  his  request,  the  obligation  should  be 
abundantly  repaid.  The  captain  agreed,  and  after  anchor- 
ing in  a  rough  sea  for  a  day  and  a  night  off  the  Athenian 
station,  he  at  length  arrived  at  Ephesus.  Themistocles 
rewarded  him  with  a  liberal  present  ;  for  he  received  soon 
afterwards  from  his  friends  the  property  which  he  had 
deposited  at  Athens  and  Argos.  He  then  went  up  the 
country  with  one  of  the  Persians  who  dwelt  on  the  coast, 
and  sent  a  letter  to  Artaxerxes  the  son  of  Xerxes,  who  B.C.  465. 
His  letter  had  just  succeeded  to  the  throne.  The  letter  was  in  the  O1'  78'  4' 
totheKing.  f0uowing  words  :__<  ^  Themistocles,  have  come  to  you,  I 
who  of  all  Hellenes  did  your  house  the  greatest  injuries 
so  long  as  I  was  compelled  to  defend  myself  against 
your  father  ;  but  still  greater  benefits  when  I  was  in 
safety  and  he  in  danger  during  his  retreat.  And  there 
is  a  debt  of  gratitude  due  to  me  '  (here  he  noted  how 
he  had  forewarned  Xerxes  at  Salamis  of  the  resolution 
of  the  Hellenes  to  withdraw  a,  and  how  through  his  in- 
fluence, as  he  pretended,  they  had  refrained  from  break- 
ing down  the  bridges)  b.  'Now  I  am  here,  able  to  do 
you  many  other  services,  and  persecuted  by  the  Hellenes 
for  your  sake.  Let  me  wait  a  year,  and  then  I  will 
138.  myself  explain  why  I  have  come.' 

Going  to         The  King  is  said  to  have  been  astonished  at  the  bold- 
of  Persia,     ness  of  his  character,  and  told  him  to  wait  a  year  as  he 


proposed.     In  the  interval  he  made  himself  acquainted, 
as  far  as  ^e  COUH  with  the  Persian  language  and  the 


great  ho-     manners  of  the  country.     When  the  year  was  over,  he 

nour,  but 

shortly  after  arrived  at  the  court  and  became  a  greater  man  there 

dies. 

a  Cp.  Herod,  viii.  75.  b  Cp.  Herod,  viii.  108. 


CHARACTER    OF    THEMISTOCLES.  87 

than  any  Hellene  had  ever  been  before.     This  was  due        I. 
partly  to  his  previous  reputation,  and  partly  to  the  hope  The  great- 
which  he  inspired  in  the  King's  mind  that  he  would  character. 
enslave  Hellas  to  him  ;  above  all,  his  ability  had  been  acutenes-T 
tried  and  not  found  wanting.    For  Themistocles  was  a  ^t^his 
man  whose  natural  force  was  unmistakeable ;   this  was  P°wer  ?f 
the  quality  for  which   he  was  distinguished   above  all  his  readi-  ' 
other  men  ;  from  his  own  native  acuteness,  and  without  emergency. 
any  study  either  before  or  at  the  time,  he  was  the  ablest 
judge  of  the  course  to  be  pursued  in  a  sudden  emergency, 
and  could  best  divine  what  was  likely  to  happen  in  the 
remotest  future.     Whatever  he  had  in  hand  he  had  the 
power  of  explaining  to  others,  and  even  where  he  had  no 
experience  he  was  quite  competent  to  form  a  sufficient 
judgment ;  no  one  could  foresee  with  equal  clearness  the 
good  or  evil  event  which  was  hidden  in  the  future.     In  a 
word,  Themistocles,  by  natural  power  of  mind  and  with 
the  least  preparation,  was  of  all  men  the  best  able  to  ex- 
temporise the  right  thing  to  be  done.     A  sickness  put 
an  end  to  his  life,  although  some  say  that  he  poisoned 
himself  because  he  felt  that  he  could  not  accomplish 
what  he  had  promised  to  the  King.     There  is  a  monu- 
ment of  him  in  the  agora  of  the  Asiatic  Magnesia,  where 
he  was  governor — the  King  assigning  to  him,  for  bread, 
Magnesia,  which  produced  a  revenue  of  fifty  talents* 
in  the  year  ;  for  wine,  Lampsacus,  which  was  considered 
to  be  the  richest  in  wine  of  any  district  then  known  ;  and 
Myus  for  meat.     His  family  say  that  his  remains  were 
carried  home  at  his  own  request  and  buried  in  Attica, 
but  secretly;  for  he  had  been  accused  of  treason  and 
had  fled  from  his  country,  and  he  could  not  lawfully 
be  interred  there.     Such  was  the  end  of  Pausanias  the 
Lacedaemonian,  and  Themistocles  the  Athenian,  the  two 
most  famous  Hellenes  of  their  day. 

Thus  the  demand  for  the  banishment  of  the  accursed      1 39. 
made  by  the  Lacedaemonians  on  the  occasion  of  their  Jhe  Lace- 

J  daemomans 

first   embassy  was   met  by  a  counter  demand  on  the  make  a 

final  de- 
a  About  ,£12,000.  mand  for 


88  SPEECH   OF   PERICLES. 

I.      part  of  Athens.     Later  they  came  again  and  told  the  B.C.  432. 
the  restora-  Athenians  that  they  must  raise  the  siege  of  Potidaea  and  O1'  8?' 

tion  of  in- 

dependence restore  Aegina  to  independence.  Above  all,  and  in  the 
Hellenes,  plainest  terms,  they  insisted  that  if  they  wanted  to 
Perfcies0f  avert  war>  tnev  must  rescind  the  decree  which  excluded 
the  Megarians  from  the  market  of  Athens  and  the  har- 
bours in  the  Athenian  dominions.  But  the  Athenians 
would  not  listen  to  them,  nor  rescind  the  decree  ;  al- 
leging in  reply  that  the  Megarians  had  tilled  the  holy 
ground  and  the  neutral  borderland,  and  had  received 
their  runaway  slaves.  Finally,  there  came  from  Sparta 
an  embassy,  consisting  of  Rhamphias,  Melesippus,  and 
Hegesander,  who  said  nothing  of  all  this,  but  only,  '  The 
Lacedaemonians  desire  to  maintain  peace,  and  peace 
there  may  be  if  you  will  restore  independence  to  the 
Hellenes.'  Whereupon  the  Athenians  called  an  assembly 
and  held  a  discussion;  it  seemed  best  to  them  to  make 
up  their  minds  and  to  give  a  complete  and  final  answer. 
Many  came  forward  to  speak,  and  much  was  said  on 
both  sides,  some  affirming  that  they  ought  to  go  to  war, 
and  others  that  this  decree  about  the  Megarians  should 
be  rescinded  and  not  stand  in  the  way  of  peace.  At  last 
Pericles  the  son  of  Xanthippus,  who  was  the  first  man 
of  his  day  at  Athens,  and  the  greatest  orator  and  states- 
man, came  forward  and  advised  as  follows  :  — 
140.  '  Athenians,  I  say,  as  I  always  have  said,  that  we  must 
I  still  give  never  yield  to  the  Peloponnesians,  although  I  know  that 

you  my  old  11,  •  r        •     i 

advice,—     men  are  persuaded  to  go  to  war  in  one  temper  of  mind, 
anc*  act  when  the  time  comes  in  another,  and  that  their 


the  Peio-     resolutions  change  with  the  changes  of  fortune.     But  I 

ponnesian3-  t          T 

see  that  I  must  give  you  the  same,  or  nearly  the  same, 
advice  which  I  gave  before,  and  I  call  upon  those  whom 
.my  words  may  convince  to  maintain  our  united  deter- 
mination, even  if  we  should  not  escape  disaster  ;  or  else, 
if  our  sagacity  be  justified  by  success,  to  claim  no  share 
of  the  credit  a.  The  movement  of  events  is  often  as 
wayward  and  incomprehensible  as  the  course  of  human 
a  Cp.  ii.  64  init. 


SPEECH   OF  PERICLES.  89 

B.C.  432.  thought ;  and  this  is  why  we  ascribe  to  chance  whatever        I. 
belies  our  calculation.  The  de- 

'  For  some  time  past  the  designs  of  the  Lacedaemonians  of  the 
have  been  clear  enough,  and  they  are  still  clearer  now.  means' 
The  treaty  says   that  when  differences  arise,   the  two  ™*J. seem 

'  trining,  but 

parties  shall  refer  them  to  arbitration,  and  in  the  mean  submission 
time  both  are  to  retain  what  they  have.    But  for  arbitra-  win  only 
tion  they  never  ask ;  and  when  it  is  offered  by  us,  they  frre°h°de- 
refuse  it.    They  want  to  redress  their  grievances  by  arms  man^s  and 

J  J  implies  the 

and  not  by  argument ;  and  now  they  come  to  us,  using  loss  of 

b  our  inde- 

the  language,  no  longer  of  expostulation,  but  of  com-  pendence. 
mand.  They  tell  us  to  quit  Potidaea,  to  leave  Aegina 
independent,  and  to  rescind  the  decree  respecting  the 
Megarians.  These  last  ambassadors  go  further  still,  and 
announce  that  we  must  give  the  Hellenes  independence. 
I  would  have  none  of  you  imagine  that  he  will  be  fight- 
ing for  a  small  matter  if  we  refuse  to  annul  the  Megarian 
decree,  of  which  they  make  so  much,  telling  us  that  its 
revocation  would  prevent  the  war.  You  should  have  no 
lingering  uneasiness  about  this ;  you  are  not  really  going 
to  war  for  a  trifle.  For  in  the  seeming  trifle  is  involved 
the  trial  and  confirmation  of  your  whole  purpose.  If 
you  yield  to  them  in  a  small  matter,  they  will  think 
that  you  are  afraid,  and  will  immediately  dictate  some 
more  oppressive  condition  ;  but  if  you  are  firm,  you  will 
prove  to  them  that  they  must  treat  you  as  their  equals. 
Wherefore  make  up  your  minds  once  for  all,  either  to  141. 
give  way  while  you  are  still  unharmed,  or,  if  we  are  Unless  you 

/  mean  to 

going  to  war,  as  in  my  judgment  is  best,  then  on  no  plea  give  way 
small  or  great  to  give  way  at   all  ;    we  will  not  con-  JJJJ^  deter- 
descend  to  possess  our  own  in  fear.     Any  claim,  the mme  never 

J  to  give  way 

smallest  as  well  as  the  greatest,  imposed  on  a  neighbour  at  ail.   Nor 
and  an  equal  when  there  has  been  no  legal  award,  can  fear  the 

,  i  .         i  i  result  ;  for 

mean  nothing  but  slavery.  you 

'  That  our  resources  are  equal  to  theirs,  and  that  we 
shall  be  as  strong  in  the  war,  I  will  now  prove  to  you 
in  detail.  The  Peloponnesians  cultivate  their  own  soil, 
and  they  have  no  wealth  either  public  or  private.  Nor 


90  SPEECH    OF  PERICLES. 

I.        have   they   any   experience  of  long  wars  in   countries  B.C.  432. 
owifiSd     bey°nd   tne   sea ;    their    poverty   prevents    them   from  ° 
they  are      fighting,  except  in  person  against  each  other,  and  that  for 

unaccus-  .  _, 

tomed  to  a  short  time  only.  Such  men  cannot  be  often  manning 
anTdivfded  fleets  or  sending  out  armies.  They  would  be  at  a  dis- 
m  race.  tance  from  their  own  properties,  upon  which  they  must 
nevertheless  draw,  and  they  will  be  kept  off  the  sea 
by  us.  Now  wars  are  supported  out  of  accumulated 
wealth,  and  not  out  of  forced  contributions.  And  men 
who  cultivate  their  own  lands  are  more  ready  to  serve 
with  their  persons  than  with  their  property a;  they  do  not 
despair  of  their  lives,  but  they  soon  grow  anxious  lest 
their  money  should  all  be  spent,  especially  if  the  war  in 
which  they  are  engaged  is  protracted  beyond  their  calcu- 
lation, as  may  well  be  the  case.  In  a  single  pitched 
battle  the  Peloponnesians  and  their  allies  are  a  match  for 
all  Hellas,  but  they  are  not  able  to  maintain  a  war 
against  a  power  different  in  kind  from  their  ownb;  they 
have  no  regular  general  assembly,  and  therefore  cannot 
execute  their  plans  with  speed  and  decision.  The  con- 
federacy is  made  up  of  many  races  ;  all  the  representa- 
tives have  equal  votes,  and  press  their  several  interests. 
There  follows  the  usual  result,  that  nothing  is  ever  done 
properly.  For  some  are  all  anxiety  to  be  revenged  on 
the  enemy,  while  others  only  want  to  save  their  money. 
The  members  of  such  a  confederacy  are  slow  to  meet, 
and  when  they  do  meet,  they  give  little  time  to  the  con- 
sideration of  any  common  interest,  and  a  great  deal  to 
schemes  which  further  the  interest  of  their  particular 
state.  Every  one  fancies  that  his  own  neglect  will  do  no 
harm,  but  that  it  is  somebody  else's  business  to  keep  a 
look-out  for  him,  and  this  idea,  cherished  alike  by  each, 
is  the  secret  ruin  of  all. 

142.  'Their  greatest  difficulty  will  be  want  of  money,  which 
They  can-  they  can  only  provide  slowly;  delay  will  thus  occur,  and 
any  real™1  war  waits  for  no  man.  Further,  no  fortified  place  which 
bSin|  they  can  raise  against  us c  is  to  be  feared  any  more  than 

a  rival  city       a  Cp>  ^  I2J  med>  b  Cp<  viii>  g6  fin<  c  Cp.  i.  122  init. 


SPEECH   OF  PERICLES.  91 

B.C.  432.  their  navy.     As  to  the  first,  even  in  time  of   peace  it        I. 

would  be  hard  for  them  to  build  a  city  able  to  compete  or  fortified 
with  Athens  ;  and  how  much  more  so  when  they  are  in  an  Attica  : 


enemy's  country,  and  our  walls  will  be  a  menace  to  them 
quite  as  much  as  theirs  to  us  !  Or,  again,  if  they  simply 
raise  a  fort  in  our  territory,  they  may  do  mischief  to  some  rival  y°u  at 
part  of  our  lands  by  sallies,  and  the  slaves-  may  desert  to 
them  ;  but  that  will  not  prevent  us  from  sailing  to  the 
Peloponnese  and  there  raising  forts  against  them,  and  in 
other  ways  by  the  help  of  our  navy,  which  is  our  strong 
arm,  retaliating  upon  them.  For  we  have  gained  more 
experience  of  fighting  on  land  from  warfare  at  sea  than 
they  of  naval  affairs  from  warfare  on  land.  And  they 
will  not  easily  acquire  nautical  skill  a;  even  you  your- 
selves, who  have  been  practising  ever  since  the  Persian 
War,  are  not  yet  perfect.  How  can  they,  who  are  not 
sailors,  but  tillers  of  the  soil,  do  much  ?  They  will  not 
even  be  permitted  to  practise,  because  a  large  fleet  will 
constantly  be  lying  in  wait  for  them.  If  they  were 
watched  by  a  few  ships  only,  they  might  run  the  risk, 
trusting  to  their  numbers  and  forgetting  their  inexperi- 
ence ;  but  if  they  are  kept  off  the  sea  by  our  superior 
strength,  their  want  of  practice  will  make  them  unskilful} 
and  their  want  of  skill  timid.  Maritime  skill  is  like  skill 
of  other  kinds,  not  a  thing  to  be  cultivated  by  the  way 
or  at  chance  times;  it  is  jealous  of  any  other  pursuit 
which  distracts  the  mind  for  an  instant  from  itself. 

'Suppose,  again,  that  they  lay  hands  on  the  treasures      143. 
at  Olympia  and  Delphi,  and  tempt  our  mercenary,  sailors  Our  foreign 

.  ,        ,  rc  r  i  •    i  •    1  sailors  will 

with  the  offer  of  higher  pay  b,  there  might  be  serious  not  be 
danger,  if  we  and  our  metics  c  embarking  alone  were  not  offen^of  by 
still  a  match  for  them.     But  we  are  a  match  for  them  :  jjjgj1^ 
and,  best  of   all,  our   pilots   are  taken  from   our   own  are,  we  can 
citizens,  while  no  sailors  are  to  be  found  so  good  or  them. 
so   numerous  as   ours    in   all   the  rest   of  Hellas.     No 
mercenary  will  choose  to  fight  on  their  side  for  the  sake 
of  a  few  days'  high  pay,  when  he  will  not  only  be  an 
a  Cp.  i.  121  med.  b  Cp.  i.  121  init.  c  Gp.  iii.  16  init. 


SPEECH   OF  PERICLES. 


I. 

We  must 
guard  the 
city  and  the 
sea,  and 
not  mind 
about  our 
houses  and 
lands  in  the 
country. 


144. 

Let  our 
answer  be  : 
We  will 
grant  inde- 
pendence 
to  our 
allies,  if  the 
Lacedae- 
monians 
will  allow 
their  sub- 
jects to 
choose 
their  own 
form  of 
govern- 
ment. 


exile,  but  will  incur  greater  danger,  and  will  have  less  B.C.  432. 

i  r      '    L  Ol-  87. 

hope  of  victory. 

'Such  I  conceive  to  be  the  prospects  of  the  Pelopon- 
nesians.  But  we  ourselves  are  free  from  the  defects 
which  I  have  noted  in  them ;  and  we  have  great  ad- 
vantages. If  they  attack  our  country  by  land,  we  shall 
attack  theirs  by  sea  ;  and  the  devastation,  even  of  part 
of  Peloponnesus,  will  be  a  very  different  thing  from  that 
of  all  Attica.  For  they,  if  they  want  fresh  territory,  must 
take  it  by  arms,  whereas  we  have  abundance  of  land  both 
in  the  islands  and  on  the  continent ;  such  is  the  power 
which  the  empire  of  the  sea  gives.  Reflect,  if  we  were 
islanders,  who  would  be  more  invulnerable  ?  Let  us 
imagine  that  we  are,  and  acting  in  that  spirit  let  us  give 
up  lands  and  houses,  but  keep  a  watch  over  the  city  and 
the  sea.  We  should  not  under  any  irritation  at  the  loss 
of  our  property  give  battle  to  the  Peloponnesians,  who 
far  outnumber  us.  If  we  conquer,  we  shall  have  to  fight 
over  again  with  as  many  more;  and  if  we  fail,  besides  the 
defeat,  our  confederacy,  which  is  our  strength,  will  be 
lost  to  us ;  for  our  allies  will  rise  in  revolt  when  we  are 
no  longer  capable  of  making  war  upon  them.  Mourn 
not  for  houses  and  lands,  but  for  men;  men  may  gain 
these,  but  these  will  not  gain  men.  If  I  thought  that  you 
would  listen  to  me,  I  would  say  to  you,  "Go  yourselves 
and  destroy  them,  and  thereby  prove  to  the  Pelopon- 
nesians that  none  of  these  things  will  move  you." 

'I  have  many  other  reasons  for  believing  that  you  will 
conquer,  but  you  must  not  be  extending  your  empire 
while  you  are  at  war,  or  run  into  unnecessary  dangers. 
I  am  more  afraid  of  our  own  mistakes  than  of  our 
enemies'  designs.  But  of  all  this  I  will  speak  again  when 
the  time  of  action  comes ;  for  the  present,  let  us  send 
the  ambassadors  away,  giving  them  this  answer  :  "  That 
we  will  not  exclude  the  Megarians  from  our  markets 
and  harbours,  if  the  Lacedaemonians  will  not  exclude 
foreigners,  whether  ourselves  or  our  allies,  from  Sparta ; 
for  the  treaty  no  more  forbids  the  one  than  the  other. 


NEAR    APPROACH    OF    THE    WAR.  93 

B.C.  432.  That  we  will  concede  independence  to  the  cities,  if  they        I. 


01.  87. 


were  independent  when  we  made  the  treaty,  and  as  soon  We  do  not 

L  t  want  war, 

as  the  Lacedaemonians  allow  their  subject  states  to  be  but  offer 
governed  as  they  choose,  not  for  the  interest  of  Lace-  still,  peace 


daemon,  but  for  their  own.     Also  that  we  are  willing  to  a 
offer  arbitration  according  to  the  treaty.     And  that  we 
do  not  want  to  begin  war,  but  intend  to  defend  ourselves  war  in  a 
if  attacked."     This  answer  will  be  just,  and  befits  the  worthy  of 
dignity  of  the  city.     We  must  be  aware  however  that01 
war  will  come;  and  the  more  willing  we  are  to  accept  the 
situation,  the  less  ready  will  our  enemies  be  to  lay  hands 
upon  us.     Remember  that  where  dangers  are  greatest, 
there  the  greatest  honours  are  to  be  won  by  men  and 
states.     Our  fathers,  when  they  withstood  the  Persian, 
had  no  such  empire  as  we  have  ;  what  little  they  had 
they  forsook  :  not  by  good  fortune  but  by  wisdom,  and 
not  by  power  but  by  courage,  they  repelled  the  Bar- 
barian and  raised  us  to  our  present  height  of  greatness. 
We  must  be  worthy  of  them,  and  resist  our  enemies 
with  all  our  might,  that  we  may  hand  down  our  empire 
unimpaired  to  posterity/ 

Such   were   the   words   of   Pericles.    The  Athenians,      145. 
approving,  voted  as  he  told  them,  and  on   his  motion  The  Athe- 
answered  the  Lacedaemonians  in  detail  as  he  had  sug-  per?cies'°F 
gested,  and  on  the  whole  question  to  the  effect  'thatadvice' 
they  would  do  nothing  upon  compulsion,  but  were  ready 
to  settle  their  differences  by  arbitration  upon  fair  terms 
according  to  the  treaty.'     So  the  ambassadors  went  home 
and  came  no  more. 

These  were  the  causes  of  offence  alleged   on  either     146. 
side   before  the  war  began.     The  quarrel  arose  imme-  War, 
diately  out   of  the  affair   of   Epidamnus  and  Corcyra.  formally"0 
But,  although  the  contest  was  imminent,  the  contending  ^^^ed> 
parties  still  kept  up  intercourse  and  visited  each  other,  nent- 
without  a  herald,  but  not  with  entire  confidence.      For 
the  situation  was  really  an  abrogation  of  the  treaty,  and 
might  at  any  time  lead  to  war. 


BOOK     II. 


II.  I.         AND    now    the   war   between   the   Athenians    and  B.C.  43i. 
Outbreak    Peloponnesians  and  the  allies  of  both  actually  began. 
ie  war.  Henceforward  the  struggle  was  uninterrupted,  and  they 
communicated  with  one  another  only  by  heralds.     The 
narrative  is  arranged  according  to  summers  and  winters 
and  follows  the  order  of  events. 

2.  For  fourteen  years  the  thirty  years'  peace  which  was 

The  The-  concluded  after  the  recovery  of  Euboea  remained  un- 
Piataeaby  broken.  But  in  the  fifteenth  year,  when  Chrysis  the 
high-priestess  of  Argos  was  in  the  forty-eighth  year  of 
her  priesthood,  Aenesias  being  Ephor  at  Sparta,  and  at 
Athens  Pythodorus  having  two  months  of  his  archon- 
ship  to  run,  in  the  sixth  month  after  the  engagement  at 
Potidaea  and  at  the  beginning  of  spring,  about  the  first 
watch  of  the  night  an  armed  force  of  somewhat  more 
than  three  hundred  Thebans  entered  Plataea,  a  city  of 
Boeotia,  which  was  an  ally  of  Athens,  under  the  com- 
mand of  two  Boeotarchs,  Pythangelus  the  son  of  Phy- 
leides,  and  Diemporus  the  son  of  Onetorides.  They 
were  invited  by  Naucleides,  a  Plataean,  and  his  partisans, 
who  opened  the  gates  to  them.  These  men  wanted  to 
kill  certain  citizens  of  the  opposite  faction  and  to  make 
over  the  city  to  the  Thebans,  in  the  hope  of  getting  the 
power  into  their  own  hands.  The  intrigue  had  been  con- 
ducted by  Eurymachus  the  son  of  Leontiades,  one  of 
the  chief  citizens  of  Thebes.  There  was  an  old  quarrel 
between  the  two  cities,  and  the  Thebans,  seeing  that  war 


THE    THEDANS   SURPRISE   PLATAEA.          95 

B.C.  431.  was  inevitable,  were  anxious  to  surprise  the  place  while  II. 
7>  2'  the  peace  lasted  and  before  hostilities  had  actually 
broken  out.  No  watch  had  been  set  ;  and  so  they  were 
enabled  to  enter  the  city  unperceived.  They  grounded 
their  arms  in  the  Agora,  but  instead  of  going  to  work 
at  once  and  making  their  way  into  the  houses  of  their 
enemies,  as  those  who  invited  them  suggested,  they  re- 
solved to  issue  a  conciliatory  proclamation  and  try  to 
make  friends  with  the  citizens.  The  herald  announced 
that  if  any  one  wished  to  become  their  ally  and  return 
to  the  ancient  constitution  of  Boeotia,  he  should  join 
their  ranks.  In  this  way  they  thought  that  the  in- 
habitants would  easily  be  induced  to  come  over  to 
them. 

The  Plataeans,  when  they  found  that  the  city  had  been        3. 
surprised  and  taken  and  that  the  Thebans  were  within  The  Pia- 
their  walls,  were  panic-stricken.     In  the  darkness  they  rmedby  tiie 


were  unable  to  see  them  and  greatly  over-estimated  their 
numbers.     So  they  came  to  terms,  and  accepting  the  J°  terms. 

J  But  after- 

proposals  which  were  made  to  them,  remained  quiet,  the  wards, 
more  readily  since  the  Thebans  offered  violence  to  no  the  weak- 
one.     But  in  the  course  of  the  negotiations  they  some-  ™fmy  they 
how  discovered  that  their  enemies  were  not  so  numerous 


as  they  had  supposed,  and  concluded  that  they  could  the  The- 
easily  attack  and  master  them.  They  determined  to 
make  the  attempt,  for  the  Plataean  people  were  strongly 
attached  to  the  Athenian  alliance.  They  began  to  col- 
lect inside  the  houses,  breaking  through  the  party-walls 
that  they  might  not  be  seen  going  along  the  streets; 
they  likewise  raised  barricades  of  waggons,  unyoking  the 
beasts  which  drew  them,  and  took  other  measures  suit- 
able to  the  emergency.  When  they  had  done  all  which 
Could  be  done  under  the  circumstances,  they  sallied 
forth  from  their  houses,  choosing  the  time  of  night  just 
before  daybreak,  lest,  if  they  put  off  the  attack  until 
dawn,  the  enemy  might  be  more  confident  and  more  a 
match  for  them.  While  darkness  lasted  they  would  be 
timid,  and  at  a  disadvantage,  not  knowing  the  streets  so 


96  DEFEAT    OF    THE    THEBANS. 

II.       well  as  themselves.     So  they  fell  upon  them  at  once  B.C.  431. 

hand  to  hand. 

4.  When  the  Thebans  found  that  they  had  been  deceived 

The  The-    they  closed  their  ranks  and  resisted  their  assailants  on 

bans,  after  . 

some  resist-  every  side.  Two  or  three  times  they  drove  them  back. 
andfly?"1  But  when  at  last  the  Plataeans  charged  them  with  a  great 
raS^ofthe"  snoutJ  and  the  women  and  slaves  on  the  housetops 
way,  many  screamed  and  yelled  and  pelted  them  with  stones  and 

are  slain  in  «•     .  •  111  • 

the  streets :  tiles,  the  confusion  being  aggravated  by  the  ram  which 
cape^the    nad  been  falling  heavily  during  the  night,  they  turned  and 
fled  in  terror  tnrough  the  cit7-    Hardly  any  of  them  knew 
the  way  out,  and  the  streets  were  dark  as  well  as  muddy, 
for  the  affair  happened  at  the  end  of  the  month  when 
there  was  no  moon ;   whereas  their  pursuers  knew  well 
enough  how  to  prevent  their  escape ;  and  thus  many  of 
them  perished.    The  gates  by  which  they  entered  were 
the  only  ones  open,  and  these  a  Plataean  fastened  with 
the  spike  of  a  javelin,  which  he  thrust  into  the  bar  instead 
of  the  pin.     So  this  exit  too  was  closed  and  they  were 
chased  up  and  down  the  city.     Some  of  them  mounted 
upon  the  wall  and  cast  themselves  down  into  the  open. 
Most  of  these  were  killed.    Others  got  out  by  a  deserted 
gate,  cutting  through  the  bar  unperceived  with  an  axe 
which  a  woman  gave  them  ;  but  only  a  few,  for  they 
were  soon  found  out.    Others  lost  themselves  in  different 
parts  of  the  city,  and  were  put  to  death.    But  the  greater 
number  kept  together  and  took  refuge  in  a  large  building 
abutting  upon  the  wall,  of  which  the  doors  on  the  near 
side  chanced  to  be  open,  they  thinking  them  to  be  the 
gates  of  the  city,  and  expecting  to  find  a  way  through 
them  into  the  country.    The  Plataeans,  seeing  that  they 
were  in  a  trap,  began  to  consider  whether  they  should 
not  set  the  building  on  fire,  and  burn  them  where  they 
were.     At  last  they  and  the  other  Thebans  who  were 
still  alive,  and  were  wandering  about  the  city,  agreed  to 
surrender   themselves   and    their   arms   unconditionally. 
Thus  fared  the  Thebans  in  Plataea. 

The  main  body  of  the  Theban  army,  which  should 


SLAUGHTER    OF    THE    THEBAN  PRISONERS.    97 

B.C.  431.  have  come  during  the  night  to  the  support  of  the  party       II. 
2'  entering  the  city  in  case  of  a  reverse,  having  on  their  Reinforce- 

J  ments  come 

march  heard  of  the  disaster,  were  now  hastening  to  the  from 
.rescue.      Plataea    is    about    eight    miles    distant    from  The  Pla- 
Thebes,  and   the   heavy  rain  which   had   fallen  in  the  sus~ 


night  delayed  their  arrival  ;    for  the  river  Asopus  had 
swollen,  and  was  not  easily  fordable.     Marching  in  the  intend  to 

i       •  i      i  •  rr      i  •  i         •  seize  their 

ram,  and  with  difficulty  crossing  the  river,  they  came  up  citizens  out- 
too  late,  some  of  their  friends  being  already  slain  and 
others  captives.     When  the  Thebans  became  aware 

r  promising 

the  state  of  affairs,  they  resolved  to  lay  hands  on  the  withanoath 
Plataeans  who  were  outside  the  walls  ;   for  there  were 
men  and  property  left  in  the  fields,  as  would  naturally 
happen  when  a  sudden  blow  was  struck  in  time  of  peace.  res.tore  the 

r  prisoners 

And  they  meant  to  keep  any  one  whom  they  caught  as  if  theThe- 

,  ,    .  -  r      i       •  bans  re~ 

a  hostage  and  exchange  him  for  one  of  their  own  men,  tired. 
if  any  of  them  were  still  alive.  But  before  they  had 
executed  their  plan,  the  Plataeans,  suspecting  their  in- 
tendons,  and  fearing  for  their  friends  outside,  sent  a 
herald  to  the  Thebans  protesting  against  the  crime  of 
which  they  had  been  guilty  in  seizing  their  city  during 
peace,  and  warning  them  not  to  touch  anything  which 
was  outside  the  walls.  If  they  persisted  they  threatened 
in  return  to  kill  the  prisoners  ;  but  if  they  retired,  they 
would  give  them  up.  This  is  the  Theban  account,  and 
they  add  that  the  Plataeans  took  an  oath.  The  Plataeans 
do  not  admit  that  they  ever  promised  to  restore  the 
captives  at  once,  but  only  if  they  could  agree  after  nego- 
tiations ;  and  they  deny  that  they  took  an  oath.  How- 
ever this  may  have  been,  the  Thebans  withdrew,  leaving 
the  Plataean  territory  unhurt  ;  but  the  Plataeans  had  no 
sooner  got  in  their  property  from  the  country  than  they 
put  the  prisoners  to  death.  Those  who  were  taken  were 
a  hundred  and  eighty  in  number,  and  Eurymachus,  with 
whom  the  betrayers  of  the  city  had  negotiated,  was  one 
of  them. 

When  they  had   killed   their  prisoners,  they  sent  a       6. 
messenger  to  Athens  and  gave  back  the  dead  to  the 

H 


98  PREPARATIONS   FOR    THE    WAR. 

II.  Thebans  under  a  flag  of  truce  ;  they  then  took  the  neces-  B.C.  431. 
ing  only  of  sary  measures  for  the  security  of  the  city.  The  news  had 
on  the  city,  already  reached  Athens,  and  the  Athenians  had  instantly 
Piataeans  seized  any  Boeotians  who  were  in  Attica,  and  sent  a 
P?fsoenehrs!r  herald  to  Plataea  bidding  them  do  no  violence  to  the 
Learning  Theban  prisoners,  but  wait  for  instructions  from  Athens. 
they  garri-  The  news  of  their  death  had  not  arrived.  For  the  first 
and  remove  messenger  had  gone  out  when  the  Thebans  entered,  and 


^ie  second  when  they  were  just  defeated  and  captured  ; 

dren.  but  of  wnat  followed  the  Athenians  knew  nothing  ;  they 
sent  the  message  in  ignorance,  and  the  herald,  when 
he  arrived,  found  the  prisoners  dead.  The  Athenians 
next  despatched  an  army  to  Plataea,  and  brought  in  the 
harvest.  Then  leaving  a  small  force  in  the  place  they 
conveyed  away  the  least  serviceable  of  the  citizens,  to- 
gether with  the  women  and  children. 
7.  The  affair  of  Plataea  was  a  glaring  violation  of  the 

Both  sides  thirty  years'  truce,  and  the  Athenians  now  made  pre- 

now  pre- 

pare  for  the  parations  for  war.  The  Lacedaemonians  and  their  allies 
made  similar  preparations.  Both  they  and  the  Athenians 
meditated  sending  embassies  to  the  King5*,  and  to  the 
other  Barbarian  potentates1*  from  whom  either  party 
might  hope  to  obtain  aid  ;  they  likewise  sought  the 
alliance  of  independent  cities  outside  their  own  dominion. 
The  Lacedaemonians  ordered  their  friends  in  Italy  and 
Sicily,  in  addition  to  the  ships  which  they  had  on  the 
spot,  to  build  others  in  number  proportioned  to  the  size 
of  their  cities  ;  for  they  intended  to  raise  the  Pelopon- 
nesian  navy  to  a  total  of  five  hundred.  The  cities  were 
also  required  to  furnish  a  fixed  sum  of  money:  they 
were  not  to  receive  more  than  a  single  Athenian  ship, 
but  were  to  take  no  further  measures  until  these  pre- 
parations had  been  completed.  The  Athenians  reviewed 
their  confederacy,  and  sent  ambassadors  to  the  places 
immediately  adjacent  to  Peloponnesus  —  Corcyra,  Ce- 
phallenia,  Acarnania,  and  Zacynthus.  They  perceived 
that  if  they  could  only  rely  upon  the  friendship  of  these 
a  Cp.  ii.  67  init.  ;  iv.  50.  Cp.  ii.  29,  67  . 


GENERAL    SYMPATHY    WITH  LACEDAEMON.  99 


oiC8432'  statesa'  t^ley  might  completely  surround  Peloponnesus       II. 
2'  with  war. 

On  neither  side  were  there  any  mean  thoughts  ;  they       8. 
were  both  full  of  enthusiasm  :  and  no  wonder,  for  all  men  Excitement 
are  energetic  when  they  are  making  a  beginning.      At  siasirTin  " 
that  time  the  youth  of  Peloponnesus  and  the  youth  of  Hellas- 
Athens  were  numerous  ;  they  had  never  seen  war,  and 
were  therefore  very  willing  to  take  up  arms.    All  Hellas 
was  excited  by  the  coming  conflict  between  her  two  chief 
cities.     Many  were  the  prophecies  circulated  and  many 
the  oracles  chanted  by  diviners,  not  only  in  the  cities 
about  to  engage  in  the  struggle,  but  throughout  Hellas. 
Quite  lately  the  island  of  Delos  had  been  shaken  by  an 
earthquake  for  the  first  time  within  the  memory  of  the 
Hellenes;  this  was  interpreted  and  generally  believed  to 
be  a  sign  of  coming  events.     And  everything  of  the  sort 
which  occurred  was  curiously  noted. 

The  feeling  of  mankind  was  strongly  on  the  side  of  the  Universal 
Lacedaemonians  ;  for  they  professed  to  be  the  liberators  fear  of  The 
of  Hellas.      Cities  and  individuals  were  eager  to  assist  Athenians- 
them  to  the  utmost,  both  by  word  and  deed  ;  and  where 
a  man  could  not  hope  to  be  present,  there  it  seemed  to 
him  that  all  things  were  at  a  stand.     For  the  general 
indignation  against  the   Athenians   was  intense  ;  some 
were  longing  to  be  delivered  from  them,  others  fearful  of 
falling  under  their  sway. 

Such  was  the  temper  which  animated  the  Hellenes,       9. 
and  such  were  the  preparations  made  by  the  two  powers  ^jj?^0^116 
for  the  war.     Their  respective  allies  were  as  follows  :  —  either  side. 
The  Lacedaemonian  confederacy  included  all  the  Pelo- 
ponnesians  with  the  exception  of  the  Argives  and  the 
Achaeans  —  they  were  both  neutral  ;  only  the  Achaeans  of 
Pellene  took  part  with  the  Lacedaemonians  at  first  ;  after- 
wards all  the  Achaeans  joined  themb.    Beyond  the  borders 
of  the  Peloponnese,  the  Megarians,  Phocians,  Locrians, 
Boeotians,   Ambraciots,    Leucadians,    and   Anactorians 

a  Taking  pe(3aia>s  with  el  cr^urt  <£i'Aia  raCra  eii;. 
b  Cp.  v.  82  init. 

H  2 


100  SPEECH   OF  ARCHIDAMUS. 

II.  were  their  allies.  Of  these  the  Corinthians,  Megarians,  B.C.  431. 
Sicyonians,  Pellenians,  Eleans,  Ambraciots,  and  Leuca- 
dians  provided  a  navy,  the  Boeotians,  Phocians,  and 
Locrians  furnished  cavalry,  the  other  states  only  in- 
fantry. The  allies  of  the  Athenians  were  Chios,  Lesbos, 
Plataea,  the  Messenians  of  Naupactus,  the  greater  part 
of  Acarnania,  Corcyra,  Zacynthus,  and  cities  in  many 
other  countries  which  were  their  tributaries.  There  was 
the  maritime  region  of  Caria,  the  adjacent  Dorian 
peoples,  Ionia,  the  Hellespont,  the  Thracian  coast,  the 
islands  that  lie  to  the  east  within  the  line  of  Pelopon- 
nesus and  Crete,  including  all  the  Cyclades  with  the 
exception  of  Melos  and  Thera.  Chios,  Lesbos,  and 
Corcyra  furnished  a  navy;  the  rest,  land  forces  and 
money.  Thus  much  concerning  the  two  confederacies, 
and  the  character  of  their  respective  forces. 

10.  Immediately  after  the  affair  at  Plataea  the  Lacedae- 
TheLace-    monians  determined  to  invade  Attica,  and  sent  round 

daemonians  .  . 

word  to  their  Peloponnesian  and  other  allies,  bidding 
them  equip  troops  and  provide  all  things  necessary  for 

Isthmus  a  foreign  expedition.  The  various  states  made  their 
preparations  as  fast  as  they  could,  and  at  the  appointed 
time,  with  contingents  numbering  two-thirds  of  the  forces 
of  each,  met  at  the  Isthmus.  When  the  whole  army  was 
assembled,  Archidamus,  the  king  of  the  Lacedaemonians, 
and  the  leader  of  the  expedition,  called  together  the 

SpeecJ  °f    generals  of  the  different  states  and  their  chief  officers 

Archida- 
mus. and  most  distinguished  men,  and  spoke  as  follows : — 

11.  'Men  of  Peloponnesus,  and  you,  allies,  many  are  the 
hadhreat     expeditions  which  our   fathers   made  both  within   and 
experience   without  the  Peloponnese,  and  the  veterans  among  our- 

in  war,  and        .  . 

our  army     selves  are  experienced  in  war  ;  and  we  never  went  forth 
finerneVBut  w^^  a  greater  army  than  this.      But  then  we  should 


remember  that,  whatever  may  be  our  numbers  or  our 
haste,  and   valour,  we  are  going  against  a  most  powerful  city.     And 

not  hold  our  *  f 

enemy  too  we  are  bound  to  snow  ourselves  worthy  of  our  fathers, 
and  not  wanting  to  our  own  reputation.  For  all  Hellas 
is  stirred  by  our  enterprise,  and  her  eyes  are  fixed  upon 


SPEECH   OF   ARCHIDAMUS.  IOI 

B.C.  431.  us :  she  is  friendly  and  would  have  us  succeed  because  II. 
" 87'  2'  she  hates  the  Athenians.  Now  although  some  among 
you,  surveying  this  great  host,  may  think  that  there  is 
very  little  risk  of  the  enemy  meeting  us  in  the  field, 
we  ought  not  on  that  account  to  advance  heedlessly; 
but  the  general  and  the  soldier  of  every  state  should  be 
always  expecting  that  his  own  division  of  the  army  will 
be  the  one  first  in  danger.  War  is  carried  on  in  the 
dark  ;  attacks  are  generally  sudden  and  furious,  and  often 
the  smaller  army,  animated  by  a  proper  fear,  has  been 
more  than  a  match  for  a  larger  force  which,  disdaining 
their  opponent,  were  taken  unprepared  by  him.  When 
invading  an  enemy's  country,  men  should  always  be 
confident  in  spirit,  but  they  should  fear  too,  and  take 
measures  of  precaution ;  and  thus  they  will  be  at  once 
most  valorous  in  attack  and  impregnable  in  defence. 

'  And  the  city  which  we  are  attacking  is  not  so  utterly  For  they  are 
powerless,  but  is  in  the  best  possible  state  of  preparation,  prepared,^ 
and  for  this  reason  our  enemies  may  be  quite  expected  ^t'Skeiy 
to  meet  us  in  the  field.     Even  if  they  have  no  such  in-  of  ail  men 

to  sit  idly 

tention  beforehand,  yet  as  soon  as  they  see  us  in  Attica,  by  while  we 

,      ,  .  t  . !  ...  waste  their 

wasting  and  destroying  their  property,  they  will  cer-  iands. 
tainly  change  their  mind.  For  all  men  are  angry  when 
they  not  only  suffer  but  see,  and  some  strange  form  of 
calamity  strikes  full  upon  the  eye ;  the  less  they  reflect 
the  more  ready  they  are  to  fight ;  above  all  men  the 
Athenians,  who  claim  imperial  power,  and  are  more 
disposed  to  invade  and  waste  their  neighbour's  land  than 
to  look  on  while  their  own  is  being  wasted.  Remem- 
bering how  great  this  city  is  which  you  are  attacking, 
and  what  a  fame  you  will  bring  on  your  ancestors  and 
yourselves  for  good  or  evil  according  to  the  result, 
follow  whithersoever  you  are  led  ;  maintain  discipline  and 
caution  above  all  things,  and  be  on  the  alert  to  obey 
the  word  of  command.  A  great  army  is  most  assured  of 
glory  and  safety  when  visibly  animated  by  one  spirit.' 

Having  thus  spoken,  Archidamus  dismissed  the  as-       12. 
sembly.     His  first  step  was  to  send  Mclesippus,  the  son  Archida- 

J  mus  sends 


102          THE   LAST   ENVOY  FROM   SPARTA. 

II.       of  Diacritus,  a  Spartan,  to  Athens  in  the  hope  that  the  B.C.  431. 
Athenians  might  after  all  give  way,  when  they  saw  their  OL  87'  2' 
but  he  is      enemies  actually  on  the  march.     But  they  would  not 
mission  to    admit  him  to  the  assembly,  nor  even  into  the  city.     For 


-   Pericles  had  already  carried  a  motion  to  the  effect  that 
diateiy  sent  they  would  have  nothing  to  do  with  herald  or  embassy 

across  the  *  ^  J 

frontier.       while  the  Lacedaemonians  were  in  the  field.     So  Mele- 

sippus  was  sent  away  without  a  hearing  and  told  that 

he  must  cross  the  frontier  before  sunset  ;  if  the  Lacedae- 

monians wanted  to  hold  any  parley  with  the  Athenians, 

they  must  go  home  first.     He  was  attended  by  an  escort 

in  order  to  prevent  his  communicating  with  any  one. 

When  he  arrived  at  the  Athenian  frontier,  and  was  about 

to  leave  them,  he  uttered  these  words  :  '  This  day  will 

be  to  the  Hellenes  the  beginning  of  great  sorrows.'     On 

the  return  of  the  herald  to  the  camp  Archidamus  learned 

that  the  Athenians  were  not  as  yet  at  all  in  the  mood 

to  yield  ;    so  at  last  he  moved  forward  his  army  and 

prepared  to  enter  Attica.     The  Boeotians  who  had  sent 

their  contingent  of  two-thirds,  including  their  cavalry,  to 

the  Peloponnesian  army,  marched  to  Plataea  with  the 

remainder  of  their  forces  and  wasted  the  country. 

13.  While    the    Peloponnesians    were    gathering    at   the 

Pericles,      Isthmus,  and  were  still  on  their  way,  but  before  they 

tha?Arciu-  entered  Attica,  Pericles   the   son   of  Xanthippus,   who 

wttTspare    was  one  °^  ^e  ten  Athenian  generals,  knowing  that  the 

his  lands,     invasion  was  inevitable,  and  suspecting  that  Archidamus 

either  from 

friendship,  in  wasting  the  country  might  very  likely  spare  his  lands, 
judkePWm  either  out  of  courtesy  and  because  he  happened  to  be  his 
Athenians  fr^d,  or  D7  the  order  of  the  Lacedaemonian  authorities 
promises  to  (wno  had  already  attempted  to  raise  a  prejudice  against 
the  public  hima  when  they  demanded  the  expulsion  of  the  polluted 
uninjured6  family,  and  might  take  this  further  means  of  injuring 
^m  *n  ^e  e7es  °f  the  Athenians),  openly  declared  in 
the  assembly  that  Archidamus  was  his  friend,  but  not 
to  the  injury  of  the  state,  and  that  supposing  the  enemy 
did  not  destroy  his  lands  and  buildings  like  the  rest,  he 

a  Cp.  i.  126  init.  and  127. 


THE    RESOURCES    OF  ATHENS. 


103 


B.C.  431.  would  make  a  present  of  them  to  the  public ;  and  he 
' 87>  2'  desired  that  the  Athenians  would  have  no  suspicion  of 
him  on  that  account.  As  to  the  general  situation,  he 
repeated  his  previous  advice ;  they  must  prepare  for  war 
and  bring  their  property  from  the  country  into  the  city ; 
they  must  defend  their  walls  but  not  go  out  to  battle ; 
they  should  also  equip  for  service  the  fleet  in  which  lay 
their  strength.  Their  allies  should  be  kept  well  in  hand, 
for  their  power  depended  on  the  revenues  which  they 
derived  from  them ;  military  successes  were  generally 
gained  by  a  wise  policy  and  command  of  money.  The 
state  of  their  finances  was  encouraging ;  they  had  on  an 
average  six  hundred  talents*  coming  in  annually  from 
their  allies,  to  say  nothing  of  their  other  revenue ;  and 
there  were  still  remaining  in  the  Acropolis  six  thousand 
talents  of  coined  silver.  (The  whole  amount  had  once 
been  as  much  as  nine  thousand  seven  hundred  talents b, 
but  from  this  had  to  be  deducted  a  sum  of  three  thousand 
seven  hundred  expended  on  various  buildings,  such  as 
the  Propylaea  of  the  Acropolis,  and  also  on  the  siege  of 
Potidaea.)  Moreover  there  was  uncoined  gold  and  silver 
in  the  form  of  private  and  public  offerings,  sacred  vessels 
used  in  processions  and  games,  the  Persian  spoil  and 
other  things  of  the  like  nature,  worth  at  least  five  hun- 
dred talents0  more.  There  was  also  at  their  disposal, 
besides  what  they  had  in  the  Acropolis,  considerable 
treasures  in  various  temples.  If  they  were  reduced  to 
the  last  extremity  they  could  even  take  off  the  plates 
of  gold  with  which  the  image  of  the  goddess  was  over- 
laid ;  these,  as  he  pointed  out,  weighed  forty  talents,  and 
were  of  refined  gold,  which  was  all  removable.  They 
might  use  these  treasures  in  self-defence,  but  they  were 
bound  to  replace  all  that  they  had  taken.  By  this 
estimate  of  their  wealth  he  strove  to  encourage  them. 
He  added  that  they  had  thirteen  thousand  hoplites,  be- 
sides the  sixteen  thousand  who  occupied  the  fortresses 

a  About  ;£  1 4 4,000.  b  About  £2, 3 28,000. 

c  About  .£120,000. 


II. 


He  reminds 
the  Athe- 
nians of 
their  enor- 
mous 

wealth  and 
military 
and  naval 
resources, 
telling  them 
that  victory 
is  certain 
if  they 
act  with 
prudence. 


104    THE  ATHENIANS  REMOVE  INTO   THE  CITY. 

II.  or  who  manned  the  walls  of  the  city.  For  this  was  the  B.C.  431. 
number  engaged  on  garrison  duty  at  the  beginning  of 
the  wara,  whenever  the  enemy  invaded  Attica  ;  they  were 
made  up  of  the  elder  and  younger  men,  and  of  such 
metics  as  bore  heavy  arms.  The  Phaleric  wall  extended 
four  miles  from  Phalerum  to  the  city  walls  :  the  portion 
of  the  city  wall  which  was  guarded  was  somewhat  less 
than  five  miles  ;  that  between  the  Long  Wall  and  the 
Phaleric  requiring  no  guard.  The  Long  Walls  running 
down  to  the  Piraeus  were  rather  more  than  four  and  a- 
half  miles  in  length  ;  the  outer  only  was  guarded.  The 
whole  circuit  of  the  Piraeus  and  of  Munychia  was  not 
quite  seven  miles,  of  which  half  required  a  guard.  The 
Athenian  cavalry,  as  Pericles  pointed  out,  numbered 
twelve  hundred,  including  mounted  archers  ;  the  foot- 
archers,  eighteen  hundred  ;  of  triremes  fit  for  service  the 
city  had  three  hundred.  The  forces  of  various  kinds 
which  Athens  possessed  at  the  commencement  of  the 
war,  when  the  first  Peloponnesian  invasion  was  impending, 
could  not  be  estimated  at  less.  To  these  Pericles  added 
other  arguments,  such  as  he  was  fond  of  using,  which 
were  intended  to  prove  to  the  Athenians  that  victory 
was  certain. 

1  4.  The  citizens  were  persuaded,  and  brought  into  the  city 

The  citi-  their  children  and  wives,  their  household  goods,  and  even 
lowing  the  wood-work  of  their  houses,  which  they  took  down, 
gatheHnto  Their  flocks  and  beasts  of  burden  they  conveyed  to 
the  city;  Euboea  and  the  adjacent  islands. 

The  removal  of  the  inhabitants  was  painful  ;  for  the 
Athenians  had  always  been  accustomed  to  reside  in  the 
15.      country.     Such  a  life  had  been  characteristic  of  them 
but  re-        more  than  of  any  other  Hellenic  people,  from  very  early 
for  theyhad  times.     In  the  days  of  Cecrops  and  the  first  kings,  down 
to  the  rei^n  of  Theseus>  Attica  was  divided  into  com- 


thn    l\  °M  munes>  having  their  own  town  halls   and   magistrates. 
lived  in       Except   in   case   of  alarm   the   whole   people   did   not 
communes,  assemble  in  council  under  the  king,  but  administered 
a  Cp.  what  is  said  of  the  citizens  on  garrison  duty,  vii.  28  init. 


THE    EARLY   DAYS    OF  ATHENS.  105 

B.C.  431.  their  own  affairs,  and  advised  together  in  their  several       II. 
'  7>  2'  townships.     Some  of  them  at  times  even  went  to  war  until  The- 
with  him,  as  the  Eleusinians  under  Eumolpus  with  Erec-  them  into 


theus.  But  when  Theseus  came  to  the  throne,  he,  being 
a  powerful  as  well  as  a  wise  ruler,  among  other  improve- 
ments in  the  administration  of  the  country,  dissolved  the 
councils  and  separate  gove'rnments,  and  united  all  the 
inhabitants  of  Attica  in  the  present  city,  establishing 
one  council  and  town  hall.  They  continued  to  live  on 
their  own  lands,  but  he  compelled  them  to  resort  to 
Athens  as  their  metropolis,  and  henceforward  they  a  were 
all  inscribed  in  the  roll  of  her  citizens  a.  A  great  city 
thus  arose  which  was  handed  down  by  Theseus  to  his 
descendants,  and  from  his  day  to  this  the  Athenians 
have  regularly  celebrated  the  national  festival  of  the 
Synoecia,  or  '  union  of  the  communes'  in  honour  of  the 
Goddess  Athene. 

Before  his  time,  what  is  now  the  Acropolis  and  the  Small  ex- 
ground  lying  under  it  to  the  south  was  the  city.  Many 
reasons  may  be  urged  in  proof  of  this  statement:  —  The  Clty- 
temples  of  Athene  and  of  other  divinities  are  situated  in 
the  Acropolis  itself,  and  those  which  are  not,  lie  chiefly 
thereabouts  ;  the  temples  of  Olympian  Zeus,  for  ex- 
ample, and  of  the  Pythian  Apollo,  and  the  temple  of 
Earth  and  of  Dionysus  in  the  Marshes,  in  honour  of 
whom  the  more  ancient  Dionysia  are  celebrated  on 
the  twelfth  day  of  the  month  Anthesterion  b,  a  festival 
which  also  continues  to  be  observed  by  the  Ionian  de- 
scendants of  the  Athenians.  In  the  same  quarter  are 
other  ancient  temples,  and  not  far  off  is  the  fountain 
now  called  Enneacrounos,  or  the  Nine  Conduits,  from 
the  form  given  to  it  by  the  tyrants,  but  originally,  be- 
fore the  springs  were  covered  in,  Callirrhoe,  or  the  Fair 
Stream.  The  water  of  this  fountain  was  used  by  the 
ancient  Athenians  on  great  occasions;  and  at  marriage 
rites  and  other  ceremonies  the  custom  is  still  retained. 
To  this  day  the  Acropolis  or  Citadel  is  called  by  the 

a  Or,  «  all  paid  taxes  to  Athens.'  b  February-March. 


io6 


CROWDING    OF    THE    CITY. 


II. 

1 6. 


The  new- 
comers, 
having  no 
homes  of 
their  own, 
occupy  the 
temples  and 
waste 
spaces  in 
the  city. 


Athenians  Polls >  or  City,  because  that  neighbourhood  B.C.  431. 
was  first  inhabited. 

Thus  for  a  long  time  the  ancient  Athenians  enjoyed  a 
country  life  in  self-governing  communities;  and  although 
they  were  now  united  in  a  single  city,  they  and  their 
descendants,  down  to  the  time  of  this  war,  from  old  habit 
generally  resided  with  their  households  in  the  country 
where  they  had  been  born.  For  this  reason,  and  also 
because  they  had  recently  restored  their  country-houses 
and  estates  after  the  Persian  War,  they  had  a  disinclina- 
tion to  move.  They  were  depressed  at  the  thought  of 
forsaking  their  homes  and  the  temples  which  had  come 
down  to  them  from  their  fathers  and  were  the  abiding 
memorials  of  their  early  constitution.  They  were  going 
to  change  their  manner  of  life,  and  in  leaving  their 
villages  were  in  fact  leaving  what  to  each  of  them  had 
been  his  own  city. 

When  they  came  to  Athens,  only  a  few  of  them  had 
houses  or  could  find  homes  among  friends  or  kindred. 
The  majority  took  up  their  abode  in  the  vacant  spaces  of 
the  city,  and  in  the  temples  and  shrines  of  heroes,  with 
the  exception  of  those  on  the  Acropolis,  the  Eleusinium, 
and  any  other  precinct  which  could  be  securely  closed. 
The  Pelasgian  ground,  as  it  was  called,  which  lay  at  the 
foot  of  the  citadel,  was  under  a  curse  forbidding  its  occu- 
pation. There  was  also  a  half-line  of  a  Pythian  oracle 
to  the  same  effect : — 

'  Better  the  Pelasgian  ground  left  waste.' 

Yet  even  this  was  occupied  under  the  sudden  pressure 
of  necessity.  And  to  my  mind  the  oracle  came  true  in 
a  sense  exactly  contrary  to  the  popular  expectation ;  for 
the  unlawful  occupation  to  which  men  were  driven  was 
not  the  cause  of  the  calamities  which  befell  the  city,  but 
the  war  was  the  cause  of  the  occupation  ;  and  the  oracle 
without  mentioning  the  war  foresaw  that  the  place  would 
be  inhabited  some  day  for  no  good.  Many  also  estab- 
lished themselves  in  the  turrets  of  the  walls,  or  in  any 


INVASION   OF  ATTICA.  107 

B.c.  431.  other  place  which  they  could  find;  for  the  city  could  not  II. 
'  8?'  2<  contain  them  when  they  first  came  in.  But  afterwards 
they  divided  among  them  the  Long  Walls  and  the 
greater  part  of  the  Piraeus.  At  the  same  time  the 
Athenians  applied  themselves  vigorously  to  the  war, 
summoning  their  allies,  and  preparing  an  expedition  of 
a  hundred  ships  against  the  Peloponnese. 

While   they   were   thus   engaged,   the   Peloponnesian       18. 
army  was  advancing  :  it  arrived  first  of  all  at  Oenoe,  The  Peio- 
a  fortified  town  on  the  confines  of  Attica  and  Boeotia,  advance  to 


which  was  garrisoned  by  the  Athenians  in  time  of  war,  ich  they 
and  was  the  point  at  which  the  Peloponnesians  intended 
to  commence  their  invasion.  There  they  encamped  and  ture. 
prepared  to  assault  the  walls  by  means  of  engines  and 
siege  works.  But  these  and  other  operations  took  up 
time  and  detained  them  in  the  neighbourhood.  Archi- 
damus  was  severely  blamed  for  the  delay;  he  was  also 
thought  not  to  have  been  energetic  enough  in  levying 
war,  and  to  have  done  the  Athenians  good  service  by 
discouraging  vigorous  action.  After  the  muster  of  the 
forces  he  was  accused  of  delay  at  the  Isthmus,  and  of 
loitering  on  the  march.  But  his  reputation  was  most 
affected  by  his  halt  at  Oenoe.  For  the  Athenians  em- 
ployed the  interval  in  getting  away  their  property;  and 
the  Peloponnesians  fancied  that,  if  they  had  advanced 
quickly  and  he  had  not  lingered,  they  could  have  seized 
everything  before  it  was  conveyed  within  the  walls. 
Such  were  the  feelings  entertained  towards  Archidamus 
by  his  troops  during  the  halt.  He  is  said  to  have  held 
back  in  the  belief  that  the  Athenians,  while  their  lands 
were  still  unravaged  a,  would  yield,  and  that  the  thought 
of  allowing  them  to  be  devastated  would  be  too  much 
for  them. 

But  when  they  had  assaulted  Oenoe,  and  after  leaving       1  9. 
no  means  untried  were  unable  to  take  it,  and  no  herald  Leaving 

r  i        A    1  it  i  (Jen°&.  they 

came  from  the  Athenians,  at  last  they  marched  on,  and  enter  At- 
about  the  eightieth  day  after  the  entry  of  the  Thebans 


CP.  i.  82  med.  Acharnae' 


io8   THE  PELOPONNESIANS  AT  ACHARNAE. 


II. 


2O, 

where  they 

linger,  in 

the  hope 
Athenians 


21.. 

Rage  and 

excitement 

of  the 


into  Plataea,  in  the  middle  of  the  summer,  when  the  corn  B.C.  431. 
was  in  full  ear,  invaded  Attica,  under  the  command  of 
Archidamus  the  son  of  Zeuxidamus  the  Lacedaemonian 
king.  They  encamped  and  ravaged,  first  of  all,  Eleusis 
and  the  plain  of  Thria,  where  they  put  to  flight  some 
Athenian  horse  near  the  streams  called  Rheiti  ;  they 
then  advanced,  keeping  Mount  Aegaleos  on  the  right 
hand,  through  the  district  of  Kropeia  until  they  reached 
Acharnae,  which  is  the  largest  of  the  Athenian  town- 
ships or  demes,  as  they  are  called;  and  at  Acharnae 
they  encamped,  and  remained  there  a  considerable  time 
ravaging  the  country. 

In  this  first  invasion  Archidamus  is  said  to  have 
lingered  about  Acharnae  with  his  army  ready  for  battle, 

.  J 

instead  of  descending  into  the  plain,  in  the  hope  that  the 
Athenians,  who  were  now  flourishing  in  youth  and 
numbers  and  provided  for  war  as  they  had  never  been 
before,  would  perhaps  meet  them  in  the  field  rather  than 
allow  their  lands  to  be  ravaged.  When  therefore  they 
did  not  appear  at  Eleusis  or  in  the  plain  of  Thria,  he 
tried  once  more  whether  by  encamping  in  the  neigh- 
bourhood of  Acharnae  he  could  induce  them  to  come. 
out.  The  situation  appeared  to  be  convenient,  and  the 
Acharnians,  being  a  considerable  section  of  the  city  and 
furnishing  three  thousand  hoplites,  were  likely  to  be 
impatient  at  the  destruction  of  their  property,  and  would 
communicate  to  the  whole  people  a  desire  to  fight.  Or 
if  the  Athenians  did  not  come  out  to  meet  him  during 
this  invasion,  he  could  henceforward  ravage  the  plain  with 
more  confidence,  and  march  right  up  to  the  walls  of  the 
city.  The  Acharnians,  having  lost  their  own  possessions/ 
would  be  less  willing  to  hazard  their  lives  on  behalf  of 
their  neighbours,  and  so  there  would  be  a  division  in  the 
Athenian  counsels.  Such  was  the  motive  of  Archidamus 
in  remaining  at  Acharnae. 

The  Athenians,  so  long  as  the  Lacedaemonians  were  in 
^e  neighbourhood  of  Eleusis  and  the  plain  of  Thria,  en-,. 
tertained  a  hope  that  they  would  come  no  further.  They 


PERICLES   RESTRAINS    THE    ATHENIANS.      109 

B.C.  431.  remembered  how,  fourteen  years  before  a,  the  Lacedae-       II. 
' 87'  2'  monian  king,  Pleistoanax  the  son  of  Pausanias,  invaded  Athenians. 

Unpopu- 

Attica  with  a  Peloponnesian  army,  and  how  after  ad-  larity  of 
vancing  as  far  as  Eleusis  and  Thria  he  came  no  further,  but 
retreated.  And  indeed  this  retreat  was  the  cause  of  his 
exile  ;  for  he  was  thought  to  have  been  bribed.  But 
when  they  saw  the  army  in  the  neighbourhood  of 
Acharnae,  and  barely  seven  miles  from  the  city,  they  felt 
the  presence  of  the  invader  to  be  intolerable.  The 
devastation  of  their  country  before  their  eyes,  which  the 
younger  men  had  never  seen  at  all,  nor  the  elder  except 
in  the  Persian  invasion,  naturally  appeared  to  them  a 
horrible  thing,  and  the  whole  people,  the  young  men 
especially,  were  anxious  to  go  forth  and  put  a  stop  to 
it.  Knots  were  formed  in  the  streets,  and  there  were 
loud  disputes,  some  eager  to  go  out,  a  minority  resisting. 
Soothsayers  were  repeating  oracles  of  the  most  different 
kinds,  which  all  found  in  some  one  or  other  enthusiastic 
listeners.  The  Acharnians,  who  in  their  own  estimation 
were  no  small  part  of  the  Athenian  state,  seeing  their 
land  ravaged,  strongly  insisted  that  they  should  go  out 
and  fight.  The  excitement  in  the  city  was  universal ; 
the  people  were  furious  with  Pericles,  and,  forgetting  all 
his  previous  warnings,  they  abused  him  for  not  leading 
them  to  battle,  as  their  general  should,  and  laid  all  their 
miseries  to  his  charge. 

But  he,  seeing  that  they  were  overcome  by  the  irrita-       22. 
tion  of  the  moment  and  inclined  to  evil  counsels,  and  He  refuses 
confident  that  he  was  right  in  refusing  to  go  out,  would  with°uieir 
not  summon  an  assembly  or  meeting  of  any  kind,  lest,  wishes> 
coming  together  more  in  anger  than  in  prudence,  they 
might  take  some   false  step.      He  maintained  a  strict 
watch  over  the  city,  and  sought  to  calm  the  irritation  as 
far  as  he  could.     Meanwhile  he  sent  out  horsemen  from 
time  to  time  to  prevent  flying  parties  finding  their  way 
into  the  fields   near  the   city   and  doing  mischief.     A 
skirmish   took    place   at    Phrygia   between   one  of  the 
a  Cp.  i.  114  fin. 


HO 


END    OF    THE    FIRST  INVASION. 


II.       divisions  of  the  Athenian  horse  assisted  by  their  Thes-  B.C.  43r 


Skirmish 

at  Phrygia, 

in  which 

the  Athe- 

niansare 
ted> 


23. 

The  Athe- 

nians  send 

onehun- 


The  enemy 

retire  from 

Attica. 


salian  allies  on  the  one  hand,  and  the  Boeotian  cavalry 

* 

on  the  other,  in  which  the  Athenians  and  Thessalians 

, 

were  at  least  a  match  for  their  opponents,  until,  the 
Boeotian  infantry  coming  up  to  support  the  horse,  they 
were  compelled  to  fly.  The  Athenians  and  Thessalians 
lost  a  few  men,  but  recovered  their  bodies  on  the  same 
day  without  asking  for  a  truce.  On  the  morrow  the 
Peloponnesians  raised  a  trophy.  The  forces  which  the 
Thessalians  brought  to  the  aid  of  the  Athenians,  ac- 
cording to  the  terms  of  their  old  alliance  a,  consisted  of 
Larissaeans,  Pharsalians,  Cranonians,  Pyrasians,  Gyrto- 
nians,  and  Pheraeans.  The  leaders  of  the  Larissaeans 
were  Polymedes  and  Aristonous,  one  from  each  of  the 
two  leading  factions  of  their  city;  the  Pharsalians  were 
commanded  by  Meno.  The  forces  of  the  other  cities 
had  likewise  generals  of  their  own. 

When  the  Peloponnesians  found  that  the  Athenians 
did  not  come  out  to  meet  them,  they  moved  their  army 
from  Acharnae,  and  ravaged  some  of  the  townships 
which  lie  between  Mount  Parnes  and  Mount  Brilessus. 
Wm'le  tne7  were  sti11  in  the  country,  the  Athenians  sent 
^e  fleet  of  a  hundred  ships  which  they  had  been  equip- 
ping  on  an  expedition  round  the  Peloponnese.  These 
ships  carried  on  board  a  thousand  hoplites  and  four 
hundred  archers  ;  they  were  under  the  command  of 
Carcinus  the  son  of  Xenotimus,  Proteas  the  son  of 
Epicles,  and  Socrates  the  son  of  Antigenes.  After  the 
departure  of  the  fleet  the  Peloponnesians  remained  in 
Attica  as  long  as  their  provisions  lasted,  and  then,  taking 
a  new  route,  retired  through  Boeotia.  In  passing  by 
Oropus  they  wasted  the  country  called  Peiraikeb,  in- 
habited by  the  Oropians,  who  are  subjects  of  the  Athe- 
nians. On  their  return  to  Peloponnesus  the  troops 
dispersed  to  their  several  cities. 

a  Cp.  i.  102  fin.,  107  fin.  ;  iv.  78  med. 

b  Reading  with  the  MSS.  TTJV  yr\v  TTJV  UeipdiKrp.  Cp.  iii.  91  med., 
fs  'Qpoo7r6i>  TTJS  rrepav  yrjs,  i.  e.  the  coast  opposite  Euboea. 


'  7<  2> 


BRAS  ID  AS   SAVES   METHON&.  Ill 

B.C.  431.      When  they  had  retreated,  the  Athenians  posted  guards       II. 
2'  to  keep  watch  both  by  land  and  sea,  a  precaution  which       24. 
they  maintained  throughout  the  war.    They  then  passed  The  Athe- 
a  decree  reserving  of  the   treasure  in  the  Acropolis  a  aside  a 
thousand  talents  a  :  this  sum  was  set  apart  and  was  not  Jaients^d 
to  be  expended  unless  the  enemy  attacked  the  city  with  a  hundred 

.  triremes  in 

a  fleet  and  they  had  to  defend  it  at  sea.     In  any  other  case  of  an 
case,   he   who  brought   forward  or  put   to  the  vote  a  sea!0 
proposal  to  touch  the  money  was  to  be  punished  with 
death.    They  also  resolved  to  set  apart  yearly  a  hundred 
triremes,  the  finest  of  the  year,  and  to  appoint  trierarchs 
for  them  ;  these  they  were  only  to  use  at  the  same  time 
with  the  money,  and  in  the  same  emergency. 

The  Athenian  forces,  which  had  lately  been  despatched       25. 
to  Peloponnesus  in  the  hundred  vessels,  and  were  assisted  Proce^d- 

r  ings  of  the 

by  the  Corcyraeans  with  fifty  ships  and  by  some  of  the  Athenian 
allies  from  the  same  region,  did  considerable  damage  on 
the  Peloponnesian  coast.  They  disembarked  and  attacked 
Methone,  a  fortress  in  Laconia,  which  was  weak  and  had 
no  regular  garrison.  Now  Brasidas  the  son  of  Tellis,  a 
Spartan,  happened  to  be  in  those  parts  keeping  guard,  and, 
seeing  the  danger,  he  came  to  the  aid  of  the  inhabitants 
with  a  hundred  hoplites.  He  made  his  way  through  the 
scattered  parties  of  Athenian  troops,  whose  attention 
was  occupied  with  the  fortress,  and  threw  himself  into 
Methone,  suffering  a  slight  loss ;  he  thus  saved  the 
place.  The  exploit  was  publicly  acknowledged  at 
Sparta,  Brasidas  being  the  first  Spartan  who  obtained 
this  distinction  in  the  war.  The  Athenians,  proceeding 
on  their  voyage,  ravaged  the  territory  of  Pheia  in  Elis  for 
two  days,  and  defeated  three  hundred  chosen  men  from 
the  vale  of  Elis.  as  well  as  some  Elean  perioeci  from  the 
neighbourhood  of  Pheia  who  came  to  the  rescue.  But  a 
violent  storm  arose,  and  there  was  no  harbour  in  which 
the  fleet  could  find  shelter ;  so  the  greater  part  of  the 
army  re-embarked  and  sailed  round  the  promontory 
called  Ichthys  towards  the  harbour  of  Pheia.  Mean- 
a  About  ,£240,000. 


112         EXPULSION   OF    THE    AEGINETANS. 

II.  while  the  Messenians  and  others  who  were  unable  to  .B.C.  431. 
get  on  board  marched  by  land  and  captured  Pheia.  The 
fleet  soon  sailed  into  the  harbour  and  took  them  up  ; 
they  then  evacuated  Pheia  and  put  to  sea.  By  this  time 
the  main  army  of  the  Eleans  had  arrived  ;  whereupon 
the  Athenians  proceeded  on  their  way  to  other  places, 
which  they  ravaged. 

26.  About  the  same  time  the  Athenians  sent  thirty  ships 
Thirtyships  j-o  cru}se  ofjf  Locris,  having  an  eye  also  to  the  safety  of 

are  sent  to  j  J 

Locris.  Euboea.  Theopompus  the  son  of  Cleinias  was  their 
commander.  He  made  descents  on  the  Locrian  coast 
and  ravaged  various  places.  He  also  captured  Thronium, 
taking  hostages  of  the  inhabitants,  and  at  Alope  defeated 
the  Locrians  who  came  to  defend  the  place. 

27.  In   the   same   summer  the   Athenians   expelled    the 
TheAthe-    Aeginetans  and  their  families  from  Aegina,  alleging  that 

mans  expel 

the  Aegi-     they  had  been  the  main  cause  of  the  war.     The  island 


lies  close  to  Peloponnesus,  and  they  thought  it  safer  to 
send  thither  settlers  of  their  own,  an  intention  which  they 
the  exiles     shortly  afterwards  carried   out.     The   Lacedaemonians 

are  settled  ' 

by  the        gave  the  Aeginetan  exiles  the  town  of  Thyrea  to  occupy 

Lacedae-  •    ««•»•  •  i 

monians  in  and  the  adjoining  country  to  cultivate,  partly  in  order  to 
rhyrea.  annoy  the  Athenians,  partly  out  of  gratitude  to  the 
Aeginetans,  who  had  done  them  good  service  at  the  time 
of  the  earthquake  and  the  revolt  of  the  Helots.  The 
Thyrean  territory  is  a  strip  of  land  coming  down  to  the 
sea  on  the  borders  of  Argolis  and  Laconia.  There  some 
of  them  found  a  home  ;  others  dispersed  over  Hellas. 

28.  During   the   same   summer,  at  the  beginning  of  the 
Eclipse  of    lunar  month  (apparently  the  only  time  when  such  an 

event  is  possible),  and  in  the  afternoon,  there  was  an 
eclipse  of  the  sun,  which  took  the  form  of  a  crescent,  and 
then  became  full  again  ;  during  the  eclipse  a  few  stars 
were  visible. 

29.  In  the  same  summer,  Nymphodorus  the  son  of  Pythes, 
The  Athe-   a  native  of  Abdera  and  a  man  of  great  influence  with 

Sitalces  who  had  married  his  sister,  was  made  by  the 
Athenians  their  proxenus  at  that  place  and  invited  by 


ALLIANCE  WITH  SITALCES  AND  PERDICCAS.    1 1 3 

B.C.  431.  them  to  Athens.    He  had  formerly  been  considered  their       II. 
2'  enemy,  but  now  they  hoped  that  he  would  gain  over  to  hoping  that 
their  alliance  Sitalces,  who  was  the  son  of  Teres  and  over  Sitai- 
king  of  Thrace.  ofThrafe. 

This  Teres,  the  father  of  Sitalces,  was  the  first  founder      29. 
of  the  great  Odrysian  empire,  which  he  extended  over  a  Sitalces  was 
large  part  of  Thrace,  although  many  of  the  Thracian  Teres,  the 
tribes  are  still  independent.     He  has  no  connection  with 
Tereus   who   took   to   wife   from   Athens,    Procne,   the 
daughter  of  Pandion ;  they  do  not  even  belong  to  the  Teres  has 

J  noconnec- 

same  Thrace.     For  Tereus  dwelt  in  Daulia,  a  part  of  the  tion  with 
region  which  is  now  called  Phocis  but  in  those  days  was  Of  mytho- 
inhabited  by  Thracians,  and  in  that  country  Itys  suffered  logy> 
at   the    hands   of   the   women    Procne   and    Philomela. 
Many  of  the   poets  when  they  make  mention  of  the 
nightingale   (Philomela)  apply  to  the  bird  the  epithet 
Daulian.     Further,  Pandion  would  surely  have  formed  a 
marriage  connection  for  his  daughter  among  his  neigh- 
bours with  a  view  to  mutual  protection,  and  not  at  a 
distance  of  so  many  days'  journey,  among  the  Odrysian 
Thracians.     And  the  Teres  of  whom  I  am  speaking,  and 
who  was  the  first  powerful  king  of  the  Odrysae,  has  not 
even  the  same  name  a. 

Now  Sitalces,  whom  the  Athenians  made  their  ally,  Sitalces  be- 
was  the  son  of  this  Teres  ;  they  wanted  him  to  assist  aii™of ar 
them  in  the  conquest  of  Chalcidice  and  of  Perdiccas.    So  $£™'™d 
Nymphodorus  came  to  Athens,  negotiated  the  alliance  ™ade  an 
with   Sitalces,   and   got   his   son    Sadocus    enrolled   an  citizen : 
Athenian  citizen.     He  also  undertook  to  terminate  the  is  also  re- 
war  in   Chalcidice,   promising   that  he  would   persuade cc 
Sitalces   to  send  the  Athenians  an  army  of  Thracian 
horsemen   and  targeteers.     He  further   reconciled   Per- 
diccas with  the  Athenians,  and  persuaded  them  to  restore 
Therme  to  him  b.    Whereupon  Perdiccas  joined  the  Athe- 
nian army  under  Phormio c,  and  with  him  fought  against 
the  Chalcidians.     Thus  Sitalces  the  son  of  Teres  king  of 

a  i.e.  is  called  Teres,  not  Tereus. 

b  Cp.  i.  6 1  init.  c  Cp.  i.  64  med. 

I 


114  DEVASTATION    OF  MEGARA. 

II.       Thrace,  and  Perdiccas  son  of  Alexander  king  of  Mace-  B.C.  431. 

donia,  entered  into  the  Athenian  alliance. 

3°-          The  Athenians,  in  the  hundred  ships  which  were  still 
TheAthe-    cruismg  about  Peloponnesus,  took  Sollium,  a  town  be- 

nians  cap-  c 

ture  Sol-      longing  to  the  Corinthians,  which  they  handed  over  to 

Astacus,      the  Palaereans  of  Acarnania,  giving  to  them  alone  of  the 

over  IS*     Acarnanians  the  right  of  occupying  the  city  and  country. 

phaiienia.    They  also  stormed  the  town  of  Astacus,  and  driving  out 

Evarchus  who  was  tyrant  there,  added  it  to  the  Athenian 

confederacy.     They  next  sailed  to  the  island  of  Cephal- 

lenia,   which  they  gained   over  without  fighting.      The 

island  lies  over  against  Acarnania  and  Leucas,  and  con- 

tains   four   cities   inhabited   by   the   Paleans,    Cranians, 

Samaeans,  and  Pronnaeans.     Soon  afterwards  the  fleet 

proceeded  on  its  voyage  homewards. 

31.          About  the  end  of  the  summer  the  entire  Athenian 
TheAthe-   force,    including    the    metics,    invaded   the   territory   of 

nians  under 

the  com-  Megara,  under  the  command  of  Pericles  the  son  of 
Mcies  Xanthippus.  The  Athenian  fleet  had  reached  Aegina  on 
theMegarid  *ts  wav  home,  and  when  the  commanders  heard  that  the 
whole  armed  force  of  the  city  was  in  Megara,  they  sailed 


thither  and  joined  them.  This  was  the  largest  army 
which  the  Athenians  ever  had  in  one  place  ;  for  the  city 
was  still  in  her  full  strength,  and  had  not  as  yet  suffered 
from  the  plague.  The  Athenians  themselves  numbered 
not  less  than  ten  thousand  hoplites,  exclusive  of  the 
remaining  three  thousand  who  were  engaged  at  Potidaea. 
A  force  of  metics  amounting  to  at  least  three-  thousand 
took  part  in  the  invasion,  and  also  a  large  number  of 
light-armed  troops.  After  ravaging  the  greater  part  of 
the  country  they  retired.  They  repeated  the  invasion, 
sometimes  with  cavalry,  sometimes  with  the  whole  Athe- 
nian army,  every  year  during  the  war  until  Nisaea  was 
taken  a. 

32.          At  the  end  of  this  summer  the  island  of  Atalante, 
w^^c^  ^es  °^  ^e  coast  of  the  Opuntian  Locrians  and 


the  island  of  had  hitherto  been  uninhabited,  was  fortified  and  made  a 

Atalante. 

a  Cp.  iv.  66  init,  69  fin. 


PUBLIC   FUNERAL    AT   ATHENS.  115 

oiC8432'  guard-station  by  the  Athenians.    They  wanted  to  prevent       II. 
pirates  sailing  from  Opus  and  other  places  in  Locris  and 
plundering  Euboea.    Such  were  the  events  which  occurred 
during  the  remainder  of  the  summer  after  the  Pelopon- 
nesians  had  retired  from  Attica. 

During  the  following  winter,  Evarchus   the  Acarna-      33- 
nian,  desiring  to  be  restored  to  Astacus,  persuaded  the  The  c°' 

r  rmthians 

Corinthians  to  sail  with  forty  ships  and  fifteen  hundred  restore  the 
hoplites    and    reinstate   him,    he   himself    hiring    some  Evarchus 


mercenaries.     Of  this  expedition  Euphamidas  the   son 
of  Aristonymus,  Timoxenus  the  son  of  Timocrates,  and  ^Ju™  gey 
Eumachus  the   son  of  Chrysis,  were  the  commanders,  phaiienia, 
They  sailed   to  Astacus,   and  restored  Evarchus  ;   they  feated. 
then  tried  to  gain  over  certain  other  towns  on  the  coast 
of  Acarnania  ;   but,   failing  in  their  attempt,  they  pro- 
ceeded homewards.      Touching  at  Cephallenia  on  their 
voyage,  they   made   a  descent   on   the   country  of  the 
Cranians,  but  being  entrapped  by  means  of  a  pretended 
agreement,  and  then  unexpectedly  attacked,  they  lost  a 
part  of  their  forces  ;    at   length,    not  without   a  severe 
struggle,  they  put  to  sea  again  and  returned  home. 

During  the  same  winter,  in  accordance  with  an  old      34. 
national  custom,  the  funeral  of  those  who  first  fell  in  this  The  Athe- 

i  nians  cele- 

war  was   celebrated   by   the   Athenians    at   the   public  brate  the 


charge.  The  ceremony  is  as  follows  :  Three  days  before 
the  celebration  they  erect  a  tent  in  which  the  bones  of 
the  dead  are  laid  out,  and  every  one  brings  to  his  own  the  war- 
dead  any  offering  which  he  pleases.  At  the  time  of  the 
funeral  the  bones  are  placed  in  chests  of  cypress  wood, 
which  are  conveyed  on  hearses  ;  there  is  one  chest  for 
each  tribe.  They  also  carry  a  single  empty  litter  decked 
with  a  pall  for  all  whose  bodies  are  missing,  and  cannot 
be  recovered  after  the  battle.  The  procession  is  ac- 
companied by  any  one  who  chooses,  whether  citizen  or 
stranger,  and  the  female  relatives  of  the  deceased  are 
present  at  the  place  of  interment  and  make  lamentation. 
The  public  sepulchre  is  situated  in  the  most  beautiful 
spot  outside  the  walls  ;  there  they  always  bury  those 

I  2 


Il6  FUNERAL    SPEECH   OF  PERICLES. 

II.  who  fall  in  war  ;  only  after  the  battle  of  Marathon  the  B.C.  431. 
dead,  in  recognition  of  their  pre-eminent  valour,  were 
interred  on  the  field.  When  the  remains  have  been  laid 
in  the  earth,  some  man  of  known  ability  and  high  reputa- 
tion, chosen  by  the  city,  delivers  a  suitable  oration  over 
them  ;  after  which  the  people  depart.  Such  is  the  manner 
of  interment  ;  and  the  ceremony  was  repeated  from  time 
to  time  throughout  the  war.  Over  those  who  were  the 
first  buried  Pericles  was  chosen  to  speak.  At  the  fitting 
moment  he  advanced  from  the  sepulchre  to  a  lofty 
stage,  which  had  been  erected  in  order  that  he  might 
be  heard  as  far  as  possible  by  the  multitude,  and  spoke 

as  follows  :  — 
i 

(FUNERAL  SPEECH.) 

35.  'Most  of  those  who  have  spoken  here  before  me  have 

The  law      commended  the  lawgiver  who  added  this  oration  to  our 

which  en- 

joins this  other  funeral  customs  ;  it  seemed  to  them  a  worthy 
been°oftenS  thing  that  such  an  honour  should  be  given  at  their 
praised.  burial  to  the  dead  who  have  fallen  on  the  field  of  battle. 
should  pre-  But  I  should  have  preferred  that,  when  men's  deeds  have 
the  brave  been  brave,  they  should  be  honoured  in  deed  only,  and 
only,  not  with  such  an  honour  as  this  public  funeral,  which  you 


-   are  now  witnessing.    Then  the  reputation  of  many  would 
not  have  been  imperilled  on  the  eloquence  or  want  of 

f 

the  orator,  eloquence  of  one,  and  their  virtues  believed  or  not  as 
he  spoke  well  or  ill.  For  it  is  difficult  to  say  neither  too 
little  nor  too  much  ;  and  even  moderation  is  apt  not  to 


tice,  and  I  give  the  impression  of  truthfulness.  The  friend  of  the 
dead  who  knows  the  facts  is  likely  to  think  that  the 
words  of  the  speaker  fall  short  of  his  knowledge  and  of 
his  wishes  ;  another  who  is  not  so  well  informed,  when 
he  hears  of  anything  which  surpasses  his  own  powers, 
will  be  envious  and  will  suspect  exaggeration.  Man- 
kind are  tolerant  of  the  praises  of  others  so  long  as  each 
hearer  thinks  that  he  can  do  as  well  or  nearly  as  well 
himself,  but,  when  the  speaker  rises  above  him,  jealousy 
is  aroused  arid  he  begins  to  be  incredulous.  However, 


FUNERAL    SPEECH   OF  PERICLES.  117 

B.C.  431.  since  our  ancestors  have  set  the  seal  of  their  approval       IT. 
'  &7>  2'  upon  the  practice,  I  must  obey,  and  to  the  utmost  of  my 
power  shall  endeavour  to  satisfy  the  wishes  and  beliefs 
of  all  who  hear  me. 

'  I  will  speak  first  of  our  ancestors,  for  it  is  right  and      36. 
becoming  that  now,  when  we  are  lamenting  the  dead,  a  l  wil1  first 
tribute  should  be  paid   to  their  memory.      There  has  rate  our  pre- 

t  ...  ...........        .    decessors, 

never  been  a  time  when  they  did  not  inhabit  this  land,  who  gave 
which   by  their  valour   they  have  handed   down   from 
generation  to   generation,   and   we  have  received  from 
them  a  free  state.     But  if  they  were  worthy  of  praise,  dead,  I  will 
still  more  were  our  fathers,  who  added  to  their  inherit-  how  Athens 


ance,  and  after  many  a  struggle  transmitted  to  us  their 
sons  this  great  empire.  And  we  ourselves  assembled  ness- 
here  to-day,  who  are  still  most  of  us  in  the  vigour  of 
life,  have  chiefly  done  the  work  of  improvement,  and 
have  richly  endowed  our  city  with  all  things,  so  that  she 
is  sufficient  for  herself  both  in  peace  and  war.  Of  the 
military  exploits  by  which  our  various  possessions  were 
acquired,  or  of  the  energy  with  which  we  or  our  fathers 
drove  back  the  tide  of  war,  Hellenic  or  Barbarian,  I  will 
not  speak  ;  for  the  tale  would  be  long  and  is  familiar  to 
you.  But  before  I  praise  the  dead,  I  should  like  to 
point  out  by  what  principles  of  action  we  rose  a  to  power, 
and  under  what  institutions  and  through  what  manner 
of  life  our  empire  became  great.  For  I  conceive  that 
such  thoughts  are  not  unsuited  to  the  occasion,  and  that 
this  numerous  assembly  of  citizens  and  strangers  may 
profitably  listen  to  them. 

'Our  form  of  government  does  not  enter  into  rivalry      37- 
with  the  institutions  of  others.     We  do  not  copy  our 
neighbours,  but  are  an  example  to  them.     It  is  true  that  democracy, 

.      .     but  we  ho- 

we  are  called  a  democracy,  for  the  administration  is  in  nourmenof 
the  hands  of  the  many  and  not  of  the  few.  But  while  ther  rich  or 
the  law  secures  equal  justice  to  all  alike  in  their  private  P°^  ^r 
disputes,  the  claim  of  excellence  is  also  recognised  ;  and  is  free  from 

0  exclusive- 

when  a  citizen  is  in  any  way  distinguished,  he  is  preferred  ness,  our 
a  Reading 


Ii8  FUNERAL    SPEECH   OF  PERICLES. 

II.       to  the  public  service,  not  as  a  matter  of  privilege,  but  as  B.C.  431. 
private        the  reward  of  merit.     Neither  is  poverty  a  bar,  but  a  OL  8?>  2' 

from  sus- 
picion ;  yet  man  may  benefit  his  country  whatever  be  the  obscurity 

alike  the  in-  of  his  condition.  There  is  no  exclusiveness  in  our  public 
jfkwand  life*  and  in  our  private  intercourse  we  are  not  suspicious 
custom.  Of  one  another,  nor  angry  with  our  neighbour  if  he  does 
what  he  likes  ;  we  do  not  put  on  sour  looks  at  him  which, 
though  harmless,  are  not  pleasant.  While  we  are  thus 
unconstrained  in  our  private  intercourse,  a  spirit  of  rever- 
ence pervades  our  public  acts ;  we  are  prevented  from 
doing  wrong  by  respect  for  authority  and  for  the  laws, 
having  an  especial  regard  to  those  which  are  ordained 
for  the  protection  of  the  injured  as  well  as  to  those  un- 
written laws  which  bring  upon  the  transgressor  of  them 
the  reprobation  of  the  general  sentiment. 

38*  'And  we  have  not  forgotten  to  provide  for  our  weary 
Xxatkm  irT  spirits  many  relaxations  from  toil ;  we  have  regular 
our  amuse-  games  and  sacrifices  throughout  the  year ;  at  home  the 
in  our'  style  of  our  life  is  refined  ;  and  the  delight  which  we 
ancTthe  daily  feel  in  all  these  things  helps  to  banish  melancholy, 
contribute?  Because  °f  ^Q  greatness  of  our  city  the  fruits  of  the 
to  our  en-  whole  earth  flow  in  upon  us ;  so  that  we  enjoy  the 

joyment.  . 

goods  of  other  countries  as  freely  as  ot  our  own. 
39'  *  Then,  again,  our  military  training  is  in  many  respects 

in  war  we    superior  to  that  of  our  adversaries.     Our  city  is  thrown 

singly  are  i          r        • 

a  match       open  to  the  world,  and  we  never  expel  a  foreigner  or 

Peiopon-     prevent  him  from  seeing  or  learning  anything  of  which 

united8-       ^e  secret  ^  revealed  to   an   enemy  might  profit  him. 

though  we   \Ve  rely  not  upon  management  or  trickery,  but  upon  our 

secrets  and  own  hearts  and  hands.     And  in  the  matter  of  education, 

laborious110  whereas  they  from  early  youth  are  always  undergoing 

training,      laborious  exercises  which  are  to  make  them  brave,  we 

live   at  ease,  and  yet   are   equally  ready  to  face  athe 

perils  which  they  face  a.     And  here  is  the  proof.     The 

Lacedaemonians  come  into  Attica  not  by  themselves, 

but  with  their  whole  confederacy  following  ;  we  go  alone 

a  Or,  '  perils  such  as  our  strength  can  bear ; '  or  '  perils  which  are 
enough  to  daunt  us.' 


FUNERAL    SPEECH   OF   PERICLES.  119 

B.C.  431.  into  a  neighbour's  country;  and  although  our  opponents  II. 
'  are  righting  for  their  homes  and  we  on  a  foreign  soil,  we 
have  seldom  any  difficulty  in  overcoming  them.  Our 
enemies  have  never  yet  felt  our  united  strength  ;  the  care 
of  a  navy  divides  our  attention,  and  on  land  we  are  obliged 
to  send  our  own  citizens  everywhere.  But  they,  if  they 
meet  and  defeat  a  part  of  our  army,  are  as  proud  as  if 
they  had  routed  us  all,  and  when  defeated  they  pretend 
to  have  been  vanquished  by  us  all. 

*  If  then  we  prefer  to  meet  danger  with  a  light  heart 
but  without  laborious  training,  and  with  a  courage  which 
is  gained  by  habit  and  not  enforced  by  law,  are  we  not 
greatly  the  gainers  ?    Since  we  do  not  anticipate  the  pain, 
although,  when  the  hour  comes,  we  can  be  as  brave  as 
those  who  never  allow  themselves  to  rest ;  and  thus  too 
our  city  is  equally  admirable  in  peace  and  in  war.     For      40. 
we  are  lovers  of  the  beautiful,  yet  simple  in  our  tastes,  and  We  are 
we  cultivate  the  mind  without  loss  of  manliness.    Wealth  vated  by 
we  employ,  not  for  talk  and  ostentation,  but  when  there 
is  a  real  use  for  it.     To  avow  poverty  with  us  is  no 
disgrace ;  the  true  disgrace  is  in  doing  nothing  to  avoid  interested 
it.     An  Athenian   citizen  does   not   neglect   the   state  affairs,  be- 
because  he  takes  care  of  his  own  household ;  and  even  nothing  is 
those  of  us  who  are  engaged  in  business  have  a  very  fair  Jjjs^sion6 
idea  of  politics.     We  alone  regard  a  man  who  takes  no  Our  s°od- 
interest  in  public  affairs,   not  as  a  harmless,  but  as  a  others 
useless  character  ;  and  if  few  of  us  are  originators,  we  are  not  from 
all  sound  judges  of  a  policy.     The  great  impediment  to  \^e^ebnt 
action  is,  in  our  opinion,  not  discussion,  but  the  want  of  generous 

confidence 

that  knowledge  which  is  gained  by  discussion  preparatory  of  freedom, 
to  action.  For  we  have  a  peculiar  power  of  thinking  before 
we  act  and  of  acting  too,  whereas  other  men  are  courage- 
ous from  ignorance  but  hesitate  upon  reflection.  And 
they  are  surely  to  be  esteemed  the  bravest  spirits  who, 
having  the  clearest  sense  both  of  the  pains  and  pleasures 
of  life,  do  not  on  that  account  shrink  from  danger.  In 
doing  good,  again,  we  are  unlike  others ;  we  make  our 
friends  by  conferring,  not  by  receiving  favours.  Now  he 


120  FUNERAL    SPEECH   OF  PERICLES. 

II.       who  confers  a  favour  is  the  firmer  friend,  because  he  B.C.  431. 
would  fain  by  kindness  keep  alive  the  memory  of  an 
obligation ;   but  the  recipient  is  colder  in  his  feelings, 
because  he  knows  that  in  requiting  another's  generosity 
he  will  not  be  winning  gratitude  but  only  paying  a  debt. 
We  alone  do  good  to  our  neighbours  not  upon  a  calcu- 
lation of  interest,  but  in  the  confidence  of  freedom  and 
in  a  frank  and  fearless  spirit.     To  sum  up :  I  say  that 
41-      Athens  is  the  school  of  Hellas,  and  that  the  individual 
Athens  is     Athenian  m  his  own  person  seems  to  have  the  power  of 
the  school    adapting  himself  to  the  most  varied  forms  of  action  with 

of  Hellas.  r 

She  alone  in  the  utmost  versatility  and  grace.  This  is  no  passing  and 
trial  rises0  idle  word,  but  truth  and  fact ;  and  the  assertion  is  verified 
relation  ^v  ^e  portion  to  which  these  qualities  have  raised  the 
Her  citizens  state.  For  in  the  hour  of  trial  Athens  alone  among  her 

need  no 

poet  to  contemporaries  is  superior  to  the  report  of  her.  No 
prafsesTfor  enemy  who  comes  against  her  is  indignant  at  the  re- 
beaS  wit?  verses  which  he  sustains  at  the  hands  of  such  a  city;  no 
ness  to  their  subject  complains  that  his  masters  are  unworthy  of  him. 

valour. 

And  we  shall  assuredly  not  be  without  witnesses ;  there 
are  mighty  monuments  of  our  power  which  will  make  us 
the  wonder  of  this  and  of  succeeding  ages ;  we  shall  not 
need  the  praises  of  Homer  or  of  any  other  panegyrist 
whose  poetry  may  please  for  the  moment a,  although  his 
representation  of  the  facts  will  not  bear  the  light  of  day. 
For  we  have  compelled  every  land  and  every  sea  to  open 
a  path  for  our  valour,  and  have  everywhere  planted 
eternal  memorials  of  our  friendship  and  of  our  enmity. 
Such  is  the  city  for  whose  sake  these  men  nobly  fought 
and  died  ;  they  could  not  bear  the  thought  that  she 
might  be  taken  from  them ;  and  every  one  of  us  who 
survive  should  gladly  toil  on  her  behalf. 

42.  'I  have  dwelt  upon  the  greatness  of  Athens  because  I 

The  praise  want  to  show  you  that  we  are  contending  for  a  higher 

of  the  city          .  J 

is  the  praise  prize  than  those  who  enjoy  none  of  these  privileges,  and 
men,  for  to  establish  by  manifest  proof  the  merit  of  these  men 
her7  rea?e  wh°m  I  am  now  commemorating.  Their  loftiest  praise  has 

a  Cp.  i.  10  med.,  and  21. 


FUNERAL    SPEECH    OF   PERICLES.  121 

B.C.  431.  been  already  spoken.  For  in  magnifying  the  city  I  have  II. 
7>  2>  magnified  them,  and  men  like  them  whose  virtues  made  ^^^ 
her  glorious.  And  of  how  few  Hellenes  can  it  be  said  as  and  poor 
of  them,  that  their  deeds  when  weighed  in  the  balance  ferred  death 
have  been  found  equal  to  their  fame  !  Methinks  that  a  honour, 
death  such  as  theirs  has  been  gives  the  true  measure  of  a 
man's  worth  ;  it  may  be  the  first  revelation  of  his  virtues, 
but  is  at  any  rate  their  final  seal.  For  even  those  who 
come  short  in  other  ways  may  justly  plead  the  valour 
with  which  they  have  fought  for  their  country;  they 
have  blotted  out  the  evil  with  the  good,  and  have  bene- 
fited the  state  more  by  their  public  services  than  they 
have  injured  her  by  their  private  actions.  None  of  these 
men  were  enervated  by  wealth  or  hesitated  to  resign  the 
pleasures  of  life ;  none  of  them  put  off  the  evil  day  in 
the  hope,  natural  to  poverty,  that  a  man,,  though  poor, 
may  one  day  become  rich.  But,  deeming  that  the  pun- 
ishment of  their  enemies  was  sweeter  than  any  of  these 
things,  and  that  they  could  fall  in  no  nobler  cause,  they 
determined  at  the  hazard  of  their  lives  to  be  honourably 
avenged,  and  to  leave  the  rest.  They  resigned  to  hope 
their  unknown  chance  of  happiness ;  but  in  the  face  of 
death  they  resolved  to  rely  upon  themselves  alone.  And 
when  the  moment  came  they  were  minded  to  resist  and 
suffer,  rather  than  to  fly  and  save  their  lives ;  they  ran 
away  from  the  word  of  dishonour,  but  on  the  battle-field 
their  feet  stood  fast,  and  a  in  an  instant,  at  the  height  of 
their  fortune,  they  passed  away  from  the  scene,  not  of 
their  fear,  but  of  their  glory  a. 

'  Such  was  the  end  of  these  men  ;  they  were  worthy  of      43. 
Athens,  and  the  living  need  not  desire  to  have  a  more  Contem- 

plate  and 

heroic  spirit,  although  they  may  pray  for  a  less  fatal  issue,  love  Athens, 
The  value  of  such  a  spirit  is  not  to  be  expressed  in  words,  tm  know 
Any  one  can   discourse  to  you  for  ever  about  the  ad-  Sovalue 
vantages  of  a  brave  defence  which  you  know  already.  They were 

a  Or,  taking  TVX^JS  with  Kcupov :  ( while  for  a  moment  they  were 
in  the  hands  of  fortune,  at  the  height,  not  of  terror  but  of  glory, 
they  passed  away/ 


FUNERAL   SPEECH   OF  PERICLES. 

II.       But  instead  of  listening  to  him  I  would  have  you  day  by  B.C.  431. 
united  in      day  fix  your  eyes  upon  the  greatness  of  Athens,  until 
but  their      you  become  filled  with  the  love  of  her  ;  and  when  you 


are  impressed  by  the  spectacle  of  her  glory,  reflect  that 
this  empire  has  been  acquired  by  men  who  knew  their 
puichreis    duty  and  had  the  courage  to  do  it,  who  in  the  hour  of 

the  remem-  J 

brance  of     conflict  had  the  fear  of  dishonour  always  present  to  them, 

them  in  the         «       «        •  /*  i          /•  •  i     i    •  •  11 

hearts  of  and  who,  if  ever  they  failed  in  an  enterpnze,  would  not 
loTtheh01"  allow  their  virtues  to  be  lost  to  their  country,  but 
without6  freely  gave  their  lives  to  her  as  the  fairest  offering  which 
fear  :  it  is  they  could  present  at  her  feast.  The  sacrifice  which 
perousTnot  they  collectively  made  was  individually  repaid  to  them  ; 
tunaUte,f°who  ^or  ^GY  received  again  each  one  for  himself  a  praise 
wkich  grows  not  old,  and  the  noblest  of  all  sepulchres— 
I  speak  not  of  that  in  which  their  remains  are  laid,  but 
of  that  in  which  their  glory  survives,  and  is  proclaimed 
always  and  on  every  fitting  occasion  both  in  word  and 
deed.  For  the  whole  earth  is  the  sepulchre  of  famous 
men  ;  not  only  are  they  commemorated  by  columns  and 
inscriptions  in  their  own  country,  but  in  foreign  lands 
there  dwells  also  an  unwritten  memorial  of  them,  graven 
not  on  stone  but  in  the  hearts  of  men.  Make  them  your 
examples,  and,  esteeming  courage  to  be  freedom  and 
freedom  to  be  happiness,  do  not  weigh  too  nicely  the 
perils  of  war.  The  unfortunate  who  has  no  hope  of  a 
change  for  the  better  has  less  reason  to  throw  away  his 
life  than  the  prosperous  who,  if  he  survive,  is  always  liable 
to  a  change  for  the  worse,  and  to  whom  any  accidental 
fall  makes  the  most  serious  difference.  To  a  man  of 
spirit,  cowardice  and  disaster  coming  together  are  far 
more  bitter  than  death  striking  him  unperceived  at  a 
time  when  he  is  full  of  courage  and  animated  by  the 
general  hope. 

44.  '  Wherefore  I  do  not  now  commiserate  the  parents  of 

The  parents  the  dead  who  stand  here;  I  would  rather  comfort  them. 
are  to  be  You  know  that  your  life  has  been  passed  amid  manifold 
ratherrthfn  vicissitudes  ;  and  that  they  may  be  deemed  fortunate 
pitied.  Wj10  have  gained  most  honour,  whether  an  honourable 


FUNERAL    SPEECH   OF   PERICLES.  123 

B.C.  431.  death  like  theirs,  or  an  honourable  sorrow  like  yours,       II. 
7'  2'  and  whose  days  have  been  so  ordered  that  the  term  of  Some  of 
their  happiness  is  likewise  the  term  of  their  life.     I  know  yet  have 
how  hard  it  is  to  make  you  feel  this,  when  the  good  for- 
tune  of  others  will  too  often  remind  you  of  the  gladness 


which  once  lightened  your  hearts.     And  sorrow  is  felt  and  serve 

the  state  • 

at  the  want  of  those  blessings,  not  which  a  man  never  while  others 


knew,  but  which  were  a  part  of  his  life  before  they  were 
taken  from  him.     Some  of  you  are  of  an  age  at  which  J^eTr  'share 
they  may  hope  to  have  other  children,  and  they  ought  to  of  happi- 
bear  their  sorrow  better  ;  not  only  will  the  children  who  been,  and 
may  hereafter  be  born  make  them  forget  their  own  lost 


ones,  but  the  city  will  be  doubly  a  gainer.  She  will  not 
be  left  desolate,  and  she  will  be  safer.  For  a  man's 
counsel  cannot  have  equal  weight  or  worth,  when  he 
alone  has  no  children  to  risk  in  the  general  danger.  To 
those  of  you  who  have  passed  their  prime,  I  say  :  "  Con- 
gratulate yourselves  that  you  have  been  happy  during 
the  greater  part  of  your  days  ;  remember  that  your  life  of 
sorrow  will  not  last  long,  and  be  comforted  by  the  glory 
of  those  who  are  gone.  For  the  love  of  honour  alone 
is  ever  young,  and  not  riches,  as  some  say,  but  honour 
is  the  delight  of  men  when  they  are  old  and  useless." 

'  To  you  who  are  the  sons  and  brothers  of  the  departed,      45- 
I  see  that  the   struggle   to   emulate  them  will   be   an 


arduous  one.     For  all  men  praise  the  dead,  and,  how-  wil1  find 

their  ex- 

ever  pre-eminent  your  virtue  may  be,  hardly  will  you  ample  hard 
be  thought,  I  do  not  say  to  equal,  but  even  to  approach 
them.     The  living  have  their  rivals  and  detractors,  but 
when  a  man  is  out  of  the  way,  the  honour  and  good-will  but  envr 

follows  not 

which  he  receives  is  unalloyed.     And,  if  I  am  to  speak  the  dead. 
of  womanly  virtues  to  those  of  you  who  will  henceforth  widows  re- 


be  widows,  let  me  sum  them  up  in  one  short  admonition  : 

To  a  woman  not  to  show  more  weakness  than  is  natural  weakness, 

and  avoid 

to  her  sex  is  a  great  glory,  and  not  to  be  talked  about  for  both  praise 

-  ..  and  blame. 

good  or  for  evil  among  men. 

'  I  have  paid  the  required  tribute,  in  obedience  to  the      4-6. 
Jaw,  making  use  of  such  fitting  words  as  I  had.     The 


124  THE   PLAGUE. 

II.       tribute  of  deeds  has  been  paid  in  part;  for  the  dead  B.C. 431. 
tribute  of     have  been  honourably  interred,  and  it  remains  only  that 
dead.  The  their  children  should  be  maintained  at  the  public  charge 
thenTSn pay  unt^  they  are  grown  up  :    this  is  the  solid  prize  with 
deeds,  as     which,  as  with  a  garland,  Athens  crowns  her  sons  living; 

by  this  fune- 
ral, so  top    and  dead,  after  a  struggle  like  theirs.     For  where  the 

tenance  of   rewards  of  virtue  are  greatest,  there  the  noblest  citizens  are 
dren  chll~     enlisted  in  the  service  of  the  state.     And  now,  when  you 

have  duly  lamented,  every  one  his  own  dead,  you  may 

depart.' 

47.  Such  was  the  order  of  the  funeral  celebrated  in  this 
Second  in-  winter,  with  the  end  of  which  ended  the  first  year  of  the 

vasion  of 

Attica ;        Peloponnesian  War.     As  soon  as  summer  returned,  the  B.C.  430. 

outbreak       T>   t  •  •  •  i     r  i  •    i        r  ^-  ^7»  3- 

of  the  Peloponnesian  army,  comprising  as  before  two-thirds  of 
plague,  t^e  force  Of  eacn  confederate  state,  under  the  command 
of  the  Lacedaemonian  king  Archidamus,  the  son  of 
Zeuxidamus,  invaded  Attica,  where  they  established 
themselves  and  ravaged  the  country.  They  had  not 
been  there  many  days  when  the  plague  broke  out  at 
Athens  for  the  first  time.  A  similar  disorder  is  said 
to  have  previously  smitten  many  places,  particularly 
Lemnos,  but  there  is  no  record  of  such  a  pestilence 
occurring  elsewhere,  or  of  so  great  a  destruction  of 
human  life.  For  a  while  physicians,  in  ignorance  of 
the  nature  of  the  disease,  sought  to  apply  remedies ;  but 
it  was  in  vain,  and  they  themselves  were  among  the 
first  victims,  because  they  oftenest  came  into  contact 
with  it.  No  human  art  was  of  any  avail,  and  as  to 
supplications  in  temples,  enquiries  of  oracles,  and  the 
like,  they  were  utterly  useless,  and  at  last  men  were 
overpowered  by  the  calamity  and  gave  them  all  up. 

48.  The  disease  is  said  to  have  begun  south  of  Egypt  in 
which  com-  Aethiopia ;  thence  it  descended  into  Egypt  and  Libya, 
AetSopia!    and  after  spreading  over  the  greater  part  of  the  Persian 
IndecTuSsS  empire,  suddenly  fell  upon  Athens.     It  first  attacked 
of  it  are       tjle   inhabitants   of  the    Piraeus,   and   it   was   supposed 

unknown, 

but  i  shall   that  the  Peloponnesians  had  poisoned  the  cisterns,  no 
conduits  having  as  yet  been  made  there.     It  afterwards 


THE   PLAGUE.  125 

B.C.  430.  reached  the  upper  city,  and  then  the  mortality  became       II. 


pi.  87,  3. 


far  greater.     As  to  its  probable  origin  or  the  causes  facts-  Iwas 
which  might  or  could  have  produced  such  a  disturbance  sufferer. 
of  nature,  every  man,  whether  a  physician  or  not,  will 
give  his  own  opinion.     But  I  shall  describe  its  actual 
course,  and  the  symptoms  by  which  any  one  who  knows 
them  beforehand  may  recognise  the  disorder  should  it 
ever  reappear.     For  I  was  myself  attacked,  and  witnessed 
the  sufferings  of  others. 

The  season  was  admitted  to  have  been  remarkably  free      49- 
from  ordinary  sickness ;  and  if  anybody  was  already  ill  The  ^a: 

mctcristics 

of  any  other  disease,  it  was  absorbed  in  this.  Many  who  of  the 
were  in  perfect  health,  all  in  a  moment,  and  without  any 
apparent  reason,  were  seized  with  violent  heats  in  the 
head  and  with  redness  and  inflammation  of  the  eyes. 
Internally  the  throat  and  the  tongue  were  quickly  suffused 
with  blood,  and  the  breath  became  unnatural  and  fetid. 
There  followed  sneezing  and  hoarseness ;  in  a  short  time 
the  disorder,  accompanied  by  a  violent  cough,  reached 
the  chest ;  then  fastening  lower  down,  it  would  move  the 
stomach  and  bring  on  all  the  vomits  of  bile  to  which 
physicians  have  ever  given  names ;  and  they  were  very 
distressing.  An  ineffectual  retching  producing  violent 
convulsions  attacked  most  of  the  sufferers  ;  asome  as  soon 
as  the  previous  symptoms  had  abated,  others  not  until  long 
afterwards  a.  The  body  externally  was  not  so  very  hot  to 
the  touch,  nor  yet  pale ;  it  was  of  a  livid  colour  inclining 
to  red,  and  breaking  out  in  pustules  and  ulcers.  But  the 
internal  fever  was  intense  ;  the  sufferers  could  not  bear  to 
have  on  them  even  the  finest  linen  garment ;  they  insisted 
on  being  naked,  and  there  was  nothing  which  they  longed 
for  more  eagerly  than  to  throw  themselves  into  cold 
water.  And  many  of  those  who  had  no  one  to  look  after 
them  actually  plunged  into  the  cisterns,  for  they  were 
tormented  by  unceasing  thirst,  which  was  not  in  the 
least  assuaged  whether  they  drank  little  or  much.  They 

a  Or,  taking  Xox£?)o-ai/ra  with  0-^00710 1/:  '  these  convulsions  in  some 
cases  soon  abated,  in  others  not  until  long  afterwards.' 


126  THE    PLAGUE 

II.  could  not  sleep  ;  a  restlessness  which  was  intolerable  B.C.  430. 
never  left  them.  While  the  disease  was  at  its  height  the 
body,  instead  of  wasting  away,  held  out  amid  these 
sufferings  in  a  marvellous  manner,  and  either  they  died 
on  the  seventh  or  ninth  day,  not  of  weakness,  for  their 
strength  was  not  exhausted,  but  of  internal  fever,  which 
was  the  end  of  most ;  or,  if  they  survived,  then  the 
disease  descended  into  the  bowels  and  there  produced 
violent  ulceration ;  severe  diarrhoea  at  the  same  time  set 
in,  and  at  a  later  stage  caused  exhaustion,  which  finally 
with  few  exceptions  carried  them  off.  For  the  disorder 
which  had  originally  settled  in  the  head  passed  gradually 
through  the  whole  body,  and,  if  a  person  got  over  the 
worst,  would  often  seize  the  extremities  and  leave  its 
mark,  attacking  the  privy  parts  and  the  fingers  and  the 
toes ;  and  some  escaped  with  the  loss  of  these,  some 
with  the  loss  of  their  eyes.  Some  again  had  no  sooner 
recovered  than  they  were  seized  with  a  forgetfulness  of 
all  things  and  knew  neither  themselves  nor  their  friends. 

50.  The  malady  took  a  form  not  to  be  described,  and  the 
Even  the     fury  wjth  which  it  fastened  upon  each  sufferer  was  too 

animals  and 

birds  of       much  for  human   nature   to   endure.     There  was   one 

tolouch  the  circumstance  in  particular  which  distinguished  it  from 

corpses.       ordinary  diseases.      The  birds  and  animals  which  feed 

on  human  flesh,  although  so   many  bodies  were  lying 

unburied,  either  never  came  near  them,  or  died  if  they 

touched    them.      This    was    proved    by    a    remarkable 

disappearance  of  the  birds  of  prey,  who  were  not  to  be 

seen  either  about  the  bodies  or  anywhere  else ;  while  in 

the  case  of  the  dogs  the  fact  was  even  more  obvious, 

because  they  live  with  man. 

51.  Such  was  the  general  nature  of  the  disease:   I  omit 
Nothing      many  strange  peculiarities  which  characterised  individual 
against  the  cases.    None  of  the  ordinary  sicknesses  attacked  any  one 
disease.       whije  it  lasted,  or,  if  they  did,  they  ended  in  the  plague. 

Some  of  the  sufferers  died  from  want  of  care,  others 
equally  who  were  receiving  the  greatest  attention.  No 
single  remedy  could  be  deemed  a  specific ;  for  that 


THE    PLAGUE. 


B.C.  430.  which  did  good  to  one  did  harm  to  another.     No  con-       II. 
°1'  87'  3'  stitution  was  of  itself  strong  enough  to  resist  or  weak  RaPidity 

.  with  which 

enough  to  escape  the  attacks  ;  the  disease  carried  off  all  the  infec- 
alike  and  defied  every  mode  of  treatment.    Most  appalling  None^ouid 
was  the  despondency  which  seized  upon  any  one  who  felt  ^^ 
himself  sickening  •  for  he  instantly  abandoned  his  mind  impunity 

J  except  those 

to  despair  and,  instead  of  holding  out,  absolutely  threw  who  had 
away  his  chance  of  life.  Appalling  too  was  the  rapidity 
with  which  men  caught  the  infection  ;  dying  like  sheep  if 
they  attended  on  one  another  ;  and  this  was  the  principal  covered 
cause  of  mortality.  When  they  were  afraid  to  visit  one 
another,  the  sufferers  died  in  their  solitude,  so  that  many 
houses  were  empty  because  there  had  been  no  one  left  to 
take  care  of  the  sick  ;  or  if  they  ventured  they  perished, 
especially  those  who  aspired  to  heroism.  For  they 
went  to  see  their  friends  without  thought  of  themselves 
and  were  ashamed  to  leave  them,  even  at  a  time  when 
the  very  relations  of  the  dying  were  at  last  growing 
weary  and  ceased  to  make  lamentations,  overwhelmed 
by  the  vastness  of  the  calamity.  But  whatever  instances 
there  may  have  been  of  such  devotion,  more  often  the 
sick  and  the  dying  were  tended  by  the  pitying  care  of 
those  who  had  recovered,  because  they  knew  the  course 
of  the  disease  and  were  themselves  free  from  appre- 
hension. For  no  one  was  ever  attacked  a  second  time, 
or  not  with  a  fatal  result.  All  men  congratulated  them, 
and  they  themselves,  in  the  excess  of  their  joy  at  the 
moment,  had  an  innocent  fancy  that  they  could  not  die 
of  any  other  sickness. 

The  crowding  of  the  people  out  of  the  country  into      52 
the  city  aggravated  the  misery;  and  the  newly-arrived  The  misery 
suffered  most.     For,  having  no  houses  of  their  own,  but 
inhabiting  in  the  height  of  summer  stifling  huts,  the 
mortality  among  them  was  dreadful,  and  they  perished 
in  wild  disorder.     a  The  dead  lay  as  they  had  died,  one 
upon  another,  while  others  hardly  alive  wallowed a  in  the 

a  More  literally:  'They,  dying,  lay  dead  one  upon  another,  or 
wallowed  hardly  alive  '  etc. 


128  THE    PLAGUE. 

II.       streets   and  crawled  about  every  fountain   craving  for  B.C.  430. 
water.     The  temples  in  which  they  lodged  were  full  of  O1'  8?<  3- 
the  corpses  of  those  who  died  in  them ;  for  the  violence 
of  the  calamity  was  such  that  men,  not  knowing  where 
General       to  turn,  grew  reckless  of  all  law,  human  and  divine.    The 

violation  of  . 

ancient  cus-  customs  which  had  hitherto  been  observed  at  funerals 
burial0  were  universally  violated,  and  they  buried  their  dead  each 
one  as  best  he  could.  Many,  having  no  proper  appli- 
ances, because  the  deaths  in  their  household  had  been 
so  frequent,  made  no  scruple  of  using  the  burial-place  of 
others.  When  one  man  had  raised  a  funeral  pile,  others 
would  come,  and  throwing  on  their  dead  first,  set  fire  to 
it ;  or  when  some  other  corpse  was  already  burning,  before 
they  could  be  stopped  would  throw  their  own  dead  upon 
it  and  depart. 

53'  There  were  other  and  worse  forms  of  lawlessness  which 

and^K-      t^ie  plague  introduced  at  Athens.    Men  who  had  hitherto 
gious  re-      concealed  their  indulgence  in  pleasure  now  grew  bolder. 

straint  dis-  ... 

appears  in  For,  seeing  the  sudden  change. — how  the  rich  died  in  a 
the  plague0  moment,  and  those  who  had  nothing  immediately  in- 
herited their  property, — they  reflected  that  life  and  riches 
were  alike  transitory,  and  they  resolved  to  enjoy  them- 
selves while  they  could,  and  to  think  only  of  pleasure. 
Who  would  be  willing  to  sacrifice  himself  to  the  law  of 
honour  when  he  knew  not  whether  he  would  ever  live  to 
be  held  in  honour  ?  The  pleasure  of  the  moment  and  any 
sort  of  thing  which  conduced  to  it  took  the  place  both  of 
honour  and  of  expediency.  No  fear  of  God  or  law  of  man 
deterred  a  criminal,  Those  who  saw  all  perishing  alike, 
thought  that  the  worship  or  neglect  of  the  Gods  made  no 
difference.  For  offences  against  human  law  no  punish- 
ment was  to  be  feared  ;  no  one  would  live  long  enough  to 
be  called  to  account.  Already  a  far  heavier  sentence 
had  been  passed  and  was  hanging  over  a  man's  head  ; 
before  that  fell,  why  should  he  not  take  a  little  pleasure  ? 
54.  Such  was  the  grievous  calamity  which  now  afflicted 

the  Athenians  ;  within  the  walls  their  people  were  dying, 
and  without,  their  country  was  being  ravaged.     In  their 


CONTINUANCE    OF    THE    INVASION.          129 

B.C.  430.  troubles  they  naturally  called  to  mind  a  verse  which  the       II. 
7>  3'  elder  men  among  them  declared  to  have  been  current 
long  ago  :— 

'  A  Dorian  war  will  come  and  a  plague  with  it.' 
There  was  a  dispute  about  the  precise  expression  ;  some  Dispute 
saying  that  limos,  a  famine,  and  not  loimos,  a  plague,  was  ancient 
the  original  word.    Nevertheless,  as  might  have  been  ex-  Whether 


pected,  for  men's  memories  reflected  their  sufferings,  the 
argument  in  favour  of  loimos  prevailed  at  the  time.  But  the  word. 
if  ever  in  future  years  another  Dorian  war  arises  which 
happens  to  be  accompanied  by  a  famine,  they  will  prcn 
bably  repeat  the  verse  in  the  other  form.  The  answer 
of  the  oracle  to  the  Lacedaemonians  when  the  God  was 
asked  '  whether  they  should  go  to  war  or  not,'  and  he 
replied  'that  if  they  fought  with  all  their  might,  they 
would  conquer,  and  that  he  himself  would  take  their 
part  a,'  was  not  forgotten  by  those  who  had  heard  of  it, 
and  they  quite  imagined  that  they  were  witnessing  the 
fulfilment  of  his  words.  The  disease  certainly  did  set 
in  immediately  after  the  invasion  of  the  Peloponnesians,  . 
and  did  not  spread  into  Peloponnesus  in  any  degree 
worth  speaking  of,  while  Athens  felt  its  ravages  most 
severely,  and  next  to  Athens  the  places  which  were  most 
populous.  Such  was  the  history  of  the  plague  b. 

After  the  Peloponnesians  had  wasted  the  plain  they      55. 
entered  what  are  called  the  coast  lands  (Paralus]  and  The  Pel°- 

v  .        '  ponnesians 

penetrated  as  far  as  Laurium,  where  the  Athenians  have  atLaunum. 

Pericles 

their  silver  mines.     First  they  ravaged  that  part  of  the  stiii  re- 


coast  which  looks  towards  Peloponnesus,  and  afterwards 
that  situated  towards  Euboea  and  Andros.  But  Pericles, 
who  was  still  general,  continued  to  insist,  as  in  the  former  a  hundred 

1A1.  111  •          •  1  •        i     •    ships  to  ra- 

invasion,  that  the  Athenians  should  remain  within  their  Vage  Peio- 
walls.  ponnesus- 

Before,  however,  the  Peloponnesians  had  left  the  plain      56. 

and  moved  forward  into  the  coast  lands  he  had  begun 

to  equip  an  expedition  of  a  hundred  ships  against  Pelo- 

ponnesus.    When  all  was  ready  he  put  to  sea,  having  on 

a  Cp.  i.  118  fin.  b  Cp.  iii.  87. 

K 


130  THE   PLAGUE   AT  POTIDAEA. 

II.  board  four  thousand  Athenian  hoplites  and  three  hundred  B.C.  430. 
cavalry  conveyed  in  horse  transports  which  the  Athenians 
then  constructed  for  the  first  time  out  of  their  old  ships. 
The  Chians  and  Lesbians  joined  them  with  fifty  vessels. 
The  expedition  did  not  actually  put  to  sea  until  the 
Peloponnesians  had  reached  the  coast  lands.  Arriving 
at  Epidaurus  in  Peloponnesus  the  Athenians  devastated 
most  of  the  country  and  attacked  the  city,  which  at 
one  time  they  were  in  hopes  of  taking,  but  did  not  quite 
succeed.  Setting  sail  again  they  ravaged  the  territory 
of  Troezen,  Halieis,  and  Hermione,  which  are  all  places 
on  the  coast  of  Peloponnesus.  Again  putting  off  they 
came  to  Prasiae,  a  small  town  on  the  coast  of  Laconia, 
ravaged  the  country,  and  took  and  destroyed  the  place. 
They  then  returned  home  and  found  that  the  Pelopon- 
nesians had  also  returned  and  were  no  longer  in  Attica. 
5  7'  All  the  time  during  which  the  Peloponnesians  remained 
The  Peio-  jn  the  country  and  the  armament  of  the  Athenians  con- 

ponnesians 

leave  Attica  tinued  at  sea  the  plague  was  raging  both  among  the 

of  forty5  ay  troops  and  in  the  city.     The  fear  which  it  inspired  was 

days>          said  to  have  induced  the  enemy  to  leave  Attica  sooner 

than  they  intended  ;  for  they  heard  from  deserters  that 

the  disease  was  in  the  city,  and  likewise  saw  the  burning 

of  the  dead.     Still  in  this  invasion  the  whole  country 

was  ravaged  by  them,  and  they  remained  about  forty 

days,  which  was  the  longest  stay  they  ever  made. 

58.          In  the  same  summer,  Hagnon  the  son  of  Nicias,  and 

Expedition  Cleopompus  the  son  of  Cleinias,  who  were  colleagues 

Potidaea.     of  Pericles  in  his  military  command,  took  the  fleet  which 


employed  and  sailed  forthwith  against  the  Thra- 
'and  cian  Chalcidians  and  against  Potidaea,  which  still  held 
therein-      out.     On  their  arrival  they  brought  engines  up  to  the 

forcements          .,  ,        .     ,  r       ,  •  -^ 

return  to  walls,  and  tried  every  means  of  taking  the  town.  Jout 
'ns*  they  did  not  succeed  ;  nor  did  the  result  by  any  means 
correspond  to  the  magnitude  of  their  armament  ;  for 
thither  too  the  plague  came  and  made  dreadful  havoc 
among  the  Athenian  troops.  Even  the  soldiers  who 
were  previously  there  and  had  been  in  good  health 


SPEECH   OF  PERICLES.  131 


B.C.  430.  caught  the  infection  from  the  forces  under  Hagnon.  II. 
3'  But  the  army  of  Phormio  a  escaped  ;  for  he  and  his 
sixteen  hundred  troops  had  left  Chalcidice.  And  so 
Hagnon  returned  with  his  fleet  to  Athens,  having  lost  by 
the  plague  out  of  four  thousand  hoplites  a  thousand 
and  fifty  men  in  forty  days.  But  the  original  armamentb 
remained  and  prosecuted  the  siege. 

After  the   second  Peloponnesian  invasion,  now  that      59. 
Attica  had  been  once  more  ravaged,  and  the  war  and  T>e  Athe- 
the  plague  together  lay  heavy  upon  the  Athenians,  a  for  peace 
change  came  over  their  spirit.     They  blamed  Pericles  rejected. 


because  he  had  persuaded  them  to  go  to  war,  declaring 

that  he  was  the  author  of  their  troubles  ;  and  they  were  Jes.   His 

J  defence. 

anxious  to  come  to  terms  with  the  Lacedaemonians. 
Accordingly  envoys  were  despatched  to  Sparta,  but  they 
met  with  no  success.  And  now,  being  completely  at 
their  wit's  end,  they  turned  upon  Pericles.  He  saw  that 
they  were  exasperated  by  their  misery  and  were  behaving 
just  as  he  had  always  anticipated  that  they  would.  And 
so,  being  still  general,  he  called  an  assembly,  wanting  to 
encourage  them  and  to  convert  their  angry  feelings  into 
a  gentler  and  more  hopeful  mood.  At  this  assembly  he 
came  forward  and  spoke  as  follows:  — 

'  I  was   expecting  this  outburst  of  indignation  ;   the      60. 
causes  of  it  are  not  unknown  to  me.     And  I  have  sum- 


moned  an  assembly  that  I   may  remind  you  of  your  siderateand 

'  unmanly  ; 

resolutions  and  reprove  you  for  your  inconsiderate  anger  you  forget 
against   me,  and  want  of  fortitude  in  misfortune.      In  fortunes  of 
my  judgment  it  would  be  better  for  individuals  them-  ^duaide- 
selves  that  the  citizens  should  suffer  and  the  state  flourish  P6™1  01J 

those  of 

than  that  the  citizens  should  flourish  and  the  state  suffer,  the  state. 
A  private  man,  however  successful  in  his  own  dealings,  lieved  that 
if  his  country  perish  is  involved  in  her  destruction  ;  but 
if  he  be  an  unprosperous  citizen  of  a  prosperous  city  he 


is  much  more  likely  to  recover.     Seeing  then  that  states  consented 
can  bear  the  misfortunes  of  individuals,  but  individuals  why  should 
cannot  bear  the  misfortunes  of  the  state,  let  us  all  stand  k 

a  Cp.  i.  64  med.  b  Cp.  i.  59,  6r  init. 

K  2 


132  SPEECH   OF  PERICLES. 

II.  by  our  country  and  not  do  what  you  are  doing  now,  who  B.C.  430. 
because  you  are  stunned  by  your  private  calamities  are 
letting  go  the  common  hope  of  safety,  and  condemning 
not  only  me  who  advised,  but  yourselves  who  consented 
to,  the  war.  Yet  I  with  whom  you  are  so  angry  venture 
to  say  of  myself,  that  I  am  as  capable  as  any  one  of 
devising  and  explaining  a  sound  policy;  and  that  I  am 
a  lover  of  my  country,  and  incorruptible.  Now  a  man 
may  have  a  policy  which  he  cannot  clearly  expound, 
and  then  he  might  as  well  have  none  at  all  ;  or  he  may 
possess  both  ability  and  eloquence,  but  if  he  is  disloyal 
to  his  country  he  cannot,  like  a  true  man,  speak  in  her 
interest  ;  or  again  he  may  be  unable  to  resist  a  bribe, 
and  then  all  his  other  good  qualities  will  be  sold  for 
money.  If,  when  you  determined  to  go  to  war,  you 
believed  me  to  have  somewhat  more  of  the  statesman 
in  me  than  others,  it  is  not  fair  that  I  should  now  be 
charged  with  anything  like  crime. 

6  1.          'I  allow  that  for  men  who  are  in  prosperity  and  free 
*°  c^oose  ^  'ls  great  folly  to  make  war.     But  when  they 


but  you  are  must  either  submit  and  at  once  surrender  independence, 
misfortune,  or  strike  and  be  free,  then  he  who  shuns  and  not  he  who 
change  is  meets  the  danger  is  deserving  of  blame.  For  my  own 


Park  I  am  the  same  man  and  stand  where  I  did.     But 
citizens  of    yOU  are  changed  ;  for  you  have  been  driven  by  misfortune 

Athens  :        J  '    .  , 

you  should  to  recall  the  consent  which  you  gave  when  you  were  yet 

sorfows,°Ur  unhurt,  and  to  think  that  my  advice  was  wrong  because 

only  of'ihe  your  own  characters  are  weak.     The  pain  is  present  and, 

public         comes  home  to  each  of  you,  but  the  good  is  as  yet  un- 

realised  by   any  one  ;    and   your  minds   have  not  the 

strength  to   persevere  in   your  resolution,  now   that  a 

great  reverse  has  overtaken  you  unawares.      Anything 

which  is  sudden  and   unexpected  and   utterly  beyond 

calculation,  such  a  disaster  for  instance  as  this  plague 

coming  upon  other  misfortunes,  enthralls  the  spirit  of  a 

man.      Nevertheless,  being  the  citizens  of  a  great  city 

and  educated  in  a  temper  of  greatness,  you  should  not 

succumb  to  calamities  however  overwhelming,  or  darken 


SPEECH   OF  PERICLES.  133 

B.C.  430.  the  lustre  of  your  fame.  For  if  men  hate  the  presump-  II. 
7>  3'  tion  of  those  who  claim  a  reputation  to  which  they  have 
no  right,  they  equally  condemn  the  faint-heartedness  of 
those  who  fall  below  the  glory  which  is  their  own.  You 
should  lose  the  sense  of  your  private  sorrows  and  lay 
fast  hold  of  the  common  good. 

'  As  to  your  sufferings  in  the  war,  if  you  fear  that  they      62. 
maybe  very  great  and  after  all  fruitless,  I  have  shown  Jha^you?^ 
you  already  over  and  over  again  that  such  a  fear  is  ^{Jebenf^it 
groundless.     If  you  are  still  unsatisfied  I  will  indicate  less  ?  I  tell 
a  one  element  of  your  superiority  which  appears  to  have  you  are 
escaped  you  a,  although  it  nearly  touches  your  imperial 
greatness.     I  too  have  never  mentioned  it  before,  nor 
would  I  now,  because  the  claim  may  seem  too  arrogant,  half  the 

world 

if  I  did  not  see  that  you  are  unreasonably  depressed.  What  'are 

You  think  that  your  empire  is  confined  to  your  allies,  but 

I  say  that  of  the  two  divisions  of  the  world  accessible  to 

man,  the  land  and  the  sea,  there  is  one  of  which  you  are  dom?  Keep 

9  that,  and    - 

absolute  masters,  and  have,  or  may  have,  the  dominion  you  win 


to  any  extent  which  you  please.    Neither  the  great  King; 

nor  any  nation  on  earth  can  hinder  a  navy  like  yours  Demies  Ur 

from  penetrating  whithersoever  you  choose  to  sail.    When  ™*k  dis- 

we  reflect  on  this  great  power,  houses  and  lands,  of  which  having  a 

the  loss  seems  so  dreadful  to  you,  are  as  nothing.     We 

ought  not  to  be  troubled  about  them  or  to  think  much 

of  them  in  comparison  ;  they  are  only  the  garden  of  the 

house,  the  superfluous  ornament  of  wealth  ;  and  you  may 

be  sure  that  if  we  cling  to  our  freedom  and  preserve  that, 

we  shall  soon  enough  recover  all  the  rest.     But,  if  we 

are  the  servants  of  others,  we  shall  be  sure  to  lose  not 

only  freedom,  but  all  that  freedom  gives.     And  where 

your  ancestors  doubly  succeeded,  you  will  doubly  fail. 

For  their  empire  was  not  inherited  by  them  from  others 

but  won  by  the  labour  of  their  hands,  and  by  them  pre- 

a  Or,  taking  vnap^ov  vp.v  absolutely  :  '  a  consideration  which, 
however  obvious,  appears  to  have  escaped  you.' 

Or,  again,  taking  peyeOovs  ntpi  with  fv6v/j.T)dfjvm:  'one  element  of 
your  superiority  which  nearly  touches  your  empire,  but  of  which 
you  never  seem  to  have  considered  the  importance.' 


134  SPEECH   OF  PERICLES. 

II.  served  and  bequeathed  to  us.  And  surely  to  be  robbed  B.C.  430. 
of  what  you  have  is  a  greater  disgrace  than  to  fail  in 
obtaining  more.  Meet  your  enemies  therefore  not  only 
with  spirit  but  with  disdain.  Any  coward  or  fortunate 
fool  may  brag  and  vaunt,  but  he  only  is  capable  of  dis- 
dain whose  conviction  that  he  is  stronger  than  his  enemy 
rests,  like  our  own,  on  grounds  of  reason.  Courage 
fighting  in  a  fair  field  is  fortified  by  the  intelligence 
which  looks  down  upon  an  enemy;  an  intelligence  re- 
lying, not  on  hope,  which  is  the  strength  of  helplessness, 
but  on  that  surer  foresight  which  is  given  by  reason 
and  observation  of  facts. 

63.  'Once  more,  you  are  bound  to  maintain  the  imperial 

dignity  of  your  city  in  which  you  all  take  pride  ;  for  you 
stake,  and  should  not  covet  the  glory  unless  you  will  endure  the 
to  resign  it  ;  toil.  And  do  not  imagine  that  you  are  fighting  about  a 


issue,  freedom  or  slavery;  you  have  an  empire  to 

hatred  of6  ^ose'  an<^  t^iere  'ls  ^e  danger  to  which  the  hatred  of  your 
mankind,  imperial  rule  has  exposed  you.  Neither  can  you  resign 
your  power,  if,  at  this  crisis,  any  timorous  or  inactive 
spirit  is  for  thus  playing  the  honest  man.  For  by  this 
time  your  empire  has  become  a  tyranny  which  in  the 
opinion  of  mankind  may  have  been  unjustly  gained,  but 
which  cannot  be  safely  surrendered.  The  men  of  whom 
I  was  speaking,  if  they  could  find  followers,  would  soon 
ruin  a  city,  and  if  they  were  to  go  and  found  a  state  of 
their  own,  would  equally  ruin  that.  For  inaction  is 
secure  only  when  arrayed  by  the  side  of  activity;  nor 
is  it  expedient  or  safe  for  a  sovereign,  but  only  for  a 
subject  state,  to  be  a  servant. 

64.          'You  must  not  be  led  away  by  the  advice  of  such 
Nothing      citizens  as  these,  nor  be  angry  with  me  :  for  the  resolu- 

hashap-  .  . 

pened,  ex-   tion  in  favour  of  war  was  your  own  as  much  as  mine. 


if  the  enemy  has  come  and  done  what  he  was 
certain  to  do  when  y°u  refused  to  yield?  What  too  if 
when  we  the  plague  followed  ?  That  was  an  unexpected  blow, 
war!6  Do1  but  we  might  have  foreseen  all  the  rest.  I  am  well 
SS  spirit  aware  that  your  hatred  of  me  is  aggravated  by  it.  But 


SPEECH   OF  PERICLES.  135 

B.C.  430.  how  unjustly,  unless  to  me  you  also  ascribe  the  credit       II. 
'  of  any  extraordinary  success  which  may  befall  you  a !  whi^h  has 
The  visitations  of  heaven  should  be  borne  with  resigna-  Athens 
tion,  the  sufferings  inflicted  by  an  enemy  with  manliness. 
This  has  always  been  the  spirit  of  Athens,  and  should 
not  die  out  in  you.     Know  that  our  city  has  the  greatest  glorious  for 

J  all  time. 

name  in  all  the  world  because  she  has  never  yielded  to 
misfortunes,  but  has  sacrificed  more  lives  and  endured 
severer  hardships  in  war  than  any  other ;  wherefore  also 
she  has  the  greatest  power  of  any  state  up  to  this  day; 
and  the  memory  of  her  glory  will  always  survive.  Even 
if  we  should  be  compelled  at  last  to  abate  somewhat  of 
our  greatness  (for  all  things  have  their  times  of  growth 
and  decay),  yet  will  the  recollection  live,  that,  of  all 
Hellenes,  we  ruled  over  the  greatest  number  of  Hellenic 
subjects  ;  that  we  withstood  our  enemies,  whether  single 
or  united,  in  the  most  terrible  wars,  and  that  we  were 
the  inhabitants  of  a  city  endowed  with  every  sort  of 
wealth  and  greatness.  The  indolent  may  indeed  find 
fault,  but  b  the  man  of  action  b  will  seek  to  rival  us,  and 
he  who  is  less  fortunate  will  envy  us.  To  be  hateful  and 
offensive  has  ever  been  at  the  time  the  fate  of  those  who 
have  aspired  to  empire.  But  he  judges  well  who  accepts 
unpopularity  in  a  great  cause.  Hatred  does  not  last 
long,  and,  besides  the  immediate  splendour  of  great 
actions,  the  renown  of  them  endures  for  ever  in  men's 
memories.  Looking  forward  to  such  future  glory  and 
present  avoidance  of  dishonour,  make  an  effort  now  and 
secure  both.  Let  no  herald  be  sent  to  the  Lacedae- 
monians, and  do  not  let  them  know  that  you  are  de- 
pressed by  your  sufferings.  For  the  greatest  states  and 
the  greatest  men,  when  misfortunes  come,  are  the  least 
depressed  in  spirit  and  the  most  resolute  in  action.' 

By  these  and  similar  words  Pericles  endeavoured  to      65. 
appease   the   anger   of  the   Athenians  against   himself, 

a  Cp.  i.  140  init. 

b  Or,  taking  KCU  avrbs  with  ^ouXo'/ut/os :  *  he  who  is  ambitious  like 
ourselves.' 


136  THE   POLICY    OF  PERICLES. 

IT.       and  to  divert  their  minds  from  their  terrible  situation.  B.C.  430. 
In  t^le  conduct  °f  public  affairs  they  took  his  advice,  and  Oli  8?>  3' 
but  are  not  sent  no  more  embassies  to  Sparta  ;  they  were  again  eager 

appeased  r  «      i     • 

until  they     to  prosecute  the  war.    Yet  in  private  they  felt  their  suffer- 
mgs  keenly;  the  common  people  had  been  deprived  even 
which  they  possessed,  while  the  upper  class 


esteem,  and  had  lost  fair  estates  in  the  country  with  all  their  houses 
lead  of  af-  and  rich  furniture.  Worst  of  all,  instead  .of  enjoying 
hTsrdeathter  peace,  they  were  now  at  war.  The  popular  indignation 
was^ven"1  was  not  Pacined  until  the7  had  fined  Pericles  ;  but,  soon 
better  ap-  afterwards,  with  the  usual  fickleness  of  the  multitude, 
than  during  they  elected  him  general  and  committed  all  their  affairs 
His  advice  to  m*s  charge.  Their  private  sorrows  were  beginning  to 
war^as16  be  less  acutely  felt,  and  for  a  time  of  public  need  they 
sound  if  the  thought  that  there  was  no  man  like  him.  During  the 
would  only  peace  while  he  was  at  the  head  of  affairs  he  ruled  with 
lowedlt"  prudence  ;  under  his  guidance  Athens  was  safe,  and 
were'con-  reacned  the  height  of  her  greatness  in  his  time.  When 
tinuaiiy  em-  the  war  began  he  showed  that  here  too  he  had  formed  a 

barking  on  . 

rash  enter-  true  estimate  of  the  Athenian  power.  He  survived  the 
?hecityawas  commencement  of  hostilities  two  years  and  six  months  ; 
and'  after  his  deatn>  m's  foresight  was  even  better  ap- 


struggies  of  predated  than  during   his   life.     For  he  had  told   the 

gogues,       Athenians    that   if  they   would    be   patient  and   would 

Perideshad  attend  to  their  navy,  and  not  seek  to  enlarge  their  do- 

naturaieir    mmi°n  while   the  war  was   going  on,   nor  imperil  the 

leader.        existence  of  the   city,  they  would   be  victorious  ;   but 

they  did  all  that  he  told  them  not  to  do,  and  in  matters 

which  seemingly  had  nothing  to  do  with  the  war,  from 

motives  of  private  ambition   and  private  interest  they 

adopted  a  policy  which  had  disastrous  effects  in  respect 

both  of  themselves  and  of  their  allies  ;    their  measures, 

ahad  they  been  successful,  would  only  have  brought* 

honour  and  profit  to  individuals,  and,  when  unsuccess- 

ful, crippled  the  city  in  the  conduct  of  the  war.     The 

reason  of  the  difference  was  that  he,  deriving  authority 

from  his  capacity  and  acknowledged  worth,  being  also 

a  Or,  'while  they  continued  to  succeed,  only  brought.' 


ERRORS    OF    THE    ATHENIANS.  137 

•B.C.  430.  a  man  of  transparent  integrity,  was  able  to  control  II. 
7>  3'  the  multitude  in  a  free  spirit  ;  he  led  them  rather  than 
was  led  by  them  ;  for,  not  seeking  power  by  dishonest 
arts,  he  had  no  need  to  say  pleasant  things,  but,  on  the 
strength  of  his  own  high  character,  could  venture  to 
oppose  and  even  to  anger  them.  When  he  saw  them 
unseasonably  elated  and  arrogant,  his  words  humbled 
and  awed  them  ;  and,  when  they  were  depressed  by 
groundless  fears,  he  sought  to  reanimate  their  confidence. 
Thus  Athens,  though  still  in  name  a  democracy,  was  in 
fact  ruled  by  her  greatest  citizen.  But  his  successors 
were  more  on  an  equality  with  one  another,  and,  each 
one  struggling  to  be  first  himself,  they  were  ready  to 
sacrifice  the  whole  conduct  of  affairs  to  the  whims  of  the 
people.  Such  weakness  in  a  great  and  imperial  city  led 
to  many  errors,  of  which  the  greatest  was  the  Sicilian 
expedition  ;  not  that  the  Athenians  miscalculated  their 
enemy's  power,  but  they  themselves,  instead  of  con- 
sulting for  the  interests  of  the  expedition  which  they 
had  sent  out,  were  occupied  in  intriguing  against  one 
another  for  the  leadership  of  the  democracy  a,  and  not 
only  grew  remiss  in  the  management  of  the  army,  but 
became  embroiled,  for  the  first  time,  in  civil  strife.  And  Even  after 
yet  after  they  had  lost  in  the  Sicilian  expedition  the  disaster  "" 


'greater  part  of  their  fleet  and  army,  and  were  distracted 

by  revolution  at  home,  still  they  held  out  three  years  their  old 

enemies 

not  only  against  their  former  enemies,  but  against  the  and  many 
Sicilians  who   had  combined   with   them,  and   against  and  were  'at 
most  of  their  own  allies  who  had  risen  in  revolt.     Even  ^^b 
when  Cyrus  the  son  of  the  King  joined  in  the  war  and  themselves. 
supplied  the  Peloponnesian  fleet  with  money,  they  con-  Pericles  was 
tinued  to   resist,  and  were  at  last  overthrown,  not  by  Ster  aiL  * 
their  enemies,  but  by  themselves  and  their  own  internal 
dissensions.     So  that  at  the  time  Pericles  was  more  than 
justified   in  the  conviction   at  which  his  foresight  had 
arrived,  that  the  Athenians  'would  win  an  easy  victory 
over  the  unaided  forces  of  the  Peloponnesians. 

a  Cp.  vi.  28. 


138    PELOPONNESIAN  ENVOYS  SENT  TO  PERSIA. 

II.  During  the  same  summer  the  Lacedaemonians  and  their  B.C.  430. 

55>      allies  sent  a  fleet  of  a  hundred  ships  against  the  island  of 
The  Lace-   Zacynthus,  which  lies  opposite  Elis.     The  Zacynthians 
are  colonists  of  the  Peloponnesian  Achaeans,  and  were 


Zacynthus    aujes  of  the  Athenians.     There  were  on  board  the  fleet 

without  re- 

sult. a  thousand  Lacedaemonian  hoplites,  under  the  command 

of  Cnemus  the  Spartan  admiral.   They  disembarked  and 
ravaged  the  greater  part  of  the  country;  but  as  the  in- 
habitants would  not  come  to  terms,  they  sailed  away  home. 
67.          At  the  end  of  the  same  summer,  Aristeus  the  Corin- 
Envoyssent  thian,  the  Lacedaemonian  ambassadors  Aneristus.  Nico- 
Peiopon-     laus  and  Stratodemus,  Timagoras  of  Tegea,  and  Pollis 
to  the  King  of  Argos  who  had  no  public  mission,  were  on  their  way 


to  Asia  in  the  hope  of  persuading  the  King  to  give  them 
and  given  money  and  join  in  the  war.  They  went  first  of  all  to 
Athenians.  Sitalces  son  of  Teres,  in  Thrace,  wishing  if  possible  to 

detach  him  from  the  Athenians,  and  induce  him  to  lead 


Athens  and  an  army  to  the  relief  of  Potidaea,  which  was  still  block- 

put  to  J 

death.         aded  by  Athenian  forces  ;  they  also  wanted  him  to  con- 

vey them  across  the  Hellespont  on  their  intended  journey 
to  Pharnaces,  the  son  of  Pharnabazus,  who  was  to  send 
them  on  to  the  king.  At  the  time  of  their  arrival  two 
Athenian  envoys,  Learchus  the  son  of  Callimachus,  and 
Ameiniades  the  son  of  Philemon,  chanced  to  be  at  the 
court  of  Sitalces  ;  and  they  entreated  his  son  Sadocus; 
who  had  been  made  an  Athenian  citizen  a,  to  deliver  the 
envoys  into  their  hands,  that  they  might  not  find  their 
way  to  the  King  and  so  injure  a  city  which  was  in  some 
degree  his  own.  He  consented,  and,  sending  a  body  of 
men  with  Learchus  and  Ameiniades,  before  they  em- 
barked, as  they  were  on  their  way  through  Thrace  to  the 
vessel  in  which  they  were  going  to  cross  the  Hellespont,- 
seized  them  ;  they  were  then,  in  accordance  with  the 
orders  of  Sadocus,  handed  over  to  the  Athenian  envoys, 
who  conveyed  them  to  Athens.  On  the  very  day  of  their 
arrival  the  Athenians,  fearing  that  Aristeus,  whom  they 
considered  to  be  the  cause  of  all  their  troubles  at  Potidaea 
a  Cp.  ii.  29  fin. 


WAR  BETWEEN  AMBRACIA  AND  AMPHILOCHIA.  139 

B.C.  430.  and  in  Chalcidice,would  do  them  still  further  mischief  if  he  II. 
7'  3'  escaped,  put  them  all  to  death  without  trial  and  without 
hearing  what  they  wanted  to  say;  they  then  threw  their 
bodies  down  precipices.  They  considered  that  they  had  a 
right  to  retaliate  on  the  Lacedaemonians,  who  had  begun 
by  treating  in  the  same  way  the  traders  of  the  Athenians 
and  their  allies  when  they  caught  their  vessels  off  the  coast 
of  Peloponnesus.  For  at  the  commencement  of  the  war,  all 
whom  the  Lacedaemonians  captured  at  sea  were  treated 
by  them  as  enemies  and  indiscriminately  slaughtered, 
whether  they  were  allies  of  the  Athenians  or  neutrals. 

About  the  end  of  the  same  summer  the  Ambraciots,      68. 
with  a  large  Barbarian  force  which  they  had  called  out,  The  Am- 
made  war  upon  the  Amphilochian  Argos  and  upon  Am-  make  war 
philochia.     The  original  cause  of  their  enmity  against  Ss  upon*0" 
the  Argives  was  as  follows  :  —  The  Amphilochian  terri- 


tory  had  been  occupied  and  the  city  founded  by  Amphi-  gives. 
lochus  the  son  of  Amphiaraus,  who  on  returning  home 
after  the  Trojan  War  was  dissatisfied  at  the  state  of 
Argos.  He  fixed  the  site  on  the  shore  of  the  Ambra- 
cian  Gulf,  and  called  the  new  city  by  the  name  of  his 
native  place  ;  it  was  the  greatest  city  in  that  region,  and 
its  inhabitants  were  the  most  powerful  community. 
Many  generations  afterwards,  these  Amphilochians  in 
a  time  of  distress  invited  their  neighbours  the  Ambraciots 
to  join  in  the  settlement,  and  from  them  they  first  learned 
the  Hellenic  language  which  they  now  speak  ;  the  other 
Amphilochians  are  Barbarians.  After  a  while  the  Ambra- 
ciots drove  out  the  Amphilochian  Argives  and  themselves 
took  possession  of  the  city.  The  expelled  Amphilochians 
placed  themselves  under  the  protection  of  the  Acarna- 
nians,  and  both  together  called  in  the  Athenians,  who 
sent  them  a  fleet  of  thirty  ships  under  the  command  of 
Phormio.  When  Phormio  arrived,  they  stormed  Argos, 
and  sold  the  Ambraciots  into  slavery;  and  the  Amphi- 
lochians and  Acarnanians  dwelt  together  in  the  place. 
The  alliance  between  the  Acarnanians  and  Athenians 
then  first  began.  The  hatred  of  the  Ambraciots  towards 


140  SURRENDER    OF   POTIDAEA. 

II.       the  Amphilochian  Argives  commenced  with  the  enslave-  B.C.  430. 
ment   of   their   countrymen  ;   and    now   when  the   war  ° 
offered  an  opportunity  they  invaded  their  territory,  ac- 
companied by  the  Chaonians  and  some  others   of  the 
neighbouring  Barbarians.     They  came  as  far  as  Argos 
and  made  themselves  masters  of  the  country;  but  not 
being  able  to  take  the  city  by  assault  they  returned, 
and  the  several  tribes  dispersed  to  their  own  homes. 
Such  were  the  events  of  the  summer. 

69.  In  the  following  winter   the  Athenians  sent  twenty 
Phormio  at  ships  on  an  expedition  round  Peloponnesus.    These  were 

Naupactus.  . 

Meiesander  placed  under  the  command  of  Phormio,  who,  stationing 
tea  tribute  himself  at  Naupactus,  guarded  the  straits  and  prevented 
and'ca.ria  an^  one  ^rom  sailing  either  out  of  or  into  Corinth  and 
is  defeated  the  Crisaean  Gulf.  Six  other  vessels  were  sent  to  collect 

and  slain. 

the  tribute  in  Lycia  and  Cana  ;  they  were  under  the 
command  of  Meiesander,  who  was  to  see  that  Pelopon- 
nesian  privateers  did  not  establish  themselves  in  those 
parts,  and  damage  merchant  vessels  coming  from  Phaselis 
and  Phoenicia  and  all  that  region.  But  he,  going  up  the 
country  into  Lycia  with  an  army  composed  of  Athenians 
taken  from  the  crews  and  of  allied  troops,  was  defeated, 
and  himself  and  a  part  of  his  forces  slain. 

70.  In  the  same  winter  the  Potidaeans,  who  were  still  block- 
The  Poti-     aded,  found  themselves  unable  to  hold  out  ;  for  the  Pelo^ 

daeans  are  .     •  .  .  r  \      •         1-1  i         i        A    i        • 

compelled    ponnesian  invasions  of  Attica  did  not  make  the  Athenians 


withdraw  ;  and  they  had  no  more  food.     When  they  had 
The  Athe     suffered  every  sort  of  extremity,  even  to  the  eating  of 
mans  blame  human  flesh,  they  entered  into  communications  with  the 
raisfor        Athenian   generals,    Xenophon    the    son    of   Euripides, 
termsgei  y  Hestiodorus  the  son  of  Aristocleides,  and  Phanomachus 
the  son  of  Callimachus,  to  whom  the  siege  had  been  en- 
trusted.    They,  seeing  that  the  army  was  suffering  from 
the  exposed  situation,  and  considering  that  the  city  had 
already  spent  two  thousand  talents  a  on  the  siege,  ac- 
cepted the  terms  proposed.     The  Potidaeans,  with  their 
wives  and  their  children,  and  likewise  the  foreign  troopsb, 
a  ,£480,000.  b  Cp.  i.  60. 


THE  PELOPONNESIANS  ATTACK  PLATAEA.    141 

B.C.  430.  were  to  come  out  of  the  city,  the  men  with  one  garment,  II. 
the  women  with  two,  and  they  were  allowed  a  certain  fixed 
sum  of  money  for  their  journey.  So  they  came  out  under 
a  safe-conduct,  and  went  into  Chalcidice,  or  wherever 
they  could  find  a  home.  But  the  Athenians  blamed 
the  generals  for  coming  to  terms  without  their  authority, 
thinking  that  they  could  have  made  the  city  surrender  at 
discretion.  Soon  afterwards  they  sent  thither  colonists 
of  their  own.  Such  were  the  events  of  the  winter.  And 
so  ended  the  second  year  in  the  Peloponnesian  War  of 
which  Thucydides  wrote  the  history. 

B.C.  429.      In  the  following  summer  the  Peloponnesians  and  the      71. 
7'  4>  allies  under  the   command   of  Archidamus  the  son   of  Expedition 
Zeuxidamus,   the   Lacedaemonian   king,  instead   of  in-  Peiopon- 
vading   Attica,    made   an   expedition    against    Plataea.  under  Ar- 
There    he    encamped    and    was    about    to    ravage    the 
country,  when  the  Plataeans  sent  envoys  to  him  bearing 
the  following  message  : — 

'  Archidamus,   and    you    Lacedaemonians,  in  making  Protest 
war   upon    Plataea   you   are  acting  unjustly,   and  in  a  Plataeans. 
manner  unworthy  of  yourselves  and  of  your  ancestors.  Xou  a.re 
Pausanias  the  son  of  Cleombrotus,  the  Lacedaemonian,  the  promise 
when  he  and  such  Hellenes  as  were  willing  to  share  the 
danger  with  him  fought  a  battle  in  our  land  and  liberated 
Hellas  from  the  Persian,  offered  up  sacrifice  in  the  Agora  us  after  the 
of  Plataea  to   Zeus  the  God  of  Freedom,  and  in   the  Plataea. 
presence  of  all  the  confederates  then  and  there  restored 
to  the  Plataeans  their  country  and  city  to  be  henceforth 
independent;  no  man  was  to  make  unjust  war  upon  them 
at  any  time  or  to  seek  to  enslave  them  ;  and  if  they  were 
attacked,  the  allies  who  were  present  promised  that  they 
would  defend  them  to  the  utmost  of  their  power.    These 
privileges  your  fathers  granted  to  us  as  a  reward  for  the 
courage  and  devotion  which  we  displayed  in  that  time  of 
danger.     But  you  are  acting  in  an  opposite  spirit ;  for 
you  have  joined  the  Thebans,  our  worst  enemies,  and 
have  come  hither  to  enslave  us.     Wherefore,  calling  to 
witness  the  Gods  to  whom  we  all  then  swore,  and  also 


J43       ARCHIDAMUS   AND    THE   PLATAEANS. 


II. 


72. 

Archida- 

mus  offers 

peace  if 
eiSer  join 


confederacy 

or  remain 

neutral. 


ThePia- 

thatntheyply 


Athenians, 
that  they 


Archida- 
™ks  them 


the  end  of 


the  Gods  of  your  race  and  the  Gods  who  dwell  in  our  B.C.  429. 
country,  we  bid  you  do  no  harm  to  the  land  of  Plataea.  O1<  8?'  4' 
Do  not  violate  your  oaths,  but  allow  the  Plataeans  to  be 
independent,  and  to  enjoy  the  rights  which  Pausanias 
granted  to  them.' 

To  this  appeal  Archidamus  rejoined  :  — 

«  What  you  say,  Plataeans,  is  just,  but  your  acts  should 

*      . 

correspond  to  your  words.  Enjoy  the  independence 
which  Pausanias  granted  to  you,  and  assist  us  in  freeing 
^e  ot^er  Hellenes  who  were  your  sworn  confederates  in 
that  time  of  danger  and  are  now  in  subjection  to  the 

.  .         . 

Athenians.  With  a  view  to  the  emancipation  of  them 
and  of  the  other  subject  states,  this  great  war  has  been 
undertaken  and  all  these  preparations  made.  It  would 
be  best  for  you  to  join  with  us,  and  observe  the  oaths 
yourselves  which  you  would  have  us  observe.  But  if  you 
prefer  to  be  neutral,  a  course  which  we  have  already  once 
proposed  to  you,  retain  possession  of  your  lands,  and  re- 
ceive both  sides  in  peace,  but  neither  for  the  purposes  of 
war;  and  we  shall  be  satisfied.' 

The  Plataean  ambassadors  then  returned  to  the  city 
and  reported  these  words  of  Archidamus  to  the  people, 
W^°  mac^e  answer  that  they  could  not  do  what  they  were 
asked  without  the  sanction  of  the  Athenians,  in  whose 
power  they  had  left  their  wives  and  children,  and  that 
the7  also  feared  for  the  very  existence  of  their  state. 
When  the  Lacedaemonians  were  gone  the  Athenians 
might  come  and  not  allow  them  to  carry  out  the  treaty; 
or  the  Thebans,  who  would  be  included  in  the  clause 
requiring  them  'to  receive  both  sides/  might  again 
attempt  to  seize  their  town.  To  this  Archidamus, 
wanting  to  reassure  them,  made  the  following  answer:  — 

'  Then  deliver  over  your  city  and  houses  to  the  Lace- 
daemonians  ;  mark  the  boundaries  of  your  land,  and 
num^er  y°ur  fruit-trees  and  anything  else  which  can  be 
counted.  Go  yourselves  whithersoever  you  please,  while 
the  war  lasts,  and  on  the  return  of  peace  we  will  give 
back  to  you  all  that  we  have  received.  Until  then  we 


THE  PLATAEANS  WILL  NOT  DESERT  ATHENS.  143 

B.C.  429.  will  hold  your  property  in  trust,  and  will  cultivate  your       II. 
'  ground,  paying  you  such  a  rent  as  will  content  you.' 

Upon  hearing  these  words  the  envoys  again  returned       73. 
into  the  city,  and,  after  holding  a  consultation  with  the  The  Pla- 
people,  told  Archidamus  that  they  wished  first  to  com-  taining  per- 
municate  his  proposals  to  the  Athenians,  and  if  they  ™  nsS"  the 
could  get  their  consent  they  would  do  as  he  advised  ;  in  %£^°*' 
the  meantime  they  desired  him  to  make  a  truce  with  couraged 

by  them  to 

them,  and  not  to  ravage  their  land.  So  he  made  a  truce  resist. 
which  allowed  sufficient  time  for  their  ambassadors  to 
return  from  Athens  ;  and  meanwhile  he  spared  their 
land.  The  Plataean  envoys  came  to  Athens,  and  after 
advising  with  the  Athenians  they  brought  back  the 
following  message  to  their  fellow-citizens  :  —  '  Plataeans, 
the  Athenians  say  that  never  at  any  time  since  you  first 
became  their  alliesa  have  they  suffered  any  one  to  do  you 
wrong,  and  that  they  will  not  forsake  you  now,  but  will 
assist  you  to  the  utmost  of  their  power  ;  and  they  conjure 
you,  by  the  oaths  which  your  fathers  swore,  not  to  forsake 
the  Athenian  alliance.' 

When  the  answer  came,  the  Plataeans  resolved  not  to      74» 
desert  the  Athenians,  but  patiently  to  look  on,  if  they  They  reply 

tlint  tncy 

must,  while  the  Lacedaemonians  wasted  their  country,  cannot 
and  to  endure  the  worst.     No  one  was  henceforward  to 


leave  the  town,  but  answer  was  to  be  made  from  the 
walls  that  they  could  not  possibly  consent  to  the  Lace- 
daemonian proposal.  King  Archidamus,  as  soon  as  he 
received  the  reply,  before  proceeding  to  action,  fell  to 
calling  upon  the  Gods  and  heroes  of  the  country  in  the 
following  words  :  — 

'  O  ye  Gods  and  heroes  who  possess  the  land  of  Plataea,  Archida- 
be  our  witnesses  that  our  invasion  of  this  land  in  which  peais  to  the 
our  fathers  prayed  to  you  before  they  conquered   the  G 
Persians,  and  which  you  made  a  field  of  victory  to  the 
Hellenes,  has  thus  far  been  justified,  for  the  Plataeans 
first  deserted  the  alliance  ;    and  that  if  we  go  further 
we  shall  be  guilty  of  no  crime,  for  we  have  again  and 
a  Herod,  vi.  108. 


144  SIEGE    OF  PLATAEA. 

II.       again   made   them   fair   proposals   and   they   have   not  -B.C.  429. 
listened  to  us.     Be  gracious  to  us  and  grant  that  the 
real  authors  of  the  iniquity  may  be  punished,  and  that 
they  may  obtain  revenge  who  lawfully  seek  it.' 

75.          After  this  appeal  to  the  Gods  he  began  military  opera- 
The  siege    tions.    In  the  first  place,  the  soldiers  felled  the  fruit-trees 

operations 

begin  :  the  and  surrounded  the  city  with  a  palisade,  that  henceforth 
nesians1"  n°  one  might  get  out.  They  then  began  to  raise  a 
mound  mound  against  it,  thinking  that  with  so  large  an  army 
which  the  at  work  this  would  be  the  speediest  way  of  taking  the 
counteract  place.  So  they  cut  timber  from  Cithaeron  and  built  on 
thVheight  either  side  of  the  intended  mound  a  frame  of  logs  placed 
of  fhSrwaii  cross-wise  in  order  that  the  earth  might  not  scatter. 
Thither  they  carried  wood,  stones,  earth,  and  anything 


away  earth  which  would  fill  up  the  vacant  space.  They  continued 
mound.6  raising  the  mound  seventy  days  and  seventy  nights 
without  intermission  ;  the  army  was  divided  into  relays, 
and  one  party  worked  while  the  other  slept  and  ate. 
The  Lacedaemonian  officers  who  commanded  the  con- 
tingents of  the  allies  stood  over  them  and  kept  them  at 
work.  The  Plataeans,  seeing  the  mound  rising,  con- 
structed a  wooden  frame,  which  they  set  upon  the  top  of 
their  own  wall  opposite  the  mound  ;  in  this  they  inserted 
bricks,  which  they  took  from  the  neighbouring  houses  ; 
the  wood  served  to  strengthen  and  bind  the  structure 
together  as  it  increased  in  height;  they  also  hung  cur- 
tains of  skins  and  hides  in  front  ;  these  were  designed 
to  protect  the  wood-work  and  the  workers,  and  shield 
them  against  blazing  arrows.  The  wooden  wall  rose 
high,  but  the  mound  rose  quickly  too.  Then  the  Pla- 
taeans had  a  new  device  ;  —  they  made  a  hole  in  that 
part  of  the  wall  against  which  the  mound  .  pressed  and 
drew  in  the  earth. 

76.  The  Peloponnesians  discovered  what  they  were  doing, 
and  threw  into  the  gap  clay  packed  in  wattles  of  reed, 
which  would  not  scatter  and  give  way  like  the  loose 
earth.  Whereupon  the  Plataeans,  baffled  in  one  plan, 
resorted  to  another.  Calculating  the  direction,  they  dug 


SIEGE    OF  PLATAEA.  145 

B.C.  429.  a  mine  from  the  city  to  the  mound  and  again  drew  the 
'  87'  4'  earth  inward.     For  a  long  time  their  assailants  did  not 

find  them  out,  and  so  what  the  Peloponnesians  threw  on  Jeated,  the 

Plataeans 

was  of  little  use,  since  the  mound  was  always  being  drawn  build  a 
off  below  and  settling  into  the  vacant  space.     But  in  iine  of  de- 


spite of  all  their  efforts,  the  Plataeans  were  afraid  that 
their  numbers  would  never  hold  out  against  so  great  an 
army  ;  and  they  devised  yet  another  expedient.     They  crescent. 
left  off  working  at  the  great  building  opposite  the  mound, 
and  beginning  at  both  ends,  where  the  city  wall  returned 
to  its  original  lower  height,  they  built  an  inner  wall  pro- 
jecting inwards  in  the  shape  of  a  crescent,  that  if  the  first 
wall  were  taken  the  other  might  still  be  defensible.    The 
enemy  would  be  obliged  to  carry  the  mound  right  up 
to  it,  and  as  they  advanced  inwards  would  have  their 
trouble  all  over  again,  and  be  exposed  to  missiles  on  both 
flanks.     While  the  mound  was  rising  the  Peloponnesians 
brought   battering  engines  up  to  the  wall  ;    one  which 
was  moved  forward  on  the  mound  itself  shook  a  great 
part  of  the  raised  building,  to  the  terror  of  the  Plataeans. 
They  brought  up  others  too  at  other  points  of  the  wall. 
But  the  Plataeans  dropped  nooses  over  the  ends  of  these  By  ingeni- 
engines  and  drew  them  up;  they  also  let  down  huge  they  disable 
beams  suspended  at  each  end  by  long  iron  chains  from  jjj|  rams^f 
two  poles  leaning  on  the  wall   and  projecting   over  it.  the  enemy. 
These  beams  they  drew  up  at  right  angles  to  the  ad- 
vancing battering  ram,  and  whenever  at  any  point  it 
was  about  to  attack  them  they  slackened  their  hold  of 
the  chains  and  let  go  the  beam,  which  fell  with  great 
force  and  snapped  off  the  head  of  the  ram. 

At    length    the    Peloponnesians,    finding    that    their      77. 
engines  were  useless,  and  that  the  new  wall  was  rising  The  Peio- 

,  ponnesians 

opposite  to  the  mound,  and  perceiving  that  they  could  nearly  sue- 
not   without    more   formidable    means    of   attack   hope  sStingthe 
to   take   the  city,   made   preparations   for   a   blockade.  city  on  fire' 
But  first  of  all  they  resolved  to  try  whether,  the  wind 
favouring,  the  place,  which  was   but  small,  could  not 
be  set  on  fire  ;    they  were   anxious  not   to   incur  the 


146  SIEGE    OF  PLATAEA. 

II.  expense  of  a  regular  siege,  and  devised  all  sorts  of  plans  B.C.  429. 
in  order  to  avoid  it.  So  they  brought  faggots  and 
threw  them  down  from  the  mound  along  the  space 
between  it  and  the  wall,  which  was  soon  filled  up 
when  so  many  hands  were  at  work  ;  then  they  threw 
more  faggots  one  upon  another  into  the  city  as  far  as 
they  could  reach  from  the  top  of  the  mound,  and  casting 
in  lighted  brands  with  brimstone  and  pitch,  set  them  all 
on  fire.  A  flame  arose  of  which  the  like  had  never  before 
been  made  by  the  hand  of  man  ;  I  am  not  speaking  of 
fires  in  the  mountains,  when  the  woods  have  sponta- 
neously blazed  up  from  the  action  of  the  wind  and 
mutual  attrition.  There  was  a  great  conflagration,  and 
the  Plataeans,  who  had  thus  far  escaped,  were  all  but 
destroyed;  a  considerable  part  of  the  town  was  un- 
approachable, and  if  a  wind  had  come  on  and  carried 
the  flame  that  way,  as  the  enemy  hoped,  they  could  not 
have  been  saved.  It  is  said  that  there  was  also  a  violent 
storm  of  thunder  and  rain,  which  quenched  the  flames 
and  put.  an  end  to  the  danger. 

78.  The  Peloponnesians,  having  failed  in  this,  as  in  their 
Failing  in  former  attempts,  sent  away  a  part  of  their  army  but 
tempt,  they  retained  the  resta,  and  dividing  the  task  among  the 
double  wail  contingents  of  the  several  cities,  surrounded  Plataea  with 
round  the  a  wau.  Trenches,  out  of  which  they  took  clay  for  the 

city  and 

retire,  leav-  bricks,  were  formed  both  on  the  inner  and  the  outer  side 


of  the  walU  About  the  rising  of  Arcturusb  all  was  com- 
andthe  pleted.  They  then  drew  off  their  army,  leaving  a  guard 
Boeotians.  On  one  half  of  the  wall,  while  the  other  half  was  guarded 
by  the  Boeotians  ;  the  disbanded  troops  returned  to  their 
homes.  The  Plataeans  had  already  conveyed  to  Athens0 
their  wives,  children,  and  old  men,  with  the  rest  of  their 
unserviceable  population.  Those  who  remained  during 
the  siege  were  four  hundred  Plataeans,  eighty  Athenians, 
and  a  hundred  and  ten  women  to  make  bread.  These 
were  their  exact  numbers  when  the  siege  began.  There 


a  Retaining  in  the  text  TO  Se 
b  i.  e.  about  the  middle  of  September.  c  ii.  6  fin. 


EXPEDITION  AGAINST  CHALCID1CE.         147 

B.C.  429.  was  no  one  else,  slave  or  freeman,  within  the  walls.    The       II. 
7'  4'  blockade  of  Plataea  was  now  complete. 

During  the  same  summer,  when  the  corn  was  in  full       79» 
ear,  and  about  the  time  of  the  attack  on  Plataea,  the 


Athenians  sent  an  expedition  against  the  Chalcidians  of  Spartoius. 
Thrace  and  against  the  Bottiaeans,  consisting  of  two  ment  takes 
thousand  heavy-armed  troops  of  their  own  and  two  £hich'  they 
hundred  horsemen  under  the  command  of  Xenophon 


the  son  of  Euripides,  and  two  others.     They  came  close  but  Chaici- 
up  to  the  Bottian  Spartoius  and  destroyed  the  crops,  forcements 
They  expected  that  the  place  would  be  induced  to  yield  engage?'  * 
to  them  by  a  party  within  the  walls.     But  the  opposite  ™jjewed 
party  sent   to  Olynthus   and   obtained   from  thence   a  and  they 

J  are  defeated 

garrison,  partly  composed  of  hoplites,  which  sallied  out  of  with  loss. 
Spartoius  and  engaged  with  the  Athenians  under  the  walls 
of  the  town.  The  Chalcidian  hoplites  and  with  them 
certain  auxiliaries  were  defeated  and  retreated  into  Spar- 
toius, but  their  cavalry  and  light-armed  troops  had  the 
advantage  over  those  of  the  Athenians.  They  were 
assisted  by  a  few  targeteers,  who  came  from  the  district 
called  Crusis.  The  engagement  was  scarcely  over  when 
another  body  of  targeteers  from  Olynthus  came  up  to 
their  aid.  Encouraged  .by  the  reinforcement  and  their 
previous  success,  and  supported  by  the  Chalcidian  horse 
and  the  newly-arrived  troops,  the  light-armed  again 
attacked  the  Athenians,  who  began  to  fall  back  upon 
the  two  companies  which  they  had  left  with  their 
baggage  :  as  often  as  the  Athenians  charged,  the  enemy 
retired  ;  but  when  the  Athenians  continued  their  retreat, 
they  pressed  upon  them  and  hurled  darts  at  them.  The 
Chalcidian  cavalry  too  rode  up,  and  wherever  they  pleased 
charged  the  Athenians,  who  now  fled  utterly  disconcerted 
and  were  pursued  to  a  considerable  distance.  At  length 
they  escaped  to  Potidaea,  and  having  recovered  their 
dead  under  a  flag  of  truce,  returned  to  Athens  with  the 
survivors  of  their  army,  out  of  which  they  had  lost  four 
hundred  and  thirty  men  and  all  their  generals.  The 
Chalcidians  and  Bottiaeans,  having  set  up  a  trophy  and 

L  2 


148   THE  PELOPONNESIANS  INVADE  ACARNANIA. 


II.       carried  off  their  dead,  disbanded  and  dispersed  to  their  B.C.  429. 
several  cities. 

80.  In  the  same  summer,  not  long  afterwards,  the  Ambra- 

ciots  and  Chaonians,  designing  to  subjugate  the  whole  of 
Acarnania  and  detach  it  from  the  Athenian  alliance,  per- 


The  Am- 

braciots 

persuade 

daemonians  suaded  the  Lacedaemonians  to  equip  a  fleet  out  of  the 
lamfand      confederate  forces,  and  to  send  into  that  region  a  thousand 

sea  force       hopliteS. 
under  Cne-         A 

mus  against  join  with  them  and  attack  the  enemy  both  by  sea  and 
Disembark-  land,  the  Acarnanians  on  the  sea-coast  would  be  unable 

ing  his 


They  said  that  if  the  Lacedaemonians  would 


is  joined  by  Acarnania. 

a  number  of 

barbarous 

tribes  and 

marches 

towards 

Stratus. 


troops3  he  to  assist  trie  inland  tribes,  and  they  might  easily  conquer 
Zacynthus  and  Cephallenia  would  then  fall 
into  their  hands,  and  the  Athenian  fleet  would  not  so 
easily  sail  round  Peloponnesus.  They  might  even  hope 
to  take  Naupactus.  The  Lacedaemonians  agreed,  and 
at  once  despatched  Cnemus,  who  was  still  admiral  a,  with 
the  thousand  hoplites  in  a  few  ships ;  they  ordered  the  rest 
of  the  allied  navy  to  get  ready  and  at  once  sail  to  Leucas. 
The  interests  of  the  Ambraciots  were  zealously  supported 
by  Corinth,  their  mother  city.  The  fleet  which  was  to 
come  from  Corinth,  Sicyon,  and  the  adjacent  places  was 
long  in  preparation  ;  but  the  contingent  from  Leucas, 
Anactorium,  and  Ambracia  was  soon  equipped,  and 
waited  at  Leucas.  Undiscovered  by  Phormio  the  com- 
mander of  the  twenty  Athenian  ships  which  were  keep- 
ing guard  at  Naupactus,  Cnemus  and  his  thousand 
hoplites  crossed  the  sea  and  began  to  make  preparations 
for  the  land  expedition.  Of  Hellenes  he  had  in  his 
army  Ambraciots,  Leucadians,  Anactorians,  and  the 
thousand  Peloponnesians  whom  he  brought  with  him, — 
of  Barbarians  a  thousand  Chaonians,  who,  having  no 
king,  were  led  by  Photius  and  Nicanor,  both  of  the 
governing  family  and  holding  the  presidency  for  a  year. 
With  the  Chaonians  came  the  Thesprotians,  who,  like 
them,  have  no  king.  A  Molossian  and  Atintanian  force 
was  led  by  Sabylinthus,  the  guardian  of  Tharypas  the 
king,  who  was  still  a  minor ;  the  Paravaeans  were  led  by 
a  Cp.  ii.  66. 


BATTLE   OF  STRATUS.  149 

6.^429.  their  king  Oroedus,  and  were  accompanied  by  a  thousand  II. 
'  Orestians  placed  at  the  disposal  of  Oroedus  by  their  king 
Antiochus.  Perdiccas  also,  unknown  to  the  Athenians, 
sent  a  thousand  Macedonians,  who  arrived  too  late.  With 
this  army  Cnemus,  not  waiting  for  the  ships  from  Corinthj 
began  his  march.  They  passed  through  the  Argive 
territory  and  plundered  Limnaea,  an  unwalled  village. 
At  length  they  approached  Stratus,  which  is  the  largest 
city  in  Acarnania,  thinking  that,  if  they  could  take  it, 
the  other  places  would  soon  come  over  to  them. 

The  Acarnanians,  seeing  that  a  great  army  had  invaded      8  1  . 
their  territory,  and  that  the  enemy  was  threatening  them  The.  Acar~ 
by  sea  as  well  as  by  land,  did  not  attempt  any  united  being  re- 
action, but  guarded  their  several  districts,  and  sent  to  phormio,  y 
Phormio  for  aid.     He  replied  that  a  fleet  of  the  enemy 


was  about  to  sail  from  Corinth,  and  that  he  could  not  to  the  <J.e- 

fence  of 

leave  Naupactus  unguarded.    Meanwhile  the  Peloponne-  their  cities. 
sians  and  their  allies  marched  in  three  divisions  towards  marches  on. 
Stratus,  intending  to  encamp  near  and  try  negotiations  ; 


if  these  failed,  they  would  take  stronger  measures  and       le 
assault  the  wall.     The  Chaonians  and  the  other  Barba-  Hellenes 
rians  advanced  in  the  centre  ;  on  the  right  wing  were  the  the  Cha'o- 
Leucadians,  Anactorians,  and  their  auxiliaries  ;   on  the  SJgfoi^rd 
left  was  Cnemus  with  the  Peloponnesians  and  Ambra-  attempt  to 

storm  the 

ciots.     The  three  divisions  were  a  long  way  apart,  and  place,  but 

•    1  ^     c  it  m       TT    11  fall  into  an 

at  times  not  even  in  sight  of  one  another.  The  Hellenic  ambush 
troops  maintained  order  on  the  march  and  kept  a  look 
out,  until  at  length  they  found  a  suitable  place  in  which 
to  encamp  ;  the  Chaonians,  confident  in  themselves,  and 
having  a  great  military  reputation  in  that  part  of  the 
country,  would  not  stop  to  encamp,  but  they  and  the 
other  Barbarians  rushed  on  at  full  speed,  hoping  to  take 
the  place  by  storm  and  appropriate  to  themselves  the 
glory  of  the  action.  The  Stratians  perceiving  their 
approach  in  time,  and  thinking  that,  if  they  could  over- 
come them  before  the  others  arrived,  the  Hellenic  forces 
would  not  be  so  ready  to  attack  them,  set  ambuscades 
near  the  city.  When  they  were  quite  close,  the  troops 


150 


SEA-FIGHT  NEAR  NAUPACTUS. 


II. 


82. 

Cnemus 

withdraws 

his  troops 


home. 


83. 


The  fleet  of 
ponnesians 

irrtendeofto 
support 

Cnemus  is 

compelled 
by  Phor- 


came  out  of  the  city  and  from  the  ambuscades  and  fell  B.C.  429. 
upon  them  hand  to  hand.  Whereupon  the  Chaonians 
were  seized  with  a  panic  and  many  of  them  perished  ; 
the  other  Barbarians,  seeing  them  give  way,  no  longer 
stood  their  ground,  but  took  to  flight.  Neither  of  the 
Hellenic  divisions  knew  of  the  battle  ;  the  Chaonians 
were  far  in  advance  of  them,  and  were  thought  to  have 
hurried  on  because  they  wanted  to  choose  a  place  for 
their  camp.  At  length  the  Barbarians  in  their  flight 
broke  in  upon  their  lines  ;  they  received  them,  and  the 
two  divisions  uniting  during  that  day  remained  where 
they  were,  the  men  of  Stratus  not  coming  to  close 
quarters  with  them,  because  the  other  Acarnanians  had 
not  as  yet  arrived,  but  slinging  at  them  from  a  distance 
and  distressing  them  greatly.  For  they  could  not  move 
a  step  without  their  armour.  Now  the  Acarnanians  are 
famous  for  their  skill  in  slinging. 

When  night  came  on,  Cnemus  withdrew  his  army  in 
haste  to  the  river  Anapus,  which  is  rather  more  than 

.  irn«t 

nine  miles  from  Stratus,  and  on  the  following  day  car- 
*^&  off  his  dead  under  a  flag  of  truce.  The  people  of 
Oeniadae  were  friendly  and  had  joined  him  ;  to  their  city 
therefore  he  retreated  before  the  Acarnanians  had  col- 
lected their  forces.  From  Oeniadae  all  the  Peloponnesian 
troops  returned  home.  The  Stratians  erected  a  trophy 
of  the  battle  in  which  they  had  defeated  the  Barbarians. 
The  fleet  from  Corinth  and  the  other  allied  cities  on 
the  Crisaean  Gulf,  which  was  intended  to  support  Cnemus 
and  to  prevent  the  Acarnanians  on  the  sea-coast  from 
assisting  their  friends  in  the  interior  of  the  country, 
never  arrived,  but  was  compelled,  almost  on  the  day  of 

'  J 

the  battle  of  Stratus,  to  fight  with  Phormio  and  the 
twenty  Athenian  ships  which  were  stationed  at  Nau- 
pactus.  As  they  sailed  by  into  the  open  sea,  Phormio 
was  watching  them,  preferring  to  make  his  attack  outside 
the  gulf.  Now  the  Corinthians  and  their  allies  were  not 
equipped  for  a  naval  engagement,  but  for  the  conveyance 
of  troops  into  Acarnania,  and  they  never  imagined  that 


DEFEAT  OF  THE  PELOPONNESIANS.        151 

B.C.  429.  the  Athenians  with  twenty  ships  would  venture  to  engage  II. 
7'  4'  their  own  forty-seven.  But,  as  they  were  coasting  along 
the  southern  shore,  they  saw  the  Athenian  fleet  following 
their  movements  on  the  northern  ;  they  then  attempted 
to  cross  the  sea  from  Patrae  in  Achaea  to  the  opposite 
continent  in  the  direction  of  Acarnania,  when  they  again 
observed  the  enemy  bearing  down  upon  them  from 
Chalcis  and  the  mouth  of  the  river  Evenus.  They  had 
previously  endeavoured  to  anchor  under  cover  of  night, 
but  had  been  detected.  So  at  last  they  were  compelled 
to  fight  in  the  middle  of  the  channel.  The  ships  were 
commanded  by  generals  of  the  cities  which  had  furnished 
them  ;  the  Corinthian  squadron  by  Machaon,  Isocrates, 
and  Agatharchidas.  The  Peloponnesians  arranged  their  Their  ships 
ships  in  such  a  manner  as  to  make  the  largest  possible  circle. 
circle  without  leaving  an  inlet,  turning  their  prows  out- 
wards and  their  sterns  inwards  ;  within  the  circle  they 
placed  the  smaller  craft  which  accompanied  them,  and 
five  of  their  swiftest  ships  that  they  might  be  close  at 
hand  and  row  out  at  whatever  point  the  enemy  charged 
them. 

The  Athenians  ranged  their  ships  in  a  single  line  and      84. 
sailed  round  and  round  the  Peloponnesian  fleet,  which  The  Athe- 

nians  sail 

they  drove  into  a  narrower  and  narrower  space,  almost  round  and 
touching  as  they  passed,  and  leading  the  crews  to  sup- 
pose  that  they  were  on  the  point  of  charging.     But  they 


had  been  warned  by  Phormio  not  to  begin  until  he  gave  and  throws 

the  enemy  s 

the  signal,  for  he  was  hoping  that  the  enemy  s  ships,  not  vessels  into 


having  the  steadiness  of  an  army  on  land,  would  soon  fall 
into  disorder  and  run  foul  of  one  another  ;  they  would 
be  embarrassed  by  the  small  craft,  and  if  the  usual  ™n  a 

.  .  .  complete 

morning  breeze,  for  which  he  continued  waiting  as  he  victory. 
sailed  round  them,  came  down  from  the  gulf,  they  would 
not  be  able  to  keep  still  for  a  moment.  He  could  attack 
whenever  he  pleased,  because  his  ships  were  better  sailers  ; 
and  he  knew  that  this  would  be  the  right  time.  When 
the  breeze  began  to  blow,  the  ships,  which  were  by  this 
time  crowded  into  a  narrow  space  and  were  distressed 


152        WRATH  OF   THE  LACEDAEMONIANS. 

II.  at  once  by  the  force  of  the  wind  and  by  the  small  craft  B.C.  429. 
which  were  knocking  up  against  them,  fell  into  confusion ; 
ship  dashed  against  ship,  and  they  kept  pushing  one 
another  away  with  long  poles  ;  there  were  cries  of  '  keep 
off'  and  noisy  abuse,  so  that  nothing  could  be  heard 
either  of  the  word  of  command  or  of  the  coxswains'  giving 
the  time  ;  and  the  difficulty  which  unpractised  rowers  had 
in  lifting  their  oars  in  a  heavy  sea  made  the  vessels 
disobedient  to  the  helm.  At  that  moment  Phormio  gave 
the  signal ;  the  Athenians,  falling  upon  the  enemy,  began 
by  sinking  one  of  the  admirals'  vessels,  and  then  where- 
ever  they  went  made  havoc  of  them ;  at  last  such  was 
the  disorder  that  no  one  any  longer  thought  of  resisting, 
but  the  whole  fleet  fled  away  to  Patrae  and  Dyme  in 
Achaea.  The  Athenians  pursued  them,  captured  twelve 
ships,  and  taking  on  board  most  of  their  crews,  sailed 
away  to  Molycreium.  They  set  up  a  trophy  on  Rhium, 
and  having  there  dedicated  a  ship  to  Poseidon,  retired  to 
Naupactus.  The  Peloponnesians  likewise,  with  the  re- 
mainder of  their  fleet,  proceeded  quickly  along  the  coast 
from  Dyme  and  Patrae  to  Cyllene,  where  the  Eleans 
have  their  docks.  Cnemus  with  the  ships  from  Leucas, 
which  should  have  been  joined  by  these,  arrived  after  the 
battle  of  Stratus  at  Cyllene. 

85.  The  Lacedaemonians  at  home  now  sent  to  the  fleet 

The  Lace-  three  commissioners,  Timocrates,  Brasidas,  and  Lyco- 
sen™BrsS-  phron,  to  advise  Cnemus.  He  was  told  that  he  must 
fwo  others  contrive  to  fight  again  and  be  more  successful ;  he  should 
to  advise  not  aHOw  a  few  ships  to  keep  him  off  the  sea.  The 

Cnemus. 

recent  sea-fight  had  been  the  first  attempt  of  the  Lace- 
daemonians, and  they  were  quite  amazed  and  could  not 
imagine  that  their  own  fleet  was  so  inferior  to  that  of  the 
enemy.  They  suspected  that  there  had  been  cowardice, 
not  considering  that  the  Athenians  were  old  sailors  and 
that  they  were  only  beginners a.  So  they  despatched 
the  commissioners  in  a  rage.  On  their  arrival  they  and 
Cnemus  sent  round  to  the  allied  cities  for  ships,  and 
a  Cp.  i.  142. 


PREPARATIONS  FOR  A  SECOND  ENGAGEMENT.  153 

B.C.  429.  equipped  for  action  those  which  were  on  the  spot.    Phor-       II. 
7>  4<  mio   likewise  sent  home   messengers   to  announce  the  The  Athe- 

.    .  1,1  A-  •    r  nians  send 

victory,  and  at  the  same  time  to  inform  the  Athenians  reinforce- 
of  the  preparations  which  the  enemy  were  making.     He 


told  them  to  send  him  immediately  as  large  a  reinforce-  b"t  order 

J  them  to  go 

ment  as  possible,  for  he  might  have  to  fight  any  day.  to  Crete 
They  sent  him  twenty  ships,  but  ordered  the  commander 
of  them  to  go  to  Crete  first  ;  for  Nicias  of  Gortys  in 
Crete,  who  was  the  proxenus  of  the  Athenians,  had 
induced  them  to  send  a  fleet  against  Cydonia,  a  hostile 
town  which  he  promised  to  reduce.  But  he  really 
invited  them  to  please  the  Polichnitae,  who  are  neigh- 
bours of  the  Cydonians.  So  the  Athenian  commander 
took  the  ships,  went  to  Crete,  and  joined  the  Polichnitae 
in  ravaging  the  lands  of  the  Cydonians  ;  there,  owing  to 
contrary  winds  and  bad  weather,  a  considerable  time 
was  wasted. 

While  the  Athenians  were  detained  in  Crete  the  Pelo-      86. 
ponnesians  at  Cyllene,  equipped  for  a  naval  engagement,  The  Peio- 
coasted  along  to  Panormus  in  Achaia,  whither  the  Pelo-  andnphoT-S 


ponnesian   army   had   gone   to   co-operate   with    them. 
Phormio  also  coasted  along  to  the  Molycreian  Rhium  and  l^1  t°ppo~ 
anchored  outside  the  gulf  with  the  twenty  ships  which  each  other, 

i       i    r         1  j.    •       A.*  •  *r**m'          outside  the 

had  fought  in  the  previous  engagement.  This  Rhium  Crisaean 
was  friendly  to  the  Athenians  ;'  there  is  another  Rhium  Gul  ' 
on  the  opposite  coast  in  Peloponnesus  ;  the  space  between 
them,  which  is  rather  less  than  a  mile,  forms  the  mouth 
of  the  Crisaean  Gulf.  When  the  Peloponnesians  saw 
that  the  Athenians  had  come  to  anchor,  they  likewise 
anchored  with  seventy-seven  ships  at  the  Rhium  which 
is  in  Achaia,  not  far  from  Panormus  where  their  land 
forces  were  stationed.  For  six  or  seven  days  the  two 
fleets  lay  opposite  one  another,  and  were  busy  in  prac- 
tising and  getting  ready  for  the  engagement—  the  one 
resolved  not  to  sail  into  the  open  sea,  fearing  a  recurrence 
of  their  disaster,  the  other  not  to  sail  into  the  strait, 
because  the  confined  space  was  favourable  to  their 
enemies.  At  length  Cnemus,  Brasidas,  and  the  other 


154  SPEECH  OF  PELOPONNESIAN  COMMANDERS. 

II.       Peloponnesian  generals  determined  to  bring  on  an  en-  B.C.  429. 
gagement  at  once,  and  not  wait  until  the  Athenians  too  °L  8?'  4' 
received  their  reinforcements.     So  they  assembled  their 
soldiers  and,  seeing  that  they  were  generally  dispirited 
at  their  former  defeat  and  reluctant  to  fight,  encouraged 
them  in  the  following  words  :  — 

87.  'The  late  sea-fight,  Peloponnesians,  may  have  made 
You  are  some  of  you  anxious  about  the  one  which  is  impending, 
our  late  but  it  really  affords  no  just  ground  for  alarm.  In  that 
But  you  battle  we  \vere,  as  you  know,  ill-prepared,  and  our  whole 
unrre-hen  expedition  had  a  military  and  not  a  naval  object.  For- 
pared.  tune  was  in  many  ways  unpropitious  to  us,  and  this 
superior  being  our  first  sea-fight  we  may  possibly  have  suffered 
a  little  from  inexperience.  The  defeat  which  ensued 


superior  was  not  t^ie  rQSU^  of  cowardice  ;  nor  should  the  un- 
skiii,  for  conquerable  quality  which  is  inherent  in  our  minds,  and 

without  n  . 

courage  refuses  to  acknowledge  the  victory  of  mere  force,  be 
useless.  depressed  by  the  accident  of  the  event.  For  though 
our  f<art  fortune  may  sometimes  bring  disaster,  yet  the  spirit  of 
win  arrange  a  brave  man  is  always  the  same,  and  while  he  retains  his 

the  attack  it          •  •  i_ 

better.  But  courage  he  will  never  allow  inexperience  to  be  an  excuse 


for  misbehaviour.  And  whatever  be  your  own  inex- 
duty-  perience,  it  is  more  than  compensated  by  your  superiority 
in  valour.  The  skill  of  your  enemies  which  you  so  greatly 
dread,  if  united  with  courage,  may  be  able  in  the  moment 
of  danger  to  remember  and  execute  the  lesson  which  it 
has  learned,  but  without  courage  no  skill  can  do  anything 
at  such  a  time.  For  fear  makes  men  forget,  and  skill 
which  cannot  fight  is  useless.  And  therefore  against 
their  greater  skill  set  your  own  greater  valour,  and 
against  the  defeat  which  so  alarms  you  set  the  fact  that 
you  were  unprepared.  But  now  you  have  a  larger  fleet  ; 
this  turns  the  balance  in  your  favour  ;  and  you  will  fight 
close  to  a  friendly  shore  under  the  protection  of  heavy- 
armed  troops.  Victory  is  generally  on  the  side  of  those 
who  are  more  numerous  and  better  equipped.  So  that 
we  have  absolutely  no  reason  for  anticipating  failure. 
Even  our  mistakes  will  be  an  additional  advantage, 


SPEECH   OF  PHORMIO.  155 

B.C.  429.  because  they  will  be  a  lesson  to  us.  Be  of  good  courage,  II. 
7>  4'  then,  and  let  every  one  of  you,  pilot  or  sailor,  do  his 
own  duty  and  maintain  the  post  assigned  to  him.  We 
will  order  the  attack  rather  better  than  your  old  com- 
manders, and  so  give  nobody  an  excuse  for  cowardice. 
But,  if  any  one  should  be  inclined  to  waver,  he  shall  be 
punished  as  he  deserves,  while  the  brave  shall  be  honoured 
with  the  due  rewards  of  their  valour.' 

Such  were  the  words  of  encouragement  addressed  to      gg. 
the  Peloponnesians  by  their  commanders.     Phormio  too,  Phormio, 
fearing  that  his  sailors  might  be  frightened,  and  observing 
that  they  were  gathering  in  knots  and  were  evidently 


apprehensive  of  the  enemy's  numbers,  resolved  to  call  and  ad- 
them  together  and  inspirit  them  by  a  suitable  admoni-  them?3 
tion.  He  had  always  been  in  the  habit  of  telling  them 
and  training  their  minds  to  believe  that  no  superiority  of 
hostile  forces  could  justify  them  in  retreating.  And  it 
had  long  been  a  received  opinion  among  the  sailors  that, 
as  Athenians,  they  were  bound  to  face  any  number  of 
Peloponnesian  ships.  When,  however,  he  found  them 
dispirited  by  the  sight  which  met  their  eyes,  he  deter- 
mined to  revive  their  drooping  courage,  and,  having 
assembled  them  together,  he  spoke  as  follows  :  — 

*  Soldiers,  I  have  summoned  you  because  I  see  that      89. 
you  are  alarmed  at  the  numbers  of  the  enemy,  and  I  I  see  that 
would  not  have  you  dismayed  when  there  is  nothing  to 
fear.     In  the  first  place,  the  reason  why  they  have  pro- 


vided  a   fleet  so   disproportionate   is  because  we  have  Yet  (J)  their 

fleet  is  only 

defeated  them  already,  and  they  can  see  themselves  that  so  large 
they  are  no  match  for  us  ;  next,  aas  to  the  courage  which  defeated701 


they  suppose  to  be  native  to  them  and  which  is  the 
ground   of  their  confidence  when  they  attack  usa,  that  thfey  b.oast 

&  of  their 

reliance  is  merely  inspired  by  the  success  which  their  courage.but 
experience  on  land  usually  gives  them,  and  will,  as  they  cour°geyon 
fancy,  equally  ensure  them  by  sea.  But  the  superiority 

a  Or,  taking  the  antecedent  to  <u  as  supplied  by  the  clause  ov 
81'  o\Xo  TI  Bapvov&iv  .  .  KiiTopdovvres  :  '  as  to  the  ground  of  the  con- 
fidence with  which  they  attack  us  as  if  courage  were  native  to  them.' 


154  SPEECH  OF  PELOPONNESIAN  COMMANDERS. 

II.       Peloponnesian  generals  determined  to  bring  on  an  en-  B.C.  429. 
gagement  at  once,  and  not  wait  until  the  Athenians  too     '  8y>  4' 
received  their  reinforcements.     So  they  assembled  their 
soldiers  and,  seeing  that  they  were  generally  dispirited 
at  their  former  defeat  and  reluctant  to  fight,  encouraged 
them  in  the  following  words  : — 

87.  'The  late  sea-fight,  Peloponnesians,  may  have  made 
YOU  are  some  of  you  anxious  about  the  one  which  is  impending, 
our  late  but  it  really  affords  no  just  ground  for  alarm.  In  that 
But  you  battle  we  wrere,  as  you  know,  ill-prepared,  and  our  whole 
unrre-hen  expedition  had  a  military  and  not  a  naval  object.  For- 
pared.  tune  was  in  many  ways  unpropitious  to  us,  and  this 
superior  being  our  first  sea-fight  we  may  possibly  have  suffered 
outweighs  a  little  from  inexperience.  The  defeat  which  ensued 
superior  was  not  t^ie  resu^  °f  cowardice ;  nor  should  the  un- 
skiii,  for  conquerable  quality  which  is  inherent  in  our  minds,  and 

without  . 

courage  refuses  to  acknowledge  the  victory  of  mere  force,  be 
useless.  depressed  by  the  accident  of  the  event.  For  though 
our  fart  fortune  may  sometimes  bring  disaster,  yet  the  spirit  of 
will  arrange  a  brave  man  is  always  the  same,  and  while  he  retains  his 

the  attack  . 

better.  But  courage  he  will  never  allow  inexperience  to  be  an  excuse 
aiTd^your  for  misbehaviour.  And  whatever  be  your  own  inex- 
duty.  perience,  it  is  more  than  compensated  by  your  superiority 
in  valour.  The  skill  of  your  enemies  which  you  so  greatly 
dread,  if  united  with  courage,  may  be  able  in  the  moment 
of  danger  to  remember  and  execute  the  lesson  which  it 
has  learned,  but  without  courage  no  skill  can  do  anything 
at  such  a  time.  For  fear  makes  men  forget,  and  skill 
which  cannot  fight  is  useless.  And  therefore  against 
their  greater  skill  set  your  own  greater  valour,  and 
against  the  defeat  which  so  alarms  you  set  the  fact  that 
you  were  unprepared.  But  now  you  have  a  larger  fleet ; 
this  turns  the  balance  in  your  favour ;  and  you  will  fight 
close  to  a  friendly  shore  under  the  protection  of  heavy- 
armed  troops.  Victory  is  generally  on  the  side  of  those 
who  are  more  numerous  and  better  equipped.  So  that 
we  have  absolutely  no  reason  for  anticipating  failure. 
Even  our  mistakes  will  be  an  additional  advantage, 


SPEECH   OF  PHORMIO.  155 

B.C.  429.  because  they  will  be  a  lesson  to  us.  Be  of  good  courage,  II. 
7>  4<  then,  and  let  every  one  of  you,  pilot  or  sailor,  do  his 
own  duty  and  maintain  the  post  assigned  to  him.  We 
will  order  the  attack  rather  better  than  your  old  com- 
manders, and  so  give  nobody  an  excuse  for  cowardice. 
But,  if  any  one  should  be  inclined  to  waver,  he  shall  be 
punished  as  he  deserves,  while  the  brave  shall  be  honoured 
with  the  due  rewards  of  their  valour.' 

Such  were  the  words  of  encouragement  addressed  to      gg. 
the  Peloponnesians  by  their  commanders.     Phormio  too,  Phormio, 
fearing  that  his  sailors  might  be  frightened,  and  observing  ^HOTS  hlS 
that  they  were  gathering  in  knots  and  were  evidently 


apprehensive  of  the  enemy's  numbers,  resolved  to  call  and  ad- 
them  together  and  inspirit  them  by  a  suitable  admoni-  them?3 
tion.  He  had  always  been  in  the  habit  of  telling  them 
and  training  their  minds  to  believe  that  no  superiority  of 
hostile  forces  could  justify  them  in  retreating.  And  it 
had  long  been  a  received  opinion  among  the  sailors  that, 
as  Athenians,  they  were  bound  to  face  any  number  of 
Peloponnesian  ships.  When,  however,  he  found  them 
dispirited  by  the  sight  which  met  their  eyes,  he  deter- 
mined to  revive  their  drooping  courage,  and,  having 
assembled  them  together,  he  spoke  as  follows  :  — 

1  Soldiers,  I  have  summoned  you  because  I  see  that      89. 
you  are  alarmed  at  the  numbers  of  the  enemy,  and  1  1  see  that 
would  not  have  you  dismayed  when  there  is  nothing  to 
fear.     In  the  first  place,  the  reason  why  they  have  pro- 


vided  a   fleet  so   disproportionate   is  because  we  have  Jet  (r)  thf  r 

fleet  is  only 

defeated  them  already,  and  they  can  see  themselves  that  so  large 
they  are  no  match  for  us  ;  next,  aas  to  the  courage  which  defeated701 


they  suppose  to  be  native  to  them  and  which  is 
ground   of  their  confidence  when  they  attack  us  a,  that 
reliance  is  merely  inspired  by  the  success  which  their  courage.but 
experience  on  land  usually  gives  them,  and  will,  as  they 
fancy,  equally  ensure  them  by  sea.     But  the  superiority 

a  Or,  taking  the  antecedent  to  <u  as  supplied  by  the  clause  ou 
6Y  tt\Xo  TI  Bapa-ovvw  .  .  Karopdoiivres  l  '  as  to  the  ground  of  the  con- 
fidence with  which  they  attack  us  as  if  courage  were  native  to  them.' 


158 


EXPLOIT   OF  AN  ATHENIAN  SHIP. 


II. 


91. 

The  Lace- 

daemonians 

chase  the 


to  Naupac- 
these  by  a 


pursuer. 


92. 

The  Athe- 

taking  ad- 


to  cut  off  all  the  Athenian  fleet.  Eleven  vessels  which  B.C.  429. 
were  in  advance  evaded  the  sudden  turn  of  the  Pelopon- 
nesians, and  rowed  past  their  right  wing  into  the  open 
water  ;  but  they  caught  the  rest,  forced  them  aground, 
and  disabled  them.  All  the  sailors  who  did  not  swim 
out  of  them  were  slain.  Some  of  the  empty  ships  they 
fastened  to  their  own  and  began  to  tow  away;  one  they 
had  already  taken  with  the  crew,  but  others  were  saved 
by  the  Messenians,  who  came  to  the  rescue,  dashed  armed 
as  they  were  into  the  sea,  boarded  them,  and,  fighting 
from  their  decks  when  they  were  being  already  towed 
away,  finally  recovered  them. 

While  in  this  part  of  the  engagement  the  Lacedae- 
monians  had  the  victory  and  routed  the  Athenian  ships, 
their  twenty  vessels  on  the  right  wing  were  pursuing  the 
eleven  of  the  Athenians  which  had  escaped  from  their 
attack  into  the  °Pen  water  of  the  gulf.  These  fled  and, 
with  the  exception  of  one,  arrived  at  Naupactus  before 
their  pursuers.  They  stopped  off  the  temple  of  Apollo, 
and,  turning  their  beaks  outward,  prepared  to  defend 
themselves  in  case  the  enemy  followed  them  to  the  land. 
The  Peloponnesians  soon  came  up  ;  they  were  singing  a 
paean  of  victory  as  they  rowed,  and  one  Leucadian  ship 
far  in  advance  of  the  rest  was  chasing  the  single  Athe- 
nian ship  which  had  been  left  behind.  There  chanced 
to  be  anchored  in  the  deep  water  a  merchant  vessel, 
round  which  the  Athenian  ship  rowed  just  in  time, 
struck  the  Leucadian  amidships,  and  sank  her.  At  this 
sudden  and  unexpected  feat  the  Peloponnesians  were 
dismayed  ;  they  had  been  carrying  on  the  pursuit  in 
disorder  because  of  their  superiority.  And  some  of  them, 
dropping  the  blades  of  their  oars,  halted,  intending  to 
await  the  rest,  which  was  a  foolish  thing  to  do  when  the 
enemy  were  so  near  and  ready  to  attack  them.  Others, 
not  knowing  the  coast,  ran  aground. 

When  the  Athenians  saw  what  was  going  on  their 
hopes  revived,  and  at  a  given  signal  they  charged  their 
enemies  with  a  shout.  The  Lacedaemonians  did  not 


VICTORY  OF   THE  ATHENIANS. 


159 


B.C.  429.  long  resist,  for  they  had  made  mistakes  and  were  all  in       II. 
'  8?>  4>  confusion,  but  fled  to  Panormus,  whence  they  had  put  to  vantage  of 

'  .  J  m  r         t     the  confu- 

sea.  The  Athenians  pursued  them,  took  six  of  their  sion,  turn 
ships  which  were  nearest  to  them,  and  recovered  their  enemy  and 
own  ships  which  the  Peloponnesians  had  originally  dis-  fomptete 
abled  and  taken  in  tow  near  the  shore.  The  crews  of  victory- 
the  captured  vessels  were  either  slain  or  made  prisoners. 
Timocrates  the  Lacedaemonian  a  was  on  board  the  Leu- 
cadian  ship  which  went  down  near  the  merchant  vessel  ; 
when  he  saw  the  ship  sinking  he  killed  himself;  the 
body  was  carried  into  the  harbour  of  Naupactus.  The 
Athenians  then  retired  and  raised  a  trophy  on  the  place 
from  which  they  had  just  sailed  out  to  their  victory. 
They  took  up  the  bodies  and  wrecks  which  were  floating 
near  their  own  shore,  and  gave  back  to  the  enemy,  under 
a  flag  of  truce,  those  which  belonged  to  them.  The 
Lacedaemonians  also  set  up  a  trophy  of  the  victory 
which  they  had  gained  over  the  ships  destroyed  by  them 
near  the  shore  ;  the  single  ship  which  they  took  they 
dedicated  on  the  Achaean  Rhium,  close  to  the  trophy. 
Then,  fearing  the  arrival  of  the  Athenian  reinforcements, 
they  sailed  away  under  cover  of  night  to  the  Crisaean 
Gulf  and  to  Corinth,  all  with  the  exception  of  the  Leu- 
cadians.  And  not  long  after  their  retreat  the  twenty 
Athenian  ships  from  Crete,  which  ought  to  have  come 
to  the  assistance  of  Phormio  before  the  battle,  arrived  at 
Naupactus.  So  the  summer  ended. 

At  the  beginning  of  winter,  Cnemus,  Brasidas,  and  the      93. 
other  Peloponnesian  commanders,  on  the  suggestion  of  The  Peio- 
some  Megarians,  before  the  fleet  which  had  returned  to  determine 
Corinth  and  the  Crisaean   Gulf  dispersed,  determined  an  attempt 
to  make  an  attempt  on  Piraeus,  the  harbour  of  Athens.  P"^s 
The   entrance  was   unclosed   and   unguarded  ;    as   was  £ut  losing 

heart,  only 

natural,  since  the  Athenians  were  complete  masters  of  sail  to 
the  sea.     Each  sailor  was  to  carry  his  cushion  and  his  and  ravage 
oar  with  its  thong,  and  cross  on  foot  with  all  haste  from  the  island- 


a  Gp.  ii.  85  init. 


160  THE  PIRAEUS  IN  DANGER. 

II.  Corinth  to  the  Athenian  side  of  the  Isthmus  ;  they  were  B.C.  429. 
to  go  to  Megara  and  from  Nisaea,  the  harbour  of  Megara,  O1'  8?>  4' 
to  launch  forty  ships  which  happened  to  be  lying  in  the 
docks  ;  thence  they  were  to  sail  straight  for  the  Piraeus. 
No  guard  ships  were  stationed  there,  for  no  one  ever 
expected  a  that  the  enemy  would  attempt  a  surprise  of 
this  kind.  As  to  an  open  and  deliberate  attack,  how  was 
he  likely  to  venture  on  that?  and  if  he  even  entertained 
such  a  design,  would  he  not  have  been  found  out  in  timea? 
The  plan  was  immediately  carried  out.  Arriving  at  night, 
they  launched  the  ships  from  Nisaea  and  sailed  away, 
but  not  to  the  Piraeus  ;  the  danger  seemed  too  great, 
and  also  the  wind  is  said  to  have  been  unfavourable. 
So  they  gave  up  their  original  idea  and  made  for  the 
projecting  point  of  Salamis  which  looks  towards  Megara; 
here  there  was  a  fort,  and  three  ships  were  stationed 
in  order  to  prevent  anything  being  conveyed  by  sea  into 
or  out  of  Megara.  This  fort  they  assailed,  towed  away 
the  ships  without  their  crews,  and  ravaged  the  rest  of 
Salamis  which  was  unprepared  for  their  attack. 

94*  By  this  time  fire  -signals  had  carried  the   alarm  to 

Athens.    Nothing  which  had  happened  in  the  war  caused 


Athens.       a  greater  panic.     The  inhabitants  of  the  city  thought 
immedi-      that  the  enemy  had  already  sailed  into  the  Piraeus  ;  the 


belief  in  the  Piraeus  was  that  Salamis  had  been  taken 
an<^  *kat  the  enemy  were  on  the  point  of  sailing  into  the 
nesians  harbour,  which,  if  they  had  been  bolder,  they  might  easily 
have  done,  and  no  wind  would  have  prevented  them. 
But  as  soon  as  day  dawned,  the  Athenians,  coming  down 
with  the  whole  strength  of  the  city  to  the  Piraeus, 
launched  their  ships  and,  embarking  in  tumultuous  haste, 
sailed  to  Salamis,  while  their  land-forces  remained  and 
guarded  the  Piraeus.  When  the  Peloponnesians  saw  the 
fleet  coming  they  sailed  quickly  back  to  Nisaea,  but  not 


a  Or,  taking  «r«  differently,  and  ttaff  fjo-vxiav  in  the  sense  of  'with- 
out interference:'  'that  the  enemy  would  make  a  sudden  attack  of 
this  kind.  An  attempt  so  bold  and  open  was  not  likely  to  be  unop- 
posed, or  the  very  design,  if  entertained,  to  escape  detection.' 


SITALCES  MAKES  WAR   UPON  PERDICCAS.    161 


B.C.  429.  until  they  had  ravaged  the  greater  part  of  Salamis  and  II. 
8?>  4'  taken  many  prisoners  and  much  spoil,  as  well  as  the 
three  ships  which  lay  off  the  fort  of  Budorum.  There 
was  some  apprehension  about  their  own  ships ;  for  they 
had  long  been  lain  up  and  were  not  sea-worthy.  Arriving 
at  Megara  they  marched  back  again  to  Corinth,  and  the 
Athenians  having  failed  to  overtake  them  in  Salamis, 
sailed  back  likewise.  Henceforth  they  kept  more  careful 
watch  over  the  Piraeus,  among  other  precautions  closing 
the  entrance  to  the  harbour. 

About  the  same  time,  at  the  beginning  of  winter,  95. 
Sitalces  the  Odrysian,  the  son  of  Teres,  king  of  Thrace,  Sitalces 
made  war  upon  Perdiccas,  the  son  of  Alexander,  king  of  Thrace, 
Macedon,  and  upon  the  Thracian  Chalcidians.  There 
were  two  promises,  of  which  he  wished  to  perform  one, 
and  exact  fulfilment  of  the  other.  The  promise  ofdiccasand 
which  he  claimed  fulfilment  had  been  made  to  him  by  dan  Chai- 
Perdiccas,  when,  being  hard  pressed  at  the  beginning C1 
of  the  war,  he  wanted  Sitalces  to  reconcile  him  to 
the  Athenians3,  and  not  to  restore  and  place  on  the 
throne  his  brother  Philip,  who  was  his  enemy;  but  Per- 
diccas did  not  keep  his  word.  The  other  was  a  promise 
which  Sitalces  had  himself  made  to  the  Athenians  when 
he  entered  into  alliance  with  them,  that  he  would  put  an 
end  to  the  Chalcidian  war.  For  these  two  reasons  he 
invaded  the  country,  taking  with  him  Amyntas  the  son 
of  Philip,  whom  he  intended  to  make  king  of  Macedon, 
and  also  certain  Athenian  envoys  who  had  just  come  to 
remind  him  of  his  engagement,  and  the  Athenian  com- 
mander Hagnon.  For  the  Athenians  on  their  part  were 
bound  to  assist  him  against  the  Chalcidians  with  ships 
and  with  as  large  an  army  as  they  could  provide. 

Accordingly   Sitalces,   beginning  with    the   Odrysae,      96. 
made  a  levy  of  all  his  Thracian  subjects  dwelling  be- 
tweeen  Mount  Haemus  and  Mount  Rhodope  as  far  as 
the  shores  of  the  Euxine  and  of  the  Hellespont.   Beyond 

a  The    reconciliation    had    been    effected   through   the    instru- 
mentality of  Nymphodorus;  ii.  29. 

M 


1 62  THE    KINGDOM    OF   SITALCES. 

II.  the  Haemus  he  made  a  levy  of  the  Getae  and  of  all  the  B.C.  429. 
nations  lying  towards  the  Euxine  on  this  side  of  the 
Ister.  Now  the  Getae  and  their  neighbours  border  on 
the  Scythians,  and  are  equipped  like  them,  for  they  are 
all  horse-archers.  He  also  summoned  to  his  standard 
many  of  the  highland  Thracians,  who  are  independent 
and  carry  dirks ;  they  are  called  Dii,  and  most  of  them 
inhabit  Mount  Rhodope;  of  these  some  were  attracted  by 
pay,  while  others  came  as  volunteers.  He  further  called 
out  the  Agrianians,  the  Laeaeans,  and  the  other  Paeonian 
nations  who  were  his  subjects.  These  tribes  were  the  last 
within  his  empire ;  they  extended  as  far  as  the  Graaean 
Paeonians  and  the  river  Strymon,  which  rises  in  Mount 
Scombrus  and  flows  through  the  country  of  the  Graaeans 
and  Laeaeans  ;  there  his  dominion  ended  and  the  inde- 
pendent Paeonians  began.  In  the  direction  of  the 
Triballi,  who  are  likewise  independent,  the  Treres  and 
the  Tilataeans  formed  his  boundary.  These  tribes  dwell 
to  the  north  of  Mount  Scombrus  and  reach  westward  as 
far  as  the  Oscius.  This  river  rises  in  the  same  mountains 
as  the  Nestus  and  the  Hebrus,  a  wild  and  extensive 
range  which  adjoins  Rhodope. 

.97.          The  empire  of  the  Odrysae  measured  by  the  coast- 
Extent        line  reaches  from  the  city  of  Abdera  to  the  mouth  of  the 

and  wealth 

of  the  Ister  in  the  Euxine.  The  voyage  round  can  be  made 
empire"1  by  a  merchant  vessel,  if  the  wind  is  favourable  the 
whole  way,  at  the  quickest  in  four  days  and  as  many 
nights.  Or  an  expeditious  traveller  going  by  land  from 
Abdera  to  the  mouth  of  the  Ister,  if  he  takes  the  shortest 
route,  will  accomplish  the  journey  in  eleven  days.  Such 
was  the  extent  of  the  Odrysian  empire  towards  the  sea  : 
up  the  country  the  land  journey  from  Byzantium  to 
the  Laeaeans  and  to  the  Strymon,  this  being  the  longest 
line  which  can  be  drawn  from  the  sea  into  the  interior, 
may  be  accomplished  by  an  expeditious  traveller  in 
thirteen  days.  The  tribute  which  was  collected  from  the 
Hellenic  cities  and  from  all  the  barbarous  nations  in  the 
reign  of  Seuthes,  the  successor  of  Sitalces,  under  whom 


SITALCES  MARCHES  INTO  MACEDONIA.     163 

B.C.  429.  the  amount  was  greatest,  was  valued  at  about  four  hurt-  II. 
'  dred  talents  of  coined  money  a,  reckoning  only  gold  and 
silver.  Presents  of  gold  and  silver  equal  in  value  to  the 
tribute,  besides  stuffs  embroidered  or  plain  and  other 
articles,  were  also  brought,  not  only  to  the  king  himself, 
but  to  the  inferior  chiefs  and  nobles  of  the  Odrysae.  For 
their  custom  was  the  opposite  of  that  which  prevailed  in 
the  Persian  kingdom  ;  they  were  more  ready  to  receive 
than  to  give,  and  he  who  asked  and  was  refused  was  not  so 
much  discredited  as  he  who  refused  when  he  was  asked. 
The  same  custom  prevailed  among  the  other  Thracians 
in  a  less  degree,  but  among  the  Odrysae,  who  were 
richer,  more  extensively ;  nothing  could  be  done  without 
presents.  By  these  means  the  kingdom  became  very 
powerful,  and  in  revenue  and  general  prosperity  ex- 
ceeded all  the  nations  of  Europe  which  lie  between  the 
Ionian  Sea  and  the  Euxine,  in  the  size  and  strength  of 
their  army  being  second  only,  though  far  inferior,  to  the 
Scythians.  For  if  the  Scythians  were  united,  there  is 
no  nation  which  could  compare  with  them,  or  would 
be  capable  of  resisting  them  b ;  I  do  not  say  in  Europe, 
but  even  in  Asia — not  that  they  are  at  all  on  a  level 
with  other  nations  in  sense,  or  in  that  intelligence  which 
uses  to  advantage  the  ordinary  means  of  life. 

Such  was  the  great  country  over  which  Sitalces  ruled.      98. 
When  he  had  collected  his  army  and  his  preparations  Sitalces 
were  complete  he  marched  into  Macedonia,  passing  first  army  enter 
of  all  through  his  own  territory,  and  then  through  Cercine,  Macedonia- 
a  desert  mountain  which  lies  between  the  Sinti  and  the 
Paeonians.     He  went  by  the  road  which  he  had  himself 
constructed  when  he  made  his  expedition  against  the 
Paeonians  and    cut   down  the   forest.     As  he  left   the 
Odrysian  territory  in   going   through  the  mountain   he 
had  on  the  right  hand  the  Paeonians  and  on  the  left 
hand  the  Sinti  and  Maedi ;  on  quitting  the  mountain  he 
arrived  at  Doberus  in  Paeonia.     He  lost  no  part  of  his 
army   on   the   march,   except   by   sickness,   but   rather 
a  ,£96,000.  b  Gp.  Herod,  iv.  46. 

M  2, 


164  THE    HOST    OF  SITALCES. 

II.  increased  it ;  for  many  of  the  independent  Thracian  B.c.  429. 
tribes  followed  him  of  their  own  accord  in  hopes  of  OL  8?>  4> 
plunder.  The  whole  number  of  his  forces  was  estimated 
at  a  hundred  and  fifty  thousand,  of  which  about  two-thirds 
were  infantry  and  the  rest  cavalry.  The  largest  part 
of  the  cavalry  was  furnished  by  the  Odrysae  themselves, 
and  the  next  largest  by  the  Getae.  Of  the  infantry, 
those  armed  with  dirks  who  came  from  the  independent 
tribes  of  Mount  Rhodope  were  the  most  warlike.  The 
remainder  of  the  army  was  a  mixed  multitude,  chiefly 
formidable  from  its  numbers. 

99.  Having  mustered  at   Doberus,   they   made   ready  to 

Early  his-  descend  over  the  heights  into  the  plains  of  Macedonia, 
Macedo-  *  which  were  the  territory  of  Perdiccas.  There  is  an 
domkmg~  uPPer  Macedonia,  which  is  inhabited  by  Lyncestians, 
Elimiots,  and  other  tribes ;  these  are  the  allies  and  tribu- 
taries of  the  lower  Macedonians,  but  have  kings  of  their 
own.  The  maritime  country  which  we  now  call  Mace- 
donia was  conquered  and  formed  into  a  kingdom  by 
Alexander  the  father  of  Perdiccas  and  his  ancestors  the 
Temenidae,  who  originally  came  from  Argosa.  They 
defeated  and  drove  out  of  Pieria  the  Pierians,  who 
afterwards  settled  in  Phagres  and  other  places  at  the 
foot  of  Mount  Pangaeus,  beyond  the  Strymon  ;  the 
land  which  lies  under  Mount  Pangaeus  towards  the 
sea  is  still  called  the  Pierian  vale.  They  also  drove  out 
of  Bottia,  as  it  is  called,  the  Bottiaeans,  who  are  now  the 
neighbours  of  the  Chalcidians,  and  they  acquired  a 
narrow  strip  of  Paeonia  by  the  river  Axius,  reaching 
down  to  Pella  and  the  sea.  Beyond  the  Axius  they 
possess  the  country  called  Mygdonia  reaching  to  the 
Strymon,  out  of  which  they  have  driven  the  Edonians. 
They  expelled  from  the  country  still  called  Eordia  the 
Eordians,  of  whom  the  greater  part  perished,  but  a  small 
remnant  of  them  settled  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Physca; 
and  from  Almopia  the  Almopians.  They  and  their 
subjects  further  subdued  and  still  hold  various  places 

a  Herod,  viii.  137-139. 


PROGRESS    OF    THE   INVASION.  165 

B.C.  429.  belonging  to  other  tribes,  Anthemus,  Grestonia,  Bisaltia,       II. 
4  and  a  great  part  of  the  original  Macedonia.     But  the 
whole  of  this  country  is  now  called  Macedonia,  and  was 
under  the  rule  of   Perdiccas  the  son  of  Alexander  at 
the  time  of  the  invasion  of  Sitalces. 

The  Macedonians  were  unable  to  defend  themselves     IOO. 
against   the  onset  of  such  a  vast  host ;  they  therefore  The  Mace- 

donians 

retired  into  their  strongholds  and   forts,  which  at  that  retire  into 
time  were  few.     For  those  which  now  exist  were  built 
by  Archelaus  the  son  of  Perdiccas,  who,  when  he  became 
king,  made  straight  roads  and  in  various  ways  improved  cavairy 
the  country.     In  his  force  of  cavalry  and  infantry  and  in  invaders, 
his   military  resources    generally  he   surpassed    all    the  compelled 
eight  kings  who  preceded  him.  Inferiority 

The  Thracian  army  leaving  Doberus,  invaded  first  of°^  ^l™sbers 
all  the  country  which  had  formerly  been  the  principality 
of  Philip,  and  took  Eidomene  by  storm.  Gortynia,  Ata- 
lante,  and  some  other  towns  came  to  terms  out  of  regard 
for  Amyntas  the  son  of  Philip,  who  accompanied  the 
expedition.  They  also  besieged  but  failed  to  take 
Europus  ;  they  next  advanced  into  that  part  of  Mace- 
donia which  lay  on  the  left  of  Pella  and  Cyrrhus. 
Farther  south  into  Bottiaea  and  Pieria  they  did  not 
penetrate,  but  were  content  to  ravage  the  territory  of 
Mygdonia,  Grestonia,  and  Anthemus.  The  Macedonians 
had  no  idea  of  facing  them  with  infantry,  but  sent  for 
additional  cavalry  from  their  allies  in  the  upper  part  of 
the  country,  and,  although  a  handful  of  men,  dashed  in 
amongst  the  great  Thracian  host  wherever  they  pleased. 
No  one  withstood  their  onset ;  for  they  were  excellent 
horsemen  and  well  protected  with  coats  of  mail.  But 
hemmed  in  as  they  continually  were  by  a  multitude 
many  times  their  own  number,  they  ran  into  great  danger. 
At  last,  feeling  that  they  were  not  strong  enough  to 
encounter  such  superiority  of  force,  they  desisted. 

Sitalces  now  held  a  conference  with  Perdiccas  touching      101. 
the  matters  which  gave  occasion  to  the  war.     The  fleet  Sitalces 
which  the  Athenians  had  promised  never  arrived  ;    for  conference 


i66 


RETURN    OF  SITALCES. 


II. 

with  Per- 
diccas,  and 
after  an  un- 
successful 
campaign 
in  Bottice 
and  Chal- 
cidice,  is 
persuaded 
by  his 
nephew 
Seuthes 
(who  had 
been  gained 
over  by 
Perdiccas) 
to  return 
home. 
Alarm 
in  Hellas. 


IO2. 

The  Athe- 
nians, under 
Phormio, 
make  an 
expedition 
into  Acar- 
nania. 


not  believing  that  Sitalces  would  come,  they  only  sent  B.C.  429. 
gifts  and  envoys  to  him.  After  waiting  for  them  in  vain 
he  despatched  a  part  of  his  army  against  the  Chalcidians 
and  Bottiaeans,  and,  driving  them  within  their  walls, 
devastated  the  country.  While  he  was  encamped  in 
these  parts,  the  Thessalians,  who  lie  towards  the  south, 
the  Magnesians  and  other  dependants  of  the  Thessalians, 
and  all  the  Hellenes  as  far  as  Thermopylae  were  afraid 
that  his  army  would  move  on  them,  and  took  measures 
of  precaution.  Those  independent  Thracian  tribes  to 
the  north  beyond  the  Strymon  who  dwelt  in  the  plains, 
namely  the  Panaeans,  Odomantians,  Droans,  and  Der- 
saeans,  were  also  in  great  alarm.  A  belief  arose,  which 
spread  far  and  wide  among  the  enemies  of  Athens,  that 
the  Athenians  meant  to  lead  their  Odrysian  allies  against 
the  rest  of  Hellas.  Meanwhile  Sitalces  overran  and 
ravaged  Chalcidice,  Bottice,  and  Macedonia,  but  could 
not  effect  his  objects  ;  and.  his  army  being  without  food 
and  suffering  from  the  winter,  he  was  persuaded  by  his 
nephew,  who  next  to  himself  had  the  greatest  authority, 
Seuthes  the  son  of  Spardacus  a,  to  return  home  at  once. 
Now  Perdiccas  had  secretly  gained  over  Seuthes,  pro- 
mising to  give  him  his  sister  in  marriage,  with  a  portion. 
And  so  Sitalces  and  his  army,  having  remained  thirty 
days  in  all,  of  which  eight  were  passed  among  the  Chal- 
cidians, returned  home  in  haste.  Perdiccas  in  fulfilment 
of  his  promise  gave  his  sister  Stratonice  in  marriage  to 
Seuthes.  Thus  ended  the  expedition  of  Sitalces. 

During  the  same  winter  the  Athenian  forces  at  Nau- 
pactus,  after  the  Peloponnesian  fleet  had  dispersed,  made 
an  expedition  under  the  command  of  Phormio  into  the 
centre  of  Acarnania  with  four  hundred  hoplites  of  their 
own  taken  from  the  fleet b  and  four  hundred  Messenian 
hoplites.  They  first  coasted  along  towards  Astacus6 
and  disembarked.  From  Stratus,  Coronta,  and  other 
places  they  expelled  those  of  the  inhabitants  whom  they 

a  Cp.  iv.  101  fin.  b  Cp,  ii.  83  init.;  92  fin. 

c  Cp.  ii.  30;  33. 


THE    STORY   OF   A  LC  MA  EON.  167 

B.C.  429.  distrusted,  and  restoring  Cynes  the  son  of  Theolytus  to       u. 
7>  4'  Coronta,   they   returned    to   their   ships.     Oeniadae,    of  Oeniadae 
which  the  inhabitants,  unlike  the  rest  of  the  Acarnanians, 
were   their  persistent    enemies,  was  unapproachable  in  f 


winter.     For  the  town  is  in  the  midst  of  a  marsh  formed  Acheious. 

Opposite  to 

by  the  river  Acheious,  which,  rising  in  Mount  Pindus  the  town 
and  passing  first  through  the  territory  of  the  Dolopians,  Echinades, 
Agraeans,   and  Amphilochians,  and  then   through   the  formed  by 
Acarnanian  plain,  at  some  distance  from  its  mouth  flows  the  deposits 

r  a  of  the  river. 

by  the  city  of  Stratus  and  finds  an  exit  into  the  sea  near  Here  Aic- 

f~^       .     ,  ....  .    .          .       ^  .          ,  maeon,  after 

Oeniadae  :    an  expedition   in   winter   is   thus    rendered  the  murder 
impossible  by  the  water.     Most  of  the  islands  called  mf01Jhsei.(  is 
Echinades  are  situated  opposite  to  Oeniadae  and  close 


to  the  mouth  of  the  Acheious.  The  consequence  is  that  home  which 
the  river,  which  is  large,  is  always  silting  up  :  some  of  the  cated  to 
islands  have  been  already  joined  to  the  mainland,  and  ^^de 
very  likely,  at  no  distant  period,  they  may  all  be  joined  of  Apollo. 
to  it.  The  stream  is  wide  and  strong  and  full  of  mud  ; 
and  the  islands  are  close  together  and  serve  to  connect 
the  deposits  made  by  the  river,  not  allowing  them  to 
dissolve  in  the  water.  For,  tying  irregularly  and  not 
one  behind  the  other,  they  prevent  the  river  from  finding 
a  straight  channel  into  the  sea.  These  islands  are  small 
and  uninhabited.  The  story  is  that  when  Alcmaeon  the 
son  of  Amphiaraus  was  wandering  over  the  earth  after 
the  murder  of  his  mother,  he  was  told  by  Apollo  that 
here  he  should  find  a  home,  the  oracle  intimating  that  he 
would  never  obtain  deliverance  from  his  terrors  until  he 
discovered  some  country  which  was  not  yet  in  existence 
and  not  seen  by  the  sun  at  the  time  when  he  slew  his 
mother  ;  there  he  might  settle,  but  the  rest  of  the  earth 
was  accursed  to  him.  He  knew  not  what  to  do,  until  at 
last,  according  to  the  story,  he  spied  the  deposit  of  earth 
made  by  the  Ache^ous,  and  he  thought  that  a  place 
sufficient  to  support  life  must  have  accumulated  in  the 
long  time  during  which  he  had  been  wandering  since  his 
mother's  death.  There,  near  Oeniadae,  he  settled,  and, 
becoming  ruler,  left  to  the  country  the  name  of  his  son 


1 68  RETURN   OF   PHORMIO. 

II.       Acarnan.     Such  is  the  tradition  which  has  come  down  B.C.  429. 

A  1  Ol.  87,  4, 

to  us  concerning  Alcmaeon. 

103.         The  Athenians  under  Phormio  sailed  back  from  Acar- 
The  Athe-    nania  to  Naupactus,  and  later  at  the  beginning  of  spring 

nians  return  ...  -11  i          i  •  1-1 

to  Naupac-  returned  to  Athens,  bringing  with  them  the  ships  which 
they  had  captured,  besides  the  prisoners  of  free  birth 
w^om  they  ^a<^  taken  in  the  naval  engagements.  They 
were  exchanged  man  for  man.  And  so  the  winter  ended, 
and  with  it  the  third  year  in  the  Peloponnesian  War  of 
which  Thucydides  wrote  the  history. 


BOOK     III. 


oiC88428'         ^N  ^e  f°U°wmg  summer,  when  the  corn  was  in  full   III.  i. 
ear,  the  Peloponnesians  and  their  allies,  under  the  com-  Third  in- 

vasion  of 

mand  of  Archidamus,  the  son  of  Zeuxidamus,  the  Lace-  Attica  by 
daemonian  king,  invaded  Attica,  and  encamping  wasted  ponnesians. 
the  country.     The  Athenian  cavalry  as  usual  attacked 
them  whenever  an  opportunity  offered,  and  prevented 
the  great  body  of  the  light-armed   troops  from  going 
beyond  their  lines  and  injuring  the  lands  near  the  city. 
The   invaders   remained    until   their   supplies  were  ex- 
hausted ;    they  were   then   disbanded,  and  returned  to 
their  several  homes. 

No  sooner  had  the  Peloponnesians  quitted  Attica  than        2. 

the  whole  people  of  Lesbos,  with  the  exception  of  the  Jhe  Les- 

bians, with 
Methymnaeans,  revolted  from  Athens.    They  had  enter-  the  excep- 


tained  the  design  before  the  war  began,  but  the  Lace- 
daemonians   gave  them  no  encouragement.     And  now  r^oit  S'but 


they  were  not  ready,  and  were  compelled  to  revolt  sooner  sooner  than 
than  they  had  intended.    For  they  were  waiting  until  they  tended,  in- 
had  completed  the  work  of  closing  their  harbours,  raising  their  pians° 
walls,  and   building   ships,   and   they   had    not   as  yet  ^eanvtirg  been 
received  from  Pontus  the  force  of  archers,  the  corn  and  Athens  from 

Tenedos, 

the  other  supplies  for  which  they  had  sent.     But  the  in-  Methymna, 
habitants  of  Tenedos,  who  were  not  on  good  terms  with  \ene  itself. 
them,  and  the  Methymnaeans,  and  individual  citizens 
who  were  of  the  opposite  faction  and  were  proxeni  of 
Athens,  turned  informers  and  told  the  Athenians  that 
the  Mitylenaeans  were  forcing  the  other  inhabitants  of 


170  REVOLT    OF  LESBOS. 

III.  the  island  into  Mitylene ;  that  the  preparations  which  B.C.  428. 
they  were  pressing  forward  had  been  throughout  under- 
taken by  them  in  concert  with  the  Lacedaemonians  and 
with  their  Boeotian  kinsmen,  and  meant  revolt ;  and 
that  if  something  were  not  immediately  done,  Lesbos 
would  be  lost  to  Athens. 

3.  The  Athenians,  who  were  suffering  severely  from  the 

TheAthe-    plague  and  from  the  war,  of  which  they  had  begun  to 

nians  deter-  ^ °  * 

mine  to  feel  the  full  effects,  reflected  that  it  was  a  serious  matter 
Mhyieneat  to  bring  upon  themselves  a  second  war  with  a  naval 
anf?send'  Power  like  Lesbos,  whose  resources  were  unimpaired  ; 
cieippides  and  so  mainly  because  they  wished  that  the  charges 

thither  with        .  J  J 

forty  ships,  might  not  be  true,  they  at  first  refused  to  listen  to  them. 
tants'are1  *~  But,  when  they  had  sent  envoys  to  Mitylene  and  found 
forewarned.  ^^  tke  Mitylenaeans,  in  spite  of  remonstrances,  con- 
tinued their  preparations  and  persisted  in  gathering  the 
inhabitants  of  the  country  into  the  town,  they  took  alarm 
and  determined  to  be  beforehand  with  them.  Without 
losing  a  moment,  they  sent  to  Lesbos,  under  the  com- 
mand of  Clei'ppides  the  son  of  Deinias,  and  two  others, 
forty  ships  which  had  been  intended  to  cruise  about 
Peloponnesus.  They  had  heard  that  there  was  a  festival 
of  Apollo  Maloeis  held  outside  the  walls  in  which  the 
whole  population  took  part,  and  that  if  they  made  haste 
they  might  hope  to  surprise  them.  The  attempt  would 
very  likely  succeed  ;  but,  if  not,  they  might  bid  the 
Mitylenaeans  give  up  their  fleet  and  dismantle  their 
walls,  and  in  case  they  refused  they  might  go  to  war 
with  them.  So  the  ships  sailed  ;  and  as  there  happened 
to  be  at  Athens  ten  Mitylenaean  triremes,  serving  in 
accordance  with  the  terms  of  the  alliance,  the  Athenians 
seized  them  and  threw  their  crews  into  prison.  But  the 
Mitylenaeans  were  warned  by  a  messenger  from  Athens, 
who  crossed  to  Euboea  and  went  on  foot  to  Geraestus  ; 
there  he  found  a  merchant  vessel  just  about  to  sail ;  he 
took  ship,  and  arriving  at  Mitylene  on  the  third  day  after 
he  left  Athens,  announced  the  coming  of  the  Athenian 
fleet.  Whereupon  the  Mitylenaeans  abstained  from 


ENVOYS    GO    TO    SPARTA.  171 

B  c.  428.  g°ing  out  to  ^e  temple  of  Apollo  Maloeis.     They  also      III. 

01.  88.     kept  g00d  watch  about  their  walls  and  harbours,  and 
barricaded  the  unfinished  works. 

Soon  afterwards  the  Athenians  arrived.      The  com-        4. 
manders   of   the    fleet,    seeing    that   they   were   foiled,  The  Mity- 
delivered  the  message  entrusted  to  them  ;  the  city  re-  after  a"5' 
fused  to  yield  and  they  commenced  hostilities.     Taken  sSncTat 
by   surprise,   and   unprepared   for   the   war    which  was  s.ea>  nes°- 
forced   upon   them,   the    Mitylenaeans   came   out   once  armistice. 


and  made  a  show  of  fighting  a  little  in  front  of  the 
harbour;  but  they  were  soon  driven  back  by  the  Athe-  Jgjj*  to 
nian  ships,  and  then  they  began  to  parley  with  the  secretly  to 
generals,  in  the  hope  of  obtaining  tolerable  terms  of 
some  kind,  and  getting  rid  of  the  fleet  for  the  time. 
The  Athenian  generals  accepted  their  proposals,  they 
too  fearing  that  they  were  not  strong  enough  to  make 
war  against  the  whole  island.  Having  got  the  armistice, 
the  Mitylenaeans  sent  envoys  to  Athens  ;  one  of  them 
was  a  person  who  had  given  information  against  his 
fellow-citizens,  but  was  now  repentant.  They  had  a 
faint  hope  that  the  Athenians  would  be  induced  to 
withdraw  their  ships  and  believe  in  their  good  inten- 
tions. But  as  they  did  not  really  expect  to  succeed  in 
their  Athenian  mission,  they  also  sent  an  embassy  to 
Lacedaemon,  unperceived  by  the  Athenian  fleet,  which 
was  stationed  at  Malea  ato  the  north  of  the  citya.  After 
a  troublesome  voyage  through  the  open  sea,  the  envoys 
arrived  at  Lacedaemon  and  solicited  aid  for  their 
countrymen. 

The  other  envoys  who  had  been  sent  to  Athens  met        5. 
with  no  success.     When  they  returned,  the  Mitylenaeans  ^^ 
and  the  rest  of  Lesbos,  with  the  exception  of  Methymna,  Athens 

....  i-R/ri  •  i      i       T         without 

commenced  hostilities  ;  the  Methymnaeans,  with  the  Im-  success. 
brians,  Lemnians,  and  a  few  of  the  allies,  had  come  to  ensues,ein 
the  support  of  the  Athenians.     The  Mitylenaeans  with  which  the 

a  Or,  to  avoid  the  geographical  contradiction  (see  notes),  we  may 
take  the  words  with  anoo-T€\\ov<riv  :  'they  also  sent  an  embassy  .  .  . 
northward  from  the  city.' 


1  72 


BLOCKADE    OF   MITYLENE. 


III. 

Mityienae- 

ans  have 

the  advan- 
thfy  reSn 

Sting 

aid  from  Pe- 

loponnesus. 


The  Athe- 

adenM?ty-k 
lenebysea. 


Asopius 

Athenian^ 
ships 

ravages  the 

Laconian 


Oeniadae, 

which  he  is 

unable  to 


their  whole  force  sallied  out  against  the  Athenian  camp,  B.C.  428. 
and  a  battle  took  place,  in  which  they  got  the  better  ;  °L  88' 
but  they  had  no  confidence  in  themselves,  and,  instead  of 
encamping  on  the  field,  retired.  They  then  remained 
quiet,  being  unwilling  to  risk  an  engagement  without 
the  additional  help  which  they  were  expecting  from 
Peloponnesus  and  elsewhere.  For  Meleas  a  Lacedae- 
monian, and  Hermaeondas  a  Theban,  had  now  arrived 
at  Mitylen&  ;  they  had  been  sent  before  the  revolt,  but 
the  Athenian  fleet  anticipated  them,  and  they  sailed  in  by 
stealth  after  the  battle  in  a  single  trireme.  The  envoys 
recommended  the  Mitylenaeans  to  send  an  embassy  of 
their  own  in  another  trireme  to  accompany  them  on 
their  return  to  Sparta  ;  which  they  accordingly  did. 

The  Athenians,  greatly  encouraged  by  the  inactivity 
of  their  adversaries,  summoned  their  allies,  who  came  all 
the  more  readily  because  they  saw  that  the  Lesbians 
displayed  no  energy.  They  then  anchored  the  fleet 
round  the  south  of  the  city,  and  having  fortified  two 
camps,  one  on  either  side  of  it,  they  established  a 
blockade  of  both  the  harbours.  Thus  they  excluded 
the  Mitylenaeans  from  the  sea.  They  likewise  held  the 
country  in  the  immediate  neighbourhood  of  their  two 
camps  ;  but  the  Mitylenaeans  and  the  other  Lesbians, 
who  had  now  taken  up  arms,  were  masters  of  the  rest 
of  the  island.  At  Malea  the  Athenians  had,  not  a  camp, 
but  a  station  for  their  ships  and  for  their  market. 

Such  was  the  course  of  the  war  in  Lesbos.  In  the 
same  summer,  and  about  the  same  time,  the  Athenians 
sent  thirty  ships  to  Peloponnesus ;  they  were  placed  under 
the  command  of  Asopius,  the  son  of  Phormio ;  for  the 
Acarnanians  had  desired  them  to  send  out  a  son  or  rela- 
tion of  Phormio  to  be  their  leader.  The  ships  in  passing 
ravaged  the  coast  of  Laconia,  and  then  Asopius  sent  most 
of  them  home,  but  kept  twelve,  with  which  he  sailed  to 
Naupactus.  Next  he  made  a  general  levy  of  the  Acarna- 
nians and  led  his  forces  against  Oeniadae,  his  ships  sailing 
up  the  river  Achelous,  while  his  army  ravaged  the  country 


SPEECH  OF    THE  MITYLENAEANS.          173 

oiC88428'  by  land*     As  the  inhabitants  refused  to  yield,  he  dis-      III. 

banded  his  land-forces,  but  himself  sailed  to  Leucas  and  He  is  killed 

in  a  de- 

made  a  descent  upon  Nericum,  where  he  and  part  of  his  scent  upon 

t  «  .  Leucas. 

army  m  returning  to  their  ships  were  slam  by  the  in- 
habitants, assisted  by  a  few  Peloponnesian  guards.  The 
Athenians  then  put  to  sea,  and  received  their  dead  from 
the  Leucadians  under  a  flag  of  truce. 

The  envoys  whom  the  Mitylenaeans  had  sent  out  in        g. 
their  first  vessel  were  told  by  the  Lacedaemonians  to  The  Mityie- 
come  to  the  Olympic  festival,  in  order  that  the  allies,  "oytmTet 
as  well  as  themselves,  might  hear  them  and  determine  the  am,es  in 

5          to  a  council  at 

what  should  be  done.     So  they  went  to  Olympia.     The  piympia. 
Olympiad  was  that  in  which  the  Rhodian  Dorieus  was  speech. 
conqueror  for  the  second  time.     When  the  festival  was 
over,  the  allies  met   in   council,  and   the  ambassadors 
spoke  as  follows  :  — 

'We  know,  Lacedaemonians  and  allies,  that  all  Hel-       g. 
lenes  entertain  a  fixed  sentiment  against  those  who  in  There  is 
time  of  war  revolt  and  desert  an  old  alliance.     Their  feeihigra 
new  allies  are  delighted  with  them   in  as  far  as  they  ^Sewho 
profit  by  their  aid  ;  but  they  do  not  respect  them,  for  desert  their 

7  J  friends,  but 

they  deem  them  traitors  to  their  former  friends.     And  the  friend- 
this  opinion  is  reasonable  enough  ;  but  only  when  the  be  reaiUS 
rebels,  and  those  from  whom  they  sever  themselves,  are  and  equal> 
naturally  united  by  the  same  interests  and  feelings  and 
equally  matched  in  power  and  resources,  and  when  there 
is  no  reasonable  excuse  for  a  revolt.     But  our  relation  to 
the  Athenians  was  of  another  sort,  and  no  one  should  be 
severe  upon  us  for  deserting  them  in  the  hour  of  danger 
although  we  were  honoured  by  them  in  time  of  peace. 

4  Since  an  alliance  is  our  object,  we  will  first  address       10. 
ourselves  to  the  question  of  justice  and  honour.     We  Before  ask- 
know  that   no  friendship   between   man   and    man,   no 


league  between  city  and  city,  can  ever  be   permanent  ^we  de- 
unless  the  friends  or  allies  have  a  good  opinion  of  each 
other's  honesty,  and    are   similar   in  general   character. 
For  the  diversity  in  men's  minds  makes  the  difference 
in  their  actions. 


174         SPEECH  OF  THE   MITYLENAEANS. 

III.          e  Now   our   alliance  with   the  Athenians   first    began  B.C.  428. 
We  became  wilen  you  ceased  to  take  part  in  the  Persian  War,  and  OK  88' 

allies  of  the  * 

Athenians  they  remained  to  complete  the  work.  But  we  were 
wanted  to  never  the  allies  of  the  Athenians  in  their  design  of 
themdeHveer-  subjugating  Hellas  ;  we  were  really  the  allies  of  the 
ance  of  Hellenes,  whom  we  sought  to  liberate  from  the  Persians. 

