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THE KING CHATTING WITH ADMIRAL BEATTY
THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THE
BRITISH NAVY IN THE
WORLD-WAR
BY
JOHN LEYLAND
■%ll^v
ILLUSTRATED
NEW YORK
GEORGE H. DORAN COMPANY
^ 1 ..
CONTENTS
CHAPTER PAGE
I. Duties and Responsibilities of the
Sea Service i
II. The Centre of Sea-Power .... ii
III. Sweeping the Enemy from the Oceans 21
IV. The Grasp of the Mediterranean:
Sea- and Land-Power 29
V. Dealing with the Submarines ... 37
VI. The Navy and the Mine 46
VII. The Navy and Army Transport . . 55
VIII. The Navy that Flies 64
IX. Officers and Men of the Navy . . 71
X. What the British Navy is and What
IT Fights for 79
[V
ILLUSTRATIONS
The King Chatting with Admiral Beatty
Frontispiece
PAGE
A British Fleet Steaming in Line Ahead . . 6
Drifters Working at Sea 6
A Drifter at Sea: Looking for Submarines
AND Mines 22
A Drifter Laying Anti-Submarine Nets , . 22
Fleets in Alliance: British and Itallan
Ships in the Adriatic 38
On Board the Queen Elizabeth at Mudros . . 38
A Fleet Manoeuvring at Sea 64
The Captured German Submarine Mine-
Layer UC5 64
A British Submarine 80
Journalists on Board a Monitor .... 80
MAPS:
I.— The Centre of Sea-Power: The
North Sea
11. — ^The Grasp of the Mediterranean:
Sea- and Land-Power
At end
' of book
va
THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THE BRITISH
NAVY IN THE WORLD-WAR
CHAPTER I
Duties and RESPONSiBiLixrES of the Sea Service
Had I the fabled herb
That brought to life the dead,
Whom would I dare disturb
In his eternal bed?
Great Grenville would I wake,
And with glad tidings make
The soul of mighty Drake
Lift an exulting head.
William Watson.
WHEN King George returned from the visit
he paid to the Grand Fleet in June, 19 17,
he sent a message to Admiral Sir David
Beatty, who had succeeded Sir John Jellicoe in the
command, in which he said that "never had the
British Navy stood higher in the estimation of friend
or foe." His Majesty spoke of people who reason
and understand. But it is certainly true that the
work of the Sea Service during this unparalleled war
has never been properly appreciated by many of
those who have benefited by it most. The silent
Navy does its work unobserved. The record of its
heroism and the services it renders pass unobserved
by the multitude. Sometimes it emerges to strike a
blow, engage in a ''scrap," or, it may be, to fight
a battle, and then it retires into obscurity again. Its
achievements are forgotten. Only the bombardment
of a coast town or the torpedoing of a big ship, which
I
2 The Achievement of the British Navy
the Navy did not frustrate, is remembered. Such has
been the case in all the naval campaigns of the past.
Englishmen, who depend upon the Navy for their
security and the means of their life and livelihood,
as well as for their power of action against their
enemies, are but half conscious of what the Fleet is
doing for them. On this matter, British statesmen,
when they speak about the war, almost invariably
fail to enlighten them.
Who can wonder that people in the Allied countries
are still less able to realise that behind all the fighting
of their own armies lies the influence of sea-power,
exercised by the British Fleet and the fleets that
came one after another into co-operation with it?
Without this power of the sea there could have been
no hope of success in the war. As the King said,
the Navy defends British shores and commerce, and
secures for England and her Allies the ocean highways
of the world. The purpose of this book is to show
how these things are done.
On the first day of hostilities the British Navy
laid hold upon the road that would lead to victory.
There is no hyperbole in saying that the Grand
Fleet, in its northern anchorages, from the very
beginning, influenced the military situation through-
out the world, and made possible many of the opera-
tions of the armies, which could neither have been
successfully initiated nor continued without it. But
in the early days of August, 19 14, when, from the
war cloud which had overshadowed Europe, broke
forth the lurid horrors of the conflict, the situation
was extremely critical. What was required to be
Responsibilities of the Sea Service 3
done had to be done quickly and unhesitatingly, lest
the enemy should strike an unforeseen blow. Happily,
with faultless knowledge, the strategy of the emer-
gency was realised, and with unerring instinct and
sagacity it was applied. The foresight of great naval
administrators, and chiefly of Lord Fisher, who had
brought about the regeneration of the British Navy,
shaping it for modern conditions, was justified a
thousandfold.
Never was the need of exerting sea command more
urgent than at the outbreak of war. Everything
that Englishmen had won in all the centuries of the
storied past was involved in the quarrel. Only by
mastery of the sea could the country be made
secure. Its soil had never been trodden by an
invader since Norman William came in 1066. The
very food that was eaten and the things by which
the industries and commerce of the country existed
demanded control at sea. If the British Empire was
to be safe from aggression it must be safeguarded on ■
every sea. If England was to set armies in any
foreign field of operations, and to retain and main-
tain them there, with the gigantic supplies they
would require; if she was to render help to her
Allies in men or munitions or anything else, whether
they came from England, or the United States, or
any other country, and were landed in France,
Russia, Italy, or Greece, or in Egypt, Mesopotamia,
or East or West Africa, for the defeat of the enemy,
that must be done by virtue of power at sea. There-
fore, in this war, as John Hollond, writing his Dis-
course oj the Navy in 1638, said of the wars of his
4 The Achievement of the British Navy
time, "the naval part is the thread that runs through
the whole wooft, the burden of the song, the scope of
the text."
The moment when the First Fleet, as it was then
called, slipped away from its anchorage at Portland
on the morning of Wednesday, July 29th, 19 14, will
yet be regarded as one of the decisive moments of
history. The initiative had been seized, and all real
initiative was thenceforward denied to the enemy.
The gauge of victory had been won. "Time is every-
thing; five minutes makes the difference between a
victory and a defeat," said Nelson. "The advantage
and gain of time and place will be the only and
chief means for our good," Drake had said before
him. By a fortunate circumstance, which should
have arrested the imagination as with a presage of
victory — a circumstance arranged five months before,
as the result of a series of most intricate prepara-
tions — time and place were both on the British side.
The First, Second, and Third Fleets, and the
flotillas attached to them, had been mobilised as a
test operation, and inspected at Spithead by King
George, on July 20th. The First Fleet had returned
to Portland and the other fleets to their home ports,
where the surplus or "balance" crews of the Naval
Reserves were to be sent on shore. Then had come
the now famous order to "stand fast," issued on
the night of Sunday, July 26th, which had stopped
the process of demobilisation. Dark clouds had
shadowed the international horizon. Austria-Hungary
had presented her ultimatum to Serbia. She declared
war on the 28th. The Second Fleet remciined,
Responsibilities of the Sea Service 5
therefore, in proximity to its reserves of men, and the
men were ready to be re-embarked in the Third Fleet.
Few people realised at the time the immense sig-
nificance of the memorable eastward movement of the
squadrons from Portland Roads, or of the assembly
of those powerful forces at their northern strategic
anchorages. Those forces became the Grand Fleet,
that unexampled organisation of fighting force, under
command of that fine sea officer, Admiral Sir John
Jellicoe. War was declared by Great Britain on
August 4th. Successive steps of supreme importance
were taken, which, in very truth, saved the cause of
the Allies. Disaster and surprise attack were fore-
stalled. The Fleet, fully mobilised, and growing daily
in strength, was already exerting command of the
sea, and the safe transport of the Expeditionary Force
to France was assured. Co-operation with the
French Fleet was immediately established — its cruiser
squadron in the Channel and its battle squadrons in
the Mediterranean.
Fighting episodes were not delayed, but for many
months the operations of the Grand Fleet remained
shrouded as by a veil, lifted only on rare occasions.
Few people knew the tremendous anxieties and
responsibilities of the British Commander-in-Chief.
His vast command of vessels of all classes and uses
had to be organised into a mighty fleet, complete in
every element — battle squadrons, battle-cruiser squad-
rons, light-cruiser squadrons, flotillas and auxiliaries,
transports, hospital ships, and every ship and thing
that a fleet can require. A whole series of intricate
dispositions had to be made. Officers were to be
6 The Achievement of the British Navy
inspired with the ideas of the Commander-in-Chief and
the whole Fleet was to be so trained, under squadron
and flotilla commanders, that each would know on the
instant how he should act.
If Nelson, in 1789, spent many hours in explaining
to his "band of brothers" his plans for his attack at
the Nile, with fourteen sail-of-the-line, what must it
have been for Sir John Jellicoe to communicate to his
officers, and' discuss with them, all his plans for every
emergency or call for the service of every squadron
and ship in his vast command? All this must be
realised now. And during the anxious early months
of the war, as the winter was drawing near, the great
anchorages were as yet unprotected, and safety from
hostile submarines could often only be found in rapid
steaming at sea. The mining campaign of the enemy
had also to be overcome. The anxieties were
enormous, and it was only the power of command, the
sea instinct, the deep understanding, the readiness to
act in moments of extraordinary responsibility, and
the resource and professional skill of the Commander-
in-Chief and his staff and officers in command, that
enabled the tremendous work to be accomplished.
WTiile this was in progress other work of immense
significance had been going on. The Admiralty had
undertaken a gigantic task of supreme importance
with complete success. Great defensive preparations
were made in British waters, where all traffic was
regulated and controlled. The vast maritime re-
sources of the country were added to the naval
service. Two battleships building for Turkey, another
for Chile, and certain flotilla leaders and other craft
i -f' -■ 'j i .'.Bll)
■; ■ I
i X
A
i;
L
Responsibilities of the Sea Service 7
building in the country, were taken over. Officers
and rrien in abundance were ready. The magnificent
seafaring populations of the merchant marine and
the fisheries were drawn into the naval service, and
subsequently the whole mercantile marine was
brought under naval control, and for practical
purposes was embodied with the Navy. Officers and
men of these services showed splendid heroism in situ-
ations of terror and responsibility never anticipated.
A wide network of patrols was brought into being;
the blockade was organised and strengthened; the
examination services were set on foot and perfected;
and the coast sectors of defence, with their flotillas,
were raised to a standard of high efficiency. Mine-
sweepers and net-drifters were at work. Every ship-
yard in the country and a multitude of engineering
and ammunition works began to buzz with work for
the Navy and the mercantile marine. Provision was
made for dealing with the raiding cruisers and armed
merchantmen of the enemy.
At the time, the public knew little or nothing of
what was in progress. Imagination fails even now
to grasp the magnitude of what was achieved. The
naval share in the campaign was of baflBling obscurity,
while the stage of the war on land became crowded
with fighting men, locked in a terrible conflict, which
at that time seemed to bode no good to the Allies.
After the brush in the Heligoland Bight on August
28th, 19 14, the Fleet was lost to view. Not
at first, but slowly, did it become realised that
the prognostications of peace-time alarmists had
proved baseless. There had been no "bolt from
8 The Achievement of the British Navy
the blue," as had been foretold; neither invasion,
nor raid, nor foray was attempted upon British shores,
and there was no anxiety about food. There was
always, with economy, enough to eat.
But popular confidence seemed for a time to be
unreasonably disturbed by a record of successive
alarming and generally unexplained incidents — the
escape of the Goeben and Breslau in the Mediter-
ranean, the sinking of the Aboukir, Cressy, Hague,
Formidable, and other vessels, the depredations of
German raiding cruisers on the distant lines of our
trade, the bombardment of Hartlepool, Whitby, and
Scarborough, and other disquieting episodes. Strange
as it may seem, there were people who went about
asking, "What is the Fleet doing?" Was it not the
ancient inspiration of the Navy to seek out the
enemy and to capture or sink or burn his ships
wherever they were to be found? Yet there was no
battle. The German coast was not attacked. Allied
shipping to the value of millions of pounds
was being sunk. Why, then, was the Navy inactive?
When, later on, the submarine menace assumed
formidable proportions, alarm began again to seize
upon the newspapers, when there was justification
only for precaution.
The hidden truth was not comprehended. Vic-
tories were expected when, owing to the coyness of
the enemy's strategy, none were possible. The Seven
Years' War — the most successful in British annals,
the turning-point in British history, the war in
which Horace Walpole asked each morning what
victory there was to record — began with the
Responsibilities of the Sea Service 9
disaster of Minorca, followed by the tragedy of
Byng. The central facts of naval history were
but little known. Yet the Navy was, and is, in
truth, all in all to the country, the Empire, and
the Allies.
Before we enter into the main purpose of this book,
in which we shall discover in several theatres of war
the real nature of sea-power, as well as the character
and momentous consequences of the antagonism which
grew up between England and Germany, we may
inquire what services could in reason have been
expected from the Navy in the great cataclysm which
was about to sweep with destruction over the nations.
It would not have been expected to fight a battle
every month or even every year, for battles are rare
events in naval history. It would not have been
expected to attack fortified coasts, though it might do
so on occasions, because ships are designed and built
to fight at sea. The Navy would not have been
expected to forestall every untoward incident. Fish
often slip through the net, as raiders have slipped
through our guard in this and other wars. Nor, in
these days of the stealthy submarine and the blind
death-dealing mine, could the Fleet have been
expected to remain immune from every misfortune.
No one could have expected the Navy to devise a
single conclusive defence against the attack of the
submarine, any more than it was asked to find an
infallible remedy for the effects of gunfire.
