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tT. E. PA(;E, f.n., i.iTT.i). 
tE. CAPPS, rH.i)., LL.i). tW. H. D. ROUSE, litt.d. 

L. A. POST, L.ii.D. E. H. WARMINGTON, m.a., f.r.hist.soc. 















First printed 1954 
Reprinted 1964 

Printed in Great Britain 



IxTRonucTioM ...... vii 

Bibliography ...... xli 

Analysis ....... xlv 

Text and Translation 

Book I 1 

Book II 57 

Book III 155 

Book IV 227 

Index 413 

Index of Greek Words .... 429 


The Greek art of rhetoric was first naturalized at 
Rome in the time of the younger Scipio, and Latin 
treatises on the subject were in circulation from the 
time of the Gracchi. But the books by Cato, An- 
tonius, and the other Roman writers have not come 
down to us, and it is from the second decade of the 
first century B.C. that we have, in the treatise 
addressed to Gaius Herennius, the oldest Latin Art 
preserved entire. Like Cicero's incomplete De 
Inveniione, which belongs close to it in time, this work 
reflects Hellenistic rhetorical teaching. Our author, 
however, gives us a Greek art in Latin dress, com- 
bining a Roman spirit with Greek doctrine. It is a 
technical manual, systematic and formal in arrange- 
ment ; its exposition is bald, but in greatest part 
clear and precise. Indeed the writer's specific aims 
are to achieve clarity and conciseness, and to complete 
the exposition of his subject with reasonable speed. 
He seeks clarity through the use of Roman terms, and 
of specially selected examples ; he seeks conciseness 
by keeping practical needs always in view, by scrupu- 
lously avoiding irrelevant matter, and by presenting 
methods and principles, not a host of particular 
illustrations of a given point.'» 

The fact that the treatise appeared, from Jerome's 

" See Schanz, ed. 1909, p. 466. 



time on, as a work by Cicero " gave it a prestige which 
it enjoyed for over a thousand years. Because of its 
position in the MSS. following De Inventione it was in 
the twelfth century called Rhetorica Secunda ; perhaps 
because of a belief that Cicero wrote the treatise to 
replace his juvenile De Inventione, it was later called 
Rhetorica Novafi But Cicero never refers to any work 
of his which might be identified with our treatise ; 
the disparaging reference in De Oratore 1. 2. 5 to 
those " crude and incomplete " essays of his youth is 
obviously to the two books De Inventione. The pic- 
ture we draw of our author does not fit the early 
Cicero, and his doctrines in many crucial instances, as 
will be seen later, are in sharp contrast with those of 
De Inventione. Furthermore, the thought and style 
of the work are unworthy of the mature Cicero. 
Finally Quintilian ^ (who often cites De Inventione),^ 

" The uncritical editor who, before Jerome's time, made 
this ascription may also have been responsible for the division 
of the work into six books. He may have thought the un- 
titled work Cicero's because of its resemblance to De Inventione, 
and may have interpreted the inchoaia ac rudia of De Oratore 
1. 2. 5 as referring to two distinct works. An interesting 
interpolation, based on the belief in Ciceronian authorship, 
appears in the MSS. at 1. xii. 20 : [Tulli^is] heres meu-s 
[Terentiae] uxori meae. 

* For hke parallel designations oi literary works m the 
Middle Ages, see E. R. Curtius, Europdische Liieratur und 
lateinisches Mittelalter, Bern, 1948, p. 161. 

« It is argued, for example, that if Quintilian at 4. 5. 3, 
where he considers the view that the propositions in a Par- 
tition should not exceed three (cf. the like principle for the 
Enumeration in our treatise, 1. x. 17), or at 3. 6. 45, where 
he deals with the three Types of Issue (c/. our treatise, 1. x. 18), 
had known that these were identical with, or akin to, Ciceronian 
notions, he would not have kept silent on the point. 

** Usually under the title Libri Rhetorici. 


and similarly Gellius," Marius Victorinus, Servius, 
and Cassiodorus show no acquaintance with any 
Ciceronian work of this nature. Although the belief 
in Ciceronian authorship has still not entirely dis- 
appeared, all the recent editors agree that the 
attribution is erroneous. 

The first to doubt that the treatise was worthy of 
Ciceronian authorship was Lorenzo Valla (middle 
saec. xv). Then Raphael Regius in 1491 positively 
divorced the work from Cicero's name. The question 
of authorship has occupied the attention of scholars 
at intervals ever since, but has never been settled to 
the satisfaction of all. It is wisest, I believe, to 
ascribe the work to an unknown author, although 
a good many reputable scholars have made out a 
case, at first glance attractive, for assigning it to a 
rhetorician named Cornificius.^ These rely on cita- 
tions in Quintilian which correspond with passages in 
Book 4 of our treatise. Cornificius is mentioned, 
and always with disapproval, in the following places : 

In 5. 10. 2 Quintilian, discussing arguments, criticizes 
Cornificius for calling a Conclusion from Incompatibles 
contrarium ; contrarium appears in our treatise as a 
figure (of diction). 

In 9. 2. 27 Quintilian tells us that oratio libera — 
which he would allow to be called a figure only if it is 

" Gellius, 13. 6. 4, says that he has been unable to discover 
whether the term barbarismus was used before the Augustan 
age; c/. our treatise, 4. xii. 17. 

* The first to ascribe the work with assurance to Cornificius 
was Petrus Victorius in 1582 ; Regius had vacillated, assigning 
it variously to Cornificius, Verginius Flavus, and Timolaiis. 
Recent scholars who have upheld the theory of Comifician 
authorship are Johannes Tolkiehn, Jahresb. des jjhilol. 
Vereins zu Berlin 45 (1919). 73, and Wilhelm Kroll, Gloita 
22 (1934). 24, and Philologus 89 (1934). 63. 



simulated and artfully designed — is by Cornificius 
called licentia ; licentia is the term used by our author 
(4. xxxvi. 48) for a figure which, in one form, fulfils 
Quintilian's requirements. 

In 9. 3. 69-71 Quintilian, dealing with adnomina- 
tio, gives three examples of flat punning to be avoided, 
not imitated; Cornificius, he says, calls this word- 
play tradiLctio. Two of these examples are used by 
our author, one to illustrate traductio (4. xiv. 21), 
but the other to illustrate adnominatio (4. xxi. 29). 
To meet this real difficulty, the advocates of Corni- 
fician authorship maintain that adnominatio and 
traductio are brought together by Quintilian because 
they are indeed kindred figures, but these scholars 
are forced also to blame Quintilian for casual excerpt- 
ing at this point, or for drawing upon his memory — a 
charge hard to prove against so careful a w^orkman. 

In 9. 3. 91 Quintilian criticizes Cornificius and 
Rutilius for regarding^mie'o, which is no figure at all, 
as a figure of diction ; definitio, somewhat differently 
characterized, appears as a figure of diction in our 
treatise (4. xxv. 35). 

In 9. 3. 98 Quintilian tells us that Cornificius lists 
ten figures of diction of which the first five must be 
regarded as figures of thought: interrogatio (cf. 
4. XV. 22), ratiocinatio (4. xvi. 23), subiectio (4. 
xxiii. 33), transitio (4. xxvi. 35), occultatio (4. 
xxvii. 37), and the other five as not figures at all: 
sententia (4. xvii. 24), memhrum (4. xix. 26), articuli 
{ariiculus = 4. xix. 26), inierpretaiio (4. xxviii. 38), 
conclusio (4. xxx. 41)." These all appear in our 
treatise, in the places indicated in parentheses. 

° Georg Thiele, Gott. gel Anz., 1892 (2). 725 £F., compares 
the order of the figures in this passage with that which they 


Quintilian mentions Cornificius in two other places. 
In 3. 1. 21, sketching the history of writers on 
rhetoric, he says : " Cornificius wrote a great deal 
{non pauca) on the same subject (rhetoric), Stertinius 
something, and the elder Gallio « a little. But the 
predecessors of Gallio, Celsus and Laenas,* and in our 
own day \'erginius,<^ Pliny ,<^ and Tutilius wrote with 
greater care. And even today there are dis- 
tinguished authors. ..." To this passage may be 
joined 9. 3. 89, where Cornificius appears in a list 
of authors who devoted whole books {non partem 
operis . . . sed propria libros) to the discussion of 
figures : " Caecilius, Dionysius,^ Rutilius,/ Cornificius, 
Visellius, and a number of others, although there are 
living authors whose glory will match theirs." ^ 

follow in our treatise, and sees in the comparison an argument 
for Cornifician authorship ; Curtius Koehler, De Rhdoricis ad 
Herennium, Berlin, 1909, pp. 8 ff., presents the refutation. 
" Long survived the elder Seneca, who died c. a.d. 39. 

* Both A. Cornelius Celsus and Popilius Laenas fl. under 

* Verginius Flaxnis fl. under Xero. 
«^ The Elder (a.d. 23 '4-79). 

' Both Caecilius and Dionysius fl. under Augustus. 
■^ P. Rutilius Lupus fl. in the late Augustan period, 
^ In five other places Quintilian gives examples which, 
with greater or less completeness, appear also in our treatise : 
9. 3. 31 (romplezio, 4. xiv. 20); 9. 3. 56 (gradatio, 4. xxv. 34); 
two examples in 9. 3. 72 (adnominatio, 4. xxii. 30 and 4.xxi. 29), 
the wording of one differing slightly, that of the other a great 
deal, from that in our treatise; 9. 3. 85 {avriii^TaBoXTj — 
commutaiio, 4. xxviii. 39); 9. 3. 88 (duhitatio, 4. xxix. 40). 
None of these examples is assigned by Quintilian to Cornificius 
or to any other author ; whether they appeared in Cornificius' 
book and were from there borrowed by Quintilian we cannot 
know. Some or all of these examples may have been common 
to a number of manuals. The well-known remark attributed 
to Socrates (" I do not live to eat, but eat to live "), which 



An examination of these passages, especially in 
their context, leads us to several conclusions. First, 
Cornificius lived after the time of Cicero and near 
(but before) Quintilian's own day. In 3. 1. 8 ff. 
Quintilian is obviously preserving a chronological 
order : Cornificius appears after Cicero (rather than 
immediately after Antonius) and before the writers 
aetatis nostrae. Again, in 9. 3. 91 and 9. 3. 98-9 
Cornificius, Caecilius, and Rutilius are mentioned 
following discussions of Cicero. Finally, in 9. 3. 89 
Cornificius is listed with writers of the Augustan 
age, and we assume that he was contemporary with 
them or flourished soon after them.<* It would seem 
preposterous to place a writer of Marian times in this 

We further conclude that Cornificius was the 
author of a special book on figures,^ and that this is 

Quintilian uses as an example in 9. 3. 85, he may have found 
in a Greek source. 

" The eflPorts that have been made to identify Cornificius 
with any one of that name who lived at this time have come to 
nought. Nor have the many scholars who have ascribed our 
treatise to a Cornificius, and so sought to identify him with an 
earlier bearer of that name, agreed in their identification. 
C. L. Kayser's choice, the Q. Cornificius who with Cicero 
was candidate for the consulship in 64 B.C. was favoured for a 

* It is likely that this work did not contain a section on 
tropes. Quintilian (8. 6. 1 ff.) never cites Cornificius on this 
subject, nor refers to any of the several resemblances, in rules 
and examples, that exist between his treatment and our 
author's. In large part, however, his treatment differs 
from our author's. If Cornificius had discussed tropes, it is 
perhaps safe to assume that passages from his book would have 
been excerpted by Quintilian. Again, in 9. 1. 2 Quintilian 
mentions Proculus as among the writers who call tropes 
"figures"; our author, too, attaches the tropes to the 


the source from which Quintilian makes his citations 
in Book 9. Tliat Cornificius produced additional 
work in the field of rhetoric is possible ; " the phrase 
non pmtca in 3. i. 21, however, does not permit us 
to be certain whether this was in the form of a com- 
plete Art of rhetoric,* or of several works on single 
parts of the subject. 

figures in this way (4. xxxi. 42), but Quintilian does not name 
Cornificius along with Proculus, 

The separation of tropes from figures was first made, we 
think, in the Augustan age. If Cornificius dealt only with 
figures, that fact, too, might be evidence for placing him at a 
time not earlier than that period. 

" Marx, however, believes that Cornificius WTote only the 
special work on figures. 

* Thiele [Gott. gel. Anz.) and Ammon believe that it was 
such a complete Art of rhetoric. Thiele identifies it with our 
treatise; the special book on figures was a portion (= Bk. 4) 
of this Art. Ammon {Blatter, pp. 409 AT.) argues as follows : 
The division, in the MSS., of Book 4 (which is especially large) 
into three books indicates that we have in our treatise a con- 
tamination of Cornificius' complete Art and his special work 
on figures. The " Art " extends to 4. xiii. 18, at the end of 
which there is a lacuna; 4. i. 1 to 4. xiii. 18 corresponds to 
" Book iv " of the MSS. The special book on figures also 
perhaps included two books; " Book v," dealing with figures 
of diction, extends from 4. xiii. 19 to 4. xxxiv. 46, and 
" Book vi," treating figures of thought, extends from 4. xxxv. 
47 to the end. In the union a portion of the complete Art of 
rhetoric was lost — a short exposition of the two types of 
figures, and the beginning of their treatment. That Corni- 
ficius' attitude towards the use of one's own examples diflfered 
in the two works Ammon thinks is not significant. But 
Ammon's hypothesis is not acceptable, since the division into 
four books follows from the author's own words; the lacuna 
at 4. xiii. 18 is brief (only a transition is indicated) ; neither are 
the first three books of \miform length; and the author's 
special interest in ornatus justifies the length of Book 4, which 
in any event may as it stands lay claim to unity. 



Cornificius, then, lived in a later period than our 
author, and so cannot have written the Rheforica ad 
Herennium. The book by Cornificius which Quin- 
tilian cites is not the Rhetorica ad Herennium, and 
there is no evidence that Quintilian knew or made 
use of our treatise.^ The agreements between 
Cornificius' work and our author's we explain by 
assuming a common source,'' and we should re- 
member, too, that some of the matter, especially 
some of the examples, shared by both can be classed 
among the commonplaces of the subject. 

Who, finally, was the real author? We have no 
evidence to determine that question, and so must 
assign the work to an auctor incertus.^ 

" Further arguments (see Koehler) rest frankly on the 
orgumentum e sUentio. For example, Quintilian often refers 
to Cicero's De Jnventione but never mentions the agreements 
between that work and " Cornificius." Again, in 9. 2. 54 
he lists four terms used for the figure Aposiopesis, but not the 
term used by our author {praecisio, 4. xxx. 41); this silence 
leads some to question whether, had he known our treatise, 
he would not in such cases as this have referred to the terms 
our author employs. Or again, in 9. 3. 99 rjdoTToua and 
XapaKTr]piofi6s are cited from Rutilius among figures supple- 
mentary to those found in other authors. Since Cornificius 
has just been mentioned, it is inferred that his book lacked 
these figures; but they appear in our treatise as notatio 
(4. 1. 63) and effictio (4. xlix. 62). Or again, in 3. 6. 45, 
where Verginius Flavus is referred to as favouring the Antonian 
classification of the Types of Issue (r/. our treatise 1. x. 18), 
Cornificius is not mentioned — but as I should remind the reader, 
the advocates of Cornifician authorship believe that Quintilian 
was not interested in the first three books of our work, or in 
4. i. 1-xii. 18, because on the subjects there treated he had 
recourse to better material elsewhere. 

* TeuflFel-KroU and others, however, beheve that Cornificius 
probably used our treatise directly. 

" Other attributions, none of them seriously pressed to-day, 
have in the course of time since the fifteenth century been made 


The original title is as unknown to us as the name 
of the author. Marx, on the basis of the introductory 
remarks in 15ook 1, suggests, with plausibility, that 
this might have been J)e Rafione Dicendi, which was 
also the title of Antonius' treatise on rhetoric. 

Our author dedicates his work to Gaius Herennius ; 
we know several Herennii '^ of this period, but no one 
definitely identifiable vvith the addressee. Marx, 
influenced by the apparent fact that the work re- 
mained unnoticed for five hundred years, believed 
that it was intended only for private use, and not for 
publication, but this hypothesis does not receive 
universal acceptance. 

As we have said, the treatise is altogether Greek in 
doctrine. The Rhodian'' rhetor who represents its 
original source sought to bind rhetoric to philosophy, 
and the book as it stands is a synthesis of various 
teachings : pre-Aristotelian (Isocratean and " Anaxi- 
menean "), Aristotelian and Peripatetic, Stoic, 
Hermagorean, and possibly Epicurean. Hellenistic 
theorists selected from ail schools what they needed, 
and indeed some of the precepts were by then a 
common possession.*^ We must remark, too, in our 

to : Verginius Flavus (time of Xeroj, Timolaijs (time of 
Aurelian), M. Tulliiis Tiro and M. Tullius Laurea (freedmen 
of Cicero), the rhetor Junius Gallio (friend of the elder Seneca), 
M. Antonius Gnipho and L. Aelius Stilo (teachers of Cicero), 
M. T. Cicero (son of the great orator), L. Ateius Praetextatus 
(d. after 29 B.C.), and Papirius Fabianus (time of Tiberius). 

" They were of plebeian stock, and were allied to the family 
of Marius. 

* Many Romans came to Rhodes, a great centre of rhetorical 
studies, and in 87 B.C. Apollonius Molo visited Rome. The 
notes indicate a number of echoes of Rhodian life and thought. 

'^ Cf. Cicero, De Inv. 2. iii. 8 : " [Isocratean theory and 
Aristotelian theorv] were fused into one bv their successors." 


author's case the thoroughly practical motives to 
which he constantly gives expression. The notes in 
the present volume attempt in many instances to 
indicate the ties by which he is bound to the traditions 
of different schools. To illustrate briefly, and almost 
at random: the threefold purpose of the Direct 
Opening is pre- Aristotelian doctrine ; the concept of 
the officia oratoris is Aristotelian; the "virtues" 
of Style go back to Theophrastus ; the detailed 
treatment of Delivery belongs probably to post- 
Theophrastan theory; the discussion of Solecism 
and Barbarism shows a debt to Stoicism ; the defini- 
tion of rhetoric is Hermagorean, and so too, though in 
modified form, is our author's status system — indeed 
every art which had a status system w as beholden to 
Hermagoras ; the opposition to amphibolies may be 
Epicurean ; and in the case of some principles the 
Sophists and Plato play an originating or participating 

The precepts are often illustrated by excellent 
examples, many of them allusions to the recent and 
the contemporary political scene, especially the Mar- 
sic and Marian Wars, and many bringing back to life 
the older Roman eloquence. Of the older Latin 
orators, our author shows special admiration for 
Gains Gracchus and Crassus (4. i. 2, 4. ii. 2), but he 
tells us that Cato, Tiberius Gracchus, Laelius, Scipio, 
Porcina, and Antonius also commonly serve as 
models in the field of style. Poets and historians, 
too, may be models (4. v. 7); he has praise for 
Ennius and Pacuvius (4. iv. 7), but he does not 

Interdependence is often hard to trace definitely even in the 
earlier periods. 



hesitate to use these poets and Plautus <* and the 
historian Coelius Antipater in illustration of faults of 
argumentation or of style. Examples of figures of 
speech (whose sources he does not name) are drawn 
from Greek authors as well ; the speeches of Demos- 
thenes (especially De Corona) and Aeschines are 
special favourites, but sayings originated by Homer, 
Simonides, Pythagoras, Isocrates, Socrates, Theo- 
phrastus, Aristarchus, Apollonius o fjLaXaKog, and 
others also appear, as do references to Greek 
mythology. The author's experience and mastery 
of Greek literature, however, do not seem to have 
been great ; this Greek lore was transmitted to him 
from the schools. 

The schools emphasized declamation and the study 
of models, and the treatise is in this respect an image 
of school practice. Declamatory exercises — the 
author again and again stresses the importance of 
exercise ^ — are represented in the form of pro- 
gymnasmaia of various types (including training in 
epideictic), of deliberative questions (deliberaiiones, 
suasoriae), and of judicial cases {causae, control ersiae). 
The deliberative questions are all taken from events 
of Roman history, none of them antedating the war 
with Hannibal.*^ Of the judicial cases drawn from 
Roman history, almost all date from the end of the 
Jugurthine War to the end of the Nlarian War ; a 
number are also Greek in origin, and occasionally are 

" And probably also Accius ; see 2. xxvi. 42. 

* But never a word about declaiming in Greek; cf. on the 
other hand the custom followed by Cicero {Brutus 90. 310). 

* For events connected with the Hannibalic war Coelius 
Antipater may have served as a source, for the subsequent 
period the orators, and perhaps also Cato's Origines; see 



altered to fit Roman conditions. Our author doubt- 
less used collections of declamations current in his 

The organization of the treatise is rather com- 
plicated.'* The author is heir to two structural 
schemes — the pre-Aristotelian, based on the partes 
of the discourse {^lopia Xoyov), and the Peripatetic, 
based on the five oflicia (epya) of rhetoric. In his 
discussion of judicial oratory — which held the fore- 
ground in Hellenistic rhetoric, and claims most of 
his attention — both schemes are fused, " in order to 
make the subject easier to understand " (1. iii. 4), 
and with interesting results. The partes are treated 
under Invention, and not, as in the Peripatetic 
system, under Disposition. Disposition, which is 
therefore narrow in scope and rather sterile, becomes 
an adjunct of Invention ^ (3. ix. 16), and is treated 
directly after it, where in the Peripatetic structure 
we should expect a discussion of Style. The Types of 
Issue are subjoined to Proof, which is one of the partes, 
and not as in Aristotle a primary and central function 
of the whole art. The discussion of the deliberative 
and epideictic kinds, on the other hand, is more in 
hne with the Peripatetic method: in both cases 

«See Karl Barwick, Hermes 57 (1922). Iff.; Thiele, 
Quaestiones, pp. 96 ff. ; loannes Radtke, Observationes crit. 
in Cornifici libros de arte rhetorica, Koenigsberg, 1892, pp. 22 ff. ; 
Friedrich Solmsen, Amer. Journ. Philol. 62 (1941). 35-50, 169- 

^ The conflation results in certain inconsistencies; see, 
e.g.j the reference to Invention at 1. x. 16, and the note on 
3. X. 17. Certain other inconsistencies in the order are, 
however, not the result of conflation ; the author at times in 
his treatment transposes his original order of topics {e.g., in 
1. xiv. 24 and 2. xvi. 23 ; and c/. 1. xiv. 24 ff. with 2. xiv. 21 ff.). 



Invention receives first consideration, and then comes 
the Development of the cause based on the parts of the 

Each book has a Preface and a Conclusion, which, 
by brief summaries and transitions characteristic of 
lecture or text-book style, serve to tie the parts 
together, and to keep the plan of the work clear in 
the reader's mind. 

The first two books deal with Invention in judicial 
causes ; Invention in deliberative and epideictic 
speaking is discussed much more briefly in a part of 
Book 3. Disposition is also accorded little space for 
the reasons set forth above. But the treatment of 
Delivery, Memory, and Style is of special interest 
and importance. 

The doctrine of Delivery had been developed in 
post-Aristotelian times, and our author is familiar 
with books on the subject. He is dissatisfied with 
these and wishes to treat the subject with greater 
care and completeness than had characterized the 
work of his predecessors (3. xi. 19). In the section 
which he devotes to Deliver}^ two observations will 
present themselves to the modern student of public 
speaking. The rules are for the most part prescrip- 
tive ; the speaker is told precisely what use of voice, 
pause, and gesture he ought consciously to make in a 
variety of situations. And secondly, the doctrine 
represents a salutary reaction against Asianism ; 
piercing exclamations and the continual use of the 
full voice are more than once reprehended (3. xii. 
21 ff.), and the speaker is more than once warned 
against imitating the delivery of the stage-actor 
(3. xiv. 24, XV. 26). 

The section on Memory is our oldest surviving] 



treatment of the subj ect. Based on visual images and 
" backgrounds," the mnemotechnical system which it 
presents exerted an influence traceable to modern 
times. Here too the author refers to previous 
writers on the subject in order to combat their theory ; 
he specifies that these are Greek, but he does not 
mention any of them by name. 

In Book 4 we have the oldest systematic treat- 
ment of Style in Latin, indeed the oldest extant 
inquiry into the subject after Aristotle. It offers, 
furthermore, the oldest extant division of the kinds 
of Style into three, and the oldest extant formal study 
of figures. Our author gives more space to Style 
than to any other of the departments of rhetoric, and 
much more to ornatus — which is limited to the figures 
— than to the other aspects of Style. The excep- 
tionally large enumeration of figures is of course 
more in accord with Isocratean than with Aristotelian 
doctrine ; our author, together with the younger 
Gorgias (through the translation by Rutilius), pro- 
vides us with an important source for our knowledge 
of Hellenistic theory in this field. The treatment of 
the figures is not always bald and jejune, despite 
their formal array. Occasionally our author writes 
good literary criticism ; read for example the advice, 
anti-Asian in character, which he gives on the use 
of the Gorgianic figures (4. xxi. 32). He is often 
sensitive to the effect which a figure of speech, well- 
used, can work upon the hearer. He never advocates 
the tricky cunning which would have justified the 
scorn that Longinus {De Sublim., ch. 17) expressed for 
the " petty figures {(Txr]iJLdrLa) of the rhetorical crafts- 
man." His counsel is for moderation and the con- 
sideration of propriety — in the use of Apostrophe 



(4. XV. 22), Maxims (4. xvii. 25), Disjunction (4. 
xxvii. 38), Onomatopoeia (4. xxxi. 42), Metaphor 
(4. xxxiv. 45), and Comparison (4. xlviii. 61). The 
author is not always at ease among technical terms 
(see 4. vii. 10, and also 4. x. 15 and 4. xi. 16), 
since not all of these had yet become stable in Latin. 
Inasmuch as a like difficulty attends the translation of 
his terms into English, I have thought it my duty to 
readers to use the terms most familiar to them ; 
accordingly in rendering the names for the figures I 
have, abandoning strict consistency, used the English 
derivatives of the author's terms wherever possible, or 
the accepted English equivalents, and have employed 
terms of Greek origin where their use was indicated. 

A number of questions concerning the treatise are 
vigorously debated. How old was the author when 
the work was composed ? Is the treatise nothing but 
the notes of lectures delivered by his Latin teacher ? 
Does our author favour the populares ? What is 
his philosophical bias, if any ? And most baffling, 
what relation does the treatise bear to Cicero's De 
hiveniione ? 

Whereas in the nineteenth century it was cus- 
tomary to praise our author for " manly independence 
of thought," it is now, especially since Marx' work*^ 
appeared, common to make him out an uncritical 
and very young man, or a boy, who copied down, 
virtually word for word, the lectures of his Latin 
teacher, and worked these up ^^ith only slight 
additions, mostly represented by the Introductions 
and Conclusions to the several Books. The style does 
show puerilities, and signs of immaturity are sought 
and found here and there in the thought. But not 
*• See p. xxxvii. 



everything labelled as puerile by some critics justifies 
the label, and in some degree the charge would have 
to be shared by the teacher. The confusion between 
student and teacher arises necessarily from the theory 
that we have here only a student's notebook." 
Actually our author seems old enough to have spent 
{co7isuevimtis, 1. i. 1) time in philosophical studies,^ 
older enough than his kinsman Herennius to have 
composed the book for his use, and to encourage him 
in industry (1. i. 1 ; 2. xxxi. 50; 3. xxxiv. 40; 4. Ivi. 
69), young enough still to practise with him (3. i. 1 ; 
4. Ivi. 69), and to make plans for the future — he 
expects to write on Grammar (4. xii. 17), on 
Military Science and State Administration (3. ii. 3), 
on Memory (3. xvi. 28), and (if encouraged) against 
the dialecticians (2. xi. 16). We have no reason to 
believe that when he speaks of the pressure of private 
affairs (1. i. 1) and the demands of his occupations 
(1. xvii. 27) he is merely following a literary con- 
vention or indulging in rhetorical fiction. He charges 
Greek writers with childish argumentation in respect 
to the use of examples (4. iii. 4), warns against 
puerilities in the use of Isocolon and Paronomasia 
(4. XX. 27, xxiii. 32), and finds recourse to amphi- 
boUes silly (2. xi. 16). His apologies for slow 
progress and references to the magnitude of his task 
and the care he has devoted to it (e.g., 1. xvii. 27; 
2. xxxi. 50) are inconsistent with the picture of one 
who is merely working over dictated material. He 

« Cf. Quintilian, 3. 6. 59, on Cicero, De Inv. : " Such 
faults as [this collection of school-notes] has are assignable to 
his teacher." 

" Which he thinks conduce more to the good life than does 
the study of rhetoric ; he is not a professional rhetorician. 


professes to have taken pains in assembling his 
material {conquisite conscrlpsimus, 1. xxxi. 50, and 
studiose collegimus, 4. Ivi. 09), and this seems to imply 
the use of sources, although we cannot know how 
wide this use or how comprehensive his study of them 
may have been. 

Lecture notes doubtless form the core of the 
treatise, but the author probably made use of other 
sources as well, and worked the matter over with 
some degree of independence. Some of the very 
incongruities that we find in the treatise may derive 
precisely from this weaving together of material 
drawn from a number of places. Dependence on his 
teacher is explicit only in connection with a disputed 
point, on the number of Types of Issue " (1. x. 18). 
We go too far if we assume that the precepts all 
belong to the teacher and very little more than the 
Introductions and Conclusions to the author. And 
one wonders how the teacher would have regarded 
the release of his own work, even if only for private 
use, as the work of his pupil. ^ 

Does our author favour the Popular party ? It is 
believed that his teacher may have belonged to the 
school of L. Plotius Gallus and the rhetores Laiini. 
These teachers of public speaking, whose identity 
and innovations remain obscure to us, apparently as a 
matter of principle taught their subject in Latin, 
rigidly suppressing the Greek language ; they prob- 

" "\Mio the teacher [noster doctor) here referred to was we 
do not know. 

" See Schanz, ed. 1909, p. 470. Quintilian, 1. Pr. 7, regrets 
that two books of lecture notes, taken down by pupils, and by 
them published under his name, but without his consent, are 
in circulation. Marx, of course, maintains that our treatise 
was never int-ended for circulation. 


ably were Marian in sympathy and had as students 
only the sons of the populares.^ Our author can 
indeed in his examples praise or sympathize with the 
Gracchi, Saturninus, Drusus, and Sulpicius (2. xxviii. 
45; 4. xxii. 31; 4. Iv. 68; 4. xv. 22), and advise 
us to bring our adversaries into contempt by revealing 
their high birth (1. v. 8), but he can likewise accuse 
Gaius Gracchus of promoting panics (4. xxviii. 38), 
praise Caepio's attack on Saturninus as patriotic 
conduct (1. xii. 21 ; 2. xii. 17), warn Saturninus 
against the excesses of the popular mob (4. liv. 67), 
attribute the future revival of prosperity to the 
Conservatives (4. xxxiv. 45), and regard their 
slaughter as a disaster (4. viii. 12). The themes of 
the causae are variously Popular and Conservative in 
spirit, and we must infer that our author took his 
material where he found it and used it to suit his 
primary purpose — technical instruction in the art of 
rhetoric. If he really belonged to the Popular party, 
then he still must have believed in giving the Con- 
servative cause a hearing. 

Nor again should our author's attitude to the 
Greeks be represented as an antagonism approaching 
hatred. True, he deliberately takes most of his 
historical exempla from Roman history, repeatedly 
finds fault with the methods of Greek rhetoricians 
(1. i. 1; 3. xxiii. 38; 4. i. 1), and suppresses the 
names of Greek writers whose examples he uses in 
Book 4. But he also omits the names of Roman 
authors whose examples he uses in that Book. 
Furthermore, he professes to know Greek books, 
occasionally uses Greek technical terms and other 

" See Marx, Proleg., pp. 141 ff., and Aubrey Gwynn, Roman 
Education from Cicero to Quintilian, Oxford 1926, pp. 58-69. 



Greek words, and praises the Greeks for their in- 
vention of the art of rhetoric (4. vii. 10). 

A few traces of Epicureanism in the work have 
given rise to the notion that our author was an 
adherent of that school of philosophy. A maxim of 
]'!.picurus, in altered form, is quoted without attribu- 
tion (t. xvii. 24) ; in another example, religion and 
the fear of death are listed among the motives that 
impel men to crime (2. xxi. 34) ; and the dialecticians 
are censured for their love of ambiguities (2. xi. 16). 
But, as the notes in the present volume illustrate, the 
examples are drawn from the literature of various 
philosophical schools — a condition one would expect, 
inasmuch as manuals of rhetoric reflecting diverse 
schools were then extant, and these manuals may well 
have had much material in common. 

But the most vexing problem — and, as Norden ^ 
says, one of the most interesting in the history of 
Roman literature — concerns the relations between 
our treatise and De Inventione.^ We are not even 
sure of the respective dates of composition. The 
reference in De Oratare 1. 2. 5 to the " essays . . . 
which slipped out of the notebooks of my boyhood, 
or rather of my youth " '^ does not enable us to fix 
upon a particular year for the composition of De 
Invetiiione , but internal evidence points to c. 91 B.C. 
By this we mean only that the work contains no 
reference to any event that took place during or 
after the Marsic War.'^ Cicero may, of course, have 

" Gercke-Xorden, Einhitung in die Allertumsivissenschaft, 
Leipzig-Berlin, 1910, 1. 471. 

^ Relevant passages of De Inventione have been indicated 
in the notes. 

«= C/. Quintilian, 3. 6. 59 and 3. 1. 20. 

** See Marx, Proleg., pp. 76 ff. 



worked the material into its final form later. When 
he published the book remains uncertain; allowing 
even for the possibility that in the passage above 
Cicero understated his years with ironic intent, we 
may not suppose a date much after 86 b.c. Likewise 
on internal evidence we assign our treatise to c. 
86-82 B.C. The reference in 1. xv. 25 to the death of 
Sulpicius, which took place in the year 88, supplies 
us with a terminus post quern for the composition of 
Book 1.« 4. liv. 68 contains a reference to Marius' 
seventh consulship, which he held in the year 86. 
And since nothing in the work mirrors the conditions 
which obtained in the state under Sulla — for instance, 
the first illustration in 4. xxxv. 47 reflects a jury 
system still comprising both senators and equites — 
we may set the year 82 as the terminus ante quern. But 
again these dates regard only the contents ; our 
author could have collected his examples by the 
year 82 and have composed the treatise later — not 
much later, probably, for he is eager to complete the 
work and send it to Herennius. It seems then 
likely, though not certain, that De Inventione was 
composed before our treatise. 

Agreements are so frequent that obviously there 
is a close tie between the two works. Some precepts 
are set forth in virtually the same language, and 
some of the illustrations are identical. This is not the 
place to enumerate these likenesses, nor the differ- 
ences,^ which are even more striking; the treatises 

<* In 3. i. 1 it is implied that separate books were sent to 

* See Marx, Proleg., pp. 129 ff. Our author differs from 
Cicero in the method of presenting his material, in organiza- 
tion, and in spirit; for example, in many technical terms; 
in the doctrine of Proof, of the Types of Issue, of the sources 


have been coniparod in several studies, but the last 
word on the subject has not yet been said. I may 
here only review recent opinion,*^ No one now 
believes that our author used De Inveniione. On the 
other hand, the belief that Cicero used the Rhetorica 
ad Herejinium still finds adherents ; but since it is 
probable that Cicero's work antedates our treatise, 
we hesitate to accept this notion. Other critics 
postulate a common source. That both authors had a 
single Greek original in common is not acceptable, for 
it would be unbelievable that two independent trans- 
lators should have rendered their text in precisely the 
same words ; furthermore, the illustrations from 
Roman writers shared by both make such a solution 

Or did both make direct use of the same Latin 
source ? This view is popular, and takes two fonns : 
(1) that both had the same Latin teacher, the 
differences being explained by the assumption that 
they heard this teacher at different times — our 
author later, and when the teacher had changed his 
mind on a number of points ; and that Cicero used 

of Law; in the number oi genera causarum; in his emphasis 
upon the judicial kind of discourse as against Cicero's full 
treatment of all three kinds; in his much briefer discussion 
of many topics ; in his less accurate quotations ; iu the more 
limited scope of his historical references (Cicero uses events in 
Roman history that antedate Hannibal); in his thoroughly 
Latin spirit — Marx' analogA- is telling : our author is to the 
togata as Cicero, who is much more learned in Greek literature, 
is to the paUiata. 

" I have not seen M. Medved, Das Verhdltnis von Ciceros 
libri rhetorici zum Auctor ad Herennium, unpublished Vienna 
dissertation, 19-40. 

* See William Ramsay in Smith's Diet, of Greek and Roman 
Biography and Mythology (London, 1880), 1, 727. 


other sources in addition ; <* (2) that both used the 
same Latin manual,* our author only this manual, and 
without many changes — except for certain trans- 
positions and abridgements, some omission of 
examples, and slight additions (e.g., the Introductions 
and Conclusions) — and Cicero with greater altera- 
tions ; and that Cicero further used Hermagoras.*' 
Marx, on the other hand, finds that the contrast 
between the two works is too sharp to permit a 
theory either of direct dependence or of a single 
immediate common source, whether teacher or 
manual ; he posits two Latin teachers, and behind 
these, two Rhodian masters who advocated opposing 
doctrines, our author inheriting the older theory and 
Cicero a fuller and more recent system. 

Without accepting Marx' thesis that the treatise is 
entirely a set of lecture notes — for I would assign 
more of the work to the author than Marx allows — I 
believe that something like his hypothesis is required. 
The differences between the two works seem to rule 
out a single immediate common source ; the like- 
nesses we may best refer to the use by both authors 
(or by their teachers) of Latin treatises like the De 
Ratione Dicendi of Antonius.'^ We cannot appraise the 

" In Be Inv. 2. ii. 4 he professes an eclectic method of ex- 
cerpting from his sources. 

^ This second view is that of Herbolzheimer. 

<^ Whether directly or through an intermediate source; 
the point is debated. 

^ Most now believe that the influence of Antonius' book 
(r/. Cicero, Brutus 44. 163, De Oratore 1. 21. 94, Quintilian, 
3. 1. 19) is apparent in our treatise; see Kroehnert, pp. 23 ff. 
(but he thinks that Antonius was our author's Latin teacher), 
Marx, Proleg., p. 131, and Koehler, pp. 35-8, but also Weber, 
pp. 22 fif., and Thiele, QuaesL, p. 94, Antonius' book appeared 
sometime before 91 B.C. 


influence of these older Latin arts of rhetoric which 
are lost to us, but it may well have been considerable. 
Our main difficulty when we compare the two 
works is in explaining the following coincidence. In 
1. vi. 9 our author distinguishes three occasions 
(iempora) for the use of the Subtle Approach, and in 
1. ix. 16 maintains that this is his own innovation; 
in De Inventione 1. xvii. 23, however, a like threefold 
classification occurs, but instead of occasions we have 
" motives " (causae). Again diverse explanations are 
offered, but in the end we are, I beheve, forced either 
to accept Marx' view that the classification is of 
Greek origin or to take the author's words at their 
face value. Marx finds the context here thoroughly 
Greek, even though we do not know any specific 
Greek source for the threefold classification, and 
hurls the charge of fraud and impudence at our 
author ; the principle, he is sure, originated with the 
Rhodian rhetor whose doctrines our author followed, 
and Cicero in his turn received it from his own teacher 
in a modified form. Some of those who, like Marx, 
consider our treatise merely lecture notes, and yet 
wish to absolve the writer of the charge of fraud, 
make the point that he may not have known that 
his teacher had borrowed the precept from a Greek 
source ; but the notion that the author did not know 
Greek well enough for his purposes would require 
proof. Schanz and others believe that Cicero 
borrowed the principle from our treatise, but that 
hypothesis would be more acceptable if we could be 
certain that the Rhetorica ad Herennium was actually 
published and available to Cicero before his publica- 
tion of De Inventione. As a matter of fact, the 
precept appears in a somewhat different setting in De 


Inventione, where its use is confined to the admirabile 
kind of cause. Our author doubtless depends on a 
Greek source for his general treatment of the 
doctrine of the Subtle Approach. Yet he always 
writes with practical motives, and on this particular 
point specifically says that his purpose is to provide a 
sure and lucid theory. When, therefore, he claims 
as an innovation the slight distinction between 
tempora and causae, we find him guilty, not of fraud, 
but of the exaggerated self-esteem which is also 
elsewhere characteristic of him." 

The chief basis of Marx' charge of deceit is pro- 
vided by the Introduction to Book 4, considered in 
relation to the examples used in that Book. This 
Proem, organized and developed like a ckria ^ accord- 
ing to the rules of the classroom, is rather graceful and 
learned ; in language, too, it is smoother than the 
purely technical parts of the treatise ; and its con- 
tents are Greek in character. Marx and others 
contend that it did not belong in this place originally, 
but was in its main outlines taken from a Greek 
source, inserted here, and made over to seem a Latin 
product. In this Preface our author presents a long 
argument against a theory, which he labels as Greek, 
of using borrowed examples, and promises to give 
only those of his own creation (except in the case of 
faulty ones). But the execution does not fulfil the 
promise, for he then proceeds actually to use borrowed 

" He has not been moved to write by hope of gain or glory, 
" as others have been " (1. i. 1); " no one else " has written 
with sufficient care on Delivery (3. xi. 19) ; he " alone, in 
contrast with all other writers," has distinguished three 
occasions for the use of the Subtle Approach (1. ix. 16); cf. 
also 1. vi. 10, 3. vii. 14, 3. xxiv. 40, and 4. Ivi. 69. 

^ See the figure, Refining, 4. xlii. 54 S. 


examples, and without naming his sources, many of 
which are Greek. The author (or rather his teacher) 
thus got into trouble when, having used a Greek art 
which employed borrowed examples, he tried to 
adjust to it the contrary precepts of another Greek 
author who created his own examples. This is the 
person, say his critics, who in 1. i. 1 accuses Greek 
writers of futile self-assertion. 

According to another interpretation, which is 
intended to save the honour of both student and 
teacher, the young student here put down the notes 
of a lecture once delivered by his teacher, thinking 
this to be an appropriate place, but being no master 
of Greek, he was unaware that his teacher had in the 
rest of what comprises his Book 4 taken so many 
examples from Greek sources. 

It seems best, however, to grant the author some 
degree of literary individuality, and to regard his 
claim to the use of his " own " examples as at least 
an honest one. The notion that he did not know 
Greek well enough for his purpose is gratuitous. To 
be sure, one cannot deny the contradiction between 
promise and fulfilment, nor assign to the author more 
than a relatively small share in the fashioning of the 
Proem, the Greek origin of which is obvious. But he 
made good use of this Proem, which as it stands 
coheres well enough N\ith the text that follows it ; 
he would naturally use material that he had heard or 
read, perhaps not always knowing where he had 
picked it up ; ^ and what is most likely, he may have 

* Crassus in Cicero, De Oratore 1. 34. 154, tells how in his 
practice declamations, trying to choose diction different from 
that of the poetic passage by Ennius or speech by Gracchus 
on which he was practising, he would discover that the best 
words had already been used by his author. 



considered his free translation of the Greek examples 
and alteration of the Latin a large enough task to 
justify his feeling that they were now his own. He 
is sometimes adroit in transposing the original 
examples and adjusting them to Roman conditions. ** 
The claim to originality becomes then a pardonable, 
or at least an understandable, exaggeration, rather 
than evidence of misrepresentation. 

Since the treatise stands near the beginnings of 
Latin prose, ^ its style has been the subject of close 
study. The faults have received special attention, 
especially those resulting from the author's quest for 
variety and for refinements in forms and constructions 
— for example, abundantia, artificially balanced 
clauses, the love of synonyms, of word-play, hyper- 
bata, and asyndeta, the inflated language of the 
Conclusions to each Book, and other extravagances 
of rhetorical style ; also the awkward transitions and 
the author's tendency merely to reiterate, under the 
guise of remarks concluding the treatment of a 
precept, what he has already said. Further pecu- 
liarities are the arbitrary use of pronouns, the omission 
of subjects of verbs in the infinitive, the mixture of 
present and future in the sequence of tenses, the 
frequent employment of the first person future 
active indicative, of substantives in -io, of the ut . . . 
ne . . . construction, and of the indicative in indirect 
questions. The dry style of the precepts usually 
contrasts with the lively and smooth style of the 

* See, e.g., in 4. xxix. 40, how the example of the figure 
Indecision from Demosthenes, De Corona 20, receives a Roman 

*• Of extant complete prose works only Cato's De Agri Culluru 
is older. 



examples. Although the style is in general not 
highly developed nor fluent, and there are several 
passages of which the meaning is obscure, our author 
in greatest part achieves, as I have said, his aim of 
clarity. It would not he fair to class his treatise 
with the crude textbooks (lihri agrestes) disparaged 
in De Oratore 2. 3. 10. The language is up to a 
point " plebeian " and there are puerilities, but some 
of the qualities thus designated are rather to be 
assigned to what we may call the schoolmaster's 
manner and to the nature of technical, textbook 
style. Some of the irregularities perhaps also derive 
from the author's desire to make haste and to be 
brief, and from the process of translation ; here and 
there the language betrays a Greek origin. 

Our author is fond of periods formed with rhvthmic 
clausulae. It is another echo of the school practice 
of his time that the dichoree, favourite of Asianic 
style, plays the chief role,*' but other cadences are also 
frequent. In the examples illustrating the three 
types of style in Book 4, rhythms are chosen with a 
fair degree of taste so as to correspond to the 
character of the different tv-pes. 

We may say that the style is within limits archaic, 
and sometimes reminiscent of Roman comedy ; yet 
today it is no longer set in such sharp contrast as 
formerly to Ciceronian style. Kroll ^ looks upon it 
as having been formed on the same principles as those 
of the Roman orators whom Cicero regarded as his 
own forerunners. 

In the present century it has been customary to 
underv'alue the treatise because of its shortcomings — 

• See notes on 4. viii. 12, 4. xix. 26, and 4. xxxii. 44. 
» aiotta, 22 (1934). 24 ff. 


which in large part are those inherent in the nature of 
a textbook — even as its virtues were often exag- 
gerated in the nineteenth century, when more than 
one critic {e.g., Chaignet) held the work up as 
superior to Quintilian's Traiiiing of an Orator. Re- 
garded from a historical point of view, the treatise 
presents no strikingly novel system ; for us, however, it 
has literary importance because it is our only complete 
representative of the system it teaches. We may 
further readily admit that the work lacks the larger 
philosophical insight of Aristotle's Rhetoric, but that 
is not to deny its excellence as a practical treatise of 
the kind doubtless used by Roman orators. It is, 
moreover, itself not without usefulness for the 
modern student of the art. We ought now to redress 
the balance, to recognize that, though Greek in origin 
and inspiration, it marks a significant stage in Roman 
rhetorical theory, to assign due value especially to 
Book 4, and to bear in mind that the work exerted a 
beneficent influence for hundreds of years. One of 
the distinguished modern students of rhetoric, 
Spengel, called it " a book more precious than gold." 

Later History 

Interpreting a subscriptio in MS. H, Marx assumed 
that the book first came to light in Africa in the 
middle of the fourth century and was soon thereafter 
brought to Lombardy.** Therefore the first refer- 
ences to it appear late — in Jerome (in works written 
in the years a.d. 395 and 402), Rufinus (late fifth 

* See Proleg., pp. 1 ff. Not all believe that the work could 
have lain so long in oblivion ; some think that it was used by 
Comificius (see p. xiv, note h, and p. xv above). 


century), Grillius " (late fifth century), and Priscian 
(early sixth century). MSS. of the M class were 
known to Servatus Lupus, as we learn from a letter 
he wrote in 829 or 830, and indeed our oldest extant 
MSS., which belong to that class, date from the ninth 
and tenth centuries. Later the treatise was much 
used, abstracted, annotated, and interpolated ; it 
shared favour with Cicero's De Inientione, which, as 
against modern taste, seems to have been preferred 
to his De Oratore. The great number of MSS. of the 
Ad Ileremiium — we have more than a hundred — is in 
itself an index of its popularity. Complete commen- 
taries began to appear as early, perhaps?, as the twelfth 
century, translations as early as the thirteenth. The 
full story, however, of the influence which the treatise 
enjoyed in education and in the poetry and prose of 
the Middle Ages and Renaissance has yet to be 
worked out. 


The MSS. containing mediaeval translations of the 
treatise have not yet been adequately studied ; 
several versions in Western vernaculars doubtless 
remain to be brought to light. We may, however, 
mention the compendium in Italian that is associated 
^^ith the names of both Guidotto da Bologna and Bono 
Giamboni {Fiore di rettorica or Rettorica miova di Tullio), 
which in its original form was composed before 126G, 
and the French rendering (of both our treatise and 
Cicero's De hiventione) made by Jean d'Antioche de 
Harens in 1282. Enrique de Villena translated the 
work into Castilian in 1427. And the Greek version 

" See Josef Martin, Grillius : Ein Beifrag zur Geschichte 
der Rhetorik; Paderbom 1927, p. 156 (48'. 15). 



of the section on Memory in Book 3 (reprinted in 
Marx, ed. maior, pp. 54-59) has been assigned, with- 
out strong evidence in either case, to Maximus 
Planiides (early saec. 14) or Theodore Gaza (saec. 15). 
The following translations belong to modern 
times : 

French : Paul Jacob, Paris 1652, 1670 (Les 
Oeuvres de Ciceron, tr. by Pierre du 
Ryer et al., vol. 1). 

J. N. Demeunier, Paris 1783 {Oeuvres de 
Ciceron, trad, nouvelle, vol. 1). 

J. B. Levee, Paris 1816 {Oeuvres Com- 
pletes de Ciceron, trad, en Frangais, 
vol. 1). 

J. V. LeClerc, Paris 1821, 1827 {Oeuvres 
Completes de Ciceron, vol. 1, Pt. 2, 
2nd ed.), and later eds. 

L. Delcasso, Paris 1826 (in Bihlio- 
theque Latine-Frangaise, ed. C. L 
Panckoucke, vol. 1), and later eds. 

Thibaut, Paris 1881 {Oeuvres Completes 
de Ciceron, ed. J. M. N. D. Nisard, 
vol. 1). 

Henri Bornecque, Paris [1932]. 
German : Christian Walz, Stuttgart 1842 (in 
Homische Prosaiker in neuen Uber- 
setzungen 22. 3354-3532). 

Karl Kuchtner, Munich 1911. 

So far as the present translator knows, the treatise 
has not hitherto been completely translated into 
English; a rendering by Ray Nadeau of Book 1, 
based on Kayser's edition of 1854, appears in Speech 
Monographs 16 (1949). 57-68. 



The ediiio princeps was issued in \'enice in 147U by 
Nicolaus Jenson, under the editorship of Omnibonus 
Leonicenus. At least twenty-eight other editions 
appeared in the fifteenth century, several with com- 
mentaries. For the long list of editions that followed 
until the year 1834 the reader may be referred to 
J. C. Orelli's Oyiomasticon TulUanum in the Orelli- 
Baiter edition of Cicero's Works (Zurich 1836), vol. 
6, pp. 197, 215, 218, and 223. Of the nineteenth- 
century editions that appeared thereafter, we must 
list C. L. Kayser's separate edition, Leipzig (Teubner) 
1854, and his Tauchnitz edition (among Cicero's 
Works), Leipzig 186U ; G. F. Friedrich's edition, 
Leipzig (Teubner) 1884 ; and especially the excellent 
editio maior by Friedrich Marx, Leipzig (Teubner) 
1894. This last, together with Marx' ediiio minor, 
Leipzig (Teubner) 1923, forms the basis of the text 
used by the present translator, who acknowledges 
also the profit derived from the critical notes in both 
editions and from the Prolegomena and Index in the 
editio maior — a debt which will be obvious in many 
places. Marx' work represents a great advance in 
the study of our treatise, and on it all students, even 
when they reject his conclusions on certain points, 
now base their investigations. 

The Text 

The text depends on two groups of MSS. — an older 
group, M(utili), whose archetype contained lacunae 
and corruptions, and a younger, E(xpleti). The 
lacunae in M are filled out in E in part from another 



tradition. The Expleti derive from an archetype of 
perhaps the twelfth century ; for that recension 
three aids were used : a MS. of class M, a lost integer,^ 
and the recensionist's own conjectures and 

In a number of places the text cannot be restored 
with certainty. At times the readings of M, especi- 
ally when the text is corrupt and cannot otherwise 
be filled out, must give way to those of E. Neither 
M nor E can be followed alone throughout, and often 
the decision between the two is hard to make. As 
Marx says, each reading must be examined in 
accordance with the editor's conception of the 
author's habits of writing. To be sure E, which 
contains many conjectures made in the Middle 
Ages, must be used with caution, but even Marx, 
an editor of praiseworthy conservatism, adopts many 
of its readings. I have found it advisable to follow M 
in a number of cases where Marx followed E, but most 
of my changes from Marx have favoured E. The 
text in the present edition rests on that of Marx, 
editio minor ; an apparatus is supplied only for those 
places where I deviate from the text of that edition. 

In the apparatus Mx stands for Marx, ed. minor, 
1923 ; Mx ed. mat. for his edition of 1894. 

Marx constructed his text on the basis of the 
following MSS. : 

" A MS. of a fourth or fifth century edition of five works of 
Cicero (including our treatise) was found again in the twelfth 
century, and was used in forming the archetype of E. The 
Laudensis, discovered in Lodi by Landriani in 1421, and 
again lost some four years later without any copies of our 
treatise having been made from it, stems from this old edition 
of Cicero's works. 


M(utili) : lacking Bk. I, chaps. 1-5 

H Herbipolitanus (saec. 9/10) 

P Parisinus 7714 (9) 

B Bernensis (9/10) 

C Corbeiensis (or Leninopolitanus) (9/10) 

n Parisinus 7231 (12) 

M consensus of H P B C 11 


b Bambergensis (12/13) 

1 Leidensis (12) 

d Darmstadiensis (12/13) 

V Vossianus (12/13) 

p Parisinus 7696 (12) 

E consensus of b 1 d 

The reader is referred to Marx, ed. maior, pp. 10 ff.. 
and the Preface to the ed. minor, for a description of 
the MSS. The stemma that appears on the next 
page is taken from p. xxiv of the ed, minor. 

The spelHng in the present text differs in a number 
of places from that of Marx' editions. As some 
critics have charged, Marx at times went out of his 
way to set up archaic or unusual spellings (some of 
which he formed from corruptelae). My changes — 
not as a rule noted in the apparatus — have, I believe, 
sound support in the MSS. ; and in several instances 
— which are noted — I have felt that the MSS. should 
not be allowed to determine forms regarded as 
incorrect. A completely uniform orthography, for 
example in the assimilation of prepositions, has not 
been sought. 





n B 


X Filled out and corrected 

by achola 

0th cent- 

Filled out from 

X Mutilus filled out 
from integer 


In closing this Introduction, 1 wish to express the 
thanks I owe to a number of friends at Cornell 
University for generous assistance. To Professor 
Ernst Levy of the University of Washington I am 
indebted for his kindness in answering several 
questions on Roman Law. 


Georg Amnion, rev. of Marx, ed. maior, Blatter filr 

das Bayer. Gymn.-Schubvesen 33 (1897). 4:07- U 5. 
Georg Ammon, rev. of Marx, ed. minor, Bursians 

Jahresbericht 204 (1925). 10-16. 
Otto Angermann, De Aristotele rhetorum auctore, 

Leipzig, 1904. 
Karl Aulitzkv, " Apsines rrepl iXeou," Wiener Studien 

39 (1917). 26-49. 
C. Bione, / piu antichi traitati di arte retorica in lingua 

latina, Pisa, 1910. 
H. E. Bochmann, De Cornijici auctoris ad Herennium 

qui vacatur rerum Romanarum scieniia, Zwickau, 

J. Brzoska, art. " Cornificius," in P.-\V. 4. 1605- 

Georg Golla, Spracklicke Beohachtungen zum auctor ad 

Here7inium, Breslau, 1935. 
Georg Herbolzheimer, " Ciceros rhetorici libri und 

die Lehrschrift des Auctor ad Herennium." 

Philologus 81 (1926). 391-426. 
Carolus Hoffmann, De verborum transposiiionibus in 

Cornijici rhetoricorum ad Herennium libris, Munich, 

Curtius Koehler, De rhetoricis ad Herennium, Berlin, 

Rudolfus Kroehnert, De rhetoricis ad Herennium, diss. 

Koenigsberg, 1873. 



Wilhelm Kroll, " Die Entvvicklung der lateinischen 

Sprache," Glotta 22 (1934). 24-27. 
Wilhelm Kroll, " Cornificianum," Melanges Bidez 2. 

555-561, Brussels, 1934. 
Wilhelm Kroll, " Der Text des Cornificius," Philologus 

89 (1934). 63-84. 
Wilhelm Kroll, " Rhetorica V," Philologus 90 (1935). 

Wilhelm Kroll, " Rhetorik," in P.-W., Suppl. VII 

(1940). 1039-1138. 
Friedrich Marx, Prolegomena in ecliiio maior. 
Claus Peters, De rationibus inter artem rhetoricam quarti 

et primi saeculi intercedentibus , Kiel, 1907. 
Robert Philippson, rev. of Marx, ed. minor, Berl. 

Philol. Wochensckrift 44 (1924). 1181-1186. 
Schanz-Hosius, Geschichte der romischen Liter atur, 

Part 1, pp. 586-90, Munich, 1927; Martin 

Schanz, ed. 1909, Part 1, pp. 466-473. 
Eduard Stroebel, " Cornificiana," Blatter fir das 

Bayer. Gymn.-Schdwesen 38 (1902). 71-83. 
Eduard Stroebel, Tulliana, Munich, 1908. 
W. S, Teuffel, Geschichte der romischen Literatur, 6th 

ed., Berlin, 1916, 1. 305-309 (revised by Wilhelm 

Georg Thiele, Quaestio7ies de Cornifici et Ciceronis 

artibus rheioricis, Greifswald, 1889. 
Georg Thiele, rev. of Marx, ed. maior, Gottingische 

gelehrte Anzeigen 1895 (2). 717-735. 
Georg Thiele, Hermagoras, Strassburg, 1893. 
Philippus Thielmann, De sermonis proprietatibus quae 

leguntur apud Cornificium et in primis Ciceronis 

libris, Strassburg, 1879. 
Heinrich Weber, tiber die Quellen der Rhetorica ad 

Herennium des Corjiijicius, Zurich, 1886. 


Richard Wcidiier, Ciceros I'erhaltnis cur griechischen 
und romischen Schulrheiorik seiner Zeit, Erlangen, 

Julius Werner, Zur Frage nach dem Verfasser der 
Ilerenniusrheiorik, Bielitz, 1906. 

References in the Notes to the following works, 
and to a number of those in the Bibliography above, 
appear in abbreviated form : 

Halm : Carolus Halm, Rhetores Latini Minores, 

Leipzig, 1863. 
Mommsen : Theodor Mommsen, Romisches Straf- 

reckt, Leipzig, 1899. 
Otto : A. Otto, Die Sprichivorter . . . der Rijmer, 

Leipzig, 1890. 
P.-W. : Pauly - Wissowa - Kroll, Real - Encyclopddie 

der classischen Altertumsnissenschaft, Stuttgart. 

1894 ff. 
Ribbeck : Otto Ribbeck, Scaenicae Romanorum Poesis 

Frag7)ie/ita, vol. 1 : Tragicorum Fragmenta, 3rd 

ed., Leipzig, 1897 ; vol. 2 : Comicorum Fragmenta, 

3rd ed., Leipzig, 1898. 
Sav. Zeitschr. : Zeitschrift, Savigny-Stifiung fur 

Rechtsgeschichte : Romanisiische Abieilung, Wei- 
mar, 1880 ff. 
Schmalz-Hofmann : J. H. Schmalz and J. B. Hof- 

mann. Syntax und Siilistik, in Stolz-Schmalz, Lat. 

Grammatik, 5th ed., Munich, 1928 (revised by 

Manu Leumann and J. B. Hofmann). 
Spengel : Leonardus Spengel, Rhetores Graeci, vols. 2 

and 3, Leipzig, 1854 and 1856. 
Spengel-Hammer : L. Spengel and C. Hammer, 

Rhetores Graeci, vol. 1, Part 2, Leipzig, 1894. 



Vahlen : lohannes Vahlen, Ennianae Poesis Reliquiae, 

2nd ed., Leipzig, 1903. 
Volkmann: Richard Volkmann, Die Rhetorik der 

Griechen und Romer, 2nd ed., Leipzig, 1885. 
Walz : Christianus Walz, Rhetores Graeci, Stuttgart, 

Tubingen, London, and Paris, 1832-6. 9 vols. 
Warmington : E. H. Warmington, Remains of Old 

Latin, Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1935-8. 

4 vols., Loeb Classical Library. 



Book I 

(1) In a short Preface the author dedicates the 
treatise to Herennius, disclaims the intention of 
treating material irrelevant to the art of rhetoric, and 
stresses the need to apply in practice the rules he will 
set forth. (2) The task of the public speaker is to 
discuss capably those matters which law and custom 
have fixed for the uses of citizenship, and to secure 
as far as possible the agreement of his hearers. 
The kinds of causes are three : (a) Epideictic, (6) Deli- 
berative, and (c) Judicial. (3) The speaker should 
be competent in (a) Invention, (6) Arrangement, 

(c) Style, (d) Memory, and (e) Delivery, and the 
means of acquiring these kinds of competence are 
three : {a) Theory, (b) Imitation, and (c) Practice. 
(4) In showing how to adapt the discourse to the 
theory of the speaker's function, the author gives 
primary consideration to Invention as used in each 
of the parts of a discourse in a Judicial cause : (a) 
Introduction, (6) Statement of Facts, (c) Division, 

(d) Proof, (e) Refutation, and (f) Conclusion. Each 
part of the discourse is defined before receiving 
special treatment in detail. 

(5) To make an appropriate Introduction we must 
consider whether the cause is (a) honourable, (6) dis- 
creditable, (c) of doubtful creditableness, or (cT) petty. 
(6) The nature of the cause thus viewed from a 
moral standpoint determines whether the Introduc- 
tion shall take the form of (a) a Direct Opening, or 



(6) a Subtle Approach. (7) Since the aim of the 
Introduction is to make the hearer (a) attentive, 
(6) receptive, and (c) well-disposed, the means 
whereby these states can be brought about is next 
discussed, (8) extended consideration being given to 
the four methods of making the hearer well-disposed : 
by discussing (a) our own person, (6) our adversaries, 
(c) our hearers, and {d) the facts themselves. (9) The 
Subtle Approach is reserved for three occasions : 

(a) when the cause is discreditable, (6) when the 
hearer has been won over, or (c) wearied, by the 
previous speakers of the opposition ; and (9-10) the 
topics to be used in each of these situations are sub- 
joined. (11) The Subtle Approach differs from the 
Direct Opening in achieving its results less obviously. 
Various kinds of Faulty Introductions are next listed. 

(12-13) There are three kinds of Statement of 
Facts : (a) narrative directed towards victory in 
causes in which a decision is to be rendered ; (6) Inci- 
dental Narrative, introduced to gain credit, incrimin- 
ate the opponent, or the like ; (c) narrative used in 
practice exercises, whether based on {a) the exposi- 
tion of facts, which presents three forms : (a) legen- 
dary narrative, (jS) historical, and (y) realistic, or based 
on (b) persons, which emphasizes diverse traits of 
character and reversal of fortune. (14) The State- 
ment of Facts in an actual cause should have three 
qualities : (a) brevity, (6) clarity, and (c) plausibility; 
(14-16) how these may be achieved is next explained. 

(17) The Division sets forth what points we and 
our opponents agree upon, and what points remain 
contested, and then makes use of the Distribution, 
subheads under which are (a) the Enumeration, and 

(b) the Exposition, of the points we intend to discuss, 


(18-25) We next pass to Proof and Refutation, the 
most important divisions of the discourse. In order 
to develop these we must know the Types of Issue 
presented by the cause. These types are three, and 
can be charted as follows : 

1. Conjectural 2, Legal 

(question of fact) (question concerns inter- 

I pretation of a text) 

(For scheme, see Analysis (a) Letter and Spirit 

of Book II) (b) Conflicting Statutes 

(c) Ambiguity 

(d) Definition 

(e) Transference 

(/) Reasoning from Analogy 

3. Juridical 
(act admitted, but right or wrong of act is in question) 

1 I 

Absolute Assumptive 

(defence contends that (defence draws on extraneous 

act in and of itself considerations) 

is right) I 

(a) Acknowledgement of Charge 

1 I 

Exculpation Plea for Mercy 

(a) Ignorance 
()3) Accident 
(y) Necessity 

(6) Shifting of the Responsibility to 

Some other Some Circumstance 
Person (Enactment) 

(c) Shifting of the Question of Guilt 

{d) Comparison with Alternative 



(26) Before explaining how causes representing 
these Types of Issue should be developed, our 
author discusses the Justifying Motive of the defence, 
and the Central Point of the accusation, from the 
meeting of which in juridical and legal causes arises 
the Point to Adjudicate; (27) in a conjectural cause 
the Point to Adjudicate is established rather from 
the meeting of the Accusation and the Denial. 

Book II 

(1) Like Book I, this Book will be devoted to the 
most difficult kind of cause, the Judicial, and to the 
most important and difficult of the speaker's tasks, 
Invention. (2) Three subjects now demand atten- 
tion : under Proof and Refutation, (a) how to apply 
the means of invention to each Type or Subtype of 
Issue, and (6) what sort of epicheiremes to seek or 
avoid ; (c) under the divisions of the discourse, the 
Conclusion. The most important and difficult of the 
Types of Issue, the Conjectural, will be studied 
first. (3-12) After the contents appropriate to the 
Statement of Facts of both prosecutor and defen- 
dant's counsel have been set forth, the scheme of the 
Conjectural Issue is shown to include six divisions, 
which can be charted as follows : 

1. Probability 2. Comparison 
(of defendant's guilt) (no one else likely 
! to be guilty) 

(a) Motive (6) Manner 
of Life 



3. Signs 

(pointing to guilt) 


(a) Place 

(6) Point of Time 

(c) Duration of Time 

{d) Occasion 

(c) Hope of Success 

if) Ho|)e of Escaping Detec- 

5. Subsequent Behaviour 

4. Presumptive Proof 

(a) Preceding the crime 
(6) Contemporaneous with 

the crime 
(c) Following the crime 

6. Confirmatory Proof 


Common topics 

(a) For and against 

(6) For and against 


given under 


(c) For and against 


(d) For and against 


Under the above rubrics the topics to be used by 
both prosecutor and defendant's counsel are 

(13-18) We now turn to the procedure to be 
followed in the various types of Legal Issue, rules for 
both sides being supplied to meet the situation in 
which (a) the intention of the framer appears to be at 
variance with the letter of the text (13-14) ; (b) two 
statutes conflict (15) ; (c) a text is regarded as 
ambiguous (16) ; (d) we must define a legal offence 
in order to decide whether an admitted act comes 
within the definition (17) ; (e) the procedural principle 



of Transference is involved (18) ; or it is argued, by 
analogy with other laws, that (y) a matter not 
provided for by any special law comes within the 
spirit of other existing laws (18). 

(19-20) The Juridical Issue: In developing an 
Absolute Juridical cause, we must first know whether 
the act was in accord with the Law, which derives 
from six sources : (a) The Law of Nature, (b) Statute 
Law, (c) Legal Custom, (d) Previous Judgements, 
(e) Equity, (f) Agreement; each is defined and 
illustrated, (21-22) The development of the Sub- 
types of an Assumptive Juridical cause is discussed 
in the following order: (a) Comparison with the 
Alternative to show that the admitted act was less 
evil ; (6) Shifting of the Question of Guilt (22) ; (c) 
Acknowledgement of the Charge (23-25) ; and 
(d) Rejection of the Responsibility (26). 

(27) Having shown what arguments to use in a 
judicial cause, the author now studies the artistic 
Development of an argument. The five parts of a 
complete argument are (28-30) defined and illus- 
trated: (a) the Proposition, (6) the Reason, (c) the 
Proof of the Reason, (d) the Embellishment, (e) the 
Resume, provision being made for situations in which 
not all the five parts are to be used. (31) He 
next investigates defective arguments, illustrating 
(32-46) faults for each of the parts, and treating 
(46), under Embellishment, (a) similes, (/3) examples, 
(y) amplifications, and (d) previous judgements. 

(47) The Conclusion of a speech is tripartite, in- 
cluding : (a) the Summing Up ; (6) the Amplification, 
which draws commonplaces from ten formulae, and 
(c) the Appeal to Pity. 


Book III 

(1) will deal with Deliberative and Epideictic 
causes, and, of the departments of rhetoric, with 
Arrangement, Delivery, and Memory. 

(2) A Deliberative speech concerns a choice among 
two or more courses of action ; the question may be 
examined either on its own account or on account of 
a motive extraneous to the question itself. (3) The 
aim in a deliberative speech is Advantage, to be 
studied in accordance with the following topics : 










The Right 

The Praise- 

(a) Armies 


(a) Wisdom 

worthy, in 

(6) Fleets 

(rt) Money 

(b) Justice 

the opinion 

(c) Arms 

(h) Promises 

(c) Courage 

(d) Engines 

(c) Dissimula- 

(d) Temper- 

(a) The proper 

of war 




(e) Man- 

{d) Accelerated 

(6) Our alHes 



(c) All our fel- 

(e) Deception 

(d) Our des- 

The use of the topics (4-6) under the Right, and (7) 
under the Praiseworthy is explained in some detail. 
(7) We now learn how to develop the deliberative 
cause as a whole, beginning with the Introduction 
and Statement of facts, and proceeding (8) to the 
Division, (8-9) the Proof and Refutation, and 


(10) Epideictic, 
deals with 

including praise and censure, 

1. External 

(a) Descent 
(6) Education 

(c) Wealth 

(d) Kinds of power 

(e) Titles to fame 
(/) Citizenship 
(g) Friendships 

2. Physical 

(a) AgiHty 

(b) Strength 

(c) Beauty 
{d) Health 

3. Qualities of 

(a) Wisdom 
(6) Justice 
(c) Courage 
{d) Temperance 

(11) As for the Development of an epideictic dis- 
course, the Introduction is drawn from (a) our own 
person, (6) the person we are discussing, (c) the person 
of our hearers, or (d) the subject-matter itself. 
(11-13) The topics for the Introduction are indicated, 
as also for (13) the Statement of facts, the Division, 
(13-15) the Proof and Refutation, and (15) the 
Conclusion. Epideictic, though seldom employed by 
itself independently in actual life, is yet worth our 
careful attention. 

(16) Having finished with Invention, we turn to 
Arrangement, which is of two kinds : (a) that arising 
from the principles of rhetoric: (a) for the whole 
speech, (j3) for individual arguments ; and (6) that 
accommodated to particular circumstances (17). 

(18) An appropriate Arrangement in Proof and 
Refutation would be to place: (a) the strongest 
arguments at the beginning and the end of the 
pleading, (6) arguments of medium force, and weak 
arguments, in the middle. 

(19-20) Delivery, a faculty especially useful to the 
speaker, presents the following scheme ; 




I — '■ I 

Voice Quality Physical Movement 

(a) Volume 

(6) Stability (21-22) 

(c) Flexibility (23-24) 

j i I 

1. Conversational 2. Tone of 3. Tone of 

Tone Debate Amplification 

(a) Dic^nified (a) Sustained (a) Hortatory 

(6) Explicative (6) Broken (b) Pathetic 

(c) Narrative 

(d) Facetious 

(24-25) Rules for the use of the voice in situations 
representing each of these eight subdivisions are 
offered, and (26-27) rules for bodily movement 
appropriate to each. 

(28-29) The two kinds of Memory, natural and 
artificial, should supplement each other. The arti- 
ficial memory includes backgrounds and images. 
(30-32) To memorize a large number of items, we 
must have a large number of backgrounds, in a 
regular series, in a deserted region, clearly dis- 
tinguishable, of moderate size and brightness, and at 
internals of about thirty feet. (33) Images should be 
of both subject-matter and words ; (33-34) the author 
illustrates both kinds. (35-37) To acquire images 
strong enough to awaken recollection we must 
establish striking likenesses; and then in order to 
revive the images, often and rapidly rehearse the 
original backgrounds. (38-39) The author objects 
for a number of reasons to listing images that 
correspond to a great many words, yet (39-40) 
regards the memorization of words as helpful in 



strengthening the ability to memorize subject- 
matter, which is of practical use. (40) Essential in 
developing the memory is constant exercise. 

Book IV 

In a Preface (I-IO) the author justifies the method 
he will follow of using his own examples in illustration 
of the Principles of Style. The Greek writers whom 
he opposes believe in drawing examples from the 
orators and poets, on the following grounds : (a) It 
would be immodest to create one's own examples. 
(6) Since examples serve the purpose of testimony, 
they should, like testimony, be drawn from writers 
of highest esteem. The prestige of the ancients 
excites the ambition to imitate their excellence, 
(c) It is proof of technical skill to select appropriate 
examples and to list these under the proper rubrics. 

The author will refute these arguments as follows : 
(a) The argument on modesty is childish — why does 
not modesty keep these writers from writing anything 
at all? They are open rather to the charge of 
impudence, for extracting from the labour of authors 
praise for themselves, (b) Examples do not con- 
firm or bear witness, but merely clarify the nature 
of a statement. Further, testimony must accord 
with the proposition, but the performance of these 
rhetoricians does not accord with their proposal. 
In writing a treatise they propose to teach to others 
what they have invented, but really show us what 
others have invented, (c) The choice from among 
many examples is not difficult, even for those who 
lack the highest art ; the facile chooser will not 
necessarily write with skill himself. 



Furthermore, these writers are not only at fault in 
borrowing examples, but make an even greater 
mistake in borrowing from a great number of sources. 
If they must borrow examples at all, the selection 
should be made from one author alone, for (a) they 
might choose whom they would to supply examples 
for all cases, one on whose authority they could rely ; 
(6) if a student believes that all qualities can exist in 
one man, he will be encouraged to strive for a 
masterv of them all. 

Finally, the author will show that examples should 
not be borrowed at all: (a) an example cited by a 
writer on an art should be proof of his own skill in 
that art; (6) an example of one's own creation, 
draughted expressly to conform to the principle it is 
intended to clarify, makes for better understanding 
on the student's part. 

The study of Style will consider (a) the kinds to 
which faultless oratorical style will confine itself, 
and (6) the qualities style should always have. 

(11-1 4) The kinds of Style are three: (a) Grand, 
(6) Middle, and (c) Simple. Each is described and 
then illustrated by a passage. (15-16) Adjoining 
each of these styles is a defective style : (a) adjoining 
the Grand is the Swollen; (/3) adjoining the Middle 
is the Slack or Drifting; (y) adjoining the Simple is 
the Meagre. Again each is described and then 
illustrated by a passage. 

Qualities of appropriate and finished Style : 

(a) Taste (17) 

(a) Correct Latinity, 

(^) Claritv, achieved 




Current terms 


Proper terms 



(6) Artistic Composition (18), avoiding 


Excessive Alliteration 
Excessive Transplacement 
Excessive Homoeoptoton 
Excessive Hyperbaton 

(c) Distinction (18), residing in 

A. Figures of Diction 

1. Epanaphora (19) 

2. Antistrophe (19) 

3. Interlacement (20) 

4. Transplacement (20-21), 

including Antanaklasis 

5. Antithesis (21) 

6. Apostrophe (22) 

7. Interrogation (22) 

8. Reasoning by Question 

and Answer (23-24) 

9. Maxim (24-25), 

(a) Simple, and with an 


reason ; 
(6) In double form, Mith 

or without a 






Reasoning by Contraries 

Colon or Clause (26) 
Comma or Phrase (26) 
Period (27) 

(a) In a Maxim 

(b) In a Contrast 

(c) In a Conclusion 

Isocolon (27-28) 
Homoeoptoton (28) 
Homoeoteleuton (28) 
Paronomasia (29-32) 

(i) Resemblance close : 

{a) Thinning or con- 
tracting letter 

(b) The reverse 

(c) Lengthening letter 

(d) Shortening letter 

(e) Adding letters 
(/) Omitting letters 
Ig) Transposing letters 
{h) Changing letters 

(ii) Resemblance less 

(iii) Depending on Poly- 

18. Hypophora (33-34), in- 

cluding reference to 
speaker's own person 

19. Climax (34-35) 

20. Definition (35) 

21. Transition (35) 

22. Correction (36) 

23. Paralipsis (37) 

24. Disjunction (37) 

25. Conjunction (38) 

26. Adjunction (38) 

27. Reduplication (38) 

28. Synonymy or Interpreta- 

tion (38) 

29. Reciprocal Change (39) 

30. Surrender (39) 


31. Indecision (40) 

'A2. Elimination (40-41) 

.'{:{. Asyndeton (41) 

34. AponioptMis (41) 

35. Conclusion (41) 

Tropes : 

36. Onomatopoeia (42) 

37. Antonomasia (42) 

38. Metonymy (43), sub- 


(a) Greater for lesser 

(b) (Lesser for greater] 

(c) Invention for in- 


(d) [Inventor for in- 

{e) Instrument for 

(/) Cause for effect 
{g) Effect for cause 
(h) Container for con- 
(i) Content for con- 

39. Periphrasis (43) 

40. Hyperbaton (44) 

(a) By Anastrophe 

(b) B}' Transposition 

41. Hyperbole (44), used 

(a) Indei)endently 
(6) With comparison 

(a) From equiva- 
(^) From superiority 

42. Svnecdoche (44—4.5) 

Whole understood 


from part 
"^ Part from whole 
Plural from singu- 

j Singular 
{ plural 


43. Catachresis (45) 

44. Metaphor (45) 

(a) For vividness 
(6) For brevity 

(c) To avoid obscenity 

(d) For magnifying 

(e) For minifying 
(/) For embellishing 

45. Allegory (46), in form of 

(a) Comparison 

(b) Argument 

(c) Contrast 

B. Figures of Thought 

1. Distribution (47) 

2. Frankness of Speech (48- 

50), handled with 

(a) Pungency, miti- 
gated by praise, 

(6) Pretence 

3. Understatement (50) 

4. Vivid Description (51) 

5. Division (52) 

6. Accumulation (52-53) 

(a) Aiming at im- 

sharpness, or in- 

(b) Aiming at proof 



7. Refining (54-58): 

(i) By repetition, with 
changes in 

(a) Words 
(6) Delivery 
(c) Treatment 

(a) Form of 

(p) Form of 

(ii) By descanting on 
theme, treatment 
bemg in seven 
parts : 

(a) Simple Pro- 

(6) Reason 

(c) Second Expres- 

sion in new 

(d) Contrary 

(e) Comparison 
(/) Example 
ig) Conclusion 

8. Dwelling on the Point 


9. Antithesis (58) 

10. Comparison (59-61) 

(a) In form of Con- 
trast (purpose : 

(6) In form of Nega- 
tion (purpose : 

(c) Abridged (pur- 

pose : clarity) 

(d) In form of De- 

tailed Parallel 
(purpose: vivid- 

11. Exemplification (62), for 

(a) Beauty 

(6) Clarity 

(c) Verisimilitude 

{d) Vividness 

12. Simile (62) 

(i) For praise 

(ii) For censure, to excite 

(a) Hatred 

{b) Envy 

(c) Contempt 

13. Portrayal (63) 

14. Character Delineation 


15. Dialogue (65), including 

the Hypothetical 

16. Personification (66) 

17. Emphasis (67), through 

(a) Hyperbole 
(6) Ambiguity 
(c) Logical Con- 

{d) Aposiopesis 
(e) Analogy 

18. Conciseness (68) 

19. Ocular Demonstration 


An epilogue (69) enjoins Herennius to exercise 
diligently, and summarizes the contents of the 




BO(_)K I 





I. Etsi negotiis familiaribus inpediti vix satis 
otium studio suppeditare possumus, et id ipsum quod 
datur otii libentius in philosophia consumere con- 
suevimus, tamen tua nos, Gai Herenni, voluntas 
commovit ut de ratione dicendi conscriberemus, ne 
aut tua causa noluisse aut fugisse nos laborem 
putares. Et eo studiosius hoc negotium suscepimus, 
quod te non sine causa velle cognoscere rhetoricam 
intellegebamus ; non enim in se parum fructus habet 
copia dicendi et commoditas orationis, si recta in- 
tellegentia et definita animi moderatione gubernetur. 

Quas ob res ilia quae Graeci scriptores inanis 
adrogantiae causa sibi adsumpserunt reliquimus. 
Nam illi, ne parum multa scisse viderentur, ea con- 
quisierunt quae nihil adtinebant, ut ars difficilior 
cognitu putaretur ; nos autem ea quae videbantur ad 

" The beginning of Book 4 further sets forth the author's 
attitude to the Greek writers on rhetoric (who these are 
specifically is uncertain); c/. also 3. xxiii. 38. For his 
attitude to philosophical studies see the end of Book 4. 





I. Mv private affairs keep me so busy that I can 
hardly find enough leisure to devote to study, and 
the little that is vouchsafed to me I have usually 
preferred to spend on philosophy. Yet your desire, 
Gains Hercnnius, has spurred me to compose a work 
on the Theory of Public Speaking, lest you should 
suppose that in a matter which concerns you I either 
lacked the will or shirked the labour. And I have 
undertaken this project the more gladly because I 
knew that you had good grounds in wishing to learn 
rhetoric, for it is true that copiousness and facility in 
expression bear abundant fruit, if controlled by 
proper knowledge and a strict discipline of the mind. 

That is why I have omitted to treat those topics 
which, for the sake of futile self-assertion, Greek 
writers ° have adopted. For they, from fear of 
appearing to know too little, have gone in quest of 
notions irrelevant to the art, in order that the art 
might seem more difficult to understand. I, on the 
other hand, have treated those topics which seemed 


rationem dicendi pertinere sumpsimus. Non enim 
spe quaestus aut gloria commoti venimus ad scriben- 
diim quemadmodum ceteri, sed ut indiistria nostra 
tuae morem geramus voluntati. Nunc, ne nimium 
longa sumatur oratio, de re dicere incipiemiis, si te 
unum illud monuerimus, artem sine adsiduitate 
dicendi non multum iuvare, ut intellegas banc 
rationem praeceptionis ad exercitationern adcom- 
niodari oportere. 

II. Oratoris officium est de iis rebus posse dicere 
quae res ad usum civilem moribus et legibus con- 
stitutae sunt, cum adsensione auditorum quoad eius 
fieri poterit. Tria genera sunt causarum quae 
recipere debet orator: demonstrativum, delibera- 
tivum, iudiciale. Demonstrativum est quod tri- 
buitur in alicuius certae personae laudem vel vitu- 
perationem. Deliberativum est in consultationc, 
quod habet in se suasionem et dissuasionem. 
Iudiciale est quod positum est in controversia, et 
quod habet accusationem aut petitionem cum 

Nunc quas res oratorem habere oporteat doce- 
bimus, deinde quo modo has causas tractari conveniat 

" Apparently text-books on public speaking sold well; see 
Theodor Birt/Ehein. Mus. 72 (1917/18). 311-16. 

* The definition is that of Hermagoras, to whom the 
function (epyov) of the perfect orator is to redev ttoXltlkov 
£,rJTrifia SiaTideaOai, Kara to evSexo^cvov ttciutikw?. See Sextus 
Empiricus, Adv. Rhet. 62, ed. Fabricius, 2. 150. Cf. Cicero, 
De Inv. 1. V. 6. 

^ iinSeiKTiKov, ovfi^ouAevriKov, SinaviKov. The scheme is 
Aristotelian iRhel. 1. 3 . 1358b) but in essence older. The 

AD HKRENNIUM, I. i. i ii. 2 

pertinent to the theory of pubHc speaking. I have 
not been moved by hope of gain ° or desire for glorj', 
as the rest have been, in undertaking to write, but 
have done so in order that, by my painstaking work, 
I may gratify your wish. To avoid proHxity, I shall 
now begin my discussion of the subject, as soon as I 
have given you this one injunction: Theory with- 
out continuous practice in speaking is of little avail : 
from this you may understand that the precepts of 
theorv here offered ought to be applied in practice. 

II. The task of the public speaker is to discuss 1 
capably those matters which law and custom have j 
fixed for the uses of citizenship, and to secure as far j 
as possible the agreement of his hearers.^ There 
are three kinds ^ of causes which the speaker must 
treat : Epideictic, Deliberative, and Judicial.*^ The 
epideictic kind is devoted to the praise or censure of 
some particular person. The deliberative consists 
in the discussion of policy and embraces persuasion 
and dissuasion.^ The judicial is based on legal con- 
troversy, and comprises criminal prosecution or civil 
suit, and defence./ 

Now I shall explain what faculties the speaker 
should possess, and then show the proper means of 
treating these causes.?' 

author's emphasis in the first two books, on the judicial kind, 
is characteristically Hellenistic {e.g., Hermagorean). The 
better tradition indicates that originally rhetoric was con- 
cerned with tlie judicial kind, and was later extended to the 
other two fields. For a studv of the three genera see D. A. G. 
Hinks, Class. Quarterly 30 (1936). 170-6 Cf. Cicero, De Jnv. 
1. V. 7. 

* -nporpoTrq and dTTorpom]. 

^ KOT-qyopia, 8ik7), aTToXoyia. 

" 2. ii. 2 below. 


Oportet igitur esse in oratore inventionem, dis- 
positionem, elocutionem, memoriam, pronuntia- 
tionem. Inventio est excogitatio rerum verarum 
aut veri similium quae causam probabilem reddant. 
Dispositio est ordo et distributio rerum, quae 
demonstrat quid quibus locis sit conlocandum. 
Elocutio est idoneorum verborum et sententiarum 
ad inventionem adcommodatio. Memoria est firma 
animi rerum et verborum et dispositionis perceptio. 
Pronuntiatio est vocis, vultus, gestus moderatio cum 

Haec omnia tribus rebus adsequi poterimus : arte, 
imitatione, exercitatione. Ars est praeceptio, quae 

" evpcais, rd^is or ocKovofiLa, Xe^is or ipixrjvela or <f>pdaLS, 
fxvT^fiT], vTTOKpLoi's. The pFc- Aristoteliaii rhetoric, represented 
by the Rhet. ad Alexandrum, treated the first three 
(without classifying them); Aristotle would add Delivery 
lR]ieL 3. 1, 1403 b), and his pupil Theophrastus did so (see 
note on 3. xi. 19 below). When precisely in the Hellenistic 
period Memory was added as a fifth division by the Rhodian 
or the Pergamene school, we do not know. These faculties 
{res; see also 1. ii. 3) are referred to in 2. i. 1 below (c/. 
1. iii. 4) as the speaker's /«?ic/z'ow5 {officia = epya rov p-qTopo?). 
Quintilian, 3. 3. 11 ff., considers them as departments or con- 
stituent elements of the art {'partes rhetorices) rather than as 
opera {= officia) ; so also here at 3. i. 1, 3. viii. 15, 3. xvi. 28, 
and Cicero, De Int. 1. vii. 9. epyov is an Aristotelian concept 
(o/. the definition of rhetoric in Khet. 1. 1-2, 1355b), and Aristo- 
tle was the first to classify the (major) functions. Our author 
here gives the usual order of the divisions; so also Cicero, De 
Oratore 1. 31. 142. Diogenes Laertius, 7. 43, presents the 
Stoic scheme : Invention, Style {(f)paai^). Arrangement, and 
Delivery. A goodly number of rhetorical systems were 
actually based on these epya {e.g., in most part Cicero's and 
Quintilian's) ; others were based on the divisions of the dis- 
course {pLopia Xoyov). See K. Barwick, Hermes 57 (1922). 1 £E. ; 
Friedrich Solmsen, Ainer. Journ. Philol. 62 (1941). 35-50, 
169-90. Our author conflates the two schemes he has in- 


The speaker, then, should possess tlie faculties of 
Invention, Arranfrement, Style, Memory, and De- 
livery." Invention is the devising of matter, true 
or plausible, that would make the case convincing.^ 
Arrangement is the ordering and distribution of the 
matter, making clear the place to which each thing 
is to be assigned. Style is the adaptation of suitable 
words and sentences to the matter devised. Memory 
is the firm retention in the mind of the matter, words, 
and arrangement. Delivery is the graceful regula- 
tion of voice, countenance, and gesture. 

All these faculties we can acquire by three means : 
Theory, Imitation, and Practice.^ By theory is meant 

herited; see especially 1. ii. 3-iii. 4, 2. i. 1-ii. 2, and the 
Introduction to the present volume, p. xviii. 

^» The concept goes back at least as far as Plato {e.g., 
Phat'.hus 236 A); see Aristotle, Rhel. 1. 2 (1355b), on finding 
artistic proofs. 

« Tc'xvTj (also TratSei'a, iTnarrjfjLTj, fxddrjais, ftcientia, doctrina), 
fiLH-qai.?, yvyivaaia (also aoK-qais, /xeAcTT/, i^veipia, avvrideia, de- 
clamaiio). The usual triad, Nature (4>vaLs, natura, ingenium, 
facultas). Theory, and Practice, can be traced back to 
Protagoras. Plato [Phaedras 269 D), and Isocrates (e.g., Antid. 
187; Adv. Soph. 14-18, where Imitation is also included). Cf. 
also Aristotle in Diogenes Laertius 5. 18; Cicero, />»e Inv. 1. 
i. 2. De Oratore \.A. 14; Dionysius Halic. in S\Tianus. 
Scholia IJermog., ed. Rabe, 1. 4-5; Tacitus, Dialog, de 
Orator., ch. 33; Plutarch, De Uheris educ. 4 (2 A); and see 
Paul Shorey, Trans. Am. Philol. Assn. 40 (1909). 185-201. 
Imitation is' presumed to have been emphasized in the Perga- 
mene school of rhetors under Stoic influence. Quintihan, 
3. 5. 1, tells us that it was classed by some writers as a fourth 
element, which he yet subordinates to Theory. On Imitation 
cf. Antonius in Cicero, De Oratore 2. 21. 89 ff. ; Dionysius 
Halic, De Imitat. {Opuscula 2. 197-217, ed. Usener-Rader- 
macher); Quintihan, 10. 1. 20 ff. ; Eduard Stemplinger, Das 
Plagiat in der Griech. Lit., Leipzig and BerUn, 1912, pp. 81 ff. ; 
Kroll, "Rhetorik", coll. 1113 ff. ; Paulus Otto, Quaestiones 
selectae ad libellum qui est nepl vtpov? spectantes, diss. Kiel, 1906, 


dat certain viam rationemque dicendi. Imitatio est 
qua impellimur, cum diligent! ratione, ut aliquorum 
similes in dicendo valeamus esse. Exercitatio est 
adsiduus usus consuetudoque dicendi. 

Quoniam ergo demonstratum est quas causas ora- 
torem recipere quasque res habere conveniat, nunc 
quemadmodum possit oratio ad rationem oratoris 
officii adcommodari dicendum videtur. 
4 III. Inventio in sex partes orationis consumitur: 
in exordium, narrationem, divisionem, confirma- 
tionem, confutationem, conclusionem. Exordium est 
principium orationis, per quod animus auditoris con- 
stituitur ad audiendum. Narratio est rerum ges- 
tarum aut proinde ut gestarum expositio. Divisio 
est per quam aperimus quid conveniat, quid in con- 
troversia sit, et per quam exponimus quibus de rebus 
simus acturi. Confirmatio est nostrorum argu- 
mentorum expositio cum adseveratione. Confutatio 

pp. 6-19; G. C. Fiske, Lucilius and Horace, Madison, 1920, 
ch. 1 ; J. F. D' Alton, Roman Literary Theory and Criticism, 
London, New York, and Toronto, 1931, pp. 426 ff . ; Richard 
McKeon, " Literary Criticism and the Concept of Imitation 
in Antiquity," Mod. Philol. 34, 1 (1936). 1-35, and esp. pp. 
26 ff. ; D. L. Clark, " Imitation : Tlieory and Practice in 
Roman Rhetoric," Quart. Journ. Speech 37, 1 (1951). 11-22. 
'' Exercise " refers to the proqymnasmata, of which our 
treatise and Cicero's De Inv. show the first traces in Latin 
rhetoric, and to the " suasoriae " {deliberationes) and '" contro- 
versiae " {causae) in which the treatise abounds. See also 4. 
xliv. 58 (Refining). The divorce between praeexercitamenta 
and exercitationes belongs to the Augustan period. 

" The author's treatment of the parts of a discourse differs 
from that of Aristotle, who, in Rhet. 3. 13 (1414 a) ff., dis- 
cusses them — Proem, Statement of Facts, Proof, and Con- 
clusion — with all three kinds of oratory in view, not only the 
judicial, under Arrangement. Note that Invention is applied 


AD HKKI'.NXIUM. I. ii. ,s ni. 4 

a set of rules that provide a definite method and 
system of speaking. Imitation stimulates us to attain, 
in accordance \\ ith a studied method, the effectiveness 
of certain models in speaking. Practice is assiduous 
exercise and experience in speaking. 

Since, then, I have shown what causes the speaker 
should treat and what kinds of competence he should 
possess, it seems that I now need to indicate how the 
speech can be adapted to the theory of the speaker's 
4 III. Invention is used for the six parts of a dis- 
course : the Introduction, Statement of Facts, 
Division, Proof, Refutation, and Conclusion.** The 
Introduction is the beginning of the discourse, and 
by it the hearer's mind is prepared ^ for attention. 
The Narration or Statement of Facts sets forth the 
events that have occurred or might have occurred.*^ 
By means of the Division we make clear what matters 
are agreed upon and what are contested, and an- 
nounce what points we intend to take up. Proof is 
the presentation of our arguments, together with 
their corroboration.'^ Refutation is the destruction 

concretely to the parts of the discourse; in 1. xi. IS fif. l>elow 
the Issues are subjoined to Proof and Refutation. Cf. Cicero, 
De Inc. 1. xiv. 19. The Stoic scheme included Proem, 
Statement of Facts, Replies to Opponents, and Conclusion 
(Diogenes Laertius 7. 43 j. 

«> TTapaoKevd^eraL. The concept is Tsocratean. Cf. Rhet. 
ad .4?ej-., ch. 29 (1436a); Dionysius Halic, De Lij.t. 17; Anon. 
Seg. .5 and 9 (Spengel-Hammer 1 [2]. 353-4; : Rufus 4 (Spengel- 
Hammer 1 [2]. 399) ; Anon., in Rabe, Proleg. Sylloge, p. 62. 

<= This definition is translated directly from a Greek 
original; see Hermogenes, Progymn. 2 (ed. Rabe, p. 4), 
Syrianus, Scholia Hermog. (ed. Rabe 2. 170), Theon 4 (Spengel 
2. 78). Cf. Cicero, De Jnv. 1. xix. 27. 

" Cf. Cicero, De Inv. 1. xxiv. 34. 



est contrariorum locorum dissolutio. Conclusio est 
artificiosus orationis terminus. 

Nunc quoniam una cum oratoris officiis, quo res 
cognitu facilior esset, product! sumus ut de orationis 
partibus loqueremur et eas ad inventionis rationem 
adcommodaremus, de exordio primum dicendum 
5 Causa posita, quo commodius exordiri possimus 
genus causae est considerandum. Genera causarum 
sunt quattuor: honestum, turpe, dubium, humile. 
Honestum causae genus putatur cum aut id defen- 
dimus quod ab omnibus defendendum videtur, aut 
oppugnabimus quod ab omnibus videtur oppugnari 
debere, ut pro viro forti, contra parricidam. Turpe 
genus intellegitur cum aut honesta res oppugnatur 
aut defenditur turpis. Dubium genus est cum habet 
in se causa et honestatis et turpitudinis partem. 
Humile genus est cum contempta res adfertur. 
6 IV. Cum haec ita sint, conveniet exordiorum 
rationem ad causae genus adcommodari. Exor- 
diorum duo sunt genera: principium, quod Graece 

" CJ. Cicero, De Inv. 1. xlii. 78 (reprehensio). 

^ TTpoXoyos, probably. 

' IvSo^ov, Trapdboiov, aix^iho^ov, dho^ov, the o-)(riy^a.Ta imode- 
aeoiv, later sometimes called figurae materiarum or conlrover- 
siarum. The classification is on a moral basis. These genera 
causarum are not to be confused with the three genera causa- 
rum treated in 1. ii. 2 above. Most rhetoricians [e.g., Cicero. 
De Inv. 1. XV. 20) treated also a fifth kind, ohscurum [hva- 
7tapaKo\ovdr]Tov), and some included six kinds (see Quintilian, 
4. 1. 40). The division into four axvf^ara is Hermagorean 
(c/. Augustine, De Rhet. 1. 17 &., in Halm, pp. 147 ft".), and 


AD 1II:RENNIUM, I. in. 4-iv. 6 

of our adversaries' argtmients." Tlie Conclusion is 
the end of the discourse, formed in accordance with 
the principles of the art. 

Alono: with the speaker's functions, in order to 
make the subject easier to understand, I have been 
led also to discuss the parts of a discourse, and to 
adapt these to the theory of Invention. It seems, 
then, that I must at this juncture first discuss the 

5 Given the cause, in order to be able to make a 
more appropriate Introduction, we must consider 
what kind of cause it is. The kinds of causes are 
four: honourable, discreditable, doubtful, and petty .<^ 
A cause is regarded as of the honourable kind when 
we either defend what seems to deserve defence by 
all men, or attack what all men seem in duty bound 
to attack ; for example, when we defend a hero, or 
prosecute a parricide. A cause is understood to be 
of the discreditable kind when something honourable 
is under attack or when something discreditable is 
being defended. A cause is of the doubtful kind 
when it is partly honourable and partly discreditable. 
A cause is of the petty kind when the matter brought 
up is considered unimportant. 

IV. In view of these considerations, it will be in 
point to apply tlie theory of Introductions to the 
kind of cause. 7 here are two kinds of Introduction : 
the Direct Opening, in Greek called the Prooitnion,^ 

here our author conflates Hermasrorean doctrine with the 
pre- Aristotelian doctrine of the Proem ; see Georg Thiele, 
Hermagoras, Strassburg, 1893, pp. 113-121. 

'^ TTpooiixiov, ""Prelude"; see Aristotle, ^Ae^ 3. 14 (1414b), 
Quintilian, 4. 1. 2 ff.. Anon. Seg. 4, in Spengel-Hammer 
1 (2). 352-3. Cf. Cicero. De Inv. 1. xv. 20. 


prooemium ^ appellatur, et insinuatio, quae ephodos ^ 
nominatur. Principium est cum statim auditoris 
animum nobis idoneum reddimus ad audiendum. 
Id ita sumitur ut adtentos, ut dociles, ut benivolos 
auditores habere possimus. Si genus causae dubium 
habebimus, a benivolentia principium constituemus, 
ne quid ilia turpitudinis pars nobis obesse possit. 
Sin humile genus erit causae, faciemus adtentos. 
Sin turpe causae genus erit, insinuatione utendum 
est, de qua posterius dicemus, nisi quid nacti erimus 
qua re adversaries criminando benivolentiam captare 
possimus. Sin honestum genus causae erit, licebit 
recte vel uti vel non uti principio. Si uti volemus, 
aut id oportebit ostendere qua re causa sit honesta, 
aut breviter quibus de rebus simus dicturi exponere. 
Sin principio uti nolemus, ab lege, ab scriptura, aut 
ab aliquo nostrae causae adiumento principium capere 

Quoniam igitur docilem, benivolum, adtentum 
auditorem habere volumus, quo modo quidque effici 
possit aperiemus. Dociles auditores habere poteri- 
mus, si summam causae breviter exponemus et si 

* prohemium MSS. Mx. ^ epodos MSS. Mx. 

" ^^oBos. The term is used in Oxyr. Pap. 3. 27, in a rhetori- 
cal treatise of perhaps the beginning of the fourth century B.C. 
In Isaeus 3, Dionvsius Halic. comments on Isaeus' use of 
€(f)o8oi. Cf. also Anon., in Rabe, Proleg. Syll., p. 206, and 
Anon., Proleg. Invent., in Walz 7 (1). 54. 

' The hearer is to be rendered TrpoaeKriKos, cvfiadi^s, evvovs. 
Cf. Cicero, De Inv. 1. xvi. 22-3. The doctrine is pre- Aristo- 
telian ; see, e.g., Rhet. ad Alex., ch. 29 (1436a), and Epist. 
Socrat. 30. 4 on Isocrates. Aristotle, Rhet. 3. 14 (1415a), 
includes Receptiveness under Attention. Cicero, Part. Oral. 
8. 28, gives three aims for the Direct Opening : ut amice, ut 


AD HERENNIUM, I. iv. 6-7 

and the Subtle Approach, called the Ephodos.'* The 
Direct Opening straightway prepares the hearer to 
attend to our speech. Its purpose is to enable 
us to have hearers who are attentive, receptive, and 
well-disposed.'' If our cause is of the doubtful kind, 
we shall build the Direct Opening upon goodwill, so 
that the discreditable part of the cause cannot be 
prejudicial to us. If our cause is of the petty kind, 
we shall make our hearers attentive. If our cause 
is of the discreditable kind, unless we have hit upon 
a means of capturing goodwill by attacking our 
adversaries, we must use the Subtle Approach, 
which I shall discuss later.^ And finally, if our 
cause is of the honourable kind, it will be correct 
either to use the Direct Opening or not to use it.<* 
If we wish to use it, we must show why the cause is 
honourable, or else briefly announce what matters 
we are going to discuss. But if we do not wish to use 
the Direct Opening, we must begin our speech 
\nth a law, a written document, or some argument 
supporting our cause. 
7 Since, then, we wish to have our hearer receptive, 
well-disposed, and attentive, I shall disclose how each 
state can be brought about. We can have receptive 
hearers if we briefly summarise the cause and make 

intdlegenter, ut attente audiamur. For the importance of 
Attention in present-day rhetoric, cf. J. A. Winans, Public 
Speaking, New York, 1917, p. 194: "Persuasion is the 
process of inducing others to give fair, favourable, or undivided 
attention to propositions." 

' 1. vi. 9ff. 

<* Cf. Ehet. ad Ahx., ch. 29 (1437b) : " If there is no pre- 
judice against ourselves or our speech or our subject, we shall 
set forth our Proposition immediately at the beginning, 
appealing for attention and a benevolent hearing afterwards." 



adtentos eos faciemiis ; nam docilis est qui adtente 
vult audire. Adtentos habebimus, si pollicebimur 
nos de rebus magnis, novis, inusitatis verba facturos, 
aut de iis quae ad rem publicam pertineant, aut ad 
eos ipsos qui audient, aut ad deorum immortalium 
religionem ; et si rogabimus ut adtente audiant ; et 
si numero exponemus res quibus de rebus dicturi 
sumus. Benivolos auditores facere quattuor modis 
possumus : ab nostra, ab adversariorum nostrorum, 
ab auditorum persona, et ab rebus ipsis. 

V. Ab nostra persona benivolentiam contrahemus 
si nostrum officium sine adrogantia laudabimus, 
atque in rem publicam quales fuerimus, aut in 
parentes, aut in amicos, aut in eos qui audiunt 
aperiemus et si . . .^ aliquid referemus, dum haec 
omnia ad earn ipsam rem qua de agitur sint adcom- 
modata ; item si nostra incommoda proferemus, 
inopiam, solitudinem, calaniitatem, et si orabimus 
ut nobis sint auxilio, et simul ostendemus nos in aliis 
noluisse spem habere. 

Ab adversariorum persona benivolentia capta- 
bitur si eos in odium, in invidiam, in contemptionem 
adducemus. In odium rapiemus si quid eorum 
spurce, superbe, perfidiose, crudeliter, confidenter, 

* Mx stiggests aperiemus et si and ffteen additional words 
to fill the lacuna. 

" So Aristotle, Rhet. 3. 14 (1415a), and Anon. Seg. 7 
(Spengel-Hanimer 1 [2]. 353-4) : eV tov avrov or tov Xiyovro^, 
€K TOV ivavTiov or avriSiKov, e/c twv aKpoarwv or Si/ca^dvTwv, e/c 
Twv ■npayf.idroyv. Cf. also Cicero, De Inv. 1. xvi. 22. Here 
as throughout the first two books the author is dealing with 
judicial oratory. 

" TTados, here assigned to the Introduction, also has a place 
in the Conclusion; see 2. xxx. 48-xxxi. 50 below. Thus the 

AD HKRENNIUM, I. iv. 7-v. 8 

them attentive ; for the receptive hearer is one who 
is willing to listen attentively. We shall have atten- 
tive hearers by promising to discuss important, new, 
and unusual matters, or such as appertain to the 
commonwealth, or to the hearers themselves, or to 
the worship of the immortal gods ; by bidding them 
listen attentively ; and by enumerating the points 
8 we are going to discuss. We can by four methods 
make our hearers well-disposed : by discussing our 
o>\'n pei*son, the person of our adversaries, that of 
our hearers, and the facts themselves." 

V. From the discussion of our own person we shall 
secure good>\'ill by praising our services without 
arrogance and revealing also our past conduct toward 
the republic, or toward our parents, friends, or the 
audience, and by making some reference to . . . 
provided that all such references are pertinent to the 
matter in question ; likewise by setting forth our 
disabilities, need, loneliness, and misfortune,^ and 
pleading for our hearers' aid, and at the same time 
showing that we have been unwilling to place our 
hope in anyone else. 

From the discussion of the person of our adver- 
saries we shall secure goodwill by bringing them into 
hatred, unpopularity, or contempt.*^ We shall force 
hatred upon them by adducing some base, high- 
handed, treacherous, cruel, impudent, malicious, or 

author accords with the early Greek rhetoric based on the 
divisions of the discourse. Nowhere does he make a profound 
analytical study of the emotions such as we find in Aristotle, 
Bhet., Bk, II. In Anon. Seg. 6 (Spengel-Hammer 1 [2]. 353 j are 
list-ed five emotions of the hearer which play a part in the 
function of the Proem : pity, anger, fear, hate, and desire. 
' e^dpa or ^laos, (f>d6to;, opyT]. 



malitiose, flagitiose factum proferemus. In invidiam 
trahemus si vim, si potentiam, si factionem, divitias, 
incontinentiam, nobilitatem, clientelas, hospitium, 
sodalitatem, adfinitates adversariorum proferemus, 
et his adiumentis magis quam veritati eos confidere 
aperiemus. In contemptionem adducemus si in- 
ertiam, ignaviam, desidiam, luxuriam adversariorum 

Ab auditorum persona benivolentia colligitur si 
res eorum fortiter, sapienter, mansuete, magnifice 
iudicatas proferemus ; et si quae de iis existimatio, 
quae iudieii expectatio sit aperiemus. 

Ab rebus ipsis benivolum efficiemus auditorem si 
nostram causam laudando extollemus, adversariorum 
per contemptionem deprimemus. 

VI. Deinceps de insinuatione aperiendum est. 
Tria sunt tempora quibus principio uti non possumus, 
quae diligenter sunt consideranda : aut cum turpem 
causam habemus, hoc est, cum ipsa res animum 
auditoris a nobis alienat ; aut cum animus auditoris 
persuasus esse videtur ab iis qui ante contra dixerunt ; 
aut cum defessus est eos audiendo qui ante dixerunt. 

Si causa turpitudinem habebit, exordiri poterimus 
his rationibus : hominem, non rem,^ spectari oportere ; 
non placere nobis ipsis quae facta dicantur ab adver- 

^ hominem non rem Thieh : rem non hominem hominem 
non rem E : rem hominem PCMx : rem non hominem HP^ II. 

" In Cicero, De Inv. 1. xvii. 23, the Subtle Approach is 
epecifically used in the admirabile genus causae. The three 
causae of Cicero correspond to the " occasions " classified by 
our author. Anon. Seg. 21 £F. (Spengel-Hammer 1 [2]. 357 &.) 
gives four occasions on which the Prooemion should be dis- 
pensed with, and discusses the view that it must always be 


AD HERENNIUM, I. v. 8-vi. 9 

shameful act of theirs. We shall make our ad- 
versaries unpopular by scttin*^ forth their violent 
behaviour, their dominance, factiousness, wealth, lack 
of self-restraint, hi<^h birth, clients, hospitality, club 
allegiance, or marriage alliances, and by making 
clear that they rely more upon these supports than 
upon the truth. We shall bring our adversaries into 
contempt by presenting their idleness, cowardice, 
sloth, and luxurious habits. 

From the discussion of the person of our hearers 
goodwill is secured if we set forth the courage, 
wisdom, humanity, and nobility of past judgements 
they have rendered, and if we reveal what esteem 
they enjoy and with what interest their decision is 

From the discussion of the facts themselves we shall 
render the hearer well-disposed by extolling our own 
cause with praise and by contemptuously disparag- 
ing that of our adversaries. 

\'I. Now I must explain the Subtle Approach. "^ 
There are three occasions t)n which we cannot use 
the Direct Opening, and these we must consider 
carefully : (1) when our cause is discreditable, that is, 
when the subject itself alienates the hearer from 
us; (2) when the hearer has apparently been won 
over by the previous speakers of the opposition ; (3) 
or when the hearer has become wearied by listening 
to the previous speakers. 

