Skip to main content

Full text of "A beginner's history of philosophy"

See other formats 


I 


SOCRATES 


A  BEGINNER'S  HISTORY 
OF  PHILOSOPHY 


BY 


HERBEKT  ERNEST  CUSHMAN,  LL.D.,  Pn.D< 

Sometime  Professor  of  Philosophy  in  Tufts  College 
Lecturer  of  Philosophy  in  Harvard  College 
Lecturer  of  Philosophy  in  Dartmouth  College 


VOL.  I 
ANCIENT  AND  MEDIEVAL  PHILOSOPHY 

fievised  Edition 


HOUGHTON  MIFFLIN  COMPANY 

BOSTON      •      NEW  YORK      •      CHICAGO      •      DALLAS 
SAN  FRANCISCO 

ZEfje  &tber$toe  ffress  Cambribsc 


w^^ 

7? 


COPYRIGHT,  IQIO  AND  IQl8,  BY  HERBERT  ERNEST  CUSHMAN 

ALL  RIGHTS  RESERVED,  INCLUDING  THE  RIGHT  TO  REPRODUCE 
THIS  BOOK  OR  PARTS  THEREOF  IN  ANY  FORM 


<E&c  fttoeraibe  $«** 

CAMBRIDGE  .   MASSACHUSETTS 
PRINTED  IN  THE  U.S.A. 


TO 

3EORGE   HERBERT  PALMER,  Lrrr.D.,  LL.D< 
ALFORD  PROFESSOR  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

IN  HARVARD  UNIVERSITY 
WHO    HAS  INTERPRETED   LIFE  TO 

MANY  YOUNG  MEN  BY  MAKING 
I 

PHILOSOPHY  A  LIVING 

SUBJECT  TO  THEM 


PREFACE 

THIS  book  is  intended  as  a  text-book  for  sketch- 
courses  in  the  history  of  philosophy.  It  is  written  for 
the  student  rather  than  for  the  teacher.  It  is  a  history 
of  philosophy  upon  the  background  of  geography  and  of 
literary  and  political  history. 

As  a  text-book  for  sketch-courses  it  employs  sum 
maries,  tables,  and  other  generalizations  as  helps  to  the 
memory.  The  philosophical  teaching  is  presented  as 
simply  as  possible,  so  as  to  bring  into  prominence  only 
the  leading  doctrines.  My  own  personal  criticism  and 
interpretation  on  the  one  hand,  and  explanations  in 
technical  language  on  the  other,  have  been  avoided  as 
far  as  possible.  Sometimes  I  have  had  to  choose  between 
interpretation  and  technicality,  in  which  case  the  limita 
tions  of  space  have  determined  my  choice.  Since  the 
book  is  intended  for  the  student  rather  than  for  the 
teacher,  it  makes  the  teacher  all  the  more  necessary ; 
for  it  puts  into  the  hands  of  the  student  an  outline  and 
into  the  hands  of  the  teacher  the  class-room  time  for 
inspiring  the  student  with  his  own  interpretations.  In 
making  use  of  geographical  maps,  contemporary  litera 
ture,  and  political  history,  this  book  is  merely  utilizing 
for  pedagogical  reasons  the  stock  of  information  with 
which  the  college  student  is  furnished  when  he  begins 
the  history  of  philosophy. 

A  good  many  years  of  experience  in  teaching  the 
history  of  philosophy  to  beginners  have  convinced  me 
that  students  come  to  the  subject  with  four  classes  of 


vi  PREFACE 

ideas,  with  which  they  can  correlate  philosophic  doc 
trines:  good  geographical  knowledge,  some  historical 
and  some  literary  knowledge,  and  many  undefined  per 
sonal  philosophical  opinions.  Of  course,  their  personal 
philosophical  opinions  form  the  most  important  group, 
but  more  as  something  to  be  clarified  by  the  civilizing 
influence  of  the  subject  than  as  an  approach  to  the  sub 
ject  itself.  The  only  "memory-hooks"  upon  which  the 
teacher  may  expect  to  hang  philosophic  doctrines  are 
the  student's  ideas  of  history,  literature,  and  geography. 
If  the  history  of  philosophy  is  treated  only  as  a  series 
of  doctrines,  the  student  beginning  the  subject  feels  not 
only  that  the  land  is  strange,  but  that  he  is  a  stranger 
in  it.  Besides,  to  isolate  the  historical  philosophical  doc 
trines  is  to  give  the  student  a  wrong  historical  perspec 
tive,  since  philosophic  thought  and  contemporary  events 
are  two  inseparable  aspects  of  history.  Each  interprets 
the  other,  and  neither  can  be  correctly  understood  with 
out  the  other.  If  the  history  of  philosophy  is  to  have 
any  significance  for  the  beginner,  it  must  be  shown  to 
give  a  meaning  to  history. 

So  far  as  the  materials  that  form  any  history  of  phi 
losophy  are  concerned,  I  have  merely  tried  to  arrange 
and  organize  them  with  reference  to  the  student  and 
with  reference  to  the  history  of  which  they  form  an  in 
tegral  part.  I  am  therefore  overwhelmingly  indebted  to 
every  good  authority  to  whom  I  have  had  access,  but  in 
the  main  I  have  followed  the  inspiring  direction  of  the 
great  Windelband.  Many  willing  friends  have  read 
parts  of  the  manuscript  and  offered  suggestions  and 
criticisms.  I  am  particularly  indebted  to  Professors  C. 
P.  Parker,  Ephraim  Emerton,  A.  O.  Norton,  and  J.  H. 
Ropes,  and  Dr.  B.  A.  G.  Fuller  of  Harvard  University; 


PREFACE  vii 

to  Professor  Mary  W.  Calkins  of  Wellesley  College  ;  to 
Professors  C.  S.  Wade  and  D.  L.  Maulsby  of  Tufts  Col 
lege  ;  and  to  my  wife,  Abby  B.  Cushman.  However, 
for  all  the  faults  of  the  book,  which  has  been  many 
years  in  preparation,  I  am  alone  responsible. 

Instead  of  lists  of  books  for  collateral  reading,  placed 
at  the  end  of  chapters  or  of  the  book,  the  student  will 
find  references  in  the  footnotes  to  the  exact  pages  of 
many  helpful  books.  I  should  like  to  call  the  student's 
attention  to  an  appendix  to  the  discussion  of  Plato. 
This  is  a  complete  selection  of  passages  from  Plato 
made  by  the  late  Professor  Jowett  for  English  readers. 
This  selection  Professor  Jowett  was  accustomed  to  dis 
tribute  to  his  Oxford  class,  of  which  I  was  once  fortu 
nate  to  be  a  member. 

Philosophical  terms  have  been  defined  either  in  the 
text  or  in  the  footnotes.  Such  definitions  must  neces 
sarily  have  as  their  aim  their  usefulness  to  the  student, 
rather  than  their  completeness. 

TUFTS  COLLEGE,  June,  1910. 

PREFACE  TO  THE  REVISED  EDITION 

THE  only  change  which  the  reader  will  find  in  the 
revision  of  this  volume  is  in  the  form  of  presentation 
of  the  philosophies  of  the  earlier  cosmologists  (Chap- 
ter  II). 

HERBERT  E.  CUSHMAN. 

WEST  NEWTON,  February,  1918. 


CONTENTS 

INTRODUCTION  — THE  THREE  GENERAL  PERIODS 
OF  THE  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 1 

THE  COMPARATIVE  LENGTHS  OF  THE  THREE  GENERAL 
PERIODS 1 

THE  REAL  DIFFERENCES  OF  THE  THREE  GENERAL  PE 
RIODS  1 

TABLE  OF  THE  SUBDIVISIONS  OF  THE  THREE  GENERAL 
PERIODS 4 

BOOK  I.     ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY 
(625  B.  C.-476  A.  D.) 

CHAPTER  I.  THE  EARLY  GREEK  IN  ANCIENT  PHI 
LOSOPHY      5 

THE  DIVISIONS  OF  ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY 5 

THE  LITERARY  SOURCES  OF  ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY  .    .  6 

THE  ENVIRONMENT  OF  THE  EARLY  GREEK 7 

1.  His  Geographical  Environment 7 

2.  His  Political  Environment 7 

THE  NATIVE  TENDENCIES  OF  THE  EARLY  GREEK,  AS  SEEN 

(1)  In  the  Development  of  his  Religion,  (2)  in  his 
Reflections  upon  Physical  Events,  and  (3)  in  his  Inter 
est  in  Human  Conduct 9-11 

THE  THREE  PERIODS  OF  GREEK  PHILOSOPHY  ....  12 

CHAPTER   II.    THE    COSMOLOGICAL    PERIOD  :  THE 
PHILOSOPHY  OF  NATURE 15 

THE  PERIL  IN  THE  GREEK  POLITICAL  SITUATION  : 
PERSIA  AND  CARTHAGE 15 

THE  PERIL  IN  THE  NEW  RELIGION  :  THE  MYSTERIES 
AND  PYTHAGORAS 16 


CONTENTS 

CHARACTERISTICS  OF  THE  COSMOLOGISTS 18 

TABLE  OF  COSMOLOGISTS .     .    20 

How  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  QUESTION  AROSE      ....     20 

MAP   SHOWING    THE    ClTIES    WHERE    THE    COSMOLOGISTS 

91 
LIVED 

SUMMARY  COMPARISON  OF  THE  MONISTIC  PHILOSOPHIES  22 

1.  THE  MILESIAN  SCHOOL 24 

THE  MILESIAN  PHILOSOPHY 25 

2.  XENOPHANES,  THE  RELIGIOUS  PHILOSOPHER     ...  26 
THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  XENOPHANES 27 

3.  HERACLEITUS,   "THE    MISANTHROPIST"    AND   "THE 

OBSCURE  " 28 

a.  Heracleitus'   Doctrine    of    Absolute   and  Universal 

Change 28 

b.  Fire  is  the  Cosmic  Substance 29 

c.  The  Definite  Changes  of  Fire 30 

d.  The  Practical  Philosophy  of  Heracleitus      ....  31 

4.  THE  ELEATIC  SCHOOL 32 

a.  PARMENIDES 32 

(1)  The  Cosmic  Substance  is  Being 33 

(2)  Other  Tbiugs  than  the  Cosmic  Substance  (Being) 

have  no  Real  Existence 34 

b.  ZENO 35 

THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  ZENO 36 

THE  RESULTS  OF  THE  CONFLICT  BETWEEN  HERACLEITUS 
AND  PARMENIDES  37 


CHAPTER  III.     PLURALISM 39 

EFFORTS  TOWARD  RECONCILIATION 39 

THE  NEW  CONCEPTION  OF  CHANGE  OF  THE  PLURALISTS  40 
THE   NEW  CONCEPTION   OF  THE  UNCHANGING  OF  THE 

PLURALISTS  —  THE  ELEMENT 40 

THE  INTRODUCTION  OF  THE  CONCEPTION  OF  THE  EFFI 
CIENT  CAUSE 41 

SUMMARY  OF  SIMILARITIES  AND   DIFFERENCES  IN   THE 

THEORIES  OF  THE  RECONCILERS    .  41 


CONTENTS  xi 

THE  PLURALISTIC  PHILOSOPHERS  :  EMPEDOCLES,  ANAXA- 

GORAS,  LEUCIPPUS,  AND  THE  LATER  PYTHAGOREANS  .  42 

THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  EMPEDOCLES 44 

THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  ANAXAGORAS 45 

THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THE  ATOMISTS  —  LEUCIPPUS  AND 

THE  SCHOOL  AT  ABDERA 47 

THE  LATER  PYTHAGOREANS 48 

1.  The  Pythagorean  Conception  of  Being      ....  49 

2.  The  Pythagorean  Dualistic  World 51 

3.  Pythagorean  Astronomy 52 

HISTORICAL  RETROSPECT 53 

CHAPTER  IV.   THE  ANTHROPOLOGICAL  PERIOD:  THE 

PHILOSOPHY  OP  MAN 55 

AN  HISTORICAL  SUMMARY  OF  THE    ANTHROPOLOGICAL 

PERIOD 55 

THE  PERSIAN  WARS  AND  THE  RISE  OF  ATHENS  ...  56 

THE  GREEK  ENLIGHTENMENT 58 

1.  The  Impulse  for  Learning 58 

2.  The  Practical  Need  of  Knowledge 59 

3.  The  Critical  Attitude  of  Mind 61 

THE  SIGNIFICANCE  OF  THE  SOPHISTS 64 

THE  PROMINENT  SOPHISTS 67 

THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THE  SOPHISTS 68 

1.  The  Relativism  of  Protagoras 69 

2.  The  Nihilism  of  Gorgias 70 

THE  ETHICS  OF  THE  SOPHISTS.  —  THE  APPLICATION  OF 

THEIR  CRITICAL  THEORY  TO  POLITICAL  LIFE    ...  71 

SUMMARY 73 

CHAPTER  V.    SOCRATES 74 

SOCRATES  AND  ARISTOPHANES 74 

THE  PERSONALITY  AND  LIFE  OF  SOCRATES 75 

SOCRATES  AND  THE  SOPHISTS 80 

THE  UNSYSTEMATIC  CHARACTER  OF  THE  SOCRATIC  PHI 
LOSOPHY 82 

THE  IDEAL  OF  SOCRATES                                                  ,  83 


xii  CONTENTS 

WHAT  THE  SOCRATIC  IDEAL  INVOLVES 85 

THE  Two  STEPS  OF  THE  METHOD  OF  SOCRATES  ...  88 

SOCRATES  AND  ATHENS 91 

THE  LOGICAL  EXPEDIENTS  OF  SOCRATES 92 

SOCRATES  AND  THE  LESSER  SOCRATICS 93 

THE  CYNIC  SCHOOL 95 

THE  CYRENAIC  SCHOOL 96 

CHAPTER  VI.  THE  SYSTEMATIC  PERIOD  ....  98 
THE  WANING  OF  THE  GREEK  NATIONAL  SPIRIT  ...  98 
THE  PLACE  OF  THE  THREE  SYSTEMATIC  PHILOSOPHERS 

IN  GREEK  HISTORY 98 

THE    FUNDAMENTAL    PRINCIPLE    OF   THE    SYSTEMATIC 

PERIOD 100 

A  SUMMARY  OF  GREEK  PHILOSOPHY 102 

GREEK  PHILOSOPHY  (OBJECTIVE) 103 

DEMOCRITUS  AND  PLATO  —  THEIR  SIMILARITIES  AND  DIF 
FERENCES     104 

THE  LIFE  OF  DEMOCRITUS 106 

THE   COMPREHENSIVENESS   OF  THE   AIM   OF   DEMOCRI 
TUS      108 

THE  ENRICHED  PHYSICS  OF  DEMOCRITUS  —  HYLOZOISM 

BECOMES  MATERIALISM 109 

THE  MATERIALISTIC  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  DEMOCRITUS    .     .  Ill 
DEMOCRITUS'   THEORY   OF  KNOWLEDGE  —  THE  WORLD 

OF  TWOFOLD  REALITY 114 

THE  ETHICAL  THEORY  OF  DEMOCRITUS 116 

CHAPTER  VII.   PLATO 119 

ABDERA  AND  ATHENS 119 

THE  DIFFICULTIES  IN  UNDERSTANDING  THE  TEACHING 

OF  PLATO 120 

THE  LIFE  AND  WRITINGS  OF  PLATO 121 

1.  Plato's  Student  Life 121 

2.  Plato  as  Traveler 122 

3.  Plato  as  Teacher  of  the  Academy 124 

CONCERNING  THE  DIALOGUES  OF  PLATO   .    .    ,  .  126 


CONTENTS  liii 

THE  FACTORS  IN  THE  CONSTRUCTION  OF  PLATO'S  DOC 
TRINE  128 

1.  His  Inherited  Tendencies 128 

2.  His  Philosophical  Sources 130 

THE  DIVISIONS  OF  PLATO'S  PHILOSOPHY 131 

SUMMARY  OF  PLATO'S  DOCTRINE 132 

THE  FORMATION  OF  PLATO'S  METAPHYSICS 132 

THE   DEVELOPMENT    OF    PLATO'S    METAPHYSICS  —  THE 

DEVELOPMENT  OF  PLATO'S  IDEAS  IN  THE  Two  DRAFTS  136 
BRIEF  COMPARISON  OF  THE  Two  DRAFTS  OF  THE 

IDEAS 137 

COMPARISON  OF  THE  Two  DRAFTS  OF  IDEAS  IN  MORE 

DETAIL 137 

1.  The  Number  of  Ideas  in  the  Earlier  and  Later 

Drafts  compared 137 

2.  The  Relation  of  the  Ideas  and  the  World  of  Nature 

in  the  Two  Drafts  compared 138 

3.  The  Relation  among  the  Ideas  in  the  Two  Drafts 

compared 140 

PLATO'S  CONCEPTION  OF  GOD 141 

PLATO'S  CONCEPTION  OF  PHYSICAL  NATURE     ....  142 

PLATO'S  CONCEPTION  OF  MAN 144 

PLATO'S  DOCTRINE  OF  IMMORTALITY 146 

1.  The  Immortality  of  Pre-Existence 146 

2.  The  Immortality  of  Post-Existence 149 

THE  Two  TENDENCIES  IN  PLATO 150 

PLATONIC  LOVE 151 

PLATO'S  THEORY  OF  ETHICS 153 

1.  Development  of  Plato's  Theory  of  the  Good  .     .     .  153 

2.  The  Four  Cardinal  Virtues 154 

3.  Plato's  Theory  of  Political  Society 155 

APPENDIX  —  JOWETT'S   SELECTION  OF  PASSAGES    FROM 

PLATO  FOR  ENGLISH  READERS 15& 

CHAPTER  VIII.    ARISTOTLE 166 

ARISTOTLE  IN  THE  ACADEMY  AND  LYCEUM 166 

BIOGRAPHY  OF  ARISTOTLE  ....  .  168 


xiv  CONTENTS 

BRIEF  CHRONOLOGICAL  SKETCH  OF  ARISTOTLE'S  LIFE   .  168 
ARISTOTLE'S  BIOGRAPHY  IN  DETAIL 169 

1.  First  Period  —  Early  Influences 169 

2.  Second  Period — Traveler  and  Collector  .     .     .     .171 

3.  Third  Period  —  Administrator  of  the  Lyceum    .     .172 
THE  WRITINGS  OF  ARISTOTLE 173 

1.  The  Popular  Writings,  published  by  Aristotle  him 

self  174 

2.  The  Compilations .  175 

3.  The  Didactic  Writings 175 

ARISTOTLE'S  STARTING-POINT 176 

THE  FUNDAMENTAL  PRINCIPLE  IN   ARISTOTLE'S  PHILO 
SOPHY      .    .  177 

ARISTOTLE'S  LOGIC 180 

ARISTOTLE'S  METAPHYSICS „    .    .  185 

1.  Development  is  Purposeful 185 

2.  Aristotle's    Two   Different    Conceptions    of    Pur 

pose  187 

3.  Aristotle's  Conception  of  God 190 

4.  Aristotle's  Conception  of  Matter 191 

5.  Aristotle's  Conception  of  Nature 192 

THE   MECHANICAL   SERIES, — ARISTOTLE'S   THEORY  OF 

PHYSICS 194 

THE  TELEOLOGICAL  SERIES  :  THE  QUALITATIVE  CHANGES 
OF  PHENOMENA 196 

1.  The  Psychology  of  Aristotle 196 

2.  The  Ethics  of  Aristotle 199 

(a)  The  Practical  Virtues 200 

(6)  The  Dianoetic  Virtues 201 

THE  POLITICAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  ARISTOTLE 202 

CHAPTER  IX.   THE  HELLENIC-ROMAN  PERIOD  .    .  204 

ITS  TIME  LENGTH 204 

THE  FALL  OF  THE  GREEK  NATION  AND  THE  PERSIST 
ENCE  OF  ITS  CIVILIZATION 204 

MAP  OF  THE  EMPIRE  OF  ALEXANDER,  SHOWING  THE 
EXTENSION  OF  HELLENISM   .  .  205 


CONTENTS  XT 

THE  Two  PARTS  OF  THE  HELLENIC-ROMAN  PERIOD     .  208 

1.  The  Ethical  Period 208 

2.  The  Religious  Period 208 

THE  UNDERCURRENT  OF  SKEPTICISM  IN  THE  HELLENIC- 
ROMAN  PERIOD 209 

THE  FUNDAMENTAL  PROBLEM  OF  THE  HELLENIC-ROMAN 

PERIOD 211 

THE  CENTRES  OF  HELLENISM 213 

1.  Athens 213 

2.  Alexandria 215 

GENERAL  CHARACTERISTICS  OF  THE  ETHICAL  PERIOD   .  215 

1.  The  Abandonment  of  Metaphysical  Speculation     .  216 

2.  The  Growth  of  Science 216 

3.  Ethics  became  the  Central  Interest 217 

THE  SCHOOLS 218 

MAP  OF  ATHENS,  SHOWING  THE  LOCATION  OF  THE  FOUR 

SCHOOLS 219 

THE    OLD    SCHOOLS  — THE    ACADEMY  AND    THE  LY 
CEUM  220 

1.  The  Academy 220 

2.  The  Lyceum 221 

THE  NEW  SCHOOLS  —  THE  EPICUREANS  AND  THE  STOICS  222 
A  SUMMARY  OF  THE  AGREEMENTS  AND  DIFFERENCES 

OF   THE   STOICS   AND   EPICUREANS 225 

CHAPTER  X.  EPICUREANISM 227 

THE  LIFE  OF  EPICURUS 227 

THE  EPICUREANS 228 

SOME  TYPES  OF  HEDONISM,— ARISTIPPUS,  EPICURUS,  AND 

ROUSSEAU .  228 

THE  EPICUREAN  IDEAL 230 

THE  PLACE  OF  VIRTUE  IN  EPICUREANISM 233 

THE  EPICUREAN  WISE  MAN 234 

THE  EPICUREAN  WISE  MAN  IN  SOCIETY 235 

THE  GREAT  OBSTACLES  TO  HAPPINESS 236 

EPICURUS'  CONCEPTION  OF  THE  PHYSICAL  WORLD.  — 

QUALIFIED  ATOMISM ,  .  238 


xvi  CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  XI.   STOICISM .    „    .      241 

THE  POSITION  OF  STOICISM  IN  ANTIQUITY   <  ,  .    ,    ,    .  241 
THE  THREE  PERIODS  OF  STOICISM  ........  242 

1.  Period  of  Formulation  of  the  Doctrine.     .     r    .     .242 

2.  Period  of  Modified  Stoicism    .     ,     < 242 

3.  Period  of  Roman  Stoicism  ...     e     -••.-.  243 

THE  STOIC  LEADERS .    -    .  243 

THE  STOIC  WRITINGS .    .    ,  246 

THE  STOICS  AND  CYNICS -.    *    .    .     «  246 

THE  Two  PROMINENT  STOIC  CONCEPTIONS    .    «    ,    .    .  247 
THE  CONCEPTION  OF  PERSONALITY  .     .         ,    .    .    *    •>  248 

1.  The  Stoic  Psychology 248 

2.  The  Highest  Good «...  250 

THE  CONCEPTION  OF  NATURE.    ...  ,    .    .  251 

1.  Nature  is  an  All-pervading  World-Being      .     .     .  253 

2.  Nature  is  an  All-compelling  Law 253 

3.  Nature  is  Matter 254 

THE  CONCEPTIONS  OF  NATURE  AND  PERSONALITY  SUP 
PLEMENT  EACH  OTHER 256 

THE  STOIC  AND  SOCIETY 257 

DUTY  AND  RESPONSIBILITY 259 

THE  PROBLEM  OF  EVIL  AND  THE  PROBLEM  OF  FREE 
DOM    260 

THE   MODIFICATIONS   OF  THE  STOIC   DOCTRINE  AFTER 
THE  FIRST  PERIOD 261 

CHAPTER  XII.  SKEPTICISM  AND  ECLECTICISM  .  .  264 
THE  APPEARANCES  OF  PHILOSOPHIC  SKEPTICISM  .  .  .  264 
THE  THREE  PHASES  OF  PHILOSOPHIC  SKEPTICISM  .  .  265 

1.  The  First  Phase  of  Philosophic  Skepticism  is  called 

Pyrrhonism 265 

2.  The  Second  Period  of  Philosophic  Skepticism  — 

The  Skepticism  of  the  Academy 266 

3.  The   Third  Period   of   Philosophic   Skepticism  — 

Sensationalistic  Skepticism 268 

THE  LAST   CENTURY  AND  A  HALF   OF  THE   ETHICAL 
PERIOD.    ECLECTICISM  .  269 


CONTENTS 


xvu 


CHAPTER  XIII.   THE  RELIGIOUS  PERIOD  ....  273 
THE  Two  CAUSES  OF  THE   RISE  OF  RELIGIOUS   FEEL 
ING     , 273 

THE  NEED  OF  SPIRITUAL  AUTHORITY 275 

THE  RISE  OF  THE  CONCEPTION  OF  SPIRITUALITY  .     .     .  277 

THE  REVIVAL  OF  PLATONISM 279 

THE  DIVISIONS  OF  THE  RELIGIOUS  PERIOD 280 

THE  HELLENIC  RELIGIOUS  PHILOSOPHIES 282 

THE  INTRODUCTORY  PERIOD  OF  HELLENIC  RELIGIOUS 
PHILOSOPHY.  THE  TURNING  TO  THE  PAST  FOR  SPIRIT 
UAL  AUTHORITY 282 

1.  The  Greek-Jewish  Philosophy  of  Philo      ....  282 

2.  Neo-Pythagoreanism 285 

THE    DEVELOPMENT    PERIOD    OF  HELLENIC   RELIGIOUS 

PHILOSOPHY.  THE  TURNING  TO  THE  PRESENT  FOR 
SPIRITUAL  AUTHORITY.  PLATONISM  AND  NEO-PLATO 
NISM  287 

NEO-PLATONISM  AND  THE  Two  INTRODUCTORY  PHILO 
SOPHIES  t  288 

NEO-PLATONISM  AND  CHRISTIANITY 288 

THE  PERIODS  OF  NEO-PLATONISM 290 

THE  ALEXANDRIAN  SCHOOL.  THE  SCIENTIFIC  THEORY 
OF  NEO-PLATONISM.  THE  LIFE  AND  WRITINGS  OF 

PLOTINUS 2& 

THE  GENERAL  CHARACTER  OF  THE  TEACHING  OF  PLO 
TINUS  ^  291 

THE  MYSTIC  GOD 292 

1.  The  Supra-Consciousness  of  God 292 

2.  The  Conception  of  Dynamic  Pantheism    ....  293 

THE  Two  PROBLEMS  OF  PLOTINUS 293 

THE  WORLD  OF   EMANATIONS.  — THE    METAPHYSICAL 

PROBLEM  OF  PLOTINUS 294 

THE  SPIRIT ^  294 

THE  SOUL 295 

MATTER .*295 

THE  RETURN  OF  THE  SOUL  TO  GOD.  — THE  ETHICAL 

PROBLEM  OF  PLOTINUS .  297 


CONTENTS 

THE  SYRIAN  SCHOOL. —THE  SYSTEMATIZING  OF  POLY 
THEISMS. —  JAMBLICHUS 298 

THE  ATHENIAN  SCHOOL.  —  RECAPITULATION.  —  PROCLUS  299 

CHAPTER    XIV.    PATRISTICS.  —  THE  HELLENIZING 

OF  THE  GOSPEL 302 

THE  EARLY  SITUATION  OF  CHRISTIANITY 302 

THE  PHILOSOPHIES  INFLUENCING  CHRISTIAN  THOUGHT  .  305 

THE  PERIODS  OF  EARLY  CHRISTIANITY 306 

THE  APOLOGISTS 307 

THE  GNOSTICS 310 

THE  REACTION  AGAINST  GNOSTICISM.  —  THE  OLD  CATH 
OLIC  THEOLOGIANS 312 

ORIGEN  AND  THE  SCHOOL  OF  CATECHISTS 314 


BOOK  II.    THE  MIDDLE   AGES 
(476-1453) 

CHAPTER  XV.   CHARACTERISTICS  AND   CONDITIONS 
OF  THE  MIDDLE  AGES 319 

COMPARISON   OF   THE    HELLENIC-ROMAN    PERIOD   AND 

THE  MIDDLE  AGES 319 

THE  MEDIEVAL  MAN 320 

How  THE    UNIVERSE    APPEARED    TO   THE    MEDIAEVAL 

MAN 322 

MAPS  OF  THE  PTOLEMAIC  COSMOGRAPHY  ....    323,  325 

THE  MEDIEVAL  MAN  AT  SCHOOL 325 

A  MEDIAEVAL  LIBRARY 326 

1.  Books  most  commonly  read 327 

2.  Books  that  the  scholars  might  use 327 

3.  The  Books  most  influential  philosophically  upon 

the  time 328 

THE  THREE  PERIODS  OF  THE  MIDDLE  AGES     ....  328 
SUMMARY  OF  THE  POLITICAL  AND  EDUCATIONAL  WORLDS 
OF  THE  MEDIEVAL  MAN.  .  330 


CONTENTS  xix 

CHAPTER  XVI.   THE  EARLY  PERIOD  OF  THE  MID- 

DLE  AGES 334 

THE  GENERAL  CHARACTER  OF  THE  EARLY  PERIOD  .  .  334 
AN  EARLY  MEDIEVAL  GEOGRAPHICAL  MAP  ....  335 

I^THE  HISTORICAL  POSITION  OF  AUGUSTINE 335 

THE  SECULAR  SCIENCE 339 

^JHE  LIFE  OF  AUGUSTINE 339 

C-THE  Two  ELEMENTS  IN  AUGUSTINE'S  TEACHING  .  .  .  340 
THE  NEO-PLATONIC  ELEMENT  :  THE  INNER  CERTAINTIES 

OF  CONSCIOUSNESS 341 

v  THE  AUTHORITY  OF  THE  CHURCH  ACCORDING  TO  AUGUS 
TINE    345 

THE  DARK  AGES 347 

THE  REVIVAL  OF  CHARLEMAGNE 349 

JOHN  SCOTUS  ERIGENA  :  LIFE  AND  TEACHING  .  .  .  350 
THE  GREEK  PRINCIPLE  WHICH  ERIGENA  FORMULATED 

FOR  THE  MIDDLE  AGES 352 

THE  LAST  CENTURY  OF  THE  EARLY  PERIOD    ....  353 

CHAPTER  XVII.  THE  TRANSITIONAL  PERIOD  .  .  354 
THE  GENERAL  CHARACTER  OF  THE  TRANSITIONAL  PERIOD  354 

WHAT  is  SCHOLASTICISM  ? 355 

ANSELM  :  LIFE  AND  POSITION  IN  MEDIAEVAL  PHILOSOPHY  359 
ANSELM'S  ARGUMENTS  FOR  THE  EXISTENCE  OF  GOD  .  361 

ROSCELLINUS  :  LIFE  AND  TEACHING 361 

STORM  AND  STRESS 362 

THE  LIFE  OF  ABELARD 363 

ABELARD'S  CONCEPTUALISM.  UNIVERSALS  EXIST  IN  THE 

PARTICULARS 364 

ABELARD'S  RATIONALISM.  —  THE  RELATION  BETWEEN 

REASON  AND  DOGMA 36£ 

CHAPTER  XVIII.   THE  PERIOD  OF  CLASSIC  SCHO 
LASTICISM  368 

THE  GENERAL  CHARACTER  OF  THIS  LAST  PERIOD  .  .  368 
THE  Two  CIVILIZATIONS  .  .  369 


xx  CONTENTS 

MAP  SHOWING   THE    GROWTH    OF    MOHAMMEDAN   CIVIL 
IZATION  IN  THE  MIDDLE  AGES 370 

THE  FIRST  CONTACT  OF  THE  Two  CIVILIZATIONS     .    .  372 
THE   CONFLICT  BETWEEN   THE   Two   CIVILIZATIONS.  — 

THE  CRUSADES 374 

THE  REVIVAL  OF  LEARNING 375 

DIAGRAM  OF  DANTE'S  POETIC  CONCEPTION  OF  THE  UNI 
VERSE     376 

THE  STRENGTH  AND  BURDEN    OF   ARISTOTLE   TO  THE 
CHURCH 378 

1.  The  Strength  of  Aristotle  to  the  Church  ....  378 

2.  The  Burden  of  Aristotle  to  the  Church      .     .     .     .379 

THE  PREDECESSORS  OF  AQUINAS 379 

THE  LIFE   OF   THOMAS   AQUINAS.  — THE  FOUNDER  OF 

THE  DOMINICAN  TRADITION 380 

THE    CENTRAL   PRINCIPLE   OF  THOMAS'S    DOCTRINE  — 

THE  TWOFOLD  TRUTH 381 

THE  PROBLEM  OF  INDIVIDUALITY  —  THE   RELATION  OF 

PARTICULARS  AND  UNIVERSALS 383 

THE  PRIMACY  OF  THE  WILL  OR  THE  INTELLECT  .     .     .  385 
DUNS  SCOTUS,  THE  FOUNDER  OF  THE  FRANCISCAN  TRA 
DITION —  LIFE  AND  PHILOSOPHICAL  POSITION    .     .     .  386 
DUNS  SCOTUS'S  CONCEPTION  OF  THE  TWOFOLD  TRUTH. 
—  THE  SEPARATION  OF  SCIENCE  AND  RELIGION    .    .  387 

THE  INSCRUTABLE  WILL  OF  GOD 388 

THE  PROBLEM  OF  INDIVIDUALITY 389 

AFTER  DUNS  SCOTUS 390 

WILLIAM  OF  OCKAM  :  LIFE  AND  TEACHING 391 

AFTER  OCKAM 393 

INDEX   ,  .  395 


ILLUSTRATIONS 

SOCRATES Frontispiece 

MAP   SHOWING  WHERE   THE   COSMOLOGISTS   LIVED.      ...      21 

THE  EMPIRE  OF  ALEXANDER 205 

MAP  OF  ATHENS  SHOWING  THE  LOCATION  OF  THE  FOUR 

SCHOOLS 219 

PTOLEMAIC  COSMOGRAPHY  SHOWING  THE  DIVISION  OF  THE 

UNIVERSE  INTO  SPHERES 323 

PTOLEMAIC  COSMOGRAPHY  SHOWING  THE  EPICYCLIC  MOVE 
MENTS  OF  THE  PLANETS 325 

MEDIAEVAL  GEOGRAPHY.  THE  COSMAS  MAP,  A.D.  547     .  335 

GROWTH  OF  MOHAMMEDANISM  DURING  THE  MIDDLE  AGES, 
SHOWING  ITS  CONTACT  WITH  CHRISTIAN  CIVILIZATION  370 

DIAGRAM  OF  DANTE'S  POETIC  CONCEPTION  OF  THE  UNI 
VERSE  .         .  .  37(? 


A  BEGINNER'S  HISTORY  OF 
PHILOSOPHY 

INTRODUCTION 

THE  THREE  GENERAL  PERIODS  OF  THE  HISTORY 
OF  PHILOSOPHY 

The  Comparative  Lengths  of  the  Three  General 
Periods: 

Ancient  Philosophy,  625  B.  C.-476  A.  D. 

Medieval  Philosophy,  476  A.  D.-1453  A.  D. 

Modern  Philosophy,  1453  A.  D.-the  present  time. 

These  are  the  three  general  periods  into  which  the 
history  of  philosophy  naturally  falls.  The  two  dates  that 
form  the  dividing  lines  between  these  three  periods  are 
476,  the  fall  of  old  Rome,  and  1453,  the  fall  of  new 
Rome  (Constantinople).  From  this  it  will  be  seen  that 
1000  years  of  mediaeval  life  lie  between  antiquity  on 
the  one  side  and  450  years  of  modern  times  on  the 
other.  Whatever  value  may  be  put  upon  the  respective 
intellectual  products  of  these  three  periods,  it  is  impor 
tant  to  note  the  great  difference  in  their  time-lengths. 
It  is  2500  years  since  philosophical  reflection  began  in 
Europe.  Only  450  of  these  years  belong  to  modern 
times.  In  other  words,  after  the  European  man  grew  to 
reflective  manhood,  two  fifths  of  his  life  belong  to  what 
is  known  as  ancient  civilization,  two  fifths  to  mediaeval, 
and  only  one  fifth  to  modern  civilization. 

The  Real  Differences  of  the  Three  General  Periods. 
The  differences  between  these  three  periods  of  the  re- 


INTRODUCTION 


flective  life  of  the  European  have  been  very  real.  They 
are  not  to  be  explained  by  merely  political  shift  ings 
or  economic  changes ;  nor  are  they  fully  expressed  as 
differences  in  literary  or  artistic  productions.  Their 
differences  lie  deeper,  for  they  are  differences  of  mental 
attitude.  The  history  of  philosophy  is  more  profound, 
more  difficult,  and  more  human  than  any  other  history, 
because  it  is  the  record  of  human  points  of  view.  A 
good  deal  of  sympathetic  appreciation  is  demanded  if 
the  student  takes  on  the  attitude  of  mind  of  ancient  and 
mediaeval  times.  One  cannot  expect  to  be  possessed  of 
such  appreciation  until  one  has  traversed  the  history 
of  thought  through  its  entire  length. 

The  history  of  philosophy  is  an  organic  development 
from  an  objective  to  a  subjective  view  of  life,  with  a 
traditional  middle  period  in  which  subjective  and 
objective  mingle.  Ancient  thought  is  properly  called 
ubjectire,  the  modiieval  traditional,  the  modern  subject 
ive.  Can  we  briefly  suggest  what  these  abstract  terms 
mean  ?  By  the  objectivity  of  ancient  thought  is  meant 
that  the  ancient~in  making  nis  reflections  upon  life, 
starts  from  the  universe  as  a  whole.  From  this  outer 
point  of  view  he  tries  to  see  the  interconnections  be 
tween  things.  Nature  is  reality ;  men  and  gods  are  a 
part  of  nature.  Man's  mental  processes  even  are  a  part 
of  the  totality  of  things.  Even  ethically  man  is  not  ar 
independent  individual,  but  the  member  of  a  state, 
When  the  ancient  came  to  make  distinctions  between 
mind  and  matter,  he  did  not  think  of  man  as  the  knower 
in  antithesis  to  matter  as  the  object  known,  but  he 
thought  of  mind  and  matter  as  parts  of  one  cosmos. 
The  antithesis  in  ancient  thought  is  rather  between 
appearances  and  essence,  between  non-realities  and 


INTRODUCTION  3 

realities  with  differing  emphasis.  The  ancient  attempts 
speculatively  to  reconstruct  his  world,  but  it  is  always 
from  the  point  of  view  of  the  world. 

By  the  traditionalism  of  mediaeval  thought  is  meant 
that  men  are  controlled  in  their  thinking  by  a  set  of 
authoritative  doctrines  from  the  past.  In  the  Middle 
Ages,  as  the  mediaeval  period  is  called,  the  independent 
thinking  of  antiquity  had  ceased.  Men  reflected  and  re 
flected  deeply,  but  they  were  constrained  by  a  set  of 
religious  traditions.  Authority  was  placed  above  them 
and  censored  their  thinking.  The  objective  Christian 
church  and  its  authority  took  the  place  of  the  object 
ive  Greek  cosmos.  That  church  had  certain  infallible 
dogma,  and  thinking  was  allowed  only  in  so  far  as  it 
clarified  dogma. 

On  the  other  hand,  when  we  say  that  modern  thought 
is  subjective,  we  refer  to  an  entire  change  in  the  centre 
of  intellectual  gravity.  The  starting-point  is  not  the 
world,  but  the  individual.  The  universe  is  set  over 
against  mind  (dualism),  or  is  the  creation  of  mind 
(idealism).  In  any  case  the  modern  man  looks  upon 
the  universe  as  his  servant,  the  standard  of  truth  to  be 
found  in  himself  and  not  in  something  external.  The 
subject  as  knower  is  now  placed  in  antithesis  to  the  ob 
ject  as  known,  and  the  object  is  not  independent  of  the 
human  thinking  process.  Reality  is  man  rather  than  the 
cosmos.  The  political  state  is  justifiable  so  long  as  it 
enforces  the  rights  of  the  individual ;  religious  authority 
is  the  expression  of  the  individual  conscience  ;  physical 
nature  'js  a  human  interpretation.  * 

*  Read  Knight,  Life  and  Teaching  of  Hume,  pp.  102  f. 
(Black wood  Series)  ;  Falckenberg,  Hist.  Modern  Phil.,  p. 
10 ;  Zeller,  Pre-Socratic  Phil,  vol.  i,  pp.  161  f . 


INTRODUCTION 


Plato,  Dante,  and  Goethe  are  good  representatives  of 
these  three  different  historical  periods  of  the  human 
mind.  How  can  they  be  understood  without  a  philosophi 
cal  appreciation  of  the  periods  in  which  they  lived  ? 

Table  of  the  Subdivisions  of  the  Three  General 
Periods  of  Philosophy 

Cosmological,    625-480    (to 
Persian  Wars). 
Anthropological,  480-399  (to 
death  of  Socrates). 
Systematic,  399-322  (to  death 
of  Aristotle). 


1.  Ancient 
625  B.  c. 
-476  A.  D. 


Greek,  625- 
322  B.  c.  (to 
death  of 
Aristotle). 

Hellenic-Ro 
man  322  B.C. 
-476  A.  D. 
(from    death 
of  Aristotle 
to  fall  of  old 
Rome). 


Ethical,  322  B.  c.-l  A.  D.  (to 
beginning  of  Christian  era). 


Religious,  100  B.  C.-476  A.  D. 


2.  Mediaeval 
476-1453 


Early  Mediaeval,  476-1000  (from  the  fall 
of  old  Rome  to  the  beginnings  of  modern 
Europe). 

Transitional  Mediaeval  (1000-1200),  (from 
beginnings  of  modern  Europe  to  Crusades). 
Classic  Medieval,  1200-1453  (from  the 
Crusades  to  the  fall  of  new  Rome  or  Con 
stantinople). 


3.  Modern 
1453-mod- 
ern  times 


Renaissance, 
1453-1690 
(to  Locke's 
Essay  and 
the  English 
Revolution) . 


Humanistic,  1453-1600. 


Natural  Science,  1600-1690. 


Enlightenment,  1690-1781   (from  Locke's 
Essay  to  Kant's  Critique) . 
German  Idealism,  1781-1831  (from  Kant'8 
Critique  to  the  death  of  Hegel). 
Evolution,  1820  to  the  present  time. 


BOOK  I 

ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY  (625  B.  C.-476  A.  D.) 

CHAPTER   I 

THE  EARLY  GREEK  IN  ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY 

The  Divisions  of  Ancient  Philosophy.  The  history 
of  ancient  philosophy  falls  naturally  into  two  large  di 
visions  :  pure  Greek  philosophy  and  Hellenic-Roman 
philosophy  (or  Greek  philosophy  in  the  Roman  world). 
The  date,  322  B.  c.,  the  death  of  Aristotle,  which  marks 
the  line  between  these  two  periods,  is  one  of  the  mile 
stones  of  history.  Alexander  the  Great  had  died  in 
323  B.  c.  The  coincidence  of  the  deaths  of  Aristotle 
and  Alexander  not  only  suggests  their  intimate  rela 
tions  as  teacher  and  pupil  during  their  lives,  but  it 
throws  into  contrast  Greek  civilization  before  and  after 
them.  Before  Aristotle  and  Alexander  culture  was  the 
product  entirely  of  the  pure  Greek  spirit ;  after  them 
ancient  culture  was  the  complex  product  of  many  factors 
—  of  Greek  and  Roman  civilizations,  and  many  Orien 
tal  religions,  including  Christianity.  Before  Aristotle 
and  Alexander,  ancient  culture  was  characterized  by  a 
love  of  knowledge  for  its  own  sake,  by  freedom  from 
ulterior  ends  either  of  service  or  of  use ;  after  these 
great  makers  of  history,  culture  became  attenuated  to 
work  in  the  special  sciences  and  enslaved  to  practical 
questions.  Before  Aristotle  and  Alexander,  the  Greek 
city-states  had  arisen  to  political  power ;  after  Aristotle 


6  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

and  Alexander,  Greece  declined  politically  and  was 
absorbed  into  the  Koman  empire. 

The  Literary  Sources  of  Ancient  Philosophy.*  The  lit 
erary  sources  of  ancient  philosophy  are  three :  (1)  the 
primary  sources,  or  original  writings  ;  (2)  the  secondary 
sources,  or  reports  of  the  original  writers  obtained  indi 
rectly,  or  through  other  writers ;  (3)  the  interpreta 
tions  of  reliable  modern  historians  of  philosophy.  The 
specialist  in  philosophy  will,  of  course,  go  to  the  first 
two  sources  for  his  information.  Other  students  will  find 
many  accurate  modern  histories  of  ancient  philosophy. 
The  student  should  have  at  hand  the  translations  of  the 
histories  of  Zeller,  Windelband,  Weber,  Eucken,  Ueber- 
weg ;  those  of  the  Englishmen,  Burnet  and  Fairbanks ; 
of  the  Americans,  Kogers  and  Turner. 

"  The  writings  of  the  early  Greek  philosophers  of  the 
pre-Socratic  period  exist  now  only  in  fragments.  The 
complete  works  of  Plato  are  still  extant ;  so  also  are  the 
most  important  works  of  Aristotle,  and  certain  others 
which  belong  to  the  Stoic,  Epicurean,  Skeptic,  and  neo- 
Platonic  schools.  We  possess  the  principal  works  of 
most  of  the  philosophers  of  the  Christian  period  in  suf 
ficient  completeness."  1  The  secondary  sources  include 
quotations  and  comments  upon  earlier  philosophers 
found  in  the  writings  of  Plato,  Aristotle,  the  Stoics, 
Skeptics,  neo-Platonists,  and  the  so-called  doxographers. 
Doxography  —  the  commentating  upon  and  collating  of 
the  works  of  former  times  —  developed  enormously  in 
Alexandria,  Pergamos,  and  Rhodes  just  after  Aristotle, 

*  Read  Fairbanks,  First  Philosophers  of  Greece,  pp.  263 
ff.,  especially  the  re'sume'. 

1  Ueberweg,  Hist,  of  Phil.,  vol.  i,  p.  7. 


EARLY  GREEK  IN  ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY        I 

The  founder  of  this  work  was  Theophrastus,  who  was  a 
disciple  of  Aristotle  and  his  successor  in  the  Lyceum. 
Among  the  important  doxographers  were  Plutarch,  Sto- 
baeus,  and  Aetios. 

The  Environment  of  the  Early  Greek.  The  biolo 
gist  seeks  to  explain  a  living  creature  by  its  previous 
environment  and  inherited  instincts.  So  if  we  know  the 
environment  and  inherited  instincts  of  the  early  Greek, 
we  shall  be  able  to  understand  better  firstly,  why  Euro 
pean  philosophy  began  with  the  Greeks  and  not  with 
some  other  people  ;  and  secondly,  why  Greek  philosophy 
took  certain  lines  that  it  did  take. 

(1).  His  Geographical  Environment.  The  Greece 
into  which  philosophy  was  born  was  much  larger  than 
the  Greece  of  to-day.  Ancient  Greece  consisted  of  all 
the  coasts  and  islands  which  were  washed  by  the  Medi 
terranean  Sea  from  Asia  Minor  to  Sicily  and  southern 
Italy,  and  from  Gyrene  to  Thrace.  The  motherland, 
the  peninsula  of  Greece,  at  first  played  an  insignificant 
role.  The  leadership  was  in  the  hands  of  the  Ionian s, 
who  had  colonized  the  coasts  of  Asia  Minor.  In  the 
seventh  century  B.  C.,  when  the  first  Greek  philosophy 
appears,  these  lonians  commanded  the  world's  commerce 
among  the  three  continents.  Over  the  coasts  of  the  en 
tire  Mediterranean  they  had  extended  their  trade  and 
established  their  colonies.  Miletus  became  the  wealth 
iest  of  these  colonies  and  the  cradle  of  Greek  science. 
Its  wealth  afforded  leisure  to  its  people  and  therefore 
the  opportunity  for  reflection. 

(2).  His  Political  Environment.  An  understand 
ing  of  the  Greek  political  world,  in  which  its  first  philo 
sophy  appeared,  requires  an  historical  explanation  of 
its  rise.  It  takes  us  back  four  centuries  to  the  age  of 


8  HISTORY   OF  PHILOSOPHY 

the  Epic  (1000-750  B.  c.).  During  more  than  two 
centuries  of  the  age  of  the  Epic  two  changes  occurred 
which  were  to  influence  future  Greek  civilization  :  (1) 
The  oligarchy  which  had  supplanted  the  ancient  patri 
archal  monarchy  became  firmly  established ;  and  (2) 
the  Epic  was  formed.  The  importance  of  the  Epic  of 
Homer  lies  not  so  much  in  the  fact  that  a  great  poem 
was  constructed,  as  that  it  was  the  formulation  of  the 
Greek  religion,  the  Greek  aBsthetic  polytheism.  Its 
writing  indicates  that  the  earlier  unorganized,  primitive, 
and  savage  forms  of  religion  had  given  way,  among 
the  ruling  classes  at  least,  to  an  a3sthetic  polytheism, 
which  in  a  general  way  was  fixed  by  the  Epic  itself. 

The  period  of  more  than  a  century,  from  750  to  625 
B.  c.,  lying  between  the  age  of  the  Epic  and  Greek 
philosophy,  may  be  called  an  age  of  political  disturb 
ances.  The  oligarchy  had  become  oppressive  to  the  rich 
and  poor  alike.  There  had  grown  up  in  Greece,  espe 
cially  in  the  colonies,  a  class  of  citizens  who  had  be 
come  wealthy  through  commerce.  The  result  of  the 
misgovernment  by  the  oligarchy  was  that  (1)  migra 
tions  took  place,  and  (2)  many  revolutions  occurred. 
This  was  particularly  true  of  the  colonies  where  the 
proletariat  was  powerful  and  the  cities  were  full  of  ad 
venturers.  Plutocracy  was  at  war  with  aristocracy,  and 
this  was  the  opportunity  for  bold  men.  These  political 
troubles  took  form  from  650  B.  C.  on,  and  the  history 
of  the  Greek  cities  consists  of  the  endeavor  to  establish 
popular  government.  About  the  time  of  the  first  Greek 
philosophers  there  arose  here  and  there  from  the  ruins 
of  these  civil  struggles  the  so-called  tyrants,  of  whom 
Thrasybulus  at  Miletus,  Pittacus  at  Lesbos,  Periander 
at  Corinth,  and  Pisistratus  at  Athens  are  examples. 


EARLY  GREEK  IN  ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY   9 

The  courts  of  these  tyrants  became  centres  of  intellect 
ual  life.  They  patronized  poets,  writers,  and  artists. 
The  universalism  of  the  Epic  had  vanished,  and  in  its 
place  came  the  individualism  of  the  lyric  and  the  satire. 
In  many  places  the  aristocrat  went  into  gloomy  retire 
ment,  and  often  cultivated  poetry,  science,  and  philo 
sophy. 

The  Native  Tendencies  of  the  Early  Greek.  Why 
were  the  Greeks  the  first  philosophers  of  Europe? 
Their  geographical  surroundings  of  sea  and  land  had 
something  to  do  with  it.  The  passionate  party  strife 
between  the  old,  ruling  familes  of  nobles  and  the  newly 
rich  trading-class,  which  took  place  during  the  seventh 
century  B.  c.,  no  doubt  cultivated  an  early  independence 
of  opinion  and  strength  of  personality.  But,  after  all, 
genius  was  in  the  blood  of  the  race,  and  who  can  say 
that  the  true  cause  was  not  in  the  mixing  of  the  blood 
of  the  virile  Aryan  invaders  with  that  of  the  aborigi 
nal  inhabitants  ?  Whatever  may  be  the  answer  to  that 
question,  the  Greek  race  in  the  seventh  century  B.  c.  had 
an  extraordinary  curiosity  about  the  world  of  nature.  It 
loved  the  concrete  fact  as  no  other  race  of  the  time 
loved  it,  and  it  loved  to  give  a  clear  and  articulate  ex 
pression  to  the  concrete  fact  that  it  saw.  It  had  an  ar 
tistic  nature  that  was  hostile  to  all  confusion.  Let  us 
point  out  three  ways  in  which  the  Greek  was  even  in 
this  early  time  organizing  his  experiences,  reflecting 
upon  the  workings  of  social  and  nature  forces,  and 
thus  preparing  the  way  for  consideration  of  the  more 
ultimate  questions  of  philosophy. 

(1)  This  can  be  seen  first  in  the  development  of 
his  religion.  The  first  step  in  the  organization  of  his 
religion  we  have  already  seen,  for  the  Homeric  epic 


10  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

was  the  expression  of  a  well-defined,  poetic,  and  aesthetic 
polytheism  developed  out  of  a  primitive  savage  natural 
ism.  The  Greek's  sense  of  measure  was  shown  in  the 
way  both  gods  and  men  were  placed  as  a  part  of  the 
world  of  nature.  He  could  accomplish  this  the  more 
freely  because  he  had  no  hierarchy  of  priests  and  no 
dogma  of  belief  to  cramp  his  imagination.  The  Greek 
priests  did  not  penetrate  into  the  private  life  nor  teach 
religion.  "  They  were  not  theologians  but  sacristans 
and  liturgical  functionaries."  In  the  fifty  years  before 
philosophy  appeared,  this  tendency  toward  scientific 
religious  organizing  showed  the  beginning  of  another 
advance.  Monistic  belief,  of  which  signs  may  be  found 
even  in  the  earlier  Greek  writings,  came  to  the  surface. 
This  monism  1  was  expressed  or  implied  by  the  Gnomic 
poets,  "  wise  poets,"  so  called,  because  they  made  sen 
tentious  utterances  upon  the  principles  of  morality. 

(2)  The  early  genius  of  the  Greek  is  shown  in  his 
reflections  upon  physical  events.  The  Greek  had  been 
accumulating  for  a  long  time  many  kinds  of  informa 
tion,  but,  what  is  more  important,  he  had  been  reflect 
ing  upon  this  information.  The  Ionian  was  a  sea-faring 
man.  He  had  had  much  practical  experience  and  had 
made  many  true  observations  about  the  things  he  had 
seen.  In  his  travels  he  had  come  in  contact  with  the 
Orientals  and  the  Egyptians,  and  although  his  scien 
tific  conceptions  were  probably  in  the  main  his  own,  his 

1  Monism^  is  the  belief  that  reality  is  a  oneness  without  any  necessary 
implication  as  to  the  character  of  that  oneness.  Monatheism  is  a  kind 
of  monism,  in  which  some  definite  character  is  ascribed  tcTtlie  oneness, 
like  the  active  principle  in  the  world  or  the  cause  of  the  world.  Pan 
theism,  on  the  other  hand,  is  a  kind  of  monism  in  which  the  emphasis 
is  upon  the  all-inclusive  character  of  reality.  In  pantheism  God  and 
nature  ay  two  inseparable  aspects  of  reality. 


EARLY  GREEK  IN  ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY      11 

knowledge  was  undoubtedly  increased  by  his  travels. 
In  the  seventh  century  B.  c.,  the  Greeks  had  a  respect 
able  body  of  physical  science.  It  was  mostly  inorganic 
science,  however,  —  astronomy,  geography,  and  meteor 
ology.  The  early  Greek  knowledge  of  organic  pheno 
mena  was  very  meagre,  as,  for  example,  medical  and 
physiological  knowledge.  They  also  showed  little  genu 
ine  research  in  the  field  of  mathematics,  although  they 
had  picked  up  mathematical  information  here  and 
there.  Many  of  the  first  philosophers  were  scientists. 

(3)  Not  only  did  the  Greek  early  bring  a  religious 
system  out  of  the  chaos  of  his  naturalism,  not  only  did 
he  early  throw  his  physical  information  into  scientific 
form ;  but  also  early  did  he  show  an  especial  interest 
in  human  conduct.  This  can  be  seen  first  in  Homer 
(800  B.  C.),  in  a  more  developed  form  in  Hesiod 
(700  B.  c.),  and  with  still  deeper  reflection  in  the 
Gnomic  poets.  Although  the  Iliad  is  a  descriptive 
poem,  it  abounds  in  ethical  observations.  For  example, 
Hector  says,  "  The  best  omen  is  to  fight  for  one's 
country " ;  and  Nestor  in  council  says,  "  A  wretch 
without  the  tie  of  kin,  a  lawless  man  without  a  home, 
is  he  who  delights  in  civil  strife."  The  poem  by  He 
siod  (  Works  and  Days)  is  intended  to  teach  morals. 
It  is  distinctly  a  didactic  poem.  Hesiod  stands  at  the 
beginning  of  a  long  line  of  Greek  ethical  teachers.  His 
moral  observations  are,  however,  incoherently  expressed. 
They  are  not  wide  generalizations,  but  are  only  com 
ments  upon  single  experiences.  The  Gnomic  poets  ap 
peared  at  the  end  of  the  seventh  century  B.  c.,  as  the 
moral  reformers  in  the  age  of  political  disturbances. 
This  period  was  called  by  the  Greeks  the  age  of  the 
Seven  Wise  Men ;  for  among  the  men  who  were  then 


12  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

exhorting  the  age  to  come  back  to  its  senses,  tradition 
early  selected  seven  of  the  most  notable.1  The  spirit  of 
Gnomic  poetry  was  prominent  in  their  reported  sayings. 
They  were  fearful  because  of  the  common  disregard  of 
the  conventions  of  the  previous  age,  and  because  of  the 
present  excesses.  Their  watchword  was  "  moderation," 
and  they  were  ever  repeating  "  nothing  too  much."  By 
apothegm,  riddle,  epigram,  and  catchwords  they  tried  to 
reform  society.  The  names  of  all  seven  are  not  certain, 
and  only  four  of  them  are  known,  —  Thales,  Solon,  Pit- 
tacus,  and  Bias.  Their  ethical  reflections  are  not  con 
cerned,  as  in  Hesiod,  with  the  home,  the  village,  and 
the  rules  of  convention,  but  with  the  individual's  gen 
eral  relation  to  society.  Their  knowledge  of  ethical 
matters  is  remarkable  for  their  time.  Some  of  their 
sayings  are  as  follows  :  — 

"  No  man  is  happy ;  all  are  full  of  trouble."  "  Each 
thinks  to  do  the  right,  yet  no  one  knows  what  will  be 
the  result  of  his  doings,  and  no  one  can  escape  his  des 
tiny."  "  The  people  by  their  own  injustice  destroy  the 
city,  which  the  gods  would  have  protected."  "As  op 
posed  to  these  evils  the  first  necessity  is  law  and  order 
for  the  state,  contentment  and  moderation  for  the 
individual."  "  Not  wealth,  but  moderation,  is  the  high 
est  good."  "  Superfluity  of  possessions  begets  self- 
exaltation." 

The  Three  Periods  of  Greek  Philosophy,  625-322 
B.  c.  These  are 

1.  The  Cosmological  Period,  625-480  B.  c. 

2.  The  Anthropological  Period,  480-399  B.  c. 

3.  The  Systematic  Period,  399-322  B.  c. 

1  Bury,  Hist,  of  Greece,  p.  321,  calls  the  tradition  of  the  Wise  Men 
a  legend. 


EARLY  GREEK  IN  ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY   13 

1.  T/ie  Cosmological  Period  begins  with  the  birth 
of  Greek  philosophical  reflection  (625  B.  c.)  and  has 
a  nominal  ending  with  the  Persian  wars  (480  B.  c.). 
This  does  not  mean  that  the  interest  of  the  Greeks  in 
cosmology  stopped  in  480   B.  c.,  but  that  it  was  no 
longer  their  prominent  interest.  Cosmology  is  the  study 
of  the  reality  of  the  physical  universe  (the  cosmos). 
The    particular    cosmological  question    occupying   the 
minds  of  the  Greeks  in  this  period  may  be  stated  thus : 
What,  amid  the  changes  of  the  physical  world,  is  per 
manent  ?  This  will  be  seen  to  be  a  philosophical  ques 
tion  and  not  the  same  as  a  question  in  natural  science. 
The  theatre  of  philosophical  activity  was  the  colonies 
and  not  the  motherland.  Two  important  aspects  of  this 
period  must  be  considered  besides  the  philosophical,  — 
the  political  situation  and  the  religious  mysteries. 

2.  The  Anthropological  Period  begins  in  the  mo 
therland  before  the  cosmological  movement  ended  in 
the  colonies.  It  starts  with  a  great  social  impulse  just 
after  the  victories  of  the  Persian  wars  (480  B.  c.)  and 
ends  with  the  death  of  Socrates  (399  B.  c.).  Athens  is 
the  centre.  This  period  includes  the  most  productive 
intellectual  epoch  of  Greece  as  a  whole,  although  not 
its  greatest  philosophers.  Socrates  is  the  most  striking 
persjmality_in  the L  perjpjL  Tha  .period  is  called  anthro 
pological,  because  itsjnterest  js  in  the  studv^of  maiLand 
not  of  the  physical  universe.  The  word  anthropology 
means  the  study  of  man. 

3.  The  /Systematic  Period  begins  with  the  death  o£ 
Socrates  (399  B.  c.)  and  ends  with  the  death  of  Aris- 
totle  (322  B.  c.)«  Alexander  the  Great  died  323  B.  c. 
The  period  is  called  systematic  because  it  contains  the 
three  great  organizers  or  systematizers  of  Greek  philo- 


14  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

sophy.  These  were  Democritus,  Plato,  and  Aristotle. 
The  spread  of  Greek  culture  beyond  its  own  limits 
through  the  conquests  of  Alexander  is  of  great  impor 
tance  for  the  history  of  thought  in  the  Hellenic-Roman 
Period,  which  follows  this  period. 


CHAPTER  II 

THE  COSMOLOGICAL  PERIOD  (625-180  B.  C.) :  THE 
PHILOSOPHY  OF  'NATURE 

WHEN  we  enter  upon  the  one  hundred  and  fifty  years 
of  philosophical  beginnings  of  Greece,  which  are  called 
the  Cosmological  Period,  we  find  ourselves  confronted 
with  an  extremely  interesting  social  situation,  which  has 
been  brought  about  partly  by  the  political  and  geograph 
ical  environment  of  the  Greek,  partly  by  his  inherited 
genius.  On  the  one  hand,  during  this  century  and  a  half, 
the  political  troubles  of  the  Greeks  became  increasingly 
aggravated  by  the  growth  of  Persia  on  the  east  and  of 
Carthage  on  the  west.  On  the  other  hand,  we  find  that 
the  Greek  religion  took  a  sudden  turn  to  mysticism, 
and  by  its  side  a  slow  but  increasing  interest  in  philo 
sophical  questions.  All  through  this  period  Greek  poli 
tics  and  Greek  religion  were  a  constant  peril  to  Greek 
life.  Greek  philosophy  proved  to  be  its  safety. 

The  Peril  in  the  Greek  Political  Situation  :  Persia 
and  Carthage.  It  must  be  remembered  that  the  Greek 
cities  never  united  into  a  nation.  They  were  always 
fighting  among  themselves.  We  have  already  pointed 
out  the  civil  disturbances  between  the  oligarchy  and 
the  democracy  throughout  the  land.  These  internal,/ 
troubles  continued  to  the  end  of  Greek  history.  In  this 
period  there  was  added  to  these  internal  troubles  a 
critical  external  situation  which  threatened  the  existence 
of  Greece  itself.  The  sixth  century  was  a  momentous 
one  for  Greece.  In  both  the  east  and  the  west  there 


16  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

arose  mighty  empires  that  threatened  to  wipe  out  its 
civilization.  "  The  expansion  of  the  Persian  power 
(on  the  one  hand)  had  suspended  a  stone  of  Tantalus 
over  Hellas,  and  it  seemed  likely  that  Greek  civiliza 
tion  might  be  submerged  in  an  Oriental  monarchy."  1 
Cyrus  had  laid  the  foundation  of  Persia  by  taking  Media 
in  550  B.  a,  Lydia  in  546  B.  c.,  Babylonia  in  538  B.  c.; 
Egypt  was  added  by  Carnbyses  in  528  B.  c. ;  and 
Darius  organized  the  great  Persian  possessions  in  his 
long  reign  from  528  to  486  B.  c.  On  the  west,  Car 
thage  was  threatening  the  Greek  cities  of  Sicily,  and  at 
the  close  of  this  period  was  acting  in  conjunction  with 
Persia  to  obtain  possession  of  the  Mediterranean. 

The  Peril  in  the  New  Religion :  The  Mysteries  and 
Pythagoras.  Already  in  the  seventh  century  B.  c.  the  po 
litical  society  of  Greece  felt  that  it  was  under  the  wrath 
of  the  gods  because  of  some  unatoned  guilt.  "  The  earth 
is  full  of  ills,  of  ills  the  sea,"  sang  the  poet.  Keligious 
depression  became  universal.  Dissatisfied  with  the  old 
polytheism,  especially  as  expressed  in  the  theogony  of 
Hesiod,  the  Greek  in  the  sixth  century  B.  c.  began  to 
interpret  it  according  to  his  present  need.  Among  the 
masses  there  appeared  the  craving  for  immortality  and 
for  personal  knowledge  of  the  supernatural.  The  desire 
to  solve  the  mystery  of  life  by  a  short  road  became  uni 
versal.  Men  looked  to  rites  to  purify  them  from  the 
guilt  of  the  world  and  for  gaining  personal  contact  with 
the  world  of  shades.  This  new  religion  became  pan- 
Hellenic.  It  is  called  the  Mysteries  or  the  Orgia.  By 
Mysteries  is  not  meant  societies  founded  on  some  occult 
intellectual  belief,  as  the  name  might  suggest.  The 
Mysteries  were  based  on  cult  (ceremony),  and  not  on 

1  Bury,  History  of  Greece,  p.  311. 


THE  PHILOSOPHY   OF  NATURE  17 

dogma.  The  special  ceremonies  were  those  of  initiation 
and  purification.  They  were  supposed  to  purify  the  par 
ticipant  and  put  him  in  a  new  frame  of  mind.  The  soul 
would  then  be  protected  from  the  malicious  spirits  to 
which  it  was  constantly  exposed.  The  ceremonies  are 
reported  to  have  been  attended  sometimes  by  more  than 
thirty  thousand  people.  They  consisted  of  processions, 
songs,  dances,  and  dramatic  spectacles.  The  most  impor 
tant  of  the  Mysteries  were  the  Orphic  and  the  Eleu- 
sinian. 

The  Mysteries  were  the  basis  of  the  society  of  Py 
thagoreans.  Pythagoras,  of  Samos  was  a  remarkable 
man,  who  went  to  Italy  and  settled  at  Crotona.  His  sect 
is  of  double  importance  to  us  because  in  later  times  it 
developed  a  philosophy  on  its  mathematical  and  astro 
nomical  sides.  Pythagoras  and  his  immediate  following 
must  be  distinguished  from  the  later  Pythagoreans. 
Pythagoras  and  the  early  Pythagoreans  were  not  philo 
sophers,  but  a  sect  like  the  Orphic  society  of  Myster 
ies,  yet  the  sect  of  Pythagoreans  embraced  much  more 
in  its  scope.  It  tried  to  control  the  public  and  private 
life  of  its  members  and  to  evolve  a  common  method  of 
education.1  Pythagoras  was  an  exiled  aristocrat,  and 
his  sect  was  an  aristocratic  religious  body  in  reaction 
against  the  democratic  excesses.  The  only  doctrine 
upon  which  Pythagoras  placed  any  emphasis  was  that 
of  immortality  in  the  form  of  metempsychosis  (trans 
migration  of  the  soul  from  one  bodily  form  into  an 
other).  The  sect  was  dispersed  as  a  religious  body 
about  450  B.  C.  The  scattered  members  formed  a 
school  of  philosophy  at  Thebes  until  about  350  B.  C. 

1  Burnet,  Early  Greek  Philosophers,  p.  104,  for  injunctions  upon  thj 
private  life  of  the  early  Pythagoreans. 


18  HISTORY   OF  PHILOSOPHY 

Of  these  later  philosophical  Pythagoreans  and  their 
number  theory,  we  shall  speak  in  the  proper  place. 

At  the  time  of  the  dispersion  of  the  Pythagoreans 
there  existed  no  longer  any  peril  from  the  new  religion. 
The  craze  of  the  new  religion  was  passing  away.  During 
the  sixth  century  B.  c.  it  was  a  great  peril  to  the  future 
intellectual  life  of  Greece.  Had  it  then  gained  a  little 
more  power  it  would  probably  have  been  admitted  by 
the  priesthood  to  the  temples.  In  the  exercise  of  such 
enormous  sacerdotal  power,  the  priests  would  have  en 
slaved  the  Greek  mind  to  superstition,  and  the  priest 
hood  in  turn  would  have  become  an  easy  tool  for  tyrants. 
There  would  then  have  been  no  Socrates,  no  Plato,  and 
no  Aristotle.  The  Mysteries  were  a  reaction  toward 
asceticism  as  a  religious  salvation  from  the  political  peril, 
but  they  were,  however,  equally  as  great  a  peril  to 
Greece.  The  medium  course  along  the  line  of  a  rational 
philosophy,  which  the  Greek  genius  actually  took, 
proved  its  salvation. 

Characteristics  of  the  Cosmologists.  There  are  cer 
tain  characteristics  of  this  early  philosophy  that  should 
be  noted  at  the  beginning. 

•  (1)  All  the  Cosmologists  were  physical  scientists, 
and  with  few  exceptions  their  scientific  views  were  note 
worthy.  Aristotle  calls  them  physicists  in  distinction 
from  their  predecessors,  whom  he  calls  theologians. 

(2)  They  often  worked  together  in  schools.  Tradi 
tion  has  been  common  since  Bacon  that  philosophy  cen 
tres  in  individuals  ;  but  history  shows  that  frequently 
the  Greeks  worked  in  corporate  bodies.  These  philo 
sophical  scientists  worked  in  schools  ;  just  as  the  Homer- 
idae  developed  the  epic ;  the  Dsedalida?,  a  group  of  the 
earliest  artists,  the  secret  of  art ;  the  Mysteries,  reli- 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  NATURE  19 

gion.  Philosophy  now  is  in  the  cloister,  and  the  intellect 
of  the  time  speaks  from  its  retreat  from  public  life. 
While  the  Milesian  school  was  undisturbed,  owing  to 
the  long  peace  that  Miletus  enjoyed,  we  shall  find  that 
most  of  the  philosophers  of  the  Cosmological  period 
were  in  retirement  on  account  of  political  persecution. 

We  must  remember  that  by  "  school  "  is  not  necessa 
rily  meant  a  group  of  pupils  under  the  established  in 
struction  of  a  teacher.  A  school  at  this  early  period  is 
a  group  of  learned  men  at  work  on  the  same  problems. 
Later  on  in  history  we  shall  find  that  one  of  the  group 
more  learned  than  the  others  stands  in  the  position  of 
teacher  :  for  example,  Plato  in  the  Academy. 

(3)  All  the  Cosmologists  were  hylozoists.  The  ety 
mological  meaning  of  hylozoism  is  its  true  one  —  matter 
is  alive.  This  is  the  fundamental  characteristic  of  these 
pre-Socratics  from  Thales  down  to  Anaxagoras,  al 
though  some  authorities  contend  that  those  from  the 
time  of  Empedocles  were  not  hylozoists.  The  meaning 
of  hylozoism  is  simple  enough,  but  the  conception  is  a 
difficult  one  for  the  modern  mind ;  for  to-day  we  are  ac 
customed  to  think  of  an  impersonal  nature  under  me 
chanical  laws.  To  the  Greek  of  the  Cosmological  period 
the  substantial  constitution  of  the  universe  is  imper 
sonal  living  matter ;  to  us  it  is  impersonal  dead 
matter.  Both  these  views  are  to  be  contrasted  witL 
the  religious  belief  involved  in  Greek  polytheism,  in 
which  the  cosmos  is  conceived  to  be  living  personal 
spirits  ;  this  Homeric  polytheism  is  again  to  be  con 
trasted  with  the  animism  of  the  tribal  period,  in  that  it 
had  organized  into  an  aesthetic  unity  the  early  savage 
animism.  These  hylozoistic  philosophers  did  not,  how 
ever,  give  up  the  Homeric  gods,  but  they  treated  their 


20  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

existence  in  a  poetic  way.  They  usually  believed  in 
their  existence,  but  they  always  subordinated  them  to 
the  one  living  world-ground. 

(4)  In  common  with  all  ancient  peoples  these  Greek 
philosophers  did  not  believe  that  the  universe  had  un 
limited  space.  On  the  contrary,  they  believed  that  it  was 
limited  and  in  the  shape  of  an  egg. 

Table  of  Cosmologists.  The  Cosmologists  are  di 
vided  into  two  classes  :  (1)  the  earlier  were  monists  — 
those  who  believe  that  the  reality  of  the  universe  is  a 
simple,  undifferentiated  unity ;  (2)  the  later  were  plu- 
ralists  —  those  who  believe  that  the  reality  of  the  uni 
verse  consists  of  several  elements  equally  real.  They 
are  enumerated  as  follows  :  — 

THE  MONISTS 

(  Thales  ) 

1.  The  Milesian  school  •<    Anaximander    >    at  Miletus. 

(  Anaximenes      ) 

2.  Xenophanes at   Colophon 

and  Elea. 


3.  The  Eleatic  school      \  Parmenides      \         ^^ 

\  Zeno  J 

4.  Heraclaitus at  Ephesus. 

THE  PLURALISTS 

5.  Empedocles at  Agrigentum. 

6.  Anaxagoras at  Clazomense. 

7.  The  later  Pythagoreans mainly  at  Thebes. 

8.  Leucippus at  Abdera. 

How  the  Philosophical  Question  Arose.  The  interests 
of  these  philosophical  scientists  sharply  differentiate 
them  from  the  preceding  theogonists,  like  Hesiod  and 
Epimenides,  as  well  as  from  the  masses  who  were  ab 
sorbed  in  the  religion  of  the  Mysteries.  They  were, 
moreover,  the  men  of  Greece  to  whom  the  emotional 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  NATURE 


21 


excitement  of  a  religious  revival  would  not  appeal  as  a 
refuge  from  the  troubles  of  the  time.  Their  own  ex 
perience  in  the  political  troubles  had  made  paramount 
the  question  as  to  the  permanence  of  things.  Neverthe 
less,  its  answer  must  be  found  in  nature  and  in  an  in 
tellectual  way.  When  they  turned  to  the  traditional 
theogonies  they  found  110  answer  to  their  question,  for 


MAP  SHOWING  WHERE  THE  COSMOLOGISTS  LIVED 

(None  of  the  Cosmologists,  except  the  later  Pythagoreans,  lived  in  the  motherland 
of  Greece.  Philosophical  activity  during  this  period  took  place  in  the  colonies.  The 
map  shows  the  cities  which  were  the  centres  of  philosophy  and  the  homes  of  the  phi 
losophers  as  indicated.) 

there  was  only  a  mythical  chronicle  of  a  succession  of 
gods  beginning  with  the  unknown.  The  question  of  the 
Cosmologists  was  not,  therefore,  what  was  the  original 
form  of  this  changing  world,  but  what  is  fundamental 
in  the  world  always.  The  time  factor  is  no  longer  im 
portant.  Not  the  temporal  prius  but  the  real  prius  is 
what  they  seek.  The  idea  of  a  temporal  origin  of  things 
gives  place  to  that  of  eternal  being,  and  the  question 
finally  emerges,  What  is  the  real  substance  that  con 
stitutes  the  universe  f 


22  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

The  Greek  Monistic  Philosophies.  Turning  back  to 
our  classification  on  page  20,  we  see  that  the  earliest 
Greek  philosophers  emphasized  the  monistic  tendency, 
which  had  become  so  prominent  in  Greek  religion.  This 
group  of  monists  was  composed  of  the  Milesians,  Xenoph- 
anes,  the  Eleatic  School,  and  Heracleitus.  The  course 
of  reasoning  of  these  early  thinkers  is  naively  simple, 
and  like  all  naive  thought,  it  contains  such  contradic 
tions  that  the  modern  reader  is  likely  to  become  im 
patient  with  it.  The  value  of  the  study  of  the  philos 
ophy  of  these  early  Greeks  is  entirely  historical.  Its 
historical  value,  however,  is  very  great,  for  it  is  a  rev 
elation  of  the  culture  of  the  Greece  of  that  time,  it 
throws  light  on  many  of  the  teachings  of  Plato  and 
Aristotle,  and  most  of  all  it  contains  the  germs  of  mod 
ern  metaphysical  problems.  These  first  Greek  philos 
ophers  raised  the  question,  What  is  the  constitution 
of  the  substance  of  the  universe  ?  Their  answers  are 
nai've  solutions  to  the  historical  metaphysical  "riddle." 

The  Milesians,  who  form  the  earliest  philosophical 
school  in  European  history,  seem  to  have  assumed  two 
facts  as  self-evident  about  the  substance  of  the  universe : 
(1)  There  is  a  single  cosmic  substance  identical  with 
itself,  which  is  the  basis  of  all  the  changes  in  nature ;  (2) 
Moving  matter  is  the  same  as  life.  The  Milesians  were 
quite  unconscious  that  these  two  assumptions  were  con 
tradictory,  but  the  contradiction  impressed  their  succes 
sors  —  Xenophanes,  Heracleitus,  and  the  Eleatics ;  and 
divided  them  in  their  development  of  philosophy.  Mat- 
IX'ter  which  keeps  identical  with  itself  is  the  Unchanging  * 

1  Note  further  that  in  future  philosophical  discussions  of  this  prob 
lem,  the  technical  word  "  Being"  is  used  for  the  Unchanging  or  the 
substance  that  remains  forever  like  itself,  and  the  technical  -word 
*'  Becoming  "  is  used  for  the  changing  processes  of  Nature. 


THE  PHILOSOPHY   OF  NATURE  23 

and  is  brought  into  opposition  with  Life,  the  Changingt 
or  matter  which  moves.  The  question  for  Xenophanes, 
Heracleitus,  and  the  Eleatics  —  and  indeed  for  all  fu 
ture  philosophy  —  was :  How  can  the  changing  proc 
esses  of  life  be  explained  by  an  unchanging  substance  ? 
XejiopLajifiS,  who  was  more  of  a  religious  reformer 
than  a  philosopher,  was  so  absorbed  in  the  first  of  these 
assumptions  that  he  developed  it  for  his  purpose  in  his 
practical  social  reformation  to  the  entire  neglect  of  the 
second  assumption.  The  Eleatics,  however,  to  whose 
city  Xenophanes  had  come,  could  not  leave  his  doctrine 
in  its  one-sided  and  undeveloped  form.  They  accepted 
his  teaching  of  the  divine  Unchangingness  of  the  uni 
verse,  but  this  compelled  these  prof ounder  thinkers  to 
offer  some  explanation  of  the  natural  processes  of 
change.  Change  to  them  cannot  really  exist.  Heraclei 
tus,  on  the  other  hand,  was  impressed  with  the  aspect 
of  life  that  is  expressed  in  the  second  assumption  of 
the  Milesians — living  matter  is  moving  matter.  He 
therefore  maintained  in  direct  opposition  to  the  Eleatics, 
that  the  changing,  living  processes  of  nature  alone  are 
real.  The  two  contradictory  assumptions  that  lay  so 
mutually  indifferent  in  the  Milesian  doctrine  thus  be 
came  the  basis  of  a  sharp  metaphysical  controversy  be 
tween  Heracleitus  and  the  Eleatics.  The  substance  «f 
the  world  is  permanent,  change  is  an  illusion,  said  the 
Eleatics.  The  substance  of  the  world  changes,  perma 
nence  is  an  illusion,  said  Heracleitus.  Either  all  things 
are  permanent  or  all  things  change.  These  early  philos 
ophers  had  no  wealth  of  empirical  knowledge  nor  of 
psychological  reflection  upon  which  to  draw,  and  it  is 
not  strange  that  they  should  take  extreme  positions 
and  be  blind  to  their  practical  consequences. 


24  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

I.  The  Milesian  School.  Of  all  the  Greek  cities 
in  the  sixth  century  B.  c.  Miletus  was  the  wealthiest 
and  most  prosperous.  It  was  one  of  the  Ionian  colonies 
and  was  situated  on  the  coast  of  Asia  Minor,  and  it 
alone  was  able  to  preserve  its  autonomy  as  neighbor 
of  the  warring  eastern  empires.  Not  until  the  battle 
of  Lade  was  it  captured  and  destroyed  (494  B.  c.). 
From  two  generations  of  philosophers  history  has  pre 
served  three  names,  —  Thales,  Anaximander,  and  An- 
aximenes.  The  school  is  called  indifferently  the  Milesian 
or  the  Ionic  school.  The  proximity  of  Miletus  to  Ephe- 
sus,  Colophon,  and  Clazomenae  (as  a  glance  at  the  map 
will  show)  explains  the  influence  of  the  Milesian  school 
upon  the  doctrines  of  Heracleitus,  Xenophanes,  and 
Anaxagoras.  Undoubtedly  the  contact  of  the  Milesians 
with  the  Orient  and  Egypt  had  brought  to  them  knowl 
edge  and  correct  scientific  observations  of  many  sorts, 
especially  astronomical. 

Jhales  (b.  640  B.  c.)  was  a  member  of  one  of  the 
leading  families  of  Miletus,  and  lived  during  the  flour 
ishing  period  of  the  city  under  the  tyranny  of  Thrasy- 
bulus.  He  is  counted  among  the  seven  Wise  Men,  and 
belonged  to  the  rich  commercial  class.  He  probably 
engaged  in  commerce  and  traveled  in  Egypt.  He  was 
versed  in  the  current  learning,  predicted  an  eclipse, 
and  was  acute  in  mathematics  and  physics.  Probably 
he  never  committed  anything  to  writing.  Aristotle'? 
comments  are  the  only  data  about  him. 

Anaximander  (611-545  B.  c.  ?)  was  an  astronomer 

—  *  * 

and  geographer ;  he  made  an  astronomical  globe,  a  sun 
dial,  and  a  geographical  map.  He  was  an  intimate  dis 
ciple  of  Thales  and  wrote  Concerning  Nature,  which 
is  referred  to  as  the  first  Greek  philosophical  treatise. 
Nothing  is  known  of  his  life. 


THE   PHILOSOPHY   OF  NATURE  25 

es  (560-500  B.  c.  ?)  was  the  disciple  of 
Anaximander.  One  sentence  is  preserved  of  his  writ 
ings,  i 

The  Milesian  Philosophy.  The  Milesians  lived  upon 
the  seacoast,  and  the  changes  of  the  sea  and  air  must 
have  deeply  impressed  them.  They  had  an  intellec 
tual  curiosity  to  find  the  cosmic  matter  which  remained 
identical  with  itself  and  at  the  same  time  moved.  (See 
p.  22.)  They  were  not,  therefore,  interested  to  discover 
the  chemical  composition  of  matter,  but  to  find  what 
matter  was  most  moving  and  therefore  most  alive.  Thales 
said  that  it  was  water ;  Anaximenes,  air ;  and  Anaxi 
mander,  the  Apeiron,  or  the  Unlimited-  Their  respec 
tive  choices  were  determined  by  what  seemed  to  possess 
the  most  mobility  and  the  greatest  inner  vitality.  Thalea 
thought  water  possessed  this  quality.  Water  is  always 
moving.  Thales  saw  it  moving.  It  therefore  has  life  in 
itself.  Anaximander  felt  that  no  object  in  our  percep 
tual  experience  would  fully  explain  the  ceaseless  mobil 
ity  of  nature,  and  he  called  it  the  Unlimited  or  the 
Indeterminate  —  the  Apeiron.  It  is  a  mixture  in  which 
all  qualities  are  lost.  The  changes  in  nature  are  end 
less,  and  therefore  the  single  cosmic  substance,  from 
which  they  come,  must  be  endless  as  well,  for  "from 
whatever  source  things  come,  in  that  they  have  their 
end."  We  learn  that  this  is  just  the  reason  for  Anax 
imenes  choosing  the  air  for  the  single  underlying  cosmic 
substance.  The  air  is  the  most  changeable  thing  and  is 
Unlimited.1 

Both  Thales  and  Anaximenes  still  held  to  the  tra 
ditional  polytheism  of  the  Greek  Epic.  Anaximander 

1  "  Just  as  our  soul,  being  air,  holds  us  together,  so  do  breath  and  ail 
encompass  the  whole  world." 


26  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

rises  above  them  in  this  respect.  This  conception  of 
the  Unlimited,  to  which  his  scientific  search  led  him,  is 
regarded  by  him  as  Deity.  He  calls  it  "  the  divine  " 
(TO  OCLOV)  ;  although  he  speaks  of  it  in  the  neuter  gender 
\t  is,  nevertheless,  the  first  European  philosophical  con 
ception  of  God.  It  is  the  first  attempt  to  conceive  of 
God  as  purely  physical  and  yet  without  any  mythical 
dress.  In  Anaximander  the  Milesian  monism  has  a  reli 
gious  aspect. 

2.  Xenophanes,  the  Religious  Philosopher  (570 
B.  c.).  The  scientific  monism  of  Anaximander  was  after 
all  only  expressive  of  that  religious  dissatisfaction,  first 
voiced  by  the  Wise  Men,  against  the  Hesiod  cosmogony 
and  the  immorality  of  the  Homeric  myths.  Now  for  the 
first  time  a  positive  conflict  between  religion  and  phi 
losophy  arose  through  Xenophanes,  the  rhapsodist  of 
Colophon.  Colophon,  an  Ionian  city  near  Miletus,  was 
noted  for  its  obscene  and  cruel  religious  practices,  and 
when  his  native  city  capitulated  to  the  Persians,  Xe 
nophanes  charged  its  feebleness  to  its  immoral  religion. 
He  went  toMagna  Gra3cia,  and,  disguised  as  a  musician, 
he  wandered  about  for  sixty-seven  years  through  its 
length  and  breadth  declaiming  in  song  against  the 
anthropomorphism,  the  mystic  ecstasies,  and  the  gen 
eral  social  practices  of  the  Greeks.  He  finally  settled 
in  Elea,  southern  Italy  (see  map),  and  on  this  ac 
count  he  is  sometimes  called  the  founder  of  the  Eleatic 
school. 

•  Xenophanes'  influence  upon  the  thought  of  Greece 
was  threefold :  (1)  He  preached  the  Milesian  philosoph 
ical  monism  to  the  people  of  Greece  in  the  form  of  a  reli 
gious  monism ;  (2)  He  carried  this  doctrine  from  east 
ern  Greece  (Asia  Minor)  to  Western  Greece  (Magna 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  NATURE  27 

Graecia)  ;  (3)  He  was  the  connecting  link  between  the 
Milesian  and  the  following  Eleatic  school. 

The  Philosophy  of  Xenophanes.  Based  on  one  of  the 
Milesian  assumptions,  viz.,  a_^in^le_cojniic_siihstance 
remains  identical  with  itself  in  nature,  Xenophanes  felt 
l;hat  "he  had  a  right  to  set  down  two  principles  about 
qature. 

1.  The  sin^lejprhnordial  substance  below  the  changes 
of  nature  is  God.  The  reality  below  nature  which  Thales 
conceived  to  be  water,  Anaximander  to  be  unlimited 
substance  without  a  name,  Anaximenes  to  be  air,  was 
said  by  Xenophanes  to  be  God.    The  important  point 
here  is  that  Xenophanes  has  not  given  the  Greeks  a 
spiritualistic  conception  of  God;  but  that  he  has  posi 
tively  stated  that  the  su^s^c_e_^Ohe^  universe  is  an 
object  of  religious  devotion.    He  calls  the  cosmic  sub 
stance  God  instead  of  calling  it  water,  Apeiron,  or  air. 
It  is  a  material  thing,  and  yet  it  is  an  object  of  rever 
ence.    He  ascribes  to  this  God  a  spherical  forjm,  and  yet 
also  mental  power  of  omniscience.   God  is  "  one  and 
all "  (ei/  KO.I  irav),  and  yet  he  is  "  one  god,  the  greatest 
among  gods  and  men,  neither  in  form  and  thought  like 
unto  mortals."   The  positive  conception  of  God  hangs 
confused  in  the  mind  of  Xenophanes.   He  is  scarcely  a 
monotheist,  nor  yet  a  pantheist.   He  is  a  hylozoist,  who 
conceives  the  underlying  cosmic  substance  to  be  an 
object  of  religious  reverence. 

2.  The  single  cosmic  substance  belp_w_  the_£hanges  of 
nature  is  ^changeable.    To  the  Milesians  the  more 
moving  is  matter,  the  more  alive  is  it.    Life  and  activ 
ity  are  the  same  thing.    To  Xenophanes   this  is  not 
the  case,  but,  on  the  contrary,  the  opposite  is  true.   He 
conceiYfia_Iio4_tobe  a  definite  sher 


28  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

able  andhomogenequs.  ThemaJeriaLmibstanfifi^ God, 
always  remains  the  same.  "Hehas  no  need  of  going 
about,  now  hither,  now  thither,  in  order  to  carry  out  his 
wishes ;  but  he  governs  all  men  without  toil."  Xe- 
nophanes  thus  becomes  the  forerunner  of  the  Eleatic 
school. 

3.  Heracleitus,  "the  Misanthropist"  and  "the  Ob 
scure  "  (about  563-470  B.  c.).  Heracleitus  was  a 
native  of  Ephesus,  belonged  to  the  aristocracy,  and  suf 
fered  at  the  hands  of  the  democracy.  He  wrote  a  treatise 
that  was  difficult  to  understand  even  by  the  ancients,  some 
fragments  of  which  are  preserved.  He  was  called  the 
"weeping  philosopher"  because  of  his  misanthropy, 
and  also  the  "  dark  philosopher  "  because  of  the  obscurity 
of  his  writings.  He  was  a  theorist  rather  than  a  phys 
icist,  and  his  doctrines  foreshadow  our  modern  physical 
theories.  His  name  is  coupled  with  that  of  Parmenides 
in  the  deep  impression  he  made  upon  Greek  thought. 
From  his  complacent  and  gloomy  retirement  he  looked 
forth  upon  the  world  around  him  with  profound  con 
tempt,  as  did  the  Stoics  after  him. 

a.  Heracleitus'  Doctrine  of  Absolute  and  Univer 
sal  Change.  The  wonder  which  the  lonians  felt,  that 
nature  phenomena  change  into  one  another,  found  its 
liveliest  expression  in  Heracleitus.  He  not  only  found 
that  mutability  was  the  primal  aspect  of  nature  pheno 
mena,  but  he  also  pointed  out  that  human  experiences 
also  had  their  rapid  and  complete  transitions.  Espe 
cially  was  he  fond  of  citing  the  changes  of  opposites  into 
each  other.  But  what  shows  his  development  over  the 
early  Milesian  doctrine  was  his  isolation  of  the  aspect 
of  change  from  the  Milpsi^n  f*rmp.fiptjon  of  the  cosmic' 
matter,  thereby  affirming  that 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  NATURE  29 

It  is  one  thing  to  affirm  that  reality  is  essen« 
tially  change  ;  it  is  another  to  universalize  change  by 
affirming  that  the  permanent  has  no  existence.  The 
Milesian  doctrine  was  too  naive  to  go  as  far  as  that. 
Heracleitus  piles  up  figures  of  speech  to  show  that  there 
is  no  permanence  whatever.  All  existing  things  are 
only  "  becoming  "-things,  passing-away  things.  Being  is 
always  becoming,  about-to-be.  The  only  unchanging 
"  You  cannot  step  into  the  same  rivers, 


for  fresh  waters  are  ever  flowing  in  upon  you."  "  God 
is  day  and  night,  winter  and  summer,  war  and  peace, 
satiety  and  hunger."  "  All  things  flow  "  (?ravTa  pet). 
What  abides  and  deserves  the  name  of  Deity  is  not 
thing,  but  motion  —  Becoming. 

£>.  Fire  is  the  Cosmic  Substance.  Here  we  come  to 
a  difficulty  in  explaining  the  doctrine  of  Heracleitus 
because  of  the  confusion  in  his  own  mind.  He  evidently 
goes  a  long  way  toward  conceiving  the  cosmic  substance 
as  an  abstraction  —  as  the  process  of  change.  But  he 
could  not  be  wholly  abstract.  He  stops  and  tells  us  that 
the  cosmic  substance  is  fire,  and  he  probably  means  by 
fire  just  the  same  sort  of  thing  as  Anaximenes  meant 
by  air.  Fire  is  the  cosmic  substance.  It  is  the  essence 
oj_ajl  material  things  bp^qiise  it  is  the  most_mobile. 
But,  after  all,  the  fire  of  which  Heracleitus  is  thinking 
is  not  a  localized  thing,  like  the  fire  on  the  hearth.  For 
the  hearth  fire  in  a  sense  is  ever  identical  with  itself. 
The  fire  which  Heracleitus  means  is  ever  darting,  ever 
transforming  material.  To  sum  up  :  Heracleitus  does 
not  mean  by  fire  an  abstraction  like  the  law  of  change  ; 
he  does  not  mean,  on  the  other  hand,  a  material  ever 
remaining  like_Jj^elf  ;  he  does  mean  a  material,  but  a 
transforming  material. 


30  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

c.  The  Definite  Changes  of  Fire.  Heracleitus  makes 
some  acute  observations  about  the  characteristics  of 
the  changing  fire.  The  Milesians  had  been  content  to 
observe  atmospheric  changes  and  to  name  condensa 
tion  and  rarefaction  as  the  forms  of  cosmic  change. 
Heracleitus  goes  farther  and  emphasizes  definite  rela 
tions  of  change.  The  succession  of  changes  always 
remains  the  same.  Their  definite  relation  is  the  only 
permanence  in  the  world,  and  .Heracleitus'  conception  \ 
foreshadows  the  modern  conception  of  the  uniformity  ( 
of  the  law  of  nature.  The  changes  are  (1)  fateful,  (2) 
rational,  and  (3)  just.  They  show  that  the  world  is  a 
destiny,  a  reason,  and  a  justice.  This  identification  of 
ethical  and  logical  qualities  with  the  physical  betrays  the 
Undeveloped  condition  of  the  thought  of  Heracleitus. 

In  general,  there  are  two  characteristics  to  be  noted 
with  reference  to  Heracleitus'  conception  of  a  definite 
succession  of  changes  :  (IX^Ilfi-cbangesjire  always_a 
harmony  of  opposites_;  (2)  ancMjhe  changes  are  in  a 
closed  circuit.  The  process  of  change  is  not  a  flow  in 
one  direction  like  a  river  over  its  bed,  but  it  is  a  move 
ment  in  two  opposite  directions. 


means  not  only  a  passing  into  something  else 
passing  into  the  opposite.  Everything  is  the  union  of 
opposite*,  and  everything  is  the  transition  point  of  op- 
posites  about  to  separate.  The  flux  of  things  is  thus 
poetically  conceived  as  a  war  of  things,  and  this  war  is 
"the  father  of  all  things."  This  unity  of  opposites  has 
an  equilibrium  that  illudes  us  into  thinking  it  is  per 
manent.  The  universe  is  an  invisible  harmony,  divided 
into  itself  and  again  united.  Investigate  life  and  there 
are  antitheses  everywhere.  War  is  life.  The  second 
general  characteristic  of  the  succession  of  changes  is 


THE  PHILOSOPHY   OF  NATURE  31 

their  closed  circuit.  Fire  changes  into  all  things,  and 
all  things  are  changing  back  into  fire.  These  two  move« 
ments  are  called  the  "Upward  Way"  and  the  "Down 
ward  Way."  Downward,  fire  changes  through  air  and 
water  into  earth.  Upward,  earth  changes  back  to  water, 
air,  and  fire.  With  every  change,  there  is  counter- 
change,  action  is  accompanied  by  a  reaction.  "Men  do 
not  know  how  that  which  is  drawn  in  opposite  direc 
tions  harmonizes  with  itself.  The  harmonious  structure 
of  the  world  depends  upon  opposite  tension,  like  that  of 
the  bow  and  the  lyre." 

d.  The  Practical  Philosophy  of  Heracleitus.  Hera- 
cleitus  was  more  of  a  metaphysician  than  a  phys 
icist,  and  his  chief  concern  was  in  the  formation  and 
the  practical  application  of  his  theory  of  change.  He 
looked  upon  man  as  a  bit  of  cosmic  fire  struck  off  and 
imprisoned  in  a  body  of  earth,  water,  and  air.  After 
death  this  fiery  soul  is  released  and  absorbed  in  the 
cosmic  fire.  In  his  present  state  man  has  a  divided  ex 
istence  :  the  life  of  the  soul,  or  the  fire  of  the  reason ; 
and  the  life  of  the  senses  of  the  imprisoning  body.  The 
reason  retires  from  the  illusions  of  sense,  and  sees  in  its 
aristocratic  isolation  how  illusory  the  sensations  are. 
For  th£j>ejtt3ejjjbejl^^ 

while  the  reason  sees  through  this  deception,  to  the 
changingness  of  the  world.  Thus  the  beginning  is  made 
by  Heracleitus  in  distinguishing  the  reflections  of 
the  reason  from  sensations.  Truth  is  for  the  first  time 
systematically  set  over  against  opinion.  The  reason 
able  Wise  Man  resigns  himself  to  whatever  happens 
because  he  knows  that  it  is  fateful,  wise,  and  just.  The 
Wise  Man  recognizes  that  all  is  change,  and  he  is  happy 
because  he  sees  providence  in  the  vicissitudes  of  his  own 


U^r^ 


32  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

life.  Thus  in  the  aristocratic  hate,  which  Heracleitus 
holds  against  democracies,  he  makes  conformity  to  law 
the  only  way  to  happiness.  The  reason  of  Wise  Men, 
and  not  the  senses  of  the  multitude,  must  be  the  true 
guide  of  society. 

Heracleitus  was  a  profound  observer  and  theorist. 
His  physical  theory  foreshadowed  the  modern  th^riim 
of  natural  law  and  of  relativity;  his  practical  theories 
reappear  in  the  psychology  of  Protagoras  and  the  ethics 
of  the  Stoics. 

4.  The  Eleatic  School.  The  town  of  Elea  to  which 
Xenophanes  came  in  the  course  of  his  wanderings  had 
been  recently  settled  by  the  Ionian  refugees  from  Pho- 
caea,  a  great  maritime  city  in  Asia  Minor,  which  had 
been  conquered  by  the  Persians  (543  B.  c.).  Elea  is 
now  Castellamare  on  the  west  coast  of  Italy.  It  is  cele 
brated  as  the  birthplace  of  Parmenides  and  Zeno,  who 
founded  the  so-called  Eleatic  school. 

a.  Parmenides  (b.  515  B.  c.). 

Parmenides  wrote  about  470  B.  c.  He  is  represented 
as  a  serious  and  influential  man,  with  a  high  moral 
character.  He  exercised  strong  influence  upon  such 
philosophers  as  Plato  and  Democritus,  and  was  a  politi 
cal  power  in  the  city  of  Elea,  of  which  he  was  a  native. 
He  was  not  a  stranger  to  the  Pythagoreans.  The  large 
fragment  of  his  poem  is  the  most  ancient  monument  ex 
tant  of  metaphysical  speculation  among  the  Greeks. 

Parmenides  takes  the  doctrine  of  Xenophanes  with 
great  seriousness,  and  what  Xenophanes  says  about  the 
Godhead,  Parmenides  says  about  all  things.  Xenoph 
anes'  religious  weapon  of  an  unchanging  cosmic  sub 
stance  becomes  in  the  hands  of  Parmenides  an  academic 
doctrine  of  science  and  the  basis  of  logical  controversy. 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  NATURE  33 

Parmenides  used  the  conception  of  Xenophanes  in  his 
great  didactic  poem,  The  Way  of  Truth  and  the  Way 
of  Opinion,  with  the  evident  purpose  of  refuting  the 
theory  of  Heracleitus.  The  fragment  of  the  poem  re 
veals  the  driest  abstractions  dressed  in  rich  poetry.  As 
a  thinker  Parmenides  is  the  most  important  in  this 
period.  Zeno  was  the  friend  and  pupil  of  Parmenides. 
(1)  The  Cosmic  Substance  is  Being.  The  first  as 
sumption  in  the  Milesian  doctrine  —  that  there  is  a 
single  matter  that  ever  remains  identical  with  itself  — 
was  so  self-evident  to  Parmenides  that  he  does  not  at 
tempt  to  prove  it.  He  assumes  it,  as  if  it  were  cogent 
to  everybody.  However,  he  explains  what  he  means  by 
Being  in  a  negative  statement :  Not-Being,  or  what  is 
not,  cannot  be  thought.  Being  and  thought  are  so  cor 
related  that  they  are  the  same.  Thinking  always  has 
Being  as  its  content,  and  there  is  no  Being  that  is  not 
thought.  Being  =  Thought.  This  explanation  of  Par 
menides'  identification  of  thought  and  Being  may  be 
put  in  this  logical  form :  — 

All  thinking  refers  to  something  thought,  and  there 
fore  has  Being  for  its  content ; 

Thinking  that  refers  to  nothing,  and  is  therefore 
contentless,  cannot  be; 

Therefore,  not-Being  cannot  be  thought,  much  less 
can  it  be. 

These  propositions  look  very  abstract,  and  make  us 
believe  that  we  are  to  plunge  immediately  into  a  kind 
of  German  idealism.  But  Parmenides  leaves  us  in  no 
doubt  that  he  is  one  of  the  hylozoists  of  his  time. 
Being  is  indeed  thought,  but  Being  is  also  matter.  We 
may  therefore  amend  our  equation  to  Being  =  Thought 


34  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

= Matter.  Being  is  what  fills  space,  and  all  Being  has 
this  and  only  this  property.  All  Being  is  therefore  ex 
actly  alike,  and  there  is  only  one,  single  Being.  There 
are  no  distinctions  in  Being.  By  not-Being  Parmenides 
means  empty  space  or  that  which  is  not  material.  So 
that  Parmenides'  assumption  of  Being  as  the  cosmic 
substance  means  this  :  all  that  exists,  including  thought, 
fills  space;  and  all  that  does  not  exist  does  not  fill 
space. 

Being,  the  cosmic  substance,  is  one,  eternal,  imper 
ishable,  homogeneous,  unchangeable,  and  material. 
When  men  see  the  world  as  it  really  is,  when  they  see 
its  cosmic  substance,  they  see  it  to  be  one  continuous 
material  block.  The  world  is  not  made  up  of  parts  with 
intervals  of  nothing  between  them,  but  it  is  a  solid, 
homogeneous  whole.  The  cosmic  Being  is  a  timeless, 
spaceless  Being  with  no  distinctions.  The  form  of  Be 
ing  is  spherical.  It  is  cosmic-body  and  cosmic-thought. 
This  is  the  assumption  of  Parmenides,  which  is  so  self- 
evident  and  so  cogent  to  him  that  he  does  not  attempt 
to  prove  but  only  to  explain  it. 

(2)  Other  Things  than  the  Cosmic  Substance  (Be 
ing)  have  no  Real  Existence.  If  Being  is  space  that 
is  filled,  not-Being  is  empty  space.  However,  empty 
space  has  no  existence.  But  the  existence  of  a  plural 
number  of  things  depends  upon  the  existence  of  empty 
spaces  between  them.  Furthermore,  the  motion  of  things 
and  the  change  of  things  depend  upon  the  existence  of 
empty  spaces  in  which  they  can  move  and  change. 
Since  empty  space  is  not-Being  and  has  no  existence, 
the  plurality  of  things  and  the  motion  and  change  of 
things  have  also  no  existence.  They  are  illusions.  The 
nature-world,  with  its  richness  of  qualities  and  variety 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  NATURE  35 

of  motions,  before  the  logic  of  Parmenides  "folds  up 
its  tents  like  the  Arabs  and  silently  steals  away." 

This  logical  drawing  out  of  one  of  the  aspects  of  the 
Milesian  conception  of  the  cosmic  matter  has  a  curious 
result.  The  Milesians  and  Xenophanes  sought  to  ex 
plain  by  the  cosmic  substance  the  many  nature  changes. 
But  when  in  the  hands  of  Parmenides  the  cosmic  sub 
stance  is  all  of  reality,  then  there  is  no  reality  to  the 
changes.  Consequently  the  concept  formed  for  the  ex- 
pla.naijnn  of  change  Jias_ .sa_daYeiepei__as  .to  deny  the 
existence  of  change,.  The  cosmic  substance  excludes  all 
origination  and  decay,  all  space  and  time  differences, 
all  divisibility,  diversity,  and  movement.  There  is  only 
one  real,  all  else  is  illusion. 

But  what  can  we  say  of  the  varied  world  of  nature 
as  it  appears  to  us  ?  Do  we  see,  hear,  and  touch  many 
things  and  motions  ?  In  Part  II  of  his  poem  he  raises 
the  question,  Suppose  man  takes  the  world  of  change 
as  real  how  must  he  explain  it  ?  He  answers  by  using 
the  explanation  of  Heracleitus.  But  these  changes  of 
eye  and  ear  belong  to  the  world  of  sense,  and  Par 
menides  is  talking,  in  Part  I  of  his  poem,  about  the 
real  world  or  that  world  known  to  thought.  Parmenides 
insists  as  strongly  as  did  Heracleitus  that  the  reason 
and  not  the  sense  shall  be  our  guide  to  what  is  real. 
Yet  he  arrives  at  exactly  the  opposite  conclusion  from 
Heracleitus  as  to  what  the  reason  sees  as  real.  The 
senses  show  us  only  the  many  and  the  changing.  The 
reason  shows  us  nothing  of  the  sort,  but  only  perma 
nence  and  unchangingness. 

6.  Zeno  (b.  490-430  B.  a). 

Zeno  was  born  in  Elea.  He  was  contemporary  with 
those  who  tried  to  reconcile  the  two  sides  of  the  meta- 


36  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

physical  controversy,  —  Empedocles,  Anaxagoras,  and 
the  Atomists.  He  wrote  in  prose  in  the  form  of  ques 
tion  and  answer.  This  is  the  beginning  of  the  dialogue 
literature,  which  in  the  time  of  the  Sophists,  Socrates 
and  Plato,  was  richly  developed  and  became  known  as 
dialectic.  On  the  Greek  stage  during  the  time  of  Peri 
cles  it  came  forth  in  dramatic  form  through  ^Eschylus, 
Sophocles,  and  Euripides. 

The  Philosophy  of  Zeno.  Zeno  was  the  active  con 
troversialist  of  the  school  of  Elea,  and  he  was  not  a 
constructive  philosopher.  He  offered  no  contribution 
to  advance  the  thought  of  Parmenides.  He  appeared 
rather  as  the  master  of  logical  argument  in  defense  of 
his  predecessor,  by  tearing  to  pieces  the  arguments  of 
his  opponents.  The  opponents  that  Zeno  is  attacking 
are  the  Atomists  of  Abdera,  who  were  his  contempora 
ries,  rather  than  Heracleitus.  His  contribution  was  neg 
ative  and  formal,  but  it  was  nevertheless  effective  and 
searching.  His  arguments  and  paradoxes  will,  however, 
lose  their  cogency  unless  it  be  kept  in  mind  that  he  is 
trying  to  show  how  absurd  magnitude,  multiplicity,  and 
change  would  be  in  discontinuous  space  such  as  the 
Atomists  describe.  While  his  paradoxes  have  been  at 
tacked  again  and  again,  they  still  have  effectiveness 
against  atomic  theories. 

His  arguments  are  against  magnitude,  multiplicity, 
and  motion.  There  can  be  no  magnitude,  because  a  thing 
would  then  be  both  infinitely  small  and  infinitely  great. 
There  can  be  no  multiplicity  of  things,  since  they  would 
be  both  limited  and  unlimited  in  number.  There  can  be 
no  motion,  because  (1)  it  is  impossible  to  go  through  a 
fixed  space ;  (2)  it  is  impossible  to  go  though  a  space 
that  has  movable  limits ;  and  (3)  because  of  the  rela- 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  NATURE  37 

tivity  of  motion.  The  dilemmas  which  he  proposed  of 
Achilles  and  the  tortoise,  the  flying  arrow  at  rest,  and 
the  bushel  of  corn  are  classic.* 

The  Results  of  the  Conflict  between  Heracleitus 
and  Parmenides.  1.  One  important  result  of  this 
final  conflict  between  the  inconsistent  motives  in  the 
Milesian  teaching  was  that  reason  was  contrasted  with 
sense,  reflection  with  experience.  The  more  fully  the 
philosophers  developed  their  doctrines,  the  more  their 
doctrines  became  contrasted  with  the  opinions  of  unre 
flecting  people.  At  first  the  contrast  appeared  in  this 
naive  form  :  that  what  they  thought  was  right,  and 
what  others  thought  must  be  wrong,  if  others  differed 
from  them.  Then  the  contrast  came  in  this  form :  that 
reflection  gives  the  true  and  sensations  the  false.  Thus 
reflection  came  to  have  such  conclusiveness  that  it  gained 
independence.  The  philosopher  began  to  feel  the  su 
premacy  of  reason,  to  assert  that  he  has  truth,  to  call 
unreasoned  belief  by  the  opprobrious  name  of  "  opinion." 
This  is  curiously  illustrated  in  the  case  of  Heracleitus 
and  Parmenides.  Their  opposing  conceptions  of  the  cos-\ 
mic  substance  are  claimed  to  be  the  result  of  reason,/ 
while  each  calls  the  other's  theory  "  opinion." 

2.  Another  result  was  that  in  the  Greek  thought 
the  monistic  theory  was  found  to  be  useless  in  the 
study  of  nature.  These  early  monistic  views  led  up  as 
necessary  steps  to  pluralism,  but  they  were  not  in  them 
selves  serviceable.  The  imperfection  in  the  Milesian 
teaching  appeared  in  the  impassable  gulf  between  Hera 
cleitus  and  Parmenides.  It  now  remained  for  the  last 
Cosmologists  to  see  if,  on  the  basis  of  pluralism,  they 

*  Read  Windelband,  Hist,  of  Ancient  Phil.,  pp.  67  ff. ; 
Zeller,  Greek  Philosophy,  pp.  63  ff. 


38  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

could  not  reconcile  the  preceding  views  and  at  the  same 
time  obtain  a  satisfactory  metaphysics  of  nature. 

3.  The  third  result  of  the  controversy  between  the 
Eleatics  and  Heracleitus  was  that  the  peril  from  the 
Orphic  Mysteries  was  averted,  —  not  immediately? 
nor  in  a  year's  time,  but  after  many  years.  Philosophy 
became  established.  The  Greek  reason  now  had  an 
object  of  interest,  in  a  sharp  scientific  issue.  Mystery 
was  not  crushed,  but  subdued.  The  mental  life  of  the 
future  Greek  had  a  topic  for  its  reflection  which  sup 
planted,  when  the  time  came,  its  emotional  interest  in 
the  supernatural. 


