JL
I *> >AAk \ 5
ELEMENTS
LOGIC.
COMPRISING
ELEMENTS
OF
LOGIC.
COMPRISING
THE SUBSTANCE OF THE ARTICLE
IN THE
ENCYCLOPAEDIA METROPOLITANA
WITH ADDITIONS, &c.
BY
RICHARD WHATELY, D D.
ARCHBISHOP OF DUBLIN.
SIXTH EDITION, REVISED.
LONDON:
B. FELLOWES, LUDGATE STREET.
M DCCC XXXVI.
LONDON :
CLAY, PRINTER, BREAD-STREET-HILL.
TO
THE RIGHT REVEREND
EDWARD GOPLESTON, D.D.
LORD BISHOP OF LLANDAFF,
8fc. 8fc.
MY DEAR LORD,
To enumerate the advantages I have
derived from your instructions, both in
regular lectures and in private conversation,
would be needless to those acquainted with
the parties, and to the Public, uninteresting.
My object at present is simply to acknow-
ledge how greatly I am indebted to you in
respect of the present Work ; not merely as
having originally imparted to me the prin-
ciples of the Science, but also as having
a 2
DEDICATION,
contributed remarks, explanations, and illus-
trations, relative to the most important points,
to so great an amount that I can hardly
consider myself as the Author of more than
half of such portions of the treatise as are not
borrowed from former publications. I could
have wished, indeed, to acknowledge this
more explicitly, by marking with some note
of distinction those parts which are least my
own. But I found it could not be done. In
most instances there is something belonging
to each of us ; and even in those parts where
your share is the largest, it would not be fair
that you should be made responsible for any
thing that is not entirely your own. Nor
is it possible, in the case of a Science, to
remember distinctly how far one has been, in
each instance, indebted to the suggestions of
another. Information, as to matters of fact,
may easily be referred in the mind to the
person from whom we have derived it : but
scientific truths, when thoroughly embraced,
become much more a part of the mind, as it
DEDICATION. V
were; since they rest, not on the authority
of the instructor, but on reasoning from
data, which we ourselves furnish ;* they
are scions engrafted on the stems previously
rooted in our own soil ; and we are apt to
confound them with its indigenous pro-
ductions.
You yourself also, I have reason to be-
lieve, have forgotten the greater part of the
assistance you have afforded in the course
of conversations on the subject ; as I have
found, more than once, that ideas which I
distinctly remembered to have received from
you, have not been recognized by you when
read or repeated. As far, however, as I can
recollect, though there is no part of the
following pages in which I have not, more
or less, received valuable suggestions from
you, I believe you have contributed less to
the Analytical Outline, and to the Treatise
on Fallacies, and more, to the subjoined
Dissertation, than to the rest of the Work.
*SeeB. IV. Ch. ii. 1.
DEDICATION,
I take this opportunity of publicly de-
claring, that as, on the one hand, you are
not responsible for any thing contained in
this Work, so, on the other hand, should
you ever favour the world with a publication
of your own on the subject, the coincidence
which will doubtless be found in it with many
things here brought forward as my own, is
not to be regarded as any indication of
plagiarism, at least on your side.
Believe me to be,
My dear Lord,
Your obliged and affectionate
Pupil and Friend,
RICHARD WHATELY.
PREFACE.
THE following Treatise contains the sub-
stance of the Article " LOGIC " in the Ency-
clopedia Metropolitana. It was suggested to
me that a separate publication of it might
prove acceptable, not only to some who are
not subscribers to that work, but also to
several who are ; but who, for convenience
of reference, would prefer a more portable
volume.
I have accordingly revised it, and made
such additions, chiefly in the form of Notes,
as I thought likely to increase its utility.
I have taken without scruple whatever
appeared most valuable from the works of
former writers ; especially the concise, but in
general accurate, treatise of Aldrich : but
while I acknowledge my obligations to my
predecessors, of whose labours I have largely
availed myself, I do not profess to be alto-
gether satisfied with any of the treatises that
have yet appeared ; nor have I accordingly
viii PREFACE.
judged it any unreasonable presumption to
point out what seem to me the errors they
contain. Indeed, whatever deference an
Author may profess for the authority of those
who have preceded him, the very circum-
stance -of his publishing a work on the same
subject, proves that he thinks theirs open to
improvement. In censuring, however, as I
have had occasion to do, several of the doc-
trines and explanations of logical writers, and
of Aldrich in particular, I wish it to be
understood that this is not from my having
formed a low estimate of the merits of the
Compendium drawn up by the Author just
mentioned, but, on the contrary, from its
deserved popularity, from the impossibility
of noticing particularly all the points in
which we agree, and from the consideration
that errors are the more carefully to be
pointed out in proportion to the authority
by which they are sanctioned.
In the later editions I have introduced, in
the Appendix, under the word " Person/' an
extract from the theological works of my
illustrious predecessor in the teaching of
Logic, Dr. Wallis, Professor of Geometry in
this University.
I have also to acknowledge assistance
received from several friends who have at
PREFACE. IX
various times suggested remarks and alte-
rations. But I cannot avoid particularizing
the Rev. J. Newman, Fellow of Oriel Col-
lege, who actually composed a considerable
portion of the work as it now stands, from
manuscripts not designed for publication,
and who is the original author of several
pages. Some valuable illustrations of the
importance of attending to the ambiguity of
the terms used in Political Economy, were
furnished by the kindness of my friend arid
former pupil, Mr. Senior, of Magdalen Col-
lege and of Lincoln's Inn, who preceded me
in the office of Professor of Political Economy
at Oxford, and afterwards was appointed to
the same at King's College, London. They
are printed in the Appendix. But the friend
to whom it is inscribed has contributed far
more, and that, in the most important parts,
than all others together ; so much, indeed,
that, though there is in the treatise nothing
of his which has not undergone such expan-
sion or modification as leaves me solely
responsible for the whole, there is not a
little of which I cannot fairly claim to be
the Author.
The present edition has been revised with
the utmost care. But though the work has
undergone not only the close examination of
PREFACE.
myself and several friends, but the severer
scrutiny of determined opponents, I am
happy to find that no material errors have
been detected, nor any considerable al-
terations found necessary. Some small
additions have, however, been introduced
into the later editions ; and also a change
in the arrangement, which I trust will some-
what lighten the student's labour. I have
removed into an Appendix a considerable
portion of what was in the first two editions
placed in Part I. (now Chap, i.) of the
Compendium ; as being (though highly im-
portant, not only from its connexion with
the reasoning process, but for other pur-
poses, yet) not necessary, after the perusal
of the Analytical Outline, for the under-
standing of the Second and Third Chapters.
It may be studied, at the learner's choice,
either before or after the Compendium.
On the utility of Logic many writers have
said much in which I cannot coincide, and
which has tended to bring the study into
unmerited disrepute. By representing Logic
as furnishing the sole instrument for the
discovery of truth in all subjects, and as
teaching the use of the intellectual faculties
in general, they raised expectations which
PREFACE. XI
could not be realised, and which naturally
led to a re-action. The whole system, whose
unfounded pretensions had been thus bla-
zoned forth, has come to be commonly
regarded as utterly futile and empty : like
several of our most valuable medicines,
which, when first introduced, were pro-
claimed, each, as a panacea, infallible in the
most opposite disorders ; and which conse-
quently, in many instances, fell for a time
into total disuse ; though, after a long inter-
val, they were established in their just esti-
mation, and employed conformably to their
real properties.
To explain fully the utility of Logic is
what can be done only in the course of an
explanation of the system itself. One pre-
liminary observation only (for the original
suggestion of which I am indebted to the
same friend to whom this work is inscribed)
it may be worth while to offer in this place.
If it were inquired what is to be regarded as
the most appropriate intellectual occupation
of MAN, as man, what would be the answer?
The Statesman is engaged with political
affairs ; the Soldier with military ; the Mathe-
matician, with the properties of numbers and
magnitudes ; the Merchant, with commercial
concerns, &c, ; but in what are all and each
PREFACE.
of these employed ? employed, I mean, as
men ; for there are many modes of exercise
of the faculties, mental as well as bodily,
which are in great measure common to us
with the lower animals. Evidently, in Rea-
soning. They are all occupied in deducing,
well or ill, conclusions from Premises ; each,
concerning the Subject of his own particular
business. If, therefore, it be found that the
process going on daily, in each of so many
different minds, is, in any respect, the same,
and if the principles on which it is conducted
can be reduced to a regular system, and if
rules can be deduced from that system, for
the better conducting of the process, then, it
can hardly be denied that such a system and
such rules must be especially worthy the
attention, not of the members of this or that
profession merely, but of every one who is
desirous of possessing a cultivated mind. To
understand the theory of that which is the
appropriate intellectual occupation of Man
in general, and to learn to do that ivell,
which every one will and must do, whether
well or ill, may surely be considered as an
essential part of a liberal education.
Even supposing that no practical improve-
ment in argumentation resulted from the
study of Logic, it would not by any means
PREFACE. X1U
follow that it is unworthy of attention. The
pursuit of knowledge on curious and interest-
ing subjects, for its own sake, is usually
reckoned no misemployment of time ; and is
considered as, incidentally, if not directly,
useful to the individual, by the exercise thus
afforded to the mental faculties. All who
study Mathematics are not training them-
selves to become Surveyors or Mechanics :
some knowledge of Anatomy and Chemistry
is even expected in a man liberally educated,
though without any view to his practising
Surgery or Medicine. The investigation of
a process which is peculiarly and universally
the occupation of Man, considered as Man,
can hardly be reckoned a less philosophical
pursuit than those just instanced.
It has usually been assumed, however, in
the case of the present subject, that a theory
which does not tend to the improvement of
practice is utterly unworthy of regard ; and
then, it is contended that Logic has no such
tendency, on the plea that men may and
do reason correctly without it : an objection
which would equally apply in the case of
Grammar, Music, Chemistry, Mechanics, &c.,
in all of which systems the practice must
have existed previously to the theory.
But many who allow the use of systematic
XIV PREFACE.
principles in other things, are accustomed
to cry up Common-Sense as the sufficient
and only safe guide in Reasoning. Now
by Common-Sense is meant, I apprehend,
(when the term is used with any distinct
meaning,) an exercise of the judgment un-
aided by any Art or system of rules ; such
an exercise as we must necessarily employ
in numberless cases of daily occurrence ; in
which, having no established principles to
guide us, no line of procedure, as it were,
distinctly chalked out, we must needs act
on the best extemporaneous conjectures we
can form. He who is eminently skilful in
doing this, is said to possess a superior de-
gree of Common-Sense. But that Common-
Sense is only our second-best guide that
the rules of Art, if judiciously framed, are
always desirable when they can be had, is
an assertion, for the truth of which I may
appeal to the testimony of mankind in
general ; which is so much the more valu-
able, inasmuch as it may be accounted the
testimony of adversaries. For the generality
have a strong predilection in favour of Com-
mon-Sense, except in those points in which
they, respectively, possess the knowledge of
a system of rules ; but in these points they
deride any one who trusts to unaided Com-
PREFACE. XV
mon-Sense. A Sailor, e. g. will, perhaps,
despise the pretensions of medical men, and
prefer treating a disease by Common-Sense :
but he would ridicule the proposal of navi-
gating a ship by Common-Sense, without
regard to the maxims of nautical art. A
Physician, again, will perhaps contemn Sys-
tems of Political-Economy,* of Logic, or
Metaphysics, and insist on the superior wis-
dom of trusting to Common-Sense in such
matters ; but he would never approve of
trusting to Common-Sense in the treatment
of diseases. Neither, again, would the Archi-
tect recommend a reliance on Com mon-Sense
alone in building, nor the Musician in music,
to the neglect of those systems of rules,
which, in their respective arts, have been
deduced from scientific reasoning aided by
experience. And the induction might be
extended to every department of practice.
Since, therefore, each gives the preference to
unassisted Common-Sense only in those cases
where he himself has nothing else to trust
to, and invariably resorts to the rules of art,
wherever he possesses the knowledge of them,
it is plain that mankind universally bear
their testimony, though unconsciously and
* See Senior's Introductory Lecture on Political-Economy,
p. 28.
XVI PREFACE.
often unwillingly, to the preferableness of
systematic knowledge to conjectural judg-
ments.
There is, however, abundant room for the
employment of Common-Sense in the appli-
cation of the system. To bring arguments,
out of the form in which they are expressed
in conversation and in books, into the
regular logical shape, must be, of course,
the business of Common-Sense, aided by
practice ; for such arguments are, by sup-
position, not as yet within the province of
Science; else they would not be irregular,
but would be already strict syllogisms. To
exercise the learner in this operation, I have
subjoined, in the Appendix, some examples,
both of insulated arguments, and (in the last
three editions) of the analysis of argumen-
tative works. It should be added, however,
that a large portion of what is usually intro-
duced into Logical treatises, relative to the
finding of Arguments, the different kinds
of them, &c., I have referred to the head
of Rhetoric, and treated of in a work on the
Elements of that Art.
It was doubtless from a strong and deli-
berate conviction of the advantages, direct
and indirect, accruing from an acquaintance
PREFACE. XVII
with Logic, that the University of Oxford,
when re-modelling their system, not only
retained that branch of study, regardless of
the clamours of many of the half-learned,
but even assigned a prominent place to it,
by making it an indispensable part of the
Examination for the first Degree. This last
circumstance, however, I am convinced, has,
in a great degree, produced an effect opposite
to what was designed. It has contributed to
lower instead of exalting, the estimation of
the study ; and to withhold from it the earnest
attention of many who might have applied
to it with profit. I am not so weak as to
imagine that any System can ensure great
proficiency in any pursuit whatever, either
in all students, or in a very large proportion
of them : " we sow many seeds to obtain a
few flowers ;" but it might have been ex-
pected (and doubtless was expected) that
a majority at least of successful candidates
would derive some benefit worth mentioning
from their logical pursuits ; and that a
considerable proportion of the distinguished
candidates would prove respectable, if not
eminent logicians. Such expectations I do
not censure as unreasonable, or such as I
might not have formed myself, had I been
called upon to judge at that period when our
b
PREFACE.
experience was all to come. Subsequently,
however, experience has shown that those
expectations have been very inadequately
realized. The truth is, that a very small
proportion, even of distinguished students,
ever become proficients in Logic ; and that
by far the greater part pass through the
University without knowing any thing at all
of the subject. I do not mean that they
have not learned by rote a string of tech-
nical terms ; but that they understand abso-
lutely nothing whatever of the principles of
the Science.
I am aware that some injudicious friends
of Oxford will censure the frankness of this
avowal. I have only to reply that such is the
truth; and that I think too well of, and
know far too well, the University in which I
have been employed in various academical
occupations above a quarter of a century, to
apprehend danger to her reputation from
declaring the exact truth. With all its de-
fects, and no human institution is perfect,
the University would stand, I am convinced,
higher in public estimation than it does,
were the whole truth, and nothing but the
truth, in all points respecting it, more fully
known. But the scanty and partial success
of the measures employed to promote logical
PREFACE. XIX
studies is the consequence, I apprehend, of
the universality of the requisition. That
which must be done by every one, will, of
course, often be done but indifferently ; and
when the belief is once fully established,
which it certainly has long been, that any-
thing which is indispensable to a testimo-
nial, has little or nothing to do with the
attainment of honors,* the lowest standard
soon becomes the established one in the
minds of the greater number; and provided
that standard be once reached, so as to
secure the candidate from rejection, a greater
or less proficiency in any such branch of
study is regarded as a matter of indifference,
as far as any views of academical distinction
are concerned.
Divinity is one of these branches; and
to this also most of what has been said
concerning Logic might be considered as
equally applicable ; but, in fact, there are
several important differences between the
two cases. In the first place, most of the
students who are designed for the Church,
and many who are not, have a value for
theological knowledge, independently of the
* In the last-framed Examination-statute an express declara-
tion has been inserted, that proficiency in Logic is to have weight
in the assignment of honors.
62
XX PREFACE.
requisition of the schools ; and on that
ground do not confine their views to the
lowest admissible degree of proficiency :
whereas this can be said of very few in
the case of Logic. And moreover, such as
design to become candidates for holy Orders,
know that another examination in Theology
awaits them. But a consideration, which is
still more to the present purpose, is, that
Theology, not being a Science, admits of
infinite degrees of proficiency, from that
which is within the reach of a child, up to
the highest that is attainable by the most
exalted genius ; every one of which degrees
is inestimably valuable as far as it goes. If
any one understands tolerably the Church-
catechism, or even half of it, he knows
something of divinity ; and that something is
incalculably preferable to nothing. But it
is not so with a Science : one who does
not understand the principles of Euclid's
demonstrations, whatever number of ques-
tions and answers he may have learnt by
rote, knows absolutely nothing of geometry :
unless he attain this point, all his labour is
utterly lost ; worse than lost, perhaps, if he
is led to believe that he has learnt some-
thing of a Science, when, in truth, he has
not. And the same is the case with Logic,
PREFACE. XXI
or any other Science. It does not admit of
such various degrees, as a knowledge of
religion. Of course I am far from supposing
that all who understand anything at all of
Logic stand on the same level ; but I mean,
what is surely undeniable, that one who does
not embrace the fundamental principles, of
that, or any other Science, whatever he may
have taken on authority, and learned by rote,
knows, properly speaking, nothing of that
Science. And such, I have no hesitation in
saying, is the case with a considerable pro-
portion even of those candidates who obtain
testimonials, including many who gain dis-
tinction. There are some persons (probably
not so many as one in ten, of such as have
in other respects tolerable abilities,) who are
physically incapable of the degree of steady
abstraction requisite for really embracing the
principles of Logic or of any other Science,
whatever pains may be taken by themselves
or their teachers. But there is a much
greater number to whom this is a great
difficulty, though not an impossibility ; and
who having, of course, a strong disin-
clination to such a study, look naturally
to the very lowest admissible standard.
And the example of such examinations in
Logic as must be expected in the case
XX11 PREFACE.
of men of these descriptions, tends, in com-
bination with popular prejudice, to degrade
the study altogether in the minds of the
generality.
It was from these considerations, perhaps,
that it was proposed, a few years ago, to
leave the study of Logic altogether to the
option of the candidates ; but the suggestion
was rejected ; the majority appearing to
think (in which opinion I most fully coin-
cide) that, so strongly as the tide of po-
pular opinion sets against the study, the
result would have been, within a few years,
an almost universal neglect of that Science.
Matters were accordingly left, at that time,
in respect of this point, on their former foot-
ing; which I am convinced was far prefer-
able to the proposed alteration.
But a middle course between these two
was suggested, which I was persuaded would
be infinitely preferable to either ; a persua-
sion which I had long entertained, and
which is confirmed by every day's observa-
tions and reflections ; of which, few persons,
I believe, have bestowed more on this sub-
ject. Let the study of Logic, it was urged,
be made optional to those who are merely
candidates for a degree, but indispensable to
the attainment of academical honors ; and
PREFACE. XX111
the consequence would be, that it would
speedily begin and progressively continue,
to rise in estimation and to be studied with
real profit. The examination might then,
it was urged, without any hardship, be made
a strict one ; since no one could complain
that a certain moderate degree of scientific
ability, and a resolution to apply to a certain
prescribed study, should be the conditions of
obtaining distinction. The far greater part
would still study Logic ; since there would
be (as before) but few who would be willing
to exclude themselves from the possibility
of obtaining distinction ; but it would be
studied with a very different mind, when
ennobled, as it were, by being made part of
the passport to University honors, and when
a proficiency in it came to be regarded gene-
rally as an honorable distinction. And in
proportion as the number increased of those
who really understood the Science, the
number, it was contended, would increase of
such as would value it on higher and better
grounds. It would in time come to be
better known and better appreciated by all
the well-informed part of society : and lec-
tures in Logic at the University would then,
perhaps, no longer consist exclusively of an
explanation of the mere elements. This
XXIV PREFACE.
would be necessary indeed for beginners ;
but to the more advanced students, the
tutors would no more think of lecturing in
the bare rudiments, than of lecturing in
the Latin or Greek Grammar; but, in the
same manner as they exercise their pupils in
Grammar, by reading with them Latin and
Greek authors with continual reference to
grammar-rules, so, they would exercise them
in Logic by reading some argumentative
work, requiring an analysis of it on Logical
principles.
These effects could not indeed, it was
acknowledged, be expected to show them-
selves fully till after a considerable lapse of
time ; but that the change would begin to
appear, (and that very decidedly) within
three or four years, was confidently antici-
pated.
To this it was replied, that it was most
desirable that no one should be allowed to
obtain the Degree of B.A. without a know-
ledge of Logic. This answer carries a plau-
sible appearance to those unacquainted with
the actual state of the University ; though in
fact it is totally irrelevant. For it goes on
the supposition, that hitherto this object has
been accomplished ; that every one who
passes his examination does possess a know-
PREFACE. XXV
ledge of Logic ; which is notoriously not
the fact, nor ever can be, without some
important change in some part of our system.
The question therefore is, not, as the above
objection would seem to imply, whether a
real, profitable knowledge of Logic shall be
strictly required of every candidate for a
Degree, (for this in fact never has been
done) but whether, in the attempt to accom-
plish this by requiring the form of a logical
examination from every candidate without
exception, we shall continue to degrade the
Science, and to let this part of the exami-
nation be regarded as a mere form, by many
who might otherwise have studied Logic in
earnest, and with advantage : whether the
great majority of candidates, and those too
of a more promising description, shall lose
a real and important benefit, through the
attempt, (which, after all, experience has
proved to be a vain attempt) to comprehend
in this benefit a very small number, and of
the least promising.
Something of an approach to the proposed
alteration, was introduced into the Examina-
tion-statute passed in 1830 ; in which, per-
mission is granted to such as are candidates
merely for a testimonial, to substitute for
Logic a portion of Euclid. I fear, however,
XXVI PREFACE.
that little or nothing will be gained by this ;
unless indeed the Examiners resolve to make
the examinations in Logic far stricter than
those in Euclid. For since every one who
is capable of really understanding Euclid
must be also capable of Logic, the alteration
does not meet the case of those whose in-
aptitude for Science is invincible ; and these
are the very description of men whose (so
called) logical-examinations tend to depress
the Science. Those few who really are phy-
sically incapable of scientific reasoning, and
the far greater number who fancy them-
selves so, or who at least will rather run a
risk than surmount their aversion and set
themselves to study in earnest, all these
will be likely, when the alternative is pro-
posed, to prefer Logic to Euclid ; because
in the latter, it is hardly possible, at least not
near so easy as in Logic, to present the sem-
blance of preparation by learning questions
and answers by rote : in the cant phrase
of undergraduates, by getting crammed.
Experience has proved this, in the case of
the Responsion-examinations, where the al-
ternative of Logic or Euclid has always
been proposed to the candidates ; of whom
those most averse to Science, or incapable of
it, are almost always found to prefer Logic.
PREFACE. XXVH
The determination may indeed be formed,
and acted on from henceforth, that all who
do in reality know nothing, properly speak-
ing, of any Science, shall be rejected : all
I know is, that this has never been the
case hitherto.
Still, it is a satisfaction to me, that atten-
tion has been called to the evil in question,
and an experimental measure adopted for
its abatement. A confident hope is thus
afforded, that in the event (which I much
fear) of the failure of the experiment, some
other more effectual measure may be re-
sorted to.*
I am sensible that many may object, that
this is not the proper place for such remarks
as the foregoing : what has the Public at
large, they may say, to do with the statutes
of the University of Oxford ? To this it
might fairly be replied, that not only all
who think of sending their sons or other
near relatives to Oxford, but all likewise who
are placed under the ministry of such as
have been educated there, are indirectly con-
* Since this was written, the experiment has been tried. In
the first Examination-list under the new Statute (Easter, 1831), of
125 candidates who did not aspire to the higher classes, twenty -
five presented Euclid for their examination, and one hundred,
Logic !
XXV111 PREFACE.
cerned, to a certain degree, in the system
there pursued. But the consideration which
had the chief share in inducing me to say
what I have, is, that the vindication of
Logic from the prevailing disregard and con-
tempt under which it labo.urs, would have
been altogether incomplete without it. For
let it be remembered that the science is
judged of by the Public in this country, in a
very great degree, from the specimens dis-
played, and the reports made, by those
whom Oxford sends forth. Every one, on
looking into the University Calendar or Sta-
tute Book, feels himself justified in assuming,
that whoever has graduated at Oxford must
be a Logician : not, indeed, necessarily, a
first-rate Logician ; but such as to satisfy the
public examiners that he has a competent
knowledge of the Science. Now, if a very
large proportion of these persons neither are,
nor think themselves at all benefited by their
(so called) logical education, and if many of
them treat the study with contempt, and
represent it as a mere tissue of obsolete and
empty jargon, which it is a mere waste of
time to attend to, let any one judge what
conclusions respecting the utility of the
study, and the wisdom of the University in
upholding it, are likely to be the result.
PREFACE. XXIX
That prejudices so deeply-rooted as those
I have alluded to, and supported by the
authority of such eminent names, especially
that of Locke, and (as is commonly, though
not very correctly supposed) Bacon, should
be overthrown at once by the present trea-
tise, I am not so sanguine as to expect;
but if I have been successful in refuting
some of the most popular objections, and
explaining some principles which are in
general ill-understood, it may be hoped
that in time just notions on the subject
may gain ground : especially if, as I have
some reason to hope, a more able advo-
cate of the same cause should be induced
to step forward.
It may be permitted me to mention, that
as I have addressed myself to various classes
of students, from the most uninstructed tyro,
to the furthest-advanced Logician, and have
touched accordingly both on the most ele-
mentary principles, and on some of the most
remote deductions from them, it must be
expected that readers of each class will find
some parts not well calculated for them.
Some explanations will appear to the one
too simple and puerile ; and for another
class, some of the disquisitions will be at first
too abstruse. If to each description some
XXX PREFACE.
portions are found interesting, it is as much
as I can expect.
With regard to the style, I have con-
sidered perspicuity not only, as it always
must be, the first point, but as one of such
paramount importance in such a subject, as
to justify the neglect of all others. Prolixity
of explanation, homeliness in illustration,
and baldness of expression, I have regarded
as blemishes not worth thinking of, when
anything was to be gained in respect of
clearness. To some of my readers a tem-
porary difficulty may occasionally occur from
the use of some technical terms different,
or differently applied, from what they have
been accustomed to.* They must consider,
however, that the attempt to conform in this
point to the usage of every logical writer,
would have been, on account of their vari-
ations from each other, utterly hopeless. T
have endeavonred, in the terms employed,
to make no wanton innovations, but to con-
form generally to established usage, except
when there is some very strong objection
to it ; where usage is divided to prefer what
may appear in each case the most convenient
term ; and, above all, to explain distinctly
* See Book II. Chap. i. 1.
PREFACE. XXXI
the sense in which each is employed in the
present work.
If any should complain of my not having
given a history of all the senses in which
each technical term has been used by each
writer from its first introduction, and a re-
view of the works of each, I can only reply
that my design was not to write a Logical
Archseology, or a Commentary on the works
of former Logicians, but an elementary intro-
duction to the science. And few, I suppose,
would consider a treatise, for instance, on
Agriculture, as incomplete, which should
leave untouched the questions of, who was
the inventor of the plough, what successive
alterations that implement has undergone,
and from what region wheat was first intro-
duced.
And if again any should complain of the
omission of such metaphysical disquisitions
on the laws of thought, and the constitution
of the human mind generally, as they have
been accustomed to include under the head
of Logic, my answer must be, that that term
has been employed by me in a different
sense ; for reasons which I have stated in
several parts of this treatise, and especially
in Book IV. Chap, iii ; and that I am there-
fore only to be censured at the utmost as not
XXXU PREFACE.
having undertaken a work of a different kind,
and on a different subject.
Of the correctness of the fundamental
doctrines maintained in the work, I may be
allowed to feel some confidence ; not so
much from the length of time (above twenty
years) that I have been more or less occupied
with it, ending at the same time the advan-
tage of frequent suggestions and corrections
from several judicious friends, as from the
nature of the subject. In works of taste, an
author cannot be sure that the judgment of
the public will coincide with his own ; and if
he fail to give pleasure, he fails of his sole
or most appropriate object. But in the case
of truths which admit of Scientific demon-
stration, it is possible to arrive by reasoning
at as full an assurance of the justness of the
conclusions established, as the imperfection
of the human faculties will admit ; and ex-
perience, accompanied with attentive obser-
vation, and with repeated trials of various
methods, may enable one long accustomed
to tuition, to ascertain with considerable
certainty what explanations are the best com-
prehended. Many parts of the detail, how-
ever, may probably be open to objections ;
but if (as experience now authorizes me the
more confidently to hope) no errors are
PREFACE. XXXlll
discovered, which materially affect the sub-
stantial utility of the work, but only such as
detract from the credit of the author, the
object will have been attained which I ought
to have had principally in view.
No credit, I am aware, is given to an
author's own disclaimer of personal motives,
and profession of exclusive regard for public
utility ; since even sincerity cannot, on this
point, secure him from deceiving himself;
but it may be allowable to observe, that one
whose object was the increase of his repu-
tation as a writer, could hardly have chosen
a subject less suitable for his purpose than
the present. Though the interest in it has
greatly exceeded what I had anticipated, it
still can hardly be called a popular subject,
or one likely to become so, in any conside-
rable degree ; at least, during the lifetime
of a writer of the present day. Ignorance,
fortified by prejudice, opposes its reception,
even in the minds of those who are con-
sidered as both candid and well-informed.
Besides that a great majority of readers not
only know not what Logic is, but have no
curiosity to learn, the greater part of those
who imagine that they do know, are wedded
to erroneous notions of it. The multitude
never think of paying any attention to the
c
XXXIV PREFACE.
correctness of their reasoning ; and those
who do, are usually too confident that they
are already completely successful in this
point, to endure the thought of seeking
instruction upon it.
And as, on the one hand, a large class
of modern philosophers may be expected to
raise a clamour against " obsolete preju-
dices ;" "bigoted devotion to the decrees of
Aristotle;" "confining the human mind in
the trammels of the Schoolmen/' &c., so,
on the other hand, all such as really are thus
bigoted to everything that has been long
established, merely because it has been long
established, will be ready to exclaim against
the presumption of an author, who presumes
to depart in several points from the track of
his predecessors.
There is another circumstance, also, which
tends materially to diminish the credit of a
writer on this and some other kindred sub-
jects. We can make no discoveries of
striking novelties : the senses of our readers
are not struck, as with the return of a
Comet which had been foretold, or the
extinction of a taper in carbonic-acid gas :
the materials we work upon are common
and familiar to all, and, therefore, supposed
to be well understood by all. And not only
PREFACE. XXXV
is any one's deficiency in the use of these
materials, such as is generally unfelt by
himself, but when it is removed by satis-
factory explanations when the notions,
which had been perplexed and entangled,
are cleared up by the introduction of a few
simple and apparently obvious principles,
he will generally forget that any explanation
at all was needed, and consider all that has
been said as mere truisms, which even a
child could supply to himself. Such is the
nature of the fundamental principles of a
Science they are so fully implied in the
most evident and well-known truths, that
the moment they are fully embraced, it
becomes a difficulty to conceive that we
could ever have been not aware of them.
And hence, the more simple, clear, and
obvious any principle is rendered, the more
likely is its exposition to elicit those common
remarks, " of course ! of course !" " no one
could ever doubt that;" "this is all very
true, but there is nothing new brought to
light ; nothing that was not familiar to
every one," " there needs no ghost to tell
us that." I am convinced that a verbose,
mystical, and partially obscure way ot
writing on such a subject, is the most likely
to catch the attention of the multitude. The
generality verify the observation of Tacitus,
XXXVI PREFACE.
kf omne ignotum pro mirifico :" and when
any thing is made very plain to them, are
apt to fancy that they knew it already; so
that the explanations of scientific truths are
likely, for a considerable time at least, to be,
by most men, underrated the more, the more
perfectly they accomplish their object.
A very slow progress, therefore, towards
popularity (slower indeed than has in fact
taken place) is the utmost that I expected
for such a treatise as I have endeavoured
to make the present. I felt myself bound,
however, not only as a member of Society,
but more especially as a Minister of the
Gospel, to use my endeavours towards pro-
moting an object which to me appears highly
important, and (what is much more) whose
importance is appreciated by very few be-
sides. The cause of Truth universally, and
not least, of religious Truth, is benefited by
every thing that tends to promote sound
reasoning and facilitate the detection of
fallacy. The adversaries of our Faith would,
I am convinced, have been on many occa-
sions more satisfactorily answered, and would
have had fewer openings for cavil, had a
thorough acquaintance with Logic been a
more common qualification than it is. In
lending my endeavours, therefore, whether
with greater or less success, towards this
PREFACE. XXXV11
object, I trust that I am neither uselessly
nor unsuitably employed.
I have seen in several writers, a sort of
sneering allusions to " Logic ;" and also to
" Truth," (the latter, in reference, I pre-
sume, to an Essay of mine on that subject)
which I cannot but feel to be consolatory
and even flattering. Had such expressions
indeed been always accompanied by attempts
to refute the fundamental principles I have
endeavoured to establish, it would have been
understood that such implied censure was
meant to be directed against unfounded pre-
tensions. But as it is, such writers seem to
admit that it is Truth, as Truth, and Logical
reasoning, as such, that they dislike. And
certainly any who wish to propagate errors,
or to defend abuses, are perfectly right in
disliking the cultivation of Logic, though
they may not be prudent in avowing this
feeling. When truth is against a man, it is
natural he should be against truth ; and the
clear day-light could not be more unwelcome
to the " Children of the Mist," than the
establishment and diffusion of accurate prin-
ciples of reasoning, to the advocates of what
they are aware is unsound.
Many indeed whose opinions on various
points are opposed, are sincerely convinced
of the truth of what they respectively main-
XXXV111 PREFACE.
tian : but all of these ought to feel a full
confidence that truth, wherever it may lie,
will be best ascertained and best supported,
by a system of sound reasoning.
Those who are engaged in, or designed
for the Sacred Ministry, and all others who
are sensible that the cause of true Religion
is not a concern of the Ministry alone, should
remember that this is no time to forego any
of the advantages which that cause may
derive from an active and judicious culti-
vation of the faculties. Among the enemies
of Christianity in the present day, are in-
cluded, if I mistake not, a very different
description of persons from those who were
chiefly to be met with a century, or even half
a century ago : what were called " men of
wit and pleasure about town ;" ignorant,
shallow, flippant declaimers, or dull and
powerless pretenders to Philosophy. Among
the enemies of the Gospel now, are to be
found men not only of learning and inge-
nuity, but of cultivated argumentative powers,
and not unversed in the principles of Logic.
If the advocates of our Religion think proper
to disregard this help, they will find, on
careful inquiry, that their opponents do not.
And let them not trust too carelessly to the
strength of their cause : Truth will, indeed,
prevail, where all other points are nearly
PREFACE. XXXIX
equal ; but it may suffer a temporary dis-
comfiture, if hasty assumptions, unsound ar-
guments, and vague and empty declamation,
occupy the place of a train of close, accurate,
and luminous reasoning.
It is not, however, solely or chiefly for
polemical purposes that the cultivation of
the reasoning faculty is desirable ; in per-
suading, and investigating; in learning, or
teaching, in all the multitude of cases in
which it is our object to arrive at just con-
clusions, or to lead others to them, it is most
important. A knowledge of logical rules
will not indeed supply the want of other
knowledge ; nor was it ever proposed, by
any one who really understood this Science,
to substitute it for any other ; but it is no
less true that no other can be substituted for
this : that it is valuable in every branch of
study ; and that it enables us to use to the
greatest advantage the knowledge we possess.
It is to be hoped, therefore, that those Aca-
demical Bodies, who have been wise enough
to retain this Science, will, instead of being
persuaded to abandon it, give their attention
rather to its improvement and more effectual
cultivation.
CONTENTS.
PAGE
Introduction 1
BOOK I.
Analytical Outline of the Science 21
BOOK II.
Synthetical Compendium ; ... 58
Chap. I. Of the Operations of the Mind, and of Terms ib.
Chap. II. Of Propositions 66
Chap. III. Of Arguments 80
Chap. IV. Supplement to Chap. Ill 102
Chap. V. Supplement to Chap. 1 131
BOOK III.
Of Fallacies. 162
BOOK IV.
Dissertation on the Province of Reasoning 255
Chap. I. Of Induction 257
Chap. II. On the Discovery of Truth 266
Chap. III. Of Inference and Proof 302
Chap. IV. Of Verbal and Real Questions . . . .311
Chap. V. Of Realism 320
APPENDIX.
No. I. On certain Terms which are peculiarly liable to
be used ambiguously 337
No. II. Miscellaneous Examples for the exercise of
Learners * . 402
No. III. Example of Analysis 420
INDEX . 431
ELEMENTS OF LOGIC.
INTRODUCTION.
LOGIC, in the most extensive sense which Definition of
the name can with propriety be made to bear, Lc
may be considered as the Science, and also
as the Art, of Reasoning. It investigates the
principles on which argumentation is con-
ducted, and furnishes rules to secure the mind
from error in its deductions. Its most appro-
priate office, however, is that of instituting an
analysis of the process of the mind in Reason-
ing ; and in this point of view it is, as I have
said, strictly a Science: while, considered in
reference to the practical rules above men-
tioned, it may be called the Art of Reasoning.
This distinction, as will hereafter appear, has
been overlooked, or not clearly pointed out
by most writers on the subject ; Logic having
been by many regarded as merely an art ;
and its claim to hold a place among the
Sciences having even been, by some, expressly
denied.
2 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC:
prevailing Considering how early Logic attracted the
L(Sc? tins attention of philosophers,, it may appear sur-
prising that so little progress should have been
made, as is confessedly the case, in developing
its principles, and perfecting the detail of the
system ; and this circumstance has been brought
forward as a proof of the barrenness and futility
of the study. But a similar argument might
have been urged with no less plausibility, at
a period not very remote, against the study of
Natural Philosophy ; and, very recently, against
that of Chemistry. No science can be expected
to make any considerable progress, which is
not cultivated on right principles. Whatever
may be the inherent vigour of the plant, it will
neither be flourishing nor fruitful till it meet
with a suitable soil and culture : and in no
case is the remark more applicable than in the
present ; the greatest mistakes having always
prevailed respecting the nature of Logic, and
its province having in consequence been ex-
tended by many writers to subjects with which
it has no proper connexion. Indeed, with the
exception perhaps of Aristotle, (who is himself
however not entirely exempt from the errors
in question,) hardly a writer on Logic can be
mentioned who has clearly perceived, and
steadily kept in view throughout, its real
nature and object. Before his time, no dis-
tinction was drawn between the science of
INTRODUCTION.
which we are speaking, and that which is now
usually called Metaphysics ; a circumstance
which alone shows how small was the pro-
gress made in earlier times. Indeed, those
who first turned their attention to the subject,
hardly thought of inquiring into the process
of Reasoning itself, but confined themselves
almost entirely to certain preliminary points,
the discussion of which is (if logically con-
sidered) subordinate to that of the main
inquiry.
To give even a very condensed account of History of
. Logic distinct
the lives and works of all the principal writers J^}^ of
on Logic, of the technical terms introduced" 1
by each, and the senses in which each em-
ployed them, and of the improvements or
corruptions that were from time to time in-
troduced, in short, to write the History and
Antiquities of Logical Science, would be
foreign to my present design. Such a work,
if undertaken by a competent writer, would
be, though not of a popular character, yet
highly interesting and instructive to a limited
class of students. But the extensive research
which would form one indispensable qualifi-
cation for such a task, would be only one out
of many, even less common, qualifications,
without which such a work would be worse
than useless. The author should be one
thoroughly on his guard against the common
B2
4 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC.
error of confounding together, or leading his
readers to confound, an intimate acquaintance
with many books on a given subject, and a
clear insight into the subject itself. With
ability and industry for investigating a mul-
titude of minute particulars, he should possess
the power of rightly estimating each according
to its intrinsic importance, and not, as is very
commonly done, according to the degree of
laborious research it may have cost him, or
the rarity of the knowledge he may in any
case have acquired. And he should be careful,
while recording the opinions and expressions
of various authors on points of science, to
guard both himself and his readers against
the mistake of taking anything on authority
that ought to be evinced by scientific reason-
ing; or of regarding each technical term as
having a sort of prescriptive right to retain
for ever the meaning attached to it by those
who first introduced it. In no subject, in
short, is it more important for an author to
be free from all tinge of antiquarian pedantry.
But if I felt myself as fully competent to the
task of writing such a history of Logic as I
have alluded to, as I am conscious of not being
so, I should still decidedly prefer keeping such
a work altogether distinct from a treatise on
the science ; because the combination of the
two in a single volume would render it the
INTRODUCTION. 5
more difficult to avoid the blending of them
confusedly together ; and also because, on
such a plan, the distinction could not be so
easily preserved between Logic, in the sense
in which I am here using that title, and
various metaphysical disquisitions, to which
several writers have given the same name.
For these reasons I have thought it best to
take only a slight and rapid glance of the series
of logical writers down to the present day,
and of the general tendency of their labours.
Zeno the Eleatic, whom most accounts re- Early writers
on Logic.
present as the earliest systematic writer on the
subject of Logic, or, as it was then called,
Dialectics, divided his work into three parts ;
the first of which (upon Consequences) is
censured by Socrates [Plato, ParmenJ] for
obscurity and confusion. In his second part,
however, he furnished that interrogatory me-
thod of disputation [^pwr^cni} which Socrates
adopted, and which has since borne his name.
The third part of his work was devoted to
what may not be improperly termed the art of
wrangling [l/wcm/a)] , which supplied the dis-
putant with a collection of sophistical ques-
tions, so contrived, that the concession of some
point which seemed unavoidable, immediately
involved some glaring absurdity. This, if it
is to be esteemed as at all falling within the
6 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC.
province of Logic, is certainly not to be re-
garded (as some have ignorantly or heedlessly
represented it) as its principal or proper busi-
ness. The Greek philosophers generally have
unfortunately devoted too much attention to
it ; but we must beware of falling into the
vulgar error of supposing the ancients to have
regarded as a serious and intrinsically impor-
tant study, that which in fact they considered
as an ingenious recreation. The disputants
diverted themselves in their leisure-hours by
making trial of their own and their adversary's
acuteness, in the endeavour mutually to per-
plex each other with subtle fallacies; much in
the same way as men amuse themselves with
propounding and guessing riddles, or with the
game of chess ; to each of which diversions
the sportive disputations of the ancients bore
much resemblance. They were closely analo-
gous to the wrestling and other exercises of
the Gymnasium ; these last being reckoned
conducive to bodily vigour and activity, as the
former were to habits of intellectual acuteness;
but the immediate object in each was a spor-
tive, not a serious contest ; though doubtless
fashion and emulation often occasioned an
undue importance to be attached to success
in each.
Zeno, then, is hardly to be regarded as any
further a logician than as to what respects his
INTRODUCTION. 7
erotetic method of disputation ; a course of
argument constructed on this principle being
properly an hypothetical Sorites, which may
easily be reduced into a series of syllogisms.
To Zeno succeeded Euclid of Megara, and Euclid and
Antistbenes.
Antisthenes ; both pupils of Socrates. The
former of these prosecuted the subject of the
third part of his predecessor's treatise, and is
said to have been the author of many of the
fallacies attributed to the Stoical school. Of
the writings of the latter nothing certain is
known ; if, however, we suppose the above-
mentioned sect to be his disciples in this study,
and to have retained his principles, he cer-
tainly took a more correct view of the subject
than Euclid. The Stoics divided all \eKra,
every thing that could be said, into three
classes; 1st, the simple Term; 2d, the Pro-
position ; 3d, the Syllogism ; viz. the hypo-
thetical ; for they seem to have had little
notion of a more rigorous analysis, of argu-
ment than into that familiar form.
We must not here omit to notice the merits
of Archytas, to whom we are indebted (as he
himself probably was, in a great degree, to
older writers) for the doctrines of the Cate-
gories. He, however, (as well as the other
writers on the subject) appears to have had
no distinct view of the proper object and just
limits of the science of Logic ; but to have
8 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC.
blended with it metaphysical discussions not
strictly connected with it, and to have dwelt
on the investigation of the nature of terms and
propositions, without maintaining a constant
reference to the principles of Reasoning; to
which all the rest should be made subservient.
Aristotle. The state, then, in which Aristotle found
the science (if indeed it can properly be said
to have existed at all before his time) appears
to have been nearly this: the division into
Simple Terms, Propositions, and Syllogisms,
had been slightly sketched out ; the doctrine
of the Categories, and perhaps that of the
Opposition of propositions, had been laid
down ; and, as some believe, the analysis of
Species into Genus and Differentia, had been
introduced by Socrates. These, at best, were
rather the materials of the system, than the
system itself; the foundation of which indeed
he distinctly claims the merit of having laid,
and which remains fundamentally the same
as he left it.
It has been remarked, that the logical system
is one of those few theories which have been
begun and perfected by the same individual.
The history of its discovery, as far as the main
principles of the science are concerned, pro-
perly commences and ends with Aristotle ; and
this may perhaps in part account for the
subsequent perversions of it. The brevity and
INTRODUCTION. f)
simplicity of its fundamental truths (to which
point indeed all real science is perpetually
tending) has probably led many to suppose
that something much more complex, abstruse,
and mysterious, remained to be discovered.
The vanity, too, by which all men are prompted
unduly to magnify their own pursuits, has led
unphilosophical minds, not in this case alone,
but in many others, to extend the boundaries
of their respective sciences, not by the patient
development and just application of the prin-
ciples of those sciences, but by wandering into
irrelevant subjects. The mystical employment
of numbers by Pythagoras, in matters utterly
foreign to arithmetic, is perhaps the earliest
instance of the kind. A more curious and
important one is the degeneracy of Astronomy
into judicial Astrology ; but none is more
striking than the misapplication of Logic, by
those who have treated of it as "the art of
rightly employing the rational faculties," or
who have intruded it into the province of
Natural Philosophy, and regarded the Syllo-
gism as an engine for the investigation of
nature ; while they overlooked the boundless
field that was before them within the legiti-
mate limits of the science ; and perceived
not the importance and difficulty of the task,
of completing and properly filling up the
masterly sketch before them.
10 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC.
The writings of Aristotle were not only for
the most part absolutely lost to the world for
about two centuries, but seem to have been
but little studied for a long time after their
recovery. An art, however, of Logic, derived
from the principles traditionally preserved by
his disciples, seems to have been generally
known, and to have been employed by Cicero
in his philosophical works ; but the pursuit of
the science seems to have been abandoned for
a long time. As early in the Christian era as
the second and third centuries, the Peripatetic
doctrines experienced a considerable revival ;
Gaien r an( j we meet with the names of Galen, Ammo-
Ammomus,
nius, (who seems to have taken the lead among
Alexander, the commentators on Aristotle) Alexander of
porphyry, Aphrodisias, and Porphyry, as logicians ; but
it is not till the close of the fifth century, or
the beginning of the sixth, that Aristotle's
logical works were translated into Latin by
the celebrated Boethius.* Not one of these
seems to have made any considerable ad-
vances in developing the theory of reason-
ing. Of the labours of Galen (who added
the insignificant fourth Figure to the three
recognized by Aristotle) little is known ; and
Porphyry's principal work is merely on the
predicables. We have little of the science till
* Born about A.D. 475, and died about A.D. 524.
INTRODUCTION. 1 1
the revival of learning among the Arabians,
by whom Aristotle's treatises on this as well
as on other subjects, were eagerly studied.
Passing by the names of some Byzantine
writers of no great importance, we come to
the times of the Schoolmen ; whose waste of schoolmen.
ingenuity and frivolous subtilty of disputation
have been often made the subject of com-
plaints, into the justice of which it is unne-
cessary here fully to inquire. It may be
sufficient to observe, that their fault did not
lie in their diligent study of Logic, and the
high value they set upon it, but in their utterly
mistaking the true nature and object of the
science ; and by the attempt to employ it for
the purpose of physical discoveries, involving
every subject in a mist of words, to the ex-
clusion of sound philosophical investigation.*
Their errors may serve to account for the
strong terms in which Bacon sometimes ap- Bacon.
pears to censure logical pursuits ; but that
this censure was intended to bear against the
extravagant perversions, not the legitimate cul-
tivation of the science, may be proved from
his own observations on the subject, in his
Advancement of Learning.
His moderation, however, was not imitated
* Of the character of the School-divinity, Dr. Hampden's
Bampton Lectures furnish the best view that has perhaps
ever appeared.
12 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC.
Locke. in other quarters. Even Locke confounds in
one sweeping censure the Aristotelic theory,
with the absurd misapplications and perver-
sions of it in later years. His objection to the
science, as unserviceable in the discovery of
truth (which has of late been often repeated),
while it holds good in reference to many (mis-
named) logicians, indicates that, with regard
to the true nature of the science itself, he had
no clearer notions than they have, of the pro-
per province of Logic, viz. Reasoning ; and of
the distinct character of that operation from
the observations and experiments which are
essential to the study of nature.
An error apparently different, but substan-
was. tially the same, pervades the treatises of Watts
and other modern writers on the subject.
Perceiving the inadequacy of the syllogistic
theory to the vast purposes to which others
had attempted to apply it, he still craved after
the attainment of some equally comprehensive
and all-powerful system ; which he accordingly
attempted to construct under the title of The
Right Use of Reason, which was to be a
method of invigorating and properly directing
all the powers of the mind : a most magni-
ficent object indeed, but one which not only
does not fall under the province of Logic, but
cannot be accomplished by any one science or
system that can even be conceived to exist.
INTRODUCTION. 13
The attempt to comprehend so wide a field, is
no extension of science, but a mere verbal
generalization, which leads only to vague and
barren declamation. In every pursuit, the
more precise and definite our object, the more
likely we are to attain some valuable result.
If, like the Platonists, who sought after the
avrdyaQov, the abstract idea of good, we
pursue some specious but ill-defined scheme
of universal knowledge, we shall lose the sub-
stance while grasping at a shadow, and be-
wilder ourselves in empty generalities. And
learning, at least much of what is commonly
called learning, is so far from furnishing a
safeguard against this fault, to one who is
deficient in philosophical clearness of under-
standing, that it is more likely to increase it,
by puffing him up with a vain conceit of his
own supposed superiority.
It is not perhaps much to be wondered
at, that in still later times several ingenious
writers, forming their notions of the science
itself from professed masters in it, such as have
just been alluded to, and judging of its value
from their failures, should have treated the
Aristotelic system with so much reprobation
and scorn. Too much prejudiced to bestow
on it the requisite attention for enabling them
clearly to understand its real character and
object, or even to judge correctly from the
views of the
nature of the
science.
14 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC.
little they did understand, they have assailed
the study with a host of objections, so totally
irrelevant, and consequently impotent, that,
considering the talents and general information
of those from whom they proceed, they might
excite astonishment in any one who did not
fully estimate the force of very early prejudice.
incorrect Logic has usually been considered by these
views of the * *
objectors as professing to furnish a peculiar
method of reasoning, instead of a method of
analyzing that mental process which must
invariably take place in all correct reasoning ;
and accordingly they have contrasted the ordi-
nary mode of reasoning with the syllogistic, and
have brought forward with an air of triumph
the argumentative skill of many who never
learned the system ; a mistake no less gross
than if any one should regard Grammar as a
peculiar Language, and should contend against
its utility, on the ground that many speak
correctly who never studied the principles of
grammar. For Logic, which is, as it were, the
Grammar of Reasoning, does not bring forward
the regular Syllogism as a distinct mode of ar-
gumentation, designed to be substituted for any
other mode ;* but as the form to which all
* Strange as it may seem, there are some, (I suspect not
a few) who even go a step further, and consider Logic as
something opposed to right reasoning. I have seen a
Review, of a work which the Reviewer characterized as the
INTRODUCTION. 15
correct reasoning may be ultimately reduced :
and which, consequently, serves the purpose
(when we are employing Logic as an art) of
a test to try the validity of any argument ; in
the same manner as by chemical analysis we
develop and submit to a distinct examination
the elements of which any compound body is
composed, and are thus enabled to detect any
latent sophistication and impurity.
Complaints have also been made that Logic complaints
leaves untouched the greatest difficulties, and Lo & c -
those which are the sources of the chief errors
in reasoning ; viz. the ambiguity or indistinct-
ness of Terms, and the doubts respecting the
degrees of evidence in various Propositions : an
objection which is not to be removed by any
such attempt as that of Watts to lay down
" rules for forming clear ideas," and, for
"guiding the judgment;" but by replying
that no art is to be censured for not teaching
more than falls within its province, and indeed
more than can be taught by any conceivable
art. Such a system of universal knowledge as
should instruct us in the full meaning or mean-
ings of every term, and the truth or falsity,
production of an able Logician, and which he therefore con-
cluded was likely to have influence with such as will not
reason! The "not" might naturally be regarded as a
misprint ; but the context shows that such was the re-
viewer's real meaning.
16 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC.
certainty or uncertainty, of every propo-
sition, thus superseding all other studies, it
is most unphilosophical to expect, or even to
imagine. And to find fault with Logic for
not performing this, is as if one should object
to the science of Optics for not giving sight
to the blind ; or as if (like the man of whom
Warburton tells a story in his Div. Leg.) one
should complain of a reading-glass for being of
no service to a person who had never learned
to read.
In fact, the difficulties and errors above
alluded to are not in the process of Reasoning
itself (which alone is the appropriate province
of Logic), but in the subject-matter about which
it is employed. This process will have been
correctly conducted if it have conformed to the
logical .rules, which preclude the possibility of
any error creeping in between the principles
from which we are arguing, and the conclu-
sions we deduce from them. But still that
conclusion may be false, if the principles
we start from are so. In like manner, no
arithmetical skill will secure a correct result
to a calculation, unless the data are correct
from which we calculate ; nor does any one
on that account undervalue Arithmetic ; and
yet the objection against Logic rests on no
better foundation.
There is in fact a striking analogy in this
INTRODUCTION. 17
respect between the two sciences. All Num-
bers (which are the subject of Arithmetic)
must be numbers of some things, whether
coins, persons, measures, or any thing else ;
bat to introduce into the science any notice
of the things respecting which calculations are
made, would be evidently irrelevant, and
would destroy its scientific character : we
proceed therefore with arbitrary signs, repre-
senting numbers in the abstract. So also
does Logic pronounce on the validity of a
regularly-constructed argument, equally well,
though arbitrary symbols may have been
substituted for the terms ; and, consequently,
without any regard to the things signified
by those terms. And the possibility of doing
this (though the employment of such arbi-
trary symbols has been absurdly objected to,
even by writers who understood not only
Arithmetic but Algebra) is a proof of the
strictly scientific character of the system. But
many professed logical writers, not attending
to the circumstances which have been just
mentioned, have wandered into disquisitions
on various branches of knowledge ; disquisitions
which must evidently be as boundless as human
knowledge itself, since there is no subject on
which Reasoning is not employed, and to
which, consequently, Logic may not be applied.
The error lies in regarding every thing as the
c
18 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC.
proper province of Logic to which it is appli-
cable. A similar error is complained of by
Aristotle, as having taken place with respect
to Rhetoric ; of which, indeed, we find speci-
mens in the arguments of several of the inter-
locutors in Cic. de Oratore.
From what has been said, it will be evident
that there is hardly any subject to which it
is so difficult to introduce the student in a clear
and satisfactory manner, as the one we are now
engaged in. In any other branch of know-
ledge, the reader, if he have any previous
acquaintance with the subject, will usually be
so far the better prepared for comprehending
the exposition of the principles ; or if he be
entirely a stranger to it, will at least come to
the study with a mind unbiassed, and free from
prejudices and misconceptions : whereas, in the
present case, it cannot but happen, that many
who have given some attention to logical pur-
suits (or what are usually considered as such)
will have rather been bewildered by funda-
mentally erroneous views, than prepared, by
the acquisition of just principles, for ulterior
progress ; and that not a few who pretend not
to any acquaintance whatever with the science,
will yet have imbibed either such prejudices
against it, or such false notions respecting its
nature, as cannot but prove obstacles in their
study of it.
INTRODUCTION. 19
There is, however, a difficulty which exists Difficulty
. attending
more or less in all abstract pursuits ; though ^"JJ
it is perhaps more felt in this, and often oc-
casions it to be rejected by beginners as dry
and tedious; viz. the difficulty of perceiving
to what ultimate end, to what practical or
interesting application the abstract principles
lead, which are first laid before the student ;
so that he will often have to work his way
patiently through the most laborious part of
the system before he can gain any clear idea
of the drift and intention of it.
This complaint has often been made by che-
mical students ; who are wearied with descrip-
tions of oxygen, hydrogen, and other invisible
elements, before they have any knowledge
respecting such bodies as commonly present
themselves to the senses. And accordingly
some teachers of chemistry obviate in a great
degree this objection, by adopting the ana- Analytical
r f* anc * s y nt h et i'
tyttcal instead of the synthetical mode or pro-
cedure, when they are first introducing the
subject to beginners ; i. e. instead of syntheti-
cally enumerating the elementary substances,
proceeding next to the simplest combinations
of these, and concluding with those more
complex substances which are of the most
common occurrence, they begin by analyzing
these last, and resolving them step by step
into their simple elements ; thus at once
c 2
20 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC.
presenting the subject in an interesting point
of view, and clearly setting forth the object of
it. The synthetical form of teaching is in-
deed sufficiently interesting to one who has
made considerable progress in any study ; and
being more concise, regular, and systematic,
is the form in which our knowledge naturally
arranges itself in the mind, and is retained by
the memory : but the analytical is the more
interesting, easy, and natural kind of intro-
duction ; as being the form in which the first
invention or discovery of any kind of system
must originally have taken place.
It may be advisable, therefore, to begin by
giving a slight sketch, in this form, of the
logical system, before we enter regularly upon
the details of it. The reader will thus be pre-
sented with a kind of imaginary history of the
course of inquiry by which that system may be
conceived to have occurred to a philosophical
mind.
BOOK I.
ANALYTICAL OUTLINE OF THE SCIENCE
IN every instance in which we reason, in
the strict sense of the word, L e. make use of
arguments, whether for the sake of refuting
an adversary, or of conveying instruction, or
of satisfying our own minds on any point,
whatever may be the subject we are engaged
on, a certain process takes place in the mind,
which is one and the same in all cases, pro-
vided it be correctly conducted.
Of course it cannot be supposed that every
one is even conscious of this process in his own
mind ; much less, is competent to explain the
principles on which it proceeds. This indeed
is, and cannot but be, the case with every
other process respecting which any system has
been formed ; the practice not only may exist
independently of the theory, but must have
preceded the theory. There must have been
Language before a system of Grammar could
be devised ; and musical compositions, previous
to the science of Music. This, by the way,
22 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [BOOK I.
will serve to expose the futility of the popular
objection against Logic, that men may reason
very well who know nothing of it.* The
* Locke has a great deal to this purpose ; e. g. in chap.
xvii. " on Reason," (which, by the way, he perpetually
confounds with Reasoning.) He says, in 4, " If syllo-
gisms must be taken for the only proper instrument of
reason and means of knowledge, it will follow, that before
Aristotle there was not one man that did or could know
any thing by reason ; and that since the invention of syl-
logisms there is not one in ten thousand that doth. But
God has not been so sparing to men to make them barely
two-legged creatures, and left it to Aristotle to make them
rational, i. e. those few of them that he could get so to
examine the grounds of syllogisms, as to see that in above
threescore ways that three propositions may be laid together,
there are but fourteen wherein one may be sure that
the conclusion is right," fyc. 8$c. " God has been more
bountiful to mankind than so : He has given them a mind
that 'can reason without being instructed in methods of
syllogizing," fyc. $c. All this is not at all less absurd than
if any one, on being told of the discoveries of modern
chemists respecting caloric, and on hearing described the
process by which it is conducted through a boiler into the
water, which it converts into a gas of sufficient elasticity
to overcome the pressure of the atmosphere, fyc., should
reply, " If all this were so, it would follow that before the
time of these chemists no one ever did or could make any
liquor boil."
In an ordinary, obscure, and trifling writer, all this con-
fusion of thought and common-place declamation might
as well have been left unnoticed ; but it is due to the
general ability and to the celebrity of such an author as
Locke, that errors of this kind should be exposed.
He presently after inserts an encomium upon Aristotle,
in which he is equally unfortunate ; he praises him for the
''invention of syllogisms:" to which he certainly had no
1.] ANALYTICAL OUTLINE. 23
parallel instances adduced, show that such an
objection might be applied in many other cases,
where its absurdity would be obvious ; and
that there is no ground for deciding thence,
either that the system has no tendency to
improve practice, or that even if it had not, it
might not still be a dignified and interesting
pursuit.
One of the chief impediments to the attain-
ment of a just view of the nature and object of
Logic, is the not fully understanding, or not
sufficiently keeping in mind, the SAMENESS of
the reasoning-process in all cases. If, as the
ordinary mode of speaking would seem to in-
dicate, mathematical reasoning, and theologi-
cal, and metaphysical, and political, Sfc. were
essentially different from each other, i. e. dif-
ferent kinds of reasoning, it would follow, that
supposing there could be at all any such science
as we Jiatfe described Logic, there must be so
many different species, or at least different
more claim than Linnaeus to the creation of plants and
animals ; or Harvey, to the praise of having made the blood
circulate ; or Lavoisier, to that of having formed the atmo-
sphere we breathe. And the utility of this invention con-
sists, according to him, in the great service done against
"those who were not ashamed to deny anything;" a service
which never could have been performed, had syllogisms
been an invention or discovery of Aristotle's ; for what
sophist could ever have consented to restrict himself to one
particular kind of arguments, dictated by his opponent ?
24 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [BOOK I.
branches of Logic. And such is perhaps the
most, prevailing notion. Nor is this much to
be wondered at ; since it is evident to all, that
some men converse and write, in an argumen-
tative way, very justly on one subject, and
very erroneously on another ; in which again
Reasoning others excel, who fail in the former. This error
process simi-
j^ t 1 s llallsub - may be at once illustrated and removed, by
considering the parallel instance of Arithmetic;
in which every one is aware that the process
of a calculation is not affected by the nature of
the objects, whose numbers are before us : but
that (e. g.) the multiplication of a number is
the very same operation, whether it be a
number of men, of miles, or of pounds ;
though nevertheless persons may perhaps
be found who are accurate in calculations
relative to natural philosophy, and incorrect
in those of political economy, from their dif-
ferent degrees of skill in the subjects of these
two sciences ; not surely because there are
different arts of Arithmetic applicable to each
of these respectively.
Others again, who are aware that the simple
system of Logic may be applied to all subjects
whatever, are yet disposed to view it as a
peculiar method of reasoning, and not, as it is,
a method of unfolding and analyzing our rea-
soning : whence many have been led (e.g. the
author of the Philosophy of Rhetoric) to talk
2.] ANALYTICAL OUTLINE. 25
of comparing Syllogistic reasoning with Moral
reasoning; taking it for granted that it is
possible to reason correctly without reasoning
logically ; which is, in fact, as great a blunder
as if any one were to mistake grammar for a
peculiar language, and to suppose it possible
to speak correctly without speaking grammati-
cally. They have in short considered Logic
as an art of reasoning ; whereas (so far as it
is an art) it is the art of reasoning ; the logi-
cian's object being, not to lay down principles
by which one may reason, but, by which all
must reason, even though they are not dis-
tinctly aware of them : to lay down rules,
not which may be followed with advantage,
but which cannot possibly be departed from
in sound reasoning. These misapprehensions
and objections being such as lie on the very
threshold of the subject, it would have been
hardly possible, without noticing them, to
convey any just notion of the nature and
design of the logical system.
2.
Supposing it then to have been perceived
that the operation of reasoning is in all cases
the same, the analysis of that operation could
not fail to strike the mind as an interesting
matter of inquiry. And moreover, since
(apparent) arguments which are unsound and
26 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [BOOK I.
inconclusive, are so often employed, either from
error or design ; and since even those who are
not misled by these fallacies, are so often at
a loss to detect and expose them in a manner
satisfactory to others, or even to themselves ;
it could not but appear desirable to lay down
some general rules of reasoning applicable to all
cases ; by which a person might be enabled the
more readily and clearly to state the grounds
of his own conviction, or of his objection to the
arguments of an opponent ; instead of arguing
at random, without any fixed and acknowledged
principles to guide his procedure. Such rules
would be analogous to those of Arithmetic,
which obviate the tediousness and uncertainty
of calculations in the head ; wherein, after
much labour, different persons might arrive at
different results, without any of them being
able distinctly to point out the error of the rest.
A system of such rules, it is obvious, must, in-
stead of deserving to be called the art of wrang-
ling, be more justly characterized as the "art
of cutting short wrangling," by bringing the
parties to issue at once, if not to agreement ;
and thus saving a waste of ingenuity.
Analysis of In pursuing the supposed investigation, it
will be found that every conclusion is deduced,
in reality, from two other propositions; (thence
called Premises;) for though one of these may
be, and commonly is, suppressed, it must never-
2.] ANALYTICAL OUTLINE. 27
theless be understood as admitted ; as may
easily be made evident by supposing the denial
of the suppressed premiss ; which will at once
invalidate the argument : e.g. if any one, from
perceiving that " the world exhibits marks of
design," infers that "it must have had an in-
telligent author," though he may not be aware
in his own mind of the existence of any other
premiss, he will readily understand, if it be
denied that " whatever exhibits marks of design
must have had an intelligent author," that the
affirmative of that proposition is necessary to
the validity of the argument. An argument
thus stated regularly and at full length, is
called a Syllogism; which therefore is evidently
not a peculiar kind of argument, but only a
peculiar form of expression, in which every
argument may be stated.
When one of the premises is suppressed,
(which for brevity's sake it usually is) the
argument is called an Enthymeme. And it
may be worth while to remark, that when the
argument is in this state, the objections of an
opponent are (or rather appear to be) of two
kinds ; viz. either objections to the assertion
itself, or objections to its/ora?as an argument.
E. G. In the above instance, an atheist may be
conceived either denying that the world does
exhibit marks of design, or denying that it
follows from thence that it had an intelligent
28 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [BOOK I.
author. Now it is important to keep in mind
that the only difference in the two cases is, that
in the. one, the expressed premiss is denied, in
the other the suppressed ; for the force as an
argument of either premiss depends on the
other premiss : if both be admitted, the con-
clusion legitimately connected with them
cannot be denied.
It is evidently immaterial to the argument
whether the conclusion be placed first or last ;
but it may be proper to remark, that a premiss
placed offer its conclusion is called the Reason*
of it, and is introduced by one of those con-
junctions which are called causal ; vis. " since,"
" because," fyc. which may indeed be employed
to designate a premiss, whether it came first
or last. The illative conjunctions, " therefore,"
$c. designate the conclusion.
It is a circumstance which often occasions
error and perplexity, that both these classes
of conjunctions have also another signification,
being employed to denote, respectively, Cause
and Effect, as well as Premiss and Conclusion:
e. g. If I say, " this ground is rich, because the
trees on it are flourishing," or " the trees are
flourishing, and therefore the soil must be rich,"
I employ these conjunctions to denote the con-
nexion of Premiss and Conclusion; for it is
* The Major-premiss is often called the Principle; and
the word Reason is then confined to the Minor.
"3.] ANALYTICAL OUTLINE. 29
plain that the luxuriance of the trees is not
the cause of the soil's fertility, but only the
cause of my knowing it. If again I say, "the
trees flourish, because the ground is rich/
or " the ground is rich, and therefore the trees
flourish," I am using the very same conjunc-
tions to denote the connexion of cause and Proof and
effect; for in this case, the luxuriance of the
trees, being evident to the eye, would hardly
need to be proved, but might need to be
accounted for. There are, however, many
cases, in which the cause is employed to prove
the existence of its effect ; especially in argu-
ments relating iv future events ; as e. g. when
from favourable weather any one argues that
the crops are likely to be abundant :* the
cause and the reason, in that case, coincide.
And this contributes to their being so often
confounded together in other cases.
3.
In an argument, such as the example above
given, it is, as has been said, impossible for any
one, who admits both premises, to avoid
admitting the conclusion* But there will be
frequently an apparent connexion of premises Apparent
with a conclusion which does not in reality
follow from them, though to the inattentive
* See Appendix, No. I. art. Reason. See also Rhetoric,
Part I. ch. 2. ii.
30 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [BOOK I.
or unskilful the argument may appear to be
valid : and there are many other cases in
which a doubt may exist whether the argu-
ment be valid or not : i. e. whether it be
possible or not to admit the premises, and
yet deny the conclusion. It is of the highest
importance, therefore, to lay down some regu-
lar form to which every valid argument may
be reduced, and to devise a rule which shall
show the validity of every argument in that
form, and consequently the unsoundness of
any apparent argument which cannot be re-
duced to it : e. g. if such an argument as this
be proposed, " every rational agent is account-
able ; brutes are not rational agents ; therefore
they are not accountable :" or again, " all wise
legislators suit their laws to the genius of their
nation ; Solon did this ; therefore he was a
wise legislator :" there are some, perhaps, who
would not perceive any fallacy in such argu-
ments, especially if enveloped in a cloud of
words ; and still more, when the conclusion
is true, or (which comes to the same point)
if they are disposed to believe it : and others
might perceive indeed, but might be at a loss
to explain, the fallacy. Now these (apparent)
arguments exactly correspond, respectively,
with the following, the absurdity of the con-
clusions from which is manifest : "every horse
is an animal ; sheep are not horses ; therefore
3.] ANALYTICAL OUTLINE. 31
they are not animals ;" and, " all vegetables
grow ; an animal grows ; therefofe it is a
vegetable." These last examples, I have said,
correspond exactly (considered as arguments)
with the former ; the question respecting the
validity of an argument being, not whether
the conclusion be true, but whether it follows
from the premises adduced. This mode of
exposing a fallacy, by bringing forward a simi-
lar one whose conclusion is obviously absurd,
is often, and very advantageously, resorted
to in addressing those who are ignorant of
Logical rules ;* but to lay down such rules,
and employ them as a test, is evidently a safer
and more compendious, as well as a more
philosophical mode of proceeding. To attain
these, it would plainly be necessary to analyze
some clear and valid arguments, and to observe
in what their conclusiveness consists.
* An exposure of some of Hume's fallacies in his "Essay
on Miracles" and elsewhere, was attempted, on this plan,
a few years ago, in a pamphlet (published anonymously, as
the nature of the argument required, but which I see no
reason against acknowledging) entitled " Historic Doubts
relative to Napoleon Buonaparte ;" in which it was shown
that the existence of that extraordinary person could not,
on Hume's principles, be received as a well-authenticated
fact ; since it rests on evidence less strong than that which
supports the Scripture-histories.
For a clear development of the mode in which this last
evidence operates on most minds, see " Hinds on Inspira-
tion," p. 3046.