Hellas 

from  the  And  while  in  the  exercise  of  their  command  they  claimed 
But  when  no  supremacy,  we  were  very  ready  to  follow  them.  But 


our  ^ars  began  to  be  aroused  when  we  saw  them  relaxing 
and  t^ie^r  eff°rts  against  the  Persians  and  imposing  the  yoke 
ourselves,     of  their  dominion  upon  the  allies,  who  could  not  unite 

successively         ii/-ii  i  r  «     •       • 

enslaved  by  and    defend    themselves,   for    their    interests   were    too 


various.     And   so  they  were  all  enslaved,  except  our- 
thatweiost  seives  and  the  Chians.     We  forsooth  were  independent 

confidence  r 

in  them!  allies,  free  men  —  that  was  the  word  —  who  fought  at 
their  side.  But,  judging  from  previous  examples,  how 
could  we  any  longer  have  confidence  in  our  leaders? 
For  they  had  subjugated  others  to  whom,  equally  with 
ourselves,  their  faith  was  pledged  ;  and  how  could  we 
who  survived  expect  to  be  spared  if  ever  they  had  the 
power  to  destroy  us  ? 
II.  'Had  all  the  allies  retained  their  Independence,  we 

We  were  an  should  have  had  better  assurance  that  they  would  leave 

offence  to  . 

them,  but  us  as  we  were  ;  but  when  the  majority  had  been  subju- 
freYbe-1  US  gated  by  them,  they  might  naturally  be  expected.  ±o 
ourSvoiun-  ta^e  onr(ence  at  our  footing  of  equality  ;  they  would  con- 
taryadher-  trast  us  who  alone  maintained  this  equality  with  the 

ence  was  a 

testimony     majority  who  had  submitted  to  them  ;  they  would  also 
1  (2)*'  observe  that  in  proportion  as  their  strength  was  increas- 


&'  our  iso^ation  was  increasing  too.  Mutual  fear  is  the 
strong  only  solid  basis  of  alliance  ;  for  he  who  would  break  faith 
the  weak,  is  deterred  from  aggression  by  the  consciousness  of  in- 
fsoiateus,  feriority.  And  why  were  we  left  independent?  Only 
feLed^ur  because  they  thought  that  to  gain  an  empire  they  must 
navy,  (4)  we  Use  fair  words  and  win  their  way  by  policy  and  not  by 
fcTthdr^  violence.  On  the  one  hand,  our  position  was  a  witness  to 
gogues.  their  character.  For,  having  an  equal  vote  with  them, 
we  could  not  be  supposed  to  have  fought  in  their  wars 


SPEECH   OF   THE    MITYLENAEANS.          175 

B.C.  428.  against  our  will,  but  those  whom  they  attacked  must  III. 
have  been  in  the  wrong.  On  the  other  hand,  they  were 
thus  enabled  to  use  the  powerful  against  the  weak  ;  they 
thought  that  they  would  leave  us  to  the  last  ;  when  the 
lesser  states  were  removed,  the  stronger  would  fall  an 
easier  prey.  But  if  they  had  begun  with  us  while  the 
power  of  the  allies  was  still  intact,  and  we  might  have 
afforded  a  rallying-point,  they  would  not  so  easily  have 
mastered  them.  Besides,  our  navy  caused  them  some 
apprehension  ;  they  were  afraid  that  we  might  join  you, 
or  some  other  great  power,  and  that  the  union  would  be 
dangerous  to  them.  For  a  time,  too,  we  saved  ourselves 
by  paying  court  to  the  people  and  to  the  popular  leaders 
of  the  day.  But  we  were  not  likely  to  have  survived  long, 
judging  by  the  conduct  of  the  Athenians  towards  others, 
if  this  war  had  not  arisen. 

'What  trust  then  could  we  repose  in  such  a  friendship       12. 
or  such  a  freedom  as  this  ?    The  civility  which  we  showed  it  was  not 

.  -  mutual  love 

to  one  another  was  at  variance  with  our  real  feelings,  but  mutual* 
They  courted  us  in  time  of  war  because  they  were  afraid  ° 

of  us,  and  we  in  time  of  peace  paid  a  like  attention  to 
them.     And  the  faith  which  is  generally  assured  by  mu-  we  were  not 
tual  good-will  had  with  us  no  other  bond  but  mutual  ity  with 
fear  ;  from  fear,  and  not  from  love,  we  were  constrained  were*  always 
to  maintain  the  alliance,  and  whichever  of  us  first  thought 


that  he  could  safely  venture  would  assuredly  have  been  and  were 

_  therefore  at 

the  first  to  break  it.  And  therefore  if  any  one  imagines  their  mercy. 
that  we  do  wrong  in  striking  first,  because  they  delay 
the  blow  which  we  dread,  and  thinks  that  we  should 
wait  and  make  quite  sure  of  their  intentions,  he  is  mis- 
taken. If  we  are  really  on  an  equality  with  them  and 
in  a  position  to  counteract  their  designs  and  imitate 
their  threatening  attitude,  how  is  it  consistent  with  this 
equality  that  we  must  still  be  at  their  mercy?  The 
power  of  attack  is  always  in  their  hands,  and  the  power 
of  anticipating  attack  should  always  be  in  ours. 

'  These  are  the  reasons  which  we  have  to  plead,  Lace-       1  3. 
daemonians  and  allies,  in  defence  of  our  revolt.     They 


SPEECH  OF  THE   M1TYLENAEANS. 


III. 

Our  revolt, 
though  pre- 
mature, was 
not  rash ; 
it  had  a 
double 
motive  :  we 
feared  the 
Athenians 
and  sympa- 
thised with 
Hellas. 
But  we 
look  to  you 
for  help. 
Now  is  your 
opportunity 
for  attack- 
ing Athens 
by  sea. 
The  battle 
must  be 
fought  in 
the  coun- 
tries on 
which 
Athens 
depends. 


are  clear  enough  to  prove  to  our  hearers  the  justice  of  B.C.  428. 
our  cause,  and  strong  enough  to  alarm  us  and  drive  us  OL  8e 
to  seek  some  deliverance.  We  have  acted  from  no 
sudden  impulse ;  long  ago,  before  the  war  began,  we 
sent  envoys  to  you,  and  proposed  to  revolt.  But  we 
could  not,  because  you  refused  our  request.  Now, 
however,  when  the  Boeotians  have  invited  us,  we  have 
at  once  obeyed  the  call.  We  were  intending  to  make 
a  double  severance  of  ourselves,  from  the  Hellenes  and 
from  the  Athenians ;  from  the  guilt,  that  is,  of  oppress- 
ing the  Hellenes,  in  concert  with  the  Athenians,  instead 
of  aiding  in  their  liberation,  and  from  the  ruin  which  the 
Athenians  were  sooner  or  later  sure  to  bring  upon  us, 
unless  we  anticipated  them.  But  the  step  has  been 
taken  hastily  and  without  due  preparation  ;  hence  you 
are  the  more  bound  to  receive  us  into  alliance  and  to 
send  us  speedy  help,  thereby  showing  that  you  are 
ready  to  protect  those  who  have  claims  upon  you  and 
to  strike  a  blow  at  your  enemies.  Never  was  there  such 
an  opportunity  before.  The  Athenians  are  exhausted  by 
pestilence  and  by  a  costly  war ;  some  of  their  ships  are 
cruising  about  your  shores  ;  the  remainder  are  threaten- 
ing us ;  so  that  they  are  not  likely  to  have  many  to 
spare  if  you,  in  the  course  of  this  summer,  make  a 
second  attack  upon  them  by  land  and  by  sea.  They 
will  not  be  able  to  meet  you  at  sea ;  or,  if  they  do,  they 
will  have  to  withdraw  their  forces  both  from  Lesbos  and 
from  Peloponnesus.  And  let  no  one  say  to  himself  that 
he  is  going  to  incur  a  danger  which  will  be  his  own  on 
behalf  of  a  country  which  is  not  his  own.  He  may 
think  that  Lesbos  is  a  long  way  off;  but  he  will  find 
that  the  help  which  we  bring  will  be  very  near  him. 
For  the  war  will  not  be  fought  in  Attica,  as  might  be 
imagined  ;  but  in  those  countries  by  which  Attica  is 
supported.  The  revenues  of  the  Athenians  are  derived 
from  their  allies,  and,  if  they  subdue  us,  will  be  greater 
than  ever ;  no  one  will  revolt  again,  and  our  resources 
will  be  added  to  theirs ;  and  we  shall  suffer  worse  things 


LESBOS   RECEIVED    INTO    ALLIANCE.        177 
B.C.  428.  than  those  who  have  been  enslaved  already.     But.  if      III. 

Ol   88 

you  assist  us  heartily,  you  will  gain  the  alliance  of  a 
great  naval  power,  and  a  navy  is  your  chief  want ;  you 
will  draw  away  the  allies  of  the  Athenians,  who  will 
fearlessly  come  over  to  you ;  thus  you  will  more  easily 
overthrow  the  power  of  Athens.  And  you  will  no  longer 
incur,  as  in  times  past,  the  reproach  of  deserting  those 
who  revolt a.  If  you  come  forward  as  their  liberators 
your  final  triumph  will  be  assured. 

'  Do   not   then  for  very  shame   frustrate   the   hopes      14- 
which  the  Hellenes  rest  on  you,  or  dishonour  the  name  P° not  then 

betray  us, 

of  Olympian  Zeus  in  whose  temple  we  are  in  a  manner  for  our 
suppliants,  but  be  our  allies  and  helpers.     Do  not  be-  cause  of 
tray  us :  we,  the  people  of  Mitylene,  risk  our  lives  alone  Hellas- 
in  the  common  cause  of  Hellas :   universal  will  be  the 
benefit  which  we  confer  if  we  succeed,  and   still  more 
universal  the  ruin   if  you  are   inflexible   and  we   fall. 
Wherefore  prove  yourselves  worthy  of  your  reputation 
in  Hellas,  and  be  such  as  we  in  our  fear  would  have 
you.' 

These  were  the  words  of  the  Mitylenaeans. 

The  Lacedaemonians  and  the  allies  immediately  ac-      15. 
cepted  their  proposals  and  took  the  Lesbians  into  alliance.  The  Mity- 

lenaeansare 

The  confederates,  who  were  present  at  Olympia,  were  taken  into 
told  to  make  ready  quickly  for  another  expedition  into  amHhe' 
Attica,  and  to  assemble  at  the  Isthmus,  bringing  the  ^are 
usual  contingent  of  two-thirds.      The  Lacedaemonians  directed  to 

,    _  meet  at  the 

arrived  first,  and  at  once  set  to  work  making  machines  isthmus, 
for  hauling  ships  over  the  Isthmus,  from  Corinth  to  the  slowly™ 
Saronic  Gulf.     For  they  intended  to  attack  the  Athe- 
nians both  by  sea  and  land.     But  although  they  were 
energetic  themselves,  the  other  allies  assembled  slowly ; 
they  were  gathering  in  their  harvest  and  in  no  mood  for 
war. 

The  Athenians,   perceiving  that  the  activity  of  the      16. 

Lacedaemonians  was  due  to  a  conviction  of  their  weak-  The  Lace- 
daemonians 
ness,  determined  to  show  them  their  mistake,  and  to  for  the  first 

a  Cp.  i.  40  fin. ;  i.  69. 

N 


178  NAVAL    STRENGTH   OF  ATHENS. 

III.      prove  that,  without  moving  the  fleet  from  Lesbos,  they  B.C.  428. 
time  pre-     were  fuuv  able  to  repel  this  new  force  which  threatened  ° 

pare  to  at-  J 

tack  Attica  them.     They  manned  a  hundred  ships,  in  which  they 

the  Athe-     embarked,  both  metics  and  citizens  a,  all  but  the  highest 

a  hunman   class  and  the  Knights  ;  they  then  set  sail,  and,  after  dis- 

anddthePS'  P^ayin£  tndr  strength  along  the  shores  of  the  Isthmus, 

attempt       made  descents  upon  the  Peloponnesian  coast  wherever 

'  they  pleased.     The   Lacedaemonians   were   astounded, 

and  thought  that  the  Lesbians  had  told  them  what  was 

not  true.     Their  allies  too  had  not  yet  arrived,  and  they 

heard  that   the   Athenians  in   the  thirty  ships  b  which 

had    been    sent    to   cruise    around    Peloponnesus   were 

wasting  their  country  districts  ;    and    so,   not   knowing 

what  else  to  do,  they  returned  home.     However,  they 

afterwards  prepared  a  fleet  to  go  to  Lesbos,  and  ordered 

the  allies  to  equip  forty  ships  :  these  they  placed  under 

the  command  of  Alcidas,  who  was  to  take  them  out. 

When  the  Athenians  saw  that  the  Peloponnesians  had 

gone  home,  they  and  their  fleet  of  a  hundred  ships  did 

the  same. 

1  7-  At  the  time  when  the  fleet  was  at  sea,  the  Athenians 

largest  number  of  ships  which  they  ever  had 


niannayy    all  together,  effective  and   in   good  trim,  although  the 

at  this  time.  t  t  ,  . 

Great  ex-     mere  number  was  as  large  or  even  larger  at  the  com- 


mencement  of  the  war.     For  then  there  were  a  hundred 
*          which  guarded  Attica,  Euboea,  and  Salamis,  and  another 


Potidaea  in  hundred  which  were  cruising  off  Peloponnesus0,  not  in- 
yearofthe  eluding  the  ships  employed  in  blockading  Potidaea  and 
at  other  places  ;  so  that  in  one  and  the  same  summer 
their  fleet  in  all  numbered  two  hundred  and  fifty.  This 
and  the  money  spent  in  the  war  against  Potidaea  was 
the  chief  call  upon  their  treasury.  Every  one  of  the  hop- 
lites  engaged  in  the  siege  received  two  drachmae*1  a-day, 
one  for  himself,  and  one  for  his  servant  ;  the  original 
force  amounted  to  three  thousand  e,  and  this  number 
was  maintained  as  long  as  the  siege  lasted.  Sixteen 

a  Cp.  i.  143  init.  b  Cp.  iii.  7  init.  c  Cp.  ii.  17  fin. 

d  About  is.  yd.  e  Cp.  i.  57  fin.;  61  init. 


BLOCKADE    OF  MITYLENE.  179 

B.C.  428.  hundred  more  came  with  Phormio,  but  went  away  be-  III. 
fore  the  end  a.  The  sailors  in  the  fleet  all  received  the 
same  pay  as  the  soldiers.  So  great  was  the  drain  on 
the  resources  of  the  Athenians  in  the  early  part  of  the 
war,  and  such  was  the  largest  number  of  ships  which 
they  ever  manned. 

While  the  Lacedaemonians  were  at  the  Isthmus,  the      1  8. 
Mitylenaeans  and  their  allies  marched  against  Methymna,  The  Mity- 
which  they  expected  to  be  betrayed  to  them,  but,  making  make  an 
an  assault,  and  finding  that  they  were  mistaken,  they  fui  attempt 
went  off  to  Antissa,  Pyrrha,  and  Eresus  ;    and,  having  Jg^J^6" 
strengthened  the  walls  of  these  places  and  established  The  Me- 

r  thymnaeans 

their  interest  in  them,  they  quickly  returned.     As  soon  attack  An- 
as they  had  retired,  the   Methymnaeans  retaliated   byarseSde-Ut 
making  an  expedition  against  Antissa  ;  but  the  people  Rginforce- 
of  Antissa  and  their  auxiliaries  sallied  out  and  defeated  ™eunts  from 

Athens  ar- 

them  with  heavy  loss  ;  the  survivors  made  a  hasty  re-  rive  under 

Paches  who 

treat.    The  Athenians  heard  that  the  Mitylenaeans  were  blockades 


masters  of  the  country,  and  that  their  own  troops  in  Les- 
bos  were  not  sufficient  to  confine  them  within  the  walls. 
So  about  the  beginning  of  autumn  they  sent  to  Mity- 
lene,  under  the  command  of  Paches  the  son  of  Epicurus, 
a  thousand  Athenian  hoplites  who  handled  the  oars 
themselves.  On  arriving,  they  surrounded  the>  town 
with  a  single  line  of  wall  ;  and  in  some  strong  places 
forts  were  erected  which  formed  part  of  the  wall.  Thus 
Mitylene  was  effectually  blockaded  both  by  sea  and 
by  land.  The  winter  now  began  to  set  in. 

The  Athenians,  being  in  want  of  money  to  carry  on      19. 
the  siege,  raised  among  themselves  for  the  first  time  a  T.he  Ath.e- 

mans  raise 

property-tax   of   two   hundred   talents  b,    and    sent   out  a  property- 
twelve  ships  to  collect  tribute  among  the  allies,  under  Lysicies  is 


the  command  of  Lysicies  and  four  others.     He  sailed 

to  various  places  and  exacted  the  tribute  ;    but  as  he  he  *s  killed 

in  Caria. 

was  going  up  from  Myus  in  Caria,  through  the  plain 
of  the  Maeander,  he  was  attacked  at  the  hill  of  Sandius 

a  Cp.  i.  64  med.;  ii.  58  med.  b  ,£48,000. 

N  2 


l8o  SIEGE    OF  PLATAEA. 

III.      by  the  Carians  and  the  people  of  Anaeaa,  and,  with  a  B.C.  428. 

great  part  of  his  army,  perished. 
20.          During  the  same  winter  the  Plataeans,  who  were  still 

besieged  by  the  Peloponnesians  and  Boeotians,  began  to 


solve  to       suffer  from  the  failure  of  provisions.     They  had  no  hope 

break  out         ......  ... 

ofPiataea,  of  assistance  from  Athens  and  no  other  chance  of  de- 
liverance.     So  they  and  the  Athenians  who  were  shut 


them  contrived  a  plan  of  forcing  their  way 
severe.  over  the  enemy's  walls.  The  idea  was  suggested  by 
mate  the  Theaenetus  the  son  of  Tolmides,  a  diviner,  and  Eumol- 


pides  the  son  of  Dai'machus,  one  of  their  generals.     At 
^rst  they  were  a^  desirous  of  joining,  but  afterwards 

bricks.  half  of  them  somehow  lost  heart,  thinking  the  danger 
too  great,  and  only  two  hundred  and  twenty  agreed  to 
persevere.  They  first  made  ladders  equal  in  length  to 
the  height  of  the  enemy's  wall,  which  they  calculated 
by  help  of  the  layers  of  bricks  on  the  side  facing  the 
town,  at  a  place  where  the  wall  had  accidentally  not  been 
plastered.  A  great  many  counted  at  once,  and,  although 
some  might  make  mistakes,  the  calculation  would  be 
oftener  right  than  wrong  ;  for  they  repeated  the  process 
again  and  again,  and,  the  distance  not  being  great,  they 
could  see  the  wall  distinctly  enough  for  their  purpose. 
In  this  manner  they  ascertained  the  proper  length  of  the 
ladders,  taking  as  a  measure  the  thickness  of  the  bricks. 
21.  The  Peloponnesian  wall  was  double,  and  consisted 

Plan  of  the  of  an  inner  circle  looking  towards  Plataea,  and  an  outer 

Pelopon- 

nesian wall,  intended  to  guard  against  an  attack  from  Athens  ;  they 
were  at  a  distance  of  about  sixteen  feet  from  one 
another.  This  interval  of  sixteen  feet  was  partitioned 
off  into  lodgings  for  the  soldiers,  by  which  the  two 
walls  were  joined  together,  so  that  they  appeared  to 
form  one  thick  wall  with  battlements  on  both  sides.  At 
every  tenth  battlement  there  were  large  towers,  filling 
up  the  space  between  the  walls,  and  extending  both 
to  the  inner  and  outer  face  ;  there  was  no  way  at  the 
side  of  the  towers,  but  only  through  the  middle  of  them. 
a  Cp.  iii.  32  init.  ;  iv.  75  med. 


THE   ESCAPE   FROM  PLATAEA.  181 

B.C.  428.  During  the  night,  whenever  there  was  storm  and  rain,      III. 
the  soldiers  left  the  battlements  and  kept  guard  from  the 
towers,  which  were  not  far  from  each  other  and  were 
covered  overhead.     Such  was  the  plan  of  the  wall  with 
which  Plataea  was  invested. 

When  the  Plataeans  had  completed  their  preparations       22. 
they  took  advantage  of  a  night  on  which  there  was  a  The  Pia- 

...  .  ...  taeans  sally 

storm  of  wind  and  ram  and  no  moon,  and  sallied  forth,  forth. 
They  were  led  by  the   authors  of  the  attempt.     First  discovered 
of  all  they  crossed  the  ditch  which  surrounded  the  town  ; 


then  they  went  forward  to  the  wall  of  the  enemy.     The  Their 

friends  in 

guard  did  not  discover  them,  for  the  night  was  so  dark  the  city 
that  they  could  not  be  seen,  while  the  clatter  of  the 
storm  drowned  the  noise  of  their  approach.  They 
marched  a  good  way  apart  from  each  other,  that  the 
clashing  of  their  arms  might  not  betray  them  ;  and 
they  were  lightly  equipped,  having  the  right  foot  bare 
that  they  might  be  less  liable  to  slip  in  the  mud.  They 
now  set  about  scaling  the  battlements,  which  they  knew 
to  be  deserted,  choosing  a  space  between  two  of  the 
towers.  Those  who  carried  the  ladders  went  first  and 
placed  them  against  the  wall  ;  they  were  followed  by 
twelve  others,  armed  only  with  sword  and  breastplate, 
under  the  command  of  Ammeas  the  son  of  Coroebus  : 
he  was  the  first  to  mount  ;  after  him  came  the  twelve, 
six  ascending  each  of  the  two  towers  on  the  right  and 
left.  To  these  succeeded  more  men  lightly  armed  with 
short  spears,  others  following  who  bore  their  shields,  that 
they  might  have  less  difficulty  in  mounting  the  wall  ; 
the  shields  were  to  be  handed  to  them  as  soon  as  they 
were  near  the  enemy.  A  considerable  number  had  now 
ascended,  when  they  were  discovered  by  the  guards.  One 
of  the  Plataeans,  taking  hold  of  the  battlements,  threw 
down  a  tile  which  made  a  noise  in  falling  :  immediately 
a  shout  was  raised  and  the  enemy  rushed  out  upon  the 
wall  ;  for  in  the  dark  and  stormy  night  they  did  not 
know  what  the  alarm  meant.  At  the  same  time,  in 
order  to  distract  their  attention,  the  Plataeans  who  were 


1 82      THE  PASSAGE  OF  THE  ENEMY'S   WALL. 

III.  left  in  the  city  made  a  sally  against  the  Peloponnesian  B.C.  428. 
wall  on  the  side  opposite  to  the  place  at  which  their 
friends  were  getting  over.  The  besiegers  were  in  great 
excitement,  but  every  one  remained  at  his  own  post, 
and  dared  not  stir  to  give  assistance,  being  at  a  loss 
to  imagine  what  was  happening.  The  three  hundred 
who  were  appointed  to  act  in  any  sudden  emergency 
marched  along  outside  the  walls  towards  the  spot  from 
which  the  cry  proceeded ;  and  fire-signals  indicating 
danger  were  raised  towards  Thebes.  But  the  Plataeans 
in  the  city  had  numerous  counter  signals  ready  on  the 
wall,  which  they  now  lighted  and  held  up,  thereby 
hoping  to  render  the  signals  of  the  enemy  unintelligible, 
that  so  the  Thebans,  misunderstanding  the  true  state  of 
affairs,  might  not  arrive  until  the  men  had  escaped  and 
were  in  safety. 

23.          Meanwhile  the  Plataeans  were  scaling  the  walls.    The 
The  Pia-     first  party  had  mounted,  and,  killing  the  sentinels,  had 

taeans,  pro-        .  ,  ....          rr-i 

tectedby  gained  possession  of  the  towers  on  either  side.  Their 
men  who  followers  now  began  to  occupy  the  passages,  lest  the 
towers^first  enemy  should  come  through  and  fall  upon  them.  Some 
get  over  the  of  them  placed  ladders  upon  the  wall  against  the  towers, 

wall  ;  they  A       1  r        •      -i 

then  cross  and  got  up  more  men.  A  shower  of  missiles  proceed- 
'°  "  ing  both  from  the  upper  and  lower  parts  of  the  towers 
kept  off  all  assailants.  Meanwhile  the  main  body  of  the 
Plataeans,  who  were  still  below,  applied  to  the  wall 
many  ladders  at  once,  and,  pushing  down  the  battle- 
ments, made  their  way  over  through  the  space  between 
the  towers.  As  each  man  got  to  the  other  side  he  halted 
upon  the  edge  of  the  ditch,  whence  they  shot  darts  and 
arrows  at  any  one  who  came  along  under  the  wall  and 
attempted  to  impede  their  passage.  When  they  had  all 
passed  over,  those  who  had  occupied  the  towers  came 
down,  the  last  of  them  not  without  great  difficulty,  and 
proceeded  towards  the  ditch.  By  this  time  the  three 
hundred  were  upon  them ;  they  had  lights,  and  the 
Plataeans,  standing  on  the  edge  of  the  ditch,  saw  them 
all  the  better  out  of  the  darkness,  and  shot  arrows  and 


SAFE   ARRIVAL    AT   ATHENS.  183 

B.C.  428.  threw  darts  at  them  where  their  bodies  were  exposed  ;  III. 
they  themselves  were  concealed  by  the  darkness,  while 
the  enemy  were  dazed  by  their  own  lights.  And  so  the 
Plataeans,  down  to  the  last  man  of  them  all,  got  safely 
•  over  the  ditch,  though  with  great  exertion  and  only  after 
a  hard  struggle  ;  for  the  ice  in  it  was  not  frozen  hard 
enough  to  bear,  but  was  half  water,  as  is  commonly  the 
case  when  the  wind  is  from  the  east  and  not  from  the 
north.  And  the  snow  which  the  east  wind  brought  in 
the  night  had  greatly  swollen  the  water,  so  that  they 
a  could  scarcely  accomplish  the  passage a.  It  was  the 
violence  of  the  storm,  however,  which  enabled  them  to 
escape  at  all. 

From  the  ditch  the  Plataeans,  leaving  on  the  right  24. 
hand  the  shrine  of  Androcrates,  ran  all  together  along  They  first 
the  road  to  Thebes.  They  made  sure  that  no  one  would 
ever  suspect  them  of  having  fled  in  the  direction  of  their 
enemies.  On  their  way  they  saw  the  Peloponnesians  th? moun- 
pursuing  them  with  torches  on  the  road  which  leads  to  Athens. 
Athens  by  Cithaeron  and  Dryoscephalae.  For  nearly  a 
mile  the  Plataeans  continued  on  the  Theban  road  ;  they 
then  turned  off  and  went  by  the  way  up  the  mountain 
leading  to  Erythrae  and  Hysiae,  and  so,  getting  to  the 
hills,  they  escaped  to  Athens.  Their  number  was  two 
hundred  and  twelve b,  though  they  had  been  originally 
more,  for  some  of  them  went  back  to  the  city  and  never 
got  over  the  wall  ;  one  who  was  an  archer  was  taken 
at  the  outer  ditch.  The  Peloponnesians  at  length  gave 
up  the  pursuit  and  returned  to  their  lines.  But  the 
Plataeans  in  the  city,  knowing  nothing  of  what  had 
happened,  for  those  who  had  turned  back  had  informed 
them  that  not  one  was  left  alive,  sent  out  a  herald  at 
daybreak,  wanting  to  make  a  truce  for  the  burial  of  the 
dead ;  they  then  discovered  the  truth  and  returned. 
Thus  the  Plataeans  scaled  the  wall  and  escaped. 

a  Taking  vnspf'xfiv  in  the  sense  of  'superare:'  or,  'could  hardly 
keep  above  the  surface  in  crossing.' 
b  Cp.  iii.  20  med. 


184  FOURTH  INVASION   OF  ATTICA. 

III.          At  the  end  of  the  same  winter  Salaethus  the  Lace-  B.C.  428. 

25.  daemonian  was  despatched  in  a  trireme  from  Lacedae- 
Saiaethus  is  mon  to  Mitylene.  He  sailed  to  Pyrrha,  and  thence, 
Lacedae-  proceeding  on  foot,  made  his  way,  by  the  channel  of  a 
torrent  at  a  place  where  the  line  of  the  Athenian  wall 


with  the      could  be  crossed,  undiscovered  into  Mitylene.     He  told 

news  that  ' 

help  is  on  the  government  that  there  was  to  be  an  invasion  of 
Attica,  and  that  simultaneously  the  forty  ships  which 
were  coming  to  their  assistance  would  arrive  at  Lesbos  ; 
he  himself  had  been  sent  in  advance  to  bring  the  news 
and  take  charge  of  affairs.  Whereupon  the  Mitylenaeans 
recovered  their  spirits,  and  were  less  disposed  to  make 
terms  with  the  Athenians.  So  the  winter  ended,  and 
with  it  the  fourth  year  in  the  Peloponnesian  War  of 
which  Thucydides  wrote  the  history. 
26.  With  the  return  of  summer  the  Peloponnesians  de-  B.C.  427. 

After  de-     snatched  the  two  and  forty  ships  which  they  intended  Oh  88>  2' 

spatchmg  a    ^  *  J 

fleet  under  for  Mitylene  in  charge  of  Alcidas,  the  Lacedaemonian 
Lesbos,  the  admiral.     They  and  their  allies  then  invaded  Attica,  in 


-  or<^er  that  the  Athenians,  embarrassed  both  by  sea  and 
vade  Attica,  ian(j    might  have   their  attention   distracted   from   the 

causing 

great  dis-  ships  sailing  to  Mitylene.  Cleomenes  led  the  invasion. 
He  was  acting  in  the  place  of  his  nephew,  the  king 
Pausanias,  son  of  Pleistoanax,  who  was  still  a  minor. 
All  the  country  which  they  had  previously  overrun, 
wherever  anything  had  grown  up  again,  they  ravaged 
afresh,  and  devastated  even  those  districts  which  they 
had  hitherto  spared.  This  invasion  caused  greater  dis- 
tress to  the  Athenians  than  any,  except  the  second.  For 
the  Peloponnesians,  who  were  daily  expecting  to  hear 
from  Lesbos  of  some  action  .on  the  part  of  the  fleet, 
which  they  supposed  by  this  time  to  have  crossed  the 
sea,,  pursued  their  ravages  far  and  wide.  But  when  none 
of  their  expectations  were  realised,  and  their  food  was 
exhausted,  they  retired  and  dispersed  to  their  several 
cities. 

2  7.          Meanwhile  the  Mitylenaeans,  finding  as  time  went  on 

Pel°P°nnesus  never  came,  and  that 


SURRENDER    OF  MITYLEN&.  185 

B.C.  427.  their  provisions  had  run  short,  were  obliged  to  make      III. 
2'  terms  with  the  Athenians.     The  immediate  cause  was  of  help, 
as  follows  :  —  Salaethus  himself  began  to  despair  of  the  people,  who 
arrival  of  the  ships,  and  therefore  he  put  into  the  hands  [heVobies. 
of  the  common  people  (who   had  hitherto  been  light- 
armed)  shields  and  spears,  intending  to  lead  them  out 
against  the  Athenians.     But,  having  once  received  arms, 
they  would  no  longer  obey  their  leaders  ;  they  gathered 
into  knots  and  insisted  that  the  nobles  should  bring  out 
the  corn  and  let  all  share   alike  ;    if  not,  they  would 
themselves  negotiate  with  the  Athenians  and  surrender 
the  city. 

The  magistrates,  knowing  that  they  were  helpless,  and      28. 
that  they  would  be  in  peril  of  their  lives  if  they  were  left  Tlle  s°- 

'  vernment, 

out  of  the  convention,  concluded  a  general  agreement  feeling  their 
with  Paches  and  his  army  stipulating  that  the  fate  of 
the  Mitylenaeans  should   be   left   in  the  hands  of  the 
Athenians  at  home.     They  were  to  receive  him  and  his  Paches,  on 

condition 

forces  into  the  city  ;   but  might   send    an  embassy  to  that  the 
Athens  on  their  own  behalf.    Until  the  envoys  returned, 
Paches  was  not  to  bind,  enslave,  or  put  to  death  any 


Mitylenaean.     These  were  the  terms  of  the  capitulation,  fate  of  the 

inhabitants. 

Nevertheless,  when  the  army  entered,  those  Mityle- 
naeans who  had  been  principally  concerned  with  the 
Lacedaemonians  were  in  an  agony  of  fear,  and  could 
not  be  satisfied  until  they  had  taken  refuge  at  the 
altars.  Paches  raised  them  up,  and  promising  not  to 
hurt  them,  deposited  them  at  Tenedos  until  the  Athe- 
nians should  come  to  a  decision.  He  also  sent  triremes 
to  Antissa,  of  which  he  gained  possession,  and  took  such 
other  military  measures  as  he  deemed  best. 

The  forty  ships  of  the  Peloponnesians,  which  should       29. 
have  gone  at   once   to   Mitylene,  lost  time   about   the  The  Peio- 

_    ,  .  ponnesian 

Peloponnese,  and  proceeded  very  leisurely  on  their  voyage,  fleet  in- 

They  were  not  discovered  by  any  ships  from  Athens, 

and  arrived  safely  at  Delos  ;  but  on  touching  at  Icarus 

and  Myconus  they  heard,  too  late,  that  Mitylene  was  hearing  of 

taken.     Wanting    to   obtain    certain   information,   they  sails  to 

Embatum, 


186  SPEECH    OF    TEUTIAPLUS. 

III.       sailed  to  Embatum  in  Erythrae,  which  they  reached,  but  B.C.  427. 
and  holds     not  until  seven  days  after  the  fall  of  Mitylene.     Having  O1<  88'  2' 

a  council.  J  ' 

Speech  of    now  made  sure  of  the  fact,  they  consulted  as  to  what 
measures   should    next   be   taken,   and    Teutiaplus,   an 
Elean,  addressed  them  as  follows  : — 
30.  'My  opinion,  Alcidas,  and  you,  my  fellow-commanders 

Let  us         of  the   Peloponnesian   forces,  is  that  we  should  attack 

hurry  on  to  , 

Mitylene.     Mitylene  at  once,  just  as  we  are,   before  our  arrival  is 
find  the       known.     In  all  probability  we  shall  find  that  men  who 
offtheSnS    ^ave  recently  gained  possession  of  a  city  will  be  much 
guard.         off  their  guard,  and  entirely  so  at  sea,  on  which  element 
the  general  they  do  not  fear  the  attack  of  an  enemy,  and  where  our 
prise  others,  strength  at  present  chiefly  lies.     Probably  too  their  land 
f°rces>  m  the  carelessness  of  victory,  will  be  scattered  up 
and  down  among  the  houses  of  the  city.     If  we  were  to 
fall  upon  them  suddenly  by  night,  with  the  help  of  our 
friends  inside,  should  there  be  any  left,  I  have  no  doubt 
that  Mitylene  would  be  ours.     The  danger  should  not 
deter  us  ;  for  we  should  consider  that  the  execution  of 
a  military  surprise  is  always  dangerous,  and  that  the 
general  who  is  never  taken  off  his  guard  himself,  and 
never  loses  an  opportunity  of  striking  at  an  unguarded 
foe,  will  be  most  likely  to  succeed  in  war.' 
31-  His   words   failed    to    convince   Alcidas;    whereupon 

it  is  also     some   Ionian    exiles   and   the    Lesbians   who  were   on 

proposed  to 

occupy        board  the  fleet a  recommended   that,  if  this   enterprise 

and  raise  a  appeared  too  hazardous,  he  should  occupy  one  of  the 

Ionia*  mBut  I°nian  towns   or  the  Aeolian   Cyme  :    having  thus  es- 

^ec^both"  tablished   their   head-quarters   in   a  city,  the    Pelopon- 

proposi-      nesians   might   raise   the    standard    of   revolt    in    Ionia. 

hurries        There  was  a  good  chance  of  success,  for  every  one  was 

glad  of  his  arrival ;  they  might  cut  off  a  main  source  of 

Athenian  revenue  ;  and  although  they  themselves  would 

incur  expense,  for  the  Athenians  would  blockade  them  b, 

the  attempt  was  worth  making.     Pissuthnes  might  very 

likely  be   persuaded    to    co-operate.      But  Alcidas   ob- 

a  i.  e.  the  envoys  who  had  been  sent  to  Sparta.  Cp.  iii.  4  fin.,  5  fin. 
b  Adopting  with  Bekker  the  conjecture  e' 


RETURN   OF  ALCIDAS.  187 

B.C.  427.  jected  to  this  proposal  equally  with  the  last;  his  only      III. 
2'  idea  was,  now  that  he  had  failed  in  saving  Mitylene,  to 
get  back  as  fast  as  he  could  to  Peloponnesus. 

Accordingly  he  sailed  from  Embatum  along  the  coast,       32' 
touching  at  Myonnesus  in  the  territory  of  Teos  ;  he  there  ™^nseax~iles 
slew  most  of  the  captives  whom  he  had  taken  on  his  remonstrate 

,    —.    .  ,  with  him 

voyage.     He  then  put  into  harbour  at  Ephesus,  where  for  his  im- 
a  deputation  from  the  Samians  of  Anaea  a  came  to  him.  j^ng'the 
They  told  him  that  he  had  an  ill  manner  of  liberating  ^f0^e 
Hellas,  if  he  put  to  death  men  who  were  not  his  enemies  had  taken. 
and  were  not  lifting  a  hand  against  him,  but  were  allies 
of  Athens  from  necessity:  if  he  went  on  in  this  way  he 
would  convert  few  of  his  enemies  into  friends,  and  many 
of  his  friends  into  enemies.     He  was  convinced  by  them, 
and  allowed  such  of  the  Chian  prisoners  as  he  had  not 
yet  put  to  death  and  some  others  to  go  free.     They  had 
been  easily  taken,  because,  when  people  saw  the  ships, 
instead  of  flying,  they  came  close  up  to  them  under  the 
idea  that  they  were  Athenian;  the  thought  never  entered 
into  their  minds  that  while  the  Athenians  were  masters 
of  the  sea,   Peloponnesian   ships  would  find  their  way 
across  the  Aegean  to  the  coast  of  Ionia. 

From  Ephesus  Alcidas  sailed  away  in  haste,  or  rather      33- 
fled;  for  while  he  was  at  anchor  near  Clarus  he  had  been  J*e  sa|!s, 

from  Ephe- 

sighted  by  the  Athenian  sacred  vessels,  Paralus  and  sus  direct 
Salaminia,  which  happened  to  be  on  a  voyage  from  ponnesus, 
Athens.  In  fear  of  pursuit  he  hurried  through .  the 
open  sea,  determined  to  stop  nowhere,  if  he  could  help 
it,  until  he  reached  Peloponnesus.  News  of  him  and  his  Salaminia, 

n  1  -r»      i          r  /-  T-         1  and  is  pur- 

fleet  was  brought  to  Paches  from  the  country  of  Erythrae,  sued  as  far 

and  indeed  kept  coming  in  from  all  sides.  For  Ionia  not  by 
being  fortified,  there  was  great  apprehension  lest  the 
Peloponnesians,  as  they  sailed  along  the  coast,  might 
fall  upon  the  cities  and  plunder  them,  even  though  they 
had  no  intention  of  remaining.  And  the  Paralus  and 
Salaminia  reported  that  they  had  themselves  seen  him 
at  Clarus.  Paches  eagerly  gave  chase  and  pursued  him 

a  Gp.  iii.  19  fin.;  iv.  75  med. 


188  PACHES   AT   NOTIUM. 

III.      as  far  as  the  island  of  Patmos,  but,  seeing  that  he  was  no  B.C.  427. 
longer  within  reach,  he  returned.     Not  having  come  up  O1<  88'  2* 
with  the  fleet  of  the  Peloponnesians  upon  the  open  sea, 
he  congratulated  himself  that  they  had  not  been  over- 
taken somewhere  near  land,  where  they  would  have  been 
forced  to  put  in  and  fortify  themselves  on  shore,  and  the 
Athenians  would  have  had  the  trouble  of  watching  and 
blockading  them. 

34-  As  he  was  sailing  along  the  coast  on  his  return  he 

at  Notium,  the  port  of  Colophon.     Here  some 


puts  in  at     inhabitants  of  the  upper  town  had  taken  up  their  abode; 
the  port'  of  for  it  had  been  captured  by  Itamenes  and  the  Barba- 
rians,  who  had  been  invited  into  the  city  by  a  certain 
local  faction-     The  capture  took  place  about  the  time  of 
Persian       the  second  invasion  of  Attica.     The  refugees  who  settled 
which  had    in  Notium  again  quarrelled  among  themselves.    The  one 
out"  '      'n  Party  )  having  introduced  Arcadian  and  Barbarian  auxili- 
the  citadel   ar*es  whom  tney  had  obtained  from  Pissuthnes,  stationed 
and  treach-  them  in  a  fortified  quarter  of  the  town;  the  Persian  faction 
kills  the      from  the  upper  city  of  Colophon  joined  them  and  were 
Hving  with  them.     The  other  party  had  retired  from  the 
c*tv'  an<^  being  now  m  exile,  called  in  Paches.     He  pro- 
establish      posed  to  Hippias,  the  commander  of  the  Arcadians  in 
phonians     the  fortress,  that  they  should  hold  a  conference,  under- 
im'  taking,  if  they  could  not  agree,  to  put  him  back  in  the 
fort,  safe  and  sound.     So  he  came  out,  and  Paches  kept 
him  in  custody  without   fetters.     In  the  meantime  he 
made  an  attack  upon  the  unsuspecting  garrison,  took 
the   fortress,   and    slaughtered    all    the   Arcadians    and 
Barbarians  whom  he  found  within.     He  then  conducted 
Hippias  into  the  fort,  according  to  the  agreement,  and 
when  he  was  inside  seized  him  and  shot  him  to  death 
with  arrows.     He  next  handed  over  Notium  to  the  Colo- 
phonians,  excluding  the  Persian  party.     The  Athenians 
afterwards  gathered  together  all  the  Colophonians  who 
could  be  found  in  the  neighbouring  cities  and  colonised 
the  place,  to  which  they  gave  laws  like  their  own,  under 
regular  leaders  whom  they  sent  out  from  Athens. 


THE    DECREE   AGAINST   MITYLEN&.         189 

B.C.  427.      On  returning  to  Lesbos,  Paches  reduced  Pyrrha  and      III. 
2<  Eresus,  and  finding  Salaethus,  the  Lacedaemonian  go-      35. 
vernor,  concealed  in  Mitylene,  sent  him  to  Athens.     He  Salaethus 

,  is  captured 

also  sent  thither  the  Mitylenaeans  whom  he  had  de-  and  sent  to 


posited  in  Tenedos,  and  any  others  who  seemed  to 
have  been  implicated  in  the  revolt.  He  then  dismissed 
the  greater  part  of  his  army,  and,  by  the  aid  of  the 
remainder,  settled  as  seemed  best  to  him  the  affairs 
of  Mitylene  and  Lesbos. 

When  the  captives  arrived  at  Athens  the  Athenians       36. 
instantly   put   Salaethus   to  death,  although   he   made  T.he  Athe- 

*  mans  put 

various   offers,   and    among   other  things    promised    to  Salaethus  to 
procure    the   withdrawal   of    the    Peloponnesians   from  order  'the 
Plataea,   which   was   still   blockaded.      Concerning  the$2fj£ 
other    captives   a    discussion   was    held,   and    in    their  grown-up 

citizens  ot 

indignation  the  Athenians  determined  to  put  to  death  Mitylene. 

A    .  1,1  On  the  next 

not  only  the  men  then  at  Athens,  but  all  the  grown-  day  they 
up  citizens  of  Mitylene,  and  to  enslave  the  women  and 
children  ;  the  act  of  the  Mitylenaeans  appeared  inexcus- 


able,  because  they  were  not  subjects  like  the  other  states  envoys  per- 

which  had  revolted,  but  free.     That  Peloponnesian  ships  magistrates 

should  have  had  the  audacity  to  find  their  way  to  Ionia 

and  assist  the  rebels  contributed  to  increase  their  fury, 

and  led  them  to  suspect  that  the  revolt  awas  a  long 

premeditated  affair  a.     So  they  sent  a  trireme  to  Paches 

announcing   their  determination,  and  bidding  him  put 

the  Mitylenaeans  to  death  at  once.     But  on  the  follow- 

ing day  a  kind  of  remorse  seized  them  ;  they  began  to 

reflect  that  a  decree  which  doomed  to  destruction  not 

only  the  guilty,  but  a  whole  city,  was  cruel  and  monstrous. 

The   Mitylenaean   envoys  who   were  at  Athens  b    per- 

ceived the  change  of  feeling,  and  they  and  the  Athenians 

who  were  in  their  interest  prevailed  on  the  magistrates 

to  bring  the  question  again  before  the  people  ;  this  they 

were  the  more  willing  to  do,  because  they  saw  themselves 

that  the  majority  of  the  citizens  were  anxious  to  have  an 

opportunity  given  them  of  reconsidering  their  decision. 

a  Or,  'was  part  of  an  extensive  scheme.'          b  Cp.  iii.  28  med. 


190  SPEECH    OF   CLEON. 

III.      An  assembly  was  again  summoned,  and  different  opinions  B.C.  427. 
were  expressed  by  different  speakers.     In  the  former  as- 
sembly, Cleon  the  son  of  Cleaenetus  had  carried  the  de- 
cree condemning  the  Mitylenaeans  to  death.    He  was  the 
most  violent  of  the  citizens,  and  at  that  time  exercised 
Speech  of    by  far  the  greatest  influence  over  the  people  a.    And  now 
he  came  forward  a  second  time  and  spoke  as  follows  :  — 
37.  'I  have  remarked  again  and  again  that  a  democracy 

YOU  do  not  cannot  manage  an   empire,  but  never  more  than   now, 

know  how 

to  manage  when  I  see  you  regretting  your  condemnation  of  the 
Mitylenaeans.  Having  no  fear  or  suspicion  of  one 
another  in  daily  lifeb,  you  deal  with  your  allies  upon  the 

your  allies,  same  principle,  and  you  do  not  consider  that  whenever 

who  do  not  .  .  . 

love  you  ;  you  yield  to  them  out  of  pity  or  are  misled  by  their 
specious  tales,  you  are  guilty  of  a  weakness  dangerous 
to  vourselves>  and  receive  no  thanks  from  them.  You 


changing     should  remember  that  your  empire  is  a  despotism0  ex- 

your  minds. 

ercised  over  unwilling  subjects,  who  are  always  con- 
spiring against  you  ;  they  do  not  obey  in  return  for  any 
kindness  which  you  do  them  to  your  own  injury,  but  in 
so  far  as  you  are  their  masters  ;  they  have  no  love  of  you, 
but  they  are  held  down  by  force.  Besides,  what  can 
be  more  detestable  than  to  be  perpetually  changing  our 
minds?  We  forget  that  a  state  in  which  the  laws, 
though  imperfect,  are  unalterable,  is  better  off  than  one 
in  which  the  laws  are  good  but  powerless  d.  Dulness 
and  modesty  are  a  more  useful  combination  than  clever- 
ness and  licence;  and  the  more  simple  sort  generally 
make  better  citizens  than  the  more  astute.  For  the 
latter  desire  to  be  thought  wiser  than  the  laws  e  ;  they 
want  to  be  always  taking  a  lead  in  the  discussions  of 
the  assembly;  they  think  that  they  can  nowhere  have 
a  finer  opportunity  of  speaking  their  mindf,  and  their 
folly  generally  ends  in  the  ruin  of  their  country  ;  whereas 
the  others,  mistrusting  their  own  capacity,  admit  that  the 
laws  are  wiser  than  themselves  :  they  do  not  pretend  to 

a  Cp.  vi.  21  med.  b  Cp.  i.  68  init.  c  Cp.  ii.  63  med. 

d  Cp.  vi.  1  8  fin.  e  Cp.  i.  84  med.  f  Cp.  iii.  40  init. 


SPEECH    OF    CLEON.  191 

B.C.  427.  criticise  the  arguments  of  a  great  speaker ;  and  being  III. 
2<  impartial  judges,  not  ambitious  rivals,  they  are  generally 
in  the  right.  That  is  the  spirit  in  which  we  should  act ; 
not  suffering  ourselves  to  be  so  excited  by  our  own 
cleverness  in  a  war  of  wits  as  to  advise  the  Athenian 
people  contrary  to  our  own  better  judgment. 

*  I  myself  think  as  I  did  before,  and  I  wonder  at  those      38. 
who  have  brought  forward  the  case  of  the  Mitylenaeans  Why  is 
again,  thus  interposing  a  delay  which  is  in  the  interest  punishment 
of  the   evil-doer.     For   after  a  time  the  anger  of  the  wmlny 
sufferer  waxes  dull,  and  he  pursues    the  offender  with  °hatptSrnd 
less  keenness ;  but  the  vengeance  which  follows  closest  crimes  do 

us  good  ? 

upon   the   wrong   is   most   adequate  to    it   and  exacts  or  would 
the  fullest  retribution.     And  again  I  wonder  who  will  s^LiTon 
answer  me,  and  whether  he  will  attempt  to  show  that  ffh^r  ^eahsalf 
the  crimes  of  the  Mitylenaeans  are  a  benefit  to  us,  or  not  well 
that  when  we  suffer,  our  allies  suffer  with  us.     Clearly  you  were 
he  must  be  some  one  who  has  such  confidence  in  his  to  facts 
powers  of  speech  as  to  contend  athat  you  never  adopted  nercyoT* 
what  was  most  certainly  your  resolution a ;    or  else  he  eveir clever 

J    J  talker? 

must  be  some  one  who,  under  the  inspiration  of  a  bribe, 
elaborates  a  sophistical  speech  in  the  hope  of  diverting 
you  from  the  point.  In  such  rhetorical  contests  the 
city  gives  away  the  prizes  to  others,  while  she  takes 
the  risk  upon  herself.  And  you  are  to  blame,  for  you 
order  these  contests  amiss.  When  speeches  are  to  be 
heard,  you  are  too  fond  of  using  your  eyes,  but,  where 
actions  are  concerned,  you  trust  your  ears ;  you  estimate 
the  possibility  of  future  enterprises  from  the  eloquence 
of  an  orator,  but  as  to  accomplished  facts,  instead  of 
accepting  ocular  demonstration,  you  believe  only  what 
ingenious  critics  tell  youb.  No  men  are  better  dupes, 
sooner  deceived  by  novel  notions,  or  slower  to  follow 
approved  advice.  You  despise  what  is  familiar,  while 
you  are  worshippers  of  every  new  extravagance.  Not 
a  man  of  you  but  would  be  an  orator  if  he  could  ; 

a  Or, *  that  what  all  men  believe  to  be  true  is  absolutely  false.' 
b  Cp.  vii.  48  med. 


IQ2  SPEECH   OF   CLEON. 

III.  when  he  cannot,  he  will  not  yield  the  palm  to  a  more  B.C.  427. 
successful  rival :  he  would  fain  show  that  he  does  not  Q1-  88>  2p 
let  his  wits  come  limping  after,  but  that  he  can  praise 
a  sharp  remark  before  it  is  well  out  of  another's  mouth  ; 
he  would  like  to  be  as  quick  in  anticipating  what  is  said, 
as  he  is  slow  in  foreseeing  its  consequences.  You  are 
always  hankering  after  an  ideal  state,  but  you  do  not 
give  your  minds  even  to  what  is  straight  before  you. 
In  a  word,  you  are  at  the  mercy  of  your  own  ears,  and 
sit  like  spectators  attending  a  performance  of  sophists, 
but  very  unlike  counsellors  of  a  state. 

39-          '  I  want  you  to  put  aside  this  trifling,  and  therefore 

domfus  so5  ^  say  to  y°u  *kat  no  sm§^e  city  has  ever  mJured  us  so 
much  harm  deeply  as  Mitylene.  I  can  excuse  those  who  find  our 
;  none  rule  too  heavy  to  bear,  or  who  have  revolted  because 
the  enemy  have  compelled  them.  But  islanders  who 
reason.  jia(j  waus  anci  were  unassailable  by  our  enemies,  except 

Our  mdul-  ' 

gencehas    at  sea,  and  on  that  element  were  sufficiently  protected 

made  them  .  . 

insolent,  by  a  fleet  of  their  own,  who  were  independent  and 
peop1!? and  treated  by  us  with  the  highest  regard,  when  they  act 
Sunishede  t^lus  ^eY  nave  not  revolted  (that  word  would  imply 
alike,  for  that  they  were  oppressed),  but  they  have  rebelled,  and 
ail  equally  entering  the  ranks  of  our  bitterest  enemies,  have  con- 
ff'youpar-  spired  with  them  to  seek  our  ruin.  And  surely  this  is 
don  them  far  more  atrocious  than  if  they  had  been  led  by  motives 

your  other 

subjects       of  ambition   to  take  up  arms  against  us  on  their  own 
encouraged  account.     They  learned  nothing  from  the  misfortunes 
andeweU '     of  their  neighbours  who  had  already  revolted  and  been 
iectSourg"    subdued  by  us,  nor  did  the  happiness  of  which  they  were 
enemies  to  in  the  enjoyment  make  them  hesitate  to  court  destruc- 
own  allies,   tion.    They  trusted  recklessly  to  the  future,  and  cherish- 
ing hopes  which,  if  less  than  their  wishes,  were  greater 
than  their  powers,  they  went  to  war,  preferring  might  to 
right.     No  sooner  did  they  seem  likely  to  win  than  they 
set  upon  us,  although  we  were  doing  them  no  wrong. 
Too  swift  and  sudden  a  rise  is  apt  to  make  cities  in- 
solent, and   in  general,   ordinary  good-fortune  is  safer 
than  extraordinary.     Mankind  apparently  find  it  easier 


SPEECH -OF   CLEON.  193 

B.C.  427.  to  drive  away  adversity  than  to  retain  prosperity.  We  III. 
'  should  from  the  first  have  made  no  difference  between 
the  Mitylenaeans  and  the  rest  of  our  allies,  and  then 
their  insolence  would  never  have  risen  to  such  a  height ; 
for  men  naturally  despise  those  who  court  them,  but 
respect  those  who  do  not  give  way  to  them.  Yet  it  is 
not  too  late  to  punish  them  as  their  crimes  deserve. 
And  do  not  absolve  the  people  while  you  throw  the 
blame  upon  the  nobles.  For  they  were  all  of  one  mind 
when  we  were  to  be  attacked.  Had  the  people  deserted 
the  nobles  and  come  over  to  us,  they  might  at  this 
moment  have  been  reinstated  in  their  city;  but  they 
considered  that  their  safety  lay  in  sharing  the  dangers 
of  the  oligarchy,  and  therefore  they  joined  in  the  revolt. 
Reflect :  if  you  impose  the  same  penalty  upon  those  of 
your  allies  who  wilfully  rebel  and  upon  those  who  are 
constrained  by  the  enemy,  which  of  them  will  not  revolt 
upon  any  pretext  however  trivial,  seeing  that,  if  he  suc- 
ceed, he  will  be  free,  and,  if  he  fail,  no  irreparable  evil 
will  follow?  We  in  the  meantime  shall  have  to  risk 
our  lives  and  our  fortunes  against  every  one  in  turn. 
When  conquerors  we  shall  recover  only  a  ruined  city, 
and,  for  the  future,  the  revenues  which  are  our  strength 
will  be  lost  to  usa.  But  if  we  fail,  the  number  of  our 
adversaries  will  be  increased.  And  when  we  ought  to 
be  employed  in  repelling  our  regular  enemies,  we  shall 
be  wasting  time  in  fighting  against  our  own  allies. 

'  Do  not  then  hold  out  a  hope,  which  eloquence  can      40. 
secure  or  money  buy,  that  they  are  to  be  excused  and  J^^6 
that  their   error  is  to  be  deemed   human   and  venial,  pity,  fine 
Their  attack  was  not  unpremeditated  ;  that  might  have  forgiving 
been  an  excuse  for  them ;  but  they  knew  what  they  were 
doing.     This  was    my  original    contention,  and    I    still 
maintain  that  you  should  abide  by  your  former  decision,  rebels^  you 
and  not  be  misled  either  by  pity,  or  by  the  charm  of  right  to 
words,  or  by  a  too   forgiving   temper.     There   are   no  ™r^t  them 
three  things  more  prejudicial   to  your  power.      Mercy as  they> 
a  Cp.  iii.  46  med. 
O 


194  SPEECH   OF   CLEON. 

III.      should   be   reserved  for   the  merciful,  and    not   thrown  B.C.  427. 
fearingyour  away  upon  those  who  will  have  no  compassion  on  us.  and     '  88>  2< 

vengeance, 

would  have  who  must  by  the  force  of  circumstances  always  be  our 

treated  you.  .       ,  .  ...      jM1    « 

YOU  will      enemies.     And  our  charming  orators  will  still  have  an 
troubiewith  arena  a»  but  one  in  which  the  questions  at  stake  will  not 


when'th?     ^e   S°  £raVC>  an<^   ^e  C^V  W*^    not    Pa^  SO  Dearly  f° 

know  that    brief  pleasure  in  listening  to  them,  while  they  for  a  good 

rebellion  °  .  .. 

will  be  speech  get  a  good  fee.  Lastly,  forgiveness  is  naturally 
by'death.  shown  to  those  who,  being  reconciled,  will  continue 
friends,  and  not  to  those  who  will  always  remain  what 
they  were,  and  will  abate  nothing  of  their  enmity.  In 
one  word,  if  you  do  as  I  say,  you  will  do  what  is  just 
to  the  Mitylenaeans,  and  also  what  is  expedient  for  your- 
selves ;  but,  if  you  take  the  opposite  course,  they  will 
not  be  grateful  to  you,  and  you  will  be  self-condemned. 
For,  if  they  were  right  in  revolting,  you  must  be  wrong 
in  maintaining  your  empire.  But  if,  right  or  wrong,  you 
are  resolved  to  rule,  then  rightly  or  wrongly  they  must 
be  chastised  for  your  good.  Otherwise  you  must  give 
up  your  empire,  and,.  when  virtue  is  no  longer  dangerous, 
you  may  be  as  virtuous  as  you  please.  Punish  them 
as  they  would  have  punished  you  ;  let  not  those  who 
have  escaped  appear  to  have  less  feeling  than  those 
who  conspired  against  them.  Consider  :  what  might  not 
they  have  been  expected  to  do  if  they  had  conquered  ? 
—  especially  since  they  were  the  aggressors.  For  those 
who  wantonly  attack  others  always  rush  into  extremes, 
and  sometimes,  like  these  Mitylenaeans,  to  their  own  de- 
struction. They  know  the  fate  which  is  reserved  for  them 
if  their  enemy  is  spared  :  b  when  a  man  is  injured  without 
a  cause  he  is  more  dangerous  if  he  escape  than  the 
enemy  who  has  only  suffered  what  he  has  inflicted  b. 
Be  true  then  to  yourselves,  and  recall  as  vividly  as  you 
can  what  you  felt  at  the  time  ;  think  how  you  would 

a  Gp.  iii.  37  fin. 

b  Or,  referring  the  words  to  the  Mitylenaeans:  'He  who  has 
gone  out  of  his  way  to  bring  a  calamity  upon  himself  is  more  dan- 
gerous if  he  be  allowed  to  escape  than  the  enemy  who  only  re- 
taliates.' 


SPEECH   OF  DIODOTUS.  195 

B.C.  427.  have  given  the  world  to  crush  your  enemies,  and  now  III. 
2*  take  your  revenge.  Do  not  be  soft-hearted  at  the  sight 
of  their  distress,  but  remember  the  danger  which  was 
once  hanging  over  your  heads.  Chastise  them  as  they 
deserve,  and  prove  by  an  example  to  your  other  allies 
that  rebellion  will  be  punished  with  death.  If  this  is 
made  quite  clear  to  them,  your  attention  will  no  longer 
be  diverted  from  your  enemies  by  wars  against  your 
own  allies.' 

Such  were  the  words  of  Cleon  ;  and  after  him  Dio-      41. 
dotus  the  son  of  Eucrates,  who  in  the  previous  assembly  Speech  of 
had  been  the  chief  opponent  of  the  decree  which  con- 
demned the  Mitylenaeans,  came  forward  again  and  spoke 
as  follows  :  — 

;  I  am  far  from  blaming  those  who  invite  us  to  re-      42. 
consider  our  sentence  upon  the  Mitylenaeans,  nor  do  I  We  are 

r      i  1  •   1      1  i  1      right  in  re- 

approve   of  the   censure  which   has   been   cast  on  the  considering 
practice  of  deliberating  more  than  once  about  matters  [Jjg  Mity°f 
so  critical.     In  my  opinion  the  two  things  most  adverse  He^fooi* 
to  good  counsel  are  haste  and  passion  ;    the  former  is  jsh,  even 
generally  a  mark  of  folly,  the  latter  of  vulgarity  and  honest,  who 
narrowness  of  mind.     When  a  man  insists  that  words  no 


ought  not  to  be  our  guides  in  action  a,  he  is  either  want-  JJ,°ns:e  ?^Jje 
ing  in  sense  or  wanting  in   honesty:   he  is  wanting  inwhoin- 

•  r  1  •  i  -        sinuates 

sense  if  he  does  not  see  that  there  is  no  other  way  in  which  that  his 

we  can  throw  light  on  the  unknown  future  ;  and  he  is 

not  honest  if,  seeking  to  carry  a  discreditable  measure, 

and  knowing  that  he  cannot  speak  well  in  a  bad  cause,  him  by  fair 

arguments. 

he  reflects  that  he  can  slander  well  and  terrify  his  op-  The  wise 
ponents  and  his  audience  by  the  audaciousness  of  his 
calumnies.     Worst  of  all  are  those  who,  besides  other 
topics  of  abuse,  declare  that  their  opponent  is  hired  to  &™r  to 
make   an    eloquent   speech.      If  they   accused   him   of 
stupidity  only,  when  he  failed  in  producing  an  impres- 
sion  he   might  go  his  way  having  lost  his   reputation 
for  sense  but  not  for  honesty;    whereas  he  who  is  ac- 
cused of  dishonesty,  even  if  he  succeed,  is  viewed  with 
a  Cp.  ii.  40  med. 
O  2 


J96  SPEECH   OF  DIODOTUS. 

III.  suspicion,  and,  if  he  fail,  is  thought  to  be  both  fool  and  B.C.  427. 
rogue.  And  so  the  city  suffers  ;  for  she  is  robbed  of  88'  2* 
her  counsellors  by  fear.  Happy  would  she  be  if  such 
citizens  could  not  speak  at  all,  for  then  the  people  would 
not  be  misled.  The  good  citizen  should  prove  his  supe- 
riority as  a  speaker,  not  by  trying  to  intimidate  those 
who  will  follow  him  in  debate,  but  by  fair  argument  ;  and 
the  wise  city  ought  not  to  give  increased  honour  to  her 
best  counsellor,  any  more  than  she  will  deprive  him  of 
that  which  he  has  ;  while  he  whose  proposal  is  rejected 
not  only  ought  to  receive  no  punishment,  but  should 
be  free  from  all  reproach.  Then  he  who  succeeds  will 
not  say  pleasant  things  contrary  to  his  better  judgment 
in  order  to  gain  a  still  higher  place  in  popular  favour, 
and  he  who  fails  will  not  be  striving  to  attract  the  mul- 
titude to  himself  by  like  compliances. 

43-  '  But  we   take   an  opposite  course  ;    and  still  worse. 

axe  too"  Even  when  we  know  a  man  to  be  giving  the  wisest 
clever  :  you  counsel,  a  suspicion  of  corruption  is  set  on  foot  ;  and 

are  always 

suspecting  from  a  jealousy  which  is  perhaps  groundless,  we  allow 
speaker  has  the  state  to  lose  an  undeniable  advantage.  It  has  come 
terested"  to  tm's'  ^at  trie  best  advice  when  offered  in  plain  terms 
YovTunish  *s  as  muc^  distrusted  as  the  worst  ;  and  not  only  he  who 
the  giver  of  wishes  to  lead  the  multitude  into  the  most  dangerous 

bad  advice,  1-1  11 

and  not       courses  must  deceive  them,  but  he  who  speaks  in   the 


-  cause  of  right  must  make  himself  believed  by  lying. 
ing  him.  jn  fais  cjtV)  an(}  jn  fa[s  cfty  only,  to  do  good  openly 
and  without  deception  is  impossible,  because  you  are 
too  clever  ;  and,  when  a  man  confers  an  unmistakeable 
benefit  on  you,  he  is  rewarded  by  a  suspicion  that,  in 
some  underhand  manner,  he  gets  more  than  he  gives. 
But,  whatever  you  may  suspect  a,  when  great  interests 
are  at  stake,  we  who  advise  ought  to  look  further  and 
weigh  our  words  more  carefully  than  you  whose  vision 
is  limited.  And  you  should  remember  that  we  are  ac- 
countable for  our  advice  to  you,  but  you  who  listen 
are  accountable  to  nobody.  If  he  who  gave  and  he  who 
a  Reading  d 


SPEECH   OF  DIODOTUS.  197 

B.C.  427.  followed   evil    counsel   suffered  equally,  you  would   be      III. 

Ol.  88,  2.  ui       •  •  j  i?  i. 

more  reasonable  in  your  ideas  ;  but  now,  whenever  you 
meet  with  a  reverse,  led  away  by  the  passion  of  the 
moment  you  punish  the  individual  who  is  your  adviser 
for  his  error  of  judgment,  and  your  own  error  you  con- 
done, if  the  judgments  of  many  concurred  in  it. 

'  I  do  not  come  forward  either  as  an  advocate  of  the      44. 
Mitylenaeans  or  as  their  accuser  ;   the  question  for  us  The  ques- 

.    i     ,  ....  ,  ...  ..,          tion  is  one 

rightly  considered  is  not,  what  are  their  crimes?   but,  of  policy, 


what    is   for   our   interest  ?     If  I   prove   them   ever  so 

guilty,  I  will  not  on  that  account   bid   you   put   them 

to  death,  unless  it  is  expedient.     Neither,  if  perchance  you  prefer 

there  be  some  degree  of  excuse  for  them,  would  I  have  expediency. 

you   spare   them,  unless   it  be  clearly  for  the  good  of 

the  state.     For  I  conceive  that  we  are  now  concerned, 

not  with  the  present,  but  with  the  future.     When  Cleon 

insists  that  the  infliction  of  death  will  be  expedient  and 

will  secure  you  against  revolt  in  time  to  come,  I,  like 

him    taking  the  ground   of  future    expediency,   stoutly 

maintain  the  contrary  position  ;   and  I  would  not  have 

you  be  misled  by  the  apparent  fairness  of  his  proposal, 

and  reject  the  solid  advantages  of  mine.     You  are  angry 

with  the  Mitylenaeans,  and  the  superior  justice  of  his 

argument  may  for  the  moment  attract  you  ;  but  we  are 

not  at  law  with  them,  and  do  not  want  to  be  told  what 

is  just;  we  are  considering  a  matter  of  policy,  and  de- 

sire to  know  how  we  can  turn  them  to  account. 

'To  many  offences  less  than  theirs  states  have  affixed      45. 
the  punishment  of  death  ;  nevertheless,  excited  by  hope,  Experience 

.  *  '  abundantly 

men  still  risk  their  lives.     No  one  when  venturing  on  a  proves  that 
perilous  enterprise  ever  yet  passed  a  sentence  of  failure  ofe<i£th  y 
on  himself.     And  what  city  when  entering  on  a  revolt  J^"^^^ 
ever  imagined  that  the  power  which  she  had,  whether  Men,  and 

still  more 

her  own  or  obtained  from  her  allies,  did  not  justify  the  states,  are 
attempt  ?     All  are  by  nature  prone  to  err  both  in  public  away  by 
and  in  private  life,  and  no  law  will  prevent  them.     Men  sfons  and 

^oyrtt^ust 


have  gone  through  the  whole  catalogue  of  penalties  in   ytust  in 


the   hope  that,  by  increasing  their   severity,  they  may 


198  SPEECH    OF  DIODOTUS. 

III.      suffer  less  at  the  hands  of  evil-doers.      In  early  ages  B.C.  427. 

C\\     Rft 

the  punishments,  even  of  the  worst  offences,  would  na- 
turally be  milder  ;  but  as  time  went  on  and  mankind 
continued  to  transgress,  they  seldom  stopped  short  of 
death.  And  still  there  are  transgressors.  Some.greater 
terror  then  has  yet  to  be  discovered  ;  certainly  death 
deters  nobody.  For  poverty  inspires  necessity  with 
daring  ;  and  wealth  engenders  avarice  in  pride  and  in- 
solence ;  and  the  various  conditions  of  human  life,  as 
they  severally  fall  under  the  sway  of  some  mighty  and 
fatal  power,  through  the  agency  of  the  passions  lure 
men  to  destruction.  Desire  and  hope  are  never  wanting, 
the  one  leading,  the  other  following,  the  one  devising 
the  enterprise,  the  other  suggesting  that  fortune  will  be 
kind  ;  and  they  do  immense  harm,  for,  being  unseen, 
they  far  outweigh  the  dangers  which  are  seen.  Fortune 
too  assists  the  illusion,  for  she  often  presents  herself  un- 
expectedly, and  induces  states  as  well  as  individuals  to 
run  into  peril,  however  inadequate  their  means  ;  and 
states  even  more  than  individuals,  because  they  are 
throwing  for  a  higher  stake,  freedom  or  empire,  and 
because  when  a  man  has  a  whole  people  acting  with 
him,  R  he  exaggerates  the  importance  of  his  aims  a  out 
of  all  reason.  In  a  word  then,  it  is  impossible,  and 
simply  absurd  to  suppose,  that  human  nature  when  bent 
upon  some  favourite  project  can  be  restrained  either  by 
the  power  of  law  or  by  any  other  terror. 
46.  '  We  ought  not  therefore  to  act  hastily  out  of  a  mistaken 

The  threat   reliance  on  the  security  which  the  penalty  of  death  affords. 

punishment  Nor  should  we  drive  our  rebellious  subjects  to  despair  ; 

rebels  'fight  ^GY  must  not  think  that  there  is  no  place  for  repentance, 


to  the  last,   or  that  they   may  not  at  any  moment  wipe  out  their 

and,  if  we  _  *        .    J 

succeed,  we  offences.     Consider  :   at   present,   although   a  city  may 
gain  a*1'     actually  have  revolted,  when  she  becomes  conscious  of 


weakness  she  will  capitulate  while  still  able  to  defray 
policy  is      t^  cosj-  of  the  war  and  to  pay  tribute  for  the  future  ; 

prevention,  x     ' 

not  punish-  but  if  we  are  too  severe,  will  not  the  citizens  make  better 

ment. 

a  Or,  reading  avrov  :  (  he  magnifies  himself.' 


SPEECH   OF  DIODOTUS.  199 

B.C.  427.  preparations,  and,  when  besieged,  resist  to  the  last,  know-  III. 
'  ing  that  it  is  all  the  same  whether  they  come  to  terms 
early  or  late  ?  Shall  not  we  ourselves  suffer  ?  For  we 
shall  waste  our  money  by  sitting  down  before  a  city 
which  refuses  to  surrender  ;  when  the  place  is  taken  it 
will  be  a  mere  wreck,  and  we  shall  in  future  lose  the 
revenues  derived  from  it  a  ;  and  in  these  revenues  lies 
our  military  strength.  Do  not  then  weigh  offences  with 
the  severity  of  a  judge,  when  you  will  only  be  injuring 
yourselves,  but  have  an  eye  to  the  future  ;  let  the 
penalties  which  you  impose  on  rebellious  cities  be  mo- 
derate, and  then  their  wealth  will  be  undiminished  and 
at  your  service.  Do  not  hope  to  find  a  safeguard  in  the 
severity  of  your  laws,  but  only  in  the  vigilance  of  your  ad- 
ministration. At  present  we  do  just  the  opposite  ;  a  free 
people  under  a  strong  government  will  always  revolt  in 
the  hope  of  independence  ;  and  when  we  have  put  them 
down  we  think  that  they  cannot  be  punished  too  severely. 
But  instead  of  inflicting  extreme  penalties  on  free  men 
who  revolt,  we  should  practise  extreme  vigilance  before 
they  revolt,  and  never  allow  such  a  thought  to  enter  their 
minds.  When  however  they  have  been  once  put  down 
we  ought  to  extenuate  their  crimes  as  much  as  possible. 

'Think  of  another  great  error  into  which  you  would      47. 
fall  if  you  listened  to  Cleon.     At  present  the  popular  Ify°u  <ie- 

.  *  .          stroy  the 

party  are  everywhere  our  friends  ;  either  they  do  not  join  Mityienae- 
with  the  oligarchs,  or,  if  compelled  to  do  so,  they  are  their  cityPUt 


always  ready  to  turn  against  the  authors  of  the  revolt  ; 

and  so  in  going  to  war  with  a  rebellious  state  you  have  ™m  sh.ow 

J  ingratitude 

the   multitude  on   your   side.    But   if  you  destroy  the  andaiienate 

i         r  •»/!••      1       >        i  -i  i  ^e  popular 

people  of  Mitylene  who  took  no  part  in  the  revolt,  and  party  every- 


who  voluntarily  surrendered  the  city  as  soon  as  they  got 
arms  into  their  hands  ;  in  the  first  place  they  were  your  th(jy  w^e 
benefactors,  and  to  slay  them  would  be  a  crime  ;  in  the  would  be 
second  place  you  will  play  into  the  hands  of  the  ruling  pedient  to 
oligarchies,  who  henceforward,  when  they  can  induce  a 
city  to  revolt,  will  at  once  have  the  people  on  their  side  ; 
a  Cp.  iii.  39  fin. 


200  SPEECH   OF  DIODOTUS. 

III.      for  you  will  have  proclaimed  to  all  that  the  innocent  and  B.C.  427. 
the  guilty  will  share  the  same  fate.     Even  if  they  were    L  88>  2" 
guilty  you  should  wink  at  their  conduct,  and  not  allow 
the  only  friends  whom  you  have  left  to  be  converted  into 
enemies.    Far  more  conducive  to  the  maintenance  of  our 
empire  would  it  be  to  suffer  wrong  willingly,  than  for  the 
sake  of  justice  to  put  to  death  those  whom  we  had  better 
spare.     Cleon  may  speak  of  a  punishment  which  is  just 
and  also  expedient,  but  you  will  find  that,  in  any  pro- 
posal like  his,  the  two  cannot  be  combined. 

48.  '  Assured  then  that  what  I  advise  is  for  the  best,  and 
Pass  sen-     yielding  neither  to  pity  nor  to  lenity,  for  I  am  as  un^ 
leisure  on     willing  as  Cleon  can  be  that  you  should  be  influenced 
sonSsent  by  any  such  motives,  but  simply  weighing  the  arguments 
Pachesby     wm*ch  I  have  urged,  accede  to  my  proposal:  Pass  sentence 
and  spare    at  your  leisure  on  the  Mitylenaeans  whom  Paches,  deem- 
ing them  guilty,  has  sent  hither ;  but  leave  the  rest  of  the 
inhabitants  where  they  are.    This  will  be  good  policy  for 
the  future,  and  will  strike  present  terror  into  your  ene- 
mies.    For  wise  counsel  is  really  more  formidable  to  an 
enemy  than  the  severity  of  unmeaning  violence.' 

49.  Thus  spoke  Diodotus,  and  such  were  the  proposals  on 
The  motion  either  side  which  most  nearly  represented  the  opposing 

of  Diodotus  * 

is  just  parties.  In  spite  of  the  reaction  there,  was  a  struggle 
Atrireme is  between  the  two  opinions  ;  the  show  of  hands  was  very 
wSby^'  near>  but  the  motion  of  Diodotus  prevailed.  The  Athe- 
great  exer-  nians  instantly  despatched  another  trireme,  hoping  that, 

tions  arrives 

in  time  if  the  second  could  overtake  the  first a,  which  had  a 
Mityienfe.  start  of  about  twenty-four  hours,  it  might  be  in  time  to 
save  the  city.  The  Mitylenaean  envoys  provided  wine 
and  barley  for  the  crew,  and  promised  them  great 
rewards  if  they  arrived  first.  And  such  was  their  energy 
that  they  continued  rowing  whilst  they  ate  their  barley, 
kneaded  with  wine  and  oil,  and  slept  and  rowed  by  turns. 
Fortunately  no  adverse  wind  sprang  up,  and,  the  first  of 
the  two  ships  sailing  in  no  great  hurry  on  her  untoward 
errand,  and  the  second  hastening  as  I  have  described, 
a  Reading 


TAKING    OF  MINOA.  2OI 

B.C.  427.  the  one  did  indeed  arrive  sooner  than  the  other,  but  not      III. 
'  much   sooner.      Paches  had    read    the  decree  and  \vas 
about  to  put  it  into   execution,  when   the   second  ap- 
peared and  arrested  the  fate  of  the  city. 

So  near  was  Mitylene  to  destruction. 

The  captives  whom  Paches  had  sent  to  Athens  as  being       50. 
the  most  guilty  numbered  about  a  thousand,  or  rather  The  cap- 
more  ;  these  the  Athenians,  upon  the  motion  of  Cleon,  Athens  are 
put  to  death.     They  razed  the  walls  of  the  Mitylenaeans  JJeath° 
and   took  away  their  fleet.    Then,  instead  of  imposing  ^^j^ 
tribute  on  them,  they  divided  the  whole  island,  exclusive  are  divided 
of  the  territory  of  Methymna,  into  three  thousand  por-  Atheman 
tions,  of  which  they  dedicated    three   hundred    to   the C11 
Gods  ;    the  remainder  they  let  out  to  cleruchi a  taken 
from  their  own  citizens,  whom  they  chose  by  lot  and 
sent  to  Lesbos.     The  Lesbians  undertook  to  pay  them 
a  yearly  rent  of  two  minaeb  for  each  portion  and  culti- 
vated the  land  themselves.     The  Athenians  also  took 
possession   of  the   towns    on   the   continent  which   the 
Mitylenaeans  heldc,  and  these  henceforward  were  sub- 
ject to  Athens. 

Thus  ended  the  revolt  of  Lesbos. 

During  the  same  summer,  after  the  recovery  of  Lesbos,      5 1 . 
the  Athenians,  under  the  command  of  Nicias  the  son  of  The  Athe- 

T.T.  ,.   .  nians  under 

Niceratus,  made  an  expedition  against  the  island  of  Nicias  cap- 
Minoa,  which  lies  in  front  of  Megara  ;  the  Megarians 
had  built  a  fort  there  and  used  the  island  as  a  military  ^ 
station.  But  Nicias  wanted  the  Athenians  to  keep  a 
watch  over  Megara,  not  as  hitherto  from  Budorum  in 
Salamis,  but  from  this  spot,  which  was  nearer ;  the 
Peloponnesians  would  then  be  no  longer  able  to  send 
out  triremes,  as  they  had  already  done  on  one  occa- 
siond,  or  privateers  from  the  harbour  unobserved,  and 
nothing  could  be  brought  in  by  sea  to  Megara.  First 
of  all  he  took  etwo  projecting  towers  on  the  side  of 

a  Cleruchi,  literally  '  portioners,'  Athenians  who  received  land  in 
a  conquered  country,  but  remained  citizens. 

b  8/.  2s.  6d.  c  Cp.  iv.  52  med.  d  Cp.  ii.  93,  94. 

c  Or,  '  two  towers  projecting  from  Nisaea.' 


202  SURRENDER    OF  PLATAEA. 

III.  the  island  towards  Nisaea6  by  the  help  of  engines  from  B.C.  427. 
the  sea,  and,  having  thus  freed  a  way  into  the  channel 
dividing  Minoa  from  the  coast  of  Megara,  he  fortified  the 
point  nearest  the  mainland,  where,  by  a  bridge  through 
a  lagoon,  aid  could  be  brought  to  the  island,  lying  as 
it  did  at  that  point  close  to  the  shore.  The  work  was 
completed  in  a  few  days.  Nicias  then  proceeded  to 
build  a  fort  on  the  island,  and,  leaving  a  garrison,  re- 
turned with  the  rest  of  his  army. 

52.  In  this  summer  and  about  the  same  time  the  Plataeans, 

The  Pia-  who  had  exhausted  their  food  and  could  no  longer  hold 
surrender  out,  capitulated  to  the  Peloponnesians.  The  enemy  had 
Lacedae-  assaulted  their  wall  and  they  were  unable  to  defend 


themselves.     But  the  Lacedaemonian  commander  knew 
men  are      their  weakness,  and  was  desirous  that  the  place  should 

sent  from 

Sparta  to     be  surrendered  and    not  stormed  ;   he  had  instructions 
^ome  to  thjs  effectj  the  intention  being  that  if  some 
a  treaty  °f  Peace  were  concluded,  and  both  parties 


to  speak  in  agreed  to  give  up  all  the  places  which  they  had  taken 

their  own 

defence.  by  force  of  arms  a,  Plataea  might  be  excepted  on  the 
ground  that  the  inhabitants  had  come  to  terms  of  their 
own  accord.  So  he  sent  a  herald  to  enquire  whether 
they  would  surrender  the  place  to  the  Lacedaemonians 
and  submit  to  their  decision  ;  the  guilty  were  to  be 
punished,  but  no  one  without  a  just  cause.  The  Pla- 
taeans, now  in  the  last  stage  of  weakness,  surrendered 
the  city;  and  for  a  few  days,  until  the  five  men  who 
were  appointed  judges  came  from  Lacedaemon,  the 
Peloponnesians  supplied  them  with  food.  On  the  ar- 
rival of  the  judges  no  accusation  was  brought  against 
them  ;  they  were  simply  asked  one  by  one,  Whether 
they  had  done  any  kind  of  service  to  the  Lacedae- 
monians or  to  their  allies  in  the  present  war.  Before 
making  their  reply  they  requested  leave  to  speak  at 
length,  and  appointed  two  of  their  number,  Astyma- 
chus  the  son  of  Asopolaus,  and  Lacon  the  son  of 
Aeimnestus,  who  was  the  Lacedaemonian  proxenus, 
a  Cp.  v.  17  med. 


SPEECH   OF   THE    PLATAEANS.  203 

B.C.  427.  to  be  their  advocates.     They  came  forward  and  spoke      III. 

Ol.  88,  2.          r  n 

as  follows  :  — 

'  Men  of  Lacedaemon,  we   surrendered  our  city  be-      53- 
cause  we  had   confidence  in    you;  we  were  under  thew<rh°Ped 

to  have  a 

impression  that  the  trial  to  which  we  submitted  would  legal  trial 
be  legal,  and  of  a  very  different  kind   from   this  ;   and  receive 
when  we  accepted  you  and  you  alone  to  be  our  judges, 


which  indeed  you  are,  we  thought  that  at  your  hands  we  *jut  we  are 
had  the  best  hope  of  obtaining  justice.     But  we  fear  that  pointed. 
we  are  doubly  mistaken,  having  too  much  reason  to  sus-  fear  that 


pect  that  in  this  trial  our  lives  are  at  stake,  and  that  you 
will  turn  out  to  be  partial  judges.  So  we  must  infer,  ^hebkn 
because  no  accusation  has  been  preferred  against  us 
calling  for  a  defence,  but  we  speak  at  our  own  re- 
quest ;  and  because  your  question  is  a  short  one,  to 
which  the  answer,  if  true,  condemns  us,  and,  if  false,  is 
exposed  at  once.  In  the  extremity  of  our  helplessness, 
our  only  and  our  safest  course  is  to  say  something,  what- 
ever may  be  our  fate;  for  men  in  our  condition  are  sure  to 
reproach  themselves  with  their  silence,  and  to  fancy  that 
the  unuttered  word,  if  spoken,  would  have  saved  them. 

*  But  by  what  arguments  can  we  ever  convince  you  ? 
If  we  were  unacquainted  with  one  another  we  might  with 
advantage  adduce  in  evidence  matters  of  which  you  were 
ignorant,  but  now  you  know  all  that  we  can  say;  and  we 
are  afraid,  not  that  we  are  criminals  in  your  eyes  because 
you  have  decided  that  we  fall  short  of  your  own  standard 
of  virtuea,  but  that  we  are  being  sacrificed  to  please  others, 
and  that  the  cause  which  we  plead  is  already  prejudged. 

'  Still  we  may  urge  our  claims  of  justice  against  our       54. 
Theban  enemies,  and  our  claims  of  gratitude  upon  you  Treat  us 
and  the  other  Hellenes  ;  the  recollection  of  our  good  fdendT'or 
deeds  may  perhaps  move  you.     To  your  short  question,  ene<rmes. 
"  Whether  in  this  war  we  have  done  any  service  to  the  Remember 

J  t  our  conduct 

Lacedaemonians  and  their  allies,"  we  reply  that  "  if  we  (i)  in  the 

,  Persian 

are  enemies   you  are   not  wronged,  because  you  have  war,  (2)  in 


received^  no  good  from  us  ;  and  if  you  deem  us  friends, 

•  Gp.  iii.  57  init.  IIdots- 


204 


SPEECH    OF   THE    PLATAEANS. 


III. 


55- 

We  only 
left  you 
when  you 
refused  to 
aid  us 
against  the 
Thebans, 
and  told  us 
to  go  to  the 
Athenians. 
They 
helped  us 
then,  and 
how  could 
we  abandon 
them? 


56. 


The  The- 
bans at- 
tacked us 


you  who  have  made  war  upon  us,  and  not  we,  are  to  B.C.  427. 
blame."  During  the  late  peace  and  in  the  Persian  War  ° 
our  conduct  was  irreproachable ;  we  were  not  the  first  to 
violate  the  peace,  and  we  were  the  only  Boeotians  who 
took  part  in  repelling  the  Persian  invader  and  in  the 
liberation  of  Hellas.  Although  we  are  an  inland  city, 
we  joined  in  the  sea-fight  of  Artemisium  ;  we  were  at 
your  side  when  you  fought  in  our  land  under  Pausanias, 
and,  whatever  dangers  the  Hellenes  underwent  in  those 
days,  we  took  a  share  beyond  our  strength  in  all  of  them. 
And  you,  Lacedaemonians,  more  especially  should  re- 
member how  at  the  time  when  Sparta  was  panic-stricken 
by  the  rebellion  of  the  Helots,  who  seized  Ithome  after 
the  earthquake  a,  we  sent  a  third  part  of  our  own  citizens 
to  your  aid  ;  these  are  things  not  to  be  forgotten. 

1  Such  was  the  spirit  which  animated  us  in  the  great 
days  of  old ;  not  until  later  did  we  become  your  enemies, 
and  that  was  originally  your  own  fault.  For  when  we 
sought  your  help  against  the  violence  of  the  Thebans, 
you  rejected  us  and  bade  us  turn  to  the  Athenians,  who  B.C.  519. 
were  near,  whereas  you  were  at  a  distance.  Yet  even  in 
this  war  you  have  neither  suffered  nor  were  ever  likely 
to  suffer  anything  very  atrocious  at  our  hands.  If  we 
refused  to  revolt  from  the  Athenians  at  your  bidding,  we 
were  quite  right ;  for  they  assisted  us  against  the  Thebans 
when  you  shrank  from  the  task  ;  and  after  this  it  would 
have  been  dishonourable  to  betray  them.  They  had  been 
our  benefactors;  we  had  been  at  our  own  request  admitted 
to  their  alliance,  and  we  shared  the  rights  of  citizen- 
ship with  them.  How  could  we  refuse  to  respond  loyally 
to  their  call  ?  When  you  or  they  in  the  exercise  of  your 
supremacy  have  acted,  it  may  be,  wrongly  and  led  your 
allies  into  evil  courses,  the  leaders  and  not  the  followers 
are  to  be  blamed. 

'  The  Thebans  have  inflicted  many  injuries  upon  us, 
and  their  latest  crime,  as  you  are  well  aware,  is  the 
cause  of  our  present  misfortunes.     They  came,  not  only 
a  Cp.  i.  101. 


SPEECH    OF   THE    PLATAEANS.  205 

B.C.  427.  in  time  of  peace,  but  at  a  holy  season,  and  attempted      III. 
'  to  seize  our   city  ;    we   righteously  and   in   accordance  in  time  of 
with   universal  law   defended    ourselves    and    punished  were  we 
the  aggressor,  and  there  is  no  reason  why  we  should 
now  suffer  for  their  satisfaction.     If  you  take  your  own 
present  advantage  and   their  present  hatred  to  be  the  erred  at  all» 

......  is  not  the 

measure  of  justice,  you  will  prove  yourselves,  not  upright  error  out- 
and  impartial  judges,  but  the  slaves  of  expediency.    The  ou 
Thebans  may  appear  serviceable  now,  but  of  far  greater 
service  to  you  were  we  and  the  other  Hellenes  when  same  Prin- 

r  IT-  •  ,       ciPle  on 

you  were  in  far  greater  danger.     For  now  you  invade  which  we 
and  menace  others,  but  in  those  days  the  Barbarian  was  made  us^' 


threatening  to  enslave  us  all,  and  they  were  on  his  side. 

May  we  not  fairly  set  our  former  patriotism  against  our  Athenians. 

present  offence,  if  indeed  we  have  offended  ?     You  will 

find  that  the  one  more  than  outweighs  the  other  ;   for 

our  service  to  you  was  performed  at  a  time  when  very 

few  Hellenes  opposed  their  courage  to  the   power   of 

Xerxes;  they  were  then  held  in  honour,  not  awho,  looking 

to  their  own  advantage,  made  terms  with  the  invader  a 

and  were  safe,  but  who,  in  the  face  of  danger,  dared  the 

better  part.     Of  that  number  were  we,  and  there  was 

a  time  when  we  received  the  highest  honour  at  your 

hands,  but  now  we  fear  that  these  same  principles,  which 

have  led  us  to  prefer  a  just  alliance  with  the  Athenians 

to  an  interested  alliance  with  you,  will  be  our  destruc- 

tion.    And  yet  the  consistency  of  men's  conduct  should 

be  consistently  acknowledged.     For  true  expediency  is 

only  this  —  to  have  an  enduring  sense  of  gratitude  to- 

wards good  allies  whose  virtues  are  recognised  by  us, 

while  we  do  not  neglect  our  own  immediate  interest. 

'  Consider,  before  you  act,  that  hitherto  you  have  been      57. 
generally  esteemed  among  Hellenes  to  be  a  pattern  of  Remember 
nobility;  if  you  decide  unjustly  (and  this  judgment  can-  reputation: 
not  be  hidden,  for  you,  the  judges,  are  famous,  and  we, 
who  are  judged  by  you,  are  of  good  repute),  mankind 

a  Or,  reading  atroly,  and  referring  the  word  to  the  Persians  :  'who, 
looking  to  advantage,  forwarded  the  course  of  the  invader.' 


2O6 


SPEECH   OF   THE   PLATAEANS. 


III. 

by  allowing 
Plataea, 
whose  name 
your  fathers 
inscribed  on 
the  Del- 
phian tri- 
pod, to 
be  blotted 
out  in 
order  to 
please  the 
Thebans. 


58. 

Do  not 
bring  in- 
famy upon 
yourselves 
by  slaying 
suppliants. 
Your  an- 
cestors are 
buried  in 
our  land, 
and  we  have 
honoured 
them  by 
yearly  gifts. 
Will  you 
give  them 
up  to  their 
murderers, 
and  enslave 


will  be  indignant  at  the  strange  and  disgraceful  sentence  B.C.  427. 
which  you  will  have  passed  against  good  men  (although 
you  may  be  better  yourselves)3-.  They  will  not  endure 
to  see  spoils  taken  from  us,  the  benefactors  of  Hellas, 
dedicated  by  our  enemies  in  the  common  temples.  Will 
it  not  be  deemed  a  monstrous  thing  that  the  Lacedae- 
monians should  desolate  Plataea;  that  they,  whose  fathers 
inscribed  the  name  of  the  city  on  the  tripod  at  Delphi 
in  token  of  her  valour b,  should  for  the  sake  of  the 
Thebans  blot  out  the  whole  people  from  the  Hellenic 
world?  For  to  this  we  have  come  at  last.  When 
the  Persians  conquered  our  land,  we  were  all  but  ruined  ; 
and  now,  when  we  plead  before  you,  who  were  once  our 
dearest  friends,  the  Thebans  have  prevailed  against  us. 
We  have  had  to  meet  two  terrible  trials,  the  danger  first 
of  starvation,  if  we  had  not  given  up  the  city;  and  se- 
condly, of  condemnation  to  death.  The  Plataeans,  who 
were  zealous  in  the  cause  of  Hellas  even  beyond  their 
strength,  are  now  friendless,  spurned  and  rejected  by  all. 
None  of  our  old  allies  will  help  us,  and  we  fear  that 
you,  O  Lacedaemonians,  our  only  hope,  are  not  to  be 
depended  upon. 

'  Yet  once  more  for  the  sake  of  those  Gods  in  whose 
name  we  made  a  league  of  old,  and  for  our  services  to 
the  cause  of  Hellas,  relent  and  change  your  minds,  if 
the  Thebans  have  at  all  influenced  you  :  c  in  return  for 
the  wicked  request  which  they  make  of  you,  ask  of 
them  the  righteous  boon  that  you  should  not  slay  us 
to  your  own  dishonour c.  Do  not  bring  upon  yourselves 
an  evil  name  merely  to  gratify  others.  For,  although 
you  may  quickly  take  our  lives,  you  will  not  so  easily 
obliterate  the  infamy  of  the  deed.  We  are  not  enemies 
whom  you  might  justly  punish,  but  friends  who  were 
compelled  to  go  to  war  with  you  ;  and  therefore  piety 

a  Cp.  iii.  53  fin.  b  Cp.  i.  132  init. 

c  Or,  '  ask  of  them  the  boon  that  you  should  not  kill  those  whom 
you  ought  not,  and  receive  an  honest  gratitude  from  us,  instead  of 
a  disgraceful  gratitude  from  them.' 


SPEECH    OF    THE    PLATAEANS.  207 

B.C.  427.  demands  that  you  should  spare  our  lives.     Before  you      III. 

'  pass  judgment,  consider  that  we  surrendered  ourselves,  *he  country 

J  '  m  which 

and  stretched  out  our  hands  to  you;  the  custom  of  the  freedom 
Hellas  does  not  allow  the  suppliant  to  be  put  to  death,  was  won? 
Remember  too  that  we  have  ever  been  your  benefactors. 
Cast  your  eyes  upon  the  sepulchres  of  your  fathers  slain 
by  the  Persians  and  buried  in  our  land,  whom  we  have 
honoured  by  a  yearly  public  offering  of  garments,  and 
other  customary  gifts.  We  were  their  friends,  and  we 
gave  them  the  firstfruits  in  their  season  of  that  friendly 
land  in  which  they  rest  ;  we  were  their  allies  too, 
who  in  times  past  had  fought  at  their  side  ;  and  if  you 
now  pass  an  unjust  sentence,  will  not  your  conduct 
strangely  contrast  with  ours  ?  Reflect  :  when  Pausanias 
buried  them  here,  he  thought  that  he  was  laying  them 
among  friends  and  in  friendly  earth.  But  if  you  put 
us  to  death,  and  make  Plataea  one  with  Thebes,  are  you 
not  robbing  your  fathers  and  kindred  of  the  honour 
which  they  enjoy,  and  leaving  them  in  a  hostile  land  in- 
habited by  their  murderers  ?  Nay  more,  you  enslave  the 
land  in  which  the  Hellenes  won  their  liberty;  you  bring 
desolation  upon  the  temples  in  which  they  prayed  when 
they  conquered  the  Persians  ;  and  you  take  away  the 
sacrifices  which  our  fathers  instituted  from  the  city 
which  ordained  and  established  them. 

'These  things,  O  Lacedaemonians,  would  not  be  for      59- 
your  honour.     They  would  be  an  offence  against  the  We  j^the1 
common  feeling  of  Hellas  and  against  your  ancestors,  common 
You  should  be  ashamed  to  put  us  to  death,  who  are  your  Hellas,  by 
benefactors   and  have  never  done   you  any  wrong,  in 
order   that   you    may   gratify   the   enmity   of  another. 


Spare  us,  and  let  you  heart  be  softened  towards  us  ;  be  We  did 

.  surrender 

wise,   and   have  mercy  upon   us,   considering  not   only  to  the 
how  terrible  will  be  our  fate,  but  who  the  sufferers  are  ;  we  would" 
think  too  of  the  uncertainty  of  fortune,  which  may  strike 
any  one  however  innocent.     We  implore  you,  as  is  be-  h^nge^,:  if 
coming  and  natural  in  our  hour  of  need,  by  the  Gods  hear  us, 
whom  the  Hellenes  worship  at  common  altars,  to  listen 


208 


SPEECH    OF   THE    PLATAEANS. 


III. 

and  let  us 
meet  our 
fate. 


60. 

The  The- 
bans  also 
obtain  leave 
to  speak. 


61. 

We  should 
not  have 
spoken  if 
the  Pla- 
taeans  had 
not. 

But  you 
must  hear 
our  case 
as  well 
as  theirs. 
They  se- 
parated 


to  our  prayers.  We  appeal  to  the  oaths  which  your  B.C.  427. 
fathers  swore,  and  entreat  you  not  to  forget  them.  We 
kneel  at  your  fathers'  tombs,  and  we  call  upon  the  dead 
not  to  let  us  be  betrayed  into  the  hands  of  the  Thebans, 
their  dearest  friends  to  their  bitterest  enemies.  We 
remind  you  of  the  day  on  which  we  shared  in  their 
glorious  deeds — we  who  on  this  day  are  in  danger  of 
meeting  a  fearful  doom.  And  now  we  say  no  more  ; 
to  men  in  our  case,  though  we  must,  there  is  nothing 
harder  than  to  make  an  end  ;  for  with  the  end  comes 
the  decisive  hour.  Our  last  word  is  that  we  did  not 
surrender  Plataea  to  the  Thebans, — far  rather  would  we 
have  perished  from  hunger,  the  most  miserable  of  deaths, 
— but  to  you,  in  whom  we  trusted,  and,  if  you  will  not 
listen  to  us,  you  ought  at  least  to  replace  us  in  the  same 
position,  and  allow  us  to  choose  our  destiny,  whatever  it 
may  be.  We  adjure  you  not  to  deliver  us,  the  Plataeans, 
who  were  so  loyal  to  the  cause  of  Hellas,  and  who  are 
now  suppliants  to  you,  O  Lacedaemonians,  out  of  your 
own  hands  and  your  own  good  faith,  into  the  hands  of 
the  Thebans,  our  worst  enemies.  Be  our  saviours.  You 
are  liberating  the  other  Hellenes  ;  do  not  destroy  us.' 

Such  were  the  words  of  the  Plataeans  ;  whereupon 
the  Thebans,  fearing  that  the  Lacedaemonians  might 
give  way,  came  forward  and  said  that  since,  against  their 
judgment,  the  Plataeans  had  been  allowed,  instead  of 
answering  the  question,  to  make  a  long  defence,  they 
too  wished  to  speak.  Permission  was  granted,  and  they 
spoke  as  follows  : — 

'  We  should  never  have  asked  to  speak,  if  the  Plataeans 
had  briefly  answered  the  question  which  was  put  to 
thema,  and  had  not  turned  upon  us  and  arraigned  us 
while  they  made  a  long  and  irrelevant  defence  of  their 
own  doings,  excusing  themselves  from  charges  which 
nobody  brought  against  them,  and  praising  what  nobody 
blamed.  We  must  answer  their  accusations  of  us,  and 
look  a  little  closely  into  their  glorification  of  themselves, 
a  Cp.  i.  37  init. 


REPLY   OF    THE    THEBANS.  209 

B.C.  427.  that  neither  our  baseness  nor  their  superior  reputation      III. 
'  may  benefit  them,  and  that,  before  you  judge,  you  may 


hear  the  truth  both  about  us  and  them.     Our  quarrel  own  nation 
with  them  arose  thus  :  —  Some  time  after  our  first  occu-  overTo^he 
pation  of  Boeotia  a  we  settled  Plataea  and  other  places,  Athenians- 
out  of  which  we  drove  a  mixed  multitude.     But  they 
refused  to  acknowledge  our  leadership  according  to  the 
original  agreement,  and,  separating  themselves  from  the 
other  Boeotians,  deserted  the  traditions  of  their  ancestors. 
When  force  was  applied  to  them  they  went  over  to  the 
Athenians,  and,  assisted  by  them,  did  us  a  great  deal  of 
mischief  ;  and  we  retaliated. 

'They  say  that  when   the  Barbarian  invaded  Hellas      62. 
they  were    the   only   Boeotians  who  did  not  join    the 


Persian  ;  and  this  is  their  great  glory,  and  our  great  re-  sided  with 
proach.     But  we  say  that  if  they  did  not  side  with  the  in  the  war 
Persians,  it  was  only  because  the  Athenians  did  not  ;  °iorj  GXO 
and  on  the  same  principle,  they  alone  of  all  the  Boeotians  jS?^ 
afterwards  sided  with  the  Athenians  when  the  liberties  we  were  not 
of  Hellas  were  attacked  by  them.     But,  consider  how  masters, 
different  were  the  circumstances  in  which  we  and  they  afterwards 
acted.     In  those  days  our  state  was  not  governed  by  an  coronfatat 
oligarchy  which  granted  equal  justice  to  all,  nor  yet  by  for  the 
a  democracy  ;   the  power  was  in  the  hands  of  a  small  of  Hellas, 
cabal,  than  which  nothing  is  more  opposed  to  law  or  to  now  fight- 
true  political  order,  or  more  nearly  resembles  a  tyranny.  mg  for  ltm 
The   rulers    of  the    state,   hoping   to   strengthen   their 
private   interest  if   the   Persian   won,  kept   the   people 
down  and  brought  him  in.     The  city  at  large,  when  she 
acted  thus,  was  not  her  own  mistress  ;  and  she  cannot 
be  fairly  blamed  for  an  error  which  she  committed  when 
she  had  no  constitution.    After  the  Persian  departed  and 
she  obtained  a  constitution,  you  may  see  how  we  fought 
against  the  Athenians  when  they  became  aggressive  and 
endeavoured  to  subjugate  us  as  well  as  the  rest  of  Hellas. 
Owing  to   our   divisions   they   actually   conquered   the 
greater  part  of  the  country;   but  we  defeated  them  at 
a  Cp.  i.  12. 
P 


REPLY   OF    THE    THEBANS. 
III.      Coronea,  and  liberated  Boeotiaa:  and  at  this  moment  0.0.427. 

Ol      &0     fy 

we  are  zealously  co-operating  in  the  liberation  of  Hellas, 
providing  cavalry  and  munitions  of  war  more  largely 
than  any  of  the  allies.  Thus  much  in  answer  to  the 
charge  respecting  our  Persian  tendencies. 

63.          'And  now  we  will  proceed  to  show  that  you,   and 
But  they  of  not  we  have  done  the  greater  wrong  to  Hellas,  and  are 

their  own 

free-will      deserving  of  every  sort  of  punishment.     You  say  that 
Athenians    you  became  allies  and  citizens  of  Athens  in  order  that 


you  m*ght  be  protected  against  us.     If  so,  you  ought  to 
have  invited  their  aid  only  against  us,  and  not  to  have 
They  plead  assisted  them  in  their  attacks  upon  others  ;  such  a  course 

obligation,  .    .  .- 

but  no        was  certainly  open  to  you  :  even  if  you  were  in  some 


degree  coerced  by  the  Athenians,  you  had  previously 
a  crime.  made  the  alliance  with  the  Lacedaemonians  against  the 
Persians,  to  which  you  are  so  fond  of  appealing.  That 
alliance  would  at  any  rate  have  restrained  our  hands, 
and  above  all  would  have  secured  to  you  freedom  of  de- 
liberation. You  were  your  own  masters  and  no  longer 
under  compulsion  when  you  made  common  cause  with 
the  Athenians.  Your  allegation  is  that  they  were  your 
benefactors  and  that  you  could  not  honourably  betray 
them  ;  but  how  far  more  dishonourable  and  wicked  to 
betray  all  the  Hellenes  with  whom  you  had  sworn  alli- 
ance, than  the  Athenians  only,  the  one  the  liberators, 
the  other  the  enslavers  of  Hellas  I  The  return  which 
you  made  to  them  is  unequal,  nay,  infamous  ;  you  say 
that  you  invited  them  to  assist  you  because  you  were 
wronged,  and  then  you  became  their  accomplices  in 
wronging  others.  Surely  ingratitude  is  shown  in  refusing 
to  return  an  honourable  kindness,  when  it  can  be  done 
honourably,  not  in  refusing  to  return  a  kindness  which, 
however  justly  due,  cannot  be  returned  without  a  crime. 
64.  'You  have  thus  made  plain  that  when  you  alone 

When  they  among  the  Boeotians  refused  to  join  the  Persian  cause, 

resisted  the        .  -  •*.»»•««.'«« 

Persian  it     this  was  not  out  of  any  love  for  Hellas,  but  because  the 
Athenians  did  not  ;  b  and  that  you  wanted  b  to  act  with 
a  Cp.  iv.  92  fin.  b  Or,  'and  because  you  wanted'  etc. 


REPLY   OF    THE    THEBANS.  211 

B.C.  427.  them  and  not  with  us  ;  and  now  you  claim  the  benefit      III. 
'  of  the  virtue  which  others  inspired  in  you.     But  this  is  Athenians 

.  resisted 

not  reasonable  ;  having  once  chosen  the  Athenians,  fight  him.  They 
on  their  side,  and  do  not  at  the  last  moment  be  saying 
that  the  old  alliance  ought  to  save  you.     For  you  have 
abandoned  it,  and  by  the   violation   of  it,   instead   of!;sht'and 

.  have  for- 

stnvmg  to  prevent,  have  aided  in  the  enslavement  of  the  feited  ail 
B.C.  456.  Aeginetans  and  of  other  members  of  the  alliance.  And  UponCc 
you  were  not,  like  us,  under  compulsion,  but  free,  living  Hellas- 
under  your  ancient  laws.  Moreover,  you  persisted  in 
refusing  that  last  offer  of  peace  and  neutrality  which 
we  made  to  you  before  the  siege  began  a.  Who  more 
thoroughly  than  you  deserve  the  hatred  of  the  Hellenes? 
than  you  who  have  only  displayed  your  virtues  to  their 
injury?  You  have  given  proof  that  the  merit  which 
you  claim  for  your  former  actions  does  not  properly 
belong  to  you !  Your  true  nature  and  constant  desire 
are  now  revealed  in  the  light  of  day;  for  you  have 
followed  the  Athenians  in  the  path  of  injustice.  Thus 
much  we  have  to  say  as  to  our  involuntary  dealings 
with  the  Persians,  and  your  voluntary  dealings  with  the 
Athenians. 

'The  last  offence  which  you  lay  to  our  charge  is  that      65. 
we  unlawfully  assailed  your  city  in  time  of  peace,  and  at  Thfiy  Sa7 

L.  .  that  we 

a  holy  season  ;  even  in  that  affair  we  do  not  think  our-  broke  into 

selves  more  in  fault  than  you.     We  do  not  deny  that  we 

were  wrong  if  of  our  own  mere  motion  we  went  to  your 

city,  fought  with  you,  and  ravaged  your  land.    But  when  by  the  most 

J '  *"  influential 

certain  of  the  noblest  and  richest  of  your  citizens,  who  and  pa- 
wished  to  withdraw  you  from  a  foreign  alliance  and  to 
bring  you  back  to  the  national  institutions  of  Boeotia, 
came  and  invited  us,  wherein  are  we  to  blame  ?  As  you 
say  yourselves,  the  leaders  rather  than  the  followers  are 
the  transgressors b.  But  in  our  opinion,  neither  we  nor 
they  were  really  guilty.  Like  yourselves  they  were  citi- 
zens, and  they  had  a  greater  stake  in  the  country  than 
you  have;  they  opened  their  own  gates  and  received 

a  Cp.  ii.  72,  73.  l!  Cp.  iii.  55  fin. 

P  2, 


2,12  REPLY    OF   THE    THEBANS. 

III.  us  into  their  native  city,  not  as  her  enemies  but  as  B.C.  427. 
her  friends.  They  desired  that  the  bad  among  you 
should  not  grow  worse,  and  that  the  good  should  have 
their  reward.  They  wanted  to  reform  the  principles  of 
your  citizens,  and  not  to  banish  their  persons ;  they 
would  have  brought  them  back  into  a  natural  union 
with  their  kindred,  that  Plataea  might  be  the  ally  of 
all  and  the  enemy  of  none. 

66.  '  And  the  proof  that  we  acted  in  no  hostile  spirit  is 

wererreadyy  ^at  we  ^  no  ^arm  to  anv  onej  but  made  a  proclama- 
to  join  us,  tion  that  whoever  wished  to  live  under  the  national 

but  after 

awhile  institutions  of  Boeotia  should  join  us.  You  came  to 
upon'us,  us  g^dly,  and,  entering  into  an  agreement,  for  a  time 
our  dtSens  °^ere(^  no  opposition  ;  but  afterwards,  when  you  dis- 
whom  they  covered  that  we  were  few,  you  turned  upon  us.  Even 

had  sworn 

to  spare,  allowing  that  we  did  act  somewhat  inconsiderately  in 
entering  your  town  without  the  consent  of  your  whole 
people,  still  how  different  was  your  conduct  and  ours ! 
For  if  you  had  followed  our  example  you  would  have 
used  no  violence,  but  thought  only  of  getting  us  out 
by  persuasion,  whereas  you  broke  the  agreement  and 
attacked  us.  Now  we  do  not  so  much  complain  of  the 
fate  of  those  whom  you  slew  in  battle — for  they  indeed 
suffered  by  a  kind  of  law — but  there  were  others  who 
stretched  out  their  hands  to  you  ;  and  although  you 
gave  them  quarter,  and  then  promised  to  us  that  you 
would  spare  them,  in  utter  defiance  of  law  you  took 
their  lives — was  not  that  a  cruel  act  ?  Here  are  three 
crimes  which  you  committed  within  a  few  hours  ;  the 
breach  of  the  agreement,  the  slaughter  of  the  prisoners 
which  followed,  and  the  lying  promise  which  you  made 
to  us  that  you  would  not  slay  them  if  we  did  no  in- 
jury to  your  property  in  the  fields ;  and  yet  you  insist 
that  we  are  the  criminals,  and  that  you  ought  to  be 
acquitted.  Not  so ;  if  the  Lacedaemonians  give  just 
judgment :  but  for  all  these  offences  you  shall  suffer. 
67.  'We  have  entered  into  particulars,  Lacedaemonians, 

YOU  should  both  for  your  sakes  and  for  our  own,  that  you  may  know 

know  the 


REPLY   OF   THE    THEBANS.  2,13 

B.C.  427.  the  sentence  which  you  are  going  to  pass  on  them  to      III. 
'  be   righteous,  and  still  more   righteous   the  vengeance  truth  about 
which   we    have    taken.      Do    not   let '  your  hearts   be  taeans.  if 
softened  by  tales  about   their  ancient  virtues,   if  they  th^virtues 
ever  had  any;  such  virtues  might  plead  for  the  injured,  |heyhpre- 
but  should  bring  a  double  penalty a  on  the  authors  of  a  ^g^ey 
base  deed,  because  they  are  false  to  their  own  character,  a  double 
Let  them  gain  nothing  by  their  pitiful  lamentations,  or  Sent.  Pity 
by  appealing   to    your  fathers'  tombs   and   their   own  £°J  [heir' 
desolate   condition.      We   tell    you    that   a   far   sadder  p^^'j 
fate  was  inflicted  by  them  on  our  murdered  youth,  of  misfortunes 
whose  fathers  some  fell  at  Coronea  in  the  act  of  bring-  thank  them- 
ing  Boeotia  to  join  you,  while  others  are  left  in  their  old  ^question 
age  by  their  solitary  hearths,  and  entreat  you,  with  far  to  t|iem 
better  reason,  to  punish  the  Plataeans.     Men  who  suffer 
an  unworthy  fate  are  indeed  to  be  pitied,  but  there  should 
be  joy  over  those  who  suffer  justly,  as  these  do.     For 
their  present   desolation  they  may  thank  themselves  ; 
they  might  have  chosen  the  worthier  alliance,  but  they 
wilfully  renounced   it.     We   never   injured  them,  until 
they  first  sinned  against  us  ;  the  spirit  of  hatred  and  not 
of  justice  possessed  them,  and  even  now  they  are  not 
punished  half  enough.      For   they  are   going  to  suffer 
by  a  lawful  sentence,  not,  as  they  pretend,  stretching 
out  their  suppliant   hands   on  the  field  of  battle,   but 
delivering  themselves  up  to  justice  under  the  terms  of 
a    capitulation.      Maintain   then,    Lacedaemonians,   the 
common  Hellenic  law  which  they  have  outraged,  and 
give  to  us,  who  have  suffered  contrary  to  law,  the  just 
recompense  of   our   zeal  in  your  cause.      Do   not    be 
moved   by   their  words  to   spurn   and  reject   usb,   but 
show   Hellas  by  example  that,  when  a   cause  is   tried 
at  your  tribunal,  deeds  and  not  words  will  prevail.     If 
the  deeds  be  good,  a  brief  statement  of  them  is  enough ; 
if  they  be  evil,  speeches  full  of  fine  sentiments  do  but 
veil  them.     If  all  persons  in  authority  were  like  you, 
and  would  sum  up  a  case  in  a  short  question,  and  pass 
a  Cp.  i.  86  init.  b  Cp.  iii.  57  fin. 


2T4  FATE    OF    THE   PLATAEANS. 

III.      sentence  upon  all  the  offenders  at  once,  men  would  be  B.C.  427. 

less  tempted  to  seek  out  fair  words  in  order  to  excuse 

foul  deeds.' 

68.          Thus  spoke  the  Thebans.    The  Lacedaemonian  judges 
The  Pia-     thought  that  no  objection  could  be  made  to  their  ques- 

taeans  are  .  J  x 

put  to  tion,  whether  the  Plataeans  had  done  them  any  service 
their  city  in  the  war.  a  For  they  pretended  to  have  expected 
ground! th6  neutrality  from  them  in  the  times  before  the  war,  on  the 
strength  of  the  original  treaty  concluded  with  Pausanias 
after  the  defeat  of  the  Persians.  And  just  before  the 
siege  they  had  made  to  them  a  proposal  a  of  neutrality 
in  accordance  with  the  terms  of  the  same  treaty;  but 
the  Plataeans  had  refused.  Considering  that  they  had 
been  wronged  by  them,  and  that  they  were  now  released 
from  the  obligations  of  the  treaty  by  the  failure  of  their 
just  intentions,  they  again  brought  up  the  Plataeans 
one  after  another,  and  asked  each  of  them  separately, 
Whether  he  had  done  any  service  to  the  Lacedae- 
monians and  their  allies  in  the  war?  When  he  said 
No,  they  took  him  away  and  slew  him  ;  no  one  was 
spared.  They  put  to  death  not  less  than  two  hundred 
Plataeans,  as  well  as  twenty-five  Athenians  who  had 
shared  with  them  in  the  siege ;  and  made  slaves  of  the 
women.  For  about  a  year  the  Thebans  gave  possession 
of  the  city  to  certain  Megarians,  who  had  been  driven 
out  by  a  revolution b,  and  to  any  surviving  Plataeans 
who  were  of  their  own  party ;  but  they  afterwards  razed 
the  whole  place  to  the  very  foundations,  and  built  near 
the  precinct  of  Here  an  inn  forming  a  square  of  two 
hundred  feet ;  it  had  two  stories,  and  chambers  all 
round.  They  used  the  roofs  and  the  doors  of  the 
Plataeans ;  and  of  the  brass  and  iron  articles  of  furniture 
found  within  the  walls  they  made  couches,  which  they 

a  Or,  taking  ^iow  in  a  different  sense,  and  repeating  it  before  <al 
ore  v&Tcpov:  '  For  they  had  been  constantly  requesting  them,  as  they 
said,  to  remain  neutral  in  the  times  before  the  war, .  . .  and  they  had 
repeated  the  request  when  just  before  the  siege  they  had  made 
to  them  a  proposal '  etc. 

b  Cp.  iv.  66  init. 


LACEDAEMONIAN  EXPEDITION  TO  CORCYRA.   215 
RC.  427.  dedicated  to  Here;  they  also  built  in  her  honour  a  stone      III. 

f\\     ft£     o 

'  temple  a  hundred  feet  long.      The  Plataean   territory 

they  converted  into  public  land,  and  let  it  out  for  terms 

of  ten  years  ;  some  of  their  own  citizens  occupied  it. 

Throughout  the  whole  affair  the  severity  shown  by  the 

Lacedaemonians  to  the  Plataeans  was  mainly  promoted 

by  a  desire  to  gratify  the  Thebans,  who  seemed  likely  to 

be  useful  allies  to  them  in  the  war  then  just  beginning. 

B.C.  519.  Such  was  the   fate   of  Plataea,  which  was  overthrown 

5>.2'  ninety-three    years    after   the    Plataeans    entered    into 

alliance  with  Athens  a. 

The  forty  Peloponnesian  ships  which  had  been  sent      69. 
to  the  aid  of  Lesbos,  as  they  fled  through  the  open  sea  Return  of 

Alcidas. 

pursued   by  the   Athenians  b,  were  caught  in  a  storm  He  and 
near   Crete,   and,    making    their  way   in    a    straggling  make  ready 


condition  from  Crete  to  the  Peloponnesus,  found 
Cyllene  thirteen  Leucadian  and  Ambraciot  triremes,  Corcyra. 
and  Brasidas  the  son  of  Tellis,  who  had  been  sent  out 
as  a  commissioner  to  advise  Alcidas.  The  Lacedae- 
monians at  home,  after  the  failure  of  their  attempt  on 
Lesbos,  had  determined  to  increase  their  navy  and  sail 
to  Corcyra,  which  was  in  a  state  of  revolution.  The 
Athenian  squadron  at  Naupactus  consisted  of  twelve 
ships  only,  and  the  Lacedaemonians  wanted  to  reach 
the  island  before  any  more  vessels  could  arrive  from 
Athens.  Brasidas  and  Alcidas  made  their  preparations 
accordingly. 

Now  Corcyra   had  been  'in   an   unsettled  state   ever      70. 
since  the  return  of  the  prisoners  who  were  taken  at  sea  Unsettled 
in  the  Epidamnian  war  c,  and  afterwards  released  by  the  Corcyra, 
Corinthians.     They  were  nominally  ransomed  for  a  sum 
of    eight   hundred   talents  d    on    the    security   of    their  {j 


proxeni,  but  in  reality  they  had  been  induced  to  try  ers  who  had 
and  gain  over  Corcyra  to  the  Corinthian  interest.     They  from 
went  from  one  citizen  to  another,  and  solicited  them  to 
revolt  from  Athens.     On  the  arrival  of  an  Athenian  and 

a  Cp.  Herod,  vi.  108.  b  Cp.  iii.  33. 

c  Gp.  i.  55  med.  d  .£192,000. 


216  THE    CORCYRAEAN  SEDITION. 

III.      also  of  a  Corinthian  vessel  conveying  ambassadors,  there  B.C.  427. 
was  a  discussion  in  the  assembly,  and  the  Corcyraeans 
voted  that  they  would  continue  allies  of  Athens  accord- 
ing to  their  agreement  a,  but  would  renew  their  former 
Trial  of       friendship  with  the  Peloponnesians.     A  certain  Peithias, 
popular'  l  e  who  voluntarily  acted  as  the  proxenus  of  the  Athenians 
15  and  was   the   popular   leader,    was   summoned    by   the 


Trial  of  the  partizans  of  the  Peloponnesians  to  take  his  trial,  they 
and  murder  affirming  that  he  wanted  to  bring  Corcyra  under  the 
and  ofsixty  yoke  of  Athens.  He  was  acquitted,  and  then  he  in  turn 
summoned  their  five  richest  men,  declaring  that  they 
were  in  the  habit  of  cutting  poles  for  vines  in  the  sacred 
precinct  of  Zeus  and  Alcinous  ;  now  for  each  pole  the 
penalty  was  fixed  at  a  stater  b.  They  were  condemned  ; 
but  the  fine  was  so  excessive  that  they  went  and  sat  as 
suppliants  in  the  temple  of  Zeus  and  Alcinous,  begging 
that  they  might  pay  the  money  by  instalments.  Peithias, 
who  happened  to  be  a  member  of  the  senate  as  well  as 
the  popular  leader,  persuaded  the  senators  to  put  the  law 
in  execution.  The  culprits,  knowing  that  the  law  was 
against  them,  and  perceiving  that  Peithias  c  as  long  as  he 
remained  in  the  senate  would  try  to  induce  the  people  c 
to  make  an  alliance  offensive  and  defensive  with  Athens, 
conspired  together,  and,  rushing  into  the  council  chamber 
with  daggers  in  their  hands,  slew  him  and  others  to  the 
number  of  sixty,  as  well  private  persons  as  senators.  A 
few  who  were  of  the  same  party  with  him  took  refuge  in 
the  Athenian  trireme,  which  had  not  yet  left. 
71.  The  next  step  taken  by  the  conspirators  was  to 
Temporary  assemble  the  people  and  tell  them  that  they  had 

triumph  of 

the  oii-       acted  for  the  best,  and  in  order  to  secure  them  against 

garchs.       the   tvrannv   Of  Athens.     For  the   future   they  should 

receive   neither   Athenians   nor   Peloponnesians,   unless 

they   came   peaceably  with   one   ship  ;    to  bring   more 

*  Cp.  i.  44. 

b  If  the  gold  stater,  about  i6j.  ;  if  the  silver  Athenian  stater, 
about  BJ.  id.  ;  if  the  silver  Corinthian  stater  (ten  Aeginetan  obols), 
about  2j.  id. 

c  Or,  '  before  he  ceased  to  be  a  senator  would  persuade  the  people.' 


THE    CORCYRAEAN   SEDITION.  217 

B.C.  427.  should  be  deemed  the  act  of  an  enemy;  and  this  pro-  III. 
'  posal  they  compelled  the  people  to  ratify.  They  also 
sent  envoys  to  Athens,  who  were  to  put  the  most  favour- 
able colour  on  the  affair,  and  to  dissuade  the  refugees 
who  had  fled  thither  from  taking  any  inconvenient  step 
which  might  lead  to  a  counter-revolution. 

When  the  envoys  arrived,  the  Athenians  arrested  them  72» 
as  disturbers  of  the  peace,  and  deposited  them  in  Aegina,  Envoys 
together  with  any  of  the  refugees  whom  they  had  gained  cyra  are 
over.  In  the  meantime,  the  Corcyraean  oligarchs  who  Athens.  a 


were  now  in  power,  on  the  arrival  of  a  Corinthian  trireme 
and  Lacedaemonian  envoys,  attacked  and  defeated  the  party- 
people,  who  at  nightfall  took  refuge  in  the  Acropolis  and 
the  higher  parts  of  the  city,  and  there  concentrated  their 
forces.  They  also  held  the  Hyllaic  harbour  ;  the  other 
party  seized  the  Agora,  where  most  of  them  lived, 
and  the  adjacent  harbour  which  looked  towards  the 
continent. 

On  the  following   day  they  skirmished  a  little,  and       73. 
both    parties   sent   messengers   round   the   country   in-  Reinforce- 

•    •         i  1  •  •  i  ments  ar- 

vitmg   the   slaves    to  join   them,   and   promising  them  rive. 
liberty;  the  greater  number   came  to    the   aid  of  the 
people,  while  the  other  faction  was  reinforced  by  eight 
hundred  auxiliaries  from  the  mainland. 

After  resting  a  day  they  fought  again,  and  the  people,       74. 
who  had  the  advantage  in  numbers  and  in  the  strength  in  a  second 
of  their   positions,   gained  the   victory.     Their  women  J^ople  are6 
joined   vigorously  in   the   fray,  hurling   tiles   from   the  vlctonous- 
housetops,  and   showing   amid   the   uproar  a  fortitude 
beyond  their  sex.     The   conflict  was  decided   towards 
evening  ;  the  oligarchy,  fearing  lest  the  people  should 
take  the  arsenal  with  a  sudden  rush  and  so  make  an 
end  of  them,  set  fire  to  the  private  houses  which  sur- 
rounded the  Agora,  as  well  as  to  the  larger  blocks  of 
buildings,  sparing  neither  their  own  property  nor  that  of 
any  one  else  in  their  determination  to  stop  them.     Much 
merchandise  was  burnt,  and  the  whole  city  would  have 
been  destroyed  if  the  wind  had  carried   the   flame   in 


2lS  THE   CORCYRAEAN   SEDITION. 

III.      that  direction.     Both  parties  now  left  off  fighting,  and  B.C.  427. 
kept  watch    in   their   own   positions   during  the   night. 
When    the    popular   cause    triumphed,    the    Corinthian 
vessel  stole  away  and  most  of  the   auxiliaries  crossed 
over  unobserved  to  the  continent. 

75.  On  the  following  day,  Nicostratus  the  son  of  Diitre- 
Arrivai  of    phes,  an  Athenian  general,  arrived  from  Naupactus  with 
Athenian     twelve  ships  and  five  hundred  Messenian  hoplites.     He 
Nicostra?ef  tried  to  effect  a  reconciliation  between  the  two  parties, 
vain]Whtries  an(^  on  ^s  suggestion  they  agreed  to  bring  to  trial  ten  of 
to  reconcile  the  most  guilty  persons,  who  immediately  fled.    The  rest 
tending       were  to  live  together,  and  to  make  a  truce  with  one 

another,  and  with  Athens  an  alliance  offensive  and  de- 
fensive. Having  accomplished  his  purpose  he  was  about 
to  sail  away,  when  the  leaders  of  the  people  induced  him 
to  leave  five  of  his  own  vessels,  that  the  enemy  might  be 
less  inclined  to  stir,  promising  to  man  five  ships  of  their 
own  and  send  them  with  him.  He  agreed,  and  they 
selected  the  crews  of  the  ships  out  of  the  opposite 
faction.  But  the  men  were  afraid  of  being  sent  to 
Athens,  and  sat  as  suppliants  in  the  temple  of  the 
Dioscuri.  Nicostratus  sought  to  raise  them  up  and 
reassure  them,  but  they  would  not  trust  him  ;  where- 
upon the  people  armed  themselves,  arguing  that  their 
mistrust  and  unwillingness  to  sail  was  a  proof  of  their 
evil  designs.  They  took  their  enemies'  arms  out  of  their 
houses,  and  some  of  them  whom  they  chanced  to  meet 
would  have  been  slain  if  Nicostratus  had  not  interfered. 
The  rest,  to  the  number  of  about  four  hundred,  when 
they  saw  what  was  going  on  took  refuge  anew  in  the 
temple  of  Here.  But  the  people,  fearing  that  they  would 
resort  to  violence,  persuaded  them  to  rise  and  conveyed 
them  at  once  to  the  island  that  lies  in  front  of  the 
temple  of  Here,  whither  provisions  were  regularly  sent 
to  them. 

76.  At  this  stage  of  the  revolution,  on  the  fourth  or  fifth 
Appearance  day  after  the  suppliants  had  been  conveyed  to  the  island, 
ponnesian    the  fifty-three  Peloponnesian  ships  from  Cyllene,  which 

fleet. 


THE    CORCYRAEAN  SEDITION.  319 

B.C.  427.  since   the   expedition   to    Ionia   had   been   in    harbour      III. 

Ol     £8     o 

'  there  a,  arrived  on  the  scene,  still  under  the  command 
of  Alcidas.  Brasidas  his  adviser  was  on  board.  They 
anchored  for  the  night  at  Sybota,  a  harbour  on  the 
mainland,  and  when  the  morning  broke  they  sailed 
upon  Corcyra. 

The  whole  place  was  in  an  uproar  ;  the  people  dreaded       77. 
their   enemies  within  the  city  no    less   than  the  Pelo-  Confused 

...  battle  of 

ponnesian  fleet.     They  hastened  to  equip  sixty  ships,  the  Corcy- 
and  as  fast  as  they  were  manned  sent  them  out  against  Athenians 


the  Peloponnesians,  although  the  Athenians  entreated 
to  be  allowed  to  sail  out  first,  leaving  them  to  follow  as 
soon  as  they  had  got  their  fleet  together.  But  when  in 
this  straggling  fashion  their  ships  approached  the  enemy, 
two  of  them  at  once  deserted  ;  in  others  the  crews  were 
fighting  with  one  another,  and  everything  was  in  dis- 
order. The  Peloponnesians,  seeing  the  confusion,  em- 
ployed twenty  ships  only  against  the  Corcyraeans,  and 
opposed  the  remainder  of  their  fleet  to  the  twelve 
Athenian  ships,  of  which  two  were  the  Salaminia  and 
Paralus. 

The  Corcyraeans,  coming  up  few  at  a  time  and  in  this      78. 
disorderly  fashion,  had  trouble  enough  among  themselves.  Diversion 
The  Athenians,  afraid  of  being  surrounded  by  superior  the  Athe- 
numbers,  did  not  attack  the  main  body  nor  the  centre  "/owiy  n>° 
of  those  opposed  to  them,  but  fell  upon  the  wings  and  treat- 
sank  a  single  ship  ;  then,  the  enemy  forming  in  a  circle, 
they  sailed  round  them  and  endeavoured  to  throw  them 
into  confusion.      But  those  who  were  opposed   to  the 
Corcyraeans,  seeing  this  movement  and  fearing  a  repe- 
tition of  what  happened  at  Naupactusb,  came  to   the 
rescue,   and   the   united   fleet   charged    the    Athenians. 
Thereupon  they  rowed  astern,  hoping  that  by  retreat- 
ing  very   leisurely   they   might    give   the    Corcyraeans 
time  to  escape,  especially  as  the  attack  of  the  enemy 
was  now  directed  against  themselves.     The   naval  en- 
gagement ended  at  sunset. 

a  Cp.  iv.  69.  b  Cp.  ii.  84. 


220  THE    CORCYRAEAN   SEDITION. 

III.          The  Corcyraeans,  who  were  afraid  that  the  victorious  B.C.  427. 
70        enemy  would  sail  to  the  city  and  have  recourse  to  some 
The  Peio-    decisive  measure,  such  as  taking  on  board  the  prisoners 
fleetjrSfead  in  the  island,  conveyed  them  back  to  the  temple  of  Here 
theadtyking  and  Suarded  the  cit7-    But  the  Peloponnesians,  although 
retire ;        they  had  won  the  battle,  did  not  venture  to  attack  the 
city,  but  returned  to  their  station  on  the  mainland  with 
thirteen   Corcyraean  ships  which  they  had  taken.     On 
the  next  day  they  still  hesitated,  although  there  was 
great  panic  and  confusion  among  the  inhabitants.     It 
is  said  that  Brasidas  advised  Alcidas  to  make  the  at- 
tempt, but  he  had  not  an  equal  vote  with  him.     So  they 
only  disembarked  at  the  promontory  of  Leucimme  and 
ravaged  the  country. 

80.  Meanwhile  the  people  of  Corcyra,  dreading  that  the 
and  soon     fleet   of  the   Peloponnesians   would   attack   them,  held 
hearing    '  a   parley   with  the   other   faction,  especially  with   the 
Athenian     suppliants,  in  the  hope  of  saving  the  city;   they  even 
abroach6   Persuade(i  s^me  of  them  to  go  on  board  the  fleet ;  for 
ing,  return  the    Corcyraeans   still   contrived   to   man    thirty   ships. 

But  the  Peloponnesians,  after  devastating  the  land  till 
about  midday,  retired.  And  at  nightfall  the  approach 
of  sixty  Athenian  vessels  was  signalled  to  them  from 
Leucas.  These  had  been  sent  by  the  Athenians  under 
the  command  of  Eurymedon  the  son  of  Thucles,  when 
they  heard  of  the  revolution  and  of  the  intended  ex- 
pedition of  Alcidas  to  Corcyra. 

8 1.  The  Peloponnesians  set  out  that  very  night  on  their 
Massacre     way  home,  keeping  close  to  the  land,  and  transporting 
oligarchs,    the  ships  over  the  Leucadian  isthmus,  that  they  might 

not  be  seen  sailing  round a.  When  the  Corcyraeans 
perceived  that  the  Athenian  fleet  was  approaching,  while  . 
that  of  the  enemy  had  disappeared,  they  took  the  Mes- 
senian  troops,  who  had  hitherto  been  outside  the  walls, 
into  the  city,  and  ordered  the  ships  which  they  had 
manned  to  sail  round  into  the  Hyllaic  harbour.  These 
proceeded  on  their  way.  Meanwhile  they  killed  any  of 
a  Cp.  iv.  8  init. 


THE    CORCYRAEAN   SEDITION.  221 

B.C.  427.  their  enemies  whom  they  caught  in  the  city.  On  the  III. 
'  2'  arrival  of  the  ships  they  disembarked  those  whom  they 
had  induced  to  go  on  board,  and  despatched  them  a  ; 
they  also  went  to  the  temple  of  Here,  and  persuading 
about  fifty  of  the  suppliants  to  stand  their  trial,  con- 
demned them  all  to  death.  The  majority  would  not 
come  out,  and,  when  they  saw  what  was  going  on,  de- 
stroyed one  another  in  the  enclosure  of  the  temple 
where  they  were,  except  a  few  who  hung  themselves 
on  trees,  or  put  an  end  to  their  own  lives  in  any  other 
way  which  they  could.  And,  during  the  seven  days 
which  Eurymedon  after  his  arrival  remained  with  his 
sixty  ships,  the  Corcyraeans  continued  slaughtering  those 
of  their  fellow-citizens  whom  they  deemed  their  enemies  ; 
they  professed  to  punish  them  for  their  designs  against 
the  democracy,  but  in  fact  some  were  killed  from  motives 
of  personal  enmity,  and  some  because  money  was  owing 
to  them,  by  the  hands  of  their  debtors.  Every  form  of 
death  was  to  be  seen,  and  everything,  and  more  than 
everything  that  commonly  happens  in  revolutions,  hap- 
pened then.  The  father  slew  the  son,  and  the  suppliants 
were  torn  from  the  temples,  and  slain  near  them  ;  some 
of  them  were  even  walled  up  in  the  temple  of  Dionysus, 
and  there  perished.  To  such  extremes  of  cruelty  did 
revolution  go  ;  and  this  seemed  to  be  the  worst  of  revo- 
lutions, because  it  was  the  first. 

For   not  long   afterwards  the  whole    Hellenic  world      82. 
was  in  commotion  ;  in  every  city  the  chiefs  of  the  de-  The  conflict 
mocracy  and  of  the  oligarchy  were  struggling,  the  one  cracy  and 
to  bring  in  the  Athenians,  the  other  the  Lacedaemonians,  encouraged 
Now  in  time  of  peace,  men  would  have  had  no  excuse  for  a^  il,  is  by  <• 

the  hope  of 

introducing  either,  and  no  desire  to  do  so,  but  when  they  Athenian 

,  ,       ,       .  ,  ,  ,          .,         ,  ...  or  Lacedae- 

were  at  war  b  and  both  sides  could  easily  obtain  allies  to  monian 


a  Reading,  with  Poppo,  aTrc^pavTo  instead  of  dve^wprja-av,  which 
gives  no  sense. 

b  Or,  taking  gvpnaxlas  with  eVayeoycu,  and  paSias  in  a  different 
sense:  'the  introduction  of  a  foreign  alliance  on  one  side  or  the 
other  to  the  hurt  of  their  enemies  and  the  advantage  of  themselves 
was  easily  effected  by  the  dissatisfied  party.' 


222  REFLECTIONS    ON   REVOLUTION. 

III.      the  hurt  of  their  enemies  and  the  advantage  of  them-  B.C.  427. 

"5  selves,  the  dissatisfied  party  were  only  too  ready  to  in- 
anddis-      voke  foreign  aidb.     And  revolution  brought  upon  the 

organises 

society.  cities  of  Hellas  many  terrible  calamities,  such  as  have 
been  and  always  will  be  while  human  nature  remains  the 
same,  but  which  are  more  or  less  aggravated  and  differ  in 
character  with  every  new  combination  of  circumstances. 
In  peace  and  prosperity  both  states  and  individuals  are 
actuated  by  higher  motives,  because  they  do  not  fall 
under  the  dominion  of  imperious  necessities  ;  but  war 
which  takes  away  the  comfortable  provision  of  daily 
life  is  a  hard  master,  and  tends  to  assimilate  men's 
characters  to  their  conditions. 

Changes  When  troubles  had  once  begun  in  the  cities,  those  who 
morafprin-  followed  carried  the  revolutionary  spirit  further  and  fur- 
£Ptheirudse  ther>  and  determined  to  outdo  the  report  of  all  who  had 
ofianguage.  preceded  them  by  the  ingenuity  of  their  enterprises  and 
the  atrocity  of  their  revenges.  The  meaning  of  words 
had  no  longer  the  same  relation  to  things,  but  was  changed 
by  them  as  they  thought  proper.  Reckless  daring  was 
held  to  be  loyal  courage ;  prudent  delay  was  the  ex- 
cuse of  a  coward  ;  moderation  was  the  disguise  of  un- 
manly weakness  ;  to  know  everything  was  to  do  nothing. 
Frantic  energy  was  the  true  quality  of  a  man.  A  con- 
spirator who  wanted  to  be  safe  was  a  recreant  in  dis- 
guise. The  lover  of  violence  was  always  trusted,  and  his 
opponent  suspected.  He  who  succeeded  in  a  plot  was 
deemed  knowing,  but  a  still  greater  master  in  craft  was 
he  who  detected  one.  On  the  other  hand,  he  wTho 
plotted  from  the  first  to  have  nothing  to  do  with  plots 
was  a  breaker  up  of  parties  and  a  poltroon  who  was 
afraid  of  the  enemy.  In  a  word,  he  who  could  outstrip 
another  in  a  bad  action  was  applauded,  and  so  was  he 
who  encouraged  to  evil  one  who  had  no  idea  of  it. 
The  tie  of  party  was  stronger  than  the  tie  of  blood, 
because  a  partisan  was  more  ready  to  dare  without 
asking  why.  (For  party  associations  are  not  based  upon 
any  established  law,  nor  do  they  seek  the  public  good  ; 


REFLECTIONS    ON  REVOLUTION.  223 

B.C.  427.  they  are  formed  in  defiance  of  the  laws  and  from  self-  III. 
interest.)  The  seal  of  good  faith  was  not  divine  law, 
but  fellowship  in  crime.  If  an  enemy  when  he  was  in 
the  ascendant  offered  fair  words,  the  opposite  party  re- 
ceived them  not  in  a  generous  spirit,  abut  by  a  jealous 
watchfulness  of  his  actions  a.  Revenge  was  dearer  than 
self-preservation.  Any  agreements  sworn  to  by  either 
party,  when  they  could  do  nothing  else,  were  binding  as 
long  as  both  were  powerless.  But  he  who  on  a  favour- 
able opportunity  first  took  courage  and  struck  at  his 
enemy  when  he  saw  him  off  his  guard,  had  greater 
pleasure  in  a  perfidious  than  he  would  have  had  in  an 
open  act  of  revenge  ;  he  congratulated  himself  that  he 
had  taken  the  safer  course,  and  also  that  he  had  over- 
reached his  enemy  and  gained  the  prize  of  superior 
ability.  In  general  the  dishonest  more  easily  gain  credit 
for  cleverness  than  the  simple  for  goodness  ;  men  take 
a  pride  in  the  one,  but  are  ashamed  of  the  other. 

The  cause  of  all  these  evils  was  the  love   of  power,  Causes  *and 
originating  in  avarice  and  ambition,  and  the  party-spirit  therevo- 
which  is  engendered  by  them  when  men  are  fairly  em- 


barked  in  a  contest.     For  the  leaders  on  either  side  used  Disregard 

of  all  laws, 

specious  names,  the  one  party  professing  to  uphold  the  human  and 
constitutional  equality  of  the  many,  the  other  the  wisdom 
of  an  aristocracy,  while  they  made  the  public  interests, 
to  which  in  name  they  were  devoted,  in  reality  their 
prize.  Striving  in  every  way  to  overcome  each  other, 
they  committed  the  most  monstrous  crimes  ;  yet  even 
these  were  surpassed  by  the  magnitude  of  their  revenges 
which  they  pursued  to  the  very  utmost  b,  neither  party 
observing  any  definite  limits  either  of  justice  or  public 
expediency,  but  both  alike  making  the  caprice  of  the 
moment  their  law.  Either  by  the  help  of  an  unrighteous 
sentence,  or  grasping  power  with  the  strong  hand,  they 
were  eager  to  satiate  the  impatience  of  party-spirit. 
Neither  faction  cared  for  religion  ;  but  any  fair  pretence 

a  Or,  '  but  by  active  precautions.' 

h  Placing  the  comma  after  /uei^ous  instead  of  after  fTregf/ccrdv  re. 


224 


REFLECTIONS    ON   REVOLUTION. 


III. 


Universal 
distrust. 
Force  of 
character, 
not  intel- 
lect, pre- 
vailed. 


84. 


(1)  Fury  of 
the  op- 
pressed, 

(2)  dis- 
content of 
the  poor, 

(3)  Party 
hatred 
among 
equals, 
were  the 
great  in- 
centives to 
crime. 
Human 
nature  when 
inspired  by 
revenge  is 
too  much 
for  justice, 
conscience, 
or  pru- 
dence. 


which  succeeded  in  effecting  some  odious  purpose  was  B.C.  427. 
greatly  lauded.     And  the  citizens  who  were  of  neither  O1>  88>  2' 
party  fell   a  prey  to  both  ;    either  they   were  disliked 
because  they  held   aloof,  or  men  were  jealous  of  their 
surviving. 

Thus  revolution  gave  birth  to  every  form  of  wicked- 
ness in  Hellas.  The  simplicity  which  is  so  large  an 
element  in  a  noble  nature  was  laughed  to  scorn  and  dis- 
appeared. An  attitude  of  perfidious  antagonism  every- 
where prevailed  ;  for  there  was  no  word  binding  enough, 
nor  oath  terrible  enough  to  reconcile  enemies.  Each 
man  was  strong  only  in  the  conviction  that  nothing  was 
secure ;  he  must  look  to  his  own  safety,  and  could  not 
afford  to  trust  others.  ^  Inferior  intellects  generally  suc- 
ceeded best.  For,  aware  of  their  own  deficiencies,  and 
fearing  the  capacity  of  their  opponents,  for  whom  they 
were  no  match  in  powers  of  speech,  and  whose  subtle 
wits  were  likely  to  anticipate  them  in  contriving  evil, 
they  struck  boldly  and  at  once.  But  the  cleverer  sort, 
presuming  in  their  arrogance  that  they  would  be  aware 
in  time,  and  disdaining  to  act  when  they  could  think, 
were  taken  off  their  guard  and  easily  destroyed. 

Now  in  Corcyra  most  of  these  deeds  were  perpetrated, 
and  for  the  first  time.  There  was  every  crime  which  men 
a  might  be  supposed  a  to  perpetrate  in  revenge  who  had 
been  governed  not  wisely,  but  tyrannically,  and  now  had 
the  oppressor  at  their  mercy.  There  were  the  dishonest 
designs  of  others  who  were  longing  to  be  relieved  from 
their  habitual  poverty,  and  were  naturally  animated  by 
a  passionate  desire  for  their  neighbour's  goods  ;  and 
there  were  crimes  of  another  class  which  men  commit, 
not  from  covetousness,  but  from  the  enmity  which 
equals  foster  towards  one  another  until  they  are  carried 
away  by  their  blind  rage  into  the  extremes  of  pitiless 
cruelty.  At  such  a  time  the  life  of  the  city  was  all 
in  disorder,  and  human  nature,  which  is  always  ready 
to  transgress  the  laws,  having  now  trampled  them  under 
a  Or,  supplying  av  with  the  optative :  ( may  be  supposed.' 


THE    AFFAIRS    OF  SICILY.  325 

of 88*2'  ^°ot'  Delighted  to  show  that  her  passions  were  ungovern-  III. 
able,  that  she  was  stronger  than  justice,  and  the  enemy 
of  everything  above  her.  If  malignity  had  not  exercised 
a  fatal  power,  how  could  any  one  have  preferred  revenge 
to  piety,  and  gain  to  innocence  ?  But,  when  men  are 
retaliating  upon  others,  they  are  reckless  of  the  future, 
and  do  not  hesitate  to  annul  those  common  laws  of 
humanity  to  which  every  individual  trusts  for  his  own 
hope  of  deliverance  should  he  ever  be  overtaken  by 
calamity;  they  forget  that  in  their  own  hour  of  need 
they  will  look  for  them  in  vain. 

Such  were  the  passions  which  the  citizens  of  Corcyra      85. 
first  of  all  Hellenes  displayed  towards  one  another.    After  The  sur- 
the  departure  of  Eurymedon  and  £he  Athenian  fleet  the  gTrc 
surviving  oligarchs,  who  to  the  number  of  five  hundred  on"thef  o^ 
had  escaped,  seized  certain  forts  on  the  mainland,  and  positecoast, 

but  soon 

thus   became  masters  of  the  territory  on  the  opposite  return  to 
coast  which  belonged  to  Corcyra.     Thence  issuing  forth,  and  occupy 
they  plundered  the  Corcyraeans  in  the  island,  and  did  £1°^ 
much  harm,  so  that  there  was  a  great  famine  in  the  city. 
They  also  sent  ambassadors  to  Lacedaemon  and  Corinth, 
begging  that  they  might  be  restored,  but,  failing  of  their 
object,  they  procured  boats  and  auxiliaries,  and  passed 
over  to  Corcyra  about  six  hundred  in  all ;  then,  burning 
their  boats,  that  they  might  have  no  hope  but  in  the 
conquest  of  the  island,  they  went  up  the  mount  Istone, 
and  building  a  fort  there,  became  masters  of  the  country, 
and  despoiled  the  inhabitants  of  the  city. 

At  the  end  of  the  same  summer  the  Athenians  sent      86. 
twenty  ships  to  Sicily  under  the  command  of  Laches  War  in 
the  son  of  Melanopus,  and  Charoeades  the  son  of  Euphi-  tween  the 
letus.     Syracuse  and  Leontini  were  now  at  war  with  one  an^uSn1-5 
another.     All  the  Dorian  cities,  except  Camarina,  were  .tines  •  *he. 

latter  obtain 

in  alliance  with  Syracuse  ;  they  were  the  same  which  at  assistance 
the  beginning  of  the  war  were  reckoned  in  the  Lacedae-  Athens, 
monian  confederacy,  but  they  had  taken  no  active  part a. 
The  allies  of  the  Leontines  were  the  Chalcidian  cities  and 
a  Cp.  ii.  7  med. 
Q 


226  RETURN   OF    THE    PLAGUE. 

III.  Camarina.  In  Italy  the  Locnans  sided  with  the  Syra-  B.C.  427. 
cusans,  and  the  Rhegians  with  the  Leontines,  who  were 
their  kinsmen.  The  Leontines  and  their  allies  sent  to 
Athens,  and  on  the  ground,  partly  of  an  old  alliance, 
partly  of  their  Ionian  descent,  begged  the  Athenians  to 
send  them  ships,  for  they  were  driven  off  both  sea  and 
land  by  their  Syracusan  enemies.  The  Athenians  sent 
the  ships,  professedly  on  the  ground  of  relationship,  but 
in  reality  because  they  did  not  wish  the  Peloponnesians 
to  obtain  corn  from  Sicily.  Moreover  they  meant  to  try 
what  prospect  they  had  of  getting  the  affairs  of  Sicily 
into  their  hands.  So  the  commanders  of  the  fleet  came 
to  Rhegium  in  Italy,  where  they  established  them- 
selves, and  carried  on  the  war  in  concert  with  their 
allies.  Thus  the  summer  ended. 

87.          In  the  following  winter  the  plague,  which  had  never 
Reappear-    entirely  disappeared,  although  abating  for  a  time,  again 
plague  after  attacked  the  Athenians.    It  continued  on  this  second  oc- 
abated        casion  not  less  than  a  year,  having  previously  lasted  for 
At  the  same  j-wo  years.    To  the  power  of  Athens  certainly  nothing  was 
merous       more  ruinous  ;  not  less  than  four  thousand  four  hundred 
occurqua  6S  Athenian  hoplites  who  were  on  the  roll  died,  and  also 
three  hundred  horsemen,  and  an  incalculable  number  of 
the  common  people.     This  too  was  the  time  when  the 
frequent   earthquakes  occurred  at  Athens,  in  Euboea, 
and  in  Boeotia,  especially  at  Orchomenos  a. 
88.          During  the  same  winter  the  Athenians  in  Sicily  and 
Fruitless     the   Rhegians  made   an   expedition   with   thirty   ships 
agahist'the  against  the  islands  of  Aeolus,  as  they  are  called,  which 
i*1  summer  time  cannot  be  attacked  owing  to  the  want 
of  water.     These  islands  belong  to  the  Liparaeans,  who 
are  colonists  of  the  Cnidians  :  they  inhabit  one  of  them, 
which  is  not  large,  and  is  called  Lipara ;  from  this  they 
go  and  cultivate  the  rest,  Didyme,  Strongyle,  and  Hiera. 
The  inhabitants  believe  that  the  forge  of  Hephaestus  is. 
in  Hiera,  because  the  island  sends  up  a  blaze  of  fire  in 
the  night-time  and  clouds  of  smoke  by  day.   The  Aeolian 
a  Gp.  ch.  89,  and  {.23  med. 


STRANGE   NATURAL  PHENOMENA.          227 

B.C.  427.  islands  lie  off  the  territory  of  the  Sicels  and  Messenians  ;  III. 
2'  they  were  in  alliance  with  Syracuse.  The  Athenians 
wasted  the  country,  but  finding  that  the  inhabitants 
would  not  yield,  sailed  back  to  Rhegium.  And  so  ended 
the  winter,  and  with  it  the  fifth  year  in  the  Pelopon- 
nesian  War  of  which  Thucydides  wrote  the  history. 

B.C.  426.      In  the  ensuing  summer  the  Peloponnesians  and  their      89. 
88'  3'  allies,  under  the   command  of  Agis  the  son   of  Archi-  The  earth- 
damus,  the  Lacedaemonian   king,  came   as  far   as   the  cdvedby°n 
Isthmus.     They  intended   to  invade  Attica,   but   were 
deterred  from   proceeding  by    numerous  earthquakes  % 


f  h 
and  no  invasion  took  place  in  this  year.    About  the  time  great  ebb 

when  these  earthquakes  prevailed,  the  sea  at  Orobiae  in  the  sea  at 


Euboea,  retiring  from  what  was  then  the  line  of  coast 
and  rising  in  a  great  wave,  overflowed  a  part  of  the  city; 
and  although  it  subsided  in  some  places,  yet  in  others 
the  inundation  was  permanent,  and  that  which  was  for- 
merly land  is  now  sea.  All  the  people  who  could  not 
escape  to  the  high  ground  perished.  A  similar  inun- 
dation occurred  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Atalante,  an 
island  on  the  coast  of  the  Opuntian  Locri,  which  carried 
away  a  part  of  an  Athenian  fort  b,  and  dashed  in  pieces 
one  of  two  ships  which  were  drawn  up  on  the  beach. 
At  Peparethus  also  the  sea  retired,  but  no  inundation 
followed  ;  an  earthquake,  however,  overthrew  a  part  of 
the  wall,  the  Prytaneum,  and  a  few  houses.  I  conceive 
that,  where  the  force  of  the  earthquake  was  greatest,  the 
sea  was  driven  back,  and  the  suddenness  of  the  recoil 
made  the  inundation  more  violent  ;  and  I  am  of  opinion 
that  this  was  the  cause  of  the  phenomenon,  which 
would  never  have  taken  place  if  there  had  been  no 
earthquake. 

During  the  same  summer  war  was  going  on  in  various      90. 
parts  of  Sicily,  the  Hellenes  in  Sicily  fighting  against  Capture  by 


one  another,  the  Athenians  helping  their  own  allies.     I  ° 


will  mention  the  chief  actions  in  which  the  Athenians  submission 
took  part,  whether  by  the  help  of  their  allies  attacking,  or  °fMessene. 
a  Cp.  ch.  87.  b  cp.  ii.  32. 

Q  2 


228     EXPEDITIONS  TO  MELOS  AND    TANAGRA. 

III.  attacked  by  their  enemies.  Charoeades,  the  Athenian  B.C.  426. 
general,  had  been  killed  in  battle  by  the  Syracusans, 
and  Laches  having  taken  the  entire  command  of  the 
fleet,  he  and  the  allies  made  an  expedition  against 
Myle,  a  town  belonging  to  Messene.  Two  tribes  of  the 
Messenians  were  keeping  guard  there,  and  they  had  set 
an  ambuscade  for  the  force  which  they  were  expecting 
to  land  ;  but  the  Athenians  and  their  allies  put  to  flight 
with  heavy  loss  the  troops  which  came  out  of  the  am- 
bush. Then,  attacking  the  fortress,  they  compelled  its 
defenders  to  come  to  terms,  surrender  the  citadel,  and 
march  with  them  against  Messene.  Finally,  upon  the 
approach  of  the  Athenians  and  their  allies,  the  Mes- 
senians themselves  came  to  terms,  giving  hostages  and 
the  other*  pledges  which  were  required  of  them. 

91.  In  the  same  summer  the  Athenians  sent  thirty  ships 

Thirty        round  the  Peloponnese  under  the  command  of  Demos- 

Athenian 

ships  under  thenes  the  son  of  Alcisthenes,  and  Procles  the  son  of 

Theodorus.     They  also  sent  sixty  ships  and  two  thou- 


Pdoponh-e  sand  kopjes  to  Melos,  under  the  command  of  Nicias 
nese.  Sixty  the  son  of  Niceratus,  wishing  to  subdue  the  Melians, 

more  under 

Nicias  go  to  who,  although  they  were  islanders,  resisted  them  and 
aftee°sr'avag-  would  not  join  their  alliance*.  So  they  ravaged  their 
count*6  country,  but  rinding  that  the  Melians  would  not  yield, 
put  in  at  they  sailed  away  to  Oropus,  opposite  Euboea.  There 
At  Tanagra  they  put  in  at  nightfall,  and  the  hoplites  disembarking 
^concert'  went  at  once  by  land  to  Tanagra  in  Boeotia.  Mean- 
Athenian  wn^e  the  entire  Athenian  force,  under  the  command  of 
land-forces,  Hipponicus  the  son  of  Callias,  and  Eurymedon  the  son 

defeat  the  £,r  J 

inhabitants,  of  Thucles,  upon  a  signal  given  marched  to  meet  them  at 
the  same  spot.  There  they  encamped,  and  all  together 
devastated  the  country,  remaining  at  Tanagra  during 
that  day  and  the  following  night.  On  the  morrow  they 
defeated  the  Tanagraeans  who  sallied  out  upon  them, 
and  also  some  Thebans  who  had  come  to  their  aid  ;  they 
then  took  up  the  arms  of  the  slain,  raised  a  trophy,  and 
returned,  the  one  part  of  the  forces  back  again  to  the 

a  Cp.  v.  84. 


FOUNDATION    OF   HERACLEA,  229 

B.C.  426.  city,   the  other  to   their   ships.     Nicias  with   his  sixty      JIT. 
3'  ships  then  sailed  to  the  coast  of  Locris ;  after  ravaging 
the  country  he  returned  home. 

About  the  same  time  the  Lacedaemonians  founded  92. 
Heraclea,  their  colony  in  Trachinia.  The  intention  was  TO  help  the 
as  follows : — The  Trachinians  are  one  of  the  three  Malian  and  their 
tribes ;  the  other  two  being  the  Paralians  and  the  Hie- 
reans.  These  Trachinians,  having  suffered  greatly  in  war 
from  their  neighbours  the  Oetaeans,  at  first  thought  of  found  the 
attaching  themselves  to  the  Athenians,  but,  fearing  that  Heraclea. 
they  could  not  trust  them,  sent  Tisamenus,  whom  they 
appointed  their  envoy,  to  Lacedaemon.  Doris,  which 
is  the  mother  state  of  Lacedaemon,  joined  in  the 
embassy  and  also  requested  help,  for  the  Dorians  too 
were  suffering  from  the  Oetaeans.  The  Lacedaemonians 
heard  their  appeal,  and,  being  desirous  of  assisting  both 
the  Trachinians  and  Dorians,  made  up  their  minds  to 
send  out  a  colony.  They  also  thought  that  the  situation 
of  the  new  city  would  be  convenient  for  carrying  on  the 
war  against  the  Athenians.  There  a  navy  could  be 
equipped  if  they  wanted  to  attack  Euboea,  which  was 
quite  near,  and  the  station  would  be  handy  for  the 
conveyance  of  troops  to  Chalcidice.  For  eveiy  reason 
they  were  eager  to  colonise  the  place.  First  they  en- 
quired of  the  God  at  Delphi ;  he  bade  them  go,  and 
they  sent  out  settlers  taken  from  their  own  citizens  and 
the  Perioeci,  announcing  that  any  Hellenes  who  desired, 
not  being  of  the  Ionian,  Achaean,  or  certain  other  races, 
might  accompany  them.  The  leaders  of  the  colony  were 
three  Lacedaemonians,  Leon,  Alcidas,  and  Damagon. 
They  set  to  work  and  built  afresh  the  walls  of  the  city, 
which  received  the  name  of  Heraclea,  and  is  situated 
about  four  miles  and  a-half  from  Thermopylae  and  a 
little  more  than  two  from  the  sea.  They  also  con- 
structed docks,  beginning  the  works  near  Thermopylae, 
at  the  pass,  that  the  city  might  be  perfectly  defended. 

While  the  new  colonists  were  collecting  at  Heraclea,      93. 
the  Athenians  grew  alarmed ;  the  scheme  appeared  to  be 


230  FAILURE    OF    THE    NEW    COLONY. 

III.      aimed  at  Euboea,  for  Cape  Cenaeum  on  the  opposite  coast  B.C.  426. 
gradually    js  within  a  short  sail.     But  their  fears  were  not  realized  ;  OI<  88>  3< 

worn  out 

by  the  per-  no  harm  whatever  ensued.     The  reasons  were  these  :  — 
position  of  In  the  first  place  the  Thessalians  are  strong  in  that  part  of 


t^le  country,  and  fearing  that  Heraclea,  which  was  built  to 
ky  th^.      f  control  them,  would  be  a  powerful  and  dangerous  neigh- 
the  Lace-     bour,  they  carried  on  uninterrupted  war  against  the  new 
governors,    settlers  until  they  completely  wore  them  out,  although 
originally  they  had   been   very  numerous.     For   every 
one  joined  without   hesitation,  encouraged  by  the  pro- 
mise of  security  which  a  Lacedaemonian  colony  seemed 
to  offer.     But  another  great  cause  of  the  ruin  and  de- 
population of  the  place  was  the  conduct  of  the  governors 
sent  out  from  Lacedaemon,  who  frightened  the  people 
away  by  their  severe  and  often  unjust  administration  a. 
Thus  the  Heracleans  fell  an  easy  prey  to  their  neigh- 
bours. 

94.  During  the  same  summer,  and  about  the  same  time 
Attack  upon  when  the  Athenians  were  engaged  at  Melos,  the  troops 
Demos-  which  were  cruising  in  the  thirty  Athenian  ships  about 
steadSofm"  Peloponnesus  set  an  ambuscade  at  Ellomenus  in  Leucadia 
th™b?ock?  anci  killed  a  few  of  the  guards  of  the  country.  They 
ade,  is  per-  next  attacked  Leucas  itself  with  a  larger  armament, 
theMesse-  consisting  of  the  Acarnanians,  who  followed  them  with 


their  whole  forces,  all  but  the  inhabitants  of  Oeniadae  b, 
Aetoiia.  an(j  some  Zacynthians  and  Cephallenians,  together  with 
fifteen  ships  from  Corcyra.  The  Leucadians  saw  their 
territory  both  on  the  mainland  and  within  the  Isthmus, 
where  the  town  of  Leucas  and  the  temple  of  Apollo 
are  situated,  ravaged  by  the  enemy;  but  being  power- 
less against  a  superior  force,  they  remained  inactive. 
The  Acarnanians  begged  Demosthenes,  the  Athenian 
general,  to  cut  them  off  by  a  wall,  thinking  that  they 
could  easily  take  the  city  and  so  rid  themselves  of  an 
old  enemy.  But  just  then  he  was  persuaded  by  the 
Messenians  that,  having  such  an  army  in  the  field,  he 

a  Cp.  v.  52  init.  b  Cp.  ii.  102  init. 


DEMOSTHENES   IN   AETOLIA.  331 

B.C.  426.  would  gain  honour  by  attacking  the  Aetolians  :  they  HI. 
' 3'  were  the  enemies  of  Naupactus,  and  if  he  defeated 
them  he  would  easily  subjugate  the  adjoining  part  of 
the  mainland  to  the  Athenians.  The  Aetolians,  they 
said,  though  a  warlike  nation,  dwelt  in  unwalled  villages, 
which  were  widely  scattered,  and  as  they  had  only 
light-armed  soldiers,  they  would  be  subdued  without 
difficulty  before  they  could  combine.  They  told  him 
that  he  should  first  attack  the  Apodotians,  then  the 
Ophioneans,  and  after  them  the  Eurytanians.  The  last 
are  the  largest  tribe  of  the  Aetolians ;  they  speak  a 
language  more  unintelligible  than  any  of  their  neigh- 
bours, and  are  believed  to  eat  raw  flesh.  They  said 
that,  if  he  conquered  these,  the  rest  would  readily  come 
over  to  him. 

He  was  influenced  by  his  regard  for  the  Messenians,      95. 
and  still  more  by  the  consideration  that  without  rein-  He  deter- 
forcements  from  Athens,  and  with  no  other  help  than  Sake  his 
that  of  the  allies  on  the  mainland,  to  whom  he  would  Sufa^d 
add  the  Aetolians,  he  could  make  his  way  by  land  to  Phocis  into 
attack  Boeotia.     He  might  proceed  through  the  Ozolian  which  he 
Locri  to  the  Dorian  Cytinium,  keeping  Mount  Parnassus  attack  with 
on  the  right,  until  he  came  down  upon  the  Phocians. 
They  would  probably  be  eager  to  join  in  the  expedition 
because  they  had  always  been  friendly  to  Athens,  or,  if 
unwilling,  they  might  be  coerced  ;  and  once  in  Phocis  he 
would  be  on  the  borders  of  Boeotia.     So  he  left  Leucas 
with  all  his  army,  much  against  the  will  of  the  Acarna- 
nians,  and  sailed  to  Sollium.     He  there  communicated 
his  design  to  them,  but  they  would  not  accompany  him 
because  he  had  refused  to  blockade  Leucas ;  so  with  the 
remainder  of  his  army,  which  consisted  of  Cephallenians, 
Messenians,  Zacynthians,  and  three  hundred  marines  be- 
longing to  the  Athenian  fleet a,  the  fifteen  Corcyraean 
vessels  having  left,  he  marched  against  the  Aetolians, 
starting  from  Oeneon  in  Locris.     The  Ozolian  Locrians 

a  Cp.  ch.  94  init. 


233  PROGRESS    OF    THE   INVASION. 

III.  were  allies  of  the  Athenians,  and  they  were  to  meet  him  B.C.  426. 
with  their  whole  force  in  the  interior  of  the  country. 
They  dwelt  on  the  border  of  the  Aetolians,  and  as  they 
were  armed  in  a  similar  manner  and  knew  their  country 
and  ways  of  fighting,  their  help  in  the  expedition  seemed 
likely  to  be  very  valuable. 

96.  He  encamped  the  first  night  at  the  temple  of  Nemean 
The  Aeto-    Zeus,  where  the  poet  Hesiod  is  said  to  have  been  killed 
lect  their     by  the   inhabitants   in    fulfilment    of   an   oracle   which 
forces.         foretold  that  he  should  die  at  Nemea.     Early  the  next 

morning  he  proceeded  on  his  march  into  Aetolia.  On 
the  first  day  he  took  Potidania,  on  the  second  Crocy- 
leiunij  on  the  third  Teichium.  There  he  stayed  and 
sent  back  the  spoils  to  Eupalium  in  Locris.  For  he  did 
not  intend  to  attack  the  Ophioneans  yet  ;  when  he  had 
subjugated  the  rest  of  the  country  he  would  return  to 
Naupactus  and  make  a  second  expedition  against  them 
if  they  continued  to  resist.  The  Aetolians  were  aware 
of  his  designs  from  the  very  first  ;  and  no  sooner  did  he 
enter  their  territory  than  they  all  collected  in  great  force  ; 
even  the  most  distant  of  the  Ophioneans,  the  Bomieans 
and  Callieans  who  reach  down  towards  the  Malian  Gulf, 
came  to  the  aid  of  their  countrymen. 

97.  The  Messenians  repeated  the  advice  which  they  had 
Demos-       originally  given  to  Demosthenes.    They  assured  him  that 

U'"  there  would  be  no  difficulty  in  conquering  the  Aetolians, 


mm  to  march  as  -quickly  as  he  could  against 
villages,       the  villages.     He  should  not  wait  until  they  could  com- 

but  receives 

a  check  at  bine  and  meet  him  with  an  army,  but  should  endeavour 
to  take  any  place  which  was  nearest.  He,  trusting  to 
their  advice,  and  confident  in  his  good  fortune  since 
everything  was  going  favourably,  did  not  wait  for  the 
Locrians,  who  should  have  supplied  his  deficiency  in 
javelin  men,  but  at  once  marched  towards  Aegitium, 
which  he  attacked,  and  forced  his  way  in.  The  in- 
habitants had  stolen  away  and  taken  up  a  position  on 
the  top  of  the  hills  overhanging  the  town,  which  was 
itself  built  upon  heights  at  a  distance  of  about  nine 


DISASTER   OF  AEGITIUM.  233 

B.C.  426.  miles  from  the  sea.  The  other  Aetolians,  who  had  by  III. 
3'  this  time  come  to  the  rescue  of  Aegitium,  attacked  the 
Athenians  and  their  allies.  Some  ran  down  from  one 
hill  and  some  from  another  and  hurled  darts  at  them ; 
when  the  Athenian  army  advanced  they  retired,  and 
when  the  Athenians  retired  they  pressed  upon  them. 
The  battle,  which  lasted  long,  was  nothing  but  a  series 
of  pursuits  and  retreats,  and  in  both  the  Athenians  were 
at  a  disadvantage. 

While  their  archers  had  arrows  and  were  able  to  use      98. 
them,  the  Athenians  maintained  their  ground,  for  the  The  Aeto- 
Aetolians,  being  light-armed,  were  driven  back  by  the 
arrows.     But  at  length  the  captain  of  the  archers  was 
slain,  and  the  forces  under  his  command  no  longer  kept  length  fly. 
together.     The  Athenians  themselves  grew  weary  of  the  vivors  with 
long  and  tedious  struggle.     The  Aetolians  came  closer  retuSJ  to 
and  closer,  and  never  ceased  hurling  darts  at  them.     At  JJJS'gJSJ 
last  they  turned  and  fled,  and  falling  into  ravines,  out  g  Athens, 
of  which  there  was  no  way,  or  losing  themselves  in  a  thenes 
strange  country,  they  perished.     Their  guide,  Chromon 
the  Messenian,  had    been  killed.     The  Aetolians,  who 
were  light-armed   and   swift  of  foot,  followed   at   their 
heels,  hurling  darts,  and  caught  and  slew  many  of  them 
in  their  flight.     The  greater  number  missed  their  way 
and  got  into  the  woods,  out  of  which  no  path  led ;  and 
their  enemies  brought  fire  and  burnt  the  wood  about 
them.     So   the   Athenian   army  tried   every  means   of 
escape  and  perished  in  all  manner  of  ways.     The  sur- 
vivors  with   difficulty  made   their  way  to   the   sea   at 
Oeneon  in  Locris,  whence  they  had  set  out.     Many  of 
the  allies  fell,  and  of  the  Athenian  heavy-armed  about 
a  hundred  and  twenty,  all  in  the  flower  of  their  youth  ; 
they  were  the  very  finest  men  whom  the  city  of  Athens 
lost  during  the  war.     Procles,  one  of  the  two  generals, 
was  also  killed.     When  they  had  received  the  bodies 
of  their  dead  under  a  flag  of  truce  from  the  Aetolians, 
they   retreated    to    Naupactus,    and    returned    in    their 
ships    to   Athens.      Demosthenes   remained   behind    in 


234  LACEDAEMONIAN  ATTACK  UPON  NAUPACTUS. 

III.       Naupactus  and  the  neighbourhood  ;  for,  after  what  had  B.C.  426. 

happened,  he  feared  the  anger  of  the  Athenians. 
99-          About  the  same  time  the  Athenian  forces  engaged  in 
TheSiciiian  Sicily,  sailing  to  the  territory  of  Locri  and  there  dis- 
defeated.      embarking,  defeated  the  Locrians  who  came  out  to  meet 
them,  and  took  a  small  garrison  fort,  which  was  situated 
upon  the  river  Halex. 

100.  During  the  same  summer  the  Aetolians,  who  had  some 
TheAeto-    time  before  despatched  Tolophus  the  Ophionean,  Bo- 
suade  the     riades  the  Eurytanian,  and  Tisander  the  Apodotian  on 
moSans'to  an  embassy  to  Corinth  and  Lacedaemon,  induced  the 
S  edition  GX~  Lacedaemonians  to  aid  them  by  sending  an  army  against 
against        Naupactus,  in  order  to  punish  the  inhabitants  for  inviting 

Naupactus.     ,*....  ~ 

the  Athenian  invasion a.  So  in  the  autumn  they  sent 
out  three  thousand  hoplites  of  their  allies,  including  five 
hundred  from  Heraclea,  the  newly-founded  city  in  Tra- 
chis.  Eurylochus,  a  Spartan,  was  general,  and  with  him 
were  associated  in  the  command  Macarius  and  Mene- 
daeus,  also  Spartans. 

101.  When  the  army  was  collected  at  Delphi,  Eurylochus 
Eurylochus  sent  a  herald  to  the  Ozolian  Locrians,  for  he  had  to  pass 
daemonian  through  their  country  on  the  way  to  Naupactus ;  and  he 
commander  aiso  W]'shed  to  detach  them  from  the  Athenian  alliance. 

starts  from 

Delphi  and  Of  the  Locrians,  the  inhabitants  of  Amphissa  were  most 

marches  •«•••« 

through  willing  to  co-operate  with  him,  wanting  to  be  protected 
against  their  enemies  the  Phocians ;  they  were  the  first 
who  gave  hostages,  and  by  them  the  other  Locrians,  who 
were  alarmed  at  the  impending  invasion,  were  persuaded 
to  do  the  like  :— first  their  neighbours  the  Myoneans,  who 
commanded  the  most  difficult  pass  into  Locris  ;  then  the 
Ipneans,  Messapians,  Tritaeeans,  Chalaeans,  Tolopho- 
nians,  Hessians,  and  Oeantheans  ;  all  these  tribes  also 
joined  the  expedition.  The  Olpaeans  gave  hostages  but 
did  not  join  ;  the  Hyaeans  would  not  give  hostages  until 
the  Lacedaemonians  had  taken  one  of  their  villages, 
called  Polis. 

0 O2.  When  everything  was  ready,  and  Eurylochus  had  de- 

a  Cp.  iii.  94  med. 


DEMOSTHENES   STILL    AT   NAUPACTUS.     235 

B.C.  426.  posited  the  hostages  at  Cytinium  in  Doris,  he  marched      III. 
3'  with  his  army  against  Naupactus,  through  the  territory  Demos- 
of  the  Locrians.     On  his  march  he  took  Oeneon  a  and  the  help  of 
Eupaliumb,  two  Locrian  towns  which  refused  to  come  to  mans  saves" 
terms.     When  they  had  arrived  in  the  territory  of  Nau- 


pactus  and   the  Aetolians   had   at  length  joined  them,  daemonians 

.       f  .  |  .  retire,  and 

they  devastated  the  country,  and  after  taking  the  un-  in  concert 
walled  suburbs  of  the  town  marched  against  Molycreium,  Ambradots 


a  colony  of  the  Corinthians  subject  to  Athens,  which 
they  captured.  But  Demosthenes  the  Athenian,  who  lhe  Amphi- 
after  his  misfortune  in  Aetolia  was  still  in  the  neigh-  Argos. 
bourhood  of  Naupactus,  having  previous  intelligence,  and 
fearing  for  the  town,  went  and  persuaded  the  Acarna- 
nians,  much  against  their  will,  for  they  had  not  for- 
gotten his  withdrawal  from  Leucas,  to  assist  Naupactus. 
So  they  sent  with  him  on  board  the  Athenian  ships  c 
a  thousand  hoplites  ;  these  got  in  and  saved  the  place, 
which  was  in  danger  of  having  to  capitulate,  owing  to 
the  extent  of  the  wall  and  the  paucity  of  its  defenders. 
Eurylochus  and  his  soldiers,  when  they  saw  that  the 
garrison  had  been  reinforced,  and  that  there  was  no 
possibility  of  taking  the  city  by  storm,  instead  of  going 
back  to  Peloponnesus,  retired  into  the  country  of  Aeolis, 
which  is  now  called  by  the  names  of  the  towns  Calydon 
and  Pleuron,  and  to  other  places  in  the  neighbourhood  ; 
also  to  Proschium  in  Aetolia.  For  the  Ambraciots  sent 
and  persuaded  them  to  take  part  in  an  attack  on  the 
Amphilochian  Argog  and  the  rest  of  Amphilochia  and 
Acarnania,  declaring  that,  if  they  gained  possession  of 
these  places,  the  whole  continent  would  at  once  come 
over  to  the  Lacedaemonians.  Eurylochus  assented,  and 
dismissing  the  Aetolians,  waited  with  his  army  in  that 
region  until  the  time  came  for  the  Ambraciots  to  make 
their  expedition  and  for  him  to  join  them  in  the  neigh- 
bourhood of  Argos.  Thus  the  summer  ended. 

In  the  following  winter  the  Athenians  in  Sicily  and     103. 

their  Hellenic  allies  made  an  attack  upon  Inessa,  a  Sicel  The  Athe- 

nians are 
a  Cp.  iii.  95  fin.  &  Cp.  iii.  96  med.  c  Cp  iii.  105  fin. 


236 


OPERATIONS   IN  SICILY. 


III. 


defeated  at 
Inessa,  but 
are  vic- 
torious in 
Locris. 


TO4. 

The  Athe- 
nians renew 
the  purifica- 
tion of 
Delos  and 
restore 
the  Delian 
games. 


town  of  which  the  citadel  was  held  by  the  Syracusans.  B.C.  426. 
They  were  joined  by  many  of  the  Sicels,  who  had 
formerly  been  allies  of  the  Syracusans,  and  having  been 
held  down  by  them,  had  now  revolted  to  the  Athe- 
nians. The  attempt  failed,  and  they  retreated.  But 
during  their  retreat  the  Syracusans  sallied  out  and  fell 
upon  the  allies  who  were  in  the  rear  of  the  Athenians, 
routed  them,  and  put  to  flight  a  part  of  their  forces  with 
great  loss.  Soon  afterwards,  Laches  and  the  Athenians 
in  the  fleet  made  several  descents  upon  Locris.  At  the 
river  Caecinus  they  defeated  about  three  hundred  Lo- 
crians  who  came  out  to  meet  them  under  Proxenus  the 
son  of  Capaton,  took  arms  from  the  slain,  and  returned. 

In  the  same  winter  the  Athenians,  by  command  of 
an  oracle,  purified  the  island  of  Delos.  Pisistratus  the 
tyrant  had  already  purified  it,  but  imperfectly,  for  the 
purification  only  extended  to  that  part  which  was  within 
sight  of  the  temple.  The  whole  island  was  now  purified 
in  the  following  manner : — The  Athenians  took  away  the 
dead  out  of  all  the  sepulchres  which  were  in  Delos  a,  and 
passed  a  decree  that  henceforward  no  one  should  die  or 
give  birth  to  a  child  there,  but  that  the  inhabitants  when 
they  were  near  the  time  of  either  should  be  carried 
across  to  Rheneia.  Now  Rheneia  is  near  to  Delos,  so 
near  indeed  that  Polycrates  the  tyrant  of  Samos,  who 
for  a  time  had  a  powerful  navy,  attached  this  island, 
which  he  conquered  with  the  rest  of  the  islands  and 
dedicated  to  the  Delian  Apollo,  by  a  chain  to  Delos. 
After  the  purification,  the  Athenians  for  the  first  time 
celebrated  the  Delian  games,  which  were  held  every 
four  years.  There  had  been  in  ancient  days  a  great 
gathering  of  the  lonians  and  the  neighbouring  islanders 
at  Delos  ;  whither  they  brought  their  wives  and  children 
to  be  present  at  the  Delian  games,  as  the  lonians  now 
frequent  the  games  at  Ephesus.  Musical  and  gymnastic 
contests  were  held  there,  and  the  cities  celebrated  choral 
dances.  The  character  of  the  festival  is  attested  by 
a  Cp.  i.  8  init.;  v.  i. 


PURIFICATION   OF  DELOS.  237 

B.C.  426.  Homer  in  the  following  verses,  which  are  taken  from      III. 
88'3'  the  hymn  to  Apollo:- 


'  At  other  times,  Phoebus,  Delos  is  dearest  to  thy  heart, 
Where  are  gathered  together  the  lonians  in  flowing  robes,  by  Homer. 

With  their  wives  and  children  in  thy  street  : 
There  do  they  delight  thee  with  boxing  and  dancing  and  song, 
Making  mention  of  thy  name  at  the  meeting  of  the  assembly.' 

And  that  there  were  musical  contests  which  attracted 
competitors  is  implied  in  the  following  words  of  the 
same  hymn.  After  commemorating  the  Delian  dance 
of  women,  Homer  ends  their  praises  with  these  lines, 
in  which  he  alludes  to  himself  :  — 

'  And  now  may  Apollo  and  Artemis  be  gracious, 
And  to  all  of  you,  maidens,  I  say  farewell. 
Yet  remember  me  when  I  am  gone  ; 
And  if  some  other  toiling  pilgrim  among  the  sons  of  men 
Comes  and  asks  :  O  maidens, 

Who  is  the  sweetest  minstrel  of  all  who  wander  hither, 
And  in  whom  do  you  delight  most  ? 
Make  answer  with  one  voice,  in  gentle  words, 
The  blind  old  man  of  Chios'  rocky  isle.' 

Thus  far  Homer,  who  clearly  indicates  that  even  in 
days  of  old  there  was  a  great  gathering  and  festival  at 
Delos.  In  after  ages  the  islanders  and  the  Athenians  sent 
choruses  and  sacrificed.  But  the  games  and  the  greater 
part  of  the  ceremonies  naturally  fell  into  disuse,  owing  to 
the  misfortunes  of  Ionia.  The  Athenians  now  restored 
the  games  and  for  the  first  time  introduced  horse-races. 

During  the  same  winter  the  Ambraciots,  in  fulfilment     105. 
of  the  promise  by  which  they  had  induced  Eurylochus  Euryiochus 

,  .  .  and  the 

and  his  army  to  remain  a,  made  an  expedition  against  the  Ambraciots 
Amphilochian  Argos  with  three  thousand  hoplites.  They  their  forces 
invaded  the  Argive  territory  and  seized  Olpae,  a  strong  ^jjj^6 
fort  on  a  hill  by  the  sea-side,  which  in  former  days  the  chian 

Argos, 

Acarnanians  had  fortified  and  used  as  a  common  hall  which  the 
of  justice.     The  place  is  about  three  miles  from  Argos, 
which  is  also  on  the  sea-shore.      One  division  of  the 
Acarnanians  came  to  the  aid  of  Argos,  while  another  Athenians 

unite  to 

encamped  at  a  spot  called  the  Wells,  where  they  could  protect. 
a  Cp.  iii.  102  fin. 


238  THE    AMPHILOCHIAN  ARGOS. 

III.      lie  in  wait  for  Eurylochus  and  the  Peloponnesians,  and  B.C.  426. 
The  Am-     prevent  them  from  joining  the  Ambraciots  unobserved.    L  88'  3' 

braciots          *  J 

seize  oipae,  They  also  despatched  a  messenger  to  Demosthenes,  who 
for  rein-  had  led  the  Athenian  expedition  into  Aetolia,  asking  him 
forcements.  to  ^  ^^  commancjerj  ancj  sent  for  twenty  Athenian 

ships  which  were  just  then  cruising  about  the  Pelopon- 

nese  under  the  command  of  Aristoteles  the  son  of  Timo- 

crates,  and   Hierophon  the  son  of  Antimnestus.     The 

Ambraciots  sent  a  messenger  from  Olpae  to  their  own 

citizens,  bidding  them  come  and  help  them  with  their 

entire  force  ;  for  they  were  afraid  that  Eurylochus  and 

his   followers    might    not   be  able   to   make   their  way 

through  the  Acarnanians,  and   then   they  would   have 

either  to  fight  alone,  or  to  attempt  a  hazardous  retreat. 

1  06.          Eurylochus  and  the  Peloponnesians,  when  they  heard 

March  of     that   the   Ambraciots  had   arrived   at    Olpae,  left  Pro- 

ponnlsians,  schium  and  went  with  all  speed  to  help  them.     Passing 


over  the  river  Achelous  they  marched  through  Acar- 
Ambfaciots  naru'a'  leaving  the  city  and  garrison  of  Stratus  on  the 
at  oipae.  right  hand,  and  the  rest  of  Acarnania  on  their  left.  The 
land  was  deserted,  for  the  inhabitants  had  gone  to  the 
assistance  of  Argos.  Crossing  the  territory  of  Stratus 
they  proceeded  through  Phytia  and  by  the  extreme 
border  of  Medeon,  and  so  through  Limnaea  ;  at  last 
they  left  Acarnania,  and  reached  the  friendly  country 
of  the  Agraeans.  Then  taking  to  Mount  Thyamus, 
which  is  a  wild  district,  they  marched  on  and  descended 
into  the  plain  of  Argos  after  dark.  Making  their  way 
unobserved  between  the  city  of  Argos  and  the  Acar- 
nanian  force  stationed  at  the  Wells,  they  at  length 
reached  the  Ambraciots  at  Olpae. 

IO7.  The  two  armies  having  effected  this  junction  moved 
Athenian  at  break  of  day  to  a  place  called  Metropolis,  and  there 
meats*6  encamped.  Soon  afterwards  the  Argives  received  the 
Demos-  expected  reinforcement  of  twenty  Athenian  ships,  which 
thenes  takes  arrived  in  the  Ambracian  Gulf.  With  them  came  Demos- 
mand.  He  thenes,  who  brought  two  hundred  Messenian  hoplites  and 
near  cfpae,  sixty  Athenian  archers.  The  ships  anchored  about  the 


BATTLE    OF   OLPAE.  239 

B.C.  426.  hill  of  Olpae,  while  the  Acarnanians  and  a  few  of  the  III. 
3'  Amphilochians  (the  greater  part  of  them  were  prevented  wh(:re  Pre- 
from  stirring  by  the  Ambraciots  a),  having  mustered  at  action  he 
Argos,  were  now  preparing  to  give  battle.  They  as-  troops  in  an 
sociated  Demosthenes  with  their  own  generals  in  the  ambuscade- 
command  of  the  allied  forces.  He  led  them  to  the 
neighbourhood  of  Olpae,  and  there  encamped  at  a  place 
where  they  were  divided  from  the  enemy  by  a  great 
ravine.  During  five  days  they  remained  inactive;  on 
the  sixth  day  both  armies  drew  up  in  battle  array. 
Demosthenes,  fearing  that  he  would  be  surrounded  by 
the  Peloponnesians  who  were  more  numerous  and  ex- 
tended beyond  his  own  line,  placed  hoplites  and  light- 
armed  troops,  numbering  altogether  four  hundred,  in  a 
deep  lane  overgrown  with  brushwood,  intending  them 
to  lie  in  wait  until  the  moment  of  conflict,  when  they 
were  to  rush  out  from  the  rear  on  the  line  of  the  enemy 
where  it  overlapped.  The  preparations  of  both  armies 
were  now  complete  and  they  engaged.  Demosthenes 
led  his  own  right  wing,  on  which  were  the  Messenians 
and  a  few  Athenians,  while  the  other  was  held  by  the 
Acarnanians,  who  were  disposed  according  to  their  cities, 
and  by  the  Amphilochian  javelin-men  who  were  in  the 
battle.  The  Peloponnesians  and  Ambraciots  were  inter- 
mingled, with  the  exception  of  the  Mantineans,  who 
were  all  collected  on  the  left  wing;  but  the  extremity 
of  the  wing  was  occupied  by  Eurylochus  and  his 
division,  who  were  opposed  to  the  Messenians  under 
Demosthenes. 

When  the  two  armies  were  at  close  quarters,  the  left     1  08. 
wing  of  the  Peloponnesians  out-flanked  the  right  wing  The  Pel°- 

0  ponnesian 

of  their  opponents  and  threatened    to  surround   them  ;  left  wing 
whereupon  the  Acarnanians,  coming  upon  them  from  be-  stricken  by 
hind  out  of  the  ambuscade,  charged  and  turned  them. 


They  fled  without  striking  a  blow,  and  their  panic  caused  of  the  anv 

r  bush,  and 

the  greater  part  of  the  army  to  run  with  them.    For,  when  flies.  The 
they  saw  Eurylochus  and  their  best  troops  routed,  they  victorious18 
a  Gp.  iii.  114  fin. 


240     DEFEAT  OF  LACEDAEMONIANS  AND  ALLIES. 

III.      lost  whatever  courage  they  had.     The  Messenians,  who  B.C.  426. 

final?1'  but  were  *n  ^s  Part  °^  ^e  ^e^  under  tjie  command  of  ° 
driven  back  Demosthenes,  were  foremost  in  the  work.  The  right 
wing  of  the  enemy,  however,  and  the  Ambraciots,  who 
are  the  most  warlike  nation  in  those  parts,  vanquished 
their  opponents  and  drove  them  back  to  Argos.  But, 
returning,  they  saw  the  greater  part  of  the  army  de- 
feated, and  were  hard  pressed  by  the  victorious  division 
of  the  Acarnanians,  whereupon,  escaping  with  difficulty, 
they  made  their  way  to  Olpae.  Numbers  of  the  de- 
feated were  killed,  for  they  dashed  into  the  fort  wildly 
and  in  confusion,  except  the  Mantineans,  who.  kept  to- 
gether and  retreated  in  better  order  than  any  other  part 
of  the  army.  The  battle,  which  had  lasted  until  evening, 
now  ended. 

109.         On  the  next  day  Menedaeus  took  the  command,  for 
Difficulties   Eurylochus  and  Macarius,  the  two  other  generals,  had 

of  the  Lace-  J  & 

daemonian  been  slain a.  He  knew  not  what  to  do  after  so  serious 
mander,  a  defeat.  He  could  not  hope,  if  he  remained,  to  stand 
tiateswfth  a  s*ege>  hemmed  in  as  he  was  by  land,  and  at  sea 
Demos-  blockaded  by  the  Athenian  ships ;  neither  could  he 

thenes  a  J 

secrettreaty  safely  retire;  so  entering  into  a  parley  with  Demosthenes 
poneslan^0"  and  the  Acarnanian  generals  about  the  burial  of  the 
dead,  he  tried  to  negotiate  with  them  at  the  same  time, 
for  a  retreat.  The  Athenians  gave  back  to  the  enemy 
their  dead,  erected  a  trophy,  and  took  up  their  own  dead, 
in  number  about  three  hundred.  They  would  not  openly 
agree  to  the  proposal  for  a  general  retreat,  but  Demos- 
thenes and  his  Acarnanian  colleagues  made  a  secret 
treaty  with  the  Mantineans,  and  Menedaeus,  and  the 
other  Peloponnesian  generals  and  chief  persons,  allow- 
ing their  army  to  depart.  He  wanted  partly  to  isolate 
the  Ambraciots  and  their  foreign  mercenary  troops,  but 
much  more  to  take  away  the  character  of  the  Lacedae- 
monians and  Peloponnesians  among  the  Hellenes  in  those 
parts  and  convict  them  of  selfishness  and  treachery.  Ac- 
cordingly the  Peloponnesians  took  up  their  dead,  and 
a  Cp.  iv.  38  init. 


TREACHERY  OF  THE  PELOPONNESIANS.  241 

B.C.  426.  burying  them  quickly  as  well  as  they  could,  consulted      III. 
'  secretly  how  those  who  had  permission  could  best  depart. 

Meanwhile  news  was  brought  to  Demosthenes  and  the     no. 
Acarnanians  that  the  whole  remaining  force  of  the  Am-  Approach 
braciots,  who  some  time  previously  had  been  summoned  army  of  the 
from  the  city  a  to  join  the  troops  in  Olpae,  were  now        ™ 


on  their  way  through  the  territory  of  the  Amphilochians  Jj^e°ss~  re- 
and   were   in   entire   ignorance  of  what   had   occurred.  Pares  to  cut 

-  -  .  .  them  off. 

Whereupon  he  at  once  sent  forward  a  part  of  his  army 
to  lie  in  ambush  in  the  roads  and  to  occupy  the  strong 
places,  himself  at  the  same  time  preparing  to  support 
them  with  the  rest  of  his  forces. 

In  the  meantime  the  Mantineans  and  the  others  who     ill. 
were  included  in  the   truce  went   out   on   pretence  of  The  Pel°- 

.  «'.••«  ponnesians 

gathering  herbs  and  sticks,  and  stole  away  one  by  one,  steal  away 
picking  up  as  they  went  along  what   they  pretended 
to  be  looking  for.     But,  as  they  got  farther  away  from 
Olpae,  they  quickened  their  steps,  and  then  the  Am-  braciots  who 

try  to  follow 

braciots  and  others  who  happened  to  collect  on  the  them  are 
instant,  when  they  saw  that  the^y  were  leaving,  ran  after 
them  at  full  speed,  wanting  to  get  up  with  them.  The 
Acarnanians  at  first  thought  that  none  of  those  who 
were  going  away  were  protected  by  a  truce,  and  pur- 
sued the  Peloponnesians.  Some  of  the  generals  tried 
to  keep  them  back  and  explained  how  matters  stood  ; 
whereupon  a  soldier,  suspecting  that  there  was  treachery, 
hurled  a  javelin  at  them.  At  length  the  soldiers  under- 
stood, and  let  the  Mantineans  and  Peloponnesians  go, 
but  began  to  kill  the  Ambraciots.  There  was  great 
dispute  and  uncertainty  as  to  who  was  an  Ambraciot 
and  who  a  Peloponnesian.  Of  the  former  they  killed 
about  two  hundred  ;  the  Peloponnesians  escaped  into 
the  neighbouring  country  of  Agraea,  and  were  received 
by  king  Salynthius  who  was  their  friend. 

Meanwhile  the  reinforcement  from  the  city  of  Am-      112. 
bracia  had  reached  Idomene,  which  is  the  name  of  two  t^m^s~ 
lofty  peaks.     The  higher  of  the  two,  had  been  already  having  sent 
a  Cp.  iii.  105  fin. 
R 


242 


BATTLE    OF  IDOMEN&. 


III. 

on  forces 

which  oc- 
cupy the  hill 
opposite  to 

that  where- 


surprises 
them. 


113. 

Despair  of 

the  herald 

who  came 
fugitive6 


occupied  unobserved  at  nightfall  by  the  troops  which  B.C.  426. 
Demosthenes  had  sent  forward  :    of  the  lower  the  Am-  ° 
braciots  first  obtained  possession  and  encamped  there. 

...  _  . 

As  soon  as  it  was  dark,  after  supper,  Demosthenes  ad- 
vanced  with  the  rest  of  his  army,  himself  leading  half 
°^  tnem  towards  the  pass  between  the  mountains,  while 
the  rest  made  their  way  through  the  Amphilochian  hills. 
At  the  first  dawn  of  day  he  fell  upon  the  Ambraciots,  who 
were  still  half-asleep,  and  so  far  from  knowing  anything 
of  what  had  happened,  that  they  imagined  his  troops  to 
be  their  own  comrades.  For  Demosthenes  had  taken 
care  to  place  the  Messenians  in  the  first  rank  and  desired 
them  to  speak  to  the  enemy  in  their  own  Doric  dialect, 
thereby  putting  the  sentinels  off  their  guard  ;  and  as  it  was 
still  dark,  their  appearance  could  not  be  distinguished. 
So  they  fell  upon  the  Ambraciots  and  routed  them. 
Most  of  them  were  slain  on  the  spot  ;  the  remainder 
fled  over  the  mountains.  But  the  paths  were  beset  ; 
the  Amphilochians  were  lightly-armed  and  in  their  own 
country  which  they  knew,  while  their  enemies  were 
heavy-armed  and  the  country  was  strange  to  them. 
And  so,  not  knowing  which  way  to  turn,  they  fell  into 
ravines  and  into  ambuscades  which  had  been  set  for 
them,  and  perished.  Every  means  of  escape  was  tried. 
Some  even  fled  to  the  sea  which  was  not  far  distant, 
and  seeing  the  Athenian  ships  which  were  sailing  by 
while  the  action  was  taking  place,  swam  out  to  them, 
thinking  in  the  terror  of  the  moment  that  they  had 
better  be  killed,  if  die  they  must,  by  the  Athenians  in 
the  ships  than  by  their  barbarous  and  detested  enemies 
the  Amphilochians.  So  the  Ambraciots  were  cut  to 
pieces,  and  but  few  out  of  many  returned  home  to  their 
city.  The  Acarnanians,  having  despoiled  the  dead  and 
raised  trophies,  returned  to  Argos. 

On  the  following  day  there  arrived  a  herald  from  the 
Ambraciots   who   had    escaped    out    of    Olpae    to   the 

. 

Agraeans.     He  came  to  recover  the  bodies  of  the  dead 
had  been  slain  subsequently  to  the  first  engagement, 


LOSS    OF   THE   AMBRACIOTS.  243 

B.C.  426.  when,  unprotected  by  the  treaty,  they  tried  to  get  out  III. 
3>  of  Olpae  in  company  with  the  Mantineans  and  others  Ambraciots 
protected  by  it.  The  herald  saw  the  arms  of  the  Am-  heard  of  the 
braciot  troops  from  the  city  and  wondered  at  the  number  greats  ar 
of  them  ;  he  knew  nothing  of  the  later  disaster,  and  he  defeat- 
imagined  that  they  belonged  to  his  own  division  of  the 
army.  Some  one  else  thought  that  the  herald  had  come 
from  the  army  defeated  at  Idomene,  and  asked  why  he 
looked  so  astonished,  and  how  many  of  their  men  had 
fallen;  he  replied,  'about  two  hundred*;'  whereupon  the 
other  rejoined,  'These  which  you  see  are  not  the  arms  of 
two  hundred  men,  but  of  more  than  a  thousand.'  The 
herald  replied,  *  Then  they  cannot  be  the  arms  of  our 
men/  The  other  answered,  '  They  must  be,  if  you  were 
fighting  yesterday  at  Idomene.'  '  But  yesterday  we  did 
not  fight  at  all ;  it  was  the  day  before,  in  the  retreat.' 
'  All  I  know  is  that  we  fought  yesterday  with  these  men, 
who  were  marching  to  your  aid  from  Ambracia.'  When 
the  herald  heard  these  words,  and  knew  that  the  army 
coming  from  the  city  had  perished,  he  uttered  a  cry 
of  anguish,  and,  overwhelmed  by  the  greatness  of  the 
blow,  went  away  at  once  without  doing  his  errand, 
no  longer  caring  to  demand  the  dead.  And  indeed  in. 
the  whole  war  no  such  calamity  happened  within  so  few 
days  to  any  Hellenic  state b.  I  have  not  ventured  to 
set  down  the  number  of  those  who  fell,  for  the  loss 
would  appear  incredible  when  compared  with  the  size 
of  the  city.  Of  this  I  am  certain,  that  if  the  Acarnanians 
had  been  willing  to  destroy  Ambracia  as  Demosthenes 
and  the  Athenians  desired,  they  might  have  taken  it  at 
the  first  onset.  But  they  were  afraid  that  the  Athe- 
nians, if  they  once  got  possession  of  the  place,  would 
be  more  troublesome  neighbours  than  the  Ambraciots  c. 

After  assigning  a  third  part  of  the  spoils  to  the  Athe-     1 1 4. 
nians,  the   Acarnanians   divided  the  remainder   among  Division  of 
their  cities.     The  spoils  of  the  Athenians  were  captured 
on   the   voyage.     But   three  hundred   panoplies  which 

a  Cp.  iii.  in  fin.  1(  Cp.  vii.  30  fin.  c  Cp.  iii.  92  init. 

R  2, 


244 


TERMS    OF   PEACE. 


III. 


Return  of 
Demos- 
thenes 
and  the 
Athenian 
fleet. 
Treaty 
between  the 
Acarna- 
nians  and 
Amphi- 
lochians. 


The  Athe- 
nians re- 
solve to 
take  a  more 
active  part 
in  the 
affairs  of 
Sicily. 
They1  send 
out  Pytho- 
dorus. 


were  allotted  to  Demosthenes  he  brought  home  with  B.C.  426. 
him,  and  they  are  still  preserved  in  the  Athenian 
temples.  This  good  service  of  his  enabled  him  to  return 
to  Athens  with  less  apprehension  after  his  misfortune 
in  Aetolia.  The  twenty  Athenian  ships  sailed  away  to 
Naupactus.  The  Acarnanians  and  Amphilochians,  after 
the  Athenians  and  Demosthenes  had  left  them,  granted 
a  truce  to  the  Ambraciots  and  Peloponnesians  who  had 
fled  to  Salynthius  and  the  Agraeans ;  they  were  thus 
enabled  to  return  home  from  Oeniadae,  whither  they 
had  removed  from  the  country  of  Salynthius.  The 
Acarnanians  and  Amphilochians  now  made  a  treaty  of 
alliance  for  one  hundred  years  with  the  Ambraciots, 
of  which  the  terms  were  as  follows  : — c  The  Ambraciots 
shall  not  be  required  to  join  the  Acarnanians  in  making 
war  on  the  Peloponnesians,  nor  the  Acarnanians  to  join 
the  Ambraciots  in  making  war  on  the  Athenians.  But 
they  shall  aid  in  the  defence  of  one  another's  territory. 
The  Ambraciots  shall  give  up  such  places  or  hostages 
of  the  Amphilochians  as  they  possess a,  and  they  shall 
not  assist  Anactorium '  (which  was  hostile  to  the  Acar- 
nanians)b.  Upon  these  terms  they  put  an  end  to  the 
war.  Soon  afterwards  the  Corinthians  sent  a  force  of 
their  own,  consisting  of  three  hundred  hoplites  under  the 
command  of  Xenocleidas  the  son  of  Euthycles,  to  guard 
Ambracia,  whither  they  made  their  way  with  some 
difficulty  by  land.  Such  was  the  end  of  the  Ambra- 
cian  war. 

During  the  same  winter  the  Athenian  fleet  in  Sicily, 
sailing  to  Himera,  made  a  descent  upon  the  country  in 
concert  with  the  Sicels,  who  had  invaded  the  extreme 
border  of  the  Himeraeans  from  the  interior  ;  they  also 
attacked  the  Aeolian  Isles.  Returning  to  Rhegium,  they 
found  that  Pythodorus  son  of  Isolochus,  one  of  the 
Athenian  generals,  had  superseded  Laches  in  the  com-* 
mand  of  the  fleet.  The  allies  of  the  Athenians  in  Sicily 
had  sailed  to  Athens,  and  persuaded  the  Athenians  to 
a  Cp.  iii.  107  init.  b  Cp.  i.  55  init. 


THE  ATHENIANS    IN   SICILY.  245 

B.C.  426.  send  a  larger  fleet  to  their  aid  ;  for  their  territory  was  in  III. 
'  the  power  of  the  Syracusans,  and  they  were  kept  off  the 
sea  by  a  few  ships  only;  so  they  were  preparing  to 
resist,  and  had  begun  to  collect  a  navy.  The  Athenians 
manned  forty  ships  for  their  relief,  partly  hoping  to  finish 
the  war  in  Sicily  the  sooner,  partly  because  they  wanted 
to  exercise  their  fleet.  They  despatched  one  of  the 
commanders,  Pythodorus,  with  a  few  ships,  intending  to 
send  Sophocles  the  son  of  Sostratides,  and  Eurymedon 
the  son  of  Thucles,  with  the  larger  division  of  the  fleet 
afterwards.  Pythodorus,  having  now  succeeded  Laches 
in  the  command,  sailed  at  the  end  of  the  winter  against 
the  Locrian  fort  which  Laches  had  previously  taken a, 
but  he  was  defeated  by  the  Locrians  and  retired. 

In  the  early  spring  a  stream  of  fire,  not  for  the  first     1 1 6. 
time,  issued  from   Mount  Aetna,  which  is  the  highest  Eruption 
mountain  in  Sicily,  and  devastated  a  portion  of  the  terri- 
tory of  the  Catanaeans  who  dwell  on  the  skirts  of  Aetna. 
The  last  eruption  is  said  to  have  taken  place  fifty  years 
before ;    and   altogether  three   eruptions   are    recorded 
since  the  Hellenes  first  settled  in  Sicily.     Such  were  the 
events  of  the  winter;   and  so  ended  the  sixth  year  in 
the  Peloponnesian  War  of  which  Thucydides  wrote  the 
history. 

a  Cp.  iii,  99. 


BOOK     IV. 

IV.  i.        IN  the  following  summer,  about  the  time  when  the  B.C.  425. 
The  Syra-    corn  COmes  into   ear,  ten  Syracusan  and   ten   Locrian     '  88'  4' 

cusans  and 

Locrians  ships  took  possession  of  Messcne  in  Sicily,  whither  they 
Messene  had  gone  by  the  invitation  of  the  inhabitants.  And  so 
fronTthe  Messene  revolted  from  the  Athenians.  The  Syracusans 


to°k  Part  m  *kis  a^"a^r  chiefly  because  they  saw  that 
crians  at  Messene  was  the  key  to  Sicily.  They  were  afraid  that 
time  invade  the  Athenians  would  one  day  establish  themselves  there 


and  come  and  attack  them  with  a  larger  force.  The 
Locrians  took  part  because  the  Rhegians  were  their 
enemies,  and  they  wanted  to  crush  them  by  sea  as  well 
as  by  land.  They  had  already  invaded  the  territory  of 
Rhegium  with  their  whole  army,  in  order  to  hinder  the 
Rhegians  from  assisting  the  Messenians  ;  they  were  also 
partly  instigated  by  certain  Rhegian  exiles  who  had 
taken  refuge  with  them.  For  the  Rhegians  had  been 
for  a  long  time  torn  by  revolution,  and  in  their  present 
condition  could  not  resist  the  Locrians,  who  for  this 
very  reason  were  the  more  disposed  to  attack  them. 
After  wasting  the  country,  the  Locrians  withdrew  their 
land  forces  ;  but  the  ships  remained  to  protect  Messene. 
Another  fleet  which  the  allies  were  manning  was  in- 
tended to  lie  in  the  harbour  of  Messene,  and  to  carry  on 
the  war  from  thence. 

2.  During   the  spring  and  about  the  same  time,  before 

Fifth  in-      faQ  corn  was  m  fuu  ear  the  Peloponnesians  and  their 

vasion  of 

Attica.        allies  invaded  Attica,  under  the  command  of  Agis  the 


DEMOSTHENES   AT   PYLOS.  247 

B.C.  425.  son   of  Archidamus,  the   Lacedaemonian   king.     They      IV. 
'  4'  encamped  and  ravaged  the  country.  T.he  Athe: 

mans  send 

The  Athenians  sent  to  Sicily  the  forty  ships  a,  which  forty  ad- 
were  now  ready,  under  the  command  of  Eurymedon  and  ships  to 
Sophocles,  the  third  general.  Pythodorus,  having  gone 


thither  beforehand.     Orders  were  given  to  them,  as  they 
passed  Corcyra,  to  assist  the  Corcyraeans  in  the  city,  them  on 

i  .<         .          t  a  special 

who   were  harassed    by  the   exiles   in   the   mountain  b.  commisr 
The  Peloponnesians  had  already  sent  sixty  ships  to  the  Slon' 
assistance  of  the  exiles,  expecting  to  make  themselves 
masters  of  the  situation  with  little  difficulty;  for  there 
was  a  great  famine  in  the  city.     Demosthenes,  since  his 
return  from  Acarnania,  had  been  in  no  command,  but 
now  at  his  own  request  the  Athenians  allowed  him  to 
make  use  of  the  fleet  about  the  Peloponnese  according 
to  his  judgment. 

When  they  arrived  off  the  coast  of  Laconia  and  heard       3. 
that  the  Peloponnesian  ships  were  already  at  Corcyra,  Demos- 
Eurymedon   and    Sophocles  wanted   to  hasten  thither,  wants  the 
but  Demosthenes  desired  them  first  to  put  in  at  Pylos  fo  fortify 
and  not  to  proceed  on  their  voyage  until  they  had  done  ^^" 
what  he  wanted.    They  objected,  but  it  so  happened  that  ridicule  his 

arguments. 

a  storm  came  on  and  drove  them  into  Pylos.  Instantly 
Demosthenes  urged  them  to  fortify  the  place;  this  being 
the  project  which  he  had  in  view  when  he  accompanied 
the  fleet  c.  He  pointed  out  to  them  that  there  was  abund- 
ance of  timber  and  stone  ready  to  their  hand,  and  that  the 
position  was  naturally  strong,  while  both  the  place  itself 
and  the  country  for  a  long  way  round  was  uninhabited. 
Pylos  is  distant  about  forty-six  miles  from  Sparta,  and 
is  situated  in  the  territory  which  once  belonged  to  the 
Messenians  ;  by  the  Lacedaemonians  it  is  called  Cory- 
phasium.  The  other  generals  argued  that  there  were 
plenty  of  desolate  promontories  on  the  coast  of  Pelo- 
ponnesus which  he  might  occupy  if  he  wanted  to  waste 
the  public  money.  But  Demosthenes  thought  that  this 

a  Cp.  iii.  115  med.  b  Cp.  iii.  85  fin. 

c  Reading  with  many  good  MSS. 


348  CONSTRUCTION    OF  THE    FORT. 

IV.  particular  spot  had  exceptional  advantages.  There  was  B.C.  425. 
a  harbour  ready  at  hand  ;  the  Messenians,  who  were  the 
ancient  inhabitants  of  the  country  and  spoke  the  same 
language  with  the  Lacedaemonians,  would  make  de- 
scents from  the  fort  and  do  the  greatest  mischief; 
and  they  would  be  a  trusty  garrison. 

As  neither  generals  nor  soldiers  would  listen  to  him, 
he  at  last  communicated  his  idea  to  the  officers  of  divi- 


detained  by  sions  .  who  would  not  listen  to  him  either.    The  weather 

stress  of 

weather,  was  still  unfit  for  sailing  ;  he  was  therefore  compelled  to 
the  fdel  is  remain  doing  nothing  ;  until  at  length  the  soldiers,  who 
arri  earned  were  standing  about  idle,  were  themselves  seized  with 
out  by  the  a  desire  to  fortify  the  place  forthwith.  So  they  put 

common  j  r  . 

soldiers.  their  hands  to  the  work  ;  and,  being  unprovided  with 
iron  tools,  brought  stones  which  they  picked  out  and  put 
them  together  as  they  happened  to  fit  ;  if  they  required 
to  use  mortar,  having  no  hods,  they  carried  it  on  their 
backs,  which  they  bent  so  as  to  form  a  resting-place  for 
it,  clasping  their  hands  behind  them  that  it  might  not 
fall  off.  By  every  means  in  their  power  they  hurried  on 
the  weaker  points,  wanting  to  finish  them  before  the 
Lacedaemonians  arrived.  The  position  was  in  most 
places  so  strongly  fortified  by  nature  as  to  have  no 
need  of  a  wall. 

5.  The  Lacedaemonians,  who  were  just  then  celebrating 
The  fort  is   a   festival3-,   made  light  of  the  news,  being  under  the 

completed     .  ° 

in  six  days  ;  impression  that  they  could  easily  storm  the  fort  when- 

are  ieftPS     ever  they  chose  to  attack  it,  even  if  the  Athenians  did 

mosthenes    not  run  awav  °^  themselves  at  their  approach.     They 

the  rest  go  were  also  delayed   by   the   absence   of  their   army  in 

Corcyra.      Attica.     In  six  days  the  Athenians  finished  the  wall  on 

the  land  side,  and  in  places  towards  the  sea  where  it 

was  most   required  ;   they  then  left  Demosthenes  with 

five  ships  to  defend  it,  and  with  the  rest  hastened  on 

their  way  to  Corcyra  and  Sicily. 

6.  The  Peloponnesian  army  in  Attica,  when  they  heard 
Recall  of     that  Pylos  had  been  occupied,  quickly  returned  home, 

a  Cp.  v.  54  ;  v.  82  init. 


REASSEMBLING   OF  THE  PELOPONNESIANS.  249 
B.C.  425.  Agfis  and  the  Lacedaemonians  thinking  that  this  matter      IV. 

Ol    88   A. 

touched  them  very  nearly.    The  invasion  had  been  made  ponnesians 

I  roiri  /Vt  1  1  c  ti  . 

quite  early  in  the  year  while  the  corn  was  yet  green, 
and  they  were  in  want  of  food  for  their  soldiers  ;  more- 
over the  wet  and  unseasonable  weather  had  distressed 
them,  so  that  on  many  grounds  they  were  inclined  to 
return  sooner  than  they  had  intended.  This  was  the 
shortest  of  all  the  Peloponnesian  invasions  ;  they  only 
remained  fifteen  days  in  Attica. 

About  the  same  time  Simonides,  an  Athenian  general,        7. 
collecting  a  few  troops  from  the  Athenian  garrisons,  and  ASSESS 
a  larger  force  from  their  allies  in  that  neighbourhood,  subsequent 
took  Eion  in  Chalcidice,  a  colony  of  Mende,  which  had  place  called 
been   hostile   to   Athens  ;    the   place   was   betrayed   to  E 
him.     But  the  Chalcidians  and  Bottiaeans  quickly  came 
to  the   rescue,  and   he  was   driven   out  with  consider- 
able loss. 

On  the  return  of  the  Peloponnesians  from  Attica,  the       8. 
Spartans  and  the  Perioeci  a  in  the  neighbourhood  of  the  The  Spa?- 
city  a  went  at  once  to  attack  Pylos,  but  the  other  Lace-  pyios  ;  they 


daemonians,  having  only  just  returned  from  an  expe- 
dition,  were  slower  in  arriving.  A  message  was  sent 
round  the  Peloponnesus  bidding  the  allies  come  without  they  had 

,  sent  to 

a  moment  s  delay  and  meet  at  Pylos  ;  another  message  Corcyra. 
summoned  the  sixty  Peloponnesian  ships  from  Corcyra. 
These  were  carried  over  the  Leucadian  isthmus  b,  and, 
undiscovered  by  the  Athenian  ships,  which  were  by 
this  time  at  Zacynthus,  reached  Pylos,  where  their  land 
forces  had  already  assembled.  While  the  Peloponnesian 
fleet  was  still  on  its  way,  Demosthenes  succeeded  in 
despatching  unobserved  two  vessels  to  let  Eurymedon 
and  the  Athenian  fleet  know  of  his  danger,  and  to  bid 
them  come  at  once. 

While  the  Athenian  ships  were  hastening  to  the  assist- 
ance of  Demosthenes  in  accordance  with  his  request,  the 
Lacedaemonians  prepared  to  attack  the  fort  both  by 
sea  and  by  land  ;  they  thought  that  there  would  be 

a  Or,  'in  the  neighbourhood  of  Pylos.'  b  Cp.  iii.  81  init. 


250 


THE    SCENE    OF  ACTION. 


IV. 

The  Lace- 
daemonians 
prepare  to 
attack  the 
fort. 

The  har- 
bour of 
Pylos  is 
formed  by 
the  island 
Sphac- 
teria,  which 
the  Lace- 
daemonians 
occupy  with 
four  hun- 
dred and 
twenty 
men. 


9- 

Skilful  use 
made  by 
Demos- 


little  difficulty  in  taking  a  work  hastily  constructed  B.C.  425. 
and  defended  by  a  handful  of  men.  But  as  they  ex- 
pected the  speedy  arrival  of  the  Athenian  fleet  they 
meant  to  close  the  entrances  to  the  harbour,  and  pre- 
vent the  Athenians  from  anchoring  there  should  they 
fail  in  taking  the  fort  before  their  arrival. 

The  island  which  is  called  Sphacteria  stretches  along 
the  land  and  is  quite  close  to  it,  making  the  harbour  safe 
and  the  entrances  narrow;  there  is  only  a  passage  for 
two  ships  at  the  one  end,  which  was  opposite  Pylos  and 
the  Athenian  fort,  while  at  the  other  the  strait  is  wide 
enough  to  admit  eight  or  nine.  The  length  of  the  island 
is  about  a  mile  and  three-quarters  ;  it  was  wooded,  and 
being  uninhabited  had  no  roads.  The  Lacedaemonians 
were  intending  to  block  up  the  mouths  of  the  harbour 
by  ships  placed  close  together  with  their  prows  out- 
wards ;  meanwhile,  fearing  lest  the  Athenians  should 
use  the  island  for  military  operations,  they  conveyed 
thither  some  hoplites,  and  posted  others  along  the  shore 
of  the  mainland.  Thus  both  the  island  and  the  main- 
land would  be  hostile  to  the  Athenians  ;  and  nowhere  on 
the  mainland  would  there  be  a  possibility  of  landing.  For 
on  the  shore  of  Pylos  itself,  outside  the  entrance  of  the 
strait,  and  where  the  land  faced  the  open  sea,  there  were  no 
harbours,  and  the  Athenians  would  find  no  position  from 
which  they  could  assist  their  countrymen.  Meanwhile  the 
Lacedaemonians,  avoiding  the  risk  of  an  engagement  at 
sea,  might  take  the  fort,  which  had  been  occupied  in  a 
hurry  and  was  not  provisioned.  Under  this  impression 
they  conveyed  their  hoplites  over  to  the  island,  selecting 
them  by  lot  out  of  each  division  of  the  army.  One  de- 
tachment relieved  another ;  those  who  went  over  last  and 
were  taken  in  the  island  were  four  hundred  and  twenty 
men,  besides  the  Helots  who  attended  them  ;  they  were 
under  the  command  of  Epitadas  the  son  of  Molobrus. 

Demosthenes,  seeing  that  the  Lacedaemonians  were 
about  to  attack  him  both  by  sea  and  by  land,  made 
his  own  preparations.  He  drew  up  on  shore  under 


DISPOSITION  OF  THE  ATHENIAN  TROOPS.    251 

B.C.  425.  the  fort  the  three  triremes  remaining  to  him  out  of  IV. 
4>  the  five  which  had  not  gone  on  to  Corcyra,  and  pro-  J^ns^^ 
tected  them  by  a  stockade ;  their  crews  he  armed  with  means  at 
shields,  but  of  a  poor  sort,  most  of  them  made  of 
wicker-work.  In  an  uninhabited  country  there  was  no 
possibility  of  procuring  arms,  and  these  were  only 
obtained  from  a  thirty- oared  privateer  and  a  light 
boat  belonging  to  some  Messenians  who  had  just  ar- 
rived. Of  these  Messenians  about  forty  were  hoplites, 
whom  Demosthenes  used  with  the  others.  He  placed 
the  greater  part  both  of  his  heavy  and  light- armed  forces 
upon  the  side  of  the  place  which  looks  towards  the 
mainland  and  was  stronger  and  better  fortified ;  these 
he  ordered,  if  they  should  be  attacked,  to  repel  the 
land  forces,  while  he  himself  selected  out  of  the  whole 
body  of  his  troops  sixty  hoplites  and  a  few  archers, 
and  marched  out  of  the  fort  to  the  sea-shore  at  the 
point  where  the  Lacedaemonians  seemed  most  likely 
to  attempt  a  landing.  The  spot  which  he  chose  lay 
towards  the  open  sea,  and  was  rocky  and  dangerous  ; 
but  he  thought  that  the  enemy  would  be  attracted 
thither  and  would  be  sure  to  make  a  dash  at  that  point 
because  the  fortifications  were  weaker.  For  the  Athe- 
nians, not  expecting  to  be  defeated  at  sea,  had  left  the 
wall  just  there  less  strong,  knowing  that  if  their  enemies 
could  once  force  a  landing  the  place  would  in  any  case 
easily  be  taken.  Accordingly,  marching  down  to  the 
very  edge  of  the  sea,  he  there  posted  his  hoplites ;  he 
was  determined  to  keep  the  enemy  off  if  he  could,  and 
in  this  spirit  he  addressed  his  men  : — 

'My  companions  in  danger,  let  none  of  you  now  on      10. 
the  eve  of  battle  desire  to  display  his  wits  by  reckoning  Demos- 

.   /  .       thenesad- 

up  the  sum  of  the   perils  which  surround  us ;  let  him  vises  his 
rather  resolve  to  meet  the  enemy  without  much  thought, 
but  with  a  lively  hope  that  he  will  survive  them  all.     In 
cases  like  these,  when  there  is  no  choice,  reflection  is  fisht- 
useless,  and  the  sooner  danger  comes  the  better.     I  am  chances  are 
sure   that  our  chances  are  more  than  equal  if  we  will  favour. 


252  SPEECH   OF  DEMOSTHENES. 

IV.      only  stand  firm,  and,  having  so  many  advantages,  do  not  B.C.  425. 
The  place    take  fright  at  the  numbers  of  the  enemy  and  throw  them 
sibie  if  they  all  away.    The  inaccessibility  of  the  place  is  one  of  them  ; 
ground,  but  this,  however,  will  only  aid  us  if  we  maintain  our  position  ; 


w^en  we  have  once  retreated,  the  ground,  though  difficult 
accessible  jn  itself,  will  be  easy  enough  to  the  enemy,  for  there  will 
They  are  be  no  one  to  oppose  him.  And  if  we  turn  and  press 
the  enemy  upon  him  he  will  be  more  obstinate  than  ever  ;  for  his 

retreat  will  be  next  to  impossible.     On  ship-board  the 


firm,  Peloponnesians  are  easily  repelled,  but  once  landed  they 
him  off  the  are  as  good  as  we  are.  Of  their  numbers  again  we  need 
not  be  so  much  afraid  ;  for,  numerous  as  they  are,  few 
only  can  fight  at  a  time,  owing  to  the  difficulty  of  bring- 
ing their  ships  to  shore.  We  are  contending  against  an 
army  superior  indeed  in  numbers,  but  they  are  not  our 
equals  in  other  respects;  for  they  are  not  on  land  but  on 
water,  and  ships  require  many  favourable  accidents  before 
they  can  act  with  advantage.  So  that  I  consider  their 
embarrassments  to  counterbalance  our  want  of  numbers. 
You  are  Athenians,  who  know  by  experience  the  diffi- 
culty of  disembarking  in  the  presence  of  an  enemy,  and 
that  if  a  man  is  not  frightened  out  of  his  wits  at  the 
splashing  of  oars  and  the  threatening  look  of  a  ship 
bearing  down  upon  him,  but  is  determined  to  hold  his 
ground,  no  force  can  move  him.  It  is  now  your  turn  to 
be  attacked,  and  I  call  on  you  to  stand  fast  and  not  to 
let  the  enemy  touch  the  beach  at  all.  Thus  you  will 
save  yourselves  and  the  place/ 

1  1  .  The  Athenians,  inspirited  by  the  words  of  Demos- 

Difficulty  of  thenes,  went  down  to  the  shore  and  formed  a  line  along 
a  landing,  the  water's  edge.  The  Lacedaemonians  now  began  to 
move,  and  assaulted  the  fort  with  their  army  by  land,  and 
with  their  fleet'  consisting  of  forty-three  ships,  by  sea. 
The  admiral  in  command  was  Thrasymelidas,  son  of 
Cratesicles,  a  Spartan  ;  he  made  his  attack  just  where 
Demosthenes  expected.  The  Athenians  defended  them- 
selves both  by  sea  and  land.  The  Peloponnesians  had 
divided  their  fleet  into  relays  of  a  few  ships  —  the  space 


THE   GALLANTRY   OF  BRAS  ID  AS.  253 

B.C.  425.  would  not  allow  of  more  —  and  so  resting  and  fighting  by  IV. 
^  turns  they  made  their  attack  with  great  spirit,  loudly  ex- 
horting one  another  to  force  back  the  enemy  and  take  the 
fort.  Brasidas  distinguished  himself  above  all  other  men 
in  the  engagement  ;  he  was  captain  of  a  ship,  and  seeing 
his  fellow-captains  and  the  pilots,  even  if  they  could 
touch  anywhere,  hesitating  and  afraid  of  running  their 
ships  on  the  rocks,  he  called  out  to  them  :  '  Not  to  be 
sparing  of  timber  when  the  enemy  had  built  a  fort  in 
their  country;  let  them  wreck  their  ships  and  force 
a  landing  :  '  this  he  said  to  his  own  countrymen,  and  to 
the  allies  that  'they  should  not  hesitate  at  such  a  moment 
to  make  a  present  of  their  ships  to  the  Lacedaemonians, 
who  had  done  so  much  for  them  ;  they  must  run  aground, 
and  somehow  or  other  get  to  land  and  take  the  fort  and 
the  men  in  it.' 

While  thus  upbraiding  the  others  he  compelled  his      12. 
own  pilot  to  run  his  ship  aground,  and  made  for  the  But  he  is 

wounded 

gangway.      But   in   attempting    to    disembark   he   was  and  loses. 
struck   by   the   Athenians,    and,   after   receiving    many  paradoxical 


wounds,  he  swooned  away  and  fell  into  the  fore  part 
of  the  ship  ;  his  shield  slipped  off  his  arm  into  the 
sea,  and,  being  washed  ashore,  was  taken  up  by  the 
Athenians  and  used  for  the  trophy  which  they  raised 
after  their  victory.  The  Peloponnesians  in  the  other 
ships  made  great  efforts  to  disembark,  but  were  unable 
on  account  of  the  roughness  of  the  ground  and  the 
tenacity  with  which  the  Athenians  held  their  position. 
It  was  a  singular  turn  of  fortune  which  drove  the  Athe- 
nians to  repel  the  Lacedaemonians,  who  were  attacking 
them  by  sea,  from  the  Lacedaemonian  coast,  and  the 
Lacedaemonians  to  fight  for  a  landing  on  their  own  soil, 
now  hostile  to  them,  in  the  face  of  the  Athenians.  For 
in  those  days  it  was  the  great  glory  of  the  Lacedae- 
monians to  be  an  inland  people  distinguished  for  their 
military  prowess,  and  of  the  Athenians  to  be  a  nation 
of  sailors  and  the  first  naval  power  in  Hellas. 

The    Peloponnesians,    having    continued   their  efforts      13. 


254       RETURN   OF  THE   ATHENIAN  FLEET. 


IV. 

For  two 
days  the 
Peloponne- 
sians  con- 
tinue their 
efforts. 
Fifty  Athe- 
nian ships 
arrive  and 
pass  the 
night  at 
Prote. 


14. 

The  Athe- 
nians rush 
in  at  both 
mouths  of 
the  harbour, 
which  the 
enemy  had 
neglected 
to  close. 
The  Lace- 
daemonians 
are  defeated 
after  a  sharp 
conflict, 
and  the 
men  sta- 
tioned in 
the  island 
are  cut  off. 


during  this  day  and  a  part  of  the  next,  at  length  B.C.  425. 
desisted  ;  on  the  third  day  they  sent  some  of  their 
ships  to  Asine  for  timber  with  which  to  make  engines, 
hoping  by  their  help  to  take  the  part  of  the  fort  looking 
towards  the  harbour  where  the  landing  was  easier,  al- 
though it  was  built  higher.  Meanwhile  the  Athenian 
ships  arrived  from  Zacynthus ;  they  had  been  increased 
in  number  to  fifty  by  the  arrival  of  some  guard-ships 
from  Naupactus  and  of  four  Chian  vessels.  Their  com- 
manders saw  that  both  the  mainland  and  the  island  were 
full  of  hoplites,  and  that  the  ships  were  in  the  harbour 
and  were  not  coming  out :  so,  not  knowing  where  to  find 
anchorage,  they  sailed  away  for  the  present  to  the  island 
of  Prote,  which  was  close  at  hand  and  uninhabited,  and 
there  passed  the  night.  Next  day,  having  made  ready 
for  action,  they  put  off  to  sea,  intending,  if,  as  they  hoped, 
the  Peloponnesians  were  willing  to  come  out  against  them, 
to  give  battle  in  the  open;  if  not,  to  sail  into  the  harbour. 
The  Peloponnesians  did  not  come  out,  and  had  somehow 
neglected  to  close  the  mouths  as  they  had  intended. 
They  showed  no  sign  of  moving,  but  were  on  shore, 
manning  their  ships  and  preparing  to  fight,  if  any  one 
entered  the  harbour,  which  was  of  considerable  size. 

The  Athenians,  seeing  how  matters  stood,  rushed  in 
upon  them  at  both  mouths  of  the  harbour.  Most  of  the 
enemies'  ships  had  by  this  time  got  into  deep  water  and 
were  facing  them.  These  they  put  to  flight  and  pursued 
them  as  well  as  they  could  in  such  a  narrow  space, 
damaging  many  and  taking  five,  one  of  them  with  the 
crew.  They  charged  the  remaining  vessels  even  after 
they  had  reached  the  land,  and  there  were  some  which 
they  disabled  while  the  crews  were  getting  into  them 
and  before  they  put  out  at  all.  Others  they  succeeded 
in  tying  to  their  own  ships  and  began  to  drag  them  away 
empty,  the  sailors  having  taken  flight.  At  this  sight 
the  Lacedaemonians  were  in  an  agony,  for  their  friends 
were  being  cut  off  in  the  island  ;  they  hurried  to  the 
rescue,  and  dashing  armed  as  they  were  into  the  sea, 


BATTLE    IN    THE    HARBOUR.  255 

B.C.  425.  took  hold  of  the  ships  and  pulled  them  back  ;  a  that  IV. 
4'  was  a  time  when  every  one  thought  that  the  action 
was  at  a  stand  where  he  himself  was  not  engaged  a. 
There  was  a  tremendous  conflict  ;  the  two  combatants 
in  this  battle  for  the  ships  interchanging  their  usual 
manner  of  fighting  ;  for  the  Lacedaemonians  in  their 
excitement  and  desperation  did,  as  one  may  say,  carry 
on  a  sea-fight  from  the  land,  and  the  Athenians,  who 
were  victorious  and  eager  to  push  their  good-fortune 
to  the  utmost,  waged  a  land  fight  from  their  ships.  At 
length,  after  great  efforts  and  much  damage  inflicted  on 
both  sides,  they  parted.  The  Lacedaemonians  saved 
their  empty  ships,  with  the  exception  of  those  which  were 
first  taken.  Both  sides  retired  to  their  encampments  ; 
the  Athenians  then  raised  a  trophy,  gave  up  the  dead, 
and  took  possession  of  the  wrecks.  They  lost  no  time 
in  sailing  round  the  island  and  establishing  a  guard  over 
the  men  who  were  cut  off  there.  But  the  Peloponnesians 
on  the  mainland,  who  had  now  been  joined  by  all  their 
contingents,  remained  in  their  position  before  Pylos. 

At  Sparta,  -when  the  news  arrived,  there  was  great       15. 

consternation  ;    it    was    resolved   that   the    magistrates  Consterna- 

tion at 
should  go  down  to  the  camp  and  see  for  themselves  ;  Sparta. 

they  could  then  take  on  the  spot  any  measures  which  that  nothing 
they  thought  necessary.     Finding  on  their  arrival  that 


nothing  could  be  done  for  their  soldiers  in  the  island,  Spartans 
and  not  liking  to  run  the  risk  of  their  being  starved  to  truce  and 
death  or  overcome  by  force  of  numbers  b,  they  decided  ba"sadors 
that  with  the  consent  of  the  Athenian  generals  they  for 


would  suspend  hostilities  at  Pylos,  and  sending  ambas- 
sadors to  ask  for  peace  at  Athens,  would  endeavour  to 
recover  their  men  as  soon  as  possible. 

The  Athenian  commanders  accepted  their  proposals,       1  6. 
and  a  truce  was  made  on  the  following  conditions  :  — 

'  The  Lacedaemonians  shall  deliver  into  the  hands  of  The 

a  Or,  taking  /ceKcoXvcr&u  with  CKOO-TOS:  'that  was  a  time  when 
every  one  felt  that  he  was  under  a  restraint  because  he  was  unable 
to  be  everywhere  and  to  do  everything.' 

b  Omitting  77  after  fii 


256  THE    TRUCE. 

the  Athenians  at  Pylos  the  ships  in  which  they  fought,  B.C.  425. 
and  shall  also  bring  thither  and  deliver  over  any  other  ° 


fhlh-"hips  sk*Ps  °f  war  which  are  in  Laconia  ;  and  they  shall  make 
of  war  to  no  assault  upon  the  fort  either  by  sea  or  land.  The 
nians  while  Athenians  shall  permit  the  Lacedaemonians  on  the 
lasts™  mainland  to  send  to  those  on  the  island  a  fixed  quantity 
of  kneaded  flour,  viz.  two  Attic  quarts  a  of  barley-meal 
for  each  man,  and  a  pint  of  wine,  and  also  a  piece  of 
meat  ;  for  an  attendant,  half  these  quantities  ;  they  shall 
send  them  into  the  island  under  the  inspection  of  the 
Athenians,  and  no  vessel  shall  sail  in  by  stealth.  The 
Athenians  shall  guard  the  island  as  before,  but  not  land, 
and  shall  not  attack  the  Peloponnesian  forces  by  land  or 
by  sea.  If  either  party  violate  this  agreement  in  any 
particular,  however  slight,  the  truce  is  to  be  at  an  end. 
The  agreement  is  to  last  until  the  Lacedaemonian  am- 
bassadors return  from  Athens,  and  the  Athenians  are  to 
convey  them  thither  and  bring  them  back  in  a  trireme. 
When  they  return  the  truce  is  to  be  at  an  end,  and  the 
Athenians  are  to  restore  the  ships  in  the  same  condition 
in  which  they  received  them.'  Such  were  the  terms  of 
the  truce.  The  ships,  which  were  about  sixty  in  number, 
were  given  up  to  the  Athenians.  The  ambassadors  went 
on  their  way,  and  arriving  at  Athens  spoke  as  follows  :  — 
1  7.  '  Men  of  Athens,  the  Lacedaemonians  have  sent  us  to 

We  use  few  negotiate  for   the  recovery  of  our  countrymen  in   the 
island,  in  the  hope  that  you  may  be  induced  to  grant 


sionre?"     us  terms  such  as  will  be  at  once  advantageous  to  you 
quires.        anc[  noj-  inglorious  to  us  in  our  present  misfortune.   If  we 

You  have 

now  a  great  speak  at  length,  this  will  be  no  departure  from  the  custom 

opportunity      _  /->..<  • 

of  placing    of  our  country.    On  the  contrary,  it  is  our  manner  not  to 


Sa7  much  where  few  words  will  suffice,  but  to  be  more 
fortune5  °f  ^eral  °f  speech  bwhen  some   weighty   communication 
has  to  be  made  and  words  are  the  ministers  of  action  b. 

a  The  choenixwas  about  two  pints,  dry  measure;  the  cotyle  about 
half  a  pint. 

b  Or,  taking  \6yois  with  6\§uovcoz/raj:  *  when  some  weighty  com- 
munication has  to  be  made  by  words,  if  anything  is  to  be  really  done.' 


SPEECH   OF  THE    LACEDAEMONIANS.       257 

Do  not  receive  what  we  say  in  a  hostile  spirit,  or  imagine  IV. 
that  we  deem  you  ignorant  and  are  instructing  you,  but 
regard  us  simply  as  putting  you  in  mind  a  of  what  you 
already  know  to  be  good  policy.  For  you  may  turn 
your  present  advantage  to  excellent  account,  not  only 
keeping  what  you  have  won,  but  gaining  honour  and 
glory  as  well.  You  will  then  escape  the  reverse  which 
is  apt  to  be  experienced  by  men  who  attain  any  unusual 
good  fortune  ;  for,  having  already  succeeded  beyond  all 
expectation,  they  see  no  reason  why  they  should  set  any 
limit  to  their  hopes  and  desires.  Whereas  they  who  have 
oftenest  known  the  extremes  of  either  kind  of  fortune 
ought  to  be  most  suspicious  of  prosperity;  and  this  may 
naturally  be  expected  to  be  the  lesson  which  experience 
has  taught  both  us  and  you. 

'Look  only  at  the  calamity  which  has  just  overtaken       18. 
us,  who  formerly  enjoyed  the  greatest  prestige  of  any  Take  wam- 

TT   11  i  1  -^1  i        c  ingfromour 

Hellenic  state,  but  are  now  come  hither  to  ask  of  you  disaster. 
the  boon  which  at  one  time  we  should  have  thought  our-  hourof  ' 


selves  better  able  to  confer.     You  cannot  attribute  our  prosperity 

show  that 

mishap  to  any  want  of  power  ;  nor  to  the  pride  which  you  know 

.  when  to 

an  increase  of  power  fosters.  We  were  neither  stronger  stop. 
nor  weaker  than  before,  but  we  erred  in  judgment,  and 
to  such  errors  all  men  are  liable.  Therefore  you  should 
not  suppose  that,  because  your  city  and  your  empire  are 
powerful  at  this  moment,  you  will  always  have  fortune  on 
your  side.  The  wise  ensure  their  own  safety  by  not 
making  too  sure  of  their  gains,  and  when  disasters  come 
they  can  tell  better  where  they  are  ;  they  know  that  war 
will  go  on  its  way  whithersoever  chance  may  lead,  and 
will  not  be  bound  by  the  rules  which  he  who  begins  to 
meddle  with  it  would  fain  prescribe.  They  of  all  men 
will  be  least  likely  to  meet  with  reverses,  because  they 
are  not  puffed  up  with  military  success,  and  they  will 
be  most  inclined  to  end  the  struggle  in  the  hour  of 
victory.  It  will  be  for  your  honour,  Athenians,  to  act 
thus  towards  us.  And  then  the  victories  which  you  have 
*  Cp.  iv.  95  init.;  iv.  126  init.;  v.  69  fin. 
S 


258       SPEECH   OF   THE   LACEDAEMONIANS. 

IV.  gained  already  cannot  be  attributed  to  mere  luck  ;  as  B.C.  425. 
they  certainly  will  be  if,  rejecting  our  prayer,  you  should 
hereafter  encounter  disasters,  a  thing  which  is  not  un- 
likely to  happen.  But  you  may  if  you  will  leave  to 
posterity  a  reputation  for  power  and  wisdom  which  no 
danger  can  affect. 

19.  'The  Lacedaemonians  invite  you  to  make  terms  with 
We  invite    them  and  to  finish  the  war.     They  offer  peace  and  al- 

you  to 

makepeace,  liance  and  a  general  friendly  and  happy  relation,  and 
enmities  they  ask  in  return  their  countrymen  who  are  cut  off 
reconciled  in  the  island-  The7  tm"nk  ifc  better  that  neither  city 
when  the  should  run  any  further  risk,  you  of  the  escape  of  the 

victor  is  .  ... 

generous  besieged,  who  may  find  some  means  of  forcing  their 
h?s  adver-  way  out,  we  of  their  being  compelled  to  surrender  and 
by'Ties  o™  Passing  absolutely  into  your  hands.  We  think  that  great 
gratitude,  enmities  are  most  effectually  reconciled,  not  when  one 
party  seeks  revenge  and,  getting  a  decided  superiority, 
binds  his  adversary  by  enforced  oaths  and  makes  a 
treaty  with  him  on  unequal  terms,  but  when,  having  in 
his  power  to  do  all  this,  he  from  a  generous  and  equitable 
feeling  overcomes  his  resentment,  and  by  the  modera- 
tion of  his  terms  surprises  his  adversary,  who,  having 
suffered  no  violence  at  his  hands,  is  bound  to  recompense 
his  generosity  not  with  evil  but  with  good,  and  who 
therefore,  from  a  sense  of  honour,  is  more  likely  to  keep 
his  word.  And  mankind  are  more  ready  to  make  such 
a  concession  to  their  greater  enemies  than  to  those  with 
whom  they  have  only  a  slight  difference  a.  Again,  they 
joyfully  give  way  to  those  who  first  give  way  them- 
selves, although  against  overbearing  power  they  will  risk 
a  conflict  even  contrary  to  their  own  better  judgment. 

20.  '  Now,  if  ever,  is  the  time  of  reconciliation  for  us  both, 
Reconcile-  before   either   has   suffered   any  irremediable   calamity, 
possible-     which  must  cause,  besides  the  ordinary  antagonism  of 


contending  states,  a  personal  and  inveterate  hatred,  and 
w^  deprive  vou  °^  tne  advantages  which  we  now  offer. 
who  began  While   the  contest  is  still  undecided,  while   you   may 

the  war  is  a 

a  Gp.  v.  91  init. 


CLEON    THE  POPULAR    LEADER.  259 

B.C.  425.  acquire   reputation   and    our  friendship,   and  while   our      IV. 
' 4*  disaster  can  be  repaired  on  tolerable  terms,  and  disgrace  disputed 

point,  but 

averted,  let  us  be  reconciled,  and  choosing  peace  instead  you  win 
of  war  ourselves,  let  us  give  relief  and  rest  to  all  the  credit  of 
Hellenes.     The  chief  credit  of  the  peace  will  be  yours.  gj,d^git- 
Whether  we  or  you  drove  them  into  war  is  uncertain ;  united,  we 

are  the 

but  to  give  them  peace  lies  with  you,  and  to  you  they  lords  of 
will  be  grateful.  If  you  decide  for  peace,  you  may  assure 
to  yourselves  the  lasting  friendship  of  the  Lacedaemo- 
nians freely  offered  by  them,  you  on  your  part  em- 
ploying no  force  but  kindness  only.  Consider  the  great 
advantages  which  such  a  friendship  will  yield.  If  you 
and  we  are  at  one,  you  may  be  certain  that  the  rest  *of 
Hellas,  which  is  less  powerful  than  we,  will  pay  to  both 
of  us  the  greatest  deference.' 

Thus  spoke  the  Lacedaemonians,  thinking  that  the  2 1 . 
Athenians,  who  had  formerly  been  desirous  of  making  The  Athe- 
terms  with  them,  and  had  only  been  prevented  by  their  instigation 
refusal a,  would  now,  when  peace  was  offered  to  them,  Sf..^^ 
joyfully  agree  and  would  restore  their  men.  But  the 
Athenians  reflected  that,  since  they  had  the  Lacedae- 
monians shut  up  in  the  island,  it  was  at  any  time  in 
their  power  to  make  peace,  and  they  wanted  more. 
These  feelings  were  chiefly  encouraged  by  Cleon  the 
son  of  Cleaenetus,  a  popular  leader  of  the  day  who  had 
the  greatest  influence  over  the  multitude b.  He  per- 
suaded them  to  reply  that  the  men  in  the  island  must 
first  of  all  give  up  themselves  and  their  arms  and  be 
sent  to  Athens ;  the  Lacedaemonians  were  then  to  re- 
store Nisaea,  Pegae,  Troezen,  and  Achaia.  Now  these 
places  had  not  been  taken  in  war,  but  had  been  sur- 
rendered under  a  former  treaty0  in  a  time  of  reverse, 
when  the  Athenians  d  were  more  anxious  to  obtain  peace 
than  they  now  were d.  On  these  conditions  they  might 
recover  the  men  and  make  a  treaty  of  such  duration  as 
both  parties  should  approve. 

a  Gp.  ii.  59.  b  Cp.  iii.  36  fin.  c  Cp.  i.  115  init. 

d  Or,  { were  making  and  not  receiving  offers  of  peace.' 

S  2 


260  PRETENDED    VIOLATION   OF   THE    TRUCE. 


IV. 

22. 
The  pro- 

Lacedae-  * 
10 


dSadi7n°f 
private  is 

rejected/ 


tions. 


23. 

TheAthe- 

mans  retuse 

to  restore 

the  Pelo- 

onnesian 


fractioiTof 
the  treaty, 

adelsphac- 


To  this  reply  the  Lacedaemonians  said  nothing,  but  B.C.  425. 
only  requested  that  the  Athenians  would  appoint  com- 
missioners  to  discuss  with  them  the  details  of  the  agree- 
merit  and  quietly  arrive  at  an  understanding  about  them 
if  they  could-  This  Proposal  was  assailed  by  Cleon  in  un- 
measured  language  :  he  had  always  known,  he  said,  that 
they  meant  no  good,  and  now  their  designs  were  unveiled  ; 
for  they  were  unwilling  to  speak  a  word  before  the 
people,  but  wanted  to  be  closeted  with  a  select  fewa; 
if  they  had  any  honesty  in  them,  let  them  say  what 
they  wanted  to  the  whole  city.  But  the  Lacedaemo- 
nians knew  that,  although  they  might  be  willing  to  make 
concessions  under  the  pressure  of  their  calamities,  they 
could  not  speak  openly  before  the  assembly,  (for  if  they 
spoke  and  did  not  succeed,  the  terms  which  they  offered 
might  injure  them  in  the  opinion  of  their  allies);  they 
saw  too  that  the  Athenians  would  not  grant  what  was 
asked  of  them  on  any  tolerable  conditions.  So,  after  a 
fruitless  negotiation,  they  returned  home. 

Upon  their  return  the  truce  at  Pylos  instantly  came 
to  an  end,  and  the  Lacedaemonians  demanded  back 
their  ships  according  to  the  agreement.  But  the  Athe- 

.  i      i  r          i  •  i^  .  t.      r 

nians  accused  them  of  making  an  assault  upon  the  fort, 
and  °f  some  other  petty  infractions  of  the  treaty  which 
seemed  narcHy  worth  mentioning.  Accordingly  they  re- 
fused  to  restore  them,  insisting  upon  the  clause  which 
said  that  if  '  in  any  particular,  however  slight,'  the  agree- 
ment were  violated,  the  treaty  was  to  be  at  an  end.  The 
Lacedaemonians  remonstrated,  and  went  away  protest- 
ing against  the  injustice  of  detaining  their  ships.  Both 
parties  then  renewed  the  war  with  the  utmost  vigour. 
The  Athenians  had  two  triremes  sailing  round  Sphac- 
teria  in  opposite  directions  throughout  the  day,  and  at 
night  their  whole  fleet  was  moored  about  the  island, 
except  on  the  side  towards  the  sea  when  the  wind  was 
high.  Twenty  additional  ships  had  come  from  Athens 
to  assist  in  the  blockade,  so  that  the  entire  number  was 
a  Cp.  v.  85. 


AFFAIRS    OF  SICILY.  261 

B.c.  425.  seventy.      The   Peloponnesians    lay   encamped    on   the      IV. 
881  4'  mainland  and  made  assaults  against  the  fort,  watching 
for  any  opportunity  which  might  present  itself  of  rescuing 
their  men. 