If the cause has a discreditable character,'' we can 
make our Introduction with the following points : 
that the agent, not the action, ought to be considered ; 
that we ourselves are displeased with the acts which 
our opponents say have been committed, and that 

* CJ. Cicero, De Inv. 1. xvii. 24. 



sariis, et esse indigna aut nefaria. Deinde cum diu 
rem auxerimus, nihil simile a nobis factum osten- 
demus ; aut aliquorum iudicium de simili causa aut 
de eadem aut de minore aut de maiore proferemus, 
deinde ad nostram causam pedetemptim accedemus 
et similitudinem conferemus. Item si negabimus 
nos de adversariis aut de aliqua re dicturos, et tamen 
occulte dicemus interiectione verborum. 
10 Si persuasus auditor, si ^ oratio adversariorum 
fecerit fidem auditoribus — neque enim non facile 
scire poterimus, quoniam non sumus nescii quibus 
rebus fides fieri soleat — ergo si fidem factam puta- 
bimus, his nos rebus insinuabimus ad causam : de eo 
quod adversarii firmissimum sibi adiumentum 
putarint primum nos dicturos pollicebimur ; ab 
adversarii dicto exordiemur, et ab eo maxime quod 
ille nuperrime dixerit; dubitatione utemur quid 
potissimum dicamus aut cui loco primum respon- 
deamus, cum admiratione. 

Si defessi erunt audiendo, ab aliqua re quae risum 
movere possit, ab apologo, fabula veri simili, imita- 
tione depravata, inversione, ambiguo, suspicione, 
inrisione, stultitia, exsuperatione, collectione, lit- 

^ si M : fuerit id est si PJMx. 

^ Cf. Cicero, De Inv. 1. xvii. 25. 

« See 4. xxix, 40 below. 

<* Note that humour enters the rhetorical system under the 
Introduction. Aristotle, Rhet. 3. 14 (1415a), also discusses 
the place of laughter in the Proem. This classification of 
eighteen means of provoking laughter must have })een a recent 
accession to rhetorical theory ; cf. the summary in Cicero, De 
Oratore 2. 61. 248 fip. On wit and humour in ancient rhetoric, 
see E. Arndt, De ridicvli doctrina rhetorica, Bonn, 1904; 


AD hkrp:nnium, i. vi. 9-10 

these are iirnvorthy, yes, heinous. Next, when we 
have for a time enlarged upon this idea, we shall 
show that nothing of the kind has been committed by 
us. Or we shall set forth the judgement rendered 
by others in an analogous eause, whether that cause 
be of equal, or less, or greater importance ; then we 
shall gradually approach our own cause and establish 
the analogy. The same result is achieved if we deny 
an intention to discuss our opponents or some extra- 
neous matter and yet, by subtly inserting the words,*» 
do so. 
10 If the hearers have been convinced,'' if our 
opponent's speech has gained their credence — and 
this will not be hard for us to know, since we are 
well aw are of the means by which belief is ordinarily 
effected— if, then, we think belief has been effected, 
we shall make our Subtle Approach to the cause by 
the following means : the point which our adversaries 
have regarded as their strongest support we shall 
promise to discuss first ; we shall begin with a state- 
ment made by the opponent, and particularly with 
that which he has made last; and we shall use 
Indecision,^ along with an exclamation of astonish- 
ment: " What had I best say? " or "To what point 
shall I first reply .' " 

If the hearers have been fatigued by listening, 
we shall open with something that may provoke 
laughter^ — a fable, a plausible fiction, a caricature, 
an ironical inversion of the meaning of a word, an 
ambiguity, innuendo, banter, a naivety, an exaggera- 

Marv A. Grant, The Ancient Rhetorical Theories of the Laugh 
able] Madison, 1924; and Wilhelm KroU in P.-W., art. 
" Rhetorik," coll. 1076-7. Cf. also Wilhelm Siiss, ^'eue Jahrb. 
23 (1920). 28-45. 



terarum mutatione, praeter expectationem, simili- 
tudine, novitate, historia, versu, ab alicuius inter- 
pellatione aut adrisione ; si promiserimus aliter ac 
parati fuerhnus nos esse dicturos ; nos non eodem 
modo ut ceteri soleant verba facturos ; quid alii 
soleant, quid nos facturi simus ^ breviter exponemus. 

VII. Inter insinuationem et principium hoc in- 
terest. Principium eiusmodi debet esse ut statim 
apertis rationibus quibus praescripsimus aut beni- 
volum aut adtentum aut docilem faciamus auditorem ; 
at insinuatio eiusmodi debet esse ut occulte, per dis- 
simulationem, eadem ilia omnia conficiamus, ut ad 
eandem commoditatem in dicendi opera venire 
possimus. Verum hae tres ^ utilitates tametsi in 
tota oratione sunt conparandae, hoc est, ut auditores 
sese perpetuo nobis adtentos, dociles, benivolos 
praebeant, tamen id per exordium causae maxime 
conparandum est. 

Nunc, ne quando vitioso exordio utamur, quae vitia 
vitanda sint docebo. Exordienda causa servandum 
est ut lenis sit sermo et usitata verborum consuetudo, 
ut non apparata videatur oratio esse. Vitiosum 
exordium est quod in plures causas potest adcommo- 
dari, quod vulgare dicitur. Item vitiosum est quo 
nihilo minus adversarius potest uti, quod commune 

' simus E: sumus MdMx. 

2 hae tres P^B^CHE Mx ed.mai.: haec res M: haec tres 

" Of the adversary's arguments, perhaps. 

* irapa TrpoaSoKiav. 

* Xadpaiois 8i' irepwv Xoycov. Anon., Froleg. Invent., in 
Waiz 7(1). 54. 14-16, gives the same precept. 


AD HKRRNNIUM, I. vi. lo vii. ii 

tion, a recapitulation," a pun, an unexpected turn,** 
a comparison, a novel tale, a historical anecdote, 
a verse, or a challenge or a smile of approbation 
directed at some one. Or we shall promise to 
speak otherwise than as we have prepared, and not 
to talk as others usually do; we shall briefly explain 
what the other speakers do and what we intend 
to do. 

VII. Between the Subtle Approach and the Direct 
Opening there is the following difference. The 
Direct Opening should be such that by the straight- 
forward methods I have prescribed we immediately 
make the hearer well-disposed or attentive or re- 
ceptive ; whereas the Subtle Approach should be such 
that we effect all these results covertly, through 
dissimulation,*^ and so can arrive at the same vantage- 
point in the task of speaking. But though this 
three-fold advantage — that the hearers constantly 
show themselves attentive, receptive, and well- 
disposed to us — is to be secured throughout the 
discourse, it must in the main be won by the Intro- 
duction to the cause. 

Now, for fear that we may at some time use a faulty 
Introduction, I shall show what faults must be 
avoided. In the Introduction of a cause we must 
make sure that our style is temperate and that the 
words are in current use,*^ so that the discourse seems 
unprepared. An Introduction is faulty if it can be 
applied as well to a number of causes ; * that is called 
a banal Introduction. Again, an Introduction which 
the adversary can use no less well is faulty, and that 

'' Anon. Seg. 19 (Spengel- Hammer l[2j. 3.56) makes the 
same point. 

' Cf. Cicero, De Inv. 1. xviii. 26. 



appellatur; item illud quo adversarius ex contrario 
poterit uti. Item vitiosum est quod nimium appara- 
tis verbis ^ conpositum est, aut nimium longum est; 
et quod non ex ipsa causa natum videatur ut proprie 
cohaereat cum narratione ; et quod neque benivolum 
neque docilem neque adtentum facit auditorem, 
VIII. De exordio satis erit dictum; deinceps ad 

12 narrationem transeamus. Narrationum tria sunt 
genera. Unum est cum exponimus rem gestam et 
unum quidque trahimus ad utilitatem nostram 
vincendi causa, quod pertinet ad eas causas de quibus 
iudicium futurum est. Alterum genus est narra- 
tionis, quod intercurrit nonnumquam aut fidei aut 
criminationis aut transitionis aut alicuius appara- 
tionis causa. Tertium genus est id quod a causa 
civili remotum est, in quo tamen exerceri convenit, 
quo commodius illas superiores narrationes in causis 

13 tractare possipaus. Eius narrationis duo sunt genera : 
unum quod in negotiis, alterum quod in personis 
positum est. 

Id quod in negotiorum expositione positum est tres 
habet partes: fabulam, historiam, argumentum. 
Fabula est quae neque veras neque veri similes 
continet res, ut eae sunt quae tragoediis traditae 

* verbis E Mx ed. mai. : M Mx omit. 

" hiTjyqais. Cf. Cicero, De Inv. 1. xix. 27. 

* hir^yqaeLS im KpiTuiv XeyojxcvaL 

* hia^oXrj. 

** Incidental Narrative [TrapahLrjyriaLs)', cf. Quintilian, 
9. 2. 107, and Anon. Seg. 61 (Spengel- Hammer 1 [2]. 364-5). 
who distinguishes it from Digression (jTapeK^acris). 

AD HERENNIUM, I. vii. u-viii. 13 

is called a common Introduction. That Introduction, 
again, is faulty which the opponent can turn to his 
own use against you. Ami again that is faulty which 
has been composed in too laboured a style, or is too 
long ; and that which does not appear to have grown 
out of the cause itself in such a way as to have an 
intimate connection with the Statement of Facts ; and, 
finally, that which fails to make the hearer well- 
disposed or receptive or attentive. 

Vm. Concerning the Introduction I have said 
enough ; next let me turn to the Narration or State- 
ment of Facts. There are three types of Statement 
of Facts." It is one type when we set forth the facts 
and turn everv detail to our advantage so as to win the 
victory, and this kind appertains to the causes on 
which a decision is to be rendered.^ There is a 
second type which often enters into a speech as a 
means of winning belief or incriminating our adver- 
sary '^ or effecting a transition or setting the stage for 
something.^ The third type* is not used in a cause 
actually pleaded in court, yet affords us convenient 
practice / for handling the first two types more 
advantageously in actual causes. Of such narratives 
there are two kinds : one based on the facts, the other 
on the persons.? 

The kind of narrative based on the exposition of 
the facts presents three forms : legendary, historical, 
and realistic. The legendary tale comprises events 
neither true nor probable, like those transmitted by 

' 8t7/y^a€i9 Kad^ iaxrras. 

f The reference is to the progymnastnata {praeexercila- 
menta). Narratio provided the first exercises imposed by 
the rhetor; see Quintilian, 2. 4. 1, and Jean Cousin, Etudes 
8ur Quintilien, Paris, 1936, 1. 113. 

' According to tA rrpdyfiaTa or rd rrpoawTra. 



sunt. Historia est gesta res, sed ab aetatis iiostrae 
memoria remota. Argumentiim est ficta res quae 
tamen fieri potuit, velut argumenta comoediarum. 

Illud genus narrationis quod in personis positum 
est debet habere sermonis festivitatem, animorum 
dissimilitudinem, gravitatem lenitatem, spem metum, 
suspicionem desiderium, dissimulationem miseri- 
cordiam, rerum varietates, fortunae commutationem, 
insperatum incommodum, subitam laetitiam, iucun- 
dum exitum renim. Verum haec in exercendo transi- 
gentur; illud quod ad veritatem pertinet quomodo 
tractari conveniat aperiemus. 
14 IX. Tres res convenit habere narrationem : ut 
brevis, ut dilucida, ut veri similis sit; quae quoniam 
fieri oportere scimus, quemadmodum faciamus 
cognoscendum est. 

Rem breviter narrare poterimus si inde incipiemus 
narrare unde necesse erit ; et si non ab ultimo 
initio repetere volemus ; et si summatim, non parti- 

" fxv9os, but see Cousin, op. cil., \. 113, note 4. Cf. 
Aristotle, Poetics 9 (1451a) : " The poet's function is to 
describe, not the things that actually have happened, but 
the kind of things that might well happen — that are possible 
in the sense of being either probable or inevitable." But 
it is doubtless the miraculous element in tragedies that is here 
in mind ; see the example oifahula in Cicero, De Inv. 1 . xix. 27. 

* loTopia. 

'■ rrXdafxa. Cf. argumentum (Presumptive Proof) in 2. ii. 3, 
and argumentatio (argument) in 2. ii. 2 below. 

<* Cf. the figure notntio (Character Delineation), 4. 1. 63 

« Cf. Cicero, Episl. ad Fam. 5. 12. 4, on writuig history: 
" For nothing is so suited to the delight of the reader as 
are shifting circumstances and the vicissitudes of fortune. 
Concerning our author's doctrine of narratio as reflecting 
Hellenistic ideas on historiography and story writing, see 


AD lll-Rl'ANirM, I. VIII. i3-i\. 14 

tragedies." Tlie historical narrative is an account of 
exploits actually performed, but removed in time 
from the recollection of our age.* Realistic narrative 
recounts imaginarv events, which yet could have 
occurred, like the plots of comedies.*^ 

A narrative based on the persons should present a 
lively stvle and diverse traits of character.^^ such as 
austerity and gentleness, hope and fear, distrust and 
desire, hypocrisy and compassion, and the vicissitudes 
of life, such as reversal of fortune,'^ unexpected 
disaster, sudden joy, and a happy outcome. But it is 
in practice exercises that these types will be worked 
out./ How we should handle that type of Statement 
of Facts which belongs in actual causes I am about to 
14 IX. A Statement of Facts should have three 
qualities : brevity, clarity, and plausibility.^ Since 
we know that these qualities are essential, we must 
learn how to achieve them. 

We shall be able to make the Statement of Facts 
brief if we begin it at the place at which we need to 
begin ; if we do not try to recount from the remotest 

beo-innino' : if our Statement of Facts is summary and 


R. Reitzensteiii, Hellenist ische W undererzcUdnngen, Leipzig, 
1906, pp. 84 IF., and for further interpretations of these 
sections dealing with narrntio (and of Cicero, De Inv. 1. xix. 27), 
Karl Barwick, Hermes 63, 3 (1928). 261-87, and Friedrich 
Pfister, Hermes 68, 4 (1933). 4.37-60. 

f The narratio is developed {trartalio = i^cpyacta) in the 

" avvTOfLLa, aa^T^veia, TndavoTrjS. The precept is Iso- 
cratean (see Quintilian, 4. 2. 31-2) or even older (see Octave 
Navarre, Essai sur la rhetorique grecque avant Arisfoie, Paris, 
1900, p. 246). Aristotle, Bhei. 3. 16 (1416 b), scorns the 
injunction of brevity in favour of the '' proper mean." Cf. 
Cicero, De Inv. 1. xx. 28. 



culatim narrabimus ; et si non ad extremum, sed 
usque eo quo opus erit persequemur; et si transi- 
tionibus nullis uteinur, et si non deerrabimus ab eo 
quod coeperimus exponere ; et si exitus rerum ita 
ponemus ut ante quoque quae facta sint sciri ^ 
possint, tametsi nos reticuerimus : quod genus, si 
dicam me ex provincia redisse, profectum quoque in 
provinciam intellegatur. Et omnino non modo id 
quod obest, sed etiam id quod neque obest neque 
adiuvat satius est praeterire. Et ne bis aut saepius 
idem dicamus cavendum est; etiam ne quid novis- 
sime quod diximus deinceps dicamus, hoc modo : 

Athenis Megaram vesperi advenit Simo ; 
Ubi advenit Megaram, insidias fecit virgini ; 
Insidias postquam fecit, vim in loco adtulit. 

15 Rem dilucide narrabimus si ut quicquid primum 
gestum erit ita primum exponenms, et rerum ac 
temporum ordinem conservabimus ut gestae res 
erunt, aut ut potuisse geri videbuntur ; hie erit con- 
siderandum ne quid perturbate, ne quid contorte, ne 
quid nove dicamus, ne quam in aliam rem transeamus, 
ne ab ultimo repetamus, ne longe persequamur, ne 
quid quod ad rem pertineat praetereamus ; et si 
sequemur ea quae de brevitate praecepta sunt, nam 
quo brevior, dilucidior et cognitu fj^cilior narratio fiet. 

1 sciri P^BCE : scire HP^Mx. 

" Presented Ke<pa\aL(xiha><; , not /Ltept/coij. 

^ Doxapatres (eleventh century), in Walz 2. 230, gives the 
same example ; it is doubtless Greek in origin. 

" The author of these iambic trimeters and the name of the 
comedy from which they come are both unknown. C/. 
Plautus, Miles Gloriosus 439 : quae heri Athenis Ephesum 
adveni vesperi. 


AD HKllF.NNIUM, I. ix. 14-15 

not detailed ; " it' we carry it forward, not to the 
furthermost point, but to the point to which we need 
to go ; if we use no digressions and do not wander 
from the account we have undertaken to set forth ; 
and if we present the outcome in such a way that the 
facts that have preceded can also be known, although 
we have not spoken of them. For example, if I 
should say that I have returned from the province, it 
would also be understood that I had gone to the 
province.^ And in general it is better to pass by not 
only that which weakens the cause but also that 
which neither weakens nor helps it. Furthermore, 
we must guard against saying a thing more than 
once, and certainly against repeating immediately 
what we have said already, as in the following : 
" Simo came from Athens to Megara in the evening ; 
when he came to Megara, he laid a trap for the 
maiden: after laying the trap he ravished her then 
and there." '^ 

Our Statement of Facts will be clear ^ if we set 
forth the facts in the precise order in which they 
occurred, observing their actual or probable sequence 
and chronology. Here we must see that our language 
is not confused,*^ involved, or unfamiliar, that we do 
not shift to another subject, that we do not trace the 
aifair back to its remotest beginning, nor carry it too 
far forward, and that we do not omit anything per- 
tinent. And our Statement of Facts will be clear 
if we follow the precepts on brevity that I have 
laid down,/ for the shorter the Statement of Facts, 
the clearer will it be and the easier to follow. 

<* Cf. Cicero, De Inv. 1. xx. 29. 
* v7r€pj3aTcDs", in inverted order. 
^In 1. ix. 14 above. 



16 V^eri similis narratio erit si ut mos, ut opinio, ut 
natura postulat dicemus ; si spatia temporum, per- 
sonarum dignitates. consiliorum rationes, locorum 
opportunitates constabunt, ne refelli possit aut tem- 
poris parum fuisse, aut causam nullam, aut locum 
idoneum non fuisse, aut homines ipsos facere aut pati 
non potuisse. Si vera res erit, nihilominus haec 
omnia narrando conservanda sunt, nam saepe Veritas, 
nisi haec servata sint, fidem non potest facere; sin 
erunt ficta, eo magis erunt conservanda. De iis 
rebus caute confingendum est quibus in rebus tabulae 
aut alicuius firma auctoritas videbitur interfuisse. 

Adhuc quae dicta sunt arbitror mihi constare cum 
ceteris artis scriptoribus, nisi quia de insinuationibus 
nova excogitavimus, quod earn soli nos praeter 
ceteros in tria tempora divisimus, ut plane certam 
viam et perspicuam rationem exordiorum haberemus. 
X. Nunc, quod reliquum est — quoniam de rerum 
inventione disputandum est, in quo singulare con- 
sumitur oratoris artificium — dabimus operam ut 
nihilominus industrie quam rei utilitas postulabit 
quaesisse videamur — si ^ prius pauca de divisione 
causarum dixerimus. 

^ videamur si MSS. Mx ed. mai. : lacuna before si Mx. 

« C/. Cicero, De Inv. 1. xxi. 29-30. 

* See note on 1. vi. 9 above. Our author's doctrine of the 
Subtle Approach is Greek in origin, although we know no 
specific Greek source for the three occasions. That Cicero 
in De Inv. presents a like classification makes our aiithor's 


AD HKRKNNIUM, I. ix. i6-a. i6 

16 Our Statement of I'acts will have plausibility ** if it 
answers the requirements of the usual, the expeeted, 
and the natural ; if account is strictly kept of the length 
of time, the standing of the persons involved, the 
motives in the planning, and the advantages offered 
by the scene of action, so as to obviate the argument 
in refutation that the time was too short, or that there 
was no motive, or that the place was unsuitable, or 
that the persons themselves could not have acted or 
been treated so. If the matter is true, all these pre- 
cautions must none the less be observed in the State- 
ment of Facts, for often the truth cannot gain 
credence otherwise. And if the matter is fictitious, 
these measures will have to be observed all the more 
scrupulously. Fabrication must be circumspect in 
those matters in which official documents or some 
person's unimpeachable guaranty will prove to have 
played a role. 

In what I have thus far said I believe that I agree 
with the other writers on the art of rhetoric except 
for the innovations I have devised on Introductions 
by the Subtle Approach. I alone,** in contrast with 
the rest, have distinguished three occasions for the 
Subtle Approach, so as to provide us with a thoroughly 
sure method and a lucid theory of Introductions. 
X. Now as to the rest, since I must discuss the 
finding of arguments, a matter that makes unique 
demands upon the art of the speaker, I shall en- 
deavour to exhibit an industry in research such as 
the importance of the subject demands — as soon as 
1 have prefixed a few remarks on the Division of 
the cause. 

claim difficult to explain ; see the Introduction to the present 
volume, pp. xxix-xxx. 



17 Causarum divisio in duas partes distributa est. 
Primum perorata narratione ^ debemus aperire quid 
nobis conveniat cum adversai'iis, si ea quae utilia 
sunt nobis convenient, quid in controversia ^ relictum 
sit, hoc modo : " Interfectam esse ab Oreste matrem 
convenit mihi cum adversariis. lure fecerit et licue- 
ritne facere, id est in controversia." Item e con- 
trario : " Agamemnonem esse a Clytemestra occisum 
confitentur ; cum id ita sit, me ulcisci parentem 
negant oportuisse." 

Deinde, cum iioc fecerimus, distributione uti 
debemus. Ea dividitur in duas partes : enumera- 
tionem et expositionem. Enumeratione utemur cum 
dicemus numero quot de rebus dicturi sum us. Earn 
plus quam trium partium numero esse non oportet ; 
nam et periculosum est ne quando plus minusve 
dicamus, et suspicionem adfert auditori meditationis 
et artificii, quae res fidem abrogat orationi. Expositio 
est cum res quibus de rebus dicturi sumus exponimus 
breviter et absolute. 

^ perorata narratione E : per narrationem M Mx. 
* controversia d : controversiis the other MSS. Mx. 

" " Outlining of the case," the Analysis. npoKaTaaKevq, a 
combination of npocKdeais and fiepLOfios. In Cicero, De Inv. 
1. xxii. 31-xxiii. 33, partiiio. Cf. the figure divisio, 4. xl. 52 

* Martianus Capella, 5. 556, makes the same point for the 

" A favourite theme of the rhetoricians; cf. also 1. xv. 25 
and 1. xvi. 26 below, Cicero, De Inv. 1. xiii. 18-xiv. 19, 
1. xxii. 31, Quintilian, 3. 11. 4 ff., 3. 5. 11, 7. 4. 8. 



17 The Division "ofthe cause falls into two parts. When 
the Statement of Facts has been hroiir^^ht to an end, 
we ought first to make clear what we and our oppo- 
nents agree upon, if there is agreement on the points 
useful to us,** and what remains contested, as follows : 
" Orestes killed his mother ; ^ on that I agree with 
my opponents. But did he have the right to-commit 
the deed, and was he justified in committing it ? That 
is in dispute." Likewise in reply : " They admit that 
Agamemnon was killed by Clytemnestra ; yet despite 
this they say that I ought not to have avenged my 

Then, when we have done this, we should use the 
Distribution. '^ The Distribution has two parts : the 
Enumeration * and the Exposition./ We shall be 
using the Enumeration when we tell by number how 
many points we are going to discuss. The number 
ought not to exceed three ; for otherwise, besides the 
danger that we may at some time include in the 
speech more or fewer points than we enumerated ,? it 
instils in the hearer the suspicion of premeditation 
and artifice,'' and this robs the speech of conviction. 
The Exposition consists in setting forth, briefly and 
completely, the points we intend to discuss. 

** Cf. the figure distributio, 4. xxxv. 47, and disirihulio, the 
Broken Tone of Debate, 3. xiii. 23 below. 

* Cf. the enumeratio (Summing Up) of 2. xxx. 47 below. 
Quintilian, 4. 5. 24, praises Hortensius for the great pains he 
took with his Partitions, " although Cicero often lightly 
mocks him for counting his points on his fingers." 

^ CKdeais. Cf. the exposido (Proposition of an argument) 
in 2. XX. 32, and note on 2. xviii. 28 below. 

' Cf. Cicero, Brutus 60. 217 on Curio : " His memor}- was so 
altogether wanting that at times when he had announced three 
points he would add a fourth or miss the third." 

* See note on 4. vii. 10 below. 



18 Nunc ad confirmationem et confutationem transe- 
amus. Tota spes vincendi ratioque persuadendi 
posita est in confirmatione et in confutatione. Nam 
cum adiumenta nostra exposuerimus contrariaque 
dissolverimus, absolute nimirum munus oratorium 
confecerimus. XI. Utrumque igitur facere pote- 
rimus, ^i constitutionem causae cognoverimus. 
Causarum constitutiones alii quattuor fecerunt ; 
noster doctor tres putavit esse, non ut de illorum 
quicquam detraheret inventione, sed ut ostenderet id 
quod oportuisset simpliciter ac singulari modo docere 
illos distribuisse dupliciter et bipertito. Constitutio 
est prima deprecatio defensoris cum accusatoris in- 
simulatione coniuncta. Constitutiones itaque, ut 

" TTLOTis, h-araaKevrj K€(f>aXaLcov. 

* dvaoKcv-^. In the Rhef. ad Alex., ch. 7 (1428 a), Refuta- 
tion is considered as one of seven subheads under Proof; see 
alsoch. 13 (1431 a). 

* I follow the practice, perhaps begun by Thomas Wilson, 
Arte of Rhetor ique (first ed. 1553), ed. G. H. Mair, Oxford, 
1910, p. 89, of translating constitutio (or status [= OTaats], the 
term used by Cicero, except in De Inv., and by most other 
rhetoricians) as " Issue." The constitutio (= avaTams, most 
probably; see S. F. Bonner, Class. Rev. 61 [1947]. 84-6) is 
the conjoining of two conflicting statements, thus forming the 
centre of the argument and determining the character of the 
case; for a study of the meaning of status and of consiitutio 
see A. 0. L. Dieter, Speech Monographs 17, 4 (1950). 345-69. 
Our author makes use of the status system only for judicial 
oratory, the examples being drawn from both criminal and 
civil causes. Adumbrated in pre-AristoteUan rhetoric 
(where it was close to Attic procedure), as well as in Aristotle's 
Rhetoric, it was developed principally by Hermagoras. Stoic 
and Aristotelian dialectic exerted an influence in its evolution. 
The terminology and Roman examples show that our author 
assimilated the Greek theory. His system differs consider- 
ably from that of Hermagoras; see Kroehnert, pp. 21 ff . ; 


AD HI'.IM'A'ML'M. I. x. i8 xi. i8 

Now let me pass to Prcjot" aiul Kefutatioii.'' The 
entire liope of victory and the entire nietliod of per- 
suasion rest on proof and refutation, for when we 
have submitted our arguments and destroyed those 
of the opposition, we have, of course, completely fid- 
filled the speaker's function. XI. We shall, 
enabled to do both if we know the Type of Issue '^ 
which the cause presents. Others make these Types 
of Issue four.'^ My teacher * thought that there 
were three, not intending thereby to subtract any of 
the types they had discovered, but to demonstrate 
that one type which they should have taught as 
single and uncompounded they had divided into tw(i 
distinct and separate types. The Issue is determined 
by the joining of the primary plea of the defence 
with the charge of the plaintiff". The Types of Issue 

Hermann Netzker, Ilenrutguru.s, Cicero, Cornificiu.^ quae, 
docuerint tie " siatibus,'" Kiel diss., 1879, and " Die constitnlio 
legilima des Cornificius," Xe/<e Jalirhucher 133 (18S6;. 
4il-16; Heinrich Weber, Ueher 'lie Quellen der Rhel. ad Her. 
des Cornificius, Zurich diss., 1880; Thiele, Hermagoras; 
Walter Jaeneke, De slaiuum doctrina ah Hermogene tradita, 
Leipzig, 1904; Clans Peters, De ralioniljus inter arlem rhel- 
oricam quart i p.t primi saendi intercedentihvt, Kiel diss.. 
1907, pp. 10 ff. ; Kroll in P.-W., art. " Rhetorik," coll. 1090-.5. 
Cicero's system in De Inv. 1. viii. 10 £f. differs from that 
of our author. Cf. Quiiitilian, 3. (i. 1 It". Most critics see our 
author as a follower of Marcus Antonius in his system of 
status ; cf. Quintilian, 3. (3. 4o ff. (note that legalis, not legitimus 
is the term used for the " Legal " Issue by the foliov/ers of 
Antonius), and Kroehnert, loc. cit. Modern students of 
Roman Law for the most part think that from the juristic 
point of view, as against the rhetorical, the status system was 
over-intricate and impractical; see note on 2. xiii. 19 below. 

"^ Hermagoras taught four Types of Issue ; see note on 
Transference, 1. xi. 19, below. 

' See Introduction, pp. xxi ff., esp. p. xxiii. 



ante diximus, tres sunt: coniecturalis, legitima, 

Coniecturalis est cum de facto controversia est, hoc 
modo : Aiax in silva, postquam resciit quae fecisset 
per insaniam, gladio incubuit. Ulixes intervenit, 
occisum conspicatur, corpore telum cruentum educit. 
Teucer intervenit, fratrem occisum, inimicum fratris 
cum gladio cruento videt. Capitis arcessit. Hie 
coniectura verum quaeritur. De facto erit contro- 
versia ; ex eo constitutio causae coniecturalis 
19 Legitima est constitutio cum in scripto aut e 
scripto aliquid controversiae nascitur. Ea dividitur 
in partes sex : scriptum et sententiam, contrarias 
leges, ambiguum, definitionem, translationem, ratio- 

Ex scripto et sententia controversia nascitur cum 
videtur scriptoris voluntas cum scripto ipso dissentire, 
hoc modo : si lex sit quae iubeat cos qui propter 
tempestatem navem reliquerint omnia perdere, eorum 
navem ceteraque esse, si navis conservata sit, qui 
remanserunt in navi. Magnitudine tempestatis 
omnes perterriti navem reliquerunt, in scapham 

" For the spelling iuridicalis see Stroebel, Tulliana, p. 20. 

* aroxaafios. Of. Cicero, De Inv. 1. viii. 11. 

•^ See the progi/mnasma in 2. xviii. 28-xix. 30 below. 
Resenting the award of the arms of Achilles to Ulysses, Ajax 
goes mad and slaughters a flock of sheep, thinking them his 
enemies. Cf. Hermogenes, De Stat. ? (ed. Rabe, pp. 49 and 
54) : A man is discovered burying in a lonely place the body 
of a person recently slain, and is charged with murder; 
Fortunatianus 1. 6 (Halm, p. 85) and 1. 8 (Halm, p. 87). 

^ oTaoLs vofiiK-q. Cf. Cicero, De Inv. 1. xiii. 17. 

* ardaLS Kara pr^rov koL Sidvoiav. Cf. the sententia {M.a.xim) 
of 4. xvii. 24 below. 


AD HEllENNIUM, I. xi. 18-19 

are then, as 1 have said above, three : Conjectural, 
Lefjal, and Juridical.** 

The Issue is Conjectural * when the controversy 
concerns a question of fact, as follows : In the forest 
Ajax, after realizing what in his madness he had done, 
fell on his sword. Ulysses appears, perceives that 
Ajax is dead, draws the bloody weapon from the 
corpse. Teucer appears, sees his brother dead, and 
his brother's enemy with bloody sword in hand. He 
accuses Ulysses of a capital crime. Here the truth 
is sought by conjecture. The controversy will con- 
cern the fact.c And that is why the Issue in the 
cause is called Conjectural. 
19 The Issue is Legal ^ when some controversy turns 
upon the letter of a text or arises from an implication 
therein. A Legal Issue is divided into six subtypes : 
Letter and Spirit/ Conflicting Laws,/ Ambiguity jJ' 
Definition,'» Transference,' and Reasoning from 
Analogy. J 

A controversy from Letter and Spirit arises when 
the framer's intention appears to be at variance with 
the letter of the text, as follows : Suppose a law 
which decrees that whoever have abandoned their 
ship in a storm shall lose all rights of title, and that 
their ship, if saved, and cargo as well, belong to those 
who have remained on board. Terrified by the 
storm's violence, all deserted the ship and took to the 


* opog. 

* fieTdXrjtpi;. Procedural in nature. CL translatio criminis, 
1. xiv. 24, and the figure translatio, 4. xxxiv. 4o below. 
Hermagoras was the first to enter this among the Types of 
Issue; see Cicero, De Inv. 1. xi. 16, and Quintilian, 3. 6. 60. 

^ avXXoyiOfMos. 



conscenderunt — praeter unum aegrotum ; is propter 
morbum exire et fugere non potuit. Casu et fortuitu 
navis in portum incolumis delata est ; illam aegrotus 
possedit. Navem petit ille cuius fuerat. Haec con- 
stitutio legitima est ex scripto et sententia. 
20 Ex contrariis legibus controversia constat cum alia 
lex iubet aut permittit, alia vetat quippiam fieri, hoc 
modo: Lex vetat eum qui de pecuniis repetundis 
damnatus sit in contione orationem habere ; altera 
lex iubet augurem in demortui locum qui petat in 
contione nominare. Augur quidam damnatus de 
pecuniis repetundis in demortui locum nominavit ; 
petitur ab eo multa. Constitutio legitima ex contra- 
riis legibus. 

XII. Ex ambiguo controversia nascitur cum scrip- 
tum ^ duas aut plures sententias significat, hoc modo : 
Paterfamilias cum filium heredem faceret, testamento 
vasa argentea uxori legavit : " Heres mens uxori meae 
XXX pondo vasorum argenteorum dato, quae ^ 
volet." Post mortem eius vasa pretiosa et caelata 
magnifice petit mulier. Filius se quae ^ ipse vellet in 
XXX pondo ei debere dicit. Constitutio est legitima 
ex ambiguo. 

^ scriptum BCE : res unam sententiam scripta scriptum 
HP^ Mx : res una sententia scripta scriptum 11. 
- quae BCE Mx ed. inai. : qua HP H Mx. 
3 quae BCE Mx ed. mai. : qua HP U Mx. 

" This controversia is of Greek origin ; c/. Hermogenes, 
De Stat. 2 (ed. Rabe, p. 41), Fortunatianus 1. 26 (Halm, pp. 
100 f.), and Cicero, De Inv. 2. li. 153. 

* On the importance of this type of rhetorical discussion 
for juristic theory see note on 2. xiii. 19 below. 


AD HKRENNIUM, I. \i. 19 xii. 20 

boat — all except one sick man wlio, ou account of his 
illness, could not leave the ship and escape. By 
sheer chance the ship was driven safely to harbour. 
The invalid has come into possession of the ship, and 
the former owner claims it." Here is a Legal Issue 
based on Letter and Spirit.'' 

Controversy results from Conflicting Laws when one 
law orders or permits a deed while another forbids it, 
as follows : A law forbids one who has been convicted 
of extortion to speak before the Assembly.^ Another 
law commands the augur to designate in the Assembly 
the candidate for the place of a deceased augur. ^ 
A certain augur convicted of extortion has designated 
the candidate for the place of a deceased augur. A 
penalty is demanded of him.* Here is a Legal Issue 
established from Conflicting Laws. 

XII. A controversy is created by Ambiguity when 
a text presents two or more meanings, as follows : 
The father of a family, when making his son his heir, 
in his will bequeathed silver vessels to his wife : 
" Let my heir give my wife thirty pounds' weight of 
silver vessels, ' such as shall be selected '." After 
his death the widow asks for some precious vessels of 
magnificent relief-work. The son contends that he 
owes her thirty pounds' weight of vessels " such as 
shall be selected " hy himJ Here is a Legal Issue 
established from Ambiguity. 

* Doubtless the law of C. Servilius Glaucia de pecuniis 
repetundis (111 B.C.). 

** The law of Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus de sacerdotiis, 
passed in 104 B.C. and repealed by Sulla in (?) 81 B.C., is here 

' When specifically the case came up we do not know; 
Marx, Proleg., p. 108, conjectures c. 100 B.C. 

f Cf. Cicero, De Inv. 2. xl. 116; Lucilius 16. 552-3. 



21 Definitione causa constat cum in controversia est 
quo nomine factum appelletur.^ Ea est huiusmodi : 
Cum Lucius Saturninus legem frumentariam de 
semissibus et trientibus laturus esset, Q. Caepio, qui 
per id temporis quaestor urbanus erat, docuit 
senatum aerarium pati non posse largitionem tantam. 
Senatus decrevit, si cam legem ad populum ferat, 
adversus rem publicam videri ea facere. Saturninus 
ferre coepit. Collegae intercedere, ille nihilominus 
sitellam detulit. Caepio, ut ilium, contra inter- 
cedentibus collegis, adversus rem publicam vidit ferre, 
cum viris bonis impetum facit, pontes disturbat, cistas 
deicit, inpedimento est quo setius feratur. Arcessitur 
Caepio maiestatis. Constitutio legitima ex defini- 
tione. Vocabulum enim definitur ipsum cum quaeri- 
tur quid sit minuere maiestatem. 

22 Ex translatione controversia nascitur cum aut 
tempus differendum aut accusatorem mutandum aut 
Jiidices mutandos reus dicit. Hac parte constitu- 

^ appelletur BCE Mx ed. mai. : inpelletur H : inpelleretur 
PB {in marg.) 11 : conpelletur Mx. 

" At the Comitia ; over these the voters passed in single 
file to the saepta in the Campus Martins to deposit their votes. 

^ Probably in his second tribunate in 100 B.C., L. Appu- 
leius Saturninus proposed his law fixing the fee for grain at 
five-sixths of an as (for a moditis); the lex Sempronia fru- 
mentaria of 123 had set the price at alnjost eight times that 
amount. It is uncertain whether the bill passed. Caepio 
was in 99 B.C. charged with treason, but was acquitted. Cf. 
2. xii. 17 (the supposed defence by Caepio), and for Saturninus 
4. xxii. 31 and 4. liv. 67. This Q. Servilius Caepio was the 
son of the Q. Servilius Caepio referred to in 1. xiv. 24 below. 

" Literally, what constitutes " impairing the sovereign 
majesty " of the state. Cf. 2. xii. 17 and 4. xxv. 35 below. 
The crimen maiestatis minutae was invented probably in 
103 B.C. ; the Lex Appuleia de maiestate attempted to define 


AD IIKRENNIUM, I. mi. 21-22 

21 A cause rests on Definition when the name by 
which an act should be called is in controversy. The 
followincr is an example : When Lucius Saturninus 
was about to introduce the grain law concerninfr the 
five-sixths as, Quintus Caepio, who was city quaestor 
during that time, explained to the Senate that the 
treasury could not endure so great a largess. The 
Senate decreed that if Saturninus should propose that 
law before the people he would appear to be doing so 
against the common weal. Saturninus proceeded 
with his motion. His colleagues interposed a veto ; 
nevertheless he brought the lot-urn down for the 
vote. Caepio, when he sees Saturninus presenting his 
motion against the public welfare despite his col- 
leagues' veto, attacks him with the assistance of some 
Conservatives, destroys the bridges,'* throws down 
the ballot boxes, and blocks further action on the 
motion. Caepio is brought to trial for treason.'' 
The Issue is Legal, and is established from Definition, 
for we are defining the actual term when we investi- 
gate what constitutes treason.^ 

22 A controversy is based on Transference when the 
defendant maintains that there must be a postpone- 
ment of time or a change of plaintiff or judges.*^ This 

the oflfence. See Hugh Last, Cambr. Anc. History 9. 160-L 
Cf. Antonius on the trial of Xorbanus (95 B.C.) in Cicero, 
De Orafore 2. 25. 107 ff., 2. 39. 164. 

** Anglo-American procedure has no specific analogue to 
the term translatio as here defined, nor indeed was this status 
suited to Roman juristic procedure. See Theodor Schwal- 
bach, Zeitschr. der Savigny-Stiftung fur Rechtsgeschichte, 
Romanist. Abt., 2 (1881). 209-32; Moriz \Massak, Der 
Ursprung der romischen Einrede (Festschr. Leopold Pfaff), 
Vienna, 1910, pp. 12 fF. ; and Artur Steinwenter, Sav. Zeitschr. 
65 (1947). 69-120, esp. p. 81, and pp. 104-5. Note also raro 
venit in indicium below. 



tionis Graeci in iudiciis, nos in iure plerumque utimur. 
In iudiciis tamen nonnihil utimur, ut hoc modo : Si 
quis peculatus accusatur quod vasa argentea publica 
de loco privato dicatur sustulisse, possit dicere, cum 
definitione sit usus quid sit furtum, quid peculatus, 
secum furti agi, non peculatus oportere. Haec 
partitio legitimae constitutionis his de causis raro 
venit in indicium, quod in privata actione praetoriae 
exceptiones sunt et causa cadit qui egit nisi habuit 
actionem, et in publicis quaestionibus cavetur legibus 
ut ante, si reo commodum sit, indicium de accusatore 
fiat utrum illi liceat accusare necnc. 
23 XIII. Ex ratiocinatione controversia constat cum 
res sine propria lege venit in indicium, quae tamen ab 
aliis legibus similitudine quadam aucupatur. Ea est 
huiusmodi: Lex: "Si furiosus existet, adgnatum 
gentiliumque in eo pecuniaque eius potestas esto." 
Et lex : " Qui parentem necasse iudicatus erit, ut is 

" The Komans in the preliminary proceedings before the 
magistrate, where the issue is defined ; the Greeks in the actual 
trial before the judge. 

* Despite the alteration, the source of this coniroversia may 
originally have been Aristotle, Rket. 1. 13 (1374 a) : " It often 
happens that a man may admit . . . theft, but not that the 
act was sacrilege (on the ground that the thing stolen was 
not the property of a god)." Cf. Cicero, De Iin\ 1. viii. 11 : 
Quintihan, 3. 6. 41 and 5. 10. 39; Hermogenes, De Stat. 2 
(ed. Rabe, p. 37) and 4 (ed. Rabc, p. 62) ; Sopater, in Walz 
8. 102-5 ; also Rabe, Proleg. SylL, pp. 218, 253, and 336. On 
peculatus publiais see Mommsen, pp. 764 ff. 

" Cf. Vietorinus, in Halm, p. 276. 

•^ These counterpleas accepted by the praetor allege new 
states of fact or of law ; although the defendant accepts the 
inientio in the plaintiff's formula, he urges the praetor to 
permit the insertion of an exceptio in the formula. See 


AD HKRENNIUM, I. xii. 22 xui. 23 

subtype of Issue the Greeks use in the proceedings 
before judges, we generally before the magistrate's 
tribunal.** We do, however, make some use of it in 
judicial proceedings. For example, if some one is 
accused of embezzlement, alleged to have removed 
silver vessels belonging to the state from a private 
place, he can say, when he has defined theft and 
embezzlement, that in his case the action ought to 
be one for theft and not embezzlement.* This sub- 
type of Legal Issue rarely '^ presents itself in judicial 
proceedings for the following reasons : in a private 
action there are counterpleas accepted by the 
praetor,'^ and the plaintiff's case fails unless he has had 
a cause of action ; in public investigations the laws 
provide that, if it suits the defendant, a decision is 
first passed on whether the plaintiff is. or is not, per- 
mitted to make the charge. 
23 XIII. The controversy is based on Analogy when a 
matter that arises for adjudication lacks a specifically 
applicable law, but an analogy is sought from other 
existing laws on the basis of a certain similarity to 
the matter in question. For example, a law reads : 
" If a man is raving mad, authority over his person 
and property shall belong to his agnates, or to the 
members of his gens." ^ Another law reads: " He 
who has been convicted of murdering his parent shall 

A. H. J. Greenidge, The Legal Procedure of Cicero's Tiiw, 
Oxford, 1901, pp. 178-181, 229-235; E. Rabel, Sav. Zeitschr. 
32 (1911). 413-23; Leopold Wenger, Inslitutes of the Rorvan 
Law of Civil Procedure, tr. 0. H. Fisk, New York, 1940, pp. 
155 ff. Cf. Cicero, De Inv. 1. viii. 10 and 2. xix. 57-xx. 61. 
Cicero in De Inv. (2. xix. 57) and our author supply the first 
references to the exceptio in extant literature. See Friedrich 
von Velsen, Sav. Zeitschr. 21 (1900). 104-5. 
' Twelve Tables 5. 7 a. 


obvolutus et obligatus corio devehatur in profluen- 
tem." Et lex: "Paterfamilias uti super familia 
pecuniave sua legaverit, ita ius esto." Et lex: " Si 
paterfamilias intestate moritur, familia pecuniaque 
eius adgnatum gentiliumque ^ esto." Malleolus 
iudicatus est matrem necasse. Ei damnato statim 
folliculo lupino os obvolutum est et soleae ligneae 
in pedibus inductae sunt ; in carcerem ductus est. 
Qui defendebant eum tabulas in carcerem adferunt, 
testamentum ipso praesente conscribunt, testes recte 
adfuerunt ; de illo supplicium sumitur. li qui 
heredes erant testamento hereditatem adeunt. 
Frater minor Malleoli, qui eum oppugnaverat in eius 
periculo, suam vocat hereditatem lege adgnationis. 
Hie certa lex in rem nulla adfertur, et tamen multae 
adferuntur, ex quibus ratiocinatio nascitur quare 
potuerit aut non potuerit iure testamentum facere. 
Constitutio legitima ex ratiocinatione. 

Cuiusmodi partes essent legitimae constitutionis 
ostendimus ; nunc de iuridicali constitutione dicamus. 
24 XIV. luridicalis constitutio est cum factum con- 
venit, sed iure an iniuria factum sit quaeritur. Eius 
constitutionis partes duae sunt, quarum una absoluta, 
altera adsumptiva nominatur. 

^ gentiliumque d : et gentilium E : gentilium AI Mx. 

" Marx (ProZegr., p, 107; see also R. Reitzenstein, Gnomon 
5 [1929]. 605-6) affirms, and Mommsen (p. 643, note 6) 
denies, the genuineness of this law ; it is omitted in Cicero, 
De Inv. 2. 1. 148. 

* Twelve Tables 5. 3. 

' Cf. Twelve Tables 5. 4-5. 

•* Cf. Cicero, De Inv. 2. I. 149, and on this (ritualistic) form 
of punishment Mommsen, pp. 921-3; Alfred Pernice, Sav. 
Zeitschr. 17 (1896). 210 ff. ; Max Radin, Journ. Rom. Studies 
10 (1920). 119-30; Rudolf Diill, Atti del Congr. Internaz. di 

AD HKRENNIUM, I. xiii. 2.s-mv. 24 

be completely wrapped and bound in a leather 
sack and thrown into a running stream." " Another 
law : " As the head of a family has directed regarding 
his household or his property, so shall the law hold 
good." * Another law : " If the head of a family dies 
intestate, his household and property shall belong 
to his agnates, or to the members of his gens.'' *= 
Malleolus was convicted of matricide. Immediately 
after he had received sentence, his head was wrapped 
in a bag of wolf's hide, the " wooden shoes " ^ were 
put upon his feet, and he was led away to prison. 
His defenders bring tablets into the jail, write his 
will in his presence, witnesses duly attending. The 
penalty is exacted of him. His testamentary heirs 
enter upon their inheritance. Malleolus' younger 
brother, who had been one of the accusers in his 
trial, claims his inheritance by the law of agnation. 
Here no one specific law is adduced, and yet many 
laws are adduced, which form the basis for a reasoning 
by analogy to prove that Malleolus had or had not the 
right to make a will. It is a Legal Issue established 
from Analogy. 

I have explained the types of Legal Issue. Now 
let me discuss the Juridical Issue. 
24 XIV. An Issue is Juridical « when there is agree- 
ment on the act, but the right or wrong of the act is 
in question. Of this Issue there are two subtypes, 
one called Absolute/ the other Assumptive. ^ 

Diritto Rom. (Roma), Pavia, 1935, 2. 363-408. According 
to Livy, Periochae 68, Malleolus was the first (101 B.C.) to 
suffer this punishment. 

« ardms SiATowoAoyt/cTj. Cf. Cicero, De Inv. 1. xi. 15, 2. 
xxiii. 69 ff. 

f KaT avTiXrupLV. 

' Kar^ avrWcaiv, 



Absoluta est cum id ipsum quod factum est, ut 
aliud nihil foris adsumatur, recte factum esse dicemus, 
eiusmodi : ^ Mimus quidam nominatim Accium 
poetam conpellavit in scaena. Cum eo Accius 
iniuriarum agit. Hie nihil aliud defendit nisi licere 
nominari eum cuius nomine scripta dentur agenda. 

Adsumptiva pars est cum per se defensio infirma 
est, adsumpta extraria re conprobatur. Adsumptivae 
partes sunt quattuor: concessio, remotio criminis, 
translatio criminis, conparatio. 

Concessio est cum reus postulat ignosci. Ea 
dividitur in purgationem et deprecationem. Purgatio 
est cum consulto negat se reus fecisse. Ea dividitur 
in inprudentiam, fortunam, necessitatem : fortunam, 
ut Caepio ad tribunos plebis de exercitus amissione ; 
inprudentiam, ut ille qui de eo servo qui dominum 
occiderat supplicium sumpsit, cui frater esset, ante- 

^ dicemus eiusmodi / 3Ix ed. vuii. : eam dicemus eius 
modi 31 : dicemus ea eiusmodi (huiusmodi C) est BCd : 
dicemus ea est huiusmodi 6 : eam rem dicemiis eiusmodi 3Ix. 

" The mime was condemned; see 2. xiii. 19 below. This 
type of coniroversia is Greek m origin ; c/. Hermogenes, De 
Stat. 11, ed Rabe, pp. 88-9 (but belonging to the subtype of 
Legal Issue based on Analogy; see 1. .?iii. 23 above), and 
Sopater, in Walz 8. 383-4. See also Sulpitius Victor 39, in 
Halm, p. 337. 

* avyyvdifXTj. 



^ dvTeyKXrjfia. 



f Cf. 2. xvi. 23 and 2. 


43 below, and Cicero 

, De Inv. 

1. xi. 15. 

" Kadapais. 

* TrapatTTyCTi?. 

* €K TTpovoias. 


acts = rd 



tary = to. aKovata. 

■' dyvoia. 


AD IIKRENNIUM, I. xiv. 24 

It is an Absolute Issue when we contend tliat the 
act in and of itself, without our drawing on any 
extraneous considerations, was rii^ht. Tor example, 
a certain mime abused the poet Accius by name on 
the stage. Accius sues him on the ground of injuries. 
The plaver makes no defence except to maintain that 
it was permissible to name a person under whose name 
dramatic works were given to be performed on the 

The Issue is Assumptive when the defence, in itself 
insufficient, is established by drawing on extraneous 
matter. The Assumptive subtypes are four: 
Acknowledgement of the Charge.^ Rejection of the 
Responsibilitv,'^ Shifting of the Question of Guilt,<^ 
Comparison with the Alternative Course.^ 

The Acknowledgement / is the defendant's plea for 
pardon. The Acknowledgement includes the Excul- 
pation 9 and the Plea for Mercy, f^ The Exculpation 
is the defendant's denial that he acted with intent.* 
Under Plea of Exculpation are three subheads : 
Ignorance,^ Accident.^ and Necessity ; ' accident, as 
in the case of Caepio ^" before the tribunes of the plebs 
on the loss of his army : ignorance, as in the case of 
the man who, before opening the tablets of the will 
by the tenns of which his brother's slave had been 

' avdyKT], /Sia. 

*" In 105 B.C., Q. Servilius Caepio, through his failure to 
cooperate with his colleague Mallius, brought upon the army 
a disastrous defeat at Arausio at the hands of the Cimbri, 
Teutones, and their allies. Caepio's proconsular imperium 
was abrogated, and by the motion of the trihunus plebis, L. 
Cassius Longinus, he lost senatorial rank (104 B.C.). Cicero, 
Brutvs 35, 135, says of Caepio that the fortunes of war were 
imputed to him as a crime. 



quam tabulas testamenti aperuit, cum is servus testa- 
mento manu missus esset ; necessitudinem, ut ille 
qui ad diem commeatus non venit quod flumina vias 
interclusissent. Deprecatio est cum et peccasse se et 
consulto fecisse confitetur, et tamen postulat ut sui 
misereantur. Hoc in iudicio fere non potest usu 
venire, nisi quando pro eo dicimus cuius multa recte 
facta extant, hoc modo — in loco communi per 
amplificationem iniciemus : " Quodsi hoc fecisset, 
tamen ei pro pristinis beneficiis ignosci conveniret ; 
verum nihil postulat ignosci." Ergo in iudicium non 
venit, at in senatum, ad imperatorem et in consilium 
talis causa potest venire. 
25 XV. Ex translatione criminis causa constat cum 
fecisse nos non negamus, sed aliorum peccatis coactos 
fecisse dicimus; ut Orestes cum se defendit in 
matrem conferens crimen. 

Ex remotione criminis causa constat cum a nobis 
non crimen, sed culpam ipsam amovemus, et vel in 
hominem transferimus vel in rem quampiam conferi- 
mus. In hominem transfertur, ut si accusetur is qui 
Publium Sulpicium se fateatur occidisse, et id iussu 
consulum defendat et eos dicat non modo imperasse, 

" Manumitted, the slave was answerable for his crime to 
the courts, and not subject to domestic punishment. The 
controversia is doubtless Greek in origin. Cf. Quintilian, 
7. 4. 14. 

^ The controversia is Greek in origin; the like situation 
is presented in De Inv. 2. xxxi. 96. Cf. Quintilian, 7. 
4. 14. 

* Cf. Cicero, De Inv. 2. xxxiv. 104. 

** The court was obliged to render a verdict strictly on the 
law, and could not lessen the punishment. See also Quin- 
tilian, 5. 13. 5 and 7, 4. 17 ff. 


AD HKRENNIUM, I. xiv. 24-xv. 25 

manumitted, exacted punishment of the slave for 
havin<r slain his master; " necessity, as in the case of 
the soldier who overstayed his leave because the 
floods had blocked the roads.'' It is a Plea for Mercy 
when the defendant confesses the crime and pre- 
meditation, yet begs for compassion. <^ In the courts 
this is rarely practicable,'' except when we speak in 
defence of one w hose good deeds are numerous and 
notable : for example, interposing as a commonplace 
in amplification : " Even if he had done this, it 
would still be appropriate to pardon him in view of 
his past services; but he does not at all beg for 
pardon." Such a cause, then, is not admissible in 
the courts, but is admissible before the Senate, or 
a general, or a council.^ 
25 X\. A cause rests on the Shifting of the Question 
of Guilt when we do not deny our act but plead that 
we were driven to it by the crimes of others, as in 
the case of Orestes when he defended himself by 
diverting the issue of guilt from himself to his 

A cause rests on the Rejection of the Responsibility 
when we repudiate, not the act charged, but the 
responsibility, and either transfer it to another 
person or attribute it to some circumstance. An 
example of the transference of responsibility to 
another person : if an accusation should be brought 
against the confessed slayer of Publius Sulpicius, and 
he should defend his act by invoking an order of the 
consuls, declaring that they not only commanded the 

' Especially that of a magistrate; c/. Mommsen, pp. 149 f. 
and note 5, and Wenger, Institutes of the Roman Law of Civil 
Procedure, p. 32. 

f C/. 1. X. 17 above, and 1. xvi. 26 below. 



sed rationem quoque ostendisse quare id facere lice- 
ret. In rem confertur, ut si quis ex testamento quod 
facere iussus sit ex plebis scito vetetur. 

Ex conparatione causa constat cum dicimus 
necesse fuisse alterutrum facere, et id quod fecerimus 
satius fuisse facere. Ea causa huiusmodi est : C. 
Popilius, cum a Gallis obsideretur neque fugere ullo 
modo posset, venit cum hostium dueibus in con- 
locutionem ; ita discessit ut inpedimenta relinqueret, 
exercitum educeret. Satius esse duxit amittere in- 
pedimenta quam exercitum. Exercitum eduxit, 
inpedimenta reliquit. Arcessitur maiestatis. 

XVI. Quae constitutiones et quae constitutionum 
partes sint videor ostendisse. Nunc quo modo eas et 
qua via tractari conveniat demonstrandum est, si 
prius aperuerimus quid oporteat ab ambobus in causa 
destinari quo ratio omnis totius orationis conferatur. 

" P. Sulpicius Rufus was among those proscribed by Sulla 
in 88 B.C. Pursued by Sulla's horsemen, he took refuge in a 
villa at Laurentum, where he was betrayed bj' a slave and 
murdered. His head was exhibited on the rostra. The 
slave was set free by Sulla's orders and then hurled down the 
Tarpeian Rock. C/. Appian, Bell. Civil. 1. 7. 60 : " [Sul- 
picius and others] had been voted enemies of Rome, and 
anyone who came upon them had been authorized to kill 
them with impunity or to bring them before the consuls 
[Cornelius Sulla and Quintus Pompeius]." Velleius Pater- 
oulus, 2. 19, says that Sulpicius and his followers were declared 
exiles by formal decree {lege lata). It was forbidden to bury 
Sulpicius' body ; see 4. xxii. 31 below. If this controversia was 
not merely a school exercise, and the murderer was actually 
called to account, that may have been in the year 87, when 
Sulpicius' party again came into power. See the notes on 
4. xiv. 20, xxiv. 33, xxviii. 38, xxxiv. 45, lii. 65, and also 
2. xxviii. 45. 

* Cf. Cicero, De Inv. 2. xxiv. 72. According to the 
historians, after L. Cassius Longinus in the war against the 


AD IIKRKNNIUM. 1. \v. 25-\vi. 25 

act but nUo <»ave reason uliy it was lawful." An 
example ot" attrihut ion to a circumstance : if a person 
should be forbidden by a plebiscite to do what a will 
has directed him to do. 

A cause rests on Comparison with the Alternative 
Course when we declare that it was necessary for us 
to do one or the other of the two things, and that 
the one we did was the better. This cause is of the 
following sort : Gains Popilius, hemmed in by the 
Gauls, and quite unable to escape, entered into a 
parley with the enemy's chiefs. He came away witli 
consent to lead his army out on condition that he 
abandon his baggage. He considered it better to 
lose his baggage than his army. He led out his army 
and left the baggage behind. He is charged with 
treason. ** 

XVI. I believe that I have made clear what the 
Types of Issue are and what are their subdivisions. 
Now I must illustrate the proper ways and means of 
treating these, first indicating what both sides in a 
cause ought to fix upon as the point to which the 
complete economv of the entire speech should be 

Cimbri and their allies fell (in 107 B.C.) at the hands of the 
Tigurini in Gaul, C. Popilius Laenas, legate, made a pact: 
the Roman survivors would, in return for hostages and half 
of their possessions, leave in safety. The Roman band went 
under the yoke of the Tigurini. No mention is here made of 
the hostages nor of passing under the yoke, nor does the 
amount of the baggage agree precisely with that in the 
historical accounts. The charge of treason was made in 106 
by the tribune C. Caelius Caldus ; a fragment of the defence 
appears in 4. xxiv. 34 below. Popilius went into exile, but 
perhaps after a later trial under Saturninus' law of treason of 
103 B.C. 



26 Constitutione igitur reperta statim quaerenda ratio 
est. Ratio est quae caiisam facit et continet defen- 
sionem, hoc modo — ut docendi causa in hac potis- 
simum causa consistamus : Orestes confitetur se 
occidisse matrem ; nisi adtulerit facti rationem, per- 
verterit defensionem. Ergo adfert earn, quae nisi 
intercederet, ne causa quidem esset. " Ilia enim," 
inquit, " patrem meum occiderat." Ergo, ut ostendi, 
ratio ea est quae continet defensionem, sine qua ne 
parva quidem dubitatio potest remorari damna- 

Inventa ratione firmamentum quaerendum est, id 
est, quod continet accusationem, quod adfertur contra 
rationem defensionis de qua ante dictum est. Id 
constituetur hoc modo: Cum usus fuerit Orestes 
ratione hoc pacto : " lure occidi, ilia enim patrem 
meum occiderat," utetur accusator firmamento, hoc 
modo : "At non abs te occidi neque indamnatam 
poenas pendere oportuit." 

Ex ratione defensionis et ex firmamento accusa- 
tionis iudicii quaestio nascatur oportet, quam ^ nos 

^ quam BC bl Mx ed. rnai. : tarn HP : earn Mx : quod d 

*• Ratio — TO avvdxov, firmamentum = ro airiov. Cicero 
misconstrued fir mame7itum in De Inv. 1. xiv. 19; cf. Part. 
Orat. 29. 103, Quintilian, 3. 11. 19, Volkmann, pp. 100-108, 
Thiele, Hermagoras, pp. 67-78, Jaeneke, De statuum doctrina 
ah Hermogene tradita, p. 111. 

* Cf. 1. X. 17 and 1. xv. 25 above. 

' Cf. in Aristotle, Rhet. 2. 23 (1397ab), the third of the 28 
topoi from which to draw enthymemes, the topos from corre- 
lative terms : " And if ' well ' or ' justly ' is true of the person 
to whom a thing is done, you may argue that it is true of the 
doer. But here the argument may be fallacious; for, 
granting that the man deserved what he got, it does not 



AD HKRENNIUM, I. xvi. 26 

Immediately upon findinf^ the Type of Issue, then, 
we must seek the Justifyinnr Motive." It is this which 
determines the action and comprises the defence. 
Thus Orestes (for the sake of clarity, to adhere to 
tliis particular action) confesses that he slew his 
mother. Unless he has advanced a Justifying Motive 
for the act, he will have ruined his defence. He 
therefore advances one ; were it not interposed, 
there would not even be an action. " For she," says 
he, " had slain my father." ^ Thus, as I have shown, 
the Justifying Motive is what comprises the defence ; 
without it not even the slightest doubt could exist 
which would delay his condemnation. 

Upon finding the Motive advanced in Justification 
we must seek the Central Point "■ of the Accusation, 
that is, that which comprises the accusation and is 
presented in opposition to the Justifying Motive of 
the defence which I have discussed above. This will 
be established as follows : When Orestes has used 
the Justifying Motive : "I had the right to kill my 
mother,, for she had slain my father," the prosecutor 
will use his Central Point : " Yes, but not by your 
hand ought she to have been killed or punished 
without a trial." ^ 

From the Justifying Motive of the defence and the 
Central Point of the Accusation must arise the 
Question for Decision, which we call the Point to 

follow that he deserved it from you " (tr. Lane Cooper), 
and in 2. 24 (1401b), the fallacy of omission illustrated by the 
argument in Theodectes' Orestes. For the argument as used 
in other Greek tragedies, c/. Tyndareiis in Euripides, Orestes 
538-9 : " My daughter, dying, paid her debt to justice, but 
that she died at his hand was not meet," and Castor, address- 
ing Orestes in Electra 1244 : " Your mother now has but jus- 
tice, but your deed is not just." 



iudicationem, Graeci crinomenon appellant. Ea 
constituetur ex coniunctione firmamenti et rationis,^ 
hoc modo: Cum dicat Orestes se patris ulciscendi 
matrem occidisse, rectumne fuerit sine iudicio a 
filio Clytemestram occidi ? Ergo hac ratione iudi- 
cationem reperire convenit ; reperta iudicatione 
omnem rationem totius orationis eo conferri 
27 XVII. In omnibus constitutionibus et partibus 
constitutionum hac via iudicationes reperientur, 
praeterquam in coniecturali constitutione ; in ea nee 
ratio qua re fecerit quaeritur, fecisse enim negatur, 
nee firmamentum exquiritur, quoniam non subest 
ratio. Quare ex intentione et infitiatione iudicatio 
constituitur, hoc modo: Intentio : " Occidisti 
Aiacem ; " Infitiatio : "Non occidi;" Iudicatio: 
" Occideritne ? " Ratio omnis utriusque orationis, 
ut ante dictum est, ad banc iudicationem conferenda 
est. Si plures erunt constitutiones aut partes consti- 
tutionum, iudicationes quoque plures erunt in una 
causa, sed et omnes simili ratione reperientur. 

Sedulo dedimus operam ut breviter et dilucide 
quibus de rebus adhuc dicendum fuit diceremus. 
Nunc quoniam satis huius voluminis magnitudo 
crevit, commodius est in altero libro de ceteris rebus 
deinceps exponere, ne qua propter multitudinem 
litterarum possit animum tuum defatigatio retardare. 
Si qua tardius haec quam studes absolventur, cum 

^ rationis defensione MSS. Mx. 

" Kpivo^ievov, Hermagorean doctrine. 
' Cf. Cicero, De Inv. 1. xiv. 19. 
' KaTa^aCTts. 


AD HKRRNNIUM I. xvi. 26-xvii. 27 

Adjudicate and the Greeks the krinomenon.'^ That 
will be established from the meeting of the prosecu- 
tor's Central Point and the defendant's Justifying 
Motive, as follows : When Orestes says that he 
killed his mother to avenge his father, was it right for 
Clytemnestra to be slain by her son without a trial ? 
This, then, is the proper method of finding the Point 
to Adjudicate. Once the Point to Adjudicate is 
found, the complete economy of the entire speech 
ought to be directed to it. 

XVII. The Points to Adjudicate will be found in 
this way in all Types of Issue and their subdivisions, 
except the conjectural.* Here the Justifying Motive 
for the act is not in question, for the act is denied, 
nor is the Central Point of the Accusation sought, 
for no Justifying Motive has been advanced. There- 
fore the Point to Adjudicate is established from the 
Accusation <^ and the Denial,'^ as follows : Accusa- 
tion : "You killed Ajax." Denial: "I did not." 
The Point to Adjudicate: Did he kill him? The 
complete economy of both speeches must, as I have 
said above, be directed to this Point to Adjudicate. 
If there are several Types of Issue or their sub- 
divisions in one cause, there will also be several 
Points to Adjudicate, but all these, too, will be 
determined by a like method. 

I have taken great pains to discuss briefly and 
clearly the matters that have had to be treated up to 
this point. Now, since this Book has grown to 
sufficient length, it will be more convenient in turn to 
expound other matters in a second Book, so that the 
great amount of material may not tire you and 
slacken your attention. If I dispatch these matters 
too slowly for your eagerness, you will have to 



rerum magnitudini turn nostris quoqiie occupationibus 
adsignare debebis. Verumtamen maturabimus, et 
quod negotio deminutum fuerit exaequabimus in- 
dustria, ut pro tuo in nos officio et ^ nostro in te studio 
munus hoc adcumulatissime tuae largiamur voluntati. 

^ et bd: in M : CI Mx omit. 


AD HERENNIUM, I. xvii. 27 

attribute that to the magnitude of the subject and 
also to the demands of my other occupations. Yet I 
shall make speed, and compensate by diligence for 
the time taken up by my affairs, to the end that, by 
this gift, in token of your courtesy towards me and 
my own interest in you, I may grant your desire in 
most bountiful measure. 



BOOK il 


1 I. In primo libro, Herenni, breviter exposiiimus 
quas causes recipere oratorem oporteret et in 
quibus officiis artis elaborare conveniret et ea officia 
qua ratione facillime consequi posset. Verum quod 
neque de omnibus rebus simul did poterat et de 
maximis rebus primum scribendum fuit quo cetera 
tibi faciliora cognitu viderentur, ita nobis placitum 
est ut ea quae difficillima essent potissimum con- 

Causarum tria genera sunt : demonstrativum, 
deliberativum, iudiciale. Multo difficillimum iudi- 
ciale est ; ergo id primum absolvimus hoc et priore 
libro. De oratoris officiis quinque inventio et prima 
et difficillima est. Ea quoque nobis erit hoc libro 
propemodum absoluta ; parvae partes eius in tertium 
volumen transferentur. 

2 De sex partibus orationis primum scribere in- 
cepimus : in primo libro locuti sumus de exordio, 
narratione, divisione, nee pluribus verbis quam 
necesse fuit nee minus dilucide quam te velle existima- 
bamus ; deinde coniuncte de confirmatione et confu- 
tatione dicendum fuit. Quare genera constitutionum 
et earum partes aperuimus ; ex quo simul ostende- 

« 1. ii. 2. 

^ 1. ii. 3. 

" Cicero, De Inv. 1. vii. 9 : princeps omnium partium. 

" 3. i. 1-viii. 15. 

« 1. iii. 4-x. 18. 



I. In the prcccdiiif^ Book, Ilerennius, I briefly set 
forth the causes with which the speaker must deal,** 
and also the functions of his art to which he may 
well devote his pains, and the means by which he can 
most easily fulfil these functions.* But since it was 
impossible to treat all the topics at once, and I had 
primarily to discuss the most important of them in 
order that the rest might prove easier for you to 
understand, I therefore decided to write first upon 
those that are the most difficult. 

There are three kinds of causes : Epideictic, 
Deliberative, and Judicial. By far the most difficult 
is the judicial ; that is why, in the present Book, and 
in the preceding Book, I have disposed of this kind 
first of all. Of the five tasks of the speaker Invention 
is the most important ^ and the most difficult. That 
topic too I shall virtually have disposed of in the 
present Book ; small details will be postponed to 
Book III.'^ 

I first undertook to discuss the six parts of a dis- 
course. In the preceding Book I spoke about the 
Introduction, the Statement of Facts, and the 
Division,^ at no greater length than was necessary nor 
with less clarity than' I judged you desired. I had 
next to discuss Proof and Refutation, conjointly. 
Hence I expounded the different Types of Issue and 
their subdivisions,/ and this at the same time showed 

/ 1. X. 18- XV. 25. 



batur quomodo constitutionem et partem constitu- 
tionis causa posita reperiri oporteret. Deinde 
docuimus iudicationem quemadmodum quaeri con- 
veniret; qua inventa curandum ut omnis ratio 
totius orationis ad earn conferatur. Postea admonui- 
mus esse causas conplures in quas plures constitu- 
tiones aut partes constitutionum adcommodarentur. 

II. Reliquum videbatur esse ut ostenderemus quae 
ratio posset inventiones ad unam quamque constitu- 
tionem aut partem constitutionis adcommodare, et 
item quales argumentationes, quas Graeci epichire- 
mata ^ appellant, sequi, quales vitari oporteret ; 
quorum utrumque pertinet ad confirmationem et ad 
confutationem. Deinde ad extremum docuimus 
cuiusmodi conclusionibus orationum uti oporteat, 
qui locus erat extremus de sex partibus orationis. 

Primum ergo quaeremus quemadmodum quamque 
causam tractare conveniat, et nimirum eam quae 
prima quaeque difficillima est potissimum con- 

In causa coniecturali narratio accusatoris suspi- 
ciones interiectas et dispersas habere debet, ut nihil 
actum, nihil dictum, nusquam ventum aut abitum, 
nihil denique factum sine causa putetur. Defensoris 
narratio simplicem et dilucidam expositionem debet 
habere, cum adtenuatione suspicionis. 

^ epicheremata MSS. Mr. 

2 considerabimus 1 : corisideremus HPB 11 Mx. 

" 1. xvi. 2o-xvii. 27. 

* Implied in 1. xvii. 27. 

" The scheme of organization under Proof and Refutation 
is as follows : {a) the Types of Issue (1. x. 18 to end of Bk, 1 ) ; 
(b) Invention applied to the Types of Issue (2. ii. 3-xvii. 26); 


AD HKRKNNIUM, II. .. 2 u. t, 

how tlie Type of Issue and its subdivision are to be 
found in a ^ivcn cause. Then I explained how the 
Point to Adjudicate is properly sought; this found, 
we must see that the complete economy of the entire 
speech is directed to it.** After that I remarked that 
there are not a few causes ^ to which several Types of 
Issue or their subdivisions are applicable. 

II. It remained for me, as it seemed, to show by 
what method we can adapt the means of invention to 
each type of issue or its subdivision,^ and likewise 
what sort of technical arguments (which the Greeks 
call epicheiremata) ^ one ought to seek ^ or avoid ; / 
both of these departments belong to Proof and Refu- 
tation. Then finally I have explained what kind of 
Conclusions to speeches one ought to employ ; ? the 
Conclusion was the last of the six parts of a discourse. 

First, then, I shall investigate how we should handle 
causes representing each Type of Issue, and of 
course shall give primary consideration to that type 
Nvhich is the most important and most difiicult, 
3 In a Conjectural cause the prosecutor's Statement 
of Facts should contain, intermingled and interspersed 
in it, material inciting suspicion of the defendant, so 
that no act, no word, no coming or going, in short 
nothing that he has done may be tht)ught to lack a 
motiye. The Statement of Facts of the defendant's 
counsel should contain a simple and clear account, 
and should also weaken suspicion. 

(c) the tractatio of the arguments devised by Invention 
(2. xviii. 27-xxix. 46). 

' 2. xviii. 27-xix. 30. 
f 2. XX. 31-xxix. 46. 
' 2. XXX. 47-xxxi. 50. 



Huius constitutionis ratio in sex partes est distri- 
buta: probabile, conlationem, signum, argumentum, 
consecutionem, approbationem. Horum unum quod- 
que quid ^ valeat aperiemus. 

Probabile est per quod probatur expedisse peccare, 
et ab simili turpitudine hominem numquam afuisse. 
Id dividitur in causam et in vitam. 

Causa est ea quae induxit ad maleficium com- 
modorum spe aut incommodorum vitatione, cum 
quaeritur num quod commodum malefieio appetierit, 
num honorem, num pecuniam, num dominationem ; 
num aliquam cupiditatem aut amoris aut eiusmodi 
libidinis voluerit explere, aut num quod incommodum 
vitarit: inimicitias, infamiam, dolorem, supplicium. 
4 III. Hie accusator in spe commodi cupiditatem 
ostendet adversarii, in vitatione incommodi formi- 
dinem augebit. Defensor autem negabit fuisse 
causam si poterit, aut eam vehementer extenuabit; 
deinde iniquum esse dicet omnes ad quos aliquid 
emolumenti ex aliqua re pervenerit in suspicionem 
maleficii devocari. 

^ quodq(ue) quid B^CE : quodque quod P^ : quodq(ue) 
quidq(ue) 5^ : quid quid H : quid quod II : quidqu P^ : 
quidquid quid Mx. 

* €lKOS. ^ 

" ama and dywyTJ (see Anon. Seg. 182, in Spengel-Hammer 
1 [2]. 384). The Rhet. ad Alex., eh. 7 (1428 ab), divides the 
Probable into natural feelings {<l>vaLs), habit (eOos), and love 
of gain (/cepSo?). Cicero, De Inv. 2. v. 16 ft'., derives all con- 
jecture from consideration of the motive, the person, and the 


AD HERRNNIUM, II. ii. 3 in. 4 

The scheme of the Conjectural Issue includes six 
divisions: Probability, Comparison, Sign, Presump- 
tive Proof, Subsequent Behaviour, and Confirmatory 
Proof. I shall explain the meaning of each of these 

Through Probability '* one proves that the crime 
was profitable to the defendant, and that he has never 
abstained from this kind of foul practice. The sub- 
heads under Probability are Motive and Manner of 

The Motive ^ is what led the defendant to commit 
the crime, through the hope it gave him of winning 
advantages or avoiding disadvantages.*^ The question 
is : Did he seek some benefit from the crime — honour, 
money, or power? Did he wish to satisfy some 
passion — love or a like overpowering desire ? Or did 
he seek to avoid some disadvantage — enmities, ill 
4 repute, pain, or punishment? III. Here the prose- 
cutor, if the hope of gaining an advantage is in 
question, will disclose his opponent's passion ; if the 
avoidance of a disadvantage is in question, he will 
enlarge upon his opponent's fear. The defendant's 
counsel, on the other hand, will, if possible, deny 
that there was a motive, or will at least vigorously 
belittle its importance ; then he will say that it is 
unfair to bring under suspicion of wrongdoing everv 
one to whom some profit has come from an act. 

act, distinguishing in motive passion ( itnpulsio) and premedita- 
tion (ratiocinaiio). Quintilian, 7. 2. 7 ff., treats conjecture 
from the point of view of the act and the author (his identity, 
his intention [animus^). 

' Cf. Cicero, De Inv. 2. v. 17-viii. 28. 

^ CJ. in Aristotle, Rhet. 2. 23 (1399b 30 ff.), the topos of 
Inducements and Deterrents; and see note on 2. xxi. 34 



5 Deinde vita hominis ex ante factis spectabitur. 
Primum considerabit accusator niim qiiando simile 
quid fecerit. Si id non reperiet, quaeret num quando 
venerit in similem suspicionem ; et in eo debebit esse 
occupatus ut ad earn causam peccati quam paulo 
ante exposuerit vita hominis possit adcommodari, hoc 
modo : si dicet pecuniae causa fecisse, ostendat eum 
semper avarum fuisse, si honoris, ambitiosum ; ita 
poterit animi vitium cum causa peccati conglutinare. 
Si non poterit par vitium cum causa reperire, reperiat 
dispar. Si non poterit avarum demonstrare, demon- 
stret corruptorem pertidiosum, si quo modo poterit 
denique aliquo aut quam phu'imis vitiis contaminare ; 
deinde qui illud fecerit tarn nequiter eundem hunc 
tarn perperam fecisse non esse mirandum. Si vehe- 
menter castus et ^ integer ^ existimabitur adver- 
sarius, dicet facta, non famam spectari oportere ; 
ilium ante occultasse sua flagitia ; se planum fac- 
turum ab eo maleficium non abesse. Defensor 
primum demonstrabit vitam integram, si poterit; id 
si non poterit, confugiet ad inprudentiam, stultitiam, 
adulescentiam, vim, persuasionem ; quibus de rebus 
. . . vituperatio eorum quae extra id crimen erunt 
non debeat adsignari. Sin vehementer hominis 

1 et P-'6 (/ : other M8S. Mx omit. 

2 integer MS8. : Mx brackets. 

« Cf. Cicero, De Inv. 2. x. 32. 
* Cf. Cicero, De Inv. 2. x. 33. 

•= Quintilian, 7. 2. 34, discusses charges based on the past 
life of the defendant. 

'^ Cf. Cicero, De Inv. 2. x. 33 and 2. xvi. 50. 
' Cf. Cicero, De Inv. 2. x. 34. 
/ Cf. Cicero, De Inv. 2. si. 35. 



5 Next the defriulant's Manner of Life will be exa- 
mined in the light of his ])revious eonduct. First the 
prosecutor will consider whether the accused has ever 
committed a similar offence.'* If he does not find any, 
he will seek to learn whether the accused has ever in- 
curred the suspicion of any similar guilt; and it will 
devolve upon him to make every effort to relate the 
defendant's manner of life to the motive which he has 
just exposed. For example, if the prosecutor con- 
tends that the motive for the crime was money, let him 
show that the defendant has always been covetous ; 
if the motive was public honour, ambitious; he will 
thus be able to link the flaw in the defendant's 
character with the motive for the crime. If he can- 
not find a flaw consistent with the motive, let him 
find one that is not. If he cannot show that the 
defendant is covetous,* let him show that he is a 
treacherous seducer ; in short, if he possibly can, let 
him brand the defendant with the stigma of some one 
fault, or indeed, of as many faults as possible.'^ Then, 
he will say, it is no wonder that the man who in 
that other instance acted so basely should have acted 
so criminally in this instance too.<^ If the adversar}'^ 
enjoys a high reputation for purity and integrity, the 
prosecutor will say that deeds, not reputation, ought 
to be considered ; that the defendant has previously 
concealed his misdeeds,^ and he will make it plain 
that the defendant is not guiltless of misbehaviour. 
The defendant's counsel will first show his client's 
upright life/ if he can ; if he cannot, he will have 
recourse to thoughtlessness, folly, youth, force, or 
undue influence. On these matters . , . censure 
ought not to be imposed for conduct extraneous to 
the present charge. If the speaker is seriously 




turpitudine inpedietur et infainia, prius dabit operam 
ut falsos rumores dissipates esse dicat de innocente, 
et utetur loco communi rumoribus credi non oportere. 
Sin nihil eorum fieri potest, utatur extrema defen- 
sione : dicat non se de moribus eius apud censores, sed 
de criminibus adversariorum apud iudices dicere. 

IV. Conlatio est cum accusator id quod adver- 
sarium fecisse criminatur alii nemini nisi reo bono 
fuisse demonstrat, aut alium nemineni potuisse per- 
ficere nisi adversarium, aut eum ipsum aliis rationibus 
aut non potuisse aut non aeque commode potuisse, 
aut eum fugisse alias rationes commodiores propter 
cupiditatem. Hoc loco defensor demonstret oportet 
aut aliis quoque bono fuisse, aut alios quoque id quod 
ipse insimuletur facere potuisse. 

Signum est per quod ostenditur idonea perficiendi 
facultas esse quaesita. Id dividitur in partes sex : 
locum, tempus, spatium, occasionem, spem per- 
ficiendi, spem celandi. 

Locus quaeritur, Celebris an desertus, semper 
desertus an tum cum id factum sit, fuerit in eo loco 
solitudo, sacer an profanus, publicus an privatus 
fuerit ; cuiusmodi loci adtingant ; num qui est 
passus perspectus, exauditus esse possit. Horum 

" C/. Cicero, De Inv. 2. xi. 37. In Gellius, 14. 2. 8, a man 
against whom the claim of a sum of money was made pleads 
that the case concerns a claim before a private judge, and 
not a question of morals before the censors. 

* CJ. Cicero, De Inv. 2. vii. 24. 

' aijfielov. Different from the usual signum of the rhetori- 
cians ; see Rhet. ad Alex., chaps. 7 (1428a), 12 (1430b-1431a), 
and 14 (1431ab), Aristotle, Rhet. 1. 2 (1357ab) ; Cicero, De Inv. 
1. XXX. 48, and Quintilian, 5. 9. 1 ft". ; also Kroll, Philologvs 
89 (1934). 334-341. Cf. Cicero, Pro Caelio 22. 53 : "I might 


AD HKRKNNIUM, II. in. 5 iv. 7 

handicapped by the man's baseness and notoriety, he 
will first take care to say that false rumours have 
been spread about an innocent man, and will use the 
commonplace that rumours ouglit not to be believed. 
If none of these pleas is practicable, let him use the 
last resource of defence ; let him say that he is not 
discussing the man's morals before censors, but the 
charges of his opponents before jurors." 

6 IV. Comparison * is used when the prosecutor 
shows that the act charged by him against his 
adversary has benefited no one but the defendant ; 
or that no one but his adversary could have committed 
it ; or that his adversary could not have committed it, 
or at least not so easily, by other means ; or that, 
blinded by passion, his adversary failed to see any 
easier means. To meet this point the defendant's 
counsel ought to show that the crime benefited others 
as well, or that others as well could have done what is 
imputed to his client. 

By Signs one shows that the accused sought an 
opportunity favourable to success. Sign ^ has six 
divisions : the Place, the Point of Time, the Duration 
of Time, the Occasion, the Hope of Success, the 
Hope of Escaping Detection. 

7 The Place is examined as follows : Was it fre- 
quented or deserted, always a lonely place, or 
deserted then at the moment of the crime ? A sacred 
place or profane, public or private ? What sort of 
places are adjacent? Could the victim have been 
seen or heard ? I should willingly describe in detail 

in my speech search every lurking-place of suspicion. No 
motive, no place, no opportunity, no accomplice, no hope of 
succeeding in the crime, no hope of escaping detection, no 
means at all, no trace of heinous guilt will be found." 



quid reo, quid accusatori conveniat perscribere non 
gravaremur, iiisi facile quivis causa posita posset 
iudicare. Initia enim inventionis ab arte debent 
proficisci ; cetera facile conparabit exercitatio. 

Tempus ita quaeritur : quid anni, qua hora — noctu 
an interdiu — et qua die, qua noctis hora factum esse 
dicatur, et cur eiusmodi temporibus. 

Spatium ita considerabitur : satisne longum fuerit 
ad earn rem transigendam, scieritne satis ad id per- 
ficiendum spatii futurum ; nam parvi refert satis 
spatii fuisse ad id perficiendum si id ante sciri et 
ratione provideri non potuit. 

Occasio quaeritur, idoneane fuerit ad rem adori- 
endam, an alia melior quae aut praeterita sit aut non 

Spes perficiendi ecqua fuerit spectabitur hoc modo : 
si quae supra dicta sunt signa concurrent, si praeterea 
ex altera parte vires, pecunia, consilium, scientia, 
apparatio videbitur esse, ex altera parte inbecillitas, 
inopia, stultitia, inprudentia, inapparatio demonstra- 
bitur fuisse ; qua re scire poterit ^ utrum diffidendum 
an confidendum fuerit. 

Spes celandi quae fuerit quaeritur ex consciis, 
arbitris, adiutoribus, liberis aut servis aut utrisque. 

^ poterit M : potuerit E Mx. 

" For the genitive form die, see W. M. Lindsay, The Latin 
Language, Oxford, 1894, pp. 382-3 ; Neue-Wagener, Formen- 
lehre der lutein. Sprache (3rd ed., Leipzig, 1902), 1. 573-4; 
Kuhner-Holzweissig, Ausfuhrliche Grammatik der lutein. 
Sprache (2nd ed., Hannover, 1912), 1. 405-6. 

* Cf. Aristotle, Rhet. 2. 5 (1383a): "We feel confidence 
it . . . there are means of aid — either numerous means or 
great, or both numerous and great." 


AD HEllF.NNIUM, II. iv. 7 

which of these points is serviceable to the defence, and 
which to the prosecution, were it not that any one 
would in a given cause find this easy to determine. 
For of Invention it is only the first principles which 
ought to originate in theory ; all the rest will readily 
be supplied by practice. 

The Point of Time is examined as follows : In what 
season of the year, in what part of the day — whether 
at night or in the daytime — at what hour of the day ** 
or night, is the act alleged to have been committed, 
and why at such a time ? 

The Duration of Time will be considered in the 
following fashion : Was it long enough to carry this 
act through, and did the defendant know that there 
would be enough time to accomplish it ? For it is 
only of slight importance that he had enough time to 
carry out the crime if he could not in advance have 
known or have forecast that that would be so. 

The Occasion is examined as follows : Was it 
favourable for the undertaking, or was there a 
better occasion which was either let pass or not 
awaited ? 

Whether there was any Hope of Success will be in- 
vestigated as follows : Do the above-mentioned signs 
coincide ? Especially, do power, money, good judge- 
ment, foreknowledge, and preparedness appear on 
one side, and is it proved that on the other there were 
weakness, need, stupidity, lack of foresight, and 
unpreparedness ? Hereby one will know^ whether 
the defendant should have had confidence in his 
success or not. 

What Hope there was of Escaping Detection we 
seek to learn from confidants, eye-witnesses, or 
accomplices, freemen or slaves or both.^ 



8 V. Argumentum est per quod res coarguitur cer- 
tioribus argumentis et niagis firma suspicione. Id 
dividitur in tempora tria : praeteritum, instans, 

In praeterito tempore oportet considerare ubi 
fuerit, ubi visus sit, quicum visus sit, num quid 
appararit, num quern eonvenerit, num quid dixerit, 
num quid habuerit de consciis, de adiutoribus, de 
adiumentis ; num quo in loco praeter consuetudinem 
fuerit aut alieno tempore. In instanti tempore 
quaeretur num visus sit cum faciebat, num qui 
strepitus, clamor, crepitus exauditus, aut denique 
num quid aliquo sensu perceptum sit, aspectu, auditu, 
tactu, odoratu, gustatu ; nam quivis horum sensus 
potest conflare suspicionem. In consequenti tempore 
spectabitur num quid re transacta relictum sit quod 
indicet aut factum esse maleficium aut ab quo factum 
sit. Factum esse, hoc modo : si tumore et livore 
decoloratum corpus est mortui, significat eum veneno 
necatum. A quo factum sit, hoc modo : si telum, si 
vestimentum, si quid eiusmodi relictum aut si 

" Cf. Cicero, De Inv. 2. xiii, 43. Argumentum is virtually 
equivalent to the ar]fi€Lov (fallible sign) of the Rhet. ad Alex. 
(eh. 12, 1430b). The tradition thus antedates Aristotle and 
persisted against his theory of orjixeiov, which joined with 
ciKos (the probable proposition) in forming the material of 
the enthymeme (E. M. Cope, An Introd. to Aristoile^s Rhetoric, 
London and Cambridge, 1867, pp. 160 ff.). The communes 
loci dealing with the TrepiaTdaeis are akin to the Aristotelian 
kind of topoi, but are not specifically Aristotelian, They 
belong in the Hermagorean system of Issues, but the specific 
division of a-qixeXa into three periods goes back to pre-Aris- 
totelian rhetorical theory {Rhet. ad Alex., I.e.). Neocles 
(first or second Christian century) in Anon. Seg. 153 (Spengel- 
Hammer 1 [2]. 379) divides probabilities, signs, and examples 


8 V. Through Presumptive Proof guilt is demon- 
strated by means of indications that increase certainty 
and strengthen suspicion. It falls into three periods : 
preceding the crime, contemporaneous with the 
crime, following the crime.** 

In respect to the period preceding the crime, one 
ought to consider where the defendant was, where he 
was seen, with whom seen, whether he made some 
preparation, met any one, said anything, or showed 
any sign of having confidants, accomplices, or 
means of assistance ; whether he was in a place, or 
there at a time, at variance with his custom. In 
respect to the period contemporaneous with the crime, 
we shall seek to learn whether he was seen in the 
act ; whether some noise, outcry, or crash was heard ; 
or, in short, whether anything was perceived by one 
of the senses — sight, hearing, touch, smell, or taste. 
For any type of sense-experience can arouse suspicion. 
In respect to the period following the crime, one will 
seek to discover whether after the act was completed 
there was left behind anything indicating that a 
crime was committed, or by whom it was committed. 
Indicating that it was committed : for example, if 
the body of the deceased is swollen and black and blue 
it signifies that the man was killed by poison. 
Indicating by whom it was committed: for example, 
if a weapon, or clothing, or something of the kind was 
left behind, or a footprint of the accused was dis- 

into three types according to the same chronological scheme, 
" as cloud indicating storm, smoke fire, and blood murder." 
'LrjUela and eiVdra were used by the Attic orators as early as 
Antiphon, and by Thucydides; see Friedrich Solmsen, Die 
Entwkklung der arislofelischen Logik iind Rheiorik (Neue 
Philol. Untersuch. 4), Berlin, 1929, pp. 26-7, and Antiphon- 
atudien (Neue Philol. Untersuch. 8), Berlin, 1931, pp. 50 ff. 



vestigium rei repertum fuerit ; si cruor in vestimentis ; 
si in eo loco conprehensus aut visus, transacto negotio, 
quo in loco res gesta dicitur. 

Consecutio est cum quaeritur quae signa nocentis 
et innocentis consequi soleant. Accusator dicet, 
si poterit, adversarium, cum ad eum ventum sit, 
erubuisse, expalluisse, titubasse, inconstanter locutum 
esse, concidisse, pollicitum esse aliquid ; quae signa 
conscientiae sint. Si reus horum nihil fecerit, 
accusator dicet eum usque adeo praemeditatum 
fuisse quid sibi esset usu venturum ut confidentissime 
resisteret, responderet ; ^ quae signa confidentiae, 
non innocentiae sint. Defensor, si pertimuerit, 
magnitudine periculi, non conscientia peccati se 
commotum esse dicet; si non pertimuerit, fretum 
innocentia negabit esse commotum. 

VI. Approbatio est qua utimur ad extremum 
confirmata suspicione. Ea habet locos proprios 
atque communes. Proprii sunt ii quibus nisi accusa- 
tor nemo potest uti, et ii quibus nisi defensor. Com- 
munes sunt qui alia in causa ab reo, alia ab accusatore 
tractantur. In causa coniecturali proprius locus 

^ responderet 3Jx brackets. 

" Cf. Galen, De sympt07n. different, (ed. Kiihn, 7. 43), " the 
symptom (CTu/xTrraj/ia) which some physicians call iTnyevvTjfia " 
(after-symptom); Chrysippus, fragm. 125, ed. Alfred Gercke, 
Jahrhucher fur Class. Philol, Suppl. 14 (1885), 738 : nar 
eTTaKoXovOrj^d rt Kal avix7TTio[xa. 

'' Defensor is here used as if it meant reus. Cf. also the 
last sentence under Comparison in 2. iv. 6, and in 2. xiv. 22 ; 
2. XV. 22, end ; Cicero, De Inv. 2. xxviii. 83 and 86, and 2. 
xxix. 88; and Wenger, Institutes of the Roman Law of Civil 
Procedure, p. 91, note 44. 

AD HKRKNNIUM, H. v. 8-vi. 9 

covered ; if there was blood on his clothes ; or if, 
after the deed was done, he was caught or seen in 
the spot where the crime is alleged to have been 

For Subsequent Behaviour we investigate the 
signs which usually attend guilt or innocence." The 
prosecutor will, if possible, say that his adversary, 
when come upon, blushed, paled, faltered, spoke 
unccrtainlv, collapsed, or made some offer — signs of a 
guilty conscience. If the accused has done none of 
these things, the prosecutor will say his adversarv' 
had even so far in advance calculated what would 
actuallv happen to him that he stood his ground and 
replied with the greatest self-assurance — signs of 
audacity, and not of innocence. The defendant's 
counsel, if his client has shown fear, will say that he 
was moved,'' not by a guilty conscience, but by the 
magnitude of his peril ; if his client has not shown 
fear, counsel will say that he was unmoved because he 
relied on his innocence. 
9 VI. Confirmatory Proofs is what we employ finally, 
when suspicion has been established. It has special 
and common topics.'^ The special topics are those 
which only the prosecution, or those which only the 
defence, can use. The common topics are those 
which are used now by the defence, and now by the 
prosecution, depending on the case. In a conjectural 

' ^e^alcoais in Rhet. ad Alex., ch. 36 (1442b). 

^ The treatment of commonplaces goes back to Protagoras 
and Gorgias (Cicero, Brutus 12. 46-7, Quintilian, 3. 1. 12). 
On the topoi of Aristotle see Cope, An Introd. to Aristotle's 
Rhetoric, pp. 124-131. Cf. Cicero, De Inv. 2. xv. 48, who 
makes a twofold classification of the matters ampUfied : 
doubtful and certain; Quintilian, 5. 12. 15-16; and note on 
2. rxx. 47 below. 



accusatoris est cum dicit malorum misereri non 
oportere, et cum auget peccati atrocitatem. Defen- 
soris proprius locus est cum misericordiam captat et 
cum accusatorem calumniari criminatur. Com- 
munes loci sunt cum accusatoris tum defensoris : abs 
testibus, contra testes ; abs quaestionibus, contra 
quaestiones ; ab argumentis, contra argumenta ; ab 
rumoribus, contra rumores. 

A testibus dicemus secundum auctoritatem et 
vitam testium et constantiam testimoniorum. Contra 
testes : secundum ^ vitae turpitudinem, testimoniorum 
inconstantiam ; si aut fieri non potuisse dicemus aut 
non factum esse quod dicant, aut scire illos non 
potuisse, aut cupide dicere et argumentari. Haec et 
ad inprobationem et ad interrogationem testium 
10 VII. A quaestionibus dicemus cum demonstra- 
bimus maiores veri inveniendi causa tormentis et 
cruciatu voluisse quaeri, et summo dolore homines 
cogi ut quicquid sciant dicant ; et praeterea con- 

^ lacuna; secundum inserted by Schuetz. 

" For a, ab meaning on the side of cf. 2. xxvii. 43 {ab reo), 
and see Sehmalz-Hofmann, p. 523. 

* The non-technical means of persuasion (TriWei? drexvoi), 
those that are not inherent in the art, that are not supplied by 
our own efiforts. See Aristotle, Rhet. 1. 2 (1355b) and 1. 15 
(1375a), who lists five : laws, witnesses, contracts, evidence 
given under torture, and the oath. The theorv is pre-Aristo- 
telian; cf. Ehet. ad Alex., chaps. 7 (1428a) and 14 (1431b) 
ff., on the supplementary proofs {irrldeToi maTeig) : the 
speaker's own opinion, witnesses, admissions under torture, 
and oaths. The employment of these proofs long antedated 


AD IIERRNNIUM, II. vi. 9-vii. 10 

cause the prosecutor uses a special topic when he 
says that wicked men ought not to be pitied, and 
expatiates upon the atrocity of the crime. The de- 
fendant's counsel uses a special topic when he tries to 
win pity, and charges the prosecutor with slander. 
These topics are common to both prosecution and 
defence : to speak for « or against witnesses, for or 
against the testimony given under torture, for or 
against presumptive proof, and for or against rumours.** 
In favour of witnesses ^ we shall speak under the 
heads : (a) authority and manner of life of the 
witnesses, and (6) the consistency of their evidence. 
Against witnesses, under the heads : (a) their base 
manner of living ; (6) the contradictory character of 
their testimony ; (c) if we contend that what they 
allege to have happened either could not have 
happened or did not happen, or that they could not 
have known it, or that it is partiality which inspires 
their words and inferences. These topics will apper- 
tain both to the discrediting and to the examination 
of witnesses. 
10 VII. We shall speak in favour of the testimony 
given under torture '^ when we show that it was in 
order to discover the truth that our ancestors wished 
investigations to make use of torture and the rack, 
and that men are compelled by violent pain to tell 
all they know. Moreover, such reasoning will have 

argumentation in the law-courts; when argumentation came 
into being its first function was to interpret these " already 
existing " proofs. 

•^ fidprvpes. 

^ ^daavoL. To be distinguished from iudicii quaestio 
(1. xvi. 26). Torture was administered under the direction 
of the court, but not in the presence of the jury. The 
torture of free men was not legal. 



firmatior haec erit disputatio si quae dicta erunt 
argumentando isdem viis quibus omnis coniectura 
tractatur trahemus ad veri similem suspicionem; 
idemque hoc in testimoniis facere oportebit. Contra 
quaestiones hoc modo dicemus: primum maiores 
voluisse certis in rebus interponi quaestiones cum 
quae vere dicerentur sciri, quae falso in quaestione 
pronuntiarentur refelli possent, hoc modo : quo in 
loco quid positum sit, et si quid esset simile quod 
videri aut vestigiis probari ^ aut aliquo simili signo 
percipi posset; deinde dolori credi non oportere, 
quod alius alio recentior sit in dolore, quod ingeniosior 
ad eminiscendum, quod denique saepe scire aut 
suspicari possit quid quaesitor velit audire ; quod cum 
dixerit, intellegat sibi finem doloris futurum. Haec 
disputatio conprobabitur si refellemus quae in 
quaestionibus erunt dicta probabili argumentatione ; 
idque partibus coniecturae quas ante exposuimus 
facere oportebit. 
11 Ab argumentis et signis et ceteris locis quibus 
augetur suspicio dicere hoc modo convenit : Cum 
multa concurrant argumenta et signa quae inter se 
consentiant, rem perspicuam, non suspiciosam videri 
oportere. Item plus oportere signis et argumentis 
credi quam testibus, haec enim eo modo exponi quo 

^ lac. ; aut vestigiis probari suggested by Mx. 

• 2. ii. 3-v. 8. 

AD HERENNIUM, II. vii. lo-ii 

the greater force if we give the confessions elicited 
under torture an appearance of plausibility by the 
same argumentative procedure as is used in treating 
any question of fact. And this, too, we shall have to do 
with the evidence of witnesses. Against the testimony 
given under torture we shall speak as follows : In the 
first place, our ancestors wished inquisitions to be 
introduced only in connection with unambiguous 
matters, when the true statement in the inquisition 
could be recognized and the false reply refuted ; 
for example, if thev sought to learn in what place 
some object was put, or if there was in question 
something like that which could be seen, or be 
verified by means of footprints, or be perceived by 
some like sign. We then shall say that pain ought 
not to be relied upon, because one person is less 
exhausted by pain, or more resourceful in fabrication, 
than another, and also because it is often possible to 
know or divine what the presiding justice wishes to 
hear, and the witness knows that when he has said 
this his pain will be at an end. Such reasoning ^vill 
find favour, if, by a plausible argument, we refute 
the statements made in the testimony given under 
torture; and to accomplish this we should use the 
divisions under the Conjectural Issue which I have 
set forth above.** 
11 In favour of presumptive proof, signs, and the other 
means of increasing suspicion it is advantageous to 
speak as follows : \Mien there is a concurrence of 
many circumstantial indications and signs that agree 
with one another, the result ought to appear as clear 
fact, not surmise. Again, signs and presumptive 
proof deserve more credence than witnesses, for these 
first are presented precisely as they occurred in 



modo re vera sint gesta, testes corrumpi posse vel 
pretio vel gratia vel metu vel simultate. Contra 
argumenta et signa et ceteras suspiciones dicemus 
hoc modo : si demonstrabimus nullam rem esse quam 
non suspicionibus quivis possit criminari ; deinde 
unam quamque suspicionem extenuabimus et dabi- 
mus operam ut ostendamus nihilo magis in nos eam 
quam in alium quempiam convenire ; indignum 
facinus esse sine testibus coniecturam et suspicionem 
firmamenti satis habere. 
12 VIII. A rumoribus dicemus si negabimus temere 
famam nasci solere quin subsit aliquid ; et si dicemus 
causam non fuisse quare quispiam confingeret et 
eminisceretur ; et praeterea, si ceteri falsi soleant 
esse, argumentabimur hunc esse verum. Contra 
rumores dicemus primum si docebimus multos esse 
falsos rumores, et exemplis utemur de quibus falsa 
fama fuerit; et aut iniquos nostros aut homines 
natura malivolos et maledicos confinxisse dicemus ; 
et aliquam aut fictam fabulam in adversarios ad- 
feremus quam dicamus omnibus in ore esse, aut 
verum rumorem proferemus qui illis aliquid turpi- 
tudinis adferat, neque tamen ei rumori nos fidem 
habere dicemus, ideo quod quivis unus homo possit 
quamvis turpem de quolibet rumorem proferre et 
confictam fabulam dissipare. Verumtamen si rumor 
vehementer probabilis esse videbitur, argumentando 
famae fidem poterimus abrogare. 

" For the same sentiment c/. Anon. Seg. 189, in Spengel- 
Hammer 1 (2). 386; Hermogenes, De Stat. 3 (ed. Rabe, pp. 
45-6); also Aristotle, Rhet. 1. 15 (1376 a) : The speaker who 


AD HERENNIUM, II. vii. ii-viii. 12 

reality, whereas witnesses can be corrupted by 
bribery, or partiality, or intimidation, or animosity." 
Against presumptive proof, signs, and the other pro- 
vocatives of suspicion we shall speak in the following 
fashion : we shall show that nothing is safe from 
attack by suspicion, and then we shall weaken each 
and every reason for suspicion and try to show that it 
applies to us no more than to any one else ; it is a 
shameful outrage to consider suspicion and conjec- 
ture, in the absence of witnesses, as sufficiently 
12 \'III. We shall speak in favour of rumours by say- 
ing that a report is not wont to be created recklessly 
and without some foundation, and that there was no 
reason for anybody wholly to invent and fabricate 
one ; and, moreover, if other rumours usually are 
lies, we shall prove by argument that this one is 
true. We shall speak against rumours if we first 
show that many rumours are false, and cite examples 
of false report ; if we say that the rumours were 
the invention of our enemies or of other men mahcious 
and slanderous by nature ; and if we either present 
some story invented against our adversaries which 
we declare to be in every mouth, or produce a true 
report carrying some disgrace to them, and say we 
yet have no faith in it for the reason that any person 
at all can produce and spread any disgraceful rumour 
or fiction about any other person. If, nevertheless, a 
rumour seems highly plausible, we can destroy its 
authority by logical argument. 

lacks witnesses on his side will argue " that probabilities 
cannot be bribed to mislead the court, and are never convicted 
of false witness." 



Quod et difficillima tractatu est constitutio coniec- 
turalis et in veris causis saepissime tractanda est, eo 
diligentius omnes eius partes perscrutati sumus, ut ne 
parvula quidem titubatione aiit offensatione inpedire- 
mur, si ad banc rationem praeceptionis adsiduitatem 
exercitationis adcommodassemus. Nunc ad legitimae 
constitutionis partes transeamus. 
13 IX. Cum voluntas scriptoris cum scripto dissidere 
videbitur, si a scripto dicemus, his locis utemur: 
secundum narrationem primum scriptoris conlauda- 
tione, deinde scripti recitatione, deinde percontatione 
scirentne idonee adversarii id scriptum fuisse in lege 
aut testamento aut stipulatione aut quolibet scripto 
quod ad cam rem pertinebit ; deinde conlatione quid 
scriptum sit, quid adversarii se fecisse dicant : quid 
iudicem sequi conveniat, utrum id quod diligenter 
perscriptum sit, an id quod acute sit excogitatum ; 
deinde ea sententia quae ab adversariis sit excogitata 
et scripto adtributa contemnetur et infirmabitur. 
Deinde quaeretur quid periculi fuerit si id voluisset 
adscribere, aut num non potuerit perscribi. Deinde 
a nobis sententia reperietur et causa proferetur quare 
id scriptor senserit quod scripserit ; et demonstrabitur 
scriptum illud esse dilucide, breviter, commode, per- 
fecte, cum ratione certa. Deinde exempla profe- 
rentur quae res, cum ab adversariis sententia et 
voluntas adferretur, ab scripto potius iudicatae sint. 
Deinde ostendetur quam periculosum sit ab scripto 
recedere. Locus communis est contra eum qui, cum 

" dXrjdiva TTpdyfiara (Longinus, in Spenge I -Hammer 1 [2]. 
195. 18), as distinguished from school exercises; c/. 4. xliv. 58. 
* C/. Cicero, De Inv. 2. xliii. 125. 


AD IIKRENNIUM, II. vin. 12-ix. 13 

Hecaiisc the Conjectural K'^ue is the hardest to 
treat and in actual causes " needs to be treated most 
often, I have the more carefully examined all its 
divisions, in order that we may not be hindered by 
even the slightest hesitation or blunder, if only we 
have applied these precepts of theory in a^ssiduous 
practice. Now let me turn to the subtypes of Legal 
13 IX. When the intention of the framer appears at 
variance with the letter of a text, speaking in support 
of the letter * we shall employ the following topics : 
first, after the Statement of Facts, a eulogy of the 
framer and then the reading aloud of the text ; next 
the questioning of our adversaries : Are they duly 
i aware that this text was in a law, will, contract, or any 
I other document involved in the cause ? ; then a com- 
{ parison of the text with the admitted act of our 
j adversaries : Which should the judge follow — a 
I document carefully draughted, or an interpretation 
cunningly invented r After that the interpretation 
devised and given to the text by our adversaries 
will be disparaged and weakened. Then the question 
i will be raised : What risk would the writer have run 
' by adding an entry of that kind had he really intended 
it, or was it impossible to write it out in full r Then 
we shall ascertain the writer's intention and present 
the reason why he had in mind what he wrote, and 
show that that text is clear, concise, apt, complete, 
and planned with precision. Thereupon we shall cite 
examples of judgements rendered in favour of the 
text, although adversaries raised the issue of spirit 
and intention. Finally, we shall show the danger of 
departing from the letter of the text. The common- 
place here is that against one who, though confessing 



fateatur se contra quod legibus sanctum aut testa- 
mento perscriptum sit fecisse, tamen facti quaerat 
14 X. Ab sententia sic dicemus : primum laudabimus 
scriptoris commoditatem atque brevitatem, quod 
tantum scripserit quod necesse fuerit ; illud quod sine 
scripto intellegi potuerit non necessario scribendum 
putarit. Deinde dicemus calumniatoris esse officium 
verba et litteras sequi, neglegere voluntatem. 
Deinde id quod scriptum sit aut non posse fieri aut 
non lege, non more, non natura, non aequo et bono 
posse fieri, quae omnia noluisse scriptorem quam 
rectissime fieri nemo dicet ; at ea quae a nobis facta 
sint iustissime facta. Deinde contrariam sententiam 
aut nullam esse aut stultam aut iniustam aut non 
posse fieri aut non constare cum superioribus et in- 
ferioribus sententiis aut cum iure communi aut cum 
aliis legibus communibus aut cum rebus iudicatis 
dissentire. Deinde exemplorum a voluntate et contra 
scriptum iudicatorum enumeratione, deinde legum 
aut stipulationum breviter exscriptarum in quibus 

" a/cptjSoSiVatof. Cf. Cicero, Pro Caecina 23. 65 : [People 
who feel that they have equity on their side say that] " a petti- 
fogger follows the letter; a good juror defends the will arid 
intention of the framer." 