32 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [BOOK I.
Let us suppose, then, such an examination
to be made of the syllogism above mentioned :
" whatever exhibits marks of design had an
intelligent author ; the world exhibits marks of
design ; therefore the world had an intelligent
author." In the first of these premises we find
it assumed universally of the class of " things
which exhibit marks of design/' that they had
an intelligent author ; and in the other premiss,
"the world "is referred to that class as com-
prehended in it : now it is evident, that what-
ever is said of the whole of a class, may be said
of any thing comprehended in that class : so
that we are thus authorized to say of the
world, that "it had an intelligent author."
Again, if we examine a syllogism with a nega-
tive conclusion, as, e. g. " nothing which exhi-
bits marks of design could have been produced
by chance ; the world exhibits, tyc. ; therefore
the world could not have been produced by
chance :" the process of Reasoning will be
found to be the same ; since it is evident, that
whatever is denied universally of any class may
be denied of any thing that is comprehended
in that class.
On further examination it will be found, that
all valid arguments whatever may be easily
reduced to such a form as that of the fore-
going syllogisms ; and that consequently the
principle on which they are constructed is the
3.] ANALYTICAL OUTLINE. 33
UNIVERSAL PRINCIPLE of Reasoning.
So elliptical, indeed, is the ordinary mode of
expression, even of those who are considered
as prolix writers, i. e. so much is implied and
left to be understood in the course of argu-
ment, in comparison of what is actually stated,
(most men being impatient, even to excess, of
any appearance of unnecessary and tedious
formality of statement), that a single sentence
will often be found, though perhaps considered
as a single argument, to contain, compressed
into a short compass, a chain of several distinct
arguments. But if each of these be fully deve-
loped, and the whole of what the author in-
tended to imply be stated expressly, it will be
found that all the steps even of the longest and
most complex train of reasoning, may be re-
duced into the above form.
It is a mistake (which might appear scarcely
worthy of notice, had not so many, even
esteemed writers, fallen into it) to imagine that
Aristotle and other logicians meant to propose
that this prolix form of unfolding arguments
should universally supersede, in argumentative
discourses, the common forms of expression ;
and that, " to reason logically/' means, to state
all arguments at full length in the syllogistic
form : and Aristotle has even been charged with
inconsistency for not doing so. It has been said
that " in his Treatises of Ethics, Politics, $fc<
p
34 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [BOOK 1.
he argues like a rational creature, and never
attempts to bring his own system into prac-
tice." * As well might a chemist be charged
with inconsistency for making use of any of
the compound substances that are commonly
employed, without previously analyzing and
resolving them into their simple elements ; as
well might it be imagined that, to speak gram-
matically, means, to parse every sentence we
utter. The chemist (to pursue the illustration)
keeps by him his tests and his method of
analysis, to be employed when any substance is
offered to his notice, the composition of which
has not been ascertained, or in which adultera-
tion is suspected. Now a fallacy may aptly
be compared to some adulterated compound ;
" it consists of an ingenious mixture of truth
" and falsehood, so entangled, so intimately
" blended, that the falsehood is (in the che-
" mical phrase) held in solution : one drop of
" sound logic is that test which immediately
" disunites them, makes the Foreign substance
" visible, and precipitates it to the bottom."f
4.
Aristotle's But to resume the investigation of the prin-
dictum.
* Lord Kames.
"|" This excellent illustration is cited from a passage in an
anonymous pamphlet, "An Examination of Kett's Logic."
The author displays, though in a hasty production, great
reach of thought, as well as knowledge of his subject.
4.] ANALYTICAL OUTLINE. 35
ciples of reasoning : the maxim resulting from
the examination of a syllogism in the foregoing
form, and of the application of which, every
valid argument is in reality an instance, is,
" that whatever is predicated (i. e. affirmed or
denied) universally, of any class of things, may
be predicated, in like manner, (viz. affirmed
or denied) of any thing comprehended in that
class." This is the principle, commonly called
the dictum de omnl et nullo, for the establishment
of which we are indebted to Aristotle, and which
is the keystone of his whole logical system.
It is not a little remarkable that some,
otherwise judicious writers, should have been
so carried away by their zeal against that phi-
losopher, as to speak with scorn and ridicule
of this principle, on account of its obviousness
and simplicity ; though they would probably
perceive at once, in any other case, that it is
the greatest triumph of philosophy to refer
many, and seemingly very various, phenomena
to one, or a very few, simple principles ; and
that the more simple and evident such a prin-
ciple is, provided it be truly applicable to all
the cases in question, the greater is its value
and scientific beauty. If, indeed, any prin-
ciple be regarded as not thus applicable, that
is an objection to it of a different kind. Such
an objection against Aristotle's dictum, no one
has ever attempted to establish by any kind
D 2
36 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [BOOK I.
of proof; but it has often been taken for
granted ; it being (as has been stated) very
commonly supposed, without examination, that
the syllogism is a distinct kind of argument,
and that the rules of it accordingly do not
apply, nor were intended to apply, to all
reasoning whatever. Dr. Campbell* endea-
vours, under this misapprehension, with some
ingenuity, and not without an air of plausi-
bility, to show that every syllogism must be
futile and worthless, because the premises vir-
tually assert the conclusion : little dreaming of
course, that his objections, however specious,
lie against the process of reasoning itself,
universally ; and will, therefore, of course,
apply to those very arguments which he is
himself adducing. He should have been re-
minded of the story of the woodman, who had
mounted a tree, and was so earnestly employed
in lopping the boughs, that he unconsciously
cut off the bough on which he was standing.
It is much more extraordinary to find
another eminent authorf adopting, expressly,
the very same objections, and yet distinctly
admitting (within a few pages) the possibility
of reducing every course of argument to a
series of syllogisms.
The same writer brings an objection against
* " Philosophy of Rhetoric."
\ Dugald Stewart : Philosophy, vol. ii.
4.] ANALYTICAL OUTLINE. 37
the Dictum of Aristotle, which it may be worth
while to notice briefly, for the sake of setting
in a clearer light the real character and object
of that principle. Its application being, as
has been seen, to a regular and conclusive
syllogism, he supposes it intended to prove
and make evident the collusiveness of such
a syllogism ; and remarks how unphilosophical
it is to attempt giving a demonstration of a
demonstration. And certainly the charge
would be just, if we could imagine the logi-
cian's object to be, to increase the certainty
of a conclusion which we are supposed to have
already arrived at by the clearest possible mode
of proof. But it is very strange that such an
idea should ever have occurred to one who had
even the slightest tincture of natural philo-
sophy : for it might as well be imagined that
a natural philosopher's or a chemist's design is
to strengthen the testimony of our senses by
a priori reasoning, and to convince us that a
stone when thrown will fall to the ground, and
that gunpowder will explode when fired ; be-
cause they show that according to their prin-
ciples those phenomena must take place as
they do. But it would be reckoned a mark
of the grossest ignorance and stupidity not to
be aware that their object is not to prove the
existence of an individual phenomenon, which
our eyes have witnessed, but (as the phrase is)
38 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [BOOK I.
to account for it : i. e. to show according to
what principle it takes place ; to refer, in
short, the individual case to a general law of
nature. The object of Aristotle's dictum is
precisely analogous; he had, doubtless, no
thought of adding to the force of any indi-
vidual syllogism ; his design was to point out
the general principle on which that process is
conducted which takes place in each syllogism.
And as the Laws* of nature (as they are called)
are in reality merely generalized facts, of
which all the phenomena coming under them
are particular instances ; so, the proof drawn
from Aristotle's dictum is not a distinct
demonstration brought to confirm another
demonstration, but is merely a generalized
and abstract statement of all demonstration
whatever ; and is, therefore, in fact, the very
demonstration which (mutatis mutandis) ac-
commodated to the various subject-matters, is
actually employed in each particular case.
The dictum, a In order to trace more distinctly the different
ste P s * ^ e abstracting process, by which any
particular argument may be brought into the
most general form, we may first take a syllogism
(i. e. an argument stated accurately and at full
length), such as the example formerly given,
" whatever exhibits marks of design, $*.," and
then somewhat generalize the expression, by
* Appendix, No. I. art. Law.
statement of
4 ] ANALYTICAL OUTLINE. 39
substituting (as in algebra) arbitrary unmeaning
symbols for the significant terms that were
originally used ; the syllogism will then stand
thus ; " every B is A ; C is B ; therefore C is
A." The reasoning is no less evidently valid
when thus stated, whatever terms A, B, and C,
respectively may be supposed to stand for.
Such terms may indeed be inserted as to
make all or some of the assertions false ; but
it will still be no less impossible for ar.y one
who admits the truth of the premises, in an
argument thus constructed, to deny the con-
clusion ; and this it is that constitutes the
conclusiveness of an argument.
Viewing then the syllogism thus expressed,
it appears clearly, that " A stands for any thing
zvhatever that is affirmed of a whole class,"
(viz. of every B) " which class comprehends or
contains in it something else," viz. C (of which
B is, in the second premiss, affirmed) ; and
that, consequently, the first term (A) is, in the
conclusion, predicated of the third C.
Now to assert the validity of this process,
now before us, is to state the very dictum
we are treating of, with hardly even a verbal
alteration ; viz. :
1. Anything whatever, predicated of a whole
class,
2. Under which class something else is con-
tained,
40 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [BOOK I.
3. May be predicated of that which is so
contained.
The three members into which the maxim
is here distributed, correspond to the three
propositions of the syllogism to which they are
intended respectively to apply.
The advantage of substituting for the terms,
in a regular syllogism, arbitrary unmeaning
symbols, such as letters of the alphabet, is
much the same as in geometry : the reasoning
itself is then considered, by itself, clearly, and
without any risk of our being misled by the
truth or falsity of the conclusion ; which is, in
fact, accidental and variable ; the essential
point being, as far as the argument is con-
cerned, the connexion between the premises
and the conclusion. We are thus enabled to
embrace the general principle of all reasoning,
and to perceive its applicability to an inde-
finite number of individual cases. That Aris-
totle, therefore, should have been accused of
making use of these symbols for the purpose
of darkening his demonstrations, and that too
by persons not unacquainted with geometry
and algebra, is truly astonishing. If a geo-
meter, instead of designating the four angles
of a square by four letters, were to call them
north, south, east, and west, he would not
render the demonstration of a theorem the
easier ; and the learner would be much
4.] ANALYTICAL OUTLINE. 41
more likely to be perplexed in the application
of it.
It belongs then exclusively to a syllogism,
properly so called (i. e. a valid argument, so
stated that its conclusiveness is evident from
the mere form of the expression), that if letters,
or any other unmeaning symbols, be substi-
tuted for the several terms, the validity of the
argument shall still be evident. Whenever
this is not the case, the supposed argument is
either unsound and sophistical, or else may be
reduced (without any alteration of its meaning)
into the syllogistic form ; in which form, the
test just mentioned may be applied to it.
What is called an unsound or fallacious Detection of
unsound ar-
argument (i.e. an apparent argument, which is, uments -
in reality, none) cannot, of course, be reduced
into this form ; but when stated in the form
most nearly approaching to this that is possible,
its fallaciousness becomes more evident, from
its nonconformity to the foregoing rule : e. g.
" whoever is capable of deliberate crime is re-
sponsible ; an infant is not capable of deliberate
crime ; therefore, an infant is not resposible,"
(see 3) : here the term " responsible " is
affirmed universally of " those capable of deli-
berate crime ;" it might, therefore, according
to Aristotle's dictum, have been affirmed of
anything contained under that class ; but, in
the instance before us, nothing is mentioned
42 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [BOOK I.
as contained under that class ; only, the term
"infant" is excluded from that class; and
though what is affirmed of a whole class may
be affirmed of any thing that is contained under
it, there is no ground for supposing that it may
be denied of whatever is not so contained ; for
it is evidently possible that it may be applicable
to a whole class and to something else besides :
to say, e. g. that all trees are vegetables, does
not imply that nothing else is a vegetable.
Nor, when it is said, that all who are capable
of deliberate crime are responsible, does this
imply, that no others are responsible ; for
though this may be very true, it has not been
asserted in the premiss before us ; and in the
analysis of an argument, we are to discard all
consideration of what might be asserted ; con-
templating only what actually is. laid down in
the premises. It is evident, therefore, that such
an apparent argument as the above does not
comply with the rule laid down, nor can be so
stated as to comply with it ; and is conse-
quently invalid.
Again, in this instance, " food is necessary to
life ; corn is food ; therefore, corn is necessary
to life :" the term " necessary to life" is affirmed
of food, but not universally ; for it is not said of
every kind of food: the meaning of the assertion
being manifestly that some food is necessary to
life : here again, therefore, the rule has not
5.] ANALYTICAL OUTLINE. 43
been complied with, since that which has been
predicated, (I. e. affirmed or denied) not of the
whole, but of a part only of a certain class,
cannot be, on that ground, predicated of any
thing whatever, that is contained under that
class.
5.
The fallacy in this last case is, what is usually
described in logical language as consisting in
the " non-distribution of the middle term :" i. e.
its not being employed to denote all the objects ^
to which it is applicable. In order to under-
stand this phrase, it is necessary to observe, that
a proposition being an expression in which one
thing is said, L e. affirmed or denied of another ;
(e. g. " A is B,") both that of which something
is said, and that which is said of it (i. e. both A
and B), are called " terms;" from their being
(in their nature) the extremes or boundaries of
the proposition: and there are, of course, two,
and but two, terms in a proposition (though it
may so happen that either of them may con-
sist either of one word, or of several) ; and a Distribution
. .1 T i i > of terms.
term is said to be "distributed/ when it is
taken universally, so as to stand for every
thing it is capable of being applied to ; and
consequently " undistributed,'* when it stands
for a portion only of the things signified by
it : thus, " all food," or every kind of food, are
44 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC, [Book I.
expressions which imply the distribution of the
term " food ;" " some food " would imply its
non-distribution. And it is also to be ob-
served that the term of which, in one premiss,
something is affirmed or denied, and to
which, in the other premiss, something else
is referred as contained in it, is called the
" middle " term in the syllogism, as standing
between the other two (viz. the two terms of
the conclusion), and being the medium of
proof. Now it is plain, that if in each
premiss a part only of this middle term is
employed, i. e. if it be not at all distributed,
no conclusion can be drawn. Hence, if, in
the example formerly adduced, it had been
merely stated that "something " (not " what-
ever," or " everything ") " which exhibits marks
of design, is the work of an intelligent author,"
it would not have followed, from the world's
exhibiting marks of design, that that is the
work of an intelligent author.
It is to be observed, also, that the words
" all " and " every," which mark the distribu-
tion of a term, and " some," which marks its
non-distribution, are not always expressed :
they are frequently understood, and left to be
supplied by the context ; e. g. " food is neces-
sary ;" viz. " some food ;" " man is mortal ;" viz.
" every man." Propositions thus expressed are
called by logicians " Indefinite," because it is
5.] ANALYTICAL OUTLINE. 45
left undetermined by the form of the expres-
sion whether the " subject" (the term of which
something is affirmed or denied being called
the "subject" of the proposition, and that which
is said of it, the " predicate ") be distributed
or not. Nevertheless it is plain that in every
proposition the Subject either is, or is not,
meant to be distributed ; though it be not
declared whether it is or not. Consequently,
every proposition, whether expressed indefi-
nitely or not, must be understood as either
" universal " or " particular ;" those being
called universal in which the predicate is
said of the whole of the subject (or, in other
words, where the subject is distributed) ; and
those, particular, in which it is said only of
a part of the subject : e. g. " All men are
sinful," is universal ; " some men are sinful,"
particular. And this division of propositions
is, in logical language, said to be according to
their "quantity."
But the distribution or non-distribution of Quai?tityand
the predicate is entirely independent of the
quantity of the proposition ; nor are the signs
" all " and " some " ever affixed to the pre-
dicate ; because its distribution depends upon,
and is indicated by, the "quality" of the pro-
position ; i. e. its being affirmative or negative ;
it being a universal rule, that the predicate of
a negative proposition is distributed, and of
46 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [BOOK I.
an affirmative, undistributed.* The reason
of this may easily be understood, by consider-
ing that a term which stands for a whole class
may be applied to (i. e. affirmed of) any thing
that is comprehended under that class, though
the term of which it is thus affirmed may be
of much narrower extent than that other, and
may, therefore, be far from coinciding with the
whole of it. Thus it may be said with truth,
that "the Negroes are uncivilized," though
the term uncivilized be of much wider extent
than "Negroes," comprehending, besides them,
Hottentots, fyc.\ so that it would not be allow-
able to assert, that " all who are uncivilized
are Negroes ;" it is evident, therefore, that it
is a part only of the term " uncivilized " that
has been affirmed of " Negroes :" and the
same reasoning applies to every affirmative
proposition ; for though it may so happen
* The learner may perhaps be startled at being told that
the predicate of an affirmative is never distributed ; espe-
cially as Aldrich has admitted that accidentally this may
take place : as in such a proposition as " all equilateral
triangles are equiangular :" but this is not accurate : he
might have said that in such a proposition as the above
the predicate is distributable, but not that it is actually dis-
tributed : i. e. it so happens that " all equiangular triangles
are equilateral ;" but this is not implied in the previous
assertion ; and the point to be considered is, not what
might be said with truth, but what actually has been said.
And accordingly mathematicians give distinct demonstration
of the above two propositions.
5.] ANALYTICAL OUTLINE. 47
that the subject and predicate coincide, i. e.
are of equal extent, as, e. g. " all men are
rational animals;" "all equilateral triangles
are equiangular ;" (it being equally true, that
" all rational animals are men," and that " all
equiangular triangles are equilateral ;") yet this
is not implied by the form of the expression ;
since it would be no less true, that " all men
are rational animals," even if there were other
rational animals besides man.
It is plain, therefore, that if any part of the
predicate is applicable to the subject, it may
be affirmed, and, of course, cannot be denied,
of that subject ; and consequently, when the
predicate is denied of the subject, this implies
that no part of that predicate is applicable to
that subject ; i.e. that the whole of the predicate
is denied of the subject : for to say, e. g. that
" no beasts of prey ruminate," implies that
beasts of prey are excluded from the whole
class of ruminant animals, and consequently
that " no ruminant animals are beasts of prey."
And hence results the above-mentioned rule,
that the distribution of the predicate is implied
in negative propositions, and its non-distribu-
tion in affirmatives.
It is to be remembered, therefore, that it is Distribution
of middle
not sufficient for the middle term to occur in a terms -
universal proposition ; since if that proposition
be an affirmative, and the middle term be the
48 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [BOOK I.
predicate of it, it will not be distributed : e. g.
if in the example formerly given, it had been
merely asserted, that " all the works of an
intelligent author show marks of design/'
and that "the universe shows marks of design,"
nothing could have been proved ; since, though
both these propositions are universal, the
middle term is made the predicate in each,
and both are affirmative ; and accordingly, the
rule of Aristotle is not here complied with,
since the term " work of an intelligent author,"
which is to be proved applicable to " the
universe," would not have been affirmed of the
middle term (" what shows marks of design ")
under which " universe" is contained ; but the
middle term, on the contrary, would have been
affirmed of it.
If, however, one of the premises be nega-
tive, the middle term may then be made the
predicate of that, and will thus, according to
the above remark, be distributed ; e. g. " no
ruminant animals are predacious ; the lion is
predacious ; therefore the lion is not rumi-
nant :" this is a valid syllogism ; and the middle
term (predacious) is distributed by being made
the predicate of a negative proposition. The
form, indeed, of the syllogism is not that pre-
scribed "by the dictum of Aristotle, but it may
easily be reduced to that form, by stating the
first proposition thus: " no predacious animals
5.] ANALYTICAL OUTLINE. 49
are ruminant ;" which is manifestly implied
(as was above remarked) in the assertion that
" no ruminant animals are predacious." The
syllogism will thus appear in the form to
which the dictum applies.
It is not every argument, indeed, that can be
reduced to this form by so short and simple an
alteration as in the case before us : a longer and
more complex process will often be required ;
and rules will hereafter be laid down to faci-
litate this process in certain cases : but there is
no sound argument but what can be reduced
into this form, without at all departing from
the real meaning and drift of it ; and the form
will be found (though more prolix than is
needed for ordinary use) the most perspicuous
in which an argument can be exhibited.
All reasoning whatever, then, rests on the
one simple principle laid down by Aristotle,
that " what is predicated, either affirmatively
or negatively, of a term distributed, may be
predicated in like manner (i. e. affirmatively or
negatively) of any thing contained under that
term." So that when our object is to prove
any proposition, i. e. to show that one term
may rightly be affirmed or denied of another,
the process which really takes place in our
minds is, that we refer that term (of which
the other is to be thus predicated; to some
class (L e. middle term) of which that other
E
50 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [BOOK I.
may be affirmed, or denied, as the case may
be.
Whatever the subject-matter of an argu-
ment may be, the reasoning itself, considered
by itself, is in every case the same process ;
and if the writers against Logic had kept
this in mind, they would have been cautious
of expressing their contempt of what they call
" syllogistic reasoning," which is in truth all
reasoning ; and instead of ridiculing Aristotle's
principle for its obviousness and simplicity,
would have perceived that these are, in fact,
its highest praise : the easiest, shortest, and
most evident theory, provided it answer the
purpose of explanation, being ever the best.
6.
If we conceive an inquirer to have reached,
in his investigation of the theory of reasoning,
the point to which we have now arrived, a
question which would be likely next to engage
his attention, is that of Predication; i. e. since
in reasoning we are to find a middle term,
which may be predicated affirmatively of the
subject in question, we are led to inquire what
terms may be affirmed, and what denied, of
what others.
ft j s evident that proper names, or any
other terms, which denote each but a single
individual, as " Caesar," " the Thames," " the
terms.
6.J ANALYTICAL OUTLINE. 51
Conqueror of Pompey," "this river" (hence
called in Logic "singular terms") cannot be
affirmed of any thing besides themselves, and
are therefore to be denied of any thing else ;
we may say, "this river is 'the Thames," or
" Caesar was the conqueror of Pompey ;" but
we cannot say of any thing else that it is the
Thames, fyc.
On the other hand, those terms which are
called " common," as denoting any one indivi-
dual of a whole class, as " river," " conqueror,"
may of course be affirmed of any, or all that
belong to that class : as, " the Thames is a
river ;" "the Rhine and the Danube are rivers."
Common terms, therefore, are called " pre-
dicables" (viz. affirmatively predicable), from
their capability of being affirmed of others : a
singular term, on the contrary, may be the
Subject of a proposition, but never the Predi-
cate, unless it be of a negative proposition ; (as,
e.g. the first-born of Isaac was not Jacob;) or,
unless the subject and predicate be only two
expressions for the same individual object ; as
in some of the above instances.
The process by which the mind arrives at Abstraction
and generali-
the notions expressed by these " common" zation -
(or in popular language, " general") terms, is
properly called Generalization ; though it is
usually (and truly) said to be the business of
abstraction ; for Generalization is one of the
K 2
52 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [BOOK I.
purposes to which Abstraction is applied.
When we draw off, and contemplate separately
any part of an object presented to the mind,
disregarding the rest of it, we are said to
abstract that part. Thus, a person might,
when a rose was before his eyes or mind,
make the scent a distinct object of attention,
laying aside all thought of the colour, form,
8fc. ; and thus, even though it were the only
rose he had ever met with, he would be em-
ploying the faculty of Abstraction ; but if, in
contemplating several objects, and finding that
they agree in certain points, we abstract the
circumstances of agreement, disregarding the
differences, and give to all and each of these
objects a name applicable to them in respect
of this agreement, i. e. a common name, as
(( rose," we are then said to generalize. Ab-
straction, therefore, does not necessarily imply
Generalization, though Generalization implies
Abstraction.
Much needless difficulty has been raised
respecting the results of this process ; many
having contended, and perhaps more having
taken for granted, that there must be some
really existing thing,* corresponding to each
of those general or common terms, and of
which such term is the name, standing for
* See the subjoined Dissertation, -Book IV. Chap. v.
6.] ANALYTICAL OUTLINE. 53
and representing it : e. g. that as there is a
really existing Being corresponding to the
proper name, " .Etna," and signified by it, so
the common term " mountain," must also have
some one really existing thing corresponding
to it ; and of course distinct from each indivi-
dual mountain (since the term is not singular
but common), yet existing in each, since the
term is applicable to each of them. " When
many different men," it is said, " are at the
same time thinking or speaking about a
mountain, i. e. not any particular one, but
a mountain generally, their minds must be
all employed on something; which must also
be one thing, and not several, and yet cannot
be any one individual." And hence a vast
train of mystical disquisitions about Ideas, fyc.
has arisen, which are at best nugatory, and
tend to obscure our view of the process which
actually takes place in the mind.
The fact is, the notion expressed by a com- Notions ex -
J pressed by
mon term is merely an inadequate (or incom- t
plete) notion of an individual ; and from the
very circumstance of its inadequacy, it will
apply equally well to any one of several in-
dividuals : e. g. if I omit the mention and the
consideration of every circumstance which dis-
tinguishes ^Etna from any other mountain, I
then form a notion (expressed by the common
term mountain) which inadequately designates
54 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Boon I.
./Etna (i. e. which does not imply any of its
peculiarities), and is equally applicable to any
one of several other individuals.
Generalization, it is plain, may be indefi-
nitely extended by a further abstraction applied
to common terms : e. g. as by abstraction from
the term Socrates we obtain the common term
" Philosopher ; " so, from " philosopher," by a
similar process, we arrive at the more general
term " man ; " from " man" we advance to
" animal," #c.
The employment of this faculty at pleasure
has been regarded, and perhaps with good
reason, as the characteristic distinction of the
human mind from that of the Brutes. We are
thus enabled, not only to separate, and consider
singly one part of an object presented to the
mind, but also to fix arbitrarily upon whatever
part we please, according as may suit the pur-
pose we happen to have in view. E. G. any
individual person to whom we may direct our
attention, may be considered either in a politi-
cal point of view, and accordingly referred to
the class of Merchant, Farmer, Lawyer, fyc. as
the case may be ; or physiologically, as Negro,
or White-man ; or theologically, as Pagan or
Christian, Papist or Protestant ; or geographi-
cally, as European, American, fyc. fyc. And
so, in respect of anything else that may be
the subject of our reasoning : we arbitrarily fix
6.] ANALYTICAL OUTLINE. 55
upon and abstract that point which is essential
to the purpose in hand ; so that the same object .
may be referred to various different classes, object.
according to the occasion. Not, of course,
that we are allowed to refer anything to a
class to which it does not really belong ; which
would be pretending to abstract from it some-
thing that was no part of it ; but that we arbi-
trarily fix on any part of it which we choose
to abstract from the rest.
It is important to notice this, because men
are often disposed to consider each object as
really and properly belonging to some one class
alone ;* from their having been accustomed, in
the course of their own pursuits, to consider,
in one point of view only, things which may
with equal propriety be considered in other
points of view also: i. e. referred to various
Classes, (or predicates.) And this is that
which chiefly constitutes what is called narrow-
ness-of-mind. E.G. a mere botanist might be
astonished at hearing such plants as Clover and
Lucerne included, in the language of a farmer,
under the term " grasses," which he has been
accustomed to limit to a tribe of plants widely
different in all botanical characteristics ; and
the mere farmer might be no less surprised to Different
modes of clas-
find the troublesome " weed," (as he has been siflcatio
* See the subjoined Dissertation, Book IV. Chap. v.
56 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Boon I.
accustomed to call it,) known by the name of
Couch-grass, and which he has been used to
class with nettles and thistles, to which it has
no botanical affinity, ranked by the botanist as
a species of Wheat, (Triticum Repens.) And
yet neither of these classifications is in itself
erroneous or irrational ; though it would be
absurd, in a botanical treatise, to class plants
according to their agricultural use ; or, in an
agricultural treatise, according to the structure
of their flowers.
The utility of these considerations, with a
view to the present subject, will be readily
estimated, by recurring to the account which
has been already given of the process of rea-
soning; the analysis of which shows that it
consists in referring the term we are speaking
of to some class, viz. a middle term ; which term
again is referred to or excluded from (as the
case may be) another class, viz. the term which
we wish to affirm or deny of the subject of the
conclusion. So that the quality of our reason-
ing in any case must depend on our being
able correctly, clearly and promptly, to ab-
stract from the subject in question that which
may furnish a Middle-term suitable to the
occasion.
The imperfect and irregular sketch which
has here been attempted, of the logical system,
may suffice (even though some parts of it should
6.] ANALYTICAL OUTLINE. 57
not be at once fully understood by those who
are entirely strangers to the study) to point out
the general drift and purpose of the science,
and to render the details of it both more inte-
resting and more intelligible. The analytical
form, which has here been adopted, is, gene-
rally speaking, better suited for introducing
any science in the plainest and most interesting
form ; though the synthetical, which will hence-
forth be employed, is the more regular, and
the more compendious form for storing it up
in the memory.
58 [BOOK n.
BOOK II.
SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM.
CHAP. I. Of the Operations of the Mind and
of Terms.
i.
operations of THERE are three operations (or states) of
the mind. > J
the mind which are immediately concerned
in argument ; 1st. Simple Apprehension ; 2d.
Judgment ; 3d. Discourse or Reasoning.*
1st. Simple-apprehension is that act or con-
prehension.
dition of the mind in which it receives a notion
of any object; and is analogous to the percep-
* Logical writers have in general begun by laying down
that there are, in all, three operations of the mind: (in
universum tres) an assertion by no means incontrovertible,
and which, if admitted, is nothing to the present purpose.
Our business is with argumentation, expressed in words, and
the operations of the mind implied in that ; what others
there may be, or whether any, are irrelevant questions.
The opening of a treatise with a statement respecting
the operations of the mind universally, tends to foster the
prevailing error (from which probably the minds of the
writers were not exempt) of supposing that Logic pro-
fesses to teach " the use of the mental faculties in general;"
the " right use of reason," according to Watts.
CHAP. I. 2.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 59
tion of the senses. It is either Incomplex or
Complex :* Incomplex-apprehension is of
one object, or of several without any relation
being perceived between them, as of " a man,"
" a horse," " cards :" Complex is of several
with such a relation, as of " a man on horse-
back," " a pack of cards."
2d. Judgment is the comparing together in Judgment.
the mind two of the notions (or ideas) which
are the objects of Apprehension, whether com-
plex or incomplex, and pronouncing that they
agree or disagree with each other : (or that
one of them belongs or does not belong to the
other.) Judgment, therefore, is either affir-
mative or negative.
3d. Reasoning (or discourse) is the act of Discourse
proceeding from one judgment, to another
founded upon that one, (or the result of it.)
2.
Language affords the signs by which these Language.
operations of the mind are expressed and com-
municated. The notion obtained in an act of
apprehension, is called, when expressed in lan-
guage, a term : an act of judgment is expressed
by a proposition; an act of reasoning, by an
* With respect to the technical terms employed in this
work, See Preface, p. xxix.
60 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [BOOK II.
argument ; (which, when regularly expressed,
is a syllogism ;) as e. g.
" Every dispensation of Providence is beneficial ;
Afflictions are dispensations of Providence,
Therefore they are beneficial :"
is a Syllogism ; the act of reasoning being
indicated by the word " therefore." It consists
of three propositions, each of which has (neces-
sarily) two terms, as " beneficial," " dispensa-
tions of Providence," Spc.*
Language is employed for various purposes.
It is the province of the historian, for instance,
to convey information by means of language,
of the Poet, to afford a certain kind of gratifi-
cation, of the orator, to persuade, &c. &c. ;
while it belongs to the argumentative writer or
speaker, as such, to convince the understand-
ing. And as Grammar is conversant about
language universally, for whatever purpose it
is employed, so, it is only so far as it is
employed for this last purpose, viz. that of
* In introducing the mention of language previously to
the definition of Logic, I have departed from established
practice, in order that it may be clearly understood, that
Logic is entirely conversant about language. If any process
of reasoning can take place, in the mind, without any
employment of language, orally or mentally, (a metaphysical
question which I shall not here discuss) such a process does
not come within the province of the science here treated of.
This truth, most writers on the subject, if indeed they were
fully aware of it themselves, have certainly not taken due
care to impress on their readers.
CHAP. I. 2.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. (j 1
reasoning, that it falls under the cognizance of
Logic.
And whereas, in reasoning, terms are liable Terms.
Propositions.
to be indistinct, (i. e. without any clear, de-
terminate meaning,) propositions to be false,
and arguments inconclusive, Logic undertakes
directly and completely to guard against this
last defect, and, incidentally, and in a certain
degree, against the others, as far as can be done
by the proper use of language. It is, therefore,
(when regarded as an art*} " the Art of
employing language properly for the purpose
of Reasoning ; and of distinguishing what is
properly and truly an argument, from spurious
imitations of it." The importance of such a
study no one can rightly estimate who has not
long and attentively considered how much our
thoughts are influenced by expressions, and
how much error, perplexity, and labour are
occasioned by a faulty use of language.
* It is to be observed, however, that as a science is con-
versant about speculative knowledge only, so an art is the
application of knowledge to practice : hence Logic (as well
as any other system of knowledge) becomes, when applied
to practice, an art ; while confined to the theory of reason-
ing, it is strictly a science : and it is as such that it occupies
the higher place in point of dignity, since it professes to de-
velop some of the most interesting and curious intellectual
phenomena. It is surely strange, therefore, to find in a
treatise on Logic, (Aldrich's) a distinct dissertation to prove
that it is an Art, and not a Science!
62 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [BOOK II.
A syllogism being, as aforesaid, resolvable
into three propositions, and each proposition
containing two terms ; of these terms, that
which is spoken of is called the subject ; that
which is said of it, the predicate ; and these two
are called the terms or (extremes) because,
logically, the Subject is placed first, and the
Predicate last:* and, in the middle, the Copula,
which indicates the act of judgment, as by it
the Predicate is affirmed or denied of the Sub-
ject. The Copula must be either is or is NOT;
which expressions indicate simply that you
affirm or deny the Predicate, of the subject.
The substantive verb is the only verb recog-
nised by Logic ; inasmuch as all others are
compound, being resolvable, by means of the
verb, "to be," and a participle or adjective:
e. g. " the Romans conquered :" the word con-
quered is both copula and predicate, being
equivalent to " were (Cop.) victorious " (Pred.)
It is proper to observe, that the copula, as
such, has no relation to time : but expresses
merely the agreement or disagreement of two
given terms : hence, if any other tense of the
substantive verb, besides the present is used,
it is either to be understood as the same in
* In Greek and in Latin, very often, and, not unfre-
quently, in English, the predicate is, actually, put first : as
" great is Diana of the Ephesians."
CHAP. I. 3.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 63
sense, (the difference of tense being regarded
as a matter of grammatical convenience only;)
or else, if the circumstance of time really do
modify the sense of the whole proposition, so as
to make the use of that tense an essential,
then, this circumstance is to be regarded as
a part of one of the terms : " at that time,"
or some such expression, being understood.
Sometimes the substantive verb is both copula
and predicate ; i. e. where existence only is
predicated : e. g. Deus est, " there is a God."
3.
It is evident that a Term may consist either
of one Word or of several ; and that it is not
every word that is categorematic, i. e. capable
of being employed by itself as a Term. Ad-
verbs, Prepositions, tyc. and also Nouns in any
other case besides the nominative, are syncate- s y ncate g ore-
gorematic, i. e. can only form part of a term.
A nominative Noun may be by itself a term.
A Verb (all except the substantive verb used as
the copula) is a mixed word, being resolvable Mixed.
into the Copula and Predicate, to which it is
equivalent ; and, indeed, is often so resolved
in the mere rendering out of one language
into another; as "ipse adest," "he is present."
It is to be observed, however, that under
" verb," we do not include the Infinitive,
which is properly a Noun-substantive, nor
egore-
matic.
64 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [BOOK II.
the Participle, which is a Noun -adjective.
They are verbals; being related to their re-
spective verbs in respect of the things they
signify : but not verbs, inasmuch as they
differ entirely in their mode of signification.
It is worth observing, that an Infinitive (though
it often comes last in the sentence) is never the
predicate, except when another Infinitive is the
Subject : e. g.
subj. pred.
" I hope to succeed :" i. e. " to succeed is what I hope."
It is to be observed, also, that in English
there are two infinitives, one in "ing"* the
same in sound and spelling as the participle
present, from which, however, it should be
carefully distinguished ; e. g. " rising early is
healthful," and " it is healthful to rise early,"
are equivalent. In this, and in many other
cases, the English word IT serves as a represen-
tative of the subject when that is put last : e. g.
pred. subj.
" It is to be hoped that we shall succeed."
* Grammarians have produced much needless perplexity
by speaking of the participle in " ing" being employed so
and so ; when it is manifest that that very employment of
the word constitutes it, to all intents and purposes, an
infinitive and not a participle.
The advantage of the infinitive in ing, is, that it may be
used either in the nominative or in any oblique case ; not
(as some suppose) that it necessarily implies a habit ; e. g.
" Seeing is believing :" " there is glory in dying for one's
country :" " a habit of observing," fyc.
CHAP. I. 3.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 65
An adjective (including participles) cannot,
by itself, be made tbe subject of a proposition ;
but is often employed as a predicate : as
" Crassus was rich ;" though some choose to
consider some substantive as understood in
every such case, (e. g. rich man) and conse-
quently do not reckon adjectives among Simple
terms ; (L e. words which are capable, singly,
of being employed as terms.) This, however,
is a question of no practical consequence ; but
I have thought it best to adhere to Aristotle's
mode of statement. (See his Categ.)
Of Simple-terms, then, (which are what the simple-
first part of Logic treats of) there are many e
divisions ; of which, however, one will be suffi-
cient for the present purpose ; viz. into singular
and common : because, though any term what-
ever may be a subject, none but a common term
can be affirmatively predicated of several others.
A singular term stands for one individual, as singular
" Caesar," " the Thames " (these, it is plain,
cannot be said [or predicated] affirmatively, of
any thing but themselves.) A common term
stands for several individuals, (which are called
its significates) : i. e. can be applied to any of
them, as comprehending them in its single
signification; as "man," "river," "great."
The learner who has gone through the
Analytical Outline, will now be enabled to pro-
ceed to the Second and Third Chapters either
F
66 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [BOOK II.
with or without the study of the remainder of
what is usually placed in the First Chapter,
and which is subjoined as a Supplement. See
Chap. V.
CHAP. II. Of Propositions.
1-
The second part of Logic treats of the
proposition ; which is, " Judgment expressed in
words"
Definition of A Proposition is defined logically* " a sentence
indicative" i. e. affirming or denying ; (this ex-
cludes commands and questions.') " Sentence"
being the genus, and "Indicative" the difference,
this definition expresses the whole essence ;
and it relates entirely to the words of a propo-
sition. With regard to the matter, its property
is to be true or false. Hence it must not be
ambiguous (for that which has more than one
meaning is in reality several propositions), nor
imperfect nor ungrammatical, for such an ex-
pression has no meaning at all.
Since the substance (i. e. genus^ or material
part) of a Proposition is, that it is a sentence
and since every sentence (whether it be a pro-
* See Chap. V. 6. f Ibid - 3 -
CHAP. II. 1.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 67
position or not) may be expressed either abso- Divisions of
. propositions.
lutely* or under an hypothesis,^ on this we
found the division J of propositions according
to their substance ; viz. into categorical and substance.
hypothetical.^ And as genus is said to be pre-
dicated in quid (what), it is by the members of
this division that we answer the question, what
is this proposition ? (quce est propositio.) An-
swer, Categorical or Hypothetical.
Categorical propositions are subdivided into
pure, which asserts simply or purely, that the
subject does or does not agree with the predi-
cate, and modal, which expresses in what mode
(or manner) it agrees ; e. g. " an intemperate
man will be sickly;" "Brutus killed Caesar;"
are pure. " An intemperate man will probably
be sickly;" " Brutus killed Caesar justly;" are
modal. At present we speak only of pure cate-
gorical propositions.
It being the differentia^ of a proposition that
it affirms or denies, and its property to be true
or false ; and Differentia being predicated in
* As, " Caesar deserved death ;" " did Caesar deserve
death ?"
j- As, "if Caesar was a tyrant, what did he deserve ?"
" Was Caesar a hero or a villain ?" " If Caesar was a
tyrant, he deserved death ;" " He was either a hero or
a villain."
J See Chap. V. 5.
Simple and Compound) according to some writers.
|| See Chap. V. 3.
F2
68 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [BOOK II.
quale quid, Property in quale, we hence form
another division of propositions, viz. according
Quality. to their quality, into Affirmative and Negative,
(which is the quality of the expression, and
therefore, in Logic, essential} and into True
and False (which is the quality of the matter,
and therefore accidental.) An affirmative pro-
position is one whose copula is affirmative, as
" birds fly ;" " not to advance is to go back ;"
a Negative proposition is one whose copula is
negative, as " man is not perfect ;" " no miser
is happy."
Quantity. Another division* of propositions is accord-
ing to their quantity [or extent.] If the Predi-
cate is said of the whole of the Subject, the
proposition is Universal: if of a part of it
only, the proposition is Particular (or partial :)
e. g. " England is an island ;" " all tyrants
are miserable ;" ( ' no miser is rich ;" are Uni-
versal propositions, and their subjects are
therefore said to be distributed, being under-
stood to stand, each, for the whole of its Signi-
ficates : but, " some islands are fertile ;" " all
tyrants are not assassinated ;" are Particular,
and their subjects, consequently, not distri-
buted, being taken to stand for a part only of
their Significates.
As every proposition must be either Affirma-
tive or Negative, and must also be either uni-
* See Chap. V. 5.
CHAP. II. 2.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 69
versal or particular, we reckon, in all, four
kinds of pure categorical propositions, (L e.
considered as to their quantity and quality
both;) viz. Universal Affirmative, whose symbol
(used for brevity) is A ; Universal Negative, E ;
Particular Affirmative, I ; Particular Nega-
tive, O.
2.
tr\ >* f\ tr\ y\ o 1 4"i ^ K* to i i^ s\ w
When the subject of a proposition is a Com-
mon-term, the universal signs ("all, no, every")
are used to indicate that it is distributed, (and
the proposition consequently is then universal ;)
i\\Q particular signs (" some, $<?.") the contrary.
Should there be no sign at all to the common
term, the quantity of the proposition (which is
called an Indefinite proposition) is ascertained
by the matter; L e. the nature of the connexion
between the extremes : which is either Neces-
sary, Impossible, or Contingent. In necessary
and in impossible matter, an Indefinite is un- indefinite.
derstood as a universal : e. g. " birds have
wings ;" i. e. all : " birds are not quadrupeds ;"
i. e. none: in contingent matter, (i. e. where
the terms partly (i. e. sometimes) agree, and
partly not) an Indefinite is understood as a
particular ; e. g. food is necessary to life ;"
i. e. some food ; " birds sing ;" i. e. some do ;
" birds are not carnivorous ;" i. e. some are not,
or, all are not.
70 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [BOOK II.
It is very perplexing to the learner, and
needlessly so, to reckon indefinites as one
class of propositions in respect of quantity.*
They must be either universal or particu-
lar, though it is not declared which. The
person, indeed, who utters the indefinite pro-
position, may be mistaken as to this point,
and may mean to speak universally in a case
where the proposition is not universally true.
And the hearer may be in doubt which was
meant, or ought to be meant ; but the speaker
must mean either the one or the other.
Of course the determination of a question
relating to the " matter," i. e. when we are
authorized to use the universal, and when, the
particular sign, when, an affirmative, and
when a negative, is what cannot be deter-
mined by Logic.
singular pro- As for singular propositions, (viz. those whose
positions. . . , . ..-i
subject is either a proper name, or a common
term with a singular sign) they are reckoned as
Universals, (see Book IV. Ch. IV. 2.) because
in them we speak of the whole of the subject ;
e. g. when we say, " Brutus was a Roman," we
mean the whole of Brutus : this is the general
rule ; but some singular propositions may
fairly be reckoned particular ; i. e. when some
* Such a mode of classification resembles that of some
grammarians, who, among the Genders, enumerate the
doubtful gender !
CHAP. II. 2.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 71
qualifying word is inserted, which indicates
that you are not speaking of the whole of the
subject; e.g. "Caesar was not wholly a
tyrant ;" " this man is occasionally intempe-
rate ;" " non omnis mortar."*
It is evident that the subject is distributed
in every universal proposition, and never in a
particular : (that being the very difference be-
tween universal and particular propositions :)
but the distribution or non-distribution of the
predicate, depends (not on the quantity, but)
on the quality 9 of the proposition ; for, if any
part of the predicate agrees with the subject,
it must be affirmed and not denied of the sub-
ject ; therefore, for an affirmative proposition
to be true, it is sufficient that some part of t/ie
predicate agrees with the subject ; and (for the
same reason) for a negative to be true, it is
necessary that the whole of the predicate
should disagree with the subject : e. g. it is
true that " learning is useful," though the
whole of the term " useful" does not agree
with the term " learning " (for many things
* It is not meant that these may not be, and that, the
most naturally, accounted Universals ; but it is only by
viewing them in the other light, that we can regularly
state the Contradictory to a Singular proposition. Strictly
speaking, when we regard such propositions as admitting
of a variation in Quantity, they are not properly considered
as Singular ; the subject being, e* g. not Caesar, but the
parts of his character.
72 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [BOOK II.
are useful besides learning,) but " no vice is
useful," would be false if any part of the term
" useful" agreed with the term " vice ;" (i. e.
if you could find any one useful thing which
was a vice.) The two practical rules then to
be observed respecting distribution, are,
1st. All universal propositions (and no par-
ticular) distribute the subject.
2d. All negative (and no affirmative) the
predicate.*
* Hence, it is matter of common remark, that it is
difficult to prove a Negative. At first sight this appears
very obvious, from the circumstance that a Negative has
one more Term distributed than the corresponding Affir-
mative. But then, again, a difficulty may be felt in
accounting for this, inasmuch as any Negative may be
expressed (as we shall see presently) as an Affirmative,
and vice versd. The proposition, e. g. that <f such a one is
not in the Town," might be expressed by the use of an
equivalent term, " he is absent from the Town."
The fact is, however, that in every case where the ob-
servation as to the difficulty of proving a Negative holds
good, it will be found that the proposition in question is
contrasted with one which has really a term the less, dis-
tributed ; or a term of less extensive sense. E. G. It is
easier to prove that a man has proposed wise measures,
than that he has never proposed an unwise measure. In
fact, the one would be to prove that " Some of his mea-
sures are wise ;" the other, that " All his measures are
wise." And numberless such examples are to be found.
But it will very often happen that there shall be Nega-
tive propositions much more easily established than certain
Affirmative ones on the same subject. E. G. That " The
cause of animal-heat is not respiration," has been established
CHAP. II. 3.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 73
It may happen indeed, that the whole of the
predicate in an affirmative may agree with the
subject ; e. g. it is equally true, that " all men
are rational animals ;" and " all rational ani-
mals are men ;" but this is merely accidental,
and is not at all implied in the form of ex-
pression, which alone is regarded in Logic.*
Of Opposition.
3.
Two propositions are said to be opposed to
each other, when, having the same subject
and predicate, they differ, in quantity, or
quality, or both.^ It is evident, that with any
given subject and predicate, you may state
four distinct propositions, viz. A, E, I, and
O ; any two of which are said to be opposed ;
hence there are four different kinds of opposi-
tion, viz. 1st. the two universals (A and E)
are called contraries to each other : 2d. the contraries.
two particular, (I and O) subcontraries ; 3d. A subcontra-
ries.
and I, or E and O, subalterns ; 4th. A and O, subalterns.
or E and I, contradictories. contradicto-
ries.
by experiments ; but what the cause is remains doubtful.
See Note to Chap. III. 5.
* When, however, a Singular Term is the Predicate ; it
must, of course, be co-extensive with the subject; as
" Romulus was the founder of Rome."
f- For Opposition of Terms, see Chap. V.
74 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [BooKlI.
As it is evident, that the truth or falsity of
any proposition (its quantity and quality being
known) must depend on the matter of it, we
must bear in mind, that, " in necessary matter 9
all affirmatives are true, and negatives false ;
in impossible matter, vice verm; in contingent
matter, all universals, false, and particulars
true ;" (? g* " all islands (or some islands)
are surrounded by water," must be true, be-
cause the matter is necessary : to say, " no
islands, or some not, $c" would have been
false : again, " some islands are fertile ;" " some
are not fertile," are both true, because it is
Contingent Matter: put "all" or "no" in-
stead of " some," and the propositions will be
false.) Hence it will be evident, that Con-
traries will be both false in Contingent matter,
but never both true: Subcontraries, both true
in Contingent matter, but never both false :
Contradictories, always one true and the other
false, Sec. with other observations, which will
be immediately made on viewing the scheme ;
in which the four propositions are denoted by
their symbols, the different kinds of matter by
the initials, n, i, c, and the truth or falsity
of each proposition in each matter, by the
letter v. for (verurn) true, f. for (falsum)
false.
CHP. 1I.3.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM.
75
C. V.
By a careful study of this scheme, bearing
in mind, and applying the above rule con-
cerning matter, the learner will easily elicit all
the maxims relating to opposition ; as that,
in the Subalterns, the truth of the particular
(which is called the subalternate) follows from
the truth of the universal (subalternans), and
the falsity of the universal from the falsity of
the particular : that Subalterns differ in quan-
iity alone ; Contraries, and also Subcontraries,
in quality alone ; Contradictories, in both :
and hence, that if any proposition is known
to be true, we infer that its Contradictory is
false ; if false, its Contradictory true, Sfc.
Of course the learner must remember, as
76 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Boon II.
above observed, that the determination of the
"matter" is out of the province of Logic.
The rules of Opposition merely pronounce
on the truth or falsity of each proposition,
given, the matter.
Of Conversion.
4.
A proposition is said to be converted when
its terms are transposed ; i. e. when the sub-
ject is made the predicate, and the predicate
the subject : when nothing more is done, this
is called simple conversion. No conversion is
employed for any logical purpose, unless it be
illative ;* i. e. when the truth of the converse is
implied by the truth of the Exposita, (or pro-
position given ;) e. g.
" No virtuous man is a rebel, therefore
No rebel is a virtuous man."
" No Christian is an astronomer, therefore
No astronomer is a Christian." (
" Some boasters are cowards, therefore
Some cowards are boasters."
Conversion can then only be illative when
version.
* The reader must not suppose from the use of the word
" illative," that this conversion is a process of reasoning :
it is in fact only stating the same Judgment in another
form.
f When Galileo's persecutors endeavoured to bring about
the former of these, they forgot that it implied the latter.
CHAP. II. 4.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 77
no term is distributed in the Converse, which
was not distributed in the Exposita : (for if that
be done, you will employ a term universally in
the Converse, which was only used partially
in the Exposita.) Hence, as E distributes
both terms, and I, neither, these propositions
may be illatively converted in the simple
manner ; (vide 2.) But as A does not dis-
tribute the predicate, its simple conversion
would not be illative ; (e. g. from " all birds
are animals," you cannot infer that " all ani-
mals are birds,") as there would be a term
distributed in the converse, which was not,
before. We must therefore limit its quantity
from universal to particular, and the Conver-
sion will be illative : (e. g. " some animals
are birds ;") this might be fairly named con-
version by limitation ; but is commonly called
" Conversion per accidens" E may thus be con- conversion
per accidens.
verted also. But in O, whether the quantity
be changed or not, there will still be a term
(the predicate of the converse) distributed,
which was not before : you can therefore only
convert it illatively, by changing the quality ;
i. e. considering the negative as attached to
the predicate instead of to the copula, and thus
regarding it as I. One of the terms will then
not be the same as before ; but the proposition
will be equipollent (i. e. convey the same
meaning); e.g. "some members of the uni :
78 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [BOOK II.
versity are not learned :" you may consider
"not-learned" as the predicate, instead of
" learned; " the proposition will then be I, and
of course may be simply converted, " some
who are not learned are members of the uni-
versity." This may be named conversion by
negation; or as it is commonly called, by
contra-position.* A may also be fairly con-
verted in this way, e. g.
" Every poet is a man of genius ; therefore
He who is not a man of genius is not a poet :"
(or, "None but a man of genius can be a poet :"
or, "a man of genius alone can be a poet.")
For (since it is the same thing- to affirm some
attribute of the subject, or to deny the absence
of that attribute) the original proposition is
precisely equipollent to this,
subj. pred.
" No poet is not-a-man -of- genius ;"
which, being E, may of course be simply
converted. Thus, in one of these three ways,
every proposition may be illatively converted :
viz. E, I, simply ; A, O, by negation ; A> E,
by limitation.
convertible Note, that as it was remarked that, in some
affirmatives, the whole of the predicate does
* No mention is made by Aldrich of this kind of con-
version ; but it has been thought advisable to insert it, as
being in frequent use, and also as being employed in this
treatise for the direct reduction of Baroko and Bokardo.
terms.
CHAP. II. 4.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 79
actually agree with the subject, so, when this
is the case, A being converted simply, the
converse will be true: but still, as its truth
does not follow from that of the original
proposition [" exposita"] the conversion is
not illative. Many propositions in mathe-
matics are of this description : e. g.
"All equilateral triangles are equiangular ;" and
" All equiangular triangles are equilateral."
Though both these propositions are true, the
one does not follow from the other ; and
mathematicians accordingly give a distinct
proof of each.
As the simple converse of A can then only
be true when the subject and predicate are
exactly equivalent (or, as they are called,
convertible terms); and as this must always
be the case in a just definition, so the correct-
ness of a definition may be tried by this test.
E. G. " a good government is that which has
the happiness of the governed for its object ;"
if this be a right definition, it will follow that
" a government which has the happiness of
the governed for its object is a good one."
80 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [BOOK II.
CHAP. III. Of Arguments.
The third operation of the mind, viz. rea-
soning, (or discourse) expressed in words, is
argument ; and an argument stated at full
length, and in its regular form, is called a
syllogism: the third part of Logic therefore
syllogisms, treats of the syllogism. Every Argument*
consists of two parts; that which is proved;
and that by means of which it is proved : the
former is called, before it is proved, the ques-
tion ; when proved, the conclusion (or infer-
ence ;) that which is used to prove it, if stated
last (as is often done in common discourse,} is
called the reason, and is introduced by " be-
cause," or some other causal conjunction ;
(e. g. " Caesar deserved death, because he was a
tyrant, and all tyrants deserve death.") If the
conclusion be stated last (which is the strict
logical form, to which all Reasoning may be
reduced) then that which is employed to
* I mean, in the strict technical sense ; for in popular
use the word Argument is often employed to denote the
latter of these two parts alone : e. g. "This is an Argument
to prove so and so ;" this conclusion is established by the
Argument :" i. e. Premises. See Appendix, No. I. art.
Argument.
CHAP. Ill 1.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 81
prove it is called the premises* and the Con-
clusion is then introduced by some illative
conjunction, as " therefore," e. g.
" All tyrants deserve death :
Caesar was a tyrant ;
therefore he deserved death. "f
Since, then, an argument is an expression Definition of
* Argument.
in which "from something laid down and
* Both the premises together are sometimes called the
antecedent.
f It may be observed that the definition here given of
an argument, is in the common treatises of logic laid down
as the definition of a syllogism; a word which I have
confined to a more restricted sense. There cannot evi-
dently be any argument, whether regularly or irregularly
expressed, to which the definition given by Aldrich, for
instance, would not apply ; so that he appears to employ
"syllogism" as synonymous with "argument." But be-
sides that it is clearer and more convenient, when we
have these two words at hand, to employ them in the two
senses respectively which we want to express, the truth
is, that in so doing I have actually conformed to Aldrich's
practice : for he generally, if not always, employs the
term syllogism in the very sense to which I have confined
it : viz. to denote an argument stated in regular logical
form ; as, e. g. in a part of his work (omitted in the late
editions) in which he is objecting to a certain pretended
syllogism in the work of another writer, he says, " valet
certe argumentum ; syllogismus tamen est falsissimus," &c.
Now (waiving the exception that might be taken at this
use of " falsissimus," nothing being, strictly, true or false,
but a proposition) it is plain that he limits the word
" syllogism" to the sense in which it is here defined, and
is consequently inconsistent with his own definition of it.
G
82 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Boon II.
granted as true (i. e. the Premises) something
else (i. e. the Conclusion) beyond this must be
admitted to be true 9 as following necessarily (or
resulting) from the other ; and since Logic is
wholly concerned in the use of language, it
follows that a Syllogism (which is an argument
stated in a regular logical form) must be
of " an argument so expressed, that the con-
clusiveness of it is manifest from the mere
force of the expression" i. e. without consider-
ing the meaning of the terms : e. g. in this
syllogism, " Y is X, Z is Y, therefore Z is X :"
the conclusion is inevitable, whatever terms
X, Y, and Z, respectively are understood to
stand for. And to this form all legitimate
arguments may ultimately be brought.
2.
Aristotle's The rule or axiom (commonly called " die-
dictum. f
turn de omni et nullo'} by which Aristotle
explains the validity of this argument, is this :
"whatever is predicated of a term distributed,
whether affirmatively or negatively, may be pre-
dicated in like manner of every thing contained
under it." Thus, in the examples above, X is
predicated of Y distributed, and Z is contained
under Y (i. e. is its subject ; ) therefore X is
predicated of Z : so "all tyrants," $c. (p. 81.)
This rule may be ultimately applied to all
arguments ; (and their validity ultimately rests
CHAP. III. 2.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 83
on their conformity thereto) but it cannot be
directly and immediately applied to all even of
pure categorical syllogisms ; for the sake of
brevity, therefore, some other axioms are
commonly applied in practice, to avoid the
occasional tediousness of reducing all syllo-
gisms to that form in which Aristotle's dictum
is applicable.*
We will speak first of pure categorical
syllogisms ; and the axioms or canons by
which their validity is to be explained : viz.
first, if two terms agree with one and the same
third, they agree with each other: secondly,
if one term agrees and another disagrees with
one and the same third, these two disagree with
* Instead of following Aldrich's arrangement, in laying
down first the canons which apply to all the figures of
categorical syllogisms, and then going back to the " dic-
tum of Aristotle" which applies to only one of them, I
have pursued what appears a simpler and more philo-
sophical arrangement, and more likely to impress on the
learner's mind a just view of the science: viz. 1st, to
give the rule (Aristotle's dictum) which applies to the
most clearly and regularly-constructed argument, the
Syllogism in the first figure, to which all reasoning may
be reduced : then, the canons applicable to all categorical s ;
then, those belonging to the hypothetical ; and lastly, to
treat of the Sorites ; which is improperly placed by
Aldrich before the hypothetical. By this plan the pro-
vince of strict Logic is extended as far as it can be ; every
kind of argument which is of a syllogistic character, and
accordingly directly cognizable by the rules of logic,
being enumerated in natural order.
o2
84 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [BooKlI.
each other. On the former of these canons
rests the validity of affirmative conclusions ;
on the latter, of negative : for no categorical
syllogism can be faulty which does not violate
these canons ; none correct which does : hence
on these two canons are built the rules or
cautions which are to be observed with respect
to syllogisms, for the purpose of ascertaining
whether those canons have been strictly ob-
served or not.
1st. Every syllogism has three, and only
three terms: viz. the middle term, and the
two terms (or extremes, as they are commonly
called) of the Conclusion or Question. Of
these, 1st, the subject of the conclusion is
called the minor term; 2d, its predicate, the
major term ; and 3d, the middle term, (called
by the older logicians " Argumentum,") is
that with which each of them is separately
compared, in order to judge of their agree-
ment or disagreement with each other. If
therefore there were two middle terms, the
extremes, (or terms of conclusion) not being
both compared to the same, could not be
conclusively compared to each other.
2d. Every syllogism has three, and only
three propositions ; viz. 1st, the major premiss
(in which the major term is compared with the
middle :) 2d, the minor premiss (in which the
minor term is compared with the middle ;) and
CHAP. III. 2.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 85
3d, the Conclusion, in which the Minor term
is compared with the Major.*
3d. Note, that if the middle term is ambi-
guous, there are in reality two middle terms, in
sense, though but one in sound. An am-
biguous middle term is either an equivocal
term used in different senses in the two pre-
mises : (e. g.
11 Light is contrary to darkness ;
Feathers are light ; therefore
Feathers are contrary to darkness:")
or a term not distributed: for as it is then
used to stand for a part only of its significates,
it may happen that one of the extremes may
have been compared with one part of it, and
the other with another part of it ; e. g.
" White is a colour,
Black is a colour ; therefore
Black is white." Again,
" Some animals are beasts,
Some animals are birds ; therefore
Some birds are beasts."
The middle term therefore must be distri-
buted once, at least, in the premises ; (L e. by
being the subject of an universal, or predicate
* In some logical treatises the Major premiss is called
simply " Propositio ;" and the Minor, " Assumptio" In
ordinary discourse, the word " Principle " is often used to
denote the Major premiss, and " Reason," the Minor.
86 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [BOOK II.
of a negative, Chap. ii. 2, p. 69,) and once is
sufficient ; since if one extreme has been
compared to a part of the middle term, and
another to the whole of it, they must have
been both compared to the same.
4th. No term must be distributed in the con-
clusion which was not distributed in one of the
premises ; for that (which is called an illicit
process, either of the Major or the Minor
term) would be to employ the whole of a
term in the conclusion, when you had em-
ployed only a part of it in the Premiss ; and
thus, in reality, to introduce a fourth term :
e.g.
" All quadrupeds are animals,
A bird is not a quadruped ; therefore
It is not an animal." Illicit process of the major.
5th. From negative premises you can infer
nothing. For in them the Middle is pro-
nounced to disagree with both extremes ; not,
to agree with both ; or, to agree with one, and
disagree with the other ; therefore they can-
not be compared together ; e. g.
" A fish is not a quadruped ; "
*' A bird is not a quadruped," proves nothing.
6th. If one premiss be negative, the conclu-
sion must be negative ; for in that premiss the
middle term is pronounced to disagree with
CHAP. III. 2.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM 87
one of the extremes, and in the other premiss
(which of course is affirmative by the pre-
ceding rule) to agree with the other extreme ;
therefore the extremes disagreeing with each
other, the conclusion is negative. In the
same manner it may be shown, that to prove
a negative conclusion one of the Premises must
be a negative.
* By these six rules all Syllogisms are to be
tried ; and from them it will be evident ; 1st,
that nothing can be proved from two particular
Premises; (for you will then have either the
middle Term undistributed t or an illicit pro-
cess : e. g.
" Some animals are sagacious :
Some beasts are not sagacious :
Some beasts are not animals.")
And, for the same reason, 2dly, that if one
of the Premises be particular, the Conclusion
must be particular ; e. g.
" All who fight bravely deserve reward ;
Some soldiers fight bravely ;" you can only infer that
" Some soldiers deserve reward :"
* Others have given twelve rules, which I found might
more conveniently be reduced to six. No syllogism can
be faulty which violates none of these six rules. It is
much less perplexing to a learner not to lay down as a
distinct rule, that, e. g. against particular premises ; which
is properly a result of the foregoing ; since a syllogism
with two particular premises would oftend against either
R. 3. or K. 4.
88 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [BOOK II.
for to infer a universal Conclusion would be
an illicit process of the minor. But from two
universal Premises you cannot always infer a
universal Conclusion ; e. g.
" All gold is precious,
All gold is a mineral : therefore
Some mineral is precious."
And even when we can infer a universal,
we are always at liberty to infer a particular ;
since what is predicated of all may of course be
predicated of some.
Of Moods.
3.
When we designate the three propositions
of a syllogism in their order, according to
their respective quantity and quality (2. e. their
symbols) we are said to determine the wood of
the syllogism ; e. g. the example just above,
" all gold, fyc" is in the mood A, A, I. As
there are four kinds of propositions, and three
propositions in each syllogism, all the possible
ways of combining these four, (A, E, I, O,) by
threes, are sixty-four. For any one of these
four may be the major premiss, each of these
four majors may have four different minors,
and of these sixteen pairs of premises, each
may have four different conclusions. 4x4
CHAP. III. 4.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 89
(= 16) x 4 = 64. This is a mere arithmetical
calculation of the moods, without any regard
to the logical rules : for many of these moods
are inadmissible in practice, from violating
some of those rules ; e. g. the mood E, E, E,
must be rejected as having negative premises ;
I, O, O, for particular premises ; and many
others for the same faults ; to which must be
added I, E, O, for an illicit process of the
major, in every figure. By examination then
of all, it will be found that, of the sixty-four
there remain but eleven moods which can be
used in a legitimate syllogism, viz. A, A, A,
A, A, I, A,E, E, A,E,0, A, I, I, A,O,O,
E,A,E, E,A,0, E,I, O, I, A, I, O, A, O.
Of Figure.
4.
The Figure of a syllogism consists in the
situation of the Middle term with respect to
the Extremes of the Conclusion, ( i. e. the major
and minor term.) When the Middle term is
made the subject of the major premiss, and the
predicate of the minor, that is called the first
Figure ; (which is far the most natural and
clear of all, as to this alone Aristotle's dictum
may be at once applied.) In the second Figure
the Middle term is the predicate of both pre-
mises : in the third, the subject of both : in the
90 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [BooKlI.
fourth the predicate of the Major premiss, and
the subject of the Minor. (This is the most
awkward and unnatural of all, being the very
reverse of the first.) Note, that the proper
order is to place the Major premiss first, and
the Minor second ; but this does not constitute
the Major and Minor premises ; for that pre-
miss (wherever placed) is the Major, which
contains the major term, and the Minor, the
minor (v. R. 2. p. 84.) Each of the allowable
moods mentioned above will not be allowable
in every Figure ; since it may violate some of
the foregoing rules, in one Figure, though not
in another : e. g. I, A, I, is an allowable mood
in the third Figure ; but in the first it would
have an undistributed middle.* So A, E, E,
would in the first Figure have an illicit process
of the major, but is allowable in the second ;
and A, A, A, which in the first Figure is allow-
able, would in the third have an illicit process
of the minor : all which may be ascertained by
trying the different Moods in each figure, as
per scheme.
r A
* e. g. Some restraint is salutary : all restraint is un-
i i
i
pleasant : something unpleasant is salutary. Again : Some
i A
herbs are fit for food : nightshade is an herb : some
i
nightshade is fit for food.
CHAP.IH. 4.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 91
Let X represent the major term, Z the
minor, Y the middle.
1st Fig.
2d Fig.
3d Fig.
4th Fig.
Y,X,
X,Y,
Y,X,
X, Y,
Z, Y,
Z,Y,
Y,Z,
Y, Z,
z,x,
Z, X,
Z,X,
Z, X.
The Terms alone being here stated, the
quantity and quality of each Proposition (and
consequently the Mood of the whole Syllo-
gism) is left to be filled up : (i. e. between
Y and X, we may place either a negative or
affirmative Copula : and we may prefix either
a universal or particular sign to Y.) By
applying the Moods then to each Figure, it
will be found that each figure will admit six
Moods only, as not violating the rules against
undistributed middle, and against illicit process :
and of the Moods so admitted, several (though
valid) are useless, as having a particular Con-
clusion, when 4 universal might have been
drawn ; e. g. A, A, I, in the first Figure,
" All human creatures are entitled to liberty ;
All slaves are human creatures ; therefore
Some slaves are entitled to liberty/'
Of the twenty-four Moods, then, (six in each
Figure) five are for this reason neglected :
for the remaining nineteen, logicians have
devised names to distinguish both the Mood
92 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [BOOK II.
itself, and the Figure in which it is found ;
since when one Mood (i. e. one in itself,
without regard to Figure) occurs in two
different Figures, (as E, A, E, in the first
and second) the mere letters denoting the
mood would not inform us concerning the
figure. In these names, then, the three
vowels denote the propositions of which the
Syllogism is composed : the consonants (be-
sides their other uses, of which hereafter)
serve to keep in mind the Figure of the
Syllogism.
Fig. 1. bArbArA, cElArEnt, dArll, fErlOque prio-
ris.
Fig. 2. cEsArE, cAmEstrEs, fEstlnO, bArOkO,*
secundae.
( tertia, dArAptl, dlsArals, dAtlsI, fElAptOn,
Fig. 3. < bOkArdO,f fErlsO, habet : quarta insuper
( addit.
Fig. 4. brAmAntlp, cAmEnEs, dlmArla, fEsApo,
frEsIsOn.
By a careful study of these mnemonic lines
(which must be committed to memory) you
will perceive that A can only be proved in
the first Figure, in which also every other
Proposition may be proved ; that the second
proves only negatives; the third only parti-
culars ; that the first Figure requires the
* Or, Fakoro, see 7.
f Or Dokamo, see 7.
CHAP. III. 1.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 93
major premiss to be universal, and the minor,
affirmative, fyc. ; with many other such obser-
vations, which will readily be made, (on trial
of several Syllogisms, in different Moods)
and the reasons for which will be found in
the foregoing rules : e. g. to show why the
second figure has only negative Conclusions,
we have only to consider, that in it the mid-
dle term being the predicate in both premises,
would not be distributed unless one premiss
were negative; (Chap. ii. 2) therefore the
Conclusion must be negative also, by Chap. iii.
2, Rule 6. One Mood in each figure may
suffice in this place by way of example :
First, Barbara, viz. (bAr.) " Every Y is X ;
(bA) every Z is Y ; therefore (rA) every Z
is X :" e. g. let the major term (which is
represented by X) be " one who possesses all
virtue ;" the minor term (Z) " every man who
possesses one virtue ;" and the middle term
(Y) " every one who possesses prudence ;"
and you will have the celebrated argument of
Aristotle, Eth. sixth book, to prove that the
virtues are inseparable ; viz.
" He who possesses prudence, possesses all virtue ;
He who possesses one virtue, must possess prudence ;
therefore
He who possesses one, possesses all."
Second, Camestres, (cAm) " every X is Y ;
(Es) no Z is Y ; (trES) no Z is X." Let the
94 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [BooKlI.
major term (X) be " true philosophers," the
minor (Z) " the Epicureans ;" the middle (Y)
" reckoning virtue a good in itself ;" and this
will be part of the reasoning of Cicero, Off.
book first and third, against the Epicureans.
Third, Darapti, viz. (dA) " every Y is X ;
(rA'p) every Y is Z ; therefore (tl) Some Z is
X))
: e.g.
" Prudence has for its object the benefit of individuals ;
but prudence is a virtue : therefore some virtue has for its
object the benefit of the individual,"
is part of Adam Smith's reasoning {Moral
Sentiments) against Hutcheson and others,
who placed all virtue in benevolence.
Fourth, Camenes, viz. (cAm) " every X is
Y ; (En) no Y is Z ; therefore (Es) no Z is
X:" e.g.