Meanwhile   in    Sicily  the  Syracusans  and  the  allies      24. 
brought  up  the  fleet  which  they  had  been   equipping a  The  syra- 
to  Messene,  and  joining  the  other  fleet  which  was  keep-  Locrians 
ing  guard  there,  carried  on  the  war  from  thence.     They  warlgainst 
were  instigated  chiefly  by  the  Locrians,  who  hated  the 
Rhegians,  and  had  already  invaded  their  territory  with 
their  whole  force.     They  were  eager  to  try  their  fortune  the  Syra- 
in  a  naval  engagement,  for  they  saw  that  the  Athenians  CIJ 
had  only  a  few  ships  actually  on   the  spot,  the  larger 
portion  of  the  fleet  which  had  been  despatched  to  Sicily 
being,  as  they  heard,  engaged  in  the  siege  of  Sphac- 
teria.     If  they  conquered  at  sea  they  hoped  to  blockade 
Rhegium  both  by  sea  and  land ;  they  would  easily  master 
the  place,  and  their  affairs  would  then  be  really  gaining 
strength.     Rhegium,  the   extreme   point  of  Italy,  and 
Messene,  of  Sicily,  are  close  to  one  another;    and   if 
Rhegium  were  taken  the  Athenians  would  not  be  able 
to  lie  there  and  command   the  strait.     Now  the   strait 
is  that  portion  of  sea  between  Rhegium  and   Messene 
where  Sicily  is  nearest  to  the  continent ;   it  is  the  so- 
called   Charybdis  by  which   Odysseus   is  said   to  have 
passed.   The  channel  was  naturally  considered  dangerous ; 
for  the  strait  is  narrow,  and  the  sea  flowing  into  it  from 
two  great  oceans,  the  Tyrrhenian  and  Sicilian,  is  full  of 
currents. 

In  this  strait  the  Syracusans  and  their  allies,  who  had       25. 
somewhat  more  than   thirty  ships,  were  compelled   to  ^jj1^" 
fight   late   in   the  day  for  a  vessel  which  was   sailing  Syracusan 
through.     They  put  out  against  sixteen  Athenian   and  Athenians6 
eight  Rhegian  ships  ;  but,  being  defeated  by  the  Athe- 
nians,  they  made  a  hasty  retreat,  each  ship  as  it  best 
could,  to  their  stations  at  Messene  and  near  Rhegium  ; 
one  ship  was  lost.    Night  closed  the  engagement.    After 
a  Cp.  iv.  i  fin. 


262  THE  ATHENIANS  AND  THEIR  SICILIAN  ALLIES. 

IV.      this  the  Locrians  quitted  the  Rhegian  territory,  and  the  B.C.  425. 
Partial  sue-  Syracusans  and  their  confederates  united  their  fleet  and 

cess  of  the 

Syracusans,  anchored  at  the  promontory  of  Pelorus  near  Messene, 
two  Athe-  where  their  land-forces  were  also  stationed.  The  Athe- 
nian ships.  njans  ancj  Rhegians,  sailing  up  to  them,  and  seeing  that 
the  crews  were  not  there,  fell  upon  the  empty  vessels,  but 
an  iron  grapnel  was  thrown  out  at  them,  and  they  in  their 
turn  lost  a  ship,  from  which  the  crew  escaped  by  swim- 
ming. Then  the  Syracusans  embarked,  and,  as  they 
were  being  towed  along  the  shore  towards  Messene,  the 
Athenians  again  attacked  them.  Making  a  sudden  twist 
outwards  they  struck  the  first  blow  at  the  Athenians, 
who  lost  another  ship.  Thus  both  in  the  movement 
along  the  coast  and  in  the  naval  engagement  which 
ensued,  the  Syracusans  proved  themselves  quite  a  match 
for  the  Athenians,  and  at  length  made  their  way  into 
the  harbour  at  Messene. 

Unsuccess-      The   Athenians,  hearing   that    Camarina   was    being 
o? the6™1*5  betrayed   to  the  Syracusans  by  a   certain  Archias  and 
Messenians  his  confederates,  sailed  thither.     Meanwhile  the  Messe- 
Naxos,  and  nians,  with  their   whole  power   by  land   and   with  the 
Leontines    allied  fleet,  made  war  upon  Naxos,  a   Chalcidian  city 
nians  upon  which  was  their  neighbour.    On  the  first  day  they  forced 
TheSAthe-   ^e  Naxians  to  retire  within  their  walls  and  ravaged  the 
nians  for      country ;  on  the  morrow  they  sailed  round  to  the  river 
withdraw     Acesines,  again  ravaged  the  country,  and  with  their  land- 
conTest e      forces  made  incursions  in  the  neighbourhood  of  the  city. 
But  in  the  meantime  a  large  body  of  Sicels  came  down 
over  the  heights  to  assist  the  Naxians  against  the  Messe- 
nians.    Perceiving  this  they  took  heart,  and  shouting  to 
one  another  that  the  Leontines  and  their  other  Hellenic 
allies  were  coming  to  succour  them,  they  sallied  out  of 
the  city,  charged  the  Messenians,  and  put  them  to  flight 
with  a  loss  of  more  than  a  thousand  men  ;  the  rest  with 
difficulty  escaped,  for  the  barbarians  fell  upon  them  in 
the  roads   and    destroyed   most  of  them.      The   allied 
fleet,  putting  into  Messene,  broke  up  and  returned  home. 
Whereupon  the  Leontines  and  their  allies,  in  concert  with 


THE    SITUATION   AT    PYLOS.  263 

B.C.  425.  the  Athenians,  marched  against  the  now  enfeebled  Mes-  IV. 
881  4'  sene.  The  Athenian  fleet  attempted  an  assault  of  the 
harbour  while  the  army  attacked  the  city.  But  the 
Messenians  and  a  Locrian  garrison  under  Demoteles, 
which  after  their  disaster  at  Naxos  had  been  left  to 
protect  the  place,  suddenly  falling  upon  them  put  to 
flight  the  main  body  of  the  Leontines  with  great  loss  ; 
whereupon  the  Athenians  disembarked,  came  to  their 
aid,  and,  falling  on  the  Messenians  while  they  were  still 
in  confusion,  chased  them  back  to  the  city.  They  then 
erected  a  trophy  and  retired  to  Rhegium.  After  this 
the  Hellenes  in  Sicily  went  on  fighting  against  one 
another  by  land  ;  but  the  Athenians  took  no  part  in 
their  operations. 

At    Pylos    meanwhile    the   Athenians    continued    to       26. 
blockade   the   Lacedaemonians   in   the  island,  and  the  The 

blockade  of 

Peloponnesian  army  on  the  mainland  remained  in  their  Pylos  was 
old  position.     The  watch  was   harassing  to  the  Athe-  owing  (i)  to 
nians,  for  they  were  in  want  both  of  food  and  water  ;  J^Jf  °£d 
there  was  only  one  small  well,  which  was  inside  the  fort,  water  ; 
and  the  soldiers  were  commonly  in  the  habit  of  scraping  confined 


away  the  shingle  on  the  sea-shore,  and  drinking  any  (jto  the 
water  which  they  could  get.  The  Athenian  garrison  l^^f~  of 
was  crowded  into  a  narrow  space,  and,  their  ships  having  anchoring 
no  regular  anchorage,  the  crews  took  their  meals  (4)  to  the 
on  land  by  turns  ;  one  half  of  the  army  eating  while 
the  other  lay  at  anchor  in  the  open  sea.  The  unex- 


pected  length  of  the  siege  was  a  great  discouragement  for  the  in- 
to them  ;  they  had  hoped  to  starve  their  enemies  out  of  supplies. 
in  a  few  days,  for  they  were  on  a  desert  island,  and  had 
only  brackish  water  to  drink.  The  secret  of  this  pro- 
tracted resistance  was  a  proclamation  issued  by  the 
Lacedaemonians  offering  large  fixed  prices,  and  free- 
dom if  he  were  a  Helot,  to  any  one  who  would  convey 
into  the  island  meal,  wine,  cheese  or  any  other  provision 
suitable  for  a  besieged  place.  Many  braved  the  danger, 
especially  the  Helots  ;  they  started  from  all  points  of 
Peloponnesus,  and  before  daybreak  bore  down  upon  the 


264  FEARS    OF    THE   ATHENIANS. 

IV.  shore  of  the  island  looking  towards  the  open  sea.  They  B.C.  425. 
took  especial  care  to  have  a  strong  wind  in  their  favour, 
since  they  were  less  likely  to  be  discovered  by  the 
triremes  when  it  blew  hard  from  the  sea.  The  blockade 
was  then  impracticable,  and  the  crews  of  the  boats 
were  perfectly  reckless  in  running  them  aground ;  for 
a  value  had  been  set  upon  them,  and  Lacedaemonian 
hoplites  were  waiting  to  receive  them  about  the  landing- 
places  of  the  island.  All  however  who  ventured  when 
the  sea  was  calm  were  captured.  Some  too  dived  and 
swam  by  way  of  the  harbour,  drawing  after  them  by  a 
cord  skins  containing  pounded  linseed  and  poppy-seeds 
mixed  with  honey.  At  first  they  were  not  found  out, 
but  afterwards  watches  were  posted.  The  two  parties 
had  all  sorts  of  devices,  the  one  determined  to  send  in 
food,  the  other  to  detect  them. 

27-  When  the  Athenians  heard  that  their  own  army  was 

Thesitua-    suffering   and   that   supplies  were  introduced  into   the 

tion  is  re- 
ported to     island,  they  began  to  be  anxious  and  were  apprehensive 

aeon  de-  that  the  blockade  might  extend  into  the  winter.  They 
reports!  reflected  that  the  conveyance  of  necessaries  round  the 
The  Athe-  Peloponnese  would  then  be  impracticable.  Their  troops 

mans  want  .  * 

to  send  were  in  a  desert  place,  to  which,  even  in  summer,  they 

sioner^to  were   not  able  to  send  a  sufficient  supply.     The  coast 

aeon  was  without  harbours ;    and  therefore  it  would  be  im- 

biamesthe  possible  to  maintain  the  blockade.     Either  the  watch 

generals,        r 

and  pro-      would  be  relaxed  and  the  men  would  escape  ;  or,  taking 

send!  not     advantage  of  a  storm,  they  might  sail  away  in  the  ships 

sfon<S~but  which  brought  them  food.     a  Above  all  they  were  afraid 

He^ouid    ^at  the  Lacedaemonians,  feeling  the  strength  of  their 

soon  take    position,  would  make  no  more  overtures  to  them a,  and 

he^ere       they  regretted  having  rejected  their  advances.     Cleon, 

ral>       knowing   that   he   was   an   object   of   general   mistrust 

because  he  had  stood  in  the  way  of  peace,  challenged 

the   reports  of  the   messengers  from    Pylos ;    who  re- 

a  Or,  *  Above  all  they  feared  that  the  Lacedaemonians,  who  no 
longer  made  overtures  to  them,  must  now  be  reassured  of  the 
strength  of  their  own  position.' 


CLEON  AND    NICIAS.  265 

B.C.  425.  joined  that,  if  their  words  were  not  believed,  the  Athe-      IV. 

Ol   88    A. 

nians  should  send  commissioners  of  their  own.  And 
so  Theagenes  and  Cleon  himself  were  chosen  commis- 
sioners. As  he  knew  that  he  could  only  confirm  the 
report  of  the  messengers  whom  he  was  calumniating, 
or  would  be  convicted  of  falsehood  if  he  contradicted 
them,  observing  too  that  the  Athenians  were  disposed  to 
take  active  measures,  he  advised  them  not  to  send  com- 
missioners, which  would  only  be  a  loss  of  valuable  time, 
but,  if  they  were  themselves  satisfied  with  the  report,  to 
send  a  fleet  against  the  island.  Pointedly  alluding  to 
Nicias  the  son  of  Niceratus,  who  was  one  of  the  generals 
and  an  enemy  of  his,  he  declared  sarcastically  that,  if  the 
generals  were  good  for  anything,  they  might  easily  sail 
to  the  island  and  take  the  men,  and  that  this  was  what 
he  would  certainly  do  himself  if  he  were  general. 

Nicias  perceived  that  the  multitude  were  murmuring      28. 
at  Cleon,  and  asking  '  why  he  did  not  sail  —  now  was  The  Pe°Ple 

0  -  murmur  at 

his  time  a  if  he  thought  the  capture  of  Sphacteria  to  be  him. 
such   an    easy   matter  ;  '   and   hearing   him   attack   the  signs  in  his 


generals,  he  told  him  that,  as   far   as  they  were   con- 
cerned,  he  might  take  any  force  which  he  required  and  £°1(k  back» 
try.     Cleon   at   first  imagined  that  the  offer  of  Nicias  afterwards 
was  only  a  pretence,  and  was  willing  to  go  ;  but  finding  tcTsan.  GC 


that  he  was  in  earnest,  he  tried  to  back  out,  and  said 

that   not   he   but   Nicias   was    general.     He   was   now  that  he  wil1 

return 

alarmed,  for  he  never  imagined  that  Nicias  would  go  victorious 

r  within 

so  far  as  to  give  up  his  place  to  him.     Again  Nicias  twenty 
bade  him  take  the  command  of  the  expedition  against  TheAthe- 
Pylos,  which  he  formally  gave  up  to  him  in  the  presence  "ia£smlaugh 
of  the  assembly.     And   the  more    Cleon  declined  the 
proffered  command  and  tried  to  retract  what  he  had 
said,  so  much  the  more  the  multitude,  as  their  manner  is, 
urged  Nicias  to  resign   and  shouted  to  Cleon  that  he 
should   sail.     At  length,  not   knowing  how  to   escape 
from  his  own  words,  he  undertook  the  expedition,  and, 
coming   forward,  said   that   he  was    not   afraid   of  the 
*  Reading  o  rt. 


266 


THE   ATHENIANS   AND    CLEON. 


IV. 


29. 

He  selects 
Demos- 
thenes to 
be  his 
colleague, 
hearing 
that  he  is 
already 
meditating 
an  attack 
upon  the 
island. 
The  design 
is  encour- 
aged by  an 
accidental 
fire. 


Lacedaemonians,  and  that  he  would  sail  without  with-  B.C.  425. 
drawing  a  single  man  from  the  city  if  he  were  allowed  O1'  88'  4* 
to  have  the  Lemnian  and  Imbrian  forces  now  at  Athens, 
the  auxiliaries  from  Aenus,  who  were  targeteers,  and  four 
hundred  archers  from  other  places.  With  these  and 
with  the  troops  already  at  Pylos  he  gave  his  word  that 
within  twenty  days  he  would  either  bring  the  Lace- 
daemonians alive  or  kill  them  on  the  spot.  His  vain 
words  moved  the  Athenians  to  laughter ;  nevertheless 
the  wiser  sort  of  men  were  pleased  when  they  reflected 
that  of  two  good  things  they  could  not  fail  to  obtain 
one — either  there  would  be  an  end  of  Cleon,  which  they 
would  have  greatly  preferred,  or,  if  they  were  disappointed, 
he  would  put  the  Lacedaemonians  into  their  hands. 

When  he  had  concluded  the  affair  in  the  assembly, 
and  the  Athenians  had  passed  the  necessary  vote,  he 
made  choice  of  Demosthenes,  one  of  the  commanders 
at  Pylos,  to  be  his  colleague,  and  proceeded  to  sail  with 
all  speed.  He  selected  Demosthenes  because  he  heard 
that  he  was  already  intending  to  make  an  attack  upon 
the  island ;  for  the  soldiers,  who  were  suffering  much 
from  the  discomfort  of  the  place,  in  which  they  were 
rather  besieged  than  besiegers  a,  were  eager  to  strike  a 
decisive  blow.  He  had  been  much  encouraged  by  a  fire 
which  had  taken  place  in  the  island.  It  had  previously 
been  nearly  covered  with  wood  and  was  pathless,  having 
never  been  inhabited  ;  and  he  had  feared  that  the  nature 
of  the  country  would  give  the  enemy  an  advantage.  For, 
however  large  the  force  with  which  he  landed,  the  Lace- 
daemonians might  attack  him  from  some  place  of  am- 
bush and  do  him  much  injury.  Their  mistakes  and  the 
character  of  their  forces  would  be  concealed  by  the 
wood  ;  whereas  all  the  errors  made  by  his  own  army 
would  be  palpable,  and  so  the  enemy,  with  whom  the 
power  of  attack  would  rest,  might  come  upon  them  sud- 
denly wherever  they  liked.  And  if  they  were  compelled 
to  go  into  the  wood  and  there  engage,  a  smaller  force 
a  Cp.  vii.  1 1  fin. 


THE  PLAN   OF  DEMOSTHENES.  2,6?      . 

B.C.  425.  which  knew  the  ground  would  be  more  than  a  match       IV. 
4'  for  the  larger  number  who  were  unacquainted  with  it. 
Their  own  army,  however  numerous,  would  be  destroyed 
without  knowing  it,  for  they  would  not  be  able  to  see 
where  they  needed  one  another's  assistance. 

Demosthenes  was  led  to  make  these  reflections  from       30. 
his  experience  in  Aetolia  a,  where  his  defeat  had  been  in 


a  great  measure  owing  to  the  forest.    However,  while  the  wood  dis- 

,  .  .  •  i  ,  covers  the 

Athenian  soldiers  were  taking  their  midday  meal,  with  a  number  and 


guard  posted  in  advance,  at  the  extremity  of  the  island, 
being  compelled  by  want  of  room  to  land  on  the  edge  of 
the  shore  at  meal-times,  some  one  unintentionally  set  fire 
to  a  portion  of  the  wood  ;  a  wind  came  on,  and  from  this 
accident,  before  they  knew  what  was  happening,  the 
greater  part  of  it  was  burnt.  Demosthenes,  who  had 
previously  suspected  that  the  Lacedaemonians  when 
they  sent  in  provisions  to  the  besieged  had  exaggerated 
their  number,  saw  that  the  men  were  more  numerous 
than  he  had  imagined.  He  saw  toob  the  increased  zeal 
of  the  Athenians,  who  were  now  convinced  that  the 
attempt  was  worth  making,  and  the  island  seemed  to  him 
more  accessible.  So  he  prepared  for  the  descent  and 
despatched  messengers  to  the  allies  in  the  neighbour- 
hood for  additional  forces.  Cleon  sent  and  announced 
to  Demosthenes  his  approach,  and  soon  afterwards, 
bringing  with  him  the  army  which  he  had  requested, 
himself  arrived  at  Pylos.  On  the  meeting  of  the  two 
generals  they  first  of  all  sent  a  herald  to  the  Lace- 
daemonian force  on  the  mainland,  proposing  that  they 
should  avoid  any  further  risk  by  ordering  the  men  in 
the  island  to  surrender  with  their  arms  ;  they  were  to 
be  placed  under  surveillance  but  well  treated  until  a 
general  peace  was  concluded. 

Finding  that  their  proposal  was  rejected,  the  Athe-      31. 
nians  waited  for  a  day,  and  on  the  night  of  the  day  Disposition 

r  ,.  ,  .  '  of  the  Lace- 

followillg    put    off,    taking   with    them   all  their  heavy-  daemonian 
armed  troops,  whom  they  had  embarked  in  a  few  ships.  threeVta- 

o   /-.•••  v   r»       i-    '      >     /  tions,  the 

a  Cp.  in.  98.  •  Reading  TO  re. 


268 


THE   ATTACK    UPON    THE    ISLAND. 


IV. 

main  body 

occupying 

the  centre 
island. 


32. 

The  Athe- 

lites  land, 


nian  forces 
later  are 

?nSsmsdied 
parties  and 

occupy  the 

higher 
is°and°    ie 


A  little  before  dawn  they  landed  on  both  sides  of  the  B.C.  425. 
island,  towards  the  sea  and  towards  the  harbour,  a  force 

.  .          ..  .  .11  i  ry-i 

amounting  in  all  to  about  eight  hundred  men.  They 
then  ran  as  fast  as  they  could  to  the  first  station  on  the 
island.  Now  the  disposition  of  the  enemy  was  as  follows  : 
This  first  station  was  garrisoned  by  about  thirty  hoplites, 
while  the  main  body  under  the  command  of  Epitadas  was 
posted  near  the  spring  in  the  centre  of  the  island,  where 
the  ground  was  most  level.  A  small  force  guarded  b  the 
furthest  extremity  of  the  island  opposite  Pylos,  which 
was  precipitous  towards  the  sea,  and  on  the  land  side 
the  strongest  point  of  all,  being  protected  to  some  extent 
by  an  ancient  wall  made  of  rough  stones,  which  the 
Spartans  thought  would  be  of  use  to  them  if  they  were 
overpowered  and  compelled  to  retreat.  Such  was  the 
disposition  of  the  Lacedaemonian  troops. 

The  Athenians  rushed  upon  the  first  garrison  and  cut 
them  down,  half  asleep  as  they  were  and  just  snatching 
up  their  arms.  They  had  not  seen  the  enemy  land,  and 
fancied  that  their  ships  were  only  gone  to  keep  the  cus- 
tomary  watch  for  the  night.  When  the  dawn  appeared, 
*^e  rest  °f  the  army  began  to  disembark.  They  were 
the  crews  of  rather  more  than  seventy  ships,  including 
all  but  the  lowest  rank  of  rowers,  variously  equipped. 
There  were  also  archers  to  the  number  of  eight  hundred, 
anc[  as  many  targeteers,  besides  the  Messenian  auxiliaries 
and  all  who  were  on  duty  about  Pylos,  except  the  guards 
who  could  not  be  spared  from  the  walls  of  the  fortress. 
Demosthenes  divided  them  into  parties  of  two  hundred 
more  or  less,  who  seized  the  highest  points  of  the  island 
in  order  that  the  enemy,  being  completely  surrounded 
and  distracted  by  the  number  of  their  opponents,  might 
not  know  whom  they  should  face  first,  but  might  be 
exposed  to  missiles  on  every  side.  For  if  they  attacked 
those  who  were  in  front,  they  would  be  assailed  by  those 
behind  ;  and  if  those  on  one  flank,  by  those  posted  on  the 
other  ;  and  whichever  way  they  moved,  the  light-armed 

a  Reading  avrb  TO  ea^arov,  or,  avro 


THE  LACEDAEMONIANS  ATA  DISADVANTAGE.  269 

B.C.  425.  troops  of  the  enemy  were  sure  to  be  in  their  rear.  These  IV. 
4'  were  their  most  embarrassing  opponents,  because  they 
were  armed  with  bows  and  javelins  and  slings  and  stones, 
which  could  be  used  with  effect  at  a  distance.  Even  to 
approach  them  was  impossible,  for  they  conquered  in 
their  very  flight,  and  when  an  enemy  retreated,  pressed 
close  at  his  heels.  Such  was  the  plan  of  the  descent 
which  Demosthenes  had  in  his  mind,  and  which  he 
now  carried  into  execution. 

The  main  body  of  the  Lacedaemonians  on  the  island      33. 
under  Epitadas,  when  they  saw  the  first  garrison  cut  to  The  Lace- 

J  daemonian 

pieces  and  an  army  approaching  them,  drew  up  in  battle  hopiites  are 
array.      The  Athenian  hopiites  were  right  in  front,  and  "ope  with 
the   Lacedaemonians  advanced   against  them,  wanting  ^Jjf111" 
to  come  to  close  quarters ;  but  having  light-armed  ad-  Athenian 
versaries  both  on  their  flank  and  rear,  they  could  not  get 
at  them  or  profit  by  their  own  military  skill,  for  they  were 
impeded  by  a  shower  of  missiles  from  both  sides.    Mean- 
while the  Athenians  instead  of  going  to  meet  them  re- 
mained  in   position,  while  the  light-armed   again   and 
again  ran  up   and  attacked  the   Lacedaemonians,  who 
drove    them    back    where    they  pressed    closest.      But 
though  compelled  to  retreat  they  still  continued  fight- 
ing, being  lightly  equipped  and  easily  getting  the  start 
of  their  enemies.     The  ground  was  difficult  and  rough, 
the  island  having  been  uninhabited;  and  the  Lacedae- 
monians, who  were  incumbered  by  their  arms,  could  not 
pursue  them  in  such  a  place. 

For  some  little  time  these  skirmishes  continued.     But      34. 
soon  the  Lacedaemonians  became  too  weary  to  rush  out  They  are 
upon  their  assailants,  who  began  to  be  sensible  that  their  distressed, 
resistance  grew  feebler.     The  sight  of  their  own  number, 
which  was  many  times  that  of  the  enemy,  encouraged 
them  more  than  anything ;  they  soon  found  that  their 
losses  were  trifling  compared  with  what  they  had  ex- 
pected ;  and  familiarity  made  them  think  their  oppon- 
ents much  less  formidable  than  when  they  first  landed 
cowed  by  the  fear  of  facing  Lacedaemonians.    They  now 


270  THE    CONFLICT   DEEPENS. 

IV.  despised  them  and  with  a  loud  cry  rushed  upon  them  in  a  B.C.  425. 
body,  hurling  at  them  stones,  arrows,  javelins,  whichever 
came  first  to  hand.  The  shout  with  which  they  accom- 
panied the  attack  dismayed  the  Lacedaemonians,  who 
were  unaccustomed  to  this  kind  of  warfare.  Clouds  of 
dust  arose  from  the  newly-burnt  wood,  and  there  was  no 
possibility  of  a  man's  seeing  what  was  before  him,  owing 
to  the  showers  of  arrows  and  stones  hurled  by  their  assail- 
ants which  were  flying  amid  the  dust.  And  now  the  Lace- 
daemonians began  to  be  sorely  distressed,  for  their  felt 
cuirasses  did  not  protect  them  against  the  arrows,  and  the 
points  of  the  javelins  broke  off  where  they  struck  them. 
They  were  at  their  wits'  end,  not  being  able  to  see  out  of 
their  eyes  or  to  hear  the  word  of  command,  which  was 
drowned  by  the  cries  of  the  enemy.  Destruction  was 
staring  them  in  the  face,  and  they  had  no  means  or 
hope  of  deliverance. 

35.  At  length,  finding  that  so  long  as  they  fought  in  the 

They  re-  same  narrow  spot  more  and  more  of  their  men  were 
fortification  wounded,  they  closed  their  ranks  and  fell  back  on  the 
Semityof  last  fortification  of  the  island,  which  was  not  far  off,  and 


wnere  their  other  garrison  was  stationed.     Instantly  the 
themselves  light-armed  troops  of  the  Athenians  pressed  upon  them 

with  PTGcitcr 

success  with  fresh  confidence,  redoubling  their  cries.  Those  of 
the  Lacedaemonians  who  were  caught  by  them  on  the 
wav  were  killed,  but  the  greater  number  escaped  to  the 
fort  and  ranged  themselves  with  the  garrison,  resolved  to 
defend  the  heights  wherever  they  were  assailable.  The 
Athenians  followed,  but  the  strength  of  the  position  made 
it  impossible  to  surround  and  cut  them  off,  and  so  they 
attacked  them  in  face  and  tried  to  force  them  back.  For 
a  long  time,  and  indeed  during  the  greater  part  of  the 
day,  both  armies,  although  suffering  from  the  battle  and 
thirst  and  the  heat  of  the  sun,  held  their  own  ;  the  one 
endeavouring  to  thrust  their  opponents  from  the  high 
ground,  the  other  determined  not  to  give  way.  But  the 
Lacedaemonians  now  defended  themselves  with  greater 
ease,  because  they  were  not  liable  to  be  taken  in  flank. 


PARLEY    WITH    THE   ENEMY. 

B.C.  425.      There  was  no  sign  of  the  end.     At  length  the  general      IV. 
'  of  the  Messenian  contingent  came  to  Cleon  and  Demos-       36. 
thenes  and  told  them  that  the  army  was  throwing  away  The  Mes- 
its  pains,  but  if  they  would  give  him  some  archers  and  general 
light-armed  troops  and  let  him  find  a  path  by  which  he  ?0nudnsd\^ay 
might  get  round  in  the  rear  of  the  Lacedaemonians,  he  the  rocks 
thought  that  he  could  force  his  way  in.    Having  obtained  pears  sud- 
his  request  he  started  from  a  point  out  of  sight  of  the  their  rear. 
enemy,  and  making  his  way  wherever  the  broken  ground 
afforded  a  footing  and  where  the  cliff  was  so  steep  that 
no  guards  had  been  set,  he  and  his  men  with  great  diffi- 
culty got  round  unseen  and  suddenly  appeared  in  the 
rear,  striking  panic  into  the  astonished  enemy  and  re- 
doubling   the   courage   of    his   own   friends   who    were 
watching  for  his  reappearance.      The   Lacedaemonians 
were  now  assailed  on  both   sides,    and   to   compare   a 
smaller  thing  to  a  greater,  were  in  the  same  case  with 
their  own  countrymen  at  Thermopylae.     For  as  they 
perished  when  the  Persians  found  a  way  round  by  the 
path,  so  now  the  besieged  garrison  were  attacked  on  both 
sides,  and  no  longer  resisted.     The  disparity  of  numbers, 
and  the  failure  of  bodily  strength  arising  from  want  of 
food,  compelled  them  to  fall  back,  and  the  Athenians 
were  at  length  masters  of  the  approaches. 

Cleon   and    Demosthenes  saw   that  if  the   Lacedae-      37. 
monians  gave  way  one  step    more  they  would  be  de-  Cleon  and 
stroyed  by  the  Athenians  ;  so  they  stopped  the  engage-  thenes 
ment  and  held  back  their  own  army,  for  they  wanted,  if  Lacedae- 


possible,  to  bring  them  alive  to  Athens.  They  were  in 
hopes  that  when  they  heard  the  offer  of  terms  their 
courage  might  be  broken,  and  that  they  might  be  in- 
duced by  their  desperate  situation  to  yield  up  their  arms. 
Accordingly  they  proclaimed  to  them  that  they  might, 
if  they  would,  surrender  at  discretion  to  the  Athenians 
themselves  and  their  arms. 

Upon  hearing  the  proclamation  most  of  them  lowered      38. 
their  shields  and  waved  their  hands  in  token  of  their  The  Lace- 
willingness  to  yield.    A  truce  was  made,  and  then  Cleon 


272       THE   LACEDAEMONIANS   SURRENDER. 

IV.      and   Demosthenes  on  the  part  of  the  Athenians,  and  B.C.  425. 
StyPhon  the  son  of  Pharax  on  the  part  of  the  Lacedae-  ( 


sent,  and     monians,  held  a  parley.     Epitadas,  who  was  the  first  in 

the  offer  is  j      i       i     i  « 

accepted,  command,  had  been  already  slain  ;  Hippagretas,  who 
prisoners  was  next  m  succession,  lay  among  the  slain  for  dead  ; 
Athens'  t0  and  Styphon  had  taken  the  place  of  the  two  others, 
hS™dbredtW°  kaving  been  appointed,  as  the  law  prescribed,  in  case 
and  ninety-  anything  should  happen  to  them.  He  and  his  com- 
who'm  a  panions  expressed  their  wish  to  communicate  with  the 
and'twemy  Lacedaemonians  on  the  mainland  as  to  the  course  which 


pursue.  The  Athenians  allowed  none  of  them 
to  stir,  but  themselves  invited  heralds  from  the  shore  ;  and 
after  two  or  three  communications,  the  herald  who  came 
over  last  from  the  body  of  the  army  brought  back  word, 
'  The  Lacedaemonians  bid  you  act  as  you  think  best,  but 
you  are  not  to  dishonour  yourselves.'  Whereupon  they 
consulted  together,  and  then  gave  up  themselves  and 
their  arms.  During  that  day  and  the  following  night  the 
Athenians  kept  guard  over  them  ;  on  the  next  day  they 
set  up  a  trophy  on  the  island  and  made  preparations  to 
sail,  distributing  the  prisoners  among  the  trierarchs.  The 
Lacedaemonians  sent  a  herald  and  conveyed  away  their 
own  dead.  The  number  of  the  dead  and  the  prisoners 
was  as  follows  :  —  Four  hundred  and  twenty  hoplites  in 
all  passed  over  into  the  island  ;  of  these,  two  hundred  and 
ninety-two  were  brought  to  Athens  alive,  the  remainder 
had  perished.  Of  the  survivors  the  Spartans  numbered 
about  a  hundred  and  twenty.  But  few  Athenians  fell, 
for  there  was  no  regular  engagement. 

39.  Reckoned  from  the  sea-fight  to  the  final  battle  in  the 

Duration     island,  the  time  during  which  the  blockade  lasted  was 

blockade,     ten  weeks  and  two  days.     For  about  three  weeks  the 

foodPy0i     Lacedaemonians   were    supplied   with    food    while    the 

Spartan  ambassadors  were  gone  to  solicit  peace,  but 

during  the  rest  of  this   time  they  lived   on  what  was 

brought  in  by  stealth.     A  store  of  corn  and  other  pro- 

visions  was   found   in   the   island    at   the   time  of  the 

capture  ;    for  Epitadas  the  general  had  not  served  out 


FULFILMENT   OF   CLEON'S   PROMISE.        273 

B.C.  425.  full  rations.     The  Athenians  and  Peloponnesians   now      IV. 
4'  withdrew  their  armies  from  Pylos   and  returned  home. 
And  the  mad  promise  of  Cleon  was  fulfilled  ;    for  he 
did  bring  back  the  prisoners  within  twenty  days  as  he 
had  said. 

Nothing    which    happened    during    the    war    caused      4°- 
greater   amazement  in    Hellas  ;    for  it  was  universally  Astonish- 

J  ment  of 

imagined   that  the  Lacedaemonians  would  never  give  Hellas  at 

,     .  .  ,  J  ,  r    r  the  surren- 

up  their  arms,  either  under  the  pressure  of  famine  or  der  of  the 
in  any  other  extremity,  but  would  fight  to  the  last  and  monlans" 
die  sword  in  hand.  No  one  would  believe  that  those 
who  surrendered  were  men  of  the  same  quality  with 
those  who  perished.  There  is  a  story  of  a  reply  made 
by  a  captive  taken  in  the  island  to  one  of  the  Athenian 
allies  who  had  sneeringly  asked  '  Where  were  their  brave 
men  —  all  killed  ?'a  He  answered  that  'The  spindle'' 
(meaning  the  arrow)  'would  be  indeed  a  valuable  weapon 
if  it  picked  out  the  brave.'  He  meant  to  say  that  the 
destruction  caused  by  the  arrows  and  stones  was  in- 
discriminate. 

On  the  arrival  of  the  captives  the  Athenians  resolved      4  r  • 
to  put  them  in  chains  until  peace  was  concluded,  but  The  Pri~ 

soners  are 

if  in  the  meantime  the  Lacedaemonians  invaded  Attica,  detained  as 
to  bring  them  out  and  put  them  to  death.     They  placed  for  Attica. 
a  garrison  in  Pylos  ;  and  the  Messenians  of  Naupactus, 
regarding   the  place   as  their  native  land  (for  Pylos  is 
situated  in  the  territory  which  was  once  Messenia),  sent  Pyl 
thither  some  of  themselves,  being  such  troops  as  were  daemonians 
best  suited  for  the  service,  who  ravaged  Laconia  and  did 


great  harm,  because  they  spoke  the  same  language  with  sue  for 
the  inhabitants.  The  Lacedaemonians  had  never  before 
experienced  this  irregular  and  predatory  warfare  ;  and 
finding  the  Helots  desert,  and  dreading  some  serious 
domestic  calamity,  they  were  in  great  trouble.  Although 
not  wishing  to  expose  their  condition  before  the  Athe- 
nians, they  sent  envoys  to  them  and  endeavoured  to 

a  Literally,  'Were  their  dead  brave?'   implying  that  the  living 
were  not. 


274     ATHENIAN  EXPEDITION    TO    CORINTH. 


IV. 


42 


nearSoiy- 
The  'corin- 


meet  them, 


43. 

Obstinate 

conflict  on 

the  hill  of 
Thelwo' 


recover  Pylos  and  the   prisoners.     But  the  Athenians  B.C.  425. 
only  raised  their  terms,  and  at  last,  after  they  had  made  Olt  88>  4' 
many  fruitless  journeys,  dismissed  them.     Thus  ended 
the  affair  of  Pylos. 

During  the  same  summer  and  immediately  afterwards 
the  Athenians  attacked  the  Corinthian  territory  with 
eighty  ships,  two  thousand  heavy-armed,  and  cavalry 
to  the  number  of  two  hundred  conveyed  in  horse  trans- 
Ports-  They  were  accompanied  by  allies  from  Miletus, 
Andros,  an<^  Carystus.  Nicias  the  son  of  Niceratus,  and 
two  others,  were  in  command.  Very  early  in  the  morn- 
ing they  put  in  between  the  promontory  Chersonesus 
and  the  stream  Rheitus,  to  that  part  of  the  coast  which 
is  overhung  by  the  Solygeian  ridge  ;  there  in  ancient 
times  Dorian  invaders  had  taken  up  their  position  and 
fought  against  their  Aeolian  enemies  in  Corinth,  and 
to  this  day  there  is  a  village,  called  Solygeia,  on  the  hill 
which  they  occupied.  From  the  beach  where  the  crews 
landed  this  village  is  distant  nearly  a  mile  and  a-half,  the 
city  of  Corinth  about  seven  miles,  and  the  Isthmus  about 
two  miles  and  a  quarter.  The  Corinthians,  having  had 
previous  intimation  from  Argos  of  the  intended  invasion, 
came  in  good  time  to  the  Isthmus.  The  whole  popula- 
tion, with  the  exception  of  those  who  dwelt  to  the  north 
of  the  Isthmus  and  five  hundred  troops  who  were  em- 
ployed in  protecting  Ambracia  and  Leucadia  a,  was  on 
the  watch  to  see  where  the  Athenians  would  land.  But, 
having  sailed  in  before  day-light,  they  were  not  dis- 
covered ;  the  Corinthians  however  were  soon  informed 
by  signals  of  their  landing  ;  and  so,  leaving  half  their 
troops  at  Cenchreae  in  case  the  Athenians  should  attack 
Crommyon,  they  came  to  the  rescue  with  all  speed. 

Battus,  one  of  the  two  generals  who  were  present  in 
the  engagement,  taking  a  single  division  of  the  force, 
went  to  Solygeia,  intending  to  protect  the  village,  which 
was  not  fortified  ;  Lycophron  with  the  remainder  of 
the  army  attacked  the  enemy.  The  Corinthians  first 
a  Cp.  iii,  114  fin. 


BATTLE    OF  SOLYGEIA.  275 

B.c.  425.  of  all  assailed  the  right  wing  of  the  Athenians,  which      IV. 

Ol   88    A 

4'  had  only  just  landed  in  front  of  the  Chersonesus,  and  %*%£** 
then  engaged  with  the  rest.  The  conflict  was  stubborn,  wards. 
and  all  hand  to  hand.  The  Athenians,  who  were  on  the 
right  wing,  and  the  Carystians,  who  were  on  the  extreme 
right,  received  the  Corinthians,  and  with  some  difficulty 
drove  them  back.  They  retired  behind  a  loose  stone 
wall,  and  the  whole  place  being  a  steep  hill-side,  threw 
the  stones  down  from  above ;  but  soon  they  raised  the 
Paean  and  again  came  on.  Again  the  Athenians  re- 
ceived them,  and  another  hand  to  hand  fight  ensued, 
when  a  division  of  the  Corinthians  coming  to  the  aid 
of  their  left  wing,  forced  back  the  right  wing  of  the 
Athenians  and  pursued  them  to  the  sea ;  but  the  Athe- 
nians and  Carystians  in  their  turn  again  drove  them 
back  from  the  ships.  Meanwhile  the  rest  of  the  two 
armies  had  been  fighting  steadily.  On  the  right  wing 
of  the  Corinthians,  where  Lycophron  was  opposed  to 
the  Athenian  left,  the  defence  was  most  energetic ;  for 
he  and  his  troops  were  apprehensive  that  the  Athenians 
would  move  on  the  village  of  Solygeia.  For  a  long  time  44. 
neither  would  give  way,  but  at  length  the  Athenians,  The  Athe- 

.  ,  .  /-      .        nians  gain 

having  an  advantage  in  cavalry,  with  which  the  Conn-  a  partial 
thians   were   unprovided,   drove  them   back,   and   they  farmed  at' 
retired  to  the  summit  of  the  ridge ;  where  they  grounded  *®  ^  of 
their  arms  and  remained  inactive,  refusing  to  come  down.  a  reinforce- 
In  this  defeat  of  their  right  wing   the  Corinthians  in-  retreat  to 
curred  the  heaviest  loss,  and  Lycophron  their  general l 
was  slain.     The  whole  army  was  now  forced  back  upon 
the  high  ground,  where  they  remained  in  position  ;  they 
were  not  pursued  far,  and  made  a  leisurely  retreat.    The 
Athenians  seeing  that  they  did  not  return  to  the  attack, 
at  once  erected  a  trophy  and  began  to  spoil  the  enemies' 
dead  and  take   up  their  own.     The  other  half  of  the 
Corinthians  who  were  keeping  guard  at  Cenchreae,  lest 
the  Athenians  should  sail  against  Crommyon,  had  their 
view  of  the  battle  intercepted  by  Mount  Oneium.     But 
when  they  saw  the  dust  and  knew  what  was  going  on, 

T    2 


276  THE    ATHENIANS   AT   METHON&. 

IV.  they  instantly  came  to  the  rescue.  The  elder  men  of  B.C.  425. 
Corinth  hearing  of  the  defeat  likewise  hastened  to  the 
spot.  The  united  army  then  advanced  against  the 
Athenians,  who  fancying  that  a  reinforcement  had  come 
from  the  neighbouring  states  of  Peloponnesus,  quickly 
retreated  to  their  ships,  taking  their  spoils  and  their  own 
dead,  with  the  exception  of  two  whom  they  could  not 
find  ;  they  then  embarked  and  sailed  to  the  neighbour- 
ing islands.  Thence  they  sent  a  herald  asking  for  a 
truce,  and  recovered  the  two  dead  bodies  which  were 
missing.  The  Corinthians  lost  two  hundred  and  twelve 
men  ;  the  Athenians  hardly  so  many  as  fifty. 
45.  On  the  same  day  the  Athenians  sailed  from  the  islands 

Second        to    Crommyon,  which   is   in   the  territory   of   Corinth, 

descent  of 

the  Athe-     nearly  fourteen  miles  from  the  city,  and,  there  anchoring, 
they  ravaged   the   country  and    encamped    during   the 
-  niSht     On   the   following   day  they   sailed    along    the 


ing  the        coast   to  Epidaurus.  where  they  made  a  descent,  and 

neighbour- 

hood  of       then    passed  onward  and  came   to  Methone,  which  is 


situated  between  Epidaurus  and  Troezen.  They  built 
they1  cutoff  a  wa^  across  the  isthmus,  and  so  cut  off  the  peninsula 
Methone  by  on  which  Methone  stands.  Leaving  a  garrison,  they 

a  wall  and  .  IF 

leave  a        continued   for    some   time    to    ravage    the    country   of 

Troezen,  Halieis,  and  Epidaurus.     The  fleet,  when  the 

fortification  was  completed,  returned  home. 

46.  Just  about  this  time  Eurymedon  and  Sophocles,  who 

The  Athe-    had  started  from  Pylos  on  their  voyage  to  Sicily  with 

?heirSway  to  the  Athenian  fleet,  arrived  at  Corcyra,  and  in  concert 

atCCorcy0ra  with  the  P°Pular  Party  attacked   the  Corcyraean   oli- 

The  oii-      garchs,  who  after  the  revolution  had  crossed  over  into 

Mount        the  island  and  settled  in  Mount  Istone.     They  became 

surrender     masters   of  the   country  again,  and   were   doing   great 

to  that"     mischief  a.      The   Athenians    assaulted   and    took   their 

their  fate     fortress  ;  the  garrison,  who  had  fled  in  a  body  to  a  peak 

left  to  the    of  the  hill,   came  to  terms,  agreeing  to   give  up  their 

people.^      auxiliaries  and  surrender  their  arms,  but  stipulating  that 

their   own   fate    should    be   decided    by   the   Athenian 

a  Cp.  iii.  85. 


THE  END  OF  THE  CORCYRAEAN  OLIGARCHS.   277 

B.C.  425.  people.  The  garrison  themselves  were  conveyed  by  the  IV. 
4>  generals  to  the  island  of  Ptychia  and  kept  there  under 
a  promise  of  safety  until  they  could  be  sent  to  Athens ; 
on  condition  however  that  if  any  of  them  were  caught 
attempting  to  escape,  they  should  all  lose  the  benefit 
of  the  agreement.  Now  the  leaders  of  the  Corcyraean 
democracy  feared  that  when  the  captives  arrived  at  Athens 
they  would  not  be  put  to  death  ;  so  they  devised  the  fol- 
lowing trick : — They  sent  to  the  island  friends  of  the 
captives,  whom  with  seeming  good-will  they  instructed 
to  tell  them  that  they  had  better  escape  as  fast  as  they 
could,  for  the  fact  was  that  the  Athenian  generals  were 
about  to  hand  them  over  to  the  Corcyraean  democracy; 
they  would  themselves  provide  a  vessel. 

The  friends  of  the  captives  persuaded  a  few  of  them,      4  7. 
and  the  vessel  was  provided.     The  prisoners  were  taken  The  captive 

iit  oligarchs 

sailing  out ;  the  truce  was  at  an  end,  and  they  were  all  are  induced 
instantly  delivered  up  to  the  Corcyraeans.     The  feeling  tJ break 
which   the   Athenian    generals   displayed   greatly   con- 
tributed  to  the  result ;  for,  being  compelled  to  proceed 
to  Sicily  themselves,  they  were  well  known  to  wish  that  vengeance 

,.       ri     •       •          1  •  oftheCor- 

no  one  else  should  gain  the  credit  of  bringing  the  prisoners  cyraeans. 
to  Athens;  band  therefore  the  agreement  was  interpreted 
to  the  letter b,  and  the  contrivers  of  the  trick  thought 
that  they  could  execute  it  with  impunity.  The  Cor- 
cyraeans took  the  prisoners  and  shut  them  up  in  a  large 
building ;  then  leading  them  out  in  bands  of  twenty  at 
a  time,  they  made  them  pass  between  two  files  of  armed 
men ;  they  were  bound  to  one  another  and  struck  and 
pierced  by  the  men  on  each  side,  whenever  any  one  saw 
among  them  an  enemy  of  his  own ;  and  there  were  men 
with  whips,  who  accompanied  them  to  the  place  of  exe- 
cution and  quickened  the  steps  of  those  who  lingered. 

In   this    manner   they  brought   the   prisoners  out  of      48. 
the  building,  and  slew  them  to  the  number  of  sixty  They  are 
undiscovered  by  the  rest,  who  thought  that  they  were  massacred. 

a  Or,  '  and  so  the  pretext  turned  out  to  be  the  exact  truth ; '  or, 
'  and  so  the  pretext  seemed  to  correspond  to  the  facts.' 


278    NIGHT  CLOSED  UPON  THEIR  SUFFERINGS. 


IV. 

The  Athe- 

nian  com- 

manders, 
want  them 
b°ybothe7sied 


within- 

difference. 

They  now 

voyage  to61 
Sicily. 


AC). 

Anactorium 

is  occupied 

by  the 


50. 

Seizure  of  a 

Persian 


taking  them  away  to  some  other  place.  But  soon  they  B.C.  425. 
found  out  what  was  happening,  for  some  one  told  them, 
and  then  they  called  upon  the  Athenians,  if  they  wanted 
them  to  die,  to  take  their  lives  themselves.  Out  of  the 
building  they  refused  to  stir,  and  threatened  that  into  it, 
if  they  could  help,  no  one  should  enter.  The  Corcy- 
raean  populace  had  not  the  least  intention  of  forcing 
a  way  in  by  the  door,  but  they  got  upon  the  roof  and, 
making  an  opening,  threw  tiles  and  shot  arrows  down 
from  above.  The  prisoners  sought  to  shelter  themselves 
as  they  best  could.  Most  of  them  at  the  same  time 
put  an  end  to  their  own  lives ;  some  thrust  into  their 
throats  arrows  which  were  shot  at  them,  others  strangled 
themselves  with  cords  taken  from  beds  which  they  found 
in  the  place,  or  with  strips  which  they  tore  from  their 
own  garments.  This  went  on  during  the  greater  part 
of  the  night,  which  had  closed  upon  their  sufferings,  until 
in  one  way  or  another,  either  by  their  own  hand  or  by 
missiles  hurled  from  above,  they  all  perished.  At  day- 
break the  Corcyraeans  flung  the  dead  bodies  cross-wise 
on  waggons  and  carried  them  out  of  the  city.  The 
women  who  were  taken  in  the  fortress  on  Mount  Istone 
were  reduced  to  slavery.  Thus  the  Corcyraeans  in  the 
mountain  were  destroyed  by  the  people,  and,  at  least 
while  the  Peloponnesian  war  lasted,  there  was  an  end 
of  the  great  sedition ;  for  there  was  nothing  left  of  the 
other  party  worth  mentioning.  The  Athenians  then 
sailed  for  Sicily,  their  original  destination,  and  there 
fought  in  concert  with  their  allies. 

At  the  end  of  the  summer  the  Athenian  forces  in 
Naupactus  and  some  Acarnanians  made  an  expedition 
against  Anactorium,  a  Corinthian  town  at  the  mouth 
of  the  Ambracian  Gulf,  which  was  betrayed  to  them. 
The  Acarnanians  expelled  the  Corinthians,  and  sent  a 
colony  of  their  own,  taken  from  the  whole  nation,  to 
occupy  the  place.  So  the  summer  ended. 

During  the  ensuing  winter  Aristides  the  son  of  Ar- 
chippus,  one  of  the  commanders  of  the  Athenian  vessels 


SEIZURE    OF   ARTAPHERNES.  279 

B.C.  425.  which  collected  tribute  from  the  allies,  captured  at  Eion,      IV. 
4'  upon  the  Strymon,  Artaphernes  a  Persian,  who  was  on  ?nv°y  bear- 
his  way  from  the  King  to  Sparta.     He  was  brought  to  spatches 
Athens,  and  the  Athenians  had  the  despatches  which  he  King,  in 


was  carrying  and  which  were  written   in  the  Assyrian 
character  translated,  and  read  them  ;  there  were  many  °f  the 

J  Spartans. 

matters  contained  m  them,  but  the  chief  point  was  a  The  Athe- 
remonstrance  addressed  to  the  Lacedaemonians  by  the 
King,  who  said  that  he  could  not  understand  what  they 


wanted  ;  for,  although  many  envoys  had  come  to  him,  *heir  OWJ^ 
no  two  of  them  agreed.     If  they  meant  to  make  them-  at  the  time 


selves  intelligible,  he  desired  them  to  send  to  him  another 
embassy  with  the  Persian  envoy.  Shortly  afterwards 
the  Athenians  sent  Artaphernes  in  a  trireme  to  Ephesus,  returns- 
and  with  him  an  embassy  of  their  own,  but  they  found 
that  Artaxerxes  the  son  of  Xerxes  had  recently  died  ; 
for  the  embassy  arrived  just  at  that  time.  Whereupon 
they  returned  home. 

During  the  same  winter  the  Chians  dismantled  their      51.- 
new  walls  by  order  of  the  Athenians,  who  suspected  that  TheChians, 

suspected 

they  meant  to  rebel,  not  however  without  obtaining  from  of  rebellion, 
the   Athenians   such   pledges   and   assurances   as   they  to  dismantle 
could,  that  no  violent  change  should  be  made  in  their  their  walls> 
condition.     So  the  winter  came  to  an  end  ;  and  with  it 
the  seventh  year   in   the  Peloponnesian  War  of  which 
Thucydides  wrote  the  history. 

B.C.  424.      Early  in  the  ensuing  summer  there  was  a  partial  eclipse      52. 
of  the  sun  at  the  time  of  the  new  moon,  and  within  the  An  eclipse 

of  the  sun 

first  ten  days  of  the  same  month  an  earthquake.  and  an 

The  main  body  of  the  refugees  who  had  escaped  from  occur?11* 
Mitylene  and  the  rest  of  Lesbos  had  established  them-  The  Les- 
selves  on  the  continent.     They  hired  mercenaries  from  gees,  who 
Peloponnesus  or  collected  them  on  the  spot,  and  took 
Rhoeteium,  but  on  receiving  a  payment  of  two  thousand 


Phocaean   staters  a,    they  restored  the   town   uninjured,  and  Antan- 
They  then  made  an  expedition  against  Antandrus  and 

a  The  value  of  the  Phocaean  stater  is  not  precisely  known  :  it  was 
somewhat  less  than  that  of  the  Attic  stater  (about  i6j.) 


280  CAPTURE    OF   CYTHERA. 

IV.  took  the  city,  which  was  betrayed  into  their  hands.  They  B.C.  424. 
hoped  to  liberate  the  other  so-called  '  cities  of  the  coast,'  ° 
which  had  been  formerly  in  the  possession  of  the  Mity- 
lenaeans  and  were  now  "held  by  the  Athenians  a,  but  their 
principal  object  was  Antandrus  itself,  which  they  in- 
tended to  strengthen  and  make  their  head-quarters. 
Mount  Ida  was  near  and  would  furnish  timber  for  ship- 
building, and  by  the  help  of  a  fleet  and  in  other  ways 
they  could  easily  harass  Lesbos  which  was  close  at 
hand,  and  reduce  the  Aeolian  towns  on  the  continent. 
Such  were  their  designs. 

53-  During  the  same  summer  the  Athenians  with   sixty 

sm*Ps>  two  thousand  hoplites,  and  a  few  cavalry,  taking 


Son  Gainst  a^so  certain  Milesian  and  other  allied  forces,  made 
Cythera.  an  expedition  against  Cythera,  under  the  command  of 
ofth/3  'e  Nicias  the  son  of  Niceratus,  Nicostratus  the  son  of 
Diotrephes,  and  Autocles  the  son  of  Tolmaeus.  Cythera 
is  an  island  which  lies  close  to  Laconia  off  Cape  Malea  ; 
it  is  inhabited  by  Lacedaemonian  Perioeci;  and  a  Spartan 
officer  called  the  Judge  of  Cythera  was  sent  thither 
every  year.  The  Lacedaemonians  kept  there  a  garrison 
of  hoplites,  which  was  continually  relieved,  and  took 
great  care  of  the  place.  There  the  merchant  vessels 
coming  from  Egypt  and  Libya  commonly  put  in  ;  the 
island  was  a  great  protection  to  the  Lacedaemonians 
against  depredation  by  sea,  on  which  element,  though 
secure  by  land,  they  were  exposed  to  attack,  for  the 
whole  of  Laconia  runs  out  towards  the  Sicilian  and 
Cretan  seas  b. 

54.  The  Athenian  fleet  appeared  off  Cythera,  and  with 

TheAthe-  a  detachment  of  ten  ships  and  two  thousand  Milesian 
capture  hoplites  took  Scandeia,  one  of  the  cities  on  the  sea- 
An^ngage-  shore.  The  rest  of  their  army  disembarked  on  the  side 
"lace  inkeS  °^  ^e  island  looking  towards  Malea,  and  moved  on  to 
which  the  the  lower  city  of  the  Cytherians,  which  is  also  on  the 

Cytherians  .      J    , 

arede-        sea-coast  ;  there  they  found  all  the  inhabitants  encamped 
and  the       m  force.     A  battle  was  fought  in  which  the  Cytherians 
a  Cp.  iii.  50  fin.  b  Cp.  Herod,  vii.  235. 


DESPONDENCY  OF  THE  LACEDAEMONIANS.    281 

B.C.  424.  held  their  ground  for  some  little   time,  and   then,  be-      IV. 
taking  themselves  to  flight,  retired  to  the  upper  city. island 

_,  °  .  J     capitulates. 

They  at  length  surrendered  to  Nicias  and  his  colleagues,  The  Athe- 
placing  themselves  at  the  disposal  of  the  Athenians,  but  ravage 
stipulating  that  their   lives   should   be   spared.     Nicias  L*c™fast  of 
had  already  contrived  to  enter  into  communication  with 
some  of  them,  and  in  consequence  the  negotiations  were 
speedier,  and  lighter  terms   were  imposed    upon  them 
both  at  the  time  and  afterwards  a.     Else  the  Athenians 
would  have  expelled  them,  because  they  were  Lacedae- 
monians and  their  island  was  close  to  Laconia.     After 
the  capitulation  they  took  into  their  own  hands  Scandeia, 
the  city  near  the  harbour,  and  secured  the  island  by  a 
garrison.     They  then  sailed  away,  made  descents  upon 
Asine,  Helos,  and  most  of  the  other  maritime  towns  of 
Laconia,  and,  encamping  wherever  they  found  convenient, 
ravaged  the  country  for  about  seven  days. 

The  Lacedaemonians  seeing  that  the  Athenians  had       55. 
got  possession  of  Cythera,  and  anticipating  similar  de-  The  Lace*- 

,  ,    daemonians 

scents  on  their  own  shores,  nowhere  opposed  them  with  lose  confi- 
their  united  forces,  but  distributed  a  body  of  hoplites  themselves. 
in  garrisons  through  the  country  where  their  presence  ^defen?11 
seemed  to  be  needed.     They  kept  strict  watch,  fearing  sive-. 
lest  some  domestic  revolution  should  break  out.    Already  in  their 
a  great  and  unexpected  blow  had  fallen  upon  them  at 
Sphacteria ;  Pylos  and  Cythera  were  in  the  hands  of  the 
Athenians,  and  they  were  beset  on  every  side  by  an 
enemy  against  whose  swift  attacks  precaution  was  vain. 
Contrary  to  their  usual  custom  they  raised  a  force  of 
four  hundred  cavalry  and  archers.     Never  in  their  his- 
tory had  they  shown  so  much  hesitation  in  their  military 
movements.     They  were  involved  in  a  war  at  sea,  an 
element  to  which  they  were  strange,  against  a  power 
like  the  Athenians,  in  whose  eyes  to  miss  an  opportunity 
was  to  lose  a  victory b.     Fortune  too  was  against  them, 
and   they   were   panic-stricken   by   the    many  startling 
reverses  which   had   befallen   them   within   so  short   a 
a  Cp.  iv.  57  fin.  h  Cp.  i.  70  med. 


282  ATHENIAN  ATTACK  ON  THYREA. 

IV.  time.  They  feared  lest  some  new  calamity  like  that  B.C.  424. 
of  the  island  might  overtake  them  ;  and  therefore  they 
dared  not  venture  on  an  engagement,  but  expected  all 
their  undertakings  to  fail  ;  they  had  never  hitherto 
known  misfortune,  and  now  they  lost  all  confidence  in 
their  own  powers. 

56.          While  the  Athenians  were  ravaging  their  coasts  they 
The  small    hardly   ever    stirred  ;    for  each   garrison   at   the  places 

garrisons  ... 

stationed  in  where  they  happened   to  land  considered   in  their  de- 

Le  afraid*7  pressed  state   of  mind  that  they  were  too  few  to  act. 

o  move.  Qne  Qf  them  however,  which  was  in  the  neighbourhood 
of  Cotyrta  and  Aphrodisia,  did  offer  some  resistance, 
and  by  a  sudden  rush  put  to  flight  the  scattered  light- 
armed  troops  ;  but,  being  encountered  by  the  hoplites, 
they  again  retired  with  the  loss  of  some  few  men  and 
arms.  The  Athenians,  raising  a  trophy,  sailed  away  to 
Cythera.  Thence  they  coasted  round  to  Epidaurus 
Limera  and,  after  devastating  some  part  of  its  territory, 
to  Thyrea,  which  is  situated  in  the  country  called  Cy- 
nuria,  on  the  border  of  Argolis  and  Laconia.  The 
Lacedaemonians,  who  at  that  time  held  the  town, 
had  settled  there  the  Aeginetan  exiles^  whom  they 
wished  to  requite  for  services  rendered  to  them  at  the 
time  of  the  earthquake  and  the  Helot  revolt,  and  also 
because  they  had  always  been  partizans  of  theirs,  al- 
though subjects  of  the  Athenians. 
57-  Before  the  Athenian  ships  had  actually  touched,  the 

Athenian      Aeginetans  quitted  a  fort  on  the  sea-shore  which  they 

attack  upon 

Thyrea,  were  just  building  and  retired  to  the  upper  city,  where 

Aeginetan  they  lived,  a  distance  of  rather  more  than  a  mile.     One 

setdedare  °f  the  country  garrisons  of  the  Lacedaemonians  which 

The  Lace-  was   helping   to   build   the   fort  was  entreated  by  the 

daemonian 

garrisons     Aeginctans  to  enter  the  walls,  but  refused,  thinking  that 
enter  the      to   be  shut   up  inside  them  would   be  too  dangerous. 


So  they  ascended  to  the  high  ground,  and  then,  con- 
and  its  in-  sidering  the  enemy  to  be  more  than  a  match  for  them, 
put  to  death  would  not  come  down.  Meanwhile  the  Athenians  landed,. 

by  the 

Athenians.  a  Cp.  ii.  27. 


GENERAL  CONGRESS  OF  SICILIAN  STATES.    283 

B.C.  424.  marched  straight  upon  Thyrea  with  their  whole  army,  IV. 
and  took  it.  They  burnt  and  plundered  the  city,  and 
carried  away  with  them  to  Athens  all  the  Aeginetans 
who  had  not  fallen  in  the  battle,  and  the  Lacedaemonian 
governor  of  the  place,  Tantalus  the  son  of  Patrocles, 
who  had  been  wounded  and  taken  prisoner.  They  also 
had  on  board  a  few  of  the  inhabitants  of  Cythera,  whose 
removal  seemed  to  be  required  as  a  measure  of  pre- 
caution. These  the  Athenians  determined  to  deposit 
in  some  of  the  islands  ;  at  the  same  time  they  allowed 
the  other  Cytherians  to  live  in  their  own  country,  paying 
a  tribute  of  four  talents*.  They  resolved  to  kill  all 
the  Aeginetans  whom  they  had  taken  in  satisfaction  of 
their  long  standing  hatred,  and  to  put  Tantalus  in  chains 
along  with  the  captives  from  Sphacteria. 

During  the  same  summer  the  people  of  Camarina  and       $8. 
Gela  in  Sicily  made  a  truce,  in  the  first  instance  with  A  COI}fer- 

cn.cc  is  liclcl 

one  another   only.      But   after  a   while   all   the   other  at  Gela 
Sicilian  states  sent  envoys  to  Gela,  where  they  held  a  representa- 
conference    in   the    hope   of  effecting   a   reconciliation.  sSiianth 
Many  opinions  were  expressed  on  both  sides  ;  and  the  states- 
representatives  of  the  different  cities  wrangled  and  put 
in  claims  for  the  redress  of  their  several  grievances.     At 
length   Hermocrates  the  son  of  Hermon,  a  Syracusan, 
b  who  had  been  the  chief  agent  in  bringing  them  toge- 
ther15,  stood   forward   in   the   assembly   and   spoke   as 
follows  :  — 

'Sicilians,  the  city  to  which  I  belong  is  not  the  least      59* 
in  Sicily,  nor  am  I   about  to  speak   because  Syracuse  |j?f^  of 
suffers  more  than  other  cities  in  the  war,  but  because  I  crates. 
want  to  lay  before  you  the  policy  which  seems  to  me  best 
fitted  to  promote  the  common  good  of  the  whole  country. 


You  well  know,  and  therefore  I  shall  not  rehearse  to  you  Jhey 

*         to  gam 

at  length,  all  the  misery  of  war.     Nobody  is  compelled  more  than 

.  1-11        ^ey  will 

to  go  to  war  by  ignorance,  and  no  one  who  thinks  that  lose. 
he  will  gain  anything  from  it  is  deterred  by  fear.     The  ^JJ{ 

a  ^960. 

b  Or,  *  whose  words  chiefly  influenced  their  decision.' 


384  SPEECH  OF   HERMOCRATES. 

IV.      truth  is  that  the  aggressor  deems  the  advantage  to  be  B.C.  424. 

greater  than  the  suffering  ;  and  the  side  which  is  attacked  ° 
they  had     would  sooner  run  any  risk  than  suffer  the  smallest  im- 

better  make 

peace.  mediate  loss.  But  when  such  feelings  on  the  part  of 
either  operate  unseasonably,  the  time  for  offering  counsels 
of  peace  has  arrived,  and  such  counsels,  if  we  will  only 
listen  to  them,  will  be  at  this  moment  invaluable  to  us. 
Why  did  we  go  to  war  ?  Simply  from  a  consideration 
of  our  own  individual  interests,  and  with  a  view  to  our 
interests  we  are  now  trying  by  means  of  discussion  to  ob- 
tain peace  ;  and  if,  after  all,  we  do  not  before  we  separate 
succeed  in  getting  our  respective  rights,  we  shall  go  to 
60.  war  again.  But  at  the  same  time  we  should  have  the  sense 

The  inter-    to  see  that  this  conference  is  not  solely  concerned  with 

ests  of  the 

whole         our  private  interests,  but  with  those  of  the  whole  country. 
i-  Sicily  is  at  this  moment  imperilled  by  the  designs  of  the 


citiesoniy    Athenians,  and  we  must  try,  if  not  too  late,  to  save  her. 

are  at  stake.  The  Athenians  are  a  much  more  convincing  argument 

Athenians    of  peace  than  any  words  of  mine  can  be.     They  are  the 

us'  greatest  power  in  Hellas;  they  come  hither  with  a  few 

ships  to   spy  out  our  mistakes  ;    though   we   are   their 

natural  enemies,  they  assume  the  honourable  name  of 

allies,  and  under  this  flimsy  pretence  turn  our  enmity  to 

good  account.     For  when  we  go  to  war  and  invite  their 

assistance  (and  they  are  fond  of  coming  whether  they 

are  invited  or  not)  we  are  taxing  ourselves  for  our  own 

destruction,  and  at  the  same  time  paving  the  way  for 

the  advance  of  their  empire.     And  at  some  future  day, 

when  they  see  that  we  are  exhausted,  they  are  sure  to 

come  again  with   a   larger  armament,  and   attempt  to 

bring  all  Sicily  under  their  yoke  a. 

6l.          '  And  yet  if  we  must  call  in  allies  and  involve  our- 
selyes  m  dangers,  as  men  of  sense,  looking  to  the  interest 


war.  Of  our  several  states,  we  should  set  before  us  the  pros- 

We  only  .    . 

invite  the     pect  of  gaming  an  increase  of  dominion,  not  of  losing 
what  we  already  have.   We  should  consider  that  internal 
quarrels  more  ^an  anything  else  are  the  ruin  of  Sicily 
a  Cp.  iv.  i  med. 


SPEECH    OF  HERMOCRATES.  285 

• 

B.C.  424.  and   her  cities  ;   we  Sicilians   are   fighting  against   one      IV. 

another  at  the  very  time  when  we  are  threatened  by  a  nothing 
common  enemy.     Knowing  this,  we  should  be  reconciled  Dorian  and 


man  to  man,  city  to  city,  and  make  an  united  effort  for 
the  preservation  of  all  Sicily.  Let  no  one  say  to  him-  Sicily 
self,  "The  Dorians  among  us  may  be  enemies  to  the 
Athenians,  but  the  Chalcidians,  being  lonians,  are  safe 
because  they  are  their  kinsmen."  For  the  Athenians  do 
not  attack  us  because  we  are  divided  into  two  races,  of 
which  one  is  their  enemy  and  the  other  their  friend, 
but  because  they  covet  the  good  things  of  Sicily  which 
we  all  share  alike  a.  Is  not  their  reception  of  the  Chal- 
cidian  appeal  a  proof  of  this  ?  b  They  have  actually 
gone  out  of  their  way  to  grant  the  rights  and  privileges 
of  their  old  treaty  to  those  who  up  to  this  hour  have 
never  aided  them  as  required  by  the  terms  of  that  treaty. 
The  ambition  and  craft  of  the  Athenians  are  pardonable 
enough.  I  blame  not  those  who  wish  to  rule,  but  those 
who  are  willing  to  serve.  The  same  human  nature  which 
is  always  ready  to  domineer  over  the  subservient,  bids 
us  defend  ourselves  against  the  aggressor.  And  if, 
knowing  all  these  things,  we  continue  to  take  no  thought 
for  the  future,  and  have  not  every  one  of  us  made  up  our 
minds  already  that  first  and  foremost  we  must  all  deal 
wisely  with  the  danger  which  threatens  all,  we  are 
grievously  in  error. 

'  Now  a  mutual  reconciliation  would  be  the  speediest  Let  us 
way  of  deliverance  from  this  danger  ;  for  the  Athenians 
do  not  come  direct  from  their  own  country,  but  first 


plant   themselves   in   that    of   the   Sicilians   who   have  footing  in 

Sicilv 

invited  them.  Instead  of  finishing  one  war  only  to 
begin  another,  we  should  then  quietly  end  our  differ- 
ences by  peace.  And  those  who  came  at  our  call  and 
had  so  good  a  reason  for  doing  wrong  will  have  a  still 
better  reason  for  going  away  and  doing  nothing. 

'  Such  is  the   great   advantage  which  we  obtain  by      62. 
sound  policy  as  against  the  Athenians.     And  why,  if  why 

should  we 
a  Cp.  vi.  77,  79.  b  Gp.  iii.  86. 


286  SPEECH   OF   HERMOCRATES. 

IV.      peace  is  acknowledged  by  all  to  be  the  greatest  of  bless-  B.C.  424. 
not  secure    ings,  should  we  not  make  peace  among  ourselves  ?   What-     '  9' 

the  bless-  .,   .       ,  .  . 

ings  of  peace  ever  good  or  evil  is  the  portion  of  any  of  us,  is  not  peace 
relying  on  more  likely  than  war  to  preserve  the  one  and  to  alleviate 
ofewar?nces  t^ie  ot^er^  ^nd  has  not  peace  honours  and  glories  of  her 
own  unattended  by  the  dangers  of  war  ?  (But  it  is  un- 
necessary to  dilate  on  the  blessings  of  peace  any  more 
than  on  the  miseries  of  war.)  Consider  what  I  am  saying, 
and  instead  of  despising  my  words,  may  every  man  seek 
his  own  safety  in  them !  And  should  there  be  some  one 
here  present  who  was  hoping  to  gain  a  permanent  ad- 
vantage either  by  right  or  by  force,  let  him  not  take  his 
disappointment  to  heart.  For  he  knows  that  many  a 
man  before  now  who  has  sought  a  righteous  revenge,  far 
from  obtaining  it,  has  not  even  escaped  himself;  and 
many  an  one  who  in  the  consciousness  of  power  has 
grasped  at  what  was  another's,  has  ended  by  losing  what 
was  his  own.  The  revenge  of  a  wrong  is  not  always 
successful  merely  because  it  is  just ;  nor  is  strength  most 
assured  of  victory  when  it  is  most  full  of  hope.  The  in- 
scrutable future  is  the  controller  of  events,  and,  being 
the  most  treacherous  of  all  things,  is  also  the  most  bene- 
ficent; for  when  there  is  mutual  fear,  men  think  twice 
before  they  make  aggressions  upon  one  another. 
63.  '  And  now,  because  we  know  not  what  this  hidden 

Send  away   future  may  bring  forth,  and  because  the  Athenians,  who 

the  Athe- 
nians :  even  are  dangerous  enemies,  are  already  at  our  gates, — having 

punish  your  these  two  valid  reasons  for  alarm,  let  us  acquiesce  in  our 
th|mwni  disappointment,  deeming  that  the  obstacles  a  to  the  ful- 
make  you  filment  of  our  individual  hopes  a  are  really  insuperable. 

the  enemies 

of  your  Let  us  send  out  of  the  country  the  enemies  who  threaten 
us,  and  make  peace  among  ourselves,  if  possible  for  ever; 
but  if  not,  for  as  long  as  we  can,  and  let  our  private 
enmities  bide  their  time.  If  you  take  my  advice,  rest 
assured  that  you  will  maintain  the  freedom  of  your  several 
cities;  from  which  you  will  go  forth  your  own  masters, 

a  Or,  reading  snaaros  n  :  '  to  the  accomplishment  of  those  things 
which  each  of  us  in  whatever  degree  was  hoping  to  effect.' 


THE  SICILIANS  AGREE   TO  MAKE  PEACE.      387 

and  recompense,  like  true  men,  the  good  or  evil  which  is  IV. 
done  to  you.  But  if  you  will  not  believe  me,  and  we  are 
enslaved  by  others,  the  punishment  of  our  enemies  will 
be  out  of  the  question.  Even  supposing  we  succeed  in 
obtaining  vengeance  to  our  hearts'  content,  we  may 
perhaps  become  the  friends  of  our  greatest  enemies,  we 
certainly  become  the  enemies  of  our  real  friends. 

'As  I  said  at  first,  I  am  the  representative  of  a  great      64. 
city  which  is  more  likely  to  act  on  the  aggressive  than  on  Though  i 
the  defensive;  and  yet  with  the  prospect  of  these  dangers 
before  me  I  am  willing  to  come  to  terms,  and  not  to  ^ 


injure  my  enemies  in  such  a  way  that  I  shall  doubly  cpnces- 
injure  myself.     Nor  am  I  so  obstinate  and  foolish  as  to  and  lask 

,1,1  T  t-  -11    T  others  to  do 

imagine  that,  because  I  am  master  of  my  own  will,  I  can  the  like. 
control  fortune,  of  whom  I  am  not  master  ;  but  I  am  dis-  brethren. 


posed  to  make  reasonable  concessions.  And  I  would  ask 
the  other  Sicilians  to  do  the  same  of  their  own  accord,  ians. 
and  not  to  wait  until  the  enemy  compels  them.  There 
is  no  disgrace  in  kinsmen  yielding  to  kinsmen,  whether 
Dorians  to  Dorians,  or  Chalcidians  to  the  other  lonians. 
Let  us  remember  too  that  we  are  all  neighbours,  in- 
habitants of  one  island  home,  and  called  by  the  common 
name  of  Sicilians.  When  we  see  occasion  we  will  fight 
among  ourselves,  and  will  negotiate  and  come  to  terms 
among  ourselves.  But  we  shall  always,  if  we  are  wise, 
unite  as  one  man  against  the  invader  ;  for  when  a  single 
state  suffers,  all  are  imperilled.  We  will  never  again 
introduce  allies  from  abroad,  no,  nor  pretended  media- 
tors. This  policy  will  immediately  secure  to  Sicily  two 
great  blessings  ;  she  will  get  rid  of  the  Athenians,  and  of 
civil  war.  And  for  the  future  we  shall  keep  the  island  free 
and  our  own,  and  none  will  be  tempted  to  attack  us.' 

Such  were  the  words  of  Hermocrates.     The  Sicilians      65. 
took  his  advice  and  agreed  among  themselves  to  make  Terms  of 
peace,  on  the  understanding  that  they  should  all  retain 


what  they  had  ;  only  Morgantine  was  handed  over  to  the 
Camarinaeans,  who  were  to  pay  in  return  a  fixed  sum  to  ™ans  a*;e 

r   J  dissatisfied 

the  Syracusans.     The  cities  in  alliance  with  Athens  sent  with  their 


288     UNDUE    ELATION   OF    THE    ATHENIANS. 

IV.      for  the  Athenian  generals  and  told  them  that  a  treaty  B.C.  424. 

was  about  to  be  made  in  which  they  might  join  if  they  O1'  89' 
that  they     pleased.    They  assented  ;  the  treaty  was  concluded  ;  and 
conquered^  so  the  Athenian  ships  sailed  away  from  Sicily.     When 
fheyyhad     the  generals  returned   the  Athenians   punished  two  of 
bribed611      tnem>  Pythodorus  and  Sophocles,  with  exile,  and  im- 
posed a  fine  on  the   third,  Eurymedon,  believing  that 
they  might  have  conquered  Sicily  but  had  been  bribed 
to  go  away.     For  in  their  present  prosperity  they  were 
indignant  at  the  idea  of  a  reverse ;    they  expected   to 
accomplish  everything,  possible  or  impossible,  with  any 
force,  great  or  small.     The  truth  was   that  they  were 
elated  by  the  unexpected  success  of  most  of  their  enter- 
prises, which  inspired  them  with  the  liveliest  hope. 
66.  During  the  same  summer  the  citizens  of  Megara  were 

rfMe^ara $  karc*  Pressed  by  the  Athenians,  who  twice  every  year  in- 
thinking  it  vaded  the  country  with  their  whole  armya,  as  well  as  by 

better  to          .     .  _ 

have  one  their  own  exiles  in  Pegae,  who  had  been  driven  out  by 
tewompr2an  the  people  in  a  revolution b,  and  were  continually  harassing 
restore0 the  and  Pandering  them.  So  they  conferred  together  upon 
exiles.  the  advisability  of  recalling  the  exiles,  lest  they  should 

The  popu- 
lar leaders    expose  the  city  to  destruction  from  the  attacks  of  two 

rater  Sto  enemies  at  once.  The  friends  of  the  exiles  became  aware 
Sonwith  °^  t^ie  movenient and  ventured  to  urge  the  measure  more 
the  Athe-  openly  than  hitherto.  But  the  popular  leaders,  knowing 

nians.  i  i     •  • 

that  their  partizans  were  in  great  extremity  and  could 
not  be  trusted  to  hold  out  in  support  of  them  much 
longer,  took  alarm  and  entered  into  negotiation  with  the 
Athenian  generals,  Hippocrates  the  son  of  Ariphron,  and 
Demosthenes  the  son  of  Alcisthenes.  They  thought  that 
they  would  incur  less  danger  by  surrendering  the  city  to 
them  than  by  the  restoration  of  the  exiles  whom  they  had 
themselves  expelled.  So  they  agreed  that  the  Athenians 
should  in  the  first,  place  seize  their  Long  Walls0,  which 
were  a  little  less  than  a  mile  in  length  and  extended 
from  the  city  to  their  harbour  Nisaea.  They  wanted  to 
prevent  the  Peloponnesians  interfering  from  Nisaea,  of 
a  Cp.  ii.  31.  b  Cp.  iii.  68  med.  c  Cp.  i.  103  fin. 


LONG    WALLS    OF   MEGARA    TAKEN.         289 

B.C.  424.  which  they  formed   the  sole  garrison,  being  stationed       IV. 
there  to  secure  Megara.     The  conspirators  were  then  to 
try  and  place  in  the  hands  of  the  Athenians  the  upper 
city,  which  would  be  more  ready  to  come,  over  when 
they  once  had  possession  of  the  Long  Walls. 

Both  parties  had  now  made  all  necessary  preparations,      67. 
both  in  word  and  act.    The  Athenians  sailed  at  nightfall  Disposition 
to  Minoa,  the  island  in  front  of  Megara,  with  six  hundred  Athenian 
hoplites  under  the  command  of  Hippocrates.    They  then  bdore 
took  up  their  position  not  far  from  the  Long  Walls,  in  a 


trench  out  of  which  the  bricks  for  the  walls  had  been  are  opened 
dug.     A  second   division   of  the  Athenian  army,  con-  by  their 
sisting  of  light-armed  Plataeans  and  of  a  part  of  the  JJnfedi- 
force  employed  in  guarding  the  frontier,  under  the  com-  a*es'  and 

r     J  they  mount 

mand  of  Demosthenes  the  other  general,  lay  in  ambush  the  Long 
at  the  temple  of  Ares,  which  is  nearer  still.     During  the 
night  no  one  knew  what  they  were  about,  except  the  men 
who  were  immediately  concerned.    Just  before  daybreak 
the  conspirators  executed  their  plan.    They  had  long  ago 
provided  that  the  gates  should  be  open  when  required  ; 
for  by  the  permission  of  the  commander,  who  supposed 
them  to  be  privateering,  they  had  been  in  the  habit  of 
conveying  a  sculling-boat  out  of  the  town  by  night.    This 
they  placed  upon  a  waggon,  and  carried  it  down  to  the 
sea  through  the  trench  ;  they  then  sailed  out,  and  just 
before  day  broke  the  boat  was  brought  back  by  them  on 
the  waggon  and  taken  in  at  the  gates;  their  object  being, 
as  they  pretended,  to  baffle  the  Athenian  watch  at  Minoa, 
since  the  vessel  would  never  appear  in  the  harbour  at  all. 
The  waggon  had  just  arrived  at  the  gates,  which  were 
opened  for  the  boat  to  enter,  when  the  Athenians,  with 
whom  the  whole  affair  had  been  preconcerted,  seeing  this 
movement,  rushed  out  of  the  ambuscade,  wanting  to  get 
in  before  the  gates  were  shut  again  and  while  the  waggon 
was  still  in  them,  and  prevented  them  from  being  closed. 
At  the  same   instant   their   Megarian  confederates  cut 
down  the  guards  stationed  at  the  gates.     First  of  all  the 
Plataeans  and  the  frontier  guard    under  Demosthenes 

U 


390  MEGARA    STILL    HOLDS    OUT. 

IV.      rushed  in  where   the  trophy   now   stands.     No   sooner  B.C.  424. 
were   they  within   the   gates   than   the    Peloponnesians 
who  were  nearest  and  saw  what  was  going  on  hastened 
to    the    rescue  ;    but    they  were    overpowered    by   the 
Plataeans,  who  secured  the  gates  for   the  entrance   of 
the  Athenian  hoplites  as  they  came  running  up. 
68.  Then  the  Athenians  entered,  and  one  after  another 

ThePeio-    proceeded  to  mount  the   wall.     A   few   Peloponnesian 

ponnesians,  r 

supposing  guards  at  first  resisted  and  some  of  them  were  killed  ; 
rianftcf3'"  but  the  greater  part  took  to  flight  ;  they  were  terrified 
over  to°ne  at  the  night  attack  of  the  enemy,  and  fancied,  when  they 


^  saw  ^e  Megarians  who  were  in  the  conspiracy  fighting 

Nisaea.  against  them,  that  all  the  Megarians  had  betrayed  them. 

is  detected  It  had  occurred  at  the  same  time  to  the  Athenian  herald, 

garchkai1"  without  orders,  to  make  proclamation  that  any  Megarian 

party  in  who   pleased  might  join   the   ranks   of  the  Athenians. 

time  to  save  *  . 

Megara  When  the  Lacedaemonians  heard  the  proclamation  none 
of  them  remained  any  longer,  but  thinking  that  the  Athe- 
nians and  Megarians  had  really  combined  against  them 
they  fled  into  Nisaea. 

When  the  morning  dawned  and  the  Long  Walls  were 
already  captured,  Megara  was  in  a  tumult,  and  those  who 
had  negotiated  with  the  Athenians  and  a  large  number  of 
others  who  were  in  the  plot  insisted  upon  opening  the 
gates  and  going  out  to  battle.  Now  they  had  agreed 
that  the  Athenians  should  immediately  rush  in  ;  and  they 
were  themselves  to  be  anointed  with  oil  ;  this  was  the 
mark  by  which  they  were  to  be  distinguished,  that  they 
might  be  spared  in  the  attack.  There  was  the  less  danger 
in  opening  the  gates,  since  there  had  now  arrived  four 
thousand  Athenian  hoplites  and  six  hundred  horse,  who 
by  a  previous  arrangement  had  come  from  Eleusis  during 
the  night.  When  they  were  anointed  and  had  collected 
about  the  gates  some  one  in  the  secret  acquainted  the 
other  party,  who  instantly  came  upon  them  in  a  compact 
body  and  declared  that  there  should  be  no  going  out  ; 
even  when  they  were  stronger  than  at  present  they  had 
not  ventured  to  take  the  field  ;  the  danger  to  the  city 


BUT   NISAEA    SURRENDERS.  291 

B.C.  424.  was  too  palpable  ;  if  any  one  opposed  them  the  battle  IV. 
would  have  to  be  fought  first  within  the  walls.  They  did 
not  betray  their  knowledge  of  the  plot,  but  assumed  the 
confident  tone  of  men  who  were  recommending  the  best 
course.  At  the  same  time  they  kept  watch  about  the 
gates  ;  and  thus  the  conspiracy  was  foiled. 

The  Athenian  generals  became  aware  that  some  diffi-      69. 
culty  had  arisen,  and  that  they  could  not  carry  the  city  by  T.he  Athe- 
storm.    So  they  immediately  set  about  the  circumvalla-  off  Nisaea 
tion  of  Nisaea,  thinking  that,  if  they  could  take  it  before  wan.Cr°SS 
any  assistance  arrived,  Megara  itself  would  be  more  likely 


to  capitulate.     Iron  and  other  things  needful,  as  well  as  dan§er  of 

•  A  •        starvation, 

masons,  were  quickly  procured  from  Athens.  Beginning  capitulates. 
from  the  wall  which  they  already  held  they  intercepted 
the  approach  from  Megara  by  a  cross  wall,  and  from  that 
drew  another  on  either  side  of  Nisaea  down  to  the  sea. 
The  army  divided  among  them  the  execution  of  the 
trench  and  walls,  obtaining  stones  and  bricks  from  the 
suburbs  of  the  town.  They  also  cut  down  timber  and 
fruit-trees  and  made  palisades  where  they  were  needed. 
The  houses  in  the  suburbs  were  of  themselves  a  sufficient 
fortification,  and  only  required  battlements.  All  that  day 
they  continued  working  ;  on  the  following  day,  towards 
evening,  the  wall  was  nearly  finished,  and  the  terrified 
inhabitants  of  Nisaea  having  no  food  (for  they  depended 
for  their  daily  supplies  on  the  upper  city),  and  imagining 
that  Megara  had  gone  over  to  the  enemy,  despairing  too 
of  any  aid  soon  arriving  from  Peloponnesus,  capitulated 
to  the  Athenians.  The  conditions  were  as  follows  :  — 
They  were  to  go  free,  every  man  paying  a  fixed  ransom 
and  giving  up  his  arms  ;  but  the  Athenians  might  deal 
as  they  pleased  with  the  Lacedaemonian  commander 
and  any  Lacedaemonian  who  was  in  the  place.  Upon 
these  terms  they  came  out,  and  the  Athenians,  having 
severed  the  communication  of  Megara  with  the  Long 
Walls,  took  possession  of  Nisaea  and  prepared  for  further 
action. 

It  so  happened  that  Brasidas,  son  of  Tellis,  the  Lace-      70. 
U  3 


292  ENERGY   OF   BRAS  ID  AS. 

IV.      daemonian,  who  was  equipping  an  expedition  intended  B.C.  424. 

for  Chalcidice,  was  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Sicyon  and  ° 
senXtond   Corinth  at   the  time-      Hearing  of  the  capture  of  the 
the  Boeo-     Long  Walls,  and  fearing  for  the  safety  of  the  Pelopon- 

tiansforan  .  .      -_. 

army.  nesians  in  Nisaea,  and  of  Megara  itself,  he  sent  to  the 
Boeotians,  desiring  them  to  bring  an  army  and  meet  him 
with  all  speed  at  Tripodiscus.  The  place  so  called  is 
a  village  of  Megara  situated  under  Mount  Geraneia. 
Thither  he  also,  came  himself,  bringing  two  thousand 
seven  hundred  Corinthian,  four  hundred  Phliasian,  and 
six  hundred  Sicyonian  hoplites,  as  well  as  the  followers 
whom  he  had  previously  collected a.  He  had  hoped  to 
find  Nisaea  still  untaken  ;  but  the  news  of  the  capture 
reached  him  at  Tripodiscus,  where  he  did  not  arrive 
until  night.  He  immediately  took  with  him  a  body  of 
three  hundred  chosen  men,  and  before  his  arrival  in  the 
country  was  reported  reached  Megara,  undiscovered  by 
the  Athenians,  who  were  near  the  sea.  He  professed  that 
he  wanted,  and  he  really  meant  if  he  could,  to  attempt 
the  recovery  of  Nisaea ;  but  the  great  point  was  to  get 
into  Megara  and  make  that  safe.  So  he  demanded 
admission  and  held  out  hopes  of  regaining  Nisaea. 

71.  The  two  factions  in  Megara  were  both  equally  afraid  to 
He  tries      receive  him — the  one  lest  he  should  introduce  the  exiles 
Megara,      and  drive  them  out,  the  other  lest  the  people,  fearing  this 
faction  is^  very  thing,  should  set  upon  them  and  ruin  the  city,  which 
wiliS  to     would  then  be  distracted  by  civil  war  and  at  the  same  time 
receive  him.  beset  by  the  Athenians.   And  so  both  parties  determined 

to  wait  and  see  what  would  happen.  For  they  both  ex- 
pected a  battle  to  ensue  between  the  Athenians  and  the 
army  which  had  come  to  the  relief  of  the  city,  and  when 
the  victory  was  won  the  party  whose  friends  had  con- 
quered could  more  safely  join  them.  Brasidas,  thus 
failing  in  his  purpose,  returned  to  the  main  body  of 
his  troops. 

72.  At  dawn  of  day  the  Boeotians  appeared.    Even  before 
The  Boeo-   they  were  summoned  by  Brasidas  they  had  intended  to 

tians  arrive. 

a  Cp.  iv.  80  fin. 


NEITHER  SIDE   TAKE   THE  OFFENSIVE.     393 

B.C.  424.  relieve  Megara  ;  for  the  danger  came  home  to  them;  and       IV. 
their  whole  force  was  already  collected  at  Plataea.    When  indecisive 

.  Boeotian 

his  messenger  arrived  they  were  more  resolved  than  ever,  action  of 
and  sent  forward  two  thousand  two  hundred  heavy-armed  nlan 
and  six  hundred  horse,  allowing  the  greater  number  to  cavalrv- 
return.  The  entire  army  of  Brasidas  now  amounted  to 
six  thousand  hoplites.  The  Athenian  hoplites  were 
drawn  up  near  Nisaea  and  the  sea,  their  light-armed 
troops  were  scattered  over  the  plain,  when  the  Boeotian 
cavalry  came  riding  up,  fell  upon  the  light-armed,  and 
drove  them  to  the  shore.  The  attack  was  unexpected, 
for  in  no  former  invasion  had  aid  come  to  the  Megarians 
from  any  quarter.  The  Athenian  cavalry  now  rode  for- 
ward and  there  was  a  long  engagement,  in  which  both 
parties  claim  to  have  won  a  victory.  The  Athenians 
drove  the  general  of  the  Boeotian  cavalry  and  a  few 
other  horsemen  up  to  the  walls  of  Nisaea,  and  there 
slew  them  and  took  their  arms.  As  they  retained  pos- 
session of  the  dead  bodies,  and  only  restored  them  under 
a  flag  of  truce,  they  raised  a  trophy.  Still  in  respect  of 
the  whole  engagement  neither  side  when  they  parted  had 
a  decided  advantage.  The  Boeotians  retired  to  their 
main  body,  and  the  Athenians  to  Nisaea. 

Brasidas  and  his  army  then  moved  nearer  to  the  sea       73. 
and  to  the  town  of  Megara,  and  there,  taking  up  a  con-  The  Pel°- 

ponnesians, 

venient  position  and  marshalling  their  forces,  they  re-  having 

j         ..  1  .  ry-i  .  .,       shown  that 

mamed   without   moving.      They   were    expecting    the  they  are 


Athenians  to  attack  them,  and  knew  that  the  Mega- 

rians  were  waiting  to  see  who  would  be  the  conquerors.  ™£  £  are  to 

They  were  very  well  satisfied,  for  two  reasons.     In  the  The  Athe- 

r  ,  ,  nians  are 

first  place  they  were  not  the  assailants,  and  had  not  gone  even  more 
out  of  their  way  to  risk  a  battle,  although  they  had  clearly        "*  to 


shown  that  they  were  ready  to  engage  ;  and  so  they  might  the  Pel?~ 

J         °       ponnesians. 

fairly  claim  a  victory  without  fighting.    Again,  the  result  The  result 
in  regard  to  Megara  was  good  :    for  if  they  had  not  put  Brasidas  fe 
in  an  appearance  they  would  have  had  no  chance  at  all,  fndt™Megara 
but  would  have  been  as  good  as  beaten,  and  beyond  a  £[.  ^rechical 
doubt  would  immediately  have  lost  the  city.     Whereas  party. 


294  REVOLUTION  IN   ME  GAR  A. 

IV.  now  the  Athenians  themselves  might  be  unwilling  to  B.C.  424. 
fight;  and,  if  so,  they  would  gain  their  object  without 
striking  a  blow.  And  this  turned  out  to  be  the  fact  ;  for 
the  Megarians  did  in  the  end  receive  Brasidas.  At  first 
the  Athenians  came  out  and  drew  up  near  the  Long 
Walls,  but  not  being  attacked  they  likewise  remained 
inactive.  The  generals  on  their  side  were  restrained 
by  similar  reflections.  They  had  gained  the  greater 
part  of  what  they  wanted  ;  they  would  be  offering 
battle  against  a  superior  force;  and  their  own  danger 
would  be  out  of  proportion  to  that  of  the  enemy. 
They  might  be  victorious  and  take  Megara,  but  if 
they  failed  the  loss  would  fall  on  the  flower  of  their 
infantry.  Whereas  the  Peloponnesians  were  naturally 
more  willing  to  encounter  a  risk  which  would  be  divided 
among  the  several  contingents  making  up  the  army  now 
in  the  field  ;  and  each  of  these  was  but  a  part  of  their 
whole  force,  present  and  absent.  Both  armies  waited  for 
a  time,  and,  when  neither  saw  the  other  moving,  the 
Athenians  first  of  the  two  retired  into  Nisaea  and  the 
Peloponnesians  returned  to  their  previous  position. 
Whereupon  the  party  in  Megara  friendly  to  the  exiles 
took  courage,  opened  the  gates,  and  received  Brasidas 
and  the  generals  of  the  other  cities,  considering  that  the 
Athenians  had  finally  made  up  their  minds  not  to  fight, 
and  that  he  was  the  conqueror.  They  then  entered  into 
negotiations  with  him  ;  for  the  other  faction  which  had 
conspired  with  the  Athenians  was  now  paralysed. 

74-  After  this  the  allies  dispersed  to  their  several  cities 

anc*  Brasidas  returned  to  Corinth,  where  he  made  prepa- 


intothe       rations  for  his  expedition  into  Chalcidice,   his  original 

the  on-       destination.     When  the  Athenians  had  also  gone  home, 

cruelly  and°  sucn  °f  tne    Megarians  as  had  been  chiefly  concerned 

ouTiyhput     w^  tnem>  knowing  that  they  were  discovered,  at  once 

to  death      slipped  away.     The  rest  of  the  citizens  after  conferring 

ponents.      with  the  friends  of  the  exiles  recalled  them  from  Pegae, 

first  binding  them  by  the  most  solemn  oaths  to  consider 

the  interests  of  the  state  and  to  forget  old  quarrels.    But 


THE    COAST  OF  ASIA    MINOR.  295 

B.C.  424.  no  sooner  had  they  come  into  office  than,  taking  the  IV. 
opportunity  of  a  review  and  drawing  up  the  divisions 
apart  from  one  another,  they  selected  about  a  hundred 
of  their  enemies,  and  of  those  who  seemed  to  have  been 
most  deeply  implicated  with  the  Athenians,  and  com- 
pelled the  people  to  give  sentence  upon  them  by  an 
open  vote  ;  having  obtained  their  condemnation,  they  put 
them  to  death.  They  then  established  in  the  city  an  ex- 
treme oligarchy.  And  no  government  based  on  a  counter 
revolution  effected  by  so  few  ever  lasted  so  long  a  time. 

During  the  same  summer  Demodocus  and  Aristides,       75- 
two  commanders  of  the  Athenian  fleet  which  collected  JjgiJJf 
the  tribute  from  the  allies,  happened  to  be  in  the  neigh-  become  the 
bourhood  of   the  Hellespont;    there  were  only  two  oftersofthe 
them,  the  third,  Lamachus,  having  sailed  with  ten  ships  exiles,  is 


into  the  Pontus.  They  saw  that  the  Lesbian  exiles  were 
going  to  strengthen  Antandrus  as  they  had  intended*,  and  Athenians. 
they  feared  that  it  would  prove  as  troublesome  an  enemy 
to  Lesbos  as  Anaea  had  been  to  Samosb;  for  the  Samian 
refugees,  who  had  settled  there,  aided  the  Peloponnesian 
navy  by  sending  them  pilots  ;  they  likewise  took  in  fugi- 
tives from  Samos  and  kept  the  island  in  a  state  of  per- 
petual alarm.  So  the  Athenian  generals  collected  troops 
from  their  allies,  sailed  to  Antandrus,  and,  defeating  a 
force  which  came  out  against  them,  recovered  the  place. 
Not  long  afterwards  Lamachus,  who  had  sailed  into  the 
Pontus  and  had  anchored  in  the  territory  of  Heraclea  at 
the  mouth  of  the  river  Calex,  lost  his  ships  by  a  sudden 
flood  which  a  fall  of  rain  in  the  upper  country  had  brought 
down.  He  and  his  army  returned  by  land  through  the 
country  of  the  Bithynian  Thracians  who  dwell  on  the 
Asiatic  coast,  and  arrived  at  Chalcedon,  a  Megarian 
colony  at  the  mouth  of  the  Pontus. 

In  the  same  summer,  and  immediately  after  the  with-       76. 
drawal  of  the  Athenians  from   Megara,  the  Athenian  The  Athe- 
general  Demosthenes  arrived  at  Naupactus  with  forty  into  com-er 
ships.    A  party  in  the  cities  of  Boeotia  who  wanted  to 
a  Cp.  iv.  52.  b  Cp.  iij.  I9j  ijjt  33  ink. 


296  DESIGNS    UPON  BOEOTIA. 

IV.      overthrow  their  constitution  and  set  up  a  democracy  like  B.C.  424. 
democrati-   that  of  Athens,  had  entered  into  communications  with  OL  89' 

cal  party 

in  Boeotia,  him  and  with  Hippocrates,  and  a  plan  of  operations  had 
take  t^  er~  been  concerted,  chiefly  under  the  direction  of  Ptoeodorus, 


while  a  Theban  exile.     Some  of  the  democratical  party  under- 
the  Athe-     took  to  betray  Siphae,  which  is  a  seaport  on  the  Crisaean 

mans  seize  ' 

Deiium.  Gulf  in  the  Thespian  territory,  and  certain  Orchomenians 
were  to  deliver  up  to  the  Athenians  Chaeronea,  which  is 
a  dependency  of  the  Boeotian,  or  as  it  was  formerly 
called  the  Minyan,  Orchomenus.  A  body  of  Orcho- 
menian  exiles  had  a  principal  hand  in  this  design  and 
kept  a  Peloponnesian  force  in  their  pay.  The  town  of 
Chaeronea  is  at  the  extremity  of  Boeotia  near  the 
territory  of  Phanoteus  in  Phocis,  and  some  Phocians 
took  part  in  the  plot.  The  Athenians  meanwhile  were 
to  seize  Deiium,  a  temple  of  Apollo  which  is  in  the 
district  of  Tanagra  looking  towards  Euboea.  In  order 
to  keep  the  Boeotians  occupied  with  disturbances  at 
home,  and  prevent  them  from  marching  in  a  body  to 
Deiium,  the  whole  movement  was  to  be  made  on  a 
single  day,  which  was  fixed  beforehand.  If  the  attempt 
succeeded  and  Deiium  was  fortified,  even  though  no 
revolution  should  at  once  break  out  in  the  states  of 
Boeotia,  they  might  hold  the  places  which  they  had 
taken  and  plunder  the  country.  The  partizans  of  demo- 
cracy in  the  several  cities  would  have  a  refuge  near 
at  hand  to  which  in  case  of  failure  they  might  retreat. 
Matters  could  not  long  remain  as  they  were  ;  and  in 
time,  the  Athenians  acting  with  the  rebels,  and  the 
Boeotian  forces  being  divided,  they  would  easily  settle 
Boeotia  in  their  interest.  Such  was  the  nature  of  the 
proposed  attempt. 
77.  Hippocrates  himself  with  a  force  from  the  city  was 

Demos-       ready  to  march  into  Boeotia  when  the  moment  came. 

a  fleet  from  He  had  sent  Demosthenes  beforehand  with  the  forty 
ships  to  Naupactus,  intending  him  to  collect  an  army  of 


crates  with  Acarnanians  and  other  allies  of  the  Athenians  in  that 

«in  cirrny 

from    '       region  and  sail  against  Siphae,  which  was  to  be  betrayed 


BRASIDAS   IN    THESSALY.  297 

B.C.  424.  to  them.    These  operations  were  to  be  carried  out  simul-       IV. 
89>      taneously  on  the  day  appointed. 


Demosthenes  on  his  arrival  found  that  the  confederate  invade 

Boeotia  on 

Acarnanians  had  already  compelled  Oemadae  to  enter  a  fixed  day. 
the  Athenian  alliance.     He  then  himself  raised  all  the  peniadae 

forced 

forces  of  the  allies  in  those  parts  and  proceeded  first  to  into  the 
make  war  upon  Salynthius  and  the  Agraeans  a.     Having  alliance. 
subdued  them,  he  took  the  necessary  steps  for  keeping 
his  appointment  at  Siphae. 

During    this    summer,    and    about   the    same    time,       78. 
Brasidas  set  out  on  his  way  to  Chalcidice  with  seven-  Braeidas, 

111-  IT  71  -i  TT  i        escorted  by 

teen  hundred  hophtes.     When  he  arrived  at  Heradea  the  leading 
in   Trachis   he   despatched    a    messenger  to  Pharsalus,  ^S^ry, 
where  he  had  friends,  with  a  request  that  they  would  makes  his 
conduct  him  and  his  army  through  the  country.     Ac-  through 
cordingly  there  came  to  meet  him  at  Melitia,  in  Achaea  His  politic 
Phthiotis,  Panaerus,  Dorus,  Hippolochidas,  Torylaus,  and  langua< 
Strophacus  who  was  the  proxenus  of  the  Chalcidians. 
Under  their   guidance  he   started.     Other   Thessalians 
also  conducted  him  ;  in  particular,  Niconidas  a  friend  of 
Perdiccas   from   Larissa.      Under  any  circumstances  it 
would  not  have  been  easy  to   cross   Thessaly  without 
an  escort,  and  certainly  for  an  armed  force  to  go  through 
a  neighbour's   country  without  his  consent  was  a  pro- 
ceeding which   excited   jealousy   among    all    Hellenes. 
Besides,  the  common  people  of  Thessaly  were  always 
well  disposed  towards  the  Athenians.     And  if  the  tra- 
ditions of  the  country  had  not  been  in  favour  of  a  close 
oligarchy,  Brasidas  could  never  have  gone  on  ;  even  as  it 
was,  some  of  the  opposite  party  met  him  on  his  march  at 
the  river  Enipeus  and  would  have  stopped  him,  saying 
that  he  had  no  business  to  proceed  without  the  consent 
of  the  whole  nation.     His  escort  replied  that  they  would 
not  conduct  him  if  the  others  objected,  but  that  he  had 
suddenly   presented   himself  and   they  were   doing  the 
duty  of  hosts  in  accompanying  him.     Brasidas  himself 
added  that  he  came  as  a  friend  to  the  Thessalian  land 
a  Cp.  iii.  in  fin. 


298       BRASIDAS    ARRIVES    IN    CHALCIDICE. 

IV.  and  people,  and  that  he  was  making  war  upon  his  B.C.  424. 
enemies  the  Athenians,  and  not  upon  them.  He  had 
never  heard  that  there  was  any  ill-feeling  between  the 
Thessalians  and  Lacedaemonians  which  prevented  either 
of  them  from  passing  through  the  territory  of  the  other  ; 
however,  if  they  refused  their  consent,  he  would  not  and 
indeed  could  not  go  on  ;  but  such  was  not  the  treatment 
which  he  had  a  right  to  expect  from  them.  Upon  this 
they  departed,  and  he  by  the  advice  of  his  escort,  fearing 
that  a  large  force  might  collect  and  stop  him,  marched 
on  at  full  speed  and  without  a  halt.  On  the  same  day  on 
which  he  started  from  Melitia  he  arrived  at  Pharsalus, 
and  encamped  by  the  river  Apidanus.  Thence  he  went 
on  to  Phacium,  and  thence  to  Perrhaebia.  Here  his 
Thessalian  escort  returned ;  and  the  Perrhaebians,  who 
are  subjects  of  the  Thessalians,  brought  him  safe  to 
Dium  in  the  territory  of  Perdiccas,  a  city  of  Mace- 
donia which  is  situated  under  Mount  Olympus  on 
the  Thessalian  side. 

79.  Thus  Brasidas  succeeded  in  running  through  Thessaly 

Brasidas  before  any  measures  were  taken  to  stop  him,  and  reached 
Perdiccas.  Perdiccas  and  Chalcidice.  He  and  the  revolted  tribu- 
taries of  the  Athenians,  alarmed  at  their  recent  suc- 
cesses, had  invited  the  Peloponnesians.  The  Chalcidians 
were  expecting  that  the  first  efforts  of  the  Athenians 
would  be  directed  against  them.  The  neighbouring 
cities,  although  they  had  not  revolted,  secretly  joined 
in  the  invitation.  Perdiccas  was  not  a  declared  enemy 
of  Athens,  but  was  afraid  that  the  old  differences  be- 
tween himself  and  the  Athenians  might  revive,  and  he 
was  especially  anxious  to  subdue  Arrhibaeus,  king  of  the 
Lyncestians. 

go.  The  Lacedaemonians  were  the  more  willing  to  let  the 

The  Lace-  Chalcidians  have  an  army  from  Peloponnese  owing  to 
encourage15  the  unfortunate  state  of  their  affairs.  For  now  that  the 
dition^f  Athenians  were  infesting  Peloponnesus,  and  especially 
Brasidas  in^  Laconia,  they  thought  that  a  diversion  would  be  best 
making  a  effected  if  they  could  retaliate  on  them  by  sending 


THE    SPARTANS    AND    THEIR    HELOTS.      299 

B.C.  424.  troops   to   help  their   dissatisfied    allies,  who   moreover      IV. 
01'89'      were   offering    to   maintain   them,   and    had   asked    for 


assistance  from  Sparta  with  the  intention  of  revolting.  ™^°ftsthe 
They  were  also  glad  of  a  pretext  for  sending   out  of  Their 

r     ,        T  T   ,  -  ,  ,  monstrous 

the  way  some  of  the  Helots,  fearing  that  they  would  crueity  and 
take  the  opportunity  of  rising  afforded  by  the  occupa-  treachery- 
tion  of  Pylos.  Most  of  the  Lacedaemonian  institutions 
were  specially  intended  to  secure  them  against  this  source 
of  danger.  Once,  when  they  were  afraid  of  the  number 
and  vigour  of  the  Helot  youth,  this  was  what  they  did  :  — 
They  proclaimed  that  a  selection  would  be  made  of 
those  Helots  who  claimed  to  have  rendered  the  best 
service  to  the  Lacedaemonians  in  war,  and  promised 
them  liberty.  The  announcement  was  intended  to  test 
them  ;  it  was  thought  that  those  among  them  who  were 
foremost  in  asserting  their  freedom  would  be  most 
high-spirited,  and  most  likely  to  rise  against  their  mas- 
ters. So  they  selected  about  two  thousand,  who  were 
crowned  with  garlands  and  went  in  procession  round 
the  temples  ;  they  were  supposed  to  have  received  their 
liberty  ;  but  not  long  afterwards  the  Spartans  put  them 
all  out  of  the  way,  and  no  man  knew  how  any  one  of 
them  came  by  his  end.  And  so  they  were  only  too 
glad  to  send  with  Brasidas  seven  hundred  hoplites  who 
were  Helots.  The  rest  of  his  army  he  hired  from  Pelo- 
ponnesus a.  He  himself  was  even  more  willing  to  go 
than  they  were  to  send  him.  The  Chalcidians  too  de-  8  1. 
sired  to  have  him,  for  at  Sparta  he  had  always  been  Justice  and 

•  r  A  •  i'  •        moderation 

considered  a  man  of  energy.  And  on  this  expedition  of  Brasidas 
he  proved  invaluable  to  the  Lacedaemonians.  At  the 
time  he  gave  an  impression  of  justice  and  moderation 
in  his  behaviour  to  the  cities,  which  induced  many  of 
them  to  revolt,  while  others  were  betrayed  into  his 
hands.  Thus  the  Lacedaemonians  were  able  to  lighten 
the  pressure  of  war  upon  Peloponnesus  ;  and  when 
shortly  afterwards  they  desired  to  negotiate,  they  had 
places  to  give  in  return  for  what  they  sought  to  recover. 
a  Cp.  iv.  70  med. 


300 


BRASIDAS    AND    PERDICCAS. 


IV. 


82. 

The  Athe- 
nians de- 
clare 
Perdiccas 
an  enemy. 


83- 


The  alliance 
between 
Perdiccas 
and  Brasi- 
das  soon 
begins  to 
cool. 
Dispute 
about  Ar- 
rhibaeus. 


And  at  a  later  period  of  the  war,  after  the  Sicilian  ex-  B.C.  424. 
pedition,  the  honesty  and  ability  of  Brasidas  which  some 
had  experienced,  and  of  which  others  had  heard  the  fame, 
mainly  attracted  the  Athenian  allies  to  the  Lacedaemo- 
nians. a  For  he  was  the  first  Spartan  who  had  gone  out 
to  them,  and  he  proved  himself  to  be  in  every  way  a 
good  man.  Thus  he  left  in  their  minds  a  firm  conviction 
that  the  others  would  be  like  him. 

The  Athenians,  hearing  of  the  arrival  of  Brasidas  in 
Chalcidice,  and  believing  that  Perdiccas  was  the  insti- 
gator of  the  expedition,  declared  the  latter  an  enemy 
and  kept  a  closer  watch  over  their  allies  in  that  region. 

Perdiccas,  at  once  uniting  the  soldiers  of  Brasidas  with 
his  own  forces,  made  war  upon  Arrhibaeus  the  son  of 
Bromerus,  king  of  the  Lyncestians,  a  neighbouring  people 
of  Macedonia ;  for  he  had  a  quarrel  with  him  and  wanted 
to  subdue  him.  But  when  he  and  Brasidas  and  the 
army  arrived  at  the  pass  leading  into  Lyncus,  Brasidas 
said  that  before  appealing  to  arms  he  should  like  to  try 
in  person  the  effect  of  negotiations,  and  see  if  he  could 
not  make  Arrhibaeus  an  ally  of  the  Lacedaemonians. 
He  was  partly  influenced  by  messages  which  came  from 
Arrhibaeus  expressing  his  willingness  to  submit  any 
matter  in  dispute  to  the  arbitration  of  Brasidas :  and 
the  Chalcidian  ambassadors  who  accompanied  the  ex- 
pedition recommended  him  not  to  remove  from  Per- 
diccas' path  all  his  difficulties,  lest,  when  they  were 
wanting  him  for  their  own  affairs,  his  ardour  should  cool. 
Besides,  the  envoys  of  Perdiccas  when  at  Sparta  had 
said  something  to  the  Lacedaemonians  about  his  making 
many  of  the  neighbouring  tribes  their  allies,  and  on  this 
ground  Brasidas  claimed  to  act  jointly  with  Perdiccas 
in  the  matter  of  Arrhibaeus.  But  Perdiccas  answered 
that  he  had  not  brought  Brasidas  there  to  arbitrate  in 
the  quarrels  of  Macedonia;  he  had  meant  him  to  destroy 

a  Or,  taking  Trpwros  closely  with  dogas :  '  For  of  all  the  Spartans 
who  had  been  sent  out,  he  was  the  first  who  proved  himself 
etc. 


BRAS  ID  AS   AT   ACANTHUS.  301 

B.C.  424.  his  enemies  when  he  pointed  them  out.  While  he,  Per-  IV. 
diccas,  was  maintaining  half  the  Lacedaemonian  army, 
Brasidas  had  no  business  to  be  holding  parley  with 
Arrhibaeus.  But  in  spite  of  the  opposition  and  resent- 
ment of  Perdiccas,  Brasidas  communicated  with  Arrhi- 
baeus, and  was  induced  by  his  words  to  withdraw  his 
army  without  invading  the  country.  From  that  time 
Perdiccas  thought  himself  ill-used,  and  paid  only  a  third 
instead  of  half  the  expenses  of  the  army. 

During  the  same  summer,  immediately  on  his  return      84. 
from  Lyncus,  and  a  little  before  the  vintage,  Brasidas,  Brasidas  is 
reinforced  by  Chalcidian  troops,  marched  against  Acan-  into  Acan- 


thus, a  colony  of  Andros.  The  inhabitants  of  the  city 
were  not  agreed  about  admitting  him  ;  those  who  in  the  citizens. 
concert  with  the  Chalcidians  had  invited  him  being 
opposed  to  the  mass  of  the  people.  So  he  asked  them 
to  receive  him  alone,  and  hear  what  he  had  to  say  be- 
fore they  decided  ;  and  to  this  request  the  multitude, 
partly  out  of  fear  for  their  still  ungathered  vintage,  were 
induced  to  consent.  Whereupon,  coming  forward  to  the 
people  (and  for  a  Lacedaemonian  he  was  not  a  bad 
speaker),  he  addressed  them  as  follows  :  — 

'  Men  of  Acanthus,  the  Lacedaemonians  have  sent  me      85. 
out  at  the  head  of  this  army  to  justify  the  declaration  We  come 
which  we  made  at  the  beginning  of  the  war  —  that  we 
were  going  to  fight  against  the  Athenians  for  the  liber- 


ties  of  Hellas.     If  we  have  been  long  in  coming,  the  why  do 

you  close 

reason  is  that  we  were  disappointed  in  the  result  of  the  your  gates 
war  nearer  home  ;    for  we  had  hoped  that,  without  in-  You'r  re-US  ' 
volving  you  in  danger,  we  might  ourselves  have  made  admVus 
a  speedy  end  of  the  Athenians.     And  therefore  let  no  ™5  have  a 

bad  effect 

one  blame  us  ;  we  have  come  as  soon  as  we  could,  and  on  other 
with  your  help  will  do  our  best  to  overthrow  them.    But  We  are 
how  is  it  that  you  close  your  gates  against  me,  and  do  ^}nn^0 
not  greet  my  arrival  ?   We  Lacedaemonians  thought  that  J.fP  y°u- 

J  We  were 

we  were  coming  to  those  who  even  before  we  came  in  act  too  strong 
were  our  allies  in  spirit,  and  would  joyfully  receive  us  ;  Athenians 
having  this  hope  we  have  braved  the  greatest  dangers,  at  Nlsaea- 


302  SPEECH   OF   BRASIDAS. 

IV.  marching  for  many  days  through  a  foreign  country,  B.C.  424. 
and  have  shown  the  utmost  zeal  in  your  cause.  And 
now,  for  you  to  be  of  another  mind  and  to  set  your- 
selves against  the  liberties  of  your  own  city  and  of  all 
Hellas  would  be  monstrous  !  The  evil  is  not  only  that 
you  resist  me  yourselves,  but  wherever  I  go  people  will 
be  less  likely  to  join  me  ;  they  will  be  offended  when 
they  hear  that  you  to  whom  I  first  came,  representing 
a  powerful  city  and  reputed  to  be  men  of  sense,  did 
not  receive  me,  and  I  shall  not  be  able  to  give  a  satis- 
factory explanation,  abut  shall  have  to  confess  either 
that  I  offer  a  spurious  liberty,  or  that  I  am  weak* 
and  incapable  of  protecting  you  against  the  threatened 
attack  of  the  Athenians.  And  yet  when  I  brought 
assistance  to  Nisaea  in  command  of  the  army  which 
I  have  led  hither,  the  Athenians,  though  more  numerous, 
refused  to  engage  with  me  ;  and  they  are  not  likely  now, 
when  their  forces  must  be  conveyed  by  sea,  to  send  an 
army  against  you  equal  to  that  which  they  had  at 
86.  Nisaea.  And  I  myself,  why  am  I  here  ?  I  come,  not 

I  am  not  to  injure,  but  to  emancipate  the  Hellenes.  And  I  have 
bound  the  government  of  Lacedaemon  by  the  most 
solemn  oaths  to  respect  the  independence  of  any  states 

not  enslave  which  I  may  bring  over  to  their  side.     I  do  not  want 

either  the 

few  or  the  to  gain  your  alliance  by  force  or  fraud,  but  to  give  you 
La<3dae-  *  ours,  that  we  may  free  you  from  the  Athenian  yoke. 
uTiike^he  I  think  that  you  ought  not  to  doubt  my  word  when 
Athenians,  j  offer  yOU  the  most  solemn  pledges,  nor  should  I  be 
character  regarded  as  an  inefficient  champion  ;  but  you  should 

to  lose.  ,       .    . 

confidently  join  me. 

1  If  any  one  among  you  hangs  back  because  he  has  a 
personal  fear  of  anybody  else,  and  is  under  the  impression 
that  I  shall  hand  over  the  city  to  a  party,  him  above  all 
I  would  reassure.  For  I  am  not  come  hither  to  be  the 
tool  of  a  faction  ;  nor  do  I  conceive  that  the  liberty 
which  I  bring  you  is  of  an  ambiguous  character  ;  I 


a  Or,  taking  firifyepeiv  after  alriav  ega  :   (  but  shall  be   deemed 
either  to  offer  a  spurious  liberty,  or  to  be  weak.' 


SPEECH   OF  BRASIDAS.  303 

B.C.  424.  should  forget  the  spirit  of  my  country  were  I  to  en-  IV. 
slave  the  many  to  the  few,  or  the  minority  to  the 
whole  people.  Such  a  tyranny  would  be  worse  than 
the  dominion  of  the  foreigner,  and  we  Lacedaemonians 
should  receive  no  thanks  in  return  for  our  trouble,  but 
instead  of  honour  and  reputation,  only  reproach.  We 
should  lay  ourselves  open  to  charges  far  more  detest- 
able than  those  which  are  our  best  weapons  against 
the  Athenians,  who  have  never  been  great  examples  of 
virtue.  For  to  men  of  character  there  is  more  disgrace 
in  seeking  aggrandisement  by  specious  deceit  than  by 
open  violence3;  the  violent  have  the  justification  of 
strength  which  fortune  gives  them,  but  a  policy  of  in- 
trigue is  insidious  and  wicked. 

'So  careful  are  we  where  our  highest  interests  are  at      87. 
stake.     And  not  to  speak  of  our  oaths,  you  cannot  have  if  you  will 
better   assurance   than   they  give  whose  actions,  when  friends,  we 
compared   with   their    professions,   afford   a   convincing  JJJJJ^JL 
proof  that  it  is  their  interest  to  keep  their  word.  ™ies: 

Having  a 

*  But  if  you  plead  that  you  cannot   accept   the   pro-  duty  to 
posals  which  I  offer,  and  insist  that  you  ought  not  to  w? cannot 


suffer  for  the  rejection  of  them  because  you  are  our 
friends. ;  if  you  are  of  opinion  that  liberty  is  perilous  sition 
and  should  not  in  justice  be  forced  upon  any  one,  but 
gently  brought  to  those  who  are  able  to  receive  it, — I 
shall  first  call  the  Gods  and  heroes  of  the  country  to 
witness  that  I  have  come  hither  for  your  good,  and  that 
you  would  not  be  persuaded  by  me :  I  shall  then  use 
force  and  ravage  your  country  without  any  more  scruple. 
I  shall  deem  myself  justified  by  two  overpowering  argu- 
ments. In  the  first  place,  I  must  not  permit  the  Lace- 
daemonians to  suffer  by  your  friendship,  and  suffer  they 
will  through  the  revenues  which  the  Athenians  will  con- 
tinue to  derive  from  you  if  you  do  not  join  me;  and 
in  the  second  place,  the  Hellenes  must  not  lose  their 
hope  of  liberation  by  your  fault.  On  any  other  ground 
we  should  certainly  be  wrong  in  taking  such  a  step ;  it 
a  Cp.  i.  77  med. 


304  THE    MISTAKE    OF    THE    DAY. 

IV.  is  only  for  the  sake  of  the  general  weal  that  we  Lace-  B.C.  424. 
daemonians  have  any  right  to  be  forcing  liberty  upon 
those  who  would  rather  not  have  it.  For  ourselves,  we 
are  far  from  desiring  empire,  but  we  want  to  overthrow 
the  empire  of  others.  And  having  this  end  in  view, 
we  should  do  injustice  to  the  majority  if,  while  bringing 
independence  to  all,  we  tolerated  opposition  in  you. 
Wherefore  be  well  advised.  Strive  to  take  the  lead  in 
liberating  Hellas,  and  lay  up  a  treasure  of  undying  fame. 
You  will  save  your  own  property,  and  you  will  crown 
your  city  with  glory.' 

88.  Thus  spoke  Brasidas.     The  Acanthians,  after  much 
TheAcan-  had  been  said  on  both  sides,  partly  under  the  attrac- 

thians,  who  . 

are  afraid     tion  of  his  words,  and  partly  because  they  were  afraid 

theirSvmt-    °f  losing  their  vintage,  determined  by  a  majority,  voting 

Srinedtoter~  secretly> to  revolt  from  Athens.     They  pledged  Brasidas 

revolt  from  to  stand  by  the  engagement  to  which  the  government 

of  Sparta  had  sworn  before  they  sent  him  out,  and  to 

respect  the  independence  of  all  whom  he  brought  over 

to  the  Lacedaemonian  alliance.     They  then  admitted 

his  army;  and  shortly  afterwards  Stageirus,  a  colony  of 

the  Andrians,  revolted  also.      Such  were  the  events  of 

the  summer. 

89.  Meanwhile  the  betrayal  of  Boeotia  into  the  hands  of 
The  plot      Hippocrates  and  Demosthenes,  the  Athenian  generals, 

for  the 

betrayal  was  on  the  eve  of  accomplishment.  At  the  beginning 
isdis-e0tl  of  the  ensuing  winter  Demosthenes  and  his  fleet  were 
covered.  j.Q  appear  a^  Siphae,  and  Hippocrates  simultaneously  to 
march  upon  Delium.  But  there  was  a  mistake  about 
the  day,  and  Demosthenes,  with  his  Acarnanian  and 
numerous  other  allies  drawn  from  that  neighbourhood, 
sailed  to  Siphae  too  soon.  His  attempt  failed ;  for  the 
plot  was  betrayed  by  Nicomachus  a  Phocian,  of  the  town 
of  Phanoteus,  who  told  the  Lacedaemonians,  and  they 
the  Boeotians.  Whereupon  there  was  a  general  levy,  of 
the  Boeotians,  for  Hippocrates,  who  was  to  have  been 
in  the  country  and  to  have  distracted  their  attention, 
had  not  yet  arrived  ;  and  so  they  forestalled  the  Athe- 


THE   ATHENIANS    FORTIFY  DELIUM.       305 

B.C.  424.  nians   by   the    occupation   of    Siphae    and    Chaeronea.       IV. 
When  the  conspirators  in  the  Boeotian  cities  saw  that 
there  had  been  a  mistake  they  made  no  movement  from 
within. 

Hippocrates  had  called  out  the  whole  force  of  Athens,      9°- 
metics   as  well   as   citizens,  and  all   the   strangers  who 
were  then  in  the  city.     But  he  did  not  arrive  at  Delium 
until  after  the  Boeotians  had  retired  from  Siphae.     He  fortify 
encamped  and  fortified  Delium,  which  is  a  temple  of 
Apollo.     His  army  dug  a  trench  around  the  temple  and 
the  sacred  precinct,  the  earth  which  they  threw  up  out  leaves  the 

.    .  J  Boeotian 

of  the  trench  forming  a  rampart ;  along  this  rampart  territory, 
they  drove  in  a  palisade,  and  cutting  down  the  vines 
in  the  neighbourhood  of  the  temple  threw  them  on 
the  top.  They  made  a  like  use  of  the  stones  and 
bricks  of  the  houses  near,  which  they  pulled  down,  and 
by  every  means  in  their  power  strove  to  increase  the 
height  of  the  rampart.  Where  the  temple  buildings 
did  not  extend  they  erected  wooden  towers  at  con- 
venient places ;  the  cloister  which  had  once  existed 
had  fallen  down.  They  began  their  work  on  the  third 
day  after  their  departure  from  Athens,  and  continued 
all  this  and  the  two  following  days  until  the  mid-day 
meal.  When  it  was  nearly  finished  the  army  retired 
from  Delium  to  a  distance  of  a  little  more  than  a  mile, 
intending  to  go  home.  The  greater  part  of  the  light- 
armed  troops  proceeded  on  their  march,  but  the  hoplites 
piled  their  arms  and  rested.  Hippocrates,  who  had 
remained  behind,  was  occupied  in  placing  the  guards  at 
their  posts,  and  in  superintending  the  completion  of  that 
part  of  the  outworks  which  was  still  unfinished. 

Meanwhile  the  Boeotians  were  gathering  at  Tanagra.      91. 
All  the  forces  from  the  different  cities  had  now  arrived.  The  Boe°- 

tians  at  the 

They  saw  that  the  Athenians  were  already  marching  instigation 
homewards,  and  most  of  the  Boeotarchs  (who  are  in  dlfdftS- 
number  eleven)  disapproved  of  giving  battle,  because  the  ™rseue°the 
enemy  had  left  the  Boeotian  territory.  For  when  the  Athenians 

.  .  .  across  the 

Athenians  rested  m  their  march  they  were  just  on  the  border. 


306  SPEECH   OF  PAGO  NBAS. 

IV.  borders  of  Oropia.  But  Pagondas  the  son  of  Aeoladas,  B.C.  424. 
one  of  the  two  Boeotarchs  from  Thebes,  who  was  in 
command  at  the  time  (the  other  being  Arianthidas  the 
son  of  Lysimachidas),  a  wanted  to  fight  %  believing  that 
the  risk  was  worth  encountering.  So  calling  the  sol- 
diers to  him  in  successive  divisions,  that  they  might  not 
all  leave  their  arms  at  once,  he  exhorted  the  Boeotians 
to  march  against  the  Athenians  and  to  hazard  battle,  in 
the  following  words  :  — 

92.  'Men  of  Boeotia,  no  one  among  us  generals  should 

TheAthe-   ever  have  allowed  the  thought  to  enter  his  mind  that 

nians  are  _    ,          •  «      «        •    «        •  11  1 

our  in-  we  ought  not  to  fight  with  the  Athenians,  even  although 
enemies,  we  may  not  overtake  them  on  Boeotian  soil.  They 
weefindGr  have  crossed  our  frontier  ;  it  is  Boeotia  in  which  they 
them.  have  built  a  fort,  and  Boeotia  which  they  intend  to  lay 
the  aggres-  waste.  Our  enemies  they  clearly  are  wherever  we  find 
them,  and  therefore  in  that  country  out  of  which  they 


ourselves     came  and  did  us  mischief.     But   perhaps  not   to   fight 
them"*       may  aPPear  t°  some  one  to  be  the  safer  course.     Well 


without       then,  let  him  who  thinks  so  think  again.     When  a  man 

i.-rii  •  r   i   •  r  1   • 

being  in  full  possession  of  his  own  goes  out  of  his  way 
to  attack  others  because  he  covets  more,  he  cannot  re- 


andfne°Tr'e  ^ect  to°  muc^  5  kut  w^en  a  man  'ls  attacked  by  another 
the  most  and  has  to  fight  for  his  own,  prudence  does  not  allow 
of  afier01  '  of  reflection.  In  you  the  temper  has  been  hereditary 


which  would  repel  the  foreign  invader,  whether  he  be  in 
mercy  ;  but  another's  country  or  in  your  own  ;  the  Athenian  invader 
covered  our  above  all  others  should  be  thus  repelled,  because  he 

liberty  at  .    ,  ^  .    , 

Coronea,     is  your  next   neighbour,     ror  among  neighbours   an- 

agairTshow  tagonism    is    ever    a    condition    of   independence,    and 

we  cannot    agamst  men  ^^e  tnese>  who  are  seeking  to  enslave  not 

be  attacked  only  near  but  distant  countries,  shall  we  not  fight  to 

punity.        the  last?     Look  at  their  treatment  of  Euboea  just  over 

the  strait,  and  of  the  greater  part  of  Hellas.     I  would 

have  you  know,  that  whereas  other  men  fight  with  their 

neighbours  about  the  lines  of  a  frontier,  for  us,  if  we 

a  Or,  omitting  the  words  '  who  was  in  command  at  the  time  :  * 
'  wanted  to  fight  while  he  held  the  command.' 


THE    BOEOTIANS   PREPARE    TO    FIGHT.     307 

B.C.  424.  are  conquered,  there  will  be  no  more  disputing  about  IV. 
frontiers,  but  one  fixed  boundary,  including  our  whole 
country,  for  the  Athenians  will  come  in  and  take  by 
force  all  that  we  have.  So  much  more  dangerous  are 
they  than  ordinary  neighbours.  And  men  who,  like 
them,  wantonly  assail  others,  will  not  hesitate  to  attack 
him  who  remains  quietly  at  home  and  only  defends 
himself;  but  they  are  not  so  ready  to  overbear  the 
adversary  who  goes  out  of  his  own  country  to  meet 
them,  and  when  there  is  an  opportunity  strikes  first. 
We  have  proved  this  in  our  own  dealings  with  the 
Athenians.  Once,  owing  to  our  internal  dissensions, 
they  took  possession  of  our  land,  but  we  overcame 
r  B.C.  447.  them  at  Coronea,  and  gave  Boeotia  that  complete  se- 
2'  curity  which  has  lasted  to  this  day a.  Remember  the 
past :  let  the  elder  men  among  us  emulate  their  own 
earlier  deeds,  and  the  younger  who  are  the  sons  of  those 
valiant  fathers  do  their  best  not  to  tarnish  the  virtues 
of  their  race.  Confident  that  the  God  whose  temple 
they  have  impiously  fortified  and  now  occupy  will  be 
our  champion,  and  relying  on  the  sacrifices,  which  are 
favourable  to  us,  let  us  advance  to  meet  them.  They 
may  satisfy  their  greed  by  attacking  those  who  do  not 
defend  themselves ;  but  we  will  show  them  that  from 
men  whose  generous  spirit  ever  impels  them  to  fight 
for  the  liberties  of  their  country,  and  who  will  not  see 
that  of  others  unjustly  enslaved, — from  such  men  they 
will  not  part  without  a  battle.' 

With  this  exhortation  Pagondas  persuaded  the  Boeo-      93- 
tians  to  march  against  the  Athenians,  and  quickly  moved  The  Boeo- 
his  army  forward  (for  the  day  was  far  advanced).    As  soon  numbering 
as  he  approached  the  enemy  he  took  up  a  position  where  eighteen 
a  hill  intercepted  the  view,  and  there  drew  up  his  army 
and  prepared  for  action.     Hippocrates,  who  was  still  at 
Delium,  heard  that  the  Boeotians  were  advancing,  and  division 
sent   a   message   to  the  army  bidding  them   get   into  twenty-five 
position.       He    himself    came    up    shortly    afterwards, deep>  ap~ 
a  Cp.  iii.  62  fin. 
X   2 


308  DISPOSITION   OF    THE   FORCES. 

IV.  having  left  three  hundred  cavalry  at  Delium,  in  order  B.C.  424. 
tPheeacSre°sVter  that  ^^  might  Pr°tect  the  place  if  assailed,  and  also  ° 
of  a  hm.  might  watch  their  opportunity  and  attack  the  Boeotians 
while  the  battle  was  going  on.  To  these  the  Boeotians 
opposed  a  separate  force.  When  everything  was  ready 
they  appeared  over  the  crest  of  the  hill,  and  halted  in 
the  order  which  they  proposed  to  maintain  in  the  engage- 
ment ;  they  numbered  about  seven  thousand  hoplites, 
more  than  ten  thousand  light-armed  troops,  a  thousand 
cavalry,  and  five  hundred  targeteers.  The  Thebans  and 
the  Boeotians  of  the  adjoining  district  occupied  the  right 
wing.  In  the  centre  were  the  men  of  Haliartus,  Coronea, 
and  Copae,  and  the  other  dwellers  about  the  Lake 
Copais.  On  the  left  wing  were  the  Thespians,  Tanag- 
raeans,  and  Orchomenians  ;  the  cavalry  and  light-armed 
troops  were  placed  on  both  wings.  The  Thebans  were 
formed  in  ranks  of  five  and  twenty  deep  ;  the  formation 
of  the  others  varied.  Such  was  the  character  and  array 
of  the  Boeotian  forces. 

94.  All  the  hoplites  of  the  Athenian  army  were  arranged 
Numbers  jn  ranks  eight  deep  ;  their  numbers  equalled  those  of 
Athenian  their  opponents  ;  the  cavalry  were  stationed  on  either 
about  The  wing.  No  regular  light-armed  troops  accompanied  them, 


for  Athens  had  no  organised  force  of  this  kind.  Those 
tian  :  they  who  originally  joined  the  expedition  were  many  times 
up  eight  over  the  number  of  the  enemy  ;  but  they  were  to  a  great 
extent  without  proper  arms,  for  the  whole  force,  strangers 
as  well  as  citizens,  had  been  called  out.  Having  once 
started  homewards,  there  were  but  few  of  them  forth- 
coming in  the  engagement.  When  the  Athenians  were 
ranged  in  order  of  battle  and  on  the  point  of  advancing, 
Hippocrates  the  general,  proceeding  along  the  lines, 
exhorted  them  as  follows  :  — 

95.          'Men  of  Athens,  there  is  not  much  time  for  exhorta- 
We  are       tion,  but  to  the  brave  a  few  words  are  as  good  as  many; 

fighting  not 

only  to  gain  I  am  only  going  to  remind,  not  to  admonish  you  a.     Let 
a  Cp.  iv.  17  med.,  126  init.  ;  v.  69  fin. 


BATTLE    OF   DELIUM.  309 

B.C.  424.  no  man  think  that  because  we  are  on  foreign  soil  we  are       IV. 
running  into  great  danger  without  cause.     Although  in  ?oe<?tia'h 
Boeotian  territory  we  shall  be  fighting  for  our  own.     If  safety  and 

,          -r»    i  .  .          .        ,        r     .  1       liberties  of 

we   are   victors,   the    Peloponnesians,    deprived   of    the  Athens. 


Boeotian  cavalry,  will  never  invade  our  land  again,  so 
that  in  one  battle  you  win  Boeotia  and  win  at  the  same 

worthy  of 

time  for  Attica  a  more  complete  freedom.     Meet  them  her,  worthy 
in  a  spirit  worthy  of  the  first  city  in  Hellas  —  of  that  victors  at 
Athens  which  we  are   all  proud  to    call  our  country;  Oenophyta- 
in  a  spirit  too  worthy  of  our  fathers,  who  in  times  past 
under  Myronides  at   Oenophyta  overcame  these   very 
Boeotians  and  conquered  their  land/ 

Thus  spoke  Hippocrates,  and  had  gone  over  half  the      96. 
army,  not  having  had  time  for  more,  when  the  Boeotians  The  risht 

J  '  wing  of  the 

(to   whom    Pagondas    just   before    engaging   had   been  Athenians 
making  a  second  short  exhortation)  raised  the  Paean, 
and  came  down  upon  them  from  the  hill.     The  Athe- 
nians  hastened  forward,  and  the  two  armies  met  at  a  run.  wing  of  the 

Boeotians 

The  extreme  right  and  left  of  either  army  never  engaged,  overcomes" 
for  the  same  reason  ;  they  were  both  prevented  by  water- 


courses.  But  the  rest  closed,  and  there  was  a  fierce 
struggle  and  pushing  of  shield  against  shield.  The  left 
wing  of  the  Boeotians  as  far  as  their  'centre  was  worsted  Boeotian 
by  the  Athenians,  who  pressed  hard  upon  this  part  of  Xh^nTans6 
the  army,  especially  upon  the  Thespians.  For  the  troops  Defeated!7 
ranged  at  their  side  having  given  way  they  were  sur- 
rounded and  hemmed  in  ;  and  so  the  Thespians  who 
perished  were  cut  down  fighting  hand  to  hand.  Some  of 
the  Athenians  themselves  in  surrounding  the  enemy  were 
thrown  into  confusion  and  unwittingly  slew  one  another. 
On  this  side  then  the  Boeotians  were  overcome,  and  fled 
to  that  part  of  the  army  which  was  still  fighting  ;  but 
the  right  wing,  where  the  Thebans  were  stationed,  over- 
came the  Athenians,  and  forcing  them  back,  at  first  step 
by  step,  were  following  hard  upon  them,  when  Pagondas, 
seeing  that  his  left  wing  was  in  distress,  sent  two  squad- 
rons of  horse  unperceived  round  the  hill.  They  suddenly 
appeared  over  the  ridge  ;  the  victorious  wing  of  the  Athe- 


310    THE  BOEOTIAN  AND  ATHENIAN  HERALDS. 

IV.  nians,  fancying  that  another  army  was  attacking  them,  8.0.424. 
was  struck  with  panic ;  and  so  at  both  points,  partly 
owing  to  this  diversion,  and  partly  to  the  pressure  of  the 
advancing  Thebans  who  broke  their  line,  the  rout  of  the 
Athenian  army  became  general.  Some  fled  to  the  sea 
at  Delium,  others  towards  Oropus,  others  to  Mount 
Parnes,  or  in  any  direction  which  gave  hope  of  safety. 
The  Boeotians,  especially  their  cavalry  and  that  of  the 
Locrians  which  arrived  when  the  rout  had  begun,  pursued 
and  slaughtered  them.  Night  closed  upon  the  pursuit, 
and  aided  the  mass  of  the  fugitives  in  their  escape.  On 
the  next  day  those  of  them  who  had  reached  Oropus  and 
Delium,  which,  though  defeated,  they  still  held,  were 
conveyed  home  by  sea.  A  garrison  was  left  in  the 
place. 

97.  The  Boeotians,  after  raising  a  trophy,  took  up  their 

TheAthe-    own  dead,  and  despoiled  those  of  the   enemy.     They 

nians  are  .  _  .   . 

refused  then  left  them  under  the  care  of  a  guard,  and  retiring 
Kr^ion  to  Tanagra  concerted  an  attack  upon  Delium.  The 
their  dead,  herald  of  the  Athenians,  as  he  was  on  his  way  to  ask 

on  the  J 

ground  for  their  dead,  met  a  Boeotian  herald,  who  turned  him 
have  been  back,  declaring  that  he  would  get  no  answer  until  he 
facrifege.  had  returned  himself.  He  then  came  before  the  Athe- 
nians and  delivered  to  them  the  message  of  the  Boeo- 
tians, by  whom  they  were  accused  of  transgressing  the 
universally  recognised  customs  of  Hellas.  Those  who 
invaded  the  territory  of  others  ever  abstained  from 
touching  the  temples,  whereas  the  Athenians  had  forti- 
fied Delium  and  were  now  dwelling  there,  and  doing  all 
that  men  usually  do  in  an  unconsecrated  place.  They 
were  even  drawing,  for  common  use,  the  water  which  the 
Boeotians  themselves  were  forbidden  to  use  except  as 
holy  water  for  the  sacrifices.  They  therefore  on  behalf 
both  of  the  God  and  of  themselves,  invoking  Apollo 
and  all  the  divinities  who  had  a  share  in  the  temple, 
bade  the  Athenians  depart  and  carry  off  what  belonged 
to  them. 
98.  Upon  the  delivery  of  this  message  the  Athenians  sent 


DISPUTE    ABOUT   THE    TEMPLE.  311 

B.C.  424.  to  the  Boeotians  a  herald  of  their  own,  who  on  their       IV. 
89'      behalf  declared  that   they  had  done  no  injury  to  the  ™e  Athe- 
temple,  and  were  not  going  to  do  any  if  they  could  help ;  defend 

...          themselves 

they  had  not  originally  entered  it  with  any  injurious  against  the 
intent,  but  in  order  that  from  it  they  might  defend  s 
themselves  against  those  who  were  really  injuring  them. 
According  to  Hellenic  practice,  they  who  were  masters  their  op- 
of  the  land,  whether  much  or  little,  invariably  had  posses-  P( 
sion  of  the  temples,  to  which  they  were  bound  to  show  the 
customary  reverence,  but  in  such  ways  only  as  were  pos- 
sible. There  was  a  time  when  the  Boeotians  themselves 
and  most  other  nations,  including  all  who  had  driven 
out  the  earlier  inhabitants  of  the  land  which  they  now 
occupied,  attacked  the  temples  of  others,  and  these  had 
in  time  become  their  own.  So  the  Boeotian  temples 
would  have  become  theirs  if  they  had  succeeded  in 
conquering  more  of  Boeotia.  So  much  of  the  country 
as  they  did  occupy  was  their  own,  and  they  did  not 
mean  to  leave  it  until  compelled.  As  to  meddling  with 
the  water,  they  could  not  help  themselves ;  the  use  of 
it  was  a  necessity  which  they  had  not  incurred  wantonly ; 
they  were  resisting  the  Boeotians  who  had  begun  by 
attacking  their  territory.  When  men  were  constrained 
by  war,  or  by  some  other  great  calamity,  there  was  every 
reason  to  think  that  their  offence  was  forgiven  by  the 
God  himself.  He  who  has  committed  an  involuntary 
misdeed  finds  a  refuge  at  the  altar,  and  men  are  said 
to  transgress,  not  when  they  presume  a  little  in  their 
distress,  but  when  they  do  evil  of  their  own  free-will. 
The  Boeotians,  who  demanded  a  sacred  place  as  a 
ransom  for  the  bodies  of  the  dead,  were  guilty  of  a  far 
greater  impiety  than  the  Athenians  who  refused  to  make 
such  an  unseemly  bargain.  They  desired  the  Boeotians 
to  let  them  take  away  their  dead,  not  adding  the  con- 
dition "if  they  would  quit  Boeotia,"  for  in  fact  they 
were  in  a  spot  which  they  had  fairly  won  by  arms  and 
not  in  Boeotia,  but  simply  saying  "  if  they  would  make 
a  truce  according  to  ancestral  custom." ' 


312     DELIUM    TAKEN  BY    THE    BOEOTIANS. 

IV.          The  Boeotians  replied  that  if  they  were  in  Boeotia  B.C.  424. 
oQt       they   might   take   what   belonged   to   them,    but    must 
The  depart  out  of  it  ;   if  they  were  in  their  own  land  they 

could  do  as  tne7  Phased.     They  knew  that  the  territory 


about  the     Of  Qropus,  in  which  the  dead  lay  (for  the  battle  took 

spot  in  J     } 

which  the  place  on  the  border),  was  actually  in  the  possession  of 
bodies  lie.  Athens,  but  that  the  Athenians  could  not  take  them  away 
without  their  leave,  aand  they  were  unwilling  as  they 
pretended  to  make  a  truce  respecting  a  piece  of  ground 
which  did  not  belong  to  thema.  And  to  say  in  their 
reply  'that  if  they  would  quit  Boeotian  ground  they 
might  take  what  they  asked  for,'  sounded  plausible. 
Thereupon  the  Athenian  herald  departed,  leaving  his 
purpose  unaccomplished. 

IOO.          The  Boeotians  immediately  sent  for  javelin-men  and 
They          slingers  from  the  Malian  Gulf.     They  had  been  joined 

attack,  and, 

by  the  help  after  the  battle  by  the  Corinthians  with  two  thousand 


hoplites,  and  by  the  Peloponnesian  garrison  which  had 
SkeDeHum  evacuated  Nisaeab,  as  well  as  by  some  Megarians. 
seventeen  They  now  marched  against  Delium  and  attacked  the 

days  after  * 

the  battle,  rampart,  employing  among  other  military  devices  an 
engine,  with  which  they  succeeded  in  taking  the  place  ; 
it  was  of  the  following  description.  They  sawed  in  two 
and  hollowed  out  a  great  beam,  which  they  joined 
together  again  very  exactly,  like  a  flute,  and  suspended 
a  vessel  by  chains  at  the  end  of  the  beam  ;  the  iron 
mouth  of  a  bellows  directed  downwards  into  the  vessel 
was  attached  to  the  beam,  of  which  a  great  part  was  itself 
overlaid  with  iron.  This  machine  they  brought  up  from 
a  distance  on  carts  to  various  points  of  the  rampart 
where  vine  stems  and  wood  had  been  most  extensively 
used,  and  when  it  was  quite  near  the  wall  they  applied 
a  large  bellows  to  their  own  end  of  the  beam,  and  blew 
through  it.  The  blast,  prevented  from  escaping,  passed 

a  Or,  taking  dijdev  with  vnep  rrjs  eWi/o>i>:  'and  they  were  unwil- 
ling to  make  a  truce  respecting  a  piece  of  ground  which  was  claimed 
by  the  Athenians.' 

b  Cp.  iv.  69  fin. 


EXPEDITION  AGAINST    AMPHIPOLIS.        313 

B.C.  424.  into  the  vessel  which  contained  burning  coals  and  sul-  IV. 
phur  and  pitch  ;  these  made  a  huge  flame,  and  set  fire 
to  the  rampart,  so  that  no  one  could  remain  upon  it. 
The  garrison  took  flight,  and  the  fort  was  taken.  Some 
were  slain  ;  two  hundred  were  captured  ;  but  the  greater 
number  got  on  board  their  ships  and  so  reached  home. 

Delium  was  captured  seventeen  days  after  the  battle.      101. 
The  Athenian  herald  came  shortly  afterwards  in  igno-  ™ey  now 

give  up 

ranee  of  its  fate  to  ask  again  for  the  dead,  and  now  the  the  dead, 
Boeotians,  instead  of  repeating  their  former  answer,  gave 
them  up.     In  the  battle  the  Boeotians  lost  somewhat 

less  than  five  hundred  ;  the  Athenians  not  quite  a  thou-  is  Hippo- 

crates the 

sand,  and  Hippocrates  their  general  ;  also  a  great  number  general. 
of  light-armed  troops  and  baggage-bearers. 

Shortly  after  the  battle  of  Delium,  Demosthenes,  on  Failure  of 
the  failure  of  the  attempt  to  betray  Siphae,  against 
which  he  had  sailed  with  forty  ships  a,  employed  the 
Agraean  and  Acarnanian  troops  together  with  four 
hundred  Athenian  hoplites  whom  he  had  on  board  in 
a  descent  on  the  Sicyonian  coast.  Before  all  the  fleet 
had  reached  the  shore  the  Sicyonians  came  out  against 
the  invaders,  put  to  flight  those  who  had  landed,  and 
pursued  them  to  their  ships,  killing  some,  and  making 
prisoners  of  others.  They  then  erected  a  trophy,,  and 
gave  back  the  dead  under  a  flag  of  truce. 

While  the  affair  of  Delium  was  going  on,  Sitalces  the  Death  of 
Odrysian  king  died  ;   he  had  been  engaged  in  an  ex-  who  is  ' 


pedition  against  the  Triballi,  by  whom  he  was  defeated 
in  battle.  Seuthes  the  son  of  Spardocusb,  his  nephew, 
succeeded  him  in  the  kingdom  of  the  Odrysians  and 
the  rest  of  his  Thracian  dominions. 

During  the  same  winter,  Brasidas  and  his  Chalcidian      102. 
allies  made  an  expedition  against  Amphipolis  upon  the  The  first, 

c^  *.I/A  *.t_   .'••••  i  %nt5  1  second,  and 

river  Strymon,  the  Athenian  colony.     The  place  where  third  foun- 


the   city  now  stands  is  the  same  which  Aristagoras  of 
B.C.  497.  Miletus  in  days  of  old,  when  he  was  flying  from  King  pohs< 
Darius,   attempted  to  colonise  ;    he  was  driven  out  by 
a  Cp.  iv.  77  init,  89.  b  Cp.  ii.  101  fin. 


3  14  BRAS  I  DAS   AT   AMPH1POLIS. 

IV.      the  Edoniansa.     Two  and  thirty  years  afterwards  the  B.C.  424. 
Athenians  made  another  attempt  ;   they  sent  a  colony 
of  ten  thousand,  made  up  partly  of  their  own  citizens,  B.C.  465. 
partly  of  any  others  who  liked  to  join  ;  but  these  also  OL  ?S>  4* 
were    attacked    by   the    Thracians   at   Drabescus,   and 
perished  b.    Twenty-nine  years  later  the  Athenians  came 
again,  under  the  leadership  of  Hagnon  the  son  of  Nicias, 
drove  out  the  Edonians,  and  built  a  town  on  the  same  B.C.  437. 
spot,  which  was  formerly  called  '  The  Nine  Ways.'   Their    lm  85<  4' 
base  of  operations   was   Eion,  a   market   and   seaport 
which  they  already  possessed,  at  the  mouth  of  the  river, 
about  three  miles  from  the  site  of  the  present  town,  which 
Hagnon  called  Amphipolis,  because  on  two  sides  it  is 
surrounded  by  the  river  Strymon,  and  strikes  the  eye 
both  by  sea  and  land.     Wanting  to  enclose  the  newly- 
founded  city,  he  cut  it  off  by  a  long  wall  reaching  from 
the  upper  part  of  the  river  to  the  lower. 

103.         Against  Amphipolis  Brasidas  now  led  his  army.    Start- 
'm&  ^rom  Aniae  in  Chalcidice,  towards  evening  he  reached 


by  the         Aulon  and  Bromiscus  at  the  point  where  the  lake  Bolbe 

inhabitants  . 

of  Argiius,    flows  into  the  sea  ;  having  there  supped,  he  marched  on 

duct  his1"     during  the  night.     The  weather  was  wintry  and  some- 

tSTbridge    wnat  snowy;  and  so  he  pushed  on  all  the  quicker  ;  he  was 

near  Am-     hoping  that  his  approach  might  be  known  at  Amphi- 

polis only  to  those  who  were  in  the  secret.     There  dwelt 

in  the  place  settlers  from  Argiius,  a  town  which  was 

originally   colonised   from   Andros  ;   these    and   others 

aided  in   the   attempt,    instigated   some   by   Perdiccas, 

others  by  the  Chalcidians.     The  town  of  Argiius  is  not 

far  off,  and  the  inhabitants  were  always  suspected  by 

the  Athenians,  and  were  always  conspiring  against  Am- 

phipolis.    For  some  time  past,  ever  since  the  arrival  of 

Brasidas  had  given  them  an  opportunity,  they  had  been 

concerting   measures  with  their  countrymen  inside  the 

walls  for  the  surrender  of  the  city.     They  now  revolted 

from  the  Athenians,  and  received  him  into  their  town. 

On  that  very  night  they  conducted  the  army  onwards 

a  Cp.  Herod,  v.  124.  b  Cp.  i.  100  fin. 


THUCYDIDES.  315 

B.C.  424.  to  the  bridge  over  the  river,  which  is  at  some  distance  IV. 
from  the  town.  At  that  time  no  walls  had  been  built 
down  to  the  river,  as  they  have  since  been  ;  a  small 
guard  was  posted  there.  Brasidas  easily  overcame  the 
guard,  owing  partly  to  the  plot  within  the  walls,  partly 
to  the  severity  of  the  weather  and  the  suddenness  of  his 
attack  ;  he  then  crossed  the  bridge,  and  at  once  became 
master  of  all  the  possessions  of  the  Amphipolitans  out- 
side the  walls.  For  they  lived  scattered  about  in  the 
country. 

The  passage  of  the  river  was  a  complete  surprise  to  the     104. 
citizens  within  the  walls.    Many  who  dwelt  outside  were  ^j^5 
taken.     Others  fled  into  the  town.     The  Amphipolitans  outside  the 

walls  is 

were  in  great  consternation,  for  they  suspected  one  an-  now  at 


other.  alt  is  even  said  that  Brasidas,  if,  instead  of  allow- 
ing  his  army  to  plunder,  he  had  marched  direct  to  the 
place,  would  probably  a  have  captured  it.  But  he  merely  place  before 

.  .  .  -11       Thucydides 

occupied  a  position,  and  overran  the  country  outside  the  arrives, 
walls  ;  and  then,  finding  that  his  confederates  within 
•failed  in  accomplishing  their  part,  he  took  no  further 
step.  Meanwhile  the  opponents  of  the  conspirators  being 
superior  in  number  prevented  the  immediate  opening  of 
the  gates,  and  acting  with  Eucles,  the  general  to  whose 
care  the  place  had  been  committed  by  the  Athenians, 
sent  for  help  to  the  other  general  in  Chalcidice,  Thucy- 
dides the  son  of  Olorus,  who  wrote  this  history;  he 
was  then  at  Thasos,  an  island  colonised  from  Paros,  and 
distant  from  Amphipolis  about  half  a  day's  sail.  As 
soon  as  he  heard  the  tidings  he  sailed  quickly  to  Am- 
phipolis with  seven  ships  which  happened  to  be  on  the 
spot  ;  he  wanted  to  get  into  Amphipolis  if  possible 
before  it  could  capitulate,  or  at  any  rate  to  occupy  Eion. 

Meanwhile  Brasidas,  fearing  the  arrival  of  the  ships      IOc. 
from  Thasos,   and   hearing   that   Thucydides   had   the  and  there- 
right  of  working  gold  mines   in  the  neighbouring  dis-  modest? 
trict  of  Thrace,  and  was  consequently  one  of  the  leading  terms- 

a  Or,  '  It  is  said  to  have  been  the  impression  that  Brasidas  '  etc., 
omitting  '  probably.' 


316  SURRENDER   OF  AMPHIPOLIS. 

IV.  men  of  the  country,  did  his  utmost  to  get  possession  of  B.C.  424. 
the  city  before  his  arrival.  He  was  afraid  that,  if  Thucy- 
dides  once  came,  the  people  of  Amphipolis  would  no 
longer  be  disposed  to  surrender.  For  their  hope  would 
be  that  he  would  bring  in  allies  by  sea  from  the  islands, 
or  collect  troops  in  Thrace,  and  relieve  them.  He  there- 
fore offered  moderate  terms,  proclaiming  that  any  Am- 
phipolitan  or  Athenian  might  either  remain  in  the  city 
and  have  the  enjoyment  of  his  property  on  terms  of 
equality;  or  if  he  preferred,  might  depart,  taking  his 
goods  with  him,  within  five  days. 

1 06.  When  the  people  heard  the  proclamation  they  began 
which  are    to  waver  ;  for  very  few  of  the  citizens  were  Athenians, 
by  the  in-     the  greater  number  being  a  mixed   multitude.     Many 
Thucydides  within  the  walls  were  relatives  of  those  who  had  been 
buTfstoo11'  caPtured   outside.      In   their   alarm    they   thought   the 
late  to         terms  reasonable  ;  the  Athenian  population  because  they 

save  Am- 
phipolis.     were  too  glad  to  withdraw,  reflecting  how  much  greater 

their  share  of  the  danger  was,  and  not  expecting  speedy 
relief;  the  rest  of  the  people  because  they  retained  all* 
their  existing  rights,  and  were  delivered  from  a  fate 
which  seemed  inevitable.  The  partisans  of  Brasidas 
now  proceeded  to  justify  his  proposals  without  disguise, 
for  they  saw  that  the  mind  of  the  whole  people  had 
changed,  and  that  they  no  longer  paid  any  regard  to  the 
Athenian  general  who  was  on  the  spot.  So  his  terms 
were  accepted,  and  the  city  was  surrendered  and  de- 
livered up  to  him.  On  the  evening  of  the  same  day 
Thucydides  and  his  ships  sailed  into  Eion,  but  not  until 
Brasidas  had  taken  possession  of  Amphipolis,  missing 
Eion  only  by  a  night.  For  if  the  ships  had  not  come 
to  the  rescue  with  all  speed,  the  place  would  have  been 
in  his  hands  on  the  next  morning. 

107.  Thucydides  now  put  Eion  in  a  state  of  defence,  de- 
Brasidas      siring  to  provide  not  only  against  any  immediate  attempt 

sails  down  J  J 


the  river  to  of  Brasidas,  but  also  against  future  danger.  He  received 
faS-Tin  Ut  the  fugitives  who  had  chosen  to  quit  Amphipolis  accord- 
place2  the  ing  to  tne  agreement  and  wished  to  come  into  Eion. 


ALARM   OF    THE    ATHENIANS.  317 

B.C.  424.  Brasidas  suddenly  sailed  with  a  number  of  small  craft  IV. 
down  the  river  to  Eion,  hoping  that  he  might  take  the 
point  which  runs  out  from  the  wall,  and  thereby  com- 
mand the  entrance  to  the  harbour  ;  at  the  same  time 
he  made  an  attack  by  land.  But  in  both  these  attempts 
he  was  foiled.  Whereupon  he  returned,  and  took  mea- 
sures for  the  settlement  of  Amphipolis.  The  Edonian 
town  of  Myrcinus  joined  him,  Pittacus  the  king  of  the 
Edonians  having  been  assassinated  by  the  children  of 
Goaxis  and  Brauro  his  wife.  Soon  afterwards  Galepsus 
and  Aesyme  (both  colonies  from  Thasos)  came  over  to 
him.  Perdiccas  likewise  arrived  shortly  after  the  taking 
of  Amphipolis,  and  assisted  him  in  settling  the  newly- 
acquired  towns. 

The  Athenians  were  seriously  alarmed  at  the  loss  of     108. 
Amphipolis  ;   the  place  was  very  useful  to  them,  and  The  Athe- 
supplied  them  with  a  revenue,  and  with  timber  which 
they  imported  for  ship-building.    As  far  as  the  Strymon 


the  Lacedaemonians  could  always  have  found  a  way  to  P°IIS  be~ 

cause  it   * 

the  allies  of  Athens,  if  the  Thessalians  allowed  them  to  opens  the 
pass  ;    but  until   they  gained  possession  of  the  bridge  other  °aiiiesr 


they  could  proceed  no  further,  because,  for  a  long  way 
above,  the  river  forms  a  large  lake,  and  below,  towards  in&  cijies 

3  miscalcu- 

Eion,  it  was  guarded  by  triremes.     All  difficulty  seemed  jated,  but 
now  to  be  removed,  and  the  Athenians  feared  that  more  natural  that 
of  their  allies  would  revolt.    For  Brasidas  in  all  his  actions 
showed   himself  reasonable,  and  whenever   he  made  a 
speech  lost  no  opportunity  of  declaring  that  he  was  sent  character  of 

L.  ,  .          Brasidas. 

to   emancipate  Hellas.      Ine  cities  which  were  subject  jealousy 
to  Athens,  when  they  heard  of  the  taking  of  Amphipolis  enterprises 
and  of  his  promises  and  of  his  gentleness,  were  more  at  sParta- 
impatient  than  ever  to  rise,  and  privately  sent  embassies 
to  him,  asking  him  to  come  and  help  them,  every  one  of 
them  wanting  to  be  first.     They  thought  that  there  was 
no  danger,  for  they  had  under-estimated  the  Athenian 
power,  which  afterwards  proved   its  greatness  and  the 
magnitude  of  their  mistake  ;  they  judged  rather  by  their 
own  illusive  wishes  than  by  the  unerring  rule  of  prudence. 


3  1  8  EXCITEMENT  AMONG  A  THENIAN  SUBJECTS. 

IV.  For  such  is  the  manner  of  men  ;  what  they  like  is  always  B.C.  424. 
seen  by  them  in  the  light  of  unreflecting  hope,  what 
they  dislike  they  peremptorily  set  aside  by  an  arbitrary 
conclusion.  Moreover,  the  Athenians  had  lately  received 
a  blow  in  Boeotia,  and  Brasidas  told  the  allies  what 
was  likely  to  attract  them,  but  untrue,  that  at  Nisaea 
the  Athenians  had  refused  to  fight  with  his  unassisted 
forces  a.  And  so  they  grew  bold,  and  were  quite  con- 
fident that  no  army  would  ever  reach  them.  Above  all, 
they  were  influenced  by  the  pleasurable  excitement  of 
the  moment  ;  they  were  now  for  the  first  time  going  to 
find  out  of  what  the  Lacedaemonians  were  capable  when 
in  real  earnest,  and  therefore  they  were  willing  to  risk 
anything.  The  Athenians  were  aware  of  their  disaffec- 
tion, and  as  far  as  they  could,  at  short  notice  and  in 
winter  time,  sent  garrisons  to  the  different  cities.  Bra- 
sidas also  despatched  a  message  to  the  Lacedaemonians 
requesting  them  to  let  him  have  additional  forces,  and 
he  himself  began  to  build  triremes  on  the  Strymon. 
But  they  would  not  second  his  efforts  because  their 
leading  men  were  jealous  of  him,  and  also  because  they 
preferred  to  recover  the  prisoners  taken  in  the  island 
and  bring  the  war  to  an  end. 

109.         In   the  same  winter   the   Megarians   recovered   their 
Recovery  of  loncr  walls  which  had  been  in  the  hands  of  the  Athe- 

their  long         .    ° 

walls  by  the  mans  b,  and  razed  them  to  the  ground. 

Megarians.      Af        h       ki        f  Amphipolis  Brasidas  and  his  allies 

Description  r      ^  ' 

of  Acte  and  marched  to  the   so-called  Acte,   or   coast-land,   which 


runs  out  from  the  canal  made  by  the  Persian  King  and 
thftS?Sand  extends  into  the  peninsula  ;  it  is  bounded  by  Athos,  a 
rnos^of1  b>  ki&h  mountam  projecting  into  the  Aegean  seac.     There 
them.         are  cities  in  the   peninsula,  of  which  one  is    Sane,  an 
Andrian  colony  on  the  edge  of  the  canal  looking  towards 
the   sea    in   the  direction    of  Euboea  ;   the   others   are 
Thyssus,  Cleonae,  Acrothous,  Olophyxus,   and  Dium  ; 
their  inhabitants  are  a  mixed  multitude  of  barbarians, 

a  Cp.  iv.  85  fin.  b  Cp.  iv.  68,  69. 

c  Gp.  Herod,  vii.  22. 


BRAS  ID  AS    AT    TO  RONE.  319 

B.C.  424.  speaking  Greek  as  well  as  their  native  tongue.  A  few  IV. 
indeed  are  Chalcidian  ;  but  the  greater  part  are  Pelas- 
gians  (sprung  from  the  Tyrrhenians  who  once  inhabited 
Lemnos  and  Athens),  or  Bisaltians,  Crestonians,  Edo- 
nians.  They  all  dwell  in  small  cities.  Most  of  them 
joined  Brasidas,  but  Sane  and  Dium  held  out  ;  where- 
upon he  remained  there  for  a  time  and  wasted  their 
territory. 

Finding  that  they  would  not  yield,  he  promptly  made     1  10. 
an  expedition  against  Torone  in  Chalcidice,  which  was  Brasidas 
held  by  the  Athenians.     He  was  invited  by  a  few  of  the  expedition 
inhabitants,  who  were  ready  to  deliver  the  city  into  his 
hands.     Arriving  at  night,  or  about  daybreak,  he  took 
up  a  position  at  the  temple  of  the  Dioscuri,  which  is  town,  and 

contrives  to 

distant  about  three  furlongs  from  the  city.  The  great  introduce 
body  of  the  inhabitants  and  the  Athenian  garrison  never  soldiers. 
discovered  him  ;  but  those  Toronaeans  who  were  in  his 
interest,  and  knew  that  he  was  coming,  were  awaiting 
his  approach  ;  some  few  of  them  had  privately  gone  to 
meet  him.  When  his  confederates  found  that  he  had 
arrived,  they  introduced  into  the  city,  under  the  com- 
mand of  Lysistratus  an  Olynthian,  seven  light-armed 
soldiers  carrying  daggers  (for  of  twenty  who  had  been 
originally  appointed  to  that  service,  only  seven  had  the 
courage  to  enter).  These  men  slipped  in  undiscovered  by 
way  of  the  wall  where  it  looks  towards  the  sea.  They 
ascended  the  side  of  the  hill  on  which  the  city  is  built, 
and  slew  the  sentinels  posted  on  the  summit  ;  they  then 
began  to  break  down  the  postern-gate  towards  the  pro- 
montory of  Canastraeum. 

Meanwhile  Brasidas  advanced  a  little  with  the  rest  1  1  1  . 
of  his  army,  and  then  halting,  sent  forward  a  hundred  They  and 
targeteers,  that  as  soon  as  any  of  the  gates  were  opened,  sansPfn  ' 
and  the  signal  agreed  upon  displayed,  they  might  rush 


in  first.     There  was  a  delay,  and  they,  wondering  what  a,P°stern 
had  happened,  drew  by  degrees  nearer  and  nearer  to  the 
city.     Their  partisans  in  Torone,  acting  with  the  soldiers 
who  had  already  got  inside,  had  now  broken  through 


320  CAPTURE    OF    TORONE. 

IV.  the  postern-gate,  and  proceeded  to  cut  the  bar  which  B.C.  424. 
fastened  the  gates  near  the  market-place.  They  then 
brought  round  some  of  the  targeteers  by  way  of  the 
postern-gate,  and  introduced  them  into  the  city,  hoping 
to  strike  panic  into  the  unconscious  citizens  by  the  sudden 
appearance  of  an  armed  force  in  their  rear  and  on  both 
sides  of  them  at  once.  Their  next  step  was  to  raise  the 
fire-signal  according  to  agreement ;  they  then  received 
the  rest  of  the  targeteers  through  the  gates  by  the  market- 
place 

IT 2.          Brasidas,  when  he  saw  the  signal,  gave  his  army  the 
The  army    word  to  advance,  and  ran  forward.     Raising  with  one 

of  Brasidas,        .  t  •• '  i  i  - 

on  a  signal  voice   a   shout   which   struck    terror   into   the   souls   of 

fh7tnowT  the   inhabitants,  they  followed   him.      Some    of   them 

rush  in.       dashed  in  by  the  gates  ;  others  found  a  way  in  at  a  place 

where  the  wall  had  fallen  down  and  was  being  repaired, 

getting  up  by  some  planks  which  were  placed  against  it, 

intended  for  drawing  up  stones.     He  himself  with  the 

main  body  of  his  army  ascended  to  the  upper  part  of 

the  city,  wanting  to   make  the  capture  thorough  and 

secure;   the  rest  of  his  soldiers  overran  the  town. 

113.  While  the   capture  was  proceeding   the  Toronaeans 
TheAthe-    generally,  who  knew  nothing  about  the  plot,  were  in 

nian  garri-     *  J         ™ 

son  take  confusion.  The  conspirators  and  their  party  at  once 
Lecytlus.  joined  the  assailants.  Of  the  Athenian  hoplites,  who 
to  the  number  of  fifty  chanced  to  be  sleeping  in  the 
Agora,  a  few  were  cut  down  at  once,  but  the  greater 
number,  when  they  saw  what  had  happened,  fled,  some 
by  land,  others  to  the  Athenian  guard-ships,  of  which 
two  were  on  the  spot,  and  reached  safely  the  fort  of 
Lecythus,  a  high  point  of  the  city  which  the  Athenians 
had  occupied  and  retained  in  their  own  hands ;  it  runs 
out  into  the  sea,  and  is  only  joined  to  the  mainland  by 
a  narrow  isthmus ;  thither  fled  also  such  Toronaeans  as 
were  friendly  to  the  Athenians. 

114.  It  was  now  daylight,  and  the  city  being  completely  in 
Brasidas      his  power,  Brasidas  made  proclamation  to  the  Toronaeans 

who  had  taken  refuge  with  the  Athenians,  that  if  they 


MODERATION   OF   BRAS  I  DAS.  321 

B.C.  424.  liked  they  might  come  out  and  return  to  their  homes  ;       IV. 
they  would  suffer  no  harm  in  the  city.     He  also  sent  a  nians  to 
herald  to  the  Athenians,  bidding  them  take  what  was  At  their  ' 
their  own  and  depart  under  a  flag  of  truce  out  of  Lecythus. 
The  place,  he  said,  belonged  to  the  Chalcidians,  and  not 

to  them.     They  refused  to  go,  but  asked  him  to  make  a  He  ad- 

dresses 
truce  with  them  for  a  day,  that  they  might  take  up  their  pacific 

dead,  and  he  granted  them  two  days.  During  these  two 
days  he  fortified  the  buildings  which  were  near  Lecythus,  ofTorone- 
and  the  Athenians  strengthened  the  fort  itself.  He  then 
called  a  meeting  of  the  Toronaeans,  and  addressed  them 
much  in  the  same  terms  which  he  had  used  at  Acanthus*. 
He  told  them  that  they  ought  not  to  think  badly  of  those 
citizens  who  had  aided  him,  much  less  to  deem  them 
traitors  ;  for  they  were  not  bribed  and  had  not  acted 
with  any  view  of  enslaving  the  city,  but  in  the  interest 
of  her  freedom  and  welfare.  Those  of  the  inhabitants 
who  had  not  joined  in  the  plot  were  not  to  suppose  that 
they  would  fare  worse  than  the  rest  ;  for  he  had  not 
come  thither  to  destroy  either  the  city  or  any  of  her 
citizens.  In  this  spirit  he  had  made  the  proclamation 
to  those  who  had  taken  refuge  with  the  Athenians,  and 
he  thought  none  the  worse  of  them  for  being  their  friends  ; 
when  they  had  a  similar  experience  of  the  Lacedae- 
monians their  attachment  to  them  would  be  still  greater, 
for  they  would  recognise  their  superior  honesty;  they 
were  only  afraid  of  them  now  because  they  did  not  know 
them.  They  must  all  make  up  their  minds  to  be  faith- 
ful allies,  and  expect  henceforward  to  be  held  responsible 
if  they  offended  ;  but  in  the  past  the  Lacedaemonians 
had  not  been  wronged  by  them  ;  on  the  contrary,  it  was 
they  who  had  been  wronged  by  a  power  too  great  for 
them,  and  were  to  be  excused  if  they  had  opposed  him. 

With  these  words  he  encouraged  the  citizens.     On  the     115. 
expiration  of  the  truce  he  made  his  intended  attack  upon  The  fail  of 
Lecythus.     The  Athenians  defended  themselves  from  f0we°  * 


the  fortress,  which  was  weak,  and  from  some  houses  ht  Athe- 
a  Cp.  iv.  85-87. 
Y 


322  TAKING    OF  LECYTHUS. 

IV.  which  had  battlements.  For  a  whole  day  they  repulsed  B.C.  424. 
fliato' their  *ke  assau^  5  but  on  ^e  morrow  an  engine  was  brought 
ships.  against  them,  from  which  the  Lacedaemonians  proposed 
to  throw  fire  upon  the  wooden  bulwarks.  Just  as  the 
army  was  drawing  near  the  wall,  the  Athenians  raised 
a  wooden  tower  upon  the  top  of  a  building  at  a  point 
where  the  approach  was  easiest  and  where  they  thought 
that  the  enemy  would  be  most  likely  to  apply  the 
engine.  To  this  tower  they  carried  up  numerous  jars 
and  casks  of  water  and  great  stones ;  and  many  men 
mounted  upon  it.  Suddenly  the  building,  being  too 
heavily  weighted,  fell  in  with  a  loud  crash.  This  only  an- 
noyed and  did  not  much  alarm  the  Athenians  who  were 
near  and  saw  what  had  happened,  but  the  rest  were  ter- 
rified, and  their  fright  was  the  greater  in  proportion  as 
they  were  further  off.  They  thought  that  the  place  had 
been  taken  at  that  spot,  and  fled  as  fast  as  they  could  to 
the  sea  where  their  ships  lay. 

1 1 6.         Brasidas  witnessed  the  accident  and   observed   that 
Brasidas      they  were   abandoning   the   battlements.     He  at  once 
fort  of         rushed  forward  with  his  army,  captured  the  fort,  and 
andyputsSto  Put  to  death  all  whom  he  found  in  it.     Thus  the  Athe- 
wh^areh°Se  m'ans  were  driven  out ;  and  in  their  ships  of  war  and 
found  in  it.  other  vessels  crossed  over  to  Pallene.     There  happened 
to  be  in  Lecythus  a  temple  of  Athene  ;  and  when  Brasi- 
das was  about  to  storm  the  place  he  had  made  a  pro- 
clamation that  he  who  first  mounted  the  wall  should 
receive  thirty  minae a ;  but  now,  believing  that  the  cap- 
ture had  been  effected  by  some  more  than  human  power, 
he  gave  the  thirty  minae  to  the  Goddess  for  the  service 
of  the  temple,  and   then  pulling  down   Lecythus   and 
clearing  the   ground,  he   consecrated  the  whole   place. 
The  rest  of  this  winter  he  spent  in  settling  the  adminis- 
tration of  the  towns  which  he  already  held,  and  in  con- 
certing measures  against  the  rest.     At  the  end  of  the 
winter  ended  the  eighth  year  of  the  war. 

117-         Early  in  the  following  spring  the  Lacedaemonians  and 

a  About  £122. 


TRUCE  BETWEEN  ATHENS  AND  LACEDAEMON.  323 

B.C.  423.  Athenians  made  a  truce  for  a  year.     The  Athenians       IV. 

*'  hoped  to  prevent  Brasidas  from  gaining  over  any  more  The  Athe- 

nians be- 
of  their  allies  for  the  present  ;  the  interval  would  give  cause  they 

them  leisure  for  preparation  ;  and  hereafter,  if  it  was  for  h 
their  interest,  they  might  come  to  a  general  understand- 


ing.  The  Lacedaemonians  had  truly  divined  the  fears  success  of 
of  the  Athenians,  and  thought  that,  having  enjoyed  an  the  Lace- 
intermission  of  trouble  and  hardship,  they  would  be 
more  willing  to  make  terms,  restore  the  captives  taken 
in  the  island,  and  conclude  a  durable  peace.  Their  main  thecaptives, 

.  .,  r  make  peace 

object  was  to  recover  their  men  while  the  good-fortune  for  a  year. 
of  Brasidas  lasted  ;  on  the  other  hand,  they  feared  that, 
if  he  continued  in  his  successful  career  and  established  a 
balance  between  the  contending  powers,  they  might  still 
be  deprived  of  them.  a  And  the  loss  would  not  be  com- 
pensated by  their  equality  with  the  enemy  or  by  the 
prospect  of  victory  a.  So  they  made  a  truce  for  them- 
selves and  their  allies  in  the  following  terms  :  — 

'  I.  Concerning  the  temple  and  oracle  of  the  Pythian      1  1  8: 
Apollo,  it   seems   good  to  us   that  any  one  who  willTermsof 
shall   ask   counsel   thereat  without   fraud   and  without 
fear,  according  to  his  ancestral  customs.     To  this  we, 
the  Lacedaemonians  and  their  allies  here  present,  agree, 
and  we  will  send  heralds  to  the  Boeotians  and  Phocians, 
and  do  our  best  to  gain  their  assent  likewise. 

'  II.  Concerning  the  treasures  of  the  God,  we  will  take 
measures  for  the  detection  of  evil-doers,  both  you  and 
we,  according  to  our  ancestral  customs,  and  any  one  else 
who  will,  according  to  his  ancestral  customs,  proceeding 
always  with  right  and  equity.  Thus  it  seems  good  to 
the  Lacedaemonians  and  their  allies  in  respect  of  these 
matters. 

'III.  It  further  seems  good  to  the  Lacedaemonians 
and  their  allies  that,  if  the  Athenians  consent  to  a 
truce,  either  party  shall  remain  within  his  own  territory, 


a  Or,  '  And  although  they  would  then  be  fighting  on  an  equality 
with  the  Athenians,  the  final  victory  would  still  be  doubtful.' 

Y  2 


TERMS    OF    TRUCE. 

IV.  retaining  what  he  has.  The  Athenians  at  Coryphasium  B.C.  423. 
shall  keep  within  the  hills  of  Buphras  and  Tomeus.  ° 
They  shall  remain  at  Cythera  a,  but  shall  not  communi- 
cate with  the  Lacedaemonian  confederacy,  neither  we 
with  them  nor  they  with  us.  The  Athenians  who  are 
in  Nisaea b  and  Minoa c  shall  not  cross  the  road  which 
leads  from  the  gates  of  the  temple  of  Nisus  to  the  temple 
of  Poseidon,  and  from  the  temple  of  Poseidon  goes  direct 
to  the  bridge  leading  to  Minoa  ;  neither  shall  the  Mega- 
rians  and  their  allies  cross  this  road ;  the  Athenians  shall 
hold  the  island  which  they  have  taken,  neither  party  com- 
municating with  the  other.  They  shall  also  hold  what 
they  now  hold  at  Troezen  d,  according  to  the  agreement 
concluded  between  the  Athenians  and  Troezenians. 

'  IV.  At  sea  the  Lacedaemonians  and  their  allies  may 
sail  along  their  own  coasts  and  the  coasts  of  the  con- 
federacy, not  in  ships  of  war,  but  in  any  other  rowing 
vessel  whose  burden  does  not  exceed  five  hundred 
talents e. 

'V.  There  shall  be  a  safe-conduct  both  by  sea  and 
land  for  a  herald,  with  envoys  and  any  number  of  at- 
tendants which  may  be  agreed  upon,  passing  to  and  fro 
between  Peloponnesus  and  Athens,  to  make  arrange- 
ments about  the  termination  of  the  war  and  about  the 
arbitration  of  disputed  points. 

'  VI.  While  the  truce  lasts  neither  party,  neither  we 
nor  you,  shall  receive  deserters,  either  bond  or  free. 

fVII.  And  we  will  give  satisfaction  to  you  and  you 
shall  give  satisfaction  to  us  according  to  our  ancestral 
customs,  and  determine  disputed  points  by  arbitration 
and  not  by  arms. 

'  These  things  seem  good  to  us,  the  Lacedaemonians, 
and  to  our  allies,  But  if  you  deem  any  other  condition 
more  just  or  honourable,  go  to  Lacedaemon  and  explain 
your  views  ;  neither  the  Lacedaemonians  nor  their  allies 
will  reject  any  just  claim  which  you  may  prefer. 

a  Cp.  iv.  53,  54-  b  Cp.  iv.  69.        .        c  Cp.  iii.  51. 

d  Cp.  iv.  45.  e  About  12  tons. 


PROVISION  FOR  A   PERMANENT  PEACE.     325 

B.C.  423.      '  And  we  desire  you,  as  you  desire  us,  to  send  envoys       IV. 
2'  invested  with  full  powers. 

'  This  truce  shall  be  for  a  year.' 

The   Athenian   people   passed  the  following  decree.  During  the 
The  pry  tan  es  were  of  the  tribe  Acamantis,  Phaenippus 
was  the  registrar,  Niciades  was  the  president.     Laches 


moved  that  '  a  truce  be  concluded  on  the  terms  to  which  to  ^d  fro 

and  discuss 

the  Lacedaemonians  and  their  allies  had  consented  ;  and  the  terms 
might  it  be  for  the  best  interests  of  the  Athenian  people  !  '  manent" 
Accordingly  the  assembly  agreed  that  '  the  truce  shall  peace> 
last  for  a  year,  beginning  from  this  day,  being  the  four- 
teenth day  of  the  month  Elapheboliona.    During  the  year 
of  truce  ambassadors  and  heralds  are  to  go  from  one 
state  to  another  and  discuss  proposals  for  the  termination 
of  the  war.     The  generals  and  prytanes  shall  proceed  to 
hold  another  assembly,  at  which  the  people  shall  discuss, 
first  of  all,  the  question  of  peace,  whatever  proposal  the 
Lacedaemonian  embassy  may  offer  about  the  termina- 
tion of  the  war.     The  embassies  now  present  shall  bind 
themselves  on  the  spot,  in  the  presence  of  the  assembly, 
to  abide  by  the  truce  just  made  for  a  year.' 

To  these  terms  the  Lacedaemonians   assented,  and     119. 
they  and  their  allies  took  oath  to  the  Athenians  and  Jr°[?ial. 
their  allies  on  the  twelfth  day  of  the  Spartan  month  of  the  truce. 
Gerastius.     Those  who  formally  ratified  the  truce  were, 
on  behalf  of  Lacedaemon,  Taurus  the  son  of  Echetimi- 
das,  Athenaeus  the  son  of  Pericleidas,  Philocharidas  the 
son  of  Eryxidaidas;  of  Corinth,  Aeneas  the  son  of  Ocytus, 
Euphamidas  the  son  of  Aristonymus  ;  of  Sicyon,  Damo- 
timus  the  son  of  Naucrates,  Onasimus  the  son  of  Mega- 
cles  ;  of  Megara,  Nicasus  the  son  of  Cecalus,  Menecrates 
the  son  of  Amphidorus  ;  of  Epidaurus,  Amphias  the  son 
of  Eupaidas  ;  and  on  behalf  of  Athens,  Nicostratus  the 
son  of  Diitrephes,  Nicias  the  son  of  Niceratus,  Autocles 
the  son  of  Tolmaeus.    Such  were  the  terms  of  the  armis- 
tice ;  during  its  continuance  fresh  negotiations  for  a  final 
peace  were  constantly  carried  on. 
a  March  —  April. 


326 


SCIONE    RECEIVES    BRASIDAS. 


IV. 

120. 

Meanwhile 
Scione 
revolts. 
Brasidas 
sails  thither 
by  night  in 
a  small 
boat,  and 
having 
summoned 
the  citizens, 
warmly 
praises 
their  con- 
duct. 


121. 

Honours 
showered 
on  Brasidas. 
He  enters 
into  com- 
munication 
with  Mende 
and  Poti- 
daea. 


While  m  the  course  of  the  negotiations  the  Athenian  B.C.  423. 

IT  •  •  J       f  Ol.  89,  2. 

and  Lacedaemonian  envoys  were  passing  to  and  fro, 
Scione,  a  town  of  Pallene,  revolted  from  the  Athenians 
and  joined  Brasidas.  The  Scionaeans,  according  to  their 
own  account,  sprang  originally  from  Pellene  in  Pelopon- 
nesus, but  their  ancestors  returning  from  Troy  were 
carried  by  the  storm  which  the  Achaean  fleet  encoun- 
tered to  Scione,  where  they  took  up  their  abode.  Brasi- 
das, when  he  heard  of  the  revolt,  sailed  thither  by  night, 
sending  before  him  a  friendly  trireme,  while  he  himself 
followed  at  some  distance  in  a  small  boat,  thinking  that 
if  he  met  any  vessel,  not  a  trireme,  larger  than  the  boat, 
the  trireme  would  protect  him  %  while  if  another  trireme 
of  equal  strength  came  up,  it  would  fall,  not  upon  the 
boat,  but  upon  the  larger  vessel,  and  in  the  meantime  he 
would  be  able  to  save  himself.  He  succeeded  in  crossing, 
and  having  summoned  a  meeting  of  the  Scionaeans,  he 
repeated  what  he  had  said  at  Acanthus  and  Torone, 
adding  that  their  conduct  was  deserving  of  the  highest 
praise ;  for  at  a  time  when  the  Athenians  were  holding 
Potidaea  and  the  isthmus  of  Pallene,  and  they,  being  cut 
off  from  the  mainland,  were  as  defenceless  as  if  they  had 
been  islanders,  they  had  taken  the  side  of  liberty  un- 
bidden. They  were  not  such  cowards  as  to  wait  until 
they  were  compelled  to  do  what  was  obviously  for  their 
own  interest ;  and  this  was  a  sufficient  proof  that  they 
would  endure  like  men  any  hardships,  however  great,  if 
only  their  aspirations  could  be  realised.  He  should 
reckon  them  the  truest  and  most  loyal  friends  of  the 
Lacedaemonians,  and  pay  them  the  highest  honour. 

The  Scionaeans  were  inspirited  by  his  words ;  and  one 
and  all,  even  those  who  had  previously  been  against 
the  movement,  took  courage  and  determined  to  bear 
cheerfully  the  burdens  of  the  war.  They  received 
Brasidas  with  honour,  and  in  the  name  of  the  city 
crowned  him  with  a  golden  crown  as  the  liberator  of 

a  Reading  airw ;  or,  reading  avrrj,  ( the  mere  presence  of  the 
trireme  would  protect  him.' 


EFFECT  OF  THE  TRUCE  IN  CHALCIDICE.     327 

B.C.  423.  Hellas  ;  many  too,  in  token  of  their  personal  admiration,  IV. 
2<  placed  garlands  on  his  head,  and  congratulated  him,  as 
if  he  had  been  a  victor  in  the  games.  For  the  present 
he  left  a  small  garrison  with  them  and  returned,  but 
soon  afterwards  again  crossed  the  sea  with  a  larger  army, 
being  desirous,  now  that  he  had  the  help  of  the  Scio- 
naeans,  to  attempt  Mende  and  Potidaea  ;  he  made  sure 
that  the  Athenians  would  follow  him  with  their  ships  to 
Pallene,  which  they  would  consider  an  island  ;  and  he 
wished  to  anticipate  them.  Moreover  he  had  entered 
into  negotiations  with  these  cities,  and  had  some  hope 
of  their  being  betrayed  to  him. 

But  before  he  had  executed  his  intentions,  a  trireme     122. 
arrived  conveying  the  ambassadors  who  went  round  to  Meanwhile 
proclaim    the    truce,    Aristonymus    from   Athens,   and  stopped  in 
Athenaeus  from  Lacedaemon.     His  army  then  returned  by  the 
to  Torone,  and  the  truce  was  formally  announced  to 


him.    All  the  allies  of  the  Lacedaemonians  in  Chalcidice  truce,  which 

had  really 

agreed  to  the   terms.     Aristonymus  the  Athenian  as-  been  made 

-  ...  -  before  fhe 

sented  generally,  but  finding  on  a  calculation  of  the  revolt  of 
days  that  the  Scionaeans  had  revolted  after  the  con-  IrSkias 
elusion  of  the  truce,  refused  to  admit  them.  Brasidas  refuses  to 

give  the 

insisted  that  they  were  in  time,  and  would  not  surrender  place  up. 

•  Fury  of  the 

the  city.  Whereupon  Aristonymus  despatched  a  mes-  Athenians. 
sage  to  Athens.  The  Athenians  were  ready  at  once 
to  make  an  expedition  against  Scione.  The  Lacedae- 
monians, however,  sent  an  embassy  to  them  and  pro- 
tested that  such  a  step  would  be  a  breach  of  the  truce. 
They  laid  claim  to  the  place,  relying  on  the  testimony 
of  Brasidas,  and  proposed  to  have  the  matter  decided 
by  arbitration.  But  the  Athenians,  instead  of  risking 
an  arbitration,  wanted  to  send  an  expedition  instantly; 
for  they  were  exasperated  at  discovering  that  even  the 
islanders  were  now  daring  to  revolt  from  them,  in  a 
futile  reliance  on  the  Lacedaemonian  power  by  land. 
The  greater  right  was  on  their  side  ;  for  the  truth  was 
that  the  Scionaeans  had  revolted  two  days  after  the 
truce  was  made.  They  instantly  carried  a  resolution, 


328  REVOLT    OF    MENDE. 

IV.      moved  by  Cleon,  to  destroy  Scione  and  put  the  citizens  B.C.  423. 
to  the  sword  ;  and,  while  abstaining  from  hostilities  else- 
where, they  prepared  to  carry  out  their  intentions. 

123.  In  the  meantime   Mende,  a  city  of  Pallene  and  an 
Brasidas      Eretrian  colony,  revolted  from  them.    Brasidas  felt  justi- 

receives  the  m  * 

Mendaeans  ned  in  receiving  the  Mendaeans,  although,  when  they 
declaration  came  to  him,  the  peace  had  unmistakably  been  declared, 
of  the  truce.  because  there  were  certain  points  in  which  he  too 
charged  the  Athenians  with  violating  the  treaty.  His 
attitude  was  encouraging  to  them  ;  they  saw  his  zeal 
in  the  cause,  which  they  likewise  inferred  from  his 
unwillingness  to  hand  over  Scione  to  the  Athenians. 
Moreover  the  persons  who  negotiated  with  him  were  few 
in  number,  and  having  once  begun,  would  not  give  up 
their  purpose.  For  they  feared  the  consequences  of 
detection,  and  therefore  compelled  the  multitude  to  act 
contrary  to  their  own  wishes.  When  the  Athenians  heard 
of  the  revolt  they  were  more  angry  than  ever,  and  made 
preparations  against  both  cities.  Brasidas,  in  expectation 
of  their  attack,  conveyed  away  the  wives  and  children 
of  the  Scionaeans  and  Mendaeans  to  Olynthus  in  Chal- 
cidice,  and  sent  over  five  hundred  Peloponnesian  hop- 
lites  and  three  hundred  Chalcidian  targeteers,  under  the 
sole  command  of  Polydamidas,  to  their  aid.  The  two 
cities  concerted  measures  for  their  defence  against  the 
Athenians,  who  were  expected  shortly  to  arrive. 

124.  Brasidas  and  Perdiccas  now  joined  their  forces,  and 
Brasidas      made  a  second  expedition  to  Lyncus  against  Arrhibaeus. 
diccasagain  Perdiccas   led   his  own  Macedonian   army  and  a  force 


of  hoplites  supplied  by  the  Hellenic  inhabitants  of 
*ke  country-  Brasidas,  beside  the  Peloponnesians  who 
his  army,  remained  with  him,  had  under  his  command  a  body  of 
Chalcidians  from  Acanthus  and  other  cities,  whi.ch  sup- 
plied as  many  troops  as  they  severally  could.  The 
entire  heavy-armed  Hellenic  forces  numbered  about 
three  thousand  ;  the  Chalcidian  and  Macedonian  cavalry 
nearly  a  thousand,  and  there  was  also  a  great  multitude 
of  barbarians.  They  entered  the  territory  of  Arrhibaeus, 


PANIC   IN    THE    ARMY  OF  PERDICCAS.        329 

B.C.  423.  and  there  finding  the  Lyncestians  ready  for  battle,  they  IV. 
2'  took  up  a  position  in  face  of  them.  The  infantry  of  the 
two  armies  was  stationed  upon  two  opposite  hills,  and 
between  them  was  a  plain,  into  which  the  cavalry  of  both 
first  descended  and  fought.  Then  the  Lyncestian  heavy- 
armed  troops  began  to  advance  from  the  hill,  and  form- 
ing a  junction  with  their  cavalry,  offered  battle.  Brasidas 
and  Perdiccas  now  drew  out  their  army  and  charged  ; 
the  Lyncestians  were  put  to  flight  and  many  slain  ;  the 
rest  escaped  to  the  high  ground,  and  there  remained 
inactive.  The  conquerors  raised  a  trophy,  and  waited 
for  two  or  three  days  expecting  the  arrival  of  some 
Illyrians  whom  Perdiccas  had  hired.  Then  Perdiccas 
wanted,  instead  of  sitting  idle,  to  push  on  against  the 
villages  of  Arrhibaeus,  but  Brasidas  was  anxious  about 
Mende,  and  apprehensive  that  the  Athenians  might  sail 
thither  and  do  some  mischief  before  he  returned.  The 
Illyrians  had  not  appeared  ;  and  for  both  reasons  he  was 
more  disposed  to  retreat  than  to  advance. 

But  while  they  were  disputing,  the  news  arrived  that     125. 
the  Illyrians   had   just   betrayed    Perdiccas  and  joined  Meanwhile 

J  J  J  some  Illy- 

Arrhibaeus,  whereupon  they  both   resolved   to   retreat  ;  rians  who 
for  they  were  afraid  of  the  Illyrians,  who  are  a  nation  hfred  by 


of  warriors.     Owing  to  the  dispute  nothing  had  been 
determined  respecting  the  time  of  their  departure.    Night 
came  on,  and  the   Macedonians  and  the   mass  of  the  treachery 
barbarians  were  instantly  seized  with  one  of  those  un-  panic  and 
accountable  panics  to  which  great  armies  are  liable  a.  jjj^y  0"  the 
They  fancied  that  the  Illyrians  were  many  times  their  Perdiccas. 
real  number,  and  that  they  were  close  at  their   heels  ; 
so,  suddenly  betaking  themselves  to  flight,  they  hastened 
homewards.     And  they  compelled  Perdiccas,  when  he 
understood  the  state  of  affairs,  which  at  first  he  did  not, 
to  go  away  without  seeing  Brasidas,  for  the  two  armies 
were   encamped    at   a   considerable  distance   from   one 
another.     At    dawn    Brasidas,  finding   that   Arrhibaeus 
and  the  Illyrians  were  coming  on  and   that  the  Mace- 
a  Gp.  vii.  80  med. 


330  SPEECH   OF   DRASIDAS. 

IV.  donians  had  already  decamped,  resolved  to  follow  them.  B.C.  423. 
So  he  formed  his  hoplites  into  a  compact  square,  and  O1'  89'  2' 
placed  his  light-armed  troops  in  the  centre.  He  selected 
the  youngest  of  his  soldiers  to  run  out  upon  the  enemy 
at  whatever  point  the  attack  might  be  made.  He  himself 
proposed  during  the  retreat  to  take  his  post  in  the  rear 
with  three  hundred  chosen  men,  meaning  to  stop  the  fore- 
most of  his  assailants  and  beat  them  off.  Before  the 
Illyrians  came  up  he  exhorted  his  soldiers,  as  far  as  the 
shortness  of  the  time  permitted,  in  the  following  words  :  — 
126.  'Did  I  not  suspect,  men  of  Peloponnesus,  that  you 
The  lily-  may  be  terrified  because  you  have  been  deserted  by 


pursue.       your  companions  and   are  assailed  by  a   host   of  bar- 
barians,  I   should   think  only  of  encouraging  and   not 


^  mstructmg  you  &-  But  now  tnat  we  are  ^e^  alone  in 
few  against  the  face  of  numerous  enemies,  I  shall  endeavour  in  a  few 
™ayou  are  words  to  impress  upon  you  the  main  points  which  it  con- 
andyou  are  cerns  you  to  be  informed  of  and  to  remember.  For  you 
fighting  ought  to  fight  like  men  not  merely  when  you  happen  to 
barbarians,  have  allies  present,  but  because  courage  is  native  to  you  ; 
frightened  nor  should  you  fear  any  number  of  foreign  troops. 
oudandish  Remember  that  in  the  cities  from  which  you  come, 


cries  and     not  the  many  govern  the  few,  but  the  few  govern  the 

gestures.  ,     ,  .       .       .      .  •         i      7 

They  make  many,  and  have  acquired  their  supremacy  simply  by 
flourish  but  successful  fighting.  Your  enemies  are  barbarians,  and 
you  in  your  inexperience  fear  them.  But  you  ought 


and,  if        ^o  know,  from  your  late  conflicts  with  the  Macedonian 

withstood  J 

quietly,  portion  of  them  b  —  and  any  estimate  which  I  can  form, 
or  account  of  them  which  I  receive  from  others,  would 
lead  me  to  infer  —  that  they  will  not  prove  so  very  formid- 
able. An  enemy  often  has  weak  points  which  wear  the 
appearance  of  strength  ;  and  these,  when  their  nature  is 
explained,  encourage  rather  than  frighten  their  oppo- 
nents. As,  on  the  other  hand,  where  an  army  has  a  real 
advantage,  the  adversary  who  is  the  most  ignorant  is 
also  the  most  foolhardy.  The  Illyrians,  to  those  who 
have  no  experience  of  them,  do  indeed  at  first  sight 
a  Cp.  iv.  17  med.;  iv.  95  init.;  v.  69  fin.  b  Cp.  iv.  124  med. 


REPULSE    OF    THE    BARBARIANS.  331 

B.C.  423.  present  a  threatening  aspect.  The  spectacle  of  their  IV. 
2*  numbers  is  terrible,  their  cries  are  intolerable,  and 
the  brandishing  of  their  spears  in  the  air  has  a 
menacing  effect.  But  in  action  they  are  not  the  men 
they  look,  if  their  opponents  will  only  stand  their 
ground  ;  for  they  have  no  regular  order,  and  therefore 
are  not  ashamed  of  leaving  any  post  in  which  they 
are  hard  pressed  ;  to  fly  and  to  advance  being  alike 
honourable,  no  imputation  can  be  thrown  on  their 
courage.  When  every  man  is  his  own  master  in  battle 
he  will  readily  find  a  decent  excuse  for  saving  himself. 
They  clearly  think  that  to  frighten  us  at  a  safe  distance 
is  a  better  plan  than  to  meet  us  hand  to  hand  ;  else  why 
do  they  shout  instead  of  fighting  ?  You  may  easily  see 
that  all  the  terrors  with  which  you  have  invested  them 
are  in  reality  nothing ;  they  do  but  startle  the  sense  of 
sight  and  hearing.  If  you  repel  their  tumultuous  onset, 
and,  when  opportunity  offers,  withdraw  again  in  good 
order,  keeping  your  ranks,  you  will  sooner  arrive  at  a 
place  of  safety,  and  will  also  learn  the  lesson  that  mobs 
like  these,  if  an  adversary  withstand  their  first  attack,  do 
but  threaten  at  a  distance  and  make  a  flourish  of  valour, 
although  if  he  yields  to  them  they  are  quick  enough  to 
show  their  courage  in  following  at  his  heels  when  there 
is  no  danger.' 

Brasidas,  having  addressed  his  army,  began  to  retreat.     127. 
Whereupon  the  barbarians  with  loud  noise  and  in  great  The  I1]y- 

rians,  find- 

disorder  pressed  hard  upon  him,  supposing  that  he  was  ing  that 
flying,  and  that  they  could  overtake  and  destroy  his 
troops.  But,  wherever  they  attacked,  the  soldiers  ap- 
pointed  for  the  purpose  ran  out  and  met  them,  and  the  border- 
Brasidas  himself  with  his  chosen  men  received  their 
charge.  Thus  the  first  onset  of  the  barbarians  met  with 
a  resistance  which  surprised  them,  and  whenever  they 
renewed  the  attack  the  Lacedaemonians  received  and 
repelled  them  again,  and  when  they  ceased,  proceeded 
with  their  march.  Thereupon  the  greater  part  of  the 
barbarians  abstained  from  attacking  Brasidas  and  his 


332 


PERDICCAS    AND    BRASIDAS. 


IV. 


128. 

Brasidas 

dislodges 

them,  and 

they  follow 

no  further. 

Ill-feeling 

increases 

between 

Brasidas 

and  Per- 

diccas. 


Hellenes  in  the  open  country ;  but  leaving  a  certain  B.C.  423. 
number  to  follow  and  harass  them,  they  ran  on  after  the 
fugitive  Macedonians  and  killed  any  with  whom  they 
fell  in.  They  then  secured  beforehand  the  narrow  pass 
between  two  hills  which  led  into  the  country  of  Arrhi- 
baeus,  knowing  that  this  was  the  only  path  by  which 
Brasidas  could  retreat.  And  as  he  was  approaching  the 
most  dangerous  point  of  the  defile  they  began  to  sur- 
round him  in  the  hope  of  cutting  him  off. 

Perceiving  their  intention,  he  told  his  three  hundred  to 
leave  their  ranks  and  run  every  man  as  fast  as  he  could 
to  the  top  of  one  of  the  hills,  being  the  one  which  he 
thought  the  barbarians  would  be  most  likely  to  occupy; 
and  before  a  larger  number  of  them  could  come  up  and 
surround  them,  to  dislodge  those  who  were  already  therea. 
They  accordingly  attacked  and  defeated  them  ;  and  so 
the  main  body  of  his  army  more  easily  reached  the 
summit ;  for  the  barbarians,  seeing  their  comrades  de- 
feated and  driven  from  the  high  ground,  took  alarm ; 
they  considered  too  that  the  enemy  were  already  on  the 
borders  of  the  country,  and  had  got  away  from  them, 
and  therefore  followed  no  further.  Brasidas  had  now 
gained  the  high  ground  and  could  march  unmolested  ; 
on  the  same  day  'he  arrived  at  Arnissa,  which  is  in  the 
dominion  of  Perdiccas.  The.  soldiers  were  enraged  at 
the  hasty  retreat  of  the  Macedonians,  and  when  they 
came  upon  carts  of  theirs  drawn  by  oxen,  or  any  baggage 
which  had  been  dropped  in  the  flight,  as  was  natural  in  a 
retreat  made  in  a  panic  and  by  night,  they  of  themselves 
loosed  the  oxen  and  slaughtered  them,  and  appropriated 
the  baggage.  From  that  time  forward  Perdiccas  regarded 
Brasidas  in  the  light  of  a  foe,  and  conceived  a  new  hatred 
of  the  Peloponnesians,  which  was  not  a  natural  feeling  in 
an  enemy  of  the  Athenians.  Nevertheless,  disregarding 
his  own  nearest  interests,  he  took  steps  to  make  terms 
with  the  one  and  get  rid  of  the  other. 


a  Adopting  with  Poppo  the  correction  f 


SIEGE   AND    CAPTURE    OF   MENDE.         333 

B.C.  423.  Brasidas  returned  from  Macedonia  to  Torone,  and  IV. 
2' when  he  arrived  there  found  the  Athenians  already  129. 
in  possession  of  Mende.  Thinking  it  now  too  late  to  Nicias  at- 
cross  over  to  Fallen^  and  assist  Mende  and  Scione,  he  take  Mende, 
remained  quiet  and  guarded  Torone.  While  he  wasbl 
engaged  with  the  Lyncestians,  the  Athenians,  having 
completed  their  preparations,  had  sailed  against  Mende 
and  Scione  with  fifty  ships,  of  which  ten  were  Chian, 
conveying  a  thousand  hoplites  of  their  own,  six  hundred 
archers,  a  thousand  Thracian  mercenaries,  and  targeteers 
furnished  by  their  allies  in  the  neighbourhood.  They 
were  under  the  command  of  Nicias  the  son  of  Niceratus, 
and  Nicostratus  the  son  of  Diitrephes.  Sailing  from 
Potidaea  and  putting  in  near  the  temple  of  Poseidon 
they  marched  against  the  Mendaeans.  Now  they  and 
three  hundred  Scionaeans  who  had  come  to  their  aid, 
and  their  Peloponnesian  auxiliaries,  seven  hundred  hop- 
lites in  all,  with  Polydamidas  their  commander,  had  just 
encamped  outside  the  city  on  a  steep  hill.  Nicias, 
taking  with  him  for  the  assault  a  hundred  and  twenty 
Methonaean  light-armed  troops,  sixty  select  Athenian 
hoplites  and  all  the  archers,  made  an  attempt  to  ascend 
the  hill  by  a  certain  pathway,  but  he  was  wounded  and 
failed  to  carry  the  position  Nicostratus  with  the  re- 
mainder of  his  troops  approaching  the  hill,  which  was 
hard  of  access,  by  another  and  more  circuitous  route  was 
thrown  into  utter  confusion,  and  the  whole  army  of  the 
Athenians  was  nearly  defeated.  So  on  this  day  the 
Athenians,  finding  that  the  Mendaeans  and  their  allies 
refused  to  give  way,  retreated  and  encamped ;  and  when 
night  came  on,  the  Mendaeans  likewise  returned  to  the 
city. 

On  the  following  day  the  Athenians  sailed  round  to      130. 
the  side  of  Mende  looking  towards  Scione  ;  they  took  the  Soon,  in  con- 
suburb,  and  during  the  whole  of  that  day  devastated  the  internal 
country.    No  one  came  out  to  meet  them  ;  for  a  division 
had  arisen  in  the  city,  and  on  the  following  night  the 
three  hundred  Scionaeans  returned  home.     On  the  next  of  the 

Athenians. 


334  SIEGE    OF  SCIONE. 

IV.  day  Nicias  with  half  his  army  went  as  far  as  the  Scio-  B.C.  423. 
The  Pelo-  naean  frontier  and  devastated  the  country  on  his  march, 
are  shut  while  Nicostratus  with  the  other  half  sat  down  before  the 
citadel.  upper  gates  of  Mende,  out  of  which  the  road  leads  to 
Potidaea.  In  this  part  of  the  city  within  the  walls  the 
Mendaeans  and  their  allies  chanced  to  have  their  arms 
deposited,  and  Polydamidas,  arraying  his  forces  in  order 
of  battle,  was  just  exhorting  the  Mendaeans  to  go  forth. 
Some  one  of  the  popular  faction  answered  in  the  heat  of 
party  that  he  would  not  go  out,  and  that  he  did  not  care 
to  fight,  but  no  sooner  had  he  uttered  the  words  than  he 
was  seized  by  the  Peloponnesian  commander  and  roughly 
handled.  Whereupon  the  people  lost  patience,  caught  up 
their  arms,  and  made  a  furious  rush  upon  the  Pelopon- 
nesians  and  the  opposite  party  who  were  in  league  with 
them.  They  soon  put  them  to  flight,  partly  because  the 
onslaught  was  sudden,  and  also  because  the  gates  were 
thrown  open  to  the  Athenians,  which  greatly  terrified 
them.  For  they  thought  that  the  attack  upon  them  was 
premeditated.  All  the  Peloponnesians  who  were  not 
killed  on  the  spot  fled  to  the  citadel,  which  they  had 
previously  kept  in  their  own  hands.  Nicias  had  now 
returned  and  was  close  to  the  city,  and  the  Athenians 
rushed  into  Mende  with  their  whole  force.  As  the 
gates  had  been  opened  without  any  previous  capitula- 
tion they  plundered  the  town  as  if  it  had  been  stormed  ; 
and  even  the  lives  of  the  citizens  were  with  difficulty 
saved  by  the  efforts  of  the  generals.  The  Mendaeans 
were  then  told  that  they  were  to  retain  their  former 
constitution,  and  bring  to  trial  among  themselves  any 
whom  they  thought  guilty  of  the  revolt.  At  the  same 
time  the  Athenians  blockaded  the  garrison  in  the  Acro- 
polis by  a  wall  extending  to  the  sea  on  either  side  and 
established  a  guard.  Having  thus  secured  Mende,  they 
proceeded  against  Scione. 

131.         The   inhabitants    of  Scione    and    the   Peloponnesian 
The  garrison  had  come  out  to  meet  them  and  occupied  a 

blockade5    steep  hill  in  front  of  the  city.    The  hill  had  to  be  taken 


PERDICCAS    REJOINS    THE    ATHENIANS.     335 

B.C.  423.  by  the  Athenians  before  they  could  effect  the  circum-       IV. 
2'  vallation  of  the  place.     So  they  made  a  furious  attack  Scione. 
and  dislodged  those   who  were  stationed  there  a;  they  risen  of 
then   encamped,  and  after   raising   a   trophy,  prepared  forec"  their 
to  invest  the  city.     Soon  afterwards,  while  they  were 
engaged  in  the  work,  the  Peloponnesian  auxiliaries  who 
were  besieged  in  the  Acropolis  of  Mende,  forcing  their 
way  out   by  the   sea-shore,  broke   through   the  watch 
and  came  to  Scione   by  night.     Most  of  them  eluded 
the  Athenians  who  were  encamped  outside,  and  got  into 
the  town. 

While  the  circumvallation  of  Scione  was  proceeding,     132. 
Perdiccas,  who,  after  what  had  occurred  in  the  retreat  Perdiccas 
from  Lyncus,  hated  Brasidas,  sent  heralds  to  the  Athe-  alliance 
nian  generals,  and  came  -to  an  understanding  with  them,  Athenians. 
b  which  without  loss  of  time  he  took  measures  to  carry  J0  ^ncerit 
out  b.     It   so   happened   that    Ischagoras   the  Lacedae-  he  Puts  a 

stop  to 

monian  was  then  on  the  eve  of  marching  with  an  army  the  passage 
to  reinforce  Brasidas.    Perdiccas  was  told  by  Nicias  that,  ponnesian 
having  now  made  friends  with  the  Athenians,  he  should  n^Jnf1°rce~ 
give  them  some  evidence  of  his  sincerity.    He  himself  too  through 

Thessaly. 

no  longer  wished  the  Peloponnesians  to  find  their  way 
into  his  country.  And  so  by  his  influence  over  the  Thes- 
salian  chiefs,  with  whom  he  was  always  on  good  terms, 
he  put  a  stop  to  the  whole  expedition  ;  indeed,  the  Lace- 
daemonians did  not  even  attempt  to  obtain  the  consent 
of  the  Thessalians.  Nevertheless,  Ischagoras,  Ameinias, 
and  Aristeus,  who  had  been  sent  by  the  Lacedaemonian 
government  to  report  on  the  state  of  affairs,  found  their 
way  to  Brasidas.  They  brought  with  them,  though  con- 
trary to  law,  certain  younger  Spartans,  intending  to  make 
them  governors  of  the  cities,  instead  of  leaving  the  care 
of  them  to  chance  persons.  Accordingly  Brasidas  ap- 
pointed Clearidas  the  son  of  Cleonymus  governor  of 


a  Reading  ei 

b  Or,  'having  commenced  negotiations  immediately  after  the 
retreat'  (cp.  iv.  128  fin.);  in  which  case,  however,  fvBvs  rore  dp£dp.fvos 
and  frvyxavc  rore  must  refer  to  different  times. 


336          CHRYSIS,    THE    ARGIVE    PRIESTESS. 

• 

IV.      Amphipolis,   and    Pasitelidas  a  the   son   of  Hegesander  B.C.  423. 

C    T.  1  Ol.   80,    2. 

governor  of  Torone. 

133.  During  the  same  summer  the  Thebans  dismantled  the 
Harshness  wall  of  the  Thespians,  charging  them  with  Athenian 

and  ingrati- 

tude of  the  tendencies.     This  was  an  object  which  they  always  had 

waredsathe°"  in  view,  and   now  they  had  their  opportunity,  because 

Jhespians.  the  flower  of  the  Thespian  army  had  fallen  in  the  battle 

the  temple   of  Delium  b.     During  the  same  summer  the  temple  of 

at  Argos.     Here  at  Argos  was  burnt  down  ;  Chrysis  the  priestess 

had  put  a  light  too  near  the  sacred  garlands,  and  had  then 

gone  to  sleep,  so  that  the  whole  place  took  fire  and  was 

consumed.     In  her  fear  of  the  people  she  fled  that  very 

night  to  Phlius  ;  and  the  Argives,  as  the  law  provided, 

appointed  another  priestess  named   Phaeinis.      Chrysis 

had  been  priestess  during  eight  -years  of  the  war  and  half 

of  the  ninth  when  she  fled.     Towards  the  close  of  the 

summer  Scione  was  completely  invested,  and  the  Athe- 

nians, leaving  a  guard,  retired  with  the  rest  of  their  army. 

1  34*          In  the  following  winter  the  Athenians  and  Lacedae- 

indecisive     monians  remained  inactive,  in  consequence  of  the  armis- 

action  x 

between  the  tice  ;   but  the  Mantineans  and  the  Tegeans  with  their 

and  Man-    respective   allies  fought   a  battle  at  Laodicium  in   the 

ins'        territory  of  Orestheum  ;  the  victory  was  disputed.     For 

the  troops  of  both  cities  defeated  the  allies  on  the  wing 

.     opposed  to  them,  and  both  erected  trophies,  and  sent 

spoils  to  Delphi.     The  truth  is  that,  although  there  was 

considerable  slaughter  on  both  sides,  and  the  issue  was 

still  undecided  when  night  put  an  end  to  the  conflict,  the 

Tegeans  encamped  on  the  field  and  at  once  erected  a 

trophy,  while  the  Mantineans  retreated  to  Bucolium  and 

raised  a  rival  trophy,  but  afterwards. 

135.  At  the  close  of  the  same  winter,  towards  the  beginning 
Unsuccess-  of  spring,  Brasidas  made  an  attempt  on  Potidaea.  He 
made  by  approached  the  place  by  night  and  planted  a  ladder 
Potidaea°n  against  the  walls.  Thus  far  he  proceeded  undiscovered  ; 


a  Reading,  according  to  Dobree's  conjecture,  Tlao-iTfMSav,  not 
'E7riTe\idav.    Pasitelidas  is  mentioned,  v.  3,  as  governor  of  Torone. 
b  Cp.  iv.  96  med. 


NIGHT  ATTEMPT    UPON  POTIDAEA.        337 

B.C.  423.  for  the  ladder  was  fixed  at  a  point  which  the  sentinel  IV. 
2'  who  was  passing  on  the  bell  had  just  quitted,  and  before 
he  had  returned  to  his  post.  But  Brasidas  had  not  yet 
mounted  the  ladder  when  he  was  detected  by  the  gar- 
rison :  whereupon  he  withdrew  his  army  in  haste  without 
waiting  for  the  dawn.  So  the  winter  ended,  and  with 
it  the  ninth  year  in  the  Peloponnesian  War  of  which 
Thucydides  wrote  the  history. 


BOOK     V. 


V.  i.         WITH  the  return  of  summer  the  year  of  the  truce  ex-  B.C.  422. 
Expiration  pireH    but  hostilities  were  not  resumed  until  after  the     '  9<  3" 

of  the  truce  r 

and  sub-  Pythian  games.  During  the  armistice  the  Athenians 
resumption  removed  the  Delians  from  Delos ;  they  considered  them 
Sesh°Stlh  impure  and  unworthy  of  their  sacred  character  by  reason 
Second  of  a  certain  ancient  offence.  The  island  had  been  puri- 

punncation 

of  Delos.  fled  before,  when  they  took  the  dead  out  of  their  sepul- 
chres as  I  have  already  narrated a;  but  this  purification, 
which  seemed  sufficient  at  the  time,  was  now  thought 
unsatisfactory  because  the  inhabitants  had  been  suffered 
to  remain.  Pharnaces  gave  to  the  Delians  an  asylum 
at  Adramyttium  in  Asia,  and  whoever  chose  went  and 
settled  there. 

2.  When  the  armistice  was  over,  Cleon,  having  obtained 

cieon  sails  the  consent  of  the  people,  sailed  on  an  expedition  to  the 
dice,  and  Chalcidian  cities  with  thirty  ships  conveying  twelve 
fnfgattOUCh~  hundred  Athenian  hoplites,  three  hundred  Athenian 
Scione  horsemen,  and  numerous  allies.  Touching  first  at  Scione 

goes  on  to  & 

Torone.  (which  was  still  blockaded),  and  taking  from  thence  some 
hoplites  of  the  besieging  force,  he  sailed  into  the  so- 
called  Colophonian  port,  which  was  near  the  city  of 
Torone  ;  there  learning  from  deserters  that  Brasidas  was 
not  in  Torone,  and  that  the  garrison  was  too  weak  to 
resist,  he  marched  with  his  army  against  the  town,  and 
sent  ten  ships  to  sail  round  into  the  harbour.  First  he 
a  Cp.  i.  8  init.;  iii.  104  init. ;  v.  32  init.;  viii.  108  med. 


CAPTURE    OF    TORONE.  339 

B.C.  422.  came  to  the  new  line  of  wall  which  Brasidas  had  raised       V. 
3>  when,  wanting  to  take  in  the  suburbs,  he  broke  down  a 
part  of  the  old  wall  and  made  the  whole  city  one. 

But  Pasitelidas,  the  Lacedaemonian  governor,  and  the        3- 
garrison  under  his  command  came  to  the  defence  of  this  while  Pasi~ 

tehdas  is 

quarter  of  the  town,  and  fought  against  their  assailants,  defending 
who  pressed  them  hard.  Meanwhile  the  Athenian  fleet  the  Alb* 
was  sailing  round  into  the  harbour,  and  Pasitelidas  feared  ^is 
that  the  ships  would  take  the  city  before  he  could  return 
and  defend  it,  and  that  the  new  fortifications  would  be  town  is 
captured  and  himself  in  them.  So  he  left  the  suburb  Betrayal  of 
and  ran  back  into  the  city.  But  the  enemy  were  too  Panactum- 
quick ;  the  Athenians  from  the  ships  having  taken 
Torone  before  he  arrived  ;  while  their  infantry  followed 
close  upon  him,  and  in  a  moment  dashed  in  along  with 
him  at  the  breach  in  the  old  wall.  Some  of  the  Pelo- 
ponnesians  and  Toronaeans  were  slain  upon  the  spot, 
others  were  captured,  and  among  them  Pasitelidas  the 
governor.  Brasidas  was  on  his  way  to  the  relief  of 
Torone  at  the  time,  but,  hearing  that  the  place  was  taken, 
he  stopped  and  returned ;  he  was  within  four  miles  and 
a-half  at  the  time  of  the  capture.  Cleon  and  the  Athe- 
nians erected  two  trophies,  one  at  the  harbour  and  the 
other  near  the  new  wall.  The  women  and  children  were 
made  slaves ;  the  men  of  Torone  and  any  other  Chal- 
cidians,  together  with  the  Peloponnesians,  numbering  in 
all  seven  hundred,  were  sent  to  Athens.  The  Pelopon- 
nesian  prisoners  were  liberated  at  the  peace  which  was 
concluded  shortly  afterwards ;  the  rest  were  exchanged 
man  for  man  against  the  prisoners  whom  the  Olynthians 
had  made.  About  the  same  time  Panactum,  a  fortress 
on  the  Athenian  frontier,  was  betrayed  to  the  Boeotians. 
Cleon,  putting  a  garrison  into  Torone,  sailed  round 
Mount  Athos,  intending  to  attack  Amphipolis. 

About  the  same  time  three  envoys,  of  whom  one  was       4. 
Phaeax  the  son  of  Erasistratus,  were  sent  by  the  Athe-  Revolution 

J  in  Leontini. 

mans  with   two   ships  to  Italy  and   Sicily.     After  the  The  oii- 
general  peace  and  the  withdrawal  of  the  Athenians  from 


340  ATHENIAN  EMBASSY    TO    SICILY. 

V.       Sicily  a,  the  Leontines  had  enrolled  many  new  citizens,  B.C.  422, 
the  Syracu-  an(j  the  people  contemplated  a  redistribution  of  the  land. 

sans  drive 

out  the  The  oligarchy,  perceiving  their  intention,  called  in  the 
They^en  Syracusans  and  drove  out  the  people,  who  separated  and 
Syracuse,  wandered  up  and  down  the  island.  The  oligarchy  then 
but  some  of  ma(}e  an  agreement  with  the  Syracusans  :  and,  leaving 

them  soon  J 

grow  dis-  their  own  city  deserted,  settled  in  Syracuse,  and  received 
and  return  the  privileges  of  citizenship.  Not  long  afterwards  some 
of  them  grew  discontented,  and,  quitting  Syracuse,  occu- 
a  P^ace  ca^ed  Phoceis,  which  was  a  part  of  the 


They  fight   town  of  Leontini,  and  Brycinniae,  a  fortress  in  the  Leon- 

Syracuse.     tine  territory.     Here  they  were  joined  by  most  of  the 

nians  tr/to  common  people  who  had  been  previously  driven  out,  and 

s?diyine      fr°m  ^eir  strongholds  they  carried  on  a  continual  war- 

against       fare  against  Syracuse.     It  was  the  report  of  these  events 

which  induced  the  Athenians  to  send  Phaeax  to  Sicily. 

He  was  to  warn  the  Sicilians  that  the  Syracusans  were 

aiming  at  supremacy,  and  to  unite  the  allies  of  Athens, 

and  if  possible  the  other  cities,  in  a  war  against  Syracuse. 

The  Athenians  hoped  that  they  might  thus  save  the 

Leontine  people.     Phaeax  succeeded  in  his  mission  to 

the   Camarinaeans   and  Agrigentines,  but   in    Gela   he 

failed,  and,  convinced  that  he  could  not  persuade  the 

other  states,  went  no  further.    Returning  by  land  through 

the  country  of  the  Sicels,  and  by  the  way  going  to  Bri- 

cinniae  and  encouraging  the  exiles,  he  arrived  at  Catana, 

where  he  embarked  for  Athens. 

5.  On  his  voyage,  both  to  and  from  Sicily,  he  made  pro- 

The  Italian  posals  of  friendship  to  several  of  the  Italian  cities.     He 

make  a       also  fell  in  with  some  Locrian  settlers  who  had  been 

AthensWlth  driven  out  of  Messene.     After  the  agreement  between 

the  Sicilian  towns,  a  feud  had  broken  out  at  Messene, 

and  one  of  the  two  parties  called  in  the  Locrians,  who 

sent  some  of  their  citizens  to  settle  there  ;  thus  Messene 

was  held  for  a  time  by  the  Locrians.     They  were  re- 

turning home  after  their  expulsion  when  Phaeax  fell  in 

with  thenr,  but  he  did  them  no  harm  ;  for  the  Locrians 

a  Cp.  iv.  65  init. 


CLEON  SAILS   AGAINST  AMPHIPOLIS.      341 

B.C.  422.  had  already  agreed  with  him  to  enter  into  a  treaty  with  V. 
89<  3<  the  Athenians.  At  the  general  reconciliation  of  the  Sici- 
lians, they  alone  of  the  allies  had  not  made  peace  with 
Athens.  And  they  would  have  continued  to  hold  out 
had  they  not  been  constrained  by  a  war  with  the  Itoneans 
and  Melaeans,  who  were  their  neighbours  and  colonists 
from  their  city.  Phaeax  then  returned  to  Athens. 

Cleon  had  now  sailed  round  from  Torone  against  Am-        6. 
phipolis,  and,  making  Eion  his  head-quarters,  attacked  Cleon 
Stageirus  %  a  colony  of  the  Andrians,  which  he  failed  to  Eion  wait- 
take.     He  succeeded,  however,  in  storming  Galepsus  b,  reinforce- 
a  Thasian  colony.     He  sent  an  embassy  to  Perdiccas, 


desiring  him  to  come  with  an  army,  according  to  the  ascends  the 
terms  of  the  alliance  c,  and  another  to  Polles,  the  king  of  dyiium  to 
the  Odomantian  Thracians,  who  was  to  bring  as  many  re  tre* 
Thracian  mercenaries  as  he  could  ;  he  then  remained 
quietly  at  Eion  waiting  for  reinforcements.  Brasidas, 
hearing  of  his  movements,  took  up  a  counter-position  on 
Cerdylium.  This  is  a  high  ground  on  the  right  bank 
of  the  river,  not  far  from  Amphipolis,  belonging  to  the 
Argilians.  From  this  spot  he  commanded  a  view  of  the 
country  round,  so  that  Cleon  was  sure  to  be  seen  by  him 
if,  as  he  expected,  despising  the  numbers  of  his  op- 
ponents, he  should  go  up  against  Amphipolis  without 
waiting  for  his  reinforcements.  At  the  same  time  he  pre- 
pared for  a  battle,  summoning  to  his  side  fifteen  hundred 
Thracian  mercenaries  and  the  entire  forces  of  the  Edo- 
nians,  who  were  targeteers  and  horsemen  ;  he  had  already 
one  thousand  Myrcinian  and  Chalcidian  targeteers,  in 
addition  to  the  troops  in  Amphipolis.  His  heavy-armed, 
when  all  mustered,  amounted  to  nearly  two  thousand, 
and  he  had  about  three  hundred  Hellenic  cavalry.  Of 
these  forces  about  fifteen  hundred  were  stationed  with 
Brasidas  on  Cerdylium,  and  the  remainder  were  drawn 
up  in  order  of  battle  under  Clearidas  in  Amphipolis. 

Cleon  did  nothing  for  a  time,  but  he  was  soon  com-        7. 
pelled  to  make  the  movement  which  Brasidas  expected.  Feelings  of 

the  soldiers 
a  Cp.  iv.  88  fin.  ]J  Gp.  iv.  107  fin.  c  Cp.  iv.  132  init. 


342   CLEON  LOOKING  DOWN  UPON  AMPHIPOLIS. 


V. 

towards 
Cleon  con- 
trasts 

greatly  with 
his  own 
confidence 
in  himself. 
At  length 
he  is  com- 
pelled by 
their  mur- 
murs to 
move  for- 
ward ;  he 
ascends  a 
hill  com- 
manding a 
view  of  the 
country. 


8. 

Brasidas 
descends 
from  Cer- 
dylium. 
Fearing  the 
inferiority 
of  his  own 
troops  he 
determines 
to  fall  upon 
the  Athe- 
nians in  two 
separate 
detach- 
ments. 


For  the  soldiers  were  disgusted  at  their  inaction,  and  B.C.  422. 
drew  comparisons  between  the  generals  ;  what  skill  and  ° 
enterprise  might  be  expected  on  the  one  side,  and  what 
ignorance  and  cowardice  on  the  other.  And  they  re- 
membered how  unwilling  they  had  been  to  follow  Cleon 
when  they  left  Athens.  He,  observing  their  murmurs, 
and  not  wanting  them  to  be  depressed  by  too  long  a 
stay  in  one  place,  moved  onwards.  He  went  to  work  in 
the  same  confident  spirit  which  had  already  been  suc- 
cessful at  Pylos,  and  of  which  the  success  had  given  him 
a  high  opinion  of  his  own  wisdom.  That  any  one  would 
come  out  to  fight  with  him  he  never  even  imagined  ; 
he  said  that  he  was  only  going  to  look  at  the  place. 
If  he  waited  for  a  larger  force,  this  was  not  because  he 
thought  that  there  was  any  risk  of  his  being  defeated 
should  he  be  compelled  to  fight,  but  that  he  might 
completely  surround  and  storm  the  city.  So  he  stationed 
his  army  upon  a  steep  hill  above  Amphipolis,  whence  he 
surveyed  with  his  own  eyes  the  lake  formed  by  the  river 
Strymon,  and  the  lie  of  the  country  on  the  side  to- 
wards Thrace.  He  thought  that  he  could  go  away 
without  fighting  whenever  he  pleased.  For  indeed  there 
was  no  one  to  be  seen  on  the  walls,  nor  passing  through 
the  gates,  which  were  all  closed.  He  even  imagined 
that  he  had  made  a  mistake  in  coming  up  against  the 
city  without  siege-engines  ;  had  he  brought  them  he 
would  have  taken  Amphipolis,  for  there  was  no  one  to 
prevent  him. 

No  sooner  did  Brasidas  see  the  Athenians  in  motion, 
than  he  himself  descended  from  Cerdylium,  and  went 
into  Amphipolis.  He  did  not  go  out  and  draw  up 
his  forces  in  order  of  battle  ;  he  feared  too  much  the 
inferiority  of  his  own  troops,  not  in  their  numbers  (which 
were  about  equal  to  those  of  the  enemy)  but  in  quality; 
for  the  Athenian  forces  were  the  flower  of  their  army, 
and  they  were  supported  by  the  best  of  the  Lemnians 
and  Imbrians.  So  he  determined  to  employ  a  manoeuvre, 
thinking  that,  if  he  showed  them  the  real  number  and 


SPEECH   OF   BRASIDAS.  343 

B.C.  422.  meagre  equipment  of  his  soldiers,  he  would  be  less  likely  V. 
3'  to  succeed  than  if  he  came  upon  them  before  there  had 
been  time  to  observe  him,  and  when  as  yet  they  had  no 
real  grounds  for  their  contempt  of  him.  Selecting  a 
hundred  and  fifty  hoplites,  and  handing  over  the  rest 
to  Clearidas,  he  resolved  to  make  a  sudden  attack  be- 
fore the  Athenians  retired,  considering  that,  if  their 
reinforcements  should  arrive,  he  might  never  again  have 
an  opportunity  of  fighting  them  by  themselves.  So  he 
called  together  all  his  troops,  and  wishing  to  encourage 
them,  and  explain  his  plan,  spoke  as  follows  :  — 

'  Men  of  Peloponnesus,  I  need  not  waste  words  in  9. 
telling  you  that  we  come  from  a  land  which  has  always  We  are 
been  brave,  and  therefore  free,  and  that  you  are  Dorians*,  and  may 


and   are  about  to   fight  with  lonians  whom   you  have 

beaten  again  and  again.     But  I  must  explain  to  you  my 

plan  of  attack,  lest  you  should  be  disheartened  at  the  must  under- 

seeming  disproportion  of  numbers,  because  we  go  into  plan.  *" 

battle  not  with  our  whole  force  but  with  a  handful  of  men. 

Our  enemies,  if  I  am  not  mistaken,  despise  us; 


believe  that  no  one  will  come  out  against  them,  and  so  retreat. 
they  have  ascended  the  hill,  where  they  are  busy  looking  sally  'forth 


about  them  in  disorder,  and  making  but  small  account  of 
us.  Now,  he  is  the  most  successful  general  b  who  discerns 
most  clearly  such  mistakes  when  made  by  his  enemies,  another. 
and  adapts  his  attack  to  the  character  of  his  own  forces, 
not  always  assailing  them  openly  and  in  regular  array, 
but  acting  according  to  the  circumstances  of  the  case. 
And  the  greatest  reputation  is  gained  by  those  strata- 
gems in  which  a  man  deceives  his  enemies  most  com- 
pletely, and  does  his  friends  most  service.  Therefore 
while  they  are  still  confident  and  unprepared,  and,  if 
I  read  their  intentions  aright,  are  thinking  of  with- 
drawing rather  than  of  maintaining  their  ground,  while 
they  are  off  their  guard  and  before  they  have  recovered 
their  presence  of  mind,  I  and  my  men  will  do  our  best 

a  Gp.  i.  124  init.  ;  vi.  77  med.  ;  vii.  5  fin.  ;  viii.  25  med.  &  fin. 
b  Cp.  iii.  29  fin. 


344  SALLY   OF  BRAS  ID  AS. 

V.  to  anticipate  their  retreat,  and  will  make  a  rush  at  the  8.0.422. 
centre  of  the  army.  Then,  Clearidas,  when  you  see  me  OL  89>  3' 
engaged,  and  I  hope  striking  panic  into  them,  bring  up 
your  troops,  the  Amphipolitans  and  the  other  allies, 
open  the  gates  suddenly,  run  out,  and  lose  no  time  in 
closing  with  them.  This  is  the  way  to  terrify  them  ; 
for  reinforcements  are  always  more  formidable  to  an 
enemy  than  the  troops  with  which  they  are  already  en- 
gaged. Show  yourself  a  brave  man  and  a  true  Spartan, 
and  do  you,  allies,  follow  manfully,  remembering  that 
readiness,  obedience,  and  a  sense  of  honour  are  the 
virtues  of  a  soldier.  To-day  you  have  to  choose  between 
freedom  and  slavery;  between  the  name  of  Lacedae- 
monian allies,  which  you  will  deserve  if  you  are  brave, 
and  of  servants  of  Athens.  For  even  if  you  should  be  so 
fortunate  as  to  escape  bonds  or  death,  servitude  will  be 
your  lot,  a  servitude  more  cruel  than  hitherto  ;  and  what 
is  more,  you  will  be  an  impediment  to  the  liberation  of 
the  other  Hellenes.  Do  not  lose  heart  ;  think  of  all  that 
is  at  stake  ;  and  I  will  show  you  that  I  can  not  only 
advise  others,  but  fight  myself.' 

IO.          When  Brasidas  had  thus  spoken,  he  prepared  to  sally 
cieon         forth  with  his  own  division,  and  stationed  the  rest  of  his 

orders  his  . 

army  to  army  with  Clearidas  at  the  so-called  Thracian  gates, 
Ee'Jssud-  *  ^at  they  might  come  out  and  support  him,  in  ac- 
zutacked  b  cordance  with  his  instructions.  He  had  been  seen 
Brasidas,  descending  from  Cerdylium  into  Amphipolis,  aand  then 
secondedby  offering  up  sacrifice  at  the  temple  of  Athene  within  the 
TheAthe-  walls  ;  for  the  interior  of  the  city  was  visible  from  the 
rou?edare  surrounding  country.  While  he  was  thus  employed,  a 
Brasidas  is  report  was  brought  to  Cleon,  whoa  had  just  gone  for- 

wounded  .  .  ,     t 

mortally      ward  to  reconnoitre,  that  the  whole  army  of  the  enemy 
'    could  plainly  be  seen  collected  inside  the  town,  and  that 


hearsdofSthe  ^e  ^cet  °^  numerous  men  anc^   horses   ready  to  come 
victory  and  forth  were  visible  under  the  gate.     He  went  to  the  spot 

dies. 

a  Or,  taking  the  words  teal  TO.VTO.  irpda-aovTos  as  subordinate  to 
Qavepov  yevopevov  i  (  and  then  offering  up  sacrifice  at  the  temple  of 
Athene  within  the  walls,  for  the  interior  of  the  city,  etc.,.,  and  making 
preparations.  A  report  was  brought  to  Gleon,  who  '  etc. 


DEFEAT   AND   DEATH   OF   CLEON.          345 

B.C.  422.  and  saw  for  himself;  but  not  wishing  to  hazard  a  regular  V. 
9>  3'  engagement  until  his  allies  arrived,  and  thinking  he 
could  get  away  soon  enough,  he  gave  a  general  signal 
for  retreat,  at  the  same  time  ordering  his  forces  to  retire 
slowly  on  the  left  wing,  which  was  the  only  direction 
possible,  towards  Eion.  They  appeared  to  linger  ;  where- 
upon he  caused  his  own  right  wing  to  wheel  round,  and 
so  with  his  unshielded  side  exposed  to  the  enemy 
began  to  lead  off  his  army.  Meanwhile  Brasidas,  seeing 
that  the  Athenians  were  on  the  move  and  that  his  op- 
portunity was  come,  said  to  his  companions  and  to  the 
troops :  '  These  men  do  not  mean  to  face  us  ;  see  how 
their  spears  and  their  heads  are  shaking  ;  such  behaviour 
always  shows  that  an  army  is  going  to  run  away.  Open 
me  the  gates  as  I  ordered,  and  let  us  boldly  attack  them 
at  once.'  Thereupon  he  went  out  himself  by  the  gate 
leading  to  the  palisade  and  by  the  first  gate  of  the  long 
wall  which  was  then  standing,  and  ran  at  full  speed 
straight  up  the  road,  where,  on  the  steepest  part  of  the 
hill,  a  trophy  now  stands  :  he  then  attacked  the  centre 
of  the  Athenians,  who  were  terrified  at  his  audacity  and 
their  own  disorder,  and  put  them  to  flight.  Then 
Clearidas,  as  he  was  bidden,  sallied  forth  by  the  Thra- 
cian  gates  with  his  division,  and  charged  the  Athenians. 
The  sudden  attack  at  both  points  created  a  panic  among 
them.  Their  left  wing,  which  had  proceeded  some  little 
way  along  the  road  towards  Eion,  was  cut  off,  and 
instantly  fled.  They  were  already  in  full  retreat,  and 
Brasidas  was  going  on  to  the  right  wing  when  he  was 
wounded ;  the  Athenians  did  not  observe  his  fall,  and 
those  about  him  carried  him  off  the  field.  The  right 
wing  of  the  Athenians  was  more  disposed  to  stand. 
Cleon  indeed,  who  had  never  intended  to  remain,  fled 
at  once,  and  was  overtaken  and  slain  by  a  Myrcinian 
targeteer.  But  his  soldiers  rallied  where  they  were  on 
the  top  of  the  hill,  and  repulsed  Clearidas  two  or  three 
times.  They  did  not  yield  until  the  Chalcidian  and 
Myrcinian  cavalry  and  the  targeteers  hemmed  them  in 


346       VICTORY  AND   DEATH   OF  BRAS  I  DAS. 

V.  and  put  them  to  flight  with  a  shower  of  darts.  And  so  B.C.  422. 
the  rout  became  general,  and  those  of  the  Athenians  ° 
who  were  not  slain  at  once  in  close  combat  or  de- 
stroyed by  the  Chalcidian  horse  and  the  targeteers, 
hard-pressed  and  wandering  by  many  paths  over  the 
hills,  made  their  way  back  to  Eion.  Brasidas  was  car- 
ried safely  by  his  followers  out  of  the  battle  into  the 
city.  He  was  still  alive,  and  knew  that  his  army  had 
conquered,  but  soon  afterwards  he  died.  The  rest  of 
the  army  returning  with  Clearidas  from  the  pursuit, 
spoiled  the  dead,  and  erected  a  trophy. 

II.  Brasidas  was  buried  in  the  city  with  public  honours 

Funeral  of  in  front  of  what  is  now  the  Agora.     The  whole  body  of 

Br3.sid.cis 

TheAmphi-  the  allies  in  military  array  followed  him  to  the  grave. 
givehim  the  The  Amphipolitans  enclosed  his  sepulchre,  and  to  this 
dav  ^ey  sacrifice  to  m"m  as  to  a  hero,  and  also  celebrate 


founder,      games  and  yearly  offerings  in  his  honour.     They  like- 

superseding     .  . 

Hagnon      wise  made  him  their  founder,  and  dedicated  their  colony 

their  Teal  to  m'm3  pulling  down  a  the  buildings  which  Hagnon  had 
founder.  erected*,  and  obliterating  any  memorials  which  might 
have  remained  to  future  time  of  his  foundation15.  For 
they  considered  Brasidas  to  have  been  their  deliverer, 
and  under  the  present  circumstances  the  fear  of  Athens 
induced  them  to  pay  court  to  their  Lacedaemonian  allies. 
That  Hagnon  should  retain  the  honours  of  a  founder, 
now  that  they  were  enemies  of  the  Athenians,  seemed 
to  them  no  longer  in  accordance  with  their  interests, 
and  was  repugnant  to  their  feelings. 

They  gave   back  to  the  Athenians  their  dead,  who 

numbered  about  six  hundred,  while  only  seven  were  slain 

on  the  other  side.     For  there  was  no  regular  engage- 

ment, but  an  accident  led  to  the  battle  ;  and  the  Athe- 

nians  were    panic-stricken   before    it   had    well   begun. 

After   the   recovery  of  the   dead   the   Athenians   went 

home  by  sea.     Clearidas  and  his  companions  remained 

and  administered  the  affairs  of  Amphipolis. 

12.  At  the  end  of  the  summer,  a  little  before  this  time, 

a  Or,  'the  shrine  of  Hagnon.'  h  Cp.  iv.  102  fin. 


CESSATION   OP    MILITARY  MOVEMENTS.     347 

B.C.  422.  a  reinforcement  of  nine  hundred  heavy-armed,  under  the       V. 
3*  command  of  the  Lacedaemonian  generals  Rhamphias,  A  reinforce- 
Autocharidas,  and  Epicydidas,   set  out  for  Chalcidice.  bytheLace- 


Coming  first  to    Heraclea   in   Trachis,   they   regulated 
whatever  appeared  to  them  to  be  amiss.     They  were  pol.is 

11  J  arrive 

staying  there  when  the  battle   of  Amphipolis  occurred,  at  Heraclea, 
And  so  the  summer  came  to  an  end. 

The  following  winter  Rhamphias  and  his  army  went       13. 
as  far  as   Pierium  in  Thessaly,  but  as  the  Thessalians  but  is  not 
would  not  let  them  proceed,  and  Brasidas,  for  whom  to  pass 


these  reinforcements  were  intended,  was  dead,  they  re- 
turned  home,  thinking  that  the  time  for  action  had  gone 
by.  They  felt  that  they  were  not  competent  to  carry 
out  the  great  designs  of  Brasidas,  and  the  Athenians  had 
now  left  the  country  defeated.  But  their  chief  reason  for 
not  proceeding  was  that  the  Lacedaemonians,  at  the  time 
when  they  left  Sparta,  were  inclined  towards  peace. 

After  the   battle   of  Amphipolis   and   the   return   of       14. 
Rhamphias  from  Thessaly,  neither  side  undertook  any  Both  the  * 

,-P,,      Athenians 

military  operations.    Both  alike  were  bent  on  peace.    The  and 


Athenians  had  been  beaten  at  Delium,  and  shortly  after- 
wards  at  Amphipolis  ;  and  so  they  had  lost  that  con- 
fidence  in  their  own  strength  which  had  indisposed  them  pointed  in 

-          their  hopes, 

to  treat  at  a  time  when  temporary  success  seemed  to  now  desire 
make  their  final  triumph  certain.  They  were  afraid  too  peace< 
that  their  allies  would  be  elated  at  their  disasters,  and 
that  more  of  them  would  revolt  ;  they  repented  that  after 
the  affair  at  Pylos,  when  they  might  honourably  have  done 
so,  they  had  not  come  to  terms.  The  Lacedaemonians 
on  the  other  hand  inclined  to  peace  because  the  course 
of  the  war  had  disappointed  their  expectations.  There 
was  a  time  when  they  fancied  that,  if  they  only  de- 
vastated Attica,  they  would  crush  the  power  of  Athens 
within  a  few  years  a  ;  and  yet  they  had  received  a  blow  at 
Sphacteria  such  as  Sparta  had  never  experienced  until 
then  ;  their  country  was  continually  ravaged  from  Pylos 
and  Cythera  ;  the  Helots  were  deserting,  and  they  were 
a  Cp.  i.  8  1  fin. 


348      MOTIVES  OF  THE  TWO   GREAT  POWERS. 

V.  always  fearing  lest  those  who  had  not  deserted,  relying  B.C.  422. 
on  the  help  of  those  who  had,  should  seize  their  oppor-  ° 
tunity  and  revolt,  as  they  had  done  once  before.  More- 
over, a  truce  for  thirty  years  which  they  had  made  with 
Argos  was  on  the  point  of  expiring ;  the  Argives  were 
unwilling  to  renew  it  unless  Cynuria  were  restored 
to  them,  and  the  Lacedaemonians  deemed  it  impossible 
to  fight  against  the  Argives  and  Athenians  combined. 
They  suspected  also  that  some  of  the  Peloponnesian 
cities  would  secede  and  join  the  Argives,  which  proved 
to  be  the  case. 

15.  Upon  these  grounds  both  governments  thought  it  de- 
The  desire   sirable  to  make  peace.     The  Lacedaemonians  were  the 
daemonians  more  eager  of  the  two,  because  they  wanted  to  recover  the 
stronger      prisoners  taken  at  Sphacteria  ;  for  the  Spartans  among 
because       them  were  of  high  rank,  and  all  alike  related  to  them- 

theywantto 

recover  the  selves.  They  had  negotiated  for  their  recovery  immedi- 
ately after  they  were  taken,  but  the  Athenians,  in  the  hour 
of  their  prosperity,  would  not  as  yet  agree  to  fair  terms*. 
After  their  defeat  at  Delium,  the  Lacedaemonians  were 
well  aware  that  they  would  now  be  more  compliant,  and 
therefore  they  had  at  once  made  a  truce  for  a  year,  during 
which  the  envoys  of  the  two  states  were  to  meet  and  ad- 

16.  vise  about  a  lasting  peace.    When  Athens  had  received  a 
Br!|SQasn    second  blow  at  Amphipolis,  and  Brasidas  and  Cleon,  who 
for  very       had  been  the  two  greatest  enemies  of  peace, — the  one  be- 

different  to 

reasons  had  cause  the  war  brought  him  success  and  reputation,  and  the 
enemiefto  other  because  he  fancied  that  in  quiet  times  his  rogueries 
peace.  would  be  more  transparent  and  his  slanders  less  credible, 

But  now 

they  are  — had  fallen  in  the  battle,  bthe  two  chief  aspirants  for  po- 
Niciasand  litical  power  at  Athens  and  Sparta,  Pleistoanaxb  the  son 
'  of  Pausanias,  king  of  the  Lacedaemonians,  and  Nicias  the 
son  of  Niceratus  the  Athenian,  who  had  been  the  most 
respective  fortunate  general  of  his  day,  became  more  eager  than 

states,  have 

a  Gp.  iv.  41  fin. 

b  Or,  omitting  oi  ei>  before  e'/carepa :  c  these  (i.  e.  Cleon  and  Bra- 
sidas) being  at  the  time  the  two  great  champions  for  the  supremacy 
of  their  respective  states ;  Pleistoanax '  etc. 


NICIAS   AND   PLEISTOANAX.  349 

B.C.  422.  ever  to  make  an  end  of  the  war.    Nicias  desired,  whilst  he       V. 

9'  3'  was  still  successful  and  held  in  repute,  to  preserve  his  good  each  a 

m      strong  mo- 
fortune  ;  he  would  have  liked  to  rest  from  toil,  and  to  give  tive  for 

the  people  rest ;  and  he  hoped  to  leave  behind  him  to  end'tcfthe 
other  ages  the  name  of  a  man  who  in  all  his  life  had  never  wan 
brought  disaster  on  the  city.  He  thought  that  the  way 
to  gain  his  wish  was  to  trust  as  little  as  possible  to  for- 
tune, and  to  keep  out  of  danger  ;  and  that  danger  would 
be  best  avoided  by  peace.  Pleistoanax  wanted  peace, 
because  his  enemies  were  always  stirring  up  the  scruples 
of  the  Lacedaemonians  against  him,  and  insisting  when- 
ever misfortunes  came  that  they  were  to  be  attributed  to 
his  illegal  return  from  exile.  For  they  accused  him  and 
Aristocles  his  brother  of  inducing  the  priestess  at 
Delphi,  whenever  Lacedaemonian  envoys  came  to  en- 
quire of  the  oracle,  constantly  to  repeat  the  same 
answer :  '  Bring  back  the  seed  of  the  hero  son  of 
Zeus  from  a  strange  country  to  your  own ;  else  you 
will  plough  with  a  silver  ploughshare:'  Until,  after  a 
banishment  of  nineteen  years,  he  persuaded  the  Lace- 
daemonians to  bring  him  home  again  with  dances  and 
sacrifices  and  such  ceremonies  as  they  observed  when 
they  first  enthroned  their  kings  at  the  foundation  of 
Lacedaemon.  He  had  been  banished  on  account  of 
his  retreat  from  Attica,  when  he  was  supposed  to  have 
been  bribed  a.  While  in  exile  at  Mount  Lycaeum  he  had 
occupied  a  house  half  within  the  sacred  precinct  of  Zeus, 
through  fear  of  the  Lacedaemonians. 