What we should have expected was that it would
make the sea again the protecting wall, as Shake-
speare says, of the British Isles,
10 The Achievement of the British Navy
Or as a moat defensive to a house
Against the envy of less happier lands.
We should have expected it to safeguard the incoming
of the supplies without which neither the people nor
their industries could exist — to be the panoply of all
trade and interests afloat, whether in the nature of
imports or exports. We should have expected it to
deny all external activity to the enemy at sea — we
might not have anticipated the advent of the sub-
marine as a pirate commerce-destroyer — to shut off
his sea-borne supplies, and to exert that noiseless
pressure on the vitals of the adversary of which
Admiral Mahan speaks — ^"that compulsion, whose
silence, when once noted, becomes to the observer
the most striking and awful mark of the working of
sea-power." We should have expected the Navy to
become the support, in thrust and holding, of the
armies in the field — the shaft to their spearhead;
their flank and rearguard also. Inasmuch as the
war is world-wide, and we have powerful Allies, we
should have expected naval influence and pressure to
be manifested in the oceans, in the Mediterranean,
and, indeed, wherever the enemy is and the seas are.
Finally, we should have expected the Navy to be to
the British Empire what it has always been to the
Empire's heart — its safeguard from injury and dis-
ruption, and the bond that holds it together.
Each one of these functions has been executed by
in Navy with triumphant success in the war, and
history would show that it is executing them now as
the Sea Service has accomplished them in all the wars
of the past.
CHAPTER II
The Centre of Sea-Power
Of speedy victory let no man doubt,
Our worst work's past, now we have found them out.
Behold, their navy does at anchor lie,
And they are ours, for now they cannot fly.
Andrew Marvell, 1653.
OF all the theatres of the war, on sea or land,
the North Sea is the most important. It is
vital to all the operations of the Allies.
Command of its waters and its outlets is the thing
that matters most. In that sea is the centre of
naval influence. It is the key of all the hostilities.
From either side of it the great protagonists in the
struggle look at one another. There the great
constriction of the blockade is exerted upon
Germany. It is the mare clausum against which she
protests. Geography is there in the scales against
her. She rebels against British sea supremacy.
The "freedom of the seas" is, therefore, her claim —
though she is endeavouring to qualify to be the tyrant
of them. Her only outlook towards the outer seas is
from the Bight of Heligoland and the fringe of coast
behind the East Frisian Islands, or from the Baltic,
if her ships pass the Sound or the Belt, issuing into
See Map L, at end of book.
11
12 The Achievement of the British Navy
the North Sea through the Skager-Rak. But they
cannot reach the ocean, except through the North
Passage, where the Grand Fleet holds the guard.
Only isolated raiders, bent upon predatory enterprise,
have stealthily gone that way after nightfall. At the
southern gate of the North Sea, through the Straits
of Dover and in the Channel, the way is barred.
The guns of Dover, the Dover Patrol, and certain
other deterrents forbid the enemy to adventure in
that direction.
The new engines of naval warfare — the mine,
submarine, airship, and aeroplane — found their first
and greatest use in the North Sea; and only by
employing craft which hide beneath the water, a^d,
on rare occasions, by destroyers which seek the cover
of darkness for local forays, have the Germans been
able to exert their efforts in any waters outside the
North Sea. At the beginning of the war they had
raiding cruisers in the Pacific and Atlantic, and a
detached squadron in the Far East; but the British
Fleet reached out to those regions, and, aided by the
warships of Japan and France, it drove every vestige
of German naval power from the oceans.
In the North Sea, therefore, sea-power has exerted
its greatest, most vital, and most far-reaching effect.
There the Germans, if they had possessed the power,
could have struck a blow which, if successful for
them, would have proved a mortal stroke at the
British Empire and would have rendered useless all
the efforts of the Allies. Millions of men, incalculable
volumes of guns, munitions, and stores of every imag-
inable kind for the use of the greatest armies ever
The Centre of Sea-Power 13
set in the field, have entered the French ports solely
because the Grand Fleet holds the guard in the
North Sea. The whole face of the world would have
been changed by German naval victory. England
would have been subjected by invasion and famine.
If the heart of the Empire had been struck, what
would have been the future of its members? If sea
communication with the Allies had been cut, what
would have been their fate at the hands of the victors?
The attacks of sallying cruisers and destroyers upon
the coast towns of England, the "tip and run" raids,
as they have been called, and the visits of bomb-
dropping airships and aeroplanes are the signs of the
naval impotence of Germany,
The situation in the North Sea is, therefore, of
absorbing interest. It may be studied chiefly from
the two points of view of the strategy of the opposing
fleets and the exercise of the blockade. There is a
peculiarity in naval warfare, which is not found in
warfare upon land, that a belligerent can withdraw
his naval forces entirely from the theatre of war by
retaining them, as with a threat, or in a position of
weakness, behind the guns of his shore defences.
Nothing of the kind is possible with land armies. A
general can always find his enemy, and attack or
invest him, and, if successful, drive him back, or
cause him to surrender, and occupy the territory he
has held. The Germans have chosen the reticent
strategy of the sea. They have never come out to
make a fight to a finish, to put the matter to the
touch, "to gain or lose it all." The animus pugnandi
is wanting to their fleet. It was necessary that they
14 The Achievement of the British Navy
should do something. They could not lie for ever
stagnant at Kiel and Wilhelmshaven. They could
keep their officers and men in training by making
brief cruises in and outside the Bight of Heligoland.
They might, with luck, meet some portion of the
Grand Fleet detached and at a disadvantage.
In any case, they were bold enough to take their
chance on occasions, always with their fortified ports
and mined waters and their submarines under their
lee. They might succeed in reducing British supe-
riority by the "attrition" of some encounters. Such
was the genesis of the Dogger Bank battle of
January 24th, 191 5, when that gallant officer Sir
David Beatty inflicted a severe defeat upon Admiral
Hipper, and drove him back in flight, with the loss
of the Blucher and much other injury. The same
causes brought the German High Sea Fleet, under
Admiral Scheer, into the great conflict, first with Sir
David Beatty, and then with the main force of the
Grand Fleet, under command of Sir John Jellicoe,
on May 31st, 19 16. The events of the great engage-
ment of the Jutland Bank will not be related here.
All that it is necessary to note is that the Germans
had so chosen their time that they were able to
avoid decisive battle with Sir John Jellicoe's fleet by
retreating in the failing light of the day, and that
their adventure availed them nothing to break the
blockade or otherwise to modify the impotent position
in which they are placed at sea. That action operated
to the disadvantage of England and her Allies in no
degree whatever. The superiority of the British Fleet
as a fighting engine had been placed beyond dispute.
The Centre of Sea-Power 15
The mine and the submarine have put an end to
the system of naval blockade as practised by St.
Vincent and Cornwallis. No fleet can now lie off,
or within striking range of, an enemy's port. Battle-
ships cannot be risked against submarines, acting
either as torpedo craft or mine-layers, nor against
swift destroyers at night. That is the explanation
of the situation which has arisen in the North Sea.
The blockade is necessarily of a distant kind. There
are no places on the British coasts where the Grand
Fleet could be located, except those in which it lies
and from which it issues to sweep the North Sea
periodically. The first essential is to control the
enemy's communications, which is done effectively at
the North Passage — between the Orkneys and
Shetlands, and the Norwegian coast — and at the
Straits of Dover. If the enemy desired a final
struggle for supremacy at sea, with all its tremendous
consequences, he could have it. But he can be
attacked only when he is accessible. "There shall
be neither sickness nor death which shall make us
yield until this service be ended," wrote Howard in
1588. That is the spirit of the British Navy to-day.
But, then, the Spanish Armada was at sea. It was
not hiding behind its shore defences. Be it noted
that the Germans, thus hiding themselves, enjoy a
certain opportunity of undertaking raiding operations
in the North Sea. It is not a difficult thing to rush a
force of destroyers on a dark night against some point
in an extended line of patrols and effect a little damage
somewhere. What advantage the Germans hope to
gain by such proceedings is difficult to discover.
16 The Achievement of the British Navy
The magnificence of the work of the British patrol
flotillas and the auxiliary patrols must be recognised.
In the North Sea these are subsidiary services of the
Grand Fleet. Day and night, in every weather —
in summer heats and winter blasts and blizzards,
when icy seas wash the boats from stem to stern and
the cold penetrates to the bone — these patrols are
at work. The records of heroism at sea in these
services have never been surpassed, and England owes
a very great deal to the men who came to her service.
The mercantile marine has given its vessels to the
State, from the luxurious liner to the fishing trawler,
and officers and men have come in who have rendered
priceless services. The trawlers have carried on their
perilous work of bringing up the strange harvest of
horned mines by the score. The patrol boats have
examined suspicious vessels, controlled sea traffic, and
watched the sea passages. The destroyer flotillas
have been constantly at work and ready at any time
to bring raiding enemy forces to action. The Royal
Naval Air Service has never relaxed its activity and
has engaged in countless combats.
It has sometimes been wondered why the Grand
Fleet did not take some aggressive action: Why did
it not attack the North German sea coast, or rout out
the pestilent hornets' nest of Zeebrugge, which the
enemy, by internal communications impregnable to
sea-power, had provided with the most powerful guns,
besides defending it by great mine-fields? This mat-
ter requires to be examined. Naval history abounds
with evidence that to attack coast defences is not the
proper or even the permissible work of warships. It
The Centre of Sea-Power 17
is the business of military forces, though naval forces
may often assist, and even give the means of victory.
Moreover, what was once possible is not possible now.
Would Nelson have attacked the French Fleet at the
Nile if it had lain under the powerful guns of these
days, and behind mine-fields, through the secret pas-
sages of which submarines could have issued to
destroy him? It would be absurd to compare Nelson's
attack upon a line of block-ships and rafts at Copen-
hagen, covered by a few forts armed with old smooth-
bores, to an attack upon coast positions defended by
modern guns.
When old Sir Charles Napier was in the Baltic in
1854 he was denounced at home because he did not
destroy Kronstadt or Helsingfors. He rightly refused
to play his enemy's game by endangering his ships.
Captain (afterwards Admiral Sir) B. J. Sulivan, who
was with the fleet, put the situation quite clearly in a
letter written at the time. A military operation
was really required then, as it would be now, to
accomplish such a task.
We know that two guns have beaten off two large
ships with great loss. Had Nelson been here with
thirty English ships he would have blockaded the
gulf for years, without thinking of attacking such
fortresses to get at ships inside. Brest, Toulon, and
Cadiz were probably much weaker than these
places. ... I suppose there will be an outcry at
home about doing nothing here, but we might as
well try to reach the moon.
But the Navy has never left the Belgian coast
secure from attack. It has never lost its aggressive
18 The Achievement of the British Navy
spirit. It has attacked from the ship and the air.
The seaplanes of the Royal Naval Air Service
spotted for the guns when the monitors were bom-
barding. Bombs have repeatedly been dropped on
Ostend, Zeebrugge, and the places in the rear.
When the guns were silent there were reasons for it.
A conjoint naval and military expedition was required.
The enemy began to feel his hold on the coast pre-
carious. Continued operations by sea and land might
compel him to relax his grasp. Ships may not attack
places defended by big guns, mine-fields, and subma-
rines and destroyers issuing from secret passages
through them, but it is certain the British naval
offensive will never be paralysed.
Such is the magnificent work of the British Navy
in blockading the German Fleet, molesting the
enemy's coast positions, and controlling his com-
munications with the oceans.
The commercial blockade, by which the enemy's
supplies and commodities are cut off and his exports
paralysed, is too large a subject to be dealt with here.
The object is to bring the full measure of sea-power
to bear in crushing the national life of the enemy. It
is vital but ''silent" work of the Navy, and does not
lend itself to discussion or description. Questions of
contraband and the right and method of search, which
arise from the blockade, caused discussions with the
United States before the States came into the war.
The only object of the British Navy and the Foreign
Office was to put an end to the transit of the enemy's
commodities, and to do so with the utmost considera-
tion for the interests of neutrals, and complete pro-
The Centre of Sea-Power 19
tection for the lives of the officers and crews in their
ships and in the examining ships. For these reasons
neutral vessels were taken into port for examination,
safe from the attentions of the enemy's submarines.
One great hope of the Germans was that the neutrals
would become more and more exasperated with
England. They remembered that the war of 1812
arose from this very cause. But they were com-
pletely disappointed in all such hopes, and they
themselves, by interfering with the free navigation
of other countries, brought the United States into the
war against them.
The blockade work of the examination service and
of the armed boarding steamers has been extremely
hazardous. It has called for the greatest qualities
of seamanship, because conducted in every condition
of weather and when storm and fog have made it
extremely perilous to approach the neutral vessels
— which, moreover, have sometimes proved to be
armed enemies in disguise. Hundreds of vessels have
been brought into port by the Navy in those northern
waters. Sleepless vigilance has been required and the
highest skill of the sea in every possible condition of
the service, while the seaman has become a statesman
in his dealings with the neutral shipmaster. It has
been for the Navy to bring the ships into port, and for
other authorities to inquire into their status and to
take them before the Prize Court if required.
The German High Sea Fleet having failed, the
submarine campaign was instituted, and began
chiefly in the North Sea. It has never answered the
expectations of its authors. It has not changed the
20 The Achievement of the British Navy-
strategic situation in any degree whatever. Great
damage has been inflicted upon British interests,
and valuable ships and cargoes have been sunk, and
officers and men cast adrift in situations of ruthless
hardship. The tale of the sea has never had a more
terrible record, nor one lighted by so much noble
self-sacrifice and unfailing courage.
