Essays on the philosophy of theism

ESSAYS

ON THE

PHILOSOPHY OF THEISM

~

COLLKOK j

PHILOSOPHY OF THEISM

BY THE LATE

WILLIAM GEORGE WARD, PH.D.

SOMETIME FELLOW OP BALLIOL COLLEGE, OXFORD

AND PROFESSOR OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY AND DOGMATIC THEOLOGY
AT OLD HALL COLLEGE, WARE

REPRINTED FROM THE "DUBLIN REVIEW"

EDITED, WITH AN INTRODUCTION, BY

WILPEID WAED

4

IN TWO VOLUMES
VOL. I.

PRESENTED TO ST. MARY'S COLLEGE UBKAKY
BY REV. T. CALLAGHAN

LONDON
KEGAN PAUL, TKENCH & CO., 1, PATEKNOSTER SQUARE

1884

(77t« rights of translation and- of reproduction are reserved.")

TO

BARON FRIEDRICH VON HUGEL.

Mr DEAR BARON VON HUGEL,

In offering these volumes of my father's philosophical
essays for your acceptance, I am doing what I believe he would
himself have done had he lived to republish them. They treat
for the most part of subjects which you frequently discussed
with him, and on which I know he valued your opinion.
But a yet stronger motive which would have led him to ask
you to accept them would have been the opportunity thereby
afforded him of giving expression to the great esteem in which
he held the friendship enjoyed by him, during the closing years
of his life, with yourself and Baroness von Hiigel.

I trust that your regard for his memory will render this
dedication not unacceptable to you : and I may add that it gives
me great pleasure on personal grounds to be the means of
offering the book to you — so far as I can be said to offer that
which is not my own.

Believe me, dear Baron von Hiigel,

Yours very sincerely,

WILFRID WARD,

March, 1884.

NOTE.

THE Editor has to offer his best thanks to the Hew.
J. Connelly and E. Pennington for their kind assistance
in looking through and correcting the proofs of the
following essays. The analytical contents at the com-
mencement of each volume are in nearly every case
by the Author himself. The date given after the title of
each essay is the date of its original publication in the
Dublin Review.

March, 1884.

CONTENTS OF VOL. I.

PAOB

INTRODUCTION .. xi

ESSAY I.— THE RULE AND MOTIVE OF CERTITUDE.
(July, 1871.)

Two Bchools of philosophy ... ... ... ... ... 1

Question stated as to the test of certitude

Answer given by scholastics to that question ... ... ... 6

Primary truths known by the light of reason ... ... ... 9

Answer to objections ... ... .*. ... ... ... 11

Propositions inconceivable are not therefore untrue ... ... 17

Doctrine of various English philosophers on our subject ... ... 23

Mr. Mill's doctrine on our subject ... ... ... ... 26

ESSAY II.— MR. MILL'S DENIAL OF NECESSARY TRUTH.
(October, 1871.)

Characteristics of Mr. Mill's philosophical writing ... ... ... 33

Mathematical axioms self-evidently necessary ... ... ... 35

Consideration of Mr. Mill's reply based on the " association " psychology 37
Consequence of Mr. Mill's admitting that mathematical axioms are

cognizable by purely mental experimentation ... ... 53

Mr. Mill's argument from the " Geometry of Visibles" ... ... 57

The allegation considered that mathematical axioms are tautological 59

Three inferences from what has preceded ... ... ... ... 60

Phenomenistic anti-theists ... ... ... ... ... 63

Three arguments against phenomenism ... ... ... ... 65

viii Contents.

ESSAY III.— MB. MILL ON THE FOUNDATION OF MORALITY.
(January, 1872.)

PAGE

Domestic controversies on this matter ... ... ... ... 77

The issue joined with Mr. Mill ... ... ... ... 80

Moral goodness a simple idea ... ... ... ... ... 81

Certain moral truths self-evidently necessary ... ... ... 85

Intuitive knowledge that all acts, morally evil, are prohibited by a

Personal Being ... ... ... ... ... ... 91,

This Being inferred to be Supreme L egislator of the universe ... 92

Mr. Mill's appeal to man's primordial faculties ... ... ... 98

Mr. Bain's appeal to divergences of moral judgment ... ... 100

Mr. Mill implicitly embraces the doctrine which he speculatively opposes 1 13

Criticism of his speculative position ... ... ... ... 116

ESSAY IV.— MR. MILL'S REPLY TO THE "DUBLIN REVIEW."
(July, 1873.)

Prefatory remarks on the late Mr. Mill ... ... ... ... 120

Purpose of this essay ... ... 126

Rule and motive of certitude ... ... 127

Mr. Mill on the motive of certitud e . . . ... 133

Mr. Mill on the rule of certitude ... ... ... ... 146

Argumentative preliminaries on the matter ... ... 155

Direct controversy with Mr. Mill on the ma tter ... 160

Mr. Mill's positive thesis ... ... 176

Some subordinate issues considered ... 180

ESSAY V.— MR. MILL'S PHILOSOPHICAL POSITION.

(January, 1874.)

Mr. Mill's autobiography ... >>t 185

His aggressive and affirmative philosophical position ... 205

His position examined on mathematical axioms and the rule of certitude 209

I lis attempted distinction between two kinds of complex ideas ... 220

Summary of the preceding argument ... 222

Other propositions concerning necessary truth ... 223

Can the uniformity of nature be proved by experience ? ... 227

Mr. Mill's reply to the Dublin Review on this question . 229

Contents. ix

ESSAY VI.— MR. MILL'S DENIAL OF FREEWILL.
(April, 1874.)

PAGE

Mr. Mill's theory of determinism stated in detail 237

Great part of this theory may be accepted as true 246

Exact point at issue ... ... ••• 247

Determinism opposed to observed facts 251

Determinism and fatalism ... ... 264

Answers to objections ... ... ... ... 265

Statement of two further objections ... ... ... .-.. 282

ESSAY VII.— APPENDIX ON FREEWILL.

(July, 1874.)

Criticism in the Spectator ... ... ... ... ... 285

Distinction between resolve and desire

Men often act against their prevailing desire ... ... ... 289

ESSAY VIII.— MR. MILL ON CAUSATION.

(July, 1876.)

Recapitulation of former essays ... ... ... ... 303

Mr. Mill's sense of the word "cause"... 312

The universal belief of mankind in a causation different from this ... 320
In what precise sense of the word do mankind universally believe the

existence of causation ... ... ... ... ... 325

The principle of causation established ... ... ... ... 326

Causation in no way depends on the uniformity of nature ... 333

The principle of causation entirely ampliative ... ... ... 334

ESSAY IX.— FREEWILL.
(April, 1879.)

REPLY TO A REPLY OF DR. BAIN'S.

Summary of our original argument ... ... ... ... 337

Dr. Bain does not once refer to our central argument ... ... 346

His first criticism ... ... ... ... ... ... 347

His second criticism ... ... 350

x Contents.

PAGE

His proof of determinism drawn not from direct observation, but merely

from analogy ... ... ... ••• ••• ... 352

The degree of moral evil existing on earth seems to us by far the

greatest difficulty connected with our subject ... ... 359

The relations between moral habit and anti-impulsive effort ... ... 364

CAUSATION AND FREEWILL.

Having established indeterminism, our next step is to develop that

truth into the full doctrine of freewill ... ... ... 369

Mill's conception of cause recognizes no influx or agency ... ... 371

Kegular sequence of phenomena looked upon by the intuitionist as the

result of causation ... ... ... ... ... 375

Contrast between a blind cause and an originative cause ... ... 378

The soul acts as a blind cause in generating its spontaneous impulse, as

an originative cause in resisting it ... ... ... 381

Summary of what has been said on causation and freewill ... ... 382

INTKODUCTION.

THE following essays, with the exception of the last four in
the second volume, were written as part of a systematic
course projected by the author with a double object :
firstly, to point out the fundamental fallacies in the Ex-
perience system of philosophy, as represented especially by
the late Mr. Stuart Mill, and the absolute necessity of
admitting the power of the human mind to perceive with
certainty some immediately evident truths beyond the
phenomena of consciousness ; and, secondly, to draw out,
on the principles thus established, an argumentative train,
exhibiting the various intuitions in the intellectual and
moral order, truths of observation, and deductions, whereby
the existence of a Personal God, with the characteristics
which Theists attribute to Him, may be established. The
first of these two tasks the author considered himself to
have accomplished. Of the second he had barely indicated
the lines, in two essays on "Ethics in its bearing on
Theism " and "The Philosophy of the Theistic Contro-
versy," when he was deprived of all power of intellectual
work by the illness which terminated in his death.

It may be worth while to say a few words as to the exact
scope and aim of the essays which are here republished,
for the purpose of making clear what they do and what
they do not profess to accomplish. No exhaustive review

xii Introduction.

is attempted of Mr. Mill's philosophical work as a whole.
Such a review would have exhibited many points of agree-
ment between that writer and the author,* who always
considered that Mill's carefully disciplined and naturally
candid and thoughtful mind had done much for the super-
structure of psychology and logic, although the basis he
adopted, which was substantially that of his father, and in
part an inheritance from Hume, was most unsatisfactory,
or rather was no basis at all. What the author did
attempt was to show that the root-doctrines of the Experience
School are devoid of all scientific foundation and incapable
of defence, while the representatives of that school have in
all the useful work they have done for philosophy been in
reality acting upon those very principles of intuition
which they deride as superstitious and unscientific in
their opponents. If we note the consequences of this
(supposing the charge to be true), we at once see the
peculiar importance of the work which he undertook. If
it be granted that Mill's logic is in many respects an
advance upon previous works of the same description, and
that the experimental method of psychology attains to
valuable and new results — is, in fact, a distinct step
forward in that science, there seems at first sight no
escape from admitting that the methods and principles
of inquiry adopted by these philosophers are really an
improvement upon those which they have replaced. The
writers themselves acquire all the authority which attends
on success, and public opinion declares in their favour.
They appeal to results as the positive proof that the first
principles whence they started were sound. And the con-
sequence is that people do not look closely at the real
connection between their success and their avowed prin-

* The Review of Mill's Logic contributed to the British Critic of October,
1843, by Mr. Ward, when fellow of Balliol, shows his very high intellectual
appreciation of Mill, in spite of the severity of its criticisms.

Introduction. xiii

ciples. The world sees their success, and takes them at
their word as to the way in which it was gained. Dr. Ward's
central aim, we may say, was by a concentrated attack
upon their first principles to draw attention to them, and
to their absolute incompatibility with the mode of philoso-
phizing of those who professed them. He singled out a
few of their fundamental axioms, and insisted on holding
them up to the light and examining them.

" These men are conjurors," he said in effect. A
conjuror who is performing feats of sleight of hand
before an audience of simple villagers passes a shilling,
apparently, through the table. He gives them plenty of
time to examine the shilling and to mark it. They see it
and touch it, and know unmistakably that there it is on
one side of the table. And when it comes out on the
other side, they examine it again, and recognize their own
mark. But at the really critical part of the performance,
he diverts their attention, and, while bidding them watch
closely something unconnected with the real secret of the
trick, imperceptibly passes the coin from the right hand to
the left, so that when a few moments later he is pressing
his right hand on the top of the table and holding a plate
in his left underneath to catch the coin, as he says, when
it passes through, the whole work is already done ; there is
no coin in the right hand ; it is really under the table.
He then explains to them that his method is simple
enough. He scratches the table three times in one spot,
and says, * Presto open,' and the table opens and allows
the coin to pass. The villagers listen with open mouths.
They have no doubt this is the true explanation. See there,
he is doing it again, to show them that this is really the
secret of the matter. He scratches, pronounces the words,
and they hear the coin drop in the plate beneath the table.
He can do it, and so they do not doubt that he himself
gives the true account as to how he does it. So also it is
i. b

xiv Introduction.

with Mill and Bain. They have done a work for philosophy.
They have shown up a good deal of inaccurate thinking in
their predecessors, and added considerably to the analysis
of mental operations. This they make clear, and take care
that the world should recognize. And all the time they
profess to have been philosophizing on the principles of the
Experience School, and to reject the power of the mind to
know immediately anything beyond its own consciousness.
Here is the trick. Their readers read these principles as
they state them, and study the results ; but the sleight of
hand whereby the results are reached, the imperceptible
insertion of intuitions into the process when nobody was
looking, escapes notice. And the impossible account which
they themselves give of this part of their performance is
accepted, not after close scrutiny, but in virtue of the
authority naturally possessed by those who have been
successful in a particular department of study.

Dr. Ward's work, then, was confined to the detection of
this sleight of hand. He insists repeatedly on the necessity
of watching this part of the process, and on the absolute
impossibility of accepting their own account of the philo-
sophical method they employ, which entirely eliminates
intuitive perception of truth. In all their useful and careful
j analysis, Mill and Bain act, he says, as unmistakably on
a belief in the validity of intuitions, in the mind's power
ito perceive directly certain objective truths, as I do or
any other Christian philosopher does. They use all the
authority they have gained by successful deductions from
intuition, in advocating principles which are not more
subversive of religious philosophy than they are of the
methods they themselves have employed.

The illustration which he himself pressed most con-
stantly upon his opponents was the immediate and absolute
trust, which is assumed in all philosophy, nay, in all
coherent thought, to be rational, in the veracity of memory ;

Introduction, xv

or — to put it in such a form as will most clearly exhibit its'
connection with the point at issue — our trust that our
present impression of what we saw or heard five minutes
ago tells truly the objective fact that we did see or hear
the thing in question. On this point the author had the
advantage of learning from the rejoinder of Mr. Mill,
and the express treatment of the subject by Mr. Huxley,
that his apparent rcductio ad absurdum was not based
on an overstatement of the natural consequences of the
Experience view. Mr. Huxley quite accepted the position
that his principles allowed of no intuitive confidence in
an act of memory, and was led in his defence of his
own belief therein into what must be allowed on all
hands to be an amusing slip in logic. We trust our
memory with good reason, he argued, because we so con-
stantly experience its truthfulness. The retort was obvious.
Unless Mr. Huxley begins by trusting it instinctively, how
can he be sure that he ever has experienced its truthfulness ?
Mr. Mill, on the other hand, admitted our belief in memory
to be ultimate, because no reason can be given for it which
does not presuppose its validity. This position is, as Dr.
Ward pointed out, if literally accepted and carefully
reflected on, most paradoxical. Dr. Ward had contended
that the mind's positive declaration, if rightly analyzed, is
the ultimate test of truth, and gave as an instance the act
of memory. If, he said, you do not trust your mind's
immediate declaration there you cannot even speak co-
herently, much less give any reason for your belief that
memory tells truly. This was, of course, a reductio ad
absurdum; but Mill replied as though the ground for the
belief were the dilemma which its absence would lead to,
whereas of course it would be equally true of any false
belief that you can give no reason for it which docs not
presuppose its truth — indeed this would be the special
characteristic of a false belief. Some superstitious old

xvi Introduction.

woman tells me that she is convinced of the existence of
fairies. I ask her what is her reason. " Oh," she replies,
"I hear them knocking at my door in the night; and I
hear them singing at Christmas time." I reply, " How do
you know that the knocking is done by fairies or that the
Christmas songs are not performed by the waits ? You give
no reason for your belief, which does not presuppose the
existence of the fairies — the very thing in question."

What Mr. Mill, of course, means is that the belief
in the veracity of memory is plainly not derived from
any prior truth, and is in that sense ultimate. But its
being ultimate does not prove it to be well grounded, and it
is manifestly illogical in him to regard a belief as well
founded on the sole ground that his philosophy cannot get on
without it. Such a mode of procedure would sanction any
fanaticism that was ever devised. "All our schemes
would fail, and all our faith be vain," says the follower of
Mahomet, " if we did not believe Mahomet to be a prophet ; "
therefore forsooth he is a prophet ! And the special case
of memory presents in addition the peculiar characteristic,
that reasoning in its favour from consequences is suicidal.
In the act of recognizing the consequences, as in any
other train of thought, the memory is used and trusted.
The consequences cannot be known until the veracity of
memory is established.

The only possible warrant, then, for our trust in memory,
and its all-sufficient warrant, is the mind's own positive
declaration in the very act of remembering, that it is
telling truth; and it remained for Mr. Mill to show by
what right, save that of expediency, he admitted the
validity of that declaration, to save his neck, as it were, in
this one instance, and refused to admit it, in the absence
of similar external pressure, in others. This he never did.
And seeing that he considered the intuition controversy of
the last importance, and devoted a long appendix to Dr.

Introduction. xvii

Ward's strictures, which he said were the best which were
likely to be made by any future champion, Dr. Ward held
himself justified in assuming that he did not press his
explanation of this particular question further, because he
had some faint perception of the probable issue of a sus-
tained analysis of the position he had taken up.

Another instance which the author selected of the want)
of fidelity to his avowed principles in Mr. Mill's philosophy j
was his belief in nature's uniformity. This belief is, by \
the confession of all, at the root of induction, and induction
and the inductive method is the very watchword of modern
philosophy, and the field in which Mill has been above all
others a successful analyst of the mind's method of pro- (
cedure. Dr. Ward draws out carefully, in the second and
fifth essays of this collection, the impossibility of giving a
reasonable ground for this belief without allowing the prin-
ciple of intuition. Not that he held the belief to be itself .
intuitive, but it necessarily depends for its establishment
on certain intuitive principles — among others the principle
of causation. Mr. Bain gives up this controversy and
admits,* that we must assume the uniformity of nature, as
we can find no other basis for physical science. And yet
—we may remark in passing — what contempt do not
thinkers of his school exhibit for those who say that we
must assume Theism to be true because there is no other
satisfactory basis for moral science ! Mr. Mill was led, in
reference to this controversy, into another curious logical
blunder. He had summarized the uniformity of nature as an j
exhibition of what he called the law of causation. This law, |
he explained, implies no more than uniform phenomenal -
sequence, as he refuses to allow any other meaning to the
word " cause," than immediate precedence in order of time./
Speaking however, later on, in reference to the question
raised by Dr. Ward, he declared that a miracle would be
* See Bain's " Logic," pp. 273, 274.

xviii Introduction.

po breach of the law of causation, as a new antecedent —
jviz. the volition of a supernatural being — is, by hypothesis,
interposed in such a case. Thus, a law which was denned
as the law of phenomenal uniformity in nature, and the
basis on which physical science proceeds, is allowed by him
to be consistent with as many interruptions of that uni-
formity as might result from the constant interference (as
the author puts it) of as many deities as Homer himself
supposed to inhabit Olympus. A truly marvellous basis
for the inductive method ! Of course such an argument is
a reductio ad absurdum, but, as Dr. Ward points out, in
such a delicate matter and in treating of principles which
in their legitimate issue must overthrow religious philo-
sophy, one has a right to expect careful thought and
accurate expression : whereas in both the instances that
have been named no evidence appears of either. The author
frequently pointed out, that of questions such as the veracity
of memory and the general uniformity of phenomena all
men have abundant evidence through the intuitive and in-
ferential powers of their own mind, working in the normal
way; therefore controversy in their regard is apparently
sterile and unnecessary. But this is the very reason of
Dr. Ward's challenge : " You trust your intuitive percep-
tions," he says, " and climb by means of them to an
eminence. Then you kick down the ladder by which you
have climbed, and tell those who did not notice you while
you were climbing, that you jumped up, and that the ladder
is rotten, and would be of no use." Mr. Mill and Mr. Bain
are no doubt right in trusting in memory and in nature's
uniformity, but their only warrant for doing so is a process
of mind involving intuition, and if they pretend to have
sufficient warrant on the Experience principles let them
show it. If they fail to do so, let them own that these
principles are an insufficient account of the basis of their
own reasoning. Dr. Ward thus expresses his view on this

Introduction. xix

matter, so far as nature's uniformity is concerned, in an
essay which we have not here republished :—

" Any one who observes either the language or the
general tone of Phenomenistic philosophers will see clearly
(we think) that they do not in fact rest their belief in the
uniformity of nature on any argumentative basis whatever,
which they can distinctly contemplate or defend. The
truth of the doctrine is made clear to them by reasons which
they do not attempt to analyze, and which they could not
analyze if they did attempt to do so. The uniformity of
nature is borne in upon them (if we may so express our-
selves) by the e very-day experience of their active life.
Every day they receive fresh proofs of it and live (as we
may say) in contact with it. Accordingly, if they ever give
their minds to an inquiry as to what those arguments are
on which the doctrine can reasonably be based, any one
may see that they pursue the examination in a spirit of
languid indifference. They are already profoundly con-
vinced of the doctrine, before they have even asked them-
selves any question as to its reasonable basis.

" Now, on this we have three remarks to make : (1) We
think that their procedure is, so far, entirely reasonable.
We are confident that there are several truths of vital im-
portance to mankind, which are reasonably accepted as
certain on implicit grounds of assurance. They are reason-
ably accepted, we say, as certain, on grounds of assurance,
which have not as yet been scientifically analyzed ; nay, of
which, perhaps, scientific analysis transcends the power of
the human mind. See what Catholic philosophers say on
the sensus communis naturae.

"But then (2) these philosophers are not less than
wildly unreasonable when, as they are so fond of doing,,
they contrast their own speculative method with others,
as being characteristically precise, logical, scientific. Or^
the contrary, it is in these very qualities that their specula-

XX

Introduction.

\tion is as yet so conspicuously wanting. Here is a doctrine
of their philosophy so fundamental, so simply at the root
of their whole investigations, that unless it be known as
certainly true, their whole system is one organized sham
'and pretence. Yet it is this very doctrine, for which they
are unahle to produce any precise, logical, scientific basis
whatever.

" And (3) they show themselves still more narrow,
prejudiced, and bigoted, when they assume (which they
often do) as a kind of first principle that this method of
implicit reasoning, which is so indispensably necessary for
themselves, is in its nature insufficient for the certain
establishment of conclusions. As one out of a thousand
instances, consider what are sometimes called the " internal
evidences" of religion. Even Protestants may in their
measure (we are confident) reasonably appeal to these ; but
we will ourselves, of course, exhibit what we mean as
exemplified by a Catholic. Take, then, the case of a Catholic
who habitually frequents the sacraments, who practises
regular self-examination and moral discipline, who makes
it the one chief work of his life to discover and correct his
faults, who constantly remembers God's presence, and
trusts to His strength in his own efforts to acquire virtue.
We say with complete confidence, that such a person
possesses a quasi-experimental acquaintance with the
Existence, Power, and Holiness of some great supernatural
Being ; an acquaintance entirely analogous to that know-
ledge which scientists possess of their fundamental prin-
ciple, the uniformity of nature. Of course these philo-
sophers are at full liberty to deny our allegation or to refute
it if they can. But what we are here denouncing as so
intolerably prejudiced and illogical is that they will not take
^ the trouble to examine, and (if they can) refute it ; that
they stigmatize it as being self -evidently irrational and
fanatical. The unreason and fanaticism are really on their

Introduction.

side. In one particular the argumentative grouni
exist for Theism possess a marked superiority over those
which (as yet at least) exist for the uniformity of nature.
For the former— apart altogether from implicit reasoning-
there exists (we maintain) a substantial, cogent, conclusive
chain of explicit argument. No such chain of argument
has hitherto been set forth by any Phenomenist, for the
establishment of his one fundamental scientific premiss."

I have selected the two instances of belief in memory
and in nature's uniformity, because Mill joined issue on
both, and accepted Dr. Ward's statement of the case as a
fair one, thus rendering the charge of misrepresentation or
travesty, so serviceable in evasion and so disheartening to
those who are trying to probe a theory to its depths —
impossible.

We are now in a position to consider further the line of
the author's reasoning. If, he argued, you base your philo-
sophy on beliefs which have no warrant save the mind's
own positive declaration, you must extend your rule of
certitude farther than the testimony of consciousness as to
its own subjective experience. The mind's positive declara-
tion will include this testimony, therefore you will express
what is your rule of certitude, and not what you pretend that
it is, by saying that what your faculties positively avouch
is certainly true. But this needs a qualification. No doubt]
as Mill says, intuition has been degraded by dishonesty and\
superstition, and men have hugged prejudices and refused 1
to give them up because they were, they said, intuitively
known as truths. Here, then, is an important work for the /
philosopher — to find out what is the mind's positive declara-
tion on the one hand, and, on the other, what are those)
prejudices, inaccurate though spontaneous inferences,!
inseparable associations of feeling, and so forth, which1
have claimed the rank of intuitions, and being found outl
have damaged a good cause, as the votaries of a true '

xxii Introduction.

religion may discredit it by their private eccentricities or
vices. The rule of certitude, in view of this consideration,
is thus stated : "Whatever our existing cognitive faculties,
being rightly interrogated, declare to be certain, is certain ; "
and the motive for our certainty is the light of our reason
kvhich bids us unhesitatingly believe under such conditions.
The establishment of this doctrine as to " The Kule and
Motive of Certitude," forms the main object of the first
essay.

The next question was to show that our faculties do
positively declare the existence of certain synthetical a
priori necessary truths, as Kant terms them. That is to
say, that the mind has the power of seeing the necessary
and universal truth of certain propositions which are not
identical and consequently sterile, but in which the predi-
cate expresses something which is not connoted by the
subject. He agreed with Kant as to the paramount im-
portance of this power, in the theory of philosophical
knowledge.* Mill had challenged the intuitionists in
the field of mathematics, and in that field Dr. Ward
defended his proposition. His crucial instance was, as
appears in the second essay, " All three-sided figures
have exactly three angles." The three angles are a part
of neither definition nor connotation of the subject,
and yet the mind pronounces with certainty that it is a
necessary and universal truth that " all trilaterals are
triangular." Mill treated such truths as generalizations
from experience, as their objective necessity would accord ill
with his principles ; and this is the view against which Dr.
Ward's essay is primarily directed. He argues carefully
in the same essay that the proposition in question is an
absolute and ultimate decision of the mind, and no product

* I need hardly say that he did not agree with Kant, that they related to
mere " forms of thought." This doctrine destroys, of course, their objective
character, although it leaves untouched their attributes of necessity and
universality, which Mill denied.

Introduction. xxiii

of association, nor, again, an inference rapidly and uncon-
sciously made. In the succeeding essay he vindicates the
same claim — to the character of a priori synthetic judg-
ments— for the decisions of the mind with respect to moral
truths. " To kill my father under such circumstances is
wrong," is, he maintains, a proposition seen by the mind's
own immediate light to be necessarily true, although the
word " wrong" expresses an idea not contained in the defini-
tion of killing my father under the circumstances supposed.
The two next essays consist of a re-statement and
development of the theses already advocated with especial
reference to Mr. Mill's reply to the Dublin Review, in the
sixth edition of his work on Hamilton. Next in order comes
the treatment of determinism ; the doctrine that the action
of the will is infallibly determined by the circumstances,
internal and external — including under the former both
natural disposition and the bent of inclination arising from
habit or education — in which the agent finds himself. Dr.
Ward argued against this, that we are conscious — by our
own " self-intimacy " as he expressed it — of the spontaneous
tendency of the will which is the natural and infallibly
determined outcome of the action upon it of the forces in
question. So far he'goes with the determinists. He main-
tains that the spontaneous impulse of the will is infallibly
determined, and is the natural resultant of the internal and
external forces or attractions — motives, as Mr. Bain terms
them — which solicit it. But, he adds, that very process
of self-inspection whereby this becomes evident shows also,
if it be carried further, that the mind has a sovereign power
over this natural movement of the will. If you hold your-
self passively, the balance of motives — or as Dr. Ward
prefers to style them " attractions " — carries the day. But,
on the other hand, a person may fix his attention on some
end to be attained, not so vividly realized as to offer the
strongest attraction to the will, but, as it were, cleaved to

xxiv Introduction.

doggedly by the mind's inherent power, and may in pur-
suance of this end make an effort of will in opposition to
its spontaneous movement — an " anti-impulsive effort," as
he called it. The development of this thesis, together
with the replies called for by the criticisms which it pro-
voked— from Mr. Bain, Mr. Shadworth Hodgson, and others,
—and the treatment of causation in its connection with
Free-will, occupy the rest of the volumes now published,
with the exception of the last six papers. Of the first of
these six only a portion is here reprinted, as its earlier
pages consisted almost entirely of a repetition of remarks
made elsewhere in the series. The portion now published
indicates the view of the author — although without any full
development of it — that the sense of Moral Obligation, as
distinct from the mere perception of right and wrong,
carries with it an intimation of the existence of a personal
superior of supremely holy character. This is, it would
seem, substantially identical with the view advocated by
Cardinal Newman in the Grammar of Assent.

The succeeding essay — on the "Philosophy of the
Theistic Controversy " — is the last of the series and
sums up the previous ones, indicating, on the one hand,
the lines on which he considered that the positive
defence of Theism should proceed, and, on the other,
the dispositions necessary in order that that defence
should be * understood and felt to be satisfactory. I
think I am right in saying that as he approached close
to the positive and immediate argument for God's exist-
ence, he felt more than he had done previously the neces-
sity of something in the student which should fit him to
apprehend and feel the force of directly religious argu-
ment. This was partly due to his own experience in
conversation with friends of various schools of thought and
habits of mind, and partly to the influence of M. Olle
Laprune's excellent book, " De la Certitude Morale," which

Introduction. xxv

occupied much of his attention in the closing years of his
life.

The essays which follow tell their own story. The
first was one which attracted much attention at the time of
its appearance, and formed the subject of considerable
correspondence between the author and Mr. Mill, who was
much interested in it as a piece of argument. A few words
with reference to the subject of this essay will not be out of
place. Dr. Ward held strongly that the irreligious in-
ferences so frequently made by scientific men from the
constantly growing knowledge which fresh discoveries give
us of the details of nature's uniformity, were really logical
leaps, and not warranted by the facts of the case. The
close intimacy which the man of science has with the links
in the chain of physical causation, renders it difficult for
him, unless his mind is unusually large and candid, to^ rise
to the conception of a First Cause, self-determining, and
setting in motion, so to speak, the whole series of changes
by direct action on the first of the physical links in the
chain. But this difficulty has its basis, not in reason, but
in defective imaginative powers. He could not see that the
discovery of a considerable number of uniform successions
in such phenomena as those concerning the weather, in the
least degree interfered with the ordinary Christian concep-
tion of a God Who is behind the veil, working always. He
quotes Mill as allowing that the great test of scientifically
ascertained regularity in physical phenomena, is their
capability of prediction, and so far as " earthly " pheno-
mena go — that is, those phenomena which have special
connection with our planet, as, for example, the weather
or the course of disease — this capability is very limited.
The barometer will tell that it is to be wet within a limited
time, but nothing, he held, is known tending to show any
very lengthened chain of physical causes in such pheno-
mena, succeeding regularly each to each, and necessarily

xxvi Introduction.

determined by prior physical facts in the natural evolution
of the universe. Because men of science are intimately
acquainted with a certain number of regular physical ante-
cedents, they draw the conclusion that the phenomena
previous to those which they have observed, will be found
upon further examination to be equally regular. Dr. Ward
held, on the contrary, that the rough and ready conclusion
of the uneducated mind, that a thing so variable as the
weather, which has for so many years failed to evince
obedience to any ascertainable laws such as would enable
us to predict its changes long beforehand, is determined by
a voluntary agent external to the sphere of regular physical
causation, is quite as reasonable in itself as the other-
nay, more reasonable, if it be correctly analyzed ; and that
prayers for rain and health, if their validity is on other
grounds acknowledged, are in no way discredited by such
limited regularity as has been observed in the course of
the weather or of human disease. To bring his meaning
into greater distinctness, he points to the uniform succes-
sions in a pianoforte, between the pressure on the note,
the movement of the corresponding hammer, the vibration
of the corresponding wire, and so forth, all which are
perfectly regular, while, nevertheless, the first of the series
is invariably set in motion by the external and free agency
of the performer. If these regular successions are multiplied
into hundreds, then the parallel becomes more complete ;
and, accordingly, to bring the principle vividly before his
readers, Dr. Ward supposes an instrument with many such
connecting links between the player's " premovement " and
the resulting sound, and supposes a number of mice of
philosophical tendencies to be shut up within it. The con-
clusion which in the infancy of science they had drawn—
that the sounds were due to external agency — gradually
becomes discredited as link after link of uniform succession
is discovered. Elated by each fresh discovery, they look

Introduction. xxvii

forward to finding fixed laws determining the succession of
tunes. The parallel is obvious ; and Dr. Ward contends
that the original conception of immediate free external
action was nearer the truth than the later conception,
which was based on an intimate acquaintance with the
mechanical part of the action, but dropped out of sight the
all-important originator of the series of movements.

The essay on "Implicit and Explicit Thought" is
based, as appears in the essay itself, on Cardinal Newman's
sermon on the same subject, preached many years ago at
Oxford. The essay on " Certitude in Religious Assent '7 is
a review of the same writer's Grammar of Assent.

I have not felt at liberty to make any material changes
in the essays, and some of them, in consequence, neces-
sarily bear marks of the special occasions for which they
were written. The most that has been done by way of
alteration — in addition to the necessary changes in the
references from one essay to another — is the occasional
omission of repetitions, serviceable in a review as explain-
ing earlier stages of the author's argument to those who
had not followed the course as a whole, but needless and
tedious where the complete series is collected.

The arguments on which the author mainly built
for establishing Theism were, first and foremost, that from
the sense of moral obligation ; and secondly, that from the
existence of necessary truths which are, he considered,
dependent for their necessity upon the nature of God, the
one necessary Being. This argument he never developed ;
but it is curious to note that these two considerations are
substantially identical with those two most important
Kantian doctrines — of the categorical Imperative, and
synthetic a priori truths. The argument from causation
came next in his scheme. In the eighth essay he dwells
strongly on the ineradicable idea which exists in the
human mind, of causation as distinguished from mere

xx via Introduction.

phenomenal sequence. This idea is most distinctly con-
ceived, he considered, in personal action. The will's
volition that the hand should rise — here is the clearest
instance. The hand's action in knocking down an opposing
object comes near to this in conveying the idea of the influ-
ence involved in causation ; and causes in external nature are
conceived as causes, and not merely antecedent phenomena
from their analogy to these personal experiences of causa-
tion. "Whatever commences to exist must have a cause "
js the shape in which he held the causation axiom to be
declared positively by the human mind as correctly analyzed,
and hence it rises to the conception of the Self-Existent
First Cause, which had no beginning. The design argument,
the aesthetic argument, and others of a similar nature,
were chiefly useful, in this scheme, as subsidiary, and in-
dicating the intelligence and beauty of the Creator. He
agreed with Mill that the design argument by itself fails
to establish infinite power united with infinite goodness in
the Author of Nature ; indeed, he considered that the- facts
on which this argument is based point to some limit in
one or the other ; and that the sphere of objective con-
tradiction must probably be larger than has been generally
supposed, which hypothesis would account for this apparent
deficiency. That is to say, the number of things in-
trinsically impossible, or, to use Suarez's phrase, "extra
objectum omnipotentiae," might well, he thought, be far
larger than is apparent to our limited intelligence and
knowledge.

WILFRID WARD.

MARY'S COLLEGE
BY REV. T.

ESSAYS ON

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THEISM.

•
I.

THE RULE AND MOTIVE OF CERTITUDE.*

ENGLISH philosophers, for our present purpose, may be
divided into two sharply contrasted classes, whom we may
call objectivists and phenomenists respectively. The latter
think that man has no knowledge whatever, except of
phenomena, physical or psychical ; nay, more correctly
psychical alone : f whereas the former stoutly maintain
that man has cognizance of objective truth. We desire to
take our own humble part in this momentous controversy.
We hope, firstly, to demonstrate by argument, that there
exists a body of necessary truth cognizable by man ; and,
secondly, to consider particular portions of that truth, such
as the intrinsic distinction between moral good and evil,

* La Philosophic Scolastique Expose'e et Dtfendue. Par LE B. P. KLEUT-
GEN, S. J. Paris : Gaume.

An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent. By JOHN HENRY NEWMAN,
D.D., of the Oratory. Third Edition. London : Burns, Oates & Co.

Essays Philosophical and Theological. By JAMES MARTINEAU. London :
Triibner & Co.

An Examination of Sir W. Hamilton's Philosophy. By JOHN STUART
MILL. Third Edition. London : Longmans.

t It admits of "no doubt," pronounces Professor Huxley ex cathedrti,
" that all our "knowledge is a knowledge of states of consciousness " (" Lay
Sermons," p. 373).

VOL. I. B

2 The Philosophy of Theism.

the axiom of causation, and the existence of God. We
shall throughout consider Mr. Mill our chief antagonist ;
as being at once by far the ablest and by far the most
highly esteemed of English phenomenists. We consider it,
indeed, a singular benefit to the cause of truth, that we
have to contend with one so singularly clear in statement,
accessible to argument, and candid, or rather generous,
towards opponents. And we should add, both as a farther
benefit to truth and as a peculiar attraction to ourselves,
that he is always so intensely in earnest ; that he regards
philosophy as no mere matter of otiose speculation, as no
mere instrument of intellectual drill and intellectual excite-
ment, but as all-important in its bearing on man's daily
life and practice. But before joining direct issue with
him, a preliminary question has inevitably a prior claim
on our attention. We wish to prove that necessary truth
is cognizable by man with certitude ; but it is evidently
impossible even to argue this question, until it is first
agreed between him and ourselves what is the test of
certitude ; what are the conditions requisite and sufficient,
that certitude may be established. To this preliminary
question we must confine ourselves in our present essay.

The question itself may be stated thus. Orthodox
philosophers — we must be permitted to use the term— have
built up a large body of theological (we refer, of course,
exclusively to natural theology), metaphysical, psychical,
social, physical verities, resting on sustained processes of
reason ; and these processes of reason have been partly
deductions from intuitive truths, partly inductions from
experienced fact, partly various combinations of the two.
But before any scientific trust can be reposed in these
conclusions, a previous inquiry must be answered. How is
a thinker to know that these assumed truths are intuitive ;
that these assumed facts have been experienced ; that these
deductive and inductive processes are really valid, or, in

The Rule and Motive of Certitude. 3

other words, adapted to the inferring of true conclusions
from true premisses ?

Phenomenists will at once throw off part of the difficulty,
by saying that there are no intuitive truths to be assumed.
But they in no respect lessen their difficulty by this allega-
tion. They may deny to man all other intuitional faculties ;
but they must still ascribe to him that intuitional faculty
which is called memory, and which indubitably no less
needs authentication than the rest. This is a point of
quite central importance, and to which we beg our readers '
most careful attention. The distinction is fundamental,
between a man's power of knowing his present and his past
experience. Certainly he needs no warrant to authenticate
the truth of the former, except that present experience
itself. To doubt my present inward consciousness, as Mr .
Mill most truly affirms (p. 186), " would be to doubt that I
feel what I feel." So far, then, the phenomenist and our-
selves run evenly together ; but here we may come to a
very broad divergence. " I am conscious of a most clear
and articulate mental impression that a very short time ago
I was suffering cold ; " this is one judgment : " a very short
time ago I was suffering cold ; " this is another and totally
distinct judgment. That I know my present impression by
no manner of means implies that I know my p&si feeling.

We would thus, then, address some phenomenistic
opponent. You tell us that all diamonds are combustible,
and that the fact is proved by various experiments which
you have yourself witnessed. But how do you know that
you ever witnessed any experiment of the kind ? You reply
that you have the clearest and most articulate memory of
the fact. Well, we do not at all doubt that you have that
present impression, which you call a most clear and
articulate memory. But how do you know — how can you
legitimately even guess — that the present impression corre-
sponds with a past/rtc£? See what a tremendous assump-

4 TJie Philosophy of TJieism.

tion this is, which you, who call yourself a cautious man
of science, are taking for granted. You are so wonderfully
made and endowed — such is your assumption — that in
every successive case your clear and articulate impression
and belief of something as past, corresponds with a past
fact. You find fault with objectivists for gratuitously and
arbitrarily assuming first principles : was there ever a
more gratuitously and arbitrarily assumed first principle
than your own ?

You gravely reply,* that you do not assume it as a first
principle. You tell us you trust your present act of
memory because in innumerable past instances the avouch-
ments of memory have been true. How do you know-
how can you even guess — that there is one such instance ?
Because you trust your present act of memory : no other
answer can possibly be given. You are never weary of
urging that a priori philosophers argue in a circle ; whereas
no one ever so persistently argued in a circle as you do
yourself. You know forsooth that your present act of
memory testifies truly, because in innumerable past in-
stances the avouchment of memory has been true ; and you
know that in innumerable past instances the avouchment

* What follows does not apply personally either to Mr*Mill or Mr. Bain.
The former, with that candour which characteristically distinguishes him,
frankly confesses (p. 203, note) that " our belief in the veracity of memory is
evidently ultimate ; no reason can be given for it which does not presuppose
the belief and assume it to be well-founded." This admission was the more
signally candid because Mr. Mill must have seen that it furnishes his
antagonists with a very powerful '« argumentum ad hominem," of which
indeed we hope to avail ourselves in our next essay. Mr. Bain makes the
same admission ("Deductive Logic," p. 273). On the other hand. Professor
Huxley ("Lay Sermons," p. 359) says that "th£ general trustworthiness of
memory " is one of those " hypothetical assumptions which cannot be proved
or known with that highest degree of certainty which is given by immediate
consciousness ; but which, nevertheless, are of the highest practical value,
inasmuch as the conclusions logically drawn from them are always verified
by experience." The argument in the text applies directly to this view.
Professor Huxley cannot legitimately even guess that anything whatever has
been "verified by experience," unless he first knows that certain acts of
memory testify truly.

The Rule and Motive of Certitude. 5

of memory has been true, because you trust your present
act of memory. The blind man leads the blind, round and
round a " circle " incurably " vicious."

Kemarks entirely similar may be made on the validity
of the inductive process. The proposition, that all the
diamonds, which I have myself seen consumed by fire, were
at that moment combustible — of this proposition we can
well understand phenomenists saying, that it requires no
further authentication than the trustworthiness of my
memory. But the proposition that all diamonds on earth
are always combustible — or even that the very diamonds
which I saw burned were combustible one day earlier — who
can say that this proposition requires for its knowledge
nothing more than experience ? It is inferred from ex-
perience ; and its truth cannot possibly be known by me,
unless I first know the validity of the inferring process,
whatever that process may be.*

Without at all prejudging, then, any question really at
issue between objectivists and phenomenists as such, we
may say that "primary truths" consist of two classes:
viz. (1) primary premisses ; and (2) the validity of one or
more inferring processes. We may add, that the cognition
of a primary truth as such is precisely what is called an
"intuition." If these primary truths are guaranteed with
certitude — but not otherwise — there is a stable foundation

* Mr. Bain admits this statement of ours as frankly as Mr. Mill admitted
the former. " This most fundamental assumption of all human knowledge "
is "expressed by such language as 'nature is uniform;' 'the future will
resemble the past ;' 'nature has fixed laws.' . . . Without this assumption,
experience can prove nothing. . . . This must be received without proof '. ... If
we seem to offer any proof for it, we merely beg it in another shape " (" De-
ductive Logic," p. 227).

In case any of our readers should think it doubtful whether it be abso-
lutely necessary for phenomenists to assume as a separate principle the
validity of their inferring process— Mr. Mill, indeed, apparently does not
account this necessary — we would point out (what will be very obvious as
our essay proceeds) that no part whatever of our argument depends on this
particular statement.

6 The Philosophy of Theism.

for human knowledge in its entireness and totality. The
inquiry, then, to be instituted is this. Firstly, what
characteristics must be possessed by those truths, which the
thinker may legitimately accept as primary ? and secondly,
on what ground does he know that the propositions are true
which possess those characteristics? Or to express the
same thing in F. Kleutgen's words (n. 263), firstly, what
is the rule of certitude ? and, secondly, what is its motive ?

There never was any answer but one given to this
question by Catholics, before the deplorable darkness
spread abroad by Descartes over the whole region of
philosophy. (1) Primary truths are those which the
human intellect is necessitated by its constitution to accept
with certitude, not as inferences from other truths, but on
their own evidence : this is the rule of certitude. (2) These
truths are known to be truths ; because a created gift
called the light of reason is possessed by the soul, whereby
every man, while exercising his cognitive faculties accord-
ing to their intrinsic laws, is rendered infallibly certain
that their avouchments correspond with objective truth :
this is the motive of certitude. "It is conceivable," says
Professor Huxley ("Lay Sermons," p. 356), "that some
powerful and malicious being may find his pleasure in
deluding us, and in making us believe the thing which is
not every moment of our lives." Quite conceivable, doubt-
less ; but the light of reason makes man infallibly certain
that such a supposition is absolutely contradictory to fact.

This is the doctrine accurately and carefully elaborated
by F. Kleutgen in the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th chapters of
his Third Dissertation. "It is the light of reason which
makes us certain of what the sensus intimus attests"
(n. 263). "Proceeding from the facts furnished by ex-
perience, we advance to further knowledge by the principles
of pure thought ; but the truth of these principles and the
reality of those facts are not certain to the mind, except

The Rule and Motive of Certitude. 7

through the light of reason which is inherent in the human
mind " (n. 264). " The mind in thinking hy reason has
the consciousness of possessing truth, so long as it knows
the agreement [which exists] between its thoughts and
those principles which we call the laws of thought "
(n. 274). Since the creature's " faculty of knowledge is
created and therefore limited, no creature can be infallible
in this sense, that by his own strength he can judge of
everything with certitude. In the creature infallibility is
always united with fallibility, as being is united with not-
being. Yet, just as the creature's being, though finite, is
nevertheless true being, so his infallibility, though limited,
is nevertheless real infallibility1' (n. 277). " The principles
wherewith we begin, the logical laws which we follow in
deduction, are infallible, as the rule whereby we judge the
truth of our experimental knowledge " (n. 278).*

We may be allowed to call this doctrine the doctrine of
intrinsic certitude. We would so call it, in order to dis-
tinguish it from those theories which rest certitude on
some basis extrinsic to the mind itself; from Descartes's,
e.g., who rests it on the veracity of God ; and from La-
mennais's, who rests it on the consent of mankind. Accord-
ing to this, which we must be allowed to call the one
Catholic doctrine on the subject, the mind's intrinsic light

* We should not fail, however, to quote the important elucidation which
F. Kleutgen subjoins : " And that we may understand how little this pre-
rogative [of partial infallibility] would justify human pride, let us observe
the limits of that sphere within which [alone] it is ascribed to him. In our
investigations we need experimental knowledge, not only in commencing our
inquiries, but during their whole progress ; especially when we would apply
science to the conduct of life. Now, how many things are necessary in order
to our arriving at full certitude by means of personal experience and other
men's observations ! What calm ! what attentiveness 1 what impartiality !
what efforts ! what perseverance ! How often it happens that a new obser-
vation, a more profound examination, an unexpected discovery, have over-
thrown the most accredited systems by taking from them their basis ! If,
then, our age glorifies itself for its progress in the experimental sciences,
men should not be unmindful at the same time of the lesson in humility
which should be learnt from that very progress," etc.

8 The Philosophy of Theism.

declares the objective truth of whatever man's cognitive
faculties subjectively avouch. Would we demonstrate that
there are necessary verities ? Would we demonstrate that
this or that particular proposition is among this number ?
In either case it is requisite, and it is sufficient, to demon-
strate that the human intellect, acting on the laws of its
constitution, so declares. This is the foundation we wish
to lay in our present essay for the controversy with Mr.
Mill which is to follow. But before proceeding to vindicate
its truth, we must guard against two possible misconcep-
tions of our meaning.

In the first place, it is abundantly possible that men
may misinterpret the avouchment of their intellect; and
this, indeed, would constitute an important addition to the
causes alleged by F. Kleutgen (see our preceding footnote)
for their proclivity to error. Both schools of philosophy
admit this. The objectivist says to his opponent, If you
will only look fairly at this and that intellectual fact to
which I draw your attention, you will not be able to deny
that such and such is the declaration of your cognitive
faculties. And the phenomenist is not slow in making a
similar retort. We hope ourselves, indeed, in our next
essay vigorously to illustrate this fact ; we hope to show,
by appealing to this, that, and the other mental experience,
that phenomenists have not a leg to stand on, when they
deny that their cognitive faculties declare the existence of
necessary truth. What we are maintaining in this essay
is, that such is the sole legitimate controversial ground;
that the avouchment of man's cognitive faculties is his
final and his infallible standard of truth.

But, secondly, we appeal to the mind's positive, not its
negative constitution ; or, in other words, we lay our stress
on its affirmations, not on its incapacities. It does not
follow, because the human mind cannot conceive a propo-
sition, that such proposition may not be true ; nay, that it

The Rule and Motive of Certitude.

may not be most certain and inappreciably momentous".
We express this qualification here, that we may distinctly
explain the precise bearing of our main thesis; but we reserve
our argument on the matter to a later part of our paper.

Our main thesis, then, is this. " Man's cognitive
faculties, while acting on the laws of their constitution,
carry with them in each particular case their own evidence
of absolute trustworthiness. All human knowledge has its
commencement in various truths, whether of memory* or
of other kinds, which are self-evidently known as true,
each by itself, under the light of reason." It would, of
course, be a contradiction in terms, if we professed to
adduce direct arguments for this thesis ; because such
profession would imply that the self-evidence of these
truths is a verity inferred from premisses, whereas the
thesis itself states that the knowledge of one or other of
them as self-evident is an absolutely essential preliminary
to all inference whatever. But we will (1) adduce for it
strong indirect argument; and (2) (which is much more
important) suggest to our readers such mental experiments
as shall (we trust) satisfy them of its truth. We state our
indirect argument as follows.

Every one really knows that he knows something
besides his present consciousness ; that he has had this or
that definite past experience; that through this or that
moral or intellectual training he has arrived at this or that
interior result; and the like. There are some few most
singularly constituted men who, at particular moments of
their life, persuade themselves that they doubt whether they

* We are amazed that both Sir W. Hamilton and Mr. Mill concur in
censuring Reid for his statement that " memory is immediate knowledge
of the past" ("Mill on Hamilton," p. 134). The statement seems to us
not only indubitable, but even elementary ; and we are sanctioned in this
opinion by the high authority of Mr. Martineau (vol. ii. pp. 258-263). That
which I immediately think of, in remembering, is surely my past experience.
But the question is wholly irrelevant to our present purpose.

10 The Philosophy of Theism.

possess such knowledge, and we will presently consider
their case : for the moment, however, we will put them out
of account. Speaking generally, then, every one knows
that he knows something besides his present consciousness.
But he cannot possess that knowledge, except through the
exercise (past or present) of his cognitive faculties ; and he
cannot accept it as being knowledge and not delusion, except
by knowing that the declarations of those faculties are
true. Now, how can he know this ? By the authentication
of God ? by the testimony of his fellow-men ? But it is
only by trusting the declaration of his cognitive faculties
that he can know or even guess the existence of God and
his fellow-men ; and still more, that he can know or even
guess what God and his fellow-men testify. Unless, there-
fore, his cognitive faculties authenticate themselves, they
cannot be authenticated at all. And if they are not
authenticated at all, no man on earth knows anything
whatever, except his own experience of this particular
moment. Than this there can be no more clenching
reductio ad absurdum.

Passing now to the direct establishment of our thesis,
we appeal to each man's consciousness in our favour.
That which his faculties indubitably declare as certain,
he finds himself under an absolute necessity of infallibly
knowing to be true. I experience that phenomenon of
the present moment, which I thus express : I say that I
remember distinctly and articulately to have been much
colder a few minutes ago when I was out in the snow, than
I am now when sitting by a comfortable fire. Well, in
consequence of this present mental phenomenon, I find
myself under the absolute necessity of knowing that a very
short time ago I had that experience which I now remember.
Professor Huxley may talk of " some powerful and malicious
being," who " finds his pleasure in deluding me " and
making me fancy what never happened; but I am abso-

The Rule and Motive of Certitude. 11

lutely necessitated to know that I am under no such
delusion in regard to this recent experience.* And so with
my other intellectual operations. My faculties pronounce
that my present impression of colour differs from another
of which I retain a distinct idea ; or they pronounce that
this trilateral figure which I distinctly image in my mind,
is triangular ; or when I see two strips of wood lying in an
oblong box close together and parallel to the sides, my
faculties pronounce that the one which reaches beyond
the other is nearer than that to the further end of the box.
In all these cases I am necessitated to know that which
my faculties declare as true.

As we have already said, there are some few most
singularly constituted persons who, when contemplating
their own mental phenomena, become for the moment dizzy
with self-inspection ; seized with vertigo, as one may say,
with gazing down the abyss : and these men persuade
themselves that they do possess a power of distrusting
their cognitive faculties. We would thus address such a
sceptic, if we could obtain his attention. We appeal from
Philip drunk to Philip sober. You are giddy for the
moment and beside yourself, like a man in liquor. If you
would correctly appreciate your mental constitution, look
back at some given period of your life, when your faculties

* In a passage which we quoted in a previous note, Professor Huxley
seems to say that the truth of what memory distinctly testifies is not known
" with that highest degree of certainty which is given by immediate conscious-
ness" but is nevertheless in the very highest degree probable. If we rightly
understand him — with very great respect for his usual power and clearness
of thought — we must nevertheless say that this seems to us the most un-
reasonable opinion on the subject which can possibly be held. If my memory
may be trusted, those things which it distinctly testifies are known with
most absolute certainty; if it cannot be trusted, its avouchment does not
render them even remotely probable. Indeed, what can be more violently
unscientific — from the standpoint of mere experimental science — than to
assume without grounds, as even probable, the very singular proposition, that
mental phenomena (by some entirely unknown law) have proceeded in such a
fashion that my clear impression of the past invariably corresponds with my
past experience ?

1 2 The Philosophy of Theism.

were braced and in full play, not paralyzed by morbid intro-
spection. You were engaged in that anxious commercial
speculation, or in that important lawsuit, or you were
taking measures to avert imminent gout. Had you at that
time the power of doubting whether you had previously
entered on that speculation, or engaged in that lawsuit, or
experienced premonitory symptoms of gout ? Or when your
mother was at last pronounced out of danger, could you
really prevent yourself from infallibly knowing that you
had been anxious ? Or had you really the power of doubt-
ing whether you had ever seen that sweet face before ?
You will reply perhaps — and indeed you are bound (we
admit) in consistency to reply — that you have no reason to
know you ever were in such circumstances ; that you know
nothing whatever about yourself, except your present con-
sciousness. In that case we will practise on you a future
experiment. Employ yourself in whatever most interests
you ; in studying mathematics or taking a part in glees.
While you are so engaged, we will suddenly come up and
seize you by the arm. Can you noiv, we will say, prevent
yourself from infallibly knowing that a very short time ago
you were immersed in mathematical study or engaged in
singing that glee ?

However, whether or no we would succeed in curing this
monomaniac, is an irrelevant question : for that he is a
mere monomaniac, and, moreover, that he has no real
power of persevering in such scepticism, will be admitted by
all our readers. For the consistent sceptic cannot possibly
be a reader. He cannot understand one single sentence
—unless, while reading the last words, he trusts his memory
for the first. Now, if he trusts his memory so far as this,
he has ipso facto abandoned his sceptical position.

Phenomenists, then, as we have urged, act suicidally in
disparaging the light of reason ; for it is only by surrender-
ing themselves to that light, and so trusting their memory,

The Rule and Motive of Certitude. 13

that they can know anything whatever about phenomena.
They are very much given, however, to such disparage-
ment ; and they are very fond of alleging certain supposed
difficulties. I see a straight stick in the water, and my
faculties (they urge) confidently pronounce that the stick is
crooked ; or if a cherry is placed on my crossed fingers, my
faculties confidently pronounce that my hand is touched by
two substances. It is apparently for some such reason
that Mr. Mill lays so much stress on Berkeley's theory of
vision. Men fancy themselves — such is Berkeley's theory
— to see distance immediately ; but in fact that conviction
of distance is an inference, and no immediate judgment
whatever. Now, we do not admit this theory except for
argument's sake ; and Mr. Abbott, in his little volume called
11 Sight and Touch," professes to disprove it.* But we
cannot at all agree with the latter writer, when he says
(Preface) that if Berkeley's theory were admitted, " con-
sciousness " would be proved " delusive " and " doubt must
reign supreme : " for on the contrary — so far as the con-
troversy with scepticism is concerned — we consider the
question one of complete indifference. All these superficial
difficulties are readily solved by resorting to a philosophical
consideration, which is familiar to Catholics, though
(strangely enough) we do not remember to have seen it in
non-Catholic works. We refer to the distinction between
what may be called " undoubting " and what may be called
" absolute " assent.

By " absolute " assent we understand an assent so firm
as to be incompatible with the co-existence of doubt : but by

* The present writer has never given his mind to it, and has no bias
whatever on either side. Dr. M'Cosh ("Intuitions of the Mind," p. ll-l,
note) thinks Mr. Abbott's argument sufficient for part, not the whole, of
his conclusion. Mr. Mill (p. 300) considers that Mr. Abbott has been con-
clusively answered by Professor Fraser in the North British Review for
August, 1864. On the other hand, the last writer on the subject, Professor
Huxley, takes part against Mr. Mill and Professor Fraser. See Jtacinillan,'*
Magazine for June, 1871, p. 153.

14 The Philosophy of Theism.

11 undoubting " assent we mean no more than that with
which in fact doubt does not co-exist. Now, the mere
undoubtingness of an assent does not at all imply any
particular firmness, but arises from mere accident. For
instance, a friend, coming down to me in the country,
tells me that he has caught a sight of the telegrams as he
passed through London, and that the Versailles government
has possession of Paris. I had long expected this, and I
assent to the fact without any admixture of doubt. In an
hour or two, however, the morning paper comes in; and
I find that my friend's cursory glance has misled him, for
that the army has only arrived dose up to Paris. The
extreme facility with which I dismiss my former "un-
doubting " assent, shows how very far it was from being
" absolute." Its true analysis, in fact, was no more than
this : " there is an a priori presumption that Paris is
taken." But as no particular motive for doubt happened
to cross my mind, I was not led to reflect on the true
character of the assent which I yielded.

Now to apply this. Evidently it cannot be said that my
cognitive faculties declare any proposition to be certainly
true, unless they yield to that proposition " absolute "
assent. But a moment's consideration will show that my
assent to the crookedness of the stick or the duplicity of the
cherry, may accidentally indeed have been undoubting,
but was extremely far from being absolute. Its true
analysis was : "there is an a priori presumption that the
stick is crooked or that there are two objects touched by
my fingers ; " and this declaration of my faculties indisput-
ably corresponded with objective truth. A remark precisely
similar may be made on my putatively immediate percep-
tion of distances ; and we may bring the matter to a crucial
experiment by some such supposition as the following.

I am myself but youthful, whether in age or power of
thought; but I have a venerable friend and mentor, in

The Rule and Motive of Certitude. 15

whose moral and intellectual endowments I repose perfect
confidence. I fancy myself to see a crooked stick, or to feel
two touching objects ; but he explains to me the physical
laws which explain my delusion, and I surrender it with
the most perfect facility. He further expounds and demon-
strates Berkeley's theory of vision ; and here, though I have
a little more trouble with myself, yet after a short con-
sideration I entirely acquiesce. He proceeds, however — let
us suppose, for the purpose of probing the depth of my
convictions — to tell me that I have no reason whatever for
knowing that I ever experienced a certain sensation, which
my memory most distinctly declares me to have experienced
a very short time ago : or again, that, as to the particular
trilateral figure which I have in my thoughts, I have no
reason whatever for knowing it to be triangular, and that he
believes it to have five angles. Well, first of all I take for
granted that I have not rightly understood him. "When I
find that I have rightly understood him, either I suspect
him (as the truth indeed is) to be simulating, or else (if
I am too great an intellectual coward for this) I am
reduced to a state of hopeless perplexity and bewilderment,
and on the high-road to idiocy. So great is the distinction
between merely " undoubting " and " absolute " assent ;
between my faculties testifying that there is an a priori
presumption for some theory and their testifying that it is
certainly true.

Another objection, raised by phenomenists, turns on the
divergence which exists among objectivists, as to what their
faculties do testify. Thus many men do not think them-
selves to intue any axiom of causation at all ; and of those
who do allege such axiom, there are different schools, each
differently analyzing it. Many, again, do not think them-
selve to intue the intrinsic distinction between moral good
and evil ; and among those who do recognize this dis-
tinction, there are differences which may in some sense be

10 The Philosophy of Theism.

called fundamental. This objection cannot, however, be
maintained, unless its advocate first makes good a pre-
liminary position. He must show that the difference, on
which he insists, is a difference between what the intellect
of different men declares, and not merely between what they
interpret it as declaring. But we are perfectly confident
that he cannot show this, for that it is not true. We shall
examine the phenomena on which he relies when we come
to treat the respective questions of morality and causality.

A third objection has been urged against us, founded on
the indubitable fact that we may not, at this rudimental
stage of our argument against phenomenists, assume the
Creator's Veracity. Could not a mendacious creator, it has
been asked — Professor Huxley's " powerful and malicious
being who finds his pleasure in deluding " mankind — so
have constituted the human intellect as that it should
testify falsehood, and nevertheless have given men the same
trust in its declarations which they now feel ? We reply
easily in the negative. To say that mendacious faculties
can be infallibly known as trustworthy, is a contradiction
in terms. No possible creator could anymore achieve such
a result than he could form a crooked straight line.

We have now, then, sufficiently illustrated our funda-
mental thesis, that every thinker infallibly knows each
successive declaration of his faculties to be true. And we
have also sufficiently illustrated the first explanation, which
we appended to that thesis ; viz. that what he can ulti-
mately trust is the declaration of these faculties, and not his
own analysis thereof. We proceed to the second qualifica-
tion which we made at starting. We appeal, we said, to
the mind's positive, not its negative constitution : we cannot
admit that what is inconceivable is therefore untrue. We
side here with the vast majority of phenomenists,* against

* Mr. Herbert Spencer is, we believe, the only exception ; and that on
grounds of his own which we need not here consider.

The Rule and Motive of Certitude. 17

certain objectivists ; but we believe that our divergence
from the latter is exclusively verbal. They say, e.g., that
no trilateral figure is quadrangular, and that two straight
lines never enclose a space, because in either case the
supposition is inconceivable : but what they intend is, that
such supposition contradicts what I know as true, by my
very conception of a trilateral figure or a straight line. We
think it, however, a real calamity that they have used the
expression which we criticize, because it permits such
writers as Mr. Mill to rest contented with a most inadequate
apprehension of the objectivist argument.

In justice, however, to these writers, we must distinguish
carefully between two different senses of this word "incon-
ceivable ; " and this procedure will lead us into what our
readers may at first be tempted to suppose a digression,
but which they will ultimately find to be no digression at
all. Sometimes the word " inconceivable " is taken to
mean " unimaginable," at other times " unintelligible " or
" unthinkable." Now, there is a large class of unimaginable
things, which are by no means unthinkable ; and no objec-
tivist ever alleged that the unimaginableness of a proposition
is incompatible with its truth. We may express the dis-
tinction in Mr. Martineau's words ; though we are not
aware that this most able philosopher has ever adopted the
particular formula which we are criticizing, of inconceiv-
ableness being conclusive against truth. Ideas, he says
(vol. i. p. 193), may be clear and thinkable, which "do not
come before the imaginative or representative faculty."
" You may deny the idea of the ' infinite,' " he adds (p. 194),
" as not clear : and clear it is not, if nothing but the mental
picture of an outline deserve that word. But if a thought is
clear when it sits apart without danger of being confounded
with another, when it can exactly keep its own in speech
and reasoning with forfeit and without encroachment — if,
in short, logical clearness consists not in the idea of a limit
VOL. i. c

18 The Philosophy of Theism.

but in the limit of the idea, then no sharpest image of
any finite quantity ... is clearer than the thought of the
infinite." And so at p. 205, the author contrasts an "idea
of the reason " with " one of the phantasy." " It is no objec-
tion," he adds (p. 238), "to either the reality or the
legitimacy of a thought, that it is not of a kind to be
brought before the mind's eye." So Dr. M'Cosh. " The
thinking, judging, believing power of the mind is not the
same as the imaging power " (" Intuitions," p. 195, note).
Similarly speaks Mr. Mill from the opposite school. Take
the case of some large number : suppose, e.g., it were said
that over a certain tract of ground there had been counted
27,182,818 potatoes. It is simply impossible to have this
number in my phantasy or imagination, so as to distinguish
it from 27,182,817 and 27,182,819. Yet says Mr. Mill (p.
100), "We have a" sufficient "conception of it, when we
have conceived it by some one of its modes of composition,
such as that indicated by the position of its digits." This
" limited conception enables us to avoid confounding the
number in our calculations with any other numerical
whole ; " and we can also " by means of this attribute of
the number ascertain and add to our conception as many
more of its properties as we please." In other words, this
large number is most easily thinkable, though by no means
imaginable.

This distinction, between propositions imaginable and
propositions only thinkable, is in some degree correspondent,
though not precisely so, with a distinction made by F.
Newman, between what he characterizes respectively as
" real " and " notional " assent.* He adds, also, this
obvious qualification, that multitudes of men, from indolence
or other causes, give no more than a " notional " assent to

* He thinks, however (p. 43), that men cannot have even a " notional "
apprehension of a very large number, such as a billion or a trillion. We
are certainly disposed to dissent from him on this small episodical question.

The Rule and Motive of Certitude. 19

propositions most easily " imaginable." And this circum-
stance, as F. Newman emphatically repeats in various
passages, is often a very serious moral or intellectual
calamity.

Now, as we have said, those objectivists against whom
we are now arguing, undoubtedly used the word " incon-
ceivable " to express not " unimaginable," but " unthink-
able." We are led, then, to consider whether any proposi-
tion can (in this sense) be truly called inconceivable, except
those which actually contradict what is known by my very
conception of their " subject." If there are none such,
then our only quarrel with these philosophers will be, that
their language understates the positiveness with which man's
cognitive faculties declare certain propositions to be neces-
sarily false. But we think there are propositions which
may most fitly be called inconceivable and unthinkable, yet
which all Theists regard as indubitably true. We refer to
religious mysteries.*

Let us begin with an illustration, which has often been
given by F. Newman. It is most easily supposable that
there may be rational creatures to whom, as being incor-
poreal themselves, the union of soul and body is a veritable
mystery. If it were revealed to them — or, again, if it were
deducible from premisses with which they were acquainted
— that the soul of man is on one hand spiritual and indi-
visible, while on the other hand it is integrally present
throughout every particle of an extended body, such a

* It is said in Goschler's " Dictionary of Catholic Theology " (article
" Mysteries "), that theologians are extremely far from accord in their
acceptation of this word. F. Perrone (" De Vera Keligione," prop. 3) uses
it substantially in the same sense with F. Newman, and we ourselves so
adopt it in the text. F. Franzelin, however (see e.g. "De Deo Trino,"
thesis xvii.), employs the word quite otherwise ; viz. to designate those
truths which can in no sense be intrinsically established by reason, either
before or after their revelation. But it is very difficult indeed to find a
substitute for the word, as expressing FF. Pen-one's and Newman's idea :
whereas F. Franzelin may most easily express his by a phrase which also he
often uses, viz. " superrational verities."

20 The Philosophy of Theism.

proposition would be inconceivable to them. It would be
inconceivable, in what Mr. Mill calls (p. 90) " the proper
sense " of the term : it would be " that which the mind is
unable to put together in a representation." Their first
impulse would be to think that it is a contradiction in
terms.* But subsequent consideration might bring to their
mind that, as F. Newman expresses it (" Grammar," p. 44),
their " notion " of a thing so entirely external to their
experience "may be" — nay, is almost sure to be — "only
partially faithful to the original ; " that the word " pre-
sence " may have a far wider sense than any which they
can ever so distantly apprehend. That their notions, there-
fore, of subject and predicate are more or less mutually
contradictory, is no proof whatever that there is incompati-

* " The soul is not only one, and without parts, but, moreover, as if by a
great contradiction even in terms, it is in every part of the body. It is
nowhere, yet everywhere. . . . No part of a man's body is like a mere
instrument, as a knife or a crutch might be, which he takes up and may lay
down. Every part of it is part of himself; it is connected into one by his
soul, which is one. Supposing we take stones and raise a house, the
building is not really one ; it is composed of a number of separate parts,
•which viewed as collected together we call one, but which are not one
except in our notion of them. But the hands and feet, the head and trunk,
form one body under the presence of the soul within them. Unless the soul
were in every part, they would not form one body ; so that the soul is in
every part, uniting it with every other, though it consists of no parts at all.
I do not, of course, mean that there is any real contradiction in these
opposite truths ; indeed, we know there is not, and cannot be, because they
are true, because human nature is a fact before us. But it is a contradiction
when put into words ; we cannot so express it as not to involve an apparent
contradiction ; and then, if we discriminate our terms, and make distinctions,
and balance phrases, and so on, we shall seem to be technical and artificial
and speculative, and to use words without meaning. . . . What (we should
ask) was the meaning of saying that the soul had no parts, yet was in every
part of the body ? what was meant by saying it was everywhere and no-
where ? how could it be one, and yet repeated, as it were, ten thousand
times over every atom and pore of the body, which it was said to exist in?
how could it be confined to the body at all ? how did it act upon the body ?
how happened it. as was pretended, that when the soul did but will, the arm
moved or the feet walked ? how can a spirit, which cannot touch anything,
yet avail to move so large a mass of matter, and so easily, as the human body ?
These are some of the questions which might be asked, partly on the ground
that the alleged fact was impossible, partly that the idea was self-con-
tradictory." (F. Newman's Oxford "Parochial Sermons," vol. iv. pp. 325-328.)

The Bute and Motive of Certitude. 21

bility between the archetypes of those notions. And we
human beings indeed, in this case, are so well aware of the
ludicrous mistake which would be made by these immaterial
creatures if they reasoned otherwise, that we are mightily
tempted to forget how prone we are ourselves in other
instances to a similar paralogism.

A proposition, then, may be called " mysterious " to
some given thinker, when it would be rightly accounted by
him self-contradictory, if he suppposed that the notions
which it conveys to him adequately represent their arche-
types. It should be carefully observed, however, that his
faculties themselves convey to him an assurance of his
notions being thus utterly inadequate, and of no contra -
dictoriness being therefore necessarily involved in the
proposition itself. And it is further worth pointing out,
that such mysterious propositions may nevertheless give
real — possibly, therefore, vitally important — information ;
though it would carry us too far from our theme, if we here
enlarged on this truth.

Now, as the union of soul and body might be utterly
inconceivable to certain immaterial creatures, however
strong their evidence for the fact, so there are various
propositions concerning God, rigidly demonstrable by
human reason, which are nevertheless inconceivable to the
human intellect. That He Who is absolutely Simple and
Indivisible, is present throughout all space ; that He in
Whom is no succession of time, is ever diversely energizing ;
that in God there is no real distinction whatever between
His Nature and His Acts ; — here are propositions at once
humanly demonstrable and humanly inconceivable. We
should add that no mysteries added by revelation are
more inconceivable than those irresistibly authenticated by
reason.*

* We earnestly hope we shall not be understood to characterize all
propositions concerning God as inconceivable. God, in most of His aspects,

22 The Philosophy of Theism.

Mr. Mill excellently explains (p. 82) why it is abundantly
possible that such inconceivable propositions may be true.
" The inference " that " what we are incapable of conceiving
cannot exist," " would only be warrantable if we knew
a priori that we must have been created capable of con-
ceiving whatever is capable of existing ; that the universe
of thought and that of reality must have been formed in
complete accordance with each other. . . . But an assump-
tion more destitute of evidence could scarcely be made ;
nor can one easily imagine any evidence that would prove
it, unless it were revealed from above."*

We implied, a few pages back, that a proposition is
necessarily false which contradicts what is known by my
very conception of its "subject." We should here explain
that this does not at all conflict with what we have just
been saying about mysteries. The reason is this. When
the archetype is apprehended by me as indefinitely
transcending my conception thereof, various propositions
are not " known by its very conception," which otherwise
would be.

We have given, then, two reasons for deeply regretting
the phrase used by many objectivists, that what is incon-
ceivable is necessarily false. Firstly, even if no proposi-
tion could be called " inconceivable " except that which

can be apprehended by man (to use the common phrase) though not com-
prehended. Accordingly a great majority of the propositions concerning
Him are readily conceivable, thinkable, intelligible, though not compre-
hensible in all the fulness of their meaning ; while some few are inconceivable
as explained in ihe text. Nothing e.g. in the world conveys a more
intelligible and practical idea than the affirmation that God is Loving,
Veracious, Omniscient, Omnipotent, Holy. The same distinction applies to
revealed propositions concerning Him. F. Newman (pp. 120-137) considers
those various statements which combine to express the dogma of the Blessed
Trinity ; and in a very masterly way determines which of these statements
admit of " real," and which of only " notional " assent.

* We were much disappointed on coming, a few pages later (p. 119, note),
to Mr. Mill's disparagement of " mystical metaphysics " and " mystical
theology ; " for there cannot be a better defence of " mystical metaphysics "
than the passage quoted in the text.

The Rule and Motive of Certitude. 23

actually contradicts what is known by my very conception
of its " subject," still it was extremely to be desired that
a stronger expression than " inconceivable " should be used
to express this. But, secondly, the word "inconceivable "
may very naturally be understood as applying to every
" mystery; " and if it be so understood, all Theists know
that certain " inconceivable " propositions are demon-
stratively true.

Here, then, we sum up. Our direct thesis has been,
that whatever men's cognitive faculties indubitably declare,
is thereby known to be infallibly true. To prevent mis-
conception, however, we have added two explanations.
(1) This infallibility appertains to what they declare, not to
what they may be understood as declaring ; and (2) it
appertains to their positive declarations, and not to their
incapacities. Now, since Mr. Mill is to be our principal
opponent in various Succeeding essays, it is absolutely
necessary, before we conclude, to see how far we are in
harmony with him on this preliminary question. We are
hereafter to argue against him, that the existence of neces-
sary truths is cognizable with certitude by mankind ; but
in order to discuss this with any satisfactory result, it is
extremely momentous that he and ourselves should arrive
at an agreement as to what constitutes a sufficient test of
certain knowledge. And we shall be able, on our side, to
make our position clearer if we begin by distinguishing
it from a ground importantly different, which has been
occupied by more than one English non-Catholic objectivist.

Mr. Martineau, indeed — whom, notwithstanding extreme
theological divergence and some serious philosophical sepa-
ration, we cannot but recognize as at once the ablest and
most learned of these — entirely agrees with ourselves (if
we rightly understand him) on the question we have been
discussing. " We have entire faith," he says (vol. i. p. 241),

24 The Philosophy of Theism.

" in the veracity and the consistency of the reports given
in by our highest faculties." And he uses similar expres-
sions in pp. 47, 48, 101, 232, 237. He says again, pointedly
(p. 104), " be the proof what it may which authenticates
the belief, it is the faculty in the last resort which authen-
ticates the proof." Yet even as to Mr. Martineau, we wish
he had spoken more uncompromisingly. " Our faculties,"
he says (p. 238), " must be either taken at their word, or
dismissed as cheats." We wish he had expressly said what
he evidently holds, viz. that it is physically impossible to
" dismiss them as cheats "or to doubt their declaration.
It is a very serious loss to metaphysical science that Mr.
Martineau has never found time for writing a systematic
treatise.

Dr. M'Cosh, in his most valuable work on "the Intui-
tions of the Mind," speaks as strongly as F. Kleutgen
himself, on one part of our subject, viz. the rule of certitude.
He maintains emphatically that whatever the human
faculties avouch is infallibly certain as they avouch it. The
capacity of cognition in the mind, he says (p. 17), "is not
that of the bent mirror to reflect the object under modified
forms, but of the plane mirror to reflect it in its proper
shape and colour. The truth is preserved by the mind, not
formed; it is cognized, not created." But when question
arises on the motive of certitude, he often seems to turn off
into a different groove. He often partakes, in fact, the
error of Descartes, and implies that my reason for knowing
the veracity of my mental constitution is my previous con-
viction of God's Veracity. See third edition, pp. 30, 113,
116 : see also p, 333, where his remarks are singularly un-
satisfactory. In fact, we suspect that this view possesses,
more or less systematically and consciously, not a few
speculative minds of non-Catholic England. Yet surely
never was there an error more suicidal ; and Mr. Mill in a
few pregnant words utterly explodes it. We quote the

1 i'JSSENTED TO ST. MM?V»«? COT.T^-R LIBRARY
BY REV. T.

The Rule and Motive of Certitude. 25

passage with a few verbal changes (pp. 161, 162), and we
italicize two sentences.

" If the proof of the trustworthiness of our faculties is the
veracity of the Creator, on what does the Creator's veracity
itself rest? Is it not on the evidence of our faculties? The
Divine veracity can only be known in two ways : (1) By
intuition, or (2) through evidence. If it is known by intuition,
it is itself an immediate declaration of our faculties; and to
have ground for believing it we must assume that our faculties are
trustworthy. ... If we hold that God is not known by intuition
but proved by evidence, that evidence must rest in the last
resort on the immediate declaration of our faculties. Religion
thus, itself resting on the evidence of our faculties, cannot be
invoked to prove that our faculties ought to be believed. We
must already trust our faculties before we can have any evidence of
the truth of religion"

We are bound in fairness to add that Dr. M'Cosh, in
his "Examination of Mr. Mill's Philosophy" (p. 54), ex-
presses full concurrence with this reasoning.

Dean Mansel has undoubtedly conferred important
benefits on philosophy, and we hope in our succeeding essays
to profit largely by his labours. Yet we must frankly say
that, on the matter discussed in our present essay, his
doctrine differs from Dr. M'Cosh's, signally for the worse.
He concurs with that writer in holding that God's Veracity
is my reason for regarding my faculties as in any sense
trustworthy ; but he considers that argument as availing,
not for the conclusion that their declaration is always true,
but only that they are not so utterly mendacious as to be
the mere " instruments of deception." " We may believe,
and we ought to believe," he says (" Prolegomena Logica,"
p. 81), "that the powers which our Creator has bestowed
upon us are not given as instruments of deception. . . . But
in believing this we desert the evidence of Reason to rest
on that of Faith." According to this view, I could not
know or even guess that my faculties are not mere instru-

26 The Philosophy of Theism.

ments of deception, except for my belief that they are given
by God. But on what ground do I believe that they are
given by God ? Because they by their exercise lead me to
that conclusion. But how do I know that, in thus leading
me, they are not mere instruments of deception ? Because
they were given me by God? But how do I know that
they were given me by God? And so on with a vicious
circle ad infinitum.

We would only add here, to prevent possible miscon-
ception of our meaning, that God's Veracity is undoubtedly
a most legitimate philosophical premiss for the establish-
ment of any conclusion, which is not itself required as a
premiss for the demonstration of God's Veracity. For our
own part, we think that a consideration of God's Attributes
might with advantage be much oftener employed in philo-
sophical argument than is commonly the case. But this
by the way.

We are now, then, to consider how far we may count on
Mr. Mill's agreement with ourselves, in holding that the
genuine declaration of man's faculties is in every case
infallibly true. It is by no means so easy to answer this
question confidently as might at first be supposed. At
p. 152, indeed, he seems to speak unmistakably in our
sense. " The verdict of ... our immediate and intuitive
conviction is admitted on all hands to be a decision without
appeal." Again, in p. 166 : " As regards almost all, if not
all philosophers," he says — and by his very phrase he
implies that he at all events is no dissentient — "the
questions which divided them have never turned on the
veracity of consciousness." * What Sir W. Hamilton
" calls the testimony of consciousness to something beyond
itself, may be and is denied ; but what is denied has almost

* It should be explained that here and elsewhere he adopts under pro-
test Sir W. Hamilton's use of the word "consciousness," to express not
merely " self-consciousness," but man's intuitive faculty.

The Rule and Motive of Certitude. 27

always been that consciousness gives the testimony, not
that if given it must be believed." In the preceding page, he
says that no philosopher, not even Hume or Kant, had
" dreamed of saying that we are compelled by our nature
to believe" error. At page 161, note, he cites with approval
Mr. Stirling's excellent statement, that it is the business of
man's cognitive faculties to consider carefully what it is
which they themselves declare : and adds, pointedly and
justly (p. 166), that "we certainly do not know by intuition
what knowledge is intuitive."

Yet, in p. 171, he introduces a very ominous qualification
of this doctrine. Men should only accept, it seems, " what
consciousness," i.e. their intellect, "told them at the time
when its revelations were in their pristine purity." There are
" mental conceptions which become so identified in thought
with all our states of consciousness, that we seem and cannot
but seem to receive them by direct intuition." (Ib.) Some
thinkers (p. 177) "may be personally quite incapable of not
holding " a fundamental error. " We have no means of
interrogating consciousness," i.e. our intellect, " in the only
circumstances in which it is possible for it to give a trust-
worthy answer" (p. 172). "Something which we now
confound with consciousness may have been altogether
foreign to consciousness in its primitive state " (p. 185). He
seems really to distinguish between the primitive and the
adult state of man's cognitive faculties. He seems to imply
that the laws of man's mental constitution are changed
during his progress from infancy to manhood ; and that it
is to their earlier, not their later, declarations that we are
to look for authentication of truth.

We cannot believe that Mr. Mill really intends this ;
and we will, therefore, for the moment content ourselves
with a brief reply to his possible meaning. We will say
this, then. If the laws of man's mental constitution do
really change in his progress from infancy to manhood,

28 The Philosophy of Theism.

then never was there a philosophical proposition more
preposterously unfounded than that assumed by Mr. Mill
throughout, viz. that man's primitive faculties testify truth.
On what ground does an adult trust his faculties? We
know of no other answer than we gave in an earlier part
of our essay. In each individual case he finds himself
necessitated to know infallibly what his faculties indubitably
declare as certain ; and he generalizes this by degrees into
the universal proposition that they are veracious. But all
this applies to his adult, not his primitive, mental constitu-
tion; and if the former in any respect contradicts the
latter, his reasoning so far does not apply to the latter at
all. Mr. Mill professes, as strongly as we do, that no
knowledge or experience is possible, unless the thinker first
trust the distinct declarations of his memory. Is it only,
then, the clear declarations of man's primitive memory
which Mr. Mill accounts self-evidently true ?

For ourselves we cannot but entirely agree with Mr.
Mill's critic, whom he mentions in his note to p. 173. We
think it would be "contrary to all analogy," if man's
cognoscitive faculties did not need and did not receive, as
time advances, " development and education."

An argument, precisely resembling the above, applies
a fortiori to a view which Mr. Mill ascribes (p. 175, note)
to Mr. Herbert Spencer : viz. that " our primary forms of
thought " are in many cases " inherited by us from
ancestors by the laws of the development of organization,"
and need not, therefore, correspond with objective truth. It
is plain — we may observe in passing — that such a theory
applies no less to memory than to man's other cognitive
faculties ; and the view thus stated impresses us as indi-
cating the lowest point of speculative degradation at which
" the progress of thought " has yet arrived. We should
add, however, that all readers of Mr. Spencer are unani-
mous in accounting him a writer of rare subtlety and genius.

The Rule and Motive of Certitude. 29

Eeturning to Mr. Mill, we cannot persuade ourselves
that he really means what he seems to say ; that he really
regards man's mental constitution as undergoing a change
between infancy and maturity, in such sense that its de-
clarations of a later period can possibly contradict those
of an earlier. Nor, again, do we interpret a singular ex-
pression in his " Logic," as indicating a real difference
between him and ourselves, on what has been the theme of
this article. Yet we cannot refrain from adverting to that
expression. He says (vol. ii. pp. 97-98, seventh edition) that
"the truth of a belief" would not follow even from an
"irresistible necessity" of entertaining it; and that man-
kind might conceivably be " under a permanent necessity
of believing what might possibly not be true." But though
Mr. Mill here speaks very obscurely, we understand him as
referring to a certain imaginary state of things, which
might have existed ; and not as denying that in fact man's
reason infallibly authenticates its own authority. It seems
to us, from his language in both works, that Mr. Mill has
failed indeed (as we should estimate the matter) in clearly
and consistently apprehending and bearing in mind the
true doctrine ; but that he has never intended to advocate
a different one in preference. We shall take for granted,
therefore, in our next essay, unless we are admonished
of being mistaken, that the controversy between him and
ourselves turns in no respect on the authority of man's
faculties, but' exclusively on their avouchrnent.

On the other hand, we fully admit that again and again
inferences are so readily and imperceptibly drawn as to be
most easily mistaken for intuitions ; and that, in arguing
hereafter against Mr. Mill, we shall have no right of
alleging aught as certainly a primitive truth, without
proving that it cannot be an opinion derived inferentially
from experience. It is our strong impression that this,
and no more, is what Mr. Mill intends to urge in the

30 The Philosophy of Theism.

distinction which he draws between the primitive and the
adult avouchment of men's faculties.

We think so highly of F. Newman's philosophical
acumen, that it would not be fair if we did not in conclu-
sion place before our readers a passage in which he
apparently gives the weight of his authority to a different
view from that which we have supported throughout this
essay : —

Sometimes our trust in our powers of reasoning and memory,
that is, our implicit assent to their telling truly, is treated as a
first principle; but we cannot properly be said to have any
trust in them as faculties. At most we trust in particular acts
of memory and reasoning. We are sure there was a yesterday,
and that we did this or that in it; we are sure that three times
six is eighteen, and that the diagonal of a square is longer than
the side. So far as this we may be said to trust the mental act
by which the object of our assent is verified ; but, in doing so,
we imply no recognition of a general power or faculty, or of any
capability or affection of our minds over and above the particular
act. We know indeed that we have a faculty by which we
remember, as we know we have a faculty by which we breathe ;
but we gain this knowledge by abstraction or inference from its
particular acts, not by direct experience. Nor do we trust in
the faculty of memory or reasoning as such, even after that we
have inferred its existence ; for its acts are often inaccurate, nor
do we invariably assent to them.