He  was  vexed  by  these  accusations,  and  thinking  that       1 7. 
in  peace,  when  there  would  be  no  mishaps  and  the  Lace-  Th(r  ne&°" 

;  .  tiations 

daemonians  would  have  recovered  the  captives,  he  would  proceed. 
himself  be  less  open  to  attack,  whereas  in  war  leading  agreeto  ie 
men    must   always   have   the   misfortunes  of  the  state 


laid  at  their  door,    he   was  very   anxious   to  come   to  £ad  gained 

J  by  arms. 

terms.    Negotiations  were  commenced  during  the  winter.  Only  the 
Towards  spring   the  Lacedaemonians  sounded  a  note  retainapia- 
of  preparation  by  announcing   to  the  allies  that  their 
a  Cp.  i.  114;  ii.  21  init. 


35° 


CLAIMS    URGED    ON  BOTH  SIDES. 


V. 

nians 

Nisaea, 


been  sur- 
rendered. 


1 8. 

Terms  of 
the  treaty. 


services  would  be  required  in  the  erection  of  a  fort ;  they  B.C.  42?. 
thought  that  the  Athenians  would  thereby  be  induced  Sg'  3' 
to  listen  to  them.  At  the  same  time,  after  many  confer- 
ences and  many  demands  urged  on  both  sides,  an  under- 
standing was  at  last  arrived  at  that  both  parties  should 
give  up  what  they  had  gained  by  arms.  The  Athenians, 
however,  were  to  retain  Nisaea,  for  when  they  demanded 
the  restoration  of  Plataea  the  Thebans  protested  that 
they  had  obtained  possession  of  the  place  not  by  force 
or  treachery,  but  by  agreement*;  to  which  the  Athenians 
rejoined  that  they  had  obtained  Nisaea  in  the  same 
manner b.  The  Lacedaemonians  then  summoned  their 
allies ;  and  although  the  Boeotians,  Corinthians,  Eleans, 
and  Megarians  were  dissatisfied,  the  majority  voted  for 
peace.  And  so  the  peace  was  finally  concluded  and 
ratified  by  oaths  and  libations,  the  Lacedaemonians 
binding  themselves  to  the  Athenians  and  the  Athenians 
to  the  Lacedaemonians  in  the  following  terms  : — 

The  Athenians  and  Lacedaemonians  and  their  respec- 
tive allies  make  peace  upon  the  following  terms,  to 
which  they  swear,  each  city  separately: — 

I.  Touching  the  common  temples,  any  one  who  pleases 
may  go  and  sacrifice  in  them  and  enquire  at  them,  on 
behalf  either  of  himself  or  of  the  state,  according  to  the 
custom  of  his  country,  both  by  land  and  sea,  without  fear. 

II.  The  precinct  and  the  temple  of  Apollo  at  Delphi 
and  the  Delphian  people  shall  be  independent,  and  shall 
retain  their  own  revenues  and  their  own  courts  of  justice, 
both  for  themselves  and  for  their  territory,  according  to 
their  ancestral  customs. 

III.  The    peace   between    the  Athenians   and    their 
confederates   and  the   Lacedaemonians  and  their  con- 
federates  shall    endure   fifty    years,   both    by   sea   and 
land,  without  fraud  or  hurt. 

IV.  They  shall  not  be  allowed  to  bear  arms  to  the 
hurt  of  one  another  in  any  way  or   manner ;    neither 
the  Lacedaemonians  and  their  allies  against  the  Athe- 

a  Cp.  iii.  52  init.  h  Cp.  iv.  69  fin. 


THE    TERMS    OF   PEACE.  351 

B.C.  422.  nians  and  their  allies,  nor  the  Athenians  and  their  allies       V. 
89>  3'  against  the  Lacedaemonians  and  their  allies  ;  and  they 
shall   determine  any  controversy  which   may  arise  be- 
tween them  by  oaths  and  other  legal  means  in  such  sort 
as  they  shall  agree. 

V.  The  Lacedaemonians  and  their  allies  shall  restore 
Amphipolis  to  the  Athenians. 

VI.  The  inhabitants   of  any  cities  which   the  Lace- 
daemonians deliver  over  to  the  Athenians  may  depart 
whithersoever  they  please,  and  take  their  property  with 
them.      The  said  cities  shall  be  independent,  but  shall 
pay  the  tribute  which  was  fixed  in  the  time  of  Aristides. 
After  the  conclusion  of  the  treaty  the  Athenians  and 
their  allies  shall  not  be  allowed  to  make  war  upon  them 
to  their  hurt,  so  long  as  they  pay   the   tribute.     The 
cities  are  these — Argilusa,  Stageirusb,  Acanthus0,  Scolus, 
Olynthusd,  Spartolus6:   these  shall  be  allies  neither  of 
the  Lacedaemonians  nor  of  the  Athenians,  but  if  the 
Athenians   succeed   in   persuading    them,   having   their 
consent,  they  may  make  them  allies. 

VII.  The  Mecybernians,    Sanaeans f,   and   Singaeans 
shall  dwell  in   their  own  cities    on   the  same  terms  as 
the  Olynthians  and  Acanthians. 

VIII.  The  Lacedaemonians  and  the  allies  shall  restore 
Panactum g  to  the  Athenians.     The  Athenians  shall  re- 
store to  the  Lacedaemonians  Coryphasium h,  Cythera1, 
Methone  k,  Pteleum,  and  Atalante  \ 

IX.  The  Athenians  shall  surrender  the  Lacedaemo- 
nian captives  whom  they  have  in  their  public  prison,  or 
who  are  in  the  public  prison  of  any   place  within  the 
Athenian  dominions,  and  they  shall  let  go  the  Pelopon- 
nesians  who  are  besieged  in  Scione,  and  any  other  allies 
of  the  Lacedaemonians  who  are  in  Scione,  and  all  whom 
Brasidas  introduced  into  the  place  m,  and  any  of  the  allies 

a  Cp.  iv.  103  med.  b  Cp.  iv.  88  fin.  c  Gp.  iv.  88. 

d  Cp.  i.  58  med.  e  Cp.  ii.  79  init.  f  Cp.  iv.  109  fin. 

«  Cp.  v.  3  fin.  h  Cp.  iv.  3  med.*  *  Cp.  iv.  54. 

k  Cp.  iv.  45.  l  Cp.  ii.  32.  m  Cp.  iv.  123  fin. 


352    -          CONCLUSION   OF   THE    TREATY. 

V.       of  the  Lacedaemonians  who  are  in  the  public  prison  at  B.C.  42f. 
Athens,  or  in  the  public  prison  of  any  place  within  the  Olt  8g>  3' 
Athenian  dominions.      The  Lacedaemonians  and  their 
allies  in  like  manner  shall  restore  those  of  the  Athenians 
and  their  allies  who  are  their  prisoners. 

X.  Respecting  Scione  a,  Torone  b,  and  Sermyle,  or  any 
cities  which  are  held  by  the  Athenians,  the  Athenians 
shall  do  with  the  inhabitants  of  the  said  cities,  or  of  any 
cities  which  are  held  by  them,  as  they  think  fit. 

XI.  The  Athenians  shall  bind  themselves  by  oath  to 
the  Lacedaemonians  and  their  allies,  city  by  city,  and  the 
oath  shall  be  that  which  in  the  several  cities  of  the  two 
contracting  parties  is  deemed  the  most  binding.     The 
oaths  shall  be  in  the  following  form  : — '  I  will  abide  by 
this  treaty  and  by  this  peace  truly  and  sincerely/     The 
Lacedaemonians  and  their  allies  shall  bind  themselves 
by  a  similar  oath  to  the  Athenians.     This  oath  shall  be 
renewed  by   both  parties   every  year;    and  they  shall 
erect  pillars  at  Olympia,  Delphi,  and  the  Isthmus,  at 
Athens  in  the  Acropolis,  at  Lacedaemon  in  the  temple 
of  Apollo  at  Amyclae. 

XII.  If  anything  whatsoever  be  forgotten  on  one  side 
or  the  other,  either  party  may,  without  violation  of  their 
oaths,  take  honest  counsel  and  alter  the  treaty  in  such 
manner  as  shall  seem  good  to  the  two  parties,  the  Athe- 
nians and  Lacedaemonians. 

19.  The  treaty  begins,  at  Lacedaemon  in  the  Ephorate  of 
Ratifica-  Pleistolas,  and  on  the  twenty-seventh  day  of  the  month 
Artemisium,  and  at  Athens  in  the  Archonship  of  Alcaeus, 
on  the  twenty-fifth  day  of  the  month  Elaphebolion c. 
The  following  persons  took  the  oaths  and  ratified  the 
treaty: — On  behalf  of  the  Lacedaemonians,  Pleistolas, 
Damagetus,  Chionis,  Metagenes,  Acanthus,  Diathus, 
Ischagoras,  Philocharidas,  Zeuxidas,  Antippus,  Tellis, 
Alcinidas,  Empedias,  Menas,  Laphilus ;  on  behalf  of 
the  Athenians,  Lampon,  Isthmionicus,  Nicias,  Laches, 
Euthydemus,  Procles,  Pythodorus,  Hagnon,  Myrtilus, 
a  Cp.  v.  32  init.  b  Cp.  v.  3.  c  March — April. 


OPPOSITION   OF    THE    CHALCIDIANS.        353 

B.C.  421.  Thrasycles,  Theagenes,  Aristocrates,  lolcius,  Timocrates,       V. 
3'  Leon,  Lamachus,  Demosthenes. 

This  treaty  was  concluded  at  the  end  of  winter,  just  20. 
at  the  beginning  of  spring,  immediately  after  the  City  The  war 
Dionysia.  Ten  years,  with  a  difference  of  a  few  days,  almost  " 


had  passed  since  the  invasion  of  Attica  and  the  com- 
mencement  of  the  war.  I  would  have  a  person  reckon 
the  actual  periods  of  time,  and  not  rely  upon  catalogues 
of  the  archons  or  other  official  personages  whose  names 
may  be  used  in  different  cities  to  mark  the  dates  of  past 
events.  For  whether  an  event  occurred  in  the  beginning, 
or  in  the  middle,  or  whatever  might  be  the  exact  point,  of 
a  magistrate's  term  of  office  is  left  uncertain  by  such  a 
mode  of  reckoning.  But  if  he  measure  by  summers  and 
winters  as  they  are  here  set  down,  and  count  each  summer 
and  winter  as  a  half  year,  he  will  find  that  ten  summers 
and  ten  winters  passed  in  the  first  part  of  the  war. 

The  Lacedaemonians  —  for  the  lot  having  fallen  upon       21. 
them  they  had  to  make  restitution  first  —  immediately  The  Lace-' 

"      .          .  daemonians 

released  their  prisoners,  and  sending  three  envoys,  Ischa-  restore  their 
goras,  Menas,    and    Philocharidas,  to    Chalcidice,  com- 
manded    Clearidas    to    deliver    up   Amphipolis   to   the 
Athenians,  and  the  other  cities  to   accept  the  articles 
of  the  treaty  which   severally   concerned   them.      But  the  Chaici- 


they  did  not  approve  of  the  terms,  and  refused. 
Clearidas,  who  acted  in  the  interest  of  the  Chalcidians,  P1  the 
would  not  give  up  the  place,  and  said  that  it  was  not  in 
his  power  to  do  so  against  their  will.  Accompanied  by 
envoys  from  the  Chalcidian  cities,  he  himself  went  direct 
to  Lacedaemon,  intending  to  defend  himself  in  case 
Ischagoras  and  his  colleagues  should  accuse  him  of 
insubordination  ;  he  also  wanted  to  know  whether  the 
treaty  could  still  be  reconsidered.  On  his  arrival  he 
found  that  it  was  positively  concluded,  and  he  himself 
was  sent  back  to  Thrace  by  the  Lacedaemonians,  who 
commanded  him  to  give  up  Amphipolis,  or,  if  he  could 
not,  at  any  rate  to  withdraw  all  the  Peloponnesian  forces 
from  the  place.  So  he  returned  in  haste. 

A  a 


354  DISCONTENT    OF    THE    ALLIES. 

V.  The  representatives  of  the  other  allies  were  present  at  B.C.  42?. 

22.  Lacedaemon,  and  the  Lacedaemonians  urged  the  re- 
The  allies  luctant  states  to  accept  the  treaty.  But  they  refused 
fied;butthe  for  the  same  reasons  as  before a,  and  insisted  that  they 
monians"  must  have  more  equitable  conditions.  Finding  that 
renewliaof  the^  wou1^  not  come  m>  the  Lacedaemonians  dismissed 
hostilities  them,  and  proceeded  on  their  own  account  to  make 
dismiss^0 '  an  alliance  with  the  Athenians.  They  thought  that 
form  anal-  the  Argives,  whose  hostile  intentions  had  been  mani- 
festec*  ky  their  refusal  to  renew  the  peace  at  the  request 
of  Ampelidas  and  Lichas,  the  Lacedaemonian  envoys 
who  had  gone  thither,  being  now  unsupported  by  the 
Athenians,  would  thus  be  least  dangerous  and  that  the 
rest  of  Peloponnesus  would  be  least  likely  to  stir.  For 
the  Athenian  alliance,  to  which  they  would  otherwise 
have  had  recourse,  would  now  be  closed  to  them.  There 
were  present  at  the  time  Athenian  envoys,  and  after  a 
negotiation  the  two  parties  took  oaths,  and  made  an 
alliance,  of  which  the  terms  were  as  follows : — 
23-  The  Lacedaemonians  shall  be  allies  of  the  Athenians 
^or  ^^  years,  on  the  following  conditions  : — 

I.  If  any  enemy  invade  the  Lacedaemonian  territory 
and   harm    the    Lacedaemonians,    the    Athenians   shall 
assist    the   Lacedaemonians    in    any   way   which    they 
can,   and    to   the   utmost    of   their  power ;   and  if  the 
enemy  ravage  their  territory  and  depart,  the  offending 
city  shall  be   the  enemy  of  the  Lacedaemonians   and 
Athenians,  and  shall   suffer   at  the   hands   of  both   of 
them,   and   neither    city   shall   cease   from   war   before 
the  other.     These  things  shall  be   performed  honestly, 
and  zealously,  and  sincerely. 

II.  If  any  enemy  invade  the  Athenian  territory  and 
harm  the  Athenians,  the   Lacedaemonians  shall  assist 
them  in  any  way  which  they  can,  and  to  the  utmost  of 
their  power ;  and  if  the  enemy  ravage  their  territory  and 
depart,  the  offending  city  shall  be   the  enemy  of  the 
Athenians  and  Lacedaemonians,  and  shall  suffer  at  the 

a  Cp.  v.  17  fin. 


ALLIANCE    OF  ATHENS   AND   SPARTA.     355 

B.C.  42?.  hands  of  both  of  them,  and  neither  city  shall  cease  from       V. 
3'  war  before  the  other.     These  things  shall  be  performed 
honestly,  and  zealously,  and  sincerely. 

III.  If  the  slaves  rebel,  the  Athenians  shall  aid  the 
Lacedaemonians  with  all  their  might  and  to  the  utmost 
of  their  power. 

IV.  These  provisions  shall  be  sworn  to  on  both  sides 
by  the  same  persons  who  swore  to  the  former  treaty. 
Every  year  the   Lacedaemonians   shall  go   to  Athens 
at  the  Dionysia  and  renew  the  bath,  and  the  Athenians 
shall  go  to  Lacedaemon  at  the  Hyacinthia  and  renew 
the  oath.     Both  parties  shall  erect  pillars,  one  in  Lace- 
daemon  at  the  temple  of  Apollo  in  Amyclae,  another 
at  Athens  in  the  Acropolis  at  the  temple  of  Athene. 

V.  If  the  Lacedaemonians  and  Athenians  agree  that 
anything   shall  be   added  to  or  taken  away   from  the 
treaty  of  alliance,  whatever   it   be,   this  may  be   done 
without  violation  of  their  oaths. 

On  behalf  of  the    Lacedaemonians   there   took   the       24. 
oaths,  Pleistoanax,  Agis,  Pleistolas,  Damagetus,  Chionis,  Ratifica- 
Metagenes,   Acanthus,    Dai'thus,   Ischagoras,    Philocha- 
ridas,  Zeuxidas,  Antippus,  Alcinadas,  Tellis,  Empedias, 
Menas,    Laphilus.     On  behalf  of  the  Athenians  there 
took  the  oaths,  Lampon,  Isthmionicus,  Laches,  Nicias, 
Euthydemus,    Procles,    Pythodorus,  Hagnon,   Myrtilus, 
Thrasycles,  Theagenes,  Aristocrates,  lolcius,  Timocrates, 
Leon,  Lamachus,  Demosthenes. 

This  alliance  was  made  shortly  after  the  treaty;  at  Restoration 
the  same  time  the  Athenians  restored  to  the  Lace- 
daemonians  the  prisoners  taken  at  Sphacteria.  The 
summer  of  the  eleventh  year  then  began.  During  the 
previous  ten  years  the  first  war,  of  which  the  history 
has  now  been  written,  went  on  without  intermission. 

The  treaty  and  the  alliance  which  terminated  the  ten       25. 
years'  war  were  made  in  the  Ephorate  of  Pleistolas  at  £irst  , 

*  Connth  and 

Lacedaemon,  and  the  Archonship  of  Alcaeus  at  Athens,  other  Peio- 
Those  who  accepted  the  treaty  were  now  at  peace  ;  but 
the  Corinthians  and  several  of  the  Peloponnesian  cities 

A  a  2, 


356  THUCYDIDES. 

.V.       did  what  they  could  to  disturb  the  arrangement.   And  so  B.C.  421. 
mans  them-  before  long  a  new  cause  of  quarrel  set  the  allies  against 

selves,  show  * 

signs  of       the  Lacedaemonians  ;  who  also,  as  time  went  on,  incurred 

discontent.    ,t  .    .  r     .         .    ,  .  ,    . 

trie  suspicion  ot  the  Athenians,  because  in  certain  par- 

ticulars they  would  not  execute  the   provisions  of  the 

treaty.     For  six  years  and  ten  months  the  two  powers 

abstained    from   invading  each    other's    territories,   but 

abroad  the  cessation  of  arms  was  intermittent,  and  they 

did  each  other  all  the  harm  which  they  could.  At  last  they  B.c.  4i4. 

were  absolutely  compelled  to  break  the  treaty  made  at  the  O1-  9I>  3* 

end  of  the  first  ten  years,  and  to  declare  open  war. 

26.          The  same  Thucydides  of  Athens  continued  the  his- 

was  mere?   ^^  f°Uowmg  the  order  of  events,  which  he  reckoned 

nominal,      by  summers  and  winters,  up  to  the  destruction  of  the 

fairly  be      Athenian  empire    and  the   taking   of  Piraeus  and  the 

the  twenty?  Long  Walls   by  the  Lacedaemonians   and  their  allies. 

war  n  yearS  Altogether  the  war  lasted  twenty-seven  years,  for  if  any 

Thepre-      one  argue  that  the  interval  during  which  the  truce  con- 

'  thrice  nine  tinued  should  be  excluded,  he  is  mistaken.     If  he  have 


regard  to  the  facts  of  the  case,  he  will  see  that  the  term 
which  was  *  Peace>  can  hardly  be  applied  to  a  state  of  things  in 
verified  by  which  neither  party  gave  back  or  received  all  the  places 

the  event.  J   * 

I  myself      stipulated  ;  moreover  in  the  Mantinean  and  Epidaunan 
through  the  wars  and  in  other  matters  there  were  violations  of  the 


treaty  on  both  sides  ;  the  Chalcidian  allies  maintained 
for  twenty  their  attitude  of  hostility  towards  Athens,  and  the 
banish-  Boeotians  observed  an  armistice  terminable  at  ten  days' 
notice.  So  that,  including  the  first  ten  years'  war,  the 
doubtful  truce  which  followed,  and  the  war  which  fol- 
both  sides,  lowed  that,  he  who  reckons  up  the  actual  periods  of 
time  will  find  that  I  have  rightly  given  the  exact  number 
of  years  with  the  difference  only  of  a  few  days.  He  will 
also  find  that  this  was  the  solitary  instance  in  which 
those  who  put  their  faith  in  oracles  were  justified  by  the 
event.  For  I  well  remember  how,  from  the  beginning 
to  the  end  of  the  war,  there  was  a  common  and  often- 
repeated  saying  that  it  was  to  last  thrice  nine  years. 
I  lived  through  the  whole  of  it,  and  was  of  mature  years 


MOVEMENTS    OF   CORINTH  AND   ARGOS.      357 

B.C.  421.  and  judgment,  and  I  took  great  pains  to  make  out  the  V. 
4>  exact  truth.  For  twenty  years  I  was  banished  from  my 
country  after  I  held  the  command  at  Amphipolis,  and 
associating  with  both  sides,  with  the  Peloponnesians  quite 
as  much  as  with  the  Athenians,  because  of  my  exile, 
I  was  thus  enabled  to  watch  quietly  the  course  of  events. 
I  will  now  proceed  to  narrate  the  quarrels  which  after 
the  first  ten  years  broke  up  the  treaty,  and  the  events 
of  the  war  which  followed. 

After  the  conclusion  of  the  fifty  years'  peace  and  of      27. 
the  subsequent  alliance,  the  ambassadors  who  had  been  The  Corin- 

tnians  go 

invited  to  the  conference  from  the  other  states  of  Pelo-  to  Argos 

i    r    -r  rr-i  11  i  .  and  flatter 

ponnesus  left  Lacedaemon.  They  all  went  home  except  the  Argives 
the  Corinthians,  who  turned  aside  to  Argos  and  opened  notio^hat 
communication  with  certain  of  the  Argive  magistrates,  they  must 

become  tne 

saying  that  the  Lacedaemonians  had  made  peace  and  centre  of 
alliance  with  the  Athenians,  hitherto  their  mortal  ene- 
mies,  to  no  good  end,  but  for  the  enslavement  of  Pelo- 
ponnesus,  and  that  the  Argives  were  bound  to  take 
measures  for  its  deliverance.  They  ought  to  pass  a  vote 
that  any  independent  Hellenic  city  which  would  allow 
a  settlement  of  disputes  on  equal  terms  might  enter  into 
a  defensive  alliance  with  them.  The  negotiation  should 
not  be  carried  on  with  the  assembly,  but  the  Argives 
should  appoint  a  few  commissioners  having  full  powers, 
lest  if  any  states  appealed  to  the  people  and  were  re- 
jected, their  failure  should  become  public.  They  added 
that  hatred  of  the  Lacedaemonians  would  induce  many 
to  join  them.  Having  offered  this  recommendation,  the 
Corinthians  returned  home. 

The  Argive  magistrates,  after  hearing  these  proposals,       28. 
referred  them  to  their  colleagues  and  the  people.     The  The  Argives, 
Argives  then   passed   a  vote,  and  elected  twelve  com-  warmth a 
missioners ;   through    these   any  of  the    Hellenes    who 
pleased  might  make  an  alliance  with  them,  except  the  , 

Athenians  and  Lacedaemonians,  who  could  only  be  ad-  toieadPeio- 
mitted  to  the  league  with  the  sanction  of   the  Argive  enter65' 
people.     The  Argives  were  the  more  inclined  to  take 


358      MANTINEA   JOINS  THE  NEW  ALLIANCE. 

V.  this  course  because,  their  truce  with  the  Lacedaemonians  B.C.  421. 
being  about  to  expire,  they  saw  that  war  was  imminent. 
Moreover  they  were  encouraged  by  the  hope  of  be- 
coming the  leaders  of  Peloponnesus.  For  at  this  time 
the  reputation  of  Lacedaemon  had  fallen  very  low;  her 
misfortunes  had  brought  her  into  contempt,  while  the 
resources  of  Argos  were  unimpaired.  For  the  Argives 
had  not  taken  part  in  the  war  with  Athens,  and,  being  at 
peace  with  both  parties,  had  reaped  a  harvest  from  them. 

29.          The  first  to  enter  the  alliance  offered  by  the  Argives 
The  Man-    to  any  Hellenes  who  were  willing  to  accept  it  were  the 

tineans  join  _  _  ,..,,,.... 

the  Argives.  Mantmeans  and  their  allies,  who  joined  through  fear  of 


the  Lacedaemonians.     For,  during  the  war  with  Athens, 
tne7  ^ac^  subjected  a  part  of  Arcadia,  which  they  thought 
which  the    that  the  Lacedaemonians,  now  that  their  hands  were  free, 
to  the  Athe-  would  no  longer  allow  them  to  retain.     So  they  gladly 
Lacedae?    joined  Argos,  reflecting  that  it  was  a  great  city,  the 
momans.     constant  enemy  of  Sparta,  and,  like  their  own,  governed 
by  a  democracy.     When  Mantinea  seceded,  a  murmur 
ran  through  the  other  states  of  Peloponnesus  that  they 
must  secede  too  ;  they  imagined  that  the  Mantineans  had 
gone  over  to  the  Argives  because  they  had  better  infor- 
mation than  themselves,  and  also  they  were  angry  with 
the  Lacedaemonians,  chiefly  on  account  of  that  clause 
in   the   treaty   with   Athens   which   provided    that   the 
Lacedaemonians  and  Athenians,  if  agreed,  might  add  to 
or  take  away  from  them  whatever  they  pleased  a.     This 
clause  aroused   great   uneasiness   among   the   Pelopon- 
nesians,  and  made  them  suspect  that  the  Lacedaemonians 
meant  to  unite  with  the  Athenians  in  order  to  enslave 
them  b  ;  they  argued  that  the  power  of  altering  the  treaty 
ought  to  have  been  given  only  to  the  whole  confederacy. 
Entertaining  these  fears  they  generally  inclined  towards 
Argos,  and  every  state  was  eager  to  follow  the  example 
of  Mantinea  and  form  an  alliance  with  her. 
30.          The  Lacedaemonians  perceived  that  great  excitement 
The  Lace-   prevailed  in  Peloponnesus,  and  that  the  Corinthians  had 

daemonians 

a  Cp.  v.  18.  §  12.  b  Cp.  iv.  20  fin. 


LACEDAEMONIANS   AT    CORINTH.  359 

B.C.  421.  inspired  it  and  were  themselves  on  the  point  of  making       V. 
89<  4-  a  treaty  with  Argos.     So  they  sent  envoys  to  Corinth,  g^^ 
desiring  to  anticipate  what  might  happen.     They  laid  of  deserting 
the  blame  of  having  instigated  the  whole  movement  on  ance ;  to 
the    Corinthians,  and  protested   that,   if  they  deserted 
them  and  joined  the  Argives,  they  would  be  foresworn  ; 
indeed  they  were  already  much  to  blame  for  not  accept-  betray  the 

J  .  /    .  Chalcidian 

ing  the  peace  made  with  Athens,  although  there  was  an  cities. 
article  in  their  league  which  said  that  what  the  majority 
of  the  allies  voted  should  be  binding  unless  there  was 
some  impediment  on  the  part  of  gods  or  heroes.  Now 
the  Corinthians  had  previously  summoned  those  of  the 
allies  who,  like  themselves,  had  rejected  the  treaty : 
and,  replying  in  their  presence,  they  were  unwilling  to 
speak  out  and  state  their  grievances,  of  which  the  chief 
was  that  the  Lacedaemonians  had  not  recovered  for 
them  Solliuma  or  Anactorium b.  But  they  pretended 
that  they  could  not  betray  their  allies  in  Thrace,  to 
whom,  when  they  originally  joined  in  the  revolt  of 
Potidaea,  they  had  sworn  a  separate  oathc,  and  had 
afterwards  renewed  it.  They  denied  therefore  that  they 
were  violating  the  terms  of  the  league  by  refusing  to 
join  in  the  peace  with  the  Athenians  ;  for,  having  sworn 
in  the  name  of  the  Gods  to  the  Potidaeans,  they  would 
be  violating  their  oaths  if  they  betrayed  them  :  the 
treaty  said  '  unless  there  was  some  impediment  on  the 
part  of  Gods  and  heroes,'  and  this  did  appear  to  them 
to  be  an  impediment  of  that  nature.  Thus  far  they 
pleaded  their  former  oaths ;  as  to  the  Argive  alliance 
they  would  take  counsel  with  their  friends,  and  do  what- 
ever was  right.  So  the  Lacedaemonians  returned  home. 
Now  there  happened  to  be  at  that  time  Argive  envoys 
present  at  Corinth  who  urged  the  Corinthians  to  join 
the  alliance  without  more  delay,  and  the  Corinthians 
told  them  to  come  to  their  next  assembly. 

Soon  afterwards  envoys  from  Elis  likewise  arrived  at       31. 
Corinth,  who,  first  of  all  making  an  alliance  with  the  The  Le- 

preans. 
a  Gp.  ii.  30  init.  b  Cp.  iv.  49.  c  Cp.  i.  58. 


360    DISPUTE  BETWEEN  ELIS  AND  LEPREUM. 

V.       Corinthians,  went  on  to  Argos,  and  became  allies  of  the  B.C.  421. 
Argives   in   the  manner   prescribed.     Now  the  Eleans  ° 


to  pay  a      had  a  quarrel  with  the  Lacedaemonians  about  the  town 

rent  to  the 

Eleans,       of  Lepreum.     A  war  had  arisen  between  the  Lepreans 
agreement.  an<^  certain   Arcadian   tribes,   and   the   Eleans   having 


keen   called   in  by  the  Lepreans  came  to  assist  them, 
by  the         On  condition  of  receiving   half  their   territory.     When 

Lacedae-  * 

monians.  they  had  brought  the  war  to  a  successful  end  the 
inarag?115  Eleans  allowed  the  inhabitants  of  Lepreum  to  culti- 
JArgiveS  vate  t^le  ^anci  themselves,  paying  a  rent  of  a  talent  to 
Th??'  '  Olympian  Zeus.  Until  the  Peloponnesian  war  they 
thians  and  had  paid  the  talent,  but  taking  advantage  of  the  war 
they  ceased  to  pay,  and  the  Eleans  tried  to  compel 
^m.  The  Lepreans  then  had  recourse  to  the  Lace- 
tiansand  daemonians,  who  undertook  to  arbitrate.  The  Eleans 

Meganans. 

suspected  that  they  would  not  have  fair  play  at  their 
hands;  they  therefore  disregarded  the  arbitration  and 
ravaged  the  Leprean  territory.  Nevertheless  the  Lace- 
daemonians went  on  with  the  case  and  decided  that 
Lepreum  was  an  independent  state,  and  that  the  Eleans 
were  in  the  wrong.  As  their  award  was  rejected  by  the 
Eleans,  they  sent  a  garrison  of  hoplites  to  Lepreum. 
The  Eleans,  considering  that  the  Lacedaemonians  had 
taken  into  alliance  a  city  which  had  seceded  from  them, 
appealed  to  the  clause  of  the  agreement  which  provided 
that  whatever  places  any  of  the  confederates  had  held 
previous  to  the  war  with  Athens  should  be  retained  by 
them  at  its  conclusion,  and  acting  under  a  sense  of  in- 
justice they  now  seceded  to  the  Argives  and,  like  the 
rest,  entered  into  the  alliance  with  them  in  the  manner 
prescribed.  Immediately  afterwards  the  Corinthians  and 
the  Chalcidians  of  Thrace  joined  ;  but  the  Boeotians  and 
the  Megarians  agreed  to  refuse  a,  and,  jealously  watched 
by  the  Lacedaemonians,  stood  aloof  ;  for  they  were  well 
aware  that  the  Lacedaemonian  constitution  was  far  more 
congenial  to  their  own  oligarchical  form  of  government 
than  the  Argive  democracy. 

a  Cp.  v.  38  init. 


THE    CORINTHIANS    WAVER.  361 

B.C.  421.      During  the  same  summer,  and  about  this  time,  the       V. 
4'  Athenians  took  Scione,  put  to  death  all  the  grown-up       32. 
men,  and  enslaved  the  women  and  children  ;  they  then  Capture  of 
gave   possession  of  the  land  to  the  Plataeans.     They  Restoration 


also  replaced  the  Delians  in  Delos  a,  moved  partly  by 
the  defeats  which  they  had  sustained,  partly  by  an  oracle  Tbe  ^ 
of  the  Delphic  God.  About  this  time  too  the  Phocians  to  join 
and  Locrians  went  to  war.  The  Corinthians  and  Argives  alliance. 
(who  were  now  allies)  came  to  Tegea,  which  they  hoped 
to  withdraw  from  the  Lacedaemonian  alliance,  thinking 
that  if  they  could  secure  so  large  a  district  of  Pelo-  recourse 
ponnesus  they  would  soon  have  the  whole  of  it.  The  Boeotians. 
Tegeans  however  said  that  they  could  have  no  quarrel 
with  the  Lacedaemonians  ;  and  the  Corinthians,  who  had 
hitherto  been  zealous  in  the  cause,  now  began  to  cool, 
and  were  seriously  afraid  that  no  other  Peloponnesian 
state  would  join  them.  Nevertheless  they  applied  to  the 
Boeotians  and  begged  them  to  become  allies  of  them- 
selves and  of  the  Argives,  and  generally  to  act  with 
them  ;  they  further  requested  that  they  would  accompany 
them  to  Athens  and  procure  an  armistice  terminable 
at  ten  days'  notice,  similar  to  that  which  the  Athe- 
nians and  Boeotians  had  made  with  one  another  shortly 
after  the  conclusion  of  the  fifty  years'  peace.  If  the 
Athenians  did  not  agree,  then  the  Corinthians  demanded 
of  the  Boeotians  that  they  should  renounce  the  armis- 
tice and  for  the  future  make  no  truce  without  them. 
The  Boeotians  on  receiving  this  request  desired  the 
Corinthians  to  say  no  more  about  alliance  with  the 
Argives.  But  they  went  together  to  Athens,  where 
the  Boeotians  failed  to  obtain  the  armistice  for  the 
Corinthians,  the  Athenians  replying  that  the  original 
truceb  extended  to  them,  if  they  were  allies  of  the  Lace- 
daemonians. The  Boeotians  however  did  not  renounce 
their  own  armistice,  although  the  Corinthians  expostu- 
lated, and  argued  that  such  had  been  the  agreement. 

a  Gp.  v.  i.  b  Cp.  v.  18. 


362       THE    PRISONERS    FROM    THE    ISLAND. 

V.       Thus  the  Corinthians  had  only  a  suspension  of  hostilities  B.C.  421. 

with  Athens,  but  no  regular  truce. 

33.          During  the  same  summer  the  Lacedaemonians  with 
The  Lace-   their  whole  force,  commanded  by  their  king  Pleistoanax 

daemonians  ° 

free  the       the  son  of  rausanias,  made  war  upon  the  rarrhasians  of 
from  the      Arcadia,  who  were  subjects  of  the  Mantineansa.     They 


had  been  invited  by  a  faction  among  the  Parrhasians  ; 
and  moreover  they  wanted  to  demolish  a  fortress  in  the 
Parrhasian  town  of  Cypsela,  threatening  the  Laconian 
district  of  Sciritis,  which  the  Mantineans  had  built  and 
garrisoned.  The  Lacedaemonians  devastated  the  country 
of  the  Parrhasians  ;  and  the  Mantineans,  leaving  the 
custody  of  their  own  city  to  a  force  of  Argives,  them- 
selves garrisoned  the  territory  of  their  allies.  But  being 
unable  to  save  either  the  fort  of  Cypsela  or  the  cities  of 
Parrhasia,  they  went  home  again  ;  whereupon  the  Lace- 
daemonians, having  demolished  the  fort  and  restored  the 
independence  of  the  Parrhasians,  returned  home  likewise. 
34*  In  the  course  of  the  same  summer  the  troops  serving 
The  Helots  jn  Thrace,  which  had  gone  out  under  Brasidas  and  were 

who  served  ° 

with  Brasi-  brought  home  by  Clearidas  after  the  conclusion  of  peace, 
emanci-  arrived  at  Lacedaemon.  The  Lacedaemonians  passed  a 
£ttiedaatd  vote  that  the  Helots  who  had  fought  under  Brasidas 
-  sriou^  be  free  and  might  dwell  wherever  they  pleased. 


ers  from      Not  long  afterwards,  being  now  enemies  of  the  Eleans, 

the  island 

are  for  a      they  settled    them,  together  with  the  Neodamodes,  at 
prived'of     Lepreum,   which    is   on    the    borders    of   Laconia    and 
citizenship.  Elis<      Fearing   lest   their  own   citizens  who  had  been 
taken  in  the  island   and  had  delivered   up  their   arms 
might  expect  to  be  slighted  in  consequence  of  their  mis- 
fortune, and,  if  they  retained  the  privileges  of  citizens, 
would  attempt  revolution,  they  took  away  the  right  of 
citizenship    from   them,   although    some   of  them   were 
holding  office  at  the  time.     By  this  disqualification  they  ' 
were  deprived  of  their  eligibility  to  offices,  and  of  the 
legal  right  to  buy  and   sell.     In  time,  however,  their 
privileges  were  restored  to  them. 
a  Cp,  v.  29  init. 


DISPUTES   ABOUT    THE    TREATY.  363 

B.C.  421.      During  this  summer  the  Dictidians  took  Thyssus,  a       V. 
891  4' town  of  Mount  Athos,  which  was  in  alliance  with  the       ^r 
Athenians.     During  the  whole  summer  intercourse  con-  The  Lace- 
tinued  between  the  Athenians  and  Peloponnesians.     But 
almost  as  soon  as  the  peace  was  concluded  both  Athe- 
nians  and  Lacedaemonians  began  to  mistrust  one  another,  The  Athe- 

nians  retain 

because  the  places  mentioned  in  the  treaty  were  not  Pyios. 
given  up.  For  the  Lacedaemonians,  who  were  to  make 
restitution  first,  according  to  the  lot,  had  not  surren- 
dered  Amphipolis  and  the  other  less  important  places  nians  and 
which  they  held,  and  had  not  made  their  allies  in 
Chalcidice,  nor  the  Boeotians,  nor  the  Corinthians  accept 
the  treaty,  but  only  kept  declaring  that  they  would  join 
the  Athenians  in  coercing  them  if  they  continued  to 
refuse.  They  even  fixed  a  time,  though  they  did  not 
commit  themselves  in  writing,  within  which  those  who 
would  not  come  into  the  treaty  were  to  be  declared  the 
enemies  of  both  parties.  The  Athenians,  seeing  that 
nothing  was  being  really  done,  suspected  the  Lacedaemo- 
nians of  dishonesty,  and  therefore  they  would  not  give  up 
Pylos  when  requested  to  do  so  by  the  Lacedaemonians  ; 
they  even  repented  that  they  had  restored  the  prisoners 
taken  at  Sphacteria,  and  resolved  to  keep  the  other 
places  until  the  Lacedaemonians  had  fulfilled  their  part 
of  the  contract.  The  Lacedaemonians  replied  that  they 
had  done  what  they  could.  They  had  delivered  up  the 
Athenian  prisoners  who  were  in  their  hands,  and  had 
withdrawn  their  soldiers  from  Chalcidice  ;  they  had  neg- 
lected nothing  which  lay  within  their  power.  But  they 
could  not  give  away  Amphipolis,  of  which  they  were  not 
entirely  masters ;  they  would  however  try  to  bring  the 
Boeotians  and  Corinthians  into  the  treaty,  to  get  back 
Panactum,  and  recover  all  the  Athenian  captives  who 
were  in  the  hands  of  the  Boeotians.  They  still  con- 
tinued to  insist  on  the  restoration  of  Pylos,  or  at  any 
rate  on  the  withdrawal  of  the  Messenians  and  Helots, 
now  that  the  Lacedaemonians  had  withdrawn  their  troops 
from  Chalcidice ;  the  Athenians  might,  if  they  liked, 


364       WAR   PARTY  IN  POWER    AT   SPARTA. 

V.  garrison  the  place  themselves.  After  many  long  con-  B.C.  421. 
ferences  held  during  the  summer,  they  persuaded  the 
Athenians  to  withdraw  the  Messenians,  Helots,  and 
Lacedaemonian  deserters  :  these  the  Athenians  settled 
at  Cranii  in  Cephallenia.  So  during  this  summer  there 
was  peace  and  intercourse  between  Athens  and  Sparta. 

36.          Before  the  following  winter  the  Ephors  under  whom 
New          the  peace  was  concluded  were  succeeded  by  others,  of 

Ephors  * 

come  into  whom  some  were  actually  opposed  to  it.  During  the 
areiiri  the°  winter  embassies  from  the  allied  states  arrived  at  Sparta, 
thefwar  °f  mcluding  representatives  of  Athens,  Boeotia,  and  Corinth. 
party.  Much  was  said  with  no  result.  As  the  ambassadors  were 
gestthat  departing,  Cleobulus  and  Xenares,  the  Ephors  who  were 
tians  shall  most  desirous  of  renewing  the  war,  entered  into  a  private 
negotiation  with  the  Boeotians  and  Corinthians,  recom- 


Corinthian   mending  them  to  unite  as  closely  as  possible,  and  sug- 

and  then      gesting  that  the  Boeotians  should  first  enter  the  Argive 

the°Argives  alliance  and  then  try  and  make  the  Argives,  as  well  as 

Lacedae-     themselves,  allies  of  the  Lacedaemonians.     The  Boeo- 

monians.     tians  would  thus  escape  the  necessity  of  accepting  the 

peace  with   Athens  ;     for   the   Lacedaemonians   would 

prefer  the  friendship  and  alliance  of  Argos  to  anything 

which  they  might  lose  by  the  enmity  of  Athens  and  the 

dissolution  of  the  treaty.     The  two  Ephors  knew  that  a 

satisfactory  alliance  with  Argos  was  an  object  which  the 

Lacedaemonians  always  had  at  heart,  perceiving  as  they 

did  that  it  would  enable  them  to  carry  on  the  war  beyond 

the  Peloponnesus  with  greater  freedom.     At  the  same 

time  they  entreated  the  Boeotians  to  give  up  Panactum 

to  the  Lacedaemonians,  in  order  that  they  might  ex- 

change it  for  Pylos,  and  so  be  in  a  better  position  for 

renewing  the  war  with  Athens. 

37.  The  Boeotians  and  Corinthians,  having  received  from 
The  Boeo-  Xenares  and  Cleobulus  and  their  other  Lacedaemonian 
TWO  agre6'  friends  the  instructions  which  they  were  to  convey  to 
mal^a  their  own  governments,  returned  to  their  respective  cities. 
similar  Qn  their  way  home  two  Argives  high  in  office,  who  had 

proposal  to  * 

them.          been  waiting  for  them  on  the  road,  entered  into  com- 


ARGIVES   NEGOTIATE    WITH  BOEOTIANS.     365 

B.C.  421.  munications  with  them,  in  the  hope  that  the  Boeotians,  V. 
4>  like  the  Corinthians,  Eleans,  and  Mantineans,  might  join 
their  alliance ;  if  this  could  only  be  accomplished,  and 
they  could  act  together,  they  might  easily,  they  said,  go 
to  war  or  make  peace,  either  with  Lacedaemon  or  with 
any  other  power.  The  Boeotian  envoys  were  pleased  at 
the  proposal,  for  it  so  happened  that  the  request  of  the 
Argives  coincided  with  the  instructions  of  their  Lace- 
daemonian friends.  Whereupon  the  Argives,  finding 
that  their  proposals  were  acceptable  to  the  Boeotians, 
promised  to  send  an  embassy  to  them,  and  so  departed. 
When  the  Boeotians  returned  home  they  told  the  Boeo- 
tarchs  what  they  had  heard,  both  at  Lacedaemon  and 
from  the  Argives  who  had  met  them  on  their  way.  The 
Boeotarchs  were  glad,  and  their  zeal  was  quickened  when 
they  discovered  that  the  request  made  to  them  by  their 
friends  in  Lacedaemon  fell  in  with  the  projects  of  the 
Argives.  Soon  afterwards  the  envoys  from  Argos  ap- 
peared, inviting  the  Boeotians  to  fulfil  their  engagement. 
The  Boeotarchs  encouraged  their  proposals,  and  dis- 
missed them ;  promising  that  they  would  send  envoys 
of  their  own  to  negotiate  the  intended  alliance. 

In  the  meantime  the  Boeotarchs  and  the  envoys  from       38. 
Corinth,  Megara,  and  Chalcidice  determined  that  they  But  the 
would  take  an  oath  to  one  another,  pledging  themselves  tion  after- 
to  assist  whichever  of  them  was  at  any  time  in  need,  trough" S 
and  not  go  to  war  or  make  peace  without  the  consent  misn™nage- 

r  ment. 

of  all.  When  they  had  got  thus  far,  the  Megarians 
and  Boeotians,  who  acted  together  in  the  matter*,  were 
to  enter  into  an  agreement  with  the  Argives.  But 
before  the  oath  was  sworn,  the  Boeotarchs  communi- 
cated their  intentions  to  the  Four  Councils  of  the 
Boeotians,  whose  sanction  is  always  necessary,  and  urged 
that  oaths  should  be  offered  to  any  cities  which  were 
willing  to  join  with  them  for  mutual  protection.  But 
the  Boeotian  Councils,  fearing  that  they  might  offend  the 
Lacedaemonians  if  they  took  oaths  to  the  Corinthians 
a  Cp.  v.  31  fm. 


366  PYLOS   AND    PANACTUM. 

V.  who  had  seceded  from  them,  rejected  their  proposals.  B.C.  421. 
For  the  Boeotarchs  did  not  tell  them  what  had  passed 
at  Lacedaemon,  and  how  two  of  the  Ephors,  Cleobulus 
and  Xenares,  and  their  friends  had  advised  them  first 
to  become  allies  of  Argos  and  Corinth,  and  then  to 
make  a  further  alliance  with  the  Lacedaemonians.  They 
thought  that  the  Councils,  whether  informed  of  this  or 
not,  would  be  sure  to  ratify  their  foregone  decision  when 
it  was  communicated  to  them.  So  the  plan  broke  down, 
and  the  Corinthian  and  the  Chalcidian  envoys  went  away 
without  effecting  their  purpose.  The  Boeotarchs,  who 
had  originally  intended,  if  they  succeeded,  to  extend  the 
alliance  if  possible  to  the  Argives,  gave  up  the  idea  of 
bringing  this  latter  measure  before  the  Councils.  They 
did  not  fulfil  their  promise  of  sending  envoys  to  Argos, 
but  the  whole  business  was  neglected  and  deferred. 
39.  During  the  same  winter  the  Olynthians  made  a  sudden 
The  attack  upon  Mecyberna  a,  which  was  held  by  an  Athe- 

Lacedae-          .  .  »•*•%•_*'«_'• 

monians,  man  garrison,  and  took  it.  The  Athenians  and  Lace- 
recove? tO  daemonians  still  continued  to  negotiate  about  the  places 
suade  tET  which  h^  not  been  restored,  the  Lacedaemonians  hoping 
Boeotians,  that,  if  the  Athenians  got  back  Panactum  from  the 

with  whom  to 

they  make  Boeotians,  they  might  themselves  recover  Pylos.  So 
aiHance^  to  they  sent  an  embassy  to  the  Boeotians,  and  begged  of 
Panactum  tnem  to  giye  UP  Panactum  and  the  Athenian  prisoners 
to  themselves,  that  they  might  obtain  Pylos  in  return 
for  them.  But  the  Boeotians  refused  to  give  them  up 
unless  the  Lacedaemonians  made  a  separate  alliance 
with  them  as  they  had  done  with  the  Athenians.  Now 
the  Lacedaemonians  knew  that,  if  they  acceded  to  this 
request,  they  would  be  dealing  unfairly  with  Athens, 
because  there  was  a  stipulation  which  forbade  either 
state  to  make  war  or  peace  without  the  consent  of  the 
other ;  but  they  were  eager  to  obtain  Panactum  and 
thereby,  as  they  hoped,  recover  Pylos.  At  the  same  time 
the  party  who  wished  to  break  the  peace  with  Athens  were 
zealous  on  behalf  of  the  Boeotians.  So  they  made  the 
a  Cp.  v.  18.  §  7. 


ALARM   AT    ARGOS.  367 

B.C.  420.  alliance  about  the  end  of  winter  and  the  beginning  of       V. 
spring.   The  Boeotians  at  once  commenced  the  demolition 
of  Panactum  ;  and  the  eleventh  year  of  the  war  ended. 

Immediately  on   the   commencement   of  spring,    the      4°- 
Argives,  observing  that  the  envoys  whom  the  Boeotians  The  Ar- 

t  gives  are 

promised  to  send  had  not  arrived,  that  Panactum  was  alarmed  at 


being  demolished,  and  that  a  private  alliance  had  been 
made  between  the  Lacedaemonians  and  the  Boeotians, 
began  to  fear  that  they  would  be  isolated,  and  that  the 
whole  confederacy  would  go  over  to  the  Lacedaemonians,  monians, 
For  they  thought  that  the  Boeotians  were  demolishing  they  sup- 
Panactum   by  the  desire  of  the  Lacedaemonians,  and  Athenians 
had  likewise  been  induced  by  them  to  come  into  the  to  b,e  *n~ 

J  eluded. 

Athenian  treaty  ;  and  that  the  Athenians  were  cognisant 
of  the  whole  affair.  But,  if  so,  they  could  no  longer 
form  an  alliance  even  with  Athens,  although  they  had 
hitherto  imagined  that  the  enmity  of  the  two  powers 
would  secure  them  an  alliance  with  one  or  the  other, 
and  that  if  they  lost  the  peace  with  Lacedaemon,  they 
might  at  any  rate  become  allies  of  the  Athenians.  So 
in  their  perplexity,  fearing  that  they  might  have  to  fight 
Lacedaemon,  Tegea,  Boeotia,  and  Athens  all  at  once, 
the  Argives,  who  at  the  time  when  they  were  proudly 
hoping  to'  be  the  leaders  of  Peloponnesus  had  refused 
to  make  a  treaty  with  Lacedaemon,  now  sent  thither 
two  envoys,  Eustrophus  and  Aeson,  who  were  likely  to 
be  well  regarded  by  the  Spartans.  For  under  present 
circumstances  it  seemed  to  them  that  nothing  better 
could  be  done  than  to  make  a  treaty  with  the  Lace- 
daemonians on  whatever  terms,  and  keep  out  of  war. 

The   envoys   arrived,  and   began  to  confer  with  the       41- 
Lacedaemonians  respecting  the  conditions  on  which  the  Thev  send 

°  envoys  to 

peace  should  be  made.     The  Argives  at  first  demanded  Lacedae- 
that  the  old  quarrel  about  the  border-land  of  Cynuria,  a  Ster  v 


district  which  contains   the   cities  of  Thyrea  and  An- 
thene  and  is  occupied  by  the  Lacedaemonians,  should 
be  referred  to  the  arbitration  of  some  state  or  person.  Cynuria, 
Of  this  the  Lacedaemonians  would  not  allow  a  word  conclude 


368       ARGIVES   NEGOTIATE  AT  LACEDAEMON. 

V.       to  be  said,  but  they  professed  their  readiness  to  renew  B.C.  420. 
a  peace       the  treaty  on  the  old  terms.     The  Arrives  at  length  Ol  9°' 

with  the        .  J 

Lacedae-  induced  them  to  make  a  fifty  years'  peace,  on  the 
fifty  }yelrs°T  understanding  however  that  either  Lacedaemon  or  Argos, 
provided  that  neither  city  were  suffering  at  the  time 
from  war  or  plague,  might  challenge  the  other  to 
fight  for  the  disputed  territory,  as  they  had  done  once 
before  when  both  sides  claimed  the  victory;  but  the 
conquered  party  was  not  to  be  pursued  over  their  own 
border.  The  Lacedaemonians  at  first  thought  that  this 
proposal  was  nonsense  ;  however,  as  they  were  desirous 
of  having  the  friendship  of  Argos  on  any  terms,  they 
assented,  and  drew  up  a  written  treaty.  But  they  desired 
the  envoys,  before  any  of  the  provisions  took  effect,  to 
return  and  lay  the  matter  before  the  people  of  Argos  ;  if 
they  agreed,  they  were  to  come  again  at  the  Hyacinthia 
and  take  the  oaths.  So  they  departed. 

42.          While  the   Argives  were  thus  engaged,   the  envoys 
indignation  of  the  Lacedaemonians — Andromedes,  Phaedimus,  and 

of  the 

Athenians  Antimemdas — who  were  appointed  to  receive  Panac- 
separate  turn  and  the  prisoners  from  the  Boeotians,  and  give 
andauhe  them  UP  to  t^ie  Athenians,  found  Panactum  already 
of  Panac°n  demolished  ^7  the  Boeotians.  They  alleged  that  the 
tum,  which  Athenians  and  Boeotians  in  days  of  old  had  quar- 
beenre-av  relied  about  the  place,  and  had  sworn  that  neither 
of  them  should  inhabit  it,  but  both  enjoy  the  use  of 


intact. 


it.  However,  Andromedes  and  his  colleagues  conveyed 
the  Athenian  prisoners  who  were  in  the  hands  of  the 
Boeotians  to  Athens,  and  restored  them  ;  they  further 
announced  the  destruction  of  Panactum,  a  maintaining 
that  they  were  restoring  that  tooa,  inasmuch  as  no 
enemy  of  the  Athenians  could  any  longer  dwell  there. 
Their  words  raised  a  violent  outcry  among  the  Athe- 
nians ;  they  felt  that  the  Lacedaemonians  were  dealing 
unfairly  with  them  in  two  respects  :  first,  there  was  the 
demolition  of  Panactum,  which  should  have  been  de- 

a  Or,  '  maintaining  that  this/  i.  e.  its  destruction,  *  was  equivalent 
to  its  restoration'  (*at  TOVTO,  rfjv  Kadaipeaiv,  r/rro^ocrw/  elimi). 


ALCIBIADES.  369 

B.C.  420.  livered  standing  ;  secondly,  they  were  informed  of  the  V. 
separate  alliance  which  the  Lacedaemonians  had  made 
with  the  Boeotians,  notwithstanding  their  promise  that 
they  would  join  in  coercing  those  who  did  not  accept 
the  peace.  They  called  to  mind  all  their  other  short- 
comings in  the  fulfilment  of  the  treaty,  and  conscious 
that  they  had  been  deceived,  they  answered  the  envoys 
roughly,  and  sent  them  away. 

When    the    difference   between   the   Lacedaemonians      43. 
and   Athenians    had   gone  thus  far,   the  war  party  at  Alcibiades, 

.  ,  .  .  the  youthful 

Athens  in  their  turn  lost  no  time  in  pressing  their  views.  Athenian 
Foremost  among  them  was  Alcibiades  the  son  of  Cleinias,  tated'at  the 
a  man  who  would  have  been  thought  young  in  any  other  ^Oannfid°fnce 
city,  but  was  influential  by  reason  of  his  high  descent:  shown  in 

•  r  A  him  by the 

he   sincerely  preferred  the  Argive  alliance,  but  at  the  Lacedae- 

same  time  he  took  part  against  the  Lacedaemonians 
from  temper,  and  because  his  pride  was  touched.  For 
they  had  not  consulted  him,  but  had  negotiated  the 
peace  through  Nicias  and  Laches,  despising  his  youth, 
and  disregarding  an  ancient  connection  with  his  family, 
who  had  been  their  proxeni  ;  a  connection  which  his 
grandfather  had  renounced,  and  he,  by  the  attention 
which  he  had  paid  to  the  captives  from  Sphacteria,  had 
hoped  to  have  renewed.  Piqued  at  the  small  respect 
which  was  shown  to  all  his  claims,  he  had  originally 
opposed  the  negotiations ;  declaring  that  the  Lacedae- 
monians were  not  to  be  trusted,  and  that  their  only 
object  in  making  terms  was  that  they  might  by  Athe- 
nian help  crush  the  Argives,  and  afterwards  attack  the 
Athenians  themselves  when  they  had  no  friends.  As 
soon  as  the  rupture  occurred  he  promptly  despatched 
a  private  message  to  the  Argives,  bidding  them  send  an 
embassy  as  quickly  as  they  could,  together  with  repre- 
sentatives of  Mantinea  and  Elis,  and  invite  the  Athenians  , 
to  enter  the  alliance  ;  now  was  the  time,  and  he  would 
do  his  utmost  to  assist  them. 

The  Argives  received  his  message,  and  thus  became      44. 

aware  that  the  alliance  with  the  Boeotians  had  been At  his  sug- 
gestion the 

B  b 


370  THE    SPARTAN   EMBASSY. 

V.       made  without  the  consent  of  the  Athenians,  and  that  a  B.C.  420. 
Argives,      violent   quarrel   had   broken   out  between  Athens  and 

who  are 

partly  in-  Lacedaemon.  So  they  thought  no  more  about  their 
by  the  ambassadors  who  were  at  that  very  moment  negotiating 
^nTndenf  the  peace  with  Lacedaemon,  but  turned  their  thoughts 
CartieXb°n'  towards  Athens.  They  reflected  that  Athens  was  a  city 
democratic  which  had  been  their  friend  of  old  a  ;  like  their  own  it 
and  atso  by  was  governed  by  a  democracy,  and  would  be  a  powerful 
hh  °f  all7  to  tnem  at  sea>  if  they  were  involved  in  war. 


\3intiie'  They  at  once  sent  envoys  to  negotiate  an  alliance 
Athenians,  with  the  Athenians  ;  the  Eleans  and  Mantineans  joined 
in  the  embassy.  Thither  also  came  in  haste  three  envoys 
from  Lacedaemon,  who  were  thought  likely  to  be  ac- 
ceptable at  Athens  —  Philocharidas,  Leon,  and  Endius  b. 
They  were  sent  because  the  Lacedaemonians  were  afraid 
that  the  Athenians  in  their  anger  would  join  the  Argive 
alliance.  The  envoys  while  they  demanded  the  restora- 
tion of  Pylos  in  return  for  Panactum,  were  to  apologise 
for  the  alliance  with  the  Boeotians,  and  to  explain  that  it 
was  not  made  with  any  view  to  the  injury  of  Athens. 
45-  They  delivered  their  message  to  the  council,  adding 


bkabtrickS  that  they  came  with  ful1  Power  to  treat  about  all  differ- 
deceives  ences.  Alcibiades  took  alarm  ;  he  feared  that  if  the 
daemonian  envoys  made  a  similar  statement  to  the  people  they  would 
wm  them  over  to  their  side,  and  that  the  Argive  alliance 
would  be  rejected.  Whereupon  he  devised  the  following 
in  the  as-  trick  :  he  solemnly  assured  the  Lacedaemonians  that  if 

sembly  the 

powers        they  would  not  communicate  to  the  people  the  extent 


of  their  powers,  he  would  restore  .Pylos  to  them,  for  he 
wou^  use  ms  influence  in  their  favour  instead  of  against 
council.  them,  and  would  arrange  their  other  differences.  But 
his  real  aim  all  the  time  was  to  alienate  them  from 
Nicias,  and  to  bring  about  an  alliance  with  Argos, 
Elis,  and  Mantinea,  which  he  hoped  to  effect,  if  he  could 
only  discredit  them  in  the  assembly,  and  create  the 
impression  that  their  intentions  were  not  honest,  and 
that  they  never  told  the  same  tale  twice.  And  he 
a  Cp.  i.  102  fin.  b  Cp.  viii.  6  med. 


IRRITATION  AT    ATHENS.  371 

B.C.  420.  succeeded  ;  for  when  the  envoys  appeared  before  the  V. 
assembly,  and  in  answer  to  the  question  whether  they 
had  full  powers  replied  '  No,'  in  direct  contradiction 
to  what  they  had  said  in  the  council,  the  patience  of 
the  Athenians  was  exhausted,  and  Alcibiades  declaimed 
against  the  Lacedaemonians  more  violently  than  ever. 
The  people  were  carried  away  and  were  ready  to  have 
in  the  Argives,  and  make  an  alliance  with  them  and 
their  confederates  on  the  spot.  But  an  earthquake 
occurred  before  the  final  vote  was  taken,  and  the  as- 
sembly was  adjourned. 

The  trick  which  had  deceived  the  Lacedaemonians      46. 
themselves  completely  deceived  Nicias,  who  could  not  The  trick 

deceives 

understand  the  disavowal  of  their  powers.     Neverthe-  Nicias, 
less  in  the  assembly  which  met  on  the  following  day  !L?ess  ve' 
he  still  continued  to  maintain  that  the  Athenians  ought 
to  prefer  the  friendship  of  Sparta,  and  not  to  conclude 


the  Argive  alliance  until  they  had  sent  to  the  Lacedae-  monians  : 

TT  ,  he  is  him- 

momans  and  ascertained  their  intentions.  He  urged  seif  sent  to 
them  not  to  renew  the  war  now,  when  it  could  be  put  sat^faction 
off  with  honour  to  themselves  and  discredit  to  the  Lace-  at  Sputa. 

1  he  nego- 

daemonians  ;  they  were  successful  and  should  seek  to  tiation  fails. 
preserve  their  good-fortune  as  long  as  they  could,  but 
the  Lacedaemonians  were  in  a  bad  way,  and  would  be 
only  too  glad  to  fight  as  soon  as  possible  at  all  hazards. 
And  he  prevailed  on  them  to  send  envoys,  of  whom  he 
was  himself  one,  requiring  the  Lacedaemonians,  if  they 
were  sincere  in  their  intentions,  to  rebuild  and  restore 
Panactum,  to  restore  Amphipolis,  and  to  renounce  their 
alliance  with  the  Boeotians  unless  they  came  into  the 
treaty,  according  to  the  stipulation  which  forbade  the 
contracting  parties  to  make  a  new  alliance  except  by 
mutual  consent.  If  we,  they  added,  had  wanted  to  deal 
unfairly,  we  should  already  have  accepted  an  alliance 
with  the  Argives,  whose  ambassadors  have  come  hither 
to  offer  it.  They  entrusted  the  representation  of  these 
and  their  other  grievances  to  Nicias  and  his  colleagues, 
and  sent  them  away  to  Sparta.  On  their  arrival  they 

B  b  % 


372      TREATY  BETWEEN  ATHENS  AND  ARGOS. 

V.  delivered  their  message,  which  they  concluded  by  de-  B.C.  420. 
claring  that  unless  the  Lacedaemonians  renounced  their 
alliance  with  the  Boeotians  in  case  the  latter  still  refused 
to  accept  the  peace,  the  Athenians  on  their  part  would 
enter  into  an  alliance  with  the  Argives  and  their  con- 
federates. The  Lacedaemonians  refused  to  give  up  their 
Boeotian  alliance,  Xenares  the  Ephor,  with  his  friends 
and  partisans,  carrying  this  point.  However  they  con- 
sented to  ratify  their  former  oaths  at  the  request  of 
Nicias,  who  was  afraid  that  he  would  return  without 
having  settled  anything,  and  would  incur  the  blame  of 
failure,  as  indeed  he  did,  because  he  was  held  to  be 
responsible  for  the  original  treaty  with  the  Lacedae- 
monians. When  the  Athenians  learned  on  his  return 
that  the  negotiations  with  Sparta  had  miscarried,  they 
were  furious ;  and  acting  under  a  sense  of  injustice, 
entered  into  an  alliance  with  the  Argives  and  their 
allies,  whose  ambassadors  were  present  at  the  time,  for 
Alcibiades  had  introduced  them  on  purpose.  The  terms 
were  as  follows  : — 

47.  I.  The  Athenians  and  the  Argives,  Mantineans,  and 

Terms  of     Eleans,  on  their  own  behalf  and  that  of  the  allies  over 

an  alliance  t 

between  the  whom  they  severally  rule,  make  a  peace   to  continue 

^ndethlans    for  a  hundred  years  both  by  sea  and  land,  without  fraud 

federacCOn~  or  kurt-     The  Argives,  Eleans,  Mantineans,  and  their 

allies  shall  not    make  war  against  the  Athenians  and 

the  allies  over  whom  they  rule,  and  the  Athenians  and 

their   allies  shall  not    make  war    against   the  Argives, 

Eleans,    Mantineans,    and   their    allies,   in   any  sort   or 

manner. 

II.  Athens,  Argos,  Elis,  and  Mantinea  shall  be  allied 
for  a  hundred  years  on  the  following  conditions : — 
If  enemies  invade  the  territory  of  the  Athenians,  the 
Argives,  Eleans,  and  Mantineans  shall  go  to  Athens 
and  render  the  Athenians  any  assistance  which  they  may 
demand  of  them,  in  the  most  effectual  manner,  and  to 
the  utmost  of  their  power.  And  if  the  enemy  spoil 
their  territory  and  depart,  the  offending  city  shall  be  an 


TREATY  BETWEEN  A THENS  AND  ARGOS.     373 

enemy  to  Argos,  Mantinea,  Elis,  and  Athens,  and  suffer  V. 
at  the  hands  of  all  these  cities  ;  and  it  shall  not  be  law- 
ful for  any  of  them  to  make  peace  with  the  offending 
city,  unless  they  have  the  consent  of  all  the  rest.  And 
if  enemies  shall  invade  the  territory  of  the  Eleans  or 
Argives  or  Mantineans,  the  Athenians  shall  go  to  Argos, 
Mantinea,  or  Elis,  and  render  these  cities  any  assistance 
which  they  may  demand  of  them,  in  the  most  effectual 
manner,  and  to  the  utmost  of  their  power.  If  an  enemy 
spoil  their  territory  and  depart,  the  offending  city  shall 
be  an  enemy  to  Athens,  Argos,  Mantinea,  and  Elis.,  and 
shall  suffer  at  the  hands  of  all  these  cities ;  and  it  shall 
not  be  lawful  for  any  of  them  to  make  peace  with  the 
offending  city,  unless  they  have  the  consent  of  all  the 
rest. 

III.  The  confederates  shall  not  allow  armed  men  to 
pass  through  their  own  territory,  or  that  of  the   allies 
over  whom  they  severally  rule  or  may  rule,  or  to  pass 
by  sea,  with  hostile  intent,  unless  all  the  cities  have 
formally  consented    to   their   passage — that   is   to  say, 
Athens,  Argos,  Mantinea,  and  Elis. 

IV.  The  city  which  sends  troops  to  help  another  shall 
supply  them  with  provisions  for  thirty  days,  counting 
from  the  time  of  their  arrival  at  the  city  which  summons 
them ;  it  shall  also  provide  for  them  at  their  departure. 
But   if  the  city  which  summons  the  troops  wishes  to 
employ  them  for  a  longer  time,  it  shall  give  them  pro- 
visions at  the  rate  of  three  Aeginetan  obols  a  a  day  for 
heavy-armed  and   light-armed  troops  and  for  archers, 
and  an  Aeginetan  drachma  b  for  cavalry. 

V.  The  city  which  sent  for  the  troops  shall  have  the 
command  when  the  war  is  carried  on  in  her  territory. 
Or,  if  the  allied  cities  agree  to  send  out  a  joint  expedi- 
tion, then  the  command  shall  be  equally  shared  among 
all  the  cities. 

VI.  The  Athenians  shall  swear  to  the  peace  on  their 
own   behalf  and   on  that  of  their  allies ;    the  Argives, 

a  About  Sd.  b  About  is.  ^d. 


374      TREATY  BETWEEN  ATHENS  AND  ARGOS. 


V. 


Provisions 
for  the  rati' 
fication  of 
the  treaty 
and  for 
changes. 


48. 


The  Co- 
rinthians 
refuse  to 
join  the 
Argives 
in  the 
Athenian 
alliance. 


Mantineans,   and    Eleans,  and   their   allies   shall  swear  B.C.  420. 
city  by  city.     The  oath  shall  be  taken  over  full-grown  OL  9°' 
victims,  and  shall  be  that  oath  which  in  the  countries 
of  the  several  contracting  parties  is  deemed  the  most 
binding.     The  form  of  oath  shall  be  as  follows  : — 

'  I  will  be  true  to  the  alliance,  and  will  observe  the 
agreement  in  all  honesty  and  without  fraud  or  hurt; 
I  will  not  transgress  it  in  any  way  or  manner/ 

At  Athens  the  senate  and  the  home  magistrates  shall 
swear,  and  the  Prytanes  shall  administer  the  oath ;  at 
Argos  the  senate  and  the  council  of  eighty  and  the 
Artynae  shall  swear,  and  the  eighty  shall  administer 
the  oath ;  at  Mantinea  the  demiurgi  and  the  senate 
and  the  other  magistrates  shall  swear,  and  the  theori 
and  the  polemarchs  shall  administer  the  oath.  At  Elis 
the  demiurgi  and  the  supreme  magistrates  and  the  six 
hundred  shall  swear,  and  the  demiurgi  and  the  guardians 
of  the  law  shall  administer  the  oath.  Thirty  days  be- 
fore the  Olympian  games  the  Athenians  shall  go  to 
Elis,  to  Mantinea,  and  to  Argos,  and  renew  the  oath. 
Ten  days  before  the  Great  Panathenaea  the  Argives, 
Eleans,  and  Mantineans  shall  go  to  Athens  and  renew 
the  oath.  The  agreement  concerning  the  treaty  and 
the  oaths  and  the  alliance  shall  be  inscribed  on  a  stone 
column  in  the  Acropolis  by  the  Athenians,  by  the  Ar- 
gives on  a  similar  column  in  the  temple  of  Apollo  in 
the  Agora,  and  by  the  Mantineans  in  the  temple  of 
Zeus  in  the  Agora.  They  shall  together  erect  at  Olympia 
a  brazen  column  at  the  coming  Olympic  games.  And 
if  these  cities  think  it  desirable  to  make  any  change  in 
the  treaty,  they  shall  add  to  the  provisions  of  it.  What- 
ever the  cities  agree  upon  in  common  shall  hold  good. 

Thus  the  peace  and  the  alliance  were  concluded. 
Nevertheless  the  previous  treaty  between  the  Lacedae- 
monians and  the  Athenians  was  not  on  that  account 
renounced  by  either  party.  The  Corinthians,  although 
allies  of  the  Argives,  took  no  part  in  the  new  alliance ; 
they  had  already  refused  to  swear  to  an  offensive  and 


ELIS   AND    LACEDAEMON.  375 

B.C.  420.  defensive  alliance  which  the  Eleans,  Argives,  and  Man-  V. 
tineans  had  previously  made  with  one  another.  They 
said  that  they  were  satisfied  with  the  original  defensive 
alliance  which  bound  them  only  to  assist  one  another 
when  attacked,  but  not  to  join  in  offensive  movements. 
Thus  the  Corinthians  severed  themselves  from  the  allies, 
and  were  again  beginning  to  turn  their  thoughts  to  the 
Lacedaemonians. 

During  the  summer  the  Olympic  games  were  cele-      49. 
brated,  the  Olympiad  being  that  in  which  Androsthenes,  The  Lace- 

J  .  '  daemonians 

an  Arcadian,  won  his  first  victory  in  the   pancratium,  are  ex- 
The  Lacedaemonians  were  excluded  from  the  temple  by  the  oiym°-m 
the  Eleans,  and  so  could  neither  sacrifice  nor  contend  ^the"165 
in  the  games.     For  they  had  refused   to  pay  the  fine  ground  that 

*  .         they  had 

which,  according  to  Olympic  law,  the  Eleans  had  im-  attacked 
posed   upon   them,  alleging  that  they  had  brought  an  andentered 


armed  force  against  the  fortress  of   Phyrcus,  and  had 
introduced  some   hoplites  of  their   own   into   Lepreum  Olympic 

truce,  and 

during  the  Olympic  truce.  The  fine  amounted  to  two  had  refused 
thousand  minae  a,  being  two  minae  b  for  each  hoplite,  fine  tm- 
which  is  the  penalty  imposed  by  the  law.  The  Lace-  g^  upon 
daemonians  sent  envoys  who  argued  that  the  sentence 
was  unjust,  for  at  the  time  when  their  troops  entered 
Lepreum  the  truce  had  not  been  announced  at  Lace- 
daemon.  The  Eleans  replied  that  the  truce  (which  they 
always  proclaim  first  to  themselves)  had  already  begun 
with  them,  and  that  while  they  were  quietly  observing 
the  truce,  and  expecting  nothing  less,  the  Lacedaemo- 
nians had  treacherously  attacked  them.  The  Lacedae- 
monians rejoined  by  asking  why  the  Eleans  proclaimed 
the  truce  at  all  at  Lacedaemon  if  they  considered  them 
to  have  broken  it  already  —  they  could  not  really  have 
thought  so  when  they  made  the  proclamation;  and  from 
the  moment  when  the  announcement  reached  Lacedae- 
mon all  hostilities  had  ceased.  The  Eleans  were  still 
positive  that  the  Lacedaemonians  were  in  the  wrong,  and 
said  that  they  would  never  be  persuaded  of  the  contrary. 
a  About  ^8125.  b  About  ^8  aj.  (>d. 


376  THE    OLYMPIC    GAMES. 

V.       But  if  the  Lacedaemonians  were  willing  to  restore  Le-  B.C.  420. 
preum  to  them,  they  offered  to  remit  their  own  share 
of  the  penalty,  and  pay  on  their  behalf  that  part  which 
was  due  to  the  God. 

50.          As  this  proposal  was  rejected,  the  Eleans  made  an- 
Fearofa     other:  the  Lacedaemonians  need  not  give  up  Lepreum 

disturbance 

at  the          if  they  did  not  like,  but  since  they  wanted  to  have  access 


to  the  temple  of  Olympian  Zeus,  they  might  go  up  to 
unfounded.  his  altar  and  swear  before  all  the  Hellenes  that  they 
would  hereafter  pay  the  fine.     But  neither  to  this  offer 
would  the  Lacedaemonians  agree  ;  they  were  therefore 
excluded  from  the  temple  and   from  the  sacrifices  and 
games,  and  sacrificed  at  home.     The   other    Hellenes, 
with  the  exception  of  the  inhabitants  of  Lepreum,  sent 
representatives  to  Olympia.     The  Eleans  however,  fear- 
ing  that   the    Lacedaemonians   would   force   their  way 
into  the  temple  and  offer  sacrifice,  had  a  guard  of  young 
men  under  arms  ;  there  came   to  their   aid  likewise  a 
thousand   Argives,    and    a    thousand    Mantineans,    and 
certain    Athenian   horsemen,    who    had    been    awaiting 
the  celebration  of  the   festival   at  Argos.     The  whole 
assembly  were  in  terror  lest  the  Lacedaemonians  should 
come  upon  them  in  arms,  and  their  fears  were  redoubled 
when  Lichas,  the  son  of  Arcesilaus,  was  struck  by  the 
officers.     As  a  Lacedaemonian  he  had  been   excluded 
from  the  lists,  but  his  chariot  had  been  entered  in  the 
name  of  the  Boeotian  state,  and  was  declared  victorious. 
He  had  then  come  forward  into  the  arena  and  placed  a 
garland  on  the  head  of  his  charioteer,  wishing  to  show 
that  the  chariot  was  his  own.     When  the  blows  were 
given  the  anxiety  became  intense,  and  every  one  thought 
that  something  serious  would  >  happen.     But  the  Lace- 
daemonians   did   not   stir,  and   the  festival   passed   off 
quietly. 

The  Olympic  games  being  over,  the  Argives  and  their 
allies  went  to  Corinth,  and  requested  the  Corinthians 
to  join  them.  An  embassy  from  Lacedaemon  was  also 
present.  After  much  discussion  nothing  was  concluded, 


ALCIBIADES   IN   PELOPONNESUS.  377 

B.C.  420.  for  an  earthquake  broke  up  the  assembly,  and  the  envoys       V. 
from  the  several  states  returned  home.     So  the  summer 
ended. 

In  the  following  winter  there  was  a  battle  between       5  I  . 
the  Heracleans  of  Trachis  and  the  Oenianians,  Dolopes,  The  Hera- 

r      '  cleans  de- 

Malians,  and  certain  Thessalians.     These   were  neigh-  feated  by 
bouring  tribes  hostile  to  the  place,  for  it  was  in  order  to  bourinf  " 
control  them  that  the  place  was  originally  fortified  ;  they  tnbes> 
had  been  enemies  to  it  from  the  first,  and  had  done  it  all 
the  damage  in  their  power.     In  this  battle  they  gained 
a  victory  over  the  Heracleans.     Xenares,  son  of  Cnidis, 
the  Lacedaemonian  governor,  and  many  of  the  Hera- 
cleans were  killed.     Thus  ended  the  winter,  and  with  it 
the  twelfth  year  of  the  war. 

i.e.  419.         At  the  beginning  of  the  following  summer  the  Boeo-       52> 
901  2>     tians  took  possession  of  Heraclea,  which  after  the  battle  The  Eoe°- 

tians  take 

was  in  a  miserable  plight.  They  dismissed  Hegesippidas,  possession 
the  Lacedaemonian  governor,  for  his  misconduct*,  and 
occupied  the  place  themselves.  They  were  afraid  that 
now,  when  the  Lacedaemonians  were  embroiled  in  Pelo- 
ponnesus, the  Athenians  would  take  it  if  they  did  not. 
But,  for  all  that,  the  Lacedaemonians  were  offended. 

During    the   same    summer,    Alcibiades,   the   son   of  Activity  of 
Cleinias,  now  one  of  the  Athenian  generals,  acting  in  in  Achaia 


concert  with  the  Argives  and  their  allies,  led  into  Pelo-  J 
ponnesus  a  small  Athenian  force  of  hoplites  and  archers.  Pel°P°n- 
He  collected  other  troops  from  the  Athenian  allies  in  the 
Peloponnese,  and,  marching  with  his  army  through  the 
country,  organised  the  affairs  of  the  confederacy.   Coming 
to  Patrae,  he  persuaded  the  citizens  to  build  walls  reach- 
ing down  to  the  sea.    He  was  intending  also  to  erect  a  fort 
himself  on  the  promontory  of  Rhium  in  Achaia.    But  the 
Corinthians,  Sicyonians,  and  others  to  whose  interests  the 
fort  would  have  been  injurious,  came  and  prevented  him. 

In  the  same  summer  there  broke  out  a  war  between  the       53. 
Epidaurians  and  the  Argives.     The  occasion  of  the  war  Th«Argives 

to  on  a  flimsy 

was  as  follows  :  —  The  Epidaurians  were  bound  to  send  a  pretext 
a  Cp.  iii.  93  fin. 


378  THE    MONTH   CARNEUS. 

V.       victim  as  a  tribute   for  a  the   water  meadows  a   to  the  B.C.  419. 
make  war     temple  of  Apollo  Pythaeus  over  which  the  Arrives  had 

against  the  r  r  & 

Epidauri-  chief  authority,  and  they  had  not  done  so.  But  this 
charge  was  a  mere  pretext  ;  for  in  any  case  Alcibiades 
and  the  Argives  had  determined,  if  possible,  to  attach 
Epidaurus  to  their  league,  that  they  might  keep  the 
Corinthians  quiet,  and  enable  the  Athenians  to  bring 
forces  to  Argos  direct  from  Aegina  instead  of  sailing 
round  the  promontory  of  Scyllaeum.  So  the  Argives 
prepared  to  invade  Epidauria,  as  if  they  wished  on  their 
own  account  to  exact  payment  of  the  sacrifice. 
54.  About  the  same  time  the  Lacedaemonians  with  their 

The  Lace-    whole  force,  under  the  command  of  king  Agis  the  son 

daemomans  . 

intending  to  of  Archidamus,  likewise  made  an  expedition.  ihey 
upon  Argos  marched  as  far  as  Leuctra,  a  place  on  their  own  frontier 
'm  ^e  direction  of  Mount  Lycaeum.  No  one,  not  even 


ficesand      the  cities  whence  the  troops  came,  knew  whither  the 

the  sacred  ,        ..          .          , 

month.  expedition  was  going.  But  at  the  frontier  the  sacrifices 
obligation  is  proved  unfavourable  ;  so  they  returned,  and  sent  word  to 
theAMves  their  allies  that,  when  the  coming  month  was  over,  which 


who  go  on  was  Carneus,  a  month  held  sacred  by  the  Dorians,  they 
expedition  should  prepare  for  an  expedition.  When  they  had  re- 
treated,  the  Argives,  setting  out  on  the  twenty-seventh 


day  of  the  month  before  Carneus,  and  continuing  the 
observance  of  this  day  during  the  whole  time  of  the 
expedition,  invaded  and  devastated  the  territory  of 
Epidaurus.  The  Epidaurians  summoned  their  allies, 
but  some  of  them  refused  to  come,  pleading  the  sanctity 
of  the  month  ;  others  came  as  far  as  the  frontier  of 
Epidauria  and  there  stopped. 

55.  While  the  Argives  were  in  Epidauria,  envoys  from  the 

Conference  different  cities  met  at  Mantinea,  on  the  invitation  of  the 
Manthiea.    Athenians.   A  conference  was  held,  at  which  Euphamidas 


i-  the  Corinthian  remarked  that  their  words  and  their 
ArUosSinter  actions  were  at  variance  ;  for  they  were  conferring  about 
mitted  and  peace  while  the  Epidaurians  and  their  allies  were  in  the 

then  re-         r 

newed.        field  against   the  Argives;   first  let   envoys  from  both- 
a  Or,  reading  /3oT«/xtW,  a  anu£  ^eyo^cvov,  simply  'the  meadows.' 


WAR  BETWEEN  EPIDAURUS  AND  ARGOS.     379 

.B.C.  419.  parties  go  and  induce  the  armies  to  disband,  and  then  V. 
2'  they  might  come  back  and  discuss  the  peace.  His 
advice  was  approved  ;  so  they  went  straight  to  the 
Argives  and  compelled  them  to  withdraw  from  Epi- 
dauria.  But,  when  they  re-assembled,  they  were  still 
unable  to  agree,  and  the  Argives  again  invaded  and 
began  to  ravage  the  Epidaurian  territory.  Whereupon 
the  Lacedaemonians  likewise  made  an  expedition  as  far 
as  Caryae  ;  but  again  the  sacrifices  at  the  frontier  proved 
unfavourable,  and  they  returned  home.  The  Argives, 
after  devastating  about  one-third  of  Epidauria,  also 
returned  home.  One  thousand  Athenian  hoplites,  under 
the  command  of  Alcibiades,  had  come  to  their  aid.  But 
hearing  that  the  Lacedaemonian  expedition  was  over, 
and  seeing  that  there  was  no  longer  any  need  of  them, 
they  departed.  And  so  passed  the  summer. 

In  the  following  winter  the  Lacedaemonians,  unknown       56. 
to  the  Athenians,  sent  by  sea  to  Epidaurus  a  garrison  of  The  Lace- 

i  _        daemonians 

three  hundred  under  the  command  of  Agesippidas.    The  send  a  * 
Argives  came  to  the  Athenians  and  complained  that,  b 
notwithstanding  the  clause  in  the  treaty  which  forbade 


the  passage  of  enemies  through  the  territory  of  any  of  remonstrate 
the  contracting  parties  a,  they  had  allowed  the  Lacedae-  Athenians 
monians  to  pass  by  sea  along  the  Argive  coast.     If  they  the^ace-112 
did  not  retaliate  by  replacing  the  Messenians  and  Helots  ?aep™s°snians 
in  Pylos,  and  letting  them  ravage  Laconia,  they,  the  The 

/  /J  Athenians 

Argives,  would  consider  themselves  wronged.  The  declare  the 
Athenians,  by  the  advice  of  Alcibiades,  inscribed  at  broken. 
the  foot  of  the  column  on  which  the  treaty  was  re- 
corded b  words  to  the  effect  that  the  Lacedaemonians 
had  not  abided  by  their  oaths,  and  thereupon  conveyed 
the  Helots  recently  settled  at  Cranii  c  to  Pylos  that 
they  might  plunder  the  country,  but  they  took  no 
further  steps.  During  the  winter  the  war  between 
the  Argives  and  Epidaurians  continued  ;  there  was  no 
regular  engagement,  but  there  were  ambuscades  and 
incursions  in  which  losses  were  inflicted,  now  on  one 
a  Cp.v.47-  §3-  b  Cp.v.  i8.§4j23.  §5.  c  Cp.  v.  35  fin. 


380   LACEDAEMONIANS  MAKE  WAR  UPON  ARGOS. 


57- 

daemonians 
at  length 

field  in 


PhHus"  at 


V.       side,  now  on  the  other.     At  the  end  of  winter,  when  B.C. 
the   spring   was   approaching,    the   Argives   came   with    1- 
scaling-ladders    against    Epidaurus,   expecting    to   find 
that   the   place   was    stripped   of  its  defenders  by  the 
war,  and  could  be  taken  by  storm.     But  the  attempt 
failed,  and  they  returned.     So  the  winter  came  to  an 
end,  and  with  it  the  thirteenth  year  of  the  war. 

In  the  middle  of  the  following  summer,  the  Lacedae-  B.C.  418. 
momans5  seeing  that  their  Epidaurian  allies  were  in 
great  distress,  and  that  several  cities  of  Peloponnesus 
had  seceded  from  them,  while  others  were  disaffected, 
and  knowing  that  if  they  did  not  quickly  take  measures 
°f  precaution  the  evil  would  spread,  made  war  on  Argos 
with  their  whole  forces,  including  the  Helots,  under  the 
command  of  Agis  the  son  of  Archidamus,  the  Lacedae- 
monian king.  The  Tegeans  and  the  other  Arcadian 
allies  of  the  Lacedaemonians  took  part  in  the  expedi- 
tion. The  rest  of  their  allies,  both  from  within  and 
without  the  Peloponnesus,  mustered  at  Phlius.  Among 
the  other  contingents  there  came  from  Boeotia  five 
thousand  heavy-armed,  and  as  many  light-  armed,  five 
hundred  cavalry,  and  attached  to  each  horseman  a  foot- 
soldier  ;  and  from  Corinth  two  thousand  heavy-armed, 
while  the  Phliasians  joined  with  their  whole  force,  be- 
cause the  army  was  to  assemble  in  their  country. 

The  Argives,  having  had  previous  notice  of  the  Lace- 
daemonian    preparations,   and   seeing;    that    they   were 

,f  .    .         ,  r      i 

actually  on  their  march  to  join  the  rest  of  the  army 
at  Phlius,  now  took  the  field  themselves.  The  Manti- 
neans  and  their  allies  and  three  thousand  Elean  hop- 
Htes  came  to  their  aid.  They  advanced  to  Methydrium 
in  Arcadia,  where  they  fell  in  with  the  Lacedaemonians. 
The  two  armies  each  occupied  a  hill,  and  the  Argives, 
thinking  that  they  now  had  the  Lacedaemonians  alone, 
prepared  for  action.  But  in  the  night  Agis  removed 
his  forces  unknown  to  them  and  joined  the  allies  at 
Phlius.  At  dawn  the  Argives  became  aware  of  his 
departure,  and  moved  first  to  Argos,  then  to  the 


TheArgives 

and  their 

allies  march 

dia°  there 
they  find 

the  Lace- 
daemonians 

But  Agis 

anddjosinhsem 
the  arm  °f 
at  Phlius. 


MOVEMENTS    OF    THE    TWO   ARMIES.       381 

RC.  418.  Nemean  road,  by  which  they  expected  the  Lacedae-  V. 
901  3>  monians  and  their  allies  to  descend  into  the  plain.  But 
Agis,  instead  of  taking  the  road  by  which  he  was 
expected,  led  the  Lacedaemonians,  Arcadians,  and  Epi- 
daurians  by  a  more  difficult  path,  and  so  made  his  way 
down  ;  the  Corinthians,  Pellenians,  and  Phliasians  went 
by  another  steep  pass  ;  the  Boeotians,  Megarians,  and 
Sicyonians  he  commanded  to  descend  by  the  Nemean 
road,  where  the  Argives  had  taken  up  their  position,  in 
cider  that,  if  the  Argives  should  return  and  attack  his 
own  division  of  the  army  in  the  plain,  they  might  be 
pursued  and  harassed  by  their  cavalry.  Having  made 
these  dispositions,  and  having  come  down  into  the 
plain,  he  began  to  devastate  Saminthus  and  the  neigh- 
bourhood. 

It  was  now  daylight,  and  the  Argives,  who  had  be-       59. 
come  aware  of  his  movement,  quitted  Nemea  and  went  The  Argives 

•  ,1  TH     1  •  •  al"e  SUr~ 

m   search  of  the   enemy.     I  ^countering  the  Phhasian  rounded  by 
and  Corinthian  forces,  they  killed  a  few  of  the  Phlia- 
sians,  and  had  rather  more  of  their  own  troops  killed  by 


the  Corinthians.     The  Boeotians,  Megarians,  and  Sicyo-  in  three 

divisions  ; 

mans  marched  as  they  were  ordered  towards  Nemea,  but  they  are  in 
found  the  Argives  no  longer  there,  for  by  this  time  they 
had  descended  from  the  high  ground,  and  seeing  their 

lands  ravaged  were  drawing  up  their  troops  in  order  of  unconsci- 

ous, when 
battle.    The  Lacedaemonians  prepared  to  meet  them,  two  of  their 

The  Argives  were  now  surrounded  by  their  enemies  ; 
for  on  the  side  of  the  plain  the  Lacedaemonians  and  truce> 
their  division  of  the  army  cut  them  off  from  the  city; 
from  the  hills  above  they  were  hemmed  in  by  the  Co- 
rinthians, Phliasians  and  Pellenians,  towards  Nemea  by 
the  Boeotians,  Sicyonians,  and  Megarians,  and  in  the 
absence  of  the  Athenians,  who  alone  of  their  allies  had 
not  arrived,  they  had  no  cavalry.  The  main  body  of 
the  Argives  and  their  allies  had  no  conception  of  their 
danger.  They  thought  that  their  position  was  a  favour- 
able one,  and  that  they  had  cut  off  the  Lacedaemonians 
in  their  own  country  and  close  to  the  city  of  Argos. 


382  HASTY  PEACE    CONCLUDED. 

V.  But  two  of  the  Argives,  Thrasyllus  one  of  the  five  B.C.  418. 
generals,  and  Alciphron  t  e  proxenus  of  the  Lacedae- 
monians, came  to  Agis  when  the  armies  were  on  the 
point  of  engaging,  and  urged  him  privately  not  to  fight ; 
the  Argives  were  ready  to  offer  and  accept  a  fair  arbi- 
tration, if  the  Lacedaemonians  had  any  complaint  to 
make  of  them  ;  they  would  gladly  conclude  a  treaty, 
and  be  at  peace  for  the  fut  re. 

60.  These  Argives  spoke  of  their  own  motion ;  they  had 
The  truce  no  authority  from  the  people  ;  and  Agis,  likewise  on  his 
own  authority,  accepted  their  proposals,  not  conferring 
^h  his  countrymen  at  large,  but  only  with  one  of  the 
ahmpe°o  Lacedaemonian  magistrates  who  accompanied  the  ex- 
ponnesians  pedition.  He  made  a  treaty  with  the  Argives  for  four 

now  returns  .  -1-1-11  ,1      • 

home.  months,  within  which  they  were  to  execute  their  agree- 
Jreat  fault  ment>  and  then,  without  saying  a  word  to  any  of  the 
with  their  ailies  he  at  once  withdrew  his  army.  The  Lacedae- 

commanu-  * 

ers,  monians  and  their  allies  followed  Agis  out  of  respect  for 

the  law,  but  they  blamed  him  severely  among  them- 
selves. For  they  believed  that  they  had  lost  a  glorious 
opportunity ;  their  enemies  had  been  surrounded  on 
every  side  both  by  horse  and  foot ;  and  yet  they  were 
returning  home  having  'done  nothing  worthy  of  their 
great  effort.  No  finer  Hellenic  army  had  ever  up  to  that 
day  been  collected  ;  its  appearance  was  most  striking  at 
Nemea  while  the  host  was  still  one  ;  the  Lacedaemo- 
nians were  there  in  their  full  strength  ;  arrayed  by  their 
side  were  Arcadians,  Boeotians,  Corinthians,  Sicyonians, 
Pellenians,  Phliasians,  and  Megarians,  from  each  state 
chosen  men — they  might  have  been  thought  a  match  not 
only  for  the  Argive  confederacy,  but  for  another  as  large. 
So  the  army  returned  and  dispersed  to  their  homes, 
much  out  of  humour  with  Agis. 

and  the  The  Argives  on  their  part  found  still  greater  fault 

wit^  those  who  had  made  the  peace,  unauthorised  by 
the  people ;  they  too  thought  that  such  an  opportunity 
would  never  recur,  and  that  it  was  the  Lacedaemonians 
who  had  escaped,  for  the  combat  would  have  taken 


MORE  ATHENIAN  TROOPS  IN  PELOPONNESE.  383 

B.C.  418.  place  close  to  their  own  city,  and  they  had  numerous  V. 
°'  3'  and  brave  allies.  And  so,  as  they  were  retreating  and 
had  reached  the  bed  of  the  Charadrus,  where  they  hold 
military  trials  before  they  enter  the  city,  they  began  to 
stone  Thrasyllus.  He  saved  his  life  by  flying  to  the 
altar,  but  they  confiscated  his  property. 

Soon  afterwards  there  arrived  an  Athenian  reinforce-      6  1. 
ment  of  a  thousand  hoplites  and  three  hundred  horse,  A1cit>iades 

r  and  the 

under  the  command  of  Laches  and  Nicostratus.     The  allies  refuse 
Argives,  although  dissatisfied  with  the  truce,  were   re-  ledge  the 
luctant  to  break  it,  so  they  bade  them  depart  ;  and,  when 


they  desired  to  treat,  they  would  not  present  them  to  reluctantly 

consent  to 

the   assembly  until   they  were   compelled   by  the  im-  its  violation. 

portunity  of  their  Mantinean  and  Elean  allies,  who  had 

not  yet  left  Argos.     The  Athenians  then,  speaking  by 

the    mouth    of  their    ambassador   Alcibiades,   told   the  whi?h  sur- 

renders 

Argives  in  the  presence  of  the  rest  that  they  had  no  to  them. 
right  to  make  the  truce  at  all  independently  of  their 
allies,  and  that,  the  Athenians  having  arrived  at  the 
opportune  moment,  they  should  fight  at  once.  The 
allies  were  convinced,  and  they  all,  with  the  exception 
of  the  Argives,  immediately  marched  against  Orcho- 
menus  in  Arcadia  ;  the  Argives,  though  consenting,  did 
not  join  them  at  first,  but  they  came  afterwards.  Their 
united  forces  then  sat  down  before  Orchomenus,  which 
they  assailed  repeatedly;  they  were  especially  anxious 
to  get  the  place  into  their  hands,  because  certain  Ar- 
cadian hostages  had  been  deposited  there  by  the 
Lacedaemonians.  The  Orchomenians,  considering  the 
weakness  of  their  fortifications  and  the  numbers  of  the 
enemy,  and  beginning  to  fear  that  they  might  perish 
before  any  one  came  to  their  assistance,  agreed  to  join 
the  alliance  :  they  were  to  give  hostages  of  their  own 
to  the  Mantineans,  and  to  deliver  up  those  whom  the 
Lacedaemonians  had  deposited  with  them. 

The  allied  force,  now  in  possession  of  Orchomenus,       62. 
considered   against  what  town   they  should   next   pro-  TheArgives 

&  J  r          and  their 

ceed  ;  the  Eleans  wanted  them  to  attack  Lepreum,  the  allies  now 


384       EXASPERATION  OF  LACEDAEMONIANS. 

V.       Mantineans  Tegea.     The  Argives  and  Athenians  sided  B.C.  418. 
quarrel        ^\\\\  the  Mantineans ;  whereupon  the  Eleans,  indignant 

among  *• 

themselves,  that  they  had  not  voted  for  the  expedition  against  Le- 

The  Eleans 

return  preum,  returned  home,  but  the  remainder  of  the  allies 
made  preparations  at  Mantinea  to  attack  Tegea.  They 
were  ass^steci  ^y  a  party  within  the  walls  who  were  ready 

tack  Tegea.  to  betray  the  place  to  them. 

63.  The   Lacedaemonians,   when  after   making  the  four 
The  Lace-    months'  truce  they  had  returned  home,  severely  blamed 

daemonians 

are  furious  Agis  because  he  had  not  conquered  Argos,  and  had  lost 

He  pacifies  an  opportunity  of  which,   in  their  own  judgment,  they 

Neverthe-  ^ad   never  before  had   the  like.     For   it  was   no   easy 

less  they  matter  to  bring  together  a  body  of  allies  so  numerous 

appoint  ten  fc  J 

Spartans  and  brave.  But  when  the  news  came  that  Orchomenus 
advisers5,  had  fallen  they  were  furious,  and  in  a  fit  of  passion, 
which  was  unlike  their  usual  character,  they  had  almost 
made  up  their  minds  to  raze  his  house  and  fine  him  in 
the  sum  of  a  hundred  thousand  drachmae a.  But  he 
besought  them  not  to  punish  him,  promising  that  he 
would  atone  for  his  error  by  some  brave  action  in  the 
field  ;  if  he  did  not  keep  his  word  they  might  do  as 
they  pleased  with  him.  So  they  did  not  inflict  the  fine 
or  demolish  his  house,  but  on  this  occasion  they  passed 
a  law  which  had  no  precedent  in  their  history,  providing 
that  ten  Spartans  should  be  appointed  his  counsellors  b, 
who  were  to  give  their  consent  before  he  could  lead  the 
army  out  of  the  city. 

64.  Meanwhile  word  was   brought  from  their  friends  in 
The  Lace-    Tegea  that  they  must  come  at  once,  since  Tegea  was 
again  lead    about  to  secede  and  had  almost  seceded  already  to  the 
whoVforce  Argives   and   their    allies.      Whereupon    the   Lacedae- 
to  the  sup-    monians  led  out  their  whole  force,  including  the  Helots, 
Tegea.        with  an  alacrity  which  they  had  never  before  displayed, 

and    marched  to   Orestheum  in  Maenalia.    They   told 

a  About  ^6700,  supposing  the  sum  to  be  given  in  Aeginetan 
drachmae. 

b  Cp.  the  cases  of  Cnemus,  ii.  85  init. ;  Alcidas,  iii.  69  med. ;  As- 
tyochus,  viii.  39  med.,  for  a  somewhat  similar  proceeding. 


MEETING    OF   THE    TWO    ARMIES.          385 

B.C.  418.  their  Arcadian  allies  to  assemble  and  follow  them  at  V. 
3>  once  to  Tegea.  When  the  army  had  proceeded  as  far 
as  Orestheum  they  dismissed  the  sixth  part,  including 
the  elder  and  the  younger  men,  who  were  to  keep  guard 
at  home,  and  arrived  at  Tegea  with  the  rest  of  their 
troops.  Not  long  afterwards  the  Arcadian  allies  ap- 
peared. They  had  also  sent  to  the  Corinthians,  and  to  the 
Boeotians,  Phocians,  and  Locrians,  whom  they  summoned 
to  meet  them  with  all  speed  at  Mantinea.  But  the  notice 
given  to  the  allies  was  short,  and  their  passage  was  barred 
by  the  enemies'  country,  which  they  could  not  easily 
traverse  unless  they  waited  for  one  another  and  came 
all  together.  However,  they  did  their  best.  The  Lace- 
daemonians. accompanied  by  their  Arcadian  allies,  in- 
vaded the  territory  of  Mantinea,  and  pitching  their  camp 
near  the  temple  of  Heracles,  wasted  the  country. 

When   the  Argives   and   their  allies  saw  the  enemy       65. 
they  took  up  a  steep  and  hardly  assailable  position,  and  TheArgives 
arranged  themselves  in  order  of  battle.     The  Lacedae- 
monians   instantly   charged   them,  and   had   proceeded 


within  a  javelin  or  stone's  throw  when  one  of  the  elder  charse 
Spartans,  seeing  the  strength  of  the  ground  which  they  Agis  nearly 
were  attacking,  called  out  to  Agis  that  he  was  trying  to 
mend  one  error  by  another  ;  he  meant  to  say  that  his 


present  mistaken  forwardness  was  intended  to  repair  the  withdraw 

x  his  troops. 

discredit   of  his   former  'retreat.     And,   either   in   con-  Afterawhiie 
sequence  of  this  exclamation   or   because   a  some   new  who  afeVe 


thought  suddenly  struck  him  a,  he  withdrew  his  army  in 

haste  without  actually  engaging.    He  marched  back  into  with  tlf  ir 

J  generals, 

the  district  of  Tegea,  and  proceeded  to  turn  the  water  follow  him. 
into  the  Mantinean  territory.  This  water  is  a  constant 
source  of  war  between  the  Mantineans  and  Tegeans,  on 
account  of  b  the  great  harm  which  is  done  b  to  one  or  other 
of  them  according  to  the  direction  which  the  stream  takes. 
Agis  hoped  that  the  Argives  and  their  allies  when  they 

a  Or,  '  some  new  thought,  or  the  same  thought  (which  had  oc- 
curred to  the  Spartan  elder),  suddenly  struck  him.' 
b  Or,  'the  harm  which  is  commonly  done.' 

C  c 


386       THE   LACEDAEMONIANS    DISAPPEAR. 

V.  heard  of  this  movement  would  come  down  from  the  hill  B.C.  418. 
and  try  to  prevent  it ;  he  could  then  fight  them  on  level  9°'  3' 
ground.  Accordingly  he  stayed  about  the  water  during 
the  whole  day,  diverting  the  stream.  Now  the  Argives 
and  their  confederates  were  at  first  amazed  at  the  sudden 
retreat  of  their  enemies  when  they  were  so  near,  and  did 
not  know  what  to  think.  But  when  the  Lacedaemonians 
had  retired  and  disappeared  from  view,  and  they  found 
themselves  standing  still  and  not  pursuing,  they  once 
more  began  to  blame  their  own  generals.  Their  cry 
was  that  they  had  already  let  the  Lacedaemonians  slip 
when  they  had  them  at  a  disadvantage  close  to  Argos  ; 
and  now  they  were  running  away  and  no  one  pursued 
them  ;  the  enemy  were  just  allowed  to  escape,  while 
their  own  army  was  quietly  betrayed.  The  commanders 
were  at  first  bewildered  by  the  outcry;  but  soon  they 
quitted  the  hill,  and  advancing  into  the  plain  took  up 
a  position  with  the  intention  of  attacking. 

66.  On  the  following  day  the   Argives  and   their  allies 

The  Lace-    drew  themselves  up  in  the  order  in  which  they  intended 

daemonians  .,  •  t       i  -» /r 

are  sur-  to  fight  should  they  meet  with  the  enemy.  Meanwhile 
Organisa-  the  Lacedaemonians  returned  from  the  water  to  their 
arm  °f  their  °^  encampment  near  the  temple  of  Heracles.  There 
they  saw  quite  close  to  them  the  Argive  army,  which 
had  moved  on  from  the  hill,  and  was  already  in  order 
of  battle.  Never  within  living  memory  were  the  Lace- 
daemonians more  dismayed  than  at  that  instant ;  not 
a  moment  was  to  be  lost  :  immediately  they  hurried 
every  man  to  his  own  place,  the  king  Agis,  according 
to  the  law,  directing  their  several  movements.  For 
when  the  king  is  in  the  field  nothing  is  done  without 
him  ;  he  in  person  gives  orders  to  the  polemarchs,  which 
they  convey  to  the  commanders  of  divisions ;  these 
again  to  the  commanders  of  fifties,  the  commanders  of 
fifties  to  the  commanders  of  enomoties,  and  these  to 
the  enomoty.  In  like  manner  any  more  precise  in- 
structions are  passed  down  through  the  army,  and 
quickly  reach  their  destination.  For  almost  the  whole 


ARRAY  OF  THE    TWO    ARMIES.  387 

B.C.  418.  Lacedaemonian  army  are  officers  who  have  officers  under       V. 
9°'  3'  them,  and  the  responsibility  of  executing  an  order  de- 
volves upon  many. 

On  this  occasion  the  Sciritae  formed  the  left  wing,  a  67. 
position  to  which  in  the  Lacedaemonian  army  they  have  Disposition 
a  peculiar  and  exclusive  right.  Next  to  the  Sciritae  troops. 
were  placed  the  troops  who  had  served  in  Chalcidice 
under  Brasidas,  and  with  them  the  Neodamodes.  Next 
in  order  were  ranged  the  several  divisions  of  the  Lace- 
daemonian army,  and  near  them  the  Heraeans  of  Ar- 
cadia ;  next  the  Maenalians,  and  on  the  right  wing  the 
Tegeans,  and  a  few  Lacedaemonians  at  the  extreme 
point  of  the  line  ;  the  cavalry  were  placed  on  both  wings. 
This  was  the  order  of  the  Lacedaemonians.  On  the 
right  wing  of  the  enemy  were  placed  the  Mantineans, 
because  the  action  was  to  be  fought  in  their  country,  and 
next  to  them  such  of  the  Arcadians  as  were  their  allies. 
Then  came  the  select  force  of  a  thousand  Argives, 
whom  the  city  had  long  trained  at  the  public  expense 
in  military  exercises  ;  next  the  other  Argives,  and  after 
them  their  allies,  the  Cleonaeans  and  Orneatae.  Last 
of  all  the  Athenians  occupied  the  left  wing,  supported 
by  their  own  cavalry. 

Such  was  the  order  and  composition  of  the  two  armies  :      68. 
that  of  the  Lacedaemonians  appeared  to  be  the  larger,  Numbers 
but  what  the  number  was,  either  of  the  several  con-  army  could 


tingents,  or  of  the  total  on  either  side,  I  cannot  pretend 
exactly  to  say,  for  the  secrecy  of  the  government  did  tained 
not  allow  the  strength  of  the  Lacedaemonian  army  to 
be  known,  and  the  numbers  on  the  other  side  were 
thought  to  be  exaggerated  by  the  vanity  natural  to  men 
when  speaking  of  their  own  forces.  However,  the  fol- 
lowing calculation  may  give  some  idea  of  the  Lacedae- 
monian numbers.  There  were  seven  divisions  in  the 
field,  besides  the  Sciritae  who  numbered  six  hundred  ; 
in  each  division  there  were  four  pentecosties,  in  every 
pentecosty  four  enomoties,  and  of  each  enomoty  there 
fought  in  the  front  rank  four.  The  depth  of  the  line 

C  c  2, 


388    LAST  WORDS  OF  THE  GENERALS. 

V.       was  not  everywhere  equal,  but  was  left  to  the  discretion  B.C.  418. 
of  the  generals  commanding  divisions  ;  on  an  average  it 
was  eight  deep.   The  front  line  consisted  of  four  hundred 
and  forty-eight  men,  exclusive  of  the  Sciritae  a. 

69.  The  two  armies  were  now  on  the  point  of  engaging, 
The  Man-    but  first  the  several  commanders  addressed  exhortations 
gives,  and    to  their  own  contingents.     The  Mantineans  were  told 
reei^ld18    that  they  were  not  only  about  to  fight  for  their  country, 
eloquent  ex-  fo^  would  have  to  choose  between  dominion b  or  slavery: 

hortations  7  - 

from  their  having  tried  both,  did  they  want  to  be  deprived  of  the 
But  the  one,  or  to  have  any  more  acquaintance  with  the  other  ? 
moSans"  Tne  Argives  were  reminded  that  in  old  times  they  had 
of  ?hemneed  keen  sovereign,  and  more  recently  the  equals  of  Sparta, 
in  the  Peloponnese ;  would  they  acquiesce  for  ever  in 
the  loss  of  their  supremacy,  and  lose  at  the  same  time 
the  chance  of  revenging  themselves  upon  their  hateful 
neighbours,  who  had  wronged  them  again  and  again? 
The  Athenians  were  told  that  it  was  glorious  to  be 
fighting  side  by  side  with  a  host  of  brave  allies  and  to 
be  found  equal  to  the  bravest.  If  they  could  conquer 
the  Lacedaemonians  in  Peloponnese,  they  would  both 
extend  and  secure  their  dominion,  and  need  never  fear 
an  invader  again.  Such  were  the  exhortations  addressed 
to  the  Argives  and  to  their  allies.  But  the  Lacedae- 
monians, both  in  their  war-songs  and  in  the  words  which 
a  man  spoke  to  his  comrade,  did  but  remind  one  another 
of  what  their  brave  spirits  knew  already0.  For  they  had 
learned  that  true  safety  was  to  be  found  in  long  previous 
training,  and  not  in  eloquent  exhortations  uttered  when 
they  were  going  into  action. 

70.  At  length  the  two  armies  went  forward.    The  Argives 
mar^mlo5  ^^  ^^  a^*es  advanced  to  the  charge  with  great  fury 
battle  with   and  determination.    The  Lacedaemonians  moved  slowly 

and  to  the  music  of  many  flute-players,  who  were  sta- 
tioned  m  their  ranks,  and  played,  not  as  an  act  of  religion, 

a  The  whole  number  of  the  Lacedaemonians  is  3584  without  the 
Sciritae,  or  with  them  4184. 

b  Cp.  v.  29  init.  c  Cp.  iv.  17  med.,  95  init.,  126  init. 


AGIS  CHANGES  FRONT  IN  FACE  OF  ENEMY.  389 

B.C.  418.  but  in  order  that  the  army  might  march  evenly  and  in       V. 
901  3<  true  measure,  and  that  the  line  might  not  break,  as  often  llle  sou.nd 

of  music. 

happens  in  great  armies  when  they  go  into  battle. 

Before  they  had  actually  closed  a  thought  occurred  to       7  1  • 
Agis.     All  armies,  when  engaging,  are  apt  to  thrust  out-  Asis  tries  to 

'  J  extend  his 

wards  their  right  wing  ;  and  either  of  the  opposing  forces  left  wing  by 
tends  to  outflank  his  enemy's  left  with  his  own  right, 
because  every  soldier  individually  fears  for  his  exposed 


side,  which  he  tries  to  cover  with  the  shield  of  his  com-  a  gap  which 

he  endea- 

rade  on  the  right,  conceiving  that  the  closer  he  draws  in  vours  to 
the  better  he  will  be  protected.  The  first  man  in  the  t 
front  rank  of  the  right  wing  is  originally  responsible  for  ^{JJ  hls 
the  deflection,  for  he  always  wants  to  withdraw  from  the 
enemy  his  own  exposed  side,  and  the  rest  of  the  army, 
from  a  like  fear,  follow  his  example.  In  this  battle  the 
line  of  the  Mantineans,  who  were  on  the  Argive  right 
wing,  extended  far  beyond  the  Sciritae  ;  and  still  further, 
in  proportion  as  the  army  to  which  they  belonged  was 
the  larger,  did  the  Lacedaemonians  and  Tegeans  on  the 
Lacedaemonian  right  wing  extend  beyond  the  Athenian 
left.  Agis  was  afraid  that  the  Lacedaemonian  left  wing 
would  be  surrounded,  and,  thinking  that  the  Mantineans 
outflanked  them  too  far,  he  signalled  to  the  Sciritae  and 
the  old  soldiers  of  Brasidas  to  make  a  lateral  movement 
away  from  his  own  division  of  the  army,  and  so  cover  the 
line  of  the  Mantineans:  to  fill  up  the  space  thus  left 
vacant  he  ordered  Hipponoidas  and  Aristocles,  two  of  the 
polemarchs,  to  bring  up  their  two  divisions  from  the  right 
wing,  thinking  that  he  would  still  have  more  troops  than 
he  wanted  there,  and  that  he  would  thus  strengthen  that 
part  of  his  line  which  was  opposed  to  the  Mantineans. 

He  had  given  the  order  at  the  last  moment,  when  the      72. 
charge  had  already  begun,  and  Aristocles  and  Hipponoi-  ^"{^ede- 
das  refused  to  make  the  movement.     (For  the  cowardice  refusing  to 

stir,  the 

which  they  were  supposed  to  have  shown  on  this  occa-  Mantineans 
sion  they  were  afterwards  banished  from  Sparta.)     The  ;£sdhAr£ 
enemy  were  upon  him  before  he  was  ready,  and  as  the  J^rougjj  d^e 
two  divisions  would  not  advance  into  the  place  left  by  feat  the  left 


39°  BATTLE    OF  MANTINEA. 

V.       the  Sciritae,  Agis  ordered  the  Sciritae  themselves  to  close  B.C.  418. 

up'  but  he  found  that  ifc  was  to°  late'  and  that  neither  ° 
could  they  now  fill  the  vacant  space.     Then  the  Lace- 

daemonians showed  in  a  remarkable  manner  that,  al- 
though utterly  failing  in  their  tactics,  they  could  win  by 
their  courage  alone.  When  they  were  at  close  quarters 
with  the  enemy,  the  Mantinean  right  put  to  flight  the 
Sciritae  and  the  soldiers  of  Brasidas.  The  Mantineans 
and  their  allies  and  the  thousand  chosen  Argives  dashed 
in  through  the  gap  in  the  Lacedaemonian  ranks  and 
completed  their  defeat  ;  they  surrounded  and  routed 
them,  and  so  drove  them  to  their  waggons,  where  they 
killed  some  of  the  elder  men  who  were  appointed  to 
guard  them.  In  this  part  of  the  field  the  Lacedae- 
monians were  beaten,  but  elsewhere,  and  especially  in 
the  centre  of  the  army,  where  the  king  Agis  and  the 
three  hundred  Knights,  as  they  are  called,  who  attend 
him,  were  posted,  they  charged  the  elder  Argives,  the 
Five  Divisions  as  they  are  termed,  the  Cleonaeans,  Ornea- 
tae,  and  those  of  the  Athenians  who  were  ranged  with 
them,  and  put  them  to  flight.  Most  of  them  never  even 
struck  a  blow,  but  gave  way  at  once  on  the  approach  of 
the  Lacedaemonians  ;  some  were  actually  trodden  under 
foot,  being  overtaken  by  the  advancing  host. 
73.  When  the  allies  and  the  Argives  had  yielded  in  this 
^Ah0*  cluarter>  they  became  severed  from  their  companions  to 
nians,  the  left  as  well  as  to  the  right  of  the  line;  meanwhile 
oniyaverted  the  extended  right  wing  of  the  Lacedaemonians  and  the 


Tegeans  threatened  to  surround  the  Athenians.     They 
the  Lace-    were  in  great  danger  ;  their  men  were  being  hemmed 

daemomans 

on  the  right  in  at  one  point  and  were  already  defeated  at  another  ; 

goto'the  as-  and  but  for  their  cavalry,  which  did  them  good  service, 
they  would  have  suffered  more  than  any  other  part  of 
*ke  army-  Just  ^en  Agis,  observing  the  distress  of  the 


the  left.       Lacedaemonian   left  wing,  which  was   opposed   to  the 

The  Lace-     .......  A       - 

daemonians  Mantineans  and  the  thousand  select  Argives,  com- 
battieTbut  rnanded  his  whole  forces  to  go  and  assist  their  own 
suenfarPUr~  defeated  troops.  Whereupon  the  Athenians,  when  their 


THE    GREATEST  OF  HELLENIC   BATTLES.     391 

B.C.  418.  opponents  turned  aside  and  began  to  move  away  from  V. 
3*  them,  quietly  made  their  escape,  and  along  with  them 
the  defeated  Argives.  The  Mantineans  and  their  allies 
and  the  chosen  force  of  Argives,  seeing  their  army  con- 
quered and  the  Lacedaemonians  bearing  down  upon 
them,  gave  up  all  thoughts  of  following  up  their  advan- 
tage and  fled.  The  loss  incurred  by  the  chosen  Argives 
was  small,  that  of  the  Mantineans  more  serious.  The 
pursuit  was  not  fierce  nor  the  flight  protracted,  for  the 
Lacedaemonians  fight  long  and  refuse  to  move  until 
they  have  put  an  enemy  to  flight,  but,  having  once 
defeated  him,  they  do  not  follow  him  far  or  long. 

Thus,  or  nearly  thus,  went  the  battle,  by  far  the  74. 
greatest  of  Hellenic  battles  which  had  taken  place  for  Numbers 
a  long  time,  and  fought  by  the  most  famous  cities.  The 
Lacedaemonians  exposed  the  arms  of  the  enemies' dead, 
and  made  a  trophy  of  them  ;  they  then  plundered  the 
bodies,  and  taking  up  their  own  dead  carried  them  away 
to  Tegea,  where  they  were  buried ;  the  enemies'  dead 
they  gave  back  under  a  flag  of  truce.  Of  the  Argives, 
Orneatae,  and  Cleonaeans  there  fell  seven  hundred,  of  the 
Mantineans  two  hundred,  and  of  the  Athenians,  including 
their  settlers  in  Aeginaa,  two  hundred,  and  both  their 
generals.  As  to  the  Lacedaemonians,  their  allies  were 
not  hard  pressed  and  did  not  incur  any  considerable  loss  ; 
how  many  of  themselves  fell  it  was  hard  to  ascertain 
precisely,  but  their  dead  are  reported  to  have  numbered 
about  three  hundred. 

Just  before  the  battle,  Pleistoanax,  the   other  king,       75- 
led   out   of   Sparta  a   reinforcement   composed   of  the  Jhe  La9e~ 

x  daemomans 

elder  and  younger  citizens  b ;  he  had  proceeded  as  far  as  go  home 
Tegea  when  he  heard  of  the  victory,  and  returned.    The  brate  the 
Lacedaemonians  sent  and  countermanded  the  reinforce-  Gre^morai 
ments  from  Corinth  and  beyond  the  Isthmus  ;  they  then  j^Jj*of  the 
went  home  themselves  and,  dismissing  the  allies,  cele- 
brated the  festival    of  the  Carnea,  for  which  this  hap- 
pened to  be  the  season.     Thus,  by  a  single  action,  they 
a  Cp.  ii.  27  med.  b  Gp.  v.  64  med. 


392  THE    CARNEA    AGAIN. 

V.       wiped  out  the  charge  of  cowardice,  which  was  due  to  B.C.  418. 
their  misfortune  at  Sphacteria,  and  of  general  stupidity 
and  sluggishness,  then  current  against  them  in  Hellas. 
They  were  now  thought  ato  have  been  hardly  used  by 
fortune  a,  but  in  character  to  be  the  same  as  ever. 

The  very  day  before  the  battle,  the  Epidaurians  with 
their  whole  force  invaded  the  territory  of  Argos,  expect- 
ing to  find  it  deserted  ;  they  killed  many  of  the  soldiers 
who  had  been  left  to  protect  the  country  when  the  main 
army  took  the  field  b.  After  the  battle  three  thousand 
Elean  hoplites  came  to  the  aid  of  the  Mantineans,  and  a 
second  detachment  of  a  thousand  from  Athens.  While 
the  Lacedaemonians  were  still  celebrating  the  Carnea 
they  marched  all  together  against  Epidaurus,  and  began 
to  surround  the  city  with  a  wall,  dividing  the  task  among 
them.  The  other  allies  did  not  persevere,  but  the  Athe- 
nians soon  completed  their  own  portion,  the  fortification 
of  the  promontory  on  which  the  temple  of  Here  stood. 
In  this  part  of  the  works  a  garrison  was  left,  to  which 
all  furnished  a  contingent ;  they  then  returned  to  their 
several  cities.  So  the  summer  ended. 

76.          At  the  very  beginning  of  the  following  winter,  after 
The  Lace-   the  celebration  of  the  Carnea,  the  Lacedaemonians  led 

daemonian 

party  at       out  an  army  as  far  as  1  egea,  whence  they  sent  proposals 
tSding'to    of  peace  to  the  Argives.     There  had  always  been  some 
the  demo-    Partizans  of  Lacedaemon  in  the  city,  who  had  wanted  to 
cracy,  make  put  down  the  democracy.     After  the  battle  it  was  far 
easier  for  this  party  to  draw  the  people  into  an  alliance 
with  Sparta.     Their  intention  was  to  make  first  of  all  a 
peace,  and  then  an  alliance,  with  the  Lacedaemonians, 
and,  having  done  so,  to  set  upon  the  people.     And  now 
there  arrived  in  Argos,  Lichas  the  son  of  Arcesilaus,  the 
proxenus  of  the  Argives,  offering  them  one  of  two  alter- 
natives :    There  were  terms  of  peace,  but  they  might  also 
have  war  if  they  pleased.     A  warm  discussion  ensued, 
for  Alcibiades  happened  to  be  in  the  place.     The  party 

a  Or,  '  to  have  incurred  disgrace  through  a  mishap.' 
b   Reading  e£eA 


TREATY   OF   PEACE.  393 

B.C.  418.  which  had  been  intriguing  for  the  Lacedaemonians,  and       V. 
3'  had  at  last  ventured  to  come  forward  openly,  persuaded 
the  Argives  to  accept  the  terms  of  peace,  which  were  as 
follows : — 

'  It  seems  good  to  the  Lacedaemonian   assembly  to       77. 
make  an  agreement  with  the  Argives  on  the  following  The  terms 

to  of  the  first 
terms  : —  treaty. 

I.  The  Argives  shall  restore  to  the  Orchomenians a 
the  youths,  and  to  the  Maenalians  the  men  whom  they 
hold  as  hostages,  and  to  the  Lacedaemonians  a  the  men 
who  were  deposited  in  Mantinea. 

II.  They  shall  also  evacuate  Epidauria,  and  demolish 
the  fortifications  which  they  have  erected  there.     If  the 
Athenians  refuse  to  evacuate  Epidauria,  they  shall  be 
enemies  to  the  Argives  and  Lacedaemonians,  and  to  the 
allies  of  the  Lacedaemonians,  and  to  the  allies  of  the 
Argives. 

III.  If  the    Lacedaemonians  have   any   youths   be- 
longing to  any  of  the  allies  in  their  country,  they  shall 
restore  them  to  their  several  cities. 

IV.  Concerning  the  sacrifice  to  the  God,  the   Epi- 
daurians  shall  be  permitted  to  take  an  oath  which  the 
Argives  shall  formally  tender  to  them. 

V.  The  cities  in  Peloponnesus,  both  small  and  great, 
shall  be  all  independent,  according  to  their  ancestral  laws. 

VI.  If  any    one   from   without   Peloponnesus   comes 
against    Peloponnesus   with    evil    intent,   the   Pelopon- 
nesians  shall  take  counsel  together  and  shall  repel  the 
enemy ;  and  the  several  states  shall  bear  such  a  share  in 
the  war  as  may  seem  equitable  to  the  Peloponnesians. 

VII.  The  allies  of  the  Lacedaemonians  without  Pelo- 
ponnesus shall  be  in  the  same  position  as  the  other  allies 
of  the  Lacedaemonians  and  the  allies   of  the  Argives, 
and  they  shall  retain  their  present  territory. 

VIII.  Both  parties  bmay  if  they  think  fit  show  this 

a  Cp.  v.  6 1  fin. 

b  Or,  taking  avrols  of  the  allies :   '  may  show  this  agreement  to 
their  allies  and  make  terms  with  them  if  the  allies  think  fit ; '  or, 


394  TREATY   OF   ALLIANCE. 

V.       agreement  to  their  allies  and  make  terms  with  themb,  but  B.C.  418. 
if  the  allies  raise  any  objection,  they  shall  dismiss  them  °! 
to  their  homes.' 

78.  When  the  Argives  had  accepted  these  propositions  in 

The  ai-       the   first    instance   the   Lacedaemonian    army  returned 
Argos  with  home  from  Tegea.     The  two  states  now  began  to  hold 
AthenT,eaAd  intercourse  with   one  another,  and  not  long  afterwards 
SiveddiS~    t^le  same  Party  which  had  negotiated   the  treaty  con- 
trived that  the  Argives  should   renounce  their  alliance 
with    Mantinea,    Athens,   and    Elis,   and    make   a   new 
treaty  of  alliance  with  Lacedaemon  on  the  following 
terms : — 

79-  '  It  seems  good  to  the  Lacedaemonians  and  to  the 

ofhtheerms  Argives  to  make  peace  and  alliance  for  fifty  years  on 
second  the  following  conditions  : — 

elude  an          I.  They  shall  submit  to  arbitration  on  fair  and  equal 
terms,  according  to  their  ancestral  customs. 

nm  Xhe  other  cities  of  Peloponnesus  shall  participate 
ponnesian    in  the  peace  and  alliance,  and  shall  be  independent  and 

cities,  with       ,  .    . 

fuller  their  own  masters,  retaining  their  own  territory  and 
fo°theirhi-  submitting  to  arbitration  on  fair  and  equal  terms,  ac- 
dependence  COrding  to  their  ancestral  customs. 

cLRQ  in  CclSC  *•* 

of  dispute        HI.  All   the   allies   of   the    Lacedaemonians   outside 

tion.  Peloponnese    shall    share    in    the    same    terms   as   the 

Lacedaemonians,   and    the  allies  of   the  Argives  shall 

be  in  the  same  position  as  the  Argives,  and  shall  retain 

their  present  territory. 

IV.  If  it  shall  be  necessary  to  make  an  expedition  in 
common  against  any    place,  the   Lacedaemonians   and 
the  Argives  shall   consult  together   and  fix  the  share 
in  the  war  which  may  be  equitably  borne  by  the  allies. 

V.  If  any  of  the  states,  either  within  or  without  Pelo- 
ponnesus, have  a  dispute  about  a  frontier,  or  any  other 
matter,  the  difference  shall  be  duly  settled.     But  should 

referring  £vju/3aXeV0ai  to  the  original  agreement  and  giving  a 
different  sense  to  the  words  ai  KO,  avrols  SOKTJ  :  l  may  show  the 
agreement  to  their  allies  before  they  conclude  it,  in  case  they  are 
willing  to  come  into  it.' 


SPARTA    AND  ARGOS  AGAINST  ATHENS.  395 

B.C.  418.  a  quarrel  break  out  between  two  of  the  allied  cities,  they       V. 
3'  shall  appeal  to  some  state  which  both  the  cities  deem  to 
be  impartial. 

VI.  Justice  shall  be  administered  to  the  individual 
citizens  of  each  state  according  to  their  ancestral 
customs.' 

Thus  the  peace  and  the  alliance  were  concluded,  and      80. 
the   Lacedaemonians    and    Argives    settled    with    each  The  Lace- 

,  i  •  /v  1*11  i  dncmonians 

other  any   difference   which   they   had   about   captures  and  Argives 
made  in  the  war,  or  about  any  other  matter.     They  now  together 
acted  together,  and  passed  a  vote   that   no   herald 


embassy  should  be  received  from  the  Athenians,  unless  They  in- 
they  evacuated  the  fortifications  which  they  held  in  chaicidian 
Peloponnesus  and  left  the  country;  they  agreed  also 
that  they  would  not  enter  into  alliance  or  make  war 
except  in  concert.  They  were  very  energetic  in  all  Evacuation 
their  doings,  and  both  Lacedaemonians  and  Argives  sent  daurus. 
ambassadors  to  the  Chaicidian  cities  in  Thrace,  and 
to  Perdiccas  whom  they  persuaded  to  join  their  con- 
federacy. He  did  not,  however,  immediately  desert 
the  Athenians,  but  he  was  thinking  of  deserting,  being 
influenced  by  the  example  of  the  Argives  ;  for  he  was 
himself  of  Argive  descent  a.  The  Argives  and  Lacedae- 
monians renewed  their  former  oaths  to  the  Chalcidians 
and  swore  new  ones  b.  The  Argives  also  sent  envoys  to 
the  Athenians  bidding  them  evacuate  the  fortifications 
which  they  had  raised  at  Epidaurus.  They,  seeing  that 
their  troops  formed  but  a  small  part  of  the  garrison,  sent 
Demosthenes  to  bring  them  away  with  him.  When  he 
came  he  proposed  to  hold  a  gymnastic  contest  outside 
the  fort  ;  upon  this  pretext  he  induced  the  rest  of  the 
garrison  to  go  out,  and  then  shut  the  gates  upon  them. 
Soon  afterwards  the  Athenians  renewed  their  treaty 
with  the  Epidaurians,  and  themselves  restored  the  fort 
to  them. 

When  the  Argives  deserted  the  alliance  the  Manti-      81. 
neans  held  out  for  a  time,  but  without  the  Argives  they 
a  Cp.  ii.  99  init.  b  Cp.  i.  58  med.;  v.  31  fin. 


396         THE  ARGIVE    DEMOCRACY  REVIVES. 

V.       were  helpless,  and  so  they  too  came  to  terms  with  the  B.C.  418. 
terms  with   Lacedaemonians,  and  gave  up  their  claim  to  supremacy 
daemo-       over  the  cities  in  Arcadia  which   had  been  subject  to 
TheArgive  them a.     Next  the  Lacedaemonians   and   the   Argives, 
puTdown7  eac^  providing  a  thousand  men,  made  a  joint  expedi- 
by  force,      tion :  first  the  Lacedaemonians  went  alone  and  set  up  a 
more  oligarchical  government  at  Sicyon  ;  then  they  and 
the  Argives  uniting  their  forces  put  down  the  democracy 
at  Argos,  and  established  an  oligarchy  which  was  in  the 
interest  of  the  Lacedaemonians.     These  changes  were 
effected  at  the  close   of  winter   towards   the  approach 
of  spring,  and  so  ended  the  fourteenth  year  of  the  war. 
82.  In  the  ensuing  summer  the  people  of  Dium  in  Mount  B.C.  417. 

The  popu-  Athos  revolted  from  the  Athenians  to  the  Chalcidians ; 
at  Argos,     and  the  Lacedaemonians  resettled  the  affairs  of  Achaia 
thernTefves  uP°n  a  footing  more  favourable  to  their  interests  than 
of  a  Lace-    hitherto.     The   popular  party  at  Argos,  reconstituting 
festival,  at-  themselves  by  degrees,  plucked  up  courage,  and,  taking 
defeat  the     advantage  of  the  festival  of  the  Gymnopaediae  at  Lace- 
Thgeyrrenew  daemon,  attacked  the  oligarchy.    A  battle  took  place  in 
rdanAaihe~     the  city :  the  popular  party  won,  and  either  killed  or  ex- 
liance  and    pelled  their  enemies.  The  oligarchy  had  sought  help  from 
bufw  long    their  friends  the  Lacedaemonians,  but  they  did  not  come 
wails  to  the  ^or  SOme  time  ;  at  last  they  put  off  the  festival  and  went 
to  their  aid.     When  they  arrived  at  Tegea  they  heard 
that  the  oligarchs  had  been  defeated.     They  would  pro- 
ceed no   further,  but  in  spite  of  the  entreaties  of  the 
fugitives  returned  home  and  resumed  the  celebration  of 
the  festival.     Not  long  afterwards  envoys  came  to  them 
both  from  the  party  now  established  in  Argos  and  from 
those  who  had  been  driven  out,  and  in  the  presence  of 
their  allies,  after  a  long  debate,  they  passed  a  vote  con- 
demning the  victorious  faction ;  they  then   resolved  to 
send  an  expedition  to  Argos,  but  delays  occurred  and 
time  was   lost.     Meanwhile   the   democracy    at   Argos, 
fearing   the   Lacedaemonians,    and   again    courting    the 
Athenian   alliance  in  which   their  hopes  were   centred, 
a  Cp.  v.  29  init. 


PERDICCAS   AGAIN.  397 

B.C.  417.  built  Long  Walls  to  the  sea,  in  order  that  if  they  were  V. 
4'  blockaded  by  land  they  might  have  the  advantage,  with 
Athenian  help,  of  introducing  provisions  by  water. 
Certain  other  states  in  Peloponnese  were  privy  to  this 
project.  The  whole  Argive  people,  the  citizens  them- 
selves, their  wives,  and  their  slaves,  set  to  work  upon 
the  wall,  and  the  Athenians  sent  them  carpenters  and 
masons  from  Athens.  So  the  summer  ended. 

In  the  ensuing  winter  the  Lacedaemonians,  hearing  of  83. 
the  progress  of  the  work,  made  an  expedition  to  Argos  The  un- 
with  their  allies,  all  but  the  Corinthians  ;  there  was  also  waiis  are 


a  party  at  Argos  itself  acting  in  their  interest.  Agis  the 
son  of  Archidamus,  king  of  the  Lacedaemonians,  led  the 
army.  The  support  which  they  expected  to  find  at  Lacedae- 

-  .,     .  11        i  1  •   i  monians. 

Argos  failed  them  ;  the  walls  however,  which  were  The 
not  yet  finished,  were  captured  by  them  and  razed  to  blockade3 
the  ground  ;  they  also  seized  Hysiae,  a  place  in  the  Perdiccas. 
Argive  territory,  and  put  to  death  all  the  free  men  whom 
they  caught  ;  they  then  withdrew,  and  returned  to  their 
several  cities.  Next  the  Argives  in  their  turn  made 
an  expedition  into  the  territory  of  Phlius,  which  they 
ravaged  because  the  Phliasians  had  received  their  exiles, 
most  of  whom  had  settled  there  ;  they  then  returned 
home.  During  the  same  winter  the  Athenians  blockaded 
Perdiccas  in  Macedonia,  complaining  of  the  league  which 
he  had  made  with  the  Argives  and  Lacedaemonians  ;  and 
also  that  he  had  been  false  to  their  alliance  at  a  time 
when  they  had  prepared  to  send  an  army  against  the 
Chalcidians  and  against  Amphipolis  under  the  com- 
mand of  Nicias  the  son  of  Niceratus.  The  army  was 
in  fact  disbanded  chiefly  owing  to  his  withdrawal.  So 
he  became  their  enemy.  Thus  the  winter  ended,  and 
with  it  the  fifteenth  year  of  the  war. 

B.C.  416.      In  the  ensuing  summer,  Alcibiades  sailed  to  Argos      84. 

O1>  9I'  with  twenty  ships,  and  seized  any  of  the  Argives  who  Alcibiades 
were  still  suspected  to  be  of  the  Lacedaemonian  faction,  suspected 
three  hundred  in  number  ;  and  the  Athenians  deposited  Th^uhe- 
them  in  the  subject  islands  near  at  hand.  The  Athe-  nians'  en- 

raged at 


398       ATHENIAN   EXPEDITION   TO    MELOS. 

V.       nians  next  made  an   expedition   against  the  island  of  B.C.  416. 
theinde-      Melos  with  thirty  ships  of  their   own,    six   Chian,  and    lm  9I* 

pendence  .  J  r 

of  the  island  two  Lesbian,  twelve  hundred  hoplites  and  three  hun- 
sendthither  dred  archers  besides  twenty  mounted  archers  of  their 
tSonexped'~  own,  and  about  fifteen  hundred  hoplites  furnished  by 
But  first  their  allies  in  the  islands.  The  Melians  are  colonists  of 

they  try 

negotiation,  the  Lacedaemonians  who  would  not  submit  to  Athens 
like  the  other  islanders.  At  first  they  were  neutral  and 
took  no  part.  But  when  the  Athenians  tried  to  coerce 
them  by  ravaging  their  lands,  they  were  driven  into 
open  hostilities*.  The  generals,  Cleomedes  the  son  of 
Lycomedes  and  Tisias  the  son  of  Tisimachus,  encamped 
with  the  Athenian  forces  on  the  island.  But  before 
they  did  the  country  any  harm  they  sent  envoys  to 
negotiate  with  the  Melians.  Instead  of  bringing  these 
envoys  before  the  people,  the  Melians  desired  them  to 
explain  their  errand  to  the  magistrates  and  to  the  chief 
men.  They  spoke  as  follows  : — 

85.  '  Since  we  are  not  allowed  to  speak  to  the  people,  lest, 
Since  we      forsooth,  they  should  be  deceived  by  seductive  and  un- 
cioseted       answerable  b  arguments  which  they  would  hear  set  forth 

m  a  single  uninterrupted  oration  (for  we  are  perfectly 
aware  tnat  tn^s  *s  wnat  you  mean  in  bringing  us  before  a 
speeches,  select  few),  you  who  are  sitting  here  may  as  well  make 
assurance  yet  surer.  Let  us  have  no  set  speeches  at  all, 
but  do  you  reply  to  each  several  statement  of  which  you 
disapprove,  and  criticise  it  at  once.  Say  first  of  all  how 
you  like  this  mode  of  proceeding.' 

86.  The   Melian    representatives   answered: — 'The  quiet 
We  do  not  interchange  of  explanations  is  a  reasonable  thing-,  and 

object.   But 

discussion  we  do  not  object  to  that.     But  your  warlike  movements, 

yoiTand  which  are  present  not  only  to  our  fears  but  to  our  eyes, 

mocke  seem  to  belie  your  words.     We  see  that,  although  you 

and  can '  may  reason  with  us,  you  mean  to  be  our  judges ;  and 

only  end  in'  ..  i/-i          i«  •  .-.,.. 

our  ruin,      that  at  the  end  of  the  discussion,  if  the  justice  of  our 
cause  prevail  and  we  therefore  refuse  to  yield,  we  may 
expect  war  ;  if  we  are  convinced  by  you,  slavery.' 
a  Cp.  iii.  91  init.  b  Or,  '  unexamined.' 


THE    MELIAN    CONTROVERSY.  399 

B.C.  416.  Ath.  'Nay,  but  if  you  are  only  going  to  argue  from  V. 
fancies  about  the  future,  or  if  you  meet  us  with  any  other  &  7. 
purpose  than  that  of  looking  your  circumstances  in  the  Nay,  but 

_  . .  .  .  f     ,  .  you  must 

face  and  saving  your  city,  we  have  done ;  but  if  this  is  lookatfacts. 
your  intention  we  will  proceed.' 

Mel.  '  It  is  an  excusable  and  natural  thing  that  men       88. 

in  our   position  should   have  much  to  say  and   should  Jt  must  fae 
.  i    ».*'''*•  as  y°u»  an<i 

indulge  in  many  fancies.     But  we  admit  that  this  con-  not  as  we, 

ference  has  met  to  consider  the  question  of  our  preser-  p  ei 
vation ;  and  therefore  let  the  argument  proceed  in  the 
manner  which  you  propose.' 

Ath.  'Well,   then,   we    Athenians    will    use    no    fine       89. 
words  ;  we  will  not  go  out  of  our  way  to  prove  at  length  NO  use  in 
that  we  have  a  right  to  rule,  because  we  overthrew  the  about  right; 
Persians a;    or  that  we  attack  you  now  because  we  are  fsxfhe  ^ord. 
suffering   any  injury  at   your  hands.     We   should   not 
convince  you  if  we  did  ;  nor  must  you  expect  to  con- 
vince  us    by  arguing    that,  although  a   colony   of  the 
Lacedaemonians,  you  have  taken  no  part  in  their  ex- 
peditions, or  that  you  have  never  done  us  any  wrong. 
But  you  and  we  should  say  what  we  really  think,  and 
aim    only  at  what  is  possible,  for  we  both  alike  know 
that  into  the  discussion  of  human  affairs  the  question  of 
justice   only  enters  where   the  pressure  of  necessity  is 
equal,  and  that  the  powerful  exact  what  they  can,  and 
the  weak  grant  what  they  must/ 

Mel.  '  Well,  then,  since  you  set  aside  justice  and  invite      90. 
us  to  speak  of  expediency,  in  our  judgment  it  is  cer-  For  your 
tainly  expedient  that   you  should  respect   a   principle  Sen,  it  is ' 
which  is  for  the  common  good  ;  ai  d  that  to  every  man  tSjfyou' 
when  in  peril  a  reasonable  claim  should  be  accounted  should  not 

i    •  r     •    I_,L  j  t  t  -   i     1        -       i.  betoo strict. 

a  claim  of  right,  and  any  plea  which  he  is  disposed  to 
urge,  even  if  failing  of  the  point  a  little,  should  help 
his  cause.  Your  interest  in  this  principle  is  quite  as 
great  as  ours,  b  inasmuch  as  you,  if  you  fall,  will  incur 

a  Cp.  vi.  83  init. 

b  Or,  '  inasmuch  as  you,  if  you  disregard  it,  will  by  your  example 


400  THE   ME  LI  AN   CONTROVERSY. 

V.       the  heaviest  vengeance,  and  will  be  the  most  terrible  B.C.  416. 
example  to  mankind  V 

91.  Ath.  'The   fall   of  our   empire,   if  it   should   fall,  is 
For  our-      not  an  event  to  which  we  look  forward  with  dismay; 

selves  we 

have  no  for  ruling  states  such  as  Lacedaemon  are  not  cruel  to 
it  is  you  their  vanquished  enemies.  a  And  we  are  fighting  not 
iearnhthe  tO  so  much  against  the  Lacedaemonians,  as  against  our 
lesson  of  own  subjects  who  may  some  day  rise  up  and  overcome 

what  is  ex-  J 

pedient  their  former  masters  a.  But  this  is  a  danger  which  you 
and  you.  S  may  leave  to  us.  And  we  will  now  endeavour  to  show 
that  we  have  come  in  the  interests  of  our  empire,  and 
that  in  what  we  are  about  to  say  we  are  only  seeking 
the  preservation  of  your  city.  For  we  want  to  make  you 
ours  with  the  least  trouble  to  ourselves,  and  it  is  for  the 
interests  of  us  both  that  you  should  not  be  destroyed.' 

92.  Mel.  '  It  may  be  your  interest  to  be  our  masters,  but 
For  you,      how  can  it  be  ours  to  be  your  slaves?' 

how  for  us?      Ath.  'To  you  the  gain  will  be  that  by  submission  you 
93-      will  avert  the  worst  ;  and  we  shall  be  all  the  richer  for 

You  will  ,  .        , 

suffer  less    your  preservation. 

gaidnwmo?ean      Mel-  '  But  must  we  be  your  enemies?     Will  you  not 
94.      receive  us  as  friends  if  we  are  neutral  and  remain  at 


95.  Ath.  'No,  your   enmity  is   not  half  so  mischievous 
Our  subjects  to  us  as  your  friendship  ;  for  the  one  is  in  the  eves  of 

would  not  .  J 

understand  our  subjects  an  argument  of  our  power,  the  other  of 

that.  5 

our  weakness. 

96.  Mel.  'But  are  your  subjects  really  unable  to  distin- 
Butweare   guish  between  states  in  which  you  have  no  concern,  and 
of  yours™7  those  which  are  chiefly  your  own  colonies,  and  in  some 

cases  have  revolted  and  been  subdued  by  you?' 

97.  Ath.  '  Why,  they  do  not  doubt  that  both  of  them  have 

justify  others  in  inflicting  the  .heaviest  vengeance  on  you  should 
you  fall.' 

a  Or,  taking  eo-ri  fie  ...  6  dyav  as  a  parenthesis  and  giving  a 
different  sense  to  nov  and  avrol  :  {  With  the  Lacedaemonians,  how- 
ever, we  are  not  now  contending  ;  the  real  danger  is  from  our  many 
subject  states,  who  may  of  their  own  motion  rise  up  and  overcome 
their  masters.' 


THE   M  ELI  AN   CONTROVERSY.  401 

B.C.  416.  a  good  deal  to  say  for  themselves  on  the  score  of  justice,       V. 
but  they  think  that  states  like  yours  are  left  free  because 


they  are  able  to  defend  themselves,  and  that  we  do  not  about  jus- 
attack  them  because  we  dare  not.     So  that  your  sub-  We2y  that 


jection  will  give  us  an  increase  of  security,  as  well  as 
an  extension  of  empire.     For  we  are  masters  of  the  sea, 
and  you  who  are  islanders,  and   insignificant  islanders  islanders. 
too,  must  not  be  allowed  to  escape  us.' 

Mel.  (  But  do  you  not  recognise  another  danger?    For,      98. 
once  more,  since  you  drive  us  from  the  plea  of  justice  But  will  not 

*  your  policy 

aand  press  upon  us   your  doctrine  of  expediency*,  we  convert  ail 
must  show  you  what   is  for  our  interest,  and,  if  it  be  into  ene- 
for  yours  also,  may  hope  to  convince  you:  —  Will  youmies? 
not  be  making  enemies  of  all  who  are  now  neutrals? 
When  they  see  how  you  are  treating  us  they  will  expect 
you  some  day  to  turn  against  them  ;  and  if  so,  are  you 
not  strengthening  the  enemies  whom  you  already  have, 
and  bringing  upon  you  others  who,  if  they  could  help, 
would  never  dream  of  being  your  enemies  at  all  ?' 

Ath.  'We  do  not  consider  our  really  dangerous  ene-      99. 
mies  to  be  any  of  the  peoples  inhabiting  the  mainland  The  neutral 
who,  secure  in  their  freedom,  may  defer  indefinitely  any  the  mSn° 
measures  of  precaution  which  they  take  against  us,  but 
islanders  who,  like  you,  happen  to  be  under  no  control, 
and  all  who  may  be  already  irritated  by  the  necessity  therefore  we 

f       .       .     .  ,  have  no- 

of  submission  to  our  empire  —  these  are  our  real  enemies,  thing  to  fear 


for  they  are  the  most  reckless  and  most  likely  to  bring 
themselves  as  well  as  us  into  a  danger  which  they  cannot 

but  foresee.'  our  danger. 

Mel.  '  Surely  then,  if  you  arid  your  subjects  will  brave     IOO. 
all  this  risk,  you  to  preserve  your  empire  and  they  to  be 


quit  of  it,  how  base  and  cowardly  would  it  be  in  us.  who  an^. 

*  subjects  for 

retain  our  freedom,  not  to  do  and  suffer  anything  rather  freedom, 

.1,  ,  ,  shall  we 

than  be  your  slaves.  be  slaves? 

Ath.  'Not  so,  if  you  calmly  reflect  :  for  you  are  not     101. 
fighting  against  equals  to  whom  you  cannot  yield  without  Bardic"0 
disgrace,  but  you  are  taking  counsel  whether  or  no  you  in  yielding 
a  Or,  '  and  insist  upon  our  compliance  with  your  interests.' 
Dd 


402  THE   M  ELI  AN   CONTROVERSY. 

V.       shall  resist  an  overwhelming  force.     The  question  is  not  B.C.  416. 
one  of  honour  but  of  prudence.' 

102.  Mel.  '  But  we  know  that  the  fortune  of  war  is  some- 
SaVfortune  times  impartial,  and  not  always  on  the  side  of  numbers. 
may  be-      If  we  yield  now.  all  is  over  ;  but  if  we  fight,  there  is  yet 

friend  us. 

a  hope  that  we  may  stand  upright. 

103.  Ath.  '  Hope  is  a  good  comforter  in  the  hour  of  danger, 
Hope  is  a    and  when  men  have  something  else  to  depend  upon,  al- 
ceiver  ;  and  though  hurtful,  she  is  not  ruinous.    But  when  her  spend- 
tectecfwhen  thrift  nature  has  induced  them  to  stake  their  all,  a  they 


aireadre  see  ^er  as  s^e  *s  *n  t^le  moment  of  their  fall,  and  not 
mined.  till  then.  While  the  knowledge  of  her  might  enable 
them  to  be  ware  of  her,  she  never  fails  a.  You  are  weak 
and  a  single  turn  of  the  scale  might  be  your  ruin.  Do 
not  you  be  thus  deluded  ;  avoid  the  error  of  which  so 
many  are  guilty,  who,  although  they  might  still  be  saved 
if  they  would  take  the  natural  means,  when  visible 
grounds  of  confidence  forsake  them,  have  recourse  to 
the  invisible,  to  prophecies  and  oracles  and  the  like, 
which  ruin  men  by  the  hopes  which  they  inspire  in 
them/ 

104.  Mel.  'We  know  only  too  well  how  hard  the  struggle 
Heaven  will  must  be  against  your  power,  and  against  fortune,  if  she 

protect  the  * 

right  and     does  not  mean  to  be  impartial.     Nevertheless  we  do  not 

daemonians  despair  of  fortune  ;  for  we  hope  to  stand  as  high  as  you 

will  succour  jn  fae  favour  of  heaven,  because  we  are  righteous,  and 

you  against  whom  we  contend  are  unrighteous  ;  and  we 

are  satisfied  that  our  deficiency  in  power  will  be  com- 

pensated by  the  aid  of  our  allies  the  Lacedaemonians  ; 

they  cannot  refuse  to  help  us,  if  only  because  we  are 

their  kinsmen,  and  for   the  sake  of  their  own  honour. 

And  therefore  our  confidence  is  not  so  utterly  blind  as 

you  suppose.' 

105.  Ath.  'As  for  the  Gods,  we  expect  to  have  quite  as 
That  the     much  of  their  favour  as  you  :  for  we  are  not  doing  or 

stronger  . 

a  Or,  '  they  see  her  as  she  is  in  the  moment  of  their  fall  ;  and 
afterwards,  when  she  is  known  and  they  might  be  ware  of  her,  she 
leaves  them  nothing  worth  saving.' 


THE   M  ELI  AN   CONTROVERSY.  403 

B.C.  416.  claiming  anything  which  goes  beyond  common  opinion       V. 
'9I'     about  divine  or  men's  desires  about  human  things.     For  should  rule 

over  the 

of  the  Gods  we  believe,  and  of  men  we  know,  that  by  a  weaker  is  a 
law  of  their  nature  wherever  they  can  rule  they  will.  Simmon  to 


This  law  was  not  made  by  us,  and  we  are  not  the  first 
who  have  acted  upon  it  ;  we  did  but  inherit  it,  and  shall 
bequeath  it  to  all  time,  and  we  know  that  you  and  all  are  as  likely 

.  .     .    .  -  .  .     .  to  favour  us 

mankind,  if  you  were  as  strong  as  we  are,  would  do  as  as  you. 
we  do.     So  much  for  the  Gods  ;  we  have  told  you  why  Lacedae- 
we  expect  to  stand  as  high  in  their  good  opinion  as  you.  JJJJJj^j 
And  then  as  to  the  Lacedaemonians  —  when  you  imagine  their  in- 
that  out  of  very  shame  they  will  assist  you,  we  admire 
the  simplicity  of  your  idea,  but  we  do  not  envy  you 
the  folly  of  it.     The  Lacedaemonians  are  exceedingly 
virtuous  among  themselves,  and  according  to  their  na- 
tional standard  of  morality*.     But,  in  respect  of  their 
dealings  with  others,  although   many  things  might   be 
said,  a  word  is  enough  to  describe  them,  —  of  all  men 
whom  we  know  they  are  the  most  notorious  for  identify- 
ing what  is  pleasant  with  what  is  honourable,  and  what 
is  expedient  with  what  is  just.     But  how  inconsistent 
is    such  a  character  with   your   present   blind   hope  of 
deliverance!' 

Mel.  'That  is  the  very  reason  why  we  trust  them;     106. 
they  will  look  to  their  interest,  and  therefore  will  not  But  their 
be  willing  to  betray  the  Melians,  who  are   their  own  induce  them 
colonists,  lest  they  should  be  distrusted  by  their  friends  to  assist  us- 
in  Hellas  and  play  into  the  hands  of  their  enemies.' 

Ath.  '  But  do  you  not  see  that  the  path  of  expediency     107. 
is  safe,  whereas  justice  and  honour  involve  danger  in  Not  when 
practice,  and  such  dangers  the  Lacedaemonians  seldom  danger.  an 
care  to  face?' 

Mel.  '  On  the  other  hand,  we  think  that  whatever  perils     1  08. 
there  may  be,  they  will  be  ready  to  face  them  for  our  But  they 
sakes,  and  will  consider  danger  less  dangerous  where  our  aid,  and 
we  are  concerned.     For  b  if  they  need  our  aid  b  we  are  kinsmen.0™ 


a  Cp.  i.  68  init.  b  Or,  c  when  we  need  their  aid.' 

D  d  3 


404  THE  MELT  AN   CONTROVERSY. 

V.       close  at  hand,  and  they  can  better  trust  our  loyal  feeling  B.C.  416. 

because  we  are  their  kinsmen.' 

109.         Ath.  'Yes,  but  what  encourages  men  who  are  invited 
The  aid       to  jom  m  a  conflict  is  clearly  not  the  good-will  of  those 

which  you  J  / 

can  give  is   who  summon  them  to  their  side,  but  a  decided  supe- 
dent  to       riority  in  real  power.     To  this  no  men  look  more  keenly 


than  the  Lacedaemonians  ;  so  little  confidence  have  they 

dou?  sakes  in  t^ie^r  own  resources>  that  they  only  attack  their  neigh- 
Theywiii  bours  when  they  have  numerous  allies,  and  therefore 
alone  to  an  they  are  not  likely  to  find  their  way  by  themselves  to 

an  island,  when  we  are  masters  of  the  sea/ 
I  IO.  Mel.  'But  they  may  send  their  allies  :  the  Cretan  sea 
Their  ships  is  a  large  place  ;  and  the  masters  of  the  sea  will  have 
their  way  to  more  difficulty  in  overtaking  vessels  which  want  to 
maytan6-7  escape  than  the  pursued  in  escaping.  If  the  attempt 
vadeAttica  s^ou^  ^  they  mav  mvade  Attica  itself,  and  find  their 
and  draw  way  to  allies  of  yours  whom  Brasidas  did  not  reach  : 
ames.y01  and  then  you  will  have  to  fight,  not  for  the  conquest 

of  a  land  in  which  you   have  no  concern,  but   nearer 

home,  for  the  preservation  of  your  confederacy  and  of 

your  own  territory.' 

III.         Ath.  'Help  may  come  from  Lacedaemon  to  you    as 
Wait  and     it  has  come  to  others,  and  should  you  ever  have  actual 

you  will  see. 

Nothing      experience  of  it,  then  you  will  know  that  never  once 


the  ^ave  the  Athenians  retired  from  a  siege  through  fear 
?bu  are  de-  °^  a  foe  elsewhere.     You  told  us  that  the  safety  of  your 
ludedbya    city  would  be  your  first  care,  but  we  remark  that,  in 
of  honour,    this  long  discussion,  not  a  word   has  been   uttered  by 
again!         you  which  would  give  a  reasonable  man  expectation  of 
deliverance.    Your  strongest  grounds  are  hopes  deferred, 
and  what  power  you  have  is  not  to  be  compared  with 
that  which  is  already  arrayed  against  you.     Unless  after 
we  have  withdrawn  you  mean  to  come,  as  even  now 
you  may,  to  a  wiser  conclusion,  you  are  showing  a  great 
want  of  sense.     For  surely  you  cannot  dream  of  flying 
to  that  false  sense  of  honour  which  has  been  the  ruin 
of  so  many  when  danger  and   dishonour  were  staring 
them  in  the  face.     Many  men  with  their  eyes  still  open 


ANSWER    OF  THE    MELIANS.  405 

B.C.  416.  to  the  consequences  have  found  the  word  "honour"  too  V. 
much  for  them,  and  have  suffered  a  mere  name  to  lure 
them  on,  until  it  has  drawn  down  upon  them  real  and 
irretrievable  calamities ;  through  their  own  folly  they 
have  incurred  a  worse  dishonour  than  fortune  would 
have  inflicted  upon  them.  If  you  are  wise  you  will 
not  run  this  risk ;  you  ought  to  see  that  there  can  be 
no  disgrace  in  yielding  to  a  great  city  which  invites  you 
to  become  her  ally  on  reasonable  terms,  keeping  your 
own  land,  and  merely  paying  tribute ;  and  that  you  will 
certainly  gain  no  honour  if,  having  to  choose  between 
two  alternatives,  safety  and  war,  you  obstinately  prefer 
the  worse.  To  maintain  our  rights  against  equals,  to 
be  politic  with  superiors,  and  to  be  moderate  towards 
inferiors  is  the  path  of  safety.  Reflect  once  more  when 
we  have  withdrawn,  and  say  to  yourselves  over  and  over 
again  that  you  are  deliberating  about  your  one  and  only 
country,  which  may  be  saved  or  may  be  destroyed  by 
a  single  decision.' 

The  Athenians  left  the  conference  :  the  Melians,  after     112. 
consulting  among  themselves,  resolved  to  persevere  in  The 
their  refusal,  and   made  answer  as  follows  : — '  Men  of  refuse  to 
Athens,  our  resolution  is  unchanged ;   and  we  will  not  yield* 
in   a   moment    surrender   that    liberty   which  our   city, 
founded  seven  hundred  years  ago,  still  enjoys ;  we  will 
trust   to  the  good-fortune  which,  by  the  favour  of  the 
Gods,  has  hitherto  preserved  us,  and  for  human  help  to 
the  Lacedaemonians,  and  endeavour  to  save  ourselves. 
We   are   ready   however   to   be   your   friends,  and   the 
enemies  neither  of  you  nor  of  the  Lacedaemonians,  and 
we  ask  you  to  leave  our  country  when  you  have  made 
such  a  peace  as   may  appear  to  be  in  the  interest  of 
both  parties.' 

Such  was  the  answer  of  the  Melians ;  the  Athenians,      113. 
as  they  quitted  the  conference,  spoke  as  follows: — 'Well,  Last  words 
we  must  say,  judging  from  the  decision  at  which  you  Athenians, 
have  arrived,  that  you  are  the  only  men  who  deem  the 
future  to  be  more  certain  than  the  present,  and  regard 


406  SIEGE    OF  MELOS. 

V.       things  unseen  as  already  realised  in  your  fond  anticipa-  B.C.  416. 
tion,  and  that  the  more  you  cast  yourselves  upon  the 
Lacedaemonians  and  fortune,  and  hope,  and  trust  them, 
the  more  complete  will  be  your  ruin.' 

114-         The  Athenian  envoys  returned  to  the  army;  and  the 

Athenians    genera^s5  when  they  found  that  the  Melians  would  not 

blockade     yield,   immediately  commenced  hostilities.     They  sur- 

rounded the  town  of  Melos  with  a  wall,  dividing  the 

work  among  the  several  contingents.     They  then  left 

troops  of  their  own  and  of  their  allies  to  keep  guard  both 

by  land  and  by  sea,  and  retired  with  the  greater  part  of 

their  army;  the  remainder  carried  on  the  blockade. 

115.  About  the  same  time  the  Argives  made  an  inroad  into 
Inroad  of    Phliasia,  and  lost  nearly  eighty  men,  who  were  caught  in 
Phiiasia.      an  ambuscade  by  the  Phliasians  and  the  Argive  exiles. 
at  pykM?8    The  Athenian  garrison  in  Pylos  took  much  spoil  from 
Stween      ^e   Lacedaemonians  ;    nevertheless  the  latter   did    not 
Athens  and  renounce  the  peace  and   go   to  war,  but  only  notified 

Corinth.  &  J 

Check  of  by  a  proclamation  that  if  any  one  of  their  own  people 
before  had  a  mind  to  make  reprisals  on  the  Athenians  he 
might.  The  Corinthians  next  declared  war  upon  the 
Athenians  on  some  private  grounds,  but  the  rest  of  the 
Peloponnesians  did  not  join  them.  The  Melians  took 
that  part  of  the  Athenian  wall  which  looked  towards  the 
agora  by  a  night  assault,  killed  a  few  men,  and  brought 
in  as  much  corn  and  other  necessaries  as  they  could  ; 
they  then  retreated  and  remained  inactive.  After  this 
the  Athenians  set  a  better  watch.  So  the  summer 
ended. 

116.  In    the  following   winter    the    Lacedaemonians    had 
The  Lace-    intended  to  make  an  expedition  into  the  Argive  terri- 
intending     tory,  but  finding  that  the  sacrifices  which  they  offered 

at  the  frontier  were  unfavourable  a  they  returned  home. 
Argives,   suspecting  that  the  threatened  invasion 


thesacri-     was  instigated   by  citizens  of  their   own,  apprehended 
some  of  them  ;   others  however  escaped. 

About    the    same    time    the    Melians    took    another 
a  Cp.  v.  54,  55. 


SURRENDER    OF  MELOS.  407 

B.C.  416.  part  of  the  Athenian  wall ;    for  the  fortifications  were       V. 

insufficiently  guarded.     Whereupon  the  Athenians  sent  Meios taken 
fresh  troops,  under  the  command  of  Philocrates  the  son  male  m- 
of  Demeas.     The  place  was  now  closely  invested,  and  put^o^ 
there  was  treachery  among  the  citizens  themselves.     So  death-     J 
the  Melians  were   induced   to   surrender   at   discretion. 
The  Athenians  thereupon  put  to  death  all  who  were  of 
military  age,  and  made  slaves  of  the  women  and  children. 
They  then   colonised   the   island,    sending  thither  five 
hundred  settlers  of  their  own. 


BOOK    VI. 


VI.   I.       DURING  the  same  winter  the  Athenians  conceived  a  B.C.  416. 
TheAthe-    desire  of  sending   another  expedition  to  Sicily,  larger 
norantof     than   that   commanded   by   Laches    and    Eurymedona. 
feseourceasnof  They  hoped  to  conquer  the  island.    Of  its  great  size  and 
the  island,    numerous   population,   barbarian    as   well   as   Hellenic, 

determine 

to  send  a  most  of  them  knew  nothing,  and  they  never  reflected 
ditSnlto*5"  that  they  were  entering  on  a  struggle  almost  as  arduous 
as  the  Peloponnesian  War.  The  voyage  in  a  merchant- 
vessel  round  Sicily  takes  up  nearly  eight  days,  and  this 
great  island  is  all  but  a  part  of  the  mainland,  being 
divided  from  it  by  a  seg^not  much  more  than  two  miles 
in  width. 

2.  I  will  now  describe  the  original  settlement  of  Sicily, 

Thucydides  and  enumerate  the  nations  which  it  contained.  Oldest 
thetacesby  of  all  were  (i)  the  Cyclopes  and  Laestrygones,  who  are 
said  to  have  dwelt  in  a  district  of  the  island  ;  but  who 
*key  were,  whence  they  came,  or  whither  they  went,  I 
mythical  cannot  tell.  We  must  be  content  with  the  legends  of 
and  Lae-  the  poets,  and  every  one  must  be  left  to  form  his  own 
^rhe65'  opinion.  (2)  The  Sicanians  appear  to  have  succeeded 
frornlTain  tnese  ear^y  races,  although  according  to  their  own  ac- 
saidtobe  count  they  were  still  older;  for  they  profess  to  have 
thons.  been  children  of  the  soil.  But  the  fact  is  that  they  were 


was 


Iberians,   and   were   driven  from  the   river    Sicanus  in 
Phodansme  ^er^a  ^7  tne  Ligurians.     Sicily,  which  was  originally 

a  Cp.  iii.  115. 


THE    RACES  AND    CITIES    OF  SICILY.       409 

called  Trinacria,  received  from  them  the  name  Sicania.       VI. 
To  this  day  the  Sicanians  inhabit  the  western  parts  o 


the  island.     (3)  After  the  capture  of  Troy,  some  Trojans  after  the  fall 

A  •  of  Troy. 

who  had  escaped  from  the  Achaeans  came  in  ships  to  5.  The 
Sicily;  they  settled  near  the  Sicanians,  and  both  took  i^  from 
the  name  of  Elymi.  The  Elymi  had  two  cities,  Eryx  ph™e_ 
and  Egesta.  (4)  These  were  joined  by  certain  Phocians,  dans. 
who  had  also  fought  at  Troy,  and  were  driven  by  a  storm 
first  to  Libya  and  thence  to  Sicily.  (5)  The  Sicels  were 
originally  inhabitants  of  Italy,  whence  they  were  driven 
by  the  Opici,  and  passed  over  into  Sicily;  —  according  to 
a  probable  tradition  they  crossed  upon  rafts,  taking 
advantage  of  the  wind  blowing  from  the  land,  but  they 
may  have  found  other  ways  of  effecting  a  passage  ;  there 
are  Sicels  still  in  Italy,  and  the  country  itself  was  so 
called  from  Italus  a  Sicel  king.  They  entered  Sicily 
with  a  large  army,  and  defeating  the  Sicanians  in  battle, 
drove  them  back  to  the  southern  and  western  parts  of 
the  country;  from  them  the  island,  formerly  Sicania, 
took  the  name  of  Sicily.  For  nearly  three  hundred  years 
after  their  arrival  until  the  time  when  the  Hellenes  came 
to  Sicily  they  occupied  the  most  fertile  districts,  and 
they  still  inhabit  the  central  and  southern  regions.  (6) 
The  Phoenicians  at  one  time  had  settlements  all  round 
the  island.  They  fortified  headlands  on  the  sea-coast, 
and  settled  in  the  small  islands  adjacent,  for  the  sake  of 
trading  with  the  Sicels  ;  but  when  the  Hellenes  began 
to  find  their  way  by  sea  to  Sicily  in  greater  numbers 
they  withdrew  from  the  larger  part  of  the  island,  and 
forming  a  union  established  themselves  in  Motya,  Soloeis, 
and  Panormus,  in  the  neighbourhood  of  the  Elymi,  partly 
trusting  to  their  alliance  with  them,  and  partly  because 
this  is  the  point  at  which  the  passage  from  Carthage  to 
Sicily  is  shortest.  Such  were  the  Barbarian  nations  who 
inhabited  Sicily,  and  these  were  their  settlements. 

(7)  The  first  Hellenic  colonists  sailed  from  Chalcis  in  3. 
Euboea  under  the  leadership  of  Thucles,  and  founded  7-  The 
Naxos  ;  there  they  erected  an  altar  in  honour  of  Apollo  colonies0  :— 


410  THE    CITIES    OF  SICILY. 

VI.      the  Founder,  a  which  is  still  standing  without  the  citya, 
n(^  on  ^s  altar  religious  embassies  sacrifice  before  they 
cis:  about    sail  from  Sicily.     (8)  In  the  following  year  Archias,  one 
[Ifsyra-     of  the   Heraclidae,   came   from    Corinth   and    founded 
Syracuse,  first  driving  the  Sicels  out  of  the  island  of 
734R  c       Ortygia  ;  and  there  the  inner  city,  no  longer  surrounded 
(3)Leontini,  by  the  sea,  now  stands  b  ;  in  process  of  time  the  outer 
and  (4)  c'a-  city  was  included  within  the  walls  and  became  populous. 
Naxosfr°m   (9)  In  the  fifth  year  after  the  foundation  of  Syracuse 
Thucles  and  the  Chalcidians  went  forth  from  Naxos,  and 
driving  out  the  Sicels  by  force   of  arms,  founded  first 
Leontini,  then  Catana.     The  Catanaeans  however  chose 
a  founder  of  their  own,  named  Evarchus. 

4.  (10)  About  the  same  time  Lamis  came  from  Megara 

(sjTrotiius,  bringing  a  colony  to  Sicily,  where  he  occupied  a  place 
sus,  and  called  Trotilus,  upon  the  river  Pantacyas  ;  but  he  soon 
Hybiaean  afterwards  joined  the  settlement  of  the  Chalcidians  at 


Leontini  ;  with  them  he  dwelt  a  short  time,  until  he  was 
driven  out  ;  he  then  founded  Thapsus,  where  he  died. 
728  B.C.  His  followers  quitted  Thapsus  and  founded  the  city 
which  is  called  the  Hybiaean  Megara  ;  Hyblon,  a  Sicel 
km£>  had  betrayed  the  place  to  them  and  guided  them 


Geia*  thitfler-     There  they  remained  two  hundred  and  forty- 

from  five  years,  and  were  then  driven  out  of  their  town  and 

and  c^ete,  land  by  Gelo  the  tyrant  of  Syracuse  ;    but  before  they 

fi?)  Agri-  were  driven  out,  and  a  hundred  years  after   their  own 

gentum  foundation,  they  sent  out  Pamillus  and  founded  Selinus  ; 

from  Gela,  * 

582  B.C.      he  had  come  from  Megara,  their  own  mother  state,  to  take 

orMessenfe,  part  in  the  new  colony.    (11)  In  the  forty-fifth  year  after 

from  Cym6.  the  founcjation  of  Syracuse,  Antiphemus  of  Rhodes  and 

Entimus  of  Crete  came  with  their  followers  and  together 

built  Gela.     The  city  was  named  from  the  river  Gela, 

but  the  spot  which  is  now  the  Acropolis  and  was  first 

fortified  is  called   Lindii.     The  institutions  of  the  new 

settlement  were  Dorian.     Exactly  a  hundred  and  eight 

years   after   their   own    foundation    the    inhabitants   of 

a  Or,  {  which  is  now  outside  the  city.' 

b  Reading  TrepifcXv^ofieV?;  with  all  the  MSS. 


THE    CITIES    OF  SICILY.  411 

Gela  founded  Agrigentum,  which  they  named  from  the       VI. 
river  Acragas  ;   they  appointed  Aristonous  and  Pystilus 
founders  of  the  place,  and  gave  to  it  their  own  institutions. 

(12)  Zancle   was   originally   colonised    by    pirates  who 
came  from  Cyme,  the  Chalcidian  city  in  Opicia ;  these 
were  followed  by  a  large  body  of  colonists  from  Chalcis 
and  the  rest  of  Euboea,  who  shared  in  the  allotment  of 
the  soil.      The  first  settlement  was   led  by  Perieres  of 
Cyme,  the  second  by  Crataemenes  of  Chalcis.     Zancle 
was  the  original  name  of  the  place,  a  name  given  by  the 
Sicels  because  the  site  was  in  shape  like  a  sickle,  for 
which  the  Sicel  word  is  Zanclon.     These  earlier  settlers 
were  afterwards  driven  out  by  the   Samians  and  other 

B.C.  494.  lonians,  who  when  they  fled  from  the  Persians  found 
their  way  to  Sicily*.  Not  long  afterwards  Anaxilas,  the 
tyrant  of  Rhegium,  drove  out  these  Samians.  He  then 
repeopled  their  city  with  a  mixed  multitude,  and  called 
the  place  Messene  after  his  native  country. 

B.C.  648?      Himera   was    colonised    from    Zancle    by    Eucleides.        5. 

OL  33  ^* 

Simus,  and  Sacon.    Most  of  the  settlers  were  Chalcidian,  MHimera, 
but   the    Myletidae,    Syracusan    exiles   who   had   been  (13)  Acrae, 
defeated  in  a  civil  war,  took  part  in  the  colony.     Their  and  (r'4)" 
language  was  a  mixture  of  the  Chalcidian  and   Doric  gff1^6^6' 
dialects,  but  their  institutions  were  mainly  Chalcidian.  from  Syra- 

(13)  Acrae  and  Casmenae  were  founded  by  the  Syracu-  (15)  Cama- 
sans,  Acrae  seventy  years  after  Syracuse,  and  Casmenae  Syracuse? 
nearly  twenty  years  after  Acrae.     Camarina  was  origin-  5"  B>C- 
ally  founded  by  the  Syracusans  exactly  a  hundred  and 
thirty-five  years  after  the  foundation  of  Syracuse ;  the 
founders  were  Dascon  and  Menecolus.     But  the  Cama- 
rinaeans  revolted,  and  as  a  punishment  for  their  revolt 

were  violently   expelled   by  the    Syracusans.     After  a 

B.C.  498-  time  Hippocrates  the  tyrant  of  Gela,  receiving  the  terri- 

01.' 7o,  s-tory  of  Camarina b  as  the  ransom  of  certain  Syracusan 

prisoners,  became  the  second  founder  of  the  place,  which 

he  colonised  anew.     The  inhabitants  were   once   more 

a  Cp.  Herod,  vi.  22,  23.  b  Cp.  Herod,  vii.  154. 


413  MOTIVES    OF   THE  ATHENIANS. 

VI.      driven  out  by  Gelo,  a  who  himself  colonised  the  city  for  B.C.  491 
the  third  time  a.  01/72.  2 

6.  These  were  the  nations,  Hellenic  or  Barbarian,  who  75>  3< 

Ambition     inhabited  Sicily,  and  such  was  the  great  island  on  which  01  Q?16' 

was  the  real  m         J  ' 

motive  of  the  Athenians  were  determined  to  make  war.  They 
expedition)  virtuously  professed  that  they  were  going  to  assist  their 
theA^he1-  own  kinsmen  and  their  newly-acquired  allies  b,  but  the 
nians  found  simple  truth  was  that  they  aspired  to  the  empire  of 

an  occasion  ' 

in  the  war  Sicily.  They  were  principally  instigated  by  an  embassy 
Egestaand  which  had  come  from  Egesta  and  was  urgent  in  re- 
questing  aid.  The  Egestaeans  had  gone  to  war  with  the 


taean  neighbouring  city  of  Selinus  about  certain  questions  of 
marriage  and  about  a  disputed  piece  of  land.  The 
Selinuntians  summoned  the  Syracusans  to  their  assist- 
ance, and  their  united  forces  reduced  the  Egestaeans 
to  great  straits  both  by  sea  and  land.  The  Egestaean 
envoys  reminded  the  Athenians  of  the  alliance  which 
they  had  made  with  the  Leontines  under  Laches  in  the 
former  warc,  and  begged  them  to  send  ships  to  their 
relief.  Their  chief  argument  was,  that  if  the  Syracusans 
were  not  punished  for  the  expulsion  of  the  Leontines, 
but  were  allowed  to  destroy  the  remaining  allies  of  the 
Athenians,  and  to  get  the  whole  of  Sicily  into  their  own 
hands,  they  would  one  day  come  with  a  great  army, 
Dorians  assisting  Dorians,  who  were  their  kinsmen,  and 
colonists  assisting  their  Peloponnesian  founders,  and 
would  unite  in  overthrowing  Athens  herself.  Such  being 
the  danger,  the  Athenians  would  be  wise  in  combining 
with  the  allies  who  were  still  left  to  them  in  Sicily 
against  the  Syracusans,  especially  since  the  Egestaeans 
would  themselves  provide  money  sufficient  for  the  war. 
These  arguments  were  constantly  repeated  in  the  ears  of 
the  Athenian  assembly  by  the  Egestaeans  and  their 
partisans  ;  at  length  the  people  passed  a  vote  that  they 


a  Or,  adopting  the  conjecture  TfXacov  :  '  and  the  city  was  colonised 
for  the  third  time  by  the  inhabitants  of  Gela.'  This  accords  with 
the  statement  of  Diodorus,  xi.  76. 

b  The  Camarinaeans  and  Agrigentines,  v.  4  fin.,  and  some  of  the 
Sicels,  iii.  103  init.,  115  init.  c  Gp.  iii.  86. 


SMALL  WARS  IN  ARGOLIS  AND  MACEDONIA.   413 

B.C.  416.  would  at  all  events  send  envoys  to  ascertain  on  the  spot      VI. 

OL  9I>  whether  the  Egestaeans  really  had  the  money  which  they 
professed  to  have  in  their  treasury  and  in  their  temples, 
and  to  report  on  the  state  of  the  war  with  Selinus.  So 
the  Athenian  envoys  were  despatched  to  Sicily. 

During  the  same  winter  the  Lacedaemonians  and  their        7- 
allies,  all  but  the  Corinthians,  made  an  expedition  into  Jhe  La<?e- 

daemonians 

the  Argive  territory,  of  which  they  devastated  a  small  invade  Ar- 
part,  and,  having  brought  with  them  waggons,  carried  fettle'  at  e> 
away  a  few  loads  of  corn.  They  settled  the  Argive  ^fvaee  the 
exiles  at  Orneae,  where  they  left  a  small  garrison, 


and  having  made  an  agreement  that  the  inhabitants  of  ousiy  at- 

...  111  •    •  15     tacked  by 

Orneae  and  the  Argives  should  not  injure  one  another  s  the  Argive 


land  for  a  given  time,  returned  home  with  the  rest  o 

their  army.    Soon  afterwards  the  Athenians  arrived  with  Athenians, 

J  but  escape. 

thirty  ships  and  six  hundred  hoplites.  They  and  the 
people  of  Argos  with  their  whole  power  went  out  and 
blockaded  Orneae  for  a  day,  but  at  night  the  Argive 
exiles  within  the  walls  got  away  unobserved  by  the 
besiegers,  who  were  encamped  at  some  distance.  On 
the  following  day  the  Argives,  perceiving  what  had  hap- 
pened, razed  Orneae  to  the  ground  and  returned.  Soon 
afterwards  the  Athenian  fleet  returned  likewise. 

The  Athenians  also  conveyed  by  sea  cavalry  of  their  The 
own,  and  some  Macedonian  exiles  who  had  taken  refuge 
with  them,  to  Methone  on  the  borders  of  Macedonia,  Macedonia. 
and  ravaged  the  territory  of  Perdiccas.  Whereupon  the 
Lacedaemonians  sent  to  the  Thracian  Chalcidians,  who 
were  maintaining  an  armistice  terminable  at  ten  days' 
notice  with  the  Athenians,  and  commanded  them  to 
assist  Perdiccas,  but  they  refused.  So  the  winter  ended, 
and  with  it  the  sixteenth  year  in  the  Peloponnesian  War 
of  which  Thucydides  wrote  the  history. 

B.C.  415.      Early  in  the  next  spring  the  Athenian  envoys  returned        8. 
9I>  2>  from  Sicily.    They  were  accompanied  by  Egestaeans  who  The  Athe- 
brought  sixty  talents*  of  uncoined  silver,  being  a  month's 
pay  for  sixty  vessels  which  they  hoped  to  obtain  from 
a  .£14,400. 


414       THE  ATHENIANS   DECIDE   FOR    WAR. 

VI.      Athens.     The  Athenians  called  an  assembly,  and  when  B.C.  415. 
convoke  an  they  heard  both  from  their  own  and  from  the  Egestaean 

assembly, 

which  de-  envoys,  amongst  other  inviting  but  untrue  statements, 
favou^f  that  there  was  abundance  of  money  lying  ready  in  the 
Ata  second  temples  and  in  the  treasury  of  Egesta  a,  they  passed  a 
assembly,  vote  that  sixty  ships  should  be  sent  to  Sicily  ;  Alcibiades 

called  for 

the  purpose  the  son  of  Cleinias,  Nicias  the  son  of  Niceratus,  and  La- 
machus  the  son  of  Xenophanes  were  appointed  com- 
rnanders.  They  were  told  to  assist  Egesta  against  Seli- 

to  deter       nus  .  if  this  did  not  demand  all  their  military  strength 

them  from 

going  to  war  they  were  empowered  to  restore  the  Leontines,  and 
generally  to  further  in  such  manner  as  they  deemed 
best  the  Athenian  interest  in  Sicily.  Five  days  after- 
wards another  assembly  was  called  to  consider  what 
steps  should  be  taken  for  the  immediate  equipment  of 
the  expedition,  and  to  vote  any  additional  supplies 
which  the  generals  might  require.  Nicias,  who  had 
been  appointed  general  against  his  will,  thought  that 
the  people  had  come  to  a  wrong  conclusion,  and  that 
upon  slight  and  flimsy  grounds  they  were  aspiring  to 
the  conquest  of  Sicily,  which  was  no  easy  task.  So, 
being  desirous  of  diverting  the  Athenians  from  their 
purpose,  he  came  forward  and  admonished  them  in  the 
following  terms  :  — 
9.  '  I  know  that  we  are  assembled  here  to  discuss  the 

I  must  say   preparations  which  are   required   for  our  expedition  to 

what  I  be-     *  .    . 

lievetobe  Sicily,  but  in  my  judgment  it  is  still  a  question  whether 
This'war'is  we  ought  to  go  thither  at  all  ;  we  should  not  be  hasty 


*n  determining  a  matter  of  so  much  importance,  or  allow 
timed.  ourselves  to  rush  into  an  impolitic  war  at  the  instigation 
of  foreigners.  Yet  to  me  personally  war  brings  honour  ; 
and  I  am  as  careless  as  any  man  about  my  own  life  : 
not  that  I  think  the  worse  of  a  citizen  who  takes  a  little 
thought  about  his  life  or  his  property,  for  I  believe  that 
the  sense  of  a  man's  own  interest  will  quicken  his  in- 
terest in  the  prosperity  of  the  state.  But  I  have  never 
been  induced  by  the  love  of  reputation  to  say  a  single 
a  Cp.  vi.  46. 


SPEECH   OF  NIC  I  AS.  415 

B.C.  415.  word  contrary  to  what  I  thought  ;  neither  will  I  now  :  I  VI. 
2'  will  say  simply  what  I  believe  to  be  best.  If  I  told  you  to 
take  care  of  what  you  have  and  not  to  throw  away  present 
advantages  in  order  to  gain  an  uncertain  and  distant 
good,  my  words  would  be  powerless  against  a  temper  like 
yours.  I  would  rather  argue  that  this  is  not  the  time, 
and  that  your  great  aims  will  not  be  easily  realised. 

'  I  tell  you  that  in  going  to  Sicily  you  are  leaving       10. 
many  enemies  behind  you,  and   seem   to  be   bent  on  The  state  of 
bringing   new   ones   hither.     You   are   perhaps   relying  in  Hellas  is 
upon  the  treaty  recently  made,  which  if  you  remain  quiet  a 


may  retain  the  name  of  a  treaty;  for  to  a  mere  name  the  faming  of 
intrigues  of  certain  persons  both  here  and  at  Lacedae-  conquests 

.  .         .          -r,        ./-  abroad  we 

mon  have  nearly  succeeded  in  reducing  it.     But  if  you  shall  be 


at 


meet  with  any  serious  reverse,  your  enemies  will  be  upon  enemes 
you  in  a  moment,  for  the  agreement  was  originally  ex- 
tracted  from  them  by  the  pressure  of  misfortune,  and  the  cidians  are 
discredit  of  it  fell  to  them  and  not  to  usa.  In  the  treaty  beiiion. 
itself  there  are  many  disputed  points  ;  and,  unsatisfactory 
as  it  is,  to  this  hour  several  cities,  and  very  powerful 
cities  too,  persist  in  rejecting  it.  Some  of  these  are  at 
open  war  with  us  already  b;  others  may  declare  war  at 
ten  days'  notice0;  and  they  only  remain  at  peace  because 
the  Lacedaemonians  are  indisposed  to  move.  And  in 
all  probability,  if  they  find  our  power  divided  (and  such 
a  division  is  precisely  what  we  are  striving  to  create), 
they  will  eagerly  join  the  Sicilians,  whose  alliance  in  the 
war  they  would  long  ago  have  given  anything  to  obtain. 
These  considerations  should  weigh  with  us.  The  state 
is  far  from  the  desired  haven,  and  we  should  not  run 
into  danger  and  seek  to  gain  a  new  empire  before  we 
have  fully  secured  the  old.  The  Chalcidians  in  Thrace 
have  been  rebels  all  these  years  and  remain  unsubdued, 
and  there  are  other  subjects  of  ours  in  various  parts  of 
the  mainland  who  are  uncertain  in  their  allegiance. 
And  we  forsooth  cannot  lose  a  moment  in  avenging  the 

a  Cp.  v.  46  init.  b  Cp.  v.  115  med. 

c  Cp.  v.  26  med.,  vi.  7  fin. 


416 


SPEECH   OF  NIC1AS. 


VI. 


II. 

Sicily,  even 
if  con- 
quered, 
cannot  be 
retained. 


The  Si- 
cilians, if 
they  were 
united, 
would  not 
help  Sparta 
to  make  war 
upon  you, 
because 
they  would 
fear  that  a 
united  Hel- 
las might 
make  war 
upon  them. 
The  less  an 
enemy  is 
known,  the 
more  he  is 
feared. 
Familiarity 
makes  you 
despise  the 
Lacedae- 
monians, 
but  they 
are  biding 
their  time. 


wrongs  of  our  allies  the  Egestaeans,  while  we  still  defer  B.C.  415. 
the  punishment  of  our  revolted  subjects,  whose  offences 
are  of  long  standing. 

'  And  yet  if  we  subdue  the  Chalcidian  rebels  we  may 
retain  our  hold  on  them  ;  but  Sicily  is  a  populous  and 
distant  country,  over  which,  even  if  we  are  victorious,  we 
shall  hardly  be  able  to  maintain  our  dominion.  And 
how  foolish  is  it  to  select  for  attack  a  land  which  no 
conquest  can  secure,  while  he  who  fails  to  conquer  will 
not  be  where  he  was  before ! 

'  I  should  say  that  the  Sicilians  are  not  dangerous  to 
you, — certainly  not  in  their  present  condition,  and  they 
would  be  even  less  so  if  they  were  to  fall  under  the  sway 
of  the  Syracusans  (and  this  is  the  prospect  with  which 
the  Egestaeans  would  fain  scare  you).  At  present  indi- 
viduals might  cross  the  sea  out  of  friendship  for  the 
Lacedaemonians ;  but  if  the  states  of  Sicily  were  all 
united  in  one  empire  they  would  not  be  likely  to  make 
war  upon  another  empire.  For  whatever  chance  they 
may  have  of  overthrowing  us  if  they  unite  with  the  Pelo- 
ponnesians,  there  will  be  the  same  chance  of  their  being 
overthrown  themselves  if  the  Peloponnesians  and  Athe- 
nians are  ever  united  against  thema.  The  Hellenes  in 
Sicily  will  dread  us  most  if  we  never  come ;  in  a  less 
degree  if  we  display  our  strength  and  speedily  depart ; 
but  if  any  disaster  occur,  they  will  despise  us  and  be 
ready  enough  to  join  the  enemies  who  are  attacking  us 
here.  We  all  know  that  men  have  the  greatest  respect 
for  that  which  is  farthest  off,  and  for  that  of  which  the 
reputation  has  been  least  tested ;  and  this,  Athenians, 
you  may  verify  by  your  own  experience.  There  was  a 
time  when  you  feared  the  Lacedaemonians  and  their 
allies,  but  now  you  have  got  the  better  of  them,  and 
because  your  first  fears  have  not  been  realised  you 
despise  them,  and  even  hope  to  conquer  Sicily.  But 
you  ought  not  to  be  elated  at  the  chance  mishaps  of 
your  enemies ;  before  you  can  be  confident  you  should 
a  Cp.  viii.  46. 


SPEECH   OF  NIC  I  AS.  417 

B.C.  415.  have  gained  the  mastery  over  their  minds  a.  Remember  VI. 
2<  that  the  Lacedaemonians  are  sensitive  to  their  disgrace, 
and  that  their  sole  thought  is  how  they  may  even  yet 
find  a  way  of  inflicting  a  blow  upon  us  which  will  re- 
trieve their  own  character  ;  the  rather  because  they  have 
laboured  so  earnestly  and  so  long  to  win  a  name  for 
valour.  If  we  are  'wise  we  shall  not  trouble  ourselves 
about  the  barbarous  Egestaeans  in  Sicily;  the  real  ques- 
tion is  how  we  can  make  ourselves  secure  against  the 
designs  of  an  insidious  oligarchy. 

'  We  must  remember  also  that  we  have  only  just  re-       12. 
covered  in  some  measure  from  a  great  plague  and  a  We  have 

plenty  of 

great  war,  and  are  beginning  to  make  up  our  losses  in  work  at 

,  T      •  i  i  home,  and 

men  and  money.     It  is  our  duty  to  expend  our  new  had  better 


resources  upon  ourselves  at  home,  and  not  upon  begging 
exiles  who  have  an  interest  in  successful  lies  ;  who  find  to  them- 

selves. 

it  expedient  only  to  contribute  words,  and  let  others 
fight  their  battles  ;  and  who,  if  saved,  prove  ungrateful  ; 
if  they  fail,  as  they  very  likely  may,  only  involve  their 
friends  in  a  common  ruin. 

*  I  dare  say  there  may  be  some  young  man  here  who  Alcibiades 
is  delighted  at  holding  a  command,  and  the  more  so  lo  com°Ung 
because  he  is  too  young  for  his  post  b  ;  and  he,  regarding  ^^pe-011 
only  his  own  interest,  may  recommend  you  to  sail  ;  he  dition  and 

J  he  only 

may  be  one  who  is  much  admired  for  his  stud  of  horses,  wants  to  in- 
and  wants  to  make  something  out  of  his  command  which  taste  for 
will  maintain  him  in  his  extravagance.     But  do  not  you  I^pJbiic 
give  him  the  opportunity  of  indulging  his  own  magnifi-  expense. 
cent  tastes  at  the  expense  of  the  state.     Remember  that 
men  of  this  stamp  impoverish  themselves  and  defraud 
the  public.     An  expedition  to  Sicily  is  a  serious  busi- 
ness, and  not  one  which  a  mere  youth  can  plan  and 
carry  into  execution  off-hand.     The  youth  of  whom  I       13- 
am  speaking  has  summoned  to  his  side  young  men  like  He  has  his 
himself,  whom,  not  without  alarm,  I  see  sitting  by  him  supporters. 

.  _  ,  .       who  rather 

in  this  assembly,  and  I  appeal  against  them  to  you  elder  alarm  me. 

a  Cp.  ii.  87  init.  ;  vi.  72  init. 

b  Omitting  the  comma  after  eWXeu/. 

E  e 


41  8  CHARACTER    OF  ALCIBIADES. 

VI.      citizens.    If  any  of  you  should  be  placed  next  one  of  his  B.C.  4iS. 
suPPorters>  l  would  not  have  him  ashamed,  or  afraid,  of  OL  9I'  2' 


you  with      being  thought  a  coward  if  he  does  not  vote  for  war.    Do 

cowardice, 

but  never  not,  like  them,  entertain  a  desperate  craving  for  things 
Do  not  a  '  out  °f  your  reach  ;  you  know  that  by  prevision  many 
JSidiyT  in  successes  are  gained,  but  few  or  none  by  mere  greed. 
let  the'  On  behalf  of  our  country,  now  orf  the  brink  of  the 

Egestaeans 

fight  their  greatest  danger  which  she  has  ever  known,  I  entreat  you 
s>  to  hold  up  your  hands  against  them.  Do  not  interfere 
with  the  boundaries  which  divide  us  from  Sicily.  I  mean 
the  Ionian  gulf  which  parts  us  if  we  sail  along  the  coast, 
the  Sicilian  sea  if  we  sail  through  the  open  water  ;  these 
are  quite  satisfactory.  The  Sicilians  have  their  own 
country;  let  them  manage  their  own  concerns.  And  let 
the  Egestaeans  in  particular  be  informed  that,  having 
originally  gone  to  war  with  the  Selinuntians  on  their  own 
account,  they  must  make  peace  on  their  own  account. 
Let  us  have  no  more  allies  such  as  ours  have  too  often 
been,  whom  we  are  expected  to  assist  when  they  are  in 
misfortune,  but  to  whom  we  ourselves  when  in  need  may 
look  in  vain. 

14*  'And  you,  Prytanis.  as  you  wish  to  be  a  good  citizen, 

anc*  be^eve  tliat  t^ie  welfare  of  the  state  is  entrusted  to 


not  fear  to   you,  put  my  proposal  to  the  vote,  and  lay  the  question 

bring  before  . 

you  once  once  more  before  the  Athenians.  If  you  hesitate,  re- 
queTtiorfof  member  that  in  the  presence  of  so  many  witnesses  there 
didon  itself  can  ^e  no  Q1163^011  °f  breaking  the  law,  and  that  you  will 

be  the  physician  of  the  state  at  the  critical  moment. 

The  first  duty  of  the  good  magistrate  is  to  do  the  very 

best  which  he  can  for  his  country,  or,  at  least,  to  do  her 

no  harm  which  he  can  avoid/ 

15.  Such  were  the  words  of  Nicias.     Most  of  the  Athe- 

The  Athe-   nians  who  came  forward  to  speak  were  in  favour  of  war, 

mans  refuse 

to  rescind  and  reluctant  to  rescind  the  vote  which  had  been  already 
vote.0"  passed,  although  a  few  took  the  other  side.  The  most 
^rongtyad-  enthusiastic  supporter  of  the  expedition  was  Alcibiades 
vocated  by  the  son  of  Cleinias  ;  he  was  determined  to  oppose  Nicias, 

Alcibiades,  '  . 

who  wants   who  was  always  ins  political  enemy  and  had  just  now 


SPEECH   OF   ALCIBIADES.  419 

B.C.  415.  spoken  of  him  in  disparaging  terms  ;  but  the  desire  to      VI. 
'  command  was  even  a   stronger  motive  with  him.     He  to  &am  an, 

empire  and 

was  hoping  that  he  might  be  the  conqueror  of  Sicily  and  to  pay  his 

.      ,  .  .  own  debts. 

Carthage  ;    and   that    success  would    repair  his   private  Thucydides 
fortunes,  and  gain  him  money  as  well  as  glory.     He  had 


a  great  position  among  the  citizens  and  was  devoted  to         fer  to 
horse-racing  and  other  pleasures  which  outran  his  means,  ruin  the 

...  r  .        .      state.    For 

And  in  the  end  his  wild  courses  went  far  to  rum  the  notwith- 
Athenian  state.  For  the  people  feared  the  extremes  to 
which  he  carried  his  lawless  self-indulgence,  and  the  far- 
reaching  purposes  which  animated  him  in  all  his  actions,  was  not 
They  thought  that  he  was  aiming  at  a  tyranny  and  set  and  the 
themselves  against  him.  And  therefore,  although  his  t£j?warwas 


talents  as  a  military  commander  were  unrivalled,  they 
entrusted  the  administration  of  the  war  to  others,  because  men. 
they  personally  objected  to  his  private  life  ;  and  so  they 
speedily  shipwrecked  the  state.     He  now  came  forward 
and  spoke  as  follows  :  — 

'  I  have  a  better  right  to  command,  men  of  Athens,      1  6. 
than  another  ;  for  as  Nicias   has   attacked   me,   I  must  My  private 
begin  by  praising  myself;  and  I   consider   that    I  amganceis 
worthy.     Those  doings  of  mine  for  which  I  am  so  much  benefit.0 
cried  out  against  are  an  honour  to  myself  and   to   my  ^^fmen 
ancestors,  and  a  solid   advantage   to    my  country.     In  complain 
consequence  of  the  distinguished    manner    in   which    I  looked 
represented  the  state  at    Olympia,  the  other  Hellenes  by%theUfor-n 
formed  an  idea  of  our  power  which  even  exceeded  the  ^o^the 
reality,  although  they  had  previously  imagined  that  we  look  down 
were   exhausted  by  war.     I   sent   into   the    lists   seven  unfortunate 
chariots,  —  no  other   private  man  ever  did  the  like  ;    I  Great  men' 
was  victor,  and  also  won  the  second  and  fourth  prize  ;  ^biilons1 
and  I  ordered  everything  in  a  style  worthy  of  my  victory.  but  .their 
The  general  sentiment  honours  such  magnificence  ;  and  notacknow- 
the  energy  which  is  shown  by  it  creates  an  impression  of  during  their 
power.     At  home,  again,  whenever  I  gain  eclat  by  pro-  The  foolish 
viding  choruses  or  by  the  performance  of  some  other  .youth  gain- 
public  duty,  although  the  citizens  are  naturally  jealous  the  Argive 

r  ,  ._  alliance. 

of  me,  to  strangers  these  acts  of  munificence  are  a  new 

E  e  2, 


420  SPEECH   OF  ALCIBIADES. 

VI.  argument  of  our  strength.  There  is  some  use  in  the  B.C.  415. 
folly  of  a  man  who  at  his  own  cost  benefits  not  only 
himself,  but  the  state.  And  where  is  the  injustice,  if  I 
or  any  one  who  feels  his  own  superiority  to  another  re- 
fuses to  be  on  a  level  with  him  ?  The  unfortunate  keep 
their  misfortunes  to  themselves.  We  do  not  expect  to  be 
recognised  by  our  acquaintance  when  we  are  down  in  the 
world ;  and  on  the  same  principle  why  should  any  one 
complain  when  treated  with  disdain  by  the  more  fortu- 
nate? He  who  would  have  proper  respect  shown  to  him 
should  himself  show  it  towards  others.  I  know  that  men 
of  this  lofty  spirit,  and  all  who  have  been  in  any  way 
illustrious,  are  hated  while  they  are  alive,  by  their  equals 
especially,  and  in  a  lesser  degree  by  others  who  have  to 
do  with  them  ;  but  that  they  leave  behind  them  to  after- 
ages  a  reputation  which  leads  even  those  who  are  not  of 
their  family  to  claim  kindred  with  them,  and  that  they 
are  the  glory  of  their  country,  which  regards  them,  not  as 
aliens  or  as  evil-doers,  but  as  her  own  children,  of  whose 
character  she  is  proud.  These  are  my  own  aspirations, 
and  this  is  the  reason  why  my  private  life  is  assailed  ; 
but  let  me  ask  you,  whether  in  the  management  of 
public  affairs  any  man  surpasses  me.  Did  I  not,  with- 
out involving  you  in  any  great  danger  or  expense, 
combine  the  most  powerful  states  of  Peloponnesus 
against  the  Lacedaemonians,  whom  I  compelled  to  stake 
at  Mantinea  all  that  they  had  upon  the  fortune  of  one 
day  ?  and  even  to  this  hour,  although  they  were  victo- 
rious in  the  battle,  they  have  hardly  recovered  courage. 

1 7.  '  These  were  the  achievements  of  my  youth,  and  of 

And  now     what  is  supposed  to  be  my  monstrous  folly ;  thus  did  I 

abide  by  ^  ^  J  J 

your  in-      by  winning  words  conciliate  the  Peloponnesian  powers, 
ThereVs      and  my  heartiness  made  them  believe  in  me  and  follow 

fe°arhing  tO   me-     And  now  do  not  be  afraid  a  of>  m?  because  I  am 
Sicily.         young,  but  while  I  am  in  the  flower  of  my  days  and 

The  Sici-       '       ,  °  J 

liansarea    Nicias  enjoys  the  reputation  of  success,  use  the  services 
a  Adopting  the  conjecture  TreQoprja-df,  and  placing  a  full  stop  after 


SPEECH   OF  ALCIBIADES.  42,1 

B.C.  415.  of  us  both.     Having  determined  to  sail,  do  not  change      VI. 

Ol.   QI     2. 

your  minds  under  the  impression  that  Sicily  is  a  great  ™ixed  ™u 

power.     For  although  the  Sicilian  cities  are  populous,  provided 

their  inhabitants  are  a  mixed  multitude,  and  they  readily 

give  up  old  forms  of  government  and  receive  new  ones 

from  without.     No  one  really  feels  that  he  has  a  city  of  barians  wil1 

assist  us. 

his  own  ;  and  so  the  individual  is  ill-provided  with  arms,  At  home 
and  the  country  has  no  regular  means  of  defence.     A  morTthan 


man  looks  only  to  what  he  can  win  from  the  common 
stock  by  arts  of  speech  or  by  party  violence ;  hoping,  if  ponnesians. 
he  is  overthrown,  at  any  rate  to  carry  off  his  prize  and 
enjoy  it  elsewhere.  They  are  a  motley  crew,  who  are 
never  of  one  mind  in  counsel,  and  are  incapable  of  any 
concert  in  action.  Every  man  is  for  himself,  and  will 
readily  come  over  to  any  one  who  makes  an  attractive 
offer  ;  the  more  readily  if,  as  report  says,  they  are  in  a 
state  of  revolution.  They  boast  of  their  hoplites,  but,  as 
has  proved  to  be  the  case  in  all  Hellenic  states,  the 
number  of  them  is  grossly  exaggerated.  Hellas  has 
been  singularly  mistaken  about  her  heavy  infantry;  and 
even  in  this  war  it  was  as  much  as  she  could  do  to 
collect  enough  of  them.  The  obstacles  then  which  will 
meet  us  in  Sicily,  judging  of  them  from  the  information 
which  I  have  received,  are  not  great ;  indeed,  I  have 
overrated  them,  for  there  will  be  many  barbarians  who, 
through  fear  of  the  Syracusans,  will  join  us  in  attacking 
thema.  And  at  home  there  is  nothing  which,  viewed 
rightly,  need  interfere  with  the  expedition.  Our  fore- 
fathers had  the  same  enemies  whom  we  are  now  told 
that  we  are  leaving  behind  us,  and  the  Persian  besides ; 
but  their  strength  lay  in  the  greatness  of  their  navy,  and 
by  that  and  that  alone  they  gained  their  empire.  Never 
were  the  Peloponnesians  more  hopeless  of  success  than  at 
the  present  moment ;  and  let  them  be  ever  so  confident, 
they  can  only  invade  us  by  land,  which  they  will  equally 
do  whether  we  go  to  Sicily  or  not.  But  on  the  sea  they 

a  Cp.  vi.  88  ink.,  98  init.,  103  med. 


422  SPEECH    OF   ALCIDIADES. 

VI.      cannot   hurt    us,  for  we  shall   leave  behind  us  a  navy  B.C.  415. 

equal  to  theirs. 

1  8.  '  What  reason  can  we  give  to  ourselves  for  hesitation  ? 

why  then    what    excuse    can  we  make  to  our  allies  for   denying 

Tip^itfitp  ? 

For  an  them  aid  ?  We  have  sworn  to  them,  and  have  no  right 
to  argue  that  they  never  assisted  us  a.  In  seeking  their 
alliance  we  did  not  intend  that  they  should  come  and 


is  to  attack,  help  us  here,  but  that  they  should  harass  our  enemies 

We  cannot    .       ~.   .. 

lose,  and  m  Sicily,  and  prevent  them  from  coming  hither.     Like 

probably  all  other  imperial  powers,  we  have  acquired  our  dominion 

masters  of  ^7  our  reacn'ness  to  assist  any  one,  whether  Barbarian  or 

Hellas.  Hellene,  who  may  have  invoked  our  aid.     If  we  are  all 

Let  young 

and  old  act  to  sit  and  do  nothing,  or  to  draw  distinctions  of  race 
when  our  help  is  requested,  we  shall  add  little  to  our 
empire>  and  run  a  great  risk  of  losing  it  altogether.  For 

from  want    mankind  do  not  await  the  attack  of  a  superior  power, 

of  energy.  .  . 

they  anticipate  it.  We  cannot  cut  down  an  empire  as 
we  might  a  household  ;  but  having  once  gained  our 
present  position,  we  must  keep  a  firm  hold  upon  some, 
and  contrive  occasion  against  others  ;  for  if  we  are  not 
rulers  we  shall  be  subjects.  You  cannot  afford  to  regard 
inaction  in  the  same  light  as  others  might,  unless  you 
impose  a  corresponding  restriction  on  your  policy. 
Convinced  then  that  we  shall  be  most  likely  to  in- 
crease our  power  here  if  we  attack  our  enemies  there, 
let  us  sail.  We  shall  humble  the  pride  of  the  Pelopon- 
nesians  when  they  see  that,  scorning  the  delights  of 
repose,  we  have  attacked  Sicily.  By  the  help  of  our 
acquisitions  there,  we  shall  probably  become  masters  of 
all  Hellas  ;  at  any  rate  we  shall  injure  the  Syracusans, 
and  at  the  same  time  benefit  ourselves  and  our  allies. 
Whether  we  succeed  and  remain  or  depart,  in  either 
case  our  navy  will  ensure  our  safety;  for  at  sea  we  shall 
be  more  than  a  match  for  all  Sicily.  Nicias  must  not 
divert  you  from  your  purpose  by  preaching  indolence, 
and  by  trying  to  set  the  young  against  the  old  ;  rather 
in  your  accustomed  order,  old  and  young  taking  counsel 
a  Cp.  iv.  61  med. 


SECOND    SPEECH   OF   NICIAS,  423 

B.c.  415.  together,  after  the  manner  of  your  fathers  who  raised  VI. 
2>  Athens  to  this  height  of  greatness,  strive  to  rise  yet 
higher.  Consider  that  youth  and  age  have  no  power 
unless  united  ;  but  that  the  lighter  and  the  more  exact 
and  the  middle  sort  of  judgment,  when  duly  attempered, 
are  likely  to  be  most  efficient.  The  state,  if  at  rest,  like 
everything  else  will  wear  herself  out  by  internal  friction. 
Every  pursuit  which  requires  skill  will  bear  the  impress 
of  decay,  whereas  by  conflict  fresh  experience  is  always 
being  gained,  and  the  city  learns  to  defend  herself,  not 
in  theory,  but  in  practice.  My  opinion  in  short  is,  that 
a  state  used  to  activity  will  quickly  be  ruined  by  the 
change  to  inaction;  and  that  they  of  all  men  enjoy  the 
greatest  security  who  are  truest  to  themselves  and  their 
institutions  even  when  they  are  not  the  best.' 

Such  were  the  words  of  Alcibiades.     After  hearing      19. 
him  and   the  Egestaeans  and  certain    Leontine   exiles The  people 

are  bent  on 

who  came  forward  and  earnestly  entreated  assistance,  war : 
reminding  the  Athenians  of  the  oaths  which  they  had 
sworn  a,  the  people  were  more  than  ever  resolved  upon 
war.     Nicias,  seeing   that   his   old   argument  would  no  required. 
longer  deter  them,   but  that  he   might  possibly  change 
their  minds  if  he  insisted  on  the  magnitude  of  the  force 
which  would  be  required,  came  forward  again  and  spoke 
as  follows  : — 

'  Men  of  Athens,  as  I  see  that  you  are  thoroughly       20. 
determined  to   go  to  war,  I   accept   the   decision,  and  The  Hei- 
will  advise  you  accordingly,  trusting  that  the  event  will  in  Sicily  are 
be  such  as  we  all  wish.     The  cities  which  we  are  about 
to  attack  are,  I  am  informed,  powerful,  and  independent 
of  one  another ;  they  are  not  inhabited  by  slaves,  who  hopiitesand 
would  gladly  pass  out  of  a  harder  into  an  easier  con- 
dition of  life  ;  and  they  are  very  unlikely  to  accept  our 
rule  in  exchange  for  their  present  liberty  b.     As  regards 
numbers,  although  Sicily  is  but  one  island,  it  contains 
a  great   many  Hellenic   states.     Not   including  Naxos 
and  Catana  (of  which  the  inhabitants,  as  I  hope,  will  be 
a  Cp.  iii.  86.  b  Cp.  vii.  55  fin. 


424  SECOND    SPEECH    OF  NICIAS. 

VI.  our  allies  because  they  are  the  kinsmen  of  the  Leontines),  B.C.  415. 
there  are  seven  other  cities  fully  provided  with  means 
of  warfare  similar  to  our  own,  especially  Selinus  and 
Syracuse,  the  cities  against  which  our  expedition  is 
particularly  directed.  For  they  have  numerous  hoplites, 
archers,  and  javelin-men,  and  they  have  many  triremes 
which  their  large  population  will  enable  them  to  man ; 
besides  their  private  wealth,  they  have  the  treasures  of 
the  Selinuntian  temples  ;  and  the  Syracusans  receive  a 
tribute  which  has  been  paid  them  from  time  imme- 
morial by  certain  barbarian  tribes.  Moreover,  they  have 
a  numerous  cavalry,  and  grow  their  own  corn  instead  of 
importing  it :  in  the  two  last  respects  they  have  a  great 
advantage  over  us. 

21.          '  Against  such  a  power  more  is  needed  than  an  in- 
And  we       significant  force  of  marines ;    if  we  mean  to  do  justice 
with  us  a     to  our  design  a  we  must  embark  a  multitude  of  infantry ; 
neither  must  we  allow  ourselves  to  be  kept  within  our 
^nes  ^7  ^e  numbers  of  their  cavalry  a.     For  what  if  the 
not  of         Sicilians  in  terror  combine  against  us,  and  we  make  no 
javelin-men  friends  except  the  Egestaeans  who  can  furnish  us  with 
fordweCshaii  horsemen  capable  of  opposing   theirs  ?     To  be  driven 
distant        from  the  island  or  to  send  for  reinforcements,  because 
country.      we  were  wanting  in  forethought  at  first,  would  be  dis- 
graceful.    We  must  take  a  powerful  armament  with  us 
from  home,  in  the  full  knowledge  that  we  are  going  to  a 
distant  land,  and  that  the  expedition  will  be b  of  a  kind 
very  different  from  any  which  you  have  hitherto  made 
among  your  subjects  against   some  enemy  in  this  part 
of  the  world,  yourselves  the  allies  of  others.      Here  a 
friendly   country  is   always   near,   and   you  can   easily 
obtain   supplies.     There  c  you  will  be  dependent  on  a 
country0  which  is  entirely  strange  to  you,  and  whence 

a  Or,  'and  not  to  be  kept  within  our  lines  by  the  numbers  of 
their  cavalry,  we  must  embark  a  multitude  of  infantry.' 

b  Reading  orpareua'd/iej'ot  and  a.Tra.pTfjo'ovTfs. 

c  Or,  'you  will  be  removed  to  a  country;'  or,  reading  with 
Bekker  drrapTrjaavTes,  'you  will  find  yourselves  dependent  on,'  or 
'  will  have  been  removed  to  a  country.' 


SECOND    SPEECH    OF  NICIAS.  425 

B.C.  415.  during  the  four  winter  months  hardly  even  a  message       VI. 
°h  91f  2l  can  be  sent  hither. 

'I  say,  therefore,  that  we  must  take  with  us  a  large       22. 


heavy-armed   force  both    of  Athenians   and   of    allies,  F°°d 

'  be  brought 

whether  our  own  subjects  or  any  Peloponnesians  whom  from  home, 

.   .  ,    t  .  ,        and  we 

we  can  persuade  a  or  attract  by  payb  to  our  service  ;  also  musthave 
plenty  of  archers  and  javelin-men  to  act  against  the  man°d  oTthe 


enemy's  cavalry.  Our  naval  superiority  must  be  over- 
whelming,  that  we  may  not  only  be  able  to  fight,  but  to  procure 
may  have  no  difficulty  in  bringing  in  supplies.  And  fS  dse- 
there  is  the  food  carried  from  home,  such  as  wheat  and  where- 
parched  barley,  which  will  have  to  be  conveyed  in 
merchant-vessels  ;  we  must  also  have  bakers,  drafted  in 
a  certain  proportion  from  each  mill,  who  will  receive  pay, 
but  will  be  forced  to  serve,  in  order  that,  if  we  should  be 
detained  by  a  calm,  the  army  may  not  want  food  ;  for  it 
is  not  every  city  that  will  be  able  to  receive  so  large  a 
force  as  ours.  We  must  make  our  preparations  as  com- 
plete as  possible,  and  not  be  at  the  mercy  of  others  ; 
above  all,  we  must  take  out  with  us  as  much  money 
as  we  can  ;  for  as  to  the  supplies  of  the  Egestaeans  which 
are  said  to  be  awaiting  us,  we  had  better  assume  that 
they  are  imaginary. 

'  Even  supposing  we  leave  Athens  with  a  force  of  our       23. 
own,  not  merely  equal  to  that  of  the  enemy,  but  in  every  We  must 

.     ,        ,  '    leave  no- 

way  superior,  except  indeed  as  regards  the  number  of  thing  to 
hoplites  which  they  can  put  into  the  field,  for  in  that  ch 
respect  equality  is  impossible,  still  it  will  be  no  easy  task 
to  conquer  Sicily,  or  indeed  to  preserve  ourselves.  You 
ought  to  consider  that  we  are  like  men  going  to  found  a 
city  in  a  land  of  strangers  and  enemies,  who  on  the  very 
day  of  their  disembarkation  must  have  command  of  the 
country  ;  for  if  they  meet  with  a  disaster  they  will  have  no 
friends.  And  this  is  what  I  fear.  We  shall  have  much 
dnee  of  prudence  ;  still  more  of  good-fortune  (and  who 
can  guarantee  this  to  mortals?).  Wherefore  I  would  trust 

a  Cp.  vi.  29  med. 

b  Gp.  vi.  43  med.  ;  vii.  57  fin. 


426      ENTHUSIASM   FOR    THE   EXPEDITION. 

VI.  myself  and  the  expedition  as  little  as  possible  to  accident,  B.C.  415. 
and  would  not  sail  until  I  had  taken  such  precautions  as 
will  be  likely  to  ensure  our  safety.  This  I  conceive  to 
be  the  course  which  is  the  most  prudent  for  the  whole 
state,  and,  for  us  who  are  sent  upon  the  expedition,  a 
security  against  danger.  If  any  one  thinks  otherwise, 
to  him  I  resign  the  command/ 

24.          These  were  the  words  of  Nicias.     He  meant  either  to 
TheAthe-    deter  the  Athenians  by   bringing   home   to   them   the 

nians  are  e      .  1.1-  •  i  r 

not  deterred  vastness  of  the  undertaking,  or  to  provide  as  far  as 
fbrcere^  he  could  for  the  safety  of  the  expedition  if  he  were 
qreateVthee  comPe^ed  to  proceed.  The  result  disappointed  him. 
preparation  Far  from  losing  their  enthusiasm  at  the  disagreeable 

the  more  -  , 

they  are  as-  prospect,  they  were  more  determined  than  ever  ;  they 


approved  of  his  advice,  and  were  confident  that  every 
chance  of  danger  was  now  removed.  All  alike  were 
seized  with  a  passionate  desire  to  sail,  the  elder  among 
them  convinced  that  they  would  achieve  the  conquest  of 
Sicily,  —  at  any  rate  such  an  armament  could  suffer  no 
disaster  ;  the  youth  were  longing  to  see  with  their  own 
eyes  the  marvels  of  a  distant  land,  and  were  confident  of 
a  safe  return  ;  the  main  body  of  the  troops  expected  to 
receive  present  pay,  and  to  conquer  a  country  which 
would  be  an  inexhaustible  mine  of  pay  for  the  future. 
The  enthusiasm  of  the  majority  was  so  overwhelming 
that,  although  some  disapproved,  they  were  afraid  of 
being  thought  unpatriotic  if  they  voted  on  the  other 
side,  and  therefore  held  their  peace. 

25.          At  last  an  Athenian  came  forward,  and  calling  upon 

Nicias  gives  Nicias,  said  that  they  would  have  no  more  excuses  and 

sionaTesti-  delays  ;    he  must  speak   out  and  say  what  forces  the 

foreran?*  people  were  to  vote  him.     He  replied,  with  some  un- 

quired.        willingness,  that  he  would  prefer  to  consider  the  matter 

at  leisure  with  his  colleagues,  but  that,  as  far  as  he  could 

see  at  present,  they  ought  to  have  at  least  a  hundred 

triremes  of  their  own  ;  of  these  a  certain  number  might 

be   used    as   transports  %   and    they   must    order   more 

a  Cp.  ch.  31  init.,  43  init. 


THE    MUTILATION   OF    THE    HERMAE.      427 

B.C.  415.  triremes  from  their  allies.  Of  heavy-armed  troops  they  VI. 
2'  would  require  in  all,  including  Athenians  and  allies, 
not  less  than  five  thousand,  and  more  if  they  could 
possibly  have  them ;  the  rest  of  the  armament  must 
be  in  proportion,  and  should  comprise  archers  to  be 
procured  both  at  home  -and  from  Crete,  and  slingers. 
These  forces,  and  whatever  else  seemed  to  be  required, 
the  generals  would  make  ready  before  they  started. 

Upon  this  the  Athenians  at  once  decreed  that  the      26. 
generals  should  be  empowered  to  act  as  they  thought  Prepara- 
best  in  the  interest  of  the  state  respecting  the  numbers  of  war. 
the  army  and  the  whole  management  of  the  expedition. 
Then  the  preparations  began.     Lists  for  service  were 
made  up  at  home  and  orders  given  to  the  allies.     The 
city  had  newly  recovered  from  the  plague  and  from  the 
constant  pressure  of  war ;  a  new  population  had  grown 
up  ;  there  had  been  time  for  the  accumulation  of  money 
during   the    peace  ;    so  .  that   there   was   abundance  of 
everything  at  command. 

While  they  were  in  the  midst  of  their  preparations,       27. 
the   Hermae  a  or  square  stone  figures  carved  after  the  Meanwhile 
ancient  Athenian  fashion,  and  standing  everywhere  at  outrage  on 
the  doorways a  both  of  temples  and  private  houses,  in  Jj^e^the 
one  night  had  nearly  all  of  them  throughout  the  city  unknown 
their  faces  mutilated.     The  offenders  were  not  known,  it  are  sus- 
but  great  rewards  were  publicly  offered  for  their  detec-  designs0 
tion,  and   a   decree  was  passed  that  any  one,  whether  dfmocracy. 
citizen,  stranger,  or  slave,  might  without  fear  of  punish- 
ment disclose  this  or  any  other  profanation  of  which  he 
was  cognizant.     The  Athenians  took  the  matter  greatly 
to  heart — it  seemed  to  them  ominous  of  the  fate  of  the 
expedition ;   and    they  ascribed   it  to  conspirators  who 
wanted    to   effect   a   revolution   and   to   overthrow   the 
democracy. 

Certain   metics   and   servants   gave   information,  not      28. 

a  Or  Kara  TO  emxapiov  may  be  taken  with  TroXXoi :  '  or  square 
figures  of  carved  stone  which,  after  the  ancient  Athenian  fashion, 
usually  stand  at  the  doorways '  etc. 


428  THE   SUPPOSED  PLOT. 

VI.      indeed  about  the  Hermae,  but  about  the  mutilation  of  B.C.  415. 
informa-     other  statues  which  had  shortly  before  been  perpetrated 
given  about  by  some  young  men  in  a  drunken  frolic  :  they  also  said 
profane  &  that   the   mysteries   were   repeatedly  profaned   by  the 
Ahdbiadcs    celebration  of  them  in  private  houses,  and  of  this  im- 
and  others   piety  they  accused,  among  others,  Alcibiades.     A  party 
of  ceie-       who  were  jealous  of  his  influence  over  the  people,  which 
mysteries6  interfered  with   the   permanent   establishment  of  their 
hn0usesate     own>  thinking  that  if  they  could  get  rid  of  him  they 
would    be    supreme a,    took    up    and    exaggerated    the 
charges   against  him,  clamorously   insisting   that  both 
the  mutilation  of  the  Hermae  and  the  profanation  of  the 
mysteries  were  part  of  a  conspiracy  against  the  democracy, 
and  that  he  was  at  the  bottom  of  the  whole  affair.     In 
proof  they  alleged   the   excesses   of  his  ordinary   life, 
which  were  unbecoming  in  the  citizen  of  a  free  state. 
29.          He   strove  then  and   there   to  clear  himself  of  the 
He  begs  to  charges,  and  also  offered  to  be  tried  before   he   sailed 
before  he     (for  all  was  now  ready),  in  order  that,  if  he  were  guilty, 
he  might  be  punished,  and  if  acquitted,  might  retain 
his  command.      He   adjured    his  countrymen  to  listen 
have  more    to  no  calumnies  which    might   be   propagated   against 
obtaining  a  him  in  his  absence ;  and  he  protested  that  they  would 


be  wiser  in  not  sending  a  man  who  had  so  serious  an 
deferred  imputation  hanging  over  him  on  a  command  so  im- 
portant. But  his  enemies  feared  that  if  the  trial  took 
place  at  once  he  would  have  the  support  of  the  army; 
and  that  the  people  would  be  lenient,  band  would  not 
forget  thatb  he  had  induced  the  Argives  and  some 
Mantineans  to  join  in  the  expedition.  They  therefore 
exerted  themselves  to  postpone  the  trial.  To  this  end 
they  suborned  fresh  speakers,  who  proposed  that  he 
should  sail  now  and  not  delay  the  expedition,  but 
should  return  and  stand  his  trial  within  a  certain  num- 
ber of  days.  Their  intention  was  that  he  should  be 

a  Cp.  ii.  65  fin. 

*>  Or,   supplying   avrov  with  fapanevav :   ( being  well  disposed  to 
him  because '  etc. 


THE    FAREWELL.  429 

B.C.  415.  recalled  and  tried  when  they  had  stirred  up  a  stronger      VI. 

'  feeling  against  him,  which  they  could  better  do  in  his 

absence.     So  it  was  decided  that  Alcibiades  should  sail. 

About  the  middle  of  summer  the  expedition  started       30. 
for  Sicily.     Orders  had  been  previously  given  to  most  Conflict  of 
of  the  allies,  to   the  corn-ships,  the  smaller  craft,  and  among  the 


generally  to  the  vessels  in  attendance  on  the  arma-  a 
ment,  that  they  should  muster  at  Corcyra,  whence  the  j£JJ?*nt  of 
whole  fleet  was  to  strike  across  the  Ionian  gulf  to  the 
promontory  of  lapygia.  Early  in  the  morning  of  the  day 
appointed  for  their  departure,  the  Athenians  and  such 
of  their  allies  as  had  already  joined  them  went  down 
to  the  Piraeus  and  began  to  man  the  ships.  The  entire 
population  of  Athens  accompanied  them,  citizens  and 
strangers  alike.  The  citizens  came  to  take  farewell,  one 
of  an  acquaintance,  another  of  a  kinsman,  another  of 
a  son  ;  the  crowd  as  they  passed  along  were  full  of 
hope  and  full  of  tears  ;  hope  of  conquering  Sicily,  tears 
because  they  doubted  whether  they  would  ever  see  their 
friends  again,  when  they  thought  of  the  long  voyage 
on  which  they  were  sending  them.  At  the  moment 
of  parting  the  danger  was  nearer;  and  terrors  which 
had  never  occurred  to  them  when  they  were  voting  the 
expedition  now  entered  into  their  souls.  Nevertheless 
their  spirits  revived  at  the  sight  of  the  armament  in 
all  its  strength  and  of  the  abundant  provision  which 
they  had  made.  The  strangers  and  the  rest  of  the 
multitude  came  out  of  curiosity,  desiring  to  witness  an 
enterprise  of  which  the  greatness  exceeded  belief. 

No  armament  so  magnificent  or  costly  had  ever  been      31. 
sent  out  by  any  single  Hellenic  power,  though  irt  mere  Beaiityand 
number  of  ships  and  hoplites  that  which  sailed  to  Epi-  of  the 


daurus  under  Pericles  and  afterwards  under  Hagnon  to 
Potidaeaa  was  not  inferior.    For  that  expedition  consisted 
of  a  hundred  Athenian    and  fifty  Chian    and  Lesbian  with  it. 
triremes,  conveying  four  thousand  hoplites  all  Athenian 
citizens,    three    hundred    cavalry,   and   a    multitude   of 

a   Cp.  ii.  56,  58. 


430  THE   ATHENIAN  ARMADA. 

VI.  allied  troops.  Still  the  voyage  was  short  and  the  equip-  B.C.  415. 
merits  were  poor,  whereas  this  expedition  was  intended 
to  be  long  absent,  and  was  thoroughly  provided  both 
for  sea  and  land  service,  wherever  its  presence  might 
be  required.  On  the  fleet  the  greatest  pains  and 
expense  had  been  lavished  by  the  trierarchs  and  the 
state.  The  public  treasury  gave  a  drachma  a  a  day  to 
each  sailor,  and  furnished  empty  hulls  for  sixty  swift 
sailing  vessels,  and  for  forty  transports  carrying  hoplites. 
All  these  were  manned  with  the  best  crews  which  could 
be  obtained.  The  trierarchs,  besides  the  pay  given  by 
the  state,  added  somewhat  more  out  of  their  own  means 
to  the  wages  of  the  upper  ranks  of  rowers  and  of  b  the 
petty  officers  b.  The  figure-heads  and  other  fittings 
provided  by  them  were  of  the  most  costly  description. 
Every  one  strove  to  the  utmost  that  his  own  ship 
might  excel  both  in  beauty  and  swiftness.  The  infantry 
had  been  well  selected  and  the  lists  carefully  made 
up.  There  was  the  keenest  rivalry  among  the  soldiers 
in  the  matter  of  arms  and  personal  equipment.  And 
while  at  home  the  Athenians  were  thus  competing  with 
one  another  in  the  performance  of  their  several  duties, 
to  the  rest  of  Hellas  the  expedition  seemed  to  be  a 
grand  display  of  their  power  and  greatness,  rather  than 
a  preparation  for  war.  If  any  one  had  reckoned  up 
the  whole  expenditure  (i)  of  the  state,  (2)  of  individual 
soldiers  and  others,  including  in  the  first  not  only  what 
the  city  had  already  laid  out,  but  what  was  entrusted  to 
the  generals,  and  in  the  second  what  either  at  the  time 
or  afterwards  private  persons  spent  upon  their  outfit, 
or  the  trierarchs  upon  their  ships,  the  provision  for  the 
long  voyage  which  every  one  may  be  supposed  to  have 
carried  with  him  over  and  above  his  public  pay,  and 
what  soldiers  or  traders  may  have  taken  for  purposes 
of  exchange,  he  would  have  found  that  altogether  an 


b  Others    translate    'the    crews    generally,'    or    *  the    soldiers' 
servants.' 


PRAYERS   AND    LIBATIONS.  431 

B.C.  415.  immense  sum  amounting  to  many  talents  was  withdrawn  VI. 
9I>  2<  from  the  city.  Men  were  quite  amazed  at  the  boldness  of 
the  scheme  and  the  magnificence  of  the  spectacle,  which 
were  everywhere  spoken  of,  no  less  than  at  the  great 
disproportion  of  the  force  when  compared  with  that  of 
the  enemy  against  whom  it  was  intended.  Never  had 
a  greater  expedition  been  sent  to  a  foreign  land ;  never 
was  there  an  enterprise  in  which  the  hope  of  future 
success  seemed  to  be  better  justified  by  actual  power. 

When  the  ships  were  manned  and  everything  required       32. 
for  the  voyage  had  been  placed  on  board,  silence  was  Prayers 
proclaimed  by  the  sound  of  the  trumpet,  and  all  with  the  whole 
one  voice  before  setting  sail  offered  up  the  customary 
prayers ;  these  were  recited,  not  in  each  ship,  but  by  a 
single  herald,  the  whole  fleet   accompanying  him.     Onmakeliba- 

*   ,  **  tions  and 

every  deck  both  officers  and  men,  mingling  wine  in  raise  the 
bowls,  made  libations  from  vessels  of  gold  and  silver. 
The  multitude  of  citizens  and  other  well-wishers  who 
were  looking  on  from  the  land  joined  in  the  prayer. 
The  crews  raised  the  Paean,  and  when  the  libations 
were  completed,  put  to  sea.  After  sailing  out  for  some 
distance  in  single  file,  the  ships  raced  with  one  another 
as  far  as  Aegina ;  thence  they  hastened  onwards  to 
Corcyra,  where  the  allies  who  formed  the  rest  of  the 
army  were  assembling. 

Meanwhile  reports  of  the  expedition  were  coming  in  Rumours  of 
to  Syracuse  from   many  quarters,  but  for  a  long  time  tioVreach" 
nobody  gave  credit  to  them.     At  length  an  assembly  syracuse- 
was  held.     Even  then  different  opinions  were  expressed,  . 
some  affirming  and  others  denying  that  the  expedition 
was  coming.      At  last  Hermocrates  the  son  of  Hermon, 
believing  that  he  had  certain  information,  came  forward, 
and  warned  the  Syracusans  in  the  following  words : — 

'I  dare  say  that,  like  others,  I  shall  not  be  believed       33* 
when  I  tell  you  that  the  expedition  is  really  coming ;  and  §^J_of 
I  am  well  aware  that  those  who  are  either  the  authors  crates. 

Thcv  fire 

or  reporters  of  tidings  which  seem  incredible  not  only  coming  and 
fail  to  convince  others,  but  are  thought  fools  for  their 


433  SPEECH   OF    HERMOCRATES. 

VI.      pains.     Yet,  when  the  city  is  in  danger,  fear  shall  not  B.C.  415. 
if elou  are    st°P  m^  mouth  5  f°r  I  am  convinced  in  my  own  mind 
prepared     that   I   have   better   information   than   anybody.     The 

there  is  .  . 

nothing  Athenians,  wonder  as  you  may,  are  coming  against  us 
s^cUywiii  with  a  great  fleet  and  army;  they  profess  to  be  assist- 
aga'inst  *n£  t*ieir  Egestaean  allies  and  to  be  restoring  the 
them ;  and  Leontines.  But  the  truth  is  that  they  covet  Sicily,  and 

ETTCclt  GX- 

peditions     especially  our  city.    They  think  that,  if  they  can  conquer 

never  come  .1  -11  -i  ±1  TM  MI 

to  good.  us>  they  will  easily  conquer  the  rest.  They  will  soon 
be  here,  and  you  must  consider  how  with  your  present 
resources  you  can  make  the  most  successful  defence. 
You  should  not  let  them  take  you  by  surprise  because 
you  despise  them,  or  neglect  the  whole  matter  because 
you  will  not  believe  that  they  are  coming  at  all.  But 
to  him  who  is  not  of  this  unbelieving  temper  I  say: — 
And  do  not  you  be  dismayed  at  their  audacity  and 
power.  They  cannot  do  more  harm  to  us  than  we  can 
do  to  them  ;  the  very  greatness  of  their  armament  may 
be  an  advantage  to  us ;  it  will  have  a  good  effect  on 
the  other  Sicilians,  who  will  be  alarmed,  and  in  their 
terror  will  be  the  more  ready  to  assist  us.  Then,  again, 
if  in  the  end  we  overpower  them,  or  at  any  rate  drive 
them  away  baffled,  for  I  have  not  the  slightest  fear  of 
their  accomplishing  their  purpose,  we  shall  have  achieved 
a  noble  triumph.  And  of  this  I  have  a  good  hope.  Rarely 
have  great  expeditions,  whether  Hellenic  or  Barbarian, 
when  sent  far  from  home,  met  with  success.  They  are 
not  more  numerous  than  the  inhabitants  and  their  neigh- 
.  bours,  who  all  combine  through  fear ;  and  if  owing  to 
scarcity  of  supplies  in  a  foreign  land  they  miscarry,  al- 
though their  ruin  may  be  chiefly  due  to  themselves,  they 
confer  glory  on  those  whom  they  meant  to  overthrow. 
The  greatness  of  these  very  Athenians  was  .based  on 
the  utter  and  unexpected  ruin  of  the  Persians a,  who 
were  always  supposed  to  have  directed  their  expedition 
against  Athens.  And  I  think  that  such  a  destiny  may 
very  likely  be  reserved  for  us. 

a  Cp.  i.  69  fin. 


SPEECH    OF  HERMOCRATES.  433 

oi°  1*2       *"^et  us  ta^e  courage  then,  and  put  ourselves  into  a      VI. 
'  state  of  defence  ;  let  us  also  send  envoys  to  the  Sicels,       34. 
and,  while  we  make  sure  of  our  old  allies,  endeavour  to  Let  us 

TTT         -11     -f  /•  summon 

gam  new  ones.     We  will  despatch  envoys  to  the  rest  of  our  old 
Sicily,  and  point  out  that  the  danger  is  common  to  all  ; 
we  will  also  send  to  the  Italian  cities  in  the  hope  that 
they  may  either  join  us,  or  at  any  rate  refuse  to  receive  tain  help 
the  Athenians.     And  I  think  that  we  should  send   to  rest  of 
the  Carthaginians  ;   the  idea  of  an  Athenian  attack  is  Carthage*7' 
no  novelty  to  them  ;  they  are  always  living  in  appre-  J^JJ*1^ 
hension  of  it.     They  will  probably  feel  that  if  they  leave  Corinth. 
us  to  our  fate,  the  trouble  may  reach  themselves,  and  would  take 


therefore  they  may  be  inclined  in  some  way  or  other, 
secretly,  if  not  openly,  to  assist  us.  If  willing  to  help, 
of  all  existing  states  they  are  the  best  able  ;  for  they  Athenians 
have  abundance  of  gold  and  silver,  and  these  make  war,  We  should 
like  other  things,  go  smoothly.  Let  us  also  send  to  the  Seat  * 
Lacedaemonians  and  Corinthians  and  entreat  them  to 


come  to  our  aid  speedily,  and  at  the  same  time  to  revive  did  not 
the  war  in  Hellas.    I  have  a  plan  which  in  my  judgment  should  'still 


is  the  best  suited  to  the  present  emergency,  although  it 

is  the  last  which   you  in  your  habitual  indolence  will  ^J1^  might 


readily  embrace  a.    Let  me  tell  you  what  it  is.    If  all  the  dismayed 
Sicilian  Greeks,  or  at  least  if  we  and  as  many  as  will  boldness 
join  us,  taking  two  months'  provisions,  would  put  out  to  uprtieex- 
sea  with  all  our  available  ships  and  meet  the  Athenians  Pedltlon- 
at  Tarentum  and  the  promontory  of  lapygia,  thereby 
proving  to  them  that  before  they  fight  for  Sicily  they 
must  fight  for  the  passage  of  the  Ionian  Sea,  we  should 
strike  a  panic  into  them.     They  would  then  reflect  that 
at  Tarentum  (which  receives  us),  we,  the  advanced  guard 
of  Sicily,  are  among  friends,  and  go  forth  from  a  friendly 
country,  and  that  the  sea  is  a  large  place  not  easy  to 
traverse  with  so  great   an  armament  as   theirs.     They 
would  know  that  after  a  long  voyage  their  ships  will  be 
unable  to  keep  in  line,  and  coming  up  slowly  and  few 
at  a  time  will  be  at  our  mercy.     On  the  other  hand,  if 
a  Cp.  i.  143  fin. 
Ff 


434  SPEECH   OF   HERMOCRATES. 

VI.  they  lighten  their  vessels  and  meet  us  in  a  compact  B.C.  415. 
body  with  the  swifter  part  of  their  fleet,  they  may  have  OL  9I>  2" 
to  use  oars,  and  then  we  shall  attack  them  when  they 
are  exhausted.  Or  if  we  prefer  not  to  fight,  we  can  retire 
again  to  Tarentum.  Having  come  over  with  slender 
supplies  and  prepared  for  a  naval  engagement,  they  will 
not  know  what  to  do  on  these  desolate  coasts.  If  they 
remain  we  can  blockade  them ;  if  they  attempt  to  sail 
onwards  they  will  cut  themselves  off  from  the  rest  of 
their  armament,  and  will  be  discouraged  ;  for  they  will 
be  far  from  certain  whether  the  cities  of  Italy  and  Sicily 
will  receive  them.  In  my  opinion  the  anticipation  of  these 
difficulties  will  hamper  them  to  such  a  degree,  that  they 
will  never  leave  Corcyra.  While  they  are  holding  con- 
sultations, and  sending  out  spies  to  discover  our  number 
and  exact  position,  they  will  find  themselves  driven  into 
winter ;  or  in  dismay  at  the  unexpected  opposition,  they 
may  very  likely  break  up  the  expedition  ;  especially  if, 
as  I  am  informed,  the  most  experienced  of  their  generals 
has  taken'  the  command  against  his  will,  and  would 
gladly  make  any  considerable  demonstration  on  our  part 
an  excuse  for  retreating.  I  am  quite  sure  that  rumour 
will  exaggerate  our  strength.  The  minds  of  men  are 
apt  to  be  swayed  by  what  they  hear ;  and  they  are  most 
afraid  of  those  who  commence  an  attack,  or  who  at  any 
rate  show  to  the  aggressor  betimes  that  he  will  meet 
with  resistance ;  for  then  they  reflect  that  the  risk  is 
equally  divided.  And  so  it  will  be  with  the  Athenians. 
They  are  now  attacking  us  because  they  do  not  believe 
that  we  shall  defend  ourselves,  and  in  this  opinion  they 
are  justified  by  our  refusal  to  join  with  the  Lacedae- 
monians in  putting  them  down.  But,  if  they  see  aus 
enterprising  almost  to  rashness  a,  they  will  be  more  dis- 
mayed at  our  unexpected  resistance  than  at  our  real 
power.  Take  my  advice ;  if  possible,  resolve  on  this 
bold  step,  but  if  not,  adopt  other  measures  of  defence  as 

a  Or,  '  that  they  were  mistaken,  and  that  we  boldly  venture,'  etc. 
Cp.  ii.  89  med. 


FACTION  AT   SYRACUSE.  435 

B.C.  415.  quickly  as  possible.  Remember  each  and  all  of  you  VI. 
2'  that  the  true  contempt  of  an  invader  is  shown  by  deeds 
of  valour  in  the  field,  and  that  meanwhile  the  greatest 
service  which  you  can  render  to  the  state  is  to  act  as  if 
you  were  in  the  presence  of  danger,  considering  that  safety 
depends  on  anxious  preparation*.  The  Athenians  are 
coming  ;  I  am  certain  that  they  are  already  on  the  sea 
and  will  soon  be  here.' 

Thus  spoke  Hermocrates.     Great  was  the  contention      35. 

which  his  words  aroused  among  the  Syracusan  people,  People  said, 

*  r     r    >  They  will 

some  asserting  that  the  Athenians  would  never  come,  never 
and  that  he  was  not  speaking  truth,  others  asking,  *  And  what'  harm 
if  they  should  come,  what  harm  could  they  do  to   usJoV^ew 
nearly  so  great  as  we  could  do  to  them?'  while  others  saw  the 

danger. 

were  quite  contemptuous,  and  made  a  jest  of  the  whole 
matter.  A  few  only  believed  Hermocrates  and  realised 
the  danger.  At  last  Athenagoras,  the  popular  leader, 
who  had  at  that  time  the  greatest  influence  with  the 
multitude,  came  forward  and  spoke  as  follows  :  — 

'He  is  either  a  coward  or  a  traitor  who  would  not      3^- 
rejoice  to  hear  that  the  Athenians  are  so  mad  as  to  come  A?hena-°f 
hither   and   deliver  themselves    into   our  hands.     The  goras- 
audacity  of  the  people  who  are  spreading  these  alarms  alarms  are 
does  not  surprise  me,  but  I  do  wonder  at  their  folly  traitors,  y 
if  they  cannot   see  that  their  motives  are  transparent. 


Having  private  reasons  for  being  afraid,  they  want  to  Pub!ic  at- 
strike  terror  into  the  whole  city  b  that  they  may  hide  from  their 
themselves  b   under  the  shadow  of  the   common  fear.  s 
And  now,  what  is  the  meaning  of  these  rumours  ?    They 
do  not  grow  of  themselves  ;  they  have  been  got  up  by  peedingiy 
persons  who  are  the  troublers  of  our  state.     And  you, 
if  you  are  wise,  will  not  measure  probabilities  by  their 
reports,  but  by  what  we  may  assume  to  be  the  intentions 
of  shrewd  and  experienced  men  such  as  I  conceive  the 
Athenians  to  be.     They  are  not  likely  to  leave  behind 
them  a  power  such  as  Peloponnesus.     The  war  which 

a  Cp.  ii.  ii  med. 

b  Or,  (  that  they  may  hide  their  own  consciousness  of  guilt.' 

Ff  3 


436  SPEECH   OF  ATHENAGORAS. 

VI.      they  have  already  on  their  hands  is  far  from  settled,  and  B.C.  415. 
will  they  go  out  of  their  way  to  bring  upon  themselves 
another   as  great  ?      In  my  opinion  they  are  only  too 
glad  that  we  are  not  attacking  them,  considering   the 
number  and  power  of  our  states. 

3  7-          '  Even  if  the  rumour  of  their  coming  should  turn  out 
than    to   ^e  true>  *  am  sure  ^at    Sicily  is  more  able  than 


a  match  for  Peloponnesus  to  maintain  a  great  war.   The  whole  island 

the  Athe- 

nians ;  and  is  better  supplied  in  every  way,  and  our  own  city  is 
Syracuse,  herself  far  more  than  a  match  for  the  army  which  is 
po^esskS?  said  to  be  threatening  us  ;  aye,  and  for  another  as  great. 
of  it,  could  i  know  that  they  will  not  bring  cavalry  with  them,  and 

not  conquer      . 

Syracuse,  will  find  none  here,  except  the  few  horsemen  which  they 
may  procure  from  Egesta.  They  cannot  provide  a  force 
of  hoplites  equal  to  ours%  for  they  have  to  cross  the 
sea  ;  and  to  come  all  this  distance,  if  only  with  ships  and 
with  no  troops  or  lading,  would  be  work  enough  b.  I 
know  too  that  an  armament  which  is  directed  against 
so  great  a  city  as  ours  will  require  immense  supplies0. 
Nay,  I  venture  to  assert  that  if  they  came  hither,  having 
at  their  command  another  city  close  upon  our  border  as 
large  as  Syracuse,  and  could  there  settle  and  carry  on 
war  against  us  from  thence,  they  would  still  be  destroyed 
to  a  man  ;  how  much  more  when  the  whole  country  will 
be  their  enemy  (for  Sicily  will  unite),  and  when  they 
must  pitch  their  camp  the  moment  they  are  out  of  their 
ships,  and  will  have  nothing  but  their  wretched  huts 
and  meagre  supplies,  being  prevented  by  our  cavalry 
from  advancing  far  beyond  their  lines  ?  Indeed  I  hardly 
think  that  they  will  effect  a  landing  at  all.  So  far  supe- 
rior, in  my  judgment,  are  our  forces  to  theirs. 
38.  'The  Athenians,  I  repeat,  know  all  that  I  am  telling 
TheAthe-  you,  and  do  not  mean  to  throw  away  what  they  have 
a  shrewd  got  :  I  am  pretty  sure  of  that.  But  some  of  our  people 

a  Cp.  vi.  23  init. 

b  Placing  a  comma  after  e'X&Was,  omitting  the  comma  after  Set, 
and  taking  peya  yap  .  .  Kopi(r6f)vai  as  a  parenthesis. 
c  Cp.  vi.  2  1  med. 


SPEECH  OF   ATHENAGORAS.  437 

6.0.415.  are  fabricating  reports  which  neither  are,  nor  are  ever      VI. 
01.  91,  2.  jjkeiy  to  k    true<     j  know,  an(:i  jiave  aiwayS  known,  that  Pe°pi 

*  J  not  likely 

by  words  hke  these,  and  yet  more  mischievous,  if  not  by  to  ruin 
acts,  they  want  to  intimidate  you,  the  Syracusan  people,  ThesT  V 
and  make  themselves  chiefs  of  the  state.     And   I  am 


afraid  that  if  they  persevere  they  will  succeed  at  last,  by  °jj: 
and  that  we  shall  be  delivered  into  their  hands  before  conspira- 
we  have  had  the  sense  to  take  precautions  or  to  detect  want  To  get 
and  punish  them.     This  is  the  reason  why  our  city  is 
always  in  a  state  of  unrest  and  disorganisation,  fighting 
against  herself  quite  as  much  as  against  foreign  enemies,  resist  them 
and  from   time   to   time   subjected   to   tyrants  and   to 
narrow  and  wicked  oligarchies.     If  the  people  will  only 
support  me  I  shall  endeavour  to  prevent  any  such  mis- 
fortunes happening  in  our  day.     With  you  I  shall  use 
persuasion,  but  to  these  conspirators  I  shall  apply  force  ; 
and  I  shall  not  wait  until  they  are  detected  in  the  act 
(for  who  can  catch  them  ?),  but  I  shall  punish  their  in- 
tentions and  the  mischief  which  they  would  do  if  they 
could.   For  the  thoughts  of  our  enemies  must  be  punished 
before  they  have  ripened  into  deeds.     If  a  man  does  not 
strike  first,  he  will  be  the  first  struck.     As  to  the  rest  Tirade 
of  the  oligarchical  party,  I  must  expose  them  and  have  theyoung 
an  eye  on   their  designs  ;    I   must  also   instruct  them  ;  ollsarchs- 
that,  I  think,  will  be  the  way  by  which  I  can  best  deter 
them  from  their  evil  courses.     Come  now,  young  men, 
and  answer  me  a  question  which    I  have   often   asked 
myself.   "  What  can  you  want  ?  "    To  hold  office  already  ? 
But  the  law  forbids.     And  the  law  was  not  intended  to 
slight  you  had  you  been  capable  ;  it  was  passed  because 
you  were   incapable.     And   so   you   would   rather  not 
be  on  an  equality  with  the  many  ?     But  when  there  is 
no  real  difference  between  men,  why  should  there  be  a 
privileged  class  ? 