CHAPTER  III 

PLURALISM 

Efforts  toward  Reconciliation.  The  theories  of  Hera- 
cleitus  and  Parmenides  were  in  part  fantastic  and  in 
part  abstract.  They  were  the  two  motives  of  the  Mile 
sian  school  that  had  been  developed  so  far  as  to  reveal 
their  inherent  inconsistencies. 

Physical  theories  now  began  to  spring  up  which 
modified  the  metaphysical  theories ;  and  these  produced 
results  which  while  not  so  logical,  were  less  distant  from 
the  facts  of  life.  The  Eleatics  had  so  conceived  Being  as 
to  deny  the  existence  of  changing  phenomena  perceived 
in  the  world  of  nature.  On  the  other  hand,  Heracleitus 
had  so  emphasized  the  universality  of  change  that 
there  was  little  reality  left  in  the  particular  changes. 
The  later  Heracleitans  were  Heracleitus  gone  mad. 
"We  not  only  cannot  step  into  the  same  river  twice, 
but  we  cannot  do  it  once."  All  the  preceding  philoso 
phers  had  been  monists.  The  time  had  therefore  come 
for  thinkers  to  abandon  monism  if  thought  were  to 
have  any  usefulness.  Monism,  whether  in  the  form  of 
Heracleitus'  doctrine  of  universal  change  or  of  Par 
menides'  doctrine  of  universal  permanence,  had  merely 
set  aside  the  problem  about  the  Many.  Of  course,  a 
more  satisfactory  solution  of  this  problem  could  come 
only  when  human  life  had  become  riper  and  had  more 
experiences  upon  which  to  draw.  It  was  natural  for  the 
Greek  philosopher  to  look  now  to  pluralism  for  his 
solution,  when  he  turned  away  from  monism.  At  the 


40  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

outset  pluralism  tried  to  reconcile  the  two  extremes  to 
which  the  Milesian  motifs  had  gone.  Its  later  develop 
ment  in  the  doctrine  of  Protagoras  was  as  extreme  as 
that  of  the  monists. 

The  New  Conception  of  Change  of  the  Pluralists.  Fac 
ing  the  fact  that  change  has  to  be  explained  and  cannot 
be  denied,  change  is  conceived  by  the  pluralists  to  be  not 
a  transformation  but  a  transposition.  It  is  an  alteration 
in  position  of  the  parts  of  a  mass.  Birth,  growth,  death, 
are  only  such  changes  of  transposition.  Empedocles,  to 
whom  the  origin  of  the  doctrine  is  attributed,  says, 
"  There  is  no  coming  into  Being  of  aught  that  perishes, 
nor  any  end  for  it  in  baneful  death,  but  only  a  min 
gling  and  a  separation  of  what  has  been  mingled.  Just 
as  when  painters  are  elaborating  temple  offerings,  — 
they,  when  they  have  taken  the  pigments  of  many  colors 
in  their  hands,  mix  them  in  a  harmony,  —  so  let  not 
the  error  prevail  in  thy  mind  that  there  is  any  other 
source  of  all  the  perishable  creatures  that  appear  in 
countless  numbers."  All  origination,  then,  is  a  new 
combination,  and  every  destruction  only  a  separation 
of  the  original  parts.  The  Pluralists  thus  make  Hera- 
cleitus'  conception  useful  in  the  explanation  of  nature. 

The  New  Conception  of  the  Unchanging  of  the 
Pluralists  —  The  Element.  But  there  must  be  a  per 
manence  in  order  that  there  be  change.  This  can  only 
be  conceived  by  assuming  that  there  are  many  original 
units  that  in  themselves  do  not  change.  The  mass  of 
the  world  is  ever  the  same  ;  there  is  no  new  creation.  ' 
Being  consists  in  many  elements,  and  not  in  a  single 
block.  So  to  Empedoclesn 


_ 

the  pnOTity^oFtormmg  ^  the^onception  of  th 
which  has  occupied   anTmportant  place    in    science. 


PLURALISM  41 

The  element  is  conceived  by  the  Pluralists  as  unori- 
ginated,  imperishable,  and  unchanging.  It  has  all  the 
qualities  that  Parmenides  attributed  to  his  single  Being, 
only  the  elements  may  change  their  place  and  suffer 
mechanical  division.  The  Pluralists  thus  make  the 
Eleatic  conception  useful  in  the  explanation  of  nature. 

The  Introduction  of  the  Conception  of  the  Efficient 
Cause.  The  Eleatics  had  detached  the  quality  of  mo 
tion  from  Being.  The  Pluralists,  in  reintroducing  it, 
were  obliged  to  make  it  a  separate  force  in  order  to  get 
movement  into  their  universe.  The  elements  are  change 
less.  How  can  they  move?  They  cannot  move  them 
selves.  They  are  moved  from  without.  Here  in  Em- 
pedocles  is  made  a  differentiation  of  great  importance 
—  the  concept  of  the  moving  or  efficient  cause.  How 
ever,  this  does  not  appear  in  this  early  time  in  concep 
tual  but  in  mythical-poetic  and  undefined  form.  With 
this  differentiated  efficient  cause,  can  Pluralism  be  con 
sidered  to  be  hylozoism  ?  Authorities  differ.  Certainly 
this  new  concept  shows  the  beginning  of  the  breaking 
up  of  hylozoism  and  the  beginning  of  the  formation  of 
a  mechanistic  conception  of  the  universe.  But  probably 
the  Pluralists  were  as  much  hylozoists  as  their  prede 
cessors,  the  monists.  Their  efficient  causes  are  material 
like  the  elements,  and  they  are  poetically  and  indefi 
nitely  described.  They  are  in  every  case  conceived  as 
the  material  which  has  a  lively  or  an  originating  mo 
tion.  We  must  keep  in  mind  that  all  the  Cosmologists 
except  the  Eleatics  believed  movement  to  be  life. 

Summary  of  Similarities  and  Differences   in  the 
Theories  of  the  Reconcilers. 

The  general  common  characteristics  of  the  theories 
of  the  Reconcilers :  — 


42  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

1.  A  plurality  of  the  elements. 

2.  An  efficient  cause  which  explains  the  shifting  of 

the  elements  in  causing  the  origin,  growth,  and 
decay  of  the  world  of  nature. 

The  general  differences  between  the  theories  of  the 
Reconcilers :  — 

1.  In  the  number  and  quality  of  the  elements. 

2.  In  the  number  and  quality  of  the  causes. 

The  Pluralistic  Philosophers :  Empedocles,  Anaxa- 
goras,  Leucippus,  and  the  Later  Pythagoreans.  With 
the  Pluralists  we  pass  completely  out  of  the  sixth  cen 
tury  B.  C.  The  lives  of  the  hylozoistic  Pluralists  span  the 
fifth  century,  and  cosmological  interest  extends  later. 
Even  the  Eleatic  Zeno  lived  from  490  to  430  B.  c.  Em 
pedocles  lived  from  490  to  430  B.  c.,  Anaxagoras  from 
500  to  425  B.  c.,  and  the  Pythagoreans  and  Leucippus 
later.  When  the  cosmological  movement  was  still  virile 
in  the  Grecian  colonies,  and  even  before  it  had  reached 
its  systematic  form  in  Democritus  of  Abdera,  the  an 
thropological  movement  had  begun  in  the  motherland, 
in  Athens.  The  Persian  Wars  are  the  dividing  line 
between  the  two  periods,  but  only  because  they  denote 
the  beginning  of  the  new  movement  in  Athens,  not 
the  end  of  the  old  movement  in  Asia  Minor  and 
Magna  Gra3cia.  Contemporaneous  with  the  Pluralists 
was  the  brilliant  Age  of  Pericles,  when  the  Sophists 
were  carrying  education  to  the  people  and  Socrates 
was  teaching  in  the  Athenian  market-place.  By  the 
middle  of  the  fifth  century  B.  c.  there  was  the  liveliest 
interchange  of  scientific  ideas  throughout  Greek  society, 
and  the  contemporaneousness  of  the  Pluralists  with  one 
another  and  with  the  Athenian  philosophers  shows  this 
in  many  similarities  in  their  doctrines  and  in  many 


PLURALISM  43 

polemical  references.  There  are  four  schools  of  Recon* 
cilers,  of  which  Empedocles,  Anaxagoras,  Leucippus, 
and  the  later  Pythagoreans  are  the  representatives. 

Empedocles*  (490  to  430  B.  c.)  was  the  first  Dorian 
philosopher,  a  partisan  of  the  democracy,  and  belonged 
to  a  rich  family  of  Agrigentum.  He  became  a  dis 
tinguished  statesman,  but  he  later  fell  from  popular 
favor.  Then,  in  the  garb  of  a  magician,  he  traveled  as 
physician  and  priest  through  Magna  Graecia.  His  po 
litical  affiliations  would  prevent  his  direct  connection 
with  the  Pythagoreans,  but  he  showed  that  the  Pytha 
goreans  influenced  him,  and  his  career  is  an  imitation 
of  that  of  Pythagoras.  He  was  acquainted  with  the 
theory  of  Heracleitus,  and  he  knew  Parmenides  per 
sonally.  He  was  one  of  the  first  rhetoricians,  and  was 
probably  connected  with  a  large  literary  circle.  He  is 
the  first  and  most  imperfect  representative  of  the  re 
conciliation.  The  story  of  his  suicide  by  leaping  into 
Mt.  JStna  is  supposed  to  be  a  myth. 

Anaxagoras  (500-425  B.  c.),  a  man  of  wealthy 
antecedents,  was  much  esteemed,  was  born  in  Clazo- 
mense  in  a  circle  rich  in  Ionian  culture,  but  was  iso 
lated  from  practical  life.  He  declared  the  heaven  to  be 
his  fatherland  and  the  study  of  the  heavenly  bodies  to 
be  his  life's  task.  He  went  to  Athens  about  450  B,  c., 
where  he  formed  one  of  a  circle  of  notable  men  of  cul 
ture.  He  lived  in  Athens  under  the  patronage  of  Per 
icles,  but  in  434  B.  C.  he  was  expelled.  In  Athens  he 
was  intimate  with  such  men  as  Euripides,  Thucydides, 
and  Protagoras.  He  represents  the  first  appearance  of 
philosophy  in  Athens. 

The  life  of  Leucippus  is  almost  unknown.  He  was 
*  Read  Matthew  Arnold,  Empedocles  (a  poem). 


44  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

probably  born  in  Miletus,  visited  Elea,  and  settled  in 
Abdera. 

The  Later  Pythagoreans.  After  the  Pythagoreans 
as  a  religious  and  political  body  had  been  defeated  at 
Crotona,  they  lost  their  prestige  and  were  scattered  to 
the  four  winds.  They  were  beaten  in  the  battle  of 
Crotona  (510  B.  c.)  and  dispersed  about  450  B.  c. 
Pythagoras  died  504  B.  c.  His  scattered  followers,  these 
later  Pythagoreans,  formed  a  school  of  philosophy  which 
had  its  centre  at  Thebes.  Destroyed  as  a  religious  body 
the  members  lost  their  superstitions  and  turned  their 
attention  to  philosophy,  astronomy,  mathematics,  medi 
cine,  and  physics.  As  mathematicians  and  as  astrono 
mers  they  are  the  most  notable  among  the  ancients. 
Philolaus  is  the  probable  originator  of  their  philosophy 
of  numbers.  This  school  disappeared  about  350  B.  c. 
Pythagoreanism  reappeared  later  under  the  name  of 
neo-Pythagoreanism. 

The  Philosophy  of  Empedocles.  Empedocles  con 
ceived  the  number  of  elements  to  be  four,  —  earth,  air, 
fire,  and  water,  —  an  arbitrary  enumeration,  which  never 
theless  persisted  in  the  popular  imagination  throughout 
the  Middle  Ages.  He  chose  this  number  of  elements 
because  they  included  all  the  elements  in  his  predeces 
sors'  theories.  By  the  transposition  and  new  arrange 
ment  of  these  elements  he  could  account  for  the  variety 
of  the  world.  The  efficient  causes  that  make  these  dif 
ferent  separations  and  mixtures  are  Love  and  Hate,  two 
mythical  and  sensuous  entities.  Love  is  the  cause  of  the 
union  of  things,  Hate  of  their  separation. 

This  is  the  general  metaphysical  theory  that  Empedo 
cles  uses  to  explain  the  physical  world  and  especially 
physiological  phenomena  ;  and  he  is  probably  best  known 


PLURALISM  45 

as  the  author  of  the  aphorism,  "  Like  attracts  Like.'* 
For  example,  he  conceives  the  physical  world  as  con 
tinuously  repeating  itself  through  four  cosmic  stages, 
each  centuries  long.  The  world  moves  therefore  in 
cyclical  evolution,  in  which  Love  is  bringing  like  ele 
ments  together  only  to  be  followed  by  stages  of  the 
separation  of  the  like  elements  by  Hate,  —  an  endless 
cosmic  procession. 

But  Empedocles'  interest  in  cosmology  was  only  a 
part  of  his  dominating  interest  in  the  organic  world. 
He  held  some  interesting  evolution  theories.  His  special 
interest  in  human  physiology  led  him  to  frame  the  first 
theory  of  perception.  Man  is  composed  of  the  four  ele 
ments,  and  he  can  know  the  universe  around  himself 
because  Like  in  him  attracts  Like  in  the  external  world. 
The  earth  forms  our  solid  parts,  water  the  liquid  parts, 
air  is  the  vital  breath,  and  fire  is  the  soul.  The  blood 
contains  the  four  elements,  and  is  therefore  the  real  car 
rier  of  life.  If  we  perceive  anything,  it  is  because  we 
have  qualities  similar  to  that  thing.  The  element  in 
us  attracts  the  like  element  outside.  He  fancifully  ex 
plained  how  parts  of  each  element  pressed  upon  parts 
of  like  elements  —  earth  upon  earth,  air  upon  air ;  and 
how  these  clung  together  until  sundered  by  Hate.  The 
senses  have  only  a  partial  number  of  elements,  while  the 
reason  has  them  all ;  therefore  sense  knowledge  is  par 
tial  when  compared  with  rational  knowledge. 

The  Philosophy  of  Anaxagoras.  The  pluralistic  con 
ception  of  the  nature-substance,  that  was  originated  by 
Empedocles  in  this  crude  form,  got  a  more  complete 
character  in  the  hands  of  Anaxagoras.  For  Anaxagoras 
took  exception  to  the  arbitrary  assumption  of  Empedo 
cles  that  the  elements  were  only  four  in  number.  How 


46  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

could  this  world  of  infinite  variety  be  derived  from  only 
four  elements  ?  We  must  postulate  as  many  elements  as 
there  are  qualities,  if  by  merely  shuffling  them  —  by 
various  combinings  and  separatings  of  them  —  their  in 
finite  number  is  to  be  explained.  There,  are  a  plural 
number  of  elements  qualitatively  distinct.  Every  per 
ceptual  thing  is  composed  of  these  heterogeneous  parts 
or  qualities  or  elements.  But  how  do  you  know  an  ele 
ment  when  you  find  one  ?  Always  by  the  fact  that  when 
you  divide  it,  its  parts  are  homogeneous.  The  elements 
are,  therefore,  those  substances  that  divide  into  parts 
that  are  like  one  another ;  while  the  perceptual  objects 
of  nature  can  be  divided  into  parts  that  are  unlike  one 
another.  They  are  called  "  seeds  "  by  Anaxagoras,  and 
designated  as  "  homoiomeriai  "  by  Aristotle  and  later 
philosophy.  This  was  a  time,  it  must  be  remembered, 
when  chemical  analysis  had  not  developed,  and  when 
mechanical  division  and  change  of  temperature  were  the 
only  means  of  investigation.  Form,  color,  and  taste  were 
the  characteristics  that  differentiated  elements.  So  An 
axagoras  was  content  to  name  as  elements  such  things 
as  bones,  muscles,  flesh,  marrow,  metals,  etc.  The  count 
less  elements  or  qualities  are  present  in  a  finely  divided 
state  throughout  the  universe.  Every  perceptual  object 
has  present  in  it  all  elements,  even  opposite  elements. 
It  is,  however,  known  and  named  by  the  element  that 
prevails  in  it  at  any  particular  instant.  For  example, 
fire  contains  an  element  of  cold  but  the  fire  element 
prevails.  Opposites  attract,  and  the  qualitative  change 
in  a  thing  consists  in  the  predominance  of  some  other 
quality  already  present  in  it. 

For  the  efficient  cause  of  the  combining  and  separat 
ing  of  the  elements  Anaxagoras  selected  one  of  the 


PLURALISM  47 

elements.  He  called  it  the  Nous,  the  Greek  word  for 
mind  or  reason.  Many  historians  have  therefore  con 
cluded  that  Anaxagoras  is  the  author  of  an  idealistic 
philosophy.  'Aristotle  says  of  Anaxagoras  that  he  "  stood 
out  like  a  sober  man  among  the  random  talkers  that  had 
preceded  him."  But  both  Plato  *  and  Aristotle  are  dis 
appointed  with  the  way  in  which  Anaxagoras  handles 
the  conception  of  Nous  and,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  the 
Nous,  as  Anaxagoras  uses  it,  is  not  less  hylozoistic 
than  the  Love  and  Hate  of  Empedocles.  In  the  Nous 

/Anaxagoras  threw  out  a  thought  that  was  too  big  for 
him.  Its  introduction,  however,  marks  the  breaking  up 
of  pre-Socratic  hylozoism.  Anaxagoras  wrote  down  the 
word,  Nous,  from  which  comes  the  contrast  with  matter. 
He  stripped  the  mythical  dress  from  the  efficient  cause 
of  Empedocles  and  substituted  Nous,  because  he  wished 
to  emphasize  the  unity  of  the  cosmic  process.  The  Nous 
is  one  of  the  elements ;  it  is  "  thought-stuff,"  it  is  a 
corporeal  substance.  It  differs  from  all  the  other  ele 
ments  in  that  it  is  the  finest,  the  most  mobile,  and  has 
the  power  of  self-motion.  If  among  the  early  schools 
motion  is  life,  here  we  find  the  new  conception  of  self- 
motion  as  most  alive.  Instead  of  a  departure  from 
hylozoism,  this  is  a  rehabilitation  of  hylozoism  in  more 
perfect  form.  The  Nous  is  the  cause  of  the  harmony 
and  order  of  the  cosmos. 

The  Philosophy  of  the  Atomists  —  Leucippus  and 
the  School  at  Abdera.  Only  circumstantial  evidence  is 
left  to  testify  to  the  early  beginnings  of  the  school  of 
atomists  at  Abdera.  About  450  B.  c.,  owing  to  the  rise 
of  Athens  and  the  great  victory  of  Cimon  over  the  Per 
sians,  the  Ionian  civilization  on  the  coasts  of  Asia  Minor 
*  Read  Plato,  Phaedo,  97,  B. 


48  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

had  a  new  lease  of  life,  and  there  was  a  renewal  of  sci« 
entific  activity  in  the  cities.  The  influence  of  the  Mile 
sians  appeared  and  Anaxagoras'  doctrine,  which  had 
been  widely  disseminated,  began  to  have  great  vigor. 
Among  the  philosophers  of  this  section  was  one  about 
whom  we  know  very  little,  except  that  his  name  was 
Leucippus  and  that  he  was  the  father  of  atomism. 
Miletus  was  probably  his  native  place,  and  after  visit 
ing  Elea  he  settled  in  Abdera  in  Thrace.  We  know  ^ 
that  the  pqlemic  of  Zeno  was  directed  against  contem-  7 
porary  atomism  ;  and  we  know  the  theories  of  the  pupils  •' 
of  Leucippus,  of  Protagoras,  and  of  Democritus,  in  whom  • 
the  doctrine  of  atomism  culminated.  Probably  the  the 
ory  of  Leucippus  was  that  the  cosmic  substance  is  com 
posed  of  an  infinite  number  of  elements  quantitatively 
distinct,  in  opposition  to  Empedocles'  theory  of  a  four 
fold  division  as  well  as  against  Anaxagoras'  theory  of 
an  infinite  number  of  qualities.  Atomism  in  this  early 
form  represents  one  of  the  ways  that  Greek  thought 
took  in  reconciling  the  conflicting  claims  of  Heracleitus 
and  Parmenides.  The  doctrine  of  atomism  will  be  pre 
sented  fully  in  its  greatest  representative,  Democritus. 
The  Later  Pythagoreans.  Had  the  Pythagorean 
band  remained  what  Pythagoras  had  designed  it,  had  it 
not  had  its  political  aspirations  crushed  at  the  battle  of 
Crotona  and  the  members  scattered  far  and  wide,  it 
would  probably  have  for  the  historian  of  to-day  only  the 
importance  of  a  local  band  of  political  and  religious 
reformers.  The  adversity  at  Crotona  was,  however,  a 
blessing  in  disguise  for  the  Pythagoreans  and  for  Greece, 
for  it  turned  the  Pythagoreans  from  religious  politics 
to  science  and  metaphysics.  In  the  first  place,  they  be 
came  the  authors  of  an  important  metaphysical  theory. 


PLURALISM  49 

This  was  the  theory  of  numbers  which  influenced  Plato, 
became  the  foundation  of  a  vigorous  school  in  Alexan 
dria  in  the  Hellenic-Roman  Period,  flourished  during 
the  Middle  Ages,  and  united  with  the  doctrines  of  the 
Jews  in  what  is  called  the  Cabala.  To-day  the  magic 
numbers  persist  in  our  superstitions.  In  the  second 
place,  the  Pythagoreans  turned  to  science,  —  especially 
to  mathematics  and  astronomy,  —  and  in  these  two 
branches  became  very  celebrated  in  ancient  times.  Their 
astronomical  theory  had  a  most  extraordinary  history. 
With  modifications  it  was  preserved  by  Plato  and  Aris 
totle,  and  later  became  the  basis  of  the  Ptolemaic  sys 
tem  of  astronomy.  This  system  was  the  scientifically 
accepted  system  for  fifteen  hundred  years,  when  it  was 
supplanted  by  the  Newtonian  theory.  It  is  a  most  sin 
gular  fact  that  the  cosmological  background  of  the  Epics 
of  Dante  and  Milton  is  the  astronomical  system  of  the 
Pythagoreans  as  expressed  in  the  Ptolemaic  system. 

The  Pythagoreans,  be  it  remarked,  were  "  Reconcil 
ers,"  but  they  were  more.  The  original  ethical  motive 
of  Pythagoras  _ j nfl  n mi n*(\_$\Gm_sui  scientists.  They  did 
not  attempt  to  formulate  a  science  of  ethics,  but  the 
ethical  motive  was  always  back  of  their  mathematics 
and  astronomy. 

i.  The  Pythagorean  Conception  of  Being.  The  Py 
thagorean  conception  jrf^reality  is  the  most  advanced 
of  any  cosmological  theory  in  this  period.  The  Pythago 
reans  were  hylozoists,  but  they  come  the  nearest  to 
transcending  the  hylozoism  of  their  time.  The  influence 
of  the  later  Pythagoreans,  whom  Plato  met  in  Italy, 
upon  Plato  shows  that  Pythagorean  philosophy  forms 
a  link  between  the  cosmology .  oJLthe-  colonies  and  the 
following  comprehensive  systems  of  thought. 


50  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

The  important  position,  in  the  evolution  of  Greek 
thought  occupied  by  the  Pythagoreans  depends  upon 
their  conception  of  that  Being  that  abides  amid  all 
Change.  Pythagoreanism  is  usually  spoken  of  as  "  the 
number  theory."  This  is,  however,  only  a  suggestion  of 
its  import.  For  numbers  are  not  to  the  Pythagoreans 
what  the  different  kinds  of  cosmic  matter  were  to  the 
early  monists,  or  what  the  several  elements  were  to  the 
pluralists,  —  Empedocles,  Anaxagoras,  and  the  atomists. 
Neither  are  they  abstractions  merely,  such  as  we  use  in  sci 
entific  reckoning.  ThePythagoreans  were  pluralists  and 
hylozoists  whose  pluraTnumbers  look  beyond  hylozoism. 

There"  are  two  kinds  of_reality  in  the  Pythagorean 
teaching:  (1)  numbers,  and  (2)  unlimited  space.  The 
essential  nature  of  things,  the  Being  that  abides,  con 
sists  in  the  shaping  of  this  unlimited  space  into  mathe 
matical  forms.  The  numbers  or  the  forms  are  the  lim 
ited  aspect  of  Being;  space  is  the  unlimited  aspect  of 
Being.  Actual  Being  consists  in  the  union  of  the  two 
aspects.  Being  therefore  has  two  roots,  each  being  ne 
cessary  to  the  other.  The  later  Pythagoreans,  indeed, 
called  attention  to  the  fact  that  their  numbers  were  not 
the  same  as  the  different  kinds  of  matter  out  of  which 
the  other  Cosmologists  conceived  the  world  to  be  fash 
ioned.  Numbers  are  not  the  stuff  out  of  which  the 
world  of  nature-objects  have  arisen,  but  rather  are 
forms  of  nature-objects.  Numbers  are  the  patterns  or 
models  of  things ;  things  are  the  copies  or  imitations 
of  numbers.  Unlimited  space  furnishes  the  material ; 
numbers  or  mathematical  forms  furnish  the  mould  ;  the 
result  is  a  material  thing.  Here  we  find  the  early  basis 
of  Plato's  doctrine  of  Ideas,  and  the  correlation  in  Aris 
totle  of  Form  and  matter.  If  we  were  to  draw  an  ana- 


PLURALISM  51 

logy  between  the  Pythagorean  conception  of  numbers 
and  any  part  of  the  preceding  cosmological  teaching,  we 
should  find  the  similarity  between  the  numbers  and  the 
earlier  efficient  causes  and  not  between  the  numbers 
and  the  elements.  For  example,  Pythagorean  numbers 
have  a  function  more  nearly  like  Love  and  Hate  than 
like  the  four  elements  in  Empedocles'  teaching.  On  the 
other  hand,  Pythagorean  unlimited  space  is  analogous 
to  the  Empedoclean  elements. 

2.  The  Pythagorean  Dualistic  World.1  The  Pytha 
goreans  carried  out  their  conception  of  this  twofold 
reality  both  in  their  mathematical  studies  and  in  their 
conceptions  of  natural  objects.  It  was  from  such  inves 
tigations  that  they  were  impressed  by  the  dualism  in 
everything  and  so  reached  their  principle.  They  ob 
served  in  mathematics  that  the  number-series  consists 
of  alternate  odd  and  even  numbers.  The  odd  numbers 
are  limited  and  the  even  unlimited  (because  they  could 
be  divided).  They  explained  the  elements  as  deter 
mined  by  mathematical  forms:  fire  has  the  form  of  a 
tetrahedron  ;  earth,  of  the  cube  ;  air,  of  the  octohedron  ; 
water,  "of  the  icosahedron ;  and  an  additional  fifth  ele 
ment,  the  a3ther,  of  the  dodecahedron.  They  carried  this 
dualism  further  by  identifying  the  limited  form  with 
the  odd,  with  the  perfect,  and  with  the  good  ;  while  the 
unlimited  was  identified  with  the  even,  the  imperfect, 
and  the  bad.  Some  of  the  Pythagoreans  even  sought  to 
trace  out  this  dualism  in  the  many  realms  of  experience, 
and  they  originated  a  table  of  ten  pairs  of  opposites : 
limited  and  unlimited  ;  odd  and  even  ;  one  and  many ; 
right  and  left ;  male  and  female ;  rest  and  motion ; 

1  Dualism  :  the  belief  that  the  world  is  to  be  explained  by  two  mde* 
pendent  and  coexistent  principles. 


62  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

straight  and  crooked ;  light  and  dark ;  good  and  bad ; 
square  and  oblong. 

There  is  a  system  in  the  Pythagorean  theory  not  to 
be  found  in  the  teaching  of  the  other  reconcilers.  Al 
though  all  the  numbers,  and  with  them  all  the  world,  are 
jivided  into  two  opposing  classes,  these  are,  neverthe 
less,  united  in  a  harmony.  The  harmony  of  a  dualism 
reminds  us  of  Heracleitus'  harmony  of  antitheses.  All 
series  of  numbers  have  their  unity  and  harmony  in  the 
odd-even  number,  One.  To  the  Pythagorean  the  oppo- 
sites  of  life  —  the  good  and  the  bad,  the  limited  and 
unlimited,  the  perfect  and  imperfect,  the  odd  and  even 
—  exist  in  an  harmonious  whole. 

As  the  Pythagorean  school  grew  in  years,  the  realms 
to  which  it  applied  its  theory  increased.  While  we 
have  stated  its  metaphysical  theory  first  in  order  to 
give  it  prominence,  the  school  came  to  the  formulation 
of  its  theory  through  its  investigations  in  mathematics, 
music,  and  astronomy.  Then  it  applied  the  theory  to 
geometrical  structures  and  to  other  fields  with  a  pro 
cedure  that  was  arbitrary  and  unmethodical.  Yet  so 
universal  was  the  application  of  the  theory  that  it  lived 
to  have  superstitious  authority  for  the  human  mind  in 
the  Middle  Ages. 

3.  Pythagorean  Astronomy.  The  formation  of  the 
world-all  began  from  the  One,  or  central  fire,  which 
attracted  and  limited  the  nearest  portions  of  the  unlim 
ited.  This  fire  became  the  centre  of  the  world-all,  which 
had  the  shape  of  a  hollow  globe.  Around  the  central 
fire  the  celestial  bodies  move  in  globular  transparent 
shells.  Their  movements  are  concentric  to  the  fire.  This 
is  the  beginning  of  the  astronomical  theory  of  the  crys 
talline  spheres.  The  world-all  is  divided  into  three 


PLURALISM  53 

concentric  portions.  The  periphery  or  outer  rim  ia 
Olympus,  where  all  is  perfection  and  where  the  gods 
dwell.  Between  Olympus  and  the  moon  is  Cosmos, 
where  all  is  orderly  and  all  movements  are  in  circles. 
Between  the  moon  and  the  central  fire  is  the  region 
called  Uranus,  where  all  is  disorderly  and  the  move 
ments  are  up  and  down.  The  earth  is  in  this  lower 
section  of  disorder,  and  moves  in  a  transparent  globular 
shell  like  the  celestial  bodies  around  the  central  fire. 
The  number  of  the  heavenly  bodies  is  the  perfect  num 
ber,  ten.  The  world-all  is  conceived  as  a  heavenly  hep 
tachord,  with  the  orbits  of  the  seven  planets  as  the 
sounding  strings.  Upon  this  notion  was  founded  the 
harmony  of  the  spheres,  which  harmony  is  not  heard 
by  man  because  it  is  constant.  In  modifying  this  astro 
nomical  theory  and  then  accepting  it,  the  most  impor 
tant  change  that  Aristotle  made  was  to  conceive  the 
earth  as  at  the  centre  of  the  world-all  with  the  sua 
revolving  about  it.  This  was  the  form  in  which  the 
Ptolemaic  astronomers  received  it. 

Historical  Retrospect.  In  these  many  searchings  of 
the  Cosmologists  for  a  reality  amid  the  changes  of 
nature,  what  result  can  be  found  significant  for  the  Cos- 
mological  Period  and  valuable  as  a  bequest  for  the 
following  periods?  Are  these  crude  scientific  specula 
tions  of  the  early  Greeks  to  be  looked  upon  as  out  of 
connection  with  their  own  age  and  the  age  to  come  ? 
The  Cosmological  philosophy  had  two  definite  results.  In 
the  first  place,  with  reference  to  its  own  century  and  a 
half,  it  saved  the  intellectual  world  ol_Qieece  from  the 
slavery  of  a  mystio.  rfiliginn.  W^hen  we  started  with 
Thales  in  625  B.  C.,  we  saw  Greece  confronted  with 
two  perils.  One  was  political,  and  consisted  of  internecine 


54  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

troubles  and  of  danger  from  its  warlike  neighbors. 
This  peril  grew  still  greater,  until  at  the  very  end  of 
the  period  it  was  averted  at  the  battle  of  Salamis. 
Greek  arms  banished  this  political  peril.  But  the  other 
peril  was  subjective  and  therefore  more  menacing.  The 
mysteries_flf  the  Onhio  religion  would  have  qnp.Tio.Tipd 
the  Greek  genius  had  not  its  rational  philosophy  given 
the  Greek  intellectual  life  new  conceptions.  In  the  next 
place,  it  Jap^uejit^_J»^^ 

well-drawn   contrast   between  a  world  of   intellectual 
6rder~an3Ta  world  of  sensuous  disorder. T"TEeTh6ugIit  z>f  \ 
an  order  in  Mature  irTconformityTo^aw  was  developed  / 
into  clearness  in  the  Cosmological  Period.  The  order  ^ 
was  obtained  from  the  astronomical  studies  of  these 
scientists.  Reasoning  from  the  order  that  they  saw,  to  an 
ordering  principle,  Anaxagoras  and  the  Pythagoreans 
almost,  but  not  quite,  gave  to  that  principle  a  teleological 
meaning.  The  principle  of  permanence  that  these  nature 
scientists  sought  was  found  in  the  great  and  simple  re 
lations  of  the  stars,  whose  revolutions  are  the  expression 
of  order  and  constancy.  Impregnated  as  they  were  with 
their  elemental  hylozoism,  the  Greek  Cosmologists  were 
as  yet  not  quite  able  to  find  an  orderly  permanence  in 
the  terrestrial  world  with  its  manifold  and  intersecting 
motions.  Yet  Greek  thought  was  looking  forward.  The 
Cosmologist   had  already  contrasted  the  terrestrial  asu 
the  imperfect  with  the  celestial  as  the  perfect  peace  and] 
permanence.  The  step  was  but  a  short  one  from  the 
contrast  of  the  two  realms  to  the  effort  to  bring  them 
into  a  unity.    Thus  in  this  astronomical  and  concrete 
form  a  distinction  of  value  was  obtained  that  had  last 
ing  ethical   and  assthetical  significance,  not  only  upon 
Plato  and  Aristotle,  but  upon  modern  thought. 


CHAPTER  IV 

THE  ANTHROPOLOGICAL  PERIOD  (490-399  B.  C.):  THE 
PHILOSOPHY  OF  MAN 

An  Historical  Summary  of  the  Anthropological  Pe 
riod.  The  Anthropological  Period  begins  with  the 
Persian  Wars,  490  and  480  B.  C.  After  the  battle  of 
Marathon  there  sprang  up  a  distinct  impulse  toward 
knowledge  all  over  Greece  ;  and  detailed  investigations 
were  begun  in  mathematics,  astronomy,  biology,  medi 
cine,  history,  and  physics.  Science,  which  had  up  to  this 
time  been  unorganized  and  undifferentiated,  now  became 
sharply  divided  into  the  special  sciences.  But  what 
makes  the  Persian  Wars  of  particular  importance  is 
that  they  are  the  starting-point  in  the  motherland  of  the 
movement  in  the  study  of  man  and  human  relations. 
The  battle  of  Marathon  does  not  therefore  mark  the 
end  of  the  Cosmological  movement  and  the  waning  of 
the  Greeks'  interest  in  science  ;  but  it  marks  rather  the 
beginning  in  Athens  of  the  Anthropological  movement. 
The  Cosmological  and  the  Anthropological  Periods 
overlap. 

The  Anthropological  Period  easily  divides  itself  into 
three  epochs  from  the  point  of  view  of  its  political 
affairs :  — 

1.  The  Persian  Wars,  490  and  480  B.  c. 

2.  The  Age  of  Pericles,  467-428  B.  c. 

3.  The  Peloponnesian  Wars,  432-403  B.  c. 

The  first  epoch  is  the  birth  and  the  last  epoch  the  de 
cadence  of  pure  Greek  civilization,  while  the  thirty-nin* 


66  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

years  of  the  supremacy  of  Pericles  cover  the  ripest 
period  of  Greek  life.  In  this  connection  it  is  well  to 
mention  Hegel's  thought  that  nations  do  not  ripen  in 
tellectually  until  they  begin  to  decay  politically  ("  The 
owl  of  Minerva  does  not  start  upon  its  flight  until  the 
evening  twilight  has  begun  to  fall ").  Plato  and  Aris 
totle  do  not  come  until  after  this  period,  when  Greek 
political  life  had  begun  to  wane. 

The  following  table  is  a  partial  list  of  the  notable 
men  of  the  period,  with  the  date  of  their  birth :  — 
JEschylus,  525  Anaxagoras,  500. 

(dramatist  before  Pericles).        Empedocles,  495. 
Sophocles,  495  Protagoras,  480. 

(dramatist  during  Age  of  Peri-   Democritus,  470.  y 

cles).  Sophists  (many), 

Phidias,  490.  450-350. 

Euripides,  480  Socrates,  469. 

(dramatist  of  the  Sophistic  and   Antisthenes,  440, 
the  new  learning).  Aristippus,  435. 

Herodotus,  475.  Plato,  427. 

Thucydides,  471. 
Xenophon,  430  ? 
Aristophanes,  444. 

The  Persian  Wars  and  the  Rise  of  Athens.  Tho 
blow  that  had  been  impending  over  Greece  during  the 
sixth  century  had  been  struck,  but  had  been  averted  in 
the  Persian  Wars  of  490  B.  c.  and  480  B.  c.  The  power 
ful  and  splendidly  organized  "  barbaric  neighbor,"  who 
had  threatened  the  civilization  of  the  Greek  cities  of 
Asia  Minor  for  so  many  years,  had  swept  over  the  Helles 
pont  into  Greece  and  had  been  turned  back.  It  has 
been  pointed  out1  that  the  Persian  Wars  were  only  one 

1  Wheeler,  History  of  Alexander  the  Great. 


THE  PHILOSOPHY   OF  MAN  57 

of  a  series  of  conflicts  between  Oriental  and  Occidental 
civilizations  ;  and  that  the  strip  of  Asia  Minor  along 
the  Mediterranean  has  always  been  a  disputed  border 
land  between  irreconcilable  hemispheres.  First  was  the 
mythical  invasion  of  Troy;  then  the  Persian  Wars; 
then  came  the  arms  of  Alexander  conquering  Persia  ; 
then  the  invasion  of  the  Mohammedans  to  the  very  walls 
of  Tours  ;  then  the  Crusades  ;  and  to-day  we  still  have 
the  eternal  Eastern  question  with  us.  While  each  of 
these  conflicts  was  momentous  for  Europe,  none  was 
more  important  in  its  issues  for  the  world  than  the  Per 
sian  Wars.  For  *J1™U£[LJJIP^  wflTS  did  Greece  first 
come  to  a  consciousness  ofjiejrself..  Neyej  before  did 
nnit.pfl  strmigtfr,  —  the  greatness  of  her 


inherited  instincts*.  TheJlfi^cautui^UBL^^ 

ioHS.  niomentjof  Greece^  if  not  of  the  world. 


Classic  Greece  —  the  Greece  whose  thought  became 
fundamental  to  western  civilization  —  was  born  from 
the  Persian  Wars. 

The  centre  of  gravity  of  the  Greek  world  was  shifted 
after  the  Persian  Wars  from  Miletus  to  Athens,  from 
the  colonies  to  the  motherland.  Indeed,  the  history  of 
classic  Greece  is  almost  entirely  the  history  of  Athens. 
Of  the  large  cities  of  Greece,  —  Corinth,  ^Egina,  Sparta, 
and  Thebes,  —  Athens  was  naturally  the  locality  where 
Grecian  civilization  would  centre  when  the  commercial 
and  maritime  colonies  fell.  The  Ionian  race,  by  whom  it 
had  been  settled,  was  a  mixed  race,  and  by  nature  very 
versatile.  Before  the  Persian  Wars  it  had  been  under 
the  wise  tyranny  of  ^Pislstratna^gko  took  the  first  steps 
toward_tlie_jfoundiijg  jof  .^n__Aih£maj^jejn^ire.  In  the 
period  between  the  two  wars,  Themis  tocles  had  built  the 
Athenian  fleet  and  thereby  made  Athens  the  great  mari- 


58  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

time  and  naval  centre  of  Greece.  There  was,  indeed,  every 
reason  why  Athens  and  not  some  other  Grecian  city 
should  become  the  new  centre  of  classic  Greece.  The 
Spartans  were  oligarchical,  stern,  unintellectual,  and 
offensive  to  strangers  ;  the  people  of  Thebes  were  held 
under  a  strict  aristocratic  government,  the  people  of 
Thessaly  were  aristocratic,  luxurious,  and  stagnant ;  but 
the  Athenians  were  democratic,  social  to  strangers,  lit 
erary,  liberal,  frugal,  and  alert.  After  the  Persian  Wars 
the  power  of  the  Delian  confederacy  became  more  and 
more  centralized  in  the  city  of  Athens.  Controlling  the 
fleet  of  the  Confederacy  for  her  own  defense  and  using 
the  rich  treasury  of  the  Confederacy  for  her  own  munici 
pal  improvements,  Athens  under  the  brilliant  rule  of 
Pericles,  who  summoned  scholars  and  artists  from  all 
Greece,  was  the  only  city  of  Greece  where  the  Renais 
sance  of  Greece  was  possible.  Athens  had  become  the 
eye  of  Greece,  and  the  following  description  of  the  Greek 
Renaissance  is  especially  significant  in  regard  to  her. 

The  Greek  Enlightenment.  Following  the  Persian 
Wars  there  arose  throughout  Greece  a  great  national 
intellectual  movement.  The  years  mark  the  Greek  Re 
naissance,  the  Age  of  Pericles,  and  the  time  when  the 
Greek  masterpieces  in  literature  and  plastic  art  were 
produced.  Perhaps  the  greatest  Greek  production  was 
Athens  itself,  whose  cultural  influence  was  personified 
in  the  scholar-politician,  Pericles. 

1.  The  Impulse  for  Learning.  In  the  first  place 
there  was  a  general  impulse  throughout  Greece  for  edu 
cation.  Everybody  seemed  to  want  to  know  what  the 
schools  of  Cosmologists  had  had  to  say  about  science. 
The  Greeks  now  had  wealth  and  therefore  leisure  ;  they 
had  come  into  contact  with  the  Oriental  peoples  and 


THE   PHILOSOPHY  OF  MAN  59 

therefore  they  had  their  curiosity  excited.  Learning, 
which  had  been  confined  in  the  Cosmological  Period  to 
a  few  scholars  in  the  schools,  now  came  forth  into  the 
market  place.  Learning  in  the  fifth  century  B.  c.  was 
drawn  from  the  schools  into  publicity.  The  objects  of 
interest  had  greatly  widened  and  the  learning  of  the 
scholars  began  to  filter  into  the  general  consciousness. 
Whereas  in  the  sixth  century  philosophy  was  a  matter 
between  learned  men,  in  the  fifth  century  we  find  Soc 
rates  and  the  Sophists  teaching  whosoever  would  listen. 
2.  TJie  Practical  Need  of  Knowledge.  But  mere  curi 
osity  will  not  entirely  explain  the  Greek  intellectual 
movement.  There  had  grown  up  an  imperative  practical 
need  for  knowledge.  In  Athens  and  other  Greek  cities 
the  democracy  of  the  fifth  century  B.  c.  had  supplanted 
the  tyranny  of  the  sixth  century.  Duty  and  inclination 
together  forced  the  citizen  into  active  participation  in 
public  affairs.  In  these  democratic  cities  family  tradi 
tion  and  character  were  no  longer  sufficient  for  success  ; 
but  it  became  generally  recognized  that  the  most  useful 
and  successful  man  was  the  educated  man.  The  com 
plex  relations  existing  between  states  and  between  the 
citizens  in  the  states  made  education  absolutely  neces 
sary  for  the  politician.  Nowhere  was  the  need  of  an 
education  more  imperative  than  in  Athens ;  nowhere 
was  the  need  more  easily  filled.  In  a  very  short  time 
after  the  Persian  Wars  the  social  position  of  science 
changed  to  one  of  power ;  and  the  inner  character  of 
science  changed  from  the  study  of  nature  to  the  study 
of  ethical  and  political  problems.  Scientists  became 
teachers  of  eloquence,  for  the  citizen  now  needed  to  be 
an  orator  and  a  rhetorician.  Statesmen  and  generals 
must  know  how  to  persuade.  Courts  of  law  were  pub- 


60  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

lie,  their  proceeding  oral,  and  personal  attendance  was 
therefore  required.  There  was  no  man  in  Athens  who 
might  not  be  condemned,  if  he  could  not  personally  in 
court  refute  falsehoods  and  disentangle  sophistries. 
Besides,  to  be  beaten  in  debate  was  as  disgraceful  in 
the  eyes  of  the  public  as  to  lose  one's  cause. 

Two  classes  of  men,  with  an  importance  hitherto  un 
known,  appear  in  Greek  history, — the  rhetoricians  and 
the  dialecticians.  Rhetoric  was  public  oratory,  necessary 
for  the  public  defense  of  one's  rights,  or  for  the  main 
tenance  of  one's  dignity,  or  for  the  gratification  of  one's 
ambition.  The  dialectic  was,  on  the  other  hand,  argument 
employed  in  private..b.etagfi£gLt wo  persons,  usually  friends, 
to  unraYel^ji-ribacurity,  to  re_duce  an  ppppnent_tp_silence, 
to  exercise  one's  self  in  the  mastery  of  a  subject,.  or_lo- 
siftevidence,  The  dialectic,  therefore,  became  a  distinct 
mental  pursuit  for  men  who  had  a  natural  defect  in 
public  speaking  or  rhetoric.  Besides  rhetoric  and  dia 
lectic,  there  grew  up  somewhat  later  what  was  called 
the  eristic.  Juristic  was  polemical  argument  consisting 
of  catch-phrases  and  logical  subtleties.  It  was  taught  as 
an  art  of  adroit  argument. 

The  great  Greek  tragedies  occupy  a  place  in  the  de 
velopment  of  the  dialectic  and  the  satisfying  of  the  need 
of  knowledge.  Science,  through  the  drama,  transformed 
the  old  religious  views  and  brought  its  new  interpreta 
tion  to  the  common  people.  The  development  of  the 
fifth-century  drama  out  of  the  epic  of  the  sixth  century 
was  not  merely  a  change  in  architectonic,  but  a  trans 
formation  of  its  ethical  and  religious  spirit.  The  germ 
was  in  the  previous  ethics,  lyrics,  and  gnomics,  yet  it  was 
fully  amplified  in  the  drama.  Instead  of  a  summary  of 
deeds  the  tragic  poet  makes  his  characters  talk,  defend, 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  MAN  61 

refute,  accuse,  lament,  etc.  This  gives  rise  to  exigen 
cies  that  require  the  dialectic.  In  the  conflicting  duties 
and  in  the  justification  of  the  wrong  done  by  the  wrong 
suffered,  dialectical  skill  is  called  for  in  the  drama  to 
weigh  the  ethical  motives  in  a  manner  that  the  epic 
does  not  demand.  Thus  the  drama  of  -ZEschylus,  Sopho 
cles,  and  Euripides  was  a  link  between  the  lyric  and 
gnomic  poetry  of  the  sixth  century  B.  c.  and  the  dia 
logue  literature  of  Plato.* 

3.  The,  Critical  Attitude  of  Mind.  The  most  im 
portant  characteristic  of  this  period  is  neither  the  in 
tensified  social  curiosity  nor  the  increased  social  needs. 
It  is  rather  ethical  in  its  character.  It  is  the  "critical" 
or  "  individualistic  "  attitude  of  mind.  This  began  with 
the  "  free  city  feeling  "  —  the  consciousness  of  the  free 
man  in  a  free  state  —  in  the  first  half  of  the  fifth  cen 
tury  B.  c.,  and  developed  rapidly  into  individualism  and 
critical  skepticism  toward  the  end  of  that  century. 

If  one  were  to  compare  in  a  single  word  the  history 
of  Greece  before  the  Persian  Wars  with  that  after  the 
Persian  Wars,  he  would  say  that  the  former  was  tra 
ditional  and  the  latter  was  critical.  Nevertheless,  at  the 
beginning  of  the  Cosinological  Period  Greek  traditional 
customs  were  being  weakened  by  attacks  upon  them. 
Religious  ideas  were  threatened  by  the  Cosmologists. 
The  subordination  of  the  gods  to  the  cosmic  substance 
was  an  attack  upon  the  established  polytheism  of  the 
Epic,  and  the  attack  became  direct  in  the  hands  of 
Xenophanes.  It  was  "  the  divestiture  of  Nature  of  its 
gods  by  science."  The  Mysteries  were  a  part  of  this 
departure  from  the  traditional  religion.  But  the  new 
and  more  critical  scientific  attitude  toward  traditional 

*  Read  Grote,  History  of  Greece,  vol.  viii,  pp.  334-347. 


62  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

religion  was  only  incidental  to  the  growing  criticism  of 
law.  In  the  days  of  the  oligarchy  there  were  two  self- 
evident  political  assumptions  :  (1)  that  law  has  validity 
because  it  is  law ;  (2)  that  obedience  to  law  is  for  one's 
advantage.  When,  however,  the  political  disturbances 
began,  a  self-conscious  individualism  developed  among 
the  Greeks.  The  Gnomic  Poets  had  been  the  first  to 
appeal  to  the  individual  consciousness  of  the  people. 
All  through  the  sixth  century  B.  c.  Greece  had  stern  ex 
periences,  and  the  individual  found  himself  questioning 
the  sanctity  of  tradition  and  of  time-honored  laws. 
There  was  no  longer  a  tacit  acquiescence  in  established 
order,  and  the  claims  of  authority  were  no  longer,  as 
formerly,  unchallenged.  Confidence  in  political  assump 
tions  began  to  waver,  and  a  critical  attitude  was  taken 
toward  laws  which  changed  from  year  to  year.  The 
appearance  everywhere  of  the  tyrant,  the  vigorous  per 
sonality  who  could  set  up  his  will  against  the  will  of 
a  traditional  aristocracy,  impressed  the  age  with  the 
power  of  individual  egoism.  The  seat  of  authority  was 
shifted  from  tradition  to  the  individual  reason,  and  all 
institutions  were  brought  under  individual  criticism. 

The  Persian  Wars  mark  the  point  of  transition  from 
the  traditional  attitude  to  the  critical  attitude  of  the 
Greek  mind.  In  themselves  the  Persian  Wars  were  a 
great  moral  uplift,  and  were  a  return  for  a  time  to  the 
traditional  institutions.  The  changes  long  since  begun 
were  suspended  for  a  time  in  the  united  effort  of  the 
Greek  nation.  But  the  tendencies  became  more  insist 
ent  when  the  danger  was  past.  The  Persian  Wars  had 
cleared  the  atmosphere  of  its  pessimism  and  had  given 
freedom  to  the  intellectual  movement.  Then  later,  in 
the  heat  of  that  intellectual  movement,  individualism 


THE   PHILOSOPHY   OF  MAN  63 

and  criticism  came  to  fullest  fruitage.     Doubt  grew 
into  positive  skepticism. 

In  the  last  part  of  the  fifth  century  B.  c.,  critical  skep 
ticism  became  universal.  In  religion  the  anthropomor 
phism  of  the  Epic  passes  under  ridicule.  Critias  declares 
that  the  gods  are  the  invention  of  shrewd  statecraft. 
In  literature  the  Epic,  in  which  the  gods  interfere  in 
all  human  details,  yields  to  the  naturalistic  descrip 
tions  of  Herodotus  and  Thucydides,  and  to  the  per 
sonal  note  of  lyric  and  satirical  poetry.  More  impor 
tant  than  all  was  the  change  of  attitude  toward  the 
laws.  Instead  of  the  law  having  a  divine  authority,  vhtf 
individual  placed  himself  above  it  and  sat  in  judgmenc 
upon  it.  The  tribal  conception  of  guilt,  that  when  a 
member  of  a  tribe  sinned  the  whole  tribe  would  suffer 
at  the  hands  of  the  gods,  had  given  way  at  the  time  of 
the  Persian  Wars  to  that  of  personal  responsibility 
and  retribution.  It  was  noted  that  laws  change  in 
the  same  state,  that  they  differ  in  different  states,  and 
that  moral  customs  have  a  great  variety.  All  laws  seem 
therefore  to  be  made  by  man,  and  the  question  then 
arose,  Is  there  any  law  which  has  universal  validity  ? 
Is  there  any  real  prius  or  "  Nature  "  of  laws?  In  the 
Anthropological  Period,  the  important  question  was 
about  the  real  prius  or  "  Nature "  of  human  institu 
tions,^  just  as  in  the  Cosmological  Period  the  question 
was  about  the  real  prius  or  "  Nature  "  of  the  world  of 
physical  phenomena.  Yet  the  question  of  the  Anthro 
pologists  was  a  part  of  the  Cosmological  problem.  The 
Cosmologists  had  called  the  real  prius  or  "  Nature " 
(<£uVis),  that  which  ever  remains  like  itself,  and  it  is 
now  asked  if  "  Nature  "  in  itself  contains  any  unchang 
ing  and  eternal  politico-moral  law.  The  contrast  is  thus 


64  HISTORY  OP  PHILOSOPHY 

drawn  for  all  time  between  natural  law  and  statute 
law,  and  the  distinction  dominates  this  period.  Human 
legal  institutions  were  regarded  as  only  makeshifts, 
and  often  even  as  contradicting  the  divine  law.  The 
conflict  between  natural  or  divine  law  and  human  law 
appears  worked  out  in  the  Antigone  of  Sophocles. 

The  same  interest  in  the  foundations  of  morality  and 
moral  relations  opened  up  the  whole  subject  of  the 
power  of  human  consciousness  to  discern  such  relations. 
It  was  a  logical  necessity  that  turned  thought  from  a 
review  of  man's  relations  with  his  fellows  to  a  criti 
cism  of  his  own  constitution.  What  is  man?  What 
are  his  faculties  ?  Has  he  any  that  give  him  the  truth 
and  the  reality?  Or  do  they  all  deceive  him  so  that  he 
cannot  detect  the  real  from  the  sham  of  life  ?  What 
are  the  mental  faculties  used  in  disputation,  and  how 
are  they  to  be  trained  so  that  man  may  rise  to  an  emi 
nence  of  culture  among  his  fellows  ?  The  Greek  thus 
turned  to  a  criticism  of  his  knowing  faculties,  and  the 
positive  social  and  moral  demands  made  such  a  criti 
cism  necessary  to  his  well-being.  Greek  science  took 
a  strong  anthropological  direction,  and  logic,  ethics, 
psychology,  rhetoric,  etc.,  took  the  place  of  natural  sci 
ence  subjects.  The  Greek  in  the  fifth  century  B.  c.  was 
interested  in  man  —  in  his  inner  activities,  his  ideations 
and  volitions.  Of  this  critical  and  individualistic  atti 
tude  Euripides  is  the  literary  exponent ;  Pericles  is  the 
political  personification ;  Socrates  and  the  Sophists  are 
its  philosophical  expression. 

The  Significance  of  the  Sophists.  The  Sophists  were 
the  direct  means  of  bringing  this  intellectual  change 
into  Greek  life.  They  were  the  bearers  of  this  Greek 
Enlightenment,  and  they  were  the  missionaries  that 


THE   PHILOSOPHY  OF  MAN  65 

spread  its  influence  far  and  wide.  This  significance  of 
the  Sophists  to  the  culture  of  Greece  was  never  under 
stood  by  the  historian  until  Hegel  set  them  in  their 
true  light.  The  dark  side  of  their  character  has  been 
painted  in  blackest  colors,  so  that  the  word  "  Sophist " 
has  carried  an  opprobrium  with  it.  They  were,  how 
ever,  the  exponents  of  the  Greek  illumination,  and  not 
the  cause  of  it.  They  therefore  share  all  its  weaknesses 
and  its  excellencies ;  and  any  judgment  upon  them  is  a 
judgment  upon  the  time  itself.  The  most  accurate  de 
scription  of  them  is  that  they  were  the  exponents  of 
QlgejLCulture  in  the  age  of  Perjcleg. ;  the  worst  that  can 
be  said  of  them  is  that  they  stimulated  the  Greek  spirit 
in  directions  in  which  it  should  have  been  controlled. 
Their  true  work  was  to  carry  the  gospel  of  Greek  indi 
vidualism  everywhere ;  their  fault  lay  in  the  fact  that 
too  frequently  they  confused  individualism  with  hypoc 
risy,  and  led  their  hearers  to  believe  that  appearance 
knowledge  is  the  same  as  true  knowledge. 

The  word  "  Sophist"  had  a  development  among  the 
Greeks.  It  first  meant  a  wise  man  (the  Cosmologists, 
from  Thales  to  Anaxagoras,  were  Sophists)  ;  then  a 
teacher  of  wisdom ;  then  a  paid  teacher  of  wisdom. 
Moreover,  among  the  Sophists  there  is  a  difference  be 
tween  the  early  Sophists,  who  were  inspired  by  a  distinct 
desire  to  spread  culture,  and  the  later  Sophists,  who 
were  mercenary  teachers,  and  had  on  that  account  de 
generated  into  mere  quibblers.  In  general,  the  ground 
of  the  contemporary  hostility  to  the  Sophists  was  the 
hatred  of  the  conservative  and  reactionary  party,  to 
which  belonged  Aristophanes  the  satirist,  2Eschylus 
"  the  father  of  tragedy,"  and  the  exponent  of  institu 
tional  morals,  and  Xenophon,  who  stood  for  a  complete 


66  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

return  to  a  patriarchal  state.  This  party  was  very  bit» 
ter  against  the  exponents  of  the  new  and  radical  spirit 
springing  up  in  Greece.  All  the  philosophers  of  the 
new  learning,  including  Socrates,  suffered  at  the  hands 
of  those  who  would  conserve  the  old  traditions.  In  par 
ticular,  the  accusations  against  the  Sophists  of  this 
period  were  :  they  were  cavilers ;  they  taught  for  pay ; 
they  represented  the  universalizing  of  education  against 
the  old  aristocracy;  they  menaced  institutions. 

The  Sophists  were  then  primarily  and,  on  the  whole, 
the  transmitters  to  the  people  of  the  culture  of  the 
time.  They  were  the  teachers  of  the  humanities  to  that 
age.  They  were  not  technically  philosophers,  but  were 
interested  in  philosophical  questions.  Protagoras  was 
the  only  Sophist  who  was  the  author  of  any  fruitful 
philosophical  conceptions.  Gorgias  made  occasional 
essays  into  philosophy.  But  besides  Protagoras  and 
Gorgias  no  other  Sophists  can  be  classed  as  philoso 
phers,  except  possibly  Hippias  and  Prodicus. 

The  Sophists  introduced  a  profusion  of  knowledge 
among  the  people.  They  made  investigations  in  lan 
guage,  logic,  and  the  theory  of  cognition.  They  taught 
literature,  history,  grammar,  the  principles  of  the  dia 
lectic,  the  eristic,  and  rhetoric  —  all  subjects  concerned 
with  the  art  of  human  expression.  They  studied  and 
taught  the  special  subjects  concerned  with  human  re 
lations,  like  ethics,  the  theory  of  knowledge,  psychology, 
and  politics.  Anything  that  had  a  place  in  Greek  cul 
ture  was  systematically  and  skillfully  presented  by  such 
men  as  Protagoras,  Gorgias,  Hippias,  and  Prodicus, 
who  were  men  of  encyclopedic  erudition.  The  Sophist 
took  the  education  of  the  Greek  child  at  the  age  of  six 
teen,  after  he  had  received  his  elementary  training,  first 


THE   PHILOSOPHY  OF  MAN"  67 

at  home  and  then  at  the  hands  of  the  teacher  at  school. 
The  Greek  boy's  education  was  naturally  divided  into 
two  parts  :  gymnastics  for  the  body  and  music  for  the 
soul.  Under  music  was  included  geometry,  performance 
on  the  lyre,  pronunciation,  the  chorus  and  poetry,  as 
tronomy,  physics,  and  geography.  At  the  age  of  sixteen 
he  got  his  instruction  by  meeting  public  men,  such  as  the 
Sophists,  in  the  street,  in  the  Agora,  and  other  public 
places.  It  was  at  this  period  of  his  life  that  the  Sophist 
took  his  education  into  those  higher  branches  which 
were  necessary  for  his  success  in  politics,  society,  and 
law.  Thus  the  instruction  of  the  Sophist  was  usually 
for  a  specific  purpose,  and  thus  rhetoric,  dialectic,  and 
the  mental  sciences  were  in  great  demand. 

The  Prominent  Sophists.  The  list  of  Sophists  is 
a  long  one.  The  first  to  call  himself  a  Sophist  and  a 
teacher  of  public  virtue  was,  according  to  Plato,  Pro 
tagoras  of  Abdera.  He  was  also  probably  the  most 
eminent  of  the  number.  He  was  born  about  480  B.  c. 
Polus  and  Thrasymachus  were  the  last ;  and  Aristotle 
mentions  the  Sophists  as  in  the  past.  So  that  we  may 
conclude  that  as  a  band  they  existed  only  one  hun 
dred  years  (450-350  B.  c.).  Already  at  the  beginning 
of  the  fourth  century  (400  B.  c.)  their  importance  had 
greatly  diminished.  In  this  hundred  years  we  find  some 
fourteen  or  fifteen  prominent  Sophists.  There  is,  first, 
Protagoras,  whose  theory  of  knowledge  is  not  only  in 
itself  a  contribution  to  thought,  but  also  of  importance 
as  a  factor  in  forming  the  materialist  atomistic  doctrine 
of  the  school  of  Abdera,  —  the  school  of  Leucippus  and 
Democritus  ;  Gorgias  of  Leontini,  the  head  of  an  em 
bassy  T6~  Athens,  a  man  of  eloquence,  whose  style  was 
imitated  by  Thucydides  and  whom  we  might  have  stud- 


68  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

ied  in  connection  with  the  Eleatic  school,  for  he  carried 
out  still  further  the  doctrines  of  Zeno  ;  Prodicus,  the 
pupil  of  Protagoras  and  Gorgias,  a  brilliant  man  and  a 
traveler,  whose  method  of  instruction  was  used  by  Soc 
rates  ;  Hippias,  contemporary  of  Prodicus,  remarkable 
for  his  mathematical,  physical,  and  historical  erudition, 
&nd  a  man  full  of  vanity ;  the  brothers,  Euthydemus 
and  Dionysiodorus,  teachers  of  eristic ;  the  rhetorician 
Thrasymachus  and  the  rhetoricians  of  the  school  of 
Gorgias,  viz.,  Polus,  Lycophron,  Protarchus,  and  Al- 
cidamus  ;  Evenus,  rhetorician,  moralist,  and  poet ;  Cri- 
tias,  the  leader  of  the  thirty ;  Callicles  and  Hippoda- 
mus. 

Many  of  these  men  were  reformers.  Some  (as  Alcid- 
amus)  were  opposed  jto  the  institution  of  slavery  in 
Greece ;  some  to  marriage  ;  some  (as  Lycophron)  to  the 
nobility ;  some  to  the  inequality  of  property ;  while 
Hippodamus  was  the  first  to  propose  an  ideal  state. 

The  method  of  argumentation  employed  by  the  Soph 
ists  was  first  to  perplex  and  confuse  their  opponents  as 
to  what  had  been  taken  in  the  past  as  valid.  Then  they 
made  their  opponents  ridiculous  by  drawing  out  conse 
quences  from  their  statements.  Their  conclusions  were 
often  verbal  and  their  witticisms  vulgar.* 

The  Philosophy  of  the  Sophists.  The  philosophy  of 
the  Sophists  was  only  the  logical  following  out  of  the 
general  attitude  of  the  time  toward  all  traditions.  The 
more  the  old  physical  theories  fell  into  disrepute,  the 
more  the  changes  of  the  world  of  politics  seemed  to  in 
dicate  instability  everywhere,  the  more  opinions  differed 
on  the  same  subject,  —  so  much  the  more  did  the  possi- 

*  Read  H.  Jackson  in  Encyclopedia  Britannica,  article 
"  Sophists." 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  MAN  69 

bility  present  itself  to  the  Sophists  of  taking  two  con- 
tradictories  as  equally  true,  and  so  much  the  faster  did 
the  whole  Greek  world  lose  faith  in  any  valid  truth  and 
in  any  certain  knowledge.  The  dogmatism  of  the  Cos- 
inological  Period  is  thus  naturally  followed  by  the 
skepticism  of  the  Anthropological.  Beginning  with  the 
cautious  and  enlightened  relativism  of  Protagoras,  there 
grew  up  a  volume  of  criticism,  until  the  later  Sophists 
applied  destructive  doctrines  to  everything.  The  best 
representatives  of  the  philosophical  aspect  of  the  So 
phistic  movement  were  Protagoras  and  Gorgias. 

i.  The  Relativism  of  Protagoras.  Although  theo 
retically  skepticism  is  the  centre  and  logical  result  of 
the  Sophistic  movement,  the  teaching  of  the  greatest 
Sophist,  Protagoras,  cannot  be  strictly  called  skepti 
cism.  Philosophically,  skepticism  is  not  the  denial  of 
this  or  that  particular  belief  as  true,  but  the  denial  of 
the  existence  of  any  truth  whatever.  Protagoras  refused 
to  make  any  positive  statements  —  either  in  denial  or 
affirmation  —  about  ultimate  truth,  because,  as  he  said, 
we  have  no  insight  whatever  into  the  nature  of  absolute 
truth.  Our  knowledge  is  confined  to  motions  and  the 
phenomena  of  motion.  His  teaching  would  be  called  in 
modern  times  relativism  or  phenomenalism.  The  funda 
mental  principle  beneath  such  a  doctrine  is  that  know 
ledge  is  human  —  never  absolute,  but  always  relative. 

The  relativism  of  Protagoras  was  based  on  two  prin 
ciples  :  the  first  is  that  of  universal  change,  which  he 
borrowed  from  Heracleitus ;  the  second  is,  so  far  as  we 
know,  original  with  Protagoras,  —  that  sense-perception 
is  the  only  source  and  only  kind  of  knowledge.  In 
Heracleitus'  doctrine  change  is  universal,  each  term  of  a 
series  of  changes  passing  into  another.  The  senses  are  a 


70  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

part  of  this  flux,  and  since  they  are,  according  to  Protag 
oras,  the  only  source  of  knowledge,  knowledge  is  ephem 
eral  and  unreal.  Reason  is  extended  and  continued  sen 
sation.  A  movement  external  to  the  organism  stimulates 
an  organ  of  the  body  and  is  met  by  a  reacting  movement 
of  the  organ.  The  result  is  perception.  Perception  being 
itself  a  process,  each  present  moment  of  perception  is 
the  only  knowledge.  We  cannot  know  things  as  they 
are  in  themselves  ;  there  is  no  insight  into  the  Being  of 
things  over  and  above  our  perceptions.  On  the  contrary, 
reality  is  not  only  what  it  perceptually  appears  for  each 
individual,  but  also  what  it  appears  at  each  individual 
momentary  perception. 

What  is  the  result  of  such  a  theory  of  knowledge  ? 
Protagoras  expresses  it  well  in  his  famous  words,  "  Man 
is  the  measure  of  all  things."  It  is  absolute  sensational 
ism.  There  is  no  truth  except  that  of  the  present  mo 
ment.  Each  man  sees  the  truth  for  himself  at  the 
moment  of  his  perception.  It  does  not  matter  if  another 
has  a  different  perception.  It  does  not  matter  if  at  the 
next  moment  his  perception  differs.  Each  perception 
exists  at  the  moment,  is  true,  and  at  that  moment  is  the 
only  perception.  There  are  as  many  truths  as  there  are 
individuals,  as  many  as  there  are  moments  in  an  indi 
vidual's  life.  Each  individual  is  the  measure  of  the  true, 
the  beautiful,  and  the  good ;  for  a  thing  that  is  good  or 
true  to  one  man  may  be  harmful  or  false  to  another. 
Metaphysical  discussions  are  vain,  for  the  only  reality 
to  prove  is  the  content  of  the  present  moment.  All 
causes  and  ultimate  criteria  are  impossible  to  be  known. 

2.  The  Nihilism  of  Gorgias.  As  the  philosophy  of 
Protagoras  teaches  that  everything  is  equally  true,  that 
of  Gorgias  teaches  that  everything  is  equally  false. 


THE   PHILOSOPHY  OF  MAN  71 

Gorgias  declared  that  Being,  knowledge,  and  the  com 
munication  of  knowledge  are  impossible.  Starting  from 
the  dialectic  of  the  Eleatic,  Zeno  (as  Protagoras  started 
from  that  of  Heracleitus),  Gorgias  maintained:  (1) 
Nothing  is  ;  (2)  If  anything  is,  it  cannot  be  thought ; 
(3)  Even  if  it  can  be  thought,  it  cannot  be  communi 
cated.  The  knowledge  of  the  thing  is  different  from  the 
thing ;  the  expression  of  the  thought  in  words  is  differ 
ent  from  the  thought  itself. 

The  Ethics  of  the  Sophists.  —  The  Application  of 
their  Critical  Theory  to  Political  Life.  The  ethical- 
political  life  was.  of  paramount  importance  to  the 
Greek.  When  the  later  Sophists  began  to  scrutinize 
it  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  individual,  their 
skepticism  became  a  direct  menace  to  Greek  polit 
ical  institutions.  The  individual  became  a  law  unto 
himself,  and  the  citizen  set  himself  up  as  superior  to 
society.  Since  the  time  of  the  Gnomic  poets  the  con 
tent  of  both  moral  and  political  laws  had  become  more 
and  more  a  subject  of  reflection ;  and  at  the  time  of 
the  Sophists  the  whole  foundation  of  law  was  called  in 
question.  When  the  individual  man  is  declared  to  be 
the  measure  of  all  things,  all  legal  and  moral  institu 
tions  hang  in  the  balance.  All  rules  of  conduct  and  all 
laws  become  then  artificial  and  merely  conventional 
products ;  and  just  as  there  is  no  standard  of  truth  or 
error  in  knowledge,  so  there  is  no  standard  of  good 
citizenship  or  morality.  The  good  man  is  the  prudent 
man ;  the  good  citizen  is  the  successful  and  powerful 
man.  Might  is  right. 

Thus  the  Sophists  came  to  teach  such  doctrines  as 
these :  Laws  are  made  by  the  strongest,  represent  their 
will,  and  must  be  obeyed  if  they  cannot  be  disobeyed ; 


72  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

it  takes  a  strong  man  to  make  a  law,  but  a  stronger  to 
break  it ;  the  laws  are  only  conventions  invented  either 
by  the  many  to  restrain  the  powerful  few,  or  by  the  few 
to  enslave  the  many.  Even  religions  are  devices  of  the 
crafty  to  enchain  the  people.  Obedience  to  law  is  there 
fore  a  matter  of  personal  interest.  Happiness  is  the 
most  important  consideration  of  the  individual.  Some 
times  personal  interest  conflicts  with  law  and  law  does 
not  then  bring  happiness,  for  criminals  are  often  the 
most  happy.  It  is  not  obedience  to  law  that  brings 
happiness  but  (Polus)  a  shrewd  calculation  of  ends 
with  no  regard  to  right  or  law.  The  Sophists  made  no 
attempt  to  put  their  theories  into  execution.  They  ex 
pressed  the  sentiments  of  the  Greek  people,  and  Greek 
public  opinion  then  pointed  to  segregation  and  indi 
vidualism.  Plato  said  that,  after  all,  the  Greek  public 
was  the  great  Sophist. 

It  was  thus  that  the  distinction  arose  between  positive 
law  and  natural  law.  Reflecting  upon  the  differences 
among  the  constitutions  of  the  Greek  states  and  upon 
the  constant  alterations  in  these  constitutions,  the 
Sophist  concluded  that  the  greater  part  of  them  were 
of  human  invention.  They  were  positive  laws  and  were 
to  be  contrasted  with  natural  law,  which  was  such  law 
as  is  binding  on  all  men  equally.  Natural  law  is  there 
fore  of  greater  worth  than  positive  law,  and  is  set  in 
antithesis  to  it.  Sir  Henry  Maine  says  in  his  Ancient 
Law  that  the  Greeks  did  not  found  any  system  of 
jurisprudence,  because  natural  law  was  always  referred 
to  by  them  in  arguing  any  question.  The  only  way  to 
find  natural  law  is  to  strip  it  of  the  mass  of  conven 
tional  laws.  The  word  "  nature  "  has  been  in  its  his 
tory  one  of  the  most  ambiguous  of  words;  and  Protag- 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  MAN  73 

eras'  teaching  that  "  nature  "  consists  of  primary  ethical 
feelings  is  hardly  a  complete  and  satisfactory  definition. 
The  more  the  theory  of  the  Sophists  limited  "  nature  " 
to  human  nature,  and  to  human  nature  in  its  capricious 
and  individual  aspects,  so  much  the  more  did  statute 
laws  appear  antagonistic  to  natural  law  and  seem  to  be 
detrimental  to  it. 

Summary. 

1.  Although  a  skepticism  and  a  criticism,  Sophistry 
was  a  relative  advance  over  the  traditionalism  and  dog 
matism  of  the  Cosmologists. 

2.  Sophistry  turned  the  attention  to  man  and  his 
interests  as  the  principal  object  of  inquiry. 

3.  The  Sophists  stood  for  freedom  of  thought  by 
pointing  to  individual  consciousness  as  the  final  court 
of  appeal. 

4.  Although  the  Sophists  differed  very  much  in  their 
teaching,  they  had  a  mutual  dependence  and  common 
presuppositions. 

5.  The  Sophists  disregarded  the  likenesses  and  em* 
phasized  the  differences  among  men. 

6.  The  Sophists  built  up  their  doctrines  upon  the 
basis  of  a  sensationalist  psychology. 


CHAPTER  V 

SOCRATES  (469-399 B.C.). 

Socrates  and  Aristophanes.  There  were  two  ways 
in  which  the  other  elements  in  Greek  society  tried  to 
meet  the  Sophists.  One  was  led  by  Aristophanes,  the 
other  by  Socrates.  Aristophanes  was  a  rich  nobleman 
who  looked  back  with  pride  upon  the  good  old  times. 
He  would  have  a  government  of  the  best  rather  than 
of  the  many.  He  would  destroy  the  Sophistic  move 
ment,  and  he  wrote  many  satires  upon  Greek  life  with 
that  end  in  view.  His  satire,  The  Clouds,  is  of  especial 
interest  in  this  connection.  Socrates  represents  the 
other  way  in  which  the  Sophistic  movement  was  met. 
He  accepted  the  Sophistic  movement,  but  he  read  more 
deeply  into  it  than  the  Sophists  themselves,  and  he  tried 
to  find  its  truth. 

The  extraordinary  personality  of  Socrates  is  the  cen 
tral  figure  in  this  age  of  critical  inquiry.  For  the  first 
time  do  we  find  philosophy  centred  in  a  great  person 
ality,  and  there  is  no  more  picturesque  figure  in  his 
tory.  The  exposition  of  his  doctrines  is  essentially  a 
biography.  He  wrote  nothing  himself,  and  the  literary 
sources  of  his  life  and  teaching  are  found  in  Xeno- 
phon's  Memorabilia  and  Symposium,  in  the  writings 
of  Plato,  and  in  those  of  Aristotle.  They  throw  differ 
ent  lights  upon  his  character,  and  together  give  a  fairly 
complete  picture.  Xenophon  records  the  sober,  practi 
cal,  and  popular  side  of  Socrates,  caught  in  casual  con 
versation.  Plato  idealizes  Socrates,  especially  in  his 


SOCRATES  75 

later  writings,  and  he  reveals  Socrates'  character  on  its 
imaginative  and  spiritual  sides.  Aristotle  is  more  dis 
criminating  and  less  sympathetic,  but  always  reliable 
because  he  is  a  generation  removed.  * 

The  Personality  and  Life  of  Socrates.  Alcibiades 
described  Socrates  as  like  the  little  cases  sold  upon  the 
streets  of  Athens,  which  were  made  in  the  shape  of 
Silenus  and  contained  a  carved  image.  The  description 
was  apt,  for  Socrates  had  a  fine  spiritual  nature  within 
an  astonishing  shell.  He  was  short,  stout,  and  thick-set, 
with  his  head  set  upon  his  shoulders.  His  eyes  were 

*  The  student  should  read  the  following  references  in 
Plato's  dialogues  and  Xenophon's  Symposium  and  Memora 
bilia.  The  translations  referred  to  here  are  Jowett's  Plato 
and  Cooper,  Spelman,  etc.,  translation,  Whole  Works  of 
Xenophon.  (1851.) 

For  the  method  of  Socrates,  read  Charmides,  Lysis,  and 
Laches. 

For  the  personal  appearance  of  Socrates,  read  Plato,  Sym° 
posium,  pp.  586  ff.  and  Xenophon,  Symposium,  p.  615. 

For  the  physical  endurance  of  Socrates,  read  Plato,  Sym* 
posium,  p.  591. 

For  Socrates'  dislike  of  nature,  read  Plato,  Phcedrus,  pe 
435,  and  Xenophon,  Memorabilia,  p.  521. 

For  the  charges,  defense,  and  trial  of  Socrates,  read  Plato, 
Apology,  pp.  116  and  129. 

For  the  confinement  of  Socrates  in  prison,  read  Crito, 
beginning  and  end  of  the  dialogue. 

For  description  of  the  death  scene  of  Socrates,  read  Plato, 
Phcedo,  beginning  and  end  of  the  dialogue. 

For  description  of  the  daemoniacal  sign,  read  Plato,  Apology ; 
pp.  125-126,  and  Xenophon,  Memorabilia,  pp.  531  ff., 
585  ff. 

For  the  oracle's  statement  that  Socrates  is  the  wisest  of 
men,  read  Plato,  Apology,  p.  114. 


76  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

bulging,  his  nose  flat  with  upturned  nostrils,  his  mouth 
big  and  grinning,  and  his  beard  disordered.  His  pro 
truding  belly  was  set  upon  slender  legs,  and  his  dress 
was  slovenly.  Nevertheless  his  geniality,  his  fine  humor, 
the  unselfishness  which  he  manifested  unstintedly  toward 
his  friends,  exercised  an  irresistible  charm  upon  all  the 
remarkable  personalities  of  his  time.  Over  the  Athe 
nian  youth  his  influence  was  very  great,  and  he  sur 
rounded  himself  with  a  large  circle  of  admirers,  to  the 
neglect  of  his  home  cares  and  his  wife  Xantippe.  While 
the  habit  of  the  Sophists  was  to  talk  in  private  and  for 
pay,  Socrates  was  distinguished  from  all  his  contempo 
raries  by  the  fact  that  he  would  talk  in  the  public 
places  with  any  one,  rich  or  poor,  and  without  remuner 
ation. 

His  life  had  its  ascetic  side.  He  was  frugal  in  his 
needs.  He  went  barefoot,  summer  and  winter,  and  his 
clothing  was  the  scantiest.  He  was  abstemious  in  food 
and  drink.  While  on  occasion  at  the  feast  he  would 
drink  more  wine  than  any  one  else,  yet  he  never  was 
seen  intoxicated.  The  ascetic  side  of  his  nature  is  seen 
in  his  refusal  to  cultivate  gymnastics,  because  such 
training  required  much  food.  He  tried  to  limit  his 
wants.  He  was  a  model  of  hardiness,  self-denial,  and 
self-mastery,  as  many  an  anecdote  will  show.  "  No  one 
ever  saw  or  heard  anything  wicked  in  Socrates,"  said 
Xenophon.  "  So  pious  was  he  that  he  never  did  any 
thing  without  first  consulting  the  Gods,  so  master  of 
himself  as  never  to  prefer  pleasure  to  goodness,  so  sen 
sible  as  never  to  err  in  the  choice  between  the  better 
and  the  worse.  In  a  word,  he  was  the  best  and  the  most 
happy  of  men." 

At  times  Socrates  seems  intellectually  stiff  and  pro- 


SOCRATES  77 

saic.  This  may  have  been  incidental  to  his  asceticism, 
or  the  result  of  it.  He  was  indifferent  to  the  sensuous, 
and  he  explained  the  beautiful  in  terms  of  the  useful. 
He  refused  to  walk  out  because  trees  and  flowers  could 
teach  him  nothing.  Art  offered  no  suggestions  to  him, 
for  it  is  useless  even  if  it  is  inspired.  His  unpoetic  and 
prosy  nature  was  perhaps  not  due  so  much  to  his  lack 
of  taste  as  to  his  original  mind  overflowing  with  ideas. 
He  was  not  perceptive,  but  reflective.  He  said  that  as 
tronomy  is  a  mystery,  geometry  is  land  measuring,  which 
any  man  can  do,  arithmetic  is  merely  permissible,  and 
physics  something  to  be  neglected.  "  Ye  may  judge  how 
unprofitable  these  studies  are  by  seeing  how  men  differ 
among  themselves."  He  was  once  found  dancing  at 
home  by  himself  when  he  was  expected  to  be  at  a  dance 
with  others,  and  his  practical  nature  is  also  revealed  in 
the  fact  that  at  the  feast  he  was  reminded  of  its  utility. 
The  influence  of  Socrates'  daemon  or  divine  voice 
upon  him  is  very  interesting.  He  felt  himself  divinely 
called  by  his  daemon  (Apology,  29,  33  f.)  to  unremit 
ting  labor  in  the  moral  perfecting  of  society  through 
an  examination  of  himself  and  his  fellows.  Socrates 
was  moved  by  a  deep  religious  feeling  in  all  that  he 
undertook.  This  divine  leading  is  what  he  designates 
as  his  daemon.  He  speaks  of  it  as  "  the  God  "  or  "  the 
gods  "  which  speaks  to  other  men  through  the  oracles. 
This  divine  voice  was  ever  with  him,  but  as  to  specific 
actions  it  only  warned  him  against  the  injudicious  ac 
tion,  never  incited  him  to  the  correct  action.  Specifi 
cally  it  did  not  tell  him  what  to  do  so  much  as  what 
not  to  do.  When  he  was  about  to  prepare  a  defense 
beforehand  that  he  should  make  to  the  judges,  his 
daemon  interposed,  and  so  he  relied  upon  the  inspira* 


78  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

tion  of  the  moment.  On  one  of  his  campaigns  he  was 
observed  to  stand  in  communion  with  the  daemon  the 
whole  day,  unmindful  of  the  weather. 

As  to  the  education  and  intellectual  training  of  Soc 
rates,  one  must  say  that  it  formed  a  factor  of  less  im 
portance  in  his  life.  The  uniqueness  of  Socrates' 
character  is  only  in  small  measure  to  be  accounted  for 
by  his  environment.  He  was  one  of  those  men  who 
would  have  been  great  in  any  time.  He  got  but  little 
from  his  father,  who  was  a  sculptor,  or  from  his  mother, 
who  was  a  midwife.  He  was  not  strictly  an  educated 
man,  although  he  had  the  early  education  of  an  Athe 
nian  youth,  and  of  course  no  one  could  grow  up  a  citi 
zen  of  Athens  in  the  time  of  Pericles  without  absorbing 
its  culture.  His  formal  education  probably  consisted 
of  music  and  gymnastics,  and  he  was  certainly  familiar 
with  the  preceding  schools  of  philosophy.  Socrates 
lived  a  long  life  of  contented  poverty,  and  he  dedicated 
his  life  to  the  public.  Two  inherited  instincts  were 
strong  within  him,  which  alone  will  account  for  his 
career :  (1)  his  strong  religious  persuasion  that  he  was 
acting  under  a  mission  from  the  gods ;  (2)  his  great 
intellectual  originality,  as  shown  in  his  teaching  and  in 
his  power  over  others. 

There  are  few  striking  events  in  Socrates'  career, 
except  his  death.  He  was  born  in  Athens  in  469  B.  c. 
He  began  his  divinely  appointed  work  of  redeeming 
Athens  from  the  dangerous  tendencies  of  the  Sophists 
at  the  commencement  of  the  Peloponnesian  War.  He 
served  in  three  campaigns  as  a  soldier.  He  also  acted, 
when  called  upon,  as  prytanis,  or  lawgiver,  although 
he  stood  aloof  from  political  activity.  At  the  advanced 
age  of  seventy  he  was  accused  of  corrupting  the  youth 


SOCRATES  79 

and  denying  the  gods.  His  life  thus  far  would  have 
seemed  to  be  one  of  unimpeachable  moral  and  brilliant 
intellectual  monotony.  But  his  death  illuminates  his 
life  and  makes  it  heroic,  because  his  death  shows  what 
in  reality  his  life  was,  — the  tragic  epitome  of  the  Athe 
nian  social  situation.  His  death  was  not  due  to  him 
self,  although  he  could  have  escaped,  nor  to  his  judges, 
although  they  could  have  acquitted  him.  It  represents 
the  inevitable  conflict  between  the  Greek  ideal  of  uni- 
versalism  and  Greek  individualism.  Its  value  is  there 
fore  historic.  His  particular  accusers  were  actuated  by 
personal  animosity.  Behind  them  were  many  others 
whom  his  efforts  at  reform  and  his  bitter  irony  had 
made  hostile.  Behind  all  was  the  voice  of  Athenian 
conservatism  against  the  Athenian  culture  movement. 
The  charges  against  Socrates  were  in  part  true,  and  be 
sides  as  a  moral  reformer  he  had  been  a  public  nuisance. 
Yet  his  death  was  a  judicial  murder.  He  was  found 
guilty  by  his  judges.  To  the  sentence  of  death  proposed 
by  Meletus,  one  of  his  accusers,  Socrates  had  the  right 
to  propose  an  alternative  sentence,  and  the  judges  must 
.choose  between  the  two.  Had  Socrates  proposed  a  small 
fine,  it  would  probably  have  been  accepted  by  the  judges. 
He  proposed,  however,  that  Athens  provide  for  him 
at  the  public  expense,  arrogant  as  he  was  in  his  com 
placent  sense  of  virtue.  The  judges  then  could  do  no 
thing  else  than  pronounce  the  sentence  of  death.  This 
was  delayed  thirty  days  on  account  of  the  sacrifice  at 
Delos.  Even  then  Socrates  could  have  easily  escaped 
from  jail.  But  he  refused  to  do  the  law  a  wrong,  and 
drank  the  hemlock  in  May,  399  B.  c. 

Professor  G.  H.  Palmer  points  out  the  irony  that 
characterizes  the  life  and  death  of  Socrates.  He  stands 


80  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

for  the  harmony  of  opposite  qualities.  He  devoted 
himself  to  the  good  of  Athens,  and  yet  Athens  put  him 
to  death.  In  the  service  of  the  eternal  was  he  sacrificed,, 
His  own  personality  is  an  exemplification  of  this  irony. 
In  appearance  his  un-Greek  physical  ugliness  is  in  con 
trast  with  his  beautiful  Greek  soul ;  he  was  the  most 
austere  and  yet  the  most  sensitive  of  men ;  he  was  al 
ways  a  serious  moralist  and  yet  always  a  jester  ;  he  was 
scarcely  out  of  Athens  and  yet  he  was  a  world's  man  ; 
he  was  the  world's  philosopher  and  yet  he  had  no  system 
of  thought  and  left  no  writings. 

Socrates  and  the  Sophists.  In  his  point  of  departure 
Socrates  is  in  entire  agreement  with  the  Sophists.  He  is 
a  critical  philosopher.  Criticism  is  the  starting-point  of 
his  philosophy  as  a  whole,  and  he  begins  each  particular 
argument  afresh  with  a  critical  examination  of  its 
grounds.  This  means  that  he,  like  the  Sophists,  turns 
to  the  individual  reason  as  the  final  court  of  appeal. 
Like  them  he  refused  to  accept  any  traditional  dogma 
unexamined,  and  he  commenced  a  critical  inquiry  into 
all  kinds  of  conceptions.  Socrates  and  the  Sophists  are 
one  in  the  spirit  of  the  Greek  illumination  in  their 
critical  attack  upon  intellectual  problems.  Socrates' 
famous  saying  that  "  virtue  js_  knowledge "  could 
equally  well  be  put  into  the  mouth  of  Protagoras  ;  and 
the  doctrine  of  Protagoras  that  "  man  is  the  measure 
of  all  things  "  could  be  ascribed  to  Socrates  without 
inconsistency. 

In  his  conclusions  in  one  respect  Socrates  arrives  at 
the  same  point  as  the  Sophists,  —  but  in  only  one  re 
spect.  He_agrees  with them  as  _tp_the ..  worthlessness 
^pfjhe i  results  of  naturaLscifiiLce.  Natural  science  can 
not  be  worth  while,  because  it  does  not  lead  to  moral 


SOCRATES  81 

excellence..  The  meagre  results  of  the  Cosmologists  show 
the  worthlessness  of  natural  science  to  man.  In  this  one 
respect  Socrates'  criticism  leads  him  to  skepticism  like 
the  Sophists,  —  to  a  skepticism  of  natural  science. 

But  in  Jiis  conclusions  as  to  the  value  of  human 
nature,  Socrates  set  himself  entirely  against  the  out 
come  of  the  reflections  of  the  Sophists,  and  indeed  of 
his  time.  In  the  absorbing  anthropological  topics  of  his 
time,  he  laid  the  foundations  of  a  constructive  philoso^ 
phy  against  the  skeptical  conclusions  of  the  Sophists. 
In  human  matters  he  maintained  that  there  is  a  validity 
to  truth  and  a  possibility  of  absolute  knowledge.  He 
admitted  with  the  Sophists  that  there  are  obscurities  in 
human  thought,  and  that  obviously  the  standard  of  truth 
does  not  belong  to  any  one  man.  But  while  the  Sophists 
emphasized  these  contradictions  and  reasoned  therefore 
that  no  valid  truth  existed,  Socrates  cut  his  way  through 
such  contradictions  and  obscurities,  emphasized^Jbhe 
identity  in  men,  and  maintained  that  the  truth  is  in  all 
men  together,  —  in  humanity.  It  exists  as  an  ideal  to 
be  striven  for  by  men  together.  When  Protagoras  says 
that  "  man  is  the  measure  of  all  things,"  he  means  by 
"  man  "  the  individual  man ;  while  Socrates,  if  he  had 
used  that  expression,  would  have  meant  "  humanity." 
And  Socrates  means  by  his  principle  "  virtue  is  know 
ledge  "  that  the  knowledge  of  that  same  humanity  (£.  e. 
insight,  reason)  is  virtue  ;  while  Protagoras,  agreeing  as 
he  did  formally  with  the  maxim  that  "  virtue  is  know 
ledge,"  would  always  define  "  knowledge  "  as  the  in 
dividual  feelings.  "  The  individual  man  is  the  measure 
of  all  things,"  Protagoras  would  say ;  "  Humanity  is 
the  measure  of  all  things,"  Socrates  would  reply. 
"  Virtue  is  knowledge  gained  by  the  feelings,"  Protag- 


82  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

oras  would  say ;  "  Virtue  is  knowledge  gained  by  the 
reason,"  Socrates  would  reply.  Beneath  the  changing 
capricious  individual,  beneath  the  variety  of  men,  Soc 
rates  believed  that  there  was  a  common  humanity,  one 
unchanging  man,  who  contained  the  ultimate  truth. 
There  are  many  opinions,  ideas,  and  feelings,  but  only 
one  knowledge.  This  knowledge  is  rational ;  and  human 
nature  is  a  unity  in  the  possession  of  this  knowledge. 

This  is  the  principle  that  distinguishes  Socrates  from 
the  other  leaders  of  the  Greek  Illumination.  While  he 
was  imbued  with  the  motives  of  the  Greek  culture  of 
his  time,  —  curious  about  its  results,  feeling  its  useful 
ness,  and  critical  of  all  tradition,  —  he  nevertheless 
withheld  himself  from  its  skeptical  conclusions.  Any 
culture  illumination  runs  the  danger  of  defeating  itself 
and  becoming  skeptical  of  its  own  powers.  This  is  what 
actually  happened  in  the  Sophistic  philosophy.  But 
when  Socrates  set  himself  against  this  superficial  and 
self-destructive  outcome  of  his  age,  he  became  in  his 
constructive  philosophy  the  clearest  and  most  compre 
hensive  expression  of  that  age.  Because  he  grasped  the 
principle  of  the  Greek  Enlightenment  deeply  and  for 
mulated  it  constructively,  his  intellectual  reign  became 
historically  established.  The  fundamental  principle  of 
the  philosophy  of  Socrates  was  therefore  the  real  prin 
ciple  of  classic  Greek  civilization,  and  by  saving  that 
principle  he  saved  Greek  civilization  for  modern 
Europe. 

The  Unsystematic  Character  of  the  Socratic  Philo 
sophy.  The  casual  reader  is  often  troubled  to  know 
for  what  precisely  Socrates  is  searching.  The  vague 
ness  of  the  Socratic  quest  is  partly  due  to  the  fact  that 
he  had  no  system.  Indeed,  he  had  no  groundwork  for 


SOCRATES  83 

a  system  of  thought.  His  psychology  or  theory  of  the 
human  mind  was  undefined.  He  speaks  of  sensations 
and  perceptions,  but  they,  with  the  feelings  and  the 
will,  are  considered  by  him  to  be  unimportant  factors 
in  the  conscious  life.  On  the  whole,  the  mind  was 
thought  by  him  to  be  an  aggregation  of  conceptions  or 
ideas.  The  feelings  cloud  the  activity  of  these  concep 
tions,  and  the  only  feeling  to  which  Socrates  attached 
any  importance  was  his  daemon  or  divine  voice.  This 
grew  to  be  his  mentor  as  he  grew  older.  Socrates  never 
made  a  scientific  psychological  analysis.  He  began 
rather  with  three  assumptions  which  amounted  to  con 
victions.  They  were  these  :  that  only  by  acquiring  con 
ceptions  is  true  knowledge  to  be  found  ;  that  virtue, 
consists  in  acting  according  to  conceptions;  that  the 
world  has  been  designed  according  to  conceptions.  Con 
ceptions  were,  so  to  speak,  an  obsession  with  Socrates.  * 
They  were  his  postulates,  his  instruments,  and  his  goal. 
The  other  factors  of  the  mind  were  neglected  by  him. 
The  Ideal  of  Socrates.  The  goal  of  the  quest  of  Soc 
rates  is  an  ideal,  and  in  the  nature  of  things  had  the 
vagueness  of  any  ideal.  The  content  of  an  ideal  has  to 

*  What  is  the  difference  between  perception  and  conception  ?  We 
have  heard  a  good  deal  about  perceptions  in  the  doctrine  of  Protagoras. 
We  have  now  reached  a  point  where  many  of  the  theories  will  involve 
a  comparison  of  perception  with  conception.  An  understanding-  of  the 
difference  between  perception  and  conception  will  be  necessary  for  an 
understanding  of  the  doctrines,  especially  of  Democritus,  Plato,  and 
Aristotle.  In  general,  perception  is  the  consciousness  of  an  object  in 
which  some  actual  sensation  of  it  is  present ;  a  conception  is  the  con 
sciousness  of  an  object  in  which  no  actual  sensation  of  it  is  present. 
Thus  I  perceive  a  tree,  when  my  retina  is  actually  stimulated  ;  I 
conceive  a  tree,  when  I  turn  my  head  away  and  no  sense  organ  is 
actually  stimulated,  t.  e.  I  do  not  touch,  see,  hear  the  tree.  To  the 
Greek  the  perception  was  particular  and  transient ;  the  conception  was, 
on  the  other  hand,  universal  or  general  anil  permanent. 


84  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

remain  undefined  until  it  has  been  gained  by  experience, 
and  then  of  course  it  is  no  longer  an  ideal.  Any  ideal, 
however,  can  be  stated  formally,  and  the  formal  and 
deductive  side  of  knowledge  has  had  an  important 
place  both  in  practical  conduct  and  in  the  history  of 
science.  Socrates  could  state  his  ideal  formally  and  to 
some  extent  he  could  give  it  content  ;  but  it  always  re 
mained  for  him  an  object  to  be  sought.  He  believed 
that  the  ideal  lay  in  conceptions  and  could  be  found  if 
he  got  the  truth  of  any  one  conception.  So  he  under 
took  to  define  such  conceptions  as  friendship,  courage, 
prudence,  etc.,  but  his  search  was  never  satisfied. 
Nevertheless,  the  search  itself  was  scarcely  less  impor 
tant  to  him  than  its  accomplishment. 
The  ideal  of 


_ 

andjiis  LJo.imal.j8tateinfiDJi.QlJlie__  ideal  was 
is  Virtue.  The  primal  end  to  be  striven  for  is  wisdom, 
that  is,  in  conceptions  and  by  conceptions.  But  where 
are  these  conceptions  to  be  found  but  in  one's  own 
mind  ?  Therefore  the  region  of  the  quest  of  Socrates 
was  his  own  mind,  and  his  motto  was,  "  Know  thyself." 
And  what  is  this  Virtue  of  which  knowledge  or  wisdom 
is  the  equivalent?  It  does  not  mean  virtue  in  the  nar 
row  modern  meaning  of  the  term,  nor  yet  in  the  narrow 
original  meaning,  of  warlike  prowess  or  valor.  The 
Greek  word  which  Socrates  used  was  apcrrj,  and  is  best 
translated  excellence  or  ability.  In  the  history  of  the 
word  it  had  a  variety  of  meanings,  like  the  Latin  word 
virtus,  whose  equivalent  it  is.  It  is  derived  from  the 
same  root  as  the  word  "Api??,  Ares  (or  Mars),  the  name 
of  the  god  of  war.  While  therefore  originally  it  meant 
military  valor,  it  came  to  mean  any  kind  of  excellence. 
In  modern  times  there  appeared  a  book  called  The 


SOCRATES  85 

Greatest  Thing  in  the  World,  which  had  as  its  aim  to 
show  that  Christian  love  is  the  "  greatest  thing  in  the 
world."  To  Socrates  not  "  Love  "  but  "  Wisdom  "  is 
the  "  greatest  thing  in  the  world,"  and  Greek  civiliza 
tion  is  thus  contrasted  with  that  of  Christianity. 

But  now  the  question  comes,  What  kind  of  know 
ledge  or  wisdom  does  Socrates  mean  as  the  greatest 
excellence  ?  In  contrasj^to_the  Sophists^jwho  rejied^upon 
the  sensations  and  impulses  as  wisdom,  Socrates  turned 
to  that  element  which  had  been  the  decisive  factor  oi 
the  culture  of  the  time.  This  was  insight.  The  great 
est  excellence  is  insight.  He  who  acts  according  to  his 
feelings  is  not  sure  of  his  knowledge,  but  he  who  acts 
according  to  insight  has  the  greatest  excellence  in  the 
world.  But  Socrates  restricts  the  meaning  of  knowledge 
still  further.  Not  only  is  knowledge  to  Socrates  insight, 
but  it  is  moral  insight.  For  the  problems  in  which  he 
was  interested  were  the  problems  of  human  life  and 
principally  the  problem  of  self-examination.  Thus  we 
can  translate  the  conventional  formal  statement  of 
Socrates,  viz.,  Knowledge  is  virtue,  into  this  rather 
longer  sentence,  Moral  insight  is  the  most  excellent 
thing  in  the  world.  For  the  first  time  in  the  history  of 
thought  philosophy  is  founded  upon  a  moral  postulate. 

What  the  Socratic  Ideal  involves.  AVe  have  now 
examined  the  meaning  of  the  formal  statement  of  the 
Socratic  ideal.  A  further  question  along  this  same  line 
concerns  what  that  ideal  involves. 

1.  In  the  first  place,  to  possess  knowledge  is  to  act 
righteously.  Knowledge  =  righteous  conduct.  Socrates 
does  not  mean  that  knowledge  is  merely  the  condition 
of  right  conduct ;  he  means  that  knowledge  actually 
constitutes  moral  conduct.  The  development  of  the 


86  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

reason  is  actually  the  same  as  the  development  of  the 
will.  Knowledge  is  virtue  and  virtue  is  knowledge. 
Vice  is  ignorance  and  ignorance  is  vice.  To  have  an 
insight  into  the  truth  is  the  principle  of  living.  Not 
only  is  deficient  insight  the  cause  of  evil,  but  it  is  itself 
the  greatest  evil.  Not  only  does  a  man  act  wrongly  be 
cause  he  does  not  know  the  good,  but  not  to  know  the 
good  is  the  greatest  wrong  that  can  happen  to  him. 

2.  Not  only  is  moral  insight  the  same  as  virtuous 
activity,  but  this  insight  is  always  accompanied  by  hap 
piness.  The  will  follows  the  recognition  of  the  good,  and 
the  appropriate  action  makes  man  happy.  Happiness 
is  the  necessary  result  of  moral  excellence.  The  Wise 
Man  knows  what  is  good  for  him  and  does  it ;  thus  in 
his  performance  he  becomes  happy.  Socrates  would  sub 
scribe  to  the  proverb  "  Be  good  and  you  will  be  happy." 
Such  teaching  on  the  part  of  Socrates  implies  that  he 
believed  two  things  :  (1)  that  man  by  unremitting 
earnest  examination  of  himself  and  others  could  gain 
such  perfect  happiness  ;  and  (2)  that  the  world  is  under 
providential  guidance.  Socrates  never  expressly  denied 
the  existence  of  the  Homeric  gods  and  never  expressly 
declared  himself  a  monotheist.  He  is,  however,  always 
referring  to  one  over-ruling  wisdom.  He  had  a  personal 
conviction  of  immortality,  but  he  never  attempted  its 
proof.  Although  Socrates  had  little  confidence  in  human 
knowledge  about  the  world  of  physical  nature,  he  was 
animated  by  a  belief  that  amounted  to  a  conviction  in 
the  providential  arrangement  of  the  world.  In  such  a 
divinely  ordered  world  the  good  must  be  happy.  Only 
a  perfect  wisdom  can,  however,  be  certain  that  always 
the  results  of  his  actions  will  gain  happiness  in  the  en 
vironment  in  which  he  lives ;  but  still  man  can  be  sure 


SOCRATES  87 

that  happiness  increases  proportionately  with  know 
ledge.  Greek  philosophy  did  go  beyond  this  point  in 
ethics,  and  this  is  called,  in  technical  language,  eudce- 
monism.  Eudcemonism  and  hedonism  are  pleasure 
theories  that  are  similar.  Eudaemonism  is  the  theory 
that  active  well-being  is  the  highest  good  in  life  and 
that  that  good  is  always  accompanied  by  pleasure.  In 
hedonism  pleasure  is  the  good  to  be  aimed  at.  In  his 
tory  eudaemonism  has  easily  degenerated  into  hedonism. 
3.  Socrates  makes  moral  insight  the  same  as  virtuous 
activity,  and  he  says  that  its  inevitable  accompaniment 
is  happiness.  Does  he  also  make  moral  insight  the  same 
as  utility?  According  to  Xenophon,  Socrates  regards 
moral  excellence  as  that  which  is  most  useful.  Indeed, 
in  some  of  the  Platonic  dialogues  Socrates  seems  to 
define  insight  as  the  art  of  measuring  or  prudence,  and 
it  is  pointed  out  that  Socrates  developed  no  virtue  so 
fully  as  self-control.  In  the  exigencies  of  the  argument 
Socrates  also  often  resorted  to  the  useful  to  define  the 
good.  The  question,  What  is  the  good  ?  often  resolves 
itself  into  the  other  question,  What  is  the  thing  good 
for  ?  Indeed,  the  form  of  the  argument  often  assumes 
the  vicious  circle :  Why  is  the  act  just  ?  Because  it  is 
useful?  Why  is  it  useful?  Because  it  is  just.  For  the 
purposes  of  disputation,  in  which  Socrates  was  always 
shrewd  and  not  always  scrupulous,  he  so  frequently  re 
fers  the  good  to  what  is  suitable  to  men's  happiness  and 
profit  that  his  philosophy  does  not  seem  to  rise  above 
the  relativism  of  the  Sophists.  But  it  is  certain  that 
Socrates  strove  to  transcend  this  relativism,  although 
not  with  full  success  and  although  his  formulated  teach 
ing  does  not  always  go  beyond  it.  However,  that  he 
believed  in  an  absolute  rather  than  a  relative  good  ap- 


88  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

pears  in  many  ways :  in  his  doctrine  that  it  is  better  to 
suffer  wrong  than  to  do  it ;  in  his  strict  conformity  to 
law  rather  than  to  save  himself  from  death  by  breaking 
the  law ;  in  his  constant  interpretation  of  life  as  right- 
doing,  ethical  improvement,  and  participation  in  the 
good.  The  utility  that  is  always  in  the  background  of 
his  thought  is  the  usefulness  for  the  soul.  We  may  con 
clude,  therefore,  that  it  was  only  superficially  for  the 
purposes  of  argumentation  that  Socrates  made  the  use 
ful  an  equivalent  of  moral  insight. 

The  purpose  of  Socrates  was,  after  all,  not  to  teach 
men  to  think  correctly  nor  to  become  cultured  but  to 
become  happy  and  useful  Athenians.  Moral  excellence 
is  the  Socratic  goal ;  and  knowledge,  happiness,  and 
usefulness  are  only  aspects  of  that  goal.  Knowledge  is 
the  essential  means,  happiness  the  essential  result,  and 
usefulness  the  essential  sign  of  moral  excellence.  It  fol 
lows  as  a  corollary  from  Socrates'  philosophical  ideal 
that  he  should  also  teach :  (1)  that  virtue  is  teachable, 
and  (2)  that  the  virtues  are  one.  Virtue  is  obviously 
teachable  if  it  is  knowledge.  It  follows  also,  although 
not  so  obviously,  that  all  the  virtues  are  fundamentally 
the  same,  and  that  a  man  cannot  be  virtuous  in  one 
thing  without  being  virtuous  in  all.  The  really  temper 
ate  man  is  also  courageous,  wise,  and  just. 

The  Two  Steps  of  the  Method  of  Socrates.  The  ex 
ternal  form  of  the  method  of  Socrates  was  conversation. 
Thinking  was  to  him  an  inner  conversation.  The  result 
of  a  conversation,  external  or  internal,  was  evolvement, 
—  the  implicit  in  thought  made  explicit.  This  was  quite 
opposed  to  the  method  of  the  Sophists,  which  was  the 
supplying  of  knowledge.  Socrates  did  not  propose  to 
start  from  any  kind  of  knowledge  except  the  ideal  to 


SOCRATES  89 

be  striven  for.  Starting  with  the  presupposition  that 
man  contained  knowledge,  the  end  which  Socrates  at 
tempted  to  reach  by  his  method  was  a  practical  one. 
With  so  much  in  summary,  let  us  examine  the  two 
steps  of  the  method  of  Socrates. 

The  first  step  that  Socrates  deems  necessary  for  man 
in  attaining  this  ideal  of  moral  excellence  is  negative. 
Indeed,  it  is  more,  —  it  is  complete  abnegation  on  the 
part  of  the  seeker  for  truth.  One  must  confess  that  he 
himself  knows  nothing,  and  come  to  a  realization  that 
his  untested  individual  opinions  are  not  the  truth.  He 
must  approach  the  subject  as  a  seeker  and  not  as  a 
teacher.  This  attitude  of  mind  is  the  beginning  of 
wisdom.  Plato  relates  how  the  Delphic  oracle  amazed 
Socrates  by  announcing  that  he  was  the  wisest  of  the 
Greeks.  In  reflecting  upon  the  statement  of  the  oracle 
he  came  to  agree  with  the  oracle  because,  as  he  said,  he 
was  ignorant  and  he  knew  it,  while  the  other  Greeks 
were  ignorant  and  did  not  know  it.  Before  Socrates 
began  to  examine  any  conception,  he  professed  or  as 
sumed  to  profess  absolute  ignorance  of  it.  He  is  the 
modest  inquirer.  He  is  always  described  in  the  role  of 
the  questioner  who  is  seeking  information  and  light. 

He  laid  the  same  requirement  upon  others  that  he 
did  upon  himself.  The  dialectic  conversation  could  not 
be  successfully  carried  on  unless  his  interlocutors  had 
the  same  recognition  of  self -ignorance,  —  the  same  meas 
ure  of  self-knowledge.  The  Sophists  with  whom  he  often 
carried  011  his  discussions  laid  claim  to  knowledge  on 
every  known  subject  under  the  Greek  sun  and  were  ready 
to  teach  anything  to  the  Greek  youth.  To  Socrates' 
mind  nothing  could  more  impede  his  undertakings  than 
such  an  affectation  of  wisdom ;  to  the  Sophists  nothing 


90  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

could  be  more  repugnant  than  such  a  confession  which 
Socrates  always  obliged  them  to  make.  Although  pro 
fessing  to  be  only  a  seeker  for  knowledge,  he  tried  first 
by  his  questions  to  scrutinize  and  to  break  down  with 
his  exasperating  logic  the  half -formed  conceptions  of  the 
egotist.  This  clear-cut  analysis  for  purely  destructive 
purposes,  which  he  used  in  preparation  for  his  later  con 
structive  conversation,  is  called  the  Socratic  irony.  As 
he  proved  himself  superior  to  any  of  his  companions  in 
the  use  of  the  dialectic,  he  could  begin  his  conversations 
in  the  most  destructive  fashion.  His  method  was  de 
structive  of  all  prejudice  and  preconceived  opinion  that 
would  in  any  way  stand  athwart  perfectly  free  inquiry 
into  the  truth.  His  wish  was  to  begin  de  novo  with 
every  one,  so  that  all  traditional  beliefs  having  been 
given  up  and  the  investigators  having  confessed  their 
ignorance,  constructive  study  of  the  concept  in  hand 
could  be  begun. 

The  second  step  in  Socrates'  method  of  dialectical 
inquiry  follows  upon  the  initial  destructive  criticism.  It 
is  in  this  part  of  the  conversation  that  we  find  his  own 
constructive  theory.  The  dialogue  is,  of  course,  its  ne 
cessary  condition  ;  for  the  truth  is  not  in  me  nor  in  thee, 
but  in  us  all.  It  is  latent  in  the  mind  and  not  on  the 
surface  of  any  opinion.  Let  us  rub  our  minds  together. 
Let  us  sift  our  varied  concepts,  unfold  our  real  selves, 
and  briug  the  unborn  truth  to  the  light.  Our  ideas  sup 
plement  one  another  and  have  a  common  ground.  In 
tellectual  intercourse  is  an  intellectual  and  a  personal 
need,  for  it  reveals  common  sympathies  and  a  oneness 
of  life.  Common  love  of  knowledge  makes  friends,  and 
this  mutual  intellectual  helpfulness  he  calls  by  the 
mythical  term  Eros.  Inquiry  is  indefinite  in  duration ; 


SOCRATES  91 

the  quest  of  truth  is  endless ;  and  Socrates  acknow 
ledges  by  his  fresh  beginnings  again  and  again  his  fail 
ure  to  reach  the  ideal.  Thus  the  theoretical  self-abne 
gation  of  Socrates  had  a  twofold  significance  in  his 
constructive  philosophy.  On  the  one  hand,  it  was  an 
invitation  to  his  countrymen  to  help  him  in  his  search 
for  the  universal  truth  ;  on  the  other,  it  was  an  acknow 
ledgment  that  he  had  failed  to  attain  that  universal 
truth. 