" Whatever is expedient, is conformable to nature ;
Whatever is conformable to nature, is not hurtful to
society ; therefore
What is hurtful to society is never expedient ;''
is part of Cicero's argument in Off. Lib. iii. ;
but it is an inverted and clumsy way of
stating what would much more naturally fall
into the first Figure ; for if you examine the
Propositions of a Syllogism in the fourth
Figure, beginning at the Conclusion, you will
see that as the major term is predicated of the
minor, so is the minor of the middle, and that
CHAP. III. 4.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 95
again of the major ; so that the major appears
to be merely predicated of itself. Hence the
five Moods in this Figure are seldom or never
used ; some one of the fourteen (moods with
names) in the first three Figures, being the
forms into which all arguments may most
readily be thrown ; but of these, the four in
the first Figure are the clearest and most
natural; as to them Aristotle's dictum will
immediately apply.
With respect to the use of the first three
Figures (for the fourth is never employed but
by an accidental awkwardness of expression)
it may be remarked, that the First is that
into which an argument will be found to fall
the most naturally, except in the following
cases : First, When we have to disprove
something that has been maintained, or is
likely to be believed, our arguments will
usually be found to take most conveniently
the form of the Second Figure : viz. we
prove that the thing we are speaking of
cannot belong to such a Class, either be-
cause it wants what belongs to the whole
of that Class, (Cesare) or because it has
something of which that class is destitute ;
(Camestres) e. g. " No impostor would have
warned his followers, as Jesus did, of the
persecutions they would have to submit
to ;" and again, " An enthusiast would have
96 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [BOOK II.
expatiated, which Jesus and his followers did
not, on the particulars of a future state,"
The same observations will apply, mutatis
mutandis, when a Particular conclusion is
sought, as in Festino and Baroko,
The arguments used in the process called
the "Abscissio Infiniti," will in general be
the most easily referred to this Figure. See
Chap. v. 1. subsection 6.
The Third Figure is, of course, the one
employed when the Middle Term is Singular,
since a Singular term can only be a Subject.
This is also the form into which most argu-
ments will naturally fall that are used to esta-
blish an objection (Enstasis of Aristotle) to an
opponent's Premiss, when his argument is such
as to require that premiss to be Universal. It
might be called, therefore, the Enstatic Figure.
E. G. If any one contends that " this or that
doctrine ought not to be admitted, because it
cannot be explained or comprehended," his
suppressed major premiss may be refuted by
the argument that " the connexion of the
Body and Soul cannot be explained or com-
prehended," &c,
A great part of the reasoning of Butler's
Analogy may be exhibited in this form.
As it is on the dictum above-mentioned that
all Reasoning ultimately depends, so, all argu-
ments may be in one way or other brought
CHAP. III. 5.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 97
into some one of the four Moods in the first
Figure : and a Syllogism is, in that case, said
to be reduced : (i. e. to the first figure.} These
four are called the perfect moods, and all the
rest imperfect.
Os tensive Reduction.
5.
In reducing a Syllogism, we are not, of
course, allowed to introduce any new Term
or Proposition, having nothing granted but
the truth of the Premises ; but these Pre-
mises are allowed to be illatively converted
(because the truth of any Proposition implies
that of its illative converse) or transposed : by
taking advantage of this liberty, where there
is need, we deduce (in Figure 1st,) from the
Premises originally given, either the very same
Conclusion as the original one, or another
from which the original Conclusion follows by
illative conversion. E. G. Darapti,
" All wits are dreaded ;
All wits are admired ;
Some who are admired are dreaded,"
is reduced into Darii, by converting by limita-
tion (per accidens) the minor Premiss.
" All wits are dreaded ;
Some who are admired are wits ; therefore
Some who are admired are dreaded."
H
98 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [BOOK II.
And Camestres,
" All true philosophers account virtue a good in itself ;
The advocates of pleasure do not account, fyc.
Therefore they are not true philosophers,"
is reduced to Celarent, by simply converting
the minor, and then transposing the Premises.
" Those who account virtue a good in itself, are not
advocates of pleasure ;
All true philosophers account virtue, fyc. : therefore
No true philosophers are advocates of pleasure."
This Conclusion may be illatively converted
into the original one.
Reduction by So, BdTOko ,** 6. g.
means of
conversion **T P i , T
by negation. Every true patriot is a friend to religion ;
Some great statesmen are not friends to religion ;
Some great statesmen are not true patriots,"
to Ferioy by converting the major by negation,
(contraposition), vide Chap. ii. 4.
" He who is not a friend to religion, is not a true patriot :
Some great statesmen, $c."
and the rest of the Syllogism remains the
same : only that the minor Premiss must be
considered as affirmative, because you take
" not-a-friend-to-religion," as the middle term.
In the same manner Bokardo^ to Darn ; e. g.
" Some slaves are not discontented ;
All slaves are wronged ; therefore
Some who are wronged are not discontented."
* Or Fakoro, considered i. e. as Festino.
f Or Dokamo, considered i e. as Disamis.
CHAP. III. 6.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 99
Convert the major by negation (contra-
position) and then transpose them ; the Con-
clusion will be the converse by negation of the
original one, which therefore may be inferred
from it ; e. g.
" All slaves are wronged ;
Some who are not discontented are slaves ;
Some who are not discontented are wronged."
In these ways (by what is called Ostensive
Reduction, because you prove, in the first
figure, either the very same Conclusion as be-
fore, or one which implies if) all the imperfect
Moods may be reduced to the four perfect
ones. But there is also another way, called
Reductio ad impossibile.
6.
By which we prove (in the first figure) not
directly that the original Conclusion is true,
but that it cannot be false ; i.e. that an ab-
surdity would follow from the supposition of
its being false ; e. g.
" All true patriots are friends to religion ;
Some great statesmen are not friends to religion ;
Some great statesmen are not true patriots :"
if this Conclusion be not true, its contradictory
must be true ; viz.
" All great statesmen are true patriots :"
ii 2
100 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [BOOK II.
let this then be assumed, in the place of the
minor Premiss of the original Syllogism, and a
false conclusion will be proved ; e. g.
bAr, " All true patriots are friends to religion ;
bA, All great statesmen are true patriots ;
rA, All great statesmen are friends to religion :"
for as this Conclusion is the Contradictory of
the original minor Premiss, it must be false,
since the Premises are always supposed to be
granted ; therefore one of the Premises (by
which it has been correctly proved) must be
false also ; but the major Premiss (being one
of those originally granted) is true ; therefore
the falsity must be in the minor Premiss ;
which is the contradictory of the original con-
clusion ; therefore the original Conclusion
must be true. This is the indirect mode of
Reasoning. (See Rhetoric, Part I. Ch. ii. 1.)
7.
This kind of Reduction is seldom employed
but for Baroko and Bokardo, which are thus
reduced by those who confine themselves to
simple Conversion, and Conversion by limita-
tion, (per accidens ;) and they framed the
names of their Moods, with a view to point
out the manner in which each is to be re-
duced ; viz. B, C, D, F, which are the initial
letters of all the Moods, indicate to which
Mood of the first figure (Barbara, Celarent,
Darii, and Ferio) each of the others is to be
CHAP. III. 7.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 101
reduced : m indicates that the Premises are to
be transposed; s and p, that the Proposition
denoted by the vowel immediately preceding,
is to be converted ; s, simply, p, per accidens,
(by limitation:) thus, in Camestres, (see ex-
ample, p. 93,) the C indicates that it must be
reduced to Celarent ; the two ss, that the
minor Premiss and Conclusion must be con-
verted simply ; the m, that the Premises must
be transposed. The P> in the mood Bramantip,
denotes that the premises warrant a univer-
sal conclusion in place of a particular. The
/, though of course it cannot be illatively
converted per accidens, viz. : so as to become
A, yet is thus converted in the Conclusion,
because as soon as the premises are trans-
posed (as denoted by the m,) it appears that a
universal conclusion follows from them.
K (which indicates the reduction ad im-
possibile) is a sign that the Proposition,
denoted by the vowel immediately before it,
must be left out, and the contradictory of the
Conclusion substituted ; viz. for the minor
Premiss in Baroko and the major in Bokardo.
But it has been already shown, that the
Conversion by contraposition (by negation)
will enable us to reduce these two Moods,
attentively.*
* If any one should choose that the names of these
moods should indicate this, he might make K the index
102 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [BOOK II.
CHAP. IV.
SUPPLEMENT TO CHAP. III.
Of Modal Syllogisms, and of all Arguments
besides regular and Pure- Categorical Syl-
logisms.
Of Modals.
I-
Hitherto we have treated of pure categorical
Propositions, and the Syllogisms composed of
such. A pure categorical proposition is styled
by some logicians a proposition "de inesse"
from its asserting simply that the Predicate is
or is not (in our conception) contained in the
Subject ; as " John killed Thomas." A modal
proposition asserts that the predicate is or is
not contained in the Subject in a certain
mode, or manner ; as, " accidentally," " wil-
fully," Sfc.
A Modal proposition may be stated as a
pure one, by attaching the mode to one of
the Terms : and the Proposition will in all
respects fall under the foregoing rules ; e. g.
"John killed Thomas wilfully and maliciously ;' ?
here the Mode is to be regarded as part of the
Predicate. " It is probable that all knowledge
of conversion by negation ; and then the names would be,
by a slight change, Fakoro and DoJcamo.
CHAI-. IV. . l.J SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 103
is useful ;" " probably useful" is here the Pre-
dicate. But when the Mode is only used to
express the necessary, contingent, or impos-
sible connexion of the Terms, it may as well
be attached to the Subject: e. g. "man is
necessarily mortal ;" is the same as " all men
are mortal :" " injustice is in no case expe-
dient," corresponds to " no injustice is ex-
pedient :" and " this man is occasionally
intemperate," has the force of a particular :
(vide Chap. ii. 2. note.) It is thus, and thus
only, that two singular Propositions may be
contradictories ; e. g. " this man is never in-
temperate," will be the contradictory of the
foregoing. Indeed every sign (of universality
or particularity) may be considered as a Mode.
Since, however, in all Modal Propositions,
you assert that the dictum (i. e. the assertion
itself) and the Mode, agree together, or dis-
agree, so, in some cases, this may be the most
convenient way of stating a Modal, purely :
subj. cop. pred. subject.
e. g. " It is impossible that all men should
subject.
be virtuous." Such is a proposition of the
subj. cop. pred.
Apostle Paul's : "This "is a faithful saying, fyc.
subject.
that Jesus Christ came into the world to save
subj.
sinners." In these cases one of your Terms
(the subject) is itself an entire Proposition.
104/ ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [BOOK II.
In English, the word IN is often used in
expressing one proposition combined with
another, in such a manner as to make the
two, one proposition : e. g. " You will have a
formidable opponent to encounter in the Em-
peror :" this involves two propositions; 1st,
" You will have to encounter the Emperor ;"
2d, f( He will prove a formidable opponent :"
this last is implied by the word in, which de-
notes (agreeably to the expression of Logicians
mentioned above when they speak of a pro-
position " de inesse ") that that Predicate is
contained in that Subject.
It may be proper to remark in this place,
that we may often meet with a Proposition
whose drift and force will be very different,
according as we regard this or that as its. Pre-
dicate.* Indeed, properly speaking, it may be
considered as several different Propositions,
each indeed implying the truth of all the rest,
but each having a distinct Predicate ; the
division of the sentence being varied in each
case ; and the variations marked, either by
the collocation of the words, the intonation
of the voice, or by the designation of the
* On the logical analysis of propositions Mr. Greenlaw
has founded a very ingenious, and as it appears to me, cor-
rect and useful grammatical theory, of the use of the Latin
Subjunctive. His work is well worth the notice of
Students of Logic as well as of Latinity.
CHAP. IV. 1.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 105
emphatic words, [viz.: the Predicate,] as scored
under, or printed in italics. E. G. " The
1 2 % 3
Organon ' of Bacon was not designed to
456
supersede the Qrganon of Aristotle :" this
might be regarded as, at least, six different
propositions : if the word numbered (1) were
in italics, it would leave us at liberty to
suppose that Bacon might have designed to
supersede by some work of his, the Organon
of Aristotle ; but not by his own Organon ;
if No. 2 were in italics, we should understand
the author to be contending, that whether or
no any other author had composed an Or-
ganon with such a design, Bacon at least did
not : if No. 3, then, we should understand
him to maintain that whether Bacon's Or-
ganon does or does not supersede Aristotle's,
no such design at least was entertained : and
so with the rest. Each of these is a distinct
Proposition ; and though each of them im-
plies the truth of all the rest, (as may easily be
seen by examining the example given) one of
them may be, in one case, and another, in
another, the one which it is important to
insist on.
We should consider in each case what
Question it is that is proposed, and what an-
swer to it would, in the instance before us,
be the most opposite or contrasted to the one
to be examined. E. G. " You will find this
106 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Boon II.
doctrine in Bacon," may be contrasted, either
with, "You will find in Bacon a different
doctrine," or with, " You will find this doc-
trine in a different author."
And observe, that when a proposition is
contrasted with one which has a different pre-
dicate, the Predicate is the emphatic word ;
as "this man is a murderer ;" i.e. not one
who has slain another accidentally, or in self-
defence : " this man is a murderer," with the
Copula for the emphatic word, stands opposed
to " he is not a murderer ;" a proposition with
the same terms, but a different Copula.*
It will often happen that several of the Pro-
positions which are thus stated in a single
sentence, may require, each, to be distinctly
stated and proved : e. g the Advocate may
have to prove, first the fact, that "John killed
Thomas ;" and then, the character of the act,
* Thus if any one reads (as many are apt to do) " Thou
shalt not steal," "Thou shalt not commit adultery," he
implies the question to be, whether we are commanded to
steal or to forbear : but the question really is, what things
are forbidden ; and the answer is, " Thou shalt not steal ;
" Thou shalt not commit adultery" &c.
The connexion between Logic and correct Delivery is
further pointed out in Rhet. App. 1.
Strictly speaking, the two cases I have mentioned coin-
cide ; for when the " is" or the " not " is emphatic, it
becomes properly the Predicate : viz. " the statement of
this man's being a murderer, is true, 1 ' or, " is false."
CHAP. IV. 2.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 10?
that "the killing was wilful and malicious."
See Praxis, at the end of the vol. See also
Elements of Rhetoric, Part I. Ch. iii. 5.
Of Hypothetical.
2.
A hypothetical* Proposition is defined to
be two or more categoricals united by a Copula
(or conjunction), and the different kinds of
hypothetical Propositions are named from
their respective conjunctions ; viz. conditional,
disjunctive, causal, fyc.
When a hypothetical conclusion is inferred
from a hypothetical Premiss, so that the force
of the Reasoning does not turn on the hypo-
thesis, then the hypothesis (as in modals)
must be considered as part of one of the
Terms; so that the Reasoning will be, in
effect, categorical : e. g.
predicate.
" Every conqueror is either a hero or a villain :
Caesar was a conqueror ; therefore
predicate.
He was either a hero or a villain."
" Whatever comes from God is entitled to reverence ;
subject.
If the Scriptures are not wholly false, they must come
from God ;
If they are not wholly false, they are entitled to reve-
rence."
* Compound, according to some writers.
108 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [BOOK II.
But when the Reasoning itself rests on the
hypothesis (in which way a categorical Con-
clusion may be drawn from a hypothetical
Premiss,) this is what is called a hypothetical
Syllogism ; and rules have been devised for
ascertaining the validity of such Arguments
at once, without bringing them into the
categorical form. (And note, that in these
Syllogisms the hypothetical Premiss is called
the major, and the categorical one the minor.}
They are of two kinds, conditional and dis-
junctive.
Of Conditionals.
3.
A Conditional * Proposition has in it an illa-
tive force ; i. e. it contains two, and only two
categorical Propositions, whereof one results
from the other (or follows from it,) e. g.
antecedent.
" If the Scriptures are not wholly false,
consequent.
they are entitled to respect."
That from which the other results is called
the antecedent ; that which results from it, the
consequent (consequens ;) and the connexion
* Called Hypothetical by those writers who use the
word Compound to denote what I have called Hypothe-
tical.
CHAP. IV. 3.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 109
between the two (expressed by the word "if")
the consequence (consequentia.) The natural
order is, that the antecedent should come
before the consequent ; but this is frequently
reversed : e. g. " the -husbandman is well off if
he knows his own advantages ;" Virg. Geor.
And note, that the truth or falsity of a con-
ditional Proposition depends entirely on the
consequence: e.g. "if Logic is useless, it
deserves to be neglected ;" here both Ante-
cedent and Consequent are false : yet the
whole Proposition is true ; i. e. it is true that
the Consequent follows from the Antecedent.
" If Cromwell was an Englishman, he was an
usurper," is just the reverse case : for though
it is true that " Cromwell was an English-
man/' and also " that he was an usurper," yet
it is not true that the latter of these Pro-
positions depends on the former; the whole
Proposition, therefore, is false, (or at least
absurd, see next section) though both Ante-
cedent and Consequent are true.
It is to be observed, however, that a false,
or at least nugatory Conditional Proposition of
this kind, viz. : in which each member is a true
categorical, is such, that, though itself absurd,
no false conclusion can be drawn from it ; as
may be seen from the instance just given.
A Conditional Proposition, in short, may be
considered as an assertion of the validity of a
110 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [BOOK II.
certain Argument; since to assert that an
argument is valid, is to assert that the Con-
clusion necessarily results from the Premises,
whether those Premises be true or not.
The meaning, then, of a Conditional Pro-
position, which is, that the antecedent being
granted, the consequent is granted, may be
considered in two points of view : first, if the
Antecedent be true, the Consequent must be
true ; hence the first rule ; the antecedent being
granted, the consequent may be inferred; se-
condly, if the Antecedent were true, the Con-
sequent wouldbe true ; hence the second rule ;
the consequent being denied, the antecedent may
be denied ; for the Antecedent must in that
case be false ; since if it were true, the Con-
sequent (which is granted to be false) would
be true also. E. G. " If this man has a fever,
he is sick :" here if you grant the antecedent,
the first rule applies, and you infer the truth
of the Consequent ; " he has a fever, there-
fore he is sick ;" if A is B, C is D ; but A is B,
therefore C is D (and this is called a construc-
tive Conditional Syllogism ;) but if you deny
the consequent (i. e. grant its contradictory)
the second rule applies, and you infer the
contradictory of the antecedent ; <f he is not
sick, therefore he has not a fever ; 5 ' this is the
constructive destructive Conditional Syllogism : if A is B,
and Destruc- .
tive C is D ; C is not D, therefore A is not B.
CHAP. IV. 3.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. Ill
Again, " if the crops are not bad, corn must
be cheap," for a major ; then, " but the crops
are not bad, therefore corn must be cheap," is
Constructive. " Corn is not cheap, therefore
the crops are bad," is Destructive. " If every
increase of population is desirable, some mi-
sery is desirable ; but no misery is desirable ;
therefore some increase of population is not
desirable," is Destructive.
But if you affirm the consequent or deny the
antecedent, you can infer nothing ; for the
same Consequent may follow from other Ante-
cedents : e. g. in the example above, a man
may be sick from other disorders besides a
fever ; therefore it does not follow, from his
being sick, that he has a fever ; or (for the
same reason) from his not having a fever, that
he is not sick.
There are, therefore, two, and only two,
kinds of Conditional Syllogisms ; the construc-
tive, founded on the first rule, and answering
to direct Reasoning ; and the destructive, on
the second, answering to indirect; being in
fact a mode of throwing the indirect form of
reasoning into the direct : e. g. If C be not
the centre of the circle, some other point must
be ; which is impossible : therefore C is the
centre. (Euclid, B. III. Pr. 1.)
And note, that a Conditional Proposition conversion of
Conditionals.
may (like the categorical A) be converted by
112 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [BOOK II.
negation ; i. e. you may take the contradictory
of the consequent, as an antecedent, and the
contradictory of the antecedent, as a consequent :
e. g. "if this man is not sick, he has not a
fever." By this conversion of the major Pre-
miss, a Constructive Syllogism may be reduced
to a Destructive, and vice versa. (See 6.
p. 99.)
Of Disjunctives.
4.
A Disjunctive Proposition is one that con-
sists of two or more categorical, connected
by the conjunctions " either " and " or," the
force of which is, to state an alternative ; i. e.
to imply that some one of the categoricals thus
connected must be true : e. g. " either A is B
or C is D " will not be a true proposition unless
one of the two members of it be true.
On the other hand, one of the members
may be true, and yet they may have no such
natural connexion together as to warrant their
being proposed as an alternative ; as " either
Britain is an island, or a triangle is a square.''
Such a proposition would rather be called
nugatory and absurd, than false ; since no
false conclusion could be deduced from it ; as
was remarked in the last section concerning
such a conditional as this might be reduced
CHAP. IV. 1] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. H3
to : e. g. " If Britain is not an island," &c.
Such propositions are often colloquially uttered
in a kind of jest.
If, therefore, one or more of these categori-
cals be denied (i. e. granted to be false) you
may infer that the remaining one, or (if several)
some one of the remaining ones, is true. E. G.
" Either the earth is eternal, or the work of
chance, or the work of an intelligent Being ;
it is not eternal, nor the work of chance ;
therefore it is the work of an intelligent
Being." " It is either spring, summer,
autumn, or winter ; but it is neither spring
nor summer ; therefore it is either autumn or
winter." Either A is B, or C is D ; but A is
not B, therefore C is D.
Observe, that in these examples (as well as
in most others) it is implied not only that
one of the members (the categorical Proposi-
tions) must be true, but that only one can be
true ; so that, in such cases, if one or more
members be affirmed, the rest may be denied;
[the members may then be called exclusive :]
e. g. " it is summer, therefore it is neither
spring, autumn, nor winter ;" " either A is B
or C is D ; but A is B, therefore C is not D."
But this is by no means universally the case ;
e. g. " virtue tends to procure us either the
esteem of mankind, or the favour of God :"
here both members are true, and consequently
i
114 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [BOOK II.
from one being affirmed we are not authorized
to deny the other. Of course we are left to
conjecture in each case, from the context,
whether it is meant to be implied that the
members are or are not " exclusive."
It is evident that a disjunctive Syllogism may
easily be reduced to a conditional, by taking
as an antecedent the contradictory of one or
more of the members : e. g. if it is not spring
or summer, it is either autumn or winter, fyc.
It is to be observed of Hypothetical (com-
pound) Propositions, whether Conditional, or
Disjunctive, that they are always affirmative:
i.e. it is always affirmed, not denied, that
the connexion between the several categorical
members, denoted, respectively, by the con-
junctions employed, does exist. Accordingly,
the contradiction of any hypothetical proposi-
tion is not made by a hypothetical. If I assert
that " if A is B, C is D," you might deny that,
by saying " it does not follow that if A is B, C
must be D ;" or in some such expression. So
the contradiction of this, " either A is B or C
is D, would be by two categorical negatives ;
" neither is A, B, nor is C, D." The conjunc-
tions " neither " and " nor," it should be ob-
served, do not correspond in their nature with
"either" and "or;" since these last are dis-
junctive, which the others are not.
CIIAI-. 1V.5.J SYNTHETICAL COMPKN Dll ;.M. | |5
The Dilemma,
5,
is a complex kind of Conditional Syllogism.
The account usually given of the Dilemma
in Logical treatises is singularly perplexed and
unscientific* And it is remarkable that all the
rules they usually give respecting it, and the
faults against which they caution us, relate
exclusively to the Subject-matter : as if one
were to lay down as rules respecting a Syllo-
gism in Barbara, " 1st. Care must be taken
that the major Premiss be true : 2dly. that the
minor Premiss be true !"
Most, if not all, writers on this point either
omit to tell us whether the Dilemma is a kind
of conditional, or of disjunctive argument; or
else refer it to the latter class, on account of
its having one disjunctive Premiss ; though it
clearly belongs to the class of conditionals.
1st. If you have in the major Premiss se-
veral antecedents all with the same consequent,
then these Antecedents, being (in the minor)
disjunctively granted (i. e. it being granted
that some one of them is true,) the one common
consequent may be inferred, (as in the case of a
simple Constructive Syllogism :) e.g. if A is B,
C is D ; and if X is Y, C is D ; but either
A is B, or X is Y : therefore C is D. "If the
blest in heaven have no desires, they will be
i 2
structive Di-
structive Di-
116 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [BOOK II.
perfectly content : so they will, if their desires
are fully gratified ; but either they will have
no desires, or have them fully gratified ; there-
fore they will be perfectly content." Note in
hj s case> the two conditionals which make up
the major Premiss may be united in one Pro-
position by means of the word " whether :" e. g.
" whether the blest, fyc. have no desires, or
have their desires gratified, they will be con-
tent."
2d. But if the several antecedents have each
a different consequent, then the Antecedents,
being, as before, disjunctively granted, you
can only disjunctively infer the consequents :
e.g. if A is B, C is D ; and if X is Y, E is F ;
but either A is B, or X is Y ; therefore either
C is D, or E is F. " If ^Eschines joined in
the public rejoicings, he is inconsistent; if
he did not, he is unpatriotic : but he either
joined, or not, therefore he is either incon-
sistent or unpatriotic." (Demost. For the
Crown.} This case, as well as the foregoing,
is evidently constructive.
In the Destructive form, whether you have
one Antecedent with several Consequents, or
several Antecedents, either with one, or with
several Consequents ; in all these cases, if you
deny the whole of the Consequent, or Conse-
quents, you may in the conclusion deny the
whole of the Antecedent or Antecedents : e. g.
CHAP. IV. 5.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 117
"if the world were eternal, the most useful
arts, such as printing, $c. would be of un-
known antiquity : and on the same supposi-
tion, there would be records long prior to the
Mosaic ; and likewise the sea and land, in all
parts of the globe, might be expected to
maintain the same relative situations now as
formerly : but none of these is the fact :
therefore the world is not eternal." Again,
" if the world existed from eternity, there
would be records prior to the Mosaic ; and
if it were produced by chance, it would not
bear marks of design : there are no records
prior to the Mosaic : and the world does bear
marks of design : therefore it neither existed
from eternity, nor is the work of chance."
These are sometimes called Dilemmas, but
hardly differ from simple conditional Syllo-
gisms, two or more being expressed together.
Nor is the case different if you have one
antecedent with several consequents, which
consequents you disjunctively deny ; for that
comes to the same thing as wholly denying
them ; since if they be not all true, the one
antecedent must equally fall to the ground ;
and the Syllogism will be equally simple : e. g.
" If we admit the popular objections against
Political Economy, we must admit that it
tends to an excessive increase of wealth ; and
also, that it tends to impoverishment : but it
118 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [BOOK II.
cannot do both of these ; (i. e. either not/ the
one, or, not the other) therefore we cannot
admit the popular objections," tyc. ; which is
evidently a simple Destructive. The true
Dilemma is, " a conditional Syllogism with
several* antecedents in the major, and a dis-
junctive minor;" hence,
Destructive 3d. That is most properly called a destructive
Dilemma. r r J
Dilemma, which has (like the constructive ones)
a disjunctive minor Premiss ; i. e. when you
have several Antecedents with each a different
Consequent ; which Consequent (instead of
wholly denying them, as in the case lately
mentioned) you disjunctively deny ; and thence,
in the Conclusion, deny disjunctively the An-
tecedents : e. g. if A is B, C is D ; and if X is
Y, E is F : but either C is not D, or E is not
F ; therefore, either A is not B, or X is not Y.
" If this man were wise, he would not speak
irreverently of Scripture in jest ; and if he
were good he would not do so in earnest;
but he does it, either in jest, or earnest;
therefore he is either not wise or not good."
Resoiutionof Every Dilemma may be reduced into two or
a Dilemma. * J
more simple Conditional Syllogisms : e. g. " If
^Eschines joined, S^c. he is inconsistent; he
* The name Dilemma implies precisely two antecedents ;
and hence it is common to speak of " the horns of a di-
lemma ;" but it is evident there may be either two or
more.
CHAP. IV. 5.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 1 19
did join, $c. therefore he is inconsistent ;" and
again, ' 4 if ^Eschines did not join, fyc. he is
unpatriotic ; he did not, fyc. therefore he is
unpatriotic." Now an opponent might deny
either of the minor Premises in the above
Syllogisms, but he could not deny both ; and
therefore he must admit one or the other of
the Conclusions ; for, when a Dilemma is
employed, it is supposed that some one of the
Antecedents must be true (or, in the destruc-
tive kind, some one of the Consequents false),
but that we cannot tell which of them is so ;
and this is the reason why the argument is
stated in the form of a Dilemma.
Sometimes it may happen that both ante-
cedents may be true, and that we may be
aware of this ; and yet there may be an
advantage in stating (either separately or con-
jointly) both arguments, even when each
proves the same conclusion, so as not to
derive any additional confirmation from the
other ; still, I say, it may sometimes be
advisable to state both, because, of two pro-
positions equally true, one man may deny or
be ignorant of the one, while he admits the
other, and another man, vice versa.
From what has been said, it may easily be
seen that all Dilemmas are in fact conditional
syllogisms; and that Disjunctive Syllogisms
may also be reduced to the form of Con-
120 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [BOOK IL
ditionals ; but as it has been remarked, that
all Reasoning whatever may ultimately be
brought to the one test of Aristotle's " Dic-
tum," it remains to show how a Conditional
Syllogism may be thrown into such a form,
that that test will at once apply to it; and
this is called the
Reduction of Hypothetical *
6.
For this purpose we must consider every
Conditional Proposition as a universal affir-
* Aldrich has stated, somewhat rashly, that Aristotle
utterly despised Hypothetical Syllogisms, and thence made
no mention of them. We cannot, considering how large a
portion of his works is lost, draw any conclusion from the
mere absence of a treatise on this branch, in the portion
which has come down to us.
Aldrich observes, that no hypothetical argument is valid
which cannot be reduced to a categorical form ; and this
is evidently agreeable to what has been said at the begin-
ning of chap. iii. ; but then he has unfortunately omitted
to teach us how to reduce Hypothetical to this form ;
except in the case where the Antecedent and Consequent
chance to have each the same subject ; in which case, he
tells us to take the minor Premiss and Conclusion as an
Enthymeme, and fill that up categorically ; e. g. " If Caesar
was a tyrant, he deserved death : he was a tyrant ; there-
fore he deserved death ;" which may easily be reduced to
a categorical form, by taking as a major Premiss, " all
tyrants deserve death." But when (as is often the case)
the Antecedent and Consequent have not each the same
subject, (as in the very example he gives, " if A is B, C is
D,") he gives no rule for reducing such a Syllogism as
CHAP. IV. 6.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 121
mative categorical Proposition, of which the
Terms are entire Propositions, viz. the ante-
cedent answering to the Subject, and the con-
sequent to the Predicate ; e. g. to say, " if
Louis is a good king, France is likely to
prosper," is equivalent to saying, "the case
of Louis being a good king, is a case of
France being likely to prosper :" and if it be
granted as a minor Premiss to the Condi-
tional Syllogism, that "Louis is a good king ;"
that is equivalent to saying, " the present case
is the case of Louis being a good king;"
from which you will draw a conclusion in
Barbara, (viz. "the present case is a case
of France being likely to prosper,") exactly
equivalent to the original Conclusion of the
has a Premiss of this kind; and indeed leads us to sup-
pose that it is to be rejected as invalid, though he has just
before demonstrated its validity. And this is likely to
have been one among the various causes which occasion
many learners to regard the whole system of Logic as a
string of idle reveries, having nothing true, substantial, or
practically useful in it ; but of the same character with the
dreams of Alchymy, Demonology, and judicial Astrology.
Such a mistake is surely the less inexcusable in a learner,
when his master first demonstrates the validity of a certain
argument, and then tells him that after all it is good for
nothing ; (prorsus repudiandum.) In the late editions of
Aldrich's Logic, all that he says of the reduction of
Hypothetical is omitted; which certainly would have
been an improvement, if a more correct one had been
substituted ; but as it is, there is a complete hiatus in the
system.
122 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC, [BOOK II.
Conditional Syllogism : viz. " France is likely
to prosper." As the Constructive Condition
may thus be reduced to Barbara, so may the
Destructive, in like manner, to Celarent: e.g.
"if the Stoics are right, pain is no evil : but
pain is an evil; therefore the Stoics are not
right;" is equivalent to "the case of the
Stoics being right, is the case of pain being
no evil ; the present case is not the case of
pain being no evil ; therefore the present case
is not the case of the Stoics being right."
This is Camestres, which, of course, is easily
reduced to Celarent. Or, if you will, all
Conditional Syllogisms may be reduced to
Barbara, by considering them all as con-
structive ; which may be done, as mentioned
above, by converting by negation the major
Premiss. (See p. 111.)
The reduction of Hypothetical may always
be effected in the manner above stated ; but
as it produces a circuitous awkwardness of
expression, a more convenient form may in
some cases be substituted : e. g. in the ex-
ample above, it may be convenient to take
" true " for one of the Terms : " that pain is
no evil is not true ; that pain is no evil is
asserted by the Stoics ; therefore something
asserted by the Stoics is not true." Some-
times again it may be better to unfold the
argument into two Syllogisms : e. g. in a
CHAP. IV. 6.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 123
former example ; first, " Louis is a good king ;
the governor of France is Louis ; therefore
the governor of France is a good king." And
then, second, " every country governed by a
good king is likely to prosper," fyc. [A Di-
lemma is generally to be reduced into two or
more categorical Syllogisms.] And when the
antecedent and consequent have each the
same Subject, you may sometimes reduce the
Conditional by merely substituting a categori-
cal major Premiss for the conditional one :
e. g. instead of " if Caesar was a tyrant, he
deserved death ; he was a tyrant, therefore he
deserved death ;" you may put for a major,
" all tyrants deserve death ;" fyc. But it is of
no great consequence, whether Hypotheticals
are reduced in the most neat and concise man-
ner or not ; since it is not intended that they
should be reduced to categoricals, in ordinary
practice, as the readiest way of trying their
validity, (their own rules being quite sufficient
for that purpose ;) but only that we should be
able, if required, to subject any argument
whatever to the test of Aristotle's Dictum, in
order to show that all Reasoning turns upon
one simple principle.
124 ELEMENTS OF LUU ic. [BOOK II.
Of Enthymeme, Sorites, fyc.
7.
There are various abridged forms of Argu-
ment which may be easily expanded into
regular Syllogisms ; such as,
1st. The Enthy meme,* which is a Syllo-
gism with one Premiss suppressed. As all the
Terms will be found in the remaining Premiss
and Conclusion, it will be easy to fill up the
Syllogism by supplying the Premiss that is
wanting, whether major or minor : e. g.
" Caesar was a tyrant ; therefore he deserved
death." " A free nation must be happy ;
therefore the English are happy."
This is the ordinary form of speaking and
writing. It is evident that Enthymemes may
be filled up hypothetically.
It is to be observed, that the Enthymeme is
not strictly syllogistic ; i. e. its conclusiveness
is not apparent from the mere form of expres-
sion, till the suppressed Premiss shall have
been, either actually, or mentally supplied.
The expressed Premiss may be true, and yet
the Conclusion false.
* The word Enthymeme is employed in a different sense
from this, by Aristotle, in Rhet. B. i. See Elements of
Rhetoric, Part. I. Ch. ii. 2.
CHAP. IV. 7.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 1 25
The Sorites, on the other hand, is strictly
syllogistic ; as may be seen by the examples.
If the Premises stated be true, the Conclusion
must be true. For,
2d. When you have a string of Syllogisms,
in the first figure, in which the Conclusion of
each is made the Premiss of the next, till you
arrive at the main or ultimate Conclusion of all,
you may sometimes state these briefly, in the
form called Sorites ; in which the Predicate sorites.
of the first proposition is made the Subject of
the next ; and so on, to any length, till finally
the Predicate of the last of the Premises is
predicated (in the Conclusion) of the Subject
of the first : e. g. A is B, B is C, C is D, D is
E ; therefore A is E. " The English are a
brave people ; a brave people are free ; a free
people are happy ; therefore the English are
happy." A Sorites then, has as many middle
Terms as there are intermediate Propositions
between the first and the last ; and conse-
quently, it may be drawn out into as many
separate Syllogisms ; of which the first will
have, for its major Premiss, the second, and
for its minor, the Jirst of the Propositions of
the Sorites ; as may be seen by the example.
The reader will perceive also by examination
of that example, and by framing others, that
the first proposition in the Sorites is the only
minor premiss that is expressed: when the
126 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [BOOK II.
whole is resolved into distinct syllogisms, each
conclusion becomes the minor premiss of the
succeeding syllogism. Hence, in a Sorites,
the first proposition, and that alone, of all the
premises may be particular ; because in the
first figure the minor may be particular, but
not the major ; (see Chap. iii. 4) and all
the other propositions, prior to the conclusion,
are major premises. It is also evident that
there may be, in a Sorites, one, and only one,
negative premiss, viz. the last : for if any of
the others were negative, the result would be
that one of the syllogisms of the Sorites would
have a negative minor premiss ; which is (in
the 1st Fig.) incompatible with correctness.
See Chap. iii. 4.
Hypothetical A string of Conditional Syllogisms * may
in like manner be abridged into a Sorites ;
e.g. if A is B, C is D; if C is D, E
is F ; if E is F, G is H ; but A is B, there-
fore G is H. " If the Scriptures are the word
of God, it is important that they should be
well explained ; if it is important, fyc. they
deserve to be diligently studied : if they de-
serve, fyc. an order of men should be set
aside for that purpose ; but the Scriptures are
* Hence it is evident how injudicious an arrangement
has been adopted by former writers on Logic, who have
treated of the Sorites and Enthymeme before they en-
tered on the subject of Hypotheticals.
CHAP. IV. 7.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 1 '21
the word, fyc.\ therefore an order of men
should be set aside for the purpose, $c.:" in
a destructive Sorites, you, of course, go back
from the denial of the last consequent to the
denial of the first antecedent : " G is not H ;
therefore A is not B."
Those who have spoken of Induction or of induction.
Example, as a distinct kind of Argument in a Example.
Logical point of view, have fallen into the
common error of confounding Logical with
Rhetorical distinctions, and have wandered
from their subject as much as a writer on the
orders of Architecture would do who should
introduce the distinction between buildings of
brick and of marble. Logic takes no cogni-
zance of Induction, for instance, or of a priori
reasoning, fyc., as distinct Forms of argument ;
for when thrown into the syllogistic form, and
when letters of the alphabet are substituted
for the Terms (and it is thus that an Argu-
ment is properly to be brought under the
cognizance of Logic), there is no distinction
between them ; e. g. " a Property which
belongs to the ox, sheep, deer, goat, and
antelope, belongs to all horned animals ; ru-
mination belongs to these ; therefore to all."
This, which is an inductive argument, is evi-
dently a Syllogism in Barbara. The essence
of an inductive argument, as well as of the
other kinds which are distinguished from it,
tions.
128 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [BOOK II.
consists not in the form of the Argument, but
in the relation which the Subject-matter of the
Premises bears to that of the Conclusion.*
3d. There are various other abbreviations
commonly used, which are so obvious as
hardly to call for explanation : as where one
of the Premises of a Syllogism is itself the
Conclusion of an Enthymeme, which is ex-
pressed at the same time : e. g. " all useful
studies deserve encouragement ; Logic is
such (since it helps us to reason accurately,)
therefore it deserves encouragement ;" here
the minor Premiss is what is called an En-
thymematic sentence. The antecedent in that
minor Premiss (i. e. that which makes it
Enthymematic) is called by Aristotle the Pro-
syllogism.
Equivalents. It is evident that you may, for brevity,
substitute for any term an equivalent: as in
the last example, "it" for "Logic;" "such"
for "a useful study," fyc. The doctrine of
Conversion, laid down in the Second Chapter,
furnishes many equivalent propositions, since
each is equivalent to its illative converse.
The division of nouns also (for which see
* See Rhetoric, Part I. Ch. ii. 6. Nothing probably
has tended more to foster the prevailing error of consi-
dering Syllogism as a particular kind of argument, than
the inaccuracy just noticed, which appears in all or most
of the logical works extant. See Dissertation on the
Province of Reasoning, Ch. i.
CHAP. IV. 7.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 129
Chap, v.) supplies many equivalents; e.g. if
A is the genus of B, B must be a species
of A : if A is the cause of B, B must be the
effect of A.
4th. And many Syllogisms, which at first
apparently
sight appear faulty, will often be found, on incorrect -
examination, to contain correct reasoning,
and, consequently, to be reducible to a re-
gular form ; e. g. when you have, apparently,
negative Premises, it may happen, that by
considering one of them as affirmative, (see
Chap. ii. 4. p. 78), the Syllogism will be
regular : e. g. " no man is happy who is not
secure : no tyrant is secure ; therefore no
tyrant is happy," is a Syllogism in Cdarent.
If this experiment be tried on a Syllogism
which has really negative Premises, the only
effect will be to change that fault into another :
viz. an excess of Terms, or (which is sub-
stantially the same) an undistributed middle ;
e. g. " an enslaved people is not happy ; the
English are not enslaved ; therefore they are
happy :" if "enslaved" be regarded as one of
the Terms, and "not enslaved" as another,
there will manifestly be four. Hence you
may see how very little difference there is in
reality between the different faults which are
enumerated.
Sometimes there will appear to be too many
terms ; and yet there will be no fault in the
K
130 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [BOOK II.
Reasoning, only an irregularity in the ex-
pression : e. g. l( no irrational agent could
produce a work which manifests design ; the
universe is a work which manifests design ;
therefore no irrational agent could have pro-
duced the universe." Strictly speaking, this
Syllogism has five terms ; but if you look to
the meaning, you will see, that in the first
Premiss (considering it as a part of this Argu-
ment} it is not, properly, "an irrational agent"
that you are speaking of, and of which you
predicate that it could not produce a work
manifesting design ; but rather it is this
"work/' fyc. of which you are speaking, and
of which it is predicated that it could not be
produced by an irrational agent; if, then,
you state the Propositions in that form, the
Syllogism will be perfectly regular. (See 1.
of this Supplement.)
Thus, such a Syllogism as this, " every true
patriot is disinterested ; few men are disin-
terested ; therefore few men are true patriots;"
might appear at first sight to be in the second
Figure, and faulty ; whereas it is Barbara,
with the Premises transposed: for you do not
really predicate of "few men," that they are
" disinterested," but of " disinterested persons,"
that they are " few." Again, te none but
candid men are good reasoners ; few infidels
are candid; few infidels are good reasoners."
CHAP. V. 1.] SUPPLEMENT TO CHAP. I. 131
In this it will be most convenient to consider
the major Premiss as being, " all good rea-
soners are candid," (which of course is pre-
cisely equipollent to its illative converse by
negation ;) and the minor Premiss and Con-
clusion may in like manner be fairly expressed
thus " most infidels are not candid ; there-
fore most infidels are not good reasoners :"
which is a regular Syllogism in Camestres.*
Or, if you would state it in the first Figure,
thus : " those who are not candid (or un-
candid) are not good reasoners ; most infidels
are not candid ; most infidels are not good
reasoners."
CHAP. V.
SUPPLEMENT TO CHAP. I.
[This Supplement may be studied either before or after the
Compendium.']
1-
The usual divisions of nouns into univocal,
equivocal, and analogous, and into nouns of
* The reader is to observe that the term employed as
the Suhject of the minor premiss, and of the conclusion,
is " most-infidels :" he is not to suppose that " most" is a
sign of distribution ; it is merely a compendious expres-
sion for " the greater part of."
K 2
132 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Boon II.
the first and second intention, are not, strictly
speaking, divisions of words, but divisions of
the manner of employing them ; the same word
may be employed either univocally, equivo-
cally, or analogously ; either in the first inten-
tion or in the second. The ordinary logical
treatises often occasion great perplexity to the
learner, by not noticing this circumstance, but
rather leading him to suppose the contrary.
(See Book III. 8.) Some of those other
divisions of nouns, which are the most com-
monly in use, though not appropriately and
exclusively belonging to the Logical system,
i. e. to the theory of reasoning, it may be
worth while briefly to notice in this place.
Let it be observed then, that a noun ex-
presses the view we take of an object. And
its being viewed as an object, i. e. as one, or
again as several, depends on our arbitrary
choice ; e. g. we may consider a troop of
cavalry as one object ; or we may make any
single horse with its rider, or any separate
man or horse, or any limb of either, the sub-
ject of our thoughts.
singular and 1. When then any one object is considered
Common , . .
terms. according to its actual existence, as numerically
one, the noun denoting it is called Singular ;
as, " this tree," the " city of London," fyc.
When it is considered as to its nature and
character only, as being of such a description
CHAP. V. 1.] SUPPLEMENT TO CHAP. I. 133
as will equally apply to other single objects,
the inadequate or incomplete view (see Ana-
lytical Outline, 6.) thus taken of an indi-
vidual is expressed by a Common noun ; as
" tree," " city/'
2. When any object is considered as a part
of a whole, viewed in reference to the whole
or to another part, of a more complex object
of thought, the noun expressing this view
is called Relative : and to Relative noun is
opposed Absolute ; as denoting an object con-
sidered as a whole, and without reference to
anything of which it is a part, or to any other
part distinguished from it. Thus, " Father,"
and " Son," " Rider," " Commander,'* #c.
are Relatives, being regarded, each as a part
of the complex objects, Father-and-Son, $*c. ;
the same object designated absolutely would
be termed a Man, Living-Being, fyc.
Nouns are Correlative to each other, which correlative.
denote objects related to each other, and
viewed as to that relation. Thus, though a
King is a ruler of men, "King" and "Man"
are not correlative, but King and Subject, are.
3. When there are two views which cannot compatible
and opposite.
be taken of one single object at the same
time, the terms expressing these views are
said to be Opposite, or Inconsistent (repug-
nantia) ; as, " black and white ;" when both
may be taken of the same object at the same
134 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [BOOK II.
time, they are called Consistent, or Compatible
(convenientia) ; as, " white and cold." Rela-
tive terms are Opposite, only when applied
with reference to the same subject : as, one
may be both Master and Servant ; but not at
the same time to the same person.
concrete and 4. When the notion derived from the view
taken of any object, is expressed with a refe-
rence to, or as in conjunction with, the object
that furnished the notion, it is expressed by a
Concrete term ; as, "foolish," or "fool;" when
without any such reference, by an Abstract
term ; as, " folly."
positive, 5. A term which denotes a certain view
o f an object as being actually taken of it, is
called Positive ; as, " speech" " a man speak*
ing :" a term denoting that this view might
conceivably be taken of the object, but is not,
is Privative; as " dumbness," a " man silent,"
fyc.* That which denotes that such a notion
is not and could not be formed of the object,
* Many Privative epithets are such that by a little
ingenuity the application of them may be represented as
an absurdity. Thus, Wallis's remark (introduced in this
treatise) that a jest is generally a mock -fallacy, *. e. a
fallacy not designed to deceive, but so palpable as only to
furnish amusement, might be speciously condemned as
involving a contradiction : for " the design to deceive," it
might be said, " is essential to a fallacy." In the same
way it might be argued that it is absurd to speak of " a
dead man ;" e.g. " every man is a living creature ; nothing
dead is a living creature ; therefore no man is dead !"
CHAP. V. 1.] SUPPLEMENT TO CHAP. I. 135
is called Negative; as, a " dumb statue," a
" lifeless carcase," fyc.
It is to be observed that the same term
may be regarded either as Positive, or as Pri-
vative or Negative, according to the quality
or character which we are referring to in our
minds: thus, of " happy" and "miserable,"
we may regard the former as Positive, and
the latter (w/zhappy) as Privative ; or vice
versa ; according as we are thinking of enjoy-
ment or of suffering.
6. A Privative or Negative term is also Definite and
called Indefinite (infinitum) in respect of its
not defining and marking out an object ; in
contradistinction to this, the Positive term is
called Definite (finitum) because it does thus
define or mark out. Thus, " organized Being,"
or " Caesar," are called Definite, as marking
out, and limiting our view to, one particular
class of Beings, or one single person ; " unor-
ganized," or " not-Caesar," are called Indefi-
nite, as not restricting our view to any class,
or individual, but only excluding one, and
leaving it undetermined, what other individual
the thing so spoken of may be, or what other
class it may belong to.
It is to be observed, that the most perfect
tory opposi-
opposition between nouns exists between any tionofterm8 -
two which differ only in respectively wanting
and having the particle not (either expressly, or
136 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [BOOK II.
in sense) attached to them ; as, " organized/'
and " not-organized," " corporeal," and " in-
corporeal ;" for not only is it impossible for
both these views to be taken at once of the
same thing, but also, it is impossible but that
one or other should be applicable to every
object ; as there is nothing that can be both,
so there is nothing that can be neither. Every
thing that can be even conceived must be
either (l Caesar," or " not-Caesar ;" either " cor-
poreal," or " incorporeal." And in this way a
complete twofold division may be made of any
subject, being certain (as the expression is) to
exhaust it. And the repetition of this process,
so as to carry on a subdivision as far as there
is occasion, is thence called by Logicians
" abscissio infiniti ;" i. e. the repeated cutting
off of that which the object to be examined is
not; e.g. " I. This disorder either is, or is not,
a dropsy ; and for this or that reason, it is
not ; 2. Any other disease either is, or is not,
gout ; this is not : then, 3. It either is, or is
not, consumption, fyc. Sfc." This procedure is
very common in Aristotle's works.
Such terms may be said to be in contra-
dictory opposition to each other.
contrary On the other hand, Contrary terms, L e.
those which, coming under some one class,
are the most different of all that belong to that
class, as " wise" and " foolish," both denoting
terms.
CHAP. V. 2.] SUPPLEMENT TO CHAP. I. 137
mental habits, are opposed, but in a different
manner : for though both cannot be applied to
the same object, there may be other objects
to which neither can be applied : nothing can
be at once both " wise " and " foolish ;" but a
stone cannot be either.
2.
The notions expressed by Common terms,
we are enabled (as has been remarked in the
Analytical Outline) to form by the faculty of
abstraction: for by it, in contemplating any
object (or objects,) we can attend exclusively
to some particular circumstances belonging to
it, [some certain parts of its nature as it
were,] and quite withhold our attention from
the rest. When, therefore, we are thus con-
templating several individuals which resemble
each other in some part of their nature, we
can (by attending to that part alone, and not
to those points in which they differ) assign
them one common name, which will express or
stand for them merely as far as they all agree ;
and which, of course, will be applicable to all
or any of them ; (which process is called
generalization} and each of these names is
called a common term, from its belonging to
them all alike ; or a predicable, because it
may be predicated affirmatively of them, or of
any one of them.
138 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [BOOK II.
Generalization (as has been remarked) im-
plies abstraction, but it is not the same thing ;
for there may be abstraction without generali-
zation. When we are speaking of an Indi-
vidual, it is usually an abstract notion that we
form ; e. g. suppose we are speaking of the
present King of France ; he must actually be
either at Paris or elsewhere ; sitting, standing,
or in some other posture ; and in such and
such a dress, fyc. Yet many of these circum-
stances, (which are separable Accidents [vide
6] and consequently) which are regarded as
non-essential to the individual, are quite dis-
regarded by us ; and we abstract from them
what we consider as essential ; thus forming
an abstract notion of the Individual. Yet
there is here no generalization.
3.
The following is the account usually given
in logical treatises of the different kinds of
predicables; but it cannot be admitted without
some considerable modifications, explanations
and corrections, which will be subjoined.
Whatever term can be affirmed of several
things, must express either their whole essence,
which is called the Species ; or a part of their
essence (viz. either the material part, which is
Genus. called the Genus, or the formal and distin-
guishmg part, which is called Differentia, or
CHAP. V. 3.] SUPPLEMENT TO CHAP. I.
139
in common discourse, characteristic) or some-
thing joined to the essence ; whether necessarily
(i.e. to the whole species, or, in other words,
universally, to every individual of it), which is
called a Property ; or contingently (i. e. to property.
some individuals only of the species), which is
an Accident.
Accident.
Every predicable expresses either
The whole essence
of its subject :
viz. : Species
or part of its
essence
i
Genus Difference
or something
joined to its
essence
Property
Accident
universal [peculiar universal
but not but not and pe-
peculiar universal]* culiar
inseparable separable.
Of these predicables, genus and species are
commonly said, in the language of logicians,
to be predicated in quid () (i. e. to answer
to the question, " what?" as, " what is Caesar ?"
Answer, " a man ;" " what is a man ?" Answer,
"an animal.") Difference, in " quale quid;'
(jn-olov rt) Property and Accident in quale
(7T040 1/.)
It is evident from what has been said, that
See below, 4.
140 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [BOOK II.
the Genus and Difference put together make up
the Species: e.g. "rational" and "animal 15 con-
stitute " man ;" so that, in reality, the Species
contains the Genus (i. e. implies it ;) and when
the Genus is called a whole, and is said to con-
tain the Species, this is only a metaphorical
expression, signifying that it comprehends the
Species, in its own more extensive signification.
If for instance I predicate the term " animal "
of an individual man, as Alexander, I speak
truth indeed, but only such a portion of the
truth that I might equally predicate the same
term of his horse Bucephalus. If I predicate
the terms " Man " and " Horse " of Alexander
and of Bucephalus respectively, I use a more
full and complete expression for each than the
term "animal;" and this last is accordingly
the more extensive, as it contains, (or, more
properly speaking, comprehends) and may
be applied to, several different species ; viz.:
" bird," " beast," " fish," $c.
In the same manner the name of a species
is a more extensive (L e. comprehensive) but
less full and complete term than that of an
individual (viz. a singular term ;) since the
species may be predicated of each of these.
" The impression produced on the mind by
a Singular Term, may be compared to the dis-
tinct view taken in by the eye, of any object
(suppose some particular man) near at hand,
CHAP. V. 3.] SUPPLEMENT TO CHAP. I. 141
in a clear light, which enables us to distinguish
the features of the Individual: in a fainter
light, or rather further off, we merely perceive
that the object is a man: this corresponds
with the idea conveyed by the name of the
Species : yet farther off, or in a still feebler
light, we can distinguish merely some living
object; and at length, merely some object;
these views corresponding respectively with
the terms denoting the Genera, less or more
remote." Rhet. Part III. Chap. ii. 1.
Hence it is plain that when logicians
speak of " Species" as " expressing the whole
essence of its subjects," this is not strictly
correct, unless we understand by the " whole
essence" the "whole that any common term
can express ;" the " nearest approach to the
whole essence of the subject that any term
(not synonymous with the subject) can denote."
No predicate can express, strictly, the whole
essence of its subject, unless it be merely
another name, of the very same import, and
co-extensive with it ; as " Caesar was the con-
queror of Pompey."
But when logicians speak of Species as a
" whole," this is, properly, in reference to the
Genus and the Difference ; each of which
denotes a "part" of that species which we
constitute by joining those two together. But
then, it should be remembered that a Species
142 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [BOOK II.
is not a predicable in respect of its Genus and
Difference (since it cannot be predicated of
them) but only in respect of the individuals or
lower species, of which it can be predicated.
4.
A Species then, it is plain, when predicated
of individuals, stands in the same relation to
them, as the Genus to the Species ; and when
predicated of other (lower) species, it is then,
in respect of these, a Genus, while it is a
Species in respect of a higher Genus ; as
" quadruped/' which is a species of " animal/'
is a genus in respect of " horse ;" which latter
again may be predicated of Bucephalus and
of other individuals. Such a term is called
a subaltern species or genus ; being each, in
respect of different other terms, respectively.
A genus that is not considered as a species
of anything, is called summum (the highest)
genus ; a species that is not considered as a
genus of anything, L e. is regarded as con-
taining under it only individuals, is called
infima (the lowest) species.
When I say of a Magnet, that it is " a kind
of iron-ore" that is called its proximum genus,
because it is the closest (or lowest) genus
that is predicated of it : " mineral" is its more
remote genus.
CHAP. V. 4.] SUPPLEMENT TO CHAP. I. 143
When I say that the Differentia of a magnet
is its " attracting iron," and that its Property
is "polarity" these are called respectively
a Specific Difference and Property ; because
magnet is (I have supposed) an infima, species
(i. e. only a species.)
When I say that the Differentia of iron
ore is its " containing iron" and its property
" & ing attracted by the magnet" these are
called respectively, a generic Difference and
Property, because "iron ore" is a subaltern
species or genus ; being both the genus of mag-
net, and a species of mineral.
It should be observed here, that when
logicians speak of Property and Accident as
predicables expressing, not the Essence or
part of the Essence of a subject, but some-
thing united to the Essence, this must be
understood as having reference not to the
nature of things as they are in themselves,
but to our conceptions of them. " Polarity"
for instance is as much a part of the real
nature of the substance we call Magnet, as its
attraction of iron ; and again, a certain shape,
colour, or specific gravity as much belongs in
reality to those magnets which are of that
description, as either polarity, or attraction.
But our modes of conceiving, and of ex-
pressing our conceptions have reference to
the relations in which objects stand to our
144 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [BOOK II.
own minds ; and are influenced in each in-
stance by the particular end we have in view.
That, accordingly, is accounted a part of the
Essence of anything which is essential to the
notion of it formed in our minds. Thus, if
we have annexed such a notion to the term,
Man, that "rationality" stands prominent in
our minds, in distinguishing Man from other
Animals, we call this, the " Difference," and
apart of the " Essence" of the term Man ;
though " risibility " be an attribute which does
not less really belong to Man. So, the pri-
mary and prominent distinction in our minds
of a Triangle from other plane rectilineal
Figures, is its having three sides ; though
the equality of its three angles to two right-
angles, be, in reality, no less essential to
a triangle. But that this last is the fact, is
demonstrated to the learner not till long after
he is supposed to have become familiar with
the notion of a Triangle.
Hence, in different sciences or arts, different
attributes are fixed on, as essentially charac-
terising each species, according as this or that
is the most important in reference to the
matter we are engaged in. In navigation,
for instance, the polarity of the Magnet is the
essential quality ; since if there could be any
other substance which could possess this,
without attracting iron, it would answer the
ouPPLKMKNT TO (HAP. I.
same purpose : but to those manufacturers
who employ Magnets for the purpose of more
expeditiously picking up small bits of iron, and
for shielding their faces from the noxious steel-
dust, in the grinding of needles, the attracting
power of the Magnet is the essential point.
Under the head of Property, logicians have
enumerated, as may be seen in the preceding-
table, not only such as are strictly called pro-
perties, as belonging each to the whole species
of which it is predicated, arid to that alone,
but also, such as belong to the whole species,
and to others besides ; in other words, pro-
perties which are universal, but not peculiar ;
as, " to breathe air " belongs to every man ;
but not to man alone ; and it is, therefore,
strictly speaking, not so much a property of
the Species " man," as of the higher, i. e. more
comprehensive, Species, which is the genus of
that, viz. of " land-animal."
Other Properties, as some logicians call
them, are peculiar to a species, but do not
belong to the whole of it ; e. g. man alone can
be a poet, but it is not every man that is
so. These, however, are more commonly and
more properly reckoned as accidents.
Some have also added a fourth kind of Pro-
perty ; viz. that which is peculiar to a Species^
and belongs to every Individual of it, but not
at every time. But this is, in fact, a contradid-
L
146 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [BOOK II.
tion ; since whatever does not always belong
to a Species, does not belong to it universally.
It is through the ambiguity of words that they
have fallen into this confusion of thought ; e. g.
the example commonly given is, " homini
canescere ;" " to become grey " being, they
say, (though it is not) peculiar to man, and
belonging to every individual, though not
always, but only in old age, &c. Now, if
by " canescere " be meant the very state of
becoming grey, this manifestly does not belong
to every man : if again it be meant to signify the
liability to become grey at some time or other,
this does belong always to man. And the
same in other instances. Indeed the very
Proprium fixed on by Aldrich, " risibility/' is
nearly parallel to the above. Man is " always
capable of laughing ;" but he is not " capable
of laughing always"
Accidents sc- That is most properly called an Acci-
parable and .
inseparable, dent, which may be absent or present, the
essence of the Species continuing the same ;
as, for a man to be " walking? or a " native
of Paris." Of these two examples, the former
is what logicians call a separable Accident,
because it may be separated from the indi-
vidual : (e. g. he may sit down ;) the latter
is an inseparable Accident, being not separable
from the individual, (i.e. he who is a native
of Paris can never be otherwise ;) " from the
CHAP. V. 4.] SUPPLEMENT TO CHAP. I. 147
individual," I say, because every accident must
be separable from the species, else it would be
a property.
This seems to me a clearer and more correct
description of the two kinds of accident than
the one given by Aldrich ; viz. that a Separable
Accident may be actually separated, and an
Inseparable, only in thought, " ut Mantuanum
esse, a Virgilio." For surely " to be the
author of the ^Eneid " was another Insepa-
rable Accident of the same individual ; " to
be a Roman citizen" another ; and " to live in
the days of Augustus " another ; now can we
in thought separate all these things from the
essence of that individual? To do so would
be to form the idea of a different individual.
We can indeed conceive a man, and one who
might chance to bear the name of Virgil,
without any of these Accidents ; but then it
would plainly not be the same man. But
Virgil, whether sitting or standing, &c. we
regard as the same man ; the abstract notion
which we have formed of that individual being
unaltered by the absence or presence of these
separable accidents. (See above, 2.)
Let it here be observed, that both the
general name " Predicable," and each of the
classes of Predicables, (viz. Genus, Species,
8?c.) are relative ; L e. we cannot say what
predicable any term is, or whether it is any
L2
148 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book II.
at all, unless it be specified of what it is to
be predicated : e. g. the term " red " would
be considered a genus, in relation to the terms
" pink/' " scarlet," fyc. : it might be regarded
as the differentia, in relation to " red rose ;"-
as a property of " blood," as an accident of
" a house," fyc. And in all cases accord-
ingly, the Differences or Properties of any
lower species will be Accidents in refer-
ence to the class they come under. E. G.
" malleability" is an " accident" in reference
to the term metal; but it is a " property" of
gold and most other metals ; as the absence
of it, brittleness, is of Antimony and
Arsenic, and several others, formerly called
Semimetals.
And universally, it is to be steadily kept
in mind, that no " common terms " have, as
the names of individuals have, any real thing
existing in nature corresponding to them (roSe
TI,, as Aristotle expresses it, though he has
been represented as the champion of the op-
posite opinion : vide Categ. c. 3.), but that
each of them is merely a name denoting a
certain inadequate notion which our minds
have formed of an Individual, and which,
consequently, not including anything wherein
that individual differs from certain others, is
applicable equally well to all or any of them :
thus "man" denotes no real thing (as the
CHAP. V. 5.] SUPPLEMENT TO CHAP. I. 149
sect of the Realists maintained) distinct from
each individual, but merely any man, viewed
Inadequately, i. e. so as to omit, and abstract
from, all that is peculiar to each individual ;
by which means the term becomes applicable
alike to any one of several individuals, or
(in the plural) to several together ; and we
arbitrarily fix on the circumstance which we
thus choose to abstract and consider sepa-
rately, disregarding all the rest ; so that the
same individual may thus be referred to any
of several different Species, and the same
Species to several Genera, as suits our pur-
pose. Thus, it suits the Farmer's purpose to JJc7or
class his cattle with his ploughs, carts, and ssification -
other possessions, under the name of "stock?
the Naturalist, suitably to his purpose, classes
them as " quadrupeds" which term would
include wolves, deer, 8fc., which to the farmer
would be a most improper classification : the
Commissary, again, would class them with
corn, cheese, fish, fyc., as ''provision ;" that
which is most essential in one view, being
subordinate in another,
5.
An individual is so called because it is in- Division.
capable of logical division ; which is a meta-
phorical expression to signify " the distinct
(i. e. separate) enumeration of several things
150 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [BOOK II.
signified by one common name." This ope-
ration is directly opposite to generalization,
(which is performed by means of abstrac-
tion ;) for as, in that, you lay aside the
differences by which several things are dis-
tinguished, so as to call them all by one
common name, so, in Division, you add on
the Differences, so as to enumerate them
by their several particular names. Thus,
" mineral " is said to be divided into " stones,
metals/' fyc. ; and metals again into "gold,
iron," fyc. ; and these are called the Parts
(or members) of the division.
The rules for Division are three : 1st. each
of the Parts, or any of them short of all,
must contain less (i. e. have a narrower signi-
fication) than the thing divided. 2d. All the
Parts together must be exactly equal to the
thing divided; (therefore we must be careful
to ascertain that the summiim genus may be
predicated of every term placed under it, and
of nothing else.) 3d. The Parts or Members
must be opposed; i.e. must not be contained
in one another: e.g. if you were to divide
" book " into " poetical, historical, folio,
quarto, french, latin," fyc. the members would
be contained in each other ; for a french book
may be a quarto, and a quarto, french, fyc.
You must be careful, therefore, to keep in
mind the principle of division with which you
CHAP. V. 5.J SUPPLEMENT TO CHAP. I. 151
set out : c. g. whether you begin dividing
books according to their matter, their language,
or their size, fyc. all these being so many
cross divisions. And when anything is capable
(as in the above instance) of being divided in
several different ways, we are not to reckon
one of these as the true, or real, or right
one, without specifying what the object is
which we have in view : for one mode of
dividing may be the most suitable for one
purpose, and another for another; as e.g. one
of the above modes of dividing books would
be the most suitable to a bookbinder ; another
in a philosophical, and the other in a philo-
logical view.
It must be carefully remembered, that the
word " Division," as employed in Logic, is,
as has been observed already, metaphorical;
for to divide, means, originally and properly,
to separate the component parts of anything ;
each of which is of course absolutely less than
the whole: e.g. atvee (i.e. any individual tree)
might be divided " physically," as it is called,
into root, trunk, branches, leaves, fyc. Now
it cannot be said that a root or a leaf is a
tree : whereas in a Logical Division each of
the members is, in reality, more than the
whole ; e. g. if you divide tree (i. e. the genus,
tree) into oak, elm, ash, fyc. we may say of the
oak, or of any individual oak, that "it is a
152 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [BOOK II.
tree ;" for by the very word " oak," we express
not only the general notion of a tree, but more,
viz. the peculiar Characteristic (i. e. Difference)
of that kind of tree.
It is plain, then, that it is logically only,
i. e. in our mode of speaking, that a Genus
is said to contain (or rather comprehend) its
Species; while metaphysically, (i. e. in our
conceptions) a Species contains, i. e. implies,
its Genus.
Care must be taken not to confound a
physical Division with a logical ; which begin-
ners are apt to do, by introducing, in the
course of a Division, the mention of the real
Parts of which an Individual consists, and of
each of which accordingly the whole cannot be
affirmed.
6.
Definition is another metaphorical word,
which literally signifies, " laying down a boun-
dary ;" and is used in Logic to signify "an
expression which explains any term, so as
to separate it from everything else," as a
boundary separates fields.
A Nominal Definition (such as are those
usually found in a dictionary of one's own lan-
guage) explains only the meaning of the term,
by giving some equivalent expression, which
may happen to be better known. Thus you
CHAP. V. 6.J SUPPLEMENT TO CHAP. I. 153
might define a " Term," that which forms one
of the extremes or boundaries of a " proposition ;"
and a " Predicable," that which may be predi-
cated; "decalogue," ten commandments; "tele-
scope," an instrument for viewing ^distant
objects, S^c. A Real Definition is one which
explains and unfolds the nature of the thing ;
and each of these kinds of definition is either
accidental or essential. An essential Definition
assigns (or lays down) the constituent parts of
the essence (or nature). An accidental Defi-
nition (which is commonly called a description)
assigns the circumstances belonging to the
essence, viz. Properties and Accidents (e.g.
causes, effects, fyc.) : thus, "man" may be
described as " an animal that uses fire to dress
his food," fyc. {And here note, that in de- T WO divi-
. . . sions of de-
scribmg a species, you cannot mention any- fiiiitio s -
thing which is strictly an accident, because, if
it does not belong to the whole of the Species,
it cannot define it : in describing an individual,
on the contrary, you enumerate the accidents,
because by them it is that one individual
differs from another, and in this case you add
the species : e. g. " Philip was a man, of Mace-
don, who subdued Greece," fyc. Individuals,
it is evident, can be defined (i. e. described) in
this way alone.]
Lastly, the Essential Definition is divided
into physical (i. e. natural) and logical or
154 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [BOOK II.
metaphysical: the physical Definition lays
down the real parts of the essence which are
actually separable ; the logical, lays down the
ideal parts of it, which cannot be separated
except in the mind: thus, a plant would be
defined physically, by enumerating the leaves,
stalks, roots, fyc. of which it is composed :
logically, it would be defined " an organized
Being, destitute of sensation ;" the former of
these expressions denoting the Genus, the
latter the Difference ; for a logical definition
must always consist of the genus and differen-
tia, which are the parts of which Logic con-
siders every species as consisting, and which
evidently are separable in the mind alone.
Thus " man " is defined " a rational animal,"
fyc. So also a " Proposition" might be de-
fined, physically, " a subject and predicate
combined by a copula :" the parts here enume-
rated being actually separable ; but logically
it would be defined " a sentence which affirms
or denies ;" and these two parts of the essence
of a Proposition (which are the genus and
differentia of it) can be separated in the mind
only. And note, that the Difference is not
always one quality, but is frequently com-
pounded of several together, no one of which
would alone suffice.
Nominal and Definitions are divided into Nominal and
Real.
Real, according to the object accomplished by
CHAI-. V. G.J SUPPLEMENT TO CHAP. I. 155
them ; whether to explain, merely, the mean-
ing of the word, or the nature of the thing :
on the other hand, they are divided into
Accidental, Physical, and Logical, according to
the means employed by each for accomplishing
their respective objects ; whether it be the
enumeration of attributes, or of the physical,
or the metaphysical parts of the essence.
These, therefore, are evidently two cross di-
visions. In this place we are concerned with
nominal definitions only (except, indeed, of
logical terms) because all that is requisite for
the purposes of reasoning (which is the proper
province of Logic) is, that a term shall not
be used in different senses : a real definition
of anything belongs to the science or system
which is employed about that thing. It is to
be noted, that in mathematics (and indeed
in all strict Sciences) the Nominal, and the
Real Definition exactly coincide ; the meaning
of the word, and the nature of the thing, being
exactly the same. This holds good also with
respect to Logical terms, most Legal, and
many Ethical terms.
It is scarcely credible how much confusion
has arisen from the ignorance of these dis-
tinctions which has prevailed among logical
writers.*
* In Chap. ii. 3 of Book IV. the doctrine here laid
down will be more fully developed.
Aldrich
156 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [BOOK II.
The principal rules for definition are three ;
viz. 1st. The definition must be adequate ; i.e.
neither too extensive nor too narrow for the
thing defined : e. g. to define " fish," " an
animal that lives in the water," would be too
extensive, because many insects, fyc. live in
the water ; to define it, " an animal that has
an air-bladder," would be too narrow ; because
many fish are without any.
2d. The definition must be in itself plainer
than the thing defined, else it would not ex-
plain it : I say, " in itself," (i. e. generally)
because, to some particular person, the term
defined may happen to be even more familiar
and better understood, than the language of
the definition.