CHAPTER III
Sweeping the Enemy from the Oceans
Far flung the Fleet then,
Freeing the seas,
Clearing the way for men,
Merchantmen these.
Sinking or flying,
Broken their power,
The enemy dying
Left England her dower.
/. L.
IN the foregoing chapter some reference was made
to the campaign of the German raiding cruisers
and armed hners against British and AlUed
commerce in the distant waters of the Atlantic and
Pacific during the early months of hostilities, and
before we go any further this aspect of the war must
be discussed. One object of the enemy was to lead
to a scattering of British naval strength, but in this
he was wholly disappointed. The distribution of the
British Fleet remained unchanged, and the great
numbers of swift cruisers and armed Hners, which
had been apprehended as presenting a formidable
menace to commerce, made but a feeble appearance.
The commerce-raiding campaign gave rise, however,
to a good deal of alarm at the time, though it sur-
prised no one who understood the means made avail-
able by the scientific and mechanical developments
21
22 The Achievement of the British Navy
of modern naval warfare, and who had studied them
in the light of history.
The interruption or destruction of the enemy's
commerce has always been one of the objects in
naval warfare. British floating commerce offered a
very large target, and the swift German cruisers,
directed by wireless telegraphy and supplied by
friendly neutrals, were at work on the lines followed
by shipping, making it inevitable that there should
at first be considerable losses to the Allies. Admiral
Mahan thought that the British total losses in the
long wars of the French Revolution and Empire
did not exceed 2^2 per cent, of the commerce of the
Empire. The Royal Commission on the Supply of
Food in Time of War expressed the opinion that
4 per cent, would have been a more accurate estimate.
German cruisers, destructive as a few of them were,
did not inflict losses amounting to anything like the
figures of the old wars. In those contests of power,
notwithstanding the depredations of commerce-
destroying frigates, British oversea trade grew,
while that of the enemy withered away. If the
enemy captured ten British ships out of a thousand
the loss might be considered serious, but if the
British frigates captured ten out of the enemy's
hundred the injury inflicted was ten times more
effective. Towards the end of the long war with
France very few French traders were captured
because scarcely any ventured to sea, while the
French continued to capture English ships up to
the very end of the war, ten years after their fleet had
been destroyed at Trafalgar. The loss by capture
Sweeping the Oceans 23
and sinking was at the rate of 500 ships a year, and
even in 1810, 619 English ships were lost.
In the present war the German commerce-
destroying campaign, by means of cruisers and
armed liners, though very effective at the beginning,
collapsed with great rapidity. Hostile action against
trade has never before been so rapidly brought
under control. Steam, the telegraph, and wireless
have enormously increased, as compared with the
sailing days, the thoroughness and efficiency of
superior sea-power. Difficulty of providing for coal
and oil supply, the want of naval repairing and
docking bases, and, above all, the immense superiority
brought quickly to bear by the combined naval
forces of England, France, and Japan, aided by the
Australian Navy (auxiliary to the British, to which
it belonged), within a comparatively short time
caused the whole of German commerce to disappear
from the oceans. Soon not a single ship remained —
trader, cruiser, or armed liner — as a target, except that
such isolated raiders as the Mowe might offer rare
opportunities of attack. This failure of the Germans
seemed the more remarkable because they had long
recognised the floating commerce of England to be
her Achilles' heel. Prince Billow described it as such.
They had expressly reserved, at The Hague Confer-
ence, the right to convert merchantmen into cruisers
on the high seas to serve as commerce-destroyers.
They used this right in some instances, as in that of
the Cap Trafalgar, which was sunk in single-ship
action by the British converted liner Carmania. Yet
this procedure proved of no effect in the war.
24 The Achievement of the British Navy-
It would be a great mistake to regard the German
cruiser campaign against commerce apart from the
general distribution of German warships and the
means taken to supply them with their requirements.
The writer is inclined to the belief that the impotence
of the Germans in distant waters shows that their
Navy was not ready nor effectively prepared for the
war. The great expenditure on the High Sea Fleet
proved unavailing. The submarine boats did not exist
in any considerable number. Only about twenty-seven
or twenty-eight of them were completed in August,
19 14, of which about a dozen were of early experi-
mental type, fit only for local use, and the programme
provided only for the building of half a dozen in each
year. The German Navy possessed not more than a
couple of big airships, and a few effective aeroplanes.
The cruisers on foreign service were scattered about
the world without plan. The battle-cruiser Goeben
and the light cruiser Breslau had been detached in
the Mediterranean during the Balkan War, and,
according to the Greek White Book, Turkey having
entered into alliance with Germany on August 4th,
the two cruisers fled to the Dardanelles in conformity
with orders received from Berlin. The Germans were
apprehensive as to their safety, and their naval
authorities never intended to leave them in their
dangerous situation of isolation in an Italian port.
The business of controlling and directing the opera-
tions of the commerce-destroying cruisers and armed
liners, and providing their supplies, was admittedly
dexterously arranged by the agency of wireless,
mainly through the means placed at disposal by
Sweeping the Oceans 25
German sympathisers in the United States, the States
of Southern America, and other neutral coimtries,
though nothing they did could withstand the steady
pressure of sea-power.
The most considerable German force in distant
waters was the East Asian Squadron, under command
of Admiral Count von Spee. It was located
at Kiao-Chau, and its principal elements were the
armoured cruisers Scharnhorst and Gneisenau. Sooner
or later this squadron was bound to be defeated, as
its commanding officer fully realised. The Japanese
declared war on August 23rd, and the fleets of
Admiral Baron Dewa and Admiral Kato were
stretched out to blockade and intercept him; but he
extricated himself very dexterously, crossed the
Pacific, defeated Admiral Sir Christopher Craddock
off Coronel on November ist, rounded Cape Horn,
and was himself defeated with the loss of his whole
squadron in the battle of the Falkland Isles on
December 8th. One of his cruisers, the Emden,
which had escaped the Japanese, made a great noise
in the world. Her captain was a very capable and
also a very gallant officer, who bombarded oil tanks
at Madras, sank the Russian cruiser Jemtchug and
the French destroyer Mousquet at Penang, and sent
to the bottom seventeen British vessels, representing
a value of £2,211,000, besides three sent into port.
The Emden was destroyed by H.M. Australian
cruiser Sydney at the Cocos-Keeling Islands on
November 8th. The Karlsruhe sank vessels repre-
senting a value of £1,662,000.
It is not the purpose here to describe the depreda-
26 The Achievement of the British Navy
tions and ocean wanderings of the other German
cruisers or auxiliary cruisers. The object is to show
how, by the all-compassing pressure of naval power,
they were successively destroyed. It would be folly
to deny that there was something defective in
the disposition of the British naval forces at the
beginning. Admiral von Spee was at large, with two
powerful armoured cruisers, but Sir Christopher
Craddock was left in inferior force off the coast of
Chile. The obsolescent battleship Canopus, which
had inferior speed, was to join him, but did not
reach him in time. The Australian battle-cruiser
Australia, which would have been an extremely valu-
able aid to Craddock's squadron, did not pursue the
German squadron across the Pacific.
Admiral of the Fleet Lord Fisher returned to the
Admiralty as First Sea Lord on October 29th, 19 14,
and at once set about to use the naval instrument he
had been so largely instrumental in creating. In
dead secrecy and with incredible speed a force was
prepared and dispatched. Admiral Sturdee had with
him the magnificent battle-cruisers Invincible and
Inflexible, the armoured cruisers Kent, Cornwall, and
Carnarvon, the light cruisers Bristol and Glasgow, and
the armed liner Macedonia. The battleship Canoptis
was already at Port Stanley. Before anyone knew
he had left England, he arrived at the Falkland
Islands on December 7th, after having steamed a
distance of 7,000 miles. The German Admiral was
known to be approaching with the object of utilising
the islands as a base. He arrived on the next day,
but was taken by complete surprise, though he was
Sweeping the Oceans 27
conscious of impending fate, and his squadron ceased
to exist.
This was one of the master-strokes of the war,
made with lightning rapidity. Strategy was seen in
action, and thenceforward the control of the ocean
was secured. There remained the business of round-
ing up the enemy cruisers which were still preying
upon shipping on the routes of commerce. Cruisers
of sufficient force were dispatched, with instructions
to remain at certain rendezvous, each forming a base
upon which lighter cruisers could fall back, or to
the support of which they could proceed. The lighter
vessels cruised on specified curves or lines of search,
and in this way a network was spread over the oceans
comparable to a spider's web. Thus in due course
every enemy cruiser and auxiliary was intercepted, or,
conscious of the toils which were spread for her,
abandoned her task and sought safety in the intern-
ment of a neutral port. The Grand Fleet in the
North Sea was the master of the situation, and made
possible the decisive blow which was struck at enemy
power in the oceans.
Thenceforward the enemy was impotent in every
sea. Not a man could he send afloat to bring aid to
his colonies and protectorates. His distant posses-
sions collapsed like a house built of cards. No means
had he to interrupt the transport of troops which have
brought about the darkening of every German
"place in the sun." "Deutschland ist Weltreich
geworden," it was said. But distant possessions are
the ripe fruit which falls into the lap of the ultimate
sea-power, and the Weltreich exists no more. By
28 The Achievement of the British Navy
means of sea-power it has been destroyed. The sub-
marine is an effective weapon within its sphere, but
no victory has ever been won by evasion, and no sea-
power can be exercised by stealthy craft which hide
beneath the surface of the sea.
CHAPTER IV
The Grasp of the Mediterranean
sea- and land-power
Others may use the ocean as their road,
Only the EngHsh make it their abode;
Our oaks secure, as if they there took root,
We tread on billows with a steady foot.
Edmund Waller, 1656.
IT is important next to consider the situation in
the Mediterranean, where sea-power is of mo-
mentous importance to the Allies. In those
historic waters the fate of many nations has been
decided. They are a vital link and the highway of the
British Empire. Between Gibraltar and Port Said
two thousand miles of British welfare lie outrolled.
To France, with her great possessions in Algeria,
Morocco, and Tunis, the importance of this sea
highway is supreme. She must, in this war
and at all times, traverse its waters or she will be
undone. Italy has won a great position in the
Adriatic and the Mediterranean, and she would
wither away and perish if either fell under enemy
control. Trieste is her object, and she has pro-
claimed a protectorate over Albania the better to
establish her power in the Adriatic, and she has her
See Map II., at end of book.
29
30 The Achievement of the British Navy
new possessions in the Libia Italiana of Northern
Africa. From the operations in the Mediterranean
we shall learn something more of the relation of sea-
power to land operations, and of the limitations of
that power, and we shall see the allied navies of
England, France, Russia, Italy, and Japan in co-oper-
ation. We shall know why the enemy made a great
submarine stroke in the Mediterranean when every-
thing else at sea had failed.
The French battleship squadrons were concen-
trated in the Mediterranean before the war. The
cruiser squadron in the Channel, like David against
Goliath, was willing to encounter even the whole
German High Sea Fleet; but the French had been
assured of British co-operation, and all danger was
forestalled. In the Mediterranean the Goeben and
Breslau had come west, and had bombarded Bona
and Philippeville; but the French Admiral, going
south from Toulon, was on their heels, and they
fled to the east again, running the gauntlet of the
British squadron on their way to join the Turks.
They had intended to raid the French transports
at sea. At this time the French were bringing their
troops from Algeria and Tunis, amounting in all to
nearly 100,000 men, with guns, horses, mules, stores,
ammunition, hospitals, tent equipment, and all the
requirements for field service, to join the main army
in France. It was a great responsibility for the
French Navy, increased many-fold when troops began
to come from their eastern possessions through the
Suez Canal.
Failure would have meant disaster. But the
The Grasp of the Mediterranean 31
whole of the transport work was managed without
the loss of a man or a horse, and was a wonderful
success. It could hardly have taken place with so
much security if the British squadron had not been
in the Mediterranean, and not at all if the Grand
Fleet had not held the German High Sea Fleet fast
in its ports by the blockade in the North Sea. From
that time forward for many months, until the
ItaUans came into the war, on May 23rd, 191 5, the
French squadron was employed in neutralising the
Austro-Hungarian Fleet in the Adriatic, which did not
dare to move. The blockading squadron was
extended across the Strait of Otranto, with occasional
sweeps to the northward, to control hostile operations,
if possible, at Cattaro and along the Dalmatian coast
up to the approaches to Pola, where the submarine
Citrie was entangled, and lost to the Austrians. The
French base for these operations was at Malta, but
an advanced base was established in the island of
Lissa. The blockade was completely successful in
checking every effort of the Austrians to strike at the
stream of transport in the Mediterranean, though it
could not avail to save Montenegro or hold back the
Austrians in their advance into Albania. No fleet
can operate beyond the range of its guns, unless its
flying officers carry their bombs into inland countries.
The blockade maintained through the winter at the
Strait of Otranto was exceedingly arduous and filled
with peril. Enemy destroyers and submarines were
at work, issuing from the wonderful island fringe of
the Dalmatian coast, and the French knew their
peril. The armoured cruiser Leon Gambetta was
32 The Achievement of the British Navy-
sunk by submarine attack, with the loss of Rear-
Admiral Senes, who was in command, and every
officer on board, as well as nearly 600 men. The
armoured cruiser Waldeck-Rousseau suffered damage
by torpedo, and the new Dreadnought Jean Bart, with
Admiral Boue de Lapeyrere, the French Admiralissimo
of the combined fleets, on board, was touched, though
only slightly injured. There were other submarine
attacks and losses of small craft, and some losses were
inflicted upon the enemy. British cruisers were
attached to the French Flag during these operations,
and they continued to co-operate with the French and
Italians in Adriatic waters and in the ^Egean, where
the French and Allied naval forces were the guard of
all the operations at Salonika and in the Piraeus.