'  I  shall  be  told  that  democracy  is  neither  a  wise  nor      39- 
a  just  thing,  and  that  those  who  have  the  money  areThetrue 

state  is 

most  likely  to  govern  well.     To  which  I  answer,  first  composed 
of  all,  that  the  people  is  the  name  of  the  whole,  the  elements  ; 


438  SPEECH   OF  ATHENAGORAS. 

VI.      oligarchy  of  a  part  ;  secondly,  that  the  rich  are  the  best  B.C.  415. 
while  an      guardians  of  the  public  purse,  the  wise  the  best  coun- 

ohgarchy 

takes  all      sellors,  and  the  many,  when  they  have  heard  a  matter 

and^ives     discussed,  the  best  judges  a;  and  that  each  and  all  of 

Jheirfu5le   these   classes    have   in   a    democracy   equal    privileges. 

share  of  the  Whereas  an  oligarchy,  while  giving  the  people  the  full 

share  of  danger,  not  merely  takes  too  much  of  the  good 

things,  but  absolutely  monopolises  them.     And  this  is 

what  the  powerful  among  you  and  the  young  would  like 

to  have,  and  what  in  a  great  city  they  will  never  obtain.  . 

40.          '  O  most  senseless  of  men.  for  such  you  are  indeed 

Blind  fools,  jf  vou  do  not  see  the  mischief  of  your  own  schemes  ; 

if  you  are  J 

not  knaves,  never  in  all  my  experience  have  I  known  such  blindness 
never  be      among-  Hellenes,  or  such  wickedness  if  you  have  your 


e7es  °Pen  to  what  you  are  doing.     Yet  even  now  learn 
you.  jf  yOU  are  stupid,  repent  if  you  are  guilty  ;  and  let  your 

aim  be  the  welfare  of  the  whole  country.  Remember 
that  the  good  among  you  will  have  an  equal  or  larger 
share  in  the  government  of  it  than  the  people  b  ;  while  if 
you  want  more  you  will  most  likely  lose  all.  Away 
with  these  reports  ;  we  know  all  about  them,  and  are 
determined  to  suppress  them.  Let  the  Athenians  come, 
and  Syracuse  will  repel  her  enemies  in  a  manner  worthy 
of  herself  ;  we  have  generals  who  will  look  to  the  matter. 
But  if,  as  I  suspect,  none  of  your  tales  are  true,  the 
state  is  not  going  to  be  deceived,  and  will  not  in  a 
moment  of  panic  admit  you  to  power,  or  impose  upon, 
her  own  neck  the  yoke  of  slavery.  She  will  take  the 
matter  into  her  own  hands,  and  when  she  gives  judgment 
will  reckon  words  to  be  equally  criminal  with  actions. 
She  will  not  be  talked  out  of  her  liberty  by  you,  but  will 
do  her  utmost  to  preserve  it  ;  she  will  be  on  her  guard, 
and  will  put  you  down  with  a  strong  hand.' 

Thus   spoke   Athenagoras.     Whereupon   one   of  the 
One  of  the  generals  rose,  and  suffering  no  one  else  to  come  forward, 
deprecates   closed  the  discussion  himself  in  the  following  words  :  — 
badUian-°f        'There  is  little  wisdom   in   exchanging  abuse  or  in 
a  Cp.  ii.  40  med.  b  Cp.  ii.  37  init. 


THE    ATHENIANS    CROSS    THE    SEA.        439 

B,c.  415.  sitting  by  and  listening  to  it  ;  let  us  rather,  in  view  of      VI. 
2'  the  reported  danger,  see  how  the  whole  city  and  every  §Jl^  :th^e 
man  in  it  may  take  measures  for  resisting  the  invaders  report  of 
worthily.     Why  should  not  the  city  be  richly  furnished  a  good 


with  arms,  horses,  and  all  the  pride  and  pomp  of  war  ; 
where  is  the  harm  even  if  they  should  not  be  wanted  ? 
We,  who  are  generals,  will  take  in  hand  all  these  matters 
and  examine  into  them  ourselves  ;  and  we  will  send 
messengers  to  the  neighbouring  cities  in  order  to  obtain 
information,  and  for  any  other  purpose  which  may  be 
necessary.  Some  precautions  we  have  taken  already, 
and  whatever  occurs  to  us  we  will  communicate  to  you/ 
When  the  general  had  thus  spoken,  the  assembly  dis- 
persed. 

The  Athenians  and  their  allies  were  by  this  time  col-      42. 
lected  at  Corcyra.    There  the  generals  began  by  holding  The  Athe- 
a  final  review  of  the  ships,  and  disposed  them  in  the  order  Corcyra 
in  which  they  were  to  anchor  at  their  stations.     The  finai  review 
fleet  was  divided  into  three  squadrons,  and  one  of  them  Armament 
assigned  by  lot  to  each  of  the  three  generals,  in  order  which  is* 
to  avoid  any  difficulties  which  might  occur,  if  they  sailed  into  -three 
together,   in    finding  water,    anchorage,   and   provisions 
where  they  touched  ;  they  also  thought  that  the  presence 
of  a  general  with  each  division  would  promote  good 
order  and   discipline  throughout  the  fleet.     They  then 
sent  before  them  to  Italy  and  Sicily  three  ships,  which 
had  orders  to  find  out  what  cities  in  those  regions  would 
receive  them,  and  to  meet  them  again  on  their  way,  that 
they  might  know  before  they  put  in. 

At  length   the   great   armament  proceeded   to  cross      43. 
from  Corcyra  to  Sicily.     It  consisted  of  a  hundred  and  At  length 

they  cross 

thirty-four  triremes  in  all,  besides  two  Rhodian  vessels  the  sea  in 
of  fifty   oars.      Of  these    a   hundred    were   Athenian  ;  and  thirty- 
sixty  being  swift  vessels,  and  the  remaining  forty  trans- 
ports  :  the  rest  of  the  fleet  was  furnished  by  the  Chians 
and  other   allies.      The   hoplites  numbered  in  all  five 
thousand  one  hundred,  of  whom  fifteen  hundred  were 
Athenians  taken  from  the  roll,  and  seven  hundred  who  hundred6 


440      THE    ATHENIANS   ARRIVE    AT   RHEGIUM. 

VI.      served  as  marines  were  of  the  fourth  and  lowest  class  of  B.C.  415. 
Athenian  citizens.     The  remainder  of  the  hoplites  were  ° 


ei"ehtand  furnished  by  the  allies,  mostly  by  the  subject  states; 
archers,  but  five  hundred  came  from  Argos,  besides  two  hundred 
hundred  and  fifty  Mantinean  and  other  mercenaries.  The  archers 
a  Hundred  were  'm  a^  ^our  hundred  and  eighty,  of  whom  eighty  were 
and  twenty  Cretans.  There  were  seven  hundred  Rhodian  slingers, 

Meganan 

light-          a  hundred  and  twenty  light-armed  Megarians  who  were 

armed,  and        ., 

thirty          exiles  a,  and  one  horse  transport  which  conveyed  thirty 

horsemen.     horsemen  and  horses> 

44-  Such  were  the  forces  with  which  the  first  expedition 
crossed  the  sea.  For  the  transport  of  provisions  thirty 
merchant  -ships,  which  also  conveyed  bakers,  masons, 


and  a  hun-  carpenters,  and  tools  such  as  are  required  in  sieges,  were 
vessels.        included  in  the  armament.     It  was  likewise  attended  by 


a  hundred  small  vessels  ;  these,  as  well  as  the  merchant- 
refused6      vesse^sJ  were  pressed  into  the  service.     Other  merchant- 
admittance  vessels  and  lesser  craft  in  great  numbers  followed  of  their 
Sty,  but  are  own  accord  for  purposes  of  trade.     The  whole  fleet  now 
with  pro-     struck  across  the  Ionian  sea  from  Corcyra.    They  arrived 
Slowed^  at  t^le  Promontory  °f  Iapygia  anc*  at  Tarentum,   each 
anchor.       ship  taking  its  own  course,  and  passed  along  the  coast  of 
Italy.    The  Italian  cities  did  not  admit  them  within  their 
walls,  or   open  a   market  to   them,  but  allowed   them 
water  and  anchorage  ;  Tarentum  and  Locri  refused  even 
these.     At  length  they  reached  Rhegium,  the  extreme 
point  of  Italy,  where  the  fleet  reunited.     As  they  were 
not  received  within  the  walls  they  encamped  outside  the 
city  at  the  temple  of  Artemis  ;  there  they  were  provided 
by  the  inhabitants  with  a  market,  and  drawing  up  their 
ships  on  shore  they  took  a  rest.    They  held  a  conference 
with  the  Rhegians,  and  pressed  them,  being  Chalcidians 
themselves,  to  aid  their  Chalcidian  kinsmen  the  Leon- 
tines.     But  the   Rhegians  replied  that  they  would   be 
neutral,   and   would   only   act   in   accordance  with   the 
decision  of  all  the  Italian  Greeks.     The  Athenian  com- 
manders now   began  to  consider   how  they  could   best 
a  Cp.  iv.  74. 


BAD  NEWS   FROM   EGESTA.  441 

'B.C.  415.  commence  operations  in  Sicily.     Meanwhile  they  were      VI. 
2'  expecting  the  ships  which  had  gone  on  and  were  to  meet 
them  from  Egesta  ;  for  they  wanted  to  know  whether 
the  Egestaeans  really  had  the  money  of  which  the  mes- 
sengers had  brought  information  to  Athens. 

From    many  quarters  the   news  began  to   reach   the       45. 
Syracusans  that   the  Athenian   fleet  was  at   Rhegium,  The  Syra- 
and  the  report  was  confirmed  by  their  spies.     They  now  resolve  to 
no  longer  doubted,  but  fell  to  work  heart  and  soul.     To  themselves 
some  of  the   Sicel   towns  they  sent  troops,   to   others  m  ^arnest- 
envoys  ;  they  also  garrisoned  the  forts  in  the  territory 
of  Syracuse,   and  within  the   city  itself  inspected   the 
horses  and  arms,  and  saw  that  they  were  in  good  con- 
dition.    In   short,   they  made   every  preparation  for  a 
war  which  was  rapidly  approaching,  and  almost  at  their 
gates. 

The  three  ships  which  had  gone  forward  to  Egesta      46. 
now  returned  to  the  Athenians  at  Rhegium  ;  they  re-  Trick 
ported   that  of  the  money  which   had  been   promised  by  the 
thirty  talents  a  only  were  forthcoming  and  no  more.    The 
spirits  of  the  generals  fell  at  once  on  receiving  this  their 


first  discouragement.  They  were  also  disappointed  at  which  the 
the  unfavourable  answer  of  the  Rhegians,  whom  they  envoys 
had  asked  first,  and  might  naturally  have  expected  to  Egesta. 
join  them  because  they  were  kinsmen  of  the  Leontines, 
and  had  always  hitherto  been  in  the  Athenian  interest. 
Nicias  expected  that  the  Egestaeans  would  fail  them  b  ; 
to  the  two  others  their  behaviour  appeared  even  more 
incomprehensible  than  the  defection  of  the  Rhegians. 
The  fact  was  that  when  the  original  envoys  came  from 
Athens  to  inspect  the  treasure,  the  Egestaeans  had  prac- 
tised a  trick  upon  them.  They  brought  them  to  the 
temple  of  Aphrodit<b  at  Eryx,  and  showed  them  the 
offerings  deposited  there,  consisting  of  bowls,  flagons, 
'censers,  and  a  good  deal  of  other  plate.  Most  of  the 
vessels  were  only  of  silver,  and  therefore  they  made 
a  show  quite  out  of  proportion  to  their  value.  They 
a  ^7200.  b  Cp.  vi.  22  fin. 


443  COUNCIL    OF    WAR. 

VI.      also  gave   private  entertainments  to  the   crews   of  the  B.C.  415. 
triremes  :  on  each  of  these  occasions  they  produced,  as  O1'  9I>  2' 
their  own,  drinking-vessels  of  gold  and  silver  not  only 
collected  in  Egesta  itself,  but  borrowed  from  the  neigh- 
bouring towns,  Phoenician  as  well  as  Hellenic.     All  of 
them  exhibiting   much   the  same   vessels   and   making 
everywhere   a  great  display,  the  sailors  were   amazed, 
and  on  their  arrival  at  Athens  told  every  one  what  heaps 
of  wealth  they  had  seen.     When  the  news  spread  that 
the  Egestaeans  had  not  got  the  money,  great  was  the 
unpopularity   incurred   throughout   the    army  by  these 
men,  who  having   been  first  imposed  upon  themselves 
had  been  instrumental  in  imposing  upon  others. 
47.  The  generals  now  held  a  council  of  war.     Nicias  was 

Opinions     of  opinion  that   they  should  sail  with   the  whole   fleet 

of  the  three  .  r  J  . 

generals,  against  belmus,  which  was  their  mam  errand  :  if  the 
would  sail  Egestaeans  provided  pay  for  all  their  forces,  they  would 
leHnus  shape  their  course  accordingly;  if  not,  they  would  de- 
making  the  mand  maintenance  for  sixty  ships,  the  number  which  the 

Egestaeans 

pay.  Egestaeans  had  requested  a,  and  remain  on  the  spot  until 


they  had  brought  the  Selinuntians  to  terms  either  by 
^orce  or  ^Y  negotiation.     They  would  then  pass  along 
he  would     the  coast  before  the  eyes  of  the  other  cities  and  display 
home.         the  visible  power  of  Athens,  while  they  proved  at  the 
same  time  her  zeal  in  the  cause  of  her  friends  and  allies  ; 
after  this  they  would  return  home,  unless  a  speedy  way 
of  relieving  the  Leontines  or  obtaining   support  from 
some  of  the  other  cities  should  unexpectedly  present 
itself.      But    they   should    not   throw   away   their  own 
resources  and  imperil  the  safety  of  Athens. 
48.          Alcibiades  urged  that  it  would  be  a  disgrace  to  have 
Aicibiades   gone  forth  with  so  great  an  armament  and  to  return 


more  ;  without  achieving  anything.  They  should  send  envoys 
to  every  city  of  Sicily,  with  the  exception  of  Selinus 
and  Syracuse;  they  should  also  negotiate  with  the  Sicels, 


first  gaining  making  friends  of  the  independent  tribes,  and  persuading 
other          the  rest  to  revolt  from  the  Syracusans.     They  would 

a  Gp.  vi.  8  init. 


OPINIONS   OF   THE    GENERALS.  443 

B.C.  415.  thus  obtain  food  and  reinforcements.     They  should  first      VI. 
2'  appeal   to   the   Messenians,   whose   city   being   on   the  Sicilian 
highway  of  traffic  was  the  key  of  Sicily,  and  possessed 
a  harbour  from  which  the  Athenian  forces  could  most 
conveniently  watch  the  enemy.     Finally,  when  they  had 
brought  the  cities  over  to  them  and   knew  who  would 
be  on  their  side  in  the  war,  they  should  attack  Selinus 
and  Syracuse,  unless  the  Selinuntians  would  come   to 
terms  with  the  Egestaeans,  and  the  Syracusans  would 
permit  the  restoration  of  the  Leontines. 

Lamachus  was  of  opinion   that   they  ought   to    sail      49. 
direct  to  Syracuse,  and  fight  as  soon  as  possible  under  Lamachus 
the  walls   of  the  city,  while  the   inhabitants  were  un-  that  the 

i          i    ,t  ,•  i     •    -t  .        TT     Athenians 

prepared  and  the  consternation  was  at  its  height.  He  should  sail 
argued  that  all  armies  are  most  terrible  at  first  ;  if  the  andXhT" 
appearance  of  them  is  long  delayed  the  spirits  of  men 


revive,  and,  when  they  actually  come,  the  sight  of  them  should 
only  awakens  contempt  a.  If  the  Athenians  could  strike  thetr  fleet 
suddenly,  while  their  opponents  were  still  in  fear  and  at 
suspense,  that  would  be  the  best  chance  of  victory.  Not 
only  the  sight  of  the  armament  which  would  never  seem 
so  numerous  again,  but  the  near  approach  of  suffer- 
ing, and  above  all  the  immediate  peril  of  battle,  would 
create  a  panic  among  the  enemy.  Many  of  the  Syra- 
cusans would  probably  be  cut  off  in  the  country,  not 
believing  in  the  approach  of  an  invader  ;  and  while  the 
villagers  were  trying  to  convey  their  property  into  the 
city,  their  own  army,  which  would  be  encamped  close 
under  the  walls,  would  be  masters  of  the  field  and 
could  have  no  lack  of  provisions.  In  the  end,  the  other 
Sicilian  Greeks,  instead  of  joining  th.e  Syracusan  alli- 
ance, would  come  over  to  them,  and  would  no  longer 
hesitate  and  look  about  them  to  see  which  side  would 
conquer.  He  was  also  of  opinion  that  they  should 
make  Megara  their  naval  station,  bthe  fleet  returning 

a  Cp.  vii.  42  med. 

b  Reading  e^op/Luo-tfeWay,  a  conjecture  of  Schaefer's  adopted  by 


444    ALCIBIADES   AT   NAXOS   AND    CAT  AN  A. 

VI.  thither  from  Syracuse  and  anchoring  in  the  harbour b.  B.C.  415. 
The  place  was  deserted,  and  was  not  far  distant  from  9I'  2* 
Syracuse  either  by  land  or  by  sea. 

50.  Lamachus  having  thus  spoken  nevertheless  gave  his 
The  P1^  of  own  v°ice  f°r  *-he  ProPosal  of  Alcibiades.  Whereupon 
is  pursued,  Alcibiades  sailed  across  in  his  admiral's  ship  to  Messene 
himself  and  proposed  an  alliance  to  the  inhabitants.  He  failed 
tnvoyato  to  convince  them,  for  they  refused  to  receive  the  Athe- 
Messene,  nians  into  the  city,  although  they  offered  to  open  a 

but  is  not  J      .  &  J  c 

admitted,     market  for  them  outside  the  walls.     So  he  sailed  back 
nian  force    to  Rhegium.     The  generals  at  once  manned  sixty  ships, 


selecting  the  crews  indifferently  out  of  the  entire  fleet; 
butde*~  and  taking  the.  necessary  provisions  coasted  along  to 
Catana.  Naxos  ;  they  left  the  rest  of  the  army  and  one  of  them- 
to  Syracuse,  selves  at  Rhegium.  The  Naxians  received  them  into 
their  city,  and  they  sailed  on  to  Catana ;  but  the  Cata- 
naeans,  having  a  Syracusan  party  within  their  walls, 
denied  admission  to  them ;  so  they  moved  to  the  river 
Terias  and  there  encamped.  On  the  following  day  they 
went  on  to  Syracuse  in  long  file  with  all  their  ships,  except 
ten,  which  they  had  sent  forward  to  sail  into  the  great 
harbour  and  see  whether  there  was  any  fleet  launched. 
On  their  approaching  the  city  a  herald  was  to  proclaim 
from  the  decks  that  the  Athenians  had  come  to  restore 
their  allies  and  kinsmen  the  Leontines  to  their  homes, 
and  that  therefore  any  Leontines  who  were  in  Syracuse 
should  regard  the  Athenians  as  their  friends  and  bene- 
factors, and  join  them  without  fear.  When  the  pro- 
clamation had  been  made,  and  the  fleet  had  taken  a 
survey  of  the  city,  and  harbours,  and  of  the  ground 
which  was  to  be  the  scene  of  operations,  they  sailed 
back  to  Catana. 

5 1 .          The  Catanaeans  now  held  an  assembly,  and  although 
They  return  they  still  refused  to  receive   the   army,  they  told  the 

to  Catana,  ,  .  .  .  t .  .       .    . 

where  the    generals   to  come   m   and   say  what   they  had  to  say. 
rwayrisnfind  While  Alcibiades  was  speaking  and  the  people  of  the 


Poppo ;  or,  following  the  MSS.  and  reading  efpopp-yfievTas:  'there 
taking  up  a  secure  position  and  thence  attacking  Syracuse.' 


RECALL    OF   ALCIBIADES.  445 

B.C.  415.  city  had   their  attention  occupied   with   the  assembly,      VI. 
9I'  2'  the   soldiers   broke   down    unobserved   a   postern    gate 


which  had  been  badly  walled  up,  and  finding  their  way  speaking. 

.    '  .  ,  The  whole 

into  the  town  began  to  walk  about  in  the  market-place,  fleet  re- 


Those  of  the  Catanaeans  who  were  in  the  Syracusan 
interest,  when  they  saw  that  the  enemy  had  entered, 
took  alarm  and  stole  away.  They  were  not  numerous, 
and  the  other  Catanaeans  voted  the  alliance  with  the 
Athenians,  and  told  them  to  bring  up  the  rest  of  their 
army  from  Rhegium.  The  Athenians  then  sailed  back 
to  Rhegium,  and  with  their  entire  force  moved  to 
Catana,  where  on  their  arrival  they  began  to  establish 
their  camp. 

But  meanwhile  news  came  from  Camarina  that  if  they      52. 

would  go  thither  the  Camarinaeans  would  join  them.  The  Athe- 

nians sail 
They  also  heard  that  the  Syracusans  were  manning  a  first  to 

navy.     So  they  sailed  with   their  whole  force  first   to  wShl's 
Syracuse,  but  they  found  that  there  was  no  fleet   in  ^'J^ 
preparation  ;    they  then   passed   on   to  Camarina,   and  *?  Cama- 

rma,  but 

putting  in  to  the  open  beach  they  sent  a  herald  oto  the  they  are  not 
city.     The  citizens  would  not  receive  them,  declaring  [henTd 
that  their  oatha  bound  them  not  to  receive  the  Athe- 
nians if  they  came  with   more   than  one  ship,  unless 
they  themselves  sent  for  a  greater  number.     So  they 
sailed  away  without  effecting  their  purpose.     They  then 
disembarked  on  a  part  of  the  Syracusan  territory,  which 
they  ravaged.     But  a  few  Syracusan  horse  coming  up 
killed    some    of   their    light  -armed    troops    who    were 
straggling.     They  then  returned  to  Catana. 

There  they  found  that  the  vessel  Salaminia  had  come       53* 
from  Athens  to  fetch  Alcibiades.  who  had  been  put  upon  The.  Sala~ 

*  r        mmia 

his  trial  by  the  state  and  was  ordered  home  to  defend  comes  to 
himself.   With  him  were  summoned  certain  of  his  soldiers,  Alcibiades. 
who   were  accused,  some   of  profaning   the   mysteries,  o^the6™ 
others  of  mutilation  of  the  Hermae.     For  after  the  de-  Athenians, 

who  con- 

parture  of  the  expedition  the  Athenians  prosecuted  both  nect  the 

,  ,  „,,  .'•  i         a    •  ,•  mutilation 

enquiries  as  keenly  as  ever.     They  did  not  investigate  Of  the 
a  Cp.  iv.  65  init. 


446        RECOLLECTIONS    OF    THE    TYRANTS. 

VI.      the  character  of  the  informers,  but  in  their  suspicious  B.C.  415. 
Hermae      mOod  listened  to  all  manner  of  statements,  and  seized  OL  9I>  2* 

witn  tnc 

tradition  of  and  imprisoned  some  of  the  most  respectable  citizens 
tratidae.      on  the  evidence  of  wretches  ;  they  thought  it  better  to 

sift  the  matter  and  discover  the  truth  ;  and  they  would  . 
not  allow  even  a  man  of  good  character  against  whom 
an  accusation  was  brought  to  escape  without  a  thorough 
investigation,  merely  because  the  informer  was  a  rogue. 
For  the  people,  who  had  heard  by  tradition  that  the 
tyranny  of  Pisistratus  and  his  sons  ended  in  great  op- 
pression, and  knew  moreover  that  their  power  was 
overthrown,  not  by  Harmodius  or  any  efforts  of  their 
own,  but  by  the  Lacedaemonians  a,  were  in  a  state  of 
incessant  fear  and  suspicion. 

54-  Now  the  attempt  of  Aristogiton  and  Harmodius  arose 

Ni°s  the*"     out  °^  a  ^ove  a^a^r>  which  I  will  narrate  at  length  ;  and 
reigning      the  narrative  will  show  that  the  Athenians  themselves 

tyrant,  but       ...  .. 

Hipparchus  give  quite  an  inaccurate  account  of  their  own  tyrants, 
was  siainlbiy  an<^  °f  the  incident  in  question,  and  know  no  more  than 
SdrAris~-US  otlier  Hellenes  b.     Pisistratus  died  at  an  advanced  age  B.C.  527. 
togiton.       in  possession  of  the  tyranny,  and  then,  not,  as   is   the 
tempt  arose  common  opinion,  Hipparchus,   but    Hippias  (who   was 
Sveaffiiir.   the  eldest  of  his  sons)  succeeded  to  his  power.  —  Har-  B.C.  514. 
m°dius  was  in  the  flower  of  youth,  and  Aristogiton,  a 


though  citizen   of  the   middle   class,  became   his   lover.     Hip- 

were  not  parchus   made   an   attempt    to   gain   the    affections   of 

virtues  or  Harmodius,  but  he  would  not  listen  to  him,  and  told 

modem-  in  Aristogiton.     The  latter  was  naturally  tormented  at  the 

tion:they  idea,  and   fearing   that  Hipparchus  who  was   powerful 

retained  the  . 

ancient  would  resort  to  violence,  at  once  formed  such  a  plot 
kept'  their  as  a  man  in  his  station  might  for  the  overthrow  of  the 
tyranny'  Meanwhile  Hipparchus  made  another  attempt; 
he  had  no  better  success,  and  thereupon  he  determined, 
not  indeed  to  take  any  violent  step,  but  to  insult 
Harmodius  cin  some  secret  place0,  so  that  his  motive 

a  Cp.  Herod,  v.  65.  *>  Cp.  i.  20. 

c  Reading  TOTTW  with  all  the  MSS.  ;  or,  reading  rpoira:  'in  some 
underhand  manner.' 


HIPPIAS    THE   ELDER   SON.  447 

B.c.  514.  could  not  be  suspected.  To  use  violence  would  have  VI. 
'  been  at  variance  with  the  general  character  of  his  ad- 
ministration, which  was  not  unpopular  or  oppressive 
to  the  many;  in  fact  no  tyrants  ever  displayed  greater 
merit  or  capacity  than  these.  Although  the  tax  on 
the  produce  of  the  soil  which  they  exacted  amounted 
only  to  five  per  cent.,  they  improved  and  adorned  the 
city,  and  carried  on  successful  wars  ;  they  were  also  in 
the  habit  of  sacrificing  in  the  temples.  The  city  mean- 
while was  permitted  to  retain  her  ancient  laws  ;  but 
the  family  of  Pisistratus  took  care  that  one  of  their 
own  number  should  always  be  in  office.  Among  others 
who  thus  held  the  annual  archonship  at  Athens  was 
Pisistratus,  a  son  of  the  tyrant  Hippias.  He  was  named 
after  his  grandfather  Pisistratus,  and  during  his  term  of 
office  he  dedicated  the  altar  of  the  Twelve  Gods  in  the 
Agora,  and  another  altar  in  the  temple  of  the  Pythian 
Apollo.  The  Athenian  people  afterwards  added  to 
one  side  of  the  altar  in  the  Agora  and  so  concealed 
the  inscription  upon  it  ;  but  the  other  inscription  on 
the  altar  of  the  Pythian  Apollo  may  still  be  seen, 
although  the  letters  are  nearly  effaced.  It  runs  as 
follows  :  — 

*  Pisistratus  the  son  of  Hippias  dedicated  this  memorial  of  his 
archonship  in  the  sacred  precinct  of  the  Pythian  Apollo. 

That  Hippias  was  the  eldest  son  of  Pisistratus   and      55» 
succeeded  to  his   power   I   can   positively  affirm  from 


special  information  which  has  been  transmitted  to  me.  more  or 
But  there  is  other  evidence.  Of  the  legitimate  sons  of  vincing, 
Pisistratus  he  alone  had  children;  this  is  indicated  by 
the  altar  just  mentioned,  and  by  the  column  which  the 
Athenians  set  up  in  the  Acropolis  to  commemorate  son 
the  oppression  of  the  tyrants.  For  on  that  column  no 
son  of  Thessalus  or  of  Hipparchus  is  named,  but  five 
of  Hippias  who  were  born  to  him  of  Myrrhine  the 
daughter  of  Callias  the  son  of  Hyperechides  ;  now  there 
is  a  presumption  that  the  son  who  married  first  would 


HARMODIUS   AND    ARISTOGITON. 

VI.  be  the  eldest.  Moreover,  his  name  is  inscribed  a  on  the  B.C.  514. 
same  column*  immediately  after  his  father's  ;  this  again  66<  3' 
is  a  presumption  that  he  was  his  eldest  son  and  suc- 
ceeded him.  I  think  too  that  Hippias  would  have 
found  a  difficulty  in  seizing  the  tyranny  if  Hipparchus 
had  been  tyrant  at  the  time  of  his  death  and  he  had 
tried  to  step  into  his  place.  As  it  was,  owing  to  the 
habitual  dread  which  he  had  inspired  in  the  citizens, 
and  the  strict  discipline  which  he  maintained  among 
his  body-guard,  he  held  the  government  with  the  most 
perfect  security  and  without  the  least  difficulty.  Nor 
did  he  behave  at  all  like  a  younger  brother,  who  would 
not  have  known  what  to  do  b  because  he  had  not  been 
regularly  used  to  command  b.  Yet  Hipparchus  by 
reason  of  his  violent  end  became  famous,  and  obtained 
in  after  ages  the  reputation  of  having  been  the  tyrant. 
56.  When  Hipparchus  found  his  advances  repelled  by 
The  rest  of  Harmodius  he  carried  out  his  intention  of  insulting  him. 
TheSre-7'  There  was  a  young  sister  of  his  whom  Hipparchus  and 
Harmodius  ^s  friends  first  invited  to  come  and  carry  a  sacred 
aitonAriSt°~  t>as^et  m  a  procession,  and  then  rejected  her,  declaring 
that  she  had  never  been  invited  by  them  at  all  because 
she  was  unworthy.  At  this  Harmodius  was  very  angry, 
and  Aristogiton,  for  his  sake,  more  angry  still.  They  and 
the  other  conspirators  had  already  laid  their  prepara- 
tions, but  were  waiting  for  the  festival  of  the  great 
Panathenaea,  when  the  citizens  who  took  part  in  the 
procession  assembled  in  arms  ;  for  to  wear  arms  on  any 
other  day  would  have  aroused  suspicion.  Harmodius 
and  Aristogiton  were  to  begin  the  attack,  and  the  rest 
were  immediately  to  join  in,  and  engage  with  the  guards. 
The  plot  had  been  communicated  to  a  few  only,  the 
better  to  avoid  detection  ;  but  they  hoped  that,  however 


a  Or,  reading  with  nearly  all  the  MSS.  ev  T§  Trpatrrj  orryAj?  :  '  on  the 
front  part  of  the  column.'  But  the  words  can  hardly  bear  this 
meaning.  The  word  TrpooT??  is  probably  derived  from  TT/JWTOS  which 
follows. 

b  Or,  giving  a  more  precise  sense  to  ^vye^eos:  'because  he  had 
succeeded  to  the  command  and  not  been  used  to  it,' 


ASSASSINATION   OF  HIPPARCHUS.          449 

B.C.  514.  few  struck  the  blow,  the  crowd  who  would  be  armed,      VI. 
3<  although  not  in  the  secret,  would  at  once  rise  and  assist 
in  the  recovery  of  their  own  liberties. 

The  day  of  the  festival  arrived,  and  Hippias  went  out       5  7. 
of  the  city  to  the  place  called  the  Ceramicus,  where  he  Harmodius 

.     ,        .  ,      .  .  ,  111-  1  and  Aris- 

was  occupied  with  his  guards  in  marshalling  the  pro-  togiton, 
cession.     Harmodius  and  Aristogiton,  who  were  ready  thaftheyg 
with  their  daggers,  stepped  forward  to  do  the  deed.    But  {j^b*jn 
seeing  one  of  the  conspirators  in  familiar  conversation  leave  Hip- 
with  Hippias,  who  was  readily  accessible  to  all,  they  fail  upon 
took  alarm  and  imagined  that  they  had  been  betrayed, 
and  were  on  the  point  of  being  seized.    Whereupon  they 


determined  to  take  their  revenge  first  on  the  man  who  and  their 
had  outraged  them  and  was  the  cause  of  their  desperate 
attempt.  So  they  rushed,  just  as  they  were,  within  the 
gates.  They  found  Hipparchus  near  the  Leocorium,  as 
it  was  called,  and  then  and  there  falling  upon  him  with 
all  the  blind  fury,  one  of  an  injured  lover,  the  other  of  a 
man  smarting  under  an  insult,  they  smote  and  slew  him. 
The  crowd  ran  together,  and  so  Aristogiton  for  the 
present  escaped  the  guards  ;  but  he  was  afterwards  taken 
and  not  very  gently  handled.  Harmodius  perished  on 
the  spot. 

The  news  was  carried  to  Hippias  at  the  Ceramicus  ;       58. 
he  went  at  once,  not  to  the  place,  but  to  the  armed  men  Hippias, 
who  were  to  march  in  the  procession  and,  being  at  a  hi 
distance,  were  as  yet  ignorant  of  what  had  happened. 
Betraying  nothing  in  his  looks  of  the  calamity  which  had  j 
befallen  him,  he  bade  them  leave  their  arms  and  go  to  a  suspected. 
certain   spot  which   he   pointed  out.     They,  supposing 
that  he  had  something  to  say  to  them,  obeyed,  and  then 
bidding  his  guards  seize  the  arms,  he  at  once  selected 
those  whom  he  thought  guilty,  and  all  who  were  found 
carrying  daggers  ;  for  the  custom  was  to  march  in  the 
procession  with  spear  and  shield  only. 

Such  was  the  conspiracy  of  Harmodius  and  Aristogiton,       59. 
which  began  in  the  resentment  of  a  lover  ;  the  reckless  TrhTe  mie 

of  Hippias 

attempt  which  followed  arose  out  of  a  sudden  fright,  grows  op- 


450  DEPOSITION   OF  HIPPIAS. 

VI.      To  the  people  at  large  the  tyranny  simply  became  more  B.C.  514. 
pressive.      oppressive,  and  Hippias,  after  his  brother's  death  living  ° 
deposed      in  great  fear,  slew  many  of  the  citizens  ;  he  also  began 
Lacedae-     to  l°°k  abroad  in  hope  of  securing  an  asylum  should 
SidngoeSsto  a  rev°lution  occur.     Himself  an  Athenian,  he  married 
the  court     his  daughter  Archedice  to  a  Lampsacene,  Aeantides,  son 
Epitaph  '     of  Hippocles  the  tyrant  of  Lampsacus  ;   for  he  observed 
daughter     that  the  family  of  Hippocles  had  great  influence  with 
Archedice.   King  Darius.     Her  tomb  is  at   Lampsacus,  and  bears 
this  inscription  :  — 

'  This  earth  covers  Archedice  the  daughter  of  Hippias, 
A  man  who  was  great  among  the  Hellenes  of  his  day. 
Her  father,  her  husband,  her  brothers,  and  her  sons  were 

tyrants, 
Yet  was  not  her  mind  lifted  up  to  vanity.' 

Hippias  ruled  three  years  longer  over  the  Athenians. 
In  the  fourth   year  he  was  deposed  by  the   Lacedae-  B.C.  510. 
monians   and    the    exiled   Alcmaeonidae.      He    retired  OL  6?'  3' 
under  an   agreement,    first   to    Sigeium,   and    then   to 
Aeantides  at  Lampsacus.     From  him  he  went  to  the 
court  of  Darius,  whence  returning  twenty  years   later 
with  the  Persian  army  he  took  part  in  the  expedition  to 
Marathon,  being  then  an  old  man. 

60.          The    Athenian    people,    recalling    these    and    other  B.C.  415. 
TheAthe-   traditions   of  the   tyrants   which   had   sunk   deep   into01'91'2 

mans  be-         .... 

come  more  their  minds,  were  suspicious  and  savage  against  the 
excited*6  supposed  profaners  of  the  mysteries  ;  the  whole  affair 
actTofir-  seemed  to  them  to  indicate  some  conspiracy  aiming  at 


!!      oligarcny  or  tyranny.    Inflamed  by  these  suspicions  they 
believe  to     had  already  imprisoned  many  men  of  high  character. 


There  was  no  sign  of  returning  quiet,  but  day  by  day 
trie  movement  became  more  furious  and  the  number  of 
cracy.         arrests   increased.     At  last  one   of  the  prisoners,  who 

Confession 

of  one        was  believed  to  be  deeply  implicated,  was  induced  by  a 

prisoners,     fellow-prisoner  to  make  a  confession  —  whether  true  or 

false  I   cannot  say;  opinions  are  divided,   and   no  one 

knew  at  the  time,  or  to  this  day  knows,  who  the  offenders 

were.     His  companion  argued  that  even  if  he  were  not 


THE   MYSTERY    OF   THE   HERMAE.         451 

B.C.  415.  guilty  he  ought  to  confess  and  claim  a  pardon a ;  he  VI. 
2<  would  thus  save  his  own  life,  and  at  the  same  time 
deliver  Athens  from  the  prevailing  state  of  suspicion. 
His  chance  of  escaping  would  be  better  if  he  confessed 
his  guilt  in  the  hope  of  a  pardon,  than  if  he  denied  it 
and  stood  his  trial.  So  he  gave  evidence  both  against 
himself  and  others  in  the  matter  of  the  Hermae.  The 
Athenians  were  delighted  at  finding  out  what  they 
supposed  to  be  the  truth  ;  they  had  been  in  despair  at 
the  thought  that  the  conspirators  against  the  democracy 
would  never  be  known,  and  they  immediately  liberated 
the  informer  and  all  whom  he  had  not  denounced.  The 
accused  they  brought  to  trial,  and  executed  such  of  them 
as  could  be  found.  Those  who  had  fled  they  condemned 
to  death,  and  promised  a  reward  to  any  one  who  would 
kill  them.  No  one  could  say  whether  the  sufferers  were 
justly  punished  ;  but  the  beneficial  effect  on  the  city  at 
the  time  was  undeniable. 

The  enemies  of  Alcibiades,  who  had  attacked  him      6 1. 
before  he  sailed,  continued  their  machinations,  and  popu-  ^P^l0.11 

r    l         ofAlcibia- 

lar  feeling  was  deeply  stirred  against  him.     The  Athe-  des  in- 
nians  now  thought  that  they  knew  the  truth  about  the 
Hermae,  and  they  were  more  than  ever  convinced  that 
the  violation  of  the  mysteries  which  had  been  laid  to  his 

force  at  the 

charge  was  a  part  of  the  same  conspiracy,  and  was  to  isthmus. 
.     be   explained  in  the  same  way.     It  so  happened  that 
while  the  city  was  in  this  state  of  excitement  a  small 
Lacedaemonian  force  proceeded  as  far  as  the  Isthmus,  Picior\ 

*  <  '  extends  to 

having  something  to  do  in  Boeotia.    They  were  supposed  Argos. 
to  have  come,  not  in  the  interest  of  the  Boeotians,  but  by  minia  is 
a  secret  understanding  with  Alcibiades ;  and  the  Athe- 
nians  really  believed  that  but  for  their  own  alacrity  in 
arresting  the  accused  persons  the  city  would  have  been  Thurii  and 
betrayed.    For  one  whole  night  the  people  lay  in  arms  in  Peiopon- 
the  temple  of  Theseus  which  is  within  the  walls.    About  ne 
this  time  too  the  friends  of  Alcibiades  at  Argos  were  sus- 
pected of  conspiring  against  the  Argive  democracy,  and 
a  Cp.  vi.  27. 
Gg  2 


452     ALCIBIADES    CONDEMNED    TO    DEATH. 

VI.  accordingly  the  Argive  hostages  who  had  been  deposited  B.C.  415. 
in  the  islands a  were  at  once  given  up  by  the  Athe-  Oli  9I>  2' 
nians  to  the  vengeance  of  the  Argive  people.  From 
every  quarter  suspicion  had  gathered  around  Alcibiades, 
and  the  Athenian  people  were  determined  to  have  him 
tried  and  executed;  so  they  sent  the  ship  Salaminia  to 
Sicily  bearing  a  summons  to  him  and  to  others  against 
whom  information  had  been  given.  He  was  ordered  to 
follow  the  officers  home  and  defend  himself,  but  they 
were  told  not  to  arrest  him ;  the  Athenians,  having  re- 
gard to  their  interests  in  Sicily,  were  anxious  not  to  cause 
excitement  in  their  own  camp  or  to  attract  the  attention 
of  the  enemy,  and  above  all  not  to  lose  the  Mantineans 
and  Argives,  whom  they  knew  to  have  been  induced  by 
his  influence  to  join  in  the  expedition  b.  He  in  his  own 
ship,  and  those  who  were  accused  with  him,  left  Sicily 
in  company  with  the  Salaminia,  and  sailed  for  Athens. 
When  they  arrived  at  Thurii  they  followed  no  further, 
but  left  the  ship  and  disappeared,  fearing  to  return  and 
stand  their  trial  when  the  prejudice  against  them  was  so 
violent.  The  crew  of  the  Salaminia  searched  for  them, 
but  after  a  time,  being  unable  to  find  them,  gave  up  the 
search  and  went  home.  Alcibiades,  now  an  exile,  crossed 
not  long  afterwards  in  a  small  vessel  from  Thurii  to  Pelo- 
ponnesus, and  the  Athenians  on  his  non-appearance 
sentenced  him  and  his  companions  to  death. 
62.  The  two  Athenian  generals  who  remained  in  Sicily 

Expedition  now  divided  the  fleet  between  them  by  lot,  and  sailed  to- 
Capture  of  wards  Selinus  and  Egesta ;  they  wanted  to  know  whether 
TheCAthe-   tne  Egestaeans  would  give  them  the  promised  money, 
returnfby    anc*  a*so  to  ascertam  tne  condition  of  the  Selinuntians 
land  to        and  the  nature  of  their   quarrel  with   the  Egestaeans. 
Failure' to    Sailing  along   the   north   coast    of  Sicily,  which  looks 
take  Hybia.  towards  the  Tyrrhenian  Gulf,  they  touched  at  Himera, 
the  only  Hellenic  city  in  this  part  of  the  island.     But 
they  were  not  received,  and  passed  on.    On  their  voyage 
they  took  Hyccara,  a  city  on  the  sea-shore  which,  although 
a  Cp.  v.  84  init.  b  Cp.  vi.  29. 


ATHENIANS  IN  THE  NORTH  OF  SICILY.     453 

B.C.  415.  of  Sicanian  origin,  was  hostile  to  the  Egestaeansa.  They  VI. 
2>  reduced  the  inhabitants  to  slavery,  and  handed  the  place 
over  to  the  Egestaeans,  whose  cavalry  had  now  joined 
them.  The  Athenian  troops  then  marched  back  through 
the  country  of  the  Sicels  until  they  arrived  at  Catana  ; 
the  ships  which  conveyed  the  prisoners  going  round  the 
coast  to  meet  them.  Nicias  had  sailed  straight  from 
Hyccara  to  Egesta,  where  he  did  his  business,  and 
having  obtained  thirty  talents b  of  silver,  rejoined  the 
army  at  Catana.  The  Athenians  on  their  return  disposed 
of  their  slaves0  ;  the  sum  realised  by  the  sale  was  about 
a  hundred  and  twenty  talents  d.  They  next  sailed  round 
to  their  Sicel  allies  and  bade  them  send  reinforcements. . 
Then  with  half  of  their  army  they  marched  against 
Hybla  Geleatis,  a  hostile  town,  which  they  failed  to  take. 
And  so  ended  the  summer. 

Early   in    the   ensuing    winter   the   Athenians    made      63. 
preparations  for  an  attack   upon  Syracuse;    the  Syra-  The  syra~ 
cusans   likewise   prepared  to   take   the  offensive.      For  begin  to  . 
when  they  found  that  their  enemies  did  not  assail  them  Athenians. 
at  once,  as  in  their  first  panic  they  had  expected,  day  by 
day  their  spirits  rose.     And  now  the  Athenians,   after 
cruising  about  at  the  other  end  of  Sicily,  where  they 
seemed  to  be  a  long  way  off,  had  gone  to  Hybla,  and 
their  attack  upon   it   had   failed.     So  the    Syracusans 
despised  them  more  than  ever.     After  the  manner  of  the 
populace  when  elated,  they  insisted  that  since  the  Athe- 
nians would  not  come  to   them,  their   generals  should 
lead  them  against  Catana.     Syracusan  horsemen,  who 
were  always  riding  up  to  the  Athenian  army  and  watch- 
ing  their   movements,  would   ask    insultingly  whether, 
instead  of  resettling  the  Leontines  in  their  old  home, 
they  were  not  themselves  going  to  settle  down  with  their 
good  friends  the  Syracusans  in  a  new  one. 

The  generals  were  aware  of  the  state  of  affairs.     They      64. 
determined  to  draw  the  whole  Syracusan  army  as  far  The  Athe- 

nians  de- 

a  Cp.  vi.  2  med.  b  Cp.  vi.  46  init. 

c  Cp.  vii.  13  fin.  d  ^28,800. 


454 


THE   SYRACUSANS   AT   CATANA. 


VI. 

ceive  the 
Syracusans 
by  a  ficti- 
tious mes- 
sage and 
draw 
them  off 
to  Catana, 


65- 

while  they 
quietly  sail 


as  possible  out  of  the  city,  and  then  in  their  absence  sail  B.C.  415. 
thither  by  night  and  take  up  a  convenient  position  un- 
molested. They  knew  that  they  would  fail  of  their 
purpose*  if  they  tried  to  disembark  their  men  in  the 
face  of  an  enemy  who  was  prepared  to  meet'  them,  or 
if  they  marched  openly  by  land  and  were  discovered, 
for  they  had  no  cavalry  of  their  own,  and  the  Syracusan 
horse  which  were  numerous  would  do  great  harm  to  their 
light-armed  troops  and  their  camp-followers.  Whereas 
if  they  sailed  thither  by  night  they  would  be  enabled  to 
take  up  a  position  in  which  the  cavalry  could  do  them 
no  serious  mischief.  The  exact  spot  near  the  temple  of 
Olympian  Zeus  which  they  afterwards  occupied  was 
indicated  by  Syracusan  exiles  who  accompanied  them. 
Accordingly  the  generals  devised  the  following  plan ; 
they  sent  to  Syracuse  a  man  of  whose  fidelity  they  were 
assured,  but  whom  the  Syracusan  leaders  believed  to  be 
a  friend  of  theirs.  He  was  a  Catanaean,  and  professed 
to  come  from  adherents  of  their  party  whose  names  were 
familiar  to  them,  and  whom  they  knew  to  be  still  re- 
maining in  Catana  b.  He  told  them  that  the  Athenians 
lay  within  the  city  every  night  away  from  the  camp  in 
which  their  arms  were  deposited,  and  if  at  dawn  on  a 
set  day  the  Syracusans  with  their  whole  force  would 
come  and  attack  the.  troops  left  in  the  camp,  their 
partisans  in  Catana  would  themselves  cshut  the  Athe- 
nians up  in  the  town c  and  fire  their  ships ;  meanwhile 
the  Syracusans  might  assault  the  palisade,  and  easily 
take  the  camp  —  preparations  had  been  maded,  and 
many  of  the  Catanaeans  were  in  the  plot ;  from  them 
he  came. 

The  Syracusan  generals  were  already  in  high  spirits, 
and   before  this   proposal   reached  them  had  made  up 


a  Omitting  KOI  before  et  eV  T&V  vt5>v. 
b  Cp.  vi.  51. 

c  Reading  avrovs  after  a.7roK\r}o-eiv :    or,  reading  TOVS  instead  of 
avrovs :  '  shut  up  those  of  the  Athenians  who  were  in  the  town.' 
d  Placing  a  comma  after  f/8r]. 


THE    ATHENIANS   AT   SYRACUSE.  455 

B.C.  415.  their  minds  to  have  all  things  in  readiness  for  a  march      VI. 
2'  to  Catana.   So  they  trusted  the  man  the  more  recklessly,  a 


and  at  once  fixed  the  day  on  which  they  would  arrive,  disembark 
They  then  sent  him  back,  and  issued  orders  for  an  ex-  a 
pedition  to  their  whole  army,  including  the  Selinuntians 
and  the  rest  of  the  allies,  who  had  now  joined  them. 
When  they  were  ready  and  the  appointed  day  drew 
near  they  marched  towards  Catana,  and  encamped  by 
the  river  Symaethus  in  the  Leontine  territory.  The 
Athenians,  aware  of  the  approach  of  the  Syracusans, 
took  all  their  own  army  and  Sicel  or  other  allies  on 
board  their  ships  and  smaller  craft,  and  sailed  away  at 
nightfall  to  Syracuse.  At  dawn  they  disembarked  op- 
posite the  temple  of  Olympian  Zeus,  intending  to  seize 
a  place  for  their  camp  ;  almost  at  the  same  moment  the 
Syracusan  horse  who  had  advanced  before  the  rest  to 
Catana  discovered  that  the  whole  Athenian  army  had 
put  out  to  sea,  whereupon  they  returned  and  told  the 
infantry;  and  then  all  together  hurried  back  to  protect 
the  city. 

The  distance  from  Catana  to  Syracuse  was  considerable,      66. 
and  in  the  meantime  the  Athenians  had  quietly  estab-  They 
lished  themselves   in  an   advantageous   position,  where  strong7  a 
they  could  give  battle  whenever  they  pleased,  and  the  The'syra- 
Syracusan  horse  were  least  likely  to  harass  them  either  cusans 

J  *  return  from 

before  or  during  the  engagement.  On  one  side  they  were  Catana. 
protected  by  walls,  and  houses,  and  trees,  and  a  marsh  ; 
on  another  by  a  line  of  cliffs.  They  felled  the  trees 
near,  and  bringing  them  down  to  the  sea  made  a 
palisade  to  protect  their  ships  ;  on  the  shore  of  Dascon 
too  they  hurriedly  raised  a  fortification  of  rough  stones 
and  logs  at  a  point  where  the  ground  was  most  accessible 
to  the  enemy,  and  broke  down  the  bridge  over  the  river 
Anapus.  No  one  came  out  from  the  walls  to  hinder 
them  in  their  work.  The  first  to  appear  at  all  were  the 
returning  cavalry;  after  a  while  the  infantry  came  up 
and  re-formed.  They  at  once  marched  right  up  to  the 
Athenian  position,  but  the  Athenians  did  not  come  out 


456  SHORT  SPEECH   OF  NICIAS. 

VI.      to  meet  them;    so  they  retired  and  encamped  on  the  B.C.  415. 
other  side  of  the  Helorine  Road. 

67.  On  the  next  day  the  Athenians  and  their  allies  pre- 
The  Athe-   pared  to  give  battle.     Their  order  was  as  follows  : — The 

mans  pre- 
pare for       Argives   and   Mantineans   formed   the   right   wing,  the 

the"  are  Athenians  held  the  centre;  on  the  left  wing  were  the 
d^rTdeep  remammg  allies.  Half  of  their  army  which  formed  the 
and  the  van  was  ranged  eight  deep.  The  other  half  was  drawn 

Syracusans  ... 

sixteen  up  likewise  eight  deep  close  to  their  sleeping-places,  in 
a  hollow  oblong.  The  latter  were  told  to  watch  the 
engagement,  and  to  move  up  to  the  support  of  any  part 
of  the  line  which  might  be  distressed.  In  the  midst  of 
the  reserve  thus  disposed  were  placed  the  baggage- 
bearers.  The  Syracusans  drew  up  their  heavy-armed 
sixteen  deep  ;  the  army  consisted  of  the  whole  Syracusan 
people  and  their  allies,  chiefly  the  Selinuntians,  who  were 
in  the  city;  they  had  also  two  hundred  horsemen  from 
Gela,  and  twenty,  with  about  fifty  archers,  from  Camarina. 
The  cavalry,  numbering  in  all  twelve  hundred,  were 
placed  upon  the  right  wing,  and  beside  them  the  javelin- 
men.  The  Athenians  determined  to  begin  the  attack. 
Just  before  the  battle  Nicias  went  up  and  down,  and 
addressed  the  following  words  to  all  and  each  of  the 
various  peoples  who  composed  the  army : — 

68.  *  What  need,  soldiers,  is  there  of  a  long  exhortation 
We  are       when  we  are  all  here  united  in  the  same  cause  a  ?     The 

picked  men, 

and  they  mere  sight  of  this  great   army  is  more  likely  to   put 

populace  courage  into  you  than  an  eloquent  speech  and  an  infe- 

They  de-  r^or  force  b.   We  are  Argives  and  Mantineans,  and  Athe- 

spise  us,  nians  and  the  chief  of  the  islanders ;  and  must  not  the 

but  will  not 

fight  us.       presence  of  so  many  brave  allies  inspire  every  one  of 

far  from      us  with  a  good   hope   of  victory,  especially  when   we 

re°treltTsd    reflect  that  our  opponents  are  not  like  ourselves  picked 

impossible.  soldiers,  but  a  whole  city  which  has  turned  out  to  meet 

us.     They  are   Sicilians   too,  who    although   they  may 

despise  us,  will  not  stand  their  ground  against  us  ;  for 

their  skill  is  not  equal  to  their  courage.     Consider  again 

a  Cp.  vii.  6 1  init.  b  Cp.  v.  69  fin. ;  vii.  61  fin.,  77  med. 


THE   FIRST  ENGAGEMENT.  457 

B.C.  415.  that  we  are  far  from  home,  and  that  there  is  no  friendly  VI. 
2'  land  near  but  what  you  can  win  with  your  swords a. 
The  generals  of  the  enemy,  as  I  know  well,  are  appealing 
to  very  different  motives.  They  say  to  them,  "  you  are 
fighting  for  your  own  country,"  but  I  say  to  you  that 
you  are  fighting  in  a  country  which  is  not  your  own, 
and  from  which,  if  you  do  not  conquer,  retreat  will  be 
impossible,  for  swarms  of  cavalry  will  follow  at  your 
heels.  Remember  your  own  reputation,  and  charge 
valiantly,  deeming  the  difficulties  of  your  position  and 
the  necessity  which  constrains  you  to  be  more  formidable 
than  the  enemy.' 

Nicias  having   thus   exhorted   his   men  led   them  at      69. 
once  to  the   charge.     The    Syracusans  did  not  expect  The  Syra- 

cusans  are 

that  they  would  have  to  fight  just  at  that  moment,  and  unprepared 

some  of  them  had  even  gone  away  into  the  city,  which 

was  close  at  hand ;  others  came  running  up  as  fast  as 

they  could,  and,  although  late,  joined  the  main  body  one  courage.but 

*  are  deficient 

by  one  at  the  nearest  point.     For  they  showed  no  want  in  skin. 

,      .         .      ^,  .  .,  .     Motives -of 

of  spirit  or  daring  m  this  or  any  other  engagement ;  in  the  two 
courage  they  were  not  a  whit  inferior  to  their  enemies,  armies- 
had  their  skill  only  been  adequate,  but  when  it  failed, 
they  could  no  longer  do  justice  to  their  good  intentions. 
On  this  occasion  they  were  compelled  to  make  a  hasty 
defence,  for  they  never  imagined  that  the  Athenians 
would  begin  the  attack.  Nevertheless  they  took  up  their 
arms  and  immediately  went  forward  to  meet  them. l  For 
a  while  the  throwers  of  stones,  and  slingers,  and  archers 
skirmished  in  front  of  the  two  armies,  driving  one  an- 
other before  them  after  the  manner  of  light-armed 
troops.  Then  the  soothsayers  brought  out  the  customary 
victims,  and  the  trumpets  sounded  and  called  the  infantry 
to  the  charge.  The  two  armies  advanced  ;  the  Syracusans 
to  fight  for  their  country,  and  every  man  for  life  now, 
and  liberty  hereafter;  on  the  opposite  side  the  Athe- 
nians to  gain  a  new  country,  and  to  save  the  old  from 
defeat  and  ruin  ;  the  Argives  and  the  independent  allies 
a  Cp.  vii.  77  fin. 


458  DEFEAT    OF    THE   SYRACUSANS. 

VI.  eager  to  share  the  good  things  of  Sicily,  and,  if  they  B.C.  415. 
returned  victorious,  to  see  their  own  homes  once  more. 
The  courage  of  the  subject  allies  was  chiefly  inspired  by 
a  lively  consciousness  that  their  only  chance  of  life  was 
in  victory;  they  had  also  a  distant  hope  that,  if  they 
assisted  the  Athenians  in  overthrowing  others,  their  own 
yoke  might  be  lightened. 

7°-          The  armies  met,  and  for  a  long  time  the  issue  was 
cusans7are    doubtful.     During  the  battle  there  came  on  thunder  and 
defeated,      lightning,  and  a  deluge  of  rain  ;    these  added  to   the 
are  saved  in  terror  of  the  inexperienced  who  were   fighting  for  the 
byetheirreat  first  time,  but  experienced  soldiers  ascribed  the  storm 
cavalry.       to   ^he  time   of   year,    and  were   much  more   alarmed 
aat  the  stubborn  resistance  of  the  enemy  a.     First  the 
Argives  drove  back  the  left  wing  of  the  Syracusans  ; 
next  the  Athenians  the  right  wing  which  was  opposed 
to  them.     Whereupon  the  rest  of  the  army  began  to 
give  way  and  were  soon  put  to  flight.     Their  opponents 
did  not  pursue  them  far,  for  the  Syracusan  horsemen, 
who  were  numerous  and  had  not  shared  in  the  defeat, 
interposed,  and  wherever  they  saw  hoplites  advancing 
from  the  ranks  attacked  and  drove   them   back.     The 
Athenians  pursued  in  a  body  as  far  as  they  safely  could, 
and  then  returned  and  raised  a  trophy.    The  Syracusans 
rallied  on  the  Helorine  Road,  and  did  their  best  to  re- 
form after  their  defeat.     They  did  not  neglect  to  send 
some  of  their  forces  as  a  guard  to  the  Olympieum,  fear- 
ing lest  the  Athenians  should  plunder  the  treasures  of 
the  temple.     The  rest  of  the  army  returned  to  the  city. 
71.          The  Athenians,  however,  did  not  go  to  the  temple  at 
The  Athe-   all}  but  collecting  their  dead,  and  laying  them  on  a  pyre, 

nians,  sen-  .  ,  ,  <•»•«.->•« 

sibie  of  they  passed  the  night  where  they  were.  On  the  follow-? 
fitiency'in  mg  day  they  gave  back  the  Syracusan  dead  under  a 
cavalry,  £ag  of  truce,  and  gathered  from  the  pyre  the  bones  of 

return  to  °  A  J 

Catana  and  their  own  dead.  There  had  fallen  of  the  Syracusans 
where  they  and  of  their  allies  about  two  hundred  and  sixty ;  of  the 

b  Or,  giving  a  slightly  different  meaning  to  the  present:  'at  the 
prospect  of  the  enemy's  success.' 


RETURN   OF  ATHENIANS    TO    CAT  AN  A.    459 

B.C.  415.  Athenians   and  their   allies  not    more  than  fifty.     The      VI. 
9I>  2'  Athenians   then  taking  with   them  the  spoils  of  their  intend  to 

winter 

enemies,  sailed  back  to  Catana.     Winter  had  now  set  while  they 
in,  and  they  thought  that  before  they  could  do  anything  forcements" 
more  at  Syracuse  they  must   send  for  horsemen  from  Athens  and 
Athens,   and   collect   others  from  their   Sicilian  allies ;  Sicily- 
without  them  they  would  be  at  the  mercy  of  the  Syra- 
cusan   cavalry.     They   also  wanted  to   obtain   both   in 
Sicily  and  from  Athens  a  supply  of  money,  and  to  gain 
over  some  of  the  Sicilian  cities.     These  would  be  more 
willing  to  listen  to  them  after  their  victory.     They  had 
likewise  to  provide  food,  and  to  make  the  other  requisite 
preparations  for  attacking  Syracuse  in  the  spring.     Ac-       72. 
cordingly  they  sailed  away  to  Naxos  and  Catana,  in- 
tending to  winter. 

The  Syracusans,  after  burying  their  dead,  called  an  Hermo- 
assembly.     Hermocrates  the  son  of  Hermon,  a  man  of  points  out 
first-rate  ability,  of  distinguished  bravery,  and  also  of  cu 
great  military  experience,  came  forward  and  encouraged 
them.     He  told  them  not  to   be   disheartened  at   the  feat, 
result  of  the  battle  ;  for  their  resolution  had  not  been  should  have 
defeated a ;  but  they  had  suffered  from  want  of  disci-  g^erais 
pline.     Yet  they  had  proved  less  unequal  than  might  ^^ more 
have  been  expected  ;  and  they  should  remember  that  better  disci- 

1  .  pline,  and 

they  had  been  contending  against  the  most  experienced  greater 
soldiers  of  Hellas ;  they  were  unskilled  workmen,  and  se 
the  Athenians  masters  in  their  craft b.  Another  great 
source  of  weakness  had  been  the  number  of  generals 
(there  were  fifteen  of  them) ;  the  division  of  authority 
had  produced  disorganisation  and  disorder  among  the 
troops.  If  they  had  a  few  experienced  generals,  and 
during  the  winter  got  their  hoplites  into  order,  providing 
arms  for  those  who  had  none,  and  so  raising  the  number 
of  their  forces  to  the  utmost,  while  at  the  same  time  they 
insisted  on  strict  drill  and  discipline,  they  would  have 
a  good  chance  of  victory ;  for  they  had  courage  already, 
and  only  wanted  steadiness  in  action.  Both  qualities 
a  Gp.  ii.  87  init. ;  vi.  n  fin.  b  Reading 


460          GOOD    ADVICE    OF  HERMOCRATES. 

VI.      would  improve  together  ;  they  would  learn  steadiness  in  B.C.  415. 
the  school  of  danger,  and  their  natural  courage  would  Olt  9I>  2" 
be   reinforced   by  the   confidence  which   skill  inspires. 
The   generals  whom  they  elected  should  be  not  only 
few  but   entrusted   with   full  power,  the  people  taking 
a  solemn  oath  to  them  that  they  would  be  allowed  to 
command  according  to  their  own  judgment.   The  secrets 
of  the  army  would  then  be  better  kept,  and  everything 
would  be  done  in  a  more  orderly  and  straightforward 
manner. 

73-  The  Syracusans  listened  to  him,  and  voted  all  that 
cusansyra~    ke  desired.     They  chose  three  generals  and  no  more  ; 
follow  his     Hermocrates  himself,  Heraclides  the  son  of  Lysimachus, 

advice,  and  .  * 

send  envoys  and  Sicanus  the  son  of  Execestus.  They  also  sent  am- 
and  Lace-  bassadors  to  Corinth  and  to  Lacedaemon  requesting 
daemon.  aj^  an(j  urge(j  fae  Lacedaemonians  to  make  war  openly 

and  decidedly  against  the  Athenians  on  their  behalf; 

thus  they  would  either  draw  them  off  from  Sicily,  or  at 

any  rate  prevent  them  from  sending  reinforcements  to 

the  army  which  was  there  already. 

74-  No  sooner  had  the  Athenians  returned  in  the  fleet  to 
-  Catana  than  they  sailed  to  Messene,  expecting  that  the 


trived  that  cfty  would  be  betrayed  to  them.  But  they  were  dis- 
shouidbe  appointed.  For  Alcibiades,  when  he  was  recalled  and 
nowbetrays  gave  up  his  command,  foreseeing  that  he  would  be  an 
trayers"  exile,  communicated  to  the  Syracusan  party  at  Messene 
The  Athe-  the  piot  of  which  he  was  cognisant  a.  They  at  once  put 

mans  take 

up  their  to  death  the  persons  whom  he  indicated  ;  and  on  the 
quarters  at  appearance  of  the  Athenians  the  same  party,  rising  and 
arming,  prevented  their  admission.  The  Athenians  re- 
mained there  about  thirteen  days,  but  the  weather  was 
bad.  their  provisions  failed,  and  they  had  no  success. 
So  they  went  to  Naxos,  and  having  surrounded  their 
camp  with  a  palisade,  proposed  to  pass  the  winter  there. 
They  also  despatched  a  trireme  to  Athens  for  money 
and  cavalry,  which  were  to  arrive  at  the  beginning  of 
spring. 

a  Cp.  vi.  50  init. 


HERMOCRATES   AT   CAMARINA.  461 

B.C.  415.      The  Syracusans  employed  the  winter  in  raising  a  wall      VI. 
2'  near    the   city,   which   took   in   the    shrine    of  Apollo       75- 


Temenites  and  extended  all  along  that  side  of  Syracuse 
which  looks  towards  Epipolae  ;  they  thus  enlarged  the  tend  the 
area  of  the  city,  and  increased  the  difficulty  of  investing  their  walls. 
it   in   case   of   defeat.      They   fortified   and   garrisoned  Athenian 


Megara,  and  also  raised  a  fort  at  the  Olympieum  a, 
besides  fixing  palisades  at  all  the  landing-places  along  and  send  an 
the  shore.  They  knew  that  the  Athenians  were  wintering  Camanna. 
at  Naxos,  and  so,  marching  out  with  their  whole  army  to 
Catana,  they  ravaged  the  country  and  burnt  the  huts  and 
the  camp  of  the  Athenians  ;  they  then  returned  home. 
They  heard  that  the  Athenians  were  sending  an  embassy 
to  gain  over  the  Camarinaeans  on  the  strength  of  their 
former  alliance,  which  had  been  made  under  Laches  b} 
and  they  despatched  a  counter  embassy  of  their  own. 
They  suspected  that  the  Camarinaeans  had  not  been 
over-zealous  in  sending  their  contingent  to  the  first 
battle,  and  would  not  be  willing  to  assist  them  any 
longer  now  that  the  Athenians  had  gained  a  victory; 
old  feelings  of  friendship  would  revive,  and  they  would 
be  induced  to  join  them.  Accordingly  Hermocrates 
came  with  an  embassy  to  Camarina,  and  Euphemus 
with  another  embassy  from  the  Athenians.  An  assembly 
of  the  Camarinaeans  was  held,  at  which  Hermocrates, 
hoping  to  raise  a  prejudice  against  the  Athenians,  spoke 
as  follows  :  — 

*  We  are  not  here,  Camarinaeans,  because  we  suppose      76. 
that  the    presence  of  the  Athenian  army  will  dismay  We  fear 
you  ;  we  are  more  afraid  of  their  as  yet  unuttered  words,  swords  but 
to  which  you  may  too  readily  lend  an  ear  if  you  hear  Ofethe°rd 


them  without  first  hearing  us.     You  know  the  pretext 

on  which  they  have  come  to  Sicily,  but  we  can  all  guess  tend  to  be 

T-  T  liberators, 

their  real  intentions.  If  I  am  not  mistaken  they  want,  but  they 
not  to  restore  the  Leontines  to  their  city,  but  to  drive  us  enslavers 
out  of  ours.  Who  can  believe  that  they  who  desolate  ^ 


the  cities  of  Hellas  mean  to  restore  those  of  Sicily,  or  wen  as  at 

home,  the 
a  Cp.  vii.  4  fin.  b  Cp.  iii.  86. 


462 


SPEECH   OF   HERMOCRATES. 


VI. 

new  masters 
whom 
Hellas  has 
taken  in 
exchange 
for  the 
Persians. 


77- 

The  old 
tales  and 
the  old 
tricks  are 
being  re- 
peated here. 
Shall 
we  allow 
ourselves  to 
be  taken  in 
by  them 
and  to 
succumb 
one  by  one  ? 


that  the  enslavers  and  oppressors  of  the  Chalcidians  B.C.  415. 
in  Euboea  have  any  feeling  of  kindred  towards  the 
colonists  of  these  Chalcidians  in  Leontini  ?  In  their 
conquests  at  home,  and  in  their  attempt  to  conquer 
Sicily,  is  not  the  principle  upon  which  they  act  one  and 
the  same  ?  The  lonians  and  other  colonists  of  theirs 
who  were  their  allies,  wanting  to  be  revenged  on  the 
Persian,  freely  invited  them  to  be  their  leaders ;  and 
they  accepted  the  invitation.  But  soon  they  charged 
them,  some  with  desertion,  and  some  with  making  war 
upon  each  other  a  ;  any  plausible  accusation  which  they 
could  bring  against  any  of  them  became  an  excuse  for 
their  overthrow.  It  was  not  for  the  liberties  of  Hellas 
that  Athens,  or  for  her  own  liberty  that  Hellas,  fought 
against  the  Persian  ;  they  fought,  the  Athenians  that 
they  might  enslave  Hellas  to  themselves  instead  of  him, 
the  rest  of  the  Hellenes  that  they  might  get  a  new 
master,  who  may  be  cleverer,  but  certainly  makes  a 
more  dishonest  use  of  his  wits. 

'  However,  the  character  of  the  Athenians  is  known  to 
you  already,  and  we  do  not  come  here  to  set  forth  their 
enormities,  which  would  be  an  easy  task,  but  rather  to 
accuse  ourselves.  We  have  had  a  warning  in  the  fate  of 
the  Hellenes  elsewhere  ;  we  know  that  they  were  reduced 
to  slavery  because  they  would  not  stand  by  one  another. 
And  when  the  same  tricks  are  practised  upon  usb,  and 
we  hear  the  old  tale  once  more  about  the  restoration  of 
"  our  kinsmen  the  Leontines,"  and  the  succour  of  "  our 
allies  the  Egestaeans,"  why  do  we  not  all  rise  as  one 
man  and  show  them  that  here  they  will  find,  not  lonians, 
nor  yet  Hellespontians,  nor  islanders,  who  must  always 
be  the  slaves,  if  not  of  the  Persian,  of  some  other  master; 
but  Dorians  c  and  free  inhabitants  of  Sicily,  sprung  from 
the  independent  soil  of  Peloponnesus  ?  Are  we  waiting 
till  our  cities  are  taken  one  by  one,  when  we  know 
that  this  is  the  only  way  in  which  we  can  be  conquered  ? 

a  Cp.  i.  99.  b  Cp.  iv.  6 1  med. 

c  Cp.  i.  124  init. ;  v.  9  init. ;  vii.  5  fin.;  viii.  25  med. 


SPEECH   OF  HERMOCRATES.  463 

B.C.  415.  \Ve  see  what  their  policy  is  :  how  in  some  cases  their      VI. 

Ol.   91,   2. 

cunning  words  sow  ill-feeling  ;  in  others  they  stir  up  war 
by  the  offer  of  alliance  ;  or  again,  by  some  well-invented 
phrase  specially  agreeable  to  an  individual  state  they  do 
it  all  the  mischief  which  they  can.  And  does  any  one 
suppose  that,  if  his  countryman  at  a  distance  perishes, 
the  danger  will  not  reach  him,  or  that  he  who  suffers 
first  will  have  no  companions  in  ruin? 

'  If  any  one  fancies  that  not  he,  but  the  Syracusan,  is      78. 
the  enemy  of  the  Athenian,  and  asks  indignantly  "  why  In  fighting 
should  I  risk  myself  for  you  ?  "  let  him  consider  that  in  are  fighting 
fighting  for  my  country  he  will  be  at  the  same  time  Seives.Ur" 
fighting  in  mine  for  his  own  a.     And  he  will  fight  with  ^  ™foht 


o 
less  danger,  because  I  shall  still  be  in  existence  ;  he  will  behumbied 

but  you 

not  carry  on  the  struggle  alone,  for  he  will  have  me  for  cannot 
an  allyb.     Let  him  consider  that  the  Athenian  is  not       re 
really  seeking  to  chastise  the  enmity  of  the  Syracusan, 
but  under  pretence  of  attacking   me  may  be  quite  as  tion  ;  and 
desirous  of  drawing  hard  and  fast  the  bonds  of  friendship  are  fallen 
with  him.     And  if  any  one  from  envy,  or  possibly  from 
fear  (for  greatness  is  exposed  to  both),  would  have  Syra- 


cuse  suffer  that  we  may  receive  a  lesson,  but  survive  for  y°u  should 

/  have  offered 

his  own  security,  he  is  asking  to  have  a  thing  which  help,  and 

,  -r«  1         n°t  have 

human  power  cannot  compass.  For  a  man  may  regulate  waited  to 
his  own  desires,  but  he  is  not  the  dispenser  of  fortune  c  ;  be  asked- 
and  the  time  may  come  when  he  will  find  himself  mis- 
taken, and  while  mourning  over  his  own  ruin  he  may 
possibly  wish  that  he  could  still  have  my  prosperity 
to  envy.  But  he  cannot  bring  me  back  again  when 
he  has  once  abandoned  me  and  has  refused  to  take  his 
share  in  the  common  danger,  which,  far  from  being 
imaginary,  is  only  too  real.  For  though  in  name  you 
may  be  saving  me,  in  reality  you  will  be  saving  your- 
selves. And  you  especially,  Camarinaeans,  who  are  our 
next  neighbours,  and  on  whom  the  danger  will  fall  next, 
should  have  anticipated  all  this,  and  not  be  so  slack  in 

a  Cp.  iii.  13  med.  b  Reading 

c  Gp.  iv.  64  init. 


464  SPEECH   OF  HERMOCRATES. 

VI.      your  alliance.     Instead  of  our  coming  to  you,  you  should  B.C.  415. 
have  come  to  us.     Suppose  the  Athenians  had  gone  to       9I>  2' 
Camarina  first,  would  you  not  at  this  moment  be  praying 
and  begging  for  assistance  ?      Then  why  did  not  you 
present  yourselves  at  Syracuse,  and  say  to  us  in  our 
time  of  danger,    "Never  yield    to   the   enemy"?    But, 
hitherto,  neither  you  nor  any  of  the  Sicilians  have  shown 
a  spirit  like  this. 

79.  *  You  may  perhaps  disguise  your  cowardice  under  the 
YOU  may  pretence  of  impartiality  ;  you  may  balance  between  us 
partiality,  and  the  invaders,  and  plead  that  you  have  an  alliance  with 
wm  Sly  the  Athenians.  But  that  alliance  was  made  on  the  sup- 
"  position  that  you  were  invaded  by  an  enemy,  not  against  a 


with  your    friend  ;  and  you  promised  to  assist  the  Athenians  if  they 

enemies 

against       were  wronged  by  others,  not  when,  as  now,  they  are  doing 

friends.  wrong  themselves.  Are  the  Rhegians  who  are  Chalci- 
dians  so  very  anxious  to  join  in  the  restoration  of  their 
Leontine  kinsmen  a  ?  And  yet  how  monstrous  that  they, 
suspecting  the  real  meaning  of  this  plausible  claim, 
should  display  a  prudence  for  which  they  can  give 
no  reason  ;  and  that  you,  who  have  every  reason  for 
a  like  prudence,  should  be  eager  to  assist  your  natural 
enemies,  and  to  conspire  with  them  for  the  destruction 
of  those  who  by  a  higher  law  are  your  natural  kinsmen. 
This  should  not  be.  You  must  make  a  stand  against 
them.  And  do  not  be  afraid  of  their  armament.  There 
is  no  danger  if  we  hold  together  ;  the  danger  is  in  dis- 
union, and  they  want  to  disunite  us.  Even  when  they 
engaged  with  our  unaided  forces  b,  and  defeated  us  in 
battle,  they  failed  in  their  main  purpose,  and  quickly 
retired. 
80.  '  If  then  we  can  once  unite,  there  is  no  reason  for  dis- 

union win  couragement.  But  there  is  every  reason  why  you,  who 
are  our  allies,  should  meet  us  more  cordially.  We  may 
be  sure  that  help  will  come  to  us  from  Peloponnesus, 

really  be      ancj  faQ  pelOponnesians  are  far  better  soldiers  than  the 

untrue  to  ••• 

both.          Athenians.     Let  no  one  think  that  the  caution  which 
a  Cp.  vi.  44  fin.,  46  init.  b  But  cp.  vi.  65  init.,  67  med. 


SPEECH    OF   EUPHEMUS.  465 

B.c.  415.  professes  to  be  in  league  with  both,  and  therefore  gives  VI. 
2' aid  to  neither,  is  just  to  us  or  safe  for  you.  Such  a 
policy,  though  it  may  pretend  to  impartiality,  is  really 
unjust.  For  if  through  your  absence  the  victor  over- 
comes and  the  vanquished  falls,  have  you  not  abandoned 
the  one  to  his  fate,  and  allowed  the  other  to  commit 
a  crime  ?  How  much  nobler  would  it  be  to  join  your 
injured  kinsmen,  and  thereby  maintain  the  common  in- 
terest of  Sicily  and  save  the  Athenians,  whom  you  call 
your  friends,  from  doing  wrong  ! 

'  To  sum  up  : — We  Syracusans  are  quite  aware  that  YOU  who 
there  is  no  use  in  our  dilating  to  you  or  to  any  one  else  shouidno"5 
on  matters  which  you  know  as  well  as  ourselves.     But  b?tray  y°ur 

*  kinsmen  to 

we  prefer  a  prayer  to  you ;    and  solemnly  adjure  you  lonians. 
to  consider,  that,  if  you  reject  us,  we,  who  are  Dorians  conquer, 
like  yourselves,  are  betrayed  by  you  to    lonians,   our  absorbed e 
inveterate  enemies,  who  are  seeking  our   ruin.     If  the  j^we'con- 
Athenians  subdue  us,  your  decision   will   have   gained  quer,  we 
them  the  day;  but  the  honour  will  be  all  their  own,  and  you. 
the  authors  of  their  victory  will  be  the  prize  of  their 
victory.    If  on  the  other  hand  we  conquer,  you  who  have 
brought  the  peril  upon  us  will  have  to  suffer  the  penalty. 
Reflect  then,  and  take  your  choice :  will  you  have  pre- 
sent safety  and  slavery,  or  the  hope  of  delivering  your- 
selves and  us,  and  thereby  escaping   the  dishonour  of 
submitting  to  the  Athenian  yoke,  and  the  danger  of  our 
enmity,  which  will  not  be  short-lived?' 

Thus  spoke  Hermocrates.     Euphemus,  the  Athenian      8 1. 
envoy,  replied  as  follows  : — 

'We  had  come  to  renew  our  former  alliance,  but  the      82. 
attack  made  upon  us  by  the  Syracusan  envoy  renders  it  Jr™for^ns 
necessary  for  us  to  vindicate  our  title  to  empire*.     He  and  the 

•  «  •  r  11       enmity  of 

himself  bore  the  strongest  witness  in  our  favour  when  he  Dorian  and 
said  that  Dorians  and  lonians  are  inveterate  enemies. 
And  so  they  are.    We  lonians  dwelling  in  the  neighbour- 
hood  of  the  Peloponnesians  (who  are  Dorians  and  more  empire. 

We  had 

numerous  than  ourselves)  have  had  to  consider  the  best  to  defend 
a  Cp.  i.  73  init. 
Hh 


466  SPEECH   OF  E  UP  HEM  US. 

VI.      way  of  securing  our  independence.     After  the  Persian  B.C.  415. 
^ar  we  were  delivered  by  the  help  of  our  newly-acquired 
navy  from  the  rule  and  supremacy  of  Lacedaemon;  they 
men,  they    had  no  more  right  to  domineer  over  us  than  we  over 
already^65  them,  except  the  right  of  the  stronger,  which  at  the  time 
havewmadde  the>"  possessed.    We  then  assumed  the  leadership  of  the 
slaves  of      King's  former  subjects,  which  we  still  retain  ;  if  we  were 
not  to  be  the  slaves  of  the  Peloponnesians  we  thought 
that  we  must  have  the  means  of  self-defence.    And  what 
if  we  did  subjugate  those  kinsmen  of  ours  whom  the 
Syracusans  say  that  we  have  enslaved,  the  lonians  and 
the  islanders?     On  the  strictest  principles,  where  was 
the  injustice  ?     For  we  were  tljeir  mother-city,  and  they 
joined  in  the  Persian  invasion.    They  had  not  the  courage 
to  revolt  from  him  and  to  destroy  their  homes,  as  we 
did  ..when  we  left  our  city.     But  they  chose,  slavery  for 
their  own  portion,  and  would  have  imposed  it  upon  us. 
83.          'We  rule  then,  in  the  first  place,  because  we  deserve 
We  come     to  rule ;  for  we  provided  the  largest  navy  and  showed 
our  own      the  most  patriotic  alacrity  in  the  cause  of  Hellas  a ;  while 
as  for3"5  we   those  who  became  our  subjects  were  willing  slaves  to  the 
forUroursnd  Persian>  anc^  were  doing  us   mischief.      And   secondly, 
as  well  as    we  were  anxious  to  gain  additional  strength  against  the 

for  our 

own.  Peloponnesians.     We  do  not  tell  you  in  grandiloquent 

words  that  we  have  a  right  to  rule  on  the  ground  that 
we  alone  overthrew  the  Barbarians  b,  nor  do  we  pretend 
that  we  fought  for  the  liberty  of  our  allies,  and  not 
equally  for  our  own  and  the  general  liberty0.  Can 
any  man  be  blamed  because  he  makes  the  natural 
provision  for  his  own  safety d?  The  same  care  of  our 
safety  has  brought  us  hither,  and  we  can  see  that  our 
presence  here  is  for  your  benefit  as  well  as  for  our  own. 
This  we  will  prove  to  you ;  and  our  proofs  shall  be 
drawn  from  the  calumnies  of  our  enemies,  and  from  the 
suspicions  and  fears  which  most  sway  your  minds.  For 
we  know  that  those  who  are  timorous  and  mistrustful 

a  Cp.  i.  74  init.  b  Cp.  v.  89  init. 

c  Cp.  vi.  76  fin.  d  Cp.  i.  75  fin. 


SPEECH   OF  EUPHEMUS.  467 

B.C.  415-  may  be  won   for   the   moment   by  alluring  words,  but      VI. 
2'  that  when  the  time  of  action  comes  they  follow  their 
own  interests. 

'  We  have  told  you  already  that  fear  makes  us  main- 
tain our  empire  at  home  ;  and  that  a  like  fear  brings  us 
to  your  shores.  For  we  desire  by  the  help  of  our 
friends  to  secure  our  position  in  Sicily.  And  we  have 
not  come  to  enslave  you,  but  to  save  you  from  being 
enslaved.  Let  no  one  imagine  that  your  welfare  is  no  84. 
business  of  ours,  for  if  you  are  preserved,  and  are  strong  it  is  for  our 

0  ,  ....  interest  that 

enough  to  hold  out  against   the  Syracusans,  they  will  you  should 
be  less  likely  to  aid  the  Peloponnesians,  and  so  to  injure 


us.     Thus  you  become  at  once  our  first  concern.     And 

we  are  quite  consistent  in  restoring  the  Leontines,  not  sistent  in 

like  their  kinsmen  in  Euboea  to  be  subjects,  but  to  be  the  Chai- 

as  strong  as  ever  we  can  make  them,  that  from  their  { 

position  on  the  border  they  may  harass  the  Syracusans 

and  do  our  work.     In  Hellas  we  are  a  match  for  our  the  Chai- 

cidians  in 

enemies  single-handed  ;  and  as  to  our  subjection  of  the  Euboea. 
Chalcidians  at  home,  which  Hermocrates  finds  so  in- 
consistent with  our  emancipation  of  the  Chalcidians  here, 
it  is  for  our  advantage,  on  the  one  hand,  that  the  cities 
of  Euboea  should  have  no  armed  force  and  contribute 
money  only,  and,  on  the  other  hand,  that  the  Leontines 
and  our  friends  in  Sicily  should  be  as  independent  as 
possible. 

'Now  to  a  tyrant  or  to  an  imperial  citya  nothing  is      85. 
inconsistent  which  is  expedient,  and  no  man  is  a  kins-  ^^ctrin 
man  who  cannot  be  trusted.     In  each   case  we   must  tipie,  and 

,  .  .  that  prin- 

make   friends   or   enemies   according  to  circumstances,  Cjpie  re- 


and  here  our  interest  requires,  not  that  we  should  weaken 

our  friends,  but  that  our  friends  should  be  too  strong 

for  our  enemies.     Do  not  mistrust  us.     In  Hellas  we  act  cases. 

upon  the  same  principle,  managing  our   allies   as  our 

interest    requires    in   their   several   cases.     The  Chians 

and  Methymnaeans  furnish  us  with  ships,  and  are  their 

own  masters  ;   the  majority  are   less   independent,  and 

a  Cp.  ii.  63;  iii.  37  init. 

H  h  3 


468  SPEECH   OF  EUPHEMUS. 

VI.      pay  a  tribute  ;    others,  although  they  are  islanders  and  B.C.  415. 

might  be  easily  conquered,  enjoy  complete  freedom,  be- 

cause they  are  situated  conveniently  for  operations  about 

Peloponnesus  a.      So   that   in    Sicily  too   our   policy  is 

likely  to  be  determined  by  our  interest,  and,  as  I  was 

saying,  by  our  fear  of  the  Syracusans.     For  they  desire 

to  be  your   masters,  but  first  they  must  unite  you  in 

a  common  suspicion  of  us,  and  then  either  by  force,  or 

through  your  isolation  when  we  have  failed  and  retired, 

they  will  dominate  Sicily.     This   is   inevitable   if  you 

now  join  them.     Your  united  power  will  be  more  than 

we  can  manage,  and  the  Syracusans,  when  we  are  gone, 

86.      will  be  too  much  for  you.     He  who  thinks  otherwise 

YOU  told     is   convicted  out  of  his   own   mouth.     For  when   you 

Syracuse      originally  invited  us,  the  danger  which  we  should  incur 

Sicily,  I^d   if  we  allowed  you  to  fall  into  the  hands  of  the  Syra- 

backiVou°U  cusans  was   Precisely  what  you  held  before  our   eyes, 

words.        and  now  you  ought  not  to  distrust   the  argument  by 

You  have  v  &  .  f  ' 

nothing  which  you  hoped  to  convince  us.  JNor  should  you  sus- 
Pect  us  because  we  bring  hither  a  force  larger  than 
before  ;  f°r  we  have  to  contend  against  the  power  of 

much  to      Syracuse.      Much    more   to    be    mistrusted    are    they. 

fear  from  *,  . 

the  Syra-     Without  your  aid  we  cannot  even  remain  where  we  are, 
°  and  if  we  were  so  dishonourable  as  to  make  conquests 


anf  canUrS  we  should  be  unable  to  retain  them  b,  for  the  voyage  is 
always  get  long,  and  it  would  be  a  hopeless  task  to  garrison  great 
You°wiii  be  cities  which,  though  situated  on  an  island,  have  the 


resources  of  a  continent.  Whereas  these  men  are  your 
lost  us  VG  nearest  neighbours.  And  they  dwell,  not  in  a  camp, 
but  in  a  city  far  more  powerful  than  the  forces  which 
we  have  brought  to  Sicily;  they  are  always  scheming 
against  you,  and  never  miss  a  chance,  as  they  have 
often  shown,  especially  in  their  conduct  towards  the 
Leontines.  And  now  they  have  the  impudence  to  stir 
you  up  against  those  who  resist  them,  and  have  thus  far 
saved  Sicily  from  passing  under  their  yoke.  As  if  you 
had  no  eyes!  Far  more  real  than  the  security  offered 
a  Cp.  ii.  7  fin.;  vii.  57  med.  b  Cp.  vi.  u  init. 


SPEECH   OF   E  UP  H  EMUS.  469 

B.C.  415.  by  them  is  that  to  which  we  invite  you,  a  security  which  VI. 
2'  we  and  you  gain  from  one  another,  and  we  beseech  you 
not  to  throw  it  away.  Reflect  :  the  Syracusans  are  so 
numerous  that  with  or  without  allies  they  can  always 
find  their  way  to  you,  but  you  will  not  often  have  the 
chance  of  defending  yourself  with  the  aid  of  an  army 
like  ours.  And  if  from  any  suspicion  you  allow  us  to 
depart  unsuccessful,  or  perhaps  defeated,  the  time  may 
come  when  you  will  desire  to  see  but  a  fraction  of 
that  army,  although,  if  it  came,  it  would  be  too  late  to 
save  you. 

*  But  we  would  not   have   either  you,  Camarinaeans,      3  7. 
or  others  moved  by  their  calumnies.     We  have  told  you  Enough  of 
the  whole  truth  about  the  suspicions  which  are  enter- 
tained  of  us  ;  we  will  now  sum  up  our  arguments,  and 


we  think  that  they  ought  to  convince  you.     We  rule  invitation  ; 

/-    TT    i  and  you 

over  the  cities  of  Hellas  in  order  to  maintain  our  in-  had  better 
dependence,  and  we  emancipate  the  cities  of  Sicily  that  w?  can  be 


they  may  not  be  used  against  us.     And  we  are  com-  °£^se  to 
pelled   to   adopt   a   policy  of  interference   because  we  Do  not 

judge  or 

have  many  interests  to  guard.     Lastly,  we  come  now,  advise  us, 
as  we  came  before,  not  uninvited,  but  upon  your  own  yourselves 
invitation    to   assist   those    of   you    who    are    suffering  °*  °"J 
wrong.     Do  not  sit  in  judgment   upon   our   actions,  or  which  is 

everywhere 

seek  to  school  us  into  moderation  and  so  divert  us  from  the  terror 
our  purpose  (the  time  for  good  advice  has  gone  by),  oppressor 
but  in  as  far  as  our  busy,  meddlesome  spirit  can  be  of  j^J6 
service  to  you  as  well  as  to  ourselves,  take  and  use  us  ;  of  the 

oppressed, 

remember  that  these  qualities,  so  far  from  being  in-  in  your 
jurious  to  all  alike,  actually  benefit  great  numbers  of 
the  Hellenes.  For  in  all  places  —  however  remote  from 
our  sphere  —  both  he  who  fears  and  he  who  intends 
injustice,  the  one  because  he  has  a  lively  hope  that 
from  us  he  will  obtain  redress,  and  the  other  because 
he  may  well  be  alarmed  for  the  consequences  if  we 
answer  to  the  call,  must  both  alike  submit,  the  one  to 
learn  moderation  against  his  will,  the  other  to  receive 
at  our  hands  a  deliverance  which  costs  him  nothing. 


470  CAMARINA    IS   NEUTRAL. 

VI.  Do  not  reject  the  common  salvation  which  is  offered  B.C.  415. 
to  you  at  this  moment,  as  well  as  to  all  who  seek  it, 
but  following  the  example  of  your  countrymen  join  with 
us,  and  instead  of  having  always  to  watch  the  Syra- 
cusans,  assert  your  equality  and  threaten  them  as  they 
have  long  been  threatening  you.' 

88.          Thus  spoke  Euphemus.     Now  the  Camarinaeans  were 
The  Cama-  swayed  by  opposite  feelings ;    they  had  a  good  will  to 

rinaeans          i        A    i        •  11  •    •          1  i  •    i 

suspect  the  the  Athenians,  tempered  by  a  suspicion  that  they  might 
be  intending  to  enslave  Sicily,  whereas  the  Syracusans, 
fr°m  their  proximity,  were  always  at  feud  with  them, 
afraid  of  But  they  were  not  so  much  afraid  of  the  Athenians  as 
cusan  of  their  Syracusan  neighbours,  who,  as  they  thought, 
They  re^5'  might  win  without  their  assistance.  This  was  the  reason 
assist t(tf  W^V  *key  sent  them  the  small  body  of  horse  which  took 
either,  the  part  in  the  first  battle ;  and  in  a  like  spirit  they  now 

Syracusans, 

but  to  determined  that  for  the  future  they  would  give  real  as- 
neutraiity.  sistance  only  to  the  Syracusans,  but  to  a  very  moderate 
extent.  For  the  present  however,  that  they  might  seem 
to  deal  equal  justice  to  the  Athenians,  especially  after 
their  recent  victory,  they  resolved  to  return  the  same 
answer  to  both.  Such  were  the  considerations  which 
led  them  to  reply,  that  as  two  of  their  allies  were  at 
war  with  one  another,  they  thought  that  under  the 
circumstances  the  best  way  of  observing  their  oaths 
would  be  to  assist  neither.  So  the  two  embassies  de- 
parted. 

TheAthe-  The  Syracusans  proceeded  with  their  own  prepara- 
the  Sicel  tions  for  the  war,  and  the  Athenians  who  were  en- 
Theyre-  camped  at  Naxos  tried  by  negotiation  to  gain  over  as 
move  from  many  of  the  Sicels  as  they  could.  The  dwellers  in 

Naxos  to  J  J 

Catana,  the  plain  who  were  subjects  of  the  Syracusans  mostly 
stood  aloof,  but  the  Sicel  settlements  in  the  interior 
(which  had  always  been  independent)  at  once,  with  a 

prepare  for  few  exceptions,  joined  the  Athenians,  and  brought  down 

the  siege  of  * 

Syracuse,  food  to  the  army ;  in  some  cases  money  also.  Against 
those  who  were  recalcitrant,  troops  were  despatched  by 
the  Athenians ;  and  some  of  them  were  forced  into 


SYRACUSANS    AT    CORINTH  AND   SPARTA.    471 

B.c.  415.  submission,  but  others  were  protected  by  the  garrisons  VI. 
2>  which  the  Syracusans  sent  to  their  aid.  They  then 
transferred  their  station  from  Naxos  to  Catana,  and 
reconstructing  the  camp  which  had  been  burnt  by  the 
Syracusans ft,  passed  the  winter  there.  In  the  hope  of 
obtaining  assistance  they  sent  a  trireme  to  Carthage 
with  a  proposal  of  friendship ;  likewise  to  Tyrrhenia, 
since  some  of  the  cities  there  were  offering  of  themselves 
to  join  in  the  war:  to  the  various  Sicel  tribesb  and  to  the 
Egestaeans  they  issued  orders  that  they  were  to  send  as 
many  horse  as  possible.  They  further  prepared  bricks, 
tools,  and  whatever  else  was  requisite  for  siege  opera- 
tions, intending,  when  the  spring  arrived,  to  prosecute 
the  war  with  vigour. 

The    envoys    whom    the    Syracusans    had    sent    to  The  Corin- 
Corinth  and  Lacedaemonc  endeavoured  on  the  voyage  tfcefiret*6 
to  persuade  the  Italian  Greeks  that  they  were  equally  JjJ^  pro- 
threatened  by  the  Athenian  designs,  and  should  take  *? the 

Syracusan 

an  interest  in  the  war.     When  they  arrived  at  Corinth  envoys. 
they  appealed  to  the  Corinthians  for  aid  on  the  ground  withythem 
of  relationship.     The  Corinthians,  taking  the  lead  of  all  ^hST^' 
the  Hellenic  states,  with  the  utmost  enthusiasm  voted  they  ™eet 
the  aid  which  was  asked.    They  sent  with  the  Syracusan  who  had 
envoys   ambassadors  of  their  own  to  the  Lacedaemo-  thither 
nians,  bearing  a  joint  request  that  they  would  resume 
open  hostilities  at  home,  and  unite  with  them  in  sending 
help  to  Sicily.     At   Lacedaemon   the   Corinthian   am- 
bassadors met  Alcibiades   and   his    fellow   exiles.     He 
had  sailed  at  once  from  Thurii  in  a  trading  vessel  to 
Cyllene  in  Elis,  and  thence  proceeded  to  Lacedaemon 
on  the  invitation  of  the   Lacedaemonians   themselves, 
first  obtaining  a  safe-conduct ;  for  he  was  afraid  of  them 
after  his  proceedings  in  the  matter  of  the  Mantinean 
league d.     And  so  it  came  to  pass  that  the  Corinthians, 
the  Syracusans,  and  Alcibiades  appeared  simultaneously 
in  the  Lacedaemonian  assembly,  and  concurred  in  urging 

a  Cp.  vi.  75  med.  b  Cp.  vi.  98  init. 

c  Cp.  vi.  73.  d  Cp.  v.  43  ff.,  61  ff. 


472  ALCIBIADES    AT   SPARTA. 

VI.  the  same  request.  The  Ephors  and  the  magistrates  B.C.  4I$. 
were  already  intending  to  send  envoys  to  the  Syra- 
cusans  bidding  them  make  no  terms  with  the  Athe- 
nians, although  they  were  not  disposed  to  assist  them 
actively.  But  now  Alcibiades  came  forward  and  stimu- 
lated the  energies  of  the  Lacedaemonians  in  the  follow- 
ing words  :  — 

89.  'I  must  endeavour  first  of  all  to  remove  a  prejudice 
I  must  offer  against  myself,  lest  through  suspicion  of  me  you  should 
turn  a  deaf  ear  to  considerations  of  public  interest.  My 
,10  ancestors  in  consequence  of  some  misunderstanding  re- 
but you  nounced  the  office  of  Lacedaemonian  Proxenus  ;  I  myself 

were  un-  * 

grateful,      resumed  it,  and  did  you   many  good  offices,  especially 

and  I  re- 

taliated. after  your  misfortune  at  Pylos.  My  anxiety  to  serve 
demagogue  vou  never  ceased,  but  when  you  were  making  peace  with 
heredha  Athens  you  negotiated  through  my  enemies,  thereby 
leader  of  conferring  power  on  them,  and  bringing  dishonour  upon 
a  whole.  me  a.  And  if  I  then  turned  to  the  Mantineans  and 


'  Argives  and  opposed  you  in  that  or  in  any  other  way 
abuse  *was  ^ou  were  rightly  served,  and  any  one  who  while  the 
our  natural  wound  was  recent  may  have  been  unduly  exasperated 
govern-  against  me  should  now  take  another  and  a  truer  view. 

ment,  and     ,~  ..  -  .  J      -  r 

we  could  Or,  again,  it  any  one  thought  the  worse  ot  me  because 
not  change  j  wag  {ncune(}  to  faQ  people,  let  him  acknowledge  that 
here  too  there  is  no  real  ground  of  offence.  Any 
power  adverse  to  despotism  is  called  democracy,  and 
my  family  have  always  retained  the  leadership  of  the 
people  in  their  hands  because  we  have  been  the  per- 
sistent enemies  of  tyrants.  Living  too  under  a  popular 
government,  how  could  we  avoid  in  a  great  degree 
conforming  to  circumstances  ?  However,  we  did  our 
best  to  observe  political  moderation  amid  the  prevailing 
licence.  But  there  were  demagogues,  as  there  always 
have  been,  who  led  the  people  into  evil  ways,  and  it 
was  they  who  drove  me  outb.  Whereas  we  were  the 
leaders-  of  the  state  as  a  whole6,  and  not  of  a  part 

a  Cp.  v.  43.  b  Cp.  viii.  65  med. 

c  Cp.  vi.  39  init. 


SPEECH    OF   ALCIBIADES.  473 

B.C.  415.  only;  it  was  our  view  that  all  ought  to  combine  in  VI. 
2'  maintaining  that  form  of  government  which  had  been 
inherited  by  us,  and  under  which  the  city  enjoyed  the 
greatest  freedom  and  glory.  Of  course,  like  all  sensible 
men,  we  knew  only  too  well  what  democracy  is,  and 
I  better  than  any  one,  who  have  so  good  a  reason  for 
abusing  it.  The  follies  of  democracy  are  universally 
admitted,  and  there  is  nothing  new  to  be  said  about 
them.  But  we  could  not  venture  to  change  our  form 
of  government  when  an  enemy  like  yourselves  was  so 
near  to  us. 

'  Such  is  the  truth  about  the  calumnies  under  which      90. 
I  labour.     And  now  I  will  speak  to  you  of  the  matter  The  Athe- 
which  you  have  in  hand,  and  about  which  I,  in  so  far  signs  em- 
as    I   have   better   information,  am   bound   to   instruct 


you.    We  sailed  to  Sicily  hoping  in  the  first  place  to  J       Car" 


conquer  the  Sicilian  cities  ;   then  to  proceed  against  the  if  we  suc- 
Hellenes  of  Italy;  and  lastly,  to  make  an  attempt  on  were  going 
the   Carthaginian   dominions,   and   on    Carthage   itself, 
If  all  or  most  of  these  enterprises  succeeded,  we  meant 
finally  to  attack   Peloponnesus,    bringing  with   us   the  Hellas 

J  ^  would  then 

whole  Hellenic  power  which  we  had  gained  abroad,  have  been 
besides  many  barbarians  whom  we  intended  to  hire  —  °l 
Iberians  and  the  neighbouring  tribes,  esteemed  to  be 
the  most  warlike  barbarians  that  now  area.  Of  the 
timber  which  Italy  supplies  in  such  abundance  we  meant 
to  build  numerous  additional  triremes,  and  with  them  to 
blockade  Peloponnesus.  At  the  same  time  making  in- 
roads by  land  with  our  infantry,  we  should  have  stormed 
some  of  your  cities  and  invested  others.  Thus  we  hoped 
to  crush  you  easily,  and  to  rule  over  the  Hellenic  world. 
For  the  better  accomplishment  of  our  various  aims  our 
newly-acquired  territory  would  supply  money  and  pro- 
visions enough,  apart  from  the  revenue  which  we  receive 
in  Hellas. 

'You  have  heard  the  objects  of  our  expedition  from      91. 
him  who  knows  them  best  ;    the  generals  who  remain  Sic,ny  is  lost 

unless  you 
a  Reading  /tiax^corarour  and  placing  a  comma  after  eW. 


474  SPEECH   OF  ALCIBIADES. 

VI.  will  persevere  and  carry  them  out  if  they  can.  And  B.C.  415. 
come  to  the  now  jet  rne  prove  to  you  that  if  you  do  not  come  to  the 
TheSicil-  rescue  Sicily  will  be  lost.  If  the  Sicilian  cities  would 
nottmite,  all  unite  they  might  even  now,  notwithstanding  their 
cufe  alone  want  °^  military  skill,  resist  with  success  ;  but  the  Syra- 
is  no  match  Cusans  alone,  whose  whole  forces  have  been  already 
Athenians,  defeated,  and  who  cannot  move  freely  at  sea,  wilLbe  un- 
lites  andP  able  to  withstand  the  power  which  the  Athenians  already 


commander  ^ave  on  the  spot.     And  Syracuse  once  taken,  the  whole 
at  once,       Qf  Sicily  is  in  their  hands  ;  the  subjugation  of  Italy  will 

and  fortify 

Deceiea.  follow  ;  and  the  danger  which,  as  I  was  saying,  threatens 
what°theeS  7OU  from  that  quarter,  will  speedily  overwhelm  you. 
mSiread.  And  therefore  remember  every  one  of  you  that  the 
YOU  must  safety,  not  of  Sicily  alone,  but  of  Peloponnesus,  is  at 
doing.  stake.  No  time  should  be  lost.  You  must  send  to 
Sicily  a  force  of  hoplites  who  will  themselves  handle  the 
oars  and  will  take  the  field  immediately  on  landing.  A 
Spartan  commander  I  conceive  to  be  even  more  indis- 
pensable than  an  army;  his  duty  will  be  to  organise  the 
troops  which  are  already  enlisted,  and  to  press  the  un- 
willing into  the  service.  Thus  you  will  inspire  confidence 
in  your  friends  and  overcome  the  fears  of  the  wavering. 
Here  too  in  Hellas  you  should  make  open  war.  The 
Syracusans,  seeing  that  you  have  not  forgotten  them, 
will  then  persevere  in  their  resistance,  while  the  Athe- 
nians will  have  greater  difficulty  in  reinforcing  their 
army.  You  ought  above  all  to  fortify  Deceiea  in  Attica  ; 
the  Athenians  are  always  in  dread  of  this  ;  to  them  it 
seems  to  be  the  only  calamity  which  they  have  not 
already  experienced  to  the  utmost  in  the  course  of  the 
war.  And  the  way  to  hurt  an  enemy  most  surely  is 
to  inform  yourself  exactly  about  the  weak  points  of 
which  you  see  that  he  is  conscious,  and  strike  at  them. 
For  every  man  is  likely  to  know  best  himself  the  dangers 
which  he  has  most  to  fear.  I  will  sum  up  briefly  the 
chief  though  by  no  means  all  the  advantages  which  you 
will  gain,  and  the  disadvantages  which  you  will  inflict, 
by  the  fortification  of  Deceiea.  The  whole  stock  of  the 


SPEECH   OF    ALCIBIADES.  475 

B.C.  415.  country  will  fall  into  your  hands.  The  slaves  will  come  VI. 
gi>  2>  over  to  you  of  their  own  accord  ;  what  there  is  besides 
will  be  seized  by  you.  The  Athenians  will  at  once  be 
deprived  of  the  revenues  which  they  obtain  from  the 
silver  mines  of  Laurium,  and  of  all  the  profits  which 
they  make  by  the  land  or  by  the  law  courts  :  above  all, 
the  customary  tribute  will  fail  ;  for  their  allies,  when 
they  see  that  you  are  now  carrying  on  the  war  in  earnest, 
will  not  mind  them.  How  far  these  plans  are  executed,  92. 
and  with  how  much  speed  and  energy,  Lacedaemonians, 
depends  on  you  ;  for  I  am  confident  that  they  are 
practicable,  and  I  am  not  likely  to  be  mistaken. 

'  You  ought  not  in  fairness  to  think  the  worse  of  me  Athens  has 

•  i-     •  1  f  compelled 

because,  having  been  once  distinguished  as  a  lover  ot  my  me  to  be 


country,  I  now  cast  in  my  lot  with  her  worst  foes  and  g 
attack  her  with  all  my  might  ;  or  suspect  that  I  speak  only 
with  the  forwardness  of  an  exile.  An  exile  I  am  indeed  ; 
I  have  lost  an  ungrateful  country,  but  I  have  not  lost  Oniy  that  I 
the  power  of  doing  you  service,  if  you  will  listen  to  me.  ™e^y  refair 
The  true  enemies  of  my  country  are  not  those  who,  like 
you,  have  injured  her  in  open  war,  but  those  who  have 
compelled  her  friends  to  become  her  enemies.  I  love 
Athens,  not  in  so  far  as  I  am  wronged  by  her,  but  in  so 
far  as  I  once  enjoyed  the  privileges  of  a  citizen.  The 
country  which  I  am  attacking  is  no  longer  mine,  but  a 
lost  country  which  I  am  seeking  to  regain.  He  is  the 
true  patriot,  not  who,  when  unjustly  exiled,  abstains  from 
attacking  his  country,  but  who  in  the  warmth  of  his 
affection  seeks  to  recover  her  without  regard  to  the 
means.  I  desire  therefore  that  you,  Lacedaemonians, 
will  use  me  without  scruple  in  any  service  however 
difficult  or  dangerous,  remembering  that,  according  to 
the  familiar  saying,  "the  more  harm  I  did  you  as  an 
enemy,  the  more  good  can  I  do  you  as  a  friend."  For 
I  know  the  secrets  of  the  Athenians,  while  I  could  only 
guess  at  yours.  Remember  the  immense  importance  of 
your  present  decision,  and  do  not  hesitate  to  send  an 
expedition  to  Sicily  and  Attica.  By  despatching  a 


476  DEC  RLE  A  .     G  YLIPP  US. 

VI.  fraction  of  your  forces  to  co-operate  in  Sicily  you  may  B.C.  415. 
save  great  interests,  and  may  overthrow  the  Athenian 
power  once  and  for  ever.  And  so  henceforward  you 
may  dwell  safely  yourselves  and  be  leaders  of  all  Hellas, 
which  will  follow  you,  not  upon  compulsion,  but  from 
affection.' 

03.          Thus  spoke  Alcibiades  :  the  Lacedaemonians,  who  had 
The  Lace-   been  intending  to  send  an  army  against  Athens,  but 

daemonians 

determine  were  still  hesitating  and  looking  about  them,  were  greatly 
Decdea  strengthened  in  their  resolution  when  they  heard  all 
^lippufto  ^ese  Pomts  urged  by  him  who,  as  they  thought,  knew 
Syracuse,  best.  Accordingly  they  now  turned  their  thoughts  to 
the  fortification  of  Decelea,  and  determined  to  send  im- 
mediate assistance  to  the  Syracusans.  They  appointed 
Gylippus  the  son  of  Cleandridas  commander  of  the 
Syracusan  forces,  and  desired  him  to  co-operate  with 
the  Syracusan  and  Corinthian  representatives,  and  send 
aid  to  Sicily  in  the  speediest  and  most  effective  manner 
which  the  circumstances  admitted.  Whereupon  he  told 
the  Corinthians  to  despatch  immediately  two  ships  to 
him  at  Asine,  and  to  fit  out  as  many  more  as  they 
meant  to  send  ;  the  latter  were  to  be  ready  for  sea  when 
the  season  arrived.  Coming  to  this  understanding  the 
envoys  departed  from  Lacedaemon. 

About  this  time  the  trireme  which  the  Athenian 
generals  had  despatched  from  Sicily  for  money  and 
cavalry  a  arrived  at  Athens.  The  Athenians  hearing  their 
request,  voted  supplies  of  food  and  a  force  of  cavalry 
for  the  army.  So  the  winter  ended,  and  with  it  the 
seventeenth  year  in  the  Peloponnesian  War  of  which 
Thucydides  wrote  the  history. 

94.  At   the  very  beginning  of  the  following    spring  the  B.C.  414. 

Operations  Athenians  quitted    Catana,  and   sailed  along  the  coast  °L  9I>  3' 
nians  in  the  towards  the  Sicilian  Megara  ;  this  place,  as  I  have  already 


mentioned15,  in  the   days   of  Gelo  the   tyrant  was  de- 
Arrival  of    P°Pu^ate<^  by  the  Syracusans,  who  still  retain  possession 
horsemen     of  the  country.     They  disembarked,  and  after  ravaging 
a  Cp.  vi.  74  fin.  t>  Cp.  vi.  4  init. 


ARGIVES   AND    LACEDAEMONIANS.         477 

B.C.  414-  the  fields  proceeded  to  attack  a  small  Syracusan  fortress  a,       VI. 
'  9I'  3'  but  without  success  ;  they  then  moved  on  some  by  land  and  money 

*  from 

and  some  by  sea  to  the  river  Terias,  and  going  up  Athens. 
the  country  wasted  the  plain  and  burned  the  corn. 
They  encountered  a  few  Syracusans,  some  of  whom  they 
killed,  and  setting  up  a  trophy  returned  to  their  ships. 
They  then  sailed  back  to  Catana,  and  having  taken  in 
provisions  marched  with  their  whole  force  against  Cento- 
ripa,  a  Sicel  town,  which  capitulated.  Thence  they 
returned,  and  on  their  way  burned  the  corn  of  the 
Inessians  and  the  Hyblaeans.  Arriving  at  Catana  they 
found  that  the  horsemen  to  the  number  of  two  hundred 
and  fifty  had  come  from  Athens  according  to  order,  with 
their  equipments,  but  without  horses,  which  they  ex- 
pected to  procure  on  the  spot.  Thirty  mounted  archers 
and  three  hundred  talents  of  silver  b  had  arrived  also. 

During  the  same  spring  the  Lacedaemonians  led  an      95. 

army  against   Argos,  and  advanced  as  far  as  Cleonae,  A  Lace- 

daemonian 
but   retired   in   consequence   of   an   earthquake.      The  invasion 

Argives  in  their  turn  invaded  the  neighbouring  district 
of  Thyrea,  and  took  a  great  deal  of  spoil  from  the  Lace- 
daemonians,  which  was  sold  for  no  less  than  twenty-five 

invade 

talents  c.     Somewhat   later   the  populace  of  Thespiae  d  Thyrea. 
made  an  attack  upon  the  government,  but  the  attempt 


did  not  succeed  ;  for  the  Thebans  came  to  the  rescue. 
Some  of  the  insurgents  were  apprehended,  others  fled 
to  Athens. 

The  Syracusans  heard  that   the  Athenians   had   re-      96. 
ceived  their  cavalry,  and  that  they  would  soon  be  upon  The  Syra- 
them.     They   considered   that,    unless    the    Athenians  detennine 
gained  possession  of  Epipolae  (which  was  a  steep  place 


looking  down  upon  Syracuse),  the  city  could  not  easily  but  are 

.  /  J  J   anticipated, 

be  invested,  even  if  they  were  defeated  in  battle  ;  they  while 
therefore  determined  to  guard  the  paths  leading  to  the  nsvfewf  by 
summit  that  the  enemy  might  not  get  up  by  stealth. 
At  all  other  points  the  place  was  secure,  as  it  lies  high 

a  Cp.  vi.  75  init.  &  ^72,000. 

c  ;£6j°oo.  d  Cp.  iv.  133  init. 


478          ATHENIANS   SURPRISE   EPIPOLAE. 

VI.  and  slopes  right  down  to  the  city,  from  the  interior  of  B.C.  414. 
which  it  can  all  be  seen  ;  the  Syracusans  call  it  Epi-  '  9I>  3' 
polae  (or  the  plateau),  because  it  is  above  the  level  of 
the  adjacent  country.  Hermocrates  and  his  colleagues 
had  now  entered  upon  their  command.  The  whole 
people  went  out  at  break  of  day  to  the  meadow 
skirting  the  river  Anapus,  '  and  proceeded  to  hold  a 
review  of  their  forces.  A  selection  was  at  once  made 
of  six  hundred  hoplites,  who  were  appointed  to  guard 
Epipolae,  and  to  run  in  a  body  to  any  point  at  which 
they  were  needed.  They  were  commanded  by  Diomilus, 
an  Andrian  exile. 

97.  On  the  very  same  morning  the  Athenians  were  like- 

who  land,    wise  holding  a  muster  of  their  army.     They  had  come 

unobserved,  ^ 

north  of  the  from   Catana  with  their  whole  force,  and   had   put  in 
They  gain    unobserved  near  a  place  called  Leon,  which  is  distant 


^rom   Epipolae    not   quite  a   mile  ;    there   they  disem- 
and  put  to   barked  their  troops.     Their  ships  cast  anchor  at  Thap- 

flight  the 

Syracusan  sus,  which  is  a  peninsula  with  a  narrow  isthmus,  running 
out  into  the  sea,  and  not  far  from  Syracuse  either  by 
land  or  water.  The  Athenian  sailors  made  a  palisade 
across  the  isthmus  and  remained  at  Thapsus,  while  the 
troops  ran  to  Epipolae,  and  gained  the  summit  by  the 
way  of  the  Euryelus  before  the  Syracusans  saw  them 
or  could  come  up  to  them  from  the  meadow  where  the 
review  was  going  on.  Nevertheless  Diomilus  with  his 
six  hundred  hurried  to  the  spot,  accompanied  by  the 
rest  of  the  army,  each  man  running  as  fast  as  he  could  ; 
but  the  distance  from  the  meadow  which  they  had  to 
traverse  before  they  could  engage  was  not  less  than 
three  miles  ;  consequently  they  were  in  disorder  when 
they  closed  with  the  Athenians.  They  were  defeated 
in  the  engagement  which  ensued  on  Epipolae,  and  re- 
tired into  the  city.  Diomilus  and  about  three  hundred 
others  were  slain.  The  Athenians  erected  a  trophy,  and 
gave  up  to  the  Syracusans  the  bodies  of  the  dead  under 
a  flag  of  truce.  On  the  following  day  they  went  down 
to  the  city  itself,  but  as  the  Syracusans  did  not  come 


THE   WALL  AND   THE  FIRST  CROSS-WALL.     479 

B.C.  414.  out  against  them,  they  retired  and  built  a  fort  upon  VI. 
'  Labdalum,  at  the  edge  of  the  cliffs  of  Epipolae  looking 
towards  Megara,  in  order  that  when  they  advanced 
either  to  fight  or  to  construct  lines,  the  place  might 
serve  as  a  depository  for  their  baggage  and  their  pro- 
perty. 

Not  long  afterwards  the  Athenians  were  joined  by      98. 
three  hundred  Egestaean  horsemen,  and  about  ,a  hun-  The  Athe- 
dred  more  furnished  by  the  Sicels,  Naxians,  and  others,  muster  six 
They  had  two  hundred  and  fifty  of  their  own,  for  some  anTfifty 
of  whom  they  received  horses  from  the  Egestaeans  and  J^hTbe  in 
Catanaeans ;    other   horses   they   bought.      The   whole  to  construct 

3,  W3.ll 

number  of  their  cavalry  was  now  raised  to  six  hundred  round 
and  fifty.     They  placed  a  garrison  in  Labdalum   and  S 
went  down  to  Sycer  where  they  took  up  a  position  and 
immediately  commenced  building  a  wall  round  the  city,  meet  them, 

but  retire, 

The  Syracusans  were   amazed   at   the  celerity  of  the  and  some 
work.     They  saw  tfcat   they  must  interfere,  and  made  cavairy  are 
up  their  minds  to  go  out  and  fight.     The  two  armies  defeated- 
.  were  already  preparing  to  engage  when  the  Syracusan 
generals,  seeing  that  their  forces  were  in  disorder  and 
were  forming  with  difficulty,  led  them  back  into  the  city, 
,all   but  a  detachment   of  the  cavalry,  who,  remaining 
,on  the  spot,  prevented  their  opponents  from  gathering 
stones  for  the  wall,  and  compelled  them  to  keep  together. 
At  length,  advancing  with  one  division  of  their  hoplites 
and  all  their  cavalry,  the  Athenians  attacked  the  Syra- 
cusan horse,  whom  they  put  to  flight,  and  killed  some 
of  them  ;  they  then  erected  a  trophy. 

On  the  following  day  some  of  the  Athenians  proceeded      99. 
with  the  construction  of  that  part  of  the  circle  which  lay  The  S7ra- 

J   cusans  raise 

towards  the  north ;    others  began  to  collect  wood  and  a  palisade 
stones  and  lay  them  along  the  intended  course  of  the  wall  waiiC°U 
towards  Trogilus,  where  the  distance  was  shortest  from 
the  Great  Harbour  to  the  outer  sea.     The  Syracusans 
by  the  advice  of  their  commanders,  chiefly  of  Hermo- 
crates,  determined  to  risk  no  more  general  engagements. 
They  thought  it  better  to  raise  a  counter-wall  across  the 


480  ATHENIAN  ATTACK  ON  THE  CROSS-WALL. 

VI.  line  along  which  the  Athenian  wall  was  building.  If  they  B.C.  414. 
were  first  they  would  intercept  them.  They  might  indeed 
be  attacked  by  the  Athenians  while  thus  engaged,  but 
then  they  could  oppose  them  with  a  part  of  their  army ; 
and  there  would  be  time  to  run  a  palisade  across,  if  not 
a  wall,  before  any  attack  took  place.  The  Athenians 
on  the  other  hand  would  have  to  leave  their  work, 
and  employ  their  whole  army  against  them.  So  they 
came  out  and  drew  a  cross-wall,  beginning  at  their  own 
city,  from  a  point  below  the  circle  of  the  Athenian 
wall,  cutting  down  the  olive-trees  in  the  precinct  of 
Apollo  and  erecting  wooden  towers.  As  yet  the  Athe- 
nian ships  had  not  sailed  round  from  Thapsus  into 
the  Great  Harbour;  the  Syracusans  were  still  masters 
of  their  own  coasts,  and  the  Athenians  brought  their 
necessaries  from  Thapsus  by  land. 

1OO.         The  Athenians  did  not  interfere  with  their  work,  for 
These,        they  were  afraid  of  dividing  and  weakening  their  forces  ; 

when  partly          J  fc 

finished,  and  they  were  pressing  forward  that  part  of  the  line  on 
bya sudden  which  they  were  employed.  So  when  the  Syracusans 
of'the  hac*  sufficiently  completed  a  part  of  their  palisade  and 
Athenians,  cross-wall,  leaving  one  division  to  guard  the  work,  they 
retreated  into  the  city  with  the  rest  of  their  army.  The 
Athenians  now  destroyed  their  conduits,  which  were 
laid  underground  to  bring  drinking-water  into  the  city. 
Then,  choosing  their  time  at  noon  when  the  Syracusan 
guard  remained  within  their  tents  (some  of  them  had 
even  retired  into  the  city)  and  when  the  vigilance  of 
their  sentinels  at  the  palisade  was  relaxed,  they  took  a 
body  of  three  hundred  chosen  hoplites  of  their  own 
and  some  light-armed  troops,  picked  soldiers,  to  whom 
they  gave  heavy  arms,  and  bade  them  run  quickly  to 
the  cross-wall.  The  rest  of  the  army  proceeded  in  two 
divisions  under  the  two  generals,  one  towards  the  city 
in  case  the  enemy  should  come  to  the  rescue,  the  other 
to  that  part  of  the  palisade  which  adjoined  the  postern- 
gate  of  the  city.  The  three  hundred  attacked  and 
captured  the  further  end  of  the  palisade,  from  which 


SECOND    COUNTERWORK.  481 

B.C.  414.  the  guards  retired  and  fled  inside  the  new  outer  wall  VI. 
3'  which  enclosed  the  shrine  of  Apollo  Temenitesa.  The 
pursuers  pressed  forward  and  made  their  way  in  after 
them  ;  but  they  were  forced  out  again  by  the  Syra- 
cusans  ;  and  some  Argives  and  a  few  of  the  Athenians 
fell  there.  Then  the  whole  army,  turning  back,  de- 
stroyed the  cross-wall,  tore  up  the  palisades,  carried  the 
stakes  to  their  camp,  and  raised  a  trophy. 

On  the  following   day  the  Athenians,  beginning   at     101. 
one  end  of  the  unfinished  circle,  proceeded  to  bring  the  T.he  Athe~ 
wall  Mown  overb  the  cliff  which  on  this  side  of  Epi-ceedto 


polae  looks  across  the  marsh  towards  the  Great  Harbour, 
intending   to    carry  on  the   line   by  the   shortest   way  JJ^ds  the 
to  the  harbour   right  through  the  level  of  the  marsh.  ^^ 
Meanwhile  the  Syracusans  also  came  out,  and  begin-  They  take 
ning  from  the  city,  proceeded  to  carry  another  palisade  ade  which 


through  the  middle  of  the  marsh,  with  a  ditch  at  the 

side,  in  order  to  prevent  the  Athenians  from  completing 

their  line  to  the  sea.     The  latter,  having  finished  their  feating  the 

work  as  far  as  the  cliff,  attacked  the  new  Syracusan 

palisade   and    ditch.     They  ordered   the   ships    to   sail 

round  from  Thapsus   into  the  Great   Harbour  of  the  themselves. 

f  L,amachus 

Syracusans  ;  with  the  first  break  of  day  they  descended  is  slain. 
themselves  from  Epipolae  to  the  level  ground  ;  and 
passing  through  the  marsh  where  the  soil  was  clay  and 
firmer  than  the  rest,  over  planks  and  gates  which  they 
laid  down,  they  succeeded  at  sunrise  in  taking  nearly 
the  whole  of  the  palisade  and  the  ditch,  and  the  re- 
mainder not  long  afterwards.  A  battle  took  place  in 
which  the  Athenians  were  victorious,  and  the  Syra- 
cusans on  the  right  wing  fled  to  the  city,  those  on 
the  left  along  the  river.  The  three  hundred  chosen 
Athenian  troops  pressed  on  at  full  speed  towards  the 
bridge,  intending  to  stop  their  passage,  but  the  Syra- 
cusans, fearing  that  they  would  be  cut  off,  and  having 
most  of  their  horsemen  on  the  spot,  turned  upon  the 
three  hundred,  and  putting  them  to  flight,  charged  the 
a  Cp.  vi.  75  init.  b  Or,  '  along.' 

I  i 


482  NARROW  ESCAPE    OF   NIC  I  AS. 

VI.  right  whig  of  the  Athenians.  The  panic  now  extended  B.C.  414. 
to  the  whole  division  at  the  extremity  of  the  wing. 
Lamachus  saw  what  had  happened,  and  hastened  to  the 
rescue  from  his  own  place  on  the  left  wing,  taking  with 
him  a  few  archers  and  the  Argive  troops  ;  but  pressing 
forward  across  a  certain  ditch  he  and  a  few  who  had 
followed  him  were  cut  off  from  the  rest,  and  he  fell  with 
five  or  six  others.  The  Syracusans  hastily  snatched 
up  their  bodies,  and  carried  them  across  the  river  out 
of  the  reach  of  the  enemy.  But  when  they  saw  the  rest 
of  the  Athenian  army  advancing  towards  them  they 
retreated. 

I  O2.         Meanwhile  the  Syracusans  who  fled  first  into  the  city, 
Meanwhile  observing  the  resistance  made  by  the  left  wing,  took 

theSyracu-  ...  .  -    . 

sans  attack  courage,  and  coming  out  drew  up  against  that  part  of  the 
waiis^n116  Athenian  line  which  was  opposed  to  them.  They  also 
which  are  sent  a  detachment  against  the  wall  of  circumvallation  on 


Epipolae,  supposing  that  it  was  undefended,  and  might 
setting  fire  be  taken.     They  did  indeed  take  and  demolish  the  out- 
timber  and  work,  which  was  about  a  thousand  feet  in  length  ;  but 
engines.      Nicias,  who  happened  to  have  been  left  there  because 
he  was  ill,  saved  the  lines  themselves.     He  commanded 
the  attendants  of  the   camp  to  set  fire  to  the  engines 
and  to  the  timber  which  had  been  left  lying  in  front  of 
the  wall,  for  being  without  troops  he  knew  that  there 
was  no  other  way  of  escape.     The  expedient  succeeded  ; 
and  in  consequence  of  the  fire  the  Syracusans  gave  up 
the  attack.     The  Athenian  army  too  was  now  hastening 
from  the  plain  to  the  circle,  with  the  intention  of  beat- 
ing off  the  enemy  ;    while  the  ships,  as  they  had  been 
ordered,   were    sailing    from    Thapsus    into    the    Great 
Harbour.     The  Syracusans  on  the  heights,  seeing  this 
combined   movement,  quickly  retreated,  together   with 
the  rest  of  the  army,  into  the  city,  thinking  that  with 
their  present  force  they  were  no  longer  able  to  prevent 
the  completion  of  the  line  of  wall  towards  the  sea. 
103.         The  Athenians  then  erected  a  trophy  and   restored 
tneSSyra-0f  ^  Syracusan  dead  under  a  flag  of  truce.     The  Syra- 


HOPES    OF    THE   ATHENIANS.  483 

« 

B.C.  414.  cusans  delivered  to  them  the  bodies  of  Lamachus  and       VI. 
'  91>  3>  his  companions.    The  whole  Athenian  forces,  both  naval  c"sans  at 

the  progress 

and  military,  were  now  on  the  spot,  and  they  proceeded  of  the  wail. 
to  cut  off  the  Syracusans  by  a  double  wall,  beginning  at  pariey  with 
the  southern  cliff  of  Epipolae  and  extending  to  the  sea. 
Provisions  came  to  their  army  in  abundance  from  various  §Jei 
parts  of  Italy.  Many  of  the  Sicel  tribes  who  had  rais,  whom 
hitherto  been  hesitating  now  joined  the  Athenians,  and 
three  penteconters  came  from  the  Tyrrhenians.  Every- 
thing began  to  answer  to  their  hopes.  The  Syracusans 
despaired  of  saving  the  city  by  arms,  for  no  help  reached 
them  even  from  Peloponnesus.  Within  the  walls  they 
were  talking  of  peace,  and  they  began  to  enter  into 
communications  with  Nicias,  who,  now  that  Lamachus 
was  dead,  had  the  sole  command.  But  no  definite 
result  was  attained ;  although,  as  might  be  expected 
when  men  began  to  feel  the  pressure  of  the  siege  and 
their  own  helplessness,  many  proposals  were  made  to 
him,  and  many  more  were  discussed  in  the  city.  Their 
calamities  even  made  them  suspicious  of  one  another; 
accordingly  they  deposed  their  generals,  attributing  the 
misfortunes  which  had  befallen  the  city  since  they  were 
appointed  either  to  their  ill-luck  or  to  their  treachery.  In 
their  room  they  chose  Heraclides,  Eucles,  and  Tellias. 

Meanwhile    Gylippus    the    Lacedaemonian    and    the     104. 
ships  from  Corinth a  were  already  at  Leucas  hastening  Gylippus 
to  their  relief.     They  were  alarmed  at  the  reports  which  Tarentum. 
were  continually  pouring  in,  all  false,  but  all  agreeing  despises  the 
that  the  Athenian  lines  round  Syracuse  were  now  com- 
plete.     Gylippus  had  no  longer  any  hope  of  Sicily,  but 
thought  that  he  might  save  Italy;    so  he   and    Pythen 
the  Corinthian  sailed  across  the  Ionian  Gulf  to  Taren- 
tum as  fast  as  they  could,  taking  two  Laconian  and 
two  Corinthian   ships.     The  Corinthians  were   to  man 
ten  ships  of  their  own,  two  Leucadian,  and  three  Am- 
bracian,   and   to   follow.      Gylippus   on    his    arrival    at 
Tarentum  went  on  a  mission  to  Thurii,  of  which  his 
a  Cp.  vi.  93  med. 
I  i  2 


484 


ATHENIANS    LAND    IN   LACONIA. 


VI. 


105. 

Athenians 
violate  the 
peace 
with  the 
Lacedae- 
monians 
by  devas- 
tating the 
Laconian 
coast. 


father  had  formerly  been  a  citizen ;  he  had  hoped  to  B.C.  414. 
gain  over  the  Thurians,  but  failed ;  he  then  continued 
his  voyage  from  Tarentum  along  the  coast  of  Italy. 
He  was  caught  in  the  Terinaean  gulf  by  a  wind  which 
in  this  region  blows  violently  and  steadily  from  the 
north,  and  was  carried  into  the  open  sea.  After  ex- 
periencing a  most  violent  storm  he  returned  to  Taren- 
tum, where  he  drew  up  those  of  his  ships  which  had 
suffered  in  the  gale  and  refitted  them.  Nicias  heard 
of  his  approach,  but  despised  the  small  number  of  his 
ships;  in  this  respect  he  was  like  the  Thurians.  He 
thought  that  he  had  come  on  a  mere  privateering  ex- 
pedition, and  for  some  time  set  no  watch a. 

During  the  same  summer,  about  the  same  time,  the 
Lacedaemonians  and  their  allies  invaded  Argolis  and 
wasted  most  of  the  Argive  territory.  The  Athenians 
assisted  the  Argives  with  thirty  ships.  The  use  which 
they  made  of  them  was  a  glaring  violation  of  the  treaty 
with  the  Lacedaemonians.  Hitherto  they  had  only  gone 
out  on  marauding  expeditions  from  Pylos ;  when  they 
landed,  it  was  not  upon  the  shores  of  Laconia,  but 
upon  other  parts  of  the  Peloponnese ;  and  they  had 
merely  fought  as  the  allies  of  the  Argives  and  Man- 
tineans.  The  Argives  had  often  urged  them  just  to 
land  soldiers  on  Lacedaemonian  ground,  and  to  waste 
some  part  of  Laconia,  however  small,  without  remaining, 
and  they  had  refused.  But  now,  under  the  command 
of  Pythodorus,  Laespodias,  and  Demaratus,  they  landed 
at  Epidaurus  called  Limera,  Prasiae,  and  other  places, 
and  wasted  the  country.  Thereby  the  Athenians  at  last 
gave  the  Lacedaemonians  a  right  to  complain  of  them 
and  completely  justified  measures  of  retaliation.  After 
the  Athenian  fleet  had  departed  from  Argos,  and  the 
Lacedaemonians  had  likewise  retired,  the  Argives  in- 
vaded Phliasia,  and  having  ravaged  the  country  and 
killed  a  few  of  the  Phliasians,  returned  home. 
a  Cp.  vii.  i  med. 


BOOK    VII. 


B.C.  414.      GVLIPPUS   and  Pythen,  after   refitting  their  ships  at  VII.  I 
91.  3-  Tarentum,  coasted   along   to   the   Epizephyrian   Locri.  Gyiippus 

0  arrives  at 

1  hey  now  learned  the  truth,  that  Syracuse  was  not  as  Himera 
yet  completely  invested,  but  that  an  army  might  still  an  army 
enter  by  way  of  Epipolae.     So  they  considered  whether  ^mThre 
they  should  steer  their  course  to  the  left  or  to  the  right  Jhousand 
of  Sicily.    They  might  attempt  to  throw  themselves  into  marches 
Syracuse  by  sea,  but  the  risk  would  be  great  ;  or  they  Syracuse. 


might  g°  first  to  Himera,  and  gathering  a  force  of  the 
Himeraeans,  and  of  any  others  whom  they  could  induce 
to  join  them,  make  their  way  by  land.  They  deter- 
mined to  sail  to  Himera.  Nicias,  when  he  heard  that 
they  were  at  Locri,  although  he  had  despised  them  at 
first,  now  sent  out  four  Athenian  ships  to  intercept  them  ; 
but  these  had  not  as  yet  arrived  at  Rhegium,  and  came 
too  late.  So  they  sailed  through  the  strait,  and  touching 
by  the  way  at  Rhegium  and  Messene,  reached  Himera. 
There  having  drawn  up  their  ships  on  the  beach  they 
persuaded  the  Himeraeans  to  make  common  cause  with 
them,  and  not  only  to  join  in  the  expedition  themselves, 
but  to  supply  arms  to  all  their  unarmed  sailors.  They 
then  sent  to  the  Selinuntians  and  told  them  to  come 
and  meet  them  with  their  whole  army  at  an  appointed 
place.  The  Geloans  and  certain  of  the  Sicels  also  pro- 
mised to  send  them  a  small  force  ;  the  latter,  with  the 
more  alacrity  because  Archonides,  a  Sicel  king  in  these 
parts  who  was  a  powerful  man  and  friendly  to  the 
Athenians,  had  recently  died,  and  because  Gyiippus 


486  ARRIVAL    OF   GONGYLUS. 

VII.     seemed  to  have  come  from  Lacedaemon  with   hearty  B.C.  414. 

good-will.    And  so,  taking  with  him  about  seven  hundred 

of  his  own  sailors  and  marines  for  whom  he  had  obtained 

arms,   about    a  thousand    Himeraean    infantry,    heavy 

and   light-armed    included,  and   a  hundred  Himeraean 

horsemen,  some   light-armed  troops   and   cavalry  from 

Selinus,  a  few  more  from  Gela,  and  of  the  Sicels  about 

a  thousand  in  all,  Gylippus  marched  towards  Syracuse. 

2.  In  the   meantime  the  Corinthian  ships a   had  put  to 

The  Syra-    Sea  from  Leucas  and  were  coming  with  all  speed  to  the 

about  to      aid  of  the  besieged.     Gongylus,  one  of  the  Corinthian 

terms  when  commanders,  who  started  last  in  a  single  ship,  arrived  at 

Sns^and  Syracuse  before  the  rest  of  the  fleet,  and  a  little  before 

encourages  Gylippus.     He  found  the  citizens  on  the  point  of  hold- 

themwith     .    * 

the  news  mg  an  assembly  at  which  the  question  of  peace  was  to 
pus  is  IV  be  discussed  ;  from  this  intention  he  dissuaded  them  by 
They'go  ^e  encouraging  announcement  that  more  ships,  and 
him'0  meet  Gylippus  the  son  of  Cleandridas,  whom  the  Lacedaemo- 
nians had  sent  to  take  the  command,  were  on  their  way. 
Whereupon  the  Syracusans  were  reassured,  and  at  once 
went  forth  with  their  whole  army  to  meet  Gylippus, 
who,  as  they  were  informed,  was  now  close  at  hand.  He 
had  shortly  before  captured  the  Sicel  fort  Getae  on  his 
march,  and  drawing  up  his  men  in  readiness  to  fight, 
came  to  Epipolae,  taking  the  path  by  the  Euryelus  ; 
where  the  Athenians  had  found  a  way  before  himb. 
Having  formed  a  junction  with  the  Syracusans,  he 
marched  against  the  Athenian  lines.  He  arrived  just 
at  the  time  when  the  Athenians  had  all  but  finished 
their  double  wall c,  nearly  a  mile  long,  reaching  to  the 
Great  Harbour ;  there  remained  only  a  small  portion 
toward  the  sea,  upon  which  they  were  still  at  work. 
Along  the  remainder  of  the  line  of  wall,  which  extended 
towards  Trogilus  and  the  northern  sea,  the  stones  were 
mostly  lying  ready;  a  part  was  half-finished,  a  part 

a  Cp.  vi.  93  med.,  104  med.  b  ^.p.  vi.  97  med. 

c  Cp.  vi.  103  init. 


GYLIPPUS    JOINS    THE   SYRACUSANS.       487 

B.C.  414.  had  been  completed  and  left.     So  near  was    Syracuse      VII. 
3'  to  destruction. 

The  Athenians,  though  at  first  disconcerted  by  the  3-  ' 
sudden  advance  of  Gylippus  and  the  Syracusans,  drew  ^^s 
up  their  forces  in  order  of  battle.  He  halted  as  he  Syracusans 

.          ,  ,  -_     .  offer  battle 

rpproached,  and  sent  a  herald  to  them  offering  a  truce  to  Nicias 
if  they  were  willing  to  quit  Sicily  within  five  days 
taking  what  belonged  to  them.  But  they  despised  his 
offer,  and  sent  away  the  herald  without  an  answer.  Ni9as  re- 
Whereupon  both  armies  set  themselves  in  order  oftheAthe- 
battle.  Gylippus,  seeing  that  the  Syracusans  were  in 
confusion,  and  could  with  difficulty  form,  led  back  his 
troops  to  the  more  open  ground.  Nicias  did  not  follow, 
but  lay  still,  close  to  his  own  wall.  When  GylippUs 
observed  that  the  Athenians  remained  where  they  were, 
he  led  away  his  army  to  the  height  called  Temenites  ; 
there  they  passed  the  night.  On  the  following  day  he 
stationed  the  greater  part  of  his  troops  in  front  of  the 
Athenian  wall  that  they  might  not  despatch  a  force  to 
any  other  point,  and  then  sent  a  detachment  against  the 
fort  of  Labdalum,  which  was  out  of  sight  of  the  Athe- 
nian lines.  He  took  the  place,  and  killed  every  one 
whom  he  found  in  it.  On  the  same  day  an  Athenian 
trireme  which  was  keeping  watch  over  the  harbour  of 
the  Syracusans  was  taken  by  them. 

The  Syracusans  and  their  allies  now  a  began  to  build  a 
a  single  line  of  wall  starting  from  the  city  and  running 
upwards  across  Epipolae  at  an  angle  with  the  Athenian  work. 
wall  ;  this  was  a  work  which,  unless  it  could  be  stopped  an  attack 


by  the  Athenians,  would  make  the  investment  of  t 
city  impossible.  Towards  the  sea  the  Athenian  wall  was  lines- 
now  completed,  and  their  forces  had  come  up  to  the  high 
ground.  Gylippus,  knowing  that  a  part  of  the  wall  was 
weak,  instantly  went  by  night  with  his  army  to  attack 
it.  But  the  Athenians,  who  happened  to  be  passing  the 
night  outside  the  walls,  perceived  this  movement  and 
marched  to  oppose  him  ;  whereupon  he  at  once  with- 
a  Or,  omitting  'upwards:'  '  began  to  build  on  the  high  ground.' 


488 


FORTIFICATION    OF  PLEMMYRIUM. 


VII. 


The  Athe- 
nians by 
the  fortifi- 
cation of 
Plemmy- 
rium  obtain 
greater 
command 
of  the 
harbour ; 
but  the 
removal  of 
the  army 
exposes 
their 
foragers 
to  the 
Syracusan 
cavalry. 


5- 

Gylippus, 
engaging 
the  Athe- 
nians in  a 


drew.     They  then  raised  the  weak  portion  of  their  wall  B.C.  414. 
higher  ;   and  guarded  it  themselves,  while  they  posted 
the  allies  on  the  other  parts  of  the  fortification  in  the 
places  severally  assigned  to  them. 

Nicias  now  determined  to  fortify  Plemmyrium,  a  pro- 
montory which  runs  out  opposite  the  city  and  narrows 
the  entrance  to  the  Great  Harbour.  He  thought  that 
this  measure  would  facilitate  the  introduction  of  sup- 
plies*. His  forces  would  then  be  able  to  watch  the 
harbour  of  the  Syracusans  from  a  nearer  point,  whereas 
they  had  hitherto  been  obliged  to  put  out  from  the 
further  corner  of  the  Great  Harbour  whenever  a  Syra- 
cusan ship  threatened  to  move.  He  was  inclined  to  pay 
more  attention  than  hitherto  to  naval  operations  ;  for 
since  the  arrival  of  Gylippus  the  Athenian  prospects  by 
land  were  not  so  encouraging.  Having  therefore  trans- 
ferred his  ships  and  a  portion  of  his  army  to  Plemmy- 
rium, he  built  three  forts  in  which  the  greater  part  of 
the  Athenian  stores  were  deposited  ;  and  the  large  boats 
as  well  as  the  ships  of  war  were  now  anchored  at  this 
spot.  The  removal  was  a  first  and  main  cause  of  the 
deterioration  of  the  crews.  For  when  the  sailors  went 
out  to  procure  forage  and  water,  of  which  there  was 
little,  and  that  only  to  be  obtained  from  a  distance,  they 
were  constantly  cut  off  by  the  Syracusan  cavalry,  who 
were  masters  of  the  country,  a  third  part  of  their  force 
having  been  posted  in  a  village  at  the  Olympieum  b 
expressly  in  order  to  prevent  the  enemy  at  Plemmyrium 
from  coming  out  and  doing  mischief.  About  this  time 
Nicias  was  informed  that  the  rest  of  the  Corinthian  fleet  c 
was  on  the  point  of  arriving,  and  he  sent  twenty  ships, 
which  were  ordered  to  lie  in  wait  for  them  about  Locri 
and  Rhegium  and  the  approach  to  Sicily. 

While  Gylippus  was  building  the  wall  across  Epipolae, 
employing  the  stones  which  the  Athenians  had  pre- 
viously laid  there  for  their  own  use,  he  at  the  same  time 


a  Cp.  vii.  13  init.,  24  fin. 

c  Cp.  vii.  2  iniJL 


,f  vi.  75  init, 


DEFEAT   AND    VICTORY   OF    GYLIPPUS.     489 

B.C.  414.  constantly  led  out  and  drew  up  in  front  of  the  wall  the      VII. 
3>  Syracusans  and  their  allies,  and  the  Athenians  on  their  confined 
part  drew  up  in  face  of  them.     When  he  thought  that  tween  the 
the   moment   had   arrived   he    offered  battle ;   the   two  defeated, 
armies  met  and  fought  hand  to  hand  between  the  walls. 
But  there  the  Syracusan  cavalry  was  useless  ;  the  Syra- 
cusans and  their  allies  were  defeated,  and  received  their 
dead  under  a  flag  of  truce,  while  the  Athenians  raised 
a  trophy.     Gylippus  then  assembled  his  army  and  con- 
fessed that  the  fault  was  his  own  and  not  theirs  ;  for  by 
confining  their  ranks  too  much  between  the  walls  he  had 
rendered  useless  both  their  cavalry  and  their  javelin-men. 
But  he  meant  to  make  another  attempt.     And  he  re- 
minded them  that  while  in  material  force  they  were  equal 
to  their  enemies,  in  energy  of  purpose  they  ought  to  be 
far  superior.     That  they,  who  were  Peloponnesians  and 
Dorians a,  should  allow  a  mixed  rabble  of  lonians  and 
islanders  to  remain  in  the  country  and  not  resolve  to 
master  them  and  drive  them  out,  was  a  thing  not  to  be 
thought  of. 

On   the   first   opportunity   he    led    them   out    again.        6. 
Nicias  and  the  Athenians  had  determined  that,  whether  But  renew- 
the  Syracusans  would  offer  battle  or  not,  they  must  not  conflict  on 
allow  them  to  carry  on  their  counterwork.     For  already 


their  wall  had  almost  passed  the  end  of  the  Athenian  wher,e  his 

cavalry  can 

wall,  and  if  the  work  advanced  any  further  it  would  make  act,  he  is 
no  difference  to  the  Athenians  whether  they  fought  and  The  cross- 
conquered  in  every  battle,  or  never  fought  at  all.     So 
they  went  out  to  meet  the  Syracusans.    Gylippus  before 
engaging  led  his  heavy-armed  further  outside  the  walls  wail. 
than  on  the  former  occasion ;  his  cavalry  and  javelin- 
men  he  placed  on  the  flanks  of  the  Athenians  in  the 
open  space  between  the  points  at  which  their  respective 
lines  of  wall  stopped.     In  the  course  of  the  battle  the 
cavalry  attacked  the  left  wing  of  the  Athenians  which 
was  opposed  to  them,  and  put  them  to  flight ;  the  defeat 
became   general,   and    the   whole  Athenian    army   was 
a  Cp.  i.  124  init. ;  v.  9  init. ;  vi.  77  med. ;  viii.  25  med. 


490     THE   CROSS-WALL  PASSES    THE    WALL. 

VII.     driven  back  by  main  force  within  their  lines.     On  the  B.C.  414. 
following  night  the   Syracusans   succeeded   in  carrying 
their  wall  past  the  works  of  the  enemy.   Their  operations 
were  now  no  longer  molested  by  them,  and  the  Athe- 
nians, whatever   success  they  might   gain  in  the  field, 
were  utterly  deprived  of  all  hope  of  investing  the  city. 
7'  Not  long  afterwards  the  remaining  Corinthian  with  the 

Ambraciot  and  Leucadian  ships  a  sailed   in,  under  the 


forcements.  command  of  Erasinides  the  Corinthian,  having  eluded 
collects  the  Athenian  guardships.  They  assisted  the  Syracusans 
Sicily"1  in  completing  what  remained  of  the  Syracusan  wall  up 
embassy  to  to  t^le  Athenian  wall  which  it  crossed.  Gylippus  mean- 
Corinth  while  had  gone  off  into  Sicily  to  collect  both  naval  and 

and  Lace- 

daemon.      land   forces,   and  also   to   bring  over   any  cities  which 

m^nanavy.  either  were  slack  in  the  Syracusan  cause  or  had  stood 

aloof  from  the  war.     More  ambassadors,  Syracusan  and 

Corinthian,  were  despatched  to  Lacedaemon  and  Corinth, 

requesting  that  reinforcements  might  be  sent  across  the 

sea   in  merchant-ships  or  small  craft,  or  by  any  other 

available  means,  since  the  Athenians  were  sending  for 

assistance.     The  Syracusans,  who  were  in  high  spirits, 

also  manned  a  navy,  and  began  to  practise,  intending  to 

try  their  hand  at  this  new  sort  of  warfare. 

8.  Nicias  observing  how  they  were  employed,  and  seeing 

Day  by  day  that  the  strength  of  the  enemy  and  the  helplessness  of 

the  Syracu-  .... 

sans  are  the  Athenians  was  daily  increasing,  sent  to  Athens  a 
^u^  report  of  his  circumstances,  as  he  had  often  done 
Before,  but  never  in  such  detail.  He  now  thought  the 

strength,      situation  so  critical  that,  if  the  Athenians  did  not  at  once 

Nicias 

writes  to  recall  them  or  send  another  considerable  army  to  their 
help,  the  expedition  was  lost.  Fearing  lest  his  mes- 
sengers, either  from  inability  to  speak  or  b  from  want  of 
intelligence  b,  or  because  they  desired  to  please  the 
people,  might  not  tell  the  whole  truth,  he  wrote  a 
letter,  that  the  Athenians  might  receive  his  own  opinion 
of  their  affairs  unimpaired  in  the  transmission,  and  so 

a  Cp.  vii.  4  fin. 

b  Or,  reading  /-wqpjs  instead  of  yvvpris  :  '  from  defect  of  memory/ 


THE  ATHENIANS    ON   THE    DEFENSIVE.     491 

B.C.  414.  be  better  able  to  judge  of  the  real  facts  of  the  case.      VII. 
i-  91.  3-  jjie  messengers  departed  carrying  his  letter  and  taking 
verbal  instructions.     He  was  now  careful  to  keep  his 
army  on  the  defensive,  and  to  run   no  risks  which  he 
could  avoid. 

At  the  end  of  the  same  summer,  Euetion  an  Athenian       9. 
general,  in   concert  with   Perdiccas  and  assisted    by  a  Failure  of 
large  force  of  Thracians,  made  an  attack  upon  Amphi-  up0an  Am- 
polis,  which  he  failed  to  take.     He  then  brought  round  PhiP°lis- 
triremes  into  the  Strymon  and  besieged  the  place  from 
the   river,  making   Himeraeum  his   head-quarters.     So 
the  summer  ended. 

In  the  following  winter  the  messengers  from  Nicias      10. 
arrived  at  Athens.     They  delivered  their  verbal  instruc-  The  mes- 

.   ,  sengers  of 

tions,  and  answered  any  questions  which  were   put  to  Nicias 
them.   They  also  presented  his  letter,  which  the  registrar  %&££ 
of  the  city,  coming  forward,  read  to  the  Athenian  people. 
It  ran  as  follows  : — 

'  Athenians,  in  many  previous  despatches  I  have  re-      j  i . 
ported  to  you  the  course  of  events  up  to  this  time,  but  The  arrival 
now  there  is  greater  need  than  ever  that  you  should  has  entirety 
inform  yourselves  of  our  situation,  and  come  to  some  de- 
cision.     After  we  had  engaged  the  Syracusans,  against 
whom  you  sent  us,  in  several  battles,  and  conquered  in  now  be- 
most  of   them,  and  had   raised  the  lines  within  which S1< 
we  are  now  stationed,  Gylippus  a  Lacedaemonian  ar- 
rived, bringing  an  army  from   Peloponnesus  and  from 
certain  of  the  cities  of  Sicily.     In  the  first  engagement 
he  was  defeated  by  us,  but  on  the  following  day  we  were 
overcome  by  numerous  horsemen  and  javelin-men,  and 
retired  within   our   lines.     We   have  therefore  desisted 
from  our  siege-works  and  remain  idle,  since  we  are  over- 
powered by  the  superior  numbers  of  the   enemy,  and 
indeed  cannot  bring  our  whole  army  into  the  field,  for 
the  defence  of  our  wall  absorbs  a  portion  of  our  heavy- 
armed.     The  enemy  meanwhile  have  built  a  single  wall 
which  crosses  ours,  and  we  cannot  now  invest  them,  un- 
less a  large  army  comes  and  takes  this  cross-wall.     So 


493  LETTER    OF  NICIAS. 

VII.     that  we,   who   are   supposed   to   be   the   besiegers,  areB.c.4i4. 

really  the  besieged  a,  at  least  by  land  ;    and  the  more 

so   because  we   cannot   go   far  even  into  the  country, 

for  we  are  prevented  by  their  horsemen. 
12.  'Moreover  they  have  sent  ambassadors  to  Pelopon- 

nesus  asking  for  reinforcements,  and  Gylippus  has  gone 


collecting     to  the  cities  in  Sicily  intending  to  solicit  those  who  are 

reinforce-  .    .  . 

ments,  and  at  present  neutral  to  join  him,  and  to  obtain  from  his 
allies  fresh  naval  and  land  forces.     For  they  purpose,  as 

>  t0  attack  our  walls  b     land>  and  at  the  same  time 


Their  ships  to  make  an  effort  at  sea.  And  let  no  one  be  startled 
are  in  good  when  I  say  "  at  sea."  Our  fleet  was  originally  in  first- 
whereas  our  rate  condition  :  the  ships  were  sound  and  the  crews  were 


dec?  i?6  m  g°°d  order,  but  now,  as  the  enemy  are  well  aware, 
the  timbers  of  the  ships,  having  been  so  long  ex- 
posed to  the  sea,  are  soaked,  and  the  efficiency  of  the 
crews  is  destroyed.  We  have  no  means  of  drawing  up 
our  vessels  and  airing  them,  because  the  enemy's  fleet 
is  equal  or  even  superior  in  numbers  to  our  own,  and 
we  are  always  expecting  an  attack  from  them.  They 
are  clearly  trying  their  strength  ;  they  can  attack  us 
when  they  please,  and  they  have  far  greater  facilities 
for  drying  their  ships,  since  they  are  not,  like  us,  en- 
gaged in  a  blockade. 

1  3-  c  Even  if  we  had  a  great  superiority  in  the  number  of 

our  sm*ps,  and  were  not  compelled  as  we  are  to  employ 
ficStyif"  tliem  all  in  keeping  guard,  we  could  hardly  have  the 
conveyed  like  advantage.  For  our  supplies  have  to  pass  so  near 
crews'are  the  enemy's  city  that  they  are  with  difficulty  conveyed 
andnoiir1Sed  to  us  now>  and  if  we  relax  our  vigilance  ever  so  little  we 
sailors  de-  ^11  lose  them  altogether. 

It  has  been,  and  continues  to  be  the  ruin  of  our  crews, 
that  the  sailors,  having  to  forage  and  fetch  water  and 
wood  from  a  distance,  are  cut  off  by  the  Syracusan 
horse  b,  while  our  servants,  since  we  have  been  reduced 
to  an  equality  with  the  enemy,  desert  us.  Of  the 
foreign  sailors,  some  who  were  pressed  into  the  service 
a  Cp.  iv.  29  init.  b  Cp.  vii.  4  fin. 


LETTER    OF   NICIAS.  493 

B.C.  414.  run  off  at  once  to  the  Sicilian  cities  ;  others,  having  been  VII. 
originally  attracted  by  high  pay,  and  fancying  that  they 
were  going  to  trade  and  not  to  fight,  astonished  at  the 
resistance  which  they  encounter,  and  especially  at  the 
naval  strength  of  the  enemy,  either  find  an  excuse  for 
deserting  to  the  Syracusans,  or  they  effect  their  escape 
into  the  country;  and  Sicily  is  a  large  place.  Others, 
again,  have  persuaded  the  trierarchs  to  take  Hyccarian 
slaves  in  their  room  while  they  themselves  are  busy 
trading  ;  and  thus  the  precision  of  the  service  is  lost. 

'  I  am  writing  to  those  who  know  that  the  crew  of  a       14. 
vessel  does  not  long  remain  at  its  prime,  aand  that  the  I  cannot 

prevent 

sailors  who  really  start  the  ship   and  keep  the  rowing  these 
together  are  but  a  fraction  of  the  whole  number  a.     The  forUyour 
most  hopeless  thing  of  all  is  that,  although  I  am  general,  ^pers  wil 
I  am  not  able  to  put  a  stop  to  these  disorders,  for  tempers  not  submit 
like   yours  are   not  easily  controlled.     And  we  cannot  piine. 
even  fill  up  the  crews,  whereas  the  enemy  can  obtain  in  danger 


recruits  from  many  sources.     Our  daily  waste  in  men 

and  stores  can  only  be  replaced  out  of  the  supplies  which  ^  is  bett«r 

*  r  that  you 

we  brought  with  us  ;    and  these  we  have  no  means  of  should 

.-,...,.,  P    .  know  the 

increasing,  for  the  cities  which  are  now  our  confederates,  truth, 
Naxos  and  Catana,  are  unable  to  maintain  us.  There 
is  only  one  advantage  more  which  the  Syracusans  can 
gain  over  us  :  if  the  towns  of  Italy  from  which  our 
provisions  are  derived,  seeing  our  reduced  condition  and 
your  neglect  of  us,  go  over  to  the  enemy,  we  shall  be 
starved  out,  and  they  will  have  made  an  end  of  the  war 
without  striking  a  blow.  I  could  have  written  you 
tidings  more  cheering  than  these,  but  none  more  profit- 
able ;  for  you  should  be  well-informed  of  our  circum- 
stances if  you  are  to  take  the  right  steps.  Moreover  I 
know  your  dispositions  ;  you  like  to  hear  pleasant  things, 
but  afterwards  lay  the  fault  on  those  who  tell  you  them 
if  they  are  falsified  by  the  event  ;  therefore  I  think  it 
safer  to  speak  the  truth. 

a  Or,  'and  that  there  are  few  sailors  who  can  start  a  ship  and 
keep  the  rowing  together.' 


494         ^    SECOND    EXPEDITION  DECREED. 

VII.         '  And  now,  do  not  imagine  that  your  soldiers  and  their  B.C.  414. 
15-      generals  have  failed  in  the  fulfilment  of  the  duty  which 
origma^y  imposed  upon  them.     But  when  all  Sicily 


duty,  but     is  uniting  against  us,  and  the  Syracusans  are  expecting 

the  enemy 

and  their     another  army  from    Peloponnesus,  it  is  time  that  you 

foomuch     should  make  up  your  minds.   For  the  troops  which  we  have 

^"j^*^  here  certainly  cannot  hold  out  even  against  our  present 

want  to       enemies,  and  therefore  you  ought  either  to  recall  us  or  to 

Whatever    send  another  army  and  fleet  as  large  as  this,  and  plenty 

quickly'.  °  of  money.     You  should  also  send  a  general  to  succeed 

me,  for  I  have  a  disease   in   the   kidneys  and  cannot 

remain  here.     I  claim  your  indulgence  ;  while  I  retained 

my  health  I  often  did  you  good  service  when  in  com- 

mand.     But  do  whatever  you  mean  to  do  at  the  very 

beginning  of  spring,  and  let  there  be  no  delay.     The 

enemy    will    obtain    reinforcements    in    Sicily   without 

going  far,  and  although  the  troops  from  Peloponnesus 

will  not  arrive  so  soon,  yet  if  you  do  not  take  care  they 

will   elude   you  ;    their   movements  will   either   be   too 

secret  for  you,  as  they  were  before  a,  or  too  quick.' 

1  6.  Such  was  the   condition   of  affairs  described   in  the 

TheAthe-    letter  of  Nicias.     The  Athenians,  after  hearing  it  read, 

mans  re-  *• 

solve  to  did  not  release  Nicias  from  his  command,  but  they  joined 
second  ex-  with  him  two  officers  who  were  already  in  Sicily, 
wh1chQDe-°f  Menander  and  Euthydemus,  until  regular  colleagues 

mosthenes    could  be   elected  and  sent  out,  for  they  did  not  wish 

and  E- 


are him  to   bear  the  burden  in  his  sickness  alone.     They 
com°m        also  resolved  to  send  a   second  fleet  and  an  army   of 
manders.     Athenians  taken  from  the  muster-roll  and  of  allies.     As 
colleagues  to  Nicias  they  elected  Demosthenes  the  son 
of  Alcisthenes,   and    Eurymedon   the   son   of  Thucles. 
Eurymedon  was  despatched  immediately  to  Sicily  about 
the  winter  solstice  ;  he  took  with  him  ten  ships  conveying 
a  hundred  and  twenty  talents  b  of  silver,  and  was  to  tell 
the  army  in  Sicily  that  they  should  receive  assistance 
17.      and  should  not  be  neglected.     Demosthenes  remained 
The  Athe-   behind,  and  was  busied  in  getting  ready  the  expedition 

nians  and 

a  Cp.  vii.  2  init.  b  ,£28,800. 


THE   LACEDAEMONIAN   CONSCIENCE.       495 

B.C.  414.  which  he  was  to  bring  out  in  the  spring.  He  announced  VII. 
?>  to  the  allies  that  troops  would  be  required,  and  collected  Peippon- 
money,  ships,  and  hoplites  at  Athens.  The  Athenians  ready  their 
also  sent  twenty  ships  to  cruise  off  the  Peloponnesian 
coast  and  intercept  any  vessels  trying  to  pass  from  the 
Peloponnesus  or  Corinth  to  Sicily.  The  Sicilian  envoys  a 
had  now  arrived  at  Corinth,  and  the  Corinthians  had 
heard  from  them  that  affairs  were  looking  better  in 
Sicily.  Seeing  how  opportune  had  been  the  arrival  of 
the  ships  which  they  had  already  despatched  they  were 
more  zealous  than  ever.  They  prepared  to  convey 
hoplites  to  Sicily  in  merchant-vessels  ;  the  Lacedae- 
monians were  to  do  the  like  from  Peloponnesus.  The 
Corinthians  also  proceeded  to  man  twenty-five  ships  of 
war,  intending  to  hazard  a  naval  engagement  against  the 
Athenian  squadron  stationed  at  Naupactus.  They  hoped 
that,  if  the  attention  of  the  Athenians  was  diverted  by  an 
opposing  force,  they  would  be  unable  to  prevent  their 
merchant-vessels  from  sailing. 

The  Lacedaemonians  also  prepared  for  their  already       18.   * 
projected  invasion  of  Attica  b.     They  were  partly  stimu-  The 
lated  by  the   Syracusans  and  Corinthians,  who  having  monians" 
heard  of  the  reinforcements  which  the  Athenians  were          ™fstl" 


sending  to  Sicily,  hoped  that  they  might  be  stopped  by  rre 
the  invasion.     Alcibiades  was  always  at  hand  insisting  fortify 

_  _       ._   .        ._         ,  ,      -  .        Decelea. 

upon  the  importance  of  fortifying  Decelea  and  of  carrying  in  the 


on  the  war  with  vigour.  Above  all,  the  Lacedaemonians 
were  inspirited  by  the  thought  that  the  Athenians 
would  be  more  easily  overthrown  now  that  they  had  of  violating 

,         the  treaty  ; 

two  wars  on  hand,  one  against  themselves,  and  another  in  this,  the 
against  the  Sicilians.      They  considered  also  that  this  Athenians- 
time  they  had  been  the  first  offenders  against  the  treaty, 
whereas  in  the  former  war  the  transgression  had  rather 
been  on  their  own  side.     For  the  Thebans  had  entered 
Plataea   in  time   of  peace  c,  and   they   themselves  had 
refused    arbitration   when    offered    by    the    Athenians, 

a  Cp.  vii.  7.  b  Cp.  vi.  93  init. 

c  Cp.  ii.  2  foil.;  iii.  56  init. 


496  FORTIFICATION    OF   DECELEA. 

VII.  although  the  former  treaty  forbade  war  in  case  an  B.C.  414. 
adversary  was  willing  to  submit  to  arbitration a.  They 
felt  that  their  ill-success  was  deserved,  and  they  took 
seriously  to  heart  the  disasters  which  had  befallen  them 
at  Pylos  and  elsewhere.  But  now  the  Athenians  with  a 
fleet  of  thirty  ships  had  gone  forth  from  Argos  and 
ravaged  part  of  the  territory  of  Epidaurus  and  Prasiae, 
besides  other  placesb;  marauding  expeditions  from  Pylos 
were  always  going  on ;  and  whenever  quarrels  arose  about 
disputed  points  in  the  treaty  and  the  Lacedaemonians 
proposed  arbitration,  the  Athenians  refused  it.  Reflecting 
upon  all  this,  the  Lacedaemonians  concluded  that  the 
guilt  of  their  former  transgression  was  now  shifted  to  the 
Athenians,  and  they  were  full  of  warlike  zeal.  During 
the  winter  they  bade  their  allies  provide  iron,  and  them- 
selves manufactured  tools  for  the  fortification  of  Decelea. 
They  also  prepared,  and  continually  urged  the  other 
Peloponnesians  to  prepare,  the  succours  which  they  in- 
tended to  send  in  merchant-vessels  to  the  Syracusans. 
And  so  the  winter  ended,  and  with  it  the  eighteenth 
year  in  the  Peloponnesian  War  of  which  Thucydides 
wrote  the  history. 

19-          At  the  very  beginning  of  the  next  spring,  and  earlier  B.C.  413. 
The  Lace-   ^an  ever  before,  the  Lacedaemonians  and  their  allies     ' 9I>  4* 

daemonians 

enter  Attica  entered  Attica  under  the  command  of  Agis  the  son  of 
Decelea! y  Archidamus  the  Lacedaemonian  king.  They  first  de- 
vastated the  plain  and  its  neighbourhood.  They  then 
began  to  fortify  Decelea,  dividing  the  work  among  the 
cities  of  the  confederacy.  Decelea  is  distant  about  four- 
teen miles  from  Athens,  and  not  much  further  from 
Boeotia.  The  fort  was  designed  for  the  devastation  of 
the  plain  and  the  richest  parts  of  the  country,  and  was 
erected  on  a  spot  within  sight  of  Athens. 

Reinforce-  While  the  Peloponnesians  and  their  allies  in  Attica 
fo^fdi^6  were  t^lus  engaged>  the  Peloponnesians  at  home  were 
from  which  despatching  hoplites  in  merchant-vessels  to  Sicily.  The 
tionofthe  Lacedaemonians  selected  the  best  of  the  Helots  and 
a  Cp.  i.  78  fin.,  85,  140  med.  b  Cp.  vi.  105. 


REINFORCEMENTS  SENT  TO  BOTH  SIDES.    497 

B.C.  413.  Neodamodes,  numbering  in  all  six  hundred,  and  placed      VII. 
4'  them  under  the  command  of  Eccritus,  a  Spartan.    The  Athenians 

1  is  diverted 

Boeotians  furnished  three  hundred  hoplites,  who  were  by  the 
commanded  by  two  Thebans,  Xenon  and  Nikon,  and  at  Nau- 
Hegesander,  a  Thespian.  These  started  first  and  put  out  pac 
into  the  open  sea  from  Taenarus  in  Laconia.  Not  long 
afterwards  the  Corinthians  sent  five  hundred  heavy- 
armed,  some  of  them  from  Corinth  itself,  others  who 
were  Arcadian  mercenaries  ;  they  were  all  placed  under 
the  command  of  Alexarchus,  a  Corinthian.  The  Sicyo- 
nians  also  sent  with  the  Corinthians  two  hundred  hoplites 
under  the  command  of  Sargeus,  a  Sicyonian.  Meanwhile 
the  twenty-five  ships  which  the  Corinthians  had  manned 
in  the  winter  lay  opposite  to  the  twenty  Athenian  ships 
at  Naupactus  until  the  merchant-vessels  conveying  the 
heavy-armed  troops  had  got  safely  off.  So  the  design 
succeeded,  and  the  attention  of  the  Athenians  was 
diverted  from  the  merchant-ships  to  the  triremes. 

At  the  beginning  of  spring,  whilst  the  Lacedaemonians       20. 
were  fortifying  Decelea,  the  Athenians  sent  thirty  ships  Charicies  * 
under  the  command  of  Charicies  the  son  of  Apollodorus  ships  sent7 
to  cruise  about  Peloponnesus.     He  was  told  to  touch  at  The  'second 
Argos,  and  there  to  summon  and  take  on  board  a  force 
of  heavy-  armed  which  the  Argives,  being  allies  of  the 

J  musters  at 

Athenians,  were  bound  to  furnish.  Meanwhile  they  Aegina. 
despatched  under  Demosthenes  their  intended  expe- 
dition to  Sicily :  it  consisted  of  sixty  Athenian  ships  and 
five  Chian,  twelve  hundred  heavy-armed  Athenians  taken 
from  the  roll,  and  as  many  others  as  could  possibly  be 
obtained  from  the  different  islanders ;  they  also  collected 
from  their  subject-allies  supplies  of  all  sorts  for  the  war. 
Demosthenes  was  told  first  of  all  to  co-operate  with 
Charicies  on  the  coast  of  Laconia.  So  he  sailed  to 
Aegina,  and  there  waited  until  the  whole  of  his  arma- 
ment was  assembled  and  until  Charicies  had  taken  on 
board  the  Argives. 

In  the  same  spring  and  about  the  same  time  Gylip-      2 1 . 
pus  returned  to  Syracuse,  bringing  from  each  of  the 

Kk 


498     THE  SYRACUSANS  MAN  A  GREAT  FLEET. 


VII.     cities  which  he  had   persuaded    to  join  him   as   many  B.C.  413 


mocrates  troops  as  he  could  obtain.  He  assembled  the  Syra- 
Syracusans  cusans  and  told  them  that  they  should  man  as  large 
sea^they  a  fleet  as  possible  and  try  their  fortune  at  sea  ;  he  hoped 
imhate  the  to  obtain  a  decisive  result  which  would  justify  the  risk. 
daring  Hermocrates  took  the  same  view,  and  urged  them 

spirit  of 

their  foes,  strongly  not  to  be  faint-hearted,  but  to  attack  the 
enemy  with  their  ships.  He  said  that  the  Athenians 
had  not  inherited  their  maritime  skill,  aand  would  not 
retain  it  for  evera;  there  was  a  time  when  they  were 
less  of  a  naval  people  than  the  Syracusans  themselves  b, 
but  they  had  been  made  sailors  from  necessity  by  the 
Persian  invasion.  To  daring  men  like  the  Athenians 
those  who  emulated  their  daring  were  the  most  formid- 
able foes.  The  same  reckless  courage  which  had  often 
enabled  the  Athenians,  although  inferior  in  power,  to 
strike  terror  into  their  adversaries  might  now  be  turned 
against  them  by  the  Syracusans.  He  well  knew  that 
if  they  faced  the  Athenian  navy  suddenly  and  unex- 
pectedly, they  would  gain  more  than  they  would  lose  ; 
the  consternation  which  they  would  inspire  would  more 
than  counterbalance  their  own  inexperience  and  the  supe- 
rior skill  of  the  Athenians.  He  told  them  therefore  to 
try  what  they  could  do  at  sea,  and  not  to  be  frightened. 
Thus  under  the  influence  of  Gylippus,  Hermocrates,  and 
others,  the  Syracusans,  now  eager  for  the  conflict,  began 
to  man  their  ships. 

22.          When  the  fleet  was  ready,  Gylippus,  under  cover  of 

At  dawn      night,  led  forth  the  whole  land-army,  intending  to  attack 

attacks  the  in  person   the  forts  on   Plemmyrium.     Meanwhile   the 

piemmy-     triremes  of  the  Syracusans,  at  a  concerted  signal,  sailed 

to'fleet16  forth>  thirty-five  from  the  greater  harbour  and  forty-five 

encounters  from  the  lesser,  where  they  had   their  arsenal.     These 

nians  in  the  latter  sailed  round  into  the  Great  Harbour,  intending  to 

form  a  junction  with  the  other  ships  inside  and  make 

a  combined  attack  on  Plemmyrium,  that  the  Athenians, 

assailed  both  by  sea  and  land,  might  be  disconcerted. 

a  Or,  *  or  been  sailors  from  all  time.'  b  Cp.  i.  14. 


THEIR  DEFEAT  IN  THE  FIRST  SEA-FIGHT.   499 

B.C.  413.  The  Athenians  however  quickly  manned  sixty  ships;  and  VII. 
'  with  twenty-five  of  them  engaged  the  thirty-five  of  the 
Syracusans  which  were  in  the  Great  Harbour :  with  the 
remainder  they  encountered  those  which  were  sailing 
round  from  the  arsenal.  The  two  squadrons  met  at  once 
before  the  mouth  of  the  Great  Harbour :  the  struggle 
was  long  and  obstinate,  the  Syracusans  striving  to  force 
an  entrance,  the  Athenians  to  prevent  them. 

Meanwhile  Gylippus,  quite  early  in  the  morning,  while      23. 
the  Athenians  in  Plemmyrium  who  had  gone  down  to  The  forts 

i  .  .  .  are  taken, 

the  water-side  had  their  minds  occupied   by  the  sea-  but  in  the 
fight,   made   a    sudden    attack   upon   their   forts.      He  the  sfra- 

defeated. 


captured  the  largest  of  them  first,  then  the  two  lesser,  cusans  are 


their  garrisons  forsaking  them  when  they  saw  the  largest 
so   easily  taken.     Those   who   escaped   from  the   fort- 
ress first  captured,  getting  into  a  merchant-vessel  and 
some  boats  which  were  moored  at  Plemmyrium,  found 
their  way  to  the  main   station  of  the  Athenians,  but 
with  difficulty ;  for  they  were  chased  by  a  swift  trireme, 
the  Syracusans  at  that  time  having  the  advantage  in 
the  Great  Harbour.     But  when  the  two  lesser  fortresses 
were   taken,   the   Syracusans   were   already  losing   the 
day,  and  the  fugitives  got  past  them  with  greater  ease. 
For  the  Syracusan  ships  which  were  fighting  before  the 
mouth  of  the  harbour,  having  forced  their  way  through 
the  enemy,  entered  in  disorder,  and  falling  foul  of  one 
another  gave  away  the  victory  to  the  Athenians,  who 
routed  not  only  these,  but  also  the  others  by  whom  they 
were  at  first  worsted  inside  the  harbour.     Eleven  Syra- 
cusan ships  were  disabled ;  the  crews  in  most  of  them 
were  slain,  in   three,  made   prisoners.     The   Athenians 
themselves  lost  three  ships.     They  now  drew  to  land 
the  wrecks  of  the  Syracusan  ships,  and  erecting  a  trophy 
on  the  little  island  in  front  of  Plemmyrium   returned 
to  their  own  station. 

But  although  the  Syracusans  were  unsuccessful  in  24. 
the  sea-fight,  still  they  had  taken  the  fortresses  of  The  loss 
Plemmyrium.  They  erected  three  trophies,  one  for 

K  k  2 


500  BUT    TAKE   PLEMMYRIUM. 

VII.     each  fort.     Two  out  of  the  three  forts   they  repaired  B.C.  413. 

foThf0113    anc*    garrisoned,  but  one  of  the   two  which  were  cap- 

Athenians.   tured  last  they  demolished.     Many  perished  and  many 

prisoners  were  made  at   the   capture  of  the  forts,  and 

abundant   spoil  of  different    kinds  was   taken,  for   the 

Athenians  used  them  as  a  store,  and  much   corn  and 

goods  of  traders  were  deposited  in  them;    also  much 

property  belonging  to  the  trierarchs,  including  the  sails 

and  other  fittings  of  forty  triremes,  and  three  triremes 

which  had  been  drawn  up  on  the  beach.     The  loss  of 

Plemmyrium  was  one  of  the  greatest  and  severest  blows 

which  befell  the  Athenians.     For  now  they  could    no 

longer   even   introduce  provisions  with  safety,  but  the 

Syracusan  ships  lay  watching  to  prevent  them,  and  they 

had  to  fight  for  the  passage*.     General  discouragement 

and  dismay  prevailed  throughout  the  army. 

25.          The  Syracusans  next  sent  out  twelve  ships  under  the 

The  Syra-    command  of  Agatharchus,  a  Syracusan.     One  of  these 

cusans  send  ..  '  _    , 

a  third  hastened  to  Peloponnesus  conveying  envoys  who  were 
PeiopSon-t0  to  report  their  improved  prospects,  and  to  urge  more 
stron^y  tnan  ever  tne  prosecution  of  the  war  in  Hellas. 


a  squadron  The  remaining  eleven  sailed  to  Italy,  hearing  that  ships 

which  inter-  ,     .  .  , 

cepts  some  laden  with  supplies  were  on  their  way  to  the  Athenians. 

fuppSeT     The7  fel1   m  with  and  destroyed   most  of  these  ships, 

and   burnt  a  quantity  of  ship-timber  which  was  lying 

ready  for   the  Athenians   in   the  'territory  of  Caulonia. 

Then   they   came    to   Locri,   and   while   they  were   at 

anchor  there,  one  of  the  merchant-vessels  from   Pelo- 

ponnesus sailed  in,  bringing  some  Thespian  hoplitesb. 

These  the  Syracusans  took  on  board,  and  sailed  home- 

wards.    The  Athenians  watched  for  them  near  Megara 

with   twenty  ships  and  took  one  ship  with  the  crew, 

but  the  rest  made  their  escape  to  Syracuse. 

TheAthe-        There  was  some  skirmishing   in   the   harbour  about 

up"hePUl     tne  palisades  which  the   Syracusans  had  fixed  in  the 

whichthe    sea  in  front  °^  t^ieir  olc*  dock-houses,  that  their  ships 

Syracusans  might  ride  at  anchor  in  the  enclosed  space,  where  they 

had  driven 

a  Cp.  vii.  4  med.,  13  init.  *>  Cp.  vii.  19  med. 


SKIRMISHING   IN    THE    HARBOUR.  501 

B.C.  413.  could  not  be  struck  by  the  enemy,  and  would  be  out  VII. 
'  of  harm's  way.  The  Athenians  brought  up  a  ship  of  in  to  Prp~ 
ten  thousand  talents  a  burden,  which  had  wooden  towers  ships. 
and  bulwarks  ;  and  from  their  boats  they  tied  cords  to 
the  stakes  and  b  wrenched  and  tore  them  up  b  ;  or  dived 
and  sawed  them  through  underneath  the  water.  Mean- 
while the  Syracusans  kept  up  a  shower  of  missiles  from 
the  dock-houses,  which  the  men  in  the  ship  returned. 
At  length  the  Athenians  succeeded  in  pulling  up  most 
of  the  palisades.  The  stakes  which  were  out  of  sight 
were  the  most  dangerous  of  all,  there  being  some  which 
were  so  fixed  that  they  did  not  appear  above  the  water  ; 
and  no  vessel  could  safely  come  near.  They  were  like 
a  sunken  reef,  and  a  pilot,  not  seeing  them,  might  easily 
catch  his  ship  upon  them.  Even  these  were  sawn  ofif 
by  men  who  dived  for  hire  ;  but  the  Syracusans  drove 
them  in  again.  Many  were  the  contrivances  employed 
on  both  sides,  as  was  only  natural,  when  two  armies 
confronted  each  other  at  so  short  a  distance.  There 
were  continual  skirmishes,  and  they  practised  all  kinds 
of  stratagems. 

The  Syracusans  also  sent  to  the  Sicilian  cities  Corin-  A  second 
thian,  Ambraciot,  and  Lacedaemonian  ambassadors  an- 
nouncing  the  taking  of  Plemmyrium,  and  explaining  that 


in  the  sea-fight  they  had  been  defeated,  not  so  much  by  Syracuse  to 

,  i  •  ^    c  ^  *.t  •      -u  •  A-U  •  •  the  cities  of 

the  superior  strength  of  the  enemy,  as  through  their  own  Sicily. 

disorder.  They  were  also  to  report  their  great  hopes 
of  success,  and  to  ask  for  assistance  both  by  land  and 
sea.  They  were  to  add  that  the  Athenians  were  ex- 
pecting reinforcements  ;  and  if  they  could  succeed  in 
destroying  the  army  then  in  Sicily  before  these  arrived, 
there  would  be  an  end  of  the  war.  Such  was  the  course 
of  events  in  Sicily. 

Demosthenes,  when  the  reinforcements  which  he  was       26. 
to  take  to  Sicily  had  all  collected,  sailed  from  Aegina  Devastation 
to    Peloponnesus   and  joined   Charicles  and   his   thirty  anderection 

a  About  250  tons. 

b  Or,  '  wrenched  them  up  and  broke  them  off.' 


502  PROGRESS    OF    THE    SECOND    EXPEDITION. 

VII.     ships  a.     He  embarked  the  Argive   hoplites,   and,  pro-  B.C.  413. 
of  a  second  ceeding  to    Laconia,  first  devastated  some  part  of  the01'91'4' 
opposite      lands  of  Epidaurus  Limera.     Next  the  Athenians  landed 
Demos-'      m  the  district  of  Laconia  opposite  Cythera,  where  there 
*s  a  temple  °f  Apollo.     They  ravaged  various  parts  of 


assisted  in  the  country,  and  fortified  a  sort  of  isthmus  in  the  neigh- 
tions,  sails  bourhood,  that  the  Helots  of  the  Lacedaemonians  might 
Corcyra.10  desert  and  find  a  refuge  there,  and  that  privateers  might 
make  the  place,  as  they  did  Pylos,  their  head-quarters 
for  marauding  expeditions.  Demosthenes  assisted  in 
the  occupation,  and  then  sailed  to  Corcyra,  intending  to 
collect  additional  forces  from  the  allies  in  that  region, 
and  to  make  his  way  with  all  speed  to  Sicily.  Charicles 
waited  until  he  had  completed  the  fort,  and  then  leaving 
a  garrison,  ,he  sailed  home  with  his  thirty  ships,  accom- 
panied by  the  Argives. 

27.  During  the   same   summer   there   arrived  at  Athens 

The  Dian    thirteen  hundred  Thracian  targeteers  of  the  Dian  race, 
arrive  too     who  carried  dirks;  they  were  to  have  sailed  with  De- 


?-  mosthenes  to  Sicily,  but  came  too  late,  and  the  Athe- 
tion-  nians   determined   to   send   them   back  to  their  native 

country.  Each  soldier  was  receiving  a  drachma  b  per 
day  ;  and  to  use  them  against  Decelea  would  have  been 
too  expensive. 

Thucydides  For  during  this  summer  Decelea  had  been  fortified  by 
spSfof  °  the  whole  Peloponnesian  army,  and  was  henceforward 
sufffrhTs  regulai"ly  occupied  for  the  annoyance  of  the  country  by 
caused  by  a  succession  of  garrisons  sent  from  the  allied  cities, 

the  forti-  ,  .  .  ,  .  ,    . 

fication  of    whose  incursions  did  immense  harm  to  the  Athenians  : 


tne  destruction  of  property  and  life  which  ensued  was  a 
manently   ,  chief  cause  of  their  fall.    Hitherto  the  invasions  had  been 

commanded 

the  whole  brief  and  did  not  prevent  them  from  gathering  the  pro- 
duce  of  the  soil  in  the  interval  ;  but  now  the  Pelo- 
ponnesians  were  always  on  the  spot;  and  sometimes 


Slrea?de      ^ey  were  reinforced  by  additional   troops,  but   always 
struction  of  the  regular  garrison,  who  were  compelled  to  find  their 

cattle  and  ,.  .     .  M  .  _, 

injury  to      own  supplies,  overran  and  despoiled  the  country.     The 

cavalry. 

a  Cp.  VII.  20  mit.  o   g^d. 


DISTRESS    OF   ATHENIANS    AT   HOME.      503 

B.C.  413.  Lacedaemonian  king,  Agis,  was  present  in  person,  and  VII. 
4  devoted  his  whole  energies  to  the  war.  The  sufferings 
of  the  Athenians  were  terrible.  For  they  were  dis- 
possessed of  their  entire  territory  ;  more  than  twenty 
thousand  slaves  had  deserted  a,  many  of  them  artisans  ; 
all  their  sheep  and  cattle  had  perished,  and  now  that 
the  cavalry  had  to  go  out  every  day  and  make  descents 
upon  Decelea  or  keep  guard  all  over  the  country,  their 
horses  were  either  wounded  by  the  enemy,  or  lamed  by 
the  roughness  of  the  ground  and  the  incessant  fatigue. 

Provisions,  which  had  been  formerly  conveyed  by  the      28. 
shorter  route  from  Euboea  to  Oropus  and  thence  over-  Provisions 

\  brought  a 

land  through  Decelea,  were  now  carried  by  sea  round  the  long  way 
promontory  of  Sunium  at  great  cost.    Athens  was  obliged  citizens  on 


to  import  everything  from  abroad,  and  resembled  a  fort 
rather  than  a  city.  In  the  day-time  the  citizens  guarded 
the  battlements  by  relays  ;  during  the  night  every  man  population 

i  by  night. 

was  on  service  except  the  cavalry;  some  at  their  places  summerand 
of  arms,  others  on  the  wallb,  summer  and  winter  alike,  Twcfwars 
until  they  were  quite  worn  out.     But  worse  than  all  was  instead  -of 

*  *  one  ;  the 

the  cruel  necessity  of  maintaining  two  wars  at  once,  and  besiegers 

.  besieged. 

they  carried  on  both  with  a  determination  which  no  The  great 
one  would  have  believed  unless  he  had  actually  seen  it.  par 
That,  blockaded  as  they  were  by  the  Peloponnesians, 
who  had  raised  a  fort  in  their  country,  they  should  refuse 
to  let  go  Sicily,  and,  themselves  besieged,  persevere  in  the 
siege  of  Syracuse,  which  as  a  mere  city  might  rank  with 
Athens,  and  —  whereas  the  Hellenes  generally  were  ex- 
pecting at  the  beginning  of  the  war,  some  that  they  would 
survive  a  year,  others  two  or  perhaps  three  years,  certainly 
not  more,  if  the  Peloponnesians  invaded  Attica  —  that  in 
the  seventeenth  year  from  the  first  invasion,  after  so 
exhausting  a  struggle,  the  Athenians  should  have  been 
strong  enough  and  bold  enough  to  go  to  Sicily  at  all, 
and  to  plunge  into  a  fresh  war  as  great  as  that  in 
which  they  were  already  engaged  —  how  contrary  was  all 
this  to  the  expectation  of  mankind  !  Through  the  vast 
a  Cp.  viii.  40  med.  b  Cp.  ii.  13  fin.;  viii.  69  init. 


504         TERRIBLE  FATE    OF  MYCALESSUS. 

VII.     expense  thus  incurred,  above  all  through  the  mischief  B.C.  413. 

done  by  Decelea,  they  were  now  greatly  impoverished. 
New  It  was  at  this  time  that  they  imposed  upon  their  allies, 

instead  of  the  tribute,  a  duty  of  five  per  cent,  on  all 
things  imported  and  exported  by  sea,  thinking  that 
this  would  be  more  productive.  For  their  expenses  be- 
came heavier  and  heavier  as  the  war  grew  in  extent, 
and  at  the  same  time  their  sources  of  revenue  were 
dried  up. 

29-          And  so,  being  in  extreme  want  of  money,  and  desirous 
to  econormse>  they  at  once  sent  away  the  Thracians  who 


sent  home  came  too  late  for  Demosthenes,  ordering  Diitrephes  to 
Athenians,  convey  them  home,  but,  as  they  must  needs  sail  through 
tne  Euripus,  to  employ  them  in  any  way  which  he  could 
'  against  tne  enemy.  He  landed  them  at  Tanagra  and 
desired  to  there  made  a  hasty  raid  ;  in  the  evening  he  sailed  from 

do  what 

mischief      Chalcis  in  Euboea  across  the  Euripus,  and  disembarking 
!   y  his  troops  in  Boeotia  led  them  against  the  town  of  Myca- 
lessus-     He  passed  the  night  unperceived  at  the  temple 


The  pa-      of   Hermes,  which   is   distant   from    Mycalessus   about 

thctic  tele 

of  its  two  miles,  and  at  the  dawn  of  day  he  assaulted  and 
movSngS  captured  the  city,  which  is  not  large.  The  inhabitants 
Thucydides  were  taken  off  their  guard  ;  for  they  never  imagined 
that  an  enemy  would  come  and  attack  them  at  so  great 
a  distance  from  the  sea.  The  walls  were  weak,  and  in 
some  places  had  fallen  down  ;  in  others  they  were  built 
low  ;  while  the  citizens,  in  their  sense  of  security,  had  left 
their  gates  open.  The  Thracians  dashed  into  the  town, 
sacked  the  houses  and  temples,  and  slaughtered  the 
inhabitants.  They  spared  neither  old  nor  young,  but 
cut  down,  one  after  another,  all  whom  they  met,  the 
women  and  children,  the  very  beasts  of  burden,  and 
every  living  thing  which  they  saw.  a  For  the  Thracians, 
when  they  dare,  can  be  as  bloody  as  the  worst  bar- 
barians8'. There  in  Mycalessus  the  wildest  panic  ensued, 
and  destruction  in  every  form  was  rife.  They  even  fell 

a  Or,  '  For  the  Thracians,  like  all  very  barbarous  tribes,  are  most 
bloody  when  they  are  least  afraid.' 


DEMOSTHENES  IN    THE    IONIAN   GULF.      505 

B.C.  413.  upon  a  boy's  school,  the  largest  in  the  place,  which  the      VII. 
9I'  4'  children  had  just  entered,  and  massacred  them  every  one. 
No  greater  calamity  than  this  ever  affected  a  whole  city  ; 
never  was  anything  so  sudden  or  so  terrible. 

When  the  news  reached  the  Thebans  they  hastened      30. 
to  the  rescue.     Coming  upon  the  Thracians  before  they  The  The- 

.  .....  bans  soon 

had  gone  far,  they  took  away  the  spoil,  and  putting  them  come  upon 


to  flight,  pursued  them  to  the  Euripus,  where  the  ships 
which  had  brought  them  were  moored.  Of  those  who 
fell,  the  greater  number  were  slain  in  the  attempt  to  to  their 
embark  ;  for  they  did  not  know  how  to  swim,  and  the  S 
men  on  board,  seeing  what  was  happening,  had  anchored 
their  vessels  out  of  bow-shot.  In  the  retreat  itself  the 
Thracians  made  a  very  fair  defence  against  the  Theban 
cavalry  which  first  attacked  them,  running  out  and 
closing  in  again,  after  the  manner  of  their  country;  • 
and  their  loss  was  trifling.  But  a  good  many  who 
remained  for  the  sake  of  plunder  were  cut  off  within 
the  city  and  slain.  The  whole  number  who  fell  was 
two  hundred  and  fifty,  out  of  thirteen  hundred.  They 
killed,  however,  some  of  the  Thebans  and  others  who 
came  to  the  rescue,  in  all  about  twenty,  both  horse- 
men and  hoplites.  Scirphondas,  one  of  the  Theban 
Boeotarchs,  was  slain.  A  large  proportion  of  the  My- 
calessians  perished.  Such  was  the  fate  of  Mycalessus  ; 
considering  the  size  of  the  city,  no  calamity  more  de- 
plorable occurred  during  the  wara. 

Demosthenes,  after  helping  to  build  the  fort  on  the      31. 
Laconian  coast,  sailed  away  to  Corcyra  b.     On  his  way  Demos- 
thither    he    destroyed    a   merchant-vessel    anchored   at  sailing  up 
Pheia  in  Elis,  which  was  intended  to  convey  some  of  the 
Corinthian  hoplites  to  Sicily.     But  the  crew  escaped, 
and  sailed  in  another  vessel.     He  went  on  to  Zacynthus  brings  news 
and  Cephallenia,  where  he  took  on  board  some  hoplites,  They'coiiect 
and  sent  to  the  Messenians  of  Naupactus  for  others  ;  he 
then  passed  over  to  the   mainland  of  Acarnania,  and 
touched  at  Alyzia  and  Anactorium  c,  which  were  at  that  to  Naupac- 

a Cp.  iii.  1  1  3  fin.          b  Cp.  vii.  26.          °  Cp.  iv.  49  ;  v.  30  med. 


506     DESTRUCTION    OF   SYRACUSAN  ALLIES. 

VII.  time  occupied  by  the  Athenians.  While  he  was  in  B.C.  413. 
those  regions  he  met  Eurymedon  returning  from  Sicily, 
whither  he  had  been  sent  during  the  winter  in  charge  of 
the  money  which  had  been  voted  to  the  armya;  he  re- 
ported, among  other  things,  the  capture  of  Plemmyrium 
by  the  Syracusans,  of  which  he  had  heard  on  his  voyage 
home.  Conon  too,  the  governor  of  Naupactus,  brought 
word  that  the  twenty-five  Corinthian  ships  b  which  were 
stationed  on  the  opposite  coast  were  still  showing  a 
hostile  front,  and  clearly  meant  to  fight.  He  requested 
the  generals  to  send  him  reinforcements,  since  his  own 
ships — eighteen  in  number — were  not  able  to  give  battle 
against  the  twenty-five  of  the  enemy.  Demosthenes 
and  Eurymedon  sent  ten  ships,  the  swiftest  which  they 
had,  to  the  fleet  at  Naupactus,  while  they  themselves 
completed  the  muster  of  the  expedition.  Eurymedon, 
sailing  to  Corcyra,  ordered  the  Corcyraeans  to  man 
fifteen  ships,  and  himself  levied  a  number  of  hoplites. 
He  had  turned  back  from  his  homeward  voyage,  and  was 
now  holding  the  command,  to  which,  in  conjunction  with 
Demosthenes,  he  had  been  appointed.  Demosthenes 
meanwhile  had  been  collecting  slingers  and  javelin-men 
in  the  neighbourhood  of  Acarnania. 

32.          The  ambassadors  from  Syracuse  who  had  gone  to  the 
Part  of  the  cities  of  Sicily  after  the  taking  of  Plemmyrium,  and  had 

reinforce-  .    .       . 

mentssent   persuaded  them  to  join  in  the  war,  were  now  about  to 

of  sSiyltleS  bring  back  tne  arm7  which  they  had  collected.     Nicias, 

areSdea°USe  ^avmS    previous   information,   sent   word    to   the    Sicel 

stroyed        allies  of  Athens  who  commanded  the  road,  such  as  the 

buscadeby  Centoripes  and  Alicyaei, 'and  told  them  not  to  let  the 

qOties'of  the  forces  of  the  enemy  pass,  but  to  unite  and  stop  them  ; 

Athenians,   there  was  no  likelihood,  he  said,  that  they  would  even 

think  of  taking  another  road,  since  they  were  not  allowed 

to   go   through   the   country  of  the   Agrigentines.     So 

when  the  forces  of  the  Sicilian  towns  were  on  their  way, 

the  Sicels,  complying  with  the  request  of  the  Athenians, 

set  an  ambush  in  three  divisions,  and  falling  upon  them 

a  Cp.  vii.  1 6  fin.  b  Cp.  vii.  17  fin.,  19  fin. 


DEMOSTHENES  ON  THE  COAST  OF  ITALY.    507 

B.C.  413.  suddenly   when    they   were   off  their   guard,  destroyed      VII. 
4'  about  eight  hundred  of  them,  and  all  the  envoys  except 
the    Corinthian  ;   he  brought  the  survivors,  numbering 
fifteen  hundred,  to  Syracuse. 

About  the  same  time  arrived  a  reinforcement  from       33- 
Camarinaa  of  five  hundred  hoplites,  three  hundred  javelin-  Reinforce- 

ments  from 

men,  and  three  hundred  archers.  The  Geloans  also  sent  Camarina 
five  ships  with  four  hundred  javelin-men  and  two  hundred  Nearly  the 
horsemen.  Hitherto  the  Sicilian  cities  had  only  watched 


the  course  of  events,  but  now  the  whole  island,  with  Against  the 

'  Athenians. 

the  exception  of  Agrigentum,  which  was  neutral,  united 
with  the  Syracusans  against  the  Athenians. 

After  their  misfortune  in  the  Sicel  country,  the  Syra-  The  Athe- 
cusans  deferred  their  intended  attack  for  a  time.  The  crossesfto 
forces  which  Demosthenes  and  Eurymedon  had  collected  Spygia- 

J  1  hey  are 

from  Corcyra  and  the  mainland  were  now  ready,  and  received 

,        -  •'    .  -  at  Thurii, 

they  passed  over  the  Ionian  Sea  to  the  promontory  of  where  they 
lapygia.  Proceeding  onwards,  they  touched  at  the  review. 
lapygian  islands  called  Choerades,  and  took  on  board 
a  hundred  and  fifty  lapygian  javelin-men  of  the  Mes- 
sapian  tribe.  After  renewing  an  ancient  friendship  with 
Artas,  a  native  prince  who  had  furnished  the  javelin- 
men,  they  went  on  to  Metapontium  in  Italy.  They 
persuaded  the  Metapontians,  who  were  their  allies,  to 
let  them  have  two  triremes  and  three  hundred  javelin- 
men  ;  these  they  took  with  them  and  sailed  to  Thurii. 
At  Thurii  they  found  that  the  party  opposed  to  the 
Athenians  had  just  been  driven  out  by  a  revolution. 
Wishing  to  hold  another  muster  and  inspection  of  their 
whole  army,  and  to  be  sure  that  no  one  was  missing, 
they  remained  there  for  some  time.  They  also  did  their 
best  to  gain  the  hearty  co-operation  of  the  Thurians, 
and  to  effect  an  offensive  and  defensive  alliance  with 
them,  now  that  they  had  succeeded  in  expelling  the 
anti-Athenian  party. 

About  the  same  time  the  Peloponnesians  in  their  fleet      34. 
of  twenty-five  ships,  which  was  stationed  opposite  the  indecisive 

naval  action 
a  Cp.  vi.  88  init. 


508    SEA-FIGHT    OFF    THE    COAST   OF  ACHAIA. 

VII.     Athenian  fleet  at  Naupactus  to  protect  the  passage  of  B.C.  413. 
in  the         the   merchant-vessels   ^oing  to   Sicily,   made  ready  for 

Corinthian  f     /.'  '     . 

gulf  be-  action.  They  manned  some  additional  ships,  which 
cSnthians  raised  their  number  nearly  to  that  of  the  Athenians, 
Athenians  anc*  anchored  at  Erineus  of  Achaia,  which  is  in  the 
The  former  territory  of  Rhypae.  The  bay  in  which  they  were 
assisted  by  stationed  has  the  form  of  a  crescent,  and  the  infantry  of 
the  Corinthians  and  of  the  allies,  which  had  come  from 
^ the  country  on  both  sides  to  co-operate  with  the  fleet, 
was  disposed  on  the  projecting  promontories.  The 
ships,  which  were  under  the  command  of  Polyanthes 
the  Corinthian,  formed  a  close  line  between  the  two 
points.  The  Athenians  sailed  out  against  them  from 
Naupactus  with  thirty-three  ships,  under  the  command 
of  Diphilus.  For  a  while  the  Corinthians  remained 
motionless ;  in  due  time  the  signal  was  raised  and  they 
rushed  upon  the  Athenians  and  engaged  with  them. 
The  battle  was  long  and  obstinate.  Three  Corinthian 
ships  were  destroyed.  The  Athenians  had  no  ships 
absolutely  sunk,  but  about  seven  of  them  were  rendered 
useless ;  for  they  were  struck  full  in  front  by  the  beaks 
of  the  Corinthian  vessels,  which  had  the  projecting 
beams  of  their  prows  designedly  built  thicker,  and  their 
bows  were  stoven  in.  The  engagement  was  undecided 
and  both  sides  claimed  the  victory;  but  the  Athenians 
gained  possession  of  the  wrecks  because  the  wind  blew 
them  towards  the  open  sea  and  the  Corinthians  did  not 
put  out  again.  So  the  two  fleets  parted.  There  was 
no  pursuit,  nor  were  any  prisoners  taken  on  either  side. 
For  the  Corinthians  and  Peloponnesians  were  fighting 
close  to  the  land  and  thus  their  crews  escaped,  while 
on  the  Athenian  side  no  ship  was  sunk.  As  soon  as 
the  Athenians  had  returned  to  Naupactus  the  Corin- 
thians set  up  a  trophy,  insisting  that  they  were  the 
victors,  because  they  had  disabled  more  of  the  enemy's 
ships  than  the  enemy  of  theirs.  They  refused  to  ac- 
knowledge defeat  on  the  same  ground  which  made 
the  Athenians  unwilling  to  claim  the  victory.  For  the 


SECOND  ENGAGEMENT  IN  THE  HARBOUR.    509 

B.C.  413.  Corinthians  considered  themselves  conquerors,  if  they  VII. 
4<  were  not  severely  defeated  ;  but  the  Athenians  thought 
that  they  were  defeated  because  they  had  not  gained  a 
signal  victory.  When  however  the  Peloponnesians  had 
sailed  away  and  the  land-army  was  dispersed,  the  Athe- 
nians raised  another  trophy  in  Achaia,  at  a  distance  of 
about  two  rniles  and  a  quarter  from  the  Corinthian  station 
at  Erineus.  Such  was  the  result  of  the  engagement. 

Demosthenes  and  Eurymedon,  when  the  Thurians  had      35' 
determined  to  help  them,  and  had  furnished  seven  hun-  The  Th.u~ 

nans  join 

dred  hoplites  and  three  hundred  javelin-men,  commanded  the  Athe- 

the  ships  to  sail  towards  the  territory  of  Crotona,  and  The  Athe- 

themselves,  after  holding  a  review  of  all  their  infantry  at 

the   river   Sybaris,   led   them   through   the  territory 

Thurii.     On  their  arrival  at  the  river  Hylias  the  people  coasts  to 

of  Crotona  sent  to  them,  and  said  that  they  could  not 

allow  the  army  to  march  through   their  country.     So 

they  directed  their  march  down  to  the  sea  and  passed 

the  night  at  the  mouth  of  the  river,  where  they  were  met 

by  their  ships.     On  the  following  day  they  re-embarked 

the  army  and  coasted  along,  touching  at  the  cities  which 

they  passed,  with  the  exception  of  Locria,  until  they  came 

to  the  promontory  of  Petra  near  Rhegium. 

The  Syracusans,  hearing  of  their  approach,  desired  to      36. 
have  another  trial  of  the  fleet,  and  to  use  the  army  which  The  sYra- 
they  had  collected  with  the  express  purpose  of  bringing  make  pre- 
on  an  engagement  before  Demosthenes  and  Eurymedon 
arrived  in  Sicily.    Profiting  by  the  experience  which  they 


had  acquired  in  the  last  sea-fight,  they  devised  several  the 

.  r          .  rr*          thian 

improvements  in  the  construction  of  their  vessels.    They  tion  of 
cut  down  and  strengthened  the  prows,  and  also  made  [he 
the  beams  which  projected  from   them  thicker  ;  these 
latter  they  supported  underneath  with  stays  of  timber  strengthen- 
extending  from  the  beams  through  the  sides  of  the  ship  projecting 
a  length  of  nine  feet  within  and  nine  without,  after  the  a  device 
fashion  in  which  the  Corinthians  had  refitted  their  prows  ^eltheUlted 
before  they  fought  with  the  squadron  from  Naupactus. 
a  Cp.  vi.  44  med. 


510     IMPROVED    FORM    OF  SYRACUSAN   SHIPS. 

VII.     For  the  Syracusans  hoped  thus   to  gain  an  advantage  B.C.  413. 
space,  in     over  the  Athenian  ships,  which  were  not  constructed  to 

which  the 

Athenians    resist  their  improvements,  but  had  their  prows  slender, 
room1  to       because   they  were   in    the   habit  of  rowing  round  an 


enemy  and  striking  the  side  of  his  vessel  instead  of 
skmlTtheir  meetmg  him  prow  to  prow.  The  plan  would  be  the 
own  pilots,  more  effectual,  because  they  were  going  to  fight  in  the 
Great  Harbour,  where  many  ships  would  be  crowded  in 
a  narrow  space.  They  would  charge  full  in  face,  and 
presenting  their  own  massive  and  solid  beaks  would 
stave  in  the  hollow  and  weak  forepart  of  their  enemies' 
ships  a  ;  while  the  Athenians,  confined  as  they  were, 
would  not  be  able  to  wheel  round  them  or  break  their 
line  before  striking,  to  which  manoeuvres  they  mainly 
trusted  —  the  want  of  room  would  make  the  one  im- 
possible, and  the  Syracusans  themselves  would  do  their 
best  to  prevent  the  other.  What  had  hitherto  been  con- 
sidered a  defect  of  skill  on  the  part  of  their  pilots,  the 
practice  of  striking  beak  to  beak,  would  now  be  a  great 
advantage,  to  which  they  would  have  constant  recourse  ; 
for  the  Athenians,  when  forced  to  back  water,  could  only 
retire  towards  the  land,  which  was  too  near,  and  of  which 
but  a  small  part,  that  is  to  say,  their  own  encampment, 
was  open  to  them.  The  Syracusans  would  be  masters 
of  the  rest  of  the  harbour,  and,  if  the  Athenians  were 
hard  pressed  at  any  point,  they  would  all  be  driven 
together  into  one  small  spot,  where  they  would  run  foul 
of  one  another  and  fall  into  confusion.  (Which  proved  to 
be  the  case  ;  for  nothing  was  more  disastrous  to  the 
Athenians  in  all  these  sea-fights  than  the  impossibility 
of  retreating,  as  the  Syracusans  could,  to  any  part  of  the 
harbour.)  Again,  while  they  themselves  had  command 
of  the  outer  sea  and  could  charge  from  it  and  back  water 
into  it  whenever  they  pleased,  the  Athenians  would  be 
unable  to  sail  into  the  open  and  turn  before  striking  b  ; 
besides.  Plemmyrium  was  hostile  to  them,  and  the  mouth 
of  the  harbour  was  narrow. 

a  Omitting  the  comma  at  avro'is.  b  Cp.  ii.  91  med. 


ATTACK   BY   SEA    AND    LAND.  511 

B.C.  413.      Having   thus   adapted  their   plans   to  the  degree  of     VII. 
4'  naval  skill  and  strength  which  they  possessed,  the  Syra-      37. 
cusans,  greatly  encouraged  by  the  result  of  the  previous  Gyiippus 
engagement,  attacked  the  Athenians  both  by  sea  and  land-forces 


land.     A  little  before  the  fleet  sailed  forth,  Gyiippus  led 

the  land-forces  out  of  the  city  against  that  part  of  the  l[nef-  and 

3,t  trie  S3,mc 

Athenian  wall  which  faced  Syracuse,  while  some  of  the  time  eighty 
heavy-armed   troops,  which  together  with  the  cavalry 


and  light  infantry  were  stationed   at   the   Olympieum,  deniyUdthey 


approached  the  lines  of  the  enemy  from  the  opposite 
side.  Nearly  at  the  same  instant  the  ships  of  the  Syra-  Athenian 
cusans  and  their  allies  sailed  out.  The  Athenians  at  first 
thought  that  they  were  going  to  make  an  attempt  by 
land  only,  but  when  they  saw  the  ships  suddenly  bearing 
down  upon  them  they  were  disconcerted.  Some  mounted 
the  walls  or  prepared  to  meet  their  assailants  in  front  of 
them  ;  others  went  out  against  the  numerous  cavalry  and 
javelin-  men,  who  were  hastening  from  the  Olympieum 
and  the  outer  side  of  the  wall  ;  others  manned  the  ships 
or  prepared  to  fight  on  the  beach.  When  the  crews  had 
got  on  board  they  sailed  out  with  seventy-five  ships  ; 
the  number  of  Syracusan  ships  being  about  eighty. 

During  a  great  part  of  the  day  the  two  fleets  continued      38. 
advancing    and    retreating    and    skirmishing   with    one  Slight  result 
another.      Neither  was   able   to   gain   any  considerable  first  day's 
advantage,  only  the  Syracusans  sank  one  or  two  ships  racSre- 
of  the  Athenians  ;   so  they  parted,  and  at  the  same  time  jjJJP  ^d 
the  infantry  retired  from  the  walls.     On  the  following  places 

.         .,        «  i          •    L  i  •        merchant- 

day  the  byracusans  remained  quiet  and   gave  no  sign  vessels  so 
of  what  they  meant  to  do  next.     Seeing  how  close  the  fect°them  if 
conflict  had  been,  Nicias  expected  another  attack  ;  he  defeated- 
therefore  compelled  the  trierarchs  to  repair  their  ships 
wherever   they  were   injured,   and    anchored  merchant- 
vessels   in  front  of  the  palisades  which  the  Athenians 
had  driven  into  the  sea  so  as  to  form  a  kind  of  dock  for 
the  protection  of  their  own  ships  ;  these  he  placed  at  a 
distance  of  about  two  hundred  feet  from  one  another,  in 
order  that  any  ship  which  was  hard-pressed  might  have 


5  1  2  THE  BA  TTLE  RENE  WED  ON  THE  NEXT  DA  Y. 

VII.     a  safe  retreat  and  an  opportunity  of  going  out  again  at  B.C.  413. 
leisure.     These  preparations  occupied  the  Athenians  for 
a  whole  day  from  morning  to  night. 

39-  On  the  next  day,  in  the  same  manner  as  before  but 

at  an  ear^ier  h°ur>  t^le  Syracusans  attacked  the  Athenians 
wearing      both  by  sea  and  land.     Again  the  ships  faced  one  an- 

away  with-        , 

outaserious  other,  and  again  a  great  part  of  the  day  was  passed  in 
^negnatf  '  skirmishing.  At  length  Ariston  the  son  of  Pyrrhichus, 
shracusans  a  Corinthian,  who  was  the  ablest  pilot  in  the  Syracusan 
retire  and  fleet,  persuaded  the  commanders  to  send  a  message  to 

take  their 

midday       the  proper  authorities  in  the  city  desiring  them  to  have 

thTbeach.    t^e   market  transferred   as   quickly  as   possible  to  the 

shore,  and  to  compel  any  one  who  had  food  for  sale  to 

bring  his  whole  stock  thither.     The  sailors  would  thus 

be  enabled  to  disembark  and  take  their  midday  meal 

close  to  the  ships  ;  and  so  after  a  short  interval  they 

might,  without  waiting  until  the  next  day,  renew  the 

attack  upon  the  Athenians  when  least  expected. 

40.          The    generals,   agreeing    to    the    proposal,   sent   the 

They  soon   message,   and  the   market   was   brought    down   to   the 

return,  to         .  011110  111 

the  great  shore.  Suddenly  the  Syracusans  backed  water  and 
surpnse  rowecj  towards  the  city;  then  disembarking  they  at 

once  took    their   meal   on   the   sPot     The  Athenians, 


now  com-    regarding   their  retreat  as  a  confession   of  defeat,    dis- 

pelled tO  °  it-  i  i 

charge  and  embarked  at  leisure,  and  among  other  matters  set  about 
preparing  their  own  meal,  taking  for  granted  that  there 
would  be  no  more  righting  that  day.  Suddenly  the 
Syracusans  manned  their  ships  and  again  bore  down 
upon  them  ;  the  Athenians,  in  great  disorder  and  most 
of  them  fasting,  hurried  on  board,  and  with  considerable 
difficulty  got  under  weigh.  For  some  time  the  two 
fleets  looked  at  one  another,  and  did  not  engage  ;  after 
a  while  the  Athenians  thought  they  had  better  not  delay 
until  they  had  fairly  tired  themselves  out,  but  attack  at 
once.  So,  cheering  on  one  another,  they  charged  and 
fought.  The  Syracusans  remained  firm,  and  meeting 
the  enemy  prow  to  prow,  as  they  had  resolved,  stove  in 
by  the  strength  of  their  beaks  a  great  part  of  the  bows 


VICTORY   OF   THE   SYRACUSANS.  513 

B.C.  413.  of  the  Athenian  ships.     Their  javelin-men  on  the  decks     VII. 
4'  greatly   injured   the   enemy.     Still    more  mischief  was 
done  by  Syracusans  who  rowed  about  in  light  boats  and 
dashed  in  upon  the  blades  of  the  enemy's  oars,  or  ran  up 
alongside  and  threw  darts  at  the  sailors. 

By  such   expedients   as   these  the    Syracusans,  who      41. 
made  a  great  effort,  gained  the  victory;  and  the  Athe-  The  Athe- 

.  ^  .  ,    nians  are 

mans,    retreating    between   the    merchant-vessels,   took  defeated 
refuge  at  their  own  moorings.     The  ships  of  the  enemy 
pursued  them  as  far  as   the  entrance,   but   they  were 
prevented   from   following  further  by  leaden  dolphins,  loss  of 

1  •   i  r  t          i    •         i      seven  ships. 

which  were  suspended  alott  Irom  beams  placed  in  the  TWO  Syra- 
merchant-vessels.     Two  Syracusan  ships,  in  the  exulta-  vessels 


tion  of  victory,  approached  too  near  and  were  disabled  ; 

one  of  them  was  taken  with  its  whole  crew.     The  Syra-  are  caught 

cusans  damaged  many  of  the  Athenian  ships  and  sank  trance  to 

seven  ;  the  crews  were  either  killed  or  taken  prisoners.  l 

They  then  retired  and  raised  trophies  of  the  two  sea- 

fights.     They  were  now  quite  confident  that  they  were 

not  only  equal   but  far  superior   to  the  Athenians   at 

sea,  and  they  hoped  to  gain   the   victory  on   land   as 

well.     So  they  prepared  to  renew  the  attack  on  both 

elements. 

But  in  the  midst  of  their  preparations  Demosthenes      42- 
and  Eurymedon  arrived  with  the  Athenian  reinforce-  While  the 

*  Syracusans 

ments.     They  brought  a  fleet,  including  foreign  ships,  of  are  making 


about  seventy-three  sail,  carrying  five  thousand  heavy 
infantry  of  their  own  and  of  their  allies,  numerous  javelin-  Attack1  De- 
men,  slingers,  and  archers,  both  Hellenic  and  Barbarian,  mosthenes 

arrives. 

and  abundant  supplies  of  every  kind.     The  Syracusans  Being 
and   their  allies  were  in   consternation.     It  seemed  to  u>  strike 
them  as  if  their  perils  would  never  have  an  end  when 


they  saw,  notwithstanding  the  fortification  of  Decelea,  Plans.  an 

J  '  attack  upon 

another  army  arriving  nearly  equal  to  the  former,  and  the  Syracu- 
Athens  displaying  such  exuberant  strength;  while  the 
first  Athenian  army  regained  a  certain  degree  of  confi- 
dence  after  their  disasters.     Demosthenes  at  once  saw 
how  matters  stood  ;  he  knew  that  there  was  no  time  to 

Ll 


514  ARRIVAL    OF  DEMOSTHENES, 

VII.  be  lost,  and  resolved  that  it  should  not  be  with  him  as  it  B.C.  413. 
had  been  with  Nicias.  For  Nicias  was  dreaded  at  his 
first  arrival,  but  when,  instead  of  at  once  laying  siege  to 
Syracuse,  he  passed  the  winter  at  Catana,  he  fell  into 
contempt,  and  his  delay  gave  Gylippus  time  to  come 
with  an  army  from  Peloponnesus.  Whereas  if  he  had 
struck  hard  at  first,  the  Syracusans  would  never  even 
have  thought  of  getting  fresh  troops;  strong  in  then- 
own  self-sufficiency,  they  would  have  recognised  their 
inferiority  only  when  the  city  had  been  actually  in- 
vested, and  then,  if  they  had  sent  for  reinforcements, 
they  would  have  found  them  useless.  Demosthenes, 
reflecting  on  all  this,  and  aware  that  he  too  would  never 
again  be  in  a  position  to  inspire  such  terror  as  on  the 
day  of  his  arrival,  desired  to  take  the  speediest  advan- 
tage of  the  panic  caused  by  the  appearance  of  his  army. 
Accordingly,  seeing  that  the  cross-wall  of  the  Syracusans 
which  had  prevented  the  Athenians  from  investing  them 
was  but  a  single  line,  and  that  if  he  could  gain  the  com- 
mand of  the  way  up  to  Epipolae  and  take  the  camp 
which  was  on  the  high  ground  the  wall  would  be  easily 
captured,  for  no  one  would  remain  to  withstand  them, 
he  resolved  to  make  the  attempt  at  once.  This  would 
be  the  shortest  way  of  putting  an  end  to  the  war.  If 
he  succeeded,  Syracuse  would  fall  into  his  hands ;  if  he 
failed,  he  meant  to  bring  away  the  expedition ;  he  would 
no  longer  wear  out  the  Athenian  army,  and  weaken  the 
state  to  no  purpose. 

The  Athenians  began  by  ravaging  the  fields  of  the 
Syracusans  about  the  Anapus,  and  regained  their  former 
superiority  both  by  sea  and  land.  At  sea  the  Syracusans 
no  longer  opposed  them ;  and  on  land  they  merely  sent 
out  parties  of  cavalry  and  javelin-men  from  the  Olym- 
pieum. 

43»          Before  he  attacked  Epipolae,  Demosthenes  wished  to 
iry  w^at   cou^   *>e   effected  with   engines   against  the 
counter-wall.     But  the   engines  which   he  brought  up 
in  front.      were  burnt  by  the  enemy,  who  fought  from  the  wall, 


NIGHT  ATTACK   ON  EPIPOLAE.  515 

B.C.  413.  and,  after  making  assaults  at  several  points,  the  Athe-     VII. 
4*  nian  forces  were  repulsed.     He  now  determined  to  delay  Leaving 
no  longer,  and  persuaded  Nicias  and  his  colleagues  to  the  camp, 


carry  out  the  plan  of  attacking  Epipolae.     To  approach 
during  the  daytime  and  ascend  the  heights  undetected 
appeared  to  be  impossible  ;  so  he  resolved  to  attack  by  night  by 
night.     He  ordered  provisions  for  five  days,  and  took  Euryeius  e 
with  him  all  the  masons  and  carpenters  in  the  army  ; 
also  a  supply  of  arrows  and  of  the  various  implements 
which  would   be   required   for   siege-works   if  he  were  takes  the 
victorious.     About  the  first  watch  he,  Eurymedon,  and  and  drives 


Menander  led  out  the  whole  army  and  marched  towards 
Epipolae.     Nicias  was  left  in  the  Athenian  fortifications.  ^Otr°r°ps' 
Reaching  Epipolae  at  the  Euryeius,  where  their  first  amazed  at 

,       ,         .    .       „  i-j.  the  sudden 

army  had  originally  ascended  a,  and  advancing  undis-  onset. 
covered  by  the  garrison  to  the  fort  which  the  Syracusans 
had  there  erected,  they  took  it  and  killed  some  of  the 
guards.    But  the  greater  number  made  good  their  escape  when  they 

<  -         -  are  me 

and  carried  the  news  to  the  three  fortified  camps,  one  by  the 
of  the  Syracusans,  one  of  the  other  Sicilians,  and  one  of  a 
the  allies,  which  had  been  formed  on  Epipolae  ;  they  flight- 
also  gave  the  alarm  to  the  six  hundred  who  were  an 
advanced  guard  stationed  on  this  part  of  Epipolae  b. 
They  hastened  to  the  rescue,  but  Demosthenes  and  the 
Athenians  came  upon  them  and,  in  spite  of  a  vigorous 
resistance,  drove  them  back.  The  Athenians  imme- 
diately pressed  forward  ;  they  were  determined  not  to 
lose  a  moment  or  to  slacken  their  onset  until  they  had 
accomplished  their  purpose.  Others  took  the  first  part 
of  the  Syracusan  counter-wall  and  began  to  drag  off 
the  battlements  ;  the  guards  ran  away.  Meanwhile  the 
Syracusans,  the  allies,  and  Gylippus  with  his  own  troops, 
were  hurrying  from  the  outworks.  The  boldness  of  this 
night  attack  quite  amazed  them.  They  had  not  re- 
covered from  their  terror  when  they  met  the  Athenians, 
who  were  at  first  too  strong  for  them  and  drove  them 
back.  But  now  the  conquerors,  in  the  confidence  of 
a  Cp.  vi.  97  med.  b  Cp.  vi.  96  fin. 


516  VICTORY  ENDING  IN  DEFEAT. 

yil.     victory,  began  to  advance  in  less  order  ;  they  wanted  B.C.  413. 
to  force  their  way  as  quickly  as  they  could  through  all  O1>  9I'  4' 
that  part  of  the  enemy  which  had  not  yet  fought,  and 
they  were  afraid  that  if  they  relaxed  their  efforts  the 
Syracusans  might  rally.     The  Boeotians  were  the  first 
to  make  a  stand  :  they  attacked  the  Athenians,  turned, 
and  put  them  to  flight. 

44'  The  whole  army  now  fell  into  utter  disorder,  and  the 
becomes  perplexity  was  so  great  that  from  neither  side  could  the 
confusion,  particulars  of  the  conflict  be  exactly  ascertained.  In 
behind  the  daytime  the  combatants  see  more  clearly;  though 
Those0"  even  ti1611  only  what  is  going  on  immediately  around 
whi^are  them,  and  that  imperfectly  —  nothing  of  the.  battle  as  a 
already  whole.  But  in  a  night  engagement,  like  this  in  which 
back?8  two  great  armies  fought  —  the  only  one  of  the  kind  which 
light^he11"  occurred  during  the  war  —  who  could  be  certain  of  any- 
masses  the  ^nS  *  The  moon  was  bright,  and  they  saw  before  them, 
narrow  as  men  naturally  would  in  the  moonlight,  the  figures  of 
watchword,  one  another,  but  were  unable  to  distinguish  with  cer- 
contribute  tainty  who  was  friend  or  foe.  Large  bodies  of  heavy- 
Friends°Ut'  armed  troops,  both  Athenian  and  Syracusan,  were  moving 
attack  about  in  a  narrow  space  ;  of  the  Athenians  some  were 

friends. 

Many  throw  already  worsted,  while  others,  still   unconquered,  were 


carrying  on  the  original  movement.  A  great  part  of 
mj  their  V~  ^G*r  army  had  not  yet  engaged,  but  either  had  just 
arms  be-  mounted  the  heights,  or  were  making  the  ascent  ;  and  no 

hind;  others 

miss  their  one  knew  which  way  to  go.  For  in  front  they  were  de- 
dark'and  feated  already;  there  was  nothing  but  confusion,  and  all 
are  cut  off.  distinction  between  the  two  armies  was  lost  by  reason  of 
the  noise.  The  victorious  Syracusans  and  their  allies, 
who  had  no  other  means  of  communication  in  the  dark- 
ness, cheered  on  their  comrades  with  loud  cries  as  they 
received  the  onset  of  their  assailants.  The  Athenians 
were  looking  about  for  each  other  ;  and  every  one  who 
met  them,  though  he  might  be  a  friend  who  had  turned 
and  fled,  they  imagined  to  be  an  enemy.  They  kept 
constantly  asking  the  watchword  (for  there  was  no  other 
mode  of  knowing  one  another),  and  thus  they  not  only 


THE   ATHENIANS   ARE   DRIVEN  BACK.     517 

B.C.  413.  caused  great  confusion  among  themselves  by  all  asking  VII. 
4'  at  once,  but  revealed  the  word  to  the  enemy.  The  watch- 
word of  the  Syracusans  was  not  so  liable  to  be  discovered, 
because  being  victorious  they  kept  together  and  were  more 
easily  recognised.  So  that  when  they  were  encountered 
by  a  superior  number  of  the  enemy  they,  knowing  the 
Athenian  watchword,  escaped  ;  but  the  Athenians  in  a  like 
case,  failing  to  answer  the  challenge,  were  killed.  Most 
disastrous  of  all  were  the  mistakes  caused  by  the  sound 
of  the  Paean,  which,  the  same  being  heard  in  both  armies, 
was  a  great  source  of  perplexity.  For  there  were  in  the 
battle  Argives,  Corcyraeans,  and  other  Dorian  allies  of 
the  Athenians,  and  when  they  raised  the  Paean  they 
inspired  as  much  alarm  as  the  enemy  themselves  ;  so 
that  in  many  parts  of  the  army,  when  the  confusion  had 
once  begun,  not  only  did  friends  terrify  friends  and 
citizens  their  fellow-citizens,  but  they  attacked  one  an- 
other, and  were  with  difficulty  disentangled.  The  greater 
number  of  those  who  were  pursued  and  killed  perished 
by  throwing  themselves  from  the  cliffs  ;  for  the  descent 
from  Epipolae  is  by  a  narrow  path.  The  fugitives  who 
reached  the  level  ground,  especially  those  who  had 
served  in  the  former  army  and  knew  the  neighbourhood, 
mostly  escaped  to  the  camp.  But  of  the  newly-arrived 
many  missed  their  way,  and,  wandering  about  until  day- 
break, were  then  cut  off  by  the  Syracusan  cavalry  who 
were  scouring  the  country. 

On  the   following   day   the   Syracusans   erected  two      45. 
trophies,  one  on  Epipolae  at  the  summit  of  the  ascent,  Syracusans 
the  other  at  the  spot  where  the  Boeotians  made  the  trophies. 


first  stand.  The  Athenians  received  their  dead  under  a 
flag  of  truce.  A  considerable  number  of  them  and  of  taken- 
their  allies  had  fallen  ;  there  were  however  more  arms 
taken  than  there  were  bodies  of  the  slain  ;  for  those  who 
were  compelled  to  leap  from  the  heights,  whether  they 
perished  or  not,  had  thrown  away  their  shields. 

The  confidence  of  the  Syracusans  was  restored  by      46. 
their   unexpected  success,   and  they  sent  Sicanus  with  Encouraged 

by  their 


5l  8    DEMOSTHENES  PROPOSES    TO   DEPART. 
VII.     fifteen  ships  to  Agrigentum,  then  in  a  state  of  revolution,  B.C.  413. 

SUCracuSsans    that  he  might  win  Over  the  Place  if  he  COuld.       GylippUS  O1<  9I*  4- 

seek  for  the  had  gone  off  again  by  land  to  collect  a  new  army  in  the 

third  time  J* 

aid  in  Sicily,  other  parts  of  Sicily,  hoping  after  the  victory  of  Epipolae 
Inlttempt5  to  carry  the  Athenian  fortifications  by  storm. 
gentugm"  Meanwhile  the  Athenian  generals,  troubled  by  their 
^  recent  defeat  and  the  utter  discouragement  which  pre- 
Athenian  va-iled  in  the  army,  held  a  council  of  war.  They  saw 
council  of  that  their  attempts  all  failed,  and  that  the  soldiers  were 

war. 

There  is      weary  of  remaining.     For  they  were  distressed  by  sick- 

sickness  in  .  .        .  ,  r   , 

the  camp     ness,  proceeding  from  two  causes  :  the  season  of  the  year 

soldiers  are  was  ^at  m  which  men  are  most  liable  to  disease  ;  and 
Demosed<  ^e  P^ace  m  which  they  were  encamped  was  damp 
thenes  votes  and  unhealthy.  And  they  felt  that  the  situation  was 

forimme-      .  i  i  T\  ,1  i  • 

diatede-  in  every  way  hopeless.  Demosthenes  gave  his  voice 
ire*  against  remaining  ;  he  said  that  the  decisive  attack  upon 
Epipolae  had  failed,  and,  in  accordance  with  his  original 
intention,  he  should  vote  for  immediate  departure,  while 
the  voyage  was  possible,  and  while  with  the  help  of  the 
ships  which  had  recently  joined  them  they  had  the 
upper  hand  at  any  rate  by  sea.  It  was  more  expedient 
for  the  city  that  they  should  make  war  upon  the  Pelo- 
ponnesians,  who  were  raising  a  fort  in  Attica,  than 
against  the  Syracusans,  whom  they  could  now  scarcely 
hope  to  conquer  ;  and  there  was  no  sense  in  carrying  on 
the  siege  at  a  vast  expense  and  with  no  result.  This 
was  the  opinion  of  Demosthenes. 
43^  Nicias  in  his  own  mind  took  the  same  gloomy  view  of 

Nicias,  who  their  affairs  ;  but  he  did  not  wish  openly  to  confess  their 
weakness,  or  by  a  public  vote  given  in  a  numerous 
assembl7  to  let  their  intention  reach  the  enemy's  ears, 


cuse,  is  and  so  to  lose  the  advantage  of  departing  secretly  when- 
own  mind  ever  they  might  choose  to  go.  He  had  moreover  still 
But  In  e  '  some  reason  to  suppose  that  the  Syracusans,  of  whose 
refuses^o  condition  he  was  better  informed  than  the  other  generals, 
were  likely  to  be  worse  off  than  themselves  if  they  would 

They  will  9 

be  censured  only  persevere  in  the  siege  ;  they  would  be  worn  out  by 
the  exhaustion  of  their  resources  ;  and  now  the  Athe- 


DOUBTS   AND   FEARS    OF  NIC  I  AS.  519 

B.C.  413.  nians  with  their  additional  ships  had  much  greater  com-     VII. 
4'  mand  of  the  sea,     There  was  a  party  in  Syracuse  itself  accused  of 

r        J  treason  by 

which  wanted  to  surrender  the  city  to  the  Athenians,  their  own 


and  they  kept  sending  messages  to  Nicias  and  advising 
him  not  to  depart.     Having  this  information  he  was  still 
wavering   and   considering,   and    had  not  made  up  his  enemies 
mind.      But   in   addressing    the    council    he    positively  friends. 
refused  to  withdraw  the  army  ;  he  knew,  he  said,  that  syracusans, 
the  Athenian  people  would  not  forgive  their  departure  if 


they  left  without  an  order  from  home.     The  men  upon  on.  mercen- 

whose  votes   their  fate  would  depend  would  not,  like  worse  off 

themselves,  have  seen  with  their  own  eyes  the  state  of  selves.  e 

affairs  ;   they  would  only  have  heard  the  criticisms  of 

others,  and  would  be  convinced  by  any  accusations  which 

a  clever  speaker  might  bring  forward  a.     Indeed  many 

or  most  of  the  very  soldiers  who  were  now  crying  out 

that  their  case  was  desperate  would  raise  the  opposite 

cry  when  they  reached  home,  and  would  say  that  the 

generals  were  traitors,  and  had  been  bribed  to  depart  ; 

and  therefore  he,  knowing  the  tempers  of  the  Athenians, 

b  would  for  his  own  paj  t  rather  take  his  chance  and  fall, 

if   he   must,  alone   by  the  hands   of  the  enemy,   than 

dieb  unjustly  on  a  dishonourable  charge  at  the  hands 

of  the  Athenians.     And,  after  all,  the  Syracusans  were 

in  a  condition  worse  than  their  own  ;  for  they  had  to 

maintain  mercenary  troops  ;  they  were  spending  money 

on  garrisons,  and  had  now  kept  up  a  large  navy  for  a 

whole  year  ;  already  in  great  difficulties,  they  would  soon 

be  in  greater;  they  had  expended  two  thousand  talents0. 

and  were   heavily  in  debt  ;   the  whole   of  their   large 

army  had  to  be  fed,  and  if  there  were  any  lack  of  pro- 

visions their  affairs  would  be  ruined.    For  they  depended 

on  mercenaries,  who,  unlike  the  Athenian  allies,  were 

under  no  compulsion  to  serve.     Therefore  he  said  they 

a  Cp.  iii.  38  med. 

b  Or,  '  would  for  his  own  part  rather  take  his  chance,  and  fall, 
if  he  must,  by  the  hands  of  the  enemy,  like  any  private  soldier, 
than  die.'  c  ^48,000. 


520  NICIAS   REFUSES    TO    DEPART. 

VII.     ought  to  persevere  in  the  siege,  and  not  go  away  adis-  B.C.  413. 

heartened   by  the   greatness   of  the  expense,  for  they 

were  far  richer  than  the  enemy  a. 

49-          Nicias  spoke  thus  decidedly  because  he  knew  exactly 
mat^ers  stood  in  Syracuse  ;  he  was  aware  of  their 


Eurymedon  want  of  money,  and  of  the  secret  existence  of  that  party 
insist  that  within  the  walls  which  wished  well  to  the  Athenians,  and 
tionshaU  was  continually  sending  word  to  him  not  to  depart  ;  and 
*^e  confidence  in  his  navy,  if  not  in  his  army,  which  now 


encamp       possessed  him  was  greater  than  ever.     But  Demosthenes 

but  they  '    would  not  hear  for  an  instant  of  persisting  in  the  siege  ; 

hesUa£  S    ^  ^e  sa^,  the  army  must  remain  and  ought  not  to  be 

thateN?cias  removed  without  a  vote  of  the  assembly,  then  they  should 

has  some     retire  to  Thapsus  or  Catana,  whence  they  might  overrun 

reason  for    the  whole  country  with   their  land-forces,  maintaining 

nlng'   themselves  at  the  expense  of  the  enemy  and  doing  him 

great  damage.     They  would  thus  fight  their  battles,  not 

cooped  up  in  the  harbour,  which  gave  an  advantage  to 

the  enemy,  but  in  the  open  sea,  where  their  skill  would 

be  available  and  their  charges  and  retreats  would  not  be 

circumscribed  by  the  narrow  space  which  now  hampered 

their  movements  whenever  they  had  to  put  in  or  out.    In 

a  word,  he  wholly  disapproved  of  the  Athenians  con- 

tinuing in  their  present  position  ;   they  should  with  all 

speed  break  up  the  siege  and  be  gone.    Eurymedon  took 

the  same  side.     Still  Nicias  resisted  ;  there  was  delay 

and  hesitation,  and  a  suspicion  that  he  might  have  some 

ground  which  they  did  not  know  for  his  unwillingness 

to  yield.     And  so  the  Athenians  stayed  on  where  they 

were. 

50*  Meanwhile  Gylippus  and  Sicanus  returned  to  Syracuse. 

retumswith  Sicanus  ^ac^  not  succeeded  in  his  design  upon  Agrigen- 
reinforce-  turn  ;  for  while  he  was  at  Gela  on  his  way  the  party  inclined 
Failure  of  to  friendship  with  the  Syracusans  had  been  driven  out. 
Gylippus  brought  back  a  large  army,  together  with  the 
hoplites  who  had  been  sent  in  merchant-vessels  from  Pelo- 

a  Or,  '  disheartened  at  the  idea  of  the  enemy's  riches  ;  for  they 
were  far  richer  themselves.' 


ECLIPSE    OF    THE    MOON.  521 

B.C.  413.  ponnesus  in  the  spring  %  and  had  come  by  way  of  Libya  to      VII. 
l'  4*  Selinus.     They  had  been  driven  to  Libya  by  stress  of  ^fdp^0ture 
weather,  and  the  Cyrenaeans  had  given  them  two  triremes  ponnesian 
and  pilots.  On  their  voyage  they  had  made  common  cause  the?rway 
with  the  Evesperitae,  who  were  besieged  by  the  Libyans. 
After  defeating  the  Libyans  they  sailed  on  to  Neapolis, 


a   Carthaginian  factory  which  is   the  nearest   point  to  attack. 

,  .  .       The  Athe- 

Sicily,  the  passage  taking  two  days  and  a  night  only  ;  nian  gene- 
thence  they  crossed   and   came   to    Selinus.     On  their 
arrival,  the  Syracusans  immediately  prepared  to  renew 
their  attack  upon  the  Athenians,  both  by  land  and  sea.  moon  is 
And  the  Athenian  generals,  seeing  that  their  enemy  had  NkSs  and 


been  reinforced  by  a  new  army,  and  that  their  own  affairs, 
instead  of  improving,  were  daily  growing  worse  in  every  stir- 
respect,  and  being  especially  troubled  by  the  sickness  of 
their  troops,  repented  that  they  had  not  gone  before. 
Even  Nicias  now  no  longer  objected.,  but  only  made  the 
condition  that  there  should  be  no  open  voting.  So, 
maintaining  such  secrecy  as  they  could,  they  gave  orders 
for  the  departure  of  the  expedition  ;  the  men  were  to 
prepare  themselves  against  a  given  signal.  The  prepara- 
tions were  made  and  they  were  on  the  point  of  sailing, 
when  the  moon,  being  just  then  at  the  full,  was  eclipsed. 
The  mass  of  the  army  was  greatly  moved,  and  called 
upon  the  generals  to  remain.  Nicias  himself,  who  was 
too  much  under  the  influence  of  divination  and  omens, 
refused  even  to  discuss  the  question  of  their  removal  until 
they  had  remained  thrice  nine  days,  as  the  soothsayers 
prescribed.  This  was  the  reason  why  the  departure  of 
the  Athenians  was  finally  delayed. 

And   now   the  Syracusans,  having   heard   what  had       51. 
happened,  were  more  eager  than  ever  to  prosecute  the  The  Syra- 
war  to  the  end  ;  they  saw  in  the  intention  of  the  Athe-  termite  not 
nians  to  depart  a  confession  that  they  were  no  longer  enemies*go. 
superior  to  themselves,  either  by  sea  or  land  ;  and  they  J^^11 
did  not  want  them  to  settle  down  in  some  other  part  of  Athenians 
Sicily  where  they  would  be  more  difficult  to  manage,  Tsmafr6 

party  of 
a  Cp.  vii.  19. 


522  DEATH   OF  EURYMEDON. 

VII.     but  sought  to  compel  them  forthwith  to  fight  at  sea  B.C.  413. 
them  within  under  the  disadvantages  of  their  present  position.     So01'91'4' 

their  lines.  .  .  r 

they  manned  their  ships  and  exercised  for  as  many  days 
as  they  thought  sufficient.  When  the  time  came  they 
began  by  attacking  the  Athenian  lines.  A  small  number 
both  of  the  hoplites  and  of  the  cavalry  came  out  of 
some  of  the  gates  to  meet  them  ;  they  cut  off  however 
a  portion  of  the  hoplites,  and,  putting  the  whole  body 
to  flight,  drove  them  within  their  walls.  The  entrance 
was  narrow,  and  the  Athenians  lost  seventy  horses  and 
a  few  infantry. 

52.  The  Syracusan  army  then  retired.     On  the  morrow 

Third  sea-   their   ships,    in   number   seventy-six,   sailed   forth,   and 

fight  in  the  .  J 

harbour,      at   the   same  time    their   land-forces   marched   against 


the  walls.  The  Athenians  on  their  side  put  out  with 
Athenians  eighty-six  ships  ;  and  the  two  fleets  met  and  fought. 
feated"  Eurymedon,  who  commanded  the  right  wing  of  the 
Athenians,  hoping  to  surround  the  enemy,  extended 
his  line  too  far  towards  the  land,  and  was  defeated 
by  the  Syracusans,  who,  after  overcoming  the  Athenian 
centre,  shut  him  up  in  the  inner  bay  of  the  harbour. 
There  he  was  slain,  and  the  vessels  which  were  under 
his  command  and  had  followed  him  were  destroyed. 
The  Syracusans  now  pursued  and  began  to  drive  ashore 
the  rest  of  the  Athenian  fleet. 

53*  Gylippus,   observing  the  discomfiture  of  the  enemy, 

The  defeat  who  were  beine  defeated  and  driven  to  land  beyond  their 

is  partially 

compen-      own  palisade  and  the  lines  of  their  camp,  hastened  with 

sated  by  an  _  .,  .  .  .  .   ,  1,1 

advantage  a  part  of  his  army  to  the  causeway  which  ran  along  the 
harbour,  intending  to  kill  all  who  landed,  and  to  assist 
^e  Syracusans  in  capturing  the  ships,  which  could  be 
gain  over  more  easily  towed  away  if  the  shore  was  in  the  hands  of 
near  the  their  friends.  The  Tyrrhenians,  who  guarded  this  part 


of  the  Athenian  lines,  seeing  Gylippus  and  his  forces 
ship  fails,  advance  in  disorder,  rushed  out,  and  attacking  the  fore- 
most put  them  to  flight,  and  drove  them  into  the  marsh 
called  Lysimeleia.  But  soon  the  Syracusans  and  their 
allies  came  up  in  greater  numbers.  The  Athenians  in 


ANOTHER   ATHENIAN   DEFEAT   AT   SEA.     523 

B.C.  413.  fear  for  their  ships  advanced  to  the  support  of  the  VII. 
91.  4-  Tyrrhenians,  and  joined  in  the  engagement  ;  the  Syra- 
cusans  were  overcome  and  pursued,  and  a  few  of  their 
heavy-armed  slain.  Most  of  the  Athenian  ships  were 
saved  and  brought  back  to  the  Athenian  station.  Still 
the  Syracusans  and  their  allies  took  eighteen,  and  killed 
the  whole  of  their  crews.  Then,  hoping  to  burn  the 
remainder  of  the  fleet,  they  procured  an  old  merchant- 
vessel,  which  they  filled  with  faggots  and  brands  ;  these 
they  lighted,  and  as  the  wind  blew  right  upon  the  enemy 
they  let  the  ship  go.  The  Athenians,  alarmed  for  the 
safety  of  their  fleet,  contrived  means  by  which  they  ex- 
tinguished the  flames,  and  succeeded  in  keeping  the  fire- 
ship  at  a  distance.  Thus  the  danger  was  averted. 

The  Syracusans  now  raised  a  trophy  of  their  naval      54- 
victory,  and  another  marking  their  interception  of  the  The  syfa- 

J  '  r  cusans 

hoplites  on  the  higher  ground  close  to  the  wall  at  the  raise  two 
place  where  they  took  the  horses.    The  Athenians  raised  thePAthe- 


a  trophy  of  the  victory  over  the  land-forces  whom  the 
Tyrrhenians  drove  into  the   marsh,  and  of  that  which  tr°Phy- 
they  had  themselves  gained  with  the  rest  of  the  army. 

The  Syracusans,  who  up  to  this  time  had  been  afraid      55. 
of  the  reinforcements  of  Demosthenes,  had  now  gained  The  Athe- 
a  brilliant  success  by  sea  as  well  as  by  land  ;  the  Athe-  despair  ; 
nians  were  in  utter  despair.     Great  was  their  surprise  never  before 
at  the  result,  and  still  greater  their  regret  that  they  had  ^2Tded 
ever  come.     The  Sicilian   were   the   only  cities   which  democratic 

and  popu- 

they  had  encountered  similar  in  character  to  their  own  a,  ipus  city 
enjoying  the  same  democratic  institutions  and  strong  in  own!  * 
ships,  cavalry,  and  population.     They  were  not  able  by 
holding  out  the  prospect  of  a  change  of  government  to 
introduce  an  element  of  discord  among  them  which  might 
have  gained  them  overb,  nor  could  they  master  them 
cby  ac  decided  superiority  of  force.     They  had  failed 
at  almost  every  point,  and  were  already  in  great  straits, 
when  the  defeat  at  sea,  which  they  could  not  have  thought 
possible,  reduced  their  fortunes  to  a  still  lower  ebb. 
a  Cp.  viii.  96  fin.  b  Cp.  vi.  20  init.  c  Or,  'by  their.' 


524       EXULTATION   OF  THE    SYRACUSANS. 


VII. 

56. 

The  Syra- 
cusans 
prepare  to 
close  the 
mouth  of 
the  har- 
bour. 

They  aspire 
to  take  the 
lead  in  the 
liberation 
of  Hellas. 


57- 

Athenian 
allies. 


(A)  In  Hel- 
las Proper. 


The  Syracusans  at  once  sailed  round  the  shore  of  the  B.C.  413. 
harbour  without  fear,  and  determined  to  close  the  mouth, 
that  the  Athenians  might  not  be  able,  even  if  they 
wanted,  to  sail  out  by  stealth.  For  they  were  now 
striving,  no  longer  to  achieve  their  own  deliverance,  but 
to  cut  off  the  escape  of  the  Athenians ;  they  considered 
their  position  already  far  superior,  as  indeed  it  was,  and 
they  hoped  that  if  they  could  conquer  the  Athenians 
and  their  allies  by  sea  and  land,  their  success  would  be 
glorious  in  the  eyes  of  all  the  Hellenes,  who  would  at 
once  be  set  free,  some  from  slavery,,  others  from  fear. 
For  the  Athenians,  having  lost  so  much  of  their  power, 
would  never  be  able  to  face  the  enemies  who  would  rise 
up  against  them.  And  the  glory  of  the  deliverance 
would  be  ascribed  to  the  Syracusans,  who  would  be 
honoured  by  all  living  men  and  all  future  ages.  aThe 
conflict  was  still  further  ennobled  by  the  thought  that 
they  were  now  conquering  a,  not  only  the  Athenians,  but 
a  host  of  their  allies.  And  they  themselves  were  not 
alone,  but  many  had  come  to  their  support ;  they  were 
the  leaders  of  a  war  in  which  Corinth  and  Lacedaemon 
were  their  partners  ;  they  had  offered  their  own  city  to 
bear  the  brunt  of  the  encounter,  and  they  had  made  an  im- 
mense advance  in  naval  power.  More  nations  met  at  Syra- 
cuse than  ever  gathered  around  any  single  city,  although 
not  so  many  as  the  whole  number  of  nations  enrolled  in 
this  war  under  the  Athenians  and  Lacedaemonians. 

I  will  now  enumerate  the  various  peoples  who  came 
to  Sicily  as  friends  or  enemies,  to  share  either  in  the  con- 
quest or  in  the  defence  of  the  country,  and  who  fought 
before  Syracuse b,  choosing  their  side,  not  so  much  from 
a  sense  of  right  or  from  obligations  of  kinship,  as  from 
the  accident  of  compulsion  or  their  own  interest. 

The  Athenians  themselves,  who  were  lonians,  went  of 

a  Or,  taking  the  words  as  a  reflection,  not  of  the  Syracusans,  but 
of  Thucydides  himself :  '  And  indeed  there  was  everything  to 
ennoble  the  conflict ;  for  they  were  now  conquering '  etc. 

b  Adopting  the  conjecture 


FINAL   ENUMERATION   OF    THE   FORCES.    525 

B.C.  413.  their  own  free-will  against  the   Syracusans,  who  were     VII. 
*'  Dorians ;  they  were  followed  by  the  Lemnians  and  Im-  0)  Their, 

*  J  own  settlers. 

brians,  and  the  then  inhabitants  of  Aeginaa,  and  by  the 
Hestiaeans  dwelling  at  Hestiaea  in  Euboeab:  all  these 
were  their  own  colonists,  speaking  the  same  language 
with  them,  and  retaining  the  same  institutions. 