However, if I must speak my mind, I have another ground
for reluctance to speak of our trusting memory or reasoning,
except, indeed, by a figure of speech. It seems to me un-
philosophical to speak of trusting ourselves. We are what we
are, and we use, not trust our faculties. To debate about
trusting in a case like this is parallel to the confusion implied
in wishing we had had a choice if we would be created or no,
or speculating what I should be like if I were born of other
parents. " Proximus sum egomet mini." Our consciousness of
self is prior to all questions of trust or assent. We act accord-
ing to our nature, by means of ourselves, when we remember or
reason. We are as little able to accept or reject our mental
constitution as our being. We have not the option ; we can
but misuse or mar its functions. We do not confront or

The Rule and Motive of Certitude. 31

bargain with ourselves ; and therefore I cannot call the trust-
worthiness of the faculties of memory and reasoning one of our
first principles (pp. 58-59).

We cannot doubt that these comments are aimed by
F. Newman at opinions entirely similar to those of this
essay, which were advocated by Dr. Ward in his " Philo-
sophical Introduction." We heartily concur, however, with
the first of the two paragraphs, as all will have seen who
have read our remarks ; nor did Dr. Ward express himself
otherwise in his work. Of F. Newman's second paragraph
we confess ourselves unable to apprehend the bearing ;
though very probably our inability to do so arises from
some narrowness of intellectual vision. We can hardly
be mistaken, however, in saying that the objection is
directed against our method of expressing our doctrine, and
not against that doctrine itself; and we will beg our
readers to give F. Newman's comment their attentive
consideration.

In our present essay, then, we have maintained that
whatever man's cognitive faculties indubitably declare as
certain is thereby known to be infallibly true. In our next
we are to maintain against Mr. Mill that there is no one
thing which they more indubitably declare as certain than
the existence of necessary verities.

II.

MR. MILL'S DENIAL OF NECESSAEY TRUTH.*

MR. MILL has set an excellent example, in singling out an
individual writer (Sir W. Hamilton) as his special opponent.
Even those philosophers who are most nearly agreed, differ
from each other so considerably in their exposition of
doctrine, that an antagonist who attempts to answer them
all directly is unable to exhibit the full strength of his
case. If he replies to them successively, he becomes
tedious ; if he encounters them collectively, he must use
much vagueness and indistinctness of expression. A far
more satisfactory issue will be reached, if he singles out for
conflict one in particular ; nor will he thereby be prevented
from adding such supplementary remarks as may be neces-
sary for a complete exposition of his view. All which he
need consider is, that the particular opponent whom he
selects may both be, and receive general recognition as being,
a worthy representative of the adverse school. If Mr. Mill
did well in this respect by choosing Sir W. Hamilton,
much more shall we do well by choosing Mr. Mill.

In one respect, it is both easier and more hopeful to deal
with phenomenists than with their extreme opposites, the
transcendental pantheists. Phenomenists appeal honestly

* An Examination of Sir W. Hamilton's Philosophy. By JOHN STDABT
MILL. Third Edition. London : Longmans.

A System of Logic, Eatiocinative and Inductive. By JOHN STUART MILL.
Seventh Edition. London : Longmans.

Mr. MiUs Denial of Necessary Truth. 33

and consistently to the one legitimate standard, the observed
facts of human thought ; and there is therefore a really
appreciable prospect of conducting our argument against
them to some definite result.* But Mr. Mill in particular
is a more satisfactory opponent than any other of his school,
in proportion as, more distinctly than any other of their
number, he points to the precise psychical facts on which
he would build, and the precise conclusion which he would
infer from each. His singular power of clear exposition, of
making easier what is difficult, of throwing light on what is
obscure, benefits doubtless his own cause in the first instance,
as is but fair : yet ultimately it greatly assists his antagonist ;
or rather assists the cause itself of truth, whatever that
may be : and there is no other cause, we are thoroughly
convinced, which he ever knowingly desires to promote. He
is never led, by any latent consciousness of a weak point,
to seek refuge in veiling his sense under a cloud of words ;
but on the contrary has no other aim in his language, than
that of making himself as intelligible as he can. Then
again there is no other phenomenist who has carried out
philosophical principles into nearly so large a field of
practical application ; and this is a farther advantage to
the cause of truth. We cannot indeed admit that he is, in
the fullest sense of that word, a consistent thinker ; we
cannot e.g. admit that his utilitarianism is the true philo-
sophical correlative to that generous self-sacrificing philan-
thropy which is so attractive a feature in his character,
and which so often exposes him to the charge of visionary
enthusiasm.-)* But he is almost entirely free from those

* " The man who seeks to enter the temple of Philosophy by any other
approach than the vestibule of psychology, can never penetrate into its inner
sanctuary ; for psychology alone leads to and evolves philosophical truth,
even though it is itself subordinate to philosophy. Moreover he who attempts
to construct psychology by the aid and under the direction of a metaphysical
system, contradicts the order by which both psychology and philosophy nro
developed and acquired." (Porter on the Human Intellect, p. 60.)

t For ourselves we are so profoundly convinced of the intense social evils
YOL. i. D

34 The Philosophy of Theism.

express and (one may even say) verbal self-contradictions,
of which he has pointed out so many in Sir W. Hamilton ;
and even those of his works which are least philosophical,
are evidently written under a vivid remembrance of his
philosophical tenets. So far therefore as self-contradiction
exists below the surface — as is, we think, by no means
unfrequently the case — such a fact is a most legitimately
available weapon against him in controversy.

The corner-stone of his system is that which we are to
oppose in our present essay ; his denial that there is any
truth cognizable by man as " necessary." Were he once
to admit that there is any one truth thus cognizable — his
works might still be admitted to contain a large mass of
good philosophical matter, as we think indeed they do — but
his philosophy as a whole would be at an end. On such
an hypothesis, we say, its whole framework and structure
would be proved rotten ; its materials, however valuable
in themselves, would have to be detached and rearranged ;
and his edifice would have to be reconstructed from its very
foundation. It is amply sufficient then, if we establish in
our present essay that there is at least one cognizable class
of necessary truths. By this means we shall have con-
cluded the question of principle ; and shall leave no more
behind than the question of comparative detail, what are
those propositions which justly vindicate to themselves that
title. We will leave to future essays this question of
comparative detail ; concerning ourselves here only with
the question of principle. Since therefore we are to choose
some special field whereon to join issue as a specimen of
the rest, — there is one particular class of truths, which will

which result, here in England and in Europe generally, from the Church's
loss of political pre-eminence, that we are by no means disposed to dub a
man visionary and enthusiastic, for the mere offence of advocating very funda-
mental social changes. Yet we do charge Mr. Mill with visionary enthusiasm
for expecting real social amelioration from such remedies as those, which
alone, consistently with his principles, he can propose.

Mr. Mill's Denial of Necessary Truth. 35

be generally accepted as in every respect most fitted to
effect a clear and salient result. Our direct argument shall
be, that mathematical truths are cognizable by mankind as
necessary.

This issue, again, may be still further narrowed. Mr.
Mill will not of course deny that, if mathematical axioms be
necessary, the validity of syllogistic reasoning must be also a
necessary verity ; and that the whole body of mathematical
truth must possess the same character. Our thesis then
shall be, that mathematical axioms (arithmetical, algebraic,
geometrical) are self-evidently necessary truths. By the
term " axioms," for the purpose of our present essay, we
understand those -verities which mathematicians assume as
indubitably true, and use as the first premisses of their
science. And we are to assume the doctrine for which we
argued in our first essay ; viz. that whatever a man's
cognitive faculties indubitably declare, is known by him to
be infallibly true.

We have elsewhere expressed our own suggestion, on the
true analysis of that idea " necessary," which is to be the
theme of our present essay. The idea itself, however, is so
pronounced and unmistakable, that every thinking person
understands its meaning in a certain vague but practically
sufficient way. Our present purpose accordingly will lead
us only to attempt such a delineation and embodiment of
this idea, as shall make clear the point at issue between
Mr. Mill and all objectivists. When we call a proposition
" necessary " then, we mean to say that its contradictory is
an intrinsically impossible chimera; is that which could
not be found in any possible region of existence ; is that
which even an Omnipotent Being* would be unable to
effect. And in order to show that the human mind cognizes
certain self-evidently necessary truths, we begin by putting

* We must not of course, in this rudimental stage of our argument against
Mr. Mill, assume that there is an Omnipotent Being.

36 The Philosophy of Theism.

out of court " tautologous " propositions — those which
declare no more than has already been expressed in the
subject : for concerning them, of course, Mr. Mill himself
admits that their truth is known independently of experi-
ence ; and mathematical axioms are not of their number.
Our controversy with Mr. Mill is concerned, not with these
" tautologous," but with what may be called " significant "
propositions ; with propositions which declare something
not expressed in their subject. And our allegation is this.
There is many a " significant " proposition, such that, to
use F. Kleutgen's words, "by simply considering the ideas
of the subject and the predicate, one comes to see that
there really exists between them that relation which the
proposition declares " : * and every such proposition is self-
evidently known as necessary.

Firstly then we say, that if there are such propositions,
they are self -evidently necessary. Or we may express the
same truth somewhat differently. If in any case I know,
by my merely thinking or conception of some ens, that a
certain attribute, not included in that conception, is truly
predicable of that ens, such predication is a self-evidently
necessary proposition. Take for instance the axiom, that
all trilateral figures are triangular. If, by my very concep-
tion of a trilateral figure, I know its triangularity, — and if
(as we established in our first essay) the avouchment of
my faculties corresponds infallibly with objective truth, —
then I know infallibly that a trilateral non-triangular figure
is an intrinsically repugnant chimera ; that in no possible
region of existence could such a figure be found ; that not
even an Omnipotent Being could form one. All these are
obvious and undeniable consequences of the fundamental

* F. Kleutgen explains, that such propositions are called by Kant " syn-
thetical," but by Catholic philosophers "analytical" (Phil. Scol., n. 300).
We believe that all non-Catholic philosophers without exception follow
Kant's usage in this matter : and it will be more convenient therefore if we
avoid the term altogether.

Mr. Mitt's Denial of Necessary Truth. fl7

proposition, that, by my very conception of a trilateral
figure, I know its triangularity : and to admit therefore this
fundamental proposition, is to admit that the triangularity
of all trilateral figures is cognizable as a self-evidently
necessary truth.

If this reasoning be admitted, what is our controversial
position? In such case — taking the above-named axiom
as our specimen instance, — all which we have to maintain
against Mr. Mill is, that, by my very conception of a
trilateral figure, I know that the attribute triangularity is
predicable of every such figure. But we do not see how it
is possible to make clearer so very clear a proposition ; and
our direct business therefore is merely to answer Mr. Mill's
objections.

For these, we naturally turn in the first instance to his
special philosophical work, his " Examination of Sir W.
Hamilton's Philosophy." He treats the question from
p. 318 to 326 ; and purports to account for the phenomena
on which objectivists build, by what he calls " the associa-
tion pyschology." By this term he denotes that psycho-
logical theory which alleges that man's belief in necessary
truth does not authenticate any corresponding reality, but
results from past uniformity in the association of ideas.
All my life long I have been seeing trilaterals which are
triangular, while I have had no one experience to the
contrary. So inseparable an association then — thus Mr.
Mill argues — has been established in my mind between the
ideas of trilateralness and triangularity, that I am deluded
into the fancy of some a priori connection between them,
independent of what is known by experience ; I am deluded
into the fancy, that by my very conception of a trilateral
figure I know its triangularity. We shall have, as we
proceed, to consider this argument in detail ; but we will
at once urge against it what seems an irrefragable argu-
ment ad hominem.

•><S The Philosophy of Theism.

According to Mr. Mill, ray having constantly experienced
the triangularity of trilateral figures, is merely one out of
a thousand sets of instances, in which I have observed the
unexceptional uniformity of the laws of nature. There is
no other experimental truth whatever, he thinks, which
rests on nearly so large a mass of experience, as does this
truth, that phenomena succeed each other in uniform laws.*
To this universal uniformity, " we not only do not know
any exception, but the exceptions which limit or apparently
invalidate the special laws, are so far from contradicting
the universal one that they confirm it." (" Logic," vol. ii.
p. 104.) Now the fact of my having constantly experienced
triangularity in trilateral figures, suffices (according to Mr.
Mill) for my having knit the ideas of trilateralness and
triangularity into such inseparable association that I
delusively fancy one to be involved in my very conception
of the other. Much more certainly therefore — so Mr. Mill
in consistency should admit — I must have knit into such
inseparable association the two ideas, "phenomena" and
" succeeding each other by uniform laws," that I necessarily
fancy one to be involved in my very conception of the
other. If, through my constant experience of triangular
trilaterals, I am under a practical necessity of fancying
that in every possible region of existence all trilaterals are
triangular — much more, through my constant experience of
uniformity in phenomenal succession, must I be under a
practical necessity of fancying, that in every possible region
of existence phenomena succeed each other by uniform
laws. Now am I under any such necessity, or under any
kind of approach to it ? We summon the defendant into
court as witness for the plaintiff. " I am convinced," he
says (" Logic," vol. ii. p. 98), "that any one accustomed to

* To prevent possible misapprehension, we should explain that we are
arguing entirely ad hominem. We do not ourselves admit that the uni-
formity of nature is a truth, which experience by itself would suffice to
establish.

Mr. Mills Denial of Necessary Tmth. 39

abstraction and analysis, who will fairly exert his faculties
for the purpose, will . . . find no difficulty in conceiving
that in some one, for instance, of the many firmaments
into which sidereal astronomy now divides the universe,
events may succeed one another at random without any
fixed law." Put these two statements then together. I
find insuperable difficulty against fancying, that in any
possible " firmament " there can be non- triangular tri-
laterals ; but I find no difficulty whatever against fancying,
that in many a possible " firmament " phenomena succeed
each other without fixed laws. Yet I have experienced the
uniformity of phenomenal succession (according to Mr.
Mill) very far more widely, and in no respect less unex-
ceptionally, than I have experienced the triangularity of
trilaterals. The impossibility therefore which I find in
believing the non-triangularity of any possible trilateral,
cannot be in any way imagined to arise from constancy
of experience. In other words, Mr. Mill's psychological
principle breaks down.

We will now proceed to consider in order Mr. Mill's
course of argument, from p. 318 to p. 325 ; stating it as
far as possible in his own words. He begins thus :—

It is strange that almost all the opponents of the Association
psychology should found their main or sole argument in refuta-
tion of it upon the feeling of necessity ; for if there be any one
feeling in our nature which the laws of association are obviously
equal to producing, one would say it is that. Necessary,
according to Kant's definition, and there is none better, is that
of which the negation is impossible. If we find it impossible,
by any trial, to separate two ideas, we have all the feeling of
necessity which the mind is capable of. Those, therefore, who
deny that association can generate a necessity of thought, must
be willing to affirm that two ideas are never so knit together by
association as to be practically inseparable. But to affirm this
is to contradict the most familiar experience of life. Many
persons who have been f lightened in childhood can never be
alone in the dark without irrepressible terrors. Many a person

40 The Philosophy of Theism.

is unable to revisit a particular place, or to think of a particular
event, without recalling acute feelings of grief or reminiscences
of suffering. If the facts which created these strong associa-
tions in individual minds had been common to all mankind
from their earliest infancy, and had, when the associations were
fully formed, been forgotten, we should have had a necessity of
thought — one of the necessities which are supposed to prove an
objective law, and an a priori mental connection between ideas,
(pp. 318, 319.)

We have always thought this passage to be among the
weakest which Mr. Mill ever wrote. Firstly, the two
instances which he gives in no way exemplify a necessity
of thought, but only a necessity of feeling ; the feeling of
fear in solitary darkness, and of grief in revisiting a par-
ticular place or in thinking of a particular person. Now
many wild theories have doubtless been maintained by
considerable persons ; but who in the world ever alleged,
that a necessity of feeling " proves an objective law and an
a priori mental connection between ideas " ? *

But a more important fallacy remains to be mentioned.
Mr. Mill's whole reasoning turns on the phrase, "necessity
of thought ; " and yet he has used that phrase in two
senses fundamentally different. A " necessity of thought "
may no doubt be most intelligibly understood to mean, " a
law of nature whereby under certain circumstances I
necessarily think this, that, and the other judgment." But
it may also be understood to mean, " a law of nature
whereby / think as necessary this, that, and the other

* In the first of the two instances Mr. Mill might possibly be understood
to mean, that the timid person, so long as solitude and darkness remain,
actually believes the presence of some danger. Even if this were psycho-
logically true, it would plainly be nothing to Mr. Mill's purpose. But Mr.
Mill does not really think it at all certain that there is even this temporary
belief. " The emotion of fear may be excited, and I believe often is excited
simply by terrific imaginations. That these imaginations are even for a
moment mistaken for menacing realities, may be true, but ought not to be
assumed without proof." (J. S. Mill's edition of Mill's "Analysis," vol. i.
p. 408.)

c

Mr. Mill's Denial of Necessary Truth. \£

judgment." Now we heartily agree with Mr. Mill, that
from a " necessity of thought" in the former sense, no
legitimate argument whatever can be deduced for a neces-
sity of objective truth. Supposing I felt unusually cold a
few moments ago ; it is a " necessity of thought " that I
shall now remember the circumstance : yet that past ex-
perience was no necessary truth. It is a "necessity of
thought " again, that I expect the sun to rise to-morrow :
and many similar instances could be adduced. The only
"necessity of thought" which proves the self-evident
necessity of objective truth, is the necessity of thinking
that such truth is self -evidently necessary.

This paragraph then exhibits from first to last a simple
" ignoratio elenchi," such as we should not have expected
from a writer like Mr. Mill. He proceeds, however, to say
most truly, that Dean Mansel is a far more effective
opponent of phenomenism than Sir W. Hamilton ; and
accordingly, when he proceeds to answer tJiat philosopher,
he puts forth far greater strength than in the earlier
paragraphs. Since we are here to enter on the most
critical part of our controversy, we must begin with first
distinctly setting forth (which we have not hitherto done)
Mr. Mill's own theory, on the kind oi certitude with which
men hold the truth of mathematical axioms, and on the
ground of that certitude.

This doctrine may be stated as follows. " I know the
fact that all trilaterals are triangular, just as I know the.
fact that all wood floats on the water and that all stones
sink therein. I have seen in my life a vast number of
trilateral figures, and I have found them all triangular;
all other men have had the same experience ; and the same
laws of induction, which prove that throughout the sphere
of human observation wood floats on the water, prove also
that throughout the sphere of human observation trilaterals
are triangular. Whether either of these two propositions

H The Philosophy of Theism.

is true 'in distant parts of the stellar regions' ("Logic,"
vol. ii. p. 108), is a question on which I cannot form even
a reasonable conjecture." *

For our own part we are confident, that the repugnance
against this theory which will instinctively rise up in every
intelligent mind — Mr. Mill himself admits that there is in
the first instance this instinctive repugnance — is founded
on reasoning much deeper than Mr. Mill's. Still when
thinkers of such power as Mr. Mill and some of his sup-
porters advocate a paradoxical thesis, the paradox must not
be left to sink by its own weight, but must be assailed by
explicit argument.

Now we shall not here consider the question one way or
other, whether — supposing reason did not prove mathe-
matical axioms true in every possible region of existence —
experience could by itself suffice to prove them true through-
out the reach of human observation. Our purpose is to
maintain the utter falsehood of the above hypothesis ; to
maintain that mathematical axioms are known by the light
of reason to be self-evidently necessary. Dean Mansel has
supported this view, to our mind, with absolutely irre-
fragable arguments. And we must do Mr. Mill the justice

* We think Mr. Mill will admit that we have truly stated his theory ;
yet we will give a lew references to his works. Mathematical axioms
(" Logic," vol. i. p. 258) " are experimental truths : generalizations from ob-
servation." "The reverse of the most familiar principles of arithmetic and
geometry might have been made conceivable even to our present mental
faculties, if those faculties had co-existed with a totally different constitution
of external nature." (On Hamilton, pp. 85, 86, note.) " We should probably
be as well able to conceive a round square as a heavy square, if it was not
that in our uniform experience at the instant when a thing begins to be round,
it ceases to be square." (Ib. p. 85.) See also " Logic," vol. i. pp. 259, 283.
In vol. i. p. 350, Mr. Mill speaks somewhat unexpectedly. " That a straight
line is the shortest distance between two points," he says, "we do not
doubt to be true even in the region of the fixed stars." But we do not see
how to reconcile this with his statement (vol. ii. p. 108) that " it would be
folly to affirm confidently " that " the special laws which we have found to
hold universally on our own planet " prevail " in distant parts of the stellar
regions;" and that " it would be idle to attempt to assign any " " probability "
to such a supposition. We shall return to this in the text.

Mr. Mill's Denial of Necessary Truth. 43

to say, that he has given so fair a representation of those
arguments that we have no wish to cite them except as they
stand in Mr. Mill's own pages. We will place therefore
before our readers a long extract from the " Examination
of Hamilton," which will exhibit in close context the Dean's
reasoning and Mr. Mill's attempted reply. The passage
follows almost immediately that which we last extracted >"
and the italics are ours.

Mr. Mansel joins a distinct issue with the Association psycho-
logy, and brings the question to the proper test. " It has been
already observed," he says in his ** Prolegomena Logica," " that
whatever truths we are compelled to admit as everywhere and
at all times necessary, must have their origin, not without, in
the laws of the sensible world, but within, in the constitution
of the mind itself. Sundry attempts have, indeed, been made
to derive them from sensible experience and constant association
of ideas ; but this explanation is refuted by a criterion decisive
of the fate of all hypotheses : it does not account for the
phenomena. It does not account for the fact that other associa-
tions, as frequent and as uniform, are incapable of producing a
higher conviction than that of a relative and physical necessity only"

This is coming to the point, and evinces a correct appre-
hension of the conditions of scientific proof. If other associations,
as close and as habitual as those existing in the cases in question,
do not produce a similar feeling of necessity of thought, the
sufficiency of the alleged cause is disproved, and the theory
must fall. Mr. Mansel is within the true conditions of the
Psychological Method.

But what are these cases of uniform and intimate associa-
tion, which do not give rise to a feeling of mental necessity ?
The following is Mr. Hansel's first example of them : " I may
imagine the sun rising and setting as now for a hundred years,
and afterwards remaining continually fixed in the meridian.
Yet my experiences of the alternations of day and night have
been at least as invariable as of the geometrical properties of
bodies. I can imagine the same stone sinking ninety-nine
times in the water, and floating the hundredth, but my
experience invariably repeats the former phenomenon only." *

* We would ourselves rather say : "I do not fancy myself to cognize any
intrinsic repugnance in the notion that the sun, after rising and setting for u

44 The Philosophy of Theism.

The alternation of day and night is invariable in our
experience ; but is the phenomenon day so closely linked in our
experience with the phenomenon night, that we never perceive
the one, without, at the same or the immediately succeeding
moment, perceiving the other? That is a condition present
in the inseparable associations which generate necessities of
thought. Uniformities of sequence, in which the phenomena
succeed one another only at a certain interval, do not give rise to
inseparable associations. There are also mental conditions, as
well as physical, which are required to create such an associa-
tion. Let us take Mr. Mansel's other instance, a stone sinking
in the water. We have never seen it float, yet we have no
difficulty in conceiving it floating. But, in the first place, we
have not been seeing stones sinking in water from the first
dawn of consciousness, and in nearly every subsequent moment
of our lives, as we have been seeing two and two make four,
intersecting straight lines diverging instead of inclosing a space,
causes followed by effects and effects preceded by causes. But
there is a still more radical distinction than this. No frequency
of conjunction between two phenomena will create an in-
separable association, if counter-associations are being created
all the while. If we sometimes saw stones floating as well as
sinking, however often we might have seen them sink, nobody
supposes that we should have formed an inseparable association
between them and sinking. We have not seen a stone float, but
we are in the constant habit of seeing either stones or other
things which have the same tendency to sink, remaining in a
position which they would otherwise quit, being maintained in
it by an unseen force. The sinking of a stone is but a case of
gravitation, and we are abundantly accustomed to see the force
of gravity counteracted. Every fact of that nature which we
ever saw or heard of, is pro tanto an obstacle to the formation of
the inseparable association which would make a violation of the
law of gravity inconceivable to us. Resemblance is a principle
of association, as well as contiguity : and however contradictory
a supposition may be to our experience in Me materid, if our
experience in alia materid furnishes us with types even distantly
resembling what the supposed phenomenon would be rf realized,
the associations thus formed will generally prevent the specific
association from becoming so intense and irresistible, as to

hundred years, shall remain fixed in the meridian ; or that the stone shall
float the hundredth time."

Mr. Mill's Denial of Necessary Truth. 45

disable our imaginative faculty from embodying the supposition
in a form moulded on one or other of those types.

Again, says Mr. Hansel, " experience has uniformly presented
to me a horse's body in conjunction with a horse's head, and a
man's head with a man's body ; just as experience has uniformly
presented to me space inclosed within a pair of curved lines and
not within a pair of straight lines " : yet I have no difficulty in
imagining a centaur, but cannot imagine a space inclosed by
two straight lines.* " Why do J, in the former case, consider the
results of my experience as contingent only and transgressible, con-
fined to the actual phenomenon of a limited field, and possessing no
value beyond it ; while, in the latter, I am compelled to regard them
as necessary and universal ? Why can I give in imagination to
a quadruped body what experience assures me is possessed
by bipeds only? And why can I not, in like manner, invest
straight lines with an attribute which experience has uniformly
presented in curves ? "

1 answer: — Because our experience furnishes us with a
thousand models on which to frame the conception of a centaur,
and with none on which to frame that of two straight lines
inclosing a space. Nature, as known in our experience, is
uniform in its laws, but extremely varied in its combinations.
The combination of a horse's body with a human head has
nothing, primd facie, to make any wide distinction between it
and any of the numberless varieties which we find in animated
nature. To a common, even if not to a scientific mind, it is
within the limits of the variations in our experience. Every
similar variation which we have seen or heard of, is a help
towards conceiving this particular one ; and tends to form an
association, not of fixity, but of variability, which frustrates
the formation of an inseparable association between a human
head and a human body exclusively. We know of so many
different heads, united to so many different bodies, that we have
little difficulty in imagining any head in combination with any
body. Nay, the mere mobility of objects in space is a fact so
universal in our experience, that we easily conceive any object
whatever occupying the place of any other ; we may imagine
without difficulty a horse with his head removed, and a human

* Here again we would ourselves rather say : " I do not consider myself
to cognize any intrinsic repugnance in the notion that a centaur should exist,
but I do consider myself to cognize intrinsic repugnance in the notion that
two straight lines should enclose a space."

46 The Philosophy of Theism.

head put in its place. But what model does our experience
afford on which to frame, or what elements from which to con-
struct, the conception of two straight lines inclosing a space?
There are no counter-associations in that case, and consequently
the primary association, being founded on an experience
beginning from birth, and never for many minutes intermitted
in our waking hours, easily becomes inseparable. Had but
experience afforded a case of illusion, in which two straight
lines after intersecting had appeared again to approach, the
counter-association formed might have been sufficient to render
such a supposition imaginable, and defeat the supposed necessity
of thought. In the case of parallel lines, the laws of perspective
do present such an illusion : they do, to the eye, appear to meet
in both directions, and consequently to inclose a space : and by
supposing that we had no access to the evidence which proves
that they do not really meet, an ingenious thinker, whom I
formerly quoted, was able to give the idea of a constitution of
nature in which all mankind might have believed that two
straight lines could inclose a space. That we are unable to
believe or imagine it in our present circumstances, needs no
other explanation than the laws of association afford ; for the
case unites all the elements of the closest, intensest, and most
inseparable association, with the greatest freedom from con-
flicting counter-associations which can be found within the
conditions of human life.

In all the instances of phenomena invariably conjoined
which fail to create necessities of thought, I am satisfied it
would be found that the case is wanting in some of the con-
ditions required by the Association psychology, as essential to
the formation of an association really inseparable (pp. 320-325).

The first remark which we would make on this care-
fully elaborated passage, is in itself of some importance.
Mr. Mill distinctly admits that there is a real difference
between the kind of conviction wherewith I accept those
truths which an objectivist accounts necessary, and those
truths which he accounts contingent.* Mr. Mill of course
attempts to explain this difference in some way consistent

* It can hardly be needful to explain that by " contingent " we simply
mean " not necessary."

Mr. Mill's Denial of Necessary Truth. 47

with his theory : but the admission which he so candidly
makes is none the less observable.

Next we would point out, how importantly he misunder-
stands the objectivist position. In his view the objectivist
appeals, not to the human reason, but to the human
imagination; and argues that some given mathematical
axiom is self-evidently necessary, on no other ground than
that men are incapable of imaging to themselves its contra-
dictory. Nor do we deny, as we have already implied, that
Dean Mansel's language gives our author much excuse for
his misapprehension ; though we are convinced that the
Dean had no such meaning as Mr. Mill supposes. I am
to the full as incapable of imaging that mutual action
of material particles which is called gravitation, as of
imaging a quadrangular trilateral : yet I do not regard the
former, while I do regard the latter, as intrinsically
impossible. What an objectivist really alleges is, that the
truth of any given mathematical axiom is known to me
by my very conception of its subject ; and consequently
that, under the light of reason, I infallibly cognize that
axiom as a self-evidently necessary truth. We have
in an earlier part of our essay set forth this argument.
The only answer, given to it by Mr. Mill in the above
extract, rests on the united force of two allegations. If
either of these allegations be untrue, the whole answer
breaks down ; while for ourselves we are confident that both
of them are untrue. The first is, that men never account
any proposition self-evidently necessary, except one which
they have repeatedly for an indefinite period observed by
experience to be true. The second allegation is, that when-
ever two phenomenal facts are undeviatingly and unmistak-
ably experienced in union, a thinker almost inevitably is
deluded into the fancy that there is some necessary con-
nection between them. We will reply to these two allega-
tions, in the order in which we have introduced them.

48 The Philosophy of Theism.

First, then, we confidently deny that every truth,
ordinarily accounted necessary, has been very frequently
observed as true by him who thus accounts it. Take the
very instance we have so often given. It is probable
enough that I have very often seen trilateral figures ; but
have I often, consciously or unconsciously, observed the fact
that they are triangular ? Our impression is, that very few
men observe this fact at all, except those given to mathe-
matical study. A youth of fifteen years old is beginning to
learn geometry ; and his tutor points out to him, that every
trilateral figure is triangular. Does he naturally reply,
" Of course it is ; — I have observed it a thousand times " ?
On the contrary, we believe that in ninety-nine cases out of
a hundred the proposition will be entirely new to him ; and
yet (notwithstanding its novelty) will at once commend
itself as self -evidently a necessary truth.* But there are
many cases in which the student has had no opportunity
for previous observation. We wonder how many men there
are, who have even once experienced the fact, that 2 + 9
= 3 + 8. At all events the testimony given by every
student will be this. I am told by my teacher that 2 + 9
= 3 + 8. In order to show me that the fact is so, he does
not dream of referring me to my past experience, but
recommends a fresh purely mental experiment. He tells
me, e.g., to fancy myself holding two pebbles in one hand
and nine in the other, and then transferring one pebble
from the larger to the smaller group. I thus cognize that
in every possible region of existence 2 + 9 = 3 + 8: and I
arrive easily indeed at the more general proposition, that,
in every possible region of existence, (a + 1) + (b-1) =

* " A mathematical friend told me he perfectly well remembered when
a boy being taught without understanding it the axiom ' Two straight lines
cannot inclose a space.' When the fourth proposition of Euclid was shown
him, he remembers the universality and necessity of the axiom at once flash-
ing on him." (Mahafiy's Translation of Fischer's Commentary on Kant,
introduction, p. ix.)

Mr. MilUs Denial of Necessary Truth. 49

0 + b ; where a and b are any whole numbers whatever.
Here is a large generality regarded by me as a self-evidently
necessary truth, where no one can possibly say that the truth
has been long and constantly experienced. And innumerable
similar instances may be given, as is most obvious.

Secondly, we no less confidently deny Mr. Mill's second
allegation, that the mere constant experience of two
phenomenal facts in union leads men almost inevitably to
fancy some necessary connection between the two. There
is a certain phenomenon, constantly experienced by the
inhabitants of this cold climate during far the greater
portion of the day, throughout nearly three quarters of
every year : we refer to the warmth-giving property of fire.
Every Englishmen has more frequent experience of this,
than he has even of two and two making four, or of things
equal to the same equalling one another. Nor is there any
exception whatever to this property : there is no observed
substance, which is brought near fire without its warmth
being increased. Yet we see no intrinsic repugnance what-
ever in the notion, that in some other region of existence
a substance may be found, which in every other respect
resembles earthly fire — in consumption of coal or wood, in
destroying or melting this or that other portion of matter—
and yet which does not possess this particular property of
imparting warmth. Nor again do I see any intrinsic
repugnance whatever in the notion, that here upon earth,
through preternatural agency, on one or other occasion fire
may fail to impart warmth. I have never even once ex-
perienced the equality of 2 + 9 to 3 + 8, and yet am con-
vinced that not even Omnipotence could overthrow that
equality. I have most habitually experienced the warmth-
giving property of fire, and yet see no reason for doubting
that Omnipotence (if it exist)* can at any time suspend or

" We must again remind our readers that, in this early stage of our argu-
ment with Mr. Mill, we are not at liberty to assume the existence of an
Omnipotent Being.

VOL. I. E

50 The Philosophy of Theism.

remove that property. That which I have never experienced,
I regard as necessary; that which I have habitually and
unexceptionally experienced, I regard as contingent. Most
certainly therefore mere constant and uniform experience
cannot possibly account — as Mr. Mill thinks it does — for
the mind's conviction of self-evident necessity.

There is another different road, by which we may no
less securely travel to the overthrow of Mr. Mill's theory.
Necessary truths may be most clearly distinguished from
those merely physical, by one simple consideration. Putting
aside the propositions of psychology, with which we are not
here concerned, — the philosopher learns experimental truths
no otherwise than by observing external nature ; but he
learns self-evidently necessary verities by examining his own
mind. A proposition is discerned to be self-evidently
necessary, whenever (once more to use F. Kleutgen's expres-
sion) " by simply considering the ideas of the subject and
predicate, one comes to see that there exists between them
that relation which the proposition expresses." So I judge
it self-evidently necessary, that " the disobedience of a
rational creature to his Holy Creator's command is morally
wrong;" that "malice and mendacity are evil habits;"
that " a + b =(a-l) + (b + 1); " that "all trilateral figures
are triangular." That these various propositions are not
cognized by me as experimental truths, is manifest (we say)
from one simple consideration ; for in forming them, I have
not been ever so slightly engaged in observing external
nature, but exclusively in noting the processes of my own
mind. We are not here to consider the two first of the
above-recited propositions ; but at all events, as regards
mathematical axioms, no one can possibly say that they are
psychological affirmations. Since therefore they are ascer-
tained by a purely mental process, and yet are no psycho-
logical propositions, they cannot be experimental truths
at all.

Mr. Mill's Denial of Necessary Truth. 51

Now, in his "Examination of Hamilton," Mr. Mill
apparently denies that the truth of any proposition (not
tautological) can be known by my mere conception of its
subject. But in his " Logic " he admits distinctly, that
I may thus cognize the truth of geometrical axioms. These
are his words : —

In the first place, it is said that if our assent to the pro-
position that two straight lines cannot inclose a space were
derived from the senses, we could only be convinced of its truth
by actual trial, that is, by seeing or feeling the straight lines ;
whereas in fact it is seen to be true by merely thinking of
them. That a stone thrown into water goes to the bottom,
may be perceived by our senses, but mere thinking of a stone
thrown into the water would never have led us to that con-
clusion ; not so, however, with the axioms relating to straight
lines : if I could be made to conceive what a straight line is,
without having seen one, I should at once recognize that two
such lines cannot inclose a space. Intuition is " imaginary
looking " ; but experience must be real looking : if we see a
property of straight lines to be true by merely fancying
ourselves to be looking at them, the ground of our belief
cannot be the senses, or experience; it must be something
mental.

To this argument it might be added in the case of this
particular axiom (for the assertion would not be true of all
axioms), that the evidence of it from actual ocular inspection is
not only unnecessary but unattainable. What says the axiom ?
That two straight lines cannot inclose a space ; that after
having once intersected, if they are prolonged to infinity they
do not meet, but continue to diverge from one another. How
can this, in any single case, be proved by actual observation ?
We may follow the lines to any distance we please ; but we
cannot follow them to infinity : for aught our senses can testify,
they may, immediately beyond the farthest point to which we
have traced them, begin to approach, and at last meet. Unless,
therefore, we had some other proof of the impossibility than
observation aifords us, we should have no ground for believing
the axiom at all.

To these arguments, which I trust I cannot be accused of
understating, a satisfactory answer will, I conceive, be found, if

52 The Philosophy of Theism.

we advert to one of the characteristic properties of geometrical
forms — their capacity of being painted in the imagination with
a distinctness equal to reality; in other words, the exact re-
semblance of our ideas of form to the sensations which suggest
them. This, in the first place, enables us to make (at least
with a little practice) mental pictures of all possible combina-
tions of lines and angles, which resemble the realities quite as
well as any which we could make on paper ; and in the next
place, make those pictures just as fit subjects of geometrical
experimentation as the realities themselves ; inasmuch as
pictures, if sufficiently accurate, exhibit of course all the
properties which would be manifested by the realities at one
given instant, and on simple inspection ; and in geometry we
are concerned only with such properties, and not with that
which pictures could not exhibit, the mutual action of bodies
one upon another. The foundations of geometry would therefore
be laid in direct experience, even if the experiments (which
in this case consist merely in attentive contemplation) were
practised solely upon what we call our ideas, that is, upon the
diagrams in our minds, and not upon outward objects. For in
all systems of experimentation we take some objects to serve as
representatives of all which resemble them ; and in the present
case the conditions which qualify a real object to be the
representative of its class, are completely fulfilled by an object
existing only in our fancy. Without denying, therefore, the
possibility of satisfying ourselves that two straight lines cannot
inclose a space, by merely thinking of straight lines without
actually looking at them ; I contend, that we do not believe
this truth on the ground of the imaginary intuition simply,
but because we know that the imaginary lines exactly resemble
real ones, and that we may conclude from them to real ones
with quite as much certainty as we could conclude from one
real line to another. The conclusion, therefore, is still an
induction from observation. And we should not be authorized
to substitute observation of the image on our mind, for observa-
tion of the reality, if we had not learnt by long-continued
experience that the properties of the reality are faithfully
represented in the image ; just as we should be scientifically
warranted in describing an animal which we had never seen
from a picture made of it with a daguerreotype ; but not until
we had learnt by ample experience, that observation of such a
picture is precisely equivalent to observation of the original.

Mr. Mill's Denial of Necessary Truth. 53

These considerations also remove the objection arising from
the impossibility of ocularly following the lines in their pro-
longation to infinity. For though, in order actually to see that
two given lines never meet, it would be necessary to follow them
to infinity ; yet without doing so we may know that if they
ever do meet, or if, after diverging from one another, they begin
again to approach, this must take place not at an infinite, but at
a finite distance. Supposing, therefore, such to be the case, we
can transport ourselves thither in imagination, and can frame a
mental image of the appearance which one or both of the linos
must present at that point, which we may rely on as being
precisely similar to the reality. Now, whether we fix our con-
templation upon this imaginary picture, or call to mind the
generalizations we have had occasion to make from former
ocular observation, we learn by the evidence of experience, that
a line which, after diverging from another straight line, begins
to approach it, produces the impression on our senses which we
describe by the expression " a bent line," not by the expression
" a straight line." (" Logic," vol. i. pp. 261-264.)

The reply to Mr. Mill's attempted solution of the
difficulty is so obvious, that one wonders he can have
missed it; and we have implicitly given it in an earlier
part of this essay. He admits, it will have been seen, so
much as this. I have formed in my mind the idea of a
straight line ; and by merely contemplating this idea, I
may arrive with absolute certainty at a conviction, that no
two straight lines can inclose a space. Now let us suppose
for argument's sake — the question is quite irrelevant — that
my idea of a straight line was derived in the first instance
from some physical object which I had observed. At all
events I include no other property in my idea of a straight
line, than those properties which appertain to every straight
line found in any possible region of existence. If therefore,
by contemplating my idea of a straight line, I may know
certainly that two straight lines cannot inclose a space, this
cognition of mine extends to all straight lines which can be
found in any possible region of existence. Mr. Mill then
will in consistency be obliged to admit, that in no possible

54 The Philosophy of Theism.

region of existence can two straight lines inclose a space ;
and that human thinkers know with certitude this impos-
sibility. In other words, he will in consistency be obliged
to admit the very proposition against which he is arguing ;
viz. that this mathematical axiom is known with certitude
as a necessary truth.

But indeed it is quite curious to observe how many
openings Mr. Mill has left for criticism in the extract we just
now gave. Thus, according to him, I must take two suc-
cessive steps on my way to the conclusion, that earthly
trilateral figures are triangular. First, I observe that the
picture I form in my mind of a straight line has a close
resemblance to earthly straight lines ; secondly, I satisfy
myself by mental experimentation that every figure made
up of three such straight lines, is triangular ; then, thirdly,
I infer that earthly trilateral figures inclusively are tri-
angular. Now every one who looks carefully at the matter
will see, that the first of these propositions does not at all
inflow into the last by way of proof, but is simply and
utterly superfluous. Yet it is this first proposition alone,
which has so much as the semblance of appealing to
experience, as any part whatever of my reason for holding
that trilateral figures are triangular.

Then (2) — whereas Mr. Mill purports to account for
man's power of ascertaining axioms by mere • mental ex-
perience— he bases that power on " one of the characteristic
properties of geometrical forms." But in so arguing, he has
entirely left out of account arithmetical and algebraic axioms.
I have fully as much power of arriving by mental experi-
mentation at the knowledge that " (a — 1) + (b + 1) =
a + fc," as of arriving at the knowledge that " all trilateral
are triangular ; " yet here there is no question at all of
"forms" which can be "painted in the imagination with
a distinctness equal to the reality."

(3) "In all systems of experimentation," says Mr. Mill,

Mr. Mill's Denial of Necewary Truth. 55

"we take some objects to serve as representatives of all
that resemble them ; and in the present case [that of
geometrical axioms] the conditions which qualify a real
object to be the representative of its class, are completely
fulfilled by an object existing only in our fancy." This
view when drawn out will run as follows. If I observe that
one single stone sinks in the water by its own weight, I
legitimately conclude that all stones so sink: and yet
objectivists themselves admit, that my knowledge of this
general proposition is derived entirely from experience.*
In like manner — so Mr. Mill argues — if I observe that one
mentally pictured trilateral figure is triangular, I can doubt-
less legitimately infer that all trilateral have the same
property : and yet objectivists are bound in consistency to
admit, that this fact does not negative the supposition, that
my knowledge of this general truth may be derived entirely
from experience. But why, we ask, do I conclude, from the
case of one stone, to the case of all stones ? Mr. Mill him-
self gives as the reason, that experience has conclusively
proved the uniformity of nature ; and certainly, unless this
uniformity were proved in one way or another, we should
proceed most illogically in arguing from the case of one
stone to the case of all. Mr. Mill then is here in effect
contradicting the very conclusion which he takes for granted.
He takes for granted, that geometrical axioms can be
securely ascertained by purely mental experimentation ;
and yet he implies that they can not be ascertained, until
by experience of the physical world men have learnt the
uniformity of nature.

(4) To explain our next criticism, we will once more
bring into juxtaposition two sentences of Mr. Mill's which
we have already adduced. " That a straight line is the
shortest distance between two points," Mr. Mill " does not.
doubt to be true even in the region of the fixed stars."

* Objectivists do not admit it ; but let this pass for the present.

50 The Philosophy of TJieism.

(" Logic," vol. i. p. 350.) Yet (vol. ii. p. 108) " it would
be folly," in his opinion, " to affirm confidently " that " in
distant parts of the stellar regions, where phenomena may
be entirely unlike those with which we are acquainted,"
" those special laws " prevail, " which we have found to
hold universally in our own planet." To hold otherwise, he
thinks, would be "to make a supposition without evidence,
and to which it would be idle to attempt to assign any
probability." Which of these two conflicting statements
represents Mr. Mill's real mind ? We can have no doubt
that the second does so. It would be a blunder, of which
thinkers far less clear-sighted than Mr. Mill could not be
guilty with their eyes open, to say that mathematical
axioms are mere "generalizations from observation"
("Logic," vol. i. p. 258), and yet that a man can know
them to hold good externally to the reach of possible obser-
vation. Mr. Mill then considers it impossible to know, or
even to guess, whether " in the more distant parts of the
stellar regions" there may not be quadrangular trilaterals,
and pairs of straight lines each pair inclosing a space.

Yet, in the extract before us, he alleges confidently that
two divergent straight lines will never meet. Let us concede
that experience can tell that they will not meet within the
reach of human observation. But what possible reason can
he consistently allege for even guessing that they may not
meet, after they have passed beyond human ken and entered
those inaccessible " distant parts of the stellar regions " ?

We believe that a careful observer would detect many
more paralogisms in the extract on which we have been
commenting ; but our readers will have had enough of this
particular passage.

The only other argument which we can call to mind, as
having been adduced by Mr. Mill against the self-evident
necessity of mathematical axioms, occurs in an earlier part
of his volume on Sir W. Hamilton ; p. 87, note. He has

Mr. Mill's Denial of Necessary Truth. 57

avowedly adopted this argument from another contemporary
writer, who has pressed into his service Eeid's " Geometry
of Visibles : " and the argument itself may be thus stated :
" If mankind had possessed only the sense of sight and not
that of touch, they would have accounted it a self-evidently
necessary truth that every straight line being produced will
at last return into itself, and that any two straight lines
being produced will meet in two points." Consequently,
such is Mr. Mill's implied inference, men's knowledge of
geometrical axioms depends, not on the immediate and
peremptory declaration of their cognitive faculties, but on
their possessing the sense of touch.

We must here say one preliminary word, on Mr. Mill's
strange attempt to enlist Keid's authority on his side. He
speaks of "Reid's conclusion that, to beings possessing only
the sense of sight, the paradoxes here quoted and several
others would be truths of intuition, self-evident truths."
But it is quite impossible that Eeid can have intended what
is here implied, because notoriously he maintained that
men cognize with certitude the self-evident truth of mathe-
matical axioms. In p. 451 of the volume from which
Mr. Mill quotes, he says (sub finem) that " mathematical
axioms" possess "intuitive evidence;" and in p. 452 he
proceeds to enumerate them among the " first principles of
necessary truths." We are confident that Dr. Eeid, in the
passage on which Mr. Mill relies, intended the very truth
which it will be our own business to set forth in opposition
to our present antagonist.

In order to the apprehension of Mr. Mill's argument, it
is necessary to premise, that both he and Dr. Eeid account
differences of distance as made known to man, not really by
sight at all, but exclusively by touch. They hold therefore,
that, if any man possessing sight were without the sense of
touch, he would account all the objects seen by him to be
equidistant. We are perfectly willing to admit this doctrine

58 The Philosophy of Theism.

for argument's sake, though we have no conviction of its
truth.

This being laid down, Mr. Mill in effect thus argues :
Let a planet be supposed, the inhabitants of which possess
the sense of sight but not that of touch ; while their mental
constitution is identical with that of the human race. The
objects, which the planetarian sees at any given moment,
are all accounted by him as equally distant from himself ;
and accordingly as ranged on the inner surface of a hollow
sphere, his eye being centre of that sphere. Let a straight
line be placed before his vision : it will appear to him as
the arc of a great circle of that sphere. He is told, how-
ever, on trustworthy authority that it is a straight line ;
and he will therefore enounce, as a self -evidently necessary
truth, that every straight line being produced will at last
return into itself, and that any two straight lines being
produced will meet in two points. Those geometrical
axioms therefore — such is Mr. Mill's implied conclusion —
which contradict these two propositions, are not known to
man by his mental constitution (for the planetarian has
the very same mental constitution) but by his possessing
and exercising the sense of touch.

When once this argument is stated, there can hardly be
any need of exposing its fallacy. The truth, which this
planetarian regards as self -evidently necessary, is self-
evidently necessary in the judgment of all objectivists :
only he has learned to clothe it in non-human language.
That form, which he has learned to designate by the name
" straight line," is precisely that which human beings
designate an " arc of a great circle of a sphere."

Whether such a planetarian could conceive the idea
which men call a " straight line," is a question which we
shall not here discuss ; but if he do conceive that idea —
possessing as he does the same mental constitution with
men — he will cognize as self -evidently necessary, that no

Mr. Mill's Denial of Necessary Truth. 59

straight line, however produced, can possibly return into
itself, and that no two straight lines can intersect in more
than one point. In what language he will have learnt
to express this idea "straight line," we cannot of course
guess.

We are not aware of any other reasoning of the least
importance anywhere employed by Mr. Mill, in opposition
to the objectivist doctrine on mathematical axioms. It
seems to us, that in every instance the only effect he has
legitimately produced, is to open out some fresh line of
argument, which tells with irresistible force against his
own conclusion.

We ought not, however, perhaps — considering the
ultimate purpose of these essays — entirely to pass over a
philosophical theory, which arrives at a goal substantially
the same with Mr. Mill's, by a route precisely opposite.
Our readers will remember that, towards the beginning of
our essay, we drew a distinction between "tautological"
and "significant" propositions. A proposition of the
former class declares no more than has already been
expressed in its subject. Suppose, e.g., some one were
gravely to enounce, that "every square is quadrilateral: "
"of course" I should reply ; "for ' quadrilateral ' is part
of what is expressed by the very word * square.' ' Such
nugatory propositions are of the form "A is A:" and
Mr. Mill would himself admit that they are known inde-
pendently of experience; though reasonably enough he
might refuse to dignify them with the name of " a priori "
or " necessary." Now such a philosopher as we speak of,
while admitting that mathematical axioms are cognized
independently of experience, maintains that they are
"tautological;" and consequently that no inference can
reasonably be made from them to the case of " significant "
propositions. He denies accordingly, that there are any
" necessary " propositions of the latter class.

60 The Philosophy of Theism.

As this view is fundamentally opposed to Mr. Mill's, it
is no part of our present business to reason against it at
any length. We will but draw attention to the whimsical
character of a theory which alleges that a vast body of
new truths can be syllogistically deduced from tautologies ;
and we will add one single argument by way of refutation.
So far is it from being true that "triangular" is part of
what is expressed by the word " trilateral," — that on the
contrary I have comprehended the whole of what is meant
by " trilateral," before I have so much as asked myself the
question whether a trilateral figure has three angles or
any angle at all. So far is it from being true that 3 -f 8 is
part of what is expressed by the words 2 + 9, — that on the
contrary I have comprehended the whole of what is meant
by the latter before I have so much as thought of the
former, consciously or unconsciously, directly or indirectly.

Mr. Mill has some excellent observations on this theory,
so far as regards arithmetical axioms, in his " Logic,"
vol. i. pp. 284-289.

We now, however, return to our general argument.
From what has been hitherto said three inferences may be
deduced, of much importance in their respective ways.

I. Mathematical axioms are not ordinarily intued at first
in an universal but in an individual shape. Dr. M'Cosh
has done very great service, by dwelling on this truth in
the case of all intuitions ; but our present concern is with
mathematical axioms. I hold 7 pebbles in one hand and
4 in the other, and then transfer one from the larger to
the smaller group. I intue, as a self-evidently necessary
truth, that the new 5 + 6 = the old 4 + 7 : that not even
Omnipotence could make the case otherwise. On reflection
I perceive that the same truth holds, not of these pebbles
only, but of all pebbles; not of pebbles only but of all
numerable things. Still further, reflection enables me to
intue the more general axiom, a + b = (a + 1) -f (b - 1);

Mr. Mill's Denial of Necessary Truth. 61

and the more general axiom still, a + b = (a -f- m) + (6- w) ;
where a, 6, and m may be any whole numbers whatever, so
only, that m be not greater than b. Capability of being
universalized is indubitably a characteristic of self -evidently
necessary truths; but we shall be quite mistaken, if we
fancy that they are ordinarily intued as universal. The
immense majority of mankind, while again and again
accepting them in their individual shape, seldom if ever
universalize an axiom from the beginning of their life to
the end.

II. There can be no need of employing words to prove
the very obvious proposition, that if mathematical axioms
are self -evidently necessary, the validity of syllogistic
reasoning is no less so. But the whole body of mathe-
matical truth is derived syllogistically from mathematical
axioms ; and it follows therefore, that the whole body of
mathematical truth is strictly necessary.

III. Even were there no other necessary truths than
those which (we trust) we have conclusively proved to be
such in our present essay, — let us observe what results
from our argument. Entirely distinct from, entirely over
and above, the experimental order, there is a body of what
may be called " transcendental " truth ; truth which trans-
cends human experience.* We are not able yet to decide
whether all transcendental truth is necessary : but anyhow
all necessary truth is transcendental ; for the knowledge of

* It will conduce to clearness, if we accurately distinguish between our
use of the words " transcendental " and " intuitional." We call those truths
" intuitional," which the individual accepts exclusively on the ground of
mental intuition ; and we call those truths " transcendental " which are
neither experienced facts nor inferable from experienced facts. Thus the
truths testified by memory are «* intuitional," but not " transcendental : "
they are facts which have been experienced, and therefore are not " trans-
cendental " truths ; yet they are known to him who remembers them,
exclusively on the ground of present intuition, and they are therefore " intui-
tional." On the other hand, Euclid's theorems are " transcendental," but
not generally " intuitional ; " because they are not accepted on the ground of
intuition, but of deduction from intuitive truths.

62 The Philosophy of Theism.

anything as necessary — Mr. Mill will be the first to admit —
is wholly unattainable from mere experience. Further,
among these transcendental truths are to be numbered the
propositions of geometry, arithmetic, algebra, the dif-
ferential calculus, calculus of variations, etc. Again, all
the truths of mechanics and physical astronomy are neces-
sary, if understood hypothetically. Take any proposition
whatever of physical astronomy : it is a necessary truth
that this proposition holds, if there be in existence a certain
attractive force. But still further. Scientific men have
not of course taken the trouble to work out a series of
necessary hypothetical propositions, except in those com-
paratively few cases where the hypothesis coresponds with
physical fact. But a million other hypotheses may be
framed ; as e.g. that the force of gravitation varies inversely
as the distance, or as the cube of the distance, etc. : and
for each one of these hypotheses, a new vast series of
necessary hypothetical propositions can be evolved. It is
plain then that, though there were no necessary truths
except mathematical, even so their number is literally
unimaginable and incalculable; immeasurably more than
a thousand times the number of experimental truths. All
trustworthy science, says Mr. Mill, is experimental: on
the contrary, the enormous majority of true scientific
propositions are transcendental.

This will be our best place, for explaining the exact
end at which we are aiming in this series of essays. Our
ultimate purpose is a philosophical establishment of
Theism : i.e. of the dogma, that there exists a Personal
God, Infinite in all perfections, the Creator and Moral
Governor of the universe. Those who deny that this dogma
is cognizable by man with certitude, may be called " anti-
theists ; " i.e. opponents of Theism. Of these, comparatively
few are dogmatic atheists ; men who think that reason

Mr. Mill's Denial of Necessary Truth. 63

disproves the existence of a Personal Creator. A far larger
number, of whom Professor Huxley may be taken as
representative, are "nescients;" i.e. deny that man can
know certainly, or even probably, anything whatever about
the matter. Others again, far more numerous perhaps
than is commonly supposed, regard it as probable that the
universe had an intelligent Maker ; but are driven, by the
existence of moral and physical evil, to deny that this
Maker combines Infinite Power with Infinite Love. We
are led by various indications to suspect that Mr. Mill
himself belongs to this category. Lastly, there are " pan-
theists." The pantheist holds with some emphasis the
cognizableness of the "Absolute" and the "Uncondi-
tioned ; " but denies the existence of a Personal God, to
Whom men are responsible, Who knows their thoughts,
and Who will requite them according to their works. Now
we believe that pantheists — certainly Hegelian pantheists
— hold in philosophy the objectivist doctrine : but they
have no important representative in England ; * and at all
events would require a totaDy distinct consideration. While
therefore our arguments, we hope, shall be such as to hold
their own against all comers, our direct contest shall be
only with those antitheists who profess the phenomenal
philosophy.

The phenomenistic doctrine is such as this : that an
ascertained truth, means a truth experienced or inferred
from experience ; that he who lays stress on supposed
intuitions leaves a foundation of rock to build on the sand ;
that such a thinker, instead of manfully and philosophically
confronting facts, erects into a would-be oracle his own
individual idiosyncrasy ; that " a priori philosophy " means
simply the enthronement of prejudice and the rejection of
experience. And we fully admit, or rather indeed contend,

* Dr. Stirling, the leading English Hegelian, professes belief even in
Christianity. (« Secret of Hegel," preface, p. xxi.)

64 The Philosophy of Theism.

that this phenomenistic doctrine issues legitimately in pro-
nounced antitheism.

Our first reply to it shall be founded on the faculty of
memory. " Our belief in the veracity of memory," says Mr.
Mill (on Hamilton, p. 508, note), "is evidently ultimate:
no reason can be given for it, which does not presuppose
the belief and assume it to be well founded." In other
words, according to his frank confession, when I trust my
memory — when I believe myself to have experienced what
my memory distinctly testifies — I am resting exclusively on
an intuition ; I am holding most firmly a truth for which
experience gives me no warrant at all.* Yet unless I hold
firmly this intuitive truth, I am literally incapable of
receiving any experience whatever ; I have no knowledge of
any kind except my present consciousness. The whole
fabric of experience then has, for its exclusive foundation, a
series of those intuitions which are called acts of memory.
If intuitions as such are to be distrusted, experience is an
impossibility and its very notion an absurdity.

Mr. Mill has laid himself open, we think, to just
criticism, for his mode of making this most honourable
admission. No one will doubt, either that the phenomenist
school professes the general doctrine we have ascribed to it,
or that Mr. Mill habitually identifies himself with that
school. Yet here is a most pointed exception to the school's
general doctrine ; and an exception which no phenomenist
had made before. Surely he might reasonably have been
expected not merely to state it (however explicitly and un-
mistakably) in a note, but to give it a prominent position
in his work. If ever there were a paradoxical position, his
is one on the surface. It is most intelligible to say that

* This is undeniably Mr. Mill's admission : for he says that no reason
whatever — whether grounded on experience or on any other basis— can be
given for the veracity of memory. " which does not presuppose the very thesis
for which it is adduced." A reason which presupposes the very thesis for
which it is adduced is undeniably no reason at all.

•**5^

JLI.KOK
Mr. Mill's Denial of Necessary Truth. \jOj ,,,65

there are no trustworthy intuitions ; and it is most intelli-
gible to say that there are many such : but on the surface
it is the ne plus ultra of paradox, to say that there is just
one such and no more. He seems to have been uncon-
sciously almost ashamed of this paradox ; and instead of
placing it in the foreground, has shrouded it in the obscurity
of a note.

Then further he was surely called on to state explicitly
his reasons. He holds that there is just one intuition — one
and only one — which carries with it its own evidence of
truth. There was an imperative claim on him then, as he
valued his philosophical character, to explain clearly and
pointedly ivhere the distinction lies between acts of memory
and other alleged intuitions. He would have found the
task very difficult, we confidently affirm ; but that only
gives us more reason for complaining that he did not make
the attempt. To us it seems, that various classes of
intuition are more favourably circumstanced for the estab-
lishment of their trustworthiness, than is that class which
Mr. Mill accepts. Thus in the case of many a wicked
action, it would really be easier for the criminal to believe
that he had never committed it, than to doubt its necessary
turpitude and detestableness. Then in the case of other
intuitions, I know that the rest of mankind share them
with myself; and I often know also that experience con-
firms them so far as it goes : but I must confidently trust
my acts of clear and distinct memory, before I can even
guess what is held by other men or what is declared by
experience. We think it a blot on Mr. Mill's philosophy,
that he has chosen, as his only trustworthy class of in-
tuitions, a class for which there is less extrinsic evidence
than for that of many others. But we think it a far greater
blot on his philosophy, that instead of facing the difficulty
he has ignored it.

This, then, is our first argument against the phenomenist

VOL. I. F

66 The Philosophy of Theism.

doctrine. So far from experience being a more trustworthy
guide than intuition, experience is not so much as possible
unless we are throughout guided by intuition. Our second
argument against the same doctrine is more closely con-
nected with the earlier part of this essay. Phenomenists
allege, that experience affords a legitimate basis for certi-
tude, and that intuition affords no such basis. On the
contrary — without here discussing the question of " greater "
or "less " certitude — at all events intuition affords a higher
kind of certitude than does experience. Experience at best
can but declare what happens within the reach of human
observation : but intuition avouches truths eternal and
immutable ; truths which necessarily hold good in every
possible region of existence.

But thirdly, we maintain against phenomenists, that the
best grounded conclusions of experimental science are not
certain at all, except in virtue of certain necessary truths
known mediately or immediately by intuition. In other
words we maintain, that the certainty of physical science
rests in last analysis, not on the phenomenal but on the
transcendental order. This is a conclusion of extreme im-
portance ; and we shall devote to it the remainder of our
essay. Our argument is this.

All physical science depends for its existence on the
fundamental truth, that the laws of nature are uniform.*
By introducing transcendental considerations, Catholics are
able to prove conclusively this fundamental truth. We
cannot indeed enumerate and weigh these transcendental
considerations, until we have reached a later stage of our
argument; here we are only contending, that no basis

* In saying that " the laws of nature are uniform," we mean, of course,
that no physical phenomenon takes place without a corresponding physical
antecedent, and that the same physical antecedent is invariably followed by
the same physical consequent. Of course we hold firmly against Mr. Mill
that such physical antecedents are efficient causes ; but this consideration is
external to our present argument.

Mr. MiWs Denial of Necessary Truth. 67

adduced by consistent phenomenists can suffice for its
support. This is virtually admitted by the phenomenist
philosopher, who has closer philosophical connection with
Mr. Mill than has any other living writer : we refer to Mr.
Bain. His language is so remarkable, that we shall quote
it entire, italicizing one or two sentences.

Granting, however, that the belief in memory, as well as the
belief in present consciousness, is a primary assumption, we
next remark that it comes short of our needs. The most
authentic recollection gives only what has been ; something that
has ceased, and can concern us no longer. A far more perilous
leap remains ; the leap to the future. All our interest is concen-
trated on what has yet to be ; the present and the past are of
value only as a clue to the events that are to come. Now, it is
far easier to satisfy us of what has been, than of what is still
to be.

The postulate that we are in quest of must carry us across
the gulf, from the experienced known, either present or re-
membered, to the unexperienced and unknown — must perform
the leap of real inference. " Water has quenched our thirst in
the past ; " by what assumption do we affirm that the same will
happen in the future ? Experience does not teach us this ; ex-
perience is only what has actually been; and, after never so
many repetitions of a thing, there still remains the peril of
venturing upon the untrodden land of future possibility.

The fact, generally expressed as nature's uniformity, is the
guarantee, the ultimate major premise, of all induction. " What
has been, will be," justifies the inference that water will assuage
thirst in after times. We can give no reason, or evidence, for
this uniformity; and, therefore, the course seems to be to adopt
this as the finishing postulate. And, undoubtedly, there is no
other issue possible. We have a choice of modes of expressing
the assumption, but, whatever be the expression, the substance
is what is conveyed by the fact of uniformity.

Let us word the postulate thus : — " What has uniformly
been in the past will be in the future." Otherwise " what has
never been contradicted in any known instance (there being
ample means and opportunities of search) will always be true."

This assumption is an ample justification of the inductive
operation, as a process of real inference. Without it, we can do
nothing; with it, we can do anything. Our only error is in

68 The Philosophy of Theism.

proposing to give any reason or justification of it, to treat it other-
wise than as begged at the very outset. If there be a reason, it
is not theoretical, but practical. Without the assumption, we
could not take the smallest steps in practical matters ; we could
not pursue any object or end in life. Unless the future is to
reproduce the past, it is an enigma, a labyrinth. (" Deductive
Logic," pp. 273, 274.)

We give Mr. Bain every credit for his moral candour in
making the admission — so repugnant to phenomenist prin-
ciples— that, without this a priori presumption, science
would be impossible ; and yet that no "reason or justifica-
tion " for the assumption can possibly be given. Still we
must account the passage we have quoted discreditable to
his intellectual character. In his work on " The Senses
and the Intellect," Mr. Bain emphatically denies, that even
mathematical axioms are intuitively known; and yet he
maintains the intuitive cognizableness of such a proposition,
as that " what has uniformly been in the past will be in the
future." For this truly amazing assumption he gives no
reason whatever, — and says that no reason can be given, —
except that physical science could not go on without it.
Yet what would he himself say to an objectivist, who should
assume the intuitive cognizableness of morality, while giving
no other reason for that assumption, except that Chris-
tianity could not get on without it ? He would say, we
suppose, "so much the worse for Christianity;" and we
might similarly reply to him, if we chose to be so narrow-
minded, " so much the worse for physical science." We
really know not one of the " a priori fallacies " which Mr.
Mill in his " Logic " so ably denounces, more extravagantly
wild than Mr. Bain's. " Nature abhors a vacuum ; " " actio
non datur in distans ; " * " the heavenly bodies must move

* Some philosophers, even some Catholic philosophers, really consider this
axiomatic. F. Franzelin, however ('' De Deo Uno," p. 356), says that Scotus,
Vasquez, Biel, Francis Lugo, Valentia, and many grave theologians either
doubt or deny its truth. And this fact, by the way, disproves Mr. Mill's

Mr. Mill's Denial of Necessary Truth. 69

in the most perfect of figures, i.e. a circle ; " — there is not
one of these propositions, which may not quite as plausibly
be considered self-evident. Moreover, the thinkers who
have advocated such axioms as those above mentioned,
have at all events openly avowed themselves a priori philo-
sophers ; whereas Mr. Bain, the originator of this astonish-
ing tour de force, professes himself a severe and cautious
disciple of experience.

There are two doctrines importantly different, on the
uniformity of nature. There is the Catholic doctrine, that
the laws of nature are ordinarily uniform, but very often
miraculously suspended ; and there is the infidel doctrine,
that they are unexceptionally uniform. Mr. Bain's language
throughout implies the latter. In other words, he assumes
as intuitive a principle, which with one breath sweeps off
the whole Christian religion, without condescending to give
even one philosophical reason for his opinion.*

Mr. Mill is by no means so unfaithful to his pheno-
menism as Mr. Bain, in the proof which he gives for the
uniformity of nature. He thus reasons : —

The considerations which, as I apprehend, give, at the
present day, to the proof of the law of uniformity of succession
as true of all phenomena without exception, this character of
completeness and collusiveness, are the following : — First, that
we know it directly to be true of far the greatest number of

statement (" Logic," vol. ii. p. 317), that so recently as " rather more than a
century ago " this " was a scientific maxim disputed by no one and which no
one deemed to require any proof." For ourselves we can see no shadow of
ground for the maxim.

* We ought not to conceal the fact, that the sentence immediately fol-
lowing our extract runs thus : " our natural prompting is to assume such
identity [of the future with the past] ; to believe it first and prove it after-
wards ; " and the last words may be understood as meaning that we can
" prove it afterwards." Certainly the sentence is expressed with discredit-
able obscurity ; but Mr. Bain had already said expressly that " experience
does not prove this;" and this sentence therefore must only mean, that
when the future becomes the present we shall be able to prove that it re-
sembles the past.

70 The Philosophy of Theism.

phenomena ; that there are none of which we know it not to be
true, the utmost that can be said being that of some we cannot
positively from direct evidence affirm its truth; while pheno-
menon after phenomenon, as they become better known to us,
are constantly passing from the latter class into the former ;
and in all cases in which that transition has not yet taken place,
the absence of direct proof is accounted for by the rarity or the
obscurity of the phenomena, our deficient means of observing
them, or the logical difficulties arising from the complication of
the circumstances in which they occur; insomuch that, not-
withstanding as rigid a dependence on given conditions as
exists in the case of any other phenomenon, it was not likely
that we should be better acquainted with those conditions than
we are. Besides this first class of considerations, there is a
second, which still further corroborates the conclusion. Although
there £,re phenomena the production and changes of which
elude all our attempts to reduce them universally to any
ascertained law ; yet in every such case, the phenomenon, or the
objects concerned in it, are found in some instances to obey the
known laws of nature. The wind, for example, is the type of
uncertainty and caprice, yet we find it in some cases obeying
with as much constancy as any phenomenon in nature the law
of the tendency of fluids to distribute themselves so as to
equalize the pressure on every side of each of their particles;
as in the case of the trade winds, and the monsoons. Lightning
might once have been supposed to obey no laws; but since it
has been ascertained to be identical with electricity, we know
that the very same phenomenon in some of its manifestations is
implicitly obedient to the action of fixed causes. I do not believe
that there is now one object or event in all our experience of
nature, within the bounds of the solar system at least, which
has not either been ascertained by direct observation to follow
laws of its own, or been proved to be closely similar to objects
and events which, in more familiar manifestations, or on a more
limited scale, follow strict laws : our inability to trace the same
laws on a larger scale and in the more recondite instances, being
accounted for by the number and complication of the modifying
causes, or by their inaccessibility to observation. (" Logic," vol.
ii. pp. 106, 107.)

Before we consider the value of this argument, a pre-
liminary remark will be in place. We have already said

Mr. Mill's Denial of Necessary Truth. 71

that, by help of transcendental considerations, the uni-
formity of nature is conclusively established ; and we will
here add, that these transcendental considerations are of
such a kind as to impress their force, not on philosophers
only, but on all mankind. Since then, as we consider, the
mass of men are at starting most reasonably and completely
convinced of the thesis which Mr. Mill desires to prove, it
is only to be expected that they should receive with ready
acquiescence any reasoning which is adduced for so un-
deniably true a conclusion. Let it be granted, then, that
the majority of Mr. Mill's readers are satisfied with his
argument. Still such a fact does not at all evince the
argument's real sufficiency, because the fact may so easily
be accounted for by the cause which we have stated.

Now Mr. Mill's reasoning amounts at best to this. If in
any part of the world there existed a breach in the uniformity
of nature, that breach must by this time have been dis-
covered by one or other of the eminent men who have given
themselves to physical experiment. But most certainly,
adds Mr. Mill, none such has ever been discovered, or
mankind would be sure to have heard of it : consequently,
such is his conclusion, none such exists. Now, in order to
estimate the force of this argument, let us suppose for a
moment that the fact were as Mr. Mill represents it ; let us
suppose for a moment that persons of scientific education
were unanimous in holding, that there has been no well-
authenticated case of a breach in the uniformity of nature.
What inference could be drawn from this ? Be it observed
that the number of natural agents constantly at work is
incalculably large ; and that the observed cases of uni-
formity in their action must be immeasurably fewer than
one thousandth of the whole. Scientific men, we assume
for the moment, have discovered that in a certain proportion
of instances — immeasurably fewer than one thousandth of
the whole — a certain fact has prevailed ; the fact of uni-

72 The Philosophy of Thei&m.

formity : and they have not found a single instance in which
that fact does not prevail. Are they justified, we ask, in
inferring from these premisses that the fact is universal ?
Surely the question answers itself. Let us make a very
grotesque supposition, in which however the conclusion
would really be tried according to the arguments adduced.
In some desert of Africa there is an enormous connected
edifice surrounding some vast space, in which dwell certain
reasonable beings who are unable to leave the enclosure.
In this edifice are more than a thousand chambers, which
some years ago were entirely locked up, and the keys no
one knew where. By constant diligence twenty-five keys
have been found, out of the whole number ; and the corre-
sponding chambers, situated promiscuously throughout the
edifice, have been opened. Each chamber, when examined,
is found to be in the precise shape of a dodecahedron. Are
the inhabitants justified on that account in holding with
certitude, that the remaining 975 chambers are built on the
same plan ? We cannot fancy that Mr. Mill would answer
in the affirmative : yet otherwise how will his reasoning
stand ?

But, secondly, it is as far as possible from being true
that men of scientific education are unanimous in holding
that there has been no well-authenticated case of breach in
the uniformity of nature. On the contrary, even to this
day the majority of such persons believe in Christianity, and
hold the miracles revealed in Scripture to be on the whole
accurately reported. The majority of scientific men believe
that, at one time, persons on whom the shadow of Peter
passed were thereby freed from their infirmities ; and that,
at another time, garments brought from the body of Paul
expelled sickness and demoniacal possession (Acts v. 15 ;
xix. 12). Will Mr. Mill allege that S. Peter's shadow, or
that garments from S. Paul's body, were the physical cause
of a cure, as lotions and bandages might be ? Of course

Mr. Mill's Denial of Necessary Truth. 73

not. Here then is a series of physical phenomena, result-
ing without physical cause ; and Catholics to this day
consider that breaches in the uniformity of nature are
matters of every-day occurrence.* Even then if it were
true — it seems to us (as we have already said) most untrue
— that Mr. Mill's conclusion legitimately follows from his
premisses, — still he cannot even approximate to establishing
those premisses, until he have first disproved Catholicity
and next disproved the whole truth of Christianity.

But the strongest objection against the sufficiency of
Mr. Mill's argument still remains to be stated. " All our
interest," says Mr. Bain most truly, " is concentrated on
what is yet to be ; the present and the past are of value only
as a clue to the events that are to come." Let us even
suppose then for argument's sake, that Mr. Mill had fully
proved the past and present uniformity of nature : still the
main difficulty would continue ; viz. how he proposes to
show that such uniformity will last one moment beyond the
present. It is quite an elementary remark that, whenever
a proposition is grounded on mere experience, nothing

* In the following passage F. Newman does but express what is held by
all thoughtful Catholics who are at all well acquainted with the facts of
their religion. We italicize one or two sentences : —

" Putting out of the question the hypothesis of unknown laws of nature
(which is an evasion from the force of any proof) I think it impossible to
withstand the evidence which is brought for the liquefaction of the blood of
S. Januarius at Naples, and for the motion of the eyes of the pictures of the
Madonna in the Eoman States. I see no reason to doubt the material of
the Lombard Crown at Monza; and I do not see why the Holy Coat at
Treves may not have been what it professes to be. I firmly believe that por-
tions of the True Cross are at Eome and elsewhere, that the Crib of Bethle-
hem is at Rome, and the bodies of S. Peter and S. Paul also. I believe that
at Rome too lies S. Stephen, that S. Matthew lies at Salerno, and S. Andrew
at Amalfi. I firmly believe that the relics of the saints are doing innumerable
miracles and graces daily, and that it needs only for a Catholic to show devo-
tion to any saint in order to receive special benefits from his intercession.
I firmly believe that saints in their lifetime have before now raised the dead
to life, crossed the sea without vessels, multiplied grain and bread, cured in-
curable diseases, and stopped the operation of the laws of the universe in a
multitude of ways." (" Lectures on Catholicism in England," p. 298.)

74 The Philosophy of Theism.

whatever can be known or even guessed concerning its
truth, except within the reach of possible observation. For
this very reason, Mr. Mill professes himself unable to know,
or even to assign any kind of probability to the supposi-
tion, that nature proceeds on uniform laws in distant stellar
regions. But plainly there are conditions of time, as well as
of space, which preclude the possibility of observation ; and
it is as simply impossible for men to know from mere
experience what will take place on earth to-morrow, as to
know from mere experience what takes place in the planet
Jupiter to-day.

In considering the question "on what grounds we
expect that the sun will rise to-morrow," Mr. Mill (" Logic,"
vol. ii. p. 80) falls into a mistake very unusual with him ;
for he totally misapprehends the difficulty which he has to
encounter. He argues — we think quite successfully — that
there is a probability amounting to practical certainty that
the sun will rise to-morrow, on the hypothesis that the uni-
formity of nature so long continues. But the question he has
to face is, what reason can he have for knowing, or even
guessing, that the uniformity of nature will so long con-
tinue? And to this, the true question at issue, he does not
so much as attempt a reply.

Notwithstanding the disclaimer, with which we started,
our recent course of argument may have led unwary readers
to fancy, that we have been in some way disparaging the
trustworthiness and certainty of physical science. So far
is this from being so, that on the contrary such trust-
worthiness and certainty constitute the major premiss of
our syllogism. That syllogism runs as follows. The
declarations of physical science are absolutely trustworthy
and certain : but if there were no human knowledge inde-
pendent of human experience, they would not be trustworthy
and certain ; consequently it is untrue that there is no
human knowledge independent of human experience. In

Mr. Mitt's Denial of Necessary Truth. 75

other words, that doctrine of phenomenism, which in some
sense idolizes physical science, is in real truth fatal to the
object of its idolatry.

Here we conclude for the present. This essay has con-
sisted of two distinct portions : in the former of these we
have purported to prove against Mr. Mill, on grounds of
reason, the existence of certain necessary truths ; while in
the latter portion we have set forth some general considera-
tions, which tell importantly, as we think, against the
doctrine of phenomenism. These considerations may
sufficiently be summed up as follows. Phenomenism, taken
in its full extent, teaches primarily, that experience is the
only legitimate foundation for certitude; and teaches
secondarily, as an inference from this, that there is no
necessary truth humanly cognizable as such. We have
replied firstly, as to intuitional truths in general, that (by
Mr. Mill's own admission) no experience is so much as
possible, unless a large number of truths be assumed, which
are not known by experience ; viz. truths testified by
memory. And we have replied secondly, as to necessary
truths in particular, that unless necessary truths were cog-
nizable, experimental science could not so much as exist.

Our ultimate purpose however in these essays, as we
have said, is to draw out, as completely as we can, the
philosophical argument for Theism. But it does not follow,
because Mr. Mill's phenomenism is false, that therefore
Theism is true ; on the contrary, for the full establishment
of that fundamental dogma, it will be necessary to accumu-
late a large number of philosophical premisses. This we
hope to perform in future essays.

III.

ME. MILL ON THE FOUNDATION OF MOKALITY.*

IN our last essay we argued against Mr. Mill, that
mathematical truths possess the attribute of " necessity ; "
and in this we are to argue against him, that moral
truths also are of the same kind. We have done im-
portant service, we consider, in our previous paper, not
only towards the particular conclusion there advocated,
but towards the conclusion also which we are now to main-
tain. The doctrine that there are truths possessing that
very singular quality expressed by the term "necessary"-
this doctrine is a priori both so startling, and also pregnant
with consequences so momentous, that the philosopher
may well require absolutely irresistible evidence before he
will accept it. This was our reason for placing mathe-
matical truths in the very front of our controversial
position; because they afford so much less room than
others for confusion and equivocalness, that their " neces-
sary " character is on that account more irresistibly evident.
When the philosopher is once obliged to admit that there
are propositions of this character, it is a matter of com-
parative detail which they are. This, therefore, is the

* An Essay in aid of a Grammar of Assent. By JOHN HENRY NEWMAN,
D.D., of the Oratory. London : Burns, Gates, & Co.

Dissertations and Discussions. By JOHN STUART MILL. London : . J. W.
Parker.

Utilitarianism. By JOHN STUART MILL. London : Longmans.

The Emotions and the Will. Chap. XV. : The Moral Sense. By ALEXANDER
BAIN, A.M. London : J. W. Parker.

Mr. Mill on the Foundation of Morality. 77

position of advantage from which wo approach our present
theme.

But from another point of view, we are less favourably
circumstanced in our present than in our former under-
taking. There is no difference of opinion worth mentioning
as to what those propositions are which are called mathe-
matical axioms : and there are only therefore two possible
alternatives; viz. whether those axioms are, or are not,
self -evidently necessary. All phenomenists are on one
side, and all objectivists, as a matter of course, on the other.
But those who hold most strongly the "necessary" cha-
racter of moral science differ nevertheless importantly from
each other, as to what are those axioms on which the
science is founded. Whatever theory we adopt, we must
necessarily have for our opponents, not only all pheno-
menists, but a large number of objectivists also. Even
among Catholics there are some subordinate differences on
the subject ; and before we enter on our reply to Mr. Mill,
there are three little matters of domestic controversy which
we must briefly consider, in order to make clear the precise
position which is to be our controversial standpoint.

The first of these relates to a phrase which we have
more than once used. We are here assuming for the
moment, what we are afterwards to defend against Mr.
Mill, that there are certain moral axioms intuitively
known : * and we have frequently used the phrase "moral
faculty " to express that mental faculty whereby such
axioms are cognized. F. Liberatore (Ethica, n. 32) under-
stands this phrase to imply, that moral truths are not
discerned by the intellect and reason, but assumed by
blind propension and instinct. With great deference to
so distinguished a writer, we must nevertheless say that
this seems to us a complete misapprehension of Keid's and

* By the term "axioms" are here meant " self-evidently necessary
truths."

78 The Philosophy of Theism.

Hutcheson's meaning ; and it is certainly removed to the
greatest possible degree from our own. By the phrase
"moral faculty" we mean neither more nor less (as we
have said) than the power, which resides in man's intellect,
of cognizing moral axioms with self-evident certitude. For
various reasons, it seems to us of extreme importance that
attention should be carefully fixed on this power ; and we
think it very desirable, therefore, to give it a special name.*

F. Newman habitually uses the word " conscience " to
express substantially the same thing ; nor could any word
be better adapted to the purpose, so far as regards the
ordinary usage of Englishmen. Our own difficulty in so
using it arises from the circumstance, that the word " con-
scientia " has a theological sense, importantly different
from F. Newman's, and yet not so far removed from it as
to prevent real danger of one being confused with the other.
The theological word " conscientia " does not commonly
express an intellectual power or habit; but an existing
declaration of the intellect, as to the morality (hie et nunc)
of this or that particular act : and so one hears of a
" correct " or an " erroneous," of a " certain " or a " doubt-
ful" conscience. Then again, and more importantly, its
office is the cognition, not so much of moral axioms as of
moral conclusions : and the first premisses too on which it
proceeds, are not merely moral axioms, but include God's
positive precepts, the Church's interpretation of the Divine
Law, and the Church's positive commands. We cannot,
then, but think it will be more conducive to clearness if we
avoid using this word in F. Newman's sense.

We now proceed to our second preliminary. It is a
very prominent doctrine of F. Newman's, that " con-

* It may be worth while also to cite Liberatore's own statement —
" hominem individuum universamque societatem ad perfectionem moralem
jugiter amplificandam m natures incitari, atque ideo iypo quodam honestatis
in animis insculpto gaudere, quo dijudicet quibus defectibus liberari et quibus
bonis augeri debeat." (Introductio ad Ethicam, art. iii.)

Mr. Mill on the Foundation of Morality. 79

science " testifies emphatically God's existence. And very
many Catholic writers hold (as will be presently seen) that
whenever reason notifies to me the intrinsic turpitude of
this or that act, it thereupon notifies to me the existence of
some Supreme Legislator, who forbids it. This doctrine,
however, may be advocated in two essentially different
senses.

On the one hand, it may merely be alleged that when-
ever reason notifies to me the intrinsic moral turpitude of
this or that act, it further notifies, by most prompt and
immediate consequence, the prohibition of that act by some
Supreme Legislator. We incline to think that such is
F. Newman's meaning. At all events, we ourselves heartily
accept this doctrine, and are to maintain it in the course of
our present article.

But, on the other hand, it may be alleged that the idea
itself — "moral turpitude" — is either identical with, or
includes, that of " prohibition by a Supreme Legislator."
We cannot assent to such a proposition. We accept S.
Ignatius's teaching in the " Spiritual Exercises," that evil
acts possess a " fceditas et nequitia " of their own, " ex
natura sua, vel si prohibita non essent." We follow
Suarez in holding, that they would be "mala, peccata,
culpabilia," even if (per impossibile) there existed no law
strictly so called forbidding them. We follow Vasquez,
Bellarmine, Lessius, and other eminent theologians, in
their use of similar expressions.* We are not here arguing

* A considerable number of passages to this effect have been cited by
Dr. Ward, in his " Philosophical Introduction," from the most eminent
Catholic theologians and philosophers, including the expressions mentioned
in the text (pp. 429-490). Since that work was published, the phrase used
in it — " independent morality " — has been adopted by some French infidels
to express certain tenets, which we consider to be as philosophically de-
spicable as they are morally detestable. But the phrase had not been dirtied,
to his knowledge at least, when Dr. Ward used it. F. Chastel, S.J. (Dr.
Ward, p. 481) raises the question, whether " there is a moral law indepen-
dently of all Divine law," and proceeds to answer it in the affirmative.
Suarez (ib. p. 433) says, " dictamina rationis naturalis, in quibus hsec lex

80 The Philosophy of Theism.

against those excellent Catholics who think otherwise : * we
are but explaining the position we shall assume, in this
part of our controversy against Mr. Mill.

Thirdly, the question has been raised among Catholics,
whether there can be obligation, properly so called, apart
from man's knowledge of a Supreme Legislator. So far as
this question is distinct from the preceding, it seems to us
purely verbal. If, by saying that act A is of obligation,
you only mean that its omission would be culpable and
sinful, — we hold (consistently with our previous remarks)
that there may be true obligation, without reference to
a Legislator's prohibition. So F. Chastel says, " there
would still remain moral obligation, real duty, though one
made abstraction of God and religion." On the other
hand, if the term be understood as implying the correlative
act of a Legislator who obliges, of course there can
be no obligation without full means of knowing such a
Legislator.

Without further delay, let us set forth the precise issue
which we are to join with Mr. Mill. There is a large
number of cognizable truths, which may be expressed in
one or other of the following shapes. "Act A is morally
good ; " " act B is morally bad ; " " act C is morally better
than act D." All these, it will be seen, are but different
shapes, in which emerges the one fundamental idea called
" moral goodness." We will call such judgments, therefore,
" moral judgments ; " and the truths cognized in them
" moral truths." t Our allegation against Mr. Mill is, that
a certain number { of these truths are cognized as self-

[naturalis] consistit, snnt intrinsece necessaria et independentia ab omni
voluntate etiam Divina."

* Dr. Ward has done so in his " Philosophical Introduction," pp. 78-90.

t We need hardly say that a " moral judgment " may be mistaken ; and
that in that case there is no corresponding " moral truth."