Fleets and armies have co-operated in the Mediter-
ranean from the very beginning of the war. In May,
191 7, the British monitors, which, with the converted
cruisers, had been operating with the military expe-
dition against the Turks and Bulgarians, appeared in
the Adriatic, and rendered valuable aid to the Italians
in their advance towards Trieste. The naval coali-
tion has been a marvel of effective organisation.
German professors have sometimes said that the
land would sooner or later beat the sea — that
"Moltke" would become the victor over ''Mahan."
That is the convinced opinion of the Pan-Germans,
who say that the railway will yet prove the more
rapid and the more secure means of transport than
the steamship. The lines from Antwerp by Cologne
to Vienna, and from Hamburg to Berlin, and thence
through the very heart of Europe to Vienna, and on
The Grasp of the Mediterranean 33
by Belgrade and Sofia to Constantinople, and from
the opposite shore of the Bosphorus to Baghdad and
down to the Gulf, and by a branch through Persia
to the confines of India, were to give commercial and,
perchance, military command of two continents.
Enterprise by the branch railway through Aleppo
and Damascus against Egypt, with a view to further
developments in Africa, was related to this concep-
tion of land-power. The measures adopted by the
Allies for the reconstitution of Serbia, the expeditions
to the Dardanelles and Salonika, the strong action
taken in Greece, the naval movements on the coast
of Syria, the operations in the Sinai peninsula and
Palestine, and the expedition from the Persian
Gulf to Baghdad were the answer to these gigantesque
projects of the enemy.
Behind them all lay the working of the fleets.
Every class of ship and almost every kind of vessel
employed in naval warfare has been used in one or
other of these operations — the battleship, cruiser,
destroyer, torpedo-boat, submarine, mother ship, aero-
plane, aircraft-carrier, mining vessel, river gunboat,
motor launch, mine-trawler, armed auxiliary, special
service vessel, transport, store ship, collier, oiler, tank,
distilling ship, ordnance vessel, hospital ship, tug,
lighter, and a crowd of other craft. All these are
required for the work of the Navy in the Mediter-
ranean, as elsewhere, and they have been employed
with a quality of seamanlike skill, enterprise,
resource, courage, and success such as the history of
the sea has no previous record of. The appearance
at the Golden Horn of a British submarine, which
34 The Achievement of the British Navy-
had traversed a Turkish mine-field, was the sign of
new powers in naval warfare. We are lost in
admiration of the self-sacrifice of officers and men,
both of the regular naval service and of the mercan-
tile marine and the fisheries, the latter being the
heroes of the perilous work of mine-sweeping. The
British and French navies, and the vessel representing
the Russian Navy, acted in the closest co-operation,
and all the naval forces worked in intimate associa-
tion with the armies.
Where there was failure, the failure was due to
the inevitable limitations of sea-power, which has
already been suggested with reference to the North
German coast, Zeebrugge, and the Montenegrin and
Albanian coasts. The history of the Dardanelles
expedition will not be written here. Beginning with
a bombardment of the entrance forts on November
3rd, 19 14, which had little other effect than to
stimulate the defence, continued after an interval
of months by the great naval attacks in March, 19 15,
in which enormous damage was done to the forts at
the entrance and, to some extent, at the Narrows,
but with the loss of British and French battleships
by the action of gunfire and drifting mines, the
enterprise concluded with the landing of the Allied
armies in the Gallipoli peninsula. The troops were
compelled by outnumbering forces and concentrated
gunfire to withdraw. The combined attack should
have been made at the beginning. The unaided
naval attack had merely stimulated the defence.
Here was the greatest demonstration of which
there is record of the limitation of sea-power.
The Grasp of the Mediterranean 35
In the attack of such a military position naval forces
are essential, but military operations are required if
the desired success is to be attained.
This is true of all the operations in the Mediter-
ranean and elsewhere. Sea-power gave the means
by which the army drove back the Turks from
Egypt, and it was the support of the advance in
Sinai and Palestine. It gave protection to the
transports which carried troops and Army require-
ments to Salonika and the Piraeus, patrolling the
routes or providing convoy for the ships. The enemy
realised his opportunity, and his submarines began
to develop great activity in the Mediterranean.
Certain transports were sunk, and an attempt was
made to cut the communications of the expeditionary
forces with their base. Some considerable losses were
suffered thereby, but gradually systems were developed
which gave a reasonable sense of security. The
British, French, and Italian flotillas were employed,
and that of Japan came to their aid. Never had such
naval co-operation been witnessed before. We can-
not separate the advance in Mesopotamia from the
Mediterranean operations because the same object
inspired both — viz., that of arresting the threatened
development of German commercial and military
power, through Asiatic Turkey to the Persian Gulf,
and through Persia to the borders of India. The first
advance to Kut-el-Amara and Ctesiphon proved dis-
astrous because undertaken with inadequate means;
but the Navy rendered brilliant service, and, in the
second advance, a sufficient river flotilla of gunboats
and transports made possible the advance to Baghdad
36 The Achievement of the British Navy
and beyond. The naval flotilla co-operated with most
excellent effect in this advance, played havoc with
enemy's craft, and recaptured H.M.S. Firefly, which
had been lost in the retreat from Ctesiphon.
Thus we see the Navy operating in the great
central theatre of war and on its outlook to
the East, exerting influence, transporting troops,
forming the base of armies, and everywhere proving
an essential factor in all that was done. It was con-
fronted in the Mediterranean, as elsewhere, with the
new weapon of the submarine in very active form.
That menace, and the campaign against it, shall be
the subject of the next chapter.
CHAPTER V
Dealing with the Submarines
My name is Captain Kidd,
Captain Kidd.
My name is Captain Kidd,
Captain Kidd.
My name is Captain Kidd,
And wickedly I did;
God's laws I did forbid,
As I sailed.
Old Nautical Ballad.
HAVING seen the British Fleet and the fleets
allied with it operating in the North Sea,
the Oceans, and the Mediterranean, we may
suitably turn to some special features of the duties and
work of the Navy in the war. The submarine came
as a sign and a portent of new developments in the
means and the practice of warfare at sea. Regarded
once as the weapon of the weaker Power, it was
adopted into the naval armoury of the strongest.
When, in 1901, under Lord Fisher's administration
as First Sea Lord, a beginning was made in subma-
rine construction by the ordering of five Holland
boats, many people were taken aback. Confessedly
the part to be played by the submarine lay at that
time in the realm of speculation, but the British
Navy could not afford to ignore it. Every advance
must be watched and studied as it developed. The
37
38 The Achievement of the British Navy
development has been rapid, and there are British
submarines of astonishing powers, which have no
equals in the world. They have made their mark
in many a theatre of war. The French had led the
way. The Germans followed in 1906. There is,
indeed, the best reason to believe that Grand Admiral
von Tirpitz, chief of the Navy Department, looked
with no kindly eye upon submarine boats. He was a
believer in battleships ,and the creator of the High Sea
Fleet, with its battle squadrons and cruiser divisions.
Concessions were made to the Admiralty Staff, and a
few submarines were put in hand ; but it was not until
the beginning of the war that Tirpitz became inspired
with the fervour of the convert.
Even now the relative position of the submarine
in the category of warships is obscure. Admiral
Sir Percy Scott thought that the knell of the battle-
ship had been rung by its growing power; yet ships
of the battleship class, carrying incredible armaments,
possessing speed beyond the dreams of ante-bellum
naval constructors, and infinitely superior for a dozen
reasons to anything the Germans had thought of, have
recently been completed, and will probably play a
decisive part in any future naval engagement.
But if the submarine has not dethroned the battle-
ship, she has, in the hands of the enemy, done other
remarkable things. She has struck a mortal blow
at what many excellent people have hitherto regarded
as the settled and accepted code of International Law;
she has appeared as a pirate commerce-destroyer.
Without warning and without pity she has sunk fish-
ing vessels, tramp steamers, stately liners, and hospital
Dealing with the Submarines 39
ships. The code of honour is not observed by her.
The German submarine officer has orders to run no
risks, although in the old wars naval officers — who
had no means of submerging either to attack or to
escape — gladly ran every risk incidental to the service
in which they were engaged. When the Lusitania was
sunk it was explained that if the commander of the
submarine had permitted the passengers to take to the
boats before firing his torpedo, "this would have
meant the certain destruction of his own vessel."
There was no evidence that such would have been
the case, but the risk, which implied a danger merely
incidental to naval service, w£is held to justify the
sinking of the great liner with 1,200 souls on board.
The wildest imagination could not have conceived that
any human being could take such a distorted view of
right and wrong, and of the plain duty of the seaman.
The submarine has accomplished other remarkable
things in the war. She has converted benevolent
neutrals into resolute enemies. She has brought the
United States into the war in support of the Allies.
She has transformed the mercantile marines opposed
to her into actual fighting forces. A few merchant
ships were armed before the war began, but now,
because of ruthless submarine attack, the British mer-
cantile marine is for practical purposes embodied with
the Navy, in the sense that it is under naval control,
is provided with means of defence, and acts directly
under iiaval orders. Moreover, one-half or more of
its shipping has been taken over by the naval service.
The same is true of the merchant ships of the Allies.
The German submarine has had a further effect. She
40 The Achievement of the British Navy
has created a whole array of means directed to her
destruction. Countless inventors have been set at
work, and extraordinarily ingenious methods have
been employed with the purpose of putting an end
to submarine activities by sinking every boat as she
appeared.
In the early days of the submarine it was believed
that she might be sunk by using spar torpedoes
fixed in swift boats, which would bear down upon the
submarine as she submerged and explode the charge
against her hull. But it soon occurred to seamen
that if a swift vessel, destroyer or other, could run
down a submarine she might more easily sink her by
the impact of her sharp stem or a special keel. This
method has been practised in the war, and by this
means a number of enemy submarines have been dis-
patched to Davy Jones's locker. There was an early
case in which a certain destroyer, going at high speed,
actually impaled a German submarine on her stem,
and carried her onward, so injured that she sank.
Another early case was that of the German submarine
rammed and sent to the bottom off Beachy Head on
March 28th, 191 5, by the Thordis, commanded by
that plucky skipper. Captain Bell, who set an example
to many.
Another plan was to use suitable vessels in pairs,
each pair dragging a cable connecting them, from
which hung, on short lines, small mines to be elec-
trically exploded when a submerged obstruction,
probably a periscope or conning-tower, put a tension
upon the connecting cable. The disadvantage of
this system was that the entrapping vessels could not
Dealing with the Submarines 41
travel swiftly without bringing the cable near to the
surface, and the chance of a submarine fouling the
cable was remote. Yet it may be conjectured that
the features of this system may have furnished the
germ of procedures now in use. Capture or sinking
by the use of nets was also an early idea, probably
suggested by the nets used by big ships at anchor for
protection against torpedoes, and Admiral Sir Arthur
Wilson devised a large steel net for the purpose. Pos-
sibly this method, too, has developed into the nets
employed in dealing with enemy submarines at the
present time. But submarines were continually
increasing in strength of structure, speed, and handi-
ness, so that new systems were necessary and have
developed with the requirements.
What the actual methods employed by the Navy
are cannot be explained. When Mr. Frederick
Palmer, the American writer, visited the Grand Fleet
he asked how the thing was done, and officers said:
"Sometimes by ramming; sometimes by gunfire;
sometimes by explosives; and in many other ways
which we do not tell." M. Joseph Reinach also
visited the Fleet, and said in the Figaro that the
submarine was pursued "by net, gun, explosive bomb,
and other means." Squadron-Commander Bigsworth
on August 26th, 191 5, destroyed a submarine off
Ostend by dropping bombs upon her from his aero-
plane, and there have been several other episodes of
the same kind. When the first American transports
were attacked in the Atlantic, bombs fitted with a
short-time fuse were employed which burst at a
determined depth below the surface of the sea.
42 The Achievement of the British Navy
The Royal Naval Air Service plays a large part in
the anti-submarine campaign. Its seaplanes are always
scouting over our waters and sight enemy submarines
from afar. Flying high, they can and do discover
submarines navigating below the surface, and by
wireless or other signals bring destroyers or other
craft to the scene, where by special means submarines
are destroyed.
Probably gunfire is the chief means by which sub-
marines are sent to the bottom. A German submarine
may attain complete submergence from the cruising
trim within about three minutes ; but the time may be
longer, if she has a gun mounted, wireless rigged, and
other top hamper. From the awash position, in which
her speed is reduced, she may submerge in about two
minutes. A swift destroyer, knowing the position of
such a submarine, may advance toward her, covering
a nautical mile within two minutes, so that she has an
excellent chance of coming within range and putting in
shots with effect. Gunnery is carried to a high pitch
of proficiency in the Navy, and one destroyer may be
mentioned which knocked out the periscope of a
German submarine at a range of over 2,000 yards
with her first round. There is nothing an enemy sub-
marine likes less than to see destroyers tearing down
towards her at high speed as she is getting in her gun,
withdrawing her periscope, lowering her masts — often
a disguise — and filling her tanks. Moreover, com-
plete submergence may not be a sure protection for
her if she is watched, for she may be destroyed by an
explosive bomb.