3d. The Third Rule usually given by Logi-
cians for a definition, is, that it should be
couched in a convenient number of appropriate
words (if such can be found suitable for the
purpose) : since figurative words (which are
opposed to appropriate) are apt to produce
Aldrich, having given as an instance of a Nominal Defi-
nition the absurfl one of " homo, qui ex humo," has led
some to conclude that the Nominal Definition must be
founded on the etymoloqy ; or at least that such was his
meaning. But that it was not, is sufficiently plain from
the circumstance that Wallis (from whose work his is
almost entirely abridged) expressly says the contrary. Be
this as it may, however, it is plain that the etymology of
a term has nothing to do with any logical consideration of
it. See 8, Book III.
CIIAI-. V..J SUPPLEMENT TO CHAP. I. 157
ambiguity or indistinctness ; too great brevity
may occasion obscurity ; and too great prolixity,
confusion. But this perhaps is rather an admo-
nition with respect to -Style, than a strictly
logical rule ; nor can we accordingly determine
with precision, in each case, whether it has
been complied with or not ; there is no draw-
ing the line between " too long" and " too
concise," fyc. Nor would a definition unne-
cessarily prolix be censured as incorrect, but as
inelegant, inconvenient, 8?c. If, however, a
definition be chargeable with Tautology, (which Tautology.
is a distinct fault from prolixity or verbosity)
it is properly incorrect, though without offend-
ing against the first two rules. Tautology
consists in inserting too much, not in mere
words, but in sense ; yet not so as too much to
narrow the definition (in opposition to Rule 1.)
by excluding some things which belong to
the class of the thing defined ; but only, so as
to state something which has been already
implied. Thus, to define a Parallelogram
" a four-sided figure whose opposite sides are
parallel and equal? would be tautological ; be-
cause, though it is true that such a figure, and
such alone, is a parallelogram, the equality of
the sides is implied in their being parallel, and
may be proved from it. Now the insertion
of the words " and equal," leaves, and indeed
leads, a reader to suppose that there may be
158 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Boo* II.
a four- s?ded figure whose opposite sides are
parallel but 720^ equal. Though therefore
such a definition asserts nothing false, it
leads to a supposition of what is false ; and
consequently is to be regarded as an incor-
rect definition.
The inference just mentioned, viz. : that
you supposed a quadrangle might have its
sides parallel, and not equal, would be drawn
from such a definition, according to the prin-
ciple of " exceptio probat regulum," an ex-
ception proves a rule. The force of the maxim
(which is not properly confined to the case
of an exception, strictly so called) is this ; that
the mention of any circumstance introduced
into the statement either of a definition, or
of a precept, law, remark, Sfc. is to be pre-
sumed necessary to be inserted ; so that the
precept, fyc. would not hold good if this cir-
cumstance were absent. In short, the word
" only" or some such expression, is supposed
to be understood. If e. g. it be laid down that
he who breaks into an empty house shall
receive a certain punishment, it would be
inferred that this punishment would not be
incurred by breaking into an occupied house :
if it were told us that some celestial pheno-
menon could not be seen by the naked eye, it
would be inferred that it would or might be
visible through a telescope: fyc.
CHAP. V. 6.] SUPPLEMENT TO CHAP. I. 159
And much is often inferred in this manner,
which was by no means in the Author's mind ;
from his having inaccurately inserted what
chanced to be present to his thoughts. Thus,
he who says that it is a crime for people to
violate the property of a humane Landlord
who lives among them, may perhaps not mean
to imply that it is no crime to violate the
property of an absentee-landlord, or of one
who is not humane ; but he leaves an opening
for being so understood. Thus again in saying
that " an animal which breathes through gills
and is scaly, is a fish," though nothing false is
asserted, a presumption is afforded that you
mean to give a definition such as would be
too narrow ; in violation of Rule 1 .
And Tautology, as above described, is sure
to mislead any one who interprets what is
said, conformably to the maxim that an ex-
ception proves a rule.
It often happens that one or more of the Accidental
circumstan-
above rules is violated through men's prone-
ness to introduce into their definitions " acci-
dental, along with, or instead of, essential
circumstances : I mean, that the notion they
attach to each term, and the explanation they
would give of it, shall embrace some circum-
stances, generally, but not always, connected
with the thing they are speaking of; and
which might, accordingly, (by the strict
ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [BOOK II.
account of an accident) be ' absent or present,
the essential character of the subject remaining
the same/ A definition framed from such
circumstances, though of course incorrect,
and likely at some time or other to mislead
us, will not unfrequently obtain reception,
from its answering the purpose of a correct
one, at a particular time and place.
" For instance, the Latin word Meridies, to
denote the southern quarter, is etymologically
suitable (and so would a definition founded on
that etymology) in our hemisphere; while in
the other, it would be found just the reverse.
Or if any one should define the North Pole,
that which is ' inclined towards the sun/ this
would, for half the year, answer the purpose
of a correct definition ; and would be the
opposite of the truth for the other half,
" Such glaring instances as these, which are
never likely to occur in practice, serve best
perhaps to illustrate the character of such
mistakes as do occur. A specimen of that
introduction of accidental circumstances which
I have been describing, may be found, I think,
in the language of a great number of writers,
respecting Wealth and Value ; who have
usually made Labour an essential ingredient
in their definitions. Now it is true, it so
happens, by the appointment of Providence,
that valuable articles are, in almost all
CHAP. V. C.] SUPPLEMENT TO CHAP. I. 161
instances, obtained by Labour ; but still, this
is an accidental, not an essential circumstance.
If the aerolites which occasionally fall, were
diamonds and pearls, and if these articles
could be obtained in no other way, but were
casually picked up, to the same amount as is
now obtained by- digging and diving, they
would be of precisely the same value as now.
In this, as in many other points in Political-
Economy, men are prone to confound cause
and effect. It is not that pearls fetch a high
price because men have dived for them ; but
on the contrary, men dive for them because
they fetch a high price."*
* Pol. Econ. Lect. IX. p. 251253.
162 [BOOK in.
BOOK III.
OF FALLACIES.
Introduction.
Definition of BY a Fallacy is commonly understood, " any
unsound mode of arguing, which appears to
demand our conviction, and to be decisive of
the question in hand, when in fairness it is
not." Considering the ready detection and
clear exposure of Fallacies to be both more
extensively important, and also more difficult,
than many are aware of, I propose to take
a Logical view of the subject ; referring the
different Fallacies to the most convenient
heads, and giving a scientific analysis of the
procedure which takes place in each.
After all, indeed, in the practical detection
of each individual Fallacy, much must depend
on natural and acquired acuteness ; nor can
any rules be given, the mere learning of
which will enable us to apply them with me-
chanical certainty and readiness : but still we
shall find that to take correct general views
of the subject, and to be familiarized with
INTRO.] OF FALLACIES. 163
scientific discussions of it, will tend, above all
things, to engender such a habit of mind, as
will best fit us for practice.
Indeed the case is the same with respect to
Logic in general. Scarcely any one would, in
ordinary practice, state to himself either his
own or another's reasoning, in Syllogisms in
Barbara at full length ; yet a familiarity with
Logical principles tends very much (as all
feel, who are really well acquainted with
them) to beget a habit of clear and sound
reasoning. The truth is, in this, as in many
other things, there are processes going on in
the mind (when we are practising anything
quite familiar to us) with such rapidity as to
leave no trace in the memory ; and we often
apply principles which did not, as far as
we are conscious, even occur to us at the
time.
It would be foreign, however, to the pre- inaccurate
language of
sent purpose, to investigate fully the manner [ er ***
in which certain studies operate in remotely
producing certain effects on the mind : it is
sufficient to establish the fact, that habits of
scientific analysis (besides the intrinsic beauty
and dignity of such studies) lead to practical
advantage. It is on Logical principles there-
fore that I propose to discuss the subject of
Fallacies ; and it may, indeed, seem to have
been unnecessary to make any apology for
M 2
164 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [BOOK III.
so doing, after what has been formerly said,
generally, in defence of Logic ; but that the
generality of Logical writers have usually fol-
lowed so opposite a plan. Whenever they have
to treat of anything that is beyond the mere
elements of Logic, they totally lay aside all
reference to the principles they have been
occupied in establishing and explaining, and
have recourse to a loose, vague, and popular
kind of language ; such as would be the best
suited indeed to an exoterical discourse, but
seems strangely incongruous in a professed
Logical treatise. What should we think of
a Geometrical writer, who, after having gone
through the Elements, with strict definitions
and demonstrations, should, on proceeding
to Mechanics, totally lay aside all reference
to scientific principles, all use of technical
terms, and treat of the subject in undefined
terms, and with probable and popular argu-
ments ? It would be thought strange, if even
a Botanist, when addressing those whom he
had been instructing in the principles and the
terms of his system, should totally lay these
aside when he came to describe plants, and
adopt the language of the vulgar. Surely it
affords but too much plausibility to the cavils
of those who scoff at Logic altogether, that
the very writers who profess to teach it should
never themselves make any application of, or
INTRO.] OF FALLACIES. 165
reference to, its principles, on those very occa-
sions, when, and when only, such application
and reference are to be expected. If the
principles of any system are well laid down,
if its technical language is judiciously framed,
then, surely, those principles and that lan-
guage will afford (for those who have once
thoroughly learned them) the best, the most
clear, simple, and concise method of treating
any subject connected with that system. Yet
even the accurate Aldrich, in treating of the
Dilemma and of the Fallacies, has very much
forgotten the Logician, and assumed a loose
and rhetorical style of writing, without making
any application of the principles he had for-
merly laid down, but, on the contrary, some-
times departing widely from them.*
The most experienced teachers, when ad-
dressing those who are familiar with the
elementary principles of Logic, think it re-
quisite, not indeed to lead them, on each
occasion, through the whole detail of those
* He is far more confused in his discussion of Fallacies
than in any other part of his treatise ; of which this one
instance may serve : after having distinguished Fallacies
into those in the expression^ and those in the matter (" in
dictione," and " extra dictionem,") he observes of one or
two of these last, that they are not properly called Falla-
cies, as not being Syllogisms faulty in form : ("Syllogismi
forma peccantes :") as if any one, that was such, could be
" Fallacia extra dictionem."
166 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Boo* III.
principles, when the process is quite obvious,
but always to put them on the road, as it were,
to those principles, that they may plainly see
their own way to the end, and take a scientific
view of the subject : in the same manner as
mathematical writers avoid indeed the occa-
sional tediousness of going all through a very
simple demonstration, which the learner, if he
will, may easily supply ; but yet always speak
in strict mathematical language, and with re-
ference to mathematical principles, though
they do not always state them at full length.
I would not profess, therefore, any more than
they do, to write (on subjects connected with
the science) in a language intelligible to those
who are ignorant of its first rudiments. To
do so, indeed, would imply that one was not
taking a scientific view of the subject, nor
availing one's-self of the principles that had
been established, and the accurate and concise
technical language that had been framed.
Mistakes as The rules already given enable us to de-
to the office *
velop the principles on which all reasoning
is conducted, whatever be the Subject-matter
of it, and to ascertain the validity or fal-
laciousness of any apparent argument, as far
as the form of expression is concerned ; that
being alone the proper province of Logic.
But it is evident that we may nevertheless
remain liable to be deceived or perplexed in
INTRO.] OF FALLACIES. Ki7
Argument by the assumption of false or doubt-
ful Premises, or by the employment of in-
distinct or ambiguous Terms; and, accordingly,
many Logical writers, wishing to make their
systems appear as perfect as possible, have
undertaken to give rules " for attaining clear
ideas," and for " guiding the judgment ;" and
fancying or professing themselves successful in
this, have consistently enough denominated
Logic, the "Art of using the Reason;" which
in truth it would be, and would nearly super-
sede all other studies, if it could of itself
ascertain the meaning of every Term, and the
truth or falsity of every Proposition ; in the
same manner as it actually can, the validity of
every Argument. And they have been led
into this, partly by the consideration that
Logic is concerned about the three operations
of the mind simple Apprehension, Judgment,
and Reasoning; not observing that it is not
equally concerned about all : the last opera-
tion being alone its appropriate province ;
and the rest being treated of only in reference
to that.
The contempt justly due to such preten-
sions has most unjustly fallen on the Science
itself; much in the same manner as Chemistry
was brought into disrepute among the un-
thinking, by the extravagant pretensions of
the Alchymists. And those Logical writers
168 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [BOOK III.
have been censured, not (as they should have
been) for making such professions, but for not
fulfilling them. It has been objected, espe-
cially, that the rules of Logic leave us still at
a loss as to the most important and difficult
point in reasoning; viz. the ascertaining the
sense of the terms employed, and removing
their ambiguity. A complaint resembling that
made (according to a story told by Warbur-
ton,* and before alluded to) by a man who
found fault with all the reading-glasses pre-
sented to him by the shopkeeper ; the fact
being that he never learnt to read. In the
present case, the complaint is the more un-
reasonable, inasmuch as there neither is, nor
ever can possibly be, any such system devised
as will effect the proposed object of clearing
up the ambiguity of Terms. It is, however,
no small advantage, that the rules of Logic,
though they cannot, alone, ascertain and clear
up ambiguity in any Term, yet do point out
in which Term of an argument it is to be
sought for; directing our attention to the
middle Term, as the one on the ambiguity of
which a Fallacy is likely to be built.
It will be useful, however, to class and
describe the different kinds of ambiguity
which are to be met with ; and also the
various ways in which the insertion of false,
* In his Div. Leg.
INTRO.] OF FALLACIES. 169
or, at least, unduly assumed, Premises, is
most likely to elude observation. And though
the remarks which will be offered on these
points may not be considered as strictly form-
ing a part of Logic, they cannot be thought
out of place, when it is considered how essen-
tially they are connected with the application
of it.
L . .
The division of Fallacies into those in the Division of
Fallacies
words (IN DTCTIONE,) and those in the
matter (EXTRA DICTIONEM) has not
been, by any writers hitherto, grounded on
any distinct principle : at least, not on any
that they have themselves adhered to. The
confounding together, however, of these two
classes is highly detrimental to all clear no-
tions concerning Logic ; being obviously allied
to the prevailing erroneous views which make
Logic the art of employing the Intellectual
faculties in general, having the discovery of
truth for its object, and all kinds of know-
ledge for its proper subject-matter; with all
that train of vague and groundless specu-
lations which have led to such interminable
confusion and mistakes, and afforded a pre-
text for such clamorous censures.
It is important, therefore, that rules should
be given for a division of Fallacies into
170 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [BOOK III.
Logical and Non-logical, on such a principle
as shall keep clear of all this indistinctness
and perplexity.
If any one should object, that the division
about to be adopted is in some degree arbi-
trary, placing under the one head Fallacies,
which many might be disposed to place under
the other, let him consider not only the in-
distinctness of all former divisions, but the
utter impossibility of framing any that shall be
completely secure from the objection urged,
in a case where men have formed such various
and vague notions, from the very want of
some clear principle of division, Nay, from
the elliptical form in which all reasoning is
usually expressed, and the peculiarly involved
and oblique form in which Fallacy is for the
most part conveyed, it must of course be
often a matter of doubt, or rather, of arbi-
trary choice, not only to which genus each
kind of fallacy should be referred, but even
to which kind to refer any one individual
Fallacy. For, since, in any Argument, one
Premiss is usually suppressed, it frequently
happens, in the case of a Fallacy, that the
hearers are left to the alternative of supplying
either a Premiss which is not true, or else, one
which does not prove the Conclusion ; e. g. if a
nate charac-
!acies f Fal " man ex P a tiates on the distress of the country,
and thence argues that the government is
2.] OF FALLACIES. 171
tyrannical, we must suppose him to assume
either that " every distressed country is under
a tyranny," which is a manifest falsehood, or,
merely that " every country under a tyranny
is distressed," which, however true, proves
nothing, the Middle Term being undistributed.
Now, in the former case, the Fallacy would
be referred to the head of " extra dictionem ;"
in the latter to that of " in dictione :" which
are we to suppose the speaker meant us to
understand ? Surely just whichever each of
his hearers might happen to prefer : some
might assent to the false Premiss ; others,
allow the unsound Syllogism ; to the Sophist
himself it is indifferent, as long as they can
but be brought to admit the Conclusion.
Without pretending, then, to conform to
every one's mode of speaking on the subject,
or to lay down rules which shall be in them-
selves (without any call for labour or skill in
the person who employs them) readily appli-
cable to, and decisive on, each individual case,
I shall propose a division which is at least per-
fectly clear in its main principle, and coincides,
perhaps, as nearly as possible, with the esta-
blished notions of Logicians on the subject.
2.
In every Fallacy, the Conclusion either Logo.,i iai
does, or does not follow from the Premises.
172 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [BOOK III.
Where the Conclusion does not follow from
the Premises, it is manifest that the fault is
in the Reasoning, and in that alone ; these,
therefore, we call Logical Fallacies,* as being
properly, violations of those rules of Reason-
ing which it is the province of Logic to lay
down.
Of these, however, one kind^are more purely
Logical, as exhibiting their fallaciousness by
the bare form of the expression, without any
regard to the meaning of the Terms : to
which class belong: 1st. Undistributed Middle ;
2d. Illicit Process ; 3d. Negative Premises, or
Affirmative Conclusion from a Negative Pre-
miss, and vice versa : to which may be added,
4th. those which have palpably (i. e. expressed}
more than three Terms.
The other kind may be most properly called
semi-logical ; viz. all the cases of ambiguous
middle Term except its non-distribution : for
though in such cases the conclusion does not
follow, and though the rules of Logic show
that it does not, as soon as the ambiguity of the
middle Term is ascertained, yet the discovery
and ascertainment of this ambiguity requires
attention to the sense of the Term, and know-
ledge of the Subject-matter ; so that here,
* In the same manner as we call that a criminal court in
which crimes are judged.
2.] OF FALLACIES. 173
Logic " teaches us not how to find the Fallacy,
but only where to search for it," and on what
principles to condemn it.
Accordingly it has been made a subject of
bitter complaint against Logic, that it presup-
poses the most difficult point to be already
accomplished, viz. the sense of the Terms to
be ascertained. A similar objection might be
urged against every other art in existence ;
e. g. against Agriculture, that all the precepts
for the cultivation of land presuppose the
possession of a farm ; or against Perspective,
that its rules are useless to a blind man. The
objection is indeed peculiarly absurd when
urged against Logic, because the object which
it is blamed for not accomplishing cannot pos-
sibly be within the province of any one art
whatever. Is it indeed possible or conceivable
that there should be any method, science, or
system, that should enable one to know the
full and exact meaning of every term in exist-
ence ? The utmost that can be done is to give
some general rules that may assist us in this
work ; which is done in the first two chapters
of Book II.
The very author of the objection says,
" This (the comprehension of the meaning of
general Terms) is a study which every in-
dividual must carry on for himself; and of
which no rules of Logic (how useful soever
174 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [BOOK III.
they may be in directing our labours) can
supersede the necessity." D. Stewart, Phil.
Vol. II. chap. ii. s. 2.
Nothing perhaps tends more to conceal
from men their imperfect conception of the
meaning of a term, than the circumstance of
their being able fully to comprehend a process
of reasoning in which it is involved, without
attaching any distinct meaning at all to
that Term ; as is evident when X Y Z are
used to stand for Terms, in a regular Syllo-
gism. Thus a man may be familiarized with a
Term, and never find himself at a loss from
not comprehending it ; from which he will be
very likely to infer that he does comprehend it,
when perhaps he does not, but employs it
vaguely and incorrectly ; which leads to fal-
lacious Reasoning and confusion. It must be
owned, however, that many Logical writers
have, in great measure, brought on themselves
the reproach in question, by calling Logic
" the right use of Reason," laying down
" rules for gaining clear ideas," and such-like
a\afaveta, as Aristotle calls it. (Rhet.Rook I.
Chap, ii.)
3.
Material Fai- The remaining class ( viz. where the Conclu-
sion does follow from the Premises) may be
called the Material, or Non-logical Fallacies :
3.] OF FALLACIES. 175
of these there are two kinds;* 1st. when
the Premises are such as ought not to have
been assumed; 2d. when the Conclusion i s
not the one required, but irrelevant ; which
Fallacy is commonly called " ignoratio elenchi"
because your Argument is not the " elenchus"
(i. e. proof of the contradictory) of your oppo-
nent's assertion, which it should be ; but proves,
instead of that, some other proposition resem-
bling it. Hence, since Logic defines what
Contradiction is, some may choose rather to
range this with the Logical Fallacies, as it
seems, so far, to come under the jurisdiction
of that art. Nevertheless, it is perhaps better
to adhere to the original division, both on
account of its clearness, and also because few
would be inclined to apply to the Fallacy in
question the accusation of being inconclusive,
and consequently illogical reasoning ; besides
which, it seems an artificial and circuitous
way of speaking, to suppose in all cases an
opponent and a contradiction ; the simple state-
ment of the matter being this, I am required,
by the circumstances of the case, (no matter
why) to prove a certain Conclusion ; I prove,
not that, but one which is likely to be mis-
taken for it ; in this lies the Fallacy.
* For it is manifest that the fault, if there be any, must
be either 1st. in the Premises, or 2dly. in the Conclusion,
or 3dly. in the Connexion between them.
176 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Boon III.
It might be desirable therefore to lay aside
the name of " ignoratio elenchi," but that it
is so generally adopted as absolutely to re-
quire some mention to be made of it. The
other kind of Fallacies in the Matter will
comprehend (as far as the vague and ob-
scure language of Logical writers will allow
us to conjecture) the fallacy of " non causa
pro causa," and that of " petitio principii : " of
these, the former is by them distinguished into
"a non vera pro vera" and " a non tali pro
tali ;" this last would appear to mean arguing
from a case not parallel as if it were so ;
which, in Logical language, is, having the
suppressed Premiss false ; for it is in that the
parallelism is affirmed ; and the " non vera
pro vera" will in like manner signify the ex-
pressed Premiss being false ; so that this Fal-
lacy will turn out to be, in plain terms, neither
more nor less than falsity (or unfair assump-
tion) of a Premiss.
The remaining kind, te petitio principii"
(begging the question,) takes place when a
Premiss, whether true or false, is either
plainly equivalent to the Conclusion, or de-
pends on it for its own reception. It is to
be observed, however, that in all correct
Reasoning the Premises must, virtually, im-
ply the Conclusion ; so that it is not possi-
ble to mark precisely the distinction between
4.] OF FALLACIES. 177
the Fallacy in question and fair Argument ;
since that may be correct and fair Rea-
soning to one person, which would be, to
another, " begging the question ;" inasmuch
as to one, the Conclusion might be more
evident than the Premiss, and to the other,
the reverse. The most plausible form of this
Fallacy is arguing in a circle ; and the greater
the circle, the harder to detect.
4.
There is no Fallacy that may not properly
be included under some of the foregoing
heads: those which in the Logical treatises
are separately enumerated, and contradistin-
guished from these, being in reality instances
of them, and therefore more properly enume-
rated in the subdivision thereof; as in the
scheme annexed :
178
ELEMENTS OF LOGIC.
[BOOK III.
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5.] OF FALLACIES. 179
5.
On each of the Fallacies which have been
thus enumerated and distinguished, I propose
to offer some more particular remarks ; but
before I proceed to this, it will be proper to
premise two general observations, 1st. on the
importance, and 2d. the difficulty, of detect-
ing and describing Fallacies. Both have been
already slightly alluded to ; but it is requisite
that they should here be somewhat more fully
and distinctly set forth.
1st. It seems by most persons to be taken importance
of detecting
for granted that a Fallacy is to be dreaded Fallacies.
merely as a weapon fashioned and wielded by
a skilful sophist ; or, if they allow that a man
may with honest intentions slide into one un-
consciously, in the heat of argument, still they
seem to suppose that where there is no dispute,
there is no cause to dread Fallacy ; whereas
there is much danger, even in what may be
called solitary reasoning, of sliding unawares
into some Fallacy, by which one may be so far
deceived as even to act upon the conclusion
thus obtained. By solitary reasoning I mean
the case in which one is not seeking for argu-
ments to prove a given question, but labouring
to elicit from one's previous stock of know-
ledge some useful inference.* To select one
* See the chapter on " inferring and proving," (Book IV.
ch. iii.) in the Dissertation on the Province of Reasoning.
N2
180 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [BOOK III.
from innumerable examples that might be
cited, and of which some more will occur in
the subsequent part of this essay; it is not
improbable that many indifferent sermons
have been produced by the ambiguity of the
word "plain :" a young divine perceives the
truth of the maxim, that " for the lower
orders one's language cannot be too plain f
(L e. clear and perspicuous, so as to require
no learning nor ingenuity to understand it,)
and when he proceeds to practice, the word
"plain" indistinctly flits before him, as it
were, and often checks him in the use of
ornaments of style, such as metaphor, epithet,
antithesis, fyc., which are opposed to " plain-
ness " in a totally different sense of the word ;
being by no means necessarily adverse to
perspicuity, but rather, in many cases, con-
ducive to it ; as may be seen in several of
the clearest of our Lord's discourses, which
are the very ones that are the most richly
adorned with figurative language. So far
indeed is an ornamented style from being unfit
for the vulgar, that they are pleased with it even
in excess. Yet the desire to be " plain," com-
bined with that dim and confused notion which
the ambiguity of the word produces in such
as do not separate in their minds, and set
before themselves, the two meanings, often
causes them to write in a dry and bald style,
5.] OF FALLACIES. 181
which has no advantage in point of perspicuity,
and is least of all suited to the taste of the
vulgar. The above instance is not drawn
from mere conjecture, but from actual expe-
rience of the fact.
Another instance of the strong influence of influence of
words on
words on our ideas may be adduced from a thoughts.
widely different subject : most persons feel a
certain degree of surprise on first hearing of
the result of some late experiments of the
Agricultural Chemists, by which they have
ascertained that universally what are called
heavy soils are specifically the lightest ; and
vice versa. Whence this surprise ? for no one
ever distinctly 'believed the established names
to be used in the literal and primary sense, in
consequence of the respective soils having
been weighed together; indeed it is obvious
on a moment's reflection that tenacious clay-
soils (as well as muddy roads) are figuratively
called heavy, from the difficulty of ploughing,
or passing over them, which produces an effect
like that of bearing or dragging a heavy
weight ; yet still the terms " light " and
" heavy," though used figuratively, have most
undoubtedly introduced into men's minds
something of the ideas expressed by them in
their primitive sense. The same words, when
applied to articles of diet, have produced im-
portant errors ; many supposing some article.
182 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [BOOK III.
of food to be light of digestion from its being
specifically light. So true is the ingenious
observation of Hobbes, that " words are the
counters of wise men, and the money of
fools."
" Men imagine/' says Bacon, " that their
minds have the command of Language ; but it
often happens that Language bears rule over
their mind." Some of the weak and absurd
arguments which are often urged against
Suicide may be traced to the influence of
words on thoughts. When a Christian mo-
ralist is called on for a direct Scriptural precept
against suicide, instead of replying that the
Bible is not meant for a complete code of
laws, but for a system of motives and principles,
the answer frequently given is " thou shalt do
no murder;' and it is assumed in the argu-
ments drawn from Reason, as well as in those
from Revelation, that Suicide is a species of
Murder ; viz. because it is called self-murder ;
and thus, deluded by a name, many are led to
rest on an unsound argument ; which, like all
other fallacies, does more harm than good, in
the end, to the cause of truth. Suicide, if any
one considers the nature and not the name of
it, evidently wants the most essential charac-
teristic of murder, viz. the hurt and injury done
to one's neighbour, in depriving him of life, as
well as to others by the insecurity they are in
5.] OF FALLACIES. 183
consequence liable to feel. And since no one
can, strictly speaking, do injustice to himself,
he cannot, in the literal and primary accepta-
tion of the words, be said either to rob or to
murder himself. He who deserts the post
to which he is appointed by his great Master,
and presumptuously cuts short the state of
probation graciously allowed him for working
out his salvation, (whether by action or by
patient endurance,) is guilty indeed of a
grievous sin, but of one not the least ana-
logous in its character to murder. It im-
plies no inhumanity. It is much more closely
allied to the sin of wasting life in indolence,
or in trifling pursuits, that life which is
bestowed as a seed-time for the harvest of
immortality. What is called in familiar phrase
" killing time," is, in truth, an approach, as far
as it goes, to the destruction of one's own
life : for " Time is the stuff life is made of."
" Time destroyed
Is suicide, where more than blood is spilt." Young.
It is surely wiser and safer to confine our-
selves to such arguments as will bear the test
of a close examination, than to resort to such
as may indeed at the first glance be more
specious and appear stronger, but which,
when exposed, will too often leave a man a
dupe to the fallacies on the opposite side.
184 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [BOOK III.
But it is especially the error of controver-
sialists to urge every thing that can be urged ;
to snatch up the first weapon that comes to
hand ; (" furor arma ministrat ;") without
waiting to consider what is TRUE.
More especially deserving of attention is the
influence of Analogical Terms in leading men
into erroneous notions in Theology ; where
the most important terms are analogical ; and
yet they are continually employed in Reason-
ing, without due attention (oftener through
want of caution than by unfair design) to
their analogical nature ; and most of the
errors into which theologians have fallen may
be traced, in part, to this cause.*
In speaking of the importance of refuting
Fallacies, (under which name I include, as
will be seen, any false assumption employed as
a premiss) this consideration ought not to be
overlooked ; that an unsound Principle, which
has been employed to establish some mis-
chievously false Conclusion, does not at once
become harmless, and too insignificant to be
worth refuting, as soon as that conclusion is
given up, and the false Principle is no longer
employed for that particular use. It may
equally well lead to some other no less mis-
chievous result. " A false premiss, according
* See the notes to Ch. v. 1. of the Dissertation sub-
joined.
5.] OF FALLACIES. 1 85
as it is combined with this, or with that, true
one, will lead to two different false conclu-
sions. Thus, if the principle be admitted,
that any important religious errors ought to
be forcibly suppressed, this may lead either
to persecution on the one side, or to latitudi-
narian indifference on the other. Some may
be led to justify the suppression of heresies by
the civil sword ; and others, whose feelings
revolt at such a procedure, and who see per-
secution reprobated and discountenanced by
those around them, may be led by the same
principle to regard religious errors as of little
or no importance, and all religious persuasions
as equally acceptable in the sight of God."*
It ought however to be observed on the other
hand, that such effects are often attributed to
some fallacy as it does not in fact produce.
It shall have been perhaps triumphantly urged,
and repeated again and again, and referred to
by many as irrefragable ; and yet shall have
never convinced any one ; but have been
merely assented to by those already con-
vinced. To many persons any two well-sound-
ing phrases, which have a few words the same,
and are in some manner connected with the
same subject, will serve for premiss and con-
clusion : and when we hear a man profess to
derive conviction from such arguments, we are
* The Errors of Romanism, Ch. v. 2. p. 228.
186 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [BOOK III.
naturally disposed to regard his case as hope-
less. But it will often happen that in reality
his reasoning faculties shall have been totally
dormant ; and equally so perhaps in another
case, where he gives his assent to a process of
sound reasoning, leading to a conclusion which
he has already admitted. " The puerile fal-
lacies which you may sometimes hear a man
adduce on some subjects, are perhaps in reality
no more his own, than the sound arguments
he employs on others ; he may have given
an indolent unthinking acquiescence to each ;
and if he can be excited to exertion of thought,
he may be very capable of distinguishing the
sound from the unsound."*
Thus much, as to the extensive practical
influence of Fallacies, and the consequent high
importance of detecting and exposing them.
6.
Difficulty of 2dly. The second remark is, that while
detecting .
Fallacies, sound reasoning is ever the more readily ad-
mitted, the more clearly it is perceived to be
such, Fallacy, on the contrary, being rejected
as soon as perceived, will, of course, be the
more likely to obtain reception, the more it is
obscured and disguised by obliquity and com-
plexity of expression. It is thus that it is the
* Pol. Econ. Lect. I. p. 15.
6.] OF FALLACIES. 187
most likely either to slip accidentally from the
careless reasoner, or to be brought forward
deliberately by the Sophist. Not that he
ever wishes this obscurity and complexity to
be perceived ; on the contrary, it is for his
purpose that the expression should appear as
clear and simple as possible, while in reality it
is the most tangled net he can contrive.
Thus, whereas it is usual to express our
reasoning, elliptically, so that a Premiss (or
even two or three entire steps in a course of
argument) which may be readily supplied, as
being perfectly obvious, shall be left to be
understood, the Sophist in like manner sup-
presses what is not obvious, but is in reality
the weakest part of the argument : and uses
every other contrivance to withdraw our atten-
tion (his art closely resembling the juggler's)
from the quarter where the Fallacy lies. Hence
the uncertainty before mentioned, to which
class any individual Fallacy is to be referred :
and hence it is that the difficulty of detecting
and exposing Fallacy, is so much greater than
that of comprehending and developing a pro-
cess of sound argument. It is like the de-
tection and apprehension of a criminal in
spite of all his arts of concealment and dis-
guise ; when this is accomplished, and he is
brought to trial with all the evidence of his
guilt produced, his conviction and punishment
188 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [BOOK III
are easy ; and this is precisely the case with
those Fallacies which are given as examples in
Logical treatises; they are in fact already
detected, by being stated in a plain and
regular form, and are, as it were, only brought
up to receive sentence. Or again, fallacious
reasoning may be compared to a perplexed
and entangled mass of accounts, which it re-
quires much sagacity and close attention to
clear up, and display in a regular and intel-
ligible form ; though when this is once accom-
plished, the whole appears so perfectly simple,
that the unthinking are apt to undervalue the
skill and pains which have been employed
upon it.
Moreover, it should be remembered that a
very long discussion is one of the most effec-
tual veils of Fallacy. Sophistry, like poison,
is at once detected, and nauseated, when
presented to us in a concentrated form ; but
a Fallacy which when stated barely, in a few
sentences, would not deceive a child, may
deceive half the world, if diluted in a quarto
volume. For, as in a calculation, one single
figure incorrectly stated will enable us to
arrive at any result whatever, though every
other figure, and the whole of the operations,
be correct, so, a single false assumption in any
process of reasoning, though every other be
true, will enable us to draw what conclusion
6.] OP FALLACIES. 189
we please ; and the greater the number of
true assumptions, the more likely it is that
the false one will pass unnoticed. But
when you single out one step in the course of
the reasoning, and exhibit it as a Syllogism
with one Premiss true and the other false, the
sophistry is easily perceived. I have seen a
long argument to prove that the potato is not
a cheap article of food ; in which there was
an elaborate, and perhaps correct, calculation
of the produce per acre of potatoes, and of
wheat, the quantity lost in bran expense
of grinding, dressing, fyc., and an assumption
slipped in, as it were incidentally, that a given
quantity of potatoes contains hut one-tenth part
of nutritive matter equal to bread: from all
which (and there is probably but one ground-
less assertion in the whole) a most triumphant
result was deduced.*
To use another illustration ; it is true in a
course of argument, as in Mechanics, that
" nothing is stronger than its weakest part ;"
* This, however, gained the undoubting assent of a
Review by no means friendly to the author, and usually
noted more for scepticism than for ready assent! "All
things," says an apocryphal writer, " are double, one against
another, and nothing is made in vain :" unblushing assertors
of falsehood seem to have a race of easy believers pro-
vided on purpose for their use : men who will not indeed
believe the best established truths of religion, but are ready
to believe any thing else.
190 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [BOOK III.
and consequently a chain which has one faulty
link will break : but though the number of the
sound links adds nothing to the strength of
the chain, it adds much to the chance of the
faulty one's escaping observation.
To speak, therefore, of all the Fallacies that
have ever been enumerated as too glaring
and obvious to need even being mentioned,
because the simple instances given in logical
treatises, and there stated in the plainest
and consequently most easily detected form,
are such as would (in that form) deceive no
one ; this, surely, shows extreme weakness,
or else unfairness. It may readily be allowed,
indeed, that to detect individual Fallacies, and
bring them under the general rules, is a harder
task than to lay down those general rules ;
but this does not prove that the latter office
is trifling or useless, or that it does not
essentially conduce to the performance of the
other. There may be more ingenuity shown
in detecting and arresting a malefactor, and
convicting him of the fact, than in laying
down a law for the trial and punishment of
such persons ; but the latter office, L e. that
of a legislator, is surely neither unnecessary
nor trifling.
It should be added that a close observation
and Logical analysis of Fallacious arguments,
as it tends (according to what has been already
7.] OF FALLACIES. 191
said) to form a habit of mind well suited for
the practical detection of Fallacies ; so, for
that very reason, it will make us the more
careful in making allowance for them : i. e. to
bear in mind how much men in general are
liable to be influenced by them. E. G. a re-
futed argument ought to go for nothing ; but in
fact it will generally prove detrimental to the
cause, from the Fallacy which will be pre-
sently explained. Now, no one is more likely
to be practically aware of this, and to take
precautions accordingly, than he who is most
versed in the whole theory of Fallacies ; for
the best Logician is the least likely to calcu-
late on men in general being such.
7.
Of Fallacies inform,
enough perhaps has already been said in the
preceding Compendium : and it has been re-
marked above, that it is often left to our choice
to refer an individual Fallacy to this head or
to another.
It may be worth observing, however, that
to the present class we may the most con-
veniently refer those Fallacies, so common in
practice, of supposing the Conclusion false,
because the Premiss is false, or because the
Argument is unsound; and of inferring the
192 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [BOOK III.
truth of the Premiss from that of the Con-
clusion. E. G. if any one argues for the
existence of a God, from its being universally
believed, a man might perhaps be able to
refute the argument by producing an instance
of some nation destitute of such belief; the
argument ought then (as has been observed
above) to go for nothing: but many would
go further, and think that this refutation had
disproved the existence of a God ; in which
they would be guilty of an illicit process of
the major term ; viz. " whatever is universally
believed must be true ; the existence of a
God is not universally believed ; therefore it
is not true." Others again from being con-
vinced of the truth of the Conclusion would
infer that of the Premises ; which would
amount to the Fallacy of an undistributed
middle : vis. " what is universally believed,
is true ; the existence of a God is true ;
therefore it is universally believed." Or,
these Fallacies might be stated in the hypo-
thetical form ; since the one evidently proceeds
from the denial of the antecedent to the denial
of the consequent ; and the other from the
establishing of the consequent to the inferring
of the antecedent ; which two Fallacies will
often be found to correspond respectively
with those of Illicit process of the major,
and Undistributed middle.
7.j OF FALLACIKS. 193
Fallacies of this class *are very much kept
out of sight, being seldom perceived even by
those who employ them ; but of their prac-
tical importance there can be no doubt, since
it is notorious that a weak argument is always,
in practice, detrimental ; and that there is no
absurdity so gross which men will not readily
admit, if it appears to lead to a conclusion of
which they are already convinced. Even a
candid and sensible writer is not unlikely to
be, by this means, misled, when he is seeking
for arguments to support a conclusion which
he has long been fully convinced of himself;
L e. he will often use such arguments as would
never have convinced himself, and are not likely
to convince others, but rather (by the operation
of the converse Fallacy) to confirm in their
dissent those who before disagreed with him.
It is best therefore to endeavour to put
yourself in the place of an opponent to your
own arguments, and consider whether you
could not find some objection to them. The
applause of ones own party is a very unsafe
ground for judging of the real force of an
argumentative work, and consequently of its
real utility. To satisfy those who were doubt-
ing, and to convince those who were opposed,
are the only sure tests ; but these persons are
seldom very loud in their applause, or very
forward in bearing their testimony.
o
194 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Boon-Ill.
Of Ambiguous Middle.
8.
That case in which the middle is undistri-
buted belongs of course to the preceding head ;
the fault being perfectly manifest from the
mere form of the expression : in that case the
extremes are compared with two parts of the
same term ; but in the Fallacy which has been
called semi-logical, (which we are now to
speak of) the extremes are compared with
two different terms, the middle being used in
two different senses in the two Premises.*
And here it may be remarked, that when
the argument is brought into the form of a
regular Syllogism, the contrast between these
two senses will usually appear very striking,
from the two Premises being placed together ;
and hence the scorn with which many have
treated the very mention of the Fallacy of
Equivocation, deriving their only notion of it
from the exposure of it in Logical treatises ;
whereas, in practice it is common for the two
Premises to be placed very far apart, and dis-
cussed in different parts of the discourse ; by
which means the inattentive hearer overlooks
any ambiguity that may exist in the middle
* For some instances of important ambiguities, see
Appendix.
words.
8.] OK FALLACIES. If).")
term. Hence the advantage of Logical habits,
to fix our attention strongly and steadily on
the important terms of an argument.
One case, which may be regarded as com- Parony m0 u 8
ing under the head of Ambiguous middle, is,
what is called, " Fallacia Figurce Dictionis"
the Fallacy built on the grammatical structure
of language, from men's usually taking for
granted that paronymous words (L e. those
belonging to each other, as the substantive,
adjective, verb, fyc. of the same root) have a
precisely correspondent meaning ; which is by
no means universally the case. Such a fallacy
could not indeed be even exhibited in strict
Logical form, which would preclude even the
attempt at it, since it has two middle terms in
sound as well as sense. But nothing is more
common in practice than to vary continually
the terms employed, with a view to grammati-
cal convenience ; nor is there anything unfair
in such a practice, as long as the meaning is
preserved unaltered : e. g. " murder should be
punished with death ; this man is a murderer ;
therefore he deserves to die," fyc. fyc. Here
we proceed on the assumption (in this case
just) that to commit murder and to be a mur-
derer, to deserve death and to be one who
ought to die, are, respectively, equivalent
expressions : and it would frequently prove a
heavy inconvenience to be debarred this kind
o 2
196 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [BOOK III.
of liberty; but the abuse of it gives rise to
the Fallacy in question : e.g. "projectors are
unfit to be trusted ; this man has formed a
project, therefore he is unfit to be trusted : * "
here the Sophist proceeds on the hypothesis
that he who forms a project must be a pro-
jector : whereas the bad sense that commonly
attaches to the latter word, is not at all
implied in the former.
This Fallacy may often be considered as
lying not in the middle, but in one of the
terms of the conclusion; so that the conclu-
sion drawn shall not be, in reality, at all
warranted by the Premises, though it will
appear to be so, by means of the grammatical
affinity of the words: e.g. "to be acquainted
with the guilty is a presumption of guilt ; this
man is so acquainted ; therefore we may
presume that he is guilty:" this argument
proceeds on the supposition of an exact cor-
respondence between "presume" and "pre-
sumption" which, however, does not really
exist ; for " presumption " is commonly used
to express a kind of slight suspicion ; whereas
" to presume " amounts to absolute belief.
The above remark will apply to some other
cases of ambiguity of term ; viz. the conclu-
sion will often contain a term, which (though
not, as here, different in expression from the
* Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations : Usury.
8.] OF FALLACIES. |!)7
corresponding one in the Premiss, yet) is
liable to be understood in a sense different
from what it bears to the Premiss ; though, of
course, such a Fallacy is less common, be-
cause less likely to deceive, in those cases than
in this ; where the term used in the conclu-
sion, though professing to correspond with
one in the Premiss, is not the very name in
expression, and therefore is more certain to
convey a different sense ; which is what the
Sophist wishes.
There are innumerable instances of a non-
correspondence in paronymous words, similar
to that above instanced ; as between art and
artful, design and designing, faith and faith-
ful, fyc. ; and the more slight the variation of
meaning, the more likely is the Fallacy to be
successful ; for when the words have become
so widely removed in sense as " pity " and
" pitiful," every one would perceive such
a Fallacy, nor could it be employed but
in jest.
This Fallacy cannot in practice be refuted,
(except when you are addressing regular
logicians,) by stating merely the impossibility of
reducing such an argument to the strict logical
form. You must find some way of point-
ing out the non-correspondence of the terms
in question ; e. g. with respect to the example
above, it might be remarked, that we speak
198 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [BOOK III.
of strong or faint " presumption/' but we use
no such expression in conjunction with the
verb " presume," because the word itself im-
plies strength.
No fallacy is more common in controversy
than the present, since in this way the Sophist
will often be able to misinterpret the proposi-
tions which his opponent admits or maintains,
and so employ them against him. Thus in the
examples just given, it is natural to conceive
one of the Sophist's Premises to have been
borrowed from his opponent.*
Etymology. The present Fallacy is nearly allied to, or
rather perhaps may be regarded as a branch
of that founded on etymology ; viz. when a
Term is used at one time, in its customary,
and at another, in its etymological sense.
Perhaps no example of this can be found
that is more extensively and mischievously
employed than in the case of the word repre-
sentative : assuming that its right meaning
must correspond exactly with the strict and
original sense of the verb, " represent," the
Sophist persuades the multitude, that a mem-
ber of the House of Commons is bound to be
guided in all points by the opinion of his
* Perhaps a dictionary of such paronymous words as
do not regularly correspond in meaning, would be nearly
as useful as one of synonyms ; i. e. properly speaking, of
pseudo-synonyms.
.9.] OF FALLACIES. !<)<)
constituents : and, in short, to be merely their
spokesman: whereas law and custom, which
in this case may be considered as fixing the
meaning of the Term, require no such thing,
but enjoin the representative to act according
to the best of his own judgment, and on his
own responsibility.
Home Tooke has furnished a whole maga-
zine of such weapons for any Sophist who may
need them ; and has furnished some specimens
of the employment of them. He contends,
that it is idle to speak of eternal or immutable
" Truth" because the word is derived from to
"trow," i. e. believe. He might on as good
grounds have censured the absurdity of speak-
ing of sending a letter by the " post" because
a post, in its primary sense, is a pillar ; or have
insisted that " Sycophant " can never mean
anything but " Fig- shower."
9-
It is to be observed, that to the head of Fallacy or
Interroga-
Ambiguous middle should be referred what tiolls -
is called " Fallacia plurium Interrogationum?
which may be named, simply, " the Fallacy
of Interrogation;" viz. the Fallacy of asking
several questions which appear to be but one ;
so that whatever one answer is given, being of
course applicable to one only of the implied
questions, may be interpreted as applied to
200 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [BOOK III.
the other; the refutation is, of course, to
reply separately to each question, i. e. to
detect the ambiguity.
I have said, several " questions which ap-
pear to be but one" for else there is no Fal-
lacy ; such an example, therefore, as "estne
homo animal et lapis?" which Aldrich gives,
is foreign to the matter in hand; for there
is nothing unfair in asking two distinct ques-
tions (any more than in asserting two dis-
tinct propositions) distinctly and avowedly.
This Fallacy may be referred, as has been
said, to the head of Ambiguous middle. In all
Reasoning it is very common to state one of
the Premises in form of a question, and when
that is admitted, or supposed to be admitted,
then to fill up the rest : if then one of the
Terms of that question be ambiguous, which-
ever sense the opponent replies to, the Sophist
assumes the other sense of the Term in the
remaining Premiss. It is therefore very com-
mon to state an equivocal argument, in form
of a question so worded, that there shall be
little doubt which reply will be given ; but if
there be such doubt, the Sophist must have
two Fallacies of equivocation ready ; e. g. the
question " whether anything vicious is expe-
dient," discussed in Cic. Off. Book III. (where,
by the bye, he seems not a little perplexed
with it himself) is of the character in ques-
9.] OF FALLACIES. 201
tion, from the ambiguity of the word " expe-
dient" which means sometimes, " conducive
to temporal prosperity," sometimes " con-
ducive to the greatest good :" whichever
answer therefore was given, the Sophist might
have a Fallacy of equivocation founded on this
term ; viz. if the answer be in the negative,
his argument, Logically developed, will stand
thus, " what is vicious is not expedient ;
whatever conduces to the acquisition of wealth
and aggrandizement is expedient ; therefore it
cannot be vicious :" if in the affirmative, then
thus, " whatever is expedient is desirable ;
something vicious is expedient, therefore de-
sirable."*
This kind of Fallacy is frequently employed Distribution
in such a manner, that the uncertainty shall tribution
be, not about the meaning, but the extent of a
Term, i. e. whether it is distributed or not :
e. g. " did A B in this case act from such and
such a motive?" which may imply either,
" was it his sole motive?" or " was it one of
his motives ? " in the former case the term
" that-which-actuated-A B" is distributed ; in
the latter, not : now if he acted from a mixture
* Much of the declamation by which popular assemblies
are often misled, against what is called, without any distinct
meaning, the " doctrine of expediency," (as if the " right "
and the " expedient" were in opposition) might be silenced
by asking the simple question, ' Do you then admit that
the course you recommend is inexpedient ?"
202 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [BOOK III-
of motives, whichever answer you give, may
be misrepresented, and thus disproved.
10.
intrinsic and In some cases of ambiguous middle, the
incidental
tns ca Term in question may be considered as having
in itself, from its own equivocal nature, two
significations ; (which apparently constitutes
the " Fallacia equivocationis " of Logical wri-
ters ;) others again have a middle Term which
is ambiguous from the context, i. e. from what
is understood in conjunction with it. This
division will be found useful, though it is
impossible to draw the line accurately in it.
The elliptical character of ordinary discourse
causes many Terms to become practically
ambiguous, which yet are not themselves em-
ployed in different senses, but with different
applications, which are understood. Thus,
" The Faith " would be used by a Christian
writer to denote the Christian Faith, and by
a Mussulman, the Mahometan ; yet the word
Faith, has not in these cases, of itself, two
different significations. So e/eXe/ero/, " elect,"
or " chosen," is sometimes applied to such as
are " chosen," to certain privileges and advan-
tages; (as the Israelites were, though " they
were overthrown in the wilderness " for their
disobedience; and as all Christians are fre-
quently called in the New Testament) some-
10.] OF FALLACIES. 203
times again to those who are " chosen," as fit
to receive a final reward, having made a right
use of those advantages ; as when our Lord
says, " many are called, but few chosen."
What Logicians have mentioned under the
title of " Fallacia amphiboliae " is referable to
this last class ; though in real practice it is
not very likely to occur. An amphibolous sen-
tence is one that is capable of two meanings,
not from the double sense of any of the words,
but from its admitting of a double construction :
as in the instance Aldrich gives, which is
untranslatable ; " quod tangitur a Socrate,
illud sentit ;" where " illud" may be taken
either as the nominative or accusative. So
also the celebrated response of the oracle ;
" Aio te, jEacida, Romanes vincere posse :"
which closely resembles (as Shakspeare re-
marks) the witch-prophecy, " The Duke yet
lives that Henry shall depose." A similar
effect is produced by what the French call
" construction louche," a squinting construc-
tion ; i. e. where some word or words may be
referred either to the former or latter clause
of the sentence ; of which an instance occurs
in the rubric prefixed to the service of the
30th January. " If this day shall happen to
be Sunday [this form of prayer shall be used]
and the fast kept the next day following :"
the clause in brackets may belong either to the
204 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [BooKlII.
former or the latter part of the sentence. In
the Nicene Creed, the words, " by whom all
things were made," are grammatically refer-
able either to the Father or the Son. The fol-
lowing clause of a sentence from a newspaper,
is a curious specimen of Amphibolia : "For
protecting and upholding such electors as
refused, contrary to their desires and con-
sciences, to vote for Messrs. , regardless
of threats, and unmindful of intimidation."
Accidental There are various ways in which words
equivocation.
come to have two meanings :
1st. By accident; (i. e. when there is no
perceptible connexion between the two mean-
ings) as " light" signifies both the contrary to
" heavy" and the contrary to " dark." Thus,
such proper names as John or Thomas, $c.
which happen to belong to several different
persons, are ambiguous, because they have a
different signification in each case where they
are applied. Words which fall under this first
head are what are the most strictly called
equivocal.
First and 2dly. There are several terms in the use of
second inten-
which it is necessary to notice the distinction
between first and second intention.* The
* I am aware that there exists another opinion as to
the meaning of the phrase " second-intention ;" and that
Aldrich is understood by some persons to mean (as indeed
his expression may very well be understood to imply)
10.] OF FALLACIES. 205
" first-intention " of a Term, (according to
the usual acceptation of this phrase) is a
certain vague and general signification of it, as
opposed to one more precise and limited, which
it bears in some particular art, science, or
system, and which is called its " second-inten-
tion." Thus, among farmers, in some parts,
the word " beast " is applied particularly and
especially to the ox kind ; and " bird," in the
language of many sportsmen, is in like manner
appropriated to the partridge : the common
and general acceptation (which every one is
well acquainted with) of each of those two
words, is the First-intention of each ; the
other, its Second-intention.
It is evident that a Term may have several
Second-intentions, according to the several
systems into which it is introduced, and of
which it is one of the technical Terms : thus
that every predicable must necessarily be employed in the
Second-intention. I do not undertake to combat the
doctrine alluded to, because I must confess that, after
the most patient attention devoted to the explanations
given of it, I have never been able to comprehend what
it is that is meant by it. It is one, however, which,
whether sound or unsound, appears not to be connected
with any Logical processes, and therefore may be safely
passed by on the present occasion.
For some remarks on the Second-intention of the word
" Species," when applied to organized beings (viz. as de-
noting those plants or animals, which it is conceived may
have descended from a common stock), see the subjoined
Dissertation, Book IV. Chap. v. 1.
206 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [BOOK III.
" line " signifies, in the Art-military, a certain
form of drawing up ships or troops : in Geo-
graphy, a certain division of the earth ; to
the fisherman, a string to catch fish, Sfc. Sfc. ;
all which are so many distinct Second-inten-
tions, in each of which there is a certain
signification " of extension in length " which
constitutes the First-intention, and which cor-
responds pretty nearly with the employment of
the Term in Mathematics.*
It will sometimes happen, that a Term shall
be employed always in some one or other of
its second intentions ; and never, strictly in
the first, though that first intention is a part
of its signification in each case. It is evident,
that the utmost care is requisite to avoid con-
founding together, either the first and second
intentions, or the different second intentions
with each other.
Resemblance 3rdly. When two or more things are con-
and analogy.
. nected by resemblance or analogy, they will
frequently have the same name. Thus a
"blade of grass," and the contrivance in
building called a "dove-tail," are so called
* In a few instances the Second-intention, or philoso-
phical employment of a Term, is more extensive than the
First-intention, or popular use : thus " affection " is
limited in popular use to "love;" "charity," to "alms-
giving ;" " flower," to those which have conspicuous petals ;
and fruit, to such as are eatable.
10.] OF FALLACIES. 20?
from their resemblance to the blade* of a
sword, and the tail of a real dove. But two
things may be connected by analogy, though
they have in themselves no resemblance: for
analogy is the resemblance of ratios (or rela-
tions :) thus, as a sweet taste gratifies the
palate, so does a sweet sound gratify the ear ;
and hence the same word, " sweet " is applied
to both, though no flavour can resemble a
sound in itself. So, the leg of a table does not
resemble that of an animal ; nor the foot of
a mountain that of an animal ; but the leg
answers the same purpose to the table, as the
leg of an animal to that animal ; the foot of a
mountain has the same situation relatively to
the mountain, as the foot of an animal to the
animal. This analogy therefore may be ex-
pressed like a mathematical analogy (or pro-
portion) ; " leg : animal : : supporting-stick :
table."
In all these cases (of this 3rd head) one of
the meanings of the word is called by Logi-
cians proper, i. e. original or primary ; the
other improper, secondary, or transferred :
thus, sweet is originally and properly applied
to tastes ; secondarily and improperly (i. e. by
* Unless, indeed, the primary application of the Term
be to the leaf of grass, and the secondary to cutting
instruments, which is perhaps more probable ; but the
question is unimportant in the present case.
208 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [BOOK III.
analogy) to sounds : thus also, dove-tail is
applied secondarily (though not by analogy,
but by direct resemblance) to the contrivance
in building so called.
When the secondary meaning of a word
is founded on some fanciful analogy, and
especially when it is introduced for ornament's
sake, we call this a metaphor; as when we
speak of " a ship's ploughing the deep ;" the
turning up of the surface being essential indeed
to the plough, but accidental only to the ship.
But if the analogy be a more important and
essential one, and especially if we have no
other word to express our meaning but this
transferred one, we then call it merely an
analogous word (though the metaphor is ana-
logous also) e. g. one would hardly call it
metaphorical or figurative language to speak
of the leg of a table, or mouth of a river.*
connexion 4thly. Several things may be called by the
of time or ,,-11,11
place. same name (though they have no connexion
of resemblance or analogy) from being con-
nected by vicinity of time or place; under
which head will come the connexion of cause
and effect, or of part and whole, fyc. Thus, a
door signifies both an opening in the wall
(more strictly called the door-way) and a
board which closes it ; which are things
* See Dr. Copleston's account of Analogy in the notes
to his " Four Discourses."
10.] OF FALLACI!> 209
neither similar nor analogous. When I say,
"the rose smells sweet;" and "I smell the
rose;" the word "smell" has two meanings:
in the latter sentence, I am speaking of a
certain sensation in my own mind ; in the
former, of a certain quality in the flower,
which produces that sensation, but which of
course cannot in the least resemble it ; and
here the word smell is applied with equal
propriety to both.* Thus again the word
" certainty " denotes either, primarily, the state
of our own mind when we are free from doubt,
or, secondarily, the character of the event
about which we feel certain. [See Appendix,
No. I.] Thus, we speak of Homer, for " the
works of Homer ;" and this is a secondary or
transferred meaning : and so it is when we say,
"a good shot," for a good marksman : but the
word "shot" has two other meanings, which
are both equally proper ; viz. the thing put into
a gun in order to be discharged from it, and
the act of discharging it.
Thus, " learning " signifies either the act of
acquiring knowledge, or the knowledge itself;
e.g. "he neglects his learning;" "Johnson
was a man of learning." "Possession" is
* On this ambiguity have been founded the striking
paradoxes of those who have maintained that there is no
heat in fire, no cold in ice, fyc. The sensations of heat,
cold, fyc. can of course only belong to a Sentient Being.
P
210 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [BOOK III.
ambiguous in the same manner; and a mul-
titude of others.
Much confusion often arises from ambiguity
of this kind, when unperceived ; nor is there
any point in which the copiousness and con-
sequent precision of the Greek language, is
more to be admired than in its distinct terms
for expressing an act, and the result of that
act ; e. g. Trpa&s, " the doing of anything ;"
Trpaypa, the " thing done ;" so, Soo-t? and
Scopov XT?^S and X?7/-tyu,a, fyc.
It will very often happen, that two of the
meanings of a word will have no connexion
with one another, but will each have some con-
nexion with a third. Thus, " martyr" origi-
nally signified a witness; thence it was applied
to those who suffered in bearing testimony
to Christianity ; and thence again it is often
applied to "sufferers" in general: the first and
third significations are not the least connected.
Thus " post " signifies originally a pillar,
(postum, from pono) then, a distance marked
out by posts ; and then, the carriages, mes-
sengers, fyc. that travelled over this distance.
It would puzzle any one, proceeding on mere
conjecture, to make out how the word "pre-
mises " should have come to signify a building.
Ambiguities of this kind belong practically
to the first head : there being no perceived
connexion between the different senses.
10.] OF FALLACIES. 211
Another source of practical ambiguity " is,
. . . language-
that, in respect or any subject concerning
which the generality of men are accustomed
to speak much and familiarly, in their conver-
sation relative to that, they usually introduce
ELLIPTICAL expressions ; very clearly under-
stood in the outset, but whose elliptical cha-
racter comes, in time, to be so far lost sight of,
that confusion of language, and thence, of
thought, is sometimes the result. Thus, the
expression of a person's possessing a fortune
of 10,000/. is an elliptical phrase ; meaning, at
full length, that all his property if sold would
exchange for that sum of money. And in
ninety-nine instances out of a hundred, no
error or confusion of thought arises from this
language ; but there is no doubt that it mainly
contributed to introduce and foster the notion
that Wealth consists especially of gold and
silver (these being used to measure and express
its amount) ; and that the sure way to enrich
a country is to promote the importation, and
prevent the export, of the precious metals ;
with all the other absurdities of what is com-
monly called 'the mercantile System.'
"Again, when a man complains of being
'out of work' is 4 looking out for employ-
ment/ and hopes for subsistence by labour,
this is elliptical language ; well enough under
stood in general. We know that what man
p2
212 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [BOOK lit.
lives on, is food ; and that he who is said to
be looking out for work, is in want of food and
other necessaries, which he hopes to procure
in exchange for his labour, and has no hope
of obtaining without it. But there is no doubt
that this elliptical language has contributed to
lead those who were not attentive to the cha-
racter of the expression, to regard every thing
as beneficial to the labouring classes which
furnishes employment, i. e. gives trouble ; even
though no consequent increase should take
place in the Country, of the food and other
commodities destined for their support." *
The remedy for ambiguity is a Definition of
the Term which is suspected of being used in
two senses ; viz. a Nominal, not necessarily a
Real Definition : as was remarked in Book II.
Chap. v.
Definition, It is important to observe that the very
when most
needed. circumstance which in any case " makes a
definition the more necessary, is apt to lead to
the omission of it : for when any terms are
employed that are not familiarly introduced
into ordinary discourse, such as ' parallelo-
gram,' or ' sphere,' or ' tangent/ ' pencil of
rays/ or ( refraction/ ( oxygen/ or ' alkali/
the learner is ready to inquire, and the
writer to anticipate the inquiry, what is
meant by this or that term? And though in
* Pol. Econ. Lect. IX.
10.] OF FALLACIES. 213
such cases it is undoubtedly a correct pro-
cedure to answer this inquiry by a definition,
yet, of the two cases, a definition is even
more necessary in the other, where it is not
so likely to be called for ; where the word,
not being new to the student, but familiar to
his ear, from its employment in every-day
discourse, is liable to the ambiguity which is
almost always the result. For in respect of
words that sound ' something new and strange/
though it is, as I have said, much better to
define them in the outset, yet even without
this, the student would gradually collect their
meaning pretty correctly, as he proceeded in
his study of any treatise ; from having nothing
to mislead him, nothing from which to form
his notions at all, except the manner in which
the terms were employed in the work itself
that is before him. And the very desire he
had felt of a definition would lead him in this
way to form one, and generally a sufficiently
correct one, for himself.
" It is otherwise with terms to which we are
familiarly accustomed. Of these, the student
does not usually crave definitions, from sup-
posing, for that reason, that he understands
them well enough : though perhaps (without
suspecting it) he has in reality been accus-
tomed to hear them employed in various
senses, and to attach but a vague and inac-
214 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [BOOK III
curate notion to them. If you speak to an
uninstructed hearer, of anything that is
spherical, or circular, or cylindrical, he will
probably beg for an explanation of your
meaning ; but if you tell him of anything
that is round, it will not strike him that any
explanation is needed : though he has been
accustomed to employ the word, indiscrimi-
nately, in all the senses denoted by the other
three."*
Definitions, But here it may be proper to remark, that
how far to be J r r
exacted. f or fa e abiding o f Fallacy or of verbal con-
troversy, it is only requisite that the term
should be employed uniformly in the same
sense as far as the existing question is con-
cerned. Thus, two persons might, in discuss-
ing the question whether Caesar was a GREAT
man, have some such difference in their ac-
ceptation of the epithet " great," as would be
non-essential to that question ; e. g. one of
them might understand by it nothing more
than eminent intellectual and moral qualities ;
while the other might conceive it to imply the
performance of splendid actions : this abstract
difference of meaning would not produce any
disagreement in the existing question, because
both those circumstances are united in the
case of Caesar ; but if one (and not the other)
of the parties understood the epithet " great "
* Pol, Econ. Lect. IX.
11.] OF FALLACIES. 215
to imply pure patriotism, GENEROSITY of cha-
racter, $., then there would be a disagree-
ment as to the application of the Term, even
between those who might think alike of
Caesar's character. Definition, the specific for
ambiguity, is to be employed, and demanded
with a view to this principle ; it is sufficient
on each occasion to define a Term as far as
regards the question in hand.
1 1
11.
Of those cases where the ambiguity arises
from the context, there are several species ;
some of which Logicians have enumerated,
but have neglected to refer them, in the first
place, to one common class (viz. the one
under which they are here placed ;) and have
even arranged some under the head of Fal-
lacies " in dictione" and others under that of
" extra dictionem"
We may consider, as the first of these Fallacy of
species, the Fallacy of "Division " and that of composition.
" Composition," taken together ; since in each
of these the middle Term is used in one
Premiss collectively, in the other, distribu-
tive ly : if the former of these is the major
Premiss, and the latter, the minor, this is
called the " Fallacy of Division ;" the Term
which is first taken collectively being after-
wards divided ; and vice versa. The ordinary
216 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [BOOK III.
examples are such as these ; " All the angles
of a triangle are equal to two right angles :
A B C is an angle of a triangle ; therefore
A B C is equal to two right angles." " Five
is one number ; three and two are five :
therefore three and two are one number ;" or,
"three and two are two numbers, five is
three and two, therefore five is two numbers :"
it is manifest that the middle Term, three and
two (in this last example) is ambiguous, signi-
fying, in the major Premiss, " taken dis-
tinctly ;" in the minor, " taken together :"
and so of the rest.
To this head may be referred the common
Fallacy of over-rating, where each premiss of
an argument is probable, the probability of the
conclusion ; which, in that case, is less than
that of the less probable of the premises.
For, suppose the probability of one of these
to be ^, and of the other, -^ (each more likely
than not) the probability of the conclusion
will be only j^ or a little more than 5 ; which
is less than an even chance. This Fallacy
may be most easily stated as a conditional ;
a form in which any Fallacy of ambiguous
middle may easily be exhibited. E. G. "If it
is more likely than not, that these premises
are true (L e. that they are both true) it is
more likely than not, that the conclusion is
true : but it is more likely than not that the
11.] OF FALLACIES. 217
premises are true : (I. e. that each of them is
so) therefore it is more likely than not that
the conclusion is true." Here, a term in the
antecedent, viz. " that the premises are more
likely than not to be true" is taken jointly in
the Major, and dividedly in the Minor.*
To the same class we may refer the Fallacy
by which men have sometimes been led to
admit, or pretend to admit, the doctrine of
Necessity ; e. g. " he who necessarily goes
or stays (L e. in reality, ( who necessarily goes,
or who necessarily stays ') is not a free agent ;
you must necessarily go or stay (i. e. ' you
must necessarily take the alternative'}, there-
fore you are not a free agent." Such also is
the Fallacy which probably operates on most
adventurers in lotteries ; e. g. " the gaining of
a high prize is no uncommon ocurrence ; and
what is no uncommon occurrence may rea-
sonably be expected : therefore the gaining of
a high prize may reasonably be expected ;"
the Conclusion, when applied to the indi-
vidual (as in practice it is), must be under-
stood in the sense of "reasonably expected
by a certain individual;" therefore for the
major Premiss to be true, the middle Term
must be understood to mean, "no uncom-
mon occurrence to some one particular per-
son ;" whereas for the minor (which has been
* See 14.
218 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [BOOK III.
placed first) to be true, you must undertand
it of " no uncommon occurrence to some one
or other ;*' and thus you will have the Fallacy
of Composition.
There is no Fallacy more common, or more
likely to deceive, than the one now before us :
the form in which it is most usually employed,
is to establish some truth, separately, con-
cerning each single member of a certain class,
and thence to infer the same of the whole col-
lectively. Thus, some infidels have laboured
to prove concerning some one of our Lord's
miracles, that it might have been the result
of an accidental conjuncture of natural cir-
cumstances : next, they endeavour to prove
the same concerning another ; and so on ; and
thence infer that all of them occurring as a
series might have been so. They might argue
in like manner, that because it is not very
improbable one may throw sixes in any one
out of a hundred throws, therefore it is no
more improbable that one may throw sixes
a hundred times running.
It will often happen that when two objects
are incompatible, though either of them, sepa-
rately, may be attained, the incompatibility is
disguised by a rapid and frequent transition
from the one to the other alternately. E. G.
You may prove that 100/. would accomplish
this object; and then, that it would accomplish
11.] OF FALLACIES. '2\ [)
that ; and then, you recur to the former ; and
hack again : till at length a notion is generated
of the possibility of accomplishing both by this
100/. "Two distinct objects may, by being
dexterously presented, again and again in
quick succession, to the mind of a cursory
reader, be so associated together in his thoughts,
as to be conceived capable, when in fact they
are not, of being actually combined in practice.
The fallacious belief thus induced bears a
striking resemblance to the optical illusion
effected by that ingenious and philosophical
toy called the Thaumatrope ; in which two
objects painted on opposite sides of a card,
for instance a man, and a horse, a bird, and
a cage, are, by a quick rotatory motion,
made to impress the eye in combination, so
as to form one picture, of the man on the
horse's back, the bird in the cage, &c. As
soon as the card is allowed to remain at rest,
the figures, of course, appear as they really
are, separate and on opposite sides. A mental
illusion closely analogous to this, is produced,
when by a rapid and repeated transition from
one subject to another alternately, the mind is
deluded into an idea of the actual combination
of things that are really incompatible. The
chief part of the defence which various writers
have advanced in favour of the system of
penal Colonies consists, in truth of a sort of
220 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [BOOK III.
intellectual Thaumatrope. The prosperity of
the Colony and the repression of crime, are,
by a sort of rapid whirl, presented to the mind
as combined in one picture. A very moderate
degree of calm and fixed attention soon shews
that the two objects are painted on opposite
sides of the card."*
The Fallacy of Division may often be con-
sidered as turning on the ambiguity of the word
" all ;" which may easily be dispelled by substi-
tuting for it the word "each" or "every," where
that is its signification; e.g. " all these trees
make a thick shade," is ambiguous ; meaning,
either, "every one of them," or "all together."
This is a Fallacy with which men are ex-
tremely apt to deceive themselves : for when a
multitude of particulars are presented to the
mind, many are too weak or too indolent to
take a comprehensive view of them; but con-
fine, their attention to each single point, by
turns; and then decide, infer, and act, accord-
ingly : e. g. the imprudent spendthrift, finding
that he is able to afford this, or that, or the
other expense, forgets that all of them together
will ruin hirh.
To the same head may be reduced that
fallacious reasoning by which men vindicate
themselves to their own conscience and to
others, for the neglect of those undefined duties,
* Remarks on Transportation, pp. 25, 26.
11.] OF FALLACIES. 221
which though indispensable, and therefore not
left to our choice whether we will practise
them or not, are left to our discretion as
to the mode, and the particular occasions, of
practising them ; e. g. " I am not bound to
contribute to this charity in particular ; nor to
that ; nor to the other :" the practical con-
clusion which they draw, is, that all charity
may be dispensed with.
As men are apt to forget that any two cir-
cumstances (not naturally connected) are
more rarely to be met with combined than
separate, though they be not at all incom-
patible ; so also they are apt to imagine,
from finding that they are rarely combined,
that there is an incompatibility; e.g. if the
chances are ten to one against a man's
possessing strong reasoning powers, and ten
to one against exquisite taste, the chances
against the combination of the two (suppos-
ing them neither connected nor opposed) will
be a hundred to one. Many, therefore, from
finding them so rarely united, will infer that
they are in some measure incompatible ;
which Fallacy may easily be exposed in the
form of Undistributed middle : " qualities un-
friendly to each other are rarely combined ;
excellence in the reasoning powers, and in
taste, are rarely combined ; therefore they are
bualities unfriendly to each other."