J " ' Parentes cole ; ' ' Deo convenientem cultum exhibe ; ' * rationem
sensibus ne subjicias ; ' et alia innumera generis ejusdem." (Liberatore,
n. 80.)

Mr. Mill on the Foundation of Morality. SI

evidently necessary. These we call " moral axioms." Mr.
Mill admits, of course, that moral judgments are very
frequently elicited ; but, denying as he does the existence
of any necessary truths, he denies inclusively that there are
moral truths self-evidently necessary. The ground which
he often seems to take is that no moral judgments are
intuitions, but that all are inferences ; though these infer-
ences, he would add, are so readily and imperceptibly
drawn, as to be most naturally and almost inevitably
mistaken for intuitions.

That we may bring this vital question to a distinct
issue, it is highly important to dwell at starting on the
fundamental idea " moral goodness." There is probably
no psychical fact, so pregnant with momentous con-
sequences in the existing state of philosophy, as man's pos-
session of this idea. Very many philosophers hold, that
it is complex and resolvable accordingly into simpler
elements ; we contend earnestly and confidently that it is
simple.

The strong bias of our opinion is, that Mr. Mill (as we
shall explain in a later part of our essay) so far agrees
with ourselves ; though his expression of doctrine would no
doubt be importantly different. It is very possible, however,
that the case may be otherwise ; and that he may regard
the idea before us as consisting of simpler elements. In
that case he must consistently say, that " morally good,"
as applied to human acts, means neither more nor less
than "conducive to general enjoyment." Provisionally,
therefore, we shall assume this as Mr. Mill's position.

Now, this is an issue, one would think, which must
admit of speedy and definite decision : for there is perhaps
no one idea which so constantly meets one at every turn,
whether in literature or conversation, as that of " morally
good" with its correlatives. "I am bound to do what I
am paid for doing; " "how conscientious a man H is ! "
YOL. i. G

82 The Philosophy of Theism.

" K behaved in that matter with much more uprightness
than L ; " " M is an undeniable scoundrel ; " "no praise
can be too great for N's disinterested benevolence and self-
sacrifice ; " " whatever God commands, men of course are
bound to do." At this moment we are in no way concerned
with the truth or falsehood of such propositions, but ex-
clusively with their meaning. Our readers will see at once,
that these judgments, and a thousand others of daily
occurrence, contain unmistakably the idea "morally good,"
under different aspects ; and if they consider the matter
with any care they will further see, that this idea is as
distinct from the idea " conducive to general enjoyment,"
as any one can possibly be from any other. This is
the proposition which we now wish to illustrate and
establish.

Take the last instance we gave : " whatever God com-
mands, a man is bound to do ; " or, in other words, " what-
ever God commands, a man acts morally ill in failing to
do." Does the Theist mean, by this judgment, that the
individual's disobedience to God militates against general
enjoyment ? This latter statement may or may not be true ;
but it is no more equivalent to the former, than it is to a
geometrical axiom. Or let us take such a case as would be
most favourable to Mr. Mill's argument ; the case of one
whom he would regard as amongst the greatest benefactors
of his species. "How noble," Mr. Mill would say, "was
the self-sacrificing generosity of Howard the philanthro-
pist ! " Would he merely mean by this, that Howard's
generosity conduced immensely to general enjoyment? He
would be the first indignantly to disclaim so poor an inter-
pretation of his words. By the term "noble," then, "or
"morally good," Mr. Mill means much more than "con-
ducive to general enjoyment."

But the particular idea — " moral evil " — deserves our
especial consideration, as exhibiting in clearest light the

Mr. Mill on the Foundation of Morality. 83

peculiar character of moral judgments. Take any very
obvious case of wickedness. Consider, e.g., the judgment
elicited by David concerning his own past course of action,
when Nathan had said to him, " Thou art the man." Or
suppose I had been guilty of such conduct in an exaggerated
shape, as that ascribed to Lord Bacon (truly or falsely)
by Lord Macaulay. A politician of high and unblemished
moral character, with whose political principles I am heartily
in accordance, has admitted me to his friendship and trusted
me with his dearest secrets. I find, however, as time goes
on, that my best chance of advancement lies in attach-
ing myself to the opposite side. Filled with passionate
desire for such advancement, I make political capital by
disclosing my friend's confidences to his opponents ; and
I embark heartily in a course of political enterprise,
which has for its end his ruin. As I am about to reap
the worldly fruit of my labours, I am seized with a
violent illness : and in the tedious hours of slow recovery,
I "enter into myself," to use the expression of ascetical
writers ; I bitterly repent the past ; I judge that my suc-
cessive acts have been " sinful" "^wicked." I judge, as a
consequence of this, that I have rendered myself worthy of
punishment ; that if there be a Moral Governor of the
Universe, He views my conduct with detestation ; etc. "We
are not at this moment alleging that these various judgments
are true, but only considering their correct analysis. And
surely Mr. Mill will not on reflection maintain, that when I
am pondering on the moral turpitude of my past conduct, I
am in fact merely thinking of its evil effects on general
enjoyment. Doubtless, when I reflect on the malitia of
having supported a political cause which I deem unsound,
I base this malitia greatly on the evil which I have thereby
tried to inflict on my country ; but I base it also in part on
the concomitant judgment, that to inflict such injury is
intrinsically evil. And when I reflect on the malitia of my

84 The Philosophy of Theism.

ingratitude, and of my having perfidiously violated my
friend's confidence, — in all probability the question does
not ever so distantly present itself, whether general enjoy-
ment is promoted or retarded by such practices.

We are arguing against the theory which we provision-
ally ascribe to Mr. Mill ; viz. that the idea " morally good "
is equivalent with the idea " conducive to general enjoy-
ment." But it seems to us that this whole matter may be
clenched, so as to render all evasion impossible. If this
theory were true, it would be a simply tautologous pro-
position to say, that " conduct, known by the agent as
adverse to general enjoyment, is morally evil." This pro-
position, we say, would be as simply tautologous, as the
proposition that "two mutual friends desire each other's
well-being;" or the proposition, that "a hard substance
resists muscular pressure." These two latter propositions
are really tautologous : for a desire of each other's well-
being is expressed by the very term " mutual friends ; " and
" resistance to muscular pressure " is expressed by the very
term " hard substance." Now, it is an evident logical truth,
that the contradictory of a tautologous proposition is
simply unmeaning, because its predicate denies that very
thing which its subject affirms, (See " Mill on Hamilton,"
p. 92.) " There are two mutual friends of my acquaintance,
who do not desire each other's well-being; " — " some hard
substances I have met with do not resist muscular pres-
sure ; " — for any meaning that such propositions convey, we
might even better (to use Mr. Mill's illustration) say that
" every Humpty Dumpty is an Abracadabra." Let us look
again, then, at the proposition, that " conduct, known by
the agent as averse to general enjoyment, is morally evil."
If this proposition were tautologous, its contradictory would
be unmeaning ; it would be simply unmeaning to say, that
" some conduct, known by the agent as averse to general
enjoyment, may be morally good." Will Mr. Mill him-

Mr. Mill on the Foundation of Morality. 85

self say that this is unmeaning ? On the contrary, the
energetic protest with which he would encounter its
enunciation, sufficiently evinces how clearly he apprehends
its tenor.

Indeed, Mr. Mill himself, in a very remarkable passage
which we shall quote at length before we conclude, contra-
dicts the doctrine which we are here opposing. He says in
effect, that it would, be morally better for all mankind to
undergo eternal torment than to worship such or such a
being, whom he imagines and describes. Now, most cer-
tainly eternal torment, endured by all mankind, is less con-
ducive to general enjoyment than would be the worship of
such a being; and Mr. Mill does not therefore consider
" morally good " as synonymous with " conducive to general
enjoyment."

Arguments entirely similar to those which we have here
given would equally suffice to disprove any other analysis
which might be attempted, of the idea " morally good ; "
and we conclude, therefore, that this idea is simple and
incapable of analysis.

We are now in a position to consider satisfactorily the
direct point at issue : the self-evident necessity of certain
moral truths. Let us go back to the moral judgments on
which we have already dwelt ; the moral judgments, elicited
on his sick-bed by the recently unscrupulous politician.
Take any one of their number: for instance, "my divulging
what my friend told me in confidence, was morally evil."
"We maintain that this judgment is the cognition of a self-
evidently necessary truth.

On this point let us refer to the remarks we made
in our second essay, on the notes of a self-evidently
necessary truth, and let us apply them to the case before
us. It is known to me by my very idea of this my act-
so soon as I choose carefully to consider it — that it was
morally evil ; I intue irresistibly, that in no possible sphere

86 The Philosophy of Theism.

of existence — the relevant circumstances remaining un-
changed— could such an act be otherwise ; that omnipotence
itself could not prevent such an act from being intrinsically
base and abominable.* In other words, if it be a self-
evidently necessary truth (see pp. 36, 37 of our last essay)
that a trilateral figure is triangular, — it is no less indubi-
tably a self-evidently necessary truth, that such an act as
we are considering is morally evil.

How may we consider Mr. Mill to stand in reference to
this argument ? He agrees with us, of course, that mankind
do again and again form legitimately, and with good reason,
what we have called "moral judgments:" judgments re-
ducible to the type "act A is morally good ; " or " act B
is morally evil; " or " act C is morally better than act D."
He adds, however, what is quite true, that we have no right
to consider any of these judgments intuitive, until we have
clearly shown that they are not inferential : for, as he most
justly observes, inferences from experience are often so
obviously and spontaneously drawn, that unless we are very
wary we may most easily mistake them for intuitions. We

* We do not for a moment forget the power, possessed by God, of changing
(as theologians express it) the " materia " of the Natural Law; but the
existence of this power, so far from conflicting with, on the contrary confirms,
what is said in the text. The classical instance in point is the command
imposed by God on Abraham, of sacrificing his son ; and what all Catholic
theologians say is this. God, as the Creator of mankind, could (without
disparagement of His sanctity) inflict death on Isaac or on any one else ; and
it is no more repugnant to His Attributes that He should do this by human
intermediation, than that He should do it directly. God's command, then,
intrinsically changed the circumstances of Abraham's act, if the morality of
the act was intrinsically necessary, and external to the sphere of God's
Power. It would have been intrinsically wrong in Abraham, if he had
refused to slay Isaac when commanded to do so as God's vicegerent; and
God Himself could not make such refusal innocent. On the other hand, it
would have been no less necessarily wrong to slay Isaac on his own authority ;
and God Himself could not make such slaughter innocent.

It should be added, that no such "mutatio inateriaB" can affect the
internal acts and dispositions of the will. For instance, God could not
possibly command His reasonable creatures to hate each other ; and still less
to hate Himself. Dr. Ward has stated this doctrine at length as clearly as
he could, " Philosophical Introduction," pp. 165-190.

Mr. Mill on the Foundation of Morality. 87

are next, therefore, to show, that there are indubitably some
moral judgments, which are not inferential. Our argument
runs thus.

If the idea " morally good " be really simple — as we
consider ourselves to have now conclusively established —
then that idea cannot possibly be contained in the conclu-
sion of any syllogism, unless it be expressly found in one of
the premisses.* Take, then, any one of those moral judg-
ments, which Mr. Mill admits to be legitimately formed. If
he alleges that that judgment is an inference — as indeed it
very possibly may be — he does but shift his difficulty, and
in no respect lessens it. If the judgment be really the
conclusion of a syllogism, then, as we have said, that syl-
logism must contain some other moral judgment as one of
its premisses. If this premiss be itself a conclusion, we
are thrown back on an earlier moral premiss, until at length
we come to some moral judgment, which is immediate and
not inferential. If this primary moral premiss be not
cognizable as true, then neither is the ultimate conclusion
so cognizable : and this is against the hypothesis ; for
Mr. Mill admits that many moral judgments are cogniz-
able as true, and it is one of these which we are here
considering. If, on the other hand, the primary moral
premiss be cognizable as true, then a moral proposition
is cognizable as true, which is not inferred from experi-
ence ; and Mr. Mill is obliged to abandon the keystone of
his position.

It seems to us, then, that the real issue between Mr.
Mill and ourselves turns on the question, whether the idea
" morally good " be capable of analysis. If it means " con-
ducive to general enjoyment," then no doubt all moral
judgments are inferential and founded on experience ; but

* If " morally good " were a complex idea, — it might be contained, of
course, in the conclusion of a syllogism, without appearing in the premis&es
except in its constituent elements.

88 The Philosophy of TJieism.

if it be incapable of analysis, then a certain number of
moral judgments must be intuitive. And if Mr. Mill once
admits that they are intuitive, he will certainly find no
difficulty in further admitting, that they are cognitions of
self-evidently necessary truths.

We have worded our argument throughout, in harmony
with the opinion which to us seems true (see our last
essay, pp. 48, 49), that axioms are first intued in the
individual case, though capable of being universalized.
According to this view, what Catholics call " the first prin-
ciples " of morality, are simply these universalized axioms.
Firstly, for instance, I intue, as a self-evidently necessary
truth, that my own betrayal of my friend's confidence was
intrinsically wicked; and I then further intue, as self-
evidently necessary, that all such betrayal in really
analogous circumstances possesses the same evil quality.
Those philosophers, on the contrary, who hold that axioms
are always intued in the universal, will regard every
individual moral judgment as the conclusion of syllogistic
reasoning, whereof some universal moral axiom has been
a premiss. But their substantial argument against Mr.
Mill may be precisely the same as our own.

Moreover, we have assumed throughout no other datum,
except the one for which we argued in the first of these
essays; viz. that whatever my cognitive faculties indubi-
tably avouch, is infallibly true. The strong bias of our
own opinion is, that this is the very doctrine which
Mr. Mill will call in question; but most certainly he
has no right to do so. On one hand, no experience is
possible to me — I have no knowledge whatever except
of my present consciousness — unless I first unreservedly
believe the truth of whatever my memory distinctly
declares ; while on the other hand (as we have more
than once pointed out), Mr. Mill fully admits that I
have no ground whatever for this belief, except the present

Mr. Mill on the Foundation of Morality. 89

avouchment of my faculties. If my faculties convey to me
infallible knowledge when they distinctly declare to me
a certain past experience, — no less must they convey to
me infallible knowledge, when . they declare to me (if
they do declare) the self-evident necessity of certain moral
truths. If I do not firmly trust them in the latter avouch-
ment, I have no right firmly to trust them in the former.
Nay, I have really stronger grounds for accepting the distinct
declarations of my moral faculty than the distinct declara-
tions of my memory. In the first place intrinsically, it
would be in some sense less utterly impossible to believe that
I never did betray my friend's confidence, than to believe
that such betrayal is not morally detestable. And in the
second place extrinsically, I find these obvious moral judg-
ments confirmed by every one I meet : whereas for the
trustworthiness of my memory, I can have no external
warrant at all ; because my absolute trust in its testimony
is a strictly requisite preliminary condition, in order that
I may know or even guess what any one human being
thinks or says. But we are to meet Mr. Mill in detail on
this point a few pages hence.

This datum, then, being assumed, we consider that we
have built thereon an argument absolutely irrefragable.
We consider our reasoning to have established conclusively,
(1) that the idea " morally good " is incapable of analysis ;
and (2) that various moral judgments are cognitions of self-
evidently necessary truths. We may add, that if the
Catholic reader desires to apprehend the relation which
exists between necessary truth and the One Necessary
Being, we would refer him to the Dublin Review for July,
1869, pp. 153, 154. We there stated with hearty con-
currence F. Kleutgen's doctrine, that all necessary truths
are founded on God ; that they are what they are, because
God is what He is.

Our next thesis is a very simple one ; and indeed almost

90 The Philosophy of Theism.

(if not altogether) tautologous. All acts, morally good,
are " admirable " and " praiseworthy ; " all acts, morally
evil, are " the reverse of admirable " and " blameworthy ; "
all acts are more admirable and more praiseworthy in
proportion as they are morally better.

But now, lastly — in order to express the whole doctrine
which we would place before our readers — we must make
a very important supplement to what has hitherto been
said. Let us renew our old picture. I am lying on a bed
of illness, and looking back remorsefully on my shameful
violation of my friend's confidence, and on a life of dis-
honest practices directed (as I myself knew) to the detriment
of my country's highest interests. Not only I intue that
a large number of my past acts have been morally evil, but
I further intue that they violated the command of some
living Personal Being.* This is the further thesis, which
we are now to advocate. The general axiom, we maintain,
is cognizable, that all morally evil acts are prohibited by
some living Personal Being.

Now, here let us distinctly explain our meaning. We by
no means say — on the contrary, in an earlier part of our
article we have denied — that the idea "morally evil"
either includes or is equivalent with the idea " forbidden
by some living Personal Being." The predicate of an
axiom is not commonly included in, or equivalent with, the

* "Ipsa ratio naturalis ... discernendo actiones convenientes aut
repugnantes naturae humanse, prohibitionem vel imperium divinum nobis
offert." (Liberatore, Ethica, n. 79.) " Hoc " dictamen rationis " sic auditu
quodam interne homo percipit, ut vere imperio aliquo se astringi sentiat.
. . . Cui voci intrinsecus prsecipienti si quis non pareat, sic stimulis angitur
... ut ... ipsemet se accuset et arguat et pcenam a supremd quddam
potestate sibi infligendam expectet" (ib. n. 80). "Semper in illis " judiciis
practicis " involvitur obscurus saltern et indistinctus conceptus alicujus
occultae, potestatis, . . . quse objective spectata non est nisi Deus " (ib. n. 83).
On the other hand : " Divina voluntas bonitatem vel malitiam actionibus
impertire non posset, nisi ante prtesumatur bonum esse et honestum Deo
prsecipienti parere, turpe et illicitum reluctari. Hoc non snpposito, actio
rnaiiebit indifferens etiam post Dei jussum vel prohibitionem " (ib. n. 27).

Mr. Mill on the Foundation of Morality. 91

idea of its subject ; for were it so, there would be no axioms
except tautologies. Take the parallel case, on which we
insisted in our last essay : " all trilaterals are triangular."
So far is it from being true (as we there pointed out) that
triangularity is included in the idea of trilateralness, that,
on the contrary, I call a figure " trilateral " in the fullest
sense of that word, before I have so much as considered
any question as to the number of its angles. Nevertheless
the proposition is axiomatic : because, to use F. Kleutgen's
expression, " by merely considering the idea of the subject
and predicate, I come to see that there exists between them
that relation which the proposition expresses ; " or (as we
ourselves expressed the same thought) because, from my
very conception of a trilateral, I know its triangularity.

This, then, is what we maintain in the present instance.
If after such an ill-spent life as we have supposed, while
lying on my sick-bed, I ponder in anguish of soul the idea
"morally evil" as truly applicable to so many of my past
acts, — I find myself to know, by my very conception of that
attribute, that these acts have been acts of rebellion against
some living personal authority, external to myself. We
make this allegation, on the sole possible and the abundantly
sufficient ground of an appeal to the indubitable facts of
human nature. We say, "external to myself;" because
to say merely that the lower part of my nature has rebelled
against the higher, is absurdly inadequate to express my
deep conviction. And we say "living personal authority,"
because it is still more absurd to suppose that there can
be rebellion against an impersonal thing; least of all
against an abstraction, which is in fact nothing at all.
I intue, then, the axiom, that all morally evil acts are also
forbidden me by some living personal authority external
to myself.

It is of vital moment here to make manifest how com-
pletely distinct are the two ideas; "morally evil " on one

02 The Philosophy of Theism.

hand, and " prohibited by a Personal Being " on the other.
For this purpose, let us take the following proposition :—
" to do what is prohibited by my Creator is to do an act
morally evil." A moment's consideration will show that
this proposition has an entirely distinct sense from the
purely tautological one, that " what is prohibited by my
Creator is prohibited by a Personal Being." The term
" morally evil " expresses an idea entirely external to, over
and above, the idea expressed by the term " prohibited by
a Personal Being." And as, on the one hand, it is no
tautology, but an axiom, that "to do what is prohibited by
my Holy Creator is to do an act morally evil ; " so, on the
other hand, we are here urging that it is no tautology, but
an axiom, that "all acts morally evil are prohibited by
some Personal Being."

But further, as Viva argues,* this Personal Being has
on me such paramount claims, that though all other beings
in the universe solicited mo in an opposite direction, my
obligation would in no degree be affected, of submitting
myself unreservedly to His command. His Will, then, is
more peremptorily authoritative than the united will of all
existent or possible beings who are not He.

Nay, further — and this is put by F. Franzelint — moral
laws hold good for all persons existent or possible ; all other
persons, therefore, existent or possible, are as unreservedly
subject to His command as I am. Consequently He is no
less than Supreme Legislator of the universe.

F. Kleutgen expresses substantially the same doctrine
with Yiva and Franzelin, where he says that, "when
we vividly represent to ourselves our imperfection and
dependence," " God makes Himself felt within us by
His moral law, as an August Power to which we are
subject."

* Treating the condemned proposition on " philosophical sin."
t " De Deo Uno," p. 52.

Mr. Mill on the Foundation of Morality. 03

But there are further facts of human nature to which
F. Newman conclusively appeals, as showing how universal
and how undeniably intuitive is man's conviction, that acts
morally evil are offences against a Supreme Kuler. We
will remind our readers indeed of what we have already
said concerning F. Newman's use of the word " conscience."
But we need hardly beg them to observe how singularly
his remarks combine exquisite beauty of expression with
strong and irresistible appeal to facts. The italics are
our own.

In consequence of this prerogative of dictating and command-
ing, which is of its essence, Conscience has an intimate bearing
on our affections and emotions, leading us to reverence and
awe, hope and fear, especially fear. . . . No fear is felt by any
one who recognizes that his conduct has not been beautiful,
though he may be mortified at himself, if perhaps he has
thereby forfeited some advantage ; but, if he has been betrayed
into any kind of immorality, he has a lively sense of respon-
sibility and guilt, though the act be no offence against society ;
of distress and apprehension, even though it may be of present
service to him ; of compunction and regret, though in itself it
be most pleasurable ; of confusion of face, though it may have
no witnesses. These various perturbations of mind, which are
characteristic of a bad conscience, and may be very considerable ;
self-reproach, poignant shame, haunting remorse, chill dismay
at the prospect of the future ; and their contraries, when the
conscience is good, as real though less forcible, self-approval,
inward peace, lightness of heart, and the like ; these emotions
constitute a generic difference between conscience and our other
intellectual senses; common sense, good sense, sense of ex-
pedience, taste, sense of honour, and the like. . . .

Conscience always involves the recognition of a living object,
towards which it is directed. Inanimate things cannot stir our
affections : these are correlative with persons. If, as is the case,
we feel responsibility, are ashamed, are frightened, at trans-
gressing the voice of conscience, this implies that there is One to
whom we are responsible, before whom we are ashamed, whoso
claim upon us we fear. If, on doing wrong, we feel the same
tearful, broken-hearted sorrow which overwhelms us on hurting a
mother; if, on doing right, we enjoy the same sunny serenity of

94 The Philosophy of Theism.

mind, the same soothing satisfactory delight, which follows on
our receiving praise from a father, we certainly have within us the
image of some person, to whom our love and veneration look, in
whose smile we find our happiness, for whom we yearn, towards
whom we direct our pleadings, in whose anger we are troubled
and waste away. These feelings in us are such as require for
their exciting cause an intelligent being: we are not affectionate
towards a stone, nor do we feel shame before a horse or a dog ;
we have no remorse or compunction on breaking mere human
law ; yet, so it is, conscience excites all these painful emotions,
confusion, foreboding, self-condemnation ; and, on the other hand,
it sheds upon us a deep peace, a sense of security, a resignation,
and a hope, which there is no sensible, no earthly object to
elicit. " The wicked flees, when no one pursueth ; " then why
does he flee ? whence his terror ? Who is it that he sees in solitude,
in darkness, in the hidden chambers of his heart ? If the cause of
these emotions does not belong to this visible world, the Object
to which his perception is directed must be Supernatural and
Divine; and thus the phenomena of Conscience, as a dictate,
avail to impress the imagination with the picture of a Supreme
Governor, a Judge, holy, just, powerful, all-seeing, retributive ;
and is the creative principle of religion (pp. 104-7).

We affirm then, as an axiom, that all acts morally evil
are prohibited by some Living Person external to the agent ;
and we affirm as an obvious inference, that this Person is
Supreme Legislator of the Universe.*

We may sufficiently sum up what we have now main-

* It seems to us (speaking with all diffidence) that the view expressed by
us in the text is serviceable, on two different doctrinal heads, in harmonizing
Catholic writers with themselves, with each other, and with facts. Thus
firstly Liberatore, Dmowski, and (we think) all modern Catholic philosophers,
hold, on the one hand, that God (according to human modes of conception)
cognizes any given act as intrinsically evil, antecedently to prohibiting it
by the Natural Law ; and yet they hold that, in intuing its moral evil,
men spontaneously and inevitably cognize the fact of its being prohibited
by some Supreme Legislator. It is not easy to see how these statements
can be combined, except according to the exposition which we have
drawn out.

Then, for another matter of doctrine. The vast majority of theologians
follow S. Thomas in holding, that the existence of God is not " per se nota
quoad nos ; " though they regard it as a truth, deducible from first prin-
ciples by a very obvious and immediate consequence. On the other hand, it

Mr. Mill on the Foundation of Morality. 95

tained, in three propositions : (1) the idea " morally good "
or " morally evil " is simple and incapable of analysis ;
(2) there are various human acts self-evidently known to
be morally evil; (8) such acts are further known to be
prohibited by a Supreme Kuler of the Universe. If Mr.
Mill admitted the two former of these propositions, he
would feel no difficulty in the third : in considering, there-
fore, the objections he may be expected to bring against our
doctrine, we will for brevity's sake dismiss from considera-
tion the last of our three above-named theses.

These objections, as in other similar instances, may
be of two different kinds : they may be objections against
the reasoning adduced for our conclusion, or they may be
objections against the conclusion itself. Of the former
kind, there is only one which occurs to us as possible ; and
we believe this to be the very objection on which Mr. Mill
will mainly insist. Take the judgment, applied to some
very obviously immoral act — " act B is morally evil.'*
Mr. Mill may probably admit, both that this judgment is
immediate, and also that the idea "morally evil" is
perfectly simple : yet he may allege that such an avouch-
ment is not intuitive, because it would not have issued
from the mind at the time when the mind's revelations
were in their pristine purity . The quality of immediately *
eliciting on occasion this or that moral judgment, however
indubitably now possessed, may be no part (Mr. Mill will
say) of the mind's original constitution ; but on the contrary
may result, by natural process, from various experiences,

is admitted by all, that a large number of moral axioms are self-evident and
intuitively known ; while yet those very writers, who deny that God's
existence is " per se nota quoad nos," say that some knowledge of God is
included in the cognition of a moral axiom. According to the view given in
our text, the knowledge of a Supreme Legislator of the Universe is an
inference — though a very prompt and obvious one — from the self-evident
truths of morality.

* We need hardly say that we here use the word " immediately " as
opposed to *• inferentially."

96 The Philosophy of Theism.

through which every man has passed.* Consequently (so
he will conclude) this subjective persuasion is no guarantee
whatever of objective truth. Such an objection brings us
back to certain expressions of Mr. Mill's, on which we
animadverted in the first of these essays, and which here
again require comment.t But we must preface this com-
ment by a brief exposition of terminology.

We believe there is no difference whatever, among those
philosophers who use the word "intuition," as to the
signification of that word. Of course nothing could be
known at all unless some truths were known immediately
and by their own light ; and these are called " first truths."
Moreover, it is absolutely indubitable, that the facts of
" consciousness " properly so called — the mental phenomena
which I experience at the present moment — are " first
truths " to me. Now, the word " intuition " is used, by all
who do use it, to express those other truths, over and above
acts of consciousness, which are known to me immediately
and by their own light. Sir W. Hamilton, however, uses
the expression " acts of consciousness " to express all first
truths : and we think never was there a mode of speech
more exquisitely infelicitous, more singularly adapted to
introduce equivocation and perplexity, and to surround the
whole subject with almost impenetrable fog. Mr. Mill,
while justly disapproving this use of language, yet (much
to our regret) adopts it for purposes of argument with Sir
W. Hamilton (" On Hamilton," p. 193 et alibi) ; and this

* It should be explained that, in Mr. Mill's opinion, by a process of what
he calls " mental chemistry," some idea may result from others of the past,
while nevertheless in its present state it is simple and incapable of analysis.
(See "Logic" (seventh edition), vol. ii. p. 437.) He calls such an idea
indeed "complex," because (as he considers) it "results from," it has
been "generated by," other ideas; but he adds, that it does not "consist
of" simpler ideas, and its true name, therefore, in its present state is surely
" simple."

t Since we wrote that article, we have again examined Mr. Mill's philo-
sophical writings, with a special view to this question, and we find his
meaning much more pronounced and unmistakable than we had fancied.

PRESENTED TO ST. MARY'S COLLEGE LIBRARY
BY REV. T. CALLAGHAM

Mr. Mill on the Foundation of Morality. 97

fact must be remembered in looking at those passages of
his, to which we shall presently refer. Let us now, there-
fore, pass from this question of words to the question of
things.

The main thesis of the first essay in this volume, on
"Certitude," was, that man's cognitive faculties infallibly
testify objective truth ; and, as part of this, that I intui-
tively know whatever my mind immediately avouches. We
admitted expressly (in full agreement so far with Mr. Mill)
that inferential judgments are again and again mistaken
for intuitive ones ; and in our present article accordingly
we have shown (we trust) conclusively, that certain moral
judgments are not inferential but immediate. Mr. Mill,
however, in various passages goes much further than we
have here implied : he affirms that the very thing, which
my faculties now immediately declare, is not thereby in-
tuitively known, and that I must not accept it as self-
evidently true until I can show that it was declared by my
intuitive faculties, at the time "when they received their
first impressions;" "at the first beginning of my intel-
lectual life ; " when they were " in their state of pristine
purity." See " On Hamilton," pp. 152, 160, 171, 176,
185; "Logic," vol. ii. p. 439. In one place (" On Hamil-
ton," p. 173, n.) he repudiates the opinion that man's
intuitive faculties admit of development and improvement
by means of practice ; and in another (p. 172) implies that
no one's intuitive faculties can be trusted, except an infant's
" when he first opened his eyes to the light."

Now, the answer to all this is really very obvious and
conclusive. There is one class of intuitions, of which
Mr. Mill heartily admits the existence; those which are
called acts of memory. In consistency, however, he must
maintain that he can trust no avouchments of his memory,
however clear and distinct, until he can show that that

faculty, " at the first beginning of his intellectual life,"
VOL. i. H

0«S The Philosophy of TJieism.

before it had received " development and education," nay,
" when he first opened his eyes to the light," would have
been capable of those avouchments. But it is indubitable
that he can never prove this ; because, so soon as he
attempts to prove it, he takes for granted at every turn the
very thing to be proved, viz. the trustworthiness of his
present memory. So long as Mr. Mill adheres to the
philosophical tenet which we are opposing, he cannot in
consistency have any reasonable ground whatever for
trusting his memory; and unless he trusts his memory,
he knows nothing whatever of any kind or description,
except only his mental experience of this particular moment.
In brief, there is no middle term whatever. Either the
mind's present avouchment must be accepted as infallibly
declaring objective truth, or blind, hopeless, and universal
scepticism is the inevitable lot of mankind.

Here, also, we must repeat a remark which we made in
our essay on " Certitude." Never was there a philosophical
proposition more preposterously unfounded than that which
Mr. Mill makes the foundation of his whole philosophy;
viz. that the primordial avouchments of the human mind
certainly correspond with objective truth. We may safely
challenge him to allege so much as one colourable reason
for this proposition, unless he first assumes that the mind's
present avouchments are infallibly true. It is this latter
proposition which is primarily certain ; and the former
proposition has no other evidence whatever, except of
inference from the latter. He denies that very truth
which alone can supply any reasonable ground for what
stands as the sole basis of his intellectual speculations.
Our reason for this confident statement will be at once
understood by those who have read the essay to which we
refer.

This is our answer to the objection which Mr. Mill will
probably raise. We might have replied to it from an

Mr. Mill on the Foundation of Morality. 99

entirely different point of view : for we confidently deny the
psychological allegation on which it is built ; we confidently
deny that men go through any series of experiences, which
could by possibility have generated their present moral
judgments. On this head we can refer to an unusually
able article, contributed to the Macmillan of July, 1869, by
Mr. K. H. Button, called " A Questionable Parentage of
Morals." Mr. Button's arguments indeed are directly
addressed against a theory ascribed by him to Mr. Herbert
Spencer ; * but they apply a longe fortiori to Mr. Mill's.
For ourselves, however, we think it better to abstain alto-
gether from this psychological question. We thus abstain,
in order that our readers' attention may be more un-
dividedly fixed on what we consider the glaring unreason-
ableness and utterly subversive tendency of that principle
of Mr. Mill's, which alone could give any controversial
value to such a psychological allegation. Never could we
have expected so able a thinker as Mr. Mill to take up a
position so relentlessly suicidal.

We hold, then, that no such objection will stand for a
moment — or has so much as the slightest plausibility—
against the reasoning adduced for our two theses. And
since we know of no other objection, we assume that they
are conclusively established. We next, therefore, proceed to
consider such objections as may be raised against our theses
themselves, and no longer against the arguments which we
have adduced in their behalf. There is only one of these
which impresses us as presenting any even superficial
difficulty; we refer to the divergence of moral standard,
which has prevailed in different times and countries. Mr.
Bain lays much stress on this in the chapter which we
have named at the head of our essay, and which Mr. Mill
(in his " Utilitarianism ") commemorates with the warmest

* We use this form of expression, because Mr. Spencer afterwards dis-
claimed that theory.

100 The Philosophy of Theism.

commendation. Mr. Bain lays stress, e.g., on such points
as "the change that has come over men's sentiments on
the subject of slavery" (p. 312). He lays stress, again, on
the inexhaustible varieties of what may be called ritual
morality: on such facts, as that the Mussulman women
think it a duty to cover their faces in public (p. 300) ; the
men to abstain from wine (p. 301) ; the Hindoos to venerate
the cow (p. 308) ; the Buddhists to avoid animal food (ib.).
How are such fundamental differences of moral judgment,
he asks, consistent with any supposition that the first
principles of moral truth are self-evidently known to man-
kind as universally and necessarily true ?

F. Harper gives the true reply to this obvious objection,
in the sixth of his papers contributed to the Month on
F. Newman's " Grammar." " First," he says, "I observe
with Sir J. Mackintosh, that people may differ as much as
they please about what is right and wrong, but they all
nevertheless agree that there is something right and some-
thing wrong." But further and more importantly, " we
have forgotten the influence that the will has over the
intellect in moral matters ; and the influence again which
passion, affection, prejudice, evil education, custom, have
in such subjects over both. By means of these and similar
causes, the perception of right and wrong has been blunted,
often choked. Still more often it is liable to be misdirected."
" These varieties, therefore," he adds, " of popular or national
judgment, however extensive, prove nothing against the
objective evidence and certitude of moral principles; or
against the possibility of their subjective evidence and
certainty, as reflected in the individual conscience when left
free to its unbiassed determination and in its right balance."

The question, however, is of immeasurably more prominent
importance in our controversy with Mr. Mill than it was in
F. Harper's criticism of F. Newman ; and we will therefore
draw out, at much greater length and in our own way, what

Mr. Mill on the Foundation of Morality. 101

is substantially identical alike with the doctrine of F. New-
man and F. Harper.

Firstly, however, we must observe, that phenomenists
here are in the habit of trying most unfairly to shift the
burden of proof from themselves to their opponents. We
allege with confidence that we have demonstratively proved
our theses. Unless, therefore, Mr. Bain demonstrates the
validity of his objection, he does nothing whatever ; for
great probability on one side is simply valueless against
proof on the other. At the same time, however, we do not
for a moment admit that our antagonists can give even
probable ground for the validity of their objection.

Then, further, we would point out that they appeal from
what is known to what is unknown. I am most intimately
aware of my own present or habitual thoughts and feelings :
I am also in various degrees well acquainted with those of
my friends, my compatriots, my contemporaries. Our
antagonists appeal from these, to the sentiments of bar-
barous tribes, separated from me most widely by time or
place or both, and of whose circumstances I know next to
nothing. And they make this appeal on a question in
which everything depends on circumstances; a very little
divergence in these often sufficing to change an act from

I intrinsically evil to intrinsically good.
We now proceed to give our own explanation of the
facts to which Mr. Bain has appealed ; reminding our
readers, however, that it is no business of ours to prove
our explanation sufficient, but Mr. Bain's business to
prove (if he can) that it is otherwise. We have already
conclusively (we trust) established our position ; Mr. Bain
has no standing in court, unless he conclusively establishes
his.

(1) Firstly, then, in one respect the most barbarous
nations emphatically confirm our view. As F. Harper
quotes from Mackintosh, they may differ as to what is right

102 The Philosophy of Theism.

or wrong, but they all agree that there is a right and a
wrong. And so it has often been said — though the present
writer has no such knowledge as would justify him in
affirming it from his own researches — that every nation,
however savage, has some word in its language to express
"duty," as distinct from "expediency." Mr. Bain admits
throughout, that all those to whom he appeals have that
very same idea of what is meant by " right," or "wrong,"
or "moral obligation," which is possessed by Europeans
of the nineteenth century.* It is true that he explains the
origin and authority of this idea in a way fundamentally
different from our own. But in raising this issue, he is
amenable to the court of modern and civilized experience ;
and by considering the most undeniable facts of human
nature as it exists around us, we are able (as we trust we
have shown) conclusively to establish our own doctrine.

Nay, (2) the number of moral axioms is by no means
inconsiderable which are intued by all men possessing the
use of reason throughout the world. In other words, men
not only agree everywhere on the existence of a "right"
and a " wrong," but in no inconsiderable degree on the
acts to which they ascribe those respective attributes.
Take the two instances on which we have ourselves insisted :
the sins of David, and of the dishonest and treacherous
politician. In either case there is no one, capable of under-
standing such actions, who will not in his cool judgment
condemn them without a moment's hesitation. We say
"in his cool judgment," because it is manifest that men
who are wholly absorbed and excited in the pursuit of some
temporal end, refuse commonly even to consider the moral
character of what they do. But otherwise, " there must be
admitted to exist," says Mr. Bain himself (p. 300), " a

* For instance. " Every man may have the feeling of conscience, that is
the feeling of moral reprobation and moral approbation. All men agree in
having these feelings, though all do not agree in the matters to which they are
applied " (pp. 297, 298).

Mr. Mill on tJie Foundation of Morality. 103

tolerably uniform sense of the necessity of recognizing
some rights of individuals : " " there are to a certain point
' eternal and immutable ' moral judgments ... in the re-
pudiation of the thief, the manslayer, and the rebel ; " and
we may add, no less, of him who becomes the wanton enemy
of his benefactor, or who for private ends violates his
solemn promise, or who for personal reward inflicts on
his country what he knows to be a heavy injury.

(3) We shall still further see the existing amount of
agreement on moral matters, by another consideration.
There are several classes of actions, on which there may
be indeed no universally received axiom of the form " act
B is morally evil " — where nevertheless all mankind agree
in holding as self-evident that "act C is better than act D."
Thus men everywhere will consider some course of conduct
more admirable cseteris paribus, in proportion as it is more
unselfish, however little they may agree as to what amount
of selfishness is actually immoral. It is said, again, that
the most barbarous nations regard celibacy as a higher
state than marriage, while differing most widely from each
other as to the limits of actual obligation in such matters.
If this be true, we should be disposed to hold that the moral
judgment in question is really cognized by all men as self-
evidently true. For though Protestants earnestly repudiate
this axiom, we should regard this as one of the not infre-
quent cases in which men refuse to recognize what they
really cognize ; we should say that the preternatural hatred
of these Protestants for Catholicity, in this as in many
other cases, prevents their explicit perception of the most
obvious moral truths. But there is no need whatever of
insisting on this.*

* Mr. Bain, when reciting cases in whicli " strong antipathies " have been
arbitrarily " made into moral rules " (p. 309), has the following shameless
remark : — " There has been a very prevailing disposition to restrict the
indulgences of sex. Some practices are so violently abhorred, that they are
not permitted even to be named" (p. 310). We must do Mr. Mill the

104 The Philosophy of Theism.

(4) But no consideration perhaps so impressively shows
the unanimity of moral conviction even now prevalent
among mankind, as the following. All mankind, we say,
are agreed in holding that justice, beneficence, veracity,
fidelity to promises, gratitude, temperance, fortitude, — that
these, and not their opposites, are the virtuous ends of
action. By this phrase we mean to express two proposi-
tions. On the one hand, every act, otherwise faultless,* is
accounted by all men as good, if done for the sake of
justice, beneficence, or any one of the rest ; while, on the
other hand, every act is accounted by all men to be evil, if
it contravene these ends. Take any one in their number —
say justice — as standing for the rest. Many men doubtless
in various times and places have thought it right to do
many an act, which Catholics know to be unjust : still they
have never thought it right because unjust ; they have never
thought it right, for the sake of any virtuousness which
they have supposed to reside in injustice ; but because of
the virtuousness of beneficence, or gratitude, or the like.
Similarly, many men think an act wrong because they
think it unjust ; but they never think it wrong because they
think it just. They regard this or that just act as wrong,
because they regard it as opposed to beneficence or gratitude,
but never because they regard it as required by justice. In
one word, they think many an act good simply because
prompted by justice ; but they never think an act good
because prompted by mjustice. And the same remark
applies, to the other virtuous ends of action which we have
named above. A "good man," in the judgment of all
mankind, means " a man possessing in various degrees the

justice to say, that no sentiment can be more violently opposed than this
to Ms way of regarding similar subjects.

* We say " otherwise faultless," because it is perhaps possible that an
act, known to be intrinsically evil, may be done for the virtuousuess of some
good end. It is perhaps possible, e.g., that I may commit what I know to be
a theft on A, for the virtuousness of benefiting some very deserving person B.
For ourselves, however, we doubt whether this is possible.

Mr. Mitt oil tfw Foundation of Morality. 105

qualities of justice, benevolence, veracity, fidelity to pro-
mises, gratitude, temperance, fortitude."

So much on the existing concurrence of moral judgments.
Our further remarks are directed to explain the existing
divergence.

(5) The moral faculty, like all other faculties and
perhaps more than any other, is perfected by cultivation ;
and the means whereby it is cultivated is moral action.*
If I only know two or three moral axioms and no others
whatever, I know that there are certain acts intrinsically
wrong and prohibited by the Supreme Kuler ; or, in other
words, I know that there is a Natural Law — whether its
extent be wide or narrow — possessing irrefragable claims
on my obedience, and strictly binding, though the whole
universe solicited me to rebellion. Every other course of
conduct, then, is glaringly unreasonable, except (1) to obey
its precepts carefully, so far as I know them ; and (2) to
use every means at my disposal — by interrogating my con-
sciousness, by praying for light to this Supreme Kuler, and
in every other attainable way — in order to discover the full
extent of its enactments. In proportion as I give myself
more energetically to this task — and specially in proportion
as I labour, not only to comply with strict obligation, but to
do what is morally the better and more pleasing therefore
to my Supreme Euler — in that proportion two results
ensue. Firstly, the utterances of my moral faculty become
far more readily distinguishable from all other intellectual
suggestions ; f and secondly, the number of moral axioms

* Similarly F. Harper, as we have seen, holds that the perception of
right and wrong has been blunted, often choked, still more often misdirected,
by passion, evil education, affection, prejudice, custom. He adds that 4< the
great aim of a true education must be to strengthen the principle of law, and
then to direct it in a light channel." F. Newman, again, is constantly
laying extreme stress on the proposition stated in the text.

t There is one special means by which moral judgments become more
and more pointedly distinguished from all others, in proportion as the agent
grows in a habit of viitue ; viz. that they are so intimately connected with

106 The Philosophy of Theism.

within my cognizance is very rapidly increased. Certainly
we maintain with confidence, that no man's intellect really
avouches as self-evident a false moral verdict, on the case
brought up to it for judgment. But nevertheless, in con-
sistency with what has just been said, we have no difficulty
whatever in admitting, (1) that those whose moral faculty
is uncultivated may easily be mistaken as to its true
utterances ; and (2) that very often indeed they will see no
wickedness in many an act, which those more advanced in
moral discernment will intuitively cognize to be evil.

(6) We have said that no man's intellect avouches as
self-evident a false moral verdict, on the case brought up to
it for judgment ; and we are now to express our meaning in
this qualification, on which we lay great stress. The very
notion of an " axiom " — as we have so often quoted from
F. Kleutgen — is that it exists wherever, by merely com-
paring the ideas of subject and predicate, I come to see the
truth of a proposition. But suppose those ideas did not
correspond with objective facts : in that case of course the
supposed axiom is simply delusive, as applied to these facts.
A first-rate lawyer may give a faultless judgment on a case

a sense of sin. Moral perception grows so far more quickly than moral
action, that a prevailing sense of sinfulness may be taken as an infallible
measure of advance in true goodness. It is a peculiar merit of F. Newman's
philosophy, to our mind, that he is ever so urgent in insisting on this. Mr.
Lecky — whose views, as a whole, are to us simply revolting — nevertheless
speaks well on this point. He criticizes (" European Morals," p. 67, note)
the language, so commonly found among philosophers of either school, about
the delight which is supposed to accrue to every good man from the testi-
mony of his approving conscience, and the pleasure which the good man
is supposed to receive from reflecting on that delight ; like " little Jack
Homer," says Mr. Lecky, " who said * what a good boy am I ' ! " And he
quotes a truly fatuous passage from Adam Smith. " The man who . . .
from proper motives has performed a generous action . . . feels himself . . .
the natural object ... of the esteem and approbation of all mankind [!!!].
And when he looks backward to the motive from which he acted, and surveys
it in the light in which the indifferent spectator will survey it, he still con-
tinues to enter into it, and applauds himself by sympathy with the approba^
tion of this supposed impartial judge. In both these points of view his con-
duct appears to him in every way agreeable. Misery and wretchedness can
never enter the breast in which dwelleth complete self -satis/action"

Mr. Mill on the Foundation of Morality. 107

proposed to him for consideration ; but if the case be
wrongly drawn up, the judgment is valueless or mischievous.
The same is true concerning moral judgments ; and we will
give one obvious instance. To the uninstructed and non-
Catholic reader of that unprincipled book Pascal's " Pro-
vincial Letters," such a circumstance as the following will
happen again and again. He will read in Pascal some
propositions, advocated by illustrious Catholic casuists, and
will regard it as axiomatic that they are immoral. And yet,
if he comes to apprehend those very propositions as illus-
trated by the context and taken in connection with the
general drift of these casuists, he will entirely revoke his
former judgment, and not improbably accept as self-evident
the very opposite.

This misstatement of the case is a most fruitful source
of apparent divergences in moral judgment. Whether from
prejudice and moral fault indefinitely varying in degree, or
from mere intellectual inaccuracy and want of comprehen-
siveness, it happens again and again that men totally
misapprehend the phenomena on which they judge. We
may take an illustration from negro slavery, on which Mr.
Bain twice insists (pp. 299, 312) as illustrating his theory.
A and B are equally good men, and have therefore equally
cultivated their moral faculty. A, however, has lived mostly
among slaves, and is intimately acquainted with their cir-
cumstances and character. B, on the contrary, has derived
his scanty information on the subject entirely from slave-
holders; and, moreover, has never had any reason for
pondering carefully on such light as the matter would
receive, from the known laws of human nature. Some
definite act of harshness to a slave will be cognized by A
as self-evidently wrong ; while B forms no moral judgment
on it at all, axiomatic or otherwise. Mr. Bain himself
admits in substance what we are now affirming. " When
an abolitionist from Massachusetts," he says (p. 299)

108 The Philosophy of Theism.

" denounces the institution of slavery, and a clergyman of
Carolina defends it, both of them have in common the same
sentiment of justice and injustice."

(7) There are other instances, which are explicable by
a process very familiar to Mr. Mill. This writer is con-
stantly pointing out, how very easily an inference may be
mistaken for an intuition; and we have always heartily
concurred in his remark. Now, many of the judgments
cited by Mr. Bain, on the obligatoriness of some ritual
observance, are conclusions of a syllogism. " Whatever
the Supreme Euler commands is of obligation : but He
commands this ; therefore this is of obligation." The only
moral axiom here is the major premiss, which is indubitably
true ; and it is an historian's business, not a philosopher's,
to trace the origin of the minor. Moreover, although some
of these ritual observances should be both intrinsically
immoral, and self-evidently cognizable as such by one who
has duly cultivated his moral faculty, this admission (as
is obvious) does not in any way affect our argument.

(8) In other cases, again, a moral judgment is the con-
clusion, not of unconscious, but of explicit and prolonged
reasoning. Mr. Bain seems really to speak (p. 312) as
though the question, whether slavery be or be not permis-
sible, could be axiomatically answered. We do not ourselves
think that it is capable of any universal solution ; we think
that what is permissible or even preferable in some circum-
stances, is intrinsically evil in others. But however this may
be, the true conclusion can only be reached by a sustained
process of reasoning — a process in which moral axioms
doubtless play a large part, but in which a large part is
also played by various psychological and social data. And
the moral axioms will be precisely those premisses on which
both parties in the controversy profess agreement.

(9) Finally, the instances are by no means few in which
mere antipathy has been mistaken by philosophers for

Mr. Mill on the Foundation of Morality. 109

moral disapprobation. It by no means follows, because
some body of men abhor some practice, that they regard it
as morally wrong. And, most fortunately for our purpose,
it happens that we have irrefragable proof of this, in facts,
which to the grandfathers of living Englishmen were
matters of every-day experience. We refer to the time
when duelling was of social obligation. Some hundred
years ago, any layman who refused to fight a duel under
circumstances in which public opinion required it, was
treated as a veritable Pariah : he was received into no
society of gentlemen ; no gentleman would give him his
daughter in marriage ; nay, to associate with him was to be
socially excommunicated. From such usages as these, had
they occurred in some distant and very partially known
period, Mr. Bain would have confidently inferred that
those who practised them accounted as morally evil the
refusal to fight duels ; and yet no fact in the world is more
certain than the reverse of this. These men were in
general so firmly convinced of the truth of Christianity that
they regarded with horror the very suspicion of infidelity.
On the other hand, it is equally undeniable that they knew
duelling to be forbidden by Christianity ; because for this
very reason no clergyman was expected to fight.* Again,
suppose one of themselves — a man too of otherwise profligate
life — were lying on his death-bed : they would probably
experience a momentary misgiving about his future lot;
though they would very likely soon reassure themselves,
by some blasphemous plausibilities about God's mercy.
But suppose a man of spotless life were on his death-bed,
who had been under their ban for his faithfulness to God
and his consequent refusal to fight ; the very notion would
not occur to them, that he had placed his salvation in
jeopardy by conduct which nevertheless they so intensely

* See, in the Dublin Review for July, 1871, p. 94, Dr. Hampden's amazing
letter to Mr. Newman.

110 The Philosophy of Theism.

abhorred. A defaulter was accounted by them " no gentle-
man ; " but they never doubted that he might be an admir-
able Christian. They abhorred his act, because it indicated
(as they thought) mental qualities, which to them were
intensely distasteful ; but not because they regarded it as
wicked or sinful.

Some reader may object, that he cannot believe such
absurd inconsistency to have existed in " enlightened "
England of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. We
reply, firstly, that the facts are simply notorious, and that
no one will dream of calling them in question. We reply,
secondly, that we willingly concede one premiss on which
this difficulty is based ; viz. these men's ludicrous and
contemptible inconsistency. There is no amount of imbecile
and childish self-contradiction, we verily believe, which
may not be expected from those truly pitiable persons, who
deliberately permit themselves in any other course of
conduct than that of labouring earnestly to make their
conscience their one predominant rule of life.

Mr. Mill himself admits, that an unfavourable judgment
is often formed of acts, which judgment is mistaken for one
of moral disapprobation without being so. "All professed
moralists," he says ("Dissertations," vol. i. pp. 386, 387),
" treat the moral view of actions and characters ... as if
it were the sole one ; whereas it is only one out of three.
. . . According to the first, we approve or disapprove ;
according to the second, we admire or despise ; according
to the third, we love, pity, or dislike."

We pointed out above, that the onus probandi in this
matter rests entirely with Mr. Mill and Mr. Bain. We are

* We rnust incidentally protest against this doctrine of Mr. Mill's, so far
as he applies it to what ought to be, and not merely to what is. In propor-
tion as a man advances in virtue and love of God, in that proportion (we
must maintain) he approaches to that state of mind in which he admires and
loves those acts most which God most admires and loves, i.e. those which
are most excellent.

Mr. Mill on the Foundation of Morality. Ill

in no respect called on to prove that we have correctly
explained the facts on which they insist; but they are
called on to disprove, if they can, the satisfactoriness of
our explanation. We have proved our theses on ground
totally distinct. They do not advance their cause one step,
unless they demonstrate conclusively that their objection
to those theses is valid ; unless they demonstrate conclu-
sively, that the existing variety of moral judgments cannot
be explained by the considerations we have set forth, and
by others which might be added. We are very confident
not only that they cannot demonstrate this conclusively,
but that they cannot render such an opinion even probable.
Here, however, is the advantage of controversy with living
men. If they honour us with their attention, we may beg
them to name that particular instance of moral diversity
on which they would especially insist, and to give their
reasons for thinking that this instance is conclusive against
our position. We promise beforehand that, if they make
such attempt, we will give it most explicit notice, and
grapple with it in the face of day.

There are no other objections to our doctrine — so far,
at least, as we know of them — which impress us as having
the slightest plausibility. Mr. Bain, e.g., complains (p. 291)
that objectivists assign no standard of moral truth. It
might as well be said that they assign no standard of
mathematical truth. A mathematical proposition is estab-
lished, if it is either on one hand cognized as axiomatic,
or on the other hand deduced from propositions which are
so cognized ; and precisely the same thing may be said of
a moral proposition.

Supposing, indeed, Mr. Bain's opponents alleged that
moral truth is purely subjective and created by the human
mind, such an objection as his would be intelligible. But
this is the very thing which is denied by objectivists in
general, and most emphatically by Catholics in particular.

112 The Philosophy of Theism.

An evil action is undoubtedly called by them "difformis
rectae rationi ; " but quite as often " contraria naturae
hominis," or " perturbatio ordinis naturalis." There is an
objective " natural order " of actions, then, a moral scale, so
to speak ; and it is the office of human reason to cognize,
not to create it.

It is a favourite argument of Mr. Mill's, that objectivism
keeps moral science in a stationary state, and interferes
with its legitimate progress. Now, the only progress of
which, consistently with his principles, he can here be
speaking is that which arises from fresh light being thrown
on the consequences of this or that action. But objectivists
hold as strongly as phenomenists, that the morality of
actions is importantly affected by their consequences ; and
that any light therefore, thrown on the latter, importantly
affects the former.

A Catholic philosopher, indeed, does undoubtedly hold
that in a very true sense moral science is stationary ; but
this conclusion does not result from his objectivism, but
from a different Catholic doctrine altogether. He considers
that moral truths are an integral part of Divine Kevela-
tion ; and that though, like other revealed verities, they
admit elucidation and development, yet they are not pro-
gressive in that sense in which progressiveness may be
truly ascribed to a purely secular science. But this whole
question, though of the gravest moment, is entirely ex-
ternal to our present theme.

We are not aware of any other arguments Which Mr.
Mill has ever alleged against our position. And how in-
sufficient those arguments are, may be seen from the very
unsuspicious testimony of Mr. Mill himself, who has not
been prevented by them from unconsciously embracing
one principal part of the very doctrine which he opposes.
He says with profoundest truth ("Dissertations," vol. i. p.

Mr. Mill on the Foundation of Morality. 113

884), that " mankind are much more nearly of one nature
than of one opinion about their own nature ; " and it is
the very reason of our own sympathy with many exhibitions
of his personal character, that he has been quite unable to
confine the breadth of his own nature within the limits of
what we must call his own most narrow and contra-natural
theory. His theory is purely phenomenistic ; viz. that
"morally good "is simply equivalent with "conducive to
general enjoyment," and " morally evil " the reverse. Yet,
in almost every page of his writing on moral and political
subjects, he assumes the transcendental axiom, that
"benevolence is morally good" and "malevolence is
morally evil" : the idea "morally good" being that very
transcendental idea on which objectivists insist, but which
Mr. Mill in theory regards as delusive.* We are confident
that all familiar with his writings will concur in this
remark, when they understand what we mean. This view,
constantly implicit, occasionally finds explicit mention.
Thus, in a passage we shall immediately quote, he says in
effect that a benevolent being may, but that a malevolent
being can not, be a legitimate object of worship. Elsewhere
he describes a habit of disinterested benevolence as the true
" standard of excellence " ; f he affirms (" On Hamilton,"
p. 123) that he " loves and venerates " moral goodness ;
and says (" Dissertations," vol. iii. p. 340) that "the cultiva-
tion of a disinterested preference of duty for its own sake "

* On the terms " phenomenistic " and " transcendental," see pp. 1, 2,
61, 62.

t "Man is never recognized by" Bentham "as a being capable of
desiring for its own sake the conformity of his own character to his standard
of excellence, without hope of good or fear of evil from other source than
his own inward consciousness." (" Dissertations," vol. i. p. 359.) But one
" coequal part " of morality " is self-education ; the training by the human
being himself of his affection and will " (ib. p. 363) into accordance, of course,
with the true " standard of excellence." We assume that the habit of disin-
terested benevolence is what Mr. Mill here intends to describe as the " true
standard of excellence ; " for otherwise he would be more inconsistent with
his professed principles, than we even allege him to be.

VOL. I. i

114 The, Philosophy of Theism.

is a higher state than tjiat of sacrificing selfish preferences
to a more distant self-interest." What can he mean by the
word "excellence," or the word "venerate," or the word
"higher," consistently with his theory? Undoubtedly he
is at liberty, without transcending the bounds of phenome-
nism, to allege that benevolence is beneficent and conducive
to the happiness of mankind : for happiness consists in a
series of phenomena, and experience can teach what con-
duces to the increase of such phenomena. But Mr. Mill
constantly goes further than this : he calls a habit of dis-
interested benevolence "high," "excellent," worthy of
" veneration," and the like. What right has the pheno-
menist to such notions as these? What phenomena do
these notions represent ? Wherein is their objective counter-
part discerned by experience ?

But there is perhaps no one passage throughout his
entire works, in which Mr. Mill so unveils his innermost
nature — nor is there any other to our mind so eloquent —
as the following well-known invective of his, against a view
ascribed by him to Dean Mansel.

If instead of the " glad tidings " that there exists a Being in
whom all the excellences which the highest human mind can
conceive exist in a degree inconceivable to us, I am informed
that the world is ruled by a being, whose attributes are infinite,
but what they are we cannot learn, or what are the principles
of his government, except that " the highest human morality
which we are capable of conceiving " does not sanction them, —
convince me of it, and I will bear my fate as I may. But
when I am told that I must believe this and at the same time
call this being by the names which express and affirm the
highest human morality, I say in plain terms that I will not.
Whatever power such a being may have over me, there is one
thing which he shall not do ; he shall not compel me to worship
him. I will call no being good, who is not what I mean when
I apply that epithet to my fellow-creatures ; and if such a being
can sentence me to hell for not so calling him, to hell I will go."
("On Hamilton," pp. 123, 124.)

Mr. Mill on the Foundation of Morality. 115

We have two preliminary remarks to make on this most
impressive passage before using it against Mr. Mill's con-
sistency. In the first place, all Catholics will substantially
agree with what we understand to be its doctrine. Let the
impossible and appalling supposition be put for argument's
sake, that men had been created by a malignant being,
who commanded them to cherish habits of pride, envy,
mutual hatred, and sensuality. The case is of course
utterly and wildly impossible ; but supposing it, un-
doubtedly men would be strictly obliged, at whatever
sacrifice, both to disobey those commands and to withhold
worship from the being who could issue them.* In the
second place, we are quite confident that Dean Mansel
meant no such doctrine as Mr. Mill supposes, though we
cannot acquit him of having expressed himself with singular
incautiousness.

The first inference we draw against Mr. Mill's con-
sistency from the passage just quoted, has been already
expressed. He accounts malevolence not merely to ba
maleficent — which is all that can be said by a consistent
phenomenist — but as intrinsically evil and base ; so evil
and base, that he would rather undergo eternal torment
than worship a malevolent being.

But secondly, he brings utilitarianism to a distinct issue ;
for he says in effect that all men, individually and collec-
tively, should rather undergo everlasting torment than
worship a malignant being who commands them to do so.
His professed theory — the fundamental principle of his
whole moral philosophy — is that morality consists exclu-
sively and precisely in promoting the happiness of one's
fellow-creatures. Yet here he says, that in a particular

* On the other hand, we should say that they would also be under an
obligation of not doing that which would impair their permanent happiness.
Nor, of course, is there any difficulty whatever in the circumstance that an
intrinsically impossible hypothesis issues legitimately in two mutually
contradictory conclusions.

116 The Philosophy of Theism.

case the true morality of all men would lie in promoting,
not the happiness, but the everlasting torment of all man-
kind.* He says, in effect, that all men would act basely
and wickedly if they worshipped a malevolent being. And
he cannot possibly mean, by the words " basely " and
" wickedly," that they would act " adversely to the promotion
of general enjoyment ; " because he holds that this baseness
and wickedness would remain, even if such conduct were
the sole means of exempting all mankind from an eternity
of woe. When a crucial case really comes before him, his
better nature compels him to decide sternly, peremptorily,
effusively, indignantly, against his own doctrine.

We have now concluded our own case. We must forego
what would have been a great accession to our argument,
by being obliged to postpone our detailed consideration of
Mr. Mill's own moral scheme. But we have already reached
the extreme bounds which we had prescribed to ourselves ;
and, in what remains of our present essay, can give no
more than a most perfunctory criticism of Mr. Mill's
doctrine.

Through his whole philosophical career, that gentleman
has consistently and most earnestly disclaimed what he
calls " the selfish theory ; " the theory which regards
morality as consisting in enlightened self-interest. On the
other hand, as we have just pointed out, he cannot, consist-
ently with his phenomenism, admit the existence of trans-
cendental virtue or transcendental obligation ; he cannot
speak of benevolence as intrinsically excellent, or of its
opposite as intrinsically detestable. Disclaiming thus at
once the morality of self-interest and the morality of trans-
cendental goodness, it is difficult at first to see what

* This remark has already been made by Mr. Mivart, in his admirable
"Genesis of Species " (p. 194). He states himself to have derived it from
Rev. Father Roberts.

Mr. Mill on the Foundation of Morality. 117

possible footing is left him ; yet he is not left entirely
•without means of answering the relevant questions. Thus
we may ask, what men mean when they say that A's conduct
is morally detestable, and they therefore abhor it; while
B's conduct is morally good, and they therefore approve it.
They mean to express — so Mr. Mill may reply without
inconsistency — on the one hand, that abhorrence which
arises in their mind from a sense that A's habits tend to
their grievous detriment ; and on the other hand, that
complacency which arises in their mind from a sense that
B's conduct tends to their enjoyment. See e.g. " Disserta-
tions," vol. i. pp. 155, 156; "On Hamilton," p. 572. But
then we further ask Mr. Mill, why should I, a given indi-
vidual, aim, not at my own interest, but that of my fellow-
men ? why is it my reasonable course to sacrifice myself in
their behalf ? And to this question, so far as we can see,
his answer is glaringly inadequate. He will say indeed very
truly, that there is an unselfish element in human nature ;
that "the idea of the pain of another is naturally painful,
and the idea of his pleasure naturally pleasurable " (" Dis-
sertations," vol. i. p. 137) ; and that in this part of human
nature lies a foundation, on which may be reared the habit
of finding a constantly increasing part of my gratification
in the happiness of others. Mr. Mill may further say, and
indeed does say, that all mankind are prompted by the
strongest motives of self-interest, so to educate each indi-
vidual as that he may thus find gratification in other men's
enjoyment. Nay, and he may add further still — though he
would find much difficulty in proving this — that those who
have been thus trained lead happier lives in consequence
than they would otherwise have led. But when he has
gone so far as this, he has exhausted his resources. He can
give no reason whatever why I, a given individual, who
have not been thus trained, — and who, as a simple matter
of fact, find very much less pleasure in other men's enjoy-

118 The Philosophy of Tlteism.

ment than in my own — should sacrifice the latter in favour
of the former.

We will illustrate the most essential and characteristic
part of this doctrine by a little fable, wildly absurd from the
standpoint of natural history, but none the less fitted to
express our meaning. The cats and rats a-re in a state of
internecine warfare ; and the fleas, if left to their natural
habits, perform acts which in various ways injure the
former and benefit the latter. Moved by this circumstance,
the cats capture a large number of young fleas, and train
them to take their pleasure in acts which have an opposite
tendency. The cats accordingly dearly prize the trained
fleas, and the rats the natural fleas: so much is quite
intelligible. But Mr. Mill should add, that the cats feel
toward the trained fleas, and the rats towards the natural
fleas, that very sentiment which is called in human
matters " moral approbation ; " while the rats feel towards
the trained fleas, and the cats towards the natural fleas, the
sentiment of " moral disapproval."

We are well aware, that Mr. Mill will indignantly
repudiate the parallel. What we allege is, that his spon-
taneous view (so to call it) is directly contradictory to his
speculative theory ; that the doctrine constantly implied by
him whenever he treats of human affairs, is that very
objectivist doctrine which in theory he denounces. We do
not of course mean that his implicit doctrine is Theistical ;
but we do say that it is objectivist, as ascribing intrinsic and
transcendental excellence to the practice of beneficence.
And the indignation with which he will regard such an
analysis of moral sentiments as is contained in our little
fable is to our mind a measure of his wide distance from
the genuine utilitarian philosophy.

In theory, however, he has made his doctrine even more
untenable, and (we must be allowed to add) even more
odious, by his denial of human free will. There is perhaps

Mr. Mill on the Foundation of Morality. 119

no one philosophical theme on which he has enlarged with
so much earnestness and so much power as on this ; and
yet, so weak is his cause, we think there is no one on which
he can be so triumphantly refuted. In a future essay
we shall, first, meet him, hand to hand and step to step,
on this battle-field; and we shall, secondly, express that
detailed criticism on this moral system as a whole, which
we had hoped to give on the present occasion.

IV.
ME. MILL'S REPLY TO THE "DUBLIN REVIEW."*

[The following essay had been entirely completed in its
first draft, and the greater portion of it actually sent to
press, when intelligence arrived of Mr. Mill's unexpected
death. Under these circumstances, we have been naturally
led to look through the essay with renewed care, to see
that it contain no particle of violence or bitterness ; but on
doing so we have found nothing to change in it, except one
or two expressions which implied that Mr. Mill was still
alive. Towards Mr. Mill, in fact, we were not likely to have
fallen into undue harshness of language ; and the less so,
because he was himself habitually courteous to opponents,
and especially to the present writer. On the other hand,
we expressed an opinion in a former essay — an opinion
to which we were led by various indications in his
writings — that he was not a believer in the One True God
Whom Christians worship ; and whereas, when avowedly
noticing our essay, he expressed no remonstrance on this
head, we may fairly assume that our opinion was correct.
Nor indeed does any one doubt that the tendency of his
philosophy as a whole is intensely antitheistic, insomuch
that many ascribe the overthrow of religious belief, e.g. in
Oxford, almost entirely to his influence. Now, it is the

* An Examination of Sir W. Hamilton's Philosophy. By JOHN STUABT
MILL. Fourth Edition. London : Longmans.

A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive. By JOHN STUART MILL.
Eighth Edition. London : Longmans.

Mr. Mill's Reply to the "Dublin Review" 121

firmly held doctrine of Catholics, that there is no invincible
ignorance of the One True God ; or, in other words, that
disbelief in God convicts the disbeliever of grave sin : so
that Catholics are confined within somewhat narrow limits
as to the amount of respect towards such a writer, which
they are at liberty to feel and to express. Our own per-
sonal sympathy with Mr. Mill on one or two points was so
great, that we believe there was more danger of our trans-
gressing those limits than of our committing the opposite
fault.

One such point of sympathy was what always impressed
us as his unselfishness ; his zeal for what he believed the
truth ; and his preference of public over personal objects.
Nor, again, must we fail to commemorate his earnest oppo-
sition to nationalism in every shape. He never spoke
otherwise than with grave reprobation of that pseudo-
patriotism, which implies that men can laudably direct a
course of conduct to the mere pursuit of their country's
temporal aggrandisement. His notions as to wherein
man's highest good consists must be accounted by every
Catholic deplorably erroneous ; but he was thoroughly
penetrated with the great truth, that the genuine patriot
aims at his countrymen's highest good, and not at their
worldly exaltation or glory.

A very able commentator on his character, in the Pall
Mall Gazette of May 10th, considers that Mr. Mill " was by
temperament essentially religious," and that his "absence
of definite religious convictions" produced "a sharp
contrast " in his mind " between theory and feeling." We
quite agree with what is indicated by this remark. Mr.
Mill possessed apparently passionate feelings of love, which
were ever yearning for an adequate object; and he was,
alas ! ignorant of Him Who implants such feelings in order
that they may be concentrated on Himself. It is in this
way we should account for " that generous, self-sacrificing

122 The Philosophy of Theism.

philanthropy " which we commemorated in our above-
named essay as "so attractive a feature in his character;"
though we need hardly say how much more solid and
reliable is such philanthropy (in the Catholic's judgment)
where it is rested on the love of God. By the same
characteristic of Mr. Mill's mind we should also account
for language, in honour of his wife's memory, which other-
wise would almost have induced us to doubt the writer's
sanity. We are especially thinking, under this head, of his
amazing preface to the essay on "the Enfranchisement of
Women," contained in the second volume of his " Disserta-
tions and Discussions ; " and to the inscription on her
gravestone.* We confess that his possession of this loving
temperament, however questionable its exhibition may
have been in this or that particular, has ever given us
a feeling towards him, quite different in kind from that
which we can entertain towards any of his brother
phenomenists.

Turning to his philosophical character — with which we
are here of course more directly concerned — the following
pages, taken by themselves, might be understood as im-
plying a very far more disparaging estimate of that character
than we really entertain. It so happens, indeed, that the
particular controversy in which we are here engaged, deals
almost exclusively with what we must account his weakest
intellectual points. Among his strongest, we should name
what may be called the " encyclopedic " quality of his mind :
by which we intend to express not merely the extent of his
knowledge and information (though this was indeed extra-
ordinary), but his unfailing promptitude in seeing the con-
nection between one part of that knowledge and another ;
his viewing every theme in which he might be engaged,

* Here is one sentence of this epitaph : " Were there even a few hearts
and intellects like hers, this earth would already become the hoped-for
heaven."

Mr. Mill's Reply to the " Ihublin Review" 123

under the full light thrown on it by every fact which he
knew and every doctrine which he held. Cognate to this
was his sincere anxiety to apprehend his opponents' point
of view, and to derive from their disquisitions all the in-
struction he could. Then, his historical and political studies
went far below the mere husk of events ; for he possessed
(we think) great power of justly appreciating the broad
facts of every-day life, whether as recorded in the past or
witnessed in the present. His language, again, was the
genuine correlative of his thought — clear, well-balanced,
forcible.' What we must deny to him, is any sufficient
acquaintance with the subtler phenomena of mind.

This latter defect exhibited itself in two different ways.
Firstly, it altogether vitiated his metaphysics. We consider
that no really profound psychologian can be (as Mr. Mill
wasX a phenomenist; and, conversely, we think that Mr.
Mill's deficiency in psychological insight generated an
incapacity of doing justice to the arguments adduced against
his metaphysical scheme. At the same time, however, we
must state our own strong impression, that (whether from
early prejudice or whatever cause) he never fully gave his
mind, even so much as he might have done, to those par-
ticular psychological facts which are adduced by his
opponents as lying at the foundation of their system ; and
we think that the following essay will suffice in itself to
establish against him this charge.

Another consequence (we think) resulting from his un-
acquaintance with the subtler phenomena of mind, was his
tendency to the wildest speculations on such themes as
"Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity." As we have already
said, Mr. Mill was very largely acquainted with facts,
both past and present : but in such speculations as those
to which we refer, facts could give him no guidance;
and he had no other clue to assist him in his re-
searches except such as was afforded by (what we must

124- The Philosophy of Theism.

be allowed to call) his shallow and narrow knowledge of
human nature.

We may perhaps say without impropriety, that Mr.
Mill's death is to us a matter of severe controversial dis-
appointment. We had far more hope of coming to some
understanding with him than with such writers as Mr.
Herbert Spencer and Dr. Bain, because he was in the
habit of apprehending and expressing his own thoughts so
much more definitely and perspicuously than they. Our
present essay, indeed, originally concluded with an earnest
appeal to him, that he would join issue on the themes
therein handled, more fully than he could do by mere
isolated footnotes . and appendices. For the same reason
we shall continue to treat him as representing the anti-
theistic school. His books are not dead, because he is
dead ; and we think that they both are in fact, and are
legitimately calculated to be, very far more influential than
those of his brother phenomenists. We pointed out in an
earlier essay that, by singling out an individual opponent,
we did but follow his own excellent example ; and we may
here add that Sir W. Hamilton had died before Mr. Mill
commenced his assault.

On looking through our present paper, it occurs to us that
some may complain of what they may consider its undue
vehemence on such a purely speculative subject as the
character of mathematical axioms. But Mr. Mill himself,
we are convinced, would have been the last to make this
complaint. No other inquiry can be imagined so pregnant
with awful consequences, as the inquiry whether a Personal
God do or do not exist. It is this very doctrine (as we have
more than once explained) which we are vindicating in our
present series of articles. Now, the proposition that there
exists a vast body of necessary truth may well be (as we
are convinced it is) a vitally important philosophical preface
to the further proposition that there exists a Necessary

Mr. Mill's Reply to the " Dublin Review" 125

Person.* But the doctrine that there exists a vast body
of necessary truth is so startling a priori, and is pregnant
also with consequences so momentous, that the philosopher
will require absolutely irresistible evidence before he will
accept it. It is most desirable, therefore, that it shall
be considered, as far as may be, on its own merits;
that it shall be detached from other topics, on which
men's affections, antipathies, misapprehensions, prejudices,
will inevitably obscure and complicate their judgment.
Now, just such a neutral ground is afforded by mathe-
matical truth ; and we placed it therefore in the very front
of our controversial position. It affords an excellent
opportunity for considering the characteristics of necessary
truth as such, because no one can have any religious or
moral prejudice for or against any given mathematical
theorem.

It has also occurred to us as possible, that the following
essay may be accounted arrogant in its tone towards so
powerful and eminent a thinker as Mr. Mill. But let our
position be considered. As regards the particular themes
herein treated, we are deliberately of opinion, not that
there is more to be said on our side than on Mr. Mill's,
but that he is utterly and simply in the wrong ; that not
one of his arguments has the slightest force, and hardly
one of them the most superficial appearance of force. Now,
if a Catholic honestly thinks this, he should make his
readers distinctly understand that he thinks it ; because he
must know that the welfare of immortal souls suffers
grievous injury, from an exaggerated estimate of the argu-
mentative ground available for disbelief.]

We have said on a former occasion that Mr. Mill has

* The truth, known by Revelation, that there are Three Necessary
Persons in no way conflicts (we need hardly say) with the truth, known by
Reason, that there exists One Necessary Person.

126 Tlie Philosophy of TMsm.

always been " singularly clear in statement, accessible to
argument, and candid or rather generous towards oppo-
nents ; " and the whole tone of his replies to the Dublin
Review is in full accordance with this estimate of his con-
troversial qualities. At the same time, it was his conviction
no less than our own, that the highest interests of mankind
are intimately involved in the prevalence of sound doctrine
on the matters in debate ; while on our side we further know
that these interests are inappreciable in magnitude and
eternal in duration. It is our bounden duty, therefore, to
do everything we can to expose what we consider the un-
reasonableness and shallowness of those phenomenistic
tenets which Mr. Mill has embraced. Of those tenets we
must ever affirm with confidence that they are (as we have
just implied) not unreasonable only, but incredibly shallow ;
and it is of extreme moment that this characteristic of
theirs be fully understood. Yet the very weakness of a
cause may in some sense set forth the ability of its advocate ;
and our predominant feeling towards Mr. Mill is one of
surprise, that so skilful and rarely accomplished a navigator
should have embarked in so frail a vessel.

Without further preamble, however, let us commence
our work by entering again on the matters treated in our
first essay, and by seeing where Mr. Mill stands thereon
in relation to ourselves. We begin, then, with "the rule
and motive aof certitude."

There is one truth which the extremest sceptic cannot
possibly call in question, viz. that his inward conscious-
ness, as experienced by him at the present moment, is
what it is. To doubt this, as Mr. Mill observes, would be
"to doubt that I feel what I feel." But this knowledge is
utterly sterile, very far inferior to that possessed by the
brutes ; and no one manifestly can possess knowledge
worthy of being so called, unless he knows the phenomena,
not only of his momentarily present consciousness, but also

Mr. MilVs Reply to tlw " Dublin Review." 127

(to a greater or less extent) of that consciousness which
has now ceased to exist. A man cannot e.g. so much as
understand the simplest sentence spoken to him, unless,
while hearing the last word, he knows those words which
have preceded it. We ask this question, then : what means
has he of possessing this knowledge of the past ? On what
grounds can he reasonably accept, as true, the clearest and
distinctest avouchments of his memory ? "I am conscious
of a most clear and articulate mental impression that a very
short time ago I was suffering cold : " this is one judgment.
" A very short time ago I was suffering cold : " this is
another and totally distinct judgment. That a man knows
his present impression of a past feeling, by no manner of
means implies that he knows the past existence of that feel-,
ing. How do you know, we would have asked Mr. Mill,
how do you know (on the above supposition of facts) that
a very short time ago you were suffering cold? How do
you know e.g. that Professor Huxley's suggestion* is not
the very truth ? How do you know, in other words, that
some powerful and malicious being is not at this moment
deluding you into a belief that you were cold a short time
ago, when the real fact was entirely otherwise ? How do
you know, in fact, that any one experience, which your
memory testifies, ever really befel you at all ?

It is plain, then, and most undeniable, that the philo-
sopher cannot claim for men any knowledge whatever
beyond that of their momentarily present consciousness,
unless he establishes some theory on what scholastics call
the " rule and motive of certitude." He must (1) lay down
the " rule of certitude ; " or, in other words, explain what
is the characteristic of those truths which men may reason-
ably accept with certitude : and (2) he must lay down " the

* " It is conceivable that some powerful and malicious being may find
his pleasure in deluding us, and in making us believe the thing which is not
every moment of our lives." (" Lay Sermons," p. 356.)

1 28 The Philosophy of Theism.

motive of certitude ; " or, in other words, explain what is
men's reasonable ground for accepting, as certain, those
truths which possess such characteristic. It is conceivable,
doubtless, that the principle he lays down may authenticate
no other avouchments except those of memory; or it is
conceivable, on the contrary, that that principle may
authenticate a large number of other avouchments. But
if he professes to be a philosopher at all, if he professes
to establish any reasonable stronghold whatever against
absolute and utter scepticism, some theory or other he
must lay down, on the rule and motive of certitude. And
such theory is, by absolute necessity, the one argumentative
foundation of his whole system.

We maintained in our first essay, that it is the
scholastic theory on this fundamental issue which alone
is conformable with reason and with facts. This theory is
of course set forth by different writers, with greater or less
difference of detail and of expression ; and we referred to
F. Kleutgen as having enunciated it with singular clear-
ness of exposition. Firstly, what is the rule of certitude ?
or, in other words, what is the characteristic of those
truths which I may reasonably accept as certain ? Every
proposition, he replies, is known to me as a truth, which
is avouched by my cognitive faculties when those faculties
are exercised according to their intrinsic laws; whether
they be thus exercised in declaring primary verities, or
in deriving this or that inference from those verities.
Secondly, what is the motive of certitude ? or, in other
words, what is my reasonable ground for accepting the
above-named propositions as certainly true ? He replies,
that a created gift, called the light of reason, is possessed
by the soul, whereby every man, while exercising his
cognitive faculties according to their intrinsic laws, is
rendered infallibly certain that their avouchments corre-
spond with objective truth.

Mr. Mill's Reply to the " Lublin Review? 1 29

In advocating this theory, however, we guarded oui
against two possible misconceptions of its bearing. We
admitted, in the first place, how abundantly possible it
is, nay, how frequently it happens, that men misunder-
stand the avouchment of their intellect. In fact a large
part of our controversy with Mr. Mill proceeds on this very
ground : we allege against him, that this, that, and the
other proposition, which he denies, is really declared by
the human faculties, when exercised according to their
intrinsic laws. Then, secondly, we explained that our
appeal is made to the mind's positive, not its negative con-
stitution ; or, in other words, that we lay our stress on its
affirmations, not on its incapacities. It does not at all
follow, we added, because the human mind cannot conceive
some given proposition, that such proposition may not be
true ; nay, that it may not be most certain and inappre-
ciably momentous. This statement appears to us of great
importance, in regard to various controversies of the present
day. But it has little or no bearing on the points directly
at issue between Mr. Mill and ourselves.

Such, then, is the scholastic thesis, on the rule and
motive of certitude ; viz. that man's cognitive faculties,
while acting on the laws of their constitution, carry with
them in each particular case immediate evidence of absolute
trustworthiness. It would be a contradiction almost in
terms if we professed to adduce direct arguments for this
thesis, because the very fact of adducing arguments would
imply that man's reasoning faculty can be trusted, which is
part of the very conclusion to be proved. But (1) we
adduced for our thesis what appears to us strong indirect
argument ; and (2) (which is much more important) we
suggested to the inquirer such mental experiments as are
abundantly sufficient, we consider, to satisfy him of its
truth. Under the latter head we appealed to each man's
consciousness in our favour. That which his faculties

VOL. i. K

130 The Philosophy of Theimi.

indubitably declare as certain, he finds himself under an
absolute necessity of infallibly knowing to be true. I
experience, e.g., that phenomenon of the present moment,
which I thus express : I say that I remember distinctly and
articulately to have been much colder a few minutes ago
when I was out in the snow, than I am now when sitting
by a comfortable fire. Well, in consequence of this present
mental phenomenon, I find myself under the absolute
necessity of knowing that a very short time ago I had
that experience which I now remember. Professor Huxley
suggests that "some powerful and malicious being" may
possibly " find his pleasure in deluding me," and in making
me fancy as past what has never really happened to me ;
but I am absolutely necessitated to know that I am under
no such delusion in regard to this recent experience. My
act of memory is not merely known to me as a present
impression, but carries with it also immediate evidence of
representing a fact of my past experience. And so with my
other intellectual operations, whether of reasoning or any
other. The subjective operation, if performed according
to the laws of my mental constitution, carries with it
immediate evidence of corresponding with objective truth.

All must admit that this is at least a consistent and
intelligible theory; and for several intellectually active
centuries it reigned without a rival. Descartes, however,
the great philosophical revolutionist of Christian times,
substituted for it a strange and grotesque invention of his
own. He held that each man's reason for knowing the
trustworthiness of his faculties is his previous conviction
of God's Existence and Veracity. Nothing can be more
simply suicidal than this theory, because (as is manifest)
unless I first know the trustworthiness of my cognitive
faculties, I have no means of knowing as certain (or even
guessing as probable) God's Existence and Veracity them-
selves. We insisted on this consideration in our first essay ;

Mr. Mill's Reply to the " Dublin Review" 131

but as we are here in hearty concurrence with Mr. Mill,
we need add no more on the present occasion. We fear
that Descartes's theory possesses, more or less partially,
not a few minds among the non-Catholic opponents
of phenomenism.

But if certain non-Catholic opponents of phenomenism
have exhibited shallowness in one direction, the whole body
of phenomenists * have exhibited still greater shallowness
in another. They have universally assumed, as the basis
of their whole philosophy, that each man knows with
certitude the past existence of those experiences which his
memory distinctly testifies. They admit of course that
unless this certitude existed man would possess less know-
ledge than the very brutes ; and yet, though its assumption
is to them so absolutely vital, not one of them has so much
as entertained the question, on what ground it rests. As
we have already asked, how do they know, how can they
reasonably even guess, that a man's present distinct
impression of a supposed past experience corresponds with
a past fact ? Still more emphatically — how do they know
that this is not only so in one instance, but in every
instance ? that man is so wonderfully made and endowed,
that his present impression of what he has recently ex-
perienced always corresponds with what he has in fact so
experienced ? They make this prodigious assumption
without the slightest attempt at giving a reason for it — nay,
and without any apparent consciousness that a reason
needs to be given. And then finally, as though to give
a crowning touch of absurdity to their amazing position,
they make it their special ground of invective against the
opposite school of philosophy, that it arbitrarily erects,

* There is only one exception with which we happen to be acquainted,
viz. that of Professor Huxley, which we presently mention in the text.

By "phenomenists " (we need hardly say) we mean those philosophers who
ascribe to mankind no immediate knowledge whatever except of phenomena.

132 The Philosophy of Theism.

into first principles of objective truth, the mere subjective
impressions of the human mind. One could not have
believed it possible that such shallowness should have
characterized a whole school of philosophers — some of
them, too, undoubtedly endowed with large knowledge and
signal ability — were not the facts of the case patent and
undeniable.

We mentioned just now, in a note, that an exception
to this universality is afforded by Professor Huxley ;
and there may of course be other exceptions, with which
we do not happen to be acquainted. In our first essay we
quoted one of the Professor's remarks, to which we here
refer. " The general trustworthiness of memory," he says,
"is one of those hypothetical assumptions which cannot
be proved or known with that highest degree of certainty
which is given by immediate consciousness ; but which,
nevertheless, are of the highest practical value, inas-
much as the conclusions logically drawn from them are
always verified by experience." To this singular piece of
reasoning we put forth an obvious reply. You tell us
that you trust your present act of memory because in
innumerable past instances the avouchments of memory
have been true. How do you know, how can you even
guess, that there has been one such instance? Because
you trust your present act of memory; no other answer
can possibly be given. Never was there so audacious an
instance of arguing in a circle. You know forsooth that
your present act of memory can be trusted because in
innumerable past instances the avouchment of memory
has been true ; and you know that in innumerable past
instances the avouchment of memory has been true because
you trust your present act of memory. The blind man
leads the blind round a " circle " incurably " vicious."