Of  the  rest  who  joined  in  the  expedition,  some  were  (ii)  Subjects 
subjects,  others  independent  allies,  some  again  mercen- 
aries.     Of  the   subjects   and   tributaries,  the  Eretrians, 
Chalcidians,  Styreans,  and   Carystians  came  from  Eu- 
boea ;    the    Ceans,   Andrians,    and   Tenians    from    the 
islands;  the  Milesians,  Samians,  and  Chians  from  Ionia. 
Of  these  however  the  Chians c  were  independent,  and 
instead  of  paying  tribute,  provided  ships.     All  or  nearly 
all  were  lonians  and  descendants  of  the  Athenians,  with 
the   exception    of  the    Carystians,   who    are   Dryopes. 
They  were  subjects  and  constrained  to  follow,  but  still 
they  were  lonians  fighting  against  Dorians.     There  were 
also  Aeolians,  namely,  the  Methymnaeans d,  who  fur-  subjects. 
nished  ships  but  were  not  tributaries,  and  the  Tenedians 
and  Aenians,  who  paid  tribute.     These  Aeolians  were 
compelled  to  fight  against  their  Aeolian  founders,  the 
Boeotians,  who   formed   part   of  the   Syracusan   army. 
The   Plataeans   were   the    only   Boeotians   opposed   to 
Boeotians;  an  antagonism  which  was  natural,  for  they 
hated  one  another.     The  Rhodians  and  Cytherians  were  (3)  Dorians, 
both  Dorians ;  the  Cytherians,  although  Lacedaemonian  against 
colonists,  bore  arms  in  the  Athenian  cause  against  the  kmdred- 
Lacedaemonians   who   came   with   Gylippus ;    and   the 
Rhodians,  though  by  descent  Argive,  were  compelled 
to  fight  against  the  Syracusans,  who  were  Dorians,  and 
against    the    Geloans,   who    were    actually   their    own 
colony6,  and  were  taking  part  with  Syracuse.     Of  the  ("0  Allies 
islanders  around  Peloponnesus,  the  Cephallenians  and  Za- 
cynthians  were  independentf ;  still,  being  islanders,  they 

a  Cp.  ii.  27  med.  i>  Cp.  i.  114  fin. 

c  Cp.  vi.  85  med.  a  Cp.  iii.  50  med. ;  vi.  85  med. 

6  Cp.  vi.  4  med.  f  Cp.  ii.  7  fin.;  vi.  85  med. 


526    THE   ATHENIANS    AND    THEIR   ALLIES. 

VII.     followed  under  a  certain  degree  of  constraint ;  for  the  B.C.  413. 
compelled,  Athenians  were  masters  of  the  sea.     The  Corcyraeans,  °L  9If  4> 

either  (i)  * 

islanders,     who  were  not  only  Dorians  but  actually  Corinthians, 

or  (2)  cities  .  .  .         . 

having        were   serving   against   Corinthians   and  oyracusans,  al- 

enmities.  though  they  were  the  colonists  of  the  one  and  the  kins- 
men of  the  other  ;  they  followed  under  a  decent  appear- 
ance of  compulsion,  but  gladly,  because  they  hated  the 
Corinthians a.  The  Messenians  too,  as  the  inhabitants 
of  Naupactus  were  now  called,  including  the  garrison  of 
Pylos,  which  was  at  that  time  held  by  the  Athenians, 
were  taken  by  them  to  the  war.  A  few  Megariansb, 
having  the  misfortune  to  be  exiles,  were  thus  induced 
to  fight  against  the  Selinuntians,  who  were  Megarians 
like  themselves0. 

(iv)  Volun-  The  service  of  the  remaining  allies  was  voluntary. 
The  Argivesd,  not  so  much  because  they  were  allies 
of  Athens,  as  because  they  hated  the  Lacedaemonians, 
and  individually  for  the  sake  of  their  own  immediate 
advantage,  followed  the  Athenians,  who  were  lonians, 
being  themselves  Dorians,  to  fight  against  Dorians. 
The  Mantineans  and  other  Arcadians  were  mercenaries 
accustomed  to  attack  any  enemy  who  from  time  to  time 
might  be  pointed  out  to  them,  and  were  now  ready,  if 
they  were  paid,  to  regard  the  Arcadians,  who  were  in 
the  service  of  the  Corinthians e,  as  their  enemies.  The 
Cretans  and  Aetolians  also  served  for  hire  ;  the  Cretans, 
who  had  once  joined  with  the  Rhodians  in  the  founda- 
tion of  Gela f,  came  with  reluctance ;  nevertheless  for 
pay  they  consented  to  fight  against  their  own  colonists. 
Some  of  the  Acarnanians  came  to  aid  their  Athenian 
allies,  partly  from  motives  of  gain,  but  much  more  out  of 
regard  for  Demosthenesg  and  good-will  to  Athens.  All 
these  dwelt  on  the  eastern  side  of  the  Ionian  Gulf. 

(B)  Allies  Of  the  Hellenes  in  Italy,  the  Thurians  and  Meta- 
pontians,  compelled  by  the  necessities  of  a  revolutionary 

a  Cp.  i.  25  med.        b  Cp.  iv.  74;  vi.  43  fin.        c  Cp.  vi.  4  init. 

d  Cp.  vi.  43.  e  Cp.  vii.  19  fin. 

f  Cp.  vi.  4  med.  8  Cp.  iii.  105  foil.;  vii.  31  fin. 


THE   SYRACUSANS   AND    THEIR  ALLIES.  527 

B.C.  413.  period,  joined   in   the   enterprise ;    of  the    Hellenes   in     VII. 
01.  91-  4-  Sicily,  the  Naxians   and    Catanaeans.      Of  Barbarians,  including 

9 '  '  barbarians. 

there  were  the  Egestaeans,  who  invited  the  expedition, 
and  the  greater  part  of  the  Sicels,  and,  besides  native 
Sicilians,  certain  Tyrrhenians a  who  had  a  quarrel  with 
the  Syracusans ;  also  Iapygiansb,  who  served  for  hire. 
These  were  the  nations  who  followed  the  Athenians. 

The  Syracusans,  on  the  other  hand,  were  assisted  by      58. 
the  Camarinaeans,  who  were  their  nearest  neighbours,  Syr 
and  by  the  Geloans,  who  dwelt  next  beyond  them  ;  and 
then  (for  the  Agrigentines,  who  came  next,  were  neutral)  ,v 

by  the  still  more  distant  Selinuntians.     All  these   in-  from  the 
habited  the  region  of  Sicily  which  lies  towards  Libya,  (a)  from  the 
On  the  side  looking  towards  the  Tyrrhenian  Gulf  the  district. 
Himeraeans,  the  only  Hellenic  people  in  those  parts, 
were   also    their    only   allies.      These    were    the    Hel- 
lenic peoples  in  Sicily  who  fought  on  the  side  of  the 
Syracusans ;   they  were  Dorians  and  independent.     As 
for  Barbarians,  they  had  only  such  of  the  Sicels  as  had 
not  gone  over  to  the  Athenians. 

Of  Hellenes  who  were  not  inhabitants  of  Sicily,  the  (u)  inhabit- 
Lacedaemonians  provided  a  Spartan  general ;  the  Lace-  ^  Proper, 
daemonian  forces  were  all  Neodamodes  and  Helots. 
(The  meaning  of  the  word  Neodamode  is  freedman.) 
The  Corinthians  were  the  only  power  which  furnished 
both  sea  and  land  forces.  Their  Leucadian  and  Am- 
braciot  kinsmen  accompanied  them ;  from  Arcadia  came 
mercenaries  sent  by  Corinth  ;  there  were  also  Sicyonians 
who  served  under  compulsion c ;  and  of  the  peoples 
beyond  the  Peloponnese,  the  Boeotians. — This  external 
aid  however  was  small  compared  with  the  numerous 
troops  of  all  kinds  which  the  Sicilians  themselves  sup- 
plied ;  for  they  dwelt  in  great  cities,  and  had  collected 
many  ships  and  horses  and  hoplites,  besides  a  vast 
multitude  of  other  troops.  And  again,  the  proportion 
furnished  by  the  Syracusans  themselves  was  greater 

a  Gp.  vi.  103  med.  b  Cp.  vii.  33  med. 

c  Cp.  v.  8 1  med.;  vi.  19  fin. 


CLOSING    OF   THE   HARBOUR. 

VII.     than  that  of  all  the  rest  put  together,  on  account  of  the  B.C.  413. 

size  of  the  city  and  the  magnitude  of  their  own  danger. 
59.  Such  were  the  allies  who  were  assembled  on  both 


These  were  sides.     At  that  time  they  were  all  on  the  spot,  and  no- 
thing whatever  came  afterwards  to  either  army. 
The  Syra-        The  Syracusans  and  the  allies  naturally  thought  that 
begin  to      the  struggle  would  be  brought  to  a  glorious  end  if,  after 
harbor?      having  defeated  the  Athenian  fleet,  they  took  captive 
the  whole  of  their  great  armament,  and  did  not  allow 
them  to  escape  either  by  sea  or  land.     So  they  at  once 
began  to  close  the  mouth  of  the  Great  Harbour,  which 
was  about  a  mile  wide,  by  means  of  triremes,  merchant- 
vessels,  and  small  boats,  placed  broadside,  which  they 
moored  there.     They  also  made  every  preparation  for 
a  naval  engagement,  should  the  Athenians  be  willing  to 
hazard  another ;  and  all  their  thoughts  were  on  a  grand 
scale. 

60.  The  Athenians,  seeing  the  closing  of  the  harbour  and 

The  Athe-  inferring  the  intentions  of  the  enemy,  proceeded  to  hold 
parefor  a  council.  The  generals  and  officers  met  and  considered 
struggle,  the  difficulties  of  their  position.  The  most  pressing  was 

draw  from"  the  want  of  food-  For  thev  had  alread7  sent  to  Catana,. 
the  higher  when  they  intended  to  depart,  and  stopped  the  supplies ; 

ground, 

and  deter-   and  they  could  get  no  more  unless  they  recovered  the 
fight  their    command  of  the  sea.     They  resolved  therefore  to  quit 
™l  or  tfby  their  lines  on  the  higher  ground  and  to  cut  off  by  a 
defeated,     cross-wall  a  space  close  to  their  ships,  no  greater  than 
was  absolutely  required  for  their  baggage  and  for  their 
sick  ;  after  leaving  a  guard  there  they  meant  to  put  on 
board  every  other  man,  and  to  launch  all  their  ships, 
whether  fit  for  service  or  not ;  they  would  then  fight  a 
decisive  battle,  and,  if  they  conquered,  go  to  Catana ; 
but  if  not,  they  would  burn  their  ships,  and  retreat  by 
land  in   good   order,  taking   the  nearest  way  to  some 
friendly  country,  Barbarian  or  Hellenic.     This   design 
they  proceeded   to   execute,   and  withdrawing  quietly 
from  the  upper  walls,  manned  their  whole  fleet,  com- 
pelling every  man  of  any  age  at  all  suitable  for  service 


SPEECH    OF   NICIAS    TO    HIS   MEN.          529 

B.C.  413.  to  embark.     The  entire  number  of  the  ships  which  they     VII. 
4>  manned  was  about  a  hundred  and  ten.     They  put  on 
board  numerous  archers  and  javelin-men,  Acarnanians, 
and  other  foreigners,  and   made  such  preparations  for 
action  as  the  nature  of  the  plan  imposed  upon  them  by 
their  necessities  allowed.     When  all  was  nearly  ready,  Nicias 
Nieias,  perceiving  that  the  soldiers  were  depressed  by  dejection6 
their   severe  defeat  at   sea,  which  was  so   new  an  ex-  °Q^ers 
perience  to  them,  while  at  the  same  time  the  want  ofstrivesto 

encourage 

provisions  made  them  impatient  to  risk  a  battle  with  them. 
the  least  possible  delay,  called  his  men  together,  and 
before  they  engaged  exhorted  them  as  follows  : — 

'  Soldiers  of  Athens  and  of  our  allies,  we  have  all  the      6 1 . 
same  interest  in  the  coming  struggle a ;  every  one  of  us  if  we  win 
as  well  as  of  our  enemies  will  now  have  to  fight  for  his  our  homes 
life  and  for  his  country,  and  if  only  we  can  win  in  the. 
impending  sea-fight,  every  one  may  see  his  native  city 
and  his  own  home  once  more.     But  we   must  not  be not  to  be 

.  cast  down 

faint-hearted,  nor  behave  as  if  we  were  mere  novices  in  by  reverses. 
the  art  of  war,  who  when  defeated  in  their  first  battle 
are  full  of  cowardly  apprehensions  and  continually  re- 
tain the  impress  of  their  disaster.  You,  Athenians, 
have  had  great  military  experience ;  and  you,  allies,  are 
always  fighting  at  our  side.  Remember  the  sudden 
turns  of  war  ;  let  your  hope  be  that  fortune  herself  may 
yet  come  over  to  us ;  and  prepare  to  retrieve  your  de- 
feat in  a  manner  worthy  of  the  greatness  of  your  own 
army  which  you  see  before  you  b. 

'We  have  consulted  the  pilots  about  any  improve-      62. 
ments  which  seemed  likely  to  avail  against  the  crowding  We  are 
of  ships  in  the  narrow  harbour,  as  well  as  against  the  fight  a  land- 
troops  on  the  enemy's  decks,  which  in  previous  engage- 
ments  did  us  so  much  harm,  and  we  have  adopted  them 
as  far  as  we  had  the  means.     Many  archers  and  javelin-  suggested 
men  will  embark,  and  a  great  number  of  other  troops,  recent 
whom  if  we  were  going  to  fight  in  the  open  sea  we  should  exper 
not  employ  because  they  increase  the  weight  of  the  ships, 
a  Cp.  vi.  68  ink.  b  Cp.  vi.  68  init.;  vii.  77  med. 

M  m 


530          SPEECH   OF  NICIAS    TO    HIS    MEN. 

VII.  and  therefore  impede  our  skill  ;  but  here,  where  we  are  B.C.  413. 
obliged  to  fight  a  land-battle  on  ship-board  a,  they  will  be  9I>  4' 
useful.  We  have  thought  of  all  the  changes  which  are 
necessary  in  the  construction  of  our  ships,  and  in  order 
to  counteract  the  thickness  of  the  beams  on  the  enemy's 
prows,  for  this  did  us  more  mischief  than  anything  else, 
we  have  provided  iron  grapnels,  which  will  prevent  the 
ship  striking  us  from  retreating  if  the  marines  are  quick 
and  do  their  duty.  For,  as  I  tell  you,  we  are  positively 
driven  to  fight  a  land-battle  on  ship-board,  and  our  best 
plan  is  neither  to  back  water  ourselves  nor  to  allow  the 
enemy  to  back  water  after  we  have  once  closed  with  him. 
Recollect  that  the  shore,  except  so  far  as  our  land-forces 
extend,  is  in  their  hands. 

63.          'Knowing  all  this,  you  must  fight  to  the  last  with  all 
To  the        your  strength,  and  not  be   driven  ashore.     When  ship 

soldiers  ..  ,  .  . 

i  say  :  strikes  ship  refuse  to  separate  until  you  have  swept  the 
engaged"06  enemy's  heavy-armed  from  their  decks.  I  am  speaking 
you  must  to  the  hoplites  rather  than  to  the  sailors  ;  for  this  is  the 

not  separate 

until  you  special  duty  of  the  men  on  deck.  We  may  still  reckon 
the  enemy's  on  the  superiority  of  our  infantry.  The  sailors  I  would 
Tfctbe  exhort,  nay  I  would  implore  them,  not  to  be  paralysed 
YOU  have  ^7  their  disasters  ;  for  they  will  find  the  arrangements 
more  and  on  deck  improved,  and  the  numbers  of  the  fleet  increased, 

better  ships.  0 

TO  the  Some  among  you  have  long  been  deemed  Athenians, 
Remember  though  they  are  not  ;  and  to  them  I  say,  Consider  how 


Prec^ous  ls  that  privilege,  and  how  worthy  to  be   de- 
advantages  fended.    You  were  admired  in  Hellas  because  you  spoke 
derived°U    our  language  and  adopted  our  manners,  and  you  shared 
cOTmexkm    eclually  with  ourselves  in  the  substantial  advantages  of 
Athen         °ur  emP*re'  wmle  vou  gained  even  more  than  we  by  the 
Show  that    dread  which  you  inspired  in  subject-states  and  in  your 
ness"iTeak~  security  against  injustice.      You   alone  have  been  free 
another's"    Partners  in  that  empire  ;  you  ought  not  to  betray  it  now. 
strength.     And  so,  despising  the  Corinthians  whom  you  have  beaten 
again  and  again,  and  the  Sicilians  who  never  dared  to 
withstand  us  when  our  fleet  was  in  its  prime,  repel  your 
a  Cp.  i.  49  init. 


SPEECH   OF   GYLIPPUS    TO    HIS   MEN.       531 

B.C.  413.  enemies,  and  show  that  your  skill  even  amid  weakness     VII. 
'  and  disaster  is  superior  to  the  strength  of  another  in  the 
hour  of  his  success. 

'  Let  me  appeal  once  more  to  you  who  are  Athenians,      64. 
and  remind  you  that  there  are  no  more  ships  like  these  And  you, 

Athenians, 

in  the  dockyards  of  the  Piraeus,  and  that  you  have  no  must  not 

ri    c  •  T  L   \  '   ^          forget  that 

more  recruits  fit  for  service.  In  any  event  but  victory  the  safety 
your  enemies  here  will  instantly  sail  against  Athens,  while  ^^Ssrat 
our  countrymen  at  home,  who  are  but  a  remnant,  will  be  home  is  at. 

stake  ;  and 

unable  to  defend  themselves  against  the  attacks  of  their  that  the 
former  foes  reinforced  by  the  new  invaders.  You  who 
are  in  Sicily  will  instantly  fall  into  the  hands  of  the  ° 
Syracusans  (and  you  know  how  you  meant  to  deal  to  y°u- 
with  them),  and  your  friends  at  Athens  into  the  hands 
of  the  Lacedaemonians.  In  this  one  struggle  you  have 
to  fight  for  yourselves  and  them.  Stand  firm  therefore 
now,  if  ever,  and  remember  one  and  all  of  you  who  are 
embarking  that  you  are  both  the  fleet  and  army  of  your 
country,  and  that  on  you  hangs  the  whole  state  and  the 
great  name  of  Athens  :  for  her  sake  if  any  man  exceed 
another  in  skill  or  courage  let  him  display  them  now  ; 
he  will  never  have  a  better  opportunity  of  doing  good 
to  himself  and  saving  his  country/ 

Nicias,  as  soon  as  he  had  done  speaking,  gave  orders      65. 
to  man  the  ships.     Gylippus  and  the  Syracusans  could  The  Syra- 

1-11       cusans 

see   clearly   enough    from    the   preparations   which   the  meet  the 
Athenians  were  making  that  they  were  going  to  fight. 
But  they  had  also  previous  notice,  and  had  been  told 


of  the  iron  grapnels  ;  and  they  took  precautions  against  improve- 
this  as  against  all  the  other  devices  of  the  Athenians.  Gylippus 
They  covered  the  prows  of  their  vessels  with  hides,  ex-  them?8 
tending  a  good  way  along  the  upper  part  of  their  sides, 
so   that    the   grapnels   might   slip    and   find    no    hold. 
When  all  was  ready,  Gylippus  and  the  other  generals 
exhorted  their  men  in  the  following  words  :  — 

'  That  our  recent  actions  have  been  glorious,  and  that      66. 
in  the  coming  conflict  we  shall  be  fighting  for  a  glorious  Our  past 

&  victories  are 

pr  ize,  most  of  you,  Syracusans  and  allies,  seem  to  be  a  pledge 

M  m  2 


532       SPEECH   OF   GY LIP  PUS    TO    HIS    MEN. 


VII. 

of  our 
future 
success, 
as  the 
defeats  of 
the  enemy 
in  former 
engage- 
ments are 
ominous  of 
his  defeat 
in  this. 
They  came 
hither  to 
enslave  us 
with  their 
navy,  but 
now  the 
power  of 
the  sea  has 
departed 
from  them 
to  us. 


67. 


Success 
infuses 
courage. 
Their  new 
inventions 
are  bad 
imitations 
of  ours, 
which  they 
cannot  use. 
Their  ships 
are  weighed 
down  with 
fighting- 
men. 
They  are 
simply 
desperate. 


aware  :  what  else,  would  have  inspired  you  with  so  much  B.C.  413. 
energy  ?  But  if  any  one  is  not  so  quick  in  apprehending  O1<  9If  4' 
these  things  as  he  ought  to  be,  he  shall  hear  of  them 
from  me.  The  Athenians  came  hither  intending  to 
enslave  first  of  all  Sicily,  and  then,  if  they  succeeded, 
Peloponnesus  and  the  rest  of  Hellas,  they  having  already 
the  largest  dominion  of  any  Hellenic  power,  past  or 
present.  But  you  set  mankind  the  example  of  with- 
standing that  invincible  navy;  which  you  have  now 
defeated  in  several  engagements  at  sea,  and  which  you 
will  probably  defeat  in  this.  For  when  men  are  crippled 
in  what  they  assume  to  be  their  strength,  any  vestige  of 
self-respect  is  more  completely  lost  than  if  they  had 
never  believed  in  themselves  at  all.  When  once  their 
pride  has  had  a  fall  they  throw  away  the  power  of 
resistance  which  they  might  still  exert.  And  this  we 
may  assume  to  be  the  condition  of  the  Athenians. 

'Far  otherwise  is  it  with  us.  The  natural  courage, 
which  even  in  the  days  of  our  inexperience  dared  to 
risk  all,  is  now  better  assured,  and  when  we  go  on  to 
reflect  that  he  is  the  strongest  who  has  overcome  the 
strongest,  the  hopes  of  every  one  are  redoubled.  And 
in  all  enterprises  the  highest  hopes  infuse  the  greatest 
courage.  Their  imitation  of  our  modes  of  fighting  will 
be  useless  to  them.  To  us  they  come  naturally,  and  we 
shall  readily  adapt  ourselves  to  any  arrangements  of  ours 
which  they  have  borrowed.  But  to  them  the  employment 
of  troops  on  deck  is  a  novelty;  they  will  be  encumbered 
with  crowds  of  hoplites  and  of  javelin-men,  Acarnanians 
and  others,  who  are  mere  awkward  landsmen  put  into  a 
ship,  and  will  not  even  know  how  to  discharge  their  darts 
when  they  are  required  to  keep  their  places.  Will  they 
not  imperil  the  ships?  And  their  own  movements  will 
be  so  unnatural  to  them  that  they  will  all  fall  into  utter 
confusion.  The  greater  number  of  the  enemy's  ships 
will  be  the  reverse  of  an  advantage  to  him,  should  any  of 
you  fear  your  inequality  in  that  respect ;  for  a  large  fleet 
confined  in  a  small  space  will  be  hampered  in  action  and 


THE   EVE    OF    THE    CONFLICT.  533 

B.C.  413.  far  more  likely  to  suffer  from  our  devices.  And  I  would  VII. 
4<  have  you  know  what  I  believe  on  the  best  authority  to 
be  the  simple  truth.  Their  misfortunes  paralyse  them, 
and  they  are  driven  to  despair  at  finding  themselves 
helpless.  They  have  grown  reckless,  and  have  no  con- 
fidence in  their  own  plans.  They  will  take  their  chance 
as  best  they  can,  and  either  force  a  way  out  to  sea,  or  in 
the  last  resort  retreat  by  land  ;  for  they  know  that  they 
cannot  in  any  case  be  worse  off  than  they  are. 

*  Against  such  disorder,  and  against  hateful  enemies       68. 
whose  good-fortune  has  run  away  from  them  to  us,  let  NOW  is  the 
us  advance  with  fury.     We  should  remember  in  the  first  revenge, 
place  that  men  are  doing  a  most  lawful  act  when  they  Detest  of6 


take  vengeance  upon  an  enemy  and  an  aggressor,  and 
that  they  have  a  right  to  satiate  their  heart's  animosity  ;  have  ai- 
secondly,  that  this  vengeance,  which  is  proverbially  the  Let  us  do 
sweetest  of  all  things,  will  soon  be  within  our  grasp.     I  ^  they1 


need  not  tell  you  that  they  are  our  enemies,  and  our 
worst  enemies.     They  came  against  our  land  that  they  We  may 
might  enslave  us,  and  if  they  had  succeeded  they  would  thing,  and 


have  inflicted  the  greatest  sufferings  on  our  men,  and  the 


worst  indignities  upon  our  wives  and  children,  and  would 
have  stamped  a  name  of  dishonour  upon  our  whole  city. 
Wherefore  let  no  one's  heart  be  softened  towards  them. 
Do  not  congratulate  yourselves  at  the  mere  prospect  of 
getting  safely  rid  of  them.  Even  if  they  conquer  they  can 
only  depart.  But  supposing  that  we  obtain,  as  we  niost 
likely  shall,  the  fulness  of  our  desires,  in  the  punishment 
;  of  the  Athenians  and  in  the  confirmation  to  Sicily  of  the 
liberties  which  she  now  enjoys,  how  glorious  will  be  our 
prize!  Seldom  are  men  exposed  to  hazards  in  which 
they  lose  little  if  they  fail,  and  win  all  if  they  succeed.' 

When  Gylippus   and  the    other   Syracusan  generals      69. 
had,  like  Nicias,  encouraged  their  troops,  perceiving  the  The  peril 
Athenians  to  be  manning  their  ships,  they  presently  did  nearer  and 

-.T.    .  j  nearer,  and 

the  same.     Nicias,  overwhelmed   by  the  situation,  and  Nicias  once 


seeing  how  great  and  how  near  the  peril  was  (for  the 

ships  were  on  the  very  point  of  rowing  out),  feeling  too,  trierarchs 


534 


NIC  I  AS    CANNOT   SAY   ENOUGH. 


VII. 

the  old  tale 
of  free- 
dom and 
country, 
wives  and 
children, 
and  their 
fathers' 
Gods. 
They  then 
go  on 
board. 


70. 

Disposition 
of  the 
Syracusan 
fleet. 

The  Athe- 
nians rush 
to  the 
mouth  of 
the  harbour. 
The  Syra- 
cusans  bear 
down  upon 
them. 
Fury  and 
disorder 
of  the 
conflict. 


as  men  do  on  the  eve  of  a  great  struggle,  that  all  which  B.C.  413. 
he  had  done  was  nothing,  and  that  he  had  not  said  half  ° 
enough,  again  addressed  the  trierarchs,  and  calling  each 
of  them  by  his  father's  name,  and  his  own  name,  and 
the  name  of  his  tribe,  he  entreated  those  who  had  made 
any  reputation  for  themselves  not  to  be  false  to  it,  and 
those  whose  ancestors  were  eminent  not  to  tarnish  their 
hereditary  fame.  He  reminded  them  that  they  were 
the  inhabitants  of  the  freest  country  in  the  world,  and 
how  in  Athens  there  was  no  interference  with  the  daily 
life  of  any  man*.  He  spoke  to  them  of  their  wives  and 
children  and  their  fathers'  Gods,  as  men  will  at  such  a 
time ;  for  then  they  do  not  care  whether  their  common- 
place phrases  seem  to  be  out  of  date  or  not,  but  loudly 
reiterate  the  old  appeals,  believing  that  they  may  be  of 
some  service  at  the  awful  moment.  When  he  thought 
that  he  had  exhorted  them,  not  enough,  but  as  much  as 
the  scanty  time  allowed,  he  retired,  and  led  the  land- 
forces  to  the  shore,  extending  the  line  as  far  as  he 
could,  so  that  they  might  be  of  the  greatest  use  in  en- 
couraging the  combatants  on  board  ship.  Demosthenes, 
Menander,  and  Euthydemus,  who  had  gone  on  board 
the  Athenian  fleet  to  take  the  command,  now  quitted 
their  own  station,  and  proceeded  straight  to  the  closed 
mouth  of  the  harbour,  intending  to  force  their  way  to 
the  open  sea  where  a  passage  was  still  left. 

The  Syracusans  and  their  allies  had  already  put  out 
with  nearly  the  same  number  of  ships  as  before.  A  de- 
tachment of  them  guarded  the  entrance  of  the  harbour ; 
the  remainder  were  disposed  all  round  it  in  such  a  manner 
that  they  might  fall  on  the  Athenians  from  every  side 
at  once,  and  that  their  land-forces  might  at  the  same 
time  be  able  to  co-operate  wherever  the  ships  retreated 
to  the  shore.  Sicanus  and  Agatharchus  commanded 
the  Syracusan  fleet,  each  of  them  a  wing ;  Pythen  and 
the  Corinthians  occupied  the  centre.  When  the  Athe- 
nians approached  the  closed  mouth  of  the  harbour  the 
»  Cp.  ii.  37. 


FINAL    STRUGGLE    IN    THE    HARBOUR.      535 

B.C.  413.  violence   of  their   onset   overpowered   the   ships  which     VII. 
9I'  4'  were  stationed  there  ;  they  then  attempted  to  loosen  the  Manoeuvres 
fastenings.     Whereupon  from  all  sides  the  Syracusans  courage  'of 
and  their  allies  came  bearing  down  upon  them,  and  the 
conflict  was   no   longer  confined   to  the   entrance,  but 


extended  throughout  the  harbour.    No  previous  engage-  boatswains, 
ment  had  been  so  fierce  and  obstinate.     Great  was  the  nians  fight- 
eagerness  with  which  the  rowers  on  both  sides  rushed  JIJ^  °he 
upon  their  enemies  whenever  the  word  of  command  was  IJT^^15 
given  ;  and  keen  was  the  contest  between  the  pilots  as  wm  they 

.          find  a  home 

they  manoeuvred  one  against  another.  The  marines  among  their 
too  were  full  of  anxiety  that,  when  ship  struck  ship,  the  ^m  they 
service  on  deck  should  not  fall  short  of  the  rest  ;  every 
one  in  the  place  assigned  to  him  was  eager  to  be  fore- 
most among  his  fellows.  Many  vessels  meeting  —  and 
never  did  so  many  fight  in  so  small  a  space,  for  the  two 
fleets  together  amounted  to  nearly  two  hundred  —  they 
were  seldom  able  to  strike  in  the  regular  manner,  because 
they  had  no  opportunity  of  first  retiring  or  breaking  the 
line  ;  they  generally  fouled  one  another  as  ship  dashed 
against  ship  in  the  hurry  of  flight  or  pursuit.  All  the 
time  that  another  vessel  was  bearing  down,  the  men  on 
deck  poured  showers  of  javelins  and  arrows  and  stones 
upon  the  enemy;  and  when  the  two  closed,  the  marines 
fought  hand  to  hand,  and  endeavoured  to  board.  In 
many  places,  owing  to  the  want  of  room,  they  who  had 
struck  another  found  that  they  were  struck  themselves  ; 
often  two  or  even  more  vessels  were  unavoidably  en- 
tangled about  one,  and  the  pilots  had  to  make  plans  of 
attack  and  defence,  not  against  one  adversary  only,  but 
against  several  coming  from  different  sides.  The  crash 
of  so  many  ships  dashing  against  one  another  took  away 
the  wits  of  the  sailors,  and  made  it  impossible  to  hear 
the  boatswains,  whose  voices  in  both  fleets  rose  high,  as 
they  gave  directions  to  the  rowers,  or  cheered  them  on 
in  the  excitement  of  the  struggle.  On  the  Athenian 
side  they  were  shouting  to  their  men  that  they  must 
force  a  passage  and  seize  the  opportunity  now  or  never 


AGONY   OF    THE   SPECTATORS. 


VII. 


71. 

Fearful 
anxiety  of 
the  men 
drawn  up 
on  shore, 
especially 
when  the 
battle 
wavers. 
They  ac- 
company 
the  conflict 
with  cries 
and  move- 
ments of 
the  body. 
At  length 
the  Athe- 
nians are 
driven 
ashore. 
The  army 
seeing  the 
ships  lost 
know 
themselves 
to  be  lost, 
like  the 
Lacedae- 
monians at 
Pylos. 


of  returning  in  safety  to  their  native  land.  To  the  B.C.  413. 
Syracusans  and  their  allies  was  represented  the  glory 
of  preventing  the  escape  of  their  enemies,  and  of  a 
victory  by  which  every  man  would  exalt  the  honour 
of  his  own  city.  The  commanders  too,  when  they  saw 
any  ship  backing  water  without  necessity,  would  call  the 
captain  by  his  name,  and  ask,  of  the  Athenians,  whether 
they  were  retreating  because  they  expected  to  be  more 
at  home  upon  the  land  of  their  bitterest  foes  than  upon 
that  sea  a  which  had  been  their  own '  so  long a ;  on  the 
Syracusan  side,  whether,  when  they  knew  perfectly  well 
that  the  Athenians  were  only  eager  to  find  some  means 
of  flight,  they  would  themselves  fly  from  the  fugitives. 

While  the  naval  engagement  hung  in  the  balance  the 
two  armies  on  shore  had  great  trial  and  conflict  of  soul. 
The  Sicilian  soldier  was  animated  by  the  hope  of  in- 
creasing the  glory  which  he  had  already  won,  while 
the  invader  was  tormented  by  the  fear  that  his  for- 
tunes might  sink  lower  still.  The  last  chance  of  the 
Athenians  lay  in  their  ships,  and  their  anxiety  was 
dreadful.  The  fortune  of  the  battle  varied ;  and  it  was 
not  possible  that  the  spectators  on  the  shore  should 
all  receive  the  same  impression  of  it.  Being  quite  close 
and  having  different  points  of  view,  they  would  some 
of  them  see  their  own  ships  victorious ;  their  courage 
would  then  revive,  and  they  would  earnestly  call 
upon  the  Gods  not  to  take  from  them  their  hope  of 
deliverance.  But  others,  who  saw  their  ships  worsted, 
cried  and  shrieked  aloud,  and  were  by  the  sight  alone 
more  utterly  unnerved  than  the  defeated  combatants 
themselves.  Others  again,  who  had  fixed  their  gaze  on 
some  part  of  the  struggle  which  was  undecided,  were  in 
a  state  of  excitement  still  more  terrible;  they  kept 
swaying  their  bodies  to  and  fro  in  an  agony  of  hope  and 
fear  as  the  stubborn  conflict  went  on  and  on ;  for  at 
every  instant  they  were  all  but  saved  or  all  but  lost. 

a  Or,  reading  TTOVOV  after  oXt'you :  '  which  by  the  labour  of  years 
they  had  made  their  own.' 


THE  GREAT  DEFEAT  OF  THE  ATHENIANS.  537 

B.C.  413.  And  while  the  strife  hung  in  the  balance  you  might  VII. 
4'  hear  in  the  Athenian  army  at  once  lamentation,  shouting, 
cries  of  victory  or  defeat,  and  all  the  various  sounds 
which  are  wrung  from  a  great  host  in  extremity  of 
danger.  Not  less  agonising  were  the  feelings  of  those 
on  board.  At  length  the  Syracusans  and  their  allies, 
after  a  protracted  struggle,  put  the  Athenians  to  flight, 
and  triumphantly  bearing  down  upon  them,  and  en- 
couraging one  another  with  loud  cries  and  exhortations, 
drove  them  to  land.  Then  that  part  of  the  navy  which 
had  not  been  taken  in  the  deep  water  fell  back  in 
confusion  to  the  shore,  and  the  crews  rushed  out  of  the 
ships  into  the  campa.  And  the  land-forces,  no  longer 
now  divided  in  feeling,  but  uttering  one  universal  groan 
of  intolerable  anguish,  ran,  some  of  them  to  save  the 
ships,  others  to  defend  what  remained  of  the  wall ;  but 
the  greater  number  began  to  look  to  themselves  and  to 
their  own  safety.  Never  had  there  been  a  greater  panic 
in  an  Athenian  army  than  at  that  moment.  They  now 
suffered  what  they  had  done  to  others  at  Pylos.  For  at 
Pylos  the  Lacedaemonians,  when  they  saw  their  ships 
destroyed,  knew  that  their  friends  who  had  crossed  over 
into  the  island  of  Sphacteria  were  lost  with  themb. 
And  so  now  the  Athenians,  after  the  rout  of  their  fleet, 
knew  that  they  had  no  hope  of  saving  themselves  by 
land  unless  events  took  some  extraordinary  turn. 

Thus,  after  a  fierce  battle  and  a  great  destruction  of      72. 
ships  and  men  on  both  sides,  the  Syracusans  and  their  Demos- 
allies  gained  the  victory.     They  gathered  up  the  wrecks  desires  to 
and  bodies  of  the  dead,  and  sailing  back  to  the  city,  conflict!*6 
erected  a  trophy.    The  Athenians,  overwhelmed  by  their 
misery,  never  so  much  as  thought  of  recovering  their 
wrecks  or  of  asking  leave  to  collect  their  dead.     Their  to  embark. 
intention  was  to  retreat  that  very  night.     Demosthenes  decided  to 
came  to  Nicias  and  proposed  that  they  should  once  more  faenPd.n  by 
man  their  remaining  vessels  and  endeavour  to  force  the 
passage  at  daybreak,  saying  that  they  had  more  ships 
a  Cp.  vii.  41  init.,  74  fin.  t>  Cp.  iv.  14  ink. 


538  THE   DEVICE    OF   HERMOCRATES. 

VII.  fit  for  service  than  the  enemy.  For  the  Athenian  fleet  B.C.  413. 
still  numbered  sixty,  but  the  enemy  had  less  than  fifty. 
Nicias  approved  of  his  proposal,  and  they  would  have 
manned  the  ships,  but  the  sailors  refused  to  embark  ;  for 
they  were  paralysed  by  their  defeat,  and  had  no  longer 
any  hope  of  succeeding.  So  the  Athenians  all  made  up 
their  minds  to  escape  by  land. 

73-  Hermocrates  the  Syracusan  suspected  their  intention, 

Hermo-  ancj  dreading  what  might  happen  if  their  vast  army,  re- 
ticipating  treating  by  land  and  settling  somewhere  in  Sicily,  should 
wants  the  n>  choose  to  renew  the  war,  he  went  to  the  authorities, 
whro°wasnS'  and  represented  to  them  that  they  ought  not  to  allow 
keeping  fae  Athenians  to  withdraw  by  night  (mentioning  his 

holiday,  to  * 

intercept  own  suspicion  of  their  intentions),  but  that  all  the  Syra- 

themagis-  cusans  and  their  allies  should  march  out  before  them, 

declaring  wa^  UP  ^e  roadsj  and  occupy  the  passes  with  a  guard. 

the  thing  They  thought  very  much  as  he  did,  and  wanted  to  carry 

impossible,  *  ' 

he  per-  out  his.plan,  but  doubted  whether  their  men,  who  were 
Athenians  too  glad  to  repose  after  a  great  battle,  and  in  time  of 


festival—  for  there  happened  on  that  very  day  to  be  a 
theirmarch;  sacrifice  to  Heracles—  could  be  induced  to  obey.  Most 
of  them,  in  the  exultation  of  victory,  were  drinking  and 
keeping  holiday,  and  at  such  a  time  how  could  they  ever 
be  expected  to  take  up  arms  and  go  forth  at  the  order 
of  the  generals?  On  these  grounds  the  authorities  de- 
cided that  the  thing  was  impossible.  Whereupon  Her- 
mocrates himself,  fearing  lest  the  Athenians  should  gain 
a  start  and  quietly  pass  the  most  difficult  places  in 
the  night,  contrived  the  following  plan  :  when  it  was 
growing  dark  he  sent  certain  of  his  own  acquaintances, 
accompanied  by  a  few  horsemen,  to  the  Athenian  camp. 
They  rode  up  within  earshot,  and  pretending  to  be 
friends  (there  were  known  to  be  men  in  the  city  who 
gave  information  to  Nicias  of  what  went  on)  called  to 
some  of  the  soldiers,  and  bade  them  tell  him  not  to 
withdraw  his  army  during  the  night,  for  the  Syracusans 
were  guarding  the  roads  ;  he  should  make  preparation 
at  leisure  and  retire  by  day.  Having  delivered  their 


THE    BEATEN   HOST   BEGINS    TO    MOVE.    539 

B.C.  413.  message  they  departed,  and  those  who  had  heard  them     VII. 
informed  the  Athenian  generals. 

On  receiving  this  message,  which  they  supposed  to  be  74. 
genuine,  they  remained  during  the  night.  And  having 
once  given  up  the  intention  of  starting  immediately, 
they  decided  to  remain  during  the  next  day,  that  the 
soldiers  might,  as  well  as  they  could,  put  together  their 
baggage  in  the  most  convenient  form,  and  depart,  taking 
with  them  the  bare  necessaries  of  life,  but  nothing  else. 

Meanwhile  the  Syracusans  and  Gylippus,  going  forth  and  so 
before  them  with  their  land-forces,  blocked  the  roads  in  Syracusans 
the  country  by  which  the  Athenians  were  likely  to  pass,  b£ckthe 
guarded  the  fords  of  the  rivers  and  streams,  and  posted  roads- 
themselves  at  the  best  points  for  receiving  and  stopping 
them.    Their  sailors  rowed  up  to  the  beach  and  dragged 
away  the  Athenian  ships.     The  Athenians  themselves 
burnt  a  few  of  them,  as  they  had  intended,  but  the  rest 
the  Syracusans  towed  away,  unmolested  and  at  their 
leisure,  from  the  places  where  they  had  severally  run 
aground,  and  conveyed  them  to  the  city. 

On  the  third  day  after  the  sea-fight,  when  Nicias  and       75- 
Demosthenes  thought  that  their  preparations  were  com-  of 


plete,  the  army  began  to  move.     They  were  in  a  dread-  parture. 
ful  condition  ;    not  only  was  there  the  great  fact  that  sights  of 


they  had  lost  their  whole  fleet,  and  instead  of 
expected  triumph  had  brought  the  utmost  peril  upon 
Athens  as  well  as  upon  themselves,  but  also  the  sights  are  left 
which  presented  themselves  as  they  quitted  the  camp  cursing 
were  painful  to  every  eye  and  mind.  The  dead  were  comrades  ; 


unburied,  and  when  any  one  saw  the  body  of  a  friend 
lying  on  the  ground  he  was  smitten  with   sorrow  and  in  tears ; 

the  sense 

dread,  while  the  sick  or   wounded   who   still   survived  of  disgrace, 
but  had    to  be  left  were   even   a   greater  trial  to   the 
living,   and    more   to   be   pitied   than   those  who 


gone.     Their  prayers  and  lamentations  drove  their  com-  between 

their  arrival 

panions  to  distraction  ;  they  would  beg  that  they  might  and  their 
be  taken  with  them,  and  call  by  name  any  friend  or 
relation  whom  they  saw  passing  ;  they  would  hang  upon 


540      THE    UTTER    MISERY    OF    THE    ARMY. 

VII.     their  departing  comrades  and  follow  as  far  as  they  could,  B.C.  413. 
Yet  more     ancj  when  their  limbs  and  strength  failed  them  and  they 

overwhelm- 

ing  is  the  dropped  behind  many  were  the  imprecations  and  cries 
the  future,  which  they  uttered.  So  that  the  whole  army  was  in 
tears,  and  such  was  their  despair  that  they  could  hardly 
make  up  their  minds  to  stir,  although  they  were  leaving 
an  enemy's  country,  having  suffered  calamities  too  great 
for  tears  already,  and  dreading  miseries  yet  greater  in 
the  unknown  future.  There  was  also  a  general  feeling 
of  shame  and  self-reproach, — indeed  they  seemed,  not 
like  an  army,  but  like  the  fugitive  population  of  a  city 
captured  after  a  siege ;  and  of  a  great  city  too.  For  the 
whole  multitude  who  were  marching  together  numbered 
not  less  than  forty  thousand.  Each  of  them  took  with 
him  anything  he  could  carry  which  was  likely  to  be  of 
use.  Even  the  heavy-armed  and  cavalry,,  contrary  to 
their  practice  when  under  arms,  conveyed  about  their 
persons  their  own  food,  some  because  they  had  no  at- 
tendants, others  because  they  could  not  trust  them ;  for 
they  had  long  been  deserting,  and  most  of  them  had 
gone  off  all  at  once.  Nor  was  the  food  which  they 
carried  sufficient ;  for  the  supplies  of  the  camp  had 
failed.  Their  disgrace  and  the  universality  of  the  misery, 
although  there  might  be  some  consolation  in  the  very 
community  of  suffering,  was  nevertheless  at  that  moment 
hard  to  bear,  especially  when  they  remembered  from  what 
pomp  and  splendour  they  had  fallen  into  their  present  low 
estate.  Never  had  an  Hellenic  armya  experienced  such 
a  reverse.  They  had  come  intending  to  enslave  others, 
and  they  were  going  away  in  fear  that  they  would  be 
themselves  enslaved.  Instead  of  the  prayers  and  hymns 
with  which  they  had  put  to  sea,  they  were  now  departing 
amid  appeals  to  heaven  of  another  sort.  They  were  no 
longer  sailors  but  landsmen,  depending,  not  upon  their 
fleet,  but  upon  their  infantry.  Yet  in  face  of  the  great 
danger  which  still  threatened  them  all  these  things 
appeared  endurable. 

a  Omitting  r<u. 


LAST    WORDS    OF  NICIAS.  541 

B.C.  413.      Nicais,  seeing  the  army  disheartened  at  their  terrible     VI  L 
01.  91.  4-  fa^  went  ajong  tne  ranks  and  encouraged  and  consoled       76. 
them  as  well  as  he  could.     In  his  fervour  he  raised  his  Address  of 
voice  as  he  passed  from  one  to  another  and  spoke  louder 
and  louder,  desiring  that  the  benefit  of  his  words  might 
reach  as  far  as  possible. 

'Even  now,  Athenians  and  allies,  we  must  hope  :  men       77. 
have  been  delivered  out  of  worse  straits  than  these,  and  w«  have 

suffered 

I  would  not  have  you  judge  yourselves  too  severely  on  more  than 
account  either  of  the  reverses  which  you  have  sustained  and  i  as 
or  of  your  present  undeserved  miseries.     I  too  am  as  ^CQnaes. 
weak  as  any  of  you  ;  for  I  am  quite  prostrated  by  my  Jjough  mv 
disease,  as  you  see.     And  although  there  was  a  time  been  blame- 
when  I  might  have  been  thought  equal  to  the  best  of  But'  we 
you  in  the  happiness  of  my  private  and  public  life,  I  am 


now  in  as  great  danger,  and  as  much  at  the  mercy  of  {^^  will 
fortune,  as  the  meanest.     Yet  my  days  have  been  passed  pity  upon 
in  the  performance  of   many  a  religious  duty,   and  of  Lo"ok  at 
many  a  just  and  blameless  action.     Therefore  my  hope 


of  the  future  remains  unshaken,  a  and  our  calamities  do  and  remem- 

ber that 
not  appal  me  as  they  might  a.     Who  knows  that  they  there  is 

,  .       ._-,  .  11,1-     nowhere 

may  not  be  lightened  ?     For  our  enemies  have  had  their  a  refuge 
full  share  of  success,  and  if  our  expedition  provoked  the  ^ward,  but 
jealousy  of  any  Godb,  by  this  time  we  have  been  punished  ^re^here 
enough.    Others  ere  now  have  attacked  their  neighbours  ;  brave. 
they  have  done  as  men  will  do,  and  suffered  what  men  get  to  the 
can  bear.     We  may  therefore  begin  to  hope  that  the 
Gods  will  be  more  merciful  to  us;  for  we  now  invite 
their  pity  rather  than  their  jealousy.     And  look  at  your  while 

Athenians 

own  well-armed  ranks  ;  see  how  many  brave  soldiers  you  HVC,  Athens 
are,  marching  in  solid  array  c,  and  do  not  be  dismayed  ;  lves* 
bear  in  mind  that  wherever  you  plant  yourselves  you  are 
a  city  already,  and  that  no  city  of  Sicily  will  find  it  easy 
to  resist  your  attack,  or  can  dislodge  you  if  you  choose 

a  Or,  taking  KUT  dgiav  closely  with  <£o,8ouo-i  :  '  and  our  calamities 
do  not  appal  me,  as  if  they  were  deserved;'  or,  'although  our  cala- 
mities, undeserved  as  they  are,  do  certainly  appal  me/ 

b  Gp.  vii.  50  fin.  c  Cp.  vi.  68  init.  ;  vii.  61  fin. 


542  THE    WAY  BARRED. 

VII.     to  settle.     Provide  for  the  safety  and  good  order  of  your  B.C.  413. 
own  march,  and  remember  every  one  of  you  that  on 
whatever  spot  a  man  is  compelled  to  fight,  there  if  he 
conquer  he  may  find  a  home  and  a  fortress.     We  must 
press  forward   day  and  night,  for  our  supplies  are  but 
scanty.     The  Sicels  through  fear  of  the  Syracusans  still 
adhere  to  us,  and  if  we  can  only  reach  any  part  of  their 
territory  we  shall  be  among  friends,  and  you  may  con- 
sider yourselves  secure.     We   have  sent  to  them,  and 
they  have  been  told  to  meet  us  and  bring  food.     In  a 
word,  soldiers,  let  me  tell  you  that  you  must  be  brave  ; 
there  is  no  place  near  to  which  a  coward  can  flya.     And 
if  you  now  escape  your  enemies,  those  of  you  who  are 
not  Athenians  may  see  once  more  the  home  for  which 
they  long,  while  you  Athenians  will  again  rear  aloft  the 
fallen  greatness  of  Athens.     For  men,  and  not  walls  or 
ships  in  which  are  no  men,  constitute  a  state.' 
78.          Thus  exhorting  his  troops  Nicias  passed  through  the 
The  Athe-    army,  and  wherever  he  saw  gaps  in  the  ranks  or  the  men 
on?n  two     dropping  out  of  line,  he  brought  them  back  to  their 
oneSunder    proper  place.     Demosthenes  did  the  same  for  the  troops 
Nicias,  and  un(£er  hjs  command,  and  gave  them  similar  exhortations. 

the  other 

under  De~  The  army  marched  disposed  in  a  hollow  oblong :  the 
They  sue-'  division  of  Nicias  leading,  and  that  of  Demosthenes  fol- 
lowing ;  the  hoplites  enclosed  within  their  ranks  the 
baggage-bearers  and  the  rest  of  the  army.  When  they 
arrived  at  the  ford  of  the  river  Anapus  they  found  a  force 
of  the  Syracusans  and  of  their  allies  drawn  up  to  meet 
them ;  these  they  put  to  flight,  and  getting  command 
overtake  °*  t^ie  ^ord'  Procee<^e<^  on  their  march.  The  Syracusans 
them  and  continually  harassed  them,  the  cavalry  riding  along- 
side,  and  the  light-armed  troops  hurling  darts  at  them. 
On  this  day  the  Athenians  proceeded  about  four  and 
a-half  miles  and  encamped  at  a  hill.  On  the  next  Second  day. 
day  they  started  early,  and,  having  advanced  more  than 
two  miles,  descended  into  a  level  plain,  and  encamped. 
The  country  was  inhabited,  and  they  were  desirous  of 
a  Cp.  vi.  68  med.  and  fin. 


THE    ATHENIANS   ARE    TURNED   BACK.    543 

B.C.  413.  obtaining  food  from  the  houses,  and  also  water  which  VII. 
9I'  4'  they  might  carry  with  them,  as  there  was  little  to  be  had 
for  many  miles  in  the  country  which  lay  before  them. 
Meanwhile  the  Syracusans  had  gone  on  before  them, 
and  at  a  point  where  the  road  ascends  a  steep  hill  called 
the  Acraean  height,  and  there  is  a  precipitous  ravine  on 

Third  day.  either  side,  were  blocking  up  the  pass  by  a  wall.  On  the 
next  day  the  Athenians  advanced,  although  again  im- 
peded by  the  numbers  of  the  enemy's  cavalry  who  rode 
along-side,  and  of  their  javelin-men  who  threw  darts  at 
them.  For  a  long  time  the  Athenians  maintained  the 
struggle,  but  at  last  retired  to  their  own  encampment. 
Their  supplies  were  now  cut  off,  because  the  horsemen 
circumscribed  their  movements. 

Fourth  day.      In  the  morning  they  started  early  and  resumed  their      79. 
march.   They  pressed  onwards  to  the  hill  where  the  way  The  Athe- 
was  barred,  and  found  in  front  of  them  the  Syracusan  no  im-ma 
infantry  drawn  up  to  defend  the  wall,  in  deep  array,  o^the" 
for  the  pass  was  narrow.    Whereupon  the  Athenians  ad-  Syracusan 

position. 

vanced  and  assaulted  the  barrier,  but  the  enemy,  who 
were  numerous  and  had  the  advantage  of  position,  threw 
missiles  upon  them  from  the  hill,  which  was  steep,  and 
so,  not  being  able  to  force  their  way,  they  again  retired 
and  rested.  During  the  conflict,  as  is  often  the  case  in 
the  fall  of  the  year,  there  came  on  a  storm  of  rain  and 
thunder,  whereby  the  Athenians  were  yet  more  dis- 
heartened, for  they  thought  that  everything  was  con- 
spiring to  their  destruction  a.  While  they  were  resting, 
Gylippus  and  the  Syracusans  despatched  a  division  of 
their  army  to  raise  a  wall  behind  them  across  the  road 
by  which  they  had  come ;  but  the  Athenians  sent  some 
of  their  own  troops  and  frustrated  their  intention.  They 
then  retired  with  their  whole  army  in  the  direction  of  the 
Fifth  day.  plain  and  passed  the  night.  On  the  following  day  they 
again  advanced.  The  Syracusans  now  surrounded  and 
attacked  them  on  every  side,  and  wounded  many  of  them. 
If  the  Athenians  advanced  they  retreated,  but  charged 
a  Cp.  vi.  70  init. 


544  CHANGE  OF  ROUTE  AND  MIDNIGHT  PANIC. 

VII.     them   when    they   retired,   falling   especially   upon   the  B.C.  413. 
hindermost  of  them,  in  the  hope  that,  if  they  could  put 
to  flight  a  few  at  a  time,  they  might  strike  a  panic  into 
the  whole  army.    In  this  fashion  the  Athenians  struggled 
on  for  a  long  time,  and  having  advanced  about  three- 
quarters  of  a  mile  rested  in  the  plain.     The  Syracusans 
then  left  them  and  returned  to  their  own  encampment. 
80.          The  army  was  now  in  a  miserable  plight,  being  in 
The  con-     want  of  every  necessary ;  and  by  the  continual  assaults 
Athenians    of  the  enemy  great  numbers  of  the  soldiers  had  been 
worse  and    wounded.      Nicias   and    Demosthenes,   perceiving  their 
worse         condition,  resolved  during  the  night  to  light  as  many 
they  change  watch-fires  as  possible  and  to  lead  off  their  forces.    They 

their  route    . 

and  go        intended  to  take  another  route  and  march  towards  the 
thTsea!       sea  m  the  direction  opposite  to  that  from  which  the 
occurs!0       Syracusans  were  watching  them.     Now  their  whole  line 
Nicias        of  march  lay,  not  towards  Catana,  but  towards  the  other 
Cacyparis.   side  of  Sicily,  in  the  direction  of  Camarina  and  Gela,  and 
the  cities,  Hellenic   or  Barbarian,  of  that  region.     So 
they  lighted  numerous  fires  and  departed  in  the  night. 
And  then,  as  constantly  happens  in  armies a,  especially 
in  very  great   ones,  and   as  might   be  expected   when 
they  were  marching  by  night  in  an  enemy's  country,  and 
with  the  enemy  from  whom  they  were  flying  not  far  off, 
there   arose   a  panic   among   them,  and  they  fell  into 
confusion.     The   army  of  Nicias,  which   led   the  way, 
kept  together,  and  was  considerably  in  advance,  but  that 
of  Demosthenes,  which  was  the  larger  half,  got  severed 
from   the   other   division,   and    marched   in   less   order. 
At  daybreak  they  succeeded   in  reaching  the  sea,  and  Sixth  day. 
striking  into  the    Helorine   road   marched  along  it,  in- 
tending as  soon  as  they  arrived  at  the  river  Cacyparis 
to  follow  up   the   stream   through   the   interior  of  the 
island.     They  were  expecting  that  the  Sicels  for  whom 
they  had  sent  would  meet  them  on  this  road.     When 
they  had  reached   the   river  they  found   there  also   a 
guard  of  the  Syracusans  cutting  off  the  passage  by  a 
a  Cp.  iv.  125  init. 


ONE    DIVISION  IS  SURROUNDED.  545 

B.C.  413.  wall  and  palisade.     They  forced  their  way  through,  and      VII. 
4*  crossing  the  river,  passed  on  towards  another  river  which 
is  called  the  Erineus,  this  being  the  direction  in  which 
their  guides  led  them. 

When  daylight  broke  and  the  Syracusans  and  their       8 1. 
allies   saw  that  the  Athenians  had  departed,   most   ofTheSyra- 
them  thought  that  Gylippus  had  let  them  go  on  pur-  overtake 
pose,  and  were  very  angry  with  him.     They  easily  found 
the  line  of  their  retreat,  and  quickly  following,  came  up 
with  them  about  the  time  of  the  midday  meal.     The  surrounded 
troops  of  Demosthenes  were  last ;    they  were  marching 
slowly  and  in  disorder,  not  having  recovered  from  the 
panic  of  the  previous  night,  when  they  were  overtaken 
by  the  Syracusans,  who  immediately  fell  upon  them  and 
fought.     Separated  as  they  were  from  the  others,  they 
were  easily  hemmed  in  by  the  Syracusan  cavalry  and 
driven  into  a  narrow  space.     The  division  of  Nicias  was 
as  much  as  six  miles  in  advance,  for  he  marched  faster, 
thinking  that  their  safety  depended  at  such  a  time,  not 
in  remaining  and  fighting,  if  they  could  avoid  it,  but  in 
retreating  as  quickly  as  they  could,  and  resisting  only 
when  they  were  positively  compelled.     Demosthenes,  on 
the  other  hand,  who  had  been  more  incessantly  harassed 
throughout  the  retreat,  because  marching   last   he  was 
first   attacked  by  the   enemy,  now,  when  he   saw  the 
Syracusans   pursuing  him,  instead  of  pressing  onward, 
had  ranged  his  army  in  order  of  battle.     Thus  lingering 
he  was  surrounded,  and  he  and  the  Athenians  under  his 
command  were  in  the  greatest  danger  and  confusion. 
For  they  were  crushed  into  a  walled  enclosufe,  having 
a  road  on  both  sides  and  planted  thickly  with  olive- 
trees,  and  missiles  were  hurled  at  them  from  all  points. 
The  Syracusans  naturally  preferred  this  mode  of  attack 
to  a  regular  engagement.    For  to  risk  themselves  against 
desperate  men  would  have  been  only  playing  into  the 
hands  of  the  Athenians.    Moreover,  every  one  was  sparing 
of  his  life ;  their  good  fortune  was  already  assured,  and 
they  did  not  want  to  fall  in  the  hour  of  victory.     Even 

N  n 


DEMOSTHENES  SURRENDERS. 


VII. 


82. 

The  troops 
are  worn 
out ;  offers 
of  freedom 
to  the 
islanders 
generally 
refused. 
But  at  last 
the  whole 
force  is 
driven  to 
capitulate. 


83- 


Nicias 
being  in- 
formed 
of  the 
surrender 
of  Demos- 
thenes tries 
in  vain  to 
negotiate 
with 

Gylippus. 
Heat- 
tempts  to 
steal  away 
by  night, 
but  fails. 
Three 
hundred 
escape 
in  the 
darkness. 


by  this  irregular   mode   of  fighting  they  thought    that  B.c.  413. 
they  could  overpower  and  capture  the  Athenians. 

And  so  when  they  had  gone  on  all  day  assailing  them 
with  missiles  from  every  quarter,  and  saw  that  they  were 
quite  worn  out  with  their  wounds  and  all  their  other 
sufferings,  Gylippus  and  the  Syracusans  made  a  pro- 
clamation, first  of  all  to  the  islanders,  that  any  of  them 
who  pleased  might  come  over  to  them  and  have  their 
freedom.  But  only  a  few  cities  accepted  the  offer.  At 
length  an  agreement  was  made  for  the  entire  force  under 
Demosthenes.  Their  arms  were  to  be  surrendered,  but 
no  one  was  to  suffer  death,  either  from  violence  or  from 
imprisonment,  or  from  want  of  the  bare  means  of  life. 
So  they  all  surrendered,  being  in  number  six  thousand, 
and  gave  up  what  money  they  had.  This  they  threw 
into  the  hollows  of  shields  and  filled  four.  The  captives 
were  at  once  taken  to  the  city.  On  the  same  day  Nicias 
and  his  division  reached  the  river  Erineus,  which  he 
crossed,  and  halted  his  army  on  a  rising  ground. 

On  the  following  day  he  was  overtaken  by  the  Syra-  Seventh 
cusans,  who  told  him  that  Demosthenes  had  surrendered, 
and  bade  him  do  the  same.  He,  not  believing  them, 
procured  a  truce  while  he  sent  a  horseman  to  go  and 
see.  Upon  the  return  of  the  horseman  bringing  as- 
surance of  the  fact,  he  sent  a  herald  to  Gylippus  and 
the  Syracusans,  saying  that  he  would  agree,  on  behalf 
of  the  Athenian  state,  to  pay  the  expenses  which  the 
Syracusans  had  incurred  in  the  war,  on  condition  that 
they  should  let  his  army  go  ;  until  the  money  was  paid 
he  would*  give  Athenian  citizens  as  hostages,  a  man 
for  a  talent.  Gylippus  and  the  Syracusans  would  not 
accept  these  proposals,  but  attacked  and  surrounded  this 
division  of  the  army  as  well  as  the  other,  and  hurled 
missiles  at  them  from  every  side  until  the  evening. 
They  too  were  grievously  in  want  of  food  and  neces- 
saries. Nevertheless  they  meant  to  wait  for  the  dead 
of  the  night  and  then  to  proceed.  They  were  just  re- 
suming their  arms,  when  the  Syracusans  discovered  them 


SLAUGHTER    AT    THE   ASSINARUS.          547 

B.C.  413.  and  raised  the  Paean.     The  Athenians,  perceiving  that     VII. 
4'  they  were  detected,  laid  down  their  arms  again,  with  the 
exception  of  about  three  hundred  men  who  broke  through 
the  enemy's  guard,  and  made  their  escape  in  the  dark- 
ness as  best  they  could. 

Eighth  day.      When  the  day  dawned  Nicias  led  forward  his  army,       84. 
and  the  Syracusans  and  the  allies  again  assailed  them  The  troops 

of  Nicias 

on    every  side,  hurling  javelins    and   other   missiles   at  hurry  on 
them.      The  Athenians  hurried  on   to  the   river  Assi- 
narus.    They  hoped  to  gain  a  little  relief  if  they  forded 
the  river,   for  the  mass  of  horsemen  and  other  troops  they  *Te  . 

r     attacked  by 

overwhelmed  and  crushed  them  ;  and  they  were  worn  the  enemy, 
out  by  fatigue  and  thirst.  But  no  sooner  did  they  runs  blood, 
reach  the  water  than  they  lost  all  order  and  rushed  in  ; 
every  man  was  trying  to  cross  first,  and,  the  enemy 
pressing  upon  them  at  the  same  time,  the  passage  of  the  together  in 

0  t        r  .          the  stream. 

river  became  hopeless.  Being  compelled  to  keep  close 
together  they  fell  one  upon  another,  and  trampled  each 
other  under  foot:  some  at  once  perished,  pierced  by 
their  own  spears  ;  others  got  entangled  in  the  baggage 
and  were  carried  down  the  stream.  The  Syracusans  . 
stood  upon  the^  further  bank  of  the  river,  which  was 
steep,  and  hurled  missiles  from  above  on  the  Athenians, 
who  were  huddled  together  in  the  deep  bed  of  the  stream 
and  for  the  most  part  were  drinking  greedily.  The 
Peloponnesians  came  down  the  bank  and  slaughtered 
them,  falling  chiefly  upon  those  who  were  in  the  river. 
Whereupon  the  water  at  once  became  foul,  but  was 
drunk  all  the  same,  although  muddy  and  dyed  with 
blood,  and  the  crowd  fought  for  it. 

At  last,  when  the  dead.  bodies  were  lying  in  heaps       85. 
upon    one    another   in    the   water    and    the   army   was  Nicias  at 

J  last  sur- 

utterly  undone,  some  perishing  in  the  river,  and  any  who  renders  to 
escaped  being  cut  off  by  the  cavalry.  Nicias  surrendered 


to  Gylippus,  in  whom  he  had  more  confidence  than  in  brought  In? 
the  Syracusans.     He  entreated  him  and  the  Lacedae-  Greatness 

oi  the 

monians  to  do  what  they  pleased  with  himself,  but  not  slaughter. 
to  go  on  killing  the  men.     So  Gylippus  gave  the  word  prisoners 

N  n  2 


548 


NICIAS   SURRENDERS. 


VII. 

become  the 
property  of 
the  soldiers, 

escapeany 


86. 

The  public 

prisoners 

are  confined 
quarries  ; 


thenes  are 
death. 


to  make  prisoners.  Thereupon  the  survivors,  not  in-  B.C.  413. 
eluding  however  a  large  number  whom  the  soldiers  con- 
cealed,  were  brought  in  alive.  As  for  the  three  hundred 
who  had  broken  through  the  guard  in  the  night,  the 
Syracusans  sent  in  pursuit  and  seized  them.  The  total 
of  the  public  prisoners  when  collected  was  not  great  ;  for 
many  were  appropriated  by  the  soldiers,  and  the  whole  of 
Sicily  was  full  of  them,  they  not  having  capitulated  like 
the  troops  under  Demosthenes.  A  large  number  also 
perished  ;  the  slaughter  at  the  river  being  very  great,  quite 
as  great  as  any  which  took  place  in  the  Sicilian  war  ;  and 
not  a  few  had  fallen  in  the  frequent  attacks  which  were 
made  upon  the  Athenians  during  their  march.  Still  many 
escaped,  some  at  the  time,  others  ran  away  after  an  in- 
terval of  slavery,  and  all  these  found  refuge  at  Catana. 

The  Syracusans  and  their  allies  collected  their  forces 
and  returned  with  the  spoil,  and  as  many  prisoners  as 

-  111  •  1        1  «  i»  TM 

they  could  take  with  them,  into  the  city.  The  captive 
Athenians  and  allies  they  deposited  in  the  quarries, 
which  they  thought  would  be  the  safest  place  of  confme- 
ment.  Nicias  and  Demosthenes  they  put  to  the  sword, 
although  against  the  will  of  Gylippus.  For  Gylippus 
thought  that  to  carry  home  with  him  to  Lacedaemon 
the  generals  of  the  enemy,  over  and  above  all  his  other 
successes,  would  be  a  brilliant  triumph.  One  of  them, 
Demosthenes,  happened  to  be  the  greatest  foe,  and  the 
other  the  greatest  friend  of  the  Lacedaemonians,  both  in 
the  same  matter  of  Pylos  and  Sphacteria.  For  Nicias 
had  taken  up  their  cause  a,  and  had  persuaded  the  Athe- 
nians to  make  the  peace  which  set  at  liberty  the  prisoners 
taken  in  the  island.  The  Lacedaemonians  were  grateful 
to  him  for  the  service,  and  this  was  the  main  reason 
why  he  trusted  Gylippus  and  surrendered  himself  to  him. 
But  certain  Syracusans,  who  had  been  in  communica- 
tion with  him,  were  afraid  (such  was  the  report)  that 
on  some  suspicion  of  their  guilt  he  might  be  put  to  the 
torture  and  bring  trouble  on  them  in  the  hour  of  their 
a  Cp.  v.  1  6  med. 


FATE    OF    THE   PRISONERS.  549 

B.C.  413.  prosperity.  Others,  and  especially  the  Corinthians,  feared  VII. 
9I'4'that,  being  rich,  he  might  by  bribery  escape  and  do 
them  further  mischief.  So  the  Syracusans  gained  the 
consent  of  the  allies  and  had  him  executed.  For  these 
or  the  like  reasons  he  suffered  death.  No  one  of  the 
Hellenes  in  my  time  was  less  deserving  of  so  miserable 
an  end  ;  for  he  lived  in  the  practice  of  every  virtue. 

Those  who  were  imprisoned  in  the  quarries  were  at       87. 
the  beginning  of  their  captivity  harshly  treated  by  the  Sufferings 
Syracusans.     There  were  great  numbers  of  them,  and  prisoners 
they  were  crowded  in  a  deep  and  narrow  place.     At  {^  cold' 
first  the  sun  by  day  was  still  scorching  and  suffocating, 


for  they  had  no  roof  over  their  heads,  while  the  autumn  scanty 

allowance 

nights    were    cold,   and    the   extremes    of  temperature  Of  food 
engendered  violent  disorders.     Being  cramped  for  room  The  whole 
they  had   to   do  everything   on   the   same   spot.     The  ""  JjJem 
corpses  of  those  who  died  from  their  wounds,  exposure  about  seven 
to  the  weather,  and  the  like,  lay  heaped  one  upon  another. 
The   smells  were   intolerable  ;    and    they   were   at   the 
same  time  afflicted  by  hunger  and  thirst.     During  eight 
months  they  were  allowed  only  about  half  a  pint   of 
water  and  a  pint  of  food  a  day.     Every  kind  of  misery 
which  could  befall  man   in  such  a  place  befell  them. 
This  was  the  condition  of  all  the  captives  for  about  ten 
weeks.     At  length  the  Syracusans  sold  them,  with  the 
exception  of  the  Athenians  and  of  any  Sicilian  or  Italian 
Greeks  who  had  sided  with  them  in  the  war.    The  whole 
number  of  the  public  prisoners  is  not  accurately  known, 
but  they  were  not  less  than  seven  thousand. 

Of  all  the  Hellenic  actions  which  took  place  in  this  Thus  ended 
war,  or  indeed  of  all  Hellenic  actions  which  are  on  record,  S^jf88 
this  was  the  greatest  —  the  most  glorious  to  the  victors, 
the   most   ruinous    to   the  vanquished  ;    for  they   were 
utterly  and  at  all  points  defeated,  and  their  sufferings 
were   prodigious.     Fleet   and    army  perished   from   the 
face  of  the  earth  ;  nothing  was  saved,  and  of  the  many 
who  went  forth  few  returned  home. 

Thus  ended  the  Sicilian  expedition. 


BOOK     VIII. 


VIII.  i.      THE  news  was  brought  to  Athens,  but  the  Athenians  B.C.  4i3. 
At  first  the  could  not  believe  that  the  armament  had  been  so  com-     '  9I>  4* 

Athenians         -        t  M 

will  not  pletely  annihilated,  although  they  had  the  positive 
assurances  of  a  the  very  soldiers  who  a  had  escaped  from 
t^ie  scene  °f  action.  At  last  they  knew  the  truth  ; 

knowit,      and  then  they  were  furious  with  the  orators  who  had 

Their  pros-  .    . 

pects  are  joined  in  promoting  the  expedition  —  as  if  they  had  not 
However,  voted  it  themselves  b  —  and  with  the  soothsayers,  and 
Pr°phets>  and  all  who  by  the  influence  of  religion  had 


to  yield.  at  the  time  inspired  them  with  the  belief  that  they  would 
point  a  conquer  Sicily.  Whichever  way  they  looked  there  was 
eiders!  °  trouble  ;  they  were  overwhelmed  by  their  calamity,  and 
disced  to  were  m  ^ear  and  consternation  unutterable.  The  citizens 
economise  mourned  and  the  city  mourned  ;  they  had  lost  a  host  of 

and  to  be- 

have  well,  cavalry  and  hoplites  and  the  flower  of  their  youth,  and 
there  were  none  to  replace  them  c.  And  when  they  saw 
an  insufficient  number  of  ships  in  their  docks,  and  no 
crews  to  man  them,  nor  money  in  the  treasury,  they 
despaired  of  deliverance.  They  had  no  doubt  that  their 
enemies  in  Sicily,  after  the  great  victory  which  they  had 
already  gained,  would  at  once  sail  against  the  Piraeus. 
Their  enemies  in  Hellas,  whose  resources  were  now 
doubled,  would  likewise  set  upon  them  with  all  their 
might  both  by  sea  and  land,  and  would  be  assisted  by 
their  own  revolted  allies.  Still  they  determined  under 
any  circumstances  not  to  give  way.  They  would  procure 

a  Or,  taking  ndvv  with  orpanwrwp  :  '  trustworthy  soldiers  who.' 
b  Cp.  ii.  60  med.,  61  med.  c  Gp.  vii.  64. 


ALL    HELLAS    UP    IN   ARMS.  551 

B.C.  413.  timber  and  money  by  whatever  means  they  might,  and  VIII. 
9I'  4<  build  a  navy.  They  would  make  sure  of  their  allies, 
and  above  all  of  Euboea.  Expenses  in  the  city  were  to 
be  economised,  and  they  were  to  choose  a  council  of  the 
elder  men,  who  should  advise  together,  and  lay  before 
the  people  the  measures  which  from  time  to  time  might 
be  required.  After  the  manner  of  a  democracy,  they 
were  very  amenable  to  discipline  while  their  fright 
lasted.  They  proceeded  to  carry  out  these  resolutions. 
And  so  the  summer  ended. 

During  the  following   winter  all    Hellas  was  stirred        2. 
by  the  great  overthrow  of  the  Athenians  in  Sicily.     The  The  neutral 

J          .         states,  the 

states  which  had  been  neutral  determined  that  the  time  Lacedae- 

.  t  111  monian  and 

had  come  when,  invited  or  not,   they  could  no  longer  Athenian 


stand  aloof  from  the  war  ;  they  must  of  their  own  accord 
attack  the  Athenians.     They   considered,  one  and  all,  to  have  a 

*  snare  m  a 

that  if  the  Sicilian  expedition  had  succeeded,  they  would  war  which 
sooner  or  later  have  been  attacked  by  them.     The  war  be 
would  not  last  long,  and  they  might  as  well  share  in  the 
glory  of  it.     The  Lacedaemonian  allies,  animated  by  a  involve  no 

8        /  danger. 

common  feeling,  were  more  eager  than  ever  to  make  a  Hopes 
speedy  end  of  their  protracted  hardships.  But  none  Lacedae- 
showed  greater  alacrity  than  the  subjects  of  the  Athe-  monians- 
nians,  who  were  everywhere  willing  even  beyond  their 
power  to  revolt  ;  for  they  judged  by  their  excited 
feelings  a,  and  would  not  admit  a  possibility  that  the 
Athenians  could  survive  another  summer.  To  the  Lace- 
daemonians all  this  was  most  encouraging  ;  and  they 
had  in  addition  the  prospect  that  their  allies  from  Sicily 
would  join  them  at  the  beginning  of  spring  with  a  large 
force  of  ships  as  well  as  men  ;  necessity  having  at  last 
compelled  them  to  become  a  naval  power.  Everything 
looked  hopeful,  and  they  determined  to  strike  promptly 
and  vigorously.  They  considered  that  by  the  successful 
termination  of  the  war  they  would  be  finally  delivered 
from  dangers  such  as  would  have  surrounded  them  if  the 
Athenians  had  become  masters  of  Sicilyb.  Athens  once 
a  Cp,  iv.  1  08  med.  ])  Cp.  vi.  90. 


552  AGIS    AT   DECELEA. 

VIII.    overthrown,  they  might  assure  to  themselves  the  undis-  B.C.  413. 
puted  leadership  of  Hellas. 

3-  At  the  beginning  therefore  of  this  winter,  Agis  the 
awT  'the'65  Lacedaemonian  king   led   out  a  body  of  troops   from 
cattle  of  the  Decelea,    and    collected    from    the   allies   contributions 

Oetaeans,  1-1 

and  exacts  towards  the  expenses  of  a  navy.     Then  passing  to  the 

fromYhe  Malian  Gulf,  he  carried  off  from  the  Oetaeans,  who  were 

ofCphthia  °^  enemies*,  the  greater  part  of  their  cattle,  and  exacted 

The  Lace-  money  of  them  ;  from  the  Achaeans  of  Phthia.  and  from 

daemonians    ,,.,.,  „,. 

and  allies  the  other  tribes  in  that  region,  although  the  Thessahans, 
^hundred  to  whom  they  were  subject,  were  very  wroth  and  pro- 
ships.  tested,  he  likewise  extorted  money  and  took  hostages, 
whom  he  deposited  at  Corinth,  and  tried  to  force  upon 
them  the  Lacedaemonian  alliance.  The  whole  number 
of  ships  which  the  allies  were  to  build  was  fixed  at  a 
hundred  :  twenty  -five  were  to  be  built  by  the  Lacedae- 
monians themselves  and  twenty-five  by  the  Boeotians, 
fifteen  by  the  Phocians  and  Locrians,  fifteen  by  the 
Corinthians,  ten  by  the  Arcadians,  Pellenians,  and  Si- 
cyonians,  ten  by  the  Megarians,  Troezenians,  Epidau- 
rians,  and  Hermionians.  Every  sort  of  preparation  was 
made,  for  the  Lacedaemonians  were  determined  to  pro- 
secute the  war  as  soon  as  the  spring  set  in. 

4-  The  Athenians  also  carried  out  their  intended  pre- 
TheAthe-    parations   during   this    winter.     They   collected   timber 

mans  build    ^  .  / 

a  fleet  and  built  ships  ;  they  fortified  Sunium  for  the  protec* 
Sunium.1  7  tion  of  their  corn-ships  on  the  voyage  to  Athens  ;  also 
down  ex-  they  abandoned  the  fort  in  Laconia  which  they  had 
kee^a^e  e  erectec^  while  sailing  to  Sicilyb,  and  cut  down  any 
upon  their  expenses  which  seemed  unnecessary.  Above  all,  they 

kept  strict  watch  over  their  allies,  apprehending  revolt. 
First  the          During  the  same  winter,  while  both  parties  were  as 
intent  upon  their  preparations  as  if  the  war  were  only 
Just  beginning,  first  among  the  Athenian  subjects  the 


supported    Euboeans  sent   envoys   to   negotiate  with  Agis.     Agis 

b    their  & 


Boeotian     accepted  their   proposals,   and  summoned   from   Lace- 
aemon  Alcamenes  the  son  of  Sthenelaidas,  and  Melan- 
a  Cp.  iii.  92  foil.  b  Cp.  vii.  26  med. 


STATES    WANTING    TO    REVOLT.  553 

B.C.  413.  thus,  that  they  might  take  the  command  in    Euboea.     VIII. 
4'  They  came,  accompanied  by  three  hundred  of  the  Neo-  with  Asis» 

who  has 

damodes.  But  while  he  was  making  ready  to  convey  more  power 
them  across  the  strait,  there  arrived  envoys  from  Lesbos, 
which  was  likewise  anxious  to  revolt ;  and  as  the  Boeo- 
tians  a  were  in  their  interest,  Agis  was  persuaded  to  defer 
the  expedition  to  Euboea  while  he  prepared  to  assist  the 
Lesbians.  He  appointed  Alcamenes,  who  had  been 
designed  for  Euboea,  their  governor  ;  and  he  further 
promised  them  ten  ships,  the  Boeotians  promising  ten 
more.  All  this  was  done  without  the  authority  of  the 
Lacedaemonian  government  ;  for  Agis,  while  he  was 
with  his  army  at  Decelea,  had  the  right  to  send  troops 
whithersoever  he  pleased,  to  raise  levies,  and  to  exact 
money.  And  at  that  particular  time  he  might  be  said 
to  have  far  more  influence  over  the  allies  than  the 
Lacedaemonians  at  home,  for  he  had  an  army  at  his 
disposal,  and  was  dreaded  wherever  he  went. 

While  he  was  supporting  the  Lesbians,  certain  Chians        5. 
and  Erythraeans  (who  were  also  ready  to  revolt)  had  (s) The 

x     .  Chians  and 

recourse,  not  to  Agis,  but  to   Lacedaemon ;  they  were  Erythraeans 
accompanied  by   an    envoy   from   Tissaphernes,  whom  Tissa- 
King  Darius  the  son  of  Artaxerxes  had  appointed  to  be 
governor  of  the  provinces  on  the  coast  of  Asia.     Tissa-          in  *s 
phernes  too  was  inviting  the  assistance  of  the  Lacedae-  tribute  in 
monians,  and  promised  to  maintain  their  troops  ;  for  the  qi 
King    had   quite   lately   been   demanding    of  him   the 
revenues  due  from  the  Hellenic  cities  in  his  province, 
which  he  had  been  prevented  by  the  Athenians  from  col- 
lecting, and  therefore  still  owed.     He  thought  that  if  he 
could  weaken  the  Athenians  he  would  be  more  likely  to  get 
his  tribute ;  he  hoped  also  to  make  the  Lacedaemonians 
allies  of  the  King,  and  by  their  help  either  to  slay  or  take 
alive,  in  accordance  with  the  King's  orders,  Amorges  the 
natural  son  of  Pissuthnes,  who  had  revolted  in  Caria. 

While  the   Chians  and   Tissaphernes  were    pursuing        6. 
their  common  object,  Calligeitus  the  son  of  Laophon,  (4)  Phama- 

bazus,  who 
a  Cp.  iii.  2  fin.,  5  med.,  13  init. ;  viii.  100  med. 


554       TISSAPHERNES    AND    PHARNABAZUS. 

VIII.     a  Megarian,  and  Timagoras  the  son  of  Athenagoras,  a  B.C.  413. 
sends  over    Cyzicene,  both  exiles  from  their  own  country,  who  were 
invites  the    residing  at  the  court  of  Pharnabazus  the  son  of  Pharnaces, 
came  to  Lacedaemon.     They  had  been  commissioned  by 


HeUe°  on!  Pharnabazus  to  bring  up  a  fleet  to  the  Hellespont  ;  like 
TheChians  Tissaphernes  he  was  anxious,  if  possible,  to  induce  the 

having  the       .....  .  - 

support  of  cities  in  his  province  to  revolt  from  the  Athenians,  that 
areCifirstdre-  he  might  obtain  the  tribute  from  them  ;  and  he  wanted 
cei.ved  mto  the  alliance  between  the  Lacedaemonians  and  the  King; 

alliance  ; 

they  are  to  come  from  himself.  The  two  parties  —  that  is  to  say, 
the  assist-  the  envoys  of  Pharnabazus  and  those  of  Tissaphernes  —  • 
Peioponne-  were  acting  independently;  and  a  vehement  contest 
sian  fleet,  arose  at  Lacedaemon,  the  one  party  urging  the  Lace- 
daemonians to  send  a  fleet  and  army  to  Ionia  and 
Chios,  the  other  to  begin  with  the  Hellespont.  They 
were  themselves  far  more  favourable  to  the  proposals 
of  the  Chians  and  Tissaphernes  ;  for  Alcibiades  was 
in  their  interest,  and  he  was  a  great  hereditary  friend 
of  Endius,  one  of  the  Ephors  of  that  year.  Through 
this  friendship  the  Lacedaemonian  name  of  Alcibiades 
came  into  his  family;  for  Alcibiades  was  the  name  of 
Endius'  father*.  Nevertheless  the  Lacedaemonians,  be- 
fore giving  an  answer,  sent  a  commissioner,  Phrynis,  one 
of  their  Perioeci,  to  see  whether  the  Chians  had  as  many 
ships  as  they  said,  and  whether  the  power  of  the  city  was 
equal  to  her  reputation.  He  reported  that  what  they 
had  heard  was  true.  Whereupon  they  at  once  made 
alliance  with  the  Chians  and  Erythraeans  and  voted 
them  forty  ships  —  there  being  at  Chios  already,  as  the 
Chians  informed  them,  not  less  than  sixty.  Of  the  forty 
ships  they  at  first  intended  to  send  out  ten  themselves 
under  the  command  of  Melancridas  their  admiral  ;  but 
an  earthquake  occurred  ;  so  instead  of  Melancridas  they 
appointed  Chalcideus,  and  instead  of  the  ten  ships  they 
prepared  to  send  five  only,  which  they  equipped  in 

a  Literally,  '  for  Endius  was  called  Endius  the  son  of  Alcibiades  ;  ' 
implying  that  in  the  family  of  Endius  the  names  Endius  and  Alci- 
biades alternated. 


CHIOS,  LESBOS,  AND   THE  HELLESPONT.      555 

B.C.  412.  Laconia.     So  the  winter  ended,  and  with  it  the  nine-     VIII. 
teenth  year  in  the  Peloponnesian  War  of  which  Thucy- 
dides  wrote  the  history. 

At   the  beginning   of  the  next  summer  the    Chians        7. 
pressed  the  Lacedaemonians  to  send  the  fleet  at  once.  Tlle  shiPs 
For  their  proposals,  like  those  of  the  other  allies,  had  dragged 
been    made   secretly,   and    they   were   afraid    that   the  iJthmus. 
Athenians  would  detect  them.     Thereupon   the   Lace- 
daemonians sent  to  Corinth  three  Spartans,  who  were 
to  give  orders  that  the  ships  then  lying  at  the  Isthmus 
should  be  as  quickly  as  possible  dragged  over  from  the 
Corinthian  gulf  to  the  coast  on  the  other  side.     They 
were  all  to  be  despatched  to  Chios,  including  the  ships 
which  Agis  had  intended  for  Lesbos.     The  allied  fleet 
then  at  the  Isthmus  numbered  in  all  thirty-nine. 

Calligeitus  and  Timagoras,  who  represented  Pharna-       8. 


bazus,  took  no  part  in  the  expedition  to  Chios,  nor  did  As^,  who 

had  on- 

they  offer  to  contribute  towards  the  expenses  of  it  the  ginaiiy 
money  which  they  had  brought  with  them,  amounting  Lesbosf 
to  twenty-five  talents*;    they  thought  of  sailing  later  fnc^esce*s 
with  another  expedition.     Agis,  when  he  saw  that  the  expedition 

to  Chios 

Lacedaemonians  were  bent  on  going  to  Chios  first, 
offered  no  opposition  ;  so  the  allies  held  a  conference 
at  Corinth,  and  after  some  deliberation  determined  to 
sail,  first  of  all  to  Chios,  under  the  command  of  Chalci- 
deus,  who  was  equipping  the  five  ships  in  Laconia, 
then  to  proceed  to  Lesbos,  under  the  command  of  Alca- 
menes,  whom  Agis  had  previously  designed  to  appoint 
to  that  island,  and  finally  to  the  Hellespont;  for  this 
last  command  they  had  selected  Clearchus  the  son  of 
Rhamphias.  They  resolved  to  carry  over  the  Isthmus 
half  the  ships  first  ;  these  were  to  sail  at  once,  that  the 
attention  of  the  Athenians  might  be  distracted  between 
those  which  were  starting  and  those  which  were  to 
follow.  They  meant  to  sail  quite  openly,  taking  it  for 
granted  that  the  Athenians  were  powerless,  since  no 
navy  of  theirs  worth  speaking  of  had  as  yet  appeared. 

a  ^6000. 


THE    CHIAN   CONSPIRACY  DETECTED. 

VIII.     In  pursuance  of  their  plans  they  conveyed  twenty-one  B.C.  412. 

ships  over  the  Isthmus. 

9.  They  were  in  a  hurry  to  be  off,  but  the  Corinthians 

The  Conn-  were  unwilling  to  join  them  until  the  conclusion  of  the 
delayed"5  Isthmian  games,  which  were  then  going  on.  Agis  was 
isthmian  prepared  to  respect  their  scruples  and  to  take  the  re- 
games.  sponsibility  of  the  expedition  on  himself.  But  the 

Meanwhile     _f  J 

the  Athe-  Corinthians  would  not  agree  to  this  proposal,  and  there 
the  treason  was  delay.  In  the  meantime  the  Athenians  began  to 
discover  the  proceedings  of  the  Chians,  and  despatched 


a?edees  of  °ne  °^  ^^  Senera^s»  Aristocrat  es,  to  accuse  them  of 
them.  treason.  They  denied  the  charge  ;  whereupon  he  de- 
sired them  to  send  back  with  him  a  few  ships  as  a 
pledge  of  their  fidelity  to  the  alliance  ;  and  they  sent 
seven.  They  could  not  refuse  his  request,  for  the  Chian 
people  were  ignorant  of  the  whole  matter,  while  the 
oligarchs,  who  were  in  the  secret,  did  not  want  to  break 
with  the  multitude  until  they  had  secured  their  ground. 
And  the  Peloponnesian  ships  had  delayed  so  long  that 
they  had  ceased  to  expect  them. 

IO.  Meanwhile  the  Isthmian  games  were  celebrated.    The 

The  first  Athenians,  to  whom  they  had  been  formally  notified, 
nesian°n  sent  representatives  to  them  ;  and  now  their  eyes  began 
i?sqdnvenn  to  be  opened  to  the  designs  of  the  Chians.  On  their  re- 
Athenians  turn  h°me  they  took  immediate  measures  to  prevent  the 
into  Pei-  enemy's  ships  getting  away  from  Cenchreae  unperceived. 

raeum  and    «  ?  T«  t        -r\   -\ 

the  com-  When  the  games  were  over,  the  Peloponnesians,  under 
Aicamenes,  t^le  command  of  Alcamenes,  with  their  twenty-one  ships 
slain.  set  sail  for  Chios  ;  the  Athenians,  with  an  equal  number, 
first  sailed  up  to  them  and  tried  to  draw  them  into  the 
open  sea.  The  Peloponnesians  did  not  follow  them  far, 
but  soon  turned  back  to  Cenchreae  ;  the  Athenians  like- 
wise retired,  for  they  could  not  depend  on  the  fidelity 
of  the  seven  Chian  ships  which  formed  a  part  of  their 
fleet.  So  they  manned  some  more  ships,  making  the 
whole  number  thirty-seven,  and  when  the  Peloponne- 
sians resumed  their  voyage  along  the  coast  they  pur- 
sued them  into  Peiraeum,  a  lonely  harbour,  the  last 


FIRST   ATHENIAN   SUCCESS    AT   SEA.       557 

B.C.  412.  in  the  Corinthian  territory  before  you  reach  Epidauria.  VIII. 
One  ship  was  lost  by  the  Peloponnesians  at  sea,  but 
they  got  the  rest  together  and  came  to  anchor  in  the 
harbour.  Again  the  Athenians  attacked  them,  not  only 
on  the  water,  but  also  after  they  had  landed  ;  there  was 
a  fierce  struggle,  but  no  regular  engagement  ;  most  of 
the  enemy's  ships  were  damaged  by  the  Athenians  on 
the  beach,  and  their  commander,  Alcamenes,  was  slain. 
Some  Athenians  also  fell. 

When  the  conflict  was  over,  the  conquerors  left  a  suffi-       1  1  . 
cient  number  of  ships  to  watch  the  enemy,  and  with  the  ^^Jjjg* 
remainder  they  lay  to  under  a  little  island  not  far  off,  aded  by  the 
where  they  encamped,  and  sent  to  Athens,  requesting 


reinforcements.     For  on  the   day  after  the   battle   th 
Corinthians  had  come  to  assist  the  Peloponnesian  ships,  monians, 

who  seem 

and  the  other  inhabitants  of  the  country  quickly  fol-  doomed  to 
lowed  them.  Foreseeing  how  great  would  be  the  labour 
of  keeping  guard  on  so  desolate  a  spot,  the  Pelopon- 
nesians knew  not  what  to  do  ;  they  even  entertained  the 
idea  of  burning  their  ships,  but  on  second  thoughts  they 
determined  to  draw  them  high  up  on  shore,  and  with 
their  land-forces  stationed  near  to  keep  guard  over  them, 
until  some  good  opportunity  of  escape  should  occur. 
Agis  was  informed  of  their  condition,  and  sent  Thermon, 
a  Spartan,  to  them.  The  first  tidings  which  had  reached 
Sparta  were  to  the  effect  that  the  ships  had  left  the 
Isthmus  (the  Ephors  having  told  Alcamenes  to  send  a 
horseman  announcing  the  fact),  and  immediately  they 
determined  to  send  out  the  five  ships  of  their  own  which 
they  had  ready,  under  the  command  of  Chalcideus,  who 
was  to  be  accompanied  by  Alcibiades.  But  when  they 
were  on  the  point  of  departure,  a  second  messenger  re- 
ported that  the  other  squadron  had  been  chased  into 
Peiraeum  ;  and  then,  disheartened  by  finding  that  they 
had  begun  the  Ionian  war  with  a  failure,  they  deter- 
mined to  give  up  sending  the  ships  from  Laconia,  and 
even  to  recall  some  others  which  had  already  sailed. 

Alcibiades,  seeing  the  state  of  affairs,  advised  Endius      12. 


558     ALCIBIADES   AND    HIS   FRIEND    ENDIUS. 

VIII.     and  the  Ephors  to  persevere  in  the  expedition.     They  B.C.  412. 
gohingatoedo  would  arrive>  he  said;  before  the   Chians  had  heard  of01'92' 

nothing;     the  misadventure  of  the  ships.     He  would  himself,  as 
but  Alci- 
soon as  he  reached   Ionia,  represent  to  the  cities  the 

weakness  of  the  Athenians  and  the  alacrity  of  the  Lace- 
daemonians,  and  they  would  revolt  at  once ;   for  they 
shall  at       would  believe  him  sooner  than  any  one.     To  Endius  he 

once  put 

to  sea.  argued  in  private  a  that  he  would  gain  honour  if  he  were 
the  instrument  of  effecting  a  revolt  in  Ionia,  and  of 
gaining  the  alliance  of  the  Kinga;  he  should  not  allow 
such  a  prize  to  fall  into  the  hands  of  Agis.  Now  Agis 
was  a  personal  enemy  of  Alcibiades.  Endius  and  the 
other  Ephors  were  persuaded  by  him.  So  he  put  to  sea 
with  the  five  ships,  accompanied  by  Chalcideus  the  Lace- 
monian,  and  hastened  on  his  way. 

13.  About  this  time  sixteen   Peloponnesian  ships  which 
Return  of    had  remained  with  Gylippus  to  the  end  of  the  Sicilian 

some  ships 

from  Sicily,  war  were  returning  home.  They  were  caught  in  the 
neighbourhood  of  Leucadia  and  roughly  handled  by 
twenty-seven  Athenian  vessels,  under  the  command  of 
Hippocles  the  son  of  Menippus,  which  were  on  the 
watch  for  ships  coming  from  Sicily;  but  all  except  one 
of  them  escaped  the  Athenians  and  sailed  into  Corinth. 

14.  Chalcideus   and   Alcibiades    on   their  voyage   seized 
(i)  Chios,    every  one  whom  they  met  in  order  that  their  coming 
Erythrae,     might  not  be  reported.     They  touched  first  at  the  pro- 
menae^are  rnontory  of   Corycus   on   the    mainland,  and  there  re- 
revoifb  tO   leasmg   their  prisoners,   they  held   a   preliminary  con- 
Chaicideus  ference  with  certain  of  the  Chians,  who  were  in  the  plot, 

and  Alci-  .  .     . 

biades.  and  who  advised  them  to  give  no  notice  of  their  inten- 
tion, but  to  sail  at  once  to  the  city.  So  they  appeared 
suddenly  at  Chios,  to  the  great  wonder  and  alarm  of  the 
people.  The  oligarchs  had  contrived  that  the  council 
should  be  sitting  at  the  time.  Chalcideus  and  Alci- 
biades made  speeches  and  announced  that  many  more 
ships  were  on  their  way,  but  said  nothing  about  the 

a  Or,  'that  he  would  win  honour  by  effecting  a  revolt  in  Ionia 
and  gaining  the  alliance  of  the  King  :  Alcibiades  would  help  him.' 


CHIOS,  ERYTHRAE,   CLAZOMENAE  REVOLT.    559 

B.C.  41?.  blockade  of  Peiraeum.  So  Chios  first,  and  afterwards  VIII. 
Erythrae,  revolted  from  Athens.  They  then  sailed  with 
three  vessels  to  Clazomenae,  which  they  induced  to 
revolt.  The  Clazomenians  at  once  crossed  over  to  the 
mainland  and  fortified  Polichne,  intending  in  case  of 
need  to  retreat  thither  from  the  little  island  on  which 
Clazomenae  stands.  All  the  revolted  cities  were  occu- 
pied in  raising  fortifications  and  preparing  for  war. 

The  news  of  the  revolt  of  Chios  soon  reached  Athens;       15. 
and  the  Athenians  realised  at  once  the  magnitude  of  the  The  Athe- 

T-I  •       nians,  alive 

danger  which  now  surrounded  them.     The  greatest  city  to  their 
of  all  had  gone  over  to  the  enemy,  and  the  rest  of  their  ^as«  a°n' 
allies  were  certain  to  rise.     In  the  extremity  of  their  afiowfngthe 
alarm  they  abrogated  the  penalties  denounced  against  reserve  of 

money  and 

any  one  who  should  propose  or  put  to  the  vote  the  em-  ships  to 
ployment  of  the  thousand  talents  which  throughout  the  used. 
war  they  had  hitherto  jealously  reserved a.     They  now^yre- 
passed  a  decree  permitting  their  use,  and  resolved  to  jJJ"^ 
man  a  large  number  of  ships;  also  to  send  at  once  to  to  Asia. 
Chios   eight   ships  which  had  been  keeping   guard   at 
Peiraeum,  and  had  gone  away  under  the  command  of 
Strombichides  the  son  of  Diotimus  in  pursuit  of  Chalci- 
deus,  but   not    overtaking   him   had    returned.     Twelve 
other  ships,  under  the  command  of  Thrasycles,  were  to 
follow  immediately;   these  too  were  to  be  taken  from 
the  blockading   force.     They  also  withdrew  the  seven 
Chian  ships  which  were  assisting  them  in  the  blockade 
of  Peiraeum ;   and  setting  free  the  slaves  in  them,  put 
the  freemen  in  chains.     Other  ships  were  then  quickly 
manned  by  them  and  sent  to  take  the  place  of  all  those 
which  had  been  subtracted  from  the  blockading  squadron, 
and  they  proposed  to  equip  thirty  more.    They  were  full 
of  energy,  and  spared  no  effort  for  the  recovery  of  Chios. 

Meanwhile  Strombichides  with  his  eight  ships  arrived       1 6. 

at   Samos,   and  thence,  taking  with  him  an  additional  strombi- 

Samian  vessel,  sailed  to  Teos  and  warned  the  inhabitants  Teos. 

against  revolt.     But  Chalcideus  with  twenty-three  ships 

a  Cp.  ii.  24. 


560          MILETUS  JOINS   IN    THE    REVOLT. 

VIII.     was  on  his  way  from  Chios  to  Teos,  intending  to  attack  £.c.  412. 
escapes        jt .    fre  was  assisted   by  the  land-forces  of  Clazomenae  °L  92' 

Chalcideus  * 

andAici-  and  Erythrae,  which  followed  his  movements  on  the 
shore.  Strombichides  saw  him  in  time,  and  put  out  to 
sea  before  he  arrived.  When  fairly  away  from  land  he 

revolts08  observed  the  superior  numbers  of  the  fleet  coming  from 
Chios,  and  fled  towards  Samos,  pursued  by  the  enemy. 
The  land-forces  were  not  at  first  received  by  the  Teans, 
but  after  the  flight  of  the  Athenians  they  admitted 
them.  The  troops  waited  a  little  for  the  return  of 
Chalcideus  from  the  pursuit,  but  as  he  did  not  come 
they  proceeded  without  him  to  demolish  the  fort  which 
the  Athenians  had  built  for  the  protection  of  Teos  on 
the  land  side.  A  few  barbarians  under  the  command 
of  Stages,  a  lieutenant  of  Tissaphernes,  came  and  joined 
in  the  work  of  demolition. 
17.  Chalcideus  and  Alcibiades,  when  they  had  chased 

Chalcideus  Strombichides  to  Samos,  gave  heavy  arms  to  the  crews 

and  Alci-  * 

biades  raise  of  the  ships  which  they  had  brought  from  Peloponnesus, 
(5)  Miletus,  and  left  them  in  Chios.  Then,  having  manned  their  own 
vessels  and  twenty  others  with  Chians,  they  sailed  to 
Miletus,  intending  to  raise  a  revolt.  For  Alcibiades, 
chides  and  who  was  on  friendly  terms  with  the  principal  Milesians, 

Thrasycles,  .  i  i     r 

who  anchor  wanted  to  gam  over  the  place  bet  ore  any  more  ships 
t  Lade.  from  Peloponnesus  arrived,  and,  using  the  Chian  troops 
and  those  of  Chalcideus  only,  to  spread  revolt  far  and 
wide  among  the  cities  of  Ionia.  Thus  he  would  gain 
the  chief  credit  of  the  expedition  for  the  Chians,  for 
himself,  for  Chalcideus ;  and,  in  fulfilment  of  his  pro- 
mise*, for  Endius,  who  had  sent  him  out.  They  were 
not  observed  during  the  greater  part  of  their  voyage, 
and,  although  narrowly  escaping  from  Strombichides, 
and  from  Thrasycles  who  had  just  arrived  with  twelve 
ships  from  Athens  and  had  joined  Strombichides  in  the 
pursuit,  they  succeeded  in  raising  a  revolt  in  Miletus. 
The  Athenians  followed  close  behind  them  with  nine- 
teen ships,  but  the  Milesians  would  not  receive  them, 
a  Cp.  viii.  12. 


FIRST    TREATY    WITH   PERSIA.  561 

B.C.  412.  and  they  came  to  anchor  at  Lade,  the  island  opposite    VIII. 
the  town.     Immediately  after  the  revolt  of  Miletus  the 
Lacedaemonians  made  their  first  alliance  with  the  King 
of  Persia,  which  was  negotiated   by  Tissaphernes  and 
Chalcideus.     It  ran  as  follows  :  — 

'  The  Lacedaemonians  and  their  allies  make  an  alliance       1  8. 
with  the  King  and  Tissaphernes  on  the  following  terms:  —  Treaty  of 

'I.  All  the  territory  and  all  the  cities  which  are  in  ail  that 
possession  of  the  King,  or  were  in  possession  of  his  fore-  sutjecTto 
fathers,  shall  be  the  King's  a,  and  whatever  revenue  or  0feP£|jf  s 

other  advantages   the    Athenians    derived    from    these  sha11  be 

.  .  T^  .  11-   theirs  stlU- 

cities,    the   King,   and   the  Lacedaemonians   and   their 

allies,  shall    combine   to   prevent   them  from  receiving 
such  revenue  or  advantage. 

*  II.  The  King,  and  the  Lacedaemonians  and  their  al- 
lies, shall  carry  on  the  war  against  the  Athenians  in  com- 
mon, and  they  shall  not  make  peace  with  the  Athenians 
unless  both  parties  —  the  King  on  the  one  hand  and  the 
Lacedaemonians  and  their  allies  on  the  other  —  agree. 

'III.  Whosoever  revolts  from  the  King  shall  be  the 
enemy  of  the  Lacedaemonians  and  their  allies,  and 
whosoever  revolts  from  the  Lacedaemonians  and  their 
allies  shall  be  the  enemy  of  the  King  in  like  manner/ 

Such  were  the  terms  of  the  alliance. 

Shortly  afterwards    the    Chians   manned    ten    more       19. 
ships  and  sailed  to  Anaea,  wanting  to  hear  whether  the  Zeal  of  the 
attempt  on  Miletus  had  succeeded,  and  to  draw  fresh  The  Athe- 


cities  into  the  revolt.     A  message  however  was  brought 

from  Chalcideus,  bidding  them  return,  and  warning  them 

that  Amorges  was  coming  thither  by  land  at  the  head  (6)  Lebedus 

of  an  army.     So  they  sailed  to  the  Temple  of  Zeusb,  Erae.7 

where   they   caught   sight   of    sixteen   Athenian    ships 

which    Diomedon,    following   Thrasycles,    was   bringing 

from  Athens.   They  instantly  fled  ;  one  ship  to  Ephesus, 

the  remainder  towards  Teos.     Four  of  them  the  Athe- 

nians took  empty,  the  crews  having  got  safe  to  land  ; 

a  Cp.  viii.  43  med. 

b  A  place  so  called  between  Lebedus  and  Colophon. 

O  o 


563  REVOLUTION   IN   SAM  OS. 

VIII.     the  rest  escaped  to  Teos.     The  Athenians  then  sailed  B.C.  412. 
away  to  Samos.    The  Chians  with  their  remaining  ships 
put  to  sea,  and,  assisted  by  the  land-forces  of  their  allies  a, 
caused   first   Lebedus,  and   afterwards   Erae,  to    revolt. 
Both  the  army  and  the  fleet  then  returned  home. 
2O.          About  the  same  time  the  twenty  Peloponnesian  ships 
Escape  of    which  had  been  chased  into  Piraeum,  and  were  now  block- 
blockaded    aded  by  a  like  number  of  Athenian  ships,  made  a  sally, 
Theypre™'  defeated  the  Athenians,  and  took  four  ships  ;  they  then 


£ot  awav  to  Cenchreae,  and  once  more  prepared  to  sail  to 
Chios  and  Ionia.    At  Cenchreae  they  were  met  by  Asty- 
ochus,  the  admiral  from  Lacedaemon,  to  whom  the  whole 
of  the  Peloponnesian  navy  was  about  to  be  entrusted. 
Teos  once        By   this    time   the   land-forces    of    Clazomenae   and 
cei'veVthe     Erythrae  had  retired  from  Teos,  and  Tissaphernes,  who 
Athenians,   j^  jecj  a  seconcj  armv  thither  in  person  and  overthrown 
what  was   left   of  the  Athenian  fort,  had   retired  also. 
Not  long  after  his  departure,  Diomedon  arrived  with 
ten  ships,  and  made  an  agreement  with  the  Teans,  who 
promised  to  receive  the  Athenians  as  well  as  the  Pelo- 
ponnesians.     He  then  sailed  to  Erae,  which  he  attacked 
without  success,  and  departed. 

21.          About  the  same  time  a  great  revolution  occurred  in 
The  people  Samos.     The  people,  aided  by  the  crews  of  three  Athe- 

of  Samos 

rise  against  man  vessels  which  happened  to  be  on  the  spot,  rose 
anYset  up   against  the  nobles,  slew  in  all  about  two  hundred  of  them, 


anc*  banished  four  hundred  more  ;  they  then  distributed 
The  Athe-    their  land  and  houses  among  themselves.    The  Athenian 

nians  grant  °  . 

them  inde-  people,  now  assured  of  their  fidelity,  granted  them  inde- 
pendence ;  and  henceforward  the  city  was  in  the  hands 
of  the  democracy.  They  denied  to  the  former  landed 
proprietors  all  the  privileges  of  citizenship,  not  even 
allowing  them  to  contract  marriage  with  any  family  be- 
longing to  the  people,  nor  any  of  the  people  with  them. 
22.  The  zeal  of  the  Chians  did  not  abate.  They  had 

The  Chians  already  begun  to  go  out  with  armies  and  raise  revolts 

send  a  fleet  ,         i         /•     i        T»    i  •   i      j 

to  Lesbos,    independently  of  the  Peloponnesians  b,  and  they  wished 
a  Cp.  viii.  1  6  ink.  >'  Cp.  viii.  19. 


REVOLT  AND  RECOVERY  OF  MITYLENE.    563 

B.C.  412.  to  draw  as  many  cities  as  they  could   into   their  own     VIII. 
danger.     During  the   same   summer   they   sent   out   aAland 
Chian  fleet  numbering  thirteen  ships.     The  expedition  operates 
was  directed  first  against  Lesbos,  the  Lacedaemonians  They  in"1 
having  originally  instructed  their  officers  to  proceed  from  j^y^ 
Chios  to  Lesbos,   and  thence  to  the   Hellespont  a.     It  and  (9) 

Methymna 

was  placed  under  the  command  of  Deimadas,  one  of  the  to  revolt. 
Chian  Perioeci.  Meanwhile  the  infantry  of  the  Pelopon- 
nesians  and  of  the  neighbouring  allies,  under  Evalas,  a 
Spartan,  moved  along  the  shore  towards  Clazomenae  and 
Cyme.  The  fleet  sailed  to  Lesbos,  and  first  induced 
Methymna  to  rebel  ;  there  leaving  four  of  their  ships, 
with  the  remainder  they  raised  a  revolt  in  Mitylene. 

Meanwhile   Astyochus   the   Lacedaemonian   admiral,       23. 

with  four  ships,  set  forth,  as  he  intended,  from   Cen-  The  Athe- 

nians first, 

chreae,  and  arrived  at   Chios.     On  the  third  day  after  and  after- 
his  arrival  a  division  of  the  Athenian  fleet,  numbering  Astyochus, 
twenty-  five  ships,  sailed  to  Lesbos  under  the  command 


of  Leon  and  Diomedon  ;  Leon  had  arrived  from  Athens  rived  from 

Cenchreae, 

l^ter  than  Diomedon  with  a  reinforcement  of  ten  ships,  sail  to   - 
On  the  same  day,  towards  evening,  Astyochus  put  to  Mitylene  is 


sea,  and  taking  with   him    one    Chian   ship,   sailed   to 
Lesbos,  that  he  might  render  any  assistance  which  he 
could  to  the  Chian  fleet.     He  came  to  Pyrrha,  and  on  Chian  ships 
the    following   day   to    Eresus,   where    he    heard    that  ^uempt  to 
Mitylene  had  been  taken  by  the  Athenians  at  the  first  Methymna, 
blow.      The  Athenian  ships  had  sailed  right  into  the  J^^/^e' 
harbour  when  they  were  least  expected,  and  captured  plans  of 
the  Chian  vessels  ;  the  men  on  board  had  then  landed,  in  Lmbos, 
and  defeating  in  a  battle  a  Mitylenean  force  which  came  Tj 
out   to  meet   them,  had  taken   possession  of  the  city. 
Astyochus  heard  the  news  from  the  Eresians,  and  from  Lesbos, 
the  Chian   ships  which  had  been  left  with  Eubulus  at  wards  cia- 
Methymna.     They  had  fled  when  Mitylene  was  taken, 
and  had  now  fallen  in  with  him  ;  but  only  three  out  of 
the  four,  for  one  of  them  had  been  captured  by  the  Athe- 
nians,    Upon  this,  instead  of  going  on  to  Mitylene,  he 
a  Cp.  viii.  8  med. 
002 


zomenae. 


564     DECLINE    OF  LACEDAEMONIAN   AFFAIRS. 

VIII.  raised  a  revolt  in  Eresus,  and  armed  the  inhabitants  :  he  B.C.  412. 
then  disembarked  the  heavy-armed  from  his  ships  and 
sent  them  by  land  to  Antissa  and  Methymna  under  the 
command  of  Eteonicus  ;  and  with  his  own  and  the  three 
Chian  ships  coasted  thither  himself,  hoping  that  the 
Methymnaeans  would  take  courage  at  the  sight  of  them 
and  persevere  in  their  revolt.  But  everything  went 
against  him  in  Lesbos  ;  so  he  re-embarked  his  troops 
and  sailed  back  to  Chios.  The  land-forces  from  the 
ships  which  were  intended  to  go  to  the  Hellespont  also 
returned  to  their  several  homes.  Not  long  afterwards 
six  ships  came  to  Chios  from  the  allied  forces  of  the 
Peloponnesians  now  collected  at  Cenchreae.  The  Athe- 
nians, when  they  had  re-established  their  influence  in 
Lesbos,  sailed  away,  and  having  taken  Polichne  on  the 
mainland,  which  the  Clazomenians  were  fortifying*, 
brought  them  all  back  to  their  city  on  the  island,  except 
the  authors  of  the  revolt,  who  had  escaped  to  Daphnus. 
So  Clazomenae  returned  to  the  Athenian  alliance. 
24.  During  the  same  summer  the  Athenians,  who  were 
TheAthe-  stationed  with  twenty  of  their  ships  at  the  island  of 
Lade  make  Lade  b  and  were  watching  the  enemy  in  Miletus,  made 


a  descent  upon  Panormus  in  the  Milesian  territory. 
Chalcideus  Chalcideus  the  Lacedaemonian  general  with  a  few  foi- 
ls slain.  lowers  came  out  to  meet  them,  but  was  killed,  Three 

The  Athe- 

nians at  days  later  they  again  sailed  across  and  set  up  a  trophy, 
carry  on  which  the  Milesians  pulled  down,  because  the  Athenians 
against  were  not  really  masters  of  the  ground  at  the  time  when 
theChians,  they  erected  it.  Leon  and  Diomedon,  who  were  at 
defeated  Lesbos  with  the  rest  of  the  Athenian  fleet,  stationed 
battieTand  their  ships  at  the  islands  called  Oenussae  which  lie  in 
front  of  Cm'os>  at  Sidussa  and  Pteleum,  which  were  forts 
inss-  held  by  them  in  the  Erythraean  territory,  and  at  Lesbos 

had  been     itself,  and  carried  on  the  war  by  sea  against  the  Chians. 
and"  their     The  marines  whom  they  had   on  board  were  hoplites 


taken  from  the  ro11  and  compelled  to  serve.    They  made 
and  mo-      descents    upon    Cardamyle    and    Bolissus,   and    having 
a  Gp.  viii.  14  fin.  b  Cp.  viii.  17  fin. 


THE    DOWNFALL    OF   CHIOS.  565 

B.C.  412.  defeated  with  heavy  loss  the  Chians  who  came  out  to     VIII. 
meet  them,  they  devastated  all  that  region.     In  another  ^or  was 

5  J  there  any 

battle  at  Phanae  they  defeated   them  again,  and  in  a  imprudence 
third  at  Leuconium.    Henceforward  the  Chians  remained  revolt. 
within  their  walls.    The  Athenians  ravaged  their  country,  ^their"* 
which   was   well   stocked,   and    from   the   Persian  War losse? a 

reaction 

until  that  time  had  never  been  touched  by  an  invader,  now  sets  in, 
No  people  as  far  as  I  know,  except  the  Chians  and  to  be  sup- 
Lacedaemonians  (but  the  Chians  not  equally  with  the  pressed> 
Lacedaemonians),  have  preserved  moderation  in  pros- 
perity, and  in  proportion  as  their  city  has  gained  in 
power  have  gained  also  in  the  stability  of  their  govern- 
ment. In  this  revolt  they  may  seem  to  have  shown 
a  want  of  prudence,  yet  they  did  not  venture  upon  it 
until  many  brave  allies  were  ready  to  share  the  peril 
with  them,  and  until  the  Athenians  themselves  seemed 
to  confess  that  after  their  calamity  in  Sicily  the  state  of 
their  affairs  was  hopelessly  bad.  And,  if  they  were 
deceived  through  the  uncertainty  of  human  things,  this 
error  of  judgment  was  common  to  many  who,  like  them, 
believed  that  the  Athenian  power  would  speedily  be 
overthrown.  But  now  that  they  were  driven  off  the 
sea  and  saw  their  lands  ravaged,  some  of  their  citizens 
undertook  to  bring  back  the  city  to  the  Athenians.  The 
magistrates  perceived  their  design,  but  instead  of  acting 
themselves,  they  sent  to  Erythrae  for  Astyochus  the 
admiral.  He  came  with  four  ships  which  he  had  on  the 
spot,  and  they  considered  together  by  what  means  the 
conspiracy  might  be  suppressed  with  the  least  violence, 
whether  by  taking  hostages  or  in  some  other  way. 

The   Lacedaemonians   were   thus   engaged   in    Chios       25. 
when  towards  the  end  of  the  summer  there  came  from  Athenian 
Athens  a  thousand  Athenian  hoplites  and  fifteen  hun-  ments 
dred  Argives,  of  whom  five  hundred  were  originally  light-  Ablttie 
armed,  but  the  Athenians  gave  them  heavy  arms ;  also  b*forePthee 
a  thousand  of  the  allies.     They  were  conveyed  in  forty-  walls  of 

Miletus,  in 

eight  ships,  of  which  some  were  transports,  under  the  which  the 
command   of   Phrynichus,    Onomacles,  and    Scironides. 


566  THE    ATHENIANS   AT   MILETUS. 

VIII.     Sailing  first  to  Samos  they  crossed  over  to  Miletus,  and  B.C.  4r2. 
there  took  UP  a  P°sition-     The  Milesians  with  a  force  O1'92' 


the  Argives  of  eight  hundred  heavy-armed  of  their  own,  the  Pelopon- 

are  defeated 

by  the         nesians  who  came  with  Chalcideus,  and  certain  foreign 

Milesians.  .  c   .-p..  ,  «  ^1  • 

Aidbiades  mercenaries  of  Tissaphernes,  who  was  there  in  person 
in  ^he  Be-  w^  his  cavalry,  went  out  and  engaged  the  Athenians 
sianarmy.  and  their  allies.  The  Arrives  on  their  own  wing  dashed 

Attempt  to 

invest  forward,  and  made  a  disorderly  attack  upon  the  troops 
opposed  to  them,  whom  they  despised  ;  they  thought 
that,  being  lonians,  they  would  be  sure  to  run  awaya. 
But  they  were  defeated  by  the  Milesians,  and  nearly 
three  hundred  of  them  perished.  The  Athenians  first 
overcame  the  Peloponnesians,  and  then  forced  back  the 
barbarians  and  the  inferior  troops.  But  they  never  en- 
gaged the  Milesians,  who,  after  routing  the  Argives,  when 
they  saw  their  other  wing  defeated,  returned  to  the  city. 
The  Athenians,  having  won  the  day,  took  up  a  position 
close  under  the  walls  of  Miletus.  In  this  engagement 
the  lonians  on  both  sides  had  the  advantage  of  the 
Dorians  ;  for  the  Athenians  vanquished  the  Pelopon- 
nesians who  were  opposed  to  them,  and  the  Milesians 
vanquished  the  Argives  b.  The  Athenians  now  raised  a 
trophy,  and  prepared  to  build  a  wall  across  the  isthmus 
which  separates  the  city  from  the  mainland,  thinking 
that,  if  they  could  reduce  Miletus,  the  other  cities  would 
quickly  return  to  their  allegiance. 

26.  But  meanwhile,  late  in  the  afternoon,  news  was  brought 
Approach  to  them  that  a  fleet  of  fifty-five  ships  from  Peloponnesus 
threePeio-  and  Sicily  was  close  at  hand.  Hermocrates  the  Syra- 


-  cusan  had  urged  the  Sicilians  to  assist  in  completing  the 
overthrow  of  Athens.    Twenty  ships  came  from  Syracuse, 
under  Her-  two  from  Selinus,  and  with  them  the  Peloponnesian  ships 

mocrates.          -  .   ,      ,       ,    n  .  .  _,,  t 

Aicibiades  which  had  been  in  preparation0.  The  two  squadrons 
o  go  were  entrusted  to  Theramenes,  who  was  to  conduct  them 
to  Astyochus  the  admiral.  They  sailed  first  to  Eleusd, 
of  Miletus.  a  Gp.  i.  124  init.  ;  v.  9  init.  ;  vi.  77  med.  ;  vii.  5  fin. 

b  Gp.  iv.  12  fin.  c  Cp.  viii.  6  fin. 

d  Or,  according  to  the  reading  of  the  Vatican  MS.  adopted   by 
Bekker,  'Leros:'  cp.  infra,  27  init. 


PHRYNICHUS  INSISTS    ON   RETREATING.     567 

B.C.  412.  an  island  lying  off  Miletus.  Thence,  finding  that  the  VIII. 
Athenians  were  at  Miletus,  they  sailed  away  to  the 
lasian  Gulf,  wanting  to  ascertain  the  fate  of  the  -town. 
Alcibiades  came  on  horseback  to  Teichiussa  in  the 
Milesian  territory,  the  point  of  the  gulf  at  which  the 
fleet  had  passed  the  night,  and  from  him  they  received 
news  of  the  battle.  For  he  had  been  present,  and  had 
fought  on  the  side  of  the  Milesians  and  Tissaphernes. 
And  he  recommended  them,  if  they  did  not  mean  to 
ruin  their  cause  in  Ionia  and  everywhere  else,  to  assist 
Miletus  at  once,  and  break  up  the  blockade. 

They  determined  to  go  at  daybreak  and  relieve  the       27. 
place.     But  Phrynichus  the  Athenian  general  had  cer-  They  agree; 

r  and  the 

tain  information  from  Leros  of  their  approach,  and,  al-  Athenians 
though  his  colleagues  wanted  to  remain  and  risk  a  battle,  ofthdf 
he  refused  and  declared  that  he  would  neither  himself  approach 

on  the 

fight,  nor  allow  them  or  any  one   else  to   fight  if  he  evening  of 
could  help  it.     For  when  they  might  discover  the  exact  victory, 
number  of  the  enemy's  ships  and  the  proportion  which  advice  of 
their  own  bore   to  them,  and,  before   engaging,  make 


adequate  preparations  at  their  leisure,  he  would  not  be  rules  his 
so  foolish  as  to  risk  all  through  fear  of  disgrace.  There  withdraw  ' 
was  no  dishonour  in  Athenians  retreating  before  an  to 
enemy's  fleet  when  circumstances  required.  But  there 
would  be  the  deepest  dishonour  under  any  circumstances 
or  in  a  defeat  ;  and  the  city  would  then  not  only  incur 
disgrace,  but  would  be  in  the  utmost  danger.  Even  if 
their  preparations  were  complete  and  satisfactory,  Athens 
after  her  recent  disasters  ought  not  to  take  the  offensive, 
or  in  any  case  not  without  absolute  necessity;  and  now* 
when  they  were  not  compelled,  why  should  they  go  out 
of  their  way  to  court  danger?  He  urged  them  to  put 
on  board  their  wounded,  and  their  infantry,  and  all  the 
stores  which  they  had  brought  with  them,  but  to  leave 
behind  the  plunder  obtained  from  the  enemy's  country, 
that  their  ships  might  be  lighter  ;  they  should  sail  back 
to  Samos,  and  there  uniting  all  their  forces,  they  might 
go  on  making  attacks  upon  Miletus  when  opportunity 


568     THE   PELOPONNES1ANS   AT   MILETUS. 


VIII. 

Character 
of  Phry- 
nichus. 


28. 

The  Pelo- 
ponnesians 
at  the  sug- 
gestion of 
Tissa- 
phernes 
attack  and 
take  lasus. 
Amorges  is 
made  pri- 
soner. 
Pedaritus 
sets  out  for 
Chios,  of 
which  he 
had  been 
appointed 
governor. 


offered.     His  advice   was  followed.     And   not  on  this  B.C.  412. 
occasion  only,  but  quite  as  much  afterwards,  whenever0 
Phrynichus  had  to  act,  he  showed  himself  to  be  a  man 
of  great   sagacity a. — So   the  Athenians  departed   that 
very   evening   from   Miletus   without   completing   their 
victory,  and  the  Argives,  hurrying  away  from  Samos 
after  their  disaster,  went  home  in  a  rage. 

At  dawn  the  Peloponnesians  sailed  from  Teichiussa, 
and  on  their  arrival  at  Miletus  found  that  the  Athenians 
had  left :  after  remaining  one  day,  on  the  morrow  they 
took  the  Chian  ships  which  under  the  command  of 
Chalcideus  had  previously  been  chased  into  Miletus b, 
and  resolved  to  go  back  to  Teichiussa  and  fetch  the  naval 
stores  of  which  they  had  lightened  the  ships.  There  they 
found  Tissaphernes,  who  had  come  with  his  infantry;  he 
persuaded  them  to  sail  against  lasus,  in  which  his  enemy 
Amorges  lay.  So  they  attacked  lasus,  which  they  took 
by  a  sudden  assault ;  for  it  never  occurred  to  the  inhabi- 
tants that  their  ships  were  not  Athenian.  The  Syracu- 
sans  distinguished  themselves  greatly  in  the  action.  The 
Peloponnesians  took  captive  Amorges  the  natural  son 
of  Pissuthnes,  who  had  rebelled,  and  gave  him  to  Tissa- 
phernes, that,  if  he  liked,  he  might  convey  him  to  the 
King  in  obedience  to  the  royal  command0.  They  then 
plundered  lasus,  and  the  army  obtained  a  great  deal  of 
treasure ;  for  the  city  had  been  rich  from  early  times. 
They  did  no  harm  to  the  mercenaries  of  Amorges,  but 
received  them  into  their  own  ranks;  for  most  of  them 
came  from  Peloponnesus.  The  town,  and  all  their 
prisoners,  whether  bond  or  free,  were  delivered  by  them 
into  the  hands  of  Tissaphernes,  who  engaged  to  give 
them  a  Daric  stater d  for  each  man  ;  they  then  returned 
to  Miletus.  Thence  they  despatched  by  land  as  far  as 
Erythrae  Pedaritus  the  son  of  Leon,  whom  the  Lacedae- 
monians had  sent  out  to  be  governor  of  Chios ;  he  was 
escorted  by  the  mercenaries  who  had  been  in  the  service 


a  Cp.  viii.  68  med. 
c  Cp.  viii.  5  fin. 


b  Gp.  viii.  17  fin. 

d  Twenty  Attic  drachmae,  about  i6s. 


TISSAPHERNES   REDUCES    THE    PAY.        569 

B.c.  412.  of  Amorges.     Philip,  who  was  on  the  spot,  was  to  remain     VIII. 
and  take  charge  of  Miletus.     So  the  summer  ended. 

During   the   following  winter,   Tissaphernes,  after  he       29. 
had  put  a  garrison  in  lasus,  came  to  Miletus.     There  he  R.ed«ction 
distributed  one  month's  pay  among  all  the  ships,  at  the  Tissa- 

-  phernes 

rate  of  an  Attic  drachma  a  a  day  per  man,  as  his  envoy  agrees  to 


had  promised  at  Lacedaemon  ;  in  future  he  proposed  to 
give  half  a  drachma  only  until  he  had  asked  the  King's 
leave,  promising  that  if  he  obtained  it  he  would  pay  the  rather  more 

r/TT         than  three 

entire  drachma.    On  the  remonstrance,  however,  of  Her-  obois  a-day 
mocrates  the  Syracusan  general  (Theramenes  not  being  ^^h 
himself  admiral,  but  only  taking  charge   of  the  ships 
which   he    was    to   hand   over   to  Astyochus,   took   no 
interest  in  the  matter  of  the  pay),  he  promised  to  each 
man  a  payment  of  somewhat   more  than  three  obols, 
reckoning  the  total  sum  paid  to  every  five  ships.    For  he 
offered  to  every  five  ships,  up  to  the  number  of  fifty-  five  b, 
three  talents  a  month,  and  to  any  ships  in  excess  of  this 
number  he  agreed  to  give  at  a  like  rate. 

During  the  same  winter  there  arrived  at  Samos  from       30.* 
Athens  thirty-five  ships,  under  the  command  of  Char-  £?j^f 
minus,  Strombichides,  and  Euctemon.     Whereupon  the  ments. 
generals  assembled  their  whole  fleet,  including  the  ships  samo^  and 
engaged  at  Chios  c,  their  purpose  being  to  make  a  distri- 


bution  of  their  forces  by  lot.    The  principal  division  was  Athenian 
to  continue  watching  Miletus,  while  a  second  force  of  Thirty-three 
ships  and  soldiers  was  to  be  sent  to  Chios.    Accordingly  to'chioT; 
Strombichides,  Onomacles,  and   Euctemon,  with  thirty  remam  a°Ur 
ships,  besides  transports  in  which  they  conveyed  a  por-  Samos- 
tion  of  the  thousand  heavy-armed  who  joined  the  army 
at  Miletusd,  sailed  away  to  Chios,  the  duty  which  the  lot 
assigned   to   them.     The  other   generals   remaining   at 
Samos  with  seventy-four  ships,  and  having  the  mastery 
of  the  sea,  prepared  to  make  a  descent  upon  Miletus. 

Astyochus  was  at  Chios  selecting  hostages  as  a  pre-       31- 
caution  against  the  betrayal  of  the  island  to  Athens  e, 

a  g^d.  b  Retaining,  with  the  MSS.,  KO.I  nevTrjKovra  after  i/aOs. 

c  Cp.  viii.  24  init.  d  Cp.  viii.  25  init.  e  Gp.  viii.  24  fin. 


570 


ILL-FORTUNE    OF  ASTYOCHUS. 


VIII. 

attack  on 

Pteleum 

and  Cla- 

zomenae. 

The 

weather 

is  much 

against 

him. 


32. 

The  Les- 
bians are 
again 
desirous 
to  revolt. 
Astyochus 
is  willing 
to  assist, 
but  Pedari- 
tus,  the  new 
governor 
of  Chios, 
and  the 
Chians, 
refuse  to 
join. 


but  when  he  heard  of  the  reinforcements  which  Thera-  B.C.  412. 
menes  had  brought,  and  of  the  improved  prospects  of 
the  allies,  he  desisted,  and  taking  with  him  his  own 
Peloponnesian  ships,  ten  in  number  a,  and  ten  Chian,  he 
put  to  sea.  Failing  in  an  attack  upon  Pteleum  he  sailed 
on  to  Clazomenae,  and  demanded  that  the  Athenian 
party  should  settle  at  Daphnusb  on  the  mainland,  and 
come  over  to  the  Peloponnesians  :  Tamos,  one  of  the 
Persian  lieutenants  of  Ionia,  joined  in  the  demand.  But 
the  Clazomenians  would  not  listen  to  him  ;  whereupon 
he  assaulted  the  city  (which  was  unwalled),  but  being 
unable  to  take  it,  sailed  away  with  a  strong  wind.  He 
was  himself  carried  to  Phocaea  and  Cyme,  and  the  re- 
mainder of  the  fleet  put  into  the  islands,  Marathussa, 
Pele,  and  Drymussa,  which  lie  off  Clazomenae.  There, 
being  detained  eight  days  by  the  weather,  they  spoiled 
and  destroyed  part  of  the  property  of  the  Clazomenians 
which  had  been  deposited  in  the  islands,  and,  taking 
part  on  board,  they  sailed  away  to  Phocaea  and  Cyme, 
where  they  rejoined  Astyochus. 

While  Astyochus  was  there,  envoys  came  to  him  from 
Lesbos ;  the  Lesbians  were  once  more  eager  to  revolt, 
and  he  was  willing  to  assist  them  ;  but  the  Corinthians 
and  the  other  allies  were  disheartened  by  the  previous 
failure.  So  he  put  to  sea  and  sailed  back  to  Chios.  His 
ships  were  scattered  by  a  storm,  and  reached  Chios  from 
various  places.  Soon  afterwards  Pedaritus  and  his  army0 
having  come  by  land  from  Miletus  to  Erythrae,  where  he 
crossed  the  channel,  arrived  in  Chios.  On  his  arrival  he 
found  at  his  disposal  the  sailors  whom  Chalcideus  had 
taken  from  his  five  ships  d  and  left  in  Chios  fully  armed, 
to  the  number  of  five  hundred.  Some  of  the  Lesbians 
renewing  their  proposal  to  revolt,  Astyochus  suggested 
to  Pedaritus  and  the  Chians  that  they  should  go  with 
the  fleet  to  Lesbos  and  raise  the  country;  they  would 
thus  increase  the  number  of  their  allies,  and,  even  if  the 


a  Cp.  viii.  23  init.  and  fin. 
c  Cp.  viii.  28  fin. 


b  Cp.  viii.  23  fin. 
d  Cp.  viii.  17  init. 


HIS   NARROW    ESCAPE.  571 

B.C.  412,  attempt  did  not  wholly  succeed,  they  would  injure  the    VIII. 
Athenians.     But  they  would  not   listen,  and  Pedaritus 
refused  to  let  him  have  the  Chian  ships. 

So  Astyochus  took  five  Corinthian  ships  a  and  a  sixth       33- 
from   Megara,  one  from    Hermione,  and  the  Lacedae-  ^f/^ufo 
monian  ships  which  he  had  brought  with  him  b,  and  set  Miletus 
sail  for  Miletus  in  order  to  assume  his  command.     He  the  com- 
threatened  the  Chians,  again  and  again,  that  he  would 
certainly  not  help  them  when  their  time  of  need  came. 
Touching  at  Corycus  in  Erythraea  he  passed  the  night  escapes  the 

/  .         ,  Athenian 

there.     The  Athenian  ships  from  Samos  were  now  on  squadron 
their  way  to  Chios ;  they  had  put  in  at  a  place  where  to'chfos. . 
they  were  only  divided  from  the  Peloponnesians  by  a  hill,  £relc|  °^ 
and  neither  fleet  knew  that  the  other  was  so  near.     But  thraean 
that  night  there   came  a  despatch   from  Pedaritus  in- 
forming Astyochus  that  certain  Erythraean  prisoners  had 
been  released  by  the  Athenians  from   Samos   on  con- 
dition of  betraying  Erythrae,  and  had  gone  thither  with 
that  intention.      Whereupon  Astyochus  sailed  back  to 
Erythrae.     So  narrowly  did  he  escape  falling  into  the 
hands  of  the  Athenians.     Pedaritus  sailed  over  to  meet 
him.     They  then  enquired  about  the  supposed  traitors, 
and  found  that  the  whole  matter  was  a  trick  which  the 
men  had  devised  in  order  to  get  away  from  Samos  ;  so 
they  acquitted  them  of  the  charge,  and  Pedaritus  re- 
turned to  Chios,  while  Astyochus  resumed  his  voyage  to 
Miletus. 

In  the  meantime  the  Athenian  fleet,  sailing  round  the       34. 
promontory  of  Corycus  towards  Arginus,  lighted  upon  Three 
three  Chian  ships  of  war,  to  which  they  gave  chase.     A  ships  in 
great  storm  came  on,  and  the  Chian  ships  with  difficulty  J^-eTchfan 
escaped  into  their  harbour,  but  of  the  Athenian  ships  the  are  wrecked 

L  in  a  storm. 

three  which  were  most  zealous  in  the  pursuit  were  dis- 
abled and  driven  ashore  near  the  city  of  Chios ;  the 
crews  were  either  lost  or  taken  captive.  The  remainder 
of  the  fleet  found  shelter  in  the  harbour  called  Phoenicus, 
lying  under  Mount  Mimas,  whence  again  setting  sail 
a  Cp.  viii.  23  fin.  ]>  Cp.  viii.  23  init. 


572  THE   ATHENIANS   AT    CNIDUS. 

VIII.     they  put  in  at  Lesbos,  and  made  preparations  for  build-  B.C.  412. 

ing  the  fort  which  they  meant  to  establish  in  Chios. 
35-          During  the  same  winter,    Hippocrates  the   Lacedae- 
^(?udus'  monian  sailed  from  Lacedaemon  with  one  Laconian,  one 

which  has 

revolted  Syracusan,  and  ten  Thurian  ships  ;  of  these  last  Dorieus 
Athens,  the  son  of  Diagoras  and  two  others  were  the  commanders. 
byatheCked  Thev  Put  in  at  Cnidus,  which  under  the  influence  of 
Athenians.  Tissaphernes  a  had  already  revolted  from  Athens.  The 
six  newly-  Peloponnesian  authorities  at  Miletus,  when  they  heard 
ships  of  the  of  their  arrival,  ordered  one  half  of  these  ships  to  pro- 
tect  Cnidus,  and  the  other  half  to  cruise  off  Triopium 


but  not       ancj  seize  the  merchant-vessels  which  put  in  there  from 

quite  suc- 

cessful in     Egypt.     This  Triopium  is  a  promontory  in  the  district 

taking  the        r  >T   .,  ,.   f  ,,  .  i         r    A       11  TI_ 

town.          of  Cnidus  on  which  there  is  a  temple  of  Apollo.     The 

Athenians,  hearing  of  their  intentions,  sailed  from  Samos 

and  captured  the  six  ships  which  were  keeping  guard  at 

Triopium  ;  the  crews  escaped.    They  then  sailed  to  Cni- 

dus, and  attacking  the  town,  which  was  unwalled,  all  but 

took  it.    On  the  following  day  they  made  a  second  attack, 

but  during  the  night  the  inhabitants  had  improved  their 

hasty  defences,  and  some  of  the  men  who  had  escaped 

from  the  ships  captured  at  Triopium  had  come  into  the 

city.     So  the  Athenian  assault  was  less  destructive  than 

on  the  first  day;  and  after  devastating  the  territory  of 

Cnidus  they  departed  and  sailed  back  to  Samos. 

36.          When  Astyochus  came  to  Miletus  and  took  the  com- 

TheMiie-    mand   of  the   fleet  he   found   the   Peloponnesians   still 

earnest.       abundantly   provided    with    all    requisites.      They   had 


sufficient  pay;  the  great  spoils  taken  at  lasus  were  in 
maintain      ^he  han(js  of  the  army,  and  the  Milesians  carried  on  the 

tntj  cirrny, 

The  Peio-  war  with  a  will.  The  Peloponnesians  however  considered 
r°penTof  the  former  treaty  made  between  Tissaphernes  and  Chal- 
treaty  with  cideus  defective  and  disadvantageous  to  them  ;  so  before 
Peikiaannd  t*16  departure  of  Theramenes  they  made  new  terms  of 
other.  alliance,  which  were  as  follows  :— 

37.  '  The  Lacedaemonians  and  their  allies  make  agreement 

in  this        with  King  Darius  and  the  sons  of  the  King,  and  with 

treaty  the 

a  Cp.  viii.  109  init. 


SECOND    TREATY    WITH  PERSIA.  573 

B.C.  412.  Tissaphernes,  that  there  shall  be  alliance  and  friendship    VIII, 
between  them  on  the  following  conditions  :  —  rights  of  the 

CI.  Whatever  'territory   and    cities    belong    to    King  less  directly 
Darius,  or  formerly  belonged   to   his  father,  or  to  his  in  the 
ancestors,   against   these   neither    the    Lacedaemonians  former- 
nor  their  allies  shall  make  war,  or  do  them  any  hurt, 
nor  shall  the  Lacedaemonians  or  their  allies  exact  tribute 
of  them.     Neither  Darius  the  King  nor  the  subjects  of 
the  King  shall  make  war  upon  the  Lacedaemonians  or 
their  allies,  or  do  them  any  hurt. 

'  II.  If  the  Lacedaemonians  or  their  allies  have  need  of 
anything  from  the  King,  or  the  King  have  need  of  any- 
thing from  the  Lacedaemonians  and  their  allies,  what- 
ever they  do  by  mutual  agreement  shall  hold  good. 

'  III.  They  shall  carry  on  the  war  against  the  Athenians 
e  and  their  allies  in  common,  and  if  they  make  peace,  shall 
make  peace  in  common. 

'  IV.  The  King  shall  defray  the  expense  of  any  number 
of  troops  for  which  the  King  has  sent,  so  long  as  they 
remain  in  the  King's  country. 

'  V.  If  any  of  the  cities  who  are  parties  to  this  treaty 
go  against  the  King's  country,  the  rest  shall  interfere  and 
aid  the  King  to  the  utmost  of  their  power.  And  if  any 
of  the  inhabitants  of  the  King's  country  or  any  country 
under  the  dominion  of  the  King  shall  go  against  the 
country  of  the  Lacedaemonians  or  their  allies,  the  King 
shall  interfere  and  aid  them  to  the  utmost  of  his  power/ 

After  the  conclusion  of  the  treaty,  Theramenes,  having       38. 
delivered  over  the  fleet  to  Astyochus,  sailed  away  in  a  The  Chians 
small  boat  and  was  no  more  heard  of.     The  Athenians,  to  inaction. 
who  had  now  crossed  over  with  their  troops  from  Lesbos  ^atorsare 
to  Chios,  and  had  the  upper  hand  both  by  land  and  sea,  executed, 
began  to  fortify  Delphinium,  a  place  not  far  distant  from  government 
the  town  of  Chios,  which  had  the  double  advantage  of  ariose65 
being  strong  by  land  and  of  possessing  harbours.     The  pedarUus 


Chians  meanwhile  remained  inactive  ;  they  had  been  c°mpiains 
already  badly  beaten  in  several  battles,  and  their  in-  Astyochus. 
ternal  condition  was  far  from  satisfactory;  for  Tydeus 


574  MISERABLE   STATE    OF   CHIOS. 

VIII.  the  son  of  Ion  and  his  accomplices  had  been  executed  B.C.  412. 
by  Pedaritus  on  a  charge  of  complicity  with  Athens,  and 
the  city  was  reduced  by  the  strong  hand  to  a  mere 
oligarchy.  Hence'  they  were  in  a  state  of  mutual  dis- 
trust, and  could  not  be  persuaded  that  either  they  or 
the  mercenaries a  brought  by  Pedaritus  were  a  match 
for  the  enemy.  They  sent  however  to  Miletus  and  re- 
quested the  aid  of  Astyochus,  but  he  refused.  Where- 
upon Pedaritus  sent  a  despatch  to  Lacedaemon,  com- 
plaining of  his  misconduct.  So  favourable  to  the  Athe- 
nians was  the  course  of  affairs  in  Chios.  The  main  fleet, 
which  they  had  left  at  Samos,  from  time  to  time  made 
threatening  movements  against  the  enemy  at  Miletus, 
but  as  they  would  never  come  out,  the  Athenians  at 
length  retired  to  Samos  and  there  remained. 
39.  During  the  same  winter,  about  the  solstice,  twenty 
The  Lace-  ships  which  Calligeitus  of  Megara  and  Timagoras  of 

daemonians  ^       .  ,  /-  -i-»i 

resolve  to  Cyzicus,  the  agents  of  Pharnabazus.  had  persuaded  the 
Pharna-  Lacedaemonians  to  fit  out  in  his  interest b,  sailed  for 
He'ues^o'nt6  Ionia  :  thc^  were  Placed  under  the  command  of  Antis- 
Theysend  thenes,  a  Spartan.  The  Lacedaemonians  sent  at  the 

eleven  . 

assessors  same  time  eleven  Spartans  to  act  as  advisers c  to  Astyo- 
Astyochus.  c^us,  one  of  whom  was  Lichas  the  son  of  Arcesilaus  d. 
Besides  receiving  a  general  commission  to  assist  in  the 
direction  of  affairs  to  the  best  of  their  judgment,  they 
were  empowered  on  their  arrival  at  Miletus  to  send  on, 
if  they  saw  fit,  these  ships,  or  a  larger  or  smaller  number, 
to  Pharnabazus  at  the  Hellespont  under  the  command 
of  Clearchus6  the  son  of  Rhamphias,  who  sailed  with 
them.  The  eleven  might  also,  if  they  thought  good, 
deprive  Astyochus  of  his  command  and  appoint  Antis- 
thenes  in  his  place,  for  the  despatch  of  Pedaritus  had 
excited  suspicion  against  him.  So  the  ships  sailed  from 
Malea  over  the  open  sea  until  they  came  to  Melos. 
There  they  lighted  on  ten  Athenian  ships;  of  these 

a  Cp.  viii.  28  fin.  b  Cp.  viii.  6  init. 

c  Cp.  ii.  85  init.;  iii.  69  med. ;  v.  63  fin. 
cl  Cp.  v.  50  med.  e  Cp.  viii.  8  med. 


ASTYOCHUS    AND    THE    CHIANS   AGAIN.    575 

B.C.  412.  they  took  three  without  their  crews  and  burned  them.  VIII. 
But  then,  fearing  that  the  remainder  which  had  escaped 
would,  as  in  fact  they  did,  give  information  of  their  ap- 
proach to  the  fleet  at  Samos,  they  took  the  precaution 
of  going  by  a  longer  route.  And  sailing  round  by  Crete 
they  put  in  at  Caunus  in  Asia.  They  thought  that  they 
were  now  safe,  and  sent  a  messenger  to  the  fleet  at 
Miletus  requesting  a  convoy. 

Meanwhile   the    Chians   and   Pedaritus  continued  to      40. 
send  messengers  to  Astyochus,  who  continued  to  delay.  The  Chians 
They  implored  him  to  come  to  their  help  with  his  whole  aded. 


fleet,  saying  that  they  were  blockaded,  and  that  he  should 
not  allow  the  chief  ally  of  Sparta  in  Ionia  to  be  cut 
from  the  sea  and  overrun  and  devastated  by  land.  Now  induced  to 
the  Chians  had  more  domestic  slaves  than  any  other  state  aid. 
with  the  exception  of  Lacedaemon,  and  their  offences 
were  always  more  severely  punished  because  of  their 
number  ;  so  that,  when  the  Athenian  army  appeared 
to  be  firmly  settled  in  their  fortifications,  most  of  them 
at  once  deserted  to  the  enemy  a.  And  they  did  the 
greatest  damage,  because  they  knew  the  country.  The 
Chians  pressed  upon  the  Lacedaemonians  the  necessity 
of  coming  to  their  assistance  while  there  was  still  hope 
of  interfering  to  some  purpose  ;  the  fortification  of 
Delphinium,  though  not  yet  completed,  was  in  pro- 
gress, and  the  Athenians  were  beginning  to  extend  the 
lines  of  defence  which  protected  their  army  and  ships. 
Astyochus,  seeing  that  the  allies  were  zealous  in  the 
cause,  although  he  had  fully  meant  to  carry  out  his 
threat,  now  determined  to  relieve  the  Chians. 

But  in  the  meantime  he  received  a  message  from  41. 
Caunus,  informing  him  that  the  twenty1  seven  ships  and  j^^f 
his  Lacedaemonian  advisers  had  arrived.  He  thought  the  twenty- 

I.,,,.  ,  r  seven  ships 

that  everything  should  give  way  to  the  importance  of  bringing 


convoying  so  large  a  reinforcement  which  would  secure 
to  the  Lacedaemonians  greater  command  of  the  sea,  and  5"om 

daemon, 

that  he  must  first  of  all  provide  for  the  safe  passage  of  and  coasts 
a  Cp.  vii.  27  fin. 


576      SHIPS    OF  ASTYOCHUS   IN   THE   MIST. 


VIII. 

southward 
to  meet 
them. 
He  is 
persuaded 
by  the 
Cnidians 
to  sail 
against 
twenty 
Athenian 
ships  which 
are  watch- 
ing for 
them. 


42. 

His  ships 
lose  their 
way  in  the 
fog,  and  his 
left  wing  is 
attacked 
and  de- 
feated by 
the  Athe- 
nians, who 
in  their 
turn  fly  at 
the  sudden 
appearance 
of  the 
rest  of  the 
fleet. 


the  commissioners  who  were  to  report  on  his  conduct.  B.C.  412. 
So  he  at  once  gave  up  his  intended  expedition  to  Chios 
and  sailed  for  Caunus.  As  he  coasted  along  he  made 
a  descent  on  the  island  of  Cos  Meropis.  The  city  was 
unfortified  and  had  been  overthrown  by  an  earthquake/ 
the  greatest  which  has  ever  happened  within  our  memory. 
The  citizens  had  fled  into  the  mountains;  so  he  sacked 
the  town  and  overran  and  despoiled  the  country,  but  let 
go  the  free  inhabitants.  From  Cos  he  came  by  night  to 
Cnidus,  and  was  prevailed  upon  by  the  importunity  of 
the  Cnidians,  instead  of  disembarking  his  men,  to  sail  at 
once,  just  as  he  was,  against  twenty  Athenian  ships  with 
which  Charminus  (one  of  the  generals  at  Samos)  was 
watching  for  the  twenty-seven  ships  expected  from  Pelo- 
ponnesus, being  those  which  Astyochus  was  going  to 
escort.  The  Athenians  at  Samos  had  heard  from  Melos 
of  their  coming,  and  Charminus  was  cruising  off  the 
islands  of  Syme,  Chalce,  and  Rhodes,  and  on  the  coast 
of  Lycia ;  he  had  by  this  time  discovered  that  they 
were  at  Caunus. 

So  Astyochus  sailed  at  once  to  Syme  before  his  arrival 
was  reported,  in  the  hope  that  he  might  come  upon  the 
Athenian  squadron  in  the  open  sea.  The  rain  and 
cloudy  state  of  the  atmosphere  caused  confusion  among 
his  ships,  which  lost  their  way  in  the  fog.  When  dawn 
broke,  the  fleet  was  dispersed  and  the  left  wing  alone 
was  visible  to  the  Athenians,  while  the  other  was  still 
straggling  off  the  shore  of  the  island.  Charminus  and 
the  Athenians  put  out  to  sea  with  less  than  their  twenty 
ships,  supposing  that  these  were  only  the  squadron  from 
Caunus  for  which  they  were  watching.  They  at  once 
attacked  them,  sank  three  of  them,  disabled  others,  and 
were  gaining  the  victory,  when  to  their  surprise  there 
appeared  the  larger  part  of  the  Lacedaemonian  fleet 
threatening  to  surround  them.  Whereupon  they  fled, 
and  in  their  flight  lost  six  ships,  but  with  the  rest  gained 
the  island  of  Teutlussa,  and  thence  Halicarnassus.  The 
Peloponnesians  touched  at  Cnidus,  and  there  uniting 


LICHAS    DENOUNCES    THE    TREATIES.      577 

B.C.  412.     with  the  twenty-seven  ships  from  Caunus,  they  all  sailed    VIII. 
to  Syme  and  raised  a  trophy;  they  then  returned  and 
put  into  port  again  at  Cnidus. 

As  soon  as  the  Athenians  heard  the  result  of  the  sea-      43. 
fight  they  sailed  from  Samos  to  Syme  with  their  whole  The  Pel°- 

ponnesians, 

fleet.  They  did  not  attack  the  Peloponnesians  at  Cnidus,  who  are  now 
nor  the  Peloponnesians  them  ;  but  they  carried  away  the  confer  with 
stores  of  their  own  ships  which  had  been  left  at  Syme,  and  h 


touching  at  Loryma,  a  place  on  the  mainland,  returned  Lichas 

*  points  out 

to  Samos.     The  Peloponnesians  were  now  all  together  the  con- 

.    ^,    .  ,  1-1  •  CA        sequences 

at  Cnidus,  and  were  making  the  repairs  necessary  after  involved  in 
the  battle,  while  the  Lacedaemonian  commissioners  con- 
ferred  with  Tissaphernes  (who  was  himself  on  the  spot) 
as  to  any  matters  in  his  past  dealings  with  them  at  goes  away 
which  they  were  displeased,  and  as  to  the  best  manner  m 
of  securing  their  common  interests  in  the  future  conduct 
of  the  war.  Lichas  entered  into  the  enquiry  with  great 
energy  ;  he  took  exception  to  both  the  treaties  ;  that  of 
Chalcideus  and  that  of  Theramenes  were  equally  objection- 
able. For  the  King  at  that  time  of  day  to  claim  power 
over  all  the  countries  which  his  ancestors  had  formerly 
held  was  monstrous.  If  either  treaty  were  carried  out, 
the  inhabitants  of  all  the  islands,  of  Thessaly,  of  Locris, 
and  of  all  Hellas,  as  far  as  Boeotia,  would  again  be  re- 
duced to  slavery;  instead  of  giving  the  Hellenes  free- 
dom, the  Lacedaemonians  would  be  imposing  upon  them 
the  yoke  of  Persia.  So  he  desired  them  to  conclude 
some  more  satisfactory  treaty,  for  he  would  have  nothing 
to  say  to  these  ;  he  did  not  want  to  have  the  fleet  main- 
tained upon  any  such  terms.  Tissaphernes  was  indig- 
nant, and  without  settling  anything  went  away  in  a  rage. 

Meanwhile   the   Peloponnesians   had   been    receiving      44. 
communications   from  the   chief  men   of  Rhodes,  and  The  Pe.lQ- 

ponnesians 

resolved  to  sail  thither.     They  hoped  to  gain  over  an  persuade 

...       .  ..  .    .      .    r  (n)  Rhodes 

island  which  was  strong  alike  in  sailors  ana  in  infantry  ;  to  revolt  ; 


if  successful,  they  might  henceforward  maintain  their 
navy  by  the  help  of  their  own  allies  without  asking 
Tissaphernes  for  money.  So  in  the  same  winter  they  nothing 

pp 


57$      THE    LACEDAEMONIANS  AT   RHODES. 


VIII. 


The  Athe- 
arrive  too 


upon  the 


45. 


his  life 
Spartans, 


nes,  whom 

he  supplies 

withargu- 
against 


and  in- 

structs  in 

various 
ByYhis 


cities  who 


;ed' 


sailed  from  Cnidus  against  Rhodes,  and  first  attacked  B.C.  412. 
Cameirus  w^n  ninety-four  ships.  The  inhabitants,  who 
were  in  ignorance  of  the  plot  and  dwelt  in  an  unfortified 
city,  were  alarmed  and  began  to  fly.  The  Lacedaemo- 
nians  re-assured  them,  and  assembling  the  people  not 
on^  °^  Cameirus,  but  of  Lindus  and  lasus,  the  two 
other  cities  of  Rhodes,  persuaded  all  of  them  to  revolt 
from  the  Athenians.  Thus  Rhodes  went  over  to  the 
Peloponnesians.  Nearly  at  the  same  time  the  Athenians, 
who  had  heard  of  their  intentions,  brought  up  the  fleet 
from  Samos,  hoping  to  forestall  them  ;  they  appeared  in 
the  offing,  but  finding  that  they  were  just  too  late,  sailed 
to  Chalce,  and  thence  back  to  Samos.  They  now  fought 
against  Rhodes,  making  descents  upon  it  from  Chalce, 
Cos,  and  Samos,  while  the  Peloponnesians,  having  col- 
lected thirty-two  talents*  from  the  Rhodians,  drew  up 
their  ships,  and  did  nothing  for  eleven  weeks. 

Before  the  Peloponnesians  had  removed  to  Rhodes 
affairs  took  a  new  turn.  After  the  death  of  Chalcideus 
and  the  engagement  at  Miletus  b,  Alcibiades  fell  under 
suspicion  at  Sparta,  and  orders  came  from  home  to 
Astyochus  that  he  should  be  put  to  death.  For  he  was 
hated  by  Agis,  and  generally  distrusted.  In  fear  he 
retired  to  Tissaphernes,  and  soon,  by  working  upon 
him,  did  all  he  could  to  injure  the  Peloponnesian  cause. 
He  was  h*s  constant  adviser,  and  induced  him  to  cut 
down  the  pay  of  the  sailors  from  an  Attic  drachma 

x     • 

to  half  a  drachma0,  and  this  was  only  to  be  given 
at  irregular  intervals.  Tissaphernes  was  instructed  by 
him  to  tel1  tne  Peloponnesians  that  the  Athenians,  with 
tne^r  l°n£  experience  of  naval  affairs,  gave  half  a  drachma 
only,  not  from  poverty,  but  lest  their  sailors  should 
be  demoralised  by  high  pay,  and  spend  their  money 
on  pleasures  which  injured  their  health,  and  thereby 
impaired  their  efficiency;  dthe  payment  too  was  made 
irregularly,  that  the  arrears,  which  they  would  forfeit  by 

a  ,£7680.  b  Cp.  viii.  24  init.,  25.  c  About  $d. 

d  Others  translate  (omitting  'the  payment  too  was  made  irregu- 


ALCIBIADES  ADVISES    TISSAPHERNES.     579 

B.C.  412.  desertion,  might  be  a  pledge  of  their  continuance  in  the    VIII. 

01'92'  service  d.  He  also  recommended  him  to  bribe  the 
trierarchs  and  the  generals  of  the  allied  cities  into  con- 
senting. They  all  yielded  with  the  exception  of  the 
Syracusans  :  Hermocrates  alone  stood  firm  on  behalf 
of  the  whole  alliance.  When  the  allies  who  had  revolted 
came  asking  for  money,  Alcibiades  drove  them  away 
himself,  saying  on  behalf  of  Tissaphernes  that  the  Chians 
must  have  lost  all  sense  of  shame  ;  they  were  the  richest 
people  in  Hellas,  and  now,  when  they  were  being  saved 
by  foreign  aid,  they  wanted  other  men,  not  only  to  risk 
life,  but  to  expend  money  in  their  cause.  To  the  other 
cities  he  replied  that,  having  paid  such  large  sums  to 
the  Athenians  before  they  revolted,  they  would  be  inex- 
cusable if  they  were  not  willing  to  contribute  as  much 
and  even  more  for  their  own  benefit.  He  represented 
further  that  Tissaphernes  was  now  carrying  on  the  war 
at  his  own  expense,  and  must  be  expected  to  be  careful. 
But  if  supplies  should  come  from  the  King  he  would 
restore  the  full  pay,  and  do  whatever  was  reasonable 
for  the  cities. 

Alcibiades  also  advised  Tissaphernes  not  to  be  in  a      46. 
hurry  about  putting  an  end  to  the  war,  and  neither  to 


bring  up  the  Phoenician  fleet  which  he  was  preparing,  should 

TT    11       •          «i  i          i        11         L  balance  the 

nor  to  give  pay  to  more  Hellenic  sailors  ;  he  should  not  contending 


be  so  anxious  to  put  the  whole  power  both  by  sea  and 
land   into   the   same   hands.      Let   the   dominion  only 
remain  divided,  and  then,  whichever  of  the  two  rivals  rid  of  both. 
was  troublesome,  the  King  might  always  use  the  other  nians  are6 


against  him.     But  if  one  defeated  the  other  and  became 
supreme  on  both  elements,  who  would  help  Tissaphernes  ^s  °fethe 
to  overthrow  the  conqueror  ?     He  would  have  to  take  cause  they 

,.    .  ,  .  .   ,,    .  .    .  ,   ...  only  desire 

the  field  in  person  and  fight,  which  he  might  not  like,  at  empire  at 
great  risk  and  expense.     The  danger  would  be  easily  ^^ 
averted  at  a  fraction  of  the  cost,  and  at  no  risk  to  himself,  P™fess  to 
if  he  wore  out  the  Hellenes  in  mutual  strife.     Alcibiades  liberators 

of  Hellas. 

larly'),  'also  lest  they  should  get  away  from  their  ships  too  freely, 
leaving  the  pay  still  owing  them  as  a  pledge.' 

P  p  1 


580  THE   BALANCE    OF  POWER. 

VIII.    also  said  that  the  Athenians  would  be  more  suitable  B.C.  412. 
Thernes       Partners   of  empire,  because  they  were   less   likely   to 
approves,     encroach  by  land,  and  both  their  principles  and  their 

and  at  once  .  .  .       , 

begins  to  practice  m  carrying  on  the  war  accorded  better  with  the 
poi7cyeinhe  King's  interest.  For  if  he  helped  them  to  subject  the 
dicated  to  element  of  the  sea  to  themselves,  they  would  gladly  help 
him  in  the  subjugation  of  the  Hellenes  who  were  in  his 
country,  whereas  the  Lacedaemonians  came  to  be  their 
liberators.  But  a  power  which  was  at  that  very  moment 
emancipating  the  Hellenes  from  the  dominion  of  another 
Hellenic  power  like  themselves  would  not  be  satisfied  to 
leave  them  under  the  yoke  of  the  Barbarian  aif  they 
once  succeeded  in  crushing  the  Athenians*.  So  he 
advised  him  first  to  wear  them  both  out,  and  when  he 
had  clipped  the  Athenians  as  close  as  he  could,  then  to 
get  the  Peloponnesians  out  of  his  country.  To  this 
course  Tissaphernes  was  strongly  inclined,  if  we  may 
judge  from  his  acts.  For  he  gave  his  full  confidence  to 
Alcibiades,  whose  advice  he  approved,  and  kept  the 
Peloponnesians  ill-provided,  at  the  same  time  refusing 
to  let  them  fight  at  sea,  and  insisting  that  they  must 
wait  until  the  Phoenician  ships  arrived ;  they  would 
then  fight  at  an  advantage.  In  this  manner  he  ruined  their 
affairs  and  impaired  the  efficiency  of  their  navy,  which 
had  once  been  in  first-rate  condition.  There  were  many 
other  ways  in  which  he  showed  openly  and  unmistake- 
ably  that  he  was  not  in  earnest  in  the  cause  of  his 
allies. 

47.  In  giving  this  advice  to  Tissaphernes  and  the  King, 

Alcibiades    now  that  he  had  passed  over  to  them,  Alcibiades  said 

intrigues 

with  the       what  he  really  thought  to  be  most  for  their  interests b. 
But  he  had  another  motive ;  he  was  preparing  the  way 

for  his  OWn  return  fr°m   exile«       He  knew  that>  if  he  did 

not  destr°y  his  country  altogether,  the  time  would  come 
phemes  when  he  would  persuade  his  countrymen  to  recall  him  ; 
of  Athens,  and  he  thought  that  his  arguments  would  be  most 

a  More  literally:   *  unless  they  failed  at  some  time  or  other  to 
crush  the  Athenians.'  b  Cp.  ¥.43  init. 


ALCIBIADES*  AND    THE  ATHENIANS.       581 

B.C.  412.  effectual  if  he  were  seen  to  be  on  intimate  terms  with    VIII. 
OL  92>      Tissaphernes.     And  the  result  proved  that  he  was  right.  B»t  there 

&        wasonecon- 

The  Athenian  soldiers  at  Samos  soon  perceived  that  he  dition  :— 

.  ,    ,  .  ,  ,      Abolish  the 

had  great  influence  with  him,  and  he  sent  messages  to  the  democracy. 
chief  persons  among  them,  whom  he  begged  to  remember 
him  to  all  good  men  and  true,  and  to  let  them  know 
that  he  would  be  glad  to  return  to  his  country  and  cast 
in  his  lot  with  them.  He  would  at  the  same  time  make 
Tissaphernes  their  friend  ;  but  they  must  establish  an 
oligarchy,  and  abolish  the  villainous  democracy  which 
had  driven  him  out.  Partly  moved  by  these  messages, 
but  still  more  of  their  own  inclination,  the  trierarchs  and 
leading  Athenians  at  Samos  were  now  eager  to  over- 
throw the  democracy. 

The  matter  was  stirred  in  the  camp  first  of  all,  and  48. 
introduced  into  the  city  afterwards.  A  few  persons  went  ^Hfe^sthe 
over  from  Samos  to  Alcibiades,  and  conferred  with  him  :  confer  with 
to  them  he  held  out  the  hope  that  he  would  make,  first  They  form  a 
of  all  Tissaphernes,  and  secondly  the  King  himself,  their  S^p  . 
friend,  if  they  would  put  down  democracy;  the  King  The  Kings 
would  then  be  better  able  to  trust  them.  And  so  the  a  telling 


nobles,  on  whom  the  heaviest  burdens  are  apt  to  fall  a, 
conceived  great  hopes,  not  only  that  they  would  overcome 
their  enemies,  but  that  they  would  get  the  government 
into  their  own  hands.     Returning  to  Samos,  the  envoys  Alcibiades 
drew  all  such  as  seemed  desirable  accomplices  into  a  oligarchy? 


conspiracy,  while  the  language  held  in  public  to  the  main 
body  of  the  army  was  that  the  King  would  be  their  friend  Aities  care  ? 
and  would  supply  them  with  money  if  Alcibiades  was  should  the 
restored  and  democracy  given  up.  Now  the  multitude  deniy  make 
were  at  first  dissatisfied  with  the  scheme,  but  the  prospect 
of  the  King's  pay  was  so  grateful  to  them  that  they 
offered  no  opposition  ;  and  the  authors  of  the  movement, 
after  they  had  broached  the  idea  to  the  people,  once  more 
considered  the  proposals  of  Alcibiades  among  themselves 
and  the  members  of  their  clubs.  Most  of  them  thought 
the  matter  safe  and  straightforward  enough.  Phrynichus, 
a  Cp.  viii.  63  fin. 


582  OLIGARCHY  AND    THE  ALLIES. 

VIII.  who  was  still  general,  was  of  another  mind.  He  main-  B.C.  412. 
tained,  and  rightly,  that  Alcibiades  cared  no  more  for 
oligarchy  than  he  did  for  democracy,  and  in  seeking  to 
change  the  existing  form  of  government  was  only  con- 
sidering how  he  might  be  recalled  and  restored  to  his 
country  at  the  invitation  of  the  clubs  ;  whereas  their  one 
care  should  be  to  avoid  disunion.  Why  should  the  King 
go  out  of  his  way  to  join  the  Athenians  whom  he  did 
not  trust,  when  he  would  only  get  into  trouble  with  the 
Peloponnesians,  who  were  now  as  great  a  naval  power, 
and  held  some  of  the  most  important  cities  in  his 
dominion?  —  it  would  be  much  easier  for  him  to  make 
friends  with  them,  who  had  never  done  him  any  harm.  As 
to  the  allies,  to  whom  they  had  promised  the  blessings  of 
oligarchy  which  they  were  now  about  to  enjoy  themselves, 
he  would  be  bound  that  the  revolted  cities  would  not 
return  to  them,  nor  would  their  old  allies  be  a  whit  more 
loyal  in  consequence.  The  form  of  government  was 
indifferent  to  them  if  they  could  only  be  free,  but  they 
did  not  want  to  be  in  subjection  either  to  an  oligarchy 
or  to  a  democracy.  And  as  for  the  so-called  nobility,  the 
allies  thought  that  they  would  be  quite  as  troublesome 
as  the  people  ;  they  were  the  persons  who  suggested 
crimes  to  the  popular  mind  ;  who  provided  the  means 
for  their  execution  ;  and  who  reaped  the  fruits  themselves. 
As  far  as  it  rested  with  the  oligarchy  the  punishment  of 
death  would  be  inflicted  unscrupulously,  and  without 
trial,  whereas  the  people  brought  the  oligarchs  to  their 
senses,  and  were  a  refuge  to  which  the  oppressed  might 
always  have  recourse.  Experience  had  taught  the  cities 
this  lesson,  and  he  was  well  aware  of  their  feelings. 
He  was  therefore  himself  utterly  dissatisfied  with  the 
proposals  of  Alcibiades,  and  disapproved  of  the  whole 
affair. 

49.  But  the  conspirators  who  were  present  were  not  at  all 

The  con-     shaken  in  their  opinion.     They  accepted  the  plan  and 

spiratorsare  ,   _,    .          _  .    , 

unshaken,    prepared  to  send  Peisander  and  other  envoys  to  Athens, 


that  they  might  manage  the  recall  of  Alcibiades  and  the 

Athens, 


ASTUTENESS    OF  PHRYNICHUS.  583 

B.C.  412.  overthrow  of  the  democracy,  and  finally  make  Tissa-     VIII. 
phernes  a  friend  of  the  Athenians. 

Phrynichus  now  knew  that  a  proposal  would  be  made       5°- 
for  the  restoration  of  Alcibiades,  which  the  Athenians 


would  certainly  accept  ;  and  having  opposed  his  return  to  betray 
he  feared  that  Alcibiades,  if  he  were  recalled,  would  do  to  Astyo- 
him  a  mischief,  because  he  had  stood  in  his  way.     So  he  himself  be- 
had  recourse  to  the  following  device.    He  secretly  sent  a  Jj^'both 
letter  to  Astyochus,  the  Lacedaemonian  admiral,  who  He  con- 
was  still  at  Miletus,  informing  him  that  Alcibiades  was  make 


gaining  over  Tissaphernes  to  the  Athenians  and  ruining 
the  Peloponnesian  interests.  He  gave  full  particulars,  to  them  ; 
adding  that  Astyochus  must  excuse  him  if  he  sought  to 
harm  an  enemy  even  at  some  cost  to  his  country*.  Now 
Astyochus  had  no  idea  of  punishing  Alcibiades,  who 
moreover  no  longer  came  within  his  reach.  On  the 
contrary,  he  went  to  him  and  to  Tissaphernes  at  Mag- 
nesia, and,  turning  informer,  told  them  of  the  letter 
which  he  had  received  from  Samos.  (He  was  believed 
to  have  sold  himself  to  Tissaphernes,  to  whom  he  now 
betrayed  everything  ;  and  this  was  the  reason  why  he 
was  so  unwilling  to  bestir  himself  about  the  reduction 
of  the  payb.)  Alcibiades  immediately  sent  a  despatch 
denouncing  to  the  leaders  of  the  army  at  Samos  the 
treason  of  Phrynichus,  and  demanding  that  he  should 
be  put  to  death.  Phrynichus  was  confounded  c,  and  in 
fact  the  revelation  placed  him  in  the  greatest  danger. 
However  he  sent  again  to  Astyochus,  blaming  him  for 
having  violated  his  former  confidence.  He  then  pro- 
ceeded to  say  that  he  was  ready  to  give  the  Pelo- 
ponnesians  the  opportunity  of  destroying  the  whole 
Athenian  army,  and  he  explained  in  detail  how  Samos, 
which  was  unfortified,  might  best  be  attacked;  adding 
that  he  was  in  danger  of  his  life  for  their  sakes,  and  that 
he  need  no  longer  apologise  if  by  this  or  any  other  means 
he  could  save  himself  from  destruction  at  the  hands  of  his 

a  Cp.  vi.  92  for  a  similar  excuse.  b  Cp.  viii.  45  med. 

c  Placing  the  comma  after 


584  ALCIBIADES   AND    PHRYNICHUS. 

VIII.     worst  enemies.     Again  the  message  was  communicated  B.C.  412. 

by  Astyochus  to  Alcibiades.  OL  92> 

5  I  •  Now  Phrynichus  was  well  aware  of  his  treachery,  and 
of  which  he  he  knew  that  another  letter  from  Alcibiades  giving 

also  gives 

information  further  information  was  on  the  point  of  arriving.    Before 

Athenians,   its  arrival  he  himself  warned  the  army  that,  Samos  being 

is  purged  of  unwalled  and  some  of  the  ships  not  anchoring  within 

aaVomwhs  t^le  ^arbour,  the  enemy  were  going  to  attack  the  fleet  ; 

Alcibiades,  of  this  he  had  certain  knowledge.    They  ought  therefore 

thought  to   to  fortify  the  place  as  quickly  as  they  could,  and  to  take 

from  spite:    every  precaution.     As  he  was  in  command   he   could 

execute  his  proposals  by  his  own  authority.     So  they 

set  to  work,  and  in  consequence  Samos,  which  would 

have  been   fortified   in   any  case,  was  fortified  all  the 

sooner.     Not  long  afterwards  the  expected  letter  came 

from  Alcibiades  warning  the  Athenians  that  the  army 

was  being  betrayed  by  Phrynichus,  and  that  the  enemy 

were   going  to  make   an   attack.     But  Alcibiades  was 

not   trusted  ;   he   was   thought    to   have    attributed    to 

Phrynichus  out  of  personal  animosity  complicity  in  the 

enemy's  designs,  with  which  he  was  himself  acquainted. 

Thus  he  did  him  no  harm,  but  rather  strengthened  his 

position  by  telling  the  same  tale. 

52.  Alcibiades  still  continued  his  practices  with  Tissa- 
Tissapher-  phernes,  whom  he  now  sought  to  draw  over  to  the 
theinflu-  Athenian  interest.  But  Tissaphernes  was  afraid  of  the 
Alcibiades  Peloponnesians,  who  had  more  ships  on  the  spot  than  the 
havehked  Athenians.  And  yet  he  would  have  liked,  if  he  could,  to 
to  join  the  have  been  persuaded  ;  especially  when  he  saw  the  oppo- 

Athenians.       .  .  _    , 

For  he        sition  which  the  Peloponnesians  raised  at  Cnidus  to  the 


treaty  of  Theramenes  a.     For  his  quarrel  with  them  had 
with  the       broken  out  before  the  Peloponnesians  went  to  Rhodes, 

Pelopon- 

nesians at  where  they  were  at  present  stationed  b;  and  the  words 
the  protest  of  Alcibiades,  who  had  previously  warned  Tissaphernes 
confirmed  that  the  Lacedaemonians  were  the  liberators  of  all  the 


dties  of  Hellas>  were  verified  by  the  protest  of  Lichas, 
had  re-        who  declared  that  'for  the  King  to  hold  all  the  cities 

ceived 

a  Cp.  viii.  43.  b  Cp.  viii.  45  init. 


SHALL    ALCIBIADES    BE   RECALLED?       585 

B.C.  412.  which   he  or  his  ancestors  had  held  was  a  stipulation     VIII. 
92'      not   to  be  endured/     Alcibiades,  who  was  playing  for  from  Aici- 

r     *  biades. 

a  great  stake,  was  very  assiduous  in  paying  his  court  But  he 

.  is  afraid. 

to  Tissaphernes. 

Peisander  and  the  other  envoys  who  had  been  sent       53- 
from  Samos  arrived  at  Athens  and  made  their  proposals  Peisander 

and  his 

to  the  people.     They  said  much  in  few  words,  insisting  colleagues 
above  all  that  if  the  Athenians  restored  Alcibiades  and 
modified  their  democracy  they  might  secure  the  alliance 
of  the  King   and  gain    the  victory  over  the  Pelopon-  Alcibiades 
nesians.     There  was  great  opposition  to  any  change  in  modifica- 
the  democracy,  and  the  enemies  of  Alcibiades  were  loud  democracy. 
in  protesting  that  it  would  be  a  dreadful  thing  if  he  were  Agnation 
permitted  to  return  in  defiance  of  the  law.     The  Eumol-  is  aroused. 
pidae  and  Ceryces  called  heaven  and  earth  to  witness 
that  the  city  must  never  restore  a  man  who  had  been 
banished    for   profaning   the    mysteries.     Amid   violent 
expressions  of  indignation  Peisander  came  forward,  and 
having   up  the   objectors  one   by  one  he  pointed   out 
to  them  that  the  Peloponnesians  had  a  fleet  ready  for 
action  as  large  as  their  own,  that  they  numbered  more 
cities  among  their  allies,  and  that  they  were  furnished 
with    money  by  Tissaphernes  and  the  King  ;   whereas 
the  Athenians  had  spent  everything  :    he   then   asked 
them  whether  there  was  the  least  hope  of  saving  the 
country  unless  the  King  could  be  won  over.     They  all 
acknowledged  that  there  was  none.      He  then  said  to 
them  plainly:— 

'  But  this  alliance  is  impossible  unless  we  are  governed 
in  a  wiser  manner,  and  office  is  confined  to  a  smaller 
number  :  then  the  King  will  trust  us.  Do  not  let  us  be 
dwelling  on  the  form  of  the  constitution  a,  which  we  may 
hereafter  change  as  we  please,  when  the  very  existence  of 
Athens  is  at  stake.  And  we  must  restore  Alcibiades, 
who  is  the  only  man  living  capable  of  saving  us.' 

The   people  were  very  angry  at  the  first  suggestion      54- 
of  an  oligarchy;  but  when  Peisander  proved  to  them  that 


an 
a  Reading  ^ovXevto^v  with  most  MSS. 


586  THE   SUCCESS    OF  PEISANDER. 

VIII.     they  had  no  other  resource,  partly  in  fear,  and  partly  in  B.C.  412. 
alternative?  hope  that  it  might  be  hereafter  changed,  they  gave  way.  C 

It  is  at  last          r  J   \  3 

agreed  that  So  a  decree  was  passed  that  Peisander  himself  and  ten 
sh^iTgoand  others  should  go  out  and  negotiate  to  the  best  of  their 
Silh  Uate  judgment  with  Tissaphernes  and  Alcibiades.  Peisander 
Aleibiades.  aiso  denounced  Phrynichus,  and  therefore  the  people 
dismissed  him  and  his  colleague  Scironides  from  their 
commands,  and  appointed  Diomedon  and  Leon  to  be 
admirals  in  their  room.  Peisander  thought  that  Phry- 
nichus would  stand  in  the  way  of  the  negotiations  with 
Alcibiades,  and  for  this  reason  he  calumniated  him,  al- 
leging that  he  had  betrayed  lasus  and  Amorges.  Then 
he  went,  one  after  another,  to  all  the  clubs  which  already 
existed  in  Athens  for  the  management  of  trials  and 
elections,  and  exhorted  them  to  unite,  and  by  concerted 
action  put  down  the  democracy.  When  he  had  com- 
pleted all  the  necessary  preparations  and  the  plot  was 
ripe,  he  and  his  colleagues  proceeded  on  their  voyage  to 
Tissaphernes. 

55.          During  the  same  winter  Leon  and    Diomedon,  who 
The  Athe-    had  now  entered  upon  their  command,  made  a  descent 

nians  com-  ._  ,  _,  ,  <•          «       «         «  «  n 

mand  upon  Rhodes.  They  found  the  Peloponnesian  fleet 
fromdeS  drawn  up  out  of  their  reach,  but  they  landed,  and 
defeated  the  Rhodians  who  came  out  to  meet  them. 


blockade     From  Rhodes  they  retired  to  Chalce  a,  which  henceforth 

of  Chios.  » 

The  Chians  they  made  their  base  of  operations  rather  than  Cos, 
sally?  ?n  because  they  could  there  better  command  any  move- 
ment  wllich  might  be  made  by  the  Peloponnesian  fleet. 


success  they  About    this    time    Xenophantidas,    a    Lacedaemonian, 

are  defeated 

andPedari-  brought  word  to  Rhodes  from  Pedantus,  the  governor 
im'  of  Chios,  that  the  Athenian  fortification  was  now  com- 
pleted b,  and  that  if  the  Peloponnesians  with  their  whole 
fleet  did  not  at  once  come  to  the  rescue  Chios  would  be 
lost.  So  they  determined  to  send  help.  Meanwhile 
Pedaritus  in  person  with  his  mercenaries  c  and  the  whole 
Chian  army  attacked  the  lines  which  protected  the 

a  Cp.  viii.  44  fin.,  60  fin.  b  Cp.  viii.  40  fin. 

c  Cp.  viii.  28  fin.,  38  med. 


THE  ATHENIANS  AND    TISSAPHERNES.    587 

B.C.  412.  Athenian  fleet  ;  he  took  a  part  of  the  wall  and  obtained  VIII. 
possession  of  certain  ships  which  were  drawn  up  on 
shore.  But  the  Athenians  rushed  out  upon  them,  and 
first  putting  to  flight  the  Chians,  soon  defeated  the  rest 
of  his  forces.  Pedaritus  himself  was  slain,  together  with 
many  of  the  Chians,  and  a  great  quantity  of  arms  was 
taken. 

The  Chians  were  now  blockaded  more  closely  than       56. 
ever  both  by  sea  and  land,  and  there  was  a  great  famine  Peisander 
in  the  place.     Meanwhile  Peisander  and  his  colleagues  Tissapher- 
came  to  Tissaphernes  and  proposed  an  agreement.     But  doe's  ^not 
Alcibiades  was  not  as  yet  quite  sure  of  Tissaphernes,  ^J^«T 
who  was  more  afraid  of  the  Peloponnesians  than  of  the  and  to 

A  •*•    4  •  ••  '  •  •  Alcibiades, 

Athenians,  and  was  still  desirous,  in  accordance  with  the  who  does 
lesson  which  he  had  been  taught  by  Alcibiades  himself,  be  thought0 


to  wear  them  both  out.    So  he  had  recourse  to  the  device 
of  making  Tissaphernes  ask  too  much,  that  the  negotia-  him- 
tions  might  be  broken  off.     And  I  imagine  that  Tissa-  demand  too 
phernes  himself  equally  wanted  them  to  fail  ;    he  was  1 

moved   by  his  fears,  while  Alcibiades,  seeing  that  his 
reluctance   was    insuperable,   did   not   wish   the   Athe-  ra£e  at  }he 

tricks  of 

mans  to  think  that  he  was  unable  to  persuade  him  —  he  Alcibiades. 
wanted  them  to  believe  that  Tissaphernes  was  already 
persuaded  and  anxious  to  make  terms  but  could  not, 
because  they  themselves  would  not  grant  enough.  And 
so,  speaking  on  behalf  of  Tissaphernes  who  was  himself 
present,  he  made  such  exorbitant  demands  that,  although 
for  a  time  the  Athenians  were  willing  to  grant  anything 
which  he  asked,  at  length  the  responsibility  of  breaking 
off  the  conference  was  thrown  upon  them.  He  and 
Tissaphernes  demanded,  first  the  cession  of  all  Ionia  to 
the  King,  then  that  of  the  neighbouring  islands  ;  and 
there  were  some  other  conditions.  Thus  far  the  Athe- 
nians offered  no  opposition.  But  at  last,  fearing  that  his 
utter  inability  to  fulfil  his  promise  would  be  exposed,  at 
the  third  interview  he  demanded  permission  for  the  King 
to  build  ships,  and  sail  along  his  own  coast  wherever  and 
with  as  many  vessels  as  he  pleased.  This  was  too  much  ; 


588        TISSAPHERNES  AND   THE  ALLIES. 

VIII.     the  Athenians  now  perceived  that  matters  were  hopeless,  B.c.~4i2. 
and  that  they  had  been  duped  by  Alcibiades.     So  they  ° 
departed  in  anger  to  Samos. 

5  7-  Immediately  afterwards,  and  during  the  same  winter, 

Tissaphernes  came  down   to  Caunus  wishing  to  bring 


the  balance,  back  the  Peloponnesians  to  Miletus,  and  once  more  to 

now  thinks 

that  the       make  a  treaty  with  them  on  such  terms  as  he  could  get  ; 

come  to      he  was  willing  to  maintain  them,  for  he  did  not  want  to 

other  treaty  become  wholly  their  enemy,  and  was  afraid  that  if  their 

with  the       large  fleet  were  at  a  loss  for  supplies  they  might  be 

monians.      compelled  to  fight  and  be  defeated,  or  their  crews  might 

desert  ;  in  either  case  the  Athenians  would  gain  their 

ends  without  his  assistance.     Above  all  he  feared  lest 

they  should  ravage  the  adjoining  mainland  in  search  of 

food.     Taking  into  account  all  these  possibilities,  and 

true  to  his  policy,  which  was  to  hold  the  balance  evenly 

between  the  two   contending   powers,   he  sent   for  the 

Lacedaemonians,  furnished  them  with  supplies,  and  made 

a  third  treaty  with  them,  which  ran  as  follows  :  — 

58.          '  In  the  thirteenth  year  of  the  reign  of  Darius  the  King, 

This  treaty,  when  Alexippidas  was  Ephor  at  Lacedaemon,  a  treaty 

made  in  the  r 

name  of  was   made  in  the  plain  of  the  Maeander  between  the 

nefonthe  Lacedaemonians  and  their  allies  on  the  one  hand,  and 

hsifgdoes"  Tissaphernes,   Hieramenes,  and  the  sons  of  Pharnaces 

not  extend  on  the  other,  touching  the  interests  of  the  King,  and  of 

the  recogni- 

tion of  the    the  Lacedaemonians  and  their  allies. 


*  I.  All  the  King's  country  which  is  in  Asia  shall  con- 
tinue  to  be  the  King's,  and  the  King  shall  act  as  he 

The  ob-       pleases  in  respect  of  his  own  country. 

clause  is  'II.  The  Lacedaemonians  and  their  allies  shall  not  go 
against  the  King's  country  to  do  hurt,  and  the  King 
shall  not  go  against  the  country  of  the  Lacedaemonians 
and  their  allies  to  do  hurt.  If  any  of  the  Lacedaemonians 
or  their  allies  go  against  the  King's  country  and  do  hurt, 
the  Lacedaemonians  shall  interfere  :  and  if  any  of  the 
dwellers  in  the  King's  country  shall  go  against  the 
country  of  the  Lacedaemonians  and  their  allies,  and  do 
hurt,  the  King  shall  interfere. 


THIRD    TREATY  WITH   PERSIA.  589 

B.C.  412.  '  III.  Tissaphernes  shall  provide  food  for  the  number  VIII. 
of  ships  which  the  Lacedaemonians  have  at  present, 
according  to  the  agreement,  until  the  King's  ships  arrive. 
When  they  have  arrived,  the  Lacedaemonians  and  their 
allies  may  either  maintain  their  own  ships,  or  they  may 
receive  the  maintenance  of  their  ships  from  Tissaphernes. 
But  in  this  latter  case  the  Lacedaemonians  and  their 
allies  shall  at  the  end  of  the  war  repay  to  Tissaphernes 
the  money  which  they  have  received. 

'  IV.  When  the  King's  ships  have  arrived,  the  ships  of 
the  Lacedaemonians  and  of  their  allies  and  of  the  King 
shall  carry  on  the  war  in  common,  as  may  seem  best  to 
Tissaphernes  and  to  the  Lacedaemonians  and  their 
allies  :  and  if  they  wish  to  make  peace  with  the  Athe- 
nians both  parties  shall  make  peace  on  the  same  terms.' 

Such  was  the  treaty.    Tissaphernes  now  prepared  to       59* 
bring  up  the  Phoenician  ships,  as  he  had  .promised,  and 
to  fulfil  his  other  pledges.     He  was  anxious  at  all  events 
to  be  seen  making  a  beginning. 

Towards  the  end  of  the  winter,  Oropus,  which  was      60.  * 
occupied  by  an  Athenian  garrison,  was  betrayed  to  the  Oropus,  by 
Boeotians.    Certain  of  the  Eretrians  and  of  the  Oropians 
themselves,  both  having  an  eye  to  the  revolt  of  Euboea, 
were  concerned  in  the  enterprise.     For  Oropus,  facing  ^ 
Eretria,  while  held  by  the  Athenians  could  not  be  other  instead  of 
than  a  serious  annoyance,  both  to  Eretria  and  to  the  Euboea° 


whole  of  Euboea.     Having  now  possession  of  Oropus 

the  Eretrians  came  to  Rhodes,  and  invited  the  Pelopon-  determine 

to  relieve 

nesians  to  Euboea.     They  were  however  more  disposed  Chios,  but 
to  relieve  the  distress  of  Chios,  and  thither  they  sailed  by  the  ap-6 
from  Rhodes   with   their  whole   fleet.     Near  Triopium  Kite-  °f 
they  descried  the  Athenian  ships  in  the  open  sea  sailing  g^^f1' 
from  Chalce  :  neither  fleet  attacked  the  other,  but  both  return  to 
arrived  safely,  the  one  at  Samos,  and  the  other  at  Miletus.  naTstatifns 
The  Lacedaemonians  now  saw  that  they  could  no  longer  an 
relieve  Chios  without  a  battle  at  sea.     So  the  winter  tus- 
ended,  and  with  it  the  twentieth  year  in  the  Pelopon- 
nesian  War  of  which  Thucydides  wrote  the  history. 


590     PELOPONNESIANS  AT  THE  HELLESPONT. 

VIII.         At  the  beginning  of  the  following  spring,  Dercyllidas,  B.C.  411. 

6 1 .  a  Spartan,  was  sent  at  the  head  of  a  small  army  along 
TheChians,  the  coast  to  the  Hellespont.     He  was  to  effect  the  revolt 
theifnew7  of  Abydos,  a  Milesian  colony.    The  Chians,  while  Astyo- 
LeorTthe     c^us  was  doubting  whether  he  could  assist  them,  were 
Spartan,      compelled  by  the  pressure  of  the  blockade  to  fight  at 
ships,  make  sea.     While  he  was  still  at  Rhodes  they  had  obtained 

from    Miletus,    after   the    death    of  Pedaritus,    a    new 
governor,  Leon,  a  Spartan,  who  had  come  out  as  a  marine 
advantage    with  Antisthenes a;  he  brought  with  him  twelve  ships, 

over  thirty- 
two  Athe-    five    Thurian,    four    Syracusan,    one    from    Anaea,    one 

Milesian,  and  one  which  was  Leon's  own ;  they  had 
been  employed  in  guarding  Miletus.  The  Chians  made 
a  sally  with  their  whole  force,  and  seized  a  strong 
position  ;  their  ships  at  the  same  time,  to  the  number  of 
thirty-six,  sailed  out  and  fought  with  the  thirty-two  of 
the  Athenians*  The  engagement  was  severe  ;  the  Chians 
and  their  allies  had  rather  the  advantage,  but  evening 
had  came  on ;  so  they  retired  to  the  city. 

62.  Soon  afterwards  Dercyllidas  arrived  at  the  Hellespont 
Dercyllidas  from  Miletus ;  Abydos,  and  two  days  later  Lampsacus, 
the  HeHes-  revolted  to  him  and  Pharnabazus.    Strombichides,  having 
ffices"1     intelligence,  hastened  thither  from  Chios  with  twenty- 
(12)  Abydos  four  Athenian  ships,  of  which  some  were  transports  con- 
Lampsacus  veying  hoplites.     Defeating  the  Lampsacenes  who  came 
Strombi-      °ut  against  him,  he  took  Lampsacus,  which  was  unforti- 
suttehimur~  fied>  at  the  first  onset.     He  made  a  seizure  of  the  slaves 
and  re-        ancj  property  which  he  found  there,  and,  reinstating  the 
Lampsacus,  free  inhabitants,  went  on  to  Abydos.     But  the  people  of 
Abydos.      Abydos  would  not  yield,  and  though  he  attempted  to 

take  the  place  by  assault,  he  failed  ;  so  he  crossed  over 
to  Sestos,  a  city  of  the  Chersonese  opposite  Abydos, 
which  the  Persians  had  formerly  held.  There  he  placed 
a  garrison  to  keep  watch  over  the  entire  Hellespont. 

63.  Meanwhile  the  Chians  regained  the  command  of  the 
in  the         sea,  and  Astyochus  and  the  Peloponnesians  at  Miletus, 
stromS-0    hearing  of  the  naval  engagement  and  of  the  withdrawal 

a  Cp.  viii.  39  init. 


OLIGARCHY  AT  SAMOS.  591 

B.C.  411.  of  Strombichides  and  his  ships,  took  courage.     Sailing    VIII. 
2'  to  Chios  with  two  ships,  Astyochus  fetched  away  the  cljjdes.  the 
fleet  which  was  there,  and  with  his  united  forces  made  a  regain  con- 
demonstration  against  Samos.    But  the  Athenian  crews,  sea,  and  e 


who  were  in  a  state  of  mutual  distrust,  did  not  go  out  to 
meet  him  ;  so  he  sailed  back  again  to  Miletus.  to  the 

Athenians. 

For  about  this  time,  or  rather  sooner,  the  democracy  The  con_ 
at  Athens  had  been  subverted.    Peisander  and  his  fellow  spirators 

at  Samos 

envoys,  on  their  return  to  Samos  after  their  visit  to  Tissa-  give  up 

.       .  .,  -i   ,1     •     •    .  .  •     ,1  t  Alcibiades, 

phernes,  had  strengthened  their  interest  in  the  army,  and  but,  with 
had  even  persuaded  the  chief  men  of  Samos  to  join  them 
in  setting  up  an  oligarchy,  a  although  they  had  lately  risen 
against  their  own  countrymen*  in  order  to  put  down  oli-  persevere  in 

1       x         A         i  •  r  11  th6*1"  Plan- 

garchy0.  At  the  same  time  conternng  among  themselves, 
the  Athenian  leaders  at  Samos  came  to  the  conclusion 
that  since  Alcibiades  would  not  join  they  had  better  leave 
him  alone  ;  for  indeed  he  was  not  the  sort  of  person  who 
was  suited  to  an  oligarchy.  But  they  determined,  as 
they  were  already  compromised,  to  proceed  by  them- 
selves, and  to  take  measures  for  carrying  the  movement 
through  ;  they  meant  also  to  persevere  in  the  war, 
and  were  willing  enough  to  contribute  money  or  any- 
thing else  which  might  be  wanted  out  of  their  own 
houses,  since  they  would  now  be  labouring,  not  for 
others,  but  for  themselves0. 

Having  thus  encouraged  one  another  in  their  purpose      64. 
they  sent  Peisander  and  one  half  of  the  envoys  back  to  They  want 
Athens.     They  were  to  carry  out  the  scheme  at  home, 
and  had  directions  to  set  up  an  oligarchy  in  the  subject- 
cities  at  which  they  touched  on  their  voyage.    The  other  ^^1 
half  were  despatched  different  ways  to  other  subject-  ciaiiy  the 
cities.     Diotrephes,  who  was  then  at  Chios,  was  sent  to  having113 
assume  the  command  in  Chalcidice  and  on  the  coast  of  beue^go- 
Thrace,  to  which  he  had  been  previously  appointed.    On  yemment, 

*      rr  do  not  care 

arriving  at  Thasos  he  put  down  the  democracy.     But  to  retain 
within  about  two  months  of  his  departure  the  Thasians 

Athens. 

a  Or,  'although  there  had  just  been  an  insurrection  in  Samos  itself.' 
b  Gp.  viii.  21,  73  init.  c  Cp.  viii.  48  init. 


592 


OLIGARCHY  AT  ATHENS. 


VIII. 


65- 


Peisander 
returns  to 
Athens, 
where  he 
finds  the 
work  al- 
ready half 
done. 
Assassina- 
tion of 
Androcles, 
the  enemy 
of  Alci- 
biades . 
Programme 
of  the  new 
party. 


began  to  fortify  their  city;  they  did  not  want  to  have  an  B.C.  411. 
aristocracy  dependent  on  Athens  when  they  were  daily 
expecting  to  obtain  their  liberty  from  Lacedaemon.  For 
there  were  Thasian  exiles  who  had  been  driven  out  by 
the  Athenians  dwelling  in  Peloponnesus,  and  they,  with 
the  assistance  of  their  friends  at  home,  were  exerting 
themselves  vigorously  to  obtain  ships  and  effect  the 
revolt  of  Thasos.  The  recent  change  was  exactly  what 
they  desired  ;  for  the  government  had  been  reformed 
without  danger  to  themselves,  and  the  democracy,  who 
would  have  opposed  them,  had  been  overthrown.  Thus 
the  result  in  the  case  of  Thasos,  and  also,  as  I  imagine, 
of  many  other  states,  was  the  opposite  of  what  the  oli- 
garchical conspirators  had  intended.  For  the  subject- 
cities,  having  secured  a  moderate  form  of  government, 
and  having  no  fear  of  being  called  to  account  for 
their  proceedings,  aimed  at  absolute  freedom ;  they 
scorned  the  sham  independence  proffered  to  them  by 
the  Athenians. 

Peisander  and  his  colleagues  pursued  their  voyage  and, 
as  they  had  agreed,  put  down  the  democracies  in  the  dif- 
ferent states.  From  some  places  they  obtained  the  as- 
sistance of  heavy-armed  troops,  which  they  took  with 
them  to  Athens*.  There  they  found  the  revolution  more 
than  half  accomplished  by  the  oligarchical  clubs.  Some 
of  the  younger  citizens  had  conspired  and  secretly  assas- 
sinated one  Androcles,  a  great  man  with  the  people,  who 
had  been  foremost  in  procuring  the  banishment  of  Alci- 
biadesb.  Their  motives  were  two-fold  :  they  killed  him 
because  he  was  a  demagogue ;  but  more  because  they 
hoped  to  gratify  Alcibiades,  whom  they  were  still  ex- 
pecting to.  return,  and  to  make  Tissaphernes  their  friend. 
A  few  others  who  were  inconvenient  to  them  they  made 
away  with  in  a  like  secret  manner.  Meanwhile  they 
declared  in  their  public  programme  that  no  one  ought  to 
receive  pay  who  was  not  on  military  service ;  and  that 
not  more  than  five  thousand  should  have  a  share  in  the 


a  Cp.  viii.  69  med. 


b  Cp.  vi.  89  fin. 


THE   REIGN   OF  TERROR    AT   ATHENS.     593 

B.C.  411.  government  ;  those,  namely,  who  were  best  able  to  serve    VIII. 
*  92<  2'  the  state  in  person  and  with  their  money. 

These  were  only  pretences  intended  to  look  well  in  the      66. 

eyes  of  the  people;  for  the  authors  of  the  revolution  fully  The  con- 

spirators for 
meant  to  retain  the  new  government  in  their  own  hands,  a  time  reign 

The  popular  assembly  and  the  council  of  five  hundred  theyput  o 
were  still  convoked  ;  but  nothing  was  brought  before 


them  of  which  the  conspirators  had  not  approved  ;  the  inconve- 

nient per- 
speakers  were  of  their  party  and  the  things  to  be  said  sons  ;  the 

had  been  all  arranged  by  them  beforehand.    No  one  any  j^  mu- 
longer  raised  his  voice  against  them  ;   for  the  citizens  a^  ^ 
were  afraid  when  they  saw  the  strength  of  the  conspiracy,  trust' 
and  if  any  one  did  utter  a  word,  he  was  put  out  of  the  combine 
way  in  some  convenient  manner.     No  search  was  made  taiiate. 
for  the  assassins  ;  and  though  there  might  be  suspicion, 
no  one  was  brought  to  trial  ;  the  people  were  so  de- 
pressed and  afraid  to  move  that  he  who  escaped  violence 
thought  himself  fortunate,  even  though  he  had  never  said 
a  word.    Their  minds  were  cowed  by  the  supposed  num- 
ber of  the  conspirators,  which  they  greatly  exaggerated, 
having  no  means  of  discovering  the  truth,  since  the  size 
of  the  city  prevented  them  from  knowing  one  another. 
For  the  same  reason  a  man  a  could  not  conspire  and  re- 
taliate*, because  he  was  unable  to  express  his  sorrow  or 
indignation  to  another  ;  for  he  could  not  make  a  con- 
fidant of  a  stranger,  and  he  would  not  trust  his  acquaint- 
ance.  The  members  of  the  popular  party  all  approached 
one  another  with  suspicion  ;  every  one  was  supposed  to 
have  a  hand  in  what  was  going  on.     Some  were  con- 
cerned whom  no  one  would  ever  have  thought  likely  to 
turn  oligarchs  ;  their  adhesion  created  the  worst  mistrust 
among  the  multitude,  and  by  making  it  impossible  for 
them  to  rely  upon  one  another,  greatly  contributed  to 
the  security  of  the  few. 

Such  was  the  state  of  affairs  when  Peisander  and  his      67. 
colleagues  arrived  at  Athens.     They  immediately  set  to  The  final 


a  Or,  taking  firipovXevaavTa  as  the  object  :   '  could  not  defend 
himself  against  the  wiles  of  another.' 

Qq 


594 


THE   NEW   CONSTITUTION. 


VIII. 


•ra  he6  a- 
ranomon' 

is  repealed  ; 

then,  on  the 
pSsander? 


trades  are 

abolished 

and  re- 
board  ofY 


of  four* 
hundred. 


68. 

The  leading 

of  the 


hadhit'herto 


he  was 
adviser  of 


own  turn 

came  made 

the  best 
hmSeif. 


ramenes 

were  also 

men  of 
ability,  and 


work  and  prepared  to  strike  the  final  blow.     First,  they  B.C.  411. 
ca^e<^  an  assembly  and  proposed  the  election  of  ten  com- 
missioners,  who  should  be  empowered  to  frame  for  the 

•»'•-«• 

city  the  best  constitution  which  they  could  devise  ;  this 
was  to  De  laid  before  the  people  on  a  fixed  day.  When 
*ke  day  arrrved  they  summoned  an  assembly  to  meet  in 
the  temple  of  Poseidon  at  Colonus  without  the  walls, 

. 

and  distant  rather  more  than  a  mile.  But  the  commis- 
sioners  only  moved  that  any  Athenian  should  be  allowed 
to  propose  whatever  resolution  he  pleased  —  nothing 
more;  threatening  at  the  same  time  with  severe  penal- 
ties  anybody  who  indicted  the  proposer  for  unconsti- 
tutional action,  or  otherwise  offered  injury  to  him.  The 
whole  scheme  now  came  to  light.  A  motion  was  made 
to  abolish  all  the  existing  magistracies  and  the  payment 
of  magistrates,  and  to  choose  a  presiding  board  of  five  ; 
these  five  were  to  choose  a  hundred,  and  each  of  the 
hundred  was  to  co-opt  three  others.  The  Four  Hundred 
thus  selected  were  to  meet  in  the  council-chamber  ; 
they  were  to  have  absolute  authority,  and  might  govern 
as  they  deemed  best  ;  the  Five  Thousand  were  to  be 
summoned  by  them  whenever  they  chose. 

The  mover  of  this  proposal,  and  to  outward  appearance 
the  most  active  partizan  of  the  revolution,  was  Peisander, 
but  the  real  author  and  maturer  of  the  whole  scheme, 
who  had  been  longest  interested  in  it,  was  Antiphon,  a 
man  m^eri°r  m  virtue  to  none  of  his  contemporaries,  and 
Possessed  of  remarkable  powers  of  thought  and  gifts  of 
speech.  He  did  not  like  to  come  forward  in  the  as- 
sembly,  or  in  any  other  public  arena.  To  the  multitude, 
who  were  suspicious  of  his  great  abilities,  he  was  an 
object  of  dislike  ;  but  there  was  no  man  who  could 

J 

do  more  for  any  who  consulted  him,  whether  their 
business  lay  in  the  courts  of  justice  or  in  the  assembly. 
And  when  the  government  of  the  Four  Hundred  was 
overthrown  and  became  exposed  to  the  vengeance  of 

° 

the  people,  and  he  being  accused  of  taking  part  in  the 
plot  had  to  speak  in  his  own  case,  his  defence  was 


ANTIPHON—PHR  YNICHUS—THERAMENES.     595 

B.C.  411.  undoubtedly  the  best  ever  made  by  any  man  tried  on     VIII. 
2>  a  capital  charge  down  to  my  time.     Phrynichus  also 


showed  extraordinary  zeal  in  the  interests  of  the  oli-  accomplish 

the  arduous 

garchy.  He  was  afraid  of  Alcibiades,  whom  he  knew  task. 
to  be  cognizant  of  the  intrigue  which  when  at  Samos 
he  had  carried  on  with  Astyochus*,  and  he  thought 
that  no  oligarchy  would  ever  be  likely  to  restore  him. 
Having  once  set  his  hand  to  the  work  he  was  deemed 
by  the  others  to  be  the  man  upon  whom  they  could  best 
depend  in  the  hour  of  danger.  Another  chief  leader 
of  the  revolutionary  party  was  Theramenes  the  son  of 
Hagnon,  a  good  speaker  and  a  sagacious  man.  No 
wonder  then  that,  in  the  hands  of  all  these  able  men, 
the  attempt,  however  arduous,  succeeded.  For  an  easy 
thing  it  certainly  was  not,  one  hundred  years  after  the 
fall  of  the  tyrants,  to  destroy  the  liberties  of  the  Athe- 
nians, who  not  only  were  a  free,  but  during  more  than 
one  half  of  this  time  had  been  an  imperial  people. 

The  assembly  passed  all  these  measures  without  a  dis-      69. 
sentient  voice,  and  was  then  dissolved.     And  now  the  The  old  * 

.  .  Mit          council  of 

Four  Hundred  were  introduced  into  the  council-chamber,  the  five 
The  manner  was  as  follows  :  —  The  whole  population  were  broken  up! 
always  on  service,  either  manning  the  walls  or  drawn  up  ^  ™ee_m~ 
at  their  places  of  arms,  for  the  enemy  were  at  Decelea  b.  Part  as 

they  are 

On  the  day  of  the  assembly  those  who  were  not  in  the  bidden, 
conspiracy  were  allowed  to  go  home  as  usual,  while  the 
conspirators  were  quietly  told  to  remain,  not  actually  by  them* 
their  arms,  but  at  a  short  distance  ;  if  anybody  opposed 
what  was  doing  they  were  to  arm  and  interfere.  There 
were  also  on  the  spot  some  Andrians  and  Tenians,  three 
hundred  Carystians,  and  some  of  the  Athenian  colonists 
from  Aeginac,  who  received  similar  instructions;  they 
had  all  been  told  to  bring  with  them  from  their  homes 
their  own  arms  for  this  especial  purpose  d.  Having  dis- 
posed their  forces  the  Four  Hundred  arrived,  every  one 
with  a  dagger  concealed  about  his  person,  and  with  them 

a  Gp.  viii.  50,  51.  b  Cp.  vii.  28  init.  c  Cp.  ii.  27. 

d  Cp.  viii.  65  init. 

Q  q  2 


596     DISSOLUTION   OF  THE    FIVE    HUNDRED. 

VIII.  a  hundred  and  twenty  Hellenic  youth,  whose  services  B.C.  411. 
they  used  for  any  act  of  violence  which  they  had  in 
hand.  They  broke  in  upon  the  council  of  five  hundred 
as  they  sat  in  the  council-chamber,  and  told  them  to 
take  their  pay  and  begone.  They  had  brought  with 
them  the  pay  of  the  senators  for  the  remainder  of  their 
yearly  term  of  office,  which  they  handed  to  them  as  they 
went  out. 

70.  In  this  manner  the  council   retired  without  offering 

They  are     any  remonstrance ;   and   the   rest  of  the  citizens   kept 

the  Four     perfectly  quiet  and  made  no  counter  movement.     The 

whogove'm  Four  Hundred  then  installed  themselves  in  the  council- 

^P^^y  chamber;  for  the  present  they  elected  by  lot  Prytanes 

make  peace  of  their  own  number,  and  did  all  that  was  customary  in 

daemon,      the  way  of  prayers  and  sacrifices  to  the  Gods  at  their 

entrance  into  office.    Soon  however  they  wholly  changed 

the  democratic  system  ;  and  although  they  did  not  recall 

the  exiles,  because  Alcibiades  was  one  of  them,  they 

governed  the  city  with  a  high  hand.     Some  few  whom 

they  thought  would  be  better  out  of  the  way  were  put 

to  death  by  them,  others  imprisoned,  others  again  exiled. 

They   also   sent   heralds  to  Agis,  the   Lacedaemonian 

king,  who  was  at  Decelea,  saying  that  they  desired  to 

conclude  a  peace  with    him ;   and   that   they  expected 

him  to  be  more  ready  to  treat  with  them  than  with  the 

perfidious  democracy. 

7I«  But  he,  thinking  that  the  city  must  be  in  an  unsettled 

ingiSthatink~  sta^e  anc^  tnat  tne  people  would  not  so  quickly  yield  up 
the  city  is  their  ancient  liberty,  thinking  too  that  the  appearance  of 
mercy,  re-  a  great  Lacedaemonian  army  would  increase  their  ex- 
treat  with  citement,  and  far  from  convinced  that  civil  strife  was  not 
*em-  at  that  very  moment  raging  among  them,  gave  unfavour- 
proaching  able  answers  to  the  envoys  of  the  Four  Hundred.  He 
the  wall,  sent  to  Peloponnesus  for  large  reinforcements,  and  then, 
w^n  tne  garrison  at  Decelea  and  the  newly  arrived  troops, 
came  down  in  person  to  the  very  walls  of  Athens.  He 
by  his  expected  that  the  Athenians,  distracted  by  civil  strife, 
send  an  would  be  quite  at  his  mercy;  there  would  be  such  a 


THE  FIVE  THOUSAND  A   GOOD  PRETENCE.     597 

B.C.  411.  panic  created  by  the  presence  of  enemies  both  within  VIII. 
and  without  the  walls,  that  he  might  even  succeed  inembassyto 
taking  the  city  -at  the  first  onset;  for  the  Long  Walls  daemon. 
would  be  deserted,  and  he  could  not  fail  of  capturing 
them.  But  when  he  drew  near  there  was  no  sign  of  the 
slightest  disorder  within  ;  the  Athenians,  sending  out 
their  cavalry  and  a  force  of  heavy  and  light-armed 
troops  and  archers,  struck  down  a  few  of  his  soldiers 
who  had  ventured  too  far,  and  retained  possession  of 
some  arms  and  dead  bodies  ;  whereupon,  having  found 
out  his  mistake,  he  withdrew  to  Decelea.  There  he  and 
the  garrison  remained  at  their  posts  ;  but  he  ordered  the 
newly  arrived  troops,  after  they  had  continued  a  few 
days  in  Attica,  to  return  home.  The  Four  Hundred 
resumed  negotiations,  and  Agis  was  now  more  ready 
to  listen  to  them.  By  his  advice  they  sent  envoys  to 
Lacedaemon  in  the  hope  of  coming  to  terms. 

They  also  sent  ten  commissioners  to  Samos,  who  were       72- 
to  pacify  the  army,  and  to  explain  that  the  oligarchy  They  also 
was  not  established  with  any  design  of  injuring  Athens  embassy  *to 


or  her  citizens,  but  for  the  preservation  of  the  whole  ^eo'  " 


state.  The  promoters  of  the  change  were  five  thousand, 
not  four  hundred  ;  but  never  hitherto,  owing  to  the  for  them- 
pressure  of  war  and  of  business  abroad,  had  so  many 
as  five  thousand  assembled  to  deliberate  even  on  the 
most  important  questions.  They  instructed  them  to  say 
anything  else  which  would  have  a  good  effect,  and  sent 
them  on  their  mission  as  soon  as  they  themselves  were 
installed  in  the  government.  For  they  were  afraid,  and 
not  without  reason  as  the  event  showed,  that  the  Athe- 
nian sailors  would  be  impatient  of  the  oligarchical 
system,  and  that  disaffection  would  begin  at  Samos  and 
end  in  their  own  overthrow. 

At  the  very  time  when  the  Four  Hundred  were  estab-      73- 
lishing   themselves   at   Athens,  a   reaction   had   set   in  But  a 

,  .  i  '  i  •      i  r*  o  reaction  has 

against   the   oligarchical   movement   at   Samos.     Some  set  in  at 
Samians   of  the   popular   party,  which   had   originally 
risen  up  against  the  nobles,  changed  sides  again  when 


598  DEMOCRACY  AT  SAMOS. 

VIII.  Peisander  came  to  the  island8,  and  persuaded  by  him  B.C.  411. 
charged65  anc*  *"s  Athenian  accomplices  at  Samos,  they  formed 
sides,  begin  a  body  of  three  hundred  conspirators  and  prepared 
violence,  to  attack  the  rest  of  the  popular  party  who  had 
previously  been  their  comrades.  There  was  a  certain 
Hyperbolus,  an  Athenian  of  no  character,  who,  not  for 
sinatedby  any  fear  of  his  power  and  influence,  but  for  his  villany, 
their  Athe-  and  because  the  city  was  ashamed  of  him,  had  been 
complices,  ostracised.  This  man  was  assassinated  by  them,  and 
Jfhtheane°ertS  they  were  abetted  in  the  act  by  Charminus,  one  of  the 
rise  and  generals,  and  by  certain  of  the  Athenians  at  Samos,  to 

put  them 

down.  whom  they  pledged  their  faith.  They  also  joined  these 
Athenians  in  other  deeds  of  violence,  and  were  eager  to 
fall  upon  the  popular  party.  But  the  people,  discovering 
their  intention,  gave  information  to  the  generals  Leon 
and  Diomedon,  who  were  impatient  of  the  attempted 
oligarchy  because  they  were  respected  by  the  multitude, 
to  Thrasybulus  and  Thrasyllus,  one  of  whom  was  a 
trierarch  and  the  other  a  private  soldier,  and  to  others 
who  were  thought  to  be  the  steadiest  opponents  of  the 
oligarchical  movement.  They  entreated  them  not  to 
allow  the  Samian  people  to  be  destroyed,  and  the  island 
of  Samos,  without  which  the  Athenian  empire  would  never 
have  lasted  until  then,  to  be  estranged.  Thereupon  the 
generals  went  to  the  soldiers  one  by  one,  and  begged 
them  to  interfere,  addressing  themselves  especially  to 
the  Parali,  or  crew  of  the  ship  Paralus,  all  freeborn 
Athenians,  who  were  at  any  time  ready  to  attack 
oligarchy,  real  or  imaginary.  Leon  and  Diomedon, 
whenever  they  sailed  to  any  other  place,  left  some  ships 
for  the  protection  of  the  Samians.  And  so,  when  the 
three  hundred  began  the  attack,  all  the  crews,  especially 
the  Parali,  hastened  to  the  rescue,  and  the  popular  party 
gained  the  victory.  Of  the  three  hundred  they  slew 
about  thirty,  and  the  three  most  guilty  were  banished  ; 
the  rest  they  forgave,  and  henceforward  all  lived  together 
under  a  democracy. 

*  Cp.  yiii.  21,  63  med. 


OLIGARCHY  AT  ATHENS.  599 

B.c.  411.      Chaereas  the  son  of  Archestratus,  an  Athenian,  who    VIII. 
'  had   been   active  in   the   movement,   was   quickly   de-       74. 
spatched  by  the   Samians  and  the  army  in   the   ship  The  Paraii, 
Paralus  to   Athens,  there  to  report  the  defeat   of  the 
Samian  oligarchy,  for  as  yet  they  did  not  know  that  the 
government  was  in   the  hands   of  the   Four  Hundred.  Athens, 
No   sooner  had   he   arrived   than    the    Four   Hundred  coldly 
imprisoned  two  or  three  of  the  Paraii,  and  taking  away  chaereas 
their  ship  transferred  the  rest  of  the  crew  to  a  troop- 


ship  which  was  ordered  to  keep  guard  about  Euboea.  Samos-  and 

r  tells  all 

Chaereas,  seeing  in  an  instant  how  matters  stood,  had  manner  of 
contrived  to  steal  away  and  get  back  to  Samos,  where  the  oii?U 
he  told  the  soldiers  with   much  aggravation  the  news  garchs- 
from  Athens,  how  they  were  punishing  everybody  with 
stripes,  and  how  no  one  might  speak  a  word  against  the 
government  ;  he  declared  that  their  wives  and  children 
were  being  outraged,  and  that  the  oligarchy  were  going 
to  take  the  relations  of  all  the  men  serving  at  Samos  who 
were  not  of  their  faction  and  shut  them  up,  intending,  if 
the  fleet  did  not  submit,  to  put  them  to  death.     And  he 
added  a  great  many  other  falsehoods. 

When   the    army   heard    his    report    they   instantly      75- 
rushed  upon  the  chief  authors  of  the  oligarchy  who  were  Th^  army 

at  Samos 

present,  and  their  confederates,  and  tried  to  stone  them,  are  beside 
But  they  were  deterred  by  the  warnings  of  the  moderate  BuHnstead 
party,   who   begged    them   not   to   ruin   everything  by 
violence  while   the  enemy  were  lying   close  to   them, 
prow  threatening  prow.     Thrasybulus  the  son  of  Lycus,  persuaded 
and   Thrasyllus,   who   were   the   chief    leaders    of    the  Syiius  and 
reaction,  now  thought  that  the  time  had  come  for  the 
open   proclamation  of  democracy  at  Samos,  and  tne7 
bound  the  soldiers,  more  especially  those  of  the  oligar-  allegiance 

...  to,  the  de- 

chical  party,  by  the  most  solemn  oaths  to  maintain  a  mocracy. 


democracy  and  be  of  one  mind,  to  prosecute  vigorously  mins  unite 
the  war  with  Peloponnesus,  to  be  enemies  to  the  Four 
Hundred,  and  to  hold  no  parley  with  them  by  heralds. 
All  the   Samians  who  were  of  full  age  took  the  same 
oath,  and   the   Athenian  soldiers  determined  to  make 


6oo 


THE   PATRIOTISM    OF  THE    FLEET, 


VIII. 


76. 


Thrasyllus 
and  Thra- 
sybulus  are 
elected 
generals. 
The  sailors 
encourage 
one  an- 
other. 

They  are 
few,  we 
are  many. 
They  have 
revolted 
from  us, 
not  we  from 
them. 
We  receive 
the  tribute ; 
we  hold 
Samos  ; 
we  guard 
Piraeus  ; 
we  can 
drive  them 
off  the  sea. 
They  are 
no  loss  ; 
they  have 
neither 
money  nor 
sense  nor 
virtue. 
And 

Alcibiades 
will  gain 
over  the 
King. 


common  cause  with  the  Samians  in  their  troubles  and  B.C.  411. 
dangers,  and  invited  them  to  share  their  fortunes.    They  °L  92>  2" 
considered  that  neither  the  Samians  nor  themselves  had 
any  place  of  refuge  to  which  they  could  turn,  but  that, 
whether  the  Four  Hundred  or  their  enemies  at  Miletus 
gained  the  day,  they  were  doomed. 

There  was  now  an  obstinate  struggle ;  the  one  party 
determined  to  force  democracy  upon  the  city,  the  other 
to  force  oligarchy  upon  the  fleet.  The  soldiers  proceeded 
to  summon  an  assembly,  at  which  they  deposed  their 
former  generals,  and  any  trierarchs  whom  they  sus- 
pected, and  chose  others.  Among  the  new  generals 
Thrasybulus  and  Thrasyllus  naturally  found  a  place. 
One  after  another  the  men  rose  and  encouraged  their 
comrades  by  various  arguments.  '  We  ought  not  to 
despond,'  they  said,  '  because  the  city  has  revolted  from 
us,  for  they  are  few  and  we  are  many;  they  have  lost 
us  and  not  we  them,  and  our  resources  are  far  greater. 
Having  the  whole  navy  with  us  we  can  compel  the 
subject  states  to  pay  us  tribute  as  well  as  if  we  sailed 
forth  from  the  Piraeus  ;  Samos  is  our  own — no  weak 
city,  but  one  which  in  the  Samian  war  all  but  wrested 
from  Athens  the  dominion  of  the  sea ;  and  the  position 
which  we  hold  against  our  Peloponnesian  enemies  is  as 
strong  as  heretofore.  And  again,  with  the  help  of  the 
fleet  we  are  better  able  to  obtain  supplies  than  the 
Athenians  at  home.  Indeed  the  only  reason  why  the 
citizens  have  so  long  retained  the  command  of  the 
Piraeus  is  that  we  who  are  stationed  at  Samos  are  the 
advanced  guard  of  the  Piraeus  itself.  And  now  if  they 
will  not  agree  to  give  us  back  the  constitution,  it  wilL 
come  to  this — that  we  shall  be  better  able  to  drive  them 
off  the  sea  than  they  us.  The  help  which  the  city  gives  us 
against  our  enemies  is  poor  and  worthless ;  and  we  have 
lost  nothing  in  losing  them.  They  have  no  longer  any 
money  to  send'  (the  soldiers  were  supplying  themselves). 
c  They  cannot  aid  us  by  good  counsel ;  and  yet  for  what 
other  reason  do  states  exercise  authority  over  armies? 


TROUBLES    OF  THE   PELOPONNESIANS.     60  1 

B.C.  411.  But  in  this  respect  too  they  are  useless.  They  have  VIII. 
2'  gone  altogether  astray,  and  overthrown  the  constitution 
of  their  country,  which  we  maintain  and  will  endeavour 
to  make  the  oligarchy  maintain  likewise.  Our  advisers 
in  the  camp  then  are  at  least  as  good  as  theirs  in  the 
city.  Alcibiades,  if  we  procure  his  recall  and  pardon, 
will  be  delighted  to  obtain  for  us  the  alliance  of  the  King. 
And  above  all,  if  these  hopes  fail  entirely,  yet,  while  we 
have  our  great  navy,  there  are  many  places  of  refuge 
open  to  us  in  which  we  shall  find  city  and  lands. 

Having  met  and  encouraged  one  another  by  these  and       77- 
similar  appeals,  they  displayed  a  corresponding  energy  The  oii- 
in  their  preparations  for  war.    And  the  ten  commissioners  voys  remain 
whom  the  Four  Hundred  had  sent  out  to  Samos,  hearing  at 
when  they  reached  Delos  how  matters  stood,  went  no 
further. 

Meanwhile  the  Peloponnesians  in  the  fleet  at  Miletus      78. 
had  likewise   troubles  among   themselves.     The  sailors  The  Peio- 

ponnesian 

complained  loudly  to  one  another  that  their  cause  was  sailors 


ruined  by  Astyochus  and  Tissaphernes.  'Astyochus,' 
they  said,  'refused  to  fight  before*,  while  we  were  strong 
and  the  Athenian  navy  weak,  and  will  not  fight  now  phemes. 
when  they  are  reported  to  be  in  a  state  of  anarchy,  and 
their  fleet  is  not  as  yet  united.  We  are  kept  waiting 
for  Tissaphernes  and  the  Phoenician  ships,  which  are  a 
mere  pretence  and  nothing  more,  and  we  shall  soon  be 
utterly  exhausted.  Tissaphernes  never  brings  up  the 
promised  reinforcement,  and  he  destroys  our  navy  by 
his  scanty  and  irregular  payments  :  the  time  has  come 
when  we  must  fight.'  The  Syracusans  were  especially 
vehement  in  the  matter. 

Astyochus  and  the  allies  became  aware  of  the  outcry,       79. 
and  had  resolved  in  council  to  fight  a  decisive  battle.  Astyochus 
This  resolution  was  confirmed  when  they  heard  of  the  hundred 
confusion  at  Samos.     So  they  put  to  sea  with  all  their  ships  offers 
ships,  in  number  a  hundred  and  twelve,  and  ordering  the 
march   along   the  cdast  towar 
Cp,  viii.  38  fin.,  44  fin.,  55  init.,  60  fin. 


Milesians  to    march   along   the  cdast  towards    Mycale,  They  Prefer 

to  await  the 


602  MOVEMENTS    OF  THE   FLEETS. 

VIII.     sailed  thither  themselves.     But  the  Athenians  with  their  B.C.  411. 
return  of     fleet  of  eighty-two  ships,  which  had  come  out  of  Samos  OL  92'  2* 
and  were  just  then  moored  at  Glauce  on  the  promontory 


of  Mycale,  a  point  of  the  mainland  not  far  off,  saw  the 
raise  their    Peloponnesians  bearing  down  upon  them,  and  returned, 
a  hundred    thinking  that  with  their  inferior  numbers  they  were  not 
Theym  '    justified  in  risking  their  all.     Besides,   having  previous 
offer  battle  information  from  Miletus  that  the  Peloponnesians  were 
PekTon      anxi°us  to  fight,  they  had  sent  a  messenger  to  Strom- 
nesians,       bichides  at  the  Hellespont,  and  were  waiting  for  him 
dine  it.       to  come  to  their  aid  with  the  ships  from  Chios  which 
had  gone  to  Abydosa.     So  they  retreated  to   Samos, 
and  the   Peloponnesians   sailed  for   Mycale   and  there 
established  themselves,  together  with  the  land-forces  of 
Miletus  and  of  the  neighbouring  cities.    On  the  following 
day  they  were  on  the  point  of  attacking  Samos,  when 
news  came  that  Strombichides  had  arrived  with  the  fleet 
from    the   Hellespont  ;    whereupon   the   Peloponnesians 
immediately  retired  towards  Miletus,  and  the  Athenians 
themselves,  thus  reinforced,  sailed  against  Miletus  with 
a  hundred  and  eight  ships.     They  had  hoped  to  fight  a 
decisive  battle,  but  no  one  came  out  to  meet  them,  and 
they  returned  to  Samos. 

80.  The  Peloponnesians  had  not  gone  out  because  they 

The  Peio-  thought  bthat  even  with  their  united  force  they  could  not 
'  risk  a  battle  b.  But  not  knowing  how  to  maintain  so 
-  large  a  fleet>  especially  since  Tissaphernes  never  paid 
cept  the  them  properly,  they  at  once  while  the  summer  lasted 

invitation  of  r     r       J  '  J 

Pharnaba-  sent  Clearchus  the  son  of  Rhamphias  with  forty  ships  to 
Byzantians,  Pharnabazus,  this  being  the  commission  which  he  had 
originally  received  from  Peloponnesus0.  Pharnabazus 


to  the  Hei-  faft  been  inviting  them  to  come,  and  promised  to  main- 
Ten  of  them  tain  them  ;  the  Byzantians  likewise  had  been  sending 
effect6  the  envoys  to  them  proposing  to  revolt.  The  Pelopon- 
(i4°Byzan-  nesian  squadron  put  out  into  the  open  sea  that  they 

tium. 

a  Cp.  viii.  62. 

b  Or,  '  that  they  were  not  a  match  for  the  now  united  forces  of 
the  enemy.'  c  Cp.  viii.  8  med. 


ALCIBIADES   AT  SAMOS.  603 

B.C.  411.  might  not  be  seen  on  their  voyage  by  the  Athenians.  VIII. 
"  They  were  caught  in  a  storm  ;  Clearchus  and  most  of 
his  ships  found  refuge  at  Delos,  and  thence  returned  to 
Miletus.  He  himself  proceeded  later  by  land  to  the 
Hellespont  and  assumed  his  command.  But  ten  ships 
under  Helixus  of  Megara  arrived  safely,  and  effected  the 
revolt  of  Byzantium.  The  Athenians  at  Samos,  re- 
ceiving information  of  these  movements,  sent  a  naval 
force  to  guard  the  Hellespont  ;  and  off  Byzantium  a 
small  engagement  was  fought  by  eight  ships  against 
eight. 

Ever  since  Thrasybulus  restored  the   democracy  at      8  1. 
Samos  he  had  strongly  insisted  that  Alcibiades  should  Aitibiades 
be  recalled;  the  other  Athenian  leaders  were  of  the  same  to  theAthe- 


mind,  and  at  last  the  consent  of  the  army  was  obtained 

at  an  assembly  which  voted  his  return  and  full  pardon.  th.e  sa<} 

*  misunder- 

Thrasybulus  then  sailed  to  Tissaphernes,  and  brought  standing 
Alcibiades  to  Samos,  convinced  that  there  was  no  help  arisen  about 
for  the  Athenians   unless   by  his   means   Tissaphernes  ^es  the 
could  be  drawn  away  from  the  Peloponnesians.     An  as- 


sembly  was  called,  at  which  Alcibiades  lamented  the  cruel  of  victory. 
and  unjust  fate  which  had  banished  him  ;  he  then  spoke  phlm'es  will 
at  length  of  their  political  prospects  ;  and  bright  indeed 
were  the  hopes  of  future  victory  with  which  he  inspired 
them,  while  he  magnified  to  excess  his  present  influence 
over  Tissaphernes.  He  meant  thereby  first  to  frighten 
the  oligarchy  at  home,  and  effect  the  dissolution  of  their 
clubs  ;  and  secondly,  to  exalt  himself  in  the  eyes  of  the 
army  at  Samos  and  fortify  their  resolution  ;  thirdly,  to 
widen  the  breach  between  Tissaphernes  and  the  enemy, 
and  blast  the  hopes  of  the  Lacedaemonians.  Having 
these  objects  in  view,  Alcibiades  carried  his  fulsome 
assurances  to  the  utmost.  Tissaphernes,  he  said,  had 
promised  him  that  if  he  could  only  trust  the  Athenians 
they  should  not  want  for  food  while  he  had  anything  to 
give,  no  not  if  he  were  driven  at  last  to  turn  his  own  bed 
into  money;  that  he  would  bring  up  the  Phoenician 
ships  (which  were  already  at  Aspendus)  to  assist  the 


604  GREAT  HOPES  IN  THE  ATHENIAN  FLEET. 

VIII.  Athenians  instead  of  the  Peloponnesians  ;  but  that  he  B.C.  411. 
could  not  trust  the  Athenians  unless  Alcibiades  were  O1'  9*'  2' 
restored  and  became  surety  for  them. 

82.  Hearing  all  this,  and  a  great  deal  more,  the  Athe- 
Theywant  nians  immediately  appointed  him  a  colleague  of  their 

to  sail  to  the       - 

Piraeus,  but  other  generals,  and  placed  everything  in  his  hands  ;  no 
strained  by  man  among  them  would  have  given  up  for  all  the  world 
Alcibiades.  fa^  hope  of  deliverance  and  of  vengeance  on  the  Four 
Hundred  which  was  now  aroused  in  them  ;  so  excited 
were  they  that  under  the  influence  of  his  words  they 
despised  the  Peloponnesians,  and  were  ready  to  sail  at 
once  for  the  Piraeus.  But  in  spite  of  the  eagerness 
of  the  multitude  he  absolutely  forbade  them  to  go 
thither  and  leave  behind  them  enemies  nearer  at  hand. 
Having  been  elected  general,  he  said,  he  would  make  the 
conduct  of  the  war  his  first  care,  and  go  at  once  to  Tis- 
saphernes.  And  he  went  straight  from  the  assembly,  in 
order  that  he  might  be  thought  to  do  nothing  without 
Tissaphernes  ;  at  the  same  time  he  wished  to  be  honoured 
in  the  eyes  of  Tissaphernes  himself,  and  to  show  him 
that  he  had  now  been  chosen  general,  and  that  a  time 
had  come  when  he  could  do  him  a  good  or  a  bad  turn. 
Thus  Alcibiades  frightened  the  Athenians  with  Tissa- 
phernes, and  Tissaphernes  with  the  Athenians. 

83.  The  Peloponnesians  at  Miletus,  who  had  already  con- 
The  dislike  ceived  a  mistrust  of  Tissaphernes,  when  they  heard  of 
Peiopon-     the  restoration  of  Alcibiades  were  still  more  exasperated 

10    against  him.     About  the  time  of  the  threatened  attack 


phemes       of  {he,  Athenians   on   Miletus,  Tissaphernes,  observing" 

increases 

more  and  that  the  Peloponnesians  would  not  put  out  to  sea  and 
ThTsaiiors  fight  with  them,  had  become  much  more  remiss  in 
Paymg  t^ie  ^eet  5  an<^  previously  to  this  a  dislike  of  him, 
arising  out  of  his  connection  with  Alcibiades,  had  gained 
ground.  He  was  now  more  hated  than  ever.  As  before, 
the  soldiers  began  to  gather  in  knots  and  to  express 
discontent  ;  and  not  only  the  soldiers,  but  some  men 
of  position  complained  that  they  had  never  yet  received 
their  full  pay,  and  that  the  sum  given  was  too  small> 


ASTYOCHUS  AND  HIS  SAILORS.  605 

B.C.  411.  while  even  this  was  irregularly  paid  ;  if  they  did   not     VIII. 

01.  92,  2.  fig^t,  or  g0  where  they  could  obtain  food,  the  men  would 
desert.  All  these  grievances  they  laid  to  the  charge  of 
Astyochus,  who  humoured  Tissaphernes  for  his  own  gain. 

While  these  thoughts  were  passing  in  their  minds  the  84. 

behaviour  of  Astyochus  gave  occasion  to  an  outbreak.  Their  dis- 

content 
The  Syracusan  and  Thurian  sailors  were  for  the  most  breaks  out 

part  free  men,  and  therefore  bolder  than  the  rest  in 
assailing  him  with  demands  for  pay.  Astyochus  answered 
them  roughly  and  threatened  them  ;  he  even  raised  his  The  ¥ 

*  .  sians  in  a 

stick  against  Dorieus  of  Thurii  who  was  pleading  the  like  spirit 
cause  of  his  own  sailors.     When  the  men  saw  the  action  thegarrison 
they,  sailor-like,  lost  all  control  of  themselves,  and  rushed 
upon  him,  intending  to  stone  him  ;  but  he,  perceiving 


^ 

what  was  coming,  ran  to  an  altar,  where  taking  refuge  he  Lichas, 
escaped  unhurt,  and  they  were  parted.     The  Milesians,  proof  they 


who  were  likewise  discontented,  captured  by  a  sudden 
assault  a  fort  which  had  been  built  in  Miletus  by  Tissa- 
phernes, and  drove  out  the  garrison  which  he  had  placed 
there.  Of  this  proceeding  the  allies  approved,  especially 
the  Syracusans  ;  Lichas,  however,  was  displeased,  and 
said  that  the  Milesians  and  the  inhabitants  of  the  King's 
country  should  submit  to  the  necessary  humiliation,  and 
manage  to  keep  on  good  terms  with  Tissaphernes  until 
the  war  was  well  over.  His  conduct  on  this  and  on 
other  occasions  excited  a  strong  feeling  against  him 
among  the  Milesians  ;  and  afterwards,  when  he  fell  sick 
and  died,  they  would  not  let  him  be  buried  where  his 
Lacedaemonian  comrades  would  have  laid  him. 

While  the  Lacedaemonians  were  quarrelling  in  this      85. 
manner  with  Astyochus    and    Tissaphernes,    Mindarus  Mindarus 
arrived  from  Lacedaemon  ;  he  had  been  appointed  to  Astyochus. 
succeed  Astyochus,  who  surrendered  to  him  the  com- 


mand  of  the  fleet  and  sailed  away.     Tissaphernes  sent  sends 

envoy  to 

with  him  an  envoy,  one  of  his  own  attendants,  a  Carian  Sparta,  who 

named  Gaulites,  who  spoke  both  Greek  and  Persian  a.  him  against 

He  was  instructed  to  complain  of  the  destruction  of  the 

a  Cp.  iv.  109  med. 


606     ENVOYS  OP  THE  OLIGARCHY  AT  SAMOS. 


VIII. 


Malignity 

phernes" 

Hermo- 


86. 


The  envoys 

of  the  Four 

Hundred 
Samos  after 


biades. 

They  are 

roughly 
bythe 

whowanet' 
to  sail  at 

once  to  the 

Piraeus. 


who  dis- 

misses  the 

envoys  with 
words. 


never  done 

to  Athens. 


fort  by  the  Milesians,  and  also  to  defend  Tissaphernes  B.C.  411. 
agamst  their  charges.  For  he  knew  that  Milesian  envoys  O1'  92'  2' 
were  going  to  Sparta  chiefly  to  accuse  him,  and  Hermo- 
crates  with  them,  who  would  explain  how  he,  aided  by 
Alcibiades,  was  playing  a  double  game  and  ruining  the 
Peloponnesian  cause.  Now  Tissaphernes  owed  Hermo- 
crates  a  grudge  ever  since  they  quarrelled  about  the 
payment  of  the  sailors*.  And  when  afterwards  he  had  B.C.  410. 
been  exiled  from  Syracuse,  and  other  generals,  Potamis, 
Myscon,  and  Demarchus,  came  to  take  the  command  of 
the  Syracusan  ships  at  Miletus  b,  Tissaphernes  attacked 
him  with  still  greater  violence  in  his  exile,  declaring 
among  other  things  that  Hermocrates  had  asked  him 
for  money  and  had  been  refused,  and  that  this  was  the 
reason  of  the  enmity  which  he  conceived0  against  him. 
And  so  Astyochus,  the  Milesians,  and  Hermocrates 
sailed  away  to  Lacedaemon.  Alcibiades  had  by  this 
time  returned  from  Tissaphernes  to  Samos. 

The   envoys  whom  the  Four  Hundred  had  sent  to 
pacify  the  army  and  give  explanations  left  Delos  d  and 

r 

came  to  Samos  after  the  return  of  Alcibiades,  and  an 
assembly  was  held  at  which  they  endeavoured  to  speak. 
At  first  the  soldiers  would  not  listen  to  them,  but 
shouted  'Death  to  the  subverters  of  the  democracy.' 
When  quiet  had  been  with  difficulty  restored,  the 
envoys  told  them  that  the  change  was  not  meant  for 
the  destruction  but  for  the  preservation  of  the  state,  and 
that  there  was  no  intention  of  betraying  Athens  to  the 
enemy,  which  might  have  been  effected  by  the  new 
government  already  if  they  had  pleased  during  the 
recent  invasion.  They  declared  that  all  the  citizens 
were  in  turn  to  become  members  of  the  Five  Thousand, 
and  that  the  families  of  the  sailors  were  not  being  out- 
raged,  as  Chaereas  slanderously  reported,  or  in  any  way 
molested  ;  they  were  living  quietly  in  their  respective 
homes.  They  defended  themselves  at  length,  but  the 


Cp.  viii.  45  med. 

c  Or,  '  displayed.' 


b  Cp.  Xen.  Hell.  i.  i.  27  foil. 
d  Cp.  viii.  77. 


FIVE   THOUSAND,    NOT  FOUR   HUNDRED.    607 

B.C.  411.  more  they  said,  the  more  furious  and  unwilling  to  listen  VIII. 
'  grew  the  multitude.  Various  proposals  were  made ; 
above  all  they  wanted  to  sail  to  the  Piraeus.  Then 
Alcibiades  appears  to  have  done  as  eminent a  a  service 
to  the  state  as  any  man  ever  did.  For  if  the  Athenians 
at  Samos  in  their  excitement  had  been  allowed  to  sail 
against  their  fellow-citizens,  the  enemy  would  instantly 
have  obtained  possession  of  Ionia  and  the  Hellespont. 
This  he  prevented,  and  at  that  moment  no  one  else 
could  have  restrained  the  multitude  :  but  he  did  restrain 
them,  and  with  sharp  words  protected  the  envoys  against 
the  fury  of  individuals  in  the  crowd.  He  then  dismissed 
them  himself  with  the  reply  that  he  had  nothing  to  say 
against  the  rule  of  the  Five  Thousand,  but  that  the  Four 
Hundred  must  be  got  rid  of,  and  the  old  council  of  Five 
Hundred  restored.  If  they  had  reduced  the  expendi- 
ture in  order  that  the  soldiers  on  service  might  be  better 
off  for  supplies,  he  highly  approved.  For  the  rest  he 
entreated  them  to  stand  firm,  and  not  give  way  to  the 
enemy;  if  the  city  was  preserved,  there  was  good  hope 
that  they  might  be  reconciled  amongst  themselves,  but 
if  once  anything  happened  either  to  the  army  at  Samos 
or  to  their  fellow-citizens  at  home,  there  would  be  no 
one  left  to  be  reconciled  with. 

There  were  also  present  envoys  from  Argos,  who  prof-  The  Paraii 
fered  their  aid  'to  the  Athenian  people  at  Samos.'    Alci-  escaped 
biades  complimented  them,  and  requested  them  to  come  jjjjjj^  en_ens 
with  their  forces  when  they  were  summoned ;   he  then  ^gof0™ 
dismissed  them.     These  Arrives  came  with  the  Paraii  offering 

aid. 

who  had  been  ordered  by  the  Four  Hundred  to  cruise  off 
Euboea  in  a  troop-shipb;  they  were  afterwards  employed 
in  conveying  to  Lacedaemon  certain  envoys  sent  by  the 
Four  Hundred,  Laespodias,  Aristophon,  and  Melesias. 
But  when  they  were  near  Argos  on  their  voyage  the 
crews  seized  the  envoys,  and,  as  they  were  among  the 
chief  authors  of  the  revolution,  delivered  them  over  to 
the  Argives  ;  while  they,  instead  of  returning  to  Athens, 
a  Reading  npStros.  b  Cp.  viii.  74  med. 


608     WHY  TISSAPHERNES  WENT  TO  ASPENDUS. 

VIII.     went  from  Argos  to  Samos,  and  brought  with  them  in  B.C.  411. 

their  trireme  the  Argive  ambassadors. 

87.          During  the  same  summer,  and  just  at  the  time  when 
Tissa-         the   Peloponnesians   were    most    offended   with    Tissa- 

phernes 

goes  to        phernes  on  various  grounds,  and  above  all  on  account 
Phoenician  °f  the  restoration  of  Alcibiades,  which  finally  proved 


What  was    ^m  to  be  a  partizan  of  the  Athenians,  he,  as  if  he  were 

his  real        wanting  to  clear  himself  of  these  suspicions,  prepared  to 

There  were  go  to  Aspendus  and  fetch  the  Phoenician  ships  ;  and  he 

answers.      desired  Lichas  to  go  with  him.     He  also  said  that  he 

iscoS/fnced  wou^  assign  the  charge  of  the  army  to  his  lieutenant 

that  he  was  Tamos,  who  would  provide  for  them  during  his  absence. 

suing  his     Why  he  went  to  Aspendus,  and  having  gone  there  never 

policy.181  y  brought  the  ships,  is  a  question  not  easy  to  answer,  and 

which   has   been   answered    in  various  ways.     For  the 

Phoenician  fleet  of  a  hundred  and  forty-seven  ships  came 

as  far  as  Aspendus  —  there  is  no  doubt  about  this  ;  but 

why  they  never  came  further  is  matter  of  conjecture. 

Some  think  that,  in  going  to  Aspendus,  Tissaphernes  was 

still  pursuing  his  policy  of  wearing  out  the  Pelopon- 

nesians ;  at  any  rate  Tamos,  who  was  in  charge,  supplied 

them  no  better,  but  rather  worse.     Others  are  of  opinion 

that  he  brought  up  the  Phoenician  fleet  to  Aspendus  in 

order  to   make  money  by  selling  the   crews  their  dis- 

charge ;  for  he  certainly  had  no  idea  of  using  them  in 

actual  service.     Others  think  that  he  was  influenced  by 

the  outcry  against  him  which  had  reached  Lacedaemon  ; 

and   that   he   wanted   to    create   an   impression   of  his 

honesty:    'Now  at  any  rate  he  has  gone  to  fetch  the 

ships,  and  they  are  really  manned.'     I  believe  beyond 

all  question  that  he  wanted  to  wear  out  and  to  neutralise 

the  Hellenic  forces;  his  object  was  to  damage  them  both 

while  he  was  losing  time  in  going  to  Aspendus,  and  to 

paralyse  their  action,  and  not  strengthen  either  of  them 

by  his  alliance.     For  if  he  had  chosen  to  finish  the  war, 

finished  it  might  have  been  once  for  all,  as  any  one  may 

see  :  he  would  have  brought  up  the  ships,  and  would  in 

all  probability  have  given  the  victory  to  the  Lacedae- 


THE  OLIGARCHY  BEGINS  TO  BREAK  UP.     609 

B.C.  411.  monians,  who  lay  opposite  to  the  Athenians  and  were  VIII. 
2>  fully  a  match  for  them  already.  The  excuse  which  he 
gave  for  not  bringing  them  is  the  most  conclusive  evi- 
dence against  him  ;  he  said  that  there  was  not  as  many 
collected  as  the  King  had  commanded.  But  if  so,  the 
King  would  have  been  all  the  better  pleased,  for  his 
money  would  have  been  saved  and  Tissaphernes  would 
have  accomplished  the  same  result  at  less  expense. 
Whatever  may  have  been  his  intention,  Tissaphernes 
came  to  Aspendus  and  conferred  with  the  Phoenicians, 
and  the  Peloponnesians  at  his  request  sent  Philip,  a 
Lacedaemonian,  with  two  triremes  to  fetch  the  ships. 

Alcibiades,  when  he  learned  that  Tissaphernes  was       88. 
going  to  Aspendus,  sailed  thither  himself  with  thirteen  Alcibiades, 
ships,  promising  the  army  at  Samos  that  he  would  not 
fail  to  do  them  a  great  service.     He  would  either  bring 


the  Phoenician  ships  to  the  Athenians,  or,  at  any  rate,  intended  to 
make  sure  that  they  did  not  join  the  Peloponnesians.  the  Phoe- 


He  had  probably  known  all   along   the  real  mind   of 

back. 


Tissaphernes,  and  that  he  never  meant  to  bring  them  keep  ll 


at  all.  He  wanted  further  to  injure  him  as  much  as 
possible  in  the  opinion  of  the  Peloponnesians  when 
they  observed  how  friendly  Tissaphernes  was  towards 
himself  and  the  Athenians;  their  distrust  would  compel 
him  to  change  sides.  So  he  set  sail  and  went  on 
his  voyage  eastward,  making  directly  for  Phaselis  and 
Caunus. 

The   commissioners   sent  by  the  Four  Hundred  re-       89. 
turned  from  Samos  to  Athens  and  reported  the  words  The  con- 
of  Alcibiades  —  how  he  bade  them  stand  firm  and  not  language  of 
give  way  to  the  enemy,  and  what  great  hopes  he  enter- 
tained  of  reconciling  the  army  to  the  city,  and  of  over- 
coming  the  Peloponnesians.     The  majority  of  the  oli-  of  the 
garchs,  who  were  already  dissatisfied,  and  would  have  a  path  of 
gladly  got  out  of  the  whole  affair  if  they  safely  could,  Thera- 
were  now  much  encouraged.    They  began  to  come  toge- 


ther  and  to  criticise  the  conduct  of  affairs.   Their  leaders  begin  to 
were  some  of  the  oligarchical  generals  and  actually  in  the  Five 

Thousand. 
R  r 


6lo  THE    MALCONTENT   OLIGARCHS. 

VIII.     office  at  the   time,   for  example,  Theramenes  the  son  B.C.  411. 
Lho7heSre      of  Hagnon  and  Aristocrates  the  son  of  Scellius.     They  OK  92' ; 
revolution    had  been  among  the  chief  authors  of  the  revohition, 

coming,  and 

each  man  a  but  now,  fearing,  as  they  urged,  the  army  at  Samos,  and 
take  the  being  in  good  earnest  afraid  of  Alcibiades,  fearing  also 
lead  m  u.  jest  j-heir  colleagues,  who  were  sending  envoys  to  Lace- 
daemon  b,  might,  unauthorised  by  the  majority,  betray 
the  city,  they  did  not  indeed  openly  profess  a  that  they 
meant  to  get  rid  of  extreme  oligarchy,  but  they  main- 
tained that  the  Five  Thousand  should  be  established  in 
reality  and  not  in  name,  and  the  constitution  made  more 
equal.  This  was  the  political  pretext  of  which  they 
availed  themselves,  but  the  truth  was  that  most  of  them 
were  given  up  to  private  ambition  of  that  sort  which  is 
more  fatal  than  anything  to  an  oligarchy  succeeding  a 
democracy.  For  the  instant  an  oligarchy  is  established 
the  promoters  of  it  disdain  mere  equality,  and  everybody 
thinks  that  he  ought  to  be  far  above  everybody  else. 
Whereas  in  a  democracy,  when  an  election  is  made,  a 
man  is  less  disappointed  at  a  failure  because  he  has  not 
been  competing  with  his  equals.  The  motives  which 
most  sensibly  affected  them  were  the  great  power  of 
Alcibiades  at  Samos,  and  an  impression  that  the  oli- 
garchy was  not  likely  to  be  permanent.  Accordingly 
every  one  was  struggling  hard  to  be  the  first  champion 
of  the  people  himself. 