* The departments of Law, considered in 2. xiii. 19-20 

* KOLvov SiKaiov, the " unwritten statutes of heaven that stand 
fast for ever " (dypaTna Kdo(f)aXrj dewv p-d/xt/na) of Sophocles, 
Antig. 454-5. (Sophocles apparently echoes an argument 
used by Pericles in an actual case ; see Lysias, Adv. Andoc. 10). 
Cf. Aristotle, Rhet. 1. 10 (1368b) : " By universal law I mean 
all the unwritten principles that are supposed to be acknow 
ledged by all mankind "; 1. 13 (1373b) : " For indeed there 
is, as all men to some extent divine, a natural and universal 


AD HERKN'NIUM, II. i.\. jt,-x. 14 

that he has violated the mandates of a statute or 
the directions of a will, yet seeks to defend his act. 
14 X. In favour of the intention we shall speak as 
follows : first we shall praise the framer for deft 
conciseness in having written only what was necessary ; 
he did not think it necessary to write what could be 
understood without a text. Next we shall say that 
to follow the words literally and to neglect the 
intention is the method of a pettifogger." Then, 
we shall contend, the letter either cannot be 
carried out, or at least not without violation of 
Statute Law, Legal Custom, the Law of Nature, or 
Equity * — all these, as no one will deny, the writer 
wished to be most strictly observed ; but on the 
contrary, what we have done is absolutely just. 
Further, the interpretation of our adversaries is 
either no interpretation, or is unreasonable, unjust, 
impracticable, or inconsistent with past or sub- 
sequent interpretations, or is in disagreement with 
the common law <^ or with other generally binding 
rules of law or with previous decisions. Next we 
shall cite instances of decisions rendered in favour of 
the intention and contrary to the letter, and then 

notion of right and wrong, binding on them even if they 
have no mutual intercourse or covenant"; 1. 15 (137oa); 
" It is clear that if the written law is adverse to our case, he 
[the speaker] must appeal to the universal law, and to the 
principles of equity as representing a higher order of justice. 
[He must say] that [the judge's obhgation to decide] ' accord- 
ing to my best judgement ' means that the judge will not be 
guided simph" and solely by the letter of the statute " (tr. 
Lane Cooper); Cope, An Introd. to Aristotle's Rhetoric, pp. 
239-44. Cf. also the Stoic Chrysippus in Diogenes Laertius 
7. 88 : " The common law, the right reason pervading all 
things; " and Cicero, De Offic. 3. 17. 69. 



intellegatur scriptorum voluntas et recitatione ute- 
mur et ^ expositione. Locus communis contra eum 
qui scriptum recitet et scriptoris voluntatem non 

15 Cum duae leges inter se discrepant ,2 videndum est 
primum num quae obrogatio aut derogatio sit, deinde 
utrum leges ita dissentiant ut altera iubeat, altera 
vetet, an ita ut altera cogat, altera permittat. Infirma 
enim erit eius defensio qui negabit se fecisse quod 
cogeretur, cum altera lex permitteret ; plus enim 
valet sanctio permissione. Item ilia defensio tenuis 
est, cum ostenditur id factum esse quod ea lex 
sanciat cui legi obrogatum aut derogatum sit, id quod 
posteriore lege sanctum sit esse neglectum. Cum 
haec erunt considerata, statim nostrae legis exposi- 
tione, recitatione, conlaudatione utemur. Deinde 
contrariae legis enodabimus voluntatem et cam 
trahemus ad nostrae causae commodum. Dein de 
iuridicali absoluta sumemus rationem iuris et 
quaeremus partes iuris utrocum faciant ; de qua parte 
iuridicalis posterius disseremus. 

16 XI. Si ambiguum esse scriptum putabitur, quod in 
duas aut plures sententias trahi possit, hoc modo 
tractandum est : primum sitne ambiguum quaeren- 
dumst; deinde quomodo scriptum esset si id quod 
adversarii interpretantur scriptor fieri voluisset 
ostendendum est ; deinde id quod nos interpretemur 
et fieri posse et honeste, recte, lege, more, natura, 

' Icbc. ; recitatione utemur et sugg. Mx. 

* discrepant E : discrepent other MS8. Mx. 

o See 2. xiii. 19-20. 

AD HERKNNIUM, II. x. 14-xi. 16 

read and explain laws or contracts which had been 
written down in concise form and yet in which the 
intention of the framer is understood. The common- 
place here is that against one who reads a text and 
does not interpret the writer's intention. 

15 When two laws conflict, we must first see whether 
they have been superseded or restricted, and then 
whether their disagreement is such that one commands 
and the other prohibits, or one compels and the other 
allows. It will be a weak defence indeed for a 
person to say that he failed to do what one law 
ordained, because another law made it optional ; for 
obligation is more binding than mere permission. So 
also it is a meagre defence for a person to show 
that he has observed the obligation of a law which 
has been superseded or restricted, without heeding 
the obligation of the later law. After these considera- 
tions we shall at once pass to the exposition, reading, 
and warm recommendation of the law favourable to 
us. Then we shall elucidate the intention of the 
opposing law and appropriate it for the advantage of 
our cause. Finally, we shall take over the theory of 
Law from the Absolute Juridical Issue, and examine 
with which side the departments of Law hold ; this 
subtype of a Juridical Issue I shall discuss later.» 

16 XI. If a text is regarded as ambiguous, because it 
can be interpreted in two or more meanings, the 
treatment is as follows : first we must examine 
whether it is indeed ambiguous ; then we must show 
how it would have been written if the writer had 
wished it to have the meaning which our adversaries 
give to it ; next, that our interpretation is practicable, 
and practicable in conformity with the Honourable 
and the Right, with Statute Law, Legal Custom, 



bono et aequo fieri posse; quod adversarii inter- 
pretentur ex eontrario ; nee esse ambigue scriptum 
cum intellegatur utra sententia vera sit. Sunt qui 
arbitrentur ad banc causam tractandam vehementer 
pertinere cognitionem amphiboliarum earn quae ab 
dialecticis proferatur. Nos vero arbitramur non 
modo nuUo adiumento esse, sed potius maximo inpedi- 
mento. Omnes enim illi amphibolias aucupantur, 
eas etiam quae ex altera parte sententiam nullam 
possunt interpretari. Itaque et alieni sermonis 
molesti interpellatores, et scripti cum odiosi tum 
obscuri interpretes sunt ; et dum caute et expedite 
loqui volunt, infantissimi reperiuntur. Ita dum 
metuunt in dicendo ne quid ambiguum dicant, 
nomen suum pronuntiare non possunt. Verum horum 
pueriles opiniones rectissimis rationibus, cum voles, 
refellemus. In praesentiarum hoc intercedere non 
alienum fuit, ut huius infantiae garrulam disciplinam 
17 XII. Cum definitione utemur, primum adferemus 
brevem vocabuli definitionem, hoc modo : ** Maie- 
statem is minuit qui ea toUit ex quibus rebus civitatis 
amplitudo constat. Quae sunt ea, Q. Caepio? 

** Honesta res and rectum are defined in 3. ii. 3 below, the 
departments of Law in 2. xiii. 19-20 below. 

*" Isocrates, Panath. 26-28, on the so-called eristic dis- 
cussions " which our young men take greater pleasure in than 
they ought," holds them unsuitable for grown men. In 
Cicero, De Oratore 2. 26. Ill, Antonius blames the rhetoricians 
for not knowing ambiguities as well as the dialecticians 
understood them (see also Orator 32. 115), whereas Dionysius 
Halic, De Composit. Verb., ch. 4, says that treatises such as 
those of Chrysippus dealing, among others, with ambiguous 
propositions offer no benefit to civil oratory, at least with 
respect to charm and beauty of style. The contempt for 


AD HEREXNIUM, II. xi. i6-xii. 17 

the Law of Nature, or E(}uity; ° of our adversaries' 
interpretation the opposite is true ; and the text is 
not ambiguous since one well understands which is 
the true sense. There are some who think that for 
the development of this kind of cause a knowledge 
of amphibolies as taught by the dialecticians is highly 
useful. I, however, believe that this knowledge is 
of no help at all, and is, I may even say, a most 
serious hindrance. In fact these writers are on the 
lookout for all amphibolies, even for such as yield 
no sense at all in one of the two interpretations. 
Accordingly, when some one else speaks, they are 
his annoying hecklers, and when he writes, they are 
his boring and also misty interpreters. And when 
they themselves speak, wishing to do so cautiously 
and deftly, they prove to be utterly inarticulate. 
Thus, in their fear to utter some ambiguity while 
speaking, they cannot even pronounce their own 
names. Indeed I shall refute the childish opinions 
of these writers by the most straightforward proofs 
whenever you wish. For the present it has not been 
out of place to make this protest, in order to express 
my contempt for the wordy learning of this school of 

XII. When we deal with the Issue of Definition, 
\vc shall first briefly define the term in question, as 
follows: "He impairs the sovereign majesty of 
the state who destroys the elements constituting its 
dignity. What are these, Quintus Caepio ? The 

dialectic is Epicurean; cf. Diogenes Laertiiis 10. 31 : "Dia- 
lectic the Epicureans reject as superfluous "; Cicero, De Fin. 
1. 7. 22, on Epicurus : " He does not show how to detect 
ambiguities"; ibid., 2. 6. 18. Chrysippus maintained that 
every word is by nature ambiguous, while Diodorus Cronus 
asserted that no word is ambiguous (GelUus 11. 12). 



SufFragia populi et magistratus consilium.^ Nempe 
igitur tu et populum suffragio et magistratum consilio 
privasti cum pontes disturbasti." Item ex con- 
trario : " Maiestatem is minuit qui amplitudinem 
civitatis detrimento adficit. Ego non adfeci, sed 
prohibui detrimento ; aerarium enim conservavi, 
libidini malorum restiti, maiestatem omnem interire 
non passus sum." Primum igitur vocabuli sententia 
breviter et ad utilitatem adcommodate causae 
describitur; deinde factum nostrum cum verbi 
descriptione coniungetur ; deinde contrariae descrip- 
tionis ratio refelletur, si aut falsa erit aut inutilis aut 
turpis aut iniuriosa — id quod ex iuris partibus 
sumetur de iuridicali absoluta, de qua iam loquemur. 
18 Quaeritur in translationibus primum num aliquis 
eius rei actionem, petitionem, aut persecutionem 
habeat, num alio tempore, num alia lege, num alio 
quaerente. Haec legibus et moribus, aequo et bono 
reperientur ; de quibus dicetur in iuridicali absoluta. 
In causa ratiocinali primum quaeretur ecquid in 
rebus maioribus aut minoribus aut similibus ^ similiter 

^ suffragia populi et magistratus consilium E : sufFragia 
magistratus M Mx. 

^ similibus K : dissimilibus M Mx. 

* Our author here resumes the controversy between 
Saturninus and Caepio treated in 1. xii. 21 above. 

^ 2. xiii. 19-20 below. 

" For the meaning of these terms see Moriz Wlassak, Sai\ 
Zeitschr. 42 (1921). 408 ff., and Sitzungsb. Akad. der Wissensch. 
in Wien {Philos.-liist. Kl.) 202, 3 (1924). 168, note 37; Wenger, 
Institutes of the Roman Late of Civil Procedure, p. 259, note 10, 
and p. 416. All enforceable rights are exhausted by the 
triad : actio refers to the legis actio, petitio comprehends 
obligations without regard to the form of the legal procedure, 
and persecutio refers probably to rights in general embraced 
under prosecution, including such praetorian remedies outside 

AD HKRKNXIUM, II. xii. 17-18 

suffrage of the people and the counsel of" the magis- 
tracy. No doubt, then, in demolishing the bridges of 
the Comitium, you have deprived the people of their 
suffrage and the magistracy of their counselUng." ^* 
Likewise, in reply : " He impairs the sovereign 
majesty of the state who inflicts damage upon its 
dignity. I have not inflicted, but rather prevented, 
damage, for I have saved the Treasury, resisted the 
license of wicked men, and kept the majesty of the 
state from perishing utterly." Thus the meaning of 
the term is first explained briefly, and adapted to the 
advantage of our cause ; then we shall connect our 
conduct with the explanation of the term ; finally, 
the principle underlying the contrary definition will 
be refuted, as being false, inexpedient, disgraceful, 
or harmful — and here we shall borrow our means 
from the departments of Law treated under the 
Absolute Juridical Issue, which I shall soon discuss. ** 
18 In causes based on Transference we first examine 
whether one has the right to institute an action, claim. 
or prosecution ^ in this matter, or whether it should 
not rather be instituted at another time, or under 
another law, or before another examiner. The 
pertinent means will be provided by Statute Law, 
Legal Custom, and Equity, which I shall discuss in 
connection with the Absolute Juridical Issue. '^ 

In a cause based on Analogy ^ we shall first seek 
to know whether there exists any like text or decision 
on matters of greater, less, or like importance ; next 

an ordinary lawsuit as interdictu (see Greenidge, The Legal 
Procedure of Ckero's Time, pp. 75-8, Wenger, pp. 245 tf.) 
and in integrum restiiutiones (see Wenger, pp. 244-5). 

<* 2. xiii. 19-20 below. 

* Arising from a gap in the law, which is filled by a process 
of deduction. 



scriptum aut iudicatum sit; deinde utrum ea res 
similis sit ei rei qua de agitur an dissimilis ; deinde 
utrum consulto de ea re scriptum non sit, quod 
noluerit cavere, an quod satis cautum putarit propter 
ceterorum scriptorum similitudinem. 

De partibus legitimae constitutionis satis dictum 
est ; nunc ad iuridicalem revertemur. 
19 XIII. Absoluta iuridicali constitutione utemur cum 
ipsam rem quam nos fecisse confitemur iure factam ^ 
dicemus, sine ulla adsumptione extrariae defensionis. 
In ea convenit quaeri iurene sit factum. De eo 
causa posita dicere poterimus si ex quibus partibus 
ius constet cognoverimus. Constat igitur ex his 
partibus : natura, lege, consuetudine, iudicato, 
aequo et bono, pacto. 

1 factam E : factum M Mx. 

" See 1. xiv. 24 above. 

* Cf. Cicero, De Inv. 2. liii. 160 ff. Johannes Stroux 
(" Summum ius summa iniuria," in Festschr. Speiser-Sarasin, 
Leipzig, 1926, and " Griechische Einfliisse auf die Entwickl. 
der rom. Reclitswissensch. gegen Ende der republikan. Zeit," 
in Atti del Congr. Internaz. di diritto Rom. (Roma), Pavia, 
1934, 1. 111-132; now both printed as Rom. Rechtsivissensch. 
und Rhetor ik, Potsdam, 1949) argues that rhetorical theory 
had a substantial influence on Roman jurisprudence (the 
sequence being from Greek philosophy to Greek rhetoric, 
thence to Roman rhetoric, and finally to Roman juristic 
theory and practice), but many students of Roman Law 
believe that, though useful for pleading, it was not of real 
significance for directing judicial decisions. Thus the status 
system as a whole seems to have had no influence upon the 
jurists, with the possible exception of the doctrines of Letter 
and Spirit and of Definition (1. xi. 19, 2. ix. 13-x. 14; 1. xii. 21, 


AD IIRRF>NNIUM, II. xii. iS-xiii. 19 

whether that matter is in fact like or unlike the 
matter in question ; then whether the absence of a 
text concerning the matter here involved was in- 
tentional, because the framer was unwilling to make 
any provision, or because he thought that there was 
provision enough thanks to the similar provisions in 
the other legal text^. 

On the subdivisions of the Legal Issue I have said 
enough ; now I shall turn back to the Juridical.** 

XIII. We shall be dealing with an Absolute 
Juridical Issue when, without any recourse to a 
defence extraneous to the cause, we contend that the 
act itself which we confess having committed was 
lawful. Herein it is proper to examine whether 
the act was in accord with the Law. We can discuss 
this question, once a cause is given, when we know 
the departments of which the Law is constituted. 
The constituent departments, then, are the following : 
Nature, Statute, Custom, Previous Judgements, 
Equity, and Agreement.* 

2. xii. 17); r/., for example, Quintilian, 7. 6. 1. The rhetori- 
cian's method of interpretation is rationaUstic and schematic, 
the jurist's is casuistic. See A. A. Schiller, Virginia Laiv Rev. 
27(1941). 733-768, esp. 750 If. ; Fritz Schulz, Principles of 
Homan Lmv, Oxford, 1936, pp. 129 ff., and History of Roman 
Legal Science, Oxford, 1946, pp. 53 ff., 71 fiF.; J. Himmel- 
schein, " Studien zu der antiken Hermeneutica iuris," in Sym- 
holae Friburgens. in honorera Ottonis Lenel, Leipzig, 1935, 
pp. 373-424; Artur Steinwenter, "Rhetorik und romischer 
Zivilprozess," Sav. Zeitschr. 67 (1947). 69-120 ; H. F. Jolowicz, 
Historical Introduction to the Study of Roman Law, 2nd ed., 
Cambridge, 1952, pp. 576 f. Note, too, that such sources of 
Law as the Edict and the responsa prudentium are missing 
from our author's list; see Jolowicz, ch. 5. On the philo- 
sophical (Stoic) background of our author's theory of Law see 
tiiso Kroll. Philologus 90 (1935). 211-215. 


Natura ius est quod cognationis aut pietatis causa 
obsen^atur, quo iure parentes a liberis et a parentibus 
liberi coluntur. 

Lege ius est id quod populi iussu sanctum est ; quod 
genus, ut in ius eas cum voceris. 

Consuetudine ius est id quod sine lege aeque ac si 
legitimum sit usitatum est; quod genus, id quod 
argentario tuleris expensum ab socio eius recte petere 

ludicatum est id de quo sententia lata est aut 
decretum interpositum. Ea saepe diversa sunt, ut 
aliud alio iudici aut praetori aut consuli aut tribuno 
plebis placitum sit ; et fit ut de eadem re saepe alius 
aliud decreverit aut iudicarit, quod genus: M. 
Drusus, praetor urbanus, quod cum herede mandati 
ageretur iudicium reddidit, Sex. lulius non reddidit. 

" (f)vaLs. In the Roman conception ius civile is the Law 
which each people forms for itself and is peculiar to its state; 
the ius gentium (not the modern law of nations), on the other 
hand, is the Law common to all peoples. The latter became 
identified with Natural Law, which was originally a Greek 
concept. See Gains, Inst. 1. 1, and Elemer Balogh, in Studi 
in onore di Pietro Bonfante (Milan, 1930), 4. 677-9. Alfred 
Pernice, Sav. Zeitschr. 22 (1901). 62-3, denying the juristic 
value of these " sources of Law," points out that Nature 
cannot be a source of positive Law. Cf. Cicero, De Inn. 
2. xxii. 67. 

** vo^os. The definition, as against the others in this 
section, is Roman; cf. Gaius, Inst. 1. 3 : "A statute is a 
command and ordinance of the people." But our author's 
definition seems too inclusive ; for example, not every action 
of a Popular Assembly made Law. On sanctio (consecration) 
see Mommsen, p. 882, and p. 901, note 5. 

<= Twelve Tables 1. 1. 

^ avviqdeia. Students of Roman jurisprudence deny that 
the concept of customary law held by the rhetoricians (to 


AD HKRENNIUM. II. xni. 19 

To the Law of Nature " beloiiir the duties observed 
because of kinship or family loyalty. In accordance 
with this kind of Law parents are cherished by their 
children, and children i)y their parents. 

Statute Law ^ is that kind of Law which is sanc- 
tioned by the will of the people ; for example, you 
are to appear before the court when summoned to 
do so.<= 

Legal Custom '^ is that which, in the absence of any 
statute, is by usage endowed with the force of statute 
law; for example, the money you have deposited 
with a banker you may rightly seek from his partner.* 

It is a Previous Judgement/ when on the same 
question a sentence has been passed or a decree 
interposed. These are often contradictory, according 
as one judge, praetor, consul, or tribune of the plebs 
has determined differently from another ; and it 
often happens that on the ver)' same matter one has 
decreed or decided differently from another. For 
example. Marcus Drusus, city praetor, granted an 
action on breach of contract against an heir, where- 
as Sextus Julius refused to do so.^ Again, Gaius 

whom it was useful, for tradition is a valid source for argu- 
mentation) was as such employed bv the jurists of this period. 
See Pemice, Sav. Zeitschr. 22 (1901). 59 ff . ; Artur St«in- 
wenter, in Studi in onore di Pietro Bonfante, 2.421-40; A. A. 
Schiller, Virginia Law Rev. 24 (1938). 268-82; Fritz Schulz, 
History of Roman Legal Science, p. 74; C. W. Westrup, 
Inirod. to Earhj Roman Law III, 1 (Copenhagen and London, 
1939). 127 ff. 

' One of only a few situations in Roman private law 
described as of customary origin ; see Schiller, Virg. Law 
Rev. 24. 275. 

^ K€KpifM€VOV. 

" M. Livius Drusus was praetor urbanus c. 115 B.C., Sextus 
Julius Caesar in 123 B.C. 



Item : C. Caelius iudex absolvit iniuriarum eum qui 
Lucilium poetam in scaena nominatim laeserat, P. 
Mucius eum qui L. Accium poetam nominaverat 
20 condemnavit. Ergo, quia possunt res simili de causa 
dissimiliter iudicatae proferri, cum id usu venerit, 
iudicem cum iudice, tempus cum tempore, numerum 
cum numero iudiciorum conferemus. 

Ex aequo et bono ius constat quod ad veritatem et 
utilitatem communem videtur pertinere ; quod genus, 
ut maior annis lx et cui morbus causa est cognitorem 
det. Ex eo vel novum ius constitui convenit ex 
tempore et ex hominis dignitate. 

Ex pacto ius est si quid inter se pepigerunt, si quid 
inter quos convenit. Pacta sunt quae legibus obser- 
vanda sunt, hoc modo : " Rem ubi pagunt, orato ; 
ni pagunt, in comitio aut in foro ante meridiem 
causam coicito." Sunt item pacta quae sine legibus 

*• C. Caelius (Caldus ? See P. F. Girard, Melanges de droit 
romain [Paris, 1923] 2. 398, note 2), before 103 B.C. The 
mimi specialised in broad and coarse humour {iocus illiberalis). 
Lucilius used licence in attacking other men {e.g., the poets 
Accius and Pacuvius), but resented attacks upon himself. 

** See R. E. Smith, '" The Law of Libel at Rome," Class. 
Quart. 44 (1951). 171-2. 

'^ Publius Mucius Scaevola, probably in 136 B.C. See 
1. xiv. 24 above. 

** Corresponds to KaXov Kai hiKaiov, ivieiKes, loov, yet the 
Roman term emphasizes the social point of view, implying 
more than " fairness." The honum is connected with bona 
fides. See Fritz Pringsheim, " Bonum et Aequum," Sav. 
^Zeitschr. 52 (1932). 78-155; Westrup, op. cit., Ill, 1. 21 ff. 
The definition is philosophical, and Greek in origin, but the 
illustration is from Roman law. According to Stroux, 
" Summum ius summa iniuria," the Aristotelian doctrine of 
equity came to the Roman Forum through the Peripatetic 
and Academic writers, and thence to the interpretatio iuris, 
but most students deny such an influence upon the Roman 


AD HKRENNIUM, II. xiii. 19-20 

Caelius, sitting in judgement, acquitted" of tlie 
charge of injury ** the man who had by name attacked 
the poet Lucilius on the stage, while Publius Mucius 
condemned <^ the man who had specifically named the 
poet Lucius Accius. Therefore, because different 
past judgements can be offered for a like case, we 
shall, when this comes to pass, compare the judges, 
the circumstances, and the number of decisions. 

The Law rests on Equity ^ when it seems to agree 
with truth and the general welfare ; for example, a 
man who is more than sixty years old, and pleads 
illness, shall substitute an attorney for himself.'' 
Thus according to circumstances and a person's 
status virtually a new kind of Law may well be 

It is Law founded on Agreement / if the parties 
have made some contract between themselves — if 
there is some covenant between parties. There are 
agreements which must be observed according to 
statutes, as for example: " When parties have con- 
tract on the matter, party shall plead ; if they do 
not have contract, party shall state outline of cause in 
the Comitium or the Forum before midday." ^ There 
are also agreements which, independently of statutes, 

jurists, or minimize it. See Ernst Lew, Sav. Zeitschr. 48 
(1928). 668-78; Schiller, Virg. Law Rev.^21. 753 flF.; Schulz, 
History of Roman Legal Science, pp. 74 f. 

' This is the earliest text expressly mentioning substitution 
in Roman procedure. On procedural representation see 
Wenger, Institutes of the Roman Law of Civil Procedure, pp. 
88 flF. 

■^ avvaXXayy^a. 

Twelve Tables 1. 6-9. The Comitium adjoined the Forum 
on the northwest ; although the two areas were not separated 
by a natural line, each kept its separate identity until the 
middle of the second century B.C. 



observantur ex convento, quae iure praestare 

His igitur partibus iniuriam demonstrari, ius con- 
'firmari convenit, id quod in absoluta iuridicali facien- 
dum videtur. 

21 XIV. Cum ex conparatione quaeretur utrum satius 
fuerit facere id quod reus dicat se fecisse, an id quod 
accusator dicat oportuisse fieri, primum quaeri con- 
veniet utrum fuerit utilius ex contentione, hoc est, 
utrum honestius, facilius, conducibilius. Deinde 
oportebit quaeri ipsumne oportuerit iudicare utrum 
fuerit utilius, an aliorum fuerit utilius statuendi 
potestas. Deinde interponetur ab accusatore suspi- 
cio ex constitutione coniecturali qua re putetur non 
ea ratione factum esse quo melius deteriori ante- 
poneretur, sed ^ dolo malo negotium gestum de 
aliqua probabili causa. Ab defensore contra refel- 
latur argumentatio coniecturalis de qua ante dictum 
est. Deinde quaeretur potueritne vitari ne in eum 

22 locum veniretur. His sic tractatis accusator utetur loco 
communi in eum qui inutile utili praeposuerit cum 
statuendi non habuerit potestatem. Defensor contra 
eos qui aequum censeant rem perniciosam utili 
praeponi utetur loco communi per conquestionem ; 
et simul quaerat ab accusatoribus, ab iudicibus ipsis, 

^ sed bid : sed in eo II Mx : si in co P^ : sine eo // : si sine 
C^ : sine B : ine C^. 

" Our author now turns to the Assumptive Juridical Issue. 
C/. 1. xiv. 24 and 1. xv. 25 above, and Cicero's fuller, and 
generally clearer, treatment in De Inv. 2. xxiv. 72 ff. ; also the 
figure Comparison [similitudo), 4. xlv. 59 below. 

* Cf. the definition of Advantage, 3. ii. 3 below. 


AD HKRKNNIUM, H. xiii. 20-xiv. 22 

are binding by virtue of the covenant itself; these 
are said to obtain at Law. 

These, then, are the divisions of Law by means of 
which one should demonstrate the injustice or 
establish the justice of an act — which we see to be 
the end sought in an Absolute Juridical cause. 

21 XIV. When Comparison « is used to examine 
whether it was better to do that which the defendant 
^ays he did, or that which the prosecutor says should 
have l)een done, it will be proper first to ascertain 
from the conflict which was the more advantageous, 
that is, more honourable, practicable, and profitable.'' 
Next we ought to discover whether the defendant 
himself should have decided which was the more 
advantageous, or whether the right to determine this 
belonged to others. Then the prosecutor, in accord- 
ance with the procedure in a conjectural issue, will 
interpose a suspicion leading to the belief that the 
defendant had not by his act intended to prefer the 
better to the worse, but had carried out the business 
with wilful fraud on some plausible ground. Let the 
defendant's counsel, on his side, refute the conjectural 
argument referred to above. Then the question will 
be whether this development could have been pre- 

22 vented from reaching such a pass. These points thus 
treated, the prosecutor will use the commonplace 
against one who has preferred the disadvantageous 
to the advantageous when he lacked the right of 
decision. The defendant's counsel, on his part, will 
use a commonplace in the form of a complaint against 
those who deem it equitable to prefer the ruinous to the 
advantageous ; and at the same time let him ask the 
accusers, and the jurors themselves, what they would 
have done had they been in the defendant's place, 



quid facturi essent si in eo loco fuissent, et tempus, 
locum, rem, deliberationem suam ponet ante oculos. 
XV. Translatio criminis est cum ab reo facti causa 
in aliorum peccatum transfertur. Primum quaeren- 
dum est iurene in alium crimen transferatur ; deinde 
spectandum est aeque magnum sit illud peccatum 
quod in alium transferatur atque illud quod reus 
suscepisse dicatur ; deinde, oportueritne in ea re 
peccare in qua alius ante peccarit ; deinde, opor- 
tueritne iudicium ante fieri ; deinde, cum factum 
iudicium non sit de illo crimine quod in alium trans- 
feratur, oporteatne de ea re iudicium fieri quae res in 
iudicium non devenerit. Locus communis accusatoris 
contra eum qui plus censeat vim quam indicia valere 
oportere. Et ab adversariis percontabitur accusator 
quid futurum sit si idem ceteri faciant ut de indem- 
natis supplicia sumant, quod eos idem fecisse dicant. 
Quid si ipse accusator idem facere voluisset ? Defensor 
eorum peccati atrocitatem proferet in quos crimen 
transferet ; rem, locum, tempus ante oculos ponet, ut 
ii qui audient existiment aut non potuisse aut inutile ^ 
fuisse rem in iudicium venire. 
23 XVI. Concessio est per quam nobis ignosci pos- 
tulamus. Ea dividitur in purgationem et depre- 

1 inutile CE : non inutile M Mx. 

^ Cf. 1. XV. 25 above, and Cicero, De Inv. 2. xxvi. 78 ff. 
{relatio criminis). 

" Cf. Cicero, De Inv. 2. xxvii. 80 f. 

" The problem is that exploited in tragedy, concerning the 
right to take justice into one's own hands. 

<^ Cf. Cicero, De Inv. 2. xxviii. 84 f. 

• Cf. Cicero, De Inv. 2. xxxi. 94. 


AD HKRRNNIUM. IF. xiv. 22-xvi. 23 

and he will set before their eyes the time, the place, 
the circumstances, and the defendant's deliberations. 

X\'. Shifting of the Question of Guilt takes place 
when the defendant refers the reason for his act to 
the crime committed by others." First we must 
examine whether the Law permits the shifting of the 
issue of guilt to another; next we must see whether 
the offence which is being imputed to another is as 
serious as that with which the defendant is charged ; 
then whether the defendant ought to have trans- 
gressed in the same way as another had previously ; 
next, whether a judicial decision ought not to have 
been rendered before he committed his act ; then, in 
the absence of a judicial decision on the offence which 
is being imputed to another, whether a decision ought 
now to be rendered on a matter which has never come 
to trial.'' Here the prosecutor's commonplace is 
against one who believes that violence ought to pre- 
vail over judicial decisions.*^ Furthermore, he will 
ask his adversaries what would happen if everyone 
else should do the same as they, and should inflict 
punishment upon persons who have not been con- 
victed, contending that the adversaries have set the 
example. What if the accuser himself had wished 
to do likewise ? The defendant's counsel will set 
forth the atrocity of the crime committed by those to 
whom he is shifting the issue of guilt ; he will present 
before the eyes of the hearers the circumstances, the 
place, and the time so that they may think that it 
was either impossible or inexpedient for the matter 
to come to trial. ^ 

XVL Through the Acknowledgement * we plead for 
pardon. The Acknowledgement includes the Excul- 
pation and the Plea for Mercy. 



Purgatio est cum consulto a nobis factum negamus. 
Ea dividitur in necessitudinem, fortunam, inpru- 
dentiam, De his partibus primum ostendendum est ; 
deinde ad deprecationem revertendum videtur. 
Primum considerandum est num culpa ventum sit in 
necessitudinem. Deinde quaerendum est quo modo 
vis ilia vitari potuerit ac levari. Deinde is qui in 
necessitudinem causam conferet expertusne sit quid 
contra facere aut excogitare posset. Deinde num 
quae suspiciones ex coniecturali constitutione trahi 
possint, quae significent id consulto factum esse 
quod necessario cecidisse dicitur. Deinde, si maxime 
necessitudo quaepiam fuerit, conveniatne earn satis 
idoneam causam putari. 
24 Si inprudentia reus se peccasse dicet, primum 
quaeretur utrum potuerit nescire an non potuerit; 
deinde utrum data sit opera ut sciretur an non; 
deinde utrum casu nescierit an culpa. Nam qui se 
propter vinum aut amorem aut iracundiam fugisse 
rationem dicet, is animi vitio videbitur nescisse, non 
inprudentia ; quare non inprudentia se defendet, sed 
culpa contaminabit. Deinde coniecturali constitu- 
tione quaeretur utrum scierit an ignoraverit, et 
considerabitur satisne inprudentia praesidii debeat 
esse cum factum esse constet. 

« CJ. Cicero, De lav. 2. xxxii. 98 fif. 

* Cf. Cicero, De Inv. 2. xxxi. 95, and Rhet. ad Alex., ch. 4 
(1427 a). 

« Cf. Aristotle, Eth. Nic. 3. 3 (1111 a 24) : "For it is 
perhaps a mistake to say that acts committed through anger 
or desire are involuntary." 

AD HKRENNIUM, II. wi. 23-24 

The Kxculjjation is our denial tliat wc acted with 
intent. Subheads under Plea of Exculpation are 
Necessity, Accident, and Ignorance. These are to be 
explained first, and then, as it seems, it will be best 
to return to the Plea for Mercy. One must first 
consider whether it was the defendant's fault that 
he was brought to this necessity." After that wc 
must inquire what means he had to avoid or lighten 
this superior force. Next, did he who offers necessity 
as an excuse try to do, or to contrive, what he could 
against it } Then, cannot some grounds for suspicion 
be drawn from the procedure in a conjectural issue, 
which would signify that the deed attributed to 
necessity was premeditated ? Finally, if there was 
some extreme necessity, is it proper to deem this a 
sufficient excuse ? 

If the defendant says that he erred through 
ignorance,^ the first question will be : Could he or 
could he not have been uninformed ? Next, did he 
or did he not make an effort to inform himself.' 
Then, is his ignorance attributable to accident or to 
his own fault .'' For a person who declares that his 
reason fied because of wine or love or anger, will 
appear to have lacked comprehension through fault 
of character rather than ignorance '^ ; he ^^•ill there- 
fore not justify himself on the ground of ignorance, 
but will taint himself with guilt.^ Finally, by means 
of the procedure in a conjectural issue, we shall seek 
to discover whether he was or was not informed, and 
consider whether ignorance should be sufficient 
justification when it is established that the deed was 

** The Ehel. ad Alex., ch. 7 (1429 a), admits such a defence 
as a last resort. 



Cum in fortunam causa conf'ertur et ea re defensor 
ignosci reo dicet oportere, eadem omnia videntur 
consideranda quae de necessitudine praescripta sunt. 
Etenim omnes hae ^ tres partes purgationis inter se 
finitimae sunt, ut in omnes eadem fere possint 

Loci communes in his causis : accusatoris contra 
eum qui, cum peccasse confiteatur, tamen oratione 
iudices demoretur ; defensoris de humanitate, miseri- 
cordia: voluntatem in omnibus rebus spectari con- 
venire ; quae consulto facta non sint, ea fraudi ^ 
esse non oportere. 

XVII. Deprecatione utemur cum fatebimur nos 
peccasse, neque id inprudentes aut fortuito aut 
necessario fecisse dicemus, et tamen ignosci nobis 
postulabimus. Hie ignoscendi ratio quaeritur ex his 
locis : si plura aut maiora officia quam maleficia vide- 
buntur constare ; si qua virtus aut nobilitas erit in eo 
qui supplicabit ; si qua spes erit usui futurum si sine 
supplicio discesserit; si ipse ille supplex mansuetus 
et misericors in potestatibus ostendetur fuisse ; si ea 
quae peccavit non odio neque crudelitate, sed officio 
et recto studio commotus fecit ; si tali de causa aliis 
quoque ignotum est ; si nihil ab eo periculi nobis 

1 hae E Mx ed. mai. : haec p 31x. 

2 ea fraudi E : an ea fraude M : an ea fraudei Mx. 

» Cf. Cicero, De Inv. 2. xxxi. 96. 
* Cf. Cicero, De Inv. 2. xxxiii. 101 f. 

' For the commonplaces on pity see also 2. xvii. 26 and 
especially 2. xxxi. 50 below. 

•^ Cf. Cicero, De Inv. 2. xxxv. 106, and Pro Ligario. 


AD HERENNIUM, II. wi. 24-\vii. 25 

When the cause of the crime is attributed to 
accident,** and counsel for the defence maintains that 
his client should be pardoned on that ground, it 
appears that all the points to be considered are pre- 
cisely those prescribed above for necessity ; for all 
these three divisions of Exculpation are so closely 
interrelated that virtually the same rules can be 
applied to them all. 

Commonplaces ^ in these causes are the following : 
that of the prosecutor against one who confesses 
a crime, yet holds the jurors up by prolix speech- 
making ; for the defence, on humanity and pity,c 
that it is the intention which should alwavs be con- 
sidered, and that unintentional acts ought not to be 
regarded as crimes. 

XVII. We shall use the Plea for Mercy ^ when we 
confess the crime without attributing it to ignorance, 
chance, or necessity, and yet beg for pardon. Here 
the ground for pardoning is sought in the following 
topics : if it seems e\ident that the good deeds of 
the suppliant have been more numerous or more 
weighty than the bad ; if he is endowed ^^■ith some 
virtue, or with good birth ; if there is any hope that 
he v.i.U be of service in the event that he departs 
unpunished ; if the suppliant himself is sho\\Ti to 
have been gentle and compassionate ^ in power ; if 
in committing his mistakes he was moved not bv 
hatred or cruelty, but by a sense of duty and right 
endeavour ; if on a similar ground others also have 
been pardoned ; if, in the event that we acquit him, 
no peril from him appears likely to be our lot in 

' For mansuetus et misericors cf. Sallust, Cat. 54. 2 (on 
Caesar), 52. 11 and 52. 27 (Cato), and 34. 1 (Q. Marciiis); 
Cicero, Pro Murena 41. 90, Pro Sulla 33. 93. 



futurum videbitur si eum missum fecerimus ; si nulla 
aut a nostris civibus aut ab aliqua civitate vituperatio 

26 ex ea re suscipietur. Loci communes : de humani- 
tate, fortuna, misericordia, rerum commutatione. His 
locis omnibus ex contrario utetur is qui contra dicet, 
cum amplificatione et enumeratione peccatorum. 
Haec causa iudicialis fieri non potest, ut in libro primo 
ostendimus, sed, quod potest vel ad senatum vel ad 
consilium venire, non visa est supersedenda. 

Cum ab nobis crimen removere volemus, aut in rem 
aut in hominem nostri peccati causam conferemus. 
Si causa in hominem conferetur, quaerendum erit 
primum potueritne tantum quantum reus demonstra- 
bit is in quem causa conferetur; et quone modo aut 
honeste aut sine periculo potuerit obsisti ; si maxime 
ita sit, num ea re concedi reo conveniat quod alieno 
inductu fecerit. Deinde in coniecturalem trahetur 
controversiam et edisseretur num consulto factum sit. 
Si causa in rem quandam conferetur, et haec eadem 
fere et omnia quae de necessitudine praecepimus 
consideranda erunt. 

27 XVI II. Quoniam satis ostendisse videamur quibus 
argumentationibus in uno quoque genere causae 
iudicialis uti conveniret, consequi videtur ut doceamus 

« 1. xiv. 24. Cf. Cicero, De Inv. 2. xxxiv. 105. 

* Cicero, De Inv. 2. xxix. 86-xxx. 94, considers also the 
situation {remotio rei) in which the defendant denies that the 
act he is charged with concerned him or his duty. Cf. also 
Exculpation, 2. xvi. 23 above. 


AD HKHFAMUM, II. xvii. 25 win. 27 

the future ; if as a result of that aecjuittal no censure 
will accrue either from our fellow-citizens or from 

26 some other state. Comm(^nplaces : on humanity, 
fortune, pity, and the mutability of things. All these 
commonplaces, reversed, will he used bv the adver- 
sary, who will also amplify and recount the defen- 
dant's transgressions. Such a cause is not admissible 
in the courts, as I showed in Book I," but because 
it is admissible either before the Senate or a 
council, I have decided that I should not pass it 

j When we Mish to Reject the Responsibility, we 
shall throw the blame for our crime either upon some 

i circumstance or upon another person.'' If upon a 
person, we must first examine whether the person 
to whom the responsibility is transferred had as 
nuich influence as the defendant will represent ; next, 
whether the defendant could somehow have resisted 
this influence honourably or safely ; ^ and, even if the 
conditions are in fullest measure such as the defend- 
ant represents them to be, whether it is nevertheless 
proper to make allowances to him just because he 
acted on another's persuasion. Then we shall turn 
the controversy into one of fact and examine in 
detail whether there was premeditation. If the 
responsibility is transferred to some circumstance, 
virtually these same precepts and all those that I 
have set forth on Necessity '^ are to be observed. 
7 XVIII. Since I believe that I have fully shown 
what arguments are advantageously used in each 
type of judicial cause, it seems to follow that I should 

' See the definition of Advantage, 3. ii. 3 below. 
^ 2. xvi. 23 above. 


quemadmodum ipsas argumentationes ornate et 
absolute tractare possimus. Nam fere non difficile 
invenire quid sit causae adiumento, difficillimum vero 
est ^ inventum expolire et expedite pronuntiare. 
Haec enim res facit ut neque diutius quam satis sit in 
isdem locis commoremur, nee eodem identidem 
revolvamur, neque inchoatam argumentationem relin- 
quamus, neque incommode ad aliam deinceps 
transeamus. Itaque hac ratione et ipsi meminisse 
poterimus quid quoque loco dixerimus, et auditor cum 
totius causae tum unius cuiusque argumentationis 
distributionem percipere et meminisse poterit. 
28 Ergo absolutissima et perfectissima est argu- 
mentatio ea quae in quinque partes est distributa: 
propositionem, rationem, rationis confirmationem, 
exornationem, conplexionem. Propositio est per 

* vero est PB C Ud : est vero b I : est H Mx. 

" Traciatio and inventio supplement each other; Cicero, 
De Oratore 2. 41. 176 : " We now see that it is by no means 
enough to find what to say, unless you are able to handle it 
{id inventum tractare) skilfully once found; " c/. also 
ibid., 2. 27. 120. The tradition is Isocratean; Paneg. 9: 
" For the deeds of the past are a heritage common to us all, 
but the ability to make full use (= xPV^i-^) ^^ them at the 
proper time, in each instance to form the right conceptions 
about them, and to set these forth in a finished style, is the 
special gift of them that know." Cf. 1. ii. 2, 2. ii. 2, 3. iv. 7, 
3. vi. 11. 

* Cicero, De Inv. 1. xxxvii. 67, divides the deductive argu- 
ment {argumentatio per ratiocinationem) into propositio, 
propositionis approbatio, assumptio, assumptionis approbatio, 
and complexio. 

While Aristotle in forming arguments constructs the 
enthymeme in close analogy with the logical syllogism (e.g., 
Rhet. 1. 2, 1356 b), our author, with the practical speaker in 
mind in this meagre treatment, shows little interest in the 
syllogistic form. The epicheireme is more complicated than 

AD HEUENNIUM, II. win. 27 28 

explain how to develop** these arguments elegantly 
and completely. To be sure, it is in general not hard 
to devise matter which should serve to support a 
cause, but to polish what has been devised and to 
give it a ready delivery is very hard. Indeed it is 
this faculty which keeps us from dwelling longer 
than necessary on the same topics, from returning 
again and again to the same place, abandoning a 
chain of argument before it has been completed, and 
making an inappropriate transition to the next argu- 
ment. By the following method, therefore, we can 
ourselves remember what we have said in each place, 
and the hearer can perceive and remember the 
distribution of the parts in the whole cause and also 
in each particular argument. 

The most complete and perfect argument, then, 
is that which is comprised of five parts : the Pro- 
position, the Reason, the Proof of the Reason, the 
Embellishment, and the Resume.^ Through the 

the enthymeme (of which it is a later name). Aristotle's 
enthymeme (and, later, also Quintilian's [epicheireme] ; see 
5. l4. 6) comprised two premises and conclusion ; the epi- 
cheireme normally comprised four premises. Aristotle took 
the premises for granted ; the later rhetoricians thought it 
necessary to prove each. The epicheireme may have 
developed under Stoic influence. Cicero, De Int. 1. xxxv. 61, 
makes it clear that the quinquepartite epicheireme grew out 
of Aristotle's syllogism; Theophrastus, following observa- 
tions of Isocrates, may have been the first to introduce it into 
rhetoric. Cicero's syllogistic form {ratiocinaiio) is logical; 
he treats it on a par with Socratic induction. See Cicero, 
De Int. 1. xxxiv. 57 ff. ; Quintilian, 5. 10. 1 ff . and 5. 14. 5 fF. ; 
Wilhelm Kroll, Das Epicheirema, in Sitzungsh. Akad. der 
Wi-ssen.sch. in Wien {Philos.-histor.KL), 216. 2 (1936); 
Friedrich Solmsen, Amer. Journ. Philol. 62 (1941). 39 ff., 
169 ff. It is doubtful whether the epicheireme as here 
described was very widely used in actual oratory. 



quam ostendimus summatim quid sit quod probari 
volumus. Ratio est quae causam demonstrat verum 
esse id quod intendimus, brevi subiectione. Rationis 
confirm atio est ea quae pluribus argumentis corro- 
borat breviter expositam rationem. Exornatio est 
qua utimur rei honestandae et conlocupletandae 
causa, confirmata argumentatione. Conplexio est 
quae concludit breviter, colligens partes argumenta- 

Hisce igitur quinque partibus ut absolutissime 
utamur, hoc modo tractabimus argumentationem : 

XIX. " Causam ostendemus Ulixi fuisse quare 
interfecerit Aiacem. 

" Inimicum enim acerrimum de medio tollere 
volebat, a quo sibi non iniuria summum periculum 

" Videbat illo incolumi se incolumem non futurum ; 
sperabat illius morte se salutem sibi conparare; 
consueverat, si iure non potuerat, iniuria quavis 
inimico exitium machinari, cui rei mors indigna 
Palamedis testimonium dat. Ergo et metus periculi 

* nporaais, Xrj^fia, hereafter in Book 2 called expositio by 
our author. 

* Cf. Cicero, De Inv. 1. xxxviii. 68. 

* The Proposition. Here begins a progymnasnui [avyKpiais 
of persons). The theme was first taken up in 1. xi. 18 above. 
Thiele, Hermagoras, pp. 159-163, conjectures that the source 
of both theme (originally a ottXujv Kpiai? or an Alas of 
tragedy) and treatment by five-fold epicheireme is Hermagoras. 
Cf. Quintilian, 4. 2. 13 ; Ulysses replies that he did not do the 
deed, and had no quarrel with Ajax, and that their conflict 
was concerned only with renown. 

<* The Reason. 

' Ulysses hated Palamedes because he had exposed 
Ulysses' deceit in feigning madness so as to avoid joining the 


AD HERENNIUM, II. xviii. 28-xix. 28 

Proposition" we set forth summarily what we intend 
to prove. The Reason, by means of a brief explana- 
tion subjoined, sets forth the eausal basis for the 
Proposition, establishing the truth of what we are 
urging. The Proof of the Reason corroborates, by 
means of additional arguments, the briefly presented 
Reason. Embellishment we use in order to adorn 
and enrich the argument, after the Proof has been 
established. The Resume is a brief conclusion, draw- 
ing together the parts of the argument. 

Hence, to make the most complete use of these five 
parts, we shall develop an argument as follows:* 

XIX. " VVe shall show that Ulysses had a motive 
in killing Ajax.*^ 

" Indeed he wished to rid himself of his bitterest 
enemy, from whom, with good cause, he feared 
extreme danger to himself.*^ 

He saw that, with Ajax alive, his own life would 
be unsafe; he hoped by the death of Ajax to secure 
his own safety ; it was his habit to plan an enemy's 
destruction by whatsoever wrongful means, when he 
could not by rightful, as the undeserved death of 
Palamedes bears witness.* Thus the fear of danger 

Greek expedition to Troy, and because Ulysses envied his 
fame for wisdom. According to another tradition this 
hatred arose from the severe reproof Palamedes dealt out to 
Ulysses for returning empty-handed from a foraging expedi- 
tion. The stories of the vengeance also differ. Ulysses and 
Diomedes induced him to descend into a well in order to find 
alleged treasure, and then stoned him ; or they drowned him 
while he was fishing; or with Agamemnon they bribed a 
servant of Palamedes to conceal under Palamedes' bed a 
forged letter from Priam offering a bribe of gold, accused 
Palamedes of treachery, and when the letter (or gold) was 
discovered, caused him to be stoned by the Greeks. 



hortabatur eum interimere a quo supplicium vere- 
batur, et consuetudo peccandi maleficii suscipiendi 
removebat dubitationem. 

29 " Omnes enim cum minima peccata cum causa 
suscipiunt, tum vero ilia quae multo maxima sunt 
maleficia aliquo certo emolumento inducti suscipere 
conantur. Si multos induxit in peccatum pecuniae 
spes, si conplures scelere se contaminarunt imperii 
cupiditate, si multi leve conpendium fraude maxima 
commutarunt, cui mirum videbitur istum a maleficio 
propter acerrimam formidinem non temperasse ? 
Virum fortissimum, integerrimum, inimicitiarum 
persequentissimum, iniuria lacessitum, ira exsuscita- 
tum homo timidus, nocens, conscius sui peccati, 
insidiosus voluit interimere ; acerrimum homo per- 
fidiosus ^ inimicum incolumem esse noluit. Cui ^ 
tandem hoc mirum videbitur? Nam cum feras 
bestias videamus alacres et erectas vadere ut alteri 
bestiae noceant, non est incredibile putandum istius 
quoque animum ferum, crudelem atque inhumanum 
cupide ad inimici perniciem profectum, praesertim 
cum in bestiis nullam neque bonam neque malam 
rationem videamus, in isto plurimas et pessumas 
rationes semper fuisse intellegamus. 

30 "Si ergo pollicitus sum me daturum causam qua 
inductus Ulixes accesserit ad maleficium, et si 
inimicitiarum acerrimam rationem et periculi metum 

^ lac; voluit interimere acerrimum homo perfidiosus siigg. 

2 Cui J? : qui i/ Mx. 

AD HERENNIUM, II. xix. 28-30 

encouraged him to slay the man from wliom he 
dreaded vengeance, and, in addition, the habit of 
wrong-doing robbed him of his scruples at under- 
taking the evil deed.** 

" Now not only do all men have a motive even in 
their least peccadillos, but certainly they are 
attracted by some sure reward when they enter upon 
crimes which are by far the most heinous. If the 
hope of gaining money has led many a man to wrong- 
doing, if from greed for power not a few have tainted 
themselves with crime, if numerous men have trafficked 
for a paltry profit with arrant deceit, who will find 
it strange that Ulysses, when under stress of acute 
terror, did not refrain from crime ? A hero most 
brave, most upright, most implacable against his foes, 
harassed by a wrong, roused to anger — him the 
frightened, malevolent, guilt-conscious, guileful man 
wished to destroy ; the treacherous man did not 
wish his bitter enemy to stay alive. To whom, 
pray, will this seem strange ? For when we see 
wild beasts rush eagerly and resolutely to attack 
one another, w^e must not think it incredible that 
this creature, too — a wild, cruel, inhuman spirit — set 
out passionately to destroy his enemy ; especially 
since in beasts we see no reasoning, good or bad, 
while he, we know% always had designs, ever so many, 
and ever so base.^ 

" If, then, I have promised to give the motive 
which impelled Ulysses to enter upon the crime, and 
if I have shown that the reckoning of a bitter enmity 
and the fear of danger were the factors, it must 

" The Proof of the Reason. 

" The Embellishment. Quintilian, 5. 14. 6, knows of the 
exornatio as a part of the epicheireme. 


intercessisse demonstravi, non est dubium quin 
confiteatur causam maleficii fuisse." 

Ergo absolutissima est argumentatio ea quae ex 
quinque partibus constat, sed ea non semper necesse 
est uti. Est cum conplexione supersedendum est, si 
res brevis est, ut facile memoria conprehendatur ; 
est cum exornatio praetermittenda est, si parum 
locuples ad amplificandum et exornandum res videtiir 
esse. Sin et brevis erit argumentatio et res tenuis 
aut humilis, tum et exornatione et conplexione super- 
sedendum est. In omni argumentatione de duabus 
partibus postremis haec quam exposui ratio est 
habenda. Ergo amplissima est argumentatio quinque- 
pertita ; brevissima est tripertita ; mediocris, sublata 
aut exornatione aut conplexione, quadripertita. 

XX. Duo genera sunt vitiosarum argumenta- 
tionum : unum quod ab adversario reprehendi potest, 
id quod pertinet ad causam ; alterum quod tametsi 
nugatorium est, tamen non indiget reprehensionis. 
Quae sint quae reprehensione confutari conveniat, 
quae tacite contemni atque vitari sine reprehensione, 
nisi exempla subiecero, intellegere dilucide non 
poteris. Haec cognitio vitiosarum argumentationum 
duplicem utilitatem adferet. Nam et vitare in 
argumentatione vitium admonebit et ab aliis non 
vitatum commode reprehendere docebit. 

Quoniam igitur ostendimus perfectam et plenam 
argumentationem ex quinque partibus constare, in 

" The Resume. 

* Arrangement accommodated to circumstance, as in 
3. ix. 17 below. Cf. Cicero, De Inv. 1. xxxix. 70 ff. 

'■ Our author omitted to use a transition here. Cicero, 
De Inv. 1. xlii. 78 ft'., rightly considers the defective arguments 
under Refutation (reprehensio). 


AD HKKKNNILM. II. \i\. ^o-.xx. 31 

unquestionably be aeknowledged that he had a motive 
for his crime." '^ 

An argument comprised of the five parts is, then, 
the most complete, but its use is not always necessary. 
There is a time when the Resume should be dis- 
pensed with — if the matter is brief enough to be 
readily embraced by the memory. There is a 
situation, too. in which the ]^mbellishment should be 
omitted — if the matter proves to be too meagre for 
amplification and adornment. And if the argument 
is brief and the matter also slight or in^^ignificant, then 
both the Embellishment and the Resume «should be 
left out. This rule which I have just set forth is to 
be observed for the last two parts in every argument. ** 
The fullest argument, therefore, is fivefold, the 
briefest threefold, and the mean fourfold, lacking 
either the Kmbellishment or the Resume. 

XX. Defective arguments <^ are of two kinds : one 
can be refuted'' by the adversary, and so belongs to 
the cause proper ; the other, although likewise invalid, 
does not need to be refuted. If I do not add ex- 
amples, you will be unable clearly to distinguish those 
arguments which it is proper to refute in rebuttal, and 
those which it is proper to ignore in disdainful silence 
and to abstain from refuting. This knowledge of 
defective arguments will confer a double advantage. 
It will warn us to avoid a fault in arguing, and teach 
us skilfully to reprehend a fault not avoided by 

Since, then, I have shown that a perfect and full 
argument consists of five parts,* let us consider the 

^ Reprehenaio = Aucti?. 

' Cf. Cicero, De Inc. 1. xlii. 79. 



una quaque parte argumentationis quae vitia vitanda 
sunt consideremus, ut et ipsi ab his vitiis recedere, et 
adversariorum argumentationes hac praeceptione in 
omnibus partibus temptare et ab aliqua parte labe- 
factare possimus. 

32 Expositio vitiosa est cum ab aliqua aut a maiore 
parte ad omnes confertur id quod non necessario est 
omnibus adtributum ; ut si quis hoc modo exponat : 
" Omnes qui in paupertate sunt malunt maleficio 
parare divitias quam officio paupertatem tueri." Si 
qui hoc modo exposuerit argumentationem, ut non 
curet quaerere qualis ratio aut rationis confirmatio sit, 
ipsam facile reprehendemus expositionem cum 
ostendemus id quod in aliquo paupere inprobo sit in 
omnes pauperes falso et iniuria conferri. 

33 Item vitiosa expositio est cum id quod raro fit 
fieri omnino negatur, hoc modo : " Nemo potest uno 
aspectu neque praeteriens in amorem incidere." 
Nam cum nonnemo devenerit in amorem uno aspectu, 
et cum ille neminem dixerit, omnino nihil differt raro 
id fieri, dummodo aliquando fieri aut posse modo fieri 

XXI. Item vitiosa expositio est cum omnes res 
ostendemus nos collegisse et aliquam rem idoneam 
praeterimus, hoc modo: ** Quoniam igitur hominem 
occisum constat esse, necesse est aut a praedonibus 
aut ab inimicis occisum esse aut abs te, quem ille 

" The fallacy of False Generalization. Cf. Cicero, De Inv. 
1. xliii. 80. 

*• In Cicero, De Inv. 1. xliii. 80, this observation is assigned 
to the speech delivered by C. Scribonius Curio (first of the 
three orators of that name, praetor in 121 B.C.) in defence of 
Servius Fulvius in a prosecution for incest. According to Cicero, 
Brutus 32. 122, the speech was once esteemed a masterpiece. 


AD HERENNIUM, II. xx. 31-xxi. t,^ 

faults to be avoided in each single part of the argu- 
ment, so that we may ourselves be able to shun these 
faults, and by the following rules test the argument 
of our adversaries in all its parts and undermine it in 
some one of these. 

The Proposition is defective when an assertion 
based on some one part or on a majority of individuals, 
but not necessarily applicable to all, is referred to all, 
as if one should argue as follows : " All the poor would 
rather do wrong and acquire riches than do right and 
remain poor." If a speaker has presented this sort 
of Proposition in an argument, without caring to ask 
of what nature the Reason or the Proof of the Reason 
is to be, we shall easily refute his Proposition by 
showing that what is true of one dishonest poor man 
is being falsely and unjustlv applied to all the poor.'* 

Again, the Proposition is defective when a rare 
occurrence is declared to be absolutely impossible, as 
follows: " No one can fall in love at a single glance, 
or as he is passing by." ^ For inasmuch as some have 
fallen in love at first sight, and yet the speaker has 
said " no one," it is of no significance whatsoever 
that the experience occurs but rarely, provided we 
understand that it sometimes does occur, or even only 
that it can occur. 

XXI. Again, the Proposition is defective when we 
submit that we have made a complete enumeration 
of the possibilities and pass by some pertinent one,<^ 
as follows: " Since, then, it is established that the 
man was killed, he must have been killed by robbers, 
or by enemies, or by you, whom in his will he made 

* The fallacy of Incomplete Disjunction. Cf. Cicero, De 
Inv. 1. xlv. 84." 



heredem testamento ex parte faciebat. Praedones in 
illoloco visi numquam sunt ; inimicum nullum habebat ; 
relinquitur, si neque a praedonibus neque ab inimicis 
occisus est, quod alteri non erant, alteros non habe- 
bat, ut abs te sit interemptus." Nam in huiuscemodi 
expositione reprehensione utemur si quos praeter- 
quam quos ille conlegerit potuisse suscipere male- 
ficium ostenderimus ; velut in hoc exemplo, cum 
dixerit necesse esse aut a praedonibus aut ab inimicis 
aut a nobis occisum esse, dicemus potuisse vel a 
famiUa vel a coheredibus nostris. Cum hoc modo 
illorum conlectionem disturbaverimus, nobis latiorem 
locum defendendi reliquerimus. Ergo hoc quoque 
vitandum est in expositione, ne quando, cum omnia 
collegisse videamur, aliquam idoneam partem 
34 Item vitiosa expositio est quae constat ex falsa 
enumeratione, si aut cum plura sunt pauciora 
dicamus, hoc modo : " Duae res sunt, iudices, quae 
omnes ad maleficium impellant : luxuries et avaritia." 
" Quid amor? " inquiet quispiam, " quid ambitio? 
quid religio? quid metus mortis? quid imperii 

« Cf. Cicero, De Inv. 1. xlv. 85. 

* C/. Cato in Livy, 34. 4. 1 ff . : " Often have you heard me 
complain . . . that the state is suffering from the two 
opposing vices, luxury and greed, which have been the curse 
and destruction of every great empire; " Cicero, Pro S. 
Rose. Am. 27. 75 : " The city creates luxury ; from luxury 
greed inevitably springs, and from greed bursts forth audacity, 
the source of every crime and wrong; " Longinus, De Svblim. 
46. 6 : " For the love of money . . . and the love of pleasure 
enslave us;" Isocrates, Antid. 217: "Well then, I say 
that every man does everything he does for the sake of 
pleasure or gain or glory; " Aristotle, Rhet. 1. 10 (1369 a) : 


AD HERENNIUM, II. xxi. 33-34 

part-heir. In that place robbers have never been 
seen. He had no enemy. If he was not killed by 
robbers, of whom there were none, nor by enemies, of 
whom he had none, it remains that he was slain by 
you." We shall refute a Proposition of this type 
by showing that others besides those whom the 
speaker has enumerated could have undertaken the 
crime." Here, for example, when he has said that 
the murder must have been committed by robbers, or 
by enemies, or by us, we shall say that it could have 
been committed by the man's slaves or by our co-heirs. 
When we have in this way upset the enumeration 
made by our accusers, we have left ourselves wider 
room for defence. This then is another mistake 
always to be avoided in the Proposition — the omission 
of some pertinent item when we think that we have 
included all. 
34 Again, the Proposition is defective if it is based on a 
false enumeration and we present fewer possibilities 
than there are in reality, as follows : " There are two 
things, men of the jury, which ever impel men to 
crime: luxury and greed." ^ "But what about 
love?," some one will say, " ambition.^ superstition, 
the fear of death. <^ the passion for power, and, in short, 

*' Thus every act of men is necessarily done from one or 
other of seven causes : chance, nature, compulsion, habit, 
calculation, passion, or desire." 

' Aristotle, Polit. 2. 9 (1271 a), declares greed and ambition 
to be the commonest motives of crime ; c/. also Timon the 
Misanthrope in Stobaeus, 3. 10. 53 : " The components of 
evil are greed and the love of glory " ; and Horace, Serm. 
1. 4. 25-6 : " Take anyone at all from amid a crowd — he is 
suffering from either greed or some wretched ambition." 

^ The sentiment is Epicurean; c/., for example, Lucretius 
1. 80 ff., 3. 59 ff. 



cupiditas ? quid denique alia permulta ? " Item 
falsa enumeratio est cum pauciora sunt et plura 
dicimus, hoc modo : " Tres res sunt quae omnes 
homines sollicitent : metus, cupiditas, aegritudo»"" 
Satis enim fuerat dixisse metum, cupiditateniy 
quoniam aegritudinem cum utraque re coniunctam 
esse necesse est. 

XXII. Item vitiosa expositio est quae nimium 
longe repetitur, hoc modo : " Omnium malorum 
stultitia est mater atque materies. Ea parit immen- 
sas cupiditates. Immensae porro cupiditates infinitae, 
immoderatae sunt. Hae ^ pariunt avaritiam. Avari- 
tia porro hominem ad quod vis maleficium impellit. 
Ergo avaritia inducti adversarii nostri hoc in se 
f acinus admiserunt." Hie id quod extremum dictum 
est satis fuit exponere, ne Ennium et ceteros poetas 
imitemur, quibus hoc modo loqui concessum est : 

Utinam ne in nemore Pelio securibus 
Caesae accidissent abiegnae ad terram trabes, 
Neve inde navis inchoandi exordium 
Coepisset quae nunc nominatur nomine 
Argo, quia Argivi in ea delecti viri 
Vecti petebant pellem inauratam arietis 
Colchis, imperio regis Peliae, per dolum ; 
Nam numquam era errans mea domo efferret 

^ hae E : haec 31 Mx. 

« In Theon 5 (Spengel 2. 99 and 105) and in Stobaeus, 3. 10. 37, 
Bion of Borysthenes (first half 3rd century B.C.) is quoted as 
saying that avarice is mother city {iiriTpoiroXis) of all evil ; in 
Diogenes Laertius, 6. 50, the saying is attributed to Diogenes 
the Cynic (fourth century B.C.). This sentiment was popular 
in the rhetorical schools and philosophical diatribes. Cf. Sallust, 


AD HERENNIUM, II. xvi. 34-xxii. 34 

the great multitude of other motives? " Again the 
enumeration is false when the possibilities are fewer 
than we present, as follows: "There are three 
emotions that agitate all men : fear, desire, and 
worry." Indeed it had been enough to say fear and 
desire, since worry is necessarily conjoined with both. 
XXII. Again, the Proposition is defective if it 
traces things too far back, as follows: " Stupidity is 
the mother and matter of all evils. She gives birth to 
boundless desires. Furthermore, boundless desires 
have neither end nor limit. They breed avarice. 
Avarice, further, drives men to any crime you \\i.\\. 
Thus it is avarice which has led our adversaries to 
take this crime upon themselves." ° Here what 
was said last was enough for a Proposition, lest we 
copy Ennius and the other poets, who are licensed 
to speak as follows: " O that in Pelion's woods the 
firwood timbers had not fallen to the ground, cut down 
by axes, and that therefrom had not commenced 
the undertaking to begin the ship which now is named 
with the name of Argo, because in it sailed the picked 
Argive heroes who were seeking the golden fleece of 
the ram from the Colchians, \vith guile, at King Pelias' 
command. For then never would my mistress, mis- 
led, have set foot away from home." ^ Indeed here 

Cat. 10 : " These [the lust for money and the lust for power] 
were, I might say, the source (muteries) of all evils " ; Calpurnius 
Flaccus 8 ; " A man long happy is substance (materia) for all 
disasters," and see also Otto, s.v. " avaritia " 5, p. 51. 

^ Medea's nurse in the Prologue of Ennius' Medea Exuly 
which was a reproduction of Euripides' Medea. Ennius here 
observed the sequence of causes more carefully than Euripides 
had done; see Schol. in Eurip., Med. 1. 1 ff., ed. Ed. Schwartz, 
2. 140 ff. Cf. acero, De Inv. 1. xlix. 91 ; Quintilian, 5. 10. 83 ; 
Ribbeck, 1. 49-50. 



Nam hie satis erat dicere, si id modo quod satis esset 
curarent poetae : 

Utinam ne era errans mea domo eflferret pedem. 
Ergo hac quoque ab ultimo repetitione in expositioni- 
bus magnopere supersedendum est. Non enim 
reprehensionis ^ sicut ^ aliae conplures indiget, sed ^ 
sua sponte vitiosa est. 
35 XXIII. Vitiosa ratio est quae ad expositionem non- 
est adcommodata vel propter infirmitatem vel 
propter vanitatem. Infirma ratio est quae non 
necessario ostendit ita esse quemadmodum exposituna 
est, velut apud Plautum : 

Amicum castigare ob meritam noxiam 
Inmune est facinus, verum in aetate utile 
Et conducibile. 

Haec expositio est. Videamus quae ratio adferatur : 

Nam ego amicum hodie meum 
Concastigabo pro commerita noxia. 

Ex eo quod ipse facturus est, non ex eo quod fieri 
convenit, utile quid sit ratiocinatur. Vana ratio est 
quae ex falsa causa constat, hoc modo: "Amor 
fugiendus non est, nam ex eo verissima nascitur 
amicitia." Aut hoc modo: " Philosophia vitanda 

^ reprehensionis sngg. Mx : reprehensione MSS. 
* sicut BCl : sed sicut HPUbd Mx. 
' lac. ; indiget sed sugg. 31 x. 

" Its faultiness is self-evident. Cf. Plato, Sophist 252 C: 
" They do not need others to refute them, but, as the saying 
goes, they have an enemy and adversary who dwells in the 
same house with them." 


AD HKUKNNIUM, II. .vxii. 34-.\xiii. 35 

it were atlL'(}uatc, if poets had a care for mere 
adequacy, to say: " Would that my misled mistress 
iiad not set foot away from home." In the Pro- 
|X)sition, then, we must also carefully guard against 
this tracing of things back to their remotest origin; 
for the Proposition does not, like many others, 
need to be refuted, but is on its own account 

XXIII. The Reason is defective if it isinappro])riate 
to the Proposition because either weak or groundless. 
It is weak when it does not conclusively demonstrate 
the correctness of the Proposition, as in Plautus : 
" To reprove a friend for a fault that deserves reproof 
is a thankless task, but in season useful and profit- 
able." That is the Proposition. Let us see what 
Keason is presented : " For '^ today I shall severely 
reprove my friend for a fault that much deserves 
reproof." His reckoning of what is useful is based on 
what he himself is about to do, and not on what it is 
proper to do. A Reason is groundless when it rests 
on a false supposition, as follows: " One must not 
flee from love, for it engenders the truest friendship." ^ 
Or as follows : " One must spurn philosophy, for it 

* Trininnmus 23-6. A proper translation would be: 
" For instance, today.' Nam, here appearing in colloquial 
speech, introduces a particular instance of a general state- 
ment ; it is transitional rather than confirmatoiy, and so the 
charge that Megaronides uses a false syllogism is imjust. 
Cicero, De Im\ 1. 1. 95, is guilty of the same misunderstanding. 
See \\. M. Lindsay, Stjntax of Plautvs, Oxford, 1007, p. 100. 

" Cf. Aristotle, /t;/?e/. 2. 24 (1401 b), illustrating, among the 
sham enthj^memes, the topos from a sign (a single instance 
used to prove the rule) : " For example, one might say that 
lovers are of service to their countries, for it was the love of 
Harmodius and Aristogeiton which brought about the down- 
fall of the tyrant Hipparchus." 



est, adfert enim socordiam atque desidiam." Nam 
hae rationes nisi falsae essent, expositiones quoque 
earum veras esse confiteremur. 
36 Itemque infirma ratio est quae non necessariam 
causam adfert expositionis, velut Pacuvius : 

Fortunam insanam esse et caecam et brutam per- 

hibent philosophi 
Saxoque instare in globoso praedicant volubili ; 
Id quo saxum inpulerit Fors, eo cadere Fortunam 

Caecam ob eam rem esse iterant, quia nihil cernat 

quo sese adplicet ; 
Insanam autem esse aiunt, quia atrox, incerta 

instabilisque sit ; 
Brutam, quia dignum atque indignum nequeat 

Sunt autem alii philosophi qui contra Fortunam 

Ullam misera in aetate esse; Temeritatem esse 

Id magis veri simile esse usus reapse experiundo 

edocet ; 
Velut Orestes modo fuit rex, factust mendicus 

Naufragio nempe re ergo id factum, hau Forte aut 

Fortuna obtigit. 

Nam hie Pacuvius infirma ratione utitur cum ait 
verius esse Temeritate quam Fortuna res geri. Nam 

" C/. R. W. Emerson in " The American Scholar " : 
" Inaction is cowardice, but there can be no scholar without 
the heroic mind," For other echoes of the opposition to 
philosophy and art see 2. xxvii. 43 and 4. xxxii. 43. 


AD HERENNIUM, II. xvni. 35-36 

produces inactivity and sloth. " ^ If all these Reasons 
were not false, we should also be obliged to admit the 
truth of their Propositions. 
30 Again, a Reason is weak if the causal basis which it 
submits for the Proposition is not a compelling one. 
For example, Pacuvius : "The goddess Fortune is 
mad, blind, and stupid, some philosophers maintain. 
They declare that she stands upon a revolving globe 
of stone ; ^ whither Chance impels this stone, 
thither, they say, does Fortune fall. She is blind, 
they repeat, for that she fails wholly to perceive 
whereto she attaches herself. Moreover they declare 
that she is mad because she is cruel, uncertain, and 
inconstant ; stupid because she knows not how to tell 
worthy from unworthy. But there are other philo- 
sophers who, on the contrary, deny that in our 
wretched life there is any such thing as Fortune ; 
there is, they say, Blind Accident. That this is 
more like the truth, is proved by the actual expe- 
rience of life ; even as Orestes now was king, and 
now became a beggar. Surely by the shipwreck of 
his property was this brought to pass, and did not 
befall by Chance or Fortune." '^ Pacuvius here uses 
a weak Reason when he says that it is truer to ascribe 
the guidance of events to Accident rather than to 
Fortune, for whichever of these philosophical theories 

* C/. the like portrayal of Fortune in Cebetis Tabula 
(probably first Christian century), ch. 7 (ed. Praechter, p. 6), 
and Shakespeare, Henry V, 3. 6. 26 ff. ; also Otto, s.v. '"for- 
tuna " 1, p. 142. 

' We do not know to which play this fragment (from a 
prologue, perhaps) is to be assigned. Ribbeck, 1. 14.5, con- 
jectures Chryses; Marx, and Warmington, 2. 319, Dulorestes; 
L. A. Post, Hermiona. For the genitive form re (last verse) 
see p. 68, note a. 



utraque opinione philosophorum fieri potuit ut is qui 
rex fuisset mendicus factus esset. 

37 XXIV. Item infirma ratio est cum videtur pro 
ratione adferri, sed idem dicit quod in expositione 
dictum est, hoc modo : " Magno malo est hominibus 
avaritia, idcirco quod homines magnis et multis 
incommodis conflictantur propter immensam pecuniae 
cupiditatem. " Nam hie aliis verbis idem per ratio- 
nem dicitur quod dictum est per expositionem. 

Item infirma ratio est quae minus idoneam quam 
res postulat causam subicit expositionis, hoc modo: 
" Utilis est sapientia, propterea quod qui sapientes 
sunt pietatem colere consuerunt." Item : " Utile 
est amicos veros habere, habeas enim quibuscum 
iocari possis." Nam in huiusmodi rationibus non 
universa neque absoluta, sed extenuata ratione 
expositio confirmatur. 

Item infirma ratio est quae vel alii expositioni 
potest adcommodari, ut facit Pacuvius, qui eandem 
adfert rationem quare caeca, eandem quare bruta 
Fortuna dicatur.^ 

38 In confirmatione rationis multa et vitanda in 
nostra et observanda in adversariorum oratione sunt 
vitia, proptereaque diligentius consideranda quod 
adcurata confirmatio rationis totam vehementissime 
conprobat argumentationem. 

^ dicatur HE -. dicitur other MSS. Mx. 

AD HKRF.NNIUM. II. xxiii. 36-xxiv. 38 

you hold, it could have liappened that one who had 
been a king became a beggar. 

XX I\'. Again, a Reason is weak when it appears 
to be presented as the Reason, but says precisely the 
same as was said in the Proposition," as follows : " A 
great evil to mankind is greed, for the reason that 
men wrestle with great and many ills on account of 
the boundless passion for money." Here the 
Reason merely repeats in other words what has been 
said in the Proposition. 

Again, a Reason is weak if the causal basis which it 
submits for the Proposition is inadequate to the 
demands of the subject.* as follows : " Wisdom is use- 
ful because the wise have been in the habit of 
cultivating a sense of duty." Or, " It is useful to 
have true friends, for thus you may have persons with 
whom you can jest." In Reasons of this kind the 
Proposition is supported not by a universal or absolute 
reason, but by a feeble one. 

Again, the Reason is weak if it can at choice be 
applied to another Proposition,^ as in the case of 
Pacuvius, who presents the sanle reason for caUing 
Fortune blind as for calling her stupid.*^ 

In the Proof of the Reason, there are many faults 
to be avoided in our discourse and also to be watched 
for in that of our adversaries. These must be con- 
sidered the more carefully because an accurate Proof 
of the Reason supplies the most cogent support of the 
whole argument. 

« Cf. Qcero, De Inv. lA. 95. 

* Very like the type of fallacy in 2. xxiii. 36 above. 
' An Introduction similarly defective is called banal in 
I. vii. 11 above. 

^ 2. xxiii. 36 above. 



Utuntur igitur studiosi in confirmanda ratione 
duplici conclusione, hoc modo : 

Iniuria abs te adficior indigna, pater ; 
Nam si inprobum esse Cresphontem ^ existimas, 
Cur me huic locabas nuptiis ? Sin est probus, 
Cur talem invitam invitum cogis linquere ? 

Quae hoc modo concludentur aut ex contrario con- 
vertentur aut ex simplici parte reprehendentur. Ex 
contrario, hoc modo : 

Nulla te indigna, nata, adficio iniuria. 

Si probus est, te locavi ; sin est inprobus, 

Divortio te liberabo incommodis. 

Ex simplici parte reprehendetur si ex duplici con- 
clusione alterutra pars diluitur, hoc modo : 

" Nam si inprobum esse Cresphontem ^ existimas, 
Cur me huic locabas nuptiis ? " " Duxi probum ; 
Erravi; post cognovi, et fugio cognitum." 

39 XXV. Ergo reprehensio huiusmodi conclusionis 
duplex est; auctior ilia superior, facilior haec 
posterior ad excogitandum. 

^ chresponthem P 11 : chrespontem B C Mx ed. mai. : 
chresponthe H : threspontem E : Chresponten Mx, 

2 chrespontem M Mx ed. mai. : threspontem Id : tres- 
pontem 6 : Chresponten Mx. 

" 8iXTjfji^a, SiAT^/i/ittTov. Complexio in Cicero, De Inv. 1. xxix. 
45, and in Servius on Virgil, Aen. 2. 675. Cf. in Aristotle, 
Rhet. 2. 23 (1399 a). No. 14 of the 28 lines of argument from 
which to draw enthymemes, the topos of criss-cross conse- 
quences; Hermogenes, De Inv. 4. 6 (ed. Rabe, pp. 192-4); 
and also the figure Division, 4. xl. 52 below. 


AD HERENNIUM, II. xxiv. 38 xxv. 39 

Students in the rhetorical schools, therefore, in 
Proving the Reason, use a Dilemma,» as follows : 
" You treat me, father, with undeserved wrong. For 
if you think Cresphontes wicked, why did you give 
me to him for wife ? But if he is honourable, why do 
you force me to leave such a one against his will and 
mine?" Such a Dilemma will either be reversed 
against the user, or be rebutted in a single term.* 
Reversed, as follows : " My daughter, I do not treat 
you with any undeserved wrong. If he is honour- 
able, I have given him you in marriage ; but if he is 
wicked, I shall by divorce free you from your ills." 
It will be a rebuttal in a single term if one or the other 
alternative is confuted, as follows: " You say: * For 
if you think Cresphontes wicked, why did you give 
me to him for wife ? ' I thought him honourable. I 
erred. Too late I came to know him, and knowing 
39 him, I fly from him." <= XXV. Thus the rebuttal of 
a dilemma of this type is twofold : the first fuller, 
the second easier to invent. 

* Cf. Cicero, De Inv. 1. xlv. 83; he uses an example which 
our author gives in 2. xxvi. 42 to illustrate the vice of 

' The verses in this section have been referred either to a 
Greek school of rhetoric where exercises were set on the 
Cresphontes of Euripides or to Ennius' Cresphontes ; see Marx, 
Proleg., p. 132, and Ribbeck, 1. 33, but also Johannes Tolkiehn, 
Berl. philol. Wochenschr. 37 (1917). 828-9, who beheves that 
the first four verses belong to the Ennian play. Our author 
seems here to have forgotten what precisely constitutes Proof 
of the Reason ; cf. his definition in 2. xviii. 28 above, and the 
illustration in 2. xix. 29. 

In the event that the conditions here mirrored are Roman, 
the daughter must have remained in the potestas of her father 
if he divorced her from her husband without her consent. 
This, then, would be an early reference to marriage without 



Item vitiosa conlirmatio est rationis cum ea re quae 
plures res significat abutimur pro certo unius rei 
signo, hoc modo : " Necesse est, quoniam pallet, 
aegrotasse; " aut " Necesse est peperisse, quoniam 
sustinet puerum infantem." Nam haec sua sponte 
certa signa non habent ; sin cetera quoque similia 
concurrunt, nonnihil illiusmodi signa adaugent 

Item vitiosum est quando ^ vel in alium vel in eum 
ipsum qui dicit id ^ quod in adversarium dicitur ^ 
potest convenire, hoc modo : 

" Miseri sunt qui * uxores ducunt." " At tu duxisti 

Item vitiosum est id quod vulgarem habet defen- 
sionem, hoc modo : " Iracundia deductus peccavit 
aut adulescentia aut amore." Huiuscemodi enim 
deprecationes si probabuntur, inpune maxima peccata 

Item vitiosum est cum id pro certo sumitur, quod 
inter omnes constat, quod etiam nunc in contro- 
versia est,^ hoc modo : 

Eho tu, dii quibus est potestas motus superum 

atque inferum 
Pacem inter ® sese conciliant, conferunt con- 


1 quando d : quod other MSS. Mx. 

2 id i/ : M Mx omit. 

3 dicitur d : dicit other MSS. Mx. 
* qui P^CE : si MMx. 

5 est Cbl : Slid: other MSS. Mx omit. 
« inter E : enim inter other MSS. Mx. 

Cf. Cicero, De Inv. 1. xliii. 81. 


AD HERKNNIUM, II. xxv. 39 

Again, the Proof of the Reason is faulty wlien we 
misapply a sign designating a variety of things in such 
a way as to indicate specifically a single thing,*» as 
follows : " Since he is pale, he must have been sick," 
or: " She must have become a mother, since she is 
holding a baby boy in her arms." ^ These indica- 
tions do not of themselves offer definite proof, but if 
there is concurrence of other like indications, such 
signs increase probability not a little. 

Again, there is a fault when that which is directed 
against the adversary can as well fit some one else 
or the speaker himself,'^ as follows: " Wretched are 
they who marry wives." " Yet you have married a 
second." ^ 

Again, that is faulty which presents a banal 
defence, as follows : " He was led into crime by 
anger — or youth — or love."'^ For if excuses of this 
sort are admitted, the greatest crimes will escape 

Again it is a fault to assume as certain, on the 
ground that " it is universally agreed upon," a thing 
which is still in dispute, as follows : " Ho ! Look you, 
the gods who guide the movements of the beings that 
dwell above and below keep peace among themselves 

* Cf. Aristotle's examples of the infallible kind of sign in 
Bhet. 1. 2 (1357 b) : " He is sick, for he has a fever," and 
"She has had a child, for she has milk"; also Anal. Pr. 
2. 27 i70 a). 

' This is the "common" argument; c/. Cicero, De Inv. 
1. xlviii. 90, ^nd Quintihan, 5. 13. 29. Faults such as 
those treated from here on are described briefly by Quin- 
tilian in o. 13. 34 f. 

^ From a comedy (?) by an unknown author; yet Ribbeck, 
1. 300-1, suspects that the verse may belong to a dispute 
between Jason and Medea in Ennius' Medea. 

' Cf. 2. xvi. 24 above. 



Nam ita pro suo iure hoc exemplo utentem Thespro- 
tum ^ Ennius induxit, quasi iam satis certis rationibus 
ita esse demonstrasset. 

40 Item vitiosum est quod iam quasi sero atque acto 
negotio dici videtur, hoc modo : " In mentem mihi 
si venisset, Quirites, non commisissem ut in hunc 
locum res veniret, nam hoc aut hoc fecissem ; sed me 
tum haec ratio fugit." 

Item vitiosum est cum id quod in aperto delicto 
positum est tamen aliqua tegitur defensione, hoc 
modo : 

Cum te expetebant omnes florentissimo 
Regno, reliqui ; nunc desertum ab omnibus 
Summo periclo sola ut restituam paro. 

XXVI. Item vitiosum est quod in aliam partem ac 
dictum sit potest accipi. Id est huiusmodi, ut si quis 
potens ac factiosus in contione dixerit : " Satius est 
uti regibus quam uti malis legibus." Nam et hoc, 
tametsi rei augendae causa potest sine malitia dici, 
tamen propter potentiam eius qui dicit non dicitur 
sine atroci suspicione. 

41 Item vitiosum est falsis aut vulgaribus delinitionibus 
uti. Falsae sunt huiusmodi, ut si quis dicat iniuriam 

1 thesprotum M : threspontem E (tbespontem d) : Chres- 
pontem Mx. 

° Probably from the Thyesies of Ennius; see Vahlen, pp. 
ccx and 183. Thesprotus is perhaps interceding to reconcile 
the estranged brothers Atreus and Thyestes. But if the 
reading Chrespontem (E threspontem) is correct, the verses are 
from the Cresphontes of Ennius; see Ribbeck, 1. 34. CJ. 
Cicero, De Inv. 1. xux. 91. 

* Cf. Cicero, De Inv. 1. xlviii. 90. 

' Cf. Cicero, De Inv. 1. xlviii. 90. 


AD HKIIKNMUM, 11. wv. 39 vwi. 41 

and join in concord."'' Thus Thesj)rotus, as l'!,nnius 
has presented him, uses this example on his own 
authority, as thouf(h he had already demonstrated the 
fact by reasons sufficiently conclusive. 

40 Again, that is faulty which appears to be pro- 
nounced too late, as it were, and after the matter has 
been concluded,* as follows: " If it had entered my 
mind, fellow-citizens, I should not have been guilty 
of allowing the matter to come to such a pass, for I 
should have done this or that ; but at the time this 
thought escaped me." 

Again, there is a fault when that which stands 
as a manifest transgression is yet cloaked by some 
defence,*^ as follows: " When all men were seeking 
you out and you had a most prosperous kingdom, I 
forsook you; now that all have deserted you, I, 
alone, in greatest peril, prepare to restore you."'* 

XXVI. Again, that is faulty which can be taken in 
another sense than the speaker intended ; * for 
example, if some influential demagogue should in a 
speech before the Assembly say: "It is better to 
submit to kings than to bad laws." In fact, these 
words, though they may be uttered by way of 
amplification without sinister intent, are nevertheless 
because of the speaker's influence sure to breed a 
terrible suspicion. 

41 Again, it is a fault to use false or general defini- 
tions;/ false, as if one should say that there is no 

** Assigned to the Medus of Pacuvius ; Medea is speaking 
to Aeetes. 

' Cicero, De Inv. 1. xlvii. 88, gives a different treatment of 

f Cf. Cicero, De Inv. 1. Ixix. 91. The " general definition " 
represents the same kind of fault as the last type of weak 
Reason in 2. xxiv. 37 above. 


esse nullam nisi quae ex pulsatione aut convicio 
constet. Vulgares sunt quae nihilominus in aliam 
rem transferri possunt, ut si quis dicat : " Quadru- 
plator, ut breviter scribam, capitalis est,^ est enim 
inprobus et pestifer civis." Nam nihilo magis 
quadruplatoris quam furis, quam sicarii aut proditoris 
adtulit definitionem. 

Item vitiosum est pro argument© sumere quod in 
disquisitione positum est, ut si quis quem furti arguat 
et ita dicat eum esse hominem inprobum, avarum, 
fraudulentem ; ei rei testimonium esse quod sibi 
furtum fecerit. 

Item vitiosum est controversiam controversia dis- 
solvere, hoc modo ; " Non convenit, censores, istum 
vobis satis facere quod ait se non potuisse adesse ita 
ut iuratus fuerit.^ Quid ? si ad exercitum non 
venisset, idemne tribuno militum diceret ? " Hoc 
ideo vitiosum est quia non expedita aut iudicata res, 
sed inpedita et in simili controversia posita exempli 
loco profertur. 
42 Item vitiosum est cum id de quo summa contro- 
versia est parum expeditur et quasi transactum sit 
relinquitur, hoc modo : 

Aperte fatur dictio, si intellegas : 

Tali dari arma qualis qui gessit fuit 

lubet, potiri si studeamus Pergamum. 

Quem ego me profiteor esse ; me est aecum frui 

1 est CE : other MSS. Mx omit. 

2 fuerit M : fuerat E Mx. 

** See the definition of iniuria in 4. xxv. 35 below. 
* The fallacy of Begging the Question. 
" Cf. Aristotle, Rhet. 2. 24 (1401 b), illustrating, among the 
sham enthymemes, the topos from a " sign " ; "Suppose that 


AD HKRKNNIUM, II. xxvi. 41-42 

injury except in the form of battery or of insulting 
language ; ** general, like that which can be equally 
well applied to something else, as if one should say : 
" An informer, in short, is worthy of death ; for he 
is a wicked and dangerous citizen." The speaker has 
offered a definition no more appropriate to an informer 
than to a thief, assassin, or traitor. 

Again, it is a fault to advance as proof what has 
been put in question,* as if one should charge another 
with theft, and accordingly declare that he is a 
wicked, greedy, and deceitful man — and the evidence 
for this is that he has stolen from the speaker.*^ 

Again, it is a fault to refute one disputed point by 
another disputed point j'^ as follows : " You should not 
be satisfied, Censors, when this defendant says that 
he was unable to be present as he had sworn he would 
be. I ask, would he have given this same excuse to 
the tribune of the soldiers if he had failed to appear 
for military duty? " This is faulty because a matter 
not clearly settled or adjudged, but entangled with 
difficulties and based on a like point of dispute is cited 
as an example. 
42 Again, a fault is present when a matter about 
which there is the sharpest controversy is not clearly 
settled and is allowed to pass as though it were agreed 
upon, as follows : " Plainly speaks the oracle's 
response if you would understand. He commands 
that the arms be given to a warrior such as was he 
who bore them, should we be zealous to take Per- 
gamum. This warrior I profess to be. It is but fair 

some one calls Dionysius a thief ' because he is a rogue.' 
There is, of course, no logical argument here; not every 
rogue is a thief, though every thief is a rogue." 

•* Cf. the last fault considered in 2. xxv. 39 above. 


Fraternis armis mihique adiudicarier, 

Vel quod propinquus vel quod virtute aemulus. 

Item vitiosum est ipsum sibi in sua oratione dis- 
sentire et contra atque ante dixerit dicere, hoc 
modo: "Qua causa accusem hunc?", turn id 
exputando evolvere : 

Nam si veretur, quid eum accuses qui est probus ? 
Sin inverecundum animi ingenium possidet, 
Quid autem eum accuses qui id parvi auditum 
aestimet ? 

XXVII. Non incommoda ratione videtur sibi osten- 
disse quare non accusaret. Quid postea ? quid ait ? 

Nunc ego te ab summo iam detexam exordio. 

43 Item vitiosum est quod dicitur contra iudicis 
voluntatem aut eorum qui audiunt, si aut partes 
quibus illi student, aut homines quos illi caros habent 
laedantur, aut aliquo eiusmodi vitio laeditur auditoris 

Item vitiosum est non omnes res confirmare quas 
pollicitus sis in expositions 

Item verendum est ne de alia re dicatur, cum alia 
de re controversia sit ; inque eiusmodi vitio con- 
siderandum est ne aut ad rem addatur quid, aut 
quippiam de re detrahatur, aut tota causa mutata in 

" Perhaps from the Armorum Indicium of Accius (Warm- 
ington, 2. 362) rather than from the play of the same name 
by Pacuvius (Marx, Proleg., p. 132); see Tolkiehn, Bed. 
Philol. Wochenschr. 37 (1917). 827-8. Ajax speaks for the 
arms of Achilles which Agamemnon, on Athena's advice, 
later awarded to Ulysses. 

* The fragment is from a tragedy by an unknown author. 
The example was a favourite of the rhetoricians. Cf. Cicero, 

AD HRRENNIUM, II. xxvi. 42-.\xvii. 43 

that I liave the use of my cousin's arms and that they 
be awarded me, either because I am his kin or, if you 
will, because I rival him in valour." ** 

Again, it is a fault to be inconsistent with oneself in 
one's own discourse and to contradict what one has 
said before, as follows: " On what ground shall I 
impeach him ? ", and then to develop this thought by 
the following reflection : " For if he has a conscience, 
why should you impeach an honourable man ? But 
if he has a shameless character, to what avail then 
would you impeach one who, when he has heard 
the charge, deems it of little account ? " XXVII. He 
seems to have provided himself with a sound enough 
reason for not making the accusation. What does he 
say next ? " Now at last I will finish you off from the 
very first thread." ^ 
43 Again, that is faulty which is said against the con- 
victions of the judge or the audience ^ — if the party 
to which they are devoted, or men whom they hold 
dear, should be attacked, or the sentiments of the 
hearer outraged by some fault of this kind. 

Again, it is a fault not to prove everything which in 
the Proposition you have promised to prove. '^ 

Again, one must beware of talking on a different 
subject from the one in dispute ^ — and in regard to 
this kind of fault one must take care not to add any- 
thing to, or omit anything from, the subject, and not 
to change the question at issue and turn to quite 

De Inv. 1. xlv. 83, 1. 1. 93; Victorinus, in Halm, p. 253; C. 
Julius Victor, ch. 12, in Halm, p. 414. 

' Cf. Cicero, De Inv. 1. xlix. 92, and De Oraiore 2. 75. 

** Cf. Cicero, De Inv. 1. 1. 94. 

' The fallacy of Shifting Ground. Cf. Cicero, De Inv. 
I. 1. 94. 


aliam causam derivetur ; uti apud Pacuvium Zethus ^ 
cum Amphione, quorum controversia de musica 
inducta disputatione in sapientiae rationem et virtutis 
utilitatem consumitur. 

Item considerandum est ne aliud accusatoris crimi- 
natio contineat, aliud defensoris purgatio purget, 
quod saepe consulto multi ab reo faciunt angustiis 
causae coacti ; ut si quis, cum accusetur ambitu 
magistratum petisse, ab imperatoribus saepe numero 
apud exercitum donis militaribus se dicat ^ donatum 
esse. Hoc si diligenter in oratione adversariorum 
observaverimus, saepe deprehendemus eos de ea re 
quod dicant non habere. 
44 Item vitiosum est artem aut scientiam aut studium 
quodpiam vituperare propter eorum vitia qui in eo 
studio sunt ; veluti qui rhetoricam vituperant propter 
alicuius oratoris vituperandam vitam. 

Item vitiosum est ex eo, quia perperam factum 
constet esse, putare ostendi a certo homine factum 
esse, hoc modo : " Mortuum deformatum, tumore 
praeditum, corpore decoloratum constat fuisse ; ergo 
veneno necatus est." Deinde si sit usque in eo 

^ Zethus MSS. : faciunt Zethus 3Ix. 

^ lac. ; donis militaribus se dicat sugg. Mx. 

" The twins in the Antiopa (as in the Antiope of Euripides) 
engage in a famous debate: the practical Zethus, hostile to 
culture, finds fault with Amphion's love of music, and urges 
the virile active life of farming, cattle breeding, and war; 
the cultivated Amphion praises music and the life of con- 
templation. Amphion yields " to his brother's mood " so 
far as to still his lyre; see Horace, Epist. 1. 18. 43^. Cf. 
Cicero, De Inv. 1. 1. 94, De Oratore 2. 37. 155, De Re Puhl. 1. 18, 
and Callicles in Plato, Gorgias 485 E ff. The separation of 
musical from philosophical studies represents a Roman point 
of view. 


AD HERKNNIUM, II. xxvii. 43-44 

another; like the case of Zethus and Aniphion in 
Pacuvius — their controversy, begun on the subject 
of music, ends in a disputation on the theory of 
wisdom and the utility of virtue.** 

Again, care must be taken that the prosecutor's 
charge shall not bear on one point, and the Exculpa- 
tion of the defence on another. Many speakers on 
the side of the defence are often intentionally guilty 
of this irrelevance when pressed by the difficulties of 
their cause ; for example, if a man accused of having 
sought a magistracy by bribery should say that in 
the army he had often received military- gifts from 
generals. If we carefully watch for this fault in the 
speech of our adversaries we shall often detect that 
they have nothing to say to the point. 

Again, it is a fault to disparage an art or science or 
any occupation because of the faults of those engaged 
in it,^ as in the case of those who blame rhetoric 
because of the blameworthy life of some orator.'^ 

Again, it is a fault, when you establish that a 
crime was committed, to believe you are thereby 
proving that it was committed by a specific person, as 
follows : " It is established that the corpse was dis- 
figured, swollen, and discoloured ; therefore the man 
killed by poison." Then, if the speaker con- 


^* The argument is not ad rem but ad hominem ; the fallacy 
of Ignoring the Question. Cf. Cicero, De Inv. 1. 1. 94. 

•■ Cf. QuLntilian, 12. 1. 32 : '" Let us banish from our hearts 
the notion that eloquence, the fairest of all things, can com- 
bine with vicious character " ; Philodemus, RJiet. 2. 270, ed. 
Sudhaus : '" But it is clear to all that many orators are very 
able, yet in character thoroughly depraved; " Plato, Gorgias 
457 A, and Ludwig Radermacher, Artium Scriptores, Sitzung3- 
ber. Ost-erreich. Akad. (philos.-hist. Klasse) 227, 3 (Vienna, 
1951). 45. 



occupatus, ut multi faciunt, venenum datum, vitio 
non mediocri conflictetur. Non enim factumne sit 
quaeritur, sed a quo factum sit. 
45 XXVIII. Item vitiosum est in conparandis rebus 
alteram rem efFerre, de re altera mentionem non 
facere aut neglegentius disputare; ut si cum con- 
paretur utrum satius sit populum frumentum accipere 
an non accipere, quae commoda sint in altera re vera 
curet enumeret, quae in altera incommoda sint et 
quae velit depressa praetereat, aut ea quae minima 
sint dicat. 

Item vitiosum est in rebus conparandis necesse 
putare ^ alteram rem vituperare ^ cum alteram laudes ; 
quod genus, si quaeratur utris maior honor habendus 
sit, Albensibus an Vestinis Pennensibus, quod ^ rei 
publicae populi Romani profuerint, et is qui dicat 
alteros laedat. Non enim necesse est, si alteros 
praeponas, alteros vituperare ; fieri enim potest ut, 
cum alteros magis laudaris, aliquam alteris partem 
laudis adtribuas, ne cupide depugnasse contra veri- 
tatem puteris. 

1 putare Lambinus : putari MSS. Mx. 

2 vituperare E : vituperari other 3ISS. Mx. 

^ quod P^BCH Mx ed. mai. : quo M Mx : qui b d. 

" Cf. Cicero, De Inv. 1. 1. 94. Yet this procedure is not 
faulty when followed in the Statement of Facts ; see De Inv. 
1. xxi. 30. 

" A deliberative problem; our author has in the first two 
books been emphasizing the judicial kind. 


AD HERENNIUM, II. xwii. 44-xvvm. 45 

centrates, as many do, on proving that poison was 
administered, he will be harassed by a not insigni- 
ficant fault. The question is not whether the crime 
was committed, but who committed it. 
45 XXV'III. Again, it is a fault in making a comparison 
to bring out one term and either suppress mention 
of the other, or treat it rather cursorily ; <* for ex- 
ample, if in deciding by a comparison whether it is 
better for the populace to receive, or not to receive, 
wheat, the speaker should on the one hand really take 
care to enumerate the benefits, but on the other 
should pass over the disadvantages and whatever he 
wishes to suppress, or should mention only those 
disadvantages which are least serious.'' 

Again, it is a fault in making a comparison to think 
it necessary to disparage one thing when you praise 
the other ; ^ for example, if the question should 
arise, who are to be held in greater honour for services 
to the Roman republic, the Albensians or the Pinnen- 
sian Vestini,^ and the speaker should attack one or 
the other. Indeed it is not necessary, if you prefer 
one, to disparage the other; for you can manage, 
when you have given greater praise to one, to allot 
some portion of praise to the other, so that you may 
not be thought to have combated the truth under 
influence of partiality. 

' Cf. Cicero, Z>e /ny. 1. 1. 94. 

^ Most probably for her faithfulness to Rome in the Marsic 
war, in which she gallantly withstood a siege. Alba Fucens, a 
city of the Aequi on the borders of the Marsi in Central Italy, 
was rewarded with the status of municipium ; Pinna (or 
Penna), at the foot of the Apennines, a chief city of the Vestini, 
was also faithful to Rome (although the other Vestini were in 
revolt) and endured a hard siege. 



Item vitiosum est de nomine et vocabulo contro- 
versiam struere quam rem consuetude optime potest 
iudicare ; velut Sulpicius, qui intercesserat ne exules 
quibus causam dicere non licuisset reducerentur, 
idem posterius, immutata voluntate, cum eandem 
legem ferret, aliam se ferre ^ dicebat propter nominum 
commutationem ; nam non exules, sed vi eiectos se 
reducere aiebat. Proinde quasi id fuisset in contro- 
versia, quo illi nomine appellarentur, aut proinde 
quasi non omnes quibus aqua et igni interdictum est 
exules appellentur. Verum illi fortasse ignoscimus si 
cum causa fecit ; nos tamen intellegamus vitiosum 
esse intendere controversiam propter nominum 
46 XXIX. Quoniam exornatio constat ex similibus et 
exemplis et amplificationibus et rebus iudicatis et 
ceteris rebus quae pertinent ad exaugendam et con- 
locupletandam argumentationem, quae sint his rebus 
vitia consideremus. 

^ aliam se ferre TICP^ Mx ed. mai. : aliam sese ferre E : 
alios efferre H : aliose ferre P : alio se ferre Mx : aliis e 
ferre B. 

" Cf. Horace, Ars Poet. 72 : " Usage (usus = con^uetudo = 
avvrj$€ia)f in whose hands lie the decision (arbitrium), rights 
{ius), and standard (norma) of speaking"; Demetrius, De 
Elocut. 2. 86 : " Usage, which is our teacher always," and 
2. 87, in which he makes usage his " standard " [Kavuiv = 

^ In 90 B.C., after the outbreak of the Marsic War, the 
tribune Q. Varius Hybrida introduced a law on treason 
directed against the senatorial leaders; it inquired into the 
actions of those who helped or advised the allies to take up 
arms against Rome. Sulpicius' law in 88 restored the exiles 
who had been condemned without a hearing either by the 
Varian Commission or by the court estabUshed under the Lex 


AD HERP:NNIUM, II. xxvin. 45-xxix. 46 

Again, it is a fault to build upon a name or appella- 
tion a dispute which usage can best decide.** For 
example, Sulpicius * had opposed his veto to the 
recall of the exiles who had not been permitted to 
plead their cause ; later he changed his mind, and 
proposing the same law, said he was offering a 
different proposal, because he had changed the name. 
For, he said, he was recalling not " exiles," but 
" those ejected by violence " — as though the dispute 
concerned the name by which to call those people, or 
as though all to whom water and fire have been 
formally forbidden are not called exiles. True, 
we perhaps excuse Sulpicius if he had a reason for 
doing this.<^ Yet let us understand that it is a fault 
to raise a controversy on account of a change in 

XXIX. Since FLmbellishment consists of similes, 
examples, amplifications, previous judgements, and 
the other means which serve to expand and enrich 
the argument, let us consider the faults which attach 
to these. 

Plautia Iitdiciaria of 90/89, but was itself later in the year 
repealed by SuUa. Why Sulpicius had earher vetoed a 
proposal to recall the exiles is not clear, for many of these 
belonged to his own party. The grounds for the veto were 
probably constitutional, and the new form of the proposal 
may have been intended to avoid constitutional objections 
that the decisions of the courts were being nulhfied ; or 
perhaps popular opinion pressed him to change his mind. It 
was through the interdiction of fire and water, the symbol of 
the community, that the capital sentence was carried into 
effect. See Ernst Levy, Die rorn. Kapitalstrafe, Sitzungsber. 
Heidelberg. Akad. (philos.-hist. Klasse) 21, 5 (1930-31). 14 flf. 
' The author here seems to betray bias in favour of the 
Popular party ; but see the Introduction to the present 
volume, pp. xxiii f. 



Simile vitiosum est quod ex ^ aliqua parte dissimile 
est nee habet parem rationem conparationis aut sibi 
ipsi obest qui adfert. 

Exemplum vitiosum est si aut falsum est, ut repre- 
hendatur, aut inprobum, ut non sit imitandum, aut 
maius aut minus quam res postulat. 

Res iudicata vitiose proferetur si aut dissimili de re 
proferetur, aut de ea re qua de controversia non est, 
aut inproba, aut eiusmodi ut aut plures aut magis 
idoneae res iudicatae ab adversariis proferri possint. 

Item vitiosum est id quod adversarii factum esse 
confiteantur, de eo argumentari et planum facere 
factum esse ; nam id augeri oportet. 

Item vitiosum est id augere quod convenit docere, 
hoc modo : ut si quis quem arguat hominem occidisse 
et, antequam satis idoneas argumentationes ad- 
tulerit, augeat peccatum et dicat nihil indignius esse 
quam hominem occidere. Non enim utrum indignum 
sit an non, sed factumne sit quaeritur. 

Conplexio vitiosa est quae non quidque quod ^ 
primum dictum est primum conplectitur, et quae non 
breviter concluditur, et quae non ex enumeratione 
certum et constans aliquid relinquit, ut intellegatur 
quid propositum in argumentatione sit, quid deinde 

1 quod ex B CIl : id quod ex E : quode P : quod de 
H Mx. 

2 non quidque quod CH : non quique quod 6'^ : non quod 
quique P^iVa; : non quod quidque P'^TL Bl '. quod non quodque 
b : quod quique H. 

" Cf. Cicero, De Inv. 1. Ixiv. 82. 

6 Aristotle, Rhet. 2. 25 (1403 a), Quintilian, 5. 13. 24, Anon. 
Seg. 187 (Spengel-Hammer 1 [2]. 385), and Apsines, Ars Rhet. 
9 (Spengel-Hammer 1 [2]. 283-5) treat the invalidation of 
examples (Auaet? Trapahf-iyyiaTaiv). 


AD HEllENNIUM, II. xxix. 46 

A Simile is defective if it is inexact in any aspect, 
and lacks a proper ground for the comparison, or is 
prejudicial to him who presents it." 

An Example is defective if it is either false, and 
hence refutable, or base, and hence not to be imitated, 
or if it implies more or less than the matter demands.* 

The citing of a Previous Judgement will be faulty ^ 
if the judgement applies to an unlike matter, or one 
not in dispute, or if it is discreditable, or is of such a 
kind that previous decisions either in greater number 
or of greater appropriateness can be offered by our 

Again, it is a fault, when our adversaries admit a 
fact, to devote an argument to establishing it as a 
fact ; ^ for it should rather be amplified. 

Again, it is a fault to amplify what one should 
prove ; " for example, if a man should charge another 
with homicide, and before he has presented con- 
clusive arguments, should amplify the crime, avowing 
that there is nothing more shameful than homicide. 
The question is, in fact, not whether the deed is or 
is not shameful, but whether it was committed. 

The Resume is defective if it does not include every 
point in the exact order in which it has been pre- 
sented ; if it does not come to a conclusion briefly \i 
and if the summary does not leave something precise 
and stable, so as to make clear what the Proposition 

« C/. Cicero, De Inv. 1. xliv. 82. 

** C/. Cicero, De Inv. 1. xlix. 92. 

* Two functions are difPerentiated, the logical and 
emotional ; see 2. xxx. 47 ff . below. Cf. Cicero, De Inv. 
1. xlix. 92 ; in Aristotle, Rhet. 2. 24 (1401 b), the iopos (among 
the sham enthymemes) of indignation (Sci'vcdcti?) — the 
speaker amplifies the deed without having proved his case. 

f Cf. Cicero, De Inv. 1. xxxvii. 67. 



ratione, quid rationis confirmatione, quid tota argu- 
mentatione demonstratum. 
47 XXX. Conclusiones, quae apud Graecos epilog! 
nominantur, tripertitae sunt. Nam constant ex 
enumeratione, amplificatione, et commiseratione. 
Quattuor locis uti possumus conclusionibus : in 
principio, secundum narrationem, secundum firmis- 
simam argumentationem, in conclusione. 

Enumeratio est per quam colligimus et com- 
monemus quibus de rebus verba fecerimus, breviter, 
ut renovetur, non redintegretur oratio ; et ordine ut 
quicquid erit dictum referemus, ut auditor, si 
memoriae mandaverit, ad idem quod ipse meminerit 
reducatur. Item curandum est ne aut ab exordio 
aut narratione repetatur orationis enumeratio. Ficta 

" i-niXoyoi. The Isocratic theory of the Conclusion was 
also tripartite; to Theodectes (whose rhetorical system was 
based on the parts of the discourse) its functions are to stir 
the emotions, especially anger and pitj^ to praise or blame, 
and to recall what has been said. See Hugo Rabe, Proleg. 
SylL, Leipzig, 1931, pp. 32 and 216; Anon. Seg. 208-9, in 
Rpengel-Hammer 1 (2). 389; Friedrich Solmsen in Hermes 
67 (1932). 144-151. The Rhet. ad Alex., ch. 36 (1444 b- 
1445 a), discusses the part played in Conclusions by the 
Summary and the Conciliation of the Audience (including the 
Appeal to Pity), together with Discrediting the Opponent. 
To Aristotle, Rhet. 3. 19 (1419 b), the Conclusion has four 
functions : to conciHate the audience and discredit the 
opponent, to magnify and depreciate, to excite the emotions 
required by the case, and to review what has been said. 
Cicero, De Inv. 1. lii. 98, divides condusio into Summing Up, 
Invective {indignatio, Sclvwols), and Appeal to Pitj»^ (con- 
questio) ; in Part. Oral. 15. 52 fF. the peroratio is restricted 
(doubtless because the work is in the form of an isagogic 
dialogue) to two divisions. Amplification and Summing Up, 
Invective and Appeal to Pity being subordinate to Ampli- 
fication. Anon. Seg. 203 (Spengel- Hammer 1 [2]. 454) con- 
siders the Conclusion as dealing with either facts (to irpaKTiKov) 

AD lUlUKNNIUM, II. wix. 47 

was, tlien what has been established by the Reason, 
by the Proof of the Reason, and by the argument as 
a whole. 

XXX. Conclusions, among the Greeks called epi- 
logoi,^ are tripartite, consisting of the Summing Up, 
Amplification, and Appeal to Pity. We can in four 
places use a Conclusion : in the Direct Opening, 
after the Statement of Facts, after the strongest 
argument, and in the Conclusion of the speech. 

The Summing Up ^ gathers together and recalls 
the points we have made — briefly, that the speech 
may not be repeated in entirety, but that the memory 
of it may be refreshed ; and we shall reproduce all 
the points in the order in which they have been pre- 
sented, so that the hearer, if he has committed them 
to memory, is brought back to what he remembers. 
Again, we must take care that the Summary should 
not be carried back to the Introduction or the State- 
ment of Facts. Otherwise the speech will appear to 

or emotions (t6 nadrjriKov), placing the Summary in the 

former class; so also Quintihan, 6. 1. 1. 