Let us observe the Professor's philosophical position.
It is his principle, that men know nothing with certitude

Mr. Mill's Reply to the " Dublin Review" 133

except their present consciousness. Now, on this principle,
it is just as absurd to say that the facts testified by
memory are probably as that they are certainly true.
What can be more violently unscientific, we asked, from
the stand-point of experimental science, than to assume
without grounds as ever so faintly probable the very singular
proposition, that mental phenomena (by some entirely un-
known law) have proceeded in such a fashion that my
clear impression of the past corresponds with my past
experience ? Professor Huxley possesses, no doubt, signal
ability in his own line ; but surely as a metaphysician he
exhibits a sorry spectacle. He busies himself in his latter
capacity with diligently overthrowing the only principle on
which his researches as a physicist can have value or even
meaning.

At present, however, our direct business is with Mr.
Mill ; and we are next to inquire how his philosophy stands
in reference to the rule and motive of certitude. As to the
rule of certitude, he speaks (it seems to us) so ambiguously
as to make it a matter of no ordinary difficulty to discover
which one of two contradictory propositions he intends to
affirm ; while, as to the motive of certitude, he unites with
his brother phenomenists in shirking the question altogether.

We shall begin with urging against him this latter
allegation. We did not bring it forward by any means
so strongly in our former essay,* because (as we shall
explain further on) we had good reason for understanding
him to admit much more in our favour than his present
reply shows him to have intended. Even now we entirely
concede that he (and again Dr. Bain) have made a distinct
step beyond earlier writers of their school. They have
advanced, we say, a little way beyond earlier writers, along
the road which, if duly pursued, would have brought them

* We only said, that he " has failed in clearly and consistently appre-
hending and bearing in mind the true doctrine."

134 The Philosophy of Theism.

into the observed presence of the question with which we
are here engaged. Yet even they, we must maintain, have
nowhere arrived at a distinct apprehension, that there is
such a question to be considered as the motive of certitude.

With Dr. Bain we are not here concerned. As to Mr.
Mill, the direct basis of our allegation against him is of
course negative. He admits everywhere, that men's know-
ledge of their past experience is an absolutely indispensable
condition for knowledge.* But we believe no one place can
be mentioned throughout his works in which he so much
as professes to explain, on what principle it is that men
can reasonably trust their memory as authenticating their
past experience. At least, we protest we have been unable
to find such a passage, though our search has been minute
and laborious.

There is no part of his writings in which one might so
reasonably have expected to find some doctrine on the
motive of certitude, as in a passage on which we have
before now laid some stress — a passage, indeed, which (for
reasons presently to be given) we originally understood in
a far more favourable sense than his subsequent explana-
tion permits. He had said (" On Hamilton," p. 209, note)
that " our belief in the veracity of memory is evidently
ultimate," because " no reason can be given for it which
does not presuppose the belief and assume it to be well
grounded." On this we made the following comment in our
second essay : —

He holds that there is just one intuition — one, only one —
which carries with it [immediate] evidence of truth. There
was an imperative claim on him then, as he valued his philo-
sophical character, to explain clearly and pointedly, where the
distinction lies between acts of memory and other alleged in-
tuitions. He would have found the task very difficult, we

* For instance. " All who have attempted the explanation of the human
mind by sensation, have postulated the knowledge of past sensations as well
as of present." (" On Hamilton," p. 210, note.)

Mr. Mill's Reply to the " Dublin Review" 135

confidently affirm ; but that only gives us more reason for
complaining that he did not make the attempt. To us it seems
that various classes of intuition are more favourably circum-
stanced for the establishment of their trustworthiness, than is
that class which Mr. Mill accepts. Thus, in the case of many a
wicked action, it would really be easier for the criminal to
believe that he had never committed it than to doubt its
necessary turpitude and detestableness. Then, in the case of
other intuitions, I know that the rest of mankind share them
with myself; and I often know, also, that experience confirms
them as far as it goes ; but I must confidently trust my acts of
clear and distinct memory, before I can even guess what is held
by other men or what is declared by experience.

Mr. Mill thus replies :—

Dr. Ward with good reason challenges me to explain where
the distinction lies, between acts of memory and other alleged
intuitions which I do not admit as such. The distinction is,
that as all the explanations of mental phenomena presuppose
memory, memory itself cannot admit of being explained.
Whenever this is shown to be true of any other part of our
knowledge, I shall admit that part to be intuitive. Dr. Ward
thinks that there are various other intuitions more favourably
circumstanced for the establishment of their trustworthiness
than memory itself, and he gives as an example our conviction
of the wickedness of certain acts. My reason for rejecting this
as a case of intuition is, that the conviction can be explained
without presupposing as part of the explanation the very fact
itself, which the belief in memory cannot.

Our readers, then, will observe that Mr. Mill, when
expressly challenged, gives no other reason for his belief in
the veracity of memory except only this. Memory, he
says, must be assumed to be veracious, because " as all
the explanations of mental phenomena presuppose memory,
memory itself cannot admit of being explained : " or, in
other words (as he expressed the same thought somewhat
more clearly in his original note), because " no reason can
be given for the veracity of memory which does not pre-
suppose the belief and assume it to be well grounded."

130 The Philosophy of Theism.

But a moment's consideration will show that this answer
implies a fundamental misconception of the point we had
raised. The question which he answers is, whether my
knowledge of past facts (assuming that I have such know-
ledge) is on the one hand an immediate and primary, or on
the other hand a mediate and secondary, part of my know-
ledge.* But the question which we asked was totally
different from this. We asked, on what ground my belief
of the facts testified by my memory can be accounted part
of my knowledge at all. We asked, in short, on what reason-
able ground can my conviction rest, that I ever experienced
those sensations, emotions, thoughts, which my memory
represents to me as past facts of my life ?

We say that the question to which Mr. Mill has replied
is fundamentally different from the question which we
asked. Let it be assumed that my belief in the declarations
of my memory is a real part of my knowledge, and nothing
can be more pertinent than Mr. Mill's argument : he
shows satisfactorily, that such belief must be an immediate
and primary part of my knowledge, not a mediate and
derivative part thereof. But when the very question asked
is whether this belief be any part of my knowledge at allt
Mr. Mill's reply is simply destitute of meaning. For con-
sider. We may truly predicate of every false belief which
ever was entertained — nay, of every false belief which can
even be imagined — that " no " satisfactory " reason can be
given for it which does not presuppose the belief and
assume it to be well grounded." If Mr. Mill, then, were here
professing to prove the trustworthiness of memory, his argu-
ment would be this : " The declarations of memory," he
would be saying, " are certainly true, because they possess
one attribute which is possessed by every false belief which
was ever entertained or can even be imagined."

* Observe, e.gr., his words : " Whenever this appears to be true of any
other part of our knowledge"

Mr. Mill's Reply to tlie " Dublin Review" 137

Or we may draw out against him, in a different shape,
what is substantially the same argument. Mr. Mill's first
business — as it is that of every philosopher — was to show
that philosophy is possible ; or, in other words, to place
before his disciples reasonable grounds for rejecting the
sceptical conclusion. Now, the sceptic's argument — as put,
e.g. (however inconsistently), by Professor Huxley — may be
worded as follows : — " No knowledge is possible to me,
except that which I possess at any given moment of my
actually present consciousness. No knowledge is possible
to me, I say, beyond this, because I cannot possibly acquire
more except by knowing that the declarations of my
memory may be trusted. But I see no ground whatever
for knowing that these may be trusted. How can I guess
but that — as the Professor suggests — some powerful and
malicious being may find his pleasure in deluding me, and
making me fancy myself to remember things which never
happened ? Nay, apart from that supposition, there may
be ten thousand different agencies, to me unknown, which
may have produced my present impression of a supposed
past, not one of which agencies in any degree implies that
this supposedly past experience was ever really mine."
Mr. Mill, we say, was absolutely required to give reasonable
ground for rejecting this view of things, under pain of
forfeiting his position of " philosopher " altogether. Let us
consider, then, how far the one argument which he gives for
the trustworthiness of memory will enable him to oppose
the sceptical view. His argument, if it can be logically
expressed at all, consists of two syllogisms which we will
draw out in form.

SYLLOGISM I.

Knowledge of much more than present consciousness is
possible to human beings.

138 The Philosophy of Theism.

But such knowledge would not be possible, unless they
had reasonable grounds for trusting their memory.

Therefore they have reasonable grounds for trusting
their memory.

SYLLOGISM II.

Men have reasonable grounds for trusting their memory
(Conclusion of First Syllogism).

But they would not have such grounds, unless its veracity
were immediately evident, (because "no reason can be
given for it, which does not presuppose it ").

Therefore the veracity of memory is immediately
evident.

We beg our readers, then, to observe the character of
this argument. It abandons all profession of replying to
the sceptic at all ; it assumes, as the very major premiss
of its first syllogism, that precise proposition which the
sceptic expressly and formally denies.

We infer from all this, that the question which we
pressed on Mr. Mill, we will not say has not been answered,
but has not even been apprehended by him. With him,
as with other phenomenists, " the motive of certitude " is a
"missing link" of the philosophical chain. Even if the
merits of his philosophical structure were far greater than
we can admit, no one can deny that it is entirely destitute
of a foundation ; that he has exhibited no grounds whatever
on1 which inquirers can reasonably accept either his own
conclusions or any one else's.

A similar view of his position is impressed on our mind
by another paragraph, in which he treats the sceptical
tenet more directly, and in which he shows again that he
has not even a glimpse of the sceptic's true controversial
status. It will be better to give this paragraph at length ;

Mr. MilVs Reply to the " Dublin Review" 139

and we need only explain, by way of preface, that he uses
the word "consciousness," not in the sense in which we
uniformly use it, and which he himself accounts the more
usual and convenient, but in a totally different sense given
to it by Sir W. Hamilton. We italicize one sentence : —

According to all philosophers, the evidence of consciousness,
if only we can obtain it pure, is conclusive. This is an obvious,
but by no means a mere identical proposition. If consciousness
be defined as intuitive knowledge, it is indeed an identical
proposition to say, that if we intuitively know anything, we do
know it, and are sure of it. But the meaning lies in the
implied assertion, that we do know some things immediately or
intuitively. That we must do so is evident, if we know any-
thing ; for what we know mediately depends for its evidence on
our previous knowledge of something else : unless, therefore, we
know something immediately, we could not know anything
mediately and consequently could not know anything at all.
That imaginary being, a complete sceptic, might be supposed to
answer, that perhaps we do not know anything at all. I shall
not reply to this problematical antagonist in the usual mariner,
by telling him that if he does not know anything, I do. I put to
him the simplest case conceivable of immediate knowledge, and
ask if we ever feel anything ? If so, then at the moment of feeling
do we know that we feel ? or, if he will not call this knowledge,
will he deny that when we have a feeling we have at least some
sort of assurance, or conviction, of having it? This assurance
of conviction is what other people mean by knowledge. If he
dislikes the word, I am willing in discussing with him to
employ some other. By whatever name this assurance is called,
it is the test to which we bring all our other convictions. He
may say it is not certain ; but such as it may be it is our model
of certainty. We consider all our other assurances and con-
victions as more or less certain, according as they approach the
standard of this. I have a conviction that there are icebergs on
the Arctic seas. I have not the evidence of my senses for it : I
never saw an iceberg. Neither do I intuitively believe it by a
law of my mind. My conviction is mediate, grounded on
testimony, and on inferences from physical laws. When I say
I am convinced of it, I mean that the evidence is equal to that
of my senses. I am as certain of the fact as if I had seen it.

TJie Philosophy of TJieism.

And on a more complete analysis, when I say that I am con-
vinced of it, what I am convinced of is that if I were in the
Arctic seas I should see it. We mean by knowledge, and by
certainty, an assurance similar and equal to that afforded by
our senses : if the evidence in any other case can be brought up
to this, we desire no more. If a person is not satisfied with
this evidence, it is no concern of anybody but himself, nor
practically of himself, since it is admitted that this evidence is
what we must, and may in full confidence, act upon. Absolute
scepticism, if there be such a thing, may be dismissed from
discussion as raising an irrelevant issue, for in denying all
knowledge it denies none. The dogmatist may be quite satisfied if
the doctrine he maintains can be attacked by no arguments, but those
which apply to the evidence of our senses. If his evidence is equal
to that, he needs no more ; nay, it is philosophically maintain-
able that by the laws of psychology we can conceive no more,
and that this is the certainty we call perfect. (" On Hamilton,"
pp. 157, 158.)

This whole passage, as we have observed, is very
significant. In the italicized sentence, Mr. Mill says that
scepticism cannot be assailed by any arguments, except
those which would overthrow "the evidence of the senses."
Very short work would be made of this statement by a
consistent follower of Professor Huxley. He would point,
of course, to the undeniable fact, that men's belief in the
" evidence of their senses " or in the phenomena of their
consciousness at any given moment on one hand, and
men's belief in anything else whatever on the other hand,—
that these two beliefs rest respectively on grounds funda-
mentally different from each other. He would urge with
irrefragable force, that the former belief is independent of
the question whether their memory may or may not be
trusted ; whereas every other belief is destitute of so much as
the hundredth part of a leg to stand on, unless the trust-
worthiness of memory be in some way made known to
them. Of this vital fact in the controversy with sceptics,
Mr. Mill seems absolutely and utterly unaware.

There is another passage of Mr. Mill's which we may

Mr. Mill's Reply to the " Dublin Review" 141

also adduce. We referred to it in our first essay ; but
now that we understand more clearly Mr. Mill's statements,
we had better quote it entire :—

I must protest against adducing, as evidence of the truth of
a fact in external nature, the disposition, however strong or
however general, of the human mind to believe it. Belief is
not proof, and does not dispense with the necessity of proof. I
am aware, that to ask for evidence of a proposition which we
are supposed to believe instinctively is to expose one's self to the
charge of rejecting the authority of the human faculties ; which
of course no one can consistently do, since the human faculties
are all which any one has to judge by: and inasmuch as the
meaning of the word evidence is supposed to be something
which when laid before the mind induces it to believe, to
demand evidence when belief is ensured by the mind's own
laws, is supposed to be appealing to the intellect against the
intellect. But this, I apprehend, is a misunderstanding of the
nature of evidence. By evidence is not meant anything and
everything which produces belief. There are many things
which generate belief besides evidence. A mere strong associa-
tion of ideas often causes a belief so intense as to be unshakable
by experience or argument. Evidence is not that which the
mind does or must yield to, but that which it ought to yield to,
namely, that by yielding to which its belief is kept conformable
to fact. There is no appeal from the human faculties generally,
but there is an appeal from one human faculty to another ; from
the judging faculty to those which take cognisance of fact, the
faculties of sense and consciousness. The legitimacy of this
appeal is admitted whenever it is allowed that our judgments
ought to be conformable to fact. To say that belief suffices for
its own justification is making opinion the test of opinion ; it is
denying the existence of any outward standard, the conformity
of an opinion to which constitutes the truth. We call one mode
of forming opinions right and another wrong, because the one
does, and the other does not, tend to make the opinion agree
with fact — to make people believe what really is, and expect
what really will be. Now, a mere disposition to believe, even if
supposed instinctive, is no guarantee for the truth of the thing
believed. If, indeed, the belief ever amounted to an irresistible
necessity, there would then be no use in appealing from it,
because there would be no possibility of altering it. But even

142 The Philosophy of Theism.

then the truth of the belief would not follow; it would only
follow that mankind were under a permanent necessity of
believing what might possibly not be true ; in other words, that
a case might occur in which our senses or consciousness, if they
could be appealed to, might testify one thing, and our reason
believe another.— (" Logic," vol. ii. pp. 96-98.)

Now, to begin with the opening sentences of this para-
graph. Of course we admit that, under particular circum-
stances, there may be a strong disposition of the human
mind to believe untrue propositions. But Mr. Mill's state-
ment is very different from this. No disposition to believe,
he says, "however strong or however general," can evidence
a fact. A more glaringly untenable philosophical statement
never was put forth. There is literally no " fact in external
nature," great or small, which does not rest in last resort,
for the " evidence of its truth," exclusively on " the disposi-
tion of the human mind to believe it." This is absolutely
undeniable ; for consider : No one fact can possibly be
established, except through the past experience of human
beings. Mr. Mill of all men will not deny this. But that
human beings ever had this past experience is a fact to
which not one with any show of reason could attach the
least shred of credibility, were it not for the " disposition "
of their " mind " to accept as true the declarations of their
memory ; and were it not for that inward gift possessed by
them, whereby they know that this acceptance is reasonable.
And a comment precisely similar might so easily be made
on each successive sentence of the passage, that we should
be guilty of tedious impertinence if we inflicted such
comment on our readers' patience. Our inference is as
before, that Mr. Mill, from wholly failing to apprehend the
position of sceptics, has also wholly failed to apprehend
the necessity of carefully considering "the motive of
certitude."

We have said, however, that Mr. Mill is one of two

Mr. MiWs Reply to tfie " Dublin Review:' 143

phenomenist writers, who (as we think) have advanced a
little way beyond earlier writers of their school, towards
discerning the existence of this question. In Mr. Mill's
case, we are here specially referring to the ninth chapter of
his work " On Hamilton," concerning "the interpretation
of consciousness." In p. 159 he cites the distinction drawn
by Sir W. Hamilton, between the authority of what is
commonly called consciousness on one hand, and of what
is commonly called intuition on the other; * and in pp. 162-3
he expresses hearty concurrence with this distinction.! Sir
William proceeds — still with Mr. Mill's full approval — to
derive an instance of this distinction from the faculty of
memory. "I cannot deny," he says (Mill, p. 160), "the
actual phenomenon " that I have that present impression
which I call an act of memory, " because my denial would
be suicidal : but I can without self-contradiction assert that
[present] consciousness may be a false witness in regard to
any former existence ; and I maintain, if I please, that the
memory of the past, in consciousness, is nothing but a
phenomenon, which has no reality beyond the present." Mr.
Mill, then, has here got hold of the truth, that the two
beliefs — belief in the present existence of the act of memory,
and belief in the past existence of those phenomena which
memory testifies — that these two beliefs rest on foundations
totally different from each other. It is passing strange,
that he should have let this truth slip from his mind after
having once apprehended it ; that he should have failed to
inquire accordingly, what is the basis on which beliefs of
the latter kind reasonably rest ; and above all, that at the

* All those philosophers who use the word " intuitions " at all, use it in
the same sense. They use it to express those truths which are not indeed
mere facts of present consciousness, but which nevertheless are immediately
and primarily known with certitude.

t These are Mr. Mill's words of approval : — " By the conception and clear
exposition of this distinction, Sir W. Hamilton has " shown " that, whatever
be the positive value of his achievements in metaphysics, he has a greater
capacity for the subject than many metaphysicians of high reputation."

144 The Philosophy of Theism.

beginning of this very chapter (at pp. 157-8) he should
have expressed (as our readers have seen) an opinion
directly contrary to that doctrine of Sir W. Hamilton's which
he endorses in pp. 162-3.

We consider, then, that we have established a very grave
charge indeed against Mr. Mill's philosophical character.
It is the very first business of a philosopher to show that
he has a raison d'etre ; that philosophy can exist ; that
human knowledge is possible. Those who hold that no
human knowledge is possible, ground their opinion on the
alleged impossibility of authenticating the avouchments of
memory. Mr. Mill not only has not solved this difficulty,
not only has not attempted to solve it, but has not even
contemplated its existence. We are by no means implying
that herein he is inferior to other phenomenists ; on the
contrary we have said that he is somewhat in advance of
them : but what we wish to impress on our readers, is the in-
credible shallowness of the phenomenistic philosophy itself.

Mr. Mill has also replied to the rest of the criticism
which we expressed in our second essay, on his treatment
of the memory question ; and this will be our proper place
for dealing with his reply. One remark we made was, that
his statement about memory constitutes " a most pointed
exception to his school's general doctrine, and an exception
which no phenomenist had made before." To this Mr.
Mill answers ("On Hamilton," p. 210, note) that he "doubts
whether we can point out any phenomenist who has not
made it either expressly or by implication." We reply,
that we had understood him to admit in his note — and we
had excellent reason for so understanding him — much more
than (as now appears) he ever intended. We understood
him in his original note to express agreement with what
was said in Dr. Ward's " Philosophical Introduction," on
this particular theme.* Now, the view set forth in that

* Mr. Mill said: "Our belief in the veracity of memory is evidently

Mr. Mill's Reply to the " Dublin Review" 145

work was identical with the view advocated in the preceding
pages. Dr. Ward maintained, not merely that " the veracity
of memory" in each particular case is not known by reason-
ing or by consciousness, but further that it is known with
certitude by means of a gift which may be called the light
of reason ; that man's belief in the veracity of memory on
one hand, and of present consciousness on the other, rest on
grounds fundamentally different from each other ; but that
each rests on evidence abundantly sufficient. Dr. Ward,
we may add, laid his main stress on the proposition, that
the trustworthiness of memory, in any given case whatever,
is known, not at all by consciousness, but by the mind's
own inward light. We had no other notion, then, but that
Mr. Mill intended to express concurrence with this opinion.
And even if we had otherwise doubted this, we should have
been strongly confirmed in our existing impression by that
comment of Mr. Mill's on Sir W. Hamilton which we so
recently quoted. How were we to guess that the same
writer, who praised Sir William so warmly for his " con-
ception and clear exposition of this distinction," did not
himself recognize the distinction ? We consider, therefore
(as we have more than once said in the preceding pages),
that we had excellent reasons for considering Mr. Mill's
view to be coincident with our own on the motive of
certitude; and we now can only regret our inevitable
mistake. We said in our first essay, that he "failed in
consistently apprehending and bearing in mind " what we
regard as "the true doctrine; " but we now see that he
never in any way held it. Our readers, then, will under-
stand what was the view which we inevitably (though it
now appears mistakenly) ascribed to Mr. Mill: and this

ultimate," etc. « This point is forcibly urged in " Dr. Ward's "Philosophical
Introduction," "a book . . . showing a capacity in the writer," etc., etc.
Nor did Mr. Mill give the most distant hint that he differed from Dr. Ward's
view of the subject in its most essential particular.
VOL. I.

14(5 The Philosophy of Theism.

being so, we easily defend the criticism expressed by us in
our second essay. If Mr. Mill's doctrine had been what
we supposed, it would have constituted " a most pointed
exception to his school's general doctrine ; " for we are
certainly not aware of a single phenomenist writer, anterior
to Mr. Mill, who had so much as a glimpse of it.

Mr. Mill further takes exception to our remark, that " if
there ever were a paradoxical position, his is one on the
surface." But it will now be understood that we were
speaking of the position which we inevitably mistook for
his, and not of that which he really intended to assume.
We understood him to concur with our doctrine, that the
soul of man possesses a special gift, given for the very
purpose of authenticating intuitions. On such a supposi-
tion we do think it paradoxical to hold that there is just
one class of intuitions and no more. But we need hardly
say that the statement is of no controversial importance,
and we willingly withdraw it.

We confess, however, with regret one piece of careless-
ness, which Mr. Mill has pointed out. We did not suffici-
ently bear in mind that he had " avowedly left the question
open, whether our perception of our own personality is not "
another "case of the same kind ; " another case of intuition.

We now pass from Mr. Mill's doctrine (or rather absence
of doctrine) on the motive of certitude, to his doctrine on
the rule thereof. In particular as regards primary truths :
what is the characteristic, we should have liked to ask him,
of those judgments which man may reasonably accept as
immediately and primarily evident ?• F. Kleutgen answers
— and we are heartily in accord — that all those and only
those judgments may reasonably be accepted as immediately
evident which man's existing cognitive faculties imme-
diately avouch as certain.

Now, whether it be taken as proof of Mr. Mill's obscurity
or of our own dulness, certain it is that on this point also,

Mr. Mill's Reply to the " Dublin Review" 147

when we wrote our first essay, we considered Mr. Mill's
doctrine to be far nearer our own than it really is. We
were led astray by such passages as the following, which
we quoted in p. 26 : — " The verdict of our immediate and
intuitive conviction is admitted on all hands to be a decision
without appeal.'' " As regards almost all, if not all, philo-
sophers " — and by his very phrase (we said) he implies
that he at all events is no dissentient — "the questions which
divided them have never turned on the veracity of con-
sciousness : " where (as we explained) he is, by his own
express avowal, using the word "consciousness" in Sir
W. Hamilton's sense of "immediate and intuitive convic-
tion." What Sir W. Hamilton calls " the testimony of
consciousness," so Mr. Mill proceeds, "to something beyond
itself, may be and is denied ; but what is denied has almost
always been that consciousness gives the testimony, not
that if given it must be believed." We might have added
other similar statements. Thus (p. 137) : " what con-
sciousness directly reveals, together with what can be
legitimately inferred from its revelations, composes by
universal admission all that we know." " All agree with "
Sir W. Hamilton (p. 165), "in the position itself, that a
real fact of consciousness cannot be denied." These
sentences, one would have thought, are most plain and
unmistakable in their assertion, that whatever is declared
by men's " immediate and intuitive conviction " is indubit-
ably true. Then there was another reason also for crediting
Mr. Mill with the same theory, viz. that, according to
this interpretation of his words, he would have laid down
a solid basis for his belief in the veracity of memory. If
those judgments may reasonably be accepted as primarily
evident, which man's existing cognitive faculties imme-
diately avouch as certain, then the various declarations of
memory indubitably rank among primarily evident truths.
In the same essay, however, we quoted other sentences

148 The Philosophy of Theism.

of Mr. Mill, which point to quite a different — indeed, a
directly contradictory — theory on the rule of certitude.
This theory is, that no judgment can be reasonably ac-
cepted by me as immediately evident which would not
have been declared by my cognitive faculties in their earliest
and primordial state* And the sentences of Mr. Mill,
which we quoted as seeming to express this theory, are
such as the following. Men should only accept, he says,
"what consciousness told them at the time ivhen its revela-
tions were in their pristine purity." " We have no means
of interrogating consciousness in the only circumstances in
which it is possible for it to give a trustworthy answer."
And we might have added several others even stronger.
That which is " a fact of our consciousness in its present
artificial state " may possibly " have no claim to the title of
a fact of consciousness generally, or to the unlimited credence
given to what is originally consciousness" (p. 163). "We
cannot study the original elements of our mind in the facts
of our present consciousness " (p. 179). " Could we try the
experiment of the first consciousness in any infant . . . what-
ever was present in that first consciousness would be the
genuine testimony of consciousness " (p. 178). And accord-
ingly Mr. Mill complains, that "in all Sir W. Hamilton's
writings " no " single instance can be found in which,
before registering a belief as a part of our consciousness
from the beginning, he thinks it necessary to ascertain that
it has not grown up subsequently " (p. 181). Of course Sir
W. Hamilton never dreamed of the strange tenet here
taken for granted by Mr. Mill. He never dreamed of the
tenet, that what he called " consciousness " — i.e., as Mr.

* We expressed this theory, however, somewhat incorrectly. Mr. Mill,
we said, "seems to imply that the laws of man's mental constitution are
changed during his progress from infancy to manhood." The theory we
are criticizing has faults enough of its own to answer for, but need not be
understood as involving so great a paradox as this. Mr. Mill pointed out to
us this misapprehension in a private letter.

Mr. Mill's Reply to the " Dublin Review" 149

Mill himself explains, " immediate and intuitive conviction "
— is no rule of certitude, except as regards its primordial
avouchments.

This tenet, indeed — we must really be allowed to say —
is so transparently shallow that we were very unwilling
to believe it could be Mr. Mill's. In our first essay accord-
ingly we declared, " we cannot persuade ourselves that he
really means what he seems to say." When, however, we
looked more narrowly at Mr. Mill's language with a view
to our third essay, we arrived at a different conclusion ;
and "we found his meaning," as we said, "much more
pronounced and unmistakable than we had fancied."
We observed particularly (what had escaped our notice)
that he alleges this theory in direct opposition to the other,
as his reason for upholding what he calls the "psycho-
logical" as contrasted with the " introspective " method of
philosophizing ("On Hamilton," p. 179). This consideration
is decisive. We are obliged accordingly to credit this grave
writer with the theory which he so energetically professes,
and to understand him as holding that no declaration of
my cognitive faculties is trustworthy, unless it be a
declaration which those faculties would have put forth
when I was " an infant ; " when I " first opened my eyes
to the light " (" On Hamilton," p. 178).

Certainly he has here assumed very solid ground against
necessists.* He may very safely challenge them to show,
if they can, that when they were infants, first opening their
eyes to the light, their faculties would have avouched as a
necessary truth the triangularity of trilaterals, or the
divergency of two intersecting straight lines. But then he
absolutely slaughters himself, by the weapon which he
raises against his opponents. We would thus address one

* The word " necessarian is irretrievably appropriated to the purpose of
designating those who deny free will. We have coined, therefore, the word
in the text, to express an idea for which some word or other is urgently
needed.

150 The Philosophy of Theism.

of his disciples. You are very confident, doubtless, that
you really experienced this or that fact, which you re-
member to have occurred an hour or so ago ; and you will
very readily admit that if such memory were not trust-
worthy, experimental science would be even more utterly
impossible than metaphysical. Yet have you any ground
(even the faintest) for even conjecturing, that when you
were a new-born infant — or, for that matter, when you were
a baby half a year old — your memory could truly testify
the experience of your last hour ? Of course not. When,
therefore, Mr. Mill assumes the trustworthiness, whether of
his own or other men's memory, he is suicidally abandon-
ing the " psychological," and contenting himself with the
" introspective " method. Or, in other words, that " psy-
chological" method, which he regards as the one safeguard
of sound philosophy, overthrows the whole possibility of
experimental science.

But, in fact, we are greatly understating the case.
Take any one of Mr. Mill's living disciples. We have been
saying that, on his own theory, the avouchments of his
present memory are not primarily and immediately known
by him as true. But in our third essay we have further
urged, that (on his own theory) he has no means of even
making the inquiry whether they be true or no. He can-
not, we say, so much as begin to investigate the question
whether his existing memory be trustworthy, without taking
for granted that it is so ; for, unless he trust his existing
memory, he cannot so much as draw the most obvious of
conclusions from the simplest of premisses. But if he
takes for granted that the avouchments of his present
memory are true, then he is taking the present, and not
the primordial, declaration of his faculties as his rule of
certitude. We cannot conjecture why Mr. Mill has left
wholly unanswered this very direct objection, which we had
so clearly and definitely expressed.

Mr. Mill's Reply to the " Dublin Review" 151

So far we have argued against this amazing theory
from its consequences. We have maintained that, by up-
holding it, Mr. Mill inflicts on himself no less a calamity
than that of philosophical suicide. Let us now in turn
consider the same theory as regards the evidence adducible
for its truth. It is necessarily an essential part of the
foundation on which Mr. Mill's whole philosophy rests;
and we have a right to expect, therefore, that it shall itself
be inexpugnable. Yet was there ever, we ask, a more
gratuitous and arbitrary dictum than that whatever men's
faculties declared in their primordial condition, is infallibly
true ? On what ground (from his point of view) could Mr.
Mill even guess, that whatever a baby's memory distinctly
testifies is infallibly true ? Was there ever otherwise such
a basis as this attempted for a philosophical system ? such
a foundation as this laid down as the one support of all
human knowledge ? The whole mass of human knowledge
is made utterly dependent on what is about the most
gratuitous and arbitrary hypothesis which can well be
imagined.

Do we, then, ourselves, Mr. Mill might ask, doubt that
the avouchment of men's faculties in their earlier state is
infallibly true ? Speaking generally, we do not doubt this
at all ; though we should be sorry to commit ourselves on
Mr. Mill's case, of the new-born infant first opening his
eyes to the light. But we maintain confidently that the
veracity of my primordial faculties — instead of being a
primary truth — is an inference from the veracity of my
present faculties. Our position is most intelligible. What-
ever my existing faculties indubitably declare I am under
a necessity of infallibly knowing to be true, and I infer
from this fact that I possess a special gift (called by
scholastics the light of reason) which authenticates the
veracity of these faculties. Of these none is more vitally
essential than that of memory; and by means of this

152 The Philosophy of Theism.

faculty I know with infallible certainty a large number of
facts in my past life. Looking back at these, I find myself
to have possessed, at every period to which my memory
reaches, the same light of reason which I possess now ; and
I infer, therefore, that then, no less than now, my faculties
were veracious. In one word, the veracity of men's
faculties in their earlier state is inferred from their present
veracity ; whereas Mr. Mill, by a preposterous inversion of
the natural order, would authenticate the present by means
of the past.

Such is the contrast we would draw between the
theories of what may respectively be called " primordial "
and " existing " certitude. At the same time, we have been
uniformly careful to urge that there may be serious mis-
takes in interpreting the avouckment of men's existing
faculties. Particularly, we altogether admitted in our
first essay, "that again and again inferences are so
readily and imperceptibly drawn as to be most easily
mistaken for intuitions." In accordance with this we pro-
ceeded to say, that " in arguing hereafter with Mr. Mill we
shall have no right of alleging aught as certainly a primi-
tive truth without proving that it cannot be an opinion
derived inferentially from experience." In our third essay
we acted sedulously on this principle : we argued carefully
that those moral judgments, which we were maintaining to
be intuitive, could not possibly be derived from experience,
however rapid and imperceptible the process of inference
might be supposed to be. We have no means of knowing
on what ground Mr. Mill would base his opposition to the
conclusions of that essay ; but we still strongly incline to
the opinion there expressed, that he would oppose it in no
other way than by falling back on his own amazing theory
of primordial certitude.

In regard to our second essay, our impression is
different. The main purpose of that essay was to establish

Mr. Mill's Reply to the " Dublin Review" 153

against Mr. Mill the doctrine that the whole body of
mathematical truth possesses the attribute of necessity.
Now, if Mr. Mill really admitted that men's cognitive
faculties in their existing state declare this doctrine, and if
he denied the doctrine on no other ground than that the
faculties of a new-born infant would give no such testimony,
we should consider him abundantly refuted by the preceding
remarks. But we still think, as we thought when we wrote
the essay, that he assumes ground far stronger and more
plausible than this. He alleges, we think, that necessists
do not accurately analyze the declaration of their existing
faculties. I consider myself e.g. to cognize, as a self-
evident and necessary truth, that every trilateral figure is
triangular : but Mr. Mill would reply, that experience has
most unexceptionally united in my mind the two ideas of
trilateralness and triangularity ; and that accordingly I
mistake for intuition what is really a rapid and unconscious
inference from experience. In the remaining part of our
essay, then, this is the issue to be handled. And in this
later part of our discussion we are far more favourably cir-
cumstanced than we have been in our earlier. Hitherto
we have trodden ground on which Mr. Mill can hardly
be said to have entered into express controversy with
us at all, because of his silence on our first essay, and
on that part of our third which is connected therewith.
But as to our second essay — on the necessary character of
mathematical truth — he has encountered us explicitly, and
said all which he deemed necessary for our refutation. We
have the immense advantage, therefore, of knowing all
which can be said against us by that opponent, who is (to
our mind), immeasurably the ablest and most persuasive of
his school.

Certainly at the outset, Mr. Mill's theory on mathe-
matical axioms is very startling. If I were asked what are

154 The Philosophy of Theism.

those truths which are best known to me by constant and
uniform experience, all the world except phenomenist
philosophers would be greatly surprised by any hesitation
in my reply. The truths, I should answer, best known to
me by constant and uniform experience are such as these :
that fire burns ; that water quenches fire ; that wood floats
on water, while stones sink therein, etc. But Mr. Mill
tells me, that this reply is a complete mistake ; that there
is another class of truths, known to me by experience with
an immeasurably greater degree of familiarity than those
just mentioned. I ask in amazement to what truths he
can possibly be referring ; and he tells me, to such as
these : that trilaterals are triangular, and that intersecting
straight lines mutually diverge. This is indubitably his
proposition ; for consider : I have no tendency whatever to
regard the former class of truths (the effect of water upon
fire, etc.) as eternal and immutable; whereas he assures
me, that my considering the latter class (the triangularity
of trilaterals, etc.) to possess these attributes arises exclu-
sively from their having been to me such constant matters
of experience. He considers, therefore, that the triangularity
of trilaterals has been to me an immeasurably more
constant matter of experience than have been the most
familiar and every-day properties of fire and water. And
while this is indubitably Mr. Mill's thesis, no less indubit-
ably at first hearing it startles me beyond expression. Ask
the vast majority of Englishmen how often they -have
observed that fire burns or that water quenches it ; they
will reply they have experienced it almost every day of
their lives. Ask them, on the contrary, how often they
have observed that trilaterals are triangular; they will
tell you that they have never to their knowledge experi-
enced it from the day they were born. Mr. Mill's statement,
then, is assuredly on the surface a startling paradox ;
and we are confident that closer examination will show

Mr. Mill's Reply to tlie " Dublin Review" 155

it to be undeniably and demonstrably erroneous. This
closer examination is what we are now to undertake, and
we will begin with reciting certain argumentative pre-
liminaries : —

I. We did not in our essay attempt any analysis of the
word " necessary," nor even inquire whether such analysis
is possible. " Our present purpose," we said, " will lead
us only to attempt such a delineation and embodiment of
this idea as shall make clear the point at issue. When we
call a proposition "necessary," then, we mean to say that
its contradictory is an intrinsically impossible chimera ; is
that which could not be found in any possible state of
existence; which even Omnipotence would be unable to
effect." To this explanation of the word Mr. Mill's silence
gives consent.

II. Mr. Mill himself is a phenomenist, one who avowedly
denies the cognizableness of necessary truth as such. If
he admitted that there is so much as one science which is
conversant throughout with necessary truth, he would, ipso
facto, be going over bag and baggage to what is now his
enemies' camp. It was well worth while, then, as we said,
"to choose some special field whereon to join issue as a
specimen of the rest." Now, " there is one particular
class of truths, which will be generally accepted as in every
respect most fitted to effect a clear and salient result."
Our contention then was, that mathematical truths — vast
and inexhaustible as is their number — are cognizable by
mankind as necessary.

III. But it was possible very greatly to narrow this
issue. " Mr. Mill will not of course deny that, if mathe-
matical axioms are necessary, the validity of syllogistic
reasoning must be also a necessary verity; and that the
whole body, therefore, of mathematical truth possesses
the same character." Our thesis was accordingly, "that
mathematical axioms (arithmetical, algebraic, geometrical)

156 The Philosophy of Theism.

are self-evidently necessary truths." And by the term
" axioms," for the purpose of our discussion, we under-
stood "those verities which mathematicians assume as
indubitably true, and use as the first premisses of their
science." Mr. Mill tacitly accepts all this as a fair and
straightforward joining of issue.

IV. We next come to a question of words. It is plain
that propositions may be divided, if we please, into two
classes : those which express no more than has been
already expressed by the subject, and those which do
express more. Now, it so happens that a distinction, sub-
stantially similar to this, is of vital importance in the dis-
cussion between necessists and phenomenists ; and it is
very desirable, therefore, that names shall be given to the
two above-named classes. All non-Catholics since Kant,
of either school, have used the words " analytical " arid
" synthetical " for this purpose. But a Catholic cannot so
use these words without risk of serious misconception,
because Catholic philosophy has affixed to them quite a
different sense. What Catholics mean by calling a pro-
position " analytical " — so F. Kleutgen explains — is that
" by simply considering the idea of the subject and predicate,
one comes to see that there exists between them that
relation which the proposition expresses." But, as we shall
immediately urge, a most important class of those propo-
sitions which non-Catholics call " synthetical " possess the
very property mentioned by F. Kleutgen; and these are
accordingly denominated by Catholics " analytical." In
our second essay, we attempted to evade this difficulty
by calling these two classes respectively " tautologous "
and " significant." An able writer, however, in the
Spectator was reasonably led by this nomenclature to
misunderstand some of our remarks ; and we cannot our-
selves, on consideration, defend its appropriateness. We
will adopt, therefore, the words used by Sir W. Hamilton

Mr. Mill's Reply to the "Dublin Review" 157

for the purpose before us, and will use the two words,
"explicative," " ampliative." From this, moreover, we
obtain the incidental advantage, that these two phrases are
to our mind really more fitted to express the intended
distinction than the other two.

We will define, then, these two terms thus. " Explicative "
propositions are those which declare no more than that
some idea (1) is, or (2) is not, identical with or included in
some other idea. If the former, they are " positively1"
explicative ; " if the latter, " negatively" so. "Ampliative "
propositions are those which declare more than this. And
it may be worth while to add, that various propositions
rank technically under the former head which in common
parlance would not be called so much as " explicative," but
are mere truisms : as " this apple is this apple," or "is an
apple."

V. All positively explicative propositions are at once
reducible to the principle of identity " A is A." Take e.g.
as one example, " all hard substances resist pressure : "
there is no meaning in this proposition, except that " all
hard substances are hard ; " or " all substances which resist
pressure resist pressure." J

VI. A second purely verbal explanation. " Self-evident "
truths, in the present essay, are by no means the same
thing with " primary " truths, but are only a particular
class of them. All those truths are " primary," which are
known to human beings immediately, and which need not
to be inferred from other truths. But we call no truth
"self-evident," unless it be cognized as certain by merely
pondering the proposition which expresses it ; by pene-

* We may be allowed a moment's digression to repeat a remark made
by us on a former occasion. We suggested that what have been called
" the fundamental laws of thought," are but different exhibitions of the
principle of identity. Thus, the principle of contradiction ; " anything which
is not — B is— not B ; " the principle of excluded middle ; " anything which
is — not B is not— B."

158 The Philosophy of Theism.

trating and comparing with each other the ideas respec-
tively expressed by the proposition's subject and predicate.
The fact that I was miserably cold a short time ago — if it
be a fact — is to me a " primary " truth : nevertheless it is
not a " self-evident " one, because it is known to me as
certain, not by my pondering the proposition which ex-
presses it, but by my consulting the attestation of my
memory.*

"We should add, that these self-evident truths are called
by scholastic writers " principles " and " axioms." The
latter term is of much philosophical service ; but the word
" principles " has in English so many different senses that
we do not think it very well fitted to be a technical term.
In our present discussion we must refrain from using even
the word " axioms " in its scholastic sense, because Mr.
Mill gives the name " axioms " to the first premisses of
mathematical science, while denying that those premisses
are self-evident. There is another expression, common in
modern philosophy. Those truths are said to be " cog-
nizable a priori," which may be known independently of
experience, whether they be self-evident or only deducible
from self-evident premisses. Such truths are called in
Catholic philosophy " metaphysically certain."

VII. All self-evident truths are necessary. This follows
at once from the theory of certitude. Take the proposition
" every trilateral is triangular : " and let us assume for the
moment that this proposition is self-evident; or in other
words that it is known by me to be true, if I do but duly
ponder it. But, as we urged in the earlier part of our
essay, the declaration of my faculties infallibly corre-
sponds with objective truth. Take therefore any trilateral
which can exist in the universe — which can be formed

* We are well aware that we did not in our former essays preserve this
distinction of meaning between " primary " and " self-evident." but we are
of opinion that it will be found conducive to clearness of thought.

Mr. Mill's Reply to the " Dublin Review." 159

by Omnipotence itself — I know infallibly of this trilateral
that it is triangular. It will be seen, then, by reverting to
that very explanation of the word " necessary " which we
gave at starting, that the, triangularity of every trilateral
— if it be a " self-evident " — must also be a " necessary "
truth.

VIII. Mr. Mill nowhere, of course, dreams of denying
that all explicative propositions are self-evident. And
certainly — though he would doubtless wish to avoid the
word "necessary" — we take for granted he would admit
that the truth " A is A " must hold good in every possible
sphere of existence.* It is not therefore absolutely accu-
rate to say that he denies the cognizableness of any
necessary truth, but only of any necessary truth which is
not purely explicative. At the same time, we most heartily
concur with him in holding that these truths "A is A,"
"B is B," "C is C"— though they went through aU the
letters of a thousand alphabets — are utterly sterile, and
cannot by any possible mutual combination germinate into
an organic whole. There can be no syllogism without a
middle term. Although, therefore, it may not be strictly
true to say that Mr. Mill denies all necessary truth, he does
deny the possibility of any necessary science; and denies
also the cognizableness of any such necessary truths as we
may caU " fruitful."

IX. On the other hand, he holds as firmly as we do, that
mathematical axioms are ampliative and not explicative :
indeed, he would consider, as we do, that this fact is suffi-
ciently proved by the very existence of mathematical science.
Take our ordinary instance, " all trilateral are triangular : "
no one would dream of saying that the idea " triangular "

* Yet we observe that even thus we take too much for granted. " Whether
the three so-called fundamental laws," he says (" On Hamilton," p. 491) — and
the principle of identity is one of these three — " are laws of our thoughts
. . . merely because we perceive them to be universally true of all observed
phenomena, I will not positively decide."

160 The Philosophy of Theism.

is identical with, or contained in, the idea " trilateral." * And
though some able writers have maintained that the axioms
of arithmetic are purely explicative, this is not the place to
oppose them ; because Mr. Mill dissents from them as
eagerly and as confidently as we do. We briefly referred
to this question in our second essay.

We are thus at last brought to the point at issue between
Mr. Mill and ourselves. He denies, whereas we affirm, that
various ampliative propositions are self-evident and neces-
sary. And we are now to join issue on mathematical axioms,
as being special and critical instances of the general class
" ampliative."

In general accordance with what has been expressed, we
thus laid down in our second essay the immediate ground
on which the discussion was to turn. "If in any case,"
we said, " I know by my very conception of some ens,
that a certain attribute, not included in that conception,
is truly predicable of that ens, such predication is a self-
evident necessary proposition." These words defined with
strict accuracy, as our readers will have seen, the kind of
necessary truth of which Mr. Mill certainly denies the exist-
ence, though they are incidentally faulty in expression, as
implying that explicative propositions are not necessary.
Mr. Mill himself might admit, though in different phrase-
ology, that explicative propositions are self-evident and
necessary ; and the controversy between him and ourselves
turns on the question whether certain ampliative proposi-
tions are not self-evident and necessary also. Moreover, as
has been seen, ?/they are self-evident, it follows that they
are necessary.

Here, then, is the direct and central combat we have to

* F. Kleutgen avowedly concurs with Kant's doctrine, on the cognizable-
ness of " synthetical a priori propositions " as self-evident ; differing only
from him on the appropriateness of this particular word " synthetical." On
this particular there is no difference of doctrine, but only of words, between
other writers of the scholabtic following and the philosopher of Konigsberg.

Mr. Mill's Reply to the " Dublin Review" 101

fight out with Mr. Mill, and we beg our readers to con-
centrate on it their best attention. We take, as our pattern
specimen, the judgment " all trilaterals are triangular."
We maintain (1) that this judgment is ampliative : because
(as is manifest) the idea "triangular" is neither identical
with, nor contained in, the idea " trilateral." We maintain
("2) that this judgment is self-evident : because its truth is
known by duly pondering the proposition which expresses
it ; because, as soon as I have apprehended it, I need not
go ever so little beyond the region of my own thoughts in
order to cognize its truth. Mr. Mill's reply is substantially
as follows ; and we print his whole paragraph in a note,
that our readers may judge for themselves whether we have
misconceived him.* The proposition " all trilaterals are
triangular " — so Mr. Mill answers in effect — is indubitably
ampliative ; because the idea expressed by the predicate is
not identical with, nor contained in, that expressed by the
subject. But the judgment expressed by the proposition is

* " It is not denied nor deniable that tbere are properties of things which
we know to be true (as Dr. Ward expresses it) by our * very conception ' of
the thing, But this is no argument against our knowing thc-m solely by ex-
perience, for these are cases in which, in the very process of forming the
conception, we have experience of the fact. It is not likely that Dr. Ward
lias returned to the notion (so long abandoned and even forgotten by in-
tuitionists) of ideas literally innate, and thinks that we bring into the world
the conception of a trilateral figure ready made. He doubtless believes that
it is at least suggested by observation of objects. Now, the fact of three
sides and that of three angles are so intimately linked together in external
nature, that it is impossible for the conception of a three-sided figure to get
into the mind without carrying into the mind with it the conception of three
angles. Therefore, when we have once got the conception of a trilateral, we
have no need of further experience to prove triangularity. The conception
itself, which represents all our previous experience, suffices. And if the
association theory be true, it must follow from it that whenever any property
of external things is in the relation to the things which is required for the
formation of an inseparable association, that property will get into the con-
ception, and be believed without further proof. Dr. Ward will say that
triangularity is not included in the conception of trilateral. But this is
only true in the sense that triangularity is not in the connotation of the
name. Many attributes, not included in the definition, are included in the
conception. Dr. Ward cannot but see that on the experience hypothesis, this
not only may but must be the case." (" On Hamilton," p. 337, note.)

VOL. 1. M

162 The Philosophy of Theism.

not ampliative at all, but explicative.* Why ? Because,
in consequence of the singular uniformity of my past
experience, I have come to include triangularity in my very
idea of trilateralness ; because, through this uniformity of
experience, I have acquired an inability of thinking of a
figure as trilateral without at the same moment (implicitly,
at least) thinking of it as triangular. According to Mr. Mill,
then, when an adult expresses the proposition that " all
trilateral are triangular," the judgment which he elicits
would be truly analyzed and expressed by a different pro-
position ; by the proposition, that " all figures which have
three sides and three angles are triangular." But this
proposition is of course purely explicative, and is admitted
by Mr. Mill himself to be self-evident.

We are so very confident of our cause, that we earnestly
desire to exhibit Mr. Mill's theory at its thoroughly best
advantage. We will put it, therefore, this way. The pro-
position was once placed before me for the first time in a
formalized shape (perhaps in some "object-lesson"), that
" horses differ greatly from each other in colour." Though
(by hypothesis) I have never before expressly contemplated
that proposition in form, I at once recognize it as expressing
a freshly familiar truth ; a truth vividly known to me by
every day's experience. Now, the very same thing took
place — so Mr. Mill would say — when the proposition was
first placed before me in a formulized shape, that " all
trilaterals are triangular : " I recognize it at once, as ex-
pressing a freshly familiar truth, vividly known to me by

* It may be asked how our ascription of this opinion to Mr. Mill is recon-
cileable with our recent statement, that he regards mathematical axioms as
ampliative propositions. But the answer is most easy. According to
him, my judgment that all trilaterals are triangular was ampliative when first
I formed it, and indeed for a considerable time afterwards. He considers
that it was first formed through my experience of external nature ; and
that it became more and more familiar and intensified by the same cause
until at last (as explained in the text) it became part of my mind's habitual
furniture and is easily mistaken for an intuition.

Mr. Mill's Reply to the " Dublin Review" 163

every day's experience. According to Mr. Mill, the triangu-
larity of trilaterals is a truth as freshly known to me by
daily experience as is the fact that horses are of different
colours or that wood floats on water. Nay, according to
Mr. Mill, the first-named truth is known to me with in-
definitely greater freshness of familiarity than are the two
latter. For consider : Mr. Mill admits that all mankind
are under an incapacity of conceiving that even Omni-
potence could form a non-triangular trilateral ; whereas no
one of cultivated mind has the slightest difficulty in con-
ceiving that Omnipotence could make wood sink in the
water, or could make all horses of the same colour. And
it is Mr. Mill's precise allegation, that this contrast arises
exclusively from the fact that experience is so very much
more peremptorily uniform (if we may so express ourselves)
in testifying the triangularity of trilaterals than in testifying
the above-named properties of wood and of horses.* Mr.
Mill's contention, then, is as follows :•— " The truth that all
trilaterals are triangular, is known by every one with

* " Dr. Ward says that mere constant and uniform experience cannot
possibly account for the mind's conviction of self-evident necessity. Nor do
I pretend that it does. The experience must not only be constant and uni-
form, but the juxtaposition of the facts in experience must be immediate
and close ; as well as early, familiar, and so free from even the semblance
of an exception that no counter-association could possibly arise." ("On
Hamilton," p. 339, note.) " Whether the " mathematical u axiom needs con-
firmation or not, it receives confirmation in almost every instant of our lives.
. . . Experimental proof crowds in upon us in such endless profusion, and
without one instance in which there can be even a suspicion of an exception
to the rule, that we should soon have stronger ground for believing the
axiom, even as an experimental truth, than we have for almost any of the
general truths which we confessedly learn from the evidence of the senses.
Independently of a priori evidence, we should certainly believe it with an
intensity of conviction far greater than we accord to any ordinary physical
truth. . . . Where, then, is the necessity for assuming that our recognition
of these truths has a different origin from the rest of our knowledge, when
its existence is perfectly accounted for by supposing its origin to be the
same? when the causes which produce belief in all other instances exist
in this instance, and in a degree of strength as much superior to what exists
in other cases as the intensity of the belief itself is superior?" (" Logic,"
vol. i. p. 267.)

1 64 The Philosophy of Theism.

indefinitely greater freshness of familiarity than the truth
that wood floats upon water." This is what he affirms,
and what we deny ; and it is precisely on this point that
issue is joined.

As politicians would say, we cannot desire a better issue
than this to go the country upon. We affirm as an in-
dubitable matter of fact, that Mr. Mill is here contradicted
by the most obvious experience. We affirm as an indu-
bitable matter of fact, that ninety-nine hundredths of man-
kind not only do not know the triangularity of trilaterals
with this extraordinary freshness of familiarity, but do not
know it at all. Those who have not studied the elements
of geometry — with hardly an exception — if they were told
that trilaterals are triangular, and if they understood the
statement, would as simply receive a new piece of informa-
tion as they did when they were first told the death of
Napoleon III. Then, as to those who are beginning the
study of mathematics. A youth of fifteen, we said in our
second essay, is beginning to learn geometry, and his
tutor points out to him that every trilateral is triangular.
Does he naturally reply — as he would if his tutor were
telling him that horses are of different colours — "of course
the fact is so ; I have observed it a thousand times " ? On
the contrary, in all probability the proposition will be
entirely new to him ; and yet, notwithstanding its novelty,
will at once commend itself as a self-evident truth.*
Lastly, take those who learned the elements of geometry
when they were young, and are now busily engaged in

* Mr. Mill does not directly reply to this allegation of ours. Nor does
he notice Mr. Mahaffy's testimony, quoted by us in the note. " A mathe-
matical friend," says the latter, " told me he perfectly well remembered, when
a boy, being taught, without understanding it, the axiom, that two straight
lines cannot enclose a space. When the fourth proposition of Euclid was
shown to him, he remembers the universality and necessity of the axiom at
once flashing on him."

Mr. Mill's Reply to the " Dublin Review." 165

political, or forensic, or commercial life. If the triangularity
of trilaterals were mentioned to them, they would remember,
doubtless, that they had been taught in their youth to see
the self-evidence of this truth ; but they would also re-
member, that for years and years it had been absent from
their thoughts. Is it seriously Mr. Mill would allege, that
they know the triangularity of trilaterals with the same
freshness of familiar experience (or rather with indefinitely
greater freshness of familiar experience) with which they
know the tendency of fire to burn and of water to quench
it ? or with which they respectively know the political
events of the moment, or the practice of the courts, or the
habits of the Stock Exchange ? If he did allege this in his
zeal for a theory, we should confidently appeal against so
eccentric a statement to the common sense and common
experience of mankind.

But is it not, then, Mr. Mill might ask, a matter to
every man of every-day experience, that trilaterals are
triangular? If by "every-day experience" he means
" every day observation " — and his argument requires this,
— we answer confidently in the negative. Even if we could
not lay our finger on the precise fallacy which has misled
Mr. Mill, it would be none the less certain that he has been
misled. It cannot possibly be true that the triangularity
of trilaterals is a matter to every man of every-day observa-
tion, because (as we said just now) patently and undeniably
the mass of men know nothing whatever about it. But
Mr. Mill's fallacy is obvious enough to those who will look
at facts as they really are. In the first place — putting
aside that very small minority who are predominantly
occupied with mathematical studies — the very notion of a
" trilateral " does not occur to men at all, except accidentally
and on rare occasions. It is not because my eyes light by
chance on three straws mutually intersecting, or on some
other natural object calculated to suggest a trilateral, that

1C6 The Philosophy of Theism.

therefore any thought of that figure, either explicitly or
implicitly, enters my mind. I am probably musing on
matters indefinitely more interesting and exciting ; the
prospects of the coming parliamentary division, or the point
of law which I am going down to argue, or the symptoms
of the patient whom I am on my way to visit, or the pro-
bable fluctuation of the funds. The keen geometrician may
see trilaterals in stocks and stones, and think of trilateral^
on the slightest provocation : but what proportion of the
human race are keen geometricians ?

Then, secondly — still excluding these exceptional geome-
tricians— for a hundred times that observation might suggest
to me the thought of a trilateral, not more than once perhaps
will it suggest to me the triangularity of such trilateral. Mr.
Mill himself will admit, we suppose, that such explicit
observation is comparatively rare ; but he will urge, probably,
that I implicitly observe the triangularity of every trilateral
which I remark. We will make, then, a very simple sup-
position, for the purpose of testing this suggestion, as well
as for one or two other purposes connected with our argu-
ment. We will suppose that all rose stalks within the reach
of human observation had leaves of the same shape with each
other. On such supposition, the shape of its stalk-leaves
would be a more obvious and obtrusive attribute of the rose
than is triangularity of the trilateral ; and yet, beyond all
possibility of doubt, one might very frequently observe a
rose, without even implicitly noticing the shape of its stalk-
leaves. The present writer can testify this at first-hand.
In a life of sixty odd years, he has often enough smelt roses
and handled their stalks, and yet he had not the slightest
notion whether their leaves are or are not similarly shaped,
until he asked the question for the very purpose of this
illustration. And it is plain that if he has not observed the
mutual dissimilarity of their leaves, neither would he have
observed their similarity did it exist. Now, we appeal to

Mr. Mill's Reply to the " Dublin Review" 1G7

our readers' common sense, whether what we said at start-
ing is not undeniably true ; viz. that every ordinary person
is very far more likely to observe the shape of rose-stalk
leaves, than to observe the number of angles formed by the
sides of a trilateral.

At the same time, we fully admit that many a man may
have implicitly observed the similarity of shape in rose-stalk
leaves (supposing such similarity to exist) without having
explicitly adverted to the fact until he heard it mentioned ;
and in like manner this or that man may have implicitly
observed the triangularity of various trilaterals. But such
a circumstance does but give occasion to another disproof
of Mr. Mill's theory. Suppose I have implicitly observed
the former phenomenon. I hear the proposition stated,
that the shape of all rose-stalk leaves is similar, and I set
myself to test its truth by my former experience. I consult
my confused remembrance of numerous instances in which
I have looked at rose- stalks, and I come to assert, with
more or less positiveness, that all those within my observa-
tion have had similar leaves. On the other hand, I wish,
let us suppose, to test the proposition that all trilaterals
are triangular. If Mr. Mill's theory were true, I should
proceed as in the foregoing instance ; I should contemplate
my confused remembrance of numerous instances in which
1 have observed the triangularity. But the fact is most
different from this. I do not consult at all my memory of
past experience, but give myself to the contemplation of
some imaginary trilateral, which I have summoned into
my thoughts. And the impression which I receive from
such contemplation is not at all that the various trilaterals
/ have observed in times past are triangular, but that in no
possible world could non-triangular trilaterals exist. Observe,
then, these two respective cases. My process of reason has
been fundamentally different in the two ; and the impression
luhich I receive from that process will have been mnda-

168 The Philosophy of Theism.

mentally different in the two : consequently the two cases
are fundamentally different, instead of being (as they would
be on Mr. Mill's theory) entirely similar.

Our readers will observe that we have just now twice
used the word " impression," instead of such more definite
terms as " cognition " or " intuition." Our reason for this
is easily given. By the admission of Mr. Mill himself, every
adult who gives his mind to the careful thought of trilateral s,
receives the impression that their triangularity is a necessary
truth : but Mr. Mill denies that this impression is a genuine
intuition, and we could not of course assume what Mr. Mill
denies.

Here we bring to a close the exhibition of our first
argument against Mr. Mill ; an argument which we must
maintain to be simply final and conclusive, even if no second
were adducible. According to his theory, the triangularity
of trilateral (or any other geometrical axiom) is a pheno-
menon known to all men with as great freshness of familiarity
as the phenomenon that fire burns, or that water quenches
it ; or rather, the former class of phenomena is known to
all men with incomparably greater freshness of familiarity
than the latter. But such a proposition is undeniably
inconsistent with the most patent and indubitable facts.
This circumstance would of course be fatal to Mr. Mill,
even though we were entirely unable to account for it
psychologically; but (as we have further argued) it can
be psychologically accounted for with the greatest possible
ease.

A second argument has been incidentally included in
our exposition of the first. The mental process, whereby I
come to cognize the truth of a geometrical axiom, is funda-
mentally different from the mental process, whereby I come
to recognize the truth of an experienced fact ; whereas, on
Mr. Mill's theory, these two processes would be simply
identical.

Mr. Mill's Reply to the "Dublin Review"

There is a third and perfectly distinct line of argument,
which has been urged with great cogency by modern neces-
sists against the phenomenistic school. We have hitherto
been advocating the necessary character of geometrical
axioms, as an inferential truth ; and this is the line (we
think) most in harmony with the ordinary language of
Catholic philosophers. But non-Catholic necessists havo
powerfully advocated the same truth, as one immediately
declared by the human faculties. Let us revert to our
specimen instance. We have hitherto contemplated the
proposition, that " all trilateral are triangular : " we have
argued that the proposition is undeniably self-evident, and
from this we have inferred that it is also necessary. But
we will now contemplate a different proposition ; viz. that
" the triangularity of trilaterals is a necessary truth." WTe
maintain, in accordance with many modern philosophers,
that this propostion is immediately declared by the human
faculties ; that it is self-evident ; that it is recognized as
true by a mere pondering of its sense and comparison of
its terms. Mr. Mill himself admits that the declaration of
the human faculties is primd facie in our favour ; while we
on our side allege that profo under self- inspection does but
corroborate and intensify men's primd facie impression. We
think, indeed, that in no way will the truth of our allegation
be more effectively forced on the inquirer's conviction than
by his considering (as we shall now proceed to do) Mr. Mill's
attempted refutation thereof. He lays very great stress on
this alleged refutation, and says that the principle on which
it rests is one which intuitionists ought to have specially
considered, " because it is the basis of the " phenomenistic
" theory." (" On Hamilton," p. 314.) We can only reply,
that the phenomenistic theory in that case rests on a basis
of extraordinary frailty.

Mr. Mill distinctly admits that, when the human mind
contemplates mathematical axioms, there arises in it a

170 The Philosophy of Theism.

certain " conviction of self-evident necessity : " but he con-
siders that this conviction can be satisfactorily explained,
without accounting it a genuine intuition. These are his
words in reply to ourselves :

Dr. Ward says that mere uniform and constant experience
cannot possibly account for the mind's conviction of self-evident
necessity. Nor do I pretend that it does. The experience must
not only be constant and uniform, but the juxtaposition of the
facts in experience must he immediate and close, as well as
early, familiar, and so free from even the semhlance of an ex-
ception, that no counter-association can possibly arise. (" On
Hamilton," p, 339.)

Now, we must admit at once that this reply is no after-
thought of Mr. Mill's, but that, on the contrary, he had
repeatedly made the same statement on earlier occasions ;
and, indeed, in one passage which we actually quoted
(pp. 44, 45). We must admit, therefore, that in our
second essay we did not sufficiently bear in mind Mr.
Mill's previous explanation ; and we must accordingly
withdraw a reply to him, which we pressed with some
confidence, but which he has shown in his rejoinder to
labour under this fault. This, however, of 'course by the
way, as it does not affect the merits of Mr. Mill's argument
itself. That argument, it will be seen, runs thus. That
"conviction," he says, "of self-evident necessity," which
I receive when I contemplate a geometrical axiom, cannot
be shown to be a genuine intuition, because it may be
accounted for in quite a different way. In what way ? we
ask. He replies by the following syllogism.

Major. " If there be a phenomenon so circumstanced,
that not only my experience of it is constant and uniform,
but the juxtaposition of facts in experience is immediate
and close, and so free from even the persistent * semblance
of an exception that no counter-association can possibly

* Our reason for inserting the word " persistent " will presently appear.

Mr. MilTs Reply to the " Dublin Review." 171

arise — an impression will inevitably be made on my mind,
that this phenomenon is a self-evidently necessary truth."

Minor. "But the triangularity of trilaterals, or any other
geometrical axiom, is a phenomenon thus circumstanced."

The consequent is obvious.

Now, plainly Mr. Mill would do nothing for his cause,
if we could successfully deny either of his premisses ; but it
so happens that we confidently deny both. We will begin
with the minor, which is expressed somewhat more clearly
and emphatically a few pages earlier, A geometrical axiom,
he says (p. 334), (1) is " founded on an experience beginning
from birth, and never for many minutes intermitted in our
waking hours : " while on the other hand (2) no counter-
association is ever formed ; because " experience affords "
no " case of persistent illusion " in which such axiom has
even the semblance of being contradicted. We have said
that we deny both Mr. Mill's major and his minor ; and we
now add, that we deny also both the statements contained
in his minor.

We deny them altogether (1) that a geometrical axiom
is "founded on an experience never for many minutes
intermitted in our waking hours/' On the contrary, as
regards the mass of mankind, we affirm (and have already
given ample reasons for our affirmation) that the triangu-
larity of trilaterals has never been to them a matter of
observation at all. Of course a necessist will be the last to
deny that men's experience of such triangularity has been
" constant and uniform " in this sense, that they have never
once experienced any phenomenon inconsistent therewith :
but such an admission gives no help whatever to Mr. Mill's
reasoning.

Then, (2) what does Mr. Mill mean, when he further
says that experience affords no case of persistent illusion
in which any geometrical axiom has even the semblance of
being contradicted? That there are "illusions" of the

172 The Philosophy of Theism.

kind he expressly admits, though denying that such illusions
are " persistent ; " for he proceeds at once to mention one
himself. " In the case of parallel lines," he says, " the
laws of perspective do present such an illusion : they do to
the eye appear to meet in hoth directions, and consequently
to inclose a space.'' Mr. Mahaffy had given another instance,
viz. a straight stick, appearing bent in the water, and
presenting thereby an illusion contradictory to the axiom,
that a straight line is the shortest way between two points.
But Mr. Mill replies, that these are not " persistent "
illusions ; and explains himself to mean (p. 335, note) that
their " illusory character is at once seen, from the imme-
diate accessibility of the evidence which disproves them."
Observe what is involved in this.

There are two different classes of truths, which we may
be allowed for the present purpose to call geometrical and
physical axioms respectively ; * both of which Mr. Mill
regards as unknown except through experience. He admits,
however, that the former class produce on the mind an
inevitable impression of their being necessary, while the
latter produce no such impression at all. We ask him to
explain how this difference arises, if both classes really
rest on the same kind of evidence. He replies firstly, that
geometrical axioms are known by far more unintermittent
observation than physical ; and on this part of his answer
we have already rejoined. He replies secondly, that no
persistent illusions befall me in which geometrical axioms
have even the semblance of being contradicted ; whereas in
the case of all physical axioms I am exposed to such
illusions. In other words, according to Mr. Mill, I am from
time to time under an illusion, that fire does not burn, nor
stones sink in the water — without any " evidence " being
" immediately accessible " to me which would correct

* "We here are for the moment using the word " axioms" in the inaccurate
sense of " obvious and elementary truths."

Mr. Mill's Reply to the " DMin Review)?' 173

such illusion. Mr. Mill, we are sure, cannot have soberly
intended this; yet, unless he intended it, his elaborate
argumentative structure is in ruins.*

We deny, then, the second proposition of his minor no
less peremptorily than we deny the first. We deny that
men's experience of geometrical axioms is exempt from
liability to illusion, in any sense which can assist Mr. Mill's
argument.

Before proceeding to Mr. Mill's major, let us revert for
a moment to our old instance ; the impression which he
admits to be inevitably made on my mind, that the triangu-
larity of trilaterals is a necessary truth. Does he mean
that this is merely a superficial impression ? that my
faculties, if carefully and accurately consulted, declare such
impression to be unfounded ? Or does he fall back on his
theory of primordial certitude, and give up the testimony of
men's existing faculties altogether ? If the latter be his
meaning, of course we can only refer to what we urged in
the earlier part of this essay. It is impossible to know
that my faculties, when I was a baby in arms, would have

* After the substance of this article had been completed, we came for the
first time across a work on Kant by Mr. Mahaffy, from whose earlier volume
we gave an extract in our second essay. Had we met with it sooner we
should have made much use of it, as it travels over many parts of the same
ground which we have ourselves trodden. We give an extract bearing on
what is said in the text : —

Mr. Mill " had said ' had but experience afforded a case of illusion ' in
which " mathematical " truths appeared to be reversed, the counter-associa-
tion might have been sufficient to disprove the supposed necessity of thought.
In other words, had we but the least starting-point to help our imagination
in doing it, we would have conceived the reverse of 2 -f 2 = 4, or of a
straight line being the shortest between two points. This statement I took
up, and showed that in our every -day life there were such things as double
vision of an object single to the touch, and a straight stick appearing bent in
the water. I argued that on Mr. Mill's showing, these natural objects should
have been sufficient to defeat " the supposed necessity, " and that still they
were not so. ... I did not mean to maintain [as Mr. Mill's answer implies]
that mankind had reason to believe that 1 = 2, or that a bent line was th<;
shortest way between two points ; but merely that, on Mr. Mill's own showing,
we had a sufficient amount of experience to enable us to conceive it " (Kant's
"Critical Philosophy," pp. 157, 158).

174 The Philosophy of Theism.

declared the necessity of a geometrical axiom ; just as it is
impossible to know that they would have faithfully repre-
sented to me my experience of one hour back. If Mr. Mill
is prepared on that account to disbelieve the distinctest
declarations of his memory, he will doubtless be consistent
in disbelieving, on the same ground, the necessity of
geometrical axioms. But as Mr. Mill always takes the
trustworthiness of memory for granted, an appeal from him
to men's primordial faculties as their rule of certitude is the
most glaring of inconsistencies.

We are anxious, however, throughout — so confident we
are of our cause — to exhibit Mr. Mill's position at its
greatest possible advantage : and we will take for granted,
therefore, that his appeal is to men's existing faculties.
His major premiss, then, will be the following : — " Let there
be a phenomenon so circumstanced that not only my expe-
rience of it is constant and uniform, but the juxtaposition
of facts in experience immediate and close, and so free from
the persistent semblance of an exception that no counter-
association can possibly arise. In such case (1) a super-
ficial impression will inevitably be made on my mind that
this phenomenon is a self-evidently necessary truth ; but
(2) my faculties, if carefully and accurately consulted, will
declare such impression to be unfounded. Mr. Mill's major,
then, like his minor, contains two separate statements ;
and in the case of his major, moreover, just as in the case
of his minor, we entirely deny them both.

The first of these statements, however, is so com-
paratively unimportant that a very few words will suffice for
its examination. Mr. Mill alleges a supposed psychological
fact, viz. that certain conditions generate in the human
mind an inevitable prima facie impression that certain
propositions are necessary. What evidence does he adduce
of this supposed fact ? Absolutely none. He may say,
perhaps, that conclusive proof is impossible from the nature

Mr. Milt's Reply to the " Dublin Review" 175

of the case ; that he does not even pretend that his con-
ditions apply, except to propositions which his opponents
regard as really necessary. But at least he might have
applied something like what he calls " the method of con-
comitant variation ; " he might have shown that in propor-
tion as there is a nearer approach to the fulfilment of his
conditions, in that proportion there is a nearer approach
to the generation of this superficial impression. But the
fact is indubitably otherwise. All men have unceasing
experience of certain very obvious physical phenomena;
yet no one has the faintest appreciable tendency towards
doubting that Omnipotence could make fire innocuous,
could make wood sink in the water, or could make stones
float thereon.

But at last the question is one of fact, not theory ; and
its gist lies in the second of the two statements which we
have included in Mr. Mill's major. The question, in fact,
is simply this : what do the human faculties declare con-
cerning geometrical axioms ? We have always readily
conceded to Mr. Mill, that a man's self- inspection is often
very defective ; and that he will again and again carelessly
ascribe to his faculties some avouchment which is not
really theirs. As to this, however, there is one, and only
one, reasonable appeal; viz. from a superficial to a pro-
founder examination of the human consciousness. Let
as many competent inquirers as possible devote themselves
to this examination ; let them, by painstaking introspection,
ponder on the true nature of their mind's avouchment,
when they contemplate the triangularity of a trilateral.
Is that avouchment such as the following : — " I have never
met with nor heard of a non-triangular trilateral ? " Or is
is not rather : "A non-triangular trilateral is an intrin-
sically impossible chimera, which Omnipotence itself could
not fashion ? " There are several arguments, we consider,
any one of which may with entire conclusiveness be directed

17G The Philosophy of Theism.

against Mr. Mill's theory : yet we could be content (were it
requisite) to abandon them all, and to rest our whole case
on the issue we have just raised.

In fact, Mr. Mill's silence on this matter is the most
emphatic controversial support which can well be imagined.
It is impossible to obtain from him a categorical statement,
that the existing faculties of an adult declare the " con-
tingent " * character of mathematical axioms. We say,
with some confidence, that no such statement is to be found
in any of his writings ; and that just where we should
most expect such a statement, he seems to check himself
in full career, and fall back on his amazing theory of
primordial certitude. In saying, then, most confidently that
the human faculties declare the necessary character of
geometrical axioms, we do but say what Mr. Mill himself
nowhere ventures expressly to deny.

So far we have been considering Mr. Mill's negative
thesis, viz. that mathematical axioms are not cognizable
as necessary truths. But his positive thesis is not so easily
intelligible. No one (we believe) was ever more anxious
than Mr. Mill to treat his opponents with perfect fairness ;
but, in fact, he has altogether failed to treat them fairly in
this particular matter, because he has kept so much in the
background his own actual theory, on the degree of certitude
possessed by these axioms, and on the grounds which he
considers sufficient to establish that certitude. He declares,
indeed, again and again, that their universal truth is amply
proved by uniform experience ; but we find it most difficult
to understand what he means by this allegation. Eevert-
ing to an earlier example, let us suppose that all rose-stalks,
known as within human experience, have been observed to
possess leaves similar in shape, what conclusion should

* By " contingent," we need hardly say, is simply meant the contradictory
of " necessary."

Mr. Mill's Reply to the "Dublin Review!1 177

I have a right to draw from this circumstance ? I could
not know that even in Dorsetshire or Hampshire, some
fresh method of planting or sowing might not be found to
produce indubitable roses, growing on stalks totally different
in shape from those hitherto experienced ; and I could not
even guess that, in some newly-discovered country, such
rose-trees should not be found abundant. In like manner
we do not see how Mr. Mill could reasonably even guess
but that, in some newly-discovered country, a tree may be
found the wood of which shall possess the capability of
being formed into quadrangular trilaterals. He says,
indeed, that the truth of mathematical axioms " pervades
all nature ; " but how can he reasonably even guess that
this is the case ? What stronger reason can he possibly
have for his opinion that trilaterals are everywhere
triangular, than his ancestors had for their opinion that
all swans are white, and that all metals sink in the
water?*

Here, however, as in several other instances, Mr. Mill
has shown himself too clear-sighted to be quite satisfied
with his own position ; and he takes refuge in a thinly-
disguised reproduction of that very necessist theory, which
he so energetically repudiates. This fact is so very curious
and characteristic, that we beg our readers to give it special
attention.

" That a straight line is the shortest distance between
two points, we do not doubt to be true," says Mr. Mill,
" even in the region of the fixed stars." (" Logic," vol. i.
pp. 862-363.) What right has Mr. Mill, we asked, to hold
this truth without doubt ? He regards this axiom as merely
a fact known by experience. But " in distant parts of the
stellar regions," he affirms (vol. ii. p. 108), "where pheno-

" That all metals sink in water was a uniform experience, from the
origin of the human race to the discovery of potassium in the present century
by Sir Humphry Davy. That all swans are white was a uniform experience
down to the discovery of Australia " (Mill's " Logic," vol. i. p. 305).
VOL. I. N

178 The Philosophy of Theism.

mena may be entirely unlike those with which we are
acquainted, it would be folly to affirm confidently that "
those laws prevail "which we have found to hold uni-
versally on our own planet." In our second essay we
asked him distinctly how he could reconcile these two
statements ; how he could regard a certain property of
stellar straight lines as a truth known by experience, while
he admitted that the stellar region is beyond the reach of
experience. Mr. Mills tacitly replies by correcting the
earlier sentence. " That a straight line is the shortest
distance between two points we do not doubt," he had said,
"to be true, even in the region of the fixed stars." But
now he adds in a note a qualification. " In strictness,
wherever the present constitution of space exists ; which we
have ample reason to believe that it does in the region of
the fixed stars." In the new note of his work on Hamilton,
written with avowed reference to our criticism, he expresses
the same theory more fully. We italicize a few words.

Only if space itself is everywhere what we conceive it to be, can
our conclusions from the conception be everywhere objectively true.
The truths of geometry are valid, wherever the constitution of space
agrees with what is within our means of observation. That space
cannot anywhere be differently constituted, or that Almighty
power could not make a different constitution of it, we know
not (p. 338, note).

Here is a most undeniable ampliative proposition : viz.
" wherever the present constitution of space exists, a straight
line is always the shortest distance between two points."
Yet Mr. Mill admits that this ampliative proposition is
cognizable, independently of experience, as a "conclusion
from the conception " of space. It is really difficult to
imagine a more explicit surrender of the whole point at
issue between him and ourselves.

Or we may express the same self-contradiction of Mr.
Mill's in a somewhat different shape. It is impossible,

Mr. Mill's Reply to the "Dublin Review." 179

Mr. Mill confesses, to know by experience that in the stellar
region trilaterals are triangular, because in that region
"phenomena may be totally unlike those with which we
are acquainted : " yet, according to him, I may confidently
" conclude " their triangularity from my " conception " of
stellar " space." In like manner, therefore, as to earthly
trilaterals. I need not resort to experience for my know-
ledge of their triangularity ; but I may " conclude " that
attribute from my very " conception " of earthly " space."
This is the very proposition which hitherto we have been
engaged in affirming and he in denying.

Here we close our direct and central conflict with Mr.
Mill. We have confined our attention to geometrical axioms,
and, indeed, almost exclusively to one such axiom ; because
the more closely the issue can be narrowed, the greater
hope there is of arriving at a definite decision. Nor is
there any inconvenience in such a course : because (1) it is
very easy for inquirers to apply to other mathematical
axioms what has been said of one ; and because (2) if there
were so much as one ampliative judgment which Mr. Mill
admitted to be necessary, by that very admission he would
be a refugee from the phenomenistic to the necessist camp.

On arithmetical axioms in particular, we will content
ourselves with placing on record the point at issue. We gave,
as our specimen instance, the axiom "2 + 9 = 3 + 8;"
and Mr. Mill replies to us, in the new edition of his work
on Hamilton, at p. 339. While we confidently maintain
against Mr. Mill that the axiom is self-evident, we never-
theless entirely agree with him that it is deducible from one
still simpler ; from the axiom that " change of arrange-
ment makes no difference in the number of objects." ' We
heartily agree with him, that this latter judgment is

* Mr. Mill says inadvertently, "change opposition ;" but we need hardly
point out that arithmetical axioms apply to succession m time, or indeed to
any other aggregation, no less than to position in place.

180 The Philosophy of Theism.

ampliative, and not merely explicative. On the other hand,
whereas he alleges that man's knowledge of it is derived
only from experience, we maintain, on the contrary, that
the axiom is not merely self-evident, but among the most
superficially obvious of self-evident truths. After the dis-
cussion of the previous pages, we need not trouble our
readers with arguments on this head.

One or two subordinate points were incidentally raised
in our second essay, and it will be more satisfactory not
to pass entirely over Mr. Mill's replies on those issues. At
the same time, our notice of those replies must necessarily
be very brief ; and we may mention to our readers for their
relief, that they can pass over what follows without losing
any essential part of our argument.

(1) Mr. Mill had argued as follows : —

Many persons who have been frightened in childhood can
never be alone in the dark without irrepressible terrors. Many
a person is unable to revisit a particular place, or to think of a
particular event, without recalling acute feelings of grief or
reminiscences of suffering. If the facts which created these
strong associations in individual minds had been common to all
mankind from their earliest infancy, and had, when the associa-
tions were fully formed, been forgotten, we should have had a
necessity of thought ; one of those necessities which are supposed
to prove an objective law, and an a priori mental connection
between ideas.

We replied to this that a mere necessity of feeling has
never been affirmed to prove "an a priori connection
between two ideas." Mr. Mill, however, thus rejoins
(" On Hamilton," p. 329, note) :

If the person in whose mind a given spot is associated with
terrors, had entirely forgotten the fact by which it came to be
so ; and if the rest of mankind, or even only a great number
of them, felt the same terror on coming to the same place, and
were equally unable to account for it ; — there would certainly
grow up a conviction that the place had a natural quality of

Mr. Mitt'* Reply to the "DuUin Review" 181

terribleness, which would probably fix itself in the belief that
the place was under a curse, or was the abode of some invisible
object of terror.

Of course we entirely deny this. We would ask any
disciple of Mr. Mill this simple question. Let us suppose
that Mr. Mill's conditions were fulfilled : we ask, what is
that particular ampliative judgment which, on that suppo-
sition, men would suppose themselves to cognize as self-
evident ? Mr. Mill avowedly cannot answer this question.
They might think it self-evident, he says, that the place was
under a curse, or they might think it self-evident that the
place was the abode of some terrific object ; but it is not
(according to him) more than probable that they would
think it either the one or the other.

(2) We further objected that Mr. Mill had used the
words " necessity of thought " in two different senses : a
"law of nature whereby I necessarily think ;" and "a law
of nature whereby I think as necessary." Mr. Mill replies
("On Hamilton," p. 339) that the only evidence which can be
given for my thinking a thing as necessary, is my neces-
sarily thinking it. But we had adduced evidence of a totally
different character. Mr. Mill proceeds indeed to say, that
he has refuted our arguments for this different kind of
evidence ; but our preceding pages have, we trust, suffi-
ciently shown that his alleged refutation is invalid.

(3) Mr. Mill admits that men possess the power of
cognizing mathematical axioms by means of purely mental
experience. He accounts for this power by " one of the
characteristic properties of geometrical forms ; " viz. " that
they can be painted in the imagination with a distinctness
equal to the reality." We urged against him that, in thus
speaking, he entirely leaves out of account arithmetical and
algebraic axioms ; though these, equally with geometrical,
can be arrived at by purely mental experimentation. He
replies (" On Hamilton," p. 340) as follows :—

182 The Philosophy of Theism.

I do not leave them out of account, but have assigned in
my Logic another and equally conclusive reason why they can
be studied in our conception alone; namely, that arithmetical
and algebraic axioms, being true not of any particular kind of
thing but of all things whatever, any mental conceptions what-
ever will adequately represent them.

We fully admH that in his "Logic" (vol. i. pp. 293-
295) Mr. Mill sets forth the true doctrine, that arithmetical
axioms hold good, not of any particular kind of thing, but
of all things whatever. But we cannot for the life of us
see that he anywhere assigns this doctrine as a "reason
why they can be studied " and known to be true, by men's
"conception alone." On the contrary, as it seems to us,
he distinctly denies that they can be so studied. These are
his words : "All who wish to carry the child's mind with
them in teaching arithmetic, all who wish to teach
numbers and not mere ciphers, now teach it through the
evidence of the senses" (p. 296).

(4) There remains to be reconsidered, a reply we gave
to an argument which Mr. Mill had based on Keid's
"Geometry of Visibles." It would carry us much too
far, if we attempted to make our present rejoinder under-
stood by those who do not clearly bear in mind our earlier
remarks. We will here, therefore, presuppose them.

Mr. Mill (" On Hamilton," p. 92, note) does not attempt,
on his own account, any further discussion on the point ;
but contents himself with maintaining that Eeid was of the
same mind with Mr. Mill himself, and with referring us to
Keid's own arguments. We are still perfectly confident
tbat it is Mr. Mill wbo is opposing Eeid. It is certainly
not very probablo that Eeid can have intended to argue
against the necessary character of mathematical axioms,
considering that he habitually and earnestly upheld their
necessary character. And there is one sentence of his
which will put the matter beyond dispute.

Mr. Mill's Reply to the "Dublin Review" 183

Keid conceived certain imaginary " Idomenians," who
agree with human beings in every other particular, but who
possess the sense of sight without any accompanying sense
of touch. The Idomenians, he says, would regard as self-
evident certain strange geometrical propositions; as, e.g.,
that " every straight line, being sufficiently produced, will
re-enter into itself." The question between Mr. Mill and
ourselves is this : whether in such an opinion they would
be (according to Keid) referring to that figure which human
beings call a straight line ; or, on the contrary, to some
totally different figure (viz. the arc of a great circle), which
they will have learned to call by the name of a straight
line. Mr. Mill maintains the former alternative, and we
the latter. Now let our readers observe Keid's own words,
especially those which we italicize : —

This small specimen of the geometry of visibles is intended
... to demonstrate the truth of what we have affirmed above ;
namely, that those figures and that extension which are the
immediate objects of sight [and which, therefore, are those con-
templated by the Idomenians] are not the figures and the ex-
tension about which common geometry is employed. (Hamilton's
edition, p. 148.)

Surely this is final and decisive.