222' > ,; ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [BOOK IH.
12.
The other kind of ambiguity arising from
the context, and which is the last case of
Ambiguous middle that I shall notice, is the
"fallacia accident is ;" together with its con-
verse, "fallacia a dicto secundum quid ad
dictum simpliciter ;" in each of which the
middle Term is used, in one Premiss to
signify something considered simply, in itself,
and as to its essence ; and in the other Pre-
miss, so as to imply that its Accidents are
taken into account with it : as in the well-
known example, " what is bought in the
market is eaten ; raw meat is bought in the
market ; therefore raw meat is eaten." Here
the middle has understood in conjunction with
it, in the major Premiss, " as to its substance
merely :" in the minor, " as to its condition and
circumstances."
To this head, perhaps, as well as to any,
may be referred the Fallacies which are fre-
quently founded on the occasional, partial,
and temporary variations in the acceptation
of some Term, arising from circumstances of
person, time, and place, which will occasion
something to be understood in conjunction
with it beyond its strict literal signification.
E. G. The word "loyalty," which properly
denotes attachment to lawful government,
whether of a king, president, senate, fyc.,
5 13.] OF FALLACIES. 223
according to the respective institutions of each
nation, has often been used to signify exclu-
sively, attachment to regal authority; and
that, even when carried beyond the boundaries
of law. So, " reformer" has sometimes been
limited to the protestant reformers of religion ;
sometimes, to the advocates of some particular
parliamentary reform ; fyc. And whenever any
phrase of this kind has become a kind of
watch-word or gathering-cry of a party, the
employment of it would commonly imply cer-
tain sentiments not literally expressed by the
words. To assume therefore that one is
friendly or unfriendly to " Loyalty " or to
"Reform" in one sense, because he has de-
clared himself friendly or unfriendly to it in
another sense, when implying and connected
with such and such other sentiments, is a
Fallacy, such as may fairly be referred to the
present head.
13.
On the non-logical (or material) Fallacies :
and first, of " begging the question ;" Petitio
Principii.
The indistinct and unphilosophical account
which has been given by Logical writers
of the Fallacy of " non causa" and that of
"petitio principiiy" makes it very difficult to
224 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [BOOK III.
ascertain wherein they conceived them to
differ, and what, according to them, is the
nature of each. Without therefore professing
to conform exactly to their meaning, and
with a view to distinctness only, which is the
main point, let us confine the name " petitio
pnncipil " to those cases in which the Premiss
either appears manifestly to be the same as
the Conclusion, or is actually proved from the
Conclusion, or is such as would naturally
and properly so be proved ; as e. g. if any
one should infer the actual occurrence of the
eclipses recorded in the Chinese annals, from
an assumption of the authenticity of those
annals. And to the other class may be re-
ferred all other cases, in which the Premiss
(whether the expressed or the suppressed one;
is either proved false, or has no sufficient
claim to be received as true.
Let it however be observed, that in such
cases (apparently) as this, we must not too
hastily pronounce the argument fallacious ;
for it may be perfectly fair at the commence-
ment of an argument to assume a Premiss that
is not more evident than the Conclusion, or is
even ever so paradoxical, provided you pro-
ceed to prove fairly that Premiss ; and in like
manner it is both usual and fair to begin by
deducing your Conclusion from a Premiss
exactly equivalent to it; which is merely
13.] OF FALLACIES. 225
throwing the proposition in question into the
form in which it will be most conveniently
proved.
Arguing in a Circle, however, must neces-
sarily be unfair ; though it frequently is prac-
tised undesignedly ; e.g. some Mechanicians
attempt to prove, (what they ought to lay
down as a probable but doubtful hypothesis,)
that every particle of matter gravitates equally;
" why ?" because those bodies which contain
more particles ever gravitate more strongly,
i.e. are heavier: " but (it may be urged) those
which are heaviest are not always more bulky ;"
" no, but still they contain more particles,
though more closely condensed ;" "how do you
know that ? " " because they are heavier ;"
" how does that prove it ? " " because all par-
ticles of matter gravitating equally, that mass
which is specifically the heavier must needs
have the more of them in the same space."
Obliquity and disguise being of course most
important to the success of the petitio principii
as well as of other Fallacies, the Sophist will
in general either have recourse to the circle,
or else not venture to state distinctly his
assumption of the point in question, but will
rather assert some other proposition which
implies it ;* thus keeping out of sight (as a
* Gibbon affords the most remarkable instances of this
kind of style. That which he really means to speak of,
Q
226 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [BOOK III.
dexterous thief does stolen goods) the point
in question, at the very moment when he is
taking it for granted. Hence the frequent
union of this Fallacy with " ignoratio elenchi :"
[vide 15.] The English language is per-
haps the more suitable for the Fallacy of
petitio prmcipii, from its being formed from
two distinct languages, and thus abounding in
synonymous expressions, which have no re-
semblance in sound, and no connexion in
etymology ; so that a Sophist may bring
forward a proposition expressed in words of
Saxon origin, and give as a reason for it, the
very same proposition stated in words of Nor-
man origin ; e. g. " to allow every man an
unbounded freedom of speech must always
be, on the whole, advantageous to the State ;
for it is highly conducive to the interests of
the Community, that each individual should
enjoy a liberty perfectly unlimited, of ex-
pressing his sentiments."
14.
undue as- The next head is, the falsity, or, at least,
sumption. '
undue assumption, of a Premiss, when it is
not equivalent to, or dependent on, the Con-
clusion ; which, as has been before said,
is hardly ever made the subject of his proposition. His
way of writing reminds one of those persons who never
dare look you full in the face.
14.] OF FALLACIES. 227
seems to correspond nearly with the meaning
of Logicians, when they speak of " non causa
pro causa" This name indeed would seem to
imply a much narrower class : there being
one species of arguments which are from cause
to effect ; in which, of course, two things are
necessary ; 1st, the sufficiency of the cause ;
2d, its establishment ; these are the two
Premises ; if therefore the former be unduly
assumed, we are arguing from that which is
not a sufficient cause as if it were so : e. g. as
if one should contend from such a man's
having been unjust or cruel, that he will
certainly be visited with some heavy temporal
judgment, and come to an untimely end. In
this instance the Sophist, from having as-
sumed, in the Premiss, the (granted) existence
of a pretended cause, infers in the conclusion
the existence of the pretended effect, which
we have supposed to be the Question. Or
vice versa, the pretended effect may be em-
ployed to establish the cause ; e. g. inferring
sinfulness from temporal calamity. But when
both the pretended cause and effect are
granted, i. e. granted to exist, then the So-
phist will infer something from their pre-
tended connexion ; i. e. he will assume as a
Premiss, that " of these two admitted facts, the
one is the cause of the other :" as Whitfield
attributed his being overtaken by a hail-
Q 2
Cause.
228 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [BOOK III.
storm to his having not preached at the last
town ; or as the opponents of the Reformation
assumed that it was the cause of the troubles
which took place at that period, and thence
inferred that it was an evil.
sign put for Many are the cases in which a Sign (see
Rhet. Part I.) from which one might fairly
infer a certain phenomenon, is mistaken for
the Cause of it : (as if one should suppose the
falling of the mercury to be a cause of rain ;
of which it certainly is an indication) whereas
the fact will often be the very reverse. E. G.
a great deal of money in a country is a pretty
sure proof of its wealth ; and thence has been
often regarded as the cause of it ; whereas
in truth it is an effect. The same, with a
numerous and increasing population. Again,
The labor bestowed on any commodity has
often been represented as the cause of its
value ; though every one would call a fine
pearl an article of value, even though he
should meet with it accidentally in eating
an oyster. Pearls are indeed generally ob-
tained by laborious diving : but they do not
fetch a high price from that cause ; but on
the contrary, men dive for them because
they fetch a high price.* So also expo-
sure to want and hardship in youth, has
been regarded as a cause of the hardy con-
* Pol. Econ. Lect. IX. p. 253.
14.] OF FALLACIES. 229
stitution of those men and brutes which have
been brought up in barren countries of un-
genial climate. Yet the most experienced
cattle-breeders know that animals are, cceteris
paribus, the more hardy for having been well
fed and sheltered in youth; but early hard-
ships, by destroying all the tender, ensure
the hardiness of the survivors ; which is the
cause, not the effect, of their having lived
through such a training. So loading a gun-
barrel to the muzzle, and firing it, does not
give it strength ; though it proves, if it escape,
that it was strong.
In like manner, nothing is more common
than to hear a person state confidently, as
from his own experience, that such and such
a patient was cured by this or that medicine :
whereas all that he absolutely knows, is that
he took the medicine, and that he recovered.
Similar is the procedure of many who are
no theorists forsooth, but have found by ex-
perience that the diffusion of education dis-
qualifies the lower classes for humble toil.
They have perhaps experienced really a de-
terioration in this last respect; and having
a dislike to education, they shut their eyes
to the increase of pauperism ; L e. of the
habit of depending on parish-pay, rather than
on independent exertions ; which, to any un-
prejudiced eye would seem the most natural
230 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Boon III.
mode of explaining the relaxation of those
exertions. But such men require us, on the
ground that they are practical men, to adopt
the results of their experience; i.e. to acquiesce
in their crude guesses as to cause and effect,
(like that of the rustic who made Tenterden-
steeple the cause of Goodwin Sands,) precisely
because they are not accustomed to reason.
But I believe we may refer to the same
head the apprehensions so often enter-
tained, that a change however small, and
however in itself harmless, is necessarily
a dangerous thing, as tending to produce
extensive and hurtful innovations. Many
instances may be found of small alterations
being followed by great and mischievous ones;*
but I doubt whether all history can furnish
an instance of the greater innovation having
been, properly speaking, caused by the lesser.
Of course the first change will always precede
the second; and many mischievous innova-
tions have taken place; but these may all
I think be referred to a mistaken effort to
obtain some good, or get rid of some evil ;
not to the love of innovation for its own sake.
The mass of mankind are, in the serious
concerns of life, wedded to what is established
and customary ; and when they make rash
changes, this may often be explained by
* "^ Post hoc ; ergo, propter hoc."
14.] OF FALLACIES. 231
the too long postponement of the requisite
changes ; which allows (as in the case of
the Reformation) evils to reach an intolerable
height, before any remedy is thought of.
And even then, the remedy is often so violently
resisted by many, as to drive others into
dangerous extremes. And when this occurs,
we are triumphantly told that experience
shows what mischievous excesses are caused
by once beginning to innovate. " I told
you that if once you began to repair your
house you would have to pull it all down."
" Yes ; but you told me wrong ; for if I
had begun sooner, the replacing of a few
tiles might have sufficed. The mischief was,
not in taking down the first stone, but in
letting it stand too long."
Such an argument as any of these might
strictly be called " non causa pro causa ;" but
it is not probable that the Logical writers
intended any such limitation (which indeed
would be wholly unnecessary and imperti-
nent,) but rather that they were confounding
together cause and reason; the sequence of
Conclusion from Premises being perpetually
mistaken for that of effect from physical
cause.* It may be better, therefore, to drop
the name which tends to perpetuate this con-
fusion, and simply to state (when such is the
* See Appendix, No. I. article Reason.
232 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [BooicIII.
case) that the premiss is unduly assumed;
i. e. without being either self-evident, or satis-
factorily proved.
The contrivances by which men may deceive
themselves or others, in assuming Premises
unduly, so that that undue assumption shall
not be perceived, (for it is in this the Fallacy
consists) are of course infinite. Sometimes
(as was before observed) the doubtful premiss
is suppressed, as if it were too evident to need
being proved, or even stated, and as if the
whole question turned on the establishment of
the other premiss. Thus Home Tooke proves,
by an immense induction, that all particles
were originally nouns or verbs ; and thence
concludes, that in reality they are so still, and
that the ordinary division of the parts of
speech is absurd ; keeping out of sight, as
self-evident, the other premiss, which is ab-
solutely false ; viz. that the meaning and force
of a word, now, and for ever, must be that
which it, or its root, originally bore.
indirect as- Sometimes men are shamed into admitting
sumption. f . '
an unfounded assertion, by being confidently
told, that it is so evident, that it would argue
great weakness to doubt it. In general, how-
ever, the more skilful Sophist will avoid a
direct assertion of what he means unduly to
assume ; because that might direct the reader's
attention to the consideration of the question
14.] OF FALLACIES. 233
whether it be true or not; since that which
is indisputable does not so often need to be
asserted. It succeeds better, therefore, to
allude to the proposition, as something curious
and remarkable ; just as the Royal Society
were imposed on by being asked to account
for the fact that a vessel of water received no
addition to its weight by a live fish put into
it; while they were seeking for the cause,
they forgot to ascertain the fact ; and thus
admitted without suspicion a mere fiction.
Thus an eminent Scotch writer, instead of
asserting that " the advocates of Logic have
been worsted and driven from the field in every
controversy," (an assertion which, if made,
would have been the more readily ascertained
to be perfectly groundless,) merely observes, that
" it is a circumstance not a little remarkable."
One of the many contrivances employed Fallac y of
" L J references.
for this purpose, is what may be called the
" Fallacy of references ;" which is particularly
common in popular theological works. It is
of course a circumstance which adds great
weight to any assertion, that it shall seem to
be supported by many passages of Scripture,
or of the Fathers and other ancient writers,
whose works are not in many people's hands.
Now when a writer can find few or none of
these, that distinctly and decidedly favour his
opinion, he may at least find many which may
234 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [BooKlII.
be conceived capable of being so understood,
or which, in some way or other, remotely
relate to the subject ; but if these texts were
inserted at length, it would be at once per-
ceived how little they bear on the question ;
the usual artifice therefore is, to give merely
references to them ; trusting that nineteen out
of twenty readers will never take the trouble
of turning to the passages, but, taking for
granted that they afford, each, some degree
of confirmation to what is maintained, will
be overawed by seeing every assertion sup-
ported, as they suppose, by five or six Scrip-
ture-texts, as many from the Fathers, fyc.
Great force is often added to the employ-
ment in a declamatory work, of the fallacy
now before us, by bitterly reproaching or
deriding an opponent, as denying some sacred
truth, or some evident axiom ; assuming, that
is, that he denies the true premiss, and keeping
out of sight the one on which the question
really turns. E. G. a declaimer who is main-
taining some doctrine as being taught in Scrip-
ture, may impute to his opponents a contempt
for the authority of Scripture, and reproach
them for impiety ; when the question really is,
whether the doctrine be scriptural or not.
Frequently the Fallacy of ignoratio elenchi
is called in to the aid of this ; i. e. the Premiss
is assumed on the ground of another propo-
14.] OF FALLACIES. 235
sition, somewhat like it, having been proved.
Thus, in arguing by example, $c. the pa-
rallelism of two cases is often assumed from
their being in some respects alike, though per-
haps they differ in the very point which is
essential to the argument. E. G. From the
circumstance that some men of humble sta-
tion, who have been well educated, are apt
to think themselves above low drudgery, it
is argued, that universal education of the
lower orders would beget general idleness :
this argument rests, of course, on the assump-
tion of parallelism in the two cases, viz. the
past and the future ; whereas there is a cir-
cumstance that is absolutely essential, in which
they differ ; for when education is universal it
must cease to be a distinction ; which is pro-
bably the very circumstance that renders men
too proud for their work.
This very same Fallacy is often resorted to
on the opposite side : an attempt is made to
invalidate some argument from Example, by
pointing out a difference between the two
cases : though they agree in every thing that
is essential to the question.
It should be added that we may often be calculation of
probabilities.
deceived, not only by admitting a premiss
which is absolutely unsupported, but also, by
attributing to one which really is probable,
a greater degree of probability than rightly
236 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [BOOK III.
belongs to it. And this effect will often be
produced by our omitting to calculate the
probability in each successive step of a long
chain of argument, and being, in each, (see
11,) deceived by the fallacy of Division.
Each premiss successively introduced, may
have, as was above explained, an excess of
chances in its favour, and yet the ultimate
conclusion may have a great preponderance
against it ; e. g. " All Y is (probably) X : all
Z is (probably) Y : therefore Z is (probably)
X :" now suppose the truth of the major
premiss to be more probable than not ; in
other words, that the chances for it are more
than - ; say ^ ; and for the truth of the minor,
let the chances be greater still ; say | : then
by multiplying together the numerators, and
also the denominators of these two fractions,
|x|, we obtain ^, as indicating the degree of
probability of the conclusion ; which is less
than - ; i. e. the conclusion is less likely to
be true than not. E. G. " The reports this
author heard are (probably) true ; this (some-
thing which he records) is a report which
(probably) he heard ; therefore it is true :"
suppose, first, The majority of the reports he
heard, as 4 out of 7, (or 12 of 21,) to be
true ; and, next, That he generally, as twice
in three times, ( or 8 in 12,) reports faithfully
what he heard ; it follows that of 21 of his
15.] OF FALLACIES. 237
reports, only 8 are true. Of course, the
results are proportionably striking when there
is a long series of arguments of this descrip-
tion. And yet weak and thoughtless reasoners
are often influenced by hearing a great deal
urged, a, great number of probabilities brought
forward, in support of some conclusion ; i. e.
a long chain, of which each successive link
is weaker than the foregoing ; instead of (what
they mistake it for) a cumulation of argu-
ments, each, separately proving the probability
of the conclusion.
Lastly, it may be here remarked, conform-
ably with what has been formerly said, that
it will often be left to your choice whether to
refer this or that fallacious argument to the
present head, or that of Ambiguous middle ;
" if the middle term is here used in this sense,
there is an ambiguity ; if in that sense, the
proposition \sfalse"
15.
The last kind of Fallacy to be noticed irrelevant
* Conclusion.
is that of Irrelevant Conclusion, commonly
called ignoratio elenchi.
Various kinds of propositions are, accord-
ing to the occasion, substituted for the one
of which proof is required. Sometimes the
Particular for the Universal ; sometimes a
238 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [BOOK III.
proposition with different Terms : and various
are the contrivances employed to effect and
to conceal this substitution, and to make
the Conclusion which the Sophist has drawn,
answer, practically, the same purpose as the
one he ought to have established. I say,
"practically the same purpose," because it
will very often happen that some emotion will
be excited some sentiment impressed on the
mind (by a dexterous employment of this
Fallacy) such as shall bring men into the dis-
position requisite for your purpose, though
they may not have assented to, or even stated
distinctly in their own minds, the proposition
which it was your business to establish.* Thus
if a Sophist has to defend one who has been
guilty of some serious offence, which he wishes
to extenuate, though he is unable distinctly to
prove that it is not such, yet if he can succeed
in making the audience laugh at some casual
matter, he has gained practically the same
point.
So also if any one has pointed out the
extenuating circumstances in some particular
case of offence, so as to show that it differs
widely from the generality of the same class,
the Sophist, if he find himself unable to
disprove these circumstances, may do away
the force of them, by simply referring the
* See Rhetoric, Part II.
15.] OF FALLACIES. 239
action to that very class, which no one can
deny that it belongs to, and the very name
of which will excite a feeling of disgust suffi-
'cient to counteract the extenuation; e.g. let
it be a case of peculation ; and that many
mitigating circumstances have been brought
forward which cannot be denied ; the sophis-
tical opponent will reply, " well, but after all,
the man is a rogue, and there is an end of it ;"
now in reality this was (by hypothesis) never
the question ; and the mere assertion of what
was never denied, ought not, in fairness, to
be regarded as decisive ; but practically, the
odiousness of the word, arising in great mea-
sure from the association of those very circum-
stances which belong to most of the class,
but which we have supposed to be absent in
this particular instance, excites precisely that
feeling of disgust, which in effect destroys the
force of the defence. In like manner we may
refer to this head, all cases of improper appeals
to the passions, and every thing else which is
mentioned by Aristotle as extraneous to the
matter in hand (e<o rov TT pay paras.}
In all these cases, as has been before ob-
served, if the fallacy we are now treating of
be employed for the apparent establishment,
not of the ultimate Conclusion, but (as it very
commonly happens) of a Premiss, (i. e. if the
Premiss required be assumed on the ground
240 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [BOOK III.
that some proposition resembling it has been
proved) then there will be a combination of
this Fallacy with the last mentioned.
A good instance of the employment and
exposure of this Fallacy occurs in Thucydides,
in the speeches of Cleon and Diodotus con-
cerning the Mitylenaeans : the former (over
and above his appeal to the angry passions
of his audience) urges the justice of putting
the revolters to death ; which, as the latter
remarked, was nothing to the purpose, since
the Athenians were not sitting in judgment,
but in deliberation; of which the proper end
is expediency. And to prove that they had
a right to put them to death, did not prove
this to be an advisable step.
This fallacy It is evident, that ignoratio elenchi may be
used in refu- *
employed as well for the apparent refutation
of your opponent's proposition, as for the
apparent establishment of your own ; for it
is substantially the same thing, to prove what
was not denied, or to disprove what was not
asserted : the latter practice is not less com-
mon, and it is more offensive, because it
frequently amounts to a personal affront, in
attributing to a person opinions, fyc. which he
perhaps holds in abhorrence. Thus, when in a
discussion one party vindicates, on the ground
of general expediency, a particular instance of
resistance to Government in a case of intole-
15.] OF FALLACIES. 241
rable oppression, the opponent may gravely
maintain, that "we ought riot to do evil that
good may come :" a proposition which of
course had never heen denied ; the point in
dispute being " whether resistance in this par-
ticular case were doing evil or not." In this
example it is to be remarked (and the remark
will apply very generally) that the Fallacy of
petitio principii is combined with that of igno-
ratio elenchi; which is a very common and often
successful practice ; viz. the Sophist proves, or
disproves, not the proposition which is really
in question, but one which so implies it as to
proceed on the supposition that it is already
decided, and can admit of no doubt ; by this
means his " assumption of the point in ques-
tion" is so indirect and oblique, that it may
easily escape notice ; and he thus establishes,
practically, his Conclusion, at the very moment
he is withdrawing your attention from it to
another question.
There are certain kinds of argument re-
counted and named by Logical writers, which
we should by no means universally call
Fallacies ; but which when unfairly used, and
so far as they are fallacious, may very well
be referred to the present head ; such as
the " argumentum ad hominem" or personal
ad hominem,
argument, " argumentum ad verectmdiam," &c -
" argumentum ad populum" Sfc. all of them
R
242 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [BOOK III.
regarded as contradistinguished from " argu-
mentum ad rem" or according to others
(meaning probably the very same thing)
"ad judicium." These have all been de-
scribed in the lax and popular language
before alluded to, but not scientifically : the
" argumentum ad hominem" they say, " is
addressed to the peculiar circumstances,
character, avowed opinions, or past conduct
of the individual, and therefore has a refer-
ence to him only, and does not bear
directly and absolutely on the real question,
as the 'argumentum ad rem' does:" in like
manner, the " argumentum ad verecundiam"
is described as an appeal to our reverence
for some respected authority, some vene-
rable institution, fyc. and the " argumen-
tum ad populum" as an appeal to. the preju-
dices, passions, fyc. of the multitude ; and
so of the rest. Along with these is usually
enumerated "argumentum ad ignorantiam"
which is here omitted, as being evidently
nothing more than the employment of some
kind of Fallacy, in the widest sense of that
word, towards such as are likely to be
deceived by it. It appears then (to speak
rather more technically) that in the "argu-
mentum ad hominem" the conclusion which
actually is established, is not the absolute
and general one in question, but relative and
15.] UK KAIJ.AC IKS. 243
particular ; viz. not that " such and such is
the fact," but that "this man is bound to
admit it, in conformity to his principles of
Reasoning, or in consistency with his own
conduct, situation, fyc.* Such a conclusion
it is often both allowable and necessary to
establish, in order to silence those who will
not yield to fair general argument ; or to
convince those whose weakness and preju-
* The " argumentum ad hominem " will often have the
effect of shifting the burden of proof, not unjustly, to the
adversary. (See Rhet. Part I. chap. iii. 2.) A com-
mon instance is the defence, certainly the readiest and most
concise, frequently urged by the Sportsman, when accused
of barbarity in sacrificing unoffending hares or trout to his
amusement : he replies, as he may safely do, to most of his
assailants, " why do you feed on the flesh of animals ?" and
that this answer presses hard, is manifested by its being
usually opposed by a palpable falsehood ; viz. that the
animals which are killed for food are sacrificed to our neces-
sities ; though not only men can, but a large proportion
(probably a great majority) of the human race actually do,
subsist in health and vigour without flesh-diet ; and the
earth would support a much greater human population
were such a practice universal.
When shamed out of this argument they sometimes urge
that the brute creation would overrun the earth, if we did
not kill them for food ; an argument, which, if it were valid
at all, would not justify their feeding on fish ; though, if
fairly followed up, it would justify Swift's proposal for keep-
ing down the excessive population of Ireland. The true
reason, viz. that they eat flesh for the gratification of the
palate, and have a taste for the pleasures of the table, though
not for the sports of the field, is one which they do not like
to assign.
R 2
244 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Boon III.
dices would not allow them to assign to it
its due weight. It is thus that our Lord on
many occasions silences the cavils of the
Jews ; as in the vindication of healing on
the Sabbath, which is paralleled by the
authorized practice of drawing out a beast
that has fallen into a pit. All this, as we
have said, is perfectly fair, provided it be
done plainly, and avowedly ; but if you
attempt to substitute this partial and relative
Conclusion for a more general one if you
triumph as having established your proposi-
tion absolutely and universally, from having
established it, in reality, only as far as it
relates to your opponent, then you are
guilty of a Fallacy of the kind which we
are now treating of: your Conclusion is not
in reality that which was, by your own
account, proposed to be proved. The fal-
laciousness depends upon the deceit, or
attempt to deceive. The same observations
will apply to " argumentum ad verecundiam"
and the rest.
It is very common to employ an ambi-
guous Term for the purpose of introducing
the Fallacy of irrelevant conclusion : L e.
when you cannot prove your proposition in
the sense in which it was maintained, to prove
it in some other sense ; e. g. those who
contend against -the efficacy of faith, usually
16.] OF FALLACIES. 245
employ that word in their arguments in the
sense of mere belief, unaccompanied with
any moral or practical result, but considered
as a mere intellectual process; and when
they have thus proved their Conclusion, they
oppose it to one in which the word is used
in a widely different sense.*
* " When the occasion or object in question is not such
as calls for, or as is likely to excite in those particular readers
or hearers, the emotions required, it is a common Rhetorical
artifice to turn their attention to some object which will call
forth these feelings ; and when they are^too much excited
to be capable of judging calmly, it will not be difficult to
turn their Passions, once roused, in the direction required,
and to make them view the case before them in a very dif-
ferent light. When the metal is heated it may easily be
moulded into the desired form. Thus vehement indignation
against some crime, may be directed against a person who
has not been proved guilty of it ; and vague declamations
against corruption, oppression, fyc. or against the mischiefs
of anarchy; with high-flown panegyrics on liberty, rights of
man, fyc. or on social order, justice, the constitution, law,
religion, <^c. will gradually lead the hearers to take for
granted, without proof, that the measure proposed will lead
to these evils,- or to these advantages ; and it will in conse-
quence become the object of groundless abhorrence or ad-
miration. For the very utterance of such words as have a
multitude of what may be called stimulating ideas associated
with them, will operate like a charm on the minds, espe-
cially of the ignorant and unthinking, and raise such a
tumult of feeling, as will effectually blind their judgment ;
so that a string of vague abuse or panegyric will often have
the effect of a train of sound Argument." Rhetoric, Part II.
Chap. ii. 6.
246 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Boon III.
16.
The Fallacy of ignoratio elenchi is nowhere
more common than in protracted controversy,
when one of the parties, after having at-
tempted in vain to maintain his position, shifts
his ground as covertly as possible to another,
instead of honestly giving up the point. An
instance occurs in an attack made on the
system pursued at one of our Universities.
The objectors, finding themselves unable to
maintain their charge of the present neglect of
Mathematics in that place, (to which neglect
they attributed the late general decline in
those studies) shifted their ground, and con-
tended that that University was never famous
for Mathematicians : which not only does not
establish, but absolutely overthrows, their own
original assertion ; for if it never succeeded in
those pursuits, it could not have caused their
late decline.
Fallacy of A practice of this nature is common in oral
combating
^^7-' controversy especially ; viz. that of combating
both your opponent's Premises alternately, and
shifting the attack from the one to the other,
without waiting to have either of them de-
cided upon before you quit it.
It has been remarked above, that one class
of the propositions that may be, in this Fal-
lacy, substituted for the one required, is the
17.] OF FALLACIES. 247
particular for the universal : similar to this, is
the substitution of a conditional with a uni-
versal antecedent, for one with a particular
antecedent, which will usually be the harder
to prove : e. g. you are called on, suppose, to
prove that " if any private interests are hurt
by a proposed measure, it is inexpedient ;"
and you pretend to have done so by showing
that " if all private interests are hurt by it, it
must be inexpedient." Nearly akin to this is
the very common case of proving something
to be possible when it ought to have been
proved highly probable ; or probable, when it
ought to have been proved necessary ; or,
which comes to the very same, proving it to
be not necessary, when it should have been
proved not probable ; or improbable, when it
should have been proved impossible. Aristotle
(in Rhet. Book II.) complains of this last
branch of the Fallacy, as giving an undue
advantage to the respondent ; many a guilty
person owes his acquittal to this ; the jury
considering that the evidence brought does not
demonstrate the absolute impossibility of his
being innocent ; though perhaps the chances
are innumerable against it.
17.
Similar to this case is that which may be Fallacy of
* . Olyections,
called the Fallacy of objections : L e. showing
248 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Boon 111.
that there are objections against some plan,
theory, or system, and thence inferring that
it should be rejected ; when that which ought
to have been proved is, that there are more,
or stronger objections, against the receiving
than the rejecting of it. This is the main,
and almost universal Fallacy of anti-christians ;
and is that of which a young Christian should
be first and principally warned.* They find
numerous " objections " against various parts
of Scripture ; to some of which no satisfactory
answer can be given ; and the incautious
hearer is apt, while his attention is fixed on
these, to forget that there are infinitely more,
and stronger objections against the supposition
that the Christian Religion is of human origin ;
and that where we cannot answer all objec-
tions, we are bound in reason and in candour
to adopt the hypothesis which labours under
the least. That the case is as I have stated,
I am authorized to assume, from this circum-
stance ; that no complete and consistent account
has ever been given of the manner in which the
Christian Religion, supposing it a human con-
trivance, could have arisen and prevailed as it
did. And yet this may obviously be demanded
with the utmost fairness, of those who deny
its divine origin. The Religion exists : that is
the phenomenon ; those who will not allow it
* See Note at the end of Appendix, No. Ill,
17.] OF FALLACIES. 249
to have come from God, are bound to solve
the phenomenon on some other hypothesis
less open to objections; they are not indeed
called on to prove that it actually did arise in
this or that way ; but to suggest (consistently
with acknowledged facts) some probable way
in which it may have arisen, reconcileable
with all the circumstances of the case. That
infidels have never done this, though they
have had near 2000 years to try, amounts to
a confession that no such hypothesis can be
devised, which will not be open to greater
objections than lie against Christianity.* The
Fallacy of Objections is also the strong-hold
of bigoted anti-innovators, who oppose all
reforms and alterations indiscriminately; for
there never was, or will be, any plan exe-
cuted or proposed, against which strong and
even unanswerable objections may not be
urged ; so that unless the opposite objections
be set in the balance on the other side, we
can never advance a step. " There are objec-
tions," said Dr. Johnson, " against a plenum,
and objections against a vacuum ; but one of
them must be true."
The very same Fallacy indeed is employed
* In an " Essay on the Omissions of our Sacred Writers,"
I have pointed out some circumstances which no one has
ever attempted to account for on any supposition of their
being other than, not only true witnesses, but supernatu-
rally inspired.
250 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [BOOK III.
(as has been said) on the other side, by those
who are for overthrowing whatever is esta-
blished as soon as they can prove an objection
against it ; without considering whether more
and weightier objections may not lie against
their own schemes : but their opponents have
this decided advantage over them, that they
can urge with great plausibility, " we do not
call upon you to reject at once whatever is ob-
jected to, but merely to suspend your judgment 9
and not come to a decision as long as there
are reasons on both sides :" now since there
always will be reasons on both sides, this wow-
decision is practically the very same thing as
a decision in favour of the existing state of
things. The delay of trial becomes equivalent
to an acquittal.*
18.
>
Fallacy of Another form of ignoratio elenchi, which is
a ^ so ratner the more serviceable on the side
of the respondent, is, to prove or disprove
some part of that which is required, and dwell
on that, suppressing all the rest.
* " Not to resolve, is to resolve." Bacon.
How happy it is for mankind that in the most momen-
tous concerns of life their decision is generally formed for
them by external circumstances : which thus saves them
not only from the perplexity of doubt and the danger of
delay, but also from the pain of regret ; since we acquiesce
much more cheerfully in that which is unavoidable.
18.] OF FALLACIES. 251
Thus, if a University is charged with culti-
vating only the mere elements of Mathematics,
and in reply a list of the books studied there
is produced, should even any one of those
books be not elementary, the charge is in
fairness refuted; but the Sophist may then
earnestly contend that some of those books
are elementary ; and thus keep out of sight
the real question, viz. whether they are all
so. This is the great art of the answerer of a
book ; suppose the main positions in any work
to be irrefragable, it will be strange if some
illustration of them, or some subordinate part
in short, will not admit of a plausible objec-
tion ; the opponent then joins issue on one of
these incidental questions, and comes forward
with " a Reply " to such and such a work.
Hence the danger of ever advancing more
than can be well maintained, since the refu-
tation of that will often quash the whole.
The Quakers would perhaps before now have
succeeded in doing away our superfluous and
irreverent oaths, if they had not, besides many
valid and strong arguments, adduced so many
that are weak and easily refuted. Thus also, a
guilty person may often escape by having too
much laid to his charge ; so he may also by
having too much evidence against him, i. e.
some that is not in itself satisfactory. Ac-
cordingly, a prisoner may sometimes obtain
252 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [BOOK III.
acquittal by showing that one of the witnesses
against him is an infamous informer and spy ;
though perhaps if that part of the evidence
had been omitted, the rest would have been
sufficient for conviction.
Cases of this nature might very well be re-
ferred also to the Fallacy formerly mentioned,
of inferring the Falsity of the Conclusion from
the Falsity of a Premiss ; which indeed is very
closely allied to the present Fallacy : the real
question is, " whether or not this Conclusion
ought to be admitted;" the Sophist confines
himself to the question, " whether or not it
is established by this particular argument;' 9
leaving it to be inferred by the audience, if he
has carried his point as to the latter question,
that the former is thereby decided.
19.
suppressed It will readily be perceived that nothing is
Couclusion. r
less conducive to the success ot the Fallacy in
question than to state clearly, in the outset,
either the proposition you are about to prove,
or that which you ought to prove. It answers
best to begin with the Premises, and to intro-
duce a pretty long chain of argument before
you arrive at the Conclusion. The careless
hearer takes for granted, at the beginning,
that this chain will lead to the Conclusion
required ; and by the time you are come to
20.] OF FALLACIES. 253
the end, he is ready to take for granted that
the Conclusion which you draw is the one
required ; his idea of the question having
gradually become indistinct. This Fallacy is
greatly aided by the common practice of sup-
pressing the Conclusion and leaving it to be
supplied by the hearer; who is of course less
likely to perceive whether it be really that
"which was to be proved," than if it were
distinctly stated. The practice therefore is at
best suspicious ; and it is better in general to
avoid it, and to give and require a distinct
statement of the Conclusion intended.
20.
Before we dismiss the subject of Fallacies, it Jests
may not be improper to mention the just and
ingenious remark, that Jests are Fallacies ;*
i. e. Fallacies so palpable as not to be likely
to deceive any one, but yet bearing just that
resemblance of argument which is calculated
to amuse by the contrast; in the same
manner that a parody does, by the contrast
of its levity with the serious production which
it imitates. There is indeed something laugh-
able even in Fallacies which are intended for
serious conviction, when they are thoroughly
exposed.f
* See Wallis's Logic.
f See Rhetoric, Part I. Ch. iii. 7, p. 131.
254 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [BOOK III.
There are several different kinds of joke
and raillery, which will be found to correspond
with the different kinds of Fallacy. The pun
(to take the simplest and most obvious case)
is evidently, in most instances, a mock argu-
ment founded on a palpable equivocation of
the middle Term : and the rest in like manner
will be found to correspond to the respec-
tive Fallacies, and to be imitations of serious
argument.
It is probable indeed that all jests, sports,
or games, (iratBuu) properly so called, will be
found, on examination, to be imitative of
serious transactions ; as of War or Com-
merce.* But to enter fully into this subject
would be unsuitable to the present occasion.
I shall subjoin some general remarks on the
legitimate province of Reasoning, and on its
connexion with Inductive philosophy, and
with Rhetoric ; on which points much mis-
apprehension has prevailed, tending to throw
obscurity over the design and use of the
Science under consideration.
* See some excellent remarks on " Imitation," in Dr.
A. Smith's posthumous Essays.
BOOK IV.] 255
BOOK IV.
DISSERTATION ON THE PROVINCE OF
REASONING.
LOGIC being concerned with the theory of
Reasoning, it is evidently necessary, in order
to take a correct view of this Science, that all
misapprehensions should he removed relative
to the occasions on which the Reasoning-
process is employed, the purposes it has
in view, and the limits within which it is
confined.
Simple and obvious as such questions may
appear to those who have not thought much
on the subject, they will appear on further
consideration to be involved in much per-
plexity and obscurity, from the vague and
inaccurate language of many popular writers.
To the confused and incorrect notions that
prevail respecting the Reasoning-process may
be traced most of the common mistakes re-
specting the Science of Logic, and much of the
unsound and unphilosophical argumentation
256 ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [BOOK IV.
which is so often to be met with in the works
of ingenious writers.
These errors have been incidentally ad-
verted to in the foregoing part of this work ;
but it may be desirable, before we dismiss the
subject, to offer on these points some further
remarks, which could not have been there
introduced without too great an interruption
to the development of the system. Little or
nothing indeed remains to be said that is
not implied in the principles which have been
already laid down ; but the results and appli-
cations of those principles are liable in many
instances to be overlooked, if not distinctly
pointed out. These supplementary observa-
tions will neither require, nor admit of, so
systematic an arrangement as has hitherto
been aimed at ; since they will be such as
are suggested principally by the objections
and mistakes of those who have misunder-
stood, partially or entirely, the nature of the
Logical system.
Let it be observed, however, that as I am
not writing a review or commentary on any
logical works, but an introduction to the
Science, I shall not deem it necessary to point
out in all cases the agreement or disagreement
between other writers and myself, in respect
of the views maintained, or the terms em-
ployed, by each.
CHAP. I. 1.] OF INDUCTION. 257
opposing
CHAP. I. Of Induction.
i-
MUCH has been said by some writers of the Mistake of
superiority of the Inductive to the Syllogistic
method of seeking truth ; as if the two stood
opposed to each other ; and of the advantage
of substituting the Organon of Bacon for that
of Aristotle, fyc. fyc. which indicates a total
misconception of the nature of both. There
is, however, the more excuse for the confu-
sion of thought which prevails on this subject,
because eminent Logical writers have treated,
or at least have appeared to treat, of Induc-
tion as a kind of Argument, distinct from the
Syllogism ; which if it were, it certainly might
be contrasted with the Syllogism : or rather,
the whole Syllogistic theory would fall to the
ground, since one of the very first principles
it establishes, is that all Reasoning, on what-
ever subject, is one and the same process,
which may be clearly exhibited in the form
of Syllogisms. It is hardly to be supposed,
therefore, that this was the deliberate mean-
ing of those writers ; though it must be ad-
mitted that they have countenanced the error
in question, by their inaccurate expressions.
s
258 ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [BOOK IV.
This inaccuracy seems chiefly to have arisen
from a vagueness in the use of the word
Induction ; which is sometimes employed to
designate the process of investigation and of
collecting facts ; sometimes, the deducing of
an inference from those facts. The former
of these processes (viz. that of observation and
experiment) is undoubtedly distinct from that
which takes place in the Syllogism ; but then
it is not a process of argumentation ; the
latter again is an argumentative process ; but
then it is, like all other arguments, capable of
being Syllogistically expressed. And hence
Induction has come to be regarded as a dis-
tinct kind of argument from the Syllogism.
This Fallacy cannot be more concisely or
clearly stated, than in the technical form with
which we may now presume our readers to be
familiar.
" Induction is distinct from Syllogism :
Induction is a process of Reasoning ;" therefore
" There is a process of Reasoning distinct from
^Syllogism." '
Here, " Induction," which is the middle
Term, is used in different senses in the two
Premises.
TWO senses Induction, so far forth as it is an argu-
of the word
induction, ment, may, of course, be stated Syllogisti-
cally : but so far forth as it is a process of
inquiry with a view to obtain the Premises of
CHAP. I. 1.] OF INDUCTION. 259
that argument, it is, of course, out of the
province of Logic : and the latter is the ori-
ginal and strict sense of the word. Induction
means properly, not the inferring of the con-
clusion,, but the bringing in, one by one, of
instances, bearing on the point in question,
till a sufficient number has been collected.
The ambiguity therefore, above alluded to, and
which has led to much confusion, would be best
avoided by saying that we do not, strictly speak-
ing, reason by Induction, but reason from In-
duction : i.e. from our observations on one, or proper sense
of Induction.
on several individuals, (e/e TW KO,& e/caarov) we
draw a conclusion respecting the class (TO
Kado\ov) they come under : or, in like manner,
from several species, to the genus which com-
prehends them : in logical language, what we
have predicated of certain singular terms, we
proceed to predicate of a common term which
comprehends them ; or proceed in the same
manner from species to genus. E. G. " The
Earth moves round the Sun in an elliptical
orbit ; so does Mercury ; and Venus ; and
Mars, fyc. : therefore a Planet (the common
term comprehending these singulars) moves
round," fyc. " Philip was reckless of human
life ; so was Alexander ; and J. Caesar ; and
Augustus, fyc. : therefore this is the general
character of a Conqueror''
Now it appears as if the most obvious and
s2
260 ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [BOOK IV.
simplest way of filling up such enthymemes
as these, expressed as they are, would be, in
the third figure ; having of course a particular
Conclusion:
inductiveAr- *' Earth, Mercury, Venus, fyc, move, fyc.
pressed in a Mi. These are planets ; therefore
Syllogism, ~ , n ,,
borne planets move, fyc.
But when we argue from Induction we gene-
rally mean to infer more than a particular
conclusion ; and accordingly most logical
writers present to us the argument in the
form of a syllogism in Barbara ; inserting, of
course, a different minor premiss from the
in the first foregoing, viz. : the simple converse of it.
figure.
And if I am allowed to assume, not merely
that " Mercury, Venus, and whatever others I
may have named, are Planets," but also, that
" All Planets are these," that these are the
whole of the individuals comprehended under
the term Planet, I am, no doubt, authorized
to draw a universal conclusion. But such an
assumption would, in a very great majority
of cases where Induction is employed, amount
to a palpable falsehood, if understood literally.
And accordingly those logicians who state an
argument from Induction in the above form,
mean, I apprehend, that it is to be under-
stood with a certain latitude ; i. e. that, in
such propositions as " all planets are Mercury,
CHAP. I. 1.] OF INDUCTION. 261
Venus, fyc" or " all Conquerors are Philip,
Alexander, and Caesar," they mean, (by a
kind of logical fiction) to denote that " all
Conquerors are adequately represented by
Philip, Alexander, $*c." that these indivi-
duals are a sufficient sample, in respect of the
matter in question, of the class they belong to.
I think it clearer, therefore, to state simply The Major
A * premiss sup-
and precisely what it is that we do mean to pressed<
assert. And in doing this, we shall find that
the expressed premiss of the enthymeme,
viz.: that which contains the statement re-
specting the individuals is the Minor ; and
that it is the Major that is suppressed, as
being in all cases substantially the same : viz.
that what belongs to the individual or indivi-
duals we have examined, belongs (certainly, or
probably, as the case may be) to the whole
class under which they come. E. G. From find-
ing on an examination of several sheep, that
they each ruminate, we conclude that the
same is the case with the whole species of
sheep : and from finding on examination of the
sheep, ox, deer, and other animals deficient
in upper cutting-teeth, that they each rumi-
nate, we conclude (with more or less cer-
tainty) that quadrupeds thus deficient are
ruminants : the hearer readily supplying, in
sense, the suppressed major premiss ; viz. that
" what belongs to the individual sheep we have
262 ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [Boon IV.
examined, is likely to belong to the whole
species ;" fyc.
Whether that which is properly called
Induction (viz. the inquiry respecting the
several individuals or species) be sufficiently
ample, i. e. takes in a sufficient number of
individual, or of specific cases, whether the
character of those cases has been correctly
ascertained and how far the individuals we
have examined are likely to resemble, in this
or that circumstance, the rest of the class, fyc.
fyc., are points that require indeed great judg-
ment and caution ; but this judgment and
caution are not to be aided by Logic, because
they are, in reality, employed in deciding
whether or not it is fair and allowable to lay
down your Premises ; i. e. whether you are
authorized or not, to assert, that "what is
true of the individuals you have examined, is
true of the whole class :" and that this or that
is true of those individuals. Now, the rules
of Logic have nothing to do with the truth
or falsity of the Premises ; except, of course,
when they are the conclusions of former argu-
ments; but merely teach us to decide, not
whether the Premises are fairly laid down, but
whether the Conclusion follows fairly from the
Premises or not.
CHAP. I. 2.] OF INDUCTION. 263
2.
Whether then the Premiss may fairly be Assumption
* of Premises
assumed, or not, is a point which cannot be in Inducti(
decided without a competent knowledge of
the nature of the subject. E. G. in Natural
Philosophy, in which the circumstances that
in any case affect the result, are usually far
more clearly ascertained, a single instance is
usually accounted a sufficient Induction ; e.g.
having once ascertained that an individual
magnet will attract iron, we are authorized to
conclude that this property is .universal. In
the affairs of human life, on the other hand,
a much fuller Induction is required ; as in the
former example. In short, the degree of evi-
dence for any proposition we originally assume
as a Premiss (whether the expressed or the
suppressed one) is not to be learned from
Logic, nor indeed from any one distinct Science ;
but is the province of whatever Science fur-
nishes the subject-matter of your argument.
None but a Politician can judge rightly of the
degree of evidence of a proposition in Politics ;
a Naturalist, in Natural History, fyc. fyc.
E. G. from examination of many horned ani- inve 8 ti ga
* tion.
mals, as sheep, cows, fyc.> a Naturalist finds
that they have cloven feet ; now his skill as a
Naturalist is to be shown in judging whether
these animals are likely to resemble in the
264 ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [BOOK IV.
form of their feet all other horned animals;
and it is the exercise of this judgment, toge-
ther with the examination of individuals, that
constitutes what is usually meant by the In-
ductive process ; which is that by which we
gain, what are properly, new truths ; and which
is not connected with Logic ; being not what
is strictly called Reasoning, but Investigation.
But when this major Premiss is granted him,
and is combined with the minor, viz. that the
animals he has examined have cloven feet,
then he draws the Conclusion logically: viz.
that "the feet of all horned animals are
cloven."* Again, if from several times meet-
ing with ill-luck on a Friday, any one concluded
that Friday, universally, is an unlucky day,
one would object to his Induction ; and yet it
would not be, as an argument, illogical; since
the Conclusion follows fairly, if you grant his
implied Premiss; viz. that the events which
happened on those particular Fridays are such
as must happen, or are especially likely to
happen, on all Fridays : but we should object
to his laying down this Premiss ; and therefore
should justly say that his Induction is faulty,
though his argument is correct.
* I have selected an Instance in which Induction is the
only ground we have to rest on ; no reason, that I know of,
having ever been assigned that could have led us to conjec-
ture this curious fact a priori
CHAP. I. 2.] OF INDUCTION. 265 r
And here it may be remarked, that the c more
w . doubtful PlC-
ordinary rule for fair argument, viz. that ^edVn
in an Enthymeme the suppressed Premiss
should be always the one of whose truth
least doubt can exist, is not observed in In-
duction : for the Premiss which is usually
the more doubtful of the two, is, in this
case, the major ; it being in few cases quite
certain that the individuals, respecting which
some point has been ascertained, are to be
fairly regarded as a sample of the whole
class : and yet the major Premiss is seldom
expressed ; for the reason just given, that it
is easily understood; as being (mutatis mu-
tandis) the same in every Induction.
What has been said of Induction will
equally apply to Example ; which differs from
it only in having a singular instead of a
general conclusion ; and that, from a single
case. E. G. in one of the instances above,
if the conclusion had been drawn, not re-
specting conquerors in general, but respecting
this or that conqueror, that he was not likely
to be careful of human life, each of the cases
adduced to prove this would have been called
an Example. (See Elements of Rhetoric,
Part I. ch. ii. 6.)
266 ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [BOOK IV.
CHAP. II. On the Discovery of Truth.
i.
WHETHER it is by a process of Reasoning
that New Truths are brought to light, is a
question which seems to be decided in the ne-
gative by what has been already said ; though
many eminent writers seem to have taken for
granted the affirmative. It is, perhaps, in a
great measure, a dispute concerning the use of
words ; but it is not, for that reason, either
uninteresting or unimportant ; since an inac-
curate use of language may often, in matters
of Science, lead to confusion of thought, and
to erroneous conclusions. And, in the present
instance, much of the undeserved contempt
which has been bestowed on the Logical sys-
tem may be traced to this source. For when
any one has laid down, that " Reasoning is
important in the discovery of Truth," and that
" Logic is of no service in the discovery of
Truth," (each of which propositions is true
in a certain sense of the terms employed,
but not in the same sense) he is naturally
led to conclude, that there are processes of
Reasoning to which the Syllogistic theory does
not apply ; and, of course, to misconceive alto-
gether the nature of the Science.
CHAP. II. 1.] DISCOVERY OF TRUTH. 267
In maintaining the negative side of the
above question, three things are to be pre-
mised : first, that it is not contended that
discoveries of any kind of Truth can be made
(or at least are usually made) without Reason-
ing ; only, that Reasoning is not the whole of
the process, nor the whole of that which is
important therein ; secondly, that Reasoning
shall be taken in the sense, not of every exer-
cise of the Reason, but of Argumentation, in
which we have all along used it, and in which
it has been defined by all the Logical writers,
viz. " from certain granted propositions to
infer another proposition as the consequence
of them :" thirdly, that by a " New Truth,"
be understood, something neither expressly
nor virtually asserted before, not implied
and involved in anything already known.
To prove, then, this point demonstratively,
becomes on these data perfectly easy ; for
since all Reasoning (in the sense above de-
fined) may be resolved into Syllogisms ; and
since even the objectors to Logic make it a
subject of complaint, that in a Syllogism the
Premises do virtually assert the Conclusion,
it follows at once that no New Truth (as
above defined) can be elicited by any process
of Reasoning.
It is on this ground, indeed, that the justly-
celebrated author of the Philosophy of Rhetoric
268 ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [BOOK IV.
objects to the Syllogism altogether, as neces-
sarily involving a petitio prmcipii ; an objection
which, of course, he would not have been dis-
posed to bring forward, had he perceived that,
whether well or ill-founded, it lies against all
arguments whatever. Had he been aware that
a Syllogism is no distinct kind of argument
otherwise than in form, but is, in fact, any
argument whatever,* stated regularly and at
full length, he would have obtained a more
correct view of the object of all Reasoning ;
which is, merely to expand and unfold the
assertions wrapt up, as it were, and implied
in those with which we set out, and to bring
a person to perceive and acknowledge the full
force of that which he has admitted ; to con-
template it in various points of view; to admit
in one shape what he has already admitted in
another, and to give up and disallow whatever
is inconsistent with it.
Nor is it always a very easy task to bring
before the mind the several bearings, the
various applications, of even any one pro-
position. A common Term comprehends
several, often, numberless individuals ; and
these, often, in some respects, widely differing
from each other ; and no one can be, on
each occasion of his employing such a Term,
* Which Dugald Stewart admits, though he adopts
Campbell's objection.
CHAP. II. 1.] DISCOVERY OF TRUTH. 269
attending to and fixing his mind on each of
the individuals, or even of the species, so
comprehended. It is to be remembered, too,
that both Division and Generalization are in
a great degree arbitrary ; i. e. that we may
both divide the same genus on several dif-
ferent principles, and may refer the same
species to several different classes, according
to the nature of the discourse and drift of the
argument ; each of which classes will furnish
a distinct middle Term for an argument, ac-
cording to the question. E. G. If we wished
to prove that "a horse feels," (to adopt an
ill-chosen example from the above writer,)
we might refer it to the genus " animal ;" to
prove that " it has only a single stomach," to
the genus of " non-ruminants ;" to prove that
it is " likely to degenerate in a very cold
climate," we should class it with " original
productions of a hot climate," fyc. fc. Now,
each of these, and numberless others to which
the same thing might be referred, are implied
by the very term, " horse ;" yet it cannot
be expected that they can all be at once
present to the mind whenever that term is
uttered* Much less, when, instead of such
a Term as that, we are employing Terms
of a very abstract and, perhaps, complex
signification,* as " government, justice," fyc.
* On thhr^oint there are some valuable remarks in the
Philosophy of Rhetoric itself, Book IV. Chap. vii.
270 ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [Boon IV.
categories. The ten Categories * or Predicaments,
which Aristotle and other Logical writers
have treated of, being certain general heads
or summa genera, to one or more of which
every Term may be referred, serve the pur-
pose of marking out certain tracks, as it were,
which are to be pursued in searching for
middle Terms, in each argument respectively;
it being essential that we should generalize
on a right principle, with a view to the ques-
tion before us ; or, in other words, that we
should abstract that portion of any object
presented to the mind, which is important
to the argument in hand. There are ex-
pressions in common use which have a re-
ference to this caution ; such as, " this is a
question, not as to the nature of the object,
but the magnitude of it :" " this a question
of time, or of place" fyc. i. e. " the subject
must be referred to this or to that Category."
With respect to the meaning of the Terms
in question, " Discovery," and " New Truth ;"
* The Categories enumerated by Aristole, are overt a,
TTOffOV, TTOIOV, TTpOffTl, 7TOV, TToYc, Kelffddl, 'kyilV, 7TOie~lV,
Trda^tv ; which are usually rendered, as adequately as,
perhaps, they can be in our language, Substance, Quan-
tity, duality, Relation, Place, Time, Situation, Posses-
sion, Action, Suffering. The Catalogue has been by
some writers enlarged, as it is evident may easily be
done by subdividing some of the heads ; and by others
curtailed, as it is no less evident that all may ultimately
be referred to the two heads of Substance, and Attribute,
or (in the language of some Logicians) Accident.
CHAP. II. 1.] DISCOVERY OF TRUTH. 271
it matters not whether we confine ourselves to
the narrowest sense, or admit the widest, pro-
vided we do but distinguish. There certainly
are two kinds of "Ne.w Truth" and of
"Discovery," if we take those words in the TWO kinds of
Discovery.
widest sense in which they are ever used.
First, such Truths as were, before they were
discovered, absolutely unknown, being not
implied by anything we previously knew,
though we might perhaps suspect them as
probable; such are all matters of fact strictly
so called, when first made known to one who
had not any such previous knowledge, as
would enable him to ascertain them a priori ;
i. e. by Reasoning ; as if we inform a man that
we have a colony at Botany Bay ; or that the
earth is at such a distance from the sun ; or
that platina is heavier than gold. The com-
munication of this kind of knowledge is most
usually, and most strictly, called information, information.
We gain it from observation, and from testi-
mony. No mere internal workings of our own
minds (except when the mind itself is the very
object to be observed), or mere discussions in
words, will make a fact known to us ; though
there is great room for sagacity in judging
what testimony to admit, and in the forming of
conjectures that may lead to profitable obser-
vation, and to experiments with a view to it.
The other class of Discoveries is of a very
272 ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [BOOK IV.
different nature. That which may be elicited
by Reasoning, and consequently is implied in
that which we already know, we assent to on
that ground, and not from observation or tes-
timony. To take a Geometrical truth upon
trust, or to attempt to ascertain it by obser-
vation, would betray a total ignorance of the
nature of the Science. In the longest de-
instruction, monstration, the Mathematical teacher seems
only to lead us to make use of our own stores,
and point out to us how much we had already
admitted ; and, in the case of many Ethical
propositions, we assent at first hearing, though
perhaps we had never heard or thought of
the proposition before. So also do we readily
assent to the testimony of a respectable man
who tells us that our troops have gained a
victory ; but how different is the nature of
the assent in the two cases. In the latter
we are disposed to thank the man for his
information, as being such as no wisdom or
learning would have enabled us to ascertain ;
in the former, we usually exclaim "very true!"
" that is a valuable and just remark ; that
never struck me before !" implying at once
our practical ignorance of it, and also our
consciousness that we possess, in what we
already know, the means to ascertain the
truth of it ; that we have a right, in short,
to bear our testimony to its truth.
CHAP. !!.].] DISCOVERY OF TRUTH. 273
To all practical purposes, indeed, a Truth
of this description may be as completely un-
known to a man as the other; but as soon
as it is set before him, and the argument by
which it is connected with his previous no-
tions is made clear to him, he recognizes it as
something conformable to, and contained in,
his former belief.
It is not improbable that Plato's doctrine of
Reminiscence arose from a hasty extension of
what he had observed in this class, to all ac-
quisition of knowledge whatever. His Theory
of ideas served to confound together matters
of fact respecting the nature of things, (which
may be perfectly new to us) with propositions
relating to our own notions, and modes of
thought ; (or to speak, perhaps, more cor-
rectly, our own arbitrary signs) which propo-
sitions must be contained and implied in those
very complex notions themselves ; and whose
truth is a conformity, not to the nature of
things, but to our own hypothesis. Such
are all propositions in pure Mathematics, and
many in Ethics, viz. those which involve no
assertion as to real matters of fact. It has
been rightly remarked,* that Mathematical
propositions are not properly true or false,
in the same sense as any proposition respect-
ing real fact is so called. And hence, the
* Dugald Stewart's Philosophy, Vol. II.
T
274 ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [BOOK IV.
truth (such as it is) of such propositions is
necessary and eternal ; since it amounts only
to this, that any complex notion which you
have arbitrarily framed, must be exactly con-
formable to itself. The proposition, that " the
belief in a future state, combined with a
complete devotion to the present life, is not
consistent with the character of prudence,"
would be not at all the less true if a future
state were a chimera, and prudence a quality
which was no-where met with ; nor would the
truth of the Mathematician's conclusion be
shaken, that " circles are to each other as
the squares of their diameters," should it be
found that there never had been a circle, or a
square, conformable to the definition, in rerum
natura.
Hence the futility of the attempt of Clarke,
and others, to demonstrate (in the mathe-
matical sense) the existence of a Deity. This
can only be done by covertly assuming in the
Premises the very point to be proved. No
matter of fact can be mathematically demon-
strated; though it may be proved in such a
manner as to leave no doubt on the mind.
E. G. I have no more doubt that I met such
and such a man, in this or that place, yester-
day, than that the angles of a triangle are
equal to two right angles : but the kind of
certainty I have of these two truths is widely
CHAP. II. 1.] DISCOVERY OF TRUTH. 275
different ; to say, that I did not meet the man,
would be false indeed, but it would not be
anything inconceivable, self-contradictory, and
absurd; but it would be so, to deny the
equality of the angles of a triangle to two
right angles.
The Ethical proposition, instanced above,
is one of those which Locke calls " trifling,"
because the Predicate is merely a part of the
complex idea implied by the subject. And he
is right, if by " trifling" he means that it
gives not, strictly speaking, any information :
but he should consider that to remind a man
of what he had not, and might not have,
thought of, may be, practically, as valuable
as giving him information ; and that most pro-
positions in the best Sermons, and all, in pure
Mathematics, are of the description which he
censures.
It is, indeed, rather remarkable that he
should speak so often of building Morals into
a demonstrative Science, and yet speak so
slightingly of those very propositions to which
we must absolutely confine ourselves, in order
to give to Ethics even the appearance of such
a Science ; for the instant you come to an
assertion respecting a matter of fact, as that
u men (i. e. actually existing men) are bound
to practise virtue," or " are liable to many
temptations," you have stepped off the ground
T 2
tion.
276 ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [BOOK IV.
of strict demonstration ; just as when you
proceed to practical Geometry.
information But to return i it is of the utmost import-
ana Instruc- *
ance to distinguish these two kinds of Dis-
covery of Truth. In relation to the former,
as I have said, the word ' ' information " is
most strictly applied ; the communication of
the latter is more properly called "instruc-
tion" I speak of the usual practice ; for it
would be going too far to pretend that writers
are uniform and consistent in the use of these,
or of any other term. We say that the His-
torian gives us information respecting past
times ; the Traveller, respecting foreign coun-
tries : on the other hand, the Mathematician
gives instruction in the principles of his Sci-
ence ; the Moralist instructs us in our duties ;
and we generally use the expressions " a well-
informed man," and " a well-instructed man,"
in a sense conformable to that which has been
here laid down. However, let the words be
used as they may, the things are evidently
different, and ought to be distinguished. It
is a question comparatively unimportant, whe-
ther the term " Discovery " shall or shall not
be extended to the eliciting of those Truths,
which, being implied in our previous know-
ledge, may be established by mere strict
Reasoning.
Similar verbal questions, indeed, might be
CHAP. II. 1.] DISCOVERY OF TRUTH. 277
raised respecting many other cases : e. g. one
has forgotten (i. e. cannot recollect) the name
of some person or place ; perhaps we even try
to think of it, but in vain ; at last some one
reminds us, and we instantly recognise it as the
one we wanted to recollect : it may be asked,
was this in our mind, or not ? The answer is,
that in one sense it was, and in another sense,
it was not. Or, again, suppose there is a vein
of metal on a man's estate, which he does not
know of; is it part of his possessions or not ?
and when he finds it out and works it, does
he then acquire a new possession or not ?
Certainly not, in the same sense as if he has
a fresh estate bequeathed to him, which he
had formerly no right to ; but to all practical
purposes it is a new possession. This case,
indeed, may serve as an illustration of the one
we have been considering ; and in all these
cases, if the real distinction be understood,
the verbal question will not be of much
consequence. To use one more illustration.
Reasoning has been aptly compared to the
piling together blocks of stone ; on each of
which, as on a pedestal, a man can raise
himself a small, and but a small height above
the plain ; but which, when skilfully built up,
will form a flight of steps, which will raise
him to a great elevation. Now (to pursue
this analogy) when the materials are all ready
278 ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [BOOK IV.
to the builder's hand, the blocks ready dug
and brought, his work resembles one of the
two kinds of Discovery just mentioned, viz.
that to which we have assigned the name of
instruction: but if his materials are to be
entirely, or in part, provided by himself, if
he himself is forced to dig fresh blocks from
the quarry, this corresponds to the other
kind of Discovery.*
* " The fundamental differences between these two
great branches of human knowledge, as well as their con-
sequences, cannot perhaps be more strikingly illustrated
than in the following familiar exposition by a celebrated
writer. ' A clever man,' says Sir J. Herschel, ' shut up
alone and allowed all unlimited time, might reason out for
himself all the truths of mathematics, by proceeding from
those simple notions of space and number of which he
cannot divest himself without ceasing to think ; but he
would never tell by any effort of reasoning what would
become of a lump of sugar, if immersed in water, or what
impression would be produced on his eye by mixing the
colours yellow and blue,' results which can be learnt only
from experience.
" Thus then the extremes of human knowledge may be
considered as founded on the one hand purely upon reason,
and on the other purely upon sense. Now, a very large
portion of our knowledge, and what in fact may be con-
sidered as the most important part of it, lies between these
two extremes, and results from a union or mixture of them,
that is to say, consists of the application of rational prin-
ciples to the phenomena presented by the objects of
nature." Front's Bridgervater Treatise, p. 2.
CHAP. II. 2.] DISCOVERY OF TRUTH. 279
2.
I have hitherto spoken of the employment Physical Dis-
coveries.
of argument in the establishment of those
hypothetical Truths (as they may be called)
which relate only to our own abstract no-
tions. It is not, however, meant to be
insinuated that there is no room for Reason-
ing in the establishment of a matter of fact :
but the other class of Truths have first been
treated of, because, in discussing subjects of
that kind, the process of Reasoning is always
the principal, and often the only thing to be
attended to, if we are but certain and clear
as to the meaning of the terms ; whereas,
when assertions respecting real existence are
introduced, we have the additional and more
important business of ascertaining and keep-
ing in mind the degree of evidence for those
facts ; since, otherwise, our Conclusions could
not be relied on, however accurate our Rea-
soning. But, undoubtedly, we may by Reason-
ing arrive at matters of fact, if we have matters
of fact to set out with as data ; only that it
will very often happen that, " from certain
facts," as Campbell remarks, " we draw only
probable Conclusions ;" because the other
Premiss introduced (which he overlooked) is -
only probable. And the maxim of Mechanics
holds good in arguments ; that " nothing is
280 ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [BOOK IV.
stronger than its weakest part." He observed
that in such an instance, for example, as the
one lately given, we infer from the certainty
that such and such tyrannies have been short-
lived, the probability that others will be so ;
and he did not consider that there is an
understood Premiss which is essential to the
argument ; (viz. that all tyrannies will re-
semble those we have already observed) which
being only of a probable character, must attach
the same degree of uncertainty to the Con-
clusion. And the doubtfulness is multiplied,
if both Premises are uncertain. For since it is
only on the supposition of both Premises being
true, that we can calculate on the truth of the
Conclusion, we must state in numbers the
chances against each Premiss being true, and
then multiply these together, to judge of the
degree of evidence of the Conclusion.*
An individual fact is not unfrequently elicited
by skilfully combining, and reasoning from,
those already known ; of which many curious
cases occur in the detection of criminals by
officers of justice, and by Barristers; who
acquire by practice such dexterity in that par-
ticular department, as to draw sometimes the
right conclusion from data, which might be in
the possession of others, without being applied
to the same use. But in all cases of the
* See Book III. 14.
CHAP. II. 2.] DISCOVERY OF TRUTH. 281
establishment of a general fact from Induction,
that general fact (as has been formerly re-
marked) is ultimately established by Reasoning.
E. G. Bakewell, the celebrated cattle-breeder,
observed, in a great number of individual
beasts, a tendency to fatten readily ; and in a
great number of others, the absence of this
constitution : in every individual of the former
description, he observed a certain peculiar
make, though they differed widely in size,
colour, fyc. Those of the latter description
differed no less in various points, but agreed
in being of a different make from the others :
these facts were his data ; from which, com-
bining them with the general principle, that
Nature is steady and uniform in her proceed-
ings, he logically drew the conclusion that
beasts of the specified make have universally
a peculiar tendency to fattening. But then
his principal merit consisted in making the
observations, and in so combining them as to
abstract from each of a multitude of cases,
differing widely in many respects, the circum-
stances in which they all agreed ; and also in
conjecturing skilfully how far those circum-
stances were likely to be found in the whole
class. The making of such observations, and
still more the combination, abstraction, and
judgment employed,* are what men commonly
* See Polit. Econ. Lect. IX. p. 229239.
282 ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [BOOK IV.
mean (as was above observed) when they
speak of Induction ; and these operations are
certainly distinct from Reasoning.* The same
observations will apply to numberless other
cases ; as, for instance, to the Discovery of the
law of " vis inertice? and the other principles
of Natural Philosophy.
It may be remarked here, that even the
most extensive observations of facts will often
be worse than useless to those who are de-
ficient in the power of discriminating and
selecting. Their knowledge, whether much
or little, is like food to a body whose digestive
system is so much impaired as to be incapable
of separating the nutritious portions. To
attempt to remedy the defect of minds thus
constituted " by imparting to them additional
knowledge, to confer the advantage of wider
experience on those who have not the power
of profiting by experience, is to attempt
enlarging the prospect of a short-sighted man
by bringing him to the top of a hill."f
But to what class, it may be asked, should
be referred the Discoveries we have been
speaking of ? All would agree in calling them,
when first ascertained, " New Truths," in the
strictest sense of the word ; which would seem
to imply their belonging to the class which
* See Book I. 1. Note.
f Polit. Econ. Lect. IX. p. 236.
CHAP. II. 2.] DISCOVERY OF TRUTH. 283
may be called by way of distinction, " Physical
Discoveries:" and yet their being ultimately
established by Reasoning, would seem, accord-
ing to the foregoing rule, to refer them to the
other class, viz. what may be called " Logical
Discoveries ;" since whatever is established by
Reasoning must have been contained and
virtually asserted in the Premises. In answer
to this, I would say, that they certainly do
belong to the latter class, relatively to a
person who is in possession of the data : but to
him who is not, they are New Truths of the
other class. For it is to be remembered, that
the words " Discovery" and "New Truths"
are necessarily relative. There may be a pro-
position which is to one person absolutely
known; to another (viz. one to whom it has
never occurred, though he is in possession of
all the data from which it may be proved} it
will be (when he comes to perceive it, by a
process of instruction) what we have called a
Logical Discovery : to a third (viz. one who is
ignorant of these data) it will be absolutely
unknown, and will have been, when made
known to him, a perfectly and properly New
Truth, a piece of information, a Physical
Discovery, as we have called it.* To the
* It may be worth while in this place to define what is
properly to be called Knowledge : it implies three things ;
1st, firm belief, 2dly, of what is true, 3dly, on sufficient
284 ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [BOOK IV.
Philosopher, therefore, who arrives at the
Discovery by reasoning from his observations,
and from established principles combined with
them, the Discovery is of the former class ; to
the multitude, probably of the latter ; as they
will have been most likely not possessed of all
his data.
^ foWows from what has been said, that in
Mathematics, and in such Ethical propositions
as we were lately speaking of, we do not
allow the possibility of any but a Logical
Discovery ; i. e. no proposition of that class
can be true, which was not implied in the
definitions and axioms we set out with, which
are the first principles. For since these pro-
positions do not profess to state any matter of
fact, the only truth they can possess, consists
in conformity to the original principles. To
one, therefore, who knows these principles,
such propositions are Truths already implied ;
since they may be developed to him by Rea-
soning, if he is not defective in the discursive
grounds. If any one e. g. is in doubt respecting one of
Euclid's demonstrations, he cannot be said to know the pro-
position proved by it ; if, again, he is fully convinced of any-
thing that is not true, he is mistaken in supposing himself
to know it ; lastly, if two perons are each fully confident,
one that the moon is inhabited, and the other that it is not,
(though one of these opinions must be true) neither of them
could properly be said to know the truth, since he cannot
have sufficient proof of it.