*" dvdiivrjois, araK-ec^aAatojcn?. In Ithct. ad Alez., ch. 20 
(1433 b), TToAtAAoyta. Cf. Bhet. ad Alex., Ic. : " When 
Summing Up we shall recapitulate either in the form of a 
di\-ision or a recommendation of policy or of a question or of 
an enumeration;" Cicero, Fart. Oral. 17. 59: "There are 
two occasions for the Summing Up — if you mistrust the 
memory of those before whom you are pleading whether on 
account of the length of time elapsed [since the events you 
have been discussing took place] or on account of the length 
of your speech, or if, by repeatedly presenting arguments 
that strengthen your speech and setting these forth briefly, 
your case will have more force; " Quintilian, 6. 1. 1 : " The 
Summing Up . . . both refreshes the memory of the index 
and at the same time places the whole case before his eyes." 
Cf. the enumeratio of 1. x. 17 above, and comphzio, the 
Resume of an argument, 2. xviii. 28 above. 



enim et dedita opera conparata oratio videbitur esse 
artificii significandi, ingenii venditandi, memoriae 
ostendendae causa. Quapropter initivim enumera- 
tionis sumendum est a divisione. Dein ^ ordine 
breviter exponendae res sunt quae tractatae erunt in 
confirmatione et confutatione. 

Amplificatio est res quae per locum communem 
instigationis auditorum causa sumitur. Loci com- 
munes ex decern praeceptis commodissime sumentur 
adaugendi criminis causa. 
48 Primus locus sumitur ab auctoritate, cum com- 
memoramus quantae curae ea res fuerit dis im- 
mortalibus aut maioribus nostris, regibus, civitatibus, 
nationibus, hominibus sapientissimis, senatui ; item 
maxime quo modo de his rebus legibus sanctum sit. 

Secundus locus est cum consideramus illae res de 
quibus criminamur ad quos pertineant ; utrum ad 
omnes, quod atrocissimum est ; an ad superiores, 

* dein P^ CYlbl : tie 31 : deinde Omnibonus Mx . deinde 
ex d. 

" See note on 4. vii. 10 below. 

* The purpose of Amplification is Setvouai? [indignatio in 
4. XV. 22 and 4. xxxix. 51, iracundia in 3. xiii. 24). Note that 
the loci communes (see note on 2. vi. 9 above) are here attached 
to Amplification {av^riats), which, in turn, is a subhead under 
the Conclusion. The theory of Amplification was first formed 
for epideictic; Gorgias, Tisias (Plato, Phaedrus 207 A), and 
Isocrates gave it prominence. Cf. Cicero, Part. Oral. 15. 52 : 
" The right place for Amplification is in the Peroration; but 
also in the course of the speech there are opportunities to 
digress for the sake of amplification, when some point has 
been proved or refuted. Amplification is, then, a more 
impressive affirmation, so to speak, which by moving the 
mind wins belief in speaking; " 8. 27 : " Although Ampli- 
fication has its own proper place, often in the opening of a 

AD HKRKNNIUM, II. x.w. 47 48 

have been fabricated "^ and devised with elaborate 
pains so as to demonstrate the speaker's skill, adver- 
tise his wit, and display his memory. Therefore the 
Summary must take its beginning from the Division. 
Then we must in order and briefly set forth the points 
treated in the Proof and Refutation. 

Amplification is the principle of using Common- 
places to stir ^ the hearers. To amplify an accusa- 
tion it will be most advantageous to draw common- 
places from ten formulae. 

(1) The first commonplace^ is taken from autho- 
rity, when we call to mind of what great concern the 
matter under discussion has been to the immortal 
gods, or to our ancestors, or kings, states, barbarous 
nations, sages, the Senate; and again, especially 
how sanction has been provided in these matters 
by laws. 

(2) The second commonplace "^ is used when we 
consider who are affected by these acts on which our 
charge rests; whether all men, which is a most 
shocking thing ; or our superiors, such as are those 

speech, and almost always at the end, yet it is to be used also 
in other parts of the discourse, especially when a point has 
been proved or refuted." Cicero, De Inv. 1. liii. 100-liv. 105, 
gives five additional loci for invective; his No. 12 is like our 
authors Xo. 8. There are correspondences between our 
author's commonplaces and those listed in Aristotle, Ehef. 
1. 14 (1374 b-137.5 a); 0/., e.g., ixovos t] Trpwro^ (our author's 
No, 8)» TO dxjpLwBeaTepov ahtKiqyuj. (Xo. 7), €k vpovoias (Xo, 6), 
laoLs (Xo. 5); on correspondences with those in the Rhet. ad 
Alex, see Claus Peters, pp. 100-101. Pet<?rs, and Octave 
Xavarre, Essai sur la Rhetor ique Grecque avant Aristote, Paris, 
1900, pp. 304 flF., illustrate the use made of several of these 
commonplaces by Greek orators. See Walter Plobst, Die 
Atixesis, diss. Munich, 1911. 
« Cf. Cicero, De Inv. 1. liii. 101. 



quod genus ii sunt a quibus auctoritatis locus com- 
munis sumitur ; an ad pares, hoc est, in isdem par- 
tibus animi, corporis, fortunarum positos ; an ad 
inferiores, qui his omnibus rebus antecelluntur. 

Tertius locus est quo percontamur quid sit even- 
turum si omnibus idem concedatur, et, ea re neglecta, 
ostendemus quid periculorum atque incommodorum 

Quartus locus est quo demonstratur, si huic sit 
permissum, multos alacriores ad maleficium futuros, 
quod adhuc expectatio iudicii remoratur. 

Quintus locus est cum ostendimus, si semel aliter 
iudicatum sit, nullam rem fore quae incommodo 
mederi aut erratum iudicum corrigere possit. Quo in 
loco non incommodum erit uti ceterarum rerum con- 
paratione, ut ostendamus alias res posse aut vetustate 
sedari aut consilio corrigi, huius rei aut leniendae aut 
corrigendae nullam rem adiumento futuram. 
49 Sextus est locus cum ostendimus et consulto 
factum et dicimus voluntario facinori nullam esse 
excusationem, inprudentiae iustam deprecationem 

Septimus locus est quo ostendimus taetrum facinus, 
crudele, nefarium, tyrannicum esse; quod genus 
iniuria mulierum, aut earum rerum aliquid quarum 
rerum causa bella suscipiuntur et cum hostibus de 
vita dimicatur. 

• Cj. 3. vi. 10 below. 

* Cj. Cicero, Delnv. 1. liii. 101 and 2. xxxii. 100; the locus 
qui efficitur ex causis in Top. 18. 67. 

' Cf. Cicero, De Inv. 1. liii. 102; Rhet. ad Alex., eh. 4 
(1427 a). 

^ Cf. Cicero, De Inv. 1. liii. 102. 


AD HERENNIUM, II. wv. 48 49 

from whom the commonplace of authority is taken; 
or our peers, those in the same situation as we with 
respect to quaUties of character, physical attributes, 
and external circumstances ; " or our inferiors, whom 
in all these respects we excel. 

(3) By means of the third commonplace ** we ask 
what would happen if the same indulgence should be 
granted to all culprits, and show what perils and 
disadvantages would ensue from indifference to this 

(4) By means of the fourth commonplace *^ we show 
that if we indulge this man, many others will be the 
more emboldened to commit crimes — something 
which the anticipation of a judicial sentence has 
hitherto checked. 

(5) By the fifth commonplace '^ we show that if 
once judgement is pronounced otherwise than as we 
urge, there will be nothing which can remedy the 
harm or correct the jurors' error. Here it will be in 
point for us to make a comparison with other mistakes, 
so as to show that other mistakes can either be 
moderated by time or corrected designedly, but that 
so far as the present mistake is concerned, nothing 
will serve either to alleviate or to amend it. 

49 (6) By means of the sixth commonplace ^ we show 
that the act was done with premeditation, and 
declare that for an intentional crime there is no 
excuse, although a rightful plea of mercy is provided 
for an unpremeditated act. 

(7) By means of the seventh commonplace ^ we 
show that it is a foul crime, cruel, sacrilegious, and 
tyrannical ; such a crime as the outraging of women, 
or one of those crimes that incite wars and life-and- 
death struggles with enemies of the state. 



Octavus locus est quo ostendimus non vulgare, sed 
singulare esse maleficium, spurcum, nefarium, in- 
usitatum ; quo maturius et atrocius vindicandum est. 

Nonus locus est qui constat ex peccatorum con- 
paratioiie, quasi cum dicemus maius esse maleficium 
stuprare ingenuum quam sacrum legere, quod 
alterum propter egestatem, alterum propter in- 
temperantem superbiam fiat. 

Decimus locus est per quem omnia quae in negotio 
gerundo acta sunt quaeque rem consequi solent 
exputamus acriter et criminose et diligenter, ut agi 
res et geri negotium videatur rerum consequentium 
50 XXXI. Misericordia commovebitur auditoribus si 
variam fortunarum commutationem dicemus ; si 
ostendemus in quibus commodis fuerimus quibusque 
incommodis simus, conparatione ; si quae nobis futura 
sint nisi causam obtinuerimus enumerabimus et 
ostendemus ; si supplicabimus et nos sub eorum 
quorum misericordiam captabimus potestatem subi- 
ciemus : si quid nostris parentibus, liberis, ceteris 
necessariis casurum sit propter nostras calamitates 

" Cf. Cicero, De Inv. 1. liv. 103. 

*• dvTiTTapa^oXTJ. See the example of the grand style, 4. 
viii. 12 below, for a use of this commonplace. Cf. Quintilian, 
6. 2. 21 : " For some things are heinous in themselves, such 
as parricide, murder, poisoning, but other things have to be 
made to seem heinous; " and Cicero, De Inv, 1. liv. 104. 

' iKTVTTOims. Cf, the figures descriptio, 4. xxxix. 51, and 
demonstration 4. Iv. 68 below; Cicero, De Inv. 1. liv. 104. 

•* «Aeos-, oIktos. Cicero's treatment in De Inv, 1, Iv. 106- 
Ivi. 109 is fuller, listing sixteen loci of conqves'io. Karl 
Aulitzky, Wiener Studien 39 (1917). 26-i9, believes that 
Cicero and our author here use a common Roman source 
which may derive from Apollonius 6 {.laXaKos. That the 

AD UKRKNNIUM, II. xvx. 49-xxxi. 50 

(8) By means of the eighth commonplace " we show 
that it is not a common l)ut a unique crime, base, 
nefarious, and unheard-of, and therefore must be 
the more promj3tly and drastically avenged. 

(9) The ninth commonplace consists of a com- 
parison ^ of wrongs, as when we shall say it is a more 
heinous crime to debauch a free-born person than to 
steal a sacred object, because the one is done from 
unbridled licentiousness and the other from need. 

(10) By the tenth commonplace we shall examine 
sharply, incriminatingly, and precisely, everj-^thing 
that took place in the actual execution of the deed 
and all the circumstances that usually attend such 
an act, so that by the enumeration of the attendant 
circumstances the crime may seem to be taking place 
and the action to unfold before our eyes.*^ 

XXXI. We shall stir Pity ^ in our hearers by re- 
calling the vicissitudes of fortune ; by comparing the 
prosperity we once enjoyed with our present adver- 
sity ; ^ by enumerating and explaining the results 
that will follow for us if we lose the case ; / by 
entreating those whose pity we seek to win, and by 
submitting ourselves to their mercy ; by revealing 
what will befall our parents, children, and other 
kinsmen through our disgrace,? and at the same time 

Appeal to Pity belongs in the Conclusion of a forensic speech 
is a concept of pre- Aristotelian rhetoric; c/. Rhet. ad Alex., 
ch. 36 (1445 a). 

•" Cf. Cicero, Part. Orat. 17. 57 : " For nothing is so pitiable 
as a man who has become pitiable after having been happv ; " 
Aristotle, Poetics, ch. 13 (1452 b-1453 a). 

f So also Rhet. ad Alex., ch. 36 (1445 a), and Quintilian, 
6. 1. 19. 

" Quintilian, 6. 1. 18, offers similar advice to the accuser 
who is exciting pity for the man he is seeking to avenge. 



aperiemus, et simul ostendemus illorum nos sollici- 
tudine et miseria, non nostris incomniodis dolere ; 
si de dementia, humanitate, misericordia nostra 
qua in alios usi sumus aperiemus ; si nos semper aut 
diu in malis fuisse ostendemus ; si nostrum fatum aut 
fortunam conqueremur ; si animum nostrum fortem, 
patientem incommodorum ostendemus futurum. 
Commiserationem brevem esse oportet, nihil enim 
lacrima eitius arescit. 

Fere locos obscurissimos totius artificii tractavimus 
in hoc libro ; quapropter huic volumini modus hie sit. 
Reliquas praeceptiones, quoad videbitur, in tertium 
librum transferemus. Haec si, ut conquisite con- 
scripsimus, ita tu diligenter et nobiscum et sine nobis 
considerabis, et nos industriae fructus ex tua con- 
scientia capiemus, et tute nostram diligentiam lauda- 
bis tuaque ^ perceptione laetabere ; tu scientior eris 
praeceptorum artificii, nos alacriores ad reliquum 
persolvendum. Verum haec futura satis scio, te 
enim non ignoro. Nos deinceps ad cetera praecepta 
transeamus, ut, quod libentissime faciamus, tuae 
rectissimae ^ voluntati morem geramus. 

1 tuaque P^-CE : tua M Mx. 

- rectissimae Md : rectissime b I Mx. 


AD HKllENNIUM. IF. wxi. 50 

showing that we grieve not because of our own 
straits but because of their anxiety and misery ; by 
disclosing the kindness, humanity, and sympathy 
we have dispensed to others ; by showing that we 
have ever, or for a long time, been in adverse circum- 
stances ; by deploring our fate or bad fortune; by 
showing that our heart will be brave and patient of 
adversities. The Appeal to Pity must be brief, for 
nothing dries more quickly than a tear." 

In the present Book I have treated virtually the 
most obscure topics in the whole art of rhetoric ; there- 
fore this Book must end here. The remaining rules, 
so far as seems best, I shall carry over to Book III. If 
you study the material that I have presented, both 
with and without me, with care equal to the pains I 
have taken in assembling it, I, on my part, shall reap 
the fruit of my labour in your sharing the knowledge 
with me, and you, on yours, will praise my diligence 
and rejoice in the learning you have acquired. You 
will have greater understanding of the precepts of 
rhetoric, and I shall be more eager to discharge the 
rest of my task. But that this will be so I know quite 
well, for I know you well. Let me turn at once to the 
other rules, so that I may gratify your very proper 
wish — and this it gives me the greatest pleasure to do. 

" The proverb is attributed by Cicero, in De Inv. 1. ivi. 109, 
to Apollonius the rhetorician, who is perhaps to be identified 
with Apollonius d /xoAaK-d? (born c. 160 B.C.) rather than with 
Apollonius Molon, Cicero's teacher. Both d ^oAaKo? and Molon 
(later) taught at Rhodes. For a study of the proverb see 
G. D. Kellogg, Amer. Journ. Philol. 28 ('l907). 301-10. 




1 I. Ad omnem iudicialem causam quemadmodum 
conveniret inventionem rerum adcommodari satis 
abundanter arbitror superioribus libris demonstratum. 
Nunc earum rationem rerum inveniendarum quae 
pertinebant ad causas deliberativas et demonstrativas 
in hunc librum transtulimus, ut omnis inveniendi 
praeceptio tibi quam primum persolveretur. 

Reliquae quattuor partes erant artificii. De 
tribus partibus in hoc libro dictum est : dispositione, 
pronuntiatione, memoria. De elocutione, quia plura 
dicenda videbantur, in quarto libro conscribere 
maluimus, quern, ut arbitror, tibi librum celeriter 
absolutum mittemus, ne quid tibi rhetoricae artis 
deesse possit. Interea prima quaeque et nobiscum 
cum voles, et interdum sine nobis legendo consequere, 
ne quid inpediare quin ad banc utilitatem pariter 
nobiscum progredi possis. Nunc tu fac adtentum te 
praebeas ; nos proficisci ad instituta pergemus. 

2 II. Deliberationes partim sunt eiusmodi ut quaera- 
tur utrum potius faciendum sit, partim eiusmodi ut 
quid potissimum faciendum sit consideretur. Utrum 

» 3. ii. 2-v. 9, vi. 10-viii. 15. 
*• 3. ix. 16-x. 18 below. 
« 3. xi. 19-xv. 27 below. 
^ 3. xvi. 28-xxiv. 40 below. 

<■ Style would ordinarily have preceded Delivery and 
Memory; c/. 1. ii. 3 above. 



I. In the precedin»; Books I have, as I believe, 
shown amply enough how to apply the Invention of 
topics to any judicial cause. The method of finding 
the topics appropriate to deliberative and epideictic 
causes I now carr}' over to the present Book,'* in 
order that I may as speedily as possible discharge my 
task of explaining to you all the rules of Invention. 

Four departments of rhetoric are left us to con- 
sider. Three are treated in the present Book: 
Arrangement,^ Delivery,*' and Memory.^ Style, 
because it seems to require a fuller treatment, I 
prefer to discuss in Book IV,« which I hope to com- 
plete quickly and send to you, so that you may not 
lack anything on the art of rhetoric. Meanwhile you 
will learn all the principles I first set forth,/ with me, 
when you wish, and at times without me, by reading, 
so that you may in no way be kept from equal 
progress with me towards the mastery of this useful 
art. It is now for you to give attention, while I 
resume progress towards our goal. 

II. Deliberative 9 speeches are either of the kind in 
which the question concerns a choice between two 
courses of action, or of the kind in which a choice 
among several is considered. An example of a 

f Of judicial oratory, the most difficult and important 
kind; c/. 2. i. 1 above. 
" See note on the epideictic kind, 3. vi. 10 below. 


potius, hoc modo : Kartago toUenda an relinquenda 
videatur. Quid potissimum, hoc pacto : ut si Hanni- 
bal consultet, cum ex Italia Kartaginem arcessatur, 
an in Italia remaneat, an domum redeat, an in 
Aegyptum profectus occupet Alexandriam. 

Item deliberationes partim ipsae propter se 
consultandae sunt, ut si deliberet senatus captivos 
ab hostibus redimat an non ; partim propter aliquam 
extraneam causam veniunt in deliberationem et con- 
sultationem, ut si deliberet senatus solvatne legibus 
Scipionem ut eum liceat ante tempus consulem fieri ; 
partim et propter se sunt deliberandae et magis 
propter extraneam causam veniunt in consultationem, 
ut si deliberet senatus bello Italico sociis civitatem 

* Cato the Elder and Publius Scipio Nasica always ended 
their speeches, on no matter what question, the one with 
" In my opinion, Carthage must be destroj^ed," and the other 
with " In my opinion, Carthage must be spared " ; see 
Phitarch, 3Iarcus Cato 27 (352), and Appian, Pun. 8(1). 10. 69. 
This stiasoria was common among the rhetoricians ; c/. Cicero, 
De Inv. 1. viii. 11 and 1. xii. 17. 

* When, in 203 B.C., the Carthaginians were in danger from 
Scipio, they summoned Hannibal to Africa. Appian, Hann. 
7. 9. 58, reports Hannibal's fear of the perfidy and ingratitude 
of his countrymen. Alexandria, once captured, might have 
appeared to him as a safe refuge from the Romans and his 
enemies at home. Egypt had been weakened by the war 
with Antiochus the Great. The deliberations are not re- 
ferred to in any historical account that has come down to 
us; the source may have been L. Coelius Antipater. 

' A suasoria referring to the aftermath of Cannae in 216 
B.C., as described in Livy 22. 60 flf. Some wished to ransom 



choice between two courses of action : Does it seem 
better to destroy Carthage, or to leave her standini; ? <* 
An example of a choice among several : If Hannibal, 
when recalled to Carthage from Italy, should deliber- 
ate whether to remain in Italy, or return home, or 
invade Egypt and seize Alexandria.'' 

Again, a question under deliberation is sometimes 
to be examined on its own account ; for example, if 
the Senate should deliberate whether or not to 
redeem the captives from the enemy/ Or sometimes 
a question becomes one for deliberation and inquiry 
on account of some motive extraneous to the question 
itself; for example, if the Senate should deliberate 
whether to exempt Scipio from the law so as to per- 
mit him to become consul while under age.^ And 
sometimes a question comes under deliberation on 
its own account and then provokes debate even 
more because of an extraneous motive ; for example, 
if in the Italic War the Senate should deliberate 

the prisoners at public cost ; others opposed the disburse- 
ment of money by the state, but not ransoming at the 
exj)ense of individuals, and would have granted, on surety, 
loans from the treasury' to those who needed money. T. 
Manlius Torquatus spoke against the proposal, which failed. 
This suasaria was popular -with the rhetoricians; r/. Cicero, 
De Oratore 3. 28. 109, De Offic. 1. 13. 40 and 3. 32. 113. 

•* Although Scipio Aemilianus was in fact seeking the 
aedileship, and not the consulship, for 147 B.C., he was 
exempted from the law requiring a candidate for the consul- 
ship to have been praetor (and at least two years previously); 
at 36 (or 37) he was also well under the age required (in 
Cicero's day 43 years) for holding the consulship. He was 
elected consul in order to deal with Carthage. 

Our author's consistent rule is to refer to the younger 
Scipio simply as Scipio (see also 4. v. 7, 4. xiii. 19, and 4. 
xxxii. 43 below) and to the elder as Africanus (see 4. xv. 22, 
4. xx\'. 34, and 4. xxxi. 42), 



det an non. In quibus causis rei natura faciei 
deliberationem omnis oratio ad ipsam rem adcom- 
modabitur; in quibus extranea causa conficiet 
deliberationem, in his ea ipsa causa erit adaugenda 
aut deprimenda. 

Omnem orationem eorum qui sententiam dicent 
finem sibi conveniet utilitatis proponere, ut omnis 
eorum ad earn totius orationis ratio conferatur. 

Utilitas in duas partes in civili consultatione dividi- 
tur : tutam, honestam. 

Tuta est quae conficit instantis aut consequentis 
periculi vitationem qualibet ratione. Haec tribuitur 
in vim et dolum, quorum aut alterum separatim aut 
utrumque sumemus coniuncte. Vis decernitur per 
exercitus, classes, arma, tormenta, evocationes 
hominum, et alias huiusmodi res. Dolus consumitur 
in pecunia, pollicitatione, dissimulatione, matura- 
tione, mentitione, et ceteris rebus de quibus magis 

" When examined on its own account, this question 
might, for example, be considered as involving a radical 
change in Roman institutions; a motive "extraneous" to 
the question itself might be the effect of the measure upon 
other allies now threatening defection. In 90 B.C., L. Julius 
Caesar put through his law offering full Roman citizenship 
to all corporate communities in Italy that had not revolted ; 
in the next year the lex Plautia-Papiria was passed, granting 
citizenship to any individual who (a) belonged to a city of 
Italy allied with Rome, and (6) resided permanently in Italy, 
and (c) applied for citizenship within sixty days. 

* TO av[X(f)€pov (and Injury, to ^Xa^epov) in Aristotle, Rhei. 
1. 3 (1358 b). Cf. Cicero, De Oratore 2. 82. 334 : " Thus in an 
advisory speech there is nothing more desirable than Worth 
(dignitas) . . . but Advantage generally gains the upper 



wliether or not to grant citizenship to the Allies;." 
In causes in which the subject of itself engenders the 
deliberation, the entire discourse will be devoted 
to the subject itself. In those in which an extraneous 
motive gives rise to the deliberation, it is this motive 
which will have to be emphasized or depreciated. 

The orator who gives counsel will throughout his 
speech properly set up Advantage ^ as his aim,*^ so 
that the complete economy of his entire speech may 
be directed to it. 

Advantage in political deliberation has two aspects : 
Security «^ and Honour.* 

To consider Security is to provide some plan or 
other for ensuring the avoidance of a present or 
imminent danger. Subheads under Security are 
Might and Craft, which we shall consider either 
separately or conjointly. Might is determined by 
armies, fleets, arms, engines of war, recruiting of 
man power, and the like. Craft is exercised by 
means of money, promises, dissimulation, accelerated 
speed, deception, and the other means, topics which 

' TcAof. In Aristotle, Rhet. 1. 6 (1362 a), okottos. The 
topics drawn from the " ends " of the three different branches of 
oratory were later called xeAi/ca K€<f>dXaLa. Volkmann, pp. 
299 fif., discusses the treatment of these by different rhetori- 
cians. Cf. Cicero, De Inc. 2. li. 150 ff. 

•^ TO xpijaifiov, dvayKolov, aKLvhwov. 

' TO KoXov. Aristotle, Bhet. 1. 3 (1358 b), makes Honour 
(and Justice) subsidiary to Advantage, but Cicero in De Inv. 
2. li. 156 sets forth Honour and Advantage as coordinate 
aims, and Antonius in De Oratore 2. 82. 335 considers the 
situation in which Advantage and Honour oppose each other. 
The Stoics believed a conflict between Honour and Advantage 
to be impossible; see Cicero, De Offic. 3, 2. 9 ff. Perhaps 
because of Stoic influence, Cicero makes Advantage the sole 
aim in Part. Orat. 24. 83. 



idoneo tempore loquemur si quando de re militari aut 
de administratione rei publicae scribere velimus. 

Honesta res dividitur in rectum et laudabile. 
Rectum est quod cum virtute et officio fit. Id dividi- 
tur in prudentiam, iustitiam, fortitudinem, modes- 
tiam. Prudentia est calliditas quae ratione quadam 
potest dilectum habere bonorum et malorum. Dici- 
tur item prudentia scientia cuiusdam artificii ; item 
appellatur prudentia rerum multarum memoria et 
usus conplurium negotiorum. lustitia est aequitas 
ius uni cuique rei tribuens pro dignitate cuiusque. 
Fortitude est rerum magnarum appetitio et rerum 
humilium contemptio et laboris cum utilitatis ratione 
perpessio. Modestia est in animo continens modera- 
tio cupiditatem. 
4 III. Prudentiae partibus utemur in dicendo si 
commoda cum incommodis conferemus, cum alterum 
sequi, vitare alterum cohortemur; aut si qua in re 

" Whether our author ever wrote on these subjects we do 
not know. See notes on 3. xvi. 28 and 4. xii. 17 below. 

^ opdov and eVaiverov (Aristotle, Eth. Nic. 2. 7. 11, 1108 a). 

" To be distinguished from ius (2. xiii. 19). 

** oo(f)ia (and ^povqais — the definition shows that prudentia 
partakes of the nature of both), hiKaioavvq, dvBpeia, ao)(f>po<jvv7). 
Here rhetoric draws upon philosophy for a catalogue of the 
virtues ; see Plato, Republic 4. 428 ff. After Plato's example, 
the Stoics treated these as the primary virtues; see e.g., the 
Epitome of Didymus in Stobaeus, 2. 7. 5 b 2 (ed. Wachsmuth, 
2. 60), and Diogenes Laertius 7. 92. Cf. also Hippolytus, 
Bef. Omn. Haer. 1. 20. Aristotle, Rhet. 1. 9 (1366 b), Usts 
Prudence as well as Wisdom among the elements of Virtue, 
and adds Magnificence, Magnanimity, Liberality, and 
Gentleness. See note on 3. vi. 10 below, and KroU, Philo- 
logus 90 (1935). 206 fif. 

* CJ. 3. iii. 4 below; Cicero, De Inv. 2. liii. 160, De Nat. 
Deor. 3. 15. 38, De Offic. 1. 5. 15, De Leg. 1. 6. 19; Ulpian in 


AD HKRKNNIUM, III. n. 3-111. 4 

1 shall discuss at a more appropriate time, if ever I 
attempt to \vrite on the art of war or on state 

The Honourable is divided into the Right and the 
Praiseworthy. ** The Right ^ is that whicli is done in 
accord with \'irtue and Duty. Subheads under the 
Right are Wisdom, Justice, Courage, and Tem- 
perance. '^ Wisdom is intelligence capable, by a 
certain judicious method, of distinguishing good and 
bad ; likewise the knowledge of an art is called 
Wisdom; and again, a well-furnished memory, or 
experience in diverse matters, is termed Wisdom. 
Justice is equity, giving to each thing what it is 
entitled to in proportion to its worth. '^ Courage is 
the reaching for great things and contempt for what 
is mean ; also the endurance of hardship in expecta- 
tion of profit./ Temperance is self-control that 
moderates our desires.'' 
4 III. We shall be using the topics of Wisdom in our 
discourse if we compare advantages and disadvantages, 
counselling the pursuit of the one and the avoidance 
of the other ; if we urge a course in a field in which we 

Justinian, Dig. 1. 1. 10. On this concept (which was Greek 
in origin ; cf., e.g., Aristotle, Top. 6. 5 [143 a 16], 6. 7 [145 b 36], 
Kth. Mc. 5. 9 [1133 b], Bhet. 1. 9 [1366 b 9], and the Stoic 
definition in Stobaeus, lor. cil.) see Leopold Wenger, " Suum 
Cuique in antiken Urkunden," in Aus der Geistesirelt des 
Mittelalttrs (Grabmann Festschrift), Miinster, 1935, 1. 
1415-25, and Felix Senn, De la justice et du droit, Paris, 1927, 
pp. 1-54. 

f Cf. 3. iii. 6 and 4. xxv. 35 below, and the definition in 
Cicero, De Inv. 2. liv. 163. 

» Cf. Plutarch, De virl. vior. 2 (441 A) : " Virtue, when it 
moderates our desires (imdvixiav Koajxovaa) and defines the 
mean and the seasonable in our pleasures, is called 



cohortemur aliquid cuius rei aliquam disciplinam pot- 
erimus habere quo modo aut qua quidque ratione fieri 
oporteat ; aut si suadebimus quippiam cuius rei gestae 
aut praesentem aut auditam memoriam poterimus 
habere — qua in re facile id quod velimus exemplo 
allato persuadere possumus. 

lustitiae partibus utemur si aut innocentium aut 
supplicium misereri dicemus oportere ; si ostendemus 
bene merentibus gratiam referre convenire ; si 
demonstrabimus ulcisci male meritos oportere; si 
fidem magnopere censebimus conservandam ; si leges 
et mores civitatis egregie dicemus oportere servari ; si 
societates atque amicitias studiose dicemus coli 
convenire ; si quod ius in parentes, deos, patriam 
natura conparavit, id religiose colendum demonstra- 
bimus ; si hospitia, clientelas, cognationes, adfinitates 
caste colenda esse dicemus ; si nee pretio nee gratia 
nee periculo nee simultate a via recta ostendemus 
deduci oportere ; si dicemus in omnibus aequabile 
ius statui convenire. His atque huiusmodi partibus 
iustitiae si quam rem in contione aut in consilio 
faciendam censebimus iustam esse ostendemus, 
contrariis iniustam. Ita fiet ut isdem locis et ad 
suadendum et ad dissuadendum simus conparati. 
5 Sin fortitudinis retinendae causa faciendum quid ^ 
esse dicemus, ostendemus res magnas et celsas sequi 

^ quid d : other MSS. Mx omit. 

* T]d-q KoX voixoi, edi] Kal vofiifxa. Cf. 1. 11. 2 and 2. xii. 19 


AD HERENNIUM, III. iii. 4-5 

have a technical knowledge of the ways and means 
whereby each detail should be carried out ; or if we 
recommend some policy in a matter whose history 
we can recall either from direct experience or hear- 
say — in this instance we can easily persuade our 
hearers to the course we wish by adducing the 

We shall be using the topics of Justice if we say 
that we ought to pity innocent persons and sup- 
pliants ; if we show that it is proper to repay the 
well-deserving with gratitude ; if we explain that we 
ought to punish the guilty ; if we urge that faith 
ought zealously to be kept ; if we say that the laws 
and customs '^ of the state ought especially to be pre- 
served ; if we contend that alliances and friendships 
should scrupulously be honoured; if we make it 
clear that the duty imposed by nature toward parents, 
gods, and fatherland must be religiously observed ; 
if we maintain that ties of hospitality, clientage, 
kinship, and relationship by marriage must inviolably 
be cherished ; if we show that neither reward nor 
favour nor peril nor animosity ought to lead us astray 
from the right path ; if we say that in all cases a 
principle of dealing alike with all should be estab- 
lished. With these and like topics of Justice we 
shall demonstrate that an action of which we are 
sponsors in Assembly or council is just, and by their 
contraries we shall demonstrate that an action is 
unjust. As a result we shall be provided with the 
same commonplaces for both persuasion and dis- 
5 When we invoke as motive for a course of action 
steadfastness in Courage, we shall make it clear that 
men ought to follow and strive after noble and lofty 



et appeti oportere; et item res humiles et indignas 
viris fortibus viros ^ fortes propterea contemnere 
oportere nee idoneas dignitate sua iudicare. Item 
ab nulla re honesta periculi aut laboris magnitudine 
deduci oportere ; antiquiorem mortem turpitudine 
haberi; nullo dolore cogi ut ab officio recedatur; 
nullius pro rei veritate metuere inimicitias ; quodlibet 
pro patria, parentibus, hospitibus, amicis, iis rebus 
quas iustitia colere cogit, adire periculum et quem- 
libet suscipere laborem. 

Modestiae partibus utemur si nimias libidines 
honoris, pecuniae, similium rerum vituperabimus ; 
si unam quamque rem certo naturae termino defini- 
emus ; si quoad cuique satis sit ostendemus, nimium 
progredi dissuadebimus, modum uni cuique rei 
<i Huiusmodi partes sunt virtutis amplificandae is 
suadebimus, adtenuandae ^ si ab his dehortabimur, 
ut haec adtenuentur quae supra demonstravi. Nam 
nemo erit qui censeat a virtute recedendum ; verum 
aut res non eiusmodi dicatur esse ut virtutem pos- 
simus egregiam experiri, aut in contrariis potius 
rebus quam in his virtus constare quae ostendantur. 
Item, si quo pacto poterimus, quam is qui contra 
dicet iustitiam vocabit, nos demonstrabimus ignaviam 
esse et inertiam ac pravam liberalitatem ; quam 
prudentiam appellant, inept am et garrulam et odio- 
sam scientiam esse dicemus ; quam ille modestiam 
dicet esse, eam nos inertiam et dissolutam negle- 
gentiam esse dicemus; quam ille fortitudinem 

1 viros E : vel viros M : lac. followed by vel viros 

2 adtenuandae E : omnibus verbis adtenuandae 31 Mx. 


AD HERENNIUM, III. iii. 5-6 

actions, and that, by the same token, actions base 
and unworthy of the brave ought therefore to be 
despised by brave men and considered as beneath 
their dignity. Again, from an honourable act no 
peril or toil, however great, should divert us; 
death ought to be preferred to disgrace ; no pain 
should force an abandonment of duty ; no man's 
enmity should be feared in defence of truth; for 
country, for parents, guest-friends, intimates, and 
for the things justice commands us to respect, it 
behoves us to brave any peril and endure any 

We shall be using the topics of Temperance if we 
censure the inordinate desire for office, money, or the 
like ; if we restrict each thing to its definite natural 
bounds ; if we show how much is enough in each case, 
advise against going too far, and set the due limit to 
every matter. 
6 \'irtues of this kind are to be enlarged upon if we 
are recommending them, but depreciated if we are 
urging that they be disregarded, so that the points 
which I have made above ^ will be belittled. To be 
sure, no one will propose the abandonment of virtue, 
but let the speaker say that the affair is not of such 
a sort that we can put any extraordinary virtue to the 
test ; or that the virtue consists rather of qualities 
contrary to those here evinced. Again, if it is at all 
possible, we shall show that what our opponent calls 
justice is cowardice, and sloth, and perverse genero- 
sity ; what he has called wisdom we shall term 
impertinent, babbling, and offensive cleverness ; what 
he declares to be temperance we shall declare to be 
inaction and lax indifference ; what he has named 

" 3. iii. 4-5. 



nominarit, earn nos gladiatoriam et inconsideratam 
appellabimus temeritatem. 

7 IV. Laudabile est quod conficit honestam et 
praesentem et consequentem commemorationem. 
Hoc nos eo separavimus a recto non quod hae 
quattuor partes quae subiciuntur sub vocabulum 
recti banc honestatis commemorationem dare non 
soleant, sed quamquam ex recto laudabile nascitur, 
tamen in dicendo seorsum tractandum est hoc ab 
illo. Neque enim solum laudis causa rectum sequi 
convenit, sed si laus consequitur, duplicatur recti 
appetendi voluntas. Cum igitur erit demonstratum 
rectum esse, laudabile esse demonstrabimus aut ab 
idoneis hominibus — ut si qua res honestiori ordini 
placeat quae a deteriore ordine inprobetur — aut 
quibus sociis aut omnibus civibus, exteris nationibus, 
posterisque nostris. 

Cum huiusmodi divisio sit locorum in consultatione, 
breviter aperienda erit totius tractatio causae. 

Exordiri licebit vel a principio vel ab insinuatione 
vel isdem rationibus quibus in iudiciali causa. Si 
cuius rei narratio incidet, eadem ratione narrari 

8 Quoniam in huiusmodi causis finis est utilitas et ea 
dividitur in rationem tutam atque honestam, si 
utrumque poterimus ostendere, utrumque pollice- 

•^ Thucydides, 3. 82, describing the moral effects of the 
revolutions in the Hellenic world during the fifth year of the 
Peloponnesian war (427-6 B.C.), tells how men changed as 
they thought fit the accepted value of words in their relation 
to things : " For reckless audacity came to be regarded as the 
courage of self-sacrifice for party, cautious delay as fair- 
seeming cowardice, moderation as a screen for unmanliness, 


AD HKRENNIUM, 111. iii. 6-iv. 8 

courage we shall term the reckless temerity of a 

7 IV^ The Praiseworthy is what produces an honour- 
able remembrance, at the time of the event and after- 
wards. I have separated the Praiseworthy from the 
Right, not because the four categories which I list 
under the appellative Right usually fail to engender 
this honourable remembrance, but because, although 
the praiseworthy has its source in the right, we must 
nevertheless in speaking treat one apart from the 
other. Indeed we should pursue the right not alone 
for the sake of praise ; but if praise accrues, the desire 
to strive after the right is doubled. When, therefore, 
a thing is shown to be right, we shall show that it is 
also praiseworthy, whether in the opinion of qualified 
persons (if, for example, something should please a 
more honourable class of men, and be disapproved by 
a lower class), or of certain allies, or all our fellow 
citizens, or foreign nations, or our descendants. 

Such being the division of topics in deliberative 
speaking, I must briefly explain how to develop the 
cause as a whole. 

The Introduction may be made by means of the 
Direct Opening or of the Subtle Approach, or by the 
same means as in a judicial cause. If there happens 
to be a Statement of Facts, the same method will 
properly be followed in the narrative. 

8 Since in causes of this kind the end is Advantage, 
and Advantage is divided into the consideration of 
Security and the consideration of Honour, if we can 
prove that both ends will be served, we shall promise 

and sagacity in all things as general lecklessness ; " see also 
Cato in Sallust, Cat. 52. 11. Our author here uses the figure 
distinctio (TrapaBiaaToXi^) ; see note on 4. xxv. 35 below. 



bimur nos in dicendo demonstraturos esse ; si alterum 
erimus demonstraturi, simpliciter quid dicturi sumus 
ostendemus. At si nostram rationem tutam esse 
dicemus, divisione utemur in vim et consilium. Nam 
quod in docendo rei dilucide ^ magnificandae causa 
dolum appellavimus, id in dicendo honestius con- 
silium appellabimus. Si rationem nostrae sententiae 
rectam esse dicemus, et omnes partes recti incident, 
quadripertita divisione utemur ; si non incident, quot 
erunt, tot exponemus in dicendo. 

Confirmatione et confutatione utemur nostris locis 
quos ante ostendimus confirmandis, contrariis con- 
futandis. Argumentationis artificiose tractandae 
ratio de secundo libro petetur. \^^. Sed si acciderit 
ut in consultatione alteri ab tuta ratione, alteri ab 
honesta sententia sit, ut in deliberatione eorum qui a 
Poeno circumsessi deliberant quid agant, qui tutam 
rationem sequi suadebit his locis utetur : Nullam rem 
utiliorem esse incolumitate ; virtutibus uti neminem 
posse qui suas rationes in tuto non conlocarit ; ne 
deos quidem esse auxilio iis qui se inconsulto in 
periculum mittant ; honestum nihil oportere existi- 
9 mari quod non salutem pariat. Qui tutae rei prae- 
ponet rationem honestam his locis utetur : Virtutem 
nullo tempore relinquendam ; vel dolorem, si is 
timeatur, vel mortem, si ea formidetur, dedecore et 

^ dilucide 6 : di\ucida.e7nostother MSS. 3Iz : dilucidandae d. 

" 2. xviii. 28 ff. 

AD HKKENNIUM, III. iv. 8 v. 9 

to make this twofold proof in our discourse ; if we are 
going to prove that one of the two will be served, we 
shall indicate simply the one thing we intend to 
affirm. If, now, we say tliat our aim is Security, we 
shall use its subdivisions. Might and Strategy. For 
that which, in instructing, I have, in order to give 
clarity and emphasis, called Craft, we shall in speak- 
ing call by the more honourable name of Strategy. 
If we say that our counsel aims at the Right, and all 
four categories of Right apply, we shall use them all. 
If these categories do not all apply, we shall in 
speaking set forth as many as do, 

Wc shall use Proof and Refutation when we 
establish in our favour tlie topics explained above, 
and refute the contrary topics. The rules for de- 
veloping an argument artistically will be found in 
Book II." V. But if it happens that in a deliberation 
the counsel of one side is based on the consideration 
of security and that of the other on honour, as in the 
case of those who, surrounded by Carthaginians, 
deliberate on a course of action.^ then the speaker 
who advocates security will use the following topics : 
Nothing is more useful than safety ; no one can make 
use of his virtues if he has not based his plans upon 
safety ; not even the gods help those who thought- 
lessly commit themselves to danger ; nothing ought 
to be deemed honourable which does not produce 
9 safety. One who prefers the considerations of 
honour to security will use the following topics : 
Virtue ought never to be renounced ; either pain, 
if that is feared, or death, if that is dreaded, is more 

" A saasoria used also by Cicero, in De Inv. 2. Ivii, 171, 
concerning the inhabitants of Casiliaum in Campania, after 
the heroic defence of 216 B.C. against Hannibal, 



infamia leviorem esse ; considerare quae sit turpitude 
eonsecutura — at non immortalitatem neque aeternam 
incolumitatem consequi, nee esse exploratum illo 
vitato periculo nullum in aliud periculum venturum ; 
virtuti vel ultra mortem proficisci esse praeclarum ; 
fortitudini fortunam quoque esse adiumento solere ; 
eum tute vivere qui honeste vivat, non qui in prae- 
sentia incolumis, et eum qui turpiter vivat incolumem 
in perpetuum esse non posse. 

Conclusionibus fere similibus in his et in iudicialibus 
causis uti solemus, nisi quod his maxime conducit 
quam plurima rerum ante gestarum exempla pro- 
10 VI. Nunc ad demonstrativum genus causae 
transeamus. Quoniam haec causa dividitur in 
laudem et vituperationem, quibus ex rebus laudem 
constituerimus, ex contrariis rebus erit vituperatio 

" The proverb was extremely common in Greek and Latin 
literature; see Otto, s.v. " fortuna " 9, p. 144. 

* Cf. Cicero, Be Inv. 2. lix. 177-8. The epideictic kind, 
like the deliberative (3. ii. 2-v. 9 above), receives only a 
sketchy treatment from our author — evidence of the dominant 
position which the judicial kind, with its status system, 
held in Hellenistic rhetoric. Despite the Epicurean notion 
that only epideictic was amenable to rules, the judicial kind 
was in fact the easiest to systematize, even as it was by far 
the most often employed in Hellenistic times. The Greek 
term " epideictic " did not primarily emphasize the speaker's 
virtuosity, nor was the Latin equivalent demonstrativum 
intended to imply logical demonstration. Whereas in both 


AD HKRRNNIUM, HI. v. 9 vi. 10 

tolerable than disgrace and infamy ; one must 
consider the shame which will ensue — indeed neither 
immortality nor a life everlasting is achieved, nor 
is it proved that, once this peril is avoided, another 
will not be encountered; virtue finds it noble to go 
even beyond death ; fortune, too, hal)itually favours 
the brave ; " not he who is safe in the present, but he 
who lives honourably, lives safely — whereas he who 
lives shamefully cannot be secure for ever. 

As a general rule we employ virtually the same 

Conclusions in these as in judicial causes, except that 

here especially it is useful to present examples from 

the past in the greatest possible number. 

10 VI. Let us now turn to the Epideictic kind of cause.'' 

Since epideictic includes Praise and Censure, the 

topics on which praise is founded will, by their con- 

, traries, serve us as the bases for censure. The 

^ following, then, can be subject to praise: External 

deliberative and judicial causes the speaker seeks to persuade 
his hearers to a course of action, in epideictic his primary 
purpose is by means of his art to impress his ideas upon them, 
without action as a goal. On the scope and purpose of 
epideictic, and on the discrepancies between our author's 
treatment and that of Aristotle (Rhet. 1. 3, 1358 b), see 
D. A. G. Hinks, Class. Quart. 30 (1936). 170-6; cf. also Quinti- 
lian, 3. 4. 1 if., and Volkmann, pp. 19 ff. In the Stoic scheme 
" encomiastic " was used instead of " epideictic " ; see 
Diogenes Laertius 7. 42. This term, for which hiadativum 
(see Cicero, Par/. Oral. 3. 10, and Quintilian, 3. 3. 14, 3. 4. 12) 
would be the Latin equivalent, actually corresponds more 
closely to our author's definition of the <jenus than does 
demonstrativum. Doxapatres (Rabe, Proleg. SijlL, pp. 149 fiF.) 
argues for the primacy of the deliberative kind, setting the 
judicial in the second place, and the epideictic (panegyric) 
last; cf. Isocrates, Paneg. 4, Antid. 46 ff., Panath. 271. See 
also Stanley Wilcox, Harvard Studies in Class. Philol. 53 
(1942). 121-155. 


conparata. Laiis igitur potest esse renim exter- 
narum, corporis, animi. 

Rerum externarum sunt ea quae casu aut fortuna 
secunda aut adversa accidere possunt : genus, 
educatio, divitiae, potestates, gloriae, ci vitas, amici- 
tiae, et quae huiusmodi sunt et quae his contraria. 
Corporis sunt ea quae natura corpori adtribuit com- 
moda aut incommoda : velocitas, vires, dignitas, 
valetudo, et quae contraria sunt. Animi sunt ea quae 
consilio et cogitatione nostra constant : prudentia, 
iustitia, fortitudo, modestia, et quae contraria sunt. 
11 Erit igitur haec confirmatio et confutatio nobis in 
huiusmodi causa. 

Principium sumitur aut ab nostra, aut ab eius de 
quo loquemur, aut ab eorum qui audient persona, aut 
ab re. 

* The classification is Platonic and Aristotelian; see, e.g., 
Plato, Gorgias 477 C, Eufhyd. 279, Phihbus 48 E, Laws 
697 B, 727 A ff., Epist. 8. 355 B (c/. also Phaedrus 241 C); 
Aristotle, Eth. Nic. I. 8, 1098 b ("an ancient classification 
and one accepted by philosophers "), Magna Moral. 1. 3 
(1184 b), Protrepticus (see Oxyrh. Pap. 4. 82 ff.). It also 
appears early in rhetorical theory; see Bhet. ad Alex. 1 
(1422 a). Cf. also Areius Didymus in Stobaeus, 2. 7. 14; 
Diogenes Laertius 5. 30 ff. ; Clemens Alex., Paedagogus 

2. 10. 102; Hippolytus, Ref. Omn. Haer. 1. 20; Sextus 
Empiricus, Adv. Ethic. 3. 45; Aelius Aristides 45. 17; Cicero, 
De Fin. 3. 14. 43, De Inv. 1. liii. 101 and 2. lix. 177, De Oratore 

3. 29. 115, Part. Oral. 11. 38, Top. 23. 89; Apsines, Ars Bhet., 
in Spengel- Hammer 1 (2). 312. 7ff. ; and see Claus Peters, 
pp. 71-83. 

^ Ta €kt6s dyadd, rd eVt'/CTTjTa. 
" cuyeVeia. 
•* TTaiSeia. 

* ttXovtos, ;:^p7;^aTa, KTTJ}j.aTa. 
^ Sum/Ltet?, bwaOTeia. 


AD HERENNIUM, III. v.. lo ii 

Circumstances, Physical Attributes, and (Qualities of 

To External Circumstances ^ belong such as can 
happen by chance, or by fortune, favourable or 
adverse: descent,*^ education,** wealth,*^ kinds of 
power,/ titles to fame,^ citizenship,'' friendships,' 
and the like, and their contraries. Physical Attri- 
butes J are merits or defects bestowed upon the body 
by nature: agility,^' strength,' beauty,'" health,'* 
and their contraries. Qualities of Character <> rest 
upon our judgement and thought: wisdom, justice, 
11 courage, temperance, and their contraries. Such, 
then, in a cause of this kind, will be our Proof and 

The Introduction? is drawn from our own person, 
or the person we are discussing, or the person of our 
hearers, or from the subject-matter itself. 

" €vBo^La, TlfiTj. 

'' TTarpis, ttoXls, idvo^, TroAtreia. 

' (^I'Aoi. Cf. Eutychus in Plautus, Mercator 845-6 : " What 
I kept seeking was at home. There I found six companions : 
life, friendship, native land, gladness, fun, and sport." 

'■ TToScu/ceia. 

' la^vs, ponJLT]. 

•" «raAAos-. 

" vyUia, €V€^ia. 

" dperat ipvxi]s — properly, Virtues of the Soul. See note on 
3. ii. 3 above. Our author and Cicero in De Inv. differ from 
the Rhet. ad Alex., Aristotle, and Theon in including only the 
"primary" virtues; see Georg Reichel, Quaestiones Pro- 
gymnasm,, diss. Leipzig, 1909, pp. 90 ff. 

^ The tractatio is based upon the parts of the discourse, 
and thus follows the pre-Aristotelian rhetorical theory. 

Note that unlike judicial (see 1. iv. 6) and deliberative 
(3. iv. 7) oratory, epideictic lacks the Subtle Approach 
(insinuatio) . 



Ab nostra, si laudabimus : aut officio facere, quod 
causa necessitudinis intercedat; aut studio, quod 
eiusmodi virtute sit ut omnes commemorare debeant 
velle ; aut quod rectum sit ^ ex aliorum laude osten- 
dere qualis ipsius animus sit. Si vituperabimus : 
aut merito facere, quod ita tractati simus ; ^ aut 
studio, quod utile putemus esse ab omnibus unicam 
malitiam atque nequitiam cognosci ; aut quod 
placeat ostendi quod nobis placeat ex aliorum vitu- 

Ab eius persona de quo loquemur, si laudabimus : 
vereri nos ut illius facta verbis consequi possimus ; 
omnes homines illius virtutes praedicare oportere ; 
ipsa facta omnium laudatorum eloquentiam anteire. 
Si vituperabimus, ea quae videmus contrarie paucis 
verbis commutatis dici posse dicemus, ut paulo supra 
exempli causa demonstratum est. 
12 Ab auditorum persona, si laudabimus: quoniam 
non apud ignotos laudemus, nos monendi causa pauca 
dicturos ; aut si erunt ignoti, ut talem virum velint 
cognoscere petemus ; quoniam in eodem virtutis 
studio sint apud quos laudemus atque ille qui laudatur 
fuerit aut sit, sperare nos facile iis quibus velimus 
huius facta probaturos. Contraria vituperatio : 

^ aut quod rectum sit Aldus : quod rectum sit aut 3ISS. 

2 simus E : sumus other MSB. Mx. 

* Or perhaps : " from one's praise of others what one's 
own character is." 

* CJ. Isocrates, Paneg. 13 : " For I notice that the other 
speakers in their Introductions mollify their audience and 
make excuses for what they are going to say . . . some 
saying that it is hard to find words to match the greatness 
of the deeds", and Panath. 36; Demosthenes, Phil. 2. 11; 
and also 4. viii. 12 and 4. xxxix. 51 below. 


AD HKRENNIUM, III. vi. 11-12 

From our own person : if we speak in j^raise, we 
shall say that we are doing so from a sense of duty, 
because ties of friendship exist ; or from goodwill, 
because such is the virtue of the person under 
discussion that every one should wish to call it to 
mind ; or because it is appropriate to show, from 
the praise accorded him by others, what his character 
is.** If we speak in censure, we shall say that we are 
justified in doing so, because of the treatment we 
have suffered ; or that we are doing so from gof>dwill, 
because we think it useful that all men should be 
apprised of a wickedness and a worthlessness without 
parallel; or because it is pleasing to show by our 
censure of others what conduct is pleasing to 

When we draw our Introduction from the person be- 
ing discussed : if we speak in praise, we shall say that 
we fear our inability to match his deeds with words ; ^ 
all men ought to proclaim his virtues ; his very deeds 
transcend the eloquence of all eulogists. If we speak 
in censure, we shall, as obviously we can by the 
change of a few words, and as I have demonstrated 
just above, express sentiments to the contrary effect. 

When the Introduction is drawn from the person of 
thehearers: if we speak in praise, we shall say that since 
we are not delivering an encomium amongst people 
unacquainted with the man, we shall speak but briefly, 
to refresh their memories ; or if they do not know him, 
we shall try to make them desire to know a man of 
such excellence ; since the hearers of our eulogy have 
the same zeal for virtue as the subject of the eulogy 
had or now has, we hope easily to ^^in the approval 
of his deeds from those whose approval we desire. 
The opposite, if it is censure : we shall say that since 



quoniam norint, pauca de nequitia eius dicturos ; 
quod si ignorent, petemus uti gnoscant, uti malitiam 
vitare possint ; quoniam dissimiles sint qui audiant 
atque ille qui vituperatur, sperare eos illius vitam 
vehementer inprobaturos. 

Ab rebus ipsis : incertos esse quid potissimum 
laudemus; vereri ne, cum multa dixerimus, plura 
praetereamus, et quae similes sententias habebunt ; 
quibus sententiis contraria sumuntur a vituperatione. 
13 VII. Principio tractato aliqua harum quas ante 
commemoravimus ratione, narratio non erit uUa quae 
necessario consequatur; sed si qua incident, cum 
aliquod factum eius de quo loquemur nobis narrandum 
sit cum laude aut vituperatione, praeceptio narrandi 
de primo libro repetetur. 

Divisione hac utemur : exponemus quas res lauda- 
turi sumus aut vituperaturi ; deinde ut quaeque 
quove tempore res erit gesta ordine dicemus, ut quid 
quamque tute cauteque egerit intellegatur. Sed 
exponere oportebit animi virtutes aut vitia ; deinde 
commoda aut incommoda corporis aut rerum exter- 
narum quomodo ab animo tractata sint ^ demonstrare. 
Ordinem hunc adhibere in demonstranda vita 
debemus : 

^ tractata sint H^P^B C d : tracta sint 11 : tractata sunt 6 
Mx : sunt tractata I : tractata H. 


AD HERKNNIUM. III. vi. 12 vii. 13 

our hearers know tlie man. we shall confine ourselve«; 
to a few words on the subject of his wortlilessness : 
but if they do not, we shall try to make them know 
him, in order that they may avoid his wickedness ; 
since our hearers are unlike the subject of our 
censure, we express the hope that they will vigorously 
disapprove his way of life. 

When the Introduction is drawn from the subject- 
matter itself: we shall say that we do not know what 
to praise in particular; we fear that in discussing a 
number of things we shall pass by even more ; and 
add whatever will carry like sentiments. The senti- 
ments opposite to these are drawn upon, if we 

VII. If the Introduction has been developed in 
accordance with any of the methods just mentioned, 
there will be no need for a Statement of Facts to 
follow it; but if there is occasion for one, when we 
must recount with either praise or censure some deed 
of the person discussed, the instructions for Stating 
the Facts will be found in Book I.'* 

The Division we shall make is the following : we 
shall set forth the things we intend to praise or 
censure ; then recount the events, observing their 
precise sequence and chronology, so that one mav 
understand what the person under discussion did and 
with what prudence and caution. But it will first 
be necessary to set forth his virtues or faults of 
character, and then to explain how. such being his 
character, he has used the advantages or disad- 
vantages, physical or of external circumstances. The 
following is the order we must keep when portraying 
a life : 

° 1. viii. 12-i\. 16. 



Ab externis rebus : genus — in laude : quibus 
maioribus natus sit ; si bono genere, parem aut 
excelsiorem fuisse ; si humili genere, ipsum in suis, 
non in maiorum virtutibus habuisse praesidium. 
In vituperatione : si bono genere, dedecori maioribus 
fuisse ; si malo, tamen his ipsis detrimento fuisse. 
Educatio — in laude : bene et ^ honeste in bonis 
disciplinis per omnem pueritiam educatum.^ In 
vituperatione : . . . 
14 Deinde transire oportet ad corporis commoda: 
natura si sit dignitas atque forma, laudi fuisse earn, 
non quemadmodum ceteris detrimento atque dede- 
cori ; si vires atque velocitas egregia, honestis haec 
exercitationibus et industriis dicemus conparata; si 
valetudo perpetua, diligentia et temperantia cupidi- 
tatum. In vituperatione, si erunt haec corporis 
commoda, male ^ his usum dicemus quae casu et 
natura tamquam quilibet gladiator habuerit ; si non 
erunt, praeter formam omnia ipsius culpa et in- 
temperantia afuisse dicemus. 

Deinde revertemur ad extraneas res, et in his 
animi virtutes aut vitia quae fuerint considerabimus ; 
divitiae an paupertas fuerit, et quae potestates, quae 
gloriae, quae amicitiae, quae inimicitiae, et quid 
fortiter inimicitiis gerundis fecerit ; cuius causa 
susceperit inimicitias; qua fide, benivolentia, officio 

1 bene et E : M omits : lac. Mx. 

^ per omnem puericiam educatum E : totius pueritiae 
fuerit M Mx. 

3 male E : de M Mx. 


AD HERENNIUM, III. vii. 13-14 

(1) External Circumstances : Descent — in praise : 
the ancestors of whom he is sprung ; if he is of 
illustrious descent, he has been their peer or 
superior; if of humble descent, he has had his 
support, not in the virtues of his ancestors, but in his 
own. In censure : if he is of illustrious descent, he has 
been a disgrace to his forebears ; if of low descent, he 
is none the less a dishonour even to these. Educa- 
tion — in praise : that he was well and honourably 
trained in worthy studies throughout his boyhood. 
In censure : . . . 
14 (2) Next we must pass to the Physical Advantages : 
if by nature he has impressiveness and beauty, these 
have served him to his credit, and not, as in the case 
of others, to his detriment and shame ; if he has 
exceptional strength and agility, we shall point out 
that these were acquired by worthy and diligent 
exercise ; if he has continual good health, that was 
acquired by care and by control over his passions. In 
censure, if the subject has these physical advantages, 
we shall declare that he has abused what, like the 
meanest gladiator, he has had by chance and nature. 
If he lacks them, we shall say that to his own fault 
and want of self-control is his lack of every physical 
advantage, beauty apart, attributable. 

(3) Then we shall return to External Circumstances 
and consider his virtues and defects of Character 
evinced vdih respect to these : Has he been rich or 
poor ? WTiat kinds of power has he wielded ? What 
have been his titles to fame ? What his friendships ? 
Or what his private feuds, and what act of bravery 
has he performed in conducting these feuds ? With 
what motive has he entered into feuds? With 
what loyalty, goodwill, and sense of duty has he 



gesserit aniicitias ; in divitiis qualis aut paupertate 
cuiusmodi fuerit ; quemadmodum habuerit in potesta- 
tibiis gerundis animum. Si interierit, cuiusmodi 
mors eius fuerit, cuiusmodi res mortem eius sit 
15 consecuta. VIII. Ad omnes autem res in quibus 
animus hominis maxime consideratur illae quattuor 
animi virtutes erunt adcommodandae ; ut, si laude- 
■ mus, aliud iuste, aliud fortiter, aliud modeste, aliud ^ 
prudenter factum esse dicamus ; si vituperabimus, 
aliud iniuste, aliud immodeste, aliud ignave, aliud 
stulte factum praedicemus. 

Perspicuum est iam nimirum ex hac dispositione 
quemadmodum sit tractanda tripertita divisio laudis 
et vituperationis, si illud etiam adsumpserimus, non 
necesse esse nos omnes has partes in laudem aut in 
vituperationem transferre, propterea quod saepe ne 
incidunt quidem, saepe ita tenuiter incidunt ut non 
sint necessariae ^ dictu. Quapropter eas partes quae 
firmissimae videbuntur legere oportebit. 

Conclusionibus brevibus utemur, enumeratione ad 
exitum causae ; in ipsa causa crebras et breves 
amplificationes interponemus per locos communes. 

Nee hoc genus causae eo quod raro accidit in vita 
neglegentius commendandum est ; neque enim id 
quod potest accidere ut faciendum sit aliquando, 
non oportet velle quam adcommodatissime posse 
facere ; et si separatim haec causa minus saepe 
tractatur, at in iudicialibus et in deliberativis causis 
saepe magnae partes versantur laudis aut vitu- 

1 aliud E : et aliud 31 Mx. 

2 necessariae E : necessaria other MSS. Mx. 

^ If a noble death, evdavaaia. 

> I.e., the epideictic. As a progymnasma it is the type 
rrepl iyKco^lov Kal ipoyov. 


AD HERKNNIUM, III. vii. 14-viii. 15 

conducted his friendships ? What character of man 
has he been in wealth, or in poverty ? What has been 
his attitude in the exercise of his prerogatives ? If 
he is dead, what sort of death did he die,<* and what 
sort of consequences followed upon it? VIII. In 
all circumstances, moreover, in which human charac- 
ter is chiefly studied, those four above-mentioned 
virtues of character will have to be applied. Thus, 
if we speak in praise, we shall say that one act was 
just, another courageous, another temperate, and 
another wise ; if we speak in censure, we shall declare 
that one was unjust, another intemperate, another 
cowardly, and another stupid. 

From this arrangement it is now no doubt clear 
how we are to treat the three categories of praise and 
censure — \Wth the added proviso that we need not use 
all three for praise or for censure, because often not 
all of them even apply, and often, too, when they do, 
the application is so slight that it is unnecessary to 
refer to them. We shall therefore need to choose 
those categories which seem to provide the greatest 

Our Conclusions will be brief, in the form of a 
Summary at the end of the discourse ; in the dis- 
course itself we shall by means of commonplaces 
frequently insert brief amplifications. 

Nor should this kind of cause * be the less strongly 
recommended just because it presents itself only 
seldom in life. Indeed when a task may present 
itself, be it only occasionally, the ability to perform it 
as skilfully as possible must seem desirable. And if 
epideictic is only seldom employed by itself inde- 
pendently, still in judicial and deliberative causes 
extensive sections are often devoted to praise or 



perationis. Quare in hoc quoque causae genere 
nonnihil industriae consumendum putemus. 

Nunc, absoluta a nobis difficillima parte rhetoricae, 
hoc est inventione perpolita atque ad omne causae 
genus ^ adcommodata, tempus est ad ceteras partes 
proficisci. Deinceps igitur de dispositione dicemus. 

16 IX. Quoniam dispositio est per quam ilia quae 
invenimus in ordinem redigimus ut certo quicquid 
loco pronuntietur, videndum est cuiusmodi rationem 
in disponendo habere conveniat. Genera disposi- 
tionum sunt duo : unum ab institutione artis pro- 
fectum, alterum ad casum temporis adcommodatum. 

Ex institutione artis disponemus cum sequemur 
earn praeceptionem quam in primo libro exposuimus, 
hoc est ut utamur principio, narratione, divisione, 
confirmatione, confutatione, conclusione, et ut hunc 
ordinem quemadmodum praeceptum est ante in 
dicendo sequamur. Item ex institutione artis non 
modo totas causas per orationem, sed singulas quoque 
argumentationes disponemus, quemadmodum in libro 
secundo docuimus : in expositionem, rationem, con- 
firmationem rationis, exornationem, conclusionem. 

17 Haec igitur duplex dispositio est : una per orationes, 

1 atque ad omne causae genus B^C d : atque omne causae 
genus P^B 11 Mx : ad que omne causae genus H : adq(ue) 
omne causae genus P^ : atque omne causae ad genus b I. 

" In the Peripatetic order of the officia oraioris Style 
followed Invention in second place, Arrangement being 
third; cf. 1. ii. 3 above, and the note on 3. i. 1. 

* rants', oiKovofxia. Coiax and Tisias were the first to 
set up a theory of Arrangement. Sulpitius Victor 14 (Halm, 
p. 320) distinguishes between the Natural Arrangement 
{ordo naturalis) and the Artistic {ordo artificiosus, OLKovo^iia), 
the former corresponding to our author's ordo artificiosus 
(see 3. ix. 1 7 below), the genus ah institutione artis profectum, and 

AD HKRENNIUM, III. viir. 15-ix. 17 

censure. Therefore let us believe that this kind of 
cause also must claim some measure of our industry. 
Now that I have completed the most difficult part 
of rhetoric — thoroughly treating Invention and 
applying it to every kind of cause — it is time to 
proceed to the other parts. I shall therefore next " 
discuss the Arrangement. 

Iti IX. Since it is through the Arrangement ^ that we 
set in order the topics we have invented so that there 
may be a definite place for each in the delivery, 
we must see what kind of method one should follow 
in the process of arranging. The kinds of Arrange- 
ment are two : one arising from the principles of 
rhetoric, the other accommodated to particular 

Our Arrangement will be based on the principles 
of rhetoric when we observe the instructions that I 
have set forth in Book I <^ — to use the Introduction, 
Statement of Facts, Division, Proof, Refutation, and 
Conclusion, and in speaking to follow the order 
enjoined above. It is likewise on the principles of 
the art that we shall be basing our Arrangement, not 
only of the whole case throughout the discourse, but 
also of the individual arguments, according to Pro- 
position, Reason, Proof of the Reason, Embellish- 
ment, and Resume, as I have explained in Book 11.*^ 

17 This Arrangement, then, is twofold — one for the 
whole speech, and the other for the individual 

the latter to our author's genus ad casum temporis adcommo- 
datum. Cf. Quintilian's oeconomica dispositio in 7. 10. 11. 
Athanasius (probably fourth Christian century), in Rabe, 
Proleg. Sijll., p. 176, distinguishes ra^t? from oiKovofiia on the 

same principle. 
' 1. ill. 4. 

Conclusio is there called complexio. 



altera per argumentationes, ab institutione artis 

Est autem alia dispositio, quae, cum ab ordine 
artificioso recedendum est, oratoris iudicio ad tempus 
adcommodatur ; ut si ab narratione dicere incipiamus 
aut ab aliqua firmissima argumentatione aut litte- 
rarum aliquarum recitatione ; aut si secuYidum 
principium confirmatione utamur, deinde narratione ; 
aut si quam eiusmodi permutationem ordinis facie- 
mus; quorum nihil, nisi causa postulat, fieri oporte- 
bit. Nam si vehementer aures auditorum obtunsae 
videbuntur atque animi defatigati ab adversariis 
multitudine verborum, commode poterimus principio 
supersedere et ^ exordiri causam aut a narratione 
aut aliqua firma argumentatione. Deinde, si com- 
modum erit, quod non semper necesse est, ad prin- 
cipii sententiam reverti licebit. X. Si causa nostra 
magnam difficultatem videbitur habere, ut nemo 
aequo animo principium possit audire, ab narratione 
cum inceperimus, ad principii sententiam revertemus. 
Si narratio parum probabilis, exordiemur ab aliqua 
firma argumentatione. His commutationibus et 
translationibus saepe uti necesse est cum ipsa res 
artificiosam dispositionem artificiose commutare 

^ et BCE : HPIi Mz omit. 

" On the principle of " anomaly " rather than " analogy, '■ 


AD HKRKNNIUM, III. i.\. ly-x. 17 

arguments — aiul is based upon the principles of 

But there is also another Arrangement, which, 
when we must depart from the order imposed by the 
rules of the art, is accommodated to circumstance in 
accordance with the speaker's judgement ; ° for 
example, if we should begin our speech with the 
Statement of Facts, or with some very strong argu- 
ment, or the reading of some documents ; or if 
straightway after the Introduction we should use 
the Proof and then the Statement of Facts ; or if we 
should make some other change of this kind in the 
order. But none of these changes ought to be made 
except when our cause demands them. For if the 
ears of the audience seem to have been deafened 
and their attention wearied by the wordiness of our 
adversaries, we can advantageously omit the Intro- 
duction,^ and begin the speech with either the 
Statement of Facts or some strong argument. Then, 
if it is advantageous — for it is not always necessar}" — 
one may recur to the idea intended for the Intro- 
duction. X. If our cause seems to present so great a 
difficulty that no one can listen to the Introduction 
with patience, we shall begin with the Statement of 
Facts and then recur to the idea intended for the 
Introduction, If the Statement of Facts is not quite 
plausible, we shall begin with some strong argument. 
It is often necessary to employ such changes and 
transpositions when the cause itself obliges us to 
modify with art the Arrangement prescribed by the 
rules of the art. 

* But in 1. vi. 10 our author advises us in such circumstances 
to use the Subtle Approach, and to open with something that 
may provoke laughter, 



18 In confirmatione et confutatione argumentationum 
dispositionem ^ huiusmodi convenit habere : firmissi- 
mas argumentation es in primis et in postremis causae 
partibus conlocare ; mediocres, et neque inutiles 
ad dicendum neque necessarias ad probandum, quae 
si separatim ac singulae dicantur infirmae sint, cum 
ceteris coniunctae firmae et probabiles fiunt, inter- 
poni oportet. Nam et statim re narrata expectat 
animus auditoris si qua re causa confirmari possit — 
quapropter continuo firmam aliquam oportet inferre 
argumentationem ; et reliqua, quoniam nuperrime 
dictum facile memoriae mandatur, utile est, cum 
dicere desinamus, recentem aliquam relinquere in 
animis auditorum bene firmam argumentationem. 
Haec dispositio locorum, tamquam instructio mili- 
tum, facillime in dicendo, sicut ilia in pugnando, 
parere poterit victoriam. 

19 XI. Pronuntiationem multi maxime utilem oratori 
dixerunt esse et ad persuadendum plurimum valere. 
Nos quidem unum de quinque rebus plurimum posse 
non facile dixerimus ; egregie ^ magnam esse utili- 
tatem in pronuntiatione audacter confirmaverimus. 

^ dispositionem BC^ : dispositiones HE Mx : disputationes 

2 egregie 31 : nee egregie other MS8. Mx. 

" Quintilian, 5. 12. 14, calls this the Homeric disposition, 
from //. 4. 297-9 : " And first he [Nestor] arrayed the horse- 
men with horses and chariots, and behind them the foot- 
soldiers, many and valiant, to be a bulwark of battle. But 
the weaklings he drove into the midst." C/. also Longinus, 
in Spengel-Hammer 1 (2). 185. 16 £f. 

* (7/. 1. ii. 3 above. 

" Cf. Quintilian, 11. 3. 2 : " But delivery itself has a 
marvellously powerful effect in oratory ; for the nature of the 
material we have composed in our minds is not so important 


AD IIKRENNIUM, III. v. t8-\i. 19 

18 In tli(* Proof and Refutation of arguments it is 
appropriate to adopt an Arrangement of the following 
sort : (1) the strongest arguments should be placed at 
the beginning and at the end of the pleading ; (2) 
those of medium force, and also those that are neither 
useless to the discourse nor essential to the proof, 
which are weak if presented separately and individu- 
ally, but become strong and plausible when conjoined 
with the others, should be placed in the middle.* 
For immediately after the facts have been stated the 
hearer waits to see whether the cause can by some 
means be proved, and that is why we ought straight- 
way to present some strong argument. (3) And 
as for the rest, since what has been said last is easily 
committed to memory, it is useful, when ceasing to 
speak, to leave some very strong argument fresh in 
the hearer's mind. This arrangement of topics in 
speaking, like the arraying of soldiers in battle, can 
readily bring victory. 

19 XI. Many have said that the faculty of greatest 
use to the speaker and the most valuable for per- 
suasion is Delivery. For my part, I should not readily 
say that any one of the five faculties * is the most 
important ; that an exceptionally great usefulness 
resides in the delivery I should boldly affirm.^ For 

as how we deliver it; " 11. 3. 7 : " Cicero also thinks action 
to be the dominant element in oratory; " 11. 3. 5-6 : " For 
my part I would affirm that a mediocre speech supported by 
all the power of delivery will have more force than the best 
speech devoid of that power. That is why Demosthenes, 
asked what was primary in the whole task of oratory, gave 
the palm to delivery, and gave it second and third place as 
well. ... So that we may assume that he thought it to be 
not merely the first, but the only virtue of oratory " (c/. also 
Philodemus, Rhet., ed, Sudhaus, 1. 196; Cicero, Brutus 37. 



Nam commodae inventiones et concinnae verborum 
elocutiones et partium causae artificiosae disposi- 
tiones et horum omnium diligens memoria sine pro- 
nuntatione non plus quam sine his rebus pronuntiatio 
sola valere poterit. Quare, et quia nemo de ea re 
diligenter scripsit — nam omnes vix posse putarunt de 
voce et vultu et gestu dilucide scribi, cum eae res ad 
sensus nostros pertinerent — et quia magnopere ea 
pars a nobis ad dicendum conparanda est, non 
neglegenter videtur tota res consideranda. 

Dividitur igitur pronuntiatio in vocis figuram et in 
corporis motum. Figura vocis est ea quae suum 
quendam possidet habitum ratione et industria 
20 conparatum. Ea dividitur in tres partes : magni- 
tudinem, firmitudinem, mollitudinem. Magnitu- 
dinem vocis maxime conparat natura ; nonnihil auget, 
sed maxime conservat adcuratio.^ Firmitudinem 

^ conservat accuratio 3IS. used by Lambinvs : amplificat 
(amplificet b) accuratio (adcuratio 3Ix) bl Mx : ciiratur con- 
servat HP : cura conservat P'^llB-C^d : conservat BC. 

142, Orator 17. 56 ; Plutarch, Vitae Dec. Oral. 845 B ; Longinus, 
in Spengel-Hammer 1 (2). 195; Theon 5, in Spengel 2. 104 f.). 
Our author is probably following Theophrastus ; Athanasius 
(Rabe, Proleg. SylL, p. 177) says that to Theophrastus " the 
most important thing for persuasion in rhetoric is delivery." 
C/. Philodemus, Rhet., ed. Sudhaus 1. 193 (I use Gomperz' 
restoration) : "Of the six, or as some hold, seven parts of 
rhetoric, Athenaeus [second century B.C.] said that the most 
important is delivery; " Longinus, in Spengel-Hammer 1 (2). 
194: " Delivery is of greatest importance for proof." Thrasy- 
machus maintained that delivery is given us by nature, not 
by art (Quintilian, 3. 3. 4). 

* Diogenes Laertius, 5. 48, lists a work on delivery by 
Theophrastus. L. Plotius Gallus, friend of Marius, wrote 
about Gesture as practised in his day (QuintiHan, 11. 3. 143); 
whether this work antedated our treatise we do not know. 
Theophrastus was probably the first to make Delivery a 

AD HERRNNIUM, III. xi. 19-20 

skilful invention, elegant style, the artistie arrange- 
ment of the parts eomprising the case, and the careful 
memory of all these will be of no more value without 
delivery, than delivery alone and independent of 
these. Therefore, because no one has written care- 
fully on this subject ° — all have thought it scarcely 
possible for voice, mien, and gesture to be lucidly 
described, as appertaining to our sense-experience — 
and because the mastery of delivery is a very 
important requisite for speaking, the whole subject, 
as I believe, deserves serious consideration. 

Delivery, then, includes Voice Quality and Physical 
Movement.'' \'oice Quality ^ has a certain character 
20 of its own, acquired by method and application. It 
has three aspects : Volume, Stability, and Flexibility. 
\'ocal volume is primarily the gift of nature ; cultiva- 
tion ^ augments it somewhat, but chiefly conserves it. 

fourth officiitm oratoris (adding to it Invention, Style, and 
Arrangement, Aristotle's scheme in the Rhetoric); Aristotle 
(see Rhet. 3. 1, 1403 b) did not fully develop the theory of 
delivery. The Stoics followed Theophrastus ; for their 
scheme see note on 1. ii. 3 above. See also Philodemus on 
deliverv, in H. M. Hubbell, The Rhetorica of PhilofJemus, 
New Haven, 1920, pp. 300-1. 

* The divisions are probably Theophrastan (77 Kivrjots tov 
aojyMTos Kai 6 tovos r-qs <j><jjvrjS) ; see Athanasius, in Rabe, 
Proleg. SylL, p. 177. Cf. Longinus, in Spengel- Hammer 
1 (2). 194 : Siddeais aco/iaro? re koi tovov (f>ojvTJg, and Dionysius 
Halic, De Demosth. 53 : to. vad-q to. Trjg (fnovrj? Kal to. axT^fJUtTa 
TOV aco^aro?. 

' Cf. Cicero's study of Voice in De Oratore 3. 56. 213- 
58. 219, 3. 60. 224-61. 227, and Orator 17. 55-18. 60; Quin- 
tilian'sin 11. 3. 14-65. 

•* Cura comprised methods derived from rhetoric, music, 
and acting, but was in part also dietetic and medical in 
nature ; see Armin Krumbacher, Die Stimmbildung der Redner 
im Altertum his auf die Zeit Quintilians, Paderborn, 1920, 
esp. pp. 101-7. 



vocis maxime conparat cura ; nonnihil adauget, et 
maxime conservat exercitatio declamationis.^ MoUi- 
tudinem vocis, hoc est ut earn torquere in dicendo 
nostro commodo possimus, maxime faciet exercitatio 
declamationis. Quapropter de magnitudine vocis et 
firmitudinis parte, quoniam altera natiira paritur, 
altera cura conparatur, nihil nos adtinet commonere 
nisi ut ab iis qui non inscii sunt eius artificii ratio 
curandae vocis petatur. XII. De ea parte firmitu- 
dinis quae conservatur ratione declamationis, et de 
mollitudine vocis, quae maxime necessaria est oratori, 
quoniam ea quoque moderatione declamationis con- 
paratur, dicendum videtur. 
21 Firmam ergo maxime poterimus in dicendo vocem 
conservare si quam maxime sedata et depressa voce 
principia dicemus. Nam laeditur arteria si antequam 
voce leni permulsa est acri clamore completur. Et 
intervallis longioribus uti convenit ; recreatur enim 
spiritu vox et arteriae reticendo adquiescunt. Et in 
continuo clamore remittere et ad sermonem transire 
oportet ; commutationes enim faciunt ut nuUo genere 
vocis efFuso in omni voce integri simus. Et acutas 
vocis exclamationes vitare debemus ; ictus enim fit 
et vulnus arteriae acuta atque adtenuata nimis 
adclamatione, et qui splendor est vocis consumitur 
uno clamore universus, Et uno spiritu continenter 
multa dicere in extrema convenit oratione ; fauces 

^ declamationis P^B^E : imitationis 31 Mx. 

" Note that these references to declamatio, the earliest in 
extant Latin literature, appear in connection with delivery. 
Declamatio = probably dva(f)U)vrjaLS. See S. F. Bonner, 
Roman Declamation in the Late Republic and Early Empire, 
Liverpool, 1949, p. 20, note 3. 

* The phonasci, teachers of singing and declamation. 


AD HKRENNIUM, III. xi. 20 xii. 21 

Stability is primarily gained by cultivation; declama- 
tory exercise augments it somewhat, but chiefly 
conserves it. \'ocal flexibility — the ability in speak- 
ing to vary the intonations of the voice at pleasure — 
is primarily achieved by declamatory exercise.** 
Thus with regard to vocal volume, and in a degree 
also to stability, since one is the gift of nature and 
the other is acquired by cultivation, it is pointless to 
give any other advice than that the method of cul- 
tivating the voice should be sought from those skilled 
in this art.'' XII. It seems, however, that I must 
discuss stability in the degree that it is conserved 
bv a system of declamation, and also vocal flexibility 
(this is especially necessary to the speaker), because 
it too is acquired by the discipline of declamation. 
21 We can, then, in speaking conserve stability mainly 
by using for the Introduction a voice as calm and 
composed as possible. For the windpipe is injured if 
filled with a violent outburst of sound before it has 
been soothed by soft intonations. And it is appro- 
priate to use rather long pauses — the voice is re- 
freshed by respiration and the windpipe is rested by 
silence. We should also relax from continual use of 
the full voice and pass to the tone of conversation ; 
for, as the result of changes, no one kind of tone is 
spent, and we are complete in the entire range. 
Again, we ought to avoid piercing exclamations, for a 
shock that wounds the windpipe is produced by 
shouting which is excessively sharp and shrill.^ and 
the brilliance of the voice is altogether used up by 
one outburst. Again, at the end of the speech it is 
proper to deliver long periods in one unbroken 

' The Rhodian school opposed the overloud delivery of the 
Asiatic orators. 



enim calefiunt, et arteriae conplentur, et vox, quae 
tractata varie est, reducitur in quendam sonum 
aequabilem atque constantem. Quani saepe rerum 
naturae gratia quaedam iure debetur, velut accidit in 
hac re ! Nam quae dicimus ad vocem servandam 
prodesse, eadem adtinent ad suavitudinem pronuntia- 
tionis, ut quod nostrae voci prosit idem voluntati 
22 auditoris probetur. Utile est ad firmitudinem sedata 
vox in principio. Quid insuavius quam clamor in 
exordio causae ? Intervalla vocem confirmant ; 
eadem sententias concinniores divisione reddunt et 
auditori spatium cogitandi relinquunt. Conservat 
vocem continui clamoris remissio, et auditorem 
quidem varietas maxime delectat, cum sermone 
animum retinet aut exsuscitat clamore. Acuta 
exclamatio vocem vulnerat ; eadem laedit auditorem, 
habet enim quiddam inliberale et ad muliebrem potius 
vociferationem quam ad virilem dignitatem in dicendo 
adcommodatum. In extrema oratione continens 
vox remedio est voci. Quid ? haec eadem nonne 
animum vehementissime calefacit auditoris in totius 
conclusione causae ? Quoniam igitur eadem vocis 
firmitudini et pronuntiationis suavitudini prosunt, de 
utraque re simul erit in praesentia dictum — de firmi- 
tudine quae visa sunt, de suavitudine quae coniuncta 
fuerunt ; cetera suo loco paulo post dicemus. 

" CJ. Dionysius Halic, De Composit. Verb., ch, 23, on the 
smooth mode of composition : "It limits . . . the measure 
of the period so that a man's full breath will be able to en- 
compass it; " Cicero, Brutus 8. 34. 

* Our author repeats the thought of the first sentence of 
Sect. 21 immediately above. 

" He proceeds at once to do so ; see 3. xiii. 23-xiv. 25. The 
detailed rules that follow belong to a rhetoric later than that 
of Theophrastus, who apparently did not hand down many 


AD HRRRNNIUM, III. xii. 21-22 

breath ,° for then the throat becomes warm, the wind- 
pipe is filled, and the voice, which has been used in a 
variety of tones, is restored to a kind of uniform and 
constant tone. How often must we be duly thankful 
to nature, as here ! Indeed what we declare to be 
beneficial for conserving the voice applies also to 
agreeableness of delivery, and, as a result, what 
benefits our voice likewise finds favour in the hearer's 
taste. A useful thing for stability is a calm tone in 
the Introduction.* WTiat is more disagreeable than 
the full voice in the Introduction to a discourse ? 
Pauses strengthen the voice. They also render the 
thoughts more clear-cut by separating them, and 
leave the hearer time to think. Relaxation from a 
continuous full tone conserves the voice, and the 
variety gives extreme pleasure to the hearer too, 
since now the conversational tone holds the attention 
and now the full voice rouses it. Sharp exclamation 
injures the voice and likewise jars the hearer, for it 
has about it something ignoble, suited rather to 
feminine outcry than to manly dignity in speaking. 
At the end of the speech a sustained flow is beneficial 
to the voice. And does not this, too, most vigorously 
stir the hearer at the Conclusion of the entire dis- 
course ? Since, then, the same means serve the 
stability of the voice and agreeableness of delivery, 
my present discussion will have dealt with both at 
once, offering as it does the observations that have 
seemed appropriate on stability, and the related 
observations on agreeableness. The rest I shall set 
forth somewhat later, in its proper place. <^ 

precepts of delivery. See Johannes Stroux, De TheophraMi 
virtuiibus dicetidi, Leipzig, 1912, p. 70; Maximilian Schmidt. 
Commentatio de Theophrasio rhetore, Halle, 1839, p. 61. 


23 XIII. MoUitudo igitur vocis, quoniam omnis ad 
rhetoris praeceptionem pertinet, diligentius nobis 
consideranda est. Earn dividimus in sermonem, 
contentionem, amplificationem. Sermo est oratio 
remissa et finitima cotidianae locutioni. Contentio est 
oratio acris et ad confirmandum et ad confutandum 
adcommodata. Amplificatio est oratio quae aut in 
iracundiam inducit, aut ad misericordiam trahit 
auditoris animum. 

Sermo dividitur in partes quattuor: dignitatem, 
demonstrationem, narrationem, iocationem. Dignitas 
est oratio cum aliqua gravitate et vocis remissione. 
Demonstratio est oratio quae docet remissa voce 
quomodo quid fieri potuerit aut non potuerit. Narra- 
tio est rerum gestarum aut proinde ut gestarum 
expositio. locatio est oratio quae ex aliqua re risum 
pudentem et liberalem potest conparare. 

Contentio dividitur in continuationem et in 
distributionem. Continuatio est orationis enunti- 
andae adceleratio clamosa. Distributio est in con- 
tentione oratio frequens cum raris et brevibus inter- 
vallis, acri vociferatione. 

24 Amplificatio dividitur in cohortationem et con- 
questionem. Cohortatio est oratio quae aliquod 

" dv€ifi€vri. 

* Contentio (evaytovto? Xoyos) represents the impassioned, 
vehement address of formal debate, sermo the informal 
language of ordinary conversation (Cicero, De Offic. 1. 37. 132 : 
sermo in circulis, disputationibus, congressionibus familiarium 
versetur, sequatur etiam convivia). Our author's treatment 
seems to have a Peripatetic cast; see Aristotle, Rhet. 3. 12 
(1413 b). Cf. Cicero, I.e. (in De Offic., Bk. 1, he follows the 
Stoic philosopher Panaetius) : " Rules for contentio we have 
from the rhetoricians. There are none for sermo; yet I do 
not know why there cannot be for sermo, too." 


AD HRRRNNIUM, III. xiii. 23-24 

23 XIII. Now the flexibility of the voice, since it 
depends entirely on rhetorical rules, deserves our 
more careful consideration. The aspects of Flexi- 
bility are Conversational Tone, Tone of Debate, and 
Tone of Amplification. The Tone of Conversation is 
relaxed," and is closest to daily speech. The Tone 
of Debate is energetic, and is suited to both 
proof and refutation.'' The Tone of Amplification 
either rouses the hearer to wrath or moves him to 

Conversational tone comprises four kinds : the 
Dignified,*^ the Explicative, the Narrative, and the 
Facetious. The Dignified, or Serious, Tone of Con- 
versation is marked by some degree of impressive- 
ness and by vocal restraint. The Explicative in a 
calm voice explains how something could or could 
not have been brought to pass. The Narrative sets 
forth events that have occurred or might have 
occurred.'^ The Facetious can on the basis of some 
circumstance elicit a laugh which is modest and 

In the Tone of Debate are distinguishable the 
Sustained and the Broken. The Sustained is full- 
voiced and accelerated delivery. The Broken Tone 
of Debate is punctuated repeatedly with short, inter- 
mittent pauses, and is vociferated sharply. 

24 The Tone of Amplification includes the Hortatory 
and the Pathetic. The Hortatory, by amplifying 

"■ Cf. the definition ofdignitas, 4. xiii. 18 below. 

•* The same definition oi narratio as in 1. iii. 4 above. 

* The Facetious belongs naturally to sermo; see note on 
C(mtentio above. The definition recalls the difference {e.g., 
Aristotle, Eth. Nic. 4. 14, 1128) between the wit whose jests 
are in good taste (eurpaTrtAo?), and the buffoon (/Soj/xoAoxoi-). 



peccatum amplificans auditorem ad iracundiam 
adducit. Conquestio est oratio quae incommodorum 
amplificatione animum auditoris ad misericordiam 

Quoniam igitur mollitudo vocis in tres partes 
divisa est, et eae partes ipsae sunt in octo partes 
alias distributae, harum octo partium quae cuiusque 
idonea pronuntiatio sit demonstrandum videtur. 

XIV. Sermo cum est in dignitate, plenis faucibus 
quam sedatissima et depressissima voce uti conveniet, 
ita tamen ut ne ab oratoria consuetudine ad tragicam 
transeamus. Cum autem est in demonstratione, 
voce paululum attenuata, crebris intervallis et 
divisionibus oportet uti, ut in ipsa pronuntiatione 
eas res quas demonstrabimus inserere atque insecare 
videamur in animis auditorum. Cum autem est sermo 
in narratione, vocum varietates opus sunt, ut quo 
quidque pacto gestum sit ita narrare videamur.^ 
Strenue quod volumus ostendere factum, celeriuscule 
dicemus; at aliud otiose, retardabimus. Deinde 
modo acriter, turn clementer, maeste, hilare in 
omnes partes commutabimus ut verba item pro- 
nuntiationem. Si qua inciderint in narrationem 
dicta, rogata, responsa, si quae admirationes de 
quibus nos narrabimus, diligenter animum adver- 
temus ut omnium personarum sensus atque animos 
^ videamur Id : videatur other MSS. Mx. 

* Amplification and Appeal to Pity are separated in 2, xxx. 
47 and 2. xxxi. 50 above; c/. 4. viii. 11 (the Grand Style), 
4. xxviii. 38 (Reduplication), 4. liii. 66 (Personification), and 
also 4. xxxix. 51 (Vivid Description) below, 



II. 24-\iv. 24 

some fault, incites the hearer to indignation. The 
Pathetic, by amplifying misfortunes, wins the hearer 
over to \nty° 

Since, then, vocal flexibility is divided into three 
tones, and these in turn subdivide into eight others, 
it appears that we must explain what delivery is 
appropriate to each of these eight subdivisions. 

XIV. (1) For the Dignified Conversational Tone it 
will be proper to use the full throat but the calmest 
and most subdued voice possible, yet not in such a 
fashion that we pass from the practice of the orator 
to that of the tragedian.* (2) For the Explica- 
tive Conversational Tone one ought to use a rather 
thin-toned voice, and frequent pauses and inter- 
missions, so that we seem by means of the delivery 
itself to implant and engrave in the hearer's mind 
the points we are making in our explanation. 
(3) For the Narrative Conversational Tone varied 
intonations are necessary-, so that we seem to recount 
everything just as it took place. Our delivery will 
be somewhat rapid when we narrate what we wish 
to show was done vigorously, and it will be slower 
when we narrate something else done in leisurely 
fashion. Then, corresponding to the content of 
the words, we shall modify the delivery in all the 
kinds of tone, now to sharpness, now to kindness, or 
now to sadness, and now to gaiety. If in the 
Statement of Facts there occur any declarations, 
demands, replies, or exclamations of astonishment 
concerning the facts we are narrating, we shall give 
careful attention to expressing with the voice the 

* On the speaker's delivery as against the actor's see 
3. XV. 26 below; Cicero, Orator 25. 86; Quintilian, 11. 3. 57, 
181 flf. 



25 voce exprimamus. Sin erit sermo in iocatione, 
leviter tremebunda voce, cum parva significatione 
risus, sine ulla suspicione nimiae cachinnationis 
leniter oportebit ab sermone serio torquere verba 
ad liberalem iocum. 

Cum autem contendere oportebit, quoniam id aut 
per continuationem aut per distributionem facien- 
dumst, in continuatione, adaucto mediocriter sono 
vocis,^ verbis continuandis vocem quoque iungere ^ 
oportebit et torquere sonum et celeriter cum clamore 
verba conficere, ut vim volubilem orationis vociferatio 
consequi possit. In distributione vocis ab imis 
faucibus exclamationem quam clarissimam adhibere 
oportet, et quantum spatii in singulas exclamationes 
sumpserimus, tantum in singula intervalla spatii 
consumere iubemur. 

In amplificationibus cum cohortatione utemur voce 
adtenuatissima, clamore leni, sono aequabili, com- 
mutationibus crebris, maxima celeritate. In con- 
questione utemur voce depressa, inclinato sono, 
crebris intervallis, longis spatiis, magnis commuta- 

XV. De figura vocis satis dictum est ; nunc de 
corporis motu dicendum videtur. 
20 Motus est corporis gestus et vultus moderatio 
quaedam quae probabiliora reddit ea quae pro- 
nuntiantur. Convenit igitur in vultu pudorem et 
acrimoniam esse, in gestu nee venustatem conspi- 

1 vocis P"^ CUE Mx ed. mai. : voci M Mx. 

2 iungere P^JS^II : adiungere d : augere CE Mx : rugere M. 

" For the fullest extant treatment of gesture in ancient 
rhetoric see Quintilian, Bk. 11, ch. 3. 


AD HKRENNIUM, III. xiv. 24-xv. 26 

25 feelings and thoughts of each personage. (4) For 
the Facetious Conversational Tone, with a gentle 
quiver in the voice, and a slight suggestion of a 
smile, but without any trace of immoderate laughter, 
one ought to shift one's utterance smoothly from the 
Serious Conversational tone to the tone of gentle- 
manly jest. 

Since the Tone of Debate is to be expressed either 
through the Sustained or the Broken, when the 
(5) Sustained Tone of Debate is required, one ought 
moderately to increase the vocal volume, and, in 
maintaining an uninterrupted flow of words, also to 
bring the voice into harmony with them, to inflect 
the tone accordingly, and to deliver the words 
rapidly in a full voice, so that the voice production 
can follow the fluent energy of the speech. (6) For 
the Broken Tone of Debate we must with deepest 
chest tones produce the clearest possible exclama- 
tions, and I advise giving as much time to each pause 
as to each exclamation. 

For (7) the Hortatory Tone of Amplification we 
shall use a very thin-toned voice, moderate loudness, 
an even flow of sound, frequent modulations, and the 
utmost speed. (8) For the Pathetic Tone of 
Amplification we shall use a restrained voice, deep 
tone, frequent intermissions, long pauses, and 
marked changes. 

XV. On Voice Quality enough has been said. 
Now it seems best to discuss Physical Movement. 
2o Physical movement ° consists in a certain control 
of gesture and mien which renders what is delivered 
more plausible. Accordingly the facial expression 
should show modesty and animation, and the gestures 
should not be conspicuous for either elegance or 



ciendam nee turpitudinem esse, ne aut histriones aut 
operarii videamur esse. Ad easdem igitur partes in 
quas vox est distributa motus quoque corporis ratio 
videtur esse adcommodanda. Nam si erit sermo 
cum dignitate, stantis in vestigio, levi dexterae motu, 
loqui oportebit, hilaritate, tristitia, mediocritate 
vultus ad sermonis sententias adcommodata. Sin 
erit in demonstratione sermo, paululum corpus a 
cervicibus demittemus ; nam est hoc datum ut quam 
proxime tum vultum admoveamus ad auditores si 
quam rem docere eos et vehementer instigare 
velimus. Sin erit in narratione sermo, idem motus 
poterit idoneus esse qui paulo ante demonstrabatur in 
dignitate. Sin in iocatione, vultu quandam debe- 
bimus hilaritatem significare sine commutatione 
27 Sin contendemus per continuationem, brachio cele- 
ri, mobili vultu, acri aspectu utemur. Sin contentio 
fiet per distributionem, porrectione perceleri brachii, 
inambulatione, pedis dexteri rara supplausione,^ acri 
et defixo aspectu uti oportet. 

Sin utemur amplificatione per cohortationem, 
paulo tardiore et consideratiore gestu conveniet uti, 
similibus ceteris rebus atque in contentione per 
continuationem. Sin utemur amplificatione per 

' supplausione bl, subplausione F^UB^ : supplusione Hd, 
subplusione PBMx : subplosione C. 

" Here doubtless is the Theophrastan tradition of to 
TTpdnov (see note on 4. x. 15 below) ; yet Athenaeus, 1. 20, says 


AD HERENXIUM, III. xv. 26-27 

grossness,** lest we give the impression that we are 
either actors or day labourers. It seems, then, that 
the rules regulating bodily movement ought to 
correspond to the several divisions of tone comprising 
voice. To illustrate : (1) For the Dignified Conver- 
sational Tone, the speaker must stay in position 
when he speaks, lightly moving his right hand, his 
countenance expressing an emotion corresponding 
to the sentiments of the subject — gaiety or sadness 
or an emotion intermediate. (2) For the Explicative 
Conversational Tone, we shall incline the body 
forward a little from the shoulders, since it is natural 
to bring the face as close as possible to our hearers 
when we wish to prove a point and arouse them 
vigorously. (3) For the Narrative Conversational 
Tone, the same physical movement as I have just set 
forth for the Dignified will be appropriate, (-i) For 
the Facetious Conversational Tone, we should by our 
countenance express a certain gaiety, without 
chanffinjr crestures. 
27 (5) For the Sustained Tone of Debate, we shall use 
a quick gesture of the arm. a mobile countenance, and 
a keen glance. (6) For the Broken Tone of Debate, 
one must extend the arm very quickly, walk up and 
down, occasionally stamp the right foot, and adopt a 
keen and fixed look. 

(7) For the Hortatory Tone of Amplification, it 
will be appropriate to use a somewhat slower and 
more deliberate gesticulation, but otherwise to 
follow the procedure for the Sustained Tone of 
Debate. (8) For the Pathetic Tone of Amplification, 

that Theophrastus gave free play to gestures in his own 
delivery. Cf. 3. xiv. 24 above; also Cicero, De Oratore 
2. 59. 242. 3. 59. 220; QuintiUan, 11. 3. 89; Gellius 1. 5. 



conquestionem, feminis plangore et capitis ictu, 
nonnumquam sedato et constanti gestu, maesto et 
conturbato vultu uti oportebit. 

Non sum nescius quantum susceperim negotii qui 
motus corporis exprimere verbis et imitari scriptura 
conatus sim voces. Verum nee hoc confisus sum 
posse fieri ut de his rebus satis commode scribi 
posset, nee, si id fieri non posset, hoc quod feci fore 
inutile putabam, propterea quod hie admonere 
voluimus quid oporteret ; reliqua trademus exercita- 
tioni. Hoc tamen scire oportet, pronuntiationem 
bonam id proficere,^ ut res ex animo agi videatur. 
28 XVI. Nunc ad thesaurum inventorum atque ad 
omnium partium rhetoricae custodem, memoriam, 

Memoria utrum habeat quiddam artificiosi, an 
omiiis ab natura proficiscatur, aliud dicendi tempus 
magis idoneum dabitur. Nunc proinde atque constet 
in hac re multum valere artem et praeceptionem, ita 
de ea re loquemur. Placet enim nobis esse artificium 
^ proficere 31 : perficere other MSS. Mx. 

• C/. Quintilian, 11. 3. 123 : " Slapping the thigh, which, 
it is believed, Cleon [see Plutarch, Nicias 8] was the first to 
introduce at Athens, is in common use; it is becoming as a 
sign of indignation and also excites the hearer. Cicero [Brutus 
80. 278] misses this in CaUdius." In Lucian, Rhetor. Praeceptor 
19, the young learner is satirically encouraged to make use of 
this gesture. 

* On ancient mnemonics see Helga Hajdu, Das mnemo- 
technische Schrifttum des Mittelalters (Vienna, Amsterdam, 
and Leipzig, 1936), pp. 11-33, and L. A. Post, Class. Weekly 


AD HERENNIUM, III. xv. 27-xvi. 28 

one ought to slap one's tliigh * and beat one's head, 
and sometimes to use a cahn and uniform gesticula- 
tion and a sad and disturbed expression. 

I am not unaware how great a task I have under- 
taken in trying to express physical movements in 
words and portray vocal intonations in writing. 
True, I was not confident that it was possible to treat 
these matters adequately in writing. Yet neither 
did I suppose that, if such a treatment were im- 
possible, it would follow that what I have done here 
would be useless, for it has been my purpose merely 
to suggest what ought to be done. The rest I shall 
leave to practice. This, nevertheless, one must 
remember: good delivery ensures that what the 
orator is saying seems to come from his heart. 
28 XVI. Now let me turn to the treasure-house of the 
ideas supplied by Invention, to the guardian of all the 
parts of rhetoric, the Memory.* 

The question whether memory has some artificial 
quality, or comes entirely from nature, we shall have 
another, more favourable, opportunity to discuss. At 
present I shall accept as proved that in this matter 
art and method are of great importance, and shall 
treat the subject accordingly. For my part, I am 

25 (1932). 105-110; on Memory in oral literature, J. A. 
Notopoulos, Trans. Am. Philol. Assn. 69 (1938). 465-493. 
The rhetorical interest in memoria appears early, among the 
sophists, who valued its uses in the learning of common- 
places and for improvisation. Our author's mnemonic 
system is the oldest extant. Whether such pictorial methods 
were widely used by the orators we do not know, but the 
theory persists to this day. See also Longinus, in Spengel- 
Hammer 1 (2). 197-206;' Cicero, Z)e Oratore 2. 85. 350-88. 
360; and esp. Quintilian's historical and critical treatment, 
11. 2. 1-51. 



memoriae — quare placeat alias ostendemus ; in 
praesentia cuiusmodi sit ea aperiemus. 

Sunt igitur duae memoriae : una naturalis, altera 
artificiosa. Naturalis est ea quae nostris animis 
insita est et simul cum cogitatione nata; artificiosa 
est ea quam confirmat inductio quaedam et ratio 
praeceptionis. Sed qua via in ceteris rebus ingenii 
bonitas imitatur saepe doctrinam, ars porro naturae 
commoda confirmat et auget, item fit in hac re ut 
nonnumquam naturalis memoria, si cui data est 
29 egregia, similis sit huic artificiosae, porro haec arti- 
ficiosa naturae commoda retineat et amplificet ratione 
doctrinae. Quapropter et naturalis memoria prae- 
ceptione confirmanda est ut sit egregia, et haec quae 
doctrina datur indiget ingenii. Nee hoc magis aut 
minus in hac re quam in ceteris artibus fit, ut ingenio 
doctrina, praeceptione natura nitescat. Quare et 
illis qui natura memores sunt utilis haec erit institutio, 
quod tute paulo post poteris intellegere ; et si illi, 
freti ingenio, nostri non indigerent, tamen iusta causa 
daretur quare iis qui minus ingenii habent adiumento 
velimus esse. Nunc de artificiosa memoria loquemur. 

" Whether our author ever published such an explanation 
we do not know. See notes on 3. ii. 3 and 4. xii. 17. 

* For the commonplace c/. Isocrates, Adv. Soph. 14 fif., 
Antid. 189 fF. ; Plato, Phaedrus 269 D; Cicero, Pro Archia 7. 
15, TiLsc. Disp. 2. 13, Crassus in De Oratore 1. 25. 113 £F.; 
Horace, Ars Poet. 408-11; the comic (?) poet Simylus, in 
Stobaeus, 4. 18 a 4; Longinus, De Sublim. 36. 4; QuintiUan, 
2. 19. 1 ff., and (on Delivery) 11. 3. 11 fif. ; and for its apphca- 


AD HERENNIUM, III. xvi. 28-29 

satisfied that there is an art of memory — the frrounds 
of my belief I shall explain elsewhere.'* For the 
present I shall disclose what sort of thing memory is. 
There are, then, two kinds of memory : one 
natural, and the other the product of art. The 
natural memory is that memory which is imbedded 
in our minds, born simultaneously with thought. 
The artificial memory is that memory which is 
strengthened by a kind of training and system of 
discipline. But just as in everything else the merit 
of natural excellence often rivals ac{juired learning, 
and art, in its turn, reinforces and develops the 
natural advantages,^ so does it happen in this 
instance. The natural memory, if a person is 
29 endowed with an exceptional one, is often like this 
artificial memory, and this artificial memory, in its 
turn, retains and develops the natural advantages by 
a method of discipline. Thus the natural memory 
must be strengthened by discipline so as to become 
exceptional, and, on the other hand, this memory 
provided by discipline requires natural ability. It 
is neither more nor less true in this instance than in 
the other arts that science thrives by the aid of innate 
ability, and nature by the aid of the rules of art. 
The training here offered will therefore also be use- 
ful to those who by nature have a good memory, 
as you will yourself soon come to understand.*^ But 
even if these, relying on their natural talent, did not 
need our help, we should still be justified in wishing to 
aid the less well-endowed. Now I shall discuss the 
artificial memory. 

tion to memoria Antonius in Cicero, Dc Oratore 2. 88. 360, and 
Longinus, in Spengel- Hammer 1 (2). 204. 
' Cf. 3. xxii. 36 below. 



Constat igitur artificiosa memoria ex locis et ^ 
imaginibus. Locos appellamus eos qui breviter, 
perfecte, insignite aut natura aut manu sunt absoluti, 
ut eos facile naturali memoria conprehendere et 
amplecti queamus : ut aedes, intercolumnium, 
angulum, fornicem, et alia quae his similia sunt. 
Imagines sunt formae quaedam et notae et simulacra 
eius rei quam meminisse volumus ; quod genus equi, 
leonis, aquilae memoriam si volemus habere, imagines 
30 eorum locis certis conlocare oportebit. Nunc cuius- 
modi locos invenire et quo pacto reperire et in locis 
imagines constituere oporteat ostendemus. 

XVII. Quemadmodum igitur qui litteras sciunt 
possunt id quod dictatur eis scribere, et recitare quod 
scripserunt, item qui mnemonica ^ didicerunt possunt 
quod audierunt in locis conlocare et ex his memoriter 
pronuntiare. Nam loci cerae aut chartae simillimi 
sunt, imagines litteris, dispositio et conlocatio 
imaginum scripturae, pronuntiatio lectioni. Oportet 
igitur, si volumus multa meminisse, multos nos nobis 
locos conparare, uti multis locis multas imagines con- 
locare possimus. Item putamus oportere ex ordine 
hos locos habere, ne quando perturbatione ordinis 

1 ex locis M : locis et E Mx. 

^ qui mnemonica Aldus : qui nemonica Mx : quinimmodica 
P : qui inmodica Hb ; qui immodica 115 Old. 

" Cf. " the table of my memory," Shakespeare, Hamlet 

1. 5. 98. For the analogy with wax cf. Socrates in Plato, 
Theaet. 191 CD; Cicero, Part. Orat. 6. 26, and in De Oratore 

2. 88. 360, Charmadas {fl. 107 B.C.) and Metrodorus (bom c. 
150 B.C.); and the seal-ring in Aristotle, De Mem. et Recollect. 


AD HERKNNIUM, III. \vi. 29-.\vii. 30 

The artificial memory includes backgrounds and 
images. By backgrounds I mean such scenes as are 
naturally or artificially set off on a small scale, com- 
plete and conspicuous, so that we can grasp and 
embrace them easily by the natural memory — for 
example, a house, an intercolumnar space, a recess, an 
arch, or the like. An image is, as it were, a figure, 
mark, or portrait of the object we wish to remember ; 
for example, if we wish to recall a horse, a lion, or an 
eagle, we must place its image in a definite back- 
30 ground. Now I shall show what kind of backgrounds 
we should invent and how we should discover the 
images and set them therein. 

XVII. Those who know the letters of the alphabet 
can thereby write out what is dictated to them and 
read aloud what they have written. Likewise, those 
who have learned mnemonics can set in backgrounds 
what they have heard, and from these backgrounds 
deliver it by memory. For the backgrounds are very 
much like wax tablets " or papyrus, the images like 
the letters, the arrangement and disposition of the 
images like the script, and the delivery is like the 
reading. We should therefore, if we desire to 
memorize a large number of items, equip ourselves 
with a large number of backgrounds, so that in these 
we may set a large number of images. I likewise 
think it obligatory to have these backgrounds in a 
series, so that we may never by confusion in their 
order be prevented from following the images — 

450 ab. Cf. also, in Theophrastus, De Sens. 51-2, Demo- 
critus' theory that in vision the air is moulded like wax, and 
see the interpretation of this passage by Paul Friedlander, 
Die platonischen Schriften, Berlin and Leipzig, 1930, p. 448, 
note 1. 



inpediamur quo setius quoto quoque loco ^ libebit, 
vel ab superiore vel ab inferiore parte, imagines 
sequi, et ea quae mandata locis erunt edere possimus ; 

XVIII. nam ut, si in ordine stantes notos complures 
viderimus, nihil nostra intersit utrum ab summo an ab 
imo an ab medio nomina eorum dicere incipiamus, 
item in locis ex ordine conlocatis eveniet ut in 
quamlibebit partem quoque loco libebit, imaginibus 
commoniti, dicere possimus id quod locis manda- 

31 verimus. Quare placet et ex ordine locos conparare. 
Locos quos sumpserimus egregie commeditari 
oportebit, ut perpetuo nobis haerere possint ; nam 
imagines, sicuti litterae, delentur ubi nihil utimur; 
loci, tamquam cera, remanere debent. Et ne forte in 
numero locorum falli possimus, quintum quemque 
placet notari ; quod genus si in quinto loco manum 
auream conlocemus, si in decimo aliquem notum 
cui praenomen sit Decimo, deinde facile erit dein- 
ceps ^ similis notas quinto quoque ^ loco conlocare. 

XIX. Item commodius est in derelicta quam in celebri 
regione locos conparare, propterea quod frequentia et 
obambulatio hominum conturbat et infirmat ima- 
ginum notas, solitudo conservat integras simula- 
crorum figuras. Praeterea dissimiles forma atque 
natura loci conparandi sunt, ut distincti interlucere 

^ quoq(ue) loco I: loco quoque H : quoq(ue) PH: 
quidq(ue) loco G : quidq(ue) B : quoquo loco E Mx. 
2 deinceps PmB'-CE : inceps HPB Mx. 
^ quoque M : quoquo E Mx. 