Our second essay, however, was not exclusively devoted
to the discussion of mathematical axioms, but contained in
its later part various general considerations, which tell
importantly (as we think) against the doctrine of pheno-
menism. There are only two of these which it has naturally
fallen in Mr. Mill's way to answer ; and on one of the two
— relating to the faculty of memory — we have rejoined in
the early part of this essay. The remaining one concerns
the very foundation of phenomenism. The whole body of
doctrine accumulated by a phenomenist depends throughout
on his premiss, that "the laws of nature are uniform."
Let this premiss be successfully denied, and straightway

184 The Philosophy of Theism.

there is no phenomenistic philosophy. We allege that
phenomenists can adduce no grounds whatever, which
will reasonably be accounted sufficient to establish their
fundamental premiss ; and we criticized in that sense
Mr. Mill's arguments for the desired conclusion. In the
new edition of his Logic, Mr. Mill replies to our criticism
(vol. ii. pp. 109-111) ; though we think few readers will fail
to see how unsatisfactory is his self-defence. The question,
however, is one of such fundamental importance in the
conflict with phenomenism, that no merely perfunctory
treatment of it is permissible. In our next essay on Mr.
Mill, then, we hope to elucidate the matter in more detail.

One or two other questions, more or less cognate, are in
our mind, which we trust also to include in our next paper.
And so much having been accomplished, we have every
hope of continuing in subsequent papers without further
interruption — and still with Mr. Mill as our representative
opponent — the course of argument which we originally pro-
jected against that poison of antitheism, which just now
so widely and so profoundly infects all the higher specula-
tions of non-Catholic Europe.

V.
ME. MILL'S PHILOSOPHICAL POSITION.*

IT is impossible to pursue our controversy with Mr. Mill
without some preliminary notice of the very remarkable
autobiography which has appeared in this last quarter.
We will not ourselves, however, make any comment on Mr.
Mill's personal qualities as therein exhibited : because (1)
our argument concerns his philosophy, not himself; and
because (2) any attempt at subtle appreciation of character
is wholly beyond the present writer's power of thought and
expression. We will supply our omission, however, as best
we can, by placing before our readers large part of a very
able criticism which appeared in the Spectator and with
which on the whole we concur : —

That this curious volume delineates, on the whole, a man
marked by the most earnest devotion to human good, and the
widest intellectual sympathies, no one who reads it with any
discernment can doubt. But it is both a very melancholy book
to read, and one full of moral paradoxes. It is very sad, in the
first instance, to read the story of the over-tutored boy, con-
stantly incurring his father's displeasure for not being able to
do what by no possibility he could have done, and apparently
without any one to love. Mr. James Mill, vivacious talker, and

* Autobiography. By JOHN STUART MILL. London : Longmans.

An Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy. By JOHN STUART
MILL. Fourth Edition. London : Longmans.

A System of Logic, Ttatiocinative and Inductive. By JOHN STUART MILL.
Eighth Edition. London : Longmans.

186 The Philosophy of Theism.

in a narrow way powerful thinker as he was, was evidently as
an educator, on his son's own showing, a hard master, anxious to
reap what he had not sown, and to gather what he had not
strewed ; or, as that son himself puts it, expecting " effects
without causes." Not that the father did not teach the child
with all his might, and teach in many respects well ; but then
he taught the boy far too much, and expected him to learn
besides a great deal that he neither taught him nor showed him
where to find. The child began Greek at three years old, read
a good deal of Plato at seven, . . . began logic at twelve,
went through a "complete course of political economy" at
thirteen, including the most intricate points of the theory of
currency. He was a constant writer for the " Westminster
Review " at eighteen, was editing Bentham's " Theory of
Evidence " and writing habitual criticisms of the Parliamentary
debates at nineteen. At twenty he fell into a profound melancholy
on discovering that the only objects of life for which he lived —
the objects of social and political reformers — would, if suddenly
and completely granted, give him no happiness whatever. Such
a childhood and youth, lived apparently without a single strong
affection — for his relation to his father was one of deep respect
and fear, rather than love, and he tells us frankly, in describing
the melancholy to which we have alluded, that if he had loved
any one well enough to confide to him, the melancholy would
not have been — and resulting at the age of eighteen in the
production of what Mr. Mill himself says might, with as little
extravagance as would ever be involved in the application of
such a phrase to a human being, be called "a 'mere reasoning
machine," — are not pleasant subjects of contemplation : even
though it be true, as Mr. Mill asserts, that the over-supply of
study and under-supply of love did not prevent his childhood
from being a happy one. Nor are the other personal incidents
of the autobiography of a different cast. Nothing is more
remarkable than the fewness, limited character, and apparently,
so far as close intercourse was concerned, temporary duration,
of most of Mr. Mill's friendships. The one close and intimate
friendship of his life, which made up to him for the insufficiency
of all others, that with the married lady who, after the death of
her husband, became his wife, was one which for a long time
subjected him to slanders, the pain of which his sensitive nature
evidently felt very keenly. And yet he must have been aware
that though in his own conduct he had kept free from all stain,

Mr. Mill's Philosophical Position. 187

his example was an exceedingly dangerous and mischievous one
for others, who might be tempted by his moral authority to
follow in a track in which they would not have had the strength
to tread. Add to this that his married life was very brief, only
seven years and a half, being unexpectedly cut short, and that
his passionate reverence for his wife's memory and genius — in
his own words, " a religion " — was one which, as he must have
been perfectly sensible, he could not possibly make to appear
otherwise than extravagant, not to say an hallucination, in the
eyes of the rest of mankind ; and yet that he was possessed by
an irresistible yearning to attempt to embody it in all the tender
and enthusiastic hyperbole of which it is so pathetic to find a
man who gained his fame by his " dry-light " a master ; — and it
is impossible not to feel that the human incidents in Mr. Mill's
career are very sad. True, his short service in Parliament,
when he was already advanced in years, was one to bring him
much intellectual consideration and a certain amount of popu-
larity. But even that terminated in a defeat, and was hardly
successful enough to repay him for the loss of literary pro-
ductiveness which those three years of practical drudgery im-
posed. In spite of the evident satisfaction and pride with
which Mr. Mill saw that his school of philosophy had gained
rapid ground since the publication of his u Logic," and that his
large and liberal view of the science of political economy had
made still more rapid way amongst all classes, the record of his
life which he leaves behind him is not, even in its own tone,
and still less in the effect produced on the reader, a bright and
happy one. It is " sicklied o'er with the pale cast of thought,"
and of thought that has to do duty for much, both of feeling
and of action, which usually goes to constitute the full life of a
large mind.

And besides the sense of sadness which the human incidents
of the autobiography produce, the intellectual and moral story
itself is full of paradox which weighs upon the heart as well as
the mind. Mr. Mill was brought up by his father to believe
that Christianity was false, and that even as regards natural
religion there was no ground for faith.* But in the mean time,
he is most anxious to point out that religion, in what he thinks
the best sense, is possible even to one who does not believe in
God. That best sense is the sense in which religion stands for

* This is certainly an under-statement, as vre shall show presently in
the text

188 The Philosophy of Theism,

an ideal conception of a perfect Being to which those who have
such a conception "habitually refer as the guide of their
conscience : " an ideal, he says, " far nearer to perfection than
the objective Deity of those who think themselves obliged to
find absolute goodness in the author of a world so crowded with
suffering and so deformed by injustice as ours." Unfortunately,
however, this "ideal conception of a perfect Being" is not a
power on which human nature can lean. It is merely its own
best thought of itself; so that it dwindles when the mind and
heart contract, and vanishes just when there is most need of
help. This Mr. Mill himself felt at one period of his life. At
the age of twenty he underwent a crisis, which apparently
corresponded in his own opinion to the state of mind that leads
to " a Wesleyan's conversion." . . .

It is clear that Mr. Mill felt the deep craving for a more
permanent and durable source of spiritual life, than any which
the most beneficient activity spent in patching up human
institutions and laboriously recasting the structure of human
society could secure him ; — that he himself had a suspicion that,
to use the language of a book he had been taught to make light
of, his soul was thirsting for God, and groping after an eternal
presence, in which he lived and moved and had his being.
What is strange and almost burlesque, if it were not so melan-
choly, is the mode in which this moral crisis culminates. A
few tears shed over Marmontel's " Memoires," and the fit passed
away : —

" Two lines of Coleridge, in whom alone of all writers I have found a true
description of what I felt, were often in my thoughts, not at this time (for I
had never read them), but in a later period of the same mental malady —

without hope draws nectar in a sieve,
And hope without an object cannot live.'

In all probability my case was by no means so peculiar as I fancied it, and I
doubt not that many others have passed through a similar state; but the
idiosyncrasies of my education had given to the general phenomenon a
special character, which made it seem the natural effect of causes that it was
hardly possible for time to remove. I frequently asked myself if I could or
if I was bound to go on living, when life must be passed in this manner. 1
generally answered to myself that I did not think I could possibly bear it
beyond a year. When, however, not more than half that duration of time
had elapsed, a small ray of light broke in upon my gloom. I was reading
accidentally Marmontel's * Me'moires,' and came to the passage which relates
his father's death, the distressed position of the family, and the sudden in-

Mr. Mill's Philosophical Position. 189

gpiration by which he, then a mere boy, felt and made them feel that he
would be everything to them— would supply the place of all that they had
lost. A vivid conception of the scene and its feelings came over me, and I
was moved to tears. From this moment my burden grew lighter. The
oppression of the thought that all feeling was dead within me was gone. I
was no longer hopeless ; I was not a stock or a stone. I had still, it seemed,
some of the material out of which all worth of character and all capacity for
happiness are made. Relieved from my ever-present sense of irremediable
wretchedness, I gradually found out that the ordinary incidents of life could
again give me some pleasure ; that I could again find enjoyment, not intense,
but sufficient for cheerfulness, in sunshine and sky, in books, in conversation,
in public affairs; and that there was once more excitement, though of a
moderate kind, in exerting myself for my opinions, and for the public good.
Thus the cloud gradually drew off, and I again enjoyed life ; and though I
had several relapses, some of which lasted many months, I never again was
as miserable as I had been."

And the only permanent instruction which this experience left
behind it seems to have been curiously slight. It produced a
threefold moral result : — first, a grave alarm at the dangerously-
underminiiig capacities of his own power of moral analysis
which promised to unravel all those artificial moral webs of
painful and pleasurable associations with injurious and useful
actions respectively, which his father had so laboriously woven
for him during his childhood and youth : and further, two
notable practical conclusions — one, that in order to attain
happiness (which he " never wavered " in regarding as " the
test of all rules of conduct and the end of life ") the best
strategy is a kind of flank march, to aim at something else, at
some ideal end, not consciously as a means to happiness, but as
an end in itself, — so, he held, may you have a better chance of
securing happiness by the way than you can by any direct
pursuit of it ; and the other, that it is most desirable to cultivate
the feelings, the passive susceptibilities, as well as the reason-
ing and active powers, if the utilitarian life is to be made enjoy-
able. Surely a profound sense of the inadequacy of ordinary
human success to the craving of the human spirit was never
followed by a less radical moral change. That it resulted in a
new breadth of sympathy with writers like Coleridge and
Wordsworth, whose fundamental modes of thought and faith
Mr. Mill entirely rejected, but for whose mode of sentiment,
after this period of his life, he somehow managed, not very,
intelligibly, to make room, is very true; and it is also true that
this gave a new largeness of tone to his writings, and gave him
a real superiority in all matters of taste to the utilitarian clique

1 90 The Philosophy of Theism.

to which he had belonged — results which enormously widened
the scope of his influence, and changed him from the mere ex-
positor of a single school of psychology into the thoughtful critic
of many different schools. But as far as we can judge, all this
new breadth was gained at the cost of a certain haze, which,
from this time forth, spread itself over his grasp of the first
principles which he still professed to hold. He did not cease to
be a utilitarian, but he ceased to distinguish between the duty
of promoting your own happiness and of promoting anybody
else's, and never could make it clear where he found his moral
obligation to sacrifice the former to the latter. He still main-
tained that actions, and not sentiments, are the true objects of
ethical discrimination ; but he discovered that there was a
significance which he had never before suspected even in senti-
ments and emotions of which he continued to maintain that the
origin was artificial and arbitrary. He did not cease to declaim
against the prejudices engendered by the intuitional theory of
philosophy ; but he made it one of his peculiar distinctions as
an experience-philosopher, that he recommended the fostering of
new prepossessions, only distinguished from the prejudices he
strove to dissipate by being, in his opinion, harmless, though
quite as little based as those in ultimate or objective truth. He
maintained as strongly as ever that the character of man is
formed by circumstances, but he discovered that the will can act
upon circumstances, and so modify its own future capability of
willing ; and though it is in his opinion circumstances which
enable or induce the will thus to act upon circumstances, he
taught and thought that this makes all the difference between
fatalism and the doctrine of cause and effect as applied to
character. After his influx of new light he remained as strong
a democrat as ever, but he ceased to believe in the self-interest
principle as universally efficient to produce good government
when applied to multitudes, and indeed qualified his democratic
theory by an intellectual aristocracy of feeling, which to our
minds is the essence of exclusiveness, " A person of high
intellect," he writes, " should never go into unintellectual
society, unless he can enter it as an apostle ; yet he is the only
person with high objects who can ever enter it at all." You can
hardly have exclusiveness more extreme than that, or a doctrine
more strangely out of moral sympathy with the would-be
universalism of the Benthamite theory. In fact, it seems to us,
Mr. Mill's unquestionable breadth of philosophic treatment was

Mr. MilVs Philosophical Position. 191

gained at the cost of a certain ambiguity which fell over the
root-principles of his philosophy — an ambiguity by which he
gained for it a more catholic repute than it deserved. The
result of the moral crisis through which Mr. Mill passed at
the age of twenty may be described briefly, in our opinion,
as this : that it gave him tastes far in advance of his philosophy
— foretastes, in fact, of a true philosophy ; and that this moral
flavour of something truer and wider served him in place of
the substance of anything truer and wider during the rest of
his life. . . .

On the whole, the book will be found, we think, even by
Mr. Mill's most strenuous disciples, a dreary one. It shows
that in spite of all Mr. Mill's genuine and generous compassion
for human misery and his keen desire to alleviate it, his relation
to concrete humanity was of a very confined and reserved kind,
— one brightened by few personal ties, and those few not,
except in about two cases, really hearty ones. The multitude
was to him an object of compassion and of genuine beneficence,
but he had no pleasure in men, no delight in actual intercourse
with this strange, various, homely world of motley faults and
virtues. His nature was composed of a few very fine threads,
but wanted a certain strength of basis, and the general effect,
though one of high and even enthusiastic disinterestedness, is
meagre and pallid. His tastes were refined, but there was a
want of homeliness about his hopes. He was too strenuously
didactic to be in sympathy with man, and too incessantly
analytic to throw his burden upon God. There was something
overstrained in all that was noblest in him, this excess
seeming to be by way of compensation, as it were, for the
number of regions of life in which he found little or nothing
where other men find so much. He was strangely deficient in
humour, which, perhaps, we ought not to regret, for had he had
it, his best work would, in all probability, have been greatly
hampered by such a gift. Unique in intellectual ardour and
moral disinterestedness, of tender heart and fastidious tastes,
though narrow in his range of practical sympathies, his name
will long be famous as that of the most wide-minded and
generous of political economists, the most disinterested of
Utilitarian moralists, and the most accomplished and impartial
of empirical philosophers. But as a man, there was in him a
certain poverty of nature, in spite of the nobleness in him, a
monotonous joylessness, in spite of the hectic sanguineness of

192 The Philosophy of Theism.

his theoretic creed, a want of genial trust, which spurred on
into an almost artificial zeal his ardour for philosophic recon-
struction; and these are qualities which will probably put a
well-marked limit on the future propagation of an influence
such as few writers on such subjects have ever before attained
within the period of their own lifetime.

Our own comments on the autobiography shall be con-
fined to one or two points, on which it illustrates (as we
think, very instructively) Mr. Mill's habits and character,
as a thinker on philosophy and religion. And firstly, the
present work makes it abundantly clear that we were
correct in our estimate of his opinion on religious subjects.
By " deism " is commonly understood the doctrine, that an
infinitely perfect Being is Author of the universe, but that
this Being has made no revelation to mankind. Mr. Mill
considers this doctrine no less obviously irrational and
immoral than Christianity itself. His father, he said
(pp. 39-40), "found it impossible to believe that a world so
full of evil was the work of an Author combining infinite
power with perfect goodness and righteousness. His
intellect spurned the subtleties by which men attempted to
blind themselves to this open contradiction." And in this
passage, as our readers will have observed, Mr. Mill not
only narrates as a fact his father's unbelief, but adds on
his own account the statement that " Theism is an open
contradiction." In p. 46 he says that " the ideal of good "
framed by such thinkers as himself, " is usually far nearer
to perfection than the objective Deity of those who think
themselves obliged to find absolute goodness in the author
of a world so crowded with suffering and so deformed with
injustice as ours." And in p. 70 he laments that " those
who reject revelation very generally take refuge in an
optimistic deism, a worship of the order of nature and the
supposed course of Providence, at least as full of contradic-
tions and perverting to the moral sentiments as any of the

Mr. Mill's Philosophical Position. 193

forms of Christianity, if only it is as completely realized."
Moreover, any one who reads the volume will see that these
passages express what was his own doctrine from first to
last. If, then, by the term " God " be understood an
" infinitely perfect Being " — Omnipotence, of course, being
included in "Perfection" — nothing can be clearer than
that Mr. Mill throughout his life confidently denied the
existence of God. He implies, indeed (p. 89), that " dog-
matic atheism " is absurd : but he himself was in the
ordinary sense of the term a " dogmatic atheist ; " because
he confidently denied the existence of any such Being as
Him who is ordinarily called " God."

It may be worth while to add, that he not only rejected
deism as confidently as he rejected Christianity, but that
he thought Christianity the less unreasonable of the two.
His father " spoke with respect" of Butler's "Analogy"
(p. 38), which

kept him, as he said, for some considerable time, a believer in
the divine authority of Christianity, by proving to him that
whatever are the difficulties in believing that the Old and New-
Testaments proceed from, or record the acts of, a perfectly wise
and good Being, the same and still greater difficulties stand in
the way of the belief that a Being of such a character can have
been the Maker of the universe. He considered Butler's argu-
ment as conclusive against the only opponents for whom it was
intended. Those who admit an omnipotent as well as perfectly
just and benevolent Maker and Ruler of such a world as this,
can say little against Christianity but what can, with at least
equal force, be retorted against themselves (p. 39).

In this last sentence, as in a former instance, the author
is avowedly expressing what is his own opinion as well as
his father's. In his view, then, the deistic theory is not
only faulty on the same ground with the Christian, but has
the additional faultiness of adducing arguments against
Christianity which are equally destructive of deism itself.

Further, from the very first opening of his reason to

VOL. I.

194 The Philosophy of Theism.

the day on which this autobiography was concluded, no
shade of doubt on the absolute and even obvious certainty
of atheism seems to have even momentarily crossed his
mind. At one critical period of his life (see pp. 132-146)
he was led to question profoundly the whole basis on which
he had been so carefully trained, and which he had hitherto
assumed as indubitable. He was impelled by the very
strongest motives to look in every possible direction for
some relief ; and yet there was one direction in which he
never thought of looking, viz. belief in God.* No one
more heartily denounced than he all habit of passive
acquiescence (as he would call it) in tenets once learned ;
yet his faith in atheism seems really to have rivalled, in
firmness, tenacity, undoubtingness, unfaltering persistency,
the faith of Catholics in the great verities of their creed.
Of every other tenet which he held, he felt it his duty again
and again to re-examine the grounds : but the truth of
atheism was too self-evident in his view to need re-examina-
tion. Catholics, in accordance with their fundamental
principles, hold the truth of Catholicity firmly and irre-
spectively of inquiry ; while Mr. Mill chose, in the very
teeth of his fundamental principles, to hold the truth of
atheism firmly and irrespectively of inquiry.

And at last what was the intellectual foundation of this
blind persistency ? Strange to say of a phenomenistic
philosopher, it was his absolute trust in the self-evident
character of a certain alleged axiom. He had been taught
from childhood to account it a self-evident contradiction in
terms, that a world so abounding in evil as this can have
been created by a Being infinite at once in love and in
power. It is meant by the very term " Infinite in love "
— so he had been taught to think — that such a Being
imparts all the happiness He possibly can ; and it is meant

* He says in one place (p. 43), " I am one of the very few examples in
this country who has not thrown off religious belief, but never had it."

Mr. Mill's Philosophical Position. 195

by the very term " Infinite in power," that He can impart
all the happiness He may wish. Looking, then, at the
experienced facts of life, he held that the affirmation of
God's Existence is not merely a statement open to in-
numerable objections and surrounded by innumerable diffi-
culties— though this also he would have said — but a direct
contradiction in terms ; as though one spoke of a crooked
straight line of a round square. We on our side maintain,
not only that his thesis is indefensible, but that it will not
bear a moment's consideration. We are not able, indeed,
to draw out an intelligible argument on this head, until we
can discuss the matter as a whole ; until we are directly
engaged in that theistic controversy on which this series
of essays is intended to converge. Even when we are
engaged in that controversy, we are not so insane as to
imagine that we can explain how it is that such a world as
this can have proceeded from an infinitely loving and
powerful Creator. Nay, the Catholic is not called on to
show positively, that any given objection of antitheists is
invalid ; because it is rather their business to prove it valid.*
The Catholic begins by drawing out the direct proof of
God's Existence — a proof of the most urgent, immediate,
irrefragable, irresistible character that can well be imagined,
which penetrates the inmost depths of the human heart,
and which reasonably convinces million millions of men,
who would be wholly incapable of understanding its scientific
analysis. Of course, on the imaginary supposition that
any argument could be adduced on the opposite side,
which demonstratively disproves God's Existence — absolute
scepticism must result ; and the Catholic philosopher is
therefore required further to answer any such alleged
argument. But here his obligation manifestly ends. We

* So as regards e.g. transubstantiation. Catholic philosophers do not
profess to show that this dogma is reconcilable with reason ; they content
themselves with showing that it cannot be proved irreconcilable therewith.

196 TJie Philosophy of Theism.

do not for a moment deny that the task incumbent on him
is arduous, and requires care, though it can most certainly
be achieved with triumphant success ; but we maintain
that to answer Mr. Mill's thesis is a task of no arduousness
at all. It may be arduous (though it is superabundantly
practicable) to answer this or that objection, which pro-
fesses to show by a train of reasoning that such a world as
this cannot have proceeded from an infinitely perfect Being ;
but it is most easy to answer Mr. Mill's allegation, that this
impossibility is a self-evident axiom.

Now, before going a step further, we must emphatically
premise one explanation. That Mr. Mill's irreligion was
due to grave personal sin on his part, we hold with firmest
faith ; because the Church teaches that there is no in-
vincible ignorance of God. But if it be asked in what
particular acts or omissions that sin consisted, we must
reply that it is God only Who knows men's thoughts ; and
that we must renounce absolutely and heartily all notion
of forming any judgment whatever on such a question. It
is not, however, at all inconsistent with this profession, to
point out that in this, that, and the other particular, Mr.
Mill's procedure was evidently faulty; because in no one
instance do we hazard a conjecture that in that particular
case he was acting culpably and against light. And it is
plainly of moment to show that his procedure was funda-
mentally faulty, in order that his authority may be estimated
at no more than its true value.

Now, certainly there was one knowledge which, before
all others, it behoved him to acquire ; viz. the true character
of the religion professed by his fellow-countrymen. There
was one Man, says Mr. Mill himself (" On Liberty," p. 47),
" who left on the memory of those who watched His life
and conversation such an impression of His moral grandeur,
that eighteen subsequent centuries have done homage to
Him as the Almighty in person ; " God in human nature.

Mr. Mill's Philosophical Position. 197

What is more obviously incumbent on an inquiring student
than to study carefully the religion taught by this Man ?
Nor are there wanting the most authentic possible records
of that teaching. St. Paul e.g. would surely be as important
an author to master, as Demosthenes, Tacitus, Juvenal,
Quintilian (pp. 20, 21). Still more important to study
would be the extant memoirs of that Man, to Whom we
have already referred ; as such memoirs were recorded by
disciples " who witnessed His life and conversation," and
on whom "such an impression of His moral grandeur"
was produced. Now, we are not professing here to set
forth how such studies might have assisted in drawing
Mr. Mill from darkness to light ; we are but alleging his
utter neglect of them, as proving his profound prejudice
and obduracy on things religious.

In no other way will the fact of this utter neglect be
more vividly impressed on the imagination of our readers,
than if we briefly recount the course of his studies : and
this also on other accounts is a matter of some interest.
By the time he was eight years old (p. 8) he had read
Herodotus, Xenophon's Memorabilia and Cyropsedia, parts
of Diogenes Laertius, Lucian and Isocrates (p. 5) ; the
histories of Eobertson, Hume, Gibbon, Watson, Hooker,
and much of Kollin ; Plutarch's Lives ; Burnet's History
of his Own Time ; a large portion of the Annual Kegister
(p. 7) ; Millar's Historical View of the English Govern-
ment ; and numerous books of adventure and of amusement
(pp. 8, 9). He says, indeed (p. 43), that he "has men-
tioned at how early an age his father made him a reader
of ecclesiastical history : " but on looking back at the earlier
passage to which this refers, we find that what he has
mentioned in this line consisted only of Moshem's History ;
M'Crie's Life of John Knox ; and Sewell's and Rutty's
Histories of the Quakers (p. 8). At about the same period
(p. 43) his father " taught him to take the strongest interest

198 The Philosophy of Theism.

in the Keforrnation, as the great and decisive contest against
priestly tyranny for liberty of thought." Mr. Mill also
(ib.) learned his father's account of " what had been thought
by mankind on the impenetrable problems," of which
Christianity is one attempted solution. From these studies
he proceeded (p. 11) to Virgil, Horace, Phaedrus, Livy,
Sallust, Ovid, Terence, Lucretius, Cicero, Homer, Sophocles,
Euripides, Aristophanes, Thucydides, Xenophon's Hellenics,
Demosthenes, ^Eschines, Lysias, Theocritus, Anacreon,
Dionysius, Polybius, Aristotle's Ehetoric * (p. 11), and
Mitford's History of Greece (p. 12). He also read some of
Milton's poetry, Goldsmith's, Burns's, Walter Scott's,
Dryden's, Cowper's, and Campbell's ; also Joyce's Scientific
Dialogues, and various treatises on chemistry (pp. 16, 17).
At twelve years old he began Logic (p. 18), and at the same
age he read the Athenian orators, Tacitus, Juvenal, and
Quintilian (p. 21). At about the same period (p. 24) he
studied very carefully his father's History of British India ;
and must have possessed, therefore (we may mention by
the way), a far more accurate knowledge of Hindoo theology
than he ever had of Christian. Then he advanced to
political economy (p. 28). Later on came a little psychology
(p. 62) ; and he then embarked on a course of jurisprudence
and Bentham (p. 64). To these he added (pp. 68, 69)
Locke, Helvetius, Hartley, Berkeley, Hume's Essays, Eeid,
Dugald Stewart, and some of Brown. He also read an
anonymous work against " optimistic deism " (pp. 69-71),
which " contributed materially to his development." He
says expressly (p. 71) : "I have now, I believe, mentioned
all the books which had any considerable effect on my
earlier mental development ; " and adds : " From this point
I began to carry on my intellectual cultivation by writing

* F. Newman says (" Idea of a University," p. 100) that the classics have
in France subserved the spread of deism : the elder Mr. Mill seems to have
used them in the interest of atheism.

Mr. Mill's Philosophical Position. 199

still more than by reading." It is an undeniable fact, then,
that when he first began his irreligious crusade,* he had
never given himself ever so superficially, either to a study
of Christian doctrine, or to an examination of the argu-
ments adduced for God's Existence. And his conduct was
even more remarkable at the mental crisis to which we
have already referred, when he was carried off violently
from his old moorings, and was looking everywhere for
a haven of rest. He was led to seek refuge in various
teachings of Coleridge, of Maurice, of Sterling : but the
thought did not so much as occur to him that anything
solid could be said in behalf of what they, one and all,
accounted the centre of their whole life, their belief in
Christianity.

A curious fact indeed may be adduced from this volume,
in further confirmation of our remark on the complete
absence of Christianity from his thoughts. We have
already pointed out how high was his estimation (if we
may use such words without profaneness, even when re-
counting an infidel's opinion) of our Blessed Lord's character
and work. On the other hand, he states (p. 113) that he
had obtained most valuable culture "by means of reverential
admiration for the lives and characters of heroic persons,
especially the heroes of philosophy : " and he mentions two
objects of this reverential admiration in particular; viz.
Socrates and Turgot. It did not enter his mind, apparently,
to regard the Founder of Christianity as even occupying a
high place among the heroic benefactors of mankind.

One cannot be surprised, then, at that ignorance of the
most elementary Christian doctrines, which meets one in
every corner of his writings where he mentions Christianity
at all. Of this we will cite an instance which occurs in

* It may most truly be called this ; because from the first it was the aim
of his publications to promote the radical reform of society on some irre-
ligious basis or other.

200 The Philosophy of Theism.

the present volume. We extract the passage to which we
refer, italicizing one clause.

Of unbelievers (so called), as well as of believers, there are
many species, including almost every variety of moral type.
But the best among them, as no one who has had opportunities
of really knowing them will hesitate to affirm, are more
genuinely religious, in the best sense of the word religion, than
those who exclusively arrogate to themselves the title. The
liberality of the age, or, in other words, the weakening of the
obstinate prejudice which makes men unable to see what is
before their eyes because it is contrary to their expectations, has
caused it to be very commonly admitted that a deist may be
truly religious ; but if religion stands for any graces of character,
and not for mere dogma, the assertion may equally be made of
many whose belief is far short of deism. Though they may
think the proof incomplete that the universe is a work of design,
and though they assuredly disbelieve that it can have an
Author and Governor who is absolute in power as well as perfect
in goodness, they have that which constitutes the principal
worth of all religions whatever, an ideal conception of a Perfect
Being, to which they habitually refer as the guide of their
conscience; and this ideal of Good is usually far nearer to
perfection than the objective Deity of those who think them-
selves obliged to find absolute goodness in the author of a world
so crowded with suffering and so deformed by injustice as ours
(pp. 45-46).

No doubt, by the word " religion," are meant certain
" graces of character, and not mere dogma." But what
graces? Would Mr. Mill have used the word "religion"
to express justice as such ? or benevolence as such ? or
veracity as such ? or fortitude or temperance as such ? Of
course there would be no sense in his doing so. What is
ordinarily meant by " religion " as a grace of character
is the habit of communion with God. A person is more
" religious " in proportion as he more has his thoughts
fixed on God's presence ; in proportion as the whole stream
of his life is devoted to the end of loving and obeying God.
It is most intelligible, then, to say that a deist can be

Mr. Mill's Philosophical Position. 201

" religious ; " and all those indeed must think the saying
true, who consider (as we do) that there may be invincible
ignorance on the divine origin of Christianity. Such a
saying results from faithfulness to the rules of logic, not
from so-called "liberality" or " weakening of prejudice."
But what can possibly be meant by an atheist being
" religious " ? How can any man remember God's presence,
if he do not believe that God exists ? how can he devote his
life to loving and obeying God, if he thinks there is no God
to be loved and obeyed ?

When first we hear it, then, such language seems simply
astounding : but on consideration, one comes to see what
it indicates. It indicates that Mr. Mill had no notion of
what it is which Christians mean, when they speak of
" religiousness " or " piety." Had it not been for Mr.
Mill's case, we should have said that even those who do
not practise religion, know well what is meant by these
terms ; but Mr. Mill, while leading a life of laborious study,
remained to the end of his life profoundly ignorant of the
very existence of what the whole world around him knew to
be among the most widely extended and powerful springs
of human conduct. And this was the man who sat in
judgment, as if from an elevated pedestal, on the acts
and motives of saintly persons ; who claimed superiority
over the prejudices of the vulgar; who condescendingly
patronized the mediaeval Church ; who was kind enough to
see even in modern Catholicity much which he was happy
to approve, though far more which he was obliged to
condemn.*

It may seem heartless if, while making these comments,
we do not pause for a moment to bewail the hard lot of

* Observe e.g. such a sentence as this : " There are men who, not dis-
guising their own unbelief, have written deeper and finer things in vindica-
tion of what religion has done for mankind, than would have sufficed to found
the reputation of some of its most admired defenders " (" Dissertations and
Discussions," vol. ii. p. 122).

202 The Philosophy of Theism.

one, by nature so teachable, loving, and sensitive, placed
from his birth under the iron yoke of that bigoted and
intolerant atheist his father, and indoctrinated by him so
carefully to paganism. But (as we have already said) we
are attempting no appreciation whatever of his personal
character ; we are but mentioning this or that fact, which
bears importantly on the value of his speculations whether
in the sphere of religion or philosophy.

For, indeed, even in the matter of social philosophy,
how fatal to his intellectual character is what we have just
mentioned ! He was ignorant (as we have said) of the very
existence of what is among the most widely extended and
powerful springs of human conduct. The main purpose of
his life was to act directly or indirectly on the convictions
and actions of his contemporaries. To do so with any
hope of success, it was necessary that he should clearly
understand their existing motives, impulses, instincts. And
yet, in one very prominent particular, he was as ignorant
of the moral world in the midst of which he passed his
days as though he had never read of the past nor lived in
the present.

Then, again — considering he claimed to take a leading
position in metaphysics and psychology — how noteworthy
was his ignorance of what Catholics have done in that
direction. For many centuries a series of men, admitted
by Mr. Mill himself to be powerful thinkers, had concen-
trated their intellectual energy on the work of raising an
edifice of theological science, on the basis of the scholastic
philosophy. We should not have been surprised, however
profoundly Mr. Mill might have differed from them : what
does surprise us is, that he took no pains to know them.
What would he have thought of himself, if he had written
his work on Hamilton without acquiring a knowledge of
Kant's philosophy ? Of course, whether Kant be or be not
intellectually superior to the giants of scholasticism, is a

Mr. Mill's Philosophical Position. 203

matter of opinion : but it is a matter of undeniable fact
that the latter immeasurably surpassed him in the influence
of their speculations on the whole course of thought and
of society for many centuries. Yet, undeterred by this
crass ignorance, Mr. Mill permitted himself very freely to
criticize the intellectual characteristics of those very
centuries.

It will be said, perhaps, that at all events other anti-
theistic philosophers of the day are no less unacquainted
with Catholic theology and philosophy than Mr. Mill. We
heartily endorse this remark. Their dense ignorance of
Catholicity is a mark of their crooked and perverse intel-
lectual habits, which can be appreciated by the most
ordinarily educated Catholic. In fact, they are less ac-
quainted with Catholicity, and have far less wish to be
acquainted, than had Mr. Mill himself.* But, then, the
latter always laid claim to exceptional large-mindedness,
and honestly believed such claim to be legitimate. He
accounted himself " much superior to most of his contem-
poraries in willingness and ability to learn from everybody "
(p. 242). He professed "great readiness and eagerness to
learn from everybody, and to make room in his opinions
for every new acquisition by adjusting the old and new to
one another " (p. 252). He was eager to learn from every
quarter, except only the Catholic Church.

There are other passages in the autobiography besides
those we have mentioned, which bear importantly on Mr.
Mill's philosophical tenets : but (with one exception to be
immediately mentioned) they will be more conveniently
considered in subsequent essays, especially when we come
to handle again his utilitarian tenets. We therefore proceed

* Mr. Mill's autobiography has not unnaturally caused for the moment a
reaction against him, even as compared with other writers of the same
school. We look forward to a reaction against this reaction. To our mind,
no one of the rest approaches him either in intellectual clearness, candour,
and ability, nor, again, in zealous philanthropy.

204 The Philosophy of Theism.

to resume our controversy with him, at the point where we
left off in the preceding essay.

The principal topic with which we were occupied was
a consideration of Mr. Mill's reply to the arguments we
had adduced against him, on the necessary character of
mathematical axioms. It might appear, on the surface,
that this is somewhat a subordinate question, in its bear-
ing on the very vital points at issue between Mr. Mill
and ourselves : but we replied, that Mr. Mill " would
have been the last to make this complaint." Our state-
ment is fully borne out by the autobiography. He ac-
counted the controversy between intuitionism and pheno-
menism far more fundamental than any other, in matters
no less of social than of strictly philosophical speculation ;
and he accounted the discussion on the necessary character
of mathematical axioms to be the very turning-point of this
controversy. The former opinion is expressed in p. 273 ;
and in p. 226 he declares, that " the chief strength " of the
philosophy which he assails "in morals, politics, and
religion, lies in the appeal which it is accustomed to make
to the evidence 'of mathematics and the cognate branches of
physical science." "To keep it from these," he adds, "is
to drive it from its stronghold ; " and by parity of reason,
if we maintain it in these, we maintain it in its stronghold.
No one, then, could have a stronger conviction than Mr.
Mill himself, on the vital character of the issue which we
joined with him. We candidly expressed our opinion as
to the utterly worthless character of his reasoning. "We
are deliberately of opinion," we said, "that not one of
his arguments has the slightest force, and hardly one of
them the most superficial appearance of force." " The
whole mass of human knowledge," we further alleged,
" is made," by him, " utterly dependent on what is about
the most gratuitous and arbitrary theory which can well

Mr. Mill's Philosophical Position. 205

be imagined." And we added, that Mr. Mill's death had
been to us a severe controversial disappointment. We
had been eager to engage in a hand-to-hand conflict with
so distinguished a champion, not on a few questions only,
however fundamental, but on the whole mass of philo-
sophical speculations, which leads onward to that one
supreme issue, the Existence of a Personal God. We
were full of confidence that a signal triumph must result
to the cause of truth, if we could induce Mr. Mill to
put forth his utmost strength on the other side.

At the same time, we are glad to think that the keystone
of his whole philosophical position lies in those very
doctrines on which he lived to publish his reply to our
adverse arguments. Every philosopher of the present day
has his " aggressive " as well as his " affirmative " position.
You understand his "aggressive" position so far as you
understand what those tenets are which he desires to over-
throw ; and you understand his " affirmative " position so
far as you understand what those tenets are which he
desires to establish in their place. Now, Mr. Mill's
" aggressive " position mainly consisted, (1) in his denying
the cognizableness of any necessary truths ; and (2) (as a
means for that denial) in his denying the competence of
men's existent faculties to avouch truth finally and without
appeal. Whereas, then, he regards the very " stronghold "
of necessists to be their view of mathematical axioms, we
may fairly say that the keystone of his "aggressive" position
consists (1) in his doctrine on mathematical axioms, and
(2) in his doctrine on the rule of certitude. On the other
hand, his " affirmative " position mainly consists in his
claim to substitute a body of science built exclusively on
experience, for a body of science purporting to be built
partly on necessary truth. But no body of science can
possibly be built on the exclusive basis of experience, unless
the philosopher first establishes on grounds of experience

206 The Philosophy of Theism.

the uniformity of nature ; or what Mr. Mill calls " the law
of universal causation." Mr. Mill himself admits this as
heartily as we maintain it. The keystone, then, of Mr.
Mill's "affirmative" position lies in his doctrine, that the
uniformity of nature can be proved by experience ; while
the keystone of his " aggressive " position lies (as we have
seen) in his respective doctrines, on mathematical axioms,
and on the rule of certitude. And it so happens that
these are the very three doctrines on which he expressly
replied to our adverse arguments. In our last essay we
commenced our rejoinder on that reply, and on the present
occasion are to complete it. It is certainly a great matter
of regret to us, for the sake of truth, that such rejoinder
must now necessarily be final ; and it would have been a
matter of keen interest to us to know how he would have
encountered our remarks.

Our last essay was much longer than we could have
wished; but we were very desirous of drawing out unin-
terruptedly our whole counter-argument on the necessity
of mathematical axioms. To prevent our essay, however,
from swelling to an absolutely intolerable length, we were
obliged to omit all summary of our lengthened reasoning.
And we feel this to have been so great a disadvantage, that
one of our first procedures on the present occasion will be
in some degree to supply that deficiency.

Before commencing this, however, we shall make a
little further comment on a position of Mr. Mill's, which
we criticized. Our readers, on referring to our previous
remarks, will see that he makes two statements. Firstly,
he says that "wherever the present constitution of space
exists," the axioms of geometry are cognizable to man-
kind as " conclusions from that conception." Secondly, he
adds, that we have ample reason to know,* that the same

* His word is to " believe ; " but on looking at the context our reader
•will see that he certainly means " know."

Mr. Mill's Philosophical Position. 207

" constitution of space which exists on our own planet,
exists also in the region of the fixed stars." Now what
does he mean by this extremely vague term " constitution
of space " ? We can fancy his indignation, if one of his
opponents had used so vague a term as this without ex-
planation. Yet we affirm, with some confidence, that Mr.
Mill has nowhere even attempted to explain what he meant
by the term ; and we doubt indeed whether he ever used it,
except in the two notes, replying to our own criticism,
which he inserted in the latest edition of his respective
works on " Logic " and on " Hamilton."

There is only one meaning which we can think of as
intended by this phrase. We must suppose that he
accounts "the present constitution of space" as existing
wherever the three dimensions — length, breadth, height — •
are predicable of all material objects. But if this were his
meaning, he would hold that a man can " conclude " the
truth of geometrical axioms "from his very conception"
of length, breadth, and height. This, however, is the
precise point at issue between him and his opponents ; and
if such were his meaning, he would be saying in so many
words that his opponents are in the right and he in the
wrong. We would beg our readers to look back at our
whole criticism in pp. 176-179. For our own part, we
believe this is one of the cases — far more numerous
throughout Mr. Mill's works than might be supposed — in
which his spontaneous reason is too strong for his artificial
and elaborated philosophy.

We will next direct our readers' attention to a remark
we made a page earlier. We observed how difficult it is to
know what is Mr. Mill's positive thesis, on the cognizable-
ness of mathematical axioms ; and also to know what are
the grounds alleged by him for such thesis. He declares
again and again, that the universal truth of these axioms,
throughout the planet Terra at least, is irrefragably proved

208 The Philosophy of Theism.

by universal experience. Yet what does he himself say on
another occasion ? " That all metals sink in water, was
a uniform experience from the origin of the human race
down to the discovery of potassium in the present century
by Sir Humphry Davy. That all swans are white, was
a uniform experience down to the discovery of Australia "
(" Logic," vol. i. p. 305). What stronger ground, then, has
he for his conviction that over the whole earth trilaterals
are triangular, than his ancestors had for their entirely
mistaken conviction that over the whole earth swans are
white and metals sink in water ? How can he even guess
that in some newly-discovered country a tree may not be
found which shall possess the capability of being formed
into quadrangular trilaterals, or into pairs of straight lines
of which each pair shall enclose a space ?

Mr. Mill, however, is much less anxious to state and
establish his positive than his negative thesis on mathe-
matical axioms ; and unless his whole fabric of philosophy
is to collapse,* he must prove that these axioms are not
self-evidently necessary. We, on the contrary, as zealous
impugners of his philosophy, have been bent on proving
the contrary. And the general argument we have used
may be thus syllogistically stated.

Whatever the existent cognitive faculties of mankind
testify, is instinctively f known by mankind as certainly
true.

* This must not be understood in too extreme a sense. In a former
essay, we said that, on such a supposition, "his works might still be
admitted to contain a large quantity of valuable philosophical matter, as we
think indeed they do ; but his philosophy as a whole would be at an end."
This is precisely what we still think.

t We had at first said " self-evidently," but in our last essay we found
it more convenient to appropriate that phrase in a different sense. We
think the word "instinctively" the best substitute, as expressing the irre-
sistible and (as it were) piercing character of the convictions to which we
refer. Let any reader consider the keen certitude with which he knows
that he experienced those sensations of ten minutes back, which his memory
vividly testifies.

Mr. Mill's Philosophical Position. 209

But the existent cognitive faculties of mankind testify,
that any given mathematical axiom is self-evidently
necessary.

Ergo, etc.

Now, it is most surprising that a writer generally so
clear as Mr. Mill, should so long have left it uncertain
which of these two propositions it is which he denies : see
e.g. the mutually contradictory propositions which we
quoted from him in our last essay. Such, however,
being the case, we entered at length into the proof of both
the above premisses. But after reading the autobiography,
we can hardly doubt that it is the former of the two
premisses against which Mr. Mill protests.* We shall not,
therefore, here attempt to epitomize our argument for our
minor premiss ; but we shall content ourselves on that
head with referring our readers to the whole course of our
remarks. We will but briefly say here, that it would
certainly be a bold step to deny this premiss. Take any
man of ordinary thoughtfulness and education; and ask
him whether it is within the sphere of Omnipotence to
enclose a space by two straight lines, or to create a
quadrangular trilateral : there can be very little doubt what
his spontaneous answer will be. We here, then, assume
Mr. Mill to accept our minor premiss; we assume him
to concede that, if mankind trust their existent faculties, it
is impossible for them to doubt the self-evident necessity
of any given mathematical axiom.

Mr. Mill, then, we take it, would have argued in some
such manner as this : and we confine ourselves for clear-
ness' sake to geometrical axioms, because whatever is said
of them may so easily be applied to arithmetical. " From
the first moment when an infant begins to move his arms
and legs," Mr. Mill would say, "he is beginning to acquire

* See particularly a passage in pp. 225, 226, which we shall quote in a
later part of our paper.

YOL. i. P

210 The Philosophy of Theism.

knowledge on the elementary truths of geometry. Before
arriving at the age of reason, he has been completely
saturated with his experience that two intersecting straight
lines always diverge, and that a straight line is the shortest
path between two points. No wonder, then, that, when he
comes to use his faculties, they are not only unable to con-
ceive any thought contrary to this uniform experience,
but have even been so moulded by that experience as to
pronounce its various particulars so many self-evidently
necessary truths."

Our answer to this view of things is virtually contained in
the essay to which we have referred; but none the less it may
be of important service if we reproduce it under a different
arrangement. We say, then, that two different replies may
be made to Mr. Mill's reasoning, as here drawn out. It
may be replied (1), that no such experience of geometrical
axioms as an adult has acquired could possibly produce on
his faculties such a result as Mr. Mill contends for. And
it may be replied (2), that the testimony of each man's
existent faculties is his infallible rule of certitude ; and
that he has no legitimate appeal from their present to their
past avouchment. If either of these replies be substantiated,
Mr. Mill's argument falls entirely to the ground ; but we
are confident that both can easily be substantiated, and we
shall proceed at once to do so. It is the second on which
we are far the more anxious to fix our readers' attention ;
but it will be more convenient if we begin with the first.

We are assuming, then, Mr. Mill to agree with our-
selves, that men's existent faculties avouch the self-evident
necessity of some given geometrical axiom. But he main-
tains that this avouchment of theirs can be explained by
the constant and unmistakable experience of that axiom
which every adult has gone through. We reply that their
avouchment is not thus explainable. It is quite untrue, we
say, that any experience of any geometrical axiom, which

Mr. Mill's Philosophical Position. 211

an adult has had in his childhood, has any tendency so to
affect his faculties as that on that account they shall
pronounce such axiom to be a necessary truth. There
were three different arguments adduced by us in our last
essay for this proposition, either of which alone would be
conclusive.

I. According to Mr. Mill, such unintermittent and
unmistakable experience as I have had of any given
geometrical axioms suffices to make it impossible for me
to doubt, if I trust my existent faculties, that the reversal
of that axiom is beyond the sphere of Omnipotence. But
if this were so, it must follow that in proportion as I have
more accumulated experience of any truth, in that propor-
tion I find it more difficult (if I trust my existent faculties)
to regard the reversal of that truth as within the sphere of
Omnipotence. But is this anything like the case ? Most
evidently not. Suppose I have only once or twice in my
life tasted beet-root ; while, on the other hand (of course),
times without number I have felt fire to burn, and seen
wood float on water while stones sink therein. Yet most
assuredly I have not to the very smallest extent any greater
difficulty in supposing that an Omnipotent Creator could
prevent fire from burning or could support stones in the
water, than in supposing that He could alter the taste of
beet-root.

II. Let us take, as an instance of a geometrical axiom,
the proposition that two parallel straight lines will never
meet ; * and let us take* as our instance of an obvious
physical fact, the warmth-giving property of fire. No one
who reflects will doubt that an English child's experience
of the latter truth is (to say the least) every whit as
constant and uniform as his experience of the former. Yet

* We define a " straight line " to be " a line which pursues throughout
the same direction ; " and we define "parallel straight lines" to be " straight
lines which pursue the same direction with each other."

212 The Philosophy of Theism.

when he comes to the age of reason, he pronounces that
the former is a necessary truth ; whereas he would be
simply amazed at the allegation that an Omnipotent
Creator could not on any given occasion deprive fire of its
warmth-giving property.

Now, Mr. Mill himself admits this latter fact ; but he
has a reply. "Fire," he says ("On Hamilton," p. 339),
"it is true, will, under certain needful conditions, give
warmth ; but the sight of fire is often unattended with any
sensation of warmth. . . . The visible presence of fire and
the sensation of warmth are not in that invariable conjunc-
tion and immediate juxtaposition which might disable us
from conceiving one without the other, and which might
therefore lead us to suppose their conjunction a necessary
truth." He indicates here, we suppose, such apparent
exceptions to the warmth-giving property of fire as take
place when, being out of doors, one sees a fire through the
window without receiving warmth from it. And so (ibid)
his general proposition is, that in order to generate the
mind's conviction of self-evident necessity, " the experience
must not only be constant and uniform, but the juxta-
position of the facts in experience must be immediate and
close, as well as so free from even the semblance of an
exception that no counter-association can possibly arise."
Wherever, then, there has been in past experience even the
semblance of an exception — according to Mr. Mill — there no
conviction of self-evident necessity will arise. To this we
answered, that (on his own showing) there has been in
past experience the semblance of an exception to the axiom
that two parallel straight lines will never meet. " In the
case of parallel lines," he says (" On Hamilton," p. 335),
" the laws of perspective do present such an illusion," or
semblance of exception: "they do to the eye appear to
meet in both directions." He does not himself, then,
attempt to maintain his own thesis ; for his own thesis

Mr. Mill's Philosophical Position. 213

was, that in order to generate the conviction self-evident
necessity, there must have been freedom from all semblance
of exception in past experience. And he fails entirely,
therefore, in accounting for the fact that mankind regard
the geometrical axiom as self-evidently necessary, while
they do not so regard the warmth-giving property of fire.

The only answer Mr. Mill can give to this is (" On
Hamilton," p. 335, note), that, as regards the axiom, the
apparent exception is such that its " illusory character is
at once seen, from the immediate accessibility of the
evidence which disproves" it. But it is obviously un-
deniable that, in the case of a fire seen from out of doors,
precisely the same explanation can be given. When a fire
is looked at from out of doors, there is an illusory exception
(no doubt) to the warmth-giving property of fire ; but its
"illusory character, is at once seen, from the immediate
accessibility of the evidence which disproves " it.

We sum up, then, this argument. If my past experience
of parallel straight lines can have generated in my mind
(as Mr. Mill maintains it has) a conviction that the fact of
their never meeting is a self-evidently necessary truth ;—
then my past experience of fire would equally have
generated in my mind a conviction that its warmth-giving
property is a self-evidently necessary truth. That the
latter supposition is mistaken Mr. Mill, of course, fully
admits ; it follows, therefore, that his own supposition is
equally false, and that this fundamental principle of his
philosophy is an error.

We added that Mr. Mahaffy has mentioned another
instance of illusion, as besetting men's experience of
geometrical axioms. I take a straight stick, and by
manipulating it I add to the store of experience which I
already possess, that a straight line is the shortest path
between two points. I plunge half-way in the water this
" shortest path between two points," and the said path

214 The Philosophy of Theism.

appears crooked. Just as when I look at a fire through
the windows, I have a momentary illusion that fire does
not give warmth, so on this occasion I have a momentary
illusion that the shortest path between tw(j points is
crooked. The former illusion is neither stronger nor more
persistent than the latter. If, therefore, my past experience
have not generated in me a conviction that the warmth-
giving property of fire is a self-evidently necessary truth,
how can it be my past experience which has generated in
me a conviction that this geometrical axiom is self-
evidently necessary ? Let some disciple of Mr. Mill's
attempt a reply.

III. Lastly, there is more than one geometrical axiom
which I have never known by experience at all; and in
regard to which, therefore, it is manifestly impossible that
my cognitive faculties can have been moulded by ex-
perience into its avouchment. Of this kind is the axiom
which we took as our specimen, that " all trilaterals are
triangular." It is not only that students had not formulized
this truth before they met with it in their Euclid, but the
great majority of them never knew it. Observe the contrast
between this axiom on the one hand, and a truth which
men really have known by unformulized experience on the
other. The proposition was once placed before me for the
first time in a formulized shape, that " horses differ greatly
from each other in colour." Though (by hypothesis) I
have never before expressly contemplated this proposition,
I at once recognize it as expressing a fresh familiar truth ;
a truth vividly known to me by every day's experience. On
the other hand, most of those who have not studied the
elements of geometry, when first they are told that all
trilaterals are triangular, as simply receive a new piece of
information as they did when they heard that war had
been declared between Prussia and France. But that
which is received as a new piece of information cannot

Mr. Mill's Philosophical Position. 215

possibly have been already known to them by past ex-
perience.

This last argument is indubitably valid as against Mr.
Mill ; because, throughout his reply to us, he fully admits
that the triangularity of trilaterals is a veritable axiom — a
part of the geometrical basis, and not of the geometrical
superstructure. His disciples might imaginably allege
that it is no axiom at all ; but only a spontaneous inference,
imperceptible as such by reason of its rapidity from certain
genuine axioms. If they do allege this, they are called on
to state what those axioms are from which the proposition
could be deduced ; and we entirely deny the possibility of
their doing this. However, even on the supposition of
their success, the two first arguments we gave (either of
which is alone decisive) would remain unaffected.

We have now, then, made good our first reply to Mr.
Mill. We have shown, we trust, conclusively, that no such
experience of geometrical axioms as adults have acquired
in their youth could possibly produce on their cognitive
faculties any such effect as Mr. Mill's argument supposes.
But we think it of immeasurably greater importance to
establish against him our second reply ; to establish against
him the thesis, that the actual testimony of each man's
existent faculties is his infallible rule of certitude, and that
no legitimate appeal lies from their present to their past
avouchment. We consider this thesis (as we have often
said) to be of inappreciable moment : because its scope
extends far beyond the mere question of mathematical
axioms ; and its rejection would issue by necessary conse-
quence, in bringing down human knowledge to a level
below that of the brutes. We reasoned on this head
against Mr. Mill in a former essay ; and our present
business is merely to epitomize our former argument.

The thesis, then, which we defend, as at once so certain
and so fundamental, is this : that what each man's existent

216 The Philosophy of Theism,

faculties actually testify is instinctively known by him as
certainly true. It is by no means easy to understand,
what is the adverse theory advocated by Mr. Mill. If we
were to take literally some of his strange expressions
quoted by us, we should understand him as maintaining
a singular theory enough. We should understand him
as maintaining that no declaration of a man's cognitive
faculties is trustworthy, unless it be a declaration which
these faculties would have uttered when he was " an
infant," when he "first opened his eyes to the light";
that no argument is valid, unless it would have been
recognized as valid by a new-born infant ; that no avouch-
ment of memory concerning the past may reasonably be
trusted, unless the memory of a new-born infant would
have safely carried him so far back. But we will do our
author more justice than he has done himself, and state
his proposition in a form less revolting to common sense.
We will understand him, then, to mean, that it is not what
my faculties actually testify that I can with reason regard
as certainly true, but rather what they would have testified
had they grown to maturity according to their own intrinsic
laws of development, without being denaturalized and
artificialized by that great body of experience which has
accumulated round them during their long infancy. Now,
it will be very useful for the purpose of our present argu-
ment, if we devise some name to express the human
faculties in this purely imaginary condition. Let us call
these the "pure human faculties," and the point at issue
may then be stated thus. On our part, we contend that
the rule of certitude is the actual avouchment of man's
existent faculties ; whereas Mr. Mill contends that it is the
hypothetical avouchment of man's "pure" faculties.

We argue, firstly, against Mr. Mill's theory, as we have
often argued before, that it lays the axe to the root of all
human knowledge whatever; that, if it were sound, no

Mr. . Mill's Philosophical Position. 217

human being could know anything as certain or even as
probable, except only the facts of his momentarily present
consciousness. He could not e.g. apprehend the smallest
sentence spoken to him ; for what he at this moment hears
is only the last word of the sentence ; and how can he know
what were the earlier words ? Indubitably, indeed, the
first step (whatever it may be) which he has to take, in
order to arrive at any knowledge whatever,* is only rendered
possible by his trusting the avouchment of his memory.
But how could Mr. Mill consider such trust reasonable?
We say that the actual avouchment of his existent faculties
— and of his memory inclusively — is instinctively known by
each man as certain; but this is precisely what Mr. Mill
denies.

In fact, Mr. Mill's position reminds one more of some
amusing Irish bull than of grave philosophical disquisition.
I encounter the familiar features of an old friend. Have
I a right to regard it as certain, or even probable, that I
ever saw those features before ? In other words, can I
reasonably believe those past phenomena to have occurred
which my memory most distinctly avouches ? The answer
to this question, according to Mr. Mill, depends on the
further question, whether my memory would have made
the same avouchment had it not become (as Mr. Mill would
say) artificialized and denaturalized. A true disciple of
Mr. Mill's, then, if he is so circumstanced, will not believe
that he ever saw his friend before, until he has first
examined the above-named preliminary question. But
how can he so much as begin to examine it without trust-
ing his existent memory? Yet it is unreasonable, in his
view, to trust his existent memory until he has gone
through that very investigation, which is impossible without
that trust. He has no means, therefore, whatever of

* For merely to experience the facts of his momentarily present con-
sciousness is not to possess knowledge at all.

218 The Philosophy of Theism.

arriving at any reasonable trust in the avouchments of his
memory; his knowledge, accordingly, is confined to the
experience of his momentarily present consciousness, and
is inferior to that of the very brutes.

The same argument may be exhibited in a somewhat
different shape. How did Mr. Mill arrive at his theory,
that his existent faculties cannot be trusted? By certain
trains of reasoning. But such trains of reasoning had no
meaning, except for two assumptions : (1) the assumption
that logical reasoning is valid ; and (2) the assumption that
Mr. Mill on every occasion could trust his memory of what
he had previously observed or established. But these
assumptions were the most arbitrary and gratuitous of
inventions, unless he had been first of all warranted in
trusting his existent faculties, whether of reasoning or of
memory.

We have already said that his position reminds one of
what Englishmen tell as an amusing Irish bull. All the
world knows the story of the Irishman, who stood in the
coffee-room of a hotel, professing only to warm himself at
the fire, but in reality also occupied with reading a letter
which another guest was writing to a friend. The writer
observing this, proceeds to add on paper : "I should express
myself more fully on this matter, if there were not a black-
guard in the room, looking over my shoulder at everything
I write." " You insolent liar ! " exclaims the self-convicted
Irishman. His blunder was precisely this : that his denial
of the allegation made against him was directly based on
an admission of his truth. Just so Mr. Mill's denial of
our thesis is directly based on his affirmation of it. His
belief that it is true is the principal premiss which leads
him to the conclusion that it is false.*

* What has been urged by us, in this and several preceding articles on
the absolute necessity of assuming the veracity of memory, will be found (we
think) a preservative against many false philosophies. For instance, there is

Mr. Mill's Philosophical Position. 219

But now further. Mr. Mill's argument implies that, at
all events, if it could be shown that his " pure " faculties
would have declared the necessity of mathematical axioms,
he would no longer deny the latter doctrine, but, on the
contrary, accept it.* Yet on what ground would it be
reasonable then to accept it ? How could he know e.g. that
Professor Huxley's suggestion is not true ? that the human
faculties have not been purposely made deceptive by some
mendacious creator of mankind ? But this is only one of
a hundred hypotheses which may most easily be imagined,
all of them inconsistent with the supposition that man's
" pure " faculties would be trustworthy ; and on what
ground would Mr. Mill be warranted in assuming that all
these hypotheses are false? On what ground could he
assume the proposition that (by some totally unknown law)
the human faculties so proceed in their operation that — if
sensible experience were only away — they would invariably
declare what is objectively true ? On what ground could
he take for granted that which, from his point of view, is
surely a most startling proposition ? We are under no
such difficulty; because, on our view, each man knows

a philosophical tenet beginning to show itself which would deprive the
human faculties of their due authority, on the ground that any given avouch-
ment which they may put forth is but the result of certain physical ante-
cedents e.g. in the nervous system. In reply, we will concede for argument's
sake the fact alleged; because we maintain that no inference could be drawn
from the fact such as these philosophers suppose.

If they are to escape the most flagrant and monstrous inconsistency, they
must refuse to trust any given act of memory until they can know that it is
not the result of physical antecedents. But they cannot even begin to inquire
how far this is the case without trusting other acts of memory equally uiiau-
thenticated ; and so on ad infinitum.

As modern philosophy proceeds, it will be seen (we predict) more and
more clearly that the received Catholic doctrine on the rule of certitude is
the one impregnable fortress from which every irreligious philosophy can be
defeated and overthrown.

* " The verdict of ... our immediate and intuitive conviction is ad-
mitted on all hands to be a decision without appeal. The next question is,
to what does " this intuitive conviction " bear witness ? " (Mill, " On Hamil-
ton," p. 158.)

220 The Philosophy of Theism.

instinctively on each occasion that his existent faculties
avouch truly. Mr. Mill rejects this, the only possible
foundation for human knowledge, and substitutes in its
place absolutely nothing.

Such are the arguments which we expressed, against
Mr. Mill's aberration on the rule of certitude. We do
not, however, admit that he gives in the autobiography
at all a true account of his opponents' doctrine. We
cannot even understand what he means, when he says
(p. 274) that they deem "intuition" to "speak with an
authority higher than that of our reason : " for what is
intuition except one part of reason ? And when he accuses
them (p. 226) of regarding as " intuitive every inveterate
belief of which the origin is not remembered," we must, at all
events, make one explanation. In our essay on "Necessary
Truth," we fully admitted that " again and again inferences
are so readily and imperceptibly drawn, as to be most easily
mistaken for intuitions ; and that we have no right of
alleging aught as certainly a primary truth, without proving
that it cannot be an opinion derived inferentially from
experience." What those truths are which a man's existent
faculties avouch, this is a matter for keen psychological
investigation ; and on which, without such investigation,
we admit that very serious mistake is abundantly possible.

And this brings us to another matter of much import-
ance in our controversy with Mr. Mill. He distinguishes
(" Logic," vol. ii. p. 441) two essentially different kinds of
what he calls "complex ideas : " (1) those which consist of
simpler ones, and (2) those which have been generated by
simpler ones. The idea of an orange e.g., he says, is
complex in the former sense : it " really consists of the
simple ideas of a certain colour, a certain form, a certain
taste and smell, etc., because we can, by interrogating our
consciousness, perceive all these elements in the idea."
But he considers that, by a process of what he calls

Mr. Mill's Philosophical Position. 221

" mental chemistry," some idea may result from the com-
bination of certain past ideas, which idea, nevertheless, in
its present state is incapable of analysis. Whether the fact
be so, is a very interesting psychological question, on which
we need not here attempt to pronounce. But, as a matter
of language, we should call such ideas (if they exist)
" simple," not " complex." And as a matter of philosophy,
we should confidently deny that the question here raised by
Mr. Mill can give any help in deciding what it is which
man's existent faculties testify.

We shall best illustrate what we here mean, by reverting
to a former discussion of ours with Mr. Mill, on the founda-
tion of morality. We devoted some pages of that essay
to establish the conclusion that the idea "morally good"
is perfectly simple : and then, from that conclusion, we
drew the further inference that certain moral truths are
self-evidently necessary. Mr. Mill's reply to that argument
would probably be (see " Logic," vol. ii. p. 443, note), that
the idea "morally good" is not perfectly simple, because,
though it does not consist of simpler ideas, it was originally
generated by such. In company with Mr. Hutton, we entirely
deny that ^ such can possibly have been the case, as we
stated. But what we are here pointing out is, that such
an allegation is utterly irrelevant. Let it once be admitted
that, so far as the existent human faculties are concerned,
"morally good" is an idea incapable of analysis; the con-
clusion inevitably follows (as we showed in the essay) that
the existent human faculties declare certain moral truths
to be self-evidently necessary. But it is what his faculties
do declare — not what under imaginary circumstances they
would declare — which alone is known by each man to be
infallibly true.

Our present business is not with Mr. Herbert Spencer ;
but we may mention, by the way, that (if we rightly under-
stand his various statements) his distrust of the human

222 The Philosophy of Theism.

existent faculties exceeds even Mr. Mill's. He will not
even accept, as certainly true, what lie admits that his
" pure " faculties would unmistakably declare, because he
considers that he may inherit faculties which have been de-
naturalized and artificialized by ancestral experience. Our
whole answer to Mr. Mill contains a fortiori an answer to
Mr. Spencer.* And it is no small testimony to the strength
of Theistic philosophy, that its two ablest assailants in our
time have been driven to take refuge in different phases of
a theory so manifestly absurd and self-contradictory.

Here, then, we close what is necessarily our final reply
to Mr. Mill, on what we have called the keystone of his
"aggressive" philosophical position; viz. his respective
doctrines on mathematical axioms and on the rule of
certitude. In our last essay we treated these two questions
in their logical order, and commenced with the latter :
whereas, on the present occasion, for the sake of varying
our treatment, we have proceeded inversely ; we have traced
back our difference from him on mathematical axioms, to
our difference from him on the rule of certitude. We will
sum up under five questions, and so (we hope) give our
readers an intelligible conspectus of the whole.

Question 1st. Do the existent human faculties pronounce
that mathematical axioms are self-evidently necessary ?
We reply most confidently in the affirmative, and Mr. Mill,
if we may judge from his autobiography, does not himself
venture to answer this question in the negative.

Question 2nd. Can this avouchment of the human
faculties have been produced by the mere agency of past
experience ? We answer confidently in the negative ; Mr.
Mill confidently in the affirmative.

* We would refer our readers to a masterly article on Mr. Spencer in the
Quarterly of October, 1874. We heartily concur with it from first to last,
except, indeed, that its eulogy of Mr. Spencer's ability seems to us a little
beyond the mark. Mr. Spencer's reply to it in the Fortnightly of December
entirely misses its point.

Mr. Mill's Philosophical Position. 223

Question 3rd. Supposing that the said avouchment
could have been thus produced, would this circumstance
afford any justification for doubting its certain truth ? Mr.
Mill answers this question in the affirmative ; we in the
negative. We maintain that the avouchment of each man's
existent faculties is his one infallible rule of certitude ; and
that a denial of this truth would degrade his knowledge to
a level below that of the brutes.

Question 4th. Mr. Mill implies that he accepts, as
certainly true, whatever his faculties would have declared,
had they not been denaturalized and artificialized by past
experience. Does he give any reason for this opinion ?
None whatever. He is wholly silent on the motive of
certitude.

Question 5th. What ground do we give for our own
doctrine, that whatever any man's existent faculties avouch
is known by him as certainly true ? We allege that in each
separate case this is known instinctively : and we give, as
our illustration of the term "instinctive," the keen and
instinctive certitude with which each man knows himself
to have experienced what his memory clearly and vividly
testifies.

We have been speaking on necessary truth in general,
and on the self-evident necessity of mathematical axioms
in particular. One or two further questions had better be
considered before we finally turn from this matter, though
Mr. Mill is not directly concerned with them.

I. One of these has been suggested to us by a non-
Catholic correspondent. He objects altogether to our
taking mathematical axioms as a sample of what we allege
about necessary truths in general. " Lines and angles,"
he argues, are but imagined by geometricians. No fair
parallel can be made (he thinks) between such mere notions
on one hand, and facts on the other hand, such e.g. as

224 The Philosophy of Theism.

human actions, which have a real objective existence. Our
correspondent does not deny that there are various hypo-
thetically necessary truths concerning these imaginary
lines and angles ; but he denies that this furnishes any
kind of presumption, or even illustration, in favour of there
being e.g. a necessary morality in human actions. He is
well aware that on this matter he has Mr. Mill for his
opponent, no less than ourselves ; and, in fact, we could
answer him at every point without going further for
materials than Mr. Mill's " Logic." Mr. Mill holds, that
every true proposition concerning angles and lines repre-
sents real objective truth. We will not, however, here draw
out Mr. Mill's (to our mind) conclusive argument for this
opinion ; because to do so would carry us a great deal too
far. We content ourselves with three replies, either of
which by itself appears to us decisive.

Firstly, we point to arithmetical truths. Let there be
16 rows of pebbles, each containing 18 : it is a necessary
truth that the whole number is 288. Omnipotence could
divide one pebble into two, or create new pebbles ; but it is
beyond the sphere of Omnipotence to effect that, so long as
there remain 16 rows of 18 pebbles each, the whole number
of pebbles should be either more or less than the sum of
two hundreds eight tens and eight units. Is not this an
external objective fact, if there be any such in the world ?
And the number of such arithmetical facts is simply in-
exhaustible. Then, secondly, take the theorems — inex-
haustible in number — of solid geometry. Omnipotence e.g.
can make a perfectly accurate parallelepiped : but it cannot
make one which shall not possess all the properties proved
by geometricians. And, thirdly, every proposition which
concerns areas may be most easily converted into a propo-
sition of solid geometry.* Even then, if it were true that

* Here is one instance of what we mean. Take a right-angled triangle,
and erect squares on all the sides as in Euclid I. 47. Suppose this figure to

PRESENTED TO ST. MARY'S '7Or,L*;iE LIBRARY
BY REV. T. CAU.AGHAN

Mr. Mill's Philosophical Position. 225

lines and angles are mere geometrical notions, there
remains an inexhaustible number of mathematical pro-
positions which indubitably concern objective and external
facts. All these possess the attribute of necessity, and
they may very fairly be made samples of other necessary
truths which also concern objective external facts.

II. We now pass to an objection, which may imaginably
be made from an entirely different quarter, though no such
objection has happened to come within our knowledge. On
this, as on other occasions, we have often given, as a
special explanation of the term "necessary," that the
reversal of a necessary truth is external to the sphere of
Omnipotence. It is possible that here and there some
Catholic may have been startled by this expression, as
though it implied some disparagement of God's Attributes.

Now, since a very few words will suffice to remove any
such misapprehension, those few words had better be
inserted.

On a former occasion we laid down the following propo-
sition, as that for which in due time we shall contend.
We contend, with FF. Kleutgen and Liber atore, that all
necessary truths are founded on God's Essence; that they
are what they are, because He is what He is. Let us
suppose, then, any Catholic to make the objection we
suggested above. We would ask him whether there is
any disparagement to God's Attributes in saying that He
cannot destroy Himself; that the destruction of God is
external to the sphere of Omnipotence. On the con-
trary, he will answer, God's Attributes would be intoler-
ably disparaged if He were not accounted Indestructible :
Existence is involved in His Essence. Secondly, we would

move parallelly with itself, and a solid figure is of course the result. Omni-
potence can create such a solid figure with perfect accuracy ; but Omnipo-
tence cannot effect that the portion of it generated by the square of the
Lypothenuse shall be either greater or less than the sum of those two portions
generated by the squares of the sides.

VOL. I. o

226 The Philosophy of Theism.

ask, whether there is any disparagement of God's Attributes,
in saying that He cannot change His Nature; that He
cannot make Himself e.g. mendacious, unjust, unfaithful
to promises. On the contrary, the Immutability of His
Nature is perhaps what is in my mind more than anything
else, when I speak of His Greatness. But if He cannot
change His Nature, it follows that He cannot change what
IB founded on His Nature ; that He cannot change necessary
truths. In saying, then, that the reversal of a necessary
truth is external to the sphere of Omnipotence, — so far
from disparaging God's Attributes, we are extolling the
Immutability of His Nature.

III. We must preface our next inquiry by a short pre-
liminary statement. It is alleged by various phenomenists,
that there are no ideas in the mind, except copies in
various combinations of what has been cognized by the
senses.* We need hardly say how intensely we deny this,
though we are not here considering the question at any
length. Take e.g. the idea " morally good." We have
maintained in a former essay that it is perfectly simple; and
that perhaps no other idea can be named so constantly
recurring in one or other shape. Here we may add, that
there is no idea possessing more special characteristics of
its own, more readily and vividly cognizable ; while most
certainly it is no copy, or combination of copies, of any-
thing experienced by the senses. f In a future essay we

* This is not, however, Mr. Mill's opinion ; for (not to mention other ex-
ceptions he would make) we have already recounted his doctrine, that many
an idea is generated by " mental chemistry " from other ideas, which never-
theless does not consist of those ideas, nor is now any combination of them.

t The following passage from F. Kleutgen's work on the scholastic philo-
sophy will illustrate our meaning. We translate it from the French trans-
lation. The author is assailing the doctrine of innate ideas : —

" But," it will be said, " should we be able, on sight of an individual action,
to conceive a maxim of morality, if we did not possess already certain notions
relative to the moral order ? Assuredly no. ... But are we at liberty thence
to infer that the mind finds in itself as innate those earlier ideas, or else that
it must have received them from some external source [d'ailleurs] ? Not at

Mr. Mill's Philosophical Position. 227

hope to defend a similar proposition, in regard to the idea
" cause ; " and in like manner the idea " necessary " is
certainly no copy, or combination of copies, of anything
cognized by the senses.

The question for which we have been preparing the
way is (as far as we see) of no practical importance ; but
for the sake of clearness, it may be worth while briefly
to enter on it. Is the idea "necessary" a simple or
complex idea? We suggested on a former occasion that
it is complex, and that a " necessary " truth precisely
means a truth " of which there is no cause." Subsequent
reflection has induced us to doubt the truth of this sug-
gestion ; and has inclined us to the opinion that the idea
"necessary" admits no such analysis, and is, in fact,
altogether simple. Take the proposition, " every necessary
truth is uncaused." Is this a purely explicative proposi-
tion? Does the word " uncaused " merely express what
was already in my mind when I used the word " necessary ? "
or, on the contrary, does it add something to the former
idea ? If our reader gives the former answer, he holds the
opinion which we suggested in the essay we have referred
to; if he gives the latter answer, he holds the opinion to
which we now rather incline.

We now pass to what we have called the keystone of
Mr. Mill's " affirmative " position. His whole positive
doctrine from first to last depends on the proposition, that
the uniformity of nature can be proved by experience. We
did not deny that this uniformity could be proved by intro-
ducing premisses of that kind which Mr. Mill rejects ; but
we denied that it can be proved (as he is required on his

all ; for it is sufficient that the mind possesses, besides sensibility, a higher
power of knowledge, reason. ... As we perceive in the object, by means of
the senses, those phenomena which correspond to the nature of the senses ; so
we know, by the reason, that which is exclusively within the sphere of that
faculty "(Diss. i. 11. 643).

228 The Philosophy of Theism.

principles to prove it) from experienced phenomena alone.
In the new edition of his "Logic " Mr. Mill replies to our
criticisms (vol. ii. pp. 109-111) ; and what we have now
to do is to rejoin on his reply.

"All physical science," we said, "depends for its
existence on the fundamental proposition, that the laws
of nature are uniform : " by which proposition " we mean,
that no physical phenomenon takes place without a corre-
sponding physical antecedent, and that the same physical
antecedent is invariably followed by the same physical
consequent." Mr. Mill professes to establish conclu-
sively, on mere grounds of experience, that such is the
fact ; at all events, throughout the whole of this planet.
("Logic," book iii. chap. 21.) "His reasoning," we said,
"amounts at best to this. If in any part of the world
there existed a breach in the uniformity of nature, that
breach must by this time have been discovered by one or
other of the eminent men who have given themselves to
physical experiment. But most certainly, adds Mr. Mill,
none such has been discovered, or mankind would be sure
to have heard of it ; consequently, such is his conclusion,
none such exists." Mr. Mill tacitly admits that we have
stated his argument quite correctly. We, then, thus pro-
ceeded : —

Now, in order to estimate the force of this argument, let us
suppose for a moment that the fact were as Mr. Mill represents
it ; let us suppose for a moment that persons of scientific educa-
tion were unanimous in holding that there has been no well-
authenticated case of a breach, in the uniformity of nature.
What inference could be drawn from this? Be it observed,
that the number of natural agents constantly at work is incal-
culably large ; and that the observed cases of uniformity in their
action must be immeasurably fewer than one-thousandth of the
whole. Scientific men, we assume for the moment, have dis-
covered that in a certain proportion of instances — immeasurably
fewer than one-thousandth of the whole — a certain fact has
prevailed, the fact of uniformity; and they have not found a

Mr. Mill's Philosophical Position. 229

single instance in which that fact does not prevail. Are they
justified, we ask, in inferring from these premisses that the fact
is universal ? Surely the question answers itself. Let us make
a very grotesque supposition, in which, however, the conclusion
would really be tried according to the arguments adduced. In
some desert of Africa there is an enormous connected edifice,
surrounding some vast space, in which dwell certain reasonable
beings who are unable to leave the enclosure. In this edifice
are more than a thousand chambers, which some years ago were
entirely locked up, and the keys no one knew where. By
constant diligence twenty-five keys have been found, out of
the whole number; and the corresponding chambers, situated
promiscuously throughout the edifice, have been opened. Each
chamber, when examined, is found to be in the precise shape of
a dodecahedron. Are the inhabitants justified, on that account,
in holding with certitude that the remaining 975 chambers are
built on the same plan ?

Mr. Mill frankly replies :—

Not with perfect certitude, but . . . with so high a degree of
probability that they would be justified in acting upon the
presumption until an exception appeared.

This we, of course, quite admit ; but it falls very far
short of Mr. Mill's thesis, and he therefore thus proceeds :—

Dr. Ward's argument, however, does not touch mine as it
stands in the text. My argument is grounded on the fact that
the uniformity of the course of nature as a whole, is constituted
by the uniform sequences of special effects from special natural
agencies ; that the number of these natural agencies in the part
of the universe known to us is not incalculable, nor even ex-
tremely great, that we have now reason to think that at least
the far greater number of them, if not separately, at least in
some of the combinations into which they enter, have been made
sufficiently amenable to observation, to have enabled us actually
to ascertain some of their fixed laws ; and that this amount of
experience justifies the same degree of assurance that the course
of nature is uniform throughout, which we previously had of
the uniformity of sequence among the phenomena best known
to us. This view of the subject, if correct, destroys the force
of Dr. Ward's first argument.

230 The Philosophy of Theism.

We do not see, on the contrary, how it touches our
argument ever so faintly. Mr. Mill accounts it to be
proved by experience that certain "natural agencies"
produce certain " special effects." We totally deny that
this has been proved, or that it can be proved, on mere
grounds of experience. There are none of these natural
agencies which can be cited more favourably for Mr. Mill's
purpose than that of gravitation. We ask, then, this
simple question : How could Mr. Mill show, by mere
experience, that particles throughout the earth (and
universe) attract each other in that particular way which
is spoken of as " the law of gravitation ? " What we said
on that general truth the uniformity of nature, we say
equally on that particular truth the law of gravitation.
The number of particles of matter in the universe is in-
calculably large, and the observed cases of their acting
according to the law of gravitation must be immeasurably
fewer than one-thousandth part of the whole. Scientific
men have discovered that in a certain proportion of in-
stances— immeasurably fewer than one-thousandth of the
whole — a certain fact has prevailed, the fact of gravitation ;
and they have not found a single instance in which that
fact does not prevail. Are they justified, we ask, in in-
ferring from these premisses that the fact is certainly
universal? Why, Mr. Mill has already answered in the
negative a question precisely equivalent. The very same
reasoning which showed how impossible it is to prove by
experience the uniformity of nature in general, shows
equally how impossible it is to prove by experience the law
of gravitation in particular. And the same remark is
applicable to all the other " natural agencies " which Mr.
Mill commemorates. His attempted answer only avails to
exhibit, more pointedly than it might have been seen
before, the extraordinary weakness of his case.
Our second argument was the following:—

Mr. Mill's Philosophical Position. 231

But, secondly, it is as far as possible from being true that
men of scientific education are unanimous in holding that there
has been no well-authenticated case of breach in the uniformity
of nature. On the contrary, even to this day the majority of
such persons believe in Christianity, and hold the miracles
revealed in Scripture to be on the whole accurately reported.
The majority of scientific men believe that at one time persons
on whom the shadow of Peter passed were thereby freed from
their infirmities ; and that at another time garments brought <
from the body of Paul expelled sickness and demoniacal pos-
session. (Acts v. 15; xix. 12.) Will Mr. Mill allege that
S. Peter's shadow, or that garments from S. Paul's body, were
the physical cause of a cure, as lotions and bandages might be ?
Of course not. Here, then, is a series of physical phenomena,
resulting without physical cause; and Catholics to this day
consider that breaches in the uniformity of nature are matters
of every-day occurrence. Even then, if it were true — it seems
to us (as we have already said) most untrue — that Mr. Mill's
conclusion legitimately follows from his premisses, still he
cannot even approximate to establishing those premisses until he
have first disproved Catholicity and next disproved the whole
truth of Christianity.

Mr. Mill thus replies, the italics being his own :—

Dr. Ward's second argument is, that many or most persons,
both scientific and unscientific, believe that there are well-
authenticated cases of breach in the uniformity of nature,
namely miracles. Neither does this consideration touch what I
have said in the text. I admit no other uniformity in the
events of nature than the law of Causation ; and (as I have
explained in the chapter of this volume which treats of the
Grounds of Disbelief) a miracle is no exception to that law. In
every case of alleged miracle, a new antecedent is affirmed to
exist ; a counteracting cause, namely the volition of a supernatural
being. To all, therefore, to whom beings with superhuman
power over nature are a vera causa, a miracle is a case of the
Law of Universal Causation, not a deviation from it.

What an astonishing collapse is here both of memory
and of scientific intelligence ! Firstly, of memory. Nothing
can be more express than Mr. Mill's words, where he is
first occupied with setting forth the uniformity of nature.

232 The Plt:,L>*oi>l, y of Theism.

"When in the course of this inquiry," he says (" Logic,"
vol. i. p. 376), " I speak of the cause of any phenomenon, I
do not mean a cause which is not itself a phenomenon . . .
the causes with which I concern myself are not efficient
hut physical causes. . . . Between the phenomena which
exist at any moment and the phenomena which exist at the
succeeding instant there is an invariable order of succes-
sion." Is a volition, then, of the Invisible God a
phenomenon 1 Mr. Mill laid down at starting, that he
recognizes no causes which are not phenomena ; and now
he tells us that God's volition may count as a cause.

Secondly, what a collapse of scientific intelligence !
Mr. Mill professes to lay down a doctrine on the uniformity
of nature,* which shall suffice as a reasonable basis for
physical and other science. Yet what is the view he now
professes ? He now advocates no doctrine inconsistent
with the supposition that there may be as many deities on
Olympus as Homer himself believed in ; and that each one
of these deities is arbitrarily interfering with the course of
nature every minute of every day. In all these cases " the
volition of a supernatural being" might count as " a new
antecedent," a "counteracting cause:" so that every
arbitrary and irregular phenomenon so brought about " is
a case of the law of universal causation," as he says, and
" not a deviation from it." Why, it is plain that if such
constant interference took place, there would be no " course
of nature," nor what he ordinarily calls " causation," at
all, and physical science would vanish from the sphere of
human knowledge. In other words, if we are to trust his
present language, he does not profess to prove that there is
any uniformity of nature whatever, or that physical science
can reasonably exist, f

* He calls it " the law of universal causation ; " but we cannot ourselves
use this term, because of the vital difference with Mr. Mill on " causation,"
which we are to set forth in a future essay.

t It may most fairly be asked, how belief in the Christian miracles is

Jfr. Mill's Philosophical Position. 233

It is quite true (as Mr. Mill implies in the words we
have quoted) that, in his comment on Hume's argument
against miracles, he had made the very same blunder which
he now repeats. We have always attributed the former
blunder to the same cause, to which we also attribute the
one before us. Mr. Mill, we think, held so disparaging an
estimate of the philosophy which admits the existence of
miracles, that in dealing with it he was satisfied with the
first plausible argument which came to hand ; and did not
trouble himself to examine its merits very closely.

We further adduced a third argument : —

But the strongest objection against the sufficiency of Mr.
Mill's argument still remains to be stated. " All our interest,"
says Mr. Bain most truly, " is concentrated on what is yet to be ;
the present and the past are of value only as a clue to the events
that are to come" Let us even suppose, then, for argument's sake
that Mr. Mill had fully proved the past and present uniformity
of nature ; still the main difficulty would continue, viz. how he
proposes to show that such uniformity will last one moment
beyond the present. It is quite an elementary remark that,
whenever a proposition is grounded on mere experience, nothing
whatever can be known or even guessed concerning its truth,
except within the reach of possible observation. For this very
reason Mr. Mill professes himself unable to know, or even to
assign any kind of probability to the supposition that nature
proceeds on uniform laws in distant stellar regions. But
plainly there are conditions of time, as well as of space, which
preclude the possibility of observation; and it is as simply
impossible for men to know from mere experience what will
take place on earth to-morrow, as to know from mere experience
what takes place in the planet Jupiter to-day.

Here is Mr. Mill's reply, with his own italics :—

Dr. Ward's last and, as he says, strongest argument is the
familiar one of Reid, Stewart, and their followers — that what-
ever knowledge experience gives us of the past and present, it
gives us none of the future. I confess that I see no force

consistent with belief in the existence of physical science. We answered this
question, however, directly and expressly in our essay " Science, Prayer, and
Miracles," (vol. iL of this collection).

234 The Philosophy of Theism.

whatever in this argument. Wherein does a future fact differ
from a present or a past fact, except in their merely momentary
relation to the human beings at present in existence? The
answer made by Priestly, in his examination of Keid, seems to
me sufficient, viz. that though we have had no experience of
what is future, we have had abundant experience of what was
future. The "leap in the dark" (as Professor Bain calls it)
from the past to the future is exactly as much in the dark, and
no more, as the leap from a past which we have personally
observed to a past which we have not. I agree with Mr. Bain
in the opinion that the resemblance of what we have not
experienced to what we have is, by a law of our nature, pre-
sumed through the mere energy of the idea before experience
has proved it. This psychological truth, however, is not, as Dr.
Ward, when criticizing Mr. Bain, appears to think, inconsistent
with the logical truth that experience does prove it. The proof
comes after the presumption, and consists in its invariable
verification by experience when the experience arrives. The fact
which while it was future could not be observed, having as yet
no existence, is always, when it becomes present and can be
observed, found conformable to the past.