Socrates  and  Athens.  Socrates  had  a  religious  rever 
ence  for  his  own  mission  in  the  Athenian  community. 
He  was  the  "gad-fly  of  the  Athenian  public  "  ;  he  was 
the  educator  of  the  time  ;  he  was  divinely  appointed  to 
the  Athenian  people.  He  felt  himself  so  necessary  to  the 
Athenian  State  that  at  his  trial  he  proudly  suggested 
that  instead  of  punishing  him  the  State  keep  him  at  the 
public  expense  in  the  Prytaneum.  But  the  educator 
creates  nothing ;  he  only  awakens  and  develops  the 
germs  of  knowledge  that  lie  latent.  The  human  Athe 
nian  nature  is  big  with  truth  ;  Socrates  was  divinely  ap 
pointed  to  bring  it  forth.  He  called  his  method,  after 
the  profession  of  midwifery  of  his  mother,  the  maieutic 
method.  It  was  intellectual  midwifery,  and  he  was  the 
intellectual  midwife  of  Athens.  Although  he  failed  to 
find  any  concrete  form  of  ultimate  truth,  he  never  had 
any  doubt  about  the  correctness  of  his  method  and  of 
undertaking  the  problem  afresh.  He  believed  that  his 
failure  was  due  to  the  inherent  weakness  of  human  dis 
cernment  ;  and  so  far  as  man's  discernment  or  insight 
is  clear,  so  far  will  he  know  the  true  significance  of 
things. 

Socrates  believed  in  man,  and  he  believed  that  in 
man  were  contained  all  those  elements  that  make  up  a 


92  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

firm,  rational,  and  moral  society.  Since  he  failed  to  justify 
this  belief  in  a  theoretical  way,  his  belief  became  largely 
a  matter  of  faith.  Humanity  is  something  to  be  won, 
something  to  be  developed.  He  was  personally  the  em 
bodiment  of  his  faith,  and  his  large  influence  was  due  to 
his  unswerving  confidence  in  ethical  ideals  that  did  not 
allow  the  least  paltering. 

The  Logical  Expedients  of  Socrates.  The  examina 
tion  of  concepts  by  Socrates  was  an  attempt  to  find  a 
logical  "  Nature,"  just  as  the  Cosmologists  had  searched 
physical  phenomena  to  find  a  physical  "  Nature."  This 
makes  Socrates  the  first  to  teach  by  induction  and  one 
of  the  first  to  use  definition  effectively.  In  contrast  to 
the  Sophists,  he  tried  to  give  words  exact  meanings; 
for  the  Sophists  fixed  artificial  meanings  to  words  with 
reference  to  particular  objects.  In  seeking  for  the  exact 
meaning,  Socrates  was  looking  below  the  changing  par 
ticulars  to  the  "  Nature  "  of  the  fact  and  the  universal 
principle.  Thus  he  was  making  his  hearers  conscious  of 
the  logical  dependence  of  the  particular  upon  the  uni 
versal.  The  universal  is  that  which  is  common  to  all 
particular  conceptions  or  opinions.  It  lies  beneath  them 
and  binds  them  together.  Thus,  by  logical  analysis, 
Socrates  is  taking  steps  in  the  educational  process  of 
gaining  the  universal.  Provisional  definition  would  be 
given  by  him  in  some  dialogue ;  this  definition  would 
be  tried  by  many  facts ;  thus  an  advance  would  be 
made  toward  a  true  definition  and  a  universal  principle. 
This  process  is  that  of  induction.  It  leads  to  generic 
concepts  by  comparison  of  particular  views  and  indi 
vidual  perceptions,  by  bringing  together  analogous  cases 
and  allied  relations.  The  subordination  of  the  particular 
under  the  universal  thus  became  a  principle  of  science. 


SOCRATES  93 

However  imperfect  and  childlike  was  Socrates'  method 
of  procedure,  whatever  lack  of  caution  in  generalization 
and  in  the  collection  of  material,  however  hasty  often 
times  his  judgments,  he  nevertheless  made  the  subordi 
nation  of  the  particular  to  the  universal  a  principle  of 
logical  procedure.  Xeriophon  says  that  Socrates  was 
untiring  in  his  efforts  to  examine  and  define  goodness 
and  wickedness,  justice  and  injustice,  wisdom  and  folly, 
courage  and  cowardice,  the  state  and  the  citizen^ 

Socrates  and  the  Lesser  Socratics.  The  death  of 
Socrates  proved  to  be  his  transfiguration.  His  influence, 
widespread  and  profound,  came  more  from  his  personality 
than  from  his  formulated  theory.  He  was  a  revelator 
without  a  revelation.  An  absolutely  true  end  of  life,  the 
Good,  he  firmly  believed  to  exist ;  but  it  was  an  ideal  to 
be  won  by  each  and  all.  After  him,  therefore,  there  was 
opportunity  for  various  interpretations  of  his  doctrine, 
and  several  schools  were  founded  by  his  disciples.  His 
truest  and  most  discriminating  pupil  was  Plato,  who  is 
in  a  class  by  himself  as  developing  the  philosophy  of 
Socrates  to  a  systematic  perfectness.  The  philosophy  of 
Plato  stands  with  that  of  Democritus  and  Aristotle  as 
one  of  the  three  systematic  philosophies  that  Greek  civil 
ization  produced.  Besides  Plato  there  were  the  Lesser 
Socratics :  Euclid  (not  the  mathematician),  Phsedo,  Aris- 
tippus,  and  Antisthenes.  Each  of  these  was  respectively 
the  founder  of  a  school.  These  four  Lesser-Socratic 
schools  were  that  at  Megara  founded  by  Euclid,  the 
Elean-Eretrian  founded  by  Phaedo,  the  Cynic  founded 
by  Antisthenes,  and  the  Cyrenaic  founded  by  Aristippus. 
The  influence  of  the  Megarian  and  Elean-Eretrian 
schools  was  unimportant.  It  may  suffice  to  dismiss  them 
by  saying  that  Phaedo  was  the  favorite  pupil  of  Socrates, 


04  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

and  that  Plato  was  a  member  of  the  Megarian  school 
for  a  short  time  after  the  death  of  Socrates.  The  two 
other  Lesser-Socratic  schools  had  an  important  influ* 
ence  upon  contemporary  and  later  civilization  and  will 
be  mentioned  here.  These  are  the  Cynic  and  Cyrenaic 
schools.  In  these  two  schools  two  great  types  of  ethical 
theory  that  have  since  existed  were  formulated.  All 
four  of  the  Lesser  Socratics  pretended  to  be  the  true 
development  of  the  teaching  of  Socrates  ;  and  these  two, 
as  well  as  the  other  two,  differ  in  the  accentuation  that 
they  place  on  some  phase  of  the  master's  doctrine. 

Socrates'  own  definition  of  ideal  excellence  being  in 
complete,  the  Cynics  and  Cyrenaics  tried  to  define  it, 
to  give  it  content  and  to  show  a  practical  way  of  reach 
ing  it.  They  attempted 

(1)  to  answer  affirmatively  that  there  is  a  universal 
validity ; 

(2)  to  show  in  what  it  consists ; 

(3)  to  show  how  man  must  prepare  himself  in  order 
to  reach  it. 

Both  schools  are  individualistic  and  eudsemonistic. 
They  maintained  that  to  affirm  that  the  Good  is  good 
for  its  own  sake  is  to  leave  the  Good  contentless ;  and 
to  affirm  that  the  Good  is  insight  into  the  Good  is 
to  go  in  a  circle.  The  one  unambiguous  answer  to  the 
question  of  Socrates,  What  is  ideal  excellence  or  the 
Good  ?  is  this :  Goodness  is  happiness.  This  gives  a 
content  to  the  otherwise  contentless  ideal  of  Socrates. 
The  difference  between  the  two  schools  consists  in  the 
ethical  way  in  which  this  happiness  may  be  obtained. 

It  will  appear,  therefore,  that  the  Lesser  Socratics 
were  more  Sophistic  than  Socratic.  They  were  diametri 
cally  opposed  to  Socrates'  theory  of  the  universality  of 


SOCRATES  95 

truth.  The  excellent  Good  must  be  sought  by  each  in 
his  own  way.  This  is  individualistic  virtue,  and  not  that 
of  humanity.  Civilization  was  valued  by  them  only 
as  it  satisfied  individual  needs.  The  common  problem 
of  individualistic  happiness  limited  the  efforts  of  both 
schools,  while  the  results  that  they  reached  in  solving 
it  were  quite  different. 

There  are  two  ways  of  achieving  happiness ;  one  is 
by  satisfying  the  desires,  the  other  is  by  cutting  off  the 
desires.  For  happiness  is  the  perfect  proportion  of 
desire  and  satisfaction.  A  living  creature  is  happy  if  his 
desires  are  satisfied,  whether  those  desires  be  few  or 
many.  In  the  theory  of  the  Cyrenaic  school,  happiness 
is  gained  by  increasing  the  satisfactions ;  in  the  theory 
of  the  Cynic  school,  happiness  is  gained  by  decreasing 
the  desires. 

The  Cynic  School  was  founded  by  Antisthenes,  and 
numbered  among  its  adherents  Diogenes,  about  whom 
so  many  curious  stories  have  been  told,  Crates  of 
Thebes,  his  wife  Hipparchia,  and  her  brother,  Metro- 
cles.  Virtue  in  the  eudsemonistic  sense  is  the  only  end, 
and  this  school  agreed  with  Socrates  that  this  end  is 
to  be  attained  by  knowledge.  That  is  to  say,  virtue  or 
knowledge  is  only  a  means  of  gaining  happiness,  and  all 
other  possessions  the  Cynics  affected  to  despise.  Virtue 
as  knowledge  is  therefore  to  be  sought ;  ignorance  is  to 
be  shunned  ;  all  else  is  a  matter  of  indifference.  Riches, 
luxury,  fame,  honor,  sense-pleasure  and  pain,  and  later 
with  logical  consistency  all  shame,  convention,  family, 
and  country  were  objects  of  contempt.  Man  must  make 
himself  independent  by  cutting  off  the  desires  which  he 
cannot  satisfy  or  the  desires  that  seem  superfluous. 
He  should  keep  alive  only  such  desires  as  are  necessary 


96  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

to  existence.  In  independence  of  all  outward  circum. 
stance  the  Cynic  conceives  himself  to  be  the  Wise  Man, 
in  contrast  to  whom  the  mass  of  men  are  fools.  The 
Cynic  is,  therefore,  the  equal  of  the  undesiring  gods.  He 
has  independent  lordship  and  does  not  need  the  artifi 
cialities  of  civilization.  Natural  law  was  contrasted  by 
him  in  a  Sophistic  way  with  statutory  law,  and  in  the 
midst  of  the  refinements  of  society  he  preached  a  return 
to  a  state  of  nature. 

The  Cyrenaic  School  was  founded  by  Aristippus, 
who  lived  in  Cyrene,  a  luxurious  city  of  northern 
Africa.  Aristippus  was  a  man  of  the  world.  He  was 
first  a  Sophist  and  later  a  disciple  of  Socrates.  After 
Socrates'  death  he  returned  to  Cyrene.  Here  he  founded 
his  school,  which  included  three  generations  of  his  own 
family.  The  prominent  members  of  it  were  Arete,  his 
daughter  ;  Aristippus,  his  grandson  ;  Theodorus,  Hege- 
sias,  Anniceris,  and  Euhemerus,  the  author  of  so-called 
Euhemerism,  which  taught  that  the  gods  were  originally 
only  great  men.  In  opposition  to  the  brutal  bareness  of 
the  Cynic  school,  the  Cyrenaics  saw  the  true  end  of  life 
in  the  pleasures  of  sense.  Following  Protagoras,  Aris 
tippus  said  that  the  sensations  are  always  true  and  can 
be  defined  in  terms  of  motion.  The  school  developed  an 
elaborate  psychology  of  sensation  which  summarizes  its 
doctrine.  It  is  as  follows :  (1)  The  intensity  and  not 
the  duration  of  a  sensation  determines  its  value ;  (2) 
Bodily  pleasures  are  of  greater  value  than  mental  be 
cause  they  are  more  intense ;  (3)  I  can  know  only  my 
own  sensations,  and  therefore  they  are  of  greater  value 
than  another's  ;  (4)  Man  has  a  reasonable  insight  which 
determines  him  in  the  choice  of  his  sensations. 

The  practical  problem  of  life  for  this,  as  it  was  for 


SOCRATES  97 

the  Cynic  school,  was  how  to  become  individually  inde 
pendent  of  the  world.  But  the  Cyrenaic  taught  inde 
pendence  by  enjoyment,  in  opposition  to  the  Cynic's  in 
dependence  by  renunciation.  The  Cyrenaic  Wise  Man 
knows  all  the  pleasures  of  life  thoroughly,  from  animal 
satisfactions  to  spiritual  ecstasies.  He  uses  them  all,  but 
never  forgets  himself.  He  is  lord  of  his  appetites,  never 
wishes  the  impossible,  and  has  perfect  and  serene  peace. 

It  is  an  interesting  fact  that  this  pleasure-loving 
school  drew  pessimism  as  the  consequence  of  its  theory. 
If  life  fails  to  give  enjoyment,  it  is  a  failure.  That  life 
alone  is  reprehensible  that  has  more  pain  than  plea 
sure.  It  is  on  this  ground  that  man  should  submit  to 
law  and  custom  rather  than  give  up  his  pleasures.  Yet 
some  members  of  the  school  maintained  that  man  is 
bound  to  be  unhappy.  While  he  should  have  pleasure, 
he  is  so  constituted  that  he  cannot  gain  it.  The  body 
of  man  is  an  inevitable  sufferer.  The  highest  that  we 
can  hope  is  painlessness. 

The  Cynic  and  Cyrenaic  schools  occupy  an  important 
position  in  the  history  of  philosophy.  The  Cynic  doc 
trine  was  the  basis  of  the  teaching  of  the  Stoic  school, 
and  the  Cyrenaic  was  the  legitimate  predecessor  of  the 
Epicurean  school.  These  great  schools  were  founded  in 
Athens  seventy-five  years  later,  and  will  be  discussed 
under  the  Hellenic-Roman  Period. 


CHAPTER  VI 

THE  SYSTEMATIC  PERIOD  (399  B.  C.-322  B.  C.) 

^  The  Waning  of  the  Greek  National  Spirit.  The 
Systematic  Period  extends  from  the  death  of  Socrates 
to  the  death  of  Aristotle.  It  is  only  seventy-seven  years 
long  —  about  the  same  length  as  the  Anthropological 
and  half  as  long  as  the  Cosmological  Period.  It  begins 
with  those  sorry  days  after  the  Peloponnesian  War 
and  ends  with  the  supremacy  of  Macedonian  power. 
The  period  was  filled  with  ferocious  wars  among  the 
Grecian  cities.  First  came  the  supremacy  of  Sparta, 
then  of  Thebes  (371-362  B.  c.),  then  the  invasion  by 
Philip  of  Macedon  and  the  battle  of  Chjeronea,  338  B.  c. 
In  334  B.  c.  Alexander  the  Great  began  the  conquest 
of  the  Orient,  which  he  accomplished  in  two  years.  He 
thought  by  this  that  he  could  reunite  the  Greeks  in  a 
common  cause.  He  failed  for  two  reasons.  In  the  first 
place,  as  a  Macedonian  the  Greeks  would  not  take  him 
as  a  national  representative.  In  the  second  place,  the 
Greek  spirit  was  waning.  The  people  had  lost  their 
glorious  ideals.  Decay  had  set  in.  The  worm  was  at 
the  root  of  Greek  life.  Greek  art,  literature,  and  states 
manship  had  passed. 

The  Place  of  the  Three  Systematic  Philosophers  in 
Greek  History.  Nevertheless,  when  Greek  national 
life  was  approaching  dissolution,  science  ripened  its 
richest  fruits  and  created  its  most  comprehensive  sys 
tems  of  philosophy.  These  are  connected  with  the 
names  'of  Democritus,  Plato,  and  Aristotle.  These 


THE  SYSTEMATIC   PERIOD  99 

great  systems  evidently  cannot  be  accounted  for  by  the 
social  conditions  in  which  they  appear.  Neither  the 
need  nor  the  demand  of  the  disrupted  Greece  of  these 
years  would  be  a  sufficient  cause  to  explain  the  appear 
ance  of  a  Plato  or  an  Aristotle.  The  interests  of  the 
Greek  people  became  narrower  as  the  interests  of  the 
Greek  philosophers  became  more  broadly  human.  The 
intellectual  tendency  of  this  short  period  was  utilitarian 
and  practical.  The  problems  that  now  interested  the 
Athenians  were  the  details  of  mechanics,  physiology, 
rhetoric,  and  politics.  The  field  of  science  was  now  for 
the  first  time  systematized  to  logic,  ethics,  and  physics 
—  a  classification  which,  we  shall  find,  will  exist  for 
many  centuries.  Sparta  and  Macedonia,  not  Athens 
and  Abdera,  represent  the  spirit  of  the  period. 

If  then  Democritus,  Plato,  and  Aristotle  do  not  re 
flect  the  time  in  which  they  live,  what  relation  do  they 
bear  to  Greek  civilization?  They  are  not  isolated  and 
out  of  all  relation  to  the  life  of  the  Greek  people.  On 
the  contrary,  they  are  the  most  comprehensive  and  the 
most  profound  expression  of  Greek  life.  One  turns  to 
them  as  the  most  perfect  representation  of  Greek  cul 
ture.  They  are  the  intimate  expression  of  Greek 
thought,  even  if  not  of  contemporaneous  Greek  thought. 
They  are  the  final  statements  of  the  two  preceding 
periods,  projected  into  a  time  that  had  other  interests. 

to  -a, 


close,  was  its  final  jx^ression^and, 
form.  ~Plato  did  the  same  for  the  Anthropological 
Period.  In  Aristotle  the  systematic  cosmology  of  De 
mocritus  and  the  systematic  ethics  of  Plato  find  a  new 
meaning,  in  a  closer  union,  under  a  more  coordinating 
principle.  Aristotle  was  the  last  possible  word  of  Greek 


100  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

philosophy,  for  he  systematized  every  branch  known  to 
the  Greeks.  He  not  only  evolved  a  speculative  theory 
of  the  whole,  but  he  organized  the  special  sciences.  It 
must  be  further  said  that  no  one  of  these  three  great 
Greeks  could  have  produced  the  results  each  did  pro 
duce,  if  each  had  not  been  the  leader  of  a  school  of 
many  workers.  Within  each  school  there  must  have 
been  vigorous  cooperation  along  lines  according  to  the 
inclination  of  the  individual  members.  Thus  each  school 
collected  a  vast  amount  of  material  which  was  worked 
over  according  to  the  method  and  purpose  of  the  leader. 

The  Fundamental  Principle  of  the  Systematic 
Period.  At  the  beginning  of  this  book  attention  was 
called  to  the  difference  between  Greek,  Mediaeval,  and 
Modern  thought.  Greek  thought  was  characterized  as 
objective.  It  is  important  to  reiterate  this  objective  sig 
nificance  of  Greek  thought  at  this  point,  when  we  are 
about  to  discuss  the  teachings  of  Democritus,  Plato, 
and  Aristotle.  Plato's  theory  is  often  called  an  ideal 
ism  and  Democritus'  theory  materialism,  but  they  are 
not  the  idealism  and  materialism  of  modern  times.  No 
terms  have  fluctuated  in  their  meanings  more  than 
such  philosophical  terms  as  these,  as  can  be  judged 
from  the  fact  that  in  the  Middle  Ages  Plato's  doctrine 
was  called  realism.  The  Greeks  were  not  idealists  in 
the  sense  that  Berkeley  and  Hegel  were  idealists.  In 
general,  it  should  be  remembered  that  when  we  speak 
of  Greek  art,  Greek  politics,  Greek  philosophy  as  ideal 
istic,  they  are  not  idealistic  in  the  modern  sense.* 

The  open-minded  Greek  sought  to  picture,  to  ascer- 

*  Read  Zeller,  Pre-Socratic  Phil,  vol.  i,  pp.  138-149,  con- 
cerning  the  objective  character  of  Greek  morality,  art,  and 
philosophy. 


THE  SYSTEMATIC   PERIOD  101 

tain,  to  present.  He  was  not  dominated  by  the  wish  to 
show  how  things  should  be.  To  know  and  to  under 
stand,  to  explain  by  understanding  the  abiding  reason 
in  things,  to  find  out  the  fundamental  principle  in 
things  rather  than  to  adjust  it  to  the  personal  desires 
—  this  was  the  objective  attitude  of  mind  of  the 
Greeks.  The  Greek  saw  before  he  reasoned ;  he  visual 
ized  his  thought  in  form  before  he  subjected  the  form 
to  rational  analysis.  The  cosmos  was  a  harmony  and 
an  art  before  which  he  stood  in  contemplation  rather 
than  in  criticism.  Human  elements  were  found  in  it 
everywhere,  but  only  as  parts  of  that  cosmos.  "  The 
unity  of  the  spiritual  and  the  natural,  which  Greek 
thought  demands  and  presupposes,  is  the  direct  un 
broken  unity  of  the  classic  theory  of  the  world."  1 

By  whatever  names  the  great  theories  of  the  System 
atic  Period  are  called,  we  must  remember  that  they 
did  not  depart  from  this  objective  Greek  point  of  view. 
At  certain  times  the  moorings  of  Greek  thought  seem 
about  to  be  shifted,  as  when  Plato  passes  beyond  the 
ancient  Greek  attitude  and  anticipates  Christian  mo 
rality  by  flight  from  the  world  of  sense,  and  when  Aris 
totle  elaborates  his  doctrine  of  a  transcendent  god.  But 
the  tie  never  breaks,  and  the  Systematic  philosophers 
remain  Greek  and  not  modern.  They  have  the  Greek 
objective  attitude  of  mind.  The  inner  consciousness 
does  not  stand  with  its  attestations  over  against  all 
other  things.  The  greatest  of  these  philosophers  never 
thought  of  himself  but  as  "  bone  of  the  bone  and  flesh 
of  the  flesh  "  of  the  world  surrounding  him.  In  art  the 
classic  Greek  "  could  obey  but  not  surpass  nature  "  ;  in 
religion  he  worshiped  beings  that  were  only  superior 
1  Zeller,  Pre-Socratic  Phil.,  vol.  i,  p.  162. 


102  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

human  beings ;  in  politics  he  was  a  member, of  a  social 
whole.  To  -ZEschylus,  Pericles,  Socrates,  Protagoras, 
Aristophanes,  Democritus,  Plato,  and  Aristotle  alike, 
human  nature  is  a  part  of  the  world  and  not  vice  versa* 
The  Greek  mind  interpreted  nature  rather  than  re 
created  it. 

What,  then,  is  the  nature  of  the  development  of  Greek 
thought,  and  in  what  respect  does  the  Greek  System 
atic  philosophy  differ  from  the  philosophy  of  the  Greek 
Cosmologists  ?  Greek  philosophy  in  the  Cosmological 
Period  starts  with  a  conception  of  an  objective  har 
mony  of  nature  and  spirit  which  is  called  hylozoism. 
Step  by  step  in  the  Anthropological  and  Systematic 
Periods  that  harmony  becomes  broken  into  a  dualism 
of  mind  and  matter.  The  philosophy  of  this  Systematic 
Period  is  a  dualism  of  the  parts  of  one  objective  world, 
not  a  subjective-objective  antithesis.  The  realm  of 
spirit  lies  side  by  side  with  that  of  nature,  and  the  sep 
aration  and  alienation  never  reached  the  complete  form 
that  it  did  in  the  Middle  Ages.  The  great  Greek  Sys- 
tematizers  in  part  represent  this  dualistic  tendency,  in 
part  are  a  scientific  effort  to  overcome  it.  "  In  spite  of 
this  tendency  [to  a  dualism]  the  original  presupposi 
tion  [a  harmony  between  nature  and  spirit]  asserts  itself 
in  decisive  traits ;  and  we  shall  find  that  the  true  cause 
of  its  incapacity  to  reconcile  these  contradictions  satis 
factorily  lies  in  its  refusal  to  abandon  that  presupposi 
tion.  When  that  [unity]  is  canceled,  there  remains 
to  it  no  possible  way  of  filling  up  a  chasm  which,  ac 
cording  to  its  own  standpoint,  cannot  exist."  * 

A  Summary  of  Greek  Philosophy.  At  this  point  a 
summary  of  Greek  objective  philosophy  will  be  help- 

1  Zeller,  Pre-Socratic  Phil.,  vol.  i,  p.  162. 


THE  SYSTEMATIC   PERIOD  103 

ful.  The  philosophical  problem  that  had  been  working 
itself  out  since  Thales  had  been  this:  How  may  we 
think  the  Being  that  abides  amid  the  changes  of  phe 
nomena  ?  The  Cosmologists  scrutinized  physical  nature 
and,  without  differentiating  nature  and  spirit,  con 
ceived  abiding  Being  to  be  living  matter.  The  An 
thropologists  (except  Socrates)  doubted  if  there  is  any 
abiding  Being.  Among  the  Systematic  Philosophers 
a  dualism  for  the  first  time  appears.  Nature  and 
spirit  are  differentiated,  but  both  remain  entirely  ob 
jective.  Democritus  regarded  the  material  universe  as 
abiding  Being,  but  in  so  large  a  way  as  to  be  able  to 
construct  upon  it  a  psychology  and  an  ethics.  Plato 
found  abiding  Being  in  the  realm  of  the  spirit,  in 
a  group  of  moral  and  aesthetic  entities.  Aristotle  at 
tempts  to  overcome  the  opposition  between  materialism 
and  Platonism.  To  him  abiding  Being  is  neither  physi 
cal  nature  nor  the  spirit  apart  from  physical  nature. 
Abiding  Being  to  Aristotle  is  the  spirit  m  nature. 
Greek  Philosophy  (objective). 

1.  The  Cosmologists  —  Hylozoism. 

Abiding  Being  is  living  nature  —  some  form  of 
living  matter. 

2.  The  Anthropologists  —  Relativism  (except   Soc 
rates)  . 

Being  is  not  abiding,  but  consists  of  transitory 
mental  states.  This  is  a  form  of  what  was  called 
by  the  schoolmen  Nominalism,  and  summed  up  by 
the  phrase  Unwersalia  post  rem. 

3.  The  Systematic  Philosophers. 
Democritus  —  Materialism. 

Being  consists  in  material  atoms,  but  regarded 
in  so  large  a  way  as  to  furnish  a  basis  for  a 
psychology  and  an  ethics. 


104  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

Plato  —  Objective  Idealism. 

Being  consists  of  permanent  moral  and  aesthetic 
concepts  or  types.  In  mediaeval  philosophy  Pla- 
tonism  was  called  realism  and  was  summed  up 
by  the  phrase  Universalia  ante  rem. 
Aristotle  —  Conceptualism. 

The  abiding  Being  does  not  consist  of  material 
atoms  nor  in  spiritual  types  apart  from  matter, 
but  is  an  unfolding  essence  in  matter.  This  was 
usually  called  conceptualism  by  the  Schoolmen, 
and  was  summed  up  by  the  phrase  Universalia 
in  re.  Aristotle's  conception  was  as  difficult  as  it 
was  important.  He  was  not  always  clearly  a 
conceptualist,  but  sometimes  appeared  in  the  role 
of  an  "  objective  realist." 

Democritus  and  Plato  —  Their  Similarities  and 
Differences.  The  materialism  of  Democritus  and  the 
idealism  of  Plato  were  as  opposed  as  was  possible  within 
the  realm  of  Greek  thought.  We  must  not  exaggerate 
their  similarities,  but  they  had  at  least  four  common 
characteristics. 

Their  Similarities. 

1.  Both  develop   an  outspoken  rationalism,1  which 
starts  as  a  reaction  from  the  perception  theory  of  Pro 
tagoras.    They  agree  with  Protagoras  that  perception 
cannot  yield  truth,  and  so  they  turn  away  from  percep 
tion  to  the  reason  to  find  true  knowledge. 

2.  Both  develop  a  world  of  twofold  reality.   Percep- 

1  Rationalism  and  sensationalism  refer  to  the  sources  from  which 
knowledge  is  obtained.  Rationalism  is  to  be  contrasted  with  sensation 
alism.  Rationalism  is  the  belief  that  the  reason  is  an  independent 
source  of  knowledge  and  has  a  higher  authority  than  sense-perception. 
Sensationalism  is  the  belief  that  all  our  knowledge  originates  in  sensa* 
tions.  Empiricism  is  often  used  for  sensationalism. 


THE  SYSTEMATIC  PERIOD  105 

tions  are  not  regarded  by  them  as  illusions,  although 
perceptions  are  transitory.  Both  make  a  new  estimate 
of  perceptions,  and  give  to  the  world  of  perceptions  a 
relative  value.  There  are  therefore  two  kinds  of  reality : 
the  relative  reality  of  the  world  of  perceptions  and  the 
absolute  reality  of  the  world  of  reason.  The  result  in 
both  is  a  broad  theory  of  knowledge. 

3.  In  both,  reality  consists  in  a  plural  number  of 
objective  norms.    Both  reach  their  conception  of  these 
norms  in  the  same  way.  The  changing  qualities  of  things 
are  stripped  away  and  the  true  reality  is  discovered  be 
neath.  Both  designate  this  true  form  by  the  same  word, 
idea  (iSe'a).  To  both,  the  forms  are  objective  entities. 

4.  Both  are  attempts  to  overcome  scientifically  the 
dualism  which  had  emerged  from  the  former  hylozoism 
of  Greek  thought. 

TJieir  Differences  —  The  Development  of  the  Mean 
ing  of  Idea.  1.  But  the  forms  or  ideas  are  so  vitally 
different  in  the  doctrines  of  these  two  philosophers 
that  they  have  nothing  in  common  save  the  name.  On 
the  one  hand,  Democritus  took  the  word  "  idea  "  just  as 
he  found  it  in  popular  speech.  It  is  the  shape  of  a  vis 
ible  thing,  the  geometrical  form  of  physical  objects. 
It  gets  no  new  content  in  his  hands,  but  is  merely  the 
physical  atom.  With  Plato,  however,  the  word  gets  a 
new  meaning.  He  fills  the  form  or  idea  with  an  ethical 
content.  The  idea  as  a  quantity  becomes  now  a  quality. 
The  idea  becomes  an  Idea.  The  forms  of  Plato  are 
logical  species  and  teleological  causes,  while  the  forms 
of  Democritus  are  atom-complexes.1  In  both  philoso- 

1  Teleology  is  the  doctrine  that  things  exist  for  some  purpose.  A 
teleological  cause,  which  is  the  same  as  "  final  cause  "  or  "  end,"  is  the 
purpose  involved  in  an  action.  It  ia  contrasted  with  mechanical  or  efli- 


106  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

pliers  they  are  the  norms  of  reality.  But  while  Democ- 
ritus  still  keeps  his  forms  as  the  realities  of  physical 
nature,  Plato  conceives  his  forms  to  be  true  realities  of 
objective  human  nature. 

2.  This  vital  difference  between  the  two  philoso 
phers  may  get  some  explanation  from  the  difference  in 
the  philosophical  inheritance  of  each.  To  be  sure,  they 
were  contemporaries,  both  being  born  in  the  Anthro 
pological  Period  and  both  doing  their  most  mature 
work  in  the  Systematic  Period.  Both,  too,  were  ac 
quainted  with  the  philosophy  of  the  preceding  time. 
But  the  ethical  teaching  of  Socrates  dominated  Plato, 
and  through  it  he  became  the  legitimate  perfecter  of 
the  Greek  enlightenment  and  the  anthropological  move 
ment.  But  what  was  the  influence  of  Socrates  upon 
Democritus  ?  It  seems  to  have  been  nothing.  Why  is 
Plato  absolutely  silent  about  Democritus  when  he  men 
tions  other  Greek  philosophers  ?  No  one  has  yet  been 
able  to  say.  Democritus  stands  at  Abdera  isolated  from 
the  ethical  movement  at  Athens.  The  only  influence 
upon  him  from  that  movement  came  from  Protagoras, 
who  was  a  member  of  the  school  at  Abdera.  Democ 
ritus  is  the  finisher  of  the  Cosmological  movement. 

The  Life  of  Democritus  (460-370  B.  c.).  Democ 
ritus  was  twenty  years  younger  than  Protagoras, 
about  ten  years  younger  than  Socrates,  and  a  genera 
tion  older  than  Plato.  He  was  outlived  by  Plato ;  and 
Aristotle  was  a  young  man  when  Democritus  died.  He 
was  therefore  contemporary  with  the  intellectual  move- 

cient  cause.  A  trolley  car  is  moving  and  a  man  runs  to  catch  it.  Elec 
tricity  is  the  mechanical  cause  of  the  movement  of  the  car.  The  pur 
pose  of  the  man  is  the  teleological  cause  of  his  running  ;  the  strength 
in  his  legs  is  the  mechanical  or  efficient  cause  of  his  running. 


THE  SYSTEMATIC   PERIOD  101 

ment  going  on  in  Greece,  with  Athens  as  a  centre. 
While  he  does  not  appear  to  have  come  under  the  in 
fluence  of  Socrates,  he  was  well  acquainted  with  the 
destructive  epistemology  of  the  Sophists.  Abdera,  where 
he  lived,  is  in  Thrace,  and  seems  to  have  been  outside 
the  Anthropological  movement  at  Athens.  The  school 
of  Leucippus  was  at  Abdera ;  and  Democritus  was  in 
structed  in  the  Sophistic  doctrine  directly  from  Pro 
tagoras,  who  was  a  member  of  the  Atomistic  school 
before  going  to  Athens.  The  three  Systematic  philoso 
phers  were  wide  travelers,  Democritus  not  less  than 
Plato  and  Aristotle.  He  traveled  extensively  through 
Greece,  Egypt,  and  the  Orient.  He  then  returned  to 
Abdera  and  began  his  scientific  activity.  He  remained 
five  years  in  Egypt,  and  came  to  know  the  greater  part 
of  western  Asia.  He  returned  to  Abdera  about  420  B.C., 
and  therefore  did  not  begin  his  teaching  before  he  was 
forty  years  old.  The  length  of  time  that  Democritus, 
Plato,  and  Aristotle  took  for  their  apprenticeship,  and 
the  advanced  age  before  they  began  their  mastership, 
is  remarkable.  Democritus  was  the  greatest  investi 
gator  of  nature  in  antiquity,  and  Aristotle  used  much 
of  Democritus'  work  for  his  own  scientific  writings. 
The  ancients  admired  the  writings  of  Democritus,  and 
the  loss  of  them  in  the  fourth  century  after  Christ 
is  one  of  the  most  lamentable  that  has  happened  to 
the  literary  documents  of  antiquity.  His  works  were 
extraordinary  in  number,  and  upon  every  known  sub 
ject. 

Democritus  was  the  real  exponent  of  the  Atomistic 
school.  The  founder,  Leucippus,  belonged  to  the  Cosmo- 
logical  Period  ;  Protagoras,  the  Sophist,  belonged  to  the 
Anthropological  Period,  and  had  great  influence  in  the 


108  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

development  of  the  school  at  Abdera ;  but  Democritus, 
in  systematizing  the  doctrines  of  Leucippus  and  in 
accepting  the  perception  theory  of  Protagoras,  became 
its  most  notable  representative.  He  was  the  great  sys- 
tematizer  of  the  Cosmologists,  and  yet  he  differed  from 
all  the  Cosmologists  in  embodying  in  his  theory  the 
results  of  the  Sophistic  movement. 

TheComprehensiveness  of  the  Aim  of  Democritus. 
The  reconstruction  of  the  philosophy  of  Democritus 
has  always  been  difficult  for  the  historian  because,  from 
the  originally  great  mass  of  his  writings,  only  fragments 
remain.  The  fragments  show,  however,  many  interest 
ing  things :  that  he  covered  the  entire  range  of  experi 
ence  in  his  investigations;  that  he  was  quite  as  much 
interested  in  psychical  as  in  physical  problems  ;  that  his 
contribution  to  epistemology  was  even  greater  than  to 
physics  ;  and  that  he  was  interested  in  the  atomic  theory 
because  he  believed  that  it  was  a  working  hypothesis 
for  the  explanation  of  experience  of  every  kind.  This 
last  characteristic  shows  the  systematic  nature  of  his 
work  and  his  right  to  stand  with  Plato  and  Aristotle. 
Democritus  fully  realized  that  the  task  of  science  was 
to  explain  experiences  through  a  conception  of  reality. 
So  he  constructed  his  conception  of  the  atom  in  order 
that  he  might  explain  phenomena  intelligibly.  He  saw 
that  no  conception  strange  to  experience  or  against  ex 
perience,  like  the  Eleatic  Being,  would  answer  scientific 
demands.  A  rational  conception  of  absolute  reality  will 
have  value  only  as  experience  testifies  to  it  and,  on  the 
other  hand,  as  it  explains  experience.  Democritus  valued 
his  theory  of  the  atoms  because  it  seemed  to  explain 
all  phenomena.  This  construction  of  a  single  funda 
mental  rational  principle  for  all  kinds  of  phenomena 


THE  SYSTEMATIC   PERIOD  109 

shows  how  much  more  of  a  systematic  scientist  he  was 
than  the  Cosmologists. 

The  Enriched  Physics  of  Democritus — Hylozoism 
becomes  Materialism.  There  is  so  great  enrichment  in 
elaboration  and  generalization  in  the  physical  doctrine 
of  Democritus  over  that  of  Leucippus  that  it  amounts 
to  a  change  in  principle.  In  all  probability  Leucippus, 
like  other  Cosmologists,  was  a  hylozoist,  and  did  not 
differentiate  matter  and  life.  He  is  to  be  grouped  with 
the  Reconcilers,  or  even  with  the  Eleatics,  rather  than 
with  Democritus.  Democritus_was[  ^  materialist.  The 
period  of  forty  years  between  himself  and  Leucippus  had 
been  the  rich  period  of  the  introduction  of  psychologi 
cal  investigation  and  of  the  discrimination  of  psychical 
from  physical  processes.  Materialism  or  spiritualism  is 
not  possible  in  the  historical  development  of  the  human 
mind  until  it  passes  through  just  such  a  period  of  differ 
entiation  as  the  Sophistic  Enlightenment.  Before  such 
a  period  there  is  animism  and  hylozoism  ;  after  such  a 
period  there  is  materialism  and  spiritualism  of  various 
sorts.  Matter  must  be  discriminated  from  spirit  before 
one  of  the  terms  can  be  reduced  to  the  other.  So  the 
hylozoistic  pluralism  of  Leucippus  became  in  the  hands 
of  Democritus  a  realistic  materialism,  pluralistic  as  well. 

The  reduction  of  all  phenomena  by  Democritus  to  a 
mechanics  of  atoms  was  theoretically  an  enrichment  of 
physics,  for  it  anticipated  the  underlying  principle  of 
modern  physics.  The  apparent  qualities  of  things  and 
the  qualitative  changes  of  things  are  conceived  by 
Democritus  to  be  in  truth  only  a  quantitative  relation 
of  atoms.  He  set  before  himself  the  task  of  explaining 
in  detail  how  this  or  that  quality  consists  of  atoms  in 
mechanical  motion.  The  mental  life  of  man  must  be 


110  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

explained  in  the  same  way.  So  too,  wherever  he  could, 
he  emphasized  more  sharply  than  his  predecessors  the 
mechanical  necessity  of  the  movement  of  atoms.  Im 
pact  caused  by  contact  of  the  atoms  was  the  cause  of 
every  occurrence  and  change.  No  event  is  to  be  ex 
plained  as  the  manifestation  of  some  spirit,  or  referred 
to  some  spiritual  agency.  Mechanical  cause  is  behind 
every  event ;  mechanical  cause  is  the  unifying  principle 
of  the  doctrine  of  Democritus ;  mechanical  cause  is  the 
reason  for  the  chasm  between  the  philosophy  of  Plato,  of 
Aristotle,  and  that  of  Democritus.  It  is  the  reason,  too, 
why  the  theory  of  Democritus  was  obscured  until  mod 
ern  times.  All  teleological  conceptions  and  all  hylozo- 
istic  and  animistic  ideas  are  expelled  from  the  theory  of 
Democritus,  on  the  assumption  that  spatial  form  and 
motion  are  simpler  and  more  comprehensible  terms  of 
explanation.  Thus  for  the  first  time  we  have  a  con 
scious  outspoken  materialism,  and  for  the  first  time 
the  world  is  conceived  to  be  a  universal  reign  of  me 
chanical  law. 

The  physical  theory  of  Democritus  also  yielded  a  rich 
scientific  explanation  of  the  historical  evolution  of  the 
universe.  The  universe,  according  to  Democritus, — 
following  the  teaching  of  Leucippus,  —  consists  of  two 
parts  :  the  Plenum  or  self -moving,  qualitatively  similar 
atoms ;  and  the  Void  or  empty  space,  in  which  the 
atoms  move.  The  Plenum,  or  the  atoms,  is  Being ;  the 
Void  is  not-Being.  The  atoms  differ  only  in  form  and 
size ;  *  they  are  infinite  in  number  and  therefore  are  of 
an  infinite  number  of  forms  and  sizes ;  they  are  imper 
ceptibly  small.  The  perceptible  qualities  do  not  belong 

1  Atoms  differ  primarily  in  form  (tSe'a) ;  size  is  referred  in  part  tc 
form. 


THE  SYSTEMATIC  PERIOD  1H 

to  them,  but  to  their  motions.  Motion  is  an  irreducible 
function  of  atoms,  and  each  atom,  lawless  in  itself,  is  in 
flight  through  space.  An  aggregation  of  atoms  arises 
when  the  atoms  meet  in  their  cosmic  flight.  The  shock 
causes  a  vortex  which  draws  more  atoms  into  itself. 
Like  atoms  are  drawn  together,  and  the  heavy  atoms 
press  the  fine  fire-atoms  to  the  periphery.  Thus  innu 
merable  worlds  are  formed,  for  any  place  of  the  meeting 
of  several  atoms  can  be  the  beginning  of  a  new  world. 
Sometimes  small  worlds  are  drawn  into  the  vortices  of 
large  worlds,  and  sometimes  large  worlds  disintegrate 
in  fatal  collisions.  The  worlds  are  therefore  endless 
and  in  endless  succession.  The  whole  swings  in  space 
like  a  ball ;  the  rim  of  the  whole  consists  of  compact 
atoms ;  the  centre  is  filled  with  air.  To  much  further 
length  than  we  can  go  here  Democritus  developed  a 
theoretical  description  of  cosmic  evolution  upon  the 
principle  of  mechanical  necessity  —  and  the  description 
is  almost  modern. 

The  Materialistic  Psychology  of  Democritus.  It  is 
easy  to  understand  an  explanation  of  the  physical  uni 
verse  as  atoms  in  motion ;  for  our  modern  scientific 
theories  of  nature  are  set  in  these  terms,  even  if  we 
have  transformed  the  Democritan  static  atom  into  a 
dynamic  entity.  It  is  rather  more  interesting  to  follow 
such  a  materialist  as  Democritus  in  his  extension  of  the 
materialistic  principle  over  upon  the  realm  of  the  men 
tal  life. 

In  the  first  place,  Democritus  conceives  man  to  be 
part  and  parcel  of  the  world  of  atoms.  Man  is  com 
posed  of  all  kinds  of  atoms.  His  body  consists  of  earth, 
water,  and  air  atoms.  His  mind  is  made  up  of  fire 
atoms,  which  differ  from  the  others  in  being  the  finest, 


112  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

smoothest,  and  most  mobile.  On  this  account  the  fire 
atoms  are  the  most  perfect  of  all.  Psychical  activity  is 
the  motion  of  fire  atoms.  They  are  scattered  throughout 
the  universe,  and  wherever  they  are,  there  is  life.  They 
are  in  plants  and  animals  as  well  as  in  man.  There  is 
a  larger  collection  of  them  in  man,  and  this  shows  his 
superiority  over  other  living  things.  In  man  there  is  a 
fire  atom  between  every  two  other  atoms,  and  the  whole 
is  held  together  by  breathing.  The  different  forms  of 
mental  activity  are  simply  different  forms  of  atomic 
motion. 

In  the  next  place,  our  atomic  make-up  involves  the 
presence  of  other  atomic  complexes,  if  we  are  to  have 
any  psychical  activity.  External  things  must  stimulate 
us.  But  these  external  things  are  atoms  in  action.  They 
can,  however,  influence  us  only  by  coming  into  contact 
with  our  bodies.  Only  by  impact  on  our  bodies  can 
they  set  in  motion  the  fire  atoms  which  are  scattered 
through  our  bodies.  Every  kind  of  knowledge  or  men 
tal  life  involves  the  participation  of  the  fire  atoms  in  us. 
Thus  mental  activity  involves  two  factors ;  the  fire  atoms 
within  us  and  an  external  group  of  atoms  without  us. 

How  did  Democritus  explain  the  varied  mental  life 
as  the  resultant  of  these  two  factors  ?  He  employed  the 
theory  of  effluxes,  belief  in  which  he  shared  with  his 
time.  This  is  a  purely  physiological  assumption,  origi 
nated  by  such  Cosmologists  as  Empedocles,  that  some 
how  external  bodies  send  off  emanations  from  themselves 
which  strike  upon  our  bodies.  Most  objects  in  the 
world  influence  us  at  a  distance  and  only  through  the 
emission  of  these  effluxes.  Democritus  conceived  these 
emanations  to  be  little  copies  or  "  eidola  "  of  the  thing 
that  sends  them  off.  To  illustrate  Democritus'  meaning : 


THE  SYSTEMATIC  PERIOD  113 

a  tree  is  seen  by  me  because  little  trees,  thrown  off  by 
it,  hit  my  eye?  This  theory  retained  its  position  in  phi 
losophical  circles  until  after  Locke.  It  persists  in  the 
popular  mind  to-day.  It  is  a  general  belief  that  a 
thought  is  a  copy,  photograph,  or  image  of  the  thing. 
The  words  "  image  "  and  "  imagination  "  betray  their 
origin.  It  was  believed  by  Democritus  that  such  copies 
set  in  motion  the  sense  organs  and  through  them  the 
fire  atoms.  The  effluxes  can,  however,  affect  only  those 
organs  of  the  body  that  have  similar  formation  and 
similar  atomic  motions. 

But  the  effluxes  vary  very  much  in  the  degree  of 
fineness  of  their  atomic  structure.  There  are  all  sorts, 
from  very  fine  to  very  coarse.  Since  the  efflux  must 
correspond  to  a  particular  sense  if  that  sense  is  to  be 
affected  by  it,  the  effluxes  that  can  affect  the  senses  vary 
respectively  as  to  their  fineness.  Democritus  was  par 
ticularly  interested  in  the  sensations  of  sight  and  hear 
ing  as  examples  of  this.  None  of  the  effluxes  affecting 
the  senses  are  as  fine  as  those  that  stimulate  the  reason. 
Unless  they  were  the  finest  of  all  the  effluxes,  they 
could  not  affect  the  fine  motions  of  the  fire  atoms  of  the 
reason.  These  finest  "eidola"  or  effluxes  are  the  true 
copies  of  things,  and  the  reason  therefore  alone  knows 
things  truly.  Thought,  on  the  one  hand,  is  precisely  the 
atomic  motion  of  the  direct  impact  of  the  finest  effluxes 
upon  the  fine  fire-atoms  of  the  soul.  Sensation,  on  the 
other  hand,  is  atomic  motion  from  the  indirect  impact  of 
the  coarser  grades  of  effluxes  upon  the  fire  atoms.  The 
reason  knows  reality  directly.  Sensations  are  aroused  in 
a  roundabout  way  by  the  coarse  effluxes  setting  in  motion 
the  corresponding  sense  organ,  which  in  turn  sets  in 
motion  the  fire  atoms.  Thus  does  Democritus  make  the 


114  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

distinction  between  thought  and  sensation  in  quantita 
tive  terms.  Thus  does  he  reduce  his  psychology  to  a  con 
sistency  with  his  metaphysical  principle  of  materialism. 
Democritus'  Theory  of  Knowledge  —  The  World  of 
Twofold  Reality.  Democritus  would  have  been  only 
one  of  the  great  Cosmologists,  and  he  would  not 
have  his  place  by  the  side  of  Plato  and  Aristotle,  if  his 
materialism  had  illuminated  no  other  subject  than 
physics.  Indeed,  it  is  doubtful  if  his  physics  would  have 
been  so  grandly  comprehensive  and  unqualified  had  it 
not  been  strengthened  by  his  discriminating  theory  of 
twofold  knowledge.  He  might  have  extended  and  sys 
tematized  his  materialism  so  that  it  explained  to  the 
satisfaction  of  his  time  both  physical  and  psychical 
phenomena,  and  still  have  been  a  hylozoist,  like  Leu- 
cippus,  the  founder  of  the  Atomistic  school.  The  prob 
lem  of  knowledge  —  the  problem  of  estimating  our 
mental  states  —  was  as  incomprehensible  to  Leucippus 
as  to  the  Eleatics.  Democritus,  however,  was  a  ration 
alist  and  realist  like  Plato  and  Aristotle.  He  recog 
nized,  as  did  they,  that  there  is  a  difference  in  episte- 
mological  values.  His  universalized  materialism  did 
not  prevent  him  from  evaluating  our  experiences  from 
the  same  general  point  of  view  as  the  leader  of  the 
Academy  and  the  Stagirite.  He  felt  that  a  twofold 
reality  is  as  consistent  with  materialistic  principles  as 
with  idealism.  So  he  reduced  all  qualities  to  quan 
tities,  and  then  as  quantities  re-valued  and  classified 
them.  His  chief  contribution  was  to  the  subject  of 
epistemology  and  not  to  physics,  and  that  is  why  he 
is  treated  among  the  Greek  Systematizers  and  not 
among  the  Cosmologists.  Probably  his  chief  interest 
lay  where  he  did  his  chief  work. 


THE  SYSTEMATIC   PERIOD  Hi 

The  perception  theory  of  Protagoras  was  the  starting, 
point  of  both  Democritus  and  Plato.  Both  adopted 
it  in  order  to  transcend  it  and  make  it  of  real  signifi 
cance.  Democritus,  upon  the  basis  of  his  materialistic 
psychology,  admitted  that  sense-perception  is  only  a 
transitory  process,  and  its  knowledge  must  be  as  transi 
tory.  But  he  did  not  agree  with  Protagoras  that  all 
knowledge  is  perceptual.  Sense-perception_  does  yield 
only  relative  knowledge ;  Hut  there  is  another  kind  of 
knowledge  that  is  not  relative  but  absolute.  This  is 
knowledge  of  the  reason.  Human  beings  have  reason 
as  well  as  sense-perception.  Thus  is  Democritus  a 
rationalist,  although  a  materialist. 

The  contribution  of  Democritus  to  the  theory  of 
knowledge  consists  in  just  this  turn  which  he  gave  to 
Protagoras'  doctrine  of  perception.  The  relativity  of 
perception  becomes  in  the  Democritan  theory  a  differ 
ent  thing  from  what  it  was  in  the  doctrine  of  the  great 
Sophist.  To  Protagoras  perceptual  knowledge  is  rela 
tive,  and  therefore  of  no  value  in  determining  what  is 
real.  To  Democritus  perceptual  knowledge  is  relative, 
but  it  has  a  value,  —  a  relative  value.  It  gets  this  rela 
tive  value  from  the  fact  that  the  reason  can  determine 
absolute  reality.  Perception  is  the  contributor  to  the 
reason,  and  also  in  turn  is  illuminated  by  the  reason. 
In  the  same  breath  we  may  say  that  Protagoras  was 
a  contributor  to  the  theory  of  Democritus,  and  in  turn 
that  the  Protagorean  relativism  was  illuminated  by 
the  Democritan  rationalism.  The  result  was  a  twofold 
knowledge  —  in  the  language  of  Democritus,  "  genuine 
knowledge  "  and  "  obscure  insight." 

The  objects  corresponding  to  these  two  kinds  of 
knowledge  must  be  of  two  kinds.  On  the  one  hand, 


116  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

the  objects  of  tbejgason.  or  "  genuine  knowledge,"  are,. 
the  genuine,  primary,  or  real  properties  of^jjhe  atoms 
—  for  the  atoms  are  reality  to  Democritus.  These  are 
.form,  size,  inertia,  density,  and  hardness^1  A  study  of 
these  properties  of  things  is,  therefore,  a  study  of  real 
objects.  On  the  other  hand,  the  objects  of  perception 
or  "obscure  insight  "are  the  properties  of  atoms  as 
perceived  obscurely  by  the  senses.  These  are  color,, 

are  the  qualities  or  relative 


^properties  of  things.  A  study  of  these  is  a  study  of 
only  what  is  relatively  real.  When  materialism  was 
revived  by  the  Renaissance,  the  former  group  of  objects 
were  called  "^primary  ^qualities  "  and  the  latter  "^ec- 
ondar^j^ualities.''  These  terms  have  become  classic, 
and  have  rendered  permanent  Democritus'  evaluation 
of  the  objects  of  the  two  kinds  of  knowledge.  Out  of 
the  fragments  of  the  teaching  of  the  Cosmologists  and 
the  one-sided  epistemology  of  the  Sophists,  Democritus 
constructed  contemporaneously  with  Plato,  perhaps  an 
tecedently  to  him,  a  theory  of  twofold  knowledge. 

The  Ethical  Theory  of  Democritus.  The  ethics  of 
Democritus  is  another  example  of  his  general  principle 
of  a  mechanism  of  atoms.  His  attempt  to  reduce  all 
qualitative  to  quantitative  relations,  which  gives  his 
theory  a  unique  place  in  Greek  thought,  reaches  its 
highest  distinction  in  his  ethics.  The  influence  of  his 
ethical  doctrine  upon  the  Epicureans,  and  possibly  upon 
the  Cyrenaics,  shows  its  importance  in  history.  Further 
more,  its  high  quality  proves  that  a  materialism  can 
offer  inspiring  ethical  doctrines.  Some  have  placed  the 
ethics  of  Democritus  upon  a  level  with  the  ethics  of 
Socrates  because,  as  it  is  pointed  out,  he  placed  it  upon 

1  These  all  reduce  to  form,  —  see  above. 


THE  SYSTEMATIC   PERIOD  117 

an  intellectual  basis.  The  basal  ethical  principle  of 
Deraocritus  may  be  stated  thus :  As  true  knowledge  is 
the  ideal  object  of  the  intellect,  so  true  happiness  is  the 
ideal  object  of  our  conduct.  The  ethics  of  Democritus 
is  eudaemonistic,  like  that  of  Socrates. 

Pleasures  have  fundamental  differences.  They  are  in 
every  case  the  results  of  atomic  motions  ;  but  the  atomic 
motions  of  the  intellect  differ  from  those  of  the  senses, 
and  those  of  the  senses  differ  from  one  another.  The 
fire  atoms  of  the  intellect  are  small,  and  have  a  gentle, 
peaceful  motion  ;  the  atomic  motions  of  the  senses  are 
coarse  and  violent,  caused  by  the  coarse  effluxes  of  the 
objects  that  excite  them.  Sense-pleasures  are  relative, 
like  the  perceptions.  As  perception  is  obscure  insight 
and  gains  the  appearance  and  not  the  true  reality,  so 
the  pleasures  of  sense  are  transitory,  uncertain,  violent, 
and  deceitful.  Intellectual  pleasures  are,  like  the  intel 
lect,  real,  true,  permanent,  gentle,  and  peaceful.  True 
happiness,  the  goal  of  human  activity,  attends  upon  that 
right  insight  —  upon  the  gentle  atomic  motions  of  the 
intellectual  life.  On  the  other  hand,  the  coarse  atomic 
motions  of  the  senses  disturb  the  intellectual  calm, 
and  are  often  violent  explosions.  Democritus  believed 
that  knowledge  of  the  atoms,  as  the  true  explanation  of 
the  world,  will  give  to  the  soul  a  measure  and  a  har 
mony,  will  guard  it  from  excitement  and  make  it  pos 
sessor  of  a  peace  which  —  to  use  his  happy  simile  —  is 
like  the  ocean  calm.  Two  ideals  seem  to  stand  before 
Democritus,  which  he  did  not  try  to  reconcile.  Some 
times  before  his  mind's  eye  the  ideal  happiness  is  purely 
intellectual  pleasure  and  points  toward  asceticism. 
Sometimes  he  speaks  of  happiness  as  the  life  of  perfect 
self-control  and  temperance.  He  never  positively  denies 


118  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

all  value  to  sense-pleasure,  but  he  gives  to  sense-pleas 
ure  the  relative  value  that  he  gives  to  the  senses  them 
selves.  In  every  case  the  ground  of  happiness  is  intel 
lectual  refinement,  and  the  ground  of  unhappiness  the 
lack  of  it.  The  majority  of  men  are  sensualists  and  are 
to  be  contrasted  with  the  Wise  Man,  who  finds  his  hap 
piness  either  in  his  individual  life  or  in  his  friendship 
with  other  Wise  Men. 


CHAPTER  VII 

PLATO  (427-347  B.  C.) 

Abdera  and  Athens.  The  materialism  of  Democri- 
tus  was  the  natural  consummation  of  the  thought  of  the 
Cosmological  Period.  The  influence  of  the  Sophistic 
psychology  only  enriched  it,  widened  it,  and  brought 
its  materialism  into  a  systematic  formulation.  The 
Democritan  system  from  the  isolated  centre  of  Abdera 
points  only  to  the  past.  Upon  the  death  of  Democritus 
the  school  quickly  disappeared.  Its  materialistic  doc 
trine  reappeared  from  time  to  time  in  one  form  and 
another,  —  in  the  Skeptics,  the  Epicureans,  and  the 
Stoics.  It  was  reintroduced  as  a  system  into  Europe 
during  the  Renaissance.  So  far  as  Greece  was  con 
cerned,  the  school  of  Abdera  was  an  early  ripening  and 
an  early  dying  branch. 

The  school  of  Athenian  immaterialism,  the  principal 
tendency  of  Greek  thought,  arose  from  the  centre  of 
Attic  civilization  and  pointed  to  the  future.  It  drew 
its  materials  from  practically  the  same  sources  as  the 
philosophy  of  Abdera,  but  the  materials  were  polarized 
about  the  ethical  teaching  of  Socrates.  The  life  of 
Plato  coincides  with  the  unhappy  history  of  Athens 
after  the  death  of  Pericles  (429  B.  C.).  The  Pelopon- 
nesian  War  began  in  431  B.  c.,  two  years  before  the 
death  of  Pericles  and  four  years  before  the  birth  of 
Plato  ;  and  it  did  not  end  until  403  B.  c.  The  event 
most  disastrous  to  the  Athenians  during  this  war 
was  the  Sicilian  expedition  in  413  B.  c.  Athens  was 


120  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

captured  by  the  Spartans  in  403  B.  c.,  and  the  great 
walls  of  the  city  were  destroyed.  The  remainder  of 
Plato's  life  was  contemporaneous  with  the  devastating 
wars  among  the  Greek  cities,  for  there  was  no  city 
strong  enough  to  hold  the  balance  of  power  after  it 
left  the  hands  of  the  Athenians.  In  359  B.  c.  Macedon 
began  to  loom  up  as  a  power  in  the  north.  The  life  of 
Plato,  the  formulator  of  Athenian  immaterialism,  may 
be  easily  remembered  as  covering  that  period  between 
the  rise  of  Sparta  and  the  rise  of  Macedon. 

The  Difficulties  in  Understanding  the  Teaching  of 
Plato.  The  theory  of  Plato  is  one  of  the  most  involved 
and  one  of  the  most  difficult  to  understand  in  the 
whole  history  of  philosophy.  This  difficulty  of  inter 
preting  Plato  as  a  philosopher  depends  upon  many 
factors  :  upon  the  artistic  literary  form  of  the  dialogue 
in  which  his  philosophy  is  presented ;  upon  the  con 
flicting  tendencies  of  thought  in  Plato  himself ;  upon 
the  fact  that  the  composition  of  his  dialogues  extended 
over  a  period  of  more  than  half  a  century ;  upon  the  con 
stant  reshaping  of  the  content  as  well  as  the  form  of 
his  thought ;  and  upon  the  uncertainty  of  the  chrono 
logical  order  of  his  writings.  This  chronological  order 
of  Plato's  dialogues  is  an  important  factor  in  determin 
ing  his  teaching.  Since  the  beginning  of  the  nineteenth 
century  a  vast  amount  of  literature  has  been  published 
on  the  subject,  and  many  theories  of  the  dialogue-chro 
nology  have  been  proposed.  There  are  three  principal 
groups  of  theories  :  (1)  those  based  upon  purely  a  pri 
ori  hypotheses,  as,  for  example,  that  of  Hermann,  that 
each  dialogue  is  a  stage  in  the  development  of  Plato's 
thought ;  or  that  of  Schleiermacher,  that  Plato  had  a 
systematic  plan  from  the  beginning ;  (2)  those  based 


PLATO  121 

upon  an  empirical  study  of  the  historical  allusions  in  the 
dialogues  themselves  (Zeller,  Windelband,  et  als.*);  (3) 
those  recent  theories  based  upon  the  "  stylometric  test," 
i.  e.  by  an  examination  of  the  peculiarities  of  the  style 
of  Plato.  Lutoslawski  is  a  prominent  representative  of 
this  method. 

The  result  to  the  student  is  bewildering,  on  account 
of  the  differing  conclusions.  But  since  some  choice 
must  be  made,  we  shall  follow  the  order  laid  down  by 
Windelband,1  because  it  is  fairly  orthodox  and  con 
servative.  For  convenience  to  the  memory,  the  writings 
will  be  grouped  in  the  periods  of  Plato's  life.  Our  in 
terpretation  will  therefore  follow  Windelband  in  respect 
to  the  character  of  Plato's  theory  itself. 

The  Life  and  Writings  of  Plato.  Two  important 
events  divide  Plato's  long  life  of  eighty  years  into  three 
periods.  These  events  were  the  death  of  his  master,  Soc 
rates,  in  399  B.  c.,  and  Plato's  return  from  Sicily  in  387 
B.  c.,  after  having  there  come  under  the  influence  of  the 
Pythagoreans.  His  first  period  may  be  called  his  student 
life,  and  was  twenty-eight  years  long ;  the  second  period 
was  that  of  the  traveler,  and  was  twelve  years  long ;  the 
third  period  was  that  of  teacher  of  the  Academy,  and 
was  forty  years  long.  The  first  half  of  his  life  therefore 
covers  the  first  two  periods,  and  the  second  half  covers 
his  period  as  teacher.  Probably  he  was  engaged  in  the 
composition  of  the  dialogues  during  all  these  periods, 
and  Cicero  reports  him  to  have  died  "  pen  in  hand  " 
(scribens  est  mortuus). 

i.  Plato's  Student  Life  (427-399  B.C.).  This  period 
closes  with  the  death  of  Socrates.  His  acquaintance  with 
Socrates  began  when  he  was  twenty  years  old,  and  there* 
fore  lasted  eight  years. 

1  Windelband,  Hist,  of  Ancient  Phil.,  pp.  183-189. 


122  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

The  dialogues  written  during  this  period  are  presenta 
tions  of  the  doctrine  of  Socrates  and  do  not  contain  the 
constructive  theory  of  Plato.  They  are  concerned  either 
with  Socratic  subjects  or  with  Socrates  personally,  and 
were  written  in  part  during  Socrates'  life,  in  part  di 
rectly  after  his  death. 

(a)  Dialogues  written  under  the  influence  of  Soc 
rates  : 

Lysis,  concerning  friendship  ; 
Laches,  concerning  courage ; 
Charmides,  concerning  moderation. 
5)  Dialogues  written  in  defense  of  Socrates : 
Crito,  concerning  Socrates'  fidelity  to  law ; 
Apology,  a  general  defense  of  Socrates  ; 
Euthryphro,  concerning  Socrates'  true  piety. 
2.  Plato  as  Traveler  (399-387  B.  c.).  During  this 
period  Plato  made  one  short  and  two  long  journeys,  and 
after  each  he  returned  to  Athens.    Upon  the  death  of 
Socrates  he  went  to  Megara,  where  a  former  pupil  of 
Socrates  had  a  school.    Upon  this  journey  he  was  accom 
panied  by  other  pupils  of  Socrates,  who,  as  tradition 
has  it,  feared  violence  to  themselves  after  the  death  of 
their  master.    Plato  remained  in  Megara  but  a  short 
time,  and  soon  returned  to  Athens.    Immediately  upon 
his  return  to  Athens  he  went  to  Cyrene  and  Egypt,  and 
was  away  from  Athens  about  four  years  (until  395  B.  c.). 
The  Egyptian    journey  had  little  influence  upon   his 
thought,  but  must  have  stimulated  his  imagination.  He 
then  remained  at  Athens  four  years  (395-391  B.  c.), 
and  during  this  time  he  taught  a  small  circle  and  wrote 
his  polemics  against  the  Sophists. 

In  391  B.  c.  Plato  made  his  first  Italian  journey  —  to 
Sicily  and  southern  Italy.  This  marks  the  second  criti- 


PLATO  123 

cal  point  in  his  mental  development.  For  at  this  time 
(1)  he  came  under  the  influence  of  the  Italian  Pythag 
oreans,  and  (2)  he  attempted  and  failed  in  connection 
with  Dion  *  and  Dionysius  to  erect  his  ideal  state  in 
Syracuse.  He  was  sold  as  a  slave  by  Dionysius,  re 
deemed  by  a  friend,  and  returned  to  Athens  in  387  B.  c., 
having  been  away  about  four  years. 

It  is  to  be  noted  that  Democritus  and  Plato  were  wide 
travelers,  considering  the  difficulties  of  locomotion  of 
the  time.  Both  Democritus  and  Plato  went  to  Egypt, 
and  Democritus  spent  several  years  in  Asia  Minor  (see 
p.  107). 

The  dialogues  written  during  this  period  may  be 
divided  into  (a)  the  group  of  polemics  against  the 
Sophists,  and  (6)  the  Meno. 

(a)  The  polemics  against  the  Sophists  (written  be 
tween  his  return  from  Egypt  in  395  B.  c.  and  his  first 
Italian  journey  in  391  B.  C.). 

They  are  an  attempt  to  present  a  solid  front  against 
the  Sophists,  and  to  show  the  weakness  of  the  Sophistic. 
Doctrines.  These  polemical  dialogues  are  : 

Protagoras,  a  criticism  of  the  Sophistic  assumption 
that  virtue  is  teachable,  because  that  assumption 
is  incompatible  with  the  Sophistic  fundamental 
principle ; 

Gorgias,  showing  how  superficial  the  Sophistic  rhet 
oric  is  when  compared  with  true  culture,  which  is 
the  foundation  of  real  statecraft ; 
Euthydemus,  an  exposition  of  the  fallacies  in  the 

Sophistic  eristic ; 

,    Cratylus,  a  criticism  of  the  philological  attempts  of 
the  Sophists ; 

*  Read  Wordsworth,  Dion. 


124  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

Thecetetus,  a  criticism  of  the  Sophistic  theories  of 
knowledge  ; 

The  First  Book  of  the  Republic  (the  "Dialogue 
concerning  Justice  "),  a  criticism  of  the  Sophistic 
naturalistic  theory  of  the  state. 

(b)  MenO)  which  contains  the  first  positive  state 
ment  by  Plato  of  his  own  constructive  theory.  It  is 
the  first  intimation  of  development  beyond  the  simple 
Socratic  theory  of  knowledge.  Plato  states  this,  how 
ever,  rather  timidly,  by  suggestions  and  after  the  man 
ner  of  a  mathematician. 

3.  Plato  as  Teacher  of  the  Academy  (387-347 
B.  c.).  These  forty  years  were  spent  by  Plato  in  Athens 
as  master  and  teacher  of  his  school,  the  Academy,  with 
the  exception  of  two  journeys  to  Italy.  He  undertook 
these  journeys  in  the  hope  of  realizing  in  a  practical 
way  his  political  ideals.  He  made  his  second  Italian 
journey  upon  the  invitation  of  Dion,  in  the  hope  of  in 
fluencing  the  younger  Dionysius,  and  the  third  Italian 
journey  in  order  to  reconcile  Dion  and  Dionysius.  This 
last  journey  brought  him  again  into  great  personal  danger. 

What  was  the  Academy  ?  It  was  a  public  grove  or 
garden  in  the  suburbs  of  Athens  (see  map,  p.  219)  that 
had  been  left  to  the  city  for  gymnastics  by  a  public- 
spirited  man  named  Academus.  It  had  been  surrounded 
by  a  wall  and  had  been  adorned  by  olive  trees,  statues, 
and  temples.  Near  this  inclosure  Plato  possessed  by 
inheritance  a  small  estate.  It  was  here  that  he  opened 
his  school,  and  few  places  could  be  more  favorable  for 
the  study  of  philosophy.  Plato  bequeathed  this  estate 
to  the  school,  which  held  the  property  in  a  corporate 
capacity  for  several  centuries.  The  leader  of  the  school 
was  called  scholarch,  and  he  appointed  his  own  successor. 


PLATO  125 

The  school  was  a  kind  of  religious  brotherhood  based 
upon  the  worship  of  the  Muses. 

Note  that  Democritus,  Plato,  and  Aristotle  finished 
their  education  at  an  age  much  beyond  what  is  supposed 
to  be  the  limit  in  modern  time.  They  were,  in  fact,  mature 
men  before  they  began  their  life  work.  Plato  was  32 
before  he  began  to  teach  in  Athens  and  40  before  he 
set  himself  about  his  real  life  task  in  the  founding  of 
the  Academy.  Democritus  was  40  before  he  returned  to 
Abdera  from  his  travels  in  Asia  Minor.  Aristotle  was 
41  when  he  undertook  to  act  as  tutor  of  Alexander,  and 
49  when  he  began  his  administration  of  the  Lyceum. 

The  dialogues  of  the  third  period  of  Plato's  life  con^ 
tain  his  constructive  theory,  and  are  his  masterpieces  o± 
art.  The  topics  with  which  they  deal  show  the  advance 
of  his  thought  over  the  dialogues  of  his  first  period. 
The  purely  Socratic  dialogues  were  ethical  discussions ; 
these  are  ethical,  metaphysical,  and  physical. 

Phcedrus,  Plato's  delivery  of  his  programme  upon 
his  entrance  into  active  teaching  in  the  Academy, 
in  386  B.  c. 

Symposium,  an  exposition  of  his  entire  doctrine  in 
"  love  speeches."  It  is  the  most  artistic  of  his  writ 
ings,  and  represents  the  climax  of  his  intellectual 
power  (385  or  384  B.  c.). 

Republic  (major  portion).  The  composition  of  the 
Republic  extended  over  a  long  period.  It  is  a 
discussion :  (1)  concerning  justice  (written  in  the 
second  period,  see  above)  ;  (2)  concerning  the 
ideal  state  which  shall  realize  justice  ;  (3)  concern 
ing  the  Idea  of  the  Good  and  in  criticism  of  the 
constitutions  of  states.  It  is  Plato's  masterpiece 
and  his  life  work. 


126  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

Parmenides  and  Sophist,  written  to  express  the  ol> 
jections  to  the  theory  of  Ideas,  and  to  discuss  such 
objections.  (Windelband  holds  these  dialogues 
were  not  written  by  Plato,  but  by  some  member 
of  his  school.  This  is,  however,  not  the  consensus 
of  opinion.) 
Politicus,  a  discussion  of  the  field  of  knowledge 

and  of  action  for  a  statesman. 

Phcedo,  Plato's  final  will  and  testament  to  the  school, 
written  shortly  before  his  third  Sicilian  journey, 
in  361  B.  c.  It  is  his  completed  conception  of  the 
Idea  of  the  Good  and  of  the  relation  of  other 
Ideas  to  it.  It  contains  Anaxagorean  and  Pythago 
rean  elements. 
Philebus,  concerning  the  ingredients  of  the  Idea  of 

the  Good. 

Timceus,  Plato's  conception  of  physical  nature,  ex 
pressed  in  mythical  form. 
Laws,  the  work  of  Plato's  old  age,  his  revision  of 

the  ideal  State. 

Concerning  the  Dialogues1  of  Plato.  The  early 
philosophers  presented  their  philosophy  in  metrical 
form  as  poems  "  concerning  nature "  ;  Socrates  per 
petuated  his  teachings  through  conversations  with  men  j 
Plato  made  his  influence  permanent  by  written  dia 
logues  ;  Aristotle's  philosophy,  in  the  works  that  have 
been  preserved,  stands  in  the  form  of  treatises  whose 
sole  purpose  is  that  of  exposition.  Plato's  dialogues 
therefore  have  a  twofold  place  in  the  history  of  litera- 

1  B.  Jowett,  Dialogues  of  Plato,  trans,  into  English  with  analyses 
and  introductions,  4  vols. 

See  p.  158  for  selections  from  the  dialogues  made  by  Jowett  for  Eng 
lish  readers. 


PLATO  127 

ture.  On  the  one  hand,  in  the  history  of  literature 
proper  we  have  already  mentioned  them  as  standing 
after  the  Greek  drama  in  the  development  of  Greek 
dialectics ;  on  the  other  hand,  in  the  development  of 
philosophical  instruction  they  stand  between  the  con 
versations  of  Socrates  and  the  scientific  expositions 
of  Aristotle. 

Plato  was  the  first  child  of  Fortune,  and  the  com 
plete  preservation  of  his  works  was  the  most  remark 
able  proof  of  it.  ^Eschylus  was  the  author  of  at  least 
70  writings,  of  which  7  are  preserved ;  Euripides  was 
the  author  of  95  writings,  of  which  18  are  preserved ; 
Sophocles  had  123  writings,  aside  from  his  lyric  works, 
of  which  7  are  preserved.  Shakespeare  wrote  36  plays, 
Plato  wrote  35  dialogues  that  are  genuine.  All  of 
Plato's  writings  have  come  down  to  us.  Why  were  the 
writings  of  Plato  preserved  from  the  destroying  hand 
of  time?  There  are  at  least  three  causes  of  their 
preservation  :  (1)  they  had  intrinsic  beauty  ;  (2)  there 
was  contemporary  public  interest  in  them ;  (3)  the 
chief  cause,  Plato's  school  kept  close  guard  over  them. 

By  the  dialogue  Plato  could  employ  the  Socratio 
method,  give  dramatic  effect,  and  idealize  Socrates. 
The  Republic  is  his  crowning  literary  effort,  and  the 
most  complete  statement  of  his  mature  political  views. 
Perhaps  the  Philebus  is  the  best  expression  of  his 
idea  of  goodness,  and  presents  his  most  complete  or 
ganization  of  the  sciences.  All  Plato's  dialogues  have 
a  transparent  beauty  and  a  purity  of  diction  ;  and  they 
may  be  taken  as  a  revelation  of  himself.  All  are  dia 
logues  save  the  Apology,  but  the  dialogue  element 
grows  less  and  less  in  his  later  works.  Socrates  is  usu 
ally  the  spokesman  in  them,  and  to  him  is  usually  given 


128  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

the  deciding  word.  Only  a  few  have  a  fixed  plan  of  ar 
gument.  One  thread  and  then  another  is  followed,  and 
in  many  no  decision  whatever  is  reached ;  for  the  dia 
logues  must  always  be  taken  as  artistic  products  in 
which  philosophical  experiences  are  idealized.  Plato 
often  employs  myths  or  parables  to  illuminate  his  ar 
guments.  The  situations  and  the  literary  adornments 
show  the  human  touch,  and  the  conversation  often  moves 
to  a  dramatic  close. 

In  the  Republic  Plato  sought  to  formulate  theo 
retically  certain  political  conceptions  of  the  ideal  State 
that  were  then  in  the  air.  It  is  interesting  to  note  that 
his  conception  influenced  the  political  idealism  of  later 
time,  as,  for  example,  Cicero's  De  Rcpublica,  August 
ine's  City  of  God,  More's  Utopia,  Campanella's  State 
of  the  Sun,  Bacon's  New  Atlantis,  Macchiavelli's  11 
Principe. 

The  Factors  in  the  Construction  of  Plato's  Doctrine. 

i.  His  Inherited  Tendencies,  (a)  In  the  first 
place  Plato  was  by  instinct  an  aristocrat.  His  family 
was  one  of  the  most  distinguished  in  Athens,  and  traced 
its  descent  from  Solon  and  Codrus.  In  making  an  esti 
mate  of  his  philosophy  one  must  take  account  of  the 
caste  of  society  in  which  he  was  born.  His  metaphysi 
cal  theory  of  Ideas  is  aristocratic,  and  in  it  he  turns 
from  all  that  is  of  the  earth  earthy  to  what  is  above 
the  life  of  "  opinion."  His  four  cardinal  virtues  are 
possible  only  to  the  few.  His  political  attitude  was 
peculiar.  He  was  hostile  to  the  democracy,  and  yet  his 
political  idealism  diverged  so  far  from  the  practical 
politics  of  Athenian  aristocracy  that  he  completely  ab 
stained  from  public  life.  With  Plato,  philosophy  once 
more  retires  to  the  school.  Here  we  have  the  strange 


PLATO  129 

juxtaposition  of  Socrates,  the  teacher,  who  had  been 
engaged  in  a  practical  reformation,  whose  father  was 
an  artisan  and  whose  mother  a  midwife,  and  Plato,  his 
adoring  pupil  and  truest  interpreter,  —  Plato,  the 
idealist,  "  whose  speculation  is  not  like  the  Philistine, 
whose  life  is  spent  in  the  market  place  or  the  work 
shop,  and  whose  world  is  measured  by  the  narrow 
boundaries  of  his  native  town ;  it  is  the  lord  of  the 
manor,  who  retires  to  his  mansion,  after  having  seen 
the  world,  and  turns  his  gaze  towards  the  distant  hori 
zon  ;  disdaining  the  noise  of  the  cross-roads,  he  mingles 
only  in  the  best  society,  where  is  heard  the  most  ele 
gant,  the  noblest,  and  the  loftiest  language  that  has 
ever  been  spoken  in  the  home  of  the  Muses."  1 

(b)  In  the  next  place  Plato  had  an  instinctive  love 
for  the  beautiful,  and  in  this  he  was  great,  even  in  his 
time.  Every  Periclean  Greek  was  artistic,  but  Plato 
was  more  than  this.  He  is  to  be  ranked  among  the 
great  creators  of  the  art  of  his  day,  —  with  Phidias  and 
Sophocles.  He  represented  in  his  person  everything 
ideally  Greek.  He  was  a  man  of  great  beauty,  a  human 
Apollo,  a  man  endowed  with  every  physical  and  mental 
talent,  and  his  moral  character  was  almost  ideal  in  its 
purposes.  His  real  name  was  Aristocles,  and  he  got  his 
name  Plato  from  his  broad  frame.  The  artistic  devel 
opment  of  the  time  appealed  to  him  in  his  youth,  and 
he  was  early  interested  in  the  writing  of  epic  and  dra 
matic  poetry.  This  artistic  instinct  determined  in  no 
small  measure  not  only  the  form  of  the  presentation  of 
his  thought,  but  also  the  content  of  the  thought  itself. 
It  determined  his  principle  of  conceiving  the  Ideas,  the 
constitution  of  his  State,  his  theory  of  pleasure,  and  his 
1  Goethe. 


130  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

conception  of  the  highest  Good.  The  artistic  form  of 
the  presentation  of  his  writings  was  as  important  to 
him  as  the  matter  presented. 

2.  His  Philosophical  Sources.  Plato  had  received 
a  careful  education  that  made  him  familiar  with  all 
the  scientific  theories  of  current  interest  to  the  Athe 
nians.  The  elements  of  the  earlier  philosophies,  that 
were  fundamental  to  the  mechanical  atomism  of  De- 
inocritus,  were  recombined  in  a  different  way  by  Plato 
under  the  influence  of  Socrates'  ethical  principle.  Even 
Plato's  political  and  artistic  ideals  are  subordinate  to 
his  entire  absorption  in  the  personality  and  teaching  of 
Socrates.  Heracleitus,  Protagoras,  Parmenides,  and, 
later,  Anaxagoras  and  the  Pythagoreans,  furnished 
him  with  his  philosophical  materials.  We  may  point 
out  three  of  the  preceding  philosophies  that  had  an 
especially  powerful  influence  upon  him:  those  of  (1) 
Socrates ;  (2)  Parmenides ;  and  (3)  the  Pythagoreans. 
His  revered  master,  Socrates,  furnished  Plato  through 
out  with  the  conceptual  principle,  by  which  he  worked 
over  all  his  material  into  his  daring  system.  The  influ 
ence  of  Parmenides  upon  him  was  also  very  great.  He 
speaks  of  the  Eleatic  as  "  Parmenides,  my  father." 
Plato  betook  himself  to  the  Eleatic  school  at  Megara 
upon  the  death  of  Socrates,  and  this  shows  that  he 
must  already  have  been  hospitable  to  the  philosophy 
which  taught  the  conception  of  an  absolute  and  eternal 
essence  of  things  known  by  the  human  reason.  The  in 
fluence  of  the  Pythagoreans  was  felt  by  Plato  on  his 
first  visit  to  Italy.  This  influence  grew  with  him,  and 
seems  to  dominate  the  dialogue  of  his  old  age,  the 
Laws.  The  Eleatic  Oneness  was  a  single,  immutable 
block.  In  the  Pythagorean  doctrine  of  numbers  he 


PLATO  131 

found  the  conceptual  divisions  of  that  Oneness,  and  he 
also  found  that  such  conceptions  would  give  a  content 
to  Socrates'  conception  of  the  Good.  Indeed,  the  num 
bers  seemed  to  be  the  conceptual  models  for  which 
Socrates  was  searching.  Mathematical  truths  are  inde 
pendent  of  perception.  They  are  innate  ideas.  They 
are  eternal  and  immutable  Forms.  They  were  the 
weapons  needed  against  the  Protagorean  doctrine  of 
perception.  While  Plato  agreed  with  Heracleitus  that 
the  visible  world  is  a  changing  world,  and  with  Pro 
tagoras  that  our  sense-perceptions  of  that  world  can 
yield  only  relative  truth,  he  developed  his  philosophy 
almost  entirely  on  its  conceptual  side ;  and  this  is  due 
to  the  influence  first  of  Socrates,  second  of  Parmenides, 
and  third  of  the  Pythagoreans.  Plato's  completed 
philosophy  was  the  theory  of  Ideas.,  worked  over  in  his 
mind  a  half-century  or  more,  and  is  in  itself  a  history 
of  the  development  of  pure  concepts. 

The  Divisions  of  Plato's  Philosophy.  Plato  himself 
had  no  clear  conception  of  an  exact  division  of  science, 
and  did  not  confine  himself  in  a  single  dialogue  to  a 
single  science.  Aristotle,  however,  distinguished  in  the 
philosophy  of  his  master  dialectic,  ethics,  and  physics, 
and  these  divisions  of  Plato's  teaching  have  been  tra 
ditionally  adopted.  The  dialectic,  as  commonly  used  in  1 
his  time,  meant  "  the  dialogue  or  conversation  employed  ) 
as  a  means  of  scientific  investigation."  It  was  trans-   I 
formed  by  Plato  to  mean  not  logical  but  metaphysical 
discussion.  Plato  was  concerned  with  the  laws  of  Being 
rather  than  the  laws  of  logic,  and,  as  Being  to  him 
consisted  of  Ideas,  his  dialectic  interest  was  to  reduce 
experience  by  division  and   induction  to   some  unity. 
Plato's  dialectic  was  not  logical  but  methodological,  — 


132  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

logical  operations  taken  as  a  whole,  —  by  means  of 
which  the  Ideas  and  their  relations  to  one  another  were 
to  be  found.  The  physics  of  Plato  is  of  little  value.  It 
was  an  afterthought  to  satisfy  the  demands  of  his  school. 
The  world  of  nature  phenomena  could  never  be  for  Plato 
the  object  of  true  knowledge.  Unfortunately,  the  teleo- 
logical  physics  of  Plato  was  regarded  by  the  Hellen 
istic  time  and  the  Middle  Ages  as  Plato's  most  im 
portant  achievement.  Plato  wrote  entirely  in  the  spirit 
of  the  Enlightenment,  and  his  works  show  a  great  inter 
est  in  man  as  a  moral  being,  but  little  interest  in  physi 
cal  nature. 

Summary  of  Plato's  Doctrine.  The  interpretation  of 
Plato  as  set  forth  in  what  follows  may  be  thus  sum 
marized  :  Plato  began  with  the  conceptual  form  of  ideal 
ism,  suggested  by  the  logical  method  of  Socrates,  with 
the  purpose  of  solving  logical  and  ethical  problems.  He 
advanced  to  a  teleological  idealism,  conditioned  by  the 
doctrines  of  Anaxagoras  and  the  Pythagoreans,  with  the 
purpose  of  applying  his  doctrine  to  physical  problems. 

The  Formation  of  Plato's  Metaphysics.  In  his  ear 
liest  period  Plato  made  these  very  clear  statements: 
(1)  virtue  is  knowledge;  (2)  by  knowledge  is  not  meant 
sense-perceptions.  In  his  final  statement  ofTus  philo 
sophy,  as  he  bequeathed  it  to  posterity,  he  only  gave  a 
new  evaluation  of  these  two  early  principles,  although 
he  expressed  them  in  a  highly  complex  form.  "  Virtue 
is  knowledge  "  is  the  basis  of  agreement  between  Socra 
tes  and  the  Sophists  ;  and  "  by  knowledge  is  not  meant 
sense-perceptions "  is  the  basis  of  their  opposition. 
During  Plato's  early  period  he  was  acting  as  a  faithful 
transcriber  of  Socrates  in  the  presentation  of  this  first 
principle  :  virtue  is  knowledge,  is  teachable,  is  one.  Dur- 


PLATO  133 

ing  Plato's  second  period  he  was  called  on  to  defend  the 
second  statement  against  the  Sophists.  Plato's  formation 
of  his  own  theory  begins  at  this  point,  —  at  the  point 
where  his  defense  of  his  master  was  keenest.  From  this 
time,  for  a  full  half -century,  Plato  developed  the  Socra- 
tic  principles  in  a  theory  that  went  far  beyond  Socrates, 
but  that  was  never  untrue  to  him. 

The  simplest  way  of  stating  Plato's  formation  of  his  • 
own  doctrine  is  this :  he  accepted  the  Protagorean  doc 
trine  of  a  perceptual  world  of  relative  knowledge ;  he 
placed  it  beside  the  Socratic  theory  of  conceptual  reality ; 
and  as  a  result  be  conceived  the  world  to  be  twofold. 
Both  Being  and  Becoming  share  in  reality^.  There  are,  on 
thejjnejside,  the  immutable  concepts  that  compose  true 
reality ;  there  are«  on  the  other  sjde^lbe  changing  ppr- 
ceptions  that  come  and  govThe  world  of  true  £eality_is, 
but  never  becomes  ;  the  world  of  relative  reality  becomes, 
but  never  is.  These  two  worlds  are  by  nature  separate  ; 
one  is  the  object  of  the  reason,  the  other  is  the  object* 
of  the  senses ;  one  is  incorporeal,  the  other  is  corporeal. 
The  first  world  is  the  immutable  One  of  the  Eleatics  •" 
presented  by  Plato  as  a  plural  number  of  Socratic  con 
cepts  ;  the  other  world  is  the  Heracleitan  flux  presented  - 
as  perceivable  things.  There  is  true  knowledge,  but 
Protagoras  is  right  in  saying  that  it  cannot  be  found  in 
the  perception  of  the  material  world.  It  is  knowledge 
of  an  incorporeal  world,  and  that  is  precisely  the  world 
of  Socratic  concepts  which  now  in  Plato's  hands  become 
Ideas. 

It  would,  however,  be  a  mistake  to  suppose  that 
Plato's  conception  of  the  world  was  an  artificial  eclec 
ticism,  obtained  by  putting  two  worlds  side  by  side.  To 
be  sure,  he  never  was  able  to  bring  them  into  an  organic 


134  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

unity,  and  the  dualism  between  them  is  often  very 
marked.  But  they  do  not  lie  like  two  drawers  in  a 
desk,  each  having  no  vital  influence  on  the  character  of 
the  other.  In  the  juxtaposition  of  the  two  worlds  each 
gets  a  new  meaning,  and  the  value  of  each  becomes 
greater. 

In  the  first  place,  perception  l  gets  a  new  value.  The 
logic  of  the  Sophistic  doctrine  of  perception  was  that 
perceptions  are  the  only  form  of  knowledge,  and  even 
perceptions  have  no  share  of  truthfulness.  Protagoras 
himself  did  not  go  so  far  as  this  absolute  skepticism, 
but  this  is  the  logic  of  his  position.  Perceptions  can 
have  no  value,  because  each  is  a  standard  to  itself. 
Plato  incorporates  the  perception  theory  into  his  cwn, 
and  immediately  gives  it  a  new  value.  Perceptions  do  I 

font   thfty  havg   q    \ 


relative_jvalue.  They  have  a  value  for  the  practical  \ 
world,  although  the  highest  they  can  give  is  Right  Opin 
ion.  When  we  remember  that  the  world  of  that  day  was 
weary  of  its  own  speculations  leading  to  nihilism,  it  is 
remarkable  that  Plato  did  not  turn  away  entirely  from 
the  doctrine  of  the  Sophists.  On  the  contrary,  he  took 
up  the  Sophistic  doctrine  into  his  own  and  gave  to  it  a 
value  which  it  had  not  possessed  by  itself. 

In  the  second  place,  conception  gets  a  new  value. 
What  was  conception  to  Socrates  ?  It  was  the  common 
content  of  opinions  and  perceptions  ;  it  was  the  uni 
versal  that  was  developed  inductively  out  of  many  par 
ticulars.  Socrates  brought  many  particulars  together  in 
order  to  reveal  their  common  qualities.  The  abode  of 
conceptions  was  to  Socrates  the  half  -formed  individual 
opinions  and  experiences  in  which  conception  lay,  as  in 

1  For  the  distinction  between  perception  and  conception,  see  p.  83. 


PLATO  135 

an  envelope  ;  and  the  conversation  was  needed  to  bring 
it  forth.  The  concept  to  Socrates  was  the  logical  "  na 
ture  "  of  perceptions.  But  now  since  Plato  admitted  the 
relative  reality  of  all  perceptions,  he  was  obliged  to  look 
elsewhere  to  account  for  conceptions.  If  the  conceptions 
are  true  reality,  they  cannot  be  the  common  quality  in 
opinions,  nor  the  logical  "  nature  "  of  changing  percep 
tions.  The  true  conception  cannot  be  contained  in  the 
perception.  Accordingly  the  conception  must  exist  in  an  \ 
incorporeal  world  and  possess  an  independent  reality. 
The  concepts  are  hypostasized  by  Plato.  They  become 
Ideas.  Thus  the  Socratic  concept  became  the  Platonic 

Idea    and  foT  tJin  first.  ti,vn.p.  in   T^tivfvnp.ftfrt.  tJi-QUdJlt*  TCdl- 

\ty  is  conceived  as  immaterial*  The  conceptual  world 
grows  under  Plato's  hands  to  be  "other  than"  the 
perceptual  world,  and  this  was  his  first  step  beyond 
Socrates.  The_ conceptual  world  Jsjfche  perfect  reality  . 
jhaj^annotj^contained  in  any  material  thing  nor  in  ( 
the  sum  of  all  material  things.  The  immaterial  Ideas 
are  the  object  of  thought,  as  nature  phenomena  are  the 
objects  of  perception.  Ideas  are  not  the  abstractions  of 
perceptions,  for  the  process  of  thought  is  not  an  ana 
lysis  nor  an  abstraction,  but  an  intuition  of  reality  pre 
sented  in  single  instances.  Ideas  are  the  reality  of  which 
perceptions  are  the  copies  or  shadows.  Perceptions  do 
not  contain  the  truth.  They  are  only  the  suggestions  or 
promptings  by  which  the  soul  bethinks  itself  of  the 
Ideas.  Material  things  merely  hint  to  the  soul  of  the 
existence  of  the  Ideas. 

It  is  important  in  this  connection  to  point  out  that 
Plato's  conception  of  immateriality  is  not  to  be  taken 
as  what  we  mean  in  modern  times  by  the  spiritual  or 
psychical ;  for,  according  to  Plato,  our  psychical  funo 


136  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

tions  belong  to  the  world  of  Becoming,  just  as  the  funo. 
tions  of  our  body  and  other  perceptual  things  belong 
to  it.  Besides,  even  the  Ideas  of  sense  qualities  have 
reality.  Plato  does  not  identify  the  human  mind  with 
the  incorporeal  world  of  Ideas,  nor  does  he  make  the 
modern  dualistic  division  of  the  world  into  mind  and 
matter.  The  immaterial  world  is  "  other  than  "  the 
world  of  perception,  and  bears  the  relation  to  the  mate 
rial  world  of  the  unchanging  to  the  changing,  of  the 
simple  to  the  manifold,  of  Being  to  Becoming. 

The  Development  of  Plato's  Metaphysics  —  The 
Development  of  Plato's  Ideas  in  the  Two  Drafts.  The 
twofold  world  with  its  new  evaluation  of  the  Socratic 
conception  and  of  the  Protagorean  perception  was,  after 
all,  only  Plato's  point  of  departure  for  his  constructive 
work.  It  was  his  first  and  undeveloped  apprehension 
of  a  theory  of  Ideas.  It  appeared  first  in  the  Meno  in 
his  doctrine  of  recollection  and  immortality,  which  was 
written  in  his  second  period  just  after  his  series  of 
splendid  polemics  against  the  Sophists.  From  this  time 
for  a  full  half-century  Plato  developed  the  conception 
of  a  twofold  world  into  a  Theory  of  Ideas.  In  the  course 
of  time  he  found  himself  confronted  with  three  prob 
lems  :  (1)  How  many  Ideas  are  there  ?  (2)  What  is 
the  relation  between  Ideas  and  physical  things  ?  (3) 
What  is  the  relation  of  the  Ideas  to  one  another  ? 
Plato's  answers  to  these  three  questions  compose  what 
is  known  as  his  Theory  of  Ideas.  However,  he  answers 
these  three  questions  differently  when  he  first  consid 
ered  them  than  later,  when  his  grasp  upon  the  signifi 
cance  of  his  problem  became  more  mature.  Plato's 
Theory  of  Ideas,  therefore,  may  be  said  to  have  had  a 
development  in  two  stages.  These  two  stages  are  called 


PLATO  137 

his  "two  drafts"  (Windelband)  of  the  Ideas.  We 
shall  now  present,  first  in  summary  form  and  then  in 
more  detail,  his  answers  to  these  three  questions  in  the 
two  drafts,  and  thereby  show  how  his  theory  developed 
to  its  final  formulation. 

Brief  Comparison  of  the  Two  Drafts  of  the  Ideas. 

1.  The  Earlier  Draft  of  Ideas. 

(a)    The  Number  of  Ideas  is  infinite. 

(6)  The  Relation  of  Ideas  to  Physical  Things  is 
similarity.  The  Ideas  on  their  side  are  spoken  of  as 
having  a  "  presence  "  in  physical  things,  but  never  fully 
appearing  in  them ;  the  physical  phenomena  on  their 
side  are  spoken  of  as  "  participating  "  in  the  Ideas. 

(c)  The  Ideas  are  Related  to  One  Another  logic 
ally,  as  genera  to  species,  but  they  are  only  roughly  clas 
sified  by  Plato. 

2.  The  Later  Draft  of  Ideas  —  Plato's  Final  State- 
ment. 

(«)  The  Number  of  Ideas  is  limited  to  those  of 
worth,  mathematical  relations.,  and  nature-products,  but 
Plato  never  arrived  at  any  definite  selection. 

(5)  The  Relation  of  Ideas  to  Physical  Things  is 
tejejplo^icaLjrhe  Ideas  are  the  ideal  or  purposeful  ends 
of  physical  objects,. 

(c)  The  Ideas  are  Related  to  One  Another  teleolog- 
ically.  The  Idea  of  the  Good  stands  at  the  Lead,  and 
is  the  purposeful  end  of  all  the  other  Ideas. 

Comparison  of  the  Two  Drafts  of  Ideas  in  More 
Detail. 

i.  The  Number  of  Ideas  in  the  Earlier  and  Later 
Drafts  compared.  When  Plato  first  presented  the 
Theory  of  Ideas  to  himself,  he  conceived  their  number 
to  be  infinite.  There  are  Ideas  of  everything  that  is 


138  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

thinkable.  There  are  as  many  as  there  are  class  con« 
cepts,  as  there  are  qualities  of  things  in  the  universe, 
as  there  are  common  nouns  in  the  language.  But 
it  was  pointed  out  to  Plato  that  he  had  only  repro 
duced  and  paralleled  in  the  immaterial  world  what 
exists  in  the  material  world  ;  that  such  a  theory  did 
not  solve,  but  only  doubled  our  difficulties.  Then  there 
were  technical  difficulties  in  the  conception  of  the  Ideas 
of  everything  —  of  things,  qualities,  relations,  —  good, 
bad,  and  indifferent.  But  what  probably  appealed  to 
him  most  cogently  was  the  raillery  to  which  he  found 
his  theory  subjected  (see  Parmenides),  that  he  as  a 
Greek  could  think  of  ugly  Ideas,  like  hair  and  filth,  as 
real.  The  result  was  that  in  the  later  drafting  of  his 
theory  the  number  of  qualities  worthy  to  be  called 
Ideas  becomes  very  much  limited.  Plato  makes  the 
elimination  from  no  avowed  principle  except  that  of 
worth,  because  as  a  Greek  it  was  absolutely  repel 
lent  to  him  to  regard  anything  as  real  except  worth. 
Consequently  in  his  later  dialogues  he  speaks  of  (1) 
Ideas  having  an  inherent  value,  like  the  Good  arid  the 
Beautiful,  (2)  Ideas  corresponding  to  nature  products, 
(3)  Ideas  of  mathematical  relations.  Norms  of  value 
thus  take  the  place  of  class-concepts,  and  in  his  selec 
tion  of  Ideas  his  choice  is  determined  more  and  more 
by  their  moral  worth. 

2.  The  Relation  of  Ideas  and  the  World  of  Nature 
in  the  Two  Drafts  compared.  Plato  did  not  con 
struct  his  world  of  Ideas  in  order  to  explain  the  world 
of  physical  nature.  His  original  purpose  was  to  find 
an  object  for  knowledge ;  and  his  Ideas  were  born  out 
of  his  striving  to  give  a  reality  to  the  conceptions  of 
Socrates.  In  his  evaluation  of  the  doctrine  of  his  mas- 


PLATO  139 

ter  he  had  drawn  a  distinction  between  the  two  worlds, 
but  he  had  not  thought  of  explaining  one  by  the  other. 
They  were  related  and  distinguished,  but  one  threw  no 
light  upon  the  other.  In  Plato's  first  draft  of  the  Ideas 
he  speaks  of  this  relation  as  imitation.  The  pheno 
mena  are  an  imitation  of  reality.  The  Ideas  are  the 
originals  and  physical  objects  are  copies.  To  state  the 
relation  in  modern  terms,  the  laws  of  the  growth  of  a 
tree  are  permanent,  while  the  tree  changes.  The  lower 
world  of  Becoming  has  a  similarity  to  the  higher  world 
of  Being.  As  the  Pythagoreans  had  conceived  things! 
as  imitations  of  numbers,  Plato,  strongly  influenced  by\ 
the  Pythagoreans,  thought  that  concrete  things  corre 
spond  to  their  class  concepts  only  in  a  degree.  On  the 
one  hand,  the  individual  thing  partakes  of  the  universal 
of  the  Idea,  and  this  is  called  "participation"  in  the 
Idea.  On  the  other  hand,  the  word  "  presence  "  de 
scribes  the  way  the  Idea  exists  in  the  thing,  which 
means  that  the  Idea  is  present  in  the  thing  so  long  as 
the  thing  possesses  the  quality  of  the  Idea.  The  Ideas 
are  present  and  then  withdraw,  and  thus  the  perception 
changes. 

In  the  second  drafting  of  the  Ideas,  Plato  has  become 
conscious  of  the  need  of  explaining  physical  nature 
by  the  Ideas.  He  did  not  at  first  think  of  explain 
ing  the  nature  of  the  physical  world  by  his  metaphysi 
cal  reality.  It  was  an  afterthought,  and  arose  out  of 
the  compulsion  of  having  a  systematic  theory.  Hi? 
conception  of  the  world  of  Ideas  as  the  world  of  true 
Being  ultimately  demanded  that  the  world  of  physical 
nature  should  be  not  merely  "  other  than  "  but  depend 
ent  upon  the  Ideas.  The  Ideas  are  unchanging;  the 
phenomena  are  changing.  If  the  Ideas  are  the  reality 


140  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

of  the  changing  world,  in  what  other  sense  can  they 
be  its  reality  than  as  its  cause  ?  The  Meno,  Thecete- 
tus,  Symposium,  and  Phcedrus  do  not  discuss  this 
problem.  The  /Sophist  proposes  it,  and  in  the  Phcedo 
the  thought  is  first  expressed  that  the  Ideas  are  the 
causes  of  physical  phenomena  appearing  as  they  do 
appear.  But  how  can  the  Ideas  be  causes,  when  the 
very  conception  of  them  as  pure  and  immaterial  real 
ities  denies  to  them  all  qualities  of  motion  and  change  ? 
The  Platonic  theory  reached  its  zenith  in  its  solution 
of  this  problem.  The  Ideas  must  be  conceived  as  the 
causes  of  nature  phenomena,  and  still  as  not  moving 
nor  suffering  change.  They  are  teleological  causes. 
They  are  the  realized  ends  of  the  phenomenal  world. 
The  world  of  Ideas  is  the  actual  goal  of  perfection  for 
physical  nature.  The  world  of  Ideas  is  not  only  the 
truth  of  all  knowledge ;  it  is  also  the  perfect  teleologi 
cal  cause  of  all  actual  change.  This  thought  is  devel 
oped  in  the  Philebus  and  the  Republic,  where  the 
Ideas  as  a  whole,  and  in  particular  the  Idea  of  the 
Good,  —  to  which  all  the  other  Ideas  are  means,  — 
stand  as  the  final  cause  of  all  occurrence.  The  physical 
phenomena  stand  therefore  in  a  teleological  relation  to 
the  Idea  of  the  Good.  From  the  Good  all  things  get 
their  meaning.  It  permeates  and  explains  all. 

3.  The  Relation  among  the  Ideas  in  the  Two  Drafts 
compared.  It  was  natural  that  the  conception  of  a 
pluralism  of  Ideas  should  lead  Plato  to  a  consideration 
of  the  law  of  their  relationship.  A  systematic  theory 
of  a  multiplicity  of  reals  involves  their  orderly  relation 
ship.  They  cannot  exist  independently  in  the  same 
world.  What  is  the  relationship  among  the  Ideas  ?  In 
the  earlier  drafting  of  his  theory  Plato  was  principally 


PLATO  141 

attentive  to  the  relations  of  coordination  and  subordi 
nation  among  the  Ideas ;  in  the  possibility  of  the  divi 
sion  of  class  concepts  into  genera  and  species.  The 
relationship  that  he  sought  was  logical  relationship,  the 
relationship  that  the  scientist  seeks  to  find  in  the  clas 
sification  of  plants  or  rocks.  Just  what  result  Plato 
tried  to  reach  by  such  a  logical  classification  of  his 
realities,  it  is  difficult  to  say.  He  was  not  successful. 
His  attempt  to  erect  a  logically  arranged  pyramid  of 
conceptions  with  the  most  abstract  at  the  apex  was  not 
carried  out. 

In  his  second  drafting  of  the  Ideas,  Plato  felt  the 
inadequacy  of  a  mere  logical  relationship  among  them, 
and  conceived  them  to  be  teleologically  related.  His 
reduction  of  the  number  of  Ideas  had  naturally  brought 
about  a  new  conception  of  their  relationship.  There 
must  be  some  principle  for  their  elimination,  for  the 
rejecting  of  some  and  the  keeping  of  others.  That 
principle  was  the  principle  of  their  ethical  worth.  That 
is  to  say,  the  Idea  of  the  Good,  which  had  been  the 
standard  for  eliminating  some  concepts  from  the  list 
of  Ideas  and  for  retaining  others,  now  became  for  him 
the  principle  of  the  relationship  of  the  Ideas  among 
themselves.  Plato  turned  from  the  logical  to  the  teleo- 
logical  relation  among  Ideas.  The  Idea  of  the  Good 
embraces  and  realizes  all  the  others.  It  is  therefore  the 
absolute  end  of  all  the  other  Ideas,  and  they  bear  the 
relation  to  it,  not  of  particulars  to  a  general  term,  but; 
of  means  to  an  end.  The  principle  in  their  selection 
becomes  the  principle  of  their  arrangement. 

Plato's  Conception  of  God.  The  above  sketch  of  the 
formation  and  development  of  Plato's  theory  of  Ideaa 
shows  how  difficult  it  would  be  to  frame  a  short  defini- 


142  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

tion  of  them  that  would  at  the  same  time  be  adequate. 
As  he  finally  defined  them,  they  are  immaterial  arche 
types  or  ideals,  dominated  by  a  moral  purpose.  This 
dominating  moral  purpose  in  the  Ideas  is  the  highest 
Idea  of  all,  the  Idea  of  the  Good,  which  stands  above 
all  the  others  and  gives  to  them  and  to  everything  else 
their  value  and  indeed  their  actuality. 

Is  this  Idea  of  the  Good  the  same  as  God?  Plato 
calls  the  Good  "  Deity  "  and  the  "  World  Reason,"  and 
ascribes  to  it  the  name  of  Nous.  Nevertheless  the  Idea 
of  the  Good  is  not  the  same  as  the  Christian  God,  and 
Plato  is  only  showing  here  the  influence  of  Anaxagoras' 
conception  upon  him.  (See  p.  47.)  The  Idea  of  the 
Good  is  not  a  person  or  a  spiritual  being.  It  is  merely 
the  absolute  ethical  end  and  purpose  of  the  world. 
Plato  did  not  attempt  to  give  it  a  content,  any  more 
than  did  his  master,  Socrates ;  but  Plato  presupposed 
it,  because  it  was  in  itself  the  simplest  and  most  com 
prehensible  thing  in  the  world. 

Plato's  Conception  of  Physical  Nature.  Plato  con 
structed  a  rough  sketch  of  the  philosophy  of  nature  in 
his  later  years,  in  compliance  with  the  needs  of  his 
School,  and  perhaps  with  the  urging  of  his  pupil,  Aris 
totle.  In  his  earlier  period,  he  would  have  nothing  of 
physics,  and  was  in  this  respect  quite  in  accord  with 
the  spirit  of  Socrates.  To  the  end  of  his  life  he 
maintained  that  there  can  be  no  true  knowledge  of  the 
physical  world  ;  for  it  is  a  world  of  change,  and  there 
fore  all  scientific  conclusions  about  it  could  be  only 
probable.  In  a  mythical  account  in  the  Timceus  he  drew 
a  picture  of  the  constitution  of  the  world.  He  conceived 
a  Demiurge  or  world-forming  God  to  exist,  and  he 
thought  that  this  God  made  the  world  out  of  not-Being 


PLATO  143 

or  empty  space  "  with  regard  to  the  Ideas."  The  world 
thus  constructed  is  conceived  by  Plato  as  a  huge  living 
thing,  composed  of  a  visible  body  and  an  invisible  soul. 
The  world-soul  sets  the  world-body  in  a  circular  motion, 
which  motion  was  considered  by  antiquity  to  be  the  most 
perfect  of  all  motions.  In  sharp  opposition  to  the  me 
chanical  theory  of  the  world,  Plato  conceived  the  world 
to  be  endowed  with  knowledge,  of  which  the  spherical 
motion  in  its  return  upon  itself  is  the  symbol.  The  world 
is  unitary  and  unique,  the  most  perfect  and  most  beau 
tiful  world,  and  its  origin  can  be  traced  only  to  a  reason 
working  toward  ends.  Plato's  physics,  of  which  the 
above  is  an  abbreviated  account,  will  be  seen  to  be  of 
little  importance ;  but  it  was  unfortunately,  as  we  have 
said,  this  side  of  his  doctrine  that  was  emphasized  in 
the  Middle  Ages. 

This  mythical  account  shows,  however,  the  inherent 
dualism  in  Plato's  doctrine.  The  Idea  never  fully  real 
izes  itself  in  corporeal  things,  and  Plato  was  called  on 
to  explain  the  cause  of  the  evil  and  imperfection  of 
the  physical  world.  Moreover,  the  imperfection  of  the 
physical  world  got  new  emphasis  in  the  influence  upon 
him  of  the  Pythagorean  doctrine,  which  had  set  the  per 
fect  and  imperfect  worlds  in  opposition.  What  prevent! 
the  Idea  from  fully  appearing  in  phenomena  ?  The  more 
Plato  conceived  the  world  of  Ideas  as  ethical  Ideals 
and  a  kingdom  of  pure  worth,  and  the  more  teleological 
the  Ideas  became,  the  less  could  he  regard  the  Ideas 
as  the  cause  of  imperfection  in  nature.  Ideas  are  Be 
ing,  and  the  essence  of  perfection.  The  cause  of  im 
perfection  must  therefore  be  that  which  has  no  being 
whatsoever.  The  physical  world  as  "becoming"  has 
participation,  not  only  in  that  which  has  Being  (Ideas), 


144  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

but  in  that  which  has  no  Being  (empty  space).  The 
physical  world  has  a  composite  character.  It  has  sprung 
from  the  union  of  the  Ideas  and  an  absolutely  negative 
factor,  which  Plato  calls  empty  space.  This  eternal 
negative  is  formless  and  unfashioned,  but  it  is  capable 
of  taking  on  all  possible  forms.  The  physical  universe 
is  therefore  neither  Ideas  simply,  nor  matter  simply, 
but  a  composition  of  the  two.  This  non-Being  is  not 
like  the  matter,  "unformed  stuff,"  of  Aristotle,  from 
which  all  sensible  things  are  made ;  but  it  is  that  in 
which  Ideas  have  to  appear.  The  Ideas  are  plunged 
into  this  empty  non-Being,  which  they  take  on  as  a  veil. 
And  just  this  is  the  origin  of  imperfection ;  non-Being 
withholds  the  Ideas  from  perfect  expression.  Non- 
Being,  or  empty  space,  is  an  indispensable  auxiliary  to 
the  Ideas,  for  without  it  no  physical  universe  would  be 
possible.  But  at  the  same  time  it  is  the  eternal  foe  and 
obstruction  of  the  Ideas.  Its  cooperation  with  the  Ideas 
is  at  the  same  time  a  resistance  to  them.  It  is  the 
perpetual  negation  of  Being,  and  the  primary  cause  of 
imperfection,  change,  and  instability.  On  this  account 
the  universe  can  never  be  like  the  Ideas,  but  it  can 
approximate  them.  The  soul  of  the  world,  for  example, 
—  which  was  regarded  by  Plato  in  Pythagorean  fashion 
as  number  subjecting  chaotic  space  to  harmony,  —  is 
the  most  perfect  reproduction  of  the  Idea  of  the  Good. 
The  existence  of  matter  detracts  from  the  perfection  of 
the  world,  but  it  does  not  detract  from  the  majesty  of 
the  Ideas. 