AD HKRKNNIUM, III. wii. 30-xix. 31 

proceeding from any background we wisli, what- 
soever its place in the series, and wliether we go 
forwards or backwards — nor from delivering orally 
what has been committed to the backgrounds. 
X\'III. For example, if we should see a great 
number of our acquaintances standing in a certain 
order, it would not make any difference to us whether 
we should tell their names beginning with the person 
standing at the head of the line or at the foot or in 
the middle. So with respect to the backgrounds. 
If these have been arranged in order, the result will 
be that, reminded by the images, we can repeat orally 
what we have committed to the backgrounds, pro- 
31 ceeding in either direction from any background we 
please. That is why it also seems best to arrange 
the backgrounds in a series. 

We shall need to study with special care the back- 
grounds we have adopted so that they may cling 
lastingly in our memory, for the images, like letters, 
are effaced when we make no use of them, but the 
backgrounds, like wax tablets, should abide. And 
that we may by no chance err in the number of 
backgrounds, each fifth background should be 
marked. For example, if in the fifth we should set a 
golden hand, and in the tenth some acquaintance 
whose first name is Decimus, it will then be easy to 
station like marks in each successive fifth background. 
XIX. Again, it xvill be more advantageous to 
obtain backgrounds in a deserted than in a populous 
region, because the crowding and passing to and fro 
of people confuse and weaken the impress of the 
images, while solitude keeps their outlines sharp. 
Further, backgrounds differing in form and nature 
must be secured, so that, thus distinguished, they 



possint; nam si qui multa intercolumnia sumpserit, 
conturbabitur similitudine ut ignoret quid in quoque ^ 
loco conlocarit. Et magnitudine modica et medio- 
cres locos habere oportet ; nam et praeter modum 
ampli vagas imagines reddunt, et nimis angusti 
saepe non videntur posse capere imaginum con- 

32 locationem. Tum nee nimis inlustres nee vehementer 
obscuros locos habere oportet, ne aut obcaecentur 
tenebris imagines aut splendore praefulgeant. Inter- 
valla locorum mediocria placet esse, fere paulo plus 
aut minus pedum tricenum ; nam ut aspectus item 
cogitatio minus valet sive nimis procul removeris sive 
vehementer prope admoveris id quod oportet videri. 

Sed quamquam facile est ei qui paulo plura noverit 
quamvis multos et idoneos locos conparare, tamen si 
qui satis idoneos invenire se non putabit, ipse sibi 
constituat quam volet multos licebit. Cogitatio enim 
quamvis region em potest amplecti, et in ea situm 
loci cuiusdam ad suum arbitrium fabricari et archi- 
tectari. Quare licebit, si hac prompta copia contenti 
non erimus, nosmet ipsos nobis cogitatione nostra 
regionem constituere, et idoneorum locorum com- 
modissimam distinctionem conparare. 

De locis satis dictum est; nunc ad imaginum 
rationem transeamus. 

33 XX. Quoniam ergo rerum similes imagines esse 
oportet, ex omnibus rebus nosmet nobis similitudines 
eligere debemus. Duplices igitur similitudines esse 

^ quoque Ml : uno quoque d : quoquo bMx. 

AD HERENNIUM, III. xi.v. 31-xx. 33 

may be clearly visible ; for if a person has adopted 
many intercolumnar spaces, their resemblance to one 
another will so confuse him that he will no longer 
know what he has set in each background. And 
these backgrounds ought to be of moderate size and 
medium extent, for when excessively large they 
render the images vague, and when too small often 
seem incapable of receiving an arrangement of 

32 images. Then the backgrounds ought to be neither 
too bright nor too dim, so that the shadows may not 
obscure the images nor the lustre make them glitter. 
I believe that the intervals between backgrounds 
should be of moderate extent, approximately thirty 
feet ; for, like the external eye, so the inner eye of 
thought is less powerful when you have moved the 
object of sight too near or too far away. 

Although it is easy for a person with a relatively 
large experience to equip himself with as many and as 
suitable backgrounds as he may desire, even a person 
who believes that he finds no store of backgrounds 
that are good enough, may succeed in fashioning as 
many such as he wishes. For the imagination can 
embrace any region whatsoever and in it at will 
fashion and construct the setting of some back- 
ground. Hence, if we are not content with our 
ready-made supply of backgrounds, we may in our 
imagination create a region for ourselves and obtain 
a most serviceable distribution of appropriate 

On the subject of backgrounds enough has been 
said ; let me now turn to the theory of images. 

33 XX. Since, then, images must resemble objects, 
we ought ourselves to choose from all objects like- 
nesses for our use. Hence likenesses are bound to 



debent, unae rerum, alterae verborum. Rerum simili- 
tudines exprimuntur cum summatim ipsorum nego- 
tiorum imagines conparamus ; verborum simili- 
tudines constituuntur cum unius cuiusque nominis et 
vocabuli memoria imagine notatur. 

Rei totius memoriam saepe una nota et imagine 
simplici conprehendimus ; hoc modo, ut si accusator 
dixerit ab reo hominem veneno necatum et hereditatis 
causa factum arguerit et eius rei multos dixerit testes 
et conscios esse. Si hoc primum, ut ad defendendum 
nobis expeditum sit, meminisse volemus, in primo 
loco rei totius imaginem conformabimus ; aegrotum 
in lecto cubantem faciemus ipsum ilium de quo 
agetur, si formam eius detinebimus ; si eum non 
agnoverimus,^ at aliquem aegrotum non de minimo 
loco sumemus, ut cito in mentem venire possit. 
Et reum ad lectum eius adstituemus, dextera pocu- 
lum, sinistra tabulas, medico testiculos arietinos 
tenentem. Hoc modo et testium et hereditatis et 
34 veneno necati memoriam habere poterimus. Item 
deinceps cetera crimina ex ordine in locis ponemus 
et quotienscumque rem meminisse volemus, si for- 
marum dispositione et imaginum diligenti notatione 
utemur, facile ea quae volemus memoria consequemur. 

^ agnoverimus E : other MSS. Mx omit. 

" Thus memoria embraces the speaker's command of his 
material as well as of the words. 

* According to Macrobius, Sat. 7. 13. 7-8, the anatomists 
spoke of a nerve which extends from the heart to the fourth 
finger of the left hand (the digitus medicinalis), where it 
interlaces into the other nerves of that finger ; the finger was 
therefore ringed, as with a crown. Testiculi suggests testes 


AD HERENNIUM, III. xx. 33-34 

be of two kinds, one of subject-matter,^^ the other of 
words. Likenesses of matter are formed when we 
enlist images that present a general view of the 
matter with which we are dealing; likenesses of 
words are established when the record of each single 
noun or appellative is kept by an image. 

Often we encompass the record of an entire matter 
by one notation, a single image. For example, the 
prosecutor has said that the defendant killed a man by 
poison, has charged that the motive for the crime was 
an inheritance, and declared that there are many 
witnesses and accessories to this act. If in order to 
facilitate our defence we wish to remember this first 
point, we shall in our first background form an image 
of the whole matter. We shall picture the man in 
question as lying ill in bed, if we know his person. 
If we do not know him, we shall yet take some one to 
be our invalid, but not a man of the lowest class, so 
that he may come to mind at once. And we shall 
place the defendant at the bedside, holding in his 
right hand a cup, and in his left tablets, and on the 
fourth finger ^ a ram's testicles. In this way we can 
record the man who was poisoned, the inheritance, and 
34 the witnesses. In like fashion we shall set the other 
counts of the charge in backgrounds successively, 
following their order, and whenever we wish to 
remember a point, by properly arranging the patterns 
of the backgrounds ^ and carefully imprinting the 
images, we shall easily succeed in calling back to mind 
what we wish. 

(%vitnesses). Of the scrotum of the ram purses were made; 
thus the money used for bribing the witnesses may perhaps 
also be suggested. 

" At 3. xvi. 29 above farmae is used to describe the images. 



XXI. Cum verborum similitudines imaginibus 
exprimere volemus, plus negotii suscipiemus et magis 
ingenium nostrum exercebimus. Id nos hoc mode 
facere oportebit : 

lam domum itionem reges Atridae parant. 

Hunc versum meminisse si volemus, conveniet primo ^ 
in loco constituere manus ad caelum tollentem 
Domitium cum a Regibus Marciis loris caedatur — 
hoc erit " lam domum itionem reges ; " in altero loco 
Aesopum et Cimbrum subornari ut ad Iphigeniam ^ 
in Agamemnonem et Menelaum — hoc erit " Atridae 
parant." Hoc modo omnia verba erunt expressa. 
Sed haec imaginum conformatio tum valet si 
naturalem memoriam exsuscitaverimus hac notatione, 
ut versu posito ipsi nobiscum primum transeamus bis 
aut ter eum versum, deinde tum imaginibus verba 
exprimamus. Hoc modo naturae suppeditabitur 
doctrina. Nam utraque altera separata minus erit 
firma, ita tamen ut multo plus in doctrina atque arte 
praesidii sit. Quod docere non gravaremur, ni 

^ lac. ; hunc versum meminisse si volemus conveniet primo 
sugg. Mx. 

^ Ephigeniam MSS. Mx. 

" An iambic senarius, whether our author's own creation 
or from a tragedy by an unknown author (the IpMgenia 
mentioned below ? ) is uncertain. Note that here the play is 
upon the form of the word, not its meaning, and that no 
special provision is made for the adverb iam. Quintilian, 
11.2. 25, doubts the efficacy of symbols to record a series of 
connected words : " I do not mention the fact that some things, 
certainly conjunctions, for example, cannot be represented by 



XXI. When we wish to represent by images the 
hkenesses of words, we shall be undertaking a greater 
task and exercising our ingenuity the more. This 
we ought to effect in the following way : 

lam domum itionem reges Atridae parant." 

" And now their home-coming the kings, the sons 
of Atreus, are making ready." 

If we wish to remember this verse, in our first back- 
ground we should put Domitius, raising hands to 
heaven while he is lashed by the Marcii Reges * — 
that will represent " lam domum itionem reges " 
("And now their home-coming the kings,"); in 
the second background, Aesopus and Cimber,<^ being 
dressed as for the roles of Agamemnon and Menelaus 
in Ipkigenia — that will represent " Atridae parant " 
(" the sons of Atreus, are making ready "). By this 
method all the words will be represented. But such 
an arrangement of images succeeds only if we use 
our notation to stimulate the natural memory, so 
that we first go over a given verse twice or three 
times to ourselves and then represent the words by 
means of images. In this way art will supplement 
nature. For neither by itself will be strong enough, 
though we must note that theory and technique are 
much the more reliable. I should not hesitate to 

* The scene is doubtless our author's own creation. Rex 
was the name of one of the most distinguished families of the 
Marcian gens; the Domitian (of plebeian origin) was likewise 
a celebrated gens. 

' Clodius Aesopus (a friend of Cicero) was the greatest 
tragic actor of the first half of tlie first century B.C. ; Cimber, 
mentioned only here, was no doubt also a favourite of the 
day. See Otto Ribbeck, Die romische Tragodie im Zeitalter 
der Bepuhlik, Leipzig, 1875, pp. 674-6. 



metueremus ne, cum ab institute nostro recessis- 
semus, minus commode servaretur haec dilucida 
brevitas praeceptionis. 

35 Nunc, quoniam solet accidere ut imagines partim 
firmae et acres et ad monendum idoneae sint, partim 
inbecillae et infirmae quae vix memoriam possint 
excitare, qua de causa utrumque fiat considerandum 
est, ut, cognita causa, quas vitemus et quas sequamur 
imagines scire possimus. 

XXII. Docet igitur nos ipsa natura quid oporteat 
fieri. Nam si quas res in vita videmus parvas, usita- 
tas, cotidianas, meminisse non solemus, propterea 
quod nulla nova nee admirabili re commovetur 
animus; at si quid videmus aut audimus egregie 
turpe, inhonestum, inusitatum, magnum, incredibile, 
ridiculum, id diu meminisse consuevimus. Itaque 
quas res ante ora videmus aut audimus obliviscimur 
plerumque ; quae acciderunt in pueritia meminimus 
optime saepe ; nee hoc alia de causa potest accidere 
nisi quod usitatae res facile e memoria elabuntur, in- 

36 signes et novae diutius manent in animo. Solis 
exortus, cursus, occasus nemo admiratur propterea 
quia cotidie fiunt ; at eclipses ^ solis mirantur quia 
raro accidunt, et solis eclipses ^ magis mirantur quam 
lunae propterea quod hae ^ crebriores sunt. Docet 
ergo se natura vulgari et usitata re non exsuscitari, 
novitate et insigni quodam negotio commoveri. 
Imitetur ars igitur naturam, et quod ea desiderat id 

^ eclipsis mbd Mx : eclypsis HBCl : aeglypsis P. 

2 eclipses b : eclipsis 11 d Mx : eclypsis HB I : aeclipsis C : 
aeglypsis P. 

3 hae P^B Cbd: haec I Mx. 

** Cf. Jerome, Apol. adv. libr. Rufini 1. 30. 

AD HKREXNIUM, III. xxi. 34-\mi. 36 

demonstrate this in detail, did I not fear that, onee 
having departed from my plan, I should not so well 
preserve the clear conciseness of my instruction. 

35 Now, since in normal cases some images are 
strong and sharp and suitable for awakening recollec- 
tion, and others so weak and feeble as hardly to 
succeed in stimulating memory, we must therefore 
consider the cause of these differences, so that, by 
knowing the cause, we may know which images to 
avoid and which to seek. 

XXII. Now nature herself teaches us what we 
should do. When we see in everyday life things that 
are petty, ordinary, and banal, we generally fail to 
remember them, because the mind is not being stirred 
by anything novel or marvellous. But if we see or 
hear something exceptionally base, dishonourable, 
extraordinary, great, unbelievable, or laughable, 
that we are likely to remember a long time. x\ccord- 
ingly, things immediate to our eye or ear we com- 
monly forget ; incidents of our childhood we often 
remember best." Nor could this be so for any other 
reason than that ordinary things easily slip from the 
memory while the striking and novel stay longer in 

36 mind. A sunrise, the sun's course, a sunset, are 
marvellous to no one because they occur daily. ^ 
But solar eclipses are a source of wonder because 
they occur seldom, and indeed are more marvellous 
than lunar eclipses, because these are more frequent. 
Thus nature shows that she is not aroused by the 
common, ordinary event, but is moved by a new or 

^ Cf. Lucretius 2. 1037-8 : " So wondrous v.ould this sight 
have been. Yet, wearied as all are with satiety of seeing, 
how truly no one now deigns to gaze up at the bright quarters 
of heaven ! " 



inveniat, quod ostendit sequatur. Nihil est enim 
quod aut natura extremum invenerit aut doctrina 
primum ; sed rerum principia ab ingenio profecta 
sunt, exitus disciplina conparantur. 

37 Imagines igitur nos in eo genere constituere oporte- 
bit quod genus in memoria diutissime potest haerere. 
Id accidet si quam maxime notatas similitudines 
constituemus ; si non multas nee vagas, sed aliquid 
agentes imagines ponemus ; si egregiam pulcritu- 
dinem aut unicam turpitudinem eis adtribuemus ; 
si aliquas exornabimus, ut si coronis aut veste 
purpurea, quo nobis notatior sit similitudo ; aut si 
qua re deformabimus, ut si cruentam aut caeno 
oblitam aut rubrica delibutam inducamus, quo magis 
insignita sit forma, aut ridiculas res aliquas imaginibus 
adtribuamus, nam ea res quoque faciet ut facilius 
meminisse valeamus. Nam quas res veras facile 
meminimus,^ easdem fictas et diligenter notatas 
meminisse non difficile est. Sed illud facere oporte- 
bit, ut identidem primos quosque locos imaginum 
renovandarum causa celeriter animo pervagemus. 

38 XXIII. Scio plerosque Graecos qui de memoria 
scripserunt fecisse ut multorum verborum imagines 
conscriberent, uti qui ediscere vellent paratas 
haberent, ne quid in quaerendo consumerent operae. 
Quorum rationem aliquot de causis inprobamus : 

^ meminimus P^BCUd : minus HP : meminerimus blMx. 

» The idea is a commonplace in a variety of schools of 
thought : e.g., Democritus, fragm. 154, in Diels-Kranz, Die 
Fragmenie der Vorsokrafiker, 6th ed., 2. 173, and Lucretius 
5. 1102, 1354, 1361 ff., 1379; Aristotle, Physica 2. 2(194 a) 
and 2. 8 (199 a), Meteor. 4. 3 (381 b), De mundo 5 (396 b, 
in Diels-Kranz 1. 153) ; Theophrastus, De Cans. Plant. 2. 18. 2 ; 
Dionysius Halic, /saei^s, ch. 16; Seneca, £" pis/. 65, 3 ; Marcus 


AD HERENNIUM, 111. xxir. 36XX111. 38 

strikin/]^ occurrence. Let art, then, imitate nature," 
find what she desires, and follow as she directs. 
For in invention nature is never last, education never 
first; rather the beginnings of things arise from 
natural talent, and the ends are reached by discipline. 

37 We ought, then, to set up images of a kind that can 
adhere longest in the memory. And we shall do so if 
we establish likenesses as striking as possible ; if we 
set up images that are not many or vague, but doing 
something ; if we assign to them exceptional beauty 
or singular ugliness ; if we dress some of them with 
crowns or purple cloaks, for example, so that the 
likeness may be more distinct to us ; or if we some- 
how disfigure them, as by introducing one stained 
with blood or soiled with mud or smeared with red 
paint, so that its form is more striking, or by assigning 
certain comic effects to our images, for that, too, will 
ensure our remembering them more readily. The 
things we easily remember when they are real we 
likewise remember without difficulty when they are 
figments, if they have been carefully delineated. 
But this will be essential — again and again to run 
over rapidly in the mind all the original backgrounds 
in order to refresh the images. 

38 XXIII. I know that most of the Greeks who have 
written on the memory ^ have taken the course of 
listing images that correspond to a great many words, 
so that persons who wished to learn these images by 
heart would have them ready without expending 
effort on a search for them. I disapprove of their 
method on several grounds. First, among the 

Aurelius, Medil. 11. 10; Plotinus, Enn. 5. 8. 1 ; Cicero, 

Orator 18. 58; Quintilian, 8. 3. 71; Dante, Inferno 11. 97 fif. 

* Precisely who these predecessors were we do not know. 


primum, quod in verborum innumerabili multitudine 
ridiculumst mille verborum imagines conparare. 
Quantulum enim poterunt haec valere, cum ex 
infinita verborum copia modo aliud modo aliud nos 
verbum meminisse oportebit ? Deinde, cur volumus 
ab industria quemquam removere, ut, ne quid ipse 
quaerat, nos illi omnia parata quaesita tradamus? 
Praeterea, similitudine alia alius magis commovetur. 
Nam ut saepe, formam si quam similem cuipiam 
dixerimus esse, non omnes habemus adsensores, quod 
alii videtur aliud, item fit in imaginibus ut quae nobis 
diligenter notata sit, ea parum videatur insignis aliis. 
39 Quare sibi quemque suo commodo convenit imagines 
conparare. Postremo, praeceptoris est docere quem- 
admodum quaeri quidque conveniat, et unum aliquod 
aut alterum, non omnia quae eius generis erunt 
exempli causa subicere, quo res possit esse dilu- 
cidior ; ut cum de prooemiis ■^ quaerendis disputamus, 
rationem damns quaerendi, non mille prooemiorum ^ 
genera conscribimus, item arbitramur de imaginibus 
fieri convenire. 

XXIV. Nunc, ne forte verborum memoriam aut 
nimis difficilem aut parum utilem arbitrere, rerum 
ipsarum memoria contentus sis, quod et utilior sit et 
plus habeat facultatis, admonendus es quare verborum 
memoriam non inprobemus. Nam putamus oportere 
eos qui velint res faciliores sine labore et molestia 
facere in rebus difficilioribus esse ante exercitatos. 
Nee nos banc verborum memoriam inducimusut versus 

^ prohemiis PHBC Mx : proemiis C^E : praemiis H. 

2 prohemiorum PIVBC Mx: proemiorum C^E: premiorum H. 




innumerable multitude of words it is ridiculous to 
collect imaj^es for a thousand. How meagre is the 
value these can have, when out of the infinite store of 
words we shall need to remember now one, and now 
another ? Secondly, why do we wish to rob anybody 
of his initiative, so that, to save him from making 
any search himself, we deliver to him everything 
searched out and ready ? Then again, one person is 
more struck by one likeness, and another more by 
another. Often in fact when we declare that some 
one form resembles another, we fail to receive uni- 
versal assent, because things seem different to different 
persons. The same is true with respect to images : 
one that is well-defined to us appears relatively 
39 inconspicuous to others. Ever}'body, therefore, 
should in equipping himself ^^•ith images suit his own 
convenience. Finally, it is the instructor's duty to 
teach the proper method of search in each case, 
and, for the sake of greater clarity, to add in illustra- 
tion some one or two examples of its kind, but not all. 
For instance, when I discuss the search for Intro- 
ductions, I give a method of search and do not 
draught a thousand kinds of Introductions. The 
same procedure I believe should be followed with 
respect to images. 

XXIV. Now, lest you should perchance regard the 
memorizing of words either as too difficult or as of 
too little use, and so rest content with the memorizing 
of matter, as being easier and more useful, I must 
ad\"ise you why I do not disapprove of memorizing 
words. I believe that they who wish to do easy 
things without trouble and toil must pre\iously 
have been trained in more difficult things. Nor have 
I included memorization of words to enable us to get 



meminisse possimus, sed ut hac exercitatione ilia 
rerum memoria quae pertinet ad utilitatem confirme- 
tur, ut ab hac difficili consuetudine sine labore ad 
40 illam facultatem transire possimus. Sed cum in 
omni disciplina infirma est artis praeceptio sine 
summa adsiduitate exercitationis, tum vero in 
mnemonicis ^ minimum valet doctrina, nisi industria, 
studio, labore, diligentia conprobatur. Quam pluri- 
mos locos ut habeas et quam maxime ad praecepta 
adcommodatos curare poteris; in imaginibus con- 
locandis exerceri cotidie convenit. Non enim, sicut a 
ceteris studiis abducimur nonnumquam occupatione, 
item ab hac re nos potest causa deducere aliqua. 
Numquam est enim quin aliquid memoriae tradere 
velimus, et tum maxime cum alit|uo maiore negotio 
detinemur. Quare, cum sit utile facile meminisse, 
non te fallit quod tantopere utile sit quanto labore sit 
appetendum; quod poteris existimare utilitate cognita. 
Pluribus verbis ad cam te hortari non est sententia, 
ne aut tuo studio diffisi aut minus quam res postulat 
dixisse videamur. 

De quinta parte rhetoricae deinceps dicemus. Tu 
primas quasque partes in animo frequenta et, quod 
maxime necesse est, exercitatione confirma. 

^mnemonicis Aldus : ncmonicis HPUB 3Ix : memoriis 


AD HERRNNIUM, HI. xxiv. 39-40 

verse by rote, but rather as an exercise whereby to 
strengthen that other kind of memory, the memory 
of matter, which is of practical use. Thus we may 
without effort pass from this difficult training to ease 
40 in that other memory. In every discipline artistic 
theory is of little avail without unremitting exercise, 
but especially in mnemonics theory is almost value- 
less unless made good by industry, devotion, toil, 
and care. You can make sure that you have as many 
backgrounds as possible and that these conform as 
much as possible to the rules ; in placing the images 
you should exercise every day. While an engrossing 
preoccupation may often distract us from our other 
pursuits, from this activity nothing whatever can 
divert us. Indeed there is never a moment when we 
do not wish to commit something to memory, and we 
wish it most of all when our attention is held by 
business of special importance. So, since a ready 
memory is a useful thing, you see clearly with what 
great pains we must strive to acquire so useful a 
faculty. Once you know its uses you will be able to 
appreciate this advice. To exhort you further in the 
matter of memory is not my intention, for I should 
appear either to have lacked confidence in your zeal 
or to have discussed the subject less fully than it 

I shall next discuss the fifth part of rhetoric. You 
might rehearse in your mind each of the first four 
divisions, and — what is especially necessary — fortify 
vour knowledsre of them with exercise. 




I. Quoniam in hoc libro, Herenni, de elocutione 
conscripsimus, et quibus in rebus opus fuit exemplis 
uti, nostris exemplis usi sumus, et id fecimus praeter 
consuetudinem Graecorum qui de hac re scripserunt, 
necessario faciendum est ut paucis rationem nostri 
consilii demus. Atque hoc necessitudine nos ^ 
facere, non studio, satis erit signi quod in superioribus 
libris nihil neque ante rem neque praeter rem locuti 
sumus. Nunc, si pauca quae res postulat dixerimus, 
tibi id quod reliquum est artis, ita uti instituimus, 
persolvemus. Sed facilius nostram rationem intel- 
leges si prius quid illi dicant cognoveris. 

Compluribus de causis putant oportere, cum ipsi 
praeceperint quo pacto oporteat ornare elocutionem, 
unius cuiusque generis ab oratore aut poeta probato 
sumptum ponere exemplum. Et primum se id 

^ necessitudine nos E : nos necessitudine PBCUd : necessi- 
tudine H Mx. 

*• See note on 4. v. 7 below. 

* Cf. the long prefaces to the books of Cicero, De Inv. 

" The character of this Introduction to Book 4 (only the 
final argument and some of the illustrations are Roman) 
suggests a Greek origin. It reflects the debates between 
Greeks and Greeks — on Atticism as against Asianism, or the 
old rhetoric, based on the imitation of the ancients (/it/xijat? 
rwv dpxalcov), as against the modern (pecoTepiafios). Herma- 
goras, to w^iose reliance on the ancients Cicero, De Inv. 
1. vi. 8, refers, and whom Cicero in his Introduction to that 



1. Inasmuch as in the present Book, Herennius, 1 
have written about Style, and wherever there was 
need of examples, I have used those of my own 
making, and in so doing have departed from the 
practice of the Greek writers <* on the subject, I must 
in a few words justify my method. And that I make 
this explanation from necessity, and not from choice, 
is sufficiently indicated by the fact that in the pre- 
ceding Books I have said nothing by way either of 
preface ^ or of digression. Now, after a few indispens- 
able observations, I shall, as I undertook to do, dis- 
charge my task of explaining to you the rest of the 
art. But you will more readily understand my 
method when you have learned what the Greeks say.*' 

On several grounds they think that, after they have 
given their own precepts on how to embellish style, 
they must for each kind of embellishment offer an 
example drawn from a reputable orator or poet.^ 
And their first ground is that in doing so they are 

work attacks, was doubtless also in the author's mind. See 
Paul Wendland, Quaestione-s Rhetoricae, Gottingen, 1914. 
As our notes show, in spite of the argument in this Introduc- 
tion, Book 4 contains numerous examples taken (though 
often with considerable changes) from a variety of sources, 
both Roman and Greek. 

'^ Rhetoric and poetry meet expressly also in 4. i. 2, ii. 3, 
iii. 5, iv. 7, v. 7, v, 8, xxxii. 43, xxxii. 44, and 2. xxii. 34. The 
Peripatetic school encouraged the close relationship between 
the two, 



modestia commotos facere dicunt, propterea quod 
videatur esse ostentatio quaedam non satis habere 
praecipere de artificio, sed etiam ipsos videri velle 
artificiose gignere exempla ; hoc est, inquiunt, osten- 
2 tare se, non ostendere artem. Quare pudor in primis 
est ad earn rem inpedimento, ne nos ^ solos probare, 
nos amare, alios contemnere et deridere videamur. 
Etenim cum possimus ab Ennio sumere aut a Gracco 
ponere exemplum, videtur esse adrogantia ilia relin- 
quere, ad sua devenire. 

Praeterea, exempla testimoniorum locum obtinent. 
Id enim quod admonuerit et leviter fecerit praeceptio 
exemplo, sicut testimonio, conprobatur. Non igitur 
ridiculus sit si quis in lite aut in iudicio domesticis 
testimoniis pugnet ? Ut enim testimonium, sic 
exemplum rei confirmandae causa sumitur. Non 
ergo oportet hoc nisi a probatissimo sumi, ne quod 
aliud confirmare debeat egeat id ipsum confirmationis. 
Etenim necesse est aut se omnibus anteponant et 
sua maxime probent, aut negent optima esse exempla 
quae a probatissimis oratoribus aut poetis sumpta 
sint. Si se omnibus anteponant, intolerabili adro- 
gantia sunt; si quos sibi praeponant et eorum 

1 ne nos PHlbd : ne ut nos et HMx : ne ut nos PBC : 
ne sibi nos /. 

" Cf. Horace, Ars Poei. 444. 

* Ennius and Gracchus served as models for Crassus in his 
youth ; cf. Cicero, De Oratore 1. 34. 154. 

* See note on 4. ill. 5 below. 
^ Whether civil or criminal. 


AD IIKR1:NNIUM, IV. 1. 1-2 

prompted by modesty, because it seems a kind of 
ostentation not to be content to teach the art, but to 
appear desirous themselves of creating examples 
artificially. That, they say, would be showing 
"I themselves off, not showing what the art is. Hence 
it is in the first place a sense of shame which keeps us 
from following this practice, for we should appear 
to be approving of ourselves alone,^ to be prizing 
ourselves, scorning and scoffing at others. For when 
we can take an example from Ennius. or offer one 
from Gracchus,* it seems presumptuous to neglect 
these and to have recourse to our own examples. 

In the second place, examples, they say, serve the 
purpose of testimony ; for, like the testimony of a 
\vitness, the example enforces what the precept has 
suggested and only to a slight degree effected. *= 
Would not a man be ridiculous, then, if in a trial ^ or 
in a domestic procedure ^ he should contest the issue 
on the basis of his own personal testimony ? For 
an example is used just like testimony to prove a 
point; it should properly therefore be taken only 
from a writer of highest reputation, lest what ought 
to serve as proof of something else should itself 
require proof. In fact, inventors of examples must 
either prefer themselves to all others and esteem 
their own products most of all, or else deny that the 
best examples are those taken from the orators or 
poets of highest reputation. If they should set 
themselves above all others, they are unbearably con- 
ceited ; if they should grant to any others a 
superiority over themselves and yet not believe that 

' In which the paterfamilias exercises his jurisdiction. 
See Mommsen, pp. 16 fif. ; Wenger, Institutes of the Roman Law 
of Civil Procedure, pp. 9 f. 



exempla suis exemplis non putant praestare, non 
possunt dicere quare sibi illos anteponant. 

II. Quid ? ipsa auctoritas antiquorum non cum res 
probabiliores turn hominum studia ad imitandum 
alacriora reddit ? Immo erigit omnium cupiditates et 
acuit industriam cum spes iniecta est posse imitando 
Gracci aut Crassi consequi facultatem. 

Postremo, hoc ipsum summum est artificium — res 
varias et dispares in tot poematis et orationibus 
sparsas et vage disiectas ita diligenter eligere ut 
unum quodque genus exemplorum sub singulos artis 
locos subicere possis. Hoc si industria solum fieri 
posset, tamen essemus laudandi cum talem laborem 
non fugissemus ; nunc sine summo artificio non 
potest fieri. Quis est enim qui, non summe cum 
tenet artem, possit ea quae iubeat ars de tanta et 
tam diffusa scriptura notare et separare ? Ceteri, 
cum legunt orationes bonas aut poemata, probant 
oratores et poetas, neque intellegunt qua re commoti 
probent, quod scire non possunt ubi sit nee quid sit nee 
quo modo factum sit id quod eos maxime delectet ; 
at is qui et haec omnia intellegit et idonea maxime 
eligit et omnia in arte maxime scribenda redigit in 
singulas rationes praeceptionis, necesse est eius rei 
summus artifex sit. Hoc igitur ipsum maximum 

" Cf. the place of Imitation in our author's theory, as set 
forth in 1. ii. 3 above, with the position taken in this Preface 
(see esp. 4. iv. 7 and 4. vi. 9 below) against borrowing examples 
which should serve as models for imitation. 

* The like point, with respect to rhythm, is made by Cicero, 
Orator 51. 173. 

* T€xviT-qs, T€xvoypa.<f>os. On expertness in criticism see 
Cicero, Brt'tns 47. 183, 51. 190, 54. 199 ff., 93. 320, Orator 


AD HKKb^NNlUM, IV. i. 2-11. 3 

the examples of these others excel their own, they 
cannot explain why they concede this superiority. 

II. And furthermore, does not the very prestige of 
the ancients not only lend greater authority to their 
doctrine but also sharpen in men the desire to imitate 
them ? Yes, it excites the ambitions and whets the 
zeal of all men when the hope is implanted in them 
of being able by imitation <* to attain to the skill of a 
Gracchus or a Crassus. 

Finally, they say, the highest art resides in this : 
in your selecting a great diversity of passages widelv 
scattered and interspersed among so many poems 
and speeches, and doing this with such painstaking 
care that you can list examples, each according to its 
kind, under the respective topics of the art. If this 
could be accomplished by industry alone, we should 
yet deserve praise for not having avoided such a task ; 
but actually, without the highest art it cannot be 
done. For who, unless he has a consummate grasp 
of the art of rhetoric, could in so vast and diffuse a 
literature mark and distinguish the demands of the 
art ? I<aymen, reading good orations and poems, 
approve the orators and poets, but without compre- 
hending what has called forth their approval, because 
they cannot know where that which especially delights 
them resides,* or what it is, or how it was produced. 
But he who understands all this, and selects examples 
that are most appropriate, and reduces to individual 
principles of instruction everything that especiallv 
merits inclusion in his treatise, must needs be a master 
artist <^ in this field. This. then, is the heisrht of 

11. 36, De Opt. Gen. Die. 4. 11, />e Offic. 3. 3. 15; Dionysius 
Halic, De Thuc. 4. 


artificium est — in arte sua posse et alienis exemplis 
4 Haec illi cum dicunt, magis nos auctoritate sua 
commovent quam veritate disputationis. Illud enim 
veremur, ne cui satis sit ad contrariam rationem 
probandam quod ab ea steterint ii et qui inventores 
huius artificii fuerint et vetustate iam satis omnibus 
probati sint. Quodsi, illorum auctoritate remota, 
res omnes volent cum re conparare, intellegent non 
omnia concedenda esse antiquitati. 

III. Primum igitur, quod ab eis ^ de modestia 
dicitur videamus ne nimium pueriliter proferatur. 
Nam si tacere aut nil scribere modestia est, cur quic- 
quam scribunt aut loquuntur? Sin aliquid suum 
scribunt, cur quo setius omnia scribant inpediuntur 
modestia ? Quasi si quis ad ^ Olympia cum venerit 
cursum et steterit ut mittatur, inpudentes dicat esse 
illos qui currere coeperint, ipse intra carcerem stet et 
narret aliis quomodo Ladas aut Boiscus Isthmiis ^ 
cursitarint ; sic isti, cum in artis curriculum descen- 
derunt, illos qui in eo quod est artificii elaborent 
aiunt facere immodeste, ipsi aliquem antiquum ora- 
torem aut poetam laudant aut scripturam, sic uti in 

^ quod ab eis 31 Mx ed. mai. : ab eis quod blMx. 

2 ad P^B^Cbld : HPBU Mx omit. 

3 Boiscus Isthmiis conj. Mx : bovis cum sisonius (sisoniis C) 
M : boiscum sisoniis d : boyscu sisonis I : loris cu sisonis 6 : 
Boiscus Sicyonius Turnebus : Boeotus Sicyonius Kayser : 
Boius cum Sicyoniis Gronovius. 

" Of Sparta, a celebrated long-distance runner (c. 450 B.C.), 
winner in the Olympic games, whose speed is often referred 
to by Roman authors; see P.-W. 12. 380-1. 

* Text corrupt. The runner " Boiscus " (if that reading is 
correct) is elsewhere unknown. The name (of a Thessalian 


AD HERRNNIUM, IV. ii. 3 iii. 4 

technical skill — in one's own treatise to succeed also 
in iisin<^ borrowed examples ! 

When the Greeks make such assertions, they 
influence us more by their prestige than by the truth 
of their argument. For what I really fear is that 
some one may consider the view contrary to mine 
adequately recommended because its supporters are 
the very men who invented this art and are now by 
reason of their antiquity quite universally esteemed. 
If, however, leaving the prestige of the ancients out 
of consideration, they are willing to compare all the 
arguments, point for point, they will understand 
that we need not yield to antiquity in everything. 

III. First, then, let us beware lest the Greeks 
offer us too childish an argument in their talk about 
modesty. For if modesty consists in saying nothing 
or writing nothing, why do they write or speak at 
all ? But if they do write something of their own, 
then why does modesty keep them from composing, 
themselves, everything they write ? It is as if some 
one should come to the Olympic games to run, and 
having taken a position for the start, should accuse 
of impudence those who have begun the race — 
should himself stand within the barrier and recount 
to others how Ladas " used to run, or Boiscus ^ in the 
Isthmian games. 'ITiese Greek rhetoricians do like- 
wise. When they have descended into the race- 
course of our art, they accuse of immodesty those who 
put in practice the essence of the art ; they praise 
some ancient orator, poet, or literary work, but with- 
out themselves daring to come forth into the stadium of 

boxer) occurs in Xenophon, Anab. 5. 8, and (of a Samian) in 
W. Dittenberger, Svll. Inscript. Graec., 3rd ed., Leipzig, 1915, 
No. 420. 



5 stadium rhetoricae prodire non audeant. Non ausim 
dicere, sed tamen vereor ne qua in re laudem mode- 
stiae venentur, in ea ipsa re sint inpudentes. " Quid 
enim tibi vis ? " aliquis inquiat. ** Artem tuam 
scribis ; gignis novas nobis praeceptiones ; eas 
ipse confirmare non potes ; ab aliis exempla sumis. 
Vide ne facias inpudenter qui tuo nomini velis ex 
aliorum laboribus libare laudem." Nam si eorum 
volumina prenderint antiqui oratores et poetae et 
suum quisque de libris sustulerit,^ nihil istis quod 
suum velint relinquatur. 

" At exempla, quoniam testimoniorum similia sunt, 
item convenit ut testimonia ab hominibus pro- 
batissimis sumi." Primum omnium, exempla po- 
nuntur nee confirmandi neque testificandi causa, sed 

^ sustulerit Turnebus : suis tulerit C^EMx : suus tulerit 
C : tuis tulerit M. 

" Cf. Corpus Fahularum Aesopicarum, ed. Hausrath, Fab. 
33 (1), about the man who, boasting when away from Rhodes 
that he had " beaten the Olympic record " in a jump he had 
made at Rhodes, and promising to produce witnesses of his 
exploit if his hearers would come to Rhodes, was challenged 
to repeat the leap where he was. 

* In Horace, Epist. 1. 3. 15 ff., Celsus is advised to be self- 
reliant, and not to draw upon writers whose works he has used 
in the library of the temple of Apollo — " lest, if by chance 
some day the flock of birds come to reclaim their feathers, 
the wretched crow stripped of his stolen colours excite 
laughter." Cf. the jackdaw in Phaedrus, Fab. Aesop. 1. 3 
and Babrius, Mythiamb. Aesop. 72. Philodemus, Ehet., ed. 
Sudhaus, 2. 67-8, says that in drawing certain technical 
principles from other arts, such as dialectic, the rhetoricians 
have " decked themselves out with borrowed plumage." Cf. 
also in Lucian, Pseudolog. 5, the sophist's speech, " like Aesop's 
jackdaw patched together with borrowed plumes of many 


AD HRRENNIUM, IV. iii. 4-5 

5 rhetoric." I should not venture to sav so, yet I 
fear that in their very pursuit of praise for modesty 
they are impudent. Some one may say to them : 
Now what do you mean ? You are writing a 
treatise of your own ; you are creating new precepts 
for us; you cannot confirm these yourself; so vou 
borrow examples from others. Beware of acting 
impudently in seeking to extract from the labour of 
others praise for your own name." Indeed, if the 
ancient orators and poets should take the books of 
these rhetoricians and each remove therefrom what 
belongs to himself, the rhetoricians would have 
nothing left to claim as their own.* 

But," they say, " since examples correspond to 
testimony, it is proper that, like testimony, they 
should be taken from men of the highest reputation." <= 
First and foremost, examples are set forth, not to 
confirm^ or to bear witness, but to clarify,* \Mien I 

«^ C/. the rule in Theon 8 (Spengel 2. 110. 25) that in epi- 
deietic the judgements must be taken from reputable men. 

** But c/., just above, eas confirmare, and 4. xliv. 57, end, 
exemplo conprobatum. 

' Cf. Aristotle, Problem. 18. 3 (916 b) : " We more readily 
believe in facts to which many bear witness, and examples 
and tales are like witnesses ; furthermore, belief through 
witnesses is easy; " Bhet. 2. 20 (1394 a) : "If we lack en- 
thymemes, we must use examples as logical proofs ... If we 
have enthymemes, we must use examples as witnesses, 
subsequent and supplementary to the enthymemes. . . . 
When they follow the enthymemes examples function like 
witnesses." Cf. also the definition and functions of the 
figure exemplitm, 4. xHx. 62 below, and note. On Example 
as rhetorical induction see Aristotle, Bhet. 1. 2 (1356 b, 
1357 b), and cf. Anal Pr. 2. 24 (68 b ff.); for its place in 
Cicero's theory of argumentation, De hiv. 1. xxix. 44 ff., esp. 
49, and De Oratore 2. 40. 169. Se« further Quintilian, 5. 11. 1 ff., 
and on the exempluin in dehberative speaking 3. v. 9 above. 


demonstrandi. Non enim, cum dicimus esse exorna- 
tionem quae verbi causa constet ex similiter desinen- 
tibus verbis, et sumimus hoc exemplum a Crasso : 
quibus possumus et debemus," testimonium con- 
locamus, sed exemplum. Hoc interest igitur inter 
testimonium et exemplum: exemplo demonstratur 
id quod dicimus cuiusmodi sit ; testimonio esse illud 
6 ita ut nos dicimus confirmatur. Praeterea oportet 
testimonium cum re convenire ; aliter enim rem non 
potest confirmare. At id quod illi faciunt cum re 
non convenit. Quid ita ? Quia pollicentur artem 
se ^ scribere, exempla proferunt ab iis plerumque qui 
artem nescierunt. Turn quis est qui possit id quod 
de arte scripserit conprobare, nisi aliquid scribat ex 
arte ? Contraque faciunt quam polliceri videntur. 
Nam cum scribere artem instituunt, videntur dicere 
se excogitasse quod alios doceant ; cum scribunt, 
ostendunt nobis alii quid excogitarint. 

IV. " At hoc ipsum difficile est," inquiunt, " eligere 
de multis." Quid dicitis difficile, utrum laboriosum 
an artificiosum ? Laboriosum non statim praeclarum. 
Sunt enim multa laboriosa, quae si faciatis, non con- 

^ artem se ^ : se artem se PB 11 : se artem HCd : artem 

" From the celebrated speech delivered before an Assembly 
of the people in B.C. 106 by L. Licinius Crassus in support of 
the law by which Q. Servilius Caepio sought, on behalf of the 
Senate, to wrest the judicial powers from the equites. In 
Cicero, De Oratore 1. 52. 225, the passage is fuller : " Deliver 
us from our miseries, deliver us from the jaws of those whose 
cruelty cannot have enough of our blood ; suffer us not to be 
slaves to any but yourselves as a whole, whom we both can and 
ought to serve." See also Cicero, Paradoxa Stoic. 5. 41. The 
figure of speech is Homoeoteleuton ; see 4. xx. 28 below. 


AD HERENNIUM, IV. in. 5-iv. 6 

say there is a figure of speech which, for instance, 
consists of like-ending words, and take this example 
from Crassus : quibus possuinus et debemus,^ I am 
setting up, not testimony, but an example. The 
difference between testimony and example is this : 
by example we clarify the nature of our statement, 
6 while by testimony we establish its truth. Further- 
more, the testimony must accord with the proposi- 
tion, for otherwise it cannot confirm the proposition. 
But the rhetoricians' performance does not accord 
with what they propose. How so? In that they 
promise to write a treatise of the art, and then 
mostly bring forward examples from authors who were 
ignorant of the art. Now w ho can give authority to 
his writings on the art unless he writes something in 
conformity with the art ? * Their performance is at 
variance with what they seem to promise ; for when 
they undertake to write the rules of their art, they 
appear to say that they have themselves invented 
what they are teaching to others, but when they 
actually write, they show us what others have 

IV. " But," say they, " this very choice from 
among many is difficult." What do you mean by 
difficult? That it requires labour? Or that it re- 
quires art? The laborious is not necessarily the 
excellent. There are many things requiring labour 
which you would not necessarily boast of having 
done — unless, to be sure, you thought it a glorious 

* C/. Cicero, De Inv. 1. vi. 8 : " But for a speaker it is a 
very unimportant thing to speak concerning his art — that 
Hermagoras has done ; by far the most important thing is to 
speak in conformity with his art — and this, as we all see, 
Hermagoras was altogether incapable of doing." 



tinuo gloriemini; nisi etiam si vestra manu fabulas 
aut orationes tolas transscripsissetis gloriosum puta- 
retis. Sin istud artificiosum egregium dicitis, videte 
ne insueti rerum maiorum videamini, si vos parva res 
sicuti magna delectabit. Nam isto modo seligere 
rudis quidem nemo potest, sed sine summo artificio 
multi. Quisquis enim audivit de arte paulo plus, in 
elocutione praesertim, omnia videre poterit quae ex 
arte dicentur ; facere nemo poterit nisi eruditus. Ita 
ut si Ennii de tragoediis velis sententias eligere aut 
de Pacuvianis nuntios, sed quia plane rudis id facere 
nemo poterit, cum feceris te litteratissimum putes, 
ineptus sis, propterea quod id facile faciat quivis 
mediocriter litteratus; item si, cum de orationibus 
aut poematis elegeris exempla quae certis signis 
artificii notata sunt, quia rudis id nemo facere possit, 
artificiosissime te fecisse putes, erres, propterea quod 
isto signo videmus te nonnihil scire, aliis signis multa 
scire intellegemus. Quod si artificiosum est intelle- 
gere quae sint ex arte scripta, multo est artificiosius 
ipsum scribere ex arte. Qui enim scribit artificiose 
ab aliis commode scripta facile intellegere poterit; 
qui eliget facile non continuo commode ipse scribet. 
Et si est maxime artificiosum, alio tempore utantur 

" Spa/Liara. Cf. fabula in 1. viii. 13, 1. vi. 10, and 2. viii. 
12 above. The task of copying was usually entrusted to 

** Cf. Isocrates, Ad Nicocl. 44, on the selection of maxims 
from the outstanding poets. 


AD HERENNIUM, IV. iv. 6-7 

feat to have transcribed by your own liand whole 
dramas ** or speeches ! Or do you say that tliat 
kind of thing requires exceptional art ? Then beware 
of appearing inexperienced in greater matters, if you 
are going to find the same delight in a petty thing 
as in a great. Doubtless no one quite uncultivated 
can select in this way ; yet many who lack the highest 
art can. For any one at all who has heard more than 
a little about the art, especially in the field of style, 
will be able to discern all the passages composed in 
accordance with the rules ; but the ability to compose 
them only the trained man will possess. It is as if 
you should wish to choose maxims from the tragedies 
of Ennius,* or messengers' reports from the tragedies 
of Pacuvius ; if, however, just because no one who 
is quite illiterate can do this, you should suppose 
that having done it, you are most highly cultivated, 
you would be foolish, because any person moderately 
well-read could do it easily. In the same fashion if, 
having chosen from orations or poems examples 
marked by definite tokens of art, you should suppose 
that your performance gives proof of superlative art 
on the ground that no ignoramus is capable of it, 
you would be in error, because by this token that you 
offer we see only that you have some knowledge, but 
we shall need still other tokens to convince us that 
you know a great deal. Now if to discern what is 
written artistically proves your mastery of the art, 
then a far better proof of this mastery is to write 
artistically yourself. For though the artistic writer 
will find it easy to discern what has been skilfully 
written by others, the facile chooser of examples will 
not necessarily write with skill himself. And even 
if it is an especial mark of artistic skill, let them 



ea facultate, non turn cum parere et ipsi gignere et 
proferre debent. Postremo in eo vim artificii con- 
sumant, ut ipsi ab aliis potius eligendi quam aliorum 
boni selectores existimentur. 

Contra ea quae ab iis dicuntur qui dicunt alienis 
exemplis uti oportere satis est dictum. Nunc quae 
separatim dici possint consideremus. 

V. Dicimus igitur eos cum ideo ^ quod alienis 
utantur peccare, tum magis ^ etiam delinquere quod 
a multis exempla sumant. Et de eo quod postea 
diximus antea videamus. Si concederem aliena 
oportere adsumere exempla, vincerem unius oportere, 
primum quod contra hoc ^ nulla staret illorum ratio, 
licet enim eligerent et probarent quemlibet qui sibi 
in omnes res suppeditaret exempla, vel poetam vel 
oratorem, cuius auctoritate niterentur. Deinde 
interest magni eius qui discere vult utrum omnes 

1 cum ideo B^Cbl^ : tum ideo PH : cum eod: id HPB H 

2 tum magis P^B^CUE : cum magis HPB Mx. 

^ contra hoc Mx ed. mai., all MSS. but H : hoc contra 
mMxi hocHK 

« Cf, the Preface to the Rhet. ad Alex. (1421 a) : " For the 
so-called Parian sophists, because they did not themselves 
give birth to what they teach, have no love for it, in their 
tasteless indifference, and peddle it about for money." 

* After the Greek writers have had their say, and have 
been refuted, our author takes up his own " constructive " 
case; see 4. i. 1. 

^ The theory and practice of presenting examples from a 
variety of sources were doubtless Peripatetic ; the rhetoricians 
criticized belong perhaps to the second century B.C. The use 


AD HERENNIUM, IV. iv. 7-v. 7 

employ this faculty at another time, and not when 
they themselves should be conceiving, creating, and 
bringing forth." In short, let them devote their 
artistic power to this purpose — to win esteem as 
worthy themselves to be chosen as models by others, 
rather than as good choosers of others who shpuld 
serve as models for them. 

Against the contentions of those who maintain 
that we should use borrowed examples I have said 
enough. Now let us see what can be said from my 
own particular point of view.^ 

V. Accordingly I say that they are not only at fault 
in borrowing examples, but make an even greater 
mistake in borrowing examples from a great number 
of sources.'^ And let us first look at my second point. 
Were I granting that we should borrow examples, I 
should establish that we ought to select from one 
author alone. In the first place, my opponents would 
then have no ground '^ for opposing this procedure, 
for they might choose and approve whom they would, 
poet or orator, to supply them with examples for all 
cases, one on whose authority they could rely.^ 
Secondly, it is a matter of great concern to the 

of one's own examples, on the other hand, goes back to 
Corax (see Paul Wendland, Anuximenes von Lampsakos, 
Berlin, 1905, pp. 31 ff.) and was characteristic of the sophists 
and of the author of the Rhet. ad Alex. Xote that neither 
point of view can be regarded as characteristically Greek, 

** Their theory is set forth in 4. i. 1-ii. 3 above. 

' In Cicero, De Oratore 2. 22. 90-3, Antonius discusses the 
imitation of some one good model ; Quintilian, in 10. 5. 19, 
urges the student to follow this " custom of our ancestors," 
but in 10. 2. 23 advises him not to devote himself entirely to 
imitating one particular style. Seneca, Contr. 1, Praef. 6, 
takes a stand against the adoption of a single model, however 


omnia, an omnia neminem,^ an aliud alium ^ putet 
consequi posse. Si enim putabit posse omnia penes 
unum consistere, ipse quoque ad omnium nitetur 
facultatem. Si id desperarit, in paucis se exercebit ; 
ipsis enim contentus erit, nee mirum, cum ipse prae- 
ceptor artis omnia penes unum reperire non potuerit. 
AUatis igitur exemplis a Catone, a Graccis, a Laelio, 
a Scipione, Galba, Porcina, Crasso, Antonio, ceteris, 
item sumptis aliis a poetis et historiarum scriptoribus, 
necesse erit eum qui discet putare ab omnibus omnia, 
ab uno pauca vix potuisse sumi. Quare unius ali- 
cuius esse similem satis habebit, omnia quae omnes 
habuerint solum habere se posse diffidet. Ergo 
inutilest ei qui discere vult non putare unum omnia 
posse. Igitur nemo in banc incideret opinionem si 
ab uno exempla sumpsissent. Nunc hoc signi est 
ipsos artis scriptores non putasse unum potuisse in 
omnibus elocutionis partibus enitere, quoniam neque 
sua protulerunt neque unius alicuius aut denique 
duorum, sed ab omnibus oratoribus et poetis exempla 

1 omnes omnia an omnia neminem I : omnes omnia an 
omnia a nemine P^B^C^ : aliquem omnia an unum omnia 
neminem d : omnia nomina an neminem H : omnia unum 
neminem b : omnium omnia an omnia a nemine PB C IT Mz. 

2 an aliud alium P^C : sed aliud alium E : aliud alium 
{M) Mx brackets. 

* On the eloquence of these orators see the following 
sections in Cicero, Bnitus : M. Porcius Cato {cos. 195 B.C.) 
63 S., 293 ff.; Ti. Sempronius Gracchus (tr. pi. 133 B.C.) 
103-4, 296; C. Sempronius Gracchus {tr. pi. 123 B.C.) 125-6, 
296; C. Laelius {cos. 140 B.C.), P. Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus 
(Africanus Minor, cos. 147, 134 B.C.), and Ser. Sulpicius Galba 
{cos. 144 B.C.) 82 ff. ; M. Aemilius Lepidus Porcina {cos. 
137 B.C.) 95-6; M. Antonius {cos. 99 B.C.) and L. Licinius 
Crassus {cos. 95 B.C.) 139 ff. 



student whether he should believe that every one can 
attain the sum total of qualities, or that no one can, 
or that one individual can attain one quality and 
another individual another quality. For if the 
student believes that all qualities can exist in one 
man, he himself will strive for a mastery of them 
all. But if he despairs of this achievement, he will 
occupy himself in acquiring a few qualities, and with 
these be content. Nor is this surprising, since the 
teacher of the art himself has been unable to find all 
the qualities in one author. Thus, when examples 
have been drawn from Cato, the Gracchi, LaeUus, 
Scipio, Galba, Porcina, Crassus, Antonius," and the 
rest, and some as well from the poets and historians, 
the learner will necessarily believe that the totality 
could have been taken only from them all, and that 
barely a few examples could have been taken from 
8 only one. He will therefore be content with emulat- 
ing some one author * and distrust his own single 
power to possess the sum total of qualities possessed 
by all the authors. Now it is disadvantageous for the 
student to believe that one person cannot possess 
all qualities ; «^ and so I say, no one would fall into 
this opinion if the rhetoricians had drawn examples 
from one author alone. Actually, the fact that the 
writers on rhetoric have presented neither their own 
examples nor those of some single author, or even 
two, but have borrowed from all the orators and 
poets, is a sign that they themselves have not believed 
that any one individual can be brilliant in all the 

* Who exemplifies only a few virtues. 

'^ On the popularity of this maxim in different forms see 
Otto, s.v. " omnis " 1 and 2, pp. 254—5. 



sumpserunt. Deinde, si quis velit artem demon- 
strare nihil prodesse ad dicendum, non male utatur 
hoc adiumento, quod unus ^ onines artis partes con- 
sequi nemo potuerit. Quod igitur iuvat eorum 
rationem qui omnino non probent artem, id non 
ridiculum est ipsum artis scriptorem suo iudicio 
conprobare ? 

Ergo ab uno sumenda fuisse docuimus exempla, si 
9 semper aliunde sumerentur. VI. Nunc omnino 
aliunde sumenda non fuisse sic intellegemus. 

Primum omnium, quod ab artis scrip tore adfertur 
exemplum id eius artificii debet esse. Ut si quis 
purpuram aut aliud quippiam vendens dicat : " Sume 
a me, sed huius exemplum aliunde rogabo tibi quod 
ostendam," sic mercem ipsi qui venditant aliunde 
exemplum quaeritant aliquod mercis, acervos se 
dicunt tritici habere, eorum exemplum pugno non 
habent quod ostendant. Si Triptolemus, cum homini- 
bus 2 semen largiretur,^ ipse ab aliis id hominibus 
mutuaretur, aut si Prometheus, cum mortalibus 
ignem dividere vellet. ipse a vicinis cum testo 
ambulans carbunculos corrogaret, ridiculus videretur, 

^ unus CE Mx ed. tnai. : unius M Mx. 

2 hominibus E : se hominibus M : a se hominibus Mx. 

5 largiretur P^B^IIE : gigneretur M Mx. 

* Here is reflected the quarrel, in the second century, 
between philosophers and rhetoricians concerning education; 
see Hans von Arnim, Leben und Werke des Dio von Prusa, 
Berlin, 1898, ch. 1, Hubbell, The Rhetorica of Philodemus, 
pp. 364-382, Kroll in P.-W., " Rhetorik," coll. 1080-90. For 
example, the three Greek philosophers who came as am- 
bassadors from Athens to Rome in 155 B.C. (and wielded 
considerable influence there) were all opposed to rhetoric — 


AD HERENNIUM, IV. v. 8-vi. 9 

branches of style. Moreover, should any one wisli to 
show that the art of rhetoric is of no benefit for 
speaking, he might well in support employ the argu- 
ment that no one man has been able to master all the 
branches of rhetoric. Is it not ridiculous for a 
rhetorician himself to approve by his own judgement 
what thus supports the theory of those who utterly 
condemn the art of rhetoric ? ° 

I have, then, shown that if examples were always 

to be borrowed, the borrowing should have been from 

9 one author. VI. Now we shall learn from the 

following that they should not have been borrowed 

at all. 

Above all, an example which is cited by a writer on 
an art should be proof of his own skill in that art. 
It is as if a merchant selling purple or some other 
commodity should say : " Buy of me, but I shall 
borrow from some one else a sample of this to show 
you." So do these very people who offer merchandise 
for sale go in search of a sample of it elsewhere ; they 
say : " We have piles of wheat," but have not a 
handful of grain to show as a sample.'' If Tripto- 
lemus, when dispensing seed to mankind, had him- 
self borrowed it from other men, or if Prometheus, 
wishing to distribute fire amongst mortals, had him- 
self gone about with an urn begging a few coals of 
his neighbours, he would have appeared ridiculous. 

the Academic Cameades, the Peripatetic Critolaiis, and the 
Stoic Diogenes the Babylonian. 

* C/. Plutarch, Demosth. 23 : " Further, [when Alexander 
demanded the surrender of the Athenian leaders,] Demos- 
thenes said : ' Just as we see merchants selling their stock 
of wheat by means of a few grains which they carry about 
with them in a bowl as a sample, so by giving us up, you, 
without knowing it, give yourselves up too, all of you.' " 



Isti magistri, omnium dicendi praeceptores, iion 
videntur sibi ridicule facere cum id quod aliis polli- 
centur ab aliis quaerunt ? Si qui se fontes maximos 
penitus absconditos aperuisse dicat, et haec sitiens 
cum maxime loquatur neque habeat qui sitim sedet, 
non rideatur? Isti cum non modo dominos se 
fontium, sed se ipsos fontes esse dicant, et omnium 
rigare debeant ingenia, non putant fore ridiculum si, 
cum id poUiceantur, arescant ipsi siccitate ? Chares 
ab Lysippo statuas facere non isto modo didicit, ut 
Lysippus caput ostenderet Myronium, brachia 
Praxitelis,^ pectus Polycletium, sed omnia coram 
magistrum facientem videbat; ceterorum opera vel 
sua sponte poterat considerare. Isti credunt eos qui 
haec velint discere alia ratione doceri posse com- 
10 VII. Praeterea ne possunt quidem ea quae sumun- 
tur ab aliis exempla tam esse ad ^ artem adcommo- 

1 Praxitelae MSS. Mx. 

2 ad P^CE : HPB H Mx omit. 

" Cf. Longinus, De Siiblim. 13. 3 : " Plato, who from that 
great Homeric spring drew to himself countless side streams ; " 
Quintilian, 10. 1. 46, and Dionysius Halic, De Composit. Verb. 
24, on Homer, as source of inspiration, representing his own 
conception of Ocean {II. 21. 196-7). 

** In the eyes of Rhodians, Chares, who produced the 
Colossus in 280 B.C., would belong in this list of celebrated 
sculptors of Greece. Lysippus, his teacher, was a con- 
temporary of Alexander the Great; Myron fl. 460 B.C.; 
Praxiteles was born c. 390 B.C. ; Polycleitus fl. 450-420 B.C. 
Rhetoricians liked to use the graphic arts for comparison in 
their theory. Cf., for example, Cicero, De Inv. 2. i. 1 fF., 
Brutus 18. 70, Orator 2. 8 fif. ; Horace, Ars Poet., init. (poem 
and painting, as in 4. xxviii. 39 below) ; Quintilian, 12. 10. 1 ff. ; 
Dionysius Halic, Be Imit. 6 (ed. Usener-Radermacher, 


AD UKRI'.NNIUM, I\'. vi. 9 vii. 10 

Do not these schoolmasters, teachers of public speak- 
ing to all the world, see that they are acting absurdly 
when they seek to borrow the ver^- thing they offer 
to bestow? If any one should say that he has dis- 
covered the richest of deeply hidden springs, and tell 
of the discovery while suffering extreme thirst and 
lacking the wherewithal to slake his thirst, would he 
not be a laughingstock ? When these writers declare 
that they are not only the masters of the springs, 
but are themselves the wellsprings ** of eloquence, 
and when it is their duty to water the talents of all, 
do they not think it will be laughable if, whilst making 
the offer to do so, they are themselves parched with 
drought ? Not thus did Chares learn from Lysippus 
how to make statues.'' Lysippus did not show him a 
head by Myron,*' arms by Praxiteles, a chest by 
Polycleitus. Rather with his own eyes would Chares 
see the master fashioning all the parts ; the works of 
the other sculptors he could if he wished study on his 
own initiative. These writers believe that students 
of this subject can be better taught by another 
10 VII. Furthermore, borrowed examples simply can- 
not be so well adapted to the rules of the art because 

2 [1]. 203, and for the method contrary to that in our author's 
analogy, fragm. 6a, p. 214); Theon 1, in Spengel 2. 62. 1 flF. 
Cf. also 4. xi. 16 below : "set the style in reUef, as "with 
colours " ; Cousin, Ehcdes sur QuintUien, 1. 658 ff. ; Friedrich 
Blass, Die griechische Beredsamkeit in dem Zeitraum von 
Alexander bis auf Augustus, BerUn, 1865, pp. 222 fF. ; E. 
Bertrand, De pictura et sculptura apud veteres rhetores, Paris, 
1881 ; Julius Brzoska, De canone decern oratorum Atticorum 
quaestiones, Breslau, 1883, pp. 69 flF., 81 ff. ; Lessing, Laokoon. 
' Cicero, Brutes 19. 75, likens the pleasurable effect of 
Naevius' Bellum Punicum to that yielded by a work of MjTon ; 
cf. also Dionysius Halic, De Thuc. 4. 



data, propterea quod in dicendo leviter unus quisque 
locus plerumque tangitur, ne ars appareat, in praeci- 
piendo expresse conscripta ponere oportet exempla 
uti in artis formam convenire possint, et post in 
dicendo, ne possit ars eminere et ab omnibus videri, 
facultate oratoris occultatur. Ergo etiam ut magis 
ars cognoscatur suis exemplis melius est uti. 

Postremo haec quoque res nos duxit ad hanc 
rationem, quod nomina rerum Graeca quae conver- 
timus, ea remota sunt a consuetudine. Quae enim 
res apud nostros non erant, earum rerum nomina non 
poterant esse usitata. Ergo haec asperiora primo 
videantur necesse est, id quod fiet rei, non nostra 
difficultate. Reliquum scripturae consumetur in 
exemplis ; haec tamen aliena si posuissemus, factum 
esset ut quod commodi esset in hoc libro id nostrum 
non esset, quod asperius et inusitatum id proprie 
nobis adtribueretur. Ergo hanc quoque incommodi- 
tatem fugimus. 

His de causis, cum artis inventionem Graecorum 
probassemus, exemplorum rationem secuti non 

" Cf. 1. X. 17, 2. XXX. 47, and 4. xxiii. 32. The idea is 
widespread in ancient rhetoric; c/. Aristotle, Rhet. 3. 2 (1404 
b) : " Hence may be inferred the need to disguise the art we 
employ, so that we give the impression of speaking naturally, 
not artificially. Naturalness is persuasive, artifice is the 
contrary. People take offence at a speaker who employs 
artifice, and think he has designs on them — as if he were 
mixing drinks for them; " also 3. 7 (1408 b). See further 
Philodemus, Rhet., ed. Sudhaus, 1. 200; Dionysius Halic, 
De Lys. 8; Dionysius, Ars Rhet. 8. 16 (ed. Usener-Rader- 
macher, 2 [1]. 322); Longinus, De Sublim. 22. 1 : " For art 
is perfect when it seems to be nature, and nature is effective 
when she contains art hidden within her," 17. 1-2, 38. 3; 
Anon. Seg. 94, in Spengel-Hammer 1 (2). 369; Hermogenes, 
De Meth. Gravit. 17 (ed. Rabe, p. 433); Philostratus, Vita 


AD IIEKENNILM, 1\'. vii. lo 

in speaking each single topic is in general touched 
lightly, so that the art may not be obvious. In 
instructing, on the other hand, one must cite examples 
that are draughted expressly to conform to the pattern 
of the art. It is afterwards, in speaking, that the 
orator's skill conceals his art," so that it may not 
obtrude and be apparent to all. Thus also to the end 
that the art may be better understood is it preferable 
to use examples of one's own creation. 

Finally, I have been led to this method by another 
consideration also * — the remoteness from our own 
usage of the technical terms <^ I have translated from 
the Greek. For concepts non-existent among us 
could not have familiar appellations. The translated 
terms, therefore, must seem rather harsh at first — 
that will be a fault of the subject, not mine. The 
rest of my treatise will be devoted to examples. If, 
however, these which I have here set down had been 
borrowed from other sources, the result would have 
been that anything apt in this book would not be 
mine, but whatever is a little rough or strange would 
be assigned to me as my own particular contribution. 
So I have escaped this disadvantage also. 

On these grounds, although esteeming the Greeks 
as the inventors of the art, I have not followed their 

ApoUon. 8. 6; Longinus, in Spengel-Haminer 1 (2). 195. 4; 
Cicero, De Inv. 1. xviii. 25, 1. lil 98, Brutus 37. 139, De 
Oraiore 2. 37. 156, 2. 41. 177, Orator 12. 38, Part. Orat. 6. 19; 
Ovid, Metam. 10. 252; Quintilian, 1. 11. 3, 2. 5. 7, 4. 1. 8-9, 
4. 1. 54, 4. 1. 56-58, 4. 2. 59, 4. 2. 126-7, 9. 4. 144, 11. 2. 47. 

* Posiremo . . . rationem form a hexameter. 

' ovofjuira Te^vt/ca. Cf. Varro in Cicero, Academ. 1. 6. 24 : 
" Since we are treating unusual subjects you will no doubt 
allow me-on occasion to use words unheard-of before, as the 
Greeks themselves do, and they have now been treating these 
subjects for a long time '" ; Cicero, Orator 51. 211. 



sumus. Nunc tempus postulat ut ad elocutionis 
praecepta transeamus. 

Bipertita igitur erit nobis elocutionis praeceptio. 
Primum dicemus quibus in generibus semper ^ omnis 
oratoria elocutio debeat esse ; deinde ostendemus 
quas res semper habere debeat. 

VIII. Sunt igitur tria genera, quae genera nos 
figuras appellamus, in quibus omnis oratio non vitiosa 
consumitur: unam gravem, alteram mediocrem, 
tertiam extenuatam vocamus. Gravis est quae 
constat ex verborum gravium levi et ornata construc- 
tione. Mediocris est quae constat ex humiliore 
neque tamen ex infima et pervulgatissima verborum 
dignitate. Adtenuata est quae demissa est usque ad 
usitatissimam puri consuetudinem sermonis. 

^ semper E Mz ed. mai. : eorum semper 31 : ferme semper 

* The three kinds do not occur in every correct discourse, 
but the kinds of correct discourse are limited to these three. 

* XapaKTTJpes, TrXda^ara. Notice the word figura. Our 
author's term corresponding to English " figure of speech " 
is ezornaiio (a^^/na), as in 4. xiii. 18 below (Cicero's term, 
lumen, is used only in 4. xxiii. 32 below); figura as " figure of 
speech " appears first in Quintilian. 

' ahpov {fjLeyaXoTT penes, Trepirrov), iieaov (fxiKTOv), laxvov (Xitov), 
and for other terms see W. Schmid, Rliein. Mtis. 49 (1894). 
136 ff. Here is the first extant division of the styles into 
three. Cf. especially Cicero, Be Oratore 3. 45. 177, 52. 199, 
55. 212, Orator 5. 20 flf., 23. 75 fif. ; Dionys. Halic, De Demosth. 
1 ff., and for the doctrine as transferred to Composition 
(ovvOeais), De Composit. Verb., chaps. 21 ff. ; Quintilian, 
12. 10. 58 ff.; also Varro in Gellius 6. 14. To Cicero {Orator 
21. 69 ff.), following a Hellenistic (and doubtless Peripatetic) 
concept, each of the styles represents a function of the orator, 
the plain (subtile) serving for proof (probare), the middle 
(modicum) for delight (delectare), and the vigorous (vehemens) 


AD HERENNIUM, IV. vii. lo-viii. ii 

theory of examples. Now it is time to turn to the 
principles of Style. 

I shall divide the teaching of Style into two parts. 
First I shall state the kinds to which oratorical style 
should always confine itself," then I shall show what 
qualities style should always have. 
11 VIII. There are, then, three kinds of style, called 
types,* to which discourse, if faultless, confines itself: 
the first we call the Grand; the second, the Middle; 
the third, the Simple.*^ The Grand type consists of a 
smooth and ornate arrangement of impressive words.'^ 
The Middle type consists of words of a lower, yet not 
of the lowest and most colloquial, class of words. The 
Simple type is brought down even to the most 
current idiom of standard speech. 

for swaying the hearers {fleeter e). Scholars are not in agree- 
ment on the ultimate origin of the fixed categories; some 
assign the doctrine to Theophrastus (see A. Korte, Hermes 
64 [1929]. 80, and Wilhelm KroU, Rhein. Mm. 62 [1907]. 86 ff., 
Introd. to ed. of Cicero, Orator [Berlin, 1913], p. 4, note 1, and 
" Rhetorik," coll. 1074 f.), while others deny this attribution 
(see G. L. Hendrickson, Arner. Journ. Philol. 25 [1904]. 125-46 
and 26 [1905]. 249-290, and Stroux, Be Theophrasli virt. die, 
Leipzig, 1912, chaps. 1, 7, and 8). On varying views of the 
part plaj-ed by the Peripatetic ethical idea of the mean 
(/iCCTOTTy?) in the development of the doctrine see especially 
the articles bv Hendrickson and Kroll, and S. F. Bonner in 
Class. Philol 33 (1938). 257-266. Cf. the four types of style 
in Demetrius, De Elocut. 36, the twofold division in Cicero, 
Brutus 55. 201 ; and see Fritz Wehrli, " Der erhabene und der 
schhchte Stil in der poetisch-rhetorischen Theorie der 
Antike," Phyllobolia fur Peter von der Muhll, Basel, 1946, 
p. 29. Quintihan, 12. 10. 66 fF., considers the hmitation to 
three styles arbitrary. 

•* Echoed below in connection with Epanaphora (xiii. 19), 
Antithesis (xv. 21), Interrogation (xv. 22), Paronomasia 
(xxiii. 32), Surrender (xxix. 39 — provoking pity), and 
Asyndeton (xxx. 41 — animation). 


In gravi consumetur oratio figura ^ si quae cuiusque 
rei poterunt ornatissima verba reperiri, sive propria 
sive extranea, ad ^ unam quamque rem adeommoda- 
buntur, et si graves sententiae quae in amplifieatione 
et commiseratione tractantur eligentur, et si exorna- 
tiones sententiarum aut verborum quae gravitatem 
habebunt, de quibus post dicemus, adhibebuntur. In 
hoc genere figurae erit hoe exemplum : 

Nam quis est vestrum, iudices, qui satis idoneam 
possit in eum poenam excogitare qui prodere hostibus 
patriam cogitarit ? Quod maleficium cum hoc scelere 
conparari, quod huic maleficio dignum supplicium 
potest inveniri ? In iis qui violassent ingenuum, 
matremfamilias constuprassent, vulnerassent aliquem 
aut postremo necassent, maxima supplicia maiores 
consumpserunt ; huic truculentissimo ac nefario 
facinori singularem poenam non reliquerunt. Atque 
in aliis maleficiis ad singulos aut ad paucos ex alieno 
peccato iniuria pervenit ; huius sceleris qui sunt 
adfines uno consilio universis civibus atrocissimas 
calamitates machinantur. O feros animos ! O 
crudeles cogitationes ! O derelictos homines ab 
humanitate ! Quid agere ausi sunt, aut cogitare 
possunt ? Quo pacto hostes, revulsis maiorum sepul- 
cris, diiectis moenibus, ovantes inruerent in civitatem ; 
quo modo deum templis spoliatis, optimatibus truci- 

^ consumetur oratio figura B^CHb : consumetur oratio 
figurae M : consumetur oratio figurae genere Mx : figura 
consumetur oratio Id. 

2 ad Cn : other MSS. Mx omit. 

" 4. xiii. 19 ff. 

* Cf. Cicero, Verr. 2. 2. 16. 40 : " How shall one deal with 
this man? What punishment can be found commensurate 
with his lawlessness ? " 


AD UKRENNIUM, IV. viii. ir 12 

A discourse will be composed in the Grand style if 
to each idea are applied the most ornate words that 
can be found for it, whether literal or figurative ; 
if impressive thoughts are chosen, such as are used in 
Amplification and Appeal to Pity ; and if we employ 
figures of thought and figures of diction which have 
grandeur — these I shall discuss later. '^ The following 
will be an example of this type of style : 

" Who of you, pray, men of the jury, could devise a 
punishment drastic enough for him who has plotted to 
betray the fatherland to our enemies ? What offence 
can compare with this crime, what punishment can be 
found commensurate with this offence ? ^ Upon those 
who had done violence to a freeborn youth, outraged 
the mother of a family, wounded,*^ or — basest crime of 
all — slain a man, our ancestors exhausted the cata- 
logue of extreme punishments ; while for this most 
savage and impious villainy they bequeathed no 
specific penalty.*^ In other wrongs, indeed, injury 
arising from another's crime extends to one individual, 
or only to a few ; but the participants in this crime 
are plotting, with one stroke, the most horrible 
catastrophes for the whole body of citizens. O such 
men of savage hearts ! O such cruel designs ! O 
such human beings bereft of human feeling ! WTiat 
have they dared to do, what can they now be 
planning? They are planning how our enemies, 
after uprooting our fathers' graves, and throwing 
down our walls, shall with triumphant cr}^ rush into 
the city ; how when they have despoiled the temples 

* On the criminal law in respect to wounding with intent 
to kill, see Mommsen, p. 627. 

** Cf. the ninth commonplace in 2. xxx. 49 above, the com- 
parison of crimes. 



datis, aliis abreptis in servitutem, matribusfamilias et 
ingenuis sub hostilem libidinem subiectis, urbs acer- 
bissimo concidat incendio conflagrata; qui se non 
putant id quod voluerint ad exitum perduxisse nisi 
sanctissimae patriae miserandum scelerati viderint 
cinerem. Nequeo verbis consequi, indices, indigni- 
tatem rei ; sed neglegentius id fero, quia vos mei 
non egetis. Vester enim vos animus amantissimus 
rei publicae facile edocet ut eum qui fortunas 
omnium voluerit prodere praecipitem proturbetis ex 
ea civitate, quam iste hostium spurcissimorum 
dominatu nefario voluerit obruere." 

" This passage (see also 4. xxxvi. 48 and 4. xxxix. 51 below, 
and 2. xxviii. 45 above) is not to be taken (with Mommsen, 
p. 972, note 1) as evidence that interdiction was the legal 
punishment for treason exacted of a citizen. Note " be- 
queathed no specific penalty " above in this example, and 
see Ernst Levy, Die rom. Kapitalstrafe, Sitzungsber. Heidel- 
berg. Akad. (philos.-hist. Klasse) 21, 5 (1930-31). 20 S. 

" The example is of an amplificatio criminis, belonging to 
the Conclusion of a speech. For an analysis of this passage, 
see Jules Marouzeau, Bev. de Philol. 45 (1921). 155-6, and 
Traite de stylistique applique au Latin, Paris, 1935, p. 181 : 
The diction is grandiloquent, but not artificial as in the 
passage below illustrating the swollen style. Note the 
elegant and learned abstract in -tus [dominatu) for -tio, the 
archaic genitive deum, the far-fetched hostilem libidinem (adj. 
serving for genitive of noun), the artificial disjunctions {e.g., 
idoneam, . . . poenam), the periods, the tripartite inter- 
jections, the chiasmus in violassent ingenuum, matremfamilias 
co7istuprassent, the play on words (hominem humanitate, 
excogitate cogitarit), the accumulation of epithets and of 
superlatives, the contrasts as in uno consilio, universis civibus, 
the variety in the echoes {quo pacto, quo modo), the' peri- 



of the gods, slaughtered the Conservatives and 
dmgged all others off into slavery, and when they 
have subjected matrons and freeborn youths to a 
foeman's lust, the city, put to the torch, shall collapse 
in the most violent of conflagrations ! They do not 
think, these scoundrels, that they have fulfilled their 
desires to the utmost, unless they have gazed upon 
the piteous ashes of our most holy fatherland. Men 
of the jury, I cannot in words do justice to the shame- 
fulness of their act; yet that disquiets me but little, 
for you have no need of me. Indeed your own 
hearts, overflo^^^ng ^^^th patriotism, readily tell you 
to drive this man, who would have betrayed the 
fortunes of all, headlong from this common weal th,'' 
which he would have buried under the impious 
domination of the foulest of enemies." * 

phrasis in huius scekris q\d sunt adfines, the expressive verbs 
{excogitare, constnprassenf, marMinantur, conflagrafa, trucidatis), 
and the poetic words (e.g., vwenibus). Figures of speech are 
Paronomasia (see 4. xxi. 29 below) in excogitare . . . cogitarit, 
Isocolon (see 4. xx. 27 below) in Qiiod malejicium . . . con- 
parari, quod huic . . . inveniri, Apostrophe (see 4. xv. 22 
below) in feros animos . . . humanitate. Reasoning b}' 
Question and Answer (see 4. xvi. 23 below) in Qv.ida^ere, etc., 
and Surrender (see 4. xxix. 39 below) in the last two sentences 
of the passage. The passage contains no periods ending with 
monos\-lIables ; the example of the middle style IdcIow 
contains a few. It contains sixteen dichorees (- cr - -) in 
the clausulae; the example of the middle style contains 
eight, and that of the simple style only one. iSee Friedrich 
Blass, Die Bhythmen der asianischen und romischen Kun-st- 
prosa, Leipzig, 1905, pp. 107-9; Konrad Burdach, Schhsisch- 
bokmische Briefmu-ster au-s der Wende de-s vierzehnten Jahr- 
hunderts (Vom Mittelalter zur Reformation 5), Berlin, 1926, 
pp. 106 flF. ; and the notes on 4. xix. 26 and 4. xxxii. 44 below. 
Dionysius Halic, De Demosth., ch. 1, chooses Gorgias and 
Thucydides as representatives of the grand style. 



13 IX. In mediocri figura versabitur oratio si haec, 
ut ante dixi, aliquantum demiserimiis neque tamen 
ad infimum descenderimus, sic : 

" Quibuscum bellum gerimus, iudices, videtis — 
cum sociis qui pro nobis pugnare et imperium nostrum 
nobiscum simul virtute et industria conservare soliti 
sunt. Hi 1 cum se et opes suas et copiam necessario 
norunt, tum vero nihilominus propter propinquitatem 
et omnium rerum societatem quid omnibus rebus 
populus Romanus posset scire et existimare poterant. 
Hi 2 cum deliberassent nobiscum bellum gerere, 
quaeso, quae res erat qua freti bellum suscipere con- 
arentur, cum multo maximam partem sociorum in 
officio manere intellegerent ; cum sibi non multitud- 
inem militum, non idoneos imperatores, non pecuniam 
publicam praesto esse viderent, non denique uUam 
rem quae res pertinet ad bellum administrandum ? 
Si cum finitimis de finibus bellum gererent, si totum 
certamen in uno proelio positum putarent, tamen 
omnibus rebus instructiores et apparatiores venirent ; 
nedum illi imperium orbis terrae, cui imperio omnes 
gentes, reges, nationes partim vi, partim voluntate 
consenserunt, cum aut armis aut liberalitate a populo 
Romano superati essent, ad se transferre tantulis 
viribus conarentur. Quaeret aliquis : ' Quid ? Fre- 
gellani non sua sponte conati sunt ? ' Eo quidem 
isti minus facile conarentur, quod illi quemadmodum 

1 Hi all MSS. but PB : hii PB : li Mx. 

2 Hi all 3ISS. but I: mil: li Mx. 

« 4. viii. 11. 



3 IX. Our discourse will belong to the Middle type if, 
as I have said above,'' we have somewhat relaxed our 
style, and yet have not descended to the most 
ordinary prose, as follows : 

Men of the jury, you see against whom we are 
waging war — against allies wlio have been wont to 
light in our defence, and together with us to preserve 
our empire by their valour and zeal. Not only must 
they have known themselves, their resources, and 
their manpower, but their nearness to us and their 
alliance with us in all affairs enabled them no less to 
learn and appraise the power of the Roman people in 
every sphere. When they had resolved to fight 
against us, on what, I ask you, did they rely in pre- 
suming to undertake the war, since they understood 
that much the greater part of our allies remained 
faithful to duty, and since they saw that they had at 
hand no great supply of soldiers, no competent com- 
manders, and no public money — in short, none of the 
things needful for carrying on the war ? Even if 
they were waging war with neighbours on a question 
of boundaries, even if in their opinion one battle 
would decide the contest, they would yet come to the 
task in every way better prepared and equipped than 
they are now. It is still less credible that with such 
meagre forces they would attempt to usurp that 
sovereignty over the whole world which all the 
civilized peoples, kings, and barbarous nations have 
accepted, in part compelled by force, in part of their 
own will, when conquered either by the arms of 
Rome or by her generosity. Some one will ask : 
* What of the Fregellans ? Did they not make the 
attempt on their own initiative ? ' Yes, but these 
allies would be less ready to make the attempt 



discessent ^ videbant. Nam rerum inperiti, qui iinius 
cuiusque rei de rebus ante gestis exempla petere non 
possunt, ii per inprudentiam facillime deducuntur in 
fraudem ; at ii qui sciunt quid aliis accident facile ex 
aliorum eventis suis rationibus possunt providere. 
Nulla igitur re inducti, nulla spe freti arma sus- 
tulerunt ? Quis hoc credet, tantam amentiam quem- 
quam tenuisse ut imperium populi Romani temptare 
auderet nullis copiis fretus ? Ergo aliquid fuisse 
necessum est. Quid aliud nisi id quod dico potest 
esse ? " 
14 X. In adtenuato figurae genere, id quod ad 
infimum et cotidianum sermonem demissum est, hoc 
erit exempluni : 

" Nam ut forte hie in balneas - venit, coepit, post- 
quam perfusus est, defricari ; deinde, ubi visum est ut 
in alveum descenderet, ecce tibi iste de traverso : 
* Heus,' inquit, ' adolescens, pueri tui modo me 
pulsarunt; satis facias oportet.' Hie, qui id aetatis 
ab ignoto praeter consuetudinem appellatus esset, 
erubuit. Iste clarius eadem et alia dicere coepit. 
Hie vix: ' Tamen,' inquit, 'sine me considerare.' 

^ discessent Mx : discessissent Ernesti : descissent MSS. 
2 balneas Mx ed. mai., all A18S. but p : balineas p Mx. 

° By destroying Fregellae when, after a long history of 
loyalty, she rebelled in 125 B.C., Rome kept her Italian con- 
federacy intact. See 4. xv. 22 and 4. xxvii. 37 below. The 
figure here is Hypophora ; see 4. xxiii. 33 below. 

* For the maxim (see 4. xvii. 24 below) c/. Terence, Meant. 
Tim. 221 ; Publilius Syrus 177 (ed. J. Wight Duff and A. M. 
Duff) : " From another's fault a wise man corrects his own," 
60 : " In another's misfortune it is good to descry what to 
avoid," and 133; Livy, 22. 39. 10; Tacitus, Annals 4. 33. 

" Whether the example is an excerpt from a speech actually 
delivered, or our author's own creation, is uncertain. The 
sentiments are such as Q. Varius Hybrida might have uttered 


AD HERENNIUM, IV. ix. 13-x. 14 

precisely because they saw how the Fregellans 
fared." For inexperienced peoples, unable to find in 
history a precedent for every circumstance, are 
through imprudence easily led into error; whilst 
those who know what has befallen others can easily 
from the fortunes of these others draw profit for 
their own policies.'' Have they, then, in taking up 
arms, been impelled by no motive ? Have they 
relied on no hope ? Who will believe that any one 
has been so mad as to dare, with no forces to depend 
on, to challenge the sovereignty of the Roman people ? 
They must, therefore, have had some motive, and 
what else can this be but what I say ? " ^' 

X. Of the Simple type of style, which is brought 
down to the most ordinary speech of every day, the 
following will serve as an example : 

" Now our friend happened to enter the baths, and, 
after washing, was beginning to be rubbed down. 
Then, just as he decided to go down into the pool, 
suddenly this fellow turned up. ' Say, young chap,' 
said he, ' your slaveboys have just beat me ; you must 
make it good.' The young man grew red, for at his 
age he was not used to being hailed by a stranger. 
This creature started to shout the same words, and 
more, in a louder voice. With difficulty the youth 
replied: 'Well, but let me look into the matter.' 

in support of his law (90 B.C.) prosecuting those who by 
malicious fraud compelled the allies to war against Rome; 
confederates at Rome are referred to in the example of the 
slack style, 4. xi. 16 below. The present example belongs to 
the ralionis confirmatio of an argument (see 2. xviii. 28 above), 
and is not so impassioned as the example of the grand style 
above. Dionysius Halic, De iJemosth., ch. 3 ff., chooses 
Thrasymachus, Isocrates, and Plato as representatives of the 
middle style. 



Turn vero iste clamare voce ista quae perfacile cuivis 
rubores eicere potest ; ita petulans est atque acerba : 
ne ad solarium quidem, ut mihi videtur, sed pone 
scaenam et in eiusmodi locis exercitata. Con- 
turbatus est adolescens ; nee mirum, cui etiam nunc 
pedagogi lites ad oriculas versarentur inperito huius- 
modi conviciorum. Ubi enim iste vidisset scurram 
exhausto rubore, qui se putaret nihil habere quod de 
existimatione perderet, ut omnia sine famae detri- 
ment© facere posset? " 
15 Igitur genera figurarum ex ipsis exemplis intellegi 
poterant. Erant enim et adtenuata verborum con- 
structio quaedam et item alia in gravitate, alia posita 
in mediocritate. 

Est autem cavendum ne, dum haec genera con- 
sectemur, in finitima et propinqua vitia veniamus. 
Nam gravi figurae, quae laudanda est, propinqua est 

* The Sundial, in the Forum, was a much frequented meeting- 
place for gossip; c/. Cicero, Pro Quinctio 18. 59. The Roman 
citizen ordinarily looked dowTi upon actors as beneath his 
dignity ; they were usually freedmen or slaves. For the 
connection between the stage and vice see, e.g., Cicero, In Cat. 
2. 5. 9. 

^ Analysing this example of the adleniiatuin genus (the 
" thinness " refers to lack of adornment and fineness of 
texture), Marouzeau, Traite, pp. 181-2 and art. cit., pp. 156-7, 
points to the forms of colloquial usage {pedagogi, the diminu- 
tive oriculas), idioms like de tr aver so, coepit with the passive, 
the vulgar use of the archaism pone for 2Jost, and of the 
indicative potest in a characterizing clause, the expletive use 
as in conversation of the ethical dative tibi with ecce, the 
frequent use of the demonstrative iste for hie or is, the 


AD HKRRNNIUM, IV. x. 14-15 

Right then the fellow cries out in that tone of his 
that might well force blushes from any one ; this is 
how aggressive and harsh it is — a tone certainly not 
practised in the neighbourhood of the Sundial, I 
would say, but backstage, and in places of that kind.** 
The young man was embarrassed. And no wonder, 
for his ears still rang with the scoldings of his tutor, 
and he was not used to abusive language of this kind. 
For where would he have seen a buffoon, with not a 
blush left, who thought of himself as having no good 
name to lose, so that he could do anything he liked 
without damage to his reputation? " ^ 

Thus the examples themselves are enough to make 
clear the types of style. For one arrangement of 
words is of the simple type, another again belongs to 
the grand, and another belongs to the middle. 

But in striving to attain these styles, we must avoid 
falling into faulty styles closely akin to them.'^ For 
instance, bordering on the Grand style, which is in 
itself praiseworthy, there is a style to be avoided. 

accusative of quality in id aetatis, the asyndeton in satisfacias 
oportet, and the type of parataxis characteristic of comedy in 
ita petulans est . . . exercitata. See also J. B. Hofmann, 
Lot. Umgangssprache, Heidelberg, 1936, p. 207. For heus 
see ibid., sect. 17; for eicere {= ejferre), sect. 138. For quod 
de existimatione perderet see Schmalz-Hofmann, pp. 526 f. 
Note also the brevity of Hie vix. The example is a factual, 
not primarily emotional, narratio, which is a division of sermo ; 
see 3. xiii. 23 above. Dionysius Halic, De Demosth., ch. 2, 
chooses Lysias as representative of the simple style. 

" TTapaK€Lfi€va afxaprij^aTa. Cf. Longinus, De Suhlim., 
ch. 3, and Horace, Ars Poet. 24-8. These deviations (napcK- 
pdaeii) are Peripatetic in concept; excess in style is judged 
in relation to the mean. The faulty styles were known to 
Marcus Varro (Gellius 6. 1-i); cf. also Demetrius, De Elocut. 
114, 186, 236, 302. 



ea quae fugienda; quae recte videbitur appellari si 
sufflata nominabitur. Nam ita ut corporis bonam 
habitudinem tumor imitatur saepe, item gravis 
oratio saepe inperitis videtur ea quae turget et 
inflata est, cum aut novis aut priscis verbis aut 
duriter aliunde translatis aut gravioribus quam res 
postulat aliquid dicitur, hoc modo : " Nam qui per- 
duellionibus venditat patriam non satis subplicii 
dederit si praeceps in Neptunias depultus erit lacunas. 
Poenite igitur istum qui montis belli fabricatus est, 
campos sustulit pacis." In hoc genus plerique cum 
declinantur et ab eo quo profecti sunt aberrarunt, 
specie gravitatis falluntur nee perspicere possunt 
orationis tumorem. 
16 XI. Qui in mediocre genus orationis profecti sunt, 
si pervenire eo non potuerunt, errantes perveniunt ad 
confine genus ^ eius generis, quod appellamus dis- 
solutum, quod est sine nervis et articulis ; ut hoc 
modo appellem fluctuans, eo quod fluctuat hue et 

^ confine E : confinii genus HPB U Mx : confinium C. 

* olSovv, eTTrjpjX€vov, vrrep^aXXov, cfivaoJBeS. Cf. Longinus, 
De Sublim. 3. 4 : " Evil are the swellings (oy/cot), both in the 
body and in diction, which are inflated and unreal, and 
threaten us with the reverse of our aim " (tr. W. Rhys 
Roberts) ; Horace, Ars Poet. 27. 

* Thus violating propriety (to -npiirov). See notes on 
3. XV. 26, 4. xi. 16, 4. xii. 17, and 4. xv. 22, and Introduction, 
p. XX. For a study of the history of this principle, see Max 
Pohlenz, NachricMen von der Gesellsch. der Wissensch. zu 
Gottingen (Philol-histor. Klasse), 1933, pp. 53-92. 

' Marouzeau, art. cit., pp. 157-8, and Traife, p. 181, 
analyses the learned affectations in spelling, forms, and 
construction, all embraced by a tour de force in four lines. 
Note the archaic forms subplicii, poenite, and the Lucretian 
montis ; the curious depultus, representing the primitive form 


AD HEKFA'NirM, IV. x. 15-M. 16 

To call this the Swollen ^ style will prove correct. 
For just as a swelling often resembles a healthy 
condition of the body, so, to those who are in- 
experienced, turgid and inflated language often 
seems majestic — when a thought is expressed either 
in new or in archaic words, or in clumsy metaphors, or 
in diction more impressive than the theme demands,** 
as follows : " For he who by high treason betrays his 
native land will not have paid a condign penalty 
albeit hurtl'd into gulfs Neptunian. So punish ye 
this man, who hath builded mounts of war, destroyed 
the plains of peace." '^ Most of those who fall into 
this type, straying from the type they began with, 
are misled by the appearance of grandeur and 
cannot perceive the tumidity of the stvle. 
16 XI. Those setting out to attain the Middle style, 
if unsuccessful, stray from the course and arrive at an 
adjacent type, which we call the Slack <^ because it is 
without sinews ^ and joints ; accordingly I may call it 
the Drifting, since it drifts to and fro, and cannot 

of the participle ; the ancient deponent fabricari ; the 
emphatic venditare; perduellionihus, rare example of an 
abstract in the plural (the author elsewhere uses maiestas ; for 
the difference between the two crimes see H. F. Jolowicz, His- 
torical Introd. to the Study of Roman Lav:, 2nd ed., Cambridge, 
1952, p. 327); the highly poetic lacunas; the disjunction of 
Xeptunias and lacunas; the adjective Neptunia-s for the 
genitive of the noun ; the learned double metaphor in montis 
and campos. These passages illustrating the faulty styles 
were doubtless made up by our author, with the examples of 
the faultless styles in view. 

^ €KXeXvfjL€vov, Bi.aXeXvfj.4vov. Cf. Cicero, Orator 68. 228. 

' For the analogy cf. Fortunatianus 3. 9 (Halm, p. 126) : 
" What style is the reverse of the middle style ? The luke- 
warm, slack, and, as I mav call it, sinewless stvle " ; and Horace, 
Ar.3 Poet. 26-7. 



illuc nee potest confirmate neque viriliter sese ex- 
pedire. Id est eiusmodi: " Socii nostri cum belli- 
gerare nobiscum vellent profecto ratiocinati essent 
etiam atque etiam quid possent ^ facere, si quidem 
sua sponte facerent et non haberent hinc adiutores 
multos, malos homines et audaces. Solent enim diu 
cogitare omnes qui magna negotia volunt agere." 
Non potest huiusmodi sermo tenere adtentum 
auditorem ; diffluit enim totus neque quicquam 
eonprehendens perfectis verbis amplectitur. 

Qui non possunt in ilia facetissima verborum ad- 
tenuatione commode versari veniunt ad aridum et 
exsangue genus orationis, quod non alienum est 
exile nominari, cuiusmodi est hoc: " Nam istic in 
balineis accessit ad hunc. Postea dicit : ' Hie tuus 
servus me pulsavit.' Postea dicit hie illi: ' Con- 
siderabo.' Post ille convicium fecit et magis magis- 
que praesente multis clamavit." Frivolus hie quidem 
iam et inliberalis est sermo ; non enim est adeptus id 
quod habet adtenuata figura, puris et eleetis verbis 
conpositam orationem. 

Omne genus orationis, et grave et mediocre et ad- 
tenuatum, dignitate adficiunt exornationes, de quibus 

^ possent d editors : possint the other MSS. Mx. 

" The phrase malos et audaces is used by Sisenna, fragm. 1 10, 
Hist. Rom. Reliquiae, ed. Hermann Peter, Leipzig, 1914, 1. 291. 
" Here " refers to Rome. 

* C/. Sophocles, Electra 320 : " Yes, a man entering upon 
a great enterprise likes to pause." 

^ Analysing this example of the sermo inliberalis, Marou- 
zeau, Traite, pp. 103 and 182, and art. cit., p. 157, calls 
attention to the unsyncopated balineis {cf. 4. x. 14 and 



get under way witli resolution and virility. The 
following is an example: "Our allies, when they 
wished to wage war with us, certainly would have 
deliberated again and again on what thev could do, 
if they were really acting of their own accord and did 
not have many confederates from here, evil men and 
bold." For they are used to reflecting long, all who 
wish to enter upon great enterprises."* Speech 
of this kind cannot hold the hearer's attention, for it 
is altogether loose, and does not lay hold of a thought 
and encompass it in a well-rounded period. 

Those who cannot skilfully employ that elegant 
simplicity of diction discussed above, arrive at a dry 
and bloodless kind of style which may aptlv be called 
the Meagre.-^ The following is an example: " Now 
this fellow came up to this lad in the baths. After 
that he says: ' Your slavebov here has beat me.' 
After that the lad says to him: ' I'll think about it.' 
Afterwards this fellow called the lad names and 
shouted louder and louder, while a lot of people were 
Vhere."'^ This language, to be sure, is mean and 
trifling, having missed the goal of the Simple type, 
which is speech composed of correct and well-chosen 

Each type of style, the grand, the middle, and the 
simple, gains distinction from rhetorical figures, 

4. ]. 63), the reinforced istic (of. iste in the example of the 
simple style above), the violation of the concord of number 
in the Old Latin expression prae-sente multis (see Schmalz- 
Hofmann, p. 638; W. M. Lindsay, Syntax of Plautm, Oxford, 
1907, p. 4), the adverbial post, the vulgar locution convicium 
facere, the abuse of the demonstrative in istic, hunc, hie, hie, 
nil, ilk, the monotonous transitions, the awkward parataxis 
and short sentences, the employment thrice of post or postea, 
and the direct style for the short and insignificant reply. 



post loquemur ; quae si rarae disponentur, distinctam 
sicuti coloribus, si crebrae conlocabuntur, obliquam ^ 
reddunt orationem. Sed figuram in dicendo com- 
mutare oportet, ut gravem mediocris, mediocrem 
excipiat adtenuata, deinde identidem commutentur, 
ut facile satietas varietate vitetur. 
17 XII. Quoniam quibus in generibus elocutio versari 
debeat dictum est, videamus nunc quas res debeat 
habere elocutio commoda et perfecta. Quae maxime 
admodum oratori adcommodata est tres res in se 
debet habere : elegantiam, conpositionem, digni- 

Elegantia est quae facit ut locus unus quisque 
pure et aperte dici videatur. Haec tribuitur in 
Latinitatem et ^ explanationem. 

Latinitas est quae sermonem purum conservat, ab 
omni vitio remotum. Vitia in sermone quo minus is 

^ obliquam MSS. Mx : oblitam Lambinus. 
2 et PB^CUE : B Mx omit. 

* 4. xiii. 18 below. 

* Thus violating propriety; see note on 4. x. 15 above. If 
oblitam be the correct reading, then " they produce an over- 
loaded, or overdaubed, style." 

•^ Tractatio; see note to 2. xviii. 27 above. Dionysius 
Halic, De Demosth., chaps. 8 ff., thinks that Demosthenes best 
blended all three types of style. 

'^ avvdeais ovofiaTcov, dp/xovia. The scanty treatment of 
Artistic Composition in 4. xii. 18 below is confined to the 
avoidance of faults rather than to constructive theory. 

« The qualities were chiefly treated by the Peripatetics and 
Stoics. The Theophrastan scheme is here modified. The four 
quahties in Theophrastus' system were Purity ('EXXrjviafios), 
Clarity {aa(f>-qv€La), Appropriateness (to npcTTov), and Orna- 
mentation (KaTaaK€VTj), this last embracing Correct Choice 
of Words (eVAoyi) ovo/xarcov). Artistic Composition {apixovia), 
and the Figures {oxw°^ra). Thus for our author, elegantia 

AD HRRENNIUM, IV. xi. 16 xii. 17 

which I shall discuss later. ° Distributed sparingly, 
these figures set the style in relief, as with colours; 
if packed in close succession, they set the style awry.* 
But in speaking we should vary the type of style, so 
that the middle succeeds the grand and the simple the 
middle, and then again interchange them, and yet 
again. Thus, by means of the variation,*^ satiety is 
easily avoided. 

XII. Since I have discussed the types to which 
style should confine itself, let us now see what 
qualities should characterize an appropriate and 
finished style. To be in fullest measure suitable to 
the speaker's purpose such a style should have three 
qualities : Taste, Artistic Composition,'^ and 

Taste makes each and every topic seem to be ex- 
pressed with purity and perspicuity. The subheads 
under Taste are Correct Latinity and Clarity. 

It is Correct Latinity / which keeps the language 
pure, and free of any fault. The faults in language 

comprises two primary qualities of Theophrastus' scheme ; 
Appropriateness (see note on -4. x. 15 above) is here missing; 
the ornamentation residing in the choice of words is left 
unconsidered (except for what he says under explanatio, and 
his treatment of Metaphor among the figures ; see 4. xxxiv. 45 
below) ; Artistic Composition is a primary quality, and is not 
treated as a branch of Ornamentation ; finally, Ornamenta- 
tion, represented by dignitas, is Hmited to the Figures. See 
Stroux, De Theophrasti virt. die, pp. 22-3, 64-7. 

•^ Corresponds to 'EXX-qviajjios among the Greek rhetoricians. 
Solecism and barbarism were studied chieflv by the Stoics. 
Cf. Quintilian, 1. 5. 5 ff., 1. 5. 34 flF. ; C. X. Smilev, Latinitas 
and EAAHXIIMOI, Madison, 1906; Hubbell, The Rhetorica 
of Philodemus, p. 295, note 4; Volkmann, p. 396, note 1; 
Alexander Xumenii, De Schemat., in Spengel 3. 9. 25 : 
" Barbarism involves correction of a word, solecism of the 



Latinus sit duo possunt esse : soloecismus et bar- 
barismus. Soloecismus est cum in verbis pluribus 
consequens verbum superiori ^ non adcommodatur. 
Barbarismus est cum verbis aliquid vitiose effertur.^ 
Haec qua ratione vitare possimus ^ in arte grammatica 
dilucide dicemus. 

Explanatio est quae reddit apertam et dilucidam 
orationem. Ea conparatur duabus rebus, usitatis 
verbis et propriis. Usitata sunt ea quae versantur in 
consuetudine cotidiana ; propria, quae eius rei verba 
sunt aut esse possunt qua de loquemur. 
18 Conpositio est verborum constructio quae facit 
omnes partes orationis aequabiliter perpolitas. Ea 
conservabitur si fugiemus crebras vocalium concur- 
siones, quae vastam atque hiantem orationem red- 
dunt, ut haec est: " Bacae aeneae amoenissime 
inpendebant ; " et si vitabimus eiusdem litterae 

1 superiori P^B^iJ : superius M Mx, 

2 effertur CE : efferatur HPBYl Mx. 

^ possimus CUE : possumus HPBMx. 

" At this juncture in the discussion of Style rhetoricians 
would refer to grammatical studies; c/. Quintilian, 8. 1. 2; 
Martianus Capella, 5. 508. Whether our author ever wrote 
a tract on Grammar we do not know; see notes on 3. ii. 3 
and 3. xvi. 28 above. This is the earliest mention in extant 
literature of a specific Latin ars grammatica. The close 
connection between grammatical and rhetorical studies is 
characteristic of Rhodian education. 

" KOLva €77-77. 

^ oiKcla €7rr], Kvpia €7717. 

* The regular designations of things, literal as against 
metaphorical, the designations " which were so to speak born 
with the things themselves " (Cicero, De Oratore 3. 37. 149). 

^ Hiatus, avyKpovais ^covrjevrwv. On this subject cf. 
Dionj'sius Halic, De Composit. Verb., ch. 23, and especially 


AD HERENNIUM, IV. xii. 17-18 

whicli can mar its Latinity are two : the Solecism 
and the Barbarism. A solecism occurs if the con- 
cord between a word and one before it in a group of 
words is faulty. A barbarism occurs if the verbal 
expression is incorrect. How to avoid these faults I 
shall clearly explain in my tract on Grammar.** 

Clarity ^ renders language plain and intelligible. 
It is achieved by two means, the use of current 
terms <^ and of proper terms.*^ Current terms are 
such as are habitually used in everyday speech. 
Proper terms are such as are, or can be, the designa- 
tions specially characteristic of the subject of our 

Artistic Composition consists in an arrangement of 
words which gives uniform finish to the discourse in 
every part. To ensure this virtue we shall avoid 
the frequent collision of vowels,/ which makes the 
style harsh and gaping, as the following: " Bacae 
aeneae amoenissime inpendebant." ^ We shall also 
avoid the excessive recurrence of the same letter,^ 

Demetrius, Dt Elocut. 2. 68 flF., 5. 299, who, while warning 
against a jerky style, yet points to the force, music, and 
harmony of speech that hiatus can bring. Isocrates and his 
followers, and Demosthenes, avoided hiatus, Thucydides and 
Plato [in his earher dialogues] did not; see Cicero, Orator 
44. 150 fF. Philodemus, Rhef., ed. Sudhaus, 1. 163, thinks 
hiatus rather frigid, but sometimes convenient. 

^ " The copper-coloured berries hung most invitingly " ; 
Asian in style. 

^* Alliteration ; most often Favom.QSQR to the grammarians ; 
Homoeoprophoron to Martianus Capella (5. 514). Alliteration 
(as it has been called since early modern times) played a 
larger role in Latin than in Greek style ; see Schmalz-Hofmann, 
pp. 801-3, Marouzeau, Traite, pp. 42-7, and Eduard Wolfflin, 
" Zur Allitteration," Melanges Boissier, Paris, 1903, pp. 


nimiam adsiduitatem, cui vitio versus hie erit exemplo 
— nam hie nihil prohibet in vitiis alienis exemplis 

O Tite, tute, Tati, tibi tanta, tyranne, tulisti ; 
et hie eiusdem poetae : 

quoiquam quicquam quemquam, quemque quisque 
conveniat, neget; 

et si eiusdem verbi adsiduitatem nimiam fugiemus, 
eiusmodi : 

Nam cuius rationis ratio non extet, ei 

rationi ratio non est fidem habere admodum ; ^ 

et si non utemur continenter similiter cadentibus 
verbis, hoc modo : 

Flentes, plorantes, lacrimantes, obtestantes ; 

et si verborum transiectionem vitabimus, nisi 
quae erit concinna, qua de re posterius loquemur ; 
quo in vitio est Coelius ^ adsiduus, ut haec est : " In 
priore libro has res ad te scriptas, Luci, misimus, 

^ lac. ; admodum stigg. Mx. 
2 Caelius M88. Mx. 

" " Thyself to thyself, Titus Tatius the tyrant, thou tookest 
those terrible troubles" (fragm. 108, tr. Warmington) ; from 
Ennius' Annals, Bk. I. See Vahlen p. 18. Cf. Charisius, ed. 
Barwick, p. 370, and Donatus, in Keil, Gramm. Lat. 4. 398. 

* Marx suggests that in the original play this verse might 
have been preceded by something like cum debere carnufex. 
"[Since the rascal] denies that anyone [owes] anything to 



and this blemish the follo\ving verse will illustrate — 
for at this juncture, in considering faults, nothing 
forbids me to use examples from others : 

O Tite, tute, Tati, tibi tanta, tyranne, tulisti.'* 

And this verse of the same poet : 

quoiquam quicquam quemquam, quemque quisque 
conveniat, neget.^ 

And again, v,e shall avoid the excessive repetition of 
the same word,<^ as follows : 

Nam cuius rationis ratio non extet, ei 

rationi ratio non est fidem habere admodum ; <* 

Again, we shall not use a continuous series of words 
with like case endings,^ as follows : 

Flentes, plorantes, lacrimantes, obtestantes.^ 

Again, we shall avoid the dislocation of words,!^ unless 
it is neatly effected — and this I shall discuss later. 
Coelius persists in this fault, as the following 
illustrates : " In priore libro has res ad te scriptas, 

anyone, whoever sues whomever." We do not know from 
which play (comedy) of Ennius the verse comes. 

* Transplacement. See 4. xiv. 20 below. 

^ " For when the reasonableness of a reason is not evident, 
in that reason it is not reasonable to put any faith at all." 
These iambic senarii are by Marx, Proleg., p. 118, thought to 
be in the style of Ennius. 

* Homoeoptoton. See 4. xx. 28 below. 

^ " Bewailing, imploring, weeping, protesting." Spondaic 
hexameter, assigned without certitude to Ennius; see Vahlen, 
p. 16, Warmington 1, 462. Cf. Charisius, ed. Barwick, p. 371 ; 
Diomedes, in Keil, Gramm. Lat. 1. 447. 16; and Donatus, 
in Keil 4. 398. 23. 

" Hyperbaton. See 4. xxxii. 44 below. 



Aeli." Item fugere oportet longam verborum 
continuationem, quae et auditoris aures et oratoris 
spiritum laedit. 

His vitiis in conpositione vitatis reliquum operae 
consumendum est in dignitate. XIII. Dignitas est 
quae reddit ornatam orationem varietate distinguens. 
Haec in verborum et in sententiarum exornationes 
dividitur. Verborum exornatio est quae ipsius ser- 
monis insignita continetur perpolitione. Senten- 
tiarum exornatio est quae non in verbis, sed in ipsis 
rebus quandam habet dignitatem. 