German submarines have also learned to fear
Dealing with the Submarines 43
armed merchantmen, which have not seldom used
their guns with effect, sometimes compelling their
assailants to submerge, and so evading their attack,
and sometimes by obtaining direct hits. The
Dunrohin in September, 191 6, carried on a lively
action for some minutes, hitting her assailant in the
vicinity of her conning-tower with a T.N.T. shell —
thereby causing an internal explosion, from which
dense smoke arose — followed by three common shell,
each of them making a direct hit, after which the
enemy suddenly plunged at a sharp angle, evidently
going to the bottom. In March, 19 17, the Bellorado
was attacked by gunfire from a submarine, whereby
her master, chief officer, and a seaman were killed,
while her gunners put such shot into the assailant that
she was silenced and manifestly disabled.
Further it is not permissible to go on describing how
submarines are accounted for. The catalogue of
methods is a long one. There could certainly be no
single and decisive weapon for the destruction of this
new engine of warfare. There is no remedy for the
effects of gunfire, and if submarines discover targets
possible to be attacked they will certainly attack them.
Some surprise was expressed that the British Admir-
alty did not at once suppress the submarine menace.
When the submarine campaign began in February,
191 5, it resulted in the sinking of a number of British
merchantmen; but, having risen to its height, it
declined, with fluctuations, until it was described as
being "well in hand." The methods employed had
been successful. Then, after several months, the
submarines began their depredations again, carrying
44 The Achievement of the British Navy
them into the Atlantic and the Mediterranean with
great violence. They also penetrated the Channel,
though they never checked the great stream of trans-
port for the armies between English and French ports,
which the Navy was guarding with complete success.
The reason for this recrudescence of submarine
piracy was the intense energy which the Germans
devoted to the production of standardised and
powerful classes of submarines, whose parts were
produced in many districts of the German Empire.
The new boats were practically submarine cruisers,
capable of high surface speed, which enabled them to
overhaul slow merchantmen, and they were armed
with powerful guns. The early enemy submarine
carried a 1.4-inch gun, but a 2.9-inch 12-pounder
was provided. There is now reason to believe that
the calibre has risen to 4.1 inches and, in the case
of some of the more powerful boats, to 5.1 inches,
these larger guns being shorter and lighter than the
same guns mounted in cruisers. But obviously sub-
marines of these classes, carrying on their work over
wider areas and in distant places, will not be so easy
to destroy as the smaller boats of the early submarine
campaign, and this may account for the difficulty in
providing a complete protection from the attack. Sub-
marine sections have been sent overland and assem-
bled at Trieste for the Adriatic and Mediterranean,
and at Varna for use in the Black Sea, and also doubt-
less at the Golden Horn or in the Gulf of Ismid.
There is much uncertainty about the future of the
submarine. She exercises no command at sea, and
she makes many fruitless attacks upon armed mer-
Dealing with the Submarines 45
chantmen; but she is dangerous, nevertheless. The
British Navy has devoted exhaustless energy in apply-
ing every possible agency for dealing with hostile sub-
marines, and its great success encourages the hope and
belief that the scourge will yet be exterminated. De-
stroyers, motor launches, patrolling ships of many
classes, seaplanes, observation balloons, and other
craft are at work every day and many of them every
night. But whatever element of uncertainty there
may be as to the complete success of these agencies,
there is none in the conclusion that the submarine
will never bring England, still less her Allies, to the
verge of famine or anywhere near it. Scarcity of food
is not due so much to the submarine as to the great
demand on the world's supplies, and the enormous
volume of shipping absorbed by the naval and mili-
tary requirements of England and her Allies. The
Navy, which has done such wonderful work in the
war, is not and will not be ineffective against the sub-
marine.
CHAPTER VI
The Navy and the Mine
They sink, they slink, they seek the boat,
Grisly horns stuck through their skin,
Ready to sink all things that float.
These villain boxes shaped of tin.
The fisher sees the death therein.
But reaches down with his long fling.
And grasps the chain that holds them in.
And draws the fangs they hoped would sting.
Anon.
THE British Navy fights for the great ideals
of the people, acting upon the lines of old
and loyal traditions; but, while doing so, it
has encountered the desperate devices of the enemy,
who has used the latest achievements of scientific
and mechanical invention in such a manner as to
overthrow many preconceived methods and accepted
conventions of naval warfare. We have already
spoken of the submarine. Now we shall see what
the mine is, and how it is dealt with by the Navy
and the services the Navy controls. It has been
said, with much truth, that the essence of war is
violence and that moderation in war is futility. It
is also true, as we see, in the cruel operations of
Zeppelins and bomb-dropping aeroplanes, and not
less in the attacks of submarines, as directed by the
Germans and their allies, that the non-military popu-
46
The Navy and the Mine 47
lations suffer the horrors of war in much greater degree
than was the case in the wars even of recent times.
But the Germans, at the very beginning of the
war, outraged neutral sentiment by employing osten-
sible merchant and passenger vessels, flying neutral
flags, and without giving warning to the neutrals, in
the deadly work of scattering mines indiscriminately
in the open sea on the main lines of trade. They
acted in direct contravention of the rules of war as
previously accepted. These disguised mining vessels
had traversed the trade routes as if pursuing peaceful
purposes, thus enjoying the immunities which had
always been accorded to innocent neutral vessels, and
yet they had wantonly endangered the lives of all
who traversed the sea, whether neutral or enemy.
The Admiralty were soon able to declare publicly that
this mine-laying under a neutral flag, as well as recon-
naissance conducted by trawlers and even by hospital
ships and neutral vessels, had become the ordinary
methods of German naval warfare. The later history
of the war shows how far the Germans were prepared
to go in casting off any restraint in their efforts to
do injury to their enemies. They compelled the
British Admiralty to adopt counter-measures.
For years past the Germans had devoted unremit-
ting attention to the study and practice of mining
and the production of very powerful types of mines.
In that respect they were undoubtedly ready. The
state of war between England and Germany began
at II p.m. on August 4th, 19 14, and on the morning
of the next day German mines were being laid on
the east coast of England. The Konigin Luise, a
48 The Achievement of the British Navy
former Hamburg- Amerika liner of 2,163 tons, was
caught in the act, off the Suffolk coast, and was sunk
by the light cruiser Amphion and the Third Torpedo
Flotilla. On the next day the Amphion herself, the
first British warship destroyed in the war, fell a
victim to the mines she had laid. This disguised
mine-layer had initiated a practice, which has since
been many times followed in the war, of throwing
mines overboard in the track of pursuing vessels.
It was resorted to by the retreating Germans in the
battle of the Dogger Bank. Here it may be remarked
that the Germans have always claimed the right to
subject every consideration to their necessity to win,
though at The Hague Conference of 1907, Baron
Marschall von Bieberstein, the German delegate, said
that conscience, good sense, and the duty imposed
by the principles of humanity would constitute the
most effective guarantee against abuse, and he pro-
claimed — "je le dis d, haute voix" — that German naval
officers would always fulfil "in the strictest fashion
the duties which emanate from the unwritten law of
humanity and civilisation."
Any technical description of German mines would
be out of place here; but it may be said that generally
they approximate to a spherical shape, and are pro-
vided with projecting "horns," almost in the shape of
drumsticks, concussion with which is calculated to
break a small phial within, whose contents cause
the detonation of the enormous charge of T.N.T. ex-
plosive. Each mine is provided with a sinker, which
drops to the bottom, and is attached to the mine by
a cable or sounding-line paid out by special mech-
The Navy and the Mine 49
anism to any desired length, whereby the mine may
be kept at the intended depth below the surface.
There are other types of mines, and in particular one
of cylindrical form, containing a prodigious quantity
of explosive and capable of the widest destruction.
This has probably been used only in special situations.
The ordinary mines can be laid with great rapidity by
a specially fitted mine-layer, provided with rotary gear,
bringing mine after mine along a special track to the
dropping position. The drifting mines which the
Germans at the very beginning of the war set afloat
in the main trade route from America to Liverpool,
via the North of Ireland, can be laid with still greater
rapidity.
When mine-laying in British waters by surface
boats was made extremely risky, or almost impos-
sible, the Germans resorted to the employment of
submarine mine-layers, one of which was exhibited
in the Thames. Vessels of this class, so far as they
are known, probably carry a maximum of twelve
big mines in six shoots or air-locks, the lower mine
in each shoot being released by means of a lever,
after which the other drops into its place, ready to
be let go in the same way. The boat exhibited in
London and elsewhere was of a rough, rudimentary
character, indifferently built, and her speed was prob-
ably not more than six or eight knots. Undoubtedly
many of the submarine mine-layers are of better type.
They are constantly at work especially on the east
coast of England, and some losses have resulted; but
the effect of their operations is nearly always over-
come by the means adopted by the Navy.
50 The Achievement of the British Navy
The first measure set on foot by the Admiralty
was to organise a system of search for suspicious
craft, and to declare the North Sea a war area,
within which it was dangerous for any vessel to
navigate except through channels indicated by the
naval authorities. The Germans replied with their
now famous and futile blockade order of February,
191 5. New regulations were issued from time to
time regulating navigation through the British mine-
fields, and the result has been, in association with the
patrols, to exercise a very close supervision over the
navigation in home waters. As to distant mining
operations of the enemy, the First Lord of the Ad-
miralty stated, on March 8th, 191 7, that they had
been carried very far, and the P. & O. liner Mongolia,
sunk off Bombay on June 23rd, 191 7, was not the only
vessel mined in the Arabian Sea. From time to time
it has been announced that mails for and from the
East and Australia have been lost at sea.
It is an inspiring thing to turn from this picture
of mines and the scattering of them by the enemy
to another picture — that of the gallant and successful
manner in which the Navy, and the mine-trawlers
and other vessels embodied in its service and em-
ployed in the ceaseless patrols, have grappled with"
the deadly ipenace of the mine. Ever patrolling the
British coasts, ever facing death, often speeding to
the help of vessels mined, torpedoed, or otherwise in
distress, the glorious men who man these craft have
inscribed their names in letters of gold on the roll of
British honour and fame at sea. It was a marvellous
thing, this embodiment of the vast mine-sweeping and
The Navy and the Mine 51
patrolling service in the work of the Navy in the war.
From all the coasts fishermen have come, with their
trawlers converted from the craft of winning fish at
sea, to the sterner work of bringing up and destroying
the strange harvest of deadly mines which endanger
all life at sea. Many a trawler has been sunk by
contact with her fatal captures; others have been
sunk by hostile fire and bombing by enemy aeroplanes,
but never have the brave seamen quailed in the serv-
ice of the country and the Allies, and in every port
men are to be met whose craft have been sunk under
them, and who have hastened to sea again.
Hundreds of ships, drawn from the mercantile
marine and the fisheries, steam yachts, motor boats,
armed launches, and vessels of other classes, are
employed in such dangerous work. They share the
trials of war, wind, and weather with the regular
naval patrols. Sir Edward Carson, when First Lord of
the Admiralty, directed attention to the magnificent
work of the mine-trawlers of these patrols. The
force employed at the beginning of the war numbered
about 150 small vessels, but increased to 3,000 or
more. The whole nation should understand what
mine-sweepers were doing. "The thousands of men
engaged in this operation are the men who are
feeding the whole population of this country, from
morning till night, battling with the elements as
well as the enemy, facing dangers under the sea. A
mine-sweeper carries his life in his hands at every
moment, and he does it willingly." Later again he
expressed his thanks and the thanks of the nation
for the splendid work they had accomplished. Of
52 The Achievement of the British Navy-
all the seamen who had so deservedly earned the
gratitude of the country none had had more arduous
and dangerous duties to perform than the gallant
fellows in the patrols.
They have worked in reliefs day and night at sea,
though sometimes driven to port by the fury of the
elements, and they brave every kind of weather. As
Admiral Bacon, commanding the Dover Patrol, has
said, with reference to the security with which thou-
sands of merchantmen had passed through the waters
in his control, ''no figures could emphasise more
thoroughly the sacrifice made by the personnel of
the patrols and the relative immunity ensured to the
commerce of their country." They have trawled for
mines not only in British but in distant waters. Their
magnificent work under fire, and attacked by bomb-
dropping aeroplanes, at the Dardanelles will never
be forgotten.
An American correspondent, Mr. Gordon Bruce,
who sailed in a mine-trawler to learn its work, con-
cluded an article in the New York Tribune in these
words: —
I looked at those men who go out day after day;
who wear their lifebelts continuously; who take
their tea on the decks while they peer over the rims
of their cups for the death that lurks in those som-
bre waters. I thought how fine v/as their devotion
to their duty; how great a part they are playing in
the war — out there alone, where their deeds are
attended with no sounding of trumpets, where they
give to their work the same quality of bravery as is
required of the man in the trenches. And as I
glanced at the inscription over the cabin, which read
The Navy and the Mine 53
"England expects every man to do his duty," I knew
that England would not be disappointed.
The practical methods by which the Navy and its
brave mine-trawlers conduct their operations are of
great interest, but description cannot go too far.
The enemy is certainly well acquainted with all
British methods previous to the war; but mine-sweep-
ing systems do not stand still, but develop with the
progress of armaments generally. Mine-trawling is
developed from the system of trawling for fish, which
before the war had reached a high degree of technical
efficiency, and in the application of that system to
their work in the war the men have attained great
proficiency and become extraordinarily successful.