Plato's  Conception  of  Man.  Plato  needed  a  psycho 
logy  of  another  sort  from  that  developed  by  the  Cos- 
mologists.  His  analysis  of  the  mental  life  of  man  stands 
or  falls  with  his  metaphysical  theory  of  Ideas,  but  it 


PLATO  145 

has  this  importance  :  it  is  the  first  attempt  to  under 
stand  the  psychical  life  from  within. 

The  dualism  of  the  two  worlds  appears  in  sharp  out 
lines  in  the  narrower  field  of  the  life  of  man.  The  soul 
of  man  belongs  to  both  worlds.  On  the  one  hand,  it 
belongs  to  the  world  of  Becoming  and  partakes  of  that 
world  through  its  sense-perceptions,  desires,  and  their 
pleasures.  In  this  lower  world  it  is  the  principle  of 
life  and  motion  ;  it  is  that  which  moves  itself  and  other 
things.  On  the  other  hand,  it  shares  in  the  world  of 
Being  through  its  intuitive  reason  or  knowledge.  It 
shares  in  the  instability  and  change  of  psychical  phe 
nomena  ;  it  also  possesses  the  immutability  of  reality. 
Through  its  perceptions  it  constructs  its  "  opinions  " 
or  inferences  of  changing  phenomena ;  through  its  rea 
son  it  has  true  knowledge  of  the  eternal  Ideas.  There 
fore  the  soul  must  bear  in  itself  traits  that  correspond 
to  the  two  worlds.  Plato  conceives  man  to  have  an  ir 
rational  and  a  rational  nature ;  and  he  divides  the  irra 
tional  nature  into  two  parts,  —  the  noble  irrational  part 
and  the  ignoble  irrational  part.  The  rational  part  of 
man  is  the  reason,  the  noble  irrational  part  is  the  will, 
the  ignoble  irrational  part  is  the  sensuous  appetites. 

(  Rational  nature  =  reason. 
Man   |  (  Noble  =  will 

(  Irrational  nature  <  Ignoble  =  sensuous  appe- 
(  tites. 

This  is  the  celebrated  doctrine  of  the  "  three  parts  " 
of  the  soul.  Are  they  three  parts  or  three  functions  of 
the  soul  ?  Plato  is  not  clear  as  to  this  point.  He  some 
times  speaks  of  them  as  three  divisions,  and  treats  them 
as  separable  in  such  a  way  that  only  the  reason  is  im 
mortal  and  the  other  two  parts  are  mortal.  Again,  he 


146  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

speaks  of  the  soul  as  a  unity,  which  carries  with  it  in 
the  next  life  all  three  functions.  In  this  latter  meaning 
the  three  parts  are  three  natures  or  three  different  de 
grees  of  worth  of  the  unitary  soul. 

Plato's  Doctrine  of  Immortality.  Beginning  with 
this  conception  of  the  dual  nature  of  the  human  soul, 
Plato  reasons  both  backward  and  forward  from  it: 
backward  to  its  pre-existence,  and  forward  to  its  post- 
existence,  —  its  existence  after  death.  In  the  JPhcedo, 
Plato  has  put  into  the  mouth  of  what  has  become  his 
Platonized  Socrates  his  final  thought  concerning  the 
relation  of  this  present  life  to  its  past  and  its  future.  It 
is  plainly  the  doctrine  of  the  transmigration  of  souls, 
which  he  got  from  the  Pythagoreans.  The  soul  has  a 
reality  that  is  imperishable,  and  the  soul  is  rewarded 
or  punished  for  its  conduct  in  one  existence  by  the  kind 
of  existence  into  which  it  is  metamorphosed.  In  prison, 
on  that  fatal  day  when  he  drank  the  poison,  Socrates 
explained  to  those  around  him  why  he  was  so  cheerful 
at  the  thought  of  death.  Is  not  our  present  existence  a 
kind  of  death  ?  Is  not  the  soul  in  the  present  life  de 
terred  from  true  knowledge  by  the  trammels  of  the 
bodily  desires  ?  The  true  philosopher  is  he  who  turns 
away  from  his  body's  passions,  —  dies  to  them,  and 
tries  to  live  the  reality  of  the  world  of  Ideas.  We  shall 
have  full  knowledge  when  we  pass  beyond  the  grave 
and  then  we  shall  be  rewarded,  if  we  have  striven  truly. 
But  at  present  our  body  hampers  and  misleads  us  with 
its  perceptions  of  changing  mortality  around  us,  and 
with  its  transitory  desires.  This  life  itself  is  the  reward 
or  punishment  for  our  conduct  in  our  preceding  state. 

i.  The  Immortality  of  Pre-existence.  What  proof 
does  Plato  offer  for  our  existence  before  this  life  ?  The 


PLATO  147 

Ideas,  these  testimonies  of  reality,  form  a  part  of  the 
human  soul.  They  are  eternal,  and  have  not  been  ere 
ated  by  the  soul.  Knowledge  is  not  the  origination  of 
a  new  truth,  but  is  the  recognition  of  Ideas,  whose 
presence  the  mind  merely  records.  Greek  psychology 
never  got  much  farther  than  this.  The  modern  psycho 
logical  conception  of  the  soul  as  a  dynamic  something, 
which  creates  its  own  content,  was  quite  foreign  to  the 
Greeks.  To  Plato,  as  to  all  other  Greeks,  the  soul  is  as 
passive  as  the  wax  that  receives  the  impress  of  the  seal. 
All  Greek  psychology  was  under  this  general  limita 
tion  :  all  ideas  must  be  "  given "  to  the  soul.  There 
fore  if  the  Ideas  are  not  "  given  "  by  perception,  be 
cause  perception  is  of  the  changing ;  if  nevertheless 
the  soul  finds  itself  in  possession  of  the  Ideas  on  the 
occasion  of  perception ;  if  the  soul  did  not  create  the 
Ideas,  because  the  soul  is  by  nature  passive  ;  the  logi 
cal  and  only  conclusion  is  that  the  soul  was  already  in 
possession  of  the  Ideas  in  a  pre-existent  state.  Pre- 
existence  is  the  only  way  of  accounting  for  the  full- 
born  knowledge  of  the  soul,  and  it  is  interesting  to  note 
how  important  was  the  pre-existent  state  to  the  imagi 
nation  of  the  ancient  world. 

Plato  therefore  advanced  the  doctrine  of  reminis 
cence,  or  as  he  called  it,  Anamnesis,  as  proof  of  our 
pre-existence.  Knowledge  is  recollection.  The  Ideas 
have  always  been  present  in  the  mind,  and  when  we 
recognize  them  we  have  knowledge.  The  Ideas  have  no 
past  or  future,  but  they  always  exist.  It  is  the  mind 
that  undergoes  awakening  —  an  awakening  to  their 
existence  in  itself.  When  the  mind  sees  the  objects  of 
physical  nature,  it  awakens  in  painful  astonishment  at 
the  contrast  between  the  sense  world  and  the  Ideas  of 


148  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

its  native  world  of  immateriality.  In  a  mythical  repre« 
sentation  in  the  Phcedrus,  Plato  supposes  that  be 
fore  the  present  life  our  souls  have  beheld  the  pure 
Ideas  in  their  full  reality,  that  the  Ideas  had  been  for 
gotten  in  our  birth  into  the  present  life,  but  that  the 
perception  of  similar  corporeal  things  calls  the  soul 
back  to  the  Ideas  themselves.  Then  the  "  Eros "  is 
awakened  —  the  native  philosophical  impulse  or  inborn 
love  for  the  Ideas,  by  which  the  soul  is  raised  again  to 
the  knowledge  of  that  true  reality.  Only  the  pure  Ideas 
themselves  will  satisfy  this  longing ;  the  embodiment  of 
the  Ideas  in  art  or  personalities  is  not  adequate.  The 
Eros  ties  us  to  the  Ideas.  God  does  not  have  this  long 
ing,  for  He  fully  knows  the  Good.  The  ignorant  man 
does  not  have  this  longing,  for  he  does  not  suspect  the 
existence  of  the  Ideas  in  himself.  The  Eros  is  the 
homesickness  that  the  lover  of  the  truth  feels. 

Our  birth  is  but  a  sleep  and  a  forgetting, 

The  soul  that  rises  in  us,  our  life's  star, 

Hath  had  elsewhere  its  setting, 

And  cometh  from  afar ; 

Not  in  entire  forgetfulness, 

And  not  in  utter  nakedness, 

But  trailing  clouds  of  glory  do  we  come 

From  God,  who  is  our  home.* 

When,  in  the  Meno,  the  Sophistic  dilemma  was  pro 
posed  to  Socrates,  "  How  can  inquiry  be  made  into  what 
we  know  or  into  what  we  don't  know  ? "  Socrates 
pointed  out  that  the  only  escape  from  the  dilemma  was 
the  process  of  recollecting,  and  that  knowledge  is  the 
thing  recalled.  Socrates  then  called  a  slave  to  him,  and 
by  skillfully  questioning  him  found  that  the  slave  re- 

*  Read  Wordsworth's  Ode  on  Intimations  of  Immortality. 


PLATO  149 

cognized  the  mathematical  relationship  between  the 
square  on  the  hypothenuse  of  a  right  triangle  and  the 
sums  of  the  squares  on  the  other  two  sides.  "  The  igno 
rant  slave  can  only  have  been  recollecting,"  says  Soc 
rates.  Mathematical  knowledge  is  extracted  from  the 
sense-perception  of  the  slave  only  because  the  slave  has 
through  such  perception  the  opportunity  of  recollecting 
Ideas  present  in  himself  and  not  hitherto  suspected  by 
himself.  In  Plato's  system,  mathematical  forms  have  an 
important  place.  They  are  the  links  by  means  of  which 
the  Idea  shapes  space  teleologically  into  the  sense  world. 
2.  The  Immortality  of  Post-Existence.  Plato's 
ground  for  belief  in  the  existence  of  soul  after  death  is 
practically  the  same  as  that  for  its  previous  existence. 
Its  destiny  hereafter  depends  upon  how  far  it  has 
freed  itself  in  this  earthly  life  from  the  sensuous  appe 
tite.  As  proofs  for  future  existence  Plato  mentions  the 
soul's  possession  of  the  Ideas,  the  simplicity  and  unity 
of  the  soul,  the  soul  as  the  principle  of  life,  and  t^he 
goodness  of  God.  However  weak  Plato's  arguments 
may  be  for  the  existence  of  future  immortality,  his  ab 
solute  belief  in  it  is  one  of  the  chief  points  in  his  teach 
ing.  It  is  interesting  to  note  that  the  modern  western 
world  seems  to  have  no  concern  in  the  previous  state  of 
the  soul,  but  through  the  influence  of  the  Christian 
religion  has  focused  its  attention  upon  the  future  life. 
Oriental  religions  contain  the  doctrine  of  pre-existence 
and  the  transmigration  of  souls,  but  not  in  the  same 
sense  as  Plato.  In  Plato  the  soul  possesses  an  identity 
that  persists.  It  has  all  the  qualities  of  the  Ideas,  but 
is  also  an  entity  possessing  these  qualities.  It  has  non- 
origination,  indestructibility,  unity,  and  changelessness. 
The  doctrine  of  the  immortality  of  post-existence  had 


150  HISTORY   OF  PHILOSOPHY 

appeared  in  the  Greek  religion,  but  this  is  the  first  time 
that  we  have  found  it  as  a  part  of  philosophic  teaching. 
The  student  will,  of  course,  feel  the  difficulties  in  Plato's 
conception  as  he  has  presented  it.  For  how  can  the 
soul  preserve  its  individuality  as  a  unity,  when  the  soul 
belongs  in  part  to  a  world  which  is  temporal? 

The  Two  Tendencies  in  Plato.  From  the  doctrine  of 
the  two  worlds  there  are  two  distinct  tendencies  run 
ning  through  the  entire  teaching  of  Plato.  These  are 
(1)  the  tendency  to  glorify  nature,  and  (2)  the  tendency 
to  turn  away  from  nature  to  ascetic  contemplation.  On 
the  one  hand,  Plato  felt  within  himself  the  light  heart 
beat  of  the  artist,  and  the  Hellenic  love  of  life  was 
strong  within  him.  He  felt  that  the  Idea  of  the  Good 
was  realized  even  in  the  world  of  sense,  that  there  was 
pleasure  in  the  sensuous  imitation  of  the  Idea,  in  prac 
tical  artistic  skill,  and  in  an  intelligent  understanding 
of  mathematical  orderings.  These  were  at  least  prepa 
rations  for  the  highest  Good,  which  consisted  in  know 
ledge  of  the  Ideas.  On  the  other  hand,  one  finds  beside 
this  the  ascetic  tendency  to  be  repelled  by  nature,  a 
negative  ethics  that  would  leave  the  world  of  sense  and 
would  spiritualize  the  life.  The  Theaztetus  sets  up  an 
ideal  of  retirement  for  the  philosopher,  and  points  out 
that  he  should  find  refuge  as  soon  as  possible  from  the 
evils  of  the  world  in  the  divine  presence.  The  Phcedo 
pictures  the  whole  life  of  the  philosopher  as  a  dying,  a 
purification  of  the  soul,  an  existence  in  prison,  from 
which  escape  is  only  by  virtue  and  knowledge.  This 
ascetic  tendency  seems  very  anti-Greek ;  and  yet  is  it 
foreign  to  Greek  life?  In  Greek  history  do  we  not 
find,  by  the  side  of  the  Epic  and  the  glorification  of 
nature,  the  Mysteries  and  the  withdrawal  of  the  indi' 


PLATO  151 

vidual  from  the  world  ?  Both  these  historic  tendencies 
appear  in  Plato,  and  on  the  whole  the  ascetic  tendency- 
is  stronger.  The  Ideas  are  contrasted  with  the  nature 
world  more  often  than  they  transfigure  it.  The  dualism 
of  Heaven  and  earth  is  emphasized,  and  the  contrast 
is  strongly  drawn  between  the  reality  of  the  Ideas  and 
the  temporality  of  sense. 

Platonic  Love.  Described  in  technical  terms,  in  both 
Socrates  and  Plato,  Love  (Eros)  is  the  philosophic  and 
not  a  purely  intellectual  impulse.  Its  rather  more  didac 
tic  character  in  Socrates  of  an  attempt  to  engender 
knowledge  and  virtue  in  others  appears  in  Plato  in  a 
larger  way  as  the  personal  and  practical  realization  of 
the  truth.  Reduced  to  its  simplest  terms,  Platonic  Love 
is  the  longing  of  the  human  being  in  his  imperfectness 
for  perfectness  and  completeness.  It  is  the  innate  de 
sire  for  immortality. 

True  love,  according  to  Plato,  takes  its  beginning  in 
the  astonishment  or  pain  at  the  presentment  of  the 
Ideas  through  remembrance,  and  the  starting-point  of 
Love  in  an  individual  is  the  principle  fundamental  in 
pre-existence.  The  philosophic  impulse  for  the  Ideas 
takes  the  form  of  Love,  because  visible  beauty  has  a 
special  brightness  and  makes  a  strong  impression  on  the 
mind.  Love  belongs  only  to  mortal  natures  ;  for  they, 
since  they  do  not  possess  the  divine  unchangeableness, 
have  to  propagate  themselves  continually.  Love  may  be 
described  therefore  as  the  propagative  impulse.  On  the 
one  side  it  may  be  viewed  as  an  inspiration  from  above, 
springing  from  the  higher,  divinely-related  nature  in 
man ;  on  the  other  hand  it  may  be  viewed  as  an  aspira 
tion  from  below  of  the  sensuous  and  human  in  man. 
On  this  side  it  is  a  yearning  and  not  a  possession ;  and 


152  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

it  presupposes  a  want.  Analyzed  in  this  way,  Love  is 
the  middle  term  between  having  and  not  having.  It  is 
the  union  of  the  higher  and  lower  natures  in  man,  and 
throughout  the  universe  there  stirs  this  longing  for  the 
eternal  and  imperishable. 

What  is  the  object  of  this  Love,  —  of  this  desire  of  the 
finite  to  fill  itself  with  the  eternal  and  to  generate  some 
thing  enduring?  That  object  is  the  possession  of  the 
Good,  which  is  happiness.  The  possession  of  the  Good 
is  immortality.  What  is  the  external  condition  of  Love's 
existence  ?  The  presence  of  Beauty ;  for  this  alone,  by 
its  harmonious  form,  corresponds  to  our  desire  and 
awakens  it.  Does  this  Love  appear  first  in  its  complete 
realization?  No;  there  are  many  kinds  of  beauty,  and 
Love  is  as  various  in  degree  and  kind  as  beautiful  ob 
jects.  Love  rises  step  by  step,  and  is  realized  in  a  gradu 
ated  series  of  forms.  There  is  Love  for  beautiful  shapes, 
sexual  love ;  Love  for  beautiful  souls,  and  this  appears 
in  works  of  art,  education,  and  legislation ;  Love  for 
beautiful  sciences,  the  seeking  of  beauty  wherever  found; 
and  finally  Love  for  the  pure,  shapeless,  eternal,  and 
unchangeable  —  the  Idea,  which  is  immortality.  All  else 
is  preliminary  to  the  dialectical  knowledge  of  the  Ideas. 
In  all  this,  man  is  reaching  out  from  his  sense  of  want 
for  satisfaction,  from  his  poverty  to  the  completed  riches 
of  life.  Love  bears  him  on  from  height  to  height  until, 
in  religion  and  Love  of  the  Good,  man  gains  his  immor 
tality.  In  Platonic  Love  all  kinds  of  Love  have  place 
in  pointing  the  soul  onward  to  the  divinely  perfect. 
Yet  this  Love  for  the  divinely  perfect  is  the  soul's  as 
piration  from  the  beginning,  and  all  the  preliminary 
stages  are  only  the  uncertain  attempts  to  seize  the  Idea 
in  the  copies.  Love,  therefore,  is  this  universal  struggle 


PLATO  153 

of  the  finite  to  inform  itself  with  the  Idea;  and  delight 
in  any  one  object  of  beauty  is  a  stage  in  the  development 
of  this  impulse.* 

Plato's  Theory  of  Ethics.  Plato's  Theory  of  Ideas  is, 
after  all,  fundamentally  only  an  outspoken  ethical  meta 
physics,  and  his  Ethics  is  his  most  fruitful  accomplish 
ment.  Plato's  ethical  teaching  is  therefore  involved  in 
all  that  we  have  said  about  him  up  to  this  point.  An 
understanding  of  his  ethics  includes  an  understanding 
of  the  formation  and  growth  of  his  dialectic,  an  insight 
into  his  physical  theory,  knowledge  of  the  two  tenden 
cies  which  run  through  his  teaching,  and  especially  an 
understanding  of  his  doctrine  of  Love.  If  some  of  the 
pravious  exposition  is  repeated,  it  will  be  only  to  bring 
out  more  fully  his  ethical  teaching  as  a  special  science. 
We  shall  speak  of  three  topics  under  this  general  sub- 
jact  of  his  ethics:  (1)  his  development  of  his  theory  of 
the  Good;  (2)  the  four  cardinal  virtues;  (3)  his  theory 
of  political  society. 

i.  Development  of  Plato's  Theory  of  the  Good.  Plato 
betrays  his  ascetic  tendency  in  his  first  drafting  of  the 
Ideas  and,  as  we  have  said,  the  double-world  theory  is 
the  cause  of  this.  Only  one  of  the  two  worlds  is  real 
and  will  appeal  to  the  Wise  Man.  The  soul  belongs  to 
the  supersensible  world,  and  the  knowledge,  of  which 
virtue  consists,  takes  man  away  from  the  sensible  world. 
Since  earthly  life  is  full  of  evil,  the  soul  should  die  to 
it  and  turn  away  as  soon  as  possible  to  the  divine  pres 
ence.  This  ascetic  aspect  of  morality  is  set  forth  in  the 
Phcedo  and  the  Thecetetus. 

*  Read  Edmund  Spenser,  Hymn  in  Honor  of  Beauty  ; 
Emerson,  Essay  on  Love,  also  the  poem  on  Initial,  Daemonic, 
ond  Celestial  Love  ;  Bacon,  Essay  on  Love  ;  Patmore,  Angel 
in  the  House  ;  Sill,  The  Two  Aphrodites. 


154  HISTORY   OF  PHILOSOPHY 

In  the  general  development  of  his  metaphysics  in  the 
second  drafting  of  his  Ideas,  Plato's  ethical  theory  de 
veloped  also.  He  not  only  went  beyond  the  abstract 
statement  of  Socrates,  but  beyond  his  own  original 
asceticism.  When  he  brought  his  two  worlds  into  teleo- 
logical  relationship,  he  was  logically  compelled  to  aban 
don  his  conception  of  ascetic  morals.  The  physical  world 
has  now  a  relative  reality,  and  by  the  same  sign  sense- 
life  has  a  relative  moral  value.  It  was  Plato's  firm 
conviction  that  moral  conduct  makes  man  truly  blessed, 
in  this  and  another  world.  He  still  held,  too,  that  this 
blessedness,  this  complete  perfection  of  the  soul,  this 
sharing  in  the  divine  world  of  the  Ideas,  is  the  Highest 
Good.  Yet  he  now  came  to  recognize  other  kinds  of 
happiness  as  steps  toward  the  ideal  Good.  There  are 
varieties  of  Goods,  as  appeared  in  his  doctrine  of  Love. 
Besides  the  intuition  of  knowledge  and  its  pleasures, 
there  are  physical  Goods  and  their  pleasures.  Intellectual 
pleasure  may  be  unmixed  with  pain,  but  there  are  also 
sensuous  pleasures  unmixed  with  pain.  Here  is  indeed 
Plato,  the  Greek,  speaking;  Plato,  the  Greek  artist, 
impelled  by  the  charm  of  the  Greek  world  around  him. 
Strongly  as  he  combated  the  Cyrenaic  hedonism,  and 
closely  as  he  was  allied  to  Socrates,  his  Greek  nature 
gave  way  before  the  manifestations  of  the  Idea  of  the 
Good  in  the  physical  world.  The  pleasure  in  nature  ob 
jects,  in  educational  development,  in  the  practical  and 
plastic  arts,  in  mathematical  sciences,  and  in  the  order 
liness  of  life  —  all  these  became  for  him  preliminary 
stages  in  the  full  participation  in  the  ethical  Good.  They 
came  to  have  for  him  a  relative  value,  as  expressed  in 
the  Philebus,  Republic,  and  Symposium. 

2.  The   Four   Cardinal   Virtues.     But  Plato  went 


PLATO  155 

farther,  and  was  not  content  merely  to  point  out  the 
place  of  human  conduct  in  the  twofold  world.  He  de 
veloped  his  theory  of  ethics  systematically.  He  classified 
the  virtues  on  the  basis  of  his  threefold  division  of  the 
soul.  Naturally  enough,  in  his  first  draft  of  his  theory, 
Plato  followed  Socrates  in  reducing  the  single  virtues 
to  one,  viz.,  the  virtue  of  knowledge.  In  his  second 
drafting,  however,  in  the  later  dialogues,  he  assumed 
their  distinct  independence,  and  he  reflected  upon  their 
respective  spheres.  A  virtue  corresponds  to  each  part 
of  the  soul.  Each  part  has  its  own  perfection,  which  is 
its  virtue.  Moreover,  in  so  far  as  one  or  another  part 
of  the  soul  preponderates  in  different  men,  so  far  are 
they  suited  to  developing  the  corresponding  virtue. 

{Rational   nature    in    brain  —  ( Wis 
dom)  f  Noble  part —  in  heart 
Irrational  na- I     (CW^e) 
ture               1  Ignoble  part — in  liver 
(^    ( Temperance) 

From  the  above  scheme  it  will  be  observed  that  the 
rational  nature  has  the  brain  as  its  organ  and  reaches 
its  perfection  or  virtue  in  Wisdom ;  that  the  ignoble 
irrational  nature  has  the  liver  as  its  organ,  and  reaches 
its  virtue  in  self-control  or  Temperance.  Finally,  since 
the  perfection  of  the  whole  soul  consists  in  the  orderly 
relation  of  its  single  parts,  so  subordinated  and  regu 
lated  that  the  soul  can  reach  its  highest  perfection,  the 
fourth  and  highest  virtue  is  Justice.  The  four  cardi 
nal  virtues  are  Temperance,  Courage,  Wisdom,  and 
Justice. 

3.  Plato's  Theory  of  Political  Society.  The  virtue, 
Justice,  has  little  meaning  in  individual  ethics,  and  as 
an  ethical  perfection  can  only  be  attained  in  society. 


156  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

There  is  no  English  word  that  is  quite  the  equivalent 
for  the  Greek  term,  but  Justice  is  the  usual  translation. 
Justice,  however,  does  not  contain  the  moral  spirit  of 
the  Greek  word.  Consistent  with  his  conception  of  the 
Ideas  in  his  metaphysics,  Plato's  ideal  of  moral  perfec 
tion  is  to  be  found,  not  in  the  individual,  but  in  the 
species.  Plato  pictures  less  the  perfect  man  than  the 
perfect  society.  Perfect  happiness  is  rather  that  of  the 
social  whole  than  of  the  individual,  and  this  ideal  of 
happiness  can  be  reached  only  in  the  ideal  State.  That 
is  why  the  dialogue,  the  Republic,  occupies  so  impor 
tant  a  place  in  Plato's  writings.  It  is  an  attempt  to 
show  how  the  fourth  and  last  virtue,  Justice,  can  be 
attained.  The  first  book  was  written  in  Plato's  early 
period,  and  was  perhaps  called  a  "  dialogue  concerning 
Justice."  Justice  is  distinctly  the  social  virtue  found 
only  in  a  perfect  society,  and  it  will  make  possible  the 
fulfillment  of  Wisdom,  Courage,  and  Temperance.  The 
individual  man  is  a  vital  being  whose  heart  is  the  cen 
tral  organ,  whose  characteristic  virtue  is  courage.  His 
courage  is  indeed  a  combination  of  wisdom  and  temper 
ance.  The  picture  is  of  the  individual  man,  not  amen 
able  to  society,  but  in  "  a  state  of  warfare."  In  such 
isolation  Justice  would  not  exist  as  a  virtue. 

The  political  state  is  necessary  if  the  Idea  of  the 
Good  is  to  be  manifested  in  human  life.  The  state  is 
the  true  educator  in  Justice,  and  at  the  same  time  the 
ideal  state  will  be  the  realization  of  Justice.  The  task 
of  the  state  everywhere  is  the  same,  to  wit,  to  direct  the 
common  life  of  man  so  that  every  one  may  be  happy 
through  virtue.  The  result  may  be  attained  only  by  so 
ordering  the  relations  of  society  that  Justice  may  pre 
vail.  Plato's  Republic  is  a  carefully  worked-out  plan 


PLATO  157 

of  such  an  ideal  society.  The  author  made  several  at 
tempts  at  Syracuse  with  the  aid  of  Dion  to  get  first 
the  elder  and  then  the  younger  Dionysius  to  transform 
the  tyranny  into  an  ideal  state.  These  attempts  re 
sulted  disastrously.  In  the  disappointment  of  his  old 
age  that  his  ideal  scheme  had  never  succeeded,  he  wrote 
the  Laws,  which  is  a  revised  version  of  the  Republic 
with  the  Pythagorean  number  theory  as  a  basis. 

The  Spartan  state  is  his  model.  The  Platonic  Re 
public  is  aristocratic.  There  is  paternal  government  in 
everything,  censorship  of  everything.  Each  individual's 
course  is  marked  out  for  him.  When  Greek  political 
life  was  undergoing  dissolution,  Plato  raised  the  ideal 
of  political  unity  as  necessary  to  individual  happiness  as 
against  the  anarchism  of  segregation.  Yet  even  in  this 
he  was  reflecting  the  current  distrust  of  political  institu 
tions.  The  comparison  of  existing  polit  cal  conditions 
with  his  own  political  ideal  reinforced  his  aristocratic 
leanings,  and  made  him  the  more  distrustful  of  the 
political  possibilities  of  a  democracy.  He  believed  that 
an  intelligently  worked  out  scheme  of  government  was 
practicable,  and  should  be  forced  upon  people,  if  neces 
sary.  In  no  other  way  was  political  salvation  possible. 

Since  the  State  is  the  man  "  writ  large,"  it  has  three 
parts,  corresponding  to  the  three  parts  of  the  human 
soul.  There  is  (1)  the  working  or  peasant  class,  which 
corresponds  to  the  appetitive  part  of  man ;  the  only  ob 
ject  of  such  a  class  is  to  furnish  food  for  the  State,  and 
the  highest  virtue  of  this  class  is  temperance.  The  peas 
ant  can  only  work,  eat,  and  drink,  and  the  highest  praise 
of  him  is  that  he  controls  his  appetites.  (2)  The  warrior 
class  guards  the  State  within  and  without ;  and  its  char 
acteristic  virtue  is  courage.  The  will  must  show  its  high- 


158  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

est  efficiency  in  guidance  of  the  emotions.  (3)  Highest 
of  all  is  the  cultured  class  of  philosophers  or  rulers, 
who  determine  by  their  insight  the  laws  that  should 
rule  the  State.  The  virtue  of  this  class  is  wisdom,  for 
is  this  class  not  the  brain  of  the  State  ?  The  perfection 
of  the  entire  State  exists  when  the  three  classes  have 
their  proper  distribution  of  power.  Then  does  justice 
exist.  The  duty  of  the  rulers  is  therefore  to  have  the 
highest  wisdom  possible,  of  the  warriors  to  be  unflinch 
ing  in  their  devotion  to  duty,  of  the  peasants  to  exercise 
self-control.  Thus  Plato's  Republic  is  an  aristocracy 
in  the  hands  of  the  carefully  cultured,  which  consists 
of  the  two  upper  classes.  By  means  of  community  of 
wives,  the  exposure  of  deformed  infants,  and  the  State's 
education  of  the  children  of  the  two  upper  classes,  a 
continuous  selection  can  be  made,  the  two  upper  classes 
can  be  renewed,  and  all  private  ends  can  be  renounced 
in  favor  of  the  State.  Thus  the  sole  end  of  a  commu 
nity  is  moral  education,  and  Plato  arranges  his  ideal 
community  with  reference  to  that.  The  two  upper 
classes  are  a  great  family,  to  whom  this  is  intrusted. 
They  have  dedicated  their  lives  to  the  furthering  of  sci 
ence  and  to  its  administration. 


A  SELECTION  OF  PASSAGES  FROM  PLATO 
FOR  ENGLISH  READERS. 

By  Professor  Benjamin  Jowett,  late  Principal  of  Balliol  College,  Oxford. 

The  figures  refer  to  the  pages  in  the  margin  of  Professor  Jowett's  translation  of 
Plato's  Dialogues;  the  letters  (A,  B,  C,  D,  E)  to  the  subdivisions  of  these  pages. 

FIRST  VOLUME. 

CHABMIDBS. 
Socrates  prescribes  for  Charmides'  headache. 

156  D  (.  .  .   '  Such,  Charmides,  is  the  nature  of  the  charm '  .  .  .) 
-157  C  (.  .  .  'my  dear  Charmides.') 


PLATO  159 

LYSIS. 

We  only  trust  those  who  appear  to  know  more  than  ourselvef. 
206  D  ('Upon  entering'  .  .   .) 
-210  B  ('  He  assented.') 

LACHES. 

(1)  The  art  of  fighting  in  armour  is  useless  to  the  soldier. 

182  E  ('  I  should  not  like  to  maintain  '  .  .  .) 
-184  C  (.  .  .  '  his  opinion  of  the  matter.') 

(2)  The  harmony  of  "words  and  deeds. 

188  C  ('  I  have  but  one  feeling '  .  .  .) 
-189  B  (.  .  .  'the  difference  of  our  ages.') 

PROTAGORAS. 

(1)  The  Sophists  at  the  house  of  Callias. 
314  B  (  .  .  .  '  And  now  let  us  go'  .  .   .) 

-316  A  (.  .  .  '  rendered  his  words  inaudible.') 

(2)  Protagoras  tells  the  story  of  Prometheus  and  Epimetheua. 
320  D  ('  Once  upon  a  time '  .  .  .) 

-322  D  (.  .  .  '  a  plague  of  the  state.') 

(3)  The  education  of  a  Greek  child. 

325  D  ('  Education  and  admonition  '  .  .  .) 
-326  E  (.  .  .  '  would  be  far  more  surprising.') 

EOTHYDEMOS. 

The  doctrinaire  politician  and  the  true  philosopher. 
304  B  ('  Such  was  the  discussion,  Crito  '  .  .  .) 
-to  end  (  .  .  .  '  and  be  of  good  cheer.') 

CRATYLUS. 

The  significations  of  the  various  letters. 
426  B  ('  My  first  notions  '  .  .  .) 

-427   C  (.  .  .  '  and  out   of  them  by  imitation   compounding 
other  signs.'  .  .  .) 

PHAEDRUS. 

(1)  The  philosopher  must  study  the  nature  of  man. 

229  A  ('  Let  us  turn  aside,'  .  .  .) 

-230  A  (.  .  .  '  a  diviner  and  lowlier  destiny  ?'...) 

(2)  The  banks  of  the  Ilissus. 

230  B  (  ...  'But  let  me  ask  you,  friend,'  .  .  .) 
-E  (.  .  .  'in  which  you  can  read  best.') 

(3)  The  soul  in  a  figure  and  her  transmigrations. 
245  C  ('  The  soul  through  all  her  being  '  .  .  .) 

'257  A  (.  .  .  '  leave  you  a  fool  in  the  world  below.') 


160  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY    , 

(4)  The  true  orator. 

269  E  ('  I  conceive  Pericles'  .  .  .) 

-272  C  (.  .  .  '  and  yet  the  creation  of  such  an  art  is  not  easy.'J 

(5)  The  tale  of  Thamus  and  Theuth. 

274  C  ('  I  have  heard  a  tradition  of  the  ancients '  .  .  .) 

-275  C  (. . .  '  that  the  Theban  is  right  in  his  view  about  letters.') 

(6)  Speech  better  than  writing-. 

275  C  ('  I  cannot  help  feeling  '  .  .  .) 

-277  A  (.  .  .  '  to  the  utmost  extent  of  human  happiness.') 

(7)  The  true  art  of  composition. 

277  B  ('  Until  a  man  knows  the  truth  '  .  .  .) 

-278  D  (.  .  .  '  poet  or  speech-maker  or  law-maker.') 

ION. 
The  inspiration  of  the  poet. 

533  C  ('I  perceive,  Ion,'  .  .  .) 

-536  C  (.  .  .  '  not  by  art,  but  by  divine  inspiration.') 

SYMPOSIUM. 
The  Character  of  Socrates. 

(1)  His  fit  of  abstraction  in  the  porch. 

174  A  ('  He  said  that  he  met  Socrates'  .  .  .) 
-175  C  (.  .  .  'Socrates  entered.'  .  .  .) 

(2)  His  strange  appearance  and  marvellous  power  of  influencing 

others. 
215  A  ('And  now,  my  boys,'  .  .  .) 

-216  C  (  .  .  .  '  so  that  I  am  at  my  wit's  end.') 

(3)  His  endurance,  eccentricity,  and  bravery. 
219  E  (.  .  .  'All  this  happened  '  .  .  .) 

-222  A  (.  .  .  'a  good  and  honourable  man.') 

SECOND  VOLUME. 

MENO. 
Learning  is  only  Recollection  (&» dfa^vu) :   The  Immortality  of  the 

Soul  proved  out  of  Pindar. 
81  A  ('I  will  tell  you  why'  .  .  .) 

-E  (.  .  .  '  active  and  inquisitive.'  .  .  .) 

APOLOGY,  OR  THE  DEFENCE  OF  SOCRATES 
The  whole. 

CRITO,  OR  SOCRATES  IN  PRISON. 
The  whole. 

PHAEDO,  OR  THE  LAST  DAY  OF  SOCRATES'  LIFE. 
(1)  Socrates  in  prison. 

57-60  C  (.  .  .  '  pleasure  appears  to  succeed.') 


PLATO  161 

(2)  Why  the  philosopher  is  willing  to  die,  although  he  will  not  take 

his  own  life. 

60  C  ('  Upon  this  Cebes  said '  .  .  .) 
-69  E  (.  .  .  ( it  will  be  well.') 

(3)  The  Description  of  the  Other  Life. 

107  C  ('  But  then,  O  my  friends,'  .  .  .) 
-115  A  (.  .  .  '  after  I  am  dead.') 

(4)  The  Death  of  Socrates. 

115  A  ('  When  he  had  done  speaking '  .  .  .) 
-to  end. 

GORGIAS. 

(1)  The  good  man  desires,  not  a  long,  but  a  virtuous,  life. 
511  A  ('You  always  contrive'  .  .  .) 

-513  A  (.  .  .  *  their  own  perdition.'  .  .  .) 

(2)  The  Judgment  of  the  Dead. 
523  A  ('  Listen,  then,'  .  .  .) 

-527  A  (.  .  .  '  any  sort  of  insult.') 

(3)  The  Moral  of  the  Tale. 

527  A  ('  Perhaps  this  may  appear'  .  .  .) 
-to  end. 

[Appendix.] 

I  Alcibiades. 

Socrates  humiliates  Alcibiades  by  shewing  him  his  inferiority  to 

the  Kings  of  Lacedaemon  and  of  Persia. 
120  A  ('  Why,  you  surely  know  '  .  .  .) 
-124  B  (.  .  .  *  ever  desired  anything.') 

II  Alcibiades. 
The  Gods  approve  of  simple  worship. 

148  C  ('  The  Lacedaemonians,  too,'  .  .  .) 
-150  B  (.  .  .  'for  me  to  oppose.') 

Eryxias. 
The  nature  of  money. 

399  E  ('  Then  now  we  have  to  consider '  .  .  .) 
400  E  (.  .  .  '  of  no  use  to  us  ...  True.') 

THIRD  VOLUME. 

REPUBLIC. 
Book  i. 

The  commencement  of  the  Dialogue  :  Cephalus  on  Old  Age. 
327-331  B  (.  .  .  *  is,  in  my  opinion,  the  greatest.') 


162  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

Book  ii. 

(1)  The  argument  of  Adeimantus. 

362  E  (.  .  .  '  But  let  me  add  something1  more  '  .  .  .) 
-367  E  (.  .  .  '  seen  or  unseen  by  Gods  and  men.') 

(2)  The  true  nature  of  God. 

376  D  ('  Come,  then,  and  let  us  pass  '  .  .  .) 
-383  A  ( '  Your  thoughts  ...  my  own.') 
Book  iii. 

(1)  Grace  and  beauty  in  art  and  education. 
400  D  ('  But  there  is  no  difficulty '  .  .  .) 

-402  A  (.  .  .  '  made  him  long  familiar.') 

(2)  The  good  physician  and  the  good  judge. 

408  C  ('  All  that,  Socrates,  is  excellent,'  .  .  .) 
-409  E  ('  And  in  mine  also.') 

(3)  The  true  use  of  music  and  gymnastic. 

409  E  ('  This  is  the  sort  of  medicine  '  .  .  .) 
-412  A  ('  You  are  quite  right,  Socrates.') 

Book  iv. 

Virtue  the  health,  Vice  the  disease,  of  the  Soul. 

443  C  ('  Then  our  dream  has  been  realized'  .  .  .) 

-444  E(' Assuredly.') 
Book  v. 

(1)  The  right  treatment  of  enemies. 

469  A  ('  Next,  how  shall  our  soldiers  '  .  .  .) 
-471   C  (.  .  .  'like  all  our  previous  enactments,   are  very 
good.') 

(2)  The  last  wave:  — The  Government  of  Philosophers. 
471  C  ('  But  still  I  must  say,  Socrates.'  .  .  .) 

-473  E  (.  .  .  « is  indeed  a  hard  thing.') 
Book  vi. 

(1)  The  Parable  of  the  Pilot. 

487  A  ('  Here  Adeimantus  interposed  '  .  .  .) 
-489  D  ('Precisely  so,  he  said.') 

(2)  The  low  estimation  in  which  Philosophy  is  held  by  the  World. 
493  E(' You  recognize  the  truth  of  what  I  have   been  sav 

ing  ?'...) 

-497  A  (.  .  .  « as  well  as  of  himself.') 
Book  vii. 

The  Allegory  of  the  Cave. 

514  A-520  E  (.  .  .  '  present  rulers  of  the  State.') 


PLATO  163 

Book  viii. 

Democracy  and  the  Democratic  Man. 

555  B  ('Next  comes  democracy'  .  .  .) 
-562  A  (.  .  .  '  the  democratic  man.') 
Book  ix. 

j  The  Many-headed  Monster.  I 

(  The  City  of  which  the  Pattern  is  laid  up  in  Heaven.  ) 
588  A  ('  Well,  I  said,  and  now  '  .  .  .) 

-to  the  end  of  the  book. 
Book  x. 

The  Vision  of  Er. 

614  B  ('  Well,  I  said,  I  will  tell  you  a  tale ;'...) 
-to  the  end  of  the  book. 

TIMAEUS. 

(1)  The  Tale  of  Solon. 

20  E  ('  Then  listen,  Socrates'  .  .  .) 

-26  D  (.  .  .  '  these  ancient  Athenians.'  .  .  .) 

(2)  The  Balance  of  Mind  and  Body. 

87  C  ('  There  is  a  corresponding  enquiry'  .  .  .) 
-90  D  (.  .  .  '  the  present  and  the  future.') 

CRITIAS,  OB  THE  ISLAND  OF  ATLANTIS. 
The  entire  Dialogue. 

FOURTH  VOLUME. 
PARMENIDES. 

The  meeting  of  Socrates  and  Parmenidea  at  Athens.  Criticism  of  the 

Ideas. 

126  A  ('  We  had  come  from  our  home  '  .  .  .) 
-136  C  (.  .  .  '  and  see  the  real  truth.') 

THEAETETUS. 

(1)  Socrates,  a  midwife,  and  the  son  of  a  midwife. 

148  E  ('  These  are  the  pangs  of  labour  '  .  .  .) 
-151  E  (.  .  .  '  by  the  help  of  God  you  will  be  able  to  tell.') 

(2)  The  Lawyer  and  the  Philosopher. 

172  B  (.  .  .  '  Here  arises  a  new  question'  .  .  .) 
-177  C  (.  .  .  '  Let  us  go  back  to  the  argument.') 

SOPHIST. 

The  Pre-Socratic  Philosophers  and  their  puzzles. 
241  D  ('Will  you  then  forgive  me  '  .  .  .) 
-246  D  (.  .  .  '  but  seekers  after  truth.') 


164  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

STATESMAN. 
The  Reign  of  Cronos. 

269  A  ('  Again,  we  have  been  often  told  '  .  .  .) 

-274  E  (.  .  .  '  and  at  another  time  in  another.'  .  .  .) 

PHILEBUS. 

5  The  first  Taste  of  Logic,  ) 
f  The  Art  of  Dialectic.        J 

15  C  ('  Good ;  and  where  shall  we  begin '  .  .  .) 
-17  A  (.  .  .  *  and  true  dialectic.') 

FIFTH  VOLUME. 

LAWS. 
Book  i. 

(1)  The  true  nature  of  Education. 

643  A  ('  You  seem  to  be  quite  ready  to  listen  '  .  .  .) 
-644  B  (.  .  .  'of  every  man  while  he  lives.') 

(2)  Man  a  puppet  of  the  Gods. 

644  E  ('  Let  us  look  at  the  matter  thus '  .  .  .) 

-645  B  (.  .  .  '  more  clearly  distinguished  by  us.'  .  .  .) 

Book  iii. 

The  Origin  of  Government. 

676  A  ('Enough  of  this'  .  .  .) 
-679  E  ('  Very  true.') 

Book  iv. 

(1)  The  virtuous  Tyrant. 

709  C  ('  And  does  not  a  like  principle  '  .  .  .) 
-712  A  (.  .  .  '  granting  our  supposition.') 

(2)  The  life  of  Virtue. 

715  E  ('And  now  what  is  to  be  the  next  step  ?'...) 
-718  A  (.  .  .  '  for  the  most  part  in  good  hope.'  .  .  .) 

Book  v. 

(1)  (  The  honour  of  the  Soul. 

(  Precepts  for  a  virtuous  life. 

726  A-732  D  (.  .  .  '  both  in  ]'est  and  earnest. ') 

(2)  The  best  and  second-best  state. 
739  A  ('The  next  move'  .  .  .) 

-741  A  (.  .  .  'to  fight  against  necessity.') 

(3)  Riches  and  Godliness. 

742  D  (.  .  .  *  The  intention,  as  we  affirm '  .  .  .) 
-744  A  (.  .  .  '  the  work  of  legislation.') 


PLATO  166 

Book  vii. 

(1)  The  good  citizen  must  not  lead  an  inactive  life. 
806  D  ('  What  will  be  the  manner  of  lif  e  '  .  .  .) 

-808  C  (.  .  .  '  to  the  whole  state.') 

(2)  The  education  of  the  young. 

808  D  (.  .   .  '  When  the  day  breaks  '  .  .  .) 
/      -809  A  (.  .  .  '  according  to  the  law.')  } 
)S10  A  (.  .  .  'A  fair  time'  .  .  .) 
I      -812  A  (.  .  .  '  come  to  an  end.')  ) 

Book  viii. 

The  evils  of  licentiousness. 

835  C  (.  .  .  '  There  is,  however,  another  matter '  .  .  .) 
-841  E  (.  .  .  '  wrongly  indulged.'), 

Book  x. 

(1)  (  The  three  classes  of  unbelievers.  I 
I  Advice  to  the  young.  ) 

885  B  (.  .  .  '  For  we  have  already  said '  .  .  .) 
-888  D  (.  .  .  '  the  truth  of  these  matters.') 

(2)  God  is  not  an  idle  ruler  of  the  Universe ;  but  orders  all,  even  tha 

smallest  things,  for  our  good. 

899  D  (.  .  .  *  And  now  we  are  to  address  him '  .  .  .) 
-905  D  (.  .  .  'any  understanding  whatsoever'  .  .  .) 

(3)  God  cannot  be  propitiated  by  the  gifts  of  the  wicked. 

905  D  (.  .  .  '  For  I  think  that  we  have  sufficiently  proved ' .  .  .) 

-907  D  (.  .  .  'will  not  discredit  the  lawgiver.') 
Book  xi. 

(1)  The  evils  of  retail  trade,  and  the  cure  of  them. 

918  A  ('  After  the  practices  of  adulteration  '  .  .  .) 
-919  C  (.  .  .  '  shamelessness  and  meanness.') 

(2)  The  honour  of  parents. 

930  E  ('  Neither  God,  nor  a  man  * .  .  .) 

-932  A  (.  .  .  'to  what  has  now  been  said.'  .  .  .) 

Book  xii. 

(1)  The  good  state  in  its  intercourse  with  the  world. 

949  E  ('  Now  a  state '  .  .  .) 

-951  C  (.  .  .  '  is  ill-conducted.') 

(2)  The  Burial  of  the  Dead. 

958  C  ('  Thus  a  man  is  born '  .  .  .) 
960  A  (.  .  .  'a  fitting  penalty.'  .  .  .) 


CHAPTER  VIII 

ARISTOTLE  (384-322  B.  C.) 

Aristotle  in  the  Academy  and  Lyceum.  Many  nota 
ble  pupils  gathered  around  Plato  during  his  mastership 
of  more  than  forty  years.  Plato's  nephew,  Speusippus, 
succeeded  him  as  leader  of  the  Academy,  and  for  the 
next  three  hundred  and  fifty  years  the  Academy  is 
called  by  various  names.  It  is  the  Older  Academy 
under  Speusippus  and  later ;  then  it  is  known  as  the 
Middle  Academy;  and  then,  about  120  B.  C.,  it  is 
known  as  the  New  Academy.  The  history  of  the  Acad 
emy  is,  however,  a  part  of  the  Hellenic-Roman  Period. 
It  is  sufficient  to  say  here  that  the  leaders  succeed 
ing  Plato  in  the  Academy  added  but  little  to  philosoph 
ical  speculation,  although  much  to  empirical  research. 
The  important  fact  is  that  the  sceptre  in  philosophy 
passed  from  the  Academy  when  Plato  died  and  his 
greatest  pupil  Aristotle  left  it.  Just  as  Plato  stood 
among  the  pupils  of  Socrates  as  Socrates'  most  dis 
criminating  interpreter,  so  among  the  pupils  of  Plato 
there  was  one  preeminent  pupil,  —  Aristotle.  Aris 
totle  was  too  great  a  man  to  be  subordinated  to  the 
leadership  of  Speusippus.  Upon  the  death  of  Plato  he 
left  the  Academy,  and  fourteen  years  later  he  returned 
to  Athens  and  founded  the  Lyceum,  which  became 
under  his  mastership  the  most  influential  Athenian 
school.  The  Lyceum  was  an  inclosed  space  of  ground, 
like  the  Academy.  It  was  situated  just  outside  the 
walls  of  Athens,  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Ilissus.  It 


ARISTOTLE  167 

was  dedicated  to  Apollo,  decorated  with  fountains, 
gardens,  and  buildings,  and  contained  one  of  the  great 
gymnasia  of  Athens.  It  was  frequented  by  philosophers, 
and  is  known  to  have  been  the  favorite  walk  of  Aris 
totle  and  his  pupils,  whence  they  got  their  name  of 
Peripatetics.  Theophrastus,  the  most  eminent  pupil  of 
Aristotle,  bought  a  property  near  the  grove  and  be 
queathed  it  to  the  school.  It  was  a  religious  foundation, 
like  the  Academy.  The  method  of  choosing  the  schol- 
archs  varied  at  different  times.  The  name  Lyceum  is 
from  the  same  root  as  Lycian,  and  was  given  to  Aris 
totle's  school  from  the  fact  that  the  grove  was  dedi 
cated  to  the  Lycian  Apollo. 

Here,  in  the  Lyceum,  Greek  philosophy  was  brought 
to  its  most  complete  expression.  Here  all  the  threads 
of  Greek  cosmological  and  anthropological  undertak 
ings  were  finally  woven  together.  Here  an  adjustment 
was  accomplished  between  Aristotle's  two  great  prede 
cessors,  Plato  and  Democritus  ;  and  materialistic  and 
idealistic  realism  crystallized  in  a  theory  of  develop 
ment.  The  great  form  of  Aristotle  rises  to  speak  the 
final  word  of  pure  Greek  civilization,  at  a  time  when 
the  custody  of  Greece  had  passed  from  the  hands  of 
the  Athenians,  the  Spartans,  the  Thebans  in  succession 
to  the  Macedonians.  He  was  the  most  influential  thinker 
that  history  had  seen.  In  his  formative  power  upon  hu 
man  thought  he  has  scarcely  a  peer.  Dante  called  him 
"  the  master  of  those  who  know."  "  In  my  opinion,"  said 
Cicero,  "Aristotle  stands  almost  alone  in  philosophy." 
Eusebius  said  of  him,  "  Aristotle,  nature's  private  sec 
retary,  dipped  his  pen  in  thought."  Goethe  remarked, 
"  If  now  in  my  quiet  days  I  had  youthful  faculties  at 
my  command,  I  should  devote  myself  to  Greek,  in  spite 


168  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

of  all  the  difficulties  I  know.  Nature  and  Aristotle 
should  be  my  sole  study.  It  is  beyond  all  conception 
what  that  man  espied,  saw,  beheld,  remarked,  ob 
served." 

The  portrait  that  we  draw  of  Aristotle  is  very  dif 
ferent  from  that  of  Plato.  Instead  of  the  deeply  poetic 
temper,  the  man  who  sees  all  things  in  an  ideal  unity 
of  infiniteness  and  vastness,  we  have  before  us  now 
the  scientist  in  search  of  facts,  the  accurate  man  of 
good  sense,  whose  imagination  does  not  soar  above 
the  clouds,  but  at  the  same  time  has  extraordinary  fer 
tility  in  historical  and  scientific  theoretical  explana 
tions.  His  was  a  life  filled  with  the  love  of  truth.  His 
learning  took  up  into  itself  the  entire  range  of  human 
knowledge  in  such  a  way  as  to  include  its  earlier  de 
velopment.  And  what  is  more,  he  showed  an  equal 
interest  in  all  departments.  Aristotle  was  more  of  a 
scientist  than  Plato,  for  the  theoretical  rather  than  the 
ethical  interest  was  fundamental  in  his  work.  He  is 
the  personification  and  completion  of  pure  Greek 
learning. 

Biography  of  Aristotle,  384-322  B.  c. 
Brief  Chronological  Sketch  of  Aristotle's  Life. 
First  Period  —  Aristotle  the  Student  —  37  years. 

384-347  B.  c. 

384  Born  in  Stagira  in  Macedonia. 
367   Entered  the  Academy.  Kemained  19  years. 
347  Left  the  Academy  upon  the  death  of  Plato. 

Second    Period  —  Aristotle    the    Traveler  —  12 

years.  347-335  B.  c. 

347  Went  to  the  courts  at  Atarneus  and  Mytilene  in 
Asia  Minor. 


ARISTOTLE  169 

343  Returned  to  the  court  of  Macedon  at  Pella,  in 
response  to  the  summons  of  King  Philip,  to 
teach  the  young  prince  Alexander.  Remained 
4  years. 

340  Went  from  Pella  to  Stagira  to  engage  in  scientific 
work.  Remained  5  years. 

Third  Period  —  Aristotle  the  Leader  of  the  Ly 
ceum  —  13  years.  335-322  B.  c. 

335  Founded  the  Lyceum  in  Athens.  Taught  and 
administered  the  school  12  years. 

323  Fled  to  Chalcis. 

322  Died  in  Chalcis. 

Aristotle's  Biography  in  Detail. 

i.  First  Period,  384-347  B.C.  —  Early  Influences. 
Aristotle  was  born  in  Stagira  in  Macedonia.  His  father 
was  court  physician  to  King  Amyntas,  the  founder 
of  the  Macedonian  power  and  the  father  of  King 
Philip.  He  came  from  a  long  line  of  physicians  (the 
caste,  Asclepiad)  who  traced  their  origin  to  Ascle- 
pius.  Little  is  known  about  the  early  years  of 
Aristotle  except  that  his  father  and  mother  died,  leav 
ing  him  in  the  guardianship  of  Proxenus  of  Atarneus. 
(Atarneus  is  the  state  in  Asia  Minor  which  he  later 
visited.)  It  can  scarcely  be  doubted  that  he  was  des 
tined  by  his  family  to  be  a  physician,  and  that  the 
empirical  works  of  Hippocrates  and  Democritus  were 
the  first  elements  of  his  early  education.  Aristotle 
grew  up  in  this  atmosphere  of  medicine  of  Macedonia, 
which  explains  his  respect  for  the  results  of  experience 
and  his  accuracy  in  details, — all  of  which  contrasts  him 
with  the  Attic  philosophers. 

He  was  sent  by  Proxenus  to  the  Academy  in  367  Be  C.. 


170  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

at  the  age  of  eighteen,  and  he  remained  there  for  nine 
teen  years,  or  until  he  was  thirty-seven.  He  was  not 
merely  a  pupil  in  the  school,  but  his  brilliancy  won  for 
him  immediately  a  prominent  position  there.  He  be 
came  a  teacher,  an  attractive  writer,  and  champion  of 
the  literary  spirit  of  the  school.  Even  while  he  was  a 
member  of  the  Academy  he  became  a  famous  man.  It 
is  difficult  to  say  just  how  much  influence  the  Academy 
had  upon  the  casting  of  his  thought.  His  scientific 
inclinations  were  formed  before  he  went  to  the  Acad 
emy  ;  he  got  his  immense  scientific  erudition  in  Asia 
Minor  and  in  Stagira  later,  after  he  left  the  Academy. 
Probably  the  spirit  of  the  Platonic  school  turned  his 
attention  to  ethical  and  metaphysical  theories,  and  prob 
ably  it  was  due  to  his  stay  in  the  Academy  that  he  be 
came  interested  in  rhetorical  and  purely  cultural  studies. 
At  the  same  time  his  own  influence  must  have  been 
very  great  in  forming  the  policy  of  the  Academy,  and 
he  was  probably  responsible  for  its  turning  its  attention 
to  scientific  matters. 

The  sources  from  which  Aristotle  drew  the  material 
of  his  philosophical  science  were  therefore  (1)  his  in 
herited  taste  for  medicine  and  empirical  science ;  and 
(2)  the  influence  of  the  Academy  in  ethical,  meta 
physical,  and  cultural  subjects.  Both  these  factors  ap 
pear  throughout  the  philosophical  development  of  Aris 
totle.  On  the  other  hand,  it  must  not  be  forgotten  that 
probably  Aristotle's  influence  upon  the  Academy  was 
as  great  as  that  of  the  Academy  upon  him.  His  own 
persistence  along  the  line  of  empirical  science  shows 
itself  in  his  period  at  Atarneus,  Mitylene,  and  on  his 
return  to  Stagira.  Much  has  been  said  about  an 
Estrangement  between  Aristotle  and  his  teacher,  Plato. 


ARISTOTLE  171 

This  is  probably  idle  gossip.  Aristotle  held  his  master 
in  great  esteem,  as  he  himself  testifies  in  his  Ethics. 
Aristotle  was  an  independent  and  original  mind,  and 
probably  even  in  the  school  he  would  point  out  defects 
in  Plato's  thought,  when  his  aged  teacher  would  lead 
his  theories  upon  mistaken  lines.  Plato  said  that  his 
pupil  Xenocrates  needed  the  spur,  while  Aristotle 
needed  the  bridle.  Aristotle  was  called  the  brain  of 
the  Academy. 

2.  Second  Period,  347-335  B.  c. — Traveler  and  Col 
lector.  When  Plato  died,  and  his  nephew  Speusippus 
became  scholarch  of  the  Academy,  Aristotle,  in  com 
pany  with  Xenocrates,  went  to  the  court  of  Hermeias, 
ruler  of  Atarneus  and  Mitylene.  Hermeias  was  another 
pupil  of  Plato  at  the  Academy.  Here  Aristotle  married 
twice,  and  here  he  resided  for  six  years.  In  343  B.  c. 
he  obeyed  the  summons  of  King  Philip  to  come  to 
Pella  and  become  the  tutor  of  Alexander.  He  acted  in 
this  capacity  for  four  years,  and  seems  to  have  been 
more  fortunate  than  Plato  as  instructor  of  a  king.  His 
influence  upon  Alexander  was  very  great.  Without 
losing  himself  in  the  impracticable,  Aristotle  seems  to 
have  impressed  high  philosophical  ideals  upon  the  noble 
spirit  of  his  kingly  ward.  Alexander  says  of  Aristotle, 
"  To  my  father  I  owe  my  life,  to  Aristotle  the  know- 
ledge  how  to  live  worthily."  During  the  tedium  of  the 
protracted  campaign  in  Bactria,  Alexander  sent  for  the 
tragedies  of  Euripides,  Sophocles,  and  ^Eschylus.  The 
Ethics  of  his  teacher  was  always  with  him.  The  ideals 
of  statesmanship,  the  wide  purposes  in  political  con 
trol,  the  greatness  of  the  aims  of  the  young  conqueror, 
as  well  as  his  self-control,  his  aversion  to  meanness 
and  petty  things,  and  his  sublime  moderation  were  due 


172  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

in  part  to  the  teachings  of  Aristotle.  Never  was  there  a 
more  fortunate  conjunction  of  two  great  minds  than  here. 

In  340  B.  c.,  when  Alexander  entered  upon  his  admin 
istrative  and  military  duties,  Aristotle  became  independ 
ent  of  the  Macedonian  court.  He  spent  the  most  of  these 
four  years  (340-335  B.  c.)  in  scientific  work  at  Stagira, 
in  intimate  companionship  with  his  young  friend  Theo- 
phrastus,  who  later  succeeded  him  as  scholarch  of  the 
Lyceum.  "  Among  the  special  subjects  of  study  in  the 
school  of  Mieza  and  Stagira,  natural  history  formed  a 
part.  .  .  .  Alexander  at  one  time  contributed  eight 
hundred  talents  to  forward  his  former  teacher's  inves 
tigations  in  zoology,  placed  at  his  disposal  a  thousand 
men  throughout  Asia  and  Greece,  with  instructions  to 
follow  out  Aristotle's  directions  in  collecting  and  re 
porting  details  concerning  the  life,  conditions,  and 
habits  of  animals,  and  in  every  way  made  his  cam 
paigns  serve  the  purpose  of  scientific  investigation." 1 
The  reports  of  the  ancients  concerning  the  vast  sums 
placed  at  Aristotle's  disposal  for  use  in  scientific  inves 
tigation  are  of  course  exaggerated.  That  he  made  large 
collections  during  this  period,  as  well  as  later,  is  cer 
tain.  This  was  possible  to  him,  first,  because  he  was  a 
rich  man  himself,  and  second,  because  of  his  relations 
to  the  courts  at  Atarneus  and  Macedonia. 

3.  Third  Period,  335-322  B.  c.— Administrator  of 
the  Lyceum.  When  Alexander  entered  upon  his 
campaigns  in  Asia,  and  Aristotle  felt  himself  free  from 
immediate  duty  to  him,  he  went  to  Athens  and  founded 
the  Lyceum.  This  school  very  soon  arose  above  the 
Academy,  and  became  the  model  of  later  societies  of 
scholars  of  antiquity.  Its  greatness  partook  of  the  great- 
B.  I.  Wheeler,  Life  of  Alexander  the  Great. 


ARISTOTLE  173 

ness  of  Aristotle,  —  in  the  universality  of  its  interests, 
in  the  orderliness  of  its  administration,  and  in  method 
ical  cooperation.  For  twelve  years  he  was  the  execu 
tive,  teacher,  administrator,  and  inspiration  of  this 
school  —  developing  his  philosophy,  accumulating  ma 
terials,  and  instructing  his  pupils.  The  enormous  pro 
duct  of  the  school  could  not  have  been  the  work  of  one 
pair  of  hands.  Nevertheless  the  writings,  the  immense 
collections,  the  ethical  and  political  treatises,  show  a 
unity  that  speaks  of  one  master-mind  that  had  them 
under  direction.  When  the  Athenians  began  to  rise 
against  the  Macedonian  rule,  Aristotle's  position  in 
Athens  as  a  friend  of  Alexander  became  unsafe.  He 
fled  to  Chalcis,  excusing  himself,  so  the  tradition  goes, 
because  he  wished  to  spare  the  Athenians  a  second 
crime  against  philosophy.  He  died  in  Chalcis  the  next 
year  (322  B.  c.). 

A  comparison  of  these  three  periods  of  Aristotle's 
life  discloses  the  uniformity  of  that  life,  from  beginning 
to  end.  He  was,  from  the  time  he  entered  the  Academy 
to  the  founding  of  the  Lyceum,  a  teacher.  Even  as 
pupil  of  Plato  his  original  mind  was  influencing  the 
Platonic  teaching  into  new  channels.  During  his  second 
period  he  was  a  traveler,  to  be  sure ;  but  he  was  more, 
—  a  collector  and  a  king's  tutor.  He  was  always  Aris 
totle,  the  philosophical  teacher.  Hence  the  periods  of 
his  life  cannot  be  so  sharply  marked  as  Plato's,  and 
the  lines  that  are  drawn  point  only  to  phases  of  a  life 
that  had  unity,  like  his  doctrine.  His  life  is  a  regular 
development  from  sources  in  his  first  period,  and  with 
no  later  deviating  influence. 

The  Writings  of  Aristotle.  On  every  page  of  Plato's 
dialogues  you  meet  Plato ;  in  Aristotle's  writings  the 


174  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

personality  of  the  author  is  subordinated  to  his  science. 
The  collections  of  writings  transmitted  under  the  name 
of  Aristotle  do  not  give  even  an  approximately  com 
plete  picture  of  the  immense  activity  of  the  man.  They 
form,  indeed,  a  stately  memorial,  even  after  the  spuri 
ous  writings  have  been  omitted,  but  their  bulk  is  small 
compared  with  what  we  know  was  the  product  of  his 
literary  workshop.  Forty  treatises  have  been  preserved. 
A  catalogue  of  the  library  of  Alexandria  in  220  B.  c. 
includes  a  list  of  one  hundred  and  forty-six  others, 
which  have  since  been  lost.  Aristotle  was  writer,  lec 
turer,  teacher,  and  the  administrator  of  the  Lyceum.  His 
leadership  of  that  school,  his  careful  direction  of  his 
cooperators  in  research  and  study,  was  not  only  an  in 
struction  but  an  impulsion  to  independent  scientific 
study  for  all  time.  His  great  collections  of  scientific 
data  can  be  explained  only  by  their  being  the  combined 
efforts  of  many  different  forces,  guided  and  schooled 
by  a  common  master.  The  world  was  ready  to  take  an 
account  of  stock,  and  Aristotle  was  the  first  encyclo 
pedic  philosopher. 

i.  The  Popular  Writings,  published  by  Aristotle 
himself.  These  were  intended  for  a  circle  of  readers 
wider  than  his  own  school.  No  one  of  these  works  is 
extant  in  complete  form.  They  were  written  by  Aris 
totle  during  his  life  in  the  Academy.  They  were  dia 
logues  in  form  ;  in  content  they  were  discussions  of 
justice,  wealth,  wisdom,  rhetoric,  politics,  love,  conduct, 
prayer,  generosity,  education,  government,  etc.  They 
were  less  artistic  than  Plato's  dialogues,  but  more  ori 
ginal  and  striking ;  and  they  were  full  of  happy  inven 
tions  and  rich  thought,  expressed  in  florid  diction.  The 
ancients  spoke  often  of  Aristotle's  "golden  flow  of 


ARISTOTLE  175 

thought,"  but  this  cannot  truthfully  apply  to  any  save 
these  lost  writings. 

2.  The  Compilations.  These  were  excerpts  from  scien 
tific  works,  collections  of  zoological,  literary,  historical, 
and  antiquarian  data,  which  Aristotle  and  his  pupils 
had  gathered  together.  Only  a  few  fragments  of  the 
total  remain.  There  were  critical  notes  upon  the  Pytha 
goreans,   reports  of  extracts  of    Plato's    dialogues,    a 
descriptive  basis  for  zoology  with  illustrations,  collec 
tions  of  previous  rhetorical  theories  and  models,  histo 
ries  of  tragedies  and  comedies,  discussions  about  Homer, 
Hesiod,    Archilochus,    Euripides,     and    other    poets ; 
there  were  historical  miscellanies  and  reports  concern 
ing  one  hundred  fifty-eight  Greek  state  constitutions. 

3.  The  Didactic  Writings.   These  have  in  part  been 
preserved,  and  they  make  up  the  collection  of  what  we 
have  of  Aristotle's  writings.    They  have  a  consistently 
developed  terminology,  but  they  are  wanting  in  grace 
and  beauty  of  presentation.  The  plan  of  the  books  is 
generally  the  same :  the  problem  is  precisely  stated ; 
then  follows  a  criticism  of  various  attempted  solutions  ; 
then  a  discussion  of  the  salient  points  of  the  problem  ; 
then  a  marshaling  of  the  facts  ;  and,  finally,  an  attempt 
to  get  a  conclusive  result.    The  method  is  modern  in 
its  scientific  procedure  and  the  contrast  with  Plato  is 
striking.    Yet  it  must  not  be  inferred  that  these  books 
of  Aristotle  are  orderly.  There   are  repetitions,  haste, 
unequal  development  of  parts,  and  unfulfilled  promises. 
These  books  were  nothing  else  than  the  written  note? 
which  he  had  made  the  basis  of  his  lectures  and  had 
intended  to  form  into  text-books  in  some  future  time. 
Only  parts  of  the  Logic  seem  to  have  been  completed 
for  text-book  purposes. 


176  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

These  didactic  writings  are  simply  arranged  as  fol 
lows  (Wallace)  : 

1.  The  treatise  on  Logic  called  Or g anon. 

2.  Speculative  Philosophy. 

First  Philosophy  or  Theology  or  Metaphysics. 
Mathematics   (writings  not  extant). 
Physics  (including  the  history  of  animals  and  the 
psychology). 

3.  Practical  Philosophy. 
Ethics. 
Economics. 
Politics. 

4.  Poetic  Philosophy. 
Art. 

Poetry. 

Rhetoric. 

Aristotle's  Starting-Point.  The  two  early  influences 
in  Aristotle's  mental  development  offer  an  explanation 
for  his  philosophical  point  of  view.  These  influences 
were  his  empirical  training  in  medicine  and  his  con 
ceptual  training  in  the  moral  ideals  of  the  Academy. 
Plato  had  convinced  him  that  if  there  were  to  be  any 
true  science,  it  must  be  founded  on  concepts  that  are 
unchanging.  His  own  scientific  training,  however,  re 
inforced  by  the  influence  of  Democritus,  made  him  re 
spect  the  value  of  empirical  facts.  While  the  philo 
sophical  problem  for  Aristotle  was  the  same  as  that  for 
Plato,  the  difference  between  them  was  in  the  main  a 
matter  of  emphasis  due  to  their  different  starting- 
points.  Plato  started  with  the  refutation  of  the  Prota- 
gorean  theory  of  perception,  and  consequently  he  em 
phasized  the  value  of  the  conceptual  world  ;  Aristotle, 
however,  felt  that  Plato  had  overestimated  the  con- 


ARISTOTLE  177 

ceptual  world,  and  he  emphasized  the  importance  of 
empirical  facts.  Both  when  a  member  of  the  Academy 
and  later,  he  strongly  contended  against  Plato's  evalu 
ation  of  the  world  of  Ideas,  because  they  so  transcended 
the  sense  world  that  they  neither  explained  nor  illumi 
nated  it.  Aristotle's  reaction  against  Plato's  theory 
furthermore  gives  us  a  more  correct  notion  of  what 
Plato  really  taught.  If  conceptions  are  to  enter  into 
knowledge,  they  must  not  exist  in  the  clouds  of  ab 
straction.  He  maintained  that  Plato  had  increased  the 
difficulty  of  the  problem  by  adding  a  second  world  of 
entities  quite  distinct  from  the  world  of  nature.  The 
same  problem  that  Plato  confronted  still  exists  unan 
swered,  said  Aristotle.  It  is  the  problem  of  the  two 
fold  world.  If  Ideas  are  apart  from  things,  we  could  not 
know  that  they  existed,  we  should  not  be  able  to  know 
anything  about  them,  nor  should  we  be  able  to  explain 
the  world  through  them.  It  is  true  that  Plato,  in  his 
later  draft,  had  conceived  Ideas  to  be  teleologically  re 
lated  to  the  physical  things,  but  how  could  this  be  if 
they  were  apart  from  things  ?  Thus  in  his  reaction  from 
Plato's  theory  of  Ideas,  Aristotle  reestablished  the 
world  of  perceptual  fact.  This  is  the  starting-point  of 
Aristotle. 

The  Fundamental  Principle  in  Aristotle's  Philosophy. 
The  first  question  then  is,  How  did  Aristotle  reestab 
lish  the  perceptual  fact  ?  What  means  did  he  employ 
to  give  the  perceptual  fact  a  reality?  The  answer  to 
this  question  will  be  the  statement  of  Aristotle's  funda 
mental  principle.  It  will  show  his  advance  over  Plato 
by  showing  his  new  estimate  of  the  perceptual  world. 
Plato  accepted  the  Protagorean  doctrine  of  perception, 
but  also  gave  it  a  new  value  by  placing  perceptions 


178  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

beside  conceptions  in  the  world  of  reality ;  Aristotle 
developed  Plato's  teaching  about  perceptions  by  link- 
ing  them  inseparably  with  conceptions.  Aristotle  felt 
that  Plato's  difficulties  arose  from  the  lack  of  close  re- 
lationship  between  conceptual  Being  and  perceptuaf 
fact.  What  is  that  linkage  ?  What  binds  abiding  real- 
ity  and  changing  phenomena  so  closely  ?  The  linkage 
is  development.  Development  is  the  relation  between 
conception  and  perception.  It  is  the  fundamental  prin 
ciple  in  the  philosophy  of  Aristotle  throughout  and 
places  a  new  estimate  upon  the  value  of  perception. 
Perceptual  facts  apart  from  conceptions  have  no  real 
ity;  conceptions  apart  from  perceptions  are  mere  ab 
stractions.  In  the  world  of  reality  conceptual  Being  re 
sides  in  the  perceptual  facts,  and  the  perceptual  facts 
express  conceptions.  They  always  exist  together  in  a 
linkage  or  relationship  that  is  teleological,  purposeful 
—  the  linkage  of  development.  An  abstract  statement 
of  this  relationship  is,  "  Aristotle  felt  the  conceptual  ne 
cessity  of  the  empirically  actual."  Perhaps  the  clearest 
statement  of  this  fundamental  principle  can  be  made 
in  the  terms  of  evolution.  It  is  this  :  true  reality  is  the 
essence  which  unfolds  in  phenomena.  Notice  that  this 
sentence  has  two  parts  equally  freighted :  reality  is  an 
unfolding  essence  ;  reality  is  in  phenomena.  The  true 
universal  must  be  thought  as  realizing  itself  through 
its  development  in  particulars ;  the  true  concept  as 
realizing  itself  through  its  development  in  percepts; 
the  true  abiding  Being  as  realizing  itself  in  its  devel 
opment  through  change.  On  the  one  hand,  reality  is 
the  essence  of  things ;  on  the  other,  reality  has  exist 
ence  only  in  things. 

True  reality  is  the  individual. 


ARISTOTLE  179 

The  individual  consists  of  two  aspects  :  (1)  concept 
ual  being,  and  (2)  perceptual  change. 

These  two  aspects  always  stand  in  a  relationship. 

That  relationship  is  developing  purpose. 

Here  is  the  key  to  the  teaching  of  Aristotle  that 
seems  to  open  the  doors  of  its  many  chambers.  In  his 
metaphysics  reality  is  the  individual  developing  from 
possibility  to  actuality.  In  physics  individual  phenom 
ena  get  a  reality  through  their  development  from  lower 
to  higher  types.  In  psychology  the  individual  person  is 
real  when  the  particulars,  the  physiological  and  psycho 
logical  states,  develop  toward  the  soul,  which  is  their 
truth.  So,  too,  in  the  great  system  of  logic  in  which 
Aristotle  was  pioneer,  he  is  simply  trying  to  give  the 
particular  judgment  a  meaning  by  showing  its  linkage 
to  the  universal  judgment.  Everywhere  the  starting- 
point  of  Aristotle  is  the  perceptual  fact.  Everywhere 
his  purpose  is  to  reestablish  it  by  showing  its  relation 
to  abiding  conception  in  the  individual. 

It  may  be  well  to  remark,  however,  that  Aristotle 
does  not  altogether  succeed  in  constructing  a  consist 
ent  theory.  In  spite  of  his  criticism  of  Plato's  tran 
scendent  Ideas,  in  many  places  Aristotle  does  not  over 
come  Plato's  dualism.  Frequently  he  differs  from  Plato 
more  in  words  than  in  meaning.  We  shall  observe  some 
of  his  inconsistencies  in  their  place.  We  shall  see  that 
Aristotle  as  he  meant  to  be  was  different  from  Aris 
totle  as  he  was.  Aristotle  as  he  meant  to  be  —  Aristotle 
as  the  opponent  of  Plato's  dualism  —  develops  a  philo 
sophy  from  a  single  fundamental  principle.  Aristotle 
as  he  was,  reverts  at  many  critical  points  to  Plato's 
dualism. 

Aristotle's  principle  of  development  may  appear  at 


180  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

first  blush  very  much  like  the  modern  principle  of  evo 
lution.  As  a  matter  of  fact  it  was  very  different.  In  all 
Greek  philosophy  after  Socrates  the  study  of  morals 
was  fundamental.  The  ideal  of  Socrates,  Democritus, 
Plato,  Aristotle,  and  the  later  Schools  was  a  moral 
ideal.  Being  moral  it  was  fixed,  and  it  fixed  all  the 
changes  of  life  to  it  as  a  centre.  Nature  was  to  the 
Greek  a  museum  of  types  oscillating  around  a  perfect 
form.  There  was  no  evolution  in  the  sense  of  progress. 
There  was  development  within  the  individual  —  the 
boy  becomes  a  man,  the  seed  becomes  a  flower ;  but 
there  was  no  evolution  from  genus  to  genus.  Indeed,  any 
variation  of  the  individual  from  its  type  was  considered 
a  defect. 

Aristotle's  Logic.  Aristotle  felt  that  there  must  be 
a  science  of  the  methods  of  science ;  and  so  successful 
was  he  in  its  formulation  that  it  has  practically  re 
mained  as  he  transmitted  it.  We  are  struck  by  the 
way  in  which  he  divided  science  into  the  special 
sciences,  each  with  its  well-defined  field.  It  was  per 
fectly  natural  that  he  should  also,  with  his  great  power 
of  abstract  reasoning,  discuss  the  body  of  rules  for 
legitimate  thinking.  In  science  there  must  be  an  art  of 
investigation,  just  as  in  rhetoric  there  is  an  art  of  per 
suasion.  At  an  early  period  these  logical  writings  were 
collected  under  the  name  Organon,  because  the  Lyceum 
regarded  them  so  intimately  connected  with  scientific 
procedure  as  to  be  the  instrument  or  "  organ  "  of  all 
knowledge.  Certain  parts  of  Aristotle's  Organon  are 
of  doubtful  genuineness.  The  important  sections  are 
the  Analytics,  a  masterly  logical  groundwork  of  the 
conclusion  and  proof,  and  the  Topics,  which  treats  of 
the  inductive  methods  of  probability.  Aristotle  there- 


ARISTOTLE  181 

fore  made  logic  a  preliminary  and  separate  study,  as 
it  should  be.  It  became  the  preface  to  his  scientific 
work. 

We  shall  briefly  discuss  Aristotle's  logic,  because  it 
is  an  exemplification  of  his  general  philosophical  prin 
ciple.  Among  the  subjects  in  the  history  of  philosophy, 
logic  is  perhaps  the  only  one  that  has  had  no  internal 
history.  Aristotle  was  the  pioneer  in  the  subject.  He 
left  it  so  finished  that  scarcely  any  changes  of  conse 
quence  could  be  made  in  it.  The  external  history  of  the 
Aristotelian  logic  has,  however,  been  notable.  A  por 
tion  of  the  Categories  and  De  Interpretation  was 
most  influential  in  the  history  of  the  Middle  Ages. 
The  Logic  had  been  misunderstood  and  misapplied  by 
Aristotle's  own  School,  so  that  when  it  came  into  the 
hands  of  the  Schoolmen  it  had  acquired  the  reputation 
of  being  only  an  abstract  formal  logic.  As  thus  inter 
preted  it  was  used  by  the  Schoolmen  and  attacked  by 
the  philosophers  of  the  Renaissance.  Such  a  view  of 
Aristotle's  logic  is  unjust  to  the  author.  He  had  con-- 
ceived  logic  in  its  wholeness  to  be  the  true  method  to 
be  used  in  investigating  practical  scientific  problems. 

The  Sophists  had  proposed  rules  of  practical  value 
in  the  study  of  individual  cases ;  Socrates  had  tried  to 
fix  upon  some  universal  principle  as  the  basis  of  know 
ledge  ;  Aristotle  made  a  comprehensive  study  of  the  reg 
ular  forms  of  thought  and  the  rules  that  govern  the  ar 
rangement  of  these  forms  in  right  thinking.  In  true 
Platonic  fashion  he  conceived  physical  events  in  nature 
to  be  due  to  some  universal  cause.  If,  therefore,  logical 
procedure  be  scientific,  ft  must  follow  the  ways  of  na 
ture  :  logic  must  deduce  particular  perceptions  from  some 
universal  idea.  The  necessary  thought-relations  in  which 


182  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

the  particular  stands  will  then  appear.  Deduction  of 
the  particular  from  the  universal  is  the  true  scientific 
method,  used  in  the  explanation  of  nature-phenomena : 
so  in  proof  the  same  deductive  reasoning  should  be  used 
In  scientific  study  we  are  trying  to  show  the  conceptual 
necessity  of  an  empirical  fact ;  in  proof  we  are  showing 
the  conceptual  necessity  of  the  particular  term.  Whether 
we  are  explaining  an  event  or  proving  a  conclusion,  we 
are  employing  the  same  logical  process.  Aristotle  thus 
regarded  his  logic  as  the  true  scientific  method  for  prac 
tical  service,  not  as  a  merely  abstract  discipline  in  verbal 
hair-splitting. 

Socrates  and  Plato  confined  themselves  to  the  study  of 
the  concept  or  simple  term.  Aristotle  also  studied  the 
concept.  Indeed,  he  tried  to  find  out  what  concepts  are 
fundamental  in  our  thinking,  so  fundamental  that  they 
are  our  thought  reduced  to  its  lowest  terms.  He  names 
ten  of  these  fundamental  concepts  and  calls  them  cate 
gories.  But  Aristotle  goes  farther  than  Socrates  and 
Plato,  and  makes  his  real  point  of  departure  the  judg 
ment.  A  single  term  does  not  express  truth.  For  truth 
we  must  have  two  terms  connected  by  the  verb  "  is,'* 
i.  e.  some  relation  must  be  shown  between  them.  This 
is  a  judgment.  Reasoning  is  still  more  complex.  It  is 
the  putting  together  or  showing  the  relation  between 
two  judgments.  This  process  takes  the  form  of  the  syl 
logism.  The  first  task  of  deduction  is  to  present  the  laws 
of  the  syllogism.  These  will  then  be  the  laws  of  scien 
tific  investigation.  According  to  these,  particulars  can 
be  derived  with  certainty  from  universal  propositions, 
provided  such  universals  are  established.  The  syllogism 
is  in  the  form  of  two  premises  and  a  derived  conclusion. 
It  contains  three  terms.  The  problem  is  to  infer,  from 


ARISTOTLE  183 

the  relation  that  one  of  these  terms  bears  to  the  two 
other  terms,  what  the  two  bear  to  each  other.  The  prin 
ciple  employed  is  that  of  subordination ;  and  the  dif 
ferentiations  of  the  syllogism  can  be  many,  depending  on 
the  quality  and  quantity  of  the  premises  and  the  distri 
bution  of  the  middle  term.  The  working  of  the  syllogism 
in  inference  has  a  certainty  so  great  that  Aristotle  called 
it-  apodictic. 

But  there  is  another  side  to  the  syllogistic  besides 
the  deduction  of  proof  or  the  explanation  of  empirical 
fact.  This  is  the  establishment  of  the  premises.  All  de 
duction  presupposes  absolute  premises.  All  deduction 
is  grounded  on  something  not  deduced ;  all  proof  on 
something  not  proved ;  all  explanation  on  something 
that  has  not  been  explained.  These  presuppositions  are 
universal  propositions  that  can  be  known  only  imme 
diately  through  intuitions.  Aristotle  is  not  altogether 
clear  as  to  what  these  intuitions  are.  He  names  such 
axioms  as  the  law  of  contradiction  and  the  law  of  the 
excluded  middle,  and  some  special  propositions  which 
apply  only  to  particular  sciences.  Since  the  premises 
which  we  actually  use  are  not  open  to  proof,  but  only 
strengthened  as  to  the  validity  of  their  application,  we 
must  use  the  method  of  induction  in  our  search  for 
them.  We  accumulate  data  from  opinions  and  varied 
experiences,  and  then  we  ascend  to  a  generalization 
which  we  take  as  a  premise.  The  results  of  induction 
cannot  therefore  be  in  themselves  certain.  The  results 
are  only  probable,  and  can  have  the  character  of  know 
ledge  only  as  they  explain  phenomena.  Aristotle  means 
by  induction  something  different  from  the  present  use 
of  the  term.  Induction  in  modern  times  means  a  kind 
of  proof  ,•  Aristotle  means  a  method  of  discovery  of 


184  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

relatively  universal  terms  where  the  absolutely  universal 
cannot  be  obtained. 

There  is  an  ideal  involved  in  this  conception  of  logk 
that  is  interesting.  In  a  perfectly  intellectual  society 
there  would  be  a  perfect  science  in  which  all  particular 
facts  could  be  derived  with  absolute  certainty  from  pre 
mises  absolutely  known.  Life  and  logic  would  be  iden 
tical.  We  should  then  be  certain  not  only  as  to  our 
proof  but  as  to  our  premises.  Logic  has  sometimes  been 
used  very  effectively  in  this  way.  When  the  mediaeval 
church  conceived  its  dogmas  to  be  the  ultimate  pre 
mises  of  truth,  it  could  deduce  from  them  complete 
rules  for  living.  To  the  mediaeval  mind  the  perfect 
science  was  formulated  by  deducing  it  from  the  dogma 
of  the  church.  The  dogmas  were  the  absolute  premises. 
The  Renaissance  did  not  doubt  the  infallibility  of  the 
traditional  dogmas  so  much  as  the  logical  method,  and 
Aristotle,  who  had  been  so  long  artificially  identified 
with  the  proof  of  ecclesiastical  dogma,  was  set  aside. 

Aristotle,  moreover,  showed  great  insight  into  the 
present  relation  of  thought  and  reality.  The  sequence 
of  facts  in  our  experience,  he  pointed  out,  is  exactly 
the  reverse  of  what  it  is  in  reality.  What  is  first  in 
reality  comes  last  in  our  experience,  and  what  is  first 
in  our  experience  is  last  in  reality.  To  illustrate  :  the 
mission  of  the  Athenian  State  in  the  eternity  of  things 
did  not  appear  until  every  event  in  its  history  had  oc 
curred.  A  perfect  being  would  see  the  universal  ground 
before  the  historical  particulars  derived  from  it,  while 
we  look  from  the  particulars  to  their  universal  causes. 
Logic  and  metaphysics  agree;  but  they  stand  in  in 
verted  parallelism  to  historical  and  psychological  pro 
cesses.  Knowledge  is  a  development  from  the  senses 


ARISTOTLE  185 

into  the  Ideas,  and  yet,  on  the  other  hand,  Aristotle 
never  fails  to  remind  us  that  this  development  is  the 
expression  of  an  idea  which  has  been  present  from  the 
beginning. 

Aristotle's  Metaphysics. 

i.  Development  is  Purposeful.  The  conception  of 
relation  is,  of  course,  quite  as  fundamental  in  Aris 
totle's  theory  of  metaphysics  as  in  his  logic.  In  logic 
knowledge  of  the  particular  is  possible  through  its 
relationship  to  the  universal ;  in  metaphysics  the  rela 
tionship  is  the  relationship  of  development  —  the  par 
ticular  has  significance  and  value  through  the  universal 
essence  that  unfolds  from  within  it.  If  Aristotle  shows 
genius  for  abstract  thinking  by  becoming  the  "  Father 
of  Logic,"  he  shows  equal  genius  for  abstract  thinking 
in  his  metaphysical  conception  of  development.  He  be 
lieved  that  metaphysics  applies  the  same  conditions  to 
things  that  logic  discovers  in  thought.  But  in  meta 
physics  the  relationship  is  not  the  abstract  relationship 
that  Aristotle  saw  in  Plato,  but  the  vital  relation  of 
development  in  the  life  and  change  of  nature. 

We  have  already  stated  the  fundamental  principle  in 
Aristotle's  teaching  as  an  unfolding  essence  in  phenom 
ena.  The  unfolding  is  the  relationship  of  development. 
Eeality  does  not  consist  in  the  particular  things  of 
nature,  nor  in  something  outside  nature,  but  in  this 
essential  linkage  of  the  perceptual  and  conceptual  in 
nature.  As  the  world  is  spread  out  before  us,  it  pre 
sents  objects  that  are  dynamic,  however  much  they  may 
appear  to  be  static.  Everywhere  matter  is  in  the  process 
of  forming.  The  world  is  a  forming,  not  a  formed  nor 
a  formless  world.  So,  also,  if  you  undertook  to  describe 
any  individual  object  in  the  world,  you  would  have  to 


186  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

define  it  as  a  forming  or  developing  thing.  A  tree,  for 
example,  would  not  be  adequately  denned  or  described 
by  enumerating  its  parts  at  any  one  moment ;  but  you 
must  describe  it  as  a  unitary  organism  developing  from 
a  seed.  The  reality  of  the  world  is  the  development  of 
its  meaning  in  its  history  ;  the  same  is  true  of  the  reality 
of  any  individual  thing  in  the  world.  The  world  and 
the  things  therein  have  an  unfolding  essence. 

The  next  point  to  be  observed  about  Aristotle's  con 
ception  is  that  the  relationship  of  development  is  be- 
tiveen  two  terms.  The  individual  must  have  two  aspects : 
there  must  be  that  out  of  which  the  development  is  pass 
ing,  and  that  into  which  it  is  passing.  Aristotle  calls 
these  two  aspects  of  development  respectively  Matter 
and  Form.  Every  object  of  nature  consists  of  Form  and 
Matter,  and  these  two  terms  have  passed  into  history. 
To  Aristotle  everything  is  Matter  becoming  Form,  or, 
in  other  words,  Form  realizing  itself  in  Matter.  The 
tree  has  its  Matter  which  is  becoming  Formed,  and  its 
Form  into  which  the  Matter  is  growing.  The  principle 
which  unites  the  two  is  development,  —  the  principle  of 
the  individual.  Matter,  then,  is  the  possibility  or  poten 
tiality  of  an  individual  thing  —  it  is  the  thing  given 
potentially  ;  Form  is  its  actuality  or  reality.  If  you 
emphasize  merely  the  stages  in  the  development,  you  are 
regarding  merely  the  occurrences  ;  if,  however,  you  em 
phasize  the  stages  of  development  as  aspects  of  a  unity, 
you  see  its  essence. 

The  relationship  of  development  between  two  terms 
thus  becomes  under  Aristotle's  hands  the  relation  of 
purpose.  Aristotle  calls  this  self-realization  of  the  es 
sence  in  phenomena  by  the  technical  word  entelechy, 
i.e.  in  opposition  to  the  earlier  conceptions  of  nature 


ARISTOTLE  187 

Aristotle  conceived  nature  teleologically.  Teleology  or 
purpose  we  found  Plato  using  in  his  second  draft  of  the 
Ideas,  but  more  as  a  postulate  than  as  an  efficient  means 
of  explanation.  Aristotle  uses  teleology  as  his  positive 
fundamental  principle  of  nature. 

2.  Aristotle's  Two  Different  Conceptions  of  Pur 
pose.  Aristotle  illustrated  his  conception  of  the  pur 
poseful  relation  in  nature  from  two  very  different  types  : 
(1)  the  development  of  organisms  ;  (2)  the  develop 
ment  that  takes  place  when  an  artisan  moulds  plastic 
material.  Manifestly  here  are  two  different  kinds  of 
teleological  activities.  In  organic  growth  the  Form  that 
realizes  itself  in  Matter  is  immanent  in  the  organism ; 
the  artist,  on  the  other  hand,  superimposes  the  Form 
upon  the  plastic  material.  In  the  case  of  organisms 
Matter  and  Form  are  separable  only  by  abstraction,  and 
are  only  two  aspects  of  a  development  which  is  identical 
from  the  beginning  to  the  end  ;  in  the  case  of  artistic 
construction  the  Matter  is  first  a  possibility  existing  by 
itself,  and  the  purpose  of  the  artist  is  later  added  unto 
it.  In  the  case  of  organisms  Aristotle  speaks  of  two 
causes,  —  the  material  and  the  formal ;  in  the  case  of 
artistic  construction  he  employs  four  causes,  —  the  mate 
rial,  the  efficient,  the  formal,  and  the  final.  Aristotle  did 
not  expressly  formulate  these  two  different  conceptions 
of  purpose,  but  he  completely  applied  them  in  practice. 
On  the  one  hand  he  regarded  individual  things  as  self- 
realizing,  and  on  the  other  he  looked  upon  them  as 
realized  in  other  things.  This  seemingly  harmless  dif 
ference  is  really  very  fundamental,  for  it  is  the  differ 
ence  between  Aristotle  as  he  meant  to  be  —  Aristotle 
as  the  critic  of  Plato's  dualism  —  and  Aristotle  who 
reverts  to  Plato's  teaching.  We  find  therefore  two  Aris- 


188  HISTORY    OF  PHILOSOPHY 

totles;  one  a  dynamic  monist,  the  other  a  transcendent 
dualist.  We  cannot  say  that  Aristotle  as  he  meant  to 
be  is  the  true  Aristotle,  for  he  is  a  dualist  in  very  many 
important  doctrines. 

Aristotle's  conception  of  purpose  as  exemplified  by 
organisms  is  his  original  conception,  and  is  what  he  in 
tended  to  be  the  basis  of  his  philosophy.  Here  the  truly 
real  is  the  individual  determined  by  its  own  Form.  It 
is  the  dynamic  and  not  the  artistic  view  of  life.  Activ 
ity  is  directed  to  an  end  not  without  but  within  itself. 
The  individual  is  a  complete  organic  unity  at  rest  within 
itself.  The  individual  is  primarily  the  essence  or  sub 
stance.  Of  the  ten  categories  which  he  enumerates, 
substance  from  this  point  of  view  is  to  Aristotle  the 
most  important.  The  nine  other  categories  only  describe 
the  states  or  relations  of  the  substance.  The  essence  of 
the  individual  is  the  substance ;  and  Aristotle  conceives 
the  substance  as  the  species  or  universal  in  the  thing. 
It  is  pointed  out  that  even  here  Aristotle  is  guilty  of  a 
dualism  in  the  double  meaning  in  which  he  uses  sub 
stance.  But  the  conception  of  Aristotle  here  is  of  an 
immanent,  dynamic  reality.  He  has  in  mind  the  self- 
contained  unity  of  the  individual,  whether  that  be  a 
tree,  a  man,  or  the  universe. 

Aristotle's  conception  of  purpose  as  exemplified  by 
artistic  products  preponderates  over  his  original  con 
ception  of  purpose.  When  he  regards  the  individual 
objects  in  the  world,  not  as  self-contained  but  as  rela 
tive  to  one  another,  he  has  a  different  conception  of  the 
world.  In  this  case  the  individuals  are  not  realities  but 
have  reference  to  a  reality  transcending  them.  The 
world  is  still  a  developing  world,  but  the  essence  that 
unfolds  itself  is  not  in  phenomena.  It  is  a  goal  for  which 


ARISTOTLE  189 

phenomena  strive.  The  fulfillment  of  the  purpose,  is 
beyond.  Individual  things  are  only  a  scale  of  values 
relative  to  some  transcendent  standard.  To  illustrate  : 
the  bud,  the  blossom,  the  fruit,  have  not  their  realiza 
tion  in  themselves,  but  as  food  ;  again,  the  growing  tree, 
the  timber  lying  on  the  ground,  the  timber  in  the  house, 
have  their  realization  in  the  completed  house  ;  again,  in 
the  world  at  large,  the  original  nebulous  matter  of  the 
universe,  the  first-formed  worlds,  the  early  years  of 
this  earth,  the  succeeding  centuries,  the  20th  century  of 
this  world,  are  only  a  scale  of  values  for  something  in 
the  future. 

In  facing  such  facts,  Aristotle  had  to  depart  from 
his  original  conceptualistic  standard  of  the  world  as 
an  organic  unity  and  of  individual  things  having  their 
meaning  in  themselves.  View  a  thing  by  itself,  and  it 
seems  to  be  a  self-contained  reality  which  unfolds  for 
itself  alone.  View  a  thing  with  reference  to  other  things, 
and  its  reality  is  in  something  else.  Here  is  Aristotle 
no  longer  as  he  meant  to  be,  but  as  he  really  was.  He 
is  now  Plato's  pupil.  Each  thing  now  is  to  be  regarded, 
not  as  containing  in  itself  the  two  aspects  of  Form  and 
Matter,  but  as  the  possibility  of  something  and  the  ac 
tuality  of  something  else.  The  blossom  is  the  possibility 
or  Matter  of  the  fruit  and  the  Form  or  actuality  of 
the  bud.  The  nineteenth  century  is  the  Form  of  the 
eighteenth  and  the  Matter  of  the  twentieth.  But  devel 
opment  has  a  limit  above  and  below,  according  to  Aris 
totle  :  below,  in  Matter  that  is  without  Form ;  above,  in 
Form  that  is  without  Matter.  Pure  Form  is  God,  who 
excludes  from  Himself  all  Matter  or  possibility,  because 
He  is  perfect.  Pure  Matter  is  the  lower  limit,  which  is 
entire  possibility,  and  exists  only  to  be  formed.  Here 


190  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

is  a  dualism  as  distinct  as  Plato's,  which  Aristotle  not 
only  did  not  overcome  but  which  he  developed.  In  the 
same  way  that  Plato  contrasted  Ideas  and  empty  space, 
Aristotle  contrasted  God  as  pure  Form  and  Matter  as 
pure  possibility. 

In  this  final  dualistic  form  in  which  Aristotle  left 
his  teaching,  there  are  three  specific  doctrines  which  the 
student  must  consider  carefully.  They  are  important 
because  they  had  great  influence  in  later  orthodox  the 
ology  and  in  theories  of  nature.  These  special  doctrines 
are  (1)  Aristotle's  conception  of  God;  (2)  his  concep 
tion  of  matter ;  (3)  his  conception  of  nature. 

3.  Aristotle's  Conception  of  God.  In  the  Aristotel 
ian  system  the  assumption  of  an  upper  final  term  of 
pure  Form  was  necessary,  because  Matter  as  the  pos 
sible  and  potential  is  not  endowed  with  the  power  of 
motion  and  generation.  To  Aristotle  development  is  not 
a  process  with  temporal  beginning  and  ending,  but  is  a 
kind  of  closed  circuit.  Since  reality  is  in  itself  a  devel 
oping  essence,  motion  is  as  eternal  as  reality.  We  should 
not  ask,  therefore,  When  did  the  world  begin,  and  when 
will  it  end?  but  we  can  legitimately  ask,  What  is  the. 
nature  of  reality  that  keeps  motion  alive?  When  we 
examine  individual  things,  we  find,  according  to  Aris 
totle's  explanation,  that  motion  is  the  result  of  the  in 
fluence  of  Form  upon  Matter.  There  is  inherent  in 
matter  an  impulse  to  be  formed,  and  there  is  inherent 
in  Form  an  active  forming  purpose.  But  we  may  search 
individual  things  in  vain  for  the  causal  explanation  of 
motion,  since  every  Form  is  in  turn  the  Matter  for  a 
higher  Form.  The  chain  would  be  endless  and  not  intelli 
gible  if  there  did  not  exist  a  pure  Form,  which  is  un 
moved.  God  as  the  unmoved  mover  is  the  cause  of  the 


ARISTOTLE  191 

world-motion,  but  God  must  be  the  cause  in  a  different 
sense  from  the  physical  causes,  which  are  themselves 
moved.  God  operates  as  a  cause  upon  Matter,  not  as  a 
mechanical  cause  but  as  pure  Form,  —  as  a  final  or  teleo- 
logical  cause.  God  is  the  cause  in  the  sense  that  God 
excites  in  Matter  the  impulse  to  be  actual,  like  God. 

This  prime  mover  is  similar  to  Plato's  Idea  of  the 
Good.  As  to  its  form  it  is  eternal,  unmovable,  unchange 
able,  wholly  independent  and  incorporeal,  and  yet  the 
cause  of  all  generation  and  change.  God  is  the  perfect 
Being  in  whom  all  possibility  is  actuality.  As  to  its  con 
tent  God  is  pure  thought.  But  in  respect  to  his  thought 
God  is  not  like  human  thought,  which  is  concerned  with 
external  phenomena  and  changing  things.  God  is  thought 
that  has  nothing  else  for  its  object  than  itself  and  its 
own  unchanging  content.  God  is  "  thought  of  thought." 
God's  contemplation  of  himself  is  his  own  blessed  life. 
Here  in  Aristotle  is  a  momentous  conception  formed  for 
the  first  time  in  the  history  of  thought.  Monotheism  is 
for  the  first  time  conceptually  framed  and  scientifically 
grounded.  The  monism  of  Aristotle's  predecessors  passes 
over  into  a  theism.  God  is  not  only  immaterial  in  the 
sense  that  Plato  defined  the  Ideas,  but  he  is  spiritual. 
In  Aristotle's  transcendent  God,  conceived  as  pure  self- 
consciousness,  we  have  the  ripest  fruit  of  Greek  philo 
sophy. 

4.  Aristotle's  Conception  of  Matter.  The  other  and 
lower  limit  of  Aristotle's  dualism  is  Matter,  "  first  Mat 
ter,"  as  Aristotle  called  it.  In  itself  it  is  wholly  unformed 
and  mere  possibility.  But  it  is  unlike  pure  Form  in  this 
respect,  —  it  never  exists  in  itself.  God  exists  apart 
from  Matter,  but  since  Matter  is  mere  possibility,  Mat 
ter  never  exists  apart  from  Form.  Matter  has  a  double 


192  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

character.  On  the  one  hand  Matter  is  that  which  as 
an  accessory  cause  makes  the  world  of  phenomena  pos 
sible;  on  the  other  hand  it  is  the  source  of  the  lawless 
and  purposeless  in  nature.  Through  its  seeking  to  be 
formed  it  makes  the  presentation  of  the  Idea  possible, 
and  yet  it  stands  as  a  deterrent  principle  to  the  full 
presentation  of  the  Form.  On  the  one  hand  it  is  the 
sine  qua  non  of  physical  nature,  shows  itself  in  real 
physical  effects,  and  is  the  basis  of  mechanical  causation, 
motion,  and  impact.  On  the  other  hand  it  stands  in  the 
way  of  the  Forms  actualizing  themselves  fully,  and  it 
prevents  the  universe  from  perfecting  itself  as  God  is 
perfect.  While  Matter  is  not  an  indifferent  negative 
(as  in  Plato's  teaching),  but  the  necessary  substratum 
of  corporeal  things,  it  is  however  the  indeterminate,  and 
the  ground  of  the  accidental  and  purposeless  in  nature. 
Matter  is  the  infinite  and  unlimited,  and  is  the  source  of 
unusual  phenomena,  like  monstrosities  and  abortions. 
Both  fate  and  accident  are  due  to  the  retarding  influence 
of  Matter,  because  it  obstructs  the  successful  working 
out  of  Form.  Quite  in  accord  with  Greek  thought,  Aris 
totle  conceived  necessity  and  chance  to  be  fundamen 
tally  the  same,  and  the  Greek  custom  of  drawing  lots 
shows  the  universality  of  the  notion. 

5.  Aristotle's  Conception  of  Nature.  Nature  is  there 
fore  to  Aristotle  a  far  more  complex  world  than  Plato 
had  conceived  it.  Nature  has  a  double  character  to  Aris 
totle,  as  his  twofold  conception  of  causation  shows. 
Nature  is  composed  of  mechanical  and  teleological  causes. 
Purpose  and  necessity  are  the  two  principles  of  motion 
in  the  world,  and  in  this  twofold  conception  of  causa 
tion  did  Aristotle  reconcile  Plato  and  Democritus.  How 
ever  much  Aristotle  concedes  to  the  Democritan  idea  of 


ARISTOTLE  193 

mechanical  necessity,  it  is  evident  that  in  his  conception 
of  nature  the  principle  of  teleology  predominates  over 
the  mechanical.  The  highest  actuality  is  God,  and  he 
is  a  final  or  teleological  cause ;  and  all  results  of  value 
in  nature  come  through  final  causes.  Final  causes  are 
primary  causes ;  mechanical  causes  are  secondary  causes. 
There  would  be  no  motion  whatever  in  the  universe  but 
for  the  highest  final  cause,  God.  Yet  God  is  the  unmoved 
mover,  and  matter  cannot  move  itself.  Motion  occurs 
because  matter  feels  the  impulse  to  form  itself  like  God. 
How  different  this  Aristotelian  conception  of  nature 
from  our  modern  scientific  conception  of  an  impersonal 
nature  under  a  mechanical  causation  that  is  universal! 
The  teleological  conception  of  nature  and  natural  events 
was  very  strongly  intrenched  in  the  human  mind  during 
the  Middle  Ages,  and  was  not  dislodged  easily  by  mod 
ern  investigation.  Nature  was  a  living  thing  to  Aris 
totle.  It  was  at  once  intrinsically  spontaneous,  and  self- 
determined  and  uniform.  Its  spontaneity  was  not  that  of 
capricious  chance.  Its  uniformity  was  that  of  purpose 
and  end.  On  the  other  hand,  the  Aristotelian  concep 
tion  of  nature  is  not  the  same  as  either  the  Christian 
doctrine  of  created  nature  or  Darwin's  theory  of  evolu- 
lution.  The  world  of  Aristotle  had  always  existed ;  it  is 
a  limited  world  in  space,  but  not  in  time.  Also  the  di 
vine  reason  always  existed  in  it.  Yet  its  evolution  is  not 
a  progressive  climbing  sort,  like  the  Darwinian,  in  which 
new  species  evolve.  It  means  only  that  there  is  a  re 
lationship  of  rank  and  value  among  nature  objects. 
Nature  is  a  unity.  Teleological  change  occurs  within  it. 
Nature  is  therefore  a  connected  system  of  living 
beings  in  the  process  of  development  from  Form  to 
Form,  approximating  the  Deity  and  existing  as  the 


194  HISTORY   OF  PHILOSOPHY 

potentiality  of  the  Deity.  There  is  a  graded  scale  of 
things  of  relative  worth.  But  the  double  standard  of  es 
timating  the  worth  of  nature-objects  —  that  of  mechan 
ical  necessity  and  that  of  teleological  cause  —  makes 
two  different  series,  which  find  their  union  only  at  the 
end  in  God.  From  our  foregoing  description  of  the 
nature  of  God,  it  will  be  seen  that  he  has  two  essen 
tial  characteristics :  he  is  Being  who  ever  rests  within 
himself  and  remains  like  himself ;  and  he  is  a  pure 
reason.  He  therefore  combines  in  himself  the  two  na 
ture  series  in  their  most  ideal  character.  Nature-objects 
in  the  series  of  mechanical  necessity  have  as  their  ideal 
character  just  that  uniformity,  regularity,  and  order 
that  we  find  in  the  abiding  Being  of  God.  The  greater 
the  uniformity,  the  more  nearly  like  God.  Nature- 
objects,  in  the  teleological  series,  have  as  their  ideal 
characteristic  the  reason  of  God.  The  more  nearly  ra 
tional  such  a  living  being  is,  the  more  nearly  is  it  like 
God.  In  the  one  line  the  series  of  phenomena  ascends 
from  the  disorder  of  the  terrestrial  universe  to  the  abso 
lute  uniformity  of  the  stars,  which  are  close  to  God.  In 
the  other  line  the  series  ascends  in  teleological  values 
from  the  mechanical  and  vegetative  characteristics  of 
organisms  to  their  rational  activity.  Both  series  termi 
nate  in  God.  The  stars  have  rational  intelligence  and 
the  most  uniform  motions.  Aristotle  conceived  Physics 
as  the  science  that  includes  the  first  series,  and  the  sec 
ond  series  he  conceived  to  be  included  by  Psychology, 
Ethics,  and  Politics. 

The  Mechanical  Series,  —  Aristotle's  Theory  of 
Physics.  The  general  astronomical  assumptions  of  the 
time  determined  Aristotle's  theory  of  the  physical 
world.  He  adopted  the  old  Pythagorean  conception  of 


ARISTOTLE 


195 


the  limited  world-all :  a  hollow  sphere  made  up  of  con 
centric  crystalline  spheres.  In  opposition  to  the  Pytha 
goreans,  he  conceived  the  earth  at  the  centre.  It  is 
spherical  and  stationary.  Around  it  the  crystalline 
spheres  revolve,  in  which  the  moon,  sun,  five  planets, 
and  fixed  stars  are  placed.  The  fixed  stars  are  in 
the  rim  of  the  great  sphere,  are  outside  all,  and  are 
nearest  therefore  to  God,  who  animates  all.  God  as  it 
were  holds  the  world-all  in  the  hollow  of  his  hand.  He 
moves  the  whole,  which  in  turn  moves  the  fifty-five 
concentric  crystal  spheres  within.  The  principle  of  the 
movement  of  fixed  stars  is  that  of  the  Deity,  while  the 
principle  of  the  other  spheres  is  that  of  the  spirits 
which  reside  in  them.  The  movement  of  the  planets 
have  an  influence  upon  terrestrial  life.  Aristotle  made 
the  usual  Pythagorean  division  between  the  celestial 
and  the  terrestrial  parts  of  the  world-all,  which  has 
had  so  much  influence  upon  theology.  The  motion  of 
the  world-all  is  most  perfect,  being  a  circle ;  its  form  is 
most  perfect,  being  a  sphere.  The  celestial  part  of  this 
world-all,  which  is  the  region  lying  near  the  periphery, 
is  most  like  God.  The  motion  of  this  heaven  is  circu 
lar,  and  it  is  the  place  of  uniformity,  perfectness,  and 
changeableness.  The  stars  do  not  change  nor  pass  away. 
They  are  superhuman  beings,  who  in  their  regularity 
are  like  the  blessed  gods.  The  terrestrial  part  of  the 
world-all  below  the  moon  has  motions  in  straight  lines. 
This  is  the  theatre  of  imperfection  and  irregularity,  of 
increase  and  diminution. 

There  are  many  interesting  discussions  by  Aristotle 
upon  particular  physical  matters,  such  as  space,  time, 
the  elements.  His  conception  of  motion  shows  how  the 
series  of  uniform  nature-motions  lead  up  to  the  second 


196  HISTORY   OF  PHILOSOPHY 

series  of  teleological  values.  In  nature  there  are  three 
kinds  of  motion  :  change  of  place  (mechanical)  ;  change 
in  quality  (chemical)  ;  change  in  substance  (organic). 
While  change  of  place  is  the  lowest  kind  of  motion,  it  is 
necessary  to  chemical  and  organic  changes.  Yet  Aris- 
iotle  refuses  to  allow  that  qualitative  changes  can  be 
reduced  to  quantitative  changes,  but  maintains  that 
quality  is  self-subsistent.  Organic  change,  or  change  in 
substance,  on  the  contrary,  has  a  higher  Form  of  reality 
than  the  lower  changes.  This  stand  taken  by  Aristotle, 
in  refusing  to  reduce  qualitative  to  quantitative  deter 
minations,  shows  how  comprehensive  and  sane  a  scien 
tist  he  was.  It  introduces  us  to  a  psychology  and  an 
ethics  that  are  intimately  linked  to  physics,  and  at  the 
same  time  have  realms  of  their  own.  Let  us  now  turn 
to  the  series  of  qualitative  nature  changes,  or  to  psycho 
logy,  ethics,  and  politics. 