* ^ 5H 1 

19 Repetitio est cum continenter ab uno atque eodem 
verbo in rebus similibus et diversis principia sumun- 

^ Transition missing. 

" L. Coelius Antipater, after 121 B.C., dedicated his Punic 
War (in seven books) to L. Aelius Stilo. In the Preface to 
Book I he promised that he would use Hyperbaton only when 
necessary (Cicero, Orator 69. 230), but he violated this 
principle, as here in the Preface to Book II : "In the previous 
Book, Lucius Aelius, I dedicated to you the account of these 
events." Following a normal word order the sentence would 
read : In prior e libra, Luci Aeli, has res scriptas ad te misimiis. 
Note also that beginning with the fourth word we have a 
complete dactylic hexameter — an example of epic influence. 

** KaraaK€vri (sometimes Koofxos), which includes also 
gravitas (/xeyoAoTrpeTreia) and suavitas (to lySu')» as is made clear 
in 4. Ivi. 69 below; see also Cicero, De Inv. 2. xv. 49. Orna- 
mentation, worked out exclusively by Figures, dominates our 
author's theory of Style. The Atticists opposed this kind of 
domination ; see Cicero, Orator 23. 78-24. 79. 

^ axqii-o-Ta (see note on 4. viii. 11 above) Xe^ecos and axriy-o.Ta 
Siavot'a?. The distinction, here met for the first time, is best 
discussed by Quintilian, 9. 1. 10 S. Fortunatianus, 3. 10 
(Halm, pp. 126-7), divides figures of diction into the gram- 
matical [Xt^eiDs) and the rhetorical (Adyou), probably following 


AD m.RKNNIUM, IV. xii. i8-.\iii. 19 

Luci, misimus, Aeli."° One should likewise avoid a 
long period, which does violence both to the ear of 
the listener and to the breathing of the speaker. 

These vices of composition avoided, we must 
devote the rest of our efforts to conferring Distinction 
upon the style. XIII. To confer distinction upon 
style is to render it ornate,^ embellishing it by 
variety. The divisions under Distinction are Figures 
of Diction and the Figures of Thought.^ '^It is a 
figure of diction if the adornment is comprised in the 
fine polish of the language itself. A figure of thought 
derives a certain distinction from the idea, not from 

the words. 

* * * 

19 Epanaphora ^ occurs when one and the same word 
forms successive beginnings for phrases expressing 

a Stoic author. The ancients regarded Gorgias of Leontini 
(fifth century B.C.) as the inventor of axqiia-ra. Our author's 
treatment is the oldest extant formal one, yet represents a 
period preceding that of complete systematization (that of 
Quintilian and Phoebammon). Tropes are considered at 
4. xxxi. 42 below ; the figures of thought begin at 4. xxxv. 47. 
The ancient rhetoricians diflFer sometimes greatly, sometimes 
shghtly, in their definitions of figures, which became excessively 
numerous as refinements were made in distinguishing them. 
The hne of demarcation between tropes and figures, and that 
between figures of thought and figures of diction were often 
vague. See Quintilian, Bks. 8 and 9, especially 9. 1. 1 ff . ; 
Julius Rufinianus, De Schem. Dian. 1, in Halm, pp. 59-60; 
Willy Barczat, De figurarum disciplina atquc auctorihus, diss. 
Gottingen, 1904; Hermann Schrader in Hermes 39 (1904). 
563-603; Kroll, " Rhetorik," coll. 1108-12; Volkmann, pp. 
415 ff., 456 ff.; Cousin, Etudes sur Quintilien, 1. 437-517, 
and vol. 2. 

•* i7Tava(f)opd. em^oXrj in Rutilius Lupus, 1. 7 (Halm, p. 6), is 
the same figure but also allows the use of synonyms instead of 
repeating the precise word. 



tur, hoc modo : " Vobis istuc adtribuendum est, vobis 
gratia est habenda, vobis ista res erit honori." Item : 
** Scipio Numantiam sustulit, Scipio Kartaginem 
delevit, Scipio pacem peperit, Scipio civitatem serva- 
vit." Item: " Tu in forum prodire, tu lucem con- 
spicere, tu in horum conspectum venire conaris? 
Audes verbum facere ? audes quicquam ab istis 
petere ? audes supplicium deprecari ? Quid est 
quod possis defendere ? quid est quod audeas postu- 
lare ? quid est quod tibi concedi putes oportere ? Non 
ius iurandum reliquisti ? non amicos prodidisti ? non 
parenti manus adtulisti ? non denique in omni dede- 
core volutatus es?" Haec exornatio cum multum 
venustatis habet tum gravitatis et acrimoniae 
plurimum ; quare videtur esse adhibenda et ad 
ornandam et ad exaugendam orationem. 

Conversio est per quam non, ut ante, primum repe- 
timus verbum, sed ad postremum continenter rever- 
timur, hoc modo : " Poenos populus Romanus 
iustitia vicit, armis vicit, liberalitate vicit." Item: 
" Ex quo tempore concordia de civitate sublata est, 
libertas sublata est, fides sublata est, amicitia sublata 
est, res publica sublata est." Item: " C. Laelius 
homo novus erat, ingeniosus erat, doctus erat, bonis 

° Cf. the epanaphora of tu in the passage from the speech 
(Cicero, De Oratore 2. 55. 226) delivered by L. Licinius Crassus 
pro Planc{i)o against M. Junius Brutus c. 91 B.C. : " You dare 
behold the light of day ? You dare look these people in the 
face ? You dare present yourself in the forum, within the 
City, in the plain view of the citizens ? You do not tremble 


like and diflferent ideas, as follows : " To you must 
go the credit for this, to you are thanks due, to you 
will this act of yours bring glory." Again: " Scipio 
razed Numantia, Scipio destroyed Carthage, Scipio 
brought peace, Scipio saved the state." Again: 

You venture to enter the Forum ? You venture to 
face the light ? You venture to come into the sight 
of these men ? Dare you say a word ? Dare you 
make a request of them ? Dare you beg off punish- 
ment ? '^ What can you say in your defence ? What 
do you dare to demand ? What do you think should 
be granted to you ? Have you not violated your oath ? 
Have you not betrayed your friends ? Have you 
not raised your hand against your father ? Have you 
not, I ask, wallowed in every shame ? " This figure 
has not only much charm, but also impressiveness and 
vigour in highest degree ; I therefore believe that it 
ought to be used for both the embellishment and the 
amplification of style. 

In Antistrophe ^ we repeat, not the first word in 
successive phrases, as in Epanaphora, but the last, 
as follows: " It was by the justice of the Pcoman 
people that the Carthaginians were conquered, by its 
force of arms that they were conquered, by its 
generosity that they were conquered." Again: 
Since the time when from our state concord dis- 
appeared, liberty disappeared, good faith dis- 
appeared, friendship disappeared, the common weal 
disappeared." Again : " Gaius Laelius was a self- 
made man, a talented man, a learned man, to good 

in fear of that corpse, you do not tremble in fear of the very 
images [of your ancestors] ? " 

"^ avrLarpo<j>Ti. €7n(f>opd in Rutilius Lupus 1. 8 (Halm, pp. 
6-7). Cf. Disjunction, 4. xxvii. 37 below. 



viris et studiis amicus erat ; ergo in civitate primus 
erat." Item: "Nam cum istos ut absolvant te 
rogas, ut peierent rogas, ut existimationem neglegant 
rogas, ut leges populi Romani tuae libidini largiantur 
20 XIV. Conplexio est quae utramque conplectitur 
exornationem, ut et conversione et repetitione ^ 
utamur, quam ante exposuimus, et ut repetatur idem 
verbum saepius et crebro ad idem postremum rever- 
tamur, hoc modo : " Qui sunt qui foedera saepe 
ruperunt.^ Kartaginienses. Qui sunt qui crudelis- 
sime bellum gesserunt? Kartaginienses. Qui sunt 
qui Italiam deformaverunt ? Kartaginienses. Qui 
sunt qui sibi postulant ^ ignosci ? Kartaginienses. 
Videte ergo quam conveniat eos impetrare." Item: 
*' Quem senatus damnarit, quern populus damnarit, 
quem omnium existimatio damnarit, eum vos 
sententiis vestris absolvatis ? " 

Traductio est quae facit uti, cum idem verbum 
crebrius ponatur, non modo non offendat animum, 
sed etiam concinniorem orationem reddat, hoc pacto : 
"Qui nihil habet in vita iucundius vita, is cum 

^ lac. ; ut et conversione et repetitione sugg. Mx. 
2 qui postulant E : qui sibi postulent 31 Mx. 

" A free parapiirase of Aesehines, Adv. Cles. 198 : " Who- 
ever, then, on the question of the penalty asks for your vote, 
is asking for the remission of your anger; but whoever in the 
first speech asks for your vote, is asking for the surrender of 
your oath, is asking for the surrender of the law, is asking for 
the surrender of the democratic constitution." The Greek 
original hkewise illustrates Antistrophe. 

* oviMTrXoK-q. C'f. Aesehines, Adv. Ctes. 202 : " Against 
yourself you are calling him, against the laws you are calling 
him, against the democratic constitution j'ou are calling 


AD HKRRNNIUM, IV. xin. 19x1%. 20 

men and good endeavour a friendly man ; and so 
in the state he was the first man." Again: " Is it 
acquittal by these men that you are demanding ? 
Then it is their perjury that you are demanding, it is 
their neglect of their reputation that you are demand- 
ing, it is the surrender of the laws of the Roman 
people to your caprice that you are demanding." ° 

XIV. Interlacement * is the union of both figures, 
the combined use of Antistrophe and Epanaphora, 
which are explained above ; we repeat both the first 
word and the last in a succession of phrases, as follows : 
"Who are they who have often broken treaties? 
The Carthaginians. Who are they who have waged 
war with severest cruelty ? The Carthaginians. Who 
are they who have marred the face of Italy ? The 
Carthaginians. Who are they who now ask for 
pardon? The Carthaginians.^ See then how appro- 
priate it is for them to gain their request." Again: 
" One whom the Senate has condemned, one whom 
the Roman people has condemned, one whom 
universal public opinion has condemned, would you 
by your votes acquit such a one ? " 

Transplacement ^ makes it possible for the same 
word to be frequently reintroduced, not only without 
offence to good taste, but even so as to render the 
style more elegant, as follows : " One who has 
nothincr in life more desirable than life cannot culti- 

him." Cf. also the complexio (Resume of an argument) of 
2. xviii. 28 above. 

* Quintilian, 9. 3. 31, also cites the example, but without 
naming the figure. The passage might have come from a 
debate of the sort engaged in by Cato the Elder and Publius 
Scipio Xasica ; see note on 3. ii. 2 above. 

•* ttAokt), avTifieTadeais, avyKpiais. 



virtutc vitam non potest colere." Item: " Eum 
hominem appellas, qui si fuisset homo, numquam tarn 
erudeliter hominis vitam petisset. At erat iiiimicus. 
Ergo inimicum sic ulcisci voluit, ut ipse sibi reperire- 
tur inimicus? " Item: " Divitias sine divitis esse. 
Tu vero virtiitem praefer divitiis ; nam si voles divitias 
cum virtute conparare, vix satis idoneae tibi vide- 
buntur divitiae quae virtutis pedisequae sint." 
21 Ex eodem genere est exornationis cum idem ver- 
bum ponitur modo in hac, modo in altera re, hoc 
modo : " Cu^* eam rem tam studiose curas, quae tibi 
multas dabit curas? " Item: " Nam amari iucun- 
dum sit,i si curetur ne quid insit amari." Item: 
" Veniam ad vos, si mihi senatus det veniam." 

In his quattuor generibus exornationum quae adhuc 
propositae sunt non inopia verborum fit ut ad idem 
verbum redeatur saepius ; sed inest festivitas, quae 
facilius auribus diiudicari quam verbis demonstrari 

^ iucundum sit M Mx ed. mai. : iociindum est E : iucimd- 
umst Mx. 

" Cf. Alexander Numenii (first half of second Christian 
century), De Schemat., in Spengel 3. 37 : " It is noble to live 
if one but learns how one ought to live." 

* This passage may belong to the controversia concerning 
the murder of Sulpicius, 1. xv. 25 above. Cf. Euripides, 
Androm. 590-1 : " You a man, most cowardly even of 
cowards ? Where have you any claim to consideration as a 
tnan ? " ; Philemon, fragm. 119, in Kock, Com. Alt. Fragm. 2. 
515 : " Tell me, have you any right to speak ? You go prattling 
among men as though you were a tnant " 

'^ avravaKXaai?. Sta^opa in Rutilius Lupus 1. 12 (Halm, 
p. 8). Akin to Paronomasia, 4. xxi. 29 below. 

^ Lit., " To be loved would be pleasant, if only we should 
take care that there is no bitterness in that love." Quin- 


AD HKRKNNIUM, IV. xiv. 20 21 

vate a virtiKJus life."** Again: " Vou call fiiin a 
man, who, had he been a man, would never so cruelly 
have sought another man's life.'' But he was his 
enemy. Did he therefore wish thus to avenge him- 
self upon his enemy, only to prove himself his own 
enemy? " Again: " Leave riches to the rich man, 
but as for you, to riches prefer virtue, for if you will 
but compare riches with virtue, riches will in your 
eyes prove scarcely worthy to be the lackeys of 
21 To the same type of figure belongs that which 
occurs when the same word is used first in one func- 
tion, and then in another,<^ as follows: "Why do 
you so zealously concern yourself with this matter, 
which will cause you much concern ? " Again : " To 
be dear to you would bring me joy — if only I take care 
it shall not in anguish cost me dear." ^ Again: 
" I would leave this place, should the Senate give me 
leave." ^ 

In the four kinds of figures which I have thus far 
set forth,/ the frequent recourse to the same word 
is not dictated by verbal poverty ; rather there 
inheres in the repetition an elegance which the ear can 
distinguish more easily than words can explain. 

tilian, 9. 3. 69-70, considers this a flat pun even when used in 
jest, and quotes the example as something to be avoided, not 
imitated. C/. Lucretius 4. 1133 ff. 

' Lit., " I would come to you if the Senate should grant me 
permission." Cj. the Pompeian distich, Corp. Inscr. Lat. 
4.4971 : 

Sei quid Amor valeat nostei, sei te hominem scis, 
Commiseresce mei, da veniam ut veniam. 

" If you have learned the power of Love, if you know that 
vou are human, pity me ; give me leave to come." 
^ f 4. xiii. 19-xiv. 21. 



XV. Contentio est cum ex contrariis rebus oratio 
conficitur, hoc pacto : " Habet adsentatio iucunda 
principia, eadem exitus amarissimos adfert." Item: 
Inimicis te placabilem, amicis inexorabilem 
praebes." Item: " In otio tumultuaris, in tumultu 
es otiosus; in re frigidissima cales, in ferventissima 
friges; tacito cum opus est, clamas; ubi loqui 
convenit, obmutescis ; ades, abesse vis ; abes, reverti 
cupis ; in pace bellum quaeritas, in bello pacem 
desideras ; in contione de virtute loqueris, in proelio 
prae ignavia tubae sonitum perferre non potes." 
Hoc genere si distinguemus orationem, et graves et 
ornati poterimus esse. 
22 Exclamatio est quae conficit significationem doloris 
aut indignationis alicuius per hominis aut urbis aut 
loci aut rei cuiuspiam conpellationem, hoc modo: 
" Te nunc adloquor, Africane, cuius mortui quoque 
nomen splendori ac decori est civitati. Tui clarissimi 
nepotes suo sanguine aluerunt inimicorum crudeli- 

" avTtdeat?, dvTideTov, contrapositum (Quintilian, 9. 3. 81). 
In Cicero, Part. Oral. 6. 21, a feature of the agreeable {suave) 
style. See 4. xlv. 58 below, and of. contrarium, 4. xviii. 25 

* Cf. the saying assigned to Critias (leading spirit of the 
Thirty Tyrants) in Stobaeus, 3. 14. 2 : "He who so bears 
himself towards his friends that he does everything to oblige 
them, renders hateful for the future that which is a pleasure 
for the nonce " ; also Alexis, fragm. 295, in Kock, Com. Att. 
Fragm. 2. 402 : " Avoid a pleasure which brings harm in its 

*^ Cf. Sophocles, Antig. 88 : " You have a hot spirit for 
cold business " ; Horace, Ars Poet. 465 : " Empedocles . . . 
coolly leapt into burning Aetna " ; Alexander Numenii, De 
Schemat., in Spengel 3. 36-7 : " They bathe the chilled men in 
hot springs." 


AD HKRENNIUM, I\'. \v. 21-22 

XV. Antithesis '^ occurs when the styh- is i)uilt upon 
contraries, as follows : " Flattery has pleasant 
beginnings, but also brings on bitterest endings."'' 
Again : " To enemies you show yourself conciliatory, 
to friends inexorable." Again: " When all is calm, 
you are confused ; when all is in confusion, you are 
calm. In a situation requiring all your coolness, you 
are on fire ; in one requiring all your ardour, you are 
cool.<^ When there is need for you to be silent, you 
are uproarious ; when you should speak, you grow 
mute. Present, you wish to be absent ; absent, you 
are eager to return.*^ In peace, you keep demanding 
war ; in war, you yearn for peace. In the Assembly, 
you talk of valour ; in battle, you cannot for 
cowardice endure the trumpet's sound." Embellish- 
ing our style by means of this figure we shall be able 
to give it impressiveness and distinction. 
22 Apostrophe ^ is the figure which expresses grief or 
indignation by means of an address to some man or 
city or place or object, as follows : " It is you I now 
address, Africanus, whose name even in death means 
splendour and glory to the state ! It is your famous 
grandsons/ who by their own blood have fed the 

Cf. with our author's last example of Antithesis ^4 n/A. Pa/. 
11. 305 : " Among grammarians you are a Platonist; but if 
asked about the doctrines of Plato, you are again a gram- 

'^ Cf. Horace, Serm. 2. 7. 28 : " At home you long for the 
country ; in the country, fickle man, you extol to heaven the 
distant city." 

' aTTOGTpo4>rj, €K(f>wvr]ai?. Quintilian, 9. 2. 27, considers as 
a figure only that kind of exclamatio which is simulated and 
artfully composed, and in 9. 3. 97 assigns exclamatio to the 
figures of thought ; cf. also 9. 2. 38, 9. 3. 2-4-6, and 4. 1. 63. 

^ Cornelia, daughter of the elder Scipio Africanus, was the 
mother of the Gracchi. 



tatem." Item: " Perfidiosae Fregellae, quam facile 
scelere vestro contabuistis, ut, cuius nitor urbis 
Italiam nuper inlustravit, eius nunc vix funda- 
mentorum reliquiae maneant." Item: " Bonorum 
insidiatores, latrocinia, vitam innocentissimi cuiusque 
petistis ; tantamne ex iniquitate iudiciorum vestris 
calumniis adsumpsistis facultatem ? " Hac exclama- 
tione si loco utemur, raro, et cum rei magnitudo 
postulare videbitur, ad quam volemus indignationem 
animum auditoris adducemus. 

Interrogatio non omnis gravis est neque concinna, 
sed haec quae, cum enumerata sunt ea quae obsunt 
causae adversariorum, confirmat superiorem ora- 
tionem, hoc pacto : *' Cum igitur haec omnia faceres, 
diceres, administrares, utrum animos sociorum ab re 
publica removebas et abalienabas, an non ? et utrum 
aliquem exornari oportuit qui istaec prohiberet ac 
fieri non sineret, an non ? " 
23 XVI. Ratiocinatio est per quam ipsi a nobis 
rationem poscimus quare quidque dicamus, et crebro 

" CJ. the passage, often used by rhetoricians, in Aesehines, 
Adv. Ctes. 133 : " But Thebes, Thebes our neighbour-state, 
has in one day been swept from the midst of Hellas." After 
M. Fulvius Flaccus' bill granting Roman franchise to the 
Italian allies failed to pass, Fregellae revolted and was 
destroyed in 125 B.C. See 4. ix. 13 and 4. xxvii. 37. 

* Probably addressed to the public informers {quadrup- 

" A consideration of propriety, to Trperrov. See note on 
4. X. 15 above. 

^ epcoTTjixa. Eogatio in Cicero, De Oratore 3. 53. 203, 
Assigned by Quintilian, 9. 3. 98, to the figures of thought; 
see also 9. 2. 7 on the " rhetorical question." 

* C/. Demosthenes, De Corona 71, on Philip : " By these 
acts was he, or was he not, committing wrong, breaking treaty, 
and violating the terms of peace ? And was it, or was it not, 


AD IIERENNIUM, 1\'. xv. 22-xvi. 23 

cruelty of their enemies." Again: "Perfidious 
Fregellae, how (quickly, because of your crime, you 
have wasted away ! " As a result, of the city whose 
brilliance but yesterday irradiated Italy, scarce the 
debris of the foundations now remains." Again: 
Plotters against good citizens,* villains, you have 
sought the life of every decent man ! Have you 
assumed such power for your slanders thanks to the 
perversions of justice? " If we use Apostrophe in 
its proper place, sparingly, and when the importance 
of the subject seems to demand it,<^ we shall instil in 
the hearer as much indignation as we desire. 

Not all Interrogation'^ is impressive or elegant, 
but that Interrogation is, which, when the points 
against the adversaries' cause have been summed up, 
reinforces the argument that has just been delivered, 
as follows : "So when you were doing and saying 
and managing all this, were you, or were you not, 
alienating and estranging from the republic the 
sentiments of our allies ? And was it, or was it not, 
needful to employ some one to thwart these designs 
of yours and prevent their fulfilment? " * 
23 XVI. Through the figure, Reasoning by Question 
and Answer,/ we ask ourselves the reason for every 

right that some man of the Hellenes should come forth to 
stop these incursions ? " This passage was a favourite of the 
rhetoricians. It may well be that our author has in mind 
Q. Varius Hybrida, speaking on behalf of his law de maiestate 
(90 B.C.); see 4. ix. 13 above, and note. 

^ amoAoyia, i^eraafMos. Assigned by Quintilian, 9. 3. 98, 
to the figures of thought. Cf. sibi ipsi responsio in Cicero, 
De Oratore 3. 54. 207 and Quintilian, 9. 3. 90, and 4. xxiv. 34 
below, with note; also aTr64)nai.^ in Julius Rufinianus 8 (Halm, 
p. 40; cf. aTToriaat? [infitiatio] in 1. xvii. 27 above). To be 
distinguished from ratiocinatio, the Type of Issue (Reasoning 
from Analogy), 1. xi. 19 above. 



nosmet a nobis petimus unius cuiusque propositionis 
explanationem. Ea est huiusmodi : " Maiores nostri 
si quam unius peccati niulierem damnabant, simplici 
iudicio multorum maleficiorum convictam putabant. 
Quo pacto ? Quam inpudicam iudicarant, ea vene- 
ficii quoque damnata existimabatur. Quid ita ? Quia 
necesse est earn, quae suum corpus addixerit turpis- 
simae cupiditati, timere multos. Quosistos? Virum, 
parentes, ceteros ad quos videt sui dedecoris in- 
famiam pertinere. Quid postea ? Quos tantopere 
timeat, eos necesse est optet necare.^ Quare necesse 
est? Quia nulla potest honesta ratio retinere earn 
quam magnitudo peccati facit timidam, intemper- 
antia audacem, natura mulieris inconsideratam. 
Quid ? veneficii damnatam quid putabant ? Inpudi- 
cam quoque necessario. Quare ? Quia nulla facilius 
ad id maleficium causa quam turpis amor et intem- 
perans libido commovere potuit ; tum cuius mulieris 
animus esset corruptus, eius corj^us castum esse non 
putaverunt. Quid? in viris idemne hoc observa- 
bant? Minime. Quid ita? Quia viros ad unum 
quodque maleficium singulae cupiditates impellunt, 
mulieris ad omnia maleficia cupiditas una ducit." 
Item : " Bene maiores hoc conparaverunt, ut nemi- 
nem rcgem quem armis cepissent vita privarent. 
Quid ita ? Quia quam nobis fortuna facultatem 
dedisset iniquum erat in eorum supplicium consumere 
quos eadem fortuna paulo ante in amplissimo statu 

^ lac. ; optet necare sugg. Brakman {Mnenios. 52 [1924]. 335). 

" The same argument is used in Seneca, Contr. 7. 3 (18). 6. 

^ Cf. Quintilian, 5. 11. 39 : " Would not an adulteress on 
trial for poisoning be regarded as condemned by the judgement 
of Marcus Cato, who said that every adulteress was the same 
as a poisoner? " 

AD HKRKNNIUM, IV. xvi. 23 

statement we make, and seek the meaning of each 
successive affirmation, as follows : " When our 
ancestors condemned a woman for one crime, they 
considered that by this single judgement she was con- 
victed of many transgressions. How so? Judged 
unchaste, she was also deemed guilty of poisoning." 
Why ? Because, having sold her body to the basest 
passion, she had to live in fear of many persons. Who 
are these ? Her husband, her parents, and the others 
involved, as she sees, in the infamy of her dishonour. 
And what then ? Those whom she fears so much she 
would inevitably wish to destroy. Why inevitably ? 
Because no honourable motive can restrain a woman 
who is terrified by the enormity of her crime, em- 
boldened by her lawlessness, and made heedless by 
the nature of her sex. Well now, what did they 
think of a woman found guilty of poisoning ? That 
she was necessarily also unchaste. \Miy ? Because 
no motive could more easily have led her to this crime 
than base love and unbridled lust. Furthermore, if a 
woman's soul had been corrupted, they did not con- 
sider her body chaste. Now then, did they observe 
this same principle with respect to men? Not at 
all. And why ? Because men are driven to each 
separate crime by a different passion, whereas a 
woman is led into all crimes by one sole passion."^ 
Again: " It is a good principle which our ancestors 
established, of not putting to death any king captured 
by force of arms.^ Why is this so ? Because it were 
unfair to use the advantage vouchsafed to us by 
fortune to punish those whom the same fortune had 
but recently placed in the highest station. But what 

* This was true, e.g., of Perseus and Syphax, but not 
strictly of Jugurtha. 


conlocarat. Quid quod exercitum contra duxit? 
Desino meminisse. Quid ita? Quia viri fortis est 
qui de victoria contendant, eos hostes putare ; qui 
victi sunt, eos homines iudicare, ut possit bellum 
fortitudo minuere, pacem humanitas augere. Et ille 
si vicisset, non idem fecisset ? Non profecto tarn 
sapiens fuisset. Cur igitur ei parcis ? Quia talem 
24 stultitiam contemnere, non imitari consuevi." Haec 
exornatio ad ^ sermonem vehementer adcommodata 
est, et animum auditoris retinet ^ adtentum cum 
venustate sermonis tum rationum expectatione. 

XVII. Sententia est oratio sumpta de vita quae aut 
quid sit aut quid esse oporteat in vita breviter 
ostendit, hoc pacto : " Difficile est primum quidque." 
Item: " Non solet is potissimum ^ virtutes revereri 
qui semper secunda fortuna sit usus." Item : " Liber 
is est existimandus qui nulli turpitudini servit." 
Item : ** Egens aeque est is qui non satis habet, et is 
cui satis nihil potest esse." Item : '' Optima vivendi 
ratio est eligenda; eam iucundam consuetude 
reddet." Huiusmodi sententiae simplices non sunt 
inprobandae, propterea quod habet brevis expositio, 
si rationis nullius indiget, magnam delectationem. 

^ ad all MSS. but H : HMx omit. 

2 retinet CUE : retineat HPB Mx. 

3 lac. ; quidque. Item : Non solet is potissimum svgg. Mx. 

* For the sentiment r/. Cicero, De Offic. 1. 11. 35 flf. ; 
Horace, Carm. Saec. 51 f. ; Virgil, Aeneid 6. 853. 

^ yviofiTj. Aristotle, Rhet. 2. 21 (1394 a-1395 b), offers the 
classic treatment of maxims. On the virtue of brevity in 
maxims, see Demetrius, De Elocut. 9. Sententia is excluded 
from the figures by Quintilian (9. 3. 98). 


AD IIKRENNIUM, IV. \vi. 2;,-xvii. 24 

of the fact that he has led an army against us ? I 
refuse to recall it. Why? Because it is characteristic 
of a brave man to regard rivals for victory as enemies, 
but when thev have been vanquished to consider them 
as fellow men," in order that his bravery may 
avail to put an end to the war, and his humanity to 
advance peace. But had that king prevailed, he 
would not, would he, have done the same ? No, no 
doubt he would have been less wise. Why, then, do 
you spare him ? Because it is my habit to scorn, not 
24 emulate, such folly." This figure is exceedingly well 
adapted to a conversational style, and both by its 
stylistic grace and the anticipation of the reasons, 
holds the hearer's attention. 

XVII. A Maxim ^ is a saying drawn from life, 
which shows concisely either what happens or ought 
to happen in life, for example : " Every beginning is 
difficult." Again: "Least in the habit of giving 
reverence to the virtues is he who has always enjoyed 
the favours of fortune." Again: " A free man is 
that man to be judged who is a slave to no base 
habit." ^ Again : " As poor as the man who has not 
enough is the man who cannot have enough." <* 
Again: ** Choose the noblest way of living ; habit will 
make it enjoyable."* Simple maxims of this sort 
are not to be rejected, because, if no reason is needed, 
the brevity of the statement has great charm. But 

« Cf. Cicero, Paradoxa Stoic, o. 35 : " All wicked men are 
I therefore slaves — slaves, I say ! "; Diogenes Laertius 7. 21; 
Philo, Quod Omnis Probus Liber Sit. 

^ A saying of Epicurus : '' Nothing is ' enough ' to him 
who deems ' enough ' to be ' too little ' " (C. Wotke in 
Wiener Siudien 10 [1888]. 197, Xo. 68). 

' Attributed to Pythagoras (Stobaeus, 3. 1. 29, and Plutarch, 
De exilio 8, 602 C).' 



Sed illud quoque probandum est genus sententiae 
quod confirmatur subiectione rationis, hoc pacto : 
" Omnes bene vivendi rationes in virtute sunt 
conlocandae, propterea quod sola virtus in sua 
potestate est, omnia praeterea subiecta sunt sub 
fortunae dominationem." Item: "Qui fortunis 
alicuius inducti amicitiam eius secuti sunt, hi, simul 
ac fortuna dilapsa est, devolant omnes. Cum enim 
recessit ea res quae fuit consuetudinis causa, nihil 
superest quare possint in amicitia teneri." 

Sunt item sententiae quae dupHciter efferuntur. 
Hoc modo sine ratione : " Errant qui in prosperis 
rebus omnes impetus fortunae se putant fugisse; 
sapienter cogitant qui temporibus secundis casus 
adversos reformidant." Cum ratione, hoc pacto: 
25 " Qui adulescentium peccatis ignosci putant oportere 
falluntur, propterea quod aetas ilia non est inpedi- 
mento bonis studiis. At ii sapienter faciunt qui 
adulescentes maxime castigant, ut quibus virtutibus 
omnem tueri vitam possint eas in aetate maturissima 
velint conparare." Sententias interponi raro con- 
venit, ut rei actores, non vivendi praeceptores vide- 
amur esse. Cum ita interponentur, multum adferent 
ornamenti. Et ^ necesse est animi conprobet eam 

^ Et Bornecque : lac. Mx. 

^ Cf. the Stoic principle assigned to Pythagoras in Stobaeus, 
3, 1. 29 : " This is God's law : Virtue is the strong and stable 
thing; all else is nonsense." Cf. also 4. xix. 27 below. 

^ The experience, for example, of Timon of Athens (the 
Misanthrope). For the sentiment see Otto, s.v. " amicus," 
p. 22, and Caesar, Bellum Civ. 3. 104. 1. 

<^ aviv alrias or eViAdyot». 

"* For the topic of anticipating evil, see Posidonius in 
Galen, De plac. Hipp, et Plat. 4. 7 (Diels, 6th ed., 2. 13-14), 


AD HKRKXNIUM, IV. xvir. 24-25 

we must also favour that kind of maxim which is 
supported by an accompanying reason, as follows: 
'* AH the rules for noble living should be based on 
virtue, because virtue alone is within her own control, 
whereas all else is subject to the sway of fortune." " 
Again : " Those who have cultivated a man's friend- 
ship for his wealth one and all fly from him as soon as 
his wealth has slipped away. For when the motive 
of their intercourse has disappeared, there is nothing 
left which can maintain that friendship." ^ 

There are also maxims which are presented in 
double form. Without a reason,^ as follows : " They 
who in prosperity think to have escaped all the on- 
slaughts of fortune are mistaken ; they who in 
favourable times fear a reversal are wise in their fore- 
thought." '^ With a reason,*" as follows : " They who 
think that the sins of youth deserve indulgence are 
deceived, because that time of life does not constitute 
a hindrance to sound studious activities. But they 
act wisely who chastise the young with especial 
severity in order to inculcate at the age most oppor- 
tune for it the desire to attain those virtues by 
which they can order their whole lives."/ We 
should insert maxims only rarely, that we may be 
looked upon as pleading the case, not preaching 
morals. When so interspersed, they will add much 
distinction. P'urthermore, the hearer, when he 

Cicero, Tusc. Disp. 3. 14. 29, and Plutarch, Ad Apollon. 21 
(112 D), together with the lines of Euripides (fragm. 964 D) 
they cite. 

' /x€t' atTta? or (ttlXoyov. Perhaps a Stoic development of 

^ Cf. the Adelphoe of Terence, in which both theories of 
education, in extreme form, are apphed with equally bad 



tacitus auditor cum ad causam videat adcommodari 
rem certam ex vita et moribus sumptam. 

XVIII. Contrarium est quod ex rebus diversis 
duabus alteram breviter et facile contraria ^ con- 
firmat, hoc pacto : " Nam qui suis rationibus inimicus 
fuerit semper, eum quomodo alienis rebus amicum 
fore speres ? " Item: " Nam quem in amicitia per- 
fidiosum cognoveris, eum quare putes inimicitias cum 
fide gerere posse? Aut qui privatus intolerabili 
superbia fuerit, eum commodum et cognoscentem sui 
fore in potestate qui speres, et qui in sermonibus et 
conventu amicorum verum dixerit numquam, eum 
sibi in contionibus a mendacio temperaturum ? " 
Item : " Quos ex collibus deiecimus, cum his in 
campo metuimus dimicare ? Qui cum plures erant, 
pares nobis esse non poterant, hi, postquam pauciores 
26 sunt, metuimus ne sint superiores ? " Hoc exorna- 
tionis genus breviter et continuatis verbis perfectum 
debet esse ; et ^ cum commodum est auditu propter 
brevem et absolutam conclusionem, tum vero vehe- 
menter id quod opus est oratori conprobat con- 
traria re, et ex eo quod dubium non est expedit illud 

^ lac. ; contraria s^tgg. Mx. 

^ et d edd. : ut followed by a lacuna 31 x. 

« Cf. Aristotle, Rhet. 2. 21 (1395 b) : "Hearers are de- 
lighted when a speaker succeeds in expressing as a universal 
truth the opinions they hold about particular cases." 

* €vdvfi7)fia, oxrjfJia €k rod ivavTiov. See Quintilian, 5. 10. 2 : 
" There are some who call a conclusion from consequents an 
epicheireme, v/hile you would find that a majority are of 
opinion that an enthymeme is a conclusion from incom- 
patibles. And that is why Cornificius calls it Reasoning by 
Contraries; " 9. 3. 99 : "I shall pass by those authors who 


AD HERENNIUM, IV. xvii. 2s-xwui. 26 

perceives that an indisputable principle drawn from 
practical life is being applied to a cause, must give it 
his tacit approval. ^* 

X\'III. Reasoning by Contraries ^ is the figure 
which, of two opposite statements, uses one so as 
neatly and directly to prove the other, as follows : 
" Now how should you expect one who has ever been 
hostile to his own interests to be friendly to 
another's? "<= Again: " Now why should you think 
that one \vho is, as you have learned, a faithless 
friend, can be an honourable enemy } Or how should 
you expect a person whose arrogance has been in- 
sufferable in private life, to be agreeable and not 
forget himself when in power, and one who in 
ordinary conversation and among friends has never 
spoken the truth, to refrain from lies before public 
assemblies? " Again: " Do we fear to fight them on 
the level plain when we have hurled them down from 
the hills? \Mien they outnumbered us, they were 
no match for us ; now that we outnumber them, do 
26 we fear that they will conquer us?" This figure 
ought to be brief, and completed in an unbroken 
period. Furthermore, it is not only agreeable to the 
ear on account of its brief and complete rounding-off, 
but by means of the contrary statement it also forcibly 
proves what the speaker needs to prove ; and from a 
statement which is not open to question it draws a 

have set almost no limit to the invention of technical terms, 
and have even assigned to figures what really belongs under 
arguments." Cf. the topos a fortiori in Aristotle, Ehet. 
2. 23 (1397 b); contentio {avriQerov) in -4. xv. 21 above and 
4. xlv. 58 below. 

•^ Cf. Isocrates, Ad Callim. 56 : " One who is so base where 
the interests of others are concerned — what would he not 
dare where his own are concerned? " 



quod est dubium,^ ut dilui non possit aut multo 
difficillime possit. 

XIX. Membrum orationis appellatur res breviter 
absoluta sine totius sententiae demonstratione, quae 
denuo alio membro orationis excipitur, hoc pacto : 
" Et inimico proderas." Id est unum quod appel- 
lamus membrum; deinde hoc excipiatur oportet 
altero: " Et amicum laedebas." Ex duobus mem- 
bris haec ^ exornatio potest constare, sed commo- 
dissima et absolutissima est quae ex tribus constat, 
hoc pacto : " Et inimico proderas et amicum laedebas 
et tibi non consulebas." Item: " Nee rei publicae 
consuluisti nee amicis profuisti nee inimicis restitisti." 

Articulus dicitur cum singula verba intervallis 
distinguuntur ^ caesa oratione, hoc modo : " Acri- 
monia, voce, vultu adversaries perterruisti." Item: 
" Inimicos invidia, iniuriis, potentia, perfidia sustu- 

1 dubium CE Mx ed. mai. : dubio M : in dubio 3Ix. 

2 haec d Rufinus : suis haec other M8S. Mx : soils haec 

' distinguntur d edd. : distinguentur other MSS. Mx. 

" KcoXov. The concept originated in comparison with the 
human body; it came into rhetoric from the art of music. 
The doctrine of Colon, Comma, and Period is Peripatetic; 
c/. Aristotle, Bhet. 3. 9 (1409 a fif.). Quintilian, 9. 3. 98, 
excludes Colon and Comma from the list of figures. See A. 
du Mesnil, BegrifJ der drei Kunstformen der Rede : Komma, 
Kolon, Periode, nach der Lehre der Alten, in Zum zweihundert- 
jdhrigen Juhilduni des konigl. Friedrichs-Gymnas., Frankfurt 
on 0., 1894, pp. 32-121. 

^ TpiKOiKov. Note the dichorees {- yj --) : consulebas, and 
below, restitisti, per)terrtiisti, sustulisti, conlocavit, ob)esse 
possit, contulerunt, domi)nationem (as also those in the example 
of Isocolon [compar], 4. xx. 27 below). This cadence was a 
favourite of the Asian orators. Cicero, Orator 63. 215, 


AD HERENNIUM, IV. xvm. 26-xix. 26 

thought which is in question, in such a way that the 
inference cannot be refuted, or can be refuted only 
with much the greatest difficulty. 

XIX. Colon or Clause ** is the name given to a 
sentence member, brief and complete, which does not 
express the entire thought, but is in turn supple- 
mented by another colon, as follows: " On the one 
hand you were helping your enemy." That is one 
so-called colon ; it ought then to be supplemented 
by a second: " And on the other you were hurting 
your friend." This figure can consist of two cola, 
but it is neatest and most complete when composed 
of three, as follows : " You were helping your 
enemy, you were hurting your friend, and you were 
not consulting your own best interests."^ Again: 
" You have not consulted the welfare of the republic, 
nor have you helped your friends, nor have you 
resisted your enemies." 

It is called a Comma or Phrase *= when single words 
are set apart by pauses in staccato speech, as follows : 
" By your vigour, voice, looks you have terrified your 
adversaries." Again: "You have destroyed your 
enemies by jealousy, injuries, influence, perfidy." 

discusses the dangers resulting from its use : " First it is 
recognized as rhythm, next it cloys, and then when it is seen 
to be an easy device it is despised." Longinus, De Sublim. 
41, disapproves of the agitated movement dichorees give to 
language : " For all overrhythmical writing is at once felt to 
be affected and finical and wholly lacking in passion owing 
to the monotony of its superficial polish " (tr. W. Rhys 
Roberts). See notes on 4. viii. 12 and 4. xxxii. 44. 

<= KofifjLa. Cicero, Orator 62. 211, translates the word literally 
by incisum; note ca^sa oratione in our author's definition. 
Lit., articulus = " part jointed on." Commata, rather 
than cola, are required in the forcible style {xapaia-rjp Seivd?), 
according to Demetrius, De Elocut. 5. 241. 



listi." Inter huius generis et illiiis superioris vehe- 
mentiam hoc interest : illud tardius et rarius venit, 
hoc crebrius et celerius pervenit. Itaque in illo 
genere ex remotione brachii et contortione dexterae 
gladius ad corpus adferri, in hoc autem crebro et 
celeri corpus vuhiere consauciari videtur. 
27 Continuatio est densa et continens ^ frequentatio 
verborum cum absolutione sententiarum. Ea utemur 
commodissime tripertito : in sententia, in contrario, 
in conclusione. In sententia hoc pacto : " Ei non 
multum potest obesse fortuna qui sibi firniius in 
virtute quam in casu praesidiuin conlocavit." In 
contrario hoc modo : " Nam si qui spei non multum 
conlocarit in casu, quid est quod ei magnopere casus 
obesse possit ? " In conclusione hoc pacto : ** Quodsi 
in eos plurimum fortuna potest qui suas rationes 
omnes in casum contulerunt, non sunt omnia com- 
mittenda fortunae, ne magnam nimis in nos habeat 
dominationem." In his tribus generibus ad continua- 
tionis vim adeo frequentatio necessaria est, ut infirma 
facultas oratoris videatur nisi sententiam et contra- 
rium et conclusionem frequentibus efferat verbis ; 
sed alias quoque nonnumquam non alienum est, 
tametsi necesse non est, eloqui res aliquas per 
huiusmodi continuationes. 

^ densa et continens E : et densa HPB : densa B^CU. : et 
densa et continens Mx. 

* -nepiohos. For other Latin equivalents of this term see 
Cicero, Orator 61. 204, De Oratore 3. 48. 186 ; Quintilian, 9. 4. 22. 

* ivdvfirjfxa. See 4. xviii. 25 above. 

" For the theme c/. 4. xvii. 24 above. Our author, unlike 
other post-AristoteHan rhetoricians, does not say that the 
Period is comprised of membra, yet this example seems to 
contain four — the upper limit usually allowed; see, e.g., 


AD IIKRENNIUM, IV. xix. 26-27 

There is this difference in onset between the last 
figure and the one preceding : the former moves upon 
its object more slowly and less often, the latter strikes 
more quickly and fre(|uently. Accordingly in the first 
figure it seems that the arm draws back and the hand 
whirls about to bring the sword to the adversary's 
body, while in the second his body is as it were pierced 
with quick and repeated thrusts. 
27 A Period " is a close-packed and uninterrupted 
group of words embracing a complete thought. We 
shall best use it in three places: in a Maxim, in a 
Contrast,* and in a Conclusion. In a Maxim as 
follows : " Fortune cannot much harm him who has 
built his support more firmly upon virtue than upon 
chance." In a Contrast, as follows : " For if a person 
has not placed much hope in chance, what great harm 
can chance do him ? " In a Conclusion, as follows : 
But if Fortune has her greatest power over those 
who have committed all their plans to chance, we 
should not entrust our all with her, lest she gain too 
great a domination over us." '^ In these three types 
a compact style is so necessaiy for the force of the 
period that the orator's power seems inadequate if he 
fails to present the Maxim, Contrast, or Conclusion 
in a press of words. But in other cases as well it is 
often proper, although not imperative, to express 
certain thoughts by means of periods of this sort. 

Cicero, Orator 66. 222, and Demetrius, De Elocut. 1. 16, but 
also Quintilian, 9. 4. 125. On the theory of the Period see 
esp. Aristotle, Rhet. 3. 9 (1409 a ff.); Demetrius, op. cit., 1. 
10 fF., 5. 244, 303; Cicero, Orator 62. 211 fF.; and Josef 
Zehetmeier, " Die Periodenlehre des Aristoteles," Philologu3 85 
(1930). 192-208, 255-284, 414-436. Aristotle recognized only 
periods of either one or two cola, and in fact the division into 
cola was not of primary importance in bis theorj'. 



XX. Conpar appellatur quod habet in se membra 
orationis, de quibus ante diximus, quae constent ex 
pari fere numero syllabarum. Hoc non denumera- 
tione nostra fiet — nam id quidem puerile est — sed 
tantum adferet usus et exercitatio facultatis, ut 
animi quodam sensu par membrum superiori referre 
possimus, hoc modo : " In proelio mortem parens 
oppetebat, domi filius nuptias conparabat; haec 
omina 1 gravis casus administrabant." Item: "Alii 
fortuna dedit felicitatem, huic industria virtutem 
28 conparavit." In hoc genere saepe fieri potest ut 
non plane par numerus sit syllabarum et tamen esse 
videatur, si una aut etiam altera syllaba est alterum 
brevius, aut si, cum in altero plures sunt, in altero 
longior aut longiores, plenior aut pleniores syllabae 
erunt, ut longitudo aut plenitudo harum multitu- 
dinem alterius adsequatur et exaequet. 

Similiter cadens exornatio appellatur cum in eadem 
constructione verborum duo aut plura sunt verba 
quae similiter isdem casibus efferantur, hoc modo : 
" Hominem laudem egentem virtutis, abundantem 
felicitatis ? " Item : " Huic omnis in pecunia spes 
est, a sapientia est animus remotus; diligentia 
conparat divitias, neglegentia corrumpit animum, 

. Mx : omnia MSS. 

•* laoKcoXov. Sometimes classed as a variety of irdpiaov, 
napLawais, parallelism in structure. The next three figures 
(c/. also Alliteration, 4. xii. 18 above) represent napofioLov, 
napoiJLOLOiOLs, parallelism in sound. Together with Anti- 
thesis (4. XV. 21 above) this and the next three figures com- 
prise the so-called Gorgianic figures. Isocrates exemplifies 
the extensive and effective use of Isocolon. 

" 4. xix. 26. 


AD HERENNIUM, IV. xx. 27-28 

XX. We call Isocolon " the figure comprised of cola 
(discussed above) ^ which consist of a virtually equal 
number of syllables. To effect the isocolon we shall 
not count the syllables — for that is surely childish — 
but experience and practice will bring such a facility 
that by a sort of instinct we can produce again a 
colon of equal length to the one before it, as follows : 
" The father was meeting death in battle ; the son 
was planning marriage at his home. These omens 
wTought grievous disasters." Again: "Another 
man's prosperity is the gift of fortune, but this man's 
28 good character has been won by hard work." In 
this figure it may often happen that the number of 
syllables seems equal without being precisely so ^ — 
as when one colon is shorter than the other by one or 
even two syllables, or when one colon contains more 
syllables, and the other contains one or more longer or 
fuller-sounding syllables, so that the length or full- 
ness of sound of these matches and counterbalances 
the greater number of syllables in the other. 

The figure called Homoeoptoton ^ occurs when in 
the same period two or more words appear in the 
same case, and with like terminations, as follows : 
" Hominem laudem egentem virtutis, abundantem 
felicitatis ? " ^ Again : " Huic omnis in pecunia spes 
est, a sapientia est animus remotus ; diligentia 
conparat divitias, neglegentia corrumpit animum, 

— u I v^ u — o 

<^ Note the phrase and metrical clausula, esse videatur, 
favoured by Cicero. See Tacitus, Dial, de Orator. 23 (ed. 
Gudeman, pp. 29 and 247 f.) ; Quintilian, 10. 2. 18 and 
9. 4. 73; Rufinus, in Halm, pp. 575 and (citing Probus) 583. 

^ ofioioTTTojTov. Cf. 4. xll. 18 above. 

' '■ Am I to praise a man abounding in good luck, but 
lacking in virtue ? " 



et tamen, cum ita vivit, neminem prae se ducit 

Similiter desinens est cum, tametsi casus non 
insunt in verbis, tamen similes exitus sunt, hoc pacto : 
" Turpiter audes facere, nequiter studes dicere ; 
vivis invidiose, delinquis studiose, loqueris odiose." 
Item : " Audaciter territas, humiliter placas." 

Haec duo genera, quorum alterum in exituum, 
alterum in casus similitudine versatur, inter se 
vehementer conveniunt ; et ea re qui his bene utuntur 
plerumque simul ea conlocant in isdem partibus 
orationis. Id hoc modo facere oportet: " Perdi- 
tissima ratio est amorem petere, pudorem fugere, 
diligere formam, neglegere famam." Hie et ea 
verba quae casus habent ad casus similes, et ilia quae 
non habent ad similes exitus veniunt. 
29 XXI. Adnominatio est cum ad idem verbum et 
nomen acceditur commutatione vocum aut litterarum, 

* "This man places all his hope in money; from 
wisdom is his soul withdrawn. Through diligence he 
acquires riches, but through negligence he corrupts his 
soul. And yet, living so, he counts no one any one 
before himself." Cf. neclegentiam . . . diligentiam in 
Terence, Andria 20 f. 

* o/iotoreAeyTov. For a study of our author's theory of 
Homoeoptoton and Homoeoteleuton see Karl Polheim, Die 
lateinische Reimprosa, Berlin, 1925, pp. 161 fiF.; on the 
influence of the theory, see pp. 463 ff. 

•^ Note in the Latin examples of this figure the correspon- 
dences in the endings of the verb forms as well as in those 
of the adverbs. 

** "A most depraved principle it is — to seek love and to 
shun self-respect, to esteem beauty and to slight one's 
own good name." 

* TTTOiriKO., 


AD HERENNIUNI, IV. x.x. 28-\xi. 29 

et tamen, cum ita vivit, neniinern prae se ducit 
hominem." " 

Homoeoteleuton ^* occurs when the word endings 
are similar, although the words are indeclinable, as 
follows: "You dare to act dishonourably, you 
strive to talk despicably ; you live hatefully, vou 
sin zealously, you speak offensively." Again: 
" Blusteringly you threaten ; cringingly you 
appease. "<^ 

These two figures, of which one depends on like 
word endings and the other on like case endings, are 
very much of a piece. And that is why those who use 
them well generally set them together in the same 
passage of a discourse. One should effect this in the 
following way : " Perditissima ratio est amorem 
petere, pudorem fugere, diligere formam, neglegere 
famam."<^ Here the declinable words ^ close with 
like case endings, and those lacking cases/ close with 
like terminations. 9 
29 XXI. Paronomasia ^ is the figure in which, by 
means of a modification of sound, or change of letters, 
a close resemblance to a given verb or noun * is pro- 

^ am wT a. 

* TTapovoyiaaia. Cicero, Orator 25. 84, warns the speaker 
of the Attic plain style against the kind of Paronomasia which 
is produced by the change of a letter; yet cf. De Oralore 
2. 63. 256 on Paranomasia in verbal witticisms. See Eduard 
Wolftlin, " Das Wortspiel im Lateinischen," Sitzungsb. 
Bayer. Akad. der Wiss. (philos.-pkilol. und hislor. Cla-sse), 
1887 (2), pp. 187-208. 

' Our author knows four parts of speech : proper name, or 
noun (nomen, ovo^a;, verb {vertmm, prjyia^, common noun, or 
appellative {vocabuhim, rrpooriyopia), conjunction (coniunctio, 
avvdea^xos); " noun " would include " adjective," as in No. 7 



ut ad res dissimiles similia verba adcommodentur. Ea 
multis et variis rationibus conficitur. Adtenuatione 
aut conplexione eiusdem litterae, sic : " Hie qui se 
magnifice iactat atque ostentat, venit ante quam 
Romam venit." Et ex contrario; "Hie quos 
homines alea vincit, eos ferro statim vincit." Pro- 
ductione eiusdem litterae, hoc modo : " Hinc avium 
dulcedo ducit ad avium." Brevitate eiusdem lit- 
terae: " Hie, tametsi videtur esse honoris cupidus, 
tantum tamen curiam diligit quantum Curiam ? " 
Addendis litteris, hoc pacto : " Hie sibi posset tem- 
perare, nisi amori mallet obtemperare." Demendis 
nunc litteris, sic : "Si lenones vitasset tamquam 
leones, vitae tradidisset se." Transferendis litteris, 
sic : " Videte, indices, utrum homini navo an vano 

" avaToXrj. Cf. the figure complexio, 4. 14. 20 above. 

* " That man who carries himself with a lofty bearing and 
makes a display of himself was sold as a slave before coming 
to Rome;" venit is a contraction of veniit, and precedes 
the tenue {venit). 

'^ " Those men from whom he wins in dice he straightway 
binds in chains; " tenue precedes plenius {vincit = vinciit). 

^ " The sweet song of the birds draws us from here into 
pathless places." Quintilian, 9. 3. 69-71, quotes this pun, 
and the play upon aiivari in 4. xiv. 21 above, as examples to 
be avoided, not imitated, being flat even when used in jest; 
he marvels that this artifice is included in the textbooks. 
Virgil, Oeorg. 2. 328, puns on the same words. Note in con- 
nection with the problem of authorship of our treatise that 
the example here used for adnominatio is, according to 
Quintilian, called an example of traductio by Cornificius; 
cf. 4. xiv. 20 above. 


AD HERENNIUM, IV. xxi. 29 

duced, so that similar words express dissimilar things. 
This is accomplished by many different methods: 
(1) by thinning or contracting " the same letter, as 
follows : " Hie qui se magnifice iactat atque ostentat, 
venit antequam Romam venit ; " ^» (2) and by the 
reverse : " Hie quos homines alea vincit, eos ferro 
statim vincit ; " ^ (3) by lengthening the same letter, 
as follows : " Hinc avium dulcedo ducit ad avium ; " «^ 
(4) by shortening the same letter : " Hie, tametsi 
videtur esse honoris cupidus, tantum tamen curiam 
diligit quantum Ciiriam ? " ; ^ (5) by adding letters, 
as follows: " Hie sibi posset temperare, nisi amori 
mallet obtemperare " ; / (6) and now by omitting 
letters, as follows : "Si lenones vitasset tamquam 
leones, vitae tradidisset se";9 (7) by transposing 
letters, as follows : " Videte, iudices, utrum homini 

' " Does this man, although he seems desirous of public 
honour, yet love the Curia [the Senate-house] as much as he 
loves Curia ? " The M group of MSS. reads Curiam mere- 
tricem. On this and the next three types of Paronomasia 
c/. in Phoebammon (Spengel 3. 45 fiF.) the four principles 
governing the formation of ail figures : lack, superabundance, 
transposition, interchange (evdeia, TiAeovaa^xo?, fxeTadeais, 
evaXXayq) ; in Quintilian, 1. 5. 6 and 1. o. 38 fi"., the four ways of 
committing barbarisms and solecisms, and, in 6. 3. 53, the 
poor jests formed by punning in these ways; in Philo, De 
aetern. mundi 22. 113, the four ways (Peripatetic doctrine) in 
which corruption occurs : addition {rrpoadeaLg), subtraction 
{a<f)aip€a.s), transposition (^era^eai?), and transmutation 
(dAAoicuai?) ; and H. Usener, Sitzungsb. Bayer. Akad. der 
Wiss. {philos.-philol.-hist. CI), 1892, pp. 628-631. Cf. also 
Cicero, Part. Oral. 6. 19, on the causes of obscurity in words 
and periods. 

f " This man could rule himself, if only he did not prefer 
to submit to love." 

" If he had avoided panders as though they were lions, 
he would have devoted himself to life ; " the text is corrupt. 
Tertullian, Apol. 50. 12, puns on the same words. 


credere malitis." Commutandis, hoc modo : " Deli- 
gere oportet quem velis diligere." 

Hae sunt adnominationes quae in litterarum brevi 
commutatione aut productione aut transiectione aut 
30 aliquo huiusmodi genere versantur. XXII. Sunt 
autem aliae quae non habent tarn propinquam in 
verbis similitudinem et tamen dissimiles non sunt; 
quibus de generibus unum est huiusmodi : " Quid 
veniam, qui sim, quem ^ insimulem, cui prosim, quae 
postulem, brevi cognoscetis." Nam hie est in quibus- 
dam verbis quaedam similitudo non tam perfecta 
quam illae superiores, sed tamen adhibenda non- 
numquam. Alterum genus huiusmodi : " Demus 
operam, Quirites, ne omnino patres conscripti circum- 
scripti putentur." Haec adnominatio magis accedit 
ad similitudinem quam superior, sed minus quam 
illae superiores, propterea quod non solum additae, 
sed uno tempore demptae quoque litterae sunt. 

^ quem House : quare veniam quem MSS. Mx. 

" " See, men of the jury, whether you prefer to trust an 
industrious man or a vainglorious one." 

" " You ought to choose such a one as you would wish to 
love." A form of the saying attributed to Theophrastus, that 
one must not first love and then judge, but first judge and then 
love (ou (fjiXovvra Sei Kpiveiv dAAa Kpivavra (/(tAetv) ; see 
Plutarch, De fraterno amore 8 (482 B); Rutilius Lupus 1. 6 
(Halm, p. 6) ; Seneca, Epist. 3. 2, De Morihus 48 ; Cicero, De 
Amic. 22. 85; PubUlius Syrus 134 (ed. J. Wight Duff and A. 
M. Duff); Stobaeus, 4. 27. 14; Sidonius Apollinaris, Epist. 

AD lIKRKNNirM. [V. \\i. 29-\xii. 30 

navo an vano credere malitis " ; " (8) by changiiinr 
letters, as follows : " Deligere oportet quern velis 
dilicrere." ^ 

These are word-plays which depend on a slight 
change or lengthening or transposition of letters, and 
30 the like. XXII. There are others also in which the 
words lack so close a resemblance, and yet are not 
dissimilar. Here is an example of one kind of such 
word-plays: " Quid veniam, qui sim, quern insimu- 
lem, cui prosim, quae postulem, brevi cognoscetis." «^ 
For in this example there is a sort of resemblance 
among certain words, not so complete, to be sure, as 
in the instances above, yet sometimes serviceable. 
An example of another kind: " Demus operam, 
Quirites, ne omnino patres conscripti circumscripti 
putentur."'^ In this paronomasia the resemblance 
is closer than in the preceding, yet is not so close as 
in those above, because some letters are added and 
some at the same time removed. 

5. 11. 1. In modern form : " If you suspect a man, do not 
employ him; if you employ a man, do not suspect him." 

' " Why I come, who I am, whom I accuse, whom I am 
helping, what I ask for vou will soon know," Cf. Plautus, 
Poen. 992 : 

adei atque appella quid velit, quid venerit, 
qui sit, quoiatis, unde sit. 

" Go up to him and ask him what he wants, why he has 
come, who he is, of what country, and whence he comes." 

'^ " Let us see to it, fellow-citizens, that the Conscript 
Fathers be not thought to have been utterly duped." Quin- 
tiUan, 9. 3. 72, considers this kind of paronomasia as pro- 
ducing the very worst of trivial effects. Seneca, Sn-a-s. 7. 11, 
reproves for bad taste a speaker who punned on scripsit and 
proscripsit. It has been conjectured (see Kroehnert, p. 31) 
that Crassus may have uttered these words when speaking 
on behalf of the Servilian law ; see note on 4. iii. 5. 


Tertium genus est quod versatur in easuum com- 
31 mutatione aut unius aut plurium nominum. Unius 
nominis, hoc modo : "Alexander Macedo summo 
labore animum ad virtutem a pueritia confirmavit. 
Alexandri virtutes per orbem terrae cum laude et 
gloria vulgatae sunt. Alexandrum omnes maxime 
metuerunt,^ idem plurimum dilexerunt. Alexandre 
si vita data longior esset, trans Oceanum Macedonum 
transvolassent sarisae." Hie unum nomen in com- 
mutatione easuum volutatum est. Plura nomina 
casibus commutatis hoc modo facient adnomina- 
tionem : " Tiberium Graccum rem publicam admin- 
strantem prohibuit indigna nex diutius in eo com- 
morari. Gaio Gracco similis occisio est oblata, quae 
virum rei publicae amantissimum subito de sinu 
civitatis eripuit. Saturninum fide captum malorum 
perfidia per scelus vita privavit. Tuus, o Druse, 
sanguis domesticos parietes et vultum parentis asper- 
sit. Sulpicio, cui paulo ante omnia concedebant, eum 

^ metuerunt d : metuerant other MS8. Mx. 

" PolyptotOn (770AU7TTC0T0V). 

* Unlike a normal English word order, the Latin permits 
the proper noun in each of its cases to be placed at the 
beginning of the sentence. 

'^ Note that in the two examples the cases are Greek, 
lacking the Latin ablative, and that, unlike the disposition in 
the second, Roman, example, the cases in the first example 
come in a definite order (the accusative preceding the dative). 
Alexander's career was favourite material with the 


AD HKKKNN'lUNr. IV. x.xii. 30-31 

There is a third form of" ));ir(jMoiiiasia, depending on 
31 a change of case in one or more proper nouns. ° In 
one noun, as follows : " Alexander of Macedon with 
consummate toil from boyhood trained his mind to 
virtue. Alexander's virtues have been broadcast 
with fame and glory throughout the world. All men 
greatly feared Alexander, yet deeply loved him. 
Had longer life been granted Alexander, the Mace- 
donian lances would have flown across the ocean." ^ 
Here a single noun has been inflected, undergoing 
changes of case. Several different nouns, with 
change of case, will produce a paronomasia, as 
follows :<^ "An undeserved death by violence pre- 
vented Tiberius Gracchus, while guiding the republic, 
from abiding longer therein. There befell Gaius 
Gracchus a like fate, which of a sudden tore from the 
bosom of the state a hero and staunch patriot. 
Saturninus, victim of his faith in wicked men, a 
treacherous crime deprived of life. O Drusus, 
your blood bespattered the walls of your home, 
and your mother's face.*^ They were only now 
granting to Sulpicius every concession,* yet soon 

rhetoricians. The common suasoria concerned his delibera- 
tion whether, having conquered Asia and India, he should 
navigate the ocean (when he had heard the voice say : 
" Quousque invide f " ) ; cf. e.g., Seneca, Sua3. 1. 1, Contr. 
7. 7. 19, Quintihan, 3. 8. 16. 

•* Irmentraud Haug, W ixrzbunjer Jahrb. filr die Altertums- 
wissenschaft 2 (1947). 113, argues that the reference is to the 
bust of Drusus' father. 

« When in 88 B.C. the quarrel between populares and 
optimatts grew serious, Sulla suspended the iustitium, and 
fled to his army. Then Sulpicius, in control, put through 
his measures granting the new Italian citizens a fuller share 
in political power, and transferring the command in the East 
to Marius. 


brevi spatio non modo vivere, sed etiam sepeliri 
32 Haec tria proxima genera exornationum, quorum 
ununi in similiter cadentibus, alterum in similiter 
desinentibus verbis, tertium in adnominationibus 
positum est, perraro sumenda sunt cum in veritate 
dicimus, propterea quod non haec videntur reperiri 
posse sine elaboratione et sumptione operae ; XXIII. 
eiusmodi autem studia ad delectationem quam ad 
veritatem videntur adcommodatiora. Quare fides et 
gravitas et severitas oratoria minuitur his exorna- 
tionibus frequenter conlocatis, et non modo tollitur 
auctoritas dicendi, sed offenditur quoque in eiusmodi 
oratione, propterea quod est in his lepos et festivitas, 
non dignitas neque pulcritudo. Quare quae sunt 
ampla atque pulcra diu placere possunt ; quae lepida 
et concinna cito satietate adficiunt aurium sensum 
fastidiosissimum. Quomodo igitur, si crebro his 
generibus utemur, puerili videmur elocutione delec- 
tari ; item, si raro interseremus has exornationes et in 
causa tota varie dispergemus, commode luminibus 
distinctis inlustrabimus orationem. 

" The sentiments are those of the Marian party. Ti. 
Sempronius Gracchus was clubbed to death by Scipio Nasica 
and his followers in 133 b.c. (see 4. Iv. 68 below); C. Sem- 
pronius Gracchus was killed in flight after the consul Opimius 
and his band had stormed the Aventine, in 121 b.c; L. 
Appuleius Saturninus was stoned and torn to pieces by a 
mob in the Senate-house, in 100 b.c. ; M. Livius Drusus was, 
according to Velleius Paterculus, 2. 14, stabbed by an assassin 
in the area before his house, in 91 B.C. ; on the death, in 88 
B.C., of P. Sulpicius Rufus see note on 1, xv. 25 above. Cicero, 
De Harusp. Resp. 19. 41 and 20. 43, in which all the above 
except Drusus are used as exempla, and Seneca, Octavia 
882-9, in which the fates of the Gracchi and Drusus are 


AD HERENNIUM, IV. xxii. 31-xxiii. 32 

they suffered him not to live, nor even to be 

These last three figures — the first based on like 
case inflections, the second on like word endings, and 
the third on paronomasia — are to be used very 
sparingly when we speak in an actual cause, because 
their invention seems impossible without labour and 
pains. XXIII. Such endeavours, indeed, seem more 
suitable for a speech of entertainment than for use in 
an actual cause. ** Hence the speaker's credibility, 
impressiveness, and seriousness are lessened by 
crowding these figures together. Furthermore, apart 
from destroying the speaker's authority, such a style 
gives offence because these figures have grace and 
elegance, but not impressiveness and beauty. Thus 
the grand and beautiful can give pleasure for a long 
time, but the neat and graceful quickly sate the 
hearing, the most fastidious of the senses.<^ If, then, 
we crowd these figures together, we shall seem to be 
taking delight in a childish style ; ^ but if we insert 
them infrequently and scatter them with variations 
throughout the whole discourse, we shall brighten our 
style agreeably with striking ornaments. 

joined, may have used the same source as did our author; c/. 
also Seneca, Ad Marc, de Cons. 16. 3 f. 

^ These figures serve epideictic better than judicial or 
deliberative oratory. Cicero warns the speaker of the Attic 
plain style against the use of these three figures (and of 
Isocolon, Orator 25. 84), but allows them in epideictic 
discourse {Orator 12. 38, Part. Orat. 21. 72); Quintilian, 
8. 3. 12, also justifies the full use of ornamentation in 

' Of. Cicero, Orator U. 150, and De Oratore 3. 25. 97 S. ; also 
Longinus, De Sublim., ch. 7, and Plutarch, De recta ratione 
audiendi 7 (41 E). 


33 Subiectio est cum interrogamus adversaries aut 
quaerimus ipsi quid ab illis aut quid contra nos dici 
possit ; dein subicimus id quod oportet dici aut non 
oportet, aut nobis adiumento futurum sit aut ofFuturum 
sit idem contrario, hoc modo : " Quaero igitur unde 
iste tam pecuniosus factus sit. Amplum patrimonium 
relictum est ? At patris bona venierunt. Hereditas 
aliqua venit ? Non potest dici, sed etiam a necessariis 
omnibus exhereditatus est. Praemium aliquod ex 
lite aut iudicio cepit ? Non modo id non fecit, sed 
etiam insuper ipse grandi sponsione victus est. 
ErgOj si his rationibus locupletatus non est, sicut 
omnes videtis, aut isti domi nascitur aurum aut unde 
non est licitum pecunias cepit." 

XXIV. Item : " Saepe, indices, animum adverti 
multos aliqua ex honesta re quam ne inimici quidem 
criminari possint sibi praesidium petere. Quorum 
nihil potest adversarius facere. Nam utrum ad 
patris sui ^ virtutem confugiet ? At eum vos iurati 
capite damnastis. An ad suam vitam revertetur ? 
Quam vitam aut ubi honeste tractatam? Nam hie 
quidem ante oculos vestros quomodo vixerit scitis 
omnes. At cognatos suos enumerabit, quibus vos 
conveniat commoveri? At hi quidem nulli sunt. 
1 sui c? : eius other 3ISS. Mx. 

" v7Tocf)opd, dvdvTTQ(j)opd. Assigned by Quintilian, 9. 3. 98, 
to the figures of thought. The figure subiectio is to be dis- 
tinguished from the subiectio of 2. xviii. 28 and 4. xvii. 24. 

* Whether by legis actio or by the formula procedure. See 
Wenger, Institutes of the Boman Law of Civil Procedure, 
pp. 22 f., 123 &., 132 if. 


AD IIKRENNIUM, IV. xxiii. 33-xAiv. S3 

33 Hypophora" occurs when we en(}uire of our adver- 
saries, or ask ourselves, what the adversaries can say 
in their favour, or what can be said against us ; then 
we subjoin what ought or ought not to be said — that 
which will be favourable to us or, by the same token, 
be prejudicial to the opposition, as follows: " I ask, 
therefore, from what source has the defendant 
become so wealthy ? Has an ample patrimony been 
left to him ? But his father's goods were sold. Has 
some bequest come to him ? That cannot be urged ; 
on the contrary he has even been disinherited by all 
his kin. Has he received some award from a civil 
action, whether in the older or the more recent 
form of procedure ? * Not only is that not the case, 
but recently he himself lost a huge sum on a wager 
at law.^ Therefore, if, as you all see, he has not 
gro\\Ti rich by these means, either he has a gold mine 
in his home, or he has acquired monies from an illicit 

XXIV. Another example : " Time and time again, 
men of the jury, have I observed that numerous 
defendants look for support in some honourable deed 
which not even their enemies can impeach. My 
adversary can do no such thing. Will he take refuge 
in his father's virtue ? On the contrary, you have 
taken your oath and condemned him to death. Or 
%\-ill he turn to his own life ? What life, and wherein 
lived honourably ? Why, the life that this man has 
lived before your eyes is known to all of you. Or ^^^ll 
he enumerate his kinsmen, by whom you should be 
moved ? But he has not any. He will produce 

' The sponsio in a civil suit was an agreement by the 
litigants that the loser of the case would pay a certain sum 
of money. 


Amicos proferet? At nemo est qui sibi non turpe 
putet istius amicum nominari." Item: "Credo 
inimicum, quem nocentem putabas, in iudicium 
adduxisti ? Non, nam indemnatum necasti. Leges 
quae id facere prohibent veritus ? At ne scriptas 
quidem iudicasti. Cum ipse te veteris amicitiae 
commonefaceret, commotus es ? At nihilominus, sed 
etiam studiosius occidisti. Quid ? cum tibi pueri ad 
pedes volutarentur, misericordia motus es? At 
eorum patrem crudelissime sepultura quoque prohi- 
34 buisti." Multum inest acrimoniae et gravitatis in 
hac exornatione, propterea quod cum quaesitum est 
quid oporteat, subicitur id non esse factum. Quare 
facillime fit ut exaugeatur indignitas negotii. 

Ex eodem genere, ut ad nostram quoque personam 
referamus subiectionem, sic : " Nam quid me facere 
convenit cum a tanta Gallorum multitudine circum- 
sederer ? Dimicarem ? At cum parva manu turn 
prodiremus ; locum quoque inimicissimum habe- 
bamus. Sederem in castris ? At neque subsidium 
quod expectarem habebamus, neque erat qui vitam 
produceremus. Castra relinquerem? At obside- 
bamur. Vitam militum neglegerem ? At eos vide- 
bar ea accepisse condicione ut eos, quoad possem, 
incolumis patriae et parentibus conservarem. Hos- 
tium condicionem repudiarem ? At salus antiquior 

" This example bears a very close resemblance to Demos- 
thenes, Adv. Aristogeit. 1. 76 ff. 

* This passage may perhaps belong to the controversia on 
the murder of Sulpicius in 1. xv. 25 above. 

<= Cf., in Quintilian, 9. 2. 106, npoeKOeaLs, " which means 
telling what ought to have been done and then what has been 
done"; also irpoiKdeoLs (divisio), 1, x. 17 above. 


AD HERFA'NIUM, IV. xxiv. 33-34 

friends ? But there is no one who does not consider 
it disgraceful to be called that fellow's friend." « 
Again: "Your enemy, whom you consider to be 
guilty, you doubtless summoned him to trial ? No, 
for you slew him while he was yet unconvicted. Did 
you respect the laws which forbid this act ? On the 
contrary, you decided that they did not even exist in 
the books. When he reminded you of your old 
friendship, were you moved ? No, you killed him 
nevertheless, and with even greater eagerness. And 
then when his children grovelled at your feet, were you 
moved to pity? No, in your extreme cruelty you 
34 even prevented their father's burial." ^ There is 
much vigour and impressiveness in this figure 
because, after having posed the question, " What 
ought to have been done ? ", we subjoin that that 
was not done.<^ Thus it becomes very easy to amplify 
the baseness of the act. 

In another form of the same figure we refer the 
hypophora to our own person j*^ as follows : " Now 
what should I have done when I was surrounded 
by so great a force of Gauls ? Fight ? But then our 
advance would have been with a small band. Further- 
more, we held a most unfavourable position. Remain 
in camp ? But we neither had reinforcements to look 
for, nor the where\Wthal to keep alive. Abandon the 
camp ? But we were blocked. Sacrifice the lives of 
the soldiers ? But I thought I had accepted them on 
the stipulation that so far as possible I should preserve 
them unharmed for their fatherland and their 
parents. Reject the enemy's terms ? But the safety 

^ Cf. sibi ipsi responsio in Quintilian, 9. .3. 90, there 
adjudged a figure of thought rather than of diction ; ratio- 
cinaiio, 4. xvi. 23 above. 


est militum quam inpedimentorum." Eiusmodi 
consequuntur identidem subiectiones ut ex omnibus 
ostendi videatur nihil potius quam quod factum sit ^ 
faciendum fuisse. 

XXV. Gradatio est in qua non ante ad consequens 
verbum descenditur quam ad superius ascensum ^ 
est, hoc modo : " Nam quae reliqua spes manet 
libertatis, si illis et quod libet licet, et quod licet 
possunt, et quod possunt audent, et quod audent 
faciunt, et quod faciunt vobis molestum non est? " 
Item: " Non sensi hoc et non suasi; neque suasi et 
non ipse facere statim ^ coepi ; neque facere coepi et 
nonperfeci; neque perfeci et non probavi." Item: 
Africano virtutem industria, virtus gloriam, gloria 
aemulos conparavit." Item: " Imperium Graeciae 
fuit penes Athenienses ; Atheniensium potiti sunt 
Spartiatae ; Spartiatas superavere Thebani ; The- 
banos Macedones vicerunt, qui ad imperium Graeciae 
brevi tempore adiunxerunt Asiam bello subactam." 

1 factum sit MMx ed. Diai. : factum est E -. factumst 3Ix. 

2 ascensum E : escensum Mz : conscensum P^CHd : 
consensum BPB. 

' facere statim H : statim facere PYIBC : facere E Mx. 

" Popilius is speaking; see 1. xv. 25 above. 

* /cAi/ia^. Also imnXoK-^, ascensus, and catena. This 
figure joins with Epanaphora, Antistrophe, Interlacement, 
Transplacement, and Antanaklasis (4. xiii. 19-xiv. 21 above) 
to form a complete theory of Repetition. 

" For a like word-play on libet and licet cf. Aquila Romanus 
27 (Halm, pp. 30-31) under Paronomasia (see 4. xxi. 29 above); 
Cicero, Pro Quinctio 30. 94; Calpurnius Flaccus 16. 

"* Quintilian, 9. 3. 55, and others cite, and our author in this 
example imitates, Demosthenes, De Corona 179 : "I did not 
say this and then fail to make the motion ; I did not make the 
motion and then fail to act as an ambassador ; I did not act 

AD HKKKNNIUM, IV. axiv. 34-xAv. 34 

of the soldiers has priority over that of the baggage." '^ 
The result of an accumulation of this kind of hypo- 
phora is to make it seem obvious that of all the 
possibilities nothing preferable to the thing done 
could have been done. 

XXV. Climax * is the figure in which the speaker 
passes to the fo]\ov,ing word only after advancing by 
steps to the preceding one, as follows : " Now what 
remnant of the hope of liberty survives, if those men 
may do what they please,''' if they can do what they 
may, if they dare do what they cari, if they do what 
they dare, and if you approve what they do ? " Again : 

I did not conceive this without counselling it ; 
I did not counsel it without myself at once undertaking 
it ; I did not undertake it without completing it ; nor 
did I complete it without winning approval of it." ^* 
Again : " The industry of Africanus brought him 
excellence, his excellence glory, his glory rivals."* 
Again : " The empire of Greece belonged to the 
Athenians ; the Athenians were overpowered by the 
Spartans ; the Spartans were overcome by the 
Thebans ; the Thebans were conquered by the 
Macedonians ; and the Macedonians in a short time 
subdued Asia in war and joined her to the empire 

as an ambassador and then fail to persuade the Thebans." 
Cf. Bom. 10. 14; Rosalind in Shakespeare, As You Like It 
5. 2 : " For your brother and my sister no sooner met but 
they looked; no sooner looked but they loved; no sooner 
loved but they sighed ; no sooner sighed but they asked one 
another the reason ; no sooner knew the reason but they 
sought the remedy ; and in these degrees have they made a 
pair of stairs to marriage " ; St. Augustine, Confessions 7. 10 : 
aetema Veritas et vera caritas et cava aeternitas.'; also 
Lane Cooper, Sewanee Rev. 32 (1924). 32-43. 

' Quintilian, 9. 3. 56, uses the same example, representing 
it as from a Latin author. 



35 Habet in se quendam leporem superioris cuiusque 
crebra repetitio verbi, quae propria est huius exorna- 

Definitio est quae rei alicuius proprias amplectitur 
potestates breviter et absolute, hoc modo : " Maiestas 
rei publicae est in qua continetur dignitas et ampli- 
tudo civitatis." Item : " Iniuriae sunt quae aut 
pulsatione corpus aut convicio auris aut aliqua turpi- 
tudine vitam cuiuspiam violant." Item: " Non est 
ista diligentia, sed avaritia, ideo quod diligentia est 
adcurata conservatio suorum, avaritia iniuriosa appe- 
titio alienorum." Item: "Non est ista fortitudo, 
sed temeritas, propterea quod fortitudo est con- 
temptio laboris et periculi cum ratione utilitatis et 
conpensatione commodorum, temeritas est cum in- 
considerata dolorum perpessione gladiatoria peri- 
culorum susceptio." Haec ideo commoda putatur 
exornatio quod omnem rei cuiuspiam vim et pote- 
statem ita dilucide proponit et breviter,^ ut neque 
pluribus verbis oportuisse dici videatur neque brevius 
potuisse dici putetur. 

XXVI. Transitio vocatur quae cum ostendit brevi- 
ter quid dictum sit, proponit item brevi quid con- 

^ breviter PBClJd : explicat breviter bl Mx. 

" opLOjjLos. Cf. Definition, the subtype of Legal Issue, 
1. xi. 19, 1. xii. 21, and 2. xii. 17 above. Quintilian, 9. 3. 91, 
unlike " Cornificius and Rutilius," excludes finitio from the 
figures of diction. The figure goes back to Prodicus' Correct 
Use of Terms {SpdoTrjs oi-ofiaTcov) ; see Radermacher, Artium 
Scriptores, pp. 67 ff". 

* See note on 1. xii. 21 above. 

" For iniuria in Roman law, see Mommsen, pp. 784—808; 
P. F. Girard, Melanges de droit roniain (Paris, 1923), 2. 


AD HERENNIUM, IV. xxv. 34 xxvi. y, 

35 of Greece." The constant repetition of the pre- 
ceding word, characteristic of this figure, carries a 
certain charm. 

Definition '^ in brief and clear-cut fashion grasps 
the characteristic qualities of a thing, as follows- 
The sovereign majesty of the republic is that which 
comprises the dignity and grandeur of the state."* 
Again: " By an injury is meant doing violence to 
some one, to his person by assault, or to his sensi- 
bilities by insulting language, or to his reputation by 
some scandal." c Again : " That is not economy on 
your part, but greed, because economy is careful 
conservation of one's own goods, and greed is wrong- 
ful covetousness of the goods of others." Again: 
" That act of yours is not bravery, but recklessness, 
because to be brave is to disdain toil and peril, for a 
useful purpose and after weighing the advantacres, 
while to be reckless is to undertake perils like a 
gladiator, suffering pain without taking thought."'^ 
Definition is accounted useful for this reason : it sets 
forth the full meaning and character of a thing so 
lucidly and briefly that to express it in more words 
seems superfluous, and to express it in fewer is 
considered impossible. 

XXVI. Transition ^ is the name given to the figure 
which briefly recalls what has been said, and likewise 

" The last two examples may also illustrate distinctio 
(TrapaScaaroAT;); see Quintilian, 9. 3. Q6 : " But this depends 
wholly on definition, and so I doubt whether it is a figure " 
and 9. 3. 82. ° ' 

' A figure combining the functions of the enumeratio of 
2. XXX. 4/ above (civa/xvT^m?, dvaKe<f>aXaioj<Jis, TraXiXXoyia) and 
propositio (TTpoeKdems = propositio quid sis dicturus in Cicero 
DeOratore 3. 53. 203 and Oralor 40. 137; c/. the expositii 
UkB^ols] of 1. X. 1/ above). CJ. in Anon. Seg. 12 (Spengel- 


sequatur, hoc pacto: " Modo in patriam cuiusmodi 
fuerit habetis ; nunc in parentes qualis extiterit 
considerate." Item: " Mea in istum beneficia 
cognoscitis ; nunc quomodo iste mihi gratiam ret- 
tulerit accipite." Proficit haec aliquantum exornatio 
ad duas res : nam et quid dixerit commonet, et ad 
reliquum conparat auditorem. 
36 Correctio est quae tollit id quod dictum est, et pro 
eo id quod magis idoneum videtur reponit, hoc pacto : 
" Quodsi iste suos hospites rogasset, immo innuisset 
modo, facile hoc perfici posset." Item : " Nam post- 
quam isti vicerunt atque adeo victi sunt — cam 
quomodo victoriam appellem, quae victoribus plus 
calamitatis quam boni dederit ? " Item: " O virtu- 
tis comes, invidia, quae bonos sequeris plerumque 
atque adeo insectaris ! " Commovetur hoc genere 
animus auditoris. Res enim communi verbo elata 
levius ^ tantummodo dicta videtur ; ea post ipsius 
oratoris correctionem insignior ^ magis idonea fit 
pronuntiatione. " Non igitur satius esset," dicet 
aliquis, " ab initio, praesertim cum scribas, ad 
optimum et lectissimum verbum devenire ? " Est 
cum non est satius, si commutatio verbi id erit 
demonstratura, eiusmodi rem esse ut, cum cam 

^ Insertion of levius suggested by 31 x. 
^ Insertion of insignior suggested by Mx. 

Hammer 1 [2]. 354) avavicoais, a means used in the Proem 
to induce reeeptiveness — " we recall the points previously 
made, and mark out those we intend to discuss," and the 
second type of the figure fx^ra^aais in Rutilius Lupus 2. 1 
(Halm, pp. 12 f.). Quintilian, 9. 3. 98, without defining 
transitio, classes it as a figure of thought; transitus in 9. 2. 61 
is rejected as a figure. 

AD HKRENNIUM, IV. xxvi. 35-36 

bricHy sets forth what is to follow next, thus : " You 
know how he has just been conduct! n£r himself towards 
his fatherland ; now consider what kind of son he has 
been to his parents." «^ Again : " My benefactions to 
this defendant you know ; now learn how he has 
requited me." This fij^ure is not without value for 
two ends : it reminds the hearer of what the speaker 
has said, and also prepares him for what is to come. 
Correction ^ retracts what has been said and re- 
places it with what seems more suitable, as follows : 
" But if the defendant had asked his hosts, or rather 
had only hinted, this could easily have been accom- 
plished." Again: " After the men in question had 
conquered, or rather had been conquered — for how 
shall I call that a conquest which has brought more 
disaster than benefit to the conquerors ? " Again : 
" O Mrtue's companion, Envy, who art wont to 
pursue good men, yes, even to persecute them."*' 
This figure makes an impression upon the hearer, 
for the idea when expressed by an ordinary word 
seems rather feebly stated, but after the speaker's 
own amendment it is made more striking by means 
of the more appropriate expression. " Then would 
it not be preferable," some one will say, " especially 
in WTiting, to resort to the best and choicest word at 
the beginning? " Sometimes this is not preferable, 
when, as the change of word will serve to show, the 
thought is such that in rendering it by an ordinary 

• Cf. Demosthenes, De Corona 268, and (cited by Anon. 
Seg. 12, in illustration of dvavecuai?) Aeschines, Adv. Timarch. 

* €Tn8i6p9 0)015, ivavopOojat.?, related to ^eravota. 

' Cf. Horace, Serin. 2. 3. 13 : " Are you preparing to 
appease envy by forsaking virtue ? " Insector Is the fre- 
quentative form of insequor. 


communi verbo appellaris, levius dixisse videaris, 
cum ad electius verbum accedas, insigniorem rem 
facias. Quodsi continue venisses ad id verbum, nee 
rei nee verbi gratia animadversa esset. 
37 XXVII. Occultatio est cum dicimus nos praeterire 
aut non scire aut nolle dicere id quod nunc maxime 
dicimus, hoc modo : " Nam de pueritia quidem tua, 
quam tu omnium intemperantiae addixisti, dicerem, 
si hoc tempus idoneum putarem ; nunc consulto 
relinquo. Et illud praetereo, quod te tribuni rei 
militaris infrequentem tradiderunt. Deinde quod 
iniuriarum satis fecisti L. Labeoni nihil ad hanc rem 
pertinere puto. Horum nihil dico ; revertor ad illud 
de quo iudicium est." Item : " Non dico te ab sociis 
pecunias cepisse ; non sum in eo occupatus quod civi- 
tates, regna, domos omnium depeculatus es; furta, 
rapinas omnes tuas omitto." Haec utilis est 
exornatio si aut ad rem quam non pertineat aliis 
ostendere, quod occulte admonuisse prodest, aut 
longum est aut ignobile, aut planum non potest 
fieri, aut facile potest reprehendi ; ut utilius sit 
occulte fecisse suspicionem quam eiusmodi intendisse 
orationem quae redarguatur. 

* TTapdXcufjLS, dvTt'^paai?, praeteritio, and sometimes irapa- 
aiioTTrjoLS, which Quintihan, 9. 3. 99, excludes from the figures. 
Occultatio is assigned by Quintilian in 9. 3. 98 to the figures of 
thought. Cf. praecisio, 4. xxx. 41 below, and Cicero's 
reticentia {De Oratore 3. 53. 205, and Orator 40. 138). 


AD HERKN'MIM. IV. x.wi. 30-\\vii. 37 

word you seem to have expressed it rather feebly, 
hut having come to a choicer word you make the 
thouglit more strikino;. But if you had at once 
arrived at this word, the grace neither of the thought 
nor of the word woukl have been noticed. 

XX\'II. Paralipsis " occurs when we say that we 
are passing by, or do not know, or refuse to say that 
which precisely now we are saying, as follows : " Your 
boyhood, indeed, which you dedicated to intem- 
perance of all kinds, I would discuss, if I thought 
this the right time. But at present I advisedly leave 
that aside. This too I pass by, that the tribunes have 
reported you as irregular in military service. Also 
that you have given satisfaction to Lucius Labeo for 
injuries done him I regard as irrelevant to the 
present matter. Of these things I say nothing, but 
return to the issue in this trial." ^ Again : " I do not 
mention that you have taken monies from our allies ; 
I do not concern myself with your having despoiled 
the cities, kingdoms, and homes of them all. I pass 
by your thieveries and robberies, all of them." This 
figure is useful if employed in a matter which it is not 
pertinent to call specifically to the attention of others, 
because there is advantage in making only an 
indirect reference to it, or because the direct reference 
would be tedious or undignified, or cannot be made 
clear, or can easily be refuted. As a result, it is of 
greater advantage to create a suspicion by Paralipsis 
than to insist directly on a statement that is 
refutable. <^ 

* Speaker, opponent, and Labeo all are unknown. The 
date may perhaps be assigned to the time of the Marsic war, 
about 90 B.C. ; see Friedrich Muenzer, P.-W. 12. 245. 

<■ Cf. Quintilian, 9. 2. 13. 


Disiunctum est cum eorum de quibus dicimus aut 
utrumque aut unum quodque certo concluditur verbo, 
sic: " Populus Romanus Numantiam delevit, Karta- 
ginem sustulit, Corinthum disiecit, Fregellas evertit. 
Nihil Numantinis vires corporis auxiliatae sunt, nihil 
Kartaginiensibus scientia rei militaris adiumento 
fuit, nihil Corinthiis erudita calliditas praesidii tulit, 
nihil Fregellanis morum et sermonis societas opitulata 
est." Item: " Formae dignitas aut morbo deflorescit 
aut vetustate extinguitur." Hie utrumque, in 
superiore exemplo unam quamque rem certo verbo 
concludi videmus. 
38 Coniunctio est cum interpositione verbi et 
superiores partes orationis conprehenduntur et in 
feriores, hoc modo : " Formae dignitas aut morbo 
deflorescit aut vetustate." 

Adiunctio est cum verbum quo res conprehenditur 
non interponimus, sed aut primum aut postremum 
conlocamus. Primum, hoc pacto : " Deflorescit for- 
mae dignitas aut morbo aut vetustate." Postremum, 
sic : " Aut morbo aut vetustate formae dignitas 

Ad festivitatem disiunctio est apposita, quare rarius 
utemur, ne satietatem pariat; ad brevitatem 
coniunctio, quare saepius adhibenda est. Hae tres 
exornationes de simplici genere manant. 

* 8i€l€vyix€vov. Qiiintilian, 9. 3. 64, says that devices like 
this and the two following are so common that they cannot 
lay claim to the art which figures involve. 

* Only the first sentence of this translation preserves the 
Disjunction, which cannot be rendered throughout without 
violating normal English word order. 


AD HKRKNNIUM, I\'. x.wii. 37-38 

Disjunction" is used wlien each of two or more 
clauses ends with a special verb, as follows : " By the 
Roman people Numantia was destroyed, Carthage 
razed, Corinth demolished, Fregellae overthrown. Of 
no aid to the Numantines was bodily strength ; of no 
assistance to the Carthaginians was military science ; 
of no help to the Corinthians was polished clever- 
ness ; of no avail to the Fregellans w as fellowship 
with us in customs and in language."'' Again: 
** With disease physical beauty fades, with age it 
dies."« In this example we see both clauses, and 
in the preceding each several clause ending with a 
special verb. 
38 Conj unction ^^ occurs when both the previous and the 
succeeding phrases are held together by placing the 
verb between them, as follows : " Either with disease 
physical beauty fades, or with age." 

it is Adjunction ^ when the verb holding the sen- 
tence together is placed not in the middle, but at the 
beginning or the end. At the beginning, as follows : 
" Fades physical beauty with disease or age." At the 
end, as follows : " Either with disease or age physical 
beauty fades." 

Disjunction is suited to elegant display, and so we 
shall use it moderately, that it may not cloy ; Con- 
junction is suited to brevity, and hence is to be used 
more frequently. These three figures spring from a 
single type. 

* Cf. Isocrates, Ad Dcrnonkum 6 : " For beauty is spent 
by time or wasted by disease." The saying was popular 
among Greek Patristic writers; see Engelbert Brerup, 
Isocratis Opera Omnia, Leipzig, 1906, 1. 95. 

^ Gvv€^€vyfX€vov. To be distinguished, of course, from 
coniuncfio (auvSea^o?), the part of speech (4. xxx. 41). 

' f.TTil,€Vyyi€VOV. 


XXVIII. Conduplicatio est cum ratione amplifica- 
tionis aut commiserationis eiusdem unius aut plurium 
verborum iteratio, hoc modo : " Tumultus, Gai 
Gracce, tumultus domesticos et intestinos conparas ! " 
Item : " Commotus non es, cum tibi pedes mater 
amplexaretur, non es commotus ? " Item : " Nunc 
audes etiam venire in horum conspectum, proditor 
patriae ? Proditor, inquam, patriae, venire audes in 
horum conspectum? " Vehementer auditorem com- 
movet eiusdem redintegratio verbi et vulnus maius 
efficit in contrario causae, quasi aliquod telum saepius 
perveniat in eandem corporis partem.^ 

Interpretatio est quae non iterans idem redintegrat 
verbum, sed id commutat quod positum est alio 
verbo quod idem valeat, hoc modo : " Rem publicam 
radicitus evertisti, civitatem funditus deiecisti." ^ 
Item: " Patrem nefarie verberasti, parenti manus 
scelerate attulisti." Necessum est eius qui audit 
animum commoveri cum gravitas prioris dicti re- 
novatur interpretatione verborum. 
39 Commutatio est cum duae sententiae inter se 
discrepantes ex transiectione ita efferuntur ut a 
priore posterior contraria priori proficiscatur, hoc 
modo : " Esse oportet ut vivas, non vivere ut edas." ^ 

* corporis partem // : partem corporis other MSS. Mx. 

2 deiecisti MSS. Mx ed. mai. : diiecisti 3Ix. 

2 edas Mx ed. mai., all 3ISS. but H : edis H Mx. 

" dvaSlnXwais. In Quintilian, 9. 3. 28, adiectio. For the 
first example cf. Demosthenes, De Corona 143, a favourite 
passage with the rhetoricians : " War it is that you are bring- 
ing into Attica, Aeschines, an Amphictyonic war." 

AD HERENNIUM, IV. xxviii. 38-39 

XXVIII. Reduplication " is the repetition of one or 
more words for the purpose of Amplification or Appeal 
to Pity, as follows: "You are promoting riots, 
Gaius Gracchus, yes, civil and internal riots." 
Again: "You were not moved when his mother 
embraced your knees ? You Mere not moved ? " * 
Again : " You now even dare to come into the sight 
of these citizens, traitor to the fatherland ? Traitor, I 
say, to the fatherland, you dare come into the sight 
of these citizens?" The reiteration of the same 
word makes a deep impression upon the hearer and 
inflicts a major wound upon the opposition — as if a 
weapon should repeatedly pierce the same part of the 

Synonymy or Interpretation <^ is the figure which 
does not duplicate the same word by repeating it, 
but replaces the word that has been used by another 
of the same meaning, as follows : " You have over- 
turned the republic from its roots ; you have 
demolished the state from its foundations." Again : 
" You have impiously beaten your father; you have 
criminally laid hands upon your parent." The 
hearer cannot but be impressed when the force of the 
first expression is renewed by the explanatory 
39 Reciprocal Change <^ occurs when two discrepant 
thoughts are so expressed by transposition that the 
latter follows from the former although contradictory 
to it, as follows : " You must eat to live, not Hve to 

* This passage may perhaps belong to the controversia on 
the murder of Sulpicius in 1. xv. 25 above. 
I ^ avvojvvfiia. Quintilian, 9. 3. 98, denies that this is a 

' figure. 

** dvTi/xcTa^oAif. 


Item : " Ea re poemata non facio, quia cuiusmodi 
volo non possum, cuiusmodi possum nolo." Item: 
" Quae de illo dici possunt non dicuntur, quae dicun- 
tur dici non possunt." Item: " Poema loquens 
pictura, pictura tacitum poema debet esse." Item: 
" Si stultus es, ea re taceas ; non tamen si taceas, ea 
re stultus es." Non potest dici quin commode fiat 
cum contrariae sententiae relatione verba quoque 
convertantur. Plura subiecimus exempla, ut, quo- 
niam difficile est hoc genus exornationis inventu, 
dilucidum esset, ut, cum bene esset intellectum, 
facilius in dicendo inveniretur. 

XXIX. Permissio est cum ostendemus in dicendo 
nos aliquam rem totam tradere et concedere alicuius 
voluntati, sic: " Quoniam omnibus rebus ereptis 
solum mihi superest animus et corpus, haec ipsa, quae 
mihi de multis sola relicta sunt, vobis et vestrae 
condono potestati. Vos me vestro quo pacto vobis 
videbitur utamini atque abutamini licebit ; inpunite 
in me quidlibet statuite ; dicite atque innuite: 

" Ascribed to Socrates. See the Stoic C. Musonius Rufus 
(first Christian century) in Stobaeus, 3. 18. 37; Plutarch, 
Quomodo adulesc. poet. aud. deb. 4 (21 E); Gellius 19. 2; 
Athenaeus 4. 158 F. ; Diogenes Laertius 2. 34; Stobaeus, 
3. 17. 21 (" Socrates, when asked in what respect he diflfered 
from the rest of men, replied : ' Whereas they live in order to 
eat, I eat in order to live.' "); Macrobius, Sat. 2. 8. 16. Cf. 
also Quintilian, 9. 3. 85; Clement of Alexandria, Paed. 2. 1, 
and Strom. 7. 14; Isidore, Etym. 2. 21. 11. 

* Porphyrio on Horace, Epist. 2. 1. 257, attributes this 
saying to Aristarchus of Samothrace (first half, second 
century B.C.), the editor and critic of Homer. Cf. Anth. Pal. 
6. 1 : " For I [Lais] do not wish to see myself as I am, and 
cannot see myself as I used to be." 


AD HERKNNIUM, IV. xxviii. 39-.\xix. 39 

eat."'' Again: " I do not write poems, because I 
cannot write the sort I wisli, and I do not wish to 
write the sort I can," ^ Again: " What can be told 
of that man is not being told ; what is being told of 
him cannot be told." Again : " A poem ought to be 
a painting that speaks ; a painting ought to be a silent 
poem." ^ Again : " If you are a fool, for that reason 
you should be silent ; and yet, although you should be 
silent, you are not for that reason a fool." One can- 
not deny that the effect is neat when in juxtaposing 
contrasted ideas the words also are transposed. In 
order to make this figure, which is hard to invent, quite 
clear, I have subjoined several examples — so that, 
well understood, it may be easier for the speaker to 

XXIX. Surrender ^ is used when we indicate in 
speaking that we yield and submit the whole matter 
to another's will, as follows: " Since only soul and 
body remain to me, now that I am deprived of every- 
thing else, even these, which alone of many goods are 
left me, I deliver up to you and to your power. You 
may use and even abuse me * in your own way as 
you think best ; with impunity make your decision 
upon me, whatever it may be ; speak and give a sign 

* The saying is ascribed to Simonides (sixth century B.C.) 
in Plutarch, De glor. Athen. 3 (346 F) ; see also Quaest. Conviv. 
9. 15 (748 A), Quomodo adulesc. poet. aud. deb. 3 (17 F), 
Quomodo adulat. ab amic. internosc. 15 (58 B), De vita et 
poes. Horn. 216 (ed. Bernardakis, 7. 460). Cf. Cicero, 
De Leg. 3. 1. 2 : "It can truly be said that the magistrate is a 
speaking law, the law on the other hand a silent magistrate " ; 
Horace, Ars Poet. 361 : " A poem is like a painting " ; 
Anth. Pal. 11. 145 ; and Lessing, Laokoon, Preface, 


' Varro in Priscian (Keil, Gramm. Lat. 2. 381) makes a 
similar play upon lUamur and abutamur. 



parebo." Hoc genus tametsi alias quoque non- 
numquam tractandum est, tamen ad misericordiam 
commovendam vehementissime est adcommodatum. 

40 Dubitatio est cum quaerere videatur orator utrum 
de duobus potius aut quid de pluribus potissimum 
dicat, hoc modo : " Offuit eo tempore plurimum rei 
publicae consulum — sive stultitiam sive malitiam 
dicere oportet, sive utrumque." Item: " Tu istuc 
ausus es dicere, homo omnium mortalium — quonam 
te digno moribus tuis appellem nomine ? " 

Expeditio est cum, rationibus conpluribus enumer- 
atis quibus aliqua res confieri -^ potuerit, ceterae 
tolluntur, una relinquitur quam nos intendimus, hoc 
modo: " Necesse est, cum constet istum fundum 
nostrum fuisse, ostendas te aut vacuum possedisse, 
aut usu tuum fecisse, aut emisse, aut hereditati tibi 
venisse. Vacuum, cum ego adessem, possidere non 
potuisti ; usu tuum etiam nunc fecisse non potes ; 
emptio nulla profertur ; hereditati tibi me vivo mea 
pecunia venire non potuit. Relinquitur ergo ut me 

41 vi de meo fundo deieceris." Haec exornatio pluri- 
mum iuvabit coniecturales argumentationes. Sed 
non erit, tamquam in plerisque, ut cum velimus ea 

^ confieri Stroebel : non 31 : fieri non B : aut fieri aut fieri 
non C : aut fieri aut non fieri C^E : confici Mx. 

" oLTTopia, BiaTTopTjaLg. Quintilian, 9. 3. 88, uses virtually 
the same example, after making the point that Indecision can 
belong to either the figures of thought or the figures of diction. 
Cf. Demosthenes, De Corona 20 : " Now what helped him 
. . . ? The cowardice, ought I to say, or the stupidity, or 
both, of the other Greek states." 

* Cf. Demosthenes, De Corona 22 : " Why, you — what 
would be the correct name for one to call you ? " 


AD HERENNIUM, IV. xxix. 39-41 

— I »<hall obey." Although this figure is often to be 
used also in other circumstances, it is especially suited 
to provoking pity. 

40 Indecision occurs when the speaker seems to ask 
which of two or more words he had better use, as 
follows : "At that time the republic suffered 
exceedingly from — ought I to say — the folly of the 
consuls, or their wickedness, or both." '^ Again: 
" You have dared to say that, you of all men the — 
by what name worthy of your character shall I call 
you? " * 

Elimination <= occurs when we have enumerated the 
several ways by which something could have been 
brought about, and all are then discarded except 
the one on which we are insisting, as follows : " Since 
it is established that the estate you claim as yours was 
mine, you must show that you took possession of it as 
vacant land, or made it your property bv right of 
prescription, or bought it, or that it came to you by 
inheritance. Since 1 was on the premises, you could 
not have taken possession of it as vacant land. Even 
by now you cannot have made it vour property by 
right of prescription. No sale is disclosed. Since 1 
am alive, my property could not have come to you by 
inheritance. It remains, then, that you have ex- 

41 pelled me by force from my estate." This figure will 
furnish the strongest support to conjectural argu- 
ments, but unlike most other figures, it is not one 

' Now called the Method of Residues when used in Refuta- 
tion. Quintilian, 5. 10. 66 if. and 7. 1. 31 fF., considers this 
nrgumeniorum genus ex remoiione under Proof and Refutation, 
not under the Figures; see also Cicero, De Inv. 1. xxix. 45 
{enmneratio), and Quintilian, 9. 3. 99, in note on 4. xviii. 25 
above. Cf. in Aristotle, Rhet. 2. 23 (1398 a), the iopos from 
logical division (eV Statpe'aeo)?). 



possimus uti; nam fere non poterimus, nisi nobis 
ipsa negotii natura dabit facultatem. 

XXX. Dissolutum est quod, coniunctionibus ver- 
borum e medio sublatis, separatis partibus effertur, 
hoc modo : "Gere morem parenti, pare cognatis, 
obsequere amicis, obtempera legibus." Item: 
" Descende in integram defensionem, noli quicquam 
recusare, da servos in quaestionem, stude verum 
invenire." Hoc genus et acrimoniam habet in se et 
vehementissimum est et ad brevitatem adcommo- 

Praecisio est cum dictis quibus reliquum quod 
coeptum est dici relinquitur inchoatum, sic: " Mihi 
tecum par certatio non est, ideo quod populus 
Romanus me — nolo dicere, ne cui forte adrogans 
videar; te autem saepe ignominia dignum putavit." 
Item: " Tu istuc audes dicere, qui nuper alienae 
domi — non ausim dicere, ne, cum te digna dicerem, 
me indignum quippiam dixisse videar." Hie atrocior 
tacita suspicio quam diserta explanatio facta est. 

Conclusio est quae brevi argumentatione ex iis 
quae ante dicta sunt aut facta conficit quid necessario 

" davvBerov. Variously also SiaXvais, solutum, dissolutio. 
Aristotle, Rhet. 3. 12 (1413 b) : " Asyndeta . . . are rightly 
condemned in the literary style, but in the controversial style 
speakers do indeed use them because of their dramatic effect." 
Cf. dissolutum, the slack style (4. xi. 16 above). 

^ The quality of acjioSpoT-qs. Plutarch, De vita et poes. Horn. 
40 (ed. Bernardakis, 7. 355), assigns to Asyndeton the qualities 
of rapidity and emotional emphasis. 

" aTTOCTtcijTnjCTt?. Sometimes clttokottij, obticentia, interruptio 
(Quintilian, 9. 2. 54, who here also identifies Cicero's reticentia 
with Aposiopesis; see note on occultatio, 4. xxvii. 37 above). 
With the first example cf. Demosthenes, De Corona 3, a close 


AD HKRENNIUM, IV. xxix. 41 

which we can use at will, for in general we can use 
it only when the very nature of the business gives us 
the opportunity. 

XXX. Asyndeton « is a presentation in separate 
parts, conjunctions being suppressed, as follows: 
" Indulge your father, obey your relatives, gratify 
your friends, submit to the laws." Again: " Enter 
into a complete defence, make no objection, give 
your slaves to be examined, be eager to find the 
truth." This figure has animation and great force, ^ 
and is suited to concision. 

Aposiopesis ^ occurs when something is said and 
then the rest of what the speaker had begun to say is 
left unfinished, as follows : " The contest between you 
and me is unequal '^ because, so far as concerns me. 
the Roman people — I am unwilling to say it, lest by 
chance some one think me proud. But you the 
Roman people has often considered worthy of dis- 
grace." Again: "You dare to say that, who 
recently at another's home — I shouldn't dare tell, 
lest in saying things becoming to you, I should seem 
to say something unbecoming to me." ^ Here a 
suspicion, unexpressed, becomes more telling than a 
detailed explanation would have been./ 

Conclusion,^ by means of a brief argument, deduces 
the necessary consequences of what has been said or 

^ For the commonplace cf. Aeschylus in Aristophanes, Frogs 
867; Lysias, Adv. Eratosth. 81 ; Fronto, ed. Xaber, p. 42. 

' Cf. Demosthenes, De Corona 129 : "I hesitate, lest in 
saying things becoming to you, I may be thought to have 
chosen things to say that are unbecoming to me." 

f Demetrius, De Elocut. 253, makes a like observation. 

" Like avixTTepacfxa in logic. Quintilian, 9. 3. 98, denies 
that conclusio is a figure. Cf. the conchisio of 1. iii. 4 and the 
duplex conclusio of 2. xxiv. 38 above. 



consequatur, hoc modo : " Quodsi Danais datum erat 
oraculum non posse capi Troiam sine Philoctetae 
sagittis, hae ^ autem nihil aliud ^ fecerunt nisi 
Alexandrum perculerunt, hunc extinguere id nimirum 
capi fuit Troiam." 
42 XXXI. Restant etiam decem exornationes ver- 
borum, quas idcirco non vage dispersimus, sed a 
superioribus separavimus, quod omnes in uno genere 
sunt positae. Nam earum omnium hoc proprium 
est, ut ab usitata verborum potestate recedatur atque 
in aliam rationem cum quadam venustate oratio 

De quibus exornationibus nominatio est prima, 
quae nos admonet ut cuius rei nomen aut non sit aut 
satis idoneum non sit, eam nosmet idoneo verbo 
nominemus aut imitationis aut significationis causa : 
imitationis, hoc modo, ut maiores " rudere " et 
" mugire " et " murmurari " et " sibilare " appei- 
larunt; significandae rei causa, sic: " Postquam iste 

1 hae UE : haec MMx. 

2 autem nihil aliud CE nihil aliud autem P^BUMx: 
nihil aliquod autem HP. 

" Philoctetes killed Paris with the bow and arrows of 
Heracles, and thus fulfilled the oracle revealed by the Trojan 
seer Helenus that only by means of those weapons could 
Troy be taken. 

^ These ten figures of diction are tropi (rpoTrot, tropes), a 
term our author does not use ; c/. Quintilian, 8. 6. 1 : "A 
trope is an artistic change of a word or phrase from its proper 
signification to another." Tropes were at first, as here, not 
separated from figures of thought and diction (axT^juara). 
Cicero, Brutus 18. 69, t«lls us that the division was of Greek 
origin. Even in the time of Quintilian (see 9. 1. 1-9) the line 
of demarcation was not always clear. 

* ovo^iaroTToiia. Cf. Julius Caesar in Gellius, 1. 10. 4: 
" Avoid, as you would a rock, an unheard-of and unfamiliar 

AD HERENNIUM, IV. xxx. 41-xxxi. 42 

done before, as follows : " But if the oracle had pre- 
dicted to the Danaans that Troy could not be taken 
without the arrows of Philoctetes, and these arrows 
moreover served only to smite Alexander, then 
certainly killing Alexander was the same as taking 

XXXI. There remain also ten Figures of Diction, 
which I have intentionally not scattered at random, 
but have separated from those above, because they 
all belong in one class. They indeed all have this in 
common, that the language departs from the ordinary 
meaning of the words ^ and is, with a certain grace, 
applied in another sense. 