This rejoinder is more surprising than even the two
former. Any one who attentively peruses it will see that
it comes to this. We say that, on Mr. Mill's theory, no
one, during the year 1874, has any solid ground whatever
for supposing as even probable, that fire will burn or water
will quench thirst in the year 1875. Mr. Mill replies, that
at the end of 1875 he will have ground for knowing that
such has been the case during that past year. Dr. Bain
says very truly, that " the present and past are of value
only as a clue to " the future; and we argued that, on Mr.
Mill's theory, they are no clue whatever to the future.
That is true, replies Mr. Mill ; but still what is now future
will be known as soon as it shall have become past. Let
us observe what comes of this. We find from his auto-
biography that "the principal outward purpose of his life "
(p. 67) was so to act on mankind through the laws of
human nature, that various intellectual, political, and social

Mr. Mill's Philosophical Position. 235

results might ensue, which he regarded as ameliorations of
unspeakable moment. Nevertheless — according to the
very principles which he accounted to he essentially in-
volved in such amelioration — he had no ground whatever,
at any one moment, for thinking it (we will not say certain,
but) ever so faintly probable, that the laws of human
nature were in future to continue the same. And yet if
they did not continue the same, his whole life would have
been one sustained blunder.

We made one final comment on Mr. Mill's treatment of
these subjects, which he has left entirely unnoticed.

In considering the question " on what grounds wo expect
that the sun will rise to-morrow," Mr. Mill (" Logic," vol. ii. p.
80) falls into a mistake very unusual with him ; for he totally
misapprehends the difficulty which he has to encounter. He
argues — we think quite successfully — that there is a probability
amounting to practical certainty that the sun will rise to-
morrow, on the hypothesis that the uniformity of nature so long con-
tinues. But the question he has to face is, what reason can he
have for knowing, or even guessing, that the uniformity of
nature will so long continue ? And to this, the true question at
issue, lie does not so much as attempt a reply.

Nothing, then, can be more conspicuous and undeniable
than Mr. Mill's break-down in what is the one keystone of
his " affirmative " philosophical position. He professes to
build a philosophy on the exclusive basis of experience ;
and he heartily admits that such construction is impossible,
unless the philosopher first establishes the uniformity of
nature. But if he establishes that truth on some other
basis than experience, he does not build his philosophy on
the exclusive basis of experience. Mr. Mill, then, is re-
quired by his principles to prove the uniformity of nature
from the mere facts of experience ; and we have now seen
how pitiably he fails in his attempt. We are very confident
that where he has failed no other phenomenist will
succeed ; but if any one makes the attempt, we promise

236 The Philosophy of Theism.

beforehand to meet him straightforwardly and publicly.
Meanwhile, we consider ourselves to have shown, that
nothing, at all events, can be more ignominious than Mr.
Mill's philosophical position, whether on its "aggressive"
side or its " affirmative."

The paper of ours to which Mr. Mill replied, was
followed by another on " the foundation of morality."
In our next essay we hope to supplement that paper
by one encountering him in full detail on that most vital
theme, his denial of freewill.

VI.
ME. MILL'S DENIAL OF FKEEWILL.*

ON the present occasion our contention against Mr. Mill
will be purely psychological, though connected, of course,
with most important metaphysical questions, such as
morality and again causation. On every question between
intuitionists and phenomenists, we consider Mr. Mill by
far our ablest opponent, as we have often said. But on
the particular theme now before us, he is pre-eminently
the most suitable champion we could assail; for "the
theory of volition and of responsibility," says its advocate
in the Westminster Review (Oct. 1873, p. 305), which was
"first stated in this country by Hobbes," "is now asso-
ciated most closely with the name of Mr. J. S. Mill." In
addition, however, to the two works in which Mr. Mill
treats this theme, we have also named at the head of our
essay Dr. Bain's well-known treatise, which is identical
in doctrine with Mr. Mill's volumes. And in our present
essay we propose to join issue with Mr. Mill on a mere
question of fact, in regard to experienced phenomena. He
holds, " as a truth of experience," " that volitions do in
fact follow determinate moral antecedents, with the same

* Examination of Sir W. Hamilton's Philosophy. By JOHN STUART
MILL. Fourth Edition. London : Longmans.

A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive. By JOHN STUART MILL.
Eighth Edition. London : Longmans.

The Emotions and the Will, By ALEXANDER BAIN. London : J. W.
Parker.

238 The Philosophy of Theism.

uniformity and the same certainty as physical effects follow
their physical causes : " these moral antecedents being
"desires, occasions, habits, and dispositions, combined with
outward circumstances suitable to call those internal in-
centives into action" (" On Hamilton," pp. 576, 577). He
maintains, that if we knew any given " person thoroughly,
and knew all the inducements which are acting on him, we
could foretell his conduct with as much certainty as we can
predict any physical event " (" Logic," vol. ii. p. 422). This
doctrine has commonly been called " the doctrine of philo-
sophical necessity," and we think the name a very suitable
one. Mr. Mill, however, prefers the name " determinism ; "
and in this he apparently accords with the great body of
his fellow-thinkers : by all means, therefore, so let it be.

For ourselves, as we have already implied, we shall not
attempt in our present article to establish the full doctrine
of Freewill; because this cannot be done until we have
treated " causation," as we hope to do in the next essay
of our series.* On the present occasion we shall content
ourselves with disproving (as we consider) the psychical
fact which Mr. Mill alleges. He calls his theory "deter-
minism ; " and we will call our own, therefore, by the name
of " indeterminism." The full doctrine of Freewill includes,
indeed, the doctrine of indeterminism ; but it includes also
a certain doctrine on the causation of human acts, which
we do not here profess to establish.

It is always of pre-eminent importance in controversy
to understand rightly the position of one's opponent, but
on no other question (we think) is this so necessary as on
the present. We will beg, therefore, our readers' most
careful attention, while we draw out what we apprehend to

* It is an inconvenience in philosophical controversy, that not un-
frequently some particular theme has to be treated piecemeal, in order that
nothing may be assumed without proof. It would have been indefinitely more
inconvenient if we had attempted to treat causation before we had dealt with
determinism.

Mr. MiWs Denial of Freewill 239

be Mr. Mill's theory, at a length which to them may pos-
sibly appear tedious and superfluous. As we proceed, wo
will cite in footnotes illustrative passages from Mr. Mill
himself and from Dr. Bain. The determinist, then, may
be supposed to express himself as follows :—

"By the term ' motive ' I understand the desire of some
pleasure which may be gained, or the aversion to some
pain which may be prevented, by some given course of
action.* For the sake of greater compendiousness, indeed,
I will call the avoidance of pain a negative pleasure ; and
I can then omit the second part of the above definition.
When a man in a boat sees the approach of a storm, and
rows to save his life, his motive is his desiring that negative
pleasure, the escape from death.

" If any motive at any moment acted alone, it would
as a matter of course be followed by action in the in-
dicated direction. But almost always conflicting motives
are at work; or, in other words, the pleasure desired
is seen to be unattainable, except with some concomitant
pain. Even a flower cannot be plucked without the
trouble of stooping. But in many cases there are power-
ful conflicting motives in several different directions. If
I enter on course A, I shall certainly or probably derive
pleasure M; but on the other hand, I shall certainly
or probably endure pain N : while at the same time, by
pursuing course A, I shall be prevented from pursuing
course B, or pursuing it at least with equal diligence ;
which said course B offers special pleasures of its own,
though these of course accompanied with its own pains,—
and so on indefinitely. Under these circumstances, an
illustration of my position may be derived from mechanics.

* ** A motive, being a desire or an aversion, is proportional to the plea-
santness as conceived by us of the thing desired, or the harmfulness of the
thing shunned." (" On Hamilton," p. 605.) So Dr. Bain : " Various motives
— present or prospective pleasures and pains — concur in urging us to act"
(p. 550).

240 The Philosophy of Theism.

A certain physical point, possessing certain intrinsic
qualities, is solicited at this moment by several attracting
forces : such being the case, it moves definitely and de-
cisively ; not perhaps in the direction of any one force, but
at all events in a direction resulting from the joint influence
of all. The conflicting motives which act on my will are
analogous to the conflicting forces which act on the physical
point ; and my will commonly under these circumstances
moves definitely and decisively, not perhaps in the exact
direction of any one motive, but at all events in the direc-
tion which results from the joint influence of them all.*
From time to time, no doubt, there are pauses for delibera-
tion ; and there are cases, also, in which there exists for
a while much vacillation and (as one may say) vibration of
the will. I will expound these cases presently. But in the
enormous majority of instances — even where there are
powerful motives acting on some side which does not prevail
— there is no such vacillation at all, but one definite and
decisive resultant. Take as an instance, the demeanour in
battle of some brave soldier. He is stimulated by many
impelling motives : by a certain savage pleasure in aggres-
siveness, which is partly natural and is partly due to past
habit ; by desire of his country's success ; by zeal, perhaps,
for the cause in which his country is engaged ; by desire of
his countrymen's and of the world's applause ; by repug-
nance to the infamy which would follow a display of
cowardice, etc. Yet the motives are in themselves extremely

* Detenninists " affirm as a truth of experience that volitions do, in point
of fact, follow determinate moral antecedents, with the same uniformity and
with the same certainty as physical effects follow their physical causes.
These moral antecedents are desires, aversions, habits, and dispositions, com-
bined with outward circumstances suited to call these internal incentives
into action. All these again are effects of causes ; those of them which are
mental being consequences of education and of other moral and physical
influences." (" On Hamilton," pp. 576, 577.) So Dr. Bain says in effect that
the will's act is in every case determined by " the operation of the motive
forces of pleasurable and painful sensibility, coupled with the mental
spontaneousness of the system " (p. 553).

Mr. Mill's Denial of Freewill. 241

strong which solicit him in the opposite direction. He is
vividly conscious (even though implicitly) of the danger
to which he is exposed ; of the fearful suffering, and death
itself, which may not improbably befall him ; he remembers
his wife and children whom he has left at home, and the
doubt whether he shall ever be with them again ; he has
seen, perhaps, his dear friend shot dead by his side, and
would be glad to have some brief time for the indulgence of
grief; the whole scene around him is ghastly and repulsive
in the extreme. Yet in the teeth of these repelling con-
siderations, there is not one moment's faltering or hesita-
tion : the antagonistic motives are as nothing when
conflicting with those which stir him to action. Or take a
son, passionately devoted to his mother and tending her
in her old age. In vain he is solicited by this, that, and
the other antagonistic gratification : the one master passion
overbears all other motives, promptly and without a struggle.
And so, if you look at the lives of men in general, you will
find that, during very far the greater part of their existence,
they are pursuing without hesitation one very definite line
of conduct, though there is many a motive simultaneously
present, which by itself has a very strong tendency to
divert them from their course.

"Here I can explain what I mean by the power of a
motive : I mean its tendency to influence this or that man's
conduct, at this or that particular instant, by means of the
pleasure which it proposes. That assemblage of motives,
which influences the heroic soldier or the passionately
loving son in one direction, is indefinitely ' more powerful/
' stronger ' — or, in other words, indefinitely more suggestive
of positive or negative pleasure— than that which influences
him in the other.* Here, however, I must make two

" Various motives — present or prospective pleasures and pains— concur

in urging me to act : the result of the conflict shows that one group is

stronger than another, and that is the whole case." (Bain, p. 550.) " It is

only an identical proposition to affirm that the greatest of two pleasures, or

VOL. I. R

242 The Philosophy of Theism.

explanations, to prevent very serious misconception of my
meaning.

" Firstly. The natural difference of character among
men is enormous ; and this enormous difference is enor-
mously increased by difference of education and of past life.
That which may be a most powerful motive to one man,
will be a very weak one to another, and an actual cause of
repulsion to a third. Nay, so moody and changeable is
human nature, not only at different periods of his life, but
even at different moments of the same day the same object
is desired by the same man with very varying degrees of
intensity. This is partly caused, indeed, by the fact that
the nervous and muscular systems are so very differently
affected at different instants ; so that the very same object
is indefinitely more attractive at one instant than at
another.* Nor, again, is there any more common pheno-
menon than that a man's desire of some immediate
gratification is indefinitely stronger at the moment than
his desire of what he well knows to be far more to his
permanent welfare ; or, in other words, that the thought of
enjoying such gratification is at the moment far more
suggestive to him of pleasure than is the thought of
promoting his own permanent welfare.

what appears such, sways the resulting action ; for it is the resulting action
that alone determines which is the greater." (Ibid. p. 447.) Mr. Mill is
express on this point : " Those who say that the will follows the strongest
motive, do not mean the motive which is strongest in relation to the will, or,
in other words, that the will follows what it does follow. They mean the
motive which is strongest in relation to pain and pleasure ; since a motive,
being a desire or aversion, is proportional to the pleasantness as conceived by
us of the thing desired, or the painfulness of the thing shunned." ("On
Hamilton," p. 605.) There is another passage of Mr. Mill's, which may be
cited as illustrating his doctrine in another point of view : " I dispute
altogether that we are conscious of being able to act in opposition to the
strongest present desire or aversion. The difference between a bad and a
good man is not that the latter acts in opposition to his strongest desire : it
is, that his desire to do right and his aversion to doing wrong are strong enough
to overcome — and in the case of perfect virtue to silence— any other desire or
aversion which may conflict with them." (Ibid. p. 585.) What is conscience,
he elsewhere asks, except a desire—16 the desire to do right ? " (Ibid. p. 583.)
* Bain, p. 442, and elsewhere.

Mr. Mill's Denial of Freewill 243

" Secondly. Very prominently under the head of
'pain' ranks 'difficulty:' such difficulty, e.g., as accom-
panies any attempt at breaking through a firmly established
habit. Suppose, e.g., I have established a very firm habit
of early rising. When the proper moment comes, very
strong motives on the other side are spontaneously and at
once counterbalanced by the difficulty of breaking through
my habit. And similar phenomena are by no means con-
fined to the case of habits. As one of a thousand instances,
there is a very strong impulse with some men to throw
themselves down a precipice if they are standing close to
its edge ; an impulse which it requires powerful effort to
withstand. I am not, of course, taking a case where the
man's head becomes so dizzy that he loses his power of
remaining on the cliff. I am supposing a man with full
power over his actions, but conscious of this strange and
eccentric impulse. This impulse then acts as a strong
motive : and yet it cannot in any obvious sense of the
words be called either a desire of pleasure or an aversion
of pain. In fact, however, it is the latter. There is very
great difficulty — i.e. ' pain ' — in resisting his natural
tendency to throw himself down, ajid strong motives on
the other side are required to counterbalance this difficulty.*

* The following passage from Mr. Mill's " Logic " deserves very careful
attention : —

"As we proceed in the formation of habits and become accustomed to will
a particular act or a particular course of conduct because it is pleasurable,
we at last continue to will it without any reference to its being pleasurable.
Although, from some change in us or in our circumstances, we have ceased to
find any pleasure in the action, or perhaps to anticipate any pleasure in con-
sequence of it, we still continue to desire the action, and consequently to do
it. In this manner it is that habits of hurtful excess continue to be practised
although they have ceased to be pleasurable ; and in this manner also it is
that the willingness to persevere in the course which he has chosen does not
desert the moral hero, even when the reward, however real, which he doubtless
receives from the consciousness of well-doing, is anything but an equivalent
for the sufferings he may undergo or the wishes which he may have to
renounce " (vol. ii. p. 488, 489).

The last clause of this sentence, if regard be had to its rhetoric, is one of
the numerous passages in Mr. Mill's works which imply a theory on morals

244 The Philosophy of Theism.

"I have hitherto considered that great majority of
instances in which conflicting motives issue in a definite
and decisive resultant. But I admitted at starting that
this is not always the case. Sometimes, e.g., there occurs a
pause for deliberation. But what more easily explicable
than this on my theory ? The person pauses that he may
more fully understand the full nature and consequences of
proposed alternatives, before deciding which he prefers.
You will say perhaps that he sometimes pauses in order to
consider whether some action to which he is attracted be
consistent with morality; and I admit this. But, then,
this very fact implies that his desire of performing that
action is not so strong as his desire of acting in accordance
with morality.*

" So much on the particular case of pausing. Other

indefinitely truer and nobler than that in which he philosophically acquiesced.
But its logical meaning is made obvious by the earlier clause. " Habits of
hurtful excess continue to be practised, although they have ceased to be
pleasurable," simply because their abandonment is so intensely painful. In
like manner, then, according to Mr. Mill, the difficulty of acting in opposi-
tion to a strongly formed virtuous habit affords a motive which will often
counterbalance very strong adverse solicitations. We may add that there are
passages similar to the above in his work " On Hamilton," in pp. 588, 589,
and in p. 605.

As to such other impulses as those mentioned in the text, Dr. Bain draws
especial attention to them (p. 433). Singularly enough, he adds that they
"are cases of action where we cannot discover any connection between
pleasure enjoyed or pain averted, and the energy of active devotion made
manifest;" a statement which seems at first sight to subvert his whole
theory. He says, however, that " we must look for the explanation of this
influence, which traverses the proper course of volition, in the undue or
morbid persistency of certain ideas in the mind." In various parts of his
works, Dr. Bain lays stress on these " fixed ideas ; " and it is by no means easy
to see how he reconciles his language concerning them with his general
theory. One mode of doing so is that given in the text. In some passages
he seems to imply a different explanation ; viz. that these fixed ideas imply
a certain mild form of quasi-insanity ; and that acts done under their influence
are not properly volitions. We see no reason for pursuing further this
inquiry, because our reader will see clearly, as we proceed, that it can in no
way affect our own argument.

* '; If I elect to abstain " from murder, " in what sense am I conscious
that I could have elected to commit the crime ? Only if I had desired to
commit it with a desire stronger than my horror of murder ; not with one
less strong." (Mill, " On Hamilton," p. 583.)

Mr. Mill's Denial of Freewill 245

cases, again, no doubt exist, exemplifying what I have
called vacillation and vibration of will. The devoted son,
e.g. whom I just now mentioned, may fall in love, and
there will at times be much vacillation and vibration
between his respective desires of seeing the young lady,
and of solacing his mother's old age. Such cases, however,
are very easily explained on my principles; or rather,
indeed, my principles would lead me a priori to be sure
that there must be these cases of vacillation and vibration.
Where the motives on one side are notably stronger than
those on the other, there results a definite and decisive
spontaneous impulse ; but where the motives are very
nearly balanced, there must result (on the same principles)
vacillation and vibration. During a closely balanced con-
flict of motives, there is not a single instant in which there
does not pass across the mind some thought which adds
strength to, or takes it from, one or other of the contending
powers. Some time, then, must necessarily elapse before
the balance adjusts itself between forces neither of which
is for any two successive instants the same ; and this time
is, of course, one of vacillation and vibration.* If the
relative power of the two motives is constantly changing,
no wonder that the resultant is constantly changing
also.

" Here, then, is the simple doctrine of determinism ;
which I take to be a mere interpretation of universal
experience, a statement in words of what every one is
internally convinced of.f Every human being at every
moment is infallibly determined by the law of his nature to

* The last sentence is almost verbatim Mr. Mill's ("On Hamilton," p. 584),
An opponent had objected that " balancing one motive against another is not
willing, but judging." Mr. Mill replies: "The state of mind I am speaking
of is not an intellectual, but an emotional state. If there were any indis-
pensable act of judging in this state, it would only be judging which of the
two pains or pleasures was the greatest; and to regard this as the operative
force would be conceding the point in favour of necessarianiam."

t These are Mr. Mill's words in his " Logic " (vol. ii. p. 422).

246 The Philosophy of Theism.

choose that course of conduct which is apprehended by
him as the more pleasurable or the less painful."

Now, we are disposed to agree with by far the larger part
of all this ; and here is, in fact, a hopeful augury for the
discussion, because by consequence the issue is so very
much narrowed. We object, indeed, entirely, as a matter
of words, to using the term "motive" in its deterministic
sense ; for to our mind a large share of the confusion
which has so overspread the controversy has originated in
the equivocal use of this term. We will adopt, therefore,
the word " attraction," in a very similar sense to that
which determinists express by the term "motive." We
will call by the name of an " attraction " every thought,
which proposes some pleasure, positive or negative, to be
gained by some act or course of action ; and we will call
one attraction stronger than another, if the pleasure
proposed by the former is apprehended as greater — is
more attractive at the moment — than that proposed by
the latter. If the thought proposes " positive " pleasure,
it will be a " positive " — in the other case a " negative " —
attraction.

This terminology being understood, it is very plain (as
determinists urge) that every man, during by far the
greater part of his life, is solicited by conflicting attrac-
tions ; and it is further a manifest and undeniable matter
of fact that, in the very large majority of such instances, a
certain definite and decisive inclination or impulse of the
will spontaneously ensues. Further, we are thoroughly
disposed to agree with Mr. Mill, that this spontaneous
inclination or impulse is due to the greater strength of
attraction on the prevailing side ; or, in other words, to the
greater pleasurableness (positive or negative) anticipated
at the moment from one course of action as compared
with the other. So strong and constant is the observed
gravitation of human nature towards immediate pleasure,

Mr. Mill's Denial of Freewill. 247

that on this particular head Mr. Mill's theory seems to us
thoroughly reasonable and well grounded. Nor, again, is
this theory (to our mind) best refuted by dwelling on those
instances of pause, or, again, of vacillation and vibration,
to which reference has above been made ; although we are
very far from regarding the deterministic exposition of
those instances as at all sufficient. But we think that the
opposition between determinism and indeterminism is by
no means so clearly brought out by such cases, as it is by
the far more numerous ones in which the will's spontaneous
impulse is definite and decisive. The whole argument,
then (in our view), should be made to turn on one most
simple and intelligible issue.

We beg our readers, then, to fix their attention on that
definite and decisive spontaneous impulse of the will,*
which is so very common a phenomenon, and to which we
have so often referred. We entirely agree with Mr. Mill,
as we just now said, that this spontaneous impulse of the
will is infallibly determined at each particular moment, by
the balance of pleasurableness as apprehended at that
moment. But the whole deterministic argument rests
from beginning to end on the assumption that men never
resist this spontaneous impulse; whereas we confidently
affirm, as an experienced fact, that there are cases of such
resistance — numerous, unmistakable, nay, most striking.
What we allege to be a fact of indubitable experience is
this. At some given moment, my will's gravitation, as it
may be called, or spontaneous impulse is in some given
direction; insomuch that if I held myself passively, if I
let my will alone, it would with absolute certainty move
accordingly; but, in fact, I exert myself with more or less
vigour to resist such impulse, and then the action of my

* It may be better to point out that Dr. Bain sometimes (e.g. in p. 442)
uses the term " spontaneous impulse " — he nowhere, we believe, says " spon-
taneous impulse of Hie will "—in a sense fundamentally distinct from our own.

248 The Philosophy of Theism.

will is in a different, often an entirely opposite, direction.
In other words, we would draw our readers' attention to
the frequently occurring simultaneous existence of two very
distinct phenomena. On the one hand (1) my will's gravi-
tation or spontaneous impulse is strongly in one direction ;
while, on the other hand, at the same moment (2) its
actual movement is quite divergent from this. Now, that
which "motives"* — to use deterministic language — affect,
is most evidently the will's spontaneous inclination, impulse,
gravitation. The determinist, then, by saying that the
will's movement is infallibly determined by "motives," is
obliged to say that the will never moves in opposition to its
spontaneous impulse. And, in fact, he does say this. All
determinists assume as a matter of course that the will
never puts forth effort for the purpose of resisting its
spontaneous impulse. We, on the contrary, allege that
there is no mental fact more undeniable than the frequent
putting forth of such effort. t And on this critical point
issue is now to be joined.

* For convenience sake in this paragraph we use the word " motives " as
determinists do.

t As it is very important to avoid all possibility of cavil, it will be per-
haps better to add one further explanation of the exact point at issue. Mr.
Mill and Dr. Bain hold that in each case the spontaneous impulse or inclina-
tion of the will is determined by the balance of immediate pleasure ; and
(taking into account the various explanations they give of their statement)
we are so far entirely in accord with them. But our own essential argument
would not be affected in the slightest degree, if this theory of theirs were
disproved. And it is worth while, at the risk of being thought tedious, to
make this clear.

The essence of determinism is the doctrine, that at any given moment the
will's movement is infallibly and inevitably determined by circumstances.
(1) internal and (2) external; i.e. (1) by the intrinsic constitution and dis-
position of the will, and (2) by the external influences which act on it. Now,
no one doubts that in every man, during far the larger portion of his waking
life, there exists what we have called a definite and decisive spontaneous
impulse of his will ; and determinists allege that circumstances (internal and
external) determine the will's actual movement, precisely by determining its
spontaneous impulse. It is the very essence of determinism, therefore, to
allege that the will's actual movement is never divergent from its spon-
taneous impulse.

Mr. Mill's Denial of Freewill 24-9

Before commencing our argument, however, there are
one or two further questions of terminology to be settled.
And, first, how shall we define the word " motive ? " Our
own acceptation of it may be thus set forth. We premise
the obvious truth, that some ends are aimed at for their
own sake, and others only for the sake of the former class :
the former we will call " absolute," the latter " relative,"
ends. To these two classes of ends correspond two classes
of "motives." My "ultimate motive" in a course of
action is my resolve of pursuing some absokite end or ends,
with a view to obtaining which I begin and continue that
course of action. And what an " ultimate motive "is in
relation to an absolute end or ends, precisely that is an
"immediate" or "intermediate" motive in relation to a
relative end or ends. We say " end or ends" because it is
one of the most familiar among mental phenomena that
men often aim simultaneously at many ends. A youth,
e.g., applies himself to study, partly for the sake of enjoying
its pleasure, and partly for the sake of his future temporal
advancement. Where the end is single, we may call the
motive " simple ; " where there is more than one end we
may call the motive " complex."

But it is a different question altogether, and one entirely irrelevant to the
deterministic controversy, to inquire ivhat is the exact fixed relation which
exists between circumstances on the one hand and the will's spontaneous
impulse on the other. Mr. Mill and Dr. Bain adopt on this question the
balance-of-pleasure theory; and here we agree with them. But quite
imaginably philosophers might arise (though we think this very improbable)
who should adduce strong arguments for some different theory on the subject.
Now this, as our readers will see, is a cross-controversy altogether, and in no
\vay affects the issue between determinism and its assailants. We have
ourselves assumed, throughout our essay, the balance-of-pleasure theory
as confessedly and indisputably true ; because (1) we account it the true one,
and because (2) it is held by all the determinists we ever heard of; but
nothing would be easier than to mould our argument according to any
different theory which might be established. The question, between deter-
minists and ourselves, is not at all how the will's spontaneous impulse is
formed, but exclusively whether it is ever resisted. Determinists as such
say that it is never resisted, and indeterminists as such maintain the con-
trary.

250 The Philosophy of Theism.

So far we are on common ground with deteraiinists.
But they hold that the " resolve of pursuing some absolute
end " is simply synonymous with the " desire of some
preponderating pleasure," positive or negative. For the
sake, therefore, of making ourselves more intelligible to our
Catholic readers, we will proceed a little further. Whatever
absolute end I aim at is always either " bonum honestum "
or " bonum delect abile ; " or, in other words, it is either
the practising of some virtuousness or the enjoying of some
pleasure. So far as this truth is needed in our future
argument, we shall not fail to prove it ; here we assume it.
My " ultimate motive," then, in any act or course of
action, will always be either (1) my resolve of practising
some virtuousness ; or (2) my resolve of enjoying or trying
to enjoy some pleasure ; or (3) some combination of such
resolves. In the first two cases my motive is "simple;"
in the last it is " complex." We need hardly add how
often it happens that such "resolves," however real and
influential, are implicit or unreflected on.

So much on the word " motive ; " but now further. We
have already expressed our conviction that at any given
moment the will's spontaneous impulse (of which we have
said so much) is infallibly determined by the preponderance
of pleasure proposed. The thought of this preponderating
pleasure may be called the " preponderating attraction,"
or "the resultant of co-existing attractions." Again, we
have often to speak of the will's " spontaneous impulse ; "
this we will sometimes call the will's "preponderating"
impulse ; or, for brevity's sake, we may omit the adjective
altogether, and speak of the will's "impulse." Eesistance
to this impulse may be called " anti-impulsive effort "
issuing in " anti-impulsive action."

The determinist, then, denies that there is any such
thing in man as anti-impulsive effort, or (a fortiori) as
anti -impulsive action. According to his theory, not only

Mr. Mill's Denial of Freewill 251

the will's spontaneous impulse, but its actual movement, is
at every moment infallibly determined by the balance of
pleasure. He readily admits that men often put forth
great efforts — sometimes most intense efforts — in response
to their preponderating attraction of the moment ; witness
the case above mentioned, of brave soldiers engaged in
battle. But he alleges that such effort is always in response,
and never in opposition, to their preponderating attraction ;
and that this must inevitably be the case while human
nature remains what it is.* On our side, if we expressed
our full mind, we should say that all men in full possession
of their faculties have a true moral power — and by no
means unfrequently exercise it — of anti-impulsive action ;
and that of course, therefore, they may be no less free
when they yield to their will's impulse than when they
resist it. In our present argument, however (as we have
explained), the ideas of " power " and " freedom " are to be
put in abeyance, and we are to speak only of experienced
facts. It is our purpose, then, here to prove against the
determinist that — so far from anti-impulsive efforts and
action being non-existent — they are by no means rare ;
nay, that in one particular class of men they are among
the commonest and most unmistakable phenomena in the
whole world.

We need hardly say that, in our view, devout Theists
are immeasurably the most virtuous class of human beings.
Consequently, in our view, devout Theists will, with absolute
certainty, immeasurably exceed other men in their anti-
impulsive efforts ; for the simple reason that they im-

* Wo cannot understand the determinists' objection to the word " neces-
sarianism," as expressing their doctrine. According to that doctrine, so long
as my nature remains what it is, my volitions are infallibly determined by
circumstances external and internal. On the one hand, I have no power of
altering my nature ; on the other hand, I have not, nor have had, any power
of controlling those past and present circumstances, which in combination
infallibly and inevitably determine my volition. How cau one imagine u
more complete " necessitation " of my whole conduct ?

252 The Philosophy of Theism.

measurably exceed other men in the vigilant care with
which they adjust their volitions by a standard which
they consider supremely authoritative. Nor have we any
hesitation in saying that able and thoughtful men could
never have even dreamed of so monstrous a theory as
determinism, had they not been densely and crassly ignorant
of the practical working of devout Theism. Here, in fact,
is one of those instances, by no means few, in which a
devout Christian possesses no ordinary advantage over
irreligious men, in his power of investigating truth. He
could as easily doubt that he experiences temptation, as
that from time to time he resists it ; or, to put the thing
more distinctly, he could as easily doubt that at times
the preponderating impulse of his will is towards some
pleasurableness which he accounts unlawful, as he could
doubt that at this or that given moment he is resisting
such impulse. We will not, however, begin with consider-
ing the practical working, in this respect, of devout Theism ;
we will begin with that great majority of mankind who are,
either in theory or at least in practice, irreligious. Even
such men do from time to time resist their will's prepon-
derating impulse ; whether for the sake of acting virtuously,
or, much more frequently, for the sake of promoting their
permanent worldly interest. And as our whole appeal is,
of course, necessarily to experienced facts, we must be
pardoned a certain familiarity of illustration. We will
begin with such a case as the following : —

I have for some time past been a reckless spendthrift,
and am well aware that I am travelling rapidly along the
road to ruin; though my temperament is such that the
positive attraction of present pleasure greatly preponderates
over the negative attraction of escape from a direly
calamitous future. One fine day, however, in my travels
I come across a wretched and squalid creature, who re-
counts to me his history ; and I find that its earlier part

Mr. MilVs Denial of Freewill. 253

is a precise parallel of my own. The sight of his abject
and deplorable condition produces on me a profound im-
pression, and the idea of him is ever haunting me. While
this impression remains fresh, there is a complete reversal
in the relative power of those attractions which solicit me ;
and whenever the thought enters my mind of squandering
money, the memory of what I have seen promptly redresses
the balance, and the definite decisive impulse of my will is
towards economy. Time, however, passes on, and my
memory of the poor creature I met with becomes fainter,
until at last, on some occasion when I am very specially
drawn by some tempting indulgence, the decisive and
definite impulse of my will is towards wasting money in
its purchase. Is it, or is it not, infallibly certain, from the
laws of human nature, that I shall yield to this impulse ?
Are there, or are there not, cases in which a person so
circumstanced — even though in no way under the influence
of religious motives — by means of anti-impulsive efforts,
holds back his will, and fixes his thoughts again on the
ruined spendthrift he has seen ; until a lively counter-
attraction has resulted, and the will's preponderating
impulse has changed its direction ? Let an inquirer
honestly examine his own past consciousness, and let him
appeal to the testimony of others : we are very certain
what the answer will be.

It will be said, perhaps, that at last there is no very
courageous or heroic resistance here, seeing that the will's
impulse, though definite and decisive, was by no means
intense. The answer, however, is easy. Firstly, if one
unmistakable case of anti-impulsive effort be established,
the deterministic theory is overthrown. Secondly, we are
the very last to allege that any very courageous or heroic
resistance to preponderating impulse will be found, except
in devout Theists.

Our second illustration shall be taken from a far

254 The Philosophy of Theism.

humbler and more commonplace event. A, B, and C,
three young brothers, go to a dentist. He tells them all
the same thing: "You have not been taught the proper
way of brushing your teeth. If you don't take more time
over it than is now your habit, and if you don't perform
the operation in the way I have just shown you, you will
lose all your serviceable teeth before you pass the prime
of life." The three of them accept his statement as true.
A has always had a perfect horror of false teeth. The
thought of such a danger is vividly present with him every
night and morning, when the tooth-brush is in his hands ;
and he spontaneously obeys the dentist's admonition. B,
by temperament, cares little for the future ; accordingly,
in a very few days he has forgotten all about the dentist,
and goes on just as he did before. Neither of these
cases evidently includes any phenomenon inconsistent with
determinism. C's history, however, is different. For two
or three weeks, indeed, his will's preponderating impulse
leads him to take the requisite trouble. One morning,
however, when the wind is southerly and the sky cloudy,
he is in a hurry to get his breakfast over and start off
hunting ; and his very decided impulse is to make his
tooth-brushing a most perfunctory operation. He dis-
tinctly remembers, however, the dentist's warning ; and
he knows well enough that, if he once begin to neglect it,
there is imminent danger of confirmation in a bad habit.
These thoughts are clearly and distinctly in his mind,
though not so vividly as to preponderate over the opposite
attraction. Nevertheless — to use an equestrian simile such
as he would himself love — he pulls himself up, and reins
himself in ; he dwells on the thoughts which are so clearly
and distinctly in his mind, until they become vivid, and
the balance of attraction is changed to the opposite side.
Determinists say that such a case as this never happens ;
that the laws of human nature forbid it. Will any candid
inquirer on reflection endorse their dictum ?

Mr. Mill's Denial of Freewill. 255

We may appeal, indeed, to the universal voice of man-
kind, which, on a matter of observed fact, is the most
irrefragable of authorities.* It is quite proverbial, and in
every one's mouth, that man has a real power of following
reason where it conflicts with passion. Now, men would
not surely have come to believe in such a power had they
not observed numerous facts in corroboration ; especially
each man within the sphere of his own intimate self-
experience.

Further, considering how very small a proportion of
mankind can look on their own habitual conduct with
satisfaction, if they choose carefully to measure it even by
their own standard of right, emphatic stress may justly
be laid on the universal conviction that there is such a
thing as sin and guilt. There could be no sin or guilt if
every one's conduct were infallibly and inevitably deter-
mined by circumstances; and what a balm, therefore, to
wounded consciences is offered by the deterministic theory !
Yet so strong and ineradicable in the mass of men is their
conviction of possessing a real power against temptation,
that they never attempt to purchase peace of mind by
disclaiming that power. But, as we have already urged,
how could such a conviction have possibly come to possess
them, had they not frequently experienced that power in
its actual exercise ? t

* Mr. Mill ("On Hamilton," p. 581, note) speaks with contempt of
" accepting Hodge as a better authority in metaphysics than Locke or Kant."
But we think there is much truth in his opponent's affirmation, " that no
philosopher, unless he be one in a thousand, can see or feel anything that is
inconsistent with his preconceived opinion."

t Mr. Mill at times has certainly a singular way of expressing his ideas
on determinism. In his work " On Hamilton " (p. 575, note), he puts this
question, with an obvious implication that it must be answered in the
negative : " If I am determined to prefer innocence to the satisfaction of a
particular desire, through an estimate of the relative worth of innocence and
the gratification, can this estimate, while unchanged, leave me at liberty to
choose the gratification in preference to innocence?" Why plainly— on
Mr. Mill's principles — to whatever extent I may more highly estimate the
worth of innocence as compared with the gratification, I am often inevitably

256 The Philosophy of Theism.

We cannot doubt, then, that even the mass of men who
live mainly for this world do by no means unfrequently,
however languidly and falteringly, oppose themselves to
the spontaneous impulse of their will. For our own part,
indeed, we hold confidently that those cases of vacillation
and vibration, to which we have more than once referred,
are often results of this circumstance. Many of these
cases, doubtless, can be explained in the way suggested by
Mr. Mill; but certainly not all. In several of them, we
are confident, the fact is, that the will first languidly and
falteringly resists its own spontaneous impulse, and then
(for want of due energy) sinks back into acquiescence ;
that another languid effort presently succeeds, to be again
followed by relapse ; and so on possibly for a considerable
period of time. Still — though all men do, from time to
time, put forth some anti-impulsive effort — it follows
obviously, as we have already said, from our philosophical
principles, that very far the most signal illustrations of the
doctrine we are defending will be found in the devout
Theist's resistance to temptation. Nor has the determinist
any right to ignore such facts because he himself may
believe that no God is cognizable and that devout Theism
is a superstition. If it be unmistakably proved that those
who hold and act on a certain belief (however untrue he
may consider that belief) do put forth great, or indeed any,
anti-impulsive effort, he is bound in reason to abandon his
theory. We will proceed, then, to exhibit, as clearly as we
can, those facts to which we invite his attention. To
Catholics they are familiar, and the determinist may easily,
if he chooses, convince himself of their truth. Nor is

driven to choose the latter in preference to the former. According to him,
this result will inevitably ensue, whenever the balance of pleasurableness is
on the side of gratification. How strange that he should speak of " estimating
the relative worth" of two objects, when he meant to express "balancing
their relative pleasurableness." He seems ashamed of his own theory, when
he has to face it.

Mr. Mill's Denial of Freewill 257

there any reason why, in stating them, we should adopt
the artificial course of veiling our own hearty sympathy
with piety, or our conviction that those who are not devout
Theists are like poor sheep going astray. It suffices, if we
carefully avoid all " petitio principii ; " if we never assume
the truth of Theism as any part of our premisses ; if we
state distinctly and articulately the facts which we are
alleging in argument.

Before we begin this task, however, we will make one or
two preliminary remarks, which will enable us to accom-
plish it better. Our readers, therefore, will understand
that what immediately follows is no integral part of our
argument, but only an introduction thereto. And the first
of these preliminary remarks is that a devout Theist thinks
very far more than another of merely intenor acts. He will
feel it a sacred duty to contend most earnestly against his
will's impulse, though solicited thereby to no other offence
than an evil thought, whether it be of impurity, of anger,
of impatience, of pride, of vainglory.

Our second preliminary remark is, that to those who
have trained themselves in habits of virtue, virtue itself
supplies an attraction — often an exceedingly powerful
one,* and which by itself suffices to counterbalance a

* What is here said in the text may at first cause a certain difficulty in
the mind of some Catholics, which we had better remove. Our comment,
however, will be more appropriately placed in a note, because it is so com-
plete a digression from our general argument.

It is held by the large majority of theologians, and appears to us in-
dubitably true, that no act is virtuous which is not directed " actually " or
" virtually " to " bonum honestum " — to a virtuous end. Suppose, e.g., I meet
a poor man, who is a singularly worthy recipient of alms. At the same time
I neither know this fact nor think of inquiring about it, but I give him some
money, merely to obtain his services as guide to some beautiful scenery in
the neighbourhood. The act is materially most virtuous, because the man is
so worthy a recipient ; but any one would be supremely absurd who should
account it & formally virtuous act of almsgiving.

The difficulty, then, in the text which may at first strike a Catholic is this :
how can virtue ever supply an " attraction " ? An act done merely for the
sake of pleasure is no virtuous act at all ; and if it be not done for the sake of
pleasure, how in such cases can virtue be said to supply an attraction ? The

YOL. I. S

258 The Philosophy of Theism.

large number of opposite gratifications. Acts of love
towards God, of gratitude towards Christ, of zeal for God's
glory, are often in a pious man extremely pleasurable ; nay,
even such acts as resignation to God's will in trouble and
patience under cruel insults, not unfrequently carry with
them special sweetness of their own. The peace also of
subdued passions and a good conscience may afford a
pleasure which " passeth all understanding." At times,
again, the thought of heaven is most bracing and exhila-
rating. Then there are negative attractions also, which
act powerfully on the side of virtue. The knowledge of
that remorse, which will assuredly follow a good man's
momentary lapse from virtue ; the fear of hell or of
purgatory ; all these may act very strongly on the emotions.
Then — as our supposed determinist set forth in his ex-
position of doctrine at the commencement of our essay —
there are negative attractions, which are very powerful
without being emotional at all.* The difficulty, e.g., of

answer, however, is simple. An act need not be motived by pleasure at all ;
and yet a very large amount of pleasure may be annexed to its performance,
whether by the ordinary laws of human nature or by God's special inter-
vention. Take the instance above given. Suppose I had known the poor
man to be a most worthy recipient of alms ; and had given him money, not in
return for any service whatever, but exclusively from my remembrance how
highly our Blessed Lord praised almsgiving ; and that forasmuch as I did it
to the least of His disciples, I did it to Him. No Catholic will deny that
this act was most virtuous ; yet I might have derived far more pleasure from
this thought of Christ than I should have obtained from the most beautiful
scenery to which the poor man could have guided me.

We do not, of course, at all deny that in very many cases there is a
mixture of motives. Perhaps I know very well how worthy a recipient of
alms is this man ; and I give him money, partly from such a reason as that
just described, but partly also that I may obtain his services as guide.
Different theologians pronounce differently on such a case, so far at least as
regards their mode of expression. We are ourselves disposed to say that the
integral energy of the will at any such moment should be considered as con-
sisting of two different acts, one motived by virtuousness, and the other by
pleasure; that the former act is simply virtuous, and the latter is simply
indifferent, neither good nor bad.

* A few words of psychological exposition will here be useful on these
non-emotional attractions ; though our doctrine ou them is entirely concur-
rent with that of Mr. Mill and Dr. Bain. Let us take our illustration from

Mr. Mill's Denial of Freewill . 250

breaking through a firmly established habit is a very
powerful negative attraction, though accompanied with
little or no emotion. And a similar non-emotional but
strong negative attraction is experienced when some good
end is proposed by the intellect with unusual vividness — a
vividness, perhaps, very far greater than is due to the
existing strength of acquired habit, because, proportionately
to such vividness, there would be peculiar difficulty and
pain in contravening that end. Taking all these and many
similar phenomena into consideration, it is easy to account
for the indubitable fact, that very frequently the spontaneous
impulse of a devout Theist's will is one of high virtue.

But every one well knows by experience how singularly
capricious is human emotion. The very same thoughts

Dr. Bain's own instance of early rising. A, B, and C agree in this, that the
spontaneous impulse of their will leads them on some given morning to rise
at an hour when the counter-attractions are by no means weak which solicit
them to stay in bed. A is thus influenced because it is the first of Sep-
tember ; all yesterday he was thinking of the partridges, and now that the
happy day has arrived he springs out of bed with a joyous heart. B fancies
he hears an alarm of fire, and starts up in a panic : while C gets up in ac-
cordance with his firm and established habit. A is influenced by a positive
attraction, B by a negative one, both acting on their will through their
emotions. But consider the attraction which acts on C ; or, in other words,
the thought of pleasure or pain which influences his will. This thought is
nothing else than his sense of the difficulty which opposes his resisting the
impulse engendered by his habit. We see at once that this thought acts
powerfully on his will in the way of suggesting pain, without exciting his
emotions at all. On the other hand, there would be a strong emotion (of
pain) if his impulse were thwarted ; if, e.g., he were compelled to go on for
hours lying in bed, because on some bitterly cold morning he had neither
clothes to put on nor means of lighting a fire.

So far we are entirely at one with determinists. For the sake, however,
of giving one further instance of the contrast between their theory and
our own, we may add that we admit a fourth case ; that of D, whose spon-
taneous impulse would lead him to lie in bed, but who, for the sake of some
good end, resists that impulse and gets up. The deterniinist must deny
that such a case is possible so long as the laws of human nature remain what
they are.

Dr. Bain, in his treatment of moral habits (pp. 500-519), speaks, so far as
we have observed, in entire consistency with his deterministic theory. For
our own part, we hold that anti-impulsive efforts are immeasurably the most
effective means of strengthening a good habit ; but Dr. Bain nowhere implies
that there are such things.

:,.

260 The Philosophy of Theism.

which on one day or at one moment excite the keenest
feeling, on another day or at another moment fail wholly of
any such effect. According to the laws of hum an nature,
this great emotional difference is prohably far more con-
siderable in the case of more susceptible and highly-strung
souls than in that of ordinary mortals ; nor do we doubt
that God often, for purposes of probation, intensifies by
special agency the working of natural laws. Every one
acquainted with saints' lives well knows the vicissitudes
between spiritual rapture on one side and spiritual desola-
tion on the other, which constitute one principal probation
of those most highly favoured among mankind.

This statement, then, brings us to the particular fact
on which we lay stress in our present controversy. At
some given moment, some holy man finds suddenly a
strongly preponderating impulse of his will soliciting him
to some act, which he regards with intense disapprobation
as a grievous offence against his Creator. He still, of
course, retains that very considerable negative attraction to
good which is caused by his habits of virtue ; but his
emotions in that direction are for the moment in abeyance,
while those leading in the opposite direction are for the
moment so abnormally excited as vastly to predominate
over the opposite attraction. Here, then, we have a crucial
test of the deterministic theory. The enormous balance of
pleasurableness is on the side of yielding to the temptation ;
and according to determinists, therefore, the holy man (by
the very necessity of human nature) yields irresistibly
thereto — as irresistibly as a physical point yields to the
resultant of the forces which attract it. We need hardly
say how violently such a statement is opposed to the most
undeniable facts. Nor, indeed, need we confine our atten-
tion to persons of saintly attainment ; the case of any
devout Theist will suffice. Let it once be understood what
is the deterministic theory, and no one, acquainted with

Mr. Mill's Denial of Freewill. 261

the most ordinary facts of Catholic experience, can hear it
advocated without amazement. For the deterministic
theory comes simply to this, that resistance to predominat-
ing temptation* is not so much as possible under the
existing laws of human nature. There is no single Catholic,
who has at any time so much as attempted to lead a devout
life, who does not know the reverse of this by his own
quite unmistakable self-experience. You might as well try
to persuade him that he is never visited with predominating
temptation as that he never resists it ; nay, you might as
well try to persuade him that the rain does not wet, that
the wind does not blow, that the sun does not warm. As
we said before, no pious man can possibly hold deter-
minism as soon as he comes to see what is meant by the
term.

It has been maintained, indeed, by determinists that no
psychological analysis is possible of such a phenomenon as
resistance to predominating temptation ; that the relation
between intellect and will, as testified by experience,
implies an absolute dependence of volitions on the motives
intellectually proposed. When we come (in a later part of
this essay) to treat objections* we will answer this in
detail ; here we will but make a brief remark. There is no
experienced fact in the whole world more conspicuously
manifest than that pious men very frequently do resist
predominant temptation. If, then, there be a psychological
theory which would lead validly to the conclusion that no
such resistance ever takes place, such theory is by that
very circumstance shown demonstratively to be false. On
the other hand, if it were really the case that the phenomena

* A person may be said to be visited by " temptation " whenever he is
solicited by any attraction towards forbidden pleasures, even though such
attraction be more than counterbalanced by other opposite ones. By using
the term "predominant" temptation, then, we mean to express a case in
which the attractions towards forbidden pleasure preponderate over their
opposites, so that the will's spontaneous impulse is fti the sinful direction.

The Philosophy of TJieism.

of resistance have not yet been satisfactorily analyzed by
scientific men, that would be no ground for disbelieving
what experience so urgently testifies, but only for working
at the indicated psychological problem. No explanation at
all adequate has yet been discovered of the phenomena of
dreams ; but men do not on that ground deny, that there
are such things as dreams. However (as we shall set forth
a little further on) we think ourselves that the psycho-
logical explanation commonly given by indeterminists is in
substance entirely sound and sufficient.

There are two further facts, which we allege to be
testified by experience ; and we will here set them forth,
not because we can lay any stress on them in our contro-
versy with determinism, but merely for the sake of avoiding
possible misconception. It is a very frequent phenomenon,
we hold, that a devout man, even when his will's
spontaneous impulse leads to an entirely virtuous act,
proceeds nevertheless by an effort to make his act more
virtuous (i.e. more efficaciously directed to the virtuous end)
than it otherwise would be. On the other hand, it is not
unfrequent that a man partially resists some temptation,
but not with sufficient energy for the avoidance (as Catholics
consider) of mortal sin.

We have now set forth, sufficiently for our purpose,
those broad facts of human action which make it so
obviously certain that determinism is false. At the same
time, our exposition will have shown how innocent we are
of charges frequently brought against indeterminists, that
they disparage the inestimable importance of virtuous
habits and of good moral education. What can be more
important for the cause of virtue than that the spontaneous
impulse of men's will should be as virtuous as it can
possibly be made ? And what other agency is there (on
our theory) which, on the whole, tends to make that
impulse virtuous, comparably with the effect produced by

Mr. Mill's Denial of Freewill. 2G3

good habits and good education ? Zealous, indeed, as the
Church has ever been in upholding Freewill, still more
conspicuous has been her zeal for her children's moral and
religious training.

One further question remains to be asked. What are
the motives which actuate a man when he resists his will's
spontaneous impulse? In every instance, by far the
easiest course is to act in response to that impulse ; and no
one will take the trouble of resisting it, except for some
unmistakably worthy motive, some clear dictate of reason.
There are two, and two only, classes of motives which occur
to our mind as adequate to the purpose. First, there is the
resolve of doing what is right. We consider ourselves to
have shown irrefragably in the third essay in this volume,
that there are various acts, cognizable under certain cir-
cumstances to be base, detestable, forbidden by a Supreme
Ruler; and certain others excellent, noble, approved, and
counselled by this Supreme Ruler. Here, then, is one most
worthy motive for resisting my will's spontaneous impulse,
whenever that impulse solicits me to something detestable
and forbidden, or even to something less excellent than
another proposed alternative. Another motive, which often
suggests itself, is my desire of promoting my permanent
happiness in the next world, or even in this. It happens
again and again that my will's spontaneous impulse solicits
me to some act which — even if I consider this world alone —
is known by me as likely to result in misery; or, at all events,
in much less happiness than I should otherwise enjoy.
Here it is a plain dictate of reason that I resist that
impulse, which otherwise would lead to consequences so
disastrous. It is an observed, phenomenon, we contend,
that men do at times resist the spontaneous impulse of
their will, when induced so to do by one or other of these
two classes of motives ; * but where such motives are away,

* We do not, of course, for a moment deny that determinists include both

264 The Philosophy of Theism.

it seems to us a matter of course that every one is always
led by his predominating attraction.

With one further explanation, we bring to a close our
positive exposition of the doctrine we would maintain. It
regards the distinction drawn by Mr. Mill, between mere
" determinism " and " fatalism." We here differ (we
think) from the large majority of his opponents ; for we
cannot but hold that he establishes his point (see his work
" On Hamilton," p. 601). Fatalists maintain that the will
can exercise no influence over the character ; and Mr. Mill
may earnestly deny this (as he does), without at all affirm-
ing that the will has any power of resisting its own
spontaneous impulse. Mr. Mill, of course, quite admits
that mere determinism is as absolutely contradictory to
Freewill as is fatalism itself. But the practical bearing on
the point at issue is excellently expressed by him, in a note
replying to an opponent, at pp. 602, 603.

Suppose that a person dislikes some part of his own character,
and would be glad to change it. He cannot, as he well knows,
change it by a mere act of volition. He must use the means
which nature gives to ourselves, as she gave to our parents and
teachers, of influencing our character by appropriate circum-
stances. If he is a fatalist, he will not use these means, for he
will not believe in their efficacy . . . but if he is a [deterrninist
and] if the desire is stronger than the means are disagreeable,
he will set about doing what, if done, will improve his character.

We are now to consider the very numerous objections
that have been raised against indeterminism : a considera-
tion which, we venture to say, will at every step put in
clearer light the irrefragable truth of that doctrine against

the pleasurableness of virtue and the pleasurableness of promoting a man's
own permanent interest among the attractions which influence his will. But
it is a matter of every-day experience that the pleasurableness of this or that
immediate gratification is more attractive than these at some given moment.
And what we allege is, that men not unfrequently resist such preponderating
attraction for the sake of practising virtue or of promoting their own per-
manent interest.

Mr. Mill's Denial of FreewiU. 265

which they are brought. It will be in various ways, how-
ever, more convenient to consider these objections as
brought, not merely against indeterminism, but against the
full doctrine of Freewill. Nor is such a procedure in any
way unfair to our opponents, but the very contrary, for it
does but offer them a larger target to shoot at. Hitherto,
then, we have been merely alleging, as an experienced fact,
that men often do resist their will's spontaneous impulse :
but in the next essay of our series we are to maintain, as
a doctrine deducible from the experienced fact, that they
possess the power of resistance; and that, possessing it, they
act with true freedom on every relevant occasion, whether
they exercise that power or no.* This is the doctrine of
Freewill ; and we are now to treat the various objections
which have been raised against it by determinists.

It is difficult to marshal Mr. Mill's objections in due
order, because he is directly answering, not our doctrine,
but Sir W. Hamilton's. We gladly give all honour to Sir
W. Hamilton, for his zealous advocacy both of Theism and
of Freewill ; but there are particulars on which we widely
differ from him, and, indeed, we regard Reid as both a
sounder and abler, though of course a very much less
learned, philosopher. Indeed, we think Mr. Mill obtains
unreasonable advantage on many philosophical questions
by replying to Hamilton's statements and arguments rather
than to Reid's. At all events, we have not ourselves to do
with any of Mr. Mill's objections, except those which are
relevant against our own doctrine. We will take every
care, however, that no one of those objections shall fail to
be distinctly stated and examined by us, either in this or
in a following essay of our series ; and we will supplement
them with all the others known to us, which have been
advanced by Dr. Bain and others of his school.

I. The first objection, we consider, shall be that to which

* This doctrine is developed in the essay on " Freewill." — ED.

266 The Philosophy of Theism.

we have already expressly referred ; viz. that no satisfactory
psychological analysis has ever heen alleged, of such an act
as resistance to the will's spontaneous impulse. We have
already said that, if this were really the case — seeing that
the fact of such resistance is undeniable — no other inference
would be legitimate, except, perhaps, that psychologians
have been wanting in perspicacity. We think, however,
that the account of the matter commonly given by liber-
tarians is true and sufficient; viz. that the will can for a
moment suspend its movement, and then proceed to a
choice of the motive on which it shall proceed to act. But
perhaps it will be more satisfactory if we work the matter
out with more detail. We will take, therefore, as our
special instance, that of a devout Theist resisting strong
predominant temptation ; because it is this which, far more
vividly than any other, displays the phenomena of Free-
mil, and because what we say of this can be applied
without much difficulty to all other cases.

We will suppose, then, a holy man resisting some pre-
dominant temptation to mortal sin. Our own view of what
takes place under these circumstances is such as this. In
the very first instant he yields to it by necessity,* because
his will has had no time whatever to collect its self-deter-
mining power. In the next instant he does two things : he
suspends the act of consent, and he looks up to Almighty
God for strength and help. We may add that such prayer
continues with great intensity (though often perhaps im-
plicitly) through the whole ensuing conflict. After the
second instant,, as we may call it, we arrive at the critical
point. Much more probably than not — since he is so holy
a man — even before the temptation began, God was im-
plicitly at least in his thoughts ; but otherwise, according

* According to Catholic terminology, the very first assaults of temptation
are called " motus primd primi ; " and to these the will consents without any
sin. They are followed by " motus secundo primi ; " and even to these the
will may consent without mortal sin.

Mr. Mill's Denial of Freewill. 2C7

to the experienced laws of habit, the very presence of
temptation summons into his mind some virtuous thought,
distinct or confused as the case may be. From the motives
which present themselves, he rapidly chooses such as seem
most hopeful for success. Sometimes it may happen that
such thoughts speedily excite the appropriate sensible devo-
tion, and that his will's impulse at once changes its direc-
tion. At other times, though very little sensible devotion
may be excited, yet the good motives are so vividly set
before his mind, that they constitute a very strong non-
emotional attraction, and that in this case also the will's
impulse is speedily changed. At other times, lastly, the
force of predominant attraction long remains on the other
side, and he is left to support the arduous conflict in deso-
lation. Students of hagiology well know S. Catherine of
Sienna's fearful probation, and her heroic demeanour for
so many days.* For all that long period, so it would
seem, the preponderance of attraction was strongly towards
forbidden gratification, and her anti-impulsive action intense
and unremitting.

Such, in our view, is on the whole a true analysis of
what takes place under the circumstances. Those psycho-
logians who are not satisfied with it must really take on
themselves the trouble of discovering a better. The broad
fact of resistance remains simply undeniable.

II. A second objection, raised by determinists, often
takes the form of a triumphantly asked question. Can it
be gravely maintained, they ask, that a man ever acts
against his strongest motive ? Never was there a poorer
equivocation than this " Achilles " of our opponents. What
do they mean by " acting against the strongest motive " ?
Do they mean " resisting the strongest attraction " ? In
that case it is the negative, and not the affirmative, answer

* We need hardly say that Catholics attribute this moral power of resist-
ing grave temptation to the agency of grace. Such considerations, however,
are external to the present controversy.

268 The Philosophy of Theism.

to their question, which is the true paradox. Is it para-
doxical to say that reason can resist predominant passion ?
or to say that it can not ? The ne plus ultra of paradox,
indeed, has been reached, we should think, by Mr. Fitz-
james Stephen, in his work on "Liberty, Equality,
Fraternity." " That any human creature," he says (p.
294), "ever under any conceivable circumstances, acted
otherwise than in obedience to that which, for the time being,
was his strongest wish, is to me an assertion as incredible
and as unmeaning as the assertion that on a particular
occasion two straight lines enclosed a space." "A man's
strongest wish " must be the wish which determined the
spontaneous impulse of his will. Mr. Stephen, then, is
not content with saying that men have, in fact, no power
of anti-impulsive effort ; but, he adds, that to affirm their
possession of that power is an " unmeaning " statement.

The only other sense in which we can understand this
phrase, "the strongest motive," is "the worthiest or most
reasonable motive." But to understand the determinist
as meaning this, is to suppose him in a state of absolute
hallucination. If all Theists acted consistently on what
they hold to be the worthiest and most reasonable motive,
they would lead lives of spotless virtue.

III. Another argument, somewhat similar to the former,
is frequently used by determinists. " When any change of
will is produced," they say, "it is always effected by the
agency of motives. Let it be supposed, for instance, that
a man is now beginning, for the sake of his own permanent
welfare, to shun some imprudent pleasure, in which he has
hitherto indulged. Well, by the very statement of the case
it is evident that a new motive has intervened, or, at all
events, has received great additional vigour; viz. the desire
of his own permanent welfare. It is in exact accordance
with our doctrine that, where there is a change in the
motives, there is a change in the will's movement."

Mr. Mill's Denial of Freewill. 269

It is this argument which, more than any other, has
impressed us with a sense of the evil resulting from the
equivocal use of the word " motive." Of course, in our
sense of the word, under such circumstances as the above,
a new "motive" has intervened; for this means neither
more nor less than that a new resolve has been formed.
But by "motive " they mean "the desire of some pleasure;"
and this being understood, we thus rejoin.

In the first place — as far as our own experience and
observation go — it is by no means universally true that
whenever a man begins to act with much greater vigour for
his own permanent welfare, the thought of promoting that
welfare has first become a more pleasurable and attractive
thought. Often it is so, but we think that often it is not
so. For argument's sake, however, we will waive this
demur, and will so far accept the determinists' allegation.

We proceed, then, to ask them this simple question.
Do they mean that, whenever a man begins to renounce
some imprudent enjoyment for the sake of his permanent
welfare, the pleasure of promoting that welfare has first
become greater than the pleasure of that enjoyment ? To
answer this question in the negative would be to abandon
their doctrine ; for it would be to say that a man sometimes
acts otherwise than according to the balance of pleasurable-
ness : they must, therefore, answer it in the affirmative.
But if the pleasure of promoting his own permanent welfare
has become greater to the agent than the pleasure of the
enjoyment, then his will's spontaneous inclination, impulse,
gravitation, is in favour of renouncement. The objection,
then, which we are here considering, turns out at Jast to
be nothing but the expression of that opinion with which
we have credited the determinists throughout : they do but
mean to say that no man ever acts in opposition to his
will's spontaneous impulse. This is the very opinion
against which we have been expressly arguing, and in

270 The Philosophy of Theism.

disproof of which we have adduced, as we consider, such
undeniable facts. It happens again and again, we are
quite confident, that a man will make efforts — if he is a
devout Theist, very energetic and sustained efforts — towards
renouncing this or that enjoyment for the sake of his per-
manent welfare at times when his thought of promoting
that welfare is distinctly less pleasurable than is the enjoy-
ment which he strives to renounce. And, in saying this,
we use the word " pleasurable " in the full sense given to
it by Mr. Mill and Dr. Bain ; as including negative pleasure,
and also what we have called " non-emotional attractions."
The proof, of course, which we give of our allegation, is the
fact on which we have so constantly insisted; viz. that
such renouncement is often begun in opposition to the
will's spontaneous impulse.

IV. Wonderful to say, determinists sometimes accuse
their opponents of holding that men possess the power of
acting without any motive. Nay, even Sir W. Hamilton
(quoted by Mr. Mill in p. 572) calls a free act a " motiveless
volition." This comes entirely from the equivocal use of
the word "motive."

V. It has often been argued by libertarians that all men
are conscious of freedom, and that there is an end of the
matter. Against this argument Mr. Mill raises (1) a verbal
and (2) a real objection. In his verbal objection we think
he is right ; in his real objection he is most certainly
wrong. We begin with the former. "We are conscious,'"
he says ("On Hamilton," p. 580), " of what is, not of what
will or can be:" and the word "conscious," therefore, is
used improperly by libertarians to express their meaning.
He admits, however (p. 582, note), on being taxed with
inconsistency by an opponent, that in his " Logic " he used
the word " consciousness " in the very sense to which he
objects in his work " On Hamilton," as expressing " the
whole of our familiar and intimate knowledge concerning

, Mr. Mill's Denial of Freewill. 271

ourselves." We will use the word " self -intimacy " to
express what is here spoken of. And this verbal question
being disposed of, we will set forth in our own way the
argument to which Mr. Mill objects, that we may consider
the value of his objection.

Take an obvious illustration. I am in the habit of
walking out with a stick in my hand. I know, by self-
intimacy, that I brandish this stick about in whatever
direction I choose ; in other words, I have a confused
memory of numberless instances in which I have willed
to do this, and the result has followed; while I also re-
member that in no single case have I willed it without the
result following. In precisely the same way, I know by
self-intimacy that I resist in some degree my will's spon-
taneous impulse, whenever I make the attempt to do so.
Then, by a certain course of reasoning, the validity of
which is to be defended in the next essay of our series, I
infer from this latter phenomenon that I have a power of
resisting the impulse of my will ; or, in other words, that
I am a free agent. Now, how does Mr. Mill reply to this
reasoning? Surely by a most shallow sophism. When
two courses are open to us, he says (" On Hamilton,"
p. 582), " I feel (or am convinced) that I could have chosen
the other course, if I had preferred it, that is, if I had liked
it better ; but not that I could have chosen one course while
I preferred the other." Such a statement would not possess
a moment's plausibility, were it not for Mr. Mill's ambiguous
use of the terms " prefer " and " like better ; " and we will
begin with exposing this equivocation. In one sense, I may
" prefer " course A to course B at some given moment ;
viz. in this sense, that I am at the moment more attracted
by the former than by the latter; that I spontaneously
gravitate to the former course, and not to the latter. And
yet at the very same moment I may "prefer" immeasurably
course B to course A : in this sense, that I think course B

'11'2 The Philosophy of Theism.

immeasurably preferable, as, e.g., being immeasurably more
conducive to my permanent happiness. Whether, there-
fore, I pursue course A or course B, in either case it may
be truly said that I pursue the course which I "prefer " to
the other ; the course which I " like better " than the other.
And it is this mere equivocation on which Mr. Mill un-
consciously rests for the primd facie plausibility of his
argument. Passing, however, from words to things, let us
look at the experienced facts of every-day life. Certainly
we do not deny it to be a matter of frequent occurrence
that (under such circumstances as those above described)
I effectively choose course A : " video meliora proboque,
deteriora sequor." But Mr. Mill has to maintain that
(under such circumstances) no human being does, or ever
did, effectively choose course B ; nay, and that no human
being has so much as the power of choosing it, so long as
the laws of human nature remain what they are. After
what has been said in the earlier part of our essay, we may
safely leave this question of fact to be determined by any
even moderately candid inquirer.

VI. Dr. Bain (p. 540) quotes Mr. Bailey with approval,
who argues that all the world in practice takes determinism
for granted : —

Men are perpetually staking pleasure and fortune and
reputation, and even life itself, on the very principle [of deter-
minism] which they speculatively reject. . . . Take for example
the operations of a campaign. A general . . . cannot move a
step, without taking for granted that the minds of the soldiers
will be determined by the motives presented to them. When
he directs his aide-de-camp to bear a message to an officer in
another part of the field, he calculates on his obedience with as
little mistrust as he reckons on the magnifying power of the
telescope in his hand. When he orders his soldiers to wheel, to
deploy, to form a square, is he less confident in the result than
when he performs some physical operation — when he draws a
sword, pulls a trigger, or seals a despatch? etc.

Mr. Mill's Denial of Freewill. 273

As regards the external act of obedience, this kind of act
is precisely of the class which on our principles can be
predicted beforehand with almost infallible certainty.
When the general has issued a command, the spontaneous
impulse of any given soldier's will is towards obedience ; if
for no other reason, because he knows that he would be at
once shot down were he to hesitate ; and, on the other
hand, neither the motive of virtue nor the motive of
permanent self-interest has any place whatever on the
opposite side. Now, as our readers will remember, it is a
very important part of our thesis that no human being
takes the trouble of resisting the impulse of his will,
unless in such resistance he is pursuing either virtue or his
own permanent happiness. The facts, then, here cited by
Mr. Bailey, square entirely with our own theory ; and
those stated in his next paragraph are precisely of the
same kind. As regards his remarks referring to Political
Economy — which we do not, however, think it worth while
to quote — we can only recommend him to read the first of
Mr. Mill's " Essays on some unsettled questions of Political
Economy," in order that he may see their fundamental
fallacy.

But the very case thus placed before his readers by Dr.
Bain — the case of military obedience — signally illustrates
what to our mind is among the greatest blots in deter-
ministic morality : its confining attention to exterior acts.
Certain sentries, e.g., are ordered to stay at their posts for
so many hours. It may be predicted with almost infallible
certainty that they will do so, because they know they will
otherwise be shot ; and because, on the other hand, there is
no motive of virtue or self-interest which can come into
play in an opposite direction. Still, the interior act, com-
manding this exterior one, varies indefinitely with different
persons ; and there is no pretext whatever for saying that
you can rely beforehand on this being this or that. A, e.g., is
VOL. i. T

274? The Philosophy of Theism.

actuated throughout hy the simple motive of obedience to
God's command ; B, in addition to this, offers up his
wearisome duty as a penance for his sins ; C is animated
by zeal for his country's cause ; D is influenced by strong
convictions on the nobleness of military obedience ; E is
kept where he is, by no other motive than his dislike of
being put to death. And a similar remark may be made
on numberless other instances, where men agree with each
other as a matter of course in doing the external act, but
differ indefinitely as to the spirit in which they do it. It
is really difficult to determine how often (according to what
we account sound moral doctrine) the good man's probation
consists — not in the external act which he has to do — but in
the motives for which he does it. We may safely 'say that
during far the largest portion of his life, his growth in
virtue mainly depends, either (1) on his choice of good
motives for his every-day acts ; or (2) on acts altogether
interior, such as patience, self-examination, humility,
forgivingness, equitableness of judgment, purity, under
circumstances of trial. All this is entirely external to the
sphere of a determinist's thoughts.

VII. Mr. Mill alleges ("On Hamilton," p. 577) that
determinism is shown to be probable "by each person's
observation of the voluntary actions of those with whom he
comes into contact ; and by the power which every one has
of foreseeing actions with a degree of exactness proportioned
to his previous experience and knowledge of the agents,
and with a certainty often quite equal to that with which
he predicts the commonest physical events." We deny
this alleged fact entirely so far as it bears on the issue
between Mr. Mill and ourselves ; but we would beg our
readers, in the first place, to remember what is that issue.
We (1) heartily admit that in every single case every
man's spontaneous impulse of will may be predicted by me
(to repeat Mr. Mill's words) "with a degree of exactness

Mr. Mill's Denial of Freewill. 275

proportioned to my previous experience and knowledge of
the agent ; and with a certainty often quite equal to that
with which I predict the commonest physical events." We
further hold (2) that no person takes the trouble of resisting
this impulse with any considerable energy, except only
devout Theists ; and we hold (3) that an exterior act may
be predicted in the abstract with almost infallible certainty*
in all those many cases in which there is no motive of
duty or self-interest which can act in an opposite direction
to the will's spontaneous impulse.* We are confident that
no power of foreseeing men's conduct can be alleged as
known by experience, which presents even the superficial
appearance of implying any greater certainty and uniformity
of human action than might have been fully anticipated
from our own doctrine. " When we speak of Aristides as
just," says Dr. Bain (p. 539), " of Socrates as a moral
hero, of Nero as a monster of cruelty, and of the Czar
Nicholas as grasping of territory, we take for granted a
certain persistence and regularity as to the operation of
certain motives, much the same as when we affirm the
attributes of material bodies." We assent to this in its full
extent ; substituting only, of course, for the word " motives,"
the word " attractions." Dr. Bain, on his side, proceeds to
admit that "the number and complication of motive forces
may elude our knowledge, and render prediction uncertain
and precarious." But let our readers observe this. No-
where has Dr. Bain, nor Mr. Mill, nor (so far as we know)
any other determinist whatever, attempted to show that
this "uncertainty and precariousness of prediction" is due
exclusively to "the number and complication of" attrac-

* By the phrase " predicted in the abstract" we mean that it could be
predicted by a person of superhuman and adequate intelligence, who should
thoroughly penetrate the antecedent facts. \Ve say with "almost" not
" quite " " infallible certainty ; " because it may be true indeed that the
exterior* act prompted by my will's spontaneous impulse is not opposed to
duty ; and yet it is possible that I shall choose another in preference, as still
better and more acceptable to God.

276 The Philosophy of Theism.

tions ; that it is not largely due to the freedom of men's
will. Yet until they have shown this, they have shown
nothing worth so much as a pin's head towards the estab-
lishment of their theory.

On the other hand, Mr. Mill refers very reasonably to
" each person's observation of the voluntary actions of
those with whom he comes into contact." Now, we are
confident that the careful examination of such a case will
be favourable to our doctrine rather than to his. We do
not mean that any experiment can be made on another
which is absolutely crucial and decisive ; * but we do say
that such an experiment will be to Mr. Mill a cause of
weakness rather than of strength. Suppose such an
instance as this. A widowed mother, most virtuous and
wise, devotes herself exclusively to the education of her
only son. She sees some critical probation of him ap-
proaching ; some abnormal circumstances, from under
which he will assuredly emerge, either much better or
much worse than he was before. Studying carefully (as
she has so long done) his temperament, tendencies, habits,
she is able to calculate with a real approach to certainty
what will be the impulse of his will under these circum-
stances ; though, of course, she does not intermit doing all
in her power to correct and elevate that impulse. But as
to how he will comport himself under the approaching
crisis — on this she is profoundly anxious. The impulse
itself, she well knows, will be more or less in an evil
direction : will he nobly resist ? or will he, reluctantly,
indeed, but effectively, succumb ? She awaits with breath-
less solicitude the resolution of this doubt. We maintain
that such a description as this is more conformable to
observed facts than is Mr. Mill's allegation ; viz. that she

* We say " on another," because we have maintained that every man may
make on himself an experiment which shall be absolutely decisive of the fact
that he can resist his will's impulse.

Mr. Mill's Denial of Freewill. 277

might be able (except for the imperfection of her knowledge
and discernment) to predict beforehand her son's movement
of will, just as she might predict the movement of a
physical point solicited by divergent attractions.

We do not, however, deny that, in proportion as men
have passed through the earlier part of their probation and
established firm habits of virtue, in that proportion their
resistance to predominant temptation (but only within
certain limits) may be predicted with much confidence.
But even if the power of prediction in such cases were
indefinitely greater than it is, it would in no way tend
to make probable Mr. Mill's theory. For consider. The
whole of Mr. Mill's position rests on the allegation that
men infallibly follow the most powerful attraction of those
which at the moment solicit them ; insomuch that the
balance of pleasurableness (positive or negative) may be
known with infallible certainty, by observing what that
direction is in which the will spontaneously moves. But
when any one is said to resist predominant temptation, we
mean, by the very force of the term, that he acts in opposition
to his spontaneous impulse ; that is (according to Mr.
Mill's theory itself) in opposition to the balance of pleasure.
Suppose, then, we could even predict with infallible cer-
tainty that in this or that given case this or that holy man
would resist predominant temptation, what could be
reasonably inferred from such a circumstance ? This could
reasonably be inferred from it — that the said holy man will
act with infallible certainty in a way directly opposite to
that which determinists regard as his inevitable course.

On our side, we easily explain this power of probable
prediction, so far as it exists : we explain it partly on
psychological, partly on theological grounds. Psycho-
logically— a confirmed habit of resistance to predominant
temptation generates a vast increase of facility and
promptitude in such resistance. Theologically — he who

•27$ The Philosophy of Theism.

faithfully corresponds with grace in the earlier part of his
probation, is (by way of reward) visited with larger and
more persuasive supplies thereof in his later years. But
all this is, of course, external to the deterministic con-
troversy.

VIII. Mr. Mill argues " ad homines " from God's
prescience. " The religious metaphysicians," he says
(" Logic," vol. ii. p. 422), "who have asserted the freedom
of the will, have always maintained it to be consistent with
God's foreknowledge of our actions; and if with divine,
then with any other foreknowledge." But we deny entirely
that God calculates future acts of the will through their
fixed connection with phenomenal antecedents, because we
deny that there is any such fixed connection. According
to the " religious metaphysicians " in whom we repose
confidence, God's knowledge of future human acts supposes,
as its very foundation, the will's free exercise in this or
that direction. It is strictly and fully, we maintain, within
my own power, that God shall have eternally foreseen me
as acting in this way or in that. Or rather God does not
foresee anything at all, because He is external to time.*

" Nothing to Him is present, nothing past,
But an Eternal Now doth ever last."

IX. Determinists often imply this syllogism. " If
determinism were untrue, there would be no such thing as
psychological, social, historical science ; but by the con-
fession of all men there is such science, therefore deter-
minism is true." We replied to this argument directly
and expressly in our Essay on Science, Prayer, Freewill,
and Miracles,! and must refer our readers to what we

* "Dei prcescientia, ex doctrina Patrum, res libere futuras supponit."
" In hypothesi quod res futures sint, Deus eas videre debet : consequenter
nempe ad liberam determinationem. . . . Cum verum sit hominem se deter-
nunaturum ad talem vel talem actionem, hoc ipso divinae notitise subest "
(" Perrone de Deo," nn. 393, 400).

t This essay is republished in the second volume of this collection.— ED.

Mr. Mill's Denial of Freewill. 279

there said. Here we will only explain that we admit the
existence of psychological, social, and historical science,
but deny that the existence of such science is incompatible
with freewill.

X. Determinists sometimes seem to imply an a priori
argument in favour of their theory. " Since physical
phenomena proceed on uniform laws " — so they seem to
reason — " how incredible that psychical phenomena should
proceed otherwise ! " Before entering, however, on the
field of thought thus opened, we will make a very brief
digression. " Naturam expellas furca : tamen usque re-
curret." Antitheists, having no belief in the God who
created all things, very often erect the uniformity of nature
into a kind of deity. Theists would protest with horror
against the very notion of change in God as being a horrible
irreverence. Quite similarly, a very large proportion of
antitheists reject, not with philosophical serenity, but with
passionate outcry, the very notion of external interference
with the course of phenomena, whether such interference
be alleged as proceeding by way of freewill, or of miracles,
or of God's constant action on phenomena in answer to
prayer.

We now proceed to the particular objection which we
are here to consider. As a preliminary, however, we beg
to ask determinists — who nowadays are also always pheiio-
menists — how they came to be so certain that physical
phenomena do proceed on uniform laws. In our last
essay we challenged phenomenists to prove, if they could,
the uniformity of nature, by mere appeals to experience ;
and we answered one by one the arguments by which
Mr. Mill professed so to prove it.

However, we ourselves, of course, entirely admit the
uniformity of physical phenomena, though we contend
that no proof of this truth can be derived from mere
experience. We ask, then, where is the a priori im-

280 The Philosophy of Theism.

probability of the supposition that psychical phenomena
differ somewhat in this respect from physical ? Where, we
ask, is the a priori difficulty in thinking that every human
will has a true power of interfering with psychical uni-
formity of action, so far as such interference is involved in
its power of self-determination ? Surely the answer to
this question depends altogether on the doctrine adopted
concerning human morality. We quite admit that, if the
utilitarian theory of morals were true, there would be a
real a priori presumption against Freewill. But for our
part, we hold that moral doctrine which we set forth to the
best of our power in our third essay ; we contend that man-
kind have full means of knowing that there is a Supreme
Euler, who imposes on them the obligation of obeying a
multiform and multifarious moral law. But if this be
so, it is absolutely incredible that the alternative should
depend entirely on circumstances (external or internal) and
in no respect on their own self-determination, whether they
do or do not obey that Euler. We believe, indeed, that
most determinists will agrefc with us on this particular
head. In fact, they are in general (we think) less keen
and earnest in opposing Freewill itself than they are in
opposing that doctrine on morality which we maintain to
be the only true one.

XI. This brings us to the last objection which we shall
consider in our present article ; viz. that which turns on
the connection between Freewill and moral responsibility.
On this critical question, Mr. Mill concerns himself, of
course, exclusively with Sir W. Hamilton's exposition of
the argument ; and as (for our own part) we dissent in
some respects from that exposition, we must begin by
setting forth in our own way the connection which we
allege to exist between men's cognizance of their freewill
and their cognizance of their moral responsibility.

If our readers wish thoroughly to apprehend what we

Mr. Mill's Denial of Freewill. 281

would urge on this matter, we fear we cannot exempt them
from the necessity of reading our essay on the principles
of morality.* In that essay we imagined a man lying
on his sick-bed, reviewing his past actions of treachery,
ingratitude, injustice, unprincipled ambition, and judging
as self-evidently true, that these actions have been
" morally evil," " sinful," nay, detested and forbidden by an
Existent Supreme Kuler. Let us now for argument's sake
make a supposition, which we believe to be impossible. Let
us suppose this hitherto repentant sinner to become firmly
convinced, that he has had no real power of acting other-
wise than he did; that he had been, in each particular
case up to the very beginning of his life, inevitably com-
pelled by the very laws of his nature to that particular line
of conduct which he pursued.f His repentance would
necessarily vanish and his judgment on his own past acts
would be reversed. He would still intue clearly that such
acts — if performed by a free person — would have been wicked
and forbidden by a Supreme Kuler. But as he had come
to think that he had not himself been a free agent, he
would no more consider himself to have been blameworthy,
than he would account a log of wood blameworthy, which
had been made the cause of a frightful railway accident.

Our argument, then, is the following : — We may infer
very confidently that such a repentant offender as we have
described is most firmly and profoundly cognizant, through
self-intimacy, of his own freedom. We may infer this
truth very confidently from the fact that he so resolutely
refuses, as is always found the case, to lay the flattering
unction on his soul, of fancying that he has not been free.
We do not say — as Sir W. Hamilton seems to say — that
men's intuition of moral evil includes an intuition of their

* The third essay of this collection.— ED.

t The reason why we regard this as an "impossible supposition," IB
because we are assuming that the man is now in earnest, and that he will not
therefore blind himself to manifest facts.

282 The Philosophy of Theism.

own free will. On the contrary, we do not regard their
conviction of their own free will as being a matter of
intuition at all, but as being the result of experience and
self-intimacy. Our argument is this. The firm and in-
eradicable conviction with which any given repentant
offender considers his moral intuitions to be applicable to
his own acts, shows how firm and ineradicable is that
conviction of his own free will which his self-intimacy has
produced.

We think that in hardly any part of his works has Mr.
Mill displayed more signal ability than in his argument
against Hamilton, from p. 586 to p. 591 ; but on reading
carefully through, not these pages only, but his whole
chapter on Freewill, we cannot find any semblance of reply
to the particular argument which we have here set forth.

We are sanguine that we have much strengthened our
case, by considering the objections hitherto recited ; having
been enabled by such consideration to place our full mean-
ing in clearer light, and to show, with greater variety of
illustration, how conformable is our doctrine with expe-
rienced facts. One objection, however, remains of a very
far more serious character, though it has not been adduced
either by Mr. Mill, Dr. Bain, or (so far as we know) by any
other writer of their school. "If all men," it may be
asked, "possess so real a power of resisting their will's
spontaneous impulse, how does it happen that this power
is by comparison so rarely and inconsiderably exercised ? "
Against Catholics in particular, as " ad homines," the same
difficulty may be still more urgently pressed. " You hold
that Catholics at least have full moral power, not only to
avoid mortal sin, but to make the pleasing God the one
predominant end of their life. Yet how few and far between
are those, of whom you will even allege that they do this !
How amazingly few, on the supposition that all have the
needful power ! Again, you hold that those trained in

Mr. Mill's Denial of Freewill 283

P

ignorance of religion have a true moral power — \vithout
supposing any special and authenticated Revelation — to
arrive at a knowledge of the One True God. Yet how hard
you will find it to lay your finger on one single heathen
who in fact has done this ! " The difficulty here sketched
demands the most earnest attention ; hut its treatment will
carry us into a line of thought entirely different in kind
from what has occupied us in our present essay. We will
therefore postpone its discussion to a future opportunity ;
content with having shown, by our mention of it, how very
far we are from ignoring it or wishing to slur it over. For
want of a better name, we will call it the " Calvinistic "
difficulty.

Another objection, which we also here pass over, is
founded on statistics and calculated averages ; and has
been borrowed by Mr. Mill (see "On Hamilton," p. 577)
from Mr. Buckle. If the Calvinistic objection is far the
strongest, Mr. Buckle's is certainly the weakest, of all which
have been adduced against Freewill. In fact, it tells
with its full force (whether that force be great or small)
against those very philosophers who adduce it. But as its
treatment will bring us across the same class of considera-
tions which are suggested by the Calvinistic objection, we
will treat the two in mutual connection.*

There are no other possible replies to our argument
which we can find mentioned by Mr. Mill or Dr. Bain, or
which suggest themselves to our mind; but if such are
adduced by any opponent, we promise to give them careful
attention. Meanwhile it may be interesting to our readers,
and perhaps practically serviceable, if we here give a little
prospectus of what we hope to accomplish on future occa-

* The author never carried out his intention of treating these arguments
expressly; but the general drift of his view on the matter is indicated in the
essay on ** The Extent of Freewill," published in the second volume of this
collection. — ED.

284 The Philosophy of Theism.

sions. In the next essay of our series we are (1) to uphold
the doctrine of causation, and then (2) to state and defend
our own full doctrine on Freewill. If sufficient space still
remains, we hope in the same essay to answer the two
objections — the Calvinistic and the Buckleian — which we
have now held over ; otherwise their treatment shall com-
mence the next following paper of our series. Then, with
the full light which we shall have gained from these in-
vestigations, we shall return to a fuller elucidation of those
doctrines on morality which we exhibited in the third essay
of the present volume. That further elucidation, we think,
will make evident two conclusions. Firstly, it will make
clear, that the Catholic doctrine on morality is alone
true ; as distinguished, not only from utilitarianism, but
from every non-utilitarian theory other than the Catholic.*
Secondly, it will show how large an array of materials for
the Theistic argument will have already been brought
together, even before we directly encounter antitheists on
that supreme issue.

* We need hardly say that, according to Catholic doctrine, the highest
type of human virtue is that exemplified by the saints.