The  Teleological  Series :  The  Qualitative  Changes 
of  Phenomena. 

i.  The  Psychology  of  Aristotle.  As  the  first  experi 
mental  psychologist,  Aristotle  intimately  connected  his 
studies  in  psychology  with  his  studies  in  biology  and 
medicine.  Man  is  a  part  of  the  world  of  nature,  and 
psychology  is  in  part  a  comparative  study.  As  we  pass 
upward  from  the  mechanical  changes,  we  find  chemical 
changes  of  quality,  and  then  changes  of  organic  life. 
Studying  the  organic  realm,  we  find  organism  to  con 
sist  of  souls  of  relative  ranking.  There  are  vegetative 
souls,  sensitive  souls,  and  rational  souls.  Plants  have 
vegetative  souls  with  the  powers  of  assimilation  and 
propagation  ;  besides  vegetative  souls  animals  have  sen 
sitive  souls,  with  the  powers  of  appetition  and  locomo 
tion;  man  possesses,  besides  both  these  souls,  the  ra- 


ARISTOTLE  197 

tional  soul.  Here  is  a  series  of  teleological  relationships, 
where  the  purpose  of  the  organism  is  explained  only  by 
the  activity  of  its  soul.  The  soul  builds  up  its  body  as 
a  system  of  organs,  and  as  an  organology  the  theory  of 
Aristotle  has  great  significance.  Nature  strives  ever 
upward,  even  in  the  inorganic  processes,  through  an 
unbroken  series  of  creations  to  its  highest  Form  in  man. 
Each  step  in  the  upward  progress  is  the  realization  of 
an  entelechy,  or  purpose,  and  constitutes  for  the  mo 
ment  the  goal  of  the  impulse  to  strive.  The  whole  world 
is  striving  to  realize  the  perfect  Form.  The  lower  ends, 
the  mechanical  and  vegetable  and  appetitive  Forms,  are 
not  lost  but  are  utilized  in  the  process ;  for  they  are 
the  Matter  upon  which  the  Forms  higher  than  them 
selves  are  built.  Every  member  is  both  Form  and  Mat 
ter  in  the  whole  series. 

The  psychology  has  therefore  two  parts  :  (1)  the 
general  theory  of  animal  souls,  which  possesses  rich 
suggestions;  (2)  the  doctrine  of  the  Nous  as  the  dis 
tinctive  characteristic  of  man.  These  are  the  empirical 
and  speculative  sides  to  Aristotle's  psychology. 

Man  is  an  epitome  of  all  the  changes  in  the  universe. 
He  has  vegetative,  appetitive,  and  rational  souls.  Yet 
there  is  unity  in  man,  for  the  lower  souls  are  subser 
vient  to  the  reason  and  exist  for  it.  The  appetitive 
soul  is  the  Form  of  the  vegetative  soul,  the  Matter  of 
the  Rational  soul,  etc.  Accordingly,  Aristotle  defines  the 
soul  as  the  entelechy  of  the  body,  because  bodily  human 
activity  is  enlisted  in  the  service  of  the  reason.  Reality 
in  man  is  an  unfolding  purpose,  just  as  it  is  in  nature. 
The  real  self  is  this  unfolding  rational  self,  whose  pos 
sibility  is  the  body  ;  whose  actuality  is  pure  reason.  The 
mind  is  actualized  body,  the  body  is  potential  mind. 


198  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

Aristotle  made  many  contributions  to  psychology 
about  the  origin  and  value  of  the  several  sensations, 
about  the  feelings  of  pleasure  and  pain  and  the  desires. 
He  shows  his  remarkable  genius  in  pointing  to  the 
necessity  of  a  unity  of  consciousness,  which  he  calls 
the  "  common-sensibility."  His  discussion  of  the  Nous, 
or  reason,  is  of  importance  for  two  reasons :  first,  be 
cause  it  leads  to  and  illuminates  his  ethical  theory ; 
and  second,  because  it  is  an  example  of  his  deviation 
from  his  original  conceptual  position.  The  reason,  ac 
cording  to  his  first  intention,  is  the  unfolding  purpose 
of  the  body,  —  it  is  the  immanent  essence  of  the  body. 
As  Aristotle  finally  left  his  discussion  of  the  Eeason,  it 
is  as  transcendent  as  his  God,  or  as  any  Idea  of  Plato. 
The  Nous,  or  Reason,  is  not  a  Form  of  the  body,  but 
a  Form  of  the  soul.  It  is  purely  immaterial,  simple, 
unchangeable,  and  incapable  of  suffering.  It  does  not 
originate  with  the  body  as  a  function.  It  comes  from 
without  as  a  godlike  activity,  and  will  remain  after 
the  body  passes  away.  Its  fundamental  activity  is 
thought,  and  its  object  is  those  ultimate  principles 
of  Being  which  are  the  ultimate  premises  of  logical 
thinking. 

Aristotle's  theory  of  the  Reason  is  considerably  com 
plicated  by  his  division  of  it  into  two  parts,  —  the  ac 
tive  and  the  passive  Reason.  Within  itself,  the  Reason 
is  to  be  distinguished  as  Form  and  Matter.  The  pas 
sive  Reason  is  the  Matter  for  the  active  Reason,  and 
the  active  Reason  is  the  Form  for  the  passive  Reason. 
By  the  passive  Reason  Aristotle  evidently  means  the 
individual  and  developing  man.  The  active  Reason 
can  alone  persist  after  death,  but  whether  absorbed  in 
the  Deity  or  not  he  does  not  say.  Immortality  to 


ARISTOTLE 


199 


Aristotle  in  any  case  is  not  a  perpetuation  of  the 
individuality. 

2.  The  Ethics  of  Aristotle.  We  have  seen  that 
nature  phenomena  are  of  two  classes,  —  those  mechani 
cally  related,  and  those  related  as  to  their  purposes  or 
ends.  Physics  is  concerned  with  the  first  class ;  psy 
chology  is  concerned  with  the  second  class.  But  in  a 
special  way  are  ethics  and  politics  sciences  of  the  phe 
nomena  of  the  second  class  —  sciences  of  ideologically 
related  phenomena.  Moral  life  is  an  unfolding  essence 
having  a  possibility  and  an  actuality.  The  Possibility 
or  Matter  of  the  ethical  life  is  our  feelings,  tempera 
ment,  disposition,  impulses,  and  perceptions  —  just  those 
psychological  factors  that  make  up  the  endowment  of 
the  human  personality.  The  ultimate  Form  or  actuality 
of  the  ethical  life  is  the  reason.  The  reason  as  the 
goal  of  the  moral  being  determines  its  character.  Man 
is  distinctly  a  rational  being.  Virtue  is  the  process  of 
the  ethical  life  from  its  possibilities  to  its  actuality ;  it 
is  the  essence  of  the  ethical  life.  Virtue  is  that  contin 
uous  state  of  mind  that  makes  rational  activity  possible. 
So  much  for  the  factors  that  make  the  ethical  situation  5 
the  natural  endowments  of  the  mind  are  its  material, 
the  reason  is  its  goal,  while  the  means  of  developing 
the  natural  endowments  into  rational  activity  is  virtue. 

The  situation  would  be  simple  enough  for  us  as 
moral  beings  if,  in  our  striving,  each  had  only  himself 
and  his  own  development  to  consider.  But  man  lives 
in  a  world  of  men,  and  his  highest  good  is  determined 
somewhat  by  his  environment,  —  by  riches,  bodily  com 
forts,  success.  These  are  not  essentials  but  only  acces 
sories,  and  the  lack  of  them  is  only  a  limitation.  The 
essential  factor  is  the  rational  activity.  Nevertheless, 


200  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

these  modify  the  definition  of  what  we  mean  when  we 
define  rational  activity  as  the  highest  Good  or  Form  of 
the  moral  life.  For  the  question  which  Aristotle  pro 
poses  in  his  notable  treatise  of  Ethics  is,  What  is  the 
end  or  supreme  good  of  human  action  ?  The  highest 
Good  for  a  man  among  men  is  Happiness,  or  well-being ; 
that  includes  not  only  rational  activity,  but  also  the 
pleasures  that  accrue  to  such  activity.  But  what  is 
happiness  ?  It  is  an  end  in  itself,  and  not  the  means 
to  anything  else ;  it  is  the  result  of  functioning,  a  state 
of  conscious  vitality ;  it  accords  with  the  law  of  excel 
lence  of  that  functioning.  Perfect  happiness  is,  there 
fore,  partly  the  result  of  one's  own  individual  effort, 
partly  dependent  on  circumstance.  While  virtue  is 
the  measure  of  the  worth  of  different  pleasures,  yet 
pleasures  do  not  always  attend  our  acts  in  our  present 
society.  The  greatest  Good  is  happiness,  but  since  this 
depends  in  part  on  external  goods,  the  goal  to  which 
we  should  directly  attend  —  the  factor  within  our  con^ 
trol  —  is  rational  activity. 

There  are  two  classes  of  virtues  based  on  the  two 
kinds  of  rational  life,  —  the  practical  virtues  and  the  di- 
anoetic  virtues.  The  practical  virtues  are  those  of  conduct 
based  upon  the  rational  control  of  the  impulses ;  the 
dianoetic  virtues  are  those  of  intellectual  activity  based 
upon  the  development  of  the  perceptions.  The  perfect 
moral  development  of  human  nature  will  consist  (1)  in 
the  perfect  development  and  true  regulation  of  the  feel 
ings  and  desires  in  moral  excellence  ;  and  (2)  a  perfect 
development  of  the  intellectual  faculties  for  rational 
culture. 

(a)  The  Practical  Virtues.  The  essential  thing  for 
the  individual  to  regard,  therefore,  is  the  training  of 


ARISTOTLE 


201 


his  will  by  right  rational  insight.  He  should  seek  to 
direct  his  impulses  by  reason,  and  not  only  once  but 
so  many  times  that  the  impulses  will  become  rational 
habits.  This  is  what  Aristotle  means  by  training  in 
virtue.  It  is  continuity  in  rational  activity  ;  it  is  a 
permanent  development  toward  reason  ;  it  is  the  un 
folding  of  the  real  Self.  Aristotle  had  regard  for  the 
facts  of  life  when  he  differed  from  Socrates,  who  said 
that  virtue  is  knowledge.  Aristotle  did  not  conceive 
the  will  as  psychological  power  independent  of  the 
reason.  He  doubted  if  rational  insight  was  more  power 
ful  than  the  impulses,  when  the  test  comes.  Experience 
often  shows  that  although  we  may  know  what  is  right, 
an  impulse  will  often  drive  us  into  habits  not  guided 
by  reason.  This  presupposes  for  Aristotle  a  will  that 
is  free  to  choose  among  the  desires  that  one  which  will 
lead  him  along  the  path  that  reason  points  out. 

It  is  impossible  to  formulate  a  rule  for  the  acquire 
ment  of  the  particular  virtues.  Each  virtue  must  be 
treated  by  itself.  The  only  principle  for  guidance  is 
that  the  reason  should  always  seek  the  mean  between 
two  extremes.  Thus  courage  is  the  mean  between  cow 
ardice  and  rashness  ;  temperance  between  intemperance 
and  insensibility ;  friendliness  between  obsequiousness 
and  brusqueness,  etc.  Moderation  is  the  watchword  in 
the  cultivation  of  the  practical  virtues. 

(6)  The  Dianoetic  Virtues  are  the  means  toward 
the  attainment  of  pure  rationality  for  one's  self.  The  di- 
anoetic  virtues  are  higher  than  the  practical.  They  un 
fold  the  pure  formal  activity  of  the  Nous,  and  give  the 
most  noble  and  perfect  pleasure.  Man  finds  through 
them  his  possible  participation  in  the  divine  happiness. 
These  intellectual  virtues  may  be  either  theoretical  or 


202  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

practical  insight ;  in  the  latter  case,  Aristotle  meant 
knowledge  of  the  right  in  art,  and  knowledge  of  jus 
tice.  But  the  purest  is  Wisdom  (0ewpiV),  which  is  know 
ledge  for  its  own  sake.  It  is  the  knowledge  that  God 
has  of  himself.  Man  may  approximate  this. 

In  Aristotle's  ethical  theory  there  appear  three  fea 
tures  that  are  distinctly  Greek.  (1)  The  leading  ques 
tion  that  he  asks  at  the  beginning  of  the  Ethics,  What 
is  the  end  or  Supreme  Good  of  human  action  ?  is  Greek. 
The  modern  writer  asks,  What  is  the  nature  of  duty  ? 
(2)  The  emphasis  on  the  "  mean  "  is  Greek.  The  idea 
of  the  "  mean  "  was  the  fundamental  principle  in  Greek 
life,  and  appeared  in  such  literature  as  Gnomic  poetry 
and  Plato.  (3)  The  subordination  of  individual  ethical 
conduct  to  the  conception  of  the  state  is  Greek.  Aris 
totle  says  that  politics  will  have  to  settle  the  question 
of  the  Supreme  Good,  for  the  Good  of  the  state  and 
that  of  the  individual  are  identical. 

The  Political  Philosophy  of  Aristotle.  In  the  present 
real  world  rational  activity  rather  than  happiness  is  the 
chief  concern  of  man.  Happiness  is,  however,  his  high 
est  Good,  which  he  can  attain  if  his  environment  favors 
him.  The  political  environment  is  a  moral  factor  to 
be  considered.  The  state  should  be  the  fulfillment  of 
the  morals  of  the  individual,  and  should  also  be  his 
ethical  trainer.  That  State  is  fulfilling  its  own  possi 
bilities  most  completely  which  brings  to  the  full  its 
natural  endowments.  Every  Constitution  is  right  that 
has  the  weal  of  the  people  at  heart,  so  that  we  find  Aris 
totle  holding  this  extraordinarily  liberal  position,  that 
the  external  structure  of  the  State  is  not  so  much  of 
consequence  as  that  the  State  should  be  the  educator 
of  its  people  and  the  actualization  of  its  own  in- 


ARISTOTLE  203 

herent  possibilities.  Aristotle  did  not  construct  an 
ideal  state,  like  Plato.  He  merely  pointed  out  some  es 
sentials  necessary  to  the  well-being  of  a  state,  like  ed 
ucation  and  providence  for  the  future  life  of  the  State. 
Although  the  State  is  the  offspring  of  necessity,  and 
arises  out  of  the  needs  of  utility,  it  is  the  Form  or 
actuality  of  the  inner  self-realization  of  man  from  his 
savagery.  Race,  blood,  soil,  and  geographical  position 
are  all  the  Matter  of  the  State  ;  the  rational  perfection 
of  these  is  the  Form ;  the  civic  virtue  is  the  permanent 
means  of  the  social  development.  The  individual  in 
Aristotle's  State  is  subordinated,  but  not  absorbed,  in 
the  State.  He  can  participate  in  the  intellectual  virtues. 
Since  his  own  enjoyment  in  wisdom  approximates 
God's,  he  himself  has  distinction.  Aristotle  was  a  stanch 
supporter  of  marriage  and  the  family  relations.  No 
philosopher  in  ancient  times  so  elevated  the  position  of 
woman.  He  reluctantly  consented  to  the  institution  of 
slavery  because  it  seemed  to  him  a  necessity. 


CHAPTER  IX 

THE  HELLENIC-ROMAN  PERIOD  (322  B.  C.^476  A.  IX) 

Its  Time  Length. 

Greek  Period,  300  years. 

Hellenic-Roman  Period,  800  years. 

Middle  Ages,  1000  years. 

Modern  Period,  450  years. 

We  ought  to  appreciate  at  the  beginning  the  enor 
mous  time  length  of  this  period.  It  seems  long  since 
modern  thought  began,  but  it  was  only  about  450 
years  ago.  The  Hellenic-Roman  Period  was  800  years 
long,  or  nearly  twice  as  long  as  modern  times.  It  is, 
furthermore,  two  and  a  half  times  as  long  as  the  period 
which  we  have  just  been  discussing,  —  the  pure  Greek 
period.  Now  the  Hellenic-Roman  Period  and  the  Middle 
Ages  together  form  the  epoch  of  human  history  that 
is  relatively  uncreative.  This  is  an  extent  of  1800 
years,  a  long  interval  when  compared  with  the  750 
years  of  creative  history,  which  represents  the  com 
bined  length  of  the  pure  Greek  Period  and  modern 
times.  In  European  history  the  periods  of  productive 
thought  have  been  less  than  half  as  long  as  those  of 
the  unproductive.  Yet  we  must  not  be  misled  by  such 
statistics.  History  is  an  organic  growth.  Its  seedtime 
and  growth  are  long ;  its  harvest  is  short. 

The  Fall  of  the  Greek  Nation  and  the  Persistence 
of  its  Civilization.  The  800  years  after  the  death  of 
Aristotle  are  named  the  Hellenic-Roman  Period,  be 
cause  Greek  civilization  burst  its  own  national  bound- 


THE  HELLENIC-ROMAN  PERIOD 


205 


aries  and  became  a  part  of  Roman  civilization.  The 
Greek  nation  died ;  its  culture  remained.  It  is  no 
longer  pure  Greek,  but  Greek  in  the  environment  of 
the  Roman  world  —  it  becomes  Hellenism.  With  the 
death  of  Alexander  in  323  B.  c.  the  motherland  of 
Greece  became  a  prey  to  revolutions  for  200  years.  It 
was  often  the  battleground  of  foreigners  and  the  object 
of  their  contentions.  Its  government  and  population 
sank  into  hopeless  decay.  It  was  incorporated  into  the 


THE 
EMPIRE 

Of? 
ALEXANDER 


THE  EMPIRE  OF  ALEXANDER 

(Showing  the  spread  of  Hellenism  eastward,  beginning  334  B.  c.  with  Alexander's 
Campaign) 

Roman  empire  in  146  B.  c.  and  shared  in  the  depressing 
times  of  the  Civil  Wars  of  the  first  century  B.  c.  By 
becoming  a  part  of  Rome  Greece  lost  its  uniqueness 
but  the  world  gained  its  culture  as  a  common  heritage. 
Its  autonomy  was  forever  gone,  but  its  people  became 
the  teachers  of  mankind.  In  political  power  Greece 
reached  its  height  with  Alexander,  in  creative  thought 
with  Aristotle ;  then  by  its  own  momentum  its  civiliza 
tion  persisted  as  a  missionary  force  to  the  whole  world. 


206  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

The  overflow  of  Greek  civilization  was  first  east 
ward,  to  the  nations  of  Asia.  Alexander,  with  his  mili 
tary  and  administrative  genius,  had  only  made  a  prelim 
inary  conquest  of  these  Oriental  peoples.  The  conquest 
became  permanent  through  Greek  art,  learning,  and 
institutions.  In  the  century  after  Alexander  the  habits 
and  customs  of  the  East  had  been  Hellenized.  Greek 
schools,  theatres,  and  baths  were  to  be  found  in  almost 
every  city  of  the  East.  In  the  East  and  Egypt  an  in 
exhaustible  field  was  opened  for  the  founding  of  new 
centres  of  culture.  In  the  kingdoms  partitioned  off 
from  the  old  Alexandrian  domain,  the  kings  were 
Greek,  spoke  Greek,  adored  Greek  gods,  and  pre 
served  Greek  fashions.  Amid  Asiatics  they  sought  to 
maintain  Greek  courts,  have  Greek  administrative  offi 
cers,  and  be  surrounded  with  Greek  scholars.  Greek 
colonists,  soldiers,  and  merchants  were  attracted  to 
these  kingdoms  in  such  numbers  that  the  natives 
adopted  the  costumes,  religions,  manners,  and  even  the 
language  of  the  Greeks.  The  Orient  ceased  to  be 
Asiatic  and  became  Hellenic.  The  Romans  found  there 
in  the  first  century  B.  c.  peoples  like  the  Greeks  who 
spoke  Greek. 

Greek  civilization  began  to  overflow  upon  the  west 
ern  world  when,  in  the  second  century,  Greece  with  all 
the  other  countries  upon  the  Mediterranean  was  ab 
sorbed  by  Rome.  The  conquest  of  Greece  by  Rome  in 
146  B.  c.  gave  currency  to  Greek  art,  letters,  and 
morals  in  Roman  life.  That  Greek  civilization  was  not 
lost  in  this  great  amalgamation  shows  how  deep  and 
fundamental  it  was.  The  secondary  nations  disappeared 
and  none  remained  to  compete  with  the  Greek  and 
Latin.  The  result  was  the  superiinposition  of  Greek 


THE  HELLENIC-ROMAN  PERIOD  207 

culture  upon  Roman  society.  At  the  time  of  the  con 
quest  of  Greece,  Greek  scholars  went  to  Rome  in  great 
numbers  and  opened  schools  of  eloquence  and  litera 
ture.  Later  the  Roman  youths  went  to  Athens  to  studyr 
Art  and  science  were  gradually  introduced  into  Rome 
The  old  Roman  house  got  a  Greek  addition.  Statues 
and  paintings  were  transported  from  Greece  to  Rome. 
Greek  artists  were  commissioned.  By  100  B.  c.  the 
great  Romans  were  living  in  Greek  or  Oriental  style. 
The  coarsest  Greeks,  too,  came  into  Italy  and  mingled 
with  the  Roman  proletariat.  Thus,  with  the  complete 
Latinizing  of  the  peninsula  of  Italy  in  the  second 
century,  an  increasing  Hellenism  went  hand  in  hand. 

But  the  two  civilizations  never  completely  united. 
Roman  adoption  of  Greek  culture  was  never  more  than 
a  veneer.  Greek  art  and  learning  were  rarely  studied 
by  the  Roman  except  as  a  parade  and  luxury.  As  time 
went  on  the  Roman  resorted  less  to  the  classic  and 
more  to  the  frivolous  modern  products  of  the  Greeks. 
For  it  must  be  remembered  that  when  Greece  was  con 
quered  by  Rome,  the  Romans  were  still  only  peasants, 
soldiers,  and  merchants,  without  science,  art,  or  philoso 
phy.  Before  150  B.  c.  the  Roman  children  were  taught 
nothing  higher  than  reading,  writing,  etc.  But  the 
Roman  found  a  culture  in  Greece  that  he  liked  and 
imitated.  He  kept  his  costume,  languager  and  political 
laws,  but  he  adopted  Greek  letters,  art,  morals,  and 
incorporated  many  elements  of  the  Greek  religion  into 
his  own. 

Two  results  came  from  this  superimposition  of  Greek 
culture  upon  Roman  society.  On  the  one  hand  the 
Greek  sought  to  create  a  philosophy  which  would  make 
him  a  citizen  of  the  world,  since  it  was  no  longer  an 


208  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

honor  to  be  a  citizen  of  a  Greek  city.  On  the  other 
hand,  to  the  Roman  there  came  a  mixed  good.  There 
was  a  gain  to  Roman  literature  and  perhaps  to  juris 
prudence,  but  a  fatal  loss  to  Roman  faith  and  morals. 
On  the  whole  Roman  vulgarity  was  only  concealed  by 
Greek  culture,  except  in  such  spirits  as  Scipio,  Pau- 
lus,  and  the  Gracchi,  in  whom  culture  was  genuine. 
The  Roman  felt  the  need  of  rich  intellectual  life,  and 
he  sought  it  in  the  rich  treasures  and  the  filth  of  later 
Greek  culture.  The  Greek  culture  that  he  found  was 
no  longer  pure  Greek,  but  Hellenism,  sometimes  tinged 
with  Orientalism.  It  acted  as  a  poison  on  the  Roman 
and  often  was  bitterly  opposed. 

The  Two  Parts  of  the  Hellenic-Roman  Period.  We 
must  not  forget  that,  excepting  the  first  175  years  of 
this  period,  Rome  is  the  background  upon  which  all  phi 
losophical  movements  of  the  time  are  to  be  traced.  Upon 
this  background  two  general  movements  are  prominent, 
which  divide  the  period  into  two  parts  :  (1)  the  Ethical 
Period,  and  (2)  the  Religious  Period. 

1.  The  Ethical  Period,  322  B.  c.-l  A.  D.,  had  its 
origin  in  the  Greek  culture  that  was  superimposed  upon 
Roman  civilization.  This  epoch  is  notable  for  the  rise 
and  controversies  of  the  four  celebrated  philosophical 
Schools  of  Athens;  the  introduction  of  the  teaching  of 
these  Schools  into  Roman  society ;  and  the  final  merg 
ing  and  reconciliation  of  these  Schools  in  Eclecticism 
and  Skepticism. 

2.  The   Religious   Period,  100    B.   C.-476    A.   D., 
arose  out  of  the   Oriental  religions   that  swept  into 
Rome  before  the  beginning  of  this  era.  They  were  mod 
ified  by  their  Roman  environment,  and  intellectualized 
and  systematized  by  Hellenic  culture.    Neo-Pythagore- 


THE  HELLENIC-ROMAN   PERIOD  209 

anism,  the  Alexandrian-Judaic  theosophies  in  the  first 
part,  Christianity  and  neo-Platonisin  in  the  second  part 
of  this  period,  are  the  most  important  philosophical  re 
sults. 

Note  three  things.  (1)  The  spiritual  life  of  Rome  dur 
ing  these  800  years  has  its  origin  in  imported  foreign 
movements.  The  source  of  the  ethical  movement  is 
Greek,  that  of  the  religious  movement  is  Oriental.  (2) 
The  two  movements  overlap.  Indeed,  each  from  its  be 
ginning  to  its  end  covers  about  600  years.  More  pre 
cisely  the  ethical  movement  did  not  disappear  until  about 
200  A.  D. ;  the  religious  movement  began  about  200  B.  C. 
Ethical  considerations  dominate  the  first  and  religious  • 
impulses  the  second  period.  (3)  The  century  and  a  half 
from  150  B.  C.  to  1  A.  D.  is  a  period  of  transition.  It 
is  the  time  when  the  emphasis  changes  from  ethics  to 
religion.  It  is  a  period  of  unsettled  conditions  both 
politically  and  intellectually.  Politically  it  is  the  time 
of  the  Civil  wars  and  the  formation  of  the  empire.  In 
tellectually  it  is  the  time  of  Eclecticism  and  Skepti 
cism. 

The  Undercurrent  of  Skepticism  in  the  Hellenic- 
Roman  Period.  If  we  go  beneath  the  surface  of  the 
chronological  divisions  of  this  period,  which  have  been 
given  above,  we  shall  find  their  significance  in  the  un 
dercurrent  of  Skepticism,  which  runs  from  the  begin 
ning  to  the  end  of  the  period,  and  includes  both  its 
ethical  and  religious  phases.  "  Skepticism  "  is  a  word 
with  a  history  of  its  own,  but,  as  philosophically  used,  it 
means  the  disbelief  in  the  possibility  of  true  knowledge. 
Skepticism  was  the  fundamental  frame  of  mind  that 
gradually  grew  to  conscious  expression  in  the  entire 
ancient  world,  although  it  was  entirely  at  variance 


210  HISTORY  OF   PHILOSOPHY 

with  the  spirit  of  the  Greek  culture  that  had  been  su^ 
perimposed  upon  that  world.  As  an  undercurrent  — 
a  widespread  feeling  —  Skepticism  pervaded  the  whole 
period,  while  at  different  times  and  places  it  appeared 
distinctly  on  the  surface.  These  were  800  years  of  lack 
of  confidence  in  the  power  of  the  human  reason,  but  the 
really  negative  character  of  the  time  is  often  concealed 
by  dogmatic  teachings  of  the  philosophical  Schools. 
Dogmatic  Skepticism  does  not  appear  except  with 
reference  to  the  positive  teachings  of  the  Schools,  and 
then  it  appears  conspicuously.  The  successive  stages  of 
Skepticism  can  have  their  clear  outline,  therefore,  only 
after  the  positive  philosophical  teachings,  contemporary 
with  it  and  opposed  by  it,  have  been  understood.  This 
is  the  reason  for  treating  the  Skeptics  after  and  not 
before  the  Schools.  The  reader  will,  however,  lose  the 
whole  meaning  of  the  Hellenic-Roman  Period  if  he 
does  not  see  that  it  is  fundamentally  Skeptical ;  that 
in  the  Ethical  Division  the  Schools  furnished  the  occa 
sion  of  its  appearance,  and  that  in  the  Religious  Division 
religious  faith  rose  because  Skepticism  had  taken  pos 
session  of  the  field  of  knowledge.  The  ethical  Schools 
stood  as  the  last  representatives  of  the  old  Greek  ration 
alism  of  the  Systematic  Period,  but  even  they  yielded 
to  the  Skeptical  spirit  of  the  time.  Stoicism,  Epicurean 
ism,  and  Skepticism  seek  the  same  end,  —  the  with 
drawal  of  the  individual  from  the  world  and  his  exalta 
tion  above  his  environment.  All  three  valued  science 
only  so  far  as  it  would  help  ethical  conduct.  Skepti 
cism  alone  was  avowedly  antagonistic  to  intellectual 
ideals.  The  strength  of  Skepticism  appears  more  evi 
dent  when  we  look  at  its  growth  during  this  period. 
At  the  end  of  the  Ethical  Period  the  Schools  weakened 


THE  HELLENIC-ROMAN  PERIOD  211 

and  we  find  a  century  and  a  half  (150  B.  c.  - 1  A.  D.) 
of  Skepticism  and  Eclecticism.  There  then  followed  at 
the  beginning  of  this  era  the  Religious  Period.  Man 
then  turned  to  religion  because  he  was  profoundly  skep 
tical  of  the  trustworthiness  of  the  reason  —  he  felt 
that  it  was  so  untrustworthy  as  to  be  unable  to  furnish 
him  even  a  true  theory  of  moral  conduct. 

The  Skeptical  undercurrent  of  the  Hellenic-Roman 
Period  was  the  concentration  of  all  the  negative  results 
of  the  Greek  Sophists.  It  therefore  had  more  than  one 
point  of  departure,  —  the  philosophies  of  Protagoras, 
of  the  Megarian,  Cynic,  and  Cyrenaic  Schools.  This 
Sophistic  undercurrent  fed  popular  thought  during  the 
days  of  Plato  and  Aristotle.  It  took  its  formal  begin 
ning  contemporary  with  the  rise  of  the  Stoic  and  Epicu 
rean  Schools ;  and  in  Athens,  Alexandria,  and  Rome 
there  rose  to  the  surface  the  problem  of  the  possibility 
of  human  knowledge.  Formally  it  modified  its  sweep 
ing  negations,  when  it  came  in  contact  with  the  pressing 
needs  of  morality  and  of  spiritual  retirement,  but  it 
was  ever  present  as  the  significant  attitude  of  the  time. 
While  the  nature  of  the  Skeptical  teaching  stood  in  the 
way  of  its  formation  into  a  School,  the  doctrine  itself, 
nevertheless,  developed  into  a  system  and  had  its  his 
torical  growth  and  culmination.  Weber  points  out  that 
the  first  appearance  of  Skepticism  marks  in  Greece  the 
inauguration  of  the  age  of  reason  and  its  reappearance 
marks  the  decline  of  the  age  of  reason. 

The  Fundamental  Problem  of  the  Hellenic-Roman 
Period.  The  fundamental  attitude  of  this  period  being 
Skepticism,  the  fundamental  problem  presented  to  it 
was  therefore  a  practical  one.  While  at  heart  the  age 
doubted  the  validity  of  the  human  reason,  it  was  con- 


212  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

sciously  engaged  in  solving  a  very  practical  problem. 
The  period  had  an  external  side  that  was  positive.  No 
age  can  be  merely  skeptical,  especially  for  so  long  a 
time  as  800  years.  To  doubt  the  power  of  the  human 
reason  is  usually  the  occasion  of  shunting  human  ener 
gies  along  other  lines.  The  form  of  the  practical  prob 
lem  of  this  time  was,  What  is  the  highest  wisdom  for 
practical  life  ?  This  is  consonant  with  the  skeptical 
attitude  of  the  Greek  as  indicated  by  these  two  facts : 
(1)  he  had  no  longer  an  interest  in  speculation  except 
as  it  afforded  a  basis  for  practical  wisdom,  and  (2)  he 
had  no  longer  an  interest  in  special  sciences  except  as 
they  yielded  practical  results.  To  be  sure,  it  will  be 
found  that  theories  took  to  themselves  airs  of  great  im 
portance  during  this  period  and  that  empirical  sciences 
made  rapid  advances ;  but  it  will  also  be  found  that 
they  were  always  in  the  service  of  practical  living.  The 
Wise  Man  of  this  age  is  he  who  has  a  scientific  doc 
trine  of  the  purposes  and  ends  of  human  life. 

For  with  his  entrance  into  world-wide  relations  in 
the  Ethical  Period  the  Athenian  found  himself  con 
fronted  with  a  very  different  situation  from  that  which 
had  engaged  him  during  the  age  of  Pericles.  His  na 
tional  existence  had  gone  and  could  no  longer  arouse 
his  devotion,  and  with  it  his  ideal  of  a  national  life 
had  crumbled  to  pieces.  His  epic  polytheism  had  be 
come  a  dim  thing  of  the  distant  past,  and  there  was 
no  longer  any  external  Greek  institution  to  awaken  his 
slumbering  energies.  He  might,  of  course,  go  into  re 
tirement  and  engage  in  speculative  inquiry,  except  that 
this  was  an  age  of  pressing  need.  He  was  forced  to  be 
awake  and  to  adjust  himself  as  an  individual  to  the  many 
other  peoples  mixing  and  mingling  in  one  common  civ« 


THE  HELLENIC-ROMAN  PERIOD  213 

ilization.  His  relations  were  enlarged,  but  his  interests 
were  circumscribed.  His  philosophy  was  focused  to  one 
fundamental  problem,  What,  after  all,  is  the  object  of 
human  life,  and  what  can  give  happiness  to  the  indi 
vidual  amid  the  turmoil  of  the  time?  Philosophic 
studies  were  narrowed  to  ethics,  logic,  and  physics  in 
their  practical  bearing.  How  much  narrower,  then,  the 
scope  of  the  intellectual  life  of  this  time  than  that  of 
those  men  of  retired  leisure,  Plato  and  Aristotle! 

Nor  is  the  fundamental  problem  different  when  in 
the  second  part  of  this  period  we  enter  the  great  sweep 
of  the  religious  current.  The  rise  of  religious  ideals 
and  the  shift  from  ethics  to  religion  was  only  the  pre 
sentation  of  the  practical  problem  of  living  with  a 
different  emphasis.  Man  was  now  in  the  dazzling  glory 
of  the  empire,  but  that  empire  was  unable  to  compen 
sate  the  individual  for  the  loss  of  his  political  impor 
tance.  Rome  had  given  to  its  conquered  peoples  an 
organized  legal  unity,  but  no  spiritual  ideal.  It  had 
none  to  offer.  The  individual  was  the  least  important 
factor  in  the  organization.  The  present  life  offered 
little  hope  to  the  individual,  except  in  the  light  of  a 
future  life.  Practical  wisdom  thus  became  that  which 
took  account  of  the  rewards  and  punishments  that 
would  come  in  the  life  beyond. 

The  Hellenic-Roman  Period  is  kaleidoscopic  and  be 
wildering  in  its  shif  tings  ;  but  amid  them  all  is  this  one 
conscious  problem :  "  Show  us  the  man  who  is  sure  of 
his  happiness,  whatever  the  accidents  of  the  world  may 
bring  to  him." 

The  Centres  of  Hellenism. 

I.  Athens.  With  the  overflow  of  Hellenism  to  the 
east  and  west  the  active  history  of  Athens  had  ceased, 


214  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

but  she  became  venerated  for  what  she  had  been.  Greece 
became  hallowed  and  Athens  became  the  shrine  of 
Greece  in  the  imaginations  of  men.  Although  the  city 
was  brutally  ravished,  she  exercised  a  charm  over  thft 
human  mind  for  eight  hundred  years  after  Alexander* 
Athens  remained  the  intellectual  centre  through  the 
entire  period.  It  became  the  conservative  university 
town,  where  philosophy  and  rhetoric  were  taught.  It  is 
remarkable  how  many  Oriental  philosophers  came  to 
Athens  to  teach,  how  many  youths  from  the  whole  world 
came  to  be  taught.  The  rhetorical  schools,  such  as  that 
of  Isocrates,  did  much  toward  making  Athens  the  centre 
of  culture,  and  they  offered  for  many  years  the  highest 
practical  training  to  Greek,  Roman,  and  Oriental.  Be 
sides  the  rhetorical  were  the  philosophical  or  dialectical 
schools,  which  debated  privately  questions  of  speculative 
metaphysics.  These  did  not  offer  public  training,  but 
groups  of  students  were  taught  in  the  grounds  attached 
to  gymnasia.  Four  principal  philosophical  schools  were 
thus  formed,  —  the  Academy  of  Plato,  the  Lyceum  of 
Aristotle,  the  Porch  of  the  Stoics,  and  the  Gardens  of 
Epicurus.  In  the  first  two  we  have  had  especial  interest 
in  the  previous  period.  All  four,  and  especially  the  Stoic 
and  Epicurean  schools,  will  engage  our  attention  in  this 
period.  They  are  known  in  history  as  "  the  Schools." 
(See  map  for  their  location  in  Athens.)  There  were 
many  minor  schools  in  Athens  which  later  became  reli 
gious  cults.  These  Schools  lost  their  original  interest 
in  speculative  inquiry,  and  in  this  period  devoted  them 
selves  to  the  exposition  of  the  teaching  of  their  respective 
founders  on  ethical  lines.  The  University  of  Athens  was 
built  upon  the  four  Schools.  Its  chairs  were  endowed  by 
Hadrian  and  the  Antonines  in  the  second  century  A.  D. 


THE  HELLENIC-ROMAN  PERIOD  215 

It  grew  to  have  an  elaborate  organization.  It  was  abol 
ished  by  Justinian  in  529  A.  D. 

2.  Alexandria.  There  were  many  other  centres  of 
Hellenism  and  of  other  learning  at  this  time,  —  Rhodes, 
Antioch,  Alexandria,  Pergamus,  Tarsus,  —  but  none  of 
these  could  be  said  to  rival  Athens  in  the  veneration 
of  men.  Some  were  much  more  active  and  creative  than 
Athens.  Alexandria  surpassed  Athens  and  all  other 
cities  as  the  centre  of  the  natural  sciences  in  the  Ethical 
Period  and  of  religions  in  the  Religious  Period.  Here, 
too,  rather  than  at  Athens,  were  to  be  found  the  real 
interpreters  of  Plato  and  Aristotle.  Nothing  in  ancient 
times  can  be  compared  to  the  wonders  of  the  museum 
of  Alexandria,  which  was  its  university.  Scholars  of 
every  nation  were  entertained  here  at  the  public  ex 
pense.  A  vast  botanical  garden,  a  zoological  collection, 
an  anatomical  museum,  an  astronomical  observatory,  a 
library  of  seven  hundred  thousand  volumes  were  here. 
Here  Euclid  (290  B.  c.)  wrote  his  geometry,  Eratosthe 
nes  pursued  his  astronomical,  geographical,  and  historical 
labors,  Apollonius  wrote  his  treatise  on  conic  sections; 
and  here  were  made  the  observations  that  led  to  the  dis 
covery  of  the  precession  of  the  equinoxes.  Here  Ptolemy 
and  his  school  formulated  the  system  of  astronomy  which 
was  authoritative  for  fifteen  hundred  years.  Here  the 
Christian  theologians  were  educated,  and  from  this  city 
neo-Platonism  sprang.  Literature  and  art,  history,  phi 
lology  and  criticism  flourished.  The  Hebrew  Bible  was 
translated  into  Greek.  All  religions  were  welcomed. 
Buddhist,  Jew,  Greek,  and  Egyptian  mingled,  and  com 
parative  theology  rose  to  be  a  science. 

General  Characteristics  of  the  Ethical  Period  (322 
B.  c.-l  A.  D.)  —  On  the  death  of  Aristotle  the  hitherto 


216  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

compact  "body  of  Greek  thought  disintegrated  into  its 
several  elements.  Theoretical  and  practical  knowledge, 
which  had  been  so  successfully  fused  in  the  great  sys 
tems  of  Democritus,  Plato,  and  Aristotle,  became  sepa 
rated.  The  whole  tendency  of  the  time  was  toward  segre 
gation. 

i.  The  Abandonment  of  Metaphysical  Speculation* 
The  theoretical  side  of  philosophy,  which  had  been 
so  successfully  completed  by  the  great  Greek  masters, 
now  became  subordinated  and  almost  completely  lost  to 
view.  Metaphysical  speculation  was  neglected  except 
as  it  threw  light  on  the  practical  sciences  —  on  ethics 
and  the  natural  sciences.  Knowledge  was  no  longer 
loved  for  its  own  sake. 

2o  The  Growth  of  Science.  Since  theory  was  re 
garded  as  completed,  attention  was  naturally  turned 
upon  the  details  of  erudition  and  the  specializing  of 
science.  The  natural  sciences  survived  the  systems  of 
philosophy  because  of  their  usefulness.  There  was  great 
interest  in  investigations  in  mathematics,  natural  sci 
ence,  grammar,  philology,  literary  history  and  general 
history  —  and  all  with  very  rich  results.  It  was  the  time 
of  commentaries,  criticism,  collaboration  of  the  work  of 
the  past  and  completion  of  the  special  work  begun  by 
the  past.  By  far  the  greater  number  of  the  so-called 
"philosophers"  of  this  time  are  connected  with  special 
science  and  literature,  and  not  with  metaphysics. 

It  was  in  the  Greek  Islands  and  Egypt  (Alexandria) 
that  this  advance  was  made.  Nevertheless,  it  must  be 
said  that  the  advance  in  science  was  a  good  deal  re 
stricted.  The  empirical  sciences  are  dependent  on  ob 
servation  and  experiment,  and  these  opportunities  were 
wanting  at  this  time.  Good  progress  was,  however,  made 


THE  HELLENIC-ROMAN   PERIOD  217 

in  mathematics  and  the  sciences  dependent  on  reason 
ing.  Reasoning  alone  is  incapable  of  advancing  a  science 
like  physics,  for  physics  depends  on  investigation.  But 
even  the  prevalent  skepticism  of  the  time  could  not 
doubt  the  truths  of  mathematics. 

3.  Ethics  became  the  Central  Interest.  For  the  first 
time  in  the  history  of  European  thought  ethics  was  no 
longer  a  part  of  politics.  In  the  time  of  the  autonomous 
Greek  states  ethics  and  politics  were  two  sides  of  the  same 
question  both  in  theory  and  practice.  Ethics  and  politics 
were  not  disjoined  even  by  the  Sophists,  who  neverthe 
less  paved  the  way  for  the  divorce  of  the  two.  Now  for 
the  first  time  ethical  questions  have  become  such  that 
the  individual  must  disregard  the  iron-bound  political 
situation  and  answer  them  entirely  with  reference  to 
himself.  The  decadent  Greek  state  was  no  longer  a 
moral  entity  in  the  eyes  of  the  people,  nor  could  the 
concentration  of  government  in  Rome  raise  the  state  to 
moral  dignity.  Moreover,  life  had  become  cosmopolitan. 
The  nations  were  commingling.  Ethics  must  meet  the 
needs  of  men  as  human  beings,  and  not  as  Athenians, 
Spartans,  or  Romans.  Vices  had  become  cosmopolitan 
and  virtues  must  needs  be  cosmopolitan  also.  But  cos^ 
mopolitanism  is  in  the  last  analysis  only  individualism. 
The  man  who  conceives  his  duty  so  large  that  it  em 
braces  the  whole  world  is  usually  cold  to  any  special 
interests  except  his  own.  The  Roman  dictators  and 
afterwards  the  emperor  were  the  personification  of  this 
cosmopolitan  individualism  which  the  subjects  imitated 
so  far  as  they  could. 

Thus  the  public  life  was  in  danger  of  being  swamped 
by  private  interests  and  mere  enjoyment,  by  gain  and 
the  struggle  for  existence.  The  old  belief  in  the  gods, 


218  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

the  vigorous  political  activity  for  great  ends,  the  pleas 
ure  in  free  scientific  inquiry  had  disappeared.  The  only 
refuge  for  the  reflective  mind  was  within  itself  and  the 
study  of  its  own  moral  problems.  Yet  for  this  a  definite 
science  of  ethics  was  necessary,  if  the  individual  was  to 
be  systematically  independent  of  external  things.  Plato 
and  Aristotle  had  prepared  the  way  for  such  retirement, 
and  the  tendency  toward  ethical  separation  from  the 
world  of  political  events  was  an  aspect  of  the  cosmopoli 
tanism  of  the  time.  Ethical  individuality  and  cosmopoli 
tanism  go  together.  The  development  of  the  inner  life 
belongs  to  those  individuals  who  dwell  together  in  spirit 
ual  community.  The  same  cosmopolitanism  was  sought 
by  the  skeptics  of  the  period  through  the  abandonment 
of  all  knowledge. 

The  Schools.  The  beginning  of  the  Ethical  Period  is 
marked  by  the  rise  of  the  Schools  into  prominence,  the 
end  of  that  period  by  the  fusion  of  the  Schools  with  one 
another  through  either  eclecticism  or  skepticism.  At  the 
beginning  of  the  period  each  School  had  its  distinctive 
doctrine  and  was  in  open  controversy  with  the  others  ; 
at  the  end  their  doctrines  were  much  alike.  The  Epicu 
rean  School  was  an  exception,  for  it  always  remained 
isolated  from  the  other  Schools.  While  each  School  had 
a  host  of  notable  representatives,  it  would  be  difficult 
to  find  a  creative  thinker  among  them. 

We  have  already  given  the  names  of  the  four  Schools : 
the  Stoic  or  the  Porch,  the  Epicurean  or  the  Gardens, 
the  Aristotelian  (Peripatetic)  or  the  Lyceum,  the  Pla 
tonic  or  the  Academy.  The  Stoic  and  Epicurean  are 
called  the  New  Schools  in  contrast  with  the  Lyceum 
and  the  Academy,  which  are  called  the  Old  Schools.  The 
New  Schools  were  of  Asiatic  rather  than  Greek  origin, 


THE   HELLENIC-ROMAN   PERIOD 


219 


and  the  Old  Schools  departed  very  much  from  the  teaching- 
of  their  founders ;  so  that  we  find  a  very  different  kind  of 
philosophy  taught  in  all  four  Schools  from  that  taught  by 
the  great  Greek  Systematizers.  All  the  Schools  were  So 
phistic  rather  than  Socratic,  and  may  be  characterized  as 
the  revival  of  Greek  Sophistry.  Besides  these  Schools 
there  was  the  group  of  Skeptics,  which  cannot  be  properly 


MAP  OF  ATHENS,  SHOWING  THE  LOCATION  OF  THE 
FOUR  SCHOOLS 

(The  Academy  was  three  quarters  of  a  mile  from  the  city,  the  Lyceum  just  outside 
the  city,  while  the  Porch  was  a  colonnade  on  the  market  place  (Agora).  The  location 
of  the  Gardens  is  not  precisely  known,  but  it  was  on  the  road  to  the  Academy,  ju»t  in- 
aide  the  walls.) 

called  a  School,  for  from  the  nature  of  its  doctrine  it 
could  not  form  an  organization.  In  influence  upon  the 
period,  the  Stoics,  Epicureans,  and  Skeptics  are  the  most 
important.  They  eclipsed  the  Academy  and  Lyceum  be 
cause  with  partisan  clearness  they  could  formulate  the 
attitude  of  the  age.  The  Stoic  School  made  the  most 


220  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

important  contribution  to  succeeding  history.  The  Epi* 
curean  School  had  the  most  numerous  following.  Al« 
though  the  four  Schools  were  not  endowed  until  the 
Empire,  their  life  was  most  vigorous  before  the  Empire 
during  the  Ethical  Period.  Succession  in  leadership  of 
the  Schools  cannot  be  completely  traced  —  even  that 
of  the  Academy  shows  great  gaps.  All  record  of  leader 
ship  in  the  Aristotelian,  Stoic,  and  Epicurean  Schools 
stops  at  the  close  of  this  period. 

The  Old  Schools  —  The  Academy  and  the  Lyceum. 
The  Academy  and  Lyceum  have  a  history  which  in 
these  respects  is  the  same :  (1)  both  abandoned  the  ideal 
of  an  ethical  society  and  turned  to  that  of  individual 
happiness;  (2)  both  deviated  to  Skepticism;  (3)  both 
afterward  had  a  reaction  from  Skepticism  ;  (4)  both  de 
veloped  the  Sophistic  teaching  rather  than  that  of  their 
founders ;  (5)  both  were  in  common  opposition  to  the 
New  Schools. 

i.  The  Academy.  There  were  three  Academies  after 
Plato  —  called  three,  because  of  the  difference  in  their 
doctrines.  Perhaps  it  is  better  to  say  that  there  were 
three  successive  epochs  of  the  Academy. 

(a)  The  Older  Academy,  lasting  about  seventy  years, 
from  347  B.  c.  to  280  B.  c.  The  successive  leaders  of  this 
were  Speusippus,  the  nephew  of  Plato  (d.  339  B.  c.), 
Heracleides  of  Pontus,  Xenocrates  (d.  314  B.  c.),  Po- 
lemo,  and  Crates.  This  Academy  emphasized  at  first  the 
tendency  begun  by  Plato  in  the  Laws  toward  the  Pytha 
gorean  numbers,  and  later  yielded  to  the  contemporary 
interest  in  morals. 

(5)  The  Middle  Academy,  lasting  about  one  hun< 
dred  and  fifty  years,  from  280  B.  c.  to  129  B.  c.  Of 
this  epoch  Arcesilaus  and  Carneades  were  the  most 


THE  HELLENIC-ROMAN   PERIOD  221 

prominent  leaders.  This  Academy  was  a  form  of  Skepti 
cism. 

(c)  The  New  Academy,  lasting  three  hundred  years? 
from  120  B.  c.  to  200  A.  D.  Among  its  leaders  were 
Philo  of  Larissa,  who  was  at  Rome  in  87  B.  c.,  and 
Antiochus  of  Ascalon,  who  had  Cicero  as  a  pupil  in 
Athens  in  79  and  78  B.  c.  This  epoch  of  the  Acad 
emy  represented  a  return  to  the  dogmatism  of  Plato, 
but  it  shows  the  contemporary  eclectic  tendency  by  its 
including  elements  of  Stoic  and  neo-Platonic  teach 
ings. 

On  the  whole,  the  several  epochs  of  the  Academy- 
failed  to  represent  Plato's  theory  of  the  Ideas.  The 
Academy  was  at  first  a  School  of  practical  ethics,  then 
a  Skepticism,  then  an  eclecticism.  It  was  related  to 
Plato  as  the  lesser-Socratic  schools  were  to  Socrates. 
The  true  developer  of  Plato  was  Aristotle  and  not 
the  Academies. 

2.  The  Lyceum.  From  the  death  of  Aristotle  to 
200  A.  D.  the  Lyceum  was  represented  by  individuals. 
The  pupils  of  Aristotle  were  distinguished  from  the 
master  himself  in  being  scientific  specialists.  Theo- 
phrastus  (370-287  B.  c.),  who  followed  Aristotle  as 
leader  of  the  Lyceum,  was  the  most  complete  repre 
sentative  of  Aristotle,  and  an  attempt  to  drive  out  the 
Schools  in  Athens  in  306  B.  c.  failed  solely  by  reason 
of  the  respect  in  which  he  was  held.  His  significance 
lay  in  natural  science,  and  his  two  preserved  botanical 
works  are  of  great  importance.  Eudemus  of  Rhodes 
studied  history,  mathematics,  and  astronomy.  Aristox- 
enes  studied  music,  ethics,  psychology,  and  history. 
Dicaearchus  showed  the  first  yielding  to  the  contem 
porary  ethical  interest  by  writing  history  on  its  practi' 


222  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

cal  side.  Science  was  continued  by  the  Aristotelians  in 
Sicily,  Alexandria,  and  the  Mediterranean  islands.  At 
Athens  the  School  was  most  interested  in  logic,  dialec 
tics,  and  eristics. 

The  history  of  the  Lyceum  was  similar  to  that  of 
the  Academy.  At  first  it  was  centred  in  Theophrastus, 
the  brilliant  disciple  of  the  founder,  — an  administrator 
who  knew  how  to  give  an  eminent  position  to  the  Ly 
ceum  in  the  intellectual  life  of  Athens.  This  was  fol 
lowed  by  the  naturalism  and  pantheism  of  Strato.  The 
following  generations  of  scholarchs  were  absorbed  in 
empirical  investigations.  Then,  as  in  the  Academy, 
came  the  reaction  back  to  the  original  purpose  of  the 
founder  of  the  Lyceum.  This  occurred  under  An- 
dronicus  (about  70  B.  c.),  the  eleventh  head  of  the 
School,  and  under  him  the  original  teachings  of  Aris 
totle  were  reproduced  and  defended.  This  went  on  for 
several  centuries,  until  the  School  was  merged  in  neo- 
Platonism. 

The  New  Schools — The  Epicureans  and  the  Stoics. 
The  Stoics,  Epicureans,  and  Skeptics  represent  the 
dogmatic  side  of  this  period  more  truly  than  the  Pla- 
tonists  and  Aristotelians,  for  they  give  a  radical  ex 
pression  to  its  social  aspects.  The  Epicureans  had  less 
philosophical  originality ;  but  their  doctrine  had  been 
born  mature  in  their  founder,  and  had  in  consequence 
a  unity  and  compactness.  Stoicism,  on  the  other  hand, 
was  an  eclecticism  composed  of  the  successive  philo- 
sophizings  of  its  champions  through  many  centuries. 
Stoicism  was  represented  by  many  independent  and 
notable  thinkers,  while  Epicureanism  had  only  one 
original  thinker,  —  its  founder,  Epicurus.  Stoicism  de 
veloped  by  changing  its  essentials,  while  Epicureanism 


THE  HELLENIC-ROMAN  PERIOD  223 

could  change  only  in  its  unessentials.  Stoicism  may  be 
said  to  have  been  the  characteristic  philosophy  of  this 
period,  from  the  fact  that  it  was  created  and  developed 
in  Athens  on  the  principles  of  Attic  philosophy  by  men 
who  had  originated  in  the  mixed  races  of  the  East, 
and  by  the  fact  that  it  was  easily  accepted  and  devel 
oped  by  the  Romans.  Consistent  with  the  spirit  of  the 
Hellenic-Roman  Period,  it  was  by  nature  an  eclecticism 
that  became  more  eclectic ;  and  as  time  went  on  its 
teaching  approached  that  of  the  Academy  and  Lyceum 
(second  century  B.  c.).  Epicureanism,  however,  always 
remained  Epicureanism.  Both  Stoicism  and  Epicure 
anism  were  centred  at  Athens.  Epicurus  opened  his 
School  in  the  Gardens  in  307  B.  c.,  and  Zeno  began 
his  lectures  in  the  Porch  in  294  B.  c.  Both  schools 
were  introduced  into  Rome  in  the  middle  of  the  second 
century  B.  C.,  or  just  before  the  end  of  the  Ethical 
Period. 

Epicureanism  in  Rome  could  easily  be  perverted 
into  an  excuse  for  the  luxurious  tendencies  of  the  time, 
and  since  it  advocated  absolute  government  it  voiced 
the  feeling  of  the  new  Empire  —  of  the  Emperor  and 
the  people.  As  a  philosophy  it  was  opportune  and  pop 
ular  and  at  the  same  time  easily  misunderstood.  It  made 
no  demands  upon  its  disciples.  On  the  other  hand,  Stoi 
cism  was  a  discipline  and  demanded  intellectual  acumen 
Its  insensibility  to  art  and  culture  was  an  insuperablo 
obstacle  to  its  progress  in  Greece,  but  on  this  account 
it  found  congenial  soil  in  Roman  society.  It  made  rapid 
progress  among  the  noble  families,  and  was  especially 
identified  with  those  patrician  reactionaries  who  stood 
for  the  old  regime  of  the  Republic. 

We  are  not  surprised  to  find  that  the  Stoics  and 


224  HISTORY  OF   PHILOSOPHY 

Epicureans  were  violently  opposed  to  each  other.  They 
were  the  New  Schools  and  contesting  the  same  ground 
for  favor.  They  had  the  same  aim  and,  with  so  much  in 
common,  their  differences  were  naturally  accentuated. 
In  an  age  which  Adam  Smith  has  likened  to  the  Thirty 
Years'  War  in  Germany,  they  sought  as  rivals  to  offer 
as  an  ideal  the  individual  independent  of  his  surround- 
ings.  The  Stoic  presented  one  means  of  attaining  this 
ideal  and  the  Epicurean  another.  Both  tried  to  substi 
tute  a  philosophic  creed  for  the  old  religion.  And  the 
crowds  that  still  went  to  the  Academy  and  Lyceum,  and 
were  taught  the  old  dogmatism,  must  have  looked  ask 
ance  at  these  new  dogmatic  Schools.  Those  crowds  had 
become  second-rate  men.  The  New  Schools  had  at  first 
fewer  numbers,  but  deeper  thinkers.  The  Greek  pupils 
in  the  New  Schools  listened  to  foreigners  teaching 
strange  creeds  in  strange  tongues.  But  these  new  rivals 
made  their  way.  Not  only  at  Athens,  but  at  Corinth, 
Elis,  Colophon,  and  Heraclea  in  Pontus  the  elegant  Pla 
tonic  style  was  being  superseded  by  the  crude  aphorisms 
of  Epicurus  and  the  clumsy  arguments  of  Zeno. 

It  will  be  asked,  How  far  did  these  doctrines  during 
these  eight  hundred  years  permeate  the  people  ?  Did  the 
New  Schools  reach  the  rank  and  file  of  the  people  to  the 
same  degree  that  the  Sophistic  teachings  reached  the 
Greeks?  Are  we  to  suppose  that  Stoicism  and  Epicure 
anism  were  common  and  popular  philosophies  ?  By  no 
means.  These  philosophies  reached  the  people  of  the 
Roman  world  no  farther  than  Greek  culture  permeated 
Roman  society.  Stoicism  was  consciously  taken  up  by 
the  large  patrician  class.  The  patricians  were  the  culti 
vated  Romans ;  and  Stoicism  has  so  much  in  it  like  the 
Roman  gramtas  that  it  formulated  for  the  patricians 


THE   HELLENIC-ROMAN  PERIOD  225 

their  attitude  in  this  hopeless  time.  Epicureanism,  on 
the  other  hand,  in  its  pure  form  as  Epicurus  taught  it, 
or  later  as  Lucretius  poetically  expressed  it,  could  find 
less  favor  in  Rome.  But  Epicureanism  was  easily  per 
verted,  and  no  doubt  the  educated  voluptuaries  of  Rome 
would  find  in  the  vitiated  doctrine  a  support  and  excuse 
for  their  excesses. 

A  Summary  of  the  Agreements  and  Differences  of 
the  Stoics  and  Epicureans. 

Their  Agreements. 

1.  Both  subordinated  theory  to  practice. 

2.  Both   had  the    same  purpose  in  their  practical 
philosophy  : 

(a)  to  gain  peace  of  mind  for  the  individual, 
(5)  to  gain  independence  of   the  world  for  the 
individual. 

Their  Differences. 

The  Stoics.  The  Epicureans. 

1.  Universal   law  is    su-      The  individual  is  supreme. 

preme. 

2.  Man    is    a    thinking      Man  is  a  feeling  being. 

being. 

3.  Independence    is    ob-       Independence  is   obtained 

tained  by  suppress-  by    idealizing  the   feel 

ing     the     personal  ings  through  serenity, 

feelings. 

4.  The    Stoics    were   re-  The  Epicureans  were  anti- 

ligious,  religious, 

yet  both  schools  accepted  the  popular  gods. 

5.  The  world  is  a  moral      The  world  is  a  mechanical 

order.  order. 


226                   HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

6.  The    universal    deter-  The  universal  is  the  result 

mines   the   individ-  of  the  functioning  of  the 

ual.  individual. 

I  7.  The  world  is  the  ex-  The  world  is  the  combina* 

pression  of  an  im-  tion  of  atoms, 
manent  reason. 


CHAPTER  X 

EPICUREANISM 

The  Life  of  Epicurus  (341-270  B.  c.).  Epicurus 
was  born  in  Samos  in  Asia  Minor.  He  was  a  school 
teacher  in  Mitylene  and  Lampsacus,  and  in  307  B.  c. 
he  established  in  Athens  his  Philosophical  School,  in  a 
garden  within  the  walls  on  the  road  to  the  Academy 
(see  map).  His  School  was  thereafter  called  the  Gar 
dens.  He  claimed  to  have  been  self-taught,  and  he  prob 
ably  did  not  have  a  thorough  education.  He  did,  how 
ever,  possess  great  personal  charm  and,  as  his  doctrine 
made  few  demands  upon  its  disciples  and  expressed  the 
refilled  and  delicate  hedonism  of  the  time,  it  spread 
very  wide.  His  disciples  held  him  in  great  reverence, 
and  long  after  his  death  the  image  of  his  personality 
was  a  living  influence  with  them.  Indeed,  it  was  the  per 
sonal  work  of  Epicurus  that  was  the  supreme  influence 
with  the  sect.  His  formulas  passed  on  from  generation 
to  generation  and  were  called  "  Golden  Maxims."*  He 
wrote  three  hundred  separate  treatises,  and  in  the 
amount  of  his  writings  was  exceeded  in  antiquity  only 
by  the  Stoic,  Chrysippus.  His  great  work,  On  Nature, 
consisted  of  thirty-seven  books.  The  other  Schools 
joined  in  a  bitter  attack  upon  him,  and  in  modern  times 
he  has  been  called  Socrate  double  d'un  Voltaire.  Since 
neither  polytheism  nor  Christianity  had  any  reason  for 

*  Read  Walter  Pater,  Marius  the  Epicurean;  Hicks, 
Stoic  and  Epicurean,  p.  184,  for  the  Golden  Maxims  of 
Epicurus  ;  Teuffel,  History  of  Roman  Literature,  pp.  83-86. 


228  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

preserving  his  writings,  they  have  been  almost  entirely 
lost.  Some  have  been  found  in  Herculaneum,  and  many 
more  are  thought  to  be  still  in  that  buried  city.  The 
mother  of  Epicurus  was  a  priestess,  and  her  supersti 
tions  probably  set  him  against  the  superstitions  of  his 
age.  His  later  acquaintance  with  the  philosophy  of 
Democritus  gave  him  a  scientific  basis  for  his  aggression 
against  all  religions. 

The  Epicureans.  The  Epicurean  body  was  a  guild 
or  sect  that  seemed  to  have  been  little  affected  by  the 
vicissitudes  of  time.  The  Epicureans  proselyted  vigor 
ously,  closely  organized  their  society,  and  extended 
it  throughout  Greece.  It  was  a  state  within  a  state. 
With  a  fixed  constitution  it  was  held  together  by  itin 
erant  preaching,  correspondence,  and  material  assis^- 
ance.  It  had  an  esprit  de  corps,  and  like  religious  com 
munities  it  brought  together  into  one  organization  the 
individuals  that  had  been  scattered  by  the  breaking  up 
of  political  institutions.  The  School  had  special  protec 
tion  from  the  Roman  emperors  and  existed  as  late  as 
the  fourth  century  A.  D.,  having  outlived  all  the  other 
systems.  It  had  some  famous  literary  representatives,  — 
Metrodorus,  Colotes,  Philodemus,  —  but  especially  the 
Roman  poet  Lucretius,  who  popularized  the  doctrine 
for  the  Romans.  Amafinius  introduced  Epicureanism 
into  Rome  during  the  middle  of  the  second  century  B.  C., 
and  the  teaching  was  received  with  great  favor.  Its 
numerous  disciples  in  all  antiquity  changed  the  doctrine 
only  in  its  unessentials.  The  charges  of  immorality  and 
licentiousness  are  not  true  of  the  teaching  or  of  the 
practices  of  the  founder  or  of  the  early  members  of  the 
School. 

Some  Types  of  Hedonism,  —  Aristippus,  Epicurus, 


EPICUREANISM  229 

and  Rousseau.  Epicureanism  was  not  a  philosophy  of 
pleasure  for  people  without  ideals  or  who  were  merely 
seeking  indulgence.  The  question  that  Epicurus  asked 
was  this  :  What  enduring  pleasure  is  possible  to  a  man  • 
in  these  days  of  turmoil?  He  tried  to  give  a  rational 
answer  to  those  of  his  day  who  wished  to  live  and  enjoy. 
His  aim  was  to  free  man  from  responsibility  in  his 
•share  of  the  world's  work  and  to  provide  for  him  a  life 
of  serenity.  The  pleasure  theory  of  Aristippus,  the 
Cyrenaic,  was  very  different.  Aristippus,  a  voluptuary 
in  a  luxurious  city,  presented  a  pleasure  theory  for  the 
few  who  have  fortunes.  It  is  hardly  more  than  a  grad 
ing  of  pleasures  and  the  setting  up  of  a  criterion  of 
their  selection.  Epicurus  goes  deeper  than  that.  His 
pleasure  theory  is  for  the  few,  not  because  they  are  for 
tunate,  but  because  they  are  wise ;  not  because  they 
have  fortunes  to  gratify  their  passions,  but  because 
they  are  independent  of  all  fortune.  The  Cyrenaic 
was  a  man  of  the  world;  the  Epicurean  was  in  the  „• 
world,  but  not  of  it. 

There  is  a  superficial  resemblance  between  the  teach 
ing  of  Epicurus  and  the  message  of  Rousseau  to  the 
French  people  of  the  eighteenth  century.  Both  sought 
an  ideal  of  enduring  plea&ure.  Both  would  discard  the 
artificialities  of  society.  But  Rousseau  was  a  political 
reformer  and  attempted  to  find  his  ideal  in  a  newly 
constructed  society.  Epicurus,  on  the  other  hand,  was 
no  political  reformer,  but  would  find  his  ideal  in  society 
as  it  existed.  Rousseau  appealed  to  the  primitive  feel 
ings.  He  felt  "  the  call  of  the  wild."  Epicurus  appealed 
to  the  refined  and  derivative  feelings.  He  had  no  ag 
gressive  propaganda.  He  aimed  at  no  external  reform. 
His  ideal  was  peace,  and  not  the  sword. 


230  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

The  Epicurean  Ideal.  The  central  principle  of 
Epicurus  is  that  pleasure  is  a  good  and  pain  an 
evil.  In  this  he  was  in  agreement  with  Aristippus,  and 
from  this  position  he  never  receded.  He  offered  no 
proof  of  this,  but  rested  his  central  principle  upon  the 
conviction  that  men  pursue  pleasure  and  avoid  pain. 
He  was  convinced  of  the  biological  fact.  But  he  was 
not  unobservant  from  the  beginning  that  the  subject 
was  complex.  He  saw  that  the  individual  has  to  make 
a  selection  of  pleasure  and  often  has  to  choose  pain  for 
r  the  sake  of  a  greater  pleasure.  Pleasure  is  the  only 
good,  but  Epicurus  asks  further,  What  is  pleasure  ? 
He  finds  that  he  must  give  a  content  to  pleasure  and 
evaluate  the  pleasures  in  the  interests  of  pleasure  it 
self.  This  was  to  Epicurus  no  moral  appraisal,  but  with 
reference  to  the  ^pleasantest  possible  life. 

Of  the  two  qualities  of  pleasure  Epicurus  valued 
its  duration  and  showed  his  advance  over  the  Cyre- 
naics,  who  had  valued  its  intensity.  It  was  on  this  ac 
count  that  the  Epicureans  disclaimed  all  relationship 
with  the  Cyrenaics,  the  earlier  school.  The  difference 
is  certainly  a  radical  one  between  them  :  to  Epicurus 
true  pleasure  is  that  which  endures ;  to  Aristippus  it 
is  that  which  is  most  intense,  however  fleeting.  There 
is  this  to  be  said  of  the  Cyrenaic  theory :  it  could  be 
easily  understood.  Aristippus  could  tell  exactly  what 
he  meant  by  pleasure.  It  is  this  or  that  gratification  of 
sense.  It  includes  every  positive  pleasure,  and  that 
which  is  intensest  is  best.  One  always  knows  when  he 
is  enjoying,  and  in  flitting  from  pleasure  to  pleasure  he 
knows  when  he  is  intensely  enjoying.  But  the  Cyrenaic 
presented  no  ideal.  While  the  Epicurean  theory  is  more 
difficult  to  understand,  it  is  more  mature  and  more  pro- 


EPICUREANISM  231 

found  because  it  presents  a  well-conceived  ideal.  Indeed, 
the  farther  we  follow  Epicurus  along  this  line  of  his 
pursuit  of  the  ideal  of  lasting  pleasure,  the  more  are 
we  impressed  with  his  contribution  to  our  knowledge 
of  the  nature  of  pleasure. 

In  this  connection  Epicurus  shows  his  comprehensive 
jrasp  of  the  subject  in  determining  what  are  the  last 
ing  pleasures.  Although  he  was  a  materialist  he  re 
garded  the  pleasures  of  the  mind  as  superior  to  those 
of  the  body.  The  inner  pleasures,  the  spiritual  joys,  the 
control  of  the  mind  so  that  it  could  enjoy  without  in 
dulgence  —  these  were  to  Epicurus  the  enduring  pleas 
ures.  The  pleasures  of  sense  are  primary,  for,  in  the 
last  analysis,  the  mental  life  is  a  combination  of  sen 
sations,  and  sensations  are  only  material  motions ;  nev 
ertheless  the  secondary  and  derivative  pleasures  of  the 
mind  were  superior,  according  to  Epicurus,  because  they 
had  duration.  This  estimate  of  the  superiority  of  the 
mental  pleasures  was  probably  reinforced  by  two  other 
reasons :  such  pleasures  were  possessed  by  Epicurus ; 
and  such  a  doctrine  was  in  accord  with  the  Greek  aes 
thetic  ideal  of  self -enjoyment  of  the  refined  egoist. 

The  most  permanent  state  of  mind  is  called  by  Epi 
curus  independence  of  the  world ^  on  the  one  hand,  and 
emotionlessness,  on  the  other.  These  are  the  positive 
and  negative  sides  of  one  and  the  same  thing — the 
Epicurean  ideal  of  pleasure.  In  ancient  times  the  con 
ception  of  the  "  affections,"  "  passions,"  or  "  emotions  " 
included  all  states  of  feeling  and  will  in  which  man 
is  dependent  on  the  outer  world.  To  be  emotionless  is 
to  be  independent  of  the  world.  The  Epicurean  word 
is  gtaraxia^  which  is  variously  translated  as  serenity, 
peace,  repose,  imperturbability.  Since  man  has  no  con- 


232  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

trol  over  the  world  without  him,  he  must  control  ite 
effects  within  himself.  These  effects  are  the  feelings  and 
desires  which  are  by  nature  only  mental  disturbances. 
In  mastering  these  he  becomes  independent  of  the 
world. 

If  one  will  scrutinize  his  life,  he  will  find,  according 
to  Epicurus,  that  his  experiences  form  a  stream  of  men 
tal  disturbances.  These  may  be  divided  into  two  classes, 
— desires  and  positive  pleasures.  Desires  are  wants 
and  want  is  pain.  Pain  is  therefore  exciting.  Positive 
pleasure  presupposes  desire  and  want,  and  such  pleasure 
is  also  an  excitement, —  the  excitement  that  accompanies 
the  removal  of  want.  The  positive  pleasures  are  not, 
therefore,  the  goal  of  independence  of  the  outer  world. 
There  is  another  kind  of  pleasure  —  the  pleasure  of  re 
pose.  Epicurus  recognizes  therefore  both  the  pleasure  of 
motion  and  the  pleasure  of  repose,  but  they  do  not  have 
the  same  importance  in  his  system.  Repose  is  the  goal  of 
all  our  experiences.  It  is  a  neutral  state,  a  state  of  free 
dom  from  bodily  pain  and  mental  excitement.  There  is 
nothing  higher  than  such  a  neutral  state.  We  cannot 
advance  beyond  it.  If  we  seek  new  pleasures  by  grati 
fying  new  desires,  we  are  only  returning  to  the  old 
round  of  want,  desire,  and  the  pleasurable  excitement 
of  removing  the  want.  The  pleasure  of  repose  is  the 
only  escape  from  this  round  of  experiences.  Emotion 
lessness  is  the  maximum  pleasure  —  it  is  the  repose  in 
independence  of  the  world.  Any  deviation  from  it  may 
vary  but  it  will  not  increase  our  pleasure. 

This  ideal  of  Epicurus  looks  very  much  like  the 
Cynic  doctrine  of  absence  of  wants  as  constituting 
virtue  and  happiness.  But  Epicurus  is  far  from  re 
nouncing  pleasure.  He  is  no  ascetic.  On  the  contrary, 


EPICUREANISM  233 

the  repose  of  the  Epicurean  will  be  the  greater  in  pro* 
portion  to  the  compass  of  his  needs  that  are  satisfied. 
But  he  needs  insight  into  any  given  situation  to  tell  him 
what  positive  pleasures  should  be  encouraged.  Epicuruf 
thus  distinguishes  three  kinds  of  wants  and  their  attend* 
ant  positive  pleasures  :  (1)  wants  natural  and  indispensa 
ble  —  without  the  satisfaction  of  which  we  cannot  exist ; 
(2)  wants  artificial  and  dispensable,  which  ought  always 
to  be  disregarded  ;  (3)wants  natural  and  dispensable  — 
the  great  mass  of  wants  which  lie  between  the  two 
other  classes.  Insight  is  necessary  to  decide  about  this 
third  class.  In  case  of  necessity  they  can  be  renounced, 
but  since  they  give  happiness,  the  Wise  Man  will  seek 
to  satisfy  them  as  far  as  possible. 

There  are  three  steps  leading  to  Epicurean  happi 
ness  :  (1)  the  desire  or  the  pain  of  unsatisfied  craving ; 
(2)  the  positive  pleasure  that  removes  the  pain  of  un 
satisfied  desire  ;  (3)  ataraxia,  the  repose  of  the  soul  or 
true  happiness. 

The  Place  of  Virtue  in  Epicureanism.  Epicurus 
agreed  with  the  strictest  Greek  moralists  that  virtue 
and  happiness  go  together.  His  opponents  had  to  tes 
tify  to  the  beneficial  effects  of  his  teaching  upon  the 
character  of  his  disciples.  Yet  his  conception  of  the 
place  of  virtue  in  life  is  in  direct  conflict  with  Stoicism. 
He  felt  that  the  Stoic  conception  of  virtue  for  its  own 
sake  is  an  ideal  so  imaginary  that  it  lacks  all  incentive  to 
action.  Pleasure,  on  the  other  hand,  seemed  to  him  to  be 
a  concrete  and  real  object.  It  can  be  given  a  definite  con 
tent.  Virtue  had  for  Epicurus  a  value  only  as  a  means 
to  happiness.  Moreover,  virtue  by  itself  is  not  necessa 
rily  accompanied  by  happiness,  but  only  when  it  is  em 
ployed  as  a  condition  to  happiness.  Thus  wisdom  may 


234  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

be  employed  to  gain  the  pleasure  of  liberation  from 
the  fear  of  the  gods  ;  self-control  may  be  employed  in 
order  to  get  the  maximum  of  happiness. 

The  Epicurean  Wise  Man.  To  what  classes  of  people 
could  this  Epicurean  ideal  appeal  ?  Is  it  an  ideal  pos 
sible  only  to  the  favorites  of  fortune,  wealth,  and  rank  ? 
As  presented  by  Epicurus  it  was  not  conditioned  by  ex- 
kern  al  circumstances  of  any  sort  and  its  aim  was  to  tran 
scend  all  conditions.  Nevertheless,  it  is  obvious  that 
the  theory  was  restricted  to  those  who  had  the  desire 
to  adopt  it.  On  the  whole,  the  unreflecting  common 
people  of  that  time  were  not  as  a  matter  of  fact  influenced 
by  the  Epicurean  philosophy.  The  proof  of  this  is  the 
ease  with  which  it  was  degraded  into  a  simple  pleasure 
theory  without  an  ideaL  Epicureanism  as  presented  by 
its  author  was  not  an  excuse  for  the  voluptuary  or  the 
prodigal,  although  it  was  easily  corrupted  into  that. 
v  It  was,  however,  a  philosophy  of  the  individual.  The 
individual  must  rely  upon  his  own  common  sense  as 
to  what  among  the  particular  satisfactions  will  give 
him  independence  of  the  world.  Sometimes  repose  is 
attained  by  the  satisfaction  of  all  wants ;  sometimes  the 
satisfactions  needed  are  few  because  the  wants  are  few. 
True  pleasure  is  possible  to  all  reflective  souls.  "  When 
you  come,"  says  Seneca,  "  to  the  gardens  where  the  words 
are  inscribed :  Friend,  here  it  will  be  well  for  you  to 
abide ;  here  pleasure  is  the  highest  good  ;  —  there  will 
meet  you  the  keeper  of  the  place,  a  hospitable  kindly 
man  who  will  set  before  you  a  dish  of  barley  porridge 
and  plenty  of  water  and  say,  Have  you  not  been  well 
entertained  ?  These  gardens  do  not  provoke  hunger,  but 
quench  it ;  they  do  not  cause  a  greater  thirst  by  the  drinks 
they  afford.  ...  In  this  pleasure  I  have  grown  old." 


EPICUREANISM 


235 


Man  can  use  much,  but  he  does  not  need  much.  Even 
life  itself  under  extreme  circumstances  is  not  necessary. 
The  pleasures  to  be  sought  are  the  permanent  and 
gentle.  In  one  place  Epicurus  says  with  a  somewhat 
forced  sentiment  that  the  Wise  Man  on  the  rack  will 
smile  in  the  midst  of  torture  and  say,  "  How  sweet ! ' 

The  Wise  Man  accepts  the  established  order  and  ac 
commodates  himself  to  it.  He  is  not  like  the  Stoic  Wise 
Man,  indifferent  to  all  pleasures,  but  he  is  nevertheless 
independent  of  them.  He  is  superior  to  the  world,  a  king 
and  a  god.  Accidents  cannot  disturb  him,  for  his  vir 
tuous  happiness  lies  within  himself.  He  cannot  control 
the  world  without,  but  he  can  control  the  world  within 
himself.  He  can  be  happy  with  few  or  many  satisfac 
tions,  and  he  is  master  over  the  world  if  he  is  master  of 
the  effects  of  the  world  upon  himself.  To  rest  unmoved 
in  one's  inner  self  —  that  is  the  Epicurean  ideal  of  the 
Wise  Man.  In  contrast  to  the  Cyrenaic  happiness,  the 
Epicurean  happiness  seems  passive ;  in  contrast  to  the 
Stoic  happiness  it  is  satisfaction. 

The  Epicurean  Wise  Man  in  Society.  Nevertheless 
the  Wise  Man  is  only  a  spectator  of  the  world.  He  does 
not  enter  the  world's  work  nor  does  he  enlist  as  a  soldier 
to  fight  its  moral  battles.  His  individual  independence 
gives  a  peculiar  character  to  his  social  relations.  He  will 
have  no  ties  on  account  of  their  complications.  Moreover, 
his  inner  world  offers  him  no  compensation  for  his  loss 
of  social  relationship,  except  that  the  good  within  is 
strong  and  the  evil  weak.  He  looks  upon  political  gov 
ernment  as  a  matter  of  selfish  convenience.  He  is  op 
posed  to  civic  life,  and  therefore  a  supporter  of  absolute 
government.  He  refuses  the  responsibility  of  marriage, 
but  accepts  friendship  as  the  only  worthy  social  relation- 


236  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

ship,  and  only  because  friendship  is  of  mutual  advan 
tage.  Friendship  means  intellectual  intercourse,  com 
passion,  and  forgiveness.  While  there  were  many  famous 
Epicurean  friendships,  one  must  admit  that  the  Epicu 
rean  took  an  unfair  advantage  of  the  state.  His  happiness 
presupposed  a  highly  developed  civilization  of.  refined 
tastes  and  noble  sentiments.  He  is  a  parasite  upon  the 
community  and  appropriates  the  labor  of  others.  The 
Epicurean  ideal  offers  much  to  the  individual,  but  no 
thing  to  society  as  a  means  of  spiritual  productivity. 

The  Great  Obstacles  to  Happiness.  To  universalize 
pleasure,  however  paradoxical  it  may  seem,  is  to  set  up 
an  individualism.  It  is  to  abandon  all  the  claims  of  the 
society  of  other  beings  upon  us.  The  logic  of  any  pleas 
ure  theory  is  anarchism.  But  Epicurus  is  no  anarchist, 
for  anarchism  would  be  too  disturbing  to  repose.  Epi 
curus  stopped  far  short  of  interfering  with  political  con 
ditions.  His  teaching  did  not  have  as  its  end  a  logical 
theory,  but  a  practical  accomplishment.  He  therefore 
accommodated  his  theory  to  the  practical  circumstances 
of  his  time.  He  pointed  out  that  in  the  seething  times 
of  the  third  century  B.  C.  the  individual  could  be  happy 
if  he  banished  from  his  world  two  obstacles.  These 
were  religion  and  culture. 

To  Epicurus  the  sorrow  in  man's  heart  and  the  evil 
in  his  practices  are  mainly  due  to  religion.  The  chief 
source  of  the  wretchedness  of  the  world  is  to  be  found 
in  the  crushing  fears  of  religious  belief.  Epicurus  has 
in  mind  the  exaggerated  ceremonies  and  mystical  be 
liefs  of  the  Orient,  where  his  mother  had  been  a  priest 
ess.  From  this  memory  he  was  reacting.  Keligion  pol 
lutes  men's  fancies,  clouds  the  future  with  superstitious 
fears,  and  puts  repose  and  happiness  beyond  our  reach. 


EPICUREANISM  237 

In  the  first  place,  religion  carries  with  it  the  fear  of 
<•  death.  In  modern  times  the  idea  of  life  after  death  i» 
an  added  consolation.  In  the  time  of  Epicurus  death 
meant  the  giving  up  of  the  present  life  for  a  dim,  sun 
less  region  of  flitting  shades  bordering  on  the  edge  of 
Tartarus.  No  philosophical  mind  can  be  happy,  accord 
ing  to  Epicurus,  if  it  contains  the  religious  conception 
of  death  and  the  future  life.  Again,  religion  conceives 
the  world  of  nature  as  created  and  operated  by  the  gods. 
It  is  forever  explaining  nature-phenomena  as  miraculous 
and  supernatural.  The  tranquil  mind  must  believe  in  a 
nature  world  that  is  separated  from  miraculous  inter 
vention,  and  freed  from  oversight.  The  world  must  be  a 
dependable  world.  Lastly,  religion  conceives  of  the  gods 
as  always  busying  themselves  with  the  affairs  of  men. 
Men  must  secure  their  favor  and  avert  their  wrath  by 
constant  offerings.  The  religious  man  wastes  his  time 
and  consumes  his  peace  in  the  fear  that  the  gods  are 
not  propitiated.  The  Epicurean  seeks  to  build  up  the 
life  of  the  individual.  He  seeks  a  tranquillity  that  is  in 
dependent  of  everything.  Religious  belief  with  its  inter 
fering  gods  would  thwart  his  ideal.  Hence  the  chief 
concern  of  the  Epicurean  was  to  banish  from  life  every 
conception  of  divine  government.  The  gods  exist,  but 
they  live  quite  apart  from  men.  Their  dwelling  is  in  in 
ter-stellar  space  amid  the  numberless  worlds.  They  have 
nothing  to  do  with  the  events  of  this  world,  but  are 
only  glorified  actualizations  of  the  philosophic  ideal  of 
soul-satisfying  peace.  The  more  the  teleological  concep 
tion  of  nature  became  the  common  ground  of  the  Acad 
emy,  the  Lyceum,  and  the  Porch,  the  more  did  the  Epi 
cureans  isolate  themselves  by  opposing  the  conception. 
The  other  obstacle  to  the  imperturbability  of  the  soul 


238  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

is  culture.  The  Stoics  subordinated  theory  to  practice^ 
but  Epicurus  went  so  far  as  to  deprecate  all  culture. 
It  was  the  philosophical  protest  of  an  Oriental  against 
all  for  which  Greece  had  stood.  All  knowledge  is  su 
perfluous  which  does  not  promote  happiness.  Know 
ledge  may  indirectly  promote  happiness,  and  that  is  the 
best  you  can  say  of  it.  Epicurus  therefore  despised  the 
researches  of  the  grammarians,  the  lore  of  history,  the 
science  of  mathematics,  the  theory  of  music,  poetry, 
rhetoric,  oratory,  logic.  Although  he  set  greater  store  by 
the  intellectual  than  the  physical  pleasures,  he  placed  as 
little  value  on  knowledge  for  its  own  sake  as  upon  virtue 
for  its  own  sake.  This  teaching  of  Epicurus  in  Athens 
betrays  the  change  that  had  come  over  Athenian  society. 
Plato,  who  had  been  the  impersonation  of  Athenian  cul 
ture,  had  been  dead  not  more  than  thirty  years. 

Epicurus'  Conception  of  the  Physical  World.  — 
Qualified  Atomism.  To  the  cursory  reader  the  science 
of  physics  seems  to  occupy  a  large  place  in  the  philosophy 
of  Epicurus,  and  its  presence  appears  inconsistent  with 
his  polemic  against  culture.  Upon  further  reading  one 
finds  that  physics,  too,  should  be  merely  a  servant  of  the 
happiness  of  the  individual.  We  need  knowledge  of 
physics  because  the  knowledge  of  natural  causes  will 
free  us  from  the  fears  attending  religion.  Physics  has 
no  independent  importance. 

Epicurus  undertook  to  support  his  doctrine  of  indi 
vidualism  by  the  scientific  theory  of  Democritus.  The 
materialistic  theory  of  the  great  Abderite  seems  to 
loom  large  in  the  exposition  of  Epicurus.  But  Epicurus 
was  not  interested  in  the  science  of  physics  —  not  even 
in  the  physics  of  Democritus.  He  did  not  build  his 
theory  on  the  teaching  of  Democritus,  but  on  the  con- 


EPICUREANISM  23* 

trary  he  used  the  Democritan  doctrine  to  support  his 
theory  of  moral  conduct.  Epicurus  needed  a  well-au 
thenticated  theory.  On  account  of  the  influence  of  Lu 
cretius'  poem,  Epicurus  has  been  called  in  modern  times 
the  scientist  of  antiquity.  But  his  only  contribution  to 
science  was  that,  finding  the  atomism  of  Democritus 
ready  at  hand  although  unpopular,  he  made  it  popular 
by  adjusting  it  to  his  own  purposes. 

The  Democritan  conception  that  Being  is  matter 
consisting  of  innumerable  uncreated  and  indestructible 
atoms  furnished  Epicurus  this  support  for  his  moral 
atomism.  He  followed  Democritus  in  his  analysis  of 
psychological,  physiological,  and  astronomical  phenom 
ena —  all  are  atoms  in  combinations.  But  he  lacked 
scientific  insight  and  the  Democritan  doctrine  was 
emasculated  in  his  hands.  The  central  and  fundamental 
principle  of  Democritus'  theory  was  the  universal  reign 
of  law.  This  the  Stoics  adopted  and  this  Epicurus 
neglected.  Epicurus  was  impressed  by  the  changes  of 
the  atoms  in  the  Democritan  theory ;  the  Stoics  by  the 
law  of  such  change. 

This  appears  in  the  teaching  of  Epicurus  in  two 
ways.  The  first  example  is  in  his  explanation  of  the 
origin  of  the  cosmos.  Democritus  had  conceived  that 
irregular  motion  was  an  inherent  quality  of  the  atoms 
and  that  the  universe  was  produced  by  their  combina 
tions  in  a  purely  mechanical  way.  Epicurus  conceived 
that  the  original  movement  of  the  atoms  was  in  a 
straight  line  from  above  downwards.  This  he  called  the 
"rain  of  atoms."  To  explain  their  intermingling  he 
conceived  them  to  be  endowed  with  volition  by  which 
they  arbitrarily  deviated  from  the  direct  fall.  Secondly, 
this  physical  theory  of  Epicurus  would  be  unimportant 


240  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

except  that  it  afforded  him  a  basis  for  his  theory  of  the 
individual  as  possessing  free  will.  The  doctrine  of  free 
dom  of  the  will  had  been  since  Aristotle  a  presupposi 
tion  indispensable  to  the  doctrine  of  moral  accounta 
bility  among  the  Greeks.  The  Stoic  doctrine  of  fate 
is  an  exception.  But  determinism  was  opposed  to  Epi 
curus'  conception  of  the  Wise  Man  as  an  independent 
individual.  The  human  will  is  self-determined,  and  Epi 
curus  even  said  that  he  preferred  the  illusions  of  re 
ligion  to  a  belief  in  our  slavery  to  fate.  He  classed 
freedom  and  chance  together  as  uncaused  occurrence, 
and  out  of  the  combination  built  his  conception  of  free 
dom.  The  uncaused  functioning  of  the  will  in  man  is 
the  same  as  the  causeless  deviation  of  the  atoms.  Free 
dom  is  the  choice  between  different  possibilities  and  is 
determined  by  no  cause.  The  Stoics  alone  among  the 
philosophers  of  this  time  are  the  forerunners  of  the 
study  of  physics. 

Epicurus  introduced  the  conception  of  volition  of 
the  atoms  to  account  for  the  origin  of  the  cosmos. 
From  that  point  he  conceived  the  world  to  develop  IR 
a  mechanical  way.  Teleology  in  the  nature  world  was 
repugnant  to  him.  By  modifying  the  Democritan  phys 
ics,  he  thus  succeeded  in  establishing  the  independence 
of  the  individual  in  the  social  world  and,  on  the  other 
hand,  removing  the  gods  from  interfering  in  the  physical 
world.  This  seemed  to  Epicurus  to  afford  an  absolute 
deliverance  from  superstition.  The  important  points  of 
the  physical  theory  of  Epicurus  are  these :  (1)  the 
freedom  of  the  atoms  in  motion ;  (2)  and  yet  their  me 
chanical  development ;  (3)  the  atomic  character  of  the 
gods ;  (4)  the  scattering  of  the  atoms  of  the  soul  at 
death,  which  frees  us  from  the  fear  of  Hades. 


CHAPTER  XI 

STOICISM 

The  Position  of  Stoicism  in  Antiquity.  The  Stoic 
School  had  a  long  history,  and  for  five  hundred  years 
it  was  well-nigh  the  dominating  system  of  thought.  Its 
importance  is  shown  in  the  attacks  on  all  sides  by 
which  it  was  honored.  It  was  subjected  to  a  continued 
critical  testing  by  the  Peripatetics,  Epicureans,  Skep 
tics,  and  the  Academy.  It  was  without  doubt  the  most 
comprehensive  School  of  the  Hellenic-Roman  Period, 
and  numbered  as  its  adherents  the  most  brilliant  per 
sonalities  of  the  time.  In  its  importance  to  history  its 
only  rival  was  neo-Platonism,  which  came  after  it.  Stoi 
cism  accomplished  much  toward  solving  the  problem 
of  life,  for  it  is  one  of  the  great  inner,  spiritual  move 
ments  of  humanity.  It  was  a  system  of  philosophy  raised 
upon  the  ruins  of  polytheism  —  a  religion  for  the  edu 
cated  classes,  who  tried  to  harmonize  the  old  religion 
with  the  new  philosophic  needs.  In  the  early  Christian 
centuries  it  led  the  moral  reform  by  reviving  the  classic 
ideals.  It  became  a  retreat  into  the  invisible  order,  a 
solace  amid  unrest.  Particularly  at  that  time  the  Stoic 
felt  the  emptiness  of  human  life,  for  his  possession  of 
eternity  made  earthly  existence  seem  as  nothing.  Yet 
it  was  a  movement  of  subjective  reflection  and  indi 
vidual  motive  ;  but  as  such  it  could  not  prove  itself  ade 
quate  when  the  structure  of  Roman  society  broke  down. 

But  we  must  not  take  the  Roman  Stoics  as  the  repre 
sentatives  of  the  sect.  The  Stoics  stood  for  more  than 


242  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

moral  reflection.  The  great  achievement  came  from  the 
first  three  leaders  —  the  achievement  of  giving  a  scien 
tific  basis  to  morals.  The  Stoics  made  ethics  an  inde 
pendent  science.  Such  an  elaborate  system  of  morals 
as  that  of  the  Stoics  had  never  before  existed.  Stoi 
cism  was  morality  with  a  theoretical  foundation,  and  the 
foundation  was  the  most  imposing  part  of  the  edifice. 
This  appeared  in  Roman  jurisprudence,  and  in  later 
times  in  Grotius,  Descartes,  Spinoza,  the  Calvinists  and 
Puritans,  and  in  Kant  and  Fichte.  The  writings  of  the 
individual  Stoics  have  become  a  part  of  the  world's 
literature,  and  the  Stoic  view  of  life  has  maintained 
itself  as  a  dignified  and  independent  type. 

The  Three  Periods  of  Stoicism.  The  five  hundred 
years  of  the  history  of  the  Stoic  School  are  usually  di 
vided  into  three  periods.  The  first  is  about  90  years 
long,  in  which  the  doctrine  was  formulated ;  the  second 
is  200  years  long,  when  the  doctrine  was  modified ;  the 
third  was  200  years  long,  when  it  became  a  popular 
moral  philosophy.  The  first  two  periods  were  theoretical, 
the  third  was  practical. 

1.  Period  of  Formulation  of  the  Doctrine  (294  B.  c. 
-206   B.  c.),  sometimes  called  the  period  of  Cynical 
Stoicism.  This  period  contains  the  three  great  leaders  : 
Zeno  (340-265  B.  c.),  Clean thes,  leader  of  the  School 
from  264  to  232  B.  c.,  and  Chrysippus  (280-206  B.  c.). 
Zeno  of  Tarsus,  Diogenes  of  Seleucia,  and  Antipater  of 
Tarsus  were  other  important  representatives. 

2.  Period  of  Modified  Stoicism  (206  B.c.-l  A.D.). 
This  was  the  period  of  transition.    This  period  shows  a 
modification  of  the  original  severe  Cynical  character 
of  the  doctrine  and  also  the  spread  of  Stoicism  to  Rome. 
This  modification  shows  an  approach  to  Plato  and  Aris- 


STOICISM  243 

totle.  The  most  important  representative  of  this  period 
is  Panaetius  (180-110  B.  C.),  who  introduced  the  doctrine 
into  Rome  through  his  friendship  with  Scipio  Africanus. 
Other  eminent  Stoics  of  this  period  were  Posidonius  and 
Boethus  of  Sidon. 

3.  Period  of  Roman  Stoicism  (1-200  A.  D.).  During 
this  period  Stoicism  became  a  popular  moral  philosophy. 
The  theoretic  teachings  of  the  first  two  periods  were 
successfully  translated  by  the  Roman  Stoics  in  an  im 
pressive  way  into  practical  observations.  Furthermore, 
Stoicism  was  being  inspired  with  the  rising  religious 
feeling  so  that  it  expressed  the  noblest  moral  sentiments 
of  antiquity.  The  chief  representatives  were  Seneca 
(4-65  A.  D.),  Epictetus  (living  90  A.  D.)  the  philo 
sophic  slave,  and  the  emperor  Marcus  Aurelius  (121— 
180  A.  D.).  Other  Stoics  of  this  period  were  L.  Annaeus 
Cornutus,  M.  Annaaus  Lucanus,  Persius,  and  M.  Muso- 
nius  Rufus. 

The  Stoic  Leaders.  One  of  the  striking  features  of 
the  Stoic  School  is  that  its  leaders  were  not  pure 
Greeks.  Nearly  all  the  members  before  the  Christian 
era  belong  by  birth  to  the  mixed  races  of  Asia  Minor 
and  the  eastern  archipelago.  Moreover,  the  later  Stoics 
were  mainly  Romans,  led  by  the  Phrygian,  Epictetus. 
The  Stoics  who  were  Greeks  were  third  or  fourth  rate 
men.  The  Stoic  School  contained  so  many  eminent 
thinkers  that  its  doctrine  was  not  framed  once  and  for 
all,  like  the  Epicurean  doctrine.  During  the  five  hun 
dred  years  from  Zeno  to  Marcus  Aurelius,  theoretic 
changes  went  on  within  the  School,  and  the  changes 
were  rather  modifications  than  development.  Funda 
mentally,  Stoicism  remained  the  same,  for  it  was  a  re 
ligious  attitude  of  mind. 


244  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

Athens  was  the  abiding-place  of  the  Stoic  School, 
but  Athens  of  that  day  had  little  to  say  to  it  except  to 
receive  it.  The  great  Stoic  leaders,  the  first  three 
Stoics,  like  the  three  tragic  poets,  formed  a  group  that 
is  rarely  equaled.  They  were  Zeno,  Cleanthes,  and 
Chrysippus.  Zeno  and  Chrysippus  came  from  Cyprus, 
and  Cleanthes  came  from  Assos,  not  far  from  Troy. 
Cyprus,  Lycia,  and  Pisidia  showed  a  strong  inclination 
for  the  Stoic  teaching.  Tarsus,  which  is  in  Cilicia,  had  a 
strong  Stoic  School,  and  its  influence  on  the  training  of 
St.  Paul  is  seen  in  his  theology. 

The  founding  of  the  Stoic  School  was  the  result  of 
the  experiences  of  Zeno  of  Citium.  Having  lost  much 
of  his  wealth  in  commerce,  he  turned  to  philosophy  at 
Athens.  Impressed  with  the  character  of  Socrates,  he 
attached  himself  successively  to  the  Cynic,  Megarian, 
and  Platonic  Schools,  but  without  much  satisfaction. 
He  made  himself  master  of  the  teachings  of  these 
Schools,  and  then  founded  a  School  of  his  own.  It  is 
said  that  when  he  asked  for  admittance  to  the  Acad 
emy,  Polemo,  the  leader,  replied,  "  I  am  no  stranger  to 
your  Phoenician  art,  Zeno.  I  perceive  your  design  is  to 
creep  slyly  into  my  garden  and  steal  away  my  fruit."  In 
294  B.  c.  he  began  to  teach  in  the  Painted  Porch  (see 
map,  p.  219),  a  painted  colonnade  in  the  Athenian  mar 
ket-place.  The  School  thereafter  went  by  the  name  of 
Stoa,  or  the  Porch.  His  contemporary  antagonists  were 
Arcesilaus  in  the  Academy,  and  Epicurus.  Zeno's  re 
putation  throughout  Greece  was  very  high  and  well 
deserved.  He  was  a  parsimonious  man,  simple  and 
rude  spoken.  He  used  a  bad  dialect,  foreign  words, 
and  taught  a  strange  doctrine.  He  suffered  a  slight 
wound  and,  taking  it  as  a  hint  of  destiny,  committed 


STOICISM  245 

suicide,  saying,  "  I  am  coming,  Earth,  why  do  you  call 
me?" 

Stoicism  did  not  flourish  under  Cleanthes  (who  was 
leader  of  the  School  for  thirty-two  years),  although 
to-day  he  is  the  best  known  of  these  three  leaders  on 
account  of  his  Hymn  to  Zeus.  He  was  originally 
a  pugilist,  and  was  so  poor  that  he  had  to  work  as  a 
water-carrier  by  night  in  order  to  attend  the  lectures 
of  Zeno  by  day.  He  is  said  to  have  had  a  heavy  mind, 
but  it  was  nevertheless  the  mind  of  an  inspired  prophet 
and  a  thoughtful  man  of  science.  When  Cleanthes  re 
ceived  the  Stoic  doctrines  from  Zeno,  they  were  still 
plastic.  He  made  them  monistic  and  pantheistic,  and 
introduced  the  doctrine  of  "  tension." 

Under  Chrysippus  (280-206  B.  c.)  Stoicism  was  re 
vived  and  he  saved  it  from  extinction.  Chrysippus  was 
the  systematizer  of  the  School  and  its  literary  repre 
sentative.  He  wrote  five  hundred  and  five  separate 
treatises,  three  hundred  of  which  were  on  logical  sub 
jects.  He  is  said  to  have  seldom  let  a  day  pass  without 
writing  five  hundred  lines.  He  was  the  moderating  in 
fluence  of  the  School,  mediating  between  extremes  and 
removing  objections.  He  restated  Zeno's  doctrines,  but 
his  discourses  abound  in  curious  subtleties  rather  than 
argument.  He  was  a  much  more  scholarly  man  than  his 
predecessors,  and  passed  for  the  most  learned  man  in 
antiquity.  "  Give  me  doctrines,"  he  said  to  Cleanthes, 
"  and  I  will  find  arguments  for  them."  His  haughti 
ness  created  many  adversaries,  both  in  the  Academy 
and  among  the  Epicureans,  and  he  had  great  contempt 
for  men  of  rank.  He  said,  "  If  I  thought  any  philoso 
pher  excelled  me,  I  would  myself  become  his  pupil."  It 
was  a  common  saying  in  those  days,  "  No  Chrysippus, 


246  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

no  Stoa."  In  the  hands  of  Chrysippus  the  Stoic  teach 
ing  became  a  well-rounded  system. 

The  Stoic  Writings.  Nearly  all  the  writings  of  the 
early  Stoics  have  been  lost.  Only  fragments  have  been 
preserved  from  the  writings  of  other  men  like  Cicero, 
Plutarch,  Sextus  Empiricus,  and  Diogenes  Laertius, 
and  these  men  do  not  always  distinguish  between  early 
and  later  Stoicism.  The  principal  source  of  our  know 
ledge  of  early  Stoicism  is  Diogenes  Laertius.  The 
Hymn  to  Zeus  of  Cleanthes  is  the  most  noteworthy 
fragment  extant  of  the  early  period.  Of  the  later  Stoics 
of  the  Empire  many  writings  have  been  saved :  the 
ethical  treatises  and  epistles  of  Seneca,  the  Diatribes 
and  Encheiridion  of  Epictetus,  and  the  Medita 
tions  of  Marcus  Aurelius.  The  later  Stoic  writings 
transmit  the  teaching  of  the  earlier  leaders  modified  by 
many  foreign  influences.  Such  second-hand  authorities 
as  Cicero,  Plutarch,  Diogenes  Laertius  and  Sextus 
Empiricus,  and  the  Aristotelian  commentators  give  re 
ports  so  vitiated  that  it  is  doubtful  if  they  report  any 
element  belonging  to  the  earlier  teaching.  The  doctrine 
of  the  Stoics,  since  the  time  of  Chrysippus,  however,  is 
known  beyond  peradventure. 

The  Stoics  and  Cynics.  The  Stoics  tried  to  build 
up  the  life  of  the  soul  after  the  pattern  of  the  vir 
tuous  Wise  Man,  whose  outlines  they  borrowed  from 
the  transfigured  and  lofty  form  of  Socrates.  (Noack.) 
Their  teaching  is  not  merely  a  refinement  and  ad 
vance  over  the  Cynic  School  as  Epicureanism  had  been 
to  the  Cyrenaic  School.  Stoicism  and  Epicureanism 
used  their  sources  in  different  ways.  The  Stoic  would 
give  up  more  than  the  Epicurean,  and  the  negative  side 
of  his  teaching  is  therefore  greater ;  but  in  recompense 


STOICISM  247 

he  offers  more  in  the  shape  of  a  comprehensive  meta 
physics.  The  Cyrenaic  doctrine  of  pleasure  became  the 
corner  stone  of  Epicureanism.  The  Cynic  sensualistic 
rigorism  became  in  the  Stoic  teaching  a  negative  and 
relatively  unimportant  doctrine.  While  the  Stoic  dis 
tinction  of  virtue  was  not  unproductive,  the  most  in 
fluential  aspect  of  Stoicism  was  its  dissemination  of 
humane  culture.  Thus,  in  contrast  with  the  Cynics,  the 
Stoics  had  a  deep  interest  in  scientific  theory.  The 
Stoic,  less  than  the  Cynic,  contrasted  the  individ 
ual  with  the  world.  The  Stoics  have  a  more  intelligent, 
freer,  and  milder  morality.  To  the  Cynics,  external 
things  have  no  value ;  to  the  Stoics,  they  have  both  a 
positive  and  a  negative  value.  Beneath  these  differences 
there  is  the  same  self-sufficiency  in  virtue,  the  same 
withdrawal  within,  the  same  moral  strength  of  will,  the 
same  antithesis  between  good  and  evil.  Stoicism  was 
original,  but  not  enough  so  to  mark  the  beginning  of  a 
new  epoch. 

The  Two  Prominent  Stoic  Conceptions.  There  are 
two  Stoic  conceptions  that  rise  prominently  above  all 
the  rest  of  their  teaching.  One  is  the  conception  of  per 
sonality,  the  other  is  the  conception  of  Nature.  Epicure 
anism  built  up  the  conception  of  personality,  but  it  had 
no  need  of  an  objective  principle  of  Nature ;  and  in 
deed  the  Epicurean  conception  of  personality  seems  to 
be  only  a  clever  adjustment  and  an  avoidance  of  the 
problems  of  life,  compared  to  the  clear-cut,  heroic,  and 
vigorous  Stoic  conception  of  personality.  Thus  in  Epi 
cureanism  there  is  one  prominent  conception,  in  Stoicism 
there  are  two. 

These  two  Stoic  principles  stand  side  by  side.  The 
Stoic  builds  them  up  together,  even  though  he  fails  to 


248  HISTORY   OF  PHILOSOPHY 

make  them  entirely  compatible.  All  the  essential  diffi 
culties  and  all  the  excellencies  of  Stoicism  lie  in  the 
juxtaposition  of  the  conceptions  of  personality  and  Na 
ture.  In  early  Stoicism  each  conception  is  stated  with 
great  vigor.  In  later  Stoicism  their  harmony  is  approx 
imated  by  the  modification  of  each.  The  result  was  an 
ethical  dualism  and  a  metaphysical  monism. 

The  Conception  of  Personality.  Against  Epicurean 
ism  the  Stoic  fought  for  the  dignity  of  the  soul.  The 
ideal  personality  of  the  Wise  Man  is  the  central  point 
in  Stoicism.  Even  more  than  Aristotle  did  the  Stoic 
emphasize  the  unity  and  independence  of  the  individual 
soul  as  contrasted  to  its  particular  states.  For  the  first 
time  in  European  thought  does  the  soul  become  an  in 
dependent  factor  to  be  reckoned  with.  The  Stoic  picture 
of  the  ideal  personality  is  of  a  life  completely  sundered 
from  outward  conditions,  free  from  earthly  trammels, 
but  at  the  same  time  the  organ  of  universal  law.  Con 
temporaries  asked  the  Stoics,  How  can  such  an  ideal 
be  a  person  ?  How  can  he  live  among  his  fellow  men  ? 
How  can  he  reconcile  himself  to  human  want  ?  After 
setting  forth  this  ideal  during  the  175  years  of  their 
first  period,  it  is  not  strange  that  they  were  finally  forced 
to  modify  it  in  response  to  practical  demands.  At  this 
point  we  shall  consider  the  original  portrayal  of  the 
Wise  Man. 

i.  The  Stoic  Psychology.  The  Stoic  built  his  con 
ception  of  personality  upon  a  deep  psychological  analy 
sis.  The  soul  in  the  body  is  like  the  pneuma  in  the 
world  (see  p.  255).  Not  only  does  the  soul  transform  the 
excitations  of  the  several  sense  organs  into  perceptions, 
but  its  distinguishing  faculty  is  its  power  of  trans 
forming  the  excitations  of  the  feelings  into  acts  of  will. 


STOICISM  249 

This  was  called  by  the  Stoics  the  assent  of  the  reason, 
and  is  the  distinguishing  feature  of  the  Stoic  concep 
tion  of  personality.  It  established  for  the  first  time 
in  history  the  independence  of  the  personal  soul.  The 
Stoic  felt  keenly  the  antagonism  between  the  reason 
and  the  senses,  and  he  also  felt  that  by  estimating  the 
senses  as  merely  relative  in  value  they  would  so  much 
the  more  dignify  the  reason  as  the  fundamental  feature 
of  the  personality.  While,  therefore,  all  knowledge 
comes  from  the  senses,  the  Stoic  maintained  that  no 
knowledge  exists  in  the  senses  by  themselves.  The 
assent  of  the  reason  is  necessary  to  transform  the  sen 
sations  into  true  knowledge.  The  reason  is  not  an  aggre 
gate  of  sensations,  but  an  independent  function  of  the 
personality.  It  transforms  the  sensations  into  percep 
tions,  the  perceptions  into  acts  of  will.  The  reason  is 
therefore  a  kind  of  generating  power  of  consciousness 
and  is  free  from  everything  external.  But  in  contrast 
to  this  free  rational  side  is  the  irrational  nature  of  man  ; 
for  the  reason  is  liable  to  suffer  failure,  when  it  allows 
itself  to  be  hurried  along  to  give  assent  to  exciting 
causes.  Then  emotions  arise,  and  emotions  are  failures, 
mental  disturbances,  and  in  chronic  cases  diseases.  Man 
is  not  always  able  to  defend  himself  against  the  excita 
tions  of  his  environment,  but  he  can  refuse  to  give  the 
excitations  his  assent.  He  can  refuse  to  allow  the  ex 
citations  to  become  emotions  and  to  pour  forth  his  life 
in  passion.  Man  may  be  in  the  world  and  not  of  it. 
He  may  govern  the  world  by  controlling  himself.  The 
Wise  Man  is  free  from  the  emotions,  and  virtue  consists 
in  their  absence.  The  virtuous  man  is  self-sufficient  in 
the  proud  consciousness  that  he  can  look  upon  pleasure 
as  not  a  good  and  pain  as  not  an  evil. 


250  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

What  guide  does  the  reason  have  in  granting  or  re 
fusing  its  assent  to  its  perceptions  from  without  ?  What 
is  the  criterion  of  the  truth?  The  clearness  of  the  per 
ception  —  the  clearness  in  the  sense  that  the  presenta 
tion  lays  hold  of  the  mind  and  extorts  its  assent.  The 
truth  is  the  "irresistible  presentation"  or  the  "  appre 
hending  presentation."  Who  can  know  the  truth  ?  The 
Wise  Man.  By  what  means  ?  By  sensation  and  pre 
conception.  By  what  sign  ?  By  the  sign  of  its  irresistible 
power.  The  Wise  Man  is  perfectly  free  and  perfectly 
necessitated  —  he  never  gives  assent  except  to  what 
constrains  assent. 