CHAP. II. 2.] DISCOVERY OF TRUTH. 285
faculty ; and again, to one who does not
understand those principles (L e. is not master
of the Definitions) such propositions are in
great measure, if not wholly, unmeaning. On
the other hand, propositions relating to mat-
ters of fact, may be, indeed, implied in what
he already knew ; (as he who knows the cli-
mate of the Alps, the Andes, fyc. fyc. has
virtually admitted the general fact, that " the
tops of mountains are comparatively cold")
but as these possess an absolute and physical
Truth, they may also be absolutely "new,"
their Truth not being implied in the mere terms
of tlie propositions. The truth or falsity of
any proposition concerning a triangle, is im-
plied by the meaning of that and of the other
Geometrical terms ; whereas, though one may
understand (in the ordinary sense of that word)
the full meaning of the terms " planet," and
" inhabited," and of all the other terms in the
language, he cannot thence derive any cer-
tainty that the planets are, or are not,
inhabited.
" Every branch of study, it should be ob-
served, which can at all claim the character of
a science (in the widest acceptation,) requires
two things : 1. A correct ascertainment of the
data from which we are to reason; and, 2. Cor-
rectness in the process of deducing conclusions
from them. But these two processes, though
286 ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [BOOK IV.
both are in every case indispensable, are, in
different cases, extremely different in their
relative difficulty and amount ; in the space,
if I may so speak, which they occupy in each
branch of study. In pure mathematics, for
instance, we set out from arbitrary definitions,
and postulates, readily comprehended, which
are the principles from which, by the help of
axioms hardly needing even to be stated, our
reasonings proceed. No facts whatever re-
quire to be ascertained ; no process of induction
to be carried on; the reasoning-process is
nearly every thing. In Geology, (to take an
instance of an opposite kind) the most extensive
information is requisite ; and though sound
reasoning is called for in making use of the
knowledge acquired, it is well known what
erroneous systems have been devised, by
powerful reasoners, who have satisfied them-
selves too soon with observations not suffi-
ciently accurate and extensive.
"Various branches of Natural-philosophy
occupy, in this respect, various intermediate
places. The two processes which I have
elsewhere endeavoured to describe, under the
titles of " Physical investigation " and "Logical
investigation," will, in different cases, differ
very much in their relative importance and
difficulty. The science of Optics, for instance,
furnishes an example of one approaching very
CHAP. II. 2.] DISCOVERY OF TRUTH. 28?
near to pure mathematics ; since, though the
foundation of it consists in facts ascertained by
experiment, these are fewer and more easily
ascertained than those pertaining to other
branches of Natural-philosophy. A very small
number of principles, comprehensible even
without being verified by the senses, being
assumed, the deductions from them are so
extensive, that, as is well known, a blind
mathematician, who had no remembrance of
seeing, gave an approved course of lectures on
the subject. In the application, however, of
this science to the explanation of many of the
curious natural phenomena that occur, a most
extensive and exact knowledge of facts is
called for.
" In the case of Political-Economy, that the
facts on which the science is founded are few,
and simple, and within the range of every one's
observation, would, I think, never have been
doubted, but for the error of confounding
together the theoretical and the practical
branches of it; the science of what is properly
called Political-Economy, and the practical
employment of it. The theory supplies prin-
ciples, which we may afterwards apply prac-
tically to an indefinite number of various cases;
and in order to make this application correctly,
of course an accurate knowledge of the cir-
cumstances of each case is indispensable. But
288 ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [BOOK IV.
it should be remembered that the same may be
said even with respect to Geometry. As soon as
we come to the practical branch of it, and apply
it in actual measurements, a minute attention
to facts is requisite for an accurate result. And
in each practical question in Political-Economy
that may arise, we must be prepared to ascer-
tain, and allow for, various disturbing causes,
which may more or less modify the results ob-
tained from our general principles ; just as, in
Mechanics, when we come to practice, we must
take into account the thickness, and weight,
and the degrees of flexibility, of ropes and
levers.
" The facts then which it may be necessary
to ascertain for the practical decision of any
single case that may arise, are, of course, in
Political-Economy (as in respect of the appli-
cation of the principles of any science), inde-
finite in number, and sometimes difficult to
collect ; the facts on which the general princi-
ples of the science are founded, come within
the range of everyone's experience."*
3.
It has probably been the source of much
perplexity, that the term "true" has been
applied indiscriminately to two such different
* Polit. Econ. Lect. IX. p. 225.
CHAP. II. 3.] DISCOVERY OF TRUTH. 289
classes of propositions. The term definition Definitions.
is used with the same laxity; and much confu-
sion has thence resulted. Such definitions as
the Mathematical, must imply every attribute
that belongs to the thing defined ; because
that thing is merely our meaning; which
meaning the Definition lays down : whereas,
real substances, having an independent exist-
ence, may possess innumerable qualities (as
Locke observes) not implied in the meaning
we attach to their names, or, as Locke ex-
presses it, in our ideas of them. " Their
Nominal de-
nominal essence (to use his language) is not fictions.
the same as their real essence ;" whereas the
nominal essence, and the real essence, of a
Circle, $c. are the same. A Mathematical
Definition, therefore, cannot properly be called
true, since it is not properly a proposition,*
(any more than an article in a Dictionary,)
but merely an explanation of the meaning of
a Term. Perhaps in Definitions of this class,
it might be better to substitute (as Aristotle
usually does) the imperative mood for the
indicative : thus bringing them into the form
* I mean in this place, that expression of a Definition
in which the name is conjoined with that which is, pro-
perly speaking, the definition of it, in the form of a pro-
position : as e.g. "a Triangle is a plane superficial figure
bounded by three straight lines :" the words in italics are
what, strictly speaking, constitute the Definition ; but
what I am here speaking of is the whole sentence.
U
290 ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [BOOK IV.
of postulates; for the Definitions and the
Postulates in Mathematics differ in little or
nothing but the form of expression : e. g. " let
a four-sided figure, of equal sides and right
angles, be called a square," would clearly
imply that such a figure is conceivable, and
that the writer intended to employ that term to
signify such a figure : which is precisely all
that is meant to be asserted. If, indeed, a
Mathematical writer mean to assert that the
ordinary sense of the term is that which he
has given, that, certainly, is a proposition,
which must be either true or false ; but in
defining a new term, though the term indeed
may be ill-chosen and improper, or the Defi-
nition may be self-contradictory, and conse-
quently unintelligible, the words " true," and
" false," do not apply.
The same may be said of what are called
nominal Definitions of other things ; i. e. those
which merely explain the meaning of the
word; viz. they can be true or false only
when they profess (and so far as they pro-
fess) to give the ordinary and established
meaning of the term. But those which are
called real Definitions, viz. which unfold
the nature of the thing, (which they may
do in various degrees,} to these the epithet
"true" may be applied; and to make out
such a Definition will often be the very end
CHAP. II. 4.] DISCOVERY OF TRUTH. 291
(not as in Mathematics the beginning) of
our study.*
In Mathematics there is no such distinction
between nominal and real Definition ; the
meaning of the term, and the nature, of the
thing, being one and the same : so that no
correct Definition whatever of any Mathema-
tical term can be devised, which shall not
imply every thing which belongs to the term.
4-,
When it is asked, then, whether such great Ambiguity of
" the word
Discoveries, as have been made in NaturaJ & ea8onin e-
Philosophy, were accomplished, or can be
accomplished, by Reasoning? the inquirer
should be reminded, that the question is am-
biguous. It may be answered in the affir-
mative, if by " Reasoning" is meant to be
included the assumption of Premises, To the
right performance of that work, is requisite,
not only, in many cases, the ascertainment
of facts, and of the degree of evidence for
doubtful propositions, (in which, observation
and experiment will often be indispensable,)
but also a skilful selection and combination of
known facts and principles ; such as implies,
amongst other things, the exercise of that
powerful abstraction which seizes the com-
* Burke on Taste, in the Introducion to his " Essay on
the Sublime and Beautiful."
u2
292 ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [BOOK IV.
mon circumstances the point of agreement
in a number of, otherwise, dissimilar indi-
viduals; and it is in this that the greatest
genius is shown. But if " Reasoning " be
understood in the limited sense in which it
is usually defined, then we must answer in
the negative ; and reply that such Discoveries
are made by means of Reasoning combined
with other operations.
In the process I have been speaking of,
there is much Reasoning throughout ; and
thence the whole has been carelessly called
a " process of Reasoning."
It is not, indeed, any just ground of com-
plaint that the word Reasoning is used in two
senses; but that the two senses are perpe-
tually confounded together : and hence it is
that some Logical writers fancied that Rea-
soning (viz. that which Logic treats of) was
the method of discovering Truth ; and that
so many other writers have accordingly com-
plained of Logic for not accomplishing that
end ; urging that " Syllogism " (i. e. Reason-
ing ; though they overlooked the coincidence)
never established any thing that is, strictly
speaking, unknown to him who has granted
the Premises : and proposing the introduction
of a certain "rational Logic " to accomplish
this purpose ; i. e. to direct the mind in
the process of investigation. Supposing that
CHAP. II. 4.] DISCOVERY OF TRUTH. 293
some such system could be devised that it
could even be brought into a scientific form,
(which he must be more sanguine than scien-
tific who expects,) that it were of the great-
est conceivable utility, and that it should be
allowed to bear the name of "Logic" (since
it would not be worth while to contend about
a name) still it would not, as these writers
seem to suppose, have the same object pro-
posed with the Aristotelian Logic ; or be in
any respect a rival to that system. A plough
may be a much more ingenious and valuable
instrument than a flail ; but it never can be
substituted for it.
Those Discoveries of general laws of Na-
ture, fyc. of which we have been speaking,
being of that character which we have de-
scribed by the name of " Logical Discoveries/'
to him who is in possession of all the Premises
from which they are deduced ; but being, to the
multitude (who are unacquainted with many
of those Premises) strictly " New Truths,"
hence it is, that men in general give to the
general facts, and to them, most peculiarly,
the name of Discoveries ; for to themselves they
are such, in the strictest sense ; the Premises
from which they were inferred being not only
originally unknown to them, but frequently
remaining unknown to the very last. E. G. the
general conclusion concerning cattle, which
294 ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [BooicIV.
Bakewell made known, is what most Agricul-
turists (and many others also) are acquainted
with ; but the Premises he set out with, viz. the
facts respecting this, that, and the other, indi-
vidual ox, (the ascertainment of which facts was
his first Discovery,) these are what few know,
or care to know, with any exact particularity.
observation And it may be added, that these disco-
unt, yeries of particular facts, which are the
immediate result of observation, are, in them-
selves, uninteresting and insignificant, till they
are combined so as to lead to a grand general
result. Those who on each occasion watched
the motions, and registered the times of oc-
cultation of Jupiter's satellites, little thought,
perhaps, themselves, what important results
they were preparing the way for.* So that
there is an additional cause which has confined
the term Discovery to these grand general
conclusions ; and, as was just observed, they
are, ;to the generality of men, perfectly New
Truths in the strictest sense of the word; not
beingi implied in any previous knowledge they
possessed. Very often it will happen, indeed,
; that the conclusion thus drawn will amount
only to a, probable conjecture; which conjecture
will dictate to the inquirer such an experiment,
or course of experiments, as will fully establish
* Hence, Bacon urges us to pursue Truth, without
always requiring to perceive its practical application.
CHAP. II. 4.] DISCOVERY OF TRUTH. 295
the fact. Thus Sir H. Davy, from finding that
the flame of hydrogen gas was not communi-
cated through a long slender tube, conjectured
that a shorter but still slenderer tube would
answer the same purpose ; this led him to try
the experiments, in which, by continually
shortening the tube, and at the same time
lessening its bore, he arrived at last at the
wire-gauze of his safety-lamp.
It is to be observed also, that whatever
credit is conveyed by the word " Discovery,"
to him who is regarded as the author of it, is
well deserved by those who skilfully select
and combine known Truths (especially such
as have been long and generally known) so as
to elicit important, and hitherto unthought of,
conclusions. Their's is the master-mind :
apXiretcToviKr) fypovyais. Whereas men of very
inferior powers may sometimes, by immediate
observation, discover perfectly new facts, em-
pirically ; and thus be of service in furnishing
materials to the others ; to whom they stand
in the same relation (to recur to a former
illustration) as the brickmaker or stone-
quarrier to the architect. It is peculiarly
creditable to Adam Smith, and to Mr. Mal-
thus, that the data from which they drew such
important Conclusions had been in every one's
hands for centuries.
As for Mathematical Discoveries, they (as
296 ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [BooKlV.
we have before said) must always be of the
description to which we have given the name
of " Logical Discoveries ;" since to him who
properly comprehends the meaning of the
Mathematical terms, (and to no other are the
Truths themselves, properly speaking, intel-
ligible) those results are implied in his previous
knowledge, since they are logically deducible
therefrom. It is not, however, meant to be
implied, that Mathematical Discoveries are
effected by pure Reasoning, and by that
singly. For though there is not here, as in
Physics, any exercise of judgment as to the
degree of evidence of the Premises, nor any
experiments and observations, yet there is the
same call for skill in the selection and combina-
tion of the Premises in such a manner as shall
be best calculated to lead to a new, that is,
unperceived and unthought-of Conclusion.
In following, indeed, and taking in a demon-
stration, nothing is called for but pure Reason-
ing ; but the assumption of Premises is not a
part of Reasoning, in the strict and technical
sense of that term. Accordingly, there are many
who can follow a Mathematical demonstration,
or any other train of argument, who would
not succeed well in framing one of their own.*
* Hence, the Student must not confine himself to this
passive kind of employment, if he will truly become a
Mathematician.
ing.
CiiAi-.II.5.] DISCOVERY OF TRUTH. 297
5.
For both kinds of Discovery then, the Lorn- operatic
V connected
cal, as well as the Physical, certain operations T itl
are requisite, beyond those which can fairly
be comprehended under the strict sense of
the word " Reasoning." In the Logical, is
required a skilful selection and combination of
known Truths : in the Physical, we must em-
ploy, in addition (generally speaking) to that
process, observation and experiment. It will
generally happen, that in the study of nature,
and, universally, in all that relates to matters
of fact, both kinds of investigation will be
united ; L e. some of the facts or principles
you reason from as Premises, must be ascer-
tained by observation ; or, as in the case of the
safety-lamp, the ultimate Conclusion will need
confirmation from experience ; so that both
Physical and Logical Discovery will take
place in the course of the same process. We
need not, therefore, wonder, that the two are
so perpetually confounded. In Mathematics,
on the other hand, and in great part of the
discussions relating to Ethics and Jurispru-
dence, there being no room for any Physical
Discovery whatever, we have only to make a
skilful use of the propositions in our posses-
sion, to arrive at every attainable result.
tical and
other ]
soning
298 ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [BOOK IV.
The investigation, however, of the latter
class of subjects differs in other points also
from that of the former. For, setting aside
the circumstance of our having, in these, no
question as to facts, no room for observation,
there is also a considerable difference in
what may be called, in both instances, the
process of Logical investigation ; the Premises
on which we proceed being of so different a
nature in the two cases.
To take the example of Mathematics, the
soiin g Rea " Definitions, which are the principles of our
Reasoning, are very few, and the Axioms still
fewer ; and both are, for the most part, laid
down and placed before the student in the, out-
set; the introduction of a new Definition or
Axiom, being of comparativly rare occur-
rence, at wide intervals, and with a formal
statement ; besides which, there is no room
for doubt concerning either. On the other
hand, in all Reasonings which regard matters
of fact, we introduce, almost at every step,
fresh and fresh propositions (to a very great
number) which had not been elicited in the
course of our Reasoning, but are taken for
granted ; viz. facts and laws of Nature, which
are here the principles of our Reasoning, and
maxims, or " elements of belief," which answer
to the axioms in Mathematics. If, at the
opening of a Treatise, for example, on Che-
CHAP. II. 5.] DISCOVERY OF TRUTH. 299
mistry, on Agriculture, on Political-Economy,
fyc. the author should make, as in Mathema-
tics, a formal statement of all the propositions
he intended to assume as granted, throughout
the whole work, both he and his readers
would be astonished at the number ; and, of
these, many would be only probable, and
there would be much room for doubt as to
the degree of probability, and for judgment, in
ascertaining that degree.
Moreover, Mathematical axioms are always
employed precisely in the same simple form ;
e. g. the axiom that " things equal to the same
are equal to one another," is cited, whenever
there is need, in those very words ; whereas
the maxims employed in the other class of
subjects, admit of, and require, continual mo-
difications in the application of them. E. G.
" the stability of the laws of Nature," which is
our constant assumption in inquiries relating
to Natural Philosophy, assumes many different
shapes, and in some of them does not possess
the same absolute certainty as in others ; e. g.
when, from having always observed a certain
sheep ruminating, we infer, that this individual
sheep will continue to ruminate, we assume
that "the property which has hitherto be-
longed to this sheep will remain unchanged ; "
when we infer the same property of all
sheep, we assume that " the property which
300 ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [BooKlV.
belongs to this individual belongs to the
whole species : " if, on comparing sheep with
some other kinds of horned animals, *
and finding that all agree in ruminating,
we infer that " all horned animals ruminate,"
we assume that "the whole of a genus
or class are likely to agree in any point
wherein many species of that genus agree ;"
or in other words, " that if one of two pro-
perties, fyc. has often been found accompanied
by another, and never without it, the former
will be universally accompanied by the latter :"
now all these are merely different forms of the
maxim, that " nature is uniform in her opera-
tions," which, it is evident, varies in expression
in almost every different case where it is
applied, and admits of every degree of evi-
dence, from absolute moral certainty, to mere
conjecture.
The same may be said of an infinite number
of principles and maxims appropriated to, and
employed in, each particular branch of study.
Hence, all such Reasonings are, in compa-
rison of Mathematics, very complex; requiring
so much more than that does, beyond the
process of merely deducing the conclusion
* Viz. having horns on the skull- What are called the
horns of the Rhinoceros are quite different in origin, and in
structure, as well as in situation, from what are properly
called horns.
CHAP. II. 5.] DISCOVERY OF TRUTH. 301
Logically from the Premises : so that it is no
wonder that the longest Mathematical demon-
stration should be so much more easily con-
structed and understood, than a much shorter
train of just Reasoning concerning real facts.
The former has been aptly compared to a
long and steep, but even and regular flight of
steps, which tries the breath, and the strength,
and the preseverance only ; while the latter
resembles a short, but 'rugged and uneven,
ascent up a precipice, which requires a quick
eye, agile limbs, and a firm step ; and in
which we have to tread now on this side, now
on that ever considering, as we proceed,
whether this or that projection will afford
room for our foot, or whether some loose
stone may not slide from under us. There
are probably as many steps of pure Reasoning
in one of the longer of Euclid's demonstra-
tions, as in the whole of an argumentative
treatise on some other subject, occupying per-
haps a considerable volume.
It may be observed here that Mathematical Mathem
tics usef
reasoning, as it calls for no exercise of judg-
ment respecting probabilities, is the best kind f
of introductory exercise ; and, from the same
cause, is apt, when too exclusively pursued, to
make men incorrect moral-reason ers.
As for those Ethical and Legal Reason-
ings which were lately mentioned as in some
respects resembling those of Mathematics, (viz.
302 ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [BOOK IV.
such as keep clear of all assertions respecting
facts) they have this difference ; that not only
men are not so completely agreed respecting
the maxims and principles of Ethics and Law,
but the meaning also of each term cannot be
absolutely, and for ever, fixed by an arbitrary
definition ; on the contrary, a great part of
our labour consists in distinguishing accurately
the various senses in which men employ each
term, ascertaining which is the most proper,
and taking care to avoid confounding them
together.
CHAP. III. Of Inference and Proof.
i.
SINCE it appears, from what has been said,
that universally a man must possess some-
thing else besides the Reasoning-faculty, in
order to apply that faculty properly to his
own purpose, whatever that purpose may be ;
it may be inquired whether some theory could
not be made out, respecting those " other
operations' 9 and " intellectual processes, dis-
tinct from Reasoning, which it is necessary
for us sometimes to employ in the investi-
gation of truth ;"* and whether rules could
not be laid down for conducting them.
Different AP- Something has, indeed, been done in this
plications of
Reasoning. wav j^y mO re than one writer ; and more might
* D. Stewart.
CHAP. III. 1.] DISCOVERY OF TRUTH. 303
probably be accomplished by one who should
fully comprehend and carefully bear in mind
the principles of Logic, properly so called ;
but it would hardly be possible to build up
anything like a regular Science respecting
these matters, such as Logic is, with respect
to the theory of Reasoning It may be use-
ful, however, to observe, that these " other
operations" of which we have been speaking,
and which are preparatory to the exercise
of Reasoning, are of two kinds, according to
the nature of the end proposed ; for Rea-
soning comprehends In/erring and Proving;
which are not two different things, but the
same thing regarded in two different points
of view : like the road from London to York,
and the road from York to London. He
who infers,* proves ; and he who proves,
infers; but the word " infer" fixes the mind
Jirst on the Premiss and then on the Con-
clusion ; the word " prove," on the contrary,
leads the mind from the Conclusion to the
Premiss. Hence, the substantives derived
from these words respectively, are often used
to express that which, on each occasion, is
last in the mind ; Inference being often used
to signify the Conclusion (i. e. Proposition
inferred) and Proof, the Premiss. We say,
* I mean, of course, when the word is understood to
imply correct Inference. '
304 ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [BOOK IV.
also, " How do you prove that ?" and " What
do you infer from that ?" which sentences
would not be so properly expressed if we
were to transpose those verbs. One might,
therefore, define Proving, " the assigning of
a reason or argument for the support of a
given proposition ; " and Inferring, " the de-
duction of a Conclusion from given Premises."
In the one case our Conclusion is given, (i. e.
set before us) and we have to seek for argu-
ments ; in the other, our Premises are given,
and we have to seek for a Conclusion : i. e. to
put together our own propositions, and try
what will follow from them ; or, to speak more
Logically, in the one case, we seek to refer
the Subject of which we would predicate
something, to a class to which that Predicate
will (affirmatively or negatively) apply ; in the
other, we seek to find comprehended, in the
Subject of which we have predicated some-
thing, some other term to which that Predicate
had not been before applied.* Each of these
is a definition of Reasoning.
2.
adAdvo tor To infer, then, is the business of the Philo-
sopher; to prove, of the Advocate ; the former,
* "Proving" may be compared to the act of putting
arvay any article into the proper receptacle of goods of
that description; "inferring," to that of bringing out the
article when needed.
and Advo-
cate.
CHAP. III. 2.] INFERENCE AND PROOF. 305
from the great mass of known and admitted
truths, wishes to elicit any valuable additional
truth whatever, that has been hitherto unper-
ceived ; and perhaps, without knowing, with
certainty, what will be the terms of his Con-
clusion. Thus the Mathematician, e. g. seeks
to ascertain what is the ratio of circles to each
other, or what is the line whose square will be
equal to a given circle. The Advocate, on the
other hand, has a Proposition put before him,
which he is to maintain as well as he can.
His business, therefore, is to find middle terms
(which is the inventio of Cicero); the Philo-
sopher's to combine and select known facts
or principles, suitably, for gaining from them
Conclusions which, though implied in the
Premises, were before un perceived : in other
words, for making " Logical Discoveries."
To put the same thing in another point of
view, we may consider all questions as falling
under two classes ; viz. " What shall be pre-
dicated of a certain Subject;" and, " Which
Copula, affirmative or negative, shall connect
a certain Subject and Predicate." We inquire,
in short, either, 1st, "What is A?" or, 2d,
" Is A, B, or is it not ?" The former class of
questions belongs to the Philosopher ; the lat-
ter to the Advocate. (See Rhet. Appendix G.
p. 387.)
The distinction between these two classes
x
306 ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [BooxIV.
of questions is perhaps best illustrated by refe-
rence to some case in which our decision of
each of the questions involved in some asser-
tion, is controverted, by different parties.
E. G. Paul says, that the apostles preached
" Christ crucified ; to the Jews a stumbling-
block, and to the Greeks, foolishness : " that
Jesus, who had suffered an ignominious death,
was the Messiah, the Saviour of the World,
was a doctrine opposed both by Jews and
Gentiles ; though on different grounds, accord-
ing to their respective prejudices : the Jews,
who " sought after a Sign " (i. e. the coming of
the Messiah in the clouds to establish a splen-
did temporal kingdom) were " offended "
" scandalized " at the doctrine of a suffering
Messiah : the Greeks who " sought after
Wisdom" (i. e. the mode of themselves exalting
their own nature, without any divine aid) ridi-
culed the idea of a Heavenly Saviour alto-
gether ; which the Jews admitted. In logical
language, the Gentiles could not comprehend
the Predicate ; the Jews, denied the Copula.
It may be added, that in modern phrase-
ology, the operations of corresponding preju-
dices are denoted, respectively by the words
" paradox " (a " stumbling-block") and "non-
sense ;" (" foolishness") which are often used,
the one, by him who has been accustomed to
hold an opposite opinion to what is asserted,
CHAP. III. 3.] INFERENCE AND PROOF. 307
the other, by him who has formed no opinion
on the subject.
3.
Such are the respective preparatory pro-
cesses in these two branches of study, the
philosophical, and the rhetorical. They are
widely different ; they arise from, and gene-
rate, very different habits of mind ; and require
a very different kind of training and precept.
It is evident that the business of the Advocate
and that of the Judge, are, in this point,
opposed ; the one being, to find arguments for
the support of his client's cause ; the other, to
ascertain the truth. And hence it is, that
those who have excelled the most in the
former department, sometimes manifest a de-
ficiency in the latter, though the subject-matter^
in which they are conversant, remains the
same. The Pleader, or Controversialist, or,
in short, the Rhetorician in general, who is, in
his own province, the most skilful, may be but
ill-fitted for Philosophical investigation, even
where there is no observation wanted : when
the facts are all ready ascertained for him.
And again, the ablest Philosopher may make
an indifferent disputant ; especially, since the
arguments which have led him to the con-
clusion, and have, with him, the most weight,
x2
308 ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [BooicIV.
may not, perhaps, be the most powerful in
controversy.
The commoner fault, however, by far, is to
forget the Philosopher or Theologian, and to
assume the Advocate, improperly. It is there-
fore of great use to dwell on the distinction
between these two branches. As for the bare
process of Reasoning, that is the same in both
cases ; but the preparatory processes which
are requisite, in order to employ Reasoning
profitably, these, we see, branch off into two
distinct channels. In each of these, undoubt-
edly, useful rules may be laid down ; but they
should not be confounded together. Bacon
philosophical has chosen the department of Philosophy ;
giving rules in his Organon, not only for the
conduct of experiments to ascertain new facts,
but also for the selection and combination of
known facts and principles, with a view of
obtaining valuable Inferences ; and it is pro-
bable that a system of such rules is what some
writers mean (if they have any distinct mean-
ing) by their proposed " Logic."
I* 1 the other department, precepts have
been given by Aristotle and other Rhetorical
writers, as a part of their plan. How far
these precepts are to be considered as belong-
ing to the present system, whether " method"
is to be regarded as a part of Logic, whether
the matter of Logic (i. e. general maxims,
CHAP. III. 3.] INFERENCE AND PROOF. 309
axioms, or common-places) is to be included
in the system, whether Bacon's is properly
to be reckoned a kind of Logic ; all these are
merely verbal questions, relating to the ex-
tension, not of the Science, but of the name.
The bare process of Reasoning, i. e. deducing
a Conclusion from Premises, must ever remain
a distinct operation from the assumption of
Premises ; however useful the rules may be
that have been given, or may be given, for
conducting this latter process, and others con-
nected with it ; and however properly such
rules may be subjoined to the precepts of that
system to which the name of Logic is applied
in the narrowest sense. Such rules as I now
allude to may be of eminent service ; but they
must always be, as I have before observed,
comparatively vague and general, and inca-
pable of being built up into a regular demon-
strative theory like that of the Syllogism ; to
which theory they bear much the same re-
lation as the principles and rules of Poetical
and Rhetorical criticism to those of Grammar ;
or those of practical Mechanics, to strict
Geometry. I find no fault with the extension
of a term ; but I would suggest a caution
against confounding together, by means of a
common name, things essentially different;
and above all I would deprecate the sophistry
of striving to depreciate what is called " the
310 ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [BOOK IV.
school-Logic," by perpetually contrasting it
with systems with which it has nothing in
common but the name, and whose object is
essentially different.
4.
Aristotle's It is not a little remarkable that writers,
Organon and
Bacon's. whose expressions tend to confound together,
by means of a common name, two branches of
study which have nothing else in common (as
if they were two different plans for attaining
one and the same object,) have themselves
complained of one of the effects of this con-
fusion ; viz. the introduction, early in the
career of Academical Education, of a course
of Logic ; under which name, they observe,
" men now* universally comprehend the works
of Locke, Bacon, tyc." which, (as is justly re-
marked) are unfit for beginners. Now this
would not have happened, if men had always
kept in mind the meaning or meanings of each
name they used.
And it may be added, that, however justly
the word Logic may be thus extended, we
have no ground for applying to the Aristotelian
Logic the remarks above quoted respecting
the Baconian ; which the ambiguity of the
word, if not carefully kept in view, might lead
us to do. Grant that Bacon's work is a part
* *. e. In the Scotch universities.
CHAP. IV. 1.] INFERENCE AND PROOF. 31 1
of Logic ; it no more follows, from the unfit-
ness of that for learners, that the Elements of
the Theory of Reasoning should be withheld
from them, than it follows that the elements
of Euclid, and common Arithmetic, are unfit
for boys, because Newton s Principia, which
also bears the title of Mathematical, is above
their grasp. Of two branches of study which
bear the same name, or even of two parts of
the same branch, the one may be suitable to
the commencement, the other to the close of
the Academical career.
At whatever period of that career it may
be proper to introduce the study of such as
are usually called Metaphysical writers, it
may be safely asserted, that those who have
had the most experience in the business of
giving instruction in Logic, properly so called,
as well as in other branches of knowledge,
prefer and generally pursue the plan of letting
their pupils enter on that study, next in order
after the elements of Mathematics.
CHAP. IV. Of Verbal and Real Questions.
1.
THE ingenious author of the Philosophy
of Rhetoric having maintained, or rather as-
sumed, that Logic is applicable to Verbal
312 ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [BooKlV.
controversy alone, there may be an advantage
(though it has been my aim throughout to
show the application of it to all Reasoning)
in pointing out the difference between Verbal
and Real Questions, and the probable origin
of Campbell's mistake. For to trace any error
to its source, will often throw more light on
the subject in hand than can be obtained if
we rest satisfied with merely detecting and
refuting it.
Every Question that can arise, is in fact a
Question whether a certain Predicate is or is
not applicable to a certain Subject, or, what
Predicate is applicable ; * and whatever other
account may be given by any writer, of the
nature of any matter of doubt or debate,
will be found ultimately to resolve itself into
Difference this. But sometimes the Question turns on
between a
re e i b !fue a s n t?on. the meaning and extent of the terms em-
ployed ; sometimes, on the things signified by
them. If it be made to appear, therefore,
that the opposite sides of a certain Question
may be held by persons not differing in their
opinion of the matter in hand, then, that Ques-
tion may be pronounced Verbal ; as depend-
ing on the different senses in which they
respectively employ the terms. If, on the
contrary, it appears that they employ the
terms in the same sense, but still differ as to
* See Chap. iii. 2.
CHAP.IV.!.] VERBAL AND REAL QUESTIONS. 313
the application of one of them to the other,
then it may be pronounced that the Question
is Real ; that they differ as to the opinions
they hold of the things in Question.
If, for instance, two persons contend whe-
ther Augustus deserved to be called a " great
man," then, if it appeared that the one in-
cluded, under the term " great," disinterested
patriotlsm 9 and on that ground excluded Au-
gustus from the class, as wanting in that
quality ; and that the other also gave him no
credit for that quality, but understood no more
by the term "great," than high intellectual
qualities, energy of character, and brilliant
actions, it would follow that the parties did
not differ in opinion except as to the use of
a term, and that the Question was Verbal.
If, again, it appeared that the one did give
Augustus credit for such patriotism as the
other denied him, both of them including
that idea in the term great, then, the Ques-
tion would be Real. Either kind of Question,
it is plain, is to be argued according to Logical
principles ; but the middle terms employed
would be different ; and for this reason, among,
others, it is important to distinguish Verbal
from Real controversy. In the former case,
e. g. it might be urged (with truth) that the
common use of the expression "great and
good " proves that the idea of good is not
tions mis-
314 ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [BOOK IV.
implied in the ordinary sense of the word
great; an argument which could have, of
course, no place in deciding the other Question.
2.
verbal Ques- It is byno means to be supposed that all
mis- TTII/-V n c T
for Verbal Questions are trifling and mvolous. It
is often of the highest importance to settle cor-
rectly the meaning of a word, either according
to ordinary use, or according to the meaning
of any particular writer or class of men. But
when Verbal Questions are mistaken for Real,
much confusion of thought and unprofitable
wrangling will be generally the result. Nor is
it always so easy and simple a task, as might
at first sight appear, to distinguish them from
each other. For, several objects to which one
common name is applied, will often have many
points of difference ; and yet that name may
perhaps be applied to them all in the same
sense, and may be fairly regarded as the
genus they come under, if it appear that they
all agree in what is designated by that name,
and that the differences between them are in
points not essential to the character of that
genus. A cow and a horse differ in many
respects, but agree in all that is implied by
the term " quadruped," which is therefore
applicable to both in the same sense.* So
* Yet the charge of equivocation is sometimes unjustly
brought against a writer in consequence of a gratuitous
CHAP. IV. 2.] VERBAL AND REAL QUESTIONS. 315
also the houses of the ancients differed in
many respects from ours, and their ships still
more ; yet no one would contend that the
terms "house" and " ship/' as applied to
both, are ambiguous, or that ol/cos might not
fairly be rendered house, and vavs ship; be-
cause the essential characteristic of a house
is, not its being of this or that form or
materials, but its being a dwelling for men;
these therefore would be called two different
kinds of houses ; and consequently the term
"house" would be applied to each, without
any equivocation, in the same sense : and so
in the other instances.
On the other hand, two or more things may
bear the same name, and may also have a
resemblance in many points, nay, and may from
that resemblance have come to bear the same
name, and yet if the circumstance which is
essential to each be wanting in the other,
the term may be pronounced ambiguous.
assumption of our own. An Eastern writer, e. g. may be
speaking of " beasts of burden ;" and the reader may chance
to have the idea occur to his mind of Horses and Mules ;
he thence takes for granted that these were meant ; and if it
afterwards come out that it was Camels he perhaps com-
plains of the writer for misleading him by not expressly
mentioning the species ; saying, " I could not know that he
meant Camels." He did not mean Camels, in particular ;
he meant, as he said, " beasts of burden :" and Camels are
such, as well as Horses and Mules. He is not accountable
for your suppositions.
316 ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [BOOK IV.
E. G. The word "Plantain" is the name of
a common herb in Europe, and of an Indian
fruit-tree : both are vegetables ; yet the term
is ambiguous, because it does not denote
them so far forth as they agree.
Again, the word " Priest" is applied to the
Ministers of the Jewish and of the Pagan
religions, and also to those of the Christian ;
and doubtless the term has been so trans-
ferred in consequence of their being both
ministers (in some sort) of religion.* Nor
would every difference that might be found
between the Priests of different religions con-
stitute the term ambiguous, provided such
differences were non-essential to the idea
suggested by the word Priest ; as e. g. the
Jewish Priest served the true God, and the
Pagan, false Gods : this is a most important
difference, but does not constitute the term
ambiguous, because neither of these circum-
stances is implied and suggested by the term
'lepevs; which accordingly was applied both
to Jewish and Pagan Priests. But the term
'lepevs does seem to have implied the office
of offering sacrifice, atoning for the sins of
the people, and acting as mediator between
Man and the object of his worship. And ac-
cordingly that term -is never applied to any
* See Discourse on " the Christian Priesthood," appended
to the Bampton Lectures.
CHAP. IV. 2.] VERBAL AND REAL QUESTIONS. 317
one under the Christian system, except to
the ONE great Mediator. The Christian
ministers not having that office which was
implied as essential in the term 'lepe^, were
never called by that name, but by that of
Trpeo-fivrepos.* It may be concluded, there-
fore, that the term Priest is ambiguous, as cor-
responding to the terms 'lepevs and Trpea^vrepos
respectively, notwithstanding that there are
points in which these two agree. These there-
fore should be reckoned, not two different
kinds of Priests, but Priests in two different
senses ; since (to adopt the phraseology of
Aristotle) the definition of them, so far forth
as they are Priests, would be different.
A "real" question again is liable to be Real Ques-
tions mis-
mistaken for a " verbal," when different persons
who are in fact using a term in the same sense,
are supposed to be using it in different senses ;
either, from its being erroneously taken for
granted that what commonly belongs to the
thing spoken of must be implied in the common
acceptation of the name of that thing : as e. g.
if any one should conclude, from the ordinary
kinds of wood being lighter than water, that
the ordinary sense of the term " wood " implies
floating in water: or again, from its being
* From which our word Priest is derived, but which (it
is remarkable) is never translated " Priest" in our version
of the Scriptures, but " Elder."
318 ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [BOOK IV,
rashly inferred from two persons having a
difference of opinion respecting some thing,
that they each denote that opinion in their use
respectively, of the term which expresses that
thing : as e. g. if two persons differing in opi-
nion as to the question of episcopacy, should be
considered as differing in their use of the word
" Episcopalian," and implying by it, the one
a right, and the other a wrong form of Church-
government; whereas the word does not ex-
press either the one or the other, but simply
" an adherent to an episcopal form of govern-
ment ;" they both mean the same thing ; their
difference of opinion being, whether that thing
be right or wrong.
I have noticed some instances of the above
kinds of mistake in the Appendix to " Errors of
Romanism" (p. 332) and in the Introduction
to " Political Economy," from which I will here
cite a passage.
" In speaking of exchanges, I did not mean
to limit myself to voluntary exchanges ; those
in which the whole transaction takes place
with the full consent of both parties to all the
terms of it. Most exchanges, indeed, are of
this character ; but the case of taxation, the
revenue levied from the subject in return for the
protection afforded by the sovereign, consti-
tutes a remarkable exception ; the payment
being compulsory, and not adjusted by agree-
CHAP. IV. 2.] REALISM. 319
ment with the payer. Still, whether in any
case it be fairly and reasonably adjusted, or
the contrary, it is not the less an exchange.
And it is worth remarking, that it is just so far
forth as it is an exchange, so far forth as pro-
tection, whether adequate or not, is afforded
in exchange for this payment, that the pay-
ment itself comes under the cognizance of this
science. There is nothing else that distin-
guishes taxation from avowed robbery.
"Though the generality of exchanges are
voluntary, this circumstance is not essential to
an exchange : since otherwise the very expres-
sion " voluntary exchange," would be tauto-
logical and improper. But it is a common
logical error to suppose that what usually
belongs to the thing t is implied by the usual
sense of the word. Although most noblemen
possess large estates, the word " nobleman"
does not imply the possession of a large estate.
Although most birds can fly, the ordinary use
of the term " bird " does not imply this, since
the penguin and the ostrich are always admit-
ted to be birds. And though, in a great
majority of cases, wealth is acquired by labour,
the ordinary use of the word " wealth" does
not include this circumstance, since every one
would call a pearl an article of wealth, even
though a man should chance to meet with it
in eating an oyster.
320 ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [BOOK IV.
" The logical error I have been adverting to
has, in various instances, led to confusion of
thought in many subjects, and not least in
Political-Economy."
It is evidently of much importance to keep
in mind the above distinctions, in order to
avoid, on the one hand, stigmatizing, as Verbal
controversies, what in reality are not such,
merely because the Question turns (as every
question must) on the applicability of a certain
Predicate to a certain subject; or, on the other
hand, falling into the opposite error of mis-
taking words for things, and judging of men's
agreement or disagreement in opinion in every
case, merely from their agreement or disagree-
ment in the terms employed.
CHAP. V. Of Realism.
I-
NOTHING has a greater tendency to lead to
the mistake just noticed, and thus to produce
undetected Verbal Questions and fruitless Lo-
gomachy, than the prevalence of the notion
of the Realists,* that Genus and Species are
* It is well known what a furious controversy long
existed in all the universities of Europe between the sects
of the Realists and the Nominalists ; the heat of which
was allayed by the Reformation, which withdrew men's
attention to a more important question.
CHAP.V.!.] REALISM. 321
some real THINGS, existing independently of
our conceptions and expressions ; and that, as
in the case of Singular terms there is some
real individual corresponding to each, so, in
Common terms also, there is some Thing
corresponding to each ; which is the object
of our thoughts when we employ any such
term.*
There is one circumstance which ought to
be noticed, as having probably contributed
not a little to foster this error : I mean, the
peculiar technical sense of the word " Species"
when applied to organized Beings.
It has been laid down in the course of this Technical
sense of Spe-
work, that when several individuals are ob-^ p e p s 1L ^
served to resemble each other in some point, Bdngs zed
a common name may be assigned to them
denoting that point, applying to all or any
of them so far forth as respects that common
attribute, and distinguishing them from all
others; as, e.g. the several individual build-
* A doctrine commonly, but falsely attributed to Aris-
totle, who expressly contradicts it. He calls individuals
" primary Substances" (vrpwrai ovviat) ; Genus and Species
" secondary." as not denoting (roe n) a " really-existing
thing." 13d<7a $e ovvia Soicei ro^e TI ffrifjiaivew '. 'En-i yuv
ovv TWV TTpuTwv ovffi&v avajU^tor/3//7r;rov KCLI aX^e's e<rrti>, on
ToSe TI ffrjfjLaivec aro^ov yap KO\ e v a'jotfyuw ro lr]
tcrnv. 'Eiri le. TUV ^evrtpwv overlay, $AINETAl pev o
r$ ffxhfjtart rfJQ Trpoo-r/yoptae ro^e TI ffr^iaiveiv, orav
avOpwTroe, 1i faov' OY MHN TE AAH9ES' a'AAa /ua\Xo>/
Trolov TI ar}^.a.ivEC K. r, X. Aristotle, Categ. 3.
Y
322 ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [BOOK IV.
ings, which, however different in other re-
spects, agree in being constructed for men's
dwelling, are called by the common name of
" House :" and it was added, that as we select
at pleasure the circumstance that we choose
to abstract, we may thus refer the same Indi-
vidual to several different Species, according
as it suits our purpose ; and the same, in
respect of the reference of Species to Genus :
whence it seems plainly to follow that Genus
and Species are no real things existing inde-
pendent of our thoughts, but are creatures of
our own minds. Yet in the case of Species of
organized Beings, it seems at first sight as if
this rule did not hold good ; but that the Spe-
cies to which each individual belongs, could
not be in any degree arbitrarily fixed by us,
but must be something real, unalterable, and
independent of our thoughts. Caesar or So-
crates, for instance, it may be said, must
belong to the Species Man, and can belong
to no other ; and the like, with any individual
Brute, or Plant. On the other hand, if any
one utters such a proposition as " Argus was
a mastiff," to what head of Predicables would
this Predicate be referred ? Surely our logical
principles would lead us to answer, that it
is the Species ; since it could hardly be called
an Accident, and is manifestly no other Pre-
dicable. And yet every Naturalist would at
CHAP.V. 1.] REALISM. 323
once pronounce that Mastiff is no distinct
Species, but only a variety of the Species Dog.
This however does not satisfy our inquiry as
to the head of Predicables to which it is to be
referred.
The solution of the difficulty is to be found
in the consideration of the peculiar technical
sense (or " second intention ") of the word
" Species " when applied to organized Beings : species
. . , ,. , , , tinguishedby
in which case it is always applied (when we JjJ^jjgy
are speaking strictly, as naturalists) to such
individuals as are supposed to be descended
from a common stocky or which might have so
descended ; viz. which resemble one another
(to use M. Cuvier's expression) as much as
those of the same stock do. Now this being
a point on which all (not merely Naturalists)
are agreed, and since it is & fact, (whether Questions of
an ascertained fact or not) that such and such
individuals are, or are not, thus connected, it
follows, that every question whether a certain
individual Animal or Plant belongs to a certain
Species or not, is a question not of mere ar-
rangement, but of fact. But in the case of
questions respecting Genus, it is otherwise.
If, e. g. two Naturalists differed, in the one
placing (as Linnaeus) all the Species of Bee
under one Genus, which the other subdivided
(as later writers have done) into several
genera, it would be evident that there was no
Y 2
324 ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [Boon IV.
question of fact debated between them, and
that it was only to be considered which was
the more convenient arrangement. If, on the
other hand, it were disputed whether the
African and the Asiatic Elephant are distinct
Species, or merely Varieties, it would be
equally manifest that the question is one of
fact ; since both would allow that if they are
descended (or might have descended) from
the same stock, they are of the same Species ;
and if otherwise, of two : this is the fact,
which they endeavour to ascertain, by such
indications as are to be found.
For it is to be further observed, that this
fact being one which can seldom be directly
known, the consequence is, that the marks
by which any Species of Animal or Plant is
known, are not the very Differentia which
constitutes that Species. Now, in the case of
unorganized Beings, these two coincide; the
Mark by marks by which a Diamond, e.g. is distin-
. i
g ulsne ^ from other minerals, being the very
Differentia that constitutes the Species Dia-
mond. And the same is the case in the
Genera even of organized Beings : the Linnsean
Genus " felis," e. g. (when considered as a
Species, i. e. as falling under some more com-
prehensive Class) is distinguished from others
under the same Order, by those very marks
which constitute its Differentia. But in the
which a
CHAP. V. 1 .J REALISM. 325
" Infimae Species" (according to the view of a
Naturalist) of plants and animals, this, as has
been said, is not the case ; since here the
Differentia which constitutes each Species
includes in it a circumstance which cannot
often be directly ascertained (viz. the being
sprung from the same stock), but which we
conjecture from certain circumstances of re-
semblance ; so that the marks by which a
Species is known, are not in truth the whole
of the Differentia itself, but indications of the
existence of that Differentia; viz. indications
of descent from a common stock.*
Hence it is that Species, in the case of
organized Beings, appears to be something
real, and independent of our thoughts and
language. And hence, naturally enough, the
same notions have been often extended to the
Genera also, and to Species of other things : so
that men have a notion that each individual of
every description truly belongs to some one
* There are few, and but a few, other Species to which
the same observations will in a great degree apply : I mean
in which the Differentia which constitutes the Species, and
the mark by which the Species is known, are not the same :
e.g. " Murder :" the Differentia of which is that it be com-
mitted " with malice aforethought ;" this cannot be directly
ascertained ; and therefore we distinguish murder from any
other homicide by circumstances of preparation, $c., which
are not in reality the Differentia, but indications of the Diffe-
rentia ; i. e. grounds for concluding that the malice did exist.
' same,
' one,"
326 ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [BOOK IV.
Species and no other ; and each Species, in
like manner, to some one Genus ; whether we
happen to be right or not in the ones to which
we refer them.
Few, if any indeed, in the present day avow
and maintain this doctrine : but those who are
not especially on their guard, are perpetually
sliding into it unawares.
Nothing so much conduces to this as the
transferred and secondary use of the words
Ambigmtyof ^ same ,"* " one and the same," "identical,"
fyc. when it is not clearly perceived and care-
fully borne in mind, that they are employed
in a secondary sense, and that, more fre-
quently even than in the primary.
Suppose, e. g. a thousand persons are think-
ing of the Sun : it is evident it is one and the
same individual object on which all these
minds are employed. So far all is clear. But
suppose all these* persons are thinking of a
Triangle ; not any individual triangle, but
Triangle in general;- and considering, per-
haps, the equality of its angles to two right
angles : it would seem as if, in this case also,
their minds were all employed on " one and
the same" object : and this object of their
thoughts, it may be said, cannot be the mere
word Triangle, but that which is meant by it :
* See Appendix, No. I. art. Same.
CHAP. V. 1.] REALISM. 327
nor again, can it be everything that the word
will apply to : for they are not thinking of
triangles, but of one thing. Those who do not
maintain that this " one thing" has an ex-
istence independent of the human mind, are
in general content to tell us, by way of
explanation, that the object of their thoughts
is the abstract " idea" of a triangle ;* an
explanation which satisfies, or at least silences
many ; though it may be doubted whether
they very clearly understand what sort of a
thing an "idea" is; which may thus exist in
a thousand different minds at once, and yet be
"one and the same."
The fact is, that "unity" and "sameness"
are in such cases employed, not in the pri-
mary sense, but, to denote perfect similarity.
When we say that ten thousand different
persons have all "one and the same" Idea
in their minds, or, are all of " one and the
same" Opinion, we mean no more than that
they are all thinking exactly alike. When we
say that they are all in the "same" posture,
we mean that they are all placed alike :
and so also they are said all to have the
"same" disease, when they are all diseased
alike.
* Conceptualists is a name sometimes applied to those
who adopt this explanation ; to which class Locke is
referred.
328 ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [BOOK IV.
Logomachy One instance of the confusion of thought
resulting ^
an( * endless logomachy which may spring
from inattention to this ambiguity of the
words "same," fyc., is afforded by the con-
troversy arising out of a sermon of Dr. King
(Archbishop of Dublin), published about a
century ago. He remarked (without express-
ing himself perhaps with so much guarded
precision as the vehemence of his opponents
rendered needful) that " the attributes of the
Deity (viz. Wisdom, Justice, $*c.) are not to
be regarded as the same with those human
qualities which bear the same names, but are
called so by resemblance and analogy only."
For this he was decried by Bishop Berkeley
and a host of other objectors, down to the
present time, as an Atheist, or little better.
If the divine attributes, they urged, are not
precisely the same in kind (though superior
in degree) with the human qualities which
bear the same name, we cannot imitate the
Deity as the Scriptures require ; we cannot
know on what principles we shall be judged ;
we cannot be sure that God exists at all ;
with a great deal more to the same purpose ;
all of which would have been perceived to
be perfectly idle, had the authors but recol-
lected to ascertain the meaning of the prin-
cipal word employed.
For, 1st, when any two persons (or other
CIIAP.VI.] REALISM. 329
objects) are said to have the "same" quality,
accident, fyc., what we predicate of them is
evidently a certain resemblance, and nothing *1* n * g
else. One man e.g. does not feel another's I
sickness ; but they are said to have the " same"
disease, if they are precisely similar in respect
of their ailments : and so also they are said to
have the same complexion, if the hue and
texture of their skins be alike. 2dly, Such
qualities as are entirely relative, which con-
sist in the relation borne by the subject to
certain other things, in these, it is manifest,
the only resemblance that can exist, is, resem-
blance of relations, i. e. ANALOGY. Courage,
e. g. consists in the relation in which one stands
(ez; TW %eiv TTCOS irpos, Arist.) towards dangers ;
Temperance or Intemperance, towards bodily
pleasures, fyc. When it is said, therefore, of
two courageous men, that they have both the
same quality, the only meaning this expression
can have, is, that they are, so far, completely
analogous in their characters ; having similar
ratios to certain similar objects. In short, as,
in all qualities, sameness can mean only strict
resemblance, so, in those which are of a rela-
tive nature, resemblance can mean only ana-
logy. Thus it appears, that what Dr. King
has been so vehemently censured for asserting
respecting the Deity, is literally true even
with respect to men themselves ; viz. that it
330 ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [BOOK IV.
is only by Analogy that two persons can be
said to possess the same virtue, or other such
quality. 3dly, But what he means, is, plainly,
that this analogy is far less exact and complete
in the case of a comparison between the Deity
and his creatures than between one man and
another ; which surely no one would venture
to deny. But the doctrine against which
the attacks have been directed, is self-evident,
the moment we consider the meaning of the
term employed.*
In the Introduction and Notes to the last
edition of Archbishop King's Discourse, I
have considered the matters in debate more
fully ; but this slight notice of them has been
introduced in this place, as closely connected
with the present subject.
2.
origin of the The origin of this secondary sense of the
" S ame,&c. words, " same," " one," " indentical," fyc. (an
attention to which would clear away an in-
calculable mass of confused Reasoning and
Logomachy,) is easily to be traced to the use
of Language and of other signs, for the pur-
pose of mutual communication. If any one
utters the " one single" word " triangle," and
* See Dr. Copleston's excellent Analysis and Defence
of Archbishop King's principles, in the Notes to his " Four
Discourses."
CHAP. V. 2.] REALISM. 331
gives "one single" definition of it, each of
the persons who hear him forms a certain
notion in his own mind, not differing in any
respect from that of each of the rest. They
are said therefore to have all " cne and the
same" notion, because, resulting from, and
corresponding with, (that which is, in the
primary sense) " one and the same" expres-
sion ; and there is said to be " one single "
idea of every triangle (considered merely as a
triangle) because one single name or defini-
tion is equally applicable to each. In like
manner, all the coins struck by the same single
die, are said to have " one and the same"
impression, merely because the (numerically)
" one" description which suits one of these
coins will equally suit any other that is exactly
like it. The expression accordingly which has
only of late begun to prevail, "such and
such things are of the same description," is per-
haps the most philosophical that can be em-
ployed.
It is not intended to recommend the disuse
of the words " same" " identical," fyc. in this
transferred sense ; which, if it were desirable,
would be utterly impracticable ; but merely
a steady attention to the ambiguity thus in-
troduced, and watchfulness against the errors
thence arising. " It is with words as with
money. Those who know the value of it best
332 ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [BOOK IV.
are not therefore the least liberal. We may
lend readily and largely ; and though this be
done quietly and without ostentation, there is
no harm in keeping an exact account in our
private memorandum-book of the sums, the
persons, and the occasions on which they
were lent. It may be, we shall want them
again for our own use ; or they may be em-
ployed by the borrower for a wrong purpose ;
or they may have been so long in his pos-
session that he begins to look upon them as
his own. In either of which cases it is allow-
able, and even right, to call them in.*
The difficulties and perplexities which have
involved the questions respecting personal-
identity, among others, may be traced prin-
cipally to the neglect of this caution. I
mean that many writers have sought an ex-
planation of the primary sense of identity
(viz. personal) by looking to the secondary.
Any grown man, e.g. is, in the primary sense,
the same person he was when a child : this
sameness is, I conceive, a simple notion, which
it is vain to attempt explaining by any other
more simple ; but when philosophers seek to
gain a clearer notion of it by looking to the
cases in which sameness is predicated in
another sense, viz. similarity, such as exists
* " Logic Vindicated." Oxford, 1809.
C,IAP.V.2.] REALISM. 333
between several individuals denoted by a
common name, (as when we say that there
are growing on Lebanon some of the same
trees with which the Temple was built; mean-
ing, cedars of that species} this is surely as
idle as if we were to attempt explaining the
primary sense, e.g. of "rage" as it exists in
the human mind, by directing our attention
to the " rage" of the sea. Whatever personal
identity does consist in, it is plain that it has
nothing to do with similarity ; since every one
would be ready to say, " When I WAS a child
I thought as a child, I spake as a child,
I understood as a child ; but when I became
a man, I put away childish things."
But a full consideration of this question
would be unsuitable to the subject of the
present work.
APPENDIX.
APPENDIX.
No. I.
ON CERTAIN TERMS WHICH ARE PECULIARLY LIABLE TO
BE USED AMBIGUOUSLY.
LIST OF WORDS EXPLAINED IN THE FOLLOWING APPENDIX.
i. Argument
Hence. See Reason,
xxiii. Same.
ii. Authority.
Why.
xxiv. Sin.
Can. See May, Must
Identical. See One,
xxv. Tendency.
Capable. See Possi-
Same.
Therefore.
ble, Impossible,
x. Impossibility.
See Why.
Necessary.
xi. Indifference.
xxvi. Truth.
iii. Case.
xii. Law.
xxvii. Why.
Cause. See Reason,
xiii. May.
Whence.
Why.
xiv. Necessary.
See Why.
iv. Certain.
xv. Old.
v. Church.
xvi. One.
Value.
vi. Election.
xvii. Pay.
Wealth.
vii. Expect.
xviii. Person.
Labour.
viii. Experience.
xix. Possible.
Capital.
Falsehood. SeeTruih.
xx. Priest.
Rent.
ix. Gospel.
xxi. Reason.
Wages.
xxii. Regeneration.
Profits.
IT has appeared to me desirable to illustrate the import-
ance of attending to the ambiguity of terms, by a greater
number of instances than could have been conveniently
either inserted in the context or introduced in a note,
without too much interrupting the course of the disser-
tation on Fallacies.
I have purposely selected instances from various subjects,
and some, from the most important; being convinced that
the disregard and contempt with which logical studies are
usually treated, may be traced, in part, to a notion, that
the science is incapable of useful application to any matters
z
338 APPENDIX.
of real importance, and is merely calculated to afford an
exercise of ingenuity on insignificant truisms ; syllogisms
to prove that a horse is an animal, and distinctions of
the different senses of " canis" or ' ' gallus ;" a mistake
which is likely to derive some countenance (however
unfairly) from the exclusive employment of such trifling
exemplifications.
The words and phrases which may be employed as
ambiguous middle terms are of course innumerable: but
it may be in several respects of service to the learner, to
explain the ambiguity of a few of those most frequently
occurring in the most important discussions, and whose
double meaning has been the most frequently overlooked ;
and this, not by entering into an examination of all the
senses in which each term is ever employed, but of those
only which are the most liable to be confounded together.
It is worth observing, that the words whose ambiguity is
the most frequently overlooked, and is productive of the
greatest amount of confusion of thought and fallacy, are
among the commonest, and are those of whose meaning the
generality consider there is the least room to doubt. It
is indeed from those very circumstances that the danger
arises ; words in very common use are both the most liable,
from the looseness of ordinary discourse, to slide from one
sense into another, and also the least likely to have that
ambiguity suspected. Familiar acquaintance is perpetually
mistaken for accurate knowledge.*
It may be necessary here to remark, that inaccuracy not
unfrequently occurs in the employment of the very phrase,
" such an author uses such a word in this, or that sense,"
or " means so and so, by this word." We should not use
these expressions (as some have inadvertently done) in
reference, necessarily, to the notion which may exist, in
* See Pol. Econ. Lect. IX.
AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 339
the author s mind, of the object in question ; his ideas
respecting the thing he is speaking of ; of which the notions
conveyed to others by the word, may often (even according
to the writer's own expectation) fall short : nor again,
should we regard the sense in which they understand him,
as necessarily his sense, (though it is their* s) of the word
employed ; since they may mistake his meaning : but we
must consider what sense it is likely he expected and in-
tended to convey, to those to whom he addressed himselfi
And a judicious writer will always expect each word to be
understood, as nearly as the context will allow, in the sense*
or in one of the senses, which use has established, except so
far as he may have given some different explanation. But
there are many who, from various causes, frequently fail of
conveying the sense they design.
It is but fair perhaps to add this warning to my readers ;
that one who takes pains to ascertain and explain the sense
of the words employed in any discussion, whatever care he
may use to show that what he is inquiring after, is, the
received sense, is yet almost sure to be charged, by the
inaccurate, and the sophistical, with attempting to introduce
some new sense of the words in question^ in order to serve
a purpose.
i. ARGUMENT, in the strict logical sense, has been
defined in the foregoing treatise; (Compendium, Book II.
Ch. iii. 1) : in that sense it includes (as is there remarked)
the Conclusion as well as the Premises : and thus it is, that
we say a Syllogism consists of three propositions ; viz. the
Conclusion which is proved, as well as those by which it is
proved. Argumentum is also used by many logical writers
to denote the middle term.
But in ordinary discourse, Argument is very often used
for the Premises alone, in contradistinction to the Conclusion j
z 2
340 APPENDIX.
e. g. " the Conclusion which this Argument is intended to
establish is so and so."
It is also sometimes employed to denote what is, strictly
speaking, a course or series of such Arguments ; when a
certain Conclusion is established by Premises, which are
themselves, in the same dissertation, proved by other pro-
positions, and perhaps those again, by others ; the whole
of this dissertation is often called an Argument to prove
the ultimate conclusion designed to be established ; though
in fact it is a train of Arguments. It is in this sense, e. g.
that we speak of "Warburton's Argument to prove the
divine legation of Moses," &c.
Sometimes also the word is used to denote what may be
properly called a Disputation ; i. e. two trains of argument,
opposed to each other : as when we say that A and B had
a long Argument on such and such a subject ; and that A
had the best of the Argument. Doubtless the use of the
word in this sense has contributed to foster the notion
entertained by many, that Logic is the "art of wrangling,"
that it makes men contentious, fyc. : they have heard that
it is employed about Arguments ; and hastily conclude that
it is confined to cases where there is opposition and contest.
It may be worth mentioning in this place, that the various
forms of stating an Argument are sometimes spoken of
as different kinds of Argument: as when we speak of a
Categorical or Hypothetical Argument, or of one in the first
or some other figure ; though every logician knows that
the same individual Argument may be stated in various
figures, $c.
This, no doubt, has contributed to the error of those
who speak of the Syllogism as a peculiar kind of Argu-
ment ; and of " Syllogistic Reasoning," as a distinct mode
of Reasoning, instead of being only a certain form of
expressing any argument.
AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 341
ii. AUTHORITY. This word is sometimes employed
in its primary sense, when we refer to any one's example,
testimony, or judgment: as when, e. g. we speak of cor-
recting a reading in some book, on the authority of an
ancient MS. giving a statement of some fact, on the
Authority of such and such historians, $c.
In this sense the word answers pretty nearly to the
Latin " Auctoritas."
Sometimes again it is employed as equivalent to " Po-
testas," Power : as when we speak of the Authority of a
Magistrate, 8fc.
Many instances may be found in which writers have
unconsciously slid from one sense of the word to another,
so as to blend confusedly in their minds the two ideas.
In no case perhaps has this more frequently happened than
when we are speaking of the Authority of the Church : in
which the ambiguity of the latter word (see the Article
Church) comes in aid of that of the former. The Authority
(in the primary sense) of the Catholic, i. e. Universal
Church, at any particular period, is often appealed to, in
support of this or that doctrine or practice : and it is,
justly, supposed that the opinion of the great body of the
Christian World affords a presumption (though only a pre-
sumption) in favour of the correctness of any interpretation
of Scripture, or the expediency, at the time, of any cere-
mony, regulation, $-c.
On the other hand, each particular Church has Authority
in the other sense, vis. Power, over its own members, (as
long as they choose to remain members) to enforce anything
not contrary to God's Word. But the Catholic or Univer-
sal Church, not being one religious community on earth,
can have no authority in the sense of Power ; since it is
notorious there never was a time when the power of the
Pope, of a Council, or of any other human Governors, over
342 APPENDIX.
all Christians, was in fact admitted, or could be proved to
have any just claim to be admitted.
Authority again in the sense of Auctoritas, may have
every degree of weight, from absolute infallibility, (such
as, in religious matters, Christians attribute to the Scrip-
tures) down to the faintest presumption. See Hawkins on
Tradition. Hinds 's History of the Early Progress of
Christianity, Vol. II. p. 99. Hinds on Inspiration. Errors
of Romanism, Chap. iv. And Essay on the Omission of
Creeds, $c. in the New Testament.
CAN. See " MAY," " MUST."
CAPABLE. See "POSSIBLE," "IMPOSSIBLE," and
" NECESSARY."
iii. CASE. Sometimes Grammarians use this word to
signify (which is its strict sense) a certain " variation in
the writing and utterance of a Noun, denoting the relation
in which it stands to some other part of the sentence;"
sometimes to denote that relation itself: whether indicated
by the termination, or by a preposition, or by its colloca-
tion ; and there is hardly any writer on the subject who
does not occasionally employ the term in each sense, with-
out explaining the ambiguity. Much confusion and frivolous
debate has hence resulted. Whoever would see a specimen
of this, may find it in the Port Royal Greek Grammar ; in
which the Authors insist on giving the Greek language an
Ablative case, with the same termination, however, as the
Dative : (though, by the way, they had better have fixed
on the Genitive ; which oftener answers to the Latin Abla-
tive) urging, and with great truth, that if a distinct termi-
nation be necessary to constitute a case, many Latin Nouns
will be without an Ablative, some without a Genitive or
AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 343
without a Dative, and all Neuters without an Accusative.
And they add, that since it is possible, in every instance,
to render into Greek the Latin Ablative, consequently there
must be an Ablative in Greek. If they had known and
recollected that in the language of Lapland, there are, as
we are told, thirteen Cases, they would have hesitated to
use an argument which would prove that there must
therefore be thirteen Cases in Greek and Latin also ! All
this confusion might have been avoided, if it had but been
observed that the word " Case" is used in two senses. See
Book III. 10. 4.
CAUSE. See " REASON," and " WHY."
iv. CERTAIN. This is a word whose ambiguity,
together with that of many others of kindred signification
(as " may," " can," " must," " possible," $c.) has occasioned
infinite perplexity in discussions on some of the most
important subjects ; such as the freedom of human actions,
the divine foreknowledge, *c.
In its primary sense, it is applied (according to its
etymology from cerno) to the state of a person's mind;
denoting any one's full and complete conviction ; and,
generally, though not always, implying that there is suf-
ficient ground for such conviction. It was thence easily
transferred to the truths or events, respecting which this
conviction is rationally entertained. And Uncertain (as well
as the substantives and adverbs derived from these adjec-
tives) follows the same rule. Thus we say, "it is certain
that a battle has been fought :" " it is certain that the moon
will be full on such a day : " " it is uncertain whether such
a one is alive or dead: ""it is uncertain whether it will
rain to-morrow : " meaning, in these and in all other cases,
that we are certain or uncertain respectively ; not indicating
344 APPENDIX.
any difference in the character of the events themselves,
except in reference to our knowledge respecting them ; for
the same thing may be, at the same time, both certain and
uncertain, to different individuals ; e. g. the life or death
at a particular time, of any one, is certain to his friends
on the spot ; uncertain or contingent, to those at a distance.
From not attending to this circumstance, the words " un-?
certain" and " contingent" (which is employed nearly in
the same sense as uncertain in its secondary meaning) have
been considered by many writers* as denoting some quality
in the things themselves ; and have thus become involved
in endless confusion. " Contingent" is indeed applied to
events only, not to persons : but it denotes no quality in
the events themselves ; only, as has been said, the relation
in which they stand to a person who has no complete
knowledge respecting them. It is from overlooking this
principle, obvious as it is when once distinctly stated, that
Chance or Fortune has come to be regarded as a real
agent, and to have been, by the ancients, personified as a,
(joddess, and represented by statues-
v. CHURCH is sometimes employed to signify the
Church, . e. the Universal or . Catholic Church, com-
prehending in it all Christians ; who are " Members one
of another," and who compose the body, of which Christ
is the Head; which, collectively taken, has no visible
supreme Head or earthly governor, either individual, or
council; and which is one, only in reference to its One
* Among others, Archbishop King, in his Discourse on Predestination,
has fallen into this error ; as is explained in the Notes and the Appendix
to my edition of that work.
It may he allowable to mention in this place, that I have been repre-
sented as coinciding with him as to the point in question, in a note to
Mr. Davison's work on Prophecy ; through a mistake, which the author
candidly acknowledged, and promised to rectify.
AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 345
invisible Governor and Paraclete, the Spirit of Christ,
dwelling in it, to the one common faith, and character, which
ought to be found in all Christians, and the common prin-
ciples on which all Christian societies should be constituted.
See Hinds's History of the Rise of Christianity, and
Blanco White's Preservative against Popery.
Sometimes again it is employed to signify a Church ; i. e.
any one Society, constituted on these general principles ;
having governors on earth, and existing as a Community
possessing authority over its own members ; in which sense
we read of the "Seven Churches in Asia;" of Paul's
having " the care of all the Churches," $c. This ambiguity
has often greatly favoured the cause of the Church of Rome ;
which being admitted by her opponents to be a Church,
i. e. a branch, though an unsound and corrupt one, of the
universal Church of Christ, is thence assumed to be the
Church, the Society in which all men are called upon to
enrol themselves. See the article <{ TRUTH."
The Church is also not unfrequently used to denote the
Clergy, in contradistinction to the Laity ; as, when we speak
of any one's being educated for the Church, meaning, " for
the Ministry." Some would perhaps add that it is in this
sense we speak of the endowments of the Church ; since
the immediate emolument of these is received by clergymen.
But if it be considered that they receive it in the capacity
of public instructors and spiritual pastors, these endow^
ments may fairly be regarded as belonging, in a certain
sense, to the whole body, for whose benefit they are, in
this way, calculated ; in the same manner as we consider,
e. g. the endowment of a professorship in a university, as
a benefaction, not to the professors alone, but to the uni-.
versity at large.
vi. ELECTION. This is one of the terms which is
346 APPENDIX.
oiten to all practical purposes ambiguous, when not employed,
strictly speaking, in two different senses, but with different
applications, according to that which is understood in con-
junction with it. See Book III. 10. See also Essays
on some of the Difficulties, 8fc. Essay III. "On Election."
vii. EXPECT. This word is liable to an ambiguity,
which may sometimes lead, in conjunction with other
causes, to a practical bad effect. It is sometimes used
in the sense of " anticipate" "calculate on," $<?.
(IXirtZw) in short, " consider as probable ;" sometimes for
" require., or demand as reasonable," " consider as
right" (atw.)
Thus, I may fairly "expect" (ato>) that one who has
received kindness from me, should protect me in distress ;
yet I may have reason to expect (IA7n'av) that he will not.
" England expects every man to do his duty ;" but it would
be chimerical to expect, i. e. anticipate, a universal perfor-
mance of duty. Hence, when men of great revenues,
whether civil or ecclesiastical, live in the splendor and
sensuality of Sardanapalus, they are apt to plead that this
is expected of them ; which is true, in the sense that such
conduct is anticipated as probable; not true, as implying
that it is required or approved. Thus also, because it
would be romantic to expect (i. e. calculate upon) in public
men a primary attention to the public good, or in men in
general an adherence to the rule of doing as you would be
done by, many are apt to flatter themselves that they cannot
reasonably be expected (i. e. fairly called upon) to act on
such principles. What may reasonably be expected (in one
sense of the word) must be, precisely the practice of the
majority ; since it is the majority of instances that constitutes
probability : what may reasonably be expected (in the
other sense) is something much beyond the practice of
AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 347
the generality ; as long at least as it shall be true that
" narrow is the way that leadeth unto life, and few there
he that find it."
viii. EXPERIENCE. This word, in its strict sense,
applies to what has occurred within a person's own know-
ledge. Experience, in this sense, of course, relates to the
past alone. Thus it is that a man knows by experience
what sufferings he has undergone in some disease, or what
height the tide reached at a certain time and place.
More frequently the word is used to denote that Judg-
ment which is derived from experience in the primary
sense, by reasoning from that, in combination with other
data. Thus, a man may assert, on the ground of Expe-
rience, that he was cured of a disorder by such a medi-
cine that that medicine is, generally, beneficial in that
disorder; that the tide may always be expected, under
such circumstances, to rise to such a height. Strictly
speaking, none of these can be known by Experience, but
are conclusions derived from Experience. It is in this
sense only that Experience can be applied to the future, or,
which comes to the same thing, to any general fact; as
e. g. when it is said that we know by Experience that water
exposed to a certain temperature will freeze.