Of these figures the first is Onomatopoeia,^ which 
suggests to us that we should ourselves designate 
with a suitable word, whether for the sake of 
imitation or of expressiveness, a thing which either 
lacks a name ^ or has an inappropriate name. For 
the sake of imitation, as follows: our ancestors, for 
example, said " roar," " bellow," " murmur," 
" hiss ; " for the sake of expressiveness, as follows : 

word." Cicero admits unusual (old-fashioned), new, and 
metaphorical words, although recognizing that these are 
allowed more freely in poetry than in oratory ; see De Oratore 
3. 38. 152 ff.. Orator 20. 68 and 24. 81, and also the advice 
which Horace, Ars Poet. 46 ff. and Epist. 2. 2. 119-121, gives 
to poets to use neologisms, but with restraint, Quintilian 
hkewise tolerates neologisms despite the danger in their use, 
but does not allow Roman speakers the imitative type of 
Onomatopoeia, although this was " held as one of the highest 
virtues by the Greeks; " see 1. 5. 71 f., 8. 6. 31 f., 8. 3. 35-37. 
Cf. also Gellius, 11. 7. 1 : "But as for me I think it more 
objectionable and censurable to use words that are new, 
unknown, and unheard-of than to use those that are hackneyed 
and mean." 

'^ See note on Metaphor, 4. xxxiv. 45 below. 



in rem publicam fecit impetum, fragor civitatis in 
primis." Hoc genere raro est utendum, sic ut ne 
novi verbi adsiduitas odium pariat ; sed si commode 
quis eo utatur et raro, non modo non offendet novitate, 
sed etiam exornat orationem. 

Pronominatio est quae sicuti cognomine quodam 
extraneo demonstrat id quod suo nomine non potest 
appellari ; ut si quis cum loquatur de Graccis, " At 
non Africani nepotes," inquiet, " istiusmodi fuerunt." 
Item si quis de adversario cum dicat, " Videte nunc," 
inquit, " indices, quemadmodum me Plagioxiphus 
iste tractarit." Hoc pacto non inornate poterimus, 
et in laudando et in laedendo, in corpore aut animo 
aut extraneis rebus dicere sic uti cognomen quod pro 
certo nomine collocemus. 
43 XXXII. Denominatio est quae ab rebus propinquis 
et finitimis trahit orationem qua possit intellegi res 
quae non suo vocabulo sit appellata. Id aut a 
superiore re conficitur,^ ut si quis de Tarpeio loquens 
eum Capitolinum nominet ; . . . ^ ; aut invento, ut 
si quis pro Libero vinum, pro Cerere frugem appellet ; 
. . . ; ^ aut instrumento dominum, ut si quis Mace- 

^ Text corrupt. Id [aut] a superiore re conficitur sugg. 
Mx : ita ut ventorum (inventor H) conficitur M : Id aut ab 
inventore conficitur C : id aut ab invento colligitur aut ab 
inventore conficitur E. 

2 A treatment of the substitution of inferior res for superior 
res is missing. 

^ A treatment of the substitution of inventor /or inventum is 

" avTovofiaaia. 

" Lit., " flat of the blade." 

« Cf. 3. vi. 10 above. 

^ Pro nomine, hence the name for the figure, Pronominatio. 

" ^eTcovv/xla. 


AD IIKRENNIUM, IV. xxxi. 42 xxxn. 43 

" After tliis creature attacked the republic, there 
was a hullabaloo arnon^ the first men of the state." 
This figure is to be used rarely, lest the frequent 
recurrence of the neologism breed aversion ; but if it 
is used appropriately and sparingly, then the novelty, 
far from offending, even gives distinction to the style. 
Antonomasia " or Pronomination designates by a 
kind of adventitious epithet a thing that cannot be 
called by its proper name ; for example, if some one 
speaking of the Gracchi should say : " Surely the 
grandsons of Africanus did not behave like this I " ; 
or again, if some one speaking of his adversary should 
say : " See now, men of the jur\% how your Sir Swash- 
buckler ^ there has treated me." In this way we shall 
be able, not without elegance, in praise and in censure, 
concerning physical attributes, qualities of character, 
or external circumstances,^ to express ourselves by 
using a kind of epithet in place of the precise name.** 
43 XXXII. Metonymy « is the figure which draws 
from an object closely akin or associated an expression 
suggesting the object meant, but not called by its 
own name. This is accomplished by substituting 
the name of the greater thing for that of the lesser, 
as if one speaking of the Tarpeian Rock should term it 
" the Capitoline ";...; or by substituting the 
name of the thing invented for that of the inventor, 
as if one should say " wine " for " Liber," " wheat " 
for " Ceres ";/ " . . . ; " or the instrument for the 
possessor, as if one should refer to the Macedonians 

^ Liber and C^res are common metonyms; see Cicero, Dt 
Oratore 3. 42, 167, advising the frequent use of this kind of 
figure, and De datura Deorum 2. 23. 60, citing Terence, 
Eunuch. 732; Quintilian, 8. 6. 24: "It would be too bold 
for the severe style of the forum to tolerate our saying ' Liber ' 
for ' wine ' and ' Ceres ' for ' bread.' " 



dones appellant hoc modo: " Non tarn cito sarisae 
Graeciae potitae sunt," aut idem Gallos significans : 
" nee tain facile ex Italia materis Transalpina depulsa 
est " ; aut id quod fit ab eo qui facit, ut si quis, cum 
bello velit ostendere aliquid quempiam fecisse, 
dicat : " Mars istuc te facere necessario coegit " ; aut 
si quod facit ab eo quod fit, ut cum desidiosam artem 
dicimus quia desidiosos facit, et frigus pigrum quia 
pigros efficit. Ab eo quod continet id quod contine- 
tur hoc modo denominabitur : " Armis Italia non 
potest vinci nee Graecia disciplinis " — nam hie, pro 
Graecis et Italis, quae continent notata sunt ; ab eo 
quod continetur id quod continet, ut si quis aurum 
aut argentum aut ebur nominet cum divitias velit 
nominare. Harum omnium denominationum magis 
in praecipiendo divisio quam in quaerendo difficilis 
inventio est, ideo quod plena consuetudo est non 
modo poetarum et oratorum sed etiam cotidiani 
sermonis huiusmodi denominationum. 

Circumitio est oratio rem simplicem adsumpta 
circumscribens elocutione, hoc pacto: " Scipionis 
providentia Kartaginis opes fregit." Nam hie, nisi 
ornandi ratio quaedam esset habita, Scipio potuit et 
Kartago simpliciter appellari. 
44 Transgressio est quae verborum perturbat ordinem 
perversione aut transiectione. Perversione, sic : 

" This last illustration is used also by the grammarians 
Charisius (ed. Barwick, p. 360) and Diomedes (Keil, Gramm. 
Lat. 1. 458). 

* Quintilian, 8. 6. 24-5, approves the substitution of container 
for content, but allows the converse only to poetic practice. 

AD HKRHNNIUM, IV. wxii. 4;,-44 

as follows: "Not so quickly did the Lances get 
possession of Greece," and likewise, meaning the 
Gauls: "nor was the Transalpine Pike so easily 
driven from Italy " ; the cause for the effect, as if a 
speaker, wishing to show that some one has done 
something in war, should say : " Mars forced you to 
do that " ; or effect for cause, as when we call an art 
idle because it produces idleness in people, or speak 
of numb cold because cold produces numbness." 
Content will be designated by means of container as 
follows : " Italy cannot be vanquished in warfare nor 
Greece in studies " ; for here instead of Greeks and 
Italians the lands that comprise them are designated. 
Container will be designated by means of content : * 
as if one wishing to give a name to wealth should 
call it gold or silver or ivon.\ It is harder to dis- 
tinguish all these metonymies in teaching the prin- 
ciple than to find them when searching for them, 
for the use of metonymies of this kind is abundant 
not only amongst the poets and orators but also in 
everyday speech. 

Periphrasis ^ is a manner of speech used to express 
a simple idea by means of a circumlocution, as follows : 
" The foresight of Scipio crushed the power of 
Carthage." For here, if the speaker had not designed 
to embellish the style, he might simply have said 
" Scipio " and " Carthage." 
44 Hyperbaton^^ upsets the word order by means 
either of Anastrophe ^ or Transposition. By Anas- 

' TTipL(f>paai.s. When faulty, it is TrepicraoXoyia (Quintilian, 

■^ imip^aTov. See 4. xii. 18 above. 

' dvaaTpo<f>r], Reversal of order. Quintilian, 8. 6. 65, 
defines a.vaarpo<^ri as a transposition confined to two words. 



" Hoc vobis deos immortales arbitror dedisse virtute 
pro vestra." Transiectione, hoc modo : " Instabilis 
in istum plurimum fortuna valuit. Omnes invidiose 
eripuit bene vivendi casus facultates." Huiusmodi 
transiectio, quae rem non reddit obscuram, multum 
proderit ad continuationes, de quibus ante dictum est ; 
in quibus oportet verba sicuti ad poeticum quendam 
extruere numerum, ut perfecte et perpolitissime 
possint esse absolutae. 

XXXIII. Superlatio est oratio superans veritatem 
alicuius augendi minuendive causa. Haec sumitur 
separatim aut cum conparatione. Separatim, sic : 
" Quodsi concordiam retinebimus in civitate, imperii 
magnitudinem solis ortu acque occasu metiemur." 

* " This I deem the immortal gods have vouchsafed to you 
in reward for j^^our virtue." The strictly correct order would 
have been pro vestra virtute ; virtute pro vestra gives the most 
favoured clausula. 

* " Unstable Fortune has exercised her greatest power on 
this creature. All the means of living well Chance has 
jealously taken from him." Here the adjectives are separated 
from the nouns they modify ; fortuna valuit and especially 
casus facultates were favoured clausulae (see note next above). 
Our author employs the dichoree (- ^ - -) most. See the 
study of the cadences in A. W. de Groot, Der antike Pro- 
sarhythmus, Groningen and The Hague, 1921, pp. 106-7; in 
Henri Bornecque, Les Clausules Metriques Latines, Lille, 1907, 
pp. 542 if., 579 f. ; and in Burdach, Schlesisch-bohmische Brief- 
ynuster, pp. 110 ff.; also the notes on 4. viii. 12 and 4. xix. 26, 
and the next note here below. 

" 4. xix. 27. The doctrines of rhythm were not taught as 
part of the regular curriculum by the Atticizing rhetoricians 
(Cicero, De Oratore 3. 49. 188) ; our author does not mention 
Rhythm under Composition in 4. xii. 18 above, save indirectly 
in his reference to concinnity in Hyperbaton. Here, however, 
he is under Asian influence. Cf. Cicero, Orator 69. 229 : " We 
must not transpose words in an obvious manner for the sake 


AD HERENNIUM, 1\'. \\\ii. 44-.\.\.\iii. 44 

trophe, as follows: "Hoc vobis deos immortales 
arbitror dedisse virtute pro vcstra."" By Trans- 
position, as follows: " Instabilis in istum plurimum 
fortuna valuit. Omnes invidiose eripuit bene vivendi 
casus facultates." ^ A transposition of this kind, 
that does not render the thoufjht obscure, will be 
very useful for periods, which I have discussed 
above ; <^ in these periods we ought to arrange the 
words in such a way as to approximate a poetic 
rhythm,'^ so that the periods can achieve perfect 
fullness and the highest finish. 

XXXIII. Hyperbole « is a manner of speech 
exaggerating the truth, whether for the sake of 
magnifying or minifying something. This is used 
independently, or with comparison. Independently, 
as follows : " But if we maintain concord in the state, 
we shall measure the empire's vastness by the rising 
and the setting of the sun." Hyperbole with com- 

of achieving a better cadence or a more flowing rhythm " ; 
Dionysius Halic, De Composit. Verb., ch. 4; and Blass, 
Die Rhythmen der a-sian. und rom. Kunstprosa, pp. 33 flF. Our 
author in his rhythms represents the transition between Asian 
rules and those followed by Cicero; see Bomecque, op. ciL, 
p. .546. On our author's generally ambivalent position with 
respect to Asianism, see Burdach, op. cit., pp. 96 ff". 

'' Cicero, Orator 56. 187 f . : "It is, then, quite clear that 
prose should be tightened up by rhythm, but be free of metre 
. . . There are, to be sure, no rhythms other than those used 
in poetry"; Crassus in De Oratore 1. 33. 151: " Gopd 
collocation and good arrangement of words are perfected in 
writing by means of a certain rhythm and measure not 
poetical, but oratorical." Thrasymachus of Chalcedon 
(fifth century B.C.) was the inventor of prose rhythm, and 
Isocrates excelled in its use (Cicero, Orator 52. 17.5). 

* vTT^p^oXrj. Aristotle, Rhet. 3. 11 (1413 a), says that the 
use of Hyperbole is a juvenile characteristic, betraying 
vehemence. CJ. Quuitilian, 8. 6. 67 fiF. 



Cum conparatione aut a similitudine aut a praestantia 
superlatio sumitur. A similitudine, sic : " Corpore 
niveum candorem, aspectu igneum ardorem ad- 
sequebatur." A praestantia, hoc modo : " Cuius ore 
sermo melle dulcior profluebat." Ex eodem genere 
est hoc : " Tantus erat in armis splendor ut solis 
fulgor obscurior ^ videretur." 

Intellectio est cum res tota parva de parte cognos- 
citur aut de toto pars. De parte totum sic intelle- 
gitur: " Non illae te nuptiales tibiae eius matrimonii 
commonebant ? " Nam hie omnis sanctimonia nup- 
tiarum uno signo tibiarum intellegitur. De toto pars, 
ut si quis ei qui vestitum aut ornatum sumptuosum 
ostentet dicat : ** Ostentas mihi divitias et locupletes 
45 copias iactas. ' ' Ab uno plura hoc modo intellegentur : 
" Poeno fuit Hispanus auxilio, fuit immanis ille 
Transalpinus ; in Italia quoque nonnemo sensit idem 
togatus." A pluribus unum sic intellegetur : " Atrox 
calamitas pectora maerore pulsabat ; itaque anhelans 
ex imis pulmonibus prae cura spiritus ducebat." Nam 
in superiore ^ plures Hispani et Galli et togati, et hie 
unum pectus et unus pulmo intellegitur ; et erit illic 
deminutus numerus festivitatis, hie adauctus gra vi- 
ta tis gratia. 

1 obscurior P'^B^ Hid : obscurius [Mb) Mx brackets. 

2 superiore M : superioribus other MSS. Mx. 

" Cf., for example, Homer, II. 1. 104 : Agamemnon's 
eyes " were like flashing fire " ; in 10. 437 the horses of Rhesus 
are "whiter than snow" (Hyperbole with comparison formed 
from superiority). 

* Homer, //. 1. 249, on Nestor. On the popularity of this 
passage in antiquity see Otto, pp. 242, 216 f. 

' avv€Kho-)(ri. 


AD HERENNIUM, IV. xxxiii. 44-45 

parison is formed from either equivalence or 
superiority. From equivalence, as follows: "His 
body was as white as snow, his face burned like fire." ** 
Trom superiority, as follows: "From his mouth 
flowed speech sweeter than honey."'' Of the same 
type is the following : "So great was his splendour in 
arms that the sun's brilliance seemed dim by 

Synecdoche ^ occurs when the whole is known from 
a small part or a part from the whole. The whole is 
understood from a part in the following: " Were not 
those nuptial flutes reminding you of his marriage? " 
Here the entire marriage ceremony is suggested by 
one sign, the flutes. A part from the whole, as if one 
should sav to a person who displays himself in 
luxurious garb or adornment: "You display your 
45 riches to me and vaunt your ample treasures." The 
plural will be understood from the singular, as 
follows: "To the Carthaginian came aid from the 
Spaniard, and from that fierce Transalpine. In 
Italy, too, many a wearer of the toga shared the same 
sentiment." In the following the singular will be 
understood from the plural : " Dread disaster smote 
his breasts with grief; so, panting, from out his lungs' 
very depth he sobbed for anguish." In the first 
example more than one Spaniard, Gaul, and Roman 
citizen are understood, and in this last only one breast 
and one lung.^ In the former the quantity is minified 
for the sake of elegance, in the latter exaggerated 
for the sake of impressiveness. 

^ In ancient physiology the lungs were considered to be the 
right and left halves of a single organ, with the windpipe as 
the common outlet; cj., for example, Aristotle, De Pari. 
Animal. 3. 6-7 (668 b ff.), Hist. Animal. 2. 17 (507 a 19). 


Abusio est quae verbo simili et propinquo pro 
certo et proprio abutitur, hoc modo : " Vires hominis 
breves sunt ", aut " parva statura ", aut " longum 
in homine consilium ", aut " oratio magna ", aut 
" uti pauco sermone." Nam hie facile est intellectu 
finitima verba rerum dissimilium ratione abusionis 
esse traducta. 

XXXIV. Translatio est cum verbum in quandam 
rem transferetur ex alia re, quod propter simili- 
tudinem recte videbitur posse transferri. Ea sumitur 
rei ante oculos ponendae causa, sic: " Hie Italiam 
tumultus expergefecit terrore subito." Brevitatis 
causa, sic: " Recens adventus exercitus extinxit 
subito civitatem." ObsCenitatis vitandae causa, sic: 
" Cuius mater cotidianis nuptiis delectetur." Augendi 
causa, sic: " Nullius maeror et calamitas istius ex- 
plere inimicitias et nefariam crudelitatem saturare 
potuit." Minuendi causa, sic : " Magno se praedicat 
auxilio fuisse quia paululum in rebus difficillimis 
aspiravit." Ornandi causa, sic: " Aliquando rei 

" KaTaxprjais. 

* Cf. Aristophanes, Birds 465 : fieya Kal XapLvov Ittos rt 
(" a stalwart and brawny oration," tr. B. B. Rogers). 

" fi€Ta<l)opd. Cf. Aristotle, Rhet. 3. 2 (1405 a) ff.. Poet., 
eh. 21 ; Demetrius, De Elocut. 2. 78 ff. ; Quintilian, 8. 6. 4 ff. 
According to Cicero, Orator 27. 92, metaphor is used for the 
sake of charm {snavitas) or because of the lack (inopia) of a 
proper word; cf. also De Oratore 3. 38. 155. Quintilian, 
8. 6. 6, says that we use metaphor from necessity or because 
it achieves greater expressiveness or beauty. Cf. translatio 
criminis, 2. xv. 22 above, and translatio, the subtype of Legal 
Issue, 1. xii. 22. 

** Quintilian, 8. 6. 8, terms Metaphor a shorter Simile. 

* Cf. Plautus, Cist. 43 : " She is married to a husband 
every day, indeed she is; " and Demosthenes, De Corona 129, 


AD HRRENNIUM, IV. xxxiii. 45-xxxiv. 45 

Catachresis *» is the inexact use of a like and 
kindred word in place of the precise and proper one, 
as follows : " The power of man is short," or " small 
height," or " the long wisdom in the man," or " a 
mighty speech," ^ or " to engage in a slight con- 
versation." Here it is easy to understand that words 
of kindred, but not identical, meaning have been 
transferred on the principle of inexact use. 

XXXIV. Metaphor <^ occurs when a word applying 
to one thing is transferred to another, because the 
similarity seems to justify this transference. Meta- 
phor is used for the sake of creating a vivid mental 
picture, as follows : " This insurrection awoke Italy 
with sudden terror " ; for the sake of brevity j*^ as 
follows: " The recent arrival of an army suddenly 
blotted out the state"; for the sake of avoiding 
obscenity, as follows: "Whose mother delights in 
daily marriages " ; * for the sake of magnifying, as 
follows: " No one's grief or disaster could have ap- 
peased this creature's enmities and glutted his horrible 
cruelty";/ for the sake of minifving, as follows: 
" He boasts that he was of great help because, when 
we were in difficulties, he lightly breathed a favouring 
breath " ; ^ for the sake of embellishment, as 
follows: " Some day the prosperity of the republic, 

addressing Aeschines : " Or how your mother practised 
nuptials in open daylight in the outhouse." 

^ This may perhaps belong to the controversia concerning 
the murder of Sulpieius, 1. xv. 25 above. 

" Cf. Cicero, Leg. Agr. 2. 5. 13, on the unintelligible speech 
of the once truculent Rullus : " The keener-witted persons 
standing in the Assembly suspected that he had meant to say- 
something or other about an agi-arian law " ; Quintilian, 
8. 4. 28, quotes this sentence of Cicero in illustration of ratio 



publicae rationes, quae malitia nocentium exaru- 
erunt, virtute optimatium revirescent." Transla- 
tionem pudentem dicunt esse oportere, ut cum 
ratione in consimilem rem transeat, ne sine dilectu 
temere et cupide videatur in dissimilem transcurrisse. 
46 Permutatio est oratio aliud verbis aliud sententia 
demonstrans. Ea dividitur in tres partes: simili- 
tudinem, argumentum, eontrarium. Per simili- 
tudinem sumitur cum translationes plures frequenter 
ponuntur a simili oratione ductae, sic: " Nam cum 
canes funguntur officiis luporum, cuinam praesidio 
pecuaria credemus ? " Per argumentum tractatur 
cum a persona aut loco aut re aliqua similitude 
augendi aut minuendi causa ducitur, ut si quis 
Drusum Graccum nitorem ^ obsoletum dicat. Ex 
contrario ducitur sic, ut si quis hominem prodigum 
et luxuriosum inludens parcum et diligentem appel- 
let. Et in hoc postremo quod ex contrario sumitur, 
et in illo primo quod a similitudine ducitur, per 
translationem argumento poterimus uti. Per simili- 
tudinem, sic : " Quid ait hie rex atque Agamemnon 
noster, sive, ut crudelitas est, potius Atreus ? " Ex 
contrario, ut si quem impium qui patrem verberarit 

^ nitorem M : numitoremque E Mx. 

" Cicero, De Oratore 3. 41. 165, makes the same point; cf. 
also Aristotle, Ehet. 3. 2 (1405 a), Cicero, Epist. ad Fam. 16. 
17 (Theophrastus' verecunda tralatio), Longinus, De Sublim. 
32. 3, Quintilian, 8. 3. 37. 

* aAAijyopta. 

<■ The text is corrupt. With Lindemann (ed. Leipzig, 1828, 
p. 343) and others I take Graccum as a genitive plural. The 
pohcy of M. Livius Drusus, tr. pi. in 91 B.C., finds a parallel 
in that of C. Gracchus ; see Hugh Last in Cambr. Anc. History 


AD HKRKNNIUM, IV. xxviv. 45 46 

which by the malice of wicked men has withered 
away, will bloom again by the virtue of the Con- 
servatives." They say that a metaphor ought to be 
restrained,** so as to be a transition with good reason 
to a kindred thing, and not seem an indiscriminate, 
reckless, and precipitate leap to an unlike thing. 
4G Allegory " is a manner of speech denoting one thing 
by the letter of the words, but another by their 
meaning. It assumes three aspects : comparison, 
argument, and contrast. It operates through a com- 
parison when a number of metaphors originating in a 
similarity in the mode of expression are set together, 
as follows: " For when dogs act the part of wolves, 
to what guardian, pray, are we going to entrust our 
herds of cattle? " An Allegory is presented in the 
form of argument when a similitude is drawn from 
a person or place or object in order to magnify or 
minify, as if one should call Drusus a " faded reflec- 
tion of the Gracchi." ^ An Allegory is drawn from a 
contrast ^ if, for example, one should mockingly call a 
spendthrift and voluptuary frugal and thrifty. Both 
in this last type, based on a contrast, and in the first 
above, drawn from a comparison, we can through the 
metaphor make use of argument. In an Allegor\'- 
operating through a comparison, as follows : " What 
says this king — our Agamemnon, or rather, such is 
his cruelty, our Atreus ? " In an Allegory drawn 
from a contrast : for example, if we should call 
some undutiful man who has beaten his father 

9. 177-84. With Allegory per argumentum cf, Antonomasia, 
4. xxxi. 42 above. 

"* Cf. Quintilian, 8. 6. 54 ff. {ironia, illusio); Hhet. ad Alex. 
ch. 21, 1434 a (elpwvcia); Anon., De Trop., in Walz 8. 722 



Aeneam vocemus, intemperantem et adulterum 
Hippolytum ^ nominemus. 

Haec sunt fere quae dicenda videbantur de 
verborum exornationibus. Nunc res ipsa monet ut 
deinceps ad sententiarum exornationes transeamus. 
47 XXXV. Distributio est cum in plures res aut 
personas negotia quaedam certa dispertiuntur, hoc 
modo : " Qui vestrum, iudices, nomen senatus diligit, 
hunc oderit necesse est ; petulantissime enim semper 
iste oppugnavit senatum. Qui equestrem locum 
splendidissimum cupit esse in civitate, is oportet istum 
maximas poenas ^ dedisse velit, ne iste sua turpitu- 
dine ordini honestissimo maculae atque dedecori sit. 
Qui parentes habetis, ostendite istius supplicio vobis 
homines impios non placere. Quibus liberi sunt, 
statuite exemplum quantae poenae sint in civitate 
hominibus istiusmodi conparatae." Item: "Senatus 
est officium consilio civitatem iuvare ; magistratus est 
officium opera et diligentia consequi senatus volun- 
tatem; populi est officium res optimas et homines 
idoneos maxime suis sententiis deligere et probare." 
Et : " Accusatoris officium est inferre crimina; 
defensoris diluere et propulsare ; testis dicere quae 

^ Ippolytum Mx : yppolitum PUBCb : ypolitum / : 
ipolitum d : ippolitum H. 

2 maximas poenas 6 / Mx ed. mai. : maximae poenae M Mx : 
maximam poenam Cd. 

" Called pius for his devotion to Anchises, his father. 

* Rejected the advances of his stepmother Phaedra. 

" biaipeais, fxepia^os. Cf. the distributio of 1. x. 17, the 
distributio (Broken Tone of Debate) of 3. xiii. 23, and the 
figure, divisio, in 4. xl. 52. 

^ Of Trpdyfxara or of irpoaajTra. Cf. the distinction in the 
third kind oi narratio, 1. viii. 13 above. 

AD IIERENNIUM, IV. xxxiv. 46 xxxv. 47 

" Aeneas," ° or an intemperate and adulterous man 
" Hippolytus."* 

This is substantially all I have thought it necessary 
to say on the Figures of Diction. Now the subject 
itself directs me to turn next to the Figures of 
47 XXXV. Distribution *" occurs when'certain specified 
roles are assigned among a number of things or 
persons 5*^ as follows : " Whoever of you, men of 
the jury, loves the good name of the Senate, must 
hate this man, for his attacks upon that body have 
always been most insolent. Whoever of you wishes 
the equestrian order ^ to be most resplendent in the 
state, must want this person to have paid the severest 
penalty, so that he may not be, through his personal 
shame, a stain and disgrace to a most honourable 
order. You who have parents, must prove by your 
punishment of this creature that undutiful men do 
not find favour with you. You who have children, 
must set forth an example to show how great are the 
punishments that have been provided in our state 
for men of that stamp." Again, " The Senate's 
function is to assist the state with counsel ; the 
magistracy's is to execute, by diligent activity, the 
Senate's will; the people's to choose and support 
by its votes the best measures and the most suitable 
men." Again, " The duty of the prosecutor is to 
bring the charges ; that of the counsel for the 
defence to explain them away and rebut them ; that 

* In accordance with the Lex Plautia ludiciaria of 90/89 
B.C. both senators and knights (and also some of the plebs) 
served as indices in the criminal courts. Sulla restored the 
senatorial monopoly in 82,81 B.C. 



sciat aut audierit ; quaesitoris est unum quemque 
horum in officio suo continere. Quare, L. Cassi, si 
testem praeterquam quod sciat aut audierit argu- 
mentari et coniectura prosequi patieris, ius accusa- 
toris cum iure testimonii commiscebis, testis inprobi 
cupiditatem confirmabis, reo duplicem defensionem 
parabis." Est haec exornatio copiosa, conprehendit 
enim brevd multa, et suum cuique tribuens officium 
separatim res dividit plures. 
48 XXXVI. Licentia est cum apud eos quos aut 
vereri aut metuere debemus tamen aliquid pro iure 
nostro dicimus, quod eos aut quos ii diligunt aliquo in 
errato vere reprehendere videamur, hoc modo: 
" Miramini, Quirites, quod ab omnibus vestrae 
rationes deserantur ? quod causam vestram nemo 
suscipiat ? quod se nemo vestri defensorem pro- 
fiteatur ? Adtribuite vestrae culpae, desinite mirari. 
Quid est enim quare non omnes istam rem fugere ac 
vitare debeant ? Recordamini quos habueritis defen- 
sores ; studia eorum vobis ante oculos proponite ; 
deinde exitus omnium considerate. Turn vobis 
veniat in mentem, ut vere dicam, neglegentia vestra 
sive ignavia potius, illos omnes ante oculos vestros 

" On the admission of hearsay evidence in Roman Law see 
J. L. Strachan-Davidson, Problems of the Roman Criminal 
Law, Oxford, 1912, 2. 123 flF. ; c/. ^. viii. 12 above. 

* From the celebrated speech delivered in 113 B.C. (or at 
the end of 114) by L. Licinius Crassus in defence of Licinia, 
accused with other Vestals of unchastity and condemned. 
L. Cassius Longinus Ravilla (whose rule was to insist on the 
question of the motive: Cui bono? — "for whose advantage 
was the crime? ") was the examining magistrate. 

" napprjaia, oratio libera. Quintilian, 9. 2. 27 and 9. 3. 99, 
denies that this is a figure. Cf. Isocrates, De Pace 72 f. : 


AD HERENNIUM, IV. xxxv. 47-xxxvi. 48 

of the witness to say what he knows or has heard ; " 
that of the presiding justice to hold each of these 
to his duty. Therefore, Lucius Cassius, if you allow 
a witness to argue and to attack by means of con- 
jecture, passing beyond what he knows or has heard, 
you will be confusing the riglits of a prosecutor with 
those of a witness, you will be encouraging the 
partiality of a dishonest witness, and you will be 
ordaining for the defendant that he defend himself 
twice." ^ This figure has richness, for it embraces 
much in little and, by assigning to each his duty, 
severally distinguishes a number of entities. 
48 XXXVI. It is Frankness of Speech '^ when, talking 
before those to whom we owe reverence or fear, we yet 
exercise our right to speak out, because we seem 
justified in reprehending them, or persons dear to 
them, for some fault. For example : " You wonder, 
fellow citizens, that every one abandons your in- 
terests ? That no one undertakes your cause ? That 
no one declares himself your defender ? Blame this 
upon yourselves ; cease to wonder. Why indeed 
should not every one avoid and shun this situation of 
your making ? Bethink yourselves of those whom 
you have had for defenders ; set their devotion before 
your eyes, and next consider what has become of 
them all. Then remember that thanks to your — to 
speak aright — indifference, or cowardice rather, all 
these men have been murdered before your eyes, and 

" While hating those who revile you to your hurt as bearing 
mahce to the state, you ought to praise those who admonish 
you for your benefit, and think them the best of your fellow- 
citizens, and think that best of all is the man who can 
demonstrate most vividly the defects of your practices and 
the misfortunes that arise from them." 



trucidatos esse, inimicos eorum vestris sufFragiis in 
amplissimum locum pervenisse." Item: " Nam quid 
fuit, iudices, quare in sententiis ferendis dubitaveritis 
aut istum hominem nefarium ampliaveritis ? Non 
apertissimae res erant crimini datae ? non omnes hae 
testibus conprobatae? non contra tenuiter et nuga- 
torie responsum ? Hie vos veriti estis, si primo coetu 
condemnassetis, ne crudeles existimaremini ? Dum 
earn vitatis vituperationem, quae longe a vobis erat 
afutura, eam invenistis ut timidi atque ignavi putare- 
mini. Maximis privatis et publicis calamitatibus 
acceptis, cum etiam maiores inpendere videantur, 
sedetis et oscitamini. Luci noctem, nocte lucem 
expectatis. Aliquid cotidie acerbi atque incommodi 
nuntiatur; et iam eum, cuius opera nobis haec 
accidunt, vos remoramini diutius et alitis ad rei 
publicae perniciem, retinetis quoad potestis in 
civitate ? " 
49 XXXVII. Eiusmodi licentia si nimium videbitur 
acrimoniae habere, multis mitigationibus lenietur; 
nam continuo aliquid huiusmodi licebit inferre : 
Hie ego virtutem vestram quaero, sapientiam 
desidero, veterem consuetudinem requiro," ut quod 
erit •"• commotum licentia id constituatur laude, ut 
altera res ab iracundia et molestia removeat, altera 
res ab errato deterreat. Haec res, sicut in amicitia 

^ quod erit M : ut quod erat E Mx. 

" Whether this passage derives from a speech actually 
delivered we do not know. The sentiments are appropriate 
to a tribune of the time of Marius. 

* The renewal (ampliatio) of a case followed the verdict 
non liquet by the jury, and the president's pronouncement 
amplius (cognoscendum). Renewals had to be repeated until 

AD HERENNIUM, IV. xxxvr. 48 xxxvii. 49 

thanks to your own votes their enemies have reached 
the highest estate." " Again : " Now what was your 
motive, men of the jury, in hesitating to pass sentence 
on this abominable man, or in allowing him a new 
trial } * Were not the facts charged plain as day ? 
Were they not all proved by w itnesses ? Was not the 
answer, on the other hand, feeble and trifling? Did 
you at this point fear that in condemning him at the 
first hearing you would be considered cruel ? While 
avoiding a reproach for cruelty, which you would 
have been far from incurring, you have incurred 
another reproach — you are considered timid and 
cowardly. You have met with very great losses, 
private and public, and now when even greater losses 
seem to impend, you sit and yawn. During the dav 
you wait for night, at night you wait for dav. Every 
day some troublesome and unpleasant news is 
announced — yet even now will you temporize longer 
with the author of these our ills, and nourish him 
for the destruction of the republic ; will you keep 
him in the commonwealth as long as you can } " 
49 XXXVII. If Frank Speech of this sort seems too 
pungent, there will be many means of palliation, for 
one may immediately thereafter add something of 
this sort : " I here appeal to your virtue, I call on 
your wisdom, I bespeak your old habit," so that 
praise may quiet the feelings aroused by the frank- 
ness. As a result, the praise frees the hearer from 
wrath and annoyance, and the frankness deters him 
from error. This precaution in speaking, as in 

the verdict oifecisse videtur or non fecisse videtur was rendered. 
The Lex Acilia Repetundarum (123/2 B.C.) provided against 
the abuses of this power by juries; it permitted the jury no 
more than one renewal in a single case at penalty of a fine. 


item in dicendo, si loco fit, maxime facit ut et illi qui 
audient a culpa absint, et nos qui dicimus amici 
ipsorum et veritatis esse videamur. 

Est autem quoddam genus in dicendo licentiaequod 
astutiore ratione conparatur, cum aut ita obiurgamus 
eos qui audiunt quomodo ipsi se cupiunt obiurgari, aut 
id quod scimus facile omnes audituros dicimus nos 
timere quomodo accipiant, sed tamen veritate com- 
moveri ut nihilosetius dicamus. Horum amborum 
generum exempla subiciemus ; prioris, huiusmodi : 

Nimium, Quirites, animis estis simplicibus et man- 
suetis ; nimium creditis uni cuique. Existimatis 
unum quemque eniti ut perficiat quae vobis poUicitus 
sit. Erratis et falsa spe frustra iam diu detinemini 
stultitia vestra, qui quod erat in vestra potestate ab 
aliis petere quam ipsi sumere maluistis." Posterioris 
licentiae hoc erit exemplum : " Mihi cum isto, 
iudices, fuit amicitia, sed ista tamen amicitia, tametsi 
vereor quomodo accepturi sitis, tamen dicam, vos me 
privastis. Quid ita ? Quia, ut vobis essem probatus, 
eum qui vos oppugnabat inimicum quam amicum 
habere malui." 

" Cf. Plato, Phaedo 91 B : " And I would enjoin upon 
you to be giving only little thought to Socrates, but much 
more to the truth " ; and the saying attributed to Aristotle 
by Cervantes : Amicus Plato, sed magis arnica Veritas. (See 
James Condamin, Repertoire Alphabetiqve des Citations, 
Lyons and Paris, 1926, pp. 26 ff.) 

* It has been suspected (see Friedrich Ellendt in Meyer- 
Diibner, Orator. Rom. Fragm., 2nd ed., p. 235, and Kroehnert, 
p. 30) that this may be a fragment from the speech De legibus 
promulgatis delivered (in 122 B.C.) by Gains Gracchus, the 
words here being directed against M. Livius Drusus; but 
there is no real evidence to substantiate the conjecture. 
Rutilius Lupus, 2. 18 (Halm, pp. 20-21), uses as an example 
of this figure the following passage from Demosthenes {Fragm. 

AD HRRENNIUM. IV. xxxvii. 49 

friendship, if taken at the right place, is especially 
effective in keepiiifr the hearers from error and in 
presenting us, the speakers, as friendly both to the 
hearers and to the truth. 

There is also a certain kind of frankness in speaking 
which is achieved by a craftier device, when we 
remonstrate with the hearers as they wish us to 
remonstrate with them, or when we say " we fear how 
the audience may take " something which we know 
they all will hear with acceptance, " yet the truth 
moves us to say it none the less." " I shall add 
examples of both these kinds. Of the former, as 
follows : " Fellow citizens, you are of too simple and 
gentle a character ; you have too much confidence in 
every one. You think that every one strives to 
perform what he has promised you. You are mis- 
taken, and now for a long time you have been kept 
back by false and groundless hope, in your fatuity 
choosing to seek from others what lay in your power, 
rather than take it yourselves." * Of the latter kind 
of Frank Speech the following will be an example : 
" I enjoyed a friendship with this pei*son, men of the 
jury, yet of that friendship — although I fear how you 
are going to receive what I shall say, I will yet say it 
— you have deprived me. Why : Because, in order 
to win your approval, I have preferred to consider 
your assailant as an enemy rather than as a friend." 

Oral. Att., ed. Baiter-Sauppe, fragm. 54, p. 257) : " But shall I 
refrain from speaking the truth frankly before you ? Xo, 
I say. I shall not be silent, because the common welfare 
demands speech. It is by your own doing, men of Athens, 
that the stat€ is in such great peril. For you have failed to 
defend yourselves, by recklessly believing every one and by 
esteeming as most useful the opinions of those whose counsels 
are most cowardly." 



50 Ergo haec exornatio cui licentiae nomen est, sicuti 
demonstravimus, duplici ratione tractabitur : acri- 
monia, quae si nimium fuerit aspera, mitigabitur 
laude ; et adsimulatione, de qua posterius diximus, 
quae non indiget mitigationis, propterea quod imita- 
tur licentiam et sua spontest ad animum auditoris 

XXXVIII. Deminutio est cum aliquid inesse in 
nobis aut in iis quos defendimus aut natura aut 
fortuna aut industria dieemus egregium, quod, ne 
qua significetur adrogans ostentatio, deminuitur et 
adtenuatur oratione, hoc modo : " Nam hoc pro meo 
iure, indices, dico, me labore et industria curasse ut 
disciplinam militarem non in postremis tenerem." 
Hie si quis dixisset " ut optime tenerem," tametsi 
vere dixisset, tamen adrogans visus esset. Nunc et 
ad invidiam vitandam et laudem conparandam satis 
dictum est. Item : " Utrum igitur avaritiae an 
egestatis ^ accessit ad maleficium ? Avaritiae ? At 
largissimus fuit in amicos ; quod signum liberalitatis 
est, quae contraria est avaritiae. Egestatis? Huic 
quidem pater — nolo nimium dicere — non tenuissimum 
patrimonium reliquit." Hie quoque vitatum est ne 
" magnum " aut " maximum " diceretur. Hoc igitur 
in nostris aut eorum quos defendemus egregiis com- 
modis proferendis observabimus. Nam eiusmodi res 

^ lac. after egestatis Mx. 

" dvTevavTtwais. Sometimes also fxeiwaLS, Xltottjs. 
* It has been conjectured (see EUendt in Meyer-Diibner, 
Orator. Rom. Fragm., 2nd ed., p. 256, and Kroehnert, p. 31) 


AD HERENNIUM, IV. xxxvir. 5o-.\x\viii. 50 

Thus this figure called Frankness of Speech will, 
as I have shown, be handled in two ways : with 
pungency, which, if too severe, will be mitigated by 
praise ; and with pretence, discussed above, which 
does not require mitigation, because it assumes the 
guise of Frank Speech and is of itself agreeable to 
the hearer's frame of mind. 

XXXVIII. Understatement** occurs when we say 
that by nature, fortune, or diligence, we or our 
clients possess some exceptional advantage, and, in 
order to avoid the impression of arrogant display, we 
moderate and soften the statement of it, as follows : 
" This, men of the jury, I have the right to say — that 
by labour and diligence I have contrived to be no 
laggard in the mastery of military science." If the 
speaker had here said " be the best " he might have 
spoken the truth, but would have seemed arrogant. 
He has now said quite enough both to avoid envy and 
to secure praise. Again: " Was it then because of 
avarice or of need that he entered upon the crime ? 
Avarice? But he was most generous to his friends, 
and that is a sign of generosity, a virtue opposed to 
avarice. Need ? But his father left him a patrimony 
that was — I do not wish to exaggerate — not the 
smallest."* Here again, calling the patrimony 
" large " or " very large " was avoided. This, then, is 
the precaution we shall take in setting forth the excep- 
tional advantages which we or our clients enioy. For 



that this passage may have its source in the speech delivered 
by Marcus Antonius, in 98 B.C., in defence of Manius Aquilius, 
accused of extortion; c/. Cicero, Pro Flacco 98 : " Aquilius, 
who had been convicted of extortion on many charges and by 
many witnesses." But there is no real evidence for the 



et invidiam contrahunt in vita et odium in oratione si 
inconsiderate tractes. Quare quemadmodum ratione 
in vivendo fugitur invidia, sic in dicendo consilio 
vitatur odium. 
51 XXXIX. Descriptio nominatur quae rerum con- 
sequentium continet perspicuam et dilucidam cum 
gravitate expositionem, hoc modo : " Quodsi istum, 
iudices, vestris sententiis liberaveritis, statim, sicut e 
cavea leo emissus aut aliqua taeterrima belua soluta 
ex catenis, volitabit et vagabitur in foro, acuens 
dentes in unius cuiusque fortunas, in omnes amicos 
atque inimicos, notos atque ignotos incursitans, alio- 
rum famam depeculans, aliorum caput oppugnans, 
aliorum domum et omnem familiam perfringens, rem 
publicam funditus labefactans. Quare, iudices, 
eicite eum de civitate ; liberate omnes formidine ; 
vobis denique ipsis consulite. Nam si istum inpuni- 
tum dimiseritis, in vosmet ipsos, mihi credite, feram et 
truculentam bestiam, iudices, immiseritis." 

Item : " Nam si de hoc, iudices, gravemi sententiam 
tuleritis, uno iudicio simul multos iugulaveritis : 
grandis natu parens, cuius spes senectutis omnis in 
huius adulescentia posita est, quare velit in vita 
manere non habebit ; fiUi parvi, privati patris 
auxiUo, ludibrio et despectui paternis inimicis erunt 
oppositi ; tota domus huius indigna concidet calami- 

" haTVTTcoaLs. Cf. demonstratio (Ocular Demonstration), 
4. Iv. 68 below, and consequentiutn freqtientatio in Cicero, Part. 
Oral. 16. 55. The figure is useful for exciting emotions; cf. 
the tenth commonplace of Amplification in 2. xxx. 49 above. 

" Cf. the example of Comparison in Aristotle, Bhet. 3. 3 
(1406 b) : " Androtion said of Idrieus that he was ' like a cur 
let loose from his chain, that flies at you and bites ' ; so 
Idrieus, let loose from his chains, was vicious." 

AD HKRENNIUM, IV. xxxviii. 50 xxxix. 51 

things of this sort, if you liandle them indiscreetly, in 
life provoke jealousy and in a speech antipathy. 
Therefore just as by circumspection we escape 
jealousy in life, so by prudence we avoid antipathy 
in speaking, 

XXXIX. V^ivid Description ^ is the name for the 
figure which contains a clear, lucid, and impressive 
exposition of the consequences of an act, as follows : 
" But, men of the jury, if by your votes you free this 
defendant, immediately, like a lion released from his 
cage, or some foul beast loosed from his chains, ** he 
will slink and prowl about in the forum, '^ sharpening 
his teeth to attack every one's property, assaulting 
every man, friend and enemy, known to him or un- 
known, now despoiling a good name, now attacking a 
life, now bringing ruin upon a house and its entire 
household, shaking the republic from its foundations. 
Therefore, men of the jur}', cast him out from the 
state, free every one from fear, and finally, think of 
yourselves. For if you release this creature without 
punishment, believe me, gentlemen, it is against 
yourselves that you will have let loose a wild and 
savage beast." 

Again: " For if you inflict a heavy penalty upon 
the defendant, men of the jury, you will at once by a 
single judgement have taken many lives. His aged 
father, who has set the entire hope of his last years on 
this young man, will have no reason for wishing to 
stay alive. His small children, deprived of their 
father's aid, will be exposed as objects of scorn and 
contempt to their father's enemies. His entire 
household will collapse under this undeserved 

* Cf. the second example of Simile, 4. xlix. 62 below, and 
the passage of Demosthenes cited in note. 



tate. At inimici, statim sanguinulentam palmam 
crudelissima victoria potiti, insultabunt in horum 
miserias, et superbi a re simul et verbis invenientur." ^ 

Item : " Nam neminem vestrum fugit, Quirites, 
urbe capta quae miseriae eonsequi soleant : arma qui 
contra tulerunt statim crudelissime trucidantur ; 
ceteri qui possunt per aetatem et vires laborem ferre 
rapiuntur in servitutem, qui non possunt vita pri- 
vantur; uno denique atque eodem tempore domus 
hostili flagrat ^ incendio, et quos natura aut voluntas 
necessitudine et benivolentia coniunxit distrahuntur ; 
liberi partim e gremiis diripiuntur parentum, partim 
in sinu ^ iugulantur, partim ante pedes constuprantur. 
Nemo, indices, est qui possit satis rem eonsequi 
verbis nee efFerre oratione magnitudinem calami- 

Hoce genere exornationis vel indignatio vel miseri- 
cordia potest commoveri, cum res consequentes con- 
prehensae universae perspicua breviter exprimuntur 

^ invenientur B^C : invenietur 11 : invehentur Bbd: in- 
veniuntur HPMx : invehebuntur I. 

2 flagrat C : flagrabit P^B^EMx : flagrabat H^B 11 : fra- 
glabat P^ : fragrabat H^. 

3 sinu H^P^B^CE : sinu H^PBll : sinum Mx. 

" The example is Greek in origin ; see the similar example 
(illustrating hiaXvaLs) in Herodian (Walz 8. 603). Notice 
that the speaker addresses the hearers as Quirites at first, 
and as indices at the end. For content and diction c/. the 
example of the grand style, 4. viii. 12 above. Cf. also in Homer, 
//. 9. 591 ff"., Cleopatra's description of the woes that come to 

AI) HERENNIUM, IV. xxxix. 51 

calamity. But his enemies, when once they have 
won the bloody palm by this most cruel of victories, 
will exult over the miseries of these unfortunates, 
and will be found insolent on the score of deeds as 
well as of words." 

Again: " For none of you, fellow citizens, fails to 
see what miseries usually follow upon the capture of a 
city. Those who have borne arms against the victors 
are forthwith slain with extreme cruelty. Of the 
rest, those who by reason of youth and strength can 
endure hard labour are carried off into slavery, and 
those who cannot are deprived of life. In short, at 
one and the same time a house blazes up bv the 
enemy's torch, and they whom nature or free choice 
has joined in the bonds of kinship or of sympathy are 
dragged apart. Of the children, some are torn from 
their parents' arms, others murdered on their 
parents' bosom, still others violated at their parents' 
feet. No one, men of the jury, can, by words, do 
justice to the deed, nor reproduce in language the 
magnitude of the disaster." ^ 

With this kind of figure either indignation or pity 
can be aroused, when the consequences of an act, 
taken together as a whole, are concisely set forth 
in a clear style. 

men whose city is captured : "The warriors are slain, the city 
is wasted by fire, and strangers lead captive the children and 
deep-girdled women " ; the example of Metathesis from an 
unknown author in Isidore, Bhet. 21. 34 (Halm, p. 521) : '' Re- 
call your minds to the spectacle of an unhappy city that has 
been stormed, and imagine that you see all the burning, the 
kilhng, the plundering, the pillaging, the bodily injury done 
the children, the taking captive of the matrons, the slaying 
of the old men"; Dio Chrvsostom 32. 89; and Caesar in 
Sallust, Cat, 51. 9. 



52 XL. Divisio est quae rem semovens ab re utram- 
que absolvit ratione subiecta, hoc modo : " Cur ego 
nunc tibi quicquam obiciam ? Si probus es, non 
meruisti; si inprobus, non commovebere." ^ Item: 
" Quid nunc ego de meis promeritis praedicem ? Si 
meministis, obtundam; si obliti estis, cum re nihil 
egerim, quid est quod verbis proficere possim?" 
Item: " Duae res sunt quae possunt homines ad 
turpe conpendium commovere : inopia atque avaritia. 
Te avarum in fraterna divisione cognovimus ; inopem 
atque egentem nunc videmus. Qui potes igitur 
ostendere causam maleficii non fuisse ? " Inter hanc 
divisionem et illam quae de partibus orationis tertia 
est, de qua in primo libro diximus secundum narra- 
tionem, hoc interest : ilia dividit per enumerationem 
aut per expositionem quibus de rebus in totam 
orationem disputatio futura sit; haec se statim 
explicat, et brevi duabus aut pluribus partibus 
subiciens rationes exornat orationem. 

Frequentatio est cum res tota causa dispersae 
coguntur in unum locum, quo gravior aut acrior aut 
criminosior oratio sit, hoc pacto : "A quo tandem 
abest iste vitio? Quid est cur iudicio velitis eum 
liberare? Suae pudicitiae proditor est, insidiator 

1 commovebere d : commovere other MS8. Mx. 

" -npoaaiToSoais, Distributive Reply. In distribuiis sup- 
posita ratio in De Oratore 3. 54. 207; Quintilian, 9. 3. 93, 
doubts whether distribuiis subiecta ratio is a figure. The 
figure is related to Dilemma [duplex conclusio), used in 
argumentation; see 2. xxiv. 38 above. Cf. distributio 
(4. XXXV. 47) and ratiocinatio (4. xvi. 23). Cf. also Trimalchio 
on Agamemnon's controversia in Petronius 48: " If the 
business took place, there is no argument ; if it did not, it is 
all nonsense." 



52 XL. Division ** separates the alternatives of a 
question and resolves each by means of a reason sub- 
joined, as follows: "Why should I now reproach 
you in any way ? If you are an upright man, you 
have not deserved reproach ; if a wicked man, you 
will be unmoved." Again: "Why should I now 
boast of my deserts ? If you remember them, I shall 
weary you; if you have forgotten them, I have been 
ineffective in action, and therefore what could I effect 
by words? " Again: " There are two things which 
can urge men to illicit gain : poverty and greed. 
That you were greedy in the division with your 
brother we know, that you are poor and destitute we 
now see. How, therefore, can you show that you had 
no motive for the crime? " There is the following 
difference between the present kind of Division and 
that other which forms the third part of a discourse, 
and which I treated in Book I,* next after State- 
ment of Facts : the former Division operates through 
the Enumeration or Exposition of the topics to be 
discussed throughout the whole discourse ; whereas 
here the Division at once unfolds itself, and by 
briefly adding the reasons for the two or more parts, 
embellishes the style. 

Accumulation ^ occurs w hen the points scattered 
throughout the whole cause are collected in one 
place so as to make the speech more impressive or 
sharp or accusatory, as follows : " From what vice, 
I ask, is this defendant free ? What ground have you 
for wishing to acquit him of the suit ? He is the 
betrayer of his own self-respect, and the waylayer of 

* 1. X. 17. 

•^ avvadpoLafxos. Cf. enunieratio in 2. xxx. 47 above, and 
cons^uvimatio in Quintilian, 9. 2. 103. 



alienae; cupidus, intemperans, petulans, superbus; 
impius in parentes, ingratus in amicos, infestus cogna- 
tis ; in superiores contumax, in aequos et pares 
fastidiosus, in inferiores crudelis ; denique in omnes 
53 Eiusdem generis est ilia frequentatio quae pluri- 
mum coniecturalibus causis opitulatur, cum suspi- 
ciones, quae separatim dictae minutae et infirmae 
erant, unum in locum coactae rem videntur per- 
spicuam facere, non suspiciosam, hoc pacto : " Nolite 
igitur, nolite, iudices, ea quae dixi separatim spectare, 
sed omnia colligite et conferte in unum. 

XLI. "Si et commodum ad istum ex illius morte 
veniebat ; et vita hominis est turpissima, animus 
avarissimus, fortunae familiares adtenuatissimae ; et 
res ista bono nemini praeter istum fuit ; neque alius 
quisquam aeque commode, neque iste aliis commo- 
dioribus rationibus facere potuit ; neque praeteritum 
est ab isto quicquam quod opus fuit ad maleficium, 
neque factum quod opus non fuit; et cum locus 
idoneus maxime quaesitus, tum occasio adgrediendi 
commoda, tempus adeundi opportunissimum ; spatium 
conficiendi longissimum sumptum est, non sine 
maxima occultandi et perficiendi maleficii spe; et 
praeterea, ante quam occisus homo is est, iste visus 
est in eo loco in quo est occisio facta, solus; paulo 

" For the same idea see Cicero, Part. Orat. 11. 40. 

* The example that follows is a summary of a conjectural 
case (with its dependence on the topics of circumstantial 
evidence) according to the principles set forth above in 
2. ii. 3 ff. 

AD HERENNIUM, IV. xl. 52 -xu. s3 

the self-respect of others; covetous, intemperate 
irascible, arrogant ; disloyal to his parents, ungrate- 
ful to his friends, troublesome to his kin ; insulting 
to his betters, disdainful of his ecjuals and mates, 
cruel to his inferiors ; in short he is intolerable to every 
53 Of the same kind is that other Accumulation, 
which is very useful in conjectural causes, when the 
implications, which were petty and weak because ex- 
pressed separately, are collected in one place and so 
seem to make the subject evident and not dubious,*» 
as follows:* " Do not, therefore, men of the jury, 
do not consider singly the things I have said, but join 
them all together and combine them into one. 

XLI. " If the defendant profited from the victim's 
death ; if also his life is full of dishonour, his heart 
most avaricious, and his family fortune very meagre ; 
and if that crime benefited no one but him ; <^ and if 
no one else could have done the deed with equal skill, 
or he himself could not have done it by methods more 
apt ; if he neglected nothing that was necessary for 
the crime, and did nothing that was not necessary ; 
and if he not only sought the most suitable place, 
but also a favourable occasion for entering upon the 
crime, and the most opportune moment for under- 
taking it ; if he spent the longest period of time 
in executing it, and not without the greatest hope 
of concealing and completing it; and besides, if, 
before the victim was murdered, the defendant was 
seen, alone, in the place in which the murder was 
committed ; if soon afterward, during the very 

' Cf., in 2, iv. 6 above, the prosecutor's use of Comparison, 
and for this whole passage Quintilian, 7. 2. 42-44, on Intention 



post in ipso maleficio vox illius qui occidebatur audita ; 
deinde post occisionem istum multa nocte domum 
redisse constat ; postero die titubanter et inconstanter 
de occisione illius locutum ; haec partim testimoniis, 
partim quaestionibus argumentatis omnia conpro- 
bantur, et rumore populi, quern ex argumentis natum 
necesse est esse verum — vestrum, iudices, est his ^ 
in unum locum ^ conlocatis certam sumere scientiam, 
non suspicionem maleficii. Nam unum aliquid aut 
alterum potest in istum casu cecidisse suspiciose ; ut 
omnia inter se a primo ad postremum conveniant, 
maleficii adfinem fuisse istum ^ necesse est ; casu 
non potest fieri." Vehemens haec est exornatio et 
in coniecturali constitutione causae ferme semper 
necessaria, et in ceteris generibus causarum et in 
omni oratione adhibenda nonnumquam. 
54 XLII. Expolitio est cum in eodem loco manemus 
et aliud atque aliud dicere videmur. Ea dupliciter 
fit : si aut eandem plane dicemus rem, aut de eadem 
re. Eandem rem dicemus non eodem modo — nam id 
quidem obtundere auditorem est, non rem expolire — 
sed commutate. Commutabimus tripliciter: verbis, 
pronuntiando, tractando. 

Verbis commutabimus cum re semel dicta iterum 
aut saepius aliis verbis quae idem valeant eadem res 

1 his HP^BE : ex his IVCMx. 

2 unum locum H^, all other MS8. but H : uno loco H Mx. 

3 a]dfinem fuisse istum inserted to fill lac. 

Cf. 2. V. 8 above, on Subsequent Behaviour. 

All these considerations are discussed above in 2. vi. 9 fif. 


AD HERENNIUM, IV. xu. 53-xLii. 54 

commission of the crime, the voice of the victim was 
heard; if it is established that then, after the 
murder, the defendant returned home, at dead of 
night; that on the next day he spoke of the man's 
murder haltingly and inconsistently " — if all these 
indications are proved, partly by witnesses, and partly 
by the confessions upon torture ^ which have been 
adduced in confirmation, and by public opinion, 
which, born of evidence, must necessarily be true; 
then, gentlemen, it is your duty to gather all these 
indications into one, and arrive at definite knowledge, 
not suspicion, of the crime. To be sure, some one or 
two of these things can by chance have happened in 
such a way as to throw suspicion upon this defendant ; 
but for everything to coincide from first to last, he 
must have been a participant in the crime. This 
cannot be the result of chance." This figure has 
force, and in a conjectural issue is almost always 
essential ; in the other types of causes and indeed 
in all discourse it is to be used occasionally. 
54 XLII. Refining '^ consists in dwelling on the same 
topic and yet seeming to say something ever new. 
It is accomplished in two ways : by merely repeating 
the same idea, or by descanting upon it. We shall 
not repeat the same thing precisely — for that, to be 
sure, would weary the hearer and not refine the idea — 
but with changes. Our changes will be of three 
kinds : in the words, in the delivery, and in the 

Our changes will be verbal when, having expressed 
the idea once, we repeat it once again or oftener in 

•= A xP^'-°-y ^ thought (usually ethical) developed in detail 
in accordance with definite rules ; a favourite type of pro- 



proferetur, hoc modo: " Nullum tantum est peri- 
culum quod sapiens pro salute patriae vitandum 
arbitretur. Cum agetur incolumitas perpetua civi- 
tatis, qui bonis erit rationibus praeditus profecto 
nullum vitae discrimen sibi pro fortunis rei publieae 
fugiendum putabit, et erit in ea sententia semper ut 
pro patria studiose quamvis in magnam descendat 
vitae dimicationem." 

Pronuntiando commutabimus si cum in sermone, 
tum in acrimonia, tum in alio atque alio genere vocis 
atque gestus eadem verbis commutando pronuntia- 
tionem quoque vehementius immutarimus. Hoc 
neque commodissime scribi potest neque parum est 
apertum ; quare non eget exempli. 
55 Tertium genus est commutationis, quod tractando 
conficitur, si sententiam traiciemus aut ad sermo- 
cinationem aut exsuscitationem. 

XLIII. Sermocinatio est — de qua planius paulo 
post suo loco dicemus, nunc breviter, quod ad banc 
rem satis sit, adtingemus — in qua constituetur 
alicuius personae oratio adcommodata ad dignitatem, 
hoc modo, ut, quo facilius res cognosci possit, ne ab 
eadem sententia recedamus : " Sapiens omnia rei 
publieae causa suscipienda pericula putabit. Saepe 
ipse secum loquetur ^ : ' Non mihi soli, sed etiam 
atque adeo multo potius natus sum patriae ; vita, 
1 loquetur mP^C : loquet H : loquitur PBUEMx. 

*» 4. lii. 65 below. 

** A quaestio infinita (Oeais) ; see Quintilian, 3. 5. 5 ff. 

" Cf. Julius Rufinianus 20 (Halm, pp. 43-4) : " StaAoyiCT/ioy 
occurs when someone discusses with himself and ponders 
what he is doing or what he thinks ought to be done." 

<* Cf. Plato, Epist. 9. 358 A : "Yet this, too, you ought to 
bear in mind — that none of us was born for self alone, but our 


AD IIERENNIUM. IV. xui. 54-\liii. 55 

other, equivalent terms, as follows : " No peril is so 
great that a wise man would think it ought to be 
avoided when the safety of the fatherland is at stake. 
When the lasting security of the state is in question, 
the man endowed with good principles will un- 
doubtedly believe that in defence of the fortunes of 
the republic he ought to shun no crisis of life, and he 
will ever persist in the determination eagerly to enter, 
for the fatherland, any combat, however great the 
peril to life." 

Our changes will reside in the delivery if now in the 
tone of conversation, now in an energetic tone, and 
now in variation after variation of voice and gesture, 
repeating the same ideas in different words, we also 
change the delivery quite strikingly. This cannot be 
described with complete effectiveness, and yet it is 
clear enough. Hence there is no need of illustration. 
55 The third kind of change, accomplished in the 
treatment, will take place if we transfer the thought 
into the form of Dialogue or into the form of Arousal. 

XLIII. Dialogue — which I shall soon more fully 
discuss in its place '^ and shall now touch upon briefly, 
as far as may be sufficient for the present purpose — 
consists in putting in the mouth of some person 
language in keeping with his character, as follows 
(for the sake of greater clarity, to continue the same 
theme as above) : " The wise man will think that for 
the common weal he ought to undergo every peril.* 
Often he will say to himself: ^ ' Not for self alone was 
I born, but also, and much more, for the fatherland.** 

existence is shared by our country, our parents, and our 
friends " ; Demosthenes, De Corona 205 : " Every one of 
those men considered himself to have been bom, not to his 
father and mother alone, but also to his fatherland." 



quae fato debetiir, saluti patriae potissimum solvatur. 
Aluit haec me ; tute atqiie honeste produxit usque ad 
hanc aetatem ; munivit meas rationes bonis legibus, 
optimis moribus, honestissimis disciplinis. Quid est 
quod a me satis ei persolvi possit unde haec accepi ? ' 
Exinde ut haec loquetur secum sapiens saepe, in 
periculis rei publicae nullum ipse periculum fugiet." 

Item mutatur res tractando si traducitur ad ex- 
suscitationem, cum et nos commoti dicere videamur, 
et auditoris animum commovemus, sic : " Quis est 
tam tenui cogitatione praeditus, cuius animus tantis 
angustiis invidiae continetur, qui non hunc hominem 
studiosissime laudet et sapientissimum iudicet, qui 
pro salute patriae, pro incolumitate civitatis, pro rei 
publicae fortunis quamvis magnum atque atrox 
periculum studiose suscipiat et libenter subeat ? 
56 Equidem hunc hominem magis cupio satis laudare 
quam possum, idemque hoc certo scio vobis omnibus 
usu venire." 

Eadem res igitur his tribus in dicendo commuta- 
bitur rebus: verbis, pronuntiando, tractando; trac- 
tando ^ dupliciter : sermocinatione et exsuscitatione. 

Sed de eadem re cum dicemus, plurimis utemur 
commutationibus. Nam cum rem simpliciter pro- 
nuntiarimus, rationem poterimus subicere ; deinde 
dupliciter vel sine rationibus vel cum rationibus 
pronuntiare; deinde adferre contrarium — de quibus 

1 tractando ME omit : sed tractando Cd : commutabimus 
tractando Mx. 

^ dvdaTaaii. * Cf. 4. xvii. 24. ' Cf. 4. xviii. 25. 


AD HKRKNNIUM, IV. xliii. 55-56 

Above all, let me spend my life, which I o\Te to fate, 
for the salvation of my country. She has nourished 
me. She has in safety and honour reared me even 
to this time of life. She has protected my interests 
by good laws, the best of customs, and a most 
honourable training. How can I adequately repay 
her from whom I have received these blessings ? ' 
According as the wise man often says this to himself, 
when the republic is in danger, he on his part will 
shun no danger." 

Again, the idea is changed in the treatment by 
means of a transfer to the form of Arousal,'* when not 
only we ourselves seem to speak under emotion, but 
we also stir the hearer, thus : " Who is possessed of 
reasoning power so feeble, whose soul is bound in 
such straits of envy, that he would not heap eager 
praise upon this man and judge him most wise, a 
man who for the salvation of the fatherland, the 
security of the state, and the prosperity of the 
republic eagerly undertakes and gladly undergoes 
56 any danger, no matter how great or terrible ? For 
my part, my desire to praise this man adequately is 
greater than my power to do so, and I am sure that 
this feeling of inadequacy is shared by all of you." 

The theme, then, will be varied in speaking in 
these three ways : in the words, in the delivery, in 
the treatment. In the treatment we shall vary the 
theme by two means : by Dialogue and by Arousal. 

But when we descant upon the same theme, we 
shall use a great many variations. Indeed, after 

(having expressed the theme simply, we can subjoin 
the Reason, and then express the theme in another 
form, with or without the Reasons ; ^ next we can 
present the Contrary ^ (all this I have discussed under 




omnibus diximus in verborum exornationibus ; deinde 
simile et exemplum — de quo suo loco plura dicemus ; 
XLIV. deinde conclusionem — de qua in secundo libro 
quae opus fuerunt diximus, demonstrantes argu- 
mentationes quemadmodum concludere oporteat ; 
in hoc libro docuimus cuiusmodi esset exornatio ver- 
borum cui conclusioni nomen est. Ergo huiusmodi 
vehementer ornata poterit esse expolitio, quae 
constabit ex frequentibus exornationibus verborum 
et sententiarum. 

Hoc modo igitur septem partibus tractabitur — ut 
ab eiusdem sententiae non recedamus exemplo, ut 
scire possis quam facile praeceptione rhetoricae res 
simplex multiplici ratione tractetur ^ : 
57 " Sapiens nullum pro re publica periculum vitabit 
ideo quod saepe, cum pro re publica perire noluerit, 
necesse erit cum re publica pereat ; et quoniam omnia 
sunt commoda a patria accepta, nullum incommodum 
pro patria grave putandum est. 

" Ergo qui fugiunt id periculum quod pro re 
publica subeundum est stulte faciunt ; nam neque 
efFugere incommoda possunt et ingrati in civitatem 
reperiuntur. At qui patriae pericula suo periculo 
expetunt,^ hi sapient es putandi sunt, cum et eum 
quem debent honorem rei publicae reddunt, et pro 

* tractetur E : tractatur other 3ISS. Mx. 

2 expetunt P^B^CE : expetant M Mx : expectant B. 

" 4. xlv. 59-xlix. 62. 

* 2. XXX. 47 ff. 

" 4. XXX. 41. 

^ The tractatio (i^epyaaia) of the chria is freer than that 
of the epicheireme in 2. xix. 28 ff. This is our oldest extant 
illustration of a chria. Cf. the tractatio in Hermogenes, 
Progymn. 3 (ed. Rabe, pp. 6-8). 


AD IIKRENNIUM, IV. xuii. 56 -xliv. 57 

Figures of Diction) ; then a Comparison and an 
Kxample (about these I shall say more in their 
place) ; " XLIV. and finally the Conclusion (the 
essential details of which were discussed in Book 11/^ 
when I showed how one should bring arguments to a 
close ; in this Book ^ I have explained the nature of 
that figure of diction which is called Conclusion). A 
Refinement of this sort, which will consist of numerous 
figures of diction and of thought, can therefore be 
exceedingly ornate. 

The following, then, will illustrate a treatment in 
seven parts — to continue the use of the same theme 
for my example, in order that you may know how 
easily, by the precepts of rhetoric, a simple idea is 
developed in a multiple manner : ^ 

" The wise man will, on the republic's behalf, shun 
no peril ,^ because it may often happen that if a man 
has been loath to perish for his country it will be 
necessary for him to perish with her. Further, since 
it is from our country that we receive all our advan- 
tages, no disadvantage incurred on her behalf is to be 
regarded as severe./ 

" I say, then, that they who flee from the peril to be 
undergone on behalf of the republic act foolishly ,9 
for they cannot avoid the disadvantages, and are 
found guilty of ingratitude towards the state.^ 

" But on the other hand they who, with peril to 
themselves, confront the perils of the fatherland, are 
to be considered wise, since they render to their 
country the homage due her, and prefer to die for 

* The Theme expressed simply (xpeia). 
I The Reasons (amat). 

" Expression of the theme in a new form. 

* The Reasons. 


multis perire malunt quam cum multis. Etenim 
vehementer est iniquum vitam, quam a natura 
acceptam propter patriam conservaris, naturae cum 
cogat reddere, patriae cum roget non dare ; et cum 
possis cum summa virtute et honore pro patria inte- 
rire, malle per dedecus et ignaviam vivere ; et cum 
pro amicis et parentibus et ceteris necesariis adire 
periculum velis, pro re publica, in qua et haec et illud 
sanctissimum patriae nomen continetur, nolle in 
discrimen venire. 

Ita uti contemnendus est qui in navigio non 
navem quam se mavult incolumem, item vituperandus 
qui in rei publicae discrimine suae plus quam com- 
muni saluti consulit. Navi enim fracta multi in- 
columes evaserunt ; ex naufragio patriae salvus nemo 
potest enatare. 

" Quod mihi bene videtur Decius intellexisse, qui 
se devovisse dicitur et pro legionibus in hostes immi- 
sisse medios. Amisit vitam, at non perdidit. Re 
enim vilissima certam et parva maximam redemit. 
Vitam dedit, accepit patriam; amisit animam, 
potitus est gloriam, quae cum summa laude prodita 
vetustate cotidie magis enitescit. 

" Cf. Cicero, Phil. 10. 10. 20 : " But since through the days 
and nights every kind of fate surrounds us on all sides, it is 
not a man's part, certainly not a Roman's, to hesitate to give 
to his country the life he owes to nature." 

* The argument from the Contrary {in rod ivavriov). 

* The argument by Comparison (c/c Trapa^oXrjs). 

^ The national hero P. Decius Mus, in 295 B.C. at Sentinum 
in the war against the Samnites, flung himself upon the 
weapons of the enemj', and by this act of devotion brought 
victory to the Romans. The like act was attributed to his 

AD HERENNIUM, IV. xliv. 57 

many of their fellow citizens instead of with them. 
For it is extremely unjust to give back to nature, 
when she compels, the life you have received from 
nature, and not to give to your country, when she 
calls for it, the life you have preserved thanks to your 
country ; «^ and when you can die for fatherland with 
the greatest manliness and honour, to prefer to live in 
disgrace and cowardice ; and when you are willing to 
face danger for friends and parents and your other 
kin, to refuse to run the risk for the republic, which 
embraces all these and that most holy name of 
fatherland as well.'' 

He who in a voyage prefers his own to his vessel's 
security, deserves contempt. No less blameworthy 
is he who in a crisis of the republic consults his own in 
preference to the common safety. For from the 
wreck of a ship many of those on board escape un- 
harmed, but from the wreck of the fatherland no one 
can swim to safety.*^ 

It is this that, in my opinion, Decius <^ well under- 
stood, who is said to have devoted himself to death, 
and, in order to save his legions, to have plunged 
into the midst of the enemy. He gave up his life, 
but did not throw it away ; for at the cost of a very 
cheap good he redeemed a sure good, of a small good 
the greatest good. He gave his life, and received his 
country in exchange. He lost his life, and gained 
glory, which, transmitted with highest praise, shines 
more and more every day as time goes on.'^ 

fe-ther (who bore the same name) in a battle against the Latins 
in 340 B.C. This story was a favourite historical example 
(see Exemplification, 4. xlix. 62 below) of patriotism. 

' The argument from Example (eV TrapaheiyfjidTojy), and the 
testimony of antiquity {fj-aprvpia tcuv TraXaicov}. 



" Quodsi pro re publica decere accedere periculum 
et ratione demonstratum est et exemplo conpro- 
batum, ii sapientes sunt existimandi qui nullum pro 
salute patriae periculum vitant." 
58 In his igitur generibus expolitio versatur ; de qua 
producti sumus ut plura diceremus quod non modo 
cum causam dicimus adiuvat et exornat orationem, 
sed multo maxime per eam exercemur ad elocutionis 
facultatem. Quare conveniet extra causam in 
exercendo rationes adhibere expolitionis, in dicendo 
uti cum exornabimus argumentationem, qua de re 
diximus in libro secundo. 

XLV. Commoratio est cum in loco firmissimo quo ^ 
tota causa continetur manetur diutius et eodem 
saepius reditur. Hac uti maxime convenit, et id est 
oratoris boni maxime proprium, non enim datur 
auditori potestas animum de re firmissima demovendi. 
Huic exemplum satis idoneum subici non potuit, 
propterea quod hie locus non est a tota causa 
separatus sicuti membrum aliquod, sed tamquam 
sanguis perfusus est per totum corpus orationis. 

^ quo 3Ix ed. mai., all 3IS8. but H : aquo H : a quo 3Ix. 

" Conclusion (emAoyoj). 

* 2. xviii. 28, 2. xxx. 47 ff. ^ 

'^ iTTLfiov-q. Cf. also hiaTpi^rj, as, for example, in Aristotle, 
Rhet. 3. 17 (14l'8 a). 

^ Anon., Schemata Dianoeas, in Halm, p. 72. 7, cites in 
illustration of this figure the famous beginning ojf Cicero's 
first oration against Catiline : " How long, in heaven's name, 
Catiline, will you abuse our patience ? How much longer yet 
will that madness of yours make mock of us ? To what limit 
will your unbridled audacity vaunt itself? " 

* The basis is the common comparison of a discourse with 
the human body. Cf. ahpov (4. viii. 11 above), la^vo'v (4. x. 


AD IIKRENNIUM, IV. xliv. 57-xLv. 58 

" But if reason has shown and illustration con- 
firmed that it is fitting to confront danger in defence 
of the republic, they are to be esteemed wise who 
do not shrink from any peril when the security of 
the fatherland is at stake." ^ 
58 It is of these types, then, that Refining consists. 
I have been led to discuss it at rather great length 
because it not only gives force and distinction to the 
speech when we plead a cause, but it is by far our 
most important means of training for skill in style. 
It will be advantageous therefore to practise the 
principles of Refining in exercises divorced from a 
real cause, and in actual pleading to put them to use 
in the Embellishment of an argument, which I 
discussed in Book II.* 

XLV. Dwelling on the Point '^ occurs when one 
remains rather long upon, and often returns to, the 
strongest topic on which the whole cause rests. Its 
use is particularly advantageous, and is especially 
characteristic of the good orator, for no opportunity is 
given the hearer to remove his attention from this 
strongest topic. I have been unable to subjoin a 
quite appropriate example*^ of the figure, because 
this topic is not isolated from the whole cause like 
some limb, but like blood ^ is spread through the whole 
body of the discourse. 

14 above), and esp. sufflata (4. x. 15 above), and dissolutum 
{sine nervis et articulis) and exile (4. xi. 16 above); Cicero, 
Bruttis 9. 36 and 16. 64, and Orator 23. 76; Horace, Serm. 
2. 1. 2; in Plato, Phaedrus 264 C, Socrates' principle that 
every discourse is constructed like a living creature, with a 
body of its own and a head and feet, and Aristotle, Poet., 
ch. 7 (1450 b). See also La Rue Van Hook, The Metaphorical 
Terminology of Greek Rhetoric and Literary Criticism, Chicago 
diss., 1905, pp. 18 fif. 


Contentio est per quam contraria referentur. Ea 
est in verborum exornationibus, ut ante docuimus, 
huiusmodi : " Inimicis te placabilem, amicis inexora- 
bilem praebes." In sententiarum, huiusmodi : " Vos 
huius incommodis lugetis, iste rei publicae calamitate 
laetatur. Vos vestris fortunis diffiditis, iste solus suis 
eo magis confidit." Inter haec duo contentionum 
genera hoc interest : illud ex verbis celeriter relatis 
constat; hie sententiae contrariae ex conparatione 
referantur oportet. 
59 Similitudo est oratio traducens ad rem quampiam 
aliquid ex re dispari simile. Ea sumitur aut ornandi 
causa aut probandi aut apertius dicendi aut ante 
oculos ponendi. Et quomodo quattuor de causis 
sumitur, item quattuor modis dicitur : per contrarium, 
per negationem, per conlationem, per brevitatem. 
Ad unam quamque sumendae causam similitudinis 
adcommodabimus singulos modos pronuntiandi. 

XLVI. Ornandi causa sumitur per contrarium sic : 
*' Non enim, quemadmodum in palaestra qui taedas 
candentes accipit celerior est in cursu continuo quam 
ille qui tradit, item melior imperator novus qui accipit 
exercitum quam ille qui decedit ; propterea quod 
defatigatus cursor integro facem, hie peritus impera- 
tor imperito exercitum tradit." Hoc sine simili satis 

" 4. XV. 21 . The ancient rhetoricians differed widely, some 
regarding Antithesis as a figure of diction, others as a figure 
of thought, and still others as belonging to both classes ; see 
Cousin, Etudes sur Quintilien, 2. 46-8. 

* TTapa^oXrj. This figure and the next two form a common 
triad in post-Aristotelian rhetoric. In Cicero, De Inv. 
1. XXX. 49, they are divisions of comparabile (= ofioioycjis). 
Cf. Metaphor and Allegory, 4. xxxiv. 45, 46 above, among 

AD HERENNIUM, IV. xlv. sS-xlvf. 59 

Throiifrh Antitliesis contraries will meet. As I 
have explained above, it l^elongs either amon^ the 
fif^ures of diction," as in the following exannple : " You 
show yourself conciliatory to your enemies, inexorable 
to your friends " ; or amonj^ the fi<^ures of tiiou<rht. 
as in the followinrj example : " While you deplore the 
troubles besetting him, this knave rejoices in the 
ruin of the state. While you despair of your fortunes, 
this knave alone grows all the more confident in his 
own." Between these two kinds of Antithesis there 
is this difference : the first consists in a rapid opposi- 
tion of words ; in the other opposing thoughts ought 
to meet in a comparison. 

Comparison * is a manner of speech that carries 
over an element of Hkeness from one thing to a 
different thing. This is used to embellish or prove or 
clarify or vivify. Furthermore, corresponding to these 
four aims, it has four forms of presentation : Contrast, 
Negation. Detailed Parallel, Abridged Comparison. 
To each single aim in the use of Comparison we shall 
adapt the corresponding form of presentation. 

XLVI. In the form of a contrast, in order to em- 
bellish, Comparison is used as follows : " Unlike what 
happens in the palaestra, where he who receives the 
flaming torch is swifter in the relay race than he who 
hands it on, the new general who receives command 
of an army is not superior to the general who retires 
from its command. For in the one case it is an 
exhausted runner who hands the torch to a fresh 
athlete, whereas in this it is an experienced com- 
mander who hands over the army to an inexperi- 
enced." This could have been expressed quite 

the figures of diction. Comparisons are invented, but drawn 
from real life; see note on Exemplification, 4. xlix. 62 below. 


plane et perspicue et probabiliter did potuit, hoc 
modo: " Dicitur minus bonos imperatores a melio- 
ribus exercitus accipere solere "; sed ornandi causa 
simile sumptum est, ut orationi quaedam dignitas 
conparetur. Dictum autem est per contrariumi. 
Nam tum similitude sumitur per contrarium cum ei 
rei quam nos probamus aliquam rem negamus esse 

Per negationem dicetur probandi causa hoc modo : 
" Neque equus indomitus, quamvis bene natura 
conpositus sit, idoneus potest esse ad eas utilitates 
quae desiderantur ab equo ; neque homo indoctus, 
quamvis sit ingeniosus, ad virtutem potest pervenire." 
Hoc probabilius factum est quod magis est veri simile 
non posse virtutem sine doctrina conparari, quoniam 
ne ^ equus quidem indomitus idoneus possit esse. 
Ergo sumptum est probandi causa, dictum autem per 
negationem ; id enim perspicuum est de primo 
similitudinis verbo. 
60 XLVII. Sumetur et apertius dicendi causa simile — 
dicitur per brevitatem — hoc modo: " In amicitia 
gerenda, sicut in certamine currendi, non ita convenit 
exerceri ut quoad necesse sit venire possis, sed ut 
productus studio et viribus ultra facile procurras." 
Nam hoc simile est ut apertius intellegatur mala 
ratione facere qui reprehendant eos qui, verbi causa, 

^ ne Md : quidem ne 6 I Mx. 

" Cf. Xenophon, Memorabilia 4. 1. 3 : " Such as believed 
themselves good by nature and looked down upon learning, 
Socrates would teach that the greater the natural endow- 
ments, the greater is the need of education, pointing out that 
spirited and impetuous thoroughbreds, if they are tamed 


AD IlEllENNIUM, IV. xiai. 59-MAii. 60 

simply, clearly, and plausibly without the Com- 
parison, as follows: " ITiey say that usually it is 
inferior generals who take over the command of 
armies from superior." But the Comparison is used 
for embellishment, so as to secure a certain distinction 
for the style. It is moreover presented in the form of 
a contrast. For a Comparison in the form of a con- 
trast is used when we deny that something else is 
like the thing we are asserting to be true. 

In the form of a negation and for the purpose of 
proof, Comparison will be used as follows : " Neither 
can an untrained horse, however well-built by nature, 
be fit for the services desired of a horse, nor can an 
uncultivated man, however well-endowed by nature, 
attain to virtue." « This idea has been rendered 
more plausible, for it becomes easier to believe that 
virtue cannot be secured without culture, when we 
see that not even a horse can be serviceable if 
untrained. Thus the Comparison is used for the 
purpose of proof, and moreover is presented in the 
form of a negation, as is clear from the first word 
of the Comparison. 
60 XLVII. A Comparison will be used also for greater 
clarity — the presentation being in abridged form — as 
follows : "In maintaining a friendship, as in a foot- 
race, you must train yourself not only so that you 
succeed in running as far as is required, but so that, 
extending yourself by will and sinew, you easily run 
beyond that point." Indeed this Comparison serves 
to make more obvious the poor reasoning evinced by 
the detractors of those who, for example, are 

when young, become useful and excellent horses, but if not 
broken in, become intractable and worthless;" also Quin- 
tilian, 5. 11. 24 f. 



post mortem amici liberos eius custodiant ; propterea 
quod in cursore tantum velocitatis esse oporteat ut 
efferatur ultra finem, in amico tantum benivolentiae 
ut ultra quam quod amicus sentire possit procurrat 
amicitiae studio. Dictum autem simile est per brevi- 
tatem, non enim ita ut in ceteris rebus res ab re 
separata est, sed utraeque res coniuncte et confuse 

Ante oculos ponendi negotii causa sumetur simili- 
tudo — dicetur per conlationem — sic: " Uti citha- 
roedus cum prodierit optime vestitus, palla inaurata 
indutus/ cum chlamyde purpurea variis coloribus 
intexta, et cum corona aurea magnis fulgentibus 
gemmis inluminata, citharam tenens exornatissimam 
auro et ebore distinctam, ipse praeterea forma et 
specie sit et statura adposita ad dignitatem, si, cum 
magnam populo commorit iis rebus expectationem, 
repente, silentio facto, vocem mittat acerbissimam 
cum turpissimo corporis motu, quo melius ornatus et 
magis fuerit expectatus, eo magis derisus et con- 
temptus eicitur ; item si quis in excelso loco et in 
magnis ac locupletibus copiis conlocatus fortunae 
muneribus et naturae commodis omnibus abundabit, 
si virtutis et artium quae virtutis magistrae sunt 
egebit, quo magis ceteris rebus erit copiosus et in- 
lustris et expectatus, eo vehementius derisus et 
contemptus ex omni conventu bonorum eicietur." 
Hoc simile exornatione utriusque rei, alterius inertiae 
^ iiidutus P^CE : induitur M : inductus Mx. 

" See note on Exemplification, 4. xlix. 62 below. 

^ The story of Evangelus of Tarentum at the Pythian 
games ; see Lucian, Adv. Indoctum 8-10. C/. also Socrates in 
Xenophon, Memorabilia 1. 7. 2, on the bad flute-player con- 
sidered in connection with imposture and the life of virtue. 

AD HKllENNIUM, IV. xlvii. 6o 

protectors of a friend's children after his death ; for a 
runner ought to have enou^rh sjieed to carry him 
beyond the ^oal, and a friend so much goodwill that 
in the devotion of friendship he may reach even 
beyond what his friend is capable of perceiving. 
The Comparison is moreover presented in abridged 
form, for one term is not detached from the other as 
in the other forms, but the two are conjoined and 
intermingled in the presentation. 

A Comparison will be used for vividness, and be set 
forth in the form of a detailed parallel," as follows : 
" Let us imagine a player on the lyre ^ who has 
presented himself on the stage, magnificently garbed, 
clothed in a gold-embroidered robe, with purple 
mantle interlaced in various colours, wearing a golden 
crown illumined with large gleaming jewels, and 
holding a lyre covered with golden ornaments and set 
off with ivory. Further, he has a personal beauty, 
presence, and stature that impose dignity. If, when 
by these means he has roused a great expectation in 
the public, he should in the silence he has created 
suddenly give utterance to a rasping voice, and this 
should be accompanied by a repulsive gesture, he is 
the more forcibly thrust off in derision and scorn, the 
richer his adornment and the higher the hopes he has 
raised. In the same way, a man of high station, 
endowed with great and opulent resources, and 
abounding in all the gifts of fortune and the emolu- 
ments of nature, if he yet lacks virtue and the arts 
that teach virtue, will so much the more forcibly in 
derision and scorn be cast from all association with 
good men, the richer he is in the other advantages, the 
greater his distinction, and the higher the hopes he 
has raised." This Comparison, by embellishing both 



alterius stultitiae simili ratione conlata, sub aspectus 
omnium rem subiecit. Dictum autem est per conla- 
tionem, propterea quod proposita similitudine paria 
sunt omnia relata. 

61 XLVIII. In similibus observare oportet diligenter 
ut, cum rem adferamus similem cuius rei causa 
similitudinem adtulerimus, verba ad similitudinem 
habeamus adcommodata. Id est huiusmodi : " Ita ut 
hirundines aestivo tempore praesto sunt, frigore 
pulsae recedunt, ..." Ex eadem similitudine nunc 
per translation em verba sumimus : " item falsi amici 
sereno vitae tempore praesto sunt; simul atque 
hiemem fortunae viderunt, devolant omnes." Sed 
inventio similium facilis erit si quis sibi omnes res, 
animantes et inanimas, mutas et eloquentes, feras et 
mansuetas, terrestres, caelestes, maritimas, artificio, 
casu, natura conparatas, usitatas atque inusitatas, 
frequenter ponere ante oculos poterit, et ex his 
aliquam venari similitudinem quae aut ornare aut 
docere aut apertiorem rem facere aut ponere ante 
oculos possit. Non enim res tota totae rei necesse est 
similis sit, sed id ipsum quod conferetur similitudinem 
habeat oportet. 

62 XLIX. Exemplum est alicuius facti aut dicti 
praeteriti cum certi auctoris nomine propositio. Id 

" TTapaSciyixa. Examples are drawn from history. 
Aristotle, Ehet. 2. 20 (1393 a flf.), divides Examples into this 
type and also that which is invented (but drawn from real 
life), and the latter again into the Comparison (see 4. xlv. 
59 above) and the Fable. Cf. EheL ad Alex., oh. 8 (1429 a- 
1430 a), and Quintilian, 5. 11. 1 ff. and 8. 3. 72 S. Examples 
are recommended especially in deliberative speaking, 3. v. 9 
above; cf. Isocrates, Ad Demonicum 34, Aristotle, Bhet. 

1. 9 (1368 a) and 3. 17 (1418 a). Both embellishment {cf. 

2. xxix. 46 above) and proof [cf. 3. iii. 4 above) are here 


AD HERENNIUM, IV. xiaii. 6o-\li\. 62 

terms, bringing into relation by a nu-thod of parallel 
description the one man's ineptitude and the other's 
lack of cultivation, has set the subject vividly before 
the eyes of all. Moreover the Comparison is pre- 
sented in the form of a detailed parallel because, 
once the similitude has been set up, all like elements 
are related. 

61 XL\ III. In Comparisons we must carefully see to 
it that when we present the corresponding idea for 
the sake of which we have introduced the figure we 
use words suited to the likeness. The following is an 
example : " Just as the swallows are with us in 
summer time, and when driven by the frost retire, 
..." Keeping the same comparison, and using 
Metaphor, we now say : "so false friends are with us in 
a peaceful season of our life, and as soon as they have 
seen the winter of our fortune, they fly awav, one and 
all." But the invention of Comparisons will be easy 
if one can frequently set before one's eyes everything 
animate and inanimate, mute and articulate, wild 
and tame, of the earth, sky, and sea, wrought by art, 
chance, or nature, ordinary or unusual, and can 
amongst these hunt out some likeness which is 
capable of embellishing or proving or clarifying or 
vivifying. The resemblance between the two things 
need not apply throughout, but must hold on the 
precise point of comparison. 

62 XLIX. Exemplification " is the citing of something 
done or said in the past, along with the definite 
naming of the doer or author. It is used with the 

included among the functions of Example by our author. 
In 4. iii. 5 above the function is declared to be demonstratio, 
not confirmatio or testificatio ; see note. For facti et dicti 
in the definition c/. Quintilian's recommendation in 12. 2. 29 



sumitur isdem de causis quibus similitude. Ptem 
ornatiorem facit cum nullius rei nisi dignitatis causa 
sumitur ; apertiorem, cum id quod sit obscurius magis 
dilucidum reddit ; probabiliorem, cum magis veri 
similem facit ; ante oculos ponit, cum exprimit omnia 
perspicue ut res prope dicam manu temptari possit. 
Unius cuiusque generis singula subiecissemus exem- 
pla, nisi et exemplum quod genus esset ^ in expoli- 
tione demonstrassemus et causas sumendi in similitu- 
dine aperuissemus. Quare noluimus neque pauca 
quominus intellegeretur, neque re intellecta plura 

Imago est formae cum forma cum quadam similitu- 
dine conlatio. Haec sumitur aut laudis aut vitupera- 
tionis causa. Laudis causa, sic : " Inibat in proelium 
corpore tauri validissimi, impetu leonis acerrimi 
simili." Vituperationis, ut in odium adducat, hoc 
modo: " Iste qui cotidie per forum medium tamquam 
1 esset 31 : est E Mx. 

that the speaker know and ponder the noblest things " said 
and done " in the past, and the title of Valerius Maximus' 
work, Factoruni et Dictorum Memorabiliuvi Libri IX ; also 
Thucydides' division of his material into Aoyoi and ipya. 
See Karl Alewell, tjber das rhetorische irapaBeiy^a, Kiel diss,, 
Leipzig, 1913, especially pp. 18 ff. Marivis Plotins (Keil, 
Gramm. Lat. 6. 469) and Apsines, Ars Rhet. 8 (Spengel- 
Hammer 1 [2]. 281. 10 fi".) treat four methods of drawing 
examples : from the like, the contrary, the greater, the less ; 
c/. 4. xlv. 59 above. 


AD HERENNIUM, IV. \u\. 62 

same motives as a Comparison. It rciulers a thought 
more brilliant when used for no other purpose than 
beauty ; clearer, when throwing more light upon 
what was somewhat obscure ; more plausible, when 
giving the thought greater verisimilitude ; more 
vivid, when expressing everything so lucidly that the 
matter can, 1 may almost say, be touched by the 
hand. I would have added individual specimens of 
each type had I not under Refining demonstrated 
the nature of Exemplification,'^ and, under Com- 
parison, made clear the motives for its use.** There- 
fore I have been unwilling to make my discussion of 
it either too brief for it to be understood, or too long 
once it is understood. 

Simile '^ is the comparison of one figure with 
another, implying a certain resemblance between 
them. This is used either for praise or censure. For 
praise, as follows : " He entered the combat in body 
like the strongest bull, in impetuosity like the 
fiercest lion." ^ For censure, so as to excite hatred, 
as follows : " That wretch who daily glides through 

" 4. xliv. 57 above. 

* 4. xlv. 59 above. 

' iLKwv. Puttenham's " Resemblance by Iraagene or 
Pourtrait." C/. Aristotle, RhfJ. 3. 4 (1406 b ff.). In post- 
Aristotelian rhetoric this appears as a special figure, separate 
from similitudo (Comparison), 4. xlv. 59 above, to which it is 
yet closely akin; Miniicianus, iJe Epich. 2 (Spengel-Hammer 
1 [2]. 342) attributes greater vividness to (Ikwv. Quintilian, 
5. 11. 24, advises that this kind of comparison sliouid be used 
less often than the kind which helps to prove our point. Cf. 
Cicero, De Jnv. 1. xxx. 49. Poh'bius Sard. (Spengel 3. 108) 
gives nine figures related to (Ikwv. 

<* Cf. Aristotle, Bhet. 3. 4 (1406 b) : " When Homer [cf. //. 
20. 164] says of Achilles, ' Like a lion he rushed to meet his 
foe,' that is (Iko}v" 



iubatus draco serpit dentibus adiincis, aspectu 
venenato, spiritu rabido, circum inspectans hue et 
illuc si quern reperiat eui aliquid mali faueibus 
adfiare, ore adtingere, dentibus insecare, lingua 
aspergere possit." Ut in invidiam adducat, hoc 
modo: " Iste qui divitias suas iactat sicut Gallus e 
Phrygia aut hariolus quispiam, depressus et oneratus 
iauro, clamat et delirat." In contemptionem, sic: 
Iste qui tamquam coclea abscondens retentat sese 
tacitus, cum domo totus ut comedatur ^ aufertur." 
63 Effictio est cum exprimitur atque effingitur verbis 
corporis cuiuspiam forma quoad satis sit ad intelle- 
gendum, hoc modo: " Hunc, indices, dico, rubrum, 
brevem, incurvum, canum, subcrispum, caesium, cui 
sane magna est in mento cicatrix, si quo modo potest 
vobis in memoriam redire." Habet haec exornatio 
cum utilitatem si quem velis demonstrare, turn 
venustatem si breviter et dilucide facta est. 

L. Notatio est cum alicuius natura certis descri- 
bitur signis, quae, sicuti notae quae, naturae sunt 

^ totus ut comedatur E Mx ed. inai. : ut tutus comeditur 
M : totus ut comeditur Mx. 

" ^doKavos 6(f)daXfi6s. For the example cf. Demosthenes, 
Adv. Aristogeit. 1. 52 : " But he moves through the market- 
place like a snake or a scorpion with sting raised, darting here 
and there, looking about for someone upon whom to bring 
down misfortune or calumny or evil of some kind." 

* The Galli derived their name from a river Gallus in 
Phrygia; who drank of it went mad (Ovid, Fasti 4. 366). 
The worship of the Phrygian Mother Goddess was charac- 
terized by extreme wildness. 

•^ XapaKTrjpLOfxos, favoured in comedy; e.g., Terence, Hecyra 
439-41 : " Well, I'll describe him so that you will recognize 
him — he is tall, ruddy, curly-headed, heavy-set, blear-eyed, 
and has a face like a corpse." Quintilian, 9. 3. 99, excludes 
this from the figures. 


AD HKUKNMUM, 1\'. max. 62-L. 63 

the middle of the loriim like a crested serpent, with 
curved fangs, j)oisonoiis glance," and fierce panting, 
looking about him on this side and that for some one 
to blast with venom from his throat — to smear it 
with his lips, to drive it in with his teeth, to spatter it 
with his tongue." To excite envy, as follows: 
" That creature who flaunts his riches, loaded and 
weighed down with gold, shouts and raves like a 
Phrygian eunuch-priest of Cybele * or like a sooth- 
sayer." To excite contempt, as follows: "That 
creature, who like a snail silently hides and keeps 
himself in his shell, is carried off', he and his house, to 
be swallowed whole." 
63 Portrayal «^ consists in representing and depicting 
in words clearly enough for recognition the bodily 
foiTn of some person, as follows: " I mean him, men 
of the jury, the ruddy, short, bent man, with white 
and rather curly hair, blue-grey eyes, and a huge 
scar on his chin, if perhaps you can recall him to 
memory." This figure is not only serviceable, if you 
should wish to designate some person, but also 
graceful, if fashioned with brevity and clarity. 

L. Character Delineation ^ consists in describing a 
person's character by the definite signs which, like 
distinctive marks, are attributes of that character ; 

" rjdoTToiia. Morum ac vitae imiiatio in Cicero, De Oratore 
3. 53. 204. Cf. Theophrastus, Characters, especially xxni, 
"Pretentiousness." Theophrastus developed the type; 
Roman comedy favoured it {cf. the narratives in Terence, 
and, for the theme, the Miles Gloriosus of Plautus). Of the 
orators Lysias employs Ethopoeia with special skill. rjdoTroUa 
may be connected with the simple style (see 4. x. 14 above), 
although the example of the figure shows an artificial elegance 
which sermo rarely had. Quintilian, 9. 3. 99, excludes 
-qdoTTOLia from the figures. 



adtributa; ut si velis non divitem, sed ostentatorem 
pecuniosi describere, " Iste," inquies, " iudices, qui se 
did divitem putat ^ esse praeclarum, primum nunc 
videte quo vultu nos intueatur. Nonne vobis videtur 
dicere : * Darem vobis libenter quae clientibus ^ 
dant, si mihi molesti non essetis ? ' Cum vero 
sinistra mentum sublevavit, existimat se gemmae 
nitore et auri splendore aspectus omnium prae- 
stringere. Cum puerum respicit hunc unum, quem 
ego novi — vos non arbitror — alio nomine appellat, 
deinde alio atque alio. ' At eho tu,' inquit, ' veni, 
Sannio, ne quid isti ^ barbari * turbent,' ut ignoti qui 
audient unum putent seligi de multis. Ei dicit in 
aurem aut ut domi lectuli sternantur, aut ab avunculo 
rogetur Aethiops qui ad balneas veniat, aut asturconi 
locus ante ostium suum detur, aut aliquod fragile 
falsae choragium gloriae conparetur. Deinde ex- 
clamat, ut omnes audiant : ' Videto ut diligenter 
numeretur, si potest, ante noctem.' Puer, qui iam 
bene eri naturam norit, ' Tu illo plures mittas 
oportet.' inquit, ' si hodie vis transnumerari.' 

1 putat CE : putabat HPBYi Mx. 

2 lac. ; darem vobis libenter quae clientibus s>jigg. Mx. 

3 isti B'^E : is M Mx : hi C. 

* barbari BCHE : barbaris P Mx : barbaros H. 

" This gesture, used by Palaestrio in Plautus, 3Iiles 
Gloriosus 209, is interpreted by Periplecomenus as indicating 
thought. CJ. the statue of Polyhymnia, No. 195 in A. 
Baumeister, Bilder aus dem griech. und rom. Altertum, Munich, 

^ Cf., in Athenaeus, 6. 230, the bragging beggar who owned 
in all only a drachm's weight of silver, and would shout to his 
one and only slave — but using names as many as the sands in 
number : " Boy ! Strombichides ! Don't set before us the 
silver we use in winter, but that which we use in summer ! " 



for example, if you should wish to describe a man who 
is not actually rich iiut parades as a moneyed man, 
you would say : " That person there, men of the jury, 
who thinks it adnurable that he is called rich, see now 
first with what an air he surveys us. Does he not 
seem to you to be saying: 'I'd gladly give you 
clients' doles, if you didn't try my patience! ' Yes, 
once he has propped his chin on his left hand ^ he 
thinks that he dazzles the eyes of all with the gleam 
of his jewelr}' and the glitter of his gold. When he 
turns to his slave boy here, his only one ^ — I know 
him, and you do not, I think — he calls him now by 
one name, now by another, and now by a third : ' Ho 
there, you, Sannio,' says he, ' come here, see that 
these barbarians ^ don't turn things upside down,* 
so that unknowing hearers may think he is selecting 
one slave from among many. Whispering in the 
boy's ear he tells him either to arrange the dining- 
couches at home, or to ask his uncle for an Ethiop ^ 
to attend him to the baths, or to station the Asturian 
thoroughbred before his front door, or to make ready 
some other flimsy stage property which should set 
off his vainglor}'. Then he shouts, that all may 
hear : ' See to it that the money is carefully counted 
before nightfall,^ if possible/' The boy, by this 
time well knowing his master's character, says : 
' You had better send more slaves over there if you 
want the counting done today.' * Go then,' he 

' Unlike Sannio, who was doubtless home-born. 

" In Theophrastus, Characters 21. 4, the Man of Petty 
Ambition " sees to it that his attendant shall be an Ethiop.'' 

• Cf. Calpurnius Siculus 3. 63 f. : " Let him only vie in 
feeding kids in number equal to my bulls as these are* counted 
at nightfall." 


' Age,' inquit, ' due tecum Libanum et Sosiam.' 

* Sane.' 

" Deinde casu veniunt hospites homini, quos iste 
dum splendide peregrinatur invitarat.^ Ex ea re homo 
hercule sane conturbatur, sed tamen a vitio naturae 
non recedit. * Bene,' inquit, ' facitis cum venitis, 
sed rectius fecissetis si ad me domum recta abissetis.' 
' Id fecissemus,' inquiunt illi, ' si domum novissemus.' 

* At istud quidem facile fuit undelibet invenire. 
Verum ite mecum.' 

" Sequuntur illi. Sermo interea huius consumitur 
omnis in ostentatione : quaerit in agris frumenta 
cuiusmodi sint ; negat se, quia villae incensae sint, 
accedere posse, nee aedificare etiamnunc audere, 
'tametsi in Tusculano quidem coepi insanire et in 
isdem fundamentis aedificare.' 
64 LI. " Dum haec loquitur, venit in aedes quasdam 
in quibus sodalicium erat eodem die futurum ; quo iste 
pro notitia domini aedium ^ ingreditur ^ cum hospiti- 
bus. ' Hie,' inquit, ' habito.' Perspicit argentum 
quod erat expositum, visit triclinium stratum, probat. 
Accedit servulus; dicit homini clare dominum iam 
venturum, si velit exire. * Itane ? ' inquit. ' Eamus, 
hospites ; frater venit ex Falerno ; ego illi obviam 
pergam; vos hue decima venitote.' Hospites 
discedunt. Iste se raptim domum suam conicit ; illi 
decima, quo iusserat, veniunt. Quaerunt hunc, 

^ invitarat Halm : invitat b I Mx : M omits. 

2 domini edium E : domnediam M : domnaedi iam Mx, 

3 ingreditur P^B^CE : in integro HPUB : it intro Mx. 


AD IIKRENNIUM, IV. r.. f>r, u. ^,4 

answers, ' take with you Libanus and Sosia.' * Very 
good, sir.' 

" Then by chance come guests, whom the rascal had 
invited while travelling abroad in splendour. By 
this event the man is, you may be sure, quite em- 
barrassed, but he still does not desist from his natural 
fault. * You do well,' says he, ' to come, but you 
would have done better to go straight to me at my 
house.' ' That we would have done,' say they, ' had 
we known your house.' ' But surely it was easy to 
find that out from anyone. Still, come with me.' 

" They follow. In the meanwhile all his conversa- 
tion is spent in boasting. He asks : * How are the 
crops in the fields ? ' He says that because his 
villas have been burnt, he cannot go to them, and does 
not yet dare rebuild them, ' although on my Tusculan 
estate, to be sure, I have commenced an insane 
undertaking — to build on the same foundations.' 
64 LI. " While saying this he comes to a certain 
house in which a banqueting club was to meet on that 
very day. As if in fact he knew the owner, the 
rascal now enters the house with his guests. ' Here,' 
says he, * is where I live.' He scrutinizes the silver 
which had been laid out, inspects the dining-couch 
which had been spread, and indicates his approval. A 
little slave boy comes up. He says aloud to the man 
that the master is about to arrive ; would he wish to 
leave ? ' Indeed ? ' says the man. ' Let us be off, my 
friends. My brother has arrived from the Falernian 
country. I shall go to meet him. Do come here at four 
o'clock.' ^ The guests depart. The rascal rushes 
posthaste to his own home. They, as he had bidden, 
come at four o'clock. They ask for him, discover 

" The dinner hour; cf. Martial, Epigr. 4. 8. 7, 7. 51. 11. 


reperiunt domus cuia sit, in diversorium derisi con- 
ferunt sese. 

" Vident hominem postero die ^ ; narrant, expostu- 
lant, accusant. Ait iste eos similitudine loci deceptos 
angiporto toto deerrasse ; se ^ contra valetudinem 
suam ad noctem multam expectasse. Sannioni puero 
negotium dederat ut vasa, vestimenta, pueros roga- 
ret ; servulus non inurbanus satis strenue et concinne 
conpararat.^ Iste hospites domum deducit; ait se 
aedes maximas cuidam amico ad nuptias commodasse. 
Nuntiat puer argentum repeti, pertimuerat enim qui 
commodarat. * Apage te,' inquit, ' aedes commo- 
davi, familiam dedi ; argentum quoque vult ? Tametsi 
hospites habeo, tamen utatur licet ; nos Samiis 

" Quid ego quae deinde efficiat narrem? Eius- 
modi est hominis natura ut quae singulis diebus 
efficiat gloria atque ostentatione ea vix annuo sermone 
enarrare possim." 
65 Huiusmodi notationes, quae describunt quod 
consentaneum sit unius cuiusque naturae, vehe- 
menter habent magnam delectationem, totam enim 
naturam cuiuspiam ponunt ante oculos, aut gloriosi, 
ut nos exempli causa coeperamus, aut invidi aut 

^ postero die P-U : posteri die PBMx : postridie H : 
postera die CE. 

2 se ^ : other MSS. Mx omit. 

2 conpararat Kayser : conpararet C : conparat HP Mx, 
comparat B HE. 

« Cf. the situation in Plautus, Pseud. 960-2. 

* Cf. Plautus, Asin. 444 fF. : [Leonida :] " The cups I lent 
Philodamus — has he brought them back ? " [Libanus :] 
" Not yet." " Oh ? He hasn't ? Give thmgs away, if 
you wish — accommodate a friend with them." 


AD m-.UKNNIUM, IV. i.i. 64 65 

wliose house it is, and, Iioodwinked, betake them- 
selves to an inn. 

" They see the man the next day, tell him their 
story, make their complaint and their accusation. He 
assures them that they had been deceived by the 
similarity of the place and had missed their way by a 
whole street;" he had, to the prejudice of his health, 
waited for them late into the night. To his boy 
Sannio he had given the job of borrowing vessels, 
coverings, and servants, and the little slave, not want- 
ing in cleverness, had quite energetically and artfully 
procured all these. The rascal leads his guests to his 
home. He says he has accommodated one of his 
friends with the loan of his largest mansion for a 
wedding. The boy reports that the silver is being 
recalled ; for the lender had misgivings. ' Off with 
you,' says our man, * I have obliged him with a 
mansion, I have given him my household of slaves. 
Does he want the silver,^ too? And yet, although 
I have guests, let him use it; we shall be content 
with S ami an.' «^ 

" Whv should I tell what he next brings to pass? 
Such is the character of the man that what he effects 
by empty boasting and showing-off in one day I 
could hardly recount if I talked a whole year." 

Character Delineations of this kind w hich describe 
the qualities proper to each man's nature carry very 
great charm, for they set before our eyes a person's 
whole character, of the boastful man, as I undertook 
to illustrate, or the envious or pompous man, or the 

* In this ware metal shapes were imitated. By no means 
the humblest ware, Samian yet represents the inferiority of 
earthen vessels as against those of metal. See F. 0. Waage, 
Annuity 11 (1937). 46-55. 



tumidi aut avari, ambitiosi, amatoris, luxuriosi, furis, 
quadruplatoris ; denique cuiusvis studium protrahi 
potest in medium tali notatione. 

LII. Sermocinatio est cum alicui personae sermo 
adtribuitur et is exponitur cum ratione dignitatis, 
hoc pacto : " Cum militibus urbs redundaret et 
omnes timore oppressi domi continerentur, venit 
iste cum sago, gladio succinctus, tenens iaculum ; 
III adulescentes hominem simili ornatu subsequuntur. 
Inrupit in aedes subito, deinde magna voce : ' Ubi est 
iste beatus,' inquit, ' aedium dominus ? Quin mihi 
praesto fuit ? Quid tacetis ? ' Hie alii omnes stupidi 
timore obmutuerunt. Uxor illius infelicissimi cum 
maximo fletu ad istius pedes abiecit sese. ' Per te,' 
inquit, ' ea quae tibi dulcissima sunt in vita, miserere 
nostri, noli extinguere extinctos, fer mansuete for- 
tunam; nos quoque fuimus beati ; nosce te esse 
hominem/ * Quin ilium mihi datis ac vos auribus 
meis opplorare desinitis ? Non abibit.' 

Illi nuntiatur interea venisse istum et clamore 
maximo mortem minari. Quod simul ut audivit, 

" SiaAoyoi. Quintilian, 9. 2. 29 fif., joins this figure and 
Personification (next below) as one. Cf. 4. xliii. 55 above. 

* Cf. Plautus, Rud. 315: "Who had three men with him, 
wearing cloaks and swords {chlamydatos cum machaeris).'" 

'^ The style is Greek. C/., for example, Euripides, Androm. 
892-3 : 77pds ae rcovSe yovvaTcov otKTeipov rjfxds (" I implore 
you by these knees, take pity on me "), and Medea 324; 
Sophocles, Oed. Col. 250, and Philoct. 468. 