2.  The  Highest  Good.  What  is  then  the  Highest 
Good  or  happiness  for  such  a  personality  ?  After  such 
an  analysis,  what  would  the  Stoic  be  likely  to  conceive 
to  be  the  true  ends  of  life  ?  The  very  nature  of  the  per 
sonality  gives  the  answer.  Personality  is  fundamentally 
rational  activity  which  seeks  to  preserve  itself  and  to 
gratify  its  own  nature.  The  Highest  Good  is  the  law 
of  its  own  rationality,  and  virtue  consists  in  being 
rational.  In  reaching  for  the  Highest  Good  man  can 
transcend  his  particular  faculties  in  his  free  obedience 
to  his  own  reason  ;  and  the  wholeness  of  his  existence 
depends  upon  the  wholeness  of  his  deed.  Thus  is  the 
inner  activity  whole,  in  contrast  to  the  partial  outer 
activities.  Inwardness  attains  complete  independence 
and  finds  the  depth  of  the  soul.  We  are  free  and  we 
are  happy  if  the  whole  being  goes  out  in  contemplation 
of  the  world  reason  which  is  our  reason,  and  if  all  the 
feelings  that  make  us  dependent  on  the  world  are  ex 
cluded.  Since  the  emotions  place  a  false  value  on  things, 
happiness  demands  a  whole  effort  and  ceaseless  activity. 
We  must  not  merely  theorize,  but  thought  must  become 


STOICISM  251 

conduct.  Thought-action  yields  happiness.  It  does  not 
matter  whether  man  acts  with  reference  to  this  or  that, 
for  external  objects  are  neither  good  nor  bad.  The  whole 
question  is  whether  the  reason  controls  the  passions 
or  not.  If  the  reason  controls,  the  end  is  good ;  if  the 
passions  control,  the  end  is  evil ;  all  other  ends  are  in 
different.  The  reason  either  does  or  does  not  rule,  and 
an  act  is  either  good  or  not.  Good  is  not  relative,  but 
absolute ;  and  such  relative  matters  as  wealth,  honor,  and 
riches  are  matters  of  indifference.  Even  life  itself  is 
one  of  the  indifferent  things  and  may  be  taken  when  it 
does  not  serve  the  ends  of  reason.  The  Highest  Good 
is  that  inner  unity  —  that  disposition  —  which  is  gov 
erned  by  a  single  principle. 

The  Stoic  word  for  this  ideal  Good  is  apathy,  just  as 
the  Epicurean  word  was  ataraxy  or  imperturbability. 
Positively  defined,  it  is  virtue.  Negatively  defined,  can 
we  say  it  was  passionlessness?  This  would  not  be  quite 
correct.  By  apathy  the  Stoic  means  not  absence  of  all 
feeling,  but  absence  of  control  by  the  feelings.  The 
Stoic  was  filled  with  joy,  gratitude,  serene  confidence, 
and  unwavering  submission  in  regard  to  rational  law. 
Apathy  is  not  dull  insensibility,  but  immovable  firmness. 
It  is  absence  of  the  emotions  that  render  the  man  de 
pendent  on  the  world,  but  it  is  not  absence  of  the  reach 
ing  out  of  the  soul  for  the  divine.  The  Highest  Good 
or  Apathy  is  (1)  intellectual  resignation  to  the  uni 
verse,  (2)  practical  inner  harmony,  and  (3)  self-con 
trol.  In  seeking  to  be  rational,  man  is  following  an 
impulse,  —  the  impulse  of  self-preservation. 

The  Conception  of  Nature.  In  comparison  with  the 
Epicurean  the  position  of  the  Stoic  was  peculiarly  in 
volved.  The  ideal  imperturbability  of  the  Epicurean  was 


252  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

simple  in  so  far  that  it  required  nothing  beyond  itself. 
It  was  an  individual  matter  and  varied  with  the  individ 
ual.  But  the  Stoic  ideal  personality  is  based  upon  the 
reason,  that  is  eternally  one  and  the  same.  What  is  this 
absolute  principle  that  gives  to  the  human  reason  its 
absoluteness  ?  What  is  the  extent  of  the  law  of  the  rea 
son  that  the  human  reason  itself  implies?  Thus  the 
Stoic  needed  to  supplement  his  conception  of  personal 
ity  and  the  Epicurean  did  not.  Because  his  individualism 
was  more  rigorous,  it  needed  the  more  to  be  supported. 
The  Stoic  principle  of  morality  had  to  have  its  founda 
tion  in  the  absolute  nature  of  things.  This  foundation 
could  not  be  the  politico-moral  principle  of  Greek 
national  life,  for  that  existed  no  longer.  It  could  not 
be  a  transcendent,  supersensuous,  or  incorporeal  prin 
ciple,  for  his  Cynic  inheritance  would  forbid  his  look 
ing  beyond  experience.  The  supplementary  absolute 
principle  of  the  Stoics  must  be  an  immanent  prin 
ciple,  a  living  power  in  the  world.  A  pantheistic  con 
ception  of  Nature  took  its  place  side  by  side  with  the 
Stoic  conception  of  personality,  and  this  conception  of 
Nature  became  the  central  point  of  the  Stoic  meta 
physics.  For  this  the  Stoics  adopted  the  Logos  doctrine 
of  Heracleitus,  which  will  be  recalled  as  the  doctrine  of 
primal  matter  as  rational,  just,  and  fateful  changing- 
ness.  The  Stoics  were  reinforced  in  this  by  Aristotle's 
teleological  philosophy  of  nature.  Yet  they  tried  to  over* 
come  the  dualism  of  matter  and  Form  as  it  existed  in 
Aristotle's  teaching,  and  one  feels  that  the  Stoic  pan 
theism  was  a  conscious  and  avowed  pantheism.  The 
Stoic  conception  of  Nature  is  that  of  a  unitary,  ra 
tional,  and  living  whole,  having  no  parts,  but  only  de 
terminate  forms.  Yet  it  cannot  be  called  a  hylozoism, 


STOICISM  253 

like  the  doctrine  of  Heracleitus,  for  there  Form  and 
matter  had  not  been  distinguished.  In  the  interven 
ing  years  Form  and  matter  had  been  separated,  and 
the  Stoic  sought  to  put  them  together  again.  In  com 
parison  with  the  doctrine  of  the  Old  Schools,  the  Stoic 
teaching  was  (1)  monistic,  as  against  their  dualism, 
(2)  materialistic,  as  against  their  idealism,  but  (3)  like 
them,  it  was  teleological. 

1.  In  the  first  place,  Nature  is   an   all-pervading 
World- Be  ing.  It  is  God,  u  in  whom  we  live  and  move 
and  have  our  being."  It  contains  in  itself  all  cosmic 
phenomena,  and  processes,  past,  present,  and  future.  It 
is  the  World-ground  and  the  World-mind,  and  yet  it  is 
all-in-all.  It   is  the  productive  and   formative  power, 
the  vitalizing  principle.   In   general,   it  is  the  creative 
and  guiding   reason ;  in  particular,  it   is  Providence  or 
divine  government.    It    is   the    unswerving  whole    in 
which  the  single  events  of  history  take  place.  To  the 
Stoics  the  cosmic  Reason  was  so  apparent  in  Nature 
that  purpose  appeared  to  them  in  everything.  In  their 
hands  the  great   teleological   conception  of  Aristotle's 
immanent  purposiveness  sank   to  the  petty  purposive- 
ness  for  human  beings  and  for  the  gods.   Yet  it  is  no 
wonder   that  this  conception  of  an  all-pervasive  deity 
became  a  religion  to  the  Stoics  and  raised  their  moral 
code  to  the  region  of  the  sublime.  The  world  is  Fate 
so   far    as  the    minutest    movements   are   determined. 
Nature  is   Providence  so  far  as  those   determinations 
are  full  of  purpose.  Nature  is  in  every  part  perfect  and 
without  blemish. 

2.  In  the  second  place,  Nature  is  an  all-compelling 
law.  Nature  is   an   inviolable  necessity,  an  inevitable 
destiny,  that  holds  all  phenomena  in  complete  causal 


254  HISTOKY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

connection.  Yet  this  destiny  only  proves  the  complete 
purpose  of  the  whole.  The  Stoic  seized  upon  the  cen 
tral  principle  of  Democritus,  —  which  the  Epicureans 
had  overlooked,  —  the  supremacy  of  law.  "  The  doctrine 
of  Democritus  passed  over  to  the  Epicureans  only  so 
far  as  it  was  atomism  and  mechanism ;  with  regard  to 
the  deeper  and  more  valuable  principle  of  the  universal 
reign  of  law  in  Nature,  his  legacy  passed  to  the  Stoics."  l 
There  is  no  such  thing  as  chance  ;  everything  is  caused. 
In  Epicureanism  one  finds  the  doctrine  of  necessity,  but 
the  necessity  comes  from  the  atoms  themselves.  In 
I  Stoicism  the  necessity  resides  in  the  living  activity  of 
I  the  whole.  A  living  activity !  Herein  the  Stoic  concep 
tion  differs  from  the  Democritan  teaching.  The  necessity 
is  a  living  necessity,  the  destiny  a  living  destiny. 

3.  In  the  third  place,  Nature,  is  matter.  On  the  the 
oretical  side  Stoicism  agrees  with  Epicureanism  only  at 
one  point,  —  both  were  materialistic.  The  materialism 
of  both  these  New  Schools  got  a  disproportionate  pro 
minence  because  it  had  to  be  defended  against  the  at 
tacks  of  the  Academy  and  the  Lyceum.  The  material 
ism  of  the  Epicureans  was  a  mere  adoption  of  a  theory ; 
the  materialism  of  the  Stoics  was  only  one  aspect  of  its 
supplementary  basis.  Nevertheless,  to  the  Stoic  matter 
alone  is  real,  because  it  alone  acts  and  is  acted  upon. 
Everything  is  matter, — nature-objects,  God  and  the 
soul,  and  even  the  qualities,  forces,  and  relations  between 
material  bodies.  The  Stoics  regarded  the  presence  and 
interchange  of  the  qualities  of  things  as  the  appearance 
and  intermingling  of  bodies  in  these  things. 

There  can  be  no  doubt  about  the  materialism  of  the 
Stoic  teaching,  although  both  material  and  spiritual 
i  Windelband,  Hist,  of  Phil.,  p>  183. 


STOICISM  255 

attributes  are  ascribed  to  God  in  a  way  that  is  start 
ling.  The  Heracleitan  conception  of  fire  as  the  primary 
substance  is  the  Stoic  conception  of  God.  God  is  fire> 
air,  ether,  and  most  commonly  the  atmospheric  currents 
which  pervade  all  things.  But  God  is  also  the  World- 
soul,  the  World-mind,  the  Cosmic-reason,  the  universal 
Law,  Nature,  Destiny,  Providence.  He  is  a  perfect, 
happy,  and  kind  Being.  In  single  statements  these  as 
pects  are  often  combined  and  God  is  described  as  the 
Fiery  Reason  of  the  world,  the  Mind  in  matter,  the 
reasonable  Air-currents.  The  Stoic  equation  is  Nature = 
Matter  =  Fire  =  Reason  =  Fate  =  Providence  =  God. 

The  Stoics  followed  Heracleitus  also  in  their  concep 
tion  of  the  development  of  the  present  world  from  the 
cosmic  fire.  "  In  all  points  of  detail  their  views  on  what 
we  call  physical  science  are  contemptible.  They  con 
tained  not  one  iota  of  scientific  thinking." 1  They  fol 
lowed  Aristotle,  however,  in  their  description  of  the 
elements  and  their  teleological  arrangements. 

The  primitive  substance  changes  by  its  own  inner 
rational  law  into  force  and  matter.  Force  is  the  World- 
soul,  the  pneuma  or  warm  breath,  which  pervades  all 
things.  Matter  is  the  World-body,  and  is  water  and 
earth.  In  cosmic  periods  the  primitive  fire  is  destined 
to  re-absorb  the  world  of  variety  into  itself  and  then 
consume  it  in  a  universal  catastrophe. 

The  most  important  feature  in  the  Stoic  materialism 
is  the  conception  of  pneuma,  or  the  force  into  which  the 
original  substance  is  differentiated.  This  is  the  World- 
soul.  Nature  is  thus  conceived  as  dynamical.  The  Stoic 
word  for  the  World-soul  is  translated  by  various  ex 
pressions,  as  "  creative  reason,"  "  generative  powers," 

1  Adarason,  The  Development  of  Greek  Philosophy,  p.  267. 


256  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

44  formative  fire-mind."  It  penetrates  all  things  and  dom 
inates  all  as  their  active  principle.  Through  it  the  uni 
verse  is  one,  not  a  plurality  of  parts.  The  pneuma  is  the 
life  of  the  universe.  Its  motion  is  spontaneous  ;  its  devel 
opment  is  teleological.  The  pneuma  is  an  extraordinarily 
condensed  conception,  containing  as  it  does  suggestions 
from  Heracleitus'  Logos,  Anaxagoras'  Nous,  Democri- 
tus'  fire-atoms,  and  Aristotle's  Energeia. 

The  human  being  has  a  constitution  analogous  to  the 
universe.  Man  is  the  microcosm  and  the  universe  the 
|  macrocosm.    The   soul  of  man  is  the    pneuma  which 
'  holds  his  body  together,  and  it  is  an  emanation  from  the 
.  divine  pneuma.  Mental  states  —  thought  and  emotions 
i  —  are  air  currents.  Virtue  is  the  tension  of  the  atmos 
pheric  substance  of  the  soul.  The  material,  yet  divine, 
pneuma  constitutes  man's  reason,  causes  his  activities, 
is  seated  in  his  breast.  Since  the  pneuma  is  a  body,  it 
disconnects  itself  from  the  human  corpse  at  death,  has 
a  limited  immortality,  and  returns  to  the  cosmic  pneuma 
at  the  conflagration  of  the  world. 

The  Conceptions  of  Nature  and  Personality  supple 
ment  each  other.  Thus  fundamentally  the  personality 
is  identical  with  the  cosmos  —  it  is  reason.  To  turn  the 
matter  about,  by  reason  or  "  nature  "  the  Stoic  means 
two  things  that  are  essentially  one.  He  means  the  rea 
son  of  man,  or  the  reason  of  the  world ;  to  "  live  ac 
cording  to  nature  "  is  to  live  according  to  the  nature  of 
man  or  according  to  the  nature  of  the  world.  The  life 
of  the  Wise  Man  as  a  harmony  with  physical  nature 
is  a  harmony  with  itself  as  well.  The  antithesis  to 
"  nature  "  or  "  reason  "  is  sensuous  nature.  What  we 
speak  of  as  the  natural  impulses  were  not  "  natural  " 
at  all  in  the  Stoic  teaching. 


STOICISM  207 

"  Nature  "  as  universal  is  the  creative  cosmic  power 
acting  for  ends.  Coordination  with  this  constitutes  mo 
rality.  It  is  a  willing  obedience  to  eternal  necessity. 
The  "  fool "  acts  according  to  his  sensations  and  im 
pulses,  and  therefore  against  "  nature."  But  the  Wise 
Man,  by  withdrawing  within  himself,  is  his  own  inde 
pendent  master  because  he  is  acting  universally.  "  Na 
ture  "  is  the  life-unity  of  the  human  soul  with  the 
world  reason.  True  individual  morality  is  therefore 
universal  morality,  complete  humanity,  universal  ra 
tionality.  To  obey  "  nature  "  is  to  develop  the  essential 
germ  in  one's  self. 

Thus  these  two  points  of  view  were  obtained  of 
life-unity:  a  universe  rationally  guiding  in  all  its 
changes ;  the  human  individual  epitomizing  this  uni 
verse  in  himself  as  a  rule  for  his  conduct  amid  his 
vicissitudes. 

The  Stoic  and  Society.  Men  are  divided  into  two 
classes,  —  the  entirely  wise  and  virtuous,  or  the  entirely 
foolish  and  vicious.  There  is  no  middle  ground.  If  a 
man  possesses  a  sound  reason,  he  has  all  the  virtues ;  if 
he  lacks  this  reason,  he  lacks  all.  There  are  only  a  few 
Sages ;  the  mass  of  men  are  fools.  The  Stoics  were 
continually  lamenting  with  Pharisaical  pessimism  the 
great  baseness  of  men.  From  their  sublime  height  they 
looked  upon  the  Wise  Man  as  incapable  of  sin,  upon 
the  fool  as  incapable  of  virtue.  In  thus  denying  the 
ordinary  distinctions  between  good  and  evil,  they  were 
dangerous  in  politics.  Their  political  perspective  was 
not  reliable.  In  general,  they  did  not  enter  the  politics 
of  the  democracies  where  they  lived.  They  were,  how 
ever,  often  the  advisers  of  tyrants,  and  often  assisted  in 
removing  them  (as  in  the  case  of  Julius  Cresar).  The 


258  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

Stoic  School  of  Musonius  Rufus  made  a  splendid  Puri 
tan  protest  against  Nero  and  Domitian,  and  finally  his 
disciples  and  friends  controlled  the  empire  for  a  cen« 
tury  (second  century  A.  D.).1  The  Stoic  regarded  his 
Wise  Man  as  attaining  the  same  independence  that  the 
Epicurean  claimed  for  his  Wise  Man.  He  is  lord  and 
king.  He  is  inferior  to  no  other  rational  being,  not  even 
to  Zeus  himself. 

The  Stoic  differs  from  the  Epicurean  in  his  attitude 
toward  the  political  state.  The  two  Schools  agree  that 
the  sufficient  Wise  Man  needs  the  state  but  little.  The 
Epicurean  teaches  that  society  is  not  natural  and  not 
inherent  in  human  nature.  The  Stoic,  however,  main 
tained  that  society  is  a  divine  institution,  which  gives 
way  only  occasionally  to  man's  individual  perfecting. 
Since  man  and  the  cosmic  reason  are  identical,  all  men 
are  essentially  identical.  When  men  therefore  lead  a 
life  of  reason,  they  lead  a  social  life.  This  realm  of  rea 
son  includes  not  Romans  alone,  but  all  men,  gods,  and 
slaves.  But  the  political  government  is  only  secondary, 
for  the  Stoic's  ideal  is  a  universal  empire.  The  Stoic's 
interest  in  practical  politics  was  as  weak  as  his  ideal 
of  a  rational  society  was  transcendent.  His  teaching  of 
justice  and  love  for  man  was,  however,  a  forecasting 
of  the  coming  religious  emancipation. 

There  are  two  antagonistic  tendencies  running 
through  Stoicism.  The  first  is  to  seek  society  with 
its  virtues,  —  justice,  love  of  men,  sociability  or  cos 
mopolitanism.  The  second  dispenses  with  society  to 
gain  an  inner  freedom.  Yet  these  two  tendencies  often 
coincide. 

They  may  be  presented  as  follows :  — 

1  Professor  C.  P.  Parker. 


STOICISM  259 

To  seek  society.  To  dispense  with  society. 

1.  Exaltation    of  justice  Exaltation  of  inner  freedom 
and  love.  and  happiness. 

2.  World  citizenship.  The  Wise  Man. 

3.  Relations  and  degrees  Absolute  virtue  and   abso- 
of  virtue.  lute  vice. 

4.  Virtue  depends  some-  Knowledge  alone  is  virtue, 
what  on  conditions. 

5.  Individual  should  sub-  Individual  should  make  fate, 
mit  to  fate. 

Duty  and  Responsibility.  The  Stoic's  identity  or 
human  and  cosmic  reason  elevated  the  law  of  human 
conduct  into  a  strict,  universal  law  of  duty.  It  em 
bodies,  on  the  one  hand,  the  Cynic's  protest  against 
external  law,  and  on  the  other  the  construction  of  the 
inner  moral  law.  The  backbone  of  Stoicism  is  sense  of 
responsibility.  The  Stoics  brought  out  as  never  before 
the  contrast  between  what  is  and  what  ought  to  be. 
They  were  the  most  outspoken  doctrinaires  of  antiquity, 
and  formed  a  school  of  character  building  in  stubborn 
ness.  As  time  went  on  they  substituted  human  nature 
for  cosmic  nature,  and  then  accentuated  human  nature 
as  conscience.  The  individual  could  then  define  the 
right  for  himself,  and  this  sort  of  individualism  was  de 
veloped  with  so  much  skill  that  it  admitted  great  laxity 
of  morals.  Duty  commands  some  things  and  forbids 
others,  but  there  are  left  a  great  mass  of  activities  that 
are  ethically  indifferent.  These  indifferent  matters 
offered  opportunity  for  these  men  of  conscience  to  per 
form  what  in  the  eyes  of  others  were  crimes  (for  ex 
ample,  Brutus).  Baseness  is  only  what  is  uncondition 
ally  forbidden. 

Yet  it  must  not  be  supposed  that  the  Stoics  generally 


260  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

employed  the  indifferent  as  an  excuse  for  moral  license. 
On  the  contrary,  the  concept  of  life  as  a  struggle  origi 
nated  with  the  Stoics,  and  from  them  it  passed  into  the 
common  consciousness  of  man.  There  was  before  them 
(1)  the  struggle  with  environment  dominated  by  a 
false  evaluation,  (2)  the  struggle  with  effete  civilization, 
(3)  the  struggle  particularly  with  one's  self.  The  Stoic 
hero  of  inner  courage  and  greatness  of  soul  rises  above 
his  fellows,  not  because  he  gains  dominion  over  the 
world,  but  because  in  indifference  to  it  he  isolates  him 
self.  He  exists  in  premeditation  of  doing  rather  than 
in  the  actual  doing  in  which  his  power  would  be  spent. 
Still,  in  the  absolute  contrast  between  the  good  and  the 
evil,  in  making  life  a  disjunctive,  an  "  Either  —  Or," 
duty  got  a  definite  and  distinct  meaning.  Duty,  accord 
ing  to  the  Stoics'  conception,  had  not  so  much  the  nature 
of  an  imperative  as  of  what  is  suitable,  —  an  act  adapted 
to  nature,  a  consistent  and  justifiable  act.  In  a  manner 
unknown  to  antiquity  the  ethical  nature  of  conduct  was 
thus  universalized  in  the  new  conceptions  of  philan 
thropy,  of  the  universality  of  God  and  man,  in  the  ten 
dency  to  suppress  slavery  and  care  for  the  poor  and 
sick.  Nevertheless,  as  a  moral  force  Stoicism  accepted 
the  world  as  it  found  the  world,  and  did  not  attempt  to 
make  it  over. 

The  Problem  of  Evil  and  the  Problem  of  Freedom. 
On  the  questions  of  moral  freedom  and  evil,  the  Stoics 
suffered  severe  attacks  from  the  Academy  and  the  Epi 
cureans.  Alone  among  the  Schools  of  antiquity  the 
Stoics  preached  the  doctrine  of  Fate.  The  demands  of 
ethical  responsibility,  however,  required  that  the  indi 
vidual  should  determine  his  own  conduct.  To  suit  these 
demands  the  Stoic  did  not  modify  his  fundamental 


STOICISM  2G1 

conception  of  Nature,  but  he  tried  to  justify  his  position 
on  the  ground  that  the  individual  expressed  the  law  of 
nature.  His  argument  may  be  stated  thus  :  Man  is  like 
God  ;  Man  is  one  with  God ;  Man  is  free.  It  was  also 
stated  on  psychological  grounds.  Man  can  have  one  of 
two  attitudes  toward  the  world-law :  (1)  his  perform 
ance  may  be  through  blind  compulsion ;  (2)  his  per 
formance  may  be  through  an  intelligent  understanding 
of  the  law,  in  which  case  he  is  free.  The  occurrence  of 
his  act  is  fateful,  but  it  makes  great  difference  to  the 
man  whether  the  occurrence  is  in  spite  of  him  or  with 
his  intelligent  acquiescence.  The  occurrence  is  not  an 
evil  in  itself ;  for  physical  evils  are  no  evils,  and  things 
that  appear  to  be  moral  evils  are  (1)  subservient  to  the 
good ;  (2)  merely  relative  to  good ;  or  (3)  show  that 
God's  ways  are  not  our  ways.  My  will  is  mine  though 
necessary  ;  my  will  is  mine  though  it  be  law.  The  soul 
is  free  when  it  fulfills  its  own  destiny.  God  works 
through  man's  will.  Outer  circumstances  are  only  ac 
cessory  causes,  but  the  main  cause  is  the  assent  of  the 
will.  At  the  same  time  the  Stoics  did  not  shrink  from 
the  logic  of  their  own  fatalism.  Chrysippus  said  that 
only  on  the  basis  of  determinism  could  correct  judg 
ments  of  the  future  be  made.  Only  on  this  ground 
could  the  gods  foreknow.  Only  the  necessary  can  be 
known. 

The  Modifications  of  the  Stoic  Doctrine  after  the 
First  Period.  The  inherent  difficulties  in  the  Stoic  doc 
trine  and  the  attacks  upon  it  gave  rise  to  later  conces 
sion  that  only  further  complicated  it.  (1)  The  moral 
ideal  was  lowered  to  make  a  set  of  rules  for  the  medi 
ocre  man,  and  thereby  the  Stoics  became  the  originators 
of  the  dangerous  doctrine  of  a  twofold  morals. 


262  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

(2)  By  admitting  any  supposition  instead  of  strict 
scientific  deduction  into  their  theory  they  introduced 
probabilism.    An   absolute    personality !    An    absolute 
Nature!  In  order  to  make  either  practical  the  Stoics 
had  to  modify  both.  In  the  course  of  time,  when  new 
leaders  represented  the  School,  there  came  compromises 
according  to  practical  exigencies.  The  teaching  of  the 
Wise  Man  was  superseded  by  instruction  how  to  be 
come  wise.  The  moral  idealism  was  not  renounced  but 
the  idea  of  progress  was  introduced. 

(3)  The  doctrine  of  Goods  was  modified.  From  out 
the  Goods,  esteemed  as  indifferent,  there  appear  Goods 
as  desirable.  Yet  these  were  never  thought  to  be  Goods 
in  themselves,  but  were  only  adapted  to  further  the 
Good  in  itself.  Such  were,  for  example,  the  physical 
Good  of  health,  enjoyment  of  the  senses,  etc.  On  the 
side  of  its  ideals  Stoicism  thus  was  brought  into  touch 
wfth  practical  life. 

(4)  A  distinction  was  made  concerning  those  who 
were  not  Wise  Men.  It  was  recognized  that  all  "  fools  " 
are  not  the  same  distance  from  virtue.  There  are  then 
recognized  progressive  men,  —  men  who  are  improving. 
Apathy  is  thus  modified  by  a  state  of  progress.   Even 
the  Wise  Man  has  in  common  with  others  the  affections 
of  his  senses,  such  as  pain.  The  Stoic  ethical  aristocracy 
became   more  humane.  Nevertheless,  the  Stoic   never 
yielded  this  point,  viz.,  that  there  is  no  gradual  growth 
in  virtue.  Virtue  is  not  attained  through  a  transition. 
It  is  a  sudden  turning  about. 

(5)  During  the  empire   Stoicism  became  merely  a 
moral  philosophy,  but    even  in  this  form  it   was  an 
impressive  presentation  of  the  noblest  convictions  of 
antiquity.  It  prepared  moral  feeling  for  Christianity. 


STOICISM  263 


The  more  Stoicism  became  mere  moralizing,  the  more 
the  Cynic  element  in  it  dominated  it.  In  the  first  and 
second  centuries  Cynicism  was  revived  by  wandering, 
garbed  preachers,  who  went  about  affecting  beggary 
and  teaching  morals. 


CHAPTER  XII 

SKEPTICISM  AND  ECLECTICISM 

The  Appearances  of  Philosophic  Skepticism.  We 
have  now  traced  the  history  of  the  positive  and  dogmatic 
aspect  of  the  Hellenic-Roman  Period  through  its  Ethi 
cal  Division  and  far  into  the  Religious  Division  of  the 
Period.  The  influence  of  the  ethical  movement  did  not 
disappear  until  at  least  two  centuries  after  the  begin 
ning  of  this  era,  and  the  Schools  themselves  did  not 
disappear  until  they  were  abolished  by  Justinian  in 
529  A.  D.  But  the  Ethical  Period  may  be  said  to  close 
at  the  beginning  of  this  era,  and  even  a  century  and  a 
half  before  that  —  about  150  B.  c. — its  positive  and 
dogmatic  character  had  been  lost.  Eclecticism  appeared 
in  the  Schools,  and  the  last  one  hundred  and  fifty  years 
of  the  Ethical  Period  was  in  character  transitional  and 
eclectic.  This  was  caused  by  the  growth  and  power  of 
Skepticism,  which  we  have  already  pointed  out  as  the 
undercurrent  of  the  entire  period.  Skepticism  was  the 
fundamental  frame  of  mind  of  the  eight  hundred  years 
of  this  time.  It  was  the  negative  side  of  the  period  in 
contrast  with  the  Schools.  Philosophic  Skepticism  ap 
peared  contemporaneously  with  the  rise  of  the  New 
Schools  at  the  very  beginning  of  the  Period,  and  the  con 
troversy  between  the  Schools  and  Skepticism  reached 
its  height  about  150  B.  c.  What  was  the  result?  Did 
philosophy  turn,  as  in  the  Age  of  Pericles,  back  to 
greater  triumphs  in  speculation  ?  No  ;  the  world  was  no 
longer  virile  and  no  longer  possessed  the  creative  im- 


SKEPTICISM  AND   ECLECTICISM  265 

pulse.  On  account  of  the  attacks  of  Skepticism  upon 
the  Schools,  philosophy  dissolved  itself  first  into  eclecti 
cism,  and  then  later  by  the  introduction  of  new  elements 
from  the  East  was  superseded  by  religion.  In  the  philo 
sophical  sense,  religion  and  eclecticism  are  both  skepti 
cal  —  both  have  doubts  of  the  ability  of  the  reason  to 
reach  truth.  Eclecticism  shows  its  Skepticism  by  doubt 
ing  any  one  dogmatic  scheme,  and  therefore  it  constructs 
a  compromise  of  all ;  religion  crowns  faith  in  place  of 
reason. 

Philosophic  Skepticism  in  these  times  did  not  appear 
except  with  reference  to  the  doctrines  of  the  Schools. 
It  arose  as  merely  polemical  and  antagonistic  to  the 
Schools'  teaching.  While  the  Skepticism  of  antiquity 
busied  itself  with  the  problem  of  knowledge,  it  was 
superficial  compared  with  modern  Skepticism.  Ancient 
Skepticism  did  not  doubt  that  the  object  of  knowledge 
existed ;  it  did  not  doubt  that  the  object  of  knowledge  is 
external  and  even  material.  It  assumed  that  things  exist 
which,  to  the  modern  Skeptic,  is  the  problem  at  issue. 

We  shall  look  now  at  the  appearances  of  philosophic 
Skepticism,  and  the  effect  of  this  Skepticism  upon  the 
Schools  in  their  turning  to  eclecticism. 

The  Three  Phases  of  Philosophic  Skepticism.  These 
are  three  somewhat  loosely  connected  appearances  of 
Skepticism,  and  are  determined  in  their  character  in 
large  measure  by  the  doctrines  which  they  attacked. 

i.  The  First  Phase  of  Philosophic  Skepticism  is 
called  Pyrrhonism  (from  about  300  to  230  B.  a).  This 
was  a  Skepticism  directed  against  the  assumptions  of 
the  philosophy  of  Aristotle.  From  the  dates  above  it 
will  be  seen  to  be  contemporary  with  the  founding  of 
the  Stoic  and  Epicurean  Schools,  at  the  very  beginning 


266  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

of  the  period.  The  two  representatives  were  Pyrrho 
(365-275  B.  c.)  of  Elis  and  his  pupil  Timori  (320-230 
B.  c.)  of  Phlius.  When  Zeno  had  begun  to  teach  in 
the  Painted  Porch  and  Epicurus  in  the  Gardens,  when 
Theophrastus  had  succeeded  his  master  in  the  Lyceum 
and  Polenio  led  the  Academy,  the  Skeptic  Pyrrho  be 
gan  his  personal  instruction  in  the  city  of  Elis.  Pyrrho 
had  but  little  influence.  He  left  no  writings,  and  his 
doctrine  became  known  to  the  ancients  through  his 
pupil,  Timon,  who  was  the  literary  exponent  of  this 
Skepticism.  The  teaching  may  be  stated  in  the  three 
following  sentences  :  (1)  We  can  know  nothing  of  the 
nature  of  things,  but  only  of  the  states  of  feeling  into 
which  they  put  us ;  (2)  The  only  correct  attitude  of 
mind  is  to  withhold  all  judgment  and  restrain  all  action  ; 
(3)  The  result  of  this  suspense  of  judgment  is  ataraxia 
or  imperturbability.  The  Skeptic  therefore  sought  the 
same  internal  peace  for  which  Stoic  and  Epicurean 
were  seeking,  but  he  was  skeptical  of  the  Aristotelian 
metaphysics  as  an  instrument  to  gain  it.  The  opposite 
of  any  conclusion  being  equally  plausible,  suspense  of 
judgment  is  the  only  peace  of  mind. 

Pyrrhonism  reminded  the  age  after  Aristotle  that 
the  problem  of  the  certitude  of  knowledge  is  fundamen 
tal  and  must  be  settled  before  any  philosophy  can  be 
constructed.  The  School  was  short  lived,  and  people 
disposed  to  be  skeptical  joined  the  Academy. 

2.  The  Second  Period  of  Philosophic  Skepticism — 
The  Skepticism  of  the  Academy  (280-129  B.  c.).  The 
Middle  Academy  and  its  Skepticism  was  directed  par 
ticularly  against  the  Stoic  teaching  that  an  "  appre 
hensive  presentation  "  guaranteed  its  own  truth  by  the 
conviction  of  immediate  certainty.  The  two  most  distin- 


SKEPTICISM  AND  ECLECTICISM  2tt 

guished  representatives  of  this  Skeptical  period  of  the 
Academy  were  Arcesilaus  (315-241  B.  c.)  and  Carne- 
ades  (214-129  B.  c.).  Carneades  must  be  mentioned 
particularly  as  a  genius  and  a  philosopher  of  great 
personal  influence.  "  He  was  the  greatest  philosopher 
of  Greece  in  the  four  centuries  from  Chrysippus  to 
Plotinus  ;  indeed,  in  ability  and  depth  of  thought  he 
surpassed  Chrysippus."  l  Carneades  was  the  most  for 
midable  opponent  of  the  Stoics.  He  had  listened  to  the 
Stoic  lecturers,  had  studied  their  writings,  and  had  re 
futed  them  on  their  own  grounds  in  brilliant  lectures  of 
his  own. 

The  Skepticism  of  the  Academy  arose  somewhat  in 
this  way.  The  rivalry  of  the  Porch  and  the  Older  Acad 
emy  had  grown  apace  and  had  been  a  battle  between 
two  dogmatic  Schools.  The  Academy  was  being  worsted, 
its  ancient  spirit  was  waning,  and  it  had  gradually  de 
serted  speculation  for  ethics.  Under  Arcesilaus  it  was 
provoked  to  new  life  by  the  aggressive  dogmatism  of 
the  Stoics.  Speculation,  which  it  had  ignored,  it  now 
began  to  antagonize  openly.  Arcesilaus,  in  directing 
his  attack  against  the  doctrine  of  "  apprehensive  pre 
sentation  "  of  the  Stoics,  came  to  conclusions  but 
slightly  different  from  Pyrrho.  Carneades  laid  out  for 
himself  a  twofold  task :  (1)  to  refute  all  existing  dog 
mas,  and  (2)  to  evolve  a  theory  of  probability  as  the 
basis  for  practical  activity.  He  applied  his  Skepticism 
not  only  to  speculation,  like  Arcesilaus,  but  also  to 
ethics  and  religion.* 

1  A.  Hicks,  Stoic  and  Epicurean,  pp.  322  ff. 

*  Read  Grote,  Plato,  vol.  iii,  pp.  482-490,  for  the  interest 
ing  sophistical  problems  of  the  Liar,  the  Person  Disguised 
under  a  Veil,  Electra,  Sorites,  Cornutus,  and  the  Bald  Mao- 


268  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

The  Academy  did  not  fully  adopt  Skepticism,  but 
used  it  as  a  weapon  against  the  Stoics.  The  Platonic 
tradition  was  kept  alive  within  the  School,  and  Skepti 
cism  made  no  advance  in  the  Academy  after  Carneades. 
It  did  not  even  continue  in  the  path  marked  out  by 
him.  In  the  next  generation  the  Academy  became 
eclectic. 

3.  The  Third  Period  of  Philosophic  Skepticism  — 
Sensationalistic  Skepticism  (during  two  centuries  or 
more  of  the  Christian  era).  The  chief  representatives 
were  ^Enesidemus  of  Cnossus  (first  century  A.  D.), 
Agrippa  (about  200  A.  D.),  and  Sextus  Empiricus 
(about  200  A.  D.). 

This  phase  of  Skepticism  was  represented  mainly 
by  physicians,  with  arguments  based  upon  empirical 
physiological  grounds.  When  the  Academy  passed  from 
Skepticism  to  eclecticism,  Skepticism  became  centred  in 
Alexandria.  For  two  centuries  before  Galen  (131-201 
A.  D.)  great  discoveries  had  been  made  in  medicine,  but 
the  meaning  of  the  discoveries  had  not  been  appre 
hended.  There  was  a  general  feeling  among  physicians 
of  that  time  that  there  is  no  such  thing  as  scientific 
certainty ;  and  skeptical  arguments  were  constructed^ 
based  on  the  empirical  discoveries  of  the  scientific  circle 
of  Alexandria.  While  the  arguments  of  the  Academy 
were  mostly  formal  attacks  against  the  Stoics,  this 
Skeptical  School  of  physicians  returned  to  Pyrrhonism, 
immensely  reinforced  with  scientific  material.  It  strove 
in  vain  to  disassociate  itself  from  the  Academy,  for  it 
used  in  one  way  or  another  the  formal  arguments  of 
the  Skeptics  of  the  Academy.  In  his  eight  books  on 
Pyrrhonism,  .ZEnesidemus  developed  the  reasons  which 
induced  Pyrrho  to  call  in  question  the  possibility  of 


SKEPTICISM  AND  ECLECTICISM  269 

knowledge.  These  are  known  in  philosophjr  as  the  ten 
"  tropes,"  or  ten  ways  of  justifying  doubt.1  They  were 
badly  arranged  by  JEnesidemus  and  reduced  to  five  by 
Agrippa.2 

The  Last  Century  and  a  Half  of  the  Ethical  Period. 
(150  B.  c.-l  A.  D.).  Eclecticism.  —  About  150  B.  c.  the 
Ethical  Period  became  eclectic.  After  150  years  of 
passionate  controversy  the  Schools  began  to  compromise 
their  differences  and  fuse  into  one  another.  They  no 
longer  emphasized  their  differences,  but  began  to  point 
to  their  common  ground  of  unity.  This  tendency  to  fu 
sion  applies  only  to  the  Lyceum,  the  Academy,  and  the 
Porch.  The  Epicurean  School  was  never  a  party  to  this 
eclecticism  and  always  remained  relatively  stationary. 
The  fusion  occurred  only  in  the  teaching  of  the  Schools 
and  not  in  their  organization.  Externally  the  Schools 
remained  separate  bodies  for  six  hundred  years  longer. 
In  the  second  century  Hadrian  and  the  Anton  ines  en 
dowed  separate  chairs  for  them  in  the  University  of 
Athens.  They  were  not  abolished  as  Schools  until  529 
A.  D.,  by  Justinian.  Internally  their  independent  growth 
lasted  only  during  the  two  centuries  down  to  the  year 
150  B.  c.  At  this  time  their  theoretic  mission  had 
been  completed.  Their  internal  history  from  100  B.  C. 
to  529  A.  D.  was  one  of  compromise  and  adjustment. 
The  year  150  B.  c.  is  therefore  important.  At  this 
time  the  records  of  the  Schools  stop,  controversy  abates, 
Stoicism  and  Epicureanism  are  introduced  into  Rome, 
and  fusion  of  doctrines  begins. 

The  Stoic  School  was  the  first  to  incline  to  eclecti 
cism.  Its  own  doctrine  was  a  kind  of  fusion  of  incoher- 

1  For  a  statement  of  these  tropes,  see  Weber,  Hist,  of  Phil.,  p.  153. 
•  Ueberweg,  Hist,  of  Phil.,  vol.  i,  p.  216. 


270  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

ent  parts,  and  among  the  Schools  it  could  most  easily 
welcome  new  doctrines.  About  150  B.  c.,  under  the  lead 
of  Pansetius  and  Posidonius,  it  adopted  many  of  the 
Platonic  and  Aristotelian  teachings,  tempered  its  own 
ethical  rigorism,  and  extended  its  scientific  interests.  At 
the  same  time  the  Peripatetics  of  the  Lyceum  united 
the  pantheism  of  the  Stoics  to  their  own  theism.  After 
the  death  of  Carneades  in  129  B.  C.  the  Academy 
turned  from  Skepticism  back  to  the  Platonic  tradition, 
but  it  was  a  meagre  Platonism  adulterated  with  many 
foreign  elements.  For  example,  Antiochus  of  Ascalon 
taught  Cicero  from  the  Academy  at  Athens  in  the  win 
ter  of  79-78  B.  c.  that  Platonism  and  Aristotelianism 
were  only  different  aspects  of  the  same  doctrine. 

There  were  two  factors  that  prepared  an  easy  way 
for  the  rapid  spread  of  eclecticism.  One  was  the  grow 
ing  Skepticism  that  was  so  fundamental  in  Hellenism, 
and  the  other  was  the  adoption  of  Hellenic  culture  by 
the  Romans.  Eclecticism  is,  after  all,  only  another  form 
of  Skepticism.  Both  exhibit  the  spirit  of  undecided 
conviction.  Neither  has  regard  for  the  bonds  of  tradi 
tion,  for  both  regard  the  individual  superior  to  every 
tradition  or  system.  Eclecticism,  indeed,  attempts  to  re 
concile  differing  systems ;  but  in  doing  this  it  casts  a 
doubt  upon  the  infallibility  of  them  all  only  to  a  lesser 
degree  than  Skepticism.  The  spread  of  eclecticism  was 
therefore  only  an  extension  from  Greece  of  the  skepti 
cal  spirit  upon  the  world,  and  the  Roman  world  gave  a 
glad  welcome  to  such  a  spirit.  The  Roman  character 
was  naturally  eclectic.  After  his  first  aversion  the  Ro 
man  was  hospitable  to  all  philosophies  arid  religions. 
In  his  practical  way,  undisturbed  by  philosophical  hair 
splittings,  he  selected  from  the  different  systems  what 


SKEPTICISM  AND   ECLECTICISM  271 

was  suited  to  his  practical  needs.  Eclecticism  found  fer 
tile  ground  in  Roman  civilization. 

In  the  Schools  after  the  year  150  B.  c.  there  appear 
many  notable  names  —  notable  not  because  they  contrib 
uted  to  the  theoretic  advance  of  philosophy,  but  for 
some  other  reason.  In  the  Stoic  School  were  Panaetius, 
Posidonius,  and  Boethus ;  and  later  Seneca,  Epictetus, 
and  Marcus  Aurelius.  Among  the  Academicians  are 
Philo  of  Larissa  and  Antiochus  ;  among  the  Peripatet 
ics  of  the  same  century  is  Andronicus  ;  and  among  the 
eclectic  Platonists  Plutarch  is  especially  to  be  named ; 
these  were  all  eclectics.  The  only  one  in  this  group  of 
eclectics  whom  we  shall  have  time  for  a  passing  examin 
ation  of  is  Cicero. 

M.  Tullius  Cicero  (106-43  B.  c.)  listened  to  Greek 
philosophy  in  all  the  Schools  in  Athens  and  Rhodes. 
He  read  a  good  deal  of  Greek  literature,  so  that  he  had 
much  philosophical  material  at  his  command.  He  did 
not  show  much  discretion  in  his  selection  of  his  mate 
rial,  but  he  displayed  a  good  deal  of  tact  in  using  what 
the  Roman  people  would  receive.  The  Greek  mind  spoke 
to  the  Roman  through  Cicero's  voice  almost  as  though 
the  Roman  were  speaking  for  himself.  It  must  be  ad 
mitted  that  Cicero's  acquaintance  with  Greek  philo 
sophy  was  on  the  whole  superficial,  yet  he  was  able  to 
express  certain  aspects  of  Greek  philosophy  with  clear- 
ness  for  contemporary  Latin  readers  and  for  many  gen 
erations  succeeding  them.  He  prided  himself  in  his 
ability  to  discuss  both  sides  of  a  question  without  him 
self  arriving  at  a  decision  —  after  the  manner  of  the 
Middle  Academy,  of  which  he  inscribed  himself  as  a 
member.  His  books  appeared  in  rather  rapid  succes 
sion. 


272  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

Cicero  does  not  therefore  owe  his  prominence  as  a 
philosopher  so  much  to  his  own  profound  independence 
of  thought  as  to  his  skill  in  translating  Greek  thought 
to  the  Koman  people.  His  metaphysics  is  an  eclecticism 
that  is  at  bottom  a  skepticism.  In  view  of  the  existing 
philosophical  warfare,  he  despaired  of  metaphysical  or 
absolutely  complete  knowledge.  Yet  upon  ethical  and  re 
ligious  questions  he  spoke  in  no  undecided  manner,  for 
in  these  realms  he  felt  that  we  have  more  than  merely 
probable  evidence.  Since  he  was  unable  to  refute  Skep 
ticism  in  a  scientific  way,  he  took  refuge  in  the  im 
mediate  certainty  of  consciousness  in  all  matters  that 
pertain  to  morals  and  religion.  There  are  certain  ideas 
common  to  all  men.  These  have  not  so  much  been 
taught  to  all  men  by  nature  as  they  are  inborn  in  all. 
They  are  convictions  implanted  in  us ;  there  is  a  com 
mon  human  consciousness  from  which  they  are  derived, 
and  they  are  confirmed  by  universal  opinion.  Ethical 
and  religious  consciousness  thus  rests  on  immediate 
certainty.  Man  has  the  innate  ideas  of  duty,  immortal 
ity,  and  God.  Our  belief  in  God's  existence  is  sup 
ported  by  the  teleological  argument  for  Providence  and 
divine  government.  The  high  dignity  of  man  rests  upon 
this  innate  conviction  of  freedom  and  immortality. 
Cicero  shows  his  eclecticism  by  moderating  the  Stoic 
doctrine  of  virtue :  virtue  in  itself  is  vita  beata,  but  vir 
tue  plus  happiness  is  vita  beatissima.  Unoriginal  and 
eclectic  as  Cicero's  philosophical  position  may  be,  it  is 
of  great  importance  to  the  student  of  Roman  history. 


CHAPTER  XIII 

THE  RELIGIOUS  PERIOD  (100  B.  C.-476  A.  D.) 

The  Two  Causes  of  the  Rise  of  Religious  Feeling. 
There  were  two  causes  for  the  turn  of  the  time  from 
its  interest  in  individual  practical  ethics  to  religion. 
The  first  was  an  inner  cause  within  the  nature  of  the 
ethical  philosophy  of  the  Schools.  The  rise  of  the  re 
ligious  and  the  supernatural  was  the  culmination  of 
the  undercurrent  of  skepticism  in  the  validity  of  reason, 
which  we  found  growing  rapidly  in  the  Ethical  Period. 
The  more  the  Schools  grew  alike  in  their  teaching,  the 
less  were  they  able  to  assure  their  disciples  of  any  cer 
tain  insight  into  virtue  and  happiness.  The  Ethical 
Period  ended  in  eclecticism,  and  this  was  the  impeach 
ment  of  the  authority  of  each  School.  The  Schools  ex 
amined  their  dogmatic  assumptions.  The  fundamental 
inner  conviction  grew  stronger  that  the  intellect  of  man 
is  self-inconsistent :  so  inconsistent  as  to  be  undepend- 
able  ;  so  inconsistent  as  not  to  vouchsafe  man  the  virtue 
and  happiness  which  the  Schools  had  promised.  As 
Skepticism  became  more  strongly  intrenched,  the  im 
perturbable  self-certainty  of  the  Wise  Man  became 
shaken,  the  Ethical  Period  disappeared,  and  the  Reli 
gious  Period  was  born.  Belief  in  the  authority  of  the 
supernatural  superseded  belief  in  the  authority  of  the 
reason. 

The  second  cause  may  be  called  external,  and  was  the 
introduction  of  many  eastern  religions  into  the  empire. 
It  has  been  common  to  exaggerate  the  vices  of  the 


274  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

Romans  of  the  first  Christian  centuries,  and  to  point  to 
the  corruption  of  the  times  as  the  cause  of  the  great  rise 
of  religions.*  No  doubt,  in  the  city  of  Rome  and  other 
large  cities  the  populations  were  very  licentious  and 
corrupt.  But  this  was  not  the  case  with  the  people  in 
the  small  municipalities  and  the  country.  The  people 
were  united  in  peace  under  one  government.  There 
was  great  commercial  prosperity  and  widespread  travel. 
Education  prospered.  The  religion  of  the  Romans,  how 
ever,  long  since  decadent,  had  become  an  object  of  de 
rision.  All  faith  in  it  had  been  lost,  and  magicians  and 
romancers  had  a  large  patronage.  The  inner  life  of 
man  demanded  some  external  spiritual  authority  to 
satisfy  it,  and,  finding  it  could  not  be  satisfied  in  the 
realm  of  sense,  turned  to  the  supersensuous.  It  was  an 
age  of  universal  superstitions,  reported  miracles,  and 
the  multiplying  of  myths.  In  the  realm  of  the  reli 
gious  emotions  everything  was  in  flux.  Even  the  Greek 
philosophies  —  the  Stoic,  the  Platonic,  the  Cynic,  and 
the  neo-Pythagorean  —  show  it  in  their  emphasis  upon 
renunciation  in  practical  life.  In  place  of  the  Grecian 
love  for  earthly  existence,  a  longing  for  the  mysterious 
was  growing  into  a  feverish  desire  for  strange  and 
mysterious  cults.  A  great  religious  movement  possessed 
the  nations  of  the  empire,  and  into  Roman  civilization 
of  the  first  century  A.  D.  there  streamed  many  new 
religions.  From  the  Orient  came  the  Mithra,  Magna 
Mater,  Star  Worship,  Isis  and  Osiris,  and  many  others. 
These  mingled  with  the  western  religions,  and  their 
rivalry  was  energetic  for  the  possession  of  men's  spirits. 
The  Roman  people  were  hospitable  to  all  religions,  and 
Rome  became  a  religious  battleground.  With  the  in- 
*  Read  Dill,  Roman  Society,  first  three  chapters. 


THE  RELIGIOUS  PERIOD  275 

terest  turned  from  earthly  to  heavenly  things,  salva- 
tion  from  trouble  seemed  to  lie  in  the  supernatural. 

The  Need  of  Spiritual  Authority.  Thus  the  com 
placent  Ethical  Period  gave  way  to  the  cry  for  some 
authority  in  morals  and  science.  Man  was  no  longer 
confident  that  he  could  attain  present  happiness  or  his 
soul's  salvation  by  his  own  strength.  He  turned  for 
help  both  to  the  religious  tradition  of  the  past  and  to 
the  revelation  that  might  come  to  him  in  the  present. 
The  authority  in  either  was  practically  the  same ;  for 
the  past  was  only  the  crystallization  of  an  ever-present 
divine  spirit.  Yet  present  and  past  revelations  differ  in 
their  credentials  :  the  present  revelation  is  an  immedi 
ate  illumination  of  the  spirit ;  the  past  is  presented  in 
historic  records.  The  Alexandrian  school  accepted  both 
forms  of  revelation  as  the  highest  source  of  knowledge. 

The  demand  for  supernatural  authority  found  ex 
pression  in  many  curious  ways.  It  is  notorious  that 
at  this  time  the  writings  and  oral  traditions  of  the 
past  were  greatly  interpolated.  The  philosophers  of  the 
first  century  thought  that  they  themselves  could  get  a 
hearing  only  by  inserting  their  own  doctrines  into  the 
writings  of  Plato,  Aristotle,  and  other  heroes  of  the 
past.  Thus  the  neo-Pythagoreans  invented  a  halo  of 
wisdom  for  Pythagoras  in  order  to  give  their  own  sect 
its  credentials.  The  demand  for  authority  culminated 
in  the  attempt  to  trace  the  entire  civilization  of  the 
time  to  some  religious  source.  Philo  on  the  one  side, 
and  the  Gnostics  on  the  other,  found  that  Greek  and 
Hebrew  history  have  a  common  religious  origin.  Greek 
thought  was  found  in  the  Oriental  writings.  The  Greek 
sages  were  placed  by  the  side  of  the  Old  Testament 
heroes.  The  canon  of  the  Christians  is  full  of  cross- 


276  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

references  —  the  Old  Testament  giving  historical  au 
thority  to  the  New  Testament,  the  New  Testament 
giving  to  the  Old  Testament  the  support  of  immediate 
revelation.  There  came  into  vogue  what  was  called 
"  allegorical  interpretation,"  according  to  which  an  his 
torical  document  could  be  given  two  interpretations 
(or  more)  —  a  literal  interpretation  and  a  spiritual  inter 
pretation.  The  documents  were  supposed  to  have  a  body 
and  a  soul.  The  literal  interpretation  was  of  the  body  of 
the  documents  and  suitable  for  the  people  ;  the  spiritual 
interpretation  was  the  more  liberal  interpretation  of 
the  soul  of  the  document  and  suitable  for  philosophers. 
At  the  same  time  a  vast  number  of  writings  ap 
peared  as  historical  revelations.  It  was  necessary  to 
separate  the  true  from  the  false,  but  this  could  not  be 
done  by  the  individual  without  injuring  the  very  prin 
ciple  upon  which  revelation  was  supposed  to  rest.  Con 
sequently  all  knowledge  was  generally  regarded  as  reve 
lation.  For  example,  Plutarch  and  the  Stoics  divided 
revelation  into  three  classes  :  poetry,  law,  and  philosophy. 
Although  Plutarch  disclaimed  open  superstitions,  he 
nevertheless  accepted  as  true  all  sorts  of  miracles  and 
prophecies.  The  later  neo-Platonists  are  also  examples 
of  the  great  body  of  those  who  made  no  discrimination 
as  to  what  revelation  is  true.  The  Christian  church 
may  be  said  to  have  been  alone  in  making  a  criticism 
of  the  records,  and  in  setting  up  as  criteria  tradition 
and  historically  accredited  authority.  As  a  result  of 
its  criticism  the  Christian  canon  was  finally  decided 
upon,  and  the  Old  and  New  Testaments  were  accepted 
as  alone  inspired.  The  rivals  of  the  church  —  the  Alex 
andrian  philosophies,  especially  neo-Platonism  —  had 
no  organization  that  could  decide  upon  a  canon.  They 


THE  RELIGIOUS  PERIOD  277 

were  consequently  at  a  disadvantage,  but  they  felt  no 
need  of  an  infallible  historical  authority  or  of  histori 
cal  criticism.  Revelation  to  them  was  any  immediate 
illumination  of  the  individual.  The  individual  man 
«vho  comes  in  contact  with  the  Deity  has  possession  of 
the  divine  truth.  Although  only  few  attain  the  truth, 
and  these  only  at  rare  moments,  there  is  nevertheless 
no  way  of  determining  what  is  fictitious  and  what  is 
true.  This  difference  in  the  conception  of  inspiration 
between  the  neo-Platonists  and  the  Christians  is  im 
portant  to  note,  for  it  marks  an  important  difference 
in  the  two  greatest  intellectual  movements  of  the  next 
thousand  years.  The  church  fixed  revelation  on  the 
basis  of  historical  authority,  and  this  revelation  be 
came  the  source  of  the  scholasticism  of  the  Middle 
Ages ;  neo-Platonism  left  the  individual  man  free  to 
get  revelation  from  any  source  through  his  own  per 
sonal  contact  with  the  divine,  and  this  was  the  basis  of 
the  mysticism  of  the  Middle  Ages. 

The  Rise  of  the  Conception  of  Spirituality.  We  have 
seen  that  out  of  the  widespread  cry  for  spiritual  help 
came  the  demand  for  spiritual  authority.  There  is  also 
another  result,  —  the  increased  importance  in  history  of 
the  spiritual  personality.  The  men  of  the  past  became 
heroes,  the  great  men  sanctified  and  surrounded  with 
myths.  Hero  worship,  ancestor  worship,  the  worship  of 
the  genius  of  the  emperor  inaugurated  by  Augustus, 
were  part  of  this  movement.  Disciples  began  to  have  un 
conditional  trust  in  their  masters,  and  in  neo-Platonism 
this  worship  culminated  in  veneration  for  the  leaders 
of  the  School.  This  movement  appears  in  the  grand 
est  form  in  history  in  the  impression  of  the  wonderful 
personality  of  Jesus  Christ. 


278  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

The  next  step  was  to  regard  personality  as  the  reve 
lation  of  the  divine  Logos.  Personality  is  the  cosmic 
reason.  Nature  and  history  are  kinds  of  general  revela 
tions,  but  special  revelations  require  great  personalities 
—  Moses,  the  prophets,  the  Greek  scientists,  and  es 
pecially  Jesus  who  was  the  Messiah,  the  Son  of  God. 
The  power  that  these  personalities  exhibit  must  be  a 
revelation,  and  not  the  working  of  the  human  reason, 
for  the  human  unaided  reason  deals  only  with  sensations, 
and  is  incapable  of  gaining  divine  truth.  The  reason 
needs  the  divine  to  illuminate  it.  The  great  personali 
ties  are  therefore  the  repositories  of  powers  that  make 
them  different  from  ordinary  men.  Their  revelations 
are  above,  and  sometimes  opposed  to,  the  conclusions 
of  ordinary  reason.  Thus  personalities  themselves  are 
divided  by  religious  dualism,  and  in  them. the  human 
and  divine  are  far  apart.  Moreover,  the  more  great 
personalities  were  apotheosized,  the  more  the  common 
run  of  humanity  was  depreciated.  Then  distinction  was 
made  between  great  personalities.  At  first,  when  au 
thority  was  sought  everywhere,  all  great  personalities 
were  supposed  to  have  divine  revelation ;  later,  when 
the  lines  were  drawn  between  the  Christian  and  other 
beliefs,  only  the  Christian  leaders  were  considered  by  the 
Christians  to  be  instruments  of  the  divine. 

This  spiritualizing  of  historical  personalities  laid  the 
emphasis  more  than  ever  before  upon  the  dualism  in  all 
human  beings.  All  men  are  ensnared  in  the  world  of 
sense,  and  they  can  attain  knowledge  of  the  higher 
world  only  through  the  illumination  of  their  higher 
natures.  Aristotle  alone  among  the  Greeks  had  had  a 
clear  conception  of  spirituality,  but  he  had  conceived 
spirituality  as  applied  solely  to  God.  He  had  not  con- 


THE  RELIGIOUS  PERIOD  279 

ceived  God  to  be  a  person.  But  the  Stoic  antithesis  of 
reason  and  what  is  contrary  to  reason,  and  the  Platonic 
antithesis  of  the  supersensuous  and  the  sensuous,  had 
marked  off  in  man  the  inner  personal  nature  of  man  as 
withdrawn  into  itself  and  set  over  against  his  sensuous 
nature.  The  more  this  ethical  dualism  became  a  reli 
gious  dualism,  the  more  the  conception  of  spiritual  per 
sonality  was  extended  to  all  human  beings.  Its  most 
refined  expression  was  in  the  Christian  conception  of 
the  soul. 

The  Revival  of  Platonism.  The  Platonism  of  the 
Academy  had  had  little  influence  in  the  Ethical  Period 
and  its  tradition  had  been  barely  kept  alive.  The  Middle 
Academy  had  been  skeptical  and  the  New  Academy  eclec 
tic.  The  Religious  Period,  on  the  other  hand,  was  thor 
oughly  Platonic,  and  Plato  from  this  time  until  the 
Crusades  became  the  ruling  philosophical  power.  For 
three  hundred  years  his  influence  had  been  nothing; 
for  the  next  twelve  hundred  he  dominated  men's  minds, 
so  far  as  any  philosopher  could  in  religious  times.  When 
the  Wise  Man  vanished  from  philosophy,  and  the  ex 
pectation  of  spiritual  blessedness  took  its  place,  when 
Skepticism  drove  men  from  ethics,  first  to  eclecticism 
and  then  to  theology,  when  philosophy  passed  to  mysti 
cism  —  then  did  Platonism,  with  its  antithesis  between 
the  sensible  and  the  supersensible,  come  to  its  own.  Of 
all  the  historical  philosophies  it  could  best  amalgamate 
all  religions.  Platonism  (1)  absorbed  Oriental  religions, 
(2)  furnished  a  didactic  form  for  Christianity,  (3)  re 
created  itself  into  the  mystic  neo-Platonism.  The  world- 
longing  for  the  supernatural  found  its  best  medium  in 
Platonism.  When  the  Wise  Man  vanished,  the  mystic 
priest  appeared. 


280  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

The  Divisions  of  the  Religious  Period.  Out  of  the 

seething  religious  times  at  the  beginning  of  this  era, 
there  emerged  two  distinct  currents  of  thought  that 
extended  through  the  entire  length  of  the  Religious 
Period,  and  carried  down  into  the  Middle  Ages  all  the 
culture  that  the  medieval  possessed.  The  two  move 
ments  were  (1)  the  religious  philosophies  of  the  still 
persistent  Hellenic  civilization,  and  (2)  the  new-born 
Christian  religion,  which  was  destined  to  determine  the 
future  of  the  western  people.  If  we  scrutinize  these  two 
movements  we  shall  find  that  each  has  its  introductory 
and  its  development  stages,  and  at  the  point  of  division 
in  each  stands  a  great  leader  who  was  instrumental  in 
bringing  about  the  transition.  The  great  neo-Platonist, 
Plotinus  (204-269),  marks  the  division  line  in  the 
Hellenic  movement ;  the  Christian,  Origen  (185-254), 
marks  the  division  line  in  theological  Christianity. 
While  these  men  were  contemporaries,  we  shall  take, 
for  various  reasons,  the  year  200  as  the  date  of  division 
of  the  Christian  movement,  and  the  year  250  as  the 
date  of  division  of  the  Hellenic  movement.  The  first 
stage  of  each  movement  we  shall  call  its  Introductory 
Period,  and  the  second  its  Development  Period. 

During  their  Introductory  Periods  the  two  movements 
tried  to  draw  together  under  the  influence  of  the  philo 
sophical  eclecticism  which  colors  this  time.  In  their 
Development  Periods  the  two  movements  draw  apart, 
become  closed  and  mutually  repellent.  The  historical  de 
velopments  of  the  two  movements  from  beginning  to  end 
are  very  different.  The  tide  of  Hellenism  floods  with 
Plotinus,  its  greatest  representative,  and  after  him  there 
is  a  gradual  ebb.  On  the  other  hand,  Christianity  shows 
a  continuous  growth,  both  internally  and  externally,  and 


THE  RELIGIOUS  PERIOD 


281 


the  mighty  Origen  only  points  to  the  mightier  Augus 
tine.    Both  movements  finally  merge  in  Augustine. 


Hellenic  Religious  Phi 
losophy. 

1.  Introductory    Period 
(100  B.  C.-250A.D.). 

(1)  Greek-Jewish  phi 
losophy  of  Alex 
andria. 

Philo  (25  B.  c.- 
50  A.  D.). 

(2)  Neo-Pythagoreau- 

ism  (100  B.  c.- 
150  A.  D.). 


2.  Development  Period 
(250-476). 
Neo-Platon  i  sm . 
Plotinus    (204-269). 
Jamblichus    (d.    330 
about). 
Proclus  (410-485). 


II.  Christianity. 

1.  Introductory  Period 
(31  A.  D. -200  A.  D.). 
(1)  Period  of  simple 
faith  (until  the  2d 
century  A.  D.). 


(2)  Period  of  Earlier 
Formulation      of 
Doctrine. 
Apologists      (2d 
century). 
Gnostics  (2d  cen 
tury). 

Old  Catholic  The 
ologians  (2d  and 
3d  centuries). 
2.  Development    Period 
(200-476). 

(1)  Period  of  Actual 
Formulation     of 
Doctrine. 

The  School  of 
Catechists.  Ori 
gen  (185-254). 

(2)  The  CEcumenical 
Councils  and  the 
establishment  of 
dosmuL 


282  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

The  Hellenic  Religious  Philosophies.  Alexandria  and 
not  Athens  was  now  the  intellectual  centre  of  Hellen 
ism.  The  position  and  history  of  the  city,  as  well  as  the 
character  of  its  population,  were  most  favorable  for  the 
mingling  of  religions  and  philosophies.  In  the  "uni 
versity  "  of  this  great  commercial  metropolis  the  treas 
ures  of  Greek  culture  were  concentrated  and  scholastic 
work  was  vigorously  pursued.  Here  all  philosophies 
met,  and  all  religions  and  cults  were  tolerated.  Ex 
hausted  Greek  philosophy  here  came  in  contact  with 
those  fresh  Oriental  ideas  which  previously,  at  a  dis 
tance,  had  excited  the  imagination  of  the  Greeks  as 
something  mysterious.  The  result  was  a  new  phase  of 
philosophy,  —  theosophy,  comparative  religion,  or  eclec 
ticism  of  philosophy  and  religion. 

In  no  instance  were  the  authors  of  these  religious 
philosophies  Greeks.  The  philosophy  of  Philo  was  a 
Hellenism,  but  the  Hellenism  of  a  Jew.  Neo-Pythago- 
reanism  seems  to  have  had  representatives  from  every 
country  except  the  motherland  of  Greece.  The  author 
of  neo-Platonism  was  born  in  Egypt.  Of  the  two  intro 
ductory  movements,  the  Greek-Jewish  philosophy  ac 
corded  more  with  Oriental  life,  neo-Pythagoreanism 
with  Greek  life.  Both  go  back  to  the  principles  that 
were  fundamental  in  the  Pythagorean  mysteries. 

The  Introductory  Period  of  Hellenic  Religious  Phi 
losophy  (100  B.  C.-250  A.  D.).  The  Turning  to  the 
Past  for  Spiritual  Authority. 

I.  The  Greek- Jewish  Philosophy  of  Philo.  The  Jews 
lived  in  great  numbers  in  Alexandria,  and  many  of 
them  were  wealthy  and  influential.  In  Alexandria  the 
Old  Testament  had  been  translated  into  Greek,  and 
through  it  the  Greeks  had  become  acquainted  with  the 


THE   RELIGIOUS   PERIOD  283 

religion  of  the  Jews.  While  the  Old  Testament  con- 
tained  the  philosophy  of  the  Jews,  these  Alexandrian 
Jews  had  learned  in  Alexandria  to  admire  greatly  the 
philosophy  of  the  Greeks.  So  great  was  their  admiration 
that  they  soon  conceived  Plato  to  be  in  their  Law  and 
their  Law  in  Plato.  They  argued  that  since  the  Old 
Testament  was  their  revelation,  all  the  best  Greek  phi 
losophy  must  be  in  the  Old  Testament.  The  Alexan 
drian  Jews  used  Greek  conceptions  wherever  they 
found  them ;  and  this  tendency  toward  eclecticism  ap 
peared  as  early  as  160  B.  c.  in  Aristobulus  and  Aris- 
teas.  At  that  time  these  Jews  used  Greek  philosophy 
in  interpreting  the  Old  Testament  and  employed  the 
"allegorical  method  of  interpretation."  This  eclectic 
tendency  was  brought  to  completion  by  Philo  (25  B.  c. 
-50  A.  D.),  who  was  the  most  notable  philosopher  of 
this  time.  Philo  was  guided  in  his  eclecticism  by  some 
such  rules  as  these:  (1)  Revelation  is  the  highest 
possible  authority  and  includes  the  best  of  Greek 
thought;  (2)  Greek  philosophy  is  derived  from  the 
fundamental  principles  of  the  Old  Testament ;  (3) 
Jewish  revelation  is  expressed  in  symbols,  while  Greek 
philosophy  is  expressed  in  concepts. 

Philo's  teaching  contains,  in  unsymmetrical  form, 
both  Stoicism  and  Platonism,  and  in  it  can  be  found 
the  seeds  of  all  that  grew  up  m  Christian  soil.  His 
philosophy  was  a  bridge  from  the  philosophy  of  Juda 
ism  to  Christian  theology.  It  has  been  called  a  "  buffer  " 
philosophy. 

God  is  the  ultimate  cause  of  the  world,  but  He  is  so 
transcendent  that  He  can  be  described  only  in  negative 
terms.  This  method  of  defining  God  got  the  name  in 
later  times  of  "  negative  theology."  It  was  the  common 


284  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

method  in  these  Alexandrian  days.  God  is  absolutely 
inconceivable  and  inexpressible  to  man ;  to  Himself 
He  is  "  I  am  who  am."  The  goodness  of  God  impelled 
Him,  and  His  power  enabled  Him,  to  create  the  world. 
From  this  point  of  view  Philo  is  a  monist.  But  in  man 
reason  and  sense  meet.  Man's  soul  is  from  God,  but  his 
sense-body  is  from  matter,  and  from  this  point  of  view 
Philo  is  a  dualist.  Matter  is  outside  God.  God  is  so 
transcendent  that  He  cannot  come  in  contact  with  mat 
ter,  and  so  He  created  the  world  and  rules  the  world 
through  mediators  or  "potencies."  These  "potencies" 
are  the  same  as  the  Ideas  of  Plato,  the  "  reasons "  of 
the  Stoics,  the  numbers  of  the  Pythagoreans,  the  angels 
of  the  Old  Testament,  or  the  demons  of  popular  myth 
ology.  The  sum-total  of  God's  activity  in  the  world  was 
called  by  Philo  the  Logos.  Philo  speaks  of  the  Logos 
in  two  ways :  sometimes  as  the  plural  number  of  tele- 
ological  forces  in  the  world ;  sometimes  as  the  unity  of 
these  forces,  "  the  first  begotten  of  God,"  "  the  second 
God,"  "  the  son  of  God."  The  Logos  represents  the  first 
attempt  to  overcome  the  dualism  between  matter  and 
God.  The  Logos  is  the  high  priest  standing  between 
God  and  the  world.  It  is  the  everlasting  revelation  of 
God's  presence.  Philo's  world  is  made  by  God  and  not 
by  others,  and  is  the  expression  of  God's  thought  in 
infinite  forms  and  forces.  God  is  not  defiled  by  coming 
into  contact  with  matter.  God  gives  orders,  the  Logos 
obeys.  Philo  believed  in  transmigration  of  souls,  and 
to  him  the  most  important  problem  is,  How  the  spirit 
can  become  like  God.  The  answer  is  (1)  by  the  acquire 
ment  of  the  Stoic  apathy,  (2)  by  possessing  the  Aris 
totelian  dianoetic  virtues,  (3)  by  complete  absorption 
in  God. 


THE  RELIGIOUS  PERIOD  285 

2.  Neo-Pythagoreanism.  The  history  of  Pythago- 
reanism  is  extremely  varied.  Its  body  of  doctrine  from 
epoch  to  epoch  was  continually  changing.  The  onlj 
characteristic  common  to  its  entire  history  was  its 
practical  tendency  toward  asceticism  and  its  affiliation 
with  the  Mysteries.  Let  us  review  the  history  of  Pytha- 
goreanism  down  to  the  time  of  neo-Pythagoreanism. 
In  510  B.  c.,  at  the  battle  of  Crotona,  the  early  band 
of  Pythagoreans  was  dispersed,  and  about  504  B.  c. 
Pythagoras  died.  His  scattered  followers  formed  a 
school  centring  at  Thebes  around  the  philosophy  of  num 
bers,  and  this  school  lasted  until  350  B.  C.  In  350  B.  C. 
Pythagoreanism  no  longer  existed  as  a  school,  for  its 
members  had  either  joined  the  Academy  or  formed  one 
of  the  Mysteries.  In  100  B.  C.  Pythagoreanism  again 
emerged  under  the  name  of  neo-Pythagoreanism,  and 
this  is  the  body  which  we  meet  in  the  introductory 
stage  of  the  Religious  Period.  Alexandria  was  its 
centre,  but  it  drew  its  disciples  from  every  part  of  the 
earth.  Among  them  Apollonius  alone  rises  as  a  distinct 
figure.  He  was  widely  known,  for  he  traveled  every 
where  as  a  religious  teacher  and  wonder-worker.  Other 
neo-Pythagoreans  were  P.  Nigidius  Figulus,  a  friend 
of  Cicero,  Sotion,  a  friend  of  the  Sextians,  Moderatus 
of  Gades,  and  in  later  times  Nicomachus  of  Gerasa  and 
Numenius  of  Apamea.  Another,  and  rather  numerous 
group,  allied  to  the  neo-Pythagoreans,  should  be  men 
tioned  here.  These  were  the  so-called  Eclectic  Platon- 
ists,  the  representatives  of  whom  were  Plutarch  (50—125 
A.  D.),  and  Celsus  (about  200  A.  D.),  the  opponent  of 
Christianity.  The  only  important  difference  between 
the  neo-Pythagoreans  and  the  Eclectic  Platonists  was 
that  the  former  referred  to  Pythagoras  as  their  religious 


286  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

model,  and  the  latter  to  Plato.  Both  were  mystical, 
ascetic,  and  eclectic. 

Neo-Pythagoreanism  first  became  noticeable  in  the 
first  century  B.  c.,  on  account  of  the  great  number 
of  writings  appearing  under  the  names  of  Pythagoras 
and  Philolaus.  About  these  there  arose  a  large  neo- 
Pythagorean  literature, — about  ninety  treatises  by  fifty 
authors.  The  writings  under  the  name  of  Pythagoras 
were,  for  many  centuries,  the  cause  of  the  misconcep 
tion  of  the  true  teaching  of  the  original  Pythagoras. 
The  advent  of  the  neo-Pythagorean  literature  marks  the 
return  at  Alexandria  to  the  older  systems  of  thought, 
and  is  coincident  with  the  learned  literary  investigations 
in  the  University  of  Alexandria.  The  particular  revival 
of  Pythagoreanism  in  the  form  of  neo-Pythagoreanism 
came  at  the  same  time  with  the  renewal  of  the  Homeric 
form  of  poetry. 

Neo-Pythagoreanism,  as  its  history  shows,  is  the  phi 
losophy  of  a  half-religious  sect  with  ascetic  tendencies. 
Its  transcendental  philosophy  was  better  suited  to  a 
people  under  an  autocratic  government,  and  ruled  by 
Oriental  traditions,  than  was  the  ethical  teaching  of  the 
four  Schools.  The  system  of  the  ethical  Schools  arose 
out  of  the  needs  of  the  individual ;  but  at  this  time  the 
cry  was  for  an  absolute  object  which  transcends  both 
the  individual  and  nature.  The  demand  was  for  a  god 
who  could  be  served  not  by  sacrifice,  but  by  silent 
prayer,  wisdom,  and  virtue.  There  are  many  points  of 
similarity  between  the  doctrine  of  Philo  and  neo-Pytha 
goreanism.  The  neo-Pythagoreans  were  monotheistic, 
but  at  the  same  time  they  accepted  within  their  mono 
theism  the  hierarchy  of  the  gods.  They  held  to  the  com 
monly  accepted  doctrines  of  their  time,  viz.,  the  trans- 


THE  RELIGIOUS   PERIOD  281 

migration  of  the  soul,  the  dualism  of  the  mind  and 
body,  the  mediation  of  a  graded  series  of  celestial  beings 
between  man  and  God.  They  interpreted  God  in  a 
spiritual  way,  but  they  conceived  the  ideas  in  God's 
mind  to  be  the  Pythagorean  numbers  —  just  as  Philo 
conceived  them  to  be  the  Old  Testament  angels. 

The  Development  Period  of  Hellenic  Religious 
Philosophy  (250-476  A.  D.).  The  Turning  to  the 
Present  for  Spiritual  Authority.  Platonism  and  Neo- 
Platonism.  Neo-Platonism  is  the  final  statement  of 
Hellenic  culture,  and  the  question  may  be  asked,  In  what 
form  did  it  present  Hellenism  ?  The  answer  is,  It  sets 
forth  the  Hellenic  feeling  as  mysticism.  The  contribu 
tion  of  Plotinus  was  the  destruction  of  the  classic  Greek 
ideal  with  its  definiteness  of  form,  and  was  the  substitu 
tion  of  a  new  ideal  of  soaring  spiritual  exaltation.  One 
has  only  to  look  back  to  the  art,  science,  and  philosophy 
of  the  Periclean  Age  to  appreciate  how  far  this  last  sur 
vival  of  Greek  culture  had  drifted  from  its  original 
moorings.  Nevertheless,  neo-Platonism  is  not  so  very  far 
distant  from  that  powerful  ascetic  principle  in  the  Greek 
mysteries  which  is  one  aspect  of  the  doctrine  of  Plato 
himself.  Neo-Platonism  was  Platonism  exaggerated  on 
this  mystic  and  ascetic  side.  Plotinus  said  that  he  was 
ashamed  that  he  had  a  body;  that  the  soul  looks  on  and 
weeps  at  the  sinf  ulness  of  the  body ;  that  it  is  not  enough 
to  regulate  the  body,  but  that  the  body  must  be  ex 
terminated.  As  the  voice  of  Hellenism,  neo-Platonism 
is  speaking  in  an  age  when  consciousness  is  weighed 
down  with  the  sense  of  the  enormity  of  evil  and  the 
need  of  salvation.  Neo-Platonism  feels  that  the  moral 
conflict  in  the  human  soul  is  repeated  in  the  universe; 
that  the  eternal  struggle  between  matter  and  spirit  goes 


288  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

on  in  the  macrocosm  as  well  as  the  microcosm.  Plotinus 
held  to  the  ancient  Greek  conception  of  the  personifica 
tion  of  the  powers  of  nature,  of  the  derivation  of  happi 
ness  from  activity,  of  the  supremacy  of  the  intellect  over 
the  other  faculties.  But  in  accepting  the  ancient  Greek 
doctrine  of  the  subordination  of  man  to  the  universe,  he 
conceived  man  to  be  absorbed  by  the  universe. 

Neo-Platonism  and  the  Two  Introductory  Philoso 
phies.  Neo-Platonism,  therefore,  shares  in  the  mysti 
cism  of  the  philosophies  of  Philo  and  the  neo-Pythago- 
reans.  All  three  teach  the  transcendence  of  God  ;  all 
three  were  metaphysically  monistic  and  ethically  dual- 
istic ;  all  three  conceive  the  existence  of  intermediaries 
between  God  and  man.  The  introductory  philosophies 
sought  to  build  eclectic  doctrines,  while  neo-Platonism 
became  eclectic  only  in  its  last  phases.  Plotinus  con 
structed  a  positive  and  original  philosophy,  and  among 
the  three  systems  the  teaching  of  Plotinus  is  carefully 
worked  out.  Indeed,  Plotinus  is  by  far  the  greatest 
thinker  of  this  religious  period.  In  the  philosophy  of 
Plotinus  the  relations  between  man  and  God  are  given 
a  more  aesthetic  character,  and  the  doctrine  of  imme 
diate  experience  is  more  carefully  discussed  and  has 
greater  importance  than  in  neo-Pythagoreanism  and  the 
teaching  of  Philo. 

Neo-Platonism  and  Christianity.  Neo-Platonism  and 
Christianity  have  one  thing  at  least  in  common.  They 
have  the  same  problem,  —  how  to  spiritualize  the  uni 
verse.  This  was  the  problem  that  both  Plotinus  and 
Origen  attempted  to  work  out.  With  the  development 
of  the  consciousness  of  spiritual  personality  and  the 
need  of  a  revelation,  the  Divine  seemed  to  both  to  be 
correspondingly  farther  away.  God  is  unknown  and 


THE  RELIGIOUS  PERIOD  289 

incomprehensible,  and  so  pure  that  He  cannot  come  in 
contact  with  earthly  existence.  What,  then,  is  the  bond 
between  the  heavenly  and  the  earthly  ?  From  the  point 
of  view  of  cosmology  and  of  ethics,  neither  succeeded  in 
overcoming  the  dualism.  The  sensuous  was  regarded  as 
alien  to  God,  and  as  a  thing  from  which  the  spirit  must 
free  itself.  Metaphysically  their  efforts  to  construct  a 
spiritual  monism  were  more  successful,  but  their  efforts 
were  along  different  lines.  The  Christian  conceived  the 
universe  of  God  and  matter  to  be  bound  together  by 
the  principle  of  love ;  the  neo-Platonist,  by  a  series  of 
countless  grades  of  beings  in  diminishing  perfections 
from  the  All-perfect.  Then  again,  to  the  neo-Platonist 
the  question  of  the  return  of  man  to  God  was  a  ques 
tion  of  the  personal  inner  experience  of  the  individual; 
to  the  Christian  theologian  it  was  included  in  the 
larger  problem  of  the  historical  process  by  which  the 
whole  human  race  is  redeemed.  Thus  the  metaphysical 
solution  of  each  works  out  differently  and  with  different 
factors. 

Both  neo-Platonic  and  Christian  theology  tried  to 
prove  that  their  respective  religious  convictions  were 
the  only  true  source  of  salvation.  Both  originated  in  the 
Alexandrian  School.  Christian  theology  was  preceded 
by  the  fantastic  system  of  the  Gnostics,  as  Plotinus 
was  preceded  by  the  Pythagoreans  and  Philo.  In  their 
development  the  differences  between  the  two  appear. 
Christianity  was  supported  by  a  church  organization 
which  had  an  internal  vitality  and  a  regulative  power ; 
neo-Platonism  was  supported  and  regulated  by  individ 
uals,  without  organization,  who  had  assimilated  every 
faith.  Christian  theology  was  founded  on  a  faith  that 
had  already  expanded,  while  neo-Platonism  was  at  the 


290  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

beginning  an  erudite  religion  that  tried  to  develop  an 
extended  faith  and,  incidentally,  later  to  assimilate  other 
cults.  Outwardly  neo-Platonism,  as  the  final  stand  of 
the  pagan  world  to  save  itself  from  destruction,  was 
unsuccessful  in  that  it  failed  to  perpetuate  itself  as  an 
organization.  Really  it  achieved  a  marked  success.  Not 
only  did  it  live  a  long  life  of  two  hundred  and  fifty 
years,  but  it  also  lived  in  the  development  of  its  antag 
onist,  Christianity.  For  neo-Platonism,  by  the  irony  of 
fate,  was  one  of  the  important  factors  that  entered  into 
the  building  up  and  strengthening  of  Christianity.  In 
its  lingering  death-struggle  Hellenism  was  creating  the 
conceptions  that  the  Christian,  Augustine,  later  em 
ployed  in  shaping  Christian  theology  for  the  Middle 
Ages. 

The  Periods  of  Neo-Platonism. 

(1)  The  Alexandrian  School  —  about  240. 
Neo-Platonism  presented  as  a  Scientific  Theory. 
The  leader  was  Plotinus  (204-269). 

(2)  The  Syrian  School  — about  310. 

The  Attempt  to  Systematize  all  Polytheisms. 

The  leader  was  Jamblichus  (d.  about  330). 
,    (3)  The  Athenian  School  —  about  450. 

The  Recapitulation  of  Greek  Philosophy. 

The  leader  was  Proclus  (410-485). 
The  Alexandrian  School.  The  Scientific  Theory  of 
Neo-Platonism.  The  Life  and  Writings  of  Plotinus 
(204-269  A.  D.).  Plotinus  was  born  in  Lycopolis  in 
Egypt,  and  received  his  education  in  Alexandria,  under 
Ammonius  Saccas,  who  was  Origen's  teacher.  He  cam 
paigned  with  the  emperor,  Gordian,  against  the  Per 
sians,  in  order  to  pursue  scientific  studies  in  the  East. 
He  was  especially  interested  in  the  Persian  religion.  In 


THE   RELIGIOUS   PERIOD  291 

this  way  Plotinus  became  acquainted  at  first  hand  with 
the  mysticism  of  the  Orient.  In  244  he  appeared  at 
Rome  as  a  teacher,  and  was  received  with  great  eclat  by 
the  people,  and  in  the  highest  circles  he  gained  the 
most  reverent  recognition.  His  school  contained  repre 
sentatives  from  all  nations  and  from  almost  every  call 
ing, —  physicians,  rhetoricians,  poets,  senators,  an  em 
peror  and  empress.  Plotinus  lived  in  a  country  estate 
in  Campania,  and  he  almost  succeeded  in  inducing  the 
emperor  to  found  a  city  of  philosophers  in  Campania. 
It  was  to  be  called  Platonopolis  and,  with  Plato's  Be- 
public  as  a  model,  it  was  to  be  an  Hellenic  cloister  for 
religious  contemplation.  The  literary  activity  of  Plo 
tinus  occurred  in  his  old  age,  and  he  wrote  nothing  until 
after  he  was  fifty.  His  works  consisted  of  fifty-four 
Corpuscles  which  his  pupil,  Porphyry,  combined  into 
six  Enneads.  For  the  next  three  hundred  years  his 
school  became  the  centre  of  the  Hellenic  movement  — 
the  centre  of  science,  philosophy,  and  literature.  The 
literature  of  neo-Platonism  was  enormous,  on  account 
of  the  many  commentaries  on  the  philosophy  of  Plato 
within  the  neo-Platonic  circle. 

The  General  Character  of  the  Teaching  of  Plotinus. 
There  is  a  great  division  of  opinion  about  the  value  of 
the  teaching  of  Plotinus,  for  he  drew  his  philosophy 
only  in  the  broadest  outlines,  and  he  made  no  attempt 
to  advance  from  a  general  view  of  the  world  to  exact 
knowledge  of  it.  Intellectually  his  philosophy  is  an  ab 
straction  ;  and  yet  emotionally,  in  an  intimate  way,  it 
touched  deeply  an  age  weary  with  culture.  Thus  one 
can  see  how  the  actual  achievement  of  Plotinus  was 
small,  but  how  at  the  same  time  its  force  and  influence 
was  very  great.  It  was  a  religious  teaching  which  rose 


292  HISTORY   OF  PHILOSOPHY 

to  magnificent  heights  of  contemplation  from  miserable 
intellectual  surroundings.  Nevertheless,  the  philosophy 
of  Plotinus  was  an  extreme  form  of  intellectualism  — 
it  was  an  intellectual  ennobling  and  transforming  of 
religion.  The  earlier  philosophy  had  supported  the 
happiness  of  the  individual  by  offers  of  infinitude ;  but 
Plotinus  thought  of  the  individual  as  never  isolated 
from  the  Infinite,  but  as  always  longing  for  the  Infinite. 
Fellowship  with  God  is  knowledge  of  Him,  but  it  is 
knowledge  of  a  peculiar  kind.  It  is  enthusiasm,  intui 
tion,  ecstasy.  There  is  a  chasm  between  man  and  God, 
which  Plotinus  would  bridge  by  placing  reality  so 
deeply  within  consciousness  as  to  annihilate  all  anti 
theses  and  contradictions.  Thus  this  deep  reality  be 
low  consciousness  is  cosmic  and  not  human ;  .and  the 
religion  of  Plotinus  is  cosmocentric  and  not  anthropo- 
centric.  Plotinus  intensifies  and  summarizes  Greek  cul 
ture  in  order  to  consolidate  and  defend  it.  But  in  thus 
thinking  out  the  Greek  conceptions  to  their  logical 
completeness,  those  conceptions  collapse. 

The  Mystic  God.  There  are  two  characteristics  that 
distinguish  the  mystic  God  of  Plotinus, 

1.  The  first  characteristic  is  the  supra-consciousness 
of  God.  God  is  the  indefinable,  original  Being  who  is 
above  all  antitheses.  He  is  swpnz-everything,  even 
supra-conscious.  Nothing  can  be  attributed  to  Him,  not 
even  thought  or  will,  for  these  imply  two  elements  and 
God  is  a  unity.  Any  description  of  Him  must  be  in 
negative  terms  ("negative  theology").  If  we  speak  of 
Him  as  the  One,  the  First,  the  Cosmic  Cause,  Good 
ness,  or  as  Light,  we  are  only  relatively  and  not  really 
describing  Him.  God  is  present  in  all,  yet  He  is  not 
divided ;  He  is  the  source  of  all,  and  yet  He  himself  is 


THE  RELIGIOUS  PERIOD  293 

perfectly  finished.  In  his  conception  of  God  as  compared 
to  the  world,  Plotinus  added  the  realm  of  the  supra-con 
scious  and  the  sub-conscious  to  the  conscious. 

2.  In  the  second  place  Plotinus  conceived  God  in  His 
relation  to  the  world  in  the  terms  of  dynamic  panthe 
ism.  This  is  a  pantheism  of  a  peculiar  type.  God  does 
not  create  the  world ;  the  world  is  not  the  act  of  His  will ; 
nor  is  the  world  the  result  of  a  transference  of  part  of 
His  nature.  In  ordinary  pantheism  the  world  is  a  diffu 
sion  of  the  substance  of  God  and  the  whole  is  static. 
Not  so  in  the  teaching  of  Plotinus !  God  permeates  the 
world  by  His  activity,  and  the  world  is  dynamic  through 
and  through.  But  this  dynamic  activity  of  God  must 
not  be  conceived  as  an  historical  or  time  process.  The 
process  is  timeless.  It  is  a  process  of  essence  or  worth. 
The  grades  in  the  process  are  those  of  significance  or 
value.  All  are  within  the  all-embracing  unity  of  God 
and  each  particular  draws  its  life  from  Him.  This  is 
called  the  theory  of  emanations.  Plotinus  used  the 
figure  which  mystics  have  always  employed  in  this  con 
nection,  —  the  figure  of  the  sun  and  its  rays  of  light  in 
the  darkness.  The  rays  become  less  and  less  intense 
with  the  increasing  distance  from  the  Godhead,  until 
they  end  in  darkness.  The  process  is  an  overflowing 
from  the  Godhead  in  which  the  Godhead  remains  un 
changed. 

The  Two  Problems  of  Plotinus.  Starting  with  this 
conception  of  the  Godhead  as  a  dynamic  coiitentless 
Being,  Plotinus  is  bound  to  explain  the  world  of  sense- 
phenomena.  His  problem  is  twofold :  he  must  explain 
the  sequence  of  phenomena  from  the  Godhead,  which  is 
the  metaphysical  problem ;  he  must  explain  how  man,  liv 
ing  in  the  world  of  sense,  can  rise  to  communion  with 


294  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

the  Godhead,  which  is  the  ethical  problem.  Metaphysics 
and  ethics  are  to  Plotinus  in  inverted  parallelism. 

The  World  of  Emanations.  —  The  Metaphysical 
Problem  of  Plotinus.  The  aim  of  Plotinus  in  this  is  to 
construct  a  metaphysical  monism  out  of  the  dualistic 
factors  which  had  so  long  been  present  in  Greek  thought. 
The  two  fundamental  principles  upon  which  he  raised 
his  structure  were  (1)  his  dynamic  series  of  emanations, 
and  (2)  his  conception  of  matter  as  entirely  negative. 
The  highest  Being,  God,  by  an  excess  of  energy  or 
goodness,  has  the  natural  impulse  to  create  something 
similar  to  himself.  This  creative  impulse  exists  in  each 
creature  in  turn  and  the  movement  propagates  itself. 
Stage  is  added  to  stage  in  a  descending  series,  until  the 
impulse  dies  out  in  non-Being  as  the  limit.  The  ordinary 
pantheism  of  co-existence  of  phenomena  is  transformed 
into  a  succession  of  stages  of  values,  and  all  make  up  a 
harmony  of  more  or  less  distinct  copies  of  God.  There 
are  three  steps  in  which  the  process  of  emanation  pro 
ceeds,  —  spirit,  soul,  and  matter. 

The  Spirit  or  Nous  is  the  first  emanation  from  the 
One  in  point  of  significance.  It  is  the  image  of  the  One 
sent  forth  by  its  overflow  of  energy.  This  image  in 
voluntarily  turns  toward  its  original,  the  One,  and  in 
beholding  it  becomes  Spirit,  Nous,  or  intellectual  con 
sciousness.  It  turns  to  the  One  and  recognizes  itself  as 
the  image  of  the  One.  Thus,  in  the  first  degree  away 
from  God,  the  duality  of  thinker  as  subject,  and  of  the 
thing  thought  as  object,  appears.  The  unconsciousness 
of  the  One  is  thus  contrasted  with  consciousness,  and 
the  dual  nature  of  consciousness  is  thus  brought  out ;  and 
for  the  first  time  an  exact  formulation  of  the  psychologi 
cal  conception  of  consciousness  is  given. 


THE   RELIGIOUS   PERIOD  295 

The  Nous  is  a  unitary  function  of  the  One,  like  the 
Logos  of  Philo.  At  the  same  time  the  Nous  contains 
within  itself,  as  content,  the  Platonic  Ideas  or  arch- 
types  of  individuals.  These  Ideas  are  not  mere  thoughts, 
but  have  their  own  existence.  The  Nous  is  their  unity, 
however,  just  as  a  unity  exists  for  the  theorems  of  a 
science.  These  Ideas  are  pure  intellectual  potencies  and 
the  final  causes  of  the  world  of  nature. 

The  Soul  is  the  second  degree  removed  from  the  One. 
It  stands  in  the  same  relation  to  the  Nous  as  the  Nous 
to  the  Godhead.  The  Soul  belongs  to  the  world  of 
light,  but  it  stands  just  on  the  boundaries  of  the  world 
of  darkness.  It  is  the  image  of  an  image  and  therefore 
doubly  dual,  —  it  consists  of  a  higher  or  world-soul  and 
the  lesser  souls.  The  world-soul  is  divided  into  two 
forces,  —  the  formative  power  of  the  world,  and  the  body 
of  the  world.  Individual  souls  are  divided  into  the  super 
sensible  or  intellectual  soul  (the  part  that  has  pre-exist- 
ence  and  undergoes  metamorphosis),  and  the  sensible 
part  which  has  built  up  the  body  as  an  instrument  of 
its  working  power.  The  soul  is  present  in  all  parts 
of  its  body.  The  individual  souls  are  called  plastic 
forces. 

Matter  is  the  emanation  which  is  most  distant  from 
the  One.  The  Nous  is  the  emanation  of  the  One,  the 
world-soul  is  the  emanation  from  the  Nous,  individual 
souls  are  a  kind  of  intermediate  emanation  from  the 
world-soul,  and  matter  is  the  emanation  of  the  individ 
ual  souls.  That  is  to  say,  the  world-soul,  with  the  forces 
that  are  native  to  it,  generates  matter  and  then,  by 
uniting  itself  through  its  forces  with  matter,  produces 
the  world  of  corporeal  things.  What  is  the  character 
of  matter  with  which  the  world-soul  forms  this  union? 


296  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

It  is  space.  Space  conditions  all  earthly  existence.  It 
is  the  same  as  Plato's  conception  of  the  absolutely  nega 
tive  non-Being  and  the  merely  possible.  It  is  absolute 
sterility,  entirely  evil  and  devoid  of  good.  Matter  has 
no  dualistic  independence  of  the  One.  What  is  the  char 
acter  of  the  nature  world  ?  It  has  the  same  character 
and  quality  as  the  formative  forces  that  unite  with  this 
negative  matter — it  is  no  more  and  no  less  eternal. 
The  world  of  nature  to  Plotinus  is  one  of  magic,  and 
not  merely  teleological.  He  says  that  the  heavens  are 
the  union  of  a  perfect  soul  with  matter ;  the  stars  are  the 
visible  gods  united  with  matter ;  the  powers  of  the  air 
and  sky  are  daemons,  which  mediate  between  the  stars 
and  the  souls  of  men,  united  with  matter ;  the  body  of 
man  is  the  human  soul  united  with  matter;  inorganic 
nature  is  the  lowest  of  the  plastic  forces  united  with 
matter.  Wherever  there  is  matter  (space),  there  is 
found  imperfection  and  limitation  and  evil.  Man  as  an 
individual  is  sympathetically  and  mysteriously  bound 
to  all  parts  of  the  universe.  Scientific  investigation  of 
nature  is  entirely  ruled  out  by  this  neo-Platonic  teach 
ing.  It  never  could  be  the  instrument  for  penetrating 
a  magical  universe.  Faith  and  superstition  take  the 
place  of  science,  and  prophecy  alone  undertakes  to 
solve  nature's  riddle. 

The  world  of  nature  is  thus  broken  in  two.  In  one 
sense  it  is  bad,  ugly,  and  irrational.  In  another  sense  it 
is  good,  beautiful,  and  rational,  because  it  is  formed  by 
the  souls  that  enter  into  it.  In  opposition  to  the  Gnos 
tics  Plotinus  praised  the  harmony  and  beauty  of  the 
world,  and  promulgated  his  metaphysics  of  the  beautiful 
as  a  last  farewell  of  Hellenic  civilization.  Beauty  is  not 
composite,  but  the  simple  Idea  of  worth  shining  through 


THE  RELIGIOUS  PERIOD  297 

the  world  of  sense.  Beauty  is  from  the  inner  and  for 
the  inner.  Art  does  not  imitate  nature,  but  expresses 
the  reason ;  it  supplements  the  defects  of  nature  and 
creates  something  new.  Yet  the  world  of  nature  is  beau 
tiful,  because  down  to  the  lowest  deeps  it  is  permeated 
by  the  divine. 

The  Return  of  the  Soul  to  God.  —  The  Ethical  Prob 
lem  of  Plotinus.  In  his  discussion  of  moral  conduct 
Plotinus  started  from  the  point  opposite  to  that  of  his 
metaphysics.  He  looked  from  the  point  of  view  of  man 
up  the  series  which  descended  from  the  Godhead.  Men 
immersed  in  matter  have  nevertheless  a  share  in  the  di 
vine  life,  and  their  goal  is  independence  of  the  world. 
They  must  free  themselves  from  sense.  Man's  ethical 
task  is  to  separate  the  two  worlds  and  to  turn  away 
from  the  material,  not  only  in  its  abnormalities  but  in 
every  way.  The  practical  virtues  have  little  value  in 
such  a  sublimation  of  the  soul,  for  these  only  bind  the 
soul  more  closely  to  the  world  of  matter.  The  political 
virtues  are  only  a  preparation  by  which  the  soul  learns 
how  to  be  free  from  sense.  The  intellectual  virtues  are 
necessary,  but  the  goal  of  salvation  is  not  reached  by 
knowledge  alone.  "The  wizard  king  builds  his  tower 
of  speculation  by  the  hands  of  human  workmen  till  he 
reaches  the  top  story,  and  then  he  summons  his  genii 
to  fashion  the  battlements  of  adamant  and  crown  them 
with  starry  fire."  Out  of  the  mental  condition  of  con 
templation  the  soul  will  rise  on  the  wings  of  ecstasy  to 
the  God  from  whom  it  came.  The  call  of  Plotinus  is  to 
the  ascetic  life.  The  development  required  is  that  of 
spirituality.  Ethically  Plotinus'  doctrine  is  dualistic, 
because  it  requires  the  rejection  of  matter  as  evil.  The 
return  is  not  an  evolution  nor  an  innovation  in  which 


298  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

reform  of  the  old  world  is  demanded.  There  is  no  indi« 
vidual  progress,  but  a  penetration  into  the  foundation 
of  things.  But  what  incentive  has  man  to  undertake 
this  return  ?  What  arouses  him  from  his  sleep  ?  Not 
3ense-perception  nor  reflection,  but  his  love  for  the 
beautiful.  The  innate  impulse  of  Platonic  love  turns 
the  soul  away  from  matter  to  the  illuminating  Idea, 
lie  who  has  an  immediate  recognition  of  the  pure  Idea 
is  gaining  the  higher  perfection.  Only  when  man  is  in 
ecstasy  —  an  ecstasy  which  transcends  every  subjective 
state  —  does  he  get  complete  contact  and  union  with  God. 
In  such  a  moment  of  consecration  he  forgets  himself 
and  becomes  God.  This  final  step  never  comes  unless 
God  himself .  illuminates  the  soul  by  a  special  light  so 
that  it  can  see  God.  This  final  state  comes  only  to  few 
souls,  and  to  those  but  seldom. 

The  Syrian  School.  —  The  Systematizing  of  Poly 
theisms.  —  Jamblichus.  This  school  existed  about  a 
generation  after  the  death  of  Plotinus.  Its  founder  was 
Jamblichus  (d.  about  330),  whose  teacher  was  Por 
phyry,  the  pupil  of  Plotinus.  Jamblichus  was  a  Syrian, 
who  got  his  instruction  from  Porphyry  at  Rome,  and 
then  went  back  to  his  native  country  to  set  up  for  him 
self  a  school  of  neo-Platonism.  He  soon  became  rever 
enced  as  teacher,  religious  reformer,  and  worker  of 
miracles.  He  wrote  commentaries  on  Plato,  Aristotle, 
and  the  theological  works  of  the  Orphics,  Chaldeans, 
and  the  Pythagoreans.  Among  the  crowd  of  his  enthu 
siastic  disciples,  one  notes  the  names  of  the  Emperor 
Julian  and  Hypatia.* 

The  neo-Platonism  of  Jamblichus  contained  no  new 
point  of  view.  Metaphysically  and  ethically  his  teach- 
*  Read  Charles  Kingsley,  Hypatia,  a  novel. 


THE  RELIGIOUS  PERIOD  299 

ing  was  identical  with  that  of  Plotinus.  He  tried  to 
complete  the  religious  movement  by  coordinating  all 
cults,  excepting  Christianity,  into  a  unity.  This  was  an 
eclecticism  by  which  Jamblichus  came  naturally,  for 
Syria  was  a  land  where  eclecticism  thrived.  It  was  here 
that  Gnosticism  had  its  stronghold.  With  free  eclectic 
hand  Jamblichus  filled  in  all  the  intermediary  grades 
between  the  Godhead  and  man  with  the  multitude  of 
gods  of  all  religions.  In  his  system  he  placed  10  supra- 
terrestrial  gods,  365  celestial  beings,  72  orders  of  sub- 
celestial  beings,  and  42  orders  of  natural  gods.  To  find 
places  for  them  all,  he  had  to  increase  the  number  of 
intermediaries  ;  and  to  systematize  this  complex  poly 
theism,  he  employed  the  Pythagorean  numbers.  His 
theory  shows  how  persistent  was  the  Hellenic  civiliza 
tion. 

The  Athenian  School.  —  Recapitulation.  —  Proclus. 
The  Syrian  school  failed  to  restore  the  old  religions,  and 
we  find  neo-Platonism,  after  revivals  here  and  there, 
again  at  Athens.  The  city  that  had  been  the  original 
sanctuary  of  Greek  culture  was  the  last  stronghold  of 
Hellenism. 

The  Athenian  school  made  its  appearance  about  410, 
and  its  leading  representatives  were  Plutarch,  Syrianus, 
and  Proclus.  Proclus  (410-485),  the  pupil  of  Syrianus, 
was  the  most  important  representative  of  the  Athenian 
school,  and  he  may  be  said  to  have  uttered  the  last  word 
of  dying  Hellenism.  Born  at  Constantinople,  of  a  Ly- 
cian  family,  he  received  his  education  at  Alexandria ; 
and  when  he  became  leader  of  the  school  at  Athens,  he 
received  the  extravagant  worship  of  his  pupils.  Con 
nected  with  the  Athenian  school  were  the  great  com 
mentators,  Philoponus  and  Simplicius,  whose  works  on 


300  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

Aristotle  became  of  great  value  to  later  times.  Theii 
erudite  compilations  stand  out  sharply  against  the  im 
aginative  speculations  of  their  age.  In  connection  with 
this  school  Boethius  must  not  be  overlooked.  He  was 
a  neo-Platonist  who  called  himself  a  Christian,  and  he 
was  an  important  figure  in  the  history  of  education. 
His  translations  and  expositions  of  Aristotle's  logic  and 
of  the  Isagoge  of  Porphyry  were  very  influential  in  the 
Middle  Ages. 

Proclus  was  a  theologian  like  Jamblichus,  excepting 
that  he  tried  to  put  theology  upon  a  philosophical  basis. 
By  means  of  the  dialectic  he  sought  to  systematize  the 
entire  philosophical  thought  of  the  Greeks.  His  insati 
able  desire  for  faith  was  accompanied  by  wonderful 
dialectical  ability,  with  the  result  that  his  teaching  was 
an  intricate  formalism  united  with  mythology.  He 
carried  out  his  dialectical  plans  to  the  minutest  detail. 
He  drew  the  materials  of  his  system  from  both  bar 
barians  and  Greeks,  and  he  himself  had  been  initiated 
into  all  the  Mysteries.  Every  superstition  of  the  past 
and  present  influenced  him,  and  in  framing  a  universal 
system  he  did  not  feel  satisfied  until  every  transmitted 
doctrine  had  found  a  place  in  that  system.  He  was  the 
systematizer  of  paganism  and  its  scholastic.  He  con 
ceived  that  the  fundamental  problem  was  that  of  the  One 
and  the  Many,  and  that  the  One  is  related  to  the  Many  in 
three  stages, — permanence,  going-forth,  and  return.  The 
Many  as  a  manifold  effect  is  similar  to  the  unity  of  the  ori 
ginal  cause  and  yet  different  from  it.  Development  is  the 
striving  of  the  effect  to  return  to  the  original  cause,  and 
this  strife  for  a  return  to  God  was  illustrated  by  Proclus 
in  every  realm  of  life,  and  he  repeated  it  again  and  again 
in  application  to  every  detail.  He  conceived  that  the  de* 


THE  RELIGIOUS  PERIOD  301 

velopment  of  the  world  from  the  Godhead  was  continu 
ally  going  through  this  triad  system  of  change.  His 
philosophy,  however,  shows  no  originality  other  than 
being  an  ingenious  formal  classification  in  which  every 
polytheism  found  a  place. 


CHAPTER  XIV 

PATRIST1CS.-THE  HELLENIZING  OF  THE  GOSPEL 

The  Early  Situation  of  Christianity.  The  Orient  was 
the  source  of  the  Gospel,  as  of  the  other  religions  of 
this  time.  The  power  of  Christianity  lay  in  the  sponta 
neous  force  of  its  pure  religious  feeling,  with  which  it 
entered  the  lists  for  the  conquest  of  the  world.  Chris 
tianity  was  not  a  philosophy,  but  a  religion.  It  appealed 
to  a  different  class  than  did  the  Alexandrian  schools. 
The  lower  class  received  it  first,  and  so  the  questions  of 
science  and  philosophy  occupied  the  early  Christians 
but  little.  They  were  neither  the  friends  nor  the  foes 
of  Hellenism,  and  they  took  no  interest  in  political 
theories.  The  Christian  society  was  a  spiritual  cosmo 
politanism,  which  was  inspired  and  united  by  belief  in 
God,  faith  in  Christ,  and  in  immediate  communion  with 
Christ.  Conviction  of  the  Second  Coming  of  the  Lord 
determined  the  conduct  of  the  early  Christians.  Indeed, 
that  moral  reformation  and  moral  conduct  were  the  dom 
inating  aims  of  the  Christian  communities  is  proved  by 
the  following  facts :  the  documents  dealing  with  Chris 
tian  life  of  that  time  are  almost  wholly  moral ;  the 
discipline  upon  the  members  was  for  moral  and  not  doc 
trinal  reasons.  Still  these  early  Christians  had  some  sim 
ple  doctrines,  which  were  seemingly  taken  for  granted; 
and  the  danger  is,  to  conceive  the  early  Christians  as 
either  (1)  too  sample  or  (2)  too  ignorant.  They  be 
lieved  that  there  is  one  God,  that  man  has  personal  re 
lations  to  God,  that  history  has  a  dramatic  course,  that 


THE   HELLENIZING   OF  THE   GOSPEL          303 

right  was  God's  command  and  absolutely  different  from 
wrong,  that  the  Last  Judgment  would  surely  come. 

But  about  the  middle  of  the  second  century  Chris 
tianity  was  obliged  to  change  its  attitude  towards  both 
science  and  the  State.  Between  150  and  250  a  great 
change  took  place  among  the  Christians.  The  docu 
mentary  records  are  full  of  doctrinal  struggles,  so  that 
little  room  was  left  for  recording  the  struggles  for  moral 
purity.  Morality  became  subordinated  to  belief,  and  the 
intellectual  side  of  Christianity  was  emphasized  at  the 
expense  of  the  ethical.  The  Second  Coming  of  our 
Lord  was  less  emphasized.  This  doctrine  was  either 
pushed  into  the  background  or  its  realization  was  looked 
upon  as  not  immediate.  Furthermore,  the  Christian 
sect  had  spread  over  the  empire  and  had  come  into  posi 
tive  relations  both  with  circles  of  culture  and  with  polit 
ical  affairs.  Various  statistics  of  the  numerical  growth 
of  the  Christians  are  given ;  among  them  is  the  follow 
ing  statement :  in  30  A.  D.  they  numbered  500,  in  100 
A.  D.  500,000,  in  311  A.  D.  30,000,000.  In  the  second 
century  the  self -justification  of  Christianity  could  no 
longer  be  put  upon  the  basis  of  the  feelings  and  inner 
convictions.  It  must  justify  itself  to  the  world  without, 
and  to  its  own  cultured  communicants  as  well.  It  was 
being  attacked  by  philosophy,  and,  unless  its  own  fur 
ther  growth  were  to  be  thwarted,  it  found  that  it  must 
use  the  weapons  of  philosophy.  Its  increase  of  power 
antagonized  both  the  Roman  state  and  Hellenistic  cul 
ture,  and  from  150  to  300  the  fight  between  Christian 
ity  and  the  old  world  of  things  was  to  the  death.  Chris 
tianity  eventually  conquered  Rome  and  Hellenism ;  but 
this  would  have  been  impossible  if  it  had  maintained 
its  original  attitude  of  indifference  to  culture.  Its  suo 


304  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

cess  was  due  to  the  wisdom  that  it  has  since  so  often 
shown.  It  adapted  itself  to  its  new  situation  by  taking 
over  and  making  its  own  the  culture  of  the  old  world, 
and  by  fighting  the  old  world  with  that  culture.  Chris 
tianity  thereby  shaped  its  own  constitution  into  such 
strength  that  it  could  obtain  possession  of  the  state  with 
Constantine  in  300.  From  this  impregnable  political 
position,  it  was  able  to  deal  with  its  rivals  on  an  entirely 
different  footing.  When  old  Rome  fell  in  476,  the 
church  did  not  fall  with  it,  but  on  the  contrary  it  came 
into  possession  of  the  city. 

But  this  political  success  was  the  result  and  not  the 
cause  of  the  growth  of  Christianity.  It  could  never  have 
conquered  so  intrenched  a  government  as  Rome,  if  it 
had  not  first  been  victorious  over  the  more  persistent 
civilization  of  Greece.  It  made  itself  inherently  strong 
by  Hellenizing  itself  —  strong  both  for  polemical  and 
for  constructive  purposes.  But  it  is  obvious  that  little 
philosophical  originality  may  be  expected  during  this 
period.  When  the  church  fathers  began  to  employ  Hel 
lenistic  philosophy,  they  took  it  on  the  whole  as  they 
found  it.  They  varied  it  only  to  suit  their  own  legiti 
mate  purposes.  Christianity  entered  the  religious  con 
troversies  of  the  time  when  victory  would  belong  to  the 
sect  which  could  use  Greek  civilization  most  effectively 
in  defending  itself  against  the  hostility  of  other  reli 
gions,  and  in  constantly  renewing  the  confidence  of  its 
devotees. 