VII.
APPENDIX ON FEEEWILL.

WE have heartily to thank the Spectator for a very cordial
and eloquent criticism of our essay on Freewill. The
criticism in question is well worthy of our readers' careful
attention, and it has suggested to us a few supplementary
remarks. Its principal portion runs as follows :—

Dr. Ward takes the ambiguity out of the common Millito
and Bainite argument for determinism, by distinguishing between
the attractions which act involuntarily upon the will, and
which really determine the character and the strength of what
he, like Mr. Mill and his school, calls the resultant attraction or
repulsion — i.e. the spontaneous impulse which springs out of all
these positive and negative attractions — and the motives by
which he denotes any kind of resolves to act, including those
which are not results of attractions or repulsions exerted on the
will, but the product of the will's own force. What Dr. Ward
then contends is, that besides the spontaneous impulse which is
the resultant of all the various involuntary attractions and
repulsions exerted over the will on any one occasion, we are
often conscious of " an anti-impulsive effort," which restrains
and sometimes conquers this resultant impulse, and which must
therefore be due to the pure energy of the will. Of course the
determinists would assert, that what Dr. Ward ascribes to
anti-impulsive effort and treats as if it were exclusive of the
involuntary attractions and repulsions acting upon the will, is
really due to a very important, though often latent, element
amongst those attractions and repulsions. The determinists
allege that the action of the will is always really identical with
the direction of its spontaneous impulse, which Dr. Ward
earnestly denies ; but the way in which the former would
j tate their difference with him would probably be this : — they

286 The Philosophy of Theism.

would say that Dr. Ward's " anti-impulsive effort " must itself
originate in some sort of desire or aversion, preference or dislike,
or at least in some habit of the mind, which is now perhaps
chronic, but is due to former influences of the attractive or
repulsive kind ; and that Dr. Ward has missed its true nature,
only owing to some disguise of form, which has served to merge
the latent attractions or repulsions in the moral or muscular
character of the struggles with opposite attractions or repulsions,
to which they are apt to give rise. For example, I make what
Dr. Ward means by an " anti-impulsive effort " to get up in the
morning, when for a moment the resultant of all the attractions
and repulsions operative on my will appears to be a " spontaneous
impulse " to turn round and drop off to sleep again. But the
determinists would probably regard the true rationale of such
a case as something of this kind : that what seems mere free
volition is nothing but a rush of involuntary force from half-
hidden springs, the laziness and love of sleep being felt in
every nerve, while the source of the desire or tendency by
which these cravings are overpowered, is for the moment sunk
beneath the surface of consciousness, and to be found in some
deep-rooted conviction, or custom, or habit of the past, which at
the present moment moulds my character, without seeming to
fascinate my will.

To this, Dr. Ward, as we understand him, would reply, that
he has already taken into account, in computing the character
of the " spontaneous impulse " of the moment, all these subtler
influences radiating from past emotions or formed habits ; that
he has taken great pains to exclude them from the "anti-
impulsive effort," and to include them in the resultant attraction
or repulsion which involuntarily sways the will before the " anti-
impulsive effort " is made. He would say (quite justly, as we
think), that if the determinist cannot directly trace the origin of
such an anti-impulsive effort to irresistible attractions and
repulsions, but is quite conscious of the plausibility of regarding
it as a living force putting forth a direct restraint over the
resultant of all the complex fascinations and antipathies which
spring out of our past character and tendencies, then the
determinist is not arguing on the phenomena as they actually
appear, but only yielding to an imperious prejudice and
superstition, in insisting that what seems a pure anti-impulsive
effort is but an involuntary wish or fear in disguise. The onus
probandi clearly lies with those who assert, that what strikes us

Appendix on Freewill. 287

all as a pure volition or effort of will, is really an unconscious
passion or aversion the character of which we have mistaken.
If we are no judges of the distinction between an involuntary
attraction (negative or positive) and the dead-heave of volition,
the argument fails altogether, and neither deterininist nor
indetorminist need attempt a problem beyond his powers. If
we are judges of that distinction, then we must produce
psychological evidence of the paradox, that a tendency rooted
deep in character seems to us to be a mere momentary anti-
impulsive effort of the will's own creation. And on this point
we heartily go with the drift of Dr. Ward's exposition. The
whole strength of the determinist's argument lies in his fixed
assumption, not in the evidence which he produces. He reasons
in a circle. First, that which fascinates the will most power-
fully is the strongest motive : next, the motive on which we
act must be the strongest motive, and, therefore (though we
don't know it), it must have fascinated the will most powerfully;
and this, though so far as our consciousness answers to our self-
interrogation, it had not fascinated our will at all, but rather
repelled it. Dr. Ward's ingenuity, in giving a separate name
to the resultant of all the involuntary attractions and repulsions
acting upon our will, and then maintaining that over and
above these we are constantly conscious of exerting an " anti-
impulsive effort " which neutralizes the spontaneous impulse of
the will, puts the vicious circular logic of the determinists in
its strongest and most impressive light.

We certainly are ourselves of opinion, that the argument
against determinism is more simply conclusive than our
kind critic is prepared to admit. He entirely agrees with
us, indeed, that determinists fail in adducing any positive
ground whatever for their opinions ; still, he thinks that the
utmost argumentative result, which in strictness can be
legitimately attained, is the disjunctive proposition : "Either
determinism is false, or the whole problem is beyond the
human intellect." We venture to hold, on the contrary,
with perfect confidence, that the problem (when duly stated)
not only is not beyond the human intellect, but receives
a Solution completely clear and unequivocal.

But on looking back at our essay under the light of

288 The Philosophy of Theism.

this thoughtful criticism, we arrive at the conclusion that
we failed in setting forth with due emphasis, and in
impressing on our readers with due detail and illustration,
the fundamental distinction on which our whole argument
turned — the distinction between what we called " anti-
impulsive " effort or action on the one hand, and any
different kind of volition on the other. We set forth that
distinction indeed (as we cannot but think) clearly enough
in one passage : but to set it forth clearly once for all, was
by no means sufficient ; and we ought to have exhibited it
in more various lights and with far greater copiousness
of illustration. The passage to which we refer, runs as
follows : —

What we allege to be a fact of indubitable experience is this.
At some given moment my will's gravitation, as it may be called,
or spontaneous impulse, is in some given direction, insomuch
that if I held myself passively, if I let my will alone, it would
with absolute certainty move accordingly ; but in fact I exert
myself with more or less vigour to resist such impulse, and
then the action of my will is in a different, often an entirely
opposite direction. In other words, we would draw our readers'
attention to the frequently occurring simultaneous existence of
two very distinct phenomena. On the one hand (1), my will's
gravitation or spontaneous impulse is strongly in one direction ;
while on the other hand, at the same moment (2) its actual
movement is quite divergent from this. Now, that which
" motives " * affect is most evidently the will's spontaneous
inclination, impulse, gravitation. The determinist, then, by
saying that the will's movement is infallibly determined by
" motives," is obliged to say that the will never moves in oppo-
sition to its spontaneous impulse. And in fact he does say this.
All determinists assume, as a matter of course, that the will
never puts forth effort for the purpose of resisting its spon-
taneous impulse. We, on the contrary, allege that there is no
mental fact more undeniable than the frequent putting forth of
such effort.

* For convenience' sake, in this paragraph we used the word " motives "
as determinists do.

Appendix on Freewill. 289"

Our chief object, then, in the following pages is to set
forth, as clearly and unmistakably as we can, the distinction
intended in this passage ; a distinction on which our whole
argument rests. Our readers may remember, that we called
by the name of an " attraction " " every thought which
proposes some pleasure, positive or negative, to be gained
by some act or course of action." This terminology being
understood, it is very plain (we added) "that every man
during by far the greater part of his life is solicited by
conflicting attractions; and it is further a manifest and
undeniable fact, that, in the very large majority of such
instances, a certain definite and decisive inclination or
impulse of the will spontaneously ensues." The attraction,
to which this inclination or impulse corresponds, we have
called the " predominating " attraction ; and the allegation
of ours, on which our whole argument rested, was this.
Very often, no doubt, men act in accordance with this
spontaneous impulse, and yield to this predominant attrac-
tion; but by no means unfrequently they resist this
impulse, and put forth what we have called anti-impulsive
effort. This last fact it is which the determinist (as we
shall presently point out) is obliged by his doctrine to
deny. What we wish first of all to make clear, is the
broad and unmistakable contrast which exists between that
class of phenomena which he is obliged to deny, and that
other class which he willingly admits. Or, putting the
same consideration in a somewhat different shape, we wish
to make clear that " desire " is one thing, " resolve "
another thing ; and that men not unfrequently both
" resolve " and act, in opposition to their " desire." And
as such is the principal purpose for which we are writing
this Appendix, our readers must excuse us, should we
become tedious by having recourse to some variety of
homely illustration.

I. A youth is very unhappy at school : his studies are
VOL. i. u

290 The Philosophy of Theism.

distasteful, his companions uncongenial, and his teachers
unsympathetic. His mind naturally dwells on these facts ;
and by degrees he comes to feel a strong desire, of not
waiting for vacation time, but running away at once. If
this continues, he will soon be scheming how to effect his
desire. But he suddenly remembers, that the home, to
which he might perhaps escape to-morrow, would be a very
different home from what it is in vacation time. There
would be no smiles of welcome and plans for his amuse-
ment, but in their stead stern reproof and enforced return
to school. This negative attraction — the thought of this
pain — entirely preponderates over the earlier, and changes
his state of mind altogether.

Now, let us dwell for a moment on this latter state of
mind. In the earlier stage he really desired to leave school
at once, but in the later stage it would be absurd to say
that he desires it at all. Doubtless he may feel, as keenly
as he did before, the evils of school ; but what he desires
under existing circumstances is to stay there. His inclina-
tion towards the immediate leaving school may be called (if
you will) an " optation ; " * but it cannot be called a desire.
Or (putting the same thing in another way), there is no
need of self-restraint^ to keep him at school ; for he has no
real desire of leaving it. There is no need of self-restraint
in order that he may act in accordance with his spontaneous
impulse and do just what he desires.

Now, let us make a different supposition. At home his
only parent is an indulgent mother, who is sure at any
time to receive him with open arms. Still, she has imbued
him with firm religious principle, which has been much
strengthened (let us say) by the religious discipline of the
school itself. Accordingly the thought soon spontaneously

* From "optarem ; " " I should desire it," were it not for its accompani-
ments. The recognized Catholic word " velleity " is far more expressive,
but it does not express the precise idea in the text.

Appendix on Freewill. 291

enters his mind that he would gain far more real good
where he is, and that his staying is far more accordant
with the Will of God. Now, as we observed in our essay,
"to those who have trained themselves in virtue, virtue
itself supplies an attraction ; often an exceedingly powerful
one." It may well happen, therefore, that the various
attractions offered him in pleasing God may predominate
over the attraction which solicits him to leaving school,
and that here, again, his true desire is to stay.

But another supposition is at least equally possible.
The attraction, which solicits him towards running away,
may predominate over the attraction of pleasing God ; and
his real desire may accordingly be to leave school. From
the motive,* however, of virtue and permanent self-interest,
he sets himself to resist that which is his spontaneous
impulse and real desire ; in conformity with his resolve to
aim at a certain end he contends against the desire, which
of itself would lead him to act in opposition to that end.
Here is a case in which " self-restraint " really does come
in. As soon as he intermits for one moment his watchful-
ness and self-restraint, his desire asserts its supremacy,
and impels his will in its own direction. To cease struggling
with himself is to give up the cause of virtue and self-
interest. We do not at all mean that this state of things
will probably continue very long ; because he will do all he
can to effect that the preponderance of attraction shall be
in favour of the end which he has resolved to pursue. But
we say that this state of mind, while it lasts, is most unmis-
takably heterogeneous from that which we last described.
Surely no two phenomena can be more clamorously distinct

* According to our use of terms, to ask what is my " motive " for some
action, is to ask what is that ead which 1 have resolved to pursue, and for
the sake of which I resolve on the performance of that action. But if a
deterfninist asks me what is my " motive " in some action, he means to ask
me what is that pleasure the desire of which allures me to do what I do.
See p. 246.

292 The Philosophy of Theism.

from each other — more impossible to be mutually confused
— than the two which we are contrasting. To resist one's
immediate desire on the one hand, or to gratify it on the
other hand — to practise self-restraint on one hand, or to
practise no self-restraint on the other hand — these (where
distinctly exhibited) are not merely dissimilar, but violently
contrasted phenomena.

II. We choose for our second illustration a case in
which the motive of resistance is not virtue at all, but mere
worldly interest. I live with an old aunt, from whom I
expect a large legacy. I go to a concert with her full
permission, on promise of being most faithfully back by a
certain hour. While I am in the very height of enjoyment
at a symphony of Beethoven's, my neighbour happens to
announce the time ; and I find I must start at once, and
make great haste too, if I am not to give my aunt grievous
offence, and imperil the fruit of years' assiduity. It is most
probable that I shall start off without delay; but two
alternatives are possible as to my state of mind in starting.
It may be that the dismay with which I contemplate the
threatened calamity entirely counterbalances the opposite
attraction. I make frantic efforts to push my way out,
regardless of my neighbour's convenience ; the strains of
Beethoven are to me almost as though they did not exist ;
at most, my inclination to hear more of them is no more
than a mere optation. On the other hand, it may be that
those strains still constitute my preponderating attraction,
and that reason has to contend against predominant
passion. My resolve, however, is firm not to offend the old
lady, and I exert vigorous anti-impulsive effort : neverthe-
less, my will is still under the fascination of the music;
.and as long as that is within hearing, if I intermit my
effort for a moment, I tarry on my way. During the whole
of my passage to the outward air, I am desiring to return,
though resolved to depart ; nor is it till the music is out of

. Appendix on Freewitt. 293

hearing that this conflict ceases. Now, no one can possibly
say that the two mental states which we have described arc
similar to each other ; for it is most manifest that they are
violently contrasted. Self-restraint is the principal feature
in the latter case, while it is entirely absent in the former.

III. Our next illustration shall be for the purpose of
explaining that the present issue does not turn at all on
the question whether effort is put forth by the agent, but
only anti-impulsive effort. With this view, we will recur in
the first instance to the illustration which we derived from
the demeanour in battle of some courageous soldier. He
will often put forth intense effort, brave appalling perils,
confront the risk of an agonizing death. But to what end
is this effort directed ? He puts it forth in order that he
may act in full accordance with his spontaneous present
impulse ; that he may gratify what is his strongest wish,
his real desire ; in order that he may overcome the enemy,
obtain fame and distinction, avoid the reproach of cowardice,
etc. Such efforts as these we may call " congenial " efforts.
But now take the instance of a military officer — possessing
real piety and steadfastly purposing to grow therein — who
receives at the hand of a brother officer some stinging and
(as the world would say) " intolerable " insult. His nature
flames forth; his spontaneous impulse, his real present
desire, is to inflict some retaliation, which shall at least
deliver him from the " reproach " of cowardice. Neverthe-
less, it is his firm resolve, by God's grace, to comport
himself Christianly. His resolve contends vigorously
against his desire, until the latter is brought into harmony
with his principles. Here, then, are two cases, which
agree with each other as being cases of intense effort;
but the former is " congenial " effort, while the latter is
" anti-impulsive." What is most remarkable in the last-
named officer is his " self-restraint ; " but it would be
simply absurd to talk of self-restraint in the former

294 The Philosophy of Theism.

instance. No one who considers ever so little can overlook
the fundamental contrast between the two cases.

Doubtless it may happen — perhaps it not unfrequently
happens — that a soldier's pluck and courage may fail him
for the moment on some most sanguinary field, and that
he reinforces them by anti-impulsive effort. But the cases
to which we drew attention as illustrating "congenial"
effort are the far more numerous cases in which nothing of
the kind occurs.

One further explanation should here be made. We do
not deny that there may be sometimes difficulty in deciding
whether this or that given effort be " congenial" or " anti-
impulsive ; " but these will always be instances belonging
to what may be called the border-land. In such a case,
the attractions on either side do not greatly differ in power ;
and it requires careful self-inspection to determine on which
side the balance preponderates. To take the common
illustration, what can be more mutually contrasted than
the respective shapes of a straight line and a circle ? And
yet the small arc of a very large circle is often quite in-
distinguishable from a straight line. But though it some-
times happens that the anti-impulsive effort is so slight as
not to be easily recognized for what it is, it happens quite
as often that such effort is so intense as to force its true
character on the notice of the most casual observer. We
cannot too often repeat that if there be such a thing in the
world as anti -impulsive effort, determinism is overthrown.
We are not at all concerned, therefore, to maintain that in
all cases, but only that in some cases, the putting forth of
such effort is an indisputable fact.

IV. We will next repeat the particular illustration cited
from us by our kind critic in the Spectator, with the view of
more distinctly confronting the difficulty which he expresses.
A rises at a given time on some given morning with simplest
promptitude and alacrity under the influence of a firmly

Appendix on Freeivill 295

acquired habit, though he experiences at the moment more
pain than pleasure in so doing. How is this to be
psychologically explained ? According to Mr. Mill and Dr.
Bain, the explanation is such as the following ; and we are
entirely disposed to think it correct. It is true enough,
then, that the rising gives him at the moment more pain
than pleasure ; but, at the same time, he is keenly con-
scious that his lying longer in bed would, on the whole,
entail on him greater suffering than his getting up. His
real desire, then, is to rise from bed. He needs no " self-
restraint " in order that he may get up ; but he would need
"self-restraint" in order that he should voluntarily lie
in bed.

Now consider, on the other hand, the case of B. His
desire — his preponderating and spontaneous impulse — is to
lie in bed ; but he resolves, from some motive or other, to
get up. In order to fulfil that resolve he exerts himself,
and puts forth anti-impulsive effort; he exercises manly
self-restraint and forces himself to rise, though it be but
laboriously and against the grain. A starts from bed by a
spontaneous and indeliberate impulse ; but B resolves and
fails, resolves and fails again, until he at last succeeds by
a crowning effort in launching himself on the sea of active
life. Surely no mental states are more unmistakably con-
trasted than these two.

According to the Spectator, however, the determinists
would reply, "that what seems free volition" in B's case
"is nothing but a rush of involuntary force from half-
hidden springs ; the laziness and love of sleep being felt in
every nerve, while the source of the desire or tendency, by
which these cravings are overpowered, is for the moment
sunk beneath the surface of consciousness, and to be found
in some deep-rooted conviction, or custom, or habit of the
past, which at the present moment moulds his character
without seeming to fascinate his will." We must say for

296 TJte Philosophy of Theism.

ourselves that we cannot see the slightest plausibility in
such a reply. We will go all possible lengths in heartily
admitting that the will is often very powerfully affected by
influences, which are for the moment — or permanently, if
you will — sunk beneath the surface of consciousness. The
same thought of pleasure and pain shall occur with equal
vividness to Y and Z ; and yet it shall impel Y towards
action with immeasurably greater power than that with
which it impels Z, because of various circumstances in his
temperament and past history.. Still, look at the matter
which way you will, all that these convictions, and habits,
and customs, and temperament can even imaginably do
is to effect that the desire — the spontaneous and prepon-
derating impulse — be this rather than that. But that act
of self-restraint or anti -impulsive effort, on which we are
throughout insisting, presupposes the spontaneous impulse
as already existing ; nor does it come into action at all,
until after the desire exists, until habits, temperament, cir-
cumstances, have done their work.* Here, precisely as
before, to act in accordance with my desire is one thing, and
to resist my desire is just the opposite thing. Nor is there
the most distant approach towards lessening the saliency

* An objection may be raised against what is said in the text, which it
will be more satisfactory expressly to notice. Suppose I desire some given
course of action, M ; and suppose I nevertheless resist that desire, from the
motive of virtuousness or of my permanent self-interest. This motive of
virtue or self-interest — so the objector may argue — on entering my mind
becomes in itself an attraction ; and may probably enough (on the very
principles of determinism) preponderate over the opposite attractions. We
answer, that such cases, undoubtedly, are by no means uncommon ; but that
they are not the cases on which we rest our argument. If the new attraction
preponderates over its rivals, then my desire is no longer for course M,
though I may have an optation towards that course. In such a case, there-
fore, although the action which I elicit is opposite to that which just
previously I had desired ; nevertheless, at the moment of action my desire
and my action are in perfect mutual accordance. But the cases on which
we insist are those in which it is manifest that I resolve and act in direct
opposition to what (at the very moment of acting) I desire. The un-
deniable existence of such cases is the fact on which we rest as fatal to
determinism.

.« Appendix on Freewill. 297

and impressiveness of this contrast, whether the desire
has been generated by obvious and recognized influences,
or by influences partially or entirely latent.*

V. There is one doctrine implied in what we have just
been saying, which it will nevertheless be more satisfactory
expressly to set forth. It has reference to what we called
in our essay " non-emotional attractions." It would be
quite unfair to allege that, according to determinists, my
action is always determined by that "motive" (as they
call it) which is accompanied by the most vivid picture of
pleasure for the moment. On the contrary, they hold,
even as a prominent part of their doctrine, that a thought
of pleasure or pain may exercise immense influence towards
action, while causing, nevertheless, little or no emotion.
We took every pains (we trust) to treat this part of their
theory with full justice. Take the preceding instance of A
rising from bed. The pain of rising may be far more
vividly presented to his imagination than the pain of lying
in bed. Nevertheless, what precisely results from his con-
firmed habit of early rising is, (1) that the pain of lying in
bed would, in fact, be found (when the time came) to be
greater than the present pain of getting up ; and (2) that
this eventual predominance of pain is at this moment duly
and influentially appreciated by his practical reason.^
Determinists undoubtedly are quite explicit in urging this
consideration ; and (as we have often said) we are entirely
disposed so far to agree with them.

In like manner, suppose I have acquired in great
strength what Mr. Mill calls a habit of virtue ; i.e. a habit
of benevolence. It will happen again and again that I
spontaneously practise what in some sense may be called
self-sacrifice ; that is, I deny myself some great pleasure or

* See what we observed in our notes at pp. 243, 244, 248, 249.

t It will be sufficiently clear here from the context what we mean by this
term *• practical reason ; " and it is not worth while to treat at any groat
length a matter on which we are entirely at one with determiuists.

298 The Philosophy of Theism.

endure some great pain for the sake of benefiting my
fellow-men. Moreover, I do this, though the pleasure
which I forego, or the pain which I endure, is painted on
my imagination with immeasurably greater vividness than
is the pleasure which I shall enjoy from acting beneficently,
or the pain which I should suffer from acting in a different
way.* We need not here give the explanation of this
phenomenon; because to do so would only be to repeat,
almost word for word, the explanation which we just now
gave.

We entirely agree with determinists on the existence of
such phenomena as these ; but we say that they do not
tend ever so remotely to discredit the argument on which
we have insisted. In the former of our two instances, my
real desire was to get up; and my inclination towards
lying in bed was a mere optation. In the latter case my
real desire was to, practise self-sacrifice ; and I had no more
than an optation towards the contrary self-indulgence. It
still remains absolutely true, then, that, according to
determinists, men by the very constitution of their nature
are inevitably determined to do what they really desire.
See Mr. Mill's express language quoted by us already.
Though we find no pleasure in such or such an action, he
says, " we still continue to desire it, and consequently to do
it." "I dispute altogether that we are conscious of being
able to act in opposition to the strongest present desire or
aversion."

In one word. The whole deterministic controversy turns
on this one question : "Do I, or do I not, at various times
exercise self-restraint? do I, or do I not, at various times
act in resistance (not to a mere optation, but) to my real
desire?" What can "motives," f or " circumstances," or
"temperament," or "habit," or "custom" imaginably do

* See the passages which we quoted from Mr. Mill, in pp. 242, 244, note,
t In the sense in which determinists use that word.

Appendix on Freewill. 299

for me, except to effect that my desire shall he this rather
than that ? How can they imaginably influence my action
in those cases where my action is contrary to my desire ?
If, then, there are such cases, if it be true that I often act
in opposition to what at the moment is my real desire, then
it demonstratively follows that my will at such times acts
for itself; independently of " pleasure," or " pain," or " cir-
cumstances," or " temperament," or anything else.

And on this critical point we appeal confidently to the
experience of any man who will honestly examine his past
and present consciousness. The question to which our
essay was directed throughout was the question we have
first named. "Do men ever resist a real desire? Is
there such a thing as self-restraint ? " He would be an
unusually bold man who, fairly confronting this question,
should answer it in the negative ; but to answer it in the
affirmative is to reject determinism in every possible
shape.

It is urgently important, however, in reference to the
course of argument which we hope to pursue in future
essays, to make thoroughly manifest that determinism is
absolutely nowhere, as the saying is ; that it is not only
demonstratively, but even visibly and palpably false. We
had rather, therefore, run the risk of saying many words
too much than of saying one word too little. And in
accordance with this feeling, we will conclude by drawing
out in form the argument on which we have insisted,
whether in our original essay or in this Appendix.

The determinist reasoning, when analyzed, will be found
to consist of two propositions.

Prop. 1st. " Every man's desire at any given moment
is infallibly determined by circumstances (1) internal and
(2) external ; i.e. (1) by the intrinsic constitution and
tendency of his mind, and (2) by the external influences
which at the moment act on it."

300 The Philosophy of Theism.

Prop. 2nd. "Everyman's will at any given moment
is infallibly determined as to its action by the desire which
prevails in his mind at that moment."

From these two propositions taken together, the deter-
ministic conclusion obviously follows ; viz. that every
man's will is infallibly determined by circumstances internal
and external, as to its action at any given moment.

Moreover, not only this is in fact the reasoning of a
determinist, but there is no other reasoning on which he
can possibly rely. It is most obvious that circumstances
cannot determine a man's will to some action, except by
disposing it thereto ; or, in other words, that they cannot
determine his action, except by determining his desire. His
desire, indeed, in many cases, may be negative and not
positive ; or, in other words, he may desire some course of
action not as being in itself attractive, but as being less
i/jiattractive than any practicable alternative. Then, again,
when we speak of " desire," we by no means refer exclu-
sively to what is sometimes called " conscious " desire.
There are very many active impulses which lead so
immediately to action that they cannot be reflected on as
distinct from the action to which they spontaneously and
irresistibly lead. We include all these impulses under the
general name " desire." And all this being understood, it
is most evident that the determinist reasoning must consist
of the two propositions above recited. If a man's action is
infallibly determined by circumstances, this can only be
because (1) his desire is infallibly determined by them, and
because (2) his action is infallibly determined by his desire.

With the former of the two propositions we are entirely
disposed to concur. Not only so, but we are disposed to
concur with it in the particular shape in which Mr. Mill
and Dr. Bain maintain it. Subject to the explanations
they give of their own meaning, we are quite disposed to
agree with them, that what determines a man's desire at

Appendix on Freewill. 301

any given moment is the balance of pleasure contemplated
by bim at tbat moment. As we observed in our essay,
we tbink that that constant gravitation towards immediate
pleasure, which observation testifies as characteristic of
humanity, gives these writers a thoroughly solid foundation
for this part of their doctrine.

It has been, then, against the second proposition of
determinists that our whole argument has been directed.
We most confidently deny that at every given moment
every man's action is infallibly determined by the desire
which prevails in him at that moment. No doubt (1) there
are very many instances in which a man does act in
harmony with his prevailing desire. There are (2) other
(we are confident) and very numerous instances in which
anti-impulsive effort is really put forth and anti-impulsive
action follows, but in which this circumstance does not so
force itself on an observer's notice but that determinists
may plausibly doubt it. But our main purpose throughout
has been to show (3) that there are other instances in
which it is seen with clearest evidence — in which no one
not flagrantly uncandid can possibly doubt — that a man
acts in opposition to his present prevailing desire. Indeed,
with one particular class of men, viz. devout Theists, the
phenomena of anti-impulsive effort are among the com-
monest and most unmistakable phenomena in the whole
world. But even if, instead of this vast multitude, there
were but one such phenomenon on absolutely certain record,
that one phenomenon would suffice to overthrow the deter-
ministic doctrine. If Mr. Mill admitted that one single
man on one single occasion resisted his prevalent desire,
that philosopher could not maintain it to be an invariable
law of human nature that men's actions are infallibly
determined by their desires.

We are the last to deny that indubitable truths are
often encountered by objections of real force, nay, of very

302 The Philosophy of Theism.

great force. It may happen from time to time, we quite
admit, that some conclusion is established with absolute
certainty, insomuch that any one would act unreasonably
(and perhaps with grave culpability) if he failed to yield it
the most absolute and unreserved assent; while at the
same time objections remain unsolved, which, if they stood
alone, would tend to make this very conclusion more or less
improbable. Here is one of the intellectual trials to which
God — doubtless for wisest purposes of probation — exposes
speculative thinkers. As we proceed indeed with our
present series of essays, we shall come across more than
one such truth as we have just described. But what we
here wish to point out is, that there is nothing of this kind
as regards the objections brought by Mr. Mill or Dr. Bain
against indeterminism. Let any one rightly understand
what such writers affirm ; and let him then proceed to look
at the most obvious and every-day facts of life ; — he will be
able to discern with the clearest evidence, that their pre-
tentious theory is a mere sham and delusion.

VIII. '
ME. MILL ON CAUSATION.*

CONSIDERING the point at which our argument has now
arrived, it will be perhaps conducive to clearness if, before
proceeding further, we address a few preliminary words of
recapitulation and explanation to our Catholic readers.

The preceding essays form part of a projected series—
as yet far from being concluded — the purpose of which is
to establish securely on argumentative ground, against the
antitheists of this day, the existence of that Personal and
Infinitely Perfect Being whom Christians designate by the
name " God." This is a task peculiarly needed at the
present moment, when the whole stream of speculative
irreligion tends vigorously to denial of a Personal God.
We trust that our arguments, as far as they have gone, will
hold their own against all gainsay ers ; but the particular
thinkers whom we have kept specially in mind are those
called " phenomenists."

It is the characteristic tenet of these persons (and hence
their name) that the knowledge possessed by any human
being is confined to his apprehension of phenomena—
whether physical or psychical, exclusively as phenomena ;
that any given intellectual avouchment is cognized by him
as a phenomenon, and as nothing more ; or, in other

* A System of Logic. By JOHN STUART MILL. Eighth Edition. London :
Longmans.

An Examination of Sir W. Hamilton's Philosophy. By JOHN STCART
MILL. Fourth Edition. London : Longmans.

304 The Philosophy of Theism.

words, that no intellectual avouchment can give him any
reliable information, except of its own existence and
characteristics.* For various reasons, we selected Mr.
Stuart Mill as the special representative of this school ; and
there is no doubt that, when we began our series, he held
far the highest place among them in the world's judgment.
His "Autobiography," .in fact, and his " Essays on
Keligion," have had so damaging an effect on his reputa-
tion, that it is now difficult to realize how " facile princeps "
of irreligious speculators he was accounted in 1871. But
for our own part, we still think that his former eminence
was well deserved, as regards any intellectual comparison
between himself and his brother phenomenists. His death,
as we have more than once said, was to us a matter of
severe controversial disappointment ; because we were full
of confidence that a signal triumph must have accrued to
the cause of truth had we succeeded in inducing him to
put forth his utmost strength against us. At the same
time, though we cannot now obtain that great advantage,
we shall still take him as direct representative of the school
which we are directly assailing ; while we shall from time
to time illustrate his position by citations from others who
agree with him.

f As we call Mr. Mill's school " phenomenists," we may
(with equal propriety call their opponents " intuitionists."
An "intuition" (as we use the term) is simply " an intel-
lectual avouchment, reliably declaring as immediately
evident some truth other than the mere existence and
^ characteristics of such avouchment." A " phenomenist,"
then, precisely as such, denies that there are such mental
facts as "intuitions;" and any one therefore who denies

* " The notion that truths external to the mind may be known by intuition
or consciousness, independently of observation and experience, is, I am per-
suaded, in these times the great intellectual support of false doctrines and
bad institutions." (Mr. Stuart Mill's " Autobiography," p. 225. See also
p. 273.)

Mr. Mill on Causation. 305

phenomenism, ipso facto upholds the existence of certain
"intuitions."

Now, it is most easy for an intuitionist to show by a
stroke of the pen that phenomenism cannot be accepted
with full consistency. For (as we have repeatedly asked) !
what is an act of memory, except an intellectual avouch-
ment ? On phenomenist principles, then, an act of memory
gives me no reliable information, except of its own existence
and characteristics ; and consequently it gives me no ground
whatever for knowing, nay, even for reasonably guessing,
what have been my past impressions and thoughts. I have
very often that present impression, which I call an act of
most clear and articulate memory; but, according to
phenomenism, I cannot know — I cannot legitimately even
guess — that this present impression corresponds to a past
fact. It is some years since we first urged prominently this
objection against phenomenism ; and, as far as we know,
no phenomenist whosoever, looking that objection in the
face, has attempted to answer it. Mr. Mill certainly
noticed our argument and professed to meet it : but (as we
pointed out in our essay on his reply) the question to which
he replied was not less than " fundamentally different from
the question which we had asked."

But, though an argumentum ad hominem against the
phenomenists is so very easily effected, it seemed to us of
vital importance that the conflict with phenomenism should
be carried very much further than this. Even as regards
the phenomenists themselves, no one can suppose that
their power of doing mischief is neutralized by a demon-
stration of their inconsistency. The most reasonable
thinker in the world — even while entirely seeing that their
system, as a whole, is self -contradictory — might attach
great weight to this or that individual objection alleged by
them against Theism, and might desire its refutation.
Moreover, the present profoundly disorganized state of
VOL. i. x

306 The Philosophy of Theism.

thought renders it, in our humble judgment, the one press-
ing philosophical need of our time, that that very course
of argument he pursued, which controversy with pheno-
menists implies. They admit, it may be said, no first
princi|^^whateyj2r* If, then, we are to defend Theism in
a controversy against them, we must take nothing whatever
for granted ; we must set forth, link by link, the whole
chain of argument, by which (as we contend) our conclusion
is conclusively established. But the careful performance
of this task, as we just now said, is (to our mind) on other
grounds, also the one philosophical necessity of our time ;
and phenomenists, therefore, have unintentionally conferred
a very important service on philosophy, by compelling their
opponents to its execution. We wish we could ourselves
more competently satisfy this pressing philosophical neces-
sity ; but, at all events, we may be of service in suggesting
a track, which others hereafter shall more successfully
pursue.

Now, there is a distinction between that order of
arrangement which such a purpose requires, and that
order of arrangement which is commonly adopted by
Catholic philosophers : and we wish our Catholic readers
to bear in mind the nature of this distinction. We have
on former occasions dwelt on a vitally important doctrine,
inculcated by Catholic philosophers. The Catholic holds,
not only, of course, that reason is the gift of God, but also
that every single adult is (except for his own grave sin) led
by his reason, energizing, at least, implicitly, to the sure
and certain knowledge of various truths, which are of vital
importance to his well-being here and hereafter. So
momentous is this doctrine, that we think the issue of the
fundamental conflict between religion and unbelief will turn
practically on the alternative, whether the said doctrine be
accepted or rejected. We would refer our Catholic readers
to an article in the Dublin Review, for October, 1874, as

Mr. Mill on Causation. 307

setting forth both our precise meaning in this statement,
and also our ground for making it.*

The purpose, then, at which a Catholic philosopher
commonly aims in his treatises, is not entirely the same
with that which our own controversy with phenomenists
obliges us to pursue. He desires to place before his reader
a map and exhibition of the various verities, which reason
suffices to establish ; and the order in which he exhibits
those verities is that which he judges most appropriate for
impressing them on the student's intelligence. As regards
the most fundamental of their number, it is not his busi-
ness to convince the learner of . their truth, because the
learner is known to be already convinced; but rather to
give him the power of contemplating and exhibiting to
himself that knowledge, which he already possesses. And
although of course the teacher adduces arguments for each
successive conclusion, he is content to derive such argu-
ments from those various other philosophical doctrines
which he knows to be common ground between the student
and himself.

Now, though this method is probably more suitable than
any other to the end at which he aims, our readers will at
once see that, unless great care be taken, it may here and

* Dr. Mivart, in his admirable " Lessons from Nature," has the following
remark (p. 5) : — " When any man has become a victim to doubt, he has no
rational choice, as he has no duty, but to reason out his doubts to the end ;
to seek to escape them by diverting his attention, or to obscure them by
calling up a cloud of emotion, is not only useless but blameworthy." We
are quite sure the excellent author does not intend to say what his words,
nevertheless, may be misunderstood to mean. Suppose a person of ordinary
or less than ordinary intellectual education has permitted himself to be
carried away for a period by the stream of antitheism, and has become a
" victim to doubt" or to worse than doubt. What means has God given him
of recovery? We have indicated what seems to us the true reply in the
article mentioned in the text. But it is surely an undeniable fact of human
nature that none except a very small minority are intellectually competent
to philosophical inquiries. With the great mass of men it would be the
most grotesque child's play if they gravely professed to explore and mutually
balance the arguments adducible for and against God's Existence, with a
view to discovering for themselves the truth by argumentative investigation.

308 The Philosophy of Theism.

there involve an argumentative "petitio principii." It may
possibly happen that when doctrine A is in question,
doctrine B shall he alleged as a proof thereof; and that
when (a volume later, perhaps) doctrine B comes to be
considered, doctrine A in turn shall occupy the place o*
premiss. But in controversial philosophy — as distinct
from the philosophy set forth by a Catholic addressing
Catholics — a "petitio principii" is the one most fatal of
flaws. And the philosophical series in which we are
engaged is precisely controversial ; for it is intended as
offering humble suggestions to Catholics, as to the argu-
ments available against the desolating scepticism now so
widely prevalent. Here it is comparatively of minor
importance, whether the truths on which we insist be
arranged in the order best suited for their full apprehen-
sion ; while, on the other hand, it is the most urgent of
necessities, that every step be thoroughly made good before
proceeding to another.

Of the successive steps which are thus to be made good,
the first, on which all else depends, consists in refuting the
characteristic tenet of phenomenism. As we have so often
pointed out, if this tenet were true — if it were true that no
intellectual avouchment reliably declares as immediately
evident aught except its own existence — it would follow
that no man has the power of knowing, nay, or of even
reasonably guessing, what has been any one of his past
experiences ; he has no power of knowing, or even reason-
ably guessing, any fact in the present or the past, excepting
the phenomena of his momentarily present consciousness.
We began our series, then, by laying down — in opposition
to this desolating scepticism — what we regard as the true
"rule and motive of certitude." We maintained that
whatever a man's existent cognitive faculties, if rightly
interrogated and interpreted, avouch as certain, is thereby
known to him as certain. This proposition we call " the

Mr. Mill on Causation. 309

principle of certitude ; " and it is the first principle of all
possible knowledge.

Here, however, it may be useful to subjoin an explana-
tion. The principle of certitude is not a "logical," but
what may be called an " implicit and concomitant," first
principle. Take the case which we have often supposed.
I am at this moment comfortably warm, but have the
clearest memory that a very few minutes ago I was out
in the cold. My absolutely certain knowledge that a very
short time ago I experienced the sensation of cold — this
knowledge is not an inference from premisses. No syllogism,
e.g., of the following type, has passed through my mind.
" Whatever my cognitive faculties declare as certain, is
really certain; but they declare as certain that I was
recently cold ; therefore, etc." Such a syllogism, we say,
does not in the least represent the ground of my conviction.
On the contrary, I am far more immediately certain of the
particular proposition that I was recently cold, than of the
general proposition that whatever my cognitive faculties
avouch as certain is really so. The present act of memory '
is immediately known by me, with keenest certitude, to
correspond with a fact truly past ; and I infer the general
principle of certitude, by means of reflecting on this and
a thousand similar data. We make, in passing, this
obvious remark, because we think it tends to harmonize
mutually certain dicta of different Catholic philosophers,
which on the surface present an appearance of discrepancy.

This principle of certitude, then, is the most fundamental
of those truths, which it is requisite to make good against
phenomenists. But there is a second, almost equally
fundamental. Theists_regard Theism_as_awgccggflr?/ verity ;
and we have. therefor^J^jrifl/mtflj^^^
of our argument, that God necessarily exists. But if the
idea " necessary " be~~cohtamed in the conclusion, it is
indispensable for the validity of the reasoning that the

310 The Philosophy of Theism.

same idea be contained in one or more of the premisses.

i Nor, indeed, is it sufficient that one or more of the premisses
be a necessary truth : it is further requisite that one or

\more of the premisses be a necessary ampliative truth. By
lan " ampliative " proposition, as we have often explained,
jwe mean one which expresses what is neither explicitly

^nor implicitly expressed in the subject. Any merely " ex-
plicative " proposition — as soon as the sense of the terms
is fully understood — at once assumes the shape " A is A."
Now, though the proposition "A is A" be indubitably a
necessary truth, no combination of such propositions as
" A is A," " B is B," " C is C "—though they went through
all the letters of a thousand alphabets — could issue argu-
ment atively in any conclusion beyond themselves. In
order, therefore, to establidaH^e—Goncliiaioji-.thad; " God
necessarily exists," one or mora-of^otir-preinisses must be
a necessary ampliative pzoposition. Here, therefore* we
are again brought into conflict with a fundamental tenet
of the phenomenists ; for they derr^ that any ampliative
proposition whatever is cogniiablaas_iiac_essary.*

The second, then, of our two fundamental propositions
is, that the human mind has a power on occasion of
/certainly and immediately cognizing necessary ampliative
'truths as such. Phenomenists deny this proposition, and
intuitionists maintain it. On no field can this battle be so
decisively fought out as on the field of mathematical axioms.
There are several reasons why we think this; and Mr.
Fitzjames Stephen has incidentally mentioned a strong
one. " The words which relate to time, space, and
number," he says, " are perfectly simple and adequate
to what they describe ; whereas the words which relate to
common objects are nearly in every case complex, often to

* It is not easy to find out whether they admit the proposition " A is A "
to be necessary ; we doubt, indeed, whether they have looked the question in
the face.

Mr. Mill on Causation. 311

the highest degree." On the other hand, there is no part
of his case which Mr. Mill more carefully elaborated than
that which concerns mathematical axioms. He accounted
"the chief strength" of the intuitionist philosophy "in
morals, politics, and religion," to lie in " its appeal to the
evidence of mathematics." To expel it thence, he adds,
"is to drive it from its stronghold " (" Autobiography,"
p. 226) ; and he put forth, accordingly, his very utmost
strength for the accomplishment of this task. This was
one special reason which led us to encounter him hand to
hand on this particular ground. Mr. Mill, feeling the vital
importance of the issue, replied promptly to our arguments ;
and Mr. Fitzjames Stephen, at a later period, assailed us
from a somewhat different point of view. On our side, we
thought it indispensable to reply ; * so that, as it happened,
this particular constituent of our argument was swelled to
a somewhat disproportionate size.

We here, then, assume ourselves to have been successful
in showing that the human mind has a power of cognizing
immediately certain necessary ampliative truths as such.
Now, further, no one will doubt that, if any such truths be
cognizable, the validity of the syllogistic process is among
their number. In proposing, then, to establish Theism
argument atively against phenomenists, what we propose is
this. We are first to lay down certain ampliative truths,
which we shall maintain to be immediately cognizable as
necessary, drawing out such an appeal to the phenomena
of man's intellectual nature as shall show us to be well
warranted in so maintaining. Then, combining these
truths with the facts of experience, we are to infer, as
legitimately resulting from this assemblage of self-evident
truths and experienced facts, that God certainly exists.

As we apprehend our position, the chief premisses

* The reply to Sir James (then Mr.) Stephen is not republished in this
collection.— EDITOR.

312 The Philosophy of Theism.

needed for our ..argument are divisible into three classes :
\ we need (1) certain truths in regard to morality; (2) certain
truths in regard to causation; and (3) certain truths in
regard to human freewill. Immediately after our article
on necessary truths, and before Mr. Mill had replied to
that article, we entered on the first of these classes ;
and we proved, we trust, so much as this, viz. that
certain moral verities are cognizable as necessary. There
are further doctrines concerning morality, which it will
be important to point out and elucidate ; but before
approaching these, it was desirable to consider freewill.
The establishment of this truth against phenomenists
required the establishment of two conclusions, one psycho-
logical and.jLh^-e4b^aLj^etaj)hy1sical. Phenomenists allege,
as a matter of experience (to use Mr. Mill's words) that
"volitions follow determinate moral antecedents with the
same uniformity and the same certainty as physical effects
follow their physical cause." This is the tenet of deter-
Tm'nisTn.* We argued against it in our last essay but
one, and supplemented our reasoning by some further
remarks. We called our own adverse position by the
name " indeterminism," being the purely negative position
that volitions are not certainly determined by psychical
antecedents. But jreewill includes another doctrine be-
sides that of jnj^tejm^in|sni ; iTlgpJujgsT tbe_ doctrinejhat
man is a janl f-dfiforrn Jrying nan HP. of volition . And this
proposition, of course, cannot be treated until we have
considered the question of causation. The principle of
causation, then, is to occupy us in our present essay.
/ Now, at starting, we must refer to one among the most
/ signal proofs Mr. Mill has ever given of his deficiency in
\ philosophical discernment. The sense in which he uses
vthe word " cause " is as simply different from that in which

* All phenomenists are determinists ; but the converse by no means holds,
that all determinists are phenomenists.

Mr. Mill on Causation.

intuitionists use it as is the word " box," when signifying
a " shooting-box " or an " opera-box." * We do not say
that he is entirely unaware of this fact ; but we do say that
he constantly fails to bear it in mind on occasions when,
for want of his doing so, his whole argument becomes
simply unmeaning.! This obstacle, then, against a mutual
understanding must at once be removed; and our first
undertaking shall be, therefore, to make as clear as we can
what Mr. Mill meansby a "cause." With him, foe idea,
of "cause" is essentially based on that doctrine which is
called " the uniformity oTnature j" and if i
visible and phenomenal nature, physical or
not proceed uniformly, there would be no such thing as jt

" cause "^at all. This is so undeniably his terminology,

that the very same truth whicbas_aQnieiinies called by him
" the uniformity of nature " is elsewhere called by him
"the law of universal causation." We must begin, then,
by considering (1) what phenomenists meanjwhen they
affirm that nature ^pj^eds_janifoxinly-^and (2Xhpjv_far we
can ourselvesoonenr with the proposition which they thus
intend to express.

The pEenomenist doctrine, on the uniformity of nature,
may easily be expressed with sufficient precision for our
present purpose. " Between the phenomena which exist
at any instant," says Mr. Mill (" Logic," i. 377), " and the
phenomena which exist at the succeeding instant, there is
an invariable order of succession." His whole theory, '
indeed, of inductive logic (ii. 95) "depends on the assump- 1
tion that every event, or the beginning of every pheno- \
menon, must have some antecedent, on the existence of '

* We do not at all forget that every one, in writing on political or social
subjects, uses the word " cause " in Mr. Mill's sense ; as e.g. when it is asked
" What were the causes of the French Eevolution ? " or " What are the causes
of high wages ? " But in philosophical discussions the case is quite other-
wise.

t See, as a signal instance of this, the whole argument in his " Essays on
Religion," from p, 142 to p. 145.

314 The Philosophy of Theism.

which it is invariably and unconditionally consequent."
Similarly in a later work. " When we say that an ordinary
physical fact always takes place according to some in-
variable law, we mean that it is connected by uniform
sequence or co-existence with some definite set of physical
antecedents ; that whenever that set is exactly reproduced,
the same phenomenon will take place, unless counteracted
by the similar laws of some other physical antecedent ;
and that whenever it does take place, it would always be
found that its special set of antecedents (or one of its sets,
if it has more than one) has pre-existed " (" Essays on
Religion," p. 224). In other words, according to Mr. Mill,
no phenomenon ever shows itself — be it physical or
psychical — without a corresponding phenomenal ante-
cedent ; and the same phenam£Bal_ajitejc^dent is invariably
followed by the same- phenomenal- -eofisequent. This
intensely complex fact — the uniformity of nature — con-
sists, he would add, of certain less complex groups of
facts called " the laws of nature." It is a " law of nature "
e.g. that if wheat seed be duly sown, and there be no
adverse phenomena, wheat plant will in due time grow
up : and so in a million of other cases, physical or
psychical. He would hold that this existent uniformity
of nature may imaginably be brought to a close in two
; different ways. On one hand, the existent laws of nature
might be changed for different laws: as e.g. it might be-
come a law of nature that, if wheat seed is sown, the barley
plant shall duly follow. On the other hand, the existent
laws of nature might come to an end, without being suc-
ceeded by any others whatever ; so that, in his own words,
" a chaos should succeed, in the which there was no fixed
succession of events, and the past gave no assurance of the
^future."

We need hardly say that we substantially accept this
•statement; but we do so, subject to two important excep-

Mr. Mill on Causation. 315

tions. We regard it_ajl generally true, but by no p^»"fi ftp

universally tmej that, viable a,nd phenomenal* nature pro-
ceeds uniformly. In the first place, we hold that this
uniformity of nature is interrupted with indefinite frequency
by miracles and other prodigies. In the second place, we
maintain that one most important class of psychical
phenomena, viz. human volitions, are largely external to
the common law of uniformity.

We are now able to understand what Mr. Mill means by '
" cause." " We may define the ' cause ' of a phenomenon "
he says, "to be the antecedent, or the concurrence of ante-
cedents, on which it invariably and unconditionally follows "
(" Logic," i. 392). And he implies in this statement what
he has already stated in p. 376. " When I speak of the
cause of a phenomenon, I do not mean a cause which is
not itself a phenomenon. The cajia£s_mth which I concern

myself ^re not efi&ci^f. V^f, pTiygiWl /mn«PQ " It is his^^
deliberate profession, that by the term " cause " he always i
intends to express a certain phenomenon, more or less ]
complex — a phenomenon which, according to the existent,-
laws of nature, is invariably and unconditionally followecy
by another phenomenon more or less complex, which ha
calls the effect of such cause.

As ft is of some practical importance that our readers
shall be sufficiently familiar with Mr. Mill's view of causa-
tion, we will enter on one or two further details, which are
not strictly necessary to our subsequent argument. We
will consider briefly, then, a criticism which has sometimes
been made on his view, viz. that, according to that view,
day is the " cause " of night, and night of day. For our
own part, we think he has sufficiently disproved this
allegation. These are his words : —

It is necessary to our using the word cause, that we should
believe not only that the antecedent always has been followed
by the consequent, but that, as long as the present constitution

316 The Philosophy of Theism.

of things endures, it always will be so. And this would not be
true of day and night. We do not believe that night will be
followed by day under all imaginable circumstances, but only
that it will be so provided the sun rises above the horizon. If
the sun ceased to rise, which, for aught we know, may be
perfectly compatible with the general laws of matter, night
would be, or might be, eternal. On the other hand, if the sun
is above the horizon, his light not extinct, and no opaque body
between us and him, we believe firmly that unless a change
takes place in the properties of matter, this combination of
antecedents will be followed by the consequent, day ; that if the
combination of antecedents would be indefinitely prolonged, it
would be always day; and that if the same combination had
always existed, it would always have been day, quite inde-
pendently of night as a previous condition. Therefore is it that
we do not call night the cause, nor even a condition, of day.
The existence of the sun (or some such luminous body), and
there being no opaque medium in a straight line between that
body and the part of the earth where we are situated, are the
sole conditions, and the union of these, without the addition of
any superfluous circumstances, constitutes the cause. (" Logic,"
i. 391.)

The considerations here set forth by Mr. Mill bear on
another question, on which, as it seems to us, he has not
quite done justice to his own theory. He says (i. 380)
that there is no " scientific ground for the distinction
between the cause of a phenomenon and its conditions"
This certainly holds good (on his theory of causation) in
regard to any such condition as intuitionists call a " con-
dition sine qua non ; " but we doubt whether it holds good
in regard to conditions in general. No instance is more
commonly given as illustrating the distinction between a
" condition " and " cause," than the distinction between
ploughing and sowing. Every intuitionist says, as a
matter of jsouxse, that there is a rej^^ejajji^^

contact of seed^with earijon one

hand, and the plant's growth on the

ploughing is a mere condition, and does not causally inflow

Mr. Mill on Causation. 317

into the effect. But it seems to us (though we by no means
speak confidently, and the matter is of no practical import-
ance whatever), that on Mr. Mill's own theory also, the
ploughing is not legitimately accounted part of the " cause."
Let it be supposed that hitherto the joint presence of A, B,
and C has been the invariable antecedent of M. It does
not, nevertheless, therefore follow (on Mr. Mill's theory)
that A is a partial cause of M, unless it be also true that,
so long as the present laws of nature endure, the union of
B and C will never be followed by M unless they are
accompanied by A. Now, it is included in the existent laws
of nature that whenever the seed is duly deposited in the
earth, the plant, except for accidental impediments, will in
course of time grow up ; and conversely also, that the plant
will never grow up unless seed has first been duly deposited
in the earth. But there is no ground that we know of for
accounting it inconsistent with the existent laws of nature,
that some other method be discovered, entirely different
from ploughing, whereby earth and seed shall be brought
into due contact.

Our two last remarks have been made by us, as we
said, with no other purpose than that of more familiarizing
the inquirer's mind with Mr. Mill's interpretation of the
word " cause." And if our readers think that our attempted
vindication of him has been unsuccessful, that he is obliged
in consistency to account night the cause of day, and to
deny all distinction between cause and condition, — they
are perfectly welcome to think so: they will in no way,
by so thinking, be placed out of harmony with our own
general argument. We will now, however, without further
episode, pursue that argument. The sense, then, in which
intuitionists use the word "cause" is so fundamentally i
different from Mr. Mill's, that it would be impossible to,
contend against phenomenists without inextricable con
fusion, unless we first close this inexhaustible inlet of mis-

318 The Philosophy of Theism.

apprehension. Indeed, we are confident, as we shall
presently argue, that the phenomenistic tenet on causation
could never have been persistently held by men even of
average intelligence, had they not veiled from themselves
the true nature of their tenet by their equivocal terminology.
For this reason we entirely decline, in argument with Mr.
Mill, to use the word " cause " in his sense ; and we must
at once, therefore, look about for some term which shall
sufficiently express his idea. On reflection, we think it
will be satisfactory if we use the word "prevenant" to
denote what he calls "cause;" "postvenant" to denote
what he calls " effect ; " "prevenance " to denote what he
calls " causation." We think it not only no inconvenience,
but, on the contrary, a very great advantage, that these
words, being invented by ourselves for the occasion, can
have no other technical sense. It is becoming a more and
more common complaint that so much confusion of thought
finds entrance into philosophical discussion, through words
of ordinary use being employed to express important philo-
sophical ideas : it is becoming more and more commonly
felt, that no word can endure the rough handling of every-
day colloquialism without acquiring considerable ambiguity
I of sense. On our own side, we must explain to our Catholic
readers that the " cause," with which our reasoning con-
cerns itself throughout, is what Catholic philosophical
works call "the efficient cause."'

These verbal preliminaries having been laid down, we

| are now to maintain that "the principle of causation "is

I self -evidently cognizable, as a necessary ampliative truth.

• The "principle of causation," or (as we shall sometimes

, call it) " the causation doctrine," is expressed in the state-

\ ment that " whatever has a commencement has a cause ; "

* Catholic philosophers, indeed, usually include " moral " cause under the
head of " efficient." But this sense is here excluded. A moment's consi-
deration will show that when these philosophers enounce " the principle of
causation," they do not at all include " moral " causation.

Mr. Mill on Causation. 319

or, which is equivalent, that "every new doctrine or new
mode of existence has a cause." Our readers will of
course ask for some explanation as to the sense in which
we, on our side, use this word " cause." We at once
admit that such explanation is most reasonably required
at our hands ; and this explanation, indeed, will occupy a
prominent place in the course of our argument. But
before entering on our argument at all, we wish to avov
frankly that we base our conclusion, not on grounds o
experience, but of intuition ; that we shall appeal to
experience only as testifying the universality of a certain
intuition. And if phenomenists promptly exclaim, as they
are sure to do, that " intuition " means only " my private
persuasion," and that my own private persuasion can be
no evidence of objective truth,f our answer to this objec-
tion has been stated again and again. It is only through
intuition that either phenomenists or any one else can

* Some Catholics may possibly doubt whether we have laid a sufficiently
broad foundation for the Theistic argument in our way of stating the prin-
ciple of causation. Thus Dr. Mivart, whose authority on such a question is
very great, supplements the principle of causation as expressed in the text
by another, which he accounts equally evident, viz. that " everything must
be either absolute or caused ; " that is, that every contingent thing is caused
(" Lessons from Nature," p. 356). He adds this supplement because of his
holding with S. Thomas, that reason cannot by itself disprove with certitude
the eternity of matter. It will be desirable, therefore, that we briefly place
before our Catholic readers the position on this subject, which we are
ourselves prepared in due course to sustain.

Now, Liberatore, who himself also holds S. Thomas's doctrine, admits
nevertheless that some scholastics and " almost all modern philosophers "
are against him (" Cosmologia," n. 30). Petavius (de Deo, 1. iii. c. 6, n. 1)
declares it to be the universal patristic doctrine, used constantly in contro-
versy with the Arians, that the notion of an eternal creature is cognizable
by reason as intrinsically repugnant. It may be worth while further to add
that Liberatore himself (" Logic," n. 230) defines an " effect " as " that which
advances from the state of possibility to the state of existence ; " or, in other
words, which has a commencement.

With sincere deference, then, to those eminent Catholics who on this
matter follow S. Thomas, we cannot do so ourselves. Nay, we regard the
thesis that " all contingent tilings have a commencement " as more obtrusively
(if we may so speak) axiomatic than the thesis that " all contingent things
have a cause."

t Certain persons, says Mr. Mill, "addict themselves with intolerant

320 The Philosophy of Theism.

possess experience of phenomena. Those particular intui-
tions, which are called acts of memory, are literally the
only bases they can allege for any one experience which
they cite. In truth, each man's act of memory may be
called his own^^riyui^-fier^naision ^jor_j' internal feeling/'
/in a much more simple and literal sense than can those
untuitions of causality to which we shall now appeal. For
each man's memory of his past experience is strictly
0 peculiar to himself; whereas the intuitions, which we
shall here allege, are common, as we maintain, to all

mankind.

Now, as to what is the genuine positive sense of that
word " cause," which is the centre of our argument, this
is a question which we are presently to consider, with as
much accuracy and completeness as we can. But the first
fact to which we would draw attention should be noted
anteriorly to this consideration. It is most evident, on
even a superficial examination of facts, that a certain idea
of causation which is, at all events, fundamentally different
from the idea of prevenance — and a belief in the widely-
spread existence of causation as so apprehended — that this
idea and belief, we say, prevail generally among mankind.
Indeed, we are able to call Mr. Mill himself into court, as a
signal example of the thoroughly false intellectual position
in which any one is placed who attempts to identify causa-
tion with prevenance. His professed theory is, of course,
most intelligible. In no case of causation, he says (" On
Hamilton," p. 377), "have we evidence of anything more
than what experience informs us of ; and it informs us of
nothing except immediate, invariable, and unconditional
sequence." And the context shows, even if it could be
otherwise doubtful, that by " sequence " he here means

zeal to those forms of philosophy in which intuition usurps the place of
evidence, and internal feeling is made the test of objective truth " (" Essays
on Religion," p. 72).

Mr. Mill on Causation. 321

sequence of phenomena. Yet, in his work on " Logic," the
following remarks are to be found — remarks which, as
coming from Mr. Mill, may be characterized as not less
than astounding. He is speaking about the question of
miracles, and we italicize a word or two :—

In order that any alleged fact should be contradictory to a
law of causation, the allegation must be, not simply that the
cause existed without being followed by the effect, but that this
happened in the absence of any adequate counteracting cause.
Now, in the case of the alleged miracle, the assertion is the
exact opposite of this. It is that the effect was defeated, not
in the absence but in consequence of a counteracting cause ;
namely, a direct interposition of aw act of the will of some being
who has power over nature. A miracle is no contradiction to the
law of cause and effect : it is a new effect supposed to be pro-
duced by the introduction of a new cause (ii. 167, 168).

In the eighth edition of his " Logic," when answering
a criticism of ours, Mr. Mill introduces a similar remark
into an earlier page :—

I admit no other uniformity in the laws of nature than the law
of causation, and a miracle is no exception to that law. In every
case of alleged miracle a new antecedent is affirmed to exist, a
counteracting cause; viz. the volition of a supernatural being
(p. 110).

But his professed theory is, that " between ihe phenomena
which exist at any instant and the phenomena which exist
at the succeeding instant there is an invariable order of
succession." Mr. Mill cannot snrftly ur^n to calLa^yolition
of the Invisible God by the name of a phenomenon j and we
must account, then, lor fliisT extraordinary logical collapse
by the impossibility, which Mr. Mill himself experienced,
of expelling from his mind that idea which so clamorously
presents itself to all men — the idea of true causation.

And this collapse is the more significant, if we consider
what absolute havoc it makes of those very philosophical
VOL. i. Y

322 The Philosophy of Theism.

principles which he accounted more essential than any
others. Mr. Mill did not admit the existence of any science
except experimental ; and no one felt more strongly than
he that the uniformity of nature is a doctrine absolutely
indispensable to the very existence of experimental science,
whether physical or psychological. Take any one of the
million truths firmly established by such science ; e.g. the
truth that " all diamonds are combustible." How is it
possible for me to acquire reasonable proof of this truth ?
I know, by experience, that those diamonds are combustible
on which I have made the experiment ; and I know, by the
testimony of others, that those diamonds are combustible
on which they have made the experiment. But I have not
the shadow of ground for extending my proposition to all
diamonds, unless I have sufficient proof that nature proceeds
uniformly.* So keenly, indeed, did Mr. Mill feel the justice
of this remark, that he elaborated with great care a proof
of what he called " the law of universal causation," as being
the one corner-stone of his whole philosophical edifice. Yet
suddenly it appears that he held no doctrine at all of
"universal" phenomenal "causation." Suddenly it ap-
pears that he held no doctrine on the uniformity of nature
inconsistent with his supposing that there may be as many
deities on Olympus as Homer himself believed in, and that
each one of these deities is arbitrarily interfering with the
course of nature every minute of every day. In every one
such case, "the volition of a supernatural being" would
count with him as " a new antecedent," as a " counteract-
ing cause ; " so that every arbitrary and irregular pheno-
menon so brought about would be, in his view, "a case of
the law of universal causation," " and not a deviation from
it." If we could trust what he says in the two passages we

* It may most fairly be asked how belief in the Catholic miracles is con-
sistent with belief in the certainty of physical science. We answer this
question directly and expressly in our essay on " Science, Prayer, Freewill,
and Miracles."

Mr. Mill on Causation. 323

have quoted, he never intended to defend "the law of
universal causation " in any such sense whatever as to
imply that nature proceeds uniformly ; or in any such sense
whatever as would represent that law to he a sufficient
foundation for experimental science. How, it may he asked,
do we account for "this amazing he wilder ment of thought ? j
We reply that, even in the case of Mr. Mill, his intuitional
element is too strong for him. " Naturam expellas furca,
tamen usque recurret." The existence of a causality, entirely
distinct from prevenance, is so clamorous a dictate of
human intelligence that even Mr. Mill cannot be always
shutting his ears to it.*

And this lands us in a further comment. It is a
favourite topic of the phenomenistic controversialist that
intuitionists are self-condemned, by the very fact of their
admitting the existence of an opposite party. " How can
you say," he asks, " that the intuitions to which you appeal
are universal, when the very next moment you say that
they are not universal ? when the very next moment you
say that a large and dangerous school of philosophy declares
itself unconscious of their existence ? " We reply, in the
first place, that Mr. Mill often confesses that those intel-
lectual avouchments to which we appeal are universal ; and
only contends that they cannot in reason be accepted as
evidences of objective truth. But, further — and it is to this
we are here specially drawing attention — again and again,
when he is not thinking of his theory, he himself accepts
them as evidences of objective truth. Consider e.g. his
dealing with the idea of " morally good." It is the very
foundation of his moral system, that the term cannot
reasonably be used, except as signifying " beneficial to
mankind." And yet there is hardly any writer of the day
who so abounds with appeals to " virtue," " moral eleva-

* Mr. Mill speaks with a very far greater reflection on this matter, in his
posthumously published "Essays on Religion," pp. 224-226.

324 The Philosophy of Theism.

tion," and the like, which are pure and simple nonsense if
you try the experiment of substituting for those terms what
he maintains to be their equivalent. Of course, we think
this fact most honourable to his moral nature ; but his
moral nature is thus advantageously exhibited to the sacri-
fice of his philosophical intelligence. The passages to which
we refer are as simply inconsistent with the theory professed
by him on morals, as those which we have been just now
citing are inconsistent with the theory professed by him on
causation.

In this spontaneous and unconscious admission of a
causation entirely distinct from prevenance, Mr. Mill does
but represent the rest of mankind. Not only all mankind
have an idea of causation as distinct from prevenance, but
they have an irresistible and deep conviction that causation
exists over and above mere prevenance. Had they not this
conviction, how would they regard the stream of phenomena ?
No such thing could be supposed by them to be in rerum
naturd, as " influx " or " dependence." The visible world
would be to them a mere phantasmagoria or external
picture. They would recognize no closer nexus between the
wheat seed and the wheat plant, or between the sun and
the sensation of warmth, or between human volitions and
human bodily movements, — than between the first letter of
the alphabet and the second, or the boy who always stands
first in class and the boy who stands next him, or the
moment of time which we call " eleven o'clock " and the
moment of time which we call "five minutes past eleven."*
But every person of ordinary intelligence, who is not think-
ing of a gratuitously assumed theory, would peremptorily

* It might be said, with much plausibility, that in Mr. Mill's vocabulary
" eleven o'clock " ought to be called a cause of " five minutes after eleven ; "
for most certainly the later moment "invariably and unconditionally
succeeds " the earlier. We suppose Mr. Mill would reply that a moment of
time is not a, phenomenon. But such reply would put in still stronger light
the amazing inconsistency of his calling God's agency a " cause."

Mr. Mill on Causation. 325

repudiate such a view of things, as repugnant to his deep
and sure conviction.

We have argued, then, that mankind not only have an
idea of causality, distiflgtrfr^m the idea of prevenanceTTTut
that they have a conviction that causality exists among
phenomena, and not mere prevenance. Our second step
will be to consider more precisely ^wEat is this idea of
causality. We consider, on one hand, that the idea tf caused
is a simple idea, not composed of any others ; and on the
other hand, that it is a purely intellectual idea, noffaT copy
of anything experienced by the senses, in the course^of
our essays we have already mentioned two such simple
and purely intellectual ideas, viz, "necessary" and
" moral good/' and to thegfi_wft hers add f.hp.f. nf

Now, of course there is ascertain difficulty in explaining an
idea of this kind. Were it a copy of some sensation, we
could content ourselves with referring to such sensation.
Were it composed of simpler ideas, we could explain it by
reciting those simpler ideas. But neither of these methods
being (by hypothesis) available, we can only suggest the
occasions on which an inquirer may unmistakably recognize
what is beyond doubt a very prominent part of his mental
furniture. Now, the instance most commonly given by
philosophers of a "cause," seems to us most happily
chosen for our purpose, as being one in which that idea is
exhibited with especial distinctness and prominence : we
refer to the influx of a man's mental volitions into his
bodily acts. I am urgently in need of some article, con-
tained in a closet of which I cannot find the key, and
accordingly I break open the closet with my fist. Certainly
my idea of the relation which exists between my volition
and my blow is something indefinitely beyond that of mere
universal and unconditional sequence. If on the one hand
that idea is incapable of being analyzed, on the other hand
it is to the full as incapable of being explained away or

3:>G The Philosophy of Theism.

misapprehended. The idea is as characteristic and as
clamorously distinguished from every other as is that of
" sweet," or "melodious," or "white." Phenomenists may
deny that it corresponds with any objective reality; but
they cannot deny that it is in fact conceived by the human
mind, without exposing themselves to the intellectual con-
tempt of every one who possesses the most ordinary in-
telligence and introspective faculty. The words "force,"
"power," "influx," "agency," or, on the other hand,
" dependence," may more or less suggest the idea
" cause ; " their respective significations being (as we hold)
more or less founded on that idea. But at last the most
efficacious way for each man to apprehend it, is to imagine
some such instance as we have named.

It will, perhaps, be serviceable if we give a second illus-
tration. I am bent on acquiring a knowledge of Euclid,
and I apply my mind therefore vigorously' to mastering
the demonstration given by him of some theorem. Con-
sider the relation which exists between my volition on one
hand, and my intellectual process on the other. Here is an
instance, differing widely in circumstances and detail from
that just now given : and yet this identical notion of "cause "
is no less unmistakably present to my mind when I consider
this case, than it was when I considered the former.

And now we come, lastly, to the third and crowning step
of our argument. The "principle of causation," or the
" causation doctrine," is, that "whatever has a commence-
ment has a cause." We maintain that this proposition is
cognized by the human mind as self-evidently certain and
necessary.

This psychological allegation can of course only be
established by means of psychological trial. But on whom
shall we make the trial ? We will not exactly say " fiat
experimentum in anima vili ; " but at all events it will not
be fair to make the experiment on a philosopher, be he

Mr. Mill on Causation. 327

intuitionist or phenomenist. If a landlord and farmer
disagree, they will not choose for arbitrator some landlord
or some farmer, but perhaps some lawyer. In like manner
disputing psychologians will not be satisfied with the
award of one who has already espoused his theory. And
we indeed on our side, as has been seen, have especial
reason for distrusting the verdict of phenomenists, because
again and again, when expressly confronting some philo-
sophical theory, they persuade themselves to disbelieve
their own possession of this or that conviction ; whereas,
when they allow themselves free play, that very conviction
proves its existence in their mind by the most undeniable
energy. We will not, then, appeal to the arbitration of
philosophers. But, as is clear, neither can we satisfactorily
appeal to the verdict of rough and uneducated minds, which
may be wholly incapable of introspection. It is manifest
indeed, we maintain, to impartial observers, that a convic-
tion of the causation doctrine energizes in them quite as
powerfully and constantly as in their more cultivated
neighbours, but we cannot expect them to depose to its
existence. The fair arbitrator, then, will be some person,
on the one hand, of sufficiently cultivated faculties, but, on
the other hand, who has not given his attention to philo-
sophical inquiries. To obtain from such a man his genuine
avouchment, you may deal with him in some such way as
the following : —

You draw his attention to the fact that here is some
wheat on the ground ripe for the sickle. You place
intelligibly before his mind the doctrine, that what caused
the wheat to grow has been partly certain properties or
forces of the seed, and partly certain properties or forces
of the earth with which that seed has been brought into
contact. He entirely assents. " I should never have
dreamed," he says, " of any other notion." You point out
to him, however, the possibility that God or some super-

328 The Philosophy of Theism.

natural being has miraculously there placed the wheat,
' without any seed having been previously sown. " Well,"

he replies, " it stands to reason that if there be a God, He
can do this ; but I need very strong proof indeed before I
accept the supposition of a miracle." Lastly, you suggest
to him, that perhaps neither was seed sown nor did any
preternatural being interfere, but that the wheat came
there without any agency at all. As soon as he under-
stands what you mean — which probably he does not find
very easy — he is angry at his common sense being insulted
by so self-evidently absurd a supposition. You rejoin, that
he believes God to exist without any cause ; and you ask
him why therefore he cannot believe that wheat may exist
without any cause. The obvious unfairness, as he will
account it, of such a suggestion increases his wrath. In
his own unscientific language, he gives you to understand
that God never began to exist ; nay, that Existence is

- involved in his very Essence. " The monstrous allegation,"
he will add, " against which I am exclaiming, consists in
your statement that a thing can begin to exist — can come

' from nothingness into being — except through the agency of
some cause or other." If you then proceed to cross-ques-
tion him on this word "cause" — if you suggest that he
means by it no more than " prevenant " — his wrath is still
greater than before, so completely have you denaturalized
his meaning. And he will account it just as self-evidently
absurd to say that anything can commence without a
cause, as it would be to say that a trilateral figure can be
quadrangular, or that two straight lines proceeding in the
same mutual direction can finally intersect.

We have imagined this little scene for the purpose of
exhibiting those phenomena of human nature which, as we
maintain, make it so absolutely certain that men instinc-
tively regard the principle of causation as a self-evidently
cessary truth. We need not spend many words in

Mr. Mill on Causation. 320

repeating what we have so often urged before; viz. that if /
this psychological fact be admitted, the corresponding
ontological truth rests on an absolutely impregnable basis.
If the principle of causation be avouched by the human mind
as a necessary truth, it tjTaTnecessary trufli. I should be
thought not less than insane, if I doubted the voraciousness
of my memory as to what I experienced two minutes ago ;
but I have in some sense even stronger reason for accept-
ing what — not my own private intuition alone, but — the
intuition of all mankind avouches as certain.

We may take this opportunity, however, for considering
a particular instance of objection often adduced by pheno-
menists — an objection to which we have virtually replied
indeed again and again, but which we have not on earlier
occasions expressly encountered. " Is there any one of
your so-called intuitions," asks the phenomenist, " which
the human mind more spontaneously and irresistibly
avouches, than for many centuries, it avouched as self-
evident that the sun moves round the earth? Yet you
admit that this latter avouchment was a pure delusion ;
and why therefore may not its avouchment of the causation
doctrine — granting for argument's sake that that avouch-
ment exists — be equally delusive ? "

We begin our reply by a remark, which is no part
indeed of our argument, but which is required for the
purpose of clearness. Take any time and place, in which
men never dreamed of Copernicanism. In that time and
place, their acceptance of geocentricism has nevertheless
not been an immediate judgment ; it has been one of those
numerous instances in which an inference is made so
rapidly, inevitably, and imperceptibly, as to be easily
mistaken for an immediate judgment. The syllogism, of
which the geocentric judgment is the conclusion, may be
thus stated : " That which is incompatible with undoubted
phenomena is false ; but any theory other than geocentri-

3.30 The Philosophy of Theism.

cism is thus incompatible, and is therefore false." It may
be worth while also to add, that the major premiss of this
syllogism is undeniable. On the other hand, my assent to
the causation doctrine is not the mere conclusion of a
syllogism, but is an immediate judgment. For the only
syllogism which could possibly issue in that doctrine as in
its conclusion, would be reducible to the following form : —
" Every X must have a cause ; but whatever has a com-
mencement is an X ; ergo, etc." : where X must represent
some class larger than that of " things which have a com-
mencement." But most certainly no syllogism of this type
passes through my mind as my motive of assent to the
principle of causation.*

We proceed, then, to answer the objection before us.
And, reverting to the geocentric syllogism as just now
drawn out, we answer the objection by simply denying that
men ever gave an absolute assent either to the minor
premiss or to the conclusion of that syllogism. We shall
be better able to explain what we here mean if we cite, with
a few verbal changes, a course of remark contained in a
former essay.

" Phenomenists are very fond of adducing this or that
instance, in which they allege that our faculties declare as
certain what is not really so. I see a straight stick in the
water, and my faculties (they urge) pronounce as certain that
the stick is crooked; or if a cherry is placed on my crossed
fingers, my faculties pronounce as certain that my hand is
touched by two substances. All these superficial difficulties are
readily solved by resorting to a philosophical consideration,
which is familiar to Catholics, though (strangely enough) we
do not remember to have seen it in non-Catholic works. We
refer to the distinction between what may be called * undoubt-
ing ' and what may be called ' absolute ' assent.

* The only possible "class X" would be "contingent things." But
even Dr. Mivart does not say — nor could any one say on reflection — that
the proposition " all contingent things are caused " is more immediately
evident to the human mind than the proposition " all commencing things
are caused."

Mr. Mill on Causation. 331

" By * absolute ' assent wo understand an assent so firm as
to be incompatible with the co-existence of doubt; but by
* undoubting ' assent we mean no more than that with which
in fact doubt does not co-exist. Now, the mere undoubtin guess
of an assent does not at all imply any particular firmness, but
arises from mere accident. For instance : a friend, coming
down to me in the country, tells me that he has caught a sight
of the telegrams as he passed through London, and that the
Versailles government has possession of Paris.* I had long
expected this, and I assent to the fact without any admixture of
doubt. In an hour or two, however, the morning paper comes
in; and I find that my friend's cursory glance has misled him,
for that the army has only arrived close up to Paris. The
extreme facility with which I dismiss my former 'undoubting'
assent, shows how very far it was from being * absolute.' Its true
analysis, in fact, was no more than this : ' there is an a priori
presumption that Paris is taken.' But as no particular motive
for doubt happened to cross my mind, I was not led to reflect
on the true character of the assent which I yielded.

" Now to apply this. Evidently it cannot be said that my
cognitive faculties declare any proposition to be certainly true,
unless they yield to that proposition * absolute ' assent. But a
moment's consideration will show that my assent to the crooked-
ness of the stick or the duplicity of the cherry may accident-
ally indeed have been undoubting, but was extremely far from
being absolute. Its true analysis was, ' there is an a priori pre-
sumption that the stick is crooked, or that there are two objects
touched by my fingers.' The matter may be brought to a crucial
experiment by some such supposition as the following : —

" I am myself but youthful, whether in age or power of
thought ; but I have a venerable friend and mentor, in whose
moral and intellectual endowments I repose perfect confidence.
I fancy myself to see a crooked stick, or to feel two touching
objects ; but he explains to me the physical laws which explain
my delusion, and I surrender it with the most perfect facility.
He proceeds, however — let us suppose, for the purpose of probing
the depth of my convictions — to tell me that I have no reason
whatever for knowing that I ever experienced a certain
sensation, which my memory most distinctly declares mo to
have experienced a very short time ago; or again, that as to the
particular trilateral figure which I have in my thoughts, I have

* This was of course written in 1871.

332 The Philosophy of Theism.

no reason whatever for knowing it to be triangular, and that he
believes it to have five angles. Well, first of all I take for
granted that I have not rightly understood him. When I find
that I have rightly understood him, either I suspect him (as the
truth indeed is) to be simulating ; or else I pluck up courage
and rebel against his teaching; or else (if I am too great an
intellectual coward for this) I am reduced to a state of hopeless
perplexity and bewilderment, and on the high-road to idiocy.
There is one thing, at all events, which I cannot do. I cannot
compel myself to doubt that which my existing faculties testify
as certain. So great is the distinction between merely * un-
doubting ' and ' absolute ' assent ; between my faculties testify-
ing that there is an a priori presumption for some proposition,
and their testifying that it is certainly true"

The contrast, contained in this latter paragraph, can be
applied with its full force to our present theme. I have
never heard of Copernicanism, and hold with " undoubt-
ing " assent the geocentric theory. But a venerable friend
and mentor explains to me, that heliocentricism is in no
respect incompatible with phenomena ; and indeed that, on
the heliocentric supposition, the familiar phenomena of
daily life would be precisely the same as on the geocentric.
So soon as I understand this, I have not so much as the
faintest difficulty in surrendering my geocentricism. My
belief in that theory may have accidentally been " undoubt-
ing," but it was extremely removed from being " absolute."
Now, the very contrary of this holds as to the principle of
causation. If I were called on to believe that something
came into existence without a cause, and if accordingly I
made an effort to do so, I should be " reduced to a state of
hopeless perplexity and bewilderment, and on the high-road
to idiocy." I could not possibly compel myself to believe
it, precisely because my existent faculties declare it to be
self -evidently false.

So much on this particular objection. As regards our
general argument, it may be worth while briefly to note one
thing further, which is evident as soon as stated. The idea

Mr. Mill on Causation. 333

of cmifljitinTi OILJO way whatftver^jiepends—

idea of pr^Yft^^n£g_an^rftly defends— p^J&gjmiformity of
nature* __ To take our old instance, let us suppose that tho
wheat plant had no prevenant whatever ; that the very
same phenomena, which in one time or place precede its
appearance, when found in combination at another time
and place usher in some completely different phenomenon
from that of the wheat plant. Such a circumstance woulu
not give me the slightest difficulty in understanding what!
is meant by a cause, nor would it in the slightest degree/
affect my certain knowledge that the wheat plant IMS a\
cause. If secondary causes lost all power of acting —
as God, in the Catholic belief, is indubitably free tol
deprive them of that power — such cessation of their power ,
would not ever so remotely tend to weaken that argument |
for God's Existence, which is derived from the principle of \
causation.

On looking through Mr. Mill's chapter on causation in
his reply to Hamilton (pp. 359-379), we find but one small
portion of it which, as far as we can see, requires any
further notice than is contained in the preceding pages.
Both Sir W. Hamilton and Mr. Mill himself (p. 371)
repudiate the theory of " Wolfe and the Leibnitzians," that
to deny the principle of causation would be to violate the
principle of contradiction. We do not know whether we
have made it sufficiently clear that we are ourselves at one
both with Hamilton and his critic, in heartily repudiating
that theory ; though we have been told by a learned friend
who seems to know, that "Wolfe and the Leibnitzians"
are as far from holding it as we are. Perhaps it will
conduce to more precise apprehension of what we have
throughout intended, if we notice expressly this possible
philosophical position.

We regard, then, that proposition which expresses the
causality doctrine, not as an "explicative," but as an

334 The Philosophy of Theism.

' " ampliative " proposition. In fact, as we have already
said, if it were only " explicative," it could not possibly
have any philosophical importance ; whereas, in truth, there
is hardly a more important principle throughout the whole
range of philosophy. " Whatever has a commencement
has a cause." We are as far as Mr. Mill himself from
alleging, that by any possible analysis of the idea " having
a commencement " we can find therein included the idea
" having a cause." What we do allege as regards the
above-named proposition is, that, in F. Kleutgen's words,
"by merely considering the idea of the subject and the
predicate, I come to see that there exists between them
that relation which the proposition expresses."* I consider,
on one hand, the idea of " having a commencement." I
consider, on the other hand, the totally distinct idea of
" having a cause." And by considering the two ideas, I
come to see that there exists between them that relation
which is expressed in the principle of causation. My power
of cognizing the principle of causation— just as my power of
cognizing other self-evident truths — arises from that most
precious property of the human mind whereby it is
enabled to cognize with certainty as self-evident a large
number of ampliative truths. It is precisely in virtue of
possessing this property that the human mind is capable
\oi knowledge properly so called.

But now to deny the truth of an ampliative proposition,
however obtrusively self-evident such proposition may be,
is not in itself to violate the principle of contradiction. If
I say e.g. that some trilateral figure is quadrangular, I say
what is self-evidently absurd, and I say what leads by

* F. Kleutgen says that it is such a proposition as this which Catholic
philosophers intend to denote by the term " analytical." On the other hand,
non-Catholic philosophers, whether intuitionist or phenomenist, use the
word " analytical " as synonymous with what we call " explicative." We
have before said that for this reason we think it better to avoid the term
" analytical " altogether.

Mr. Mill on Carnation. 335

necessary consequence to a contradiction, but not what is
itself self-contradictory.

Here we bring to a close our treatment of causation.
We need hardly say, that there are many questions con-
cerning it on which we have not touched. In particular,
we may mention Mr. Martineau's theory — a theory hardly
differing from what is called " occasionalism " — that no
substance can be a cause, even a secondary one, unless it
possess intelligence. We feel great respect and gratitude
to Mr. Martineau, for his very valuable labours in the cause
of true philosophy ; but on this particular tenet we are
obliged to dissent from him with much confidence. At the
same time, we shall not enter into controversy on the
subject, because our purpose only requires us to deal with
those truths which are necessary for the argumentative
establishment of Theism.

In the next essay of our series we hope to conclude
what we have to say on freewill. Since we last wrote on
that theme, Dr. Bain has brought out the third edition of
his volume on " The Emotions and the WTill," in which he
has inserted (pp. 498-500) a few pages of reply to our
former essay. Our first business, then, will be to re-
capitulate the arguments which we adduced against deter-
minism, with special reference to Dr. Bain's objections.
Secondly, we hope, by help of the causation doctrine, to
establish as certain that every human adult is to himself
a self-determining cause of volition. Lastly, we have to
answer two particular objections — one of them extremely
momentous — which we named in our essay on Mr. Mill's
" Denial of Freewill."

IX.

FKEEWILL.
BEPLY TO A EEPLY OF DR. BAIN'S.

THE plan according to which we have hitherto laid out
our essays, and which we hope to continue, was set
forth, we trust, with sufficient clearness in our essay
on Causation. Our argument led us in due course to
the very fundamental and critical question of Freewill.
Our reasoning on that subject, we consider, was such as
will hold its own against all gainsayers ; hut the two
opponents whom we encountered as specially representing
the hostile camp, were Mr. Stuart Mill and Dr. Bain.
Mr. Mill's death had at that time already occurred ; hut
Dr. Bain, in the third edition of his great work on " The
Emotions and Will," referred to our essay on Mr. Mill's
denial of freewill, and professed to refute it. His remarks
— expressed, we are bound to say, with most abundant
courtesy — seem to us so very insufficiently considered that,
had they come from an ordinary writer, we should not have
thought it worth while to notice them. But Dr. Bain is
justly recognized as one of the two living thinkers — Mr.
Herbert Spencer being the other — who stand at the head of
the English psychological (as distinct from physiological)
movement towards antitheism. Then, his volume itself,
on the " Emotions and the Will," is one, we think, of very
conspicuous ability; one which shows in various places

Freewill. 337

great power of psychological analysis ; and one which
throws much light on some hitherto obscure corners of the
human mind. Moreover, he was the one living person
with whom we were in direct and immediate conflict. We
have really, therefore, a right to deal with him as with
a representative man, and to take credit on our own side
for whatever weakness may be found in his reasoning. At
last he has, of course, full liberty to " amend his plea ; "
and if he is disposed hereafter to make a greater approach
towards putting forth his full strength on the point at
issue, we promise him we shall encounter him with greater
readiness and gratification than we do at present.

If the reader wishes thoroughly to apprehend the
reasoning we put forth in our former essays on this subject,
we fear we cannot dispense him from the necessity of reading
our two articles. Even supposing him, however, to have
done so, a brief summary of our essential and fundamental
argument will fix its salient points more definitely in his
mind. Such a summary also may be useful, as exhibiting
the general lie of the controversy even to those who may
not care to go thoroughly into the matter. But, most of
all, such a summary is indispensable if Dr. Bain's various
replies are to be placed in a clear light.