The trawl-net varies in size with the dimensions of
the vessel using it. An average size would be about
100 feet in length, with a spread of from 80 to 90
feet. The principal features in fishing trawlers are
fore and after frameworks, with fairleaders, a towing-
block, a powerful steam-winch, and towing-warps. A
trawler would pay out hundreds of fathoms of heavy
wire warp, the handling of which called for great
skill and dexterity. It was not a very difficult thing
to adapt this method of trawling to the sweeping for
mines. The fishing trawler goes unaided, but in mine-
sweeping the trawlers work in pairs, and the towing-
warp is replaced by the sweeping-wire. Two trawlers,
steaming abreast at a certain interval, drag a weighted
steel hawser which, upon striking the mooring of a
mine, brings the deadly catch to the surface, where
it is exploded by gunfire from a destroyer or by rifle
fire from an armed trawler or motor boat. The mine-
54 The Achievement of the British Navy-
sweepers have encountered perils and hardships which
have never been recorded, and fishing trawlers pursu-
ing their peaceful occupations have often incurred
the same risks.
Next after the destruction of the enemy's fighting
vessels comes the destruction of his death-dealing
mines, and the mine- trawlers, confronted with an un-
paralleled task, attended with extreme peril, have ren-
dered magnificent service to England and her Allies.
CHAPTER VII
The Navy and Army Transport
What of the mark?
Ah ! seek it not in England ;
A bold mark, an old mark
Is waiting over-sea;
Where the string harps in chorus,
And the lion flag is o'er us,
It is there our work shall be.
Sir A. Co nan Doyle.
THE stupendous and scarcely calculable opera-
tion of transporting by sea the enormous
armies which are employed in many theatres
of the hostilities is the index and measure of the
greatest of all the triumphs of naval power in the
war, namely, that of establishing and maintaining
essential command of the sea. Against this bulwark
the enemy's naval forces have battled in vain. The
submarine may, in some degree and in some circum-
stances, affect command of the sea, but it cannot
exercise it.
It is difficult to realise all that the transport of
millions of men, organised as armies and provided
with all that armies require, has meant to the Allies,
or to bring home to ourselves a full sense of what
the responsibilities of the Navy have been in safe-
guarding them. The armies of Frederick and Napo-
leon were pygmies compared with the vast hosts which
55
5Q The Achievement of the British Navy
are set in the field to-day. When Frederick invaded
Silesia he had with him not more than 30,000 men.
The motley army with which Napoleon invaded Rus-
sia — the greatest that had ever been brought under a
single command — did not greatly exceed 600,000 on
a liberal computation. Wellington in the Peninsula
never commanded 50,000 men. But in March, 191 6,
Mr. Balfour, then First Lord of the Admiralty, said
that 4,000,000 combatants had already been trans-
ported under the guardianship of the British "Fleet,
with 1,000,000 horses and other animals, 2,500,000
tons of stores, and 22,000,000 gallons of oil, for British
use and the use of the Allies. In January, 191 7,
Admiral Sir John Jellicoe, First Sea Lord, said that
over 7,000,000 men had been transported, together
with all the guns, munitions, and stores they required.
Six months later, when the United States troops began
to arrive, the figure may be estimated to have reached
10,000,000.
The victory of Germany would have been swift
and decisive if the great armies represented by these
figures had not come to the support of France. French
troops from Northern Africa and the East also joined
her brave army, because transport in the Mediter-
ranean was secure. The great army of Russia could
have made no offensive movement if she had not
received the immense supplies of guns, munitions,
motors, and other material which came to her from
abroad. Because of British supremacy at sea and the
shipping that consequently came there. Archangel,
from being a sleepy harbour, developed into one of
the busiest ports on the continent of Europe. Italy
The Navy and Army Transport 57
could have made no headway if many of the things
she required had not come to her by sea. Greece
would have remained permanently on the side of the
enemy if sea-power and the troops transported there
had not rallied her to the Allies. The German col-
onies would not have been occupied if fleets had not
carried to them the troops for their subjection. Eng-
land, by virtue of sea command guaranteed by her
Fleet, has gathered her armies from India, Canada,
Australia, New Zealand, and from every colony and
possession, and has sent them to serve in France, Bel-
gium, Greece, Gallipoli, Egypt, Palestine, Macedonia,
Mesopotamia, and Africa. Not a soldier has gone
afloat but a seaman has carried him on his back.
Before we can appreciate this aspect of the work
of the Navy in the war, we must gain some idea of
what is implied by the military service of these armies
in the field. It is not enough to dispatch armies.
They must be maintained and supplied. The com-
munications of an army are vital to its operations,
and the communications of all the armies that England
is employing are by sea, and are guarded by the Navy.
It would not be an easy thing to estimate the vast
requirements of fighting forces; but that is unneces-
sary. They are on an infinitely greater scale, in pro-
portion to the strength of the troops employed, than
in any previous war. Guns are far more numerous
and much heavier than they were. The expenditure
of ammunition has gone beyond all anticipation, and
a real fleet is required for its transport. Horses, mules,
many descriptions of heavy and light ordnance and
ammunition for them, warlike and general stores of
58 The Achievement of the British Navy
innumerable kinds, aeroplanes, balloons, the gigantic
''tanks," hospitals and hospital requisites, clothing,
food, forage, camp equipment, transport vehicles, trac-
tion engines, pontooning, railway, telegraph, building,
and mining material, locomotives of many kinds, pe-
trol, and a hundred other stores and things are neces-
sary, and they must day and night be in transit, with-
out rest or pause. It will illustrate the gigantic nature
of the operation if we record that between November,
1916, and June, 1917, 2,000 miles of complete railway
track were shipped, with nearly 1,000 locomotives,
and other supplies by railway companies. Labour
and work for a hundred different services have to be
provided also. The United States and other countries
have contributed enormous supplies, and, with the
coming of the American Army, the volume of the
ceaseless torrent — the veritable Niagara — will increase
still more. History has no parallel for such opera-
tions.
This vast business being the charge of the British
Navy and of the navies allied with it, we see how
great an object it must be of the enemy to strike at
the lines of supply. That they have completely
failed would appear almost miraculous, if we did not
know that the reasons for the failure are altogether
of a practical character. It was inevitable that there
should be some losses when submarines and mine-
layers were at work, but the destruction effected
has been a mere fraction of the whole, and the influ-
ence upon the campaigns is entirely negligible. The
Ministry of Munitions imports 1,500,000 tons of ma-
terial every month. The most considerable loss due
The Navy and Army Transport 59
to attack has been in the matter of shell components,
but it did not amount to more than 5.9 per cent, of
the whole supply from the beginning of the submarine
campaign up to June, 19 17. The most serious disas-
ters were in the Mediterranean, where submarines
sank the French transports Provence II. and Gallia,
engaged in the Salonika expedition, with the loss of
about 1,600 lives. The enemy will certainly continue
his efforts.
Never was a more seriously planned attempt made
than that of June 22nd, 19 17, when General Pershing's
American Expeditionary Force was crossing the At-
lantic. German submarines, in considerable force,
made two attacks upon the transports, and on both
occasions were beaten off with every appearance of
loss. One submarine was certainly sunk, and there
was reason to believe that the accurate fire of the
American gunners sent others to the bottom. For
purposes of convenience the expedition had been di-
vided into contingents, each composed of troop-ships
and a naval escort designed to keep off such raiders
as might be met with. An ocean rendezvous was
arranged with the American destroyers then operating
in European waters, in order that the passage through
the danger zone might be attended by every possible
protection. There was reason to believe that the Ger-
mans had secret intelligence of the course taken by the
transports to the rendezvous and of the time appointed
for their arrival there.
The first attack occurred at 10.30 p.m. at a point
well on the American side of the rendezvous, in a
part of the Atlantic which might have been presumed
60 The Achievement of the British Navy-
free from submarines. The heavy gunfire of the
American destroyers scattered the enemy boats, and
five torpedoes were seen. The second attack was
launched a few days later, against the other contingent,
on the European side of the rendezvous. Not only did
destroyers hold the boats at a safe distance, but their
speed resulted in sinking at least one submarine.
Bombs were dropped firing a charge of explosive timed
to go off at a certain distance under water. In one
instance the wreckage covered the surface of the sea
after a shot at a periscope. "Protected by our high
seas convoy destroyers and by French war vessels,"
said the Secretary of the United States Navy, "the
contingent proceeded, and joined the others at a
French port. The whole nation will rejoice that so
great a peril has passed for the vanguard of the men
who will fight our battles in France."
This incident illustrates the method of protection
chiefly employed by the British Navy. When the
original Expeditionary Force was sent to France,
the Grand Fleet was in readiness if the High Sea
Fleet should venture to issue to sea. Cruisers, de-
stroyers, naval aircraft, and submarines were on watch
and guard in the North Sea and the Channel, and
the patrol was maintained, day and night, without in-
termission until the army had been effectively trans-
ported. The patrol was then organised upon a greater
scale as the transport grew in volume. The Dover
Patrol undertook a work of the highest importance,
and was instrumental in holding off all destroyer at-
tacks from the eastward. Cruisers, destroyers, armed
motor launches^ mine trawlers and drifters, and other
The Navy and Army Transport 61
vessels have been constantly at work, and observation
balloons and seaplanes have never ceased their vigil.
The triumph has been complete, the enemy subma-
rines have never penetrated the guard, and the Chan-
nel communications of all the armies in France have
been made secure. There are certain features of this
organisation which cannot be dealt with here. The
same system has been carried into the Mediterranean
and elsewhere, and the French, Italian, and Japanese
navies have shared in the work.
In this matter of transport protection the British
Navy has rendered magnificent service to all the Allies.
General Sir Charles Munro, after the evacuation of
Gallipoli, said it was a stroke of good fortune for
the Army to be associated with a service "whose work
remained throughout this anxious period beyond the
power of criticism or cavil," and General Sir Ian Ham-
ilton reported that "one tiny flaw in the mutual trust
and confidence animating the two services would have
wrecked the whole enterprise." This is true not only
of Gallipoli but of every place in which the Navy has
been serving as the guard of the communications,
and the base and support of the military forces.
It will be understood that the Transport Depart- ^
ment of the British Admiralty undertook a colossal
work at the beginning of the war. It possessed the
unrivalled experience gained during the South African
War, 1 899- 1 90 1, when about 275,000 men were dis-
patched and supplied with all army requirements over
a distance of 7,000 miles of sea and land. Then there
was no enemy afloat, but the operation was greater
than any previously undertaken, and evoked the ad-
62 The Achievement of the British Navy
miration of the world as a revelation of resource,
energy, organisation, national spirit, good manage-
ment, and business-like capacity. What will be said
when the now incalculable work of the Transport De-
partment in this war can be estimated and described?
The inspection and selection of ships and the conver-
sion of them for the accommodation of troops and
horses was a great business. In 1899 it was estimated
that a satisfactory transport should be capable of
carrying a number of men equal to 2 5 per cent, of her
tonnage. What is the rule now one cannot say. There
are important considerations of ballasting, speed, coal
consumption, and other matters in such business, and
the removal or adaptation of existing fittings and the
allotting of space for various purposes have occupied
the Admiralty officers and officials.
It was a business both of embarkation and disem-
barkation, on both sides of the Channel, and special
provision was required for the wounded and sick.
The Naval Transport and Embarkation Officers have
had a very exhausting and anxious time in taking up,
fitting, coaling, and otherwise preparing vessels for
sea, and in giving orders for the movements of ships
at the ports on arrival and departure, as well as in
providing for the safety and expedition of all embarka-
tions of men, horses, and stores, and arranging for
docking and like matters. They merit the gratitude
of the country and the Allies. It may be said that in
all the naval and commercial ports of the United King-
dom, and in the French ports as well, work of this or
like kind has been in progresss uninterruptedly since
the beginning of the war. It is strictly naval work,
The Navy and Army Transport 63
and was set on an excellent and satisfactory footing
by the Admiralty; but, as the war progressed, and the
pressure grew greater, imposing additional duties on
the Transport Department, some matters dealt with
by certain of its branches, and concerned with ship
construction, modification, and repair, were placed
in charge of competent civilians.
CHAPTER VIII
The Navy that Flies
Heard the heavens fill with shouting, and there rain'd a
ghastly dew
From the nations' airy navies grappling in the central blue.
Tennyson.
FROM an account of the work of the British
Navy in the war there must not be omitted
some exposition of the gallant doings of the
men of the Royal Naval Air Service. They have
made their mark in the war, in every theatre of it,
and no one can tell what part they will play before
the struggle is at an end. Of some of their work
very little is known. They render "silent" service,
like that of the Navy to which they belong. They
do not always carry on their duty alone. On occa-
sions they participate in that of the Royal Flying
Corps of the Army. They have been associated with
the gallant French airmen, and the Americans come
with a new burst of energy. The Germans know
British naval airmen at Zeebrugge and Ostend, and
in all the country behind those places; at sea also,
when the German raiders return from their exploits;
and on the West front of the Army, too, where they
go at times far behind the line, spying out the land,
taking number and note of the enemy, dropping bombs
on his store and ammunition dumps, disturbing all
64
THE CAPTURED GERMAN SUBMARINE MINE-LAYER UCo
The Navy that Flies 65
his rearward services, and stirring up his aerodromes
and the nursing places, where his fledglings, whom
they call "quirks," are taking to themselves wings
and learning to fly.