But  in  the  adoption  of  Hellenistic  culture  the  church 
created  a  new  danger  to  itself.  It  must  guard  its  own 
conceptions  lest  they  be  smothered  by  this  same  Hel 
lenism.  It  must  keep  its  fundamental  beliefs  in  their 
integrity.  Greek  philosophy  must  be  a  servant  so  con- 


THE  HELLENIZING   OF  THE  GOSPEL         305 

strained  as  to  bring  out  only  the  implicit  meaning  of 
the  fundamental  Christian  doctrines.  Philosophy  must 
not  corrupt  these  doctrines  and  transmute  them  into 
Hellenism.  The  simple  faith  of  the  first  century  and  its 
doctrines  must  be  so  formulated  by  Hellenic  wisdom 
that  it  would  be  stated  for  all  time.  The  church  needed 
a  dogmatic  system,  a  creed  that  could  forestall  any  fu 
ture  innovations.  The  long  series  of  O3cumenical  councils 
of  the  church,  beginning  with  the  Council  of  Nica?a  in 
325,  were  united  efforts  in  this  direction.  After  that 
first  council,  dogma  became  more  gradually  fixed  and, 
from  time  to  time,  this  and  that  group  of  men  were 
separated  from  the  church  as  heretical. 

Patristics  is  this  philosophical  secularizing  of  the 
Gospel  which  accompanied  the  internal  and  external 
development  of  the  church  body  during  the  two  or  three 
centuries  after  the  year  150  A.  D. 

The  Philosophies  influencing  Christian  Thought. 
The  Greek  philosophies  most  influential  upon  the  de 
velopment  of  Christian  doctrine  were  Stoicism  and  neo- 
Platonism.  The  philosophy  of  Philo  was  also  influential, 
but  it  was  really  only  a  bridge  from  philosophical  Ju 
daism  to  Christian  theology.  It  contained  both  Stoicism 
and  Platonism  in  an  unsymmetrical  form,  and  Philo's 
writings  "contain  the  seeds  of  nearly  all  that  after 
wards  grew  up  on  Christian  soil."  l  Greek  philosophi 
cal  influence  upon  the  early  Christian  world  was  felt 
in  two  ways :  in  ethical  theory  and  practice ;  in  the 
construction  of  theology.  During  the  fourth  century 
Stoic  ethics  of  a  Cynic  type  replaced  the  early  Chris 
tian  ethics.  The  basis  of  Christian  society  was  no  longer 
the  ethics  of  the  Sermon  on  the  Mount,  but  rather  that 
i  Hatch,  Hibbert  Lectures,  1888,  p.  182. 


306  HISTORY   OF   PHILOSOPHY 

of  Roman  Stoicism.  This  is  shown  by  the  character  of 
that  book  on  morals  (De  Officiis  Ministrorum)  by 
St.  Ambrose,  Bishop  of  Milan  (340-397).  In  theology 
the  Christian  doctrine  had  no  need  to  borrow  from  the 
Greeks  the  conception  of  the  unity  of  God  or  that  of 
the  creation  of  the  world  by  God.  But  the  Greek  in 
fluence  is  seen  in  the  doctrines  on  subjects  allied  to 
these  :  mainly  on  the  questions  of  the  mode  of  creation 
and  the  relation  of  God  to  the  material  world.  In  the 
discussion  of  these  questions  the  influence  of  the  Stoic 
monism,  tending  toward  dualism,  and  the  influence  of 
Platonic  dualism,  tending  toward  a  threefold  conception 
of  God,  Matter,  and  Form,  will  appear  in  the  examples 
which  subsequently  follow. 

The  most  formidable  opponent  of  Christianity  dur 
ing  this  time  was  neo-Platonism,  but  neo-Platonism  and 
Christianity  were  not,  however,  long  separated.  Although 
neo-Platonism  met  its  fate  at  the  hands  of  scholasticism, 
it  influenced  in  a  thousand  ways  both  orthodox  and 
heretical  Christianity.  The  rivalry  of  these  two  bodies 
ended  —  and  with  it  came  the  ending  of  the  Hellenic- 
Roman  period  of  philosophy  —  in  a  complete  and  ori 
ginal  theology.  This  was  the  theology  of  St.  Augustine, 
who  marks  the  end  of  antiquity  and  the  beginning  of 
the  Middle  Ages. 
The  Periods  of  Early  Christianity  (30  A.  D.  -476  A.  D.). 

1.  Introductory  Period,  30-200. 

(1)  Period  of   Primitive   Faith  (during  the  1st 
century  A.  D.).  With  great  simplicity  of  doc 
trine  and  ceremonies  the  Christians  were  pre 
paring  through  faith  and  the  practice  of  vir 
tue  for  the  Second  Coming  of  our  Lord. 

(2)  Period  of  the  Earlier  Formulation  and  De* 


THE  HELLENIZING  OF  THE  GOSPEL         307 

fense  of  Christian  Doctrine  (during  the  2d 

century  A.  D.). 

(a)  The  Apologists  (2d  century). 

(6)  The  Gnostics  (2d  century). 

(c)  The  Old  Catholic  Theologians  (2d  and 

8d  centuries). 
2.  Development  Period  (200-476). 

(1)  The  Period  of  Actual  Formulation  of  Doo 
trine   (200-325).    The  Catechetical    School 
of  Alexandria  —  Origen  (3d  century). 

(2)  The  Period  of  the  Establishment  of  Dogma 
(325-modern  times)  as  seen  in  the  Council  of 
Nicaea  and  other  ecumenical  councils.  It  was 
a  period  in  which  church  dogma  was  developed 
on  the  basis  of  doctrine  already  established. 

While  the  origin  and  development  of  the  Christian 
church  is  an  interesting  story  in  itself,  only  one  aspect 
of  it  is  germane  to  the  history  of  philosophy.  That  is 
the  influence  of  Hellenism  upon  the  formation  of  the 
theology  of  the  church.  The  origin  and  development  of 
the  church  organization  lies  beyond  our  field.  Also  the 
periods  before  the  influence  of  Hellenism  —  the  Period 
of  Primitive  Faith  during  the  first  century,  and  the 
period  after  dogma  had  become  well  established,  the  time 
after  the  Council  of  Nicsea  in  325  —  will  be  omitted 
from  our  discussion  here.  Only  the  period  of  the  Earlier 
Formulation  and  that  of  the  Actual  Formulation  of  Doc 
trine,  that  is,  the  one  hundred  and  seventy-five  years 
(150-325),  are  of  interest  to  us.  This  time  is  known 
in  history  by  the  name  of  the  period  of  Patristics. 

The  Apologists.  Only  such  Christians  as  were  trained 
in  Greek  philosophy  could  rally  to  the  first  defense  of 
the  Christian  doctrine.  The  new  faith  was,  on  the  one 


SOS  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

hand,  on  the  defensive  against  the  mockery  of  Greek 
wisdom,  and,  on  the  other  hand,  it  was  obliged  to  take 
a  positive  stand  to  show  that  it  was  the  fulfillment  of 
the  human  need  of  salvation.  The  Apologists  tried  to 
make  the  Christian  teaching  as  consistent  as  possible 
with  the  results  of  Greek  philosophy  and,  at  the  same 
time,  to  read  into  Greek  philosophy  Christian  meanings. 
They  did  not  at  all  intend  to  Hellenize  the  Gospel,  but 
they  wanted  to  make  it  seem  a  rational  one  to  the  cul 
tured  world.  "  Christianity  is  philosophy  and  revela 
tion.  This  is  the  thesis  of  every  Apologist  from  Aris- 
tides  to  Minucius  Felix."  l  Their  very  act  of  defense 
was  unintentionally  the  first  step  toward  the  incorpora 
tion  of  Greek  philosophy  as  a  part  of  Christian  teach 
ing.  The  most  important  Apologists  were  Justin  Mar 
tyr  (100-166),  Athenagoras  (d.  180),  and  among  the 
Romans  Minucius  Felix  (about  200)  and  Lactantius 
(d.  320).  The  life  of  Justin  Martyr  is  characteristic. 
He  was  born  in  Sichem,  Samaria,  but  was  Greek  in 
origin  and  education.  Having  investigated  several  sys 
tems  of  philosophy  and  religion,  he  came  to  the  con 
clusion  that  the  Christian  religion  was  the  only  true 
philosophy,  and  he  died  in  defense  of  it  at  Rome. 

To  prove  that  Christianity  is  the  only  true  philosophy, 
the  Apologists  asserted  that  it  alone  guaranteed  correct 
knowledge  and  true  holiness  here  and  hereafter.  They 
proclaimed  its  preeminence  because  it  is  a  perfect  reve 
lation  of  God  through  Jesus  Christ.  Since  man  is  im 
prisoned  in  the  world  of  the  senses  and  ruled  by  dae 
mons,  he  can  never  be  saved  except  through  a  perfect 
revelation.  To  be  saved  is  to  become  rational,  and  man 
can  become  rational  only  by  divine  aid.  Revelation  has 

1  Harnack,  Outlines  of  the  Hist,  of  Dogma,  p.  120. 


THE  HELLENIZING  OF  THE  GOSPEL         309 

not  been  restricted  to  Christianity,  but  God's  inspira 
tion  has  been  at  work  in  all  mankind.  The  truth  in 
Socrates,  Plato,  and  Pythagoras  has  not  been  their  own, 
but  has  sprung  from  this  same  divine  inspiration,  for 
truth  never  is  the  product  of  man's  unaided  reason. 
Socrates  and  Plato  got  their  truth  in  part  from  God's 
direct  revelation  to  them,  in  part  indirectly  from  read 
ing  the  works  of  Moses  and  the  prophets.  But  revela 
tion  outside  of  Christianity  has  not  been  complete  nor 
continuous.  The  first  perfect  revelation  was  in  Jesus 
Christ,  for  He  is  the  first  to  reveal  the  divine  Logos  com 
pletely.  He  is  the  first  in  whom  the  Logos  has  become 
man.  He  is  the  Son  of  God  because  the  complete  essence 
of  the  inexpressible  Deity  is  unfolded  in  Him. 

The  Apologists  thus  identified  reason  and  revelation. 
The  Logos  is  the  same  in  revelation,  nature,  or  history. 
The  Stoic  conception  of  the  Logos,  which  Philo  had 
stripped  of  its  materialistic  character,  was  identified 
with  Christ  and  revelation.  Justin  could  regard  as  in 
spired  what  the  Greeks  had  looked  upon  as  natural  in 
their  own  doctrines.  Christ  is  the  world-reason,  in  whom 
the  divine  has  been  incarnated,  and  the  Apologists  had 
the  enormous  advantage  over  the  neo-Platonists  of  being 
able  to  point  to  Jesus  as  the  definite  and  historical  in 
carnation  of  God.  The  Apologists  could  summon  the 
prevailing  Platonic  dualism  of  God  and  matter  to  their 
aid  in  showing  the  need  of  such  a  revelation ;  for  mat 
ter  is  altogether  without  reason  and  goodness.  Thus  a 
summary  of  their  doctrine  is  as  follows :  the  world  is 
bad  and  needs  a  revelation ;  the  Logos  of  God  has  al 
ways  been  present  in  history,  but  has  especially  appeared 
in  Jesus  Christ,  the  man,  in  order  to  redeem  men  from 
their  sin  and  establish  the  kingdom  of  God. 


310  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

The  Gnostics.  Gnosticism  is  the  name  applied  to  a 
movement  of  hostile  reconstruction  of  Old  Testament 
tradition  instead  of  a  spiritual  interpretation  of  it.  It 
was  a  great  syncretic  movement  in  the  second  and  third 
centuries,  which  sought  to  form  a  world  religion  in  which 
men  should  be  rated  on  the  basis  of  what  they  intellect 
ually  and  morally  knew.  The  Gnostics  tried  to  trans 
form  the  Christian  faith  in  a  large  way  into  know 
ledge  that  would  still  be  Christian  ;  and  their  efforts 
show  how  strong  the  philosophical  interest  among  the 
Christians  was  beginning  to  be.  The  conditions  for  the 
development  of  such  a  doctrine  as  Gnosticism  were 
everywhere  present  in  the  empire,  yet  two  principal 
centres  are  pointed  out :  one  at  Alexandria  and  the 
other  in  Syria.  Gnosticism  was  a  most  fanciful  mix 
ture  of  Oriental  and  Occidental  cults  and  mythologies, 
very  much  more  fantastic  than  either  neo-Pythagorean- 
ism  or  neo-Platonism.  It  was  a  philosophy  in  which 
the  essential  Christian  principles  were  lost  under  the 
weight  of  esoteric  knowledge.  The  Gnostics  themselves 
were  steeped  in  Hellenic  culture,  and  in  many  localities 
formed  only  bands  of  Mysteries.  They  finally  lost  all 
sympathy  with  the  Christians,  and  were  classed  as  here 
tics  by  the  church.  The  leading  Gnostics  were  Saturni- 
nus,  Carpocrates  (about  130),  Basilides,  Valentinus 
(about  160),  and  Bardesanes  (155-225).  Only  a  few 
fragments  of  their  many  writings  remain,  and  about  all 
that  we  know  of  their  doctrines  is  what  their  opponents 
say  of  them.  Valentinus,  the  most  notable,  was  born 
at  Rome  and  died  at  Cyprus.  Bardesanes  was  born  in 
Mesopotamia.  Carpocrates  lived  at  Alexandria  and  was 
a  contemporary  of  Basilides,  who  was  a  Syrian.  The 
records  of  their  careers  are  very  meagre. 


THE  HELLENIZING  OF  THE  GOSPEL         311 

The  Gnostics  were  the  first  philosophers  of  history.1 
They  undertook  to  make  Christianity  a  world  religion 
by  conquering  Hellenic  culture  for  Christianity  and 
Christianity  for  Hellenic  culture.  The  only  way  they 
could  do  this  was  by  dislodging  Christianity  from  its 
historical  anchorage  in  the  Old  Testament.  The  Gnos 
tics  were  in  open  hostility  to  Judaism.  They  trans 
formed  every  ethical  problem  into  a  cosmological  prob 
lem,  they  regarded  human  history  as  the  continuation 
of  natural  history,  they  viewed  the  Redemption  as  the 
last  act  in  the  cosmic  drama.  This  shows  how  closely 
related  their  teaching  was  to  that  of  Philo  and  Plotinus 
and  how  consistent  with  the  theoretic  spirit  of  the 
time.  Since  the  salvation  of  the  world  by  Christ  stands 
as  the  central  point  of  their  philosophy  of  history,  their 
philosophy  of  history  amounted  to  a  philosophy  of 
Christian  history. 

The  victory  of  Christianity  over  paganism  and  Ju 
daism  was  conceived  allegorically  by  the  Gnostics  as  the 
battle  of  the  gods  of  these  religions.  The  Redeemer 
was  then  conceived  to  appear  at  the  psychological  mo 
ment  and  to  win  the  victory ;  and  this  appearance  of 
Christ  as  Redeemer  is  not  only  the  highest  point  in 
the  development  of  the  human  race,  but  it  is  the  de 
nouement  in  the  drama  of  the  universe.  Nature  was 
therefore  conceived  by  them  to  be  a  battle-ground  of 
the  gods  and  the  strife  to  be  waged  between  the  forces 
of  good  and  evil.  The  good  gets  the  victory  by  means 
of  Christ.  The  battle  was  conceived  in  the  neo-Py- 
thagorean  form  of  the  dualism  of  matter  and  spirit, 
but  was  expressed  in  mythical  terms.  The  heathen 
gods  and  the  god  of  the  Old  Testament,  who  took  the 

1  Windelband,  Hist,  of  Ancient  Phil.,  p.  357. 


312  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

form  of  the  Platonic  demiurge,  were  the  powers  in  the 
world  which  the  highest  God  had  to  overcome. 

The  dualism  of  good  and  evil  was  conceived  to  be 
the  same  as  between  spirit  and  matter,  and  was  elabo 
rated  in  a  fashion  true  to  the  Alexandrian  school.  The 
space  between  God  and  matter  was  conceived  to  be 
filled  in  by  a  whole  race  of  daemons  and  angels,  ar 
ranged  according  to  the  Pythagorean  numbers.  The 
lowest  was  so  far  from  the  divine  perfectness  as  to  be 
in  touch  with  matter,  and  he  is  the  demiurge  who 
formed  the  world.  The  battle  then  was  between  good 
and  evil,  light  and  darkness,  until  the  Logos,  the  Nous, 
Christ,  the  most  perfect  of  the  intermediary  beings, 
came  down  and  by  incarnation  released  from  matter 
the  imprisoned  spirits  of  men  and  even  of  the  fallen 
angels,  like  the  demiurge.  This  is,  in  brief,  the  Gnostic 
explanation  of  history. 

This  dualism  was  quite  consistent  with  contemporary 
Christian  ethics,  which  had  then  become  Stoic.  But 
this  dualism  was  not  consistent  with  monotheism,  the 
fundamental  Christian  principle.  The  internal  danger 
in  Patristics  —  of  swamping  the  fundamentals  of 
Christianity  through  Hellenizing  them  —  appears  thus 
early.  The  early  Christian  found  at  the  beginning  an 
antagonism  between  his  fundamental  monotheistic  meta 
physics  and  Greek  dualistic  ethics. 

The  Reaction  against  Gnosticism.  —  The  Old 
Catholic  Theologians.  We  have  seen  that  the  original 
position  of  the  Christians  was  one  of  indifference  to 
both  politics  and  philosophy ;  that  then  came  the  em 
ployment  of  Hellenism  in  the  defense  of  the  Gospel. 
This  resulted  in  the  extreme  attempt  of  the  Gnostics 
to  transform  Christianity  into  a  factor  in  a  cosmic  the- 


THE  HELLENIZING  OF  THE  GOSPEL         313 

osophy.  Gnosticism  had  tried  to  capture  the  new  re 
ligion  by  force  and  make  it  subserve  the  interests  of 
Hellenic  and  Oriental  philosophy.  This  danger  was 
averted  only  after  years  of  controversy.  Gnosticism 
was  the  gravest  danger  that  the  early  church  had  to 
meet,  and  the  Gnostics  left  their  mark  upon  the  church, 
although  they  were  expelled ;  for  the  church  never  re 
turned  to  its  original  simplicity  of  doctrine.  Gnosticism, 
however,  produced  an  extreme  reaction,  for  a  time, 
against  the  use  of  philosophy,  and  was  represented  by 
the"Old  Catholic  Theologians,"  —  Iremeus  (140-200), 
Tertullian  (160-220),  and  Hippolytus.  These  theo 
logians  stood  against  turning  faith  into  a  science  and 
tried  to  limit  dogma  to  the  articles  of  the  baptismal 
confession  interpreted  as  a  rule  of  faith.  Tatian  (170) 
saw  in  Hellenism  the  work  of  the  devil.  Irenseus  con 
ceived  a  unity  in  the  process  of  creation  and  redemp 
tion,  —  creation  as  a  divine  method  of  bringing  hu 
manity  up  into  the  church  by  way  of  redemption. 
Tertullian  went  so  far  as  to  affirm  that  the  Gospel  is 
confirmed  by  its  being  in  a  certain  sense  contradictory 
to  reason.  Credo  quid  dbsurdum.  By  this  he  means, 
not  that  faith  rests  in  things  absurd,  but  that  faith 
rests  in  things  so  far  above  reason  as  to  make  reason 
absurd.  This  reaction  was  against  Gnosticism  and  not 
against  rationalism,  for  these  men  used  both  philosophy 
and  tradition  to  support  their  arguments. 

The  reaction  against  a  systematic  theology  failed  to 
establish  itself,  for  the  need  of  Greek  philosophy  was 
found  to  be  necessary.  The  result  was  that  a  median 
position  was  taken  by  the  help  of  Greek  philosophy 
in  the  formulation  of  the  dogma  of  the  church.  This 
was  scientifically  stated  by  the  Alexandrian  School  of 


314  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

Catechists,  of  which  Clement  and  Origen  were  the 
leaders. 

Origen  (185-254)  and  the  School  of  Catechists. 
Origen,  whose  surname  was  Adamantine,  was  an  early 
teacher  in  the  School  of  Catechists,  which  had  been 
under  the  direction  of  Clement.  Like  Plotinus,  Origen 
had  been  a  pupil  of  Ammonius  Saccas.  Origen  endured 
much  persecution  on  account  of  his  teaching,  and  had 
to  flee  from  Alexandria  to  Caesarea  and  Tyre,  where  he 
spent  his  old  age.  He  was  the  most  influential  theolo 
gian  of  the  Eastern  church,  and  he  was  the  father  of 
Christian  theological  science. 

In  manner  of  life  Origen  was  a  Christian;  in  his 
thought  he  was  a  Greek.  He  was  the  Christian  Philo, 
although  he  was  a  rival  to  the  neo-Platonic  philosophers. 
His  Christian  theology  competed  with  the  philosophical 
systems  of  his  time.  It  was  founded  on  both  Testa 
ments,  and  it  also  united  in  a  peculiar  way  toward  a 
practical  end  the  theology  of  both  the  Apologists  and  the 
Gnostics.  He  was  convinced  that  Christianity  could 
be  expressed  only  as  a  science,  and  that  any  form  of 
Christianity  without  scientific  expression  is  not  clear  tc 
itself.  Although  the  church  was  offended  at  some  of 
his  doctrines,  it  made  his  philosophical  principle  and 
his  theory  of  development  its  own.  In  trying  to  state 
Christianity  in  terms  of  intellectual  knowledge,  Origen 
did  not  make  the  mistake  of  burying  its  principles 
under  philosophy  or  mythology,  as  was  the  case  with 
the  Gnostics.  The  Gnostics  had  created  a  new  Christian 
ity  ;  Origen  developed  Christianity  from  within  itself. 
He  was  an  orthodox  traditionalist,  a  strong  Biblical 
theologian  and  idealistic  philosopher.  He  maintained 
that  there  were  several  ways  of  interpreting  the  Scrip- 


THE  HELLENIZING  OF  THE  GOSPEL         315 

tures  (allegorical  interpretation).  The  masses  see  only 
the  somatic  or  outward  meaning  as  it  has  been  devel 
oped  in  history.  A  deeper  or  moral  interpretation  gives 
a  psychical  meaning  to  the  Gospel  truth.  More  pro 
found  still  is  the  spiritual  interpretation,  which  gives  to 
the  Gospels  a  pneumatic  or  spiritually  esoteric  meaning. 
Christianity  is  superior  to  all  other  religions  because  it 
is  a  religion  for  all  classes,  even  for  the  common  man. 
Christianity  is  the  only  religion  which,  without  being 
polytheistic,  can  have  its  truth  in  mythical  dress. 

The  aim  of  Origen  was  less  to  show  how  the  world 
came  to  be,  than  to  justify  the  ways  of  God  to  men  in 
the  world's  creation  and  history.  The  central  principle 
in  his  teaching  is  spiritual  monotheism.  God  is  an  un 
changing  spirit,  the  author  of  all  things,  and  He  tran 
scends  human  knowledge.  What  distinguishes  Him  most 
is  the  absolute  causality  of  His  will.  He  is  essentially 
creative,  and  this  creative  activity  is  co-eternal  with  Him 
self.  God  can  have  no  dealings  with  changing  individ 
uals  directly,  since  although  creative  He  is  unchanging. 
He  has  direct  connection  only  with  the  eternal  revela 
tion  of  His  own  image,  the  Logos.  The  Logos  is  a  per 
son,  a  special  hypostasis,  the  perfect  likeness  of  God 
with  nothing  corporeal  about  him.  He  is  not  the  God, 
but  still  God,  yet  a  second  God,  with  no  sharing  of 
divinity.1  The  Holy  Spirit  bears  the  same  relation  to 
the  Logos  as  the  Logos  to  the  Father.  In  his  relation 
to  the  world  the  Logos  is  the  Idea  of  Ideas,  the  norm 
according  to  which  things  are  created. 

Origen  followed  Philo  in  believing  that  the  original 
creation  consists  of  a  world  of  beings  that  are  pure 
intelligences,  and  that  the  cause  of  creation  is  God'a 

1  Harnack,  Outlines  of  the  History  of  Dogma,  p.  159. 


316  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

goodness.  He  further  believed  that  the  Logos  or  Wis« 
dom  of  God  is  God's  Son.  Both  the  creation  of  the 
ideal  world  of  intelligences  and  the  existence  of  the  Son 
is  from  eternity.  The  origin  of  the  visible  world  is  to  be 
contrasted  with  this  eternal  creation.  The  visible  world 
had  its  beginning  in  time  and  is  only  one  of  a  series  of 
worlds.  It  will  finally  return  to  God,  and  has  in  God  its 
beginning  and  end.  Thus  man  lives  in  a  visible  world 
of  time  with  eternities  on  either  side.  Creation,  viewed 
as  a  whole,  is  everlasting,  and  consists  of  an  endless 
number  of  beings  who  are  destined  to  become  a  part 
of  the  divine  holiness  and  to  participate  in  the  divine 
blessedness.  These  beings  are  endowed  with  freedom  of 
will,  and  they  fall  away  from  God.  The  visible  world  of 
matter  has  been  created  to  purify  the  fallen  spirits,  and 
in  consequence  we  find  materialized  spirits  graded  into 
angels,  stars,  mankind,  and  evil  demons. 

In  his  emphasis  on  the  will  as  the  fundamental 
mental  part  of  man,  Origen  is  distinctly  Christian  and 
opposed  to  Greek  intellectualism.  The  will  of  God  and 
the  will  of  man  form  the  corner  stone  in  his  system. 
The  will  of  God  is  the  eternal  development  of  His 
being,  but  the  will  of  spirits  is  their  temporal  free 
choice.  The  will  of  God  is  reality  itself;  the  will  of 
spirits  is  phenomenal  and  changing.  Freedom  of  the 
will  of  the  spirits  is  the  ground  of  their  sin,  and  con 
sequently  of  their  materiality.  Thus  it  is  by  the  free 
dom  of  the  spirits  that  Origen  explains  evil  and  the 
existence  of  imperfect  matter  without  impeaching  the 
eternal  purity  of  God.  Origen  thus  reconciled  the  ethi 
cal  transcendence  of  God  as  creator  with  his  imma 
nence  in  the  material  world.  God  is  the  creator  without 
being  the  creator  of  sin.  Through  the  conception  of 


THE  HELLENIZING  OF  THE  GOSPEL         317 

free-will  Origen  reconciled  the  two  antithetical  princi 
ples,  of  Christian  metaphysics :  faith  in  divine  omni 
potence  and  consciousness  of  sin. 

The  function  of  the  church  is  thus  an  important  one 
in  the  divine  plan.  For  the  fallen  spirits  try  to  rise  bj 
their  own  wills  from  the  matter  to  which  they  are  con 
demned  for  purification.  They  never  lose  their  divine 
essence,  however  low  they  may  falL  They  cannot  rise 
alone,  nor  are  they  compelled  to,  but  they  always  have 
the  help  of  divine  grace,  which  is  always  active  within 
man  and  has  also  been  perfectly  revealed  in  Jesus 
Christ.  After  the  manner  of  the  Apologists,  Origen 
makes  use  of  the  Stoic  and  Platonic  conceptions,  for 
the  eternal  Logos  takes  form  in  the  divine-human  unity 
of  Jesus.  Through  His  physical  suffering  redemption  is 
made  possible  to  all  believers,  and  through  His  essence 
illumination  has  been  brought  to  those  especially  in 
spired.  There  are  different  grades  of  redemption :  faith, 
or  a  religious  understanding  of  the  perceptual  world ; 
knowledge  of  the  Logos ;  final  absorption  in  God.  All 
shall  finally  be  saved  through  the  combined  forces  of 
freedom  and  Grace,  and  then  shall  all  material  existence 
disappear. 

The  controversies  within  the  church  during  the  suc 
ceeding  centuries  over  the  theory  of  Origen  are  theo 
logical  rather  than  philosophical,  and  so  our  account  of 
the  relation  of  Greek  philosophy  to  Christianity  in  the 
Hellenic-Roman  period  closes  here.  Origen's  under 
taking  was  a  private  one,  approved  at  first  in  only  lim 
ited  circles  and  on  the  whole  disapproved  by  the  church. 
In  his  scientific  dogmatics  the  particular  changes  which 
he  planned  pertain  especially  to  the  conception  of  sal 
vation  and  the  place  of  Christ  in  the  universe.  In  his 


318  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

teaching  about  Christ  he  emphasized  more  the  cosmo* 
logical  than  the  soteriological  aspect,  but  neither  was 
fully  developed.  The  history  of  the  early  church  shows 
that  Christianity  seized  the  ideas  of  ancient  philosophy 
and  insisted  on  revising  them  with  its  own  religious 
principle  before  it  used  them.  We  shall  find  that  the 
next  period  is  introduced  by  a  greater  than  Origen,  in 
whom  again  the  Christian  and  the  ancient  worlds  will 
meet  in  new  and  richer  combination,  —  St.  Augustine. 


BOOK  II 

THE  MIDDLE  AGES  (476-1453) 

CHAPTER   XV 

CHARACTERISTICS  AND  CONDITIONS  OF  THE 
MIDDLE  AGES 

Comparison  of  the  Hellenic-Roman  Period  and  the 
Middle  Ages.  The  Middle  Ages  can  be  conveniently 
remembered  as  approximately  the  1000  years  between 
the  fall  of  old  Rome,  in  476,  and  the  fall  of  new  Rome 
(Constantinople)  in  1453.  Together  these  two  period* 
make  a  long  and  a  philosophically  unproductive  stretch 
of  1800  years.  The  intellectual  materials  which  the  two 
periods  possessed,  differ  but  little,  although  during  the 
first  half  of  the  Middle  Ages  such  materials  were  very 
few.  There  is,  however,  a  decided  difference  in  the  way 
the  two  periods  look  at  things.  The  ancient  had  started 
with  Aristotle's  interest  in  knowledge  for  its  own  sake  ; 
the  ancient  had  passed  from  that  to  the  need  of 
knowledge  in  ethical  conduct ;  he  had  finally  made  use 
of  knowledge  only  in  formulating  religion.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  history  of  thought  in  the  Middle  Ages  was 
exactly  the  reverse.  The  medieval  man  starts  satisfied 
with  religion  as  thus  formulated  by  the  preceding  pe 
riod,  and  seeks  to  regain  pure  knowledge.  The  perspec 
tive  in  the  two  periods  is  therefore  different.  Hellenic 
thought  began  in  freedom  and  ended  in  tradition  ;  me 
diaeval  thought  begins  in  tradition  and,  borne  by  the 
youthful  German,  who  brings  with  him  few  original 


820  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

ideas,  pushes  forward  toward  freedom.  No  doubt  one 
can  discover  in  mediaeval  times  many  fresh  transforma 
tions  of  ancient  thought  and  a  new  Latin  terminology, 
but,  on  the  whole,  all  the  problems  of  the  Middle  Ages, 
as  well  as  their  solutions,  can  be  found  in  antiquity. 
One  may  find,  too,  the  germs  of  modern  thought  in  the 
Middle  Ages,  but  they  come  from  mediaeval  pupils  and 
not  from  mediaeval  masters.  In  the  Middle  Ages  hu 
manity  is  again  at  school ;  its  problems  appear  in  suc 
cession,  but  they  always  are  expressed  in  the  conceptions 
of  the  ancients. 

The  Mediaeval  Man.  Antiquity  had  brought  together 
three  civilizations, — those  of  Greece,  of  Rome,  and  of 
Christianity.  Greek  civilization  in  the  form  of  an  in 
tellectual  culture,  called  Hellenism,  had  been  superim 
posed  upon  Roman  political  society.  The  result  was  a 
society  with  a  twofold  stratum,  and  in  such  a  society  the 
Christian  church  had  grown  as  an  organization  of  con 
trolling  cultural  and  political  influence.  It  was  into  this 
society  that  the  German  barbarians,  by  a  series  of  in 
vasions,  entered  during  the  first  three  centuries  of  the 
Middle  Ages. 

The  Middle  Ages  began  and  antiquity  ended  when 
these  German  tribes  finally  broke  down  the  barriers  of 
the  Roman  empire.  It  was  a  new  period ;  for  a  new 
race  had  taken  upon  itself  the  responsibility  of  bearing 
the  burden  of  the  future  of  western  Europe.  The  Ger 
man  was  of  course  unconscious  of  the  magnitude  of  his 
self-imposed  burden,  for  the  German  was  young,  vigor 
ous,  and  moved  by  primitive  instincts.  He  had  leaped 
into  the  world's  fields  as  a  conqueror ;  he  remained  as 
a  laborer. 

At  the  beginning  the  German  seemed  likely  to  de» 


CONDITIONS  OF  THE  MIDDLE  AGES         321 

stroy  the  entire  product  which  antiquity  had  bequeathed. 
He  was  quite  unprepared  to  assimilate  the  rich  fruits  of 
that  ancient  civilization.  He  had,  indeed,  less  mind  for 
the  elaborate  forms  of  Greek  philosophy  than  for  the 
lighter  forms  of  Greek  art.  In  his  first  contact  he  could 
understand  neither.  Moreover  ancient  society  was  so 
weak  that  it  could  not  educate  him,  who  was  its  con 
queror,  into  its  culture.  Nevertheless,  there  was  one  ele 
ment  in  that  ancient  society  that  did  appeal  to  the 
German.  That  was  the  spiritual  power  of  the  Christian 
church.  Alone  amid  the  ruins  of  antiquity  the  power  of 
the  church  had  grown  so  strong  that  the  men  of  the 
north  bowed  before  it,  and  religion  accomplished  through 
the  emotions  of  the  Germans  what  art,  philosophy,  and 
statecraft  failed  to  achieve.  The  preaching  of  the  Gos 
pel  laid  hold  of  the  feelings  of  these  primitive  people, 
for  the  church  in  its  pretensions,  and  sometimes  in  fact, 
represented  the  old  Koman  political  unity.  Moreover 
the  church  was  also  the  repository  of  what  was  left  of 
Greek  science.  The  church  expressed  for  the  German 
his  own  ideal  of  the  personal  inner  life.  The  Germans 
became  the  supporters  of  the  church,  and  in  this  way 
the  protectors  of  ancient  culture.  Mediaeval  history  in 
western  Europe  is  therefore  the  record  of  the  develop 
ment  of  the  Germans  under  the  influence  of  the  Chris 
tian  church.  In  contrast  with  the  development  of  the 
Eastern  church,  which  was  the  development  of  a  state 
church,  the  Western  church  was  the  development  of  an 
ecclesiastical  state.  The  Western  church,  and  not  the 
later  empire,  was  the  true  successor  of  the  Roman 
empire.  Thus  the  early  beginnings  of  the  Middle  Ages 
rested  with  the  church,  but  the  later  development  of  the 
Middle  Ages  rested  with  the  German  people. 


322  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

How  the  Universe  appeared  to  the  Mediaeval  Man. 
The  mediaeval  man  had  very  indistinct  ideas  about  the 
world  around  him,  since  his  interest  did  not  lie  in  the 
earthly  realm,  but  in  the  spirit  that  controlled  it.  He 
was  content  in  his  sciences  with  conclusions  without 
their  demonstrations.  Although  it  is  said  that  relations 
of  space  and  number  are  never  indistinct  in  the  mind 
of  the  civilized  man,  the  man  of  the  Middle  Ages  cer 
tainly  did  not  possess  such  conceptions  in  so  vigorous 
a  manner  as  to  enable  him  to  discover  new  truths.  We 
must,  furthermore,  make  a  sharper  distinction  between 
mediaeval  popular  opinion  and  mediaeval  scientific  opin 
ion  than  we  should  about  popular  and  scientific  opinion 
of  modern  times ;  for  the  results  of  science  did  not 
reach  the  people  then  as  now.  To  the  ordinary  mediaeval 
man  the  world  in  which  he  lived  was  what  it  appeared  to 
be  to  his  eye.  The  earth  was  flat ;  the  sky  was  a  mate 
rial  dome,  which  sustained  the  waters  of  the  world  above 
it.  Through  this  sky-floor  the  water  sometimes  breaks 
and  the  earth  receives  showers  of  rain.  These  popular 
notions  sometimes  appeared  in  the  verse  of  the  time. 

The  mediaeval  scientific  opinion  was  based  on  the 
theory  of  Ptolemy  and  his  school  of  Alexandrian  astro 
nomers,  who  lived  in  the  second  century  A.  D.,  some  de 
tails  to  the  theory  having  been  added  by  the  Arabians. 
Ptolemy  says,  "  The  world  is  divided  into  two  vast  re 
gions  ;  the  one  ethereal,  the  other  elementary.  The  ethe 
real  region  begins  with  the  first  mover,  which  accom 
plishes  its  journey  from  east  to  west  in  twenty-four 
hours ;  ten  skies  participate  in  this  motion,  and  their 
totality  comprises  the  double  crystalline  heaven,  the  fir 
mament  and  the  seven  planets."  (See  diagram.)  The 
mediaeval  man  of  science  thought  that,  inasmuch  as  he 


CONDITIONS   OF  THE  MIDDLE  AGES 


323 


was  upon  the  earth,  he  was  therefore  standing  at  the 
centre  of  things.  Directly  above  him  was  the  cavity  of 
the  sky,  ruled  by  the  moon  ;  and  below  the  moon  were 
the  four  elements,  —  fire,  air,  water,  and  earth.  This 
region  was  the  realm  of  imperfection.  But  above  the 


M 


? 


PTOLEMAIC  COSMOGRAPHY 

A  diagram  showing  the  division  of  the  universe  into  the  ten  spheres  or  heaven« 

(From  the  private  library  of  Profetaor  R.  W.  Willion  of  Harrard  Unitenitj) 

moon  the  scientist  saw  a  series  of  nine  other  heavens, 
each  with  an  orderly  revolution  of  its  own  ;  and  beyond 
all  is  God.  The  universe  was  therefore  to  Ptolemy  a 
great  but  a  limited  sphere,  consisting  of  ten  spheres 
one  inside  another  (like  the  rings  of  an  onion).  Each 


324  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

planet  moved  with  the  motion  of  its  own  heaven  (on 
sphere),  which  was  sometimes  called  "  crystalline  "  be 
cause  it  was  transparent.  The  movements  of  the  heav 
enly  bodies,  each  in  its  own  revolving  heaven,  were 
contained  in  the  whole  sphere,  which  revolved  with  a 
motion  of  its  own.  By  ascribing  other  movements  to 
the  planets  within  their  respective  heavens,  the  medieval 
astronomers  were  able  to  predict  every  conjunction  and 
eclipse  to  the  minute.  These  separate  movements  of  the 
planets  were  called  epicycles,  the  form  of  which  is 
shown  in  the  diagram  on  the  opposite  page. 

Such  a  scientific  astronomy  would  easily  lend  itself 
to  the  theological  conceptions  of  the  time.  The  realm  of 
perfection  above  the  moon  was  supposed  to  be  under 
the  direct  supervision  of  God  and  to  be  inhabited  by 
spirits.  Thus  the  conjunction  and  relation  of  the  heavenly 
bodies  were  thought  to  have  influence  upon  human  life, 
and  they  furnished  the  basis  of  the  astrology,  necro 
mancy,  and  spiritism  so  common  in  the  Middle  Ages. 
The  ninth  heaven  embraced  all  the  others.  It  swept 
around  them  all,  without  interfering  with  their  own 
special  motions,  and  completed  its  revolution  in  twenty- 
four  hours.  The  ninth  heaven  was  both  the  source  and 
the  limit  of  all  motion  and  all  change.  Beyond  it  lies  the 
eternal  peace  of  God,  which  the  Christian  astronomer 
regarded  as  "  the  abode  of  the  blessed."  This  was  called 
the  tenth  heaven  or  the  Empyrean.  This,  in  Dante's 
words,  is  "  the  heaven  that  is  pure  light ;  light  intellect 
ual  full  of  love,  love  of  the  good  full  of  joy,  joy  that 
transcends  all  sweetness."  The  tenth  heaven  is  Paradise 
and  is  within  the  life  of  God.  It  is  important  to  note 
that  the  Ptolemaic  conception  of  the  universe  is  the 
background  upon  which  Dante  constructs  his  Divine 


CONDITIONS  OF  THE  MIDDLE  AGES 


325 


Comedy  (see  diagram,  p.  376),*  and  appears  in  part 
at  least  as  the  cosmological  basis  of  the  Paradise 
Lost  of  Milton.  For  thirteen  centuries  —  from  200 
to  1500  —  conviction  remained  unshaken  in  the  Ptole 
maic  system  of  astronomy  as  an  adequate  explanation 
of  the  universe. 


PTOLEMAIC  COSMOGRAPHY 

(Showing  the  Epicyclic  Movements  of  Saturn,  Jupiter,  and  Mars  in  respect 
to  the  Earth) 

The  Mediaeval  Man  at  School.  In  the  eleventh  and 
twelfth  centuries  there  was  a  revival  in  intellectual  in 
terests  that  was  deep  and  broad,  and  the  characteris- 

*  Read  Rossetti,  Shadow  of >  Dante >,  pp.  9-14  ;  Karl  Witte, 
Essays  on  Dante,  pp.  99  ff. 


326  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

tics  of  this  revival  will  be  discussed  subsequently  (see 
Transitional  Period,  p.  329).  Our  curiosity,  however,  is 
aroused  upon  our  entrance  into  the  Middle  Ages,  as  to 
what  the  man  of  the  early  Middle  Ages  studied  and  how 
much  he  learned.  We  must  remind  ourselves  at  the  out 
set  of  the  oft-repeated  fact  that,  on  the  whole,  in  west 
ern  Europe,  for  the  first  five  hundred  years  of  the 
Middle  Ages,  the  only  people  who  had  any  book-learning 
were  the  churchmen.  Furthermore,  with  them  the  learn 
ing  was  very  meagre.  Their  purpose  in  study  will  show 
this,  for  it  was  to  enable  them  "  to  understand  and  ex 
pound  the  Canonical  Scriptures,  the  Fathers,  and  other 
ecclesiastical  writings."  The  training  was  as  follows :  — 

1.  Theological.  Elementary  instruction  in  the  Psalms 
and  church  music,  but  no  systematic  training  in  theo 
logy, —  just  enough  training  to  enable  the  priest  to 
understand  the  Bible  and  the  Church  Fathers. 

2.  Secular    training.    Knowledge    in    the    "  Seven 
Liberal  Arts,"  i.  e.  the  trivium,  —  grammar,  rhetoric, 
and  dialectic ;  and  the  more  advanced  quadrivium,  — 
music,   arithmetic,    geometry,    and    astronomy.    These 
names  are  suggestive  of  a  vast  amount  of  knowledge, 
while,  in  truth,  very  little  was  known  or  taught  in  these 
subjects.  Astronomy  and  arithmetic  were  employed  to 
find  the  time  of  Easter.  Geometry  included  some  pro 
positions  of  Euclid  without  demonstrations.  Music  in 
cluded  plain  song  and  a  mystic  doctrine  of  number. 
More  was  made  of  grammar,  the  study  of  rhetoric  from 
Latin  classics,  and  dialectics.  Dialectics  was  logic  in 
the  Middle  Ages,  and   its   mysteries   fascinated   the 
mediaeval  man.  But  even  in  logic  there  were  only  some 
remnants  of  the  Aristotelian  logic  known. 

A  Mediaeval  Library.  Here  again  is  an  interesting 


CONDITIONS  OF  THE  MIDDLE  AGES         327 

question:  What  did  this  mediaeval  churchman  read? 
But  we  must  make  a  distinction  between  books  most 
commonly  read,  books  that  the  scholars  might  use,  and 
books  most  influential  upon  thought. 

1.  Books  most  commonly  read.  These  would  be  the 
text-books  used  in  instruction.  They  are  as  follows :  — 
The  Psalms. 

The  Grammar  of  Donatus. 

The  Christian  poets :  Prudentius,  Psycliomachia  ;  Ju- 

vencus,  Gospels  in  Verse  ;  Sedulius,  Easter  Hymn. 
Dionysius  Cato,  Disticha  de  Moribus^  a  collection  of 

proverbs  (moral  maxims)  in  rhyming  couplets. 
Virgil,  Ovid,  and  the  rhetorical  works  of  Cicero. 
M sop's  Fables  (in  Latin). 

2.  Books  that  the  scholars  might  use.  It  is  difficult 
to  say  what  any  particular  scholar  actually  did  read,  for 
the  libraries  of  monasteries  differed  enormously  in  the 
character  and  number  of  their  books ;  some  monasteries 
had  several  hundred  books,  some  none  at  all.  Some  libra 
ries  were  composed  almost  entirely  of  works  of  the 
Fathers ;  some  possessed  a  good  many  works  of  ancient 
classical  writers.  One  might  expect  to  find  any  one  or 
more  of  the  following  works  in  a  scholar's  library :  — 
Aristotle,  De  Interpretatione  and  the   Categories  in 

Boethius'  translation. 

This  explains  why  the  logical  problems  occupied 
the  almost  exclusive  attention  of  the  first  schoolmen. 
Plato,  the  Timceus. 

This  was  known  to  the  Irish  monks  perhaps  in 
Greek,  but  on  the  continent  in  a  translation  by  Chal- 
cidius.  The  only  other  sources  of  knowledge  of  Plato 
were  in  the  works  of  Augustine  and  the  neo-Platon- 
ists. 


328  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

Commentaries  on  Aristotle,  —  The  Isagoge  by  For- 
phyry,  in  a  translation  into  Latin  by  Boethius,  and 
some  commentaries  by  Boethius  himself  on  Aristotle's 
De  Interpretation  and  Categories. 

Cicero,  the  rhetorical  and  dialectical  treatises,  such  as 
the  Topica,  De  Officiis. 

Seneca,  De  Beneficiis. 

Lucretius,  De  Rerum  Natura. 

Augustine's  works  and  some  pseudo-Augustinian  writ 
ings. 

The  works  of  the  Church  Fathers,  Clement  of  Alexan 
dria  and  Origen. 

The  Pseudo-Dionysius,  translated  from  the  Greek  by 
Erigena. 

The  encyclopedic  collections  of  some  of  the  last  of  the 
scholars  of  antiquity,  like  Cassiodorus,  Capella,  Boe 
thius,  and  the  Etymologies  of  Isidore  of  Seville. 
3.  The  Books  most  influential  philosophically  upon 

the  time.  These  were  not  necessarily  the  books  most 

widely  read,  but  the  epoch-making  books,  so  to  speak. 

They  were  as  follows  :  — 

Augustine,  City  of  God. 

Boethius,  Consolation  of  Philosophy. 

Aristotle,  De  Interpretations  and  the  Categories  in 
translation  by  Boethius. 

Pseudo-Dionysius,  translated  by  Erigena. 

Porphyry,  Isagoge  translated  by  Boethius,  an  introduc 
tion  to  Aristotle's  Categories. 
The  Three  Periods  of  the  Middle  Ages. 

1.  Early  Period,  476-1000. 

2.  Transitional  Period,  1000-1200. 

3.  Period  of  Classic  Scholasticism,  1200-1453. 
There  is  one  great  natural  division  line  of  the  Middle 


CONDITIONS  OF  THE  MIDDLE  AGES         329 

Ages,  the  year  1200.  At  this  time  the  surging  of  the 
western  peoples  eastward  in  the  Crusades  was  at  its 
height,  and  the  works  of  Aristotle  were  coming  into  west 
ern  Europe  from  the  East.  These  events  mark  a  change 
in  the  political  and  intellectual  situation  in  Europe.  But 
this  change  did  not  take  place  suddenly.  There  are  in 
tervening  two  centuries  that  are  indeed  transitional,  but 
at  the  same  time  are  animated  by  a  distinct  and  inde 
pendent  philosophical  motive.  These  two  centuries  may 
be  set  apart  as  a  period,  different  from  the  earlier  and 
the  later  periods.  We  shall  call  these  three  periods  the 
Early  Period,  the  Transitional  Period,  and  the  Period 
of  Classic  Scholasticism. 

The  Early  Period  takes  us  from  the  fall  of  old  Eome 
(476)  to  the  birth  of  modern  political  Europe  (1000). 
It  is  a  period  of  religious  faith  governed  by  the  theo* 
logy  of  Augustine.  Mysticism  has  no  independent  fol 
lowing,  but  on  the  contrary  rules  within  the  church. 
The  Christian  principle  of  individual  personality  and 
the  Greek  Platonic  conception  of  universal  realities  are 
not  fused,  but  they  are  held  without  arousing  contra 
versy.  This  is  because  the  human  reason  has  no  stand 
ard  code,  nor  does  it  yet  feel  the  need  of  one.  The  only 
two  philosophers,  Augustine  and  Erigena,  of  the  period 
are  animated  by  neo-Platonism. 

The  Transitional  Period  extends  from,  the  birth  of 
political  Europe  (1000)  to  the  arrival  of  the  works  of 
Aristotle  (about  1200).  This  epoch  is  one  of  logical 
controversy,  in  which  the  Christian  and  the  Greek  mo 
tives  conflict.  This  controversy  gives  rise  to  the  first 
group  of  great  schoolmen,  who  discuss  the  reality  of 
general  ideas  in  their  application  to  dogma.  Mysticism 
still  rules  the  churchman,  but  now  in  a  modified  form, 


330  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

Plato  has  become  the  standard  of  the  reason  in  orthodox 
circles  and  Aristotle  in  those  inclined  to  heresy,  but 
as  yet  only  fragments  of  the  works  of  either  are  known. 
The  Period  of  Classic  Scholasticism  extends  from 
1200  to  the  end  of  the  Middle  Ages  (1453).  It  is  a 
period  when  a  theological  metaphysics  arises  by  the 
side  of  the  logical  controversy  and  predominates  over 
that  controversy.  The  problem  now  concerns  the  re 
spective  scopes  of  the  reason  and  faith.  The  period  is 
Aristotelian,  and  Aristotle's  philosophy  is  made  the 
standard  code  for  the  churchman  for  all  time.  Mysticism 
has  now  no  place  of  authority  in  the  church,  but  has  an 
independence.  The  period  contains  the  greatest  school 
men  of  the  Middle  Ages. 

Summary  of  the  Political  and  Educational  Worlds  of 
the  Mediaeval  Man. 

I.  Early  Period,  476-1000. 

395  The  Koman  empire  di-  (Augustine,  354-430) 

vided     into    Eastern 

and  Western  empires. 

476  Fall  of  the  Western  476-800      Disappearance 

empire,  the    Eastern  of  municipal  and  im- 

empire  lasting  about  perial  schools  and  rise 

1000  years  longer.  of  episcopal 

375-600  Northern  barba-  and 

rians     overrun     the  monastic  schools. 

Western    empire    in 

series  of  invasions.  525  Boethius  died,  the  last 

600  Koman  power  almost  notable  Roman  scho- 

entirely  in  hands  of  lar  who  knew  Greek. 

barbarians.  529  Closing  of  philosophi 
cal  Schools  at  Athens ; 


CONDITIOl^  OF  THE  MIDDLE  AGES         331 


622-732  Mohammedans 
conquer  Arabia, 
Northern  Africa,  and 
Spain. 

732  Mohammedans  re 
pulsed  at  the  battle 
of  Tours. 

600-800  Fusion  took 
place  among  German 
and  Roman  peoples. 

800  Empire  of  Charle 
magne  founded.  Civ 
ilization  higher  than 
the  German,  lower 
than  the  Roman. 


900-1000  Empire  of 
Charlemagne  broken 
up.  Demoralization. 
Invasions  by  Danes 
and  Northmen  from 
the  north;  Saracens 
from  south  by  sea; 
Slavs,  Hungarians, 
Russians,  and  Poles 
by  land.  The  church 
demoralized,  Papacy 


founding  of  monastic 
school  by  St.  Benedict. 


476-800  Dark  Ages. 


800-1000  Benedictine 
Age  :  only  period  in 
We  stern  JZurope 
when  education  is 
entirely  in  hands 
of  monks.  The  Pal 
ace  school ;  episcopal, 
cathedral,  and  monas 
tery  schools. 
(Erigena,  810-88V, 
the  forerunner  of 
Scholasticism.) 

900-1000  Dark  century 
with  decline  of  learn 
ing. 


IN  THE  EARLY  PERIOD  AND 
THE  TRANSITIONAL 
PERIOD  LITTLE  OP 
PLATO  WAS  KNOWN 


332 


HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 


temporarily 
pears,    feudalism 
places  empire. 


re- 


EXCEPT  IN  THE  FORM 
OF  NEO-PLATONISM 
AND  LITTLE  OF  ARIS- 


II.    Transitional  Period,  1000-1200. 


1000  France  and  Ger 
many  get  their  first 
form  as  nations  just 
before  this  year ;  Eng 
land  just  after.  Be 
ginning  of  new  birth 
of  Europe,  caused  by 
conversions  of  north 
ern  nations,  by  en 
lightened  rule  of  the 
Ottos,  by  regenera 
tion  of  Papacy,  by 
development  of  civic 
life. 

Beginning  of  politi 
cal  order,  ecclesiasti 
cal  discipline,  and 
social  tranquillity. 
Revival  of  architec 
ture  followed  by  re 
newal  of  art.  The  Ro 
manesque  appeared 
about  1000,  the 
Gothic  about  1150. 
Poetry  of  Trouveres 
in  north  and  of  Trou 
badours  in  south. 


TOTLE  EXCEPT  OF 
FRAGMENTS  OF  HIS 
LOGIC. 


First   Scholasticism. 

(Anselm,  1033-1109) 

(Roscellinus,d.lllO) 

(Abelard,1079-1142) 


1000  Passion  for  inquiry 
takes  the  place  of  the 
old  routine. 

1160-1200  Traces  of  the 
origination  of  the 
earliest  universities. 

1150-1250  Translation 
into  Latin  directly 
from  Greek  of  the 
works  of  Aristotle, 
previously  unknown 
in  Western  Europe. 


CONDITIONS  OF  THE  MIDDLE  AGES 


333 


III.  Period  of  Classic 
1200  Crusades    at    their 

height. 

1200-1453  Commerce  of 
Europe  with  Asia  be 
gins  to  grow  to  large 
proportions  in  coun 
tries  on  the  Mediter 
ranean.  The  Third 
Estate  grows  in 
strength,  national 
governments  prevail 
over  the  feudal  system 


Scholasticism,  1200-1453. 
1200  The  Mendicant 

Friars. 

Classic  Scholasticism* 

(T  h  o  m  a  s  Aquinas, 

1224-1274.) 

(Duns  Scotus,  1270- 

1308.) 

(William  of  Ockam, 
1280-1349.) 
1300-1453  The  period  is 

well     supplied     with 
.  schools. 

1350-1453    Deterioration 

of  Scholasticism, 


CHAPTER  XVI 

THE  EARLY  PERIOD  OF  THE  MIDDLE  AGES  (476-1000) 

The  General  Character  of  the  Early  Period.  It  is  no 
accident  that  these  five  hundred  years  of  the  Middle 
Ages  were  spiritualistic.  Both  the  political  disturbances 
and  the  intellectual  inheritance  from  the  Hellenic-Ro 
man  period  made  the  period  such.  The  troubles  during 
the  long  death  agony  of  the  Roman  empire  had  de 
prived  the  people  of  their  interest  in  this  world.  The 
world  of  kingdoms  and  material  things  presented  no 
ideals  ;  and  the  age  would  have  been  pessimistic  had 
not  the  Church  through  Augustine  presented  a  heavenly 
ideal  and  the  means  to  win  that  ideal.  Both  what  the 
material  world  had  taken  away  from  man  and  what  the 
spiritual  seemed  to  offer  him,  made  the  age  an  age  of 
faith.  The  principle  of  inner  spirituality  was  moved  to 
a  central  position.  All  things  pointed  to  the  super 
natural  and  the  transcendent.  Men  dwelt  upon  the 
nature  of  God,  the  number  and  rank  of  the  angels,  the 
salvation  of  the  soul.  In  this,  as  in  the  Transitional 
Period  following,  little  was  known  of  Aristotle  except 
some  fragments  of  his  logic ;  and  little  was  known  of 
Plato  except  in  the  form  of  neo-Platonism.  But  in  this 
period  (before  the  year  1000)  the  pupil  was  instructed 
in  both  Aristotle  and  Plato,  and  held  them  both  to 
gether  without  controversy.  Mysticism  had  little  inde 
pendence  of  church  doctrine,  as  appears  in  the  case  of 
Erigena,  the  consequences  of  whose  doctrine  were  not 
at  first  seen.  The  monastery  became  the  fundamental 


EARLY  PERIOD  O*    THE  MIDDLE  AGES      335 

social  organization  and  the  central  social  force.  Organ 
ized  ascetic  life  permitted  an  absorbing  contemplation 
of  heaven.  Prayer  superseded  thought ;  faith  prescribed 
knowledge.  The  intellectual  world  was  dominated  by  neo- 
Platonic  idealism,  and  the  all-important  topic  in  men's 
minds  was  that  of  God's  grace.  Augustine  stood  at 
the  beginning  of  the  period  and  organized  its  concep 
tion  of  grace  for  it.  Erigena  stood  near  the  end  and  stated 
the  neo-Platonism  of  the  period  in  extreme  form,  pre 
senting  the  issue  for  the  scholasticism  of  the  many  years 


MEDLEVAL  GEOGRAPHY.    THE  COSMAS  MAP,  A.  D.  647 

from  1.  KCMM'I  Evolution  of  Gtograp\y 

(Cosmas  was  an  Egyptian  monk  who  had  once  been  a  merchant  and  traveler.  He 
did  not  use  the  records  of  his  own  travels  to  supplement  the  Oreek  and  Roman  plans, 
but  he  laid  down  as  a  fact  that  the  earth  is  flat.  Then  he  piously  adduced  evidence 
from  the  Scriptures  to  support  his  view.  The  maps  drawn  by  Cosmas  are  the  earliest 
Christian  maps  that  have  survived.  Their  crudeness,  compared  with  the  maps  of  the 
Romans  and  Arabs,  reveals  the  low  state  of  knowledge  among  the  Christians.) 

to  come.  The  presentation  of  the  doctrine  of  these  two 
men  will  therefore  be  the  philosophical  exemplification 
of  the  attitude  of  the  time. 

The  Historical  Position  of  Augustine.  The  Middle 
Ages  were  inaugurated  by  a  mind  of  the  highest  order, 


336  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

• — Augustine.*  If  one  were  to  select  the  most  influential 
figures  in  the  history  of  philosophy,  Augustine  might 
be  chosen  to  stand  with  Plato,  Aristotle,  Spinoza,  and 
Kant.  "  In  some  respects  Augustine  stands  nearer  to 
us  than  Hegel  and  Schopenhauer."  1  For  the  church, 
but  no  less  for  the  period,  it  was  a  fortunate  circum 
stance  that  Augustine  should  have  lived  just  as  anti 
quity  was  closing  and  the  medieval  period  beginning. 
Through  him  the  various  influences  of  the  past  were 
gathered  up  and  presented  in  a  scientific  statement  for 
the  Middle  Ages.  "  The  history  of  piety  and  of  dogma 
in  the  West  was  so  thoroughly  dominated  by  Augus 
tine  from  the  beginning  of  the  fifth  century  to  the  era 
of  the  Reformation,  that  we  must  take  this  whole  time 
as  forming  one  period."  2 

In  his  relation  to  antiquity  Augustine  drew  especially 
upon  the  fundamental  teachings  of  St.  Paul,  the  neo- 
Platonists,  and  the  Patristics  for  the  presentation  of  his 
own  doctrine.  He  was  familiar  with  a  great  number  of 
the  doctrines  of  antiquity,  and  was  the  medium  of  their 
transmission  to  the  Middle  Ages.  He  does  not  seem  to 
have  known  the  system  of  Aristotle,  but  the  importance 
which  he  attached  to  the  dialectic  in  the  explanation  of 
the  Scriptures  contributed  a  good  deal  to  the  use  of  the 
logic  of  Aristotle  by  the  scholastics  of  the  Middle  Ages. 
He  had  some  knowledge  of  the  Pythagoreans,  the  Stoics, 
and  the  Epicureans  through  the  writings  of  Cicero. 
But  the  most  important  philosophical  influence  upon 

*  Read  Eucken,  Problem  of  Human  Life,  pp.  219-221, 
232,  236,  245-248  ;  Turner,  Hist,  of  Philosophy,  p.  226 ;  De 
Wulf ,  Hist,  of  Mediceval  Phil.,  pp.  90-98  ;  Harnack,  Hist, 
of  Dogma,  vol.  v,  pp.  3—6. 

1  Eucken,  Problem  of  Human  Life,  p.  247. 

2  Harnack,  Hist,  of  Dogma,  vol.  v,  p.  3. 


EARLY  PERIOD  OF  THE  MIDDLE  AGES      337 

Augustine  was  the  neo-Platonic  teaching  of  Plotinus 
and  Porphyry.  Neo-Platonism,  the  Pauline  theology, 
and  the  Patristic  are  the  large  factors  in  the  doctrine 
of  Augustine. 

In  his  relation  to  the  Middle  Ages,  what  in  brief  was 
the  position  of  Augustine  ?  By  means  of  neo-Platonism 
and  a  discriminating  psychological  analysis  he  trans 
formed  the  previous  belief  in  God  as  a  judye  into  a 
belief  in  the  personal  relations  between  God  and  man. 
That  is  to  say,  he  carried  out  monotheism  spiritually, 
and  in  doing  this  the  influence  of  neo-Platonism  is  very 
strong  in  him.  Augustine  made  one  of  the  centres  of 
his  teaching  the  living  relation  of  the  soul  to  God.  He 
took  religion  out  of  the  sphere  of  cosmological  science, 
where  it  had  been  placed  by  Origen  and  the  Gnostics, 
and  made  it  personal.  Furthermore,  he  offered  with  this 
new  ideal  a  plan  of  salvation ;  for  Augustine  made  it 
his  task  to  show  (1)  what  God  is,  and  (2)  what  the 
salvation  of  the  soul  requires.  Whereas  before  Augus 
tine  the  only  dogmatic  scheme  had  presented  the  place 
and  function  of  Christ  in  salvation,  Augustine  was  in 
terested  in  the  place  of  man  in  salvation.  Thus  he 
elaborated  monotheism  into  spiritual  monotheism  and 
delineated  the  inward  processes  of  the  Christian  life,  i.  e. 
of  sin  and  grace.  This  important  advance  made  by 
Augustine  must  be  attributed  to  the  influence  of  philo 
sophy  —  neo-Platonism  —  upon  him. 

But  it  must  not  be  supposed  that  the  total  teaching 
of  Augustine  and  the  total  influence  of  his  thought  is 
contained  in  this  single  change  in  Christian  piety,  as 
we  have  stated  it.  The  various  Pagan  and  Christian 
elements,  as  they  lie  in  his  system,  have  little  coherence; 
and  Augustine  does  not  settle  the  rival  claims  between 


338  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

them.  As  the  mediaeval  period  advanced,  what  in  his 
teaching  had  been  a  mere  incoherence  became  in  the 
hands  of  others  positive  discord.  He  gave  the  church 
impulses  of  the  highest  spiritual  quality,  but  he  left  no 
well-organized  capital.  These  impulses  toward  spiritual 
piety  have  never  been  lost,  but  the  profusion  of  ideas 
and  views  in  Augustine,  unharmonized  by  himself,  were 
also  a  permanent  bequest  to  posterity  that  produced 
both  vital  movements  and  violent  controversies.  The  le 
gal  and  moral  party  of  the  church  resisted  his  teaching 
at  the  beginning,  and  in  the  sixth  century,  under  the 
influence  of  Gregory  the  Great,  toned  down  Augustine's 
teaching  in  the  direction  of  a  conception  of  the  church 
as  a  juristic  organization. 

Augustine  was  thus  the  beginner  of  a  new  line  of 
development  by  his  incorporation  of  neo-Platonism  into 
Christian  doctrine  and  by  his  use  of  the  dialectic  to 
present,  defend,  and  develop  the  doctrine  of  the  church. 
Although  the  years  of  his  life  fall  in  antiquity,  although 
he  is  the  collector  of  all  the  threads  of  the  neo-Platonic 
and  Christian  religions,  he  belongs  in  the  Middle  Ages 
as  the  teacher  of  the  Middle  Ages.  His  doctrine  acted 
as  an  authoritative  spiritual  guide  for  the  new  German 
peoples.  They  took  up  the  problems  of  antiquity  from 
the  new  point  of  view  of  individual  spirituality,  and 
created  out  of  them  the  philosophy  of  the  future.  But 
philosophically  Augustine  was  far  in  advance  of  his  age, 
and  in  the  intellectually  torpid  times  that  followed  him 
little  philosophical  development  could  be  expected.  Not 
until  after  Charlemagne  does  philosophical  development 
springing  from  Augustine  appear.  Later  Luther  and 
the  Reformation  reverted  to  him,  and  our  modern  phi 
losophy  is  founded  on  the  principle  which  he  made  cen 
tral  in  his  conception  of  piety. 


EARLY  PERIOD  OF  THE   MIDDLE  AGES      339 

The  Secular  Science.  At  the  same  time  it  must  not 
be  supposed  that  the  teaching  of  Augustine  was  by  any 
means  the  only  source  from  which  this  first  period  of 
the  Middle  Ages  drew  its  materials  of  knowledge.  A 
glance  at  the  list  of  books  in  a  mediaeval  library  (see 
p.  327)  will  not  confirm  such  a  supposition.  Augustine 
does  not  include  in  his  doctrine  —  massive  as  it  is  —  all 
the  factors  that  finally  made  up  mediaeval  civilization. 
Even  at  the  beginning  there  was  a  tendency  toward 
secular  science  derived  from  Plato  and  Aristotle.  No 
ticeable  as  this  was  at  first  it  became  prominent  later. 
Secular  science  tried  at  first  to  modify  scholasticism, 
and  then  later  to  gain  an  independence  for  itself.  The 
doctrine  of  Augustine  did  not  contain  the  germs  of  sci 
ence.  But  at  the  start  the  Middle  Ages  had  writings 
on  science  in  the  inadequate  compendiums  of  Capella, 
Cassiodorus,  and  Boethius,  and  in  the  fragments  of  the 
logic  of  Aristotle. 

The  Life  of  Augustine  (354-430).  Aurelius  Au 
gustine,  often  called  "  the  Plato  of  Christianity,"  was 
born  in  Thagaste,  Numidia.  His  father  was  a  Pagan, 
his  mother  a  Christian  ;  and  it  was  his  mother  who  con 
tributed  chiefly  to  the  formation  of  his  character.  He 
was  a  boy  of  brilliant  gifts,  and  was  educated  in  the 
schools  of  Madaura  and  Carthage.  At  Carthage  his  life 
was  full  of  dissipation,  which  he  has  described  in  his 
Confessions.  He  took  up  in  succession  all  the  scientific 
and  religious  problems  of  his  time.  He  gave  up  the 
teaching  of  rhetoric,  which  he  had  practiced  in  several 
towns  in  Asia  Minor  and  Italy,  and  began  to  study 
theology.  He  was  troubled  by  his  religious  doubts  and 
tried  to  find  relief  first  in  Manichasism,  then  in  the 
skepticism  of  the  Academy,  and  then  in  neo-Platonism. 


340  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

He  was  converted  to  Christianity  through  three  influ 
ences  :  his  study  of  Plato,  the  eloquence  of  St.  Ambrose, 
and  the  unremitting  moral  influence  of  his  mother.  He 
became  a  priest,  then  a  bishop,  and  was  untiring  in  his 
activity  both  in  the  practical  organization  of  the  church 
and  in  the  theoretical  construction  of  its  doctrines.  He 
was  especially  active  in  his  literary  attempts  to  refute  the 
Pelagian  and  ManichaBan  heresies,  whose  doctrines  he 
had  previously  professed.  His  life  falls  at  the  time  when 
the  barbarian  invasions  were  beginning  and  when  Rome 
was  crumbling.  Moved  by  his  Platonic  idealism,  he  wrote 
his  City  of  God,  which,  in  an  elaborate  philosophy  of  his 
tory,  shows  that  God's  city  is  not  on  earth,  but  in  heaven. 
The  Two  Elements  in  Augustine's  Teaching.  The 
great  masses  of  thought  in  Augustine's  mind  reveal 
motion  in  two  directions.  On  the  one  hand,  he  is  the 
theologian  who  holds  on  high  the  conception  of  the 
authority  of  the  church.  On  the  other  hand,  he  is  the 
philosopher  who  speaks  for  the  principle  of  immediate 
certainty  for  the  individual.  These  are  two  foci  about 
which  his  thought  is  in  constant  flux  and  often  in  con 
tradiction.  Augustine  has,  therefore,  two  criteria  for 
truth :  the  truth  that  comes  from  an  authority  without, 
and  the  truth  that  comes  from  consciousness  itself. 
The  authority  of  the  church  and  the  authority  of  the 
immediate  consciousness  of  the  individual  —  these  are 
the  two  central  thoughts  in  Augustinianism.  Augus 
tine's  conception  of  the  authority  of  the  church  acted 
upon  him  as  a  lofty  ideal  which  both  inspired  and  at 
the  same  time  constrained  his  speculations.  As  he  grew 
older  he  gravitated  more  and  more  toward  it,  and 
thereby  became  more  conservative.  But  it  was  the  other 
central  thought  —  the  authority  of  immediate  conscious- 


EARLY  PERIOD  OF  THE  MIDDLE  AGES      341 

ness  —  which  he  made  the  basis  of  a  philosophy  of 
original  power.  Through  this  he  transcended  his  own 
time  and  became  himself  a  modern,  leading  the  Middle 
Ages  up  to  him. 

Augustine  did  not  define  accurately  the  spheres  of 
philosophy  and  theology.  He  did  not  show  whether 
reason  or  revelation  had  the  higher  authority.  He  did 
not  try  to  decide  between  the  intelligo  ut  credam  and 
credo  ut  intelligam,  that  is,  between  the  respective 
authorities  of  reason  and  faith.  That  became,  in  conse 
quence,  a  central  philosophical  problem  for  the  school 
men.  Nevertheless,  the  great  inheritance  which  Augus 
tine  left  the  world  was  along  the  philosophical  line  of 
intelligo  ut  credam  (of  knowledge  as  the  basis  of  faith 
instead  of  faith  as  the  basis  of  knowledge). 

The  Neo-Platonic  Element :  the  Inner  Certainties 
of  Consciousness.  Augustine  was  not  original  in  making 
the  starting-point  of  his  philosophy  the  inner  certainties 
of  consciousness.  That  was  the  point  of  view  of  his  time, 
and  the  starting-point  of  the  ascetic  tendency  both  of 
Christianity  and  of  neo-Platonism.  He  was  dissatisfied 
with  the  world  without,  and  turned  away  from  it  to  the 
world  within  to  find  reality.  But  this  had  been  a  grow 
ing  tendency  ever  since  the  time  of  Plato.  Augustine's 
originality  lies  in  his  psychological  description  of  these 
certainties.  He  is  the  master  of  self -observation  and 
introspection.  He  can  describe  inner  experiences  as  well 
as  analyze  them.  He  puts  his  philosophy  upon  a  solid 
anthropological  basis  by  developing  a  psychology  of  the 
certainties  of  consciousness.  In  doing  this  he  placed  the 
inner  experience  in  the  central  position  of  control.  Thus 
he  reached  a  well-defined  position  of  "  internality  "  for 
which  the  Stoics,  Epicureans,  neo-Platonists,  and  the 


542  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

preceding  Christian  theologians  had  been  groping ;  thus 
he  anticipated  Descartes  and  modern  philosophy. 

Man  clings  to  life  in  spite  of  all  its  evils.  This  shows 
that  there  is  a  reality  for  the  soul.  The  material  world 
may  pass  away,  but  the  reality  of  soul-life  is  assured. 
Man's  inner  life  is  ever  present  and  cannot  be  imagin 
ary.  The  fact  that  there  is  such  a  thing  as  probability 
implies  the  existence  of  certainty.  Where  shall  I  look 
for  certainty  ?  In  myself.  Certainty  is  there  as  a  fact  of 
inner  observation.  There  are  my  inner  mental  states  — 
my  sensations,  feelings,  etc.,  whose  existence  cannot  be 
doubted  even  if  the  existence  of  the  objects  to  which 
they  correspond  is  doubted.  I  am  certain  also  of  my 
own  consciousness  at  that  moment.  To  doubt  my  exist 
ence  is  to  assert  my  existence.  To  doubt  also  implies 
that  I  will  remember,  live  —  for  doubt  rests  upon  these 
former  ideas.  The  temporary  character  of  the  material 
world  only  strengthens  the  reality  of  this  inner  world. 
The  existence  of  the  material  world  cannot  be  demon 
strated,  and  so  man  is  driven  inward  to  find  a  basis  for 
its  reality.  Thus  by  a  deep  insight,  although  without 
much  logical  reasoning,  Augustine  transcends  Aristotle, 
and  anticipates  modern  thought  by  finding  reality  in 
the  unitary  personality^  whose  existence  is  an  inner 
certainty. 

But  Augustine  is  driven  farther  inward ;  for  the  cer 
tainty  of  the  existence  of  God  is  involved  in  this  inner 
certainty.  My  doubt  about  the  character  of  the  world 
of  material  things  implies  that  their  truth  exists  and 
that  I  have  the  capacity  for  measuring  it.  Such  truths 
are  universal.  They  transcend  the  individual  conscious 
ness,  and  their  mutual  agreement  unites  all  rational 
beings  in  a  common  standard.  On  the  other  hand,  this 


EARLY  PERIOD  OF  THE  MIDDLE  AGES      343 

unity  of  truths  implies  the  existence  of  God.  Truths 
are  the  Ideas  (Platonic)  in  God's  mind.1 

Full  knowledge  of  God  is  denied  to  man  in  this  life, 
but,  nevertheless,  all  morality  consists  in  love  for  God  ; 
all  science  is  only  an  interest  in  the  working  of  God  in 
nature  ;  all  the  beauty  in  the  world  around  us  points  to 
the  harmonious  ordering  of  God  ;  the  history  of  the 
world  is  only  the  free  act  of  God.  Thus,  in  brief,  does 
Augustine  centralize  the  principle  of  inner  spirituality 
—  of  "  internality."  Thus  does  he  put  into  control  the 
certainty  of  consciousness. 

This  was  Augustine's  great  contribution  to  the 
world  both  in  the  sphere  of  philosophy  and  religion. 
We  shall  see  how  important  this  principle  is  in  our 
tracing  of  modern  philosophy.  Its  importance  upon  the 
growth  of  religion  was  so  very  great  that  we  cannot 
pass  it  by  without  remark.  "  Augustine  was  the  re 
former  of  Christian  piety."  In  the  midst  of  religion  he 
discovered  religion.  He  looked  into  the  human  heart 
and  found  it  to  be  the  lower  good ;  he  looked  to  God 
and  found  Him  to  be  the  higher  good.  In  love  for 
God,  man  becomes  exalted  to  another  being.  This  is 
the  "  new  birth."  By  this  personal  religion  nature  and 
grace  are  separated,  but  morality  and  religion  are 
united.  Sin  is  the  disposition  to  be  independent  by  liv 
ing  in  a  state  of  unrest  in  the  desires.  Sin  is  a  state  of 
lust  and  fear.  All  is  sin  in  the  heart  of  the  natural 
man  —  in  the  heart  apart  from  God.  The  pre-Augus- 
tinian  religion  of  morality  and  baptism,  animated  by 

i  There  is  this  difference  between  Augustine's  position  and  that  of 
Descartes.  Augustine's  Quod  sifallor,  sum  is  a  refutation  of  the  doctrine 
of  probability  of  the  Academy,  not  a  demonstration  ;  Descartes'  Cogito, 
ergo  sum  is  positive,  —  a  subtle  but  an  important  difference  between 
^he  two  thinkers. 


344  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

hope  and  fear,  was  supplanted  by  him  with  the  concep 
tion  of  the  desire  to  be  happy  by  sharing  in  the  bliss 
of  God.  Augustine  passed  from  Christian  pessimism  to 
Christian  optimism,  to  a  confidence  in  pardoning  grace. 
By  faith  and  love  God  calls  us  back  to  himself  and  the 
soul  acquires  what  God  requires.  Religion  is  personal 
and  a  thing  of  the  heart.  "  Love,  unfeigned  humility, 
and  strength  to  overcome  the  world,  these  are  the  ele 
ments  of  religion  and  its  blessedness  ;  they  spring  from 
the  actual  possession  of  the  loving  God.  This  message 
Augustine  preached  to  the  Christianity  of  his  time  and 
of  all  times." l 

But  Augustine  philosophically  breaks  with  his  own 
Platonism  at  one  point,  and  finds  not  in  the  intellect, 
but  in  the  will,  the  primary  characteristic  of  this  con 
sciousness  of  inner  certainty.  The  will  is  the  inmost 
core  of  our  being.  All  our  mental  states  are  formed 
under  the  direction  of  the  purposes  of  the  will.  The 
striking  exception  to  this  is  the  cognition  of  the  higher 
divine  truth,  in  the  presence  of  which  the  mind  can  be 
only  passive.  Revelation  cannot  be  the  production  of 
the  finite  activity,  but  it  is  an  act  of  grace  before  which 
the  will  is  expectant  and  passive.  Knowledge  of  the 
divine  truths  of  the  reason  Is  the  blessedness  that  re 
sults  from  the  will  of  God  and  not  of  man.  The  will  of 
man  is  transformed  into  faith,  and  yet  even  then  an 
element  of  the  human  will  is  present,  although  passive, 
for  the  appropriation  of  the  truth  is  an  act  of  will. 
Thus,  in  regard  to  this  difficult  subject  of  the  nature 
of  the  will,  there  are  two  observations  to  be  made  :  (1) 
Augustine  conceives  the  will,  memory,  and  intellect  ag 
so  intimately  related  as  not  to  be  faculties  of  the  per- 

1  Harnack,  Hist,  of  Dogma,  vol.  v,  p.  337. 


EARLY  PERIOD  OF  THE  MIDDLE  AGES      345 

sonality  like  the  properties  of  a  substance.  They  rather 
form  an  indissoluble  unity  of  the  substance  of  the  soul. 
(2)  The  will  is  theoretically  free,  and  Augustine  is  one 
of  the  most  forcible  defenders  of  free-will  because  he  is 
also  a  defender  of  ethical  responsibility  and  the  justice 
of  God.  Theoretically  the  will  is  a  force  existing  above 
sensuous  nature  and  formally  possesses  the  capacity  of 
following  or  resisting  inclination.  Actually  it  is  never 
free  to  choose,  but  it  has  the  higher  function  of  being 
determined  by  the  Good.  Only  the  good  will  is  free.1 

The  Authority  of  the  Church  according  to  Augus 
tine.  With  the  fall  of  ancient  Rome,  the  church  was 
hard  pressed,  for  the  young  peoples  who  came  into  the 
church  were  Arian  and  the  only  German  Catholic  na 
tion  was  the  Franks.  Augustine  was  a  man  of  vigor, 
but  he  seemed  to  lack  the  peculiar  power  of  forcing  the 
church  to  adopt  as  dogma  the  truths  for  which  he  stood. 
He  always  submitted  himself  absolutely  to  the  tradi 
tion  of  the  church,  and  yet  in  a  general  way  he  accom 
plished  two  things  for  the  church  at  large  :  (1)  He 
established  tradition  as  the  authority  and  law  of  the 
church  ;  (2)  He  offered  the  church  a  scientifically  con 
structed  plan  of  salvation. 

There  now  appears  in  Augustine's  teaching  the 
second  centre  around  which  the  masses  of  his  thought 
group  themselves.  This  is  his  conception  of  the  church 
in  its  authority  and  law.  Here  is  the  principle  of  uni 
versality —  and  historical  universality  —  and  it  runs 
counter  to  the  principle  of  spiritual  individualism  which 
his  psychological  analysis  had  built  up.  Augustine  is 
just  as  vigorous  a  champion  of  the  idea  of  the  church 
as  the  means  to  salvation  as  he  is  champion  of  the  indi- 
1  Harnack,  Hist,  of  Dogma,  vol.  v,  p.  112,  n.  4. 


346  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

vidual  certainty  of  truth.  The  two  antithetical  proposi 
tions  lie  together  in  his  mind.  Asa  pietist,  he  was  an 
individualist ;  as  a  priest,  he  was  a  loyal  subject  to 
dogma.  We  have  discussed  his  teaching  as  it  centred 
about  man  ;  now  the  discussion  centres  about  God  as 
represented  by  His  church.  In  practical  life  the  will  of 
man  is  important,  but  in  the  eternal  life  the  central  in 
fluence  is  the  grace  of  God.  Between  the  will  of  man 
and  the  grace  of  God  there  is  a  chasm.  This  is  felt  the 
more  by  Augustine,  and  the  necessity  of  a  God-centred 
doctrine  seems  the  greater,  when  he  beholds  the  contrast 
between  the  perfectness  of  God  and  the  evil  world  of 
men.  Evil  now  appears  to  him  as  a  great  stream  flow 
ing  through  the  world.  Humanity  is  by  nature  void  of 
God.  Theoretically  man  is  free,  but  in  the  actual  world 
he  is  chained  to  his  senses  and  to  sin.  Adam,  the  first 
man,  alone  could  have  possessed  freedom ;  but  Adam 
in  his  freedom  sinned,  and  his  sin  was  that  of  the  whole 
human  race.  Sin  is  therefore  original  to  all  men  now 
living,  and  no  man  personally  deserves  salvation,  how 
ever  meritorious  his  conduct.  Moreover,  as  the  result 
of  Adam's  sin,  all  men  would  be  damned  were  it  not 
for  the  grace  of  God.  The  God-man  by  death  brought 
power  to  replenish  empty  humanity  with  divine  love. 
Divine  love  is  the  beginning,  middle,  and  end  of  salva 
tion.  Out  of  this  love  God  has  sent  His  Son  and 
founded  His  church.  Universal  man  died,  and  only 
universal  man  can  save.  Belief  in  Christ  is  the  only 
means  of  salvation,  yet  belief  in  Christ  comes  only  by 
God's  grace,  and  divine  grace  is  not  conditioned  on 
human  worthiness.  Thus  it  is  only  by  grace  even  now 
that  man  is  saved ;  and  no  injustice  would  be  done 
to  men  were  all  damned.  On  the  other  hand,  divine 


EARLY  PERIOD  OF  THE  MIDDLE  AGES      347 

justice  demands  that  some  men  at  least  should  be  ex 
cluded  from  salvation  in  order  that  the  punishment 
for  Adam's  sin  be  permanently  maintained.  The  choice 
of  the  favored  ones  depends  entirely  upon  the  unsearch 
able  decree  of  God.  These  are  elected  as  monuments 
of  His  loving  grace,  while  the  others  are  elected  to  be 
damned  as  monuments  of  His  justice.  The  apparent 
calamity  to  the  majority  of  mankind  only  shows  the 
goodness  of  God  the  more.  For,  in  the  first  place,  evil  is 
not  positive  like  the  good.  It  is  only  negative  and  prim 
itive — the  absence  of  the  good.  The  condemnation  of  the 
wicked  is  therefore  no  defect  in  this  theocratic  system. 
In  the  second  place,  the  wicked  only  receive  justice, 
for  the  salvation  of  only  a  few  is  a  gratuitous  act  of 
love,  which  testifies  to  God's  mercy.  But,  after  all,  it  is 
the  integrity  of  the  whole  spiritual  imperial  govern 
ment  of  God  that  is  the  important  thing  to  consider. 
The  King  is  law  and  goodness,  and  all  His  subjects 
are  testimonies  of  His  magnificent  power. 

The  Dark  Ages  (476-800).  The  traditional  estimate 
of  the  Middle  Ages  as  altogether  "  dark  "  has  been  re 
vised  by  modern  scholars.  The  period  now  called  the 
Dark  Ages  has  been  restricted  to  the  three  hundred 
years  between  the  fall  of  old  Rome  (476)  and  the 
founding  of  the  empire  by  Charlemagne  (800).  More 
over,  it  is  now  thought  that  even  in  that  period  the 
intellectual  conditions  were  better  in  Italy  than  north 
of  the  Alps.  In  northern  Italy  the  lay  teacher  seems 
always  to  have  existed ;  and  education  never  to  have 
fallen  entirely  into  the  hands  of  the  monastery  as  it  did 
in  northern  Europe  between  800  and  1000.  After  800 
the  content  of  education  north  and  south  of  the  Alps 
seems  to  have  been  different.  Everywhere,  to  be  sure, 


348  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

education  was  comprised  by  the  "  seven  liberal  arts," 
but  the  emphasis  in  the  two  regions  was  different. 
North  of  the  Alps  the  dialectic  was  made  important,  and 
theology  and  logic  flourished.  In  Italy  the  emphasis  was 
upon  grammar  and  rhetoric,  and  "  literary  Paganism  " 
was  always  kept  alive.  Thus,  when  the  revival  came  in 
1200,  it  appeared  in  the  form  of  theological  controversy 
north  of  the  Alps,  while  in  Italy  in  the  form  of  legal 
science.  The  analysis  in  the  summary  of  the  Middle 
Ages  given  above  (see  p.  330)  applies  more  truthfully  to 
the  northern  countries  than  to  Italy.  At  the  same  time 
it  is  more  pertinent  to  the  history  of  thought,  for  in 
these  northern  regions,  especially  at  Paris,  medieval 
philosophy  was  developed. 

Nevertheless,  it  is  easy  for  the  modern  scholar  to  go 
too  far  in  trying  to  play  fair  with  the  Middle  Ages. 
The  first  three  centuries  of  this  time  were  a  Dark  Age 
everywhere  in  Europe.  Wave  after  wave  of  barbarian 
invasion  swept  over  the  land.  It  is  not  so  much  a  mat 
ter  of  surprise  that  four  hundred  years  lie  between  the 
first  two  philosophers,  —  but  the  matter  of  surprise  is 
that  there  were  any  philosophical  fruits  whatever.  In 
this  respect  the  year  529  is  significant — significant 
both  in  pointing  backward  to  ancient  culture  and  also 
in  pointing  forward  to  the  feeble  effort  to  retain  some 
of  that  culture.  In  529  Justinian  abolished  the  philo 
sophical  Schools  at  Athens;  in  529  also,  St.  Benedict 
founded  his  monastic  school  at  Monte  Cassino  (near 
Naples).  These  two  events  stand  for  the  death  of  an 
tiquity  and  the  birth  of  mediaeval  life.  In  this  begin 
ning  of  the  monastic  movement  by  St.  Benedict  in 
western  Europe  was  lodged,  as  it  turned  out,  the  hope 
of  education  for  the  mediaeval  man.  During  the  two 


EARLY  PERIOD  OF  THE  MIDDLE  AGES      519 

hundred  years  between  the  year  800  and  the  year  1000 
mediaeval  education  was  entirely  in  the  hands  of  the 
monks. 

The  Revival  of  Charlemagne  (800-900).  The  dark- 
ness  of  the  Early  Period  of  the  Middle  Ages  is  broken 
by  the  somewhat  abortive  renaissance  of  Charlemagne. 
Connected  with  this  revival  is  the  name  of  John  Scotus 
Erigena  (810-880).  Note  that  during  these  five  hun 
dred  years  there  are  only  two  notable  philosophers, 
Augustine  and  Erigena.  Note  that  a  span  of  four  hun 
dred  years  lies  between  them.  Also  note  that  the  first 
philosopher,  Augustine,  was  a  Roman  and  the  second, 
Erigena,  was  an  Irishman.  Thereby  hangs  a  tale.  Dur 
ing  all  those  long  centuries  of  the  Dark  Ages  after 
Augustine  and  until  Charlemagne,  the  light  of  science 
shone  scarcely  in  northwestern  Europe.  In  the  whole 
western  hemisphere  there  were  only  three  places  where 
learning  prospered  :  one  was  in  the  far  east,  among  the 
Arabians ;  another  was  at  Constantinople  ;  the  third 
was  in  the  far  west,  in  Britain.  Thus  it  was  from  Britain 
that  Charlemagne  had  to  call  his  educators,  Alcuin  and 
Clement,  to  promote  learning  among  the  Franks ;  and 
it  was  from  Britain,  too,  that  his  successor,  Charles 
the  Bald,  called  the  Irishman,  Erigena,  for  the  same 
purpose.  During  the  renaissance  of  the  great  Charles 
and  his  successors,  Irish  scholars  could  be  found  in 
every  monastery  and  cathedral  in  the  empire.  The 
teaching  was  soon  called  the  "  Irish  learning."  Still  it 
must  be  said  in  qualification  that  the  renaissance  at  the 
court  of  Charlemagne  was  a  rather  childish  attempt  to 
unite  antiquity  with  theology.  Excepting  in  the  case  of 
Scotus  Erigena,  the  revival  was  very  feeble.  It  consisted 
of  a  new  effort  to  understand  Augustine,  to  master  the 


350  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

simplest  rules  of  logic,  and  to  think  out  dogma  by  means 
of  Hellenism.  The  period  from  800  to  1000  is  called  the 
Benedictine  Age,  because  learning  was  entirely  in  the 
hands  of  the  Benedictine  monks.  From  the  impulse 
given  by  the  Irish  scholars  many  celebrated  monastic 
and  cathedral  schools  originated,  like  those  of  Tours, 
Fulda,  Rheims,  Chartres,  and  the  school  at  Paris.  From 
the  many  monastic  schools  emerge  the  names  of  Alcuin 
of  York,  Rhabanus  Maurus  of  Fulda,  and  Gerbert  at 
Rheims.  But  among  these  scholars  the  only  one  of  phi 
losophical  importance  is  John  Scotus  Erigena. 

John  Scotus  Erigena  (810-880) :  Life  and  Teaching. 
When  his  contemporaries  were  only  lisping  at  philoso 
phy  and  his  immediate  successors  were  absorbed  in  dis 
connected  problems,  Erigena  worked  out  a  connected 
system.  Like  Augustine,  Erigena  stood  far  in  advance 
of  his  age.  He  was  not  only  the  one  great  thinker  of 
the  revival  of  Charlemagne,  but  he  was  one  of  the  most 
remarkable  personalities  of  the  Middle  Ages.  Born  in 
Ireland,  he  had  the  benefit  of  an  education  in  the 
schools  of  that  centre  of  learning,  which  he  could  not 
have  obtained  on  the  continent  of  Europe.  In  853  he 
was  called  by  Charles  the  Bald  to  carry  on  the  work 
begun  by  Alcuin  under  Charlemagne.  Three  centuries 
after  his  death  the  church  condemned  him  as  a  heretic 
(1209)  on  account  of  his  writings  on  predestination 
and  tr  an  substantiation.  His  learning  was  so  great  that 
he  has  been  called  "  the  Origen  of  the  North."  He  read 
Greek,  and  this  was  a  rare  accomplishment  in  those  days, 
for  even  Alcuin  scarcely  knew  the  Greek  alphabet.  His 
most  notable  original  work  is  De  Divisione  Naturae, 
which  was  neo-Platonism  in  Christian  dress.  His  most 
influential  work  was  his  translation  of  the  pseudo-Dio 


EARLY  PERIOD   OF  THE  MIDDLE  AGES      351 

nysius,  the  Areopagite.  It  proved,  in  fact,  to  be  one  of 
the  most  influential  books  of  this  period,  and  was  in 
strumental  on  account  of  its  large  circulation  in  propa 
gating  neo-Platonism  in  the  Middle  Ages. 

Erigena  was  neither  a  scholastic  nor  a  dialectical 
theologian.  He  neither  assailed  nor  defended  church 
doctrine.  He  calmly  pushed  neo-Platonism  to  the  bor 
ders  of  pantheism.  He  was  an  Irishman  with  a  Greek 
mind,  a  neo-Platonist  under  the  veil  of  a  Christian 
mystic.  No  churchman  ever  expressed  neo-Platonism  so 
frankly.  The  writings  from  which  Erigena  got  his  doc 
trine  are  called  the  Pseudo-Dionysius  writings  because 
the  authorship  was  falsely  attributed  to  a  companion 
of  St.  Paul,  Dionysius  the  Areopagite.  They  were,  how 
ever,  probably  written  in  the  fifth  century,  for  they 
are  essentially  neo-Platonic  and  border  on  pantheism. 
Erigena  translated  them  at  the  request  of  Charles  the 
Bald,  and  their  appearance  produced  great  astonishment 
in  Europe  (858-860).  Erigena's  own  work,  De  Divi- 
sione  Naturae,  is  an  extreme  pantheistic  statement  of 
the  doctrine  in  the  Pseudo-Dionysius.  Briefly  stated 
Erigena's  teaching  is  as  follows.  God  is  an  incompre 
hensible  being  and  can  be  described  only  in  negative 
terms  (negative  theology).  (See  chapter  on  Philo.) 
God  is  the  same  as  Being  or  Nature,  and  He  unfolds 
Himself  as  a  fourfold  series.  These  are:  God,  the 
world  in  God,  the  world  outside  God,  God  after  the 
world  has  returned  to  Him.  God  contains  in  Himself 
through  the  Logos  all  the  primordial  types  of  things 
formed  before  creation.  Creation  is  the  logical  unfold 
ing  of  particulars  from  the  universal.  Immortality  con 
sists  in  the  particulars  again  becoming  universal.  In 
the  types  of  things  God  is  creating  Himself,  and  they 


HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

are  graded  from  God  down  to  concrete  objects.  But  all 
will  finally  return  to  God,  and  Erigena  thought  he  found 
analogies  of  this  return  everywhere  in  nature. 

The  Greek  Principle  which  Erigena  formulated  for 
the  Middle  Ages.  These  details  of  the  teaching  of 
Erigena  are  unimportant  except  as  they  throw  light 
upon  that  Greek  underlying  principle  which  he  formu 
lated  for  the  Middle  Ages.  The  Heal  is  the  Universal. 
Tlie  more  universal  a  thing  is,  the  more  real  and  there 
fore  the  more  perfect  it  is.  If  we  have  an  idea  of  a  uni 
versal,  that  universal  has  existence  because  it  is  uni 
versal.  The  idea  of  God  is  universal,  therefore  God 
exists.  The  idea  of  the  world  is  a  universal,  but  not  so 
universal  as  the  idea  of  God,  and  therefore  not  so  surely 
existent.  But  the  idea  of  the  world  has  more  reality 
than  the  idea  of  a  tree.  Mediaeval  philosophy  becomes 
from  this  time  on  a  logical  theism.  In  the  case  of 
Erigena  it  is  a  logical  pantheism.  The  world  is  a  logical 
mosaic.  Keal  dependence  is  logical  dependence,  and 
what  we  in  modern  times  call  the  causes  and  effects  be 
tween  natural  objects  are  regarded  by  the  Middle  Ages 
as  sufficiently  explained  if  put  in  logical  arrangement. 
This  is  the  core  of  medieval  thinking,  and  the  student 
will  fail  to  understand  the  civilization  of  the  Middle 
Ages  unless  he  grasps  this  central  principle. 

But  this  realizing  of  the  logical  universal  is  Greek 
and  betrays  the  fundamentally  Greek  character  of  me 
dieval  civilization.  The  objective  spiritual  church  has 
merely  taken  the  place  of  objective  nature.  Mediaeval 
history  is  a  conflict  between  Greek  universalism  and 
the  Christian  conception  of  the  individual.  In  Erigena 
the  Greek  element  appeared  in  overwhelming  domi 
nance.  Erigena  is  a  smaller  Augustine  —  Augustine 


EARLY  PERIOD  OF  THE  MIDDLE  AGES      353 

uncontrolled  by  great  masses  of  thought  and  uninspired 
by  practical  ideals  of  building  up  the  church.  Erigena 
is  a  "  belated  Gnostic."  Why  was  it  that  his  nee-Pla 
tonic  pantheism  did  not  overcome  entirely  the  individ 
ualistic  element  in  Christian  dogma  ?  Why,  on  the  con 
trary,  did  it  bring  out  far-reaching  issues  of  conflict 
when  a  century  later  the  significance  of  his  teaching 
was  understood  ?  Because  inherently  and  fundamentally 
in  the  nature  of  the  German  peoples,  as  appearing  in 
their  customs  and  lawss  was  the  conviction  of  the  rights 
of  the  individual  personality.  In  the  teaching  of  the 
Christian  fathers  the  element  of  the  spiritual  personal 
ity  found  a  deep  echo  in  the  German  nature.  The  Ger 
man  could  tolerate  and  did  actually  live  under  the  later 
church  doctrine  of  a  moderate  realism ;  but  the  meas 
ured  calm  of  the  Greek  pantheistic  conception  of  Eri 
gena  deprived  the  German  of  all  his  inherited  ideals. 
Thus  when  intellectual  activity  was  aroused  a  century 
later,  the  conflict  became  hot  over  the  issue  in  Erigena's 
doctrine.  Erigena  was  the  forerunner  of  the  scholastics. 
It  was  he  who  tossed  the  apple  of  discord  among  the 
thinkers  of  the  Middle  Ages. 

The  Last  Century  of  the  Early  Period  (900-1000). 
The  century  following  Erigena  was  one  of  demoraliza 
tion.  All  learning  declined  with  the  renewed  invasions 
from  the  north,  east,  and  west.  The  empire  of  Charle 
magne  was  broken  up  and  the  Papacy  temporarily  dis 
appeared.  There  is  a  persistent  tradition  that  the  Chris 
tians  at  this  time  believed  the  end  of  the  world  to  be 
near.  This  has  been  proved  to  be  a  legend,  but  back  of  it 
lies  the  truth  that  there  was  a  fresh  rise  of  piety  which 
ksted  until  1300.  With  this  movement  we  enter  upon 
the  next  period  of  the  Middle  Ages. 


CHAPTER  XVII 

THE  TRANSITIONAL  PERIOD  (1000-1200) 

The  General  Character  of  the  Transitional  Period. 
The  first  century  of  the  Transitional  Period  was  as  dif 
ferent  from  the  last  century  of  the  Early  Period  in  its 
intellectual  attitude  and  emotional  tone  as  can  be  im 
agined.  It  was  the  century  of  the  new  birth  of  Europe 
—  a  century  when  the  beginning  of  political  order  was 
accompanied  by  a  passion  for  inquiry.  The  spirit  of 
pietism  took  possession  of  all  institutions  —  and  in  the 
thirteenth  century  the  mediaeval  system  seemed  to  have 
reached  its  perfect  form.  The  Transitional  Period  gives 
meaning  to  the  Crusades.  "If  ever  ideals  were  carried 
out  in  the  world  and  gained  dominion  over  souls,  it  hap- 
pened  then."  l  "  It  was  as  if  the  world  had  cast  aside 
its  old  garment  and  clothed  itself  in  the  v;1  ite  robe  of 
the  church."  2  The  ardor  of  the  Crusades  wars  the  speci 
fic  expression  of  this  religious  revival.  All  the  pent-up 
energies  of  the  previous  mediaeval  life  were  passing 
through  a  rapid  period  of  growth. 

Philosophically  this  period  is  the  time  when  neo- 
Platonic  mysticism,  as  elaborated  by  Erigena,  came  into 
conflict  with  the  Christian  conception  of  the  individual. 
These  two  motives  had  been  held  together  without  con 
troversy  in  the  Early  Period ;  now  they  develop  into 
controversy.  The  philosophical  theories  evolved  by  this 
controversy  go  by  the  name  of  scholasticism.  While 

1  Harnack,  vol.  vi,  p.  7. 

2  Glaber,  Hist.,  lib,  III,  4. 


THE  TRANSITIONAL  PERIOD  355 

theoretically  secular  studies  were  supposed  to  be  dis 
carded  and  ancient  literature  was  considered  to  be  the 
temptation  of  the  devil,  yet  practically  one  is  surprised 
to  find  a  trained  skill  in  the  use  of  dialectic,  and  the 
employment  of  many  of  the  materials  of  antiquity  as  a 
means  of  culture  and  the  refutation  of  heresies.  There 
was  a  knowledge  of  the  classics,  of  dialectic,  of  neo- 
Platonism,  and  of  Augustine.  The  spirit  of  Platonic 
realism  prevailed  among  the  group  of  schoolmen  of 
these  two  centuries.  The  problem  before  this  group  is 
different  from  that  presented  to  the  schoolmen  of  the 
next  period.  The  scholastics  or  schoolmen  of  this  period 
whom  we  shall  consider  in  some  detail  are,  — 

Anselm,  1033-1109. 

Roscellinus,  d.  1100  about. 

Abelard,  1079-1142. 

What  is  Scholasticism?  In  a  general  sense  scholas 
ticism  is  philosophic  thought,  but  historically  the  term 
is  usually  restricted  to  the  philosophic  thinking  of  the 
Middle  Agr  .  It  has  been  pointed  out  that  scholastic 
philosophy  does  not  differ  from  any  other  philosophy. 
It  had  its  prejudices,  its  dependence  on  authority,  its 
employment  of  deduction,  its  use  of  observation  —  like 
all  philosophy.  The  scholasticism  of  this  time,  however, 
is  distinguished  by  its  general  reference  to  church  dogma 
as  authority  and  its  imperfect  use  of  experience.  The 
scholasticism  of  the  Middle  Ages  may  therefore  be  de 
fined  as  the  application  of  dialectic  or  logical  methods 
to  the  discussion  of  theological  problems.  It  was  the 
attempt  to  present  the  doctrine  of  the  church  in  a  scien 
tific  system  of  philosophy.  Sometimes  such  an  attempt 
resulted  in  heresy  when  the  result  was  a  changing  of 
dogma.  Generally,  however,  the  scholastic  was  not  so 


356  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

ambitious,  for  he  usually  sought  to  keep  within  the 
authoritative  doctrines  of  the  church.  He  feared  the 
anathema  of  the  church.  Scholasticism  therefore,  in 
general,  had  two  characteristics:  (1)  It  assumed  that 
church  dogma  was  unquestionable  and  infallible ;  (2) 
It  tried  to  clarify  dogma  by  rational  explanation,  or  to 
show  that  dogma  was  at  least  not  contrary  to  reason. 
Dogma  may  in  some  cases  be  explained  by  the  reason. 
In  some  cases  it  may  be  so  far  above  reason  that  the 
only  thing  the  reason  can  say  is,  "  The  doctrine  does 
not  contradict  me."  In  the  words  of  an  eminent  church 
man,  "  Dogma  says,  Deus  homo  (God  became  man). 
Scholasticism  asks,  Cur  deus  homo  ?  (Why  did  God 
become  man  ?)  "  Revelation  is  assumed  ;  scholastic  phi 
losophy  is  permitted;  independent  rational  science  is 
denied.  The  remainder  of  the  history  of  the  Middle 
Ages  shows  no  conscious  attempt  to  form  a  new  body 
of  doctrine  for  the  church ;  and  only  here  and  there 
does  there  appear  an  effort  to  modify  the  existing  doc 
trine.  The  thinkers  are  employed  in  this  scholastic 
clarifying  of  the  doctrine.  In  this  period  scholasticism 
takes  the  form  of  the  logical  problem  of  the  relation  of 
universals  and  particulars.  In  the  period  of  Classic 
Scholasticism  this  logical  problem  changes  into  the 
metaphysical  one  of  the  respective  scopes  of  reason  and 
faith. 

The  problem  of  the  relation  of  universal  conceptions 
to  particular  experiences  had  become  a  central  one  to 
the  Greeks  after  Socrates.  (See  summary,  p.  103.)  It 
was  natural  that  the  same  problem  should  arise  with  the 
new  mediaeval  man  and  should  delight  him  as  an  enig 
matical  question.  But  conditions  were  less  favorable  for 
the  medieval  scholastic  than  for  the  Greek.  The  mediae- 


THE  TRANSITIONAL   PERIOD  357 

val  had  scanty  literary  materials,  no  opportunity  of  test 
ing  his  discussions  by  empirical  observations,  and  his 
mind  was  untrained.  In  the  Early  Period  scholasticism 
had  the  character  of  a  mental  game  in  logic.  It  con 
sisted,  on  the  whole,  in  the  subtle  spinning  out  of  logical 
questions  with  the  few  fragments  of  Aristotle  as  a  guide. 
This  was  dangerous  to  faith,  but  the  church  could  not 
prevent  it,  for  it  was  the  only  mental  diversion  open  to 
monks  of  the  schools  of  Charlemagne.  The  arguments 
often  reveal  great  mental  acuteness,  although  they  have 
the  appearance  of  triviality.  The  schools  of  the  ninth 
century  were  given  over  to  barren  formalism,  and  this 
threatened  to  submerge  the  vigorous  movement  inaugu 
rated  by  Erigena.  "  Can  a  prostitute  become  a  virgin 
again  through  divine  omnipotence?"  "Does  a  mouse 
that  eats  the  sacrament  eat  the  body  of  God?"  "How 
many  angels  can  stand  on  the  point  of  a  needle?" 
These  are  examples  of  the  prevailing  verbal  gymnastics 
of  that  time,  and  such  problems  can  be  found  even  in 
the  works  of  Peter  Lombard,  Thomas  Aquinas,  and 
Duns  Scotus. 

Logically  stated  the  problem  is  that  of  the  relation 
of  particulars  to  universals.  It  is  usually  called  the  prob 
lem  of  the  reality  of  general  ideas.  The  question  was 
started  by  a  passage  in  that  universally  used  text-book 
of  the  time  —  the  Isagoge  of  Porphyry,  which  was  an 
introduction  to  Aristotle's  Categories.  (See  p.  102.) 
Porphyry  divides  the  problem  into  three  parts:  (1) 
Do  genera  and  species  exist  in  nature,  or  do  they  exist 
as  mere  products  of  the  intellect?  (2)  If  they  are 
things  apart  from  the  mind,  are  they  corporeal  or  incor 
poreal  things?  (3)  Do  they  exist  outside  the  individ 
ual  things  of  sense,  or  are  they  realized  in  the  latter  ? 


358  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

Upon  the  problem  involved  here  the  thinkers  of  the 
Middle  Ages  were  divided  into  three  schools,  —  realists, 
conceptualists,  and  nominalists.1  The  realist  maintained 
that  the  general  idea  had  reality,  while  the  particular 
was  only  a  defective  imitation  of  it.  The  nominalist,  on 
the  contrary,  held  that  the  universal  is  only  a  name 
(nomen)  or  an  abstraction  derived  from  the  real  par 
ticular  thing.  The  conceptualist  tried  to  mediate  be 
tween  the  two  by  showing  that  reality  exists  only  in  the 
particular.  To  use  the  mediaeval  phrases,  realism  is  uni- 
versalia  ante  rem  ;  nominalism  is  universalia  post  rem  ; 
conceptualism  is  universalia  in  re.  (See  p.  103  for  table 
of  comparison  with  Protagoras,  Plato,  and  Aristotle.) 
The  question  was  of  great  practical  importance  to  the 
church.  Is  the  universal  church  real  and  therefore  all 
its  dogma  authoritative,  or  are  the  particular  churches 
real  and  authoritative  ?  This  was  a  vital  matter  to  the 
churchman  of  that  day  who  was  trying  to  establish  the 
primacy  of  Rome  among  the  separate  churches.  Fur 
thermore,  to  show  that  humanity  was  less  real  than  the 
particular  human  beings  would  destroy  the  church  doc 
trine  of  sin  and  redemption,  for  these  dogmas  depended 
on  the  assumption  of  the  solidarity  of  the  human  race. 
The  church  universal  and  its  universal  dogma  were  not 
mere  names  to  the  schoolmen,  and  that  is  why  the  ortho 
dox  churchmen  were  nearly  always  realists.  Religious 
principles  were  universals,  while  particulars  were  secu 
lar.  Dogma  had  become  fixed,  with  which  traditional!] 
the  church  had  become  identified.  To  emphasize  par 
ticular  experiences  would  mean  the  continual  correcting 
of  tradition  and  a  substitution  of  private  judgment  for 

1  In  this  period  the  conceptualists  were  confused  with  nominalist! 
and  called  nominalists. 


THE  TRANSITIONAL  PERIOD       .  359 

church  decrees.  When  nominalism  is  completely  worked 
out,  it  will  be  found  to  conflict  with  church  dogma  at 
every  point.  The  result  is  skepticism.  Still  the  church 
man  later  saw  that  there  is  great  danger  also  in  a  thor 
ough-going  realism  like  that  of  Erigena's.  It  became 
pantheism.  Both  realism  and  nominalism  were  danger 
ous  doctrines  for  the  church  if  they  were  driven  to  their 
logical  conclusions. 

Anselm  (1033-1109):  Life  and  Position  in  Medi 
aeval  Philosophy.  Anselm  lived  during  the  monastic 
revival  which  had  begun  in  the  tenth  century.  He  was 
in  fact  the  last  of  the  monastic  teachers,  for  during  his 
declining  years  occurred  the  first  of  the  Crusades,  and 
the  epoch  following  him  witnessed  the  transference  of 
learning  from  the  monasteries  to  the  universities.  He 
was  born  of  a  noble  family  in  Aosta,  Lornbardy,  and 
entered  in  early  life  the  monastery  of  Bee.  Here  he 
succeeded  Lanfranc  as  abbot,  and  again  he  succeeded 
Lanfranc  in  the  archbishopric  of  Canterbury.  He  was  a 
man  of  genuine  piety,  of  speculative  bent,  and  of  un 
swerving  faith  in  the  dogma  of  the  church.  As  primate 
of  England  he  resisted  with  much  sagacity  the  encroach 
ments  of  the  secular  power.  His  Cur  Deus  Homo  was 
a  treatise  on  the  doctrine  of  the  redemption  and  atone 
ment,  and  was  one  of  the  most  important  books  of  the 
Middle  Ages. 

Anselm  brought  about  a  great  change  in  theological 
teaching.  Berengar  of  Tours  had  but  recently  made  an 
attack  upon  the  doctrine  of  the  real  presence  of  Christ 
in  the  Eucharist,  and  was  the  immediate  cause  of  the 
"  storm  and  stress "  period  of  scholasticism  that  fol 
lowed.  Anselm's  teacher  and  predecessor,  Lanfranc,  had 
defended  the  doctrine.  The  doctrine  had  not  yet  been 


360  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

settled,  and  each  side  claimed  the  basis  of  .authority. 
Anselm  was  therefore  a  witness  of  the  first  attempt  to 
apply  philosophy  to  dogma,  and  he  was  the  first  to  use 
dialectics  with  the  serious  purpose  of  defending  dogma. 
From  this  time  on,  dialectics  was  no  longer  an  intel 
lectual  diversion.  He,  the  last  of  the  monastic  teachers, 
was  the  first  to  employ  dialectics  with  the  new  purpose 
of  instructing  the  believer.  His  entire  life  was  animated 
by  the  desire  to  add  knowledge  to  faith  by  the  means 
of  philosophy. 