We did not profess to treat the whole doctrine of Free-
will. We considered it exclusively on its psychological
side, reserving all metaphysical questions for later con-
sideration. Mr. Mill and Dr. Bain maintain, " as a truth
of experience" "that volitions follow determinate moral
antecedents with the same uniformity and the same
certainty as physical effects follow their physical causes."
This, in fact, is the doctrine called by its upholders the
" Deterministic." We joined issue on their own ground of
experience, and alleged that experience testifies the precise
contradictory of their thesis. As Dr. Bain calls his doctrine
"Determinism," we called our contradictory one by the
VOL. i. z

338 The Philosophy of Theism.

name of " Indeterminism." The full doctrine of Freewill
includes, indeed, the doctrine of Indeterminism ; but it
includes also a certain doctrine on the causation of human
acts. This latter is a metaphysical question, and must be
argued — as, indeed, we argue it in the second part of our
present essay — on metaphysical grounds. Here we have
no concern with it, except to mention that it is external
to the controversy of our previous essays. We began by
drawing out with much care a full statement of Dr. Bain's
theory, as we apprehend it. Dr. Bain implies that he is
satisfied with the accuracy of our analysis ; for he says
(p. 498) that "the arguments for and against Freewill
are clearly summarized " in our essay. We further pointed
out, that there are two different cases which need to be
separately considered. There are cases in which for
a while the will's spontaneous impulse exhibits much
vacillation and, as one may say, vibration. But we
added that " in the enormous majority of instances there
is no vacillation or vibration at all in this spontaneous
impulse ; that on the contrary, in these instances, there is
one definite and decisive resultant " of the various attrac-
tions which at any given moment act on the mind. We
think that our own doctrine of Indeterminism is established
by experience with no less conclusiveness in the former
than in the latter class of cases. Still, it is the latter class
of cases which place those mental facts on which we rely
in more intense and irresistible light ; and to this class of
cases, therefore, we mainly appealed.

In the great majority of those moments, therefore, which
together make up my waking life, my will is so promptly
determined by the combined effect of the various attractions
which solicit it, that its preponderating spontaneous impulse
is definite and decisive. So far Dr. Bain and ourselves are
in entire mutual agreement. Supposing, then, Dr. Bain
could show that men never resist this preponderating

Freewill. 339

spontaneous impulse, we should not have a word further
to say in our defence. Our contention against him turns
precisely, critically, vitally, on one all-important and most
definite kind of phenomena. " What we allege to be a
fact of indubitable experience " — these were our words—
" is this. At some given moment my will's gravitation,
as it may be called, or preponderating spontaneous impulse,
is in some given direction ; insomuch that if I held myself
passively, if I let my will alone, my will would with absolute
certainty move accordingly : but in fact I exert myself,
with more or less vigour, to resist such impulse ; and then
the action of my will is in a different, often an entirely
opposite, direction. In other words, we would 'draw our
reader's attention to the frequently occurring simultaneous
existence of two very distinct phenomena. On the one
hand, my will's gravitation or preponderating spontaneous
impulse is strongly in one direction; while, on the other
hand, at the same moment its actual movement is quite
divergent from this. Now, that which motives " — to use
Dr. Bain's terminology * — " affect, is most evidently the
will's spontaneous inclination, impulse, gravitation. The
Determinist, then, by saying that the will's movement is
infallibly determined by ' motives,' is obliged to say that
the will never moves in opposition to its preponderating
spontaneous impulse. And, in fact, he does say this. All
Determinists assume, as a matter of course, that the
will never puts forth effort for the purpose of resisting
its preponderating spontaneous impulse. We, on the

* We used the word " motive" in a different sense from Dr. Bain. What
Dr. Bain calls a " motive," we called an " attraction." According to our use
of terms, to ask what is my *' motive" for some action, is to ask what is that
end which I have resolved to pursue, and for the sake of which I resolve on
the performance of that action. But if a Determinist asks me what is my
" motive " for some action, he means to ask me what is the attraction which
allures (and infallibly determines) me to do what I do. By "motive" he
means an " attraction ; " but by " motive " we mean, not a certain attraction,
or a certain soh'citafo'on, but a certain governing retolve.

340 The Philosophy of Theism.

contrary, allege that there is no mental fact more un-
deniable than the frequent putting forth of such effort."
"And on this critical point," we added, "issue is now to
be joined." *

We proceeded to give instances in which, we think,
no fair inquirer can doubt that men do put forth that
anti-impulsive effort, as we called it, on which we lay so
much stress ; and, be it observed, if so much as any of
these instances be admitted as genuine, the controversy is
conclusively decided in our favour. It is quite clear to our
mind, we say, that no intelligent person, who really gives
his attention to the matter, can fairly examine these
instances without admitting their conclusiveness. It is not
all intelligent persons, however, of the phenomenistic
school who will really give their attention to what their
opponents say. And a most kind criticism of our essay,
which appeared in the Spectator, impressed us with the
opinion that we had failed in conveying to adverse readers,
with due detail and illustration, the fundamental distinction
on which our whole argument turned; the distinction
between "anti-impulsive effort " on one side, and the will's
"preponderating spontaneous impulse " on the other. To
the supplying of this defect, therefore, we devoted a supple-
mentary essay. If our readers wish thoroughly to apprehend
the strength of our case, we must beg them to peruse that
essay. Here we can but exhibit a few specimens of the
instances which we suggested. And we should premise that,
in order to obtain greater freedom of expression, in this
second essay we somewhat enlarged our terminology. In
what here follows — for the sake of still further, we hope,
elucidating our argument — we have, in some unimportant
respects, somewhat modified the said terminology ; but no

* In quoting our former essays, we occasionally make some entirely
unimportant change of expression, in order to obtain, we hope, somewhat
greater clearness.

Freeivill. 341

one can even cursorily peruse our second essay on the
subject, without understanding us to mean exactly what we
shall now proceed to express. The chief term which we first
introduced in that essay, was the term " desire." If my
will's preponderating spontaneous impulse he directed to the
attainment of some given result, I may be said to have a
" preponderating desire," or simply " the desire," of that
result. Or, again, the said preponderating spontaneous
impulse may be called my " strongest " present impulse, or
my " strongest " present desire. Very frequently, of course,
there exists what may be called a " desire," but one which
is not the " strongest," the " preponderating," present
desire. For example : A is called very early on the 1st of
September, and feels a real " desire " to sleep off again ;
nevertheless, his wish to be early among the partridges is a
stronger, more influential, more keenly-felt, more stimu-
lating desire. His " strongest present desire," therefore,
his "strongest present impulse," his "preponderating
spontaneous impulse," is to get up at once ; which he
accordingly does, as a matter of course. His weaker desire
is to stay in bed, his strongest present desire to get up.

This terminology being understood, our illustrations
were directed to show that over and over again men resist
their strongest present desire. Let us revert to a preceding
illustration. When A is called early on the 1st of Septem-
ber, his strongest present desire is to get up, and he gets up
as a matter of course. But B, who is no sportsman, has
also ordered himself to be called early the same morning,
for a very different reason. He will be busy in the middle
of the day, and he has resolved to rise betimes, that he
may visit a sick dependent. When he is called, by far his
strongest present desire is to sleep off again : but he exerts
himself; he puts forth manly self-restraint, and forces
himself to rise, though it be but laboriously and against
the grain. A starts from bed by a spontaneous and

342 The Philosophy of Theism.

indeliberate impulse; but B resolves weakly and fails,
resolves more strongly and fails again, until he at last
succeeds by a still stronger and crowning resolve in launch-
ing himself on the sea of active life. " Surely," we added,
" no mental states are more unmistakably contrasted than "
the mental states of A and B respectively ; though both are
called early and both get up. A obeys his strongest present
desire, while B resists it.*

Parallel instances, we just now pointed out, are ex-
tremely frequent; and to this point we shall presently
return. At the same time, we said in the first essay,
" very far the most signal," the most impressive, the most
arresting " instances of the doctrine we are defending, will
be found in the devout Theist's resistance to temptation."
We gave an illustration in our second paper. " A military
officer — possessing real piety and steadfastly purposing to
grow therein — receives at the hand of a brother officer some
stinging and, as the world would say, ' intolerable ' insult.
His nature flames forth ; his preponderating spontaneous
impulse — his strongest present desire — is to inflict some
retaliation, which at least shall deliver him from the
' reproach ' of cowardice. Nevertheless, it is his firm
resolve, by God's grace, to comport himself Christianly.
His resolve contends vigorously against his strongest
present desire, until the latter is brought into harmony with
his principles." What a sustained series of intense anti-
impulsive efforts is here exhibited ! What could be wilder

* We do not forget that a third hypothesis is possible. In another man,
C, there may be that " vacillation " and " vibration " of the will's pre-
ponderating spontaneous impulse, which we have already mentioned. He
is, we may suppose, a much less keen sportsman than A. His desire of
lying in bed is at one moment slightly the stronger, and his desire of getting
up is slightly the stronger next moment. Such vacillation, indeed, may
continue for no very inconsiderable time. But what we ascribe to B is, that
when he is called, his indefinitely strongest present desire is his desire of
sleeping off again; and that he combats that desire, from a motive of
benevolence, by vigorous anti-impulsive effort. No one surely will doubt
that such a case is frequent enough.

Freewill. 343

than to say that, during this protracted period, he is acting
in accordance with his strongest present desire, and with
his will's preponderating spontaneous impulse ?

Let it be distinctly observed that we rest our case, not
on the mere fact of an agent putting forth effort of the will,
however intense ; but anti-impulsive effort. Here, again,
we drew our illustration from some gallant soldier. Such
a man " will very often put forth intense effort ; brave
appalling perils ; confront the risk of an agonizing death.
But to what end is this effort directed ? He puts it forth in
order that he may act in full accordance with his preponde-
rating spontaneous impulse ; in order that he may achieve
what is his strongest present desire ; in order that he may
defend his country, overcome his country's foe, obtain fame
and distinction, gratify his military ardour, etc." Such
efforts as these — efforts directed to the gratification of a
man's strongest present desire — we called " congenial "
efforts; and undoubtedly the fact of such efforts being
frequently put forth affords no argument whatever against
Determinism. These efforts may be not less intense — they
may, if you will, be indefinitely more intense than those
which we commemorated in the preceding case. The
two classes of effort mutually differ, not in degree but in
kind. As regards our present argument, their difference
is fundamental : that difference being, that " congenial "
efforts are in accordance with the agent's strongest present
desire, whereas " anti-impulsive " efforts are in opposition
to it. And we may be permitted, perhaps, to point the
contrast more emphatically, by introducing what may in
some sense be called a theological consideration ; though
in truth the fact to which we refer is an observed fact of
experience, like any other. What soldier, then, could be
found who would bear insult, contumely, and contempt
with perfect patience, unless he were supported by earnest
and unfaltering prayer ? But certainly with a very large

344 The Philosophy of Theism.

number there is no need of earnest and unfaltering prayer,
in order to heroic action in the field. There have been not
so very few warriors of truly amazing intrepidity, who have
not exactly been men of prayer. So essentially different in
kind are the two classes of effort.

There is a very familiar use of language which will
throw still further light on the point before us. What we
have called " anti-impulsive " effort, is continually spoken
of in unscientific language as " self-control," or " self-
restraint." Take the pious soldier who receives a stinging
insult and bears it patiently : what is most remarkable in
his conduct is his " self-restraint." But no one would
commemorate the " self-restraint " of one who should be so
carried away, breathlessly as it were, by military ardour, by
desire of victory, by zeal for his country's cause, by a
certain savage aggressiveness, which is partly natural and
partly due to past habit — who should be so carried away,
we repeat, by these and similar impulses, that, under their
influence, he faces appalling danger without so much as a
moment's deliberation or reflection.

In our supplementary essay, we thus summed up our
argument. " The whole Deterministic controversy," we said,
" turns on this one question : Do I, or do I not, at various
times exercise self-restraint ? Do I, or do I not, at various
times act in resistance to my strongest present desire ? "
For consider. " What can ' motives,' " in Dr. Bain's sense
of that term, "or 'circumstances,' or 'temperament,' or
' habit,' or ' custom,' imaginably do for me at this moment,
except to effect that my desire shall be this rather than
that ? How can they imaginably influence my action in
those cases, where my action is contrary to my strongest
present desire ? If, then, there are such cases — if it be
true that I often, or indeed ever, act in opposition to what
at this moment is my strongest desire — then it demonstra-
tively follows that my will at such times acts for itself;

Freeivill. 345

independently of 'pleasure,' or ' pain,' or 'circumstances/
or ' motives/ or ' habits/ or anything else."

The question is simply and precisely this : "Do men
ever resist their strongest present desire ? Is there such a
thing among men as ' self -restraint ' ? " " Let any one
rightly understand," we concluded, "what it is which
Mr. Mill and Dr. Bain affirm ; and let him then proceed to
look at the most obvious and every-day facts of life ;—
he will be able to discern with the clearest insight that
their pretentious theory is a mere sham and delusion."
Never was a more egregious imposture palmed on the world
under the name of science and philosophy.

There is another matter, subordinate of course in im-
portance to the vital issue we have been considering, but
yet hi its consequences of very considerable moment. We
have said incidentally that the cases are very frequent, even
with the most ordinary men, in which they put forth,
however languidly and feebly, some little amount of self-
restraint and self-control. There is honour among thieves.
Even a member of the criminal classes brings himself
again and again to resist his strongest present desire, in
order to a deliberate provision for his own safety. So
much is surely plain on the surface of facts. And the very
same circumstance — the great frequency of anti-impulsive
effort — is moreover made most manifest, by that conviction
of their own moral liberty, which so intimately possesses
the minds of all men in the whole world, except only that
infinitesimal portion of mankind, the Deterministic philo-
sophers. We appealed to this in our first essay. " Con-
sidering," we said, " how very few can look upon their
habitual conduct with satisfaction if they choose to measure
it even by their own standard of right, emphatic stress
may justly be laid on the universal conviction, that there w
such a thing as sin and guilt. There could bo no sin or
guilt, if every one's conduct were inevitably determined by

346 The Philosophy of Theism.

circumstances ; and what a balm, therefore, to wounded
consciences is offered by the Deterministic theory ! Yet so
strong and ineradicable in the mass of men is their con-
viction of possessing a real power against temptation, that
they never attempt to purchase peace of mind by disclaim-
ing that power." But how could it possibly happen that
this conviction is so profoundly rooted in their mind — that
it bears so strong a prima facie appearance of being an
innate and indestructible instinct— were there not in each
man's life a very frequent experience, on which that con-
viction is based ?

The remainder of our first essay was mainly occupied
in considering the various objections to our thesis which
Determinists have adduced. There will, of course, be no
reason for here reconsidering those objections, except so
far as Dr. Bain has reproduced them. Without further
preamble, therefore, we proceed to his reply.

The absolutely bewildering circumstance in that reply
is that Dr. Bain does not once throughout refer to that one
central and fundamental argument, on which we avowedly
based our whole case. No doubt, he is unaware of our
supplementary essay; but what can have been more ex-
press and emphatic than our statement in the original one ?
As soon as ever we had concluded our exposition of the
Deterministic reasoning, we added, that " the whole argu-
ment, in our view, should be made to turn on one most
simple and intelligible issue." And we then proceeded to
set forth that issue in the plainest possible terms. Dr. Bain
complains (p. 498) that "we throw on him the burden of"
disproving Indeterminism ; whereas we assumed the whole
burden of proof ourselves, assailing Determinism unequi-
vocally and emphatically. Dr. Bain has resolutely ignored
our argument, and then complains of our not having
adduced one. We cannot at all conjecture the cause of this
singular omission.

Freewill. 347

Dr. Bain begins what he does say by a courteous remark
thaf in our essay " some new aspects " of the Freewill
question "have been opened up." We cannot, however,
accept this compliment in anything like its full extent,
because so much of our argument was built on Mr. Lloyd's
pamphlet, which Dr. Bain has evidently never seen.*

Dr. Bain's first adverse criticism is this : —

The writer too much identifies Determinism with the
utilitarian theory of morals, or, indeed, with pure selfishness ;
for he regards Freewill as the only known counterpoise to
selfish actions. Now, it is true that in illustrating the operation
of motives, the opponents of Freewill describe these usually as
" pleasures " or " pains ; " being a convenient summary and
representation of all possible motives. But they do not, there-
fore, maintain that all conduct is necessarily self-seeking.
Many anti-libertarians assert in the strongest manner the
existence of purely disinterested impulses. But the quoting of
these disinterested motives — for example, pity and heroic self-
devotion — would not alter one whit the state of the argument.
As motives, these have a power to urge the will, and, when
present alone, they determine it ; in the case of a conflict, one
side will succeed, which is thereby shown to be the stronger,
and would prove so again should the situation be repeated
(p. 498).

We reply, in the first place, that, had we said what
Dr. Bain supposes, we should have been entirely justified,
by his and Mr. Mill's language, in ascribing to them the
doctrine which he here disavows. All Determinists, we
need not say, hold as their first principle that the will is
infallibly determined by what they call the " strongest
motive ; " and it will be seen in the above paragraph how
simply Dr. Bain takes this proposition for granted. Now,
let the two following statements be observed which we ex-
tracted from Mr. Mill and Dr. Bain respectively in our
first paper. Mr. Mill says (the italics are ours) :—

» "The Freedom of the Will stated afresh." By E. M. Lloyd. Long-
mans, 1868.

348 The Philosophy of Theism.

Those who say that the will follows the strongest motive
do not mean the motive which is strongest in relation to the
will, or, in other words, that the will follows what it does
follow. They mean the motive which is strongest in relation to
pain and pleasure : since a motive, being a desire or aversion, is
proportional to the pleasantness as conceived by us of the thing
desired, or the painfulness of the thing shunned.

Still more pointedly Dr. Bain : —

It is only an identical proposition to affirm that the greatest
of two pleasures, or what appears such, sways the resulting
action; for it is the resulting action alone that determines
which is the greater.

We quoted, of course, from Dr. Bain's second edition,
•which was then the most recent. Mr. H. W. Lucas men-
tions in one of his papers — we have not cared to verify the
statement — that in Dr. Bain's third edition this sentence is
not to be found. It is curious that, in this third edition,
he should complain of us for misunderstanding him ; while,
at the same time, without making any avowal of the fact,
he withdraws the very sentence which we had quoted as
authenticating our view of his doctrine.

We should add that we were as far as possible from
ascribing to Dr. Bain the doctrine we have just named, in
the cruder and more obvious sense which many of his
expressions would bear. On the contrary, every one who
reads our first essay carefully, will see what very great
pains we took to interweave his various dicta — which are
not very easily susceptible of mutual reconcilement — into
one consistent theory.

But now we reply, secondly, that no words could possibly
be more express than those we used in disclaiming by
anticipation the precise view which Dr. Bain ascribes to
us. He tbinks we hold Determinists, as such, responsible
for the thesis that the will is never influenced by "dis-
interested motives ; " or, in other words, that the mind is

Freewill. 349

never attracted towards action, except by the thought of
personal enjoyment, positive or negative, in one or other
shape. Now, no doubt, we held Dr. Bain himself responsible
for this thesis, for the simple reason that, as has been seen,
he distinctly expressed it. But we went out of our way to
explain, with most unmistakable clearness, that our argu-
ment against Determinism was not in the slightest degree
affected by the cross controversy which Dr. Bain now raises.
As the matter is of much importance, we will inflict on our
readers a repetition of our whole passage.

As it is very important to avoid all possibility of cavil, it
will be perhaps better to add one further explanation of the
exact point at issue. Mr. Mill and Dr. Bain hold, that in each
case the spontaneous impulse or inclination of the will is
determined by the balance of immediate pleasure ; and, taking into
account the various explanations they give of their statement,
we are so far entirely in accord with them. But our own
essential argument would not be affected in the slightest
degree, if this theory of theirs were disproved. And it is
worth while, at the risk of being thought tedious, to make this
clear.

The essence of Determinism is the doctrine that, at any
given moment, the will's movement is infallibly and inevitably
determined by circumstances (1) internal, and (2) external : i.e.
(1) by the intrinsic constitution and disposition of the will,
and (2) by the external influences which act on it. Now, no
one doubts that in every man, during far the larger portion of
his waking life, there exists what we have called a definite and
decisive spontaneous impulse of his will. And Determinists
allege that circumstances, internal and external, determine the
will's actual movement, precisely by determining its spontaneous
impulse. It is the very essence of Determinism therefore to
allege that the will's actual movement is never divergent from
its spontaneous impulse.

But it is a different question altogether, and one entirely
irrelevant to the Deterministic controversy, to inquire what
is exactly the fixed relation which exists between circumstances
on the one hand, and the will's spontaneous impulse on the
other. Mr. Mill and Dr. Bain adopt on this question the

350 The Philosophy of Theism.

balance-of-pleasure theory; and here we agree with them.
But quite imaginably philosophers might arise (though we
think this very improbable) who should adduce strong argu-
ments for some different theory on the subject. Now this, as
our readers will see, is a cross controversy altogether, and in no
way affects the issue between Determinism and its assailants.
We have ourselves assumed, throughout our essay, the balance-
of-pleasure theory as confessedly and indisputably true ; because
(1) we account it the true one, and because (2) it is held by all
the Determinists we ever heard of; but nothing would be easier
than to mould our argument according to any different theory
which might be established. The question between Deter-
minists and ourselves is not at all how the will's spontaneous
impulse is formed, but exclusively whether it is ever resisted.
Determinists as such say that it is never resisted, and Indeter-
minists as such maintain the contrary.

Dr. Bain's second adverse criticism is the following :—

Remarking upon the assertion of the Determinists that the
number and complexity of the motive forces are the only
obstacles to our foreseeing the course of any one's voluntary
decisions — the writer throws upon us the burden of showing
that any uncertainty or precariousness of prediction is due to
this, and not to the Freedom of men's Will. We reply that
this burden, on every principle of evidence, lies upon him.
The rule of Nature is uniformity ; this is to be accepted in all
doubtful cases, until an exception is made good '(p. 498).

Here is the paragraph to which we have already referred
as containing Dr. Bain's complaint, that we have thrown
on Determinists the burden of proof. But, if our readers
will refer to that passage of ours on which Dr. Bain
comments, they will see that the said passage is no part
whatever of our direct argument; they will see that it
occurs among our answers to objections. We had already
given grounds — such as we have exhibited in the earlier
part of our present essay — for holding that the contra-
dictory of Determinism is among the most certain, nay,
the most obvious, of psychological facts. In our appeal to
these facts we threw no burden of proof whatever on Dr.

Freewill 351

Bain or any other Determinist. Nothing could be more
aggressive than our whole line of argument ; nor, -we may
add, did we rest any part of that argument on the ex-
perienced impossibility of predicting human acts. Having
established, as we consider, our doctrine, we proceeded to
encounter the various objections against it which Deter-
minists have alleged. Among these objections is one
founded on "the number and complexity " of those attrac-
tions which at any given moment solicit the will. Dr. Bain
entirely admits that there is great " uncertainty and pre-
cariousness " in any attempt to predict future human
actions. We ascribe this fact, in a considerable degree, to
Freewill ; he ascribes it exclusively to that " number and
complexity " of attractions which we just now mentioned.
On this allegation of his we commented as follows : — " No-
where," we said, " has any Determinist whatever attempted
to show that this uncertainty and precariousness of pre-
diction is due exclusively to the number and complexity of
attractions ; that it is not largely due to the Freedom of
men's Will. Yet, until they have shown this, they have
shown nothing worth so much as a pin's head towards
the establishment of their theory." Our own argument,
as we just now mentioned, was entirely independent of
this particular question. Still, if (per impossibile) Deter-
minists had been able to show that human conduct is
capable of being predicted with certainty in the abstract,*
— they would have adduced an argument as irrefragable on
their side as ours is on our side ; and the net result would
have been a contradiction in terms. WTe pointed out, there-
fore, that not only Determinists have not shown this, but
that they have not even attempted to show it. These
thinkers — so intolerant of a priori theories, so earnest

* By the phrase *« capable of being predicted in the abstract" we mean
" capable in itself of being predicted : capable of being predicted, therefore,
by a person of superhuman and adequate intelligence, who should thoroughly
penetrate the antecedent facts."

352 Tlie Philosophy of Theism.

in upholding an exclusive appeal to experience, — in
this particular allegation of theirs have not so much as
attempted any appeal to experience. They base their
conclusions entirely on a priori theories ; nay, on a priori
theories of what we must really call the very flimsiest
character.

This most strange circumstance, we say, is exhibited on
the very surface by that paragraph of Dr. Bain's which we
have last quoted. He does not profess to prove the uniform
sequence of human voluntary acts by any observation of
such acts. His belief in the uniform sequence of those
acts is based on considerations which he cannot himself
pretend to be anything stronger than conjectures, more or
less probable, derived from analogy. Even had these
conjectures possessed indefinitely greater force in the way
of probability than we can for a moment admit, — what,
nevertheless, could possibly be their value? What could
possibly be the value of mere conjecture — probable conjecture,
if you will — when opposed to certain and constant experi-
ence ? What can possibly be the value of mere probability,
on one side, when weighed against absolute certainty on the
other ? But, in real truth, Dr. Bain's conjectural inferences
do not carry with them so much as the slightest appearance
of probability, unless he begins by assuming, on his own side,
what is the one vital and fundamental point of difference
between him and his opponents. A very few words will
make this clear.

No doubt, it is admitted by every one that all physical,
and a large number of psychical, phenomena proceed
ordinarily * in the way of constant and uniform sequence.
Therefore, argues Dr. Bain, it may be taken for granted,
as a matter of course, unless the contrary be proved, that
those psychical phenomena which are called acts of will,

* " Ordinarily ; " for we need not here discuss the question of miracles,
on which we speak in the later portion of our essay.

Freewill. 353

also proceed in the way of constant and uniform sequence.
Certainly, we consider that we have proved most conclusively
the contradictory of this. But what we are now urging is
that — apart altogether from proof on our side — Dr. Bain's
inference is utterly fallacious on his, unless he assume what
is the one vital and fundamental point at issue hetween him
and the opposite school. The general uniformity of Nature,
we say, does not afford the very slightest presumption that
all acts of the human will are included in this uniformity—-
unless it be assumed that there is no such thing in rerum
naturd as morality in the Christian sense, nor any Moral
Governor of the world. If there is a God Who rewards and
punishes human acts, it is involved in the very notion of
such a doctrine that human acts are free. The presump-
tion, therefore, on which Dr. Bain relies, is, on the surface,
palpably irrelevant, except as addressed to those who have
already denied that there is a Moral Governor of the world.
That an Atheist, in whatever way he veils his Atheism,
will certainly repudiate Freewill — this is the very last
thing we care to dispute. In our view, he has already
given up all which to a reasonable man makes life worth
the living ; and Freewill to him would be the most
inexplicable of portents.

Dr. Bain thus proceeds : —

The writer is surprised that no one has remarked what
he admits to be a difficulty in Freewill, namely, that the
power of resisting vicious impulses is so rarely exercised. The
truth is, in the eyes of the scientific psychologists, Freewill,
maintained purely as an aid to virtue, is an anomalous position,
and not capable of being argued on the ordinary grounds of
mental doctrines. If our consciousness seems to show something
distinct from the uniform sequence of motive and act, it shows
that equally for all sorts of conduct ; the restriction to virtuous
conduct is purely arbitrary, and, as already said, is not a
psychological but a theological assumption (pp. 498, 499).

There is one clause in this paragraph which we desire
VOL. i. 2 JL

354 The Philosophy of Theism.

to note, as the only one which indicates any perception
whatever on Dr. Bain's part of what our line of argument
had been. In this clause, and in this alone, he exhibits
some vague kind of surmise, that we had appealed to
" consciousness" as "showing in human action something
distinct from the uniform sequence of motive and act."
Why did he not extend his investigation further, and at
least learn what were those particular facts of consciousness
on which we relied ?

Otherwise there is a certain difficulty in dealing with
the paragraph before us, because it appears to confuse two
totally distinct passages of ours. However, our obvious
course will be to cite and defend the two in succession. In
our first essay on the subject we thus wrote : —

We need hardly say that, in our view, devout Tbeists are
immeasurably the most virtuous class of human beings. Con-
sequently, in our view, devout Theists will, with absolute
certainty, immeasurably exceed other men in their anti-
impulsive efforts ; for the simple reason that they immeasurably
exceed other men in the vigilant care with which they adjust
their volitions with a standard which they consider supremely
authoritative.

And we thus supplemented the above : —

Nor has the determinist any right to ignore such facts,
because he himself may believe that no God is cognizable, and
that devout Theism is a superstition. If it be unmistakably
proved that those who hold and act on a certain belief (however
untrue he may consider that belief) do put forth great, or indeed
any, anti-impulsive effort, he is bound in reason to abandon his
theory.

If Dr. Bain is referring to these passages, he entirely
misunderstands us when he says that we " maintain Free-
will purely as an aid to virtue." We hold most strongly
that those who follow without resistance their will's spon-
taneous impulse are no whit less free in their act than

Freewill. 355

those who resist it.* We did not say that devout Thcistn
" immeasurably exceed other men " in the number of their
free acts, but in the frequency, or at least in the intensity,
of " their anti-impulsive efforts" We were occupied in
showing how undeniable a mental phenomenon it is, that
men do from time to time resist their preponderating
spontaneous impulse. " Even the mass of men who live
mainly" or entirely " for this world, by no means " rarely,
nay, with considerable frequency, " do oppose themselves
to the spontaneous impulse of their will." But devout
Theists put forth immeasurably stronger and more sustained
anti-impulsive effort than any other class ; and it is by
studying, therefore, the phenomena of their interior lives,
that by far the most striking and emphatic proof of our
thesis will be obtained.

If Dr. Bain asks why it is that Theists so very much
exceed other men in the intensity and persistency of anti-
impulsive effort, we gave a most intelligible reason. It is
because " they immeasurably exceed other men in the
vigilant care with which they adjust their volitions by a
standard which they regard as supremely authoritative."
Mr. H. W. Lucas, in the course of three very able articles
on Freewill contributed to the Month (February, April,
June, 1878) — articles in which he frequently refers to our
own with much kindness of expression — thus develops our
statement : —

Christian asceticism teaches a man to value the inward in-
tention rather than the external deed. It teaches him to " watch
his heart," to observe his thoughts, and to direct them as often
as possible by positive acts to God, the end of his whole being.
It brings prominently before his mind the practice of self-

* We said in the essay quoted in the text that it will " in various ways
be more convenient," when engaged in answering mere objections, to consider
those objections as brought, not merely against Indeternrinisra, but against the
full doctrine of Freewill. " Nor," we added, " is such a procedure in any
way unfair to our opponents, but the very contrary ; for it does but offer them
a larger target to shoot at."

350 The Philosophy of Theism.

control as a most important exercise of the interior life. In
short, it is hardly necessary to insist that the habit of " recol-
lection " necessarily tends to multiply the daily number of ...
choiceful acts. Take, on the other hand, the case of a man who
has no belief in the supernatural. He, too, often resists the
greatest present impulse, either for the sake of others or with
a view to his own greater advantage in the future. But he
does not value the practice of self-control as a constant means
of meriting in th,e sight of an All-seeing Dispenser of reward
and retribution. The self-control which he does exercise tends
to become habitual — in other words, tends to embody itself in a
new set of impulses ; and his wish must be so to establish
prudential and benevolent impulses in the mind, that fore-
sight and benevolence may be frictionless : and there is no
tendency to any higher kind of effort. Whereas, for the
Christian ascetic, there are simply no limits to the process of
self-perfection. He, too, endeavours to establish and cultivate
virtuous impulses ; but each set of such impulses once established
becomes for him a platform from which to mount upwards to
higher exercises of self-control.

According to our own humble view, then, all men —
good, middling, and bad alike — are equally free. But good
men exercise their freedom very largely in resisting their
preponderating spontaneous impulse ; whereas it is charac-
teristic of bad men, as such, that they so largely exercise
their liberty in abstaining from that resistance to spon-
taneous impulse, which nevertheless is fully in their power.

But we are disposed to think that there is another
psychological doctrine altogether entirely distinct from
Indeterrninism, which Dr. Bain has greatly in his mind,
when he makes the comment we have just quoted. It is
a fundamental principle of Catholic theology and philosophy
that no one acts wickedly for wickedness' sake (propter
malitiam). Thus, it happens that the philosophies of good
and of evil acts proceed respectively on a mutually
different basis. He who is to act virtuously must in some
sense pursue virtue.* But the converse by no means

* So Dr. Mivart : " For an act to be good, it must be really directed by

Freeiuill. 3.V7

holds, that he who acts wickedly is in any sense pursuing
wickedness ; for his wickedness precisely consists in his
inordinate and, so to speak, unprincipled pursuit of pleasure.
In a later part of our series we hope to set forth this great
verity, with its psychological proof, as clearly and as fully
as we can. Here we are only concerned with it incidentally,
as throwing possible light upon the origin of Dr. Bain's
mistake. Libertarians speak of Freewill as exercised in
the direction of pursuing virtue, and again as exercised in
the direction of pursuing pleasure, but never as exercised
in the direction of pursuing wickedness. Moreover, they
hold that self-restraining exercise of Freewill, or what we
have called anti-impulsive effort, is with quite immeasurably
greater frequency put forth in the direction of virtue than
of pleasure ; because pleasure, of course, has only too great
attractiveness of its own. Dr. Bain may have observed
these statements, and inferred from them that Libertarians
" maintain Freewill purely as an aid to virtue." But such
a statement, as we have pointed out, implies a complete
misapprehension of the doctrine we advocate.

Lastly, we must entirely deny Dr. Bain's allegation,
that what we affirm is in any kind of way a " theological
assumption." Doubtless, in arguing on philosophical
ground against philosophers, we should be guilty of an
intolerable sophism if we based our argument in any
degree upon any theological doctrine — i.e. on any doctrine
which we do not claim to know otherwise than through
Kevelation. But not only we made no appeal to any such
doctrine, we made no appeal even to Theism : which it
would of course, indeed, have been grossly paralogistic to
do, since we are maintaining Freewill as a premiss towards
the establishment of Theism. We thought we had made all

the doer to a good end, either actually or virtually. The idea of good,
which he has in the past apprehended, must be influencing the man at the
time, whether he adverts to it or not ; otherwise the action is not moral."
(" Lessons from Nature," p. 118.)

358 The Philosophy of TIteism.

this quite clear in a passage which we just now quoted.
The Determinist's theory is, that no man resists his
strongest present impulse; and his theory, therefore, is
conclusively and finally refuted if it be shown that any one
man— and much more if it be shown that a large class of
men — do often resist their strongest present impulse. The
refutation of Determinism would be none the less irre-
fragable, though these resisters of their strongest present
impulse were the most ignorant, the most superstitious,
the most degraded of mankind. The appeal is made, not
to any religious doctrine whatever, but to an observed
psychical fact.

So much on the particular passage above quoted from
our essay. But there is another entirely distinct passage,
in quite a different part of that essay, to which, we fancy,
Dr. Bain may partially refer. Here it is :—

One objection remains of a far more serious character,
though it has not been adduced either by Mr. Mill or Dr. Bain,
or, so far as we know, by any other writer of their school. " If
all men," it may be asked, " possess so real a power of resisting
their will's spontaneous impulse, how does it happen that this
power is by comparison so inconsiderably exercised ? " Against
Catholics in particular as ad homines the same difficulty may be
still more urgently pressed, " You hold that Catholics at least
have full moral power, not only to avoid mortal sin, but to
make the pleasing God the one predominant end of their life.
Yet how few and far between are those of whom you will
even allege that they do this — how amazingly few on the
supposition that all have the needful power ! " The difficulty
here sketched demands the most earnest attention; but its
treatment would carry us into a line of thought entirely
different in kind from what has occupied us in our present
essay. We will therefore defer its discussion to a future
opportunity, content with having shown, by our mention of it,
how very far we are from ignoring it or wishing to pass it over.

The reason for our having introduced, in some sense
prematurely, these considerations, may be briefly stated.

Freewill. 359

The ultimate purpose of our series, as we have so often
explained, is to use these preliminary doctrines — Free-
will, the reasonable basis of Morality, the principle of
Causation, etc. — as so many steps towards the argumen-
tative establishment of Theism. Now, the main considera-
tion on which modern antitheists predominantly dwell-
that which is both in itself immeasurably their most power-
ful stronghold, and is felt by them to be so — is the existence
upon earth of evil, in that degree and kind which experience
testifies. In our view, we frankly avow, all other religious
difficulties put together do not even approach in gravity to
this difficulty, though it stood alone. The contemplation
of the world's existent state is, as F. Newman says, "a
vision to dizzy and appal ; and inflicts upon the mind the
sense of a profound mystery, which is absolutely beyond
human solution." If, then, in our treatment of Theism we
did not place practically and emphatically before our
readers the full character and dimensions of this difficulty,
it would be better not to write on our theme at all. Surely
to say this is no exaggeration, but the simplest common
sense. For what kind of persuasiveness could the advocate
of Theism hope to exercise, who should be felt by his
opponents — or again, which is even more important, by
seriously perplexed inquirers — not really to apprehend that
antitheistic argument which weighs with them more than
do all the rest put together ? We thought it, therefore, of
great importance to show from the earliest moment how
fully our mind is occupied, how deeply penetrated, by the
truly tremendous facts on which antitheists lay such
prominent stress. Now, that portion of our series in which
we catch, as it were, the first glimpse of this bewildering
enigma is the discussion of Freewill ; and we would not,
therefore, allow that discussion to pass without showing that
we carefully bore the difficulty in mind with a view to its
future examination. It is not, of course, until we shall

360 The Philosophy of Theism.

have set forth the absolutely impregnable basis on which
Theism reposes that the opportune moment will have
arrived for directly and, we hope, unflinchingly confronting
the whole difficulty.

For the moment, however, we have nothing to do with
this difficulty, except so far as it may be accounted a refu-
tation of the Freewill doctrine ; and, considered in this
narrow point of view, it is most easily disposed of. We
claim to have established Indeterminism on absolutely
irrefragable psychological grounds ; and we further allege,
that the arguments to be adduced in the second part of our
present paper develop with certainty the doctrine of Inde-
terminism into the full doctrine of Freewill. Now, the
facts to which we draw attention in the above- quoted
paragraph have not even the primd facie appearance of con-
tradicting this great doctrine. The thesis which, as we
hold, we shall have conclusively established is that the
human will is free to resist its preponderating spontaneous
impulse. The fact to which Dr. Bain draws attention is,
that this power, if it exist, is at all events exercised in a
comparatively inconsiderable degree, at least as regards
persistence and intensity. Well, there is not here even the
primd facie appearance of contradiction. To say that a
certain power exists, is not even primd facie incompatible
with saying that it is comparatively little exercised. Let us
take a somewhat grotesque illustration. Dr. Bain does not
doubt that the immense majority of adults possess a
permanent power of standing for a short time on one leg ;
yet out of the million millions who possess this power, how
many and how often are they in the habit of exercising it ?
The utmost which can be said is, that the fact to which we
draw attention renders the doctrine of Freewill an im-
probable one. Well, let us concede so much, at least for
argument's sake. Still, whereas the objection to Freewill
cannot possibly be alleged as going beyond the sphere of

Freewill. 301

probability, the argument in its favour is irresistibly con-
clusive. And probability on one side, we need not say, is
simply worthless against certainty on the other.
Dr. Bain proceeds : —

Libertarians admit that to strengthen a good motive by
good education, inculcation, or other means, and obversely to
weaken some vicious motive, would have the very same effect
as the supposed outburst of the free and uncaused will. Why
not, therefore, be content with an assumption that is thoroughly
consistent with the whole of Nature's working, rather than
admit an exceptional principle that hardly admits of intelligible
wording? (p. 499).

We protest at starting against Dr. Bain using the terms
"free" and "uncaused" as synonymous; but on this we
are to speak in the second part of our paper.

Secondly, it is strange we should have to impress on
Dr. Bain that what he represents all Libertarians as
admitting is precisely what we emphatically and energetic-
ally deny. To " strengthen a motive," using the word
"motive" in Dr. Bain's sense, has an effect fundamentally
and most pointedly different from that produced by an
"outburst of Freewill." By " strengthening a good motive,"
or, as we should express it, by intensifying the influence
of some healthy attraction, I change for the better my
will's preponderating spontaneous impulse ; but an " out-
burst " of freedom is characteristically manifested by
resistance to such impulse.

Thirdly, Dr. Bain asks why we should not be "content "
with his "assumption." He speaks as though the con-
troversy between him and us were of no very serious and
vital matter ; whereas the ultimate question is nothing less
than this, whether there be or be not a Moral Governor of
the world. We should have thought antitheists were at
one with Theists in distinctly recognizing that what is as
issue between the two parties is about the most momentout
and awful alternative which can agitate the human inind.

362 The Philosophy of Theism.

Dr. Bain continues : —

The writer in the Dublin Review allows that '* in proportion
as men have passed through the earlier part of their probation,
and established firm habits of virtue, in that proportion their
resistance to predominant temptation (but only within certain
limits *) may be predicted with much confidence." But if good
habits and good training do so much, how do we know that
they are not the sole and sufficient cause of moral goodness ?
And how can we find out where their influence ceases, and the
influence of an unpredictable volition begins ? (p. 499).

Dr. Bain here expresses himself as though we considered
all free acts absolutely unpredictable ; whereas, in the very
paragraph which be quotes from us, we were arguing that
free acts are by no means entirely incapable of more or
less approximate prediction. Mr. Mill had argued that
human action is in greater degree predictable than it would
be if man possessed Freewill. We maintained against
him "that no power of foreseeing man's conduct can be
alleged as known by experience, which presents even the
superficial appearance of implying any greater certainty
and uniformity of buman action than might have been
fully anticipated from our own doctrine." As part of
our argument for this thesis, we wrote the passage
which Dr. Bain quotes. " In many cases (such was our
remark) even that standing refutation of Determinism
—a man's resistance to predominant temptation f — may
be predicted with mucb confidence. Suppose A have
acquired a strong habit of resistance to evil impulses, and

* Dr. Bain italicizes these five words.

t In our essay on Mill's " Denial of Freewill," we explained what we meant
by the phrase "predominant temptation." "A person," we pointed out, "may
be said to be visited by 'temptation' whenever he is solicited by any attraction
to forbidden pleasure ; even though that attraction be more than counter-
balanced by other divergent ones. By using the term 'predominant*
temptation, then, we refer to a case in which the attractions towards for-
bidden pleasure predominate over other co-existing attractions ; so that the
will's preponderating spontaneous impulse is in a sinful direction."

Freewill. 3G3

suppose the predominant temptation which at any given
moment assails him he inconsiderable, the fact that he
resists predominant temptation at all is a conclusive proof
of his freedom ; hut, nevertheless, if I know him intimately,
I can predict as a matter of extreme probahility that he will
resist. Nevertheless my power of probahle prediction does
not extend beyond certain limits." Let the predominant
temptation be, on another occasion, indefinitely stronger —
I may be in the greatest doubt and anxiety as to how he
will comport himself under his probation. What can he
simpler and more intelligible than this ?

There is one little matter, however, here which still
requires explanation, though Dr. Bain has not referred
to it. In our article, we thus argued ; and we have
quoted the passage in a previous page. " What," we
asked, "can ' motives,' or ' circumstance,' or 'tempera-
ment,' or 'habit,' or 'custom,' imaginably do for me,
except to effect that my desire shall be this rather than
that ? How can they imaginably influence my action in
those cases where my action is contrary to my strongest
present desire ? " Yet in the passage cited by Dr. Bain we
have averred that habit can be of very important service,
not only as effecting that my present strongest desire shall
be this rather than that, but also, and even more impor-
tantly, in facilitating my resistance to my strongest present
desire. Are not these two statements, it may be asked,
mutually contradictory ?

The direct answer to this objection is extremely simple.
We placed the words "habit," "motives," and the rest
within inverted commas, to show that we were using them
in the sense given them by Determinists. Now, we ex-
plained, that Dr. Bain in his whole treatment of moral
habits — and we suppose all other Determinists do the
same — entirely omits all reference to that most important
factor in the formation of a moral habit, the will's repeated

The Philosophy of Theism.

anti-impulsive efforts. This is, so far, to his philosophical
credit, as he shows entire consistency in shutting his eyes
to that psychical fact — men's repeated resistance to their
strong present desire — on which we have throughout laid
such prominent stress. And we still entirely hold what we
set forth : we hold that "habit," as described by Dr. Bain,
cannot imaginably "do anything for me, except to effect
that my " strongest present " desire shall be this rather
than that."

It will be far more satisfactory, however, if we do not
content ourselves with this logically sufficient reply ; if we
add a few words on the relation which exists between moral
habit on the one side, and anti-impulsive effort on the other.
First, however, we would remind our readers that the fact
itself of men resisting their strongest present desire is, as
we have so often urged, by itself a standing demonstration
of Indeterminism. And we would especially insist on the
very obvious circumstance, that this demonstration is no
whit less irrefragable — if only the fact of resistance be
admitted — whatever the degree of facility with which, in
any given case, the resistance may be accomplished. The
essential doctrine of Determinism is, that men, by the very
constitution of their nature, inevitably obey their strongest
present desire. This allegation is conclusively refuted by
one single fact of resistance ; the question of greater or less
facility being simply irrelevant.

These remarks being premised, we are now to consider
the permanent effect produced on a man's mind, in the
way of habit, by a sufficient series of anti-impulsive
efforts.

It will be found, on consideration, we believe, that this
effect consists of two entirely different particulars. We
are not, of course, attempting to set forth in detail the full
theory of habits, but only saying so much as is required
for our immediate purpose. And we will take, by way of

Freewill. 30.5

illustration, an instance to which we have more than once
referred : the instance of some brave soldier receiving a
most bitter insult, and taking it patiently. In time past
he has received many such insults, greater or less as it
may be, and in every instance by a strong anti-impulsive
effort (united, doubtless, with earnest prayer — but that is
not to our present purpose) has compelled himself to behave
Christianly under the temptation. One effect of these re-
peated acts will have been importantly to elevate what, on
any given occasion, is his will's preponderating spontaneous
impulse. There is many a little insult he now receives
which some years ago would have generated a spontaneous
predominant desire of retaliation, but which now engenders
no such predominant desire whatever : his will's strongest
present desire is to forgive the offender. Let us suppose,
however, that the insult is of a specially stinging character,
and that his will's preponderating spontaneous impulse is
in the evil direction. Here the second good result of his
previous anti-impulsive efforts comes into clear view and
into practical exercise. He finds it far easier now than he
did ten years ago, to " conquer nature " (as ascetical writers
say), and to resist his strongest present desire. Here,
then, are two quite different results effected in his mind
by his past anti-impulsive efforts. Firstly, his will's
spontaneous impulse on any given occasion is much more
in the direction of virtue than would otherwise have been
the case ; and, secondly ^ his resistance to a preponderating
spontaneous evil impulse (should such arise) is much
readier and easier than it would otherwise have been.
Dr. Bain, in his theory of moral habit, sees clearly enough
the first of these two results, but is entirely blind to the
second.

He next argues thus : —

The existence of such an uncertain power [as Freewill] is
as likely to discourage as to encourage the understood means of

366 The Philosophy of Theism.

virtuous training ; unless we suppose that the Freewill impulse
is a grant proportioned to the goodness of the previous training
(p. 499).

It is a continually increasing surprise how it can be
that a thinker of Dr. Bain's great ability and generally
keen psychological insight, so persistently fails in catching
even a glimpse of what his opponents mean. What Liber-
tarian ever called "the Freewill impulse" a "grant"?
According to Libertarians, it is precisely and critically the
contradictory of a " grant ; " being the agent's own self-
determined choice. God grants to men, no doubt, the
power of free choice ; but it is implied in the very idea of
that power that the choice itself is no grant from God
at all.

Next comes the argument, which Determinists are very
fond of adducing, that belief in Freewill "is as likely to
discourage as to encourage the understood means of virtuous
training." We replied to this argument in our first essay
on the subject. We set forth the immense value of virtuous
training and habits ; and we dwelt on these as one principal
cause of "the indubitable fact that very frequently the
spontaneous impulse of a devout Theist's will is one
of high virtue." We also drew attention to the "very
frequent phenomenon," " that a devout man— even when
his will's spontaneous impulse leads to a virtuous act —
proceeds, nevertheless, by an effort to make his act more
virtuous (i.e. more efficaciously directed to the virtuous
end) than otherwise it would be." The advantage, then,
of virtuous training and habits is not less inestimably great
on the Libertarian than on the Deterministic hypothesis.
Who, indeed, in the whole world are more urgent than
Catholics in upholding the necessity of careful religious
education ? Yet who are more uncompromising advocates
of Freewill ?

We have now quoted textually every syllable in which

Freewill.

Dr. Bain directly replies to our esfiay. But a page folio WK,
occupied with miscellaneous denunciations of that doctrine
which is so distasteful to him. Freewill, if it existed,
would be a "mysterious uncertainty that baffles all pre-
diction " (p. 499) ; its acts would be a series of " caprices "
" that no man could predict, and, therefore, no man trust
to " (p. 500) ; it would be a power which may " forsake a
man in some critical moment when he most wants it ; " " a
power that comes from nothing, has no beginning, follows
no rule, respects no known time or occasion [!], operates
without impartiality " [! !] (Ibid.). In one word, this
alleged Freewill is "an influence that we can take no
account of, that we do not know how to conciliate or to
appease ; an inscrutable fate, realizing all the worst results
that have ever been attributed to the sternest deliverances
of the necessitarian and the fatalist " (Ibid.). It seems
almost impossible to grapple with such wild statements as
these. According to Dr. Bain, when I say that within a
certain sphere I can act as I choose, this is equivalent to
saying that, within the said sphere, I am governed by an
"inscrutable fate" external to myself. In other words, to
say that I have full control over my actions is to say that
I have no control over them whatever. The " deliverances
of the necessitarian and the fatalist" he admits to be
" stern ; " but to say that I am neither fated nor neces-
sitated, he accounts still sterner. He has failed to explain,
however, what third alternative remains.

Perhaps it will be more satisfactory if we place the issuo
before our readers in a concrete shape. And we begin with
a very obvious remark. The doctrine of Freewill, which
we are to discuss, must be the doctrine of Freewill, not
as travestied by its opponents, but as clothed in that
particular shape in which its advocates hold it. Dr. Bain,
we say, was bound to contemplate the doctrine, not from
his own religious or non-religious standpoint, but from the

368 The Philosophy of Theism.

standpoint of those who are zealous for its maintenance.
But who are these ? Indubitably they are the thinkers who
consider the one fundamental verity of man's life to be
God's moral government of the world ; who hold as the
one true principle of human action, that good acts meet
with divine reward, and evil acts with divine chastisement.
Such a man knows, let us say, that in a short time he will
be visited by some serious temptation, and is full of anxiety
as to the issue. Determinists tell him : " Whether you do
or do not resist this temptation, is an alternative no more
within your power than is the alternative whether to-morrow
will be a fine day or rainy. The result depends exclusively
and infallibly on circumstances, external and internal, over
which you have no control whatever." He replies at once
that if this were the true law of human action, it would be
as unjust in the Creator to punish him for evil actions as
for evil dreams. Far different is the language of Liber-
tarians. " The whole issue," they tell him, " rests critically
and in the last resort simply with yourself. Begin at once
to pray God for strength ; impress carefully on your mind
the motives which will avail you in your trial ; work at
this day after day ; when the decisive moment comes, place
your trust in God, and put forth at the same time your
own hearty effort. Do all this, and success is absolutely
certain. Such preparatory exercises may be somewhat
irksome, and the crowning effort itself will, no doubt, be
in some sense distasteful; but God has given you the
power, as experience will at once show you, to resist your
will's preponderating impulse, and to overcome all the
difficulties which lie in your path. Sursum corda." Here
is an intelligible and consoling doctrine, which every moral
agent can take and use to his unspeakable blessedness, and
which places God's moral governance before his eyes as a
living and satisfying reality. But Determinists, who follow
Dr. Bain's lead, tell him that such advice would make him

Freeunll. ;K;<)

place his trust in " caprices of his will, which no man can
predict, and, therefore, no man can trust to ; " in an agency
" which may forsake him in some critical moment when he
most wants it ; " in "an influence that he can take no
account of, nor know how to conciliate or appease ; " in
"an inscrutable fate realizing all the worst results that
have ever been attributed to the sternest deliverances of
the necessitarian or the fatalist." Surely all this is more
like the invective of a rhetorician than the utterances of a
grave philosopher.

Here, then, having replied in detail to the whole of
Dr. Bain's reply, we close the first part of our paper.

CAUSATION AND FREEWILL.

In our reply to Dr. Bain's objections we have made
ourselves responsible, as we explained in a note, for the
full doctrine of Freewill. But our readers will remember
that in our positive exposition we have not advanced beyond
the psychological doctrine of " Indeterminism." Deter-
minists allege, as an observed psychical fact, " that volitions
follow determinate moral antecedents with the same uni-
formity and the same certainty as physical effects follow
their physical causes ; " that the will's course of action is
infallibly and inevitably determined at every moment by
the circumstances (1) internal, (2) external, of that moment.
We have entirely denied this alleged psychical fact ; in
support of that denial we have appealed to a thousand
undeniable mental phenomena ; and by so doing have
established, we consider, the doctrine of Indeterminisrn.
This doctrine, however, is purely a negative one ; it is
simply the doctrine that the doctrine of Determinism is
false. Our next step must be, by introducing the meta-
physical principle of Causation, to develop the negative
psychological doctrine of Indeterminism into the positive
metaphysical doctrine of Freewill. It will not be requisite

VOL. i. 2 B

370 The Philosophy of Theism.

to elaborate our present argument with any extraordinary
care, because all the essential part of our controversy with
the Determinists has now been brought to an end. There
never has been, and there never will be, a philosopher who,
on the one hand, admits the doctrine of Indeterminism,
and also that doctrine of Causation maintained by us in
our essay on that subject, who, on the other hand, would
hesitate for a moment to accept the entire doctrine of
Freewill.

It will be in many ways convenient, if we here re-
produce that portion of our then remarks, in our essay
on Causation, which has a more especial bearing on the
Freewill question. And, in particular, we must remind
our readers of the fundamentally different sense in which
the word "cause" is used by Phenomenists, who are
always Determinists, and by Intuitionists respectively.
This distinction requires especially to be borne in mind,
when we are engaged with our present theme. Deter-
minists uniformly allege that the doctrine of Freewill
represents certain voluntary actions as being external to
the sphere of " causation ; " whereas, in the Libertarian's
view, it is precisely free acts which testify the principle of
" causation " more prominently and emphatically than do
any other mental phenomena whatever. It is really
astounding — this is not too strong a word — to observe
how uniformly Determinists forget (what it is impossible
they should not know) that they use the word " causation "
in a sense fundamentally different from that given it by
the opposite school.

For instance : the Phenomenist and Intuitionist agree
in saying that the sun " causes " light and warmth.* But

* We do not forget the theory of that excellent philosopher, Dr. Mar-
tiueau — a theory hardly different from what is called " occasionalism "-
that no substance can be a true "cause" unless it be intelligent. This
theory, however, is comparatively rare among Intuitionists, and it will be
more convenient to ignore it in our text. There is no Theistic conclusion,

Freewill. \\~ \

by so speaking, the Phenomenist only means that that
phenomenon which is called the sun's presence is
"universally and unconditionally" (to use Mr. Mill's
phrase) followed by those two other groups of phenomena,
which are called the presence of light and of warmth. He
recognizes no kind of "influx" or "agency "in the sun,
as regards the production of light and warmth. He recog-
nizes no closer nexus between the sun and the sensation of
warmth than between the first letter of the alphabet and
the second ; or between the moment of time which we call
"eleven o'clock" and the moment of time which we call
" five minutes past eleven." In one word, by " causation "
he means no more than " uniform phenomenal sequence."
But, according to the Intuitionist's view, as exhibited by
us in our essay on Causation, the case is very different.
The idea of " cause "is as entirely distinct from that of
"phenomenal sequence," as any one idea in the whole
world is distinct from any other. That very notion of
" influx " or "agency," which a Phenomenist excludes from
the idea of " cause " — is the precise notion which an
Intuitionist expresses by that term. Such was our state-
ment in the essay we refer to ; and we will here quote a
portion of what we then set forth :—

" The idea ' cause,' " we said, " is a simple idea not
composed of any others ; * and, on the other hand, it
is a purely intellectual idea, not a copy of any thing
experienced by the senses. Now, of course," we added,
" there is a certain difficulty in explaining an idea of this

we believe, which we purport to establish by our method, which Dr. Mar-
tineau could not equally establish by his. But it would be most incon-
veniently periphrastical if we laboured so to construct our language
throughout as to include his theory. And at last, for reasons given in our
essay on Causation, we must be permitted (in a spirit removed most widely
from any disrespect) to account that theory a mistaken one.

* We explained that by the word "cause" we throughout meant what
Catholic philosophers call " the efficient cause." Moreover, we exclude the
" moral cause," which they usually include under " the efficient."

372 The Philosophy of Theism.

kind. Were it a copy of some sensation, we could content
ourselves with referring to such sensation. Were it a
compound of simpler ideas, we could explain it by reciting
those simpler ideas. But neither of these methods being
(by hypothesis) available, we can only suggest the occasions
on which an inquirer may unmistakably recognize what
is undoubtedly a very prominent part of his mental
furniture. Now, the illustration commonly given by philo-
sophers of a ' cause ' seems to us most happily chosen ; as
the very one in which that idea is exhibited with especial
distinctness and prominence. We refer to the influx of
a man's volitions into his bodily acts. I am urgently in
need of some article contained in a closet of which I cannot
find the key, and accordingly I break open the closet with
my fist. Certainly my idea of the relation which exists
between my volition and my blow, is most absolutely
distinct from that of universal and unconditional sequence.
If, on the one hand, the idea of ' cause ' is incapable of
being analyzed, on the other hand it is to the full as in-
capable of being explained away or misapprehended. The
idea is as characteristic and as clamorously distinguished
from every other, as is that of ' sweet,' or ' melodious,' or
' white.' Phenomenists may deny that it corresponds with
any objective reality ; but they cannot deny that it is in
fact conceived by the human mind, without exposing them-
selves to the intellectual contempt of every one who pos-
sesses the most ordinary intelligence and introspective
faculty." Then, so much being understood as to the
meaning of this word "cause," Intuitionists maintain that
this indubitably existing idea does correspond with an
objective reality. And when, therefore, they say that the
sun " causes " light and warmth, they mean, not that that
phenomenon which is called the sun's presence is uniformly
and unconditionally followed by those other groups of
phenomena which are called the presence of light and

Freewill. 373

warmth, but that that substance, which is called the sun,
exercises a power, which they call the " causal " power, of
diffusing light and warmth.

It is implied, we may add, in their whole notion of a
"cause," that a cause must be one or other substance. "When
they mention the influx of my volition into some blow
which I deal forth, they would thus explain their meaning
in detail. The blow is nothing else than a certain move-
ment of my closed hand. The cause of that movement is
my soul ; which addresses, if we may so speak, to my hand
that command, which is called a "volition."

It seems to us accordingly of great importance that, in
all philosophical discussion, an Intuitionist shall abstain
with great care from using this word "causation " in the
sense which Phenomenists give to it. Yet what they call
"causation" is so extremely important a fact, and so con-
stantly requires the philosopher's notice, that some ex-
pression for it is a kind of necessity. Accordingly we took
the liberty of coining a terminology for the purpose.
Throughout what remains, therefore, of our series, we
shall use the word "prevenant," to express what Pheno-
menists call a "cause;" "postvenant," to express what
they call an " effect ; " " prevenance," to express what
they call " causation."

It will be understood, then, at once, that what they call
"the law of causation," and we call "the law of pre-
venance," is simply the well-known law of uniform pheno-
menal sequence. It is no difficult matter to understand
what is meant by that law ; and we have nowhere seen it
more clearly set forth than in some sentences of Mr. Mill's,
which we quoted in our essay. As we pointed out, how-
ever, in the same essay, even in regard to the existence
of this law, there is a very important difference between
Phenomenists and Intuitionists. The former consider it
absolutely universal; whereas Intuitionists regard it as

374 The Philosophy of Theism.

'it'itc rally holding, indeed, but nevertheless as subject to
two important exceptions. "In the first place, they hold
that this uniformity of nature is interrupted with indefi-
nite frequency by miracles and other prodigies. And in
the second place, they maintain," as we have been main-
taining in our present paper, "that one most important
class of psychical phenomena — viz. human volitions — are
largely external to the common law of uniformity."

Having made clear, then, what we meant by "cause,"
we proceeded to take a further step. We proceeded to set
forth what appear to us conclusive psychological grounds
for holding, as a self-evident truth, as a philosophical
axiom, that "whatever has a commencement has a cause."
This we called the " doctrine " or " principle " of " causa-
tion" or "causality." And when we speak of psychology
as establishing a metaphysical truth, there is, of course,
one fundamental premiss on which we build our argument.
This premiss is the doctrine which we call " the principle
of certitude," and which we have maintained to be the first
principle of all possible knowledge. It is the doctrine, that
whatever a man's existent cognitive faculties, if rightly
interrogated and interpreted, avouch as certain, is thereby
known to him as certain.

It will conduce to a clear apprehension of our future
argument if, before proceeding further, we compare in
detail those two theories regarding the phenomenal world
which are advocated by the Intuitionist and the Pheno-
menist respectively. In what immediately follows, there-
fore, we are not professing to adduce any argument whatever ;
we are merely exhibiting the two antagonistic views, for the
purpose of more distinct apprehension. And firstly, to
repeat a previous remark, in regard to one particular class
of mental phenomena — viz. deliberate acts of human
will — the Intuitionist excepts them, whereas the Pheno-
menist does not except them, from the otherwise prevailing

Freewill. ;J7.->

law of uniform sequence. Putting these, however, on ono
side, the Intuitionist and Phenomenist alike hold that
phenomena, both physical and psychical, ordinarily proceed
according to the law of prevenance. The Phenomenist,
however, considers that this is an ultimate fact, proved by
experience, and in no other way ; though we have more
than once called on him to adduce, if he can, any even
plausible reason for his affirmation that experience, taken
by itself, would warrant any such conclusion.* The
Intuitionist takes up entirely different ground. He holds
that "prevenance" is the result of "causation." Accord-
ing, to him, e.g., those groups of phenomena which are
called the presence of light and warmth, follow ordinarily
on that phenomenon which is called the sun's presence,
simply because that substance which is called the sun has
the causative poiver of diffusing light and warmth. And
so in every other instance of prevenance. Then this differ-
ence of view leads to another, which we should not fail to
point out. The Phenomenist and Intuitionist agree, we
have said, in holding, that phenomena ordinarily proceed
according to the law of prevenance. But Intuitionists have
no philosophical difficulty whatever in admitting those
exceptions to prevenance which are called miracles ; whereas
the Phenomenist, if he would be consistent, must resolutely
deny the fact of their existence. Let us assume, e.g., it
were alleged on grounds of human testimony, that on one
most solemn occasion, the sun, being present, failed to
diffuse light. The historical proof of such a statement, for
anything we here say, may or may not be satisfactory.
But as a matter of philosophy ', the Intuitionist sees in it no

* Our own humble opinion is, that the law of prevenance cannot bo
established as certain by appealing exclusively to facts of experience ; and
that neither can it be established as certain by appealing exclusively to
the principle of causation : but that it can be established with certainty by
appealing to both these sources of knowledge in mutual combination. Tin*
thesis, however, requires to be worked out with great care, and it i* entirely
external to the course of our own argument.

o7G The Philosophy of Theism.

difficulty whatever. In such a case, he would say, the
sun's effect does not come into actual existence because of
a counteracting effect which is at the same moment pro-
duced by the immediate causative act of God. But the
Phenomenist is compelled by his philosophical theory, if
he be consistent, to be proof against any amount of testi-
mony which may be adduced for such a miraculous fact.
In his view, the one sole foundation of human knowledge
is men's undeviating experience of phenomenal uniformity.
To admit, therefore, that in any one case — still more, that
in a series of cases — there has been an experienced inter-
ruption of that uniformity, would be to overthrow7 his whole
structure of knowledge from its very foundation.

In the view of an Intuitionist, then, there are three
different classes of phenomena, for which the philosopher
is required to assign a proximate cause.* First, we will
mention those phenomena which he calls free acts of the
will ; and to what proximate cause he refers them, is the
very inquiry which we are immediately to institute.
Secondly, we may name those phenomena which he
accounts miraculous ; and the proximate cause of these, in
his view, is the First Cause, God. Lastly, we will consider
that enormously large series of phenomena, physical and
psychical, which proceed according to the law of preve-
nance. As to physical phenomena — we are distinguish-
ing these for the moment from psychical — their proximate
causes are those innumerable physical substances which
exist in the universe, each possessing its own permanent
properties and forces. It is these substances which, in
accordance with their action and interaction, causatively
produce those physical phenomena which surround men on
all sides, and which proceed according to the law of preve-

* By a " proximate " cause, we need hardly say, we mean " a substance
•which produces the effect, without intervention of any other substance."
If I am stabbed, the proximate cause of my wound is not the aggressor's
hand, but his dagger.

Freewill. 377

nance. But now as regards those psychical phenomena,
which proceed in the soul of any given man according to tho
law of prevenance. Of these there may be in any given
man either one proximate cause, or two, but never more.
One proximate cause is his soul, possessing its own forces,
properties, acquired habits. In many instances, however,
whether or no in all, another proximate cause co-operates—
viz. his body. For his body, in many instances, at least, by
its own properties, powerfully conduces to psychical results.

Here, then, we close our exposition, and resume our
thread of argument. Let us recount in inverse order the
three statements we have just made, and see how far we
have hitherto adduced sufficient proof of their truth.
Firstly, then, as regards those physical and psychical
phenomena which proceed according to the law of preve-
nance, we consider that the statement which we have just
made has been conclusively established in our essay on
Causation. Secondly, as regards those phenomena which
the Intuitionist accounts miraculous, we consider that our
statement as yet is entirely unproved. At the present
stage of our argument, we have no right whatever to
assume that God exists, still less that He works miracles.
And now, thirdly, as regards those phenomena of the
human will which we have already shown to be outside the
law of prevenance, we will proceed without further delay
to inquire what is their proximate cause. We begin with a
preliminary remark.

From the doctrine of causation already laid down, a
further conclusion at once results. The sun, we have said,
is a proximate cause of light and warmth. But the sun
itself had a commencement, and therefore must have a
cause. The sun is a cause indeed, but a caused cause — an
" intermediate " cause. Our present purpose, however, is
not to insist at length on this truth, because the more
appropriate place for insisting on it will be at that portion

The Philosophy of Theism.

of our series in which we hope hereafter to exhibit the well-
known argument for a First Cause. What we here wish to
point out, is an extremely important distinction which may
imaginably exist between one and another class of these
intermediate causes. In regard to those phenomena which
proceed according to the law of prevenance, it is manifest
that their proximate causes are determined, in any given
instance, by strictest necessity to one fixed and definite
result. Every such proximate cause has its proper effect
marked out for it, and must produce that proper effect
neither more nor less. The sun, e.g., must cause at any
moment that precise amount of light and warmth, neither
exceeding nor falling short, which is determined according
to the law of prevenance. If two or more proximate causes
are at work together, the effect of one will no doubt be
often modified by the effect of the other ; but this fact is of
course in no way inconsistent with that we have just said.
Nor would our remark be less indubitable, though at such
moment some preternatural intervention were effected with
the course of phenomena. Even on such a supposition,
the cause itself, as we have already said, would none the
less exercise activity towards its proper effect ; though that
effect might be prevented from coming into actual existence,
because of a counteracting effect simultaneously produced
by some preternatural cause. In all such cases, then, we
say, the proximate cause has its own proper effect marked
out for it by strictest and most absolute necessity. Let us
call such causes " blind " causes.* So the sun, the earth,
that stone, this knife, the pen I hold, is a " blind" cause of
its appropriate effects.

* The distinction in the text is substantially equivalent to the distinc-
tion made by Catholic philosophers between a " necessary " and a " free "
cause. But it appeared more appropriate not to use the latter phrase, until
the doctrine of Freedom should be established.

We shall make no further reference in our text to cases of preternatural
intervention. They do not, as has been seen, at all affect our argument;
and we have sufficiently shown that we do not forget their possibility.

Freewill. ;J79

Turning from physical to psychical phenomena the
same doctrine holds. Let us consider those varioun
psychical phenomena of mine, which proceed according to
the law of prevenance. In the case of all these phenomena,
it is involved, by hypothesis, in the very constitution of
my nature, that, given certain psychical and corporeal
antecedents, one definite group of psychical consequents
infallibly and inevitably follows. My soul and body then,
in jointly producing this phenomenal group, have their
proper agency marked out for them by strictest and most
absolute necessity: the}' are causes indeed, but "blind"
causes. If it be not too grotesque an illustration, consider
what happens when water is boiled in a kettle. The water
possesses certain forces and properties of its own ; the fire
possesses certain forces and properties of its own ; and
when the two substances are brought into due proximity,
they produce by their joint causative agency that pheno-
menon of the former which is called " boiling." Apply the
analogy to any one of my psychical phenomena, which pro-
ceeds according to the law of prevenance. My soul
possesses certain forces and properties ; my body possesses
certain forces and properties ; and on the occurrence of
certain given circumstances, on a certain given occasion,
the two substances produce, by their joint causative agency,
that phenomenon of the former which is called, e.g., an
" emotion."

So much, then, on " blind causes." But now we can, at
all events, easily imagine that there may be what we will
call an " originative " intermediate cause. We can easily
imagine that some substance shall not be determined by
its superior cause with strict and inevitable necessity to
one fixed effect ; but, on the contrary, shall be permitted a
certain latitude of choice. Nor, again, have we any diffi-
culty in imagining that the very same substance may
be necessitated to act as a " blind " cause in regard to one

880 The Philosophy of Theism,

class of its effects, while nevertheless it can act as an
" originative " cause in regard to another class. It is
involved, of course, in the whole supposition that the
substance, which acts as an originative cause, must be an
intelligent substance, such as is the human soul. More-
over, whereas we have said that our supposition is an easily
imaginable one, we are not aware of any philosopher who
has attempted to show that it is one intrinsically im-
possible.

Our readers will, by this time, have anticipated the
course which our remarks are to pursue. Let us take the
particular case to which we have so often referred. I have
just received some stinging insult, and I am at this
moment conscious of two entirely different psychical pheno-
mena, which irresistibly force themselves on my attention.
One of these is my preponderating spontaneous impulse ;
which powerfully prompts me to plans of retaliation. The
other phenomenon is my firm and unfaltering resistance to
that impulse. The two phenomena continue in mutual
company for a considerable period, and we are now to
consider the proximate cause of each. Now, as to the
former, we are in one most important respect altogether
accordant with the Determinists. We hold, as they do,
that by the very constitution of my nature, my preponde-
rating spontaneous impulse follows, by infallible and
inevitable consequence, from antecedent phenomena ; that
it is most strictly determined by the law of prevenance. It
results, therefore, from our principles, that the proximate
causes of this preponderating spontaneous impulse — viz.
my soul and my body — are here acting as "blind"
causes.

But, now, as to the accompanying phenomenon, my
resistance to this impulse : what is its proximate cause ?
Its proximate cause is manifestly my soul.* But, in this

* For we heartily follow Mr. Lucas (the Month, February, 1878, p. 244)

Freewill. 3Hl

case, does my soul act as a " blind " cause ? Most certainly
not. A blind cause is necessitated to act according to tho
law of phenomenal prevenance ; whereas we trust we have
abundantly shown, both in our previous essays on the
subject and in the earlier part of our present paper, that
the law of prevenance issues in my preponderating spon-
taneous impulse, and by no means in my active resistance.
to that impulse. My soul, then, in producing a psychical
phenomenon of this latter kind, acts as an " originative "
cause : it acts in virtue of a power (which it is thereby
shown, within certain limits, to possess) of choosing an
alternative. As a blind cause, it is co-operating with my
body in producing its own preponderating spontaneous
impulse; and, at the same moment, as an originative
cause, it is effecting its own free resistance to that impulse.

And here we would earnestly press on oar reader's notice
a fact of extreme importance which, we are confident, will
be admitted as certain by every one who fairly examines
what takes place in his own mind. Consider those various
periods of time during which I am occupied in vigorously
resisting certain solicitations — e.g., to revenge fulness—
which intensely beset me. It is a matter of direct, un-
mistakable, clamorous consciousness that, during those
periods, iifis my own soul and no external agency which
is putting forth active and sustained anti- impulsive effort.
Nor, indeed, is this remark less applicable to all cases of
anti-impulsive effort ; though, of course, where the effort
is less vigorous, the consciousness of what we speak is less
obtrusive.

But more than this may be said. The experience
which I obtain even in one such protracted and vehement
struggle is amply sufficient to give me an intimate and
infallible knowledge of one all-important fact. We refer

in holding that "no one in these days need concern himself to maintain, iu
scholastic language, a real distinction between the soul and its faculties."

382 Tie Philosophy of Theism.

to the fact, that at every moment of the struggle it has
depended on my own free choice with what degree of
emcacity I have contended against the temptation. We
shall have to pursue this subject in some detail on a future
occasion.*

In the above view of originative causation we have not
spoken of my body as co-operating with my soul, because,
as we have already pointed out, an originative cause must
necessarily be an intelligent substance. Nor have we
hesitated, at last, to use the word " free," because, as
we shall immediately point out, the notion of freedom is
included in the notion of an originative cause.

Many Libertarians, when explaining Freewill, are in
the habit of introducing reference to the human personality ;
to the "Ego." We do not find this necessary; and if it
be not necessary, we think it very undesirable. Those
questions which concern the " Ego " are so intricate, and,
we may add, so intimately mixed up with theological
dogma, that their treatment requires most anxious care.
Nor can we see that the true doctrine of human personality,
whatever it may be, has any special relevance to the exposi-
tion with which we are here engaged. Without further
reference, therefore, to the " Ego," we now proceed with
that exposition.

To sum up matters, then, as far as we have gone,
assuming for a moment the truth of Theism. If we con-
template that vast assemblage of substances and phenomena
in the universe which are known to man by experience
and reason — bound together as they are in a chain of

* We abstain from saying, with some Libertarians, that the free agent
is at every moment directly and immediately conscious of his freedom ;
because it seems to us unintelligible how the direct and immediate con-
sciousness of one given moment can testify an abiding power. Our own
way of speaking would be that I have an unremitting and most intimate
knowledge of my own freedom, founded on my intimate familiarity with my
own repeated mental acts. As far as we can see, however, the question
bet\veen these Libertarians and ourselves is purely a verbal one.

Freewill. .*j,s:»

interacting causation — we may observe this circumstance.
There are two kinds of substances* — and neither experience
nor reason testifies more than two — which act as originative
causes : these two are (1) God, and (2) the souls of men.
The First Cause, God, is, we need not say, originative of
everything. He created that vast number of physical sub-
stances which first existed in the universe, endowing each
with its own forces and attributes, and enabling them to
coalesce into fresh substances. He conserves the agency
of substances, as of so many blind causes ; and, through
that agency, He preserves the enormous multitude of
physical phenomena which succeed each other regularly
and harmoniously, according to the law of prevenance. f
He created the human body and conserves its agency, with
its own appropriate efficacy as a blind cause towards the
production, not of physical only, but also of psychical
phenomena. He created the human soul, uniting it mys-
teriously with the human body, endowing it also with
diversified efficacy as a blind cause, and conserving it in
the exercise of that efficacy. And by these two combined
agencies He originated that large number of psychical
phenomena which, no less than physical, move forward
regularly and harmoniously, according to the law of pre-
venance. But over and above all this, He endowed the
human soul with the unspeakably important and charac-

* We feel the extreme awkwardness of this expression, but cannot think
of a better.

t We must not be understood to imply by this phrase that, having
created substances each possessing its own forces and attributes, God leaves
them to themselves, with only the co-operation of His general concurbiis,
in their generation of corresponding phenomena. In our essay on '• Science,
Prayer, Freewill, and Miracles," we earnestly deny this; and we ba-e.
on our denial a defence of the Christian's prayer for temporal (not to PHV
spiritual) blessings. Certainly (as we argue at length in that essay) there
is no vestige of inconsistency in saying that — even while phenomena move
strictly and rigorously on the law of prevenance — God, nevertheless, is
actively working at every moment behind the veil, and stimulating their
course in this or that direction.

oS4- The Philosophy of Theism.

t eristic power of originative causation. This power enables
me, within certain limits, at my own pleasure and choice,
to break off from the chain of prevenance ; nay, to act, in
a certain true sense, independently of God. It is involved,
we say, in this doctrine of Freewill which we maintain,
that God has, to a certain extent, abdicated the control-
ment of my acts, and left them to my own independent
choice.*

Here we give up our momentary assumption of Theism,
and proceed at once to the last stage of our argument.
At this point we introduce, more prominently and directly
than hitherto, the term " Freewill ; " and we thus define
that term in connection with our preceding remarks. At
whatever moment and within whatever sphere my soul has
the proximate power of acting as an originative cause —
whether it exercise that power or no — at that moment and
within that sphere my " will " is said to be " free." And
it remains to show that this definition is precisely equivalent
to that which is more commonly given than any other by
Catholic philosophers. We do not mean that Catholics
are bound to this latter definition ; for the Church allows
considerable latitude of opinion on the matter. At the
same time, she fully permits her children to hold — what
for ourselves we do hold — that no view of Freewill is
altogether satisfactory to the intellect, except that taken by
the great Jesuit theologians ; and we think that their view
is becoming every day the more commonly accepted one
among Catholics. It is usually expressed thus : " Potentia
libera est ea qme, positis omnibus requisitis ad agendum,
potest agere et non agere." There is a certain awkward-

* We may at this point assure our theological readers, how very far we
are from forgetting the vast and inestimable influence for good exercised by
God over man's Freewill. We have elsewhere ventured to express, as the
bias of our own judgment, that " those exercises of Freewill on which the
salvation of any given person substantially and predominantly depends, are
those whereby he prays to God for infallible grace."

Freewill. 385

ness, indeed, in this exact form of the definition, becauriu
some given " power " may possibly be " free " in some acts,
and yet not in all. F. Palmeri, accordingly, words it some-
what differently : " Libertas est ea indifferentia activa
agentis, qua, positis omnibus ad agendum requisitis, potest
agere et non agere : " and it is in this form that we prefer
it. To appreciate its bearing, whether in one form or the
other, let us consider any given moment of human action.
My soul possesses certain qualities, intrinsic and inherent ;
certain faculties, tendencies, habits, and the like ; and it is
solicited by various attractions, having respectively their
own special intensity, direction, and adaptation to my
temperament. In order that my soul may act, nothing
more is necessary than that which now exists : " Posita
sunt omnia requisita ad agendum." My will cannot be
free, say these theologians, unless at this very moment my
soul has a real power, at least, of either doing this given
act or not doing it. They consider, of course, that in a
vast majority of cases it has more power than this ; it has
the power of acting with greater or less efficiency in this or
that direction. But unless it have, at least, so much power
as above described, my will is not free at all. And we
should add two very obvious explanations. Firstly, when
the will is said to act, this is a mere figure of speech ; for it
is the soul which acts.f Secondly, when the soul is said
to "act, "the immediate reference is to its own internal
action ; whether or no that internal action be the resolving
on, nay, the immediately commanding of, some external
act.

* The Theist indeed holds that God's coucursus is also necessary ; but
then he further holds that it is always given.

t Unless, indeed, a real distinction be supposed between the soul and
its powers. We have already quoted, however, with assent Mr. Lucas's
repudiation of such a doctrine. It is one for which much might be said
if it were permissible, on matters of pure philosophy, to go by authority,
but for which we have never seen any argument that appears to us of
weight.
VOL. I.

2 C

386 The Philosophy of Theism.

Such, then, being the more recognized Catholic defini-
tion of Freewill, we are now to show that this definition
is precisely equivalent to that which we just now gave in
our own language, and in accordance with our earlier
remarks. And one or two homely illustrations will make
this abundantly clear.

I am walking, for health's sake, in my grounds on a
bitterly cold day. My strongest present desire is to be back
comfortably in the warm house ; but I persistently refuse
to gratify that desire, remembering the great importance
of a good walk, not only for my general health, but for my
evening's comfort and my night's sleep. Plainly, according
to the Jesuit definition, my will acts with perfect freedom.
My present action is resistance to my strongest present
desire ; and I have full proximate power to abstain, if I
choose, from the continuance of this action by resolving to
go indoors. But no less plainly this act is free, according
to that definition of Freewill which we ourselves set forth.
My soul and body, co-operating as blind causes, generate
my preponderating spontaneous impulse towards going
indoors ; while my soul, acting as an originative cause,
generates my continued resistance to that preponderating
spontaneous impulse.

Conversely. I am sitting over the fire, with a novel in
my hand ; and my strongest present desire is to continue
in my present position. I remember, indeed, that nothing
in a small way can well be worse for me, and that I shall
pay dearly for my self-indulgence. " Video meliora pro-
boque : deteriora sequor," and I stay just as I am. Here,
again, according to the Jesuit definition, I am undeniably
free ; for I am entirely able, without any further " requisita
ad agendum," either to continue my self-indulgent action
or to abstain from it. And here, again, my freedom is
equally manifest, according to our own definition of free-
dom. True, indeed, my soul is not at this moment acting

Freewill. :;s:

as an originative cause ; but it lias the proximate power of
so acting if it pleases.*

At last, indeed, the fact before us is perhaps too obvious
to need illustration. It is most plain on the very surface,
that whenever and within whatever sphere I have the
proximate power to do or not to do this action, at that time
and within that sphere my soul has the proximate power to
act, if it so choose, as an originative cause. And if this be
so, the two definitions of Freewill are of course mutually
equivalent. But the sense of the term being thus under-
stood, there is absolutely nothing which we need add to our
preceding remarks, in order to show that men do possess
that power called Freewill, and by no means unfrequently
are able to exercise it. Moreover, what we have now said
is abundantly sufficient, as will be shown in subsequent
essays, for the direct purpose we have in view : it is an
exposition of Freewill abundantly sufficient as a premiss
for the establishment of Theism. At the same time, we are
here brought into the close presence of a question which
in other ways is of the gravest importance, both speculative
and practical. During how many moments of the day, in
what acts, under what conditions, am I free ? Some Liber-
tarians, e.g., have implied, or even expressed, a proposition
of this kind: "My will is not at this moment free," they
say, or seem to say, "unless I am at this moment placing
before myself the alternative, ' shall I now do this act or not
do it ? ' Otherwise," so they proceed, " how can it be true
that I have the proximate power to abstain from it ? How
can it be said that I have the proximate power of abstaining
from an act, when the very thought of abstaining from it
does not occur to me ? " This position seems to us, as we

* In this particular case, indeed, it may perhaps be said really to act n»
an originative cause, as originating the act " I don't choose just now to resist
my strongest present desire." For reasons, however, which will uppear
hereafter, we prefer our definition as it stands.

388 Th.e Philosophy of Theism.

have said, so pregnant with momentous results, whether
for good or evil, that we think it deserved much more
sustained and systematic notice than it has commonly
received. We will give two different illustrations of what
seems to us undeniably involved in it.

Firstly, take the case of a holy man occupied in medita-
tion and prayer. At first he places before himself the
alternative, " Shall I do this or not do it?" But as he
proceeds in his holy task, he is too much immersed in the
thought of God to think at all about himself. He dwells, e.g.,
on the mysteries of Christ ; he makes corresponding acts of
faith, hope, and love ; he prays for the Church ; he prays
for his enemies ; he prays for the various pious ends which
he has at heart ; and his thoughts are entirely filled with
such holy contemplations. It seems not less than grotesque
to suppose that all this time he has been asking himself the
question, " Shall I go on with these prayers of mine or
shall I leave them off ? " And yet, according to what seems
the obvious meaning of that position which we criticize, as
soon as ever he ceases to ask himself this question, his
moral freedom comes temporarily to an end. From that
moment his prayers are no more free — and therefore no
more formally good and no more meritorious — than if he
were in bed and asleep.

A picture on the opposite side. In my evening examen,
I observe clearly that, during a long conversation which I
have had with a friend, I have been largely animated by
vainglory, and I ask forgiveness of my sin accordingly.
Yet at the time when I was occupied in that conversation,
I had no suspicion whatever of the motive which was in
fact at work. It would seem to follow, from the doctrine we
criticize, that the acts of vainglory, not having been free,
had not been culpable ; and that to repent of them was as
absurd on my part as it would be to repent of a bad dream.

FreeivilL 389

For, plainly, since I did not know that these acts of vain-
glory existed, still less did I ask myself the question
whether I should continue them or no. In fact, as far as
we can see, the doctrine hefore us would deny the possibility
of there being such offences as secret sins at all ; for if I do
not knoiv of the sinful acts, how, on this view, can I be held
responsible for their commission ? Yet Abbe Gay, in that
ascetical work of his which has obtained so unusually wide
authorization and approval (see the Dublin Review for July,
1878, p. 229), gives a very different account of this matter ;
and here surely he represents all ascetical writers without
exception. He commemorates that "unhappy legion of
sins, unknown and concealed from ourselves, from which
David besought God to purify his soul." " Ab occultis
meis munda me." How can I be purified from offences,
which, being inculpable, have carried with them no defile-
ment ?

We suppose that, with most of our readers, such in-
ferences as these will be rcductiones ad absurdum of the
premiss from which they result. Yet it requires great care
to draw out accurately such principles on Freewill as
may sufficiently guard against conclusions so intolerable.
This necessary inquiry, moreover, is so intimately connected
with many remarks which we have made in this or preced-
ing essays, and is indeed so necessary as a supplement of
those remarks, that we are very unwilling to omit it. The
next subject, indeed, which is to occupy us — the " Reason-
able Basis of Morality " — will itself supply more than one
premiss, which will be of great importance in such a dis-
cussion. What we hope, then, to do, is this : After having
concluded our treatment of this last-named theme, we
purpose to suspend for a moment the direct course of our
series, and insert an intercalary essay, addressed to
Catholics, in order that we may handle this domestic ques-

390 TJie Philosophy of Theism.

tion with the carefulness due to its critical importance.
We are particularly desirous of submitting our views on
this matter to the judgment of Catholic thinkers.*

* The essay here referred to is the essay on the " Extent of Freewill,"
the last in the second volume of this collection. — ED.

END OF VOL. I.

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