9O-  The   leading   men  among  the    Four   Hundred    most 

Phrynichus,  violently  opposed  to  the  restoration  of  democracy 
Peisander,  '  were  Phrynichus,  who  had  been  general  at  Samos, 
phon,  the  and  had  there  come  into  antagonism  with  Alcibiades c, 
goingUou"  Aristarchus,  a  man  who  had  always  been  the  most 
feadhStoare  tnorougri'gomg  enemy  of  the  people,  Peisander,  and 
betray  Antiphon.  These  and  the  other  leaders,  both  at  the 

a  Or,  retaining  eTrt/xTroi/:  'and  now  fearing,  as  they  urged,  the 
army  at  Samos,  and  being  in  good  earnest  afraid  of  Alcibiades,  they 
joined  in  sending  envoys  to  Lacedaemon,  but  only  lest,  if  left 
to  themselves,  the  envoys  should  betray  the  city.  They  did  not 
openly  profess '  etc. 

b  Cp.  viii.  90  init.  c  Cp.  viii.  48. 


THE  LACEDAEMONIAN  PARTY  AT  ATHENS.  611 

B.C.  411.  first  establishment  of  the  oligarchy*,  and  again   later    VIII. 
'  when  the  army  at  Samos  declared  for  the  democracy  b,  Athens  to 

the  enemy 

sent  envoys  of  their  own  number  to  Lacedaemon,  and  if  they  can 
were  always  anxious  to   make  peace  ;   meanwhile  they  0^  power. 


continued   the   fortification   which   they  had   begun   to 

build  at  Eetioneia.     They  were  confirmed  in  their  pur-  third  time, 

r  ,  an  embassy 

poses  after  the  return  of  their  own  ambassadors  from  to  Sparta, 


Samos  ;  for  they  saw  that  not  only  the  people,  but  even 
those  who  had  appeared  steadfast  adherents  of  their  own  ™ 
party,  were  now  changing  their  minds.  So,  fearing  what  fortification 
might  happen  both  at  Athens  and  Samos,  they  sent  Anti-  neia. 
phon,  Phrynichus,  and  ten  others,  in  great  haste,  authoris- 
ing them  to  make  peace  with  Lacedaemon  upon  anything 
like  tolerable  terms  ;  at  the  same  time  they  proceeded 
more  diligently  than  ever  with  the  fortification  of  Eetio- 
neia. The  design  was  (so  Theramenes  and  his  party 
averred)  not  to  bar  the  Piraeus  against  the  fleet  at  Samos 
should  they  sail  thither  with  hostile  intentions,  but  rather 
to  admit  the  enemy  with  his  sea  and  land-forces  when- 
ever they  pleased.  This  Eetioneia  is  the  mole  of  the 
Piraeus  and  forms  one  side  of  the  entrance  ;  the  new 
fortification  was  to  be  so  connected  with  the  previously 
existing  wall  which  looked  towards  the  land,  that  a 
handful  of  men  stationed  between  the  two  walls  might 
command  the  approach  from  the  sea.  For  the  old  wall 
looking  towards  the  land,  and  the  new  inner  wall  in 
process  of  construction  facing  the  water,  ended  at  the 
same  point  in  one  of  the  two  forts  which  protected  the 
narrow  mouth  of  the  harbour.  A  cross-wall  was  added, 
taking  in  the  largest  storehouse  in  the  Piraeus  and  the 
nearest  to  the  new  fortification,  which  it  joined  ;  this 
the  authorities  held  themselves,  and  commanded  every 
one  to  deposit  their  corn  there,  not  only  what  came  in 
by  sea  but  what  they  had  on  the  spot,  and  to  take  from 
thence  all  that  they  wanted  to  sell. 

For  some  time  Theramenes  had  been  circulating  whis-      9  1  . 
pers  of  their  designs,  and  when  the  envoys  returned  from  The  envoys 

J  are  unsuc- 

a  Cp.  viii.  71  fin.  h  Cp.  viii.  86  fin. 

R  r  2 


THE    FORT   OF  EETIONEIA. 


VIII.     Lacedaemon  without   having   effected  anything  in  the  B.C.  411. 
nature   of  a   treaty   for   the   Athenian   people,   he   de-( 


monian  clared  that  this  fort  was  likely  to  prove  the  ruin  of 
hovering1  Athens.  Now  the  Euboeans  had  requested  the  Pelo- 
coasiseems  ponnesians  to  send  them  a  fleet,  and  just  at  this  time 


in  concert^  two  ^^  f°rtv  ships,  including  Italian  vessels  from  Taren- 
with  the  turn  and  Locri  and  a  few  from  Sicily,  were  stationed  at 
party.  Las  in  Laconia,  and  were  making  ready  to  sail  to  Euboea 
under  the  command  of  Agesandridas  the  son  of  Age- 
sander,  a  Spartan.  Theramenes  insisted  that  these  ships 
were  intended,  not  for  Euboea,  but  for  the  party  who 
were  fortifying  Eetioneia,  and  that  if  the  people  were 
not  on  the  alert,  they  would  be  undone  before  they 
knew  where  they  were.  The  charge  was  not  a  mere 
calumny,  but  had  some  foundation  in  the  disposition  of 
the  ruling  party.  For  what  would  have  best  pleased 
them  would  have  been,  retaining  the  oligarchy  in  any 
case,  to  *have  preserved  the  Athenian  empire  over  the 
allies  ;  failing  this,  to  keep  merely  their  ships  and  walls, 
and  to  be  independent  ;  if  this  too  proved  impracticable, 
at  any  rate  they  would  not  see  democracy  restored,  and 
themselves  fall  the  first  victims,  but  would  rather  bring 
in  the  enemy  and  come  to  terms  with  them,  not  caring 
if  thereby  the  city  lost  walls  and  ships  and  everything 
else,  provided  that  they  could  save  their  own  lives. 
92-  So  they  worked  diligently  at  the  fort,  which  had 

entrances  and  postern-gates  and  every  facility  for  intro- 


sinated.       ducing   the   enemy,  and   did  their   best   to    finish   the 

The  ene- 

mies of  the  building  in  time.  As  yet  the  murmurs  of  discontent 
seSetiy7'  had  been  secret  and  confined  to  a  few;  when  suddenly 
b^Thera  Phrynichus,  after  his  return  from  the  embassy  to  Lace- 
menes,  now  daemon,  in  a  full  market-place,  having  just  quitted  the 
bolder.  council-chamber,  was  struck  by  an  assassin,  one  of  the 
force  employed  in  guarding  the  frontier,  and  fell  dead. 

The  man  who  dealt  the  blow  escaped  ;  his  accomplice, 
seize  the  an  Argive,  was  seized  and  put  to  the  torture  by  order  of 
Aiexicies.  the  Four  Hundred,  but  did  not  disclose  any  name  or 

say  who  had  instigated  the  deed.     All  he  would  confess 


THERAMENES    THE    TRIMMER.  613 

B.C.  411.  was  that  a  number  of  persons  used  to  assemble  at  the    VIII. 
92'  2>  house  of  the  commander  of  the  frontier  guard,  and  in  promises 

the  Four 

other  houses.  No  further  measures  were  taken  ;  and  so  Hundred  to 
Theramenes  and  Aristocrates,  and  the  other  citizens,  fe°iease  him. 
whether  members  of  the  Four  Hundred  or  not,  who  were 


of  the   same  mind,  were  emboldened  to  take  decided  rate  the 

soldiers, 

steps.     For  the  Peloponnesians  had  already  sailed  round  but  in 

from  Las,  and  having  overrun  Aegina  had  cast  anchor 

at  Epidaurus  ;  and  Theramenes  insisted  that  if  they  had 

been  on  their  way  to  Euboea  they  would  never  have  gone 

up  the  Saronic  gulf  to  Aegina  and  then  returned  and  tumult,  in 

anchored  at  Epidaurus,  but  that  some  one  had  invited  two  parties 


them  for  the  purposes  which  he  had  always  alleged  ; 
it  was  impossible  therefore  to  be  any  longer  indifferent. 
After  many  insinuations  and  inflammatory  harangues,  to  the  cry 

~,       7.          of  '  Let  the 

the  people  began  to  take  active  measures.  The  hop-  Five  Thou- 
lites  who  were  at  work  on  the  fortification  of  Eetioneia  sand  rule< 
in  the  Piraeus,  among  whom  was  Aristocrates  with  his 
own  tribe,  which,  as  taxiarch,  he  commanded,  seized 
Alexicles,  an  oligarchical  general  who  had  been  most 
concerned  with  the  clubs,  and  shut  him  up  in  a  house. 
Others  joined  in  the  act,  including  one  Hermon,  who 
commanded  the  Peripoli  stationed  at  Munychia  ;  above 
all,  the  rank  and  file  of  the  hoplites  heartily  approved. 
The  Four  Hundred,  who  were  assembled  in  the  council- 
house  when  the  news  was  brought  to  them,  were  ready 
in  a  moment  to  take  up  arms,  except  Theramenes  and 
his  associates,  who  disapproved  of  their  proceedings  ;  to 
these  they  began  to  use  threats.  Theramenes  protested, 
and  offered  to  go  with  them  at  once  and  rescue  Alexicles. 
So,  taking  one  of  the  generals  who  was  of  his  own 
faction,  he  went  down  to  the  Piraeus.  Aristarchus  and 
certain  young  knights  came  also  to  the  scene  of  conflict. 
Great  and  bewildering  was  the  tumult,  for  in  the  city  the 
people  fancied  that  the  Piraeus  was  in  the  hands  of  the 
insurgents,  and  that  their  prisoner  had  been  killed,  and 
the  inhabitants  of  the  Piraeus  that  they  were  on  the  point 
of  being  attacked  from  the  city.  The  elder  men  with 


6  14  THE   FORT   IS   DEMOLISHED. 

VIII.  difficulty  restrained  the  citizens,  who  were  running  up  B.C.  411. 
and  down  and  flying  to  arms.  Thucydides  of  Pharsalus, 
the  proxenus  of  Athens  in  that  city,  happening  to  be  on 
the  spot,  kept  throwing  himself  in  every  man's  way  and 
loudly  entreating  the  people,  when  the  enemy  was  lying 
in  wait  so  near,  not  to  destroy  their  country.  At  length 
they  were  pacified,  and  refrained  from  laying  hands  on 
one  another.  Theramenes,  who  was  himself  a  general, 
came  to  the  Piraeus,  and  in  an  angry  voice  pretended  to 
rate  the  soldiers,  while  Aristarchus  and  the  party  opposed 
to  the  people  were  furious.  No  effect  was  produced  on 
the  mass  of  the  hoplites,  who  were  for  going  to  work  at 
once.  They  began  asking  Theramenes  if  he  thought 
that  the  fort  was  being  built  to  any  good  end,  and 
whether  it  would  not  be  better  demolished.  He 
answered  that,  if  they  thought  so,  he  thought  so  too. 
And  immediately  the  hoplites  and  a  crowd  of  men 
from  the  Piraeus  got  on  the  walls  and  began  to  pull 
them  down.  The  cry  addressed  to  the  people  was, 
*  Whoever  wishes  the  Five  Thousand  to  rule  and  not 
the  Four  Hundred,  let  him  come  and  help  us.'  For 
they  still  veiled  their  real  minds  under  the  name  of 
the  Five  Thousand,  and  did  not  venture  to  say  outright 
'  Whoever  wishes  the  people  to  rule  ;  '  they  feared  that 
the  Five  Thousand  might  actually  exist,  and  that  a  man 
speaking  in  ignorance  to  his  neighbour  might  get  into 
trouble.  The  Four  Hundred  therefore  did  not  wish  the 
Five  Thousand  either  to  exist  or  to  be  known  not  to 
exist,  thinking  that  to  give  so  many  a  share  in  the 
government  would  be  downright  democracy,  while  at 
the  same  time  the  mystery  tended  to  make  the  people 
afraid  of  one  another. 

93.          The  next  day  the  Four  Hundred,  although  much  dis- 
The  soldiers  turbed,  met   in   the   council-chamber.      Meanwhile  the 

march  from  .».*•»•  A 

the  Piraeus  hoplites  in  the  Piraeus  let  go  Alexicles  whom  they  had 
ThehFou?'   seized,  and   having   demolished    the   fort   went   to   the 


theatre  °f  Dionysus  near  Munychia  ;  there  piling  arms 
ties  to         they  held  an  assembly,  and  resolved  to  march  at  once  to 


APPEARANCE    OF   A    SPARTAN   FLEET.       615 

B.C.  411.  the  city,  which  they  accordingly  did,  and  again  piled    VIII. 
2'  arms  in  the  temple  of  the  Dioscuri.     Presently  deputies  them  and 

try  nego- 

appeared    sent   by    the    Four    Hundred.      These    con-  tiation. 
versed    with    them   singly,   and    tried    to   persuade  the 
more   reasonable   part  of  them  to  keep  quiet  and  re- 
strain  their  comrades,  promising  that  they  would  publish  Jj}<;  Five 
the  names  of  the  Five  Thousand,  and  that  out  of  these  outofwhom 
the  Four  Hundred  should  be  in  turn  elected  in  such  a  Hundred 


manner  as  the  Five  Thousand  might  think  fit.  In  the 
meantime  they  begged  them  not  to  ruin  everything,  or 
to  drive  the  city  upon  the  enemy.  The  discussion 
became  general  on  both  sides,  and  at  length  the  whole 
body  of  soldiers  grew  calmer,  and  turned  their  thoughts 
to  the  danger  which  threatened  the  commonwealth. 
They  finally  agreed  that  an  assembly  should  be  held 
on  a  fixed  day  in  the  theatre  of  Dionysus  to  deliberate 
on  the  restoration  of  harmony. 

When  the  day  arrived  and  the  assembly  was  on  the      94- 
point  of  meeting  in  the  theatre  of  Dionysus,  news  came  ^^fj1 
that  Agesandridas  and  his  forty-two  ships  had  crossed  Lacedae: 
over  from   Megara,  and  were  sailing   along   the   coast  squadron 
of  Salamis.     Every  man  of  the  popular  party  thought 
that   this  was  what    they   had   been    so   often  told  by 
Theramenes  and  his  friends,  and  that  the  ships  were  sternation. 
sailing   to   the   fort,  happily   now   demolished.     Nor  is 
it  impossible  that  Agesandridas  may  have  been  hovering 
about  Epidaurus  and  the  neighbourhood  by  agreement  ; 
but  it  is  equally  likely  that  he  lingered  there  of  his  own 
accord,  with  an  eye  to  the  agitation  which  prevailed  at 
Athens,  hoping  to  be  on  the  spot  at  the  critical  moment. 
Instantly  upon  the  arrival  of  the  news  the  whole  city 
rushed  down  to   the  Piraeus,  a  thinking  that  a  conflict 
with   their   enemies  more  serious  than    their   domestic 
strife  a  was  now  awaiting  them,  not  at  a  distance,  but 
at  the  very  mouth  of  the  harbour.     Some  embarked  in 

a  Omitting  r)  with  one  MS.  Otherwise,  retaining  »}  with  a  great 
majority  of  MSS.:  'thinking  that  a  conflict  among  themselves  more 
serious  than  the  attack  of  their  enemies  '  etc. 


6x6 


REVOLT   OF   EUBOEA. 


VIII. 


95- 

The  ships 

pass  on- 
ward to 

andputin 


them,  but 
strained™ 
hurrfediy, 

dSeatedly 
and  the  ' 

nesians 


isiandh°le 
which 


the  ships  which  were  lying  ready;  others  launched  fresh  B.C.  411. 
ships  ;  others  manned  the  walls  and  prepared  to  defend  O1<  92'  2' 
the  entrance  of  the  Piraeus. 

The  Peloponnesian  squadron,  however,  sailed  onward, 
doubled  the  promontory  of  Sunium,  and  then,  after 
putting  in  between  Thoricus  and  Prasiae,  finally  pro- 
ceeded  to  Oropus.  The  Athenians  in  their  haste  were 
compelled  to  employ  crews  not  yet  trained  to  work 
toSet^er>  f°r  the  city  was  in  a  state  of  revolution,  and 
the  matter  was  vital  and  urgent  ;  Euboea  was  all  in  all  to 
them  now  that  they  were  shut  out  from  Attica  a.  They 
despatched  a  fleet  under  the  command  of  Thymochares 
to  Eretria  '•>  these  ships,  added  to  those  which  were  at 
Euboea  before,  made  up  thirty-six.  No  sooner  had  they 
arrived  than  they  were  constrained  to  fight  ;  for  Agesan- 
dridas,  after  his  men  had  taken  their  midday  meal, 
brought  out  his  own  ships  from  Oropus,  which  is  distant 
by  sea  about  seven  miles  from  the  city  of  Eretria,  and 
bore  down  upon  them.  The  Athenians  at  once  began  to 
man  their  ships,  fancying  that  their  crews  were  close  at 
hand  ;  but  it  had  been  so  contrived  that  they  were 
getting  their  provisions  from  houses  at  the  end  of  the 
town,  and  not  in  the  market,  for  the  Eretrians  inten- 
tionally sold  nothing  there  that  the  men  might  lose  time 
in  embarking  ;  the  enemy  would  then  come  upon  them 
before  they  were  ready,  and  they  would  be  compelled  to 
put  out  as  best  they  could.  A  signal  was  also  raised  at 
Eretria  telling  the  fleet  at  Oropus  when  to  attack.  The 
Athenians  putting  out  in  this  hurried  manner,  and 
fighting  off  the  harbour  of  Eretria,  nevertheless  resisted 
for  a  little  while,  but  before  long  they  fled  and  were 
pursued  to  the  shore.  Those  of  them  who  took  refuge 
in  the  city  of  Eretria,  relying  on  the  friendship  of  the 
inhabitants,  fared  worst,  for  they  were  butchered  by 
them  ;  but  such  as  gained  the  fortified  position  which 
the  Athenians  held  in  the  Eretrian  territory  escaped, 
and  also  the  crews  of  the  vessels  which  reached  Chalcis. 
a  Cp.  vii.  27  fin.,  28  init. 


PANIC   AT   ATHENS.  617 

B.C.  411.  The  Peloponnesians,  who  had  taken  twenty-two  Athe-  VIII. 
2<  nian  ships  and  had  killed  or  made  prisoners  of  the  men, 
erected  a  trophy.  Not  long  afterwards  they  induced  all 
Euboea  to  revolt,  except  Oreus  of  which  the  Athenians 
still  maintained  possession.  They  then  set  in  order  the 
affairs  of  the  island. 

When  the  news  of  the  battle  and  of  the  defection  of      96. 
Euboea  was   brought   to  Athens,   the  Athenians  were  The  Athe' 

..  mans  nave 

panic-stricken.  Nothing  which  had  happened  before,  reason  to 
not  even  the  ruin  of  the  Sicilian  expedition,  however 
overwhelming  at  the  time,  had  so  terrified  them.  The 
army  at  Samos  was  in  insurrection ;  they  had  no  ships 
in  reserve  or  crews  to  man  them ;  there  was  revolution  more  ships, 
at  home — civil  war  might  break  out  at  any  moment : 
and  by  this  new  and  terrible  misfortune  they  had  lost, 
not  only  their  ships,  but  what  was  worse,  Euboea,  on 
which  they  were  more  dependent  for  supplies  than  on  ness  of  the 
Attica  itself.  Had  they  not  reason  to  despair?  But  monlans. 
what  touched  them  nearest,  and  most  agitated  their 
minds,  was  the  fear  lest  their  enemies,  emboldened  by 
victory,  should  at  once  attack  the  Piraeus,  in  which  no 
ships  were 'left ;  indeed  they  fancied  that  they  were  all 
but  there.  And  had  the  Peloponnesians  been  a  little 
more  enterprising  they  could  easily  have  executed  such 
a  plan.  Either  they  might  have  cruised  near,  and  would 
then  have  aggravated  the  divisions  in  the  city;  or  by 
remaining  and  carrying  on  a  blockade  they  might  have 
compelled  the  fleet  in  Ionia,  although  hostile  to  the  oli- 
garchy, to  come  and  assist  their  kindred  and  their  native 
city;  and  then  the  Hellespont,  Ionia,  all  the  islands  be- 
tween Ionia  and  Euboea,  in  a  word,  the  whole  Athenian 
empire,  would  have  fallen  into  their  hands.  But  on  this  as 
on  so  many  other  occasions  the  Lacedaemonians  proved 
themselves  to  be  the  most  convenient  enemies  whom  the 
Athenians  could  possibly  have  had.  For  the  two  peoples 
were  of  very  different  tempers  ;  the  one  quick,  the  other 
slow;  the  one  adventurous,  the  other  timorous a;  and  the 
a  Gp.  i.  70. 


618     DEPOSITION   OF    THE   FOUR    HUNDRED. 

VIII.     Lacedaemonian  character  was  of  great  service  to  the  B.C.  411. 
Athenians,  the  more  so  because  the  empire  for  which  OL  92>  2* 
they  were   fighting  was   maritime.      And   this  view   is 
confirmed  by  the  defeat  of  the  Athenians  at  Syracuse  ; 
for  the  Syracusans,  who  were  most  like  thema,  fought 
best  against  them. 
97-          When  the  news  came  the  Athenians  in  their  extremity 


TedTatei"  s*^   contrived  to   man  twenty  ships,  and   immediately 

depose  the  summoned  an  assembly  (the  first  of  many)  in  the  place 

dred,  and  called  the  Pnyx,  where  they  had   always  been  in  the 

aSnewgo-  hcioit  of  meeting  ;   at  which  assembly  they  deposed  the 

vemment  Four  Hundred,  and  voted  that  the  government  should 

which  be  in  the  hands  of  the  Five  Thousand  ;  this  number  was 


to  include  all  who  could  furnish  themselves  with  arms. 
Thousand  ^°  one  was  to  receiye  Pay  f°r  holding  any  office,  on  pain 
being  the  of  falling  under  a  curse.  In  the  numerous  other  assem- 

citizens 

who  sup-  blies  which  were  afterwards  held  they  re-appointed  No- 
selves  with  mothetae,  and  by  a  series  of  decrees  established  a  con- 
Payfor  stitution.  This  government  during  its  early  days  was 
°?cvsi.  ^e  best  which  the  Athenians  ever  enjoyed  within  my 

abolished.  i    , 

Aicibiades    memory.     Oligarchy  and  Democracy  were  duly  attem- 

pered.    And  thus  after  the  miserable  state  into  which 

she  had  fallen,  the  city  was  again  able  to  raise  her  head. 

The  people  also  passed  a  vote  recalling  Aicibiades  and 

others  from  exile,  and  sending  to  him  and  to  the  army 

in  Samos  exhorted  them  to  act  vigorously. 

98.          When  this  new   revolution  began,  Peisander,  Alexi- 

Betrayai  of  cles,  and  the  other  leaders  of  the  oligarchy  stole  away  to 

thereto-      Decelea  ;  all  except  Aristarchus,  who,  being  one  of  the 

b°nArTstS-  generals  at  the  time,  gathered  round  him  hastily  a  few 

chus.          archers  of  the  most  barbarous  sort  and  made  his  way  to 

Oenoe.     This  was  an  Athenian  fort  on  the  borders  of 

Boeotia  which  the  Corinthians  b,  having  called  the  Boeo- 

tians to  their  aid,  were  now  besieging  on  their  own  ac- 

count, in  order  to  revenge  an  overthrow  inflicted  by  the 

a  Cp.  i.  141  med.;  vii.  55. 

b  Or,  i  which   Corinthian   volunteers,'   omitting   'on   their   own 
account.' 


THE    TRAITOR   ARISTARCHUS.  619 

B.C.  411.  garrison  of  Oenoe  upon  a  party  of  them  who  were  going  VIII. 
2*  home  from  Decelea.  Aristarchus  entered  into  communi- 
cation with  the  besiegers,  and  deceived  the  garrison  by 
telling  them  that  the  Athenian  government  had  come  to 
terms  with  the  Lacedaemonians,  and  that  by  one  of  the 
conditions  of  the  peace  they  were  required  to  give  up 
the  place  to  the  Boeotians.  They,  trusting  him,  whom 
they  knew  to  be  a  general,  and  being  in  entire  ignorance 
of  what  had  happened  because  they  were  closely  in- 
vested, capitulated  and  came  out.  Thus  Oenoe  was  taken 
and  occupied  by  the  Boeotians  ;  and  the  oligarchical  re- 
volution at  Athens  came  to  an  end. 

During  this  summer  and  about  the  same  time  Min-      99- 
darus  transferred  the  fleet  of  the  Peloponnesians  to  the  ^^P 
Hellespont.     They  had  been  waiting  at  Miletus.     But  Phoenician 
none  of  the  commissioners  whom  Tissaphernes  on  going 
to  Aspendus  appointed  to  supply  the  fleet  gave  them 
anything  ;  and  neither  the  Phoenician  ships  nor  Tissa- 
phernes   himself  had   as   yet   made   their  appearance  ;  phemes  is 
Philip,   who    had    been    sent    with    Tissaphernes,    and  dishonest, 


Hippocrates  a  Spartan,  then  in  Phaselis,  had  informed 

the    admiral    Mindarus    that    the    ships   would    never  f°  Pharna- 

•  bazus  at 

come,  and  that  Tissaphernes  was  thoroughly  dishonest  the  Heiies- 
in  his  dealings  with  them.     All  this  time  Pharnabazus  They  are 
was  inviting  them  and  was  eager  to  secure  the  assistance  Chios.6 
of  the  fleet  ;  he  wanted,  like  Tissaphernes,  to  raise  a 
revolt,  whereby  he  hoped  to  profit,  among  the  cities  in  his 
own  dominion  which  still  remained  faithful  to  Athens. 
So  at  length  Mindarus,  in  good  order  and  giving  the 
signal  suddenly,  lest  he  should  be  discovered  by  the 
Athenians   at    Samos,   put   to    sea   from    Miletus   with 
seventy-three   ships,   and   set   sail   for  the    Hellespont, 
whither  in  this  same  summer  a  Peloponnesian  force  had 
already  gone  in  sixteen  ships,  and  had  overrun  a  portion 
of  the  Chersonese.     But  meeting  with  a  storm  Mindarus 
was  driven  into  Icarus,  and  being  detained  there  five  or 
six  days  by  stress  of  weather,  he  put  in  at  Chios. 

When  Thrasyllus  at  Samos  heard  that  he  had  started      100. 


620  THE   ATHENIANS  IN  LESBOS. 

VIII.     from  Miletus  he  sailed  away  in  all  haste  with  fifty-five  B.C.  411. 
The  Athe-    shipS}  fearing  that  the  enemy  might  get  into  the  Helles-  OL  92'  2' 
pursue        pont    before   him.      Observing   that    Mindarus   was   at 
Observing    Chios',  and  thinking  that  he  could  keep  him  there,  he 
areatoiios,  placed  scouts   at  Lesbos  and  on  the   mainland  oppo- 
s*te'  ^t  ^e  mfe^lt  ^e  informed  if  the  ships  made  any 


to  watch  attempt  to  sail  away.  He  himself  coasted  along  the 
during  island  to  Methymna  and  ordered  a  supply  of  barley- 
besiege17  meal  and  other  provisions,  intending,  if  he  were  long 
E[(rsus  Jl6)'  detained,  to  make  Lesbos  his  head-quarters  while  at- 

which  has 

revolted,  tacking  Chios.  He  wanted  also  to  sail  against  the 
Lesbian  town  of  Eresus,  which  had  revolted,  and,  if 
possible,  to  destroy  the  place.  Now  certain  of  the  chief 
citizens  of  Methymna  who  had  been  driven  into  exile 
had  conveyed  to  the  island  about  fifty  hoplites,  partizans 
of  theirs,  from  Cyme,  besides  others  whom  they  hired 
on  the  mainland,  to  the  number  of  three  hundred  in  all. 
They  were  commanded  by  Anaxander,  a  Theban,  who 
was  chosen  leader  because  the  Lesbians  were  of  Theban 
descent8.  They  first  of  all  attacked  Methymna.  In 
this  attempt  they  were  foiled  by  the  timely  arrival  of  the 
Athenian  garrison  from  Mitylene,  and  being  a  second 
time  repulsed  outside  the  walls,  had  marched  over  the 
mountains  and  induced  Eresus  to  revolt.  Thither  Thra- 
syllus  sailed,  having  determined  to  attack  them  with 
all  his  ships.  He  found  that  Thrasybulus  had  already 
reached  the  place,  having  started  from  Samos  with  five 
ships  as  soon  as  he  heard  that  the  exiles  had  landed. 
But  he  had  come  too  late  to  prevent  the  revolt,  and  was 
lying  off  Eresus.  There  Thrasyllus  was  also  joined  by 
two  ships  which  were  on  their  way  home  from  the  Helles- 
pont, and  by  a  squadron  from  Methymna.  The  whole 
fleet  now  consisted  of  sixty-seven  ships,  from  the  crews 
of  which  the  generals  formed  an  army,  and  prepared  by 
the  help  of  engines  and  by  every  possible  means  to  take 
Eresus. 

IOI.         Meanwhile  Mindarus  and  the  Peloponnesian  fleet  at 
a  Cp.  iii.  2  fin.,  5  med.,  13  init.  ;  viii.  5  init. 


LACEDAEMONIANS  AT  THE  HELLESPONT.    621 

B.C.  411.  Chios,  having  spent  two  days  in  provisioning,  and  having    VIII. 
received  from  the  Chians  three  Chian  tesseracosts  a  for  Tha  Peio- 


each  man,  on  the  third  day  sailed  hastily  from  Chios, 
not  going  through  the  open  sea,  lest  they  should  fall  in  bnef0redawn 
with  the  ships  blockading  Eresus,  but  making  directly  o^1^11103' 
for  the  mainland  and  keeping  Lesbos  on  the  left.     They  evening  of 
touched  at  the  harbour  of  the  island    Carteria,  which  day  arrives 
belongs    to   Phocaea,    and   there   taking    their   midday  Heu'espont. 
meal,  sailed  past  the  Cumaean  territory,  and  supped  at 
Argennusae   on   the   mainland   over  against    Mitylene. 
They   sailed    away   some    time   before    dawn,   and    at 
Harmatus,  which  is  opposite'  Methymna  on  the  main- 
land, they  again  took  their  midday  meal  ;  they  quickly 
passed  by  the  promontory  of  Lectum,  Larissa,  Hamaxi- 
tus,  and  the  neighbouring  towns,  and  finally  arrived  at 
Rhoeteium  in  the  Hellespont  before  midnight.     Some 
of  the   ships   also  put  into  Sigeium  and  other  places 
in  the  neighbourhood. 

The  Athenians,  who  lay  with  eighteen  ships  at  Sestosb,      102. 
knew  from  the  beacons  which  their  scouts  kindled,  and  The  Athe- 
from  the  sudden  blaze  of  many  watch-fires  which  ap-  squadron 
peared  in  the  enemy's  country,  that  the  Peloponnesians  escapes05 
were  on  the  point  of  sailing  into  the  strait.     That  very  *° 
night,  getting  close  under  the  Chersonese,  they  moved  loss» 
towards  Elaeus,  in  the  hope  of  reaching  the  open  sea 
before  the  enemy's  ships  arrived.     They  passed  unseen 
the  sixteen  Peloponnesian  ships  c  which  were  at  Abydos, 
and  had  been  told  by  their  now  approaching  friends  to 
keep   a   sharp  look-out  if  the  Athenians  tried  to  get 
away.     At  dawn  of  day  they  sighted  the  fleet  of  Min- 
darus,  which  immediately  gave   chase  ;    most  of  them 
escaped  in  the  direction  of  Imbros  and  Lemnos,  but 
the  four  which  were  hindermost  were  caught  off  Elaeus. 
One  which  ran  ashore  near  the  temple  of  Protesilaus 

a  A  small  Chian  coin  of  which  the  exact  value  is  unknown  :  if  it 
amounted  to  ^th  of  the  gold  stater  (20  drachmae)  it  would  be 
worth  3  obols,  nearly  $d. 

b  Cp.  viii.  80  fin.  c  Cp.  viii.  99  fin. 


622 


THE    ATHENIANS   FOLLOW. 


VIII. 


103. 

and  rejoins 

the  rest 

of  the 
fleet,  which 


Peioponne- 

sians  had 

gone  north- 
immedi-a 
sued  tPhUem 


104. 

Battle  of 


Athenian 
The  Peio- 


enemfes  in 
the  strait, 

A  counter 

movement 


thTcentre 
of  the 

Athenians, 

nearly 
STthem. 


the  Peloponnesians  took,  together  with  the  crew;  two  B.C.  411. 
others  without  the  crews  ;  a  fourth  they  burnt  on  the  OL  92>  2* 
shore  of  Imbros  ;  the  crew  escaped. 

For  the  rest  of  that  day  they  blockaded  Elaeus  with 
the  ships  from  Abydos  which  had  now  joined  them  ;  the 

•       i     n 

united  fleet  numbering  eighty-six;  but  as  the  town 
would  not  yield  they  sailed  away  to  Abydos. 

The  Athenians,  whose  scouts  had  failed  them,  and 
who  had  never  imagined  that  the  enemy's  fleet  could 

* 

pass  them  undetected,  were  quietly  besieging  Eresus  ; 
but  on  finding  out  their  mistake  they  instantly  set  sail 
and  followed  the  enemy  {o  the  Hellespont.  They  fell 
in  with  and  took  two  Peloponnesian  ships,  which  during 
the  pursuit  had  ventured  too  far  into  the  open  sea.  On 
the  following  day  they  came  to  Elaeus,  where  they  re- 
mained at  anchor,  and  the  ships  which  had  taken  refuge 
at  Imbros  joined  them  ;  the  next  five  days  were  spent 
in  making  preparations  for  the  impending  engagement. 

After  this  they  fought,  and  the  manner  of  the  battle 
was  as  follows.  The  Athenians  began  to  sail  in  column 
close  along  the  shore  towards  Sestos,  when  the  Pelo- 
ponnesians,  observing  them,  likewise  put  to  sea  from 
Abydos.  Perceiving  that  a  battle  was  imminent,  the 
Athenians,  numbering  seventy-six  ships,  extended  their 
line  along  the  Chersonese  from  Idacus  to  Arrhiani, 
and  the  Peloponnesians,  numbering  eighty-eight  ships, 
^rom  Abydos  to  Dardanus.  The  Syracusans  held  the 
right  wing  of  the  Peloponnesians  ;  the  other  wing,  on 

s  ...  °'. 

which  were  the  swiftest  ships,  was  led  by  Mindarus  him- 
self.  Thrasyllus  commanded  the  left  wing  of  the  Athe- 
n^ans»  and  Thrasybulus  the  right  ;  the  other  generals 
haci  their  several  posts.  The  Peloponnesians  were  eager 

.  .      .    . 

to  begin  the  engagement,  intending,  as  their  left  wing 
extended  beyond  the  right  of  the  Athenians,  to  prevent 
them,  if  possible,  from  sailing  again  out  of  the  straits,  and 
also  to  thrust  their  centre  back  on  the  land  which  was 
near.  The  Athenians,  seeing  their  intention,  advanced 
from  the  land  the  wing  on  which  the  enemy  wanted  to 


BATTLE    OF   CYNOSSEMA.  623 

B.C.  411.  cut  them  off,  and  succeeded  in  getting  beyond  them.  VIII. 
92>  2'  But  their  left  wing  by  this  time  had  passed  the  pro- 
montory of  Cynossema,  and  the  result  was  that  the 
centre  of  their  line  was  thinned  and  weakened  —  all  the 
more  since  their  numbers  were  inferior  and  the  sharp 
projection  of  the  shore  about  Cynossema  hindered  those 
who  were  on  one  side  from  seeing  what  was  taking  place 
on  the  other. 

So  the  Peloponnesians,  falling  upon  the  centre  of  the  105. 
Athenian  fleet,  forced  their  enemies'  ships  back  on  the  B"t  in  the 

moment  of 

beach,   and    having   gained  a  decisive   advantage,   dis-  victory  the 
embarked  to  follow  up  their  victory.     Neither  Thrasy- 
bulus   on   the   right  wing,  who   was   pressed    hard   by 
superior  numbers,  nor  Thrasyllus  on  the  left,  was  able  to  and  are 

7  defeated  by 

assist  them.  The  promontory  of  Cynossema  hindered  a  sudden 
the  left  wing  from  seeing  the  action,  and  the  ships  of  the  Thrasybu- 
Syracusans  and  others,  equal  in  number  to  their  own,  lus- 
kept  them  fully  engaged.  But  at  last,  while  the  victo- 
rious Peloponnesians  were  incautiously  pursuing,  some 
one  ship,  some  another,  a  part  of  their  line  began  to 
fall  into  disorder.  Thrasybulus  remarked  their  con- 
fusion, and  at  once  left  off  extending  his  wing  ;  then 
turning  upon  the  ships  which  were  opposed  to  him, 
he  repulsed  and  put  them  to  flight  ;  he  next  faced  a  the 
conquering  and  now  scattered  ships  of  the  Pelopon- 
nesian  centre,  struck  at  them,  and  threw  them  into  such 
a  panic  that  hardly  any  of  them  resisted.  The  Syra- 
cusans  too  had  by  this  time  given  way  to  Thrasyllus, 
and  were  still  more  inclined  to  fly  when  they  saw  the 
others  flying. 

After  the  rout  the  Peloponnesians  effected  their  106. 
escape,  most  of  them  to  the  river  Meidius  first,  and  then  Effect  of 
to  Abydos.  Not  many  ships  were  taken  by  the  Athe-  on  the 


nians;    for   the    Hellespont,   being   narrow,    afforded 
retreat  to  the  enemy  within  a  short  distance.     Never-  ™ey  can 
theless  nothing  could  have   been   more   opportune  for  believe 
them  than  this  victory  at  sea  ;  for  some  time  past  they  fortune?0 
a  Or,  '  intercepted.' 


62,4      RETURN   OF  ALCIBIADES    TO    SAMOS. 

VIII.     had  feared  the  Peloponnesian  navy  on  account  of  their  B.C.  411. 

Twenty-one  disaster  in  Sicily,  as  well  as  of  the  various  smaller  defeats  ° 

the  enemy    which  they  had  sustained*.      But  now  they  ceased  to 

and  fifteen   depreciate  themselves  or  to  think  much  of  their  enemies' 

ownTost.     seamanship.     They  had  taken  eight  Chian  vessels,  five 

Corinthian,  two  Ambracian,  two  Boeotian,  and  of  the 

Leucadians,    Lacedaemonians,   Syracusans,   and    Pelle- 

nians   one   each.     Their  own  loss  amounted  to   fifteen 

ships.     They   raised   a   trophy   on   the   promontory   of 

Cynossema,  and  then  collecting  the  wrecks,  and  giving 

up  to  the  enemy  his  dead  under  a  flag  of  truce,  sent 

a  trireme  carrying  the  news  of  the  victory  to  Athens. 

On  the  arrival  of  the  ship  the  Athenians  could  hardly 

believe  their  good-fortune,  and  after  the  calamities  which 

had  befallen  them  in  Euboea  and  during  the  revolution, 

they  were  greatly  encouraged.     They  thought  that  their 

affairs  were  no  longer  hopeless,  and  that  if  they  were 

energetic  they  might  still  win. 

107.  The   Athenians   at    Sestos   promptly   repaired    their 
Eight  more  ships,  and  were  proceeding  against  Cyzicus,  which  had 

Peloponne-  r     .  e       f  J 

sian  ships  revolted,  when,  seeing  the  eight  Peloponnesian  ships b 
theAthe-  Y  from  Byzantium  anchored  at  Harpagium  and  Priapus, 
They'  they  bore  down  upon  them,  and  defeating  the  land- 
recover  forces  which  were  acting  with  them,  took  the  ships. 

Cyzicus  (17) 

which  has  They  then  went  and  recovered  Cyzicus,  which  was 
unwalled,  and  exacted  a  contribution  from  the  in- 
habitants. Meanwhile  the  Peloponnesians  sailed  from 
Abydos  to  Elaeus,  and  recovered  as  many  of  their 
own  captured  vessels  as  were  still  sea-worthy;  the  rest 
had  been  burnt  by  the  Elaeusians.  They  then  sent 
Hippocrates  and  Epicles  to  Euboea  to  bring  up  the 
ships  which  were  there. 

1 08.  About  the  same  time  Alcibiades  sailed  back  with  his 
Alcibiades    thirteen  ships0  from   Caunus  and    Phaselis  to   Samos, 
fromnTissa-  announcing  that  he  had  prevented  the  Phoenician  fleet 
whomlie     fr°m  coming  to  the  assistance  of  the  enemy,  and  that  he 

a  Cp.  viii.  95,  102.  b  Cp.  viii.  80  fin. 

c  Cp.  viii.  88  init. 


ARSACES   AND    THE    DELIANS.  625 

B.C.  411.  had  made  Tissaphernes  a  greater  friend  of  the  Athe-    VIII. 
92>  2'  nians  than  ever.    He  then  manned  nine  additional  ships,  professes  to 

nave  made 

and  exacted  large  sums  of  money  from  the  Halicarnas-  a  fast  friend 
sians.     He  also  fortified  Cosa,  where  he  left  a  governor,  Athenians. 
and  towards  the  autumn  returned  to  Samos. 

When   Tissaphernes   heard   that    the    Peloponnesian  Tissa- 
fleet  had  sailed  from  Miletus  to  the  Hellespont,  he  broke  marches 
up  his  camp  at  Aspendus  and  marched  away  towards  j^  toThe 
Ionia.     Now  after  the  arrival  of  the  Peloponnesians 


the  Hellespont,  the  Antandrians,  who  are  Aeolians,  had  of  his 
procured  from  them  at  Abydos  a  force  of  infantry,  which  Arsaces 
they  led  through  Mount  Ida  and  introduced  into  their  ^tuacne.the 


city.  They  were  oppressed  by  Arsaces  the  Persian,  a 
lieutenant  of  Tissaphernes.  This  Arsaces,  when  the  garrison 
Athenians,  wishing  to  purify  Delos,  expelled  the  in-  peSpon- 
habitants  and  they  settled  in  Adramyttium  b,  professing  nesians- 
to  have  a  quarrel  which  he  did  not  wish  to  declare 
openly,  asked  their  best  soldiers  to  form  an  army  for 
him.  He  then  led  them  out  of  the  town  as  friends  and 
allies,  and,  taking  advantage  of  their  midday  meal, 
surrounded  them  with  his  own  troops,  and  shot  them 
down.  This  deed  alarmed  the  Antandrians,  who  thought 
that  they  might  meet  with  some  similar  violence  at  his 
hands  ;  and  as  he  was  imposing  upon  them  burdens 
which  were  too  heavy  for  them,  they  expelled  his 
garrison  from  their  citadel. 

Tissaphernes,  who  was  already  offended  at  the  ex-     109. 
pulsion  of  his  garrison  from  Miletus  c.  and  from  Cnidus  d,  Tissa- 

,      ,  ,  .    phernes  de- 

where  the  same  thing  had  happened,  perceived  that  this  termines  to 


new  injury  was  the  work  of  the  Peloponnesians.     He 

felt  that  they  were  now  his  determined  enemies,  and  was  "^^s  and 

apprehensive  of  some  further  injury.     He  was  also  dis-  them,  while 

gusted  at  discovering   that   Pharnabazus   had   induced  himself. 

the  Peloponnesians  to  join  him,  and  was  likely  in  less 

time  and  at  less  expense  to  be  more  successful  in  the 

war  with   the  Athenians  than  himself.      He  therefore 


a  Cp.  viii.  41  med.  b  Cp.  v.  i. 

c  Cp  viii.  84  med.  d  Cp.  viii.  35  init. 

S  S 


626  TISSAPHERNES. 

VIII.     determined  to  go  to  the  Hellespont,  and  complain  of  B.C.  411. 
He  stops  on  their  conduct  in  the  affair  of  Antandrus,  offering  at  the01'92'*' 
-Ephesus,     same  time  the  most  plausible  defence  which  he  could 
ficesStoCn     concerning  the  non-arrival  of  the  Phoenician  fleet  and 
Artemis       their  other  grievances.     He  first  went  to  Ephesus,  and 
there  offered  sacrifice  to  Artemis.  . 


[With  the  end  of  the  winter  which  follows  this  sum- 
mer the  twenty-first  year  of  the  Peloponnesian  War  is 
completed.] 


INDEX. 


The  compilation  of  this  Index  has  been  greatly  assisted  by  the  Geo- 
graphical and  Historical  Index  prepared  by  Mr.  Tiddeman  for, the 
later  editions  of  Arnold's  Thucydides. 

The  subdivision  of  the  chapters  not  agreeing  in  different  editions,  each 
chapter  is  referred  to  in  three  parts,  marked,  init.,  med.,  fin. 


A. 

Abdera,  situation  of,  ii.  97  init. ; 
Nymphodorus  of  Abdera,  ii.  29. 

Abydos,  a  Milesian  colony,  viii.  61 
init. ;  revolts  to  the  Lacedaemo- 
nians, ib.  62  ;  Strombichides  re- 
called from,  ib.  79  med. ;  the  Pelo- 
ponnesian  head-quarters,  ib.  102- 
108. 

Acamantis,  an  Athenian  tribe,  iv. 
118  fin. 

Acanthus,  an  Andrian  colony,  iv.  84 
init.;  revolts  from  Athens,  ib.  84- 
88  ;  provision  respecting,  in  the 
treaty  between  Lacedaemon  and 
Athens,  v.  18,  vi  ;  speech  of 
Brasidas  at,  iv.  85-87, 114  med., 
120  med.;  Acanthian  troops  with 
Brasidas,  ib.  124  init. 

Acanthus,  a  Lacedaemonian,  swears 
to  the  Treaty  of  Peace  and  the 

.    Alliance,  v.  19  med.,  ib.  24  init. 

Acarnan,  eponymous  hero  of  Acar- 

.    nania,  ii.  102  fin. 

Acarnania,  named  after  Acar- 
nan, ii.  102  fin.  ;  opposite  to 
Cephallenia,  ii.  30  fin.;  invaded 
by  the  Ambraciots,  ib.  80-82  ; 
the  Acarnanians  always  carry 
arms,  i.  5  fin.  ;  skilful  slingers,  ii. 
8 1  fin.,  vii.  31  fin.  ;  their  com- 
mon council,  iii.  105  init.;  allies 
of  Athens  [except  Oeniadae,  ii. 
1 02  init.],  ii.  7  fin.,  9  med.,  68  fin., 
iii.  95  med.,  102  med.,  iv.  77  med., 
89,  101  med.,  vii.  57  fin.,  60  fin., 
67  med.  ;  expedition  of  Phormio 
against  Oeniadae,  ii.  102  ;  request 
as  their  commander  a  relation  of 
Phormio,  iii.  7  ;  attack  Leucas, 


.  iii.  94  init.  med. ;  defeat  the  Am- 
braciots, ib.  105-113;  conclude 
a  treaty  with  Ambracia,  ib.  114 
med.;  colonize  Anactorium,iv.49. 

Acesines,  ariver  in  Sicily,  iv.  25  med, 

Achaea  [in  Peloponnesus],  restored 
by  the  Athenians,  i.  115  init.  [cp. 
i.  1 1 1  fin.] ;  redemanded  from  the 
Lacedaemonians  by  Cleon,  iv. 
21  med.;  resettled  by  the  Lace- 
daemonians, v.  82  init.;  Achae- 
ans,  the  original  Hellenes,  i. 
3  med.;  founders  of  Zacynthus, 
ii.  66 ;  found  Scione  on  their 
return  from  Troy,  iv.  120  init.; 
allies  of  the  Athenians,  i.  1 1 1  fin.; 
at  first  neutral  in  the  war,  except 
the  Pellenes,  ii.  9  init;  not  al- 
lowed to  join  in  the  foundation 
of  Heraclea,  iii.  92  fin.;  support 
the  Peloponnesians  in  the  en- 
gagement off  Erineum,  vii.  34  init. 

Achaea  [Pthiotis],  iv.  78  init.;  sub- 
ject to  the  Thessalians,  viii.  3  med. 

Acharnae,  the  largest  of  the  Athe- 
nian Demes,  ii.  19  fin.,  ib.  21  fin., 
23  init.;  ravaged  by  the  Pelopon- 
nesians, ib.  19  fin. 

Achelous,  ii.  102  med.,  iii.  7  med.T 
106  init.;  description  of  its  Delta, 

.    ii.  102  med. 

Acheron,  a  river  in  Thesprotis,  i. 
46  fin. 

Acherusian  lake,  in  Thesprotis,  i. 
46  med. 

Achilles,  followers  of,  the  original 
Hellenes,  i.  3  med. 

Acrae,  founded  by  the  Syracusans, 
vi.  5  init. 

Acraean  height,  in  Sicily,  vii.  78  fin. 

Acragas,  a  river  in  Sicily,  vi.  4  med. 


S  S  2 


628 


I N  D  E  X. 


Acragas,  see  Agrigentum. 

Acropolis  of  Athens:  ii.  13  med., 
15  med.;  taken  by  Cylon,  i.  126; 
anciently  called  Pelts,  ii.  15  fin.; 
preserved  from  occupation  in 
the  plague,  ii.  17  init. ;  treaties  of 
peace  recorded  on  tablets  there, 
v.  1 8,  xi;23, iv 547  fin.;  inscription 
in,  commemorating  the  oppres- 
sion of  the  tyrants,  vi.  55  init. 

Acrothous,  in  Acte,  iv.  109  med. 

Acte,  the  peninsula  of,  iv.  109. 

Actium,  the  Corinthian  fleet  met  by 
a  Corcyraean  herald  at,  i.  29  med. ; 
the  Corinthians  encamp  near,  ib. 
30  fin. 

Adeimantus,  father  of  Aristeus,  a 
Corinthian,  i.  60  med. 

Admetus,  king  of  Molossians,  pro- 
tects Themistocles,  i.  136,  137. 

Adramyttium,  settled  by  the  Deli- 
ans,  v.  i  fin.,  viii.  108  fin. 

Aeantides,  son-in-law  of  Hippias 
the  tyrant,  vi.  59  fin. 

Aegaleos,  Mount,  in  Attica,  ii.  19 fin. 

Aegean  Sea,  i.  98  med.,  iv.  109  med. 

Aegina,  on  the  direct  route  from 
Athens  to  Argos,  v.  53  fin.; 
colonized  from  Athens,  ii.  27, 
vii.  57  init.,  viii.  69  med.;  Corcy- 
raean envoys  deposited  in,  iii.  72 
init.;  the  settlers  in  Aegina  at 
Mantinea,  v.  74  fin.;  at  Syracuse, 
vii.  57  init.;  aid  in  the  oligar- 
chical conspiracy  at  Athens,  viii. 
69  med.;  the  Sicilian  expedition 
races  as  far  as,  vi.  32  med.;  the 
reinforcements  stay  at,  vii.  20  fin., 
26  init.;  ravaged  by  the  Pelopon- 
nesians,  viii.  92  med.;  former 
naval  power  of  the  Aeginetans, 
i.  14  fin.;  first  war  between  the 
Aeginetans  and  Athenians,  ib.  14 
fin.,  ib.  41  init.;  second,  ib.  105; 
come  to  terms  with  the  Athe- 
nians, ib.  108  fin.;  the  Aegine- 
tans secretly  urge  on  the  war, 
ib.  67  med. ;  the  Lacedaemonians 
demand  their  independence,  ib. 
139  init.,  140  med.;  expelled  by 
the  Athenians,  ii.  27  init. ;  settled 
by  the  Lacedaemonians  at  Thy- 
rea,  ib.  med. ;  assist  the  Lacedae- 
monians in  the  war  of  Ithome,  ib. 
fin.;  attacked  by  the  Athenians  in 


Thyrea,  iv.  56  fin.,  57  init. ;  the  sur- 
vivors put  to  death,  ib.  fin. 

Aegitium,  in  Aetolia,  iii.  97  med. 

Aeimnestus,  a  Plataean,  father  of 
Lacon,  iii.  52  fin. 

Aeneas,  a  Corinthian,  iv.  119  med. 

Aenesias,  Ephor  at  Sparta,  ii.  2  init. 

Aenianians,  in  Malis,  v.  51  init. 

Aenus,  in  Thrace,  iv.  28  med.; 
founded  from  Boeotia,  vii.  57 
med. ;  tributary  to  Athens,  ib. 

Aeoladas,  a  Theban,  father  of  Pa- 
gondas,  iv.  91  med. 

Aeolian  countries  and  cities,  Boeo- 
tia, vii.  57  med.;  Lesbos,  ib.  [cp. 
iii.  2  fin.,  5  med.,  13  init.,  viii.  4 
med.,  100  med.];  Tenedos,  vii. 
57;  Aenus,  ib.\  Cume,  iii.  31  init.; 
Antandros,  viii.  108  med. 

Aeolian  islands,  see  Liparaean 
islands. 

Aeolian  subjects  of  the  Athenians 
at  Syracuse,  vii.  57  med. 

Aeolians,  ancient  occupants  of  Co- 
rinth, iv.  42  med. 

Aeolis,  former  name  of  Calydon 
and  Pleuron,  iii.  102  med. 

Aesimides,  a  Corcyraean  com- 
mander, i.  47  init. 

Aeson,  an  Argive  envoy  to  Lacedae- 
mon,  v.  40  fin. 

Aethea,  Lacedaemonian  Perioeci 
of,  i.  101  init. 

Aethiopia,  plague  said  to  have  be- 
gun in,  ii.  48  init. 

Aetna,  eruption  of,  iii.  1 16;  the  third 
since  the  Hellenic  settlements 
of  Sicily,  ib. 

Aetolia,  customs  of  the  Aetolians,  i. 
5  fin.,  iii.  94  fin.;  disastrous  cam- 
paign of  the  Athenians  in,  ib.  94 
med.~98  [cp.  iv.  30  init.];  the 
Aetolians  persuade  the  Lacedae- 
monians to  send  an  expedition 
against  Naupactus,  ib.  100;  join  in 
the  expedition,  ib.  102  init.;  Aeto- 
lians before  Syracuse,  vii.  57  fin. 

Agamemnon,  power  of,  i.  9;  pos- 
sessed a  great  navy,  ib. 

Agatharchidas,  a  Corinthian  com- 
mander, ii.  83  fin. 

Agatharchus,  a  Sicilian  com- 
mander, vii.  25  init.,  70  init. 

Agesander,  father  of  Agesandridas, 
a  Spartan,  viii.  91  med. 


/  N  D  E  X. 


Agesandridas,  a  Spartan  com- 
mander, viii.  91  med.,  94,  95. 

Agesippidas,  a  Lacedaemonian 
commander,  v.  56  init. 

Agis,  king  of  Lacedaemon,  iii.  89 
init,  iv.  2  init.;  invades  Attica, 
ib.  2  init.,  6;  swears  to  the  Treaty 
of  Alliance,  v.  24  init.;  marches 
towards  Argos,  but  retires,  ib. 
54;  attacks  Argos,  ib.  57;  sur- 
rounds the  Argives,  ib.  58,  59; 
makes  a  truce  with  the  Ar- 
gives, ib.  60  init.;  blamed  for  his 
conduct,  and  threatened  with 
punishment,  ib.  60  med.,  63; 
nearly  commits  a  second  error, 
ib.  65  init.;  draws  the  Argives 
into  the  plain,  ib.  fin. ;  surprised 
by  the  enemy  before  Mantinea, 
ib.  66  init. ;  defeats  the  enemy,  ib. 
70-74 ;  leads  a  new  expedition  to 
Argos,  ib.  83  init. ;  invades  Attica, 
and  fortifies  Decelea,  vii.  19  init., 
27  med.;  raises  money  for  a  navy, 
viii.  3  init. ;  his  great  powers,  viii. 
4  fin. ;  rejects  the  peace  proposals 
of  the  Athenian  oligarchs,  ib.  70 
fin.;  repulsed  from  the  walls  of 
Athens,  ib.  71;  advises  the  Four 
Hundred  to  send  ambassadors  to 
Sparta,  ib.  fin.;  an  enemy  of 
Alcibiades,  viii.  12  fin.,  45  init. 

Agraeans,  in  yEtolia,  ii.  102  med., 
iii.  106  med. ;  ib.  1 1 1  fin.,  1 14  med. ; 
forced  into  the  Athenian  alliance, 
iv.  77  fin. ;  employed  in  a  descent 
upon  Sicyon,  ib.  101  med. 

Agrianians,  in  Paeonia,  ii.  96 
med. 

Agrigentum,  founded  from  Gela, 
vi.  4  med. ;  gained  over  by  Phaeax 
to  the  Athenian  alliance,  v.  4 
fin.;  remains  neutral  in  the  war 
bevveen  Syracuse  and  Athens,  vii. 
32  med.,  ib.  33  init.,  ib.  58  init.; 
falls  into  revolution,  vii.  46;  vic- 
tory of  the  anti-Syracusan  party, 
ib.  50  init. 

Alcaeus,  Archon  at  Athens,  v.  19 
init.,  ib.  25  init. 

Alcamenes,  a  Lacedaemonian  com- 
mander, viii.  4 ;  ordered  to  Les- 
bos by  Agis,  ib.  8  med.;  driven 
into  Piraeum  by  the  Athenians 
and  slain,  ib.  10  fin. 


Alcibiades,  the  name  Lacedaemo- 
nian, viii.  6  med.;  his  extravagant 
character,  vi.  12  fin.;  had  a  great 
share  in  the  ruin  of  Athens, 
ib.  15;  his  victories  at  Olympia, 
ib.  1 6  init.;  head  of  the  war  party 
at  Athens,  v.  43  init.,  vi.  15  init.; 
irritated  by  the  contempt  of  the 
Lacedaemonians,  v.  43  med.;  ne- 
gotiates an  alliance  with  Argos, 
Mantinea  and  Elis,  ib.  44,  46; 
deceives  the  Lacedaemonian  en- 
voys, ib.  45  ;  his  activity  in  Pelo- 
ponnesus, ib.  52  fin.,  53,  55  [cp. 
vi.  16  fin];  persuades  the  Athe- 
nians to  declare  the  treaty  broken 
and  resettle  the  Helots  at  Pylos, 
ib.  56 med.;  ambassador  at  Argos, 
ib.  6 1  med., 76 med.;  seizes  a  num- 
ber of  suspected  Argives,  ib.  84 
init.;  appointed  one  of  the  gene- 
rals in  Sicily,  vi.  8  med.;  speech 
of,  ib.  16-18;  accused  of  mutilat- 
ing the  Hermae  and  celebrating 
the  mysteries  in  private  houses, 
ib.  28  init.;  begs  in  vain  to  be 
tried  before  sailing,  #.29;  opinion 
of,  in  a  council  of  war,  ib.  48; 
summoned  home,  ib.  53  init.,  61; 
escapes  at  Thurii,  ib.  fin.;  con- 
demned to  death,  ib.\  causes  the 
failure  of  a  plot  to  betray  Messina, 
ib.  74  init. ;  goes  to  Lacedaemon, 
ib.  88  fin.;  his  speech  there,  ib. 
89-92;  persuades  the  Lacedae- 
monians to  fortify  Decelea,  vii.  18 
init.;  supports  the  Chians  at 
Sparta,  viii.  6 med.;  persuades  the 
Spartan  government  not  to  give  up 
the  Chian  expedition,  viii.  12;  sent 
to  Ionia  with  Chalcideus,  ib.  12 
fin. ;  induces  the  revolt  of  Chios, 
Erythrae,  Clazomenae,  ib.  14; 
chases  Strombichides  into  Sa- 
mos,  ib.  1 6 ;  causes  the  revolt  of 
Teos,  ib.  fin.;  and  of  Miletus,  ib. 
17;  present  at  an  engagement 
before  Miletus,  ib.  26  fin.;  falls 
into  disfavour  with  the  Lacedae- 
monians, ib.  45  init.;  retires  to 
Tissaphernes,  and  endeavours 
to  ruin  the  Peloponnesian  cause, 
ib.  med. ;  repulses  the  revolted 
cities  when  they  beg  money,  ib. 
fin.;  instructs  Tissaphernes  to 


$30 


INDEX. 


balance  the  Athenians  and  Lace- 
daemonians against  each  other, 
ib.  46  ;  conspires  with  some  Athe- 
nians at  Samos  to  overthrow  the 
democracy,  ib.  47-49  ;  opposed 
by  Phrynichus,  ib.  48  fin.;  whom 
he  endeavours  unsuccessfully  to 
ruin,  ib.  50,  51;  seeks  to  draw 
Tissaphernes  over  to  the  Athe- 
nian cause,  ib.  52  init.;  persuades 
Tissaphernes  to  demand  impos- 
sible terms  from  Peisander,  ib. 
56  ;  recalled  by  the  Athenians  at 
Samos,  ib.  81  init.;  encourages 
them  with  extravagant  hopes,  ib. 
81;  restrains  them  from  sailing 
to  the  Piraeus,  ib.  82  ;  made 

,  commander-in-chief,  ib.;  goes  to 
Tissaphernes,  ib. ;  again  restrains 
the  people  from  sailing  to  the 
Piraeus,  and  thus  performs  an 
eminent  service,  ib.  86  med.;  sails 
to  Aspendus,  promising  to  keep 
the  Phoenician  fleet  back,  ib.  88  ; 
recalled  by  the  Athenians  at 
home,  ib.  97  fin.;  returns  from 
Caunus,  professing  to  have  se- 
cured Tissaphernes'  friendship 
for  Athens,  ib.  108  init.;  returns 
to  Samos,  ib.  med. 

Alcidas,  takes  command  of  the  Pe- 
loponnesian  fleet  sent  to  Lesbos, 
iii.  16  fin.,  26  init.;  arrives  too 
late,  ib.  29 ;  determines  to  return, 
ib.  31 ;  slaughters  his  captives, 
ib.  32  ;  is  chased  to  Patmos  by 
the  Athenians,  ib.  33,  69  init.; 
sails  to  Corcyra,  ib.  69,  76;  en- 
gages the  Athenians,  ib.  77,  78; 
retires,  ib.  79-81;  helps  in  the 
foundation  of  Heraclea,  ib.  92  fin. 

Alcinadas,  a  Lacedaemonian,swears 
to  the  Treaty  of  Peace  and  the 
Alliance,  v.  19  med.;  ib.  24  init. 

Alcinous,  Temple  of  Zeus  and  Al- 

,    cinous  at  Corcyra,  iii.  70  med. 

Alciphron,  an  Argive,  makes  terms 
with  Agis,  v.  59  fin.,  60  init. 

Alcisthenes,  an  Athenian,  father  of 
Demosthenes,  iii.  91  init.,  iv.  66 
med.,  vii.  16  fin. 

Alcmaeon,  the  story  of,  ii.  102  fin. 

Alcmaeonidae,  aid  in  the  deposi- 
tion of  Hippias,  vi.  59  fin. 

Alexander,  the  father  of  Perdiccas, 


king  of  Macedonia,  i.  57  init.,  ib. 
137  init.;  of  Argive  descent,  ii. 
99  init. 

Alexarchus,  a  Corinthian  com- 
mander, vii.  19  med. 

Alexicles,  an  Athenian  general  of 
the  oligarchical  party,  seized  by 
the  popular  party,  viii.  92  med.; 

.  released,  93  init.;  flees  to  Dece- 
lea,  98  init. 

Alexippidas,  Ephor  at  Lacedaemon, 
viii.  58  init. 

Alicyaei,  in  Sicily,  vii.  32  med. 

All  things  have  their  times  of  growth 
and  decay,  ii.  64  med. 

Allies  [of  the  Athenians],  ii.  9  fin.; 
character  of  the  league,  i.  19; 
used  to  meet  at  Delos,  i.  96 
fin.;  formerly  independent,  ib.  97 
init.;  their  gradual  subjugation, 
ib.  99  [cp.  iii.  10,  ii,  vi.  76]; 
those  present  before  Syracuse, 

,    vii.  57 ;  admired   in   Hellas   for 

.  their  adoption  of  Athenian  lan- 
guage and  manners,  vii.  63  med. 

Allies  [of  the  Lacedaemonians],  ii. 
9  init.;  formation  of  the  league, 
i.  1 8  ;  its  character,  ib.  19  ;  allies 
summoned  to  Sparta,  i.  67  ;  again 
summoned,  ib.  119;  vote  for  war, 
ib.  125. 

Almopia,  in  Macedonia,  ii.  99  fin. 

Alope,  in  Locris,  ii.  26  fin. 

Altar,  of  Apollo  the  Founder,  at 
Naxos,  vi.  3  init.;  the  Pythian 
Apollo,  erected  by  Pisistratus  at 
Athens,  ib.  54  fin.;  [Athene]  in 
the  Acropolis,  i.  126  med.j  the 
awful  Goddesses  at  Athens,  ib.\ 
the  Twelve  Gods  at  Athens,  vi. 
54  fin.;  Olympian  Zeus,  v.  50  init. 

Altars,  a  sanctuary  and  refuge,  iv. 
98  fin.;  viii.  84  med. 

Alyzia,  in  Acarnania,  vii.  31  init. 

Ambracia,  a  Corinthian  colony,  ii. 
80  med.,  vii.  58  med.;  an  ally  of 
the  Lacedaemonians,  ii.  9  init.; 
the  Ambraciots  the  most  warlike 
of  the  Epeirots,  iii.  108  med--; 
they  send  troops  to  Epidamnus, 
i.  26  init. ;  furnish  ships  to  Corinth, 
ib.  27  fin.,  ib.  46  init.,  48  fin.;  de- 
feated in  the  engagement  off  Sy- 
bota,  ib.  49  med.;  attack  the  Am- 
philochian  Argives,  ii.  68 ;  invade 


INDEX. 


631 


Acarnania,  ib.  80 ;  retire,  ib.  82  ; 
send  reinforcements  to  Alcidas, 
iii.  69 ;  persuade  the  Lacedae- 
monians to  attack  the  Amphilo- 
.  chian  Argos,  ib.  102  fin.;  join  the 
Lacedaemonians  in  the  expedi- 
tion, ib.  105,  106 ;  defeated  by 
the  Acarnanians,  under  Demos- 
thenes, ib.  107,  1 08  ;  deserted  by 
the  Peloponnesians,  ib.  109,  ill; 
total  destruction  of  their  rein- 
forcements, ib.  112,  113;  great- 
ness of  the  calamity,  ib.  113  fin.; 
conclude  a  treaty  with  the  Acar- 
nanians, ib.  114  med.;  receive  a 
garrison  from  Corinth,  ib.  fin.; 
assist  Gylippus  with  ships,  vi. 
104  med.,  vii.  4  fin.,  7  init.,  58 
med.;  present  at  Cynossema,  viii. 
io6med.;  Ambraciot  envoys  sent 
by  the  Syracusans  to  the  Sicilian 
cities  after  the  capture  of  Plem- 
myrium,  vii.  25  fin.;  slain  by  the 
Sicels,  ib.  32. 

Ambracian  gulf,  i.  29  med.,  55  init. 

Ameiniades,  Athenian  ambassador 
to  Seuthes,  ii.  67  med. 

Ameinias,  a  Lacedaemonian  envoy, 
iv.  132  fin. 

Ameinocles,  the  Corinthian  ship- 
builder, i.  13  init. 

Ammeas,  a  Plataean  commander, 
iii.  22  med. 

Amorges,  the  bastard  son  of  Pis- 
suthnes,  revolts  in  Caria,  viii.  5 
fin.,  19  init.;  captured  by  the 
Peloponnesians,  and  handed  over 
to  Tissaphernes,  ib.  28  med.;  said 
by  Peisander  to  have  been  be- 
trayed by  Phrynichus,  ib.  54  med. 

Ampelidas,  a  Lacedaemonian  envoy 
to  Argos,  v.  22  med. 

Amphiaraus,  father  of  Amphilochus, 
ii.  68  init.;  of  Alcmaeon,  ii.  102 
med. 

Amphias,  an  Epidaurian,  iv.  119 
med. 

Amphidorus,aMegarian,iv.i  I9med. 

Amphilochia,  colonized  by  Amphi- 
lochus, ii.  68  init.;  the  Amphi- 
lochians  barbarians,  ib.  med.,  iii. 
ii2fm.;learntGreekfromtheAm- 
braciots,  ii.  68  med.;  expelled  by 
the  Ambraciots,  ii.  68  med.;  rein- 
stated by  Athenian  aid,  ib.  fin.; 


attacked  by  the  Ambraciots  and 
Lacedaemonians,  iii.  105  ;  join 
Demosthenes  at  Olpae,  ib.  107 
init.;  defeated,  108  med.;  destroy 
the  Ambraciot  fugitives  from 
Idomene,  ib.  112  ;  make  a  treaty 
with  Ambracia,  ib.  114  med. 

Amphilochian  Hills,  iii.  112  init. 

Amphipolis,  formerly  called  'The 
Nine  Ways,'  i.  100  fin.,  iv.  102 
med.;  origin  of  the  name,  iv.  102 
fin.;  attempted  colonization  of, 
by  Aristagoras,  iv.  102  init.;  un- 
successful settlement  of,  by  the 
Athenians,  i.  icofin.,  iv.  102  init.; 
colonized  by  Hagnon,  iv.  102 
med.,  v.  1 1  init.;  'Thracian  gates ' 
of,  v.  10  init,  med.;  temple  of 
Athen£  at,  ib.\  captured  by  Brasi- 
das,  iv.  102-106 ;  battle  of,  v. 
6-1 1,  12  fin.;  ordered  to  be  sur- 
rendered under  treaty,  v.  18,  v; 
not  surrendered,  ib.  21,  35,  46; 
abandonment  of  an  Athenian 
expedition  against,  v.  83  fin.; 
unsuccessfully  attacked  by  the 
Athenians,  vii.  9 ;  the  Amphipoli- 
tans  make  Brasidas  their  founder, 
v.  1 1  init. 

Amphissa,  in  Ozolian  Locris,iii.  101 
init. 

Amyclae,  temple  of  Apollo  at,  v.  18, 
xi :  ib.  23,  iv. 

Amyntas,  son  of  Philip,  ii.  95  fin., 
ib.  zoo  med. 

Amyrtaeus,  the  Egyptian  king  in 
the  fens,  i.  no  init.,  ib.  112  med. 

Anactorium,  i.  29  med. ;  sends  aid 
to  Corinth,  ib.  46  init.,  ii.  9  init.; 
hostile  to  the  Acarnanians,  iii.  1 14 
fin. ;  held  by  the  Corinthians  and 
Corcyraeans  in  common,  i.  5  5  init. ; 
captured  by  the  Corinthians,  ib.\ 
betrayed  to  the  Athenians,  iv.  49 
init.;  colonized  by  the  Acarna- 
nians, ib.  fin.;  occupied  by  the 
Athenians,  vii.  31  init.;  not  sur- 
rendered in  the  Treaty  of  Peace, 
v.  30  med.;  Anactorians  assist 
in  the  invasion  of  Acarnania,  ii. 
80  med.,  8 1  med. 

Anaea,  viii.  19  init.;  occupied  by 
Samian  refugees,  iii.  19  fin.,  iv. 
75  med.;  the  Anaeans  destroy  an 
Athenian  army  under  Lysicles, 


INDEX. 


iii.  19  fin.;  remonstrate  with  Alci- 
das  for  the  slaughter  of  his  cap- 
tives, ib.  32  ;  aid  the  Chians,  viii. 
6 1  med. 

Anapus,  river  in  Acarnania,ii.  82  init. 

Anapus,  river  in  Sicily,  vi.  96  fin., 
vii.  42  fin.,  78  init.;  bridge  over, 
vi.  66  med. 

Anaxander,  a  Theban  commander, 
viii.  loo  med. 

Anaxilas,  tyrant  of  Rhegium,  vi.  4 
fin.;  founder  of  Messene,  ib. 

Andocides  [the  orator],  commands 
the  reinforcements  sent  to  Cor- 
cyra  after  Sybota,  i.  51  med. 

Androcles,  an  Athenian  popular 
leader,  viii.  65  init.;  active  in  pro- 
curing the  banishment  of  Alcibi- 
ades,  ib.\  murdered  by  the  oli- 
garchical conspirators,  ib. 

Androcrates,  the  shrine  of,  at  Pla- 
taea,  iii.  24  init. 

Andromedes,  a  Lacedaemonian  en- 
voy, v.  42  init. 

Andros,  island  of,  ii.  55;  the  Andri- 
ans  subjects  and  tributaries  of  the 
Athenians,  iv.  42  init.,  vii.  57  init.; 
Andrians  employed  by  the  oli- 
garchs at  Athens,  viii.  69  med.; — 
Andrian  colonies :  Acanthus,  i  v.  84 
init.;  Argilus,  ib.  103  med.;  Sane, 
iv.  109  med.;  Stageira,  ib.  88  fin. 

Androsthenes,  Olympic  victor,  v.  49 
init. 

Aneristus,  Lacedaemonian  ambas- 
sador to  Persia,  ii.  67  init. 

Antagonism,  a  condition  of  inde- 
pendence, iv.  92  med. 

Antandrus,  an  Aeolian  town,  viii. 
108  med.;  captured  by  the  Les- 
bian refugees,  iv.  52  fin.;  recap- 
tured by  the  Athenians,  ib.  75 
med.;  introduces  a  Lacedaemo- 
nian garrison,  expelling  the  Per- 
sians, viii.  108  med. 

Anthemus,  in  Macedonia,  ii.  99  fin., 
100  med. 

Anthene,  on  the  borders  of  Argos 
and  Lacedaemon,  v.  41  init. 

Anthesterion,  the  Attic  month,  ii. 
15  fin. 

Anticles,  an  Athenian  commander, 
i.  117  med. 

Antigenes,  father  of  Socrates,  an 
Athenian,  ii.  23  med. 


Antimenidas,  a  Lacedaemonian  en- 
voy, v.  42  init. 

Antimnestus,  father  of  Hierophon, 
an  Athenian,  iii.  105  fin. 

Antiochus,  king  of  the  Orestians,  ii. 
80  fin. 

Antiphemus,  joint  founder  with  En- 
timus  of  Gela,  vi.  4  med. 

Antiphon,  the  soul  of  the  oligarchi- 
cal conspiracy  at  Athens,  viii.  68 
init.,  90  init.;  his  abilities  and  vir- 
tue, ib. ;  disliked  by  the  people,  ib. ; 
afterwards  tried  for  his  share  in 
the  plot,  ib. ;  sent  to  make  peace 
with  Lacedaemon,  ib.  90  med. 

Antippus,  a  Lacedaemonian,  swears 
to  the  Treaty  of  Peace  and  the 
Alliance,  v.  19  med.;  ib.  24  init. 

Antiquity,  inferiority  of,  i.  i  fin.; 
poverty  of,  i.  1 1  fin. 

Antissa,  in  Lesbos,  viii.  23  med.;  the 
Antissaeans  defeat  the  Methym- 
naeans,  iii.  1 8  init.;  Antissa  taken 
by  the  Athenians,  ib.  28  fin. 

Antisthenes,  a  Spartan,  viii.  39  med., 
6 1  med. 

Aphrodisia,  in  Laconia,  iv.  56  init. 

Aphrodite,  Temple  of,  at  Eryx,  vi. 
46  med. 

Aphytis,  in  Pallene,  i.  64  fin. 

Apidanus,  riverinThessaly,  iv.  78fin. 

Apodotians,  in  Aetolia,  iii.  94  fin. 

Apollo,  Polycrates  dedicates  Rhe- 
neia  to,  i.  13  fin.,  iii.  104  init.; 
temple  of,  at  Actium,  i.  29  med.; 
at  Amyclae,  v.  18,  xi;  23,  iv;  at 
Argos,  ib.  47  fin. ;  opposite  Cythera, 
vii.  26  med. ;  at  Delium,  iv.  76  med., 
90  init.,  97  init.;  at  Leucas,  iii.  94 
med.;  at  Naupactus,  ii.  91  init.; 
on  Triopium,  viii.  35  med.;  of  the 
Pythian  Apolio,  at  Athens,  ii.  15 
med.;  at  Delphi,  iv.  118,  i;  v. 
1 8,  ii;  of  Apollo  Pythaeus,  at  Ar- 
gos [?],  v.  53  init.;  altar  of,  Apollo 
'the  Founder'  at  Naxos,  in  Sicily, 
vi.  3  init.;  of  the  Pythian  Apollo 
in  the  Athenian  Agora,  vi.  54  fin.; 
festival  of  Apollo  Maloeis,  iii.  3 
med.;  shrine  of  Apollo  Temenites 
at  Syracuse,  vi.  75  init.,  99  fin., 
loofin.;  ancient  oracle  of  Apollo 
toAlcmaeon,ii.io2fin.;  Homeric 
Hymn  to  Apollo  quoted,  iii.  104 
med. 


INDEX. 


633 


Apollodorus,  father  of  Charicles,  an 
Athenian,  vii.  20  init. 

Apollonia,  a  colony  of  Corinth,  i.  26 
init. 

Arcadia,  did  not  change  its  inhabit- 
ants anciently,  i.  2  med.;  portion 
of,  subjected  by  the  Mantineans, 
v.  29  init. ;  Arcadians  supplied  by 
Agamemnon  with  ships  for  the 
Trojan  War,  i.  9  fin.;  Arcadian 
mercenaries  at  Notium,  iii.  34 ; 
in  the  Athenian  service  before 
Syracuse,  vii.  57  med.;  on  the 
Syracusan  side,  vii.  19  fin.,  58 
med.;  Arcadian  allies  of  the  Lace- 
daemonians join  them  in  invading 
Argos,  ib.  57  med.,  58  fin.,  6omed.; 
summoned  by  the  Lacedaemoni- 
ans to  Tegea,  ib.  64 ;  present  at 
Mantinea,  ib.  67  med.,  73  init.; 
furnish  ships  to  the  Lacedaemoni- 
ans, viii.3  fin.;  war  between  some 
Arcadian  tribes  and  the  Lepreans, 
v.  31.  [See  also  Heraeans,  Mae- 
nalia,  Mantinea,  Orchomenus, 
Parrhasians,  Tegea.] 

Arcesilaus,  father  of  Lichas,  a 
Lacedaemonian,  v.  50  med.,  76 
med.,  viii.  39  init. 

Archedice,  daughter  of  Hippias  the 
tyrant,  vi.  59  med.;  her  epitaph,  ib. 

Archelaus,  son  of  Perdiccas,  king  of 
Macedonia,  ii.  100  init. 

Archers,  at  Athens,  numbers  of  the 
horse  and  foot  archers,  ii.  13  fin.; 
horse  archers  sent  to  Melos,  v. 
84  med.;  to  Sicily,  vi.  94  fin.;  bar- 
barian archers,  viii.  98  init. 

Archestratus,  an  Athenian  com- 
mander, i.  57  fin.;  father  of  Chae- 
reas,  viii.  74  init. 

Archetimus,  a  Corinthian  com- 
mander, i.  29  init. 

Archias,  the  founder  of  Syracuse, 
vi.  3  med.;  [of  Camarina]  betrays 
Camarina  to  the  Syracusans,  iv. 
25  med. 

Archidamus,  king  of  Lacedaemon, 
i.  79  fin.;  father  of  Agis,  iii.  89 
init.;  his  prudent  character,  ib. 
fin.;  friend  of  Pericles,  ii.  13  init.; 
speech  of,  i.  80-85  5  leader  of  the 
first  expedition  into  Attica,  ii.  10 
fin.;  second  speech,  ib.  n  ;  sends 
a  herald  to  Athens,  ib.  12;  leads 


the  army  to  Oenoe,  ib.  18  init.; 
blamed  for  delay,  ib.  med.;  enters 
Attica,  ib.  19 init.;  halts  at  Achar- 
nae,  ib.  20;  retires,  ib.  23  fin.;  in- 
vades Attica  a  second  time,  ib.  47 
init.,  5 5-57;  attacks  Plataea,#.7i 
init. ;  offers  terms  to  the  Plataeans, 
ib.  71-74;  invades  Attica  a  third 
time,  iii.  i. 

Archippus,  father  of  Aristides,  an 
Athenian,  iv.  50  init. 

Archonides,  a  Sicel  king,  friend  of 
the  Athenians,  vii.  i  fin. 

Archons,  their  former  power  at 
Athens,  i.  126  med.;  Pisistratus, 
vi.  54  fin.;  Themistocles,  1.93 init.; 
Pythodorus,  ii.  2  init.;  Alcaeus,  v. 
19  init.,  25  init.;  Archonship  kept 
by  the  Pisistratidae  in  their  own 
family,  vi.  54  fin. 

Arcturus,  rising  of,  ii.  78  init. 

Ares,  Temple  of,  at  Megara,  iv.  67 
init. 

Argennusae,  a  town  opposite  Mity- 
lene,  viii.  101  med. 

Argilus,  a  colony  from  Andros,  iv. 
103  init.;  provision  respecting,  in 
the  treaty  of  peace,  v.  i8,vi ;  the 
Argilians  assist  Brasidas  in  his 
attempt  on  Amphipolis,  iv.  103 
med.;  the  Argilian  servant  of 
Pausanias,  i.  132,  133 ;  Cerdylium 
in  Argilian  territory,  v.  6  med. 

Arginus,  Mount,  opposite  Chios,  viii. 
34  init. 

Argos  [the  Amphilochian],  iii.  102 
fin.,  105  init.,  107  init.;  founded 
by  Amphilochus,  ii.  68  init.  [See 
also  Amphilochia.] 

Argos  [in  Peloponnesus],  residence 
of  Themistocles  there,  after  his 
ostracism,  i.  135  med.,  137  med.; 
forms  alliance  with  the  Athenians, 
i.  102  fin.;  the  Corinthians  warned 
from  Argos  of  the  intended  Athe- 
nian invasion,  iv.  42  med.;  hostile 
to  Lacedaemon,  i.  102  fin.,  v.  22 
med.;  truce  for  30  years  between 
Lacedaemon  and  Argos,  v.  14  fin.; 
magistrates  of  Argos,  ib.  47  fin.; 
its  democratical  constitution,  v.29 
med.,  44  med.;  temple  of  Her&  at 
Argos,  iv.  133  init.;  time  reckoned 
there  by  the  succession  of  high 
priestesses,  ii.  2  init.;  kings  of 


634 


INDEX. 


Macedonia  originally  from  Ar- 
gos,  ii.  99  init.;  Argives  used  as  a 
general  name  for  the  Hellenes  by 
Homer,  i.  3  med.;  Argives  assist 
the  Athenians  at  Tanagra,  i.  107 
fin. ;  neutral  at  the  beginning  of  the 
war,  ii.  9  init.;  refuse  to  renew 
the  peace  with  Lacedaemon,  v.  14 
fin.,  22  med.;  head  a  confederacy 
against  the  Lacedaemonians,  ib. 
27,  28  foil.;  aspire  to  lead  Pelo- 
ponnesus, ib.  28  med.  [cp.  69  med.] ; 
ally  themselves  with  the  Man- 
tineans,  ib.  29;  Eleans,  ib.  31; 
Corinthians  and  Chalcidians,  ib. 
31  fin.;  the  Lacedaemonians  seek 
their  alliance,  ib.  36 ;  the  Argives 
fail  in  attempting  an  alliance  with 
the  Boeotians,  z£.  37,  38 ;  are  com- 
pelled to  make  terms  with  Sparta, 
ib.  40,  41 ;  send  envoys  to  Athens 
at  Alcibiades'  invitation,  ib.  43, 
44 ;  ally  themselves  to  Athens,  ib. 
46  fin.,  47 ;  aid  the  Eleans  to  ex- 
clude the  Lacedaemonians  from 
the  Olympic  games,  ib.  50  med.; 
aid  Alcibiades  in  organizing  the 
affairs  of  the  confederacy,  ib.  52 
med.;  make  war  on  Epidaurus, 

*&•  53>  54  fin->  55  fin->  56  fin-;  take 
the  field  against  the  Lacedaemo- 
nians, ib.  58  init.;  surrounded  by 
the  Lacedaemonians,  ib.  59 med.; 
unaware  of  their  danger,  ib.\ 
obtain  through  Thrasyllus  and 
Alciphron  a  truce,  ib.  59  fin., 
60  init.;  blame  them  for  their 
conduct,  60  fin.,  61  init.;  cap- 
ture Orchomenus,  ib.  61  fin.;  pre- 
pare against  Tegea,  ib*  62  fin.; 
again  attacked  by  the  Lacedae- 
monians, ib.  64  ;  dissatisfied  with 
their  generals,  ib.6$  ;  found  bythe 
Lacedaemonians  unexpectedly  in 
battle  array,  ib.  66,  67;  defeated 
by  the  Lacedaemonians  at  Man- 
tinea,  ib.  70-74;  make  peace  and 
alliance  with  the  Lacedaemoni- 
ans, ib.  76-80;  renounce  their  al- 
lies, 2^.78  ;  have  their  government 
changed  by  the  Lacedaemonians 
and  the  oligarchical  party,  ib.  81 
fin.;  the  popular  party  defeat  the 
oligarchs  and  renew  the  Athenian 
alliance,  z£.82;  the  Thousand  se- 


lect Argives  trained  by  the  city, 
ib.  67  fin.,  72  med.,  73  fin.;  begin 
the  Long  Walls,  82  fin.;  ravage 
Phliasia,  ib.  83  med.,  again,  ib.  115 
init.;  three  hundred  Argives  of  the 
Lacedaemonian  party  deported 
by  Alcibiades,  ib.  84  init.;  given 
up  to  the  Argives  for  execution, 
vi.  6 1  med.;  the  Argives  suspect 
some  of  their  citizens  of  instigat- 
ing a  Lacedaemonian  invasion, 
v.  n6init.;  treacherously  attack 
and  capture  Orneae,  vi.  7  med.; 
induced  by  Alcibiades  to  join  the 
Sicilian  expedition,  vi.  29  med., 
43  fin.,  vii.  57  med.;  present  in  the 
various  engagements  before  Syra- 
cuse, vi.  67  init.,  70  med.,  100  fin., 
vii.  44  fin.;  cause  confusion  in  the 
night  attack  on  Epipolae  by  their 
Doric  Paean,  vii.  44  fin.;  invade 
the  Thyraean  territory,  vi.  95 
med.;  have  their  lands  wasted  by 
the  Lacedaemonians,  ib.  105  init.; 
aid  the  Athenians  in  ravaging  the 
Lacedaemonian  coast,  ib.  med.; 
ravage  Phliasia,  ib.  fin.;  reinforce 
the  Athenians  before  Miletus,  viii. 
25  init.;  defeated  by  the  Milesians, 
ib.  med.;  go  home  in  a  rage,  ib.  27 
fin.;  send  envoys  to  the  Athenians 
at  Samos,  ib.  86  fin.;  an  Argive 
one  of  the  murderers  of  Phryni- 
chus,  ib.  92  init. 

Arianthidas,  a  Theban  Boeotarch 
at  Delium,  iv.  91  med. 

Ariphron,  father  of  Hippocrates,  an 
Athenian,  iv.  66  med. 

Aristagoras,  of  Miletus,  attempts  to 
found  a  colony  at  Enoea  Hodoi, 
iv.  102  init. 

Aristarchus,  a  conspicuous  leader 
of  the  oligarchical  party,  viii.  90 
init.;  endeavours  vainly  to  pre- 
vent the  destruction  of  the  fort 
.  Eetioneia,  ib.  92  fin. ;  betrays 
Oenoe  to  Boeotia,  ib.  98. 

Aristeus,  son  of  Adeimantus,  a. 
Corinthian,  takes  command  of 
the  forces  sent  from  Corinth  to 
Potidaea,  i.  60  ;  made  general  of 
the  Chalcidian  forces,  ib.  62  init. ; 
engages  the  Athenians,  ib.  fin.; 
fights  his  way  into  Potidaea,  ib. 
63  init.;  sails  out  of  Potidaea,  ib. 


I  N  D  E  X. 


635 


65  med.;  defeats  the  Sermylians, 
ib.  fin.;  sent  as  ambassador  to 
the  King,  ii.  67  init.;  given  up 
by  the  Thracians  to  the  Athe- 
nians, ib.  med.;  put  to  death, 
ib.  fin. 

Aristeus,  son  of  Pellichus,  a  Co- 
rinthian commander,  i.  29  init. 

Aristeus,  a  Lacedaemonian  envoy, 
iv.  132  fin. 

Aristides,  son  of  Archippus,  an 
Athenian  general,  captures  Arta- 
phernes  at  Eion,  iv.  50  init.;  re- 
covers Antandrus,  ib.  75  init. 

Aristides,  son  of  Lysimachus,  goes 
on  an  embassy  to  Sparta,  i.  91 
init.;  settlement  of  Athenian 
tribute  in  his  time,  v.  18,  vi. 

Aristocleides,  father  of  Hestiodorus, 
an  Athenian,  ii.  70  init. 

Aristocles,  brother  of  Pleistoanax, 
accused  of  bribing  the  Delphian 
priestess,  v.  16  med. 

Aristocles,  a  Spartan  polemarch,  v. 
71  fin.;  banished  for  cowardice 
at  Mantinea,  ib.  72  init. 

Aristocrates,  an  Athenian,  swears 
to  the  Treaty  of  Peace  and  the 
Alliance,  v.  19  fin.,  24  med.;  sent 
to  enquire  into  the  suspected 
treachery  of  the  Chians,  viii.  9 
med. 

Aristocrates,  son  of  Scellius,  a  chief 
author  in  the  oligarchical  revolu- 
tion, viii.  89init. ;  heads  a  moderate 
party  in  the  oligarchy,  ib.  89 ;  aids 
in  the  destruction  of  Eetioneia, 
ib.  92  med. 

Aristogiton,  slays  Hipparchus,  i.  20 
med.,  vi.  54  init.,  ib.  56-58. 

Ariston,  a  Corinthian,  the  ablest 
pilot  in  the  Syracusan  fleet,  vii. 
39  med. 

Aristonous,  joint  founder  with  Pys- 
tilus  of  Agrigentum,  vi.  4  med. 

Aristonous,  of  Larissa,  a  Thessalian 
commander,  ii.  22  fin. 

Aristonymus,  an  Athenian,  one  of 
the  ambassadors  sent  to  proclaim 
the  one  year's  truce,  iv.  122  ;  re- 
fuses to  admit  Scione,  ib. 

Aristonymus,  father  of  Euphamidas, 
a  Corinthian,  ii.  33  med.,  iv.  119 
med. 

Aristophon,.  aji    envoy    from    the 


Four   Hundred  to   Sparta,   viii. 
86  fin. 

Aristoteles,  an  Athenian  command- 
er, iii.  105  med. 

Arms,  custom  of  carrying  arms  once 
common  to  all  Hellenes,  i.  5  fin., 
6  init. ;  the  custom  first  abandoned 
by  the  Athenians,  ib.  6  init. 

Arnae,  in  Chalcidice,  iv.  103  init. 

Arne,  Boeotians  expelled  from,  i. 
12  med. 

Arnissa,  in  Macedonia,  iv.  128  med. 

Arrhiani,  in  the  Thracian  Cherson- 
nese,  viii.  104  init. 

Arrhibaeus,king  of  the  Lyncestians, 
iv.  79  fin.;  attacked  by  Perdic- 
cas,  ib.  83;  defeated,  ib.  124; 
Perdiccas'  Illyrian  troops  desert 
to  him,  ib.  125  init.;  the  pass  into 
his  country,  ib.  127  fin. 

Arsaces,  a  lieutenant  of  Tissapher- 
nes,  viii.  108  med.;  massacres  the 
Delians,  ib.  fin. 

Artabazus,  son  of  Pharnaces,  sent 
by  Xerxes  with  letters  to  Pau- 
sanias,  i.  129  init.,  132  fin. 

Artaphernes,  a  Persian  ambassador 
to  Sparta,  intercepted  by  the 
Athenians,  iv.  50. 

Artas,  an  lapygian  prince,  furnishes* 
javelin   men   to  the   Athenians, 
vii.  33  med. 

Artaxerxes,  son  of  Xerxes,  king  of 
Persia,  i.  104  init.;  succeeds  to 
the  throne,  ib.  137  med.;  his  re- 
ception of  Themistocles,  ib.  138  ; 
his  death,  iv.  50  fin.;  the  father 
of  Darius  Nothus,  viii.  5  init. 

Artemis,  Temple  of,  at  Rhegium, 
vi.  44  fin.;  at  Ephesus,  viii.  109  fin. 

Artemisium,  a  month  at  Sparta,  v. 
19  init. 

Artemisium,  battle  of,  iii.  54  med. 

Arts:  in  the  arts,  as  in  politics,  the 
new  must  prevail  over  the  old,  i, 
71  init. 

Artynae,  the  magistrates  at  Argos, 
v.  47  fin. 

Asia :  the  Barbarians  of  Asia  wear 
girdles  in  wrestling  and  boxing 
matches,  i.  6  fin.;  Pelops  brought 
his  wealth  from  Asia,  ib.  9  init.; 
no  single  nation,  even  in  Asia, 
could  compare  with  the  Scythians 
if  united,  ii.  97  fin.;  Magnesia  in 


INDEX. 


Asia,  i.  138  fin.;  the  Thracians 
of  Asia,  iv.  75  fin.;  "the  King's 
country  in  Asia,"  viii.  58. 

Asine,  a  city  in  Laconia,  iv.  13  init., 
54  fin.,  vi.  93  med. 

Asopius,  father  of  Phormio,  an 
Athenian,  i.  64  med. 

Asopius,  son  of  Phormio,  ravages 
the  Laconian  coast,  iii.  7  init.; 
attacks  Qeniadae,  ib.  med. ;  falls 
in  a  descent  upon  Leucas,  ib.  fin. 

Asopolaus,  father  of  Astymachus, 
a  Plataean,  iii.  52  fin. 

Asopus,  river  in  Boeotia,  ii.  5  init. 

Aspendus,  viii.  81  fin.,  87  med.,  88 
init.,  99  ink.,  108  med. 

Assembly,  the  Athenian,  summoned 
by  a  general,  ii.  59  fin.;  forms  of, 
iv.  118  fin.;  usually  held  in  the 
Pnyx,  viii.  97  init.;  Peisander 
summons  an  assembly  at  Colonus, 
ib.  67  med.;  the  assembly  sum- 
moned to  the  temple  of  Dionysus 
in  Munychia  for  '  the  restoration 
of  harmony,'  ib.  93  fin.,  94  init.; 
the  oligarchs  pretend  that  so 
many  as  5000  citizens  never  met 
in  one  assembly,  ib.  72  med. 

Assembly,  the  Lacedaemonian, 
mode  of  voting  at,  i.  87  init. 

Assinarus,  river  in  Sicily,  capture  of 
Nicias'  division  at,  vii.  84. 

Assyrian  character,  used  by  the 
Persians,  iv.  50  med. 

Astacus,  in  Acarnania,  captured  by 
the  Athenians,  who  expel  the 
tyrant  Evarchus,  ii.  30  med.;  the 
town  is  retaken  and  Evarchus 
restored  by  the  Corinthians,  ib: 
33  init.;  landing  of  Phormio  near 
Astacus,  ib.  102  init. 

Astymachus,  a  Plataean,  oneof  those 
chosen  to  plead  before  the  Lace- 
daemonians, iii.  52  fin. 

Astyochus,  a  Lacedaemonian  ad- 
miral, viii.  20  med. ;  entrusted  with 
the  command  of  the  whole  navy 
in  Asia,  ib. ;  arrives  at  Lesbos,  ib. 
23  init.;  fails  to  save  Lesbos  from 
the  Athenians,  ib.  med.,  fin.;  sum- 
moned to  Chios  to  avert  a  revo- 
lution, ib.  24  fin.,  ib.  31  init.;  fails 
to  recover  Clazomenae  and  Pte- 
leum,  ib.  31  med.;  enraged  with 
the  Chians  for  refusing  to  assist 


in  the  revolt  of  Lesbos,  ib.  32  fin., 
33  init.,  38  fin.,  39  med.;  narrowly 
escapes  the  Athenians,  33  med.; 
he  is  complained  of  to  Sparta  by 
Pedaritus,  ib.  38  ;  the  Spartans 
send  out  commissioners  to  him, 
ib.  39  fin.;  at  last  determines  to 
aid  the  Chians,  ib.  40  fin.;  hear- 
ing that  reinforcements  were  com- 
ing, goes  to  meet  them,  ib.  41; 
defeats  an  Athenian  squadron, 
ib.  42  ;  receives  orders  from 
Sparta  to  put  Alcibiades  to  death, 
ib.  45  init.;  betrays  Phrynichus 
to  Alcibiades,  ib.  50  ;  believed  to 
have  sold  himself  to  Tissaphernes, 
ib.  50  med.,  ib.  83  fin.;  sails  to 
Miletus  with  a  view  to  relieve 
Chios,  ib.  60  fin. ;  offers  battle  to 
the  Athenians,  ib.  63  init.;  excites 
by  his  conduct  great  dissatisfac-. 
tion  in  the  fleet,  ib.  78  ;  offers 
battle  to  the  Athenians,  but  de- 
clines when  they  offer  afterwards, 
ib.  79  ;  stoned  by  the  sailors  for 
offering  to  strike  Dorieus,  ib.  84 
init.;  superseded  by  Mindarusr 
ib.  85  init. 

Atalante,  island  off"  Locris,  fortified 
by  the  Athenians,  ii.  32;  inunda- 
tion of  the  sea  there,  iii.  89  med.; 
ordered  to  be  surrendered  by  the 
treaty,  v.  18,  viii. 

Atalante,  in  Macedonia,  ii.  100  med. 

Athenaeus,  a  Lacedaemonian,  iv. 
119  init.,  ib.  122. 

Athenagoras,  a  popular  leader  at 
Syracuse,  vi.  35  fin.;  speech  of, 
ib.  36-40. 

Athenagoras,  father  of  Timagoras 
of  Cyzicus,  viii.  6  init. 

Athen£  of  the  Brazen  House,  curse 
of,  i.  128;  temple  of,  at  Lecythus, 
iv.  116;  at  Amphipolis,  v.  loinit.; 
at  Athens,  v.  23  fin.;  image  of,  in 
the  Acropolis  at  Athens,  ii.  13 
med. 

Athenian  Empire,  foundation  of,  i. 
14  fin.,  ib.  18  med.,  ib.  74  med.,  ib. 
93;  rise  of,  ib.  19,  89-118,  ib. 
118  ;  character  of,  ib.  19  ;  justifi- 
cation of,  ib.  75,  vi.  82,  83. 

Athens,  once  inhabited  by  Tyrrhe- 
nians, iv.  109  fin.  [cp.  ii.  17  med.]; 
formed  by  Theseus  from  the 


INDEX. 


637 


ancient  communes,  ii.  15  init.; 
small  extent  of  ancient  Athens,  ib. 
15  med.;  largeness  of  the  popula- 
tion, i.  80  med.;  appearance  of, 
compared  to  Sparta,  i.  10  init.; 
destruction  of,  in  the  Persian  war, 
i.  89  fin.;  building  of  the  City 
Walls,  i.  90,  91,  93  ;  of  the  Long 
Walls,  ib.  107  init.,  108  med.; 
plague  of  Athens,  ii.  47-54,  58, 
iii.  87  ;  resources  of  Athens,  ii. 
13  ;  the  revolution  at  Athens,  viii. 
47-72  :  restoration  of  the  demo- 
cracy, ib.  73-77,  86,  89-93,  97; 
the  government  immediately  after 
the  restoration  the  best  within 
Thucydides'  recollection,  viii.  97 
fin.;  'the  school  of  Hellas,'  ii.  41 
init.;  freedom  of  life  in,  ii.  37, 
vii.  69  med.  [See  also  Attica.] 
Athenians,  of  Ionian  race,  vi.  82 
init.,  vii.  57  init.;  have  always 
inhabited  the  same  land,  i.  2 
fin.;  their  colonies  to  Ionia  and 
the  islands,  i.  2  fin.,  12  fin.;  the 
first  Hellenes  to  adopt  luxurious 
habits,  i.  6  med.;  their  ignorance 
of  their  own  history,  ib.  20  init., 
vi.  53  fin.,  54,  55  ;  their  activity 
and  restlessness,  especially  in  con- 
trast with  the  Lacedaemonian 
character,  i.  69,  70,  102  med.,  iv. 
55  med.,  vi.  87  med.,  viii.  96  fin.; 
treatment  of  their  allies,  i.  19,  76, 
99,  iii.  10,  vi.  76,  84,  85  ;  general 
detestation  of  them  in  Hellas, 
i.  119  med.,  ii.  8  fin.,  n  init.,  63 
init.;  their  wealth  and  military 
resources,  ii.  13  med.;  their  fond- 
ness for  a  country  life,  ib.  1 5  init. ; 
become  sailors,  i.  18  med.  [cp.  iv. 
12  fin.,  vii.  21  med.];  assured  of 
empire  by  their  naval  superiority, 
ii.  62;  willing  to  face  any  odds 
at  sea,  ib.  88  fin.;  perfection 
of  their  navy,  iii.  17;  mode  of 
burying  the  dead  in  the  war,  ii. 
34 ;  their  greatness  and  glory,  ii.  - 
37-41,  63,  64;  for  half  a  cen- 
tury an  imperial  people,  viii.  68 
fin.;  maintain  the  children  of  the 
fallen  at  the  public  expense,  ii. 
46 ;  their  mistakes  in  the  war,  ib. 
65  ;  their  love  of  rhetoric,  iii.  38 
med.,  40  init.;  their  over  clever- 


ness and  suspiciousness,  ib.  43  ; 
their  fickle  temperament,  vii.  48 
med.;  their  elation  at  success, 
iv.  65  fin.;  their  impatience  of 
discipline,  vii.  14  init.  fin.;  'never 
retired  from  a  siege  through  fear 
of  another  foe,3  v.  in  init.;  the 
most  experienced  soldiers  in  Hel- 
las, vi.  72  med.,  vii.  61  fin.  [B.C. 
510];  the  Athenians  governed  by 
tyrants,  i.  18  init.,  vi.  53  fin.~59; 
the  tyrants  put  down  by  the  La- 
cedaemonians, i.  1 8  init.,  vi.  53 
fin.;  the  Athenians  make  war  on 
theAeginetans[B.c.  491],?.  14611.; 
their  services  in  the  Persian  war, 
ib.  73>  74»  ii-  36  med.;  the  Athe- 
nians build  their  walls  and  the 
Piraeus,  i.  91,  93  [B.C.  48o-B.c. 
439];  the  Athenians  join  in  the 
capture  of  Byzantium  and  Cyprus, 
z£.94;  obtain  the  leadership  of  the 
allies,  ib.  95, 96,  99  [cp.  ib.  18, 19]; 
subject  Eion,  Scyros,  Carystus, 
Naxos,  ib.  98 ;  conquer  the  Per- 
sians at  the  Eurymedon,  ib.  100 
init.;  subdue  the  revolted  Tha- 
sians,  ib.  100,  101 ;  fail  in  an  at- 
tempt to  colonize  Amphipolis,  ib. 
loo  fin.;  called  in  by  the  Lace-- 
daemonians  during  the  siege  of 
Ithome,  ib.  101,  102  ;  dismissed  by 
the  Lacedaemonians, /<£.  102 med. ; 
offended  at  the  Lacedaemonians 
and  form  alliance  with  Argos,  ib. 
fin.  ;settletheHelotsat  Naupactus, 
ib.  103  med.;  make  alliance  with 
the  Megarians,  ib.  103  fin.;  occu- 
py Nisaea,  ib.\  aid  the  revolted 
Egyptians,  ib.  104 ;  defeated  by 
the  Corinthians  and  Epidaurians 
at  Halieis,  ib.  105  init.;  defeat  the 
Peloponnesians  off  Cecryphaleia, 
ib.\  go  to  war  again  with  the 
Aeginetans  [B.C.  459],  ib.  105 ;  de- 
feat the  Aeginetans  at  sea,  ib. 
init.;  gain  a  slight  advantage 
over  the  Corinthians,  ib.  fin.;  in- 
flict a  severe  defeat  on  them,  ib. 
106 ;  build  their  Long  Walls,  ib. 
107  init.,  108  med.;  are  defeated 
by  the  Lacedaemonians  at  Tana- 
gra,  ib.  107  fin.,  108  init.;  defeat 
the  Boeotians  at  Oenophyta, 
ib.  108  med.;  compel  Aegina  to 


638 


I  N.D  E.X< 


surrender,  ib.  108 fin.;  take  Chalcis 
and  defeat  the  Sicyonians,  ib.  fin.; 
driven  out  of  Memphis,  ib.  109; 
their  reinforcements  destroyed,  ib. 
1 10 ;  unsuccessfully  attack  Phar- 
salus,  ib.  in  init.;  defeat  the  Si- 
cyonians and  make  an  attempt  on 
Oeniadae,  ib.  fin.;  send  ships  to 
Egypt,  ib.ii-z  init.;  fight  in  Cy- 
prus, ib.  med.;  take  Chaeronea 
but  are  defeated  at  Coronea,  ib. 
113;  their  garrison  in  Megara 
is  slaughtered,  ib.  114  init.;  first 
invasion  of  Attica,  ib.  med.;  Eu- 
boea  revolts,  ib.  init.;  is  reduced, 
ib.  fin.;  the  Athenians  make  a 
truce  with  the  Lacedaemonians, 
ib.n$  init.;  establish  a  demo- 
cracy at  Samos,  ib.  med.;  the  Sa- 
mians  and  Byzantines  revolt,  ib. 
the  Athenians  defeat  theSamians, 
ib.  1 1 6  med.;  blockade  Samos.  ib. 
fin.;  send  reinforcements  to  Sa- 
mos, ib.nj;  capture  Samos,  ib. 
fin.  [cp.  i.  40  fin.,  41  init.]  [The 
Peloponnesian  War]  ;  the  Athe- 
nians enter  into  alliance  with 
Corcyra,  ib.  44 ;  send  assistance 
to  Corcyra,  ib.  45  ;  fight  with  the 
Corcyraeans  at  sea  against  the 
Corinthians,  ib.  49  fin.;  send  re- 
inforcements, ib.  50  fin.,  51 ;  order 
the  Potidaeans  to  raze  their  walls, 
•ib.  56  med.;  quarrel  with  Perdic- 
cas,  ib.  57  init.;  despatch  troops 
to  Potidaea,  ib.  57  fin.,  61  init.,  64 
med.;  come  to  terms  with  Perdic- 
cas,  ib.  6 1  med.;  defeat  the  Chalci- 
dians,  ib.  62,  63  ;  invest  Potidaea, 
*£.64;  ill-feeling  of,  against  the  Co- 
rinthians, ib.  66, 103  fin.;  exclude 
the  Megarians  from  their  har- 
bours, ib.  67  fin.,  139  init.  [cp.  iv. 
66  init.] ;  speech  of  at  Sparta,  ib. 
72-78;  desire  the  Lacedaemo- 
nians to  take  away  the  curse 
of  Taenarus  and  of  Athene, 
ib.  128,  135  init.;  discuss  the 
demands  of  the  Lacedaemoni- 
ans, z#.  139;  make  a  final  offer 
of  arbitration  to  the  Lacedae- 
monians, ib.  145  ;  seize  the  Boeo- 
tians in  Attica  and  garrison  Pla- 
taea,  ii.  6;  meditate  sending  an 
embassy  to  the  king,  ib.  7  init.; 


send  ambassadors  to  places  ad- 
jacent to  Peloponnesus,  ib.  fin.; 
their  allies,  ib.  9  med.;  refuse  to 
hear  a  messenger  from  Archi- 
damus,  ib.  12  init.;  collect  into  the 
city  by  Pericles'  advice,  ib.  14-16  ; 
send  an  expedition  round  the 
Peloponnese,  ib.  17  fin.,  23,  25, 
30;  are  angry  with  Pericles  for 
not  leading  them  out,  ib.  21  ;  de- 
feated at  Phrygia,  ib.  med.;  re- 
ceive aid  from  the  Thessalians,  ib. 
22  fin.;  set  apart  a  reserve  for  the 
war,  ib.  24  [cp.  viii.  1 5  med.] ;  send 
a  fleet  to  Locris,  ib.  26 ;  expel  the 
Aeginetans,  ib.  27  init.;  make 
Nymphodorus  their  Proxenus, 
and  become  allies  of  Sitalces, 
ib.  29;  invade  Megara,  ib.  31; 
fortify  Atalante,  ib.  32  ;  celebrate 
the  funeral  of  the  fallen,  ib.  34;  suf- 
fer from  the  plague,  ib.  47-54,  58; 
again  restrained  by  Pericles  from 
sallying  out  against  the  Lacedae- 
monians, ib.$ 5 fin.;  send  an  expe- 
dition round  Peloponnese,  ib.  56  ; 
unsuccessfully  attack  Potidaea, 
ib.  58  ;  send  envoys  to  Sparta,  ib. 
59  med.;  turn  upon  and  fine 
Pericles,  z#.  59-65  init.;  elect  him 
general,  ib.  65  init.;  capture  Aris- 
teus  of  Corinth  and  other  envoys 
to  Persia,  and  put  them  to  death, 
ib.  67 ;  send  Phormio  to  aid  the 
Amphilochians,z£.68 ;  send  Phor- 
mio with  a  fleet  round  Pelopon- 
nese, #.69  init.;  despatch  ships  to 
collect  money  in  Asia,  id.fm. ;  cap- 
ture Potidaea,  ib.  70  init.;  blame 
their  generals,  ib.  med.;  send 
colonists  to  Potidaea,  ib.  fin. ;  en- 
courage the  Plataeans  to  resist, 
ib.  73;  send  an  expedition  to 
Chalcidice,  ib.  79 ;  are  defeated, 
ib. ;  defeat  the  Peloponnesians  at 
sea,  ib.  83,  84  ;  gain  a  second 
victory,  ib.  86,  92  ;  thrown  into  a 
panic  by  the  news  of  Brasidas' 
landing  in  Salamis,  ib.  93,  94  ; 
make  an  expedition  into  Acar- 
nania,  ib.  102;  receive  warning  of 
the  Lesbian  revolt,  iii.  2  ;  attempt 
to  surprise  Mitylene,  ib.  3  ;  suc- 
cessfully engage  the  Lesbians, 
ib.  4  ;  blockade  Mitylene  by  sea, 


INDEX. 


639 


ib.  6  ;  send  an  expedition  round 
Peloponnese,  ib.  7,  16  med.;  send 
another  expedition,  ib.  16  ;  their 
great  expenditure  on  the  war, 
ib.  17  ;  the  perfection  of  their 
navy,  ib.  ;  '  despatch  reinforce- 
ments to  Mitylene,  ib.  18  fin.; 
complete  the  blockade,  ib. ;  raise 
a  property  tax,  ib.  19  init.;  at- 
tempt to  collect  money  from  the 
allies,  ib.  fin. ;  gain  possession  of 
Mitylene,  ib.  27,  28  ;  take  Noti- 
um,  ib.  34  ;  reduce  Pyrrha  and 
Eresus,  ib.  35  ;  put  Salaethus  to 
death  and  order  the  slaughter  of 
all  the  grown-up  citizens  of  Mity- 
lene, ib.  36  init. ;  repent,  ib.  med. ; 
summon  a  second  assembly,  ib. 
fin. ;  send  a  ship  in  time  to  save 
Mitylene,  ib.  49  ;  put  to  death  the 
Lesbians  judged  most  guilty,  ib. 
50  init. ;  divide  the  island  among 
Athenian  colonists,  ib.  med.; 
occupy  Minoa,  ib.  51  ;  arrest  en- 
voys from  Corcyra,  #.72  init.; 
send  a  fleet  to  Corcyra,  ib.  75  ; 
engage  at  sea  with  the  Pelopon- 
nesians,  ib.  77,  78  ;  send  twenty 
ships  to  Sicily,  ib.  86  init.;  the 
plague  reappears,  #.87;  the  Athe- 
nians ravage  the  Aeolian  islands, 
ib.  88  ;  proceedings  in  Sicily,  ib. 
90,  99,  103,  115,  iv.  24,  25;  send  a 
fleet  round  the  Peloponnese,  iii. 
91  init.;  land  at  Oropus,  and  win 
a  battle  at  Tanagra,  ib.  med., 
fin.;  terrified  by  the  founding  of 
Heracleia,  ib.  93  init.;  attack  Leu- 
cas,  ib.  94  init.,  med.;  disastrous 
expedition  of,  into  Aetolia,  ib. 
95-98  ;  purify  Delos  and  restore 
the  festival,  ib.  104  ;  send  rein- 
forcements to  Sicily,  #.  115;  fortify 
Pylos,  iv.  4  :  take  and  lose  again 
Eion,  ib.  7  ;  repulse  the  Spartans, 
ib.  ii,  12  ;  defeat  the  Spartans  in 
the  harbour,  ib.  14  ;  cut  off  the 
troops  in  Sphacteria,  ib.  1 5  ;  grant 
a  truce  to  the  Lacedaemonians^. 
1 6  ;  demand  impossible  terms,  ib. 
21,  22  ;  renew  the  blockade,  #.  23  ; 
find  the  blockade  difficult,  ib.  26 ; 
despatch  Cleon  with  reinforce- 
ments, ib.  27,  28  ;  attack  Sphac- 
teria and  compel  the  surrender 


of  the  Lacedaemonians,  #.31-38  ; 
again  reject  the  peace  proposals 
of  the  Lacedaemonians,  ib.  41  fin.; 
invade  the  Corinthian  territory, 
etc.,  ib.  42-45  ;  aid  the  Corcyrae- 
ans  to  capture  I  stone,  ib.  46  ;  de- 
liver the  prisoners  to  the  Corcy- 
raeans,  ib.  47  ;  proceed  to  Sicily, 
ib.  48  fin.;  aid  the  Acarnanians  to 
capture  Anactorium,  ib.  49 ;  cap- 
ture a  Persian  ambassador  to 
Sparta,  ib.  50  init. ;  send  him  back 
with  an  embassy  of  their  own,  ib. 
fin.;  order  the  Chians  to  dis- 
mantle their  walls,  ib.  5 1  ;  capture 
Cythera,  ib.  53,  54;  ravage  the  La- 
cedaemonian coast,  ib.  54  fin.,  55  ; 
capture  Thyrea,  ib.  57  ;  quit  Sicily, 
#.65  med.;  punish  their  generals, 
ib.\  unsuccessfully  attempt  Mega- 
ra,  ib.  66-68 ;  capture  Nisaea,  #.69 ; 
engage  the  Boeotian  cavalry,  ib. 
72  ;  unwilling  to  fight  with  Bras- 
idas,  ib.  73 ;  recapture  Antan- 
drus,  #.75  med.;  plan  an  invasion 
of  Boeotia,  ib.  76,77 ;  declare  Per- 
diccas  an  enemy,  ib.  82  ;  defeated 
at  Delium,  ib.  90-96  ;  the  Boeo- 
tians refuse  to  give  up  the  dead, 
ib.  97-99  ;  the  Athenian  garrison 
in  Delium  is  captured  by  the  Boeo- 
tians, and  the  dead  are  then  given 
up,  ib.  100, 101  init.;  repulsed  by 
the  Sicyonians,  ib.  101  med.;  lose 
Amphipolis,  ib.  102-106  ;  Thucy- 
dides  saves  Eion,  ib.  105  ;  driven 
from  the  long  walls  of  Megara, 
ib.  109  init.;  lose  Acte,  ib.  med., 
fin.;  Torone,  ib.  110-113;  Lecy- 
thus,  #.114-116;  make  a  truce 
for  a  year  with  the  Lacedaemo- 
nians, #.117-119;  Scione  revolts, 
and  the  Athenians  exclude  it  from 
the  treaty,  ib.  120,  122  init.;  they 
decree  its  total  destruction,  ib. 
fin.;  defeated  by  the  Mendae- 
ans,  who  also  revolt,  ib.  129 ; 
capture  Mende,  ib.  130 fin.;  invest 
Scione,  ib.  131 ;  come  to  an  un- 
derstanding with  Perdiccas,  ib. 
132  init.;  again  purify  Delos,  v.  I  ; 
send  Cleon  to  Chalcidice,  ib.  2  ; 
capture  Torone,  ib.  3  ;  send  an 
embassy  under  Phaeax  to  Sicily, 
ib.  4,  5 ;  defeated  at  Amphipolis, 


640 


INDEX. 


ib.  6-12 ;  become  eager  for  peace, 
ib.  14  init.;  make  a  treaty  with 
the  Lacedaemonians,  ib.  17-19; 
conclude  an  alliance  with  the 
Lacedaemonians,  ib.  22  fin.-24 ; 
release  the  prisoners  from  the 
island,  ib.  24  fin.;  take  and  de- 
stroy Scione,  ib.  32  init.;  replace 
the  Delians  in  Delos,  ib.\  refuse 
a  ten  days'  armistice  to  the 
Corinthians,  ib.  med.;  begin  to 
mistrust  the  Lacedaemonians,  ib. 
35 ;  withdraw  the  Helots  from 
Pylos,  ib.  35  fin.;  send  ambassa- 
dors to  Sparta,  ib.  36  init.;  nego- 
tiate uselessly  with  the  Lacedae- 
monians, ib.  39  init.;  indignant 
at  the  destruction  of  Panactum, 
ib.  42  fin. ;  the  war  party  at  Athens 
intrigue  for  the  abrogation  of  the 
treaty,  ib.  43  ;  the  Athenians  make 
alliance  with  the  Argives,  ib.  46 
fin.,  47 ;  replace  the  Helots  at 
Pylos,  ib.  56  med. ;  solemnly  re- 
cord that  the  Lacedaemonians 
had  broken  their  oaths,  ib.\  send 
a  force  to  Argos,  ib.  61  init.;  share 
in  the  battle  of  Mantinea,  ib.  69, 
72-74;  invest  Epidaurus,  ib.  75 
fin.;  their  alliance  is  renounced 
by  the  Argives,  ib.  78  ;  withdraw 
their  troops  from  Epidaurus,  ib. 
So  fin.;  the  Dians  revolt,  ib.  82 
init. ;  the  Argives  renew  their  alli- 
ance, and,  with  Athenian  help, 
build  their  Long  Walls,  ib.  fin.; 
the  Athenians  blockade  Perdic- 
cas, #.83 fin.;  carry  off 300 Argives 
whom  they  suspect,  ib.  84  init. ; 
attack  Melos,  ib.  med. ;  hold 
a  conference  with  the  Melian  au- 
thorities, ib.  85-113;  blockade 
Melos,  ib.  114,  1 15  fin.,  116  med.; 
capture  Melos,  destroy  or  enslave 
the  inhabitants,  and  colonize  the 
island,  ib.;  spoil,  from  Pylos,  the 
Lacedaemonians,  ib.  115  init.;  the 
Corinthians  declare  war  upon 
them,  ib.\  the  Athenians  deter- 
mine to  send  an  expedition  to 
Sicily,  vi.  i,  6  init.;  send  envoys 
to  Egesta,  ib.  6  fin.;  decide  on 
war,  ib.  8  ;  assist  the  Argives  in 
the  capture  of  Orneae,  ib.  7  med.; 
ravage  Macedonia,  ib.  fin.;  the 


envoys  return  from  Sicily,  ib.  8 
init.;  debate  in  the  Assembly,  ib. 
9-23  ;  seized  with  enthusiasm  for 
the  expedition,  ib.  24  ;  greatly  dis- 
turbed by  the  mutilation  of  the 
Hermae,  ib.  27  fin.;  Alcibiades  is 
accused,  and  the  Athenians  are 
persuaded  by  his  enemies  to  de- 
cree his  immediate  departure  for 
Sicily,  ib.  28,  29  ;  the  expedition 
starts  for  Sicily,  ib.  30-32  ;  review 
of  the  troops  at  Corcyra,  ib.  42  ; 
the  Athenians  arrive  at  Rhegium, 
ib.  43,  44  ;  deceived  by  the  Eges- 
teans,  ib.  46  ;  the  generals  hold  a 
council  of  war,  ib.  47-49  ;  Alci- 
biades' opinion  prevails,  ib.  50 ; 
the  Athenians  sail  to  Syracuse, 
ib.  50 ;  obtain  possession  of  Ca- 
tana,  ib.  51 ;  not  received  at  Ca- 
marina,  ib.  52  ;  the  excitement 
about  the  mutilation  of  the  Her- 
mae continues,  ib.  53,  60  ;  the 
Athenians  send  to  arrest  Alci- 
biades, ib.  53,  6 1  init.;  condemn 
him  to  death,  ib.  61  fin.;  proceed- 
ings of,  in  Sicily,  ib.  62,  63  ;  cap- 
ture Hyccara,  ib.  62  init.;  sail  to 
Syracuse,  ib.  64,  65  ;  defeat  the 
Syracusans,  ib.  66-7 1 ;  fail  in  an 
attempt  on  Messene,  which  Alci- 
biades betrays,  ib.  74  ;  send  home 
for  money  and  cavalry,  ib.  fin. 
[cp.  93  fin.,  94  fin.];  send  an  em- 
bassy to  Camarina,  ib.  fin.,  75  ; 
Euphemus'  speech,  ib.  81-87 ;  fail 
to  win  over  the  Camarinaeans,  ib. 
88  init.;  negotiate  with  the  Sicels, 
ib.  med.;  winter  at  Catana  and 
prepare  for  a  spring  campaign, 
ib.  fin.;  receive  aid  from  home,  ib. 
93  fin.,  94  fin. ;  prosecute  the  cam- 
paign, ib.  94;  capture  Epipolae 
and  fortify  Labdalum,  ib.  96,  97; 
receive  Sicilian  reinforcements, 
ib.  98  init.;  begin  to  build  a  wall  of 
circumvallation,  anddefeat  the  Sy- 
racusans in  various  ergagements, 
#.98-101 ;  repulse  the  Syracusans 
from  Epipolae,  ib.  102;  begin  a 
double  wall  from  Epipolae  to  the 
sea,  ib.  103  init.,  vii.  2  fin.;  openly 
violate  the  peace  with  the  La- 
cedaemonians, vi.  105 ;  Athenian 
ships  arrive  at  Rhegium  too  late 


INDEX. 


641 


to  stop  Gylippus,  vii.  I  init.;  re- 
turn no  answer  to  Gylippus'  de- 
mand that  they  shall  quit  Sicily, 
ib.  3  init.;  are  driven  out  of  Lab- 
dalum,  ib.  fin. ;  repulse  an  attack 
on  their  lines,  ib.  4  init.;  fortify 
Plemmyrium,  ib. ;  defeat  the  Syra- 
cusans,  ib.  5  med. ;  defeated  by  the 
Syracusans,  ib.  6;  the  Athenians, 
aided  by  Perdiccas,  make  an  at- 
tempt upon  Amphipolis,  ib.  9  ; 
the  Athenians  at  home  receive 
the  despatch  of  Nicias,  ib.  10-15  5 
send  a  second  expedition  to  Sicily 
under  Demosthenes,  ib.  16  ;  send 
a  fleet  round  Peloponnese,  ib.  20  ; 
conquer  the  Syracusans  at  sea, 
but  lose  Plemmyrium,  ib.  22,  23  ; 
skirmish  with  the  Syracusans  in 
the  harbour,  ib.  25  med.;  ravage 
the  Laconian  coast,  and  fortify  an 
isthmus  there,  ib.  26  ;  resolve  to 
send  back  some  Thracians  who 
have  come  too  late  to  join  the 
reinforcements  to  Sicily,  ib.  27 
init.  [who  sack  Mycalessus  on 
their  way,  29,  30]  ;  suffer  terribly 
from  the  occupation  of  Decelea 
by  the  Lacedaemonians,  ib.  27, 
28  ;  Demosthenes  meets  Eury- 
medon  with  news  from  Sicily,  ib. 
3 1  init.;  Demosthenes  and  Eu- 
rymedon  collect  troops  in  Acar- 
nania  and  Corcyra,  ib.  fin.;  the 
Athenians  in  Sicily  induce  the 
Sicels  to  destroy  reinforcements 
on  their  way  to  Syracuse,  ib.  32  ; 
Demosthenes  arrives  at  Thurii,/^. 
33  ;  the  Athenians  at  Naupactus 
fight  an  indecisive  engagement 
at  sea  with  the  Corinthians,  ib. 
34 ;  consider  themselves  defeated 
because  not  signally  the  victors, 
ib.  fin.;  defeated  at  sea  by  the  Sy- 
racusans, ib.  37-41 ;  repulsed  in  a 
night  attack  on  Epipolae,  ib.  43- 
45  ;  the  Athenian  generals  hold 
a  council,  ib.  47-49  init.;  Nicias 
wishes  to  delay  and  Demosthenes 
yields,z£.49fin.;  Niciasat  last  con- 
sents to  move,  but  terrified  by  an 
eclipse  remains  another  27  days, 
ib.  50  ;  the  Athenians  are  again 
defeated  at  sea  by  the  Syracusans, 
ib.  52  ;  gain  a  slight  advantage  by 


land,  ib.  53  ;  give  themselves  up 
to  despair,  #.  55  ;  the  list  of  their 
allies  before  Syracuse,  ib.  57  ;  de- 
termine to  fight  their  way  out,  ib. 
60  ;  Nicias  addresses  the  troops, 
ib.  61-64  ;  and  the  trierarchs,  ib. 
69 ;  the  Athenians  are  completely 
defeated  at  sea,  ib.  70,  71;  over- 
whelmed by  misery  refuse  to  re- 
new the  struggle,  ib.  72  ;  are 
misled  by  false  information  and 
delay  their  retreat  three  days,  ib. 
73,  74  ;  their  misery  and  terror 
when  commencing  the  retreat,  ib. 
75  ;  encouraged  and  consoled  by 
Nicias,  ib.  76,77;  during  four  days 
are  harassed  and  at  length  con- 
fronted by  the  enemy,  ib.  78,  79; 
fall  back,  ib.  79  fin.;  recommence 
retreat,changing  their  route,  ib.  80 
init. ;  seized  with  a  panic,  ib.  med. ; 
the  second  division  is  overtaken 
and  compelled  to  surrender,  ib. 
8 1,  82  ;  the  first  meets  the  same 
fate  on  the  Assinarus,  ib.  83-85  ; 
three  hundred  escape,  ib.  83  fin.; 
but  are  captured,  ib.  85  med.; 
Nicias  and  Demosthenes  are  put 
to  death,  ib.  86  ;  the  prisoners  are 
cruelly  treated  by  the  Syracusans, 
ib.  87  ;  the  Athenians  at  home  in 
fury  and  terror,  but  determined 
not  to  yield,  viii.  I ;  suspect  the 
Chians  of  treason,  ib.  9,  10  init.; 
defeat  a  Peloponnesian  squadron 
and  blockade  them  in  Peiraeum, 
ib.  10,  ii  init. ;  intercept,  but  do 
not  succeed  in  capturing,  a  Pelo- 
ponnesian fleet,  ib.  13  ;  on  the 
news  of  the  revolt  of  Chios  pass 
a  decree  allowing  the  use  of  their 
reserve  fund  and  ships,  ib.  15  init. ; 
prepare  a  great  fleet  for  Asia 
under  Strombichides  and  Thra- 
sycles,  ib.  fin. ;  Strombichides  is 
chased  from  Teos,  ib.  16  ;  arrives 
at  Miletus  too  late  to  stop  a  re- 
volt, ib.  17  ;  captures  four  Chian 
ships,  ib.  19  ;  the  Athenians  at 
Peiraeum  lose  four  ships  in  a 
sally  of  the  Peloponnesian  fleet, 
ib.  20  init.;  Diomedon  recovers 
Teos,  but  fails  to  take  Erae,  zA 
fin.;  the  Athenians  grant  the  Sa- 
miahs  independence  after  ademo- 


T  t 


642 


INDEX. 


cratic  revolution,  ib.2\;  recon- 
quer Lesbos  which  had  revolted, 
and  Clazomenae,  ib.  23  ;  win  a 
slight  advantage  at  Miletus,  ib. 
24  init.;  fight  three  successful 
battles  against  the  Chians,  ib. 
med.;  win  a  victory  before  Mile- 
tus, ib.  25  ;  withdraw  to  Samos 
on  the  approach  of  a  Pelopon- 
nesian  fleet,  ib.  27  fin.;  receive 
reinforcements  from  home,  ib.  25 
init.,  30  init.;  prepare  to  attack 
Miletus,  ib.  30  fin.;  lose  three 
ships  in  a  storm,  ib.  34  init.;  fail 
to  take  Cnidus  which  had  re- 
volted, ib.  35  ;  blockade  Chios, 
ib.  38  init.,  40  ;  cannot  induce  the 
Peloponnesians  at  Miletus  to 
fight,  ib.  38  fin.;  defeated  at  sea, 
ib.  41, 42, 43  init.;  Rhodes  revolts, 
the  Athenians  attack  it  from 
Chalce,  Cos,  and  Samos,  ib.  44  ; 
the  oligarchical  party  at  Samos, 
by  Alcibiades'  instigation,  pre- 
pare the  way  for  a  revolution,  ib. 
47,  48  init.;  Phrynichus  resists, 
ib.  48  med.;  Peisander  is  sent 
to  Tissaphernes,  ib.  49  ;  Phryni- 
chus out-manceuvres  Alcibiades, 
who  seeks  to  ruin  him,  ib.  50,  5 1  ; 
those  at  home  agree  to  change 
the  government,  ib.  53,  54  ;  send 
Peisander  to  negotiate  with  Al- 
cibiades, ib.  54  init. ;  remove 
Phrynichus  and  appoint  Leon 
and  Diomedon  generals,  ib.  med.; 
Leon  and  Diomedon  make  a  de- 
scent upon  Rhodes,  ib.  55  init.; 
the  Athenians  at  Chios  defeat  the 
Chians  and  press  on  the  blockade, 
ib.  55  fin.,  56  init.;  Peisander's 
embassy  fails  through  Alcibia- 
des' unreasonable  demands,  ib.  56 
med.;  Oropus  is  betrayed  to  the 
Boeotians,  ib.  60  init.;  the  Athe- 
nian fleet  retire  to  Samos  for  the 
winter,  passing  in  sight  of  the 
Peloponnesians,  ib.  fin.;  they  are 
worsted  at  sea  by  the  Chians,  ib. 
6 1  fin.;  Lampsacus  and  Abydos 
revolt,  ib.  62  init.;  Strombichides 
retakes  Lampsacus  but  fails  at 
Abydos,  ib.  med.;  the  Athenians 
at  Samos  decline  Astyochus'  offer 
of  battle,  ib.  63  init.;  the  conspi- 


rators at  Samos  give  up  Alci- 
biades, but  prosecute  their  plan, 
ib.  63  fin.;  order  Peisander  to  put 
down  democracy  in  the  cities,  ib. 
64 ;  the  conspirators  at  home 
declare  for  a  pretended  govern- 
ment of  5000,  ib.  65  ;  crush  oppo- 
sition by  terrorism,  ib.  66  ;  repeal 
the  graphe  paranomon,  ib.  67 
init.;  propose  a  government  of 
400,  ib.6j  fin.;  description  of  the 
leaders  of  the  conspiracy,  ib.  68  ; 
they  instal  the  400  in  the  place 
of  the  senate,  ib.  69,  70  ;  send 
heralds  to  Agis  at  Decelea,  ib.  70 
fin.;  despatch  envoys  to  Sparta, 
ib.  71  fin.;  and  to  Samos,  ib.  72  ; 
the  Athenians  at  Samos  defeat 
an  oligarchical  conspiracy,  ib.  73; 
send  Chaereas  in  the  Paralus  to 
Athens,  ib.  74  ;  on  his  return  with 
an  unfavourable  report  the  army 
and  the  Samians  swear  allegiance 
to  the  democracy, /£.  7  5  ;  the  army 
appoints  Thrasyllus  and  Thrasy- 
bulus  generals,  2^.76  init.;  the  men 
encourage  each  other,  ib.  med.; 
the  commissioners  sent  by  the  400 
do  not  venture  beyond  Delos,  ib. 
77;  the  Athenians  at  Samos  refuse 
battle  with  Astyochus,  but  after- 
wards offer  it,  ib.jq ;  recall  Alcibia- 
des, ib.  8 1  init.;  the  army  eager  to 
sail  to  the  Piraeus,  Alcibiades  re- 
strains them,  ib.  82  init. ;  the  envoys 
of  the  Four  Hundred  now  come 
to  Samos,  ib.  86  [cp.  72  init.,  77]; 
they  are  roughly  received  by  the 
army,  ib.  86  init. ;  Alcibiades  again 
dissuades  the  army  from  sailing 
to  Athens,  ib.  med. ;  the  Argives 
offer  assistance,  ib.  fin.;  the  Four 
Hundred  in  alarm  send  envoys 
to  Lacedaemon  for  peace  on  any 
terms,  ib.  90  med.;  fortify  Eeti- 
oneia,  ib.  fin.;  the  envoys  return 
unsuccessful,  2^.9 1  init.;  Therame- 
nes  begins  to  withdraw  from  the 
oligarchs,/^,  passim  ;  the  hoplites 
under  his  instigation  destroy  Eeti- 
oneia,  ib.  92 ;  panic  in  the  city,  ib. 
med.;  the  Four  Hundred  induce 
the  people  to  fix  a  day  for  an 
assembly  'to  restore  harmony,' 
ib.  93  ;  a  Lacedaemonian  squad- 


/  N  D  E  X. 


643 


ron  approaches  and  the  Athenians 
hurriedly  equip  a  fleet,  ib.  94  ; 
utterly  defeated  at  sea  and  lose 
Euboea,  ib.  95  ;  panic-stricken  by 
their  defeat,  ib.  96  init.;  depose 
the  400,  ib.  97 ;  recall  Alcibia- 
des,  ib.  fin.;  the  leaders  of  the 
oligarchs  retire  to  Decelea,  ib.  98; 
the  Athenian  fleet  sails  to  the 
Hellespont,  ib.  100;  attacks  Ere- 
sus  on  the  way,  ib.  fin. ;  the  Athe- 
nian squadron  at  Sestos  is  chased 
by  the  Lacedaemonian  fleet,  ib. 
102 ;  the  fleet  at  Lesbos  at  once  sails 
from  Eresus  to  Elaeus,  ib.  103; 
they  defeat  the  Lacedaemonians 
atseaoffCynossema,  ib.  104,  105  ; 
almost  incredulous  of  their  good 
fortune,  ib.  106 ;  capture  eight  Pelo- 
ponnesian  ships,  ib.  107  ;  recover 
Cyzicus,  which  had  revolted,  ib. 
107  med.;  Alcibiades  returns  to 
Samos,  professing  to  have  secured 
Tissaphernes'  friendship  for  them, 
ib.  1 08  init. 

Athletes,  used  to  wear  girdles  in 
gymnastic  contests,  i.  6  fin.;  ho- 
nours paid  to,  iv.  121  med. 

Athos,  Mount,  iv.  109  med.,  v.  3 
fin.,  35  init.,  82  init. 

Atintanians,  a  people  in  Epirus,  ii. 
80  fin. 

Atreus,  son  of  Pelops,  i.  9  passim. 

Attica,  early  history  of,  i.  2  fin.; 
Ionia  colonized  from,  /$.,  ib.  12 
fin.;  ii.  15  fin.;  anciently  divided 
into  communes,  ii.  15  init.;  in- 
vaded by  the  Lacedaemonians,  i. 
114  med.;  ii.  21  init.;  invasion  in 
first  year  of  the  War,  ii.  18-23  5  m 
the  second  year,  ib.  47,  55,  56;  in 
the  fourth  year,  iii.  i ;  in  the  fifth 
year,  ib.  26 ;  in  the  sixth  year 
averted  by  an  earthquake,  ib.  89 
init.;  in  the  seventh  year,  iv.  2 
init.,  6;  in  the  nineteenth  year, 
vii.  19  init. 

Aulon,  in  Chalcidice,  iv.  103  init. 

Autocharidas,  a  Lacedaemonian 
general,  v.  12. 

Autocles,  son  of  Tolmaeus,  an 
Athenian  general,  iv.  53  init., 
119  fin. 

Axius,  river  in  Macedonia,  ii.  99 
med. 


Barbarians,  term  not  used  in 
Homer,  i.  3  med. ;  carry  arms  in 
daily  life,  ib.  6  init.;  various  bar- 
barous races:  the  Aetolians,  iii. 
94  fin.;  the  Amphilochians,  ii. 
68  init.;  in  Athos,  iv.  109;  the 
Epirots,  ii.  80-82;  the  Illyrians, 
iy.  1 26  med. ;  in  Sicily,  vi.  2 ;  ib.  1 1 
fin.;  the  Taulantians,  i.  24  init.; 
the  Thracians,  ii.  96-98,  101;  iv. 
75  fin.;  vii.  27;  Xerxes  called  'the 
Barbarian,'  i.  14  fin.,  18. 

Battus,  a  Corinthian  commander, 
iv.  43  init. 

Bells,  use  of  by  sentinels,  iv.  135 
med. 

Beroea,  in  Macedonia,  i.  61  med. 

Bisaltia,  in  Macedonia,  ii.  99  fin. 

Bisaltians  [in  Athos],  iv.  109  fin. 

Bithynian  Thracians,  iv.  75  fin. 

Boeotarchs,  Pythangelus,  ii.  2 med.; 
Diemporus,  ib.\  P agendas,  iv.  91 
med.;  Arianthidas,  ib.\  Scirphon- 
das,  vii.  30  fin.;  their  powers,  v. 
37,38. 

Boeotia,  early  history,  i.  2  med.,  in. 
6 1  med.;  formerly  called  Cad- 
meis,  i.  12  med.;  fertility  of,  ib. 
2  med.;  bordered  on  one  side  by 

•  Phocis,  iii.  95  init.;  the  Four 
Councils  of  Boeotia,  v.  38;  earth- 
quakes in  Boeotia,  iii.  87  fin. 

Boeotians,  the,  expelled  from  Arne 
by  the  Thessalians,  i.  12  med.; 
all  but  the  Plataeans  joined  the 
Persians,  iii.  62  init.  [cp.  viii.  43 
fin.];  subdued  by  the  Athenians 
after  Oenophyta,  i.  108  med.; 
become  allies  of  the  Athenians, 
ib.  1 1 1  init.;  regain  their  freedom 
at  Coronea,  ib.  1 13  fin.,  iii.  62  fin., 
67  med.,  iv.  92  fin.;  the  Boeo- 
tians in  Attica  seized  after  the 
attempt  on  Plataea,  ii.  6  med.; 
furnish  cavalry  to  the  Lacedae- 
monians at  the  opening  of  the 
War,  ib.  9  med.,  12  fin.;  ravage 
Plataea,  ib.  12  fin.;  worst  the 
Athenians  in  a  cavalry  skirmish 
at  Phrygia  in  Attica,  ib.  22  med.; 
supply  half  the  besieging  force  at 
Plataea,  ib.  78  med.;  invaded  by 
the  Athenians,  iii.  91 ;  assist  Bra- 


T  t  2 


INDEX. 


sidas  to  save  Megara  from  the 
Athenians,  iv.  70,  72 ;  the  demo- 
cratic party  in  Boeotia  concert 
an  Athenian  invasion,  ib.  76,  77; 
the  plot  is  betrayed,  ib.  89  ;  the 
Athenians  under  Hippocrates 
arrive  and  fortify  Delium,  ib.  90; 
the  Boeotians  defeat  the  Athe- 
nians at  Delium,  ib.  91-96;  quib- 
ble with  the  Athenians  about 
giving  up  the  dead,  ib.  97-99; 
capture  Delium,  ib.  100;  the 
Lacedaemonians  promise  to  in- 
vite the  Boeotians  to  join  the 
Truce,  ib.  iiSinit.;  Panactum  is 
betrayed  to  the  Boeotians,  v.  3  fin. ; 
refuse  to  join  in  the  fifty  years' 
Peace,  ib.  17  fin.;  had  only  a  ten 
days'  armistice  with  the  Athe- 
nians, ib.  26  med.,  32  med.;  re- 
fuse to  join  the  Argive  alliance, 
ib.  31  fin.;  32  med.;  fail  to 
gain  from  the  Athenians  a  ten 
days'  armistice  for  the  Corin- 
thians, ib.  fin.;  the  Lacedae- 
monians promise  to  try  to  bring 
the  Boeotians  into  the  Treaty,  ib. 
35  fin.;  the  new  Lacedaemonian 
ephors  propose  to  the  Boeotians 
that  they  should  enter  the  Ar- 
give alliance,  ib.  36;  the  Boeo- 
tians at  first  agree,  ib.  37;  the 
Boeotian  Councils  reject  the  offer, 
ib.  38  ;  the  Boeotians  form  a 
separate  alliance  with  Lacedae- 
mon,  surrendering  Panactum  and 
their  Athenian  prisoners  to  them, 
ib.  39;  take  possession  of  Hera- 
clea,  ib.  52  init. ;  take  part  in  the 
Lacedaemonian  invasion  of  Argos, 
ib.  57  fm.-6o;  summoned  by  the 
Lacedaemonians  to  Mantinea, 
ib.  64  med.;  invite  a  small  body 
of  Lacedaemonian  troops  to  the 
Isthmus,  and  thus  raise  suspicion 
at  Athens  against  Alcibiades,  vi. 
6 1  init.;  send  aid  to  Sicily,  vii. 
1 9 med.,  58  med.;  these  engaged 
against  their  Plataean  country- 
men, ib.  57  init.;  make  the  first 
stand  against  the  Athenians  on 
Epipolae,  ib.  43  fin.;  sack  of  My- 
calessus  by  the  Thracians,  ib.  29, 
30 ;  the  Boeotians  furnish  the 
Lacedaemonians  with  ships,  viii. 


3  fin.;  aid  the  revolt  of  Lesbos, 
ib.  4  fin.;  Oropus  is  betrayed  to 
the  Boeotians,  ib.  60 init.;  Oenoe 
is  betrayed  to  the  Boeotians,  ib. 
98;  the  Boeotians  lose  two  ships 
at  Cynossema,  ib.  io6med. 

Boeum,  in  Doris,  i.  107  init. 

Bolbe,  Lake,  in  Macedonia,  i.  58 
fin.,  iv.  103  init. 

Bolisstis,  in  Chios,  viii.  24  med. 

Bomieans,  in  Aetolia,  iii.  96  fin. 

Boriades,  an  Aetolian  envoy,  iii. 
100  init. 

Bottiaea,  ii.  100  med.;  the  Bot- 
tiaeans  expelled  from,  by  the 
Macedonians,  ii.  99  med. 

Bottice,  revolts  from  Athens,  i. 
56-58;  devastated  by  Phormio, 
ib.  65  fin.;  ravaged  by  Sitalces, 
ii.  101;  the  Bottiaeans  defeat  the 
Athenians,  ib.  79;  aid  the  Chalci- 
dians  to  expel  the  Athenians 
from  Eion,  iv.  7. 

Brasidas,  saves  Methone,  ii.  25 
med.;  the  first  Spartan  to  gain 
distinction  in  the  War,  ib.\  sent 
out  as  adviser  of  Cnemus,  ib.  85 
init. ;  concerts  with  the  other  com- 
manders an  attack  on  the  Piraeus, 
ib.  93;  sent  as  adviser  of  Alcidas, 
iii.  69  med.,  ib.  76  med.;  advises 
Alcidas  to  attack  Corcyra,  ib.  79 
fin.;  distinguishes  himself  at  Py- 

:  los,  iv.  ii  med.;  wounded,  ib.  12 
init.;  saves  Megara,  ib.  70-73; 
marches  through  Thessaly  to 
Chalcidice,  ib.  78;  favourable  im- 

.  pression  produced  by  him,  ib.  81, 
1 08  med.;  a  good  speaker,  ib.  84 
fin.;  his  army,  Peloponnesian 
mercenaries  and  Helots,  ib.  80 fin. 
[cp.  ib.'jQ  med.];  allies  himself 
with  Perdiccas,  ib.  83  init. ;  quar- 
rels with  him,  ib.  fin. ;  gains  over 
Acanthus  and  Stageirus,  ib.  84- 
88;  speech  of,  at  Acanthus,  ib. 
85-87;  captures  Amphipolis,  ib. 
103-106;  repulsed  from  Eion, 
ib.  107  init.;  brings  over  Myr- 
cinus,  Galepsus,  and  Aesyme,  ib. 
fin.;  takes  Torone  and  Lecythus, 
ib.  110-116;  receives  honours 
from  the  Scionaeans,  ib.  121; 
refuses  to  surrender  Scionfc  under 
the  Truce,  ib.  122;  receives  the 


INDEX. 


645 


Mendaeans  in  defiance  of  the 
Truce,  ib.  123  init.;  garrisons 
Mende  and  Scione,  ib.  fin.;  de- 
feats the  Lyncestians,  ib.  124  ; 
deserted  by  the  Macedonians,  ib. 
125;  his  speech  to  his  soldiers, 
ib.  126;  defeats  the  Illyrians,  ib. 
127,  128;  receives  commissioners 
from  Lacedaemon,  ib.  132  fin.; 
attempts  Potidaea,  ib.  135;  de- 
feats the  Athenians  at  Amphi- 
polis,  v.  6-10;  speech  of,  ib.  9; 
his  death,  ib.  10  fin.;  buried  in 
the  Agora  of  Amphipolis,  ib.  II 
init.;  receives  the  honours  of  a 
founder  from  the  Amphipolitans, 
ib.  ii  med.;  a  great  enemy  to 
peace,  ib.  16  init.;  his  Helot  sol- 
diers settled  at  Lepreum,  ib.  34 
med.;  his  old  soldiers  present  at 
Mantinea,  ib.  67  init.,  71  fin.,  72 
med. 

Brauro,  helps  in  the  assassination 
of  her  husband,  Pittacus,  king  of 
the  Edonians,  iv.  107  fin. 

Bridge  over  the  Strymon,  iv.  103 
fin.;  over  the  Anapus,  vi.  66 med. 

Brilessus,  Mount,  in  Attica,  ii.  23 
init. 

Bromerus,  father  of  Arrhibaeus  the 
king  of  the  Lyncestians,  iv.  83  init. 

Bromiscus,  in  Chalcidice,  iv.  103 
init. 

Brycinniae,  in  Leontine  territory, 
v.  4  med. 

Bucolium,  in  Arcadia,  iv.  134  fin. 

Budorum,  a  station  in  Salamis  from 
which  the  Athenians  used  to  watch 
Megara,  ii.  94  fin.,  iii.  51  med. 

Buphras,  in  Laconia,  iv.  iiSmed. 

Burial,  Carian  mode  of,  i.  8  init. 

Byzantium,  captured  by  Pausanias, 
and  entrusted  to  Gongylus,  i. 
94,  128  med.,  129  med.;  expul- 
sion of  Pausanias  from  Byzan- 
tium, ib.  131  init.;  insignificant 
engagement  at  sea  off  Byzantium, 
viii.  80  fin.  [cp.  ib.  107  init.];  the 
Byzantines  revolt  from  Athens,  i. 
115  fin.;  submit,  ib.  117  fin.;  re- 
volt again,  viii.  80. 

C. 

Cacyparis,  river  in  Sicily,  vii.  80  fin. 


Cadmeis,  old  name  of  Boeotia,  i.  12 
med. 

Caeadas,  a  chasm  into  which  male- 
factors were  flung  at  Sparta,  i. 
134  med. 

Caccinus,  a  river  of  Locris  in  Italy, 
iii.  103  fin. 

Calex,  a  river  near  Heraclea  on  the 
Pontus,  iv.  75  fin. 

Callias,  father  of  Calibrates,  a 
Corinthian,  i.  29  init.  [Athenians] 
(I)  son  of  Hyperechides,  father- 
in-law  of  Hippias  the  tyrant,  vi. 
55  init;  (II)  father  of  Hipponi- 
cus,  iii.  91  med.;  (Ill)  son  of 

•  Calliades,  an  Athenian  com- 
mander, i.  6 1  init.,  ib.  62  med.; 
killed  at  Potidaea,  ib.  63  fin. 

Callicrates,  a  Corinthian  com- 
mander, i.  29  init. 

Callieans,  an  Aetolian  tribe,  iii.  96  fin. 

Calligeitus,  a  Megarian  exile  at  the 
Court  of  Pharnabazus,  viii.  6  init. ; 

foes  as  envoy  to  Sparta,  #.,  ib. 
init.,  39  init. 

Callimachus,  father  of  Learchus,  an 
Athenian,  ii.  67  med.;  father  of 
Phanomachus,  an  Athenian,  ii. 
70  init. 

Callirrhoe,  ancientname  of  the  foun- 
tain Enneacrounos  at  Athens,  ii. 
1.5  fin. 

Calydon,  name  given  to  the  ancient 
Aeolis,  iii.  102  med. 

Camarina,  founded  from  Syracuse, 
vi.  5  med.;  recolonized  by  Hip- 
pocrates, ib.  fin.;  by  Gela,  ib.\  in 
alliance  with  Leontini,  iii.  86  init. ; 
plan  to  betray  it  to  Syracuse,  iv. 
25  med.;  Camarinaeans  make  a 
truce  with  Gela,  ib.  58  init. ;  receive 
Morgantine  from  the  Syracusans, 
ib.  65  init.;  refuse  to  receive  the 
Athenian  expedition,  vi.  52 ;  send  a 
small  force  to  the  Syracusans,  ib. 
67  fin. ;  receive  and  hear  embassies 
both  from  Athens  and  Syracuse, 
ib.  75-87;  resolve  on  neutrality, 
ib.  88  init.;  send  aid  to  Syracuse 
after  the  capture  of  Plemmyrium, 
vii.  33  init.,  58  init. 

Cambyses,  son  of  Cyrus,  king  of 
Persia,  the  lonians  in  his  time 
masters  of  the  sea  about  their 
own  coast,  i.  13  fin. 


646 


INDEX. 


Cameirus,  in  Rhodes,  revolts  from 
Athens,  viii.  44  med. 

Canal,  cut  by  the  Persians  across 
the  Isthmus  of  Athos,  iv.  109  init. 

Canastraeum,    promontory    of,    in 

.  Pallene,  iv.  no  fin. 

Capaton,  father  of  Proxenus,  an 
Italian  Locrian,  iii.  103  fin. 

Carcinus,  an  Athenian  commander, 

"  ii.  23  med. 

Cardamyle,  in  Chios,  viii.  24  med. 

Caria,  Carians  expelled  by  Minos 
from  the  Cyclades,  i.  4 ;  addicted 
to  piracy,  ib.  8  init. ;  their  mode 
of  burial,  ib.  init.;  the  Athenians 
send  look-out  ships  to  the  Carian 
coast  in  the  Samian  insurrection, 
ib.  n6init.;  maritime  Caria  sub- 
ject to  the  Athenians,  ii.  9  fin.; 
the  Athenians  send  a  squadron  to 
the  Carian  coast  to  protect  their 
Phoenician  trade,  ib.  69  med.; 
Carians  destroy  an  Athenian  ex- 
pedition, iii.  19  fin.;  Amorges  in 
Caria  revolts  from  the  King,  viii. 
5  fin. ;  Gaulites,  a  Carian  speaking 
Greek  and  Persian,  ib.  85  init. 

Carnea,  feast  at  Lacedaemon,  v.  75, 
76  init. 

Carneus,  sacred  month  among  the 
Dorians,  v.  54  med. 

Carteria,  a  Phocaean  island,  viii. 
101  med. 

Carthage,  ambitious  plans  of  Alci- 
biades  for  attacking  Carthage,  vi. 
15  med.,  90  init.;  always  in  fear 
of  an  Athenian  invasion,  ib.  34 
init.;  relations  of  the  Phoenician 
colonies  in  Sicily  to  Carthage, 
ib.  2  fin.;  Carthaginians  de- 
feated at  sea  by  the  Phocaeans, 
i.  13  fin. 

Caryae,  in  Laconia,  v.  55  med. 

Carystus,  in  Euboea,  of  Dryopian 
origin,  vii.  57  med.;  subjected  by 
the  Athenians,  i.  98  med.;  the 
Carystians  become  allies  of  the 
Athenians,  iv.  42  init.,  vii.  57  med. 

Casmenae,  founded  by  the  Syra- 

-   cusans,  vi.  5  med. 

Castle,   the    White,    a   portion   of 

Memphis,  i.  104  fin. 
Catana,  founded  by  Thucles   and 
Evarchus,  vi.  3  fin.;    lies  under 
mount  Aetna,  iii.  1 16  init.;  at  first 


refuses  to  receive  the  Athenian 
expedition,  vi.  50 med.;  after  the 
entry  of  some  Athenian  soldiers 
votes  an  alliance  with  Athens,  ib. 

5 1  fin.,  vii.  57  fin.,  85  fin. ;  becomes 
the  Athenian  station,  vi.  51  fin., 

52  fin.,  62  fin.;   the    Syracusans 
eager  to  attack  Catana,  ib.  63  fin.; 
the  Athenians  by  a  false  message 
draw  the  Syracusans  to  Catana 
while  they  sail  to  Syracuse,  ib. 
64,  65;   the  Athenians  retire  to 
Catanaat  the  beginning  of  winter, 
ib.  72  init.;  start  from  Catana  on 
an  expedition  against  Messene, 
ib.  74;   the  Syracusans   destroy 
the    Athenian    encampment    at 
Catana,  ib.  75  med.;   the  Athe- 
nians rebuild  their  camp,  ib.  88 
med.;  start  from  thence  on  various 
expeditions,  ib.  94;  abandon  Ca- 
tana, ib.  97  init.;    are   supplied 
with  horses  from  Catana,  ib.  98 
init.;    Catana  and  Naxos  men- 
tioned by  Nicias  as   unable   to 
support  the  Athenian  forces,  vii. 
14  med.;    Demosthenes   on   his 
arrival  thinks  the  winter  spent  at 
Catana  a  mistake,  ib.  42  med.; 
after  Epipolae  wishes  to  retire  to 
Catana,  ib.  49  med.;  the  Athenian 
army  at  Syracuse  fed  from  Ca- 
tana, ib.  60  init.;  at  first  wish  to 
retreat   by   sea    to    Catana,   ib. 
med.,  72 ;   the  Athenian  line  of 
retreat  in  the  opposite  direction 
to  Catana,  ib.  80  init.;  the  Athe- 
nian  fugitives   find  a  refuge   at 
Catana,  ib.  85  fin. 

Caulonia,  in  Italy,  vii.  25  init. 

Caunus,  in  Caria,  called  '  Caunus 
in  Asia,'  viii.  39  fin.;  Pericles 
sails  towards  Caunus  in  the  Sa- 
mian revolt,  i.  n6fin.;  the  Lace- 
daemonian commissioners  to 
Astyochus  put  in  at  Caunus,  viii. 
39  fin.  [cp.  42  med.];  Astyochus 
sails  for  Caunus,  ib.  41  init.; 

.  Tissaphernes  comes  to  Caunus, 
ib.  57  init.;  Alcibiades  sails  for 
Caunus,  ib.  88  fin.  [cp.  108  init.] 

Cecalus,  father  of  Nicasus,  a  Me- 
garian,  iv.  119  med. 

Cecrops,  state  of  Attica  in  his  time, 
ii.  15  init. 


INDEX. 


647 


Cecryphaleia,  victory  of  the  Athe- 
nians off,  i.  105  init. 

Cenaeum,  in  Euboea,  iii.  93  init. 

Conchreae,  the  port  of  Corinth,  the 
Corinthians  leave  half  their 

,  troops  at  Cenchreae  to  guard 
Crommyon,  iv.  42  fin.,  44  med.; 
a  Lacedaemonian  fleet  starting 
for  Chios  from  Cenchreae  is 
driven  into  Pciraeum,  viii.  10 
init.;  escapes  and  returns  to  Cen- 
chreae, ib.  20  init.;  Astyochus 
starts  from  Cenchreae,  ib.  23 
init. 

Centoripa,  a  Sicel  town,  captured 
by  the  Athenians,  vi.  94  med.; 
allied  to  Athens,  vii.  32  med. 

£eos,  the  Ceans  subjects  of  the 
Athenians,  vii.  57  init. 

Cephallenia,  repulse  of  the  Corin- 
thians in  a  descent  upon  Cephal- 
lenia, ii.  33  fin.;  an  important 

.  station  to  the  Athenians,  ib.  80 
init.  [cp.  7  fin.] ;  the  Cephallenians 
[of  Pale]  furnish  a  convoy  to  the 
Corinthians,  i.  27  fin.;  become 
allies  of  the  Athenians,  ii.  7  fin., 
30  fin.,  iii.  94  init.,  95  med.,  vi. 
85  med.,  vii.  31  init,  57  med.; 
the  Messenians  from  Pylos  set- 
tled by  the  Athenians  at  Cranii 
in  Cephallenia,  v.  35  fin.;  with- 
drawn, id.  56  med. 

Ceramicus,  at  Athens,  vi.  57  init., 
58  init. 

Cercine,  Mount,  in  Macedonia,  ii. 
98  init. 

Cerdylium,  Mount,  near  Amphi- 
polis,  v.  6-10. 

Ceryces,  the,  at  Athens,  protest 
against  the  return  of  Alcibiades, 
viii.  53  med. 

Cestrine,  in  Epirus,  i.  46  fin. 

Chaereas,  an  Athenian,  sent  as 
envoy  from  the  army  at  Samos, 
viii.  74  init.;  escapes  from  Athens 
and  brings  an  exaggerated  report 
to  Samos,  ib.  fin.,  86  init. 

Chaeronea,  in  Boeotia,  its  situation, 
iv.  76  med.;  a  dependency  of  the 
Boeotian  Orchomenus,  ib.\  taken 
by  the  Athenians  under  Tolmides, 
i.  113;  Orchomenian  exiles  plot 
its  betrayal  to  the  Athenians,  iv. 
76 med.;  the  plot  fails,  ib.  89. 


Chalaeans,  a  tribe  of  Ozolian  Lo- 
crians,  iii.  101  fin. 

Chalce,  island  of,  near  Rhodes, 
viii.  41  fin.,  44  fin.,  55  init.,  60  fin. 

Chalcedon,  a  Megarian  colony,  iv. 
75  fin. 

Chalcideus,  a  Spartan  admiral,  viii. 
6  fin.,  8  init.;  sent  to  Ionia  with 
Alcibiades,  #.  1 1  fin.,  12  fin. ;  is  pur- 
sued by  the  Athenians  on  his  way, 
ib.  15  med.;  induces  the  revolt 
of  Chios,  Erythrae,  Clazomcnae, 
*#.  14;  chases  Strombichides  into 
Samos,  ib.  16;  causes  the  revolt  of 
Teos,  ib.  fin.;  and  of  Miletus,  ib. 
17;  garrisons  Chios,  ib.  17  init. 
[cp.  32  med.];  negotiates  a  treaty 
between  the  King  and  Sparta, 
ib.  1 8,  36,  43  med.;  falls  in  a  skir- 
mish at  Panormus,  ib.  24  init.; 
his  forces  afterwards  engaged 
before  Miletus,  ib.  25  med. 

Chalcidian  cities,  the,  of  Sicily, 
founded  from  Chalcis  in  Euboea, 
vi.  3-5;  akin  to  the  Athenians, 

,  iv.  61  med.,  64  med.;  the  Chalci- 
dian dialect,  vi.  5  init. ;  invite  the 
Athenians  to  Sicily,  iii.  86  med., 
iv.  6 1  med. 

Chalcidic&  [on  the  coast  of  Thrace], 
revolts  from  Athens,  i.  56-58; 
devastated  by  Phormio,  ib.  65 
fin.;  by  Sitalces,  ii.  95  init.,  101; 
Cleon's  expedition  against  Chal- 
cidice,  v.  2-11;  Thucydides  in 
command  there,  iv.  104  fin.;  the 
Chalcidians  pull  down  their 
cities  and  retire  to  Olynthus,  i. 
58  fin.;  defeat  the  Athenians,  ii. 

.  79;  retake  Eion  from  the  Athe- 
nians, iv.  7;  invite  Brasidas,  ib* 
79,  80  init.;  Chalcidian  ambassa- 
dors accompany  Brasidas  in  his 
Macedonian  campaign,  ib.  83 
med.;  the  Chalcidians  instigate 
the  revolt  of  Amphipolis,  ib.  103 
med.;  aid  in  garrisoning  Mende 
and  Scione,  ib.  123  fin.;  supply 

.  Brasidas  with  troops  against  Ar- 
rhibaeus,  ib.  124  init.;  the  Chal- 
cidian prisoners  taken  in  Toron6 
are  sent  to  Athens,  and  after- 
wards exchanged,  v.  3  fin.;  Chal- 
cidian forces  at  the  battle  of 
Amphipolis,  ib.  6  fin.;  pursue  the 


I  N  D  E  X. 


retreating  Athenians,  ib.  lofin.j 
provisions  respecting  the  Chalci- 
dian  cities  in  the  Treaty  of  Peace, 
ib.  1 8,  v-vii,  ix,  x;  the  Chalci- 
dians  refuse  to  accept  the  Treaty, 
ib.  21  med.;  join  the  Argive 
alliance,  ib.  31  fin.;  renew  the 
alliance  with  Lacedaemon,  ib.  80 
med.;  receive  the  Dians  who 
had  revolted  from  the  Athenians, 
ib.  82  init.;  maintain  a  ten  days' 
armistice  with  the  Athenians,  vi. 
7  fin. 

Chalcis,  in  Aetolia,  taken  by  the 
Athenians,  i.  108  fin.,  ii.  83  med. 

Chalcis,  in  Euboea,  vii.  29 init.;  the 
mother  city  of  the  Chalcidian 
cities  in  Sicily,  vi.  3-5;  of  Cyme 
in  Italy,  ib.  4  fin.;  war  between 
Chalcis  and  Eretria,  i.  15  fin.; 
Chalcis  subject  to  the  Athenians, 
vi.  76  init.,  vii.  57  init.;  the  Athe- 

.  nians  retreat  to  Chalcis  after  the 
sea-fight  ofif  Eretria,  viii.  95  fin. 

Chance,  to  chance  men  ascribe 
whatever  belies  their  calculation, 
i.  140  init. 

Chaones,  a  people  in  Epirus,are  bar- 
barians, ii.  .68  fin.;  have  no  king, 
, '  ib.  80  fin.;  their  military  reputa- 
tion, ib.  8 1  med.;  assist  in  the  in- 
vasion of  Acarnania,  ib.  80  fin.; 
defeated  by  the  Stratians,  ib.  81. 

Charadrus,  scene  of  military  trials 
at  Argos,  v.  60  fin. 

Charicles,  an  Athenian  commander, 
vii.  20,  26. 

Charminus,  an  Athenian  com- 
mander, viii.  30  init.,  41  fin.;  de- 
feated by  the  Lacedaemonians, 
ib.  42  ;  abets  the  murder  of  Hy- 
perbolus,  ib.  73  med. 

Charoeades,  an  Athenian  command- 
er in  Sicily,  iii.  86  init.;  killed  in 
action,  ib.  90  init. 

Charybdis,  the  whirlpool  of,  i  v.  24  fin. 

Cheimerium,  in  Thesprotia,  i.  30 
fin.;  situation  of,  ib.  46  med.; 
Corinthian  fleet  anchors  there,  ib. 

Chersonesus,  inCorinthian  territory, 
iv.  42  init.,  43  init. 

Chersonnese,  the  Thracian,  culti- 
vated by  the  Greek  armament  at 
Troy,  i.  1 1  med.;  ravaged  by 
the  Lacedaemonians,  viii.  99  fin.; 


naval  operations  off  its  coast,  ib. 
102-105. 

Children,  a  man  without  children  has 
no  stake  in  the  country,  ii.  44  fin. 

Children  of  the  fallen  maintained 
at  the  public  charge  in  Athens, 
ii.  46  fin. 

Chionis,  a  Lacedaemonian,  swears 
to  the  Treaty  of  Peace  and  the 
Alliance,  v.  19  med.,  24  init. 

Chios,  its  moderate  and  stable  go- 
vernment, viii.  24  med.;  its  naval 
power,  ib.  6  fin.  [cp.  i.  19  init., 
ii.  9  fin.,  56  med.];  its  riches,  viii. 
24  med.;  great  number  of  slaves 
there,  ib.  40  med.;  Chios  and 
Lesbos  the  only  free  allies  of 
Athens,  iii.  10  med.,  vi.  85  med., 
vii.  57  init.;  Homer  at  Chios, 
iii.  104  fin.;  the  Chians  assist  the 
Athenians  against  the  Samians, 
i.  116,  117;  furnish  ships  in  the 
siege  of  Potidaea,  ii.  56  med.,  vi. 
31  init.;  Alcidas  puts  some  Chian 
prisoners  to  death,  iii.  32  init. ;  re- 
leases the  remainder  on  a  remon- 
strance from  the  Samian  exiles, 
ib.  fin.;  Chians  aid  the  Athenians 
at  Pylos,  iv.  13  med.;  ordered  by 
the  Athenians  to  dismantle  their 
walls,  ib.  5 1 ;  furnish  ships  against 
Mend£  and  Scione,  ib.  129  ink.; 
against  Melos,  v.  84  init.;  aid  the 
Athenians  at  Syracuse,  vi.  43  init., 
85  med.,  vii.  20  med.,  57  init.;  ne- 
.  gotiate  with  the  Lacedaemonians 
about  revolting,  viii.  5  init.;  re- 
ceived into  alliance,  ib.  6 ;  send 
the  Athenians  ships  as  a  pledge 
of  fidelity,  ib.  9  med.;  revolt,  ib.  14 
med.;  employed  by  Alcibiades  to 
raise  revolt  in  Ionia,  beginning 
with  Miletus,  ib.  17  ;  four  of  their 
ships  are  taken  by  the  Athenians, 
ib.  19  init.;  induce  Lebedus  and 
Erae  to  revolt,  ib.  fin.;  then  Me- 
thymna  and  Mitylene,  ib.  22  ;  lose 
a  few  ships  off  Lesbos,  2^.23  med.; 
defeated  in  three  battles  by  the 
Athenians,  ib.  24  med.;  their  suf- 
ferings lead  some  to  negotiate 
with  the  Athenians,  ib.  24  fin.,  31 
init.,  38  med.;  aid  in  the  capture 
of  lasus,  ib.  28  init.;  the  Athe- 
nians prepare  to  attack  them,  ib. 


INDEX. 


649 


30;  the  Chians  refuse  to  assist 

•.  Astyochus  in  procuring  the  revolt 
of  Lesbos,  ib.  32  fin.;  three  Chian 
ships  are  chased  by  the  Atheni- 
ans into  Chios,  ib.  34  init.;  have 
their  government  changed  by  the 
Lacedaemonians,  ib.  38  med.; 
completely  blockaded,  ib.  40 ;  im- 
plore the  aid  of  Astyochus,  ib.  38 
fin.,  40  init.;  defeated  by  the 
Athenians  and  more  closely  block- 
aded, ib.  55  fin.,  56  init.;  gain  an 
advantage  at  sea  over  the  Athe- 
nians, viii.  6 1  fin.;  regain  the  com- 
mand of  the  sea,  on  the  with- 
drawal of  a  part  of  the  Athenian 
fleet,  ib.  62  init.,  63  init;  the 
Athenians  plan  a  fresh  attack  on 
Chios,  on  the  arrival  of  a  Lace- 
daemonian fleet  under  Mindarus, 
ib.  100 ;  the  Lacedaemonians  slip 
away,  ib.  101;  the  Chians  lose 
eight  ships  at  Cynossema,  ib.  106 
med.;  Chian  tesseracosts,  viii. 
101  init. 

Choenix,  an  Athenian  measure,  iv. 
1 6  med.  [See  note.] 

Choerades,  lapygian  islands,  vii.  33 
med. 

Choruses,  once  sent  by  the  Atheni- 
ans to  the  festival  at  Delos,  iii. 
104  fin. 

Chromon,  Demosthenes'  Messenian 
guide  in  Aetolia,  iii.  98  med. 

Chrysippus,  murdered  by  Atreus,  i. 
9  med. 

Chrysis,  priestess  of  Here  at  Argos, 
ii.  2  init.,  iv.  133  med.;  causes 
the  conflagration  of  the  temple, 
iv.  133  med.;  flees  to  Phlius,  ib. 

Chrysis,  father  of  Eumachus,  a 
Corinthian,  ii.  33  med. 

Gilicians:  the  Cilicians  and  Phoe- 
nicians defeated  at  Salamis[in  Cy- 
prus] by  the  Athenians,  i.i  12  med. 

Cimon,  son  of  Miltiades,  captures 
Eion,  i.  98  init.;  conquers  the 
Persians  at  the  Eurymedon,  ib. 
100  init. ;  commands  the  Athenian 
reinforcements  at  the  siege  of 
Ithome,  ib.  102  init.;  dies  in  Cy- 
prus, ib.  1 12  med. 

Cimon,  father  of  Lacedaemonius, 
an  Athenian,  i.  45. 

Cithaeron,  Mt.,  ii.  75  init.,  iii.  24  init. 


Cities,  ancient  cities  small,].  2  med. ; 
resembled  scattered  villages,  ib. 
10  init.;  at  first  built  inland, 
afterwards  on  the  sea-shore,  ib. 
7  ;  the  cities  of  Ionia  unfortified, 
iii.  33  med.;  '  The  City,'  name  for 
Acropolis  at  Athens,  ii.  15  fin. 

Citium,  in  Cyprus,  i.  112  med. 

Citizen,  the  citizen  must  be  sacri- 
ficed to  the  state,  ii.  60  init.,  61  fin. 

Citizenship,  the  Lacedaemonians 
deprive  those  who  had  been 
prisoners  at  Sphacteria  of  citizen- 
ship, y.  34  fin.  ^ 

Clarus,  in  Ionia,  iii.  33  init. 

Classes  of  the  citizens  at  Athens, 
iii.  i6init,  vi.  43  med. 

Clazomenae,  built  on  an  island,  viii. 
14  fin.;  the  Clazomenians  re- 
volt from  Athens,  ib. ;  fortify  Po- 
lichne,  ib.\  aid  in  the  revolt  of 
Teos,  ib.  16;  the  Peloponnesian 
infantry  march  towards  Clazo- 
menae, ib.  22  fin.;  they  are  sub- 
dued by  the  Athenians,  ib.  23  fin.; 
repulse  a  Peloponnesian  attack, 
ib.  31  med. 

Cleaenetus,  father  of  Cleon,  an 
Athenian,  iii.  36  fin. 

Cleandridas,  father  of  Gylippus,  a 
Spartan,  vi.  93  med. 

Clearchus,  a  Lacedaemonian  com- 
mander, viii.  8  med.;  appointed  to 
the  Hellespont,  ib.  39  med.,  80. 

Clearidas,  a  Lacedaemonian,  made 
governor  of  Amphipolis,  iv.  132 
fin.;  commands  with  Brasidas  at 
the  battle  of  Amphipolis,  v.  6-1 1 ; 
refuses  to  surrender  Amphipolis, 
ib.  21  med;  brings  home  the 
troops  of  Brasidas,  ib.  34  init. 

Cleinias,  the  father  of  Alcibiades, 
an  Athenian,  v.  43 init.;  another, 
father  of  Theopompus  [?],  ii.  26; 
another,  father  of  Cleopompus, 
ib.  58. 

Cle'ippides,  an  Athenian  com- 
mander, iii.  3  med. 

Cleobulus,  ephor  at  Sparta,  v.  36 
init. ;  favours  the  war  party,  ib. ; 
negotiates  with  the  Boeotians 
and  Corinthians,  ib.  36-38. 

Cleombrotus,  father  of  Pausanias, 
a  Lacedaemonian,  i.  94  init.;  of 
Nicomedes,  ib.  107  init. 


650 


INDEX. 


Cleomedes,  an  Athenian  general  in 
the  attack  on  Melos,  v.  84  fin. 

Cleomenes,  king  of  Sparta,  expels 
the  'accursed  persons'  from 
Athens,  i.  126  fin. 

Cleomenes,  the  uncle  of  king  Pau- 
sanias,  iii.  26  med. 

Cleon,  a  great  popular  leader,  iii. 
36  fin.,  iv.  21  med.;  hostile  to 
Nicias,  iv.  27  fin.;  a  great  enemy 
to  peace,  v.  16  init. ;  his  arrogance, 
ib.  7  med.;  carries  the  decree 
condemning  the  Mitylenaeans  to 
death,  iii.  36  fin.;  his  speech 
against  its  repeal,  ib.  37-40; 
moves  and  carries  the  slaughter 
of  looo  Mitylenaean  captives  at 
Athens,  ib.  50  init.;  causes  the 
breaking  off  of  negotiations  with 
Sparta,  iv.  21,  22;  is  sent  in  place 
of  Nicias  to  Pylos,  ib.  27,  28; 
selects  Demosthenes  as  his  col- 
league, ib.  29  init.;  makes  with 
Demosthenes  an  attack  on 
Sphacteria,  ib.  31-37;  compels 
the  surrender  of  the  Lacedaemo- 
nians, ib.  38;  carries  a  decree  for 
the  destruction  of  Scione,  ib.  122 
fin.;  captures  Torone,  v.  2,  3; 
takes  Galepsus,  and  attempts 
Stageirus,  ib.  6  init.;  defeated 
and  slain  at  Amphipolis,  ib.  6-1 1. 

Cleonae,  in  Acte,  iv.  109  med. 

Cleonae,  in  Argolis,  in  alliance  with 
Argos,  v.  67  fin.;  sends  troops 
to  Mantinea,  ib.  72  fin.,  74  med.;  a 
Lacedaemonian  army  invading 
Argos  turns  back  at  Cleonae  in 
consequence  of  an  earthquake, 
vi.  95  init. 

Cleonymus,  father  of  Clearidas,  a 
Lacedaemonian,  iv.  132  fin. 

Cleopompus,  an  Athenian  com- 
mander, ii.  58  init. 

Cleruchi,  in  Lesbos,  iii.  50  med. 

Clubs,  the,  at  Athens,  viii.  48 
med.,  54  fin.,  81  med.  [cp.  iii.  82 
med.] 

Cnemus,  a  Lacedaemonian  com- 
mander, ravages  Zacynthus,  ii. 
66;  invades  Acarnania,  ib.  80-82 ; 
defeated  by  Phormio,  ib.  83,  84; 
receives  Brasidas  and  two  other 
commissioners  from  Lacedae- 
mon,  ib.  85  init.;  second  defeat 


of,  ib.  86-92;  concerts  with  Brasi- 
das an  attack  upon  the  Piraeus, 
ib.  93,  94- 

Cnidis,  father  of  Xenares,  a  Lace- 
daemonian, v.  51  fin. 

Cnidus,  revolts  from  Athens,  viii. 
35  init.;  attacked  by  the  Athe- 
nians, ib.  fin.;  the  Cnidians  per- 
suade Astyochus  to  attack  the 
Athenians  under  Charminus,  ib. 
41  fin.;  fleet  of  the  Lacedaemo- 
nians assembles  at ;  their  commis- 
sioners confer  with  Tissaphernes, 
ib.  42-44  init.  [cp.  52  init.] ;  Tissa- 
phernes' garrison  expelled  from, 
ib.  109  init.;  Lipara  a  Cnidian 
colony,  iii.  88  init.;  Triopium  in 
Cnidian  territory,  viii.  35  med. 

Colonae,  in  the  Troad,  i.  131  init. 

Colonies,  how  anciently  founded,  i. 
4  init.,  24  init.;  honours  given 
by  colonies  to  their  mother  city, 
ib.  25  fin.  [cp.  ib.  34,  38];  shares 
in  a  colony  secured  by  a  deposit, 
without  immediately  quitting 
home,  ib.  27  init.;  magistrates 
sent  by  the  mother  city,  ib.  56 
fin.;  laws  given  by  the  mother 
city,  iii.  34  fin.  [cp.  vi.  4,  S\', 
foundation  of  the  Lacedaemo- 
nian colony,  Heraclea,  iii.  92, 
93;  the  honours  of  the  founda- 
tion of  Amphipolis  transferred 
to  Brasidas,  v.  n  init.;  leaders 
chosen  from  the  mother  city,  viii. 
loomed.;  the  Hellenic  colonies 
of  Sicily,  vi.  3-5. 

Colonus,  near  Athens,  Temple  of 
Poseidon  at,  viii.  67  med. 

Colophon,  taken  by  Paches,  iii.  34 
init.;  made  an  Athenian  colony, 
ib.  fin. 

Colophonian  Port,  near  Torone,  v. 
2  med. 

Columns,  an  inscription  recording 
the  oppression  of  the  tyrants  in- 
scribed on  a  column  at  Athens, 
vi.  55  init.;  treaties  ordered  to  be 
inscribed  on  columns,  v.  18,  xi; 
23,  iv;  47  fin.;  the  infraction  of 
the  treaty  inscribed  on  the  same 
column  by  the  Athenians,  ib'.  56 
med. 

Commanders,  speech  of  the  Pelo- 
ponesian,  ii.  87. 


INDEX. 


651 


Commissioners,  sent  by  the  Lace- 
daemonians as  advisers  to  their 
officers,  ii.  85  init.,  iii.  69  med., 
76;  v.  63  fin.;  viii.  39  init. 

Common  places,  of  speeches  at 
critical  moments,  vii.  69  med. 

Confederacy,  a  confederacy  lacks  a 
central  power,  i.  141  fin. 

Conon,  an  Athenian,  governor  of 
Naupactus,  vii.  31  med. 

Controversy,  Melian,  v.  85-113. 

Copae,  on  Lake  Copais,  in  Boeotia, 
iv.  93  fin. 

Corcyra,  mother  city  of  Epidamnus, 
i.  24  init.;  formerly  inhabited  by 
the  Phaeacians,  ib.  25  fin.;  under 
obligation  to  Themistocles,  but 
afraid  to  shelter  him,  ib.  136 
init.;  its  importance,  i.  36  fin., 
44  fin.,  68  fin.,  ii.  7  fin.;  the 
Sicilian  expedition  musters  at 
Corcyra,  vi.  30  init.,  32  med., 
34  med.,  42,  43  init.;  Demos- 
thenes sails  to  Corcyra  with  the 
reinforcements  for  Sicily,  vii.  26 
fin.;  collects  troops  there,  ib.  31, 
33  med.;  naval  engagement  be- 
tween the  Corinthians  and  Cor- 
cyraeans  [B.C.  664],  ib.  13  med.; 
the  Corcyraeans  colonists  of  the 
Corinthians,  i.  25  med.;  their 
detestation  and  neglect  of  their 
mother  city,  *£.,  ib.  38  [cp.  vii.  57 
med.];  they  refuse  aid  to  the 
Epidamnians,  i.  24  fin.;  besiege 
Epidamnus,  ib.  26;  send  an 
embassy  to  Corinth,  ib.  28;  con- 
quer the  Corinthians  at  sea, 
ib.  29;  slaughter  their  prisoners 
[except  the  Corinthians]  after 
the  battle,  ib.  30  init.;  send  an 
embassy  to  Athens,  ib.  31;  their 
speech,  ib.  32-36;  obtain  alliance 
with  the  Athenians,  ib.  44;  fight 
at  sea  with  the  aid  of  the  Athe- 
nians against  the  Corinthians,  ib. 
48-51  ;  offer  the  Corinthians 
battle,  ib.  52;  want  to  kill  the 
Corinthian  messengers,  ib.  53 
med.;  set  up  a  trophy  on  Sybota, 
ib.  54  init.;  claim  the  victory,  ib. 
fin.;  driven  from  Anactorium  by 
the  Corinthians,  ib.  55  init.;  the 
Corinthians  intrigue  with  their 
Corcyraean  prisoners,  ib.  med.; 


the  Corcyraeans  receive  an  em- 
bassy from  Athens,  ii.  7  fin.;  fur- 
nish the  Athenians  with  ships,  ib. 
9  med.,  25  init.;  fall  into  sedition, 
iii.  69  fin.,  70  init.;  the  prisoners 
return  and  promote  a  revolt  from 
Athens,  ib.  70  init.;  oligarchs 
worsted  in  a  law  suit  by  Peithias, 
ib.  med.;  they  murder  him  and  his 
partizans,  ib.  fin.;  try  to  win  over 
the  people,  ib.  71;  on  the  arrival 
of  a  Corinthian  trireme  they 
attack  and  defeat  the  people,  ib. 
72;  receive  aid  from  the  main- 
land but  cannot  induce  the  slaves 
to  join  them  by  offers  of  freedom, 
ib.  73;  the  people  defeat  the 
oligarchs,  ib.  74;  Nicostratus  the 
Athenian  commander  tries  to 
effect  a  reconciliation,  ib.  75; 
on  the  proposal  of  the  popular 
leaders  five  ships  are  manned 
from  the  opposite  party,  but  the 
crews  take  sanctuary,  ib.  med.; 
the  people  disarm  and  remove 
the  others  from  the  temple  of 
Here  to  an  island,  ib.  fin.;  the 
Corcyraeans  and  Athenians  en- 
gage the  Lacedaemonians,  and 
are  defeated,  ib.  77,  78;  replace 
the  prisoners  in  the  temple  of 
Here,  ib.  79  init.;  persuade  some 
of  the  aristocratic  party  to  help 
to  man  a  fleet,  ib.  80;  the  Lace- 
daemonian fleet  retires  on  the 
approach  of  the  Athenians,  and 
the  people  massacre  their  oppo- 
nents, ib.  81;  this  massacre  the 
first  example  of  the  horrors  of  re- 
volutionary warfare  in  Hellas,  ib. 
85  init;  the  surviving  oligarchs 
occupy  Mount  Istone,  ib.  85,  iv. 
2  med.  ib.  46;  the  people  cap- 
ture Istone,  ib.  46  med.;  treach- 
erously massacre  their  prisoners, 
ib.  46  fin.-48;  send  aid  to  the 
Athenians  against  Syracuse,  vii. 
31  fin.,  44  fin.,  57  med.;  alarm 
the  Athenians  at  Epipolae  by 
their  Dorian  Paean,  ib.  44  fin. 
Corinth,  once  inhabited  by  Aeolians, 
iv.  42  med.;  triremes  first  built  at 
Corinth,  i.i3  init.;  an  early  centre 
of  commerce,  ib.  med.;  a0i/etoj/, 
ib.\  its  naval  power,  ib.  36  fin.; 


I  N  D  E  X. 


influence  of  Corinth  among  the 
barbarous  races  of  Epirus,  ib. 
47  fin.;  naval  engagement  be- 
tween the  Corcyraeans  and  Co- 
rinthians [B.C.  664],  ib.  13  med.; 
[B.C.  491]  the  Corinthians  lend 
ships  for  the  Aeginetan  war  to 
Athens,  ib.  41  init.;  [B.C.  461-445] 
make  war  upon  the  Megarians, 
ib.  103  med.;  defeat  the  Athe- 
nians at  Halieis,  ib.  105  init.;  in- 
vade Megara,  ib.  105  med.;  are 
defeated, /#.  105  fin.;  suffer  great 
loss,  ib.  1 06  ;  assist  the  Megarians 
to  revolt,  ib.  1 14  med. ;  [the  Pelo- 
ponnesian  war]  the  Corinthians 
take  the  Epidamnians  under  their 
protection,  ib.  25  med.;  hatred 
of,  to  the  Corcyraeans,  ib. ;  send 
aid  to  Epidamnus,  ib.  26  init.; 
and  a  colony,  ib.  27  init. ;  receive 
an  embassy  from  Corcyra,  ib.  28  ; 
conquered  at  sea  by  the  Corcy- 
raeans, ib.  29  ;  send  an  embassy 
to  Athens,  ib.  31  fin.;  speech  of, 
ib.  37-43  ;  sail  against  Corcyra, 
ib.  46  init. ;  fight  at  sea  with  the 
Corcyraeans,  ib.  48-50 ;  retire 
before  the  Athenian  reinforce- 
ments, ib.  5 1 ;  hold  a  parley  with 
the  Athenians,  ib.  53 ;  return 
home,  ib.  54  ;  set  up  a  trophy  at 
Sybota,  ib.  init.;  claim  the  vic- 
tory, ib.  med.;  on  the  road  cap- 
ture Anactorium,  ib.  55  init.;  their 
alliance  is  sought  by  Perdiccas, 
ib.  57  med.;  they  send  troops  to 
Potidaea,  ib.  60  [cp.  ii.  70  med.]; 
had  a  bitter  hatred  of  the  Athe- 
nians, i.  66,  of  old,  103  fin. ;  invite 
the  allies  to  Sparta,  ib.  67  init. ; 
speech  of  their  ambassadors,  ib. 
68-71;  urge  on  the  war,  ib.  119 
fin.;  second  speech  of,  ib.  120- 
124 ;  furnish  the  Lacedaemonians 
with  ships,  ii.  9  med.;  lose  Sol- 
lium,  ib.  30  init.;  restore  Evar- 
chus,  ib.  33  init.;  are  defeated  in 
Cephallenia,  ib.  fin.;  prepare  with 
others  a  fleet  to  assist  the  Lace- 
daemonian expedition  against 
Acarnania,  ib.  80  med. ;  arriving 
too  late  they  are  attacked  and 
defeated  by  Phormio,  ib.  83,  84  ; 
suffer  a  second  defeat,  ib.  90-92; 


share  in  the  projected  surprise  of 
the  Piraeus,  ib.  93-95  ;  induce 
their  Corcyraean  prisoners  [see 
i.  55]  to  attempt  an  oligarchical 
revolution  at  Corcyra,  iii.  70  init.; 
send  back  an  embassy  with  them, 
ib.,  ib.  74  fin.;  refuse  to  aid  the 
oligarchs  in  Istone,  ib.  85  med.; 
garrison  Ambracia,  ib.  114  fin., 
iv.  42  fin.;  repulse  an  Athenian 
invasion,  iv.  43,  44  ;  driven  out 
of  Anactorium  by  the  Athenians 
and  Acarnanians,  ib.  49  ;  receive 
and  aid  Brasidas,  ib.  70  med., 
74  init.;  join  in  the  one  year's 
Truce,  ib.  119  med.;  dissatisfied 
with  the  treaty  between  the  Lace- 
daemonians and  Athenians,  v.  17 
fin.,  25  init.,  35  init.;  send  envoys 
to  Argos,  ib.  27  ;  the  Lacedae- 
monians remonstrate  with  them, 
ib.  30;  they  join  the  Argive 
alliance,  ib.  31  fin.;  apply  to  the 
Boeotians,  ib.  32  med.;  the  new 
Spartan  ephors  wish  them  in 
concert  with  the  Boeotians  to 
bring  the  Argives  into  the  Lace- 
daemonian alliance,  ib.  36  ;  the 
negotiation  fails,  ib.  38  ;  the  Co- 
rinthians refuse  to  join  the  Athe- 
nian and  Argive  alliance,  ib.  48, 
50  fin. ;  prevent  the  construction 
of  a  fort  at  Rhium  by  Alcibiades, 
ib.  52  fin.;  the  Argives  attack 
Epidaurus  hoping  by  its  capture 
to  check  the  Corinthians,  ib.  53  ; 
a  Corinthian  envoy  attends  a 
conference  at  Mantinea,  ib.  55  ; 
the  Corinthians  send  a  contin- 
gent to  meet  the  Lacedaemonians 
at  Phlius,  ib.  57  fin. ;  engage  the 
Argives,  2^.59 init.;  are  too  late  for 
Mantinea,  ib.  64 med.,  75  init.;  do 
not  join  the  Lacedaemonians  in 
an  expedition  against  Argos,  ib. 
83  init.;  declare  war  against  the 
Athenians,  ib.  115  med.;  again 
withhold  support  from  a  Lace- 
daemonian attack  on  Argos,  vi.  7 
init.;  receive  an  embassy  from 
Syracuse,  ib.  73,  88  med.;  vote  the 
Syracusans  aid,  ib.  88  fin. ;  send 
envoys  with  them  to  Sparta,  ib.\ 
send  ships  and  troops  to  Sicily, 
ib.  93  med.j  104  init.,  vii.  2  init., 


INDEX. 


653 


4  fin.,  7  init.,  17  med.,  19  med.,  31 
init.;  Corinthian  ambassadors  go 
from  Syracuse  to  the  Sicilian 
states, vii.  25  fin.;  fight  at  sea  with 

•  the  Athenians,  after  preparing 
their  fleet  in  a  special  manner, 
ib.  34  ;  claim  the  victory  because 
not  severely  defeated,  ib.  fin.; 
their  forces  before  Syracuse,  ib. 
58  med.;  one  of  their  pilots, 
Ariston,  the  ablest  in  the  whole 
fleet,  ib.  39  ;  their  ships  fight  in 
the  last  battle  in  the  harbour,  ib. 
70  init.;  the  Corinthians  said  to 
have  instigated  the  execution  of 
Nicias  and  Demosthenes,  ib.  86 
fin. ;  Agis  deposits  Pthiote  Achae- 
an hostages  with  them,  viii. 
3  med.;  the  Corinthians  contri- 
bute ships  to  the  Lacedaemonian 
fleet,  ib.  fin.;  the  allies  meet  in 
conference  at  Corinth,  ib.  8  ;  the 
Corinthians  refuse  to  join  the 
Chian  expedition  until  after  the 
Isthmian  Games,  ib.  9  init.;  the 
fleet  is  chased  into  Peiraeum  by 
the  Athenians,  ib.  10;  the  Co- 
rinthians come  to  assist  them,  ib. 
ii  init.;  the  fleet  breaks  the 
blockade,  ib.  20  init.;  the  Corin- 
thians discourage  a  second  Les- 
bian revolt,  ib.  32  init.;  send  out 
five  ships  to  Astyochus,  ib.  33 
init.  [cp.  23  fin.];  besiege  Oenoe, 
ib.  98  ;  lose  five  ships  at  Cynos- 
sema,  ib.  106  med. 

Coroebus,  father  of  Ammeas,  a 
Plataean,  iii.  22  med. 

Coronea,  in  Boeotia,  iv.  93  fin.;  de- 
feat of  the  Athenians  there,  i. 
113,  iii.  62  fin.,  67  med.,  iv.  92 
fin. 

Coronta,  in  Acarnania,  ii.  102 
init. 

Corycus,  promontory  in  Erythraea, 
viii.  14  init.,  33  init.,  34  init. 

Coryphasium,  the  Lacedaemonian 
name  of  Pylos,  iv.  3  med.,  ib.  1 18, 
iii ;  ordered  to  be  restored  under 
treaty,  v.  18,  viii. 

Cos  Meropis,  devastated  by  an 
earthquake,  viii.  41  med.;  ravaged 
by  the  Peloponnesians,  ib.\  for- 
tified by  the  Athenians,  ib.  108 
init.  [cp.  44  fin.,  55  init.] 


Cotyl6,  a  measure  of  capacity,  iv. 
1 6  med.  [cp.  vii.  87  med.] 

Cotyrta,  in  Laconia,  iv.  56  init. 

Councils  :  Council  of  80  at  Argos, 
v.  47  fin.;  the  Four  Councils  of 
the  Boeotians,  ib.  38  ; — the  Coun- 
cil at  Athens, viii.  66  init.;  formed 
into  one  body  by  Theseus  from 
the  Communes,  ii.  15  init.;  ex- 
pelled by  the  oligarchs,  viii.  69; 
Alcibiades  demands  its  restora- 
tion, ib.  86  med.;— Council  of 
Elders  appointed  at  Athens,  after 
the  defeat  before  Syracuse,  viii. 
i  fin. 

Counsel,  the  two  things  most  ad- 
verse to  good  counsel,  iii.  42  init.; 
wise  counsel  more  formidable  to 
an  enemy  than  over- severity,  ib. 
48  fin. 

Courts,  profits  derived  by  the  Athe- 
nians from,  vi.  91  fin. 

Cranii,  in  Cephallenia,  settlement 
of  the  Helots  at,  v.  35  fin.;  their 
removal  to  Pylos,  ib.  56  med.; 
Cranians,  ii.  30  fin.,  ib.  33  fin. 

Cranonians,  of  Thessaly,  ii.  22  fin. 

Crataemenes,  one  of  the  founders 
of  Zancle,  vi.  4  fin. 

Cratesicles,  father  of  Thrasyme- 
lidas,  a  Lacedaemonian,  iv.  ii 
init. 

Crestonians,  in  Acte,  iv.  109  fin. 

Cretan  Sea,  the,  iv.  53  fin.,  v.  no 
init. 

Crete,  campaign  of  the  Athenians 
in,  ii.  85  fin.;  Alcidas  caught  in  a 
storm  off,  iii.  69  init.;  Cretan  and 
Rhodian  origin  of  Gela,  vi.  4  med., 
vii.  57  med.;  Cretan  archers,  vi. 
25  fin.,  43  fin.;  Cretan  merce- 
naries in  the  Athenian  army 
before  Syracuse,  vii.  57  med. 

Crisaean  Gulf,  the,  i.  107  med.,  ii. 
69  init.,  83  init.;  its  mouth,  ii.  86 
init.;  Siphae  on  the  Crisaean 
Gulf,  iv.  76  init. 

Crocyleium,  in  Aetolia,  iii.  96  med. 

Croesus,  conquered  by  Cyrus,  i.  16. 

Crommyon,  near  Corinth,  iv.  42  fin., 
44  med.,  45  init. 

Crotona,  refuses  passage  to  an  Athe- 
nian army,  vii.  35  med. 

Crusis,  in  Mygdonia,  ii.  79  med. 

Cyclades,  colonized  by  Minos,  i.  4  ; 


654 


INDEX. 


all  subject  to  Athens,  except  Melos 
and  Cythera,  ii.  9  fin. 

Cyclopes,  the,  oldest  inhabitants  of 
Sicily,  vi.  2  init. 

Cydonia,  in  Crete,  ii.  85  fin. 

Cyllene,  the  Elean  dockyard,  i.  30 
med.,  ii.  84  fin.,  86  init.,  iii.  69 
init.,  76  init.,  vi.  88  fin.;  burnt  by 
the  Corcyraeans,  i.  30  med. 

Cylon,  the  story  of,  i.  126  init, 

Cyme,  in  Aeolis,  iii.  31  init.,  viii. 
22  fin.,  31  fin.,  100  med.;  the  Cu- 
maean  territory,  viii.  101  med. 

Cyme,  in  Italy,  a  colony  from  Chal- 
cis  in  Euboea,  vi.  4  fin. 

Cynes,  an  Acarnanian,  ii.  102  init. 

Cynossema,  a  promontory  in  the 
Hellespont,  viii.  104  fin.,  106  fin.; 
battle  of,  ib.  104-106. 

Cynuria,  on  the  border  of  Argos 
and  Laconia,  iv.  56  med.;  quar- 
rel between  the  Lacedaemonians 
and  the  Argives  respecting,  v.  14 
fin.;  stipulation  about,  in  the 
treaty  between  the  Lacedaemo- 
nians and  Argives,  ib.  41. 

Cyprus  subdued  by  Pausanias,  i.  94, 
128  med.;  attacked  by  the  Athe- 
nians, ib.  104  med.,  112  med. 

Cypsela,  in  Arcadia,  v.  33  med. 

Cyrene,  i.  no  init.;  Cyrenaeans 
assist  a  Lacedaemonian  fleet  on 
the  way  to  Syracuse,  vii.  50  init. 

Cyrrhus,  in  Macedonia,  ii.  loomed. 

Cyrus,  king  of  Persia  [father  of 
Cambyses],  i.  16;  [son  of  Darius], 
ii.  65  fin. 

Cythera,  inhabited  by  Lacedaemo- 
nian Perioeci,  iv.  53  med.;  the 
*  Judge  of  Cythera,' #.;  import- 
ance of  the  island,  ib.  fin.;  cap- 
tured by  the  Athenians,  ib.  54  ; 
the  Athenians  plunder  Laconia 
from,  v.  14  med.;  ordered  to  be 
restored  under  treaty,  ib.  18,  viii ; 
the  Cytherians  in  the  Athenian 
service  before  Syracuse,  vii.  57 
med. 

Cytinium,  in  Doris,  i.  107  init.,  iii. 
95  init.,  102  init. 

Cyzicus  revolts  from  Athens,  viii. 
107  init.;  retaken,  ib.  med.;  Ti- 
magoras,aCyzicene  exile  in  Phar- 
nabazus'  service,  ib.  6  init.,  8  init., 
39  init. 


D. 

Daimachus,  father  of  Eumolpides, 
a  Plataean,  iii.  20  init. 

Damagetus,  a  Lacedaemonian, 
swears  to  the  Treaty  of  Peace 
and  the  Alliance,  v.  19  med., 
24  init. 

Damagon,  a  Lacedaemonian,  one 
of  the  founders  of  Heraclea,  iii. 
92  fin. 

Damotimus,  a  Sicyonian,  iv.  119 
med. 

Danaans,  a  name  for  the  Hellenes 
in  Homer,  i.  3  med. 

Daphnus,  near  Clazomenae,  viii.  23 
fin.,  31  med. 

Dardanus,  on  the  Hellespont,  viii. 
104  init. 

Daric  Staters,  viii.  28  fin. 

Darius,  king  of  Persia,  succeeds 
Cambyses,  i.  14  med.;  reduces  the 
islands,  ib.  16 ;  Aristagoras  of 
Miletus  and  Darius,  iv.  102  init.; 
influence  of  the  tyrants  of  Lamp- 
sacus  with  him,  vi.  59  med.; 
Hippias  takes  refuge  with  him, 
ib.  fin. 

Darius  II,  son  of  Artaxerxes,  king 
of  Persia,  viii.  5  init.,  37,  58  init. 

Dascon,  joint  founder  with  Mene- 
colus  of  Camarina,  vi.  5  med. 

Dascon,  near  Syracuse,  vi.  66  med. 

Dascylium,  satrapy  of,  in  Asia 
Minor,  i.  129  init. 

Daulia,  an  ancient  name  of  a  part 
of  Phocis,  ii.  29  med.;  the  '  Dau- 
lian  bird,'  ib. 

Death,  the  penalty  of,  proved  by 
experience  to  be  no  deterrent, 
iii.  45- 

Decelea,  fortification  of,  suggested 
by  Alcibiades,  vi.  91  med.;  vii. 
1 8  init.;  determined  on  and  car- 
ried out  by  the  Lacedaemonians, 
vi.  93  init.,  vii.  18  fin.,  19  init.; 
terrible  mischief  thus  occasioned 
to  the  Athenians,  ib.  27,  28 ; 
.Agis  at  Decelea,  viii.  4  fin.;  the 
occupation  of  Decelea  causes  the 
whole  Athenian  population  to  be 
on  service,  ib.  69  init.;  the  400 
send  heralds  to  Agis  there,  ib.  70 
fin.;  Agis  marches  from  Decelea 
to  Athens,  ib.  71  init.;  returns, 


INDEX. 


655 


ib.  fin.;  the  400  resume  negotia- 
tions with  Agis  there,  *#.;  Corin- 
thian troops  in  the  garrison,  ib. 
98  med. 

Deiniadas,  a  Chian  commander, 
viii.  22  fin. 

Deinias,  father  of  Cleippides,  an 
Athenian,  iii.  3  med. 

Delium,  a  temple  of  Apollo,  near 
Tanagra,  iv.  76  med.;  fortified 
by  the  Athenians,  ib.  90 :  cap- 
tured by  the  Boeotians,  ib.  100 ; 
battle  of,  ib.  93-96  ;  effect  of  their 
defeat  upon  the  Athenians,  v.  14 
init.,15  fin.;  the  Boeotians  charge 
the  Athenians  with  sacrilege  for 
occupying  it,  ib.  97,  98. 

Delos,  iii.  29,  viii.  77,  80  med.,  86 
init.;  purified  by  Pisistratus,  iii. 
104  init.;  purified  by  the  Athe- 
nians, i.  8  init.,  iii.  104  init.; 
second  purification  of,  v.  I  ;  the 
first  treasury  of  the  Athenian  Al- 
liance, i.  96  fin.;  earthquake  in, 
ii.  8  med.;  ancient  games  at,  iii. 
104  med.;  restored  by  the  Athe- 
nians, ib.  fin.;  the  Delians  settled 
at  Adramyttium,  v.  i  fin.,  viii. 
108  fin.;  restored  by  the  Athe- 
nians, v.  32  init.;  treacherous 
massacre  of  those  at  Adramyt- 
tium by  the  Persians,  viii.  108 
fin. 

Delphi,  temple  of,  v.  18,  xi  ;  hand- 
ed over  by  the  Lacedaemonians 
to  the  Delphians,  i.  112  fin.;  by 
the  Athenians  to  the  Phocians, 
ib.\  provision  respecting,  in  the 
treaty  between  the  Lacedaemo- 
nians and  Athenians,  v.  18,  ii ; 
spoils  sent  to,  iv.  134  med.;  al- 
leged corruption  of  the  priestess 
by  Pleistoanax,  v.  16  med.;  trea- 
sury of,  i.  121  med.,  ib.  143  init.; 
tripod  of,  i.  132  init.,  iii.  57  med. 

Delphian  Oracle,  see  Oracle. 

Delphinium,  in  Chios,  fortified  by 
the  Athenians,  viii.  38  init.,  40 
fin. 

Demaratus,  an  Athenian  com- 
mander, vi.  105  fin. 

Demarchus,  a  Syracusan  general, 
viii.  85  fin. 

Demeas,  father  of  Philocrates,  an 
Athenian,  v.  116  fin. 


Demiurgi,  the,  a  magistracy  at 
Mantinea,  v.  47  fin.;  at  Elis,  ib. 

Democracy,  the  democracy  every- 
where the  friend  of  Athens,  iii. 
47  init.,  82  init.;  Pericles'  de- 
scription of  the  Athenian  demo- 
cracy, ii.  37-40  ;  Cleon's,  iii.  37 
foil.;  Diodotus',  iii.  42  foil.;  the 
people  the  best  judges  of  a 
matter,  ii.  40  init.,  vi.  39  ;  de- 
mocracies manageable  enough 
when  under  the  influence  of  ter- 
ror, viii.  i  fin.;  the  weaknesses 
of  a  democracy,  ii.  65  init.,  iii. 
37.,  vi.  89  med.;  democracy  more 
stable  than  oligarchy,  viii.  89  fin. 

Demodocus,  an  Athenian  general, 
iv.  75  init. 

Demosthenes,  commands  an  expe- 
dition round  Peloponnese,  iii.  91 
init.;  ravages  Leucas,  ib.  94 
init.;  invades  Aetolia,  ib.  fin.- 
98  ;  retires  to  Naupactus  after 
his  failure,  ib.  98  fin.;  saves  Nau- 
pactus, ib.  102  med.;  takes  com- 
mand of  the  Acarnanians  against 
the  Ambraciots,  ib.  105  med.  [cp. 
vii.  57  fin.] ;  defeats  the  Am- 
braciots, iii.  107-111  ;  destroys 
the  Ambraciot  reinforcements, 
ib.  112,  113;  returns  to  Athens, 
ib.  114  init.;  sent  on  a  special 
commission,  iv.  2  fin.;  fortifies 
Pylos,  ib.  3-5  ;  prepares  to  meet 
the  Lacedaemonians,  ib.  9 ; 
speech  of,  ib.  10 :  repulses  the 
Lacedaemonians,  ib.  n,  12  ;  se- 
lected by  Cleon  as  his  col- 
league, ib.  29  init.;  plans  and 
executes  an  attack  on  Sphac- 
teria,  ib.  29-37  ;  forces  the  La- 
cedaemonians to  surrender,  ib. 
38  ;  attempts  Megara,  ib.  66-68; 
captures  Nisaea,  ib.  69 ;  plans 
an  invasion  of  Boeotia,  ib.  76,  77; 
failure  of  the  attempt,  ib.  89  init.; 
invades  Sicyonia,  ib.  101  med.; 
swears  to  the  Treaty  of  Peace 
and  the  Alliance,  v.  19  fin.,  24 
med.;  sent  to  Epidaurus,  ib.  80 
fin.;  chosen  as  a  colleague  of  Ni- 
cias,  vii.  16  fin.,  20  ;  ravages  the 
Laconian  coast  and  fortifies  an 
isthmus  there  on  his  way,  ib.  26 ; 
meets  Eurymedon  at  Corcyra 


•6*6 


I  N  D  E  X. 


and  sends  reinforcements  to 
Naupactus,  ib.  31  ;  holds  a  re- 
view at  Thurii,  ib.  33  fin.;  arrives 
at  Syracuse,  ib.  42  init.;  resolves 
to  strike  a  blow  at  once,  ib.  42 
med.;  fails  in  a  night  attack  on 
Epipolae,  ib.  43-45  ;  votes  in  a 
council  of  war  for  immediate 
departure,  ib.  47  ;  when  Nicias 
resists,  proposes  moving  the 
camp,  ib.  49  ;  commands  in  the 
last  sea  fight,  ib.  69-71  fin.; 
anxious  to  renew  the  engage- 
ment, ib.  72  ;  commands  one 
division  in  the  retreat,  vii.  78  foil. ; 
overtaken  and  compelled  to  sur- 
render, ib.  8 1, 82;  put  to  death  by 
the  Syracusans,  ib.  86. 

Demoteles,  a  Locrian  commander, 
iv.  25  fin. 

Dercyllidas,  a  Spartan,  sent  to  the 
Hellespont,  viii.  61  init.;  effects 
the  revolt  of  Abydos  and  Lamp- 
sacus,  ib.  62. 

Derdas,  a  Macedonian,  i.  57  init., 
59  fin. 

Dersaeans,  a  Thracian  tribe,  ii.  101 
med. 

Desertion  of  slaves,  injury  caused 
by,  vii.  27  fin.,  viii.  40  med. 

Deucalion,  father  of  Hellen,  i.  3  init. 

Diacritus,  father  of  Melesippus,  a 
Spartan,  ii.  12  init. 

Diagoras,  father  of  Dorieus,  a  Thu- 
rian,  viii.  35  init. 

Diasia,  the  festival  of  Zeus  the 
Gracious,  at  Athens,  i.  126  med. 

Diathus,  a  Lacedaemonian,  swears 
to  the  Treaty  of  Peace  and  the 
Alliance,  v.  19  med.,  ib.  24  init. 

Dictidians,  in  Mt.  Athos,  v.  35  init. 

Didyme,  one  of  the  Aeolian  islands, 
iii.  88  med. 

Diemporus,  a  Theban  Boeotarch, 
ii.  2  med. 

Dii,  a  Thracian  tribe,  ii.  96  med., 
98  fin.;  come  too  late  to  Athens 
to  join  Demosthenes'  expedition 
to  Sicily,  vii.  27  init.;  on  their  way 
back  sack  Mycalessus,  ib.  29,  30. 

Diitrephes,  father  of  Nicostratus,  an 
Athenian,  iii.  75  init.,  iv.  53  init., 
119;  another  leads  a  number  of 
Thracian  mercenaries  home,  vii. 
29,  30. 


Diodotus,  an  Athenian,  opposes  the 
slaughter  of  the  Mitylenaeans, 
iii.  41 ;  his  speech,  ib.  42-48. 

Diomedon,  an  Athenian  com- 
mander, viii.  19  med.;  popular 
with  the  people,  ib.  73  med.; 
makes  agreement  with  the  Teans, 
ib.  20  fin.;  fails  to  capture  Erae, 
ib.\  regains  Lesbos  which  had 
revolted,  ib.  23  ;  carries  on  war 
successfully  against  Chios,  ib.  24 
med.;  appointed  with  Leon  to 
the  chief  command  at  Samos, 
ib.  54  med.;  makes  a  descent 
upon  Rhodes,  ib.  55  init.;  aids 
the  democratic  reaction  at  Samos, 
ib.  73  fin. 

Diomilus,  an  Andrian  exile,  vi.  96 
fin.;  made  commander  of  a  chosen 
body  of  Syracusan  troops,  ib.\ 
slain  in  battle,  ib.  97  fin. 

Dionysia,  the  ancient,  ii.  15  med.; 
the  City  Dionysia,  v.  20  init., 
23,  iv. 

Dionysus,  temple  of,  '  in  the 
Marshes,'  ii.  15  med.;  temple  of, 
at  Corcyra,  iii.  81  fin.;  theatre  of, 
near  Munychia,  viii.  93  init.,  fin., 
94  init. 

Dioscuri,  temple  of  the,  at  Athens, 
viii.  93  init.;  at  Corcyra,  iii.  75 
med.;  at  Torone.  iv.  no  init. 

Diotimus,  son  of  Strombichus,  an 
Athenian  commander,  i.  45  ;  fa- 
ther of  Strombichides,  viii.  15  med. 

Diotrephes,  an  Athenian  com- 
mander, sent  to  take  command 
in  Chalcidice,  viii.  64  init.;  puts 
down  the  democracy  in  Thasos, 
ib.  [?  Diitrephes,  supr.] 

Diphilus,  an  Athenian  commander, 
vii.  34  med. 

Dium,  in  Macedonia,  iv.  78  fin. 

Dium,  in  Mount  Athos,  iv.  109  ;  re- 
volts from  the  Athenians,  v.  82 
init. 

Divers,  employed  at  Sphacteria,  iv. 
26  fin.;  and  at  Syracuse,  vii.  25 
med. 

Doberus,  in  Paeonia,  ii.  98  med., 
99  init.,  100  init. 

Dockyard,  the  Lacedaemonian  [Gy- 
thium],  burnt  by  the  Athenians, 
i.  108  fin. 

Dolopes,  in  Thessaly,  v.  51  init. 


INDEX. 


657 


Dolopes,  the  old  inhabitants  of 
Scyros,  i.  98  init. 

Dolopians,  in  Epirus,  ii.  102  init. 

Dolphins,  leaden,  i.e.  heavyweights 
used  to  sink  an  enemy's  ship,  vii. 
41  init. 

Dorcis,  a  Lacedaemonian,  sent  out 
to  succeed  Pausanias  in  his  com- 
mand, i.  95  fin. 

Dorians,  attack  Corinth,  iv.  42  med.; 
conquer  the  Peloponnesus,  i.  12 
med.;  colonize  Lacedaemon,  ib. 
18  init.,  107  init.,  iii.  92  init.; 
attacked  by  the  Phocians,  i.  107 
init.;  contrasted  with  lonians,  ib. 
124  init.,  v.  9  init.,  vi.  77  med., 
80  fin.,  82  ink.,  vii.  5  fin.,  57 
init.  and  med.,  viii.  25  med.; 
hold  the  month  Carneus  sacred, 
v.  54  med.;  opposed  to  Dorians 
in  the  siege  of  Syracuse,  vii.  57 
med.;  Dorians  in  Asia,  Athenian 
subjects,  ii.  9  fin.;  Dorians  in 
Sicily,  vi.  4,  5,  77  med.;  allies  of 
the  Syracusans,  iii.  86  init.,  iv. 
6 1  med.,  64  med.,  vi.  6  med.,  80 
fin.,  vii.  58  init.;  Dorian  dialect 
spoken  by  the  Messenians,  iii. 
112  med.,  iv.  41  med.;  mixed  with 
Chalcidian  at  Himera,  vi.  5  init.; 
Dorian  Paean,  alarm  caused  by 
the  Paeans  of  their  Dorian  allies 
to  the  Athenians  at  the  attack 
on  Epipolae,  vii.  44  fin. 

Dorieus,  of  Rhodes,  twice  conqueror 
at  Olympia,  iii.  8. 

Dorieus,  sent  out  in  command  of 
ten  Thurian  ships,  viii.  35  init.; 
threatened  with  violence  by  As- 
tyochus,  ib.  84  init. 

Dorus,  a  Thessalian,  iv.  78  init. 

Drabescus,  in  Thrace,  Athenian 
colonists  slaughtered  there  by 
the  Thracians,  i.  100  fin.,  iv.  102 
med. 

Drachmae,  Aeginetan,  v.  47,  iv ; 
Attic,  one  Attic  drachma  paid 
each  day  per  man  by  Tissapher- 
nes,  viii.  29  init.;  the  Athenians 
paid  but  half  a  drachma,  ib.  45 
init.;  Corinthian,  i.  27  init. 

Droans,  a  Thracian  tribe,  ii.  101 
med. 

Droughts  during  the  Peloponnesian 
War,  i.  23  med. 


Drymussa,  an  island  off  Clazdme- 
nae,  viii.  31  fin. 

Dryopes,  Carystus  in  Euboea  in- 
habited by,  vii.  57  init. 

Dryoscephalae,  in  Bocotia,  iii.  24 
init. 

Dymc,  in  Achaia,  ii.  84  med.  and  fin. 

E. 

Earth,  'the  whole  earth  is  the 
sepulchre  of  famous  men,'  ii.  43 
med. 

Earth,  Temple  of,  at  Athens,  ii.  15 
med. 

Earthquakes,  frequency  of,  during 
the  Peloponnesian  War,  i.  23  med. ; 
great  earthquake  before  the  siege 
of  Ithome,  i.  101  init.,  128  init., 
iii.  54  fin.;  at  Delos,  ii.  8  med.;  in 
the  fifth  year  of  the  war,  iii.  87  fin., 
89  init.;  the  probable  cause  of 
an  extraordinary  ebb  and  flow 
of  the  sea,  ib.  89  ;  Lacedaemo- 
nian expeditions  stopped  by,  ib. 
89  init.,  vi.  95  init.;  at  the  be- 
ginning of  the  eighth  year  of 
the  War,  iv.  52  init.;  assemblies 
interrupted  by,  v.  45  fin.,  50  fin.; 
earthquakes  at  Athens,  ib.  45 
fin.;  at  Corinth,  ib.  50  fin.;  at 
Cleonae,  vi.  95  init.;  at  Sparta, 
viii.  6  fin.;  at  Cos,  ib.  41  med.; 
the  Lacedaemonians  supersede 
an  admiral  because  of  an  earth- 
quake, ib.  6  fin. 

Eccritus,  a  Spartan  commander,  vii . 
19  med. 

Echecratides,  king  of  Thessaly,  i. 
in  init. 

Echetimidas,  father  of  Taurus,  a 
Lacedaemonian,  iv.  119  init. 

Echinades,  islands  at  the  mouth  of 
the  Achelous,  ii.  102  med. 

Eclipses  of  the  sun,  ii.  28,  iv.  52 
init.;  great  number  of, during  the 
Peloponnesian  War,  i.  23  med.; 
only  occur  at  the  new  moon,  ii. 
28  [cp.  iv.  52];  eclipse  of  the 
moon,  vii.  50  fin. 

Edoni,  iv.  109  fin.;  old  inhabitants 
of  Amphipolis,  i.  100  fin.,  iv.  102 
med.;  drive  out  Aristagoras  of 
Miletus,  iv.  102  init.;  destroy  the 
Athenian  settlers,  ib.\  expelled 


U  n 


INDEX. 


by  the  Macedonians  from  Myg- 
donia,  ii.  99  med.;  Myrcinus,  an 
Edonian  town,  iv.  107  fin.;  Pit- 
tacus,  king  of  the  Edonians,  ib,  ; 
Brasidas  summons  their  whole 
forces,  v.  6  med. 

Eetioneia,  part  of  the  Piraeus, 
fortified  by  the  oligarchs,  viii.  90 
med.,  91  med.,  92  init.;  destroyed 
by  the  soldiers  at  the  instigation 
of  Theramenes,  ib.  92. 

Egesta,  Trojan  origin  of,  vi.  2  init., 
vii.  57  fin.;  Egesteans  at  war  with 
Selinus,  vi.  6  med.;  send  envoys 
to  Athens,  ib.;  deceive  the  Athe- 
nians about  their  wealth,  ib.  8 
init.,  46  ;  their  cavalry  aid  the 
Athenians  to  capture  Hyccara, 
ib.  62  med. ;  they  supply  the  Athe- 
nians with  thirty  talents,  ib. ;  the 
Athenians  send  to  them  for 
horses,  ib.  88  med.  [cp.  98  init.]; 

,  the  Egestaeans  furnish  the  Athe- 
nians with  cavalry,  ib.  98  init. 

Egypt  revolts  from  the  King,  i.  104 
init.;  subdued  by  the  Persians, 
z£.  109,  no;  destruction  of  the 
Athenian  reinforcements  in,  ib. 
1 10  fin.;  third  Athenian  fleet  sent 
to  Egypt  without  results,  ib.  112 
med.;  visited  by  the  plague,  ii. 
48  init.;  Egyptians  in  the  fens 
most  warlike,  i.  no  med.;  Egypt- 
ian body-guard  of  Pausanias,  ib. 
130  init.;  Egyptian  vessels  at 
Cythera,  iv.  53  fin.;  at  Triopium, 
viii.  35  med. 

Eidomen&,  in  Macedonia,  ii.  100 
med. 

Eighty,  Council  of,  at  Argos,  v. 47  fin. 

Eion,  in  Chalcidice,  a  colony  of 
Mende,  iv.  7. 

Eion,  upon  the  Strymon,  iv.  50  init., 
1 08  init,  v.  6-12  ;  taken  by  the 
Athenians,  i.  98  init.,  iv.  102  fin.; 
saved  by  Thucydides,  iv.  106  fin., 
107  init.;  Artaphernes,  a  Persian 
envoy  to  Sparta,  captured  by  the 
Athenians  there,  ib.  50  init. 

Elaeus,  in  the  Thracian  Cherson- 
nese,  viii.  102,  103,  107  fin. 

Elaphebolion,  a  month  at  Athens, 
iv.  118  fin.,  v.  19  init. 

Eleatis,  part  of  Thesprotia,  i.  46 
med. 


Eleus  \al.  Leros],  viii.  27  init. 
Eleusinium,  a  temple  at  Athens,  ii. 

17  init. 

Eleusis,  in  Attica,  i.  114  fin.,  ii.  19 
med.,  20  init.,  21  init.,  iv.  68 
med.;  war  of  the  Eleusinians 
with  Erechtheus,  ii.  15  init. 

Elimiots,  a  Macedonian  tribe,  ii.  99 
init. 

Elis,  ii.  25  med.,  66  init.;  Eleans 
furnish  the  Corinthians  with 
ships,  i.  27  fin.,  46  init.;  the  Cor- 
cyraeans  burn  their  dockyard  at 
Cyllene,  ib.  30  med.;  supply  a 
naval  contingent  to  the  Lacedae- 
monian confederacy,  ii.  9  med.; 
defeated  by  the  Athenians,  ib. 
25  med.;  dissatisfied  with  the 
treaty  between  the  Lacedaemo- 
nians and  Athenians,  v.  17  fin.; 
join  the  Argive  alliance,  ib.  31 
init.;  quarrel  with  the  Lacedae- 
monians about  Lepreum,/^.  med.; 
make  an  alliance  with  Athens, 
ib.  43  fin.,  44  med.,  46  fin.,  47  ;  ex- 
clude the  Lacedaemonians  from 
the  Olympic  games,  v.  49,  50  ; 
aid  the  Argives,  ib.  58  init.;  go 
home,  on  the  other  allies  refusing 
to  attack  Lepreum,  ib.  62  ;  aid 
the  Mantineans  against  Epidau- 
rus,  ib.  75  fin.;  the  Argives  desert 
them,  ib.  78  ;  Teutiaplus,  an 
Elean  in  Alcidas'  army,  iii.  29 
fin. 

Ellomenus,  in  Leucadia,  iii.  94  init. 

Elymi,  a  partly  Trojan  race  in 
Sicily,  vi.  2  med. 

Embatum,  near  Erythrae,  iii.  29 
fin.,  32  init. 

Empedias,aLacedaemonian,  swears 
to  the  Treaty  of  Peace  and  the 
Alliance,  v.  19  med.,  24  init. 

Empire,  the  three  things  most  fatal 
to,  iii.  40  init.;  an  empire  cannot 
be  cut  down  like  a  household,  vi. 

1 8  med.;  an  empire  once  gained 
cannot  be  abandoned,  i.  75,  ii.  63  ; 
those  who  seek   empire   always 
arouse   hatred,   i.   76,  ii.  64  fin., 
iii.  37  init. 

Endius,  envoy  to  Athens,  v.  44  fin.; 
Ephor  at  Sparta,  viii.  6  med.;  an 
hereditary  friend  of  Alcibiades,#.; 
persuaded  by  Alcibiades  not  to 


INDEX. 


659 


give  up  the  expedition  to  Chios, 
ib.  12. 

Enemies,  great  enemies  more  read- 
ily forgiven  than  small  ones,  iv. 
19  fin.  [cp.  v.  91  init.];  complais- 
ance to  an  enemy  a  mistake,  i. 
34  fin.;  men  neglect  their  own 
interests  when  attacking  an  ene- 
my, ib.  41  fin. 

Engines,  battering,  used  at  the 
siege  of  Plataea,  ii.  76  med.;  en- 
gine to  set  fire  to  a  wooden  wall 
used  at  Delium,  iv.  100 ;  at  Le- 
cythus,  ib.  1 1 5  med. 

Enipeus,  a  river  of  Thessaly,  iv.  78 
med. 

Enmity,best  reconciled  by  generous 
treatment,  iv.  19  med. 

Ennea  Hodoi,  see  Amphipolis  and 
Nine  Ways. 

Enneacrounos,  a  fountain  at  Athens, 
ii.  15  fin. 

Enomoties,  the  smallest  division  in 
the  Lacedaemonian  army,  v.  68. 

Entimns,  joint  founder  with  Anti- 
phemus  of  Gela,  vi.  4  med. 

Envy,  does  not  follow  the  dead,  ii. 
45  med. 

Eordia,  a  region  of  Macedonia,  ii. 
99  fin. 

Ephesus,  Themistocles  reaches 
Ephesus  in  his  flight,  i.  137  med.; 
Alcidas  at  Ephesus,  iii.  32  init., 
33  init.;  Athenian  ambassadors 
to  the  King  return  thence,  iv. 
50  fin.;  a  Chian  ship  chased  by 
the  Athenians  escapes  to  Ephe- 
sus, viii.  19  med.;  Tissaphernes 
sacrifices  to  Artemis  at  Ephesus, 
ib.  109  fin.;  Ionian  festival  at 
Ephesus,  iii.  104  med. 

Ephors,  at  Sparta;  their  powers,  i.  87 
init.,  131  fin.;  Sthenelaidas,  ib. 
85  fin.;  Aenesias,  ii.  2  init.;  Pleis- 
tolas,  v.  19  init.;  Cleobulus,  ib.  36 
init., 37  init.;  Xenares,#.;  Endius, 
viii.  6  med.;  Alexippidas,  ib.  58 
init. 

Ephyre,  in  Thesprotia,  i.  46  med. 

Epicles,  father  of  Proteas,  an  Athe- 
nian, i.  45  med.,  ii.  23  med. 

Epicles,  a  Lacedaemonian  general, 
viii.  107  fin. 

Epicurus,  father  of  Paches,  an 
Athenian,  iii.  18  fin. 


Epicydidas, a  Lacedaemonian  gene- 
ral, v.  12. 

Epidamnus,  a  colony  of  the  Corcy- 
raeans,  i.  2.4  init.;  situation  of, 
2^.26 fin.;  the  Epidaninians  seek 
aid  from  Corcyra,  ib.  24  fin. ;  are  re- 
fused, z£.  ;  ordered  by  the  Oracle  to 
apply  to  Corinth,  ib.  25  init.;  re- 
ceive colonists  from  Corinth,  ib. 
26  init.;  are  besieged  by  the 
Corcyraeans,  ib.  fin.;  surrender 
their  city,  ib.  29  fin.;  the  affair 
of  Epidamnus  one  of  the  avowed 
causes  of  thePeloponnesian  War, 
ib.  23  fin.,  146  ;  the  Corcyraean 
prisoners  taken  in  it  won  over  by 
the  Corinthians,  iii.  70. 

Epidaurus,  its  territory  ravaged  by 
the  Athenians,  ii.  56  med.  |  cp.  vi. 
31  init.] ;  again,  iv.  45  ;  adjoins  the 
Corinthian,  viii.  10  fin.;  attacked 
by  Argos,  v.  53,  54  fin.,  55  fin.,  56 
fin.;  garrisoned  by  the  Lacedae- 
monians, ib.  56  init.;  a  Pelopon- 
nesian  fleet  anchors  there,  viii. 
92  med.,  94  med.;  besieged  by 
the  Argive  allies,  ib.  75  fin.;  the 
Argives  agree  by  treaty  to  eva- 
cuate Epidaurus,  ib.  76,  ii,  iv  ;  the 
Athenians  evacuate  Epidaurus, 
ib.  80 ;  Epidaurians  defeated  by 
the  Athenians  at  Halieis,  i.  105  ; 
assist  the  Megarians  to  revolt,  ib. 
114  med.;  furnish  a  convoy  to 
Corinth,  ib.  27  fin. ;  invade  Argos, 
v.  75  med.;  supply  ships  to  the 
Lacedaemonian  navy,  viii.  3  fin. 

Epidaurus  Limera,  in  Laconia,  iv. 
56  med.,  vi.  105  fin.,  vii.  18  med., 
26  init. 

Epipolae,  situation  and  importance 
of,  vi.  96,  vii.  2  ;  captured  by  the 
Athenians,  vi.  97  ;  fortified,  ib. 
101  init.;  unsuccessfully  attacked 
by  the  Syracusans,  ib.  102  ;  Gy- 
lippus  enters  Syracuse  by  way 
of,  vii.  i,  2  ;  the  Syracusans  de- 
feated there,  ib.  5  ;  the  Syracu- 
sans defeat  the  Athenians  and 
carry  their  cross  wall  past  the 
Athenian  wall  on  Epipolae,  ib. 
6  ;  night  engagement  upon,  ib. 

43-45- 

Epirus,  Epirot  tribes  join  the 
expedition  of  Cnemus,  ii.  80  fin. 


U  u  2 


66o 


INDEX. 


Epitadas,  the  Spartan  commander 
in  Sphacteria,  iv.  8  fin.,  31  med., 
33  init.,  39  med.;  death  of,  ib.  38 
init. 

Erae,  in  the  territory  of  Teos,  re- 
volts from  Athens,  viii.  19  fin.; 
unsuccessfully  attacked  by  the 
Athenians,  ib.  20  fin. 

Erasinides,  a  Corinthian  com- 
mander, vii.  7  init. 

Erasistratus,  father  of  Phaeax,  an 
Athenian,  v.  4  init. 

Eratocleides,  father  of  Phalius,  a 
Corinthian,  i.  24  init. 

Erechtheus,  king  of  Athens,  ii.  15 
init. 

Eresus,  strengthened  by  the  re- 
volted Lesbians,  iii.  18  init.;  cap- 
tured by  Paches,  ib.  35  init.; 
Astyochus  goes  there  and  raises 
a  revolt,  viii.  23  med.;  again  re- 
volts, ib.  loo  med.;  besieged  by 
the  Athenians,  ib.  fin.,  101  init., 
103  med. 

Eretria,  war  of  the  Eretrians  with 
the  Chalcidians,  i.  15  fin.;  subject 
to  Athens,  vii.  57  init.;  betray 
Oropus  to  the  Boeotians,  viii.  60 
init.;  the  Eretrians  go  to  Rhodes 
and  ask  assistance  from  the 
Lacedaemonians,  ib.  med.;  aid 
the  Peloponnesians  to  defeat  the 
Athenians  at  sea,  ib.  95  ;  Mende, 
an  Eretrian  colony,  iv.  123  init. 

Erineum,  in  Doris,  i.  107  init. 

Erineus,  in  Achaia,  vii.  34  init., 
fin. 

Erineus,  river  in  Sicily,  vii.  80  fin., 
82  fin. 

Eruption  of  Aetna,  iii.  1 16 ;  of 
Hiera,  in  the  Lipari  islands,  ib. 
88  med. 

Erythrae,  in  Boeotia,  iii.  24  med. 

Erythrae,  in  Ionia,  iii.  33  med.;  re- 
volts from  Athens,  viii.  5,  6,  14 
med. ;  the  Erythraeans  assist  in 
the  revolt  of  Teos,  ib.  16  med.; 
the  Athenians  hold  two  forts  in 
the  Erythraean  territory,  ib.  24 
init.;  Pedaritus  sails  from  Eryth- 
rae for  Chios,  ib.  28  fin.,  32  med.; 
Astyochus,  narrowly  escaping  the 
Athenians,  returns  thither  from 
Corycus,  ib.  33  ;  trick  of  certain 
Erythraean  prisoners,  ib. 


Eryx,  in  Sicily,  vi.  2  med.;  temple 
of  Aphrodite  there,  ib.  46 
med. 

Eryxida'i'das,  father  of  Philochari- 
das,  a  Lacedaemonian,  iv.  119 
med. 

Eteonicus,  a  Lacedaemonian  com- 
mander, viii.  23  med. 

Euboea,  Carystus  revolts,  the  other 
Euboeans  remain  quiet,  i.  98  ; 
Euboea  revolts  from  Athens,  ib. 
114  init.;  is  subdued,  ib.  fin.  jcp. 
23  fin.],  iv.  92  med.,  vi.  76,  84  ; 
the-Athcnians  remove  their  flocks 
to  Euboea  before  the  Pclopon- 
nesian  invasion,  ii.  14  ;  the  Athe- 
nians take  precautions  for  the 
safety  of  Euboea,  ib.  26  [cp.  iii. 
17  init.],  viii.  i  fin.;  plundered  by 
Locrian  pirates,  ii.  32  fin.;  the 
Lacedaemonians  form  designs 
upon  Euboea,  iii.  92,  93  ;  the 
Euboeans  negotiate  with  Agis 
about  a  fresh  revolt,  viii.  4  [cp. 
60  init.] ;  all  Euboea,  except  Oreus, 
revolts,  ib.  95  fin.;  Athens  sup- 
plied from,  vii.  28  init.,  viii.  96  init.; 
effect  of  its  loss  on  the  Athenians, 
viii.  95  init.,  96  init.;  Hestiaea 
colonized  by  the  Athenians,  vii. 
57  init.  ;  the  thirty  years'  peace 
after  the  taking  of  Euboea,  i. 
23  fin.,  146  ;  earthquakes  in  Eu- 
boea, iii.  87,  89  init. 

Eubulus,  a  Chian  (?)  commander, 
viii.  23  med. 

Eucleides,  one  of  the  founders  of 
Himera,  vi.  5  init. 

Eucles,  an  Athenian  general,  iv. 
104  med. 

Eucles,  a  Syracusan  general,  vi. 
103  fin. 

Eucrates,  father  of  Diodotus,  an 
Athenian,  iii.  41. 

Euctemon,  an  Athenian  com- 
mander, viii.  30. 

Euetion,  an  Athenian  general,  un- 
successfully attacks  Amphipolis, 
vii.  9. 

Eumachus,  a  Corinthian  com- 
mander, ii.  33  med. 

Eumolpidae,  their  protest  against 
the  return  of  Alcibiadcs,  viii.  53 
med. 

Eumolpides,  a  Plataean,  iii.  20  init. 


INDEX. 


661 


EupaYdas,  father  of  Amphias,  an 
Epidaurian,  iv.  119  fin. 

Eupalium,  a  town  in  Ozolian  Locris, 
iii.  96  med.,  102  init. 

Euphamidas,  a  Corinthian,  ii.  33 
init.,  iv.  119  med.,  v.  55  init. 

Euphemus,  an  Athenian  envoy,  vi. 
75  fin.;  speech  of,  at  Camarina, 
ib.  82-88. 

Euphiletus,  father  of  Charoeades, 
an  Athenian,  iii.  86  init. 

Euripides,  father  of  Xenophon,  an 
Athenian,  ii.  70  init.,  79  init. 

Euripus,  the,  strait  between  Eu- 
boea  and  the  mainland, vii.  29  init. 

Europus,  in  Macedonia,  ii.  loomed. 

Eurybatus,  a  Corcyraean  com- 
mander, i.  47  init. 

Euryelus,  the  highest  point  of 
Epipolae,  vi.  97  med.,  vii.  2  med., 
43  med. 

Eurylochus,  commands  a  Lacedae- 
monian expedition  against  Nau- 
pactus,  iii.  100  ;  subdues  Lo- 
cris, ib.  101;  fails  to  take  Nau- 
pactus,  ib.  102  init.;  retires  to 
Aeolis,  ib.  med.;  joins  the  Am- 
braciots  at  Olpae,  ib.  106  ;  de- 
feated, ib.  107,  1 08  ;  his  death,  ib, 
109  init. 

Eurymachus,  a  Theban,  the  chief 
agent  in  the  surprise  of  Plataea, 
ii.  2  med.;  killed  by  the  Plataeans, 
ib.  5  fin. 

Eurymedon,  river  in  Pamphylia,  de- 
feat of  the  Persians  there,  i.  100 
init. 

Eurymedon,  an  Athenian  com- 
mander, brings  an  Athenian  fleet 
.to  Corcyra,  iii.  80  fin.;  commands 
in  Boeotia,  ib.  91  med.;  sent  with 
.  a  fleet  to  Sicily,  ib.  115  fin.,  iv.  2 
med.,  46  init.,  47 ;  summoned  by 
Demosthenes  to  his  aid  at  Pylos, 
iv.  8  init.;  conduct  of,  at  Corcyra, 
ib.  46  ;  fined  by  the  Athenians^ 
ib.  65  med.;  sent  to  Sicily  as  a 
colleague  of  Nicias,  vii.  16  fin.; 
meets  Demosthenes  at  Corcyra, 
ib.  31  med.;  commands  under 
Demosthenes  in  the  attack  on 
Epipolae,  ib.  43  med.;  supports 
Demosthenes  against  Nicias  in 
the  council  of  war,  ib.  49  fin.; 
fulls  in  a  sea  fight,  ib,  52. 


Eurystheus,  slain  in  Attica  by  the 
Heraclidae,  i.  9  med. 

Eurytanians,  an  Aetolian  tribe,  iii. 
94  fin. 

Eurytimus,  father  of  Archctimus,  a 
Corinthian,  i.  29  init. 

Eustrophus,  an  Argive  envoy,  v.  40 
fin. 

Euthycles,  father  of  Xenoclcides,  a 
Corinthian,  i.  46  init.,  iii.  1 14  fin. 

Euthydemus,  an  Athenian,  swears  to 
the  Treaty  of  Peace  and  the  Alli- 
ance, v.  1 9  fin.,  24  med. ;  joined  with 
Nicias  in  command  before  Syra- 
cuse, vii.  16  init.;  commands  un- 
der Demosthenes  in  the  last  sea 
fight,  ib.  69  fin. 

Euxine,  the,  ii.  96  init.,  97  fin. 

Execestus,  father  of  Sicanus,  a 
Syracusan,  vi.  73. 

Evalas,  a  Spartan  commander,  viii. 
22  fin. 

Evarchus,  driven  from  Astacus  by 
the  Athenians,  ii.  30  med.;  re- 
stored by  the  Corinthians,  ib. 

33  mit. 
Evarchus,   founder  of  Catana,  vi. 

3  fin. 
Evenus,  a  river  in  Aetolia,  ii.  83 

med. 

Evesperitae,  in. Libya,  vii.  50  init. 
Exiles,  the  faults  of,  vi.  12  init. 
Expediency  and  justice,  i.  36,  42 

init.,  76,  iii.  40  med.,  44,  56,  82 

fin.,  v.  90,  98, 107. 

F. 

Famines,  famine  in  Cyprus,  i.  112 
med.;  during  the  war,  i.  23  med.; 
in  Potidaea  during  the  siege,  ii. 
70  init.;  in  Corcyra,  iv.  2  fin.;  in 
Plataea, iii.  52  init.,  med.;  famine, 
the  most  miserable  of  deaths,  iii. 
59  fin. 

Fear,  renders  skill  useless,  ii.  87 
med.;  the  only  solid  basis  of 
alliance,  iii.  ii  init.,  12  init. 

Festivals,  of  Zeus  *  the  Gracious,' 
i.  126  med.;  the  Synoecia  at 
Athens,  ii.  15  med.;  the  Dionysia 
at  Athens,  ib.  v..  23,  iv  ;  of  Apollo 
Maloeis  at  Mitylene,  iii.  3  med.; 
the  Hyacinthia  at  Sparta,  v.  23, 
iv ;  ib.  41  fin.;  the  Great  Pana- 


.662 


INDEX. 


thenaea  at  Athens,  ib.  47  fin.,  vi. 
56  med.;  the  Gymnopaediae  at 

.  Sparta,  v.  82  init.;  the  Carnea  at 
Sparta,  ib.  54  med.,  75  med.,  76 
init.;  Heracles  at  Syracuse,  vii. 
73  med.;  rigid  observance  of 
festivals  by  the  Lacedaemonians, 
iv.  5  init.,  v.  54,  82  init. 

Fines,  Pericles  fined,  ii.  65  init.; 
fines  imposed  on  members  of 
the  oligarchical  party  at  Cor- 
cyra,  iii.  70  med.;  on  Euryme- 
don  by  the  Athenians,  iv.  65  ; 
on  the  Lacedaemonians  by  the 
Eleans,  v.  49  ;  on  Agis  by  the 
Lacedaemonians,  ib.  63. 

Five  Hundred,  council  of,  or  Senate, 
at  Athens,  viii.  66  init.;  broken 
up  by  the  oligarchs,  ib.  69  ;  its 
restoration  demanded  by  Alci- 
biades,  ib.  86  med. 

Five  Thousand,  the  sham  govern- 
ment of,  offered  by  the  oligar- 
chical conspirators,  viii.  65  fin., 
67  fin.,  72  med.,  86  med.;  used 
as  a  cloak  for  the  restoration 
of  democracy,  ib.  89  med.,  92 
fin.;  the  oligarchs  promise  to 
publish  the  names  of  the  500, 
ib.  93  ;  established  by  the  people, 
ib.  97  ;  excellence  of  the  consti- 
tution, ib. 

Flute  players,  employed  in  the 
Lacedaemonian  army,  v.  70. 

Fortune,  uncertainty  of,  iii.  59  init.; 
man  not  the  master  of  fortune, 
iv.  64  init.,  vi.  23  med.,  78  med. 

Fortune,  good,  the  nemesis  which 
follows  upon,  iv.  17  med.;  ordi- 
nary good  fortune  better  than 
extraordinary,  iii.  39  med. 

Four  Hundred,  government  of, 
introduced  by  the  oligarchical 
conspirators  at  Athens,  viii.  67- 
70  ;  despatch  heralds  to  Agis 
and  afterwards  to  Sparta,  ib.  70 
fin.,  71  fin.;  send  commissioners 
to  Samos,  ib.  72  init.;  detain  the 
crew  of  the  Paralus,  who  bring 
news  of  the  revolution,  ib.  74  ; 
reception  of  their  envoys  at  Sa- 
mos, ib.  86  init.,  med.;  their  en- 
voys to  Sparta  captured  by  the 
Parali  who  had  escaped,  ib.  fin.; 
dissensions  arise,  id.  80 ;  the 


leaders  willing  to  betray  Athens 
to  the  enemy  to  save  their  own 
power,  ib.  90  init.,  91  fin.;  fortify 
Eetioneia,  ib.  90  med.,  91  med.; 
enter  into  negotiations  with  the 
popular  party  after  the  destruc- 
tion of  Eetioneia,  ib.  93  ;  deposed, 
ib.  97  init. 

Funeral,  public,  of  those  who  first 
fell  in  the  war,  ii.  34 ;  of  Brasidas, 
v.  ii  init. 

Future,  the,  the  controller  of  events, 
iv.  62  fin.,  63  init. 

G. 

Galepsus,  in  Thrace,  a  Thasian 
colony,  iv.  107  fin.;  revolts  from 
Athens,  ib. ;  stormed  by  the  Athe- 
nians, v.  6  init. 

Games,  Delian,  iii.  104  med.;  Ephe- 
sian,  ib.\  Pythian,  v.  I  init.;  Olym- 
pian, iii.  8,  v.  47  fin.,  49,  50. 

Garments,  offered  at  sepulchres, 
iii.  58  med. 

Gates,  the  Thracian,  at  Amphipolis, 
v.  10  init. 

Gaulites,  a  Carian,  viii.  85  init. 

Gela,  a  river  in  Sicily,  vi.  4  med. 

Gela,  founded  from  Rhodes  by  Anti- 
phemus  and  Entimus,  vi.  4  med., 
vii.  57  med.;  Agrigentum  founded 
from,  vi.  4  med.;  borders  on  Ca- 
marina,  vii.  58  init.;  conference  at, 
iv.  58  ;  receives  and  assists  Gy- 
lippus,  vii.  I  fin.;  sends  aid  to 
Syracuse,  ib.  33  init.,  57  med. 

Gelo,  tyrant  of  Syracuse,  vi.  4  init.; 
expels  the  Megareans,  ib.,  ib.  94 
init.;  colonizes  Camarina  a  third 
time,  ib.  5  fin. 

General,  speech  of  a  Syracusan,  vi. 
41. 

Geraestus,  in  Euboea,  iii.  3  fin. 

Geraneia,  Mount,  in  Megaris,  i.  105 
med.,  107  med.,  108  init.,  iv.  70 
med. 

Gerastius,  a  Spartan  month,  iv.  119 
init. 

Getae,  a  Sicel  fort,  vii.  2  med. 

Getae,  a  people  bordering  on  the 
Scythians,  ii.  96  init,  98  fin. 

Gigonus,  in  Chalcidice,  i.  61  fin. 

Glauce,  in  the  territory  of  Mycale, 
viii.  79  init. 


INDEX. 


663 


Glaucon,  an  Athenian  commander, 
i.  51  med. 

Goaxis,  sons  of,  kill  Pittacus,  king 
of  the  Edonians,  iv.  107  fin. 

Goddess,  curse  of  the,  i.  126. 

Gods,  the,  portions  of  land  dedicated 
to,  in  the  confiscation  of  Lesbos, 
iii.  50  med.;  the,  worshipped  at 
common  altars,  ib.  59  init.;  altar 
of  the  Twelve  Gods  at  Athens,  v. 
54  fin. 

Gods,  the,  protect  the  right,  i.  86 
fin.,  v.  104  ;  approve  the  principle, 
1  That  they  should  rule  who  can,' 
v.  105  init.;  their  jealousy,  vii.  77 
med. 

Gold  mines  in  Thrace  worked  by 
Thucydidcs,  iv.  105  init. 

Gongylus,  an  Eretrian,  an  envoy 
of  Pausanias',  i.  128  med. 

Gongylus,  a  Corinthian  commander, 
vii.  2  init. 

Gortynia,  in  Macedonia,  ii.  100 
med. 

Gortys,  in  Crete,  ii.  85  med. 

Graaeans,  a  Paeonian  tribe,  ii.  96 
med. 

Graphe  paranomon,  at  Athens,  re- 
pealed by  the  oligarchy,  viii.  67. 

Grappling  irons,  see  Ships. 

Grasshoppers,  ornaments  in  the 
form  of,  once  worn  at  Athens,  i. 
6  med. 

Greatness  exposed  to  the  attacks 
both  of  envy  and  of  fear,  vi.  78  med. 

Grestonia,  a  district  of  Macedo- 
nia, ii.  99  fin.,  100  med. 

Guardians  of  the  Law,  a  magis- 
tracy at  Elis,  v.  47  fin. 