Anselm's  scholasticism  therefore  circulates  about  the 
Patristic  theology  as  a  centre  ;  and  his  spirit  and  method 
is  so  similar  to  that  of  Augustine  and  the  Apologists, 
that  he  has  been  justly  called  "the  second  Augustine" 
and  "  the  last  of  the  Fathers."  Beside  the  safe  and  tra 
ditionally  centralized  teaching  of  Anselm,  the  imagina 
tive  pantheism  of  Erigena  seems  like  a  body  that  had 
been  loosened  from  its  natural  place  and  was  floating 
away  beyond  control.  Both  Erigena  and  Anselm  were 
inspired  by  the  Platonism  that  until  the  year  1200 
dominated  the  Middle  Ages.  That  is,  both  were  realists. 
The  realism  of  Erigena,  however,  expressed  in  full  the 
mystic  element  of  Platonism.  It  destroyed  all  grades  of 
reality  below  God,  and  made  unnecessary  the  church 
and  its  offices.  Erigena  was  an  extreme  realist ;  Anselm 
was  consistent  with  the  attitude  of  the  church  in  being 
a  moderate  realist.  The  credo  ut  intelligam  (faith  as 
the  basis  of  intellectual  belief)  was  the  anchor  which 
saved  him  and  became  the  safeguard  of  all  future  or 
thodox  scholastics.  The  world  to  Anselm  is  a  hierarchy 
of  universal  reals,  such  as  the  sacraments,  the  church, 
and  the  Trinity.  To  such  dogmas  of  the  church  he  ap 
plied  philosophy,  not  because  they  needed  support,  but 


THE  TRANSITIONAL  PERIOD        .          361 

in  order  to  make  them  clear  by  analysis.  Philosophy 
shall  only  clarify  dogma. 

Anselm's  Arguments  for  the  Existence  of  God.  The 
so-called  "  Anselmic  Arguments  for  the  Existence  of 
God  "  are  the  best  known  parts  of  Anselm's  teaching, 
and  in  the  eyes  of  the  churchman  place  his  theodicy  in 
the  "  status  of  a  finished  science."  To  get  their  cogency 
we  must  remember  the  underlying  thought  of  mediaeval 
realism ;  the  more  universal  a  thing  is,  the  more  real  it 
is  —  the  more  it  exists  and  the  more  perfect  it  is.  (See 
p.  352.)  In  his  Monologium  he  developed  the  so-called 
cosmologlcal  argument :  A  single  perfect  and  univer 
sal  being  must  be  assumed  as  ths  cause  of  all  lesser 
beings.  God's  essence  must  involve  his  existence.  Every 
other  being  can  be  thought  as  coming  into  existence 
from  some  external  cause,  while  God  alone  exists  from 
the  necessity  of  his  own  nature.  In  his  Proslogium  he 
elaborated  his  more  famous  ontological  argument:  Man 
has  the  idea  of  a  perfect  being;  Perfection  involves 
among  other  qualities  that  of  existence,  otherwise  we 
could  think  of  a  more  perfect  being  or  one  who  did  pos 
sess  existence ;  Therefore  God  exists. 

Roscellinus  (d.  1100  about):  Life  and  Teaching. 
Roscellinus,  a  canon  of  Compiegne,  was  the  first  scholas 
tic  to  attempt  to  modify  dogma  by  the  dialectic,  —  not 
that  there  had  not  occurred  throughout  the  history  ot 
the  church  many  theological  controversies.  Before  thk 
time  such  controversies  had  on  the  whole  arisen  over 
doctrines  that  had  not  yet  become  dogma.  The  particu 
lar  object  of  the  attack  of  Roscellinus  was  the  dogma 
of  the  Trinity,  and  the  base  of  his  attack  was  none 
other  than  philosophy.  Roscellinus  completely  failed  in 
getting  the  church  to  modify  this  particular  doctrine, 


862  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

but  lie  succeeded  in  a  larger  way  than  he  ,could  have 
imagined.  He  brought  out  into  distinctness  the  issue 
between  reason  and  revelation.  The  fundamental  ques 
tion  thereafter  was  as  to  the  rights  of  the  human  rea 
son  and  the  rights  of  divine  revelation.  Roscellinus 
supplied  a  powerful  shock  to  faith  and  awakened  the 
schools  to  the  consequences  of  questions  which  had 
seemed  before  to  be  merely  logical  problems. 

Roscellinus  was  a  nominalist,  and  it  was  from  the 
point  of  view  of  nominalism  that  he  attempted  to 
change  the  dogma  of  the  Trinity.  He  made  a  life-long 
defense  of  the  doctrine  that  the  Godhead  was  three 
different  substances,  agreeing  only  in  certain  qualities. 
This  is  tritheism  and  not  a  Trinity.  But  this  was  only 
the  most  striking  example  of  his  application  of  the  gen 
eral  principle  of  nominalism.  In  general,  universals  are 
only  names  and  have  an  existence  only  in  the  human 
mind.  Universalia  post  rem.  Individuals  alone  exist. 
The  groups  formed  out  of  many  individuals  by  addi 
tion,  or  the  parts  of  an  individual  formed  by  division, 
are  mental  affairs  and  have  no  reality.  Roscellinus  was 
opposed  by  Anselm,  condemned  by  the  church,  and 
obliged  to  recant.  He  fled  to  England,  returned  to 
France,  and  again  preached  his  doctrine. 

Storm  and  Stress.  After  the  issue  was  brought  to  a 
head  by  the  nominalism  of  Roscellinus,  the  twelfth  cen 
tury  was  torn  in  battle  over  the  reality  of  general  ideas. 
The  realists,  on  the  one  hand,  tried  to  grade  universals 
and  to  show  how  universals  are  related  to  particulars 
—  all  of  which  Anselm  had  left  to  faith.  How  do  uni 
versals,  such  as  the  persons  in  the  Trinity,  the  church, 
the  sacraments,  exist  in  one  universal  God?  Grotesque 
explanations  were  offered,  like  the  imaginative  work  of 


THE  TRANSITIONAL  PERIOD        .         363 

Bernard  of  Chartres  and  the  symbolic  number  theory 
of  his  brother,  Theodoric.  William  of  Champeaux,  a 
teacher  of  Abelard,  almost  reduced  realism  to  a  pan 
theism.  Nothing  exists  but  the  universal ;  all  individ 
uals  are  accidental  modifications  of  the  universal.  Pan 
theism  was  so  inherent  in  the  blood  of  realism  that  it 
was  always  appearing  here  and  there. 

Such  pantheistic  deductions  by  the  realists  brought 
out  nominalism  in  opposition,  in  spite  of  the  repression 
of  nominalism  by  the  authorities  of  the  church.  The 
nominalists  sought  protection  and  authority  under  the 
name  of  Aristotle,  for  his  conceptualist  doctrine  was  not 
known  at  this  time.  The  few  writings  of  Aristotle  then 
known  were  very  imperfectly  interpreted.  One  of  the 
most  ironical  situations  in  the  history  of  the  Middle 
Ages  is  that,  up  to  the  Period  of  Classic  Scholasti 
cism,  Plato  was  the  authority  of  the  orthodox  and  Aris 
totle  of  the  heterodox. 

The  Life  of  Abelard  (1079-1142).  Abelard  had 
both  Roscellinus  and  William  of  Champeaux  as  teach 
ers.  He  quarreled  with  them  both  and  set  up  a  rival 
school  of  his  own.  He  taught  in  various  places  and  was, 
with  some  interruptions,  in  Paris  from  1108  to  1136 , 
The  university  did  not  exist  until  a  generation  after 
him,  but  he  was  its  true  founder,  for  he  inaugurated 
the  movement  out  of  which  the  early  universities  sprang. 
His  method  was  transferred  from  philosophy  to  theology 
and  thence  to  all  studies.  It  was  a  didactic  method  of 
drawing  conclusions  after  an  empirical  enumeration  of 
the  pros  and  cons.  Abelard  was  acquainted  with  no 
Greek  writings  except  in  Latin  translations.  His  great 
talent  as  a  teacher  and  his  keen  French  intellect,  that 
was  impatient  of  all  restraint,  made  him,  however,  the 


364  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

most  brilliant  of  the  schoolmen.  Two  synods  condemned 
his  teaching.  Probably  his  modern  popular  reputation 
rests  upon  his  unfortunate  love-relations  with  Heloise. 
Abelard's  Conceptualism.  Universals  exist  in  the 
Particulars.  Abelard  formed  the  storm-centre  of  the 
strife  over  the  technical  relations  between  particulars 
and  universals.  His  position  has  been  misunderstood 
because  he,  the  pupil  and  opponent  both  of  Roscellinus 
and  of  William  of  Champeaux,  fought  each  with  the 
weapons  of  the  other.  He  was  repelled  from  pantheism, 
which  appears  to  him  to  be  the  logic  of  realism,  and  he 
recoiled  equally  from  the  sensualistic  outcome  of  nom 
inalism.  Universals  are  the  indispensable  forms  of 
knowledge,  and  they  must  therefore  have  some  exist 
ence  in  the  nature  of  the  things  which  we  know.  This 
existence  consists  of  the  similarity  of  the  essential  char 
acteristic  of  things.  This  likeness  is  not  a  numerical 
identity,  but  a  unity  which  makes  our  knowledge  of  the 
particular  things  possible.  This  likeness  or  similarity 
between  things  is  the  same  as  the  types  created  by  God. 
Thus  the  universal  has  no  independent  objective  exist 
ence,  and  on  the  other  hand  it  is  not  a  mere  word  out 
of  all  relation  to  things.  The  universals  exist  in  three 
ways :  (1)  they  exist  before  the  things  only  as  Ideas  in 
the  mind  of  God ;  (2)  they  coexist  with  the  things  as 
the  essential  likenesses  of  things ;  (3)  they  exist  after  the 
things  in  the  human  mind,  when  it  has  knowledge  of 
things.  Abelard  developed  his  theory  only  polemically 
and  never  worked  it  out  systematically.  On  the  techni 
cal  side  of  this  question  the  preceding  lines  of  thought 
come  into  an  unsystematic  unity.  His  theory  was  ac 
cepted  by  the  Arabian  philosophers  and  is  practically 
that  of  Aquinas  and  Duns  Scotus.  With  Abelard  the 


THE  TRANSITIONAL  PERIOD  365 

problem  was  not  solved  indeed,  but  it  came  to  a  pre 
liminary  stop  in  this  statement  —  universals  have  an 
equal  significance,  ante  rem  in  the  mind  of  God,  in  re 
in  nature,  post  rem  in  human  knowledge. 

AbelarcTs   Rationalism.  —  The    Relation    between 
Reason  and  Dogma.  The  proud,  self-reliant,  self-con 
scious  Abelard  could  be  nothing  else  than  a  rationalist. 
He  was  the  type  of  the  controversial  metaphysician.  He 
was  the  fighting  dialectician, —  intolerant  of  restraint, 
devoid  of  respect  for  authority,  seeking  the  prize  of 
victory  at  any  cost.  Erigena,  as  a  mystic,  harmonized 
reason  and  dogma  because  they  are  equal;  Anselm,  as 
an  orthodox  scholastic,  harmonized  them  because  reason 
is  subordinate  to  dogma  and  conforms  to  it ;  Abelard, 
as  a  rationalist,  harmonized  reason  and  dogma  because 
dogma  is  subordinate  to  reason  and  conforms  to  reason. 
To°  Anselm  reason  merely  clarifies  dogma ;  to  Abelard 
"dogma  is  only  a  provisional  substitute  for  reason." 
Anselm  never  questions  dogma,  while  Abelard  calls 
dogma  before  the  bar  of  the  reason  and  then  acts  as 
dogma's  advocate.  We  must  try  all  dogma  in  court,  and, 
contrary  to  modern  legal  practice,  we  must  doubt  it 
until  it  proves  its  innocence.  For  "  it  is  through  doubt 
we  come  to  investigation,  and  through  investigation  to 
the  truth."  A  good  example  of  Abelard's  attitude  ap 
pears  in  his  Sic  et  Non,  a  treatise  in  which  he  sets  the 
views  of  the  Fathers  over  against  one  another  so  that 
the  reason  may  decide  upon  the  truth.  Another  example 
of  his  method  appears  in  his  examination  of  the  doo 
trine  of  the  Trinity,  and  in  the  third  book  of  Chris 
tian  Theology  he  cites  twenty-three  objections  and^  in 
the  fourth  book  answers  them.  This  rationalizing  spirit 
led  him  to  advocate  the  doctrine  of  free-will,  to  place  the 


366  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

responsibility  of  moral  conduct  and  theoretical  belief 
upon  the  individual,  to  regard  Christianity  as  the  con 
summation  of  all  religions  and  not  as  the  presentation 
of  anything  new. 

If  in  these  discussions  he  was  more  brilliant  than 
profound,  if  he  wrote  upon  many  questions  without 
solving  any,  if  the  weight  of  his  personality  could  not 
prevail  in  his  controversies,  it  was  because  the  science 
of  the  twelfth  century  offered  him  little  empirical  sup 
port  against  the  actual  power  of  the  church  and  the 
mighty  inward  strength  of  faith  of  the  people.  What 
means  had  Abelard  to  support  his  position  that  rational 
science  should  determine  faith  ?  Nothing  but  the  hollow 
methods  of  scholastic  logic  and  the  traditions  of  the 
church  —  the  very  things  against  which  he  was  rebel 
ling.  Abelard  set  for  himself  a  problem,  but  he  lacked 
the  means  of  its  solution.  It  was,  however,  a  problem 
that  has  never  vanished  from  the  memory  of  the  Euro 
pean  peoples. 

The  unrest  in  Abelard's  teaching  is  representative 
of  the  last  century  of  this  period,  which  he  brought  to  a 
close.  There  was  growing  a  general  revolt  from  the  un 
fruitful  methods  of  the  scholastic  dialectic,  coupled  with 
feverish  desire  for  knowledge.  There  was,  on  the  one 
hand,  a  great  reaction  toward  mysticism  with  the  Victo- 
rines,  Bernard  of  Clairvaux  and  Bernard  of  Tours,  and 
toward  eclecticism  with  John  of  Salisbury  and  Peter 
the  Lombard.  On  the  other  hand,  there  was  an  interest 
ing  growth  in  empirical  science.  But  these  theoretical 
interests  were  but  eddies  in  the  great  current  of  events. 
For  Jerusalem  and  the  Holy  Land,  the  memorials  in 
earthly  form  of  all  the  ideals  sacred  to  the  mediae va] 
mind,  had  fallen  into  the  hands  of  the  infidel !  The 


THE  TRANSITIONAL  PERIOD  367 

western  world  was  preparing  for  the  rescue,  and  the 
Crusades  were  the  last  and  the  frenzied  expression  of 
the  Platonic  idealism  of  the  Middle  Ages.  They  bring 
the  first  two  periods  to  a  spectacular  climax.  Is  it  a 
mere  coincidence  that  Abelard  brings  to  a  close  the 
dominance  of  idealism  on  the  theoretic  side  at  the  time 
when  earthly  symbols  of  that  idealism  were  being  de 
stroyed  ? 


CHAPTER  XVIII 

THE  PERIOD  OF  CLASSIC  SCHOLASTICISM  (1200-1453) 

The  General  Character  of  this  Last  Period.  The 
first  one  hundred  and  fifty  years  of  this  period  was  the 
golden  age  of  scholasticism  ;  the  remaining  one  hundred 
years  was  a  period  of  decline.  The  period  of  Classic 
Scholasticism  was  a  natural  growth  from  the  Transi 
tional  Period.  At  the  end  of  the  Transitional  Period 
the  church,  in  spite  of  Mohammedans,  Jews,  heretics, 
and  the  classics,  outshone  all  else,  and  its  life  and  dogma 
were  the  most  worth  while.  In  this  period  appeared  a 
theology,  adequate  to  its  life  and  dogma,  —  a  theology 
which  was  floated  by  the  wave  of  piety  of  the  Mendi 
cant  Orders.  Acquaintance  with  the  true  Aristotle  was 
the  needed  stimulus.  The  favorable  conditions  for  that 
stimulus  were  (1)  the  triumph  of  the  church  and  papacy, 
(2)  the  intense  piety  of  the  Mendicants,  (3)  the  gen- 
eral  culture  derived  from  an  inner  development  of  the 
church  and  from  contact  with  the  East  in  Constanti 
nople,  Palestine,  and  Spain.  Aristotle  and  the  Mendi 
cants  were  the  new  forces,  and  they  achieved  their 
position  against  the  hostility  of  the  old  Orders,  the  uni 
versities,  and  the  teachers.  The  triumph  was  possible 
because  the  new  forces  contributed  nothing  really  new, 
but  merely  completed  the  old  scheme  of  things.  The 
new  Aristotle,  as  it  was  understood,  taught  metaphysics, 
epistemology,  and  politics  in  a  way  to  vindicate  dogma 
as  against  the  opposition  of  William  of  Champeaux  and 
Roscellinus.  The  Mendicants  on  their  part  vindicated 


THE  PERIOD  OF  CLASSIC   SCHOLASTICISM   369 

all  dogma  by  blending  it  with  faith  on  the  one  hand, 
and  with  reason  on  the  other. 

The  scholasticism  of  the  Transitional  Period  was 
predominantly  controversial,  while  the  character  of  this 
period,  which  we  are  now  entering,  is  synthetic  and  con 
structive.  The  infusion  of  fresh  blood  into  culture,  from 
not  only  the  logical  but  the  physical  works  of  Aristotle, 
resulted  in  the  renewal  of  interest  in  the  dialectic  and 
in  the  construction  of  systems  of  metaphysics  and 
psychology.  The  central  problem  now  concerns  the  re 
spective  scopes  of  reason  and  faith,  and  to  its  solution 
logic  and  psychology  are  applied.  A  complete  solution 
seemed  to  be  made  by  Thomas  Aquinas,  which  had  its 
literary  expression  in  Dante.  Without  the  introduction 
of  any  new  philosophical  principle  the  world  of  nature, 
as  interpreted  by  Aristotle,  was  apparently  brought  by 
Thomas  into  theoretical  harmony  with  the  Augustinian 
conception  of  the  world  of  grace.  But  no  sooner  did 
Thomas  seem  to  have  formulated  scholastic  philosophy 
for  all  time,  than  controversy  broke  out  afresh.  For 
pantheistic  mysticism  gained  its  independence  through 
one  of  Thomas's  own  brother  Dominicans,  Eckhart ;  then 
Duns  Scotus,  a  Franciscan,  drew  up  a  metaphysical  pro 
gramme  based  upon  the  Augustinian  theory  of  the  will, 
and  gave  a  new  direction  to  philosophy ;  and  further 
more  nominalism  grew  great  upon  Aristotle's  logic  and 
the  new  empirical  psychology.  For  the  churchman,  phi 
losophy  reached  its  completeness  in  Thomas  Aquinas. 
The  later  tendencies  are  regarded  by  the  churchman  as 
deteriorations,  and  even  modern  philosophy  is  looked 
upon  as  but  temporizing  with  the  classic  system  of 
Thomas. 

The  Two  Civilizations.  This  is  one  of  the  periods  of 


370 


HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 


THE  PERIOD  OF  CLASSIC   SCHOLASTICISM   371 

thought  resulting  from  the  shif tings  of  distinct  civiliza 
tions.  We  have  already  noted  the  influence  of  the  strug 
gles  of  the  Orient  and  the  Occident  in  the  Persian  wars 
and  in  the  campaigns  of  Alexander  ;  and  we  have  lately 
seen  an  entirely  new  epoch  ushered  in  by  the  invasions 
of  the  northern  tribes  into  Rome.  With  the  new  epoch 
before  us,  we  find  ourselves  confronted  with  another 
new  ethnic  situation.  The  civilization  of  the  Moham 
medan  had  grown  in  mighty  strength  in  the  East,  had 
possessed  itself  of  Asia  Minor,  northern  Africa,  and 
Spain,  and  was  now  facing  Europe  from  the  east,  west, 
and  south.  All  through  the  First  Period  of  the  Middle 
Ages  the  Christian  and  Mohammedan  civilizations  had 
been  contestants  for  supremacy.  Only  as  late  as  732  the 
Mohammedan  claim  upon  Europe  had  been  defeated  at 
the  battle  of  Tours.  Mohammed  (570-632)  converted 
the  whole  of  Arabia  to  Islam  during  the  ten  years 
between  his  Hegira  (622)  and  his  death.  His  succes 
sors  took  Palestine  (637),  Syria  (638),  Egypt  (647), 
Persia   (710),  all    north  Africa    (by    707),  invaded 
Spain  (711),  and  were  repulsed  at  Tours  (732).  All 
this  occurred  within  a  century,  and  for  the  next  two 
hundred  years  (800-1000)  the  Mohammedans  harassed 
Rome  and  the  islands  of  the  Mediterranean.   With  the 
two  civilizations  facing  each  other  on  the  Mediterranean, 
only  mutual  religious  fanaticism  could  stand  in  the  way 
of  their  mutual  cultural  influence.  In  point  of  fact,  be 
cause  of  fanaticism  the  cultures  of  the  two  civilizations 
during  the  first  centuries  of  the  Middle  Ages  touched 
each  other  but  little.  In  those  first  centuries  of  the 
Middle  Ages,  when  western  Europe  was  shrouded  in 
darkness,  the  schools  of  the  Arabs  at  Bagdad,  Basra, 
Kuf  a,  and  other  cities  were  enjoying  a  splendid  intellect- 


372  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

ual  life.  From  850  to  1100  the  centre  of  learning  of 
the  world  was  in  the  Arabian  cities  of  the  East.1  In 
1100  the  fanatical  faction  of  the  Arabians  crushed  this 
intellectual  movement  in  the  East,  the  scholars  fled  to 
Spain,  and  for  a  century  longer  Saracen  learning  flour 
ished  in  Spain,  especially  in  Cordova.  In  1200  the 
Arabian  orthodoxy  made  itself  felt  in  Spain,  and  the 
Arabian  scholars  there  had  to  find  refuge  among  the 
Jews  or  Christians. 

The  First  Contact  of  the  Two  Civilizations.  From 
the  beginning  of  the  Middle  Ages  the  point  of  contact 
between  the  two  civilizations  was  either  war  or  com 
merce.  The  Jew  was  the  globe-trotter  of  that  day,  and  was 
constantly  bringing  into  Europe  reports  of  Arabian  civ 
ilization.  He  was  a  philosopher,  a  monotheist,  a  Semite, 
like  the  Arab,  and  he  had  an  interest  in  more  than  com 
mercial  matters.  About  the  end  of  the  Early  Period 
of  the  Middle  Ages  he  found  it  profitable  to  make  first 
Hebrew  and  then  Latin  translations  of  Arabian  learn 
ing,  and  to  sell  them  in  Europe.  In  this  form,  between 
1000  and  1100,  medical  and  astronomical  knowledge 
entered  Europe.  Greek  philosophical  writings  came 
next  in  translations  from  the  Arabic,  which  had  previ 
ously  been  translated  from  the  Syriac.  Thus  for  the 
two  hundred  years,  between  1000  and  1200,  the  Chris 
tian  schools  were  beginning  to  read  portions  of  Greek 
philosophy  in  Latin,  which  had  previously  passed 
through  Syriac  and  Arabian  (and  sometimes  Hebrew) 
translations.  Before  1200,  there  were  none  but  these 
Arabic  versions.  A  pertinent  example  of  these  was  the 
works  of  Aristotle.  Before  1200  all  of  Aristotle's  writ- 

1  Historians  are  attaching-  more  importance  than  formerly  to  Con 
stantinople  as  an  intellectual  centre  of  that  time. 


THE  PERIOD  OF  CLASSIC   SCHOLASTICISM   373 

ings,  except  the  Or g anon,  appeared  in  Europe  in  this 
form,  and  the  Organon  as  a  whole  was  not  known  until 
1150.  In  1125  some  of  Aristotle's  physics  was  known 
by  the  school  of  Chartres  ;  in  1200  all  the  physics,  meta 
physics,  and  ethics  were  known  in  translations  from  the 
Latin  and  Hebrew.  These  were  accompanied  by  Ara 
bian  commentaries,  which  interpreted  Aristotle  as  if  he 
were  a  neo-Platonic  pantheist.  There  were  many  church 
men  interested  in  the  work  of  translation,  as,  for  ex- 
ample,  Gerbert,  and  Raymond  of  Toledo.  Roger  II  of 
Sicily  (d.  1154)  and  Frederick  II  (d.  1250)  had  their 
courts  filled  with  Arabian  philosophers.  Frederick  had 
many  translations  made  and  presented  to  the  Universi 
ties  of  Oxford,  Paris,  and  Bologna. 

Thus  the  influence  of  the  Arabian  upon  the  Chris 
tian  culture  before  the  Classic  Period  of  the  Middle 
Ages  was  not  inconsiderable.  But  this  must  be  said  of 
Arabian  culture  —  it  was  mainly  borrowed.  Arabia  * 
acted  merely  as  a  transmitter  of  the  materials  of  know 
ledge  from  the  Greeks  and  Hindoos ;  and  so  far  as 
philosophy  was  concerned,  the  Arab  was  returning  to 
Europe,  in  a  perverted  form,  the  Aristotle  which  had 
been  deposited  with  him  centuries  before.  The  Moham 
medans  were  the  world's  carriers  of  a  considerable  body 
of  science  and  of  many  new  agricultural  products ;  and 
of  the  amount  which  they  introduced  into  Europe  only 
a  small  portion  was  their  own.  At  the  end  of  the  twelfth 
century  the  Christian  at  Rome  and  York  was  richer  in 
the  principles  of  discovery,  but  poorer  in  the  amount  of 
traditional  learning  and  of  scientific  wealth,  than  the 
Mohammedan  at  Bagdad  and  Cordova. 

*  Read  on  this  point  Seignobos,  Hist,  of  Mediceval  Civil* 
zation,  pp.  117  f. 


374  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

The  Conflict  between  the  Two  Civilizations.  —  The 
Crusades.*  The  rivalry  between  the  two  civilizations 
became  intensified  into  an  open  conflict  about  the  year 
1100.  Up  to  the  year  1000  the  Mohammedan  leaders 
were  Arabians,  but  in  the  eleventh  century  these  Ara 
bians  were  conquered  by  tribes  of  Turks  or  Mongolians 
from  the  north  of  Asia.  These  became  converted  to 
Mohammedanism,  but  they  had  no  love  for  culture  nor 
reverence  for  the  places  in  Palestine,  which  were  sacred 
alike  to  the  Christian  and  the  Arab.  From  the  fourth 
to  the  twelfth  century  the  pilgrimages  of  the  Chris 
tians,  individually  or  in  multitudes,  largely  increased,  but 
in  the  eleventh  century  the  new  race  of  Mohammedan 
Turks  made  the  access  to  Jerusalem  more  difficult. 
They  began  to  subject  the  pilgrims  to  cruelties,  so  that 
the  Christian  was  beginning  to  find  the  door  of  his  Holy 
Land  closed  to  him.  Then  did  Platonic  Christianity 
rush  to  the  rescue  of  those  sacred  places  that  symbol 
ized  its  ideals.  This  onslaught  upon  the  Mohammedans 
came  in  a  series  of  surges,  traditionally  spoken  of  as 
the  eight  Crusades.1  The  Crusades  resulted  quite  con 
trary  to  the  expectations  of  the  church,  for  the  Crusad* 

*  Read  Emerton,  Mediaeval  Europe,  pp.  358-397 ; 
Adams,  Civilization  during  the  Middle  Ages,  pp.  258-278. 

1  THE  CRUSADES 

Major  Crusades  Minor  Crusades 

First   Crusade,     1096-1099  Fifth  Crusade,  1216-1220 

Second       "          1147-1149  Sixth        "        1228-1229 

Third         "          1189-1192  Seventh    "         1248-1254 

Fourth       "          1202-1204  Eighth     "        1270-1272 

Children's "          1212 

It  will  be  noted  that  five  of  these  nine  Crusades  occurred  within 
thirty  years  of  the  year  1200.  The  First  Crusade  resulted  in  the  cap- 
ture  of  Jerusalem  and  the  founding  of  a  kingdom.  The  other  Crusadea 
were  directly  or  indirectly  concerned  with  the  defense  or  recapture  ol 
that  kingdom. 


THE  PERIOD  OF  CLASSIC   SCHOLASTICISM   375 

ers  failed  in  permanently  recapturing  Jerusalem,  But 
the  Crusades  accomplished  the  unexpected  thing  —  they 
awakened  Europe.  The  effect  of  the  Crusades  upon 
Europe  was  far  greater  than  upon  the  Orient.  The  re 
sults  may  be  enumerated  as  follows :  — 

1.  The  dormant  European  intellect  was  shaken  up  by 
contact  with  the  heathen,  whom  the  Europeans  had  previ 
ously  despised,  but  whom  they  found  to  be  their  superiors. 

2.  A  new  national  rivalry  was  aroused  among  the 
Christian  soldiers.  This  national  spirit  was  helped  nega 
tively  by  the  losses  among  the  feudal  lords. 

3.  Commercial  activity  was  given  an  immense  im 
pulse.  A  new  social  class  was  formed,  which  allied  itself 
with  the  kings  against   the  feudal  lords.    Trade  was 
opened  with  the  East,  revealing  new  luxuries  and  new 
needs.  Venice,  Pisa,  and  Genoa,  and  in  a  secondary  way 
also  the  German,  French,  and  English  towns,  became 
prosperous  commercial  centres. 

4.  The  power  of  the  Latin  church  was  extended. 

5.  The  works  of  Aristotle  were  introduced  in  tra?is- 
lations  direct  from  the  original  Greek.  In  the  fourth 
Crusade  Constantinople  was  captured  by  the  Crusaders 
(1204),  and  in  this  way  the  treasures  of  the  Greeks 
were  opened   to  the  western    scholars.    The  complete 
works  of  Aristotle  were  introduced  into  western  Europe 
at  a  time  when  Aristotle  was  being  interpreted  as  a 
pantheist  by  the  Arabian  commentators. 

The  Revival  of  Learning.  The  need  of  learning,  that 
had  been  felt  in  the  twelfth  century,  was  now  being 
satisfied.  The  entire  logic  of  Aristotle  and  his  entire 
natural  science  gave  the  new  materials  for  knowledge. 
These  came  into  Europe  within  the  century  between 
1150  and  1250,  (1)  through  translations  from  the  Ara« 


876 


HISTORY   OF  PHILOSOPHY 


bic,  and  then  (2)  directly  through  translations  from  the 
Greek.  Aristotle's  logic  revived  scholasticism  and  hia 
science  became  the  foundation  of  metaphysics.  Medise- 


THE  UNIVERSE 

THB  ANOECTC 


DIAGRAM  OF  DANTE'S  POETIC  CONCEPTION  OF  THE  UNIVERSE 

From  Eossetti's  Shadow  of  Dante 

(Showing  its  divisions  of  Hell  (at  centre  of  the  earth),  Purgatory,  and  the  nine  heavens^ 
The  evident  plan  beneath  this  is  the  Ptolemaic  cosmography) 

val  thought  was  ready  for  this  and  there  was  a  com* 
plete  readjustment  without  the  introduction  of  a  new 
philosophical  principle.  The  side  of  Augustine's  teach* 


THE   PERIOD   OF  CLASSIC   SCHOLASTICISM   377 

ing  that  emphasized  the  intellect  rather  than  the  will, 
gained  by  being  confirmed  by  the  systematic  intellect- 
ualism  of  Aristotle.  The  founder  of  this  was  Albert 
of  Bollstaedt ;  the  organizer  and  literary  codifier  wati 
Thomas  Aquinas ;  the  poetic  expression  was  Dante. 
The  new  centres  of  learning  were  Paris  and  Constan 
tinople.  The  centres  of  teaching  were  transferred  from 
the  monasteries  to  the  new  Universities  (1100-1300). 
Salerno  had  its  beginnings  in  the  latter  part  of  the 
eleventh  century.  Bologna  in  law,  Oxford  in  general 
culture  and  theology,  Paris  in  the  same  studies,  show 
traces  of  general  organization  between  1160  and  1200. 
There  were  established  seventy-nine  of  these  universi 
ties  between  1150  and  1500.  They  were  not  "  founded,'* 
but  grew  up  as  part  of  this  movement.* 

Nevertheless,  the  struggle  was  a  full  century  long 
before  official  recognition  of  Aristotle  came.  The  name 
of  Aristotle  had  been  associated  with  pantheism  for 
many  years,  on  account  of  the  Arabian  versions  of  his 
teaching.  The  neo-Platonic  doctrine  of  emanations, 
with  its  pantheism  in  the  Arabian  versions,  was  a 
tendency  of  which  the  church  had  been  shy  since  the 
days  of  Erigena.  Until  the  theistic  character  of  Aris 
totle's  teaching  became  assured  by  the  direct  Latin 
translations  from  the  Greek,  there  was  a  powerful 
reaction  against  the  whole  of  the  new  learning.  The 
church  had  condemned  the  Physics  in  1209  and  the 
Metaphysics  in  1215.  But  in  1254  Aristotle  was  offi 
cially  recognized,  and  fifty  years  later  he  became  the 
guide  of  the  church,  whom  no  one  could  contradict  with 
out  being  accused  of  heresy. 

*  Read  Norton,  Readings  in  the  Hist,  of  Education,  pp, 
102-103. 


378  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

The  Catholic  church  never  showed  its  ability  to 
greater  advantage  than  in  its  dealings  with  the  new 
problems  of  this  period.  The  people  of  a  purely  reli 
gious  epoch  now  came  into  possession  of  Aristotelianism. 
For  centuries  the  intellect  had  been  starving  on  formal 
logic.  An  intellectual  revolution  was  imminent.  Here 
in  Aristotle  was  presented  a  rich  theory  of  nature  that 
the  church  had  never  considered.  Yet  it  is  doubtful  if 
Aristotle  would  have  been  accepted,  had  the  Mendicant 
Friars  —  the  Dominicans  and  Franciscans  —  not  suc 
ceeded  in  establishing  chairs  in  the  University  of  Paris. 
These  monks  did  not  love  philosophy  in  itself.  They 
saw,  however,  that  philosophy  must  be  able  to  defend 
itself  against  infidel  philosophy  by  the  weapons  of  phi 
losophy.  But  curiously  enough,  Aristotelianism,  which 
was  the  spring  of  this  renaissance,  became,  by  its  incor 
poration  into  the  church,  the  great  obstacle  to  the  real 
Renaissance  two  hundred  and  fifty  years  later. 

The  Strength  and  Burden  of  Aristotle  to  the  Church. 

i.  The  Strength  of  Aristotle  to  the  Church:  (1) 
Aristotle  elaborated  for  the  church,  with  great  clear 
ness,  the  conception  of  a  transcendent  God.  This  was 
a  weapon  for  the  church  against  neo-Platonism  and 
mysticism.  (2)  Aristotle  gave  to  the  church  a  theory 
of  nature  that  supplemented  its  theory  of  grace.  (3) 
Aristotle  established  a  philosophical  standard  for  the 
truth  of  things.  This  proved  of  great  value  to  the 
church  because  it  was  under  the  control  of  the  church. 
In  the  first  two  periods  of  the  Middle  Ages  philosophi 
cal  thought  had  a  relative  independence  because  it  was 
without  a  recognized  standard ;  now  philosophy  could 
be  controlled  by  the  standard  of  Aristotle.  For  exam 
ple,  with  the  coming  of  Aristotle  there  came  certain 


THE   PERIOD   OF  CLASSIC   SCHOLASTICISM   379 

standard   definitions  of  substance,  person,  nature,  acci 
dent,  mode,  potency,  and  act. 

2.  The  Burden  of  Aristotle  to  the  Church:  (1) 
Aristotle  encouraged  a  taste  for  science  and  analysis. 
At  first  the  Aristotelian  influence  in  this  direction  was 
very  small,  but  its  growth  was  only  a  question  of  time. 
(2)  Aristotle  became  for  the  church  a  second  standard. 
The  problem  for  the  churchman  now  became  a  double 
one  :  (a)  Is  my  teaching  consistent  with  church  dogma  ? 
(i)  Is  my  teaching  consistent  with  Aristotle  ?  "  My 
son,"  was  the  reply  to  a  youth  who  thought  he  had  dis 
covered  spots  on  the  sun,  "I  have  read  Aristotle  many 
times  and  I  assure  you  there  is  nothing  of  the  kind  in 
him."  Dogma,  not  now  the  only  standard,  is  not  in 
fallible.  The  reason  need  not  follow  dogma,  but  its  own 
standard.  Revelation  became  a  realm  of  mystery  which 
the  reason  could  not  reach,  but  to  which  it  pointed.  A 
doctrine  thus  might  be  of  such  a  nature  that  it  might 
be  philosophically  true,  but  theologically  not  true. 

The  Predecessors  of  Aquinas.  Many  distinguished 
names  stand  at  the  close  of  the  Transitional  Period 
and  the  beginning  of  the  Classic  Period.  These  express 
the  transitional  character  of  the  thought  of  the  thresh 
old  of  this  time.  They  show,  like  Abelard,  the  tend 
ency  toward  rationalism.  Alexander  of  Hales  (d.  1264), 
William  of  Aubergne  (d.  1249),  Vincent  of  Beauvais 
(d.  1246),  Albert  of  Bollstaedt,  called  Albertus  Magnus 
(d.  1280),  show  the  influence  of  the  new  Aristotelian 
science.  Albert  was  the  teacher  of  Thomas  Aquinas. 
The  attempt  of  Thomas  to  form  a  theological  system 
for  the  church  was  anticipated  by  the  so-called  Sums 
of  the  twelfth  century,  of  which  the  work  of  Peter  the 
Lombard  was  the  model.  The  four  books  of  Sums 


380  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

of  Peter  were  collections  of  opinions  of  the  Fathers  on 
questions  of  dogma.  They  show  the  influence  of  Aris 
totle  and  the  method  of  Abelard.  The  Sums  of  Peter 
became  for  several  centuries  the  text-book  of  the  schools 
and  the  subject  of  innumerable  commentaries.  It  was 
the  core  of  Classic  scholastic  literature,  and  around  it 
grew  up  the  problems  of  metaphysics  and  psychology. 

The  Life  of  Thomas  Aquinas  (1224-1274). — The 
Founder  of  the  Dominican  Tradition.  Thomas  belonged 
to  a  noble  house  which  was  related  to  the  royal  family. 
He  studied  in  the  University  of  Naples,  but  at  the  age 
of  nineteen,  upon  resolving  to  enter  the  Dominican 
order,  he  was  captured  and  kept  a  prisoner  by  his  bro 
thers.  After  two  years  he  made  his  escape,  and,  his 
family  having  consented  to  his  taking  orders,  he  went 
to  Cologne  under  the  instruction  of  Albert.  He  was 
then  sent  to  Paris,  where  he  obtained  his  degree  in  1257. 
He  was  a  successful  lecturer  at  Paris  until  1261,  when 
he  was  called  by  the  Pope  to  teach  philosophy  in  Eome, 
Bologna,  and  Pisa.  During  this  period  he  composed  his 
greatest  work,  Summa  Theologiae.  He  declined  pre 
ferment  and  finally  resided  at  Naples.  He  always  en 
joyed  the  highest  consideration  of  the  church  authorities. 

Thomas,  the  founder  of  the  "  Dominican  tradition," 
was  the  first  to  formulate  Christian  Aristotelianism  and 
to  draw  for  the  church  the  line  between  the  realms  of 
reason  and  faith.  He  did  not  so  much  create  doctrine  as 
he  transformed  and  assimilated  it.  The  sources  from 
which  he  drew  were  many :  the  Scriptures,  the  Fathers, 
Greek  philosophy,  and  the  teaching  of  contemporary 
Arabians  and  Jews.  If,  as  some  historians  maintain,  he 
was  not  a  thinker  of  the  first  rank,  he  at  least  relieved 
the  church  from  a  delicate  situation  by  means  of  a  con- 


THE   PERIOD   OF  CLASSIC   SCHOLASTICISM  381 

ciliating  theology.  Certainly  his  predecessors  and  con 
temporaries  stand  eclipsed  by  him.  He  satisfied  the 
mediaeval  demand  for  order  and  he  prevented  deteriora 
tion  in  the  church  doctrine.  He  did  not  rise  above  his 
age,  although  he  stood  at  the  head  of  its  intellectual 
movement.  He  was,  on  the  contrary,  the  most  perfect 
expression  of  scholasticism,  and  he  was  affectionately- 
regarded  as  doctor  angellcus  and  again  as  doctor  uni- 
ver  sails. 

The  Central  Principle  of  Thomas's  Doctrine  —  The 
Twofold  Truth.  The  life-purpose  of  Thomas  was  to 
bring  Christianity  into  closer  relation  with  civilization 
and  science.  He  sought  to  give  all  departments  of 
knowledge  their  rights  and  at  the  same  time  to  protect 
the  ascendency  of  religion.  This  was  to  him  the  same 
as  bringing  Christianity  and  Aristotle  together,  for 
Aristotle  meant  to  him  the  entire  product  of  ancient 
civilization.  To  the  mediaeval  world  of  grace  he  added 
a  world  of  nature,  and,  fully  dominated  by  the  mediae 
val  love  of  order,  he  unfolded  so  comprehensive  a  view 
of  life  that  he  included  all  its  problems.  He  felt  that 
the  natural  and  the  revealed  must  not  become  a  contra 
diction. 

To  accomplish  this  Thomas  found  in  Aristotle  his 
own  ideal  estimate  of  things.  Looking  at  Aristotle 
through  his  own  neo-Platonism,  he  naturally  found  in 
Aristotle  more  of  the  inner  and  religious  estimate  oi 
nature  than  the  facts  will  allow.  Yet  it  was  evident  to 
Thomas  that  there  was  in  Aristotle  a  great  interest  in 
nature  and  a  great  reserve  on  ultimate  questions.  Na 
ture  was,  according  to  Aristotle,  an  essence  unfolding  in 
a  system  of  grades.  This  became  the  central  principle 
of  Aquinas  in  this  form:  Nature  is  a  sketch  in  outline 


382  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

of  the,  world  of  grace.  Before  the  eye  of  the  religious 
mind  these  two  truths  should  appear :  (1)  the  world  of 
faith  and  the  world  of  nature  are  two  properly  distinct 
worlds ;  (2)  the  world  of  faith  is  a  continuation  of  the 
world  of  nature.  The  world  of  grace  and  the  world  of 
nature  are  two  grades  of  the  whole  of  existence.  Nature 
is  the  lower  stage  of  development,  and  the  point  of  con 
tact  between  it  and  the  world  of  grace  is  the  soul  of  man. 
Keligion  and  philosophy  thus  have  different  spheres,  but 
they  are  not  contradictory.  Grace  does  not  destroy, 
but  it  perfects  nature.  Nature  is  subordinate  to  grace 
as  man  is  subordinate  to  the  Christian,  the  state  to  the 
church,  the  Emperor  to  the  Pope.1 

The  difference  between  philosophy  and  theology  is 
not  that  theology  treats  of  God  and  divine  truths,  and 
philosophy  does  not.  Philosophy  discusses  divine  truths. 
But  the  difference  lies  here,  that  theology  views  truths 
in  the  light  of  revelation,  while  philosophy  views  them 
in  the  light  of  reason.  Yet  there  are  truths  that  belong 
to  philosophy,  truths  that  belong  to  theology,  and  truths 
that  belong  to  both.  The  problems  of  the  existence  of 
God,  the  immortality  of  the  soul,  and  the  relation  of  the 
world  to  God  are  theological  problems,  yet  they  can  also 
be  demonstrated  by  the  reason  of  philosophy;  but  the 
mysteries  of  the  Trinity,  the  Incarnation,  and  the  tem 
poral  creation  are  beyond  the  scope  of  the  reason  and 
belong  to  theology.  Philosophy  and  theology  are  distinct, 
yet  they  are  in  harmony.  Theology  supplements  philo 
sophy  with  faith ;  philosophy  supplements  theology  by 

1  Dante  in  De  Monarchia  did  not  share  in  Thomas's  subordination  of 
the  state  to  the  church.  Both  Dante  and  Thomas  believed  that  destiny 
lies  in  the  race,  but  the  great  poet  regarded  man  as  destined  equally 
for  earthly  and  heavenly  happiness.  To  Dante  the  church  and  the  state 
are  powers  of  like  authority. 


THE  PERIOD   OF  CLASSIC   SCHOLASTICISM   383 

(1)  establishing  preliminary  motives,  (2)  supplying 
analogies,  (3)  answering  objections.  Thomas  accepts 
both  propositions  which  had  divided  his  predecessors : 
credo  ut  intelligam  and  intelligo  ut  credam. 

Above  historical  revelation  there  is  something  even 
higher,  which  could  be  called  another  realm,  were  it  not 
more  of  a  hope  than  a  possession  of  man.  Its  appear 
ance  in  the  doctrine  of  Thomas  shows  the  influence  of 
Plato  upon  him.  It  is  the  immediate  union  of  the  indi 
vidual  with  God  in  mystic  ecstasy.1  It  is  the  dome  of 
the  religious  temple  that  Thomas  has  built.  But  Thomas 
was  careful  to  insist  that  this  heavenly  glory  could  not 
be  gained  except  through  the  offices  of  the  church.  The 
individual  cannot  reach  God  through  his  own  unaided 
efforts,  but  the  sacraments  of  the  church  form  the  mys 
terious  background  of  the  religious  life. 

The  Problem  of  Individuality  —  The  Relation  of 
Particulars  and  Universals.  The  all-absorbing  question 
of  the  Transitional  Period,  of  the  relation  of  particulars 
and  universals,  became  for  Thomas  and  his  successors 
the  problem  of  individuality.  For  the  schoolman  was 
obliged  to  define  the  individual  and  fix  his  place  in  his 
Aristotelian  world,  if  he  was  to  be  successful  against 
the  pantheism  of  the  Arabian  Aristotelianism.  What 
is  the  nature  and  standing  of  the  individual?  What 
constitutes  the  difference  between  individuals?  The 
whole  theological  edifice  of  Thomas  would  collapse  in 
mystic  unity,  the  immortality  of  the  soul  would  be  lost 
and  the  offices  of  the  church  would  be  nullified,  unless 
Thomas  showed  the  positive  nature  of  the  individual. 

1  Dante  follows  Thomas  in  placing  the  intellectual  virtues  above  the 
practical,  and  in  pointing1  to  the  intellectual  intuition  of  God  as  the 
goal  of  human  attainment.  Beatrice  is  Dante's  expression  of  this  ideal. 


384  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

In  this  connection  we  must  remember  that  on  the  whole 
the  Middle  Ages  had  accepted  Abelard's  analysis  of  the 
problem  of  the  relation  of  universals  and  particulars : 
the  universals  exist  in  three  ways,  ante  rein  or  in  God's 
mind ;  post  rem  or  in  man's  mind ;  in  re  or  in  nature. 
To  Thomas  the  universals  as  abstractions  (imiversalia 
post  rem)  in  the  human  mind  cannot  be  individuals,  for 
they  have  no  real  existence.  To  have  real  existence  the 
universal  must  exist  in  re,  in  the  many,  as  the  essence 
of  things  ;  not  as  abstraction  beside  the  many. 

The  question  of  individuality  therefore  to  Thomas 
concerns  properly  only  objects  in  re,  or  objects  in  the 
corporeal  world.1  These  are  objects  of  Form  and  Mat 
ter.  The  question  is,  whether  the  Form  or  the  matter 
of  corporeal  things  is  the  principle  of  its  individuality. 
Thomas  says  that  matter  is  this  principle,  —  not  inde 
terminate  matter,  but  matter  with  quantitative  deter 
minations.  The  difference  between  earthly  individuals 
is  numerical  —  a  difference  of  time  and  space  relations. 
The  Forms  of  nature  objects  change  continually  accord 
ing  to  their  material  conditions,  but  these  conditions  do 
not  change.  Nevertheless  the  quantitative  determina 
tions  of  individuals  are  not  the  cause,  but  the  condition, 
of  their  existence. 

But  the  question  about  the  status  of  beings  in  the 
spiritual  world,  "  separate  Forms,"  is  a  more  difficult 
one  for  Thomas.  This  is  the  problem  about  God,  the 
angels,  and  the  souls  of  men.  They  are  evidently  not 
individualized  by  matter.  What  is  the  principle  that 
distinguishes  them  from  one  another?  They  are  Forms 
without  matter  and  they  are  individualized  through 
themselves,  since  they  have  no  need  of  material  deter- 
i  De  Wulf ,  Hist,  of  Mediceval  Phil,  p.  323. 


THE  PERIOD   OF  CLASSIC   SCHOLASTICISM   385 

minations.  Thus  God  is  distinguished  from  everything 
else  as  pure  Form  or  pure  actuality.  He  is  the  unique 
individual  in  whom  all  differences  merge.  Bat  so  also 
are  the  angels  actualized  through  themselves.  What  is 
the  difference  between  God  and  the  angels  ?  God  is  an 
absolute  genus ;  the  angel  is  a  relative  genus,  i.  e.  it  is 
the  only  one  of  its  kind.  But  what  is  the  condition  of 
the  souls  of  men  ?  Are  they  all  alike  or  do  they  have  a 
principle  of  distinction?  Yes,  they  are  distinguishable, 
for  each  soul  upon  separation  from  its  body  carries  with 
it  a  love  for  its  former  body,  and  that  distinguishes  it 
from  other  souls. 

The  Primacy  of  the  Will  or  the  Intellect.  Up  to  this 
time  there  had  been  no  psychological  dispute  as  to  which 
of  the  faculties  was  fundamental.  Now  the  question  ap 
pears  in  full  force.  Much  of  the  literature  of  this  period 
is  upon  the  question  of  the  primacy  of  the  will  or  the 
intellect,  and  it  appears  to  be  almost  the  leading  motive 
of  the  time.  Augustine  had  placed  the  will  in  the  fore 
ground  of  his  teaching.  His  successors  had  never  dis 
puted  the  subject,  but  had  been  engaged  in  discussing 
what  products  of  the  intellect  are  real  —  the  particulars 
or  the  universals.  With  the  introduction  of  the  intel- 
lectualism  of  Aristotle,  there  almost  immediately  arose 
defenders  of  Augustine.  To  them  Aristotelianism  was 
too  rationalistic.  Thomas  follows  Aristotle  uncondition 
ally,  and  with  him  stand  the  German  mystics.  Intellect- 
ualism  becomes  the  central  principle  of  what  is  known 
as  the  "  Dominican  tradition."  Duns  Scotus  was  a  Fran, 
ciscan  monk.  He  took  up  arms  for  the  primacy  of  the 
will,  and  this  became  the  central  principle  of  the  "Fran 
ciscan  tradition."  On  this  point  the  nominalists  were 
his  allies. 


386  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

The  problem  of  the  will  arose  first  with  reference  to 
the  human  will.  Thomas  contended  against  Duns  Sco- 
tus  that  man  is  free  so  far  as  he  follows  his  knowledge 
of  the  good.  The  intellect  is  therefore  primal,  for  it  de 
termines  the  will  by  showing  the  will  what  the  good  is. 

The  question  next  arose  as  to  the  priority  of  the  fac 
ulties  in  God.  Does  God's  will  dominate  His  intellect  or 
His  intellect  dominate  His  will?  This  was  a  vital  point 
in  the  Augustinian  theodicy.  Does  God  will  the  good 
to  be  good,  or  does  His  will  act  according  to  what  He 
knows  to  be  good  ?  Here  lies  the  point  at  issue  between 
the  Dominican  Thomas  and  the  Franciscan  Scotus. 
Thomas  maintained  that  the  intellect  of  God  determines 
His  will.  The  intellect  is  determined  by  the  truth  so 
long  as  the  intellect  is  true  to  itself.  Why  should  not 
the  will  be  determined  by  the  truth  in  the  same  way  ? 
With  God  this  freedom  for  the  truth  is  God  himself. 
The  world  is  the  best  possible  world,  for  God  has  willed 
it  out  of  himself. 

The  world  is  determined  by  goodness  and  man's  will 
is  'determined  by  the  same  goodness.  When  the  sense 
(Conquers  the  morally  determined  will,  there  is  sin.  The 
.senses,  and  not  the  will,  are  the  cause  of  sin. 

Duns  Scotus  (1270-1308),  the  Founder  of  the  Fran 
ciscan  Tradition  —  Life  and  Philosophical  Position. 
Thus  the  Middle  Ages  did  not  come  to  a  standstill  with 
Thomas.  A  greater  movement  existed  after  him  than 
is  often  thought.  The  leading  minds  who  succeeded 
Thomas  refused  to  follow  the  middle  course  which  he 
lhad  mapped  out.  New  attempts  were  made  to  relate  the 
world  of  grace  and  the  world  of  nature.  One  was  mys 
ticism,  represented  by  Eckhart  (d.  1372).  The  other 
was  the  reaction  of  the  Augustinian s  against  the  intel- 


THE  PERIOD   OF  CLASSIC   SCHOLASTICISM   387 

lectualism  of  the  new  Aristotelianism  as  represented  by 
Thomas.  The  leader  in  this  was  Duns  Scotus.  The  seat 
of  this  movement  was  Oxford.1 

Duns  Scotus  was  born  in  Ireland  and  at  an  early  age 
he  joined  the  Franciscan  order.  He  graduated  from  Ox 
ford,  which  at  that  time  was  anti-Thomistic.  He  then 
taught  theology  and  philosophy  at  Oxford  for  ten  years. 
His  lectures  were  largely  attended  and  his  fame  spread 
over  Europe.  He  went  to  Paris  in  1304,  where  he  taught 
for  four  years.  He  was  then  transferred  to  Cologne, 
where  he  died. 

Scotus  was  the  Kant  of  scholasticism.  The  time  of 
construction  of  scholasticism  had  passed,  and  the  time 
of  criticism  and  analysis  had  come.  Scotus  was  the  in 
tellectual  knight-errant  who  refused  to  accept  any  the 
ory  without  subjecting  it  to  criticism.  He  was  the  acut- 
est  mind  of  the  Middle  Ages  and  was  called  the  doctor 
subtilis. 

Duns  Scotus's  Conception  of  the  Twofold  Truth.  — 
The  Separation  of  Science  and  Religion.  The  distinc 
tion  between  revelation,  theology,  and  philosophy,  that 
appears  in  this  period  of  Classic  Scholasticism,  was 
sharply  drawn  by  Scotus.  In  Thomas's  conception  of  a 
graded  world  of  development  the  distinction  between 
theology  and  philosophy  was  not  emphasized.  Philosophy 
now  in  the  hands  of  Scotus  becomes  science,  having  the 
marks  of  exactness  that  compel  belief,  but  is,  however, 
restricted  to  its  own  realm.  By  philosophy  Scotus  means 

1  Roger  Bacon  (1214-1292)  lived  at  Oxford  two  generations  before 
Scotus.  He  was  so  versatile  that  he  was  not  able  to  dogmatize  in  any 
one  field.  He  believed  that  theology  was  based  on  the  will  of  God,  all 
other  science  on  the  reason.  He  influenced  both  Scotus  and  Ockam  to 
turn  from  authority  to  experience.  Morality  was  to  him  the  content  of 
universal  religion. 


S38  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

logic.  In  matters  of  faith  logic  has  nothing  whatever  to 
say,  for  at  that  extreme  stands  revelation  possessing  the 
absolute  truth  that  compels  faith.  Between  revelation 
and  philosophy  Scotus  squeezes  theology  —  the  science 
that  his  predecessors  had  used  to  clarify  revelation. 
With  Scotus  it  becomes  a  domain  that  is  poor  indeed. 
Its  objects  are  the  highest,  but  it  can  never  reach  them. 
It  has  not  the  divine  assurance  of  revelation  nor  the 
exactness  of  logical  science.  Its  highest  conclusions  are 
only  probable,  and  it  can  help  revelation  only  in  a  nega 
tive  way.  It  cannot  prove  the  doctrine  of  the  Trinity, 
incarnation,  creation,  immortality,  and  even  its  proofs  for 
the  existence  of  God  have  no  cogency.  Philosophy  and 
revelation  both  profit  at  the  expense  of  scholastic  theo 
logy.  After  Scotus  scientific  heresy  frequently  shielded 
itself  on  the  ground  that  its  conclusions  apply  only  to 
the  realm  of  science,  while  the  opposite  may  be  true  in 
revelation. 

The  Inscrutable  Will  of  God.  Revelation  is  thus 
placed  beyond  the  reach  of  the  human  reason  because  it 
rests  on  the  inscrutable  will  of  God.  Revelation  is  God's 
free  act.  God  must  be  free.  If  Thomas's  conception  of 
God's  will  as  determined  by  his  intellect  were  true,  God 
would  not  be  free.  The  intellect  in  man  or  God  must 
be  the  servant  of  the  will,  if  the  will  be  free.  In  man 
consciousness  produces  at  first  a  number  of  indistinct 
and  imperfect  ideas.  Those  ideas  become  distinct  upon 
which  the  will  fixes  its  attention,  while  the  others  cease 
to  exist  because  they  are  unsupported  by  the  will. 

God's  will  is  more  fundamental  than  the  good.  God 
makes  the  good  to  be  good.  Both  Thomas  and  Scotus 
say  that  the  moral  law  is  the  command  of  God.  Thomas 
conceives  it  to  be  God's  command  because  it  is  in  ac- 


THE  PERIOD  OF   CLASSIC   SCHOLASTICISM   389 

cord  with  the  good ;  Scotus,  for  no  other  reason  than 
that  it  is  God's  command.  The  good  might  be  different 
if  God  so  created  it.  In  opposition  to  Thomas,  Scotus 
maintained  that  God  does  not  have  to  create  what  He 
does  create,  and  that  this  is  not  the  best  possible  world. 
God  creates  what  He  wills ;  He  can,  therefore,  grant 
dispensation,  and  so  can  the  church.  If  God's  will  were 
determined  by  His  intellect,  Pie  would  have  no  inde 
pendence,  He  would  not  even  exist,  He  would  be  only 
nature  or  one  of  its  causes,  there  could  be  no  evil  nor 
accident.  He  can  supersede  the  moral  law  by  a  new 
law,  just  as  He  superseded  the  Mosaic  law  by  the  Gospel. 
Individuality,  revelation,  salvation,  and  all  objects  of 
faith  have  their  existence  only  in  the  groundless  and  in 
scrutable  will  of  God.  For  this  reason  there  can  be  no 
rational  theology. 

This  founder  of  the  "  Franciscan  tradition  "  of  practi 
cal  piety  and  meritorious  action  could  not  have  other 
than  the  freedom  of  the  will  as  his  central  principle. 
An  Augustinian  he  refused,  however,  to  follow  Augustine 
in  centralizing  freedom  in  God.  The  object  of  faith  is 
the  will  of  God,  the  subject  of  faith  is  the  will  of  man. 
Human  freedom  consists  in  cooperation  with  divine 
grace.  Man  can  help  in  the  work  of  God.  His  freedom 
is  partly  formal :  he  can  will  or  not  will.  It  is  partly 
material:  he  can  will  A  or  B.  There  is  no  ulterior 
ground  to  determine  the  human  will,  and  this  unde 
termined  freedom  is  the  ground  for  merit,  provided  the 
human  will  coincides  with  the  divine. 

The  Problem  of  Individuality.  The  problem  of  in- 
dividuation  was  a  favorite  one  with  Scotus.  While  Sco 
tus  agrees  with  Thomas  as  to  the  threefold  existence  of 
the  universal,  the  individual  and  not  the  universal  is 


390  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

the  ultimate  fact.  The  individual  cannot  be  deduced 
from  the  universal,  nor  can  it  be  constituted  by  the  quan 
titative  determinations  of  matter.  It  is  already  individ 
ualized  and  substantialized.  Form,  not  matter,  individ 
ualizes.  The  definite  individual  form,  the  "  thisness  " 
(hazcceitas),  is  the  ultimate  fact.  The  individual  can 
only  be  verified  as  actual  fact.  The  individual  is  irre 
ducible,  and  no  further  explanation  can  be  made  than  to 
say  that  it  is  an  individual.  Thus  the  inquiry  into  the 
Principium  indimduationis  has  no  meaning. 

After  Duns  Scotus.  The  church  failed  to  canonize 
Scotus ;  for  though  he  claimed  to  be  its  most  faithful 
son,  he  taught  the  dangerous  doctrine  of  freedom  of  the 
individual  will.  His  doctrine  also  marks  the  beginning 
of  empirical  investigation  of  nature  and  the  decadence 
of  formal  logic.  Although  a  most  faithful  follower  of 
the  church,  he  brought  scholasticism  to  the  point  where 
it  no  longer  served  the  church.  The  result  was  ultra- 
rationalism —  not  what  Scotus  intended.  But  when 
revelation  no  longer  rests  upon  rational  ground,  and 
when  there  exists  by  its  side  a  philosophical  science 
whose  basis  is  rational,  it  is  only  a  question  of  time 
when  revelation  shall  lose  its  authority  for  men.  When 
philosophy  passed  from  Scotus  to  Ockam,  Ockam's  con 
ception  of  the  individual  as  the  ultimately  real  and  of 
the  unrationality  of  revelation  gave  him  the  old  name 
of  nominalist.  This  is  a  misnomer,  for  the  doctrine  of 
Ockam  is  quite  different  from  the  nominalism  of  Ros- 
cellinus.  The  temper  of  the  time  was  different  from 
those  days  when  Roscellinus  followed  upon  Anselm,  for 
the  superior  minds  were  now  turning  away  from  ortho 
doxy.  Disciples  of  both  Thomas  and  Scotus  were  be 
coming  nominalists.  It  was  an  epoch  when  scholasticism 


THE   PERIOD  OF  CLASSIC   SCHOLASTICISM   391 

was  being  discredited  by  the  universities,  when  theology 
was  less  a  study  in  the  curricula,  when  religion  was  be 
ing  superseded  by  magic,  when  there  were  rival  claim 
ants  for  the  Pope's  chair,  when  there  was  strife  between 
the  church  and  the  state.  The  spirit  of  the  age  was 
toward  nominalism  in  every  form.  The  command,  in 
1339,  to  the  University  of  Paris  not  to  use  Ockam's 
works  shows  how  powerful  had  become  his  following 
during  his  lifetime.  Dominicans  and  Augustinians 
went  over  in  crowds  to  nominalism.  This  beginning  of 
nominalism  betrays  the  growth  of  European  national 
life,  modern  languages,  art,  and  the  sciences.  It  shows 
the  beginning  of  Protestantism  in  all  departments.  The 
church  attempted  to  crush  it  in  the  way  that  it  had 
crushed  Roscellinus.  But  this  nominalism  had  too  deep 
root. 

William  of  Ockam  (1280-1349)  :  Life  and  Teaching. 
Ockam  was  called  Doctor  Invincibilis.  He  was  born  in 
Ockam,  England,  and  studied  at  Oxford,  where  he  prob 
ably  had  Scotus  as  a  teacher.  After  teaching  in  Paris 
(1320-1325),  he  left  Paris  and  joined  the  opponents 
of  the  temporal  power  of  the  Pope.  He  was  imprisoned 
at  Avignon,  but  escaped  to  the  court  of  Louis  of  Ba 
varia,  where  he  died.  To  Louis  he  made  his  celebrated 
promise,  "  If  you  will  defend  me  with  your  sword,  I  will 
defend  you  with  my  pen."  He  has  been  called  "  the 
first  Protestant." 

The  nominalism  of  Ockam  was  more  complex  than 
that  of  Roscellinus,  and  yet  it  was  essentially  a  tend 
ency  to  simplification  by  discarding  all  metaphysics  and 
psychology  as  useless.  "  Ockam's  razor  "  was  the  nick 
name  of  his  philosophy.  He  regarded  concepts  as  sub 
jective  signs  or  "  terms "  of  actual  facts.  Hence  his 


392  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

philosophy  was  also  called  terminism.  There  was  also 
in  it  a  naturalistic  tendency  which  was  the  result  of  the 
scientific  studies  of  the  Aristotelian  Arabians.  With 
these  logical  and  naturalistic  motives  were  united  the 
Augustinian  doctrine  of  the  will.  These  were  the  three 
factors  of  a  nominalism  that  felt  the  conviction  of  the 
importance  of  the  inner  life  as  well  as  the  need  of  an 
extended  investigation  of  nature. 

It  is,  moreover,  no  accident  that  Ockam  was  conserv 
ative,  for  he  belonged  to  the  Franciscans,  the  most  con 
servative  of  the  monastic  bodies.  This  nominalism  was 
a  reaction  against  scholasticism,  in  order  to  strengthen 
the  supernatural  character  of  dogma.  Ockam  felt  that 
scholasticism  had  waxed  too  great  —  that  under  the 
guise  of  serving  religion  it  had  virtually  subordinated 
religion.  The  reactionary  Franciscans  proclaimed  the 
entire  separation  of  religion  and  philosophy  in  order  to 
make  room  for  faith.  Faith  could  be  purified  only  by 
renouncing  scholasticism.  The  temporal  power  must  be 
given  up  by  the  church,  the  state  and  the  church  must 
be  separated.  No  new  knowledge  about  faith  can  be  ob 
tained.  The  dogma  must  be  left  impregnable,  even 
though  scientifically  men  become  skeptics. 

Consistent,  therefore,  was  it  for  this  movement  to 
disjoin  entirely  the  parts  of  the  twofold  truth.  Scotus 
had  almost  crowded  out  natural  theology ;  Ockam  com- 
pleted  the  work  of  Scotus.  Scholasticism  or  natural 
theology  is  a  rubbish-heap  of  hypotheses.  The  church 
should  abandon  speculation  and  emphasize  faith.  It 
should  return  to  the  simplicity  and  holiness  of  the 
Apostolic  church.  Ockam  was  devoted  to  the  true  up 
building  of  the  church  and  was  a  follower  of  St. 
Francis.  It  was  his  love  for  the  church  that  made 


THE   PERIOD   OF   CLASSIC   SCHOLASTICISM   393 

him  take  sides  against  her  pretensions  to  temporal 
power. 

Ockam  was  the  natural  precursor  of  his  fellow- 
countryman  John  Locke,  and  the  English  empirical 
school.  Individual  things  have  the  reality  of  original 
Forms,  for  they  come  to  us  intuitively.  Our  ideas  are 
only  signs  of  them.  This  is  a  relation  of  the  "  first  in 
tention."  As  individual  ideas  are  related  to  individual 
things,  so  general  ideas  are  related  to  individual  ideas. 
This  is  the  relation  of  the  "  second  intention."  The 
general  idea  referring  thus  indirectly  to  an  individual 
thing  is  therefore  arbitrary  and  capricious.  Real  science 
deals  with  things  intuitively  observed  ;  rational  science 
only  with  the  relations  between  ideas.  Nevertheless 
real  science  deals  only  with  an  inner  world,  even  if  its 
material  is  intuitively  known.  Intuitions  are  only  re 
presentatives  of  the  real  world.  How  much  less  real 
must  the  world  of  rational  science  then  be,  since  it  pre 
supposes  these  inner  intuitions  of  real  science.  The  uni 
versal,  therefore,  has  no  reality.  It  is  a  name,  a  sign  of 
many  things,  a  term.  Only  the  individual  is  real. 

After  Ockam.  William  of  Ockam  was  the  last  school 
man.  When  his  doctrine  of  terminism  was  united  with 
Augustine's  powerful  doctrine  of  the  will,  —  forming 
an  extreme  individualism,  —  the  glimmering  of  the  dawn 
of  modern  times  appears.  The  movement  was  made 
still  stronger  by  the  study  of  the  history  of  develop 
ment  psychologically,  and  it  became  a  kind  of  idealism 
of  the  inner  life.  Already,  too,  there  were  beginning 
investigations  in  natural  science,  based  upon  empirical 
study.  Modern  subjectivism  was  at  hand  ;  scholasticism 
had  run  its  course.  The  representatives  of  the  scholar 
tic  philosophy  of  the  fifteenth  and  sixteenth  centuries 


3s/4  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

forgot  the  principle  of  the  Classic  Schoolmen  and  be* 
came  mere  commentators  of  the  leaders  of  the  tradi 
tion  to  which  they  belonged.  Their  verbal  subtleties 
were  too  refined  to  be  understood.  The  efforts  of  Nic 
olas  Cusanus  to  bring  secular  science  under  a  system 
of  scholastic  mysticism  only  promoted  the  modern 
movement.  Cusanus  therefore  belongs  to  the  next  pe» 
riod,  and  of  him  we  shall  subsequently  hear. 


INDEX 


I 


INDEX 


Abdera,  107, 119.    See  Atomists. 

Abelard,  life  of,  363 ;  his  conceptual- 
ism,  364;  his  rationalism,  365-367. 

Academy,  the,  what  it  was,  124;  after 
the  death  of  Plato,  166 ;  and  Aris 
totle,  169-171;  Older,  Middle,  and 
New,  220,  221;  the  skepticism  of, 
266-268 ;  eclecticism  in,  270. 

Adams,  G.  B.,  Civilization  during 
the  Middle  Ages,  374  n. 

Adamson,  Robert,  The  Development 
of  Greek  Philosophy  quoted,  255. 

jEnesidernus,  Skeptic,  268. 

Agrippa,  Skeptic,  268,  269. 

Albertus  Magnus.    See  Bollstaedt. 

Alcidamus,  Sophist,  68. 

Alcuin,  349,  350. 

Alexander  of  Hales,  379. 

Alexandria,  a  centre  of  Hellenism, 
215;  in  the  Middle  Ages,  282. 

Alexandria*!  School  of  neo-Platon- 
ism,  290-298. 

Ammoniu*  Saccas,  290,  314. 

Anamnesis,  147-149. 

Anaxagoras,  his  life,  43;  his  philoso 
phy,  45-47. 

Anaximander,  24,  25. 

Anaximenes,  25. 

Ancient  Philosophy,  length  of,  1; 
underlying  character  of,  2;  divi 
sions  of,  4,  5 ;  literary  sources  of,  6. 

Animism,  19. 

Anselm,  life  and  position  in  mediae 
val  philosophy,  359-361;  his  argu 
ments  for  the  existence  of  God, 
361 ;  on  reason  and  dogma,  365. 

Anthropological  period  of  Greek 
philosophy,  12,  13;  discussion  of, 
55-97;  historical  summary  of,  55. 

Anthropologists,  103. 

Anthropology,  defined,  13. 

Antiochus  of  Ascalon,  270,  271. 

Antisthenes,  founder  of  the  Cynic 
school,  93,  95. 

Apathy,  Stoic,  251. 

Apollonius,  neo-Pythagorean,  285. 

Apologists,  the,  307-309. 


Aquinas,  Thomas,  on  the  problem 
of  reason  and  faith,  369,  377;  the 
predecessors  of,  379,  380;  life  of 
(founder  of  the  Dominican  tra 
dition),  380,  381 ;  the  central  princi 
ple  of  his  doctrine,  381-383;  the 
problem  of  individuality  accord 
ing  to,  383-385;  on  the  will  and  the 
intellect,  385,  386. 

Arabian,  schools,  371,  372;  transla 
tions  of  Greek  works,  372,  373. 

Arcesilaus,  267. 

aperTj,  meaning  of,  84. 

Aristippus,  founder  of  the  Cyrenaic 
school,  93,  96;  and  Epicurus,  229, 
230. 

Aristophanes,  opposed  the  Sophists, 
74. 

Aristotle,  his  place  in  Greek  history, 
98-100,  103;  conceptualist,  104;  ad 
vanced  age  at  which  he  finished 
his  education,  125;  in  the  Academy 
and  Lyceum,  166-168 ;  chronological 
sketch  of  his  life,  168,  169;  his  bio 
graphy  in  detail,  169-173;  the  writ- 
ings  of,  173-176;  his  starting-point, 
176, 177;  the  fundamental  principle 
in  his  philosophy,  177-180 ;  his  logic, 
180-185;  his  metaphysics,  185-194; 
development  is  purposeful,  185- 
187;  his  two  different  conceptions 
of  purpose,  187-190;  his  conception 
of  God,  190,  191 ;  his  conception  o* 
matter,  191,  192 ;  his  conception  of 
nature,  192-194;  his  theory  of  phy 
sics,  194-196;  his  psychology,  196- 
199;  his  ethics,  199-202;  his  political 
philosophy,  202,  203;  in  the  Middle 
Ages,  332,  363,  368,369;  Arabic  ver 
sions  of  his  works,  372,  373;  works 
of,  introduced  into  Western  Eu 
rope,  375-378;  the  strength  and 
burden  of,  to  the  church,  378,  379; 
and  Thomas  Aquinas,  380,  381. 

Arnold,  Matthew,  43  n. 

Astronomy,  of  the  Pythagoreans,  40- 
52,  53;  Ptolemaic,  322-325. 


INDEX 


Ataraxia,  of  Epicurus,  231,  233 ;  of 
the  Skeptics,  266. 

Athenian  school  of  neo-Platonism, 
290,  299-301. 

Athens,  rise  of,  57,  58 ;  and  Socrates, 
91;  and  Abdera,  119;  a  centre  of 
Hellenism,  213-215. 

Atomism  of  Epicurus,  the,  238-240. 

Atomistic  school,  the,  107. 

Atomists,  the,  philosophy  of,  47,  48. 

Atoms  of  Democritus,  the,  109-114, 
116,  117. 

Augustine,  the  historical  position 
of,  306,  318,  335-338;  the  life  of, 
339,  340;  the  two  elements  in  his 
teaching,  340,  341;  the  neo-Pla- 
tonic  element :  the  inner  certain 
ties  of  consciousness,  341-345;  the 
authority  of  the  church  accord 
ing  to,  345-347. 

Aurelius,  Marcus,  243,  246. 

Bacon,  Francis,  Essay  on  Love, 
153  n. 

Bacon,  Roger,  387  n. 

Bardesanes,  Gnostic,  310. 

Basilides,  Gnostic,  310. 

Becoming,  word  how  used,  22;  in 
Heracleitus's  doctrine,  29;  accord 
ing  to  Plato,  133,  136,  129. 

Being,  word  how  used,  22;  in  Par- 
menides'  doctrine,  33-35;  Pythago 
rean  conception  of,  49-51 ;  aspects 
under  which  it  was  conceived  of, 
in  Greek  philosophy,  103,  104;  ac 
cording  to  Plato,  133,  136,  139. 

Benedictine  Age,  the,  350. 

Berengar  of  Tours,  359. 

Boethius,  300. 

Bollstaedt,  Albert,  377,  379. 

Bologna,  University  of,  377. 

Burnet,  John,  Early  Greek  Philoso 
phers  cited,  17  n. 

Bury,  J.  B.,  History  of  Greece  cited, 
12  n. ;  quoted,  16. 

Carneades,  267. 

Carpocrates,  Gnostic,  310. 

Carthage,  15,  16. 

Catechists,  the  School  of,  314-318. 

Catholic  theologians,  the  old,  312- 
314. 

Cause,  teleological,  final,  mechan 
ical,  and  efficient,  105  n.  See  Final 
cause,  Efficient  cause. 

Causes,  Aristotle's,  187. 


Change,  Heracleitus's  doctrine  of, 
28,  29;  has  no  existence  in  Par- 
menides'  philosophy,  34,  35 ;  as  con 
ceived  by  the  Pluralists,  40. 

Charlemagne,  the  revival  of,  349,  350. 

Christianity,  and  neo-Platonism, 
difference  in  their  conception  of 
inspiration,  276,  277;  rise  of,  279, 
280;  summary  of  its  history,  281; 
and  neo-Platonism,  288-290;  the 
Hellenizing  of,  302-318;  the  early 
situation  of,  302-305;  the  philoso 
phies  influencing,  305,  306 ;  early, 
the  periods  of,  306,  307;  the  Apolo 
gists,  307-309;  the  Gnostics,  310- 
312;  the  reaction  against  Gnosti 
cism  (the  old  Catholic  theolo 
gians),  312-314;  Origen  and  the 
School  of  Catechists,  314-318;  and 
Mohammedanism,  371-375. 

Chrysippus,  242,  244,  245. 

Church,  authority  of,  according  to 
Augustine,  345-347;  strength  and 
burden  of  Aristotle  to,  378, 379 ;  and 
state,  Aquinas 's  and  Dante's  views 
of,  382. 

Cicero,  on  Aristotle,  167;  his  work, 
271,  272. 

Civilizations,  Christian  and  Mo 
hammedan,  369-372 ;  the  first  con 
tact  of,  372,  373;  the  conflict  be 
tween,  374,  375. 

Classic  Scholasticism,  period  of,  333, 
368-394. 

Cleanthes,  242,  244-246. 

Clement,  314. 

Conception,  and  perception,  83  n. ; 
importance  of,  to  Socrates,  83 ;  ac 
cording  to  Plato,  134,  135;  in  Aris 
totle,  177-179. 

Conceptualism,  of  Aristotle,  104 ;  in 
the  Middle  Ages,  358,  364,  365. 

Consciousness,  formulation  of  the 
psychological  conception  of,  294; 
the  inner  certainties  of,  according 
to  Augustine,  341-345. 

Constantinople,  an  intellectual  cen 
tre,  372  n. 

Cosmas  map,  the,  335. 

Cosmological  period  of  Greek  phi 
losophy,  12,  13;  treated,  15-54. 

Cosmologists,  characteristics  of  the, 
18-20;  table  of,  20;  their  philoso 
phical  question,  20,  21 ;  where  they 
lived,  21 ;  results  of  their  philoso 
phy,  53,  54. 


INDEX 


Cosmology,  defined,  13. 

Crates  of  Thebes,  95. 

Critical  attitude  of  mind,  among 
the  Greeks,  61-64;  of  Socrates,  80. 

Crusades,  the,  374,  375. 

Cusanus,  Nicolas,  394. 

Cynic  school,  the,  93-97. 

Cynics  and  Stoics,  246,  247. 

Cyrenaic  school,  the,  93-97. 

Cyrenaics,  their  teaching,  and  Epi 
cureanism,  229,  230. 

Dante,  on  Aristotle,  167;  used  Ptole 
maic  conception  of  the  universe, 
324, 325 ;  diagram  of  his  poetic  con 
ception  of  the  universe,  376;  his 
view  of  the  state  and  the  church, 
382  n. ;  placed  the  intellectual  vir 
tues  above  the  practical,  383  n. 

Dark  Ages,  the,  347-349. 

Deduction,  182. 

Definition,  Socrates  one  of  the  first 
to  use  it  correctly,  92. 

Democritus,  his  place  in  Greek  his 
tory,  98-100,  103;  and  Plato,  their 
similarities  and  differences,  104- 
106;  life  of,  106-108;  comprehen 
siveness  of  his  aim,  108;  the  en 
riched  physics  of,  109-111 ;  the  ma 
terialistic  psychology  of ,  111-114; 
his  theory  of  knowledge,  114-116; 
the  ethical  theory  of,  116-118;  a 
wide  traveler,  123;  advanced  age 
at  which  he  finished  his  education, 
125. 

Development,  according  to  Aristo 
tle,  178,  179,  185-187. 

De  Wulf ,  History  of  Mediaeval  Phi 
losophy,  336  n.,  384. 

Dialectic,  defined,  60,  131. 

Dill,  Samuel,  Roman  Society  cited, 
274  n. 

Diogenes,  95. 

Dionysiodorus,  68. 

Dogma.     See  Reason. 

Dominican  tradition,  Thomas  Aqui 
nas  the  founder  of,  380,  381 ;  intel- 
lectualism  the  central  principle  in, 
385. 

Doxography,  6. 

Drama,  the  Greek,  60,  61. 

Dualism,  defined,  51  n.;  the  Pytha- 
gorenn,  51,  52;  of  the  Systematic 
period  of  Greek  philosophy,  102, 
103. 

Dynamic  pantheism  of  Plotinus,  293. 


Eckhart,  369,  386. 

Eclectic  Platonists,  the,  285. 

Eclecticism,  264,  265,  269-272. 

Efficient  cause,  introduction  of  con 
ception  of,  by  the  Pluralists,  41; 
defined,  105  n.;  Aristotle's  concep 
tion  of,  187. 

Elean-Eretrian  school,  the,  93. 

Eleatic  school,  and  Milesian  school, 
Xenophanes  the  connecting  link 
between,  26;  lives  of  Parmenides 
and  Zeno,  32,  35;  teaching  of, 
compared  with  that  of  the  Mile 
sians  and  Heracleitus,  22  f.;  the 
philosophy  of,  33-37 ;  and  Heraclei 
tus,  results  of  the  conflict  be 
tween,  37,  38. 

Element,  the,  as  conceived  by  the 
Pluralists,  40,  41. 

Eleusinian.   See  Mysteries. 

Emanations,  the  world  of,  according 
to  Plotinus,  294-297. 

Emerson,  R.  W.,  Essay  on  Love, 
153  n.  ;  Initial,  Daemonic,  and 
Celestial  Love,  153  n. 

Emerton,  Ephraim,  Mediaeval 
Europe,  374  n. 

Empedocles,  his  conception  of 
change,  40;  his  conception  of  the 
element,  40;  his  doctrine  of  the 
efficient  cause,  41;  his  life,  43; 
the  philosophy  of,  44, 45. 

Empiricism,  104  n. 

End,  defined,  105  n. 

Entelechy,  186. 

Epic,  Greek,  importance  of  the,  8- 
10. 

Epictetus,  243,  246. 

Epicureanism,  one  of  the  New 
Schools,  222-225;  and  Stoicism, 
summary  of  agreements  and  dif 
ferences,  225, 226;  and  the  teaching 
of  Aristippus,  229;  ideal  of,  230- 
233;  the  place  of  virtue  in,  233;  the 
"Wise  Man  of,  234-236.  See  Epicurus. 

Epicureans,  the,  228. 

Epicurus,  life  of,  227,  228 ;  and  Aris 
tippus,  229;  his  ideal,  230-233;  his 
conception  of  the  physical  world, 
238-240.  See  Epicureanism. 

Epistemology,  Democritus'  contri 
bution  to,  il4-116. 

Erigena,  John  Scotus,  349,  350;  life 
and  teaching  of,  350-352 ;  the  Greek 
principle  which  he  formulated  for 
the  Middle  Ages,  352,  353. 


400 


INDEX 


Eristic,  defined,  60. 

Ethical  period  of  the  Hellenic-Ro 
man  period,  208;  general  charac 
teristics  of, 215-218. 

Ethics,  tendency  toward,  among 
early  Greeks,  11,  12  ;  of  the  So 
phists,  71-73;  of  Democritus,  316- 
118;  Plato's  theory  of,  153-158;  of 
Aristotle,  199-202;  of  Plotinus,  297, 
298. 

Eucken,  Rudolf,  Problem  of  Human 
Life,  336  n. 

Euclid,  founder  of  the  school  at  Me- 
gara,  93. 

Eudsemonism,  87. 

Euhemerisin,  96. 

Eusebius,  on  Aristotle,  167. 

Euthydemus,  68. 

Evil,  the  problem  of,  according  to 
Stoicism,  260,  261. 

Fairbanks,  Arthur,  First  Philoso 
phers  of  Greece,  6  n. 

Falckenberg,  Richard,  History  of 
Modern  Philosophy,  3  n. 

Final  cause,  denned,  105  n. ;  accord 
ing  to  Aristotle,  187. 

Fire,  Heracleitus's  doctrine  of,  30-32. 

Form  and  Matter,  in  Aristotle,  186- 
192,  197-199;  in  Thomas  Aquinas, 
384. 

Formal  cause,  187. 

Franciscan  tradition,  the,  385-387. 

Freedom,  the  problem  of,  accord 
ing  to  Epicurus,  240;  according 
to  Stoicism,  260,  261;  according  to 
Origen,  316,317;  according  to  Au 
gustine,  345;  according  to  Duns 
Scotus,  389. 

Gerbert,  350. 

Glaber,  quoted,  354. 

Gnomic  poets,  Greek,  10-12. 

Gnosticism,  310-312;  the  reaction 
against,  312-314. 

God,  Plato's  conception  of,  141,  142; 
Aristotle's  conception  of,  190,  191 , 
His  will  and  His  intellect,  386,  388, 
389. 

Goethe,  quoted,  129,  167. 

Good,  Plato's  Idea  of  the,  140-142, 
144;  Plato's  theory  of  the,  develop 
ment  of,  153, 154;  the,  of  the  Stoics, 
250, 251. 

Gorgias,  66,  67;  the  nihilism  of,  70, 
71. 


Gospel,  the  Hellenizing  of,  302-318. 
See  Christianity. 

Greece,  after  the  Persian  Wars,  57-64. 

Greek  Enlightenment,  the,  58-64,  82. 

Greek-Jewish  philosophy  of  Philo, 
281-284 ;  and  neo-Platonism,  288. 

Greek  nation,  the  fall  of,  and  the 
persistence  of  its  civilization,  204- 
208. 

Greek  national  spirit,  waning  of,  98. 

Greek  philosophy,  three  periods  of, 
12-14 ;  summary  of,  102,  103. 

Greek  thought,  was  objective,  2, 100, 
101. 

Greeks,  early,  geographical  environ 
ment  of,  7;  political  environment 
of,  8,  9, 15, 16;  native  tendencies  of, 
9-12;  perils  to,  in  the  new  religion, 
16-18;  monistic  philosophies,  22  f. 

Grote,  George,  History  of  Greece, 
61  n. ;  Plato,  267  n. 

Happiness,  according  to  Socrates,  86; 
according  to  the  Cynics  and  the 
Cyrenaics,  94-97;  according  to 
Democritus,  117,  118;  according  to 
Aristotle,  200;  according  to  Epi 
curus,  233-238. 

Harnack,  Adolf,  Outlines  of  the  His 
tory  of  Dogma  quoted,  308, 336,  344, 
354;  cited,  315  n.,  345  n. 

Hatch,  Edwin,  Hibbert  Lectures 
quoted,  305. 

Hedonism,  and  eudaemonism,  87; 
some  types  of,  228,  229. 

Hellenic-Roman  period,  204-318 ;  its 
time  length,  204;  the  fall  of  the 
Greek  nation  and  the  persistence 
of  its  civilization,  204-208 ;  the  two 
parts  of,  208,209;  the  undercurrent 
of  skepticism  in,  209-211;  the  fun 
damental  problem  of,  211-213. 

Hellenism,  205-208;  the  centres  of, 
213-215. 

Hellenizing  of  the  Gospel,  302-318. 

Heracleitus,  life,  28;  his  teaching 
compared  with  that  of  the  Mile 
sians  and  Eleatics,  22,  23;  his  phi 
losophy,  28-31;  and  Parmenides, 
results  of  the  conflict  between,  37, 
38;  practical  philosophy  of,  31. 

Hesiod,  11. 

Hicks,  R.  D.,  Stoic  and  Epicurean» 
227  n.;  cited,  267  n. 

Hipparchia,  95. 

Hippias,  66,  68. 


INDEX 


401 


Hippodamus,  68. 

Hippolytus,  313. 

JJomoiomeriai,  46. 

Human  nature,  value  set  upon,  by 
Socrates,  81. 

Hylozoism,  denned,  19;  and  Plural 
ism,  41;  the  breaking  up  of  pre- 
Socratic,  47;  becomes  materialism 
with  Democritus,  109-111. 

Hylozoists,  the  Cosmologists  were, 
19. 

Hypatia,  298. 

Idea,  development  of  the  meaning 
of  (Democritus  and  Plato),  105. 

Ideal  of  Socrates,  the,  83-85;  what  it 
involves,  85-88. 

Idealism,  of  the  Greeks,  100;  ob 
jective,  104. 

Ideas,  of  Plato,  133,  135;  the  develop 
ment  of,  in  the  two  drafts,  136, 137; 
brief  comparison  of  the  two  drafts 
of,  137;  fuller  comparison  of  the 
two  drafts  of,  137-141 ;  in  the  doc 
trine  of  anamnesis,  147,  148. 

Immortality,  Plato's  doctrine  of, 
146-150. 

Individuality,  the  problem  of,  ac 
cording  to  Thomas  Aquinas,  383- 
385;  the  problem  of,  in  Duns  Sco- 
tus,  389,  390. 

Induction,  1)2,  183. 

Intellect  or  will,  the  question  of  the 
primacy  of,  385,  386,  388,  389. 

Ionic  School.  See  Milesian  school. 

Irenaeus,  313. 

Irish  learning,  the,  349. 

Irony,  Socratic,  90. 

Jackson,  H.,  article  "  Sophists,"  in 
Encyclopaedia  Britannica,  68  n. 

Jamblichus,  298,  299. 

Jewish  (Greek-)  philosophy  of  Philo, 
281-284;  and  neo-Platonism,  288. 

Julian,  Emperor,  298. 

Justin  Martyr,  308. 

Kingsley,  Charles,  Hypatia,  298  n. 

Knight,William  A.,  Life  and  Teach 
ing  of  Hume,  3  n. 

Knowledge,  in  Socrates'  ideal,  83-86, 
88;  according  to  the  Cynics,  95; 
Democritus'  theory  of,  114-116. 

Lanfranc,  359. 

Law,  positive  and  natural,  72. 


Learning,  the  impulse  for,  among 
the  Greeks,  58,  59;  the  Revival  of, 
375-378. 

Leucippus,  his  life,  43,  44;  his  philo 
sophy,  47,  48,  109,  110;  founder  of 
the  Atomistic  school,  107. 

Logic,  Aristotle's,  180-185. 

Love,  Platonic,  151-153. 

Love  and  Hate,  Empedocles'  doc 
trine  of,  44. 

Lucretius,  228. 

Lyceum,  the,  Aristotle  in,  166,  167, 
172,  173;  after  Aristotle,  220-222; 
eclecticism  in,  270. 

Lycophron,  68. 

Maine,  Sir  Henry,  cited,  72. 

Man,  the  philosophy  of,  13,  55-97; 
Plato's  conception  of,  144-146. 

Material  cause,  187. 

Materialism,  hylozoism  becomes, 
with  Democritus,  103,  109-111; 
Stoic,  254,  255. 

Materialistic  psychology  of  Demo 
critus,  111-114. 

Matter,  and  Form,  in  Aristotle,  186- 
192, 197-199, 384 ;  of  Plotinus,295, 296. 

Mean,  the,  Aristotle's  doctrine  of, 
201,  202. 

Mechanical  series  of  Aristotle,  194- 
196. 

Mediaeval  geography,  335. 

Mediaeval  library,  a,  326-328. 

Mediaeval  Man,  the,  320, 321 ;  how  the 
universe  appeared  to,  322-325;  at 
school,  325,  326;  summary  of  the 
political  and  educational  worlds 
of,  330-333. 

Mediaeval  philosophy,  length  of,  1 ; 
underlying  character  of,  3;  divi 
sions  of,  4 ;  treated,  319-394. 

Megarian  school,  93. 

Mendicants,  the,  368. 

Metaphysical  problem,  the,  early 
formulation  of,  22,  23. 

Metaphysics,  Plato's,  the  formation 
of,  132-136;  Plato's,  the  develop 
ment  of,  136-141;  Aristotle's,  185- 
194;  abandonment  of ,  in  Hellenic- 
Roman  period,  216;  of  Plotinus, 
294-297. 

Metrocles,  95. 

Middle  Ages,  characteristics  and 
conditions  of,  319-333;  and  the 
Hellenic-Roman  period,  compari 
son  of,  319, 320 ;  the  mediaeval  man, 


402 


INDEX 


320,  321;  how  the  universe  ap 
peared  to  the  mediaeval  man,  322- 
325 ;  the  mediaeval  man  at  school, 
325,  326;  a  mediaeval  norary,  326- 
328 ;  the  three  periods  of,  328-330 ; 
summary  of  the  political  and  edu 
cational  worlds  of  the  mediaeval 
man,  330-333;  the  early  period  of, 
330-332,  334-353;  the  transitional 
period  of ,  332,  354-367;  the  period 
of  classic  scholasticism,  333,  368- 
394. 

Milesian  school,  24;  the  members  of, 
24,  25;  the  philosophy  of,  25,  26; 
the  teaching  of,  compared  with 
that  of  Heracleitus  and  the  Eleat- 
ics,  22,  23. 

Milton,  John,  325. 

Modern  philosophy,  length  of,  1; 
underlying  character  of,  3;  divi 
sions  of,  4. 

Mohammedanism,  growth  of,  dur 
ing  the  Middle  Ages,  370-372;  first 
contact  with  Christianity,  372,  373; 
conflict  with  Christianity,  374,375. 

Monism,  defined,  10  n.;  of  the  early 
Greeks,  10 ;  displaced  by  pluralism 
in  Greekjphilosophy,  39. 

Monists,  list  of  "early  Cosmologists 
who  were,  20;  discussion  of  the, 
22-38. 

Monotheism,  defined,  10  n. ;  for  the 
first  time  conceptually  framed, 
191. 

Monte  Cassino,  founding  of  the  mo 
nastic  school  at,  348. 

Moral  postulate,  philosophy  for  the 
first  time  founded  upon,  85;  of 
Socrates,  85-88. 

Motion,  according  to  Aristotle,  195, 
196. 

Mysteries,  Orphic  and  Eleusinian,  | 
16-18,    38  ;     Orphic,    dangers    of, 
averted  by  Cosmologists,  54. 

Mysticism,  in  neo-Platonism,  287. 

Natural  Science.    See  Physics. 

Nature,  the  philosophy  of ,  15-38;  the 
word  as  used  by  the  Sophists,  72,  73 ; 
a  logical,  Socrates'  attempt  to  find, 
92;  physical,  Plato's  conception  of, 
142-144;  Aristotle's  conception  of, 
192-194;  Stoic  conception  of,  251- 
257. 

Reo-Platonism,  and  Christianity, 
difference  in  their  conception  of 


inspiration,  276,  277 ;  rise  of,  279, 
280;  summary  of  its  history,  281; 
and  Platonism,  287,  288;  and  the 
philosophies  of  Philo  and  the  neo- 
Pythagoreans,  288 ;  and  Christian 
ity,  288-290;  the  periods  of,  290; 
the  Alexandrian  school  (scientific 
theory  of  neo-Platonism,  life  and 
writings  of  Plotinus),  290-298 ;  the 
Syrian  school  (the  systematizing 
of  polytheism,  Jamblichus),  290, 
298,  299 ;  the  Athenian  school  (Pro- 
clus),  290,  299-301;  its  influence  on 
Christianity,  306. 

Neo-Pythagoreanism,  281,  285-287; 
and  neo-Platonism,  288. 

Nominalism,  103,  358,  362-365,  391, 
392. 

Norton,  Arthur  O.,  Readings  in  the 
History  of  Education,  377  n. 

NOILS,  Anaxagoras'  conception  of, 
47;  of  Plotinus,  294. 

Numbers,  Pythagorean  conception 
of,  49-51. 

Objective  character  of  Greek  philo 
sophy,  2, 100, 101. 

Objective  Idealism,  104. 

Objective  Realism,  104. 

Ockam,  William  of,  387  n.,  390;  the 
course  of  philosophy  after,  393, 
394. 

Order,  thought  of,  developed  into 
clearness  by  Cosmologists,  54. 

Origen,  280,  281,  314-318. 

Orphic.    See  Mysteries. 

Oxford,  University  of,  377. 

Palmer,  G.  H.,  on  Socrates,  79. 

Panaetius,  270,  271. 

Pantheism,  defined,  10  n. ;  dynamic, 
of  Plotinus,  293;  of  Erigena,  351- 
353  ;  of  the  realists,  363. 

Paris,  University  of,  377. 

Parker,  C.  P.,  cited,  258  n. 

Parmenides,  life,  32;  develops  the 
doctrine  of  Xenophanes,  32  f . ;  his 
philosophy,  33-35;  and  Heraclei 
tus,  results  of  the  conflict  be 
tween,  37, 38.  See  Elentic  School. 

Particulars  and  Universals,  accord 
ing  to  Thomas  Aquinas,  383-385. 

Pater,  Walter,  Marius  the  Epicu 
rean,  227  n. 

Patmore,  Coventry,  Angel  in  the 
House.  153  n. 


INDEX 


403 


Patristics,  302-318. 
Perception,  and  conception,  83  n.; 
according  to  Plato,  134 ;  in  Aristo 
tle,  177-179. 
Pericles,  58. 

Periods,  of  philosophy,  the  three 
general,  1-4;  of  Greek  philosophy, 
12-14. 

Peripatetics.    See  Lyceum. 
Persia,  15,  16. 
Persian  Wars,  their  importance,  55- 

57,  62. 

Personality,  spiritual,  increased  im 
portance  of,  in  history,  277-279. 
Pessimism,  result  of  theory  of  Cyre- 

naics,  97. 

Peter  the  Lombard,  379,  380. 
Phsedo,  founder  of  the  Elean-Ere- 

trian  school,  93. 
Philo,  Greek-Jewish  philosophy  of, 

281-284;  and  neo-Platonism,  288. 
Philoponus,  299. 

Philosophic  skepticism.  See  Skep 
ticism. 

Physical  universe,  early  Greek  ten 
dency  toward  scientific  explana 
tion  of,  10, 11. 

Physics,  Socrates'  view  of,  80;  en 
richment  of,  under  Democritus, 
109-111;  Plato's  conception  of,  142- 
144;  Aristotle's  theory  of,  194-196; 
of  Epicurus,  238-240. 
Plato,  104 ;  parts  of  works  to  be  read 
75  n. ;  his  place  in  Greek  history 
93,  98-100,  103,  104;  and  Democri 
tus,  their  similarities  and  differ 
ences,104-106 ;  the  period  of  his  life 
119,  120;  the  difficulties  in  under 
standing  the  teaching  of,  120,  121 
the  chronology  of  his  dialogues 
119,  120  ;  the  life  and  writings  of 
121,  126;  his  student  life,  121,  122 
as  traveler,  122-124;  as  teacher  ol 
the  Academy,  124-126;  concerning 
his  dialogues,  126-128  ;  the  factors 
in    the   construction  of  his  doc 
trine,  128-131;  his  inherited  ten 
dencies,  128-130;  his  philosophica 
sources,  130,  131;  the  divisions  o 
his  philosophy,  131,  132  ;  summan 
of  his  doctrine,  132 ;  the  formatioi 
of  his  metaphysics,    132-136;   the 
development  of  his  metaphysics 
^the  development  of  his  ideas  in 
the  two  drafts),  136-141 ;  his  con 
ception  of  God,  141, 142  ;  his  con- 


caption  of  physical  nature,  142- 
144  ;  his  conception  of  man,  144- 
146  ;  his  doctrine  of  immortality, 
146-150 ;  the  two  tendencies  in, 
150,  151;  Platonic  love,  151-153;  hia 
theory  of  ethics,  153-158 ;  develop 
ment  of  his  theory  of  the  Good, 
153, 154  ;  the  four  cardinal  virtues, 
154, 155 ;  his  theory  of  political  so 
ciety,  155-158;  a  selection  of  pas 
sages  from,  for  English  readers, 
158-165;  in  the  Middle  Ages,  331, 
337,  338,  360,  363. 
Platonism,  the  revival  of,  279 ;  and 

neo-Platonism,  287,  288. 
Platonists,  Eclectic,  285. 
Pleasure,  of  Epicurus,  230-233.    See 

Happiness. 

Plotinus,  280,  287,  288;  life  and  writ 
ings  of,  290,  291 ;  general  character 
of  his  teaching,  291,  292  ;  the  mys 
tic  God  of,  292,  293 ;  the  two  prob 
lems  of,  293 ;  the  metaphysical 
problem  of,  294-297;  the  ethical 
problem  of,  297,  298. 
Pluralism,  tried  to  reconcile  ex 
tremes  of  Milesian  school,  39,  40; 
and  hylozoism,  41. 

Pluralists,  list  of  later  Cosmologists 
who  were,  20;  their  new  concep 
tion  of  change,  40;  their  new  con 
ception  of  the  unchanging,  40,  41 ; 
introduction  of  conception  of  effi 
cient  cause  by,  41  ;  summary  of 
similarities  and  differences  in  the 
ories  of,  41, 42;  their  lives  span  the 
fifth  century,  42.  See  Empedo- 
cles,  etc. 

Plutarch,  neo-Platonist,  299. 
Political   philosophy   of   Aristotle, 

202,  203. 
Political  society,  Plato's  theory  of, 

155-158. 

Polytheism,  Homeric,  19. 
Polytheisms,  the  systematizing  of, 

298,  299. 

Porphyry,  291,  298,  357. 
Posidonius,  270,  271. 
Primary   and    secondary  qualities, 

116. 

Probabilism  in  Stoicism,  262. 
Proclus, 299-301. 
Prodicus,  G6,  68. 

Protagoras,  66,  67 ;  the  relativism  of, 
69,  70;  his  point  of  view  compared 
with  that  of  Socrates,  81. 


404 


INDEX 


Psychology,  materialistic,  of  Demo 
critus,  111-114;  Plato's,  144-146;   o 
Aristotle,  196-199;    the  "Stoic,"*  248- 
250. 

Ptolemy,  his  cosmography,  322-325. 

Purpose,  Aristotle's  conceptions  of 
186-190. 

Pyrrho,  266. 

Pyrrhonism,  265,  266. 

Pythagoras,  17. 

Pythagoreanism,  neo-,  281,  285-287 
and  neo-Platonism,  288. 

Pythagoreans,  the  early,  17;  the 
later,  44,  48,  49 ;  their  conception  of 
Being,  49-51 ;  their  astronomy, 
52,  53;  their  dualism,  51,  52. 

Qualitative  changes  of  phenomena, 
196-202. 

Rationalism,  defined,  104  n. ;  of  Plato 
and  Democritus,  104;  of  Abelard, 
365-367. 

Realism,  100,  104,  358,  362^365;  object 
ive,  104. 

Reason  and  dogma,  the  relation  be 
tween,  355,  356,  360-362,  365-367. 

Reconcilers.  See  Pluralists. 

Relativism,  of  Protagoras,  69,  70; 
represented  by  the  anthropolo 
gists,  103. 

Religion,  of  the  Greeks,  organiza 
tion  of,  8,  9,  10 ;  the  new,  perils  of, 
16-18;  in  Epicurus 's  system,  236, 
237 ;  and  science,  the  separation  of, 
under  Duns  Scotus,  387,  388. 

Religious  feeling,  two  causes  of  the 
rise  of,  272-274. 

Religious  period  of  the  Hellenic- 
Roman  period,  208,  209;  treated, 
273-301 ;  the  divisions  of,  280,  281. 

Religious  philosophies,  Hellenic,  rise 
of,  280,  282 ;  summary  of  history  of, 
281 ;  introductory  period  of,  *281- 
287;  development  period  of,  281, 
287,  288. 

Revival  of  Learning,  the,  375-378. 

Rhabanus  Maurus,  350. 

Rhetoric  among  the  Greeks,  60. 

Romans,  their  conquest  of  Greece, 
205-208 

Roscellinus,  life  and  teaching,  361, 
362. 

Rossetti,  Christina,  Shadow  of 
Dante  cited,  325  n. 

Kousseau  and  Epicurus,  229. 


St.  Ambrose,  306. 
Salerno,  University  of,  377. 
Scholasticism,  what  it  is,  355-359 ;  of 
Anselm,    359-361;   of  Roscellinus, 
361,  362;  of  Abelard,  363-367;   clas 
sic,  period  of,  333,  368-394. 
School,  in  early  Greek  philosophy, 

meaning  of,  19 

Schools,  the,  214,  218-226;  fusion  of 
doctrines  in,  269;  after  150  B.  c., 
notable  names  in,  271.  See  Acad 
emy,  Lyceum,  etc. 
Science,  early  tendencies  toward, 
among  the  Greeks,  10, 11;  growth 
of,  in  Hellenic-Roman  period,  216, 
217;  secular,  of  the  age  of  Augus 
tine,  339;  and  religion,  the  separa 
tion  of,  under  Duns  Scotus,  387, 
388. 

Scotus,  Duns,  gave  a  new  direction 
to  philosophy,  369;  upheld  the 
primacy  of  the  Will,  385,  386;  the 
founder  of  the  Franciscan  tradi 
tion  (life  and  philosophical  posi 
tion  of),  386,  387;  his  conception 
of  the  twofold  truth,  387;  the  in 
scrutable  will  of  God,  according 
to,  388,  389;  the  problem  of  indi 
viduality,  according  to,  389,  390; 
the  course  of  philosophy  after,  390, 
391. 
Secondary  and  primary  qualities, 

116. 

Secular  science  of  the  age  of  Au 
gustine,  339. 
Seignobos,  Charles,  History  of  Me- 

diceval  Civilization,  373  n. 
Seneca,  quoted,  234. 
Sensationalism,  defined,  104  n. 
Sensationalistic  skepticism,  268,  269. 
Sextus  Empiricus,  268. 
Sill,  The  Two  Aphrodites,  153  n. 
Simplicius,  299. 

Skepticism,  what  it  is,  69;  the  un 
dercurrent  of,  in  the  Hellenic- 
Roman  period,  209-211;  philoso 
phic,  the  appearances  of,  264,  265; 
the  three  phases  of,  265-269  ;  of  the 
Academy,  266-268 ;  sensationalis  tic, 
268,  269. 

Socrates,  and  Aristophanes,  opposed 
the  Sophists,  74 ;  works  on,  for 
reading,  75;  personality  and  life 
of,  75-80;  his  daemon,  77,83;  and 
the  Sophists,  80-82  ;  unsystematic 
character  of  his  philosophy,  82,83; 


INDEX 


405 


tbe  Ideal  of,  83-86 ;  what  his  ideal 
involves,  85-88;  the  two  steps  of 
his  method,  88-Ul ;  and  Athens,  Ul; 
the  logical  expedients  of,  9'2,  93; 
and  the  Lesser  Soeratics,  93-95. 

Socratics,  the  Lesser,  and  Socrates, 
93-95. 

Sophists,  significance  of,  64-67;  the 
prominent,  67,  68;  the  philosophy 
of,  68-71;  the-ethics  of,  71-73;  sum 
mary  of  their  work,  73;  met  in 
two  ways  by  Socrates  and  Aristo 
phanes,  74 ;  and  Socrates,  80-82. 

Soul,  Plato's  doctrine  of,  145-150;  ac 
cording  to  Aristotle,  196,  197;  of 
Plotinus,  295,  297,  298. 

Spenser,  Edmund,  Hymn  in  Honor 
of  Beauty,  153  n. 

Spiritual  authority,  the  need  of,  275- 
277;  the  turning  to  the  present 
for, 287,  288. 

Spirituality,  rise  of  the  conception 
Of,  277-279. 

State,  Plato's  doctrine  of,  155-158; 
and  church,  Aquinas's  and  Dante's 
Views  of,  382. 

Stoic  school,  the,  222-225;  inclines  to 
eclecticism,  269,  270. 

Stoicism,  and  Epicureanism,  sum 
mary  of  agreements  and  differ 
ences,  225,  226;  position  of,  in  an 
tiquity,  241,  242;  the  three  periods 
Of,  242,  243;  leaders  of,  243-246; 
writings  of,  246 ;  the  two  promi 
nent  conceptions  of,  247,  248;  the 
conception  of  personality,  248 ;  the 
psychology  of,  248-250 ;  the  highest 
good,  250,  251;  the  conception  of 
nature,  251-256 ;  conceptions  of  na 
ture  and  personality  supplement 
each  other,  256,  257;  and  society, 
257-259;  duty  and  responsibility, 
259,  260  ;  the  problem  of  evil  and 
the  problem  of  freedom,  260,  261 ; 
modifications  of,  after  the  first 
period,  261-263;  its  influence  on 
Christianity,  305. 

Stoics  and  Cynics,  246,  247. 

Storm  and  Stress,  362,  363. 

Sums,  of  Peter  the  Lombard,  379, 380. 

Syllogism,  the,  182. 

Syrian  school  of  neo-Platonism,290, 
298,  299. 

Syrianus,  299. 

Systematic  period  of  Greek  philo 
sophy,  12-14;  treated,  98-203;  the 


three  philosophers  of,  their  place 
in  Greek  history,  98-100;  the  fun 
damental  principle  of,  100-102. 

Tatian,  313. 

Teleology,  defined,  105  n. 

Terminism,  392. 

Tertullian,  313. 

Teuffel,  W.  S.,  History  of  Roman 
Literature,  227  n. 

Thales,  24,  25. 

Theological  series  of  Aristotle,  196- 
202. 

Thrasymachus,  68. 

Timon,  266. 

Transitional  period  of  Middle  Ages, 
332,  354-357. 

Turner,  William,  History  of  Philoso 
phy,  336  n. 

Twofold  reality,  world  of,  Democri- 
tus'  theory  of,  114-116. 

Ueberweg,  History  of  Philosophy, 
quoted,  6;  cited,  269  n. 

Unchanging,  the,  as  conceived  by 
the  Pluralists,  40,  41. 

Universalia  ante  rem,  104,  358,  362- 
365,  384. 

Universalia  in  re,  104,  358,  364,  365, 
384. 

Universalia  post  rem,  103, 358,  362- 
365,  384. 

Universals  and  particulars,  accord 
ing  to  Thomas  Aquinas,  383-385. 

Universe,  diagram  of  Dante's  con 
ception  of,  376. 

Universities,  the  establishment  of, 
377. 

Useful,  the,  according  to  Socrates, 
87,88. 

Valentinus,  Gnostic,  310. 

Vincent  of  Beauvais,  379. 

Virtue,  meaning  of,  84;  according  to 
Socrates,  84-88;  according  to  the 
Cynics,  95;  according  to  Aristotle, 
199-202;  place  of,  in  Epicureanism, 
233. 

Virtues,  the  four  cardinal,  in  Plato, 
154, 155. 

"Weber,  History  of  Philosophy  cited, 


Wheeler,  B.  I.,  Life  of  Alexander 
the  Great,  cited,  66  n.;  quoted, 
172. 


406 


INDEX 


Will,  freedom  of.  See  Freedom. 

Will  or  intellect,  the  question  of  the 
primacy  of,  385,  38G,  388,  389. 

William  of  Aubergne,  379. 

William  of  Champeaux,  363. 

Windelband,  History  of  Ancient 
Philosophy,  37  n.;  cited,  121  n., 
311  n. ;  quoted,  254. 

Witte,  Karl,  Essays  on  Dante,  325  n. 

Wordsworth,  William,  Dion,  123  n. ; 
Ode  on  Intimations  of  Immortal 
ity  quoted,  148. 


Xenophanes,  religious  philosopher, 

26  f . ;  philosophy  of,  27  f . 
Xenophon,  parts  of  works  to  be  read, 

75  n. ;  on  Socrates,  76,  93. 

Zeller,  Edward,  Pre-Socratic  Phi 
losophy,  3  n.,  100  n.;  quoted,  101, 
102;  Greek  Philosophy,  37  n. 

Zeno,  Eleatic,  his  life,  35  f.;  his 
philosophy,  36,  37.  See  Eleatic 
school. 

Zeno,  Stoic,  242,  244,  246. 


B 
74 

v.l 


Cushman,   Herbert  Ernest 

A  beginner' s  histor/   of 
philosophy.      Rev.    ed. 


PLEASE  DO  NOT  REMOVE 
SLIPS  FROM  THIS  POCKET 


A 


UNIVERSITY  OF  TORONTO 
LIBRARY