<* Cf. Euripides, Ale. 1065 : " Take me not captive who am 
already captive " ; Sophocles, Antig. 1030 : " What feat is it 
to slay the slain anew ? " ; Ovid, Epist. ex Ponto 4. 16. 51 : 
" What pleasure do you find. Malice, in driving the steel into 
limbs already dead ? " 

* Cf. Isocrates, Ad Deinonicum 21 : " You will achieve 
self-control if, when in trouble, you regard the misfortunes of 


AD HKRFA'NIUM, IV. li. 65-1,11. 65 

miser, the climber, the lover, tlie voluptuary, the 
thief, the public informer — in short, by such delinea- 
tion any one's ruling passion can be brought into the 

LII. Dialogue ° consists in assigning to some 
person language which as set forth conforms with his 
character, for example : " When the city overflowed 
with soldiers, and all the citizens, oppressed by 
fear, kept themselves at home, this fellow ap- 
peared in military cloak, armed with a sword, in his 
hand a javelin. Three young men, equipped like 
him, follow behind.* Suddenly he bursts into the 
house, and in a loud voice shouts : ' Where is he, the 
wealthy owner of this house ? Why has he not 
appeared before me ? Why are you silent ? ' At 
this all are struck dumb with terror. The wife of the 
unhappy man, bursting into tears, throws herself at 
this creature's feet, and says : ' By all that is dearest 
to you in life, I pray you, pity us.<^ Destroy not 
anew them that are destroyed.^ Use your good 
fortune kindly. We too have enjoyed good fortune. 
Remember that you are human.' ^ ' Why do you not 
surrender him to me and cease wailing into my ears r 
He shall not escape.' 

Meanwhile word of this person's arrival and of his 
clamorous threats of death is brought to the master 
of the house. Immediately upon receipt of these 

others and remind yourself that you are human " ; the verse 
ascribed in Stobaeus, 3. 22. 25, to the poet Hippothoon (or 
Hippothoiis) : " Since you are human, remember the common 
lot of humanity " (see Xauck, Trag. Graec. Fragm., 2nd ed. 
[1889], p. 827);"' Theseus in Sophocles, Oed. Col. 567 f . : "I 
know well that I am mortal and have no greater share in the 
morrow than you do." 



* Heus,' inquit, ' Gorgia,' pedisequo ^ puerorum, 

* absconde pueros, defende, fac ut incolumis ad 
adulescentiam perducas.' Vix haec dixerat cum ecce 
iste praesto : ' Sedes,' inquit, ' audax ? Non vox 
mea tibi vitam ademit? Exple meas inimicitias et 
iracundiam satura tuo sanguine/ lUe cum magno 
spiritu : * Verebar,' ^ inquit, ' ne plane victus essem. 
Nunc video: iure mecum contendere non vis, ubi 
superari turpissimum et superare pulcerrimum est; 
interficere vis. Occidar equidem, sed victus non 
peribo.' ' Ut in extremo vitae tempore etiam 
sententias eloqueris ! Numquam ei quem vides 
dominari vis supplicare ? ' Tum mulier : ' Immo 
iste quidem rogat et supplicat ; sed tu, quaeso, 
commovere ; et tu per deos,' inquit, ' hunc ex- 
amplexare. Dominus est ; vicit hie te, vince tu 
nunc animum.' ' Quin desinis,' inquit, * uxor, loqui 
quae me digna non sint ? Tace et quae curanda 
sunt cura. Tu cessas mihi vitam, tibi omnem bene 
Vivendi spem mea morte eripere ? ' Iste mulierem 
propulit ab se lamentantem ; illi nescio quid incipienti 
dicere, quod dignum videlicet illius virtute esset, 
gladium in latere defixit." 

1 pedisequo Skutsch {Kleine Schriften, Leipzig and Berlin, 
1914, p. 119): pendens equo H: pedens aequo PB II: 
pedissequa Cbl : pedisseca d : pediseque Lamhinus Mx. 

2 verebar Orelli from a Zurich MS. : verba 31 : verba 
inetuebam E Mx. 

" yvtoiioXoyels. 

^ Cf. in Homer, II. 6, 490, Hector's words to Andromache: 

But go thou to thine house and attend to thine own tasks." 


AD HERENNIUM, IV. lit. 65 

tidings, ' Hark, Gorgias,' he says to the attendant 
of his children, ' hide them, defend them, see 
that you bring them up safe to young manhood.' 
Hardly had he uttered these words when, behold, 
this person appears, and says : ' You are still here, 
rash fool ? Has not my voice frightened you to 
death ? Appease my enmity and sate my wrath 
with your blood.' The master, with proud spirit, 
replies : ' I feared I might really be conquered. Now 
I see : You do not wish to contend with me in a trial 
at law, where failure brings shame, and success 
glory. You wish to kill me. True, I shall be killed, 
but I will die unconquered.' ' Sententious " even at 
the point of death ! You do not wish to beg your life 
of me when you see I have you in my power ? ' Then 
the woman : ' Nay, truly he begs and implores you. 
I plead with you, be moved to pity. And do you, in 
heaven's name, clasp his knees. He has you in his 
power. He has prevailed over you, and do you now 
prevail over your spirit.' ' Why do you not cease, 
my wife,' says he, ' to utter words unworthy of me? 
Be silent, and attend to your tasks. ^ And you, why 
do you not, once for all, rob me of life, and yourself, 
by mv death, of every hope of enjoying life ? ' The 
intruder thrust the weeping woman from him, and as 
the master began to say something or other, worthy, 
I am sure, of his manliness, buried the sword in his 
side." " 

' Whereas the example of Character Delineation next 
above is in the spirit of comedy, this example is tragic in 
nature. As the notes indicate, it is probably of Greek origin, 
despite certain of its distinctively Roman features. Marx, 
Proleg., p. 108, thinks that it may perhaps be referred to the 
controversia concerning the murder of Sulpicius, 1. xv. 25 



Puto in hoc exemplo datos esse uni cuique ser- 
mones ad dignitatem adcommodatos ; id quod opor- 
tet in hoc genere conservare. 

Sunt item sermocinationes consequentes, hoc genus : 
" Nam quid putamus illos dicturos si hoc iudicaritis? 
Nonne omnes hac utentur oratione ? " — deinde 
subicere sermonem. 
66 LIII. Conformatio est cum aliqua quae non adest 
persona confingitur quasi adsit, aut cum res muta aut 
informis fit eloquens, et forma ei et oratio adtribuitur 
ad dignitatem adcommodata aut actio quaedam, hoc 
pacto: " Quodsi nunc haec urbs invictissima vocem 
mittat, non hoc pacto loquatur: ' Ego ilia plurimis 
tropaeis ^ ornata, triumphis ditata certissimis, claris- 
simis locupletata victoriis, nunc vestris seditionibus, 
o cives, vexor ; quam dolis malitiosa Kartago, viribus 
probata Numantia, disciplinis erudita Corinthus 
labefactare non potuit, cam patimini nunc ab homun- 
culis deterrimis proteri atque conculcari ? " Item: 
" Quodsi nunc Lucius ille Brutus revivescat et hie 
ante pedes vestros adsit, is non hac utatur oratione ? 
' Ego reges eieci ; vos tyrannos introducitis. Ego 
libertatem, quae non erat, peperi ; vos partam 
servare non vultis. Ego capitis mei periculo patriam 

i tropeis Pll Mx : tropheis P^HBGE. 

" TTpoawTTOTToua. Representing an absent person as present 
would not today be regarded as strictly within the meaning 
of Personification. Cf. Cicero, De Oratore 3. 53. 205 {per- 
sonarum ficta inductio) ; Quintilian, 9. 2. 29-37. See Georg 
Reichel, Quaestiones Progymnasm., diss. Leipzig, 1909, pp. 
75-88, on this figure as a progymnasma. Making the dead 
speak was sometimes called elBcoXonoiLa. Cf. Cicero, Orator 

AD HRRENNIUM, IV. lii. 65 liii. 66 

I think that in this example the language assigned 
to each person was appropriate to his character — 
a precaution necessary to maintain in Dialogue. 

There are likewise Hypothetical Dialogues, as 
follows : " Indeed what do we think those people will 
say if you have passed this judgement? Will not 

every one say as follows: ?" And then one 

must add what they will say. 
66 LIII. Personification ^ consists in representing an 
absent person as present, or in making a mute thing or 
one lacking form articulate, and attributing to it a 
definite form and a language or a certain behaviour 
appropriate to its character, as follows : " But if this 
invincible city should now give utterance to her voice, 
would she not speak as follows ? ' I, city of renown, 
who have been adorned with numerous trophies, 
enriched \Wth unconditional triumphs, and made 
opulent by famous victories, am now vexed, O 
citizens, by your dissensions. Her whom Carthage 
with her wicked guile, Numantia with her tested 
strength, and Corinth with her polished culture, 
could not shake, do you now suffer to be trod upon 
and trampled underfoot by worthless weaklings ? ' " 
Again: "But if that great Lucius Brutus should 
now come to life again and appear here before you, 
would he not use this language ? * I banished kings ; 
you bring in tyrants. I created liberty, which did 
not exist ; what I created you do not wish to preserve. 
I, at peril of my life, freed the fatherland ; you, even 

25. 85 : " [The unaffected Attic speaker] will not represent 
the commonwealth as speaking, or call the dead from the 
lower world." Volkmann, p. 490, excludes Personification 
from the figures of thought; see also pp. 280 and 312 on its 



liberavi ; vos liberi sine periculo esse non curatis.' " 
Haec conformatio licet in plures res, in mutas atque 
inanimas transferatur. Proficit plurimum in ampli- 
ficationis partibus et commiseratione. 
67 Significatio est res quae plus in suspicione relinquit 
quam positum est in oratione. Ea fit per exsupera- 
tionem, ambiguum, consequentiam, abscisionem, 

Per exsuperationem, cum plus est dictum quam 
patitur Veritas, augendae suspicionis causa, sic : 

Hie de tanto patrimonio tam cito testam qui sibi 
petat ignem non reliquit." 

Per ambiguum, cum verbum potest in duas pluresve 
sententias accipi, sed accipitur tamen in cam partem 
quam vult is qui dixit ; ut de eo si dicas qui multas 
hereditates adierit : " Prospice tu, qui plurimum 
cernis." LIV. Ambigua quemadmodum vitanda 
sunt quae obscuram reddunt orationem, item haec 
consequenda quae conficiunt huiusmodi significa- 
tionem. Ea reperientur facile si noverimus et ani- 
mum adverterimus verborum ancipites aut multiplices 

" Such sentiments as are expressed in these two passages 
might have been uttered by tribunes of the plebs in the time 
of Marius ; see Kroehnert, p. 32. L. Junius Brutus liberated 
Rome from the Taiquins and founded the Roman consulate. 

*" »See 2. XXX. 48-xxxi. 50. 

' €ix(f>aaL9. Meaning conveyed by implication. Really 
more a trope than a figure. Cf. Quintilian, 8. 3. 83 : " There 
are two kinds of Emphasis; one means more than it says, 
the other often means something it does not say." 

^ See 4. xxxiii. 44 above (superlatio). 

« This passage is in the spirit of the excerpts, in Cicero, De 
Oratore 2. 55. 223-6, from the speech delivered in probably 


AD HERKNNIUM, IV. mil 66-liv. 67 

without peril, do not care to be free.' " *» Personi- 
fication may be applied to a variety of things, 
mute and inanimate. It is most useful in the 
divisions under Amplification and in Appeal to Pity.* 
67 Emphasis <^ is the fif^ure which leaves more to be 
suspected than has been actually asserted. It is 
produced through Hyperbole, Ambiguity, I^ogical 
Consequence, Aposiopesis, and Analogy. 

The emphasis is produced through Hyperbole '^ 
when more is said than the truth warrants, so as to 
give greater force to the suspicion, as follows : " Out 
of so great a patrimony, in so short a time, this man 
has not laid by even an earthen pitcher wherewith to 
seek a fire for himself." ^ 

The emphasis is produced through Ambiguity/ 
when a word can be taken in two or more senses, but 
yet is taken in that sense which the speaker intends ; 
for example, if you should say concerning a man who 
has come into many legacies: " Just look out, you, 
who look out for yourself so profitably."'^ hlV. p],ven 
as we must avoid those ambiguities which render 
the style obscure, so must we seek those which 
produce an emphasis of this sort. It will be easy to 
find them if we know and pay heed to the double and 
multiple meanings of words. 

91 B.C. by L. Lifinius Crassus on behalf of Cn. Planc(i)us 
against M. Junius Brutus, who had squandered his patrimony. 
Kroehnert, p. .31, thinks it may come from this speech, but 
there is no real evidence for the ascription. 

^ Quintilian, 6. 3. 47 flF., considers the play on double 
meanings only rarely teUing, unless helped out by the facts. 

" The play is upon the double meaning of cernere : to " dis- 
cern " and, in judicial language, " to enter upon an in- 
heritance; " thus : " you who know exceedingly well how to 
enter upon bequests." 



Per consequentiam significatio fit cum res quae 
sequantur aliquam rem dicuntur, ex quibus tota res 
relinquitur in suspicione ; ut si salsamentarii filio 
dicas : " Quiesce tu, cuius pater cubito se emungere ^ 

Per abscisionem, si, cum incipimus aliquid dicere, 
deinde praecidamus, et ex eo quod iam diximus satis 
relinquitur suspicionis, sic : " Qui ista forma et aetate 
nuper alienae domi — nolo plura dicere." 

Per similitudinem, cum aliqua re simili allata nihil 
amplius dicimus, sed ex ea significamus quid sen- 
tiamus, hoc modo : " Noli, Saturnine, nimium populi 
frequentia fretus esse; inulti iacent Gracci." 

Haec exornatio plurimum festivitatis habet inter- 
dum et dignitatis ; sinit enim quiddam tacito oratore 
ipsum auditorem suspicari. 
68 Brevitas est res ipsis tantummodo verbis necessariis 
expedita, hoc modo: " Lemnum praeteriens cepit, 
inde Thasi praesidium reliquit, post urbem Bithynam 

1 cubito se emungere E : cubiti seraugire H : cubitis emungi 
CIl3Ix : cubiti semugi P : cubitis emugi B. 

" iiraKoXovOrjaiS' 

* The saying is common, e.g., with reference to the freedman 
father of the poet Horace, in Suetonius, De Viris Illustrihus, 
Vita Horatii, and to the freedman father of Bion of Borys- 
thenes (first half, third century B.C.), in Diogenes Laertius 
4. 46. Cf. also Plutarch, Quaest. Conviv. 2. 4 (631 D), and, 
illustrating oKa>iJ.fxa {contumelia celata), Macrobius, Sat. 7. 3. 6. 

' See 4. XXX. 41 above {praecisio). 

^ L. Appuleius Saturninus, of praetorian descent, after 
being removed from the quaestorship by the Senate, joined 
the populares, and thereafter by demagoguery and violence 


AD HERENNIUM, IV. liv. 67 6S 

Emphasis by Logical Consequence " is produced 
when one mentions the things that follow from a 
given circumstance, thus leaving the whole matter in 
distrust ; for example, if you should say to the son of 
a fishmonger: "Quiet, you, whose father used to 
wipe his nose with his forearm." ^ 

The emphasis is produced through Aposiopesis '^ if 
we begin to say something and then stop short, and 
what we have already said leaves enough to arouse 
suspicion, as follows: " He who so handsome and so 
young, recently at a stranger's house — I am unwilling 
to say more." 

The emphasis is produced through Analogy, when 
we cite some analogue and do not amplify it, but by 
its means intimate what we are thinking, as follows : 
" Do not, Saturninus, rely too much on the popular 
mob — unavenged lie the Gracchi." '^ 

This figure sometimes possesses liveliness and 
distinction in the highest degree ; indeed it permits 
the hearer himself to guess what the speaker has not 
68 Conciseness ^ is the expressing of an idea by the 
very minimum of essential words, as follows : " On 
his way he took Lemnus, then left a garrison at 
Thasus, after that destroyed the Bithynian city, 

fought the Senate until he was, in 100 b.c, declared a public 
enemy by that body and slain, the mob participating; see 
note on 4. xxii. 31 above. Saturninus was influenced by the 
political ideas of C. Gracchus. On his grain-bill see 1. xii. 21 

* ^paxvXoyla. Also, from another point of view, iniTpo- 
XaofjLos. Cf. distincte concisa brevitas and percursio in Cicero, De 
Oraiore 3. 53. 202. Quintilian in 9. 3. 99 denies that fipaxv- 
Aoyta is a figure, yet in 9. 3. 50 treats it as a form of 



Cium ^ sustulit, inde re versus ^ in Hellespontum 
statim potitur Abydi ". Item : " Modo consul 
quondam, is deinde primus erat civitatis ; turn pro- 
ficiscitur in Asiam ; deinde hostis et exul est dictus ; 
post imperator, et postremo vii ^ factus est consul." 
Habet paucis conprehensa brevitas multarum rerum 
expeditionem. Quare adhibenda saepe est, cum aut 
res non egent longae orationis aut tempus non sinet 

LV. Demonstratio est cum ita verbis res exprimi- 
tur ut geri negotium et res ante oculos esse videatur. 
Id fieri poterit si quae ante et post et in ipsa re facta 

1 Bithynam Cium Muenzer : bithinia b : bithinnia v : 
bithana / : viminachium 31, Viminacium 3Ix. 

2 reversus Baiter-Kayser : rursiis C : sulsus HPB U : 
pulsus 3Ix. 

^ Insertion of vii suggested by Omnibonus and Mx. 

" Text and reference are uncertain. Friedrich Muenzer 
(Philologus 89 [1934]. 215-25) believes that the expedition 
made in 202-200 b.c. by Philip V of Macedon (Rome declared 
war in 200) is indicated. Cius was the city on the Propontis 
in Bithynia. The Rhodians were active against Philip; 
this passage may come from an actual oration, perhaps 
delivered, Muenzer thinks, bv Apollonius Molo or Apollonius 
ofiaXaKos. W. Warde Fowler, Class. Rev. 29 (1915). 136-7, 
and Roman Essays and Interpretations, Oxford, 1920, pp. 
95-99, thinks the reference is to Lucullus and his fleet in 84 
(85) B.C., when he was clearing the Hellespont and Aegean of 
the lorces of Mithridates for Sulla. Marx ( Viminachmi), 
Rhein. Mus. 47 (1892). 157-9, doubts the possibility of 
establishing the reference. For other conjectures, see A. 
von Domaszewski, Jahreshefte der oesterr. archaeol. Inst, in 
Wien 5 (1902). 147-9 (Lysimachia, in the Thracian Chersonese, 
and Lucullus), and H. Jordan, Hermes 8 (1874). 75-7 (Lysi- 
machia, and Antiochus III after his defeat in 191 B.C. by the 
Romans at Thermopylae). 

Alexander Numenii, De Schemat. (Spengel 3. 22), cites in 


AD HERENNIUM, IV. liv. 68-lv. 68 

Cius ; next, returning to the Hellespont, he forthwith 
occupies Abydus."» Again: " Just recently consul, 
next he was first man of the state ; then he sets out for 
Asia ; next he is declared a public enemy and exiled ; 
after that he is made general-in-chief and finally 
consul for the seventh time." * Conciseness expresses 
a multitude of things within the limits of but a few 
words, and is therefore to be used often, either when 
the facts do not require a long discourse or when time 
will not permit dwelling upon them. 

LV. It is Ocular Demonstration ^ when an event is 
so described in words that the business seems to be 
enacted and the subject to pass vividly before our 
eyes. This we can effect by including what has 

illustration of emTpo;^aa^d? Demosthenes, I'hil. 3. 27 : 
"He has gone to the Hellespont; formerly he marched 
against Ambracia; Elis— that important city in the Pelo- 
ponnese — he holds; against the Megarians he jplotted lately." 
If our author's example does not come from a speech actually 
delivered, it may be an imitation of this passage. 

* The reference is to Marius ; see W. Warde Fowler, Joum. 
of Philol. 10 (1882). 197-205, and Boiiian Essays and Inter- 
pretations, pp. 91-95. Marius was consul for the first time in 
107 B.C., and for the fifth in 101 ; in 100, during his sixth 
consulship, spent at Rome, he was in complete control of the 
state ; he departed for Asia in voluntary exile in 99 ; when, 
after the contest with Sulla in 88, he was declared a public 
enemy by the Senate and exiled, he fled to Africa ; he returned 
to Italy in the middle of 87, and soon thereafter received from 
Cinna the proconsular imperium and the fasces; he held the 
consulship for the seventh time in January 86 for a few days 
until his death. The career of Marius was a common theme 
in the rhetorical schools; cf. Seneca, Contr. 1. 1. 5, Valerius 
Maximus, 6. 9. 14. 

' evdpyeia. To Quintilian, 8. 3. 61, 9. 2. 40, evidentia, 
repraesentatio, sub oculos subiectio. Sometimes Hvpotyposis 
{xmoTVTT<jiai.s). Cf. d^scriptio, 4. xxxix. 51 above; Kroll, 
"Rhetorik," coll. 1111 f. 



erunt conprehendemus, aut a rebus consequentibus 
aut circum instantibus non recedemus,^ hoc modo : 
" Quod simul atque Graccus prospexit fluctuare 
populum, verentem ne ipse auctoritate senatus com- 
motus sententia desisteret, iubet advocari contionem. 
Iste interea scelere et malis cogitationibus redundans 
evolat e templo lovis ; sudans, oculis ardentibus, 
erecto capillo, contorta toga, cum pluribus aliis ire 
celerius coepit. Illi praeco faciebat audientiam ; hie, 
subsellium quoddam excors calce premens, dextera 
pedem defringit et hoc alios iubet idem facere. Cum 
Graccus deos inciperet precari, cursim isti impetum 
faciunt et ex aliis alii partibus convolant, atque e 
populo unus ' Fuge, fuge,' inquit, ' Tiberi. Non 
vides? Respice, inquam.' Deinde vaga multitude, 
subito timore perterrita, fugere coepit. At iste, 
spumans ex ore scelus, anhelans ex infimo pectore 
crudelitatem, contorquet brachium et dubitanti 
Gracco quid esset neque tamen locum in quo consti- 
terat relinquenti percutit tempus. Ille, nulla voce 
delibans - insitam virtutem, concidit tacitus. Iste 
viri fortissimi miserando sanguine aspersus, quasi 
facinus praeclarissimum fecisset circum inspectans, 

^ recedemus P'^CHbv : recedimus HPB Mx. 
2 delibans Victorius Mx ed. inai. : delabans HPYl Mx : 
delabens B : edens E. 

" ra TTapcTTOfieva. 

* ra TtapaKoXovdovvTa, to. avu^aivovra. 


AD HKIIKNNIUM, I\'. i.v. 68 

preceded, followed, and accompanied the event itself, 
or by keeping steadily to its consequences <* or the 
attendant circumstances,'' as follows : " As soon as 
(iracchus saw that the people were wavering, in 
their fear that he might, by the Senate's decree, 
be moved to change his mind, he ordered a convoca- 
tion of the Assembly. In the meanwhile, this 
fellow, filled >\'ith wicked and criminal designs, 
bounds out of the temple of Jupiter. In a sweat, 
with eyes blazing,'^ hair bristling, toga awry, he begins 
to quicken his pace, several other men joining him. 
While the herald is asking attention for Gracchus, 
this fellow, beside himself, plants his heel on a bench, 
breaks otf a leg of it with his right hand, and orders 
the others to do like\nse. When Gracchus begins a 
prayer to the gods, these creatures in a rush attack 
him, coming together from all quarters, and a man 
in the crowd shouts : ' Fly, Tiberius, fly ! Don't you 
see ? Look behind you, I say ! ' Then the fickle 
mob, stricken with sudden fear, take to flight. But 
this fellow, frothing crime from his mouth, breathing 
forth cruelty from the depth of his lungs, swings his 
arm, and, while Gracchus wonders what it means, 
but still does not move from the place where he 
stood, strikes him on the temple. Gracchus does not 
impair his inborn manliness by a single cry, but falls 
without uttering a sound. The assassin, bespattered 
with the pitiable blood of the bravest of heroes, 
looks about him as if he had done a most admirable 
deed, gaily extends his murderous hand to his 

'^ C/. Cicero, Verr. 2. 5. 62. 161 : " He [Verres] came into 
the Forum burning with criminal fury ; his eyes blazed, and 
cruelty stood out on every feature of his face; " cited by 
Quintilian, 9. 2. 40, and byGellius, 10. 3. 9. 



et hilare sceleratam gratulantibus manum porrigens, 
69 in templum lovis contulit sese." Haec exornatio 
plurimum prodest in amplificanda et commiseranda re 
huiusmodi enarrationibus, statuit enim rem totam et 
prope ponit ante oculos. 

LVI. Omnes rationes honestandae studiose colle- 
gimus elocutionis ; in qiiibus, Herenni, si te dili- 
gentius exercueris, et gravitatem et dignitatem et 
suavitatem habere in dicendo poteris, ut oratorie 
plane loquaris, nee ^ niida atque inornata inventio 
vulgari sermone efferatur. 

Nunc identidem nosmet ipsi nobis instemus — res 
enim communis agetur — ut frequenter et adsidue 
consequamur artis rationem studio et exercitatione ; 
quod alii cum molestia tribus de causis maxime 
taciunt: aut si quicum libenter exerceantur non 
habent, aut si diffidunt sibi, aut nesciunt quam viam 
sequi debeant ; quae ab nobis absunt omnes difficul- 
tates. Nam et simul libenter exercemur^ propter 
amicitiam, cuius initium cognatio fecit,^ cetera philo- 
sophiae ratio confirmavit ; ^ et nobis non diffidimus, 
propterea quod aliquantum processimus, et alia sunt 
meliora quae multo intentius petimus in vita, ut, 
etiamsi non pervenerimus in dicendo quo volumus, 

1 nee Kroll : ne MSS. Mx. 

2 exercemur nA' : enevceKvaxw H-PBC Mx : exerceamu ^. 

3 feeit C : faeit other MSS. Mx. 

* confirmavit H : confiimabat B : confirmabit other MSS. 

* This is a partisan narrative, probably from a controversia, 
of the murder of Ti. Gracchus in 133 B.C. by P. CorneUus 
Scipio Nasica Serapio and his followers. On the accounts 
that we have in the ancient historians see Friedrich Muenzer, 
P.-W. 4. 1503. 


AD HKRKNNIUM. iV. iv. 6S f,q 

followers as they congratulate him, and betakes 
G9 himself to the temple of Jupiter." " 'i'hrough this 
kind of narrative Ocular Demonstration is very useful 
in amphfying a matter and basing on it an appeal to 
pity, for it sets forth the whole incident and virtually 
brhigs it before our eyes. 

LVI. I have here carefully collected all the 
principles of embellishing style. If, Herennius, you 
exercise yourself diligently in these, your speaking 
will possess impressiveness,^ distinction, and charm. <= 
As a result you will speak like a true orator, and the 
product of your invention will not be bare and 
inelegant, nor will it be expressed in commonplace 

Now let us again and again jointly insist (for the 
matter will concern us both) upon our seeking, 
constantly and unremittingly, by study and exercise, 
to master the theory of the art.*^ Others find this 
difficult for three main reasons : they have no one 
with whom it is a pleasure to practise, or they lack 
self-confidence, or they do not know the right path 
to follow. For us none of these difficulties exists. 
We practise together gladly because of our friend- 
ship, which, originating in blood relationship, has in 
addition been strengthened by the study of philo- 
sophy. We are not without self-confidence, both 
because we have made no little progress, and because 
there are other and better studies which we pursue 
in life more intently, so that even if, in public speak- 
ing, we have not reached our goal, we shall miss but 

** ^eyaXoTrpeTTeia. 

' TO iJ8u. 

<* C/. 1. 1. 1 above. 



parva pars vitae perfectissimae desideretur ; et viam 
quam sequamur habemus, propterea quod in his 
libris nihil praeteritum est rhetoricae praeceptionis. 

Demonstratum est enim quomodo res in omnibus 
generibus causarum invenire oporteat ; dictum est 
quo pacto eas disponere conveniat ; traditum est qua 
ratione esset pronuntiandum ; praeceptum est qua 
via meminisse possemus ; demonstratum est quibus 
modis perfecta elocutio conpararetur. Quae ^ si 
sequimur, acute et cito reperiemus, distincte et 
ordinate disponemus, graviter et venuste pronunti- 
abimus, firme et perpetue meminerimus, ornate et 
suaviter eloquemur. Ergo ampHus in arte rhetorica 
nihil est. Haec omnia adipiscemur, si rationes 
praeceptionis diligentia consequemur exercitationis. 

^ quae CE Mx ed. viai. : qua M Mx. 



a little of the wholly perfect life.*^ And finally, we 
know the path to follow, because from these books 
no principle of rhetoric has been omitted. 

Indeed I have shown how in every type of cause one 
ought to find ideas. I have told how it is proper to 
arrange these. I have disclosed the method of 
delivery. I have taught how we can have a good 
memory. I have explained the means by which to 
secure a finished style. If we follow these principles, 
our Invention will be keen and prompt, our Arrange- 
ment clear and orderly, our Delivery impressive and 
graceful, our MemoiT sure and lasting, our Style 
brilliant and charming. In the art of rhetoric, then, 
there is no more. All these faculties we shall attain 
if we supplement the precepts of theory with diligent 

» Philodemus, i?/i€/., ed. Sudhaus, 1. 250, says that the art 
of rhetoric does not conduce to a life of happiness. 

* C/. Dionysius HaHc, De Composit. Verb., ch. 26, Con- 
clusion : " Here, Rufus, is my gift to you. It will be ' worth 
many others ' if only you will . . . exercise yourself in its 
lessons every day. For the rules in textbooks of rhetoric 
cannot by themselves make expert those who are eager to 
dispense with study and practice." 



Except for the writings of Cicero, references in the Introduction and 
notes to worka later tbau the lihetorica ad Herennium are not listed in 
this Index. 

Abridged comparison, 377, .'579-381 
abscusio, form of emphasis, 400, 402. 

See also praecisio. 
absolute, subtype of juridical issue, 

43-45, 91-97, 86, 89 
abusio, trope, 342 
Abydus, 405 
Academic doctrine, 94 n. See also 

accident, subhead of plea of excul- 
pation, 45, 101-103; Blind 

Accident, 123 
Accius, Lucius, 45, 95, xvii n., 134 n. 
accumulation, tigure of thought, 

accusation, in conjectural issue, 53 
Achilles, 34 n., 134 n., 385 n. 
acknowledgement of the charge, 

subtype of assumptive juri- 
dical" issue, 45, 99-105 
acrimonia, 276, 312, 330, 350, 354, 

actio, 88 

actor's delivery, 199, 203 
adcuratio (curaj, 190, 192 
adding letters, in paronomasia, 302, 

adjunction, figure of thought, 323 
adnominatio. See paronomasia, 
adprobatio, division of coniectural 

issue, 62, 72-78 
adrisio. See smile of approbation, 
adtenuata (extenuata) figura, 252, 

260, 262, 266 
advantage. See utilitas. 
Aeneas, 347 
aequitas, in definition of justice 

aequum et bonum, source of Law, 

82, 86, 90, 94 
Aeschines, 278 n., 284 n., 324 n. 
Aesopus, (Clodius), 217 
Africa, 32, 158 n. 

Agamemnon, 31, 217, 315, 109 u., 
134 n., 340 n. 

agilitv, physical attribute, in 
epideictic, 175, 181 

aereement, source of Law, 91, 95-97 

Ajax, 35, 53, 109-113, 34 n., 108 n., 
134 n. 

Albenslans, 139 

Alexander (Paris), 331 

Alexander of Macedon, 307, 247 n. 

Alexandria, 159 

Alexis, 282 n. 

allegory, trope, 345-347 

Allies, Italian, 161, 259-261, 285 

alliteration, excessive, 271-273 

ambiguity, means of provoking 
laughter in introduction, 19; 
subtype of legal issue, 35, 37, 
treatment, 85-87; in emphasis, 
401 ; fault in argumentation, 

amphibolies, 87 

Amphion, 137 

amplification, subhead of embellish- 
ment, in epicheireme, 113, 141, 
143, faulty, 143; in plea for 
mercy, 105; subhead of con- 
clusion, 145, 147-151, in epi- 
deictic, 183; tone of, aspect of 
flexibility. 197, 199, 201, in 
physical movement, 203-205 ; 
and grand style, 255; and 
personification, 401 ; purpose of 
reduplication. 325; and ocular 
demonstration, 409; of virtues 
in deliberative speaking, 167 

analogy, emphasis through, 401, 
403 ; of memory and wax, 208 
n. ; and anomaly, 1S6 n. See 
also comparison, simile, simili- 

anastrophe, means of hyperbaton. 


animus. See character, qualities of. 

anomaly. See analogy. 

antanaklasis, 280 n. 

Antiphon, 71 n. 

antistrophe, figure of diction, 277-279 

antithesis, figure of diction, 283, 
figure of thought, 377 ; 293 n. 

Antonius, (Marcus), vii, xii, xv, 
xxviii, 245, and notes pp. 7. 
33, 38, 39, 86, 207, 243, 355 

antonomasia, trope, 335 

Apollonius 6 /xaAaKo?, 150 n,, 153 n., 
404 n. 

Apollonius Molo, xv n., 404 n. 

apologus. See fable. 

aposiopesis, figure of diction, 331; 
emphasis through, 401, 403 

apostrophe, figure of diction, 283-285 

Argive heroes, 119 

Argo, 119 

argument, =epicheireme, 61, 77, 97, 
105-113, 371, defective kinds 
of, 113-145; in deliberative 
speaking, 171-173; in arrange- 
ment, 185-189; and elimina- 
tion, 329 ; in the figure conclu- 
sion, 331 ; and refining, 371, 375. 
See also epicheireme, proof. 

argumentatio. See argument. 

argumentum, = realistic narrative, 
22, 24; =presumptive proof, 
or evidence, 62, 70-72, 74, 76, 
78, 8, 108, 132, 364, allegory in 
form of,344 ; ad hominem, 137 n. 

Aristarchus of Samothrace, 326 n. 

Aristophanes, 331 n., 342 n. 

Aristotle, xv, xvi, xx, and notes pp. 
32, 71, 107, 174, 175, 352 
Rhet,, xxxiv, and notes pp. 4, 
40, 50, 63, 66, 68, 70, 73, 74, 78, 
82, 83, 106, 116, 121, 126, 129, 
132, 142-144, 147, 160-163, 
173, 191, 196, 237, 250, 288, 
292-294, 297, 329, 330, 339, 
342, 344, 356, 374, 382, 385 
Anal. Pr., 129 n., 237 n. 
Be Part. Animal., 341 n. 
Eth. Nic, notes pp. 100, 163, 174, 

Hist. Animal., 341 n. 
Magna Moral., 174 n. 
De Mem. et Recollect., 208 n. 
Meteor., 220 n. 
Physica. 220 n. 


Aristotle : 

Poetics, notes pp. 24, 151, 375 
Polit., 117 n. 
Problem.^ 237 n. 
Protrepticus, 174 n. 
Top., 163 n. 

De mundo (Ps.-Arist.), 220 n. 
See also Peripatetic doctrine, 

armies, subhead of might, 161 

arms, subhead of might, 161 

arousal, means of refining, 367, 369 

arrangement, 7, 157, 185-189, 191, 
Homeric, 188 n., in deliberative 
speaking, 169-173, in epi- 
deictic, 175-183; of an epi- 
cheireme, 107-113; of images 
in nanemonics, 209, of back- 
grounds, 215 

art, concealing art, 251 ; and nature, 
205, 207, 217,219, 221 ; an art 
called idle, 337. See also theory. 

articulus, figure of diction, 294-296 

Asia, 315, 405 

Asianism, xix, xx, xxxiii, and notes 
pp. 193, 228, 257, 271, 338. 
See also Atticism. 

assumptive, subtype of juridical 
issue, 43-49 

Asturian thoroughbred, 389 n. 

asyndeton, figure of diction, 331, 
403 n. 

Ateius Praetextatus, L., xv n. 

Athenians, 315 

Athens, 27 

Atreus, 345 

attentive hearers, aim of direct 
opening, 13-15 

Atticism, notes pp. 228, 274, 301, 
309, 338. See also Asianism. 

author, aim of, in present treatise, 
vi; age, xxi-xxii; attitude to 
Popular party, xxiii-xxiv, 141 
n., to Greeks, xxiv-xxv, 221- 
225, 229-20I, 2 n., to philo- 
sophical studies, 3, 409^11, 
2 n. ; philosophical bias, xxv; 
dependence on schools, xv- 
xvi; knowledge of grammar, 
301 n. ; treatment of style, 
xx-xxi; his teacher, xxiii n., 
33; question of authorship, 
vii-xiv; verses possibly made 
up by, 127 n., 216 n. See also 
Rhetorica ad Herennium. 


authority, commonplace from, in 
amplification, 14 7, speaker's, 309 
ayarice dclined, 317 

Backgrounds, in mnemonics, 209- 
213, 215, 217, 221, 225 

banter, means of provoking laughter 
iq introduction, 19 

barbarism, xvi, 271, ix n., 303 n. 

beauty, physical attribute, in epi- 
deictic, 175; and age, 323; in 
tigures of speech, lasting pleas- 
ure from, 309. See also digni- 
tas, festivitas, grace, lepos, sua- 

benivoli auditores. See well-dis- 
posed hearers. 

Bion of Borvsthenes, 118 n., 402 n. 

boastful man, 389-393 

Boiscus, 235 

brevitas, figure of thought, 402- 
404 ; in st^itement of facts, 
24- 26 ; and conjunction, 322 ; a 
purpose of metaphor, 342 ; form 
of comparison, 376, 378-380 

broken tone of debate. 197, 201, in 
physical movement, 203 

Bmtus," Lucius (Junius), 399, 400 n. 

Brutus, Marcus (Junius), 276 n., 
401 n. 

Caelius, Gains, 95 

Caepio (Quintus Serrilius), 45, 238 n. 

Gaepio, Quintus (Servilius), son of 

preceding, 39, 87-89 
Caimae, 158 n. 
Capitoline Hill, 335 
caricature. See fabula veri similis. 
Cameades, 247 n. 
C;arthage, 169. 277, 323, 337, 399. 

159 n. 
Carthaginians. 171, 277, 279, 323, 

341, 158 u. 
Casilinum, 171 n. 
Cassius Longinus, L. (cos. 107 B.C.). 

48 n. 
Cassius Longinus, L. (trib. pleh. 

104 B.C.), 45 n. 
Cassius (Longinus Ravilla), L., 348 n. 
catachresis, trope, 343 
Cato(M. Porcius), vii, 245, and notes 

pp. XTii, xxxii, 103, 116, 158. 

169, 279, 286 
causa. See motive, 
censure. See praise. 

central point of accu.sation, 61, 63 

Ceres, 335 

challenging some one. See inter- 
pellatio alicuius. 

change, in arrangement, 187; in 
voice, 193, 199, 201; of ges- 
tures, 203; of names, raising a 
controversy, 141; of sound or 
letters, in paronomasia, 301- 
307, 19-21; of word, in cor- 
rection, 319-321; three ways 
of, in refining, 365-376; princi- 
ple operating: in the formation 
of figures, 303 n. See also 
reciprocal change. 

character, qualities of, in epideictic, 
163-169, 175, 179, 181-183 

character delineation, ligure of 
thought, 387-395 

Chares, 249 

charm. See festivitas, grace, lepos, 
suavitas, also beauty, dignitas. 

Charmadas, 208 n. 

chria, 365 n.. 369-375, 370 n. 

Chrysippus, 72 n., 83 n., 87 n. 

CiceVo, M. Tullius, viii, ix, xii, 
xxxiii, ixxvii, xxxviii, and 
notes pp. 31, 32, 33, 41, 217, 
252, 299, 330, 339 
De Inc., relation to Rhet. ad Uer., 
xxv-xxx; vii, viii, xxi, xxxv, 
and notes pp. xiv, xv, xxii, 4- 
12, 14, 16-18, 21, 22, 24, 25, 27, 
28, 30, 32-37, 40-44, 46, 48, 50, 
52, 58, 62-64, 66, 70, 72, 73. 
80, 90, 92, 96, 98. 100, 102, 104, 
106-108, 112-li6, 119, 121, 
125-131, 135-139, 142-144, 
147, 118, 150, 153, 158, 162. 
163, 171, 172, 174, 228, 237, 
239. 248, 251, 274, 329, 376 
De Oratore, viii, xxv, xxxiii, 
XXXV, and notes pp. xxviii, 
xxxi, 6, 7, 18, 86, 106, 1.36, 
159, 160, 161, 174, 191, 203. 
205-208, 230, 237, 238, 243, 
251, 252, 270, 276, 284, 285, 
296, 301, 309, 317, 320, 333, 
335, 338, 339. 342, 344, 360, 
398, 400, 403 
Orator, notes pp. 86, 190, 191, 
199, 221, 232, 248, 251-263, 
265, 271, 274, 294-297, 301, 
309, 317, 320 333, 338, 339, 
342, 375, 398 



Cicero : 

Brutus, notes pp. xvii, xxviii. 31, 
45, 73, 114, 189, 194, 204, 232, 
244, 248, 249, 251, 253, 332. 

Part. Oral., notes pp. 12, 50, 
144-146, 151, 161, 173, 174, 
208, 251, 282, 303, 309, 356, 362 

De Opt. Gen. Die, 233 n. 

Top., 148 n., 174 n. 

Pro Archia, 206 n. 

Pro Caecina, 82 u. 

Pro Caelio, 66 n. 

In Cat., 262 n., 374 n. 

Pro Flacco, 355 n. 

Leg. Agr., 343 n. 

Pro Hgario, 102 n. 

Pro Murena, 103 n. 

Phil., 372 n. 

Pro Qui7ictio, 262 n., 314 n. 

Pro S. Rose. Am., 116 n. 

Pro Sulla, 103 n. 

In Verr., 254 n., 407 n. 

Academ., 251 n. 

De Amicitia, 304 n. 

De Fin., 87 ii., 174 n. 

De Harusp. Resp., 308 n. 

De Leg., 162 n., 327 n. 

De Nat. Dear., 162 n., 335 n. 

De Officiis, notes pp. 83, 159, 161, 
162, 196, 233, 288 

Paradoxa Stoic, 238 n., 289 n. 

De Re Publ., 136 n. 

Tusc. Disp., 206 n., 291 n. 

Epist. ad Fam., 24 n., 344 d. 
Cimber, 217 
circumitio, trope, 336 
citizenship, external circumstance, 

ill epideictic, 175 
Cius, 405 

claritv, in statement of facts, 25, 
27; subhead of taste, 269-271 
clause, tigure of diction, 295 
Cleon, 204 n. 

climax, figure of diction, 315-317 
Clytemnestra, 31, 51-53 
Coelius (Antipater, Lucius), XTii, 

273, 158 D, 
cognitor, 94 
cohortatio. See hortatory tone ol 

Colchians, 119 

collectio. See recapitulation, 
colon, figure of diction, 295, 299 
color, 268 

comedies, plots of, 25 

Comitium, 95 u. 

comma, figure of diction, 295-297 

commiseratio. See pity, appeal to. 

commonplaces. See loci. 

commoratio, figure of thought, 374 

commutatio. See reciprocal change ; 
change of sound or letters, in 

comparison, figure of thought, 377- 
383, 385; with alternative 
course, subtype of assumptive 
juridical issue, 45,49, 97-99; of 
crimes, commonplace, 151 ; 
in hyperbole, 339-341; di- 
vision of conjectural issue, 63, 
67; aspect of allegory, 345; 
in a chria (refining), 371, 373; 
means of provoking laughter 
in introduction, 21. See also 
analogy, simile, similitudo. 

complex io, part of epicheireme, 
106, 108, 110, 112, 142-144, 
185 n.; figure of diction, 278; 
eiusdem litterae, in parono- 
masia, 302, 304 

composition, artistic, qualRy of 
style, 269, 271-275 

coucessio, subtype of assumptive 
juridical issue, 44, 98-104 

concinna: transiectio, 272, oratio, 
278, interrogatio, 284; quae 
lepida et, 308 ; concinnae : 
verborum elocutiones, 190, 
sententiae, 194 

conciseness, tigure of thought, 403- 

conclusion, part of a discourse, 9, 
11, 61, 145, 185, in deliberative 
speaking, 173, in epideictic, 
183, in arrangement, 185, in 
delivery, 195 ; figure of diction, 
331-333; period used in, 297; 
in a chria, 371, 375; duplex 
conclusio, in proof of reason, 

conduplicatio. See reduplication. 

confirmatio. See proof. 

conflicting laws, subtype of legal 
issue, 35, 37, treatment, 85 

conformatio. See personification. 

confutatio. See refutation. 

conjectural issue, 35, 53, 61-81, 97, 
101, 105, 329, case sum- 
marized, 363-365 



conjunction, figure of diction, 323; 
part of speech, suppressed in 
asyndeton, 331 

conlatio, division of conjectural 
issue, 62, 66; form of com- 
parison, 376, 380-382 

conpar. See isocolon. 

conquestio, type of tone of ampliflca- 
tion, 196, 198, 200, in physical 
movement, 202-201; =com- 
plaint, 97, See also indignation. 

consecutio, division of conjectural 
issue, 02, 72 

consequence, logical, emphasis 
through, 401, 403 

Conservatives, 39, 257, 345 

consilium, division of securitv, 
68, 171 

constitutio, under proof and refuta- 
tion, 32-52; coniectural, 34, 
62, 60-80, 96, 100, 104, 328, 
case summarized, 362-364 ; 
legal, 34-42, 80-90; juridical, 
34, 42-48, 84, 88, 90-104; 
doctrine from juristic point of 
view, 33 n. 

consuetudo, source of Law, 90, 92. 
See custom, legal. 

consultatio, 4, 158, 160, 108, 170 

contentio, aspect of vocal flexibility, 
196, 200-202 ; figure of diction, 
282, 293 n. ; figure of thought, 

continuatio. See period, sustained 
tone of debate. 

contracting same letter, in parono- 
masia, 303, 305 

contrariae leges. See conflicting laws. 

contrarium, figure of diction, 292- 
294 ; period in, 296 ; aspect of 
allegory, 344; Ln refining, 368, 
370, 372; form of comparison, 
376, 378 

contrast. See contrarium, reason- 
ing by contraries, contentio. 

controversiae, xvii, 8 n., II, 31, 
35-37, 39, 41-43, 45-49, 51- 
53, 87-89, 109-113, 281, 313- 
315, 325, 343, 361 n., 395-397, 

conversational tone. See sermo. 

conversio, figure of diction. 276-278 

Corax, 184 n., 243 n. 

Corinth, 323, 399 

Corinthians, 323 

Cornelia, 283 n. 

Cornificius, ix-xiv, and note? pp. 
xxxiv, 292, 302, 316 

correction, figure of diction, 319 

cotidiana : locutio, 196, consuetudo, 
270; sermo cotidianus, 260, 
336. See also terms, current. 

countenance, the, 7, 201, 203, 205 

courage, division of the Right, in 
deliberative speaking, 163, 
topics, 165-167; quality of 
character, in epideictic, 175, 
181-183; defined, 317, charac- 
terized, 289, 167-169 

craft, subhead of security, 161, 

Crassus, L. Licinius, 233, 239, 245, 
and notes pp. xxxi, 206, 230, 
276, 305, 339, 348, 401 

Cresphontes, 127, 130 n. 

crinomenon, 52 

Critias, 282 n. 

CritolaiJs, 247 n. 

Curia (meretrix), 303 

Curio, C. Scribonius (praetor 121 
B.C.), 114 n. 

Curio, C. Scribonius (cos. 76 B.C.), 
31 n. 

custom, legal, source of Law, 83, 85, 
89, 91, 93; laws and customs, 
5, 89, 93, 165 

Danaans, 333 

debate, tone of. See contentio. 

deception, subhead of craft, 161 

Decimus, 211 

Decius (ilus. P.), 373 

declamatio, 192, 7 n. ; declama- 
tory exercises in treatise, xvii- 

definition, subtype of legal issue, 35, 
39, treatment, 87-89; in issue 
of transference, 41 ; false or 
general, 131-133; figure of 
diction, 317 

deliberative cause, 5, 59, 157-173, 
183, 138 n. 

delivery, xvi, xix, 7, 189-205, 411, 
in refining, 365, 367; speaker's 
as against actor's, 199, 203 

deminutio, figure of thought, 354 

Democritus, 209 n., 220 n. 

demonstratio, type of conversational 
tone, 196", 198, in physical 
movement, 202 ; figure of 



thought, 404-408; function ol 
examples, 236-238 

demonstrativum genus. See epi- 

Demosthenes, xvii, and notes pp. 
189, 247, 268, 271 
Be Corona, notes pp. xxxii, 284, 
314, 319, 324, 328, 330, 331, 
342, 367 
Phil., 405 n. 
Fragm., 352 n. 

Adv. Aristoqeiton (Ps.-Demosth.), 
notes pp. 312,357, 386 

denial, in conjectural issue, 53 

denominatio, trope, 334-336 

deprecatio. See mercy, plea for. 

depultus, 264 

descent, external circumstance, in 
epideictic, 175 

description, vivid, figure of thought, 
357-359, 198 n. 

detailed parallel, form of comparison, 
377, 381-383 

dialecticians, 87 

dialogue. See sermocinatio. 

dichorees, 257 n., 294 n. 

digitus medicinalis, 214 n. 

dignitas, type of conversational tone, 
196, 198, in physical movement, 
202 ; quality of style, 266, 268, 
274 fC., 408; purpose of com- 
parison, 378, of exemplifica- 
tion, 384 ; quality of emphasis, 
402 ; lacking in certain figures of 
diction, 308; physical, in 
epideictic, 174, 180; of inter- 
locutors, in dialogue, 394, 398 

dilemma, in proof of reason, 127 

Diodorus Cronus, 87 n. 

Diogenes of Babylon, 247 n. 

direct opening. See principium. 

discourse and human body, 374 n. 

discreditable kind of cause, 11, 13, 

disjunction, figure of diction, 323 

dispositio. See arrangement. 

dissimulatio, subhead of craft, 160; 
trait of character, 24 

dissolutum, type of style, 264-266 : 
figure of diction, 330 

distinctio, figure, 169 n., 317 n. 

distinction, quality of style, 269, 
276 ff. See also dignitas. 

distributio, type of tone of debate, 
196, 200, in physical move- 

ment, 202 ; subhead of division 
of the cause, 30 ; of parts in the 
cause and in each argument, 
106; figure of thought, 346- 

distributive reply, 360 n. 

division, part of a discourse, 9, 
29-31, 59, 147, 185 ; in delibera- 
tive speaking, 169-171; in 
epideictic, 179-183; figure of 
thought, 361 

dociles auditores, 12-14 

dolus, 160, 170 

Domitius, 217 

Domitius Ahenobarbus, Cn., law 
of, 37 n. 

doubtful kind of cause, 11, 13 

drifting style, 265-267 

Drusus, Marcus (Livius), 93, 352 n. 

Drusus (Marcus Livius), son of 
preceding, 307, 345 

dubitatio, figure of diction, 18, 328 

dubium genus causae, 10, 12 

dwelling on the point, figure of 
thought, 375 

Eating and living, 325-327 

economy defined, 317 

editions of treatise, xxxvii 

education, external circumstance, 
in epideictic, 175, 181 

effictio, figure of thought, 386 

Egypt, 159 

elegantia, 268-270 

elimination, figure of diction, 329- 

elocutio, 6, 156, 190, 228 flE., 240. 
244, 268, 308, 374, 408, 410 

eloquence and character, 137 n. 

embellishment, part of epicheireme, 
107-113, 185, faulty, 141-143; 
= exornatio as " figure of 
speech," 275; and epanaphora, 
277, and onomatopoeia, 335, and 
refining, 371, 375 ; and division, 
361, aim of comparison, 377- 
379; of images, in mnemonics. 
221. See also figures. 

emphasis, figure of thought, 401- 

engines of war, subhead of might, 161 

Eonius, (Quintus), xvi, 119, 131, 
231, 241, and notes pp. xxxi, 
119, 127, 129, 130, 230, 272. 



cnutneratio, part of conchision, 144, 
146, 182; part of distribution, 
30, 360; false, in iiroposition, 

epanaphora, figure of diction, 253 n., 
276, 314 n. 

cpbodos, 12. See also subtle ap- 

cpicheireme, 61, 107-145. See also 
argument, proof. 

Epicurean doctrine, xv, xri, xiv, 
and notes pp. 87, 117, 172, 220, 

epideictic, 5. 59, 157, 173-185, 
309 n. 

epilog!, 144. See also conclusion. 

equity. See aequitas, aequum et 

Ethiop, 389 

ethopoeia. See character delinea- 

Euripides, notes pp. 51, 119, 127, 
136, 280, 291, 394 

Evangelus of Tarentum, 380 n. 

exaggeration. See exsuperatio, 

example, figure of thought, 383- 
385, in refining, 371-373; 
under embellishment, 141, de- 
fective, 143; historical ex- 
amples, in the conclusion of a 
deliberative speech, 173, as a 
topic of wisdom, 165; ex- 
amples, of the types of style, 
255-267, of faulty composition, 
271-275, use of, in rhetorical 
texts, 223, 229-253, and testi- 
mony, 231, 233, 237, 2.39 £f., 
author's, illustrative of pre- 
cepts, xvi-xvii 

exceptiones praetoriae, 40 

exclamatio, figure of diction, 282- 

exclamation of astonishment, in 
introduction, 19, in statement 
of facts, 199. See also full 

exculpation, subhead under acknow- 
ledgement of the charge, 45, 
99-103, 137 

exercise. See practice. 

exile, type of style, 266 

exordium, in a judicial speech, 8, 
10-22, 28, 58, 144, in a de- 
liberative, 168, 170, in an epi- 

deictic, 174-178, In arranee- 
ment, 186, in delivery. 19 J. 
See also priiicipium, prooemium. 

exomatio. See embellishment. 

expeditio, figure of diction, 328-330 

expertuess in criticism, 232 n. 

explanatio, subhead of elcgantia, 

explicative tone of conversation, 
197, 199, in physical movement, 

expolitio. See refining. 

expositio, part of distribution, 30, 
360; part of epicheirome, 184, 
108 n., defective, 114-124, 134 

exsuperatio, means of provoking 
laughter in introduction, 18- 
20; emphasis through, 400. 
See also superlatio. 

exsuscitatio, means of refining, 
366, 368 

extenuata figura. See adtenuata. 

external circumstances, in epideic- 
tic, 173, 181-183 

Fable, means of provoking laughter 
in introduction, 19; Aesopic, 
236 n. 

fabula, legendary narrative, 22-24, 
= drama, 240; veri similis, 
means of provoking laughter in 
introduction, 18 

facetious tone of conversation, 197, 
201, in physical movement, 203 

faculties speaker should possess, 5-7 

Falemian country, 391 

fallacies : false generalization, 114 
n., incomplete disjunction, 115 
n., begeing the question, 132 ru, 
shifting ground, 135 n., ignor- 
ing the question, 137 n. See 
also faulty argumentation. 

fame, titles to, external circum- 
stance, in epideictic, 175, 181 

faulty: introductions, 21-23, argu- 
mentation, 113-145, styles, 
263-267, Latinity, 269-271, 
composition, 271-275 

festivitas, in certain figures, 280, 
308, 322, 340, 402; "of style in 
narrative, 24 

fictitious matter, in realistic narra- 
tive, 25, in statement of facts, 
29, in rumours, 79, in mnemo- 
nics, 221. See also fabula. 



figura vocis, 190-200; figurae 
simulacrorum, 210 ; figurae= 
types of style, 252-268 

figures: of diction, 275-347, tropes, 
333-347; of thought, 347-409; 
in author's example of grand 
style, 257 n. 

firmamentum, 50, 52 

firmitudo vocis, 190-194 

flattery, 283 

fleets, subhead of might, 161 

fluctuans, type of style, 264-266 

fortitude. See courage. 

fortuna, subhead of plea of exculpa- 
tion, 44, 100-102; common- 
place, 104 ; in definition of 
external circumstances, 174; 
P'ortuna, Fors, and Temeritas, 

frankness of speech, figure of 
thought, 349-355 

Fregellae, 285, 323 

Fregellans, 259, 261, 323 

frequentatio, figure of thought, 

friendships, external circumstance, 
in epideictic, 165, 175, 181, 
379-381, false, 383 

full voice, in delivery, 193-195, 

Fulvius Flaccus, M., bill of, 284 n. 

functions of Senate, magistracy, 
and people compared, 347, of 
prosecutor, counsel for defence, 
and presiding justice compared, 

Galba (Servius Sulpicius), 245 

Gauls, 313, 337, 341 

genera causarum, tria, 4 ; quattuor, 

gesture, 7, 191, 201-205, in refining, 

367. See also countenance. 
Gnipho, M. Antonius, xv n. 
Gorgias, an attendant, 397 
Gorgias of Ijcontini, notes pp. 73, 

146, 257, 275, Gorgianic figures, 

XX, 298 n. 
Gorgias, the younger, XX 
Gracchi, the, 245, 335, 345, 403, 

283 n. 
Gracchus, Gains, 231, 233, 307, 325, 

and notes pp. xxxi, 344, 352, 

Gracchus, Tiberius, 307, 407, 408 n. 


grace, in delivery, 7, 411, of gestures, 
201-203 ; in epanaphora, 277, 
in reasoning by question and 
answer, 289, in tropes, 333, in 
portrayal, 387 

gradatio, figure of diction, 314-316 

Grammar, Art of, projected by 
author, 271 

grand style, 253-257, 263, 267 

gravis figura. See grand style, 

gravitas, of delivery, 410, in dignified 
tone of conversation, 196, in 
physical movement, 202; in 
narrative, 24 ; in epanaphora, 
276, in antithesis, 282, in 
interrogation, 284, in hypo- 
phora, 312, in synecdoche, 340, 
in vivid description, 356, in 
accumulation, 360 ; lacking in 
three figures, 308. See also 
grand style. 

Greece, 315, 337 

Greeks, 3, 11, 41, 53, 61, 145, 221, 
229 ff., 235, 251, 337, 147 n. 

Hannibal, xvii, 159, 171 n. 

health, physical attribute, in epi- 
deictic, 175, 181 

hearsay evidence, 348 n. 

Hellespont, 405 

Herenuius, Gaius, xv, xxvi, 3, 59, 
229, 409 

Hermagoras, xv, xvi, xxviii, and 
notes pp. 4, 5, 10, 32, 33, 35, 
50, 52, 70, 108, 228, 239 . 

hiatus, 271 

Hippolytus, 347 

Hippothoon (Hippotholis), 395 n. 

historia, means of provoking 
laughter in introduction, 20^ 
in narration, 22, 24; histori.-; 
arum scriptores, 244 

Homer, notes pp. 188, 248, 326, 
340, 358, 396 

homoeoprophoron, 271 n. 

homoeoptoton, figure of diction, 
299-301, 309, excessive, 273 

homoeoteleuton, figure of diction, 
301, 309, 238 n. 

honourable, the, subhead of advan- 
tage, 85, 161-173, 287, 86 n.; 
kind of cause, 11, 13 

hope of escaping detection, division 
of sign, 67, 69, 363 


hope of success, dirislon of sign, 

67, 09, 363 
hortatory tone of amplification, 
197-199, 201, in physical 
movenaent, 203 
humanitas, 102, 101, 152, 254, 288 
humile genus causjie, 10, 12 
humour, in introduction, 19, 94 n., 
197 n. See also laughter, 
facetious tone of conversation, 
hyperbaton, trope, 337-339, ex- 
cessive, 273-275 
hyperbole, trope, 339-341, means 
of provoking laughter in intro- 
duction, 21, emphasis through, 
hypophora, figure of diction, 311-315 
hypothetical dialogues, 399 

Ignorance, subhead of plea of ex- 
culpation, 45, 101 ; considera- 
tion in investigating hope of 
success, 69, in investigating 
manner of life, 65; =lack of 
premeditation, 149 

imago, figure of thought, 384- 
386; in mnemonics, 208-224. 
See simile. 

imitation, means of acquiring 
rhetorical faculties, 7, 9, 233, 
243 n. ; imitatio depravata = 
caricature, means of provoking 
laughter in introduction, 19; 
purpose of onomatopoeia, 333 

impressiveness. See grand style, 
gra vitas. 

indecision, figure of diction, 19, 329 

indignation, purpose of apostrophe, 
285, of vivid description, 359, 
of the hortatory tone of ampli- 
fication Ciracundia), 199, of 
ailiplification, 146 n., 143 n., 
144 n. See also conquestio. 

infitiatio, in conjectural issue, 52 

inflata oratio, 264 

iniuriae, defined, 316 

innuendo, means of provoking 
laughter in introduction, 19 

inprudentia. See ignorance. 

inrisio. See banter. 

insinuatio. See subtle approach. 

int«llectio, trope, 340 

int€ntio, in conjectural issue, 52 

interdiction of fire and water, HI, 
256 n. 

interlacement, figure of diction, 279 

iiiterjieilatio aliciiius, means of 
provoking laughter in intro- 
duction, 20 

interpretation, figure of diction, 325 

interrogation, figure of diction, 285, 
253 n, 

introduction. See exordium, prin- 
cipium, prooemium. 

invective. See indignation. 

invention, 3-185; 7, 11, 29, 59, 61, 
69, 157, 185, 191; of compari- 
sons, 383,411, 106 n. 

inversion, ironical, of the meaning 
of a word (means of provoking 
laughter in introduction), 19 

iocatio. See facetious tone of con- 

Iphigenia, a drama, 217 

Isaeus, 12 n. 

isocolon, figure of diction, 299, 
257 n. 

Isocratcs, xv, ii. and notes pp. 7, 
9,12,25,86, 106, 116, 144, 146, 
173, 176, 206, 240, 261, 271, 
293, 298, 323, 339, 348, 382, 

issue, type of. See constitutio. 

Isthmian games, 235 

Italians, 337 

Italy, 159, 279, 285, 337, 341, 343 

iudicatio. See point to adjudicate. 

iudicatum, source of Law, 92-94, 
faulty citing of, 140, 142 

ius, =the Law, 82, 84, 88, 90-96; 
in definition of justice, 162, 
164; commune, 82; ius civile 
and iu3 gentium, 92 n. ; and 
rectum, 162 n. 

Judicial cause, 5-153; 47, 59, 157, 

169, 173, 183 
Julius Caesar, Lucius, 160 n. 
Julius (Caesar), Sextus, 93 
juridical issue, 35, 43-49, 85, 89, 

justice, subhead of the Right, 163, 

topics, 165, quality of character, 

in epideictic, 175, 183 
justifying motive, 51, 53 

Kinds of causes, 5, 173 n., 175 n., 
263 n. (see judicial cause, 
deliberative cause, epideictic). 
classified on moral basis, 11 



Labeo, Lucius, 321 

Ladas, 235 

Laelius, Gaius, 245, 277 

Latinity, correct, subhead of taste, 

laudabile. See the praiseworthy. 

laughter, in introduction, 19-21. 
See also humour, facetious tone of 

law, the " common." See ius. 

Law, sources or departments of, 
85, 89, 91-97 

legal issue, 35-43, 81-91 

legendary narrative, 23-25 

Lemnus, 403 

lengthening of the same letter, in 
paronomasia, 303, 305 

lepos, 308, 316 

Iett«r and spirit, subtype of legal 
issue, 35-37, treatment, 81-85, 

lex. See statute law. 

Lex Acilia de repetundis, 351 n. 
Appuleia de maiestate, 38 n., 49 n. 
Domitia de sacerdotiis, 37 n. 
Plautia iudiciaria, 140-141 n., 

347 n. 
Plautia Papiria, 160 n. 
Sempronia frumentana, 38 n. 
Servilia iudiciaria, 238 n., 305 n. 
Servilia de repetundis, 37 n. 
Varia de maiestate, 260 n., 285 n. 
See also pp. 35, 37, 39, 41-43. 
141, 159; Twelve Tables. 

Libanus, a slave, 391 

Liber, 335 

iicentia, figure of thought, 348-354 

life, manner of, subhead of pro- 
bability, in conjectural issue, 
63, 65-67, 363, in epideictic, 

litterarum mutatio, in paronomasia, 
300, 304, means of provoking 
laughter in introduction, 20 

loci, in mnemonics, 208-212, 214, 
216, 220, 224; communes, 72, 
74, 80, 82, 84, 96, 98, 102, 104, 
146 fE., 182; of justice, 164; 
division of, in deliberative 
speaking, 168; ordering of, in 
arrangement, 188 ; locus = 
place, division of sign, 28, 66- 
68, 98, 362 

love at first sight, 115 

Lucilius (Gaius), 95, 37 n. 


LucuUus, 404 n. 

lumen, 308 

Lysias, notes pp. 82, 263, 331, 387 

Lysimachia, 404 n. 

Lysippus, 249 

Macedonians, 307, 315, 335-337 

magnitudo vocis, 190-192 

majesty of the state, sovereign, 
defined, 39, 87-89, 317, 265 n. 

Malleolus, 43 

man power, recruiting of, subhead 
of might, 161 

manuscripts of treatise, xxxvii-xl 

Marcius Rex, family of, 217 

Marius, (Gaius), notes pp. xv, 307, 
308, 350, 400, 405 

Mars, 337 

Marsic War, 159, and notes pp. 139, 
140, 321 

maxim, figure of diction, 289-293, 
period in, 297; 240 n. 

meagre style, 267 

Medea, notes pp. 119, 129, 131 

mediocris argumentatio, 113 ; medi- 
ocris figura : see middle style. 

Megara, 27 

membrum orationis, figure of diction, 
294, 298 

memorv, 205-225 ; xix-xx, 6 n., 
157, 411; natural, 205, 207. 
217, 219, artificial, 207 ff. 

Menelaiis, 217 

mentitio, subhead of craft, 160 

mercy, plea for, subhead of acknow- 
ledgement of the charge, 45. 
101, 103-105, 129, 149 

metaphor. See translatio. 

metonymy, trope, 335-337 

Metrodorus, 208 n. 

middle style, 253, 259-261, 263, 265 

might, subhead of security, 161, 171 

mime, a, 45 

misericordia. See pity, appeal to. 

Mithridates, 404 n. 

mnemonic system, 207-225 

modestia. See temperance. 

modesty claimed by Greek writers, 
231, 235, 237 

mollitudo vocis, 190, 192, 196-200 

money, consideration in motive, 
63, 111, 125, in hope of success, 
69; subhead of craft, 161: 
desire for, among topics of tem- 
perance, 167; 31], 321, 300 n. 


moa, source o/ Law, 82, 84, 88. 

Sec also custom, legal, 
motive, subhead of probability, in 

conjectural issue, 63 
raotus corporis, 190, 200-204 
Mucius (Scaevola), I'ublius, 95 
Myron, 249 

Naevius, 249 n. 

naivety, means of provoking 
laughter in introduction, 19 

narratio, part of a discourse, 8; 
kinds of, 22-28, 30, 58, 144, 
in a conjectural cause, 60, in a 
legal cause, 80, in a deliberative 
speech, 168, in epideictic, 178; 
in arrangement, 184, 18G; type 
of conversational tone, 196, 
198-202, 262 u., in physical 
movement, 202; and historio- 
graphy, 24 n. 

nature, source of Law, 83, 87, 91, 
93 ; source of vocal volume, 
191. Sec also memory, natural; 

necessity, subhead of plea of excul- 
pation, 45, 47, 101 

negation, form of comparison, 
377, 379 

Neptunian gulfs, 265 

Nestor, 188 n., 340 n. 

nominatio, trope, 332-334 

notatio, figure of thought, 386- 
394; of images in mnemonic 
system, 214 

novel tale, means of provoking 
laughter in introduction, 21 

Numantia, 277, 323, 399 

Numantines, 323 

Obscenity, avoided in metaphor, 

occasion, division of sign, 67, 69, 

occultatio, figure of diction, 320 
ocular demonstration, figure of 

thought, 405 -409 
Olympic games, 235, 234 n. 
omitting letters, in paronomasia, 

onomatopoeia, trope, 333-335 
opening, direct. See principium. 
Orestes, 31, 47, 51, 123 
organization of treatise, xviii- 

xix, 60 n. 

P'ictum. See agreomeiU. 
Pacuviiia, (Manus), 123-125, 137, 

241, 94 n., 131 n., 134 n. 
painting and poem, 327 
Palamcdes, 109 
Panaetius, 1 96 n. 
paralipsis, figure of diction, 321 
parallelism in structure and sound, 

298 n. 
paromoeon, 271 n. 
paronomasia, figure of diction, 301- 

309, 253 n., 267 n. 
parts of a discourse, xviii, 6 n., 9, 

pathetic tone of amplification, 197, 

199, 201, in physical movement, 

Pelias, King, 119 
Pel ion's woods, 119 
perdueliionibus, 264 
Pergamum, 6 n., 133 
period, figure of diction, 297, 275, 

339, 294 n. 
Peripatetic dfx;trine, xv, xviii, and 

notes, pp. 6, 94, 156, 184, 196, 

229, 242, 247, 252, 263, 268, 

294, 303. See also Aristotle, 

periphrasis, trope, 337 
permissio. See surrender, 
permutatio, trope, 344-346 
persecutio, 88 
personification, figure of thought, 

399-401, 198 n. 
persuasion, non-technical means of, 

74 n. 
perversio, means of hyperbaton, 

petitio, 88 

petty kind of cause, 11, 13 
Philemon, 280 n. 
Philip V of Macedon, expedition of, 

404 n. 
Philoctetes, 333 
Philodemus, Rhetoric, notes pp. 

137, 189, 190, 236, 250, 271, 

phUosophy, 3, 121-123, 137, 409- 

411; philosophers as against 

rhetoricians on education, 246 n. 
phrase, figure of diction, 295-297 
Phrygian priest, 387 
physical attributes, in epideictic, 

175, 181 ; physical beauty and 

age, 323 


physical movement, in delivery, 191, 
201-205. See also countenance, 

pity, appeal to, subhead of con- 
clusion, 145, 151-153, and 
grand style, 255; aim of re- 
duplication, 325, of surrender, 
329, of vivid description, 359, 
of personification, 401 ; in 
plea of exculpation, 103, in 
plea for mercy, 103, 105; in 
confirmatory proof, 75 ; aim of 
pathetic tone of amplification, 
197, 199; and ocular demon- 
stration, 409 ; 25, 313 

place, division of sign, 29, 67-69, 363 

Plagioxiphus, 334 

Plato, xvi, and notes pp. 7, 120, 
136, 137, 146, 162, 174, 206, 
208, 248, 261, 271, 283, 352, 
366, 375 

plausibility, of statement of facts, 
25,29; plausible fiction, means 
of provoking laught«r in intro- 
duction, 19 

Plautus (T. Maccius), xvii, 121, 
and notes pp. 26, 175, 305, 342, 
387, 388, 392, 394 

player on the lyre, 381 

Plotius Gallus, L., xxiii, 190 n. 

poetrv, poets, 121, 229 n., 231, 233, 
237, 241, 243, 245, 327, 337, 
339; poem and painting, 327 ■ 

point to adjudicate, 51-53, 61 

pollicitatio, subhead of craft, 160 

Polycleitus, 249 

polyptoton, form of paronomasia, 
■ 306 n. 

Pompeian distich, 281 n. 

Popilius (Laenas), Gaius, 49, 314 n. 

Porcina (M. Aemilius Lepidus), 245 

portrayal, figure of thought, 387 

Posidonius, 290 n. 

power, kinds of, external circum- 
stance, in epideictic, 103, 175, 

practice, means of acquiring rhe- 
torical faculties, 7, 9; and 
theory, 5, 69, 81, 225, 233, 235, 
241, 247, 409, 411 ; in declama- 
tion, 193; in delivery, 205; 
in isocolon, 299 

praecisio, figure of diction, 330. 
See also abscisio. 

praestantia, superlatio a, 340 


praeter expectationem, means of 
provoking laughter in intro- 
duction, 20 

praeteritio, 320 n. 

praetorian exceptions, 41 

praise and censure, in epideictic, 5, 
173-185, 65, aim of simile, 385- 
387 ; the praiseworthy, subhead 
of the honourable, 163, 169 

Praxiteles, 249 

Pre-Aristotelian doctrine, xv f ., xviii, 
and notes pp. 6, 10, 12, 14, 25, 
32, 71, 73, 74, 146, 151, 175, 184, 
206, 275. See also Corax, 
Isocrates, Rhetorica ad Alexan- 
drum. Sophists, Tisias. 

presumptive proof. See proof. 

pretence, in subtle approach, 21, in 
frank speech, 353-355. See 
also dissimulatio. 

previous judgements. See iudicatum. 

Priam, 109 n, 

principium, xvi, 10-16, 20, 144, in 
deliberative speaking, 168, in 
epideictic, 174-178, in arrange- 
ment, 184-186, in delivery, 

192, 194. See also exordium, 
introduction, prooemium. 

probability, division of conjectural 

issue, 63 
Prodicus, 316 n. 
progvmnasmata, 23 ff., 81, 107- 

113, 127, 147-151, 179-183, 

193, 365-375, 399-401, and 
notes pp. 8, 23, 25, 34, 108, 
182, 365, 398 

Prometheus, 247 

promises, subhead of craft, 161 

pronominatio, trope, 334 

jironuntiatio. See delivery. 

prooemium, 12, 222. See also 
principium, exordium. 

proof, in judicial causes, 9, 33 ff., 59, 
61, 147, 185, in deliberative, 
171-173, in epideictic, 173- 
175; of the reason, part of epi- 
cheireme, 107, 109-111, 115, 
127 n., 145, 185, faulty, 125 flE.; 
arrangement in, 185^189; pre- 
sumptive, 63, 71-73, 365 ; con- 
firmatory, 63, 73-99; function 
of comparison, 377, 379, of 
tone of debate, 197, of examples 
in rhetorical texts, 231, 237. 
See also argument, eplcheireme. 


proposition, part of epichcircmc (see 
eipositio), 107, 109, 185, de- 
fective , 115-121, 135; propo- 
8itio=artirmation, in reasoning 
by question and answer, 287 

Protagoras, 7 n., 73 n. 

prudentia. See wisdom. 

pun. See litterarum mutatio, 

purgatio. See exculpation. 

Pythagoras, 289 n., 290 n. 

Quadruplator, 132, 281 n., 394 
quaestio: see question for decision, 
torture ; quaestio inflnita, 3GG n. 
question for decision, 51 

Ratio, part of epicheircme, 106, 108 
n., faults of, 120-124; defen- 
sionis, 51, 53 

ratiocinatio, figure of diction, 284- 
288, 257 n. ; subtype of legal 
issue, 34, 40, 88-90 

rationis confirmatio. See proof. 

realistic narrative, 23-25 

reason, part of epicheireme, 107, 
108 n., faults of, 121-125; 
proof of the : see proof. 

reasoning, by contraries, figure ol 
diction, 29.3-295; by question 
and answer, figure of diction, 
285-289, 257 n. ; from analogy, 
subtjpe of legal issue, 35, 41. 

recapitulation, means of provoking 
laughter in introduction, 21. 
See also conclusion, resume. 

receptive hearers, aim of direct; 
opening, 13-15 

reciprocal change, figure of diction. 

recklessness defined, 317; 167-169 

rectum. See the Right. 

redeeming captives, after Cannae 

reduplication, figure of diction, 325, 
198 n. 

refining, figure of thought, 365-375; 
of invented matter, 107 

refutation, defined, 9-11, 33 ff., 
59, 61, of defective arguments, 
113 ff. ; in deliberative speak- 
ing, 171-173, in epideictic, 
175; arrangement in, 189; 
and tone of debate, 197 

rejection of responsibility, subtype 

of as.sumptivo juridical isaue, 

45, 47-49, 105 
remotio crimini-s. See rejection o/ 

repetitio. See cpanapbora. 
reprehensio, of defective arguments, 

112 ff., 120, 10 n. See als«j 

residues, method of, 329 n. 
r68um4, j)art of epicheircme, 107 

113, faulty, 143-145 
reversal of order, in hyperbaton, 

337 n. 

rhetoric, censured, 137; and life of 
happiness, 409-411; and juris- 
prudence, 90 n., 92 n. ; origin- 
ally judicial, 5 n. ; and graphic 
arts, 248 n. ; and philosophy, 
246 n.; and poetry, 229 n. ; 
rhetorical question, 284 u. 

Uhetorica ad Alexandrurn, xv, and 
notes pp. 6, 9, 12, 13, 32, 62, 
66, 70, 73, 74, 100, 101, 144, 
145, 147, 151. 174, 175, 242, 
243, 345, 382 

Uhetorica ad Herennium, as lecture 
notes, xxi ff. ; dating of, xxv f. ; 
style of, xxxii f. ; later history 
of, sxxiv f. ; translations of, 
XXXV f. ; editions of, xxxvii; 
MSS. of, xxxvii-xl ; analysis of 
contents.xlv-lviii ; called Rhe- 
lorica Kova and Rlielorica f<e- 
ciindu, viii. Sec also author. 

Rhodes, 236 n. 

Rhodian rhetoric, xv, and notes pp. 
6, 150, 153, 193, 270 

Rhodians, 248 n., 404 n. 

rhythms, doctrine of, xxxiii, 256 n.. 

338 n., 339 n. 

Right, the, subhead of the honour- 
able, 53. 85, 163-169, 171 

Roman people, 139, 259, 261, 277, 
279, 323, 331, 341 

Rome, 303, 399 

rumours, in confirmatory proof, 67, 
75, 79, 365 

Samian ware, 393 
Sannio, a slave, 389, 393 
Saturninus, Lucius (Appuleius), 39, 

49 n., 88 n., 307, 403 
Scipio Aemilianus, P. Cornelius. 

169, 245, 277, 337 


Scipio (Africanus maior), P. Corne- 
lius, 158 n., 159 n., 283, 315,335 

Scipio Nasioa (Corculum), P. Cor- 
nelius, 158 n., 279 n. 

Scipio Nasica Serapio, P. Cornelius, 
308 n., 408 n. 

scriptum et sententia. See letter 
and spirit. 

security, subhead of advantage, 161, 
169, 171, 173, 179, 369 

sententia, figure of diction, 288-292, 
period in, 296; scriptum et, 
34-36, treatment, 80-84, in 
issue of ambiguity, 84-86; 
in allegory, 344; figurae 
sententiarum, 346-408 

serious tone of conversation. See 

sermo, aspect of vocal flexibility, 
192, 194, 196, 198-200, in 
physical movement, 202; co- 
tidianus, 260, 336; inliberalis, 
266; vulgaris, 408; uti pauco 
sermone, 342. See also coti- 

sermocinatio, figure of thought, 
394-398, in refining, 366-368 

shifting of question of guilt, sub- 
type of assumptive juridical 
issue, 45, 47, 99 

shortening of the same letter, in 
paronomasia, 303 

sign, division of conjectural issue, 
63, 67, 69, 77, 79, 363-365 

significatio, figure of thought, 400- 
402; = expressiveness, aim of 
onomatopoeia, 332 

simile, figure of thought, 385-387; 
faulty, in embellishment, 141, 
143. See also comparison, 
similitudo, analogy. 

similiter cadens. See homoeoptoton. 

similiter desinens. See homoeo- 

similitudo, figure of thought, 376- 
382, 384; aspect of allegory, 
344 ; emphasis produced 
through, 400, 402; justifying 
metaphor, 342 ; hyperbole with 
comparison formed from, 340; 
means of provoking laughter in 
introduction, 20; similitudines 
rerum et verborum, in mnemo- 
nics, 214-216, 222. See also ana- 
logy, comparison, imago, simile. 


Simo, 27 

Simonides, 327 n. 

simple style, 253, 261. 263, 265, 267 

Simylus, 206 n. 

Sisenna, 266 n. 

slack style, 265-267 

slapping the thigh, 205 

smile of approbation, means of 
provoking laughter in intro- 
duction, 21 

Socrates, notes pp. xi, 107, 208, 326, 
375, 378, 380 

solecism, xvi, 271, 303 n. 

Sophists, xvi, 205 n. ; Parian, 242 n. 
See also Gorgias, Prodicus, 

Sophocles, notes pp. 82, 266, 282, 
394, 395 

Sosia, a slave, 391 

sources, doctrinal, of treatise, xv If. 

Spaniards, 341 

Spartans, 315 

spatium. See time, duration of. 

speaker's functions, 5, 9, 11, 33, 59, 
and notes pp. 6, 184, 190 

speed, accelerated, subhead of 
craft, 161 

spes celandi, division of sign, 66, 68, 

spes perficiendi, division of sign, 
66, 68, 362 

sponsio, 311 n. 

statement of facts. See narratio. 

status. See constitutio. 

statute law, department of Law, 
13, 81, 83, 85, 89, 91, 93, 95, 

(Stilo), Lucius Aelius, xv n., 275 

Stoic doctrine, xv, xvi, and notes pp. 
6, 7, 9, 32, 83, 86, 91, 107, 161, 
162, 163, 173, 174, 175, 196, 
220, 268, 269, 275, 289, 290. 
291, 326 

strategy, division of security, 171 

strength, consideration in hope of 
success, 69 ; physical attribute, 
in epideictic, 175, 181; 323, 
343, 399 

stultitia. See naivety. 

style, XX, 7, 229-411, 156 n.; qualities 
of, 269 ff.; kinds of, 253 fC., 
faulty, 263-267; of treatise, 
xxxii f. ; beauty and im- 
pressiveness of, as against 
grace and elegance, 309 


suasorlae, xvil, 157-159, 171, 8 n.. 

138 n., 307 n. 
suavitas, of delivery, 194, of style. 

408, 274 n. 
subiectio, figure of diction, 310-314 
subsequent behaviour, division of 

conjectural issue, G3, 73 
subtle approach, in introduction, 

13, 17-21, 29, 169, 175 n.. 

187 n. 
Rufflata, type of style, 262-264 
Sulla, notes pp. 37, 48, 307, 347, 

404, 405 
Sulpicius (Rufus), P., 47, 141, 307, 

and not«s pp. 280, 312, 325 

343, 397 
summing up, part of conclusion, 

145, 147, in epideictic, 183. 

See also rfeum^, recapitulation, 
superioritv, hy])erbole formed from. 

superlatio, trope, 338-340. See 

also exsuperatio. 
surrender, fipure of diction, 327- 

329, 253 n., 257 n. 
suspicio. See innuendo, 
sustained tone of debate, 197, 201, 

in physical movement, 203 
swollen style, 263-265 
synecdoche, trope, 341 
synonymy, figure of diction, 325 

Tarpeian Rock, 48 n., 335 

taste, quality of style, 269-271 

Tatius, Titus, 273 

temperance, subhead of the Right, 
in deliberative speaking, 163, 
topics, 167; quality of 
character, in epideictic, 175, 
181, 183 

tempus, subhead of sign, 66, 68, 
98, 362 ; tria tempora for use of 
subtle approach, 16; tria 
tempora considered in pre- 
sumptive proof, 70-72 

Terence, notes pp. 260, 291, 300, 
335, 386, 387 

terms: current, subhead of clarity, 
271, in introduction, 21, in 
simple style, 253, metonymies 
and, 337; proper, subhead of 
clarity, 271, = literal, 255; 
figurative, 255; in grand and 
middle styles, 253. See also 

testimony, and examples, 231, 237, 
239; 365. See also witnesses; 
torture; proof, presumptive; 

Teucer, 35 

Thasu-s, 403 

Thebaas, 315 

Theodectes, 144 n. 

Theophrastiis, xvi, and notes pp. 
6, 107, 190, 191, 194, 202, 
209, 220, 253, 268, 304, 344, 
387, 389 

theory, means of acquiring rhe- 
torical faculties, 7-9; Greek, 
of examples, 253; precept and 
example, 231. See also art; 
practice and theory. 

Thesprotus, 131 

thinning the same letter, in parono- 
masia, 303-305 

Thrasymachus, 261 n., 339 n. 

Thucydides, notes pp. 71, 168, 259, 
271, 384 

time, duration of, division of sign, 
67, 69, 363; point of, division 
of sign, 67, 69, 363 

Timon of Athens, 290 n. 

Tisias, 146 n., 184 n. 

title of treatise, xv 

tone, of amplification, 197-199, in 
physical movement, 203-205 ; 
of conversation, 193, 195, 
197, 199-201, in physical move- 
ment, 203; of debate, 197, 
201, in physical movement, 203 

topics. See loci. 

tormenta, torture, 74; engines of 
war, 160 

Torquatus, T. Manlius, 159 n. 

torture, testimony given under, 
75-77, 365 

tractatio, of the three kinds of 
causes, 5 ff. ; of narration, 25 n.; 
of the types of issue, 49 ff., 
conjectural, 61-81, 61 n., legal, 
81-89, juridical, 91-105; of 
arguments in judicial causes, 
105-153, 106 n., in deliberative, 
169-173, in epideictic, 173- 
185, 175 n. ; of a chria, in re- 
fining, 365, 367-369, 371-375; 
of the types of style, 268 n- 

traductio. See transplacement. 

tragedy, 98 n., uses legendary tale, 
23; tragedian's delivery, 199 



transference, subtype of legal issue, 
35, 39-41, treatment, 89 

transgressio. See hyperbaton. 

transiectio. See transposition. 

transition, figure of diction, 317- 

translatio, subtype of legal issue, 
34, 38-40, treatment, 88; 
= metaphor, trope, 342-344, 
in allegory, 344, in comparison, 
382; criminis, subtype of 
assumptive juridical issue, 44, 
46, 98 

translation of Greek technical 
terms, xxi, 251 

transplacement, figure of diction, 
279, excessive, 273 

transposition, of words, in hyper- 
baton, 273, 337, 339, in recipro- 
cal change, 325; of letters, in 
paronomasia, 303-305 

treason. See maiesty of the state. 

trials, 37, 39, 43, 45, 49, 93-95, 
and notes pp. 38, 48, 66, 276, 
314, 321, 348, 355, 401 

Triptolemus, 247 

tropes, 333-347, xii n. 

Troy, 333 

turpe genus causae, 10, 12, 16-18 

Tusculan estate, 391 

tuta. See security. 

Twelve Tables, notes pp. 41, 42, 
92, 95 

Ulysses, 35, 109, 111, 134 n. 

understatement, figure of thought, 

unexpected turn. See praeter ex- 

unknown authors possibly drawn 
upon, notes pp. 26, 127, 129, 
134, 216, 306, 308, 315, 405, 

utilitas, aim in deliberative speak- 
ing, 160, 168; communis, in 
definition of equity, 94 ; three- 
fold, of the direct opening, 

Varius Hybrida, Q., 140 n,, 260 n.. 
285 n. 

verse, means of provoking laughter 
in introduction, 21 

Vestini, Pinnensian, 139 

Viminacium, 404 n. 

virtues, in plea for mercy, 103; 
" the primary ", in deliberative 
speaking, 163-169, 171-173, 
in epideictic, 175 n., 177-183; 
virtue and riches, 279-281, 
and fortune, 289, 291, and 
habit, 289, and envy, 319, and 
culture, 379 

vis, subhead of security, 160, 170; 

16, 64, 98, 100 

vita. See life, manner of. 

vocal flexibilitv, 191, 193, 197- 
201; stability, 191-195; vol- 
ume, 191-193 

voice, in definition of delivery, 7, 
quality, 191-201, in parono- 
masia, 301, in refining, 367 

Wealth, external circumstance, in 
epideictic, 175, 183, means of 
exciting envy in introduction, 

17, and virtue, 281, and 
friendship, 291. See also 

well-disposed hearers, aim of direct 
opening, 13, 15-17 

wisdom, subhead of the Right, in 
deliberative speaking, 163-165, 
167, quality of character, in 
epideictic, 175, 183; wise man 
and his country's peril, 367- 
375; 137, 299, 351 

witnesses, in confirmatory proof, 
75-77, 365 ; in mnemonic 
system, 216. See also testi- 

women's motive in committing 
crime, 287 

Xenophon, 235 n,, 378 n,, 380 n. 

Zethus, 137 



References are to the notes, save for a Rw items (indicated 
by a small p.) in the text of the Introduction. 

dyaOd, ra cktos, 174 

dyvoia, 44 

dypaTTTa I'OfiLfMa, 82 

dyojyT], 62 

dbo^oi', 10 

dbpov, 252, 374 

alrla. &2. 290, 291, 371 

aiTioXoyla, 285 

amov, TO, 50 

aKivSwov, TO, 161 

a/couCTta, Ttt, 44 

d/cpt/SoStVato?, 82 

eV Toiv aKpoaTwv, 14 

dATj^tvd TTpdyfiara, 80 

dXXrjyopLa. 344 

dAAoi'ojm?, 303 

dfxapTrjfjLara TrapaKeip^va , 263 

dp.(f>L^oXia, 35 

dfKf>L8o^ov, 10 

dvayK-atov, to, 161 ; dvdyKT], 45 

dvaSiVAojat?, 324 

dvoK-ei^aAaiaiat?, 145, 317 

dvd/in7CTt?, 145, 317 

d;'ai'ea>at9, 318, 319 

dvacr/ceuT/, 32 

dvaCTTOCTtS, 368 

dvaaTpo(f)-q, 337 
dva<f>ajinr)ais, 192 
dvSpe t'a, 162 
dvcLpLevr), 196 
dvdvTTO(f>opd, 310 
dvTavd/cAaoi?, 280 
dvTeycATj/Lxa, 44 
diTCvai^tajCTts, 354 

eV ToO dmStVou, 14 
din-iOeai^, avrideTou, 282. 293 ; 

/caT* dvrideaiv, 43 
KOT* avTiX-qiltiv, 43 
avTipLcraPoX-q , xi, 325 
diTt/ieTa^caif, 279 
diTivopLLa, 35 
dvTiTrapa^oXT], 150 
dvTLOTaai^, 44 

dxTLOTpOl^rj, '211 

dvTi(f>paaig , 320, 345 
dvTOvopxiaia, 334 

d7TOK-077T^, 330 

dTToAoyia, 5 
drropia, 328 
d-TToaicoTTTjaig, 330 
d7ToaTpo<f>-q, 283 
dTTorpoTTrj, 5 
aTT-d^aoi?, 52, 285 
dTTTcora, 301 
dpcTal fpyxT]?, 175 
dppLOvia, 268 
daicqaLS, 1 
davvherov , 330 
oTe^oi TTiaTCiS, 74 
drvxrjp-a, drvxia, 45 
av^-qais, 146 
€«• Tou at^ToiJ, 14 
d(f)aipeais, 303 

pdaavoi, 75 
jSejSatoJOi?, 73 
iSi'a, 45 
pXa^epov, TO, 160 



Ppax^Xoyia, 403 
^oifioXoxos, 197 

ycvT], 4 
yvcofiT), 288 
yvfivaaia, 7 

SeiVcoai?, 143, 144, 146; )(apaK- 

TTjp Setvoj, 295 
StajSoAT?, 22 
Sia^eats aatfiaros, 191, rovov 

(fxOVTjS, 191 

8iaip€ais, 346; eV Siaipeaecos, 

StaAeAu/uevov, 265 
StaAoyta/id?, 366; StdAoyoi, 

StaAuCTis, 330, 358 
Siavoia? ax^fiara, 274; /cara 

prjTOV Kai Bidvoiav, 34 
SiavopTjais, 328 
hiaTpi^Tj, 374 

StaTUTTtOCTtS, 356 

8ia<f>opd, 280 

Sic^euy/xeVov, 322 

Si^yTjat?, 22, 23 

€/f Toiv St/ca^dvTO)!', 14 

SiKaioAoyt/cjj, 43 

Si'/catov KOivdv, 82; «-aA^i^ Kal 

SUaiov, 94 
BiKaioavvrj, 162 
SiKrawKOV, 4 
SiKi;, 5 

biXTjUfia, 8tA'^/i/LtaTOP, 126 
SpdfiaTa, 240 
Suva/itis, Suvaareia, 174 
8vaTTapaKoXov9r)Tov , 10 

K-a^' eai«-as, 23 

7T€pi iyKCOfilov Kal ipoyov, 182 

e^vo?, 175^ 

l^os, 62 ; €07] Kal vop-ifia, 164 

elSoiXovoiia, 398 
eiKoj, 62, 70, 71 
eiKcov, 385 
iipoiviia, 345 
e/c^eai?, 31, 317 
iKXeXvp.€vov, 265 
CKXoyq ovofidTaiv, 268 
CKOvaia, Ttt, 44 

€KTVTTOiat,g, 150 

iK<f>u)V7]at.s, 283 

lAeo?, 150 

•EAATjvia/xd?, 268, 269 

ip.7T€Lpia, 7 

€p.(f)aaLS, 400 

(vaycovLos Xoyos, 196 

eVaAAayi^, 303 

eV Tou ivavTiov, 14, 292, 372 

ivdpycLa, 405 

li'Seta, 303 

cr'So^ov, 10 

ivdvyLTiixa. 292, 296 

iiepyaaia, 25, 370 

($€Taafj.6s, 285 

€7Tai»'CTdv, 162 

€7TaKoXovdr]ais, 402 ; /car' eVa- 

KoXovdrip.d Ti, 72 
€TTava(f>opd, 275 
€iTav6p6cj)ais, 319 
enel^evyfievov, 323 
eTTrjpfjLevou, 264 
eVi^oA^ 275 
€TnyevvTip.a, 72 
eTTtSetKTi/cdi', 4 
eTTiSiopdcoais, 319 

eTn€LK€5, 94 

i-nideTOi Trtarei?, 74 
eiriKTTjTa, rd, 174 
imXoyos, 144, 290, 291,374 
iTTLpLOvy], 374 
innrXoKij, 314 
(TTiarrJtxrj, 7 
inLTpoTT-q, 327 


iTTiTpoxaofio^, 403, 405 

i7n<j>opa, 211 

eTTix^ip^fJ-O-Ta, 61 

€pya, 384; tov it-qropo^, p. 

xviii, 4, 6 
(pwTTifxa, 284 
fvyeveia, 174 
euSo^t'a, 175 
€V€^ia, 175 
evdai'aaia, 182 
eu/ia^T/?, 12 
euvoy?, 12 
ivpiais, 6 
tirr/xiTT-eAos', 197 
€4>o8os, 12 
fX^pa, 15 

178^. TO, 274, 409 
/cat vofioi, 164 
hnoda, xiv, 387 


^t'ai?, 36G 

d-qpiojhioTipov abttcq^a, 147 

taot?, 147 
ccto/ccdAo;', 298 
loov, 94 
laropia, 24 
loxvov, 252, 374 
loxvs, 175 

Kadapais, 44 
K-oAAos', 175 
/coAov, TO, 161 ; 

KQVOJV, 140 

/caTcATj^ei?, 301 
KaTaCTK-euT7, 268, 

Aai'cov, 32 
KaTd(f>aois, 52 
KardxpT]OLS, 342 

ti 8i( 

/cai oi/caioi', 

274; Ke<Aa- 


Karqyopta, o 

KCKplfJLfyOV, 93 

KfpSo^, 62 

K-iiojais ToiJ au>p.aTo<; 

KXip.a^, 314 

Koim «7777, 270 

>cd/x/xa, 295 

KoapLOS, 274 

Kpivofievov, 52 

CTTt KpiTwv XeyopLevai, 22 

KTrjpiaTa, 174 

Ku'pia €777^, 270 

ictSAov, 294 

€*c Tou Aeyoi^o?, 14 

Ac'^i?, 6, p.eipaKiojhT)';, 309 

Ae'^eoj? ax-qp-ara, 274 
Xrip-pa, 108 
AiTOv, 252 
AlTOTTJ?, 354 
Adyot, 384 ; Adyou axpfjpaTa, 

Xvats, 113, 142 

fiddrjais, 1 

p.dpTvpe?, 15 ; fiaprvpia twv 

TTaAaicDi', 373 
p.eyaXonp€TTeia, 252, 274, 409 
fieiojats, 354 
IxeXerTj, 7 
/xepiCT/id?, 30, 346 
piiaov, 252 
p-erd^aaLS, 318 
p-erddeais, 303 
/xeTaArji/rij, 35 
/xeTcivota, 319 
p.€TdcTTaaig , 44 
peTa<f>opd, 342 
peTojvvpia, 334 

piKTOV, 252 

pipLTjaig, 1 , Tuiv dpxaioiv, 228 
/Lilcro?, 15 


fiovos T] irpaJTOS, 147 
/xdpta Xoyov, p. xviii, 6 
fivdos, 24 



VOfXLKT], 34 

vofMLfxa, aypanra Ka.a(f>aM] 6eu>v, 

82 ; €077 '^at' 1^4 
vofxos, 92 ; 17^77 Kai ^'d/LlO^, 164 

^■qpov, 266 

oy/coi, 264 
olhovv, 264 
oiVeia CTTTj, 270 
olKovojxia, 6, 184, 185 

OIKTOS, 150 

ofiOLoreXevrov, 300 

opLoioiOL^, 376 

dvd/iara, 251, 268, 301, 316 

ovopuaroTTOiia, 332 

dpy^, 15 

opQov, 162 

OpdoTTJS OVO/jLaTCOl', 316 

opiapLOS, 316 
dpos, 35 

■nados, 14; to vaOrjTLKOVy 145; 

rd TTCt^Tj rd T'^? (f>iovrjs, 191 
TTatSeia, 7, 174 
TTttAAtAoyia, 145, 317 
77apd irpoahoKiav,. 20 
■napa^oX-q, 372, 376 
77apdSeiy/xa, 142, 373, 382 
7rapa8taaToAi7, 169, 317 
TTapaSiTjyT^ai?, 22 
TTapdSo^ov, 10 
TTapatTTjaLS, 44 
TrapaK^oAou^ouvTa, ret, 406 
TTapdXenfiis , 320 

TTapamcoTTTjais, 320 
TrapeKJiaais, 22 ; TrapeK^daets, 

TTapeTTOfieva, rd, 406 
TrdpLOOv, TTapiacooL^, 298 
TTapojxoLov, TTapop.oioiOLS, 298 
TTapovoixaaia, 301 
TTapprjala, 348 
iraTpis, 175 
TreploSoS, 296 
TTepiaaoXoyia, 337 
TrepiardaeLS, 70 
nepLTTOv, 252 
7T€pC(f)paais, 337 
Tn^ai^drTj?, 25 
Tn'oTi?, 32, 74 

■nXdop^a, 24; TrAcia/xaTa, 252 
TrAeovaCT/Lids', 303 
77-AoK-i7, 279 
ttAoOtos, 174 
TToSwK'eia, 175 
TrdAt?, Tj-oAtreia, 175 ; ttoAitikov 

^T^TTJ/Xa, 4 

irpdyfxaTa, 23, 346; dXTjdwd, 
80; TO TTpaKTLKOv, 144; eV 
Toiv TTpayp-drcov, 14 

77pe7rov, rd, 202, 264, 268, 284 

TTpoiKdeoLs, 30, 312, 317 

TTpoKaraoKevrj, 30 

77-pdAoyos', 10 

eV TTpovoias, 44, 147 


TT-poaaTrdSoCTtj, 360 


TTpocrqyopia, 301 
vpoadeoLS, 303 
vpoacoTTa, 23, 346 

TTpOaOiTTOTTOlia, 398 

Trpdraat?, 108 
TTporpoTT-q, 5 

TTTWTLKd, 300 


pijfia, 301 

Kara pr/Tov Kal Siai-omi 

pwfir], 17") 


aa<f>T]i-€ia. 25, 268, 270 
oTjiiilov, GO, 70, 71 

CK-OTTO'?, 101 
OKCOflfXa, 402 

ao<f>ia, 162 

OTciais', 32 

aroxaofioi, 34 

avyyvojfxr], 44 

ouyK-piat?, 108 ; = ttAo/ct;, 279 

ovyKpovaiS i^yqciToiv, 270 

cruAAoyicr/xdj, 3.") 

avfj.^aiyo\-Ta, ra, 400 

cru^^ouAeirrtKOv, 4 

avfiTTepaofia, 331 

au^TrAoxny, 278 

avfiTTTojfxa, 72 

crvfi<f>€pov', TO, 100 

avvadpoiafios, 301 

CTVvoAAayfia, 95 

ox'vSta^?, 301, 323 

CTi/ve^evy/xti'Ov, 323 

oukkSo;^, 340 

avvexov, to, 50 

ovv^^eia, 7, 92, 140 

avvdcais ovofxaTcov, 252, 268 

avvTOjxia, 25 

avvojiai^ia, 325 

aucn-aci?, 32 

ai'aToAT7, 302 

a4>o8p6n}s, 330 

ax^^ara, 252, 268, 274, 275, 
332, UTTO^eCTetov, 10; tou aa»- 
fiaros, 191 ; oyrnMa €k tov iv- 
avrlov, 292; a)(T]p.dTia, p. XX 

cai/ia, 175, 191 

aoMipoavit] , 162 

rd^i?, 6, 1.S4, 185 

TaTxeii^i', 26H 

reXos, 161 ; tc/Xikq KetfxiXaia, 

rixirq, 7 ; rex^iT-q^, ri\voY(}d- 

(f>o?, 232; di'd/xara Te;fi'(K-d, 


Tl/Ll^, 175 

TOl^S 7-^? (fxOl^^, 191 
TpiKCoXoV, 294 
TpOTTOt, 332 

Ti')(T7, 45 

vyUia, 175 
imep^aXXov, 264 
imep^aroi', 27, 337 
imep^oX-q, 339 
imoKptois, 6 
imoTVTTOjaig , 405 

VTTCX^Opd, 310 

(ftdovos, 15 
<f>iXoi, 175 
<f>pdais, 6 
<f>p6vr)aL?, 162 
^uCTi?, 7, 62, 92 
c6i;croj8e?, 264 
4>ojvri, 191 

Seads-, 295 
XapaKTTjpiafxos, xiv, 386 
XP^<-o., 365, 371 
X'p7?/iaTa, 174 
XP'qaifj.ov, TO, 101 
Xpfjoi^. 106 


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Latin Authors 

Ammianus Makcellinus. Translated by J. C. Rolfe. 3 Vols. 
Apuleius: The Golden Ass (Metamorphoses). W. Adling- 

ton (1666). Revised by S. Gaselee. 
St. Augustine: City of God. 7 Vols. Vol. I. G. E. 

McCracken. Vol. IL W.M.Green. Vol. VI. W.C.Greene. 
St. Augustine, Confessions of. W. Watts (1631). 2 Vols. 
St. Augustine, Select Letters. J. H. Baxter. 
AusONius. H. G. Evelyn White. 2 Vols. 
Bede. J. E. King. 2 Vols. 
Boethius: Tracts and De Consolatione Philosophiae. 

Rev. H. F. Stewart and E. K. Rand. 
Caesar: Alexandrian, African and Spanish Wars. A. G. 

Caesar: Civil Wars. A. G. Peskett. 
Caesar: Gallic War. H. J. Edwards. 
Cato: De Re Rustica; Varro: De Re Rustica. H. B. Ash 

and W. D. Hooper. 
Catullus. F. W. Cornish; Tibullus. J. B. Postgate; Per- 

viGiLiUM V^ENERis. J. W. Mackail. 
Celsus: De Medicina. W. G. Spencer. 3 Vols. 
Cicero: Brutus, and Orator. G. L. Hendrickson and H. M. 

[Cicero j: Ad Herennfum. H. Caplan. 
Cicero: De Oratore, etc. 2 Vols. Vol. I. De Oratore, 

Books I. and II. E. W. Sutton and H. Rackham. Vol. II. 

De Oratore, Book III. De Fato; Paradoxa Stoicorum; 

De Partitione Oratoria. H. Rackham. 
Cicero: De Finibus. H. Rackham. 
Cicero : De Inventione, etc. H. M. Hubbell. 
Cicero: De Natura Deorum and Academica. H. Rackham. 
Cicero : De Officiis. Walter Miller. 
Cicero: De Republica and De Legibus; SoMNrcM Scipionis. 

Clinton W. Keyes. 


W. A. Falconer. 
CiCEBO : In Catilinam, Pbo Flacco, Peo Mubena, Pbo Stjlla. 

Louis E. Lord. 
CiCEBO: Lettebs to Atticus. E. O. Winstedfc. 3 Vols. 
CiCEBO: Lettebs to His Fbiends. W. GljTin Williams. 3 

CiCEBO: Philippics. W. C. A. Ker. 
CiCEBO: Pbo Abchia Post Reditum, De Domo, De Habus- 

picuM Responsis, Pbo Plancio. N. H. Watts. 
CiCEBO: Pbo Caecina, Pbo Lege Manilia, Pbo Cluentio, 

Pbo Rabibio. H. Grose Hodge. 
CiCEBO: Pbo Caelio, De Pbovinciis Consulabibus, Pbo 

Baxbo. R. Gardner. 
CiCEBO: Pbo Milone, In Pisonem, Pbo Scaubo, Pbo Fonteio, 

Pbo Rabibio Postumo, Pbo Mabcello, Pbo Ligabio, Pbo 

Rege Deiotabo. N. H. Watts. 
CiCEBO: Pbo Quinctio, Pbo Roscio Amebino, Pbo Roscio 

CoMOEDO, CoNTBA RuLLUM. J. H. Freese. 
CiCEBO: Pbo Sestio, In Vatinium. R. Gardner. 
CiCEBO: TuscuLAN Disputations. J. E. King. 
CiCEBO: Vebbine Obations. L. H. G. Greenwood. 2 Vols. 
Claudian. M. Platnauer. 2 Vols. 
Columella: De Re Rustica. De Abbobibus. H. B. Ash, 

E. S. Forster and E. Heffner. 3 Vols. 
CuBTius, Q.: Histoby of Alexandeb. J. C. Rolfe. 2 Vols. 
Flobus. E. S. Forster; and Cobnelius Nepos. J. C. Rolfe. 
Fbontinus : Stbatagems and Aqueducts. C. E. Bennett and 

M. B. McElwain. 
Fbonto: Cobbespondence. C. R. Haines. 2 Vols. 
Gellius, J. C. Rolfe. 3 Vols. 
Hobace: Odes and Epodes. C. E. Bennett. 
Hobace: Satibes, Epistles, Abb Poetica. H. R. Fairclough. 
Jebome: Selected Lettebs. F. A. Wright. 
Juvenal and Pebsius. G. G. Ramsay. 
Livy. B. O. Foster, F. G. Moore, Evan T. Sage, and A. C. 

Schlesinger and R. M. Geer (General Index). 14 Vols. 
LUCAN. J. D. Duff. 
LucBETius. W. H. D. Rouse. 
Mabtial. W. C. a. Ker. 2 Vols. 
MiNOB Latin Poets: from Publilius Sybus to Rutilius 

Namatianus, including Gbattius, Calpubnius Siculus, 

Nemesianus, Avianus, and others with " Aetna " and the 

" Phoenix." J. Wight Duff and Arnold M. Duff. 
Ovid: The Abt of Love and Othkb Poems, J, H, Mozley. 

Ovid: Fasti. Sir James G. Frazer. 

Ovid: Heroides and Amores. Grant Showerman. 

Ovid: Metamorphoses. F. J. Miller. 2 Vols. 

Ovid: Tristia and llx Ponto. A. L. Wheeler. 

Persius. Cf. Juvenal. 

Petronius. M. Heseltine; Seneca; Apocolocyntosis. 

W. H. D. Rouse. 
Plautus. Paul Nixon. 5 Vols. 
Pliny: Letters. Molmoth's Translation revised by \V. M. L. 

Hutchinson. 2 Vols. 
Pliny: Natural History. 

10 Vols. Vols. I.-V. and IX. H. Rackham. Vols. VI.- 

VIII. W. H. S. Jones. Vol. X. D. E. Eichholz. 
Propertius. H. E. Butler. 
Prudentius. H. J. Thomson. 2 Vols. 
QuiNTiLiAN. H. E. Butler. 4 Vols. 
Remains of Old Latin. E. H. Warmington. 4 Vols. Vol. I. 

(Ennius and Caecilius.) Vol. II. (Livius, Naevius, 

Pacuvius, Accius.) Vol. III. (Lucilius and Laws of XII 

Tables.) Vol. IV. (Archaic Inscriptions.) 
Sallust. J. C. Rolfe. 

ScRiPTOREs Historiae Auoustae. D. Magie. 3 Vols. 
Seneca: Apocolocyntosis. Cf. Petronius. 
Seneca: Episttjlae Morales. R. M. Gummere. 3 Vols. 
Seneca: Moral Essays. J. W. Basore. 3 Vols. 
Seneca: Tragedies. F. J. Miller. 2 Vols. 
SiDOxrus: Poems and Letters. W. B. Anderson. 2 Vols. 
SiLius Italicus. J. D. Duff. 2 Vols. 
Statius, J. H. Mozley. 2 Vols. 
Suetonius. J. C. Rolfe. 2 Vols. 
Tacitus: Dialogues. Sir Wm. Peterson. Agricola and 

Germania. Maurice Hutton. 
Tacitus : Histories and Annals. C. H. Moore and J. Jackson. 

4 Vols. 
Terence. John Sargeaunt. 2 Vols. 
Tertullian: Apologia and De Spectaculis. T. R. Glover. 

MiNUCius Felix. G. H. Rendall. 
Valerius Flaccus. J. H. Mozley. 
Varro: De Lingua Latina. R. G. Kent. 2 Vols. 
Velleius Paterculus and Res Gestae Divi Auousti. F. \V. 

Virgil. H. R. Fairclough. 2 Vols. 
ViTRUVius: De Architectura. F. Granger. 2 Vols. 


Greek Authors 

Achilles Tatius. S. Gaselee. 

Aelian: On the Nature of Animals. A. F. Scholfield. 3