Gulf,  the  Ambracian,  5.55  init.,  ii.  68 
init.,  iii.  107  init.  ;  Crisaean,  i.  107 
med.,  ii.  69  med.,  83  init.,  84  init., 
90-92  fin.,  iv.  76  init.;  lasian,  viii. 
26  med.;  Ionian,  i.  24  init.,  ii.  97 
fin.,  vi.  13  med.,  30  init.,  34  med., 
44  init.,  104  init.,  vii.  33  med.,  57 
fin.;  Malian,  iii.  96  fin.,  iv.  100 
init.,  viii.  3  init.;  Saronic,  iii.  15, 
viii.  92  init.;  Terinaean,  vi.  104 
med.;  Tyrrhenian,  vi.  62  init., 
vii.  58  init. 

Gylippus  appointed  commander  of 
the  Syracusan  forces  by  the  La- 
cedaemonians, vi.  93  med.;  ar- 
rives at  Tarentum,  ib.  104  init.; 


fails  in  a  mission  to  Thurii,  ib. 
med.;  makes  his  way  into  Syra- 
cuse, vii.  i,  2  ;  offers  battle  on 
Epipolae,  ib.  3  init. ;  captures  Lab- 
dalum,  ib.  fin.;  fails  in  an  attack 
on  the  Athenian  lines,  ib.  4  init.; 
is  defeated,  ib.  5  ;  defeats  the 
Athenians,  ib.  6  ;  goes  into  Sicily 
to  collect  allies,  ib.  7  med.  [cp.  12 
init.];  returning,  he  urges  the 
Syracusans  to  try  their  fortune 
at  sea,  ib.  2 1 ;  captures  Plemmy- 
rium,  ib.  23  ;  makes  a  diversion  by 
land  while  the  Syracusan  fleet 
attacks  the  Athenians,  ib.  37  ; 
goes  to  collect  reinforcements,  ib. 
46  fin.,  50  init.;  sustains  a  slight 
defeat,  ib.  53  ;  exports  the  Syra- 
cusans before  the  battle  in  the 
harbour,  ib.  66-68  ;  blocks  the 
roads  against  the  Athenian  re- 
treat, ib.  74  ;  compels  the  sur- 
render first  of  Demosthenes',  and 
then  of  Nicias'  division,  ib.  78-85; 
opposes  theputting  to  death  of  Ni- 
cias and  Demosthenes,  ib.  86  init. 

Gymnopaediae,  festival  of,  at  Lace- 
daemon,  v.  82  init. 

Gyrtonians,  a  Thessalian  people,  ii. 
22  fin. 

H. 

Habronichus,  Athenian  ambassa- 
dor to  Sparta  with  Themistocles, 
i.  91  init. 

Haemus,  mount,  in  Thrace,  ii.  96  init. 

Hagnon,  an  Athenian  commander, 
son  of  Nicias,  ii.  58  ;  colleague  of 
Pericles  at  Samos  [B.C.  439],  i. 
1 17  med.;  the  colonizer  of  Am- 
phipolis,  iv.  102,  v.  n  init.;  brings 
reinforcements  to  Potidaea,  ii. 
58,  vi.  31  init.;  commander  in 

-  Chalcidice,  ii.  95  fin.;  swears  to 
the  Treaty  of  Peace  and  the 
Alliance,  v.  19  fin.,  24  med. 

fiagnon,  father  of  Theramenes,  viii. 
68  fin.,  89  init. 

Halex,  a  river  of  Locris  in  Italy, 
iii.  99. 

Haliartus,  in  Boeotia,  iv.  93  fin. 

Halicarnassus,  an  Athenian  fleet 
escapes  thither,  viii.  42  fin.;  the 
Athenians  exact  money  from 
them,  ib.  108  init. 


664 


INDEX. 


Halieis,   defeat   of  the  Athenians 

there,  i.  105  init.;  ravaged  by  the 

.   Athenians,  ii.  56  fin.;  again,  iv. 

45- 

Halys,  river  in  Asia  Minor,  i.  16. 

Hamaxitus,  in  the  Troad,  viii.  101 
fin. 

Harbour,  the  Great,  of  Syracuse,  vi. 
101  med.,  vii.  4  med.,  22  fin.;  de- 
feat of  the  Syracusans  at  the 
mouth  of,  vii.  23  ;  second  sea  fight 
there,  ib.  37-41  ;  third  sea  fight, 
ib.  52  ;  fourth  and  greatest,  ib. 
70,  71  ;  the  lesser  harbour,  ib. 
22  init. 

Harmatus,  opposite  Methymna,viii. 
101  fin. 

Harmodius  and  Aristogeiton,  con- 
spiracy of,  against  Hipparchus, 
i.  20  med.,  vi.  54  init.,  56-58. 

Harpagium,  on  the  Propontis,  viii. 
107  init. 

Hebrus,  the  river,  in  Thrace,  ii.  96 
fin. 

Hegesander,  ambassador  from 
Sparta  to  Athens,  i.  139  med.; 
father  of  Pasitelidas,  a  Lacedae- 
monian, iv.  132  fin. 

Hegesander,  a  Thesbian  com- 
mander, vii.  19  med. 

Hegesippidas,  Lacedaemonian  go- 
vernor of  Heraclea,  v.  52  init.; 
dismissed  by  the  Boeotians,  ib. 

Helen,  the  suitors  of,  i.  9  init. 

Helixus,  a  Megaraean  commander, 
viii.  80  fin. 

Hellanicus,  inaccuracy  of,  i.  97  fin. 

Hellas,  early  condition  of,  i.  2  ; 
Trojan  War  first  common  action 
of,  ib.  3  init.  and  fin.;  name 
derived  from  Hellen,  and  not 
given  at  first  to  the  whole  country, 
ib.  3  med.;  Minos  first  possessor 
of  a  navy  in,  ib.  4  init.;  piracy, 
honourable  in,  ib.  4,  5  ;  ancient 
custom  of  carrying  arms  in,  ib.  6 
init.;  its  older  towns  built  inland, 
ib.  7  ;  rise  of  tyrannies  in,  ib,  13 
init.;  sends  out  colonies,  ib.  12  ; 
the  headship  of  Hellas  trans- 
ferred from  Lacedaemon  to 
Athens,  i.  18,  95,  96  ;  the  war 
between  Chalcis  and  Eretria  the 
first  in  which  Hellas  was  divided 
into  parties,  ib,  15  fin.;  agitation 


in  Hel'as  before  the  War,  i.i  med., 
ii.  8,  ii  init.;  after  the  failure  of 
the  Syracusan  expedition,  viii.  2 
init.;  astonishment  in  Hellas  at 
the  surrender  of  the  Spartans  in 
Sphacteria,  iv.  40  init.;  popular 
delusion  about  the  number  of 
heavy  infantry  in  Hellas,  vi.  17 
med.;  Hellenes,  word  not  used 
by  Homer,  i.  3  med.;  in  ancient 
times  always  carried  arms,  ib.  6 
init.;  once  had  many  barbarous 
customs,  ib.  5  and  6  ;  their  igno- 
rance of  their  own  history,  i. 
20,  vi.  54  init.;  generally  under- 
estimated the  Athenian  power,  iv. 
108  med.,  vii.  28  fin.,  viii.  2  med., 
24  fin. 

Hellen,  gave  name  to  Hellas,  i.  3 
med. 

Helleno-Tamiai,  the  officers  who 
received  the  tribute  of  the  Allies 
at  Athens,  i.  96. 

Hellespont,  the  allies  in  the  Persian 
War  at  the  Hellespont,  i.  89  med. ; 
Pausanias  in  command  there,  ib. 
95  med.,  128  med.;  Athenian 
allies  at  the  Hellespont,  ii.  9  fin. 
[cp.  vi.  77  med.] ;  Athenian  tribute 
ships  in  the  Hellespont,  iv.  75 
init.;  Pharnabazus,  satrap  at  the 
Hellespont,  seeks  aid  of  Lace- 
daemon,  viii.  6 ;  the  Lacedae- 
monians determine  to  send  a 
fleet  there  under  Clearchus,  ib. 
8  med.;  the  land  forces  intended 
for  the  Hellespont  disperse,  ib. 
23  fin.;  Dercyllidas  is  sent  thither 
overland,  ib.  61,  62  ;  the  Athe- 
nian fleet  leaves  the  Hellespont 
for  Samos,  ib.  79;  Clearchus  pro- 
ceeds thither,  Byzantium  revolts, 
viii.  80  ;  the  Hellespont  saved  to 
Athens  by  Alcibiades'  resolution 
in  preventing  the  fleet  sailing  to 
the  Piraeus,  ib.  86  med.  [cp.  96 
med.];  the  Peloponnesian  fleet 
sets  sail  for  the  Hellespont,  ib* 
99  ;  the  Athenians  follow,  ib.  100 ; 
operations  in  the  Hellespont  and 
battle  of  Cynossema,  ib.  102-107  5 
Tissaphernes  is  annoyed  on  hear- 
ing that  the  Peloponnesians  had 
gone  to  the  Hellespont,  ib.  108 
med.,  109  init. 


INDEX, 


665 


Helorine  Road,  near  Syracuse,  vi. 
66  fin.,  70  fin.,  vii.  80  fin. 

Helos,  in  Laconia,  iv.  54  fin. 

Helots,  murder  of,  at  Taenarus,  i. 
128  init.;  massacre  of,  iv.  8omed.; 
intrigue  with  Pausanias,  i.  132 
med.;  revolt  from  the  Lacedae- 
monians, ib.  101,  ii.  27  fin.,  iii.  54 
fin.,  iv.  56  fin.;  surrender,  i.  103 
init.;  settled  at  Naupactus  by  the 
Athenians,  ib.  11,9  med.;  carry 
supplies  into  Sphacteria,  iv.  26 
med.;  desert  to  the  Messenians 
in  Pylos,  iv.  41  init.;  withdrawn 
from  Pylos,  v.  35  fin.;  replaced, 
ib.  56  med.;  taken  by  the  Athe- 
nians to  Syracuse,  vii.  57  med. 
[cp.  ib.  31  init.]  ;  Demosthenes 
fortifies  an  isthmus  in  Laconia 
in  order  that  the  Helots  may 
desert  there,  ib.  26  med.;  seven 
hundred  sent  with  Brasidas, 
iv.  80  fin.;  afterwards  settled 
at  Lepreum,  v.  34  med. ;  the 
Lacedaemonians  send  a  body  of 
Helots  and  Neodamodes  to 
Sicily,  ib.  19  med.,  58  med.  [Com- 
pare Messenians.] 

Hephaestus,  the  forge  of,  believed 
to  be  in  Hiera,  iii.  88  med. 

Heraclea,  in  Trachis,  iv.  78  init.; 
founded  by  the  Lacedaemonians, 
iii.  92,  loo  fin.;  failure  of  the 
colony,  ib.  93  ;  regulated  by  the 
Lacedaemonians,  v.  12  fin.;  the 
Heracleans  are  defeated  by  the 
neighbouring  tribes,  ib.  51;  He- 
raclea taken  over  by  the  Boeo- 
tians, ib.  52. 

Heraclea,  in  Pontus,  iv.  75  fin. 

Heracles,  Temple  of,  at  Mantinca, 
v.  64  fin.,  66  init.;  festival  of,  at 
Syracuse,  vii.  73  med. 

Heraclidae,    slay     Eurystheus    in 

-  Attica,  i.  9  med.;  conquer  the 
Peloponnesus,  ib.  12  med.;  Pha- 
lius,  a  Corinthian  of  the  Heraclid 
race,  ib.  24  init.;  Archias,  founder 
of  Syracuse,  an  Heraclid,  vi. 3  med. 

Heraclides,  one  of  the  Syracusan 
generals,  vi.  73  ;  deposed  on  a 
charge  of  treachery,  ib.  103  fin. 

Heraeans,  of  Arcadia,  v.  67  init. 

Here,  Temple  of,  at  Argos,  iv.  133  ; 
at  Corcyra,  i.  24  fin.,  iii.  75  fin., 


79  init.,  81  med.;  at  Epidaurus, 
v.  75  fin.;  at  Plataea,  iii.  68  fin. 

Hermae,  mutilation  of  the,  vi.  27, 
28  ;  excitement  at  Athens  about, 
ib.  53,  60  ;  confession  of  one  of 
the  prisoners,  ib.  60  med. 

Hermaeondas,  a  Theban,  iii.  5  med. 

Hermes,  Temple  of,  near  Mycales- 
sus,  vii.  29  med. 

Hermionc,  i.  128  med.,  131  init.; 
its  territory  ravaged  by  the  Athe- 
nians, ii.  56  med.;  the  Hermioni- 
ans  furnish  a  convoy  to  Corinth, 
i.  27  fin.;  supply  ships  to  the 
Lacedaemonian  navy,  viii.  3  fin. 
[cp.  ib.  33  init.] 

Hermocrates,  speech  of,  iv.  59-64  ; 
second  speech  of,  vi.  33,  34  ;  en- 
courages the  Syracusans  after 
defeat,  ib.  72  ;  made  general  with 
two  others,  ib.  73  init.,  96  med., 
99  init.;  speech  at  Camarina,  ib. 
76-80;  deposed,  ib.  103  fin.; 
encourages  the  Syracusans  to 
prepare  "a  fleet,  vii.  21  fin.;  con- 
trives by  a  stratagem  to  delay 
the  Athenian  retreat,  ib.  73  ; 
brings  a  fleet  to  Asia,  viii.  26 
init. ;  remonstrates  with  Tissa- 
phernes  for  reducing  the  ships' 
pay,  ib.  29  med.;  again,  ib.  45 
med.;  incurs  the  hatred  of  Tissa- 
phernes,  ib.  85  ;  goes  to  Sparta 
to  expose  him,  ib. ;  exiled,  ib.  fin. 

Hermon,  an  Athenian,  commander 
of  the  Peripoli,  viii.  92  med. 

Hermon,  father  of  Hermocrates,  a 
Syracusan,  iv.  58  fin.,  vi.  32  fin. 

Hesiod,  said  to  have  been  killed  at 
Nemea,  iii.  96  init. 

Hessians,  an  Ozolian  Locrian  tribe, 
iii.  101  fin. 

Hestiaea,  in  Euboea,  expulsion  of 
the  Hestiaeans  by  the  Athenians, 
i.  1 14  fin.;  colonized  from  Athens, 
vii.  57  init. 

Hestiodorus,  an  Athenian  com- 
mander, ii.  70  init. 

Hiera,  one  of  the  Liparean  islands, 
iii.  88  med. 

Hieramenes,  mentioned  with  Tissa- 
phernes  in  the  third  treaty  with 
the  Lacedaemonians,  viii.  58  init. 

Hiereans,  a  Malian  tribe,  iii.  92 
init. 


666 


INDEX. 


Hierophon,  an  Athenian  com- 
mander, iii.  105  med. 

Himera,  colonized  from  Zancle,  vi. 
5  init.;  the  only  Hellenic  city  on 
the  north  coast,  ib.  62  init.;  the 
Athenians  and  Sicels  invade  its 
territory,  iii.  115;  the  Himeraeans 
aid  Gylippus,  vii.  i,  58  init. 

Himeraeum,  in  Thrace,  vii.  9  fin. 

Hippagretas,  one  of  the  Spartan 
commanders  at  Sphacteria,  iv.  38 
init. 

Hipparchus,  son  of  Peisistratus, 
never  actually  tyrant,  i.  20  init., 
vi.  54  init.,  55  fin.;  slain  by  Har- 
modius  and  Aristogeiton,  i.  20,  vi. 
54,  56-58  ;  left  no  children,  vi.  55 
init. 

Hippias,  commander  of  the  garrison 
at  Notium,  treacherously  seized 
by  Paches,  iii.  34  med. 

Hippias,  eldest  son  of  Peisistratus, 
i.  20  init.,  vi.  54  init.,  55  init.;  his 
children,  vi.  55  ;  becomes  more 
oppressive,  ib.  59  init.;  deposed 
by  the  Lacedaemonians,  ib.  fin.; 
goes  to  Persia  and  returns  to 
take  part  at  Marathon,  ib. 

Hippias,  father  of  Peisistratus,  vi. 
54  fin. 

Hippocles,  an  Athenian  com- 
mander, viii.  13. 

Hippoclus,  tyrant  of  Lampsacus, 
vi.  59  med. 

Hippocrates,  an  Athenian  general, 
fellow  commander  with  Demos- 
thenes, iv.  66  med.;  attempts 
Megara  and  captures  Nisaea,  ib. 
66-69  5  plans  with  Demosthenes 
an  invasion  of  Boeotia,  z'£.  76,  77; 
fortifies  Delium,  ib.  90  ;  speech 
of,  ib.  95  ;  defeated  and  slain,  ib. 
96,  101  init. 

Hippocrates,  a  Lacedaemonian 
commander,  loses  part  of  his 
fleet  off  Triopium  by  an  Athe- 
nian attack,  viii.  35  ;  informs 
Mindarus  of  the  treachery  of 
Tissaphernes,  ib.  99  med.;  sent 
to  Euboea,  ib.  107  fin. 

Hippocrates,  tyrant  of  Gela,  vi.  5 
fin.;  refounds  Camarina,  ib. 

Hippolochidas,  a  Thessalian,  aids 
Brasidas  in  his  march  through 
Thessaly,  iv.  78  init. 


Hipponicus,  an  Athenian  general, 
iii.  91  med. 

Hipponoidas,  a  Spartan  polemarch, 
v.  71  fin.;  banished  for  cowardice 
at  Mantinea,  ib.  72  init. 

Homer  quoted,  (II.  ii.  108),  i.  9  fin.; 
(ii.  570),  ib.  13  med.;  (from  the 
Hymn  to  Apollo),  iii.  104  med.; 
the  testimony  of,  shows  the  com- 
parative smallness  of  the  Trojan 
War,  i.  10  med.;  his  use  of  the 
name  Hellenes,  ib.  3  med.  [See 
Poets.] 

Honour  is  ever  young,  ii.  44  fin.; 
often  lures  men  to  destruction,  v. 
in  med. 

Hope,  the  deceitfulness  of,  iii.  39 
med.,  45,  iv.  108  med.,  v.  103  ; 
the  higher  the  hope,  the  greater 
the  courage,  vii.  67  init. 

Hyacinthia,  festival  of,  at  Lacedae- 
mon,  v.  23,  iv  ;  41  fin. 

Hyaeans,  an  Ozolian  Locrian  tribe, 
iii.  101  fin. 

Hybla  Geleatis,  in  Sicily,  unsuc- 
cessfully attacked  by  the  Athe- 
nians, vi.  62  fin.,  63  med.;  the 
Hyblaeans  have  their  corn  burnt 
by  the  Athenians,  ib.  94  fin. 

Hyblon,  a  Sicel  king,  vi.  4  init. 

Hyccara,  in  Sicily,  captured  by  the 
Athenians,  vi.  62  med.  [cp.  vii. 
13  fin.] 

Hylias,  a  river  in  Italy,  vii.  35  med. 

Hyllaic  harbour  at  Corcyra,  iii.  72 
fin.,  8 1  init. 

Hyperbolus,anAthenian,ostracized, 
viii.  73  init.;  murdered  by  the 
oligarchical  conspirators,  ib.  med. 

Hyperechides,  father  of  Callias,  an 
Athenian,  vi.  55  init. 

Hysiae,  in  Argos,  captured  by  the 
Lacedaemonians,  v.  83  med. 

Hysiae,  in  Boeotia,  iii.  24  med. 

Hystaspes,  father  of  Pissuthnes,  a 
Persian,  i.  115  med. 

I. 

lalysus,  in  Rhodes,  viii.  44  med. 

lapygia,  promontory  of,  vi.  30  init., 
34  med.,  vii.  33  med.;  lapygian 
mercenaries  hired  by  the  Athe- 
nians against  Syracuse,  vii.  33 
med.,  57  fin. 


INDEX. 


667 


lasian  Gulf,  viii.  26  med. 

lasus,  in  Ionia,  its  wealth,  viii.  28 
med. ;  captured  by  the  Pelopon- 
nesians,  ib.\  Peisander  accuses 
Phrynichus  of  having  betrayed 
it,  ib.  54. 

Iberians,  the  Sicanians  originally 
Iberians,  vi.  2  init.;  the  most 
warlike  of  barbarians,  ib.  90 
med. 

Icarus,  an  island  in  the  Aegaean, 
iii.  29  init.,  viii.  99  fin. 

Ichthys,  promontory  of,  in  Elis,  ii. 
25  fin. 

Ida,  mount,  in  the  Troad,  iv.  52 
fin.,  viii.  108  med. 

Idacus,  in  the  Thracian  Cherson- 
nese,  viii.  104  init. 

Idomene,  a  hill  in  Amphilochia,  iii. 
112,113. 

Ilium,  see  Troy. 

Illyrians  hired  by  Perdiccas,  iv.  124 
fin.;  desert,  ib.  125  init.;  attack 
and  are  defeated  by  Brasidas, 
ib.  127,  128  ;  the  Taulantians,  an 
Illyrian  tribe,  make  war  upon 
Epidamnus,  i.  24  init.;  aid  the 
Corcyraeans  to  besiege  Epidam- 
nus, ib.  26  fin. 

Imbros,  colonized  from  Athens, 
vii.  57  init.;  Imbrian  troops  at 
Athens,  iv.  28  med.;  Imbrians 
serve  under  Cleon  at  Amphipolis, 
v.  8  init.;  the  Imbrians  support 
the  Athenians  in  the  Lesbian 
revolt,  iii.  5  init.;  an  Athenian 
squadron  escapes  to  Imbros,  viii. 
102,  103. 

Imperial  powers  acquire  empire  by 
assisting  all  who  invoke  their 
aid,  vi.  1 8  init.;  to  imperial 
powers  nothing  is  inconsistent 
which  is  expedient,  ib.  85. 

Inarus,  king  of  the  Libyans,  revolts 
from  the  King,  i.  104  init.;  calls 
in  the  Athenians,  ib. ;  is  betrayed 
and  impaled,  'ib.  1 10  med. 

Inessa,  a  Sicel  town,  attacked  by 
the  Athenians,  iii.  103  init.;  the 
Inessians  have  their  crops  burnt 
by  the  Athenians,  vi.  94  fin. 

Inexperience,  in  war,  no  excuse  for 
•  misbehaviour,  ii.  87  med. 

Injustice,  more  resented  than  vio- 
lence, i.  76  med.,  iv.  86  med.; 


not  those  who  suffer,  but  those 
who  do  injustice,  should  take 
time  to  think,  i.  86  fin. 

Intelligence,  folly  of  over-,  i.  84  fin., 
iii.  43  med.,  83  fin. 

lolaus,  the  lieutenant  of  Perdiccas, 
i.  62  med. 

lolcius,  an  Athenian,  swears  to  the 
Treaty  of  Peace  and  the  Alliance, 
v.  19  fin.,  24  med. 

Ion,  father  of  Tydeus,  a  Chian,  viii. 
38  med. 

Ionia,  colonized  from  Attica,  i.  2 
fin.,  12  fin.,  95  init.,  ii.  15  med., 
iii.  86  med.,  iv.  61  med.,  vii.  57 
init.;  habits  of  life  common  to 
the  older  Athenians  and  lonians, 
i.  6  med.;  lonians  possessed  a 
great  fleet  in  the  time  of  Cyrus, 
ib.  13  fin.;  subdued  by  Cyrus  and 
Darius,  z#.  16;  the  lonians  fleeing 
from  the  Persians  found  colonies 
in  Sicily,  vi.  4  fin.;  the  lonians 
put  themselves  under  the  head- 
ship of  Athens,  i.  95  init.,  vi.  76 
med.;  Ionian  exiles  urge  the 

-  Lacedaemonians  to  raise  a  re- 
volt in  Ionia,  iii.  31  ;  the  Lace- 
daemonians exclude  the  lonians 
from  their  colony  of  Heraclea, 
ib.  92  fin.;  the  lonians  and  Tissa- 
phernes  beg  aid  at  Sparta  for  a 

•  revolt,  viii.  5,  6;  Ionia  revolts,  ib. 
14-22  ;  Tissaphernes  demands  all 
Ionia  for  the  king,  ib.  56  fin. 

lonians  contrasted  with  Dorians, 
i.  124  init.,  v.  9  init.,  vi.  77  med., 
80  fin.,  82  init.,  vii.  5  fin.,  57 
init.  and  med.,  viii.  25  med. 

Ionian  Gulf,  the,  i.  24  init.,  ii.  97 
fin.,  vi.  13  med.,  30  init.,  34  med., 
44  init.,  104  init.,  vii.  33  med., 
57  fin. 

Ionian  festival  of  the  Dionysia,  ii. 
15  med.;  at  Delos,  iii.  104  med.; 
at  Ephesus,  ib.  med. 

Ipneans,  an  Ozolian  Locrian  tribe, 
iii.  101  fin. 

Isarchidas,  a  Corinthian  com- 
mander, i.  29  init. 

Isarchus,  father  of  Isarchidas,  a 
Corinthian,  i.  29  init. 

Ischagoras,  a  Lacedaemonian  com- 
mander, iv.  132  ;  swears  to  the 
Treaty  of  Peace  and  the  Alliance, 


668 


INDEX. 


v.  19  init.,  24  init.;  goes  as  envoy 
to  Chalcidice,  ib.  21. 

Isocrates,a  Corinthian  commander, 
ii.  83  fin. 

Isolochus,  father  of  Pythodorus,  an 
Athenian,  iii.  115  init. 

Ister,  the  river,  ii.  96  init.,  97  init. 

Isthmian  Games,  viii.  9  init.,  10  init. 

Isthmionicus,  an  Athenian,  swears 
to  the  Treaty  of  Peace  and  the 
Alliance,  v.  19  fin.,  24  med. 

Isthmus,  of  Corinth,  advantage- 
ously situated  for  trade,  i.  13 
med.;  its  situation,  iv.  42  med.; 
the  Lacedaemonians  summon 
the  allies  to  the  Isthmus,  ii.  10, 
13  init.,  18  med.;  again,  iii.  ,15; 
earthquakes  stop  the  Lacedae- 
monian army  at  the  Isthmus, 
ib.  89  init.;  the  Treaty  of  Peace 
ordered  to  be  inscribed  on  a 
pillar  at  the  Isthmus,  v.  18,  xi; 
a  small  Lacedaemonian  force 
comes  to  the  Isthmus  during  the 
excitement  about  the  Hermae 
at  Athens,  vi.  61  init. 

Isthmus,  of  Leucas,  iii.  81  init.,  iv. 
8  init. 

Isthmus,  of  Pallene,  i.  56  init.,  62 
init.,  64  init. 

Istone,  mount,  occupied  by  the 
Corcyraean  oligarchs,  iii.  85,  iv. 
2  med.,  46  init.;  capture  of,  ib. 
46  med. 

Italus,  a  Sicel  king  who  gave  his 
name  to  Italy,  vi.  2  med. 

Italy,  named  from  King  Italus,  vi. 
2  med. ;  the  mother  country  of  the 
Sicels,  ib.\  most  of  the  Hel- 
lenic colonies  in,  founded  from 
Peloponnesus,!.  12  fin.;  the  Lace- 
daemonians order  their  Italian  al- 
lies to  furnish  a  naval  contingent, 
ii.  7  med.;  the  Locrians  side  with 
the  Syracusans,  the  Rhegians 
with  the  Leontines,  iii.  86  med. 
[cp.  iv.  i  med.,  24];  the  Athenians 
send  an  embassy  to,  v.  4,  5  ;  Her- 
mocrates  advises  the  Syracusans 
to  seek  allies  in,  vi.  34  ;  the  Italian 
cities  refuse  to  receive  the  Athe- 
nian expedition  to  Syracuse,  ib. 
44  ;  the  Syracusans  send  envoys 
to  the  Italian  cities,  ib.  88  fin.; 
the  Athenians  obtain  supplies 


from  them,  ib.  103  init.  [cp.  vii.  14 
med.,  25  init.];  Gylippus  goes  to 
Thurii  and  Tarentum,  vi.  104; 
the  second  Athenian  expedition 
reaches  Italy,  vii.  33  ;  Italian 
allies  of  the  Athenians  before 
Syracuse,  ib.  57  fin.;  the  Syra- 
cusans retain  their  Italian,  Sici- 
lian, and  Athenian  prisoners  after 
the  others  were  sold,  ib.  87  fin.; 
Italian  vessels  join  the  Lace- 
daemonians, viii.  91  init. 

Itamenes,  a  Persian  commander, 
iii.  34  init. 

Ithome,  mount,  seized  by  the  He- 
lots, i.  101  init.,  iii.  54  fin.;  be- 
sieged by  the  Lacedaemonians, 
i.  102  init.;  surrendered,  ib.  103. 

Itonaeans,  colonists  of  the  Italian 
Locrians,  v.  5  fin. 

Itys,  the  legend  of,  ii.  29  init. 

J. 

Justice,  an  idle  word  to  the  strong, 
i.  76  fin.,  v.  89  fin.;  justice  and 
expediency,  i.  36,  42  init.,  76,  iii. 
40  med.,  44,  56,  82  fin.,  y.  90,  98, 
107;  the  Lacedaemonian  con- 
ception of,  a  *  do  nothing '  policy, 
i.  71  init. 

K. 

Kindness,  a  little,  done  in  season 
may  cancel  a  greater  previous 
wrong,  i.  42  fin. 

Kings  of  Lacedaemon,  common 
mistake  that  they  have  two  votes 
in  council,  i.  20  fin.;  could  be 
imprisoned  by  the  Ephors,  ib. 
131  fin.;  the  government  carried 
on  by  regents  in  their  minority, 
i.  107  init.,  132  init.;  give  all 
orders  in  the  field,  v.  66  med. 

Kings  of  Persia  :  Cyrus,  i.  13  fin.; 
Cambyses,  ib.$  Darius,  ib.  14 
med. ;  Xerxes,  $.,  1 29 ;  Artaxerxes, 
ib.  104  init.,  137  med.,  iv.  50  fin.; 
Darius  Nothus,  viii.  5  init.,  18, 

37,  5.8. 

Kings  in  ancient  Hellas,  their  con- 
stitutional character,  i.  13  init. 

Knights,  the,  at  Athens,  iii.  16  init.; 
the  Three  Hundred  (so  called) 
at  Sparta,  v.  72  fin. 

Kropeia  (in  Attica),  ii.  19  fin. 


INDEX. 


669 


L. 

Labdalum,  a  fort  built  by  the  Athe- 
nians on  Epipolae,  vi.  97  fin.,  98 
med.;  captured  by  Gylippus, 
vii.  3. 

Lacedaemon  contrasted  with  Ath- 
ens, i.  loinit.;  founded  by  the 
Dorians,  ib.  18  init.,  107  ink.;  long 
unsettled,  *£.  1 8  init.;  never  subject 
to  tyrants,  ib.\  its  excellent  con- 
stitution, ib.\  common  mistakes 
about,  ib.  20  fin.;  the  Lacedae- 
monians a  pattern  of  nobility  in 
Hellas,  iii.  53  fin.,  57  init.;  'liber- 
ators of  Hellas,'  i.  69  init.,  ii.  8  fin., 
iii.  59  fin.,  iv.  85  init.,  108  init.,v.  9 
fin.,  viii.  43  fin.,  46  med.,  52  fin.; 
their  slothful  character,  especially 
in  contrast  with  the  Athenians, 
i.  69,  70,  84  init.,  102  med.,  iv. 
55  med.,  viii.  96  fin.;  their  free- 
dom from  passion,  v.  63  med.; 
force  strict  oligarchies  on  their 
subjects,  i.  19  init.  [cp.  76  init., 
144  med.,  iv.  1 32  fin.],  v.  8 1  fin.,  viii. 
38  med.;  bad  administration  of 
their  subject  states,  iii.  93  fin.,  v.52 
init.;  different  character  of,  at 
home  and  abroad,  v.  105  fin.;  their 
bad  conduct  abroad,  i.  77  fin. 
[cp.  ib.  95  fin.];  their  slaughter  of 
traders,  ii.  67  fin.,  iii.  32  ;  their 
treatment  of  the  Helots,  i.  1 28  init., 
iv.  80 med.;  the  great  number  of 
their  slaves,  viii.  40  med.;  sim- 
plicity of  Lacedaemonian  life,  i.  6 
med.;  the  Lacedaemonians  first 
to  strip  naked  in  the  games,  ib.\ 
decide  by  cries,  not  by  voting,  ib. 
87  init.;  observance  of  omens,&c., 
iii.  89  init., v.  54  med., 55  med.,  1 16 
init.,  vi.  95  init., viii.  6  fin.;  import- 
ance attached  by  them  to  religious 
observances,  iv.  5  init.,  v.  54  med., 
75  init.,  82  init.;  their  brevity  of 
speech,  iv.  17  init.;  their  military 
prowess,  ib.  12  fin.;  their  pres- 
tige, ib.  1 8  init.;  the  common  be- 
lief that  they  would  never  sur- 
render, ib.  40  init.;  secrecy  of  their 
government,  v.  54  init.,  68  init., 
74  fin.;  its  moderation  and  sta- 
bility, viii.  24  med.;  their  exclu- 
sion of  foreigners,  i.  144  init.  [cp. 


ii.  39  init.];  powers  of  their  kings, 
v. 66 med., viii. 4  fin.;  organization 
of  their  army,  iii.ioginit,  iv.  8  fin., 
38  init.,v. 66  fin. ,68  fin. ;  sometimes 
send  out  commissioners  to  advise 
a  general,  ii.  85  init.,  iii.  69  med., 
76,  v.  63  fin.,  viii.  39  init.;  march 
to  the  sound  of  music,  v.  70  ;  do 
not  pursue  a  defeated  enemy  far, 
ib.  73  fin.;  recovery  of  their  influ- 
ence after  Mantinea,  ib.  77  med. 
Lacedaemonians,  the,  put  down 
the  tyrants,  i.  18  init.,  vi.  53  fin.,  59 
fin.;  become  one  of  the  leading 
powers  of  Hellas,  ib.\Z  fin.  [cp.  ib. 
10  init.] ;  endeavour  to  prevent  the 
Athenians  from  building  their 
walls,  ib.  90  init.;  deceived  by 
Themistocles,  ib.  90-92  ;  their 
friendly  feeling  toward  the  Athe- 
nians after  the  Persian  War,  ib. 
92  ;  summon  Pausanias  to  Lace- 
daemon,  ib.  95  init.,  131  init.;  the 
Helots  revolt,  ib.  101  init.;  the 
Lacedaemonians  call  in  the  Athe- 
nians, ib.  1 02  init.;  dismiss  them 
and  so  cause  the  first  open  quar- 
rel between  themselves  and  the 
Athenians,  ib.  med.;  assist  the 
Dorians  against  the  Phocians, 
ib.  107  init.;  defeat  the  Athenians 
at  Tanagra,  ib.  fin.,  108  init.;  en- 
gage in  the  *  Sacred  War,'  ib.  112 
fin.;  invade  Attica,  ib.  114  med.; 
conclude  a  thirty  years'  truce 
with  the  Athenians,  ib.  115  init.; 
take  alarm  at  the  growth  of  the 
Athenian  empire,  ib.  1 18;  promise 
aid  to  the  Potidaeans,  ib.  58  med. ; 
summon  the  allies,  ib.  67  med.; 
vote  that  the  treaty  was  broken,  #. 
79,  87  ;  their  reasons,  ib.  88, 1 18  ; 
consult  the  oracle,  ib.  118  fin.; 
summon  the  allies  a  second  time, 
ib.  119  init.;  vote  for  war,  ib.  125  ; 
send  embassies  to  Athens,  ib. 
126  init.;  make  a  final  demand 
from  the  Athenians,  ib.  139;  medi- 
tate sending  embassies  to  the 
King,  ii.  7  init.;  the  list  of  their 
allies,  #.9 init.;  summon  the  allies 
to  the  Isthmus,  before  invading 
Attica,  ib.  10  ;  unsuccessfully  at- 
tack Oenoe,  ib.  18;  enter  and 
ravage  Attica,  ib.  19-22  ;  defeat 


INDEX. 


the  Athenians  at  Phrygia,  ib;  22 
med.;  retire,  ib.  23  fin.;  settle  the 
Aeginetans  at  Thyrea,  ib.  27  ; 
again  invade  Attica,  ib.  47  init.; 
reach  Laurium,  ib.  55  ;  quit  At- 
tica, ib.  57  ;  reject  offers  of  peace, 
ib.  59  med. ;  attack  Zacynthus,  ib. 
66 ;  send  ambassadors  to  the 
King,  ib.  67  ;  attack  and  finally 
blockade  Plataea,  ib.  71-78  ;  in- 
vade Acarnania,  ib.  80  ;  defeated 
at  sea  by  the  Athenians,  ib.  83,' 
84  ;  send  commissioners  to  assist 
their  admiral,  ib.  85  init.;  again 
defeated,  ib.  86-92  ;  meditate  an 
attack  on  Piraeus,  ib.  93  init. ; 
ravage  Salamis,  ib.  fin.;  in- 
vade Attica,  iii.  I ;  send  the  Mity- 
lenaean  envoys  to  Olympia,  ib.  8  ; 
receive  the  Mitylenaeans  into  al- 
liance, ib.  15  init.;  summon  the 
allies  to  the  Isthmus,  ib.  med.; 
send  a  fleet  to  Lesbos,  ib.  16  fin.; 
send  Salaethus  to  Mitylene,  ib.  25 
init.;  invade  Attica,  ib.  26  ;  arrive 
too  late  to  save  Lesbos,  ib.  29 ; 
compel  Plataea  to  surrender,  ib. 
52  init. ;  put  the  Plataeans  to  death, 
ib.  68  ;  raze  Plataea,  ib. ;  prepare 
an  expedition  to  Corcyra,  ib.  69  ; 
engage  the  Athenians  and  Corcy- 
raeans,  ib.  76-78;  retire,  ib.  79-81 
init. ;  deterred  byearthquakes  from 
the  invasion  of  Attica,  ib.  89  init.; 
colonize  Heraclea,  ib.  92,  93,  100; 
send  an  army  against  Naupactus, 
ib.  100-102;  invade  Amphilochia, 
ib.  105, 106 ;  defeated,  ib.  107, 108; 
desert  the  Ambraciots,  ib.  109, 
in;  invade  Attica,  iv.  2  init.;  re- 
turn on  the  news  of  the  capture 
of  Pylos,  ib.  6  ;  occupy  Sphacte- 
ria,2#.  8  fin.;  unsuccessfully  assault 
Pylos,  ib.  11,  12  ;  defeated  in  the 
harbour,  ib.  14  ;  make  a  truce 
with  the  Athenians,  and  send  am- 
bassadors to  Athens,  ib.  15,  16  ; 
their  speech,  ib.  17-20  ;  the  Lace- 
daemonians break  off  negotia- 
tions, ib.  21,  22  ;  their  troops  in 
Sphacteria  attacked  and  forced  to 
surrender,  ib.  31-38  ;  they  sue  for 
peace,  ib.  41  ;  negotiate  with  the 
King,  ib.  50  med.;  the  Athenians 
take  Cythera,  ib.  53,54 ;  the  Lace- 


daemonians are  panic-stricken  at 
their  ill  success  in  the  war,  ib. 
55  ;  their  garrison  in  Nisaea  sur- 
renders to  the  Athenians,  ib. 
69  fin.;  they  encourage  the  expedi- 
tion of  Brasidas  into  Chalcidice, 
ib.  80  init. ;  capture  Amphipolis, 
ib.  103-106  ;  make  a  truce  for  a 
year  with  the  Athenians,  ib.  117- 
119;  Brasidas  attempts  Potidaea, 
ib.  135  ;  defeats  the  Athenians  at 
Amphipolis,  v.6-i  i ;  the  Lacedae- 
monians become  eager  for  peace, 
ib.  14 ;  bring  back  Pleistoanax 
from  exile,  ib.  16  fin.;  make  a 
treaty  with  the  Athenians,  ib. 
17-19  ;  conclude  an  alliance  with 
the  Athenians,  ib.  22  fin.-24  ;  fall 
into  contempt  with  and  displease 
the  Peloponnesians,  ib.  28  fin.,  29 
fin.;  send  envoys  to  Corinth, /A 
30  ;  support  the  Lepreans  against 
Elis,  ib.  31  med.;  make  war  upon 
the  Parrhasians,  ib.  33  ;  emanci- 
pate the  Helot  soldiers  of  Brasi- 
das, and  disfranchise  the  prison- 
ers from  Pylos,  ib.  34  ;  conclude 
an  alliance  with  the  Boeotians  in 
order  to  gain  Panactum,  ib.  39  ; 
receive  Argive  envoys  and  pre- 
pare to  conclude  a  treaty  with 
them,  z#.  40,  41;  announce  the 
destruction  of  Panactum  at 
Athens,  ib.  42  ;  their  envoys  at 
Athens  are  tricked  by  Alcibia- 
des,  ib.  43-45  ;  refuse  to  give  up 
the  Boeotian  alliance  at  the  de- 
mand of  the  Athenians,  ib.  46 
med.;  excluded  by  the  Eleans 
from  the  Olympic  games,  ib.  49  ; 
expelled  from  Heraclea  by  the 
Boeotians,  ib.  51,  52  ;  start  on  an 
expedition  against  Argos  but  turn 
back,  ib.  54  init.;  again  start  and 
return,  ib.  5 5  med.;  garrison  Epi- 
daurus,  ib.  56  init.;  march  against 
Argos,  ib.  57  ;  surround  the  Ar- 
gives,  ib.  58,  59;.  furious  with 
Agis  for  making  a  truce  with  the 
Argives,  ib.  60  med.,  63  ;  march 
to  the  support  of  Tegea,  ib.  64 
init.;  surprised  by  the  Argives  be- 
fore Mantinea,  z#.  66  init.;  gain  a 
great  victory,  ib.  70-74  ;  make  al- 
liance with  Argos,  ib.  76-79;  send 


INDEX. 


671 


an  expedition  to  Argos,  ib.  82 
med.,  83  init.;  again  start  against 
Argos,  but  are  turned  back  by 
unfavourable  sacrifices,  ib.  116 
init.;  ravage  Argos,  vi.  7  init.; 
settle  the  Argive  exiles  at  Orneae, 
ib.',  order  the  Chalcidians  to 
assist  Perdiccas,  ib.  fin.;  they  re- 
fuse, ib.\  send  a  force  to  the 
Isthmus,  which  increases  the 
panic  at  Athens  after  the  muti- 
lation of  the  Hermae,  ib.  61  init.; 
receive  Corinthian  and  Syracusan 
ambassadors,  ib.  73  init.,  88  fin.; 
Alcibiades  speaks  in  their  behalf, 
ib.  89-92  ;  the  Lacedaemonians 
appoint  Gylippus  commander  of 
the  Syracusan  army,  ib.  93  med.; 
invade  Argos,  but  are  stopped  by 
an  earthquake,  ib.  95  ;  consider  the 
Athenians  guilty  of  first  breaking 
the  treaty  [cp.  vi.  105  init.]  and 
prepare  for  war  with  a  good  spirit, 
vii.  1 8  ;  invade  Attica  and  fortify 
Decelea,  ib.  19  init.;  send  troops 
to  Sicily,  ib.  17  fin.,  19  med.,  58 
med.;  Nicias  surrenders  himself 
to  them,  trusting  to  their  friendly 
feeling  for  him,  ib.  8  5  init.,  86  med. ; 
the  Lacedaemonians  derive  hope 
from  the  failure  of  the  Sicilian  ex- 
pedition, viii.  2  fin.;  raise  money 
and  order  ships  to  be  built,  ib.  3  ; 
Agis  at  Decelea  negotiates  with 
the  Lesbians  and  Euboeans  who 
desire  to  revolt,  ib.  4  ;  the  Lace- 
daemonians send  a  commissioner 
to  Chios,  ib.  6  fin.;  ally  themselves 
to  Chios  and  Erythrae,  ib.\  order 
a  fleet  to  Chios,  ib.  7,  8  ;  defeated 
at  sea  and  driven  into  Peiraeum, 
ib.  10,  ii  ;  discouraged  by  this 
unfortunate  beginning,  ib.  n  fin.; 
persuaded  by  Alcibiades  not  to 
give  way,  ib.  12  ;  cause  the  revolt 
of  Chios,  Erythrae,  Clazomenae, 
Teos,  Miletus,  ib.  14-17  ;  make 
an  alliance  with  the  King,  ib.  18  ; 
break  out  of  Peiraeum, /<£.  20  init.; 
induce  Mitylene  and  Methymna 
to  revolt,  ib.  22  ;  baffled  in  their 
plans  on  Lesbos,  ib.  23  ;  defeated 
by  the  Athenians  before  Miletus, 
ib.  25  ;  capture  lasos,  ib.  28  ;  fail 
to  retake  Clazomenae,  ib.  31 ;  sur- 


prised and  lose  six  ships  off  Tri- 
opium,  ib.  35  med.;  make  a  new 
treaty  with  the  King,  ib.  36,  37  ; 
alter  the  government  of  Chios, 
ib.  38  med.;  send  aid  to  Pharna- 
bazus,  ib.  39  init.,  80  ;  send  ad- 
visers to  Astyochus,  ib.  39  init.; 
defeat  an  Athenian  squadron,  ib. 
42  ;  distrust  Alcibiades  and  order 
his  death,  ib.  45  init.;  Astyochus 
is  believed  to  have  sold  himself 
to  Tissaphernes,  ib.  50  med.;  Pe- 
daritus,  their  governor  at  Chios, 
is  killed  .  in  battle,  ib.  55 
fin.;  they  make  a  third  treaty 
with  the  Persians,  ib.  57,  58  ;  are 
invited  by  the  Eretrians  to  Eu- 
boea,  ib.  60  med.;  send  Dercyl- 
lidas  to  the  Hellespont,  #.  61  init., 
62  init.;  offer  the  Athenians  battle 
off  Samos,  ib.  63  init.;  Agis  at 
Decelea  receives  heralds  from  the 
Four  Hundred,  ib.  70  fin.;  he 
sends  them  to  Sparta,  ib.  71  fin.; 
the  sailors  at  Miletus  complain 
of  Astyochus  and  Tissaphernes, 
tb.  78 ;  Astyochus  again  offers 
battle  to  the  Athenians,  ib.  79 
init.;  but  declines  to  engage  the 
Athenians  when  they  offer, ib.  fin.; 
the  Lacedaemonians  send  aid  to 
Pharnabazus,  and  cause  the  re- 
volt of  Byzantium,  ib.  80 ;  the 
sailors  at  Miletus  break  out  into 
open  violence  against  Astyochus, 
ib.  84  init.;  the  Lacedaemonians 
send  Mindarus  to  succeed  As- 
tyochus. 2^.85 init.;  receive  twelve 
ambassadors  from  the  oligarchs 
at  Athens,  ib.  90  med.;  do  not 
come  to  terms  with  them,  ib.  91 
init.;  despatch  a  fleet  to  Euboea, 
•ib.  91  init.;  defeat  the  Athenians 
at  sea,  ib.  95  ;  do  not  follow  up 
their  success,  ib.  96  ;  leave  Tissa- 
phernes in  disgust  and  sail  to  the 
Hellespont,  ib.  99  ;  arrive  at 
Rhoeteium,  ib.  101  fin.;  chase 
the  Athenian  squadron  at  Sestos, 
and  capture  a  few  vessels,  ib. 
102 ;  defeated  at  sea  by  the 
Athenians  off  Cynossema,  ib.  104, 
105  ;  lose  eight  more  ships,  ib. 
107  init.;  aid  in  expelling  the 
Persian  garrison  from  Antandros, 


I N  D  E  X. 


ib.  1 08  med.,  and  from  Cnidus,  109 
init.  [See  also  for  the  latter  part, 
Astyochus,  Alcibiades,  Lichas, 
Pedaritus,  Tissaphernes,  &c.j 

Lacedaemonius,  son  of  Cimon,  an 
Athenian  commander,  i.  45. 

Laches,  an  Athenian,  commands  an 
expedition  to  Sicily,  iii.  8§  init., 
vi.  i  init.,  6  med.,  75  med.;  his 
proceedings  in  Sicily,  ib.  90,  99, 
103,  115  init.;  superseded  by  Py- 
thodorus,  ib.  115  init.;  moves  the 
conclusion  of  the  one  year's  truce, 
iv.  118  fin.;  swears  to  the  Treaty 
of  Peace  and  the  Alliance,  v.  19 
fin.,  24  med.  [cp.  43  med.];  brings 
an  Athenian  force  to  Argos,  ib. 
61;  reduces  Orchomenus,  ib. fin.; 
slain  at  Mantinea,  ib.  74  fin. 

Lacon,  a  Plataean,  iii.  52  fin. 

Lade,  an  island  opposite  Miletus, 
viii.  17  fin.,  24  init. 

Laeaeans,aPaeoniantribe,ii.96med. 

Laespodias,  an  Athenian  general, 
vi.  105  fin.;  goes  as  an  envoy  from 
the  Four  Hundred  to  Sparta,  viii. 
86  fin. 

Laestrygones,  oldest  inhabitants  of 
Sicily,  vi.  2  init. 

Lamachus,  an  Athenian  com- 
mander, leads  an  expedition  into 
the  Pontus,  iv.  75  ;  swears  to  the 
Treaty  of  Peace  and  the  Alliance, 
v.  19  fin.,  24  med.;  made  one  of 
the  generals  in  Sicily,  vi.  8  med.; 
advocates  in  a  council  of  war 
an  immediate  attack  on  Syracuse, 
ib.  49  ;  votes  with  Alcibiades,  ib. 
50  init.;  falls  in  battle,  ib.  101  fin., 
103  init.  med. 

Lamis,  founder  of  Trotilus  and 
Thapsus,  vi.  4  init. 

Lampon,  an  Athenian,  swears  to 
the  Treaty  of  Peace  and  the  Al- 
liance, v.  19  fin.,  24  med. 

Lampsacus,  given  to  Themistocles 
by  the  King,  i.  138  fin.;  famous 
for  wine,  ib.\  becomes  the  refuge 
of  Hippias,  vi.  59  ;  its  tyrants,  ib.\ 
revolts  from  Athens,  viii.  62  init.; 
retaken,  ib.  med. 

Laodicium,  in  Arcadia,  battle  of,  iv. 

134. 

Laophon,  father  of  Calligcitus,  a 
Megarian,  viii.  6  init. 


Laphilus,  a  Lacedaemonian,  swears 
to  the  Treaty  of  Peace  and  the  Al- 
liance, v.  19  Died.,  24  init. 

Larissa,  on  the  Hellespont,  viii.  101 
fin. 

Larissa,  in  Thessaly,  iv.  78  init.;  the 
Larissaeans  assist  the  Athenians 
in  the  first  invasion  of  Attica,  ii. 
22  fin.;  their  two  factions,  ib. 

Las,  in  Laconia,viii.9i  med.,  92  init. 

Laurium,  silver  mines  of,  ii.  55  init., 
vi.  91  fin. 

Laws,  not  lightly  to  be  altered,  iii. 
37  med.;  the  unwritten  law  of 
society,  ii.  37  fin. 

Lawsuits,  between  the  Athenians 
and  their  allies  decided  by  Athe- 
nian law,  i.  77  init. 

Leagrus,  father  ofGlaucon,  an  Athe- 
nian, i.  51  med. 

Learchus,  an  Athenian  ambassador 
to  Sitalces,  ii.  67  med. 

Lebedus,  in  Ionia,  revolts  from 
Athens,  viii.  19  fin. 

Lectum,  promontory  of,  viii.  101  fin. 

Lecythus,  a  high  point  of  Torone, 
iv.  1 13  fin.;  captured  by  Brasidas, 
ib.  114-116  ;  dedicated  by  Brasi- 
das to  Athene,  ib.  116. 

Lemnos,  viii.  102  fin.;  once  in- 
habited by  Tyrrhenians,  iv.  109 
init;  colonized  from  Athens,  iv. 
28  fin.,  vii.  57  init;  visited  by  the 
plague,  ii.  47  med.;  the  Athenians 
deposit  Samian  hostages  there, 
i.  115  med.;  the  Lemniahs 
support  the  Athenians  in  the- 
Lesbian  revolt,  iii.  5  init.;  fight 
under  Cleon  at  Sphacteria,iv.l28 
fin.;  at  Amphipolis,  v.  8  init.; 
present  before  Syracuse,  vii. 57init. 

Leocorium,  a  temple  at  Athens,  i. 
20  med.,  vi.  57  fin. 

Leocrates,  an  Athenian  commander, 
i.  105  init. 

Leogoras,  father  of  Andocides,  an 
Athenian,  i.  51  med. 

Leon,  a  Lacedaemonian,  one  of  the 
founders  of  Heraclea,  iii.  92  fin.; 
another,  goes  as  envoy  to  Athens, 
v.  44  fin.;  another,  father  of  Pe- 
daritus, viii.  28  fin.;  another,  suc- 
ceeds Pedaritus  at  Chios,  ib.  61 
med.;  gains  an  advantage  over 
the  Athenians  at  sea,  ib.  fin. 


INDEX. 


673 


Leon,  an  Athenian,  swears  to  the 
Treaty  of  Peace  and  the  Alliance, 
v.  19  fin.,  24  med.;  an  Athenian 
general  [?the  same],  viii.  23  init. ; 
popular  with  the  multitude,  z'£.  73 
med.;  comes  with  reinforcements 
to  Diomedon,  ib.  23  init.;  re- 
gains Lesbos  which  had  revolt- 
ed, ib.  23  med.;  carries  on 
war  successfully  against  Chios, 
ib.  24  med.;  appointed  with  Di- 
omedon to  the  chief  command  at 
Samos,  ib.  54  med.;  makes  a 
descent  upon  Rhodes,  ib.  55  init.; 
aids  the  democratic  reaction  at 
Samos,  ib.  73  fin.  • 

Leon,  near  Syracuse,  vi.  97  init. 

Leonidas,  father  of  Pleistarchus 
king  of  Sparta,  i.  132  init. 

Leontiades,  father  of  Eurymachus 
a  Theban,  ii.  2  med. 

Leontini,  founded  from  Chalcis  in 
Euboea  by  Thucles,  vi.  3  fin.; 
the  Leontines  of  Ionian  descent, 
iii.  86  med.,  vi.  44  fin.,  46  init,  50 
fin.,  76  med.,  77  init.,  79  med.; 
at  war  with  Syracuse,  ib.  86  init.; 
obtain  assistance  from  Athens, 
ib.  fin.;  unsuccessfully  attack 
Messene,  iv.  25  fin.;  revolution 
in,  v.  4  init.;  the  Athenians  es- 
pouse their  cause  as  an  excuse 
for  the  conquest  of  Sicily,  ib.  fin., 
vi.  8  med.,  19  init.,  33  init.,  47  fin., 
48  fin.,  63  fin.,  76  init.,  77  init.,  84 
med. 

Leotychides,  king  of  Sparta,  i.  89 
init. 

Lepreum,  gives  rise  to  a  quarrel 
between  the  Eleans  and  Lace- 
daemonians, v.  31  ;  the  Lace- 
daemonians settle  the  Helots 
and  Neodamodes  there,  ib.  34 
med.;  they  break  the  Olympic 
Truce  by  bringing  a  garrison  into 
Lepreum,  ib.  49  init.;  the  Le- 
praeans  do  not  attend  the  Olympic 
festival,  ib.  50  init.;  the  Eleans 
are  angry  with  their  allies  for  not 
attacking  Lepreum,  ib.  62. 

Leros  \al.  Eleus],  viii.  26  init.,  27 
init. 

Lesbos  :  the  Lesbians  kindred  of 
the  Boeotians,  iii.  2  fin.,  vii.  57 
med.,  viii.  4  med.,  100  med.  [cp. 


iii.  5  med.,  13  init.];  with  the 
Chians,  the  only  independent 
allies  of  Athens,  i.  19,  vi.  85 
med.,  vii.  57  init.;  furnish  ships 
to  the  Athenians,  ii.  9  fin.,  56 
med.,  vi.  31  init.;  the  Lesbians 
aid  the  Athenians  against  the 
Samians,  i.  116,  117;  revolt  from 
Athens,  iii.  2  [see  Mitylene];  are 
received  into  the  Lacedaemonian 
confederacy, z#.  1 5 init.;  the  affairs 
of  Lesbos  set  in  order  by  Paches, 
ib.  35  ;  the  land  divided  among 
Athenian  citizens,  ib.  50 ;  the 
Lesbian  refugees  capture  Antan- 
drus,  iv.  52  med.  [which  the 
Athenians  recover,  #.  75  med.]; 
the  Lesbians  negotiate  with  Agis 
about  a  fresh  revolt,  viii.  4  med.; 
revolt  and  are  again  subdued,  ib. 
22,  23  ;  renew  negotiations  with 
Astyochus,  ib.  32  init. ;  Pedaritus 
refuses  them  aid  from  Chios,  ib. 
fin.;  the  Athenian  fleet  on  the 
way  to  the  Hellespont  puts  in 
at  Lesbos,  and  prepares  to  attack 
Eresus,  ib.  100. 

Leucas,  a  Corinthian  colony,  i.  30 
init.;  devastated  by  the  Corcy- 
raeans,  ib.\  attacked  by  the  Athe- 
nians, iii.  94  init.,  95  med.,  102 
med. 

Leucadian  Isthmus,  iii.  81  init.,  94 
med.,  iv.  8  init.;  garrisoned  by 
the  Corinthians,  iv.  42  fin.;  naval 
engagement  between  the  Pelo- 
ponnesians  returning  from  Sicily, 
and  the  Athenians,  off  Leucadia, 
viii.  13 ;  the  Leucadians  send 
troops  to  Epidamnus,  i.  26  init.; 
furnish  ships  to  Corinth,  ib.  27 
fin.,  46  init.;  Corinthian  fleet  sails 
from  Leucas,  ib.  46  med.;  the 
Leucadians  supply  the  Lacedae- 
monians with  ships,  ii.  9  med.; 
assist  in  the  invasion  of  Acarnania, 
ib.  80  fin.,  8 1  med.;  a  Leucadian 
vessel  is  sunk  by  an  Athenian  off 
Naupactus,  ib.  91  med.,  92  med.; 
the  Leucadians  repulse  an  Athe- 
nian descent,  iii.  7  ;  send  a  squad- 
ron to  Cyllene  to  reinforce  Alcidas, 
ib.  69  med. ;  aid  Gylippus  with  a 
fleet,  vi.  104  init.,  vii.  4  fin.,  7  init. ; 
present  before  Syracuse,  vii.  58 


x  x 


674 


INDEX. 


med.;  lose  one  ship  in  the  battle 
of  Cynossema,  viii.  106  med. 

Leucimme,  Corcyraeans  raise  a 
trophy  on,  i.  30  init. ;  Corcyraean 
station  at,  ib.  fin.,  47  med.,  51  fin.; 
the  Peloponnesians  land  there, 
iii.  79  fin. 

Leuconium,  in  Chios,  viii.  24  med. 

Leuctra,  in  Laconia,  v.  54  init. 

Libya,  visited  by  the  plague,  ii.  48 
init.;  trade  between  Libya  and 
Laconia,  iv.  53  fin.;  Phocians 
returning  from  Troy  are  driven 
to  Libya,  vi.  2  med.;  a  Pelopon- 
nesian  fleet  on  the  way  to  Syra- 
cuse is  driven  to  Libya,  vii.  50 
init.;  the  Libyans  besiege  the 
Evesperitae,  ib.\  Inaros,  king  of 
the  Libyans,  i.  104  init.,  110 
med. 

Lichas,  a  Lacedaemonian,  victor  at 
Olympia,  v.  50  med.;  struck  by 
the  officers,  ib.;  envoy  to  Argos, 
ib.  22  med.;  again,  ib.  76  med.; 
goes  with  ten  others  as  adviser  • 
to  Astyochus,  viii.  39  init.;  objects 
to  the  treaties  made  with  the 
king,  ib.  43,  52  fin.;  goes  with 
Tissaphernes  to  Aspendus,  ib.  87 
init.;  rebukes  the  Milesians -for 
driving  out  a  Persian  garrison, 
ib.  84  med.;  his  unpopularity 
at  Miletus,  ib.  fin.;  dies  there,  ib. 

Ligurians,  the,  drove  the  Sicanians 
out  of  Iberia,  vi.  2  init. 

Limnaea,  in  Acarnania,  ii.  80  fin., 
iii.  106  med. 

Lindii,  the  Acropolis  of  Gela,  vi.  4 
med. 

Lindus,  in  Rhodes,  viii.  44. 

Liparaean  [or  Aeolian]  islands  : 
the  Liparaeans  colonists  of  the 
Cnidians,  iii.  88  ;  invaded  by  the 
Athenians,  ib. ;  again,  ib.  1 1 5  init. 

Locrians  [Opuntian],  subjected  by 
the  Persians,  viii.  43  fin.;  allies 
of  the  Lacedaemonians,  v.  64 
med.;  give  hostages  to  the  Athe- 
'nians,  i.  108  med.;  present  at 
the  battle  of  Coronea,  ib.  113; 
furnish  the  Lacedaemonians  with 
cavalry,  ii.  9  med.;  Atalante,  in 
Locris,  seized  by  the  Athenians 
to  prevent  privateering,  ib.  32  init. 
[cp.  v.  1 8,  viii];  the  Locrians  de- 


feated by  the  Athenians,  ii.  26  ; 
inundation  of  the  sea  on  the 
Locrian  coast,  iii.  89  med.;  the 
Locrian  coast  ravaged  by  the 
Athenians,  ib.  91  fin.;  Locrian 
cavalry  pursue  the  Athenians 
after  Delium,  iv.  96  fin.;  the 
Locrians  supply  the  Lacedaemo- 
nians with  ships,  viii.  3  fin. 

Locrians,  [Ozolian],  always  carry 
arms,  i.  5  fin.;  old  inhabitants  of 
Naupactus,  ib.  103  med.;  allied  to 
the  Athenians,  iii.  95  fin.,  97  med.; 
subdued  by  the  Lacedaemonians, 
ib.  101;  go  to  war  with  the  Pho- 
cians, v.  32  init. 

Locris,  in  Italy :  the  Locrians  in 
alliance  with  the  ^yracusans,  iii. 
86  med. ;  defeated  by  the  Athe- 
nians, ib.  99  ;  again,  ib.  103  fin.; 
cause  Messene  to  revolt,  iv.  i 
init.;  join  the  Syracusans  in  at- 
tacking the  Rhegians,  ib.  24,  25  ; 
invited  to  Messene  during  a 
revolution,  v.  5  init.;  expelled,  ib.\ 
make  a  treaty  with  Athens,  z'^.fin.; 
hostile  to  the  Athenian  expedi- 
tion to  Sicily,  vi.  44  med.  [cp.  vii. 
35  fin.];  send  ships  to  the  Lace- 
daemonians, viii.  91  init. 

Loryma,  in  Caria,  viii.  43  init. 

Lot,  use  of  the  lot  to  determine 
which  side  should  first  execute  a 
treaty,  v.  21  init.;  in  the  distribu- 
tion of  an  army  between  a  num- 
ber of  generals,  viii.  30  init. 

Lycaeum,  Mount,  in  Arcadia,  v. 
16  fin.,  54  init. 

Lycia,  ii.  69  med.,  viii.  41  fin. 

Lycomedes,  father  of  Archestratus, 
an  Athenian,  i.  57  fin.;  another, 
father  of  Cleomedes,  v.  84  fin. 

Lycophron,  a  Lacedaemonian,  sent 
out  as  adviser  to  Cnemus,  ii.  85 
init. 

Lycophron,  a  Corinthian  general, 
iv.  43  ;  death  of,  ib.  44  init. 

Lycus,  father  of  Thrasybulus,  an 
Athenian,  viii.  75  init. 

Lyncus,  in  Upper  Macedonia,  ii. 
99  init.;  under  the  rule  of  Arrhi- 
baeus,  iv.  83  init.;  invaded  by 
Perdiccas  and  Brasidas,  ib.;  in- 
vaded a  second  time  by  them, 
ib.  124  init.;  Brasidas  retreats 


INDEX. 


675 


through  Lyncus,  ib.  125-128,  129 

init. 
Lysicles,  father  of  Habronichus,  an 

Athenian,   i.   91    init.;    another, 

sent  to  exact  money  in  Caria  and 

Lycia,  iii.  19  init.;  falls  in  battle, 

ib.  fin. 
Lysimachidas,    father    of    Arian- 

thidas,  a  Theban,  iv.  91  med. 
Lysimachus,    father   of   Aristides, 

an  Athenian,  i.  91  init. 
Lysimachus,  father  of  Heraclides,  a 

Syracusan,  vi.  73  init. 
Lysimeleia,  a  marsh  near  Syracuse, 

vii.  53  med. 
Lysistratus,  an  Olynthian,  iv.  no 

fin. 

M, 

Macarius,  a  Spartan  commander, 
iii.  100  fin.;  falls  at  the  battle  of 
Olpae,  ib.  109  init. 

Macedonia,  its  early  history,  ii.  99  ; 
kings  of  Macedonia  originally 
from  Argos,  ib.  init.,  v.  80  med.; 
the  Athenians  send  an  expedi- 
tion against  Macedonia,  i.  57-61; 
Macedonian  troops  sent  by  Per- 
diccas  too  late  for  the  Lacedae- 
monian expedition  into  Acarna- 
nia,  ii.  80  fin.;  the  Thracians 
invade  Macedonia  under  Sital- 
ces,  ib.  95-101  ;  the  military 
strength  of  Macedonia  much 
increased  by  Archelaus,  ib.  ipo 
init.;  Brasidas  in  Macedonia,  iv. 
78  fin.,  82,  83  ;  second  expedi- 
tion of  Brasidas  into  Macedonia, 
ib.  124-128;  the  Athenians  block- 
ade Macedonia,  v.  83  fin.;  Mace- 
donia ravaged  from  Methone  by 
the  Athenians,  vi.  7  fin. 

Machaon,  a  Corinthian  commander, 
ii.  83  fin. 

Maeander,  plain  of  the,  iii.  19  fin., 
viii.  58  init. 

Maedi,  a  Thracian  tribe,  ii.  98  med. 

Maenalia,  part  of  Arcadia,  v.  64 
init.;  Maenalians  at  Mantinea, 
ib.  67  med.;  hostages  taken  from 
the  Maenalians  by  the  Argives  to 
be  given  up  under  treaty,  ib.  77,  i. 

Magistrates,  the  good  magistrate 
is  not  always  bound  by  the  letter 
of  the  law,  vi.  14. 


Magnesia,  in  Asia,  given  to  Themi- 
stocles  by  the  king,  i.  138  fin.; 
Astyochus  goes  to  Tissaphernes 
and  Alcibiades  at  Magnesia,  viii. 
50  med. 

Magnesians,  dependents  of  Thes- 
salians,  ii.  101  med. 

Malea,  Cape,  in  Lesbos,  iii.  4  fin., 
6  fin. 

Malea,  Cape,  in  Laconia,  iv.  53 
med.,  54  init.,  viii.  39  med. 

Malian  Gulf,  the,  iii.  96  fin.,  viii. 
3  init.;  darters  and  slingers  from 
the  Malian  Gulf,  iv.  100  init. 

Malians,  iii.  92  init.,  v.  51  init. 

Maloeis,  Apollo,  festival  of,  at  Mity- 
lene,  iii.  3  med. 

Mantinea,  defeat  of  Mantinean 
troops  sent  by  the  Lacedaemo- 
nians into  Acarnania,  iii.  107, 
108;  they  escape  by  a  secret 
treaty  with  Demosthenes,  ib.  109, 
in  ;  the  Martineans  fight  with 
the  Tegeans,  iv.  134  [cp.  v.  65 
med.] ;  conquer  a  part  of  Arcadia, 
v.  29  init.;  secede  from  the  Lace- 
daemonian to  the  Argive  alliance, 
ib.\  driven  from  Parrhasia  by  the 
Lacedaemonians,  ib.  33  ;  send,  at 
Alcibiades'  bidding,  an  embassy 
to  Athens,  ib.  43  fin.,  44  ;  make  an 
alliance  with  Athens,  ib.  46,  47 
[cp.  ib.  105  med.];  send  a  guard 
to  the  Olympic  games,  ib.  50 
med.;  conference  between  the 
Argive  allies  at  Mantinea,  ib.  55 
init.;  the  Mantineans  aid  the 
Argives  when  invaded  by  the 
Lacedaemonians,  ib.  58  init.; 
compel  the  Argives  to  break 
their  truce  with  the  Lacedaemo- 
nians, ib.  61,62  ;  their  territory 
invaded  by  the  Lacedaemonians, 
ib.  64  fin.,  65  ;  battle  of  Mantinea, 
ib.  66-74  5  one  °f  tne  greatest  of 
Hellenic  battles,  ib.  74  init.; 
its  moral  effect,  ib.  75  init.;  the 
Mantineans  invade  Epidaurus 
with  their  allies,  ib.  fin.;  frequent 
violations  of  the  Treaty  of  Peace 
in  the  Mantinean  and  Epidaurian 
wars,  z#.  26  med.;  the  Mantinean 
alliance  renounced  by  the  Ar- 
gives, ib.  78  ;  the  Mantineans  are 
compelled  to  come  to  terms  with 


X   X   2 


INDEX. 


the  Lacedaemonians,  ib.  81  ink.; 
induced  by  Alcibiades,  join  the 

.  Athenian  expedition  against  Syra- 
cuse, vi.  29  med.,  43  fin.,  61  med., 
67  init.,  68  init;  the  Mantinean 

-:  troops  before  Syracuse  mercen- 
aries, vii.  57  fin. 

JMarathon,  battle  of,  i.  18  med.;  the 
Athenians  boast  that  they  fought 
alone  there,  ib.  73  fin.;  the  dead 
buried  on  the  field,  ii.  34  med.; 
Hippias  at  Marathon,  vi.  59  fin. 

Marathussa,  an  island  off  Clazo- 
menae,  viii.  31  fin. 

Mareia,  in  Egypt,  i.  104  init. 

Marriage,  questions  about  marriage 
occasion  a  war  between  Selinus 
and  Egesta,  vi.  6  init.;  marri- 
ages between  the  nobles  and  the 
people  forbidden  at  Samos,  viii. 
21  fin.;  the  water  of  the  fountain 
Callirrhoe  used  at  Athens  in 
marriage  rites,  ii.  15  fin. 

Massalia,  colonised  by  the  Pho- 
caeans,  i.  13  fin. 

Mecyberna,  in  Chalcidice,  provision 
respecting,  in  the  Treaty  of 
Peace,  v.  18,  vii ;  captured  by  the 
Olynthians,  ib.  39  init. 

Medeon,  in  Acarnania,  iii.  106  med. 

Medes,  part  of  the  garrison  of  the 
White  Castle  in  Memphis,  i.  104 
fin. ;  in  Pausanias'  body  guard,  ib. 
130  med.  [See  Persia,  and  War, 
The  Persian.] 

Megabates,  Persian  satrap  of  Das- 
cylium,  i.  129  init. 

Megabazus,  a  Persian,  ambassador 
to  Lacedaemon,  i.  109  init. 

Megabyzus,  son  of  Zopyrus,  a  Per- 
sian, reconquers  Egypt,  i.  109 
med.,  no. 

Megacles,  father  of  Onasimus,  a 
Sicyonian,  iv.  119  med. 

Megara,  Theagenes,  tyrant  of  Me- 
gara  [B.C.  620?],  i.  126  init.;  the 
Megarians,  pressed  in  war  by 
the  Corinthians,  revolt  from  Lace- 
daemon  to  Athens,  ib.  103  fin.; 
the  Athenians  build  the  Long 
Walls  of  Megara,  ib.\  Megara 
is  invaded  by  the  Corinthians, 
ib.  105  med.;  the  Megarian 
territory  ravaged  by  the  Lace- 
daemonians, ib.  1 08  init.;  the 


Megarians  revolt  from  Athens, 
ib.  114  init.;  furnish  aid  to  Co- 
rinth against  Corcyra,  ib.  27 
med.,  46  init.,  48  fin.;  are  ex- 
cluded by  the  Athenians  from 
their  harbours  ib.  67  fin.  [cp.  ante 
42  -fin];  complain  against  the 
Athenians  at  Sparta,  ib. ;  the  La- 
cedaemonians require  the  Athe- 
nians to  remove  this  restriction, 
ib.  139  init.;  the  Athenians  bring 
counter  charges  against  the  Me- 
garians, ib.  med.;  the  Megarians 
furnish  the  Lacedaemonians  with 
ships,  ii.  9  init.;  the  Athenians 
invade  Megara,  ib.  31  ;  do  this 
yearly  until  the  capture  of  Ni- 
saea,  ib.  [cp.  iv.  66  init.]  ;  some 
Megarians  suggest  to  Brasidas 
an  attack  on  the  Piraeus,  ii.  93, 
94  ;  Minoa,  the  island  in  front 
of  Megara,  is  captured  by  the 

'  Athenians,  iii.  51  ;  the  Megarian 
exiles  sheltered  for  a  year  by  the 
Thebans  at  Plataea,  ib.  68  med.; 
the  popular  leaders  at  Megara 
attempt  to  bring  in  the  Athe- 
nians, iv.  66,  67 ;  the  Athenians 
capture  the  Long  Walls  and  Ni- 
saea,  ib.  68,  69  ;  Megara  saved 
by  Brasidas,  ib.  70-73  ;  he  is  re- 
ceived into  the  city,  ib.  73  fin.; 
the  exiles  recalled,  ib.  74  ;  their 
cruel  revenge,  ib.\  long  duration 
of  the  oligarchical  government 
at  Megara,  ib.  fin.;  the  Mega- 
rians reinforce  the  Boeotians 
after  Delium,  ib.ioo  init;  assent 
to  the  one  year's  truce,  ib.  119 
med.;  dissatisfied  with  the  treaty 
between  the  Lacedaemonians 
and  Athenians,  v.  17  fin.;  refuse 
to  join  the  Argive  alliance,  ib.  3 1 
fin.;  act  with  the  Boeotians,  id. 
38  init.;  aid  the  Lacedaemo- 
nians in  the  invasion  of  Argos, 
ib.  58  fin.,  59  med.,  60  med.; 
Megarian  exiles  accompany  the 
Athenians  to  Sicily,  vi.  43  fin., 
vii.  57  med.;  the  Megarians  fur- 
nish ships  to  the  Lacedaemo- 
nians, viii.  3  fin.,  33  init. 

Megara,  in  Sicily,  founded  from 
Thapsus,  mother  city  of  Selinus, 
vi.  4  init.;  depopulated  by  Gelo, 


/  A"  D  E  X. 


#.,  $.94  init.;  Lamachus  wishes  to 
make  Megarathe  Athenian  naval 
station,  ib,  49  fin.;  fortified  by  the 
Syracusans,  ib.  75  init.;  its  lands 
ravaged  by  the  Athenians,  ib.  94 
init.;  the  Athenians  capture  a 
Syracusan  ship  off  Megara,  vii. 
25  init.; — Megarian  colonies  in 
Sicily,  vi.  4  init;  Chalcedon,  a 
Megarian  colony,  iv.  75  fin. 

Meiciades,  a  Corcyraean  com- 
mander, i.  47  init. 

Meidius,  a  river  near  Abydos,  viii. 
106  init. 

Melaeans,  a  people  in  Italy,  colo- 
nists of  the  Locrians,  v.  5  fin. 

Melancridas,  a  Spartan  admiral, 
viii.  6  fin. 

Melanopus,  father  of  Laches,  an 
Athenian,  iii.  86  init. 

Melanthus,  a  Lacedaemonian  com- 
mander, viii.  4  med. 

Meleas,  a  Lacedaemonian  com- 
mander, iii.  5  med. 

Melesander,  an  Athenian  com- 
mander, sent  to  levy  money  in 
Lycia  and  Caria,  ii.  69  med. 

Melesias,  an  envoy  from  the  Four 
Hundred  to  Sparta,  viii.  86 
fin. 

Melesippus,  a  Lacedaemonian,  sent 
to  Athens  with  the  final  demands 
of  the  Lacedaemonians,  i.  139 
med.;  sent  by  Archidamus  to 
Athens,  ii.  12  ;  words  of,  on 
quitting  Attica,  ib.  fin. 

Melitia,  in  Achaea  Phthiotis,  iv.  78 
init.  and  fin. 

Melos,  one  of  the  Cyclades,  ii.  9 
fin.;  a  colony  of  the  Lacedae- 
monians, v.  84  med.;  hostile  to 
the  Athenians,  iii.  91  init.;  rav- 
aged by  the  Athenians,  ib. ;  again 
attacked  by  the  Athenians,  v.  84 
fin.;  conference  of  the  Melians 
with  the  Athenians,  ib.  85-113. 
Melos  blockaded  by  the  Athe- 
nians, ib.  114,  115  fin.,  116  med.; 
captured,  ib.  116  fin.;  fate  of 
the  citizens,  ib. ;  capture  of  three 
Athenian  ships  off  Melos,  viii. 
39  fin.,  41  fin. 

Memphis,  attacked  by  the  Athe- 
nians, i.  104  med.;  captured  by 
the  Persians,  ib.  109  fin. 


Menander,  an  Athenian  com- 
mander in  Sicily,  vii.  16  init.; 
commands  under  Demosthenes 
in  the  attack  on  Epipolae,  ib. 
43  med.;  and  in  the  last  sea 
fight,  ib.  69  fin. 

Menas,  a  Lacedaemonian,  swears 
to  the  Treaty  of  Peace  and  the 
Alliance,  v.  19  med.,  24  init.; 
goes  as  envoy  to  Chalcidice, 
ib.  21. 

Mende,  an  Eretrian  colony,  iv.  123 
init.;  mother  city  of  Eion  in 
Chalcidice,  ib.  7  ;  revolts  to  Bra- 
sidas,  ib.  121  fin.,  123  init.;  the 
Mendaeans  repulse  the  Athe- 
nians, ib.  129  ;  the  city  is  taken 
by  the  Athenians,  ib.  130  ;  the 
Peloponnesian  garrison  escapes 
to  Scione,  ib.  131  fin. 
Mendesian  mouth  of  the  Nile,  i. 
,  no  fin. 

Menecolus,  joint  founder  with  Das- 
con  of  Camarina,  vi.  5  med. 
Menecrates,  a  Megarian,  swears  to 
the    one    year's    truce,    iv.    119 
med. 

Menedaeus,  a  Spartan  commander, 
iii.  loo  fin.;  deserts  his  Ambra- 
ciot  allies,  ib.  109,  in. 
Menippus,  father  of  Hippocles,  an 

Athenian,  viii.  13. 
Meno,  a  Thessalian  of  Pharsalus, 

ii.  22  fin. 

Mercenaries,  Arcadian,  iii.  34  init., 
vii.  19  med.,  58  med.  [cp.  ib.  48 
fin.],  [Mantineans],  iii.  109  med., 
vii.  57  fin.;  Aetolian,  vii.  57  fin.; 
Cretan,  vii.  57  fin.;  lapygian,  vii. 
33  med.,  57  fin.;  Peloponnesian, 
i.  60,  iv.  52  init.,  76  med.,  viii. 
28  fin.;  Thracian,  iv.  129  med.,  v. 
6  fin.,  vii.  27  init.,  29,  30.;  under 
Tissaphernes,  viii.  25  init. 
—  foreign  sailors  in  the  Athenian 
service,  i.  121  med.,  141  init.,  vii. 
13  med. 

Messapians,  an  Ozolian  Locrian 
tribe,  iii.  101  fin.;  an  lapygian 
tribe,  vii.  33  med. 
Messene,  in  Sicily,  originally  named 
Zancle,  vi.  4  fin.;  re-peopled  by 
Anaxilas,  ib.\  geographical  im- 
portance of,  iv.  I  ink.,  vi.  48  fin.; 
the  Messenians  come  to  terms 


6;8 


INDEX. 


with  the  Athenians,  iii.  90  fin.; 
revolt  from  Athens,  iv.  I  init.; 
Messen&  becomes  the  head- 
quarters of  the  Syracusans  in 
the  war  with  Rhegium,  ib.  24  ; 
the  Messenians  attack  and  are 
defeated  by  the  Naxians,  ib.  25 
med.;  quarrels  in  Messene,  v.  5 
init.;  the  Messenians  refuse  to 
receive  Alcibiades,  vi.  50  init.; 
attempt  to  betray  Messene  to 
the  Athenians  frustrated  by  Al- 
cibiades, ib.  74. 

Messenians  in  Peloponnesus,  old 
inhabitants  of  Laconia,  i.  101 
med.,  iv.  41  init.;  use  the  Doric 
dialect,  iii.  1 12  med.,  iv.  3  fin., 
41  init.;  settled  by  the  Athenians 
at  Naupactus,  i.  103,  ii.  9  med.; 
accompany  the  Athenians  on  an 
expedition  round  Peloponnesus,  ii. 
25 fin.;  aid Phormio  at  Naupactus, 
ib.  90  ;  serve  under  Phormio  in 
Acarnania,  ib.  102  init.;  under  Ni- 
costratus  at  Corcyra,  iii.  75  init,, 
8 1  init.;  persuade  Demosthenes 
to  attack  Aetolia,  ib.  94-98  ;  serve 
under  Demosthenes  at  Olpae,  ib. 
107  init.,  108  med.,  112  med.;  De- 
mosthenes wishes  to  settle  them 
at  Pylos,  iv.  3  fin.;  a  Messenian 
privateer  joins  him  there,  ib.  9 
med.;  the  Messenians  assist  in 
the  capture  of  Sphacteria,  ib.  32 
med. ;  stratagem  of  their  general, 
ib.  36  ;  garrison  Pylos,  ib.  41  init.; 
withdrawn,  v.  35  fin.;  replaced, 
ib.  56  ;  taken  by  the  Athenians 
to  Syracuse,  vii.  57  med.  [cp.  ib. 
31.]  [Compare  Helots.] 

Metagenes,  a  Lacedaemonian, 
swears  to  the  Fifty  Years'  Peace 
and  the  Alliance,  v.  19  med.;  ib. 
24  init. 

Metapontium,  in  Italy,  allied  to  the 
Athenians,  vii.  33  med.;  lends  aid 
against  Syracuse,  #.,  ib.  57  fin. 

Methone,  between  Epidaurus  and 
Troezen,  iv.  45  ;  ordered  to 
be  restored  under  treaty,  v.  18, 
viii. 

Methone,  in  Macedonia,  vi.  7  fin.; 
Methonaean  light-armed  troops 
under  Nicias  at  Mende,  iv.  129  fin. 

Methone,  in  Laconia,  ii.  25  init. 


Methydrium,  in  Arcadia,  v.  58  init. 

Methymna,  colonised  from  Boeotia, 
vii.  57  med.;  opposite  Harmatus, 
viii.  1 01  fin.;  the  Methymnaeans 
independent  allies  of  Athens,  iii. 
50  med.,  vi.  85  med.,  vii.  57 
med.;  refuse  to  join  in  the  re- 
volt of  Lesbos,  iii.  2  init.,  5  init.; 
defeated  in  an  attack  on  Antissa, 
ib.  1 8  med.;  revolt  from  Athens, 
viii.  22  fin.;  re-conquered  by  the 
Athenians,  ib.  23  fin.;  Methym- 
naean  exiles  attempt- Methymna, 
viii.  loo  med.;  induce  Eresus  to 
revolt,  ib.  fin. 

Metics,  metic  hoplites  at  Athens, 
ii.  13  fin.,  31  fin.,  iv.  90  init; 
serve  in  the  fleet,  i.  143  init.,  iii. 
1 6  init.  [cp.  vii.  63  med.] 

Metropolis,  in  Acarnania,  iii.  107 
init. 

Might  before  right,  i.  77,  iii.  39  med. 

Migrations  in  ancient  Hellas,  i.  2, 12. 

Miletus,  situated  on  a  peninsula, 
viii.  25  fin.;  the  Milesians,  lo- 
nians,  and  tributaries  of  the 
Athenians,  vii.  57  init.;  quarrel 
with  the  Samians,  i.  115  init.;  the 
Athenians  defeat  the  Samians 
sailing  from  Miletus,  ib.  1 16  med. ; 
Milesian  hoplites  accompany  the 
Athenians  in  the  expedition 
against  Corinth,  iv.  42  init.;  aid 
in  the  capture  of  Cythera,  ib.  53, 
54;  the  Milesians,  at  Alcibiades' 
persuasion,  revolt  from  Athens, 
viii.  17;  defeated  by  the  Athe- 
nians, ib.  24  init.;  conquer  the 
Argive  allies  of  the  Athenians, 
but  forced  to  retreat  by  the  Athe- 
nians, ib.  25  [this  defeat  causes 
Alcibiades  to  fall  into  suspicion 
at  Sparta,  ib.  45  init.];  Alcibiades 
urges  the  Peloponnesian  fleet  to 
relieve  Miletus,  ib.  26  fin.;  the 
Athenians  retire  from  Miletus, 
ib.  27  fin.;  Philip  is  put  in  com- 
mand of  Miletus,  ib.  28  fin.;  Tis- 
saphernes  comes  there,  ib.  29 
init.;  a  division  of  the  Athenian 
army  watches  Miletus,  ib.  30 
med.;  Astyochus  assumes  com- 
mand of  the  fleet  at  Miletus,  ib. 
33  init.;  the  Peloponnesians  at 
Miletus,  ib.  35,  36,  39;  Astyochus 


INDEX. 


679 


leaves  Miletus,  ib.  41;  Tissa- 
phernes  invites  the  Pelopon- 
nesians  to  Miletus,  ib.  57  init., 
60  fin.;  the  fleet  at  Miletus  offers 
battle  to  the  Athenians,  ib.  63 
init.;  discontent  of  the  Pelopon- 
nesian  sailors  at  Miletus,  ib.  78; 
the  Milesians,  acting  in  concert 
with  the  fleet,  offer  the  Athenians 
battle,  ib.  79;  the  Peloponnesians 
at  Miletus  send  a  fleet  to  the 
Hellespont,  ib.  80;  the  saijors  at 
Miletus  break  out  into  open  vio- 
lence against  Astyochus,  ib.  83, 
84  init.;  the  Milesians  expel  the 
Persian  garrison,  ib.  84  med.; 
resent  the  reproof  which  they  re- 
ceive from  Lichas,  ib.  fin.;  send 
envoys  to  Sparta  to  complain  of 
Astyochus,  ib.  85  init.,  fin.;  the 
Peloponnesian  fleet  leaves  Mile- 
tus for  the  Hellespont,  ib.  99, 
100  init.,  108  med. 

Miltiades,  the  great,  father  of  Ci- 
mon,  i.  98  init.,  100  init. 

Mimas,  Mount,  viii.  34  fin. 

Mindarus,  sent  from  Lacedaemon 
to  succeed  Astyochus,  viii.  85 
init.;  sails  to  the  Hellespont,  ib. 
99;  escapes  the  Athenian  watch, 
ib.  10 1 ;  captures  four  of  the 
Athenian  squadron  in  the  Helles- 
pont, ib.  102;  defeated  by  the 
Athenians  off  Cynossema,  ib.  104, 
105. 

Mines,  gold,  on  the  coast  opposite 
Thasos,  i.  100  med.,  iv.  105  init.; 
silver,  at  Laurium,  ii.  55,  vi.  91 
fin. 

Minoa,  an  island  off  Megara,  cap- 
tured by  Nicias,  iii.  51,  iv.  67 
init.;  retained  by  the  Athenians 
under  the  truce  for  a  year,  ib. 
1 1 8,  iii. 

Minos,  first  possessor  of  a  navy 
in  Hellas,  i.  4 ;  conquers  the 
Cyclades,  ib.\  expels  the  Carians, 
ib.\  puts  down  piracy,  ib.t  ib.  8 
med. 

Minyans,  the  Minyan  Orchomenus, 
iv.  76  med. 

Mitylene,  the  Mitylenaeans  revolt 
from  Athens,  iii.  2;  send  envoys 
to  Lacedaemon  and  Athens,  ib.  4; 
to  Sparta  again,  ib.  5  fin.;  the 


Athenians  blockade  Mitylen6  by 
sea,  ib.  6 ;  the  Mitylenaean 
envoys  attend  the  Olympic  festi- 
val at  the  bidding  of  the  Lace- 
daemonians, ib.  8;  their  speech, 
ib.  9-14;  the  Mitylenaeans  are 
taken  into  alliance  by  the  Lace- 
daemonians, ib.  15  init.;  unsuc- 
cessfully attack  Methymna,  ib. 
18  init.;  Mitylen£  is  blockaded 
by  land,  ib.  fin.;  Salaethus  is 
sent  from  Lacedaemon  to  Mity- 
lene, ib.  25;  Salaethus  arms  the 
people,  who  insist  on  surrender- 
ing the  city,  ib.  27,  28;  the  news 
reaching  the  Peloponnesian  fleet, 
Teutiaplus  advises  an  immediate 
attack  on  Mitylene,  ib.  29,  30 ; 
Paches  sends  Salaethus,  and 
the  most  guilty  of  the  Mity- 
lenaeans to  Athens,  ib.  35;  all 
the  grown  up  citizens  condemned 
to  death  by  the  Athenians,  ib.  36 
init.;  feeling  at  Athens  changes, 
ib.  fin.;  speech  of  Cleon  against 
the  recall  of  the  decree,  ib.  37- 
40;  of  Diodotus  in  favour  of  re- 
calling it,  ib.  41-48;  the 'decree 
is  recalled,  ib.  49  init.;  the  second 
ship  sent  to  stay  the  slaughter 
arrives  in  time  by  great  exertions, 
ib.  fin.;  the  captives  at  Athens 
put  to  death,  their  fleet  and  de- 
pendencies taken  away,  the  walls 
of  Mitylene  razed,  ib.  50;  Lesbian 
refugees  take  Rhoeteium  and 
Antandrus,  iv.  52;  driven  out 
again  by  the  Athenians,  ib.  75 
med.;  Mitylenk  revolts  a  second 
time,  viii.  22  fin.;  recaptured  by 
the  Athenians,  ib.  23  med.;  gar- 
risoned by  the  Athenians,  viii. 
loo  med. 

Molobrus,  father  of  Epitadas,  a 
Lacedaemonian,  iv.  8  fin. 

Molossians,  Admetus,  king  of  the 
Molossians,  shelters  Themisto- 
cles,  i.  136,  137;  the  Molossians 
assist  in  the  Lacedaemonian 
invasion  of  Acarnania,  ii.  80  fin. 

Molycreium,  a  Corinthian  colony, 
subject  to  Athens,  ii.  84  fin., 
iii.  102  init.;  taken  by  the  Pelo- 
ponnesians, iii.  102  init.;  the 
Molycreian  Rhium,  ii.  86  init. 


68o 


I  N  D  E  X. 


Morgantine,  handed  over  to  .the 
Camarinaeans,  iv.  65  init. 

Motya,  a  Phoenician  settlement  in 
Sicily,  vi.  2  fin. 

Munychia,  a  maritime  suburb  of 
Athens,  ii.  13  fin.;  Peripoli  sta- 
tioned at  Munychia,  viii.  92  med.; 
Dionysiac  Theatre  near,  ib.  93 
init. 

Mycale,  battle  of,  i.  89  init.;  Athe- 
nian and  Peloponnesian  fleets  at 
Mycale,  viii.  79. 

Mycalessus,  in  Boeotia,  vii.  29  init.; 
sacked  by  Thracians  in  Athe- 
nian pay,  ib.  29,  30. 

Mycenae,  kingdom  of,  i.  9;  the 
small  remains  of  Mycenae  do 
not  disprove  its  former  greatness, 
ib.  10. 

Myconus,  one  of  the  Cyclades,  iii. 
29  med. 

Mygdonia,  part  of,  assigned  to  the 
Chalcidians  by  Perdiccas,  i.  58 
fin.;  once  inhabited  by  the  Edo- 
nians,  ii.  99  med.;  ravaged  by 
Sitalces,  ib.  100  med. 

Myle,  a  town  of  Messene  in  Sicily, 
iii.  90  med.;  captured  by  the 
Athenians,  ib.  fin. 

Myletidae,  Syracusan  exiles,  take 
part  in  colonizing  Himera,  vi.  5 
init. 

Myoneans,  an  Ozolian  Locrian 
tribe,  iii.  101  med. 

Myonnesus,  near  Teos,  iii.  32  init. 

Myrcinus,  an  Edonian  town,  joins 
Brasidas,  iv.  107  fin.;  Myrcinian 
targeteers  at  the  battle  of  Am- 
phipolis,  v.  6  fin.;  Myrcinian 
cavalry  there,  ib.  10  fin.;  Cleon 
killed  by  a  Myrcinian  targeteer,z£. 

Myronides,  an  Athenian,  defeats 
the  Corinthians  in  Megaris,  i. 
105  fin.;  defeats  the  Boeotians 
at  Oenophyta,  ib.  108  med.  [cp. 
iv.  95  fin.] 

Myrrhine,  wife  of  Hippias,  the 
tyrant  of  Athens,  vi.  55  med. 

Myrtilus,  an  Athenian,  swears  to 
the  Treaty  of  Peace  and  the 
Alliance,  v.  19  fin.,  24  med. 

Myscon,  a  Syracusan  general,  viii. 
85  fin. 

Mysteries,  profanation  of  the  mys- 
teries at  Athens,  vi.  28  med.; 


Alcibiades  accused,  ib.\  supposed 
to  be  part  of  a  plot  against  the 
democracy,  ib.  fin.,  60  init.,  61 
init.;  Alcibiades  and  some  of  his 
comrades  summoned  home  from 
Sicily,  ib.  53  init.,  61  med. 
Myus,  a  city  in  Caria,  iii.  19  fin.; 
given  by  the  King  to  Themisto- 
cles,  i.  138  fin. 

N. 

Nature,  human,  '  always  ready  to 
transgress  the  laws,'  iii.  84  med.; 
'  prone  to  domineer  over  the  sub- 
servient,' iv.  6 1  med.,  v.  105  init.; 
prompts  men  to  accept  a  proffered 
empire,  i.  76  med.;  ever  credu- 
lous, ib.  20  ;  jealous,  ii.  35  fin.; 
changes  with  the  changes  of  for- 
tune, i.  84  init.,  140  init.,  ii.  61, 
iii.  39  med.,  iv.  17  fin.;  prone  to 
error,  iii.  45  init.,  iv.  18  init.; 
misled  in  its  judgments  by  hope, 
iii.  39  med.,  iv.  108  med.;  yields 
when  met  in  a  yielding  spirit,  iv. 
19  fin.;  inherent  vanity  of,  v.  68 
init.;  sameness  of,  i.  21  fin.,  76 
med.,  iii.  45  fin.,  82  init. 

Naucleides,  a  Plataean,  invites  the 
Thebans  to  Plataea,  ii.  2  med. 

Naucrates,  father  of  Damotimus, 
a  Sicyonian,  iv.  119  med. 

Naupactus,  settled  by  the  Helots 
from  Ithome,  i.  103  med.;  allied 
to  the  Athenians,  ii.  9  med.;  be- 
comes the  head-quarters  of  an 
Athenian  fleet,  ib.  69,  84  fin., 
92  fin.,  iii.  114  init.,  iv.  13 
med.;  the  Peloponnesians  hope 
to  take  it,  ii.  80  med.;  victory 
of  the  Athenians  off  Naupactus, 
ib.  83,  84  [cp.  iii.  78];  feigned 
attack  of  the  Peloponnesians 
upon,  ii.  90  init.;  second  victory 
of  the  Athenians  off,  ib.  91,  92  ; 
Phormio  makes  an  expedition 
from  Naupactus  into  Acarnania, 
ib.  1 02,  103  ;  Phormio's  son,  Aso- 
pius,  succeeds  him  at  Naupactus, 
iii.  7  ;  Nicostratus  sails  to  Cor- 
cyra  from  Naupactus,  ib.  75  init.; 
the  Messenians  of  Naupactusper- 
suade  Demosthenes  to  attack 
Aetolia,  ib.  94  fin. -98  ;  Demos- 


INDEX. 


681 


thenes  remains  at  Naupactus 
after  his  defeat,  ib.  98  fin.;  the 
Aetolians  persuade  the  Lacedae- 
monians to  make  an  expedition 
against  Naupactus,  ib.  100  ;  De- 
mosthenes, by  the  aid  of  the 
Acarnanians,  saves  the  place,  ib. 
102  ;  Athenian  ships  from  Nau- 
pactus come  to  Pylos,  iv.  13  med.; 
the  Messenians  of  Naupactus 
send  a  garrison  to  Pylos,  ib.  41 
init.;  the  Athenian  forces  at  Nau- 
pactus capture  Anactorium,  ib. 
49  ;  Demosthenes  comes  to  Nau- 
pactus to  aid  Hippocrates  in  the 
invasion  of  Boeotia,  ib.  76,  77  ; 
the  Corinthians  prepare  a  fleet 
to  attack  the  Athenians  at  Nau- 
pactus, vii.  17  fin.,  19  fin.;  De- 
mosthenes and  Eurymedon  send 
reinforcements,  ib.  31  med.;  in- 
decisive action  off  Naupactus,  ib. 
34;  the  Messenians  of  Naupactus 
send  a  force  to  Sicily,  ib.  31  init., 
57  med. 

Naval  Tactics :  unskilfulness  of 
ancient  tactics,  i.  49  init.  [cp.  vii. 
62];  Athenian  naval  tactics,  ii. 
83,  84,  89  med.,  91,  iii.  78,  vii.  36, 
49  med. 

Navy  :  Minos  the  first  possessor  of 
a  navy,  i.  4 ;  the  fleet  which 
carried  the  Hellenes  to  Troy, 
ib.  9  fin.,  10  med.;  the  early 
Hellenic  navies,  ib.  13, 14  [cp.  iii. 
104  init.];  progress  of  naval  in- 
vention, ib.  13  init.,  14  fin.  [see 
Ships];  importance  of  its  navy  to 
Athens,  ib.  93,  ii.  1 3  init.,vii.  66  init., 
viii.  66  [see  Athens];  the  greatest 
number  reached  by  the  Athenian 
navy,  iii.  17  init.;  composition  and 
number  of  the  Lacedaemonian 
fleet,  ii.  7  fin.,  viii.  3  fin.;  quick 
deterioration  of  ancient  navies, 
vii.  14  init. 

Naxos,  subjugated  by  the  Atheni- 
ans, i.  98  fin.;  Themistocles 
is  carried  to  Naxos  in  his  flight, 
and  narrowly  escapes  the  Athe- 
nians there,  ib.  137  init. 

Naxos  [in  Sicily],  founded  from 
Chalcis  by  Thucles,  vi.  3  init.; 
altar  of  Apollo  the  Founder  at, 
ib.\  the  Naxians  kinsmen  of  the 


Leontines,  vi.  20  med.;  defeat  the 
Messenians,  iv.  25  ;  receive  the 
Athenian  expedition,  vi.  50  med.; 
become  allies  of  Athens,  vii. 
14  med.,  ib.  57  fin.;  Naxos  is 
made  the  winter  quarters  of  the 
Athenians,  vi.  72  init.,  74  fin.,  75 
med. ;  they  abandon  it  for  Catana, 
ib.  88  med.;  the  Naxians  furnish 
the  Athenians  with  cavalry,  ib. 
98  init. 

Neapolis,  a  Carthaginian  factory  in 
Libya,  vii.  50  init. 

Neighbours  ever  enemies,  iv.  95 
med.  [cp.  v.  69  med.,  vi.  88  init.] 

Nemea,  in  Locris,  death  of  Hesiod 
at,  iii.  96  init.;  temple  of  Ne- 
mean  Zeus,  ib. 

Nemea,  in  Argolis,  v.  58-60. 

Neodamodes,  meaning  of  the  word, 
vii.  58  med.;  settled  with  the 
Helots  at  Lepreum,  v.  34  med.; 
Neodamodes  at  Mantinea,  ib.  67 
init.;  sent  to  Syracuse  with  the 
Helots  by  the  Lacedaemonians, 
vii.  19 med.,  58  med.;  three  hun- 
dred Neodamodes  sent  out  to 
Agis,  viii.  4  med. 

Nericum,  in  Leucas,  iii.  7  fin. 

Nestus,xa  river  in  Thrace,  ii.  96  fin. 

Nicanor,  a  Chaonian  leader,  ii.  Sofin. 

Nicasus,  a  Megarian,  swears  to  the 
one  year's  Truce,  iv.  119  med. 

Niceratus,  father  of  Nicias,  an 
Athenian,  iii.  51  init.,  91  init.,  iv. 
27  fin.,  42  init.,  53  init.,  119  fin., 
129  med.,  v.  16  init,  83  fin.,  vi. 
8  med. 

Niciades,  an  Athenian,  president 
at  the  passing  of  the  one  year's 
Truce,  iv.  118  fin. 

Nicias,  of  Gortys,  ii.  85  fin. 

Nicias,  father  of  Hagnon,  an  Athe- 
nian, ii.  58  init.,  iv.  102  med. 

Nicias,  his  religiousness,  vii.  77 
med.,  86  fin.;  his  superstitious 
temper,  ib.  50  fin.;  his  dilatori- 
ness,  ib.  42  med.;  his  ill  health, 
vi.  102  med.,  vii.  15  fin.,  77  init.; 
captures  Minoa,  iii.  51  init.;  rav- 
ages Melos,  ib.  91  init.;  defeats 
the  Tanagraeans,  ib.  fin.;  ravages 
Locris,  ib.;  yields  his  command 
at  Pylos  to  Cleon,  iv.  27,  28  ; 
leads  an  expedition  into  the  Co- 


682 


INDEX. 


rinthian  territory,  ib.  42-45  ;  cap- 
tures Cythera,  ib.  53,  54  ;  swears 
to  the  one  year's  Truce,  ib.  119 
fin.;  wounded  in  an  attempt  to 
take  Mende,  ib.  129;  his  anxiety 
for  peace,  v.  i6init.,  43  med.  [cp. 
vii.  86  med.];  swears  to  the 
Treaty  of  Peace  and  the  Alliance, 
v.  19  fin.,  24  med.;  goes  on  an 
unsuccessful  embassy  to  Sparta, 
ib.  46 ;  designed  for  the  command 
of  an  expedition  to  Chalcidice, 
which  Perdiccas  frustrates,  ib.  83 
fin.;  appointed  one  of  the  generals 
in  Sicily,  vi.  8  med.;  speech  of, 
ib.  9-14;  second  speech  of,  ib. 
20-23  5  gives  an  estimate  of  the 
forces  required,  ib.  25  ;  argues  in 
a  council  of  war  for  an  attack  on 
Selinus,  ib.  47;  goes  to  Egesta, 
ib.  62 ;  defeats  the  Syracusans, 
ib.  67-70 ;  saves  Epipolae,  ib.  102 ; 
becomes  sole  commander  after 
the  death  of  Lamachus,/^.  103  fin. ; 
negotiates  with  the  Syracusans, 
ib.  [cp.  vii.  48  init.,  ib.  49  init., 
ib.  73  fin.,  ib.  86  fin.] ;  fails  to 
prevent  the  coming  of  Gylippus, 
vii.  i,  2;  fortifies  Plemmyrium, 
ib.  4  med.;  defeated  by  the  Syra- 
cusans, ib.  6 ;  sends  a  despatch 
to  Athens,  ib.  8,  10,  11-15;  de- 
stroys by  an  ambush  the  Syra- 
cusan  reinforcements,  ib.  32  ;  left 
in  the  Athenian  lines  while  De- 
mosthenes attacks  Epipolae,  ib. 
43  med.;  swayed  by  information 
from  Syracuse  and  fear  of  public 
opinion  at  home,  he  refuses  to 
abandon  the  siege,  ib.  48,  49 ; 
yields  at  last,  ib.  50  med. ;  but,  an 
eclipse  of  the  moon  happening, 
decides  to  remain  thrice  nine 
days,  ib.  50  fin.;  exhorts  the  army 
before  the  battle  in  the  harbour, 
ib.  6 1  -64 ;  addresses  the  trierarchs, 
ib.  69;  endeavours  to  encourage 
his  retreating  soldiers,  ib.  76,  77  ; 
commands  one  division  in  the 
retreat,  ib.  78  init.  foil.;  overtaken 
and  compelled  to  surrender,  ib. 
83-85  ;  put  to  death  by  the  Syra- 
cusans, ib.  86. 

Nicolaus,   a   Lacedaemonian    am- 
bassador to  Persia,  ii.  67  init. 


Nicomachus,  a  Phocian,  betrays  to 
the  Lacedaemonians  the  Athe- 
nian plan  for  the  conquest  of 
Boeotia,  iv.  89  init. 

Nicomedes,  a  Lacedaemonian, 
general  in  place  of  King  Pleis- 
toanax,  i.  107  init. 

Nicon,  a  Boeotian,  commands  the 
reinforcements  to  Syracuse,  vii. 
19  med. 

Niconidas,  a  Thessalian,  escorts 
Brasidas  through  Thessaly,  iv. 
78  init. 

Nicostratus,  an  Athenian  general, 
sails  to  Corcyra,  iii.  75;  becomes 
the  colleague  of  Nicias,  iv.  53 
init.;  assists  in  the  capture  of 
Cythera,  ib.  53,  54 ;  of  Mende,  ib. 
129,  130  ;  and  in  the  blockade  of 
Scione,  ib.  131;  swears  to  the  one 
year's  Truce,  ib.  119  fin.;  brings 
with  Laches  an  expedition  to  Ar- 
gos,  v.  6 1  init.;  falls  in  the  battle 
of  Mantinea,  ib.  74  fin. 

Nightingale,  called  by  the  Poets 
the  *  Daulian  Bird,'  ii.  29  init. 

Nile,  i.  104  med.,  no  fin. 

Nine  Ways,  old  name  of  Amphi- 
polis,  i.  loo  fin.,  iv.  102  med. 

Nisaea,  the  harbour  of  Megara,  ii. 
93  init.,  iv.  66  fin. ;  connected  with 
the  city  by  the  Long  Walls,  i.  103 
fin.;  occupied  by  the  Athenians, 
ib.)  ib.  1 14  init. ;  restored  under  the 
thirty  years'  Peace,  ib.  115  init.; 
Cleon  demands  its  surrender  with 
other  places  after*  the  blocade  of 
Sphacteria,  iv.  21  fin.;  garrisoned 
by  Peloponnesian  forces,  ib.  66 
fin.;  captured  by  the  Athenians, 
ib.  69 ;  Brasidas  arrives  too  late 
to  save  it,  ib.  70  fin.;  cavalry  en- 
gagement before  Nisaea,  ib.  72 
fin.;  the  Athenians  at  Nisaea  re- 
fuse battle  with  Brasidas,  ib.  73 
[cp.  Brasidas'  account,  ib.  85  fin., 
1 08  med.]  ;  not  given  up  under 
the  treaty,  v.  17  med. 

Nisus,  Temple  of,  at  Nisaea,  iv. 
118,  iii. 

Nomothetae,  reappointed  at  Athens 
after  the  deposition  of  the  Four 
Hundred,  viii.  97  med. 

Notium,  seditions  there,  Paches 
gains  the  city  by  a  trick,  iii.  34 ; 


INDEX. 


683 


handed  over  to  the  Colophonians 
by  the  Athenians,  ib.  fin. 
Nymphodorus,  of  Abdera,  ne- 
gotiates an  alliance  between  his 
brother-in-law  Sitalces  and  the 
Athenians,  ii.  29. 


O. 


Obols,  Aeginetan,  v.  47,  iv. 

Ocytus,  father  of  Aeneas,  a  Corin- 
thian, iv.  119  med. 

Odomantians,  a  people  in  Thrace, 
ii.  101  med.;  Polles,  their  king,  v. 
6  init. 

Odrysians,  a  people  in  Thrace, 
their  empire  founded  by  Teres, 
ii.  29  init.;  Sitalces,  their  king, 
becomes  the  ally  of  the  Atheni- 
ans, ib.  fin. ;  his  campaign  against 
Perdiccas,  ib.  95,  98-101;  the 
greatness  and  wealth  of  his  king- 
dom, ib.  96,  97. 

Odysseus,  his  passage  through 
Charybdis,  iv.  24  fin. 

Oeantheans,  an  Ozolian  Locrian 
tribe,  iii.  101  fin. 

Oeneon,  a  town  in  Ozolian  Locris, 
iii.  95  fin.,  98  fin.,  102  init. 

Oeniadae,  in  Acarnania,  its  situa- 
tion, ii.  102  init.;  hostile  to  the 
Athenians,  ib.  82,  102  init.,  iii. 
94  init.;  besieged  by  Pericles, 
i.  in  fin.;  attacked  by  Asopius, 
iii..  7  med.;  the  fugitives  from 
Olpae  find  refuge  there,  ib.  114 
med.;  compelled  to  enter  the 
Athenian  alliance,  iv.  77  fin. 

Oenoe,  an  Athenian  fort  on  the 
Boeotian  frontier,  ii.  18  init.;  un- 
successfully attacked  by  the  Lace- 
daemonians, ib.  19  init.;  besieged 
by  the  Corinthians,  viii.  98  ;  be- 
trayed to  the  Boeotians  by  Aris- 
tarchus,  ib. 

Oenophyta,  battle  of,  i.  108  med. 
[cp.  iv.  95  fin.] 

Oenussae,  islands  before  Chios, 
viii.  24  init. 

Oesyme,  in  Thrace,  a  Thasian 
colony,  revolts  from  Athens,  iv. 
107  fin. 

Oetaeans,  a  people  in  Thessaly,  iii. 
92  init.,  viii.  3  init. 

Oligarchy,  oligarchies  quickly  fall 


a  victim  to  private  ambition,  viii. 
89  fin.;  their  cruelty  and  un- 
scrupulousness,  ib.  48  fin.;  their 
selfishness,  vi.  39  fin.;  the  oli- 
garchies everywhere  hostile  to 
Athens,  i.  19  init.,  76  init.,  144 
med.,  iii.  47  med.,  82  init. 

Olophyxus,  in  Acte,  iv.  109  med. 

Olorus,  father  of  Thucydides,  iv. 

104  fin. 

Olpae,  a  hill  fort  in  Acarnania,  iii. 

105  init.;  battle  of  Olpae,  ib.  106- 
109 ;    the   Peloponnesians    steal 
away  from   Olpae    under   truce 
with    Demosthenes,   ib.  in;  de- 
struction of  the  Ambraciot  rein- 
forcements on  the  way  to  Olpae, 
ib.  1 10, 112,  113. 

Olpaeans,  a  people  in  Locris,  iii. 
101  fin. 

Olympia,  treasury  at,  i.  121  med., 
143  init.; — the  Mitylenaean  en- 
voys meet  the  allies  in  council 
at  Olympia,  iii.  8  ;  treaties  in- 
scribed on  pillars  there,  v.  18,  xi; 
47  fin.; — games  at  Olympia,  i. 
126  init.,  iii.  8,  v.  49,  50;  the 
treaty  between  Athens  and  Argos 
ordered  to '  be  renewed  thirty 
days  before  the  festival,  v.  47  fin.; 
exclusion  of  the  Lacedaemonians 
by  the  Eleans,  ib.  49.; — Olympic 
victors  :  Cylon,  i.  126  init.;  Do- 
rieus,  iii.  8  ;  Androsthenes,  v.  49 
init.;  Lichas,  ib.  50  med.;  — 
Olympic  Truce,  ib.  49  med.; — 
Olympian  Zeus,  ib.  31  med.,  50 
init. 

Olympieum,  temple  at  Syracuse, 
vi.  64  med.,  65  fin.,  70  fin.,  75 
init.,  vii.  4  fin.,  37,  42  fin. 

Olympus,  Mount,  between  Thessaly 
and  Macedonia,  iv.  78  fin. 

Olynthus,  in  Chalcidice,  its  situa- 
tion, i.  63  med.;  the  Chalcidians 
leave  their  towns  on  the  coast 
and  settle  at,/*.  58 fin.;  battle  of,/*. 
62,  63  ;  Olynthian  reinforcements 
decide  an  engagement  before 
Spartolus,  ii.  79  ;  Brasidas  sends 
the  women  and  children  from 
Mende  and  Scione  to  Olynthus, 
iv.  123  fin.;  the  Olynthians  ex- 
change prisoners  with  the  Athe- 
nians, v.  3  fin.;  provision  respect- 


684 


INDEX. 


ing  Olynthus  in  the  Treaty  of 
Peace,  ib.  18,  vi ;  the  Olynthians 
capture  Mecyberna,  ib.  39  init. 

Omens  eagerly  sought  for  at  the 
commencement  of  the  War,  ii.  8 
med. 

Onasimus,  a  Sicyonian,  swears  to 
the  one  year's  Truce,  iv.  1 19  med. 

Oneium,  Mount,  in  Corinthian  ter- 
ritory, iv.  44  med. 

Onetorides,  father  of  Diemporus,  a 
Theban,  ii.  2  med. 

Onomacles,  an  Athenian  com- 
mander, viii.  25  init.,  30  med. 

Ophioneans,  an  Aetolian  tribe,  iii. 
94  fin.,  96  med.;  Tolophus,  an 
Ophionean,  ib.  100  init. 

Opici,  drove  the  Sicels  out  of  Italy, 
vi.  2  med.;  Opicia,  vi.  4  med. 

Opus,  in  Locris,  ii.  32. 

Oracle,  Delphian,  consulted  by  Cy- 
lon,  i.  126  init.;  by  the  Epidam- 
nians,  ib.  25  ink.;  by  the  Lace- 
daemonians before  beginning  the 
war,  ib.  118  fin.,  123  med.,  ii.  54 
med.;  before  colonizing  Heraclea, 
iii.  92  fin.;  orders  Pausanias  to 
be  buried  in  the  temple  of 
Athene,  i.  134  fin.;  provision  re- 
specting, in  the  one  year's  Truce, 
iv.  1 1 8,  i  ; — ancient  oracle  about 
the  suppliant  of  Ithomaean  Zeus, 
current  among  the  Lacedaemo- 
nians, i.  103  med.;  about  Alc- 
maeon,  ii.  102  fin.;  about  Hesiod, 
iii.  96  init.;  about  the  Pelasgian 
ground,  ii.  17  med.;  current  at 
Athens  during  the  plague,  ib.  54 
init.;  about  the  restoration  of 
Pleistoanax,  v.  16  med.;  about 
the  restoration  of  the  Delians, 
ib.  32  init.;  about  the  thrice  nine 
years,  current  at  the  beginning 
of  the  War,  ib.  26  fin.;  the  only 
one  justified  by  events,  ib.;  — 
oracles  recited  by  soothsayers 
and  diviners  at  the  beginning  of 
the  War,  ii.  8  med.,  21  fin.; — the 
oracles  helpless  in  the  plague, 
ib.  47  fin.;  often  the  ruin  of  those 
who  trust  them,  v.  103  fin. 

Orchomenus,  in  Arcadia,  besieged 
by  the  Argives  and  Athenians,  v. 
6 1  med.;  surrenders,  ib.  fin. 

Orchomenus,  in  Boeotia,  i.  1 13  init.; 


earthquakes  at,  iii.  87  fin.;  for- 
merly called  the  '  Minyan,'  iv. 
76  init.;  conspiracy  to  betray  the 
city  to  the  Athenians,  ib. 

Orestes,  exiled  son  of  a  Thessalian 
king,  i.  in  init. 

Orestheum,  in  Maenalia,  iv.  134 
med.,  v.  64  init. 

Orestians,  a  people  in  Epirus,  ii. 
80  fin. 

Oreus,  the  only  city  retained  by 
Athens  in  Euboea  after  the  second 
revolt,  viii.  95  fin. 

Orneae,  in  Argolis,  the  Orneatae  on 
the  Argive  side  at  Mantinea,  v. 
67  fin. ,72  fin., 74  med.;  the  Argive 
exiles  settled  at  Orneae,  vi.  7 
init.;  the  town  treacherously  cap- 
tured by  the  Argives,  ib.  med. 

Orobiae,  in  Euboea,  iii.  89  init. 

Oroedus,  king  of  the  Paravaeans, 
ii.  80  fin. 

Oropus,  subject  to  the  Athenians, 
ii.  23  fin.,  iii.  91  med.,  iv.  96  fin.; 
on  theAthenian  border,  i  v.  9 1  med., 
99  med.;  provisions  brought  from 
Euboea  to  Athens  through  Oro- 
pus, vii.  28  init.;  betrayed  to  the 
Boeotians,  viii.  60  init.;  a  Pelo- 
ponnesian  squadron  puts  in  at 
Oropus,  ib.  95. 

Ortygia,  the  first  city  of  Syracuse, 
vi.  3  med. 

Oscius,  a  river  in  Thrace,  ii.  96  fin. 

Ostracism  of  Themistocles,  i.  135  ; 
of  Hyperbolus,  viii.  73  init. 


P. 

Paches,  an  Athenian  commander, 
sent  with  reinforcements  to  Mity- 
lene,  iii.  18  fin.;  obtains  posses- 
sion of  the  city,  ib.  27,  28  ;  chases 
Alcidas  to  Patmos,  ib.  33  med.; 
captures  Notium  by  treachery, 
ib.  34  ;  reduces  Pyrrha  and  Ere-* 
sus,  ib.  35  init.;  sends  Salaethus 
captive'  to  Athens  with  the  most 
guilty  of  the  Mitylenaeans,  ib.,  ib. 
50 init.;  receives  orders  to  put  to 
death  all  the  grown  up  citizens 
of  Mitylene,  ib.  36  ;  a  counter- 
mand reaches  him  in  time  to 
save  the  city,  ib.  49  fin. 

Paean,    confusion    occasioned     at 


INDEX. 


685 


Epipolae   by   the  Doric  Paeans 

of  the  Athenian  allies,  vii.  44  fin. 
Paeonians,  subjects  of  Sitalces,  ii. 

96  med.,  98  med. 
Pagondas,  one   of  the   Boeotarchs 

from   Thebes,    iv.   91  med.;    his 
.    speech   to  his   soldiers,   ib.  92  ; 

defeats  the  Athenians  at  Delium, 

ib.  93,  96. 
Palaereans,  in  Acarnania,  Sollium 

given  to  them  by  the  Athenians, 

ii.  30  init. 
Pale,  in  Cephallenia,  ii.  30  fin.;  the 

Palaeans  furnish  four  ships  to  the 

Corinthians,  i.  27  fin. 
Pallene,  peninsula  in  Chalcidice,  i. 

56  init.,  64,  iv.  116  ink.,  120  init., 
,    123  init,  129  init.;  its  isthmus,  i. 

64  init.,  iv.  1 20  med. 

Pamillus  colonizes  Selinus  from 
Megara  in  Sicily,  vi.  4  init. 

Pamphylia,  i.  100  init. 

Panactum,  an  Athenian  fortress  on 
the  Boeotian  border,  betrayed  to 
the  Boeotians,  v.  3  fin.;  ordered 
to  be  restored  under  the  Treaty 
of  Peace,  ib.  18,  viii ;  the  Lace- 
daemonians promise  to  get  it 
back  for  the  Athenians,  ib.  35 
fin.;  they  entreat  the  Boeotians 
to  give  it  up  to  them,  ib.  36  fin.; 
the  Boeotians  demolish  it,  ib.  39 
fin.,  42  init.;  rage  of  the  Athe- 
nians at  its  destruction,  ib.  42  fin.; 
the  Lacedaemonians  demand  Py- 
los  in  return  for  Panactum,  ib.  44 
fin.;  the  Athenians  request  the 
Lacedaemonians  to  rebuild  and 
restore  it,  ib.  46  med. 

Panaeans,  in  Thrace,  ii.  101  med. 

Panaerus,  a  friend  of  Brasidas  in 
Thessaly,  iv.  78  init. 

Panathenaea,  the  Great,  at  Athens, 
v.  47  fin.,  vi.  56  med.;  the  Pana- 
thenaic  procession,  i.  20  fin.,  vi. 

57  init. 

Pancratium,  Androsthenes  victor  in 

the,  at  Olympia,  v.  49  init. 
Pandion,  king  of  Athens,  ii.  29  init. 
Pangaeus,  Mount,  in  Thrace,  ii.  99 

med. 
Panic,  liability  of  great  armies  to 

panics,  iv.  125  init. 
Panormus,  in  Achaia,  ii.  86  med., 

92  init. 


Panormus,  in  Milesian  territory, 
viii.  24  init. 

Panormus,  in  Sicily,  a  Phoenician 
settlement,  vi.  2  fin. 

Pantacyas,  a  river  in  Sicily,  vi.  4  init. 

Paralians,  part  of  the  Malians,  iii. 
92  init. 

Paralus,  a  district  in  Attica,  ii.  55 
init. 

Paralus,  the  Athenian  sacred  vessel, 
"i-  33,  77  fin.;  the  crew  all  free- 
men and  ardent  enemies  of  oli- 
garchy, viii.  73  fin.;  assist  the 
democratic  revolution  at  Samos, 
ib.  ;  go  to  Athens,  and  are  ill 
received  by  the  oligarchs,  ib.  74  ; 
sent  to  cruise  off  Euboea,  ib.,  ib. 
86  fin.;  ordered  to  convey  ambas- 
sadors to  Sparta,  ib.  86  fin.;  mu- 
tiny and  give  up  the  ambassadors 
to  the  Argives,  ib.\  come  to  Sa- 
mos with  Argive  envoys,  ib. 

Paravaeans,  a  people  in  Epirus, 
ii.  80  fin. 

Parnassus,  Mount,  in  Phocis,  iii.  95 
init. 

Parnes,  Mount,  in  Attica,  ii.  23  init. 

Paros,  Thasos  a  Parian  colony,  iv. 
104  fin. 

Parrhasians,  in  Arcadia,  campaign 
of  the  Lacedaemonians  against, 

v.  33- 

Party  associations,  evil  of,  iii.  82 
med.;  party  spirit,  growth  of,  in 
Hellas,  ib.  fin. 

Pasitelidas,  a  Lacedaemonian,  made 
governor  of  Torone,  iv.  132  fin.; 
defeated  and  captured  by  the 
Athenians,  v.  3  med. 

Passions,  fatal  influence  of  the,  iii. 
45  med. 

Patmos,  iii.  33  med. 

Patrae,  in  Achaia,  ii.  83  med.,  84 
fin.,  v.  52  fin. 

Patrocles,  father  of  Tantalus,  a 
Lacedaemonian,  iv.  57  med. 

Pausanias,  guardian  of  Pleistar- 
chus,  i.  132  init.;  the  victor  of 
Plataea,  ii.  71  med.,  iii.  54  fin., 
58  med.,  68  init.;  takes  com- 
mand of  the  Hellenic  forces,  i.  94 ; 
captures  Byzantium,  ib.,  ib.  129 
med.;  becomes  unpopular,  ib.  95 
init.;  summoned  to  Sparta,  ib.} 
acquitted  of  conspiracy  with 


686 


INDEX. 


Persia,  #.,  ib.  128  init. ;  negotiates 
with  Xerxes,  ib.  128-130;  re- 
called to  Sparta  and  imprisoned, 
ib.  131  ;  intrigues  with  the  Helots, 
132  med.;  betrayed  by  his  servant, 
ib.  fin.,  133  ;  escapes  to  the  temple 
of  Athene,  z#.  134  init.;  is  starved 
to  death,  ib.  med.;  ordered  by 
the  Delphian  oracle  to  be  buried 
in  the  temple,  ib.  fin. 

Pausanias,  son  of  Pleistoanax,  king 
of  Sparta,  iii.  26  med. 

Pausanias,  a  Macedonian,  brother 
of  Derdas,  i.  61  fin.,cp.#.  59  fin. 

Pay  for  holding  office  abolished 
by  the  oligarchs  at  Athens,  viii. 
65  fin.,  67  fin.;  the  same  pro- 
vision adopted  in  the  new  con- 
stitution, ib.  97  med.;  pay  of  the 
Athenian  senate,  ib.  69  fin.; — 
pay  of  sailors  usually  half  a 
drachma,  viii.  29  init.,  45  init.; 
Tissaphernes  pays  a  drachma 
for  a  month,  ib.  29  init;  the 
double  rate  paid  to  the  sailors 
in  the  fleet  at  Potidaea  and  to 
those  engaged  in  the  Sicilian  ex- 
pedition, iii.  17  fin.,  vi.  31  med.;— 
pay  of  Athenian  heavy  armed,  iii. 
17  med ;  rates  of  pay  fixed  by  the 
treaty  between  Athens  and  Argos 
for  various  troops,  v.  47,  iv;  pay 
of  Thracian  mercenaries,  vii.  27 
init. 

Peace  of  five  years  between  Pelo- 
ponnesians  and  Athenians,  i.  112 
init.;  of  thirty  years  after  the 
recovery  of  Euboea,  ib.  67  med., 
87 fin.,  1 15  init.  146,  ii.  2  init.;  vio- 
lated by  the  attack  on  Plataea,  z'£.  7 
init.;  treaty  of  peace  and  alliance 
for  fifty  years  at  the  end  of  the 
first  ten  years  of  the  War,  v.  18; 
this  peace  only  nominal,  ib.  26; 
peace  and  alliance  for  one  hun- 
dred years  between  the  Acarna- 
nians  and  Ambraciots,  iii.  114 
med.;  treaty  of  peace  between 
Argos  and  Lacedaemon,  v.  77  ; 
treaty  of  alliance,  ib.  79;  the 
three  treaties  between  Lacedae- 
mon and  Persia,  viii.  17  fin.,  18, 
36,  37,  57  fin.,  58;  treaties  in- 
scribed on  columns,  v.  18,  xi ;  23, 
iv  ;  47  fin.,  56  med. 


Peace,  '  has  honours  and  glories  of 
her  own,'  iv.  62  init. 

Pedaritus,  a  Lacedaemonian,  sent 
from  Lacedaemon  as  governor 
of  Chios,  viii.  28  fin.;  arrives 
there,  ib.  32  med.;  refuses  to  aid 
Astyochus  in  the  revolt  of  Lesbos, 
ib.  fin.;  deceived  by  a  trick  of 
certain  Erythraean  prisoners,  ib. 
33  fin.;  alters  the  government  of 
Chios,  ib.  38  med.;  requests  the 
aid  of  Astyochus,  ib.  38  fin.,  40 
init.;  complains  to  Sparta  of  As- 
tyochus, 38  fin.;  falls  in  an  en- 
gagement before  Chios,  ib.  55 
fin. 

Pegae,  in  Megaris,  commands  the 
pass  over  Mount  Geraneia,  i. 
107  med.;  becomes  subject  to 
the  Athenians,  ib.  103  fin.,  in 
med.;  restored  under  the  thirty 
years'  peace,  ib.  115  init.;  de- 
manded with  other  places  by  the 
Athenians  after  the  blockade  of 
Sphacteria,  iv.  21  fin.;  occupied 
by  Megarian  exiles,  ib.  66  init., 
74  init.  (cp.  iii.  68  med.). 

Peiraeum,  a  harbour  in  the  Co- 
rinthian territory,  viii.  10  fin.,  1 1 
init.,  14  med.,  15  fin.,  20  init. 

Peiraeus,  fortified  by  Themistocles, 
i.  93;  the  circuit  of  Peiraeus  and 
Munychia  not  quite  seven  miles, 
ii.  13  fin.;  Peiraeus  inhabited  by 
the  refugees  from  Attica,  ib.  17 
fin.;  visited  by  the  plague,  ib.  48 
init.;  the  Lacedaemonian  com- 
manders plan  an  attack  on  the 
Peiraeus,  but  do  not  carry  it  out, 
*#•  93>  945  tne  Athenians  expect 
the  enemy  at  the  Peiraeus  after 
the  disaster  in  Sicily,  viii.  i  med.; 
Peiraeus  protected  from  attack 
by  the  army  at  Samos,  ib.  76 
med.;  the  army  at  Samos  want 
to  sail  to  the  Peiraeus,  ib.  82  init., 
86  med.;  the  oligarchs  fortify 
Eetioneia  in  order  to  secure  the 
Peiraeus,  ib.  90 ;  tumult  in  Pei- 
raeus, the  people  destroy  the 
fort,  ib.  92;  the  hoplites  in  Pei- 
raeus march  to  Athens,  ib.  93 
init. ;  a  Lacedaemonian  fleet  ap- 
pearing off  Salamis,  the  citizens 
rush  down  to  the  Peiraeus,  ib.  94; 


INDEX. 


687 


the  Athenians  expect  an  attack 
upon  the  Peiraeus  after  their  de- 
feat off  Euboea,  ib.  96  med.;  its 
final  capture  by  the  Lacedaemo- 
nians, v.  26  init. 

Peiraice\  ii.  23  fin. 

Peisander,  one  of  the  leading  oli- 
garchs at  Athens,  viii.  90  init.; 
sent  to  Athens  to  forward  the 
oligarchical  conspiracy,  ib.  49; 
gains  the  consent  of  the  people, 
^-  S3?  54 »  is  sent  to  negotiate 
with  Alcibiades  and  Tissa- 
phernes,  ib.  54  init.;  baffled  by 
Alcibiades,  ib.  56;  sent  home 
with  orders  to  put  down  demo- 
cracy in  the  cities,  ib.  64,  65  init.; 
proposes  to  substitute  a  govern- 
ment of  Four  Hundred  for  the 
democracy,  ib.  67 ;  breaks  up  the 
old  senate  and  installs  the  Four 
Hundred,  ib.  69,  70 ;  stirs  up  an 
oligarchical  revolution  at  Samos, 
ib.  73  init.;  retreats  to  Decelea  on 
the  dissolution  of  the  Four  Hun- 
dred, ib.  98  init. 

Peisistratidae,  moderate  character 
of  their  government,  vi.  54  med.; 
overthrown  by  the  Lacedae- 
monians, ib.  53  fin.,  59  fin. 

Peisistratus,  tyrant  of  Athens,  i.  20, 
vi.  53  fin.,  54;  his  purification  of 
Delos,  iii.  104  init. 

Peisistratus  [grandson  of  the  tyrant], 
vi.  54  fin. 

Peithias,  a  Corcyraean  popular 
leader  murdered  by  the  oli- 
garchs, iii.  70. 

Pelasgians,  most  widely  spread  of 
ancient  Hellenic  tribes,  i.  3  init.; 
the  Pelasgians  of  Acte,  iv.  109 
fin.;  the  '  Pelasgian  Ground'  at 
Athens,  ii.  17  med. 

Pele,  an  island  off  Clazomenae, 
viii.  31  fin. 

Pella,  in  Macedonia,  ii.  99  med., 
100  med. 

Pellene,  in  Achaea,  said  by  the 
Scionaeans  to  be  their  mother 
city,  iv.  1 20  init.;  the  Pellenaeans 
allies  of  Lacedaemonians,  ii.  9 
init.;  join  Lacedaemonians  in 
the  invasion  of  Argos,  v.  58  fin., 
59  med.,  60  med.;  furnish  Lace- 
daemonians with  ships,  viii.  3  fin.; 


lose  one  ship  in  the  battle  of  Cy- 
nossema,  ib.  106  med. 

Pellichus,  father  of  Aristaeus,  a 
Corinthian,  i.  29  init. 

Peloponnesus,  its  name  derived 
from  Pelops,  i.  9  init.;  frequent 
changes  of  its  ancient  inhabitants, 
ib.  2  med.;  its  conquest  by  the 
Heraclidae,  ib.  12  med.;  divided 
into  five  parts,  ib.  10  init.;  the 
greater  part  of  Sicily  and  Italy 
colonized  from  Peloponnesus,  ib. 
12  fin.  [cp.  vi.  77  med.];  all,  ex- 
cept Argos  and  Achaea,  included 
in  the  Lacedaemonian  alliance, 
ii.  9  init.;  the  plague  little  felt  in 
Peloponnesus,  ib.  54  fin.;  pro- 
visions respecting  the  Pelopon- 
nesian  cities  in  the  treaties 
between  Lacedaemon  and  Argos, 
v.  77,  v,  vi ;  79,  ii,  iv,  v,  vi;  em- 
ployment of  Peloponnesian  mer- 
cenaries, i.  60,  iii.  34  init.,  109 
med.,  iv.  52  init.,  76  med.,  vii. 
19  med.,  57  fin.,  58  med.  [cp. 
ib.  48  fin.],  viii.  28  fin.;  Pericles' 
account  of  the  Peloponnesian 
character,!.  141,142.  [For actions 
performed  under  Lacedaemonian 
leadership,  see  Lacedaemon.] 

Pelops,  gave  his  name  to  the  Pe- 
loponnesus, i.  9  init. 

Pelorus,  promontory  near  Messene 
in  Sicily,  iv.  25  init. 

Penalties,  increased  severity  of 
penalties  does  not  add  to  their 
effectiveness,  iii.  45. 

Pentecosties,  a  division  of  the 
Lacedaemonian  army,  v.  68. 

Politics,  in  politics,  as  in  the  arts, 
the  new  must  prevail  over  the 
old,  i.  71  init.;  general  interest  in 
politics  at  Athens,  ii.  40  init. 

Peparethus,  island  of,  earthquake 
there,  iii.  89  fin. 

Perdiccas,  king  of  Macedonia,  quar- 
rels with  the  Athenians,  i.  56,  57; 
sends  envoys  to  Sparta,  ib.  57 
med.;  persuades  the  Chalcidians 
to  revolt,  ib.  $7,  58;  assigns  the 
Chalcidians  part  of  Mygdonia, 
ib.  58  fin.;  reconciled  to  the 
Athenians,  ib.  61  med.;  deserts 
them,  ib.  62  init.,  63;  again  recon- 
ciled to  the  Athenians,  ii.  29  fin.; 


688 


INDEX. 


sends  assistance  to  the  Ambra- 
ciots,  ib.  80  fin.;  his  perfidy  to 
Shakes,  ib.  95  med.;  attacked 
by  Sitalces,  ib.  95-101;  gains 
over  Seuthes,  ib.  101  fin.;  mar- 
ries his  sister  to  Seuthes,  ib.\ 
invites  Brasidas,  iv.  79;  declared 
an  enemy  by  the  Athenians,  ib. 
82;  in  concert  with  Brasidas 
makes  war  upon  Arrhibaeus,  ib. 
83;  assists  Brasidas  at  Amphi- 
polis,  ib.  103  med.,  107  fin.;  Per- 
diccas  and  Brasidas  defeat  the 
Lyncestians,  ib,  124;  Perdiccas 
loses  his  army  by  a  panic,  ib.  125 
init.;  quarrels  with  Brasidas,  ib. 
i28fin.;joinsthe  Athenians,/^.  132 
init.;  Cleon  demands  reinforce- 
ments from  him,  v.  6  init.;  joins 

.  the  Lacedaemonian  and  Argive 
alliance,  ib.  80  med. ;  blockaded 
by  the  Athenians,  ib.  83  fin. ;  has 
his  territory  ravaged  by  the  Athe- 
nians, vi.  7  fin.;  aids  the  Athe- 
nians to  attack  Amphipolis,vii.  9. 

Pericleidas,  father  of  Athenaeus,  a 
Lacedaemonian,  iv.  119  init. 

Pericles,  the  Athenian  statesman, 
leads  an  expedition  to  Sicyon  and 
to  Oeniadae,  i.  in  fin.;  subdues 
Euboea,  ib.  114;  conquers  Samos, 
ib.  116,  117;  under  the  'curse  of 
the  Goddess,'  ib.  127  init.;  leader 
of  the  Athenian  state,  ib.  fin.; 
opposed  to  the  Lacedaemonians, 
ib.\  his  speech,  ib.  140-144;  the 
Athenians  follow  his  counsel,  ib. 
145,  ii.  12  init.;  he  promises  his 
lands  to  the  public  if  spared  by 
the  enemy,  ii.  13  init.;  his  advice 
to  the  Athenians,  ib.,  ib.  22  init.; 
the  Athenians  grow  angry  with 
him  when  the  Lacedaemonians 
appear  in  Attica,  ib.  21,  22;  he 
commands  in  the  invasion  of 
Megara,  ib.  31  init.;  his  funeral 
speech,  ib.  35-46;  commands  an 
expedition  round  Peloponnese, 
ib.  56  [cp.  vi.  31  init.];  blamed 
and  fined  by  the  Athenians,  ii. 
59,  65;  his  defence,  ib.  60-64; 
elected  general,  ib.  65  init.;  his 
death  and  eulogy,  ib.  65  med. 

Perieres,  one  of  the  founders  of 
Zancle,  vi.  4  fin. 


Perioeci,  the,  of  Thuria  and 
Aethaea  aid  the  Helots  to  re- 
volt, i.  101  init.;  the  Perioeci 
of  Elis  defeated  by  the  Athe- 
nians, ii.  25  fin.;  the  Lacedae- 
monian Perioeci  assist  in  the 
foundation  of  Heraclea,  iii.  92 
fin.;  present  at  the  attack  on 
Pylos,  iv.  8  init.;  the  Perioeci  of 
Cythera,  ib.  53  med.;  Phrynis, 
one  of  the  Perioeci,  sent  as  com- 
missioner to  Chios,  viii.  6  fin.; 
Chian  Perioeci,  ib.  22  fin. 

Peripoli,  at  Athens,  or  'frontier 
guard,'  iv.  67  init.,  viii.  92  med.; 
Phrynichus  assassinated  by  one 
of  them,  viii.  92  init. 

Perrhaebia,  in  Thessaly,  iv.  78 
fin. 

Persia,  visited  by  the  plague,  ii.  48 
init.;  Persians  prefer  giving  to 
receiving,  #.  97  med.;  Persian  ap- 
parel and  luxury  affected  by  Pau- 
sanias,  i.  130;  Persian  language 
learned  by  Themistocles,  ib.  138 
init.;  Persian  dispatches  written 
in  the  Assyrian  character,  iv.  50 
init.;  Persian  nobles  quartered 
at  Athens,  i.  89  fin.;  Persians 
form  part  of  the  garrison  in 
Memphis,  ib.  104  fin.;  Persian 
spoil  in  the  Acropolis  at  Athens, 
ii.  13  med.  [See  Kings,  Persian, 
Medes,  and  War,  The  Persian.] 

Perseus,  i.  9  med. 

Petra,  promontory  near  Rhegium, 
vii.  35  fin.  / 

Phacium,  in  Thessaly,  iv.  78  fin. 

Phaeacians,  their  ancient  naval  re- 
nown, i.  25  fin. 

Phaeax,  an  Athenian  envoy  in 
Sicily,  v.  4,  5. 

Phaedimus,  a  Lacedaemonian  en- 
voy, v.  42  init. 

Phaeinis,  priestess  of  Here  at  Ar- 
gos,  iv.  133  fin. 

Phaenippus,  an  Athenian,  registrar 
at  the  conclusion  of  the  one 
year's  Truce,  iv.  118  fin. 

Phagres,  in  Thrace,  ii.  99  med. 

Phalerum,  one  of  the  harbours  at 
Athens,  i.  107  init.,  ii.  13  fin.; 
Phaleric  Wall,  ib.,  ib. 

Phalius,  a  Corinthian,  the  founder 
of  Epidamnus,  i.  24  init. 


INDEX. 


689 


Phanae,  in  Chios,  viii.  24  med. 

Phanomachus,  an  Athenian,  com- 
mander at  Potidaea,  ii.  70  init. 

Phanoteus,  in  Phocis,  iv.  76  med., 
89  med. 

Pharax,  father  of  Styphon,  a  Lace- 
daemonian, iv.  38  init. 

Pharnabazus,  (i)  satrap  of  the  Hel- 
lespont, viii.  6  init.,  62  init.;  begs 
aid  from  Lacedaemon,  ib.  8  init., 
39  init.,  80  med.,  99  med.,  108 
med.,  109  init.;  (ii)  father  of 
Pharnaces,  ii.  67  med. 

Pharnaces,  three  Persians,  (i)  fa- 
ther of  Artabazus,  i.  129  init.; 
(ii)  son  of  Pharnabazus,  ii.  67 
med.;  settles  the  Delians  at 
Adramyttium,  v.  i  fin.  [cp.  viii. 
108  med.]  ;  (iii)  father  of  Phar- 
nabazus, satrap  of  the  Helles- 
pont, viii.  8  init.  [?  same  as  ii]. 

Pharnaces,  the  sons  of,  viii.  58 
init. 

Pharos,  in  Egypt,  i.  104  init. 

Pharsalus,  in  Thessaly,  attacked  by 
the  Athenians,  i.  in  init.;  sends 
aid  to  the  Athenians,  ii.  22  fin.; 
friends  of  Brasidas  there,  iv.  78 
init.;  Thucydides  of  Pharsalus, 
proxenus  of  Athens,  viii.  92  med. 

Phaselis,  in  Lycia,  ii.  69  fin.,  viii. 
88  fin.,  99  med.,  108  init. 

Pheia,  in  Elis,  vii.  31  init.;  cap- 
tured by  the  Messenians,  ii. 
25  med. 

Pheraeans,  in  Thessaly,  ii.  22  fin. 

Philemon,  father  of  Ameiniades,  an 
Athenian,  ii.  67  med. 

Philip,  a  Lacedaemonian,  governor 
of  Miletus,  viii.  28  fin.;  goes  to 
fetch  the  Phoenician  fleet  from 
Aspendus,  ib.  87  fin.,  99  med. 

Philip,  a  Macedonian,  brother  of 
Perdiccas,  i.  57  init.,  ii.  95  med.; 
father  of  Amyntas,  ii.  95  fin.,  100 
med.;  joins  with  the  Athenians, 
i.  57  init.,  59,  61  fin. 

Philocharidas,  a  Lacedaemonian, 
swears  to  the  one  year's  Truce, 
iv.  119  init.;  swears  to  the  Treaty 
of  Peace  and  the  Alliance,  v.  19 
med.,  24  init.;  commissioner  in 
Chalcidice,  ib.  21  ;  ambassador 
at  Athens,  ib.  44  fin. 

Philocrates,     an    Athenian     com- 


mander, brings  reinforcements 
to  Melos,  v.  116  fin. 

Philoctetes,  his  ships  the  smallest 
that  went  to  Troy,  i.  10  med. 

Philomela,  story  of,  ii.  29  init. 

Phlius,  in  Peloponnesus,  the  Corin- 
thians request  money  for  the 
expedition  against  Epidamnus 
from  the  Phliasians,  i.  27  fin.; 
Phliasian  troops  with  Brasidas 
at  Megara,  iv.  70  med.;  the 
priestess  Chrysis  flies  for  refuge 
to  Phlius,  ib.  133  fin.;  the  Lace- 
daemonian alliance  meets  at 
Phlius  for  the  invasion  of  Argos, 
v.  57;  the  whole  Phliasian  force 
takes  part  in  the  campaign,  ib. 
fin.,  58  med.,  59  med.,  60  med.; 
Phlius  three  times  invaded  by 
the  Argives,  ib.  83  med.,  1 1 5  init., 
vi.  105  fin. 

Phocaea,  in  Ionia,  viii.  31  fin.;  the 
Phocaeans  found  Massalia,  i.  13 
fin.;  conquer  the  Carthaginians 
at  sea,  ib. ;  Carteria,  in  Phocaean 
territory, viii.  101  med.;  Phocaean 
staters,  iv.  52  med. 

Phoceis,  part  of  Leontini,  v.  4 
med. 

Phocis,  formerly  inhabited  by  Thra- 
cians,  ii.  29  init.;  some  of  the 
Phocians  settle  in  Sicily  after 
the  Trojan  War,  vi.  2  init.;  the 
Phocians  attack  the  Dorians,  i. 
107  init.;  are  defeated,  ib.  med.; 
become  the  allies  of  the  Athe- 
nians, ib.  in  init.;  receive  the 
temple  of  Delphi  from  the  Athe- 
nians,/^. 1 12  fin.;  in  the  Lacedae- 
monian alliance  at  the  beginning 
of  the  War,  ii.  9  med.;  Demos- 
thenes intends  to  gain  them  over, 
iii.  95  med.;  the  Phocians  at  en- 
mity with  the  Locrians  of  Am- 
phissa,  ib.  101  init.;  certain  Pho- 
cians engage  in  the  Athenian  plan 
for  the  subjugation  of  Boeotia, 
iv.  76  med.;  a  Phocian,  Nico- 
machus,  betrays  the  plan,  ib.  89 
med.;  the  Phocians  go  to  war 
with  the  Locrians,  v.  32  init.;  are 
summoned  by  the  Lacedaemo- 
nians to  Mantinea,  ib.  64  med.; 
furnish  the  Lacedaemonians  with 
ships,  viii.  3  fin. 


690 


INDEX. 


Phoenicians,  the,  addicted  to  piracy, 
i.  8  init.;  their  colonization  of 
Sicily,  vi.  2  fin.  [cp.  ib.  46  med.]  ; 
services  of  their  fleet  under  the 
Persian  kings,  i.  16  fin.,  100  init., 
1 12  med.,  1 16  init.;  trade  between 
Attica  and  Phoenicia,  ii.  69 ; 
Tissaphernes  prepares  a  Phoe- 
nician fleet,  viii.  46  init.,  59  [cp. 
ib.  58,  iii,  iv]  ;  keeps  the  Pelopon- 
nesians  waiting  for  the  ships,  ib. 
46  fin.;  the  Peloponnesians  grow 
impatient,  ib.  78  ;  Alcibiades  pre- 
tends that  he  will  secure  the 
Phoenician  ships  for  the  Athe- 
nians, ib.  8 1,  88,  1 08 ;  Tissa- 
phernes goes  to  Aspendus  to 
fetch  the  Phoenician  ships  :  why 
did  he  not  bring  them  ?  ib.  87  ; 
the  Peloponnesians  abandon  all 
hope  of  the  Phoenician  fleet,  ib. 
99  init.;  Tissaphernes  deter- 
mines to  excuse  himself  to  the 
Peloponnesians  for  not  bringing 
up  the  ships,  ib.  109. 

Phoenicus,an  harbour  under  Mount 
Mimas,  viii.  34  fin. 

Phormio,  an  Athenian  commander, 
sent  to  Potidaea,  i.  64  med.,  ii. 
29  fin.;  ravages  Chalcidice,  i. 
65  fin.;  brings  reinforcements  to 
Samos,  ib.  117  med.;  aids  the 
Acarnanians,  ii.  68  fin.;  stations 
himself  at  Naupactus,  ib.  69  init., 
80  med.,  8 1  init.;  defeats  the  La- 
cedaemonians, ib.  83, 84 ;  asks  for 
reinforcements,  ib.  85  med. ;  his 
second  victory,  ib.  86-92 ;  his 
speech,  ib.  89  ;  leads  an  expe- 
dition into  Acarnania,  ii.  102  ; 
sails  back  to  Athens,  ib.  103. 

Photius,  a  Chaonian  leader,  ii. 
80  fin. 

Phrygia,  in  Attica,  ii.  22  med. 

Phrynichus,  an  Athenian  com- 
mander, brings  reinforcements 
from  Athens,  viii.  25  init.;  over- 
rules his  colleagues,  and  removes 
the  fleet  to  Samos,  ib.  27  ;  op- 
poses the  proposals  of  Alcibiades 
to  overthrow  the  democracy,  ib. 
48  med.;  outwits  him  when  he  at- 
tempts his  ruin,  ib.  50,  51  ;  de- 
posed from  his  command,  ib.  54 
med.;  takes  a  great  part  in  the 


oligarchical  conspiracy,  ib.  68 
med.,  90  init.;  sent  to  make  peace 
with  Lacedaemon,  ib.  90  med.; 
returns  unsuccessful,  ib.  91  init.; 
assassinated,  ib.  92  init;  his 
sagacious  temper,  ib.  27  fin.,  68 
med. 

Phrynis,  one  of  the  Lacedaemonian 
Perioeci,  goes  as  commissioner 
to  Chios,  viii.  6  med. 

Phthiotis,  see  Achaia  (Pthiotis). 

Phyleides,  father  of  Pythangelus, 
a  Theban,  ii.  2  med. 

Phyrcus,  fortress  in  Elis,  v.  49 
init. 

Physca,  in  Macedonia,  \\.  99  fin. 

Phytia,  in  Acarnania,  iii.  106  med. 

Pieria,  in  Macedonia,  ii.  99  med., 
100  med.;  'the  Pierian  Vale,'  ib. 
99  med. 

Pierium,  in  Thessaly,  v.  13  init. 

Pindus,  Mount,  in  Thessaly,  ii.  102 
init. 

Piracy,  honourable  in  ancient  Hel- 
las, i.  5  ;  put  down  by  Minos, 
ib.  4  fin. ;  by  the  Corinthians,  ib. 
13  fin. 

Pissuthnes,  a  Persian,  satrap  of 
Lower  Asia,  iii.  31  fin.;  aids 
the  Samians  to  revolt,  i.  115 
med.;  sends  assistance  to  the 
Persian  party  at  Notium,  iii. 
34  init. 

Pitanate  Division,  never  existed  at 
Lacedaemon,  i.  20  fin. 

Pittacus,  king  of  Edonia,  his  assas- 
sination, iv.  107  fin. 

Plague,  the,  at  Athens,  i.  23  med., 
ii.  47-52  ;  first  appeared  at  Lem- 
nos,  ii.  47  med.;  lawlessness 
caused  by  the  plague,  ib.  53  ; 
not  serious  in  the  Peloponnese, 
ib.  54  fin.;  breaks  out  at  Poti- 
daea, ib.  58  ;  second  outbreak  at 
Athens,  iii.  87. 

Plataea,  the  city  small,  ii.  77  init.; 
eight  miles  from  Thebes,  ib.  5 
init.;  conduct  of  the  Plataeans 
during  the  Persian  War,  iii.  54, 
55  ;  their  care  of  the  sepulchres 
of  the  fallen  at  Plataea,  ib.  58 
med.;  they  receive  their  inde- 
pendence from  Pausanias,  ii.  71 
med.;  send  assistance  to  Sparta 
during  the  Helot  revolt,  iii.  54 


INDEX. 


fin.;  their  hostility  to  Thebes, 
ii.  71  fin.,  iii.  55  init.,  57  med., 
58  init.,  59  med.,  61  ;  allied  to 
Athens,  ii.  73  fin.,  iii.  3  init., 
55  init.,  62,  63,  68  fin.;  attacked 
at  night  by  the  Thebans  in  time 
of  peace,  ii.  2,  iii.  65  [cp.  vii. 
1 8  med.]  ;  surrender,  ii.  3  init.; 
rally,  attack  and  defeat  them,  ib.\ 
kill  their  prisoners,  ib.  5  fin.,  6  ; 
receive  a  garrison  from  Athens, 
ib.  6  fin.;  their  territory  ravaged 
by  the  Boeotians,  ib.  12  fin.; 
Plataea  is  attacked  by  the  Lace- 
daemonians, ib.  70  init.;  the 
Plataeans protest,  z£. med.;  vainly 
negotiate  with  Archidamus,  ib. 
72-74 ;  baffle  the  enemy  by 
various  stratagems,  ib.  75-77  ; 
are  blockaded,  ib.  78 ;  part  of 
them  break  out  of  the  town,  iii. 
20-24  ;  reason  why  the  Lacedae- 
monians did  not  storm  Plataea, 
ib.  52  init.;  the  Plataeans  surren- 
der, ib.  med.;  their  speech  to  the 
Lacedaemonian  judges,  ib.  53-59  5 
they  are  put  to  death,  and  Pla- 
taea razed,  ib.  68;  the  Lacedae- 
monians do  this  in  order  to 
gratify  the  Thebans,  ib.  fin. ;  light- 
armed  Plataeans  serve  with  the 
Athenians  at  Megara,  iv.  67  ;  the 
Boeotians  collect  at  Plataea,  in- 
tending to  relieve  Megara,  ib.  72 
init.;  Plataea  not  given  up  under 
the  Treaty  of  Peace,  v.  17  med. 
[cp.  iii.  52  init.] ;  the  Athenians 
give  Scion&  to  the  Plataeans,  v. 
32  init.;  the  Plataeans  serve 
against  their  Boeotian  country- 
men at  Syracuse,  vii.  57  med. 

Plataea,  battle  of,  i.  130  init.,  iii. 
54  med.,  58  med. 

Pleistarchus,  king  of  Sparta,  Pau- 
sanias  his  guardian,  i.  132  init. 

Pleistoanax,  king  of  Lacedaemon, 
Nicomedes  his  guardian,  i.  107 
init.;  brother  of  Cleomenes,  fa- 
ther of  king  Pausanias,  iii.  26 
med.;  invades  Attica,  ib.  114 
med.;  accused  of  having  been 
bribed  to  retreat,  ii.  21  init.,  v. 
1 6  fin.;  said  to  have  tampered 
with  the  Delphian  oracle,  v.  16 
med.;  restored,  ib.\  anxious  for 


peace,  ib.\  swears  to  the  Alliance, 
ib.  24  init.;  leads  an  expedition 
against  the  Parrhasians,  ib.  33  ; 
leads  reinforcements  to  Agis,  but 
returns  when  the  victory  of  Man- 
tinea  is  reported,  ib.  75  init. 

Pleistolas,  Ephor  at  Lacedaemon, 
swears  to  the  Treaty  of  Peace 
and  the  Alliance,  v.  19  med.,  24 
init.,  25  init. 

Plemmyrium,  a  promontory  oppo- 
site Syracuse,  fortified  by  Nicias, 
vii.  4  med.;  captured  by  Gylip- 
pus,  ib.  22  init.,  23  init.;  garri- 
soned by  the  Syracusans,  ib.  24 
init.;  disastrous  consequences  to 
the  Athenians  from  its  loss,  ib. 
24,  36  fin.;  Eurymedon,  meeting 
Demosthenes  on  his  way,  reports 
its  capture,  ib.  31  med. 

Pleuron,  in  Aetolia,  iii.  102  fin. 

Pnyx,  place  where  the  Athenian  as- 
sembly met,  viii.  97  init. 

Poets,  untrustworthy  witnesses  to 
history,  i.  10  med.,  21  init.,  ii.  41 
med. 

Polemarchs,  magistrates  at  Man- 
tinea,  v.  47  fin.;  officers  in  the 
Lacedaemonian  army,  ib.  66  med. 

Polichne,  near  Clazomenae,  forti- 
tified  by  the  Clazomenians,  viii. 
14  fin.;  retaken  by  the  Athenians, 
ib.  23  fin. 

Polichnitae,  inhabitants  of  Polichne 
in  Crete,  ii.  85  fin. 

Polis,  in  Locris,  iii.  101  fin. 

Polles,  king  of  the  Odomantians, 
v.  6  init. 

Pollis,  an  Argive  who  went  to  the 
King,  ii.  67  init. 

Polyanthes,  a  Corinthian  com- 
mander, vii.  34  init. 

Polycrates,  tyrant  of  Samos,  had  a 
large  navy,  i.  13  fin.,  iii.  104  init.; 
dedicates  Rhenea  to  Apollo,  i. 
13  fin.,  iii.  104  init. 

Polydamidas,  a  Lacedaemonian,  iv. 
123  fin.;  defeats  the  Athenians 
at  Mende,  ib.  129  med.;  at- 
tacked by  the  Mendaeans,  ib.  130 
med. 

Polymedes,  of  Larissa,  ii.  22  fin. 

Pontus,  the  Lesbians  send  to  the 
Pontus  for  troops  and  supplies, 
iii.  2  init.;  Lamachus  sails  into 


Y  y  2 


692 


INDEX. 


the  Pontus,  iv.  75 ;  Chalcedon 
situated  at  its  mouth,  ib.  fin. 

Poseidon,  Temple  of,  at  Colonus, 
viii.  67  med.;  ships  dedicated  to 
him  after  a  victory,  ii.  84  fin., 
92  fin.;  at  Nisaea,  iv.  118,  iii ; 
on  coast  of  Pallene,  ib.  129  med.; 
at  Taenarus,  i.  128  init.,  133  init. 

Potamis,  a  Syracusan  general,  suc- 
ceeds Hermocrates  at  Miletus, 
viii.  85  med. 

Potidaea,  a  Corinthian  colony,  i.  56 
init.;  a  tributary  of  Athens,  #.; 
importance  of  its  situation,  iv.  120 
fin.;  the  Potidaeans  ordered  by 
the  Athenians  to  pull  down  their 
walls,  i.  56  med.,  57  fin.;  send 
embassies  to  Athens  and  Sparta  ; 
they  are  encouraged  by  the  Lace- 
daemonians and  revolt,  ib.  58, 
118  init.;  receive  aid  from 
Corinth,  ib.  60;  the  Athenians 
send  an  expedition  against  Po- 
tidaea, ib.  57  fin.,  61;  battle  of 
Potidaea,  ib.  62,  63 ;  Aristeus 
retreats  into  Potidaea,  ib.  63  init.; 
Potidaea  invested,  ib.  64  ;  Aris- 
teus leaves  Potidaea,  ib.  65  ;  the 
affair  causes  great  ill-feeling  be- 
tween Corinth  and  Athens,  ib.  66 ; 
the  Corinthians  complain  at  Spar- 
ta, ib.  67 ;  beg  assistance,  ib.  7 1 
med.;  Archidamus  urges  mode- 
ration, ib.  85 ;  the  Corinthians, 
anxious  to  save  Potidaea,  press 
on  the  war,  ib.  119,  124  init.;  the 
Lacedaemonians  bid  the  Atheni- 
ans quit  Potidaea,  ib.  139  init., 
140  med.;  Hagnon  brings  fresh 
troops  to  Potidaea ;  the  plague 
breaks  out  among  them,  ii.  58  ; 
Aristeus  endeavours  to  gain  Si- 
takes'  assistance  for  Potidaea,  ib. 
67  ;  Potidaea  surrenders,  ib.  70 ; 
is  colonized  by  the  Athenians, 
ib.  fin.;  expense  of  the  siege',  ii. 
13  med.,  70  med.,  iii.  17  med., 
vi.  31  init.;  three  thousand  Athe- 
nian troops  engaged  in  the  siege, 
ii.  31  med.;  the  Athenians  escape 
to  Potidaea  after  the  battle  of 
Spartolus,  ii.  79  fin.;  Brasidas 
plans  an  attack  on  Potidaea,  iv. 
121  fin.;  Nicias  starts  from  Po- 
tidaea against  Mende,  ib.  129 


med.;  Brasidas  unsuccessfully 
attempts  Potidaea,  ib.  135. 

Potidania,  in  Aetolia,  iii.  96  med. 

Poverty,  no  bar  to  success  and  no 
disgrace  at  Athens,  ii.  37  med., 
40  init.;  the  hope  natural  to 
poverty  of  one  day  becoming 
rich,  ib.  42  med. ; — poverty  of  an- 
tiquity, i.  ii. 

Prasiae,  in  Attica,  viii.  95  init. 

Prasiae,  in  Laconia,  destroyed  by 
the  Athenians,  ii.  56  fin.;  they 
ravage  its  territory,  vi.  105  fin., 
vii.  1 8  med. 

Priapus,  on  the  Propontis,  viii.  107 
init. 

Pride,  the  Nemesis  of,  vii.  77  med. 

Priene,  in  Ionia,  i.  115  init. 

Prisoners  of  War,  provision  respect- 
ing, in  the  Treaty  of  Peace,  v.  18, 
ix  (cp.  ib'.  3  fin.). 

Procles,  (i)  an  Athenian  com- 
mander, iii.  91  init.;  falls  in  the 
Aetolian  expedition,  ib.  98  fin.: 
(ii)  another,  swears  to  the  Treaty 
of  Peace  and  the  Alliance,  v.  19 
fin.,  ib.  24  med. 

Procne,  wife  of  Tereus,  the  Thracian 
king,  ii.  29  init. 

Pronnaeans,  in  Cephallenia,  ii.  30  fin. 

Prophecies,  current  before  the  War, 
ii.  8  init. 

Prophets,  present  with  armies,  vi. 
69  med.;  the  Athenians  indignant 
with  the  prophets  who  had  en- 
couraged the  S/cilian  expedition, 
viii.  i  init.  [See  Oracles.] 

Propylaea  of  the  Acropolis  at 
Athens,  ii.  13  med. 

Proschium,  in  Aetolia,  iii.  102  fin., 
106  init. 

Prosopitis,  an  island  in  the  Nile, 
i.  109  fin. 

Prote,  an  island  near  Pylus,  iv.  13 
med. 

Proteas,  an  Athenian  commander, 
sent  to  Corcyra,  i.  45  ;  and  to 
cruise  round  Peloponnesus,  ii. 
23  med. 

Protesilaus,  Temple  of,  near  Elaeus, 
viii.  102  fin. 

Proxenus,  a  Locrian  commander, 
iii.  103  fin. 

Prytanes,  at  Athens,  iv.  118  fin.,  v. 
47  fin.,  vi.  14  init.,  viii.  70  init. 


INDEX. 


693 


Psammetichus,  father  of  Inarus,  i. 
104  init. 

Pteleum  [of  uncertain  locality],  or- 
dered to  be  restored  under  the 
Peace,  v.  18,  viii. 

Pteleum,  a  fort  in  Erythraean  ter- 
ritory, viii.  24  init.,  31  med. 

Ptoeodorus,  a  Theban  exile,  iv.  76 
init. 

Ptychia,  a  small  island  near  Cor- 
cyra,  iv.  46  med. 

Punishment  of  death  does  not  pre- 
vent crime,  iii.  45  ;  too  severe 
punishment  of  rebels  inexpedient, 
ib.  46. 

Pydna,in  Macedonia,!.  137  init.;  be- 
sieged bytheAthenians,i.6i  med. 

Pylos,  in  Messenia,  called  Cory- 
phasium  by  the  Lacedaemonians, 
iv.  3  med.,  v.  18,  viii ;  forty-six 
miles  from  Sparta,  iv.  3  med.; 
fortified  by  the  Athenians,  ib. 
3-5 ;  the  news  recalls  the  Lace- 
daemonians from  Attica,  ib.  6  ; 
unsuccessfully  assaulted  by  the 
Lacedaemonians,  ib.  n,  12  ;  the 
Athenian  fleet  defeats  the  Lace- 
daemonian, and  cuts  offthe  troops 
in  Sphacteria,  ib.  13,  14;  the 
Lacedaemonians  make  a  truce 
with  the  Athenians  at  Pylos,  and 
send  ambassadors  to  Athens,  ib.  1 5, 
1 6 ;  the  truce  ends,  the  Athenians 
retain  the  Peloponnesian  ships, 
ib.  23  ;  sufferings  of  the  Athe- 
nians at  Pylos  while  blockading 
Sphacteria,  ib.  26 ;  garrisoned 
by  the  Messenians,  ib.  41  init.; 
the  Lacedaemonians  in  dread 
of  a  Helot  revolt,  while  the  Athe- 
nians were  at  Pylos,  ib.  80  init.; 
Cleon's  success  at  Pylos  increases 
his  confidence  at  Amphipolis,v.  7 
med.;  the  Athenians  repent  that 
they  did  not  make  peace  after 
Pylos  ;  the  Lacedaemonians  dis- 
heartened by  its  capture,  ib.  14  ; 
the  Athenians  replace  the  Mes- 
senians at  Pylos  by  a  garrison  of 
their  own,  ib.  35  fin.;  the  Lace- 
daemonians negotiate  at  Athens 
with  a  view  to  the  exchange  of 
Pylos  for  Panactum,  ib.  36  fin.,  39 
med.,  44-46  ;  the  Athenians  put 
the  Helots  back  in  Pylos,  ib.  56 


med.;  marauding  expeditions  of 
the  Athenians  from  Pylos,  ib.  1  1  5 
init.,  vi.  105,  vii.  18  med.,  26  med.; 
Alcibiades  pretends  to  have  done 
the  Lacedaemonians  service  after 
Pylos,  vi.  89  init.;  the  Lacedae- 
monians consider  that  their  mis- 
fortune at  Pylos  was  deserved, 
because  they  began  the  war,  vii. 
18;  the  Messenians  from  Pylos 
serve  with  the  Athenians  before 
Syracuse,  z£.  57  med.;  comparison 
between  the  naval  engagement 
at  Pylos  and  the  last  battle  in 
the  Great  Harbour  at  Syracuse, 
ib.  71  fin.;  Demosthenes  the 
greatest  foe  of  the  Lacedaemo- 
nians, Nicias  their  greatest  friend, 
in  the  matter  of  Pylos,  ib.  86  med. 
[See  Sphacteria.] 

Pyrasians,  people  of  Pyrasus  in 
Thessaly,  ii.  22  fin. 

Pyrrha,  in  Lesbos,  iii.  18  init.,  25 
init.,  viii.  23  init.;  taken  by 
Paches,  iii.  35  init. 

Pyrrhichus,  father  of  Ariston,  a 
Corinthian,  vii.  39  init. 

Pystilus,  joint  founder  with  Aris- 
tonous  of  Agrigentum,  vi.  4  med. 

Pythangelus,  a  Theban  Boeotarch, 
ii.  2  med. 

Pythen,  a  Corinthian,  sails  with 
Gylippus  to  Sicily,  vi.  104,  vii. 
i  init.;  in  command  at  the  last 
fight  in  the  harbour,  vii.  70  init. 

Pythes,  of  Abdera,  father  of  Nym- 
phodorus,  ii.  29  init. 

Pythian  Games,  v.  i  init.  \See 
Apollo,  Delphi,  Oracle.] 

Pythodorus,  an  Athenian,  archon 
at  the  commencement  of  the  War, 
ii.  2  init.;  supersedes  Laches  in 
Sicily,  iii.  115  med.,  iv.  2  med.; 
sent  into  exile,  iv.  65  med.;  swears 
to  the  Treaty  of  Peace  and  the 
Alliance,  v.  19  fin.,  24  med.;  has 
a  command  in  an  expedition 
to  Laconia,  which  violates  the 
Treaty,  vi.  105. 


Quarries,  at  Syracuse,  used  as  a 
prison  for  the  Athenian  captives, 
vii.  86,  87. 


694 


INDEX. 


R. 

Religion,  is  lost  amid  party  strife,  iii. 
82  fin.;  all  religious  restraint  dis- 
appears during  the  plague,  ii.  53. 

Reserve  fund  and  ships  set  apart  by 
the  Athenians,  ii.  24,  viii.  15  init. 

Revenge  not  always  successful  be- 
cause just,  iv.  62  fin.;  sweetness 
of  revenge,  ii.  42  fin.,  iii.  40  fin., 
vii.  68.  init. 

Revenue,  the  Athenian,  raised  by 
tribute  from  the  allies,  i.  122  init.. 
ii.  13  med.,  69,  iii.  13  fin.,  19,  39 
fin.,  46  init.,  iv.  87  fin.,  vi.  91  fin.; 
from  mines  at  Laurium,  ii.  55,  vi. 
91  fin.;  by  a  property  tax,  iii.  19  ; 
from  profits  made  by  the  land, 
and  the  law  courts,  vi.  91  fin.; 
the  tribute  commuted  for  a  duty 
of  5  per  cent,  on  imports  and 
exports,  vii.  28  fin. 

Revolutions,  horrors  of  the  revolu- 
tion at  Corcyra,  iii.  81, 84,  iv.  46- 
48  ;  growth  of  the  revolutionary 
spirit  in  Hellas,  iii.  82,  83  [cp.  vii. 
57  fin.]  ;  the  oligarchical  revolu- 
tion at  Megara,  iv.  74. 

Rhamphias,  (i)  a  Lacedaemonian, 
brings  with  others  the  last  de- 
mands of  the  Lacedaemonians 
to  Athens,  i.  139  med.;  sets  out 
to  Chalcidice,  but  returns  on 
news  of  Brasidas'  death,  v.  12, 13  : 
(ii)  another  [?],  father  of  Clear- 
chus,  viii.  8  med.,  39  med.,  80  init. 

Rhegium,  its  important  position, 
iv.  24  med.;  Anaxilaus,  tyrant  of, 
vi.  4  fin.;  the  Rhegians,  lonians, 
and  kindred  of  the  Leontines,  iii. 
86  med.,  vi.  44  fin.,  46  init.,  79 
med.;  the  Athenians  aid  them, 
iii.  86  fin.;  they  sail  with  the 
Athenians  against  the  Lipari 
islands,  ib.  88 ;  Athenian  rein- 
forcements arrive  at  Rhegium,  ib. 
115;  the  Rhegians  fall  into  se- 
dition and  are  attacked  by  the 
Locrians,  iv.  i  med.,  24,  25  ;  re- 
fuse to  receive  the  Athenian  expe- 
dition to  Sicily,  vi.  44  ;  the  Athe- 
nians disappointed  at  this  refusal, 
ib.  46  init. ;  part  of  the  Athenians 
stay  at  Rhegium  till  assured  of 
a  reception  at  Catana,  ib.  50,  5 1  ; 
Gylippus  puts  in  there,  on  his  way 


to  Syracuse, vii.  i  med.;  the  Athe- 
nians lie  in  wait  for  a  Corin- 
thian fleet  off  Rhegium,  ib.  4  fin. 

Rheiti,  in  Attica,  ii.  19  med. 

Rheitus,  in  Corinthian  territory,  iv. 
42  init. 

Rhenea,  the  island  near  Delos, 
dedicated  to  Apollo  by  Poly- 
crates,  i.  13  fin.,  iii.  104  init. 

Rhium,  in  Achaia,  ii.  86  init.,  92 
fin.,  v.  52  fin.; — the  Molycreian, 
ii.  84  fin.,  86  init. 

Rhodes,  viii.  41  fin.;  colonized  from 
Argos,  vii.  57  med.;  assists  in  the 
colonization  of  Gela,  vi.  4  med., 
vii.  57  fin.;  Rhodian  troops  serve 
in  the  expedition  to  Sicily,  vi.  43, 
vii.  57  med.;  Rhodes  revolts  from 
Athens,  viii.  44  ;  the  Peloponne- 
sians  take  up  their  station  there, 
ib.,  ib.  52  med.;  the  Athenians 
make  descents  upon  Rhodes,  ib. 
44  fin.,  55  init.;  the  Peloponne- 
sians  quit  Rhodes,  ib.  60. 

Rhodope,  Mount,  in  Thessaly,  ii. 
96  init. 

Rhoeteum,  in  the  Troad,  viii.  101 
fin.;  captured  by  the  Lesbian 
refugees,  iv.  52  init. 

Rhypae,  in  Achaia,  vii.  34  init. 

Roll  [*ara\oyo?]  of  persons  liable  to 
military  service  at  Athens,  iii.  87, 
vi.  31  med.,  43  init.,  vii.  20  med., 
viii.  24  init. 

Ruling  States  not, cruel  to  the  van- 
quished, v.  91  init. 

S. 

Sabylinthus,  a  Molossian,  guardian 
of  the  king  Tharypas,  ii.  80  fin. 

Sacon,  one  of  the  founders  of  Hi- 
mera,  vi.  5  init. 

Sacrilege,  committed,  by  the  slaugh- 
ter of  Cylon's  adherents,  i.  126  ; 
by  the  murder  of  the  Helots  at 
Taenarus,  ib.  128  init.;  by  the 
starving  to  death  of  Pausanias, 
ib.  134  ;  in  the  Corcyraean  se- 
dition, iii.  8 1 ;  provision  against, 
in  the  one  year's  Truce,  iv.  1 18,  ii ; 
the  Athenians  charged  with,  by 
the  Boeotians,  on  account  of  the 
occupation  of  Delium,  ib.  97-99. 

Sadocus,  son  of  Sitalces  king  of  the 
Odrysians,  made  an  Athenian 


I  N  D  E  X. 


695 


citizen,  ii.  29  fin.;  gives  up  Aris- 
teus  and  the  Lacedaemonian  am- 
bassadors to  the  Athenians,  ib.  67. 

Safety  depends  on  preparation,  vi. 
34  fin. 

Salaethus,  a  Lacedaemonian,  sent 
to  Mitylene,  iii.  25  init.;  arms  the 
people,  ib.  27  ;  captured  by  the 
Athenians,  ib.  35  init.;  put  to 
death  by  them,  ib.  36  init. 

Salaminia,  the  Athenian  sacred  ves- 
sel, iii.  33  med.,  77  fin.,  vi.  53 
init.,  61. 

Salamis,  battle  of,  i.  73  fin.,  137  fin.; 
the  island  ravaged  by  the  Lace- 
daemonians, ii.  93, 94  ;  Attic  ships 
guard  it,  iii.  17  init.;  the  Atheni- 
ans blockade  Megara  from  Sa- 
lamis, ii.  93  fin.,  94  fin.,  iii.  51 
init.;  the  appearance  of  a  Pelo- 
ponnesian  fleet  off  Salamis  causes 
a  panic  at  Athens,  viii.  94. 

Salamis,  in  Cyprus,  victory  of  the 
Athenians  there,  i.  112  med. 

Salynthius,  king  of  the  Agraeans, 
iii.  in  fin.,  1 14  med.;  subdued  by 
the  Athenians,  iv.  77  fin. 

Samaeans,  in  Cephallenia,  ii.  30  fin. 

Saminthus,  in  Argolis,  v.  58  fin. 

Samos, t  no  small  city,'  viii.  76  med. ; 
one  of  the  first  Hellenic  States 
to  possess  a  navy,  i.  13  init.,  fin.; 
Polycrates  tyrant  of,  ib.  13  fin., 
iii.  104  init.;  Samians  expel  the 
Chalcidians  from  Zancle,  and  are 
themselves  driven  out  by  Ana- 
xilas,  vi.  4  fin.;  the  Samians 
quarrel  with  the  Milesians,  i.  115 
init.;  revolt  from  Athens,  i.  40 
fin.,  41  med.,  115,  viii.  76  med.; 
are  defeated,  i.  ii6init.;  defeat 
the  Athenians,  ib.  117  init.;  sur- 
render, ib.  fin.;  Samian  exiles 
settle  at  Anaea,  iii.  19  fin.,  32  init., 
iv.  75  med.;  Strombichides  with 
an  Athenian  fleet  sails  to  Samos, 
viii.  16,  17  init.,  19  fin.;  the  Sami- 
ans revolt  and  establish  a  de- 
mocracy, the  Athenians  grant 
them  independence,  ib.i\\  Samos 
becomes  the  headquarters  of  the 
Athenian  fleet,  ib.  25  init.,  27  fin., 
30  init.,  33  med.,  35  med.,  39  fin., 
41  fin.,  44  fin.,  60  fin.,  63  init.,  79  ; 
the  leading  Athenians  at  Samos, 


instigated  by  Alcibiades,  begin  to 
plot  the  overthrow  of  the  de- 
mocracy, ib.  47-54,  63  fin.;  the 
Samians,  with  the  aid  of  Athe- 
nian sailors,  crush  the  revolution 
attempted  by  the  oligarchs  at 
Samos,  ib.  73  ;  the  Samians 
unite  with  the  Athenians  against 
the  Four  Hundred,  ib.  75-77  ; 
part  of  the  Athenian  fleet  leaves 
Samos  for  the  Hellespont,  ib. 
80  fin.;  the  Athenians  at  Samos 
recall  Alcibiades,  ib.  81  init.; 
Alcibiades  at  Samos,  ib.  81,  82  ; 
envoys  from  the  Four  Hundred 
come  to  Samos,  ib.  86  init.;  the 
Argives  offer  aid,  ib.  fin.;  Alci- 
biades leaves  Samos  to  join  Tis- 
saphernes,  ib.  88  ;  the  Pelopon- 
nesians  sailing  for  the  Hellespont 
try  to  evade  the  Athenians  at  Sa- 
mos, ib.  99 ;  the  Athenians  pursue 
them  from  Samos,  ib.  100;  Alci- 
biades returns  to  Samos,  ib.  108. 

Sandius,  a  hill  in  Caria,  iii.  19  fin. 

Sane,  an  Andrian  colony  in  Athos,  iv. 
109  med.;  provision  respecting 
Sane  in  the  Treaty  of  Peace,  v. 
18,  vii. 

Sardis,  i.  115  med. 

Sargeus,  a  Sicyonian  commander 
at  Syracuse,  vii.  19  fin. 

Saronic  Gulf,  iii.  1 5  med.,  viii.  92  init. 

Scandea,  in  Cythera,  iv.  54. 

Scellias,  father  of  Aristocrates,  an 
Athenian,  viii.  89  med. 

Scione,  founded  by  Pellenians  re- 
turning from  Troy,  iv.  120  init.; 
revolts  from  Athens,  ib.;  the  Sci- 
onaeans  crown  Brasidas,  ib.  121 
init. ;  the  Athenians  and  Lacedae- 
monians disagree  about  Scione, 
ib.  122  ;  the  Athenians  decree  its 
destruction,  ib.  fin. ;  the  Athenians 
prepare  to  attack  Scione,  ib.  129 
init. ;  the  Scionaeans  aid  the  Men- 
daeans,  ib.  med.,  130  init.;  the 
Peloponnesian  garrison  of  Mende 
flees  to  Scione,  ib.  131  fin.;  Scione 
is  invested,  ib.  132  init.,  133  fin.; 
provisions  respecting  Scione  in 
the  Treaty  of  Peace,  v.  18,  ix,  x  ; 
captured  by  the  Athenians,  the 
citizens  slain,  and  the  city  given 
to  the  Plataeans,  ib.  32  init. 


696 


INDEX. 


Sciritis,  a  district  of  Laconia,  v. 
33  med.;  the  Sciritae  form  the 
left  wing  of  the  Lacedaemonian 
army,  ib.  67  init.;  present  at  the 
battle  of  Mantinea,  ib.  68  med., 
71  med.,  72  med. 

Scironides,  an  Athenian  com- 
mander, viii.  25  init.;  dismissed, 
54  med. 

Scirphondas,  a  Theban  Boeotarch, 
vii.  30  fin. 

Scolus,  in  Chalcidice,  provision  re- 
specting, in  the  Treaty  of  Peace, 
v.  1 8,  vi. 

Scombrus,  mountain  in  Thrace  from 
which  the  Strymon  rises,  ii.  96  fin. 

Scyllaeum,  promontory  near  Troe- 
zen,  v.  53  fin. 

Scyros,  island  of,  subdued  and  colo- 
nized by  the  Athenians,  i.  98  init. 

Scytale,  use  of,  at  Lacedaemon,  i. 
131  med. 

Scythians,  ii.  96  med.,  97  fin. 

Sea,  Aegaean,  i.  98,  iv.  109  init.; 
Cretan,  iv.  53  fin.,  v.  no  init.; 
Hellenic,  i.  4  init.;  Sicilian,  iv.  24 
fin.,  53  fin.,  vi.  13  med.;  Tyrrhe- 
nian, iv.  24  fin.  {See  Gulf.] 

Sea,  mastery  of  the,  gained  by  Minos, 
i.  4,  8  med.;  by  the  Corinthians, 
the  lonians,  and  by  Polycrates, 
ib.  13  ;  by  the  Athenians,  see 
Athenians. 

Selinus,  founded  by  Pamillus  from 
Megara,  vi.  4  init.  [cp.  vii.  57 
med.] ;  the  Selinuntians  make 
war  on  Egesta,  vi.  6  init.,  13  fin.;  a 
large  and  powerful  city,  ib.  20  fin.; 
Nicias  in  a  council  of  war  urges 
an  immediate  attack  on  Selinus, 
ib.  47  ;  the  Athenian  generals 
sail  towards  Selinus,  ib.  62  init.; 
the  Selinuntians  join  the  Syra- 
cusans,  ib.  65  med.,  67  med. ;  they 
receive  and  assist  Gylippus,  vii. 
i  fin.,  58  init.;  contribute  to  the 
Sicilian  fleet  which  is  despatched 
to  Asia,  viii.  26  init. 

Sermyte,  in  Sithonia,  provision  re- 
specting, in  the  Treaty  of  Peace, 
v.  1 8,  x  ;  defeat  of  the  Sermylians 
by  Aristeus,  i.  65  fin. 

Sestos,  siege  and  capture  of  (in  the 
Persian  War),  i.  89  med.,  viii.  62 
fin.;  becomes  the  Athenian  head- 


quarters in  the  Hellespont,  viii. 
62  fin.,  102  init.,  104  init.,  107  init. 

Seuthes,  king  of  the  Odrysians,  the 
successor  of  Sitalces,  ii.  97  med., 
iv.  101  fin.;  gained  over  by  Per- 
diccas,  ii.  101  fin.;  marries  Per- 
diccas'  sister,  ib. 

Ships  in  ancient  times  had  no  decks, 
i.  10  fin.;  the  ships  in  the  fleet  at 
Salamis  not  completely  decked, 
ib.  14  fin.;  invention  of  triremes, 
ib.  13  init.;  the  prows  of  ships 
built  thicker,  in  order  to  disable 
the  lighter  Athenian  vessels,  vii.  34 
med.,  36, 62  med. ;  use  of  grappling 
irons  to  catch  an  enemy's  ship,  iv. 
25  init.,  vii.  62  fin.;  ships  covered 
with  hides  in  order  to  prevent  the 
grapnels  holding,  vii.  65  ; — ships, 
dedicated  to  Poseidon  as  trophies 
of  a  victory,  ii.  84  fin.,  92  fin. 

Sicania,  an  old  name  of  Sicily,  vi. 
2  init;  the  Sicanians  Iberian  by 
descent,  ib. ;  Hyccara  of  Sicanian 
origin,  ib.  62  med. 

Sicanus,  river  in  Iberia,  vi.  2  init. 

Sicanus,  a  Syracusan  general,  vi.  73, 
96  ;  deposed,  ib.  103  fin.;  sent  to 
Agrigentum,  vii.  46 ;  fails  in  his 
mission,  ib.  50  init.;  commands  a 
division  of  the  Syracusan  fleet  in 
the  last  sea  fight,  ib.  70  init. 

Sicels,  their  occupation  of  Sicily,  vi. 
2  med.,  3  fin.;  gave  name  to  the 
island,  ib.  2  med. ;  district  in- 
habited by  them,  v.  4  fin.,  vi.  62 
med.,  94  med.;  those  in  the  in- 
terior independent,  vi.  88  med.; 
Zancl&  named  from  the  Sicel 
word  for  a  sickle,  ib.  4  fin. ;  Hy- 
blon,  Archonides,  Sicel  kings,  ib. 
4  init.,  vii.  i  fin.;  the  greater  part 
of  the  Sicels  join  the  Athenians, 
iii.  103  init.,  115  init.,  iv.  25  med., 
vi.  65  med.,  88  med.,  98  init.,  103 
med.,  vii.  57  fin.;  the  Syracusans 
try  to  gain  them  over,  vi.  45  [cp. 
ib.  34  init.,  88  med.]  ;  Alcibiades 
wishes  to  secure  their  friendship 
before  attacking  Syracuse,  ib.  48 
init;  some  of  them  aid  Gylippus, 
vii.  i  fin ,  58  init.;  he  captures 
Getae,  a  Sicel  fort,  ib.  2  med.; 
the  Sicel  allies  of  the  Athenians 
destroy  the  reinforcements  sent 


I  N  D  E  X. 


697 


by  the  Sicilian  cities  to  Syracuse, 
ib.  32  ;  the  Athenians  expect  aid 
from  the  Sicels  on  their  retreat, 
ib,  77  fin.,  80  fin. 

Sicily,  its  original  settlement,  vi.  2  ; 
Hellenic  colonies  there,  ib.  3-5  [cp. 
i.  12  fin.];  anciently  called  Trina- 
cria  and  Sicania,  vi.  2  init.;  the 
Sicilian  tyrants,  i.  14  med.,  17,  1 8 
init.;  populousness  and  democra- 
tic character  of  the  Sicilian  states, 
vi.  17  init.,  2o,vii.  28  med.,  55,  viii. 
96  fin. ;  the  Lacedaemonians  order 
their  Sicilian  allies  to  furnish  a 
fleet, ii. 7  med.  [cp.iii.86init.];  the 
Athenians  send  an  expedition  un- 
der Laches  to  Sicily,  iii.  86,  88,  90, 
99, 103  ;  reinforcements  under  Py- 
thodorus  arrive  in  Sicily,  ib.  115  ; 
eruption  of  Aetna,  ib.  116  ;  pro- 
ceedings of  the  second  Athenian 
expedition  in  Sicily,  iv.  2,  24,  25, 
65  fin.;  conference  of  the  Sicilian 
states  at  Gela,  ib.  58-65  init.;  em- 
bassy of  Phaeax  from  Athens  to 
Sicily,  v.  4,  5  ;  third  and  great 
expedition  against  Sicily :  the 
preparation,  vi.  i,  6,8-29;  the 
armament  leaves  Piraeus,  ib.  30, 
32  ;  its  magnitude  and  complete- 
ness, ib.  31,  43,  vii.  76  fin.;  the 
reception  of  the  news  in  Sicily, 
vi.  33-41  ;  the  .  Athenian  fleet 
reaches  Catana,  z£.  42-52  ;  course 
of  the  campaign  until  the  invest- 
ment of  Syracuse,  ib.  62-104  ; 
Gylippus  arrives  in  Sicily  and 
enters  Syracuse,  vii.  i,  2  ;  the 
good  fortune  of  the  Athenians 
begins  to  decline,  ib.  3-16  ;  the 
Athenians  determine  to  send  De- 
mosthenes with  reinforcements, 
ib.  17,  18  init,  20  ;  the  Athenians 
at  Syracuse  lose  command  of  the 
sea,  ib.  21-25,  36-41;  Demos- 
thenes proceeds  to  Sicily,  ib.  26, 
3 i  >  33>  3  5  5  the  attack  on  Epipolae, 
ib.  42-45  ;  the  Syracusans  gain  a 
fresh  victory  at  sea,  ib.  46-56  ; 
enumeration  of  the  hostile  forces 
in  Sicily,  ib.  57,  58  ;  the  last  battle 
in  the  harbour,  ib.  59-71  ;  the 
retreat  and  final  surrender,  ib. 
72-87  ;  a  Sicilian  contingent  is 
sent  to  the  Lacedaemonian  fleet 


in  Asia,  viii.  2  fin.,  26  init.,  28 
med.,  29,  35  init.,  45  med.,  78  fin., 
84  init.,  85  fin.,  106  med.;  Sicilian 
ships  in  the  fleet  destined  for 
Euboea,  ib.  91  init. 

Sicyon,  the  Sicyonians  defeated  by 
the  Athenians,  i.  108  fin.,  1 1 1  fin.; 
aid  the  Megarians  to  revolt,  ib. 
1 14  med.;  furnish  the  Lacedae- 
monians with  ships,  ii.  9  med.; 
prepare  ships  for  the  Lacedae- 
monian expedition  against  Acar- 
nania,  ib.  80  med.;  with  Brasidas 
at  Megara,  iv.  70  med.;  defeat 
the  Athenians,  ib.  101  med.;  aid 
in  preventing  Alcibiades'  plan  for 
fortifying  Rhium,  v.  52  fin.;  join 
the  Lacedaemonians  in  the  inva- 
sion of  Argolis,  ib.  58-60 ;  have 
their  government  changed  by  the 
Lacedaemonians,  ib.  81  fin.;  send 
troops  to  Sicily,  vii.  19  fin.,  58 
med.;  contribute  ships  to  the 
Lacedaemonian  fleet,  viii.  3  fin. 

Sidussa,  a  fort  in  the  Erythraean 
territory,  viii.  24  init. 

Sigeium,  in  the  Hellespont,  viii. 
101  fin. 

Simonides,    an  Athenian  general, 

.iv-7-. 
Simplicity,   a  large   element   in  a 

noble  nature,  iii.  83  init. 

Simus,  one  of  the  founders  of  Hi- 
mera,  vi.  5  init. 

Singaeans,  inhabitants  of  Singe  in 
Sithonia,  provision  respecting,  in 
the  Treaty  of  Peace,  v.  18,  vii. 

Sinti,  a  people  on  the  borders  of 
Macedonia,  ii.  98  init. 

Siphae,  port  of  Thespiae,  in  Boeo- 
tia,  plan  to  betray  the  city,  iv.  76 
init.,  77  med.;  failure  of  the  plot, 
ib.  89  init.,  101  med. 

Sitalces,  king  of  the  Odrysians,  be- 
comes the  ally  of  Athens,  ii.  29 
fin.,  95  med.;  makes  war  upon 
Perdiccas,  ib.  95-101  ;  dies  and 
issucceeded  bySeuthes,iv.ioi  fin. 

Six  Hundred,  the,  the  Council  at 
Elis,  v.  47  fin. 

Skill  only  to  be  acquired  by  in- 
cessant application,  i.  142  fin.,  vi. 
18  fin.;  inspires  confidence,  vi.  72 
fin.,  vii.  67  init.;  without  courage 
useless,  ii.  87  med. 


698 


INDEX. 


Slaves,  more  than  twenty  thousand 
Athenian  slaves  desert  during  the 
occupation  of  Decelea,  vii.  27  fin. ; 
great  numbers  of  the  Chian  slaves, 
viii.  40  init.;  they  desert  to  the 
Athenians,  ib.  med. 

Socrates,  an  Athenian  commander, 
ii.  23  med. 

Sollium,  in  Acarnania,  taken  by  the 
Athenians,  ii.  30  init.;  Demos- 
thenes comes  to  Sollium  on  his 
way  to  Aetolia,  iii.  95  med.;  the 
Corinthians  complain  that  the 
Lacedaemonians  did  not  recover 
Sollium  for  them,  v.  30  med. 

Soloeis,  a  Phoenician  settlement  in 
Sicily,  vi.  2  fin. 

Solygeia,  a  village  in  the  Corinthian 
territory,  iv.  42,  43  ;  Solygeian 
ridge,  a  position  once  occupied 
by  the  Dorian  invaders  of  Co- 
rinth, iv.  42  init. 

Soothsayers,  see  Prophets,  Ora- 
cles. 

Sophocles,  an  Athenian  commander, 
sent  with  reinforcements  to  Sicily, 
iii.  115  fin.,  iv.  2  med.,  46  init.; 
his  conduct  at  Corcyra,  iv.  47  ; 
condemned  to  exile,  ib.  65  med. 

Sostratides,  father  of  Sophocles,  an 
Athenian,  iii.  115  fin. 

Spardacus,  father  of  Seuthes,  a 
Thracian,  ii.  101  fin.,  iv.  101  fin. 

Sparta,  see  Lacedaemon. 

Spartolus,  in  Bottice,  defeat  of  the 
Athenians  there,  ii.  79 ;  pro- 
vision respecting,  in  the  Treaty 
of  Peace,  v.  18,  vi. 

Speeches,  Thucydides  only  vouches 
for  their  general  accuracy,  i. 
22  init.;  speech  of  Alcibiades 
at  Athens,  vi.  16-18  ;  at  Sparta, 
ib.  89-92  ;  Archidamus  (i),  i.  80- 
85,  (2)  ii.  ii  ;  the  Athenians  at 
Sparta,  i.  73-78  ;  Athenagoras, 
vi.  36-40  ;  Brasidas  at  Acanthus, 
iv.  85-87  ;  to  his  soldiers  in  Ma- 
cedonia, ib.  126  ;  at  Amphipolis, 
v.  9  ;  Cleon,  iii.  37-40  ;  Corin- 
thians at  Athens,  i.  37-43  ;  at 
Sparta  (i),  ib.  68-71,  (2)  ib.  120- 
124  ;  Corcyraeans,  i.  32-36  ;  De- 
mosthenes, iv.  10  ;  Diodotus,  iii. 
42-48  ;  Euphemus,  vi.  82-87  ; 
Gylippus,  vii.  66-68 ;  Hermo- 


crates  at  Gela,  iv.  59-64;  at  Syra- 
cuse, vi.  33,  34;  at  Camarina,  vi. 
76-80  ;  Hippocrates,  iv.  95  ;  the 
Lacedaemonian  ambassadors,  iv. 
17-20;  Mitylenaeans,  iii.  9-14;. 
Nicias  at  Athens  (i),  vi.  9-14,  (2) 
ib.  20-23;  at  Syracuse  (i),  ib.  68, 
(2)  vii.  61-64,  (3)  ib.  77  ;  Pagon- 
das,  iv.  92  ;  Peloponnesian  com- 
manders, ii.  87  ;  Pericles  (i),  i. 
140-144,  (2)  [funeral  speech],  ii. 
35-46,  (3)  ib.  60-64  5  Phormio,  ii. 
89  ;  Plataeans,  iii.  53~59|  Sthene- 
laidas,  i.  86  ;  Thebans,  iii.  61-67; 
Teutiaplus,  iii.  30. 

Sphacteria,  the  island  in  Laconia, 
iv.  8  med.;  occupied  by  the  Lace- 
daemonians, ib.;  blockaded  by 
the  Athenians,  ib.  14  fin.,  26  ;  suc- 
cessful attack  upon,  ib.  31-39; 
restoration  of  the  prisoners  taken 
in,  v.  24  fin.;  their  treatment  at 
Sparta,  ib.  34  fin.;  the  surrender 
of  Sphacteria  the  severest  blow 
Sparta  had  ever  experienced,  ib. 
14  med. 

Stageirus,  in  Chalcidice,  an  An- 
drian  colony,  iv.  88  fin.;  revolts 
from  Athens,  ib.\  unsuccessfully 
attacked  by  the  Athenians,  v.  6 
init.;  provision  respecting,  in  the 
Treaty  of  Peace,  ib.  18,  vi. 

Stages,a  lieutenant  of  Tissaphernes, 
viii.  16  fin. 

State,  a,  is  composed  not  of  walls 
or  ships,  but  of  men,  vii.  77  fin. 
[cp.  i.  143  fin.]. 

Stesagoras,  a  Samian  commander, 
i.  116  fin. 

Sthenelaidas,  a  Lacedaemonian 
Ephor,  his  speech,  i.  85  fin.,  86  ; 
[?the  same]  father  of  Alcamenes, 
viii.  4  med. 

Stratodemus,  a  Lacedaemonian, 
ambassador  to  the  King,  ii.  67 
init. 

Stratonice,  sister  of  Perdiccas,  wife 
of  Seuthes,  ii.  101  fin. 

Stratus,  in  Acarnania,  ii.  80  fin.; 
the  Stratians  defeat  the  Chao- 
nians,  ib.  81  med.;  certain  Stra- 
tians expelled  by  the  Athenians, 
ib.  102  init.;  the  Peloponnesians 
on  their  way  to  Olpae  pass  by 
Stratus,  iii.  106. 


I  N  D  E  X. 


699 


Stroebus,  father  of  Leocrates,  an 
Athenian,  i.  105  init. 

Strombichides,  an  Athenian,  sent 
in  command  of  an  expedition 
against  Chios,  viii.  15  med.;  pur- 
sues Chalcideus,  ib. ;  is  chased 
into  Samos,  ib.  16  ;  arrives  too 
late  to  prevent  the  revolt  of 
Miletus,  ib.  17  fin.;  sent  to  Chios, 
ib.  30  fin. ;  fails  to  recover  Abydos, 
which  had  revolted,  ib.  62  fin.; 
returns  to  Samos,  ib.  79  fin. 

Strombichus,  father  of  Diotimus, 
an  Athenian,  i.  45. 

Strongyle,  one  of  the  Aeolian 
islands,  iii.  88  med. 

Strophacus,  a  friend  of  Brasidas  in 
Thessaly,  iv.  78  init. 

Strymon,  the  river,  in  Thrace,  i. 
ioofin.,ii.  99med.,iv.io2,  1 08  init., 
vii.  9  fin.;  rises  in  Mount  Scom- 
brus,  ii.  96  fin.;  lake  formed  by 
it,  v.  7  fin. 

Styphon,  one  of  the  Lacedaemonian 
commanders  at  Sphacteria,  iv.  38 
init. 

Styreans,  people  of  Styra  in  Eu- 
boea,  subjects  of  the  Athenians, 
vii.  57  init. 

Sunium,  promontory  of,  in  Attica, 
vii.  28  init.,  viii.  95  init.;  fortified 
by  the  Athenians,  viii.  4  init. 

Superstition,  earthquakes  cause,  ex- 
peditions to  be  abandoned,  iii.  89 
init.,  vi.  95  init.;  a  commander 
changed,  viii.  6  fin.;  assemblies 
broken  up,  v.  45  fin.,  50  fin.;  an 
eclipse  of  the  moon  causes  the 
fatal  delay  at  Syracuse,  vii.  50  fin.; 
unpropitious  sacrifices  lead  to  the 
abandonment  of  an  expedition,  v. 
54  med.,  55  med.,  1 16  init.;  super- 
stitious observance  of  festivals  by 
the  Lacedaemonians,  iv.  5  init., 
v.  54  med.,  75  init.,  82  init. 

Sybaris,  a  river  in  Italy,  vii.  35  med. 

Sybota,  (i)  islands  off  Thesprotia, 
i.  47,  54  init.:  (2)  an  harbour 
in  Thesprotia,  ib.  50  med.,  52 
init.,  54  init.,  iii.  76  fin. 

Syce,  near  Syracuse,  vi.  98  med. 

Symaethus,  a  river  in  Sicily,  vi.  65 
med. 

Syme,  island  of,  viii.  41  fin.,  42  fin., 
43  init. 


Synoecia,  a  festival  at  Athens,  ii.  15 
med. 

Syracuse,  founded  from  Corinth  by 
Archias,  vi.  3  med.;  mother  city 
of  various  states  in  Sicily,  ib.  5  ; 
equal  in  size  and  resources  to 
Athens,  ib.  20,  vii.  28  [cp.  vi.  17 
init.]  ;  fought  the  best  of  all  Hel- 
lenic States  against  the  Athe- 
nians, viii.  96  fin.  [cp.  vii.  55  init.]; 
constantly  in  revolution,  vi.  38 
med.;  the  Syracusans  go  to  war 
with  Leontini,  iii.  86  init.;  defeat 
the  Athenians,  z£.  103  med.;  cause 
Messene  to  revolt,  iv.  i  init.;  at- 
tack the  Rhegians,  ib.  24,  25  ; 
hand  over  Morgantine  to  Cama- 
rina,  ib.  65  init.;  aid  the  oligarchi- 
cal party  at  Leontini,  v.  4  ;  the 
news  of  the  Athenian  expedition 
arrives,  the  Syracusans  first 
doubt,  then  prepare,  ib.  32  fin.- 
41,  45  ;  the  Athenians  sail  to 
Syracuse,  and  return  to  Catana, 
ib.  50-52  ;  the  Syracusans  repulse 
an  Athenian  landing  with  loss,  ib. 
52  fin.;  they  are  encouraged  by 
the  inactivity  of  the  Athenians, 
ib.  63  ;  the  Athenians  entice  them 
to  Catana  in  order  to  cover  their 
landing,  ib.  64,  65  ;  the  Syra- 
cusans are  defeated  by  the  Athe- 
nians, ib.  66-71  ;  encouraged  by 
Hermocrates,  z#.  72;  send  envoys 
to  Peloponnesus,  ib.  73  ;  extend 
their  walls  and  send  an  em- 
bassy to  Camarina,  ib.  75  ;  pro- 
mised aid  by  the  Corinthians,  ib. 
88  fin.;  the  Lacedaemonians  ap- 
point Gylippus  to  command  the 
Syracusan  forces,  ib.  93  med.; 
the  Syracusans  resist  the  Athe- 
nians in  various  landings,  ib.  94  ; 
defeated  in  an  engagement  on 
Epipolae,  ib.  96,  97 ;  receive 
another  check  and  raise  a  coun- 
ter wall,  which  the  Athenians 
destroy,  ib.  98-100  ;  again  suffer 
a  defeat,  ib.  101;  repulsed  in  an 
attack  on  Epipolae,  ib.  102  ;  fall 
into  despair  and  negotiate  unsuc- 
cessfully with  Nicias,  ib.  103  ; 
change  their  commanders,  ib. 
fin.;  on  the  point  of  surrendering, 
vii.  2  init.;  hearing  of  the  coming 


700 


I  N  D  E  X. 


of  Gylippus  go  out  to  meet  him, 
ib.  2  fin.;  take  Labdalum,  ib.  3 
fin.;  build  a  counter  wall,  ib.  4 
init.;  fail  in  an  attack  on  the 
Athenian  lines,  ib.\  defeated  by 
the  Athenians,  ib.  5  ;  defeat  the 
Athenians  and  carry  their  cross 
wall  past  the  Athenian  wall, 
ib.  6  ;  begin  to  form  a  navy,  ib. 
7  fin.,  12,  21  ;  Gylippus  brings 
in  reinforcements  from  the  Si- 
cilian cities,  ib.  21  init.;  the  Syra- 
cusans  capture  Plemmyrium,  but 
are  defeated  at  sea,  ib.  22,  23  ; 
send  a  third  embassy  to  Pelo- 
ponnese,  and  despatch  a  fleet  to 
intercept  the  Athenian  convoys, 
ib.  25  init.;  skirmish  with  the 
Athenians  in  the  harbour,  ib. 
med.;  send  envoys  to  the  Sicilian 
cities,  ib.  fin.;  more  Sicilian  rein- 
forcements arrive,  ib.  33  init.; 
the  Syracusans  rebuild  their  fleet, 
adopting  the  Corinthian  inven- 
tion of  flatter  and  stronger  prows, 
ib.  36  ;  fight  an  indecisive  en- 
gagement, ib.  38  ;  renew  the 
attack  suddenly  the  next  day, 
and  gain  a  complete  victory,  ib. 
39-41  ;  become  filled  with  confi- 
dence, ib.  41  fin.;  their  spirits  are 
dashed  by  the  arrival  of  Demos- 
thenes, ib.  42  init.;  defeat  the 
Athenians  in  a  night  engagement 
on  Epipolae,  ib.  43-45  ;  a  party 
among  them  willing  to  surrender, 
ib.  48  init.,  49  init.,  73  fin.,  86 
med.;  the  Syracusans  attack  the 
Athenians  by  sea  and  land, 
#.51-54;  encouraged  by  their 
success,  ib.  56  ;  the  Syracusan 
allies  enumerated,  ib.  58  ;  close 
the  mouth  of  the  harbour,  ib.  59  ; 
prepare  for  a  final  struggle  at 
sea,  ib.  65  ;  win  a  complete  vic- 
tory, ib.  70-7 1 ;  prevent  the  retreat 
of  the  Athenians  and  force  them 
to  surrender,  ib.  78-85 ;  kill  Nicias 
and  Demosthenes,  ib.  86  init.; 
cruelly  treat  their  prisoners,  ib. 
87  ;  send  a  fleet  under  Her- 
mocrates  to  Asia,  viii.  26  init.,  35 
init.;  distinguish  themselves  in 
the  capture  of  lasos,  ib.  28  med. ; 
their  sailors  mostly  freemen,  ib.  84 


init.;  their  boldness  in  demanding 
full  pay  of  Tissaphernes,  ib.  45 
med.,  78  fin.,  84  init.;  change  their 
commanders  and  banish  Hermo- 
crates,  ib.  85  fin. ;  take  part  in  the 
battle  of  Cynossema,  ib.  104-106. 


T. 

Taenarus,  promontory  of,  vii.  19 
med.;  temple  of  Poseidon  at,  i. 
128  init.,  133  init.;  the  '  curse  of 
Taenarus,'  ib.  128  init. 

Tamos,  a  Persian,  lieutenant  of 
Tissaphernes,  viii.  31  med.,  87. 

Tanagra,  defeat  of  the  Athenians 
there,  107  fin.,  108  init.;  its  walls 
razed  by  the  Athenians,  ib.  108 
med.;  the  Tanagraeans  are  de- 
feated by  the  Athenians,  iii.  91  fin.; 
the  Boeotians  gather  at  Tanagra 
before  the  battle  of  Delium,  iv.  91 
init.;  the  Tanagraeans  on  the  left 
wing  at  Delium,  ib.  93  fin.;  the 
Boeotians  retire  to  Tanagra  after 
Delium,  ib,  97  init.;  the  territory 
of  Tanagra  ravaged  by  Thracians 
under  Diitrephes,  vii.  29  init. 

Tantalus,  a  Lacedaemonian,  gover- 
nor of  Thyrea,  iv.  57. 

Tarentum,  vi.  34  med.,  104  med., 
vii.  i  init.;  hostile  to  the  Athenian 
expedition  to  Sicily,  vi.  44  med.; 
ships  from  Tarentum  join  the 
Lacedaemonian  fleet  intended  for 
Euboea,  viii.  91  med. 

Taulantians,  an  lllyrian  race,  near 
Epidamnus,  i.  24  init. 

Taurus,  a  Lacedaemonian,  swears 
to  one  year's  Truce,  iv.  119  init. 

Tax,  property,  of  two  hundred 
talents  at  Athens,  iii.  19 ;  of  5  per 
cent,  on  the  produce  of  the  soil 
imposed  by  the  Peisistratidae, 
vi.  54  med.;  on  imports  by  the 
Athenians,  vii.  28  fin. 

Tegea,  in  Arcadia,  constantly  at 
war  with  Mantinea,  v.  65  med.; 
the  Tegeans  fight  with  the  Man- 
tineans,  iv.  134;  refuse  to  join 
the  Argive  alliance,  v.  32  init.; 
take  part  in  the  Lacedaemonian 
expedition  against  Argos,  ib.  57 
med. ;  the  Argive  confederacy  pre- 


INDEX. 


701 


pare  to  attack  Tegea,  ib.  62  ;  the 
Lacedaemonians  occupy  Tegea, 
ib.  64  med. ;  the  Tegeans  fight  on 
the  right  wing  at  Mantinea,  ib. 
67-74  ;  the  Lacedaemonian  dead 
buried  at  Tegea,  ib.  74  med. ;  the 
Lacedaemonian  reinforcements 
do  not  proceed  beyond  Tegea, 
ib.  75  init;  the  Lacedaemonians 
march  thither  in  order  to  make 
terms  with  the  Argives,  ib.  76 
init.,  78 ;  the  Lacedaemonians 
march  to  support  the  oligarchy 
at  Argos,  but  turn  back  at  Tegea, 
ib.  82  init. 

Teichium,  in  Aetolia,  iii.  96  med. 

Teichiussa,  in  Milesian  territory, 
viii.  26  med.,  28  init. 

Tellias,  a  Syracusan  general,  vi. 
103  fin. 

Tellis,  a  Lacedaemonian,  father  of 
Brasidas,  ii.  25  init,  iii.  69  med., 
iv.  70  init.;  swears  to  the  Treaty 
of  Peace  and  the  Alliance,  v.  19 
med.,  24  init. 

Temenidae, ,  ancestors  of  the  Mace- 
donian kings,  ii.  99  init. 

Temenites,  part  of  Syracuse,  vii.  3 
med. ;  shrine  of  Apollo  Temenites, 
vi.  75  init.,  99  fin.,  100  fin. 

Temple,  see  under  the  various 
deities. 

Temple  of  Zeus,  a  place  between 
Lebedus  and  Colophon,  viii.  19 
med. 

Tenedos,  founded  from  Boeotia,  vii. 
57  med.;  tributary  to  Athens,  ib.\ 
the  inhabitants  warn  the  Athe- 
nians of  the  Lesbian  revolt,  iii.  2 
init.;  the  Athenians  place  their 
Mitylenaean  prisoners  there  for 
a  time,  ib.  28  fin.,  35. 

Tenos,  one  of  the  Cyclades  ;  the 
Tenians  tributary  to  Athens,  vii. 
57  init.;  Tenians  in  the  service 
of  the  oligarchs  at  Athens,  viii. 
69  med. 

Teos,  iii.  32  init.;  revolts  from 
Athens,  viii.  16,  19  fin.;  the  Teans 
agree  with  the  Athenians,  and 
promise  neutrality,  ib.  20  fin. 

Teres,  the  great  Odrysian  king, 
father  of  Shakes,  ii.  29  init.,  67 
init.,  95  init.;  not  the  same  as  the 
Tereus,  in  mythology,  ib.  29  init. 


Tereus,  the  ancient  Thracian  king, 
ii.  29  init. 

Terias,  a  river  in  Sicily,  vi.  50  med., 
94  init. 

Terinaean  Gulf,  in  southern  Italy, 
vi.  104  med. 

Terror,  the  reign  of,  at  Athens,viii.66. 

Tessaracosts,  a  Chian  coin,  viii. 
101  init. 

Teutiaplus,  an  Elean,  his  speech, 
iii.  30. 

Teutlussa,  an  island  near  Rhodes, 
viii.  42  fin. 

Thapsus,  near  Syracuse,  founded 
from  Megara  by  Lamis,  vi.  4  init.; 
peninsula  of,  ib.  97  init.,  99  fin., 
101  med.,  102  fin.,  vii.  49  med. 

Tharypas,  king  of  the  Molossians, 
ii.  80  fin. 

Thasos,  a  Parian  colony,  iv.  104 
fin.;  mother  city  of  Galepsus  and 
CEsyme',  ib.  107  fin.,  v.  6  init.; 
revolts  from  the  Athenians,  i.  100 
med.  [cp.  viii.  64  med.];  asks  the 
Lacedaemonians  to  invade  Attica, 
i.  101  init.;  surrenders,  ib.  fin.; 
Thucydides  at  Thasos,  iv.  104  fin., 
105  init.;  the  Thasians  have  their 
government  changed  by  the  oli- 
garchical conspirators  at  Samos, 
ib.  64  init.;  prepare  to  revolt,  ib. 

Theaenetus,  a  Plataean  diviner, 
suggests  the  plan  for  breaking 
out  of  Plataea,  iii.  20  init. 

Theagenes,  tyrant  of  Megara,  father- 
in-law  of  Cylon,  i.  126  init. 

Theagenes,  an  Athenian,  chosen 
with  Cleon  as  Commissioner  to 
Sphacteria,  iv.  27  med.;  swears 
to  the  Treaty  of  Peace  and  the 
Alliance,  v.  19  fin.,  24  med. 

Theatre  of  Dionysus,  near  Muny- 
chia,  viii.  93  init. 

Thebes,  once  allied  to  Persia,  i.  90 
med.,  iii.  56  med.,  58  fin.,  59,  62 ; 
its  hostility  to  Plataea,  ii.  71  med., 
72  med.,  iii.  55  init.,  57  med.,  58 
init.,  59  med.;  Theban  Boeo- 
tarchs,  iv.  91  med.;  the  Thebans 
furnish  the  Corinthians  with 
money  for  the  expedition  against 
Epidamnus,  i.  27  fin.;  surprise 
Plataea  in  time  of  peace,  ii.  2, 
iii.  56  init.,  vii.  18  med.;  are 
defeated,  ii.  3 ;  surrender,  ib.  4  ; 


702 


INDEX. 


send  reinforcements,  ib.  5  init.; 
come  to  terms,  ib.  fin.;  their 
speech  against  the  Plataeans,  iii. 
61-67  I  their  treatment  of  Plataea, 
ib.  68  fin.;  defeated  by  the  Athe- 
nians at  Tanagra,  ib.  91  fin.;  a 
Theban  exile,  Ptoeodorus,  plots 
with  the  Athenians  to  betray 
Boeotia,  iv.  76  init.;  the  Thebans 
on  the  right  wing  at  Delium,  ib.  93 
fin.;  their  formation  there,  ib.; 
they  dismantle  the  walls  of 
Thespiae,  ib.  133  init.;  suppress 
a  rising  at  Thespiae,  vi.  95  fin.; 
send  aid  to  Syracuse,  vii.  19  med.; 
drive  the  Thracians  to  their  ships 
after  the  sack  of  Mycalessus,  #.30. 

Themistocles,  founder  of  the  naval 
power  of  Athens,  i.  14  fin.,  93  ; 
the  victor  at  Salamis,  ib.  74  init. 
[cp.  ib.  137  fin.];  honours  paid 
to  him  by  the  Lacedaemonians, 
ib.  74  init.,  91  init.;  outwits  the 
Lacedaemonians,  ib.  90,  91  ; 
builds  the  Piraeus,  ib.  93  ;  ostra- 
cised, ib.  135  init.;  implicated  in 
the  plot  of  Pausanias,  ib. ;  takes 
refuge  with  Admetus,  ib.  136 ; 
flees  to  Ephesus,  ib.  137  init.; 
goes  to  the  Persian  court,  ib.  1 38  ; 
dies,  ib.  fin.;  said  to  have  been 
buried  in  Attica,  ib.\  his  character, 
ib.  med. 

Theodorus,  father  of  Procles,  an 
Athenian,  iii.  91  init. 

Theory tus,  father  of  Cynes  [tyrant  ?] 
of  Coronta,  ii.  102  init. 

Theopompus,  an  Athenian  com- 
mander, ii.  26  [?  Cleopompus]. 

Theori,  a  magistracy  at  Mantinea, 
v.  47  fin.;  Alcibiades  as  Qewpos 
of  Athens  at  Olympia,  vi.  16  init.; 
the  Athenians  send  Theori  to  the 
Isthmian  Games,  viii.  loinit.;  Si- 
cilian Theori  before  sailing  sacri- 
fice to  Apollo  at  Naxos,  vi.  3  init. 

Thera,  one  of  the  Cyclades,  not 
allied  to  the  Athenians,  ii.  9  fin. 

Theramenes,  an  Athenian,  a  chief 
leader  in  the  oligarchical  revolu- 
tion at  Athens,  viii.  68  fin.;  begins 
with  others  to  form  a  party  within 
the  oligarchy,  ib.  89,  90  med.,  91 ; 
instigates  the  soldiers  to  destroy 
the  fort  Eetioneia,  ib.  92,  94  init. 


Theramenes,  a  Lacedaemonian 
commander,  brings  reinforce- 
ments to  Astyochus,  viii.  26  init., 
29  med.;  persuaded  by  Alcibiades 
to  go  to  the  relief  of  Miletus,  ib. 
26  fin.,  27  init.,  28  init. ;  negotiates 
a  treaty  with  the  King,  ib.  36,  37, 
43  med.;  lost  at  sea,  ib.  38  init. 

Therme,  in  Macedonia,  taken  by 
the  Athenians,  i.  61  med.;  re- 
stored to  Perdiccas,  ii.  29  fin. 

Thermon,  a  Spartan,  sent  by  Agis 
to  Peiraeum,  viii.  1 1  med. 

Thermopylae,  ii.  101  init.,  iii. .  92 
fin.;  battle  of  Thermopylae  com- 
pared to  that  of  Sphacteria,  iv. 
36  fin. 

Theseus,  unites  the  Attic  communes 
into  one  city,  ii.  15  init.;  temple 
of,  at  Athens,  vi.  61  med. 

Thespiae,  in  Boeotia,  iv.  76  init.; 
the  Thespians  on  the  left  wing  at 
Delium,  ib.  93  fin.;  suffer  severe 
loss,  ib.  96  med.,  133  init.;  have 
their  walls  dismantled  by  the 
Thebans,  ib.  133  init.;  popular 
revolution  there,  quelled  by  the 
Thebans,  vi.  95  fin.;  the  Thes- 
pians send  aid  to  Syracuse,  vii. 
19  init.,  25  med. 

Thesprotia,  i.  30  fin.,  46  med.,  50 
med.;  the  Thesprotians  have  no 
king,  ii.  80  fin. 

Thessaly,  its  early  history,  i.  12 
med.;  once  held  by  the  Per- 
sians, viii.  43  fin.;  forms  alliance 
with  the  Athenians,  i.  102  fin. 
[cp.  ib.  107  fin.,  iv.  78  med.]; 
the  Thessalians  desert  from  the 
Athenians  at  Tanagra,  i.  107 
fin.;  assist  the  Athenians  in  the 
first  invasion  of  Attica,  ii.  22 
med.;  take  alarm  at  the  expedi- 
tion of  Sitalces,  ib.  101  med.; 
make  war  on  Heraclea,  iii.  93 
med.;  some  of  the  leading  Thes- 
salians escort  Brasidas  through 
Thessaly,  iv.  78 ;  the  Thes- 
salians refuse  Rhamphias  and 
the  Peloponnesians  passage,  v. 
13;  certain  Thessalians  aid  in  a 
defeat  of  the  Heracleans,  ib.  51 
init.;  the  Thessalians  angry  with 
Agis  for  extorting  money  from 
the  Achaeans  of  Pthia,  viii.  3  med. 


INDEX. 


7°3 


Thessalus,  brother  of  Hippias,  i.  20 
med.,  vi.  55  init. 

Thoricus,  in  Attica,  viii.  95  init. 

Thousand  Argives,  the,  a  select 
force  trained  at  the  expense  of 
the  state,  v.  67  fin.,  72  med.,  73 
fin. 

Thrace,  European,  divided  among 
various  tribes  :  Agrianians,  ii.  96 
med.;  Dersaeans,  ib.  101  med.; 
Dii,  ib.  96  med.,  98  fin.,  vii.  27 
init.;  Droans,  ii.  101  med.;  Edo- 
nians,  i.  100  fin.,  ii.  99  med.,  iv. 
102  med.,  107  fin.,  109  fin.,  v. 
6  fin.;  Getae,  ii.  96  init.,  98  fin.; 
Graaeans,  ib.  96  fin.;  Laeaeans, 
ib.  96  med.;  Maedi,  ib.  98  med.; 
Odomantians,  ib.  101  med.;  Odry- 
sians,  ib.  29,  96  init.,  97,  98  fin., 
101  med.;  Paeonians,  ib.  96  fin., 
98  med.;  Panaeans,  ib.  101  med.; 
Sinti,  ib.  98  med.;  Tilataeans,  ib. 
96  fin.;  Treres,  ib.  96  fin.;  Triballi, 
ib.  96  fin.,  iv.  101  fin.; — gold 
mines  in  Thrace,  i.  100  med.,  iv. 
105  init.; — the  Thracians  prefer 
receiving  to  giving,  ii.  97  med.; 
wanting  in  sense,  ib.  fin.;  their 
ferocity,  vii.  30 fin. ;  once  inhabited 
Phocis,  ii.  29  init.;  destroy  the 
Athenian  colonists  at  Ennea 
Hodoi,  i.  loo  fin.,  iv.  102  med.; 
march,  under  the  leadership  of 
Sitalces,  against  Perdiccas,  ii.  95- 
101.  [See  Odrysians,  Perdiccas, 
Sitalces.]  Thracian  mercenaries 
in  Athenian  service  at  Mende,  iv. 
129  init.;  the  Thracians  are  asked 
for  aid  by  Cleon  at  Amphipolis, 
v.  6 init.;  the  Edonian and  Myrci- 
nian  Thracians  serve  under  Bra- 
sidas,  ib.  fin.,  10  fin.;  Thracian 
mercenaries  sent  home  from 
Athens  sack  Mycalessus,  vii.  27 
init.,  30. 

Thracians,  the  Bithynian,  in  Asia, 
iv.  75  fin. 

Thrasybulus,  an  Athenian,  one  of 
the  steadiest  opponents  of  the 
oligarchs  at  Athens,  viii.  73  med.; 
persuades  the  army  and  the  Sa- 
mians  to  swear  allegiance  to  the 
democracy,  ib.  75 ;  appointed 
with  Thrasyllus  general,  ib.  76 
init.;  procures  the  restoration  of 


Alcibiades,  ib.  81  init.;  sails  to 
Eresus  which  had  revolted,  ib. 
100  fin.;  aids  Thrasyllus  at  Cy- 
nossema,  ib.  104, 105. 

Thrasycles,  an  Athenian,  swears  to 
the  Treaty  of  Peace  and  the 
Alliance,  v.  19  fin.,  24  med.; 
sent  with  twelve  ships  to  Chios, 
viii.  15  med.,  17  fin.,  19  med. 

Thrasyllus,  one  of  the  steadiest 
opponents  of  the  oligarchs  at 
Athens,  viii.  73  med.;  persuades 
the  army  and  the  Samians  to 
swear  allegiance  to  the  demo- 
cracy, ib.  75  ;  appointed  with 
Thrasybulus  general,  ib.  76  init.; 
follows  Mindarus  to  Chios,  ib. 
loo  init.;  sets  about  besieging 
Eresus, lA  loofin.,  103  init.;  pur- 
sues Mindarus  to  the  Hellespont, 
ib.  med.;  defeats  him  off  Cynos- 
sema,  ib.  104, 105. 

Thrasyllus,  an  Argive  general, 
makes  terms  with  Agis,  v.  59 
fin.,  60  init.;  attacked  by  the 
Argives,  ib.  60  fin. 

Thrasymelidas,  a  Spartan,  admiral 
in  command  at  Pylos,  iv.  1 1 
init.  . 

Thria,  in  Attica,  i.  114  fin.,  ii.  19 
med.,  20  init.,  21  init. 

Thronium,  in  Locris,  ii.  26. 

Thucles,  the  founder  of  Naxos  in 
Sicily,  vi.  3  init.;  of  Leontini  and 
Catana,  ib.  fin. 

Thucles,  father  of  Eurymedon,  an 
Athenian,  iii.  80  fin.,  91  med., 
vii.  16  fin. 

Thucydides,  motives  for  writing  his 
history,  i.  i ;  its  truthfulness,  ib. 
21-23,  v.  26  fin.;  the  speeches 
only  generally  accurate,  i.  22  init.; 
reasons  for  describing  the  period 
between  the  Persian  and  Pelo- 
ponnesian  Wars,#.  97 ;  his  reason 
for  reckoning  his  history  by  sum- 
mers and  winters,  v.  20 ;  at- 
tacked by  the  plague,  ii.  48  fin.; 
appointed  general  in  Thrace,  iv. 
104  fin.;  a  leading  man  in  Thrace, 
ib.  105  init.;  fails  to  save  Amphi- 
polis, ib.  1 06  fin.;  repulses  Brasi- 
das  from  Eion,  ib.  107  init.; 
exiled,  v.  26  fin.;  lived  through- 
out the  war,  ib. 


704 


INDEX. 


Thucydides,  an  Athenian  com- 
mander at  Samos,  i.  117  med. 

Thucydides,  of  Pharsalus,  proxenus 
of  Athens,  viii.  92  med.;  helps  to 
prevent  the  panic  after  the  de- 
struction of  Eetioneia,  ib. 

Thunder-storm,  effect  of,  on  armies, 
vi.  70  init.,  vii.  79  med. 

Thuria,  in  Laconia,  Perioeci  of,  i. 
101  init. 

Thurii,  in  Italy,  Alcibiades  conceals 
himself  there,  vi.  61  fin.,  88  fin.; 
the  Thurians  refuse  to  receive 
Gylippus,  ib.  104  med.;  expel  an 
anti-Athenian  party,  vii.  33  fin., 
35  init.,  57  fin.;  send  ships  to  the 
Peloponnesians  in  Asia,  viii.  35 
init.,  6 1  med.;  the  sailors  mostly 
freemen,  ib.  84  init.;  their  bold- 
ness in  demanding  full  pay  from 
Tissaphernes,  ib.  78  fin.,  84  init. 

Thyamis,  a  river  on  the  borders  of 
Thesprotia,  i.  46  fin. 

Thyamus,  Mount,  in  Aetolia,  iii. 
106  fin. 

Thymochares,  an  Athenian  com- 
mander, viii.  95  init. 

Thyrea,  in  Laconia,  given  to  the 
Aeginetans  by  the  Lacedaemo- 
nians, ii.  27  med.,  iv.  56  fin.;  cap- 
tured by  the  Athenians,  iv.  57  ; 
the  Argives  in  their  treaty  with 
Lacedaemon  insert  a  stipulation 
that  they  and  the  Lacedaemo- 
nians should  fight  for  Thyrea,  v. 
41  med.;  the  district  of  Thyrea 
invaded  by  the  Argives,  vi.  95. 

Thyssus,  in  Athos,  iv.  109  med.;  al- 
lied with  the  Athenians, v.  3 5 init.; 
captured  by  the  Dictidians,  ib. 

Tilataeans,  a  Thracian  tribe,  ii.  96  fin. 

Timagoras,  a  Cyzicene  exile  at  the 
court  of  Pharnabazus,  viii.  6  init.; 
goes  as  envoy  to  Sparta,  /&,  ib.  8 
init.,  39  init. 

Timagoras,  a  Tegean  ambassador 
to  Persia,  ii.  67. 

Timanor,  a  Corinthian  commander, 
i.  29  init. 

Timanthes,  father  of  Timanor,  a 
Corinthian,  i.  29  init. 

Timocrates,  an  Athenian,  father  of 
Aristoteles,  iii.  105  fin.;  swears 
to  the  Treaty  of  Peace  and  the 
Alliance,  v.  19  fin.,  24  med. 


Timocrates,  a  Spartan,  sent  out  as 
adviser  to  Cnemus,  ii.  85  init.; 
kills  himself,  ib.  93  med. 

Timocrates,  father  of  Timoxenus, 
a  Corinthian,  ii.  33  init. 

Timoxenus,  a  Corinthian  com- 
mander, ii.  33  init. 

Tisamenus,  a  Trachinian,  envoy  to 
Sparta,  iii.  92  init. 

Tisander,  an  Aetolian,  envoy  to 
Sparta,  iii.  100  init. 

Tisias,  an  Athenian  general  at 
Melos,  v.  84  fin. 

Tisimachus,  father  of  Tisias,  an 
Athenian,  v.  84  fin. 

Tissaphernes,  governor  of  the  pro- 
vinces on  the  coast  of  Asia,  viii. 
5  init.;  sends  an  envoy  to  ask  the 
aid  of  Sparta,  ib.;  negotiates  a 
treaty  between  Sparta  and  the 
King,  ib.  17  fin.,  18  ;  demolishes 
a  fort  at  Teos,  ib.  20  fin.;  present 
at  an  engagement  before  Miletus, 
ib.  25  init.;  persuades  the  Pelo- 
ponnesians to  attack  lasus,  ib. 
28  init.;  reduces  the  pay  of  the 
Peloponnesian  fleet,  ib.  29 ;  causes 
Cnidus  to  revolt,  ib.  35  init.  (cp.  ib. 
109) ;  makes  a  second  treaty  with 
the  Lacedaemonians,  ib.  37 ;  en- 
raged at  Lichas  for  objecting  to 
the  treaties  with  the  King,  ib.  43 
fin.;  instructed  by  Alcibiades  to 
balance  the  contending  parties, 
ib.  45,  46  [cp.  ib.  87];  persuaded 
by  Alcibiades  to  offer  impossible 
terms  to  Peisander,  ib.  56;  makes 
a  third  treaty  with  the  Lacedae- 
monians, ib.  57,  58  ;  now  shows 
himself  more  ready  to  fulfil  his 
engagements,  ib.  59  ;  his  dilatory 
conduct,  ib.  78,  80  init.;  becomes 
more  and  more  hateful  to  the 
Lacedaemonian  fleet,  4b.  83  ;  puts 
a  garrison  in  Miletus,  which  the 
Milesians  drive  out,  ib.  84  med.; 
sends  an  envoy  to  Sparta,  ib. 
85  init.;  his  malignity  against 
Hermocrates,  ib.  fin;;  goes  to 
fetch  the  Phoenician  ships,  ib.  87; 
why  he  did  not  bring  them,  ib.; 
marches  towards  Ionia,  viii.  108 
med.;  starts  for  the  Hellespont 
to  remonstrate  with  the  Lacedae- 
monians, ib.  109;  goes  to  Ephesus 


INDEX. 


705 


and  offers  sacrifice  to  Artemis,  ib. 
fin. 

Tlepolemus,  an  Athenian  com- 
mander at  Samos,  i.  117  med. 

Tolmaeus,  (i)  father  of  Tolmides, 
an  Athenian,  i.  108  fin.,  113  init.; 
(ii)  another,  father  of  Autocles, 
iv.  53  init.,  119  fin. 

Tolmides,  an  Athenian,  commands 
an  expedition  round  Peloponne- 
sus, i.  1 08  fin.;  defeated  at  Coro- 
nea,  ib.  1 1 3. 

Tolmides,  father  of  Theaenetus,  a 
Plataean,  iii.  20  init. 

Tolophonians,  an  Ozolian  Locrian 
tribe,  iii.  101  fin. 

Tolophus,  an  Aetolian,  ambassador 
to  Corinth,  iii.  100  init. 

Tomeus,  Mount,  in  Laconia,  iv.  118, 
iii. 

Torone,  in  Chalcidice,  iv.  120  med., 
122  init.,  129  init.;  captured  by 
Brasidas,  iv.  110-114;  entrusted 
by  him  to  Pasitelidas,  ib.  132  fin.; 
retaken  by  the  Athenians,  v.  2,  3  ; 
provision  respecting,  in  the  treaty 
between  Athens  and  Lacedae- 
mon,  ib.  18,  x. 

Torylaus,  a  friend  of  Brasidas  in 
Thessaly,  iv.  78  init. 

Trachinians,  one  of  the  Malian 
tribes,  iii.  92  init.  [See  Hera- 
clea.] 

Trade,  no  trade  in  ancient  Hellas, 
i.  2  init.;  ancient  trade  chiefly  by 
land,  ib.  13  med.;  trade  in  corn  at 
Athens,  viii.  4  init.  [cp.  vi.  20  fin.] ; 
trade  between  Egypt  and  Athens, 
viii.  35  med.;  between  Africa  and 
Peloponnesus,  iv.  53  fin-. 

Tradition,  Peloponnesian  traditions, 
i.  9  init.;  ancient  traditions  too 
readily  received,  ib.  20  init. 

Tragia,  an  island  off  Samos,  Athe- 
nian victory  there,  i.  116  med. 

Treasury  of  the  Athenian  confede- 
racy originally  at  Delos,  i.  96  ; 
contents  of  the  Athenian  trea- 
sury in  the  Acropolis,  ii.  13  med.; 
treasuries  of  Delphi  andOlympia, 
i.  121  med.,  143  init. 

Treaties,  see  Peace. 

Treres,  a  Thracian  tribe,  ii.  96  fin. 

Triballi,  a  Thracian  tribe,  ii.  96  fin., 
iv.  101  fin. 


Tribute  of  the  Athenian  allies,  its 
amount,  i.  96  fin.,  ii.  13  med.;  its 
first  imposition,  i.  96  init.;  its 
amount  as  fixed  in  the  time  of 
Aristides,  v.  18,  vi ;  changed  to  a 
duty  of  5  per  cent.,  vii.  28  fin.; — 
tribute  collected  by  the  Odrysian 
Empire,  ii.  97  med. 

Trierarchs,  at  Athens,  vi.  31  init., 
vii.  69  init.,  70  fin. 

Trifles  may  involve  important  prin- 
ciples, i.  140  fin. 

Trinacria,  the  ancient  name  of 
Sicily,  vi.  2  init. 

Triopium,  promontory  near  Cnidus, 
viii.  35,  60  fin.;  temple  of  Apollo 
there,  ib.  35  med. 

Tripod,  at  Delphi,  dedicated  as  a 
memorial  of  the  Persian  War,  i. 
.  132  med.,  iii.  57  med. 

Tripodiscus,  in  Megara,  iv.  70. 

Triremes,  first  built  at  Corinth,  i. 
13  init.  [See  Ships.] 

Tritaeans,  an  Ozolian  Locrian  tribe, 
iii.  101  fin. 

Troezen,  in  Peloponnesus,  restored 
by  the  Athenians  under  the 
Thirty  Years'  Peace,  i.  115  ink.; 
the  Troezenians  furnish  a  convoy 
to  Corinth,  ib.  27  fin.;  the  ter- 
ritory of  Troezen  ravaged  by  the 
Athenians,  ii.  56  fin.;  Cleon  per- 
suades the  Athenians  to  demand 
the  restitution  of  Troezen,  iv.  2 1 
fin.;  the  Athenians  seize  Methone 
and  ravage  the  territory  of  Troe- 
zen, ib.  45  [cp.  ib.  118,  iii]  ;  the 
Troezenians  furnish  the  Lacedae- 
monians with  ships,  viii.  3  fin. 

Trogilus,  near  Syracuse,  vi.  99  init., 
vii.  2  fin. 

Trojan,  colonists  in  Sicily,  vi.  2 
med.;  took,  together  with  the  Si- 
canians,  the  name  of  Elymi,  ib. 

Trotilus,  founded  from  Megara  by 
Lamis,  vi.  4  init. 

Troy,  see  War,  Trojan. 

Truce,  for  a  year  between  the  La- 
cedaemonians and  Athenians,  iv. 
117-119;  with  ten  days'  notice, 
between  the  Athenians  and  the 
Boeotians,  v.  26  med.,  32  med.; 
between  the  Athenians  and  the 
Chalcidians,  vi.  7  fin.  [cp.  ib.  10 
med.] 


z  z 


706 


INDEX. 


Truth,  little  sought  after  by  man- 
kind, i.  20  fin.  [cp.  vi.  54  init.]  ; 
pains  taken  by  Thucydides  to 
ascertain  the  truth,  i.  22,  v.  25  fin. 

Twelve  Gods,  altar  of  the,  in  the 
Athenian  Agora,  vi.  54  fin. 

Tydeus,  a  Chian,  executed  on  a 
charge  of  conspiracy  with  the 
Athenians,  viii.  38  med. 

Tyndareus,  the  oath  of  the  suitors 
of  Helen  to  him,  i.  9  init. 

Tyrannies,  rise  of,  in  Hellas,  i.  13 
init.;  the  Sicilian  tyrants,  ib.  14 
med.,  17,  1 8  init.;  policy  of  the 
early  tyrants,  ib.  17  ;  the  tyrants 
overthrown  by  the  Lacedaemo- 
nians, ib.  18  init,  vi.  53  fin.,  59  fin. 

Tyrants,  Anaxilas  of  Rhegium,  vi. 
4  fin.;  Evarchus  of  Astacus,  ii.  30 
med.,  33  init.;  Hippocles  of 
Lampsacus,  vi.  59  med.;  Hip- 
pocrates of  Gela,  ib.  5  fin.;  the 
Pisistratidae  at  Athens,  i.  20,  vi. 
53  fin.-59  ;  Polycrates  of  Samos, 
i.  13  fin.,  iii.  104  med. 

Tyrrhenia  [Etruria],  the  Tyrrhe- 
nians friendly  to  Athens,  vi.  88 
med.;  send  the  Athenians  aid, 
ib.  103  med.,  vii.  53,  54,  57  fin. 

Tyrrhenian  Gulf,  vi.  62  init.,  vii.  58 
init; — Sea,  iv.  24  fin. 

Tyrrhenians,  the  old  Pelasgian  in- 
habitants of  Lemnos  and  Athens, 
iv.  109  fin. 

U. 

Unfortunate,  the  unfortunate  man 
does  not  expect  to  be  recognized 
by  his  acquaintances,  vi.  16  med. 

V. 

Vengeance,  the  vengeance  which 
follows  closest  upon  a  wrong  the 
most  adequate,  iii.  38  init.;  sweet- 
ness of  vengeance,  ii.  42  fin.,  iii. 
40  fin.,  vii.  68  init. 

Vote,  vulgar  error  that  the  kings  of 
Lacedaemon  have  two  votes,  i. 
20  fin. 

W. 

Walls,  the  Long  Walls  [of  Athens], 
i.  69  init.,  107  init.,  108  med.,  ii. 
13  fin.;  [of  Megara],  built  by  the 


Athenians,  i.  103  fin.;  razed  by 
the  Megarians,  iv.  109  init;  [of 
Patrae],  v.  52  fin.;  [of  Argos],  ib. 
82  ;  destroyed  by  the  Lacedae- 
monians, ib.  83  init. ;  the  Walls 
of  Athens,  ib.  90-93  ;  of  the 
Piraeus,  ib.  93,  ii.  13  fin.;  of 
Phalerum,  ii.  13  fin. 
War,  Peloponnesian,  continues, 
without  a  break,  ten  years  to 
the  Treaty  of  Peace,  v.  20 ;  its 
length  and  greatness,  i.  23  ;  its 
causes,  ib.  fin.,  55  fin.,  56-66,  146; 
state  of  feeling  before,  ib.  66 
med.,  ii.  8,  n  init;  reasons  of 
the  Lacedaemonians  for  enter- 
ing upon,  i.  23  fin.,  88  ;  prepar- 
ations and  allies  of  either  side, 
ii.  7-9 ;  actual  commencement 
of  the  War,  i.  118  init.,  ii.  i  ; 
lasted  27  years,  as  foretold  by  an 
oracle,  v.  26. 

End  of  ist  year,  ii.  47  init. 
„  2nd 
5,  3rd 
„  4th 
„  5th 
„  6th 
»  7th 
„  8th 
„  9th 
„  loth 
«  „  nth 
1 2th 
1 3th 
1 4th 
1 5th 
1 6th 
„  17* 
1 8th 
1 9th 
„  2oth 
„  2ist 
War,  the  Persian,  i.  14  med.,  18  fin., 

23  init,   41    init,   69  med.,    73, 
74,   89,  90  init.,  93  fin.,  95  fin., 
97,   142   med.,  vi.    82   init.,  viii. 

24  med.;   events  of— Marathon, 
i.  1 8  med.,  vi.  59  fin.;  Thermo- 
pylae, iv.  36  fin. ;  Artemisium,  iii. 
54  med.;  Salamis,  i.  73  fin.,  137 
fin.;  Mycale,  i.  89  init;  Plataea, 
ib.  130  init,  iii.  54  med.,  58  med.; 
capture  of  Byzantium,  i.  128  med.; 
of  Eion,  Scyros,  Naxos,  ib.  98  ; 


55 
55 

55 

55 

/W   1111. 

103  fin. 

55 

iii. 

25  fin. 

55 

)5 

88  fin. 

55 

55 

116  fin. 

55 

iv. 

51  fin. 

55 

„ 

116  fin. 

55 

)5 

135- 

55 

V. 

20  init. 

55 

„ 

39  fin. 

55 

55 

51  fin. 

55 

55 

56  fin. 

55 

8  1  fin. 

55 

55 

83  fin. 

5) 

vi. 

7  fin. 

55 

93  fin. 

55 

vii. 

1  8  fin. 

55 

viii 

.6  fin. 

55 

55 

60  fin. 

55 

55 

109  fin. 

INDEX. 


707 


battle  of  the  Eurymedon,  ib.  100 
init.;  Persian  occupation  of  Ses- 
tos  alluded  to  in  viii.  62  fin.; 
dedication  of  the  tripod  at  Del- 
phi, i.  132  med.,  iii.  57  med.;  its 
object  principally  the  destruction 
of  Athens,  vi.  33  fin. 

War,  the  Sacred,  i.  112  fin. 

War,  Trojan,  first  common  action 
of  Hellas,  i.  3  init.  and  fin.;  not 
equal  to  more  modern  wars,  ib. 
9-11  ;  reason  of  its  length,  ib. 
1 1  ;  changes  in  Hellas  after  the 
return  from  Troy,  ib.  12  [cp.  ii. 
68  init.] 

War,  maxims  of,  'war  a  matter  of 
money,'  i.  83  ;  '  war  waits  for  no 
man,'  ib.  142  init.;  'the  battle  not 
always  to  the  strong,'  ii.  n  med., 
89  med.,  v.  102  ;  necessity  of  dis- 
cipline, ii.  1 1  fin.;  courage  is  forti- 
fied by  justifiable  contempt,  ib. 
62  fin. ;  '  victory  on  the  side  of 
the  greatest  battalions,'  ib.  87 
fin.;  much  to  be  learned  from 
mistakes,  ib.\  a  good  general 
is  never  off  his  guard,  iii.  30  fin., 
v.  9  init.;  when  danger  has  to  be 
faced  reflection  is  useless,  iv.  10 
init.;  war  much  a  matter  of 
chance,  i.  78  init,  120  fin.,  iv. 
18  med.,  vii.  61  fin.;  importance 
of  reinforcements  brought  up  at 
the  right  time,  v.  9  med.;  'find 
out  an  enemy's  weak  points,'  iv. 
126  med.,  vi.  91  fin.; — deteriora- 
tion of  character  caused  by 
war,  iii.  82  init.;  its  inscrutable 
nature,  i.  78  init.;  no  experienced 
man  believes  that  war  is  a  good 
or  safe  thing,  ib.  80  init.;  wars  are 
supported  out  of  accumulated 
wealth,  not  out  of  forced  con- 
tributions, ib.  141  med.;  misery 
of  war,  iv.  59  init. 

Weak,  the,  must  go  to  the  wall,  v. 
89  fin. 

'  Wells,'  in  Acarnania,  the,  iii.  105 
init.,  106  fin. 

Wisdom,  contemptuous  wisdom 
brings  men  to  ruin,  i.  122  fin. 

Women,  the  glory  of  woman  to  re- 
strain her  weakness,  and  avoid 
both  praise  and  blame,  ii.  45 
fin. 


X. 

Xanthippus,  father  of  Pericles,  an 
Athenian,  i.  in  med.,  i.  127  init. 

Xenares,  (i)  Ephor  at  Sparta,  v.  36 
init.,  46  fin.;  favours  the  war 
party,  ib.  36  med.;  negotiates  with 
the  Boeotians  and  Corinthians, 
ib.  36-38  :  (ii)  another,  the  Lace- 
daemonian governor  of  Heraclea, 
v.  51  fin.;  slain  in  battle,  ib. 

Xenocleides,  a  Corinthian  com- 
mander, i.  46  init.,  iii.  114  fin. 

Xenon,  a  Theban  commander  at 
Syracuse,  vii.  19  med. 

Xenophanes,  father  of  Lamachus, 
an  Athenian,  vi.  8  med. 

Xenophantidas,  a  Lacedaemonian, 
viii.  55  med. 

Xenophon,  an  Athenian  com- 
mander at  Potidaea,  ii.  70  init.; 
in  Chalcidice,  ib.  79. 

Xenotimus,  father  of  Carcinus,  an 
Athenian,  ii.  23  med. 

Xerxes,  king  of  Persia,  father  of 
Artaxerxes,  i.  137  med.,  iv.  50 
fin.;  his  expedition  against  Hel- 
las, i.  14  med.,  118  init.,  iii.  56 
med.;  forewarned  by  Themis- 
tocles  at  Salamis,  i.  137  fin.;  his 
letter  to  Pausanias,  ib.  129. 

Z. 

Zacynthus,  an  island  opposite  Elis, 
an  Achaean  colony,  ii.  66 ;  its 
importance  to  the  Athenians,  ib. 
7  fin.,  80  init.;  the  Zacynthians 
assist  the  Corcyraeans,  i.  47  ; 
become  the  allies  of  Athens,  ii. 
7  fin.,  9  med.,  66,  iv.  8  init.,  13 
med.,  vii.  57  med.;  Zacynthus  is 
ravaged  by  the  Lacedaemonians, 
ii.  66  ;  the  Zacynthians  furnish 
Demosthenes  with  troops  for  ser- 
vice in  Sicily,  vii.  31  init.,  57  med. 

Zancl£  :  Messen&  in  Sicily  origin- 
ally so  called  from  the  Sicel  word 
for  a  sickle,  vi.  4  fin.  [See  Mes- 
sene.] 

Zeus,  Ithomean,  i.  103  med.;  'the 
Gracious,'/^.  126  med.;  the  '  God 
of  Freedom,'  ii.  71  init.;  Olym- 
pian, iii.  14  init.,  v.  31  init.;  Ne- 
mean,  iii.  96  init.;  Lycaean,  v. 
i6fin.;  temples  of  Zeus,  at  Athens, 


Z  z  2 


708  INDEX. 

ii.    15    med.;     Corcyra,    iii.    70  Zeuxidamus,  father  of  Archidamus 

med.;  Mount  Lycaeum,  v.  i6fin.;  the  Lacedaemonian  king,  ii.  19 

between  Lebedus  and  Colophon,  med.,  47  ink.,  iii.  I  init. 

viii.   19  med.;    Mantinea,  v.  47  Zeuxidas,  a  Lacedaemonian,  swears 

fin.;  Olympia,  iii.  14  init.,  v.  50  to  the  Treaty  of  Peace  and  the 

init.;   Syracuse,  vi.  64  med.,  65  Alliance,  v.  19  med.,  24  init. 

fin.,  70  init.,  70  fin.,  75  init.,  vii.  4  Zopyrus,   father  of  Megabyzus,   a 

fin.,  37  fin.,  42  fin.  Persian,  i.  109  med.