" Men are so formed as (often unconsciously) to reason,
whether well or ill, on the phenomena they observe, and to
mix up their inferences with their statements of those
phenomena, so as in fact to theorize (however scantily and
crudely) without knowing it. If you will be at the pains
carefully to analyze the simplest descriptions you hear of
any transaction or state of things, you will find, that the
process which almost invariably takes place is, in logical
language, this ; that each individual has in his mind certain
major-premises or principles, relative to the subject in
348 APPENDIX.
question; that observation of what actually presents itself
to the senses, supplies minor-premises; and that the state-
ment given (and which is reported as a thing experienced)
consists in fact of the conclusions drawn from the combina-
tions of those premises.
" Hence it is that several different men, who have all had
equal, or even the very same, experience, i. e. have been wit-
nesses or agents in the same transactions, will often be found
to resemble so many different men looking at the same book :
one perhaps, though he distinctly sees black marks on white
paper, has never learned his letters ; another can read, but
is a stranger to the language in which the book is written ;
another has an acquaintance with the language, but under-
stands it imperfectly ; another is familiar with the language,
but is a stranger to the subject of the book, and wants
power, or previous instruction, to enable him fully to take in
the author's drift ; while another again perfectly comprehends
the whole.
" The object that strikes the eye is to all of these persons
the same ; the difference of the impressions produced on
the mind of each is referable to the differences in their
minds.
" And this explains the fact, that we find so much dis-
crepancy in the results of what are called Experience and
Common-sense, as contra-distinguished from theory. In
former times men knew by experience, that the earth stands
still, and the sun rises and sets. Common-sense taught
them that there could be no antipodes, since men could not
stand with their heads downwards, like flies on the ceiling.
Experience taught the King of Bantam that water could not
become solid. And (to come to the consideration of human
affairs) the experience and common-sense of one of the most
observant and intelligent of historians, Tacitus, convinced
him, that for a mixed government to be so framed, as to
AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 349
combine the elements of Royalty, Aristocracy, and De-
mocracy, must be next to impossible, and that if such a
one could be framed, it must inevitably be very speedily
dissolved."*
There are again two different applications of the word
(see Book III. 10), which, when not carefully distin-
guished, lead in practice to the same confusion as the
employment of it in two senses ; viz. we sometimes under-
stand our own personal Experience ; sometimes, general
Experience. Hume has availed himself of this (practical)
ambiguity, in his Essay on Miracles ; in which he observes,
that we have experience of the frequent falsity of Testimony,
but that the occurrence of a miracle is contrary to our
Experience, and is consequently what no testimony ought
to be allowed to establish. Now had he explained whose
Experience he meant, the argument would have come to
nothing : if he means, the Experience of mankind univer-
sally, i. e. that a Miracle has never come under the Expe-
rience of any one, this is palpably begging the question :
if he means the Experience of each individual who has
never himself witnessed a Miracle, this would establish a
rule (viz. that we are to believe nothing of which we have
not ourselves experienced the like) which it would argue
insanity to act upon. Not only was the King of Bantam
justified (as Hume himself admits) in listening to no evi-
dence for the existence of Ice, but no one would be autho-
rized on this principle to expect his own death. His
Experience informs him, directly, only that others have
died. Every disease under which he himself may have
laboured, his Experience must have told him has not ter-
minated fatally; if he is to judge strictly of the future by
the past, according to this rule, what should hinder him
from expecting the like of all future diseases?
* Pol. Econ. Lect. III.
350 APPENDIX.
Some have never been struck with this consequence of
Hume's principles; and some have even failed to perceive
it when pointed out: but if the reader thinks it worth his
while to consult the author, he will see that his principles,
according to his own account of them, are such as I have
stated.
Perhaps however he meant, if indeed he had any distinct
meaning, something intermediate between universal, and
individual experience; viz. the Experience of the gene-
rality, as to what is common and of ordinary occurrence ;
in which sense the maxim will only amount to this, that
false Testimony is a thing of common occurrence, and that
Miracles are not. An obvious truth, indeed ; but too general
to authorize, of itself, a conclusion in any particular case.
In any other individual question, as to the admissibility of
evidence, it would be reckoned absurd to consider merely
the average chances for the truth of Testimony in the
abstract, without inquiring what the Testimony is, in the
particular instance before us. \ As if e.g. any one had
maintained that no testimony could establish Columbus's
account of the discovery of America, because it is more
common for travellers to lie, than for new Continents to be
discovered.* Such a procedure involves a manifest ignoratio
elenchi ; the two propositions brought forward as opposed,
being by no means incompatible : Experience tells us that
" a destructive hurricane is not a common occurrence ;"
certain persons tell us that "a destructive hurricane oc-
curred in the West Indies, at such a time;" there is (as
Campbell has pointed out) no opposition between these two
assertions.
It is to be observed by the way, that there is yet an
additional ambiguity in the entire phrase "contrary to
experience;" in one sense, a miracle, or any other event,
* See " Historic Doubts relative to Napoleon Buonaparte."
AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 351
may be called contrary to the experience of any one who
has never witnessed the like ; as the freezing of water was
to that of the King of Bantam ; in another and stricter
sense, that only is contrary to a man's experience, which he
knows by experience not to be true ; as if one should be
told of an infallible remedy for some disorder, he having
seen it administered without effect. No testimony can
establish what is, in this latter sense, contrary to experience.
We need not wonder that ordinary minds should be be-
wildered by a sophistical employment of such a mass of
ambiguities.
Such reasonings as these are accounted ingenious and
profound, on account of the subject on which they are
employed ; if applied to the ordinary affairs of life, they
would be deemed unworthy of serious notice.
The reader is not to suppose that the refutation of
Hume's Essay on Miracles was my object in this Article.
That might have been sufficiently accomplished, in the way
of a " reductio ad absurdum," by mere reference to the
case of the King of Bantam adduced by the author him-
self. But this celebrated Essay, though it has often per-
haps contributed to the amusement of an anti-christian
sophist at the expense of those unable to expose its fallacy,
never probably made one convert. The author himself
seems plainly to have meant it as a specimen of his inge-
nuity in arguing on a given hypothesis : for he disputes
against miracles as contrary to the Course of Nature;
whereas, according to him, there is no such thing as a Course
of Nature ; his scepticism extends to the whole external
world; to everything, except the ideas or impressions on
the mind of the individual ; so that a miracle which is
believed, has, in that circumstance alone, on his principles,
as much reality as anything can have.
But my object has been to point out, by the use of this
352 APPENDIX.
example, the fallacies and blunders which may result from
inattention to the ambiguity of the word Experience : and
this cannot be done by a mere indirect argument; which
refutes indeed, but does not explain, an error.
FALSEHOOD and FALSITY. See " TRUTH."
ix. GOSPEL. This is instanced as one of the words
which is practically ambiguous, from its different appli-
cations, even though not employed (as it sometimes is) in
different senses.
Conformably to its etymological meaning of " Good-
tidings," it is used to signify (and that especially and
exclusively) the welcome intelligence of Salvation to man,
as preached by our Lord and his followers. But it was
afterwards transitively applied to each of the four histories
of our Lord's life, published by those who are called the
Evangelists. And the term is often used to express collec-
tively the Gospel-doctrines; i. e. the instructions given men
how to avail themselves of the offer of salvation : and
preaching the Gospel, is accordingly often used to include
not only the proclaiming of the good tidings, but the
teaching of what is to be believed and done, in consequence.
This ambiguity is one source of some important theological
errors : many supposing that Gospel truth is to be found
exclusively, or chiefly in the Gospels; to the neglect of the
other Sacred Writings.
Again, since Jesus is said to have preached the " Gospel,"
and the same is said of the Apostles, the conclusion is often
hence drawn, that the discourses of our Lord and the
Apostolic Epistles must exactly coincide ; and that in case
of any apparent difference, the former must be the standard,
and the latter must be taken to bear no other sense than
what is implied by the other ; a notion which leads
AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 353
inevitably and immediately to the neglect of the Apostolic
Epistles, when every thing they contain must be limited and
modified into a complete coincidence with our Lord's Dis-
courses. Whereas it is very conceivable, that though both
might be in a certain sense " good tidings," yet, one may
contain a much more full development of the Christian
scheme than the other. Which is confirmed by the con-
sideration, that the principal events on which the Religion
is founded (the atoning sacrifice and resurrection of Christ)
had not taken place, nor could be clearly declared by our
Lord, when He preached, saying, " the Kingdom of
Heaven is at hand ;" not that it was actually established;
as it was, when his Apostles were sent forth to preach
to all nations. See Essays on the Difficulties, &c,
Essay II.
HENCE. See " REASON " and " WHY."
IDENTICAL. See " ONE " and " SAME.
x. IMPOSSIBILITY. According to the definition we
may choose to give of this word, it may be said either that
there are three Species of it, or that it may be used in three
different senses. 1st. What may be called a mathematical
impossibility, is that which involves an absurdity and self-
contradiction ; e. g. that two straight lines should enclose a
space, is not only impossible but inconceivable, as it would
be at variance with the definition of a straight line. And it
should be observed, that inability to accomplish anything
which is, in this sense, impossible, implies no limitation of
power, and is compatible, even with omnipotence, in the
fullest sense of the word. If it be proposed, e. g. to con-
struct a triangle having one of its sides equal to the other
two, or to find two numbers having the same ratio to each
A A
354 APPENDIX.
other as the side of a square and its diameter, it is not from
a defect of power that we are precluded from solving such
a problem as these ; since in fact the problem is in itself
unmeaning and absurd : it is, in reality, nothing, that is
required to be done.
2dly. What may be called a Physical Impossibility is
something at variance with the existing Laws of Nature,
and which consequently no Being, subject to those Laws,
(as we are) can surmount ; but we can easily conceive a
Being capable of bringing about what in the ordinary course
of Nature is impossible. E. G. to multiply five loaves into
food for a multitude, or to walk on the surface of the waves,
are things physically impossible, but imply no contradiction ;
on the contrary, we cannot but suppose that the Being, if
there be such an one, who created the Universe, is able
to alter at will the properties of any of the substances it
contains.*
And an occurrence of this character, we call, miraculous.
Not but that one person may perform without supernatural
power what is, to another, physically impossible ; as, e. g.
a man may lift a great weight, which it would be physically
impossible for a child to raise ; because it is contrary to the
Laws of Nature that a muscle of this degree of strength
should overcome a resistance which one of that degree is
equal to. But if any one perform what is beyond his own
natural powers, or the natural powers of Man universally, he
has performed a miracle.
Much Sophistry has been founded on the neglect of the
distinction between these two senses. It has even been
contended, that no evidence ought to induce a man of sense
to admit that a miracle has taken place, on the ground that
it is a thing impossible ; in other words, that it is a miracle
* See an able disquisition on Miracles, subjoined to the Life of Apol-
lonius Tyanaeus, in the Encyclopedia Metropolitana.
AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 355
for if it were not a thing impossible to man, there would be
no miracle in the case : so that such an argument is palpably
begging the question ; but it has often probably been
admitted from an indistinct notion being suggested of
Impossibility in the first sense ; in which sense (viz. that
of self-contradiction) it is admitted that no evidence would
justify belief.
3dly. Moral Impossibility signifies only that high degree
of improbability which leaves no room for doubt. In this
sense we often call a thing impossible, which implies no
contradiction, or any violation of the Laws of Nature, but
which yet we are rationally convinced will never occur,
merely from the multitude of chances against it ; as, e. g.
that unloaded dice should turn up the same faces one
hundred times successively.* And in this sense, we cannot
accurately draw the line, so as to determine at what point
the improbability amounts to an Impossibility; and hence
we often have occasion to speak of this or that as almost
impossible, though not quite, fyc. The other impossi-
bilities do not admit of degrees of approach. That a
certain throw should recur two or three times successively,
we should not call very improbable; the improbability is
increased at each successive step ; but we cannot say exactly
when it becomes impossible ; though no one would scruple
to call one hundred such recurrences impossible.
In the same sense we often call things impossible which
are completely within the power of known agents to bring
about, but which we are convinced they never will bring
about. Thus, e. g. that all the civilized people in the world
should with one accord forsake their habitations and wander
about the world as savages, every one would call an impos-
sibility ; though it is plain they have the power to do so,
* And yet why should they not ? since the chances are the very same
against any given 100 throws. See Rhet. Part I. Ch. ii. 4.
A A 2
356 APPENDIX.
and that it depends on their choice which they will do ; and
moreover that there even have been instances of some few
persons doing so. In like manner, if we were told of a man's
having disgracefully fled from his post, whom we knew to
be possessed of the most undaunted courage, we should
without scruple (and with good reason, supposing the idea
formed of his character to be a just one) pronounce this an
Impossibility ; meaning, that there is sufficient ground for
being fully convinced that the thing could never take place ;
not from any idea of his not having power and liberty to
fly if he would ; for our certainty is built on the very cir-
cumstance of his being free to act as he will, together with
his being of such a disposition as never to have the will
to act disgracefully. If, again, a man were bound hand
and foot, it would be, in the other sense, impossible for him
to fly ; viz. out of his power. (t Capable " has a cor-
responding ambiguity.
The performance of anything that is morally impossible
to a mere man, is to be reckoned a miracle, as much as if
the impossibility were physical. E. G. It is morally im-
possible for poor Jewish fishermen to have framed such a
scheme of ethical and religious doctrine as the Gospel
exhibits. It is morally impossible for a man to foretell
distant and improbable future events with the exactitude of
many of the prophecies in Scripture.
Much of the confusion of thought which has pervaded,
and has interminably protracted, the discussions respecting
the long agitated question of human freedom, has arisen
from inattention to the ambiguity which has been here
noticed. If the Deity, it is said, " foresees exactly what I
shall do on any occasion, it must be impossible for me to
act otherwise ;" and thence it is inferred that man's actions
cannot be free. The middle term employed in such an
argument as this is " impossible," or " impossibility" em-
AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 357
ployed in two senses. He to whom it is, in one sense,
impossible, (viz, physically) to act otherwise than he does,
(i. e. who has it not in his power} is not a free agent ;
correct foreknowledge implies impossibility (in another sense,
viz. moral impossibility ; the absence of all room for
doubt :) and the perplexity is aggravated by resorting, for
the purpose of explanation, to such words as " may," " can,"
" possible," " must," Sfc., all of which are effected by a cor-
responding ambiguity. *
It should be observed, that many things which are not
usually termed " mathematically " necessary or impossible,
will at once appear such, when stated, not abstractedly,
but with all their actual circumstances : e. g. that (t Brutus
stabbed Caesar," is a fact, the denial of which, though a
falsehood, would not be regarded as self-contradictory
(like the denial of the equality of two right angles ;)
because, abstractedly, we can conceive Brutus acting
otherwise : but if we insert the circumstances (which of
course really existed) of his having complete power, liberty,
and also a predominant will, to do so, then, the denial of
the action amounts to a " mathematical " impossibility, or
self-contradiction ; for to act voluntarily against the dictates
of a predominant will, implies an effect without a cause.
Of Future events, that Being, and no other, can have the
same knowledge as of the past, who is acquainted with all
the causes, remote or immediate, internal and external, on
which each depends.
xi. INDIFFERENCE, in its application in respect
of the Will, and of the Judgment, is subject to an ambiguity
* See Tucker's " Light of Nature," in the Chapters on Providence, on
Free-will, and some others. I have endeavoured to condense and to
simplify some of the most valuable parts of his reasonings in the Notes
and Appendix to an edition of Archbishop King's Discourse on Predesti-
nation.
358 APPENDIX.
which some of ray readers may perhaps think hardly worth
noticing ; the distinction between unbiassed candour and
impartiality, on the one side, and carelessness on the other,
being so very obvious. But these two things nevertheless
have been, from their bearing the same name, confounded
together ; or at least represented as inseparably connected.
I have known a person maintain, with some plausibility,
the inexpediency, with a view to the attainment of truth, of
educating people, or appointing teachers to instruct them,
in any particular systems or theories, of astronomy, medi-
cine, religion, politics, $c., on the ground, that a man must
wish to believe and to find good reasons for believing, the
system in which he has been trained, and which he has
been engaged in teaching ; and this wish must prejudice his
understanding in favour of it, and consequently render him
an incompetent judge of truth.*
Now let any one consider whether such a doctrine as
this could have been even plausibly stated, but for the
ambiguity of the word Indifference, and others connected
with it. For it would follow, from such a principle, that no
physician is to be trusted, who has been instructed in a
certain mode of treating any disorder, because he must
wish to think the theory correct which he has learned : nay,
no physician should be trusted who is not utterly indifferent
whether his patient recovers or dies ; since else, he must
wish to find reasons for hoping favourably from the mode
of treatment pursued. No plan for the benefit of the
public, proposed by a philanthropist , should be listened
to; since such a man cannot but wish it may be success-
fill; #C.
No doubt the judgment is often biassed by the inclina-
tions but it is possible, and it should be our endeavour, to
* See Essay I. Second Series,
AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 359
guard against this bias. If a scheme be proposed to any
one for embarking his capital in some speculation which
promises great wealth, he will doubtless wish to find that
the expectations held out are well founded : but every one
would call him very imprudent, if (as some do) he should
suffer this wish to bias his judgment, and should believe,
on insufficient grounds, the fair promises held out to him.
But we should not think such imprudence an inevitable con-
sequence of his desire to increase his property. His wishes,
we should say, were both natural and wise ; but since they
could not render the event more probable, it was most
unwise to allow them to influence his decision. In like
manner, a good man will indeed wish to find the evidence
of the Christian religion satisfactory ; but a wise man does
not for that reason take for granted that it is satisfactory ;
but weighs the evidence the more carefully on account of
the importance of the question.
It is curious to observe how fully aware of the opera-
tion of this bias, and how utterly blind to it, the same
persons will be, in opposite cases. Such writers, e. g. as I
have just alluded to, disparage the judgment of those who
have been accustomed to study and to teach the Christian
religion, and who derive hope and satisfaction from it ; on
the ground that they must wish to find it true. And let it be
admitted that their authority shall go for nothing ; and that
the question shall be tried entirely by the reasons adduced,
But then, on the same principle, how strong must be the
testimony of the multitudes who admit the truth of Chris-
tianity, though it is to them a source of uneasiness or of
dismay; who have not adopted any antinomian system to
quiet their conscience while leading an unchristian life ; but,
when they hear of " righteousness, temperance, and judg-
ment to come, tremble," and try to dismiss such thoughts
till " a more convenient season." The case of these, who
360 APPENDIX.
have every reason to wish Christianity untrue, is passed by,
by the very same persons who are insisting on the influence
of the opposite bias. According to the homely but ex-
pressive proverb, they are " deaf on one ear."
And it may be added, that it is utterly a mistake to sup-
pose that the bias is always in favour of the conclusion
wished for : it is often in the contrary direction. The pro-
verbial expression of " too good news to be true," bears
witness to the existence of this feeling. There is in some
minds a tendency to unreasonable doubt in cases where their
wishes are strong ; a morbid distrust of evidence which
they are especially anxious to find conclusive : e. g. ground-
less fears for the health or safety of an ardently-beloved
child, will frequently distress anxious parents.
Different temperaments (sometimes varying with the state
of health of each individual) lead towards these opposite
miscalculations, the over-estimate or under-estimate of the
reasons for a conclusion, we earnestly wish to find true.
Our aim should be to guard against both extremes, and
to decide according to the evidence ; preserving the In-
difference of the Judgment, even where the Will neither
can, nor should be indifferent.
xii. LAW is, etymologically, that which is "laid"
down ; and is used, in the most appropriate sense, to signify
some general injunction, command, or regulation, addressed
to certain Persons, who are called upon to conform to it.
It is in this sense that we speak of " the Law of Moses,"
" the Law of the Land," $c.
It is also used in a transferred sense, to denote the state-
ment of some general fact, the several individual instances
of which exhibit a conformity to that statement, analogous
to the conduct of persons in respect to a Law which they
obey. It is in this sense that we speak of " the Laws of
AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 361
Nature :" when we say that " a seed in vegetating directs
the radicle downwards and the plumule upwards, in com-
pliance with a Law of Nature," we only mean that such is
universally the fact ; and so, in other cases.
It is evident therefore that, in this sense, the conformity
of individual cases to the general rule is that which con-
stitutes a Law of Nature. If water should henceforth never
become solid, at any temperature, then the freezing of water
would no longer be a Law of Nature : whereas in the other
sense, a Law is not the more or the less a Law from the
conformity or non-conformity of individuals to it : if an act
of our legislature were to be disobeyed and utterly disre-
garded by every one, it would not on that account be the
less a Law.
This distinction may appear so obvious when plainly
stated, as hardly to need mention : yet writers of great note
and ability have confounded these two senses together : I
need only mention Hooker (in the opening of his great
work) and Montesquieu : the latter of whom declaims on
the much stricter observance in the Universe of the Laws of
Nature, than in mankind, of the divine and human Laws
laid down for their conduct : not considering that, in the
former case, it is the observance that constitutes the Law.
xiii. MAY, and likewise MUST, and CAN, (as well as
CANNOT) are each used in two senses, which are very
often confounded together. They relate sometimes to
Power, sometimes to Contingency.
When we say of one who has obtained a certain sum of
money, " now he may purchase the field he was wishing
for," we mean that it is in his power ; it is plain that he
may, in the same sense, hoard up the money, or spend
it on something else ; though perhaps we are quite sure,
from our knowledge of his character and situation, that
362 APPENDIX.
he will not. When again we say, " it may rain to-mor-
row," or " the vessel may have arrived in port," the ex-
pression does not at all relate to power, but merely to
contingency : i. e. we mean, that though we are not sure
such an event will happen or has happened, we are not
sure of the reverse.
When, again, we say, " this man, of so grateful a dis-
position, must have eagerly embraced such an opportunity
of requiting his benefactor," or " one who approves of
the slave trade must be very hard-hearted," we only
mean to imply the absence of all doubt on these points.
The very notions of gratitude and of hard-heartedness
exclude the idea of compulsion, and of yielding to irresis
tible power. But when we say that " all men must die,"
or that " a man must go to prison who is dragged by
force," we mean "whether they will or not" that there
is no power to resist. So also, if we say that a Being
of perfect goodness c< cannot " act wrong, we do not mean
that it is out of his power ; since that would imply no
goodness of character; but that there is sufficient reason
for feeling sure that he will not. It is in a very different
sense that we say of a man fettered in a prison, that he
" cannot " escape : meaning, that though he has the willy
he wants the ability.
These words are commonly introduced, in questions
connected with Fatalism and the Freedom of human actions,
to explain the meaning of " necessary," " impossible," -c. ;
and having themselves a corresponding ambiguity, they
only tend to increase the perplexity.
" Chaos umpire sits,
And by deciding worse embroils the fray."
MUST. See" MAY."
AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 363
xiv. NECESSARY. This word is used as the contrary
to " impossible " in all its senses, and is of course liable to
a corresponding ambiguity. Thus it is " mathematically
Necessary " that two sides of a triangle should be greater
than the third ; there is a " physical Necessity " for the
fall of a stone; and a "moral necessity" that Beings of
such and such a character should act, when left perfectly
free, in such and such a manner ; i. e. we are sure they will,
act so ; though of course it is in their power to act other-
wise ; else there would be no moral agency.* This ambi-
guity is employed sophistically to justify immoral conduct ;
since no one is responsible for anything done under
" necessity," i. e. " physical necessity ;" as when a man
is dragged anywhere by external force, or falls down from
being too weak to stand; and then the same excuse is
fallaciously extended to " moral necessity " also.
There are likewise numberless different applications of
the word " necessity " (as well as of those derived from it)
in which there is a practical ambiguity, from the diffe-
rence of the things understood in conjunction with it : e. g.
food is "necessary;" viz. to life: great wealth is "ne-
cessary " to the gratification of a man of luxurious habits ;
the violation of moral duty is in many cases " necessary"
for the attainment of certain worldly objects ; the renuncia-
tion of such objects, and subjugation of the desires, is " ne-
cessary " to the attainment of the Gospel-promises, SfC.
And thus it is that " necessity " has come to be " the
tyrant's plea ;" for as no one is at all responsible for what
is a matter of physical necessity, what he has no power
to avoid, so, a degree of allowance is made for a man's
doing what he has power to avoid, when it appears to be
the less of two evils ; as e. g. when a man who is famishing
* See the article u Impossibility ;" note.
364 APPENDIX.
takes the first food he meets with, as " necessary " to
support life, or throws over goods in a storm, when it is
"necessary" in order to save the ship. But if the plea
of necessity be admitted without inquiring for what the act
in question is necessary, anything whatever may be thus
vindicated ; since no one commits any crime which is not,
in his view, " necessary " to the attainment of some sup-
posed advantage or gratification.
The confusion of thought is further increased by the
employment on improper occasions of the phrase "abso-
lutely necessary ;" which, strictly speaking, denotes a case
in which there is no possible alternative. It is necessary
for a man's safety, that he should remain in a house which
he cannot quit without incurring danger : it is absolutely
for simply J necessary that he should remain there, if he is
closely imprisoned in it.
I have treated more fully on this fruitful source of so-
phistry in the Appendix (No I.) to King's " Discourse on
Predestination." In the course of it, I suggested an ety-
mology of the word, which I have reason to think is not
correct ; but it should be observed, that this makes no
difference in the reasoning, which is not in any degree
founded on that etymology ; nor have I, as some have
represented, attempted to introduce any new or unusual
sense of the word, but have all along appealed to common
use, the only right standard, and merely pointed out
the senses in which each word has actually been employed.
See the introduction to this Appendix.
xv. OLD. This word, in its strict and primary sense, de-
notes the length of time that any object has existed ; and
many are not aware that they are accustomed to use it in
any other. It is, however, very frequently employed
instead of " Ancient," to denote distance of time. The
AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 3f>5
same transition seems to have taken place, in Latin. Horace
says of Lucilius, who was one of the most ancient Roman
authors, but who did not live to be old
" quo fit ut omnis
Votiva pateat veluti descripta tabella
Vita Senis."
The present is a remarkable instance of the influence of an
ambiguous word over the thoughts even of those who
are not ignorant of the ambiguity, but are not carefully on
the watch against its effects; the impressions and ideas
associated by habit with the word when used in one sense,
being always apt to obtrude themselves unawares when it
is employed in another sense, and thus to affect, our rea-
sonings. E. G. " Old times," " the Old World," $c. are
expressions in frequent use, and which, oftener than not,
produce imperceptibly the associated impression of the
superior wisdom resulting from experience, which, as a
general rule, we attribute to Old men. Yet no one is
really ignorant that the world is older now than ever it
was ; and that the instruction to be derived from observa-
tions on the past (which is the advantage that Old persons
possess) must be greater, supposing other things equal, to
every successive generation ; and Bacon's remark to this
purpose appears, as soon as distinctly stated, a mere truism :
yet few, perhaps, that he made, are more important. There
is always a tendency to appeal with the same kind of defe-
rence, to the authority of " Old times," as of aged men.
It should be kept in mind, however, that ancient customs,
institutions, $c. when they still exist, may be literally
called Old; and have this advantage attending them, that
their effects may be estimated from long experience;
whereas we cannot be sure, respecting any recently-esta-
blished Law or System, whether it may not produce in
time some effects which were not originally contemplated.
366 APPENDIX.
xvi. ONE is sometimes employed to denote strict and
proper numerical Unity ; sometimes, close Resemblance ;
correspondence with one single description. See " SAME."
" Facies non omnibus UNA,
Nee diversa tamen ; qualem decet esse sororum."
Ov. Metam. b. ii.
It is in the secondary or improper, not the primary and
proper sense of this word, that men are exhorted to " be
of one mind ;" i. e. to agree in their faith, pursuits, mutual
affections, &c.
It is also in this sense that two guineas, e. g. struck from
a wedge of uniform fineness, are said to be " of one and the
same form and weight," and also, "of one and the same
substance." In this secondary or improper sense also, a
child is said to be " of one and the same (bodily) substance
with its mother ;" or, simply " of the substance of its
mother :" for these two pieces of money, and two human
Beings, are numerically distinct.
It is evidently most important to keep steadily in view,
and to explain on proper occasions, these different uses of
the word; lest men should insensibly slide into error on
the most important of all subjects, by applying, in the
secondary sense, expressions which ought to be understood
in the primary and proper. See " PERSON."
xvii. PAY. In the strict sense, a person is said to
" pay," who transfers to another what was once his own : in
another sense " P a y" is used to denote the mere act of
handing over what never was one's own. In this latter
sense a gentleman's steward or housekeeper is said to pay
the tradesmen their bills ; in the other sense, it is the
master who pays them.
It is in the secondary or improper sense that an executor
is said to pay legacies, a landowner or farmer to pay
AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 367
tithes, &c., since the money these hand over to another
never was theirs. See " EviDENCE,"(in vol. of Tracts.) p. 339.
xviii. PERSON,* in its ordinary use at present, inva-
riably implies a numerically distinct substance. Each man
is one Person, and can be but one. It has also a peculiar
theological sense, in which we speak of the " three
Persons" of the blessed Trinity. It was probably thus
employed by our Divines as a literal, or perhaps etymo-
logical, rendering of the Latin word " Persona." I am
inclined to think, however, from the language of Wallis (the
Mathematician and Logician) in the following extract, as
well as from that of some other of our older writers, that
the English word Person was formerly not so strictly con-
fined as now, to the sense it bears in common conversation
among us.
" That which makes these expressions" (viz. respecting the
Trinity) " seem harsh to some of these men, is because they have
used themselves to fansie that notion only of the word Person,
according to which three men are accounted to be three persons*
and these three persons to be three men. But he may consider that
there is another notion of the word Person, and in common use
too, wherein the same man may be said to sustain divers persons,
and those persons to be the same man : that is, the same man as
sustaining divers capacities. As was said but now of Tully,
Tres Personas Unus sustineo ; meam, adversarii, judicis. And
then it will seem no more harsh to say, The three Persons,
Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, are One God, than to say, God
the Creatour, God the Redeemer, and God the Sanctifier, are one
God it is much the same thing whether of the two
forms we use." Letters on the Trinity, p. 63.
" The word Person ( persona) is originally a Latin word, and doth
not properly signify a Man ; (so that another person must needs
imply another man) for then the word Homo would have served,
* Most of the following observations will apply to the word " Per-
sonality."
368 APPENDIX.
and they needed not have taken in the word Persona ; but rather,
one so circumstantiated. And the same Man, if considered in
other circumstances (considerably different) is reputed another per-
son. And that this is the true notion of the word Person, appears
by those noted phrases, personam induere, personam deponere,
personam agere, and many the like, in approved Latin authours.
Thus the same man may at once sustain the Person, of a King
and a Father, if he be invested both with regal and paternal
authority. Now because the King and the Father are for the
most part not only different persons but different men also, (and
the like in other cases) hence it comes to pass that another Person
is sometimes supposed to imply another man ; but not always,
nor is that the proper sense of the word. It is Englished in our
dictionaries by the state, quality or condition whereby one man
differs from another ; and so, as the condition alters, the Person
alters, though the man be the same.
" The hinge of the controversy, is, that notion concerning the
three somewhats, which the Fathers (who first used it) did intend
to design by the name Person ; so that we are not from the word
Person to determine what was that Notion ; but from that Notion
which they would express, to determine in what sense the word
Person is here used," fyc. fyc. Letter V. in Answer to the Arian's
Vindication.*
What was precisely the notion which these Latin Fathers
intended to convey, and how far it approached the classical
signification of the word " Persona," it may not be easy to
* Dr. Wallis's theological works, considering his general celebrity,
are wonderfully little known. He seems to have been, in his day, one
of the ablest Defenders of the Church's doctrine, against the Arians and
Socinians of that period. Of course he incurred the censure, not only of
them, but of all who, though not professedly Arian, gave such an expo-
sition of their doctrine as amounts virtually to Tritheism. I beg to be
understood however as not demanding an implicit deference for his, or
for any other human authority, however eminent. We are taught to
" call no man Master, on earth." But the reference to Dr. Wallis may
serve both to show the use of the word in his days, and to correct the
notion, should any have entertained it, that the views of the subject
here taken are, in our Church, anything novel.
AMBIGUOVS TERMS. 369
determine. But we must presume that they did not intend
to employ it in what is, now, the ordinary sense of the word
Person; both because "Persona" never, I believe, bore
that sense in pure Latinity, and also because it is evident
that, in that sense, " three divine Persons " would have
been exactly equivalent to " three Gods ; " a meaning
which the orthodox always disavowed-
It is probable that they had nearly the same view with
which the Greek theologians adopted the word Hypostasis ;
which seems calculated to express " that which stands under
(i. e. is the Subject of) Attributes." They meant, it may be
presumed, to guard against the suspicion of teaching, on the
one hand, that there are three Gods, or three Parts of the one
God; or, on the other hand, that Father, Son, and Holy
Ghost are no more than three names,* all, of the same
signification ; and they employed accordingly a term which
might serve to denote, that, (though divine Attributes
belong to all and each of these, yet) there are Attributes
of each, respectively, which are not so strictly applicable
to either of the others, as such ; as when, for instance,
the Son is called especially the " Redeemer," and the
Holy Spirit, the "Comforter or Paraclete," &c. The
notion thus conveyed is indeed very faint, and imperfect ;
but is perhaps for that very reason, (considering what
Man is, and what God is,) the less likely to lead to error.
One may convey to a blind man, a notion of seeing, cor-
rect as far as it goes, and instructive to him, though very
imperfect : if he form a more full and distinct notion of
it, his ideas will inevitably be incorrect. See Essay VII.
5, Second Series.-}*
* It is possible that some may have used this expression in the very
sense attached by others to the word " Person ; " led, in a great degree,
by the peculiar signification of " Name " in Scripture. For some very
important remarks on that signification, see Hinds's History.
f It is worth observing, as a striking instance of the little reliance to
B B
370 APPENDIX.
It is perhaps to be regretted that our Divines, in render-
ing the Latin " Persona," used the word Person, whose
ordinary sense, in the present day at least, differs in a most
important point from the theological sense, and yet is not
so remote from it as to preclude all mistake and perplexity.
If " Hypostasis," or any other completely foreign term had
been used instead, no idea at all would have been conveyed
except that of the explanation given ; and thus the danger at
least of being misled by a word, would have been avoided.*
Our Reformers however did not introduce the word into
their Catechism ; though it has been (I must think, inju-
diciously) employed in some popular expositions of the
Catechism, without any explanation, or even allusion to its
being used in a peculiar sense.
As it is, the danger of being not merely not understood,
but misunderstood, should be guarded against most sedu-
lously, by all who wish not only to keep clear of error, but
to inculcate important truth ; by seldom or never employing
this ambiguous word without some explanation or caution.
For if we employ, without any such care, terms which we
must be sensible are likely to mislead, at least the unlearned
and the unthinking, we cannot stand acquitted on the plea
of not having directly inculcated error.
I am persuaded that much heresy, and some infidelity, may
be traced in part to the neglect of this caution. It is not
wonderful that some should be led to renounce a doctrine,
which, through the ambiguity in question, may be represented
to them as involving a self-contradiction, or as leading to
be placed on etymology as a guide to the meaning of a word, that
" Hypostasis," " Substantia," and " Understanding," so widely different
in their sense, correspond in their etymology.
* I wish it to be observed, that it is the ambiguity] of the word Person
which renders it objectionable; not, its being nowhere employed in
Scripture in the technical sense of theologians ; for this circumstance is
rather an advantage. See Essay VI. (Second Series) 4, note.
AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 371
Tritheism ; that others should insensibly slide into this
very error; or that many more (which I know to be no
uncommon case) should, for fear of that error, deliberately,
and on principle, keep the doctrine of the Trinity out of
their thoughts, as a point of speculative belief, to which
they have assented once for all, but which they find it dan-
gerous to dwell on ; though it is in fact the very Faith into
which,* by our Lord's appointment, we are baptized.
Nor should those who do understand, or at least have
once understood, the ambiguity in question, rest satisfied
that they are thenceforward safe from all danger in that
quarter. It should be remembered that the thoughts are
habitually influenced, through the force of association, by
the recurrence of the ordinary sense of any word to the
mind of those who are not especially on their guard against
it. See " Fallacies," 5.
The correctness of a. formal and deliberate Confession of
Faith, is not always, of itself, a sufficient safeguard against
error in the habitual impressions on the mind. The
Romanists flatter themselves that they are safe from Idolatry,
because they distinctly acknowledge the truth, that " God
only is to be served;" vi&. with " Latria ; " though they allow
ADORATION, (" hyperdulia " and " dulia ") to the Virgin and
other Saints, to Images, and to Relics : to which it has
been justly replied, that supposing this distinction correct in
itself, it would be, in practice, nugatory ; since the mass of
the people must soon (as experience proves) lose sight of it
entirely in their habitual devotions.
Nor again is the habitual acknowledgment of One God,
of itself a sufficient safeguard; since, from the additional
ambiguities of " One " and " Unity," (noticed in the
preceding Article) we may gradually fall into the notion of a
merely figurative Unity; such as unity of substance merely,
* els TO o/o/ia, "into the Name ; " not " in the Name." Matt, xxviii. 19.
BB 2
372 APPENDIX.
(see the preceding Article) Unity of purpose, concert of
action, $c. such as is often denoted by the phrase " one
mind." See " SAME," in this Appendix, and " Disser-
tation," Book IV. Chap. v.
When however I speak of the necessity of explanations,
the reader is requested to keep in mind, that I mean, not
explanations of the nature of the Deity, but, of our own use
of words. On the one hand we must not content ourselves
with merely saying that the whole subject is mysterious and
must not be too nicely pried into; while we neglect to notice
the distinction between divine revelations, and human expla-
nations of them ; between inquiries into the mysteries of
the Divine nature, and into the mysteries arising from the
ambiguities of language, and of a language too, adopted by
uninspired men. For, whatever Scripture declares, the
Christian is bound to receive implicitly, however unable to
understand it : but to claim an uninquiring assent to expres-
sions of man's framing, (however judiciously framed) without
even an attempt to ascertain their meaning, is to fall into one
of the worst errors of the Romanists.
On the other hand, to require explanations of what God
is in Himself, is to attempt what is beyond the reach of the
human faculties, and foreign from the apparent design of
Scripture-revelation; which seems to be, chiefly if not
wholly, to declare to us, (at least to insist on among the
essential articles of faith) with a view to our practical benefit,
and to the influencing of our feelings and conduct, not so
much the intrinsic nature of the Deity, as, what He is rela-
tively to us. Scripture teaches us (and our Church-Catechism
directs our attention to these points) to " believe in God,
who, as the Father, hath made us and all the World, as
the Son, hath redeemed us and all mankind, as the Holy
Ghost, sanctifieth us, and all the elect people of God."*
* Hawkins's Manual, p. 12.
AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 373
And this distinction is, as I have said, pointed out in the
very form of Baptism. Nothing indeed can be more de-
cidedly established by Scripture, nothing more indistinctly
explained (except as far as relates to us) than the doctrine
of the Trinity ;f nor are we perhaps capable, with our
present faculties, of comprehending it more fully.
In these matters our inquiry, at least our first inquiry,
should always be, what is revealed : nor if any one refuses
to adopt as an article of faith, this or that exposition, should
he be understood as necessarily maintaining its falsity.
For we are sure that there must be many truths relative
to the Deity, which we have no means of ascertaining : nor
does it follow that even every truth which can be ascertained,
must be a part of the essential faith of a Christian.
And as it is wise to reserve for mature age, such in-
structions as are unsuitable to a puerile understanding, so, it
seems the part of a like wisdom, to abstain, during this our
state of childhood, from curious speculations on subjects in
which even the ablest of human minds can but " see by
means of a glass, darkly." On these, the Learned can^have
no advantage over others ; though we are apt to forget that
any mysterious point inscrutable to Man, as Man, sur-
passing the utmost reach of human intellect, must be such
to the learned and to the ignorant, to the wise and to the
simple alike; that in utter darkness, the strongest sight,
and the weakest, are on a level. " Sir, in these matters,"
(said one of the most eminent of our Reformers, respecting
another mysterious point,) " I am so fearful, that I dare speak
no further, yea almost none otherwise, than as the Scripture
doth as it were lead me by the hand"
f- Compare together, for instance, such passages as the following; for
it is by comparing Scripture with Scripture, not by dwelling on insulated
texts, that the "Word of God is to be rightly understood: Luke i. 35, and
John xiv. 9; John xiv. 16, 18, 26, Matt, xxviii. 19, 20; John xvi. 7,
Coloss. ii. 9; Philip, i. 19, 1 Cor. vi. 19 ; Matt. x. 20, and John xiv. 23.
374 APPENDIX.
And surely it is much better thus to consult Scripture,
and take it for a guide, than to resort to it merely for confir-
mations, contained in detached texts, of the several parts of
some System of Theology, which the student fixes on as
reputed orthodox, and which is in fact made the guide which
he permits to "lead him by the hand;" while passages
culled out from various parts of the Sacred Writings in
subserviency to such system, are formed into what may
be called an anagram of Scripture : and then, by reference
to this system as a standard, each doctrine or discourse is
readily pronounced Orthodox, or Socinian, or Arian, or
Sabellian, or Nestorian, *c. ; and all this, on the ground
that the theological scheme which the student has adopted,
is supported by Scripture. The materials indeed are the
stones of the Temple ; but the building constructed with
them is a fabric of human contrivance. If instead of this,
too common, procedure, students would fairly search the
Scriptures with a view not merely to defend their opinions,
but to form them, not merely for arguments, but for
truth, keeping human expositions to their own proper
purposes [See Essay VI. First Series,] and not allowing
these to become, practically, a standard, if in short, they
were as honestly desirous to be on the side of Scripture, as
they naturally are to have Scripture on their side, how
much sounder, as well as more charitable, would their
conclusions often be !
With presumptuous speculations, such as I have alluded
to, many theologians, even of those who lived near, and
indeed during, the Apostolical times, seem to have been
alike chargeable, widely as they differed in respect of the
particular explanations adopted by each :
"Unus utrique
Error ; sed variis illudit partibus."
AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 375
And it is important to remember, what we are very
liable to lose sight of the circumstance, that, not only there
arose grievous errors during the time of the Apostles, and
consequently such were likely to exist in the times imme-
diately following, but also that when these inspired guides
were removed, there was no longer the same infallible
authority to decide what was error. In the absence of such
a guide, some errors might be received as orthodox, and
some sound doctrines be condemned as heterodox.
The Gnostics* introduced a theory of -^Eons, or successive
emanations from the divine "Pleroma" or Fulness; one
of whom was Christ, end became incarnate in the man
Jesus.f The Sabellians are reported to have described
Christ as bearing the same relation to the Father, as the
illuminating (^amcm/cov) quality, does to the Sun ; while the
Holy Ghost corresponded to the warming quality : (Sa\7rov)
or again, the Three as corresponding to the Body, Soul, and
Spirit, of a man ; or again, to Substance, Thought or
Reason, and Will or Action. The Arians again appear
to have introduced in reality three Gods ; the Son and the
Holy Spirit, created Beings, but with a certain imparted
divinity. The Nestorians and Eutychians, gave opposite,
but equally fanciful and equally presumptuous explanations
of the Incarnation, $c. Sfc.
Nor were those who were accounted orthodox, altogether
exempt from the same fault of presumptuous speculation.
"Who," says Chrysostom, "was he to whom God said,
Let us make man ? who but he . . the Son of God ?"
* Of these, and several other ancient heretics, we have no accounts but
those of their opponents ; which however we may presume to contain
more or less of approximation to what was really maintained.
f These heretics appear to have split into many different sects,
teaching various modifications of the same absurdities. See Burtons
Hampton Lectures.
376 APPENDIX.
And Epiphanius, on the same passage, says, " this is the
language of God to his Word." Each of these writers, it
may be observed, in representing God (under that title) as
addressing Himself to the Son as to a distinct Being pre-
viously to the birth of Jesus on earth, approaches very closely
to the Arian tritheism. And Justin Martyr, in a similar
tone, expressly speaks of God as " One, not in number, but
in judgment or designs."* I will not say that such passages
as these may not be so interpreted as to exclude both the
Arian and every other form of tritheism ; but it is a dangerous
thing, to use (and that, not in the heat of declamation, but in
a professed exposition) language of such a nature that it is
a mere chance whether it may not lead into the most un-
scriptural errors. If the early writers had not been habitually
very incautious in this point, that could hardly have taken
place which is recorded respecting the council held at Rimini,
(A.D. 360) in which a Confession of Faith was agreed upon,
which the Arians soon after boasted of as sanctioning their
doctrine, and " the Church," we are told, " was astonished
to ; find itself unexpectedly become Arian."')'
The .fact is, that numberless writers, both of those who
were, and who were not, accounted heretics, being dis-
pleased, and justly, with one another's explanations of the
mode of existence of the Deity, instead of taking warning
aright from the errors of their neighbours, sought, each, the
remedy, in some other explanation instead, concerning
matters unrevealed and inexplicable by man. They found
nothing to satisfy a metaphysical curiosity in the brief and
indistinct, though decisive, declarations of Scripture, that
" God was in Christ, reconciling the World unto himself;"
that " in Him dwelleth all the Fulness of the Godhead,
* OVTOS yeypafjifjifvos Beds, crfpos etrrt TOV rd ndvra
iroirfo-avTos Geov, dpiOpa Ae'yw, dXX' ov yv&pr) ; fyc.
f See Essay VI. (Second Series) 2. Note b,
AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 377
bodily;" that "it is God that worketh in us both to will
and to do of his good pleasure ;" that if we " keep Christ's
saying, He dwelleth in us, and we, in Him;" that "if any
man have not the Spirit of Christ, he is none of his;" and
that " the Lord is the Spirit," $c.* They wanted something
more full, and more philosophical, than all this ; and their
theology accordingly was " spoiled, through philosophy and
vain deceit, after the tradition of men, after the rudiments of
the World, and not after Christ." Hostile as they were to
each other, the grand mistake in principle was common to .
many of all parties.
And in later ages the Schoolmen kept up the same Spirit,
and even transmitted it to Protestants. " Theology teaches,"
(says a passage in a Protestant work) " that there is in God,
one Essence, two Processions, three Persons, four Relations,
five Notions, and the Circumincession, which the Greeks call
Perichoresis." .... What follows is still more to my
purpose ; but I cannot bring myself to transcribe any further.
" Who is this that darkeneth counsel by words without
knowledge ?"
But "the substance of great part of what I have been
saying, has been expressed in better language than mine,
in a late work which displays no ordinary ability, Mr.
Douglas's Errors regarding Religion.
" The radical mistake in all these systems, whether heretical
or orthodox, which have embroiled mankind in so many scan-
dalous disputes, and absurd and pernicious opinions, proceeds
from the disposition so natural in man of being wise above what
is written. They are not satisfied with believing a plain decla-
ration of the Saviour, ' I and the Father are one.' They under-
take with the utmost presumption and folly to explain in what
manner the Father and the Son are one ; but man might as well
attempt to take up the ocean in the hollow of his hand, as
* Not, as in our version, " that Spirit;" C O 6> v Kvptos TO irvtv^d e
378 APPENDIX.
endeavour by his narrow understanding, to comprehend the
manner of the Divine existence." .... P. 50.
"Heresies, however, are not confined to the heterodox.
While the Arians and Semi-Arians were corrupting the truth
by every subtilty of argument and ingenious perversion of terms,
the orthodox all the while were dogmatizing about the Divine
nature with a profusion of words which either had no meaning,
or were gross mistakes, or inapplicable metaphors when applied
to the infinite and spiritual existence of God. And not content
with using such arguments against the heretics as generally
produced a new heresy without refuting the former one, as
soon as they obtained the power they expelled them from the
Roman empire, and sent them with all the zeal which perse-
cution confers, and which the orthodox, from their prosperity,
had lost, to spread every variety of error amongst the nations of
the barbarians.
" Orthodoxy was become a very nice affair, from the rigour
of its terms, and the perplexity of its creed, and very unlike the
highway for the simple, which the Gospel presents. A slip in a
single expression was enough to make a man a heretic. The
use or omission of a single word occasioned a new rent in Chris-
tianity. Every heresy produced a new creed, and every creed
a new heresy Never does human folly and learned
ignorance appear in a more disgusting point of view than in these
disputes of Christians amongst themselves ; nor does any study
appear so well calculated to foster infidelity as the history of
Christian sects, unless the reader be guided by light from above,
and carefully distinguish the doctrines of the Bible from the
miserable disputes of pretended Christians." P. 53.
To discuss this important subject more fully (or perhaps
indeed as fully as it has been here treated of) is hardly
suitable to a logical work : and yet the importance of
attending to the ambiguity I have now been considering,
cannot be duly appreciated, without offering some remarks
on the subject-matter with which that ambiguity is con-
nected ; and such remarks again, if scantily and imperfectly
developed, are open to cavil or mistake. I must take the
AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 379
liberty therefore of referring the reader to such works,
both my own, and those of others, as contain something
of a fuller statement of the same views. See Essays (First
Series), Essay II. 4, and Essays IV. and V. ; Second
Series, Essay VI. 2, p. 199; VII. 3; and IX. 1.-
Origin of Romish Errors, Chap. ii. 1. Archbishop
Kings Sermon on Predestination, $c., and Encyclop. Me-
tropol. History, Chap, xxvii. p. 589, and Chap, xxxiv.
p. 740.
xix. POSSIBLE. This word, like the others of
kindred meaning, relates sometimes to contingency, some-
times to power ; and these two senses are frequently con-
founded. In the first sense we say, e.g. " it is possible this
patient may recover," not meaning, that it depends on his
choice ; but that we are not sure whether the event will not
be such. In the other sense it is " possible " to the best
man to violate every rule of morality ; since if it were out
of his power to act so if he chose it, there would be no
moral goodness in the case ; though we are quite sure that
such never will be his choice. See " IMPOSSIBLE."
xx. PRIEST. See " DISSERTATION," Book IV.
Ch. iv. 2.
Etymologically, the word answers to Presbyter, i. e.
Elder, in the Christian Church, or Jewish Synagogue ;* and
is often applied to the second order of Christian Ministers
at the present day. But it is remarkable that it never occurs
in this sense, in our translation of the Scriptures : the word
irptafivTepoQ being always rendered by Elder ; and its deri-
vative, Priest, always given as the translation of 'le/oeue.
This latter is an office assigned to none under the Gospel-
scheme, except the ONE great High Priest, of whom the
* See Vitringa de Synag.
380 APPENDIX.
Jewish Priests were types, and who offered a sacrifice
(that being the most distinguishing office of a Priest in
the sense of 'lepevg) which is the only one under the Gospel.
It is incalculable how much confusion has arisen from
confounding together the two senses of the word Priest,
and thence, the two offices themselves.
I have enlarged accordingly on this subject in a Sermon,
preached before the University of Oxford, and subjoined to
the last edition of the Bampton Lectures. See also Errors
of Romanism, Chap. ii.
xxi. REASON. This word is liable to many ambi-
guities, of which I propose to notice only a few of the
most important. Sometimes it is used to signify all the in-
tellectual powers collectively ; in which sense it can hardly
be said to be altogether denied to brutes ; since several
of what we reckon intellectual processes in the human
mind, are evidently such as some brutes are capable of.
Reason is, however, frequently employed to denote those
intellectual powers exclusively in which man differs from
brutes ; though what these are no one has been able pre-
cisely to define. The employment at will of the faculty of
Abstraction seems to be the principal ; that being, at least,
principally concerned in the use of Language. The Moral
faculty, or power of distinguishing right from wrong, (which
appears also to be closely connected with Abstraction,) is
one of which brutes are destitute ; but then Dr. Paley and
some other ethical writers deny it to man also. The de-
scription given by that author of our discernment of good
and bad conduct, (viz. as wholly dependent on expectation
of reward and punishment,) would equally apply to many
of the brute-creation, especially the more intelligent of
domestic animals, as dogs and horses. It is in this sense,
however, that some writers speak of " Reason " as enabling
AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 381
us to judge of virtue and vice ; not, as Dr. Campbell in his
Philosophy of Rhetoric has understood them, in the sense
of the power of argumentation.
Reason, however, is often used for the faculty of carrying
on the third operation of the mind ; viz. Reasoning. And
it is from inattention to this ambiguity (which has been re-
peatedly noticed in the course of the foregoing treatise,) that
some have treated of Logic as the art of rightly employing
the mental faculties in general.
Reason is also employed to signify the Premiss or Pre-
mises of an argument ; especially the minor Premiss ; and
it is from Reason in this sense that the word " Reasoning "
is derived.
It is also very frequently used to signify a Cause; as
when we say, in popular language, that the " Reason of an
eclipse of the sun is, that the moon is interposed between it
and the earth." This should be strictly called the cause.
On the other hand, <f Because" (i. e. by Cause) is used to
introduce either the Physical Cause or the Logical proof:
and " Therefore," " Hence," " Since," " Follow," " Con-
sequence," and many other kindred words, have a corre-
sponding ambiguity : e. g. " the ground is wet, because it has
rained ; " or " it has rained, and hence the ground is wet ; "
this is the assignment of the Cause; again, " it has rained,
because the ground is wet ; " " the ground is wet, and there-
fore it has rained:" this is assigning the logical proof; the
wetness of the ground is the cause, not of the rain having
fallen, but of our knowing that it has fallen. And this pro-
bably it is that has led to the ambiguous use in all languages
of almost all the words relating to these two points. It is
an ambiguity which has produced incalculable confusion of
thought, and from which it is the harder to escape, on ac-
count of its extending to those very forms of expression
which are introduced in order to clear it up.
382 APPENDIX.
What adds to the confusion is, that the Cause is often
employed as a Proof of the effect :* as when we infer, from
a great fall of rain, that there is, or will be, a flood ; which
is at once the physical effect, and the logical conclusion.
The case is just reversed, when from a flood we infer that
the rain has fallen.
The more attention any one bestows on this ambiguity,
the more extensive and important its results will appear.
See Analytical Outline, 2.
xxii. REGENERATION. This word is employed by
some Divines to signify the actual new life and character
which ought to distinguish the Christian ; by others, a re-
lease from a state of condemnation, a reconciliation to
God, adoption as his children, *c.,f which is a necessary
preliminary to the entrance on such a state; (but which,
unhappily, is not invariably followed by it) : and these are,
of course, as different things as a grain of seed sown, and
" the full corn in the ear."
Much controversy has taken place as to the time at
which, and the circumstances under which, " Regeneration "
takes place ; the greater part of which may be traced to this
ambiguity.
xxiii. SAME (as well as " One," " Identical," and other
words derived from them) is used frequently in a sense very
different from its primary one ; (as applicable to a single
object); viz. it is employed to denote great similarity.
When several objects are undistinguishably alike, One single
* See Fallacies. "Non causa pro causa." Book III. 14.
f " . . . . Baptism, wherein I was made a member of Christ, a child
of God, and an inheritor of the Kingdom of Heaven." . ..." A death
unto sin, and a new birth unto righteousness, Sec." .... " We being
regenerate, and made thy children by adoption and grace, tyc."
AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 383
description will apply equally to any of them ; and thence
they are said to be all of one and the same nature, appear-
ance, &c. : as e. g. when we say, " this house is built of the
same stone with such another," we only mean that the stones
are undistinguishable in their qualities ; not that the one
building was pulled down, and the other constructed with
the materials. Whereas Sameness, in the primary sense,
does not even necessarily imply Similarity ; for if we say of
any man that he is greatly altered since such a time, we
understand, and indeed imply by the very expression, that
he is One person, though different in several qualities ; else
it would not be he. It is worth observing also that " Same,"
in the secondary sense, admits, according to popular usage,
of degrees : we speak of two things being nearly the same,
but not entirely ; personal identity does not admit of
degrees.
Nothing, perhaps, has contributed more to the error of
Realism than inattention to this ambiguity. When several
persons are said to have One and the Same opinion
thought or idea, many men, overlooking the true simple
statement of the case, which is, that they are all thinking
alike, look for something more abstruse and mystical, and
imagine there must be some One Thing, in the primary
sense, though not an individual, which is present at once in
the mind of each of these persons : and thence readily
sprung Plato's theory of Ideas, each of which was, according
to him, one real, eternal object, existing entire and complete
in each of the individual objects that are known by one
name. Hence, first in poetical mythology, and ultimately,
perhaps, in popular belief, Fortune, Liberty, Prudence,
(Minerva,) a Boundary, (Terminus,) and even the Mildew
of Corn, (Rubigo,) $c., became personified, deified, and re-
presented by Statues; somewhat according to the process
which is described by Swift, in his humorous manner, in
384 APPENDIX.
speaking of Zeal, (in the Tale of a Tub,) " how from a
notion it became a word, and from thence, in a hot summe^
ripened into a tangible Substance." We find Seneca
thinking it necessary gravely to combat the position of some
of his Stoical predecessors, " that the Cardinal Virtues
are Animals : while the Hindoos of the present day, from
observing the similar symptoms which are known by the
name of Small-pox, and the communication of the like from
one patient to another, do not merely call it (as we do) one
disease, but believe (if we may credit the accounts given)
that the Small-pox is a Goddess, who becomes incarnate
in each infected patient. All these absurdities are in fact
but the extreme and ultimate point of Realism. See Dis-
sertation, Book IV. Chap. v.
xxiv. SIN, in its ordinary acceptation, means some actual
transgression, in thought, word, or deed, of the moral law,
or of a positive divine precept. It has also, what may
be called, a theological sense, in which it is used for that
sinfulness or frailty, that liability, or proneness, to trans-
gression, which all men inherit from their first parents,
and which is commonly denominated " original " Sin ; * in
which sense we find such expressions as " in Sin hath my
Mother conceived me." The word seems also to be still
further transferred, to signify the state of condemnation
itself, in which the children of Adam are, " by nature
born," in consequence of this sinful tendency in them : (or,
according to some divines, in consequence of the very guilt
* Of the degree of this depravity of our nature, various accounts are
given ; some representing it as amounting to a total loss of the moral
faculty, or even, to a preference of evil for its own sake ; others making
it to consist in a certain undue preponderance of the lower propensities
over the nobler sentiments, &c. But these seem to be not differences as
to the sense of the word, (with which alone we are here concerned) but as
to the state of the/actf.
AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 385
of Adam's offence being actually imputed to each individual
of his posterity.*) It must be in the sense of a " state of
condemnation," that our Church, in her office for Infant
Baptism, speaks of " remission of Sins," with reference to a
child, which is no moral agent : " following the innocency
of children," (i. e. of actual Sin) being mentioned within a
few sentences. And as it is plain that actual Sin cannot, in
the former place, be meant, so, neither can it be, in this
place, man's proneness to Sin : since the baptismal office
would not pray for, and hold out a promise of, " release"
and "remission" of that ^/oovrj/ua crapKoe which, according
to the Article, " remains even in the regenerate."
Though all Theologians probably are aware of these
distinctions, yet much confusion of thought has resulted
from their not being always attended to.
xxv. TENDENCY. "The doctrine, as mischievous
as it is, I conceive, unfounded, that since there is a tendency
in population to increase faster than the means of subsist-
ence, hence, the pressure of population against subsistence
may be expected to become greater and greater in each
successive generation, (unless new and extraordinary reme-
dies are resorted to,) and thus to produce a progressive
diminution of human welfare ; this doctrine, which some
maintain, in defiance of the fact that all civilized countries
have a greater proportionate amount of wealth, now, than
formerly, may be traced chiefly to an undetected ambiguity
in the word ' tendency,' which forms a part of the middle
term of the argument. By a ' tendency' towards a certain
result is sometimes meant, ' the existence of a cause which,
* I must again remind the reader that I am inquiring only into the
senses in which each word has actually been used ; ot into the truth or
falsity of each doctrine in question. On the present question, see Essays
on the Difficulties in St. Paul's Writings, Essay VI.
C C
386 APPENDIX.
if operating unimpeded, would produce that result.' In
this sense it may be said, with truth, that the earth, or any
other body moving round a centre, has a tendency to fly off
at a tangent ; i. e. the centrifugal force operates in that
direction, though it is controlled by the centripetal ; or,
again, that man has a greater tendency to fall prostrate than
to stand erect ; i. e. the attraction of gravitation and the
position of the centre of gravity, are such that the least
breath of air would overset him, but for the voluntary
exertion of muscular force : and, again, that population has
a tendency to increase beyond subsistence ; i. e. there are in
man propensities, which, if unrestrained, lead to that result.
'' But sometimes, again, 'a tendency towards a certain
result' is understood to mean ' the existence of such a state
of things that that result may be expected to take place.'
Now it is in these two senses that the word is used, in the
two premises of the argument in question. But in this
latter sense, the earth has a greater tendency to remain in
its orbit than to fly off from it ; man has a greater tendency
to stand erect than to fall prostrate ; and (as may be proved
by comparing a more barbarous with a more civilized period
in the history of any Country) in the progress of society,
subsistence has a tendency to increase at a greater rate than
population. In this Country, for instance, much as our
population has increased within the last five centuries, it yet
bears a far less ratio to subsistence (though still a much
greater than could be wished) than it did five hundred years
ago."*
THEREFORE. &?<? " REASON," and "WHY."
xxvi. TRUTH, in the strict logical sense, applies to
Propositions, and to nothing else ; and consists in the con-
* Pol. Econ. Lect. IX. p. 248250.
AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 387
formity of the declaration made to the actual state of the
case ; agreeably to Aldrich's definition of a " true " pro-
position vera est, quae quod res est dicit.
It would be an advantage if the word Trueness or
Verity could be introduced and employed in this sense,
since the word Truth is so often used to denote the " true "
Proposition itself. "What I tell you is the Truth; the
Truth of what I say shall be proved :" the term is here used
in these two senses. In like manner Falsehood is often
opposed to truth in both these senses ; being commonly
used to signify the quality of a false proposition. But as
we have the word Falsity, which properly denotes this, I
have thought it best, in a scientific treatise, always to
employ it for that purpose.
In its etymological sense, Truth signifies that which
the speaker "trows," or believes to be the fact. The
etymology of the word AAH0ES seems to be similar; de-
noting non-concealment. In this sense it is opposed to a
Lie: and may be called Moral, as the other may Logical,
Truth. A witness therefore may comply with his oath to
speak the Truth, though it so happen that he is mistaken
in some particular of his evidence, provided he is fully
convinced that the thing is as he states it.
Truth is not unfrequently applied, in loose and in-
accurate language, to arguments; where the proper ex*
pression would be " correctness," " collusiveness," or
" validity."
Truth again, is often used in the sense of Reality, TO ON.
People speak of the Truth or Falsity of facts; properly
speaking, they are either real or fictitious : it is the state-
ment that is " true " or " false." The " true " cause of
any thing, is a common expression ; meaning " that which
may with Truth be assigned as the cause." The senses of
Falsehood correspond,
c c2
388 APPENDIX.
"Truth" in this sense, of "reality," is also opposed
to shadows, types, pictures, $c. Thus, " the Law was
given by Moses, but grace and ' truth ' came by Jesus
Christ :" for the Law had only a " shadow of good things
to come."
The present is an ambiguity of which the Romanists have
often availed themselves with great effect; the ambiguity
of the word Church (which see) lending its aid to the
fallacy. " Even the Protestants," they say, " dare not
deny ours to be a TRUE CHURCH ; now there can be
but ONE TRUE CHURCH ;" (which they support by
those passages of Scripture which relate to the collective
Body of Christians in all those several Societies which also
are called in Scripture, Churches ;) " ours therefore must
be the true Church; if you forsake us, you forsake the
truth and the Church, and consequently shut yourself out
from the promises of the Gospel." Those who are of a
logical and accurate turn of mind will easily perceive that
the sense in which the Romish Church is admitted by her
opponents to be a true Church, is that of reality ; it is a
real, not a pretended Church; it may be truly said to be
a Church. The sense in which the Romanists seize the
concession is, that of a Church teaching true doctrines ;
which was never conceded to the Church of Rome by the
Protestants ; who hold, that a Church may err without
ceasing to be a Church.
WHENCE See " WHY," and " REASON."
xxvii. WHY? As an interrogative, this word is em-
ployed in three senses : viz. "By what proof?" (or Reason)
" From what Cause ? " " For what purpose ? " This last is
commonly called the " final cause." E. G. " Why is this
prisoner guilty of the crime ? " " Why does a stone fall
AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 389
to the earth?" " Why did you go to London?" Much
confusion has arisen from not distinguishing these different
inquiries. See REASON.
N. B. As the words which follow are all of them con-
nected together in their significations, and as the expla-
nations of their ambiguities have been furnished by the
kindness of the Professor of Political Economy, it seemed
advisable to place them by themselves, and in the order
in which they appeared to him most naturally to arrange
themselves.
The foundation of Political Economy being a few
general propositions deduced from observation or from
consciousness, and generally admitted as soon as stated, it
might have been expected that there would be as little
difference of opinion among Political-Economists as among
Mathematicians ; that, being agreed in their premises,
they could not differ in their conclusions, but through some
error in reasoning, so palpable as to be readily detected.
And if they had possessed a vocabulary of general terms
as precisely defined as the mathematical, this would pro-
bably have been the case. But as the terms of this Science
are drawn from common discourse, and seldom carefully
defined by the writers who employ them, hardly one of
them has any settled and invariable meaning, and their
ambiguities are perpetually overlooked. The principal
terms are only seven : viz. VALUE, WEALTH, LABOUR,
CAPITAL, RENT, WAGES, PROFITS.
1. VALUE. As value is the only relation with which
Political Economy is conversant, we might expect all
390 APPENDIX.
Economists to be agreed as to its meaning. There is no
subject as to which they are less agreed.
The popular, and far the most convenient, use of the
word, is to signify the capacity of being given and received
in exchange. So defined it expresses a relation. The
value of any one thing must consist in the several quantities
of all other things which can be obtained in exchange for
it, and never can remain fixed for an instant. Most writers
admit the propriety of this definition at the outset, but they
scarcely ever adhere to it,
Adam Smith defines Value to mean either the utility of
a particular object, or the power of purchasing other goods
which the possession of that object conveys. The first he
calls "Value in use," the second "Value in exchange." But
he soon afterwards says, that equal quantities of labour at all
times and places are of equal Value to the labourer, whatever
may be the quantity of goods he receives in return for them ;
and that labour never varies in its own Value. It is clear
that he affixed, or thought he had affixed, some other
meaning to the word ; as the first of these propositions
is contradictory, and the second false ? whichever of his two
definitions we adopt.
Mr. Ricardo appears to set out by admitting Adam
Smith's definition of Value in exchange. But in the greater
part of his " Principles of Political Economy," he uses the
word as synonymous with Cost : and by this one ambiguity
has rendered his great work a long enigma.
Mr. Malthus* defines Value to be the power of pur-
chasing. In the very next page he distinguishes absolute
from relative Value, a distinction contradictory to his defini-
tion of the term, as expressive of a relation.
Mr. M'Cullochf distinguishes between real and ex
* " Measure of Value," p. 1.
t " Principles of Political Economy," Part III. sect. I.
AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 391
changeable, or relative Value. And in his nomenclature,
Ine exchangeable, or relative, Value of a commodity consists
in its capacity of purchasing ; its real Value in the quantity
of labour required for its production or appropriation.
All these differences appear to arise from a confusion ol
cause and effect. Having decided that commodities are
Valuable in proportion to the labour they have respectively
cost, it was natural to call that labour their Value.
2. WEALTH. Lord Lauderdale has defined Wealth
to be "all that man desires." Mr. Malthus,* "those
material objects which are necessary, useful, or agreeable."
Adam Smith confines the term to that portion of the results
of land and labour which is capable of being accumulated.
The French Economists, to the net product of land. Mr.
M'Culloch-)" and M. Storch,J to those material products
which have exchangeable value ; according to Colonel
Torrens it consists of articles which possess utility, and
are produced by some portion of voluntary effort. M. Say||
divides wealth into natural and social, and applies the latter
term to whatever is susceptible of exchange. It will be
observed that the principal difference between these defini-
tions consists in the admission or rejection of the qualifi-
cations " exchangeable," and, " material."^
It were well if the ambiguities of this word had done
* " Principles of Political Economy," p. 28.
f "Supplement to the Encyclopaedia Britannica," Vol. VI. p. 217.
J " Cours d'Economie Politique," Tome I. p. 91. Paris edit.
" Production of Wealth," p. 1.
|| "Traite d'Economie Pol." Liv. II. Chap. 'ii.
TJ" " In many cases, where an exchange really takes place, the fact is
liable (till the attention is called to it) to he overlooked, in consequence of-
our not seeing any actual transfer from hand to hand of a material object.
For instance, when the copyright of a book is sold to a bookseller, the
article transferred is not the mere paper covered with writing, but the ex-
392 APPENDIX.
no more than puzzle pbilosophers. One of them gave
birth to the mercantile system. In common language, to
grow rich is to get money ; to diminish in fortune is to lose
money: a rich man is said to have a great deal of money ;
a poor man, very little : and the terms Wealth and Money
are in short employed as synonymous. In consequence of
these popular notions (to use the words of Adam Smith)
all the different nations of Europe have studied every means
of accumulating gold and silver in their respective countries.
This they have attempted by prohibiting the exportation of
money, and by giving bounties on the exportation, and im-
posing restrictions on the importation, of other commodities,
in the hope of producing what has been called a " favourable
balance of trade ; " that is, a trade in which, the imports
being always of less value than the exports, the difference is
paid in money. A conduct as wise as that of a tradesman
who should part with his goods only for money; and instead
of employing their price in paying his workmen's wages, or
replacing his stock, should keep it for ever in his till. The
attempt to force such a trade has been as vain, as the trade,
if it could have been obtained, would have been mischievous.
But the results have been fraud, punishment, and poverty
at home, and discord and war without. It has made na-
tions consider the Wealth of their customers a source of loss
instead of profit ; and an advantageous market a curse instead
of a blessing. By inducing them to refuse to profit by the
peculiar advantages in climate, soil, or industry, possessed
by their neighbours, it has forced them in a great measure
to give up their own. It has for centuries done more,
and perhaps for centuries to come will do more, to retard
elusive privilege of printing and publishing. It is plain, however, on a
moment's thought, that the transaction is as real an exchange, as that
which takes place between the bookseller and his customers who buy
copies of the work." Introd. fo Pol. Econ. Lect. I.
AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 393
the improvement of Europe than all other causes put to-
gether.
3. LABOUR. The word Labour signifies both the act
of labouring, and the result of that act. It is used in the
first sense when we talk of the wages of labour ; in the
second when we talk of accumulated labour. When used
to express the act of labouring, it may appear to have a
precise sense, but it is still subject to some ambiguity.