The Royal Naval Air Service has lent its aid to
the Italians, has provided unpleasant experiences for
the Bulgarians, has dropped bombs on the Turks at
Gaza and thereabout, has rendered good service in
the Mesopotamian business, and was invaluable in
"spotting" for the guns which destroyed the fugitive
German cruiser Konigsberg in the jungle-clad reaches
of the Rufiji River. From dawn to dusk these
knights of the air have been flying in many parts of
the world, and night-flying is their particular pleasure
when there is great work to be done. Their "game
book" is very full of astounding episodes of fighting
which, in exciting experiences, put into the shade the
thrilling narratives which for generations have de-
lighted the hearts of boys. Few people know the
sleepless vigil which the naval airmen keep all round
the British coasts, constantly fl3nng to keep watch
upon the enemy, to spot his submarines, to discover
his mine-fields, and to defeat any efforts he may make
when transports are moving at sea. Such is an out-
line of the occupations and duties of the Royal Naval
Air Service.
There was an "Air Department" at the Admiralty
before the war, and a Naval Wing of the Royal
Flying Corps with its "Central Air Office," its Flying
School at Eastchurch, and seaplane and aeroplane
stations at six places on the coasts, as well as airships
at Farnborough and Kingsnorth. At the Royal inspec-
66 The Achievement of the British Navy
tion at Spithead of the great mobilised Fleet, just
before the war, naval aeroplanes, seaplanes, and air-
ships gave a fine display. Development was rapid, the
Royal Naval Air Service came into independent ex-
istence, and there is now the Fifth Sea Lord at the
Admiralty charged with the supervision of the Royal
Naval Air Service, and representing it on the Air
Board.
Some of the most useful work of the Royal Naval
Air Service is in "spotting" for the guns of the
warships. Its officers made a methodical photo-
graphic survey of the coast from Nieuport to the
Dutch frontier early in the war to assist the monitors
which were then bombarding the coast, and to observe
and correct their fire. They worked from a height
of about 12,000 feet, constantly observing the devel-
opment of the enemy's gun emplacements, all in de-
spite of hostile aeroplanes and shells. That survey has
been continued, and the result is the finest thing in
aerial cartography which has ever been achieved.
It will illustrate this part of the special work of
the seaplanes if we describe how they began, which
we are enabled to do by a lively-witted official scribe,
who examined the records of their operations, and
has given his impressions: —
"I can't see where they're pitching," said the
Navy-that-Floats, referring to the shells of the mon-
itors bursting twelve miles away. "What about
spotting for us, old son?" "That will I do," replied
the Navy-that-Flies. "And more also. But I shall
have to wear khaki, because it's done out here; by
everybody, apparently."
"Wear anything you like," replied the Navy-that-
The Navy that Flies 67
Floats, "as long as you help us to hit those shore-
batteries. Only — because you wear khaki (the
Royal Naval Air Service does not usually wear
khaki) and see life, don't forget you're still the same
old Navy, as it was in the beginning, is now, and
ever shall be."
The Navy-that-Flies added "Amen," and said
that it wouldn't forget. Wherever its squadrons
were based they rigged a flagstaff and flew the
White Ensign at the peak. They erected wooden
huts and painted them Service grey, labelling them
"Mess-deck," "Ward-room," "Gun-room," etc., as
the case might be. They divided the flights into
port and starboard watches, and solemnly asked
leaye to "go ashore" for recreation. They filled in
shell-holes and levelled the ground for aerodromes;
they ran up hangars and excavated dug-outs —
whither they retired in a strong silent rush (the
expression is theirs) when the apprehensive Boche
attempted to curtail their activity with bombs.
Not all the good work of the Royal Naval Air
Service in its co-operation with the Fleet comes into
public notice. It rendered excellent service at the
Dardanelles, the seaplane carrier Arc Royal being
present. There were many fine achievements, in-
cluding the bombing of a transport in the Straits by
Flight-Commander C. H. K. Edmonds, R.N. Sea-
planes may take the place of scouting cruisers, as the
eyes of the Fleet, and relieve destroyers of some of
their scouting duties. What would Nelson not have
given for the help of seaplanes when he was crying
out for frigates, and was groping for the French in
the Mediterranean in 1798, and came unknowingly
within a short distance of them; or, again, when, in
1805, they eluded him off Toulon? Intelligence of
68 The Achievement of the British Navy
the movements of our enemy is of the utmost impor-
tance to officers commanding at sea, and this is the
service which the naval airmen have been rendering.
At the beginning of the war the Germans enjoyed
an advantage in the possession of some dirigible
airships, which sailed in calm airs, unimpeded, over
the North Sea, surveyed its full extent, and reported
what they saw to the German naval authorities.
Their number rapidly increased. Thus the British
Fleet was to a certain extent hampered in its opera-
tions. Now the situation is changed. The enemy's
airships know the peril of coming within range of
anti-aircraft guns, and they dread the "hornets" which
carry special means of setting them on fire. There
are British airships, too, and observation captive bal-
loons, fixed and towed, as well as seaplanes, main-
tained in adequate numbers. The seaplane played a
useful part in the battle of the Jutland Bank, and
craft of the class will astonish the enemy in any sub-
sequent naval engagement.
The dropping of bombs by the seaplanes or aero-
planes of the Royal Naval Air Service has become
the most prominent of its activities. The machines
are of great power, and, acting in numbers, they
have been able to drop an enormous weight of bombs
on the enemy positions, particularly in the districts
behind the coast of West Flanders. Within the space
of four or five months 70 tons of explosives were
dropped on the German aerodromes in Northern Bel-
gium. Brave naval airmen in July, 191 7, from a height
of 800 feet, dropped bombs on the Goeben and other
enemy warships at the Golden Horn, and hit the Turk-
The Navy that Flies 69
ish War Office also. In this work the young officers
— for the service demands youth — have given proof
of exceeding keenness. It would be difficult to cata-
logue the expeditions of the naval airmen on the Bel-
gian coast. They have assisted in most important
operations.
How far such work may be continued, to what
range carried, or what will be the full effect, we do
not know. The Navy-that-Flies will leave nothing
undone that is capable of accomplishment. It has
operated in association with the work of French flying
men on many occasions, at the bombardment of Zee-
brugge and elsewhere. It will find a powerful co-
worker in the new and gallant allies who are bringing
all their force to bear from beyond the Atlantic. The
United States air service will develop with extraordi-
nary rapidity, and its co-operation will be warmly wel-
comed by British naval airmen. So abundant is the
confidence of Americans, so strong and virile their
faith in themselves, that some of them look to the
aeroplane to end the war. Rear-Admiral Bradley A.
Fiske has demanded an immediate naval attack on the
German fleet and submarine bases in the Baltic by a
monster fleet of aeroplanes and seaplanes. He believes
that the importance of naval aerial operations is not
sufficiently realised by the Allies and that Essen may
be destroyed by bombardment from the air.
The field of speculation does not fall within the
scope of this little book, the object of which is to
illustrate the work of the Fleet and its associated
services in all the theatres of war. The Royal Naval
Ail Service is still young, and has undoubtedly a
70 The Achievement of the British Navy
great future. Already it has proved a valuable auxil-
iary. It has assisted in the important business of pro-
viding complete strategical observations. It has aided
the work of the commercial blockade, in making more
easy on many occasions the operations of the much-
tried examination service. Undoubtedly the trans-
port of the armies and their stores across the Channel
and in many seas, which was the subject of the last
chapter, would have been conducted with less cer-
tainty, and perhaps with less confidence, if it had not
been for the active co-operation, as the eyes of the
Fleet, of the naval flying men. The long-range gun-
nery of warships against permanent fortifications, both
at the Dardanelles and on the Belgian coast, has gained
in accuracy from the observation by the aircraft of
the Navy.
This subject might have been pursued further,
but enough has been said to show that, among the
agencies employed by the British Fleet in the accom-
plishment of the supreme duties which it exercises for
the safety of the country and the support of the Al-
lies, the Royal Naval Air Service holds an important
place. It has evoked enthusiasm among its officers,
who have maintained in a high degree, in many a bat-
tle in the air, the fearlessness, resource, and daring of
the Naval Service to which they belong.
CHAPTER IX
Officers and Men of the Navy
Sailor, what of the debt we owe you?
Day or night is the peril more?
Who so dull that he fails to know you,
Sleepless guard of our island shore?
Safe the corn to the farmyard taken;
Grain ships safe upon all the seas;
Homes in peace and a faith unshaken —
Sailor, what do we owe for these?
The late Viscount Stuart.
NO picture of the war work of the British
Navy could be complete without some ac-
count of its officers and men. From what
has already been said, the nature of the qualities
demanded of them will have been realised. In the
general direction of the Navy by the Admiralty there
have been required calm reflection, profound insight,
strategic imagination, sound and swift judgment as
to the full use and the yet ill-understood limitations
of sea-power, an abundant spring of action, and the
unflinching resolution to give effect to the utmost to
the striking and controlling force of the naval arm.
In the Commander-in-Chief of the Grand Fleet there
was needed the high ability to administer and exercise
the command, to inspire officers and men of every rank
and rating in the Fleet with zeal, efficiency, and devo-
tion, as well as sleepless vigilance in the long waiting
71
72 The Achievement of the British Navy
for the enemy, and instant readiness for action at all
times. The Commander-in-Chief does not work alone.
He has a staff who collaborate in these duties and give
effect to his plans; and admirals secondary in com-
mand, who have no light task in directing the work
and operations of the larger elements of the Fleet. Sir
John Jellicoe, who was appointed to the Grand Fleet
at the beginning of the war, was a master of the high
attainments required for his office, and it was he who
created the base of his operations, organised all the
agencies of his command, and exercised that command
with consummate ability. The instrument he had
shaped and handled so capably fell to the charge of
Sir David Beatty, a most gallant officer, eminently
fitted to use it, whose temperament is the very spirit
of action, and yet who forms his plans in the mould
of cool reflection. Happily for the British Navy, the
fire of action is mingled in its officers with the ice of
thought. They know when to strike, and when they
strike they strike hard.
Great responsibilities have rested on the captains of
His Majesty's ships. They showed in the Jutland bat-
tle, in which they were tried by the searching test
of decisive action, that they possessed the ability to
inspire and discipline their men, and to put forth the
maximum of the fighting power of the ships. Officers
in detached command away from the Fleet have ren-
dered very great services. The junior officers are be-
yond praise. By universal testimony, their devotion,
courage, and ever-ready professional skill, in every
test of emergency and endurance, have never been ex-
celled. The officers of the destroyers are men above
Officers and Men of the Navy 73
price. The commanders of submarines, who have even
carried their enterprise into the Baltic, and risked the
perils of mine and gun in the narrow waters of the
Dardanelles and the Bosphorus, are officers who have
won new laurels for the Fleet.
The men of the lower deck, wherever they serve,
give daily proof of the bravery, hardihood, cheerful-
ness, and long endurance which have always been
the qualities of British seamen. Let Sir John Jellicoe
speak of them as he knew them: —
Nothing can ever have been finer than the cool-
ness and courage shown in every case where ships
have been sunk by mines or torpedoes; discipline
has been perfect, and men have gone to their deaths
not only most gallantly, but most unselfishly. One
heard on all sides of numerous instances of men giv-
ing up on these occasions the plank which had sup-
ported them to some more feeble comrade, and I
feel prouder every day that passes that I command
such men. During the period of waiting and watch-
ing they are cheerful and contented, in spite of the
grey dullness of their lives.
It would not be difficult to single out instances
from the records of the war of constructive power in
thought, and sound and swift judgment in^ action, as
well as of splendid courage, enterprise, dash, and
resolution — call it what you will — in the crisis of
battle and in moments of stress, exhibited in a manner
rarely exampled in naval warfare. The British Fleet
has been rich in the mental endowments of its officers,
showing them to possess grasp and insight, and moral
force, to dominate hesitation and sustain action in the
tremendous emergencies of battle and when confronted
74 The Achievement of the British Navy
with the most formidable responsibilities. Excite-
ment has never carried them away. Judgment has
worked through all their endeavours as, in the long
watches and waiting, it has sustained them.
Eulogy is not required. Nothing that has been
said exceeds the merits of officers and men. It is
right that these things should be understood. The
man is more than the machine, and the finest fleet
and most complete material equipment are dead and
inert without the living power of the officers who com-
mand, and the men who man the ships and vessels of
every class. It is they who have done and are doing
the work of the Navy in the war. They, and not their
ships, have given security to the British Isles, have
kept the seas and oceans open for the Allies, have safe-
guarded every interest afloat, and have worked and
are working, day and night, to defeat the purposes of
the enemy.
We now turn to a consideration which is of para-
mount importance for a right understanding of the
Navy's work in the war. England is the support
of all her Continental Allies. If she should suffer or
lose her power of supplying them with armies and
arms, or should weaken in her offensive, the Allies
would collapse. This is a fact of primary impor-
tance. The Germans realise it fully. They hesitate
at nothing in their efforts to strike at England. They
publicly declared that they would reduce her by fam-
ine. They struck at her mercantile marine, not merely
at ships which were armed and engaged in the naval
service in such large numbers, but at the ordinary
cargo vessels, including neutral vessels carrying Brit-
Officers and Men of the Navy 75
ish supplies, and at fishermen pursuing their regular
avocations, who, under The Hague Conventions, vsrere,
with their boats, tackle, rigging, gear, and cargoes, to
be exempt from capture, and still more from destruc-
tion. Of the officers and men of these services we
must speak also. It became necessary, in the condi-
tions which had arisen, to bring the whole mercantile
marine under naval direction and orders, and practi-
cally it is embodied with the Navy, and provided for
the most part with armaments for defence, and closely
in touch with a great protective organisation.