Say's definition* is "action suivie, dirigee vers un but;"
Storch's,f "Faction des facultes humaines dirigee vers un
but utile." These definitions include a walk taken for the
purposes of health, and even the exertions of an agree-
able converser.
The great defect of Adam Smith, and of our own eco-
nomists in general, is the want of definitions. There is,
perhaps, no definition of Labour by any British Econo-
mist. If Adam Smith had framed one, he would probably
have struck out his celebrated distinction between " pro-
ductive" and "unproductive" labourers; for it is difficult
to conceive any definition of Labour which will admit the
epithet " unproductive " to be applied to any of its sub-
divisions, excepting that of misdirected labour. On the
other hand, if Mr. M'Culloch or Mr. Mill had defined
Labour they would scarcely have applied that term to the
growth of a tree, or the improvement of wine in a cellar.
4. CAPITAL. This word, as might have been expected,
from the complexity of the notions which it implies, has
been used in very different senses.
It is, as usual, undefined by Adam Smith. The general
meaning which he attached to it will however appear from
* " Traite," &c. Tome II. p. 506. t " Cours," &c. Liv. 1. Chap. iv.
394 APPENDIX.
his enumeration of its species. He divides it* into Fixed
and Circulating: including in the first what the capitalist
retains, in the second what he parts with. Fixed Capital
he subdivides into 1. Machinery; 2. Shops and other
buildings used for trade or manufacture ; 3. Improvements
of land ; 4. Knowledge and skill. Circulating Capital he
subdivides into 1. Money; 2. Provisions in the hands of
the provision-venders ; 3. Unfinished materials of manu-
facture; 4. Finished work in the hands of the merchant
or manufacturer ; such as furniture in a cabinet-maker's
shop, or trinkets in that of a jeweller.
The following is a list of the definitions adopted by some
of the most eminent subsequent economists :
Ricardof " that part of the wealth of a^country which is
employed in production ; consisting of food, clothing, tools,
raw materials, machinery, <J-c., necessary to give effect to
labour."
MalthusJ " that portion of the material possessions of
a country which is destined to be employed with a view to
profit."
Say " accumulation de valeurs soustraites a la con-
somption improductive." Chap. iii. " Machinery, necessa-
ries of the workman, materials."
Storch|| "un fonds de richesses destine a la production
materielle."
M'Culloch^y " that portion of the produce of industry
which can be made directly available to support human
existence or facilitate production."
* Book II. Chap. i.
f "Principles of Political Economy," p. 89, 3rd edit.
t " Principles," &c. p. 293.
"Traite," &c. Tome II. p. 454.
|| " Cours," &c. Liv. II. Chap. i.
f "Principles," c. p. 92.
AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 395
Mill* " something produced, for the purpose of being
employed as the mean towards a further production."
Torrensf " those things on which labour has been
bestowed, and which are destined, not for the immediate
supply of our wants, but to aid us in obtaining other articles
of utility."
It is obvious that few of these definitions exactly coin-
cide. Adam Smith's (as implied in his use of the term;
for he gives no formal definition) excludes the necessaries of
the labourer, when in his own possession ; all the rest (and
perhaps with better reason) admit them. On the other
hand, Adam Smith admits (and in that he seems to be
right) those things which are incapable of productive con-
sumption, provided they have not yet reached their con-
sumers. All the other definitions, except perhaps that of
Mr. Malthus, which is ambiguous, are subject to the incon-
sistency of affirming that a diamond, and the gold in which
it is to be set, are Capital while the jeweller keeps them
separate, but cease to be so when he has formed them into
a ring ; almost all of them, also, pointedly exclude know-
ledge and skill. The most objectionable, perhaps, is that
of Mr. M'Culloch, which, while it excludes all the finished
contents of a jeweller's shop, would include a racing stud,
Adam Smith, however, is far from being consistent in
his use of the word ; thus, in the beginning of his second
book he states, that all Capitals are destined for the main-
tenance of productive labour only. It is difficult to see
what labour is maintained by what is to be unproductively
consumed.
5. RENT. 6. WAGES. 7. PROFIT.
Adam Smith first divided revenue into Rent, Wages,
* " Elements," &c. p. 19, 3rd edit,
f " Production of Wealth," p. 5.
396 APPENDIX.
and Profit ; and his division has been generally followed.
The following definitions will best show the degree of
precision with which these three terras have been employed.
ADAM SMITH.
1. Rent. What is paid for the licence to gather the
produce of the land. Book I. Chap. vi.
2. Wages. The price of labour. Book I. Chap. v.
3. Profit. The revenue derived from stock by the person
who manages or employs it. Book I. Chap. vi.
SAY. (Traite d'Economie Politique.) 4eme Edit.
1. Rent. Le profit resultant du service productif de la
terre. Tome II. p. 169.
2. Wages. Le prix de 1'achat d'un service productif
industriel. Tome II. p. 503.
3. Profit. La portion de la valeur produite, retiree par
le capitaliste. Tome I. p. 71, subdivided intointeret, profit
industriel, and profit capital.
S TORCH. (Cours cT Economic Politique.) Paris, 1823.
1. Rent. Le prix qu'on paye pour 1'usage d'un fonds
de terre. Tome I. p. 354.
2. Wages. Le prix du travail. p. 283.
3. Profit. The returns to capital are considered by
Storch, under the heads, rente de capital, and profit de 1'en-
trepreneur. The first he divides into loyer, the hire of fixed
capital, and interet, that of circulating capital. The second
he considers as composed of, 1st, remuneration for the use
of capital ; 2nd, assurance against risk ; 3rd, remuneration for
trouble. Liv. III. Chap. ii. viii. xiii.
AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 397
SISMONDI. (Nouveau Pr incites ,
1. Rent. La part de la recolte annuelle du sol qui
revient au proprietaire apres qu'il a acquitte les frais qui
1'ont fait naitre ; and he analyzes rent into, 1st, la compen-
sation du travail de la terre ; 2d, le prix de monopole ;
3d, la mieux valeur que le proprietaire obtient par la com-
paraison d'une terre de nature superieure a une terre
inferieure ; 4th, le revenu des capitaux qu'il a fixes lui-
meme sur la terre, et ne peut plus en retirer. Tome I. p. 280.
2. Wages. Le prix du travail. p. 91.
3. Profit. La valeur dont 1'ouvrage acheve surpasse
les avances qui 1'ont fait faire. L'avantage qui re suite des
travaux passes. Subdivided into intert and profit mer-
cantile. p. 94, 359.
MALTHUS. (Principles, $c.)
1. Rent. That portion of the value of the whole pro-
duce of land which remains to the owner after payment of
all the outgoings of cultivation, including average profits
on the capital employed. The excess of price above wages
and profits. p. 134.
2. Wages. The remuneration of the labourer for his
personal exertions. p. 240.
3. Profit. The difference between the value of the
advances necessary to produce a commodity, and the value
of the commodity when produced.- p. 293.
MILL. (Elements, $c.) 3rd Ed.
1. Rent. The difference between the return made to the
most productive, and that which is made to the least produc-
tive portion of capital employed on the land. p. 33.
398 APPENDIX.
2. Wages. The price of the labourer's share of the
commodity produced. p. 41.
3. Profit. The share of the joint produce of labour and
stock which is received by the owner of stock after replacing
the capital consumed. The portion of the whole annual
produce which remains after deducting rent and wages.
Remuneration for hoarded labour. Chap. 2, 3.
TORRENS. (Com Trade.) 3rd Ed.
1 . Rent. That part of the produce which is given to the
land-proprietor for the use of the soil. p. 130.
2. Wages. The articles of wealth which the labourer
receives in exchange for his labour. p. 83.
3. Profit. The excess of value which the finished work
possesses above the value of the material, implements, and
subsistence expended. The surplus remaining after the
cost of production has been replaced. Production of
Wealth, p. 53.
M'CuLLOCH. (Principles, &c.)
1 . Rent. That portion of the produce of the earth which
is paid by the farmer to the landlord for the use of the
natural and inherent powers of the soil. p. 265.
2. Wages. The compensation paid to labourers in return
for their services. Essay on Rate of Wages, p. 1.
3. Profit. The excess of the commodities produced by
the expenditure of a given quantity of capital, over that
quantity of capital. Principles -,' p. 366.
RICARDO. (Principles, $0.) 3rd Ed*
1 . Rent. That portion of the produce of the earth which
AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 399
is paid to the landlord for the use of the original and
indestructible powers of the soil. p. 53.
2. Wages. The labourer's proportion of the produce.
Chap. v.
3. Profit. The capitalist's proportion of the produce.
Chap. vi.
The first observation to be made on these definitions, is,
that the Rent of land, which is only a species of an exten-
sive genus, is used as a genus, and that its cognate species
are either omitted, or included under genera to which they
do not properly belong. Wages and Profits are of human
creation : they imply a sacrifice of ease or immediate enjoy-
ment, and bear a ratio to that sacrifice which is indicated
by the common expressions of " the rate of wages," and the
" rate of profits :" a ratio which has a strong tendency to
uniformity. But there is another and a very large source
of revenue which is not the creation of man, but of nature ;
which owes its origin, not to the will of its possessor, but
to accident ; which implies no sacrifice, has no tendency to
uniformity, and to which the term " rate " is seldom applied.
This revenue arises from the exclusive right to some in-
strument of production, enabling the employment of a given
amount of labour or capital to be more than usually produc-
tive. The principal of these instruments is land ; but all
extraordinary powers of body or mind, all processes in
manufacture which are protected by secrecy or by law, all
peculiar advantages from situation or connexion, in short,
every instrument of production which is not universally
accessible, affords a revenue distinct in its origin from
Wages or Profits, and of which the Rent of land is only a
species. In the classification of revenues, either Rent
ought to have been omitted as a genus, and considered only
as an anomalous interruption of the general uniformity of
400 APPENDIX.
wages and profits, or all the accidental sources of revenue
ought to have been included in one genus, of which the
Rent of land would have formed the principal species.
Another remark is, that almost all these definitions of
Profit include the wages of the labour of the Capitalist.
The continental Economists have in general been aware of
this, and have pointed it out in their analyses of the com-
ponent parts of Profit. The British Economists have
seldom entered into this analysis, and the want of it has
been a great cause of obscurity.
On the other hand, much of what properly belongs to
Profit and Rent is generally included under Wages. Al-
most all Economists consider the members of the liberal
professions under the class of labourers. The whole sub-
sistence of such persons, observes Mr. M'Culloch,* is
derived from Wages ; and they are as evidently labourers
as if they handled the spade or the plough. But it should
be considered, that those who are engaged in any occupa.
tion requiring more skill than that of a common husband-
man, must have expended capital, more or less, on the
acquisition of their skill ; their education must have cost
something in every case, from that of the handicraft-appren-
tice, to that of the legal or medical student ; and a Profit on
this outlay is of course looked for, as in other disbursements
of capital ; and the higher profit, in proportion to the risk ;
viz. the uncertainty of a man's success in his business.
Part, therefore, and generally far the greater part, of what
has been reckoned the wages of his labour, ought more
properly to be reckoned profits on the capital expended in
fitting him for that particular kind of labour. And again,
all the excess of gains acquired by one possessing extraordi-
nary talents, opportunities, or patronage (since these corre-
* " Principles," &c. p. 228.
AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 401
spond to the possession of land, of a patent-right, or
other monopoly, of a^secret, $c.) may be more properly
regarded as Rent than as Wages.
Another most fruitful source of ambiguity arises from the
use of the word Wages, sometimes as expressing a quantity,
sometimes as expressing a proportion.
In ordinary language, Wages means the amount of some
commodity, generally of silver, given to the labourer in
return for a given exertion ; and they rise or fall, as that
amount is increased or diminished.
In the language of Mr. Ricardo, they usually mean the
labourer's proportion of what is produced, supposing that
produce to be divided between him and the Capitalist. In
this sense they generally rise as the whole produce is dimi-
nished ; though, if the word be used in the other sense,
they generally fall. If Mr. Ricardo had constantly used
the word " Wages," to express a proportion, the only
inconvenience would have been the necessity of always
translating this expression into common language. But
he is not consistent. When he says,* that " whatever
raises the Wages of labour lowers the Profits of stock,"
he considers Wages as a proportion. When he says,f
that " high Wages encourage population ;" he considers
wages as an amount. Even Mr. M'Culloch, who has
clearly explained the ambiguity, has not escaped it. He
has even suffered it to affect his reasonings. In his
valuable essay, " On the Rate of Wages,"J he admits that
" when Wages are high, the Capitalist has to pay a larger
share of the produce of industry to his labourers." An
admission utterly inconsistent with his general use of the
word, as expressing the amount of what the labourer
* " Principles," &c. p. 312. f Ibid. p. 83. J P. 161.
D D
402 APPENDIX.
receives, which, as he has himself observed,* may increase
while his proportion diminishes.
A few only have been noticed of the ambiguities which
attach to the seven terms that have been selected ; and
these terms have been fixed on, not as the most ambiguous,
but as the most important, in the political nomenclature.
" Supply and Demand," " Productive and Unproductive,"
" Overtrading," and very many others, both in political
economy, and in other subjects, which are often used with-
out any more explanation, or any more suspicion of their
requiring it, than the words " triangle " or " twenty,"
are perhaps even more liable to ambiguities than those
above treated of. But it is sufficient for the purpose of
this Appendix to have noticed, by way of specimens, a
few of the most remarkable terms in several different
branches of knowledge, in order to show both the fre-
quency of an ambiguous use of language, and the im-
portance of clearing up such ambiguity.
* " Principles of Political Economy," p. 365.
APPENDIX.
No. II.
MISCELLANEOUS EXAMPLES FOR THE EXERCISE OF
LEARNERS.
N.B. In such of the following Examples as are not in a
syllogistic form, it is intended that the student should
practise the reduction of them into that form ; those of
them, that is, in which the reasoning is in itself sound :
vlss. where it is impossible to admit the Premises and
deny the Conclusion. Of such as are apparent Syllo-
gisms, the validity must be tried by logical rules, which
it may be advisable to apply in the following order :
1st. Observe whether the argument be Categorical or
Hypothetical ; recollecting that an hypothetical Premiss
does not necessarily imply an hypothetical Syllogism,
unless the reasoning turns on the hypothesis. If this
appear to be the case, the rules for hypothetical Syllo-
gisms must be applied. 2dly. If the argument be cate-
gorical, count the terms. Sdly. If only three, observe
whether the Middle be distributed. 4thly. Observe
whether the Premises are both negative ; (i. e. really,
and not in appearance only,) and if one is, whether the
Conclusion be negative also; or affirmative, if both
Premises affirmative. 5thly. Observe what terms are
Distributed in the conclusion, and whether the same are
D D2
404 APPENDIX.
distributed in the Premises. Gthly. If the Syllogism is
not a Categorical in the first Figure, reduce it to that
form.
1. No one is free who is enslaved by his appetites: a
sensualist is enslaved by his appetities: therefore a sen-
sualist is not free.
2. None but Whites are civilized : the ancient Germans
were Whites : therefore they were civilized.
3. None but Whites are bivilized : the Hindoos are not
Whites : therefore they are not civilized.
4. None but civilized people are Whites : the Gauls were
Whites : therefore they were civilized.
5 No one is rich who has not enough: no miser has
enough : therefore no miser is rich.
6. If penal laws against Papists were enforced, they
would be aggrieved: but penal laws against them are not
enforced : therefore the Papists are not aggrieved.
7. If all testimony to miracles is to be admitted, the
popish legends are to be believed : but the popish legends
are not to be believed: therefore no testimony to miracles
is to be admitted.
8. If men are not likely to be influenced in the perform-
ance of a known duty by taking an oath to perform it, the
oaths commonly administered are superfluous : if they are
likely to be so influenced, every one should be made to
take an oath to behave rightly throughout his life ; but one
or the other of these must be the case : therefore either the
oaths commonly administered are superfluous, or every
man should be made to take an oath to behave rightly
throughout his life.
9. The Scriptures must be admitted to be agreeable to
truth ; and the Church of England is conformable to the
Scriptures : A. B. is a divine of the Church of England ;
EXAMPLES. 405
and this opinion is in accordance with his sentiments : there-
fore it must be presumed to be true.
10. Enoch (according to the testimony of Scripture)
pleased God ; but without faith it is impossible to please
Him; (for he that cometh to God must believe that He
is, and that He is a rewarder of them that diligently seek
Him) : therefore $(?.
1J. "If Abraham were justified by works, then had he
whereof to glory [before God :] btlt not [any one can have whereof
to glory] before God :" therefore Abraham was not justified
by works.
12. " He that is of God heareth my words ; ye therefore
hear them not, because ye are not of God."
13. Few treatises of science convey important truths,
without any intermixture of error, in a perspicuous and
interesting form: and therefore, though a treatise would
deserve much attention which should possess such excel-
lence, it is plain that few treatises of science do deserve
much attention.
14. We are bound to set apart one day in seven for
religious duties, if the fourth commandment is obligatory
on us : but we are bound to set apart one day in seven for
religious duties ; and hence it appears that the fourth com-
mandment is obligatory on us.
15. Abstinence from the eating of blood had reference
to the divine institution of sacrifices : one of the precepts
delivered to Noah was abstinence from the eating of blood ;
therefore one of the precepts delivered to Noah contained
the divine institution of sacrifices.
16. If expiatory sacrifices were divinely appointed be-
fore the Mosaic law, they must have been expiatory, not of
ceremonial sin (which could not then exist), but of moral
sin : if so, the Levitical sacrifices must have had no less
efficacy ; and in that case, the atonements under the Mosaic
406 APPENDIX.
law would have " made the comers thereunto perfect as
pertaining to the conscience ;" but this was not the case :
therefore, C. [Davison on Prophecy.]
17. The adoration of images is forbidden to Christians,
if we suppose the Mosaic law designed not for the Israel-
ites alone, but for all men : it was designed, however, for
the Israelites alone, and not for all men : therefore the ado-
ration of images is not forbidden to Christians.
18. A desire to gain by another's loss is a violation of
the tenth commandment: all gaming, therefore, since it
implies a desire to profit at the expense of another, involves
a breach of the tenth commandment.
19. All the fish that the net enclosed were an indiscri-
minate mixture of various kinds : those that were set aside
and saved as valuable, were fish that the net enclosed :
therefore those that were set aside, and saved as valuable,
were an indiscriminate mixture of various kinds.
20. All the elect are finally saved : such persons as are
arbitrarily separated from the rest of mankind by the
divine decree are the elect : therefore such persons as are
arbitrarily separated from the rest of mankind by the
divine decree, are finally saved. [The opponents of this Conclusion
generally deny the Minor Premiss and admit the Major ; the reverse would
be the more sound and the more effectual objection.]
21. No one who lives with another on terms of confi-
dence is justified, on any pretence, in killing him : Brutus
lived on terms of confidence with Caesar : therefore he was
not justified, on the pretence he pleaded, in killing him.
22. He that destroys a man who usurps despotic power
in a free country deserves well of his countrymen : Brutus
destroyed Caesar, who usurped despotic power in Rome:
therefore he deserved well of the Romans.
23. If virtue is voluntary, vice is voluntary : virtue is
voluntary : therefore so is vice. [Aristh. Eth. B. Hi.]
EXAMPLES. 407
24. A wise lawgiver must either recognize the rewards
and punishments of a future state, or must be able to
appeal to an extraordinary Providence, dispensing them
regularly in this life ; Moses did not do the former : there-
fore he must have done the latter. [Warburton.]
25. Nothing which is of less frequent occurrence than
the falsity of testimony can be fairly established by testi-
mony : any extraordinary and unusual fact is a thing of
less frequent occurrence than the falsity of testimony
(that being very common) : therefore no extraordinary
and unusual fact can be fairly established by testi-
mony.
26. Testimony is a kind of evidence which is very likely
to be false : the evidence on which most men believe that
there are pyramids in Egypt is testimony : therefore the
evidence on which most men believe that there are pyra-
mids in Egypt is very likely to be false.
27. The religion of the ancient Greeks and Romans was
a tissue of extravagant fables and groundless superstitions,
credited by the vulgar and the weak, and maintained by
the more enlightened, from selfish or political views : the
same was clearly the case with the religion of the Egyp-
tians : the same may be said of the Brahminical worship
of India, and the religion of Fo, professed by the Chinese :
the same, of the romantic mythological system of the Pe-
ruvians, of the stern and bloody rites of the Mexicans, and
those of the Britons and of the Saxons: hence we may
conclude that all systems of religion, however varied in
circumstances, agree in being superstitions kept up among
the vulgar, from interested or political views in the more
enlightened classes. [See Dissertation, Chap. i. 2. p. 234.]
28. No man can possess power to perform impossibilities ;
a miracle is an impossibility : therefore no man can possess
power to perform a miracle. [See Appendix, p. 333.]
408 APPENDIX.
29. A. B. and C. D. are each of. them equal to E. F. :
therefore they are equal to each other.
30. Protection from punishment is plainly due to the
innocent : therefore, as you maintain that this person ought
not to be punished, it appears that you are convinced of his
innocence.
31. All the most bitter persecutions have been religious
persecutions : among the most bitter persecutions were
those which occurred in France during the revolution :
therefore they must have been religious persecutions.
32. He who cannot possibly act otherwise than he does,
has neither merit nor demerit in his action : a liberal and
benevolent man cannot possibly act otherwise than he
does in relieving the poor : therefore such a man has
neither merit nor demerit in his action. [See Appendix, pp.
350, 351.]
33. What happens every day is not improbable : some
things against which the chances are many thousands to
one, happen every day : therefore some things against
which the chances are many thousands to one, are not
improbable.
34. The early and general assignment of the Epistle to
the Hebrews to Paul as its author, must have been either
from its professing to be his, and containing his name, or
from its really being his ; since, therefore, the former of
these is not the fact, the Epistle must be Paul's.
35. " With some of them God was not well pleased : for
they were overthrown in the wilderness."
36. A sensualist wishes to enjoy perpetual gratifications
without satiety: it is impossible to enjoy perpetual grati-
fications without satiety : therefore it is impossible for a
sensualist to obtain his wish.
37. If Paley's system is to be received, one who has no
knowledge of a future state has no means of distinguishing
EXAMPLES. 409
virtue and vice : now one who has no means of distinguish-
ing virtue and vice can commit no sin : therefore, if Paley's
system is to be received, one who has no knowledge of a
future state can commit no sin.
38. The principles of justice are variable : the appoint-
ments of nature are invariable : therefore the principles of
justice are no appointment of nature. [Arist. Eth. B. v. ]
39. Every one desires happiness : virtue is happiness :
therefore every one desires virtue. [Arist. Eth. B. Hi.]
40. A story is not to believed, the reporters of which
give contradictory accounts of it ; the story of the life and
exploits of Buonaparte is of this description : therefore it is
not to be believed. (Tfe Elements, p. 28.]
41. When the observance of the first day of the week as
a religious festival in commemoration of Christ's resurrec-
tion, was first introduced, it must have been a novelty:
when it was a novelty, it must have attracted notice : when
it attracted notice, it would lead to inquiry respecting the
truth of the resurrection: when it led to this inquiry, it
must have exposed the story as an imposture, supposing
it not attested by living witnesses : therefore, when the ob-
servance of the first day of the week, c. was first introduced,
it must have exposed as an imposture the story of the re-
surrection, supposing it not attested by living witnesses.
42. All the miracles of Jesus would fill more books than
the world could contain : the things related by the Evangelists
are the miracles of Jesus : therefore the things related by
the Evangelists would fill more books than the world could
contain.
43. If the prophecies of the Old Testament had been
written without knowledge of the events of the time of
Christ, they could not correspond with them exactly ; and
if they had been forged by Christians, they would not
be preserved and acknowledged by the Jews : they are
410 APPENDIX.
preserved and acknowledged by the Jews, and they corre-
spond exactly with the events of the time of Christ : there-
fore they were neither written without knowledge of those
events, nor were forged by Christians.
44. Of two evils the less is to be preferred : occasional
turbulence, therefore, being a less evil than rigid despotism,
is to be preferred to it.
45. According to theologians, a man must possess faith
in order to be acceptable to the Deity : now he who believes
all the fables of the Hindoo mythology must possess faith :
therefore such an one must, according to theologians, be
acceptable to the Deity.
46. If Abraham were justified, it must have been either
by faith or by works : now he was not justified by faith,
(according to James,) nor by works, (according to Paul):
therefore Abraham was not justified.
47. No evil should be allowed that good may come of it :
all punishment is an evil : therefore no punishment should
be allowed that good may come of it.
48. Repentance is a good thing: wicked men abound in
repentance [Arist. Eth. B. .] : therefore wicked men abound in
what is good.
49. A person infected with the plague will (probably) die
[suppose three in five of the infected die] : this man is (probably)
infected with the plague [suppose it an even chance] : therefore
he will (probably) die. [Query. What is the amount of this proba-
bility ? Again, suppose the probability of the major to be (instead of *) i,
and of the minor, (instead of 2) to be ?, Query. What will be the probability
of the conclusion ?]
50. It must be admitted, indeed, that a man who has been
accustomed to enjoy liberty cannot be happy in the condition
of a slave : many of the negroes, however, may be happy in
the condition of slaves, because they have never been accus-
tomed to enjoy liberty.
51. Whatever is dictated by Nature is allowable: de-
EXAMPLES. 411
votedness to the pursuit of pleasure in youth, and to that
of gain in old age, are dictated by nature [Arist. Rhet. B. ii.] :
therefore they are allowable.
52. He is the greatest lover of any one who seeks that
person's greatest good : a virtuous man seeks the greatest
good for himself: therefore a virtuous man is the greatest
lover of himself. [Arist. Eth. B. ix.]
53. He who has a confirmed habit of any kind of action,
exercises no self-denial in the practice of that action: a
good man has a confirmed habit of Virtue : therefore he
who exercises self-denial in the practice of Virtue is not a
good man. [Arist. Eth. B. ii.]
54. That man is independent of the caprices of Fortune
who places his chief happiness in moral and intellectual
excellence : a true philosopher is independent of the ca-
prices of Fortune : therefore a true philosopher is one
who places his chief happiness in moral and intellectual
excellence.
55. A system of government which extends to those ac-
tions that are performed secretly, must be one which refers
either to a regular divine providence in this life, or to the
rewards and punishments of another world : every perfect
system of government must extend to those actions which
are performed secretly : no system of government therefore
can be perfect, which does not refer either to a regular
divine providence in this life, or to the rewards and punish-
ments of another world. [Warburton's Divine Legation.]
56. For those who are bent on cultivating their minds by
diligent study, the incitement of academical honours is un-
necessary ; and it is ineffectual, for the idle, and such as are
indifferent to mental improvement : therefore the incitement
of academical honours is either unnecessary or ineffectual.
57. He who is properly called an actor, does not en-
deavour to make his hearers believe that the sentiments he
412 APPENDIX.
expresses and the feelings he exhibits, are really his own :
a barrister does this : therefore he is not properly to be
called an actor.
58. He who bears arms at the command of the magis-
trate does what is lawful for a Christian : the Swiss in the
French service, and the British in the American service,
bore arms at the command of the magistrate: therefore
they did what was lawful for a Christian.
59. If Lord Bacon is right, it is improper to stock a new
colony with the refuse of Jails : but this we must allow not
to be improper, if our method of colonizing New South
Wales be a wise one : if this be wise, therefore, Lord
Bacon is not right.
60. Logic is indeed worthy of being cultivated, if Aris-
totle is to be regarded as infallible : but he is not : Logic
therefore is not worthy of being cultivated.
61. All studies are useful which tend to advance a man in
life, or to increase national and private wealth : but the
course of studies pursued at Oxford has no such tendency :
therefore it is not useful.
62. If the exhibition of criminals, publicly executed,
tends to heighten in others the dread of undergoing the
same fate, it may be expected that those soldiers who have
seen the most service, should have the most dread of death
in battle : but the reverse of this is the case : therefore the
former is not to be believed.
63. If the everlasting favour of God is not bestowed at
random, and on no principle at all, it must be bestowed
either with respect to men's persons, or with respect to
their conduct : but " God is no respecter of persons : "
therefore his favour must be bestowed with respect to
men's conduct. [Sumner's Apostolical Preaching.]
64. If transportation is not felt as a severe punishment,
it is in itself ill-suited to the prevention of crime : if it is so
EXAMPLES. 413
felt, much of its severity is wasted, from its taking place at
too great a distance to affect the feelings, or even come to
the knowledge, of most of those whom it is designed to
deter ; but one or other of these must be the case : therefore
transportation is not calculated to answer the purpose of
preventing crime.
65. War is productive of evil : therefore peace is likely to
be productive of good.
66. Some objects of great beauty answer no other per-
ceptible purpose but to gratify the sight : many flowers have
great beauty; and many of them accordingly answer no
other purpose but to gratify the sight.
67. A man who deliberately devotes himself to a life of
sensuality is deserving of strong reprobation : but those do
not deliberately devote themselves to a life of sensuality
who are hurried into excess by the impulse of the pas-
sions : such therefore as are hurried into excess by the
impulse of the passions are not deserving of strong repro-
bation. [Arist. Eth. B. vii.]
68. It is a difficult task to restrain all inordinate desires :
to conform to the precepts of Scripture implies a restraint
of all inordinate desires : therefore it is a difficult task to
conform to the precepts of Scripture.
69. Any one who is candid will refrain from condemning
a book without reading it : some Reviewers do not refrain
from this : therefore some Reviewers are not candid.
70. If any objection that can be urged would justify a
change of established laws, no laws could reasonably be
maintained : but some laws can reasonably be maintained :
therefore no objection that can be urged will justify a
change of established laws.
71. If any complete theory could be framed, to explain
the establishment of Christianity by human causes, such a
theory would have been proposed before now ; but none
414 APPENDIX.
such ever has been proposed : therefore no such theory can
be framed.
72. He who is content with what he has, is truly rich :
a covetous man is not content with what he has : no covet-
ous man therefore is truly rich.
73. A true prophecy coincides precisely with all the cir-
cumstances of such an event as could not be conjectured by
natural reason : this is the case with the prophecies of the
Messiah contained in the Old Testament : therefore these
are true prophecies.
74. The connexion of soul and body cannot be compre-
hended or explained ; but it must be believed : therefore
something must be believed which cannot be comprehended
or explained.
75. Lias lies above Red Sandstone ; Red Sandstone lies
above Coal : therefore Lias lies above Coal.
76. Cloven feet belonging universally to horned animals,
we may conclude that this fossil animal, since it appears to
have had cloven feet, was horned.
77. All that glitters is not gold : tinsel glitters : therefore
it is not gold.
78. A negro is a man : therefore he who murders a negro
murders a man.
79. Meat and Drink are necessaries of life : the reve-
nues of Vitellius were spent on Meat and Drink : therefore
the revenues of Vitellius were spent on the necessaries of life.
80. Nothing is heavier than Platina : feathers are heavier
than nothing : therefore feathers are heavier than Platina.
81. The child of Themistocles governed his mother:
she governed her husband ; he governed Athens ; Athens,
Greece ; and Greece, the world : therefore the child of
Themistocles governed the world.
82. He who calls you a man speaks truly : he who calls
you a fool, calls you a man : therefore he who calls you a
fool speaks truly.
EXAMPLES. 415
83. Warm countries alone produce wines : Spain is a
warm country : therefore Spain produces wines.
84. It is an intensely cold climate that is sufficient to
freeze Quicksilver : the climate of Siberia is sufficient to
freeze Quicksilver : therefore the climate of Siberia is
intensely cold.
85. Mistleto of the oak is a vegetable excrescence which
is not a plant ; and every vegetable excrescence which is not
a plant, is possessed of magical virtues : therefore Mistleto
of the oak is possessed of magical virtues.
86. If the hour-hand of a clock be any distance (suppose
a foot) before the minute-hand, this last, though moving
twelve times faster, can never overtake the other ; for while
the minute-hand is moving over those twelve inches, the
hour-hand will have moved over one inch ; so that they
will then be an inch apart ; and while the minute-hand is
moving over that one inch, the hour-hand will have moved
over ^ inch, so that it will still be a-head ; and again,
while the minute-hand is passing over that space of ^ inch
which now divides them, the hour-hand will pass over ^
inch; so that it will still be a-head, though the distance
between the two is diminished; fyc. $c. $c., and thus it is
plain we may go on for ever : therefore the minute-hand can
never overtake the hour-hand. [This is one of the sophistical
puzzles noticed by Aldrich (the moving bodies being Achilles and a Tortoise ;)
but he is not happy in his attempt at a solution. He proposes to remove the
difficulty by demonstrating that, in a certain given time, Achilles would over-
take the Tortoise : as if any one had ever doubted that. The very problem
proposed is to surmount the difficulty of a seeming demonstration of a thing
palpably impossible ; to show that it is palpably impossible, is no solution of
the problem.
I have heard the present example adduced as a proof that the pretensions
of Logic are futile, since (it was said) the most perfect logical demonstration
may lead from true premises to an absurd conclusion. The reverse is the
truth ; the example before us furnishes a confirmation of the utility of an
acquaintance with the syllogistic form ; in which form the pretended demon-
stration in question cannot possibly be exhibited. An attempt to do so will
416 APPENDIX.
evince the utter want of connexion between the premises and the con-
clusion.]
87. Theft is a crime : theft was encouraged by the laws of
Sparta : therefore the laws of Sparta encouraged crime.
88. Every hen comes from an egg : every egg comes from
a hen : therefore every egg comes from an egg.
89. Jupiter was the son of Saturn : therefore the son of
Jupiter was the grandson of Saturn.
90. All cold is to be expelled by heat : this person's dis-
order is a cold : therefore it is to be expelled by heat.
91. Wine is a stimulant : therefore in a case where stimu-
lants are hurtful, wine is hurtful.
92. Opium is a poison: but physicians advise some of
their patients to take opium : therefore physicians advise
some of their patients to take poison.
93. What we eat grew in the fields : loaves of bread are
what we eat : therefore loaves of bread grew in the fields.
94. Animal-food may be entirely dispensed with : (as is
shewn by the practice of the Brahmins and of some monks ;)
and vegetable-food may be entirely dispensed with (as is
plain from the example of the Esquimaux and others ;) but
all food consists of animal-food and vegetable-food : there-
fore all food may be dispensed with.
95. No trifling business will enrich those engaged in it : a
mining speculation is no trifling business : therefore a mining
speculation will enrich those engaged in it.
96. He who is most hungry eats most; he who eats least
is most hungry : therefore he who eats least eats most.
[See Aldrich's Compendium : Fallaciae : where this is rightly solved.]
97. Whatever body is in motion must move either in
the place where it is, or in a place where it is not : neither
of these is possible : therefore there is no such thing as
motion. [In this instance, as well as in the one lately noticed, Aldrich
mistakes the character of the difficulty ; which is, not to prove the truth of
that which is self-evident, but to explain an apparent demonstration militat-
EXAMPLES. 417
ing against that which nevertheless no one ever doubted. He says in this
case, "solvitur ambulando;" but (pace tanti viri) this is no solution at all,
but is the very 'thing which constitutes the difficulty in question ; for it is
precisely because we know the possibility of motion, that a seeming proof of
its impossibility produces perplexity. See Introduction, p. 4.]
98. All vegetables grow most in the increase of the
moon : hair is a vegetable : therefore hair grows most in
the increase of the moon.
99. Most of the studies pursued at Oxford conduce to
the improvement of the mind : all the works of the most
celebrated ancients are among the studies pursued at Ox-
ford : therefore some of the works of the most celebrated
ancients conduce to the improvement of the mind.
100. Some poisons are vegetable: no poisons are useful
drugs : therefore some useful drugs are not vegetable.
101. A theory will speedily be exploded, if false, which
appeals to the evidence of observation and experiment :
Craniology appeals to this evidence : therefore, if Cranio-
logy be a false theory, it will speedily be exploded. [Let the
probability of one of these premises be I; and of the other -: Query.
What is the probability of the conclusion, and which are the terms ?]
102. Wilkes was a favourite with the populace ; he who
is a favourite with the populace must understand how to
manage them : he who understands how to manage them,
must be well acquainted with their character : he who
is well acquainted with their character, must hold them in
contempt : therefore Wilkes must have held the populace in
contempt.
103. To discover whether man has any moral sense, he
should be viewed in that state in which all his faculties
are most fully developed ; the civilized state is that in which
all man's faculties are most fully developed : therefore, to
discover whether man has any moral sense, he should be
viewed in a civilized state.
104. Revenge, Robbery, Adultery, Infanticide, $c. have
been countenanced by public opinion in several countries :
E E
418 APPENDIX.
all the crimes we know of are Revenge, Robbery,
Adultery, Infanticide, $c. : therefore, all the crimes we
know of have been countenanced by public opinion in
several Countries. [Paley's Moral Philosophy.]
105. No soldiers should be brought into the field who
are not well qualified to perform their part. None but
veterans are well qualified to perform their part. None but
veterans should be brought into the field.
106. A monopoly of the sugar-refining business is bene-
ficial to sugar- refiners : and of the corn-trade to corn-
growers : and of the silk-manufacture to silk-weavers,
$c. $c. ; and thus each class of men are benefited by some
restrictions. Now all these classes of men make up the
whole community: therefore a system of restrictions is
beneficial to the community. [See Chap. iii. n.]
107. There are two kinds of things which we ought
not to fret about : what we can help, and what we cannot.
[To be stated as a Dilemma.]
108. He who believes himself to be always in the right
in his opinion, lays claim to infallibility : you always believe
yourself to be in the right in your opinion : therefore you
lay claim to infallibility.
109. No part of mankind can ever have received divine
instruction in any of the arts of life ; because the Israelites,
who are said to have had a revelation made to them of religion,
did not know in the times of Solomon, that the circum-
ference of a Circle differs from the treble of the Diameter.
110. The Epistle attributed to Barnabas is not to be
reckoned among the writings of the Apostolic Fathers ;
because, if genuine it is a part of Scripture, and, if
spurious, it is the work of some forger of a later age.
111. If the original civilization of Mankind was not the
work of a divine Instructor, some instance may be found
of a nation of savages having civilized themselves. [Pol. Econ.
Lect. V.]
EXAMPLES. 419
112. The Law of Moses prohibited theft, murder, $c.
But that Law is abolished : therefore theft, murder, 8fc.
are not prohibited.
113. Agriculture might have been invented by man,
without a superhuman instructor : and so might the
working of metals ; and so might medicine ; and so might
navigation, &c. and in short there is no art of civilized life
that can be pointed out, which might not have been in-
vented by the natural faculties of man. Therefore the arts
of civilized life might have been invented by man without any
superhuman instructor.*
* See Polit. Econ. Lect. V. p. 123.
EF.2
APPENDIX.
No. III.
PRAXIS OF LOGICAL ANALYSIS.
SOME have expressed much contempt for the mode in
which Logic is usually taught, and in which students are
examined in it, as comprising no more than a mere enu-
meration of technical rules, and perhaps an application of
them to the simplest examples, exhibited in a form already
syllogistic, or nearly so, That such a description, if in-
tended to be universal, is not correct, I am perfectly certain ;
though, hitherto, the indiscriminate requisition of Logic
from all candidates for a Degree, has confined both lectures
and examinations, in a greater degree than is desirable, to
this elementary character. But the student who wishes to
acquire, and to show that he has acquired, not only the
elementary rules, but a facility of applying them in prac-
tice, should proceed from the study of such examples as
the foregoing, to exercise himself in analysing logically,
according to the rules here given, and somewhat in the
manner of the subjoined specimen, some of Euclid's de-
monstrations, various portions of Aristotle's Works, the
opening of Warburton's " Divine Legation," (which ex-
hibits the arguments in a form very nearly syllogistic)
several parts of Chillingworth's Defence of Protestantism,
the concluding part of Paley's Horse Paulinas, Leslie's
Method with the Deists, various portions of A. Smith's
Wealth of Nations, and other argumentative Works on
the most dissimilar subjects. The latter part of 1.
Chap. V. of the Dissertation on the Province of Reason-
ing, will furnish a convenient subject of a short analysis.
PRAXIS OF LOGICAL ANALYSIS. 421
A. student who should prepare himself, in this manner,
in one or more such books, and present himself for this
kind of examination in them, would furnish a good test
for ascertaining his proficiency in practical Logic.
As the rules of Logic apply to arguments only after they
have been exhibited at full length in the bare elementary
form, it may be useful to subjoin some remarks on the
mode of analysing and reducing to that form, any train of
argument that may be presented to us : since this must in
general be the first step taken in an attempt to apply logical
rules.*
First then, of whatever length the reasoning may be,
whether treatise, chapter, or paragraph, begin with the
concluding assertion ; not necessarily the last sentence
expressed, but the last point established ; and this, whe-
ther it be formally enunciated, or left to be understood.
Then, tracing the reasoning backwards, observe on what
ground that assertion is made. The assertion will be
your Conclusion ; the ground on which it rests, your Pre-
mises. The whole Syllogism thus obtained may be tried
by the rules of Logic.
If no incorrectness appear in this syllogism, proceed to
take the premises separately, and pursue with each the same
plan as with the conclusion you first stated. A premiss
must have been used as such, either because it required no
proof, or because it had been proved. If it have not been
proved, consider whether it be so self-evident as to have
needed no proof. If it have been proved, you must regard
it as a conclusion derived from other assertions which are
premises to it: so that the process with which you set
* These directions are, in substance, and nearly, in words, extracted
from the Preface to Hinds's abridged introduction to Logic.
422 APPENDIX.
out will be repeated ; 2??'*. to observe on what grounds the
assertion rests, to state these as premises, and to apply
the proper rules to the syllogism thus obtained. Having
satisfied yourself of the correctness of this, proceed, as
before, to state its premises, if needful, as conclusions de-
rived from other assertions. And thus the analysis will
go on (if the whole chain of argument be correct) till you
arrive at the premises with which the whole commences;
which of course should be assertions requiring no proof;
or, if the chain be any where faulty, the analysis will pro-
ceed till you come to some proposition, either assumed as
self-evident, though requiring proof, or incorrectly deduced
from other assertions.*
It will often happen that the same assertion will have
been proved by many different arguments ; and then, the
inquiry into the truth of the premises will branch out ac-
cordingly. In mathematical or other demonstrative rea-
soning, this will of course never take place, since absolute
certainty admits of no increase: and if, as is often the
Many students probably will find it a very clear and convenient
mode of exhibiting the logical analysis of a course of argument, to draw
it out in the form of a Tree, or Logical Division ; thus,
[Ultimate Conclusion. 1
ZisX,
proved by
IY is x,
proved
I
Zis Y?
proved by
' A is Y, Z is A, ~
[suppose proved by
admitted.] &c,
^the argument that and by the 1
| argument that
Tfi is X. Y is B, 1
&c. &c.
fC is X,
&c.
YisC,!
&c.
PRAXIS OF LOGICAL ANALYSIS. 423
case, the same truth admits of several different demonstra-
tions, we select the simplest and clearest, and discard the
rest. But in probable reasoning there is often a Cumula-
tion of arguments, each proving the same conclusion ; i. e.
each proving it to be probable. In such cases therefore
you will have first to try each argument separately ; and
should each of them establish the conclusion as in some
degree probable, you will then have to calculate the aggre-
gate probability.
In this calculation Logic only so far assists as it enables
us to place the several items of probability in the most
convenient form. As the degree of probability of each
proposition that is assumed, is a point to be determined
by the reasoner's own sagacity and experience as to the
matter in hand, so, the degree of probability of each con-
clusion, (given, that of each of its premises,)* and also
the collective probability resulting from several different
arguments all tending to the same conclusion, is an arith-
metical question. But the assistance afforded by logical
rules in clearly stating the several items so as to prepare
the way for the other operations, will not be thought lightly
of by any who have observed the confusion of thought and
the fallacy, which have often been introduced through the
want of such a statement.
Example of Analysis applied to the first part of Paleys
Evidences.
The ultimate Conclusion, that " The Christian Religion
came from God " is made to rest (as far as " the direct
historical evidence " is concerned) on these two premises ;
That "A Religion attested by Miracles is from God;"
and that " The Christian Religion is so attested."
* See Fallacies, 14, near the end.
424 APPENDIX.
Of these two premises, it should be remarked, the Minor
seems to have been admitted, while the Major was denied,
by the unbelievers of old: whereas at present the case
is reversed.*
Paley's argument therefore goes to establish the Minor
premiss, about which alone, in these days, there is likely
to be any question.
He states with this view, two propositions : viz.
PROP. I. " That there is satisfactory evidence, that many, pro-
fessing to be original witnesses of the Christian miracles, passed
their lives in labours, dangers, and sufferings, voluntarily under-
gone in attestation of the accounts which they delivered, and solely
in consequence of their belief of those accounts ; and that they
also submitted, from the same motives, to new rules of conduct."
PROP. II. " That there is NOT satisfactory evidence, that
persons pretending to be original witnesses of any other similar
miracles, have acted in the same manner, in attestation of the
accounts which they delivered, and solely in consequence of
their belief of the truth of those accounts."
Of these two propositions, the latter, it will easily be
perceived, is the Major premiss, stated as the converse by
Negation (Book II. Chap. ii. 4) of a universal affirmative:
the former proposition is the Minor.
* It is clear from the fragments remaining of the ancient arguments
against Christianity, and the allusions to them in Christian writers, and
also from the Jewish accounts of the life of Jesus which are still extant,
that the original opponents of Christianity admitted that miracles were
wrought, but denied that they proved the divine origin of the religion,
and attributed them to Magic. This concession, in persons living so
much nearer to the times assigned to the miracles, should be noticed as
an important evidence ; for, credulous as men were in those days respect-
ing magic, they would hardly have resorted to this explanation, unless
some, at least plausible, evidence for the miracles had been adduced.
And they could not but be sensible that to prove (had that been possible)
the pretended miracles to be impostures, would have been the most deci~
jive course ; since that would at once have disproved the religion.
PRAXIS OF LOGICAL ANALYSIS- 425
As a Syllogism in Barbara therefore, the whole will stand
thus :
" All miracles attested by such and such evidence, are worthy
of credit :" (by conversion, " none which are not worthy of credit
are so attested.")
" The Christian miracles are attested by such and such evi-
dence :" Therefore " they are worthy of credit."
The Minor premiss is first proved by being taken as
several distinct ones, each of which is separately esta-
blished.^ Book II. Chap. iv. 1.
I. It is proved that the first propagators of Christianity
suffered ; by showing,
1st. A priori, from the nature of the case, that they were
likely to suffer : [because they were preachers of a
religion unexpected and unwelcome: 1. to the Jews;
and 2. to Gentiles.*]
2d. From profane testimony.
3d. From the testimony of Christian Writings. [And
here comes in the proof of one of the premises of
this last argument ; viz. the proof of the credibility,
as to this point at least, of the Christian Writings.]
These arguments are cumulative ; i. e. each separately
goes to establish the probability of the one common conclu-
sion, that " the first propagators of Christianity suffered"
By similar arguments it is shown that their sufferings
were such as they voluntarily exposed themselves to.
II. It is proved that "What they suffered for was a
miraculous story :" by
1st. The nature of the case ; They could have had nothing
but miracles on which to rest the claims of the new
religion.
* As Paul expresses it, " to the Jews, a stumUing-block ; and to the
Greeks, foolishness"
426 APPENDIX.
2d. By allusions to miracles, particularly to the Resur-
rection, both in Christian and in Profane Writers, as
the evidence on which the religion rested.
The same course of argument goes to show that the
miracles in attestation of which they suffered were such as
they professed to have witnessed.
These arguments again are cumulative.
III. It is proved that "The miracles thus attested are what
we call the Christian miracles ; " in other words, that the
story was, in the main, that which we have now in the
Christian Scriptures ; by
1st. The nature of the case; vi%. that it is improbable
the original story should have completely died away,
and a substantially new one have occupied its place ;
2d. by The incidental allusions of ancient writers, both
Christian and profane, to accounts agreeing with those
of our Scriptures, as the ones then received ;
3d. by The credibility of our Historical Scriptures: This
is established by several distinct arguments, each sepa-
rately tending to show that these books were, from the
earliest ages of Christianity, well known and carefully
preserved among Christians : viz.
i. They were quoted by ancient Christian writers,
ii. with peculiar respect.
iii. Collected into a distinct volume, and
iv. distinguished by appropriate names and titles of
respect.
v. Publicly read and expounded, and
vi. had commentaries) tyc. written on them :
vii. Were received by Christians of different sects ;
S;c. Sfc*
* For some important remarks respecting the different ways in which
this part of the argument is presented to different persons, See " Hinds
on Inspiration," pp. 30 46.
PRAXIS OF LOGICAL REASONING. 427
The latter part of the first main proposition, branches off
into two; viz. 1st, that the early Christians submitted to
new rules of conduct ; 2d, that they did so, in consequence
of their belief in miracles wrought before them.
Each of these is established in various parts of the above
course of argument, and by similar premises; viz. the
nature of the case, the accounts of heathen writers, and
the testimony of the Christian Scriptures, $c.
The Major premiss, that " Miracles thus attested are
worthy of credit," (which must be combined with the former,
in order to establish the conclusion, that " the Christian
miracles are worthy of credit,") is next to be established.
Previously to his entering on the second main propo-
sition, (which I have stated to be the Converse by nega-
tion of this Major premiss,) he draws his conclusion (Ch. x,
Part I.) from the Minor premiss, in combination with the
Major, resting that Major on
1st. The d priori improbability that a false story
should have been thus attested : viz.
" If it be so, the religion must be true.* These men could not
be deceivers. By only not bearing testimony, they might have
avoided all these sufferings, and have lived quietly. Would men
in such circumstances pretend to have seen what they never saw ;
assert facts which they had no knowledge of ; go about lying, to
teach virtue ; and, though not only convinced of Christ's being
an impostor, but having seen the success of his imposture in his
crucifixion, yet persist in carrying it on; and so persist, as to
bring upon themselves, for nothing, and with a full knowledge of
the consequence, enmity, and hatred, danger and death ?"
2d. That no false story of Miracles is likely to be so
* This is the ultimate conclusion deduced from the premiss, that " it
is attested by real Miracles ; " which, in the present day, conies to the
same thing : since those for whom he is writing, are ready at once to
admit the truth of the religion, if convinced of the reality of the miracles.
The ancient Jews were not.
428 APPENDIX.
attested, is again proved, from the premiss that " no
false story of miracles ever has been so attested ; " and
this premiss again is proved in the form of a propo-
sition which includes it ; viz. that " No other mira-
culous story whatever is so attested."
This assertion again, bifurcates; m%. it is proved
respecting the several stories that are likely to be, or
that have been adduced, as parallel to the Christian,
that either
1 . They are not so attested; or
2 . They are not properly miraculous ; i. e. that admit-
ting the veracity of the narrator, it does not follow
that any miracle took place ; as in cases that may be
explained \>y false perceptions, accidents, $c.
In this way the learner may proceed to analyze the rest
of the work, and to fill up the details of those parts of the
argument which I have but slightly touched upon.*
* When the Student considers that this is only one out of many
branches of evidence, all tending to the same point, and yet that there
have been intelligent men who have held out against them all, he may
be apt to suspect either that there must be some flaw in these arguments
which he is unable to detect, or else, that there must be much stronger
arguments on the other side than he has ever met with.
To enter into a discussion of the various causes leading to infidelity
would be unsuitable to this occasion ; but I will notice one as being more
especially connected with the subject of this work, and as being very
generally overlooked. " In no other instance perhaps" (says Dr. Haw-
kins, in his valuable Essay on Tradition) " besides that of Religion, do
men commit the very illogical mistake, of first canvassing all the objections
against any particular system whose pretensions to truth they would ex-
amine, before they consider the direct arguments in its favour" (p. 82.)
But why, it may be asked, do they make such a mistake in this case
An answer, which I think would apply to a large proportion of such
persons, is this : because a man having been brought up in a Christian
country, has lived perhaps among such as have been accustomed from
their infancy to take for granted the truth of their religion, and even to
regard an uninquiring assent as a mark of commendable faith ; and
PRAXIS OF LOGICAL REASONING. 429
It will be observed that to avoid unnecessary prolixity,
I have in most of the above syllogisms suppressed one
premiss, which the learner will be able easily to supply
hence he has probably never even thought of proposing to himself the
question, Why should I receive Christianity as a divine revelation ?
Christianity being nothing new to him, and the presumption being in
favour of it, while the burden of proof lies on its opponents, he is not
stimulated to seek reasons for believing it, till he finds it controverted.
And when it is controverted, when an opponent urges How do you
reconcile this, and that, and the other, with the idea of a divine revelation ?
these objections strike by their novelty, by their being opposed to what is
generally received. He is thus excited to inquiry ; which he sets about,
naturally enough, but very unwisely, by seeking for answers to all these
objections : and fancies that unless they can all be satisfactorily solved,
he ought not to receive the religion. " As if," (says the Author already
cited) " there could not be truth, and truth supported by irrefragable
arguments, and yet at the same time obnoxious to objections, numerous,
plausible, and by no means easy of solution. There are objections (said
Dr. Johnson) against a plenum and objections against a vacuum; but
one of them must be true." He adds, that "sensible men, really de-
sirous of discovering the truth, will perceive that reason directs them to
examine first the argument in favour of that side of the question, where
the first presumption of truth appears. And the presumption is mani-
festly in favour of that religious creed already adopted by the country. . . .
Their very earliest inquiry therefore must be into the direct arguments for
the authority of that book on which their country rests its religion."
But reasonable as such a procedure is, there is, as I have said, a strong
temptation, and one which should be carefully guarded against, to adopt
the opposite course ; to attend first to the objections which are brought
against what is established, and which, for that very reason, rouse the
mind from a state of apathy.
When Christianity was first preached, the state of things was reversed.
The presumption was against it, as being a novelty. " Seeing that
all these things cannot be spoken against, ye ought to be quiet," was
a sentiment which favoured an indolent acquiescence in the old pagan
worship. The stimulus of novelty was all on the side of those who
came to overthrow this, by a new religion. The first inquiry of any
one who at all attended to the subject, must have been, not, " What
are the objections to Christianity ?" but, " On what grounds do these
men call on me to receive them as divine messengers?" And the
same appears to be the case with the Polynesians among whom our
Missionaries are labouring : they begin by inquiring, " Why should we
receive this religion ?" and those of them accordingly who have embraced
430 APPENDIX.
for himself. E. G. In the early part of this analysis it will
easily be seen, that the first of the series of cumulative
arguments to prove that the propagators of Christianity
did suffer, would at full length stand thus ;
" Whoever propagated a religion unwelcome to the Jews and to
the Gentiles, was likely to suffer ;
The Apostles did this ;
Therefore they were likely to suffer," $c. $c.
It is also to be observed, that the same proposition used
in different syllogisms may require to be differently ex-
pressed by a substitution of some equivalent, in order to
render the argument, in each, formally correct. This of
course is always allowable, provided the exact meaning be
preserved : e. g. if the proposition be, " The persons who
attested the Christian miracles underwent sufferings in attes-
tation of them," I am authorized to state the same assertion
in a different form, thus, " The Christian miracles are attested
by men who suffered in attestation of their reality," fyc.
Great care however should be used to avoid being mis-
led by the substitution of one proposition for another, when
the two are not (though perhaps they sound so) really equi-
valent, so that the one warrants the assumption of the other.
Lastly, the learner is referred to the Supplement to
Chap. iii. 1, p. 102, where I have treated of the statement
of a proposition as several distinct ones, each implying all
the rest, but differing in the division of the Predicate from
the Subject. Of this procedure the above analysis affords
an instance.
it, appear to be Christians on much more rational and deliberate conviction
than many among us, even of those who in general maturity of intellect
and civilization, are advanced considerably beyond those Islanders.
I am not depreciating the inestimable advantages of a religious educa-
tion; but, pointing out the peculiar temptations which accompany it.
The Jews and Pagans had, in their early prejudices, greater difficulties
to surmount, than ours ; but they were difficulties of a different kind. See
Rhet. Part I. ch. iii. & 1.
INDEX
PRINCIPAL TECHNICAL TERMS.
Absolute terms, b. ii. ch. v. 1.
Abstraction. The act of " drawing off" in thought, and attend-
ing to separately, some portion of an object presented to
the mind, b. ii. ch. v. 2.
Abstract terms, b. ii. ch. v. 1.
Accident. In its widest technical sense, anything that is attri-
buted to another, and can only be conceived as belonging
to some substance (in which sense it is opposed to " Sub-
stance ;") in its narrower and more properly logical sense,
a Predicable which may be present or absent, the essence
of the Species remaining the same, b. ii. ch. v. 4.
Accidental Definition. A definition which assigns the Proper-
ties of a Species, or the Accidents of an Individual ; it is
otherwise called a Description, b.ii. ch. v. 6.
Affirmative denotes the quality of a Proposition which asserts
the agreement of the Predicate with the subject, b. ii. ch. ii. 1 .
Amphibolia a kind of ambiguity of sentence, b. iii. 10.
Analogous. A term is so called whose single signification
applies with unequal propriety to more than one object,
b. ii. ch. v. 1, and b. iii. 10.
Antecedent. That part of. a Conditional Proposition on which
the other depends, b. ii. ch. iv. 6.
Apprehension (simple.) The operation of the mind by which
we mentally perceive or form a notion of some object, b. ii.
ch. i. 1.
432 INDEX.
Argument. An expression in which, from something laid down
as granted, something else is deduced, b. ii. ch. iii. 1.
Categories, b. iv. ch. ii. 1.
Categorematic. A word is so called which may by itself be
employed as a Term, b. ii. ch. i. 3.
Categorical Proposition is one which affirms or denies a Pre-
dicate of a Subject, absolutely, and without any hypothesis,
b. ii. ch. ii. 4.
Common term is one which is applicable in the same sense to
more than one individual object, b. i. 6 ; b. ii. ch. i. 3,
and b. ii. ch. iv. 6.
Compatible terms, b. ii. ch. v. 1.
Composition Fallacy of, b. iii. 11.
Conclusion. That Proposition which is inferred from the Pre-
mises of an Argument, b. ii. 2, and b.ii. ch. iii. 1.
Concrete term, b. ii. ch. v. 1.
-Conditional Proposition is one which asserts the dependence
of one categorical Proposition on another. A conditional
Syllogism is one in which the reasoning depends on such a
Proposition, b. ii. ch, iv. 6.
Consequent. That part of a conditional Proposition which
depends on the other. (Consequens), b.ii. ch. iv. 6, Note.
Consequence. The connexion between the Antecedent and Con-
sequent of a conditional Proposition. (Consequentia), b. ii.
ch. iv. 6, Note.
Contingent. The matter of a Proposition is so called when the
terms of it in part agree, and in part disagree, b. ii. ch. ii. 2.
Contradictory Propositions are those which, having the same
terms, differ both in Quantity and Quality, b. ii. ch/iii. 5.
Contrary Propositions are two universals, affirmative and
negative, with the same terms, b. ii. ch. ii. 3.
Contrary terms, b. ii. ch. v. 1.
Converse, b. ii. ch. ii. 4.
Conversion of a Proposition is the transposition of the terms, so
that the subject is made the Predicate, and vice versa, b. ii.
ch.ii. 4.
INDEX. 433
Copula. That part of a Proposition which affirms or denies the
Predicate of the Subject : viz. is, or is not, expressed or
implied, b. ii. ch. i. 2.
Definite terms, b. ii. ch. v. 1.
Definition. An expression explanatory of that which is defined,
i. e. separated, as by a boundary, from everything else, b. ii.
ch. v. 6 ; b. iii. 10, and b. iv. ch. ii. 3.
Description. An accidental Definition, b. ii. ch. v. 6.
Difference (Differentia.) The formal or distinguishing part of
the essence of a Species, b. ii. ch. v. 4.
Dilemma. A complex kind of conditional syllogism, having
more than one Antecedent in the Major Premiss, and a
disjunctive Minor, b. ii. ch. iv. 5.
Discovery of Truth two kinds of, b. iv. ch. ii. 1.
Discourse. The third operation of the mind, Reasoning, b. ii.
ch.i. 1.
Disjunctive Proposition is one which consists of two or more
categoricals, so stated as to imply that some one of them
must be true. A syllogism is called disjunctive, the rea-
soning of which turns on such a proposition, b.ii. ch. iv. 4.
Distributed is applied to a Term that is employed in its full
extent, so as to comprehend all its significates, every-
thing to which it is applicable, b. i. 5, and b. ii. ch. iii. 2.
Division, logical is the distinct enumeration of several things
signified by a common name ; and it is so called metapho-
rically, from its being analogous to the (real and properly-
called) division of a whole into its parts, b. ii. ch. v. 5.
Division. Fallacy of, b. iii. 11.
Enthymeme. An argument having one Premiss expressed, and
the other understood, b. ii. ch. iv. 7.
Equivocal. A Term is defined to be equivocal whose different
significations apply equally to several objects. Strictly
speaking, there is hardly a word in any language which
may not be regarded, as in this sense, equivocal ; but the
title is usually applied only in any case where a word
is employed equivocally ; e. g. where the middle term is
F F
434 INDEX.
used in different senses in the two Premises ; or where a Pro-
position is liable to be understood in various senses, accord-
ing to the various meanings of one of its terms, b. iii. 10.
Essential Definition is one which assigns, not the Properties or
Accidents of the thing defined, but what are regarded as its
essential parts, whether physical or logical, b.ii. ch. v. 6.
Extreme. The Subject and Predicate of a Proposition are
called its Extremes or Terms, being, as it were, the two
boundaries, having the copula (in regular order) placed
between them. In speaking of a syllogism, the word is
often understood to imply the extremes of the Conclusion,
b. ii. ch. i. 2.
Fallacy. Any argument, or apparent argument, which professes
to be decisive of the matter at issue, while in reality it is
not, b. ii. ch. v. 4.
False in its strict sense, denotes the quality of a Proposition
which states something not as it is, b. ii. ch. ii. 1, and p. 386.
Figure of a Syllogism denotes a certain situation of its middle
term in' reference to the Extremes of the Conclusion The
Major and Minor terms, b. ii. ch. iii. 4.
Generalization. The act of comprehending under a common
name several objects agreeing in some point which we
abstract from each of them, and which that common name
serves to indicate, b. ii. ch. v. ^2.
Genus. A Predicable which is considered as the material part
of the Species of which it is affirmed, b. ii. ch. v. 3.
Hypothetical Proposition is one which asserts not absolutely,
but under an hypothesis, indicated by a conjunction. An
hypothetical Syllogism is one of which the reasoning depends
on such a proposition, b. ii. ch. iv. 2.
Illative Conversion is that in which the truth of the Converse
follows from the truth of the Exposita, or Proposition
given, b. ii, ch. ii. 4.
Impossible. The Matter of a Proposition is so called when the
extremes altogether disagree, b. ii. ch. ii. 1 . Ambiguity of,
p. 353.
INDEX. 435
Indefinite Proposition is one which has for its Subject a Com-
mon term without any sign to indicate distribution or
non-distribution, b. ii. ch. ii. 2.
Indefinite Terms, b. ii. ch. v. 1 .
Individual. An object which is, in the strict and primary sense,
one, and consequently cannot be logically divided ; whence
the name, b.ii. ch. v. 5.
Induction. A kind of argument which infers, respecting a whole
class, what has been ascertained respecting one or more
individuals of that class, b. iv. ch. i. 1.
Infer. To draw a conclusion from granted premises, b. iv. ch. iii.
1. See Prove.
Infima Species is that which is not subdivided, except into
individuals, b. ii. ch. v. 4.
Inseparable accident is that which cannot be separated from
the individual it belongs to, though it may from the
Species, b. ii. ch. v. 4.
Judgment. The second operation of the mind, wherein we pro-
nounce mentally on the agreement and disagreement of two
of the notions obtained by simple Apprehension, b. ii. ch. i.
ft.
Knowledge. b. iv. ch. ii. 2. Note.
Logical definition is that which assigns the Genus and Difference
of the Species defined, b. ii. ch. v. 6.
Major term of a Syllogism is the Predicate of the conclusion.
The Major Premiss is the one which contains the Major
term. In Hypothetical Syllogisms, the Hypothetical Pre-
miss is called the Major, b. ii. ch. iii. 2, and b. ii. ch, iv. 2.
Middle term of a categorical Syllogism is that with which the
two extremes of the conclusion are separately compared,
b. ii. ch.iii. 2, and b.ii. ch. iii. 4.
Minor term of a categorical Syllogism is the subject of th e
conclusion. The Minor Premiss is that which contains the
Minor term. In Hypothetical Syllogisms, the Categorical
Premiss is called the Minor, b. ii, ch, iii. 2, and b. ii. ch. iv.
2.
436 INDEX.
Modal categorical proposition is one which asserts that the
Predicate exists in the Subject in a certain mode or manner,
b.ii. ch. ii. 1, and b. ii. ch. iv. 1.
Mood of a categorical Syllogism is the designation of its three
propositions, in the order in which they stand, according to
their quantity and quality, b. ii. ch. iii. 4.
Necessary matter of a proposition is the essential or invariable
agreement of its terms, b. ii. ch.ii. 3. Necessary, ambi-
guity of, p. 363.
Negation conversion by (otherwise called conversion by contra-
position), b. ii. ch. ii. 4.
Negative categorical proposition is one which asserts the dis-
agreement of its extremes, b. ii. ch. ii. 1.
Negative terms, b. ii. ch. v. 1.
New Truths of two kinds, b. iv. ch. ii. 1.
Nominal Definition is one which explains only the meaning of the
term defined, and nothing more of the nature of the thing
signified by that Term than is implied by the Term itself to
every one who understands the meaning of it, b. ii. ch. v. 6,
and b. iv. ch. ii. 3.
Opposed. Two propositions are said to be opposed to each
other, when, having the same Subject and Predicate, they
differ either in quantity or quality, or both, b. ii. ch. ii. 3.
Opposition of terms, b. ii. ch. v. 1.
Part logically, Species are called Parts of the Genus they come
under, and individuals, parts of the Species ; realty, the
Genus is a Part of the Species, and the Species, of the
Individual, b. ii. ch. v. 5.
Particular Proposition is one in which the Predicate is affirmed
or denied of some part only of the subject, b.ii. ch. ii. 1.
Per Accidens. Conversion of a proposition is so called when the
Quantity is changed, b. ii. ch. ii. 4.
Physical definition is that which assigns the parts into which the
thing defined can be actually divided, b. ii. ch. v. 6.
Positive terms, b. ii. ch. v. 1 .
Predicaments, b. iv. ch. ii. 1.
INDEX. 437
Predicate of a Proposition is that Term which is affirmed or
denied of the other, b. ii. ch. i. 2.
PredicaUe. A Term which can be affirmatively predicated of
several others, b. ii. ch. v. 2.
Premiss. A proposition employed to establish a certain conclu-
sion, b. ii. ch. iii. 1,
Privative terms, b. ii. ch. v. 1.
Probable arguments, b. ii. ch. iv. 1, and b. iv. ch. i, 2.
Property. A Predicable which denotes something essentially
conjoined to the essence of the Species, b. ii. ch. v. 3.
Proposition. A sentence which asserts, i.e. affirms or denies,
b. ii. ch. ii. 1.
Prove. To adduce Premises which establish the truth of a
certain conclusion, b. iv. ch. iii. 1.
Proximum Genus of any Species is the nearest or least remote
to which it can be referred, b. ii. ch. v. 4.
Pure categorical proposition is one which asserts simply that the
Predicate is, or is not, "contained in the Subject, b. ii. ch. ii.
1, and b. ii. ch. iv. 1.
Quality of a Proposition is its affirming or denying. This is
the Quality of the expression, which is, in Logic, the essen-
tial circumstance. The Quality of the matter is, its being
true or false ; which is, in Logic, accidental, being essential
only in respect of the subject-matter treated of, b. ii. ch. ii.
1-
Quantity of a Proposition is the extent in which its subject is
taken ; viz. to stand for the whole, or for a part only of its
Significates, b. ii. ch. ii. 1.
Question. That which is to be established as a Conclusion stated
in an interrogative form, b. ii. ch. ii. 4.
Real definition is one which explains the nature of the thing
defined, viz. either the whole nature of it (as in Mathema-
tics), or else something beyond what is necessarily under-
stood by the Term, b. ii. ch. v. 6, and b. iv. ch. ii. 3.
References fallacy of, b. iii. 14.
Relative terms, b. ii. ch. v. 1.
438 INDEX.
Same. Secondary use of the word, b. iv. ch. v. 1, and p. 382.
Second intention of a term, b. iii. 10.
Separable accident is one which may be separated from the
individual, b. iii. Introd.
Significate. The several things signified by a common Term are
its significates (Significata), b. ii. ch. ii. 1 .
Singular term is one which stands for one individual. A Sin-
gular proposition is one which has for its Subject either a
Singular term, or a common term limited to one individual
by a singular sign, eg. " This," b. ii. ch.i. 3 ; b. ii. ch. ii.
2, and b. ii. ch. v. 1 .
Sorites. An abridged form of stating a series of Syllogisms, of
which the Conclusion of each is a Premiss of the succeed-
ing, b. ii. ch. iv. 7.
Species. A predicate which is considered as expressing the
whole essence of the individuals of which it is affirmed, b. ii.
ch. v. 3, peculiar sense of, in Natural History, b. iv. ch. v. 1.
Subaltern Species and Genus is that which is both a Species of
some higher Genus, and a Genus in respect of the Species
into which it is divided. Subaltern opposition, is between
a Universal and a Particular of the same Quality. Of these,
the Universal is the Subalternant, and the Particular the
Subalternate, b. ii. ch. ii. 3, and b. ii. ch. v. 4.
Subcontrary opposition is between two particulars, the affir-
mative and the negative, b. ii. ch. ii. 3.
Subject of a proposition is that term of which the other is
affirmed or denied, b. ii. ch. i. 2.
Summum Genus is that which is not considered as a Species of
any higher Genus, b. ii. ch. v. 4.
Syllogism. An argument expressed in strict logical form ; viz.
so that its conclusiveness is manifest from the structure of
the expression alone, without any regard to the meaning of
the Terms, b. ii. ch. iii. 1.
Syncategorematic words are such as cannot singly express a
Term, but only a part of a Term, b. ii.ch. i. 3.
The Subject or Predicate of a Proposition, b. ii. ch. i. 2.
INDEX. 439
Tendency ambiguity of, p. 385.
Thaumatrope, b. iii. 11.
True Proposition is one which states what really is, b. ii. ch. ii.
1-
Truth new two kinds of, b. iv. ch. ii. 2.
Universal Proposition is one whose Predicate is affirmed or
denied of the whole of the Subject, b. ii. ch. ii. 1.
Univocal. A Common term is called Univocal in respect of
those things to which it is applicable in the same signifi-
cation, b. ii. ch. v. 1.
THE END.
U. CLAY, PRINTER, BREAD-STREET-HILL.
Open Library