When Mr. Balfour was First Lord of the Admiralty,
speaking in the House of Commons on March 7th,
19 1 6, he directed special attention to this aspect of
naval work, not merely to the service of ships flying
the White Ensign, but to that of transports and of
merchant and cargo vessels, and their officers and
men, conveying imports and exports, and the supplies
required by the Allied armies. "On them," he said,
"we depend, not less than on our armed forces, for
maintaining the necessary economic basis upon which
all war must ultimately be waged." There were, as
he said, thousands of officers and men whose ships had
been sunk under them by mine and submarine, and yet
who had cheerfully signed on again, and were not to
be driven from their ancient heritage of the sea.
England depends upon her mercantile marine for her
national existence. To a great extent, her food and
raw materials are in its charge; and it also brings
without ceasing hundreds of thousands of tons of mu-
nitions of many kinds required by the Allies. When,
therefore, we estimate the work of the Navy in the
76 The Achievement of the British Navy
war, we must give to the merchant branch of the Sea
Service the position it deserves, as an absolute and
primary necessity to England and her Allies.
The nobility of the work carried on by the officers
and men of the merchant service and the fishermen,
whether in armed ships, mine trawlers, or cargo ves-
sels, is a dominant note of the war. Their heroism
has been conspicuous, and, as was stated by Admiral
Sir Henry Jackson, when he was First Sea Lord of
the Admiralty, the facility with which they learned
to carry out their duties as part of a trained fighting
force was extraordinary. "The Allied nations," he
said, "owe them a deep debt of gratitude for their
response, as well as for their indomitable pluck and
endurance." "There is no room in the Navy for any-
thing but the most sincere admiration and respect for
the officers and men of the mercantile marine," said
Sir John Jellicoe. They had practically become a
part of the fighting force, sharing in the work of the
Navy in the war, and their courageous conduct and
unflinching devotion to duty have gained the testimony
of naval officers everywhere, not only in the British
service, but in the Allied navies which have come
into contact with them. Of the magnificent service
of the mine-trawlers we have spoken in a previous
chapter.
Let this chapter conclude with an appeal to Eng-
land and her Allies to remember the great and endur-
ing services of British seamen. They do not often
speak of one another. Sometimes, as by a flash, as
when Sir John Jellicoe wrote of his men, the truth is
revealed. It was that taciturn old officer. Sir John
Officers and Men of the Navy 77
Jervis, who said of Troubridge that he had "honour
and courage as bright as his sword." The torch is
handed on from one officer to another. There are
many qualities among them. The fire of Drake meets
the resolute gravity of Blake; the long reflection of
Kempenfelt is the foil to the fierce glow of Nelson.
The tradition is continuous. Sir John Jellicoe could
find no words to do justice to his officers and men
in the day and night actions of the Jutland Battle.
The glorious traditions of the past were worthily
upheld. Sir David Beatty showed his fine qualities of
gallant leadership, high determination, and correct
strategic insight. Great qualities were manifested by
every rank and rating. Down in the engine-rooms,
seeing nothing of the battle, men were working like
Titans, and some ships reached speeds which they had
never before attained. This was great service for
England and her Allies.
There is sometimes a tendency to forget — to lose
proportion, also — in censuring seamen for not doing
what the power of the sea alone can never achieve.
Howe was burned in effigy in London almost at the
very time when he was fighting his glorious battle
of Quiberon Bay, braving the perils of rocks which
were charted and known, and not, be it noted, of
submarines and mines which are invisible and un-
known. As the sarcastic songster wrote at the time:
When Hawke did bang
Monsieur Conflans,
You sent us beef and beer;
Now Monsieur's beat.
We've naught to eat.
Since you have naught to fear.
78 The Achievement of the British Navy
And so Nelson spoke. "I will only apply," he said,
"some very old lines wrote at the end of some former
war:
"Our God and sailor we adore
In times of danger — not before!
The danger past, both are alike requited:
God is forgotten, and the sailor slighted!"
Now, the object of this book is to show what are
the services of the British Navy to England and to
the Allies. Its influence has been visible throughout
the world, working everywhere with unexampled suc-
cess. It operates solely because of the qualities and
sacrifices of its officers and men. To them a high
tribute must be paid.
CHAPTER X
What the British Navy Is and What It Fights
For
Where shall the watchful sun,
England, my England,
Match the master-work you've done,
England, my own?
When shall he rejoice agen
Such a breed of mighty men
As come forward, one to ten,
To the song on your bugles blown,
England —
Down the years on your bugles blown?
JV. E. Henley.
ANTAGONISM between England and Germany
became the central fact in the international
situation many years before the war. There
seemed to be a fundamental antithesis between the
ideals of the two peoples. The freedom of the English-
man, guaranteed to him by sea-power, appeared ef-
feminate and undisciplined weakness to the German;
- the freedom of the German, guaranteed to him only by
the military strength of his autocratic State, was
regarded as feudal dependence by the Englishman.
Not to bring about a conflict, but to avert one — or,
if the worst came to the worst, to engage in one with
success — was the motive of British policy. There
was no visible ground for German aggression, but
deep-seated antagonism was the element of danger
79
80 The Achievement of the British Navy
which successive Premiers and Foreign Ministers had
had to take account of in appraising their country's
future, and, with the guidance of their colleague at
the Admiralty, who based his judgment on that of
his naval advisers, they had obtained the means to
build up the Fleet, which was to be the country's
and Empire's defence.
Armageddon was foreseen, though there was hope
against hope that, in the great crisis, the dire struggle
might be averted. It was known that Belgium and
France would have need of England if the dogs of
war were let slip. Many soldiers and writers had
pointed out that Belgium would become the inevitable
pathway of aggression. German writers had declared
it an injury that the Congress of Vienna had not es-
tablished Germany on the North Sea, and Arndt had
expressed the ardent desire of the German heart to re-
conquer the great western rivers, implying the domi-
nation of the seas. There were dangers in these lesser
countries. They were full of possibilities. Qui trop
embrasse mal etreint. Belgium would cry aloud for
English help. As to Italy, it was difficult to believe
that she could hold to her compact with the Central
Powers. Russia, it was known, would be against
them. Thus in all her naval efforts, long before the
war, England, while guarding her own interests, was
working and building up her naval strength, in con-
scious knowledge of the duty she might one day have
to her friends who have now become her Allies. This
is a very important point, and it leads to a brief
survey of great sacrifices and unstinted efforts which
Englishmen have made in the past.
I ' ji
is' •<'
:^r
i?l5
What the British Navy Fights For 81
The Fleet that went into the war was the most
powerful, best organised, and best equipped in every
essential particular in the world. Yet, for a very-
long anterior period. Englishmen had remained un-
conscious of what they owed to the Fleet. They had
fought brilliant campaigns in China, Afghanistan, In-
dia, Burma, the Crimea, Abyssinia, and elsewhere, in
which the Navy was a most essential factor, though
it had scarcely appeared in the public eye. It was
therefore from a low ebb that the British Navy rose to
the high-water m^k of the war. It was not until about
the year 1882 that the tide began to turn, driven for-
ward by the lively breeze of a very useful agitation,
in which the late Mr. W. T. Stead took a prominent
part, and which is believed to have been inspired by
the present Lord Fisher and the late Mr. Arnold Fors-
ter. A great shipbuilding scheme was put in hand in
1889. Ever since that time, under far-seeing First
Lords and First Sea Lords of the Admiralty, the task
of asserting British naval supremacy has gone for-
ward. Expenditure on the Navy mounted from i3i,-
000,000 in 1901 to £51,500,000 in 1914, which latter
was thought a monstrous figure; but it was not a
penny too much for the great interests which had to
be safeguarded.
Battleships of increasing power, cruisers of many
classes, destroyers, submarines, and auxiliaries were
built. Lord Fisher came to the Admiralty as First Sea
Lord in 1904, and during the subsequent six years an
enormous work was carried on. The battleships cul-
minated in the Dreadnoughts — that class of ships
with a main armament of all big guns — the cruisers
82 The Achievement of the British Navy
in the battle-cruisers, destroyers grew more numerous
and of much greater power, submarines were devel-
oped in range and sea-keeping qualities. None of
these types have stood still. The Dreadnought de-
veloped into the Super-Dreadnought, and the latter
has developed into the ships of powers before un-
dreamed of, which no one has yet described. The sub-
marine has been changed out of recognition, and no
one suspects what these British vessels can and will
do when "The Day" really comes.
All these mechanical developments of the Fleet,
which are so essential at the present time, grew out
of the impetus given in and after the year 1904.
But that was not the only thing which placed the
country in such a position of advantage at the begin-
ning of the war. The battle-fleet and cruiser squad-
rons had been reorganised to coincide with the needs
of the Empire, owing to the shifting of the stress of
naval power from the Atlantic and the Channel to the
North Sea. Some squadrons in distant waters were
reduced in strength to correspond with the require-
ments, and non-fighting ships — vessels too weak to
fight and too slow to run away — were brought home
from distant seas, and their officers and men were
made available for modern ships. A system of nu-
cleus crews was adopted for the reserve ships to facili-
tate mobilisation and to make sure that the ships
would be really fit for sea. Before that time the whole
Fleet had been pivoted on the Mediterranean, and a
British warship was rarely seen in the North Sea. By
progressive steps the naval front was changed from
the South to the East. On the east coast of the
What the British Navy Fights For 83
United Kingdom destroyer and submarine flotillas
were based on ports prepared for them. A great dock-
yard was erected at Rosyth, and all along the coast
naval bases were developed, and every preparation
was made for the possibility of war. These were
developments of great significance, and the immense
and growing strength of the British Fleet justified
the French in concentrating their battle squadrons in
the Mediterranean, and leaving at Brest and in the
Channel only a division of cruisers, supported by flo-
tillas.
Fleets of warships are meant to fight when the
need for fighting comes; but there was no affront to
Germany, no cause for resentment or agitation, in the
concentration of the main strength of the British
Fleet in such places, and with such bases, that they
could carry their power into the North Sea. Force
attracts force in strategy as in physics, and the growth
of the German High Sea Fleet at Wilhelmshaven,
with the great sea canal thence to Kiel on the Baltic,
inevitably brought about the British concentration.
How magnificently advantageous was the position se-
cured has already been shown. In an earlier chapter
it has also been explained that by the strategic posi-
tion occupied by the Grand Fleet, and the grip held
on the entrance to the Channel at Dover, the North
Sea became strategically a closed sea — a mare clausum.
This fact, which is a fact of geography as well as
of strategic concentration, has made the enemy restive
and resentful. We are described as the "tyrants of
the seas," and the "freedom of the seas" became a
catchword of the Germans. Every ruler who has felt
84 The Achievement of the British Navy
the hard pressure of British sea-power, whether his
name was Louis, or Napoleon, or Wilhelm, has, per-
haps inevitably, taken this line in denouncing us to
neutrals and endeavouring to array neutrals against us.
In an earlier stage of the present war this was the
consistent plea of German statesmen. But when they
instructed their sea officers to sink the Lusitania and
many other ships, and when they threatened with dis-
aster neutral ships which approached the British Isles,
they became themselves the tyrants of the sea in a very
real sense, and they thus arrayed the United States
and other States against themselves, and brought a new
Armada to strengthen the already superior British
Fleet.
The war is a fight for freedom. The British Navy
is fighting, and glad to have the Allied navies fighting
in co-ordination with it, for the liberation of oppressed
nations and countries from military domination.
Command of the sea implies no restriction of naviga-
tion. It exists only in war time. In time of peace
the British Navy guaranteed the freedom of the seas,
and will guarantee it again when the war is at an end.
We cannot do better than quote on this question what
that distinguished American writer Admiral Mahan
said: —
Why do English innate political conceptions of
popular representative Government, of the balance
of law and liberty, prevail in North America from
the Arctic Circle to the Gulf of Mexico, from the
Atlantic to the Pacific? Because the command of
the sea at the decisive era belonged to Great Britain.
In India and Egypt administrative efficiency has
taken the place of a welter of tyranny, feudal strug-
What the British Navy Fights For 85
gle, and bloodshed, achieving thereby the compara-
tive welfare of the once harried populations. What
underlies this administrative efficiency? The Brit-
ish Navy, assuring in the first place British control
and thereafter communication with the home coun-
try, whence comes the local power without which
administration everywhere is futile. What, at the
moment when the Monroe doctrine was proclaimed,
insured beyond peradventure the immunity from
foreign oppression of the Spanish-American colonies
in their struggle for independence? The command
of the sea by Great Britain, backed by the feeble
Navy but imposing strategic position of the United
States, with her swarm of potential commerce-de-
stroyers, which, a decade before, had harassed the
trade even of the Mistress of the Seas.
In concluding, therefore, we see how the British
Navy, having served Great Britain and the British
Empire so efficiently and so well in every interest
and possession, fighting constantly against every
stealthy device of the enemy, has served the Allies
not less well and worthily. And we discover, too,
that the Navy is ever friendly to neutral Powers,
and that the command of the sea which it exercises
in the war is the panoply of freedom and liberty
throughout the world.
1
if
'I
I. THE ( EXTUE OF SEA TOWER: THE NORTH SEA
I ARO C C O
T RIP Q. I, J
II. THE GRASP OF THE MEDITEERANEAN— LAND AND SEA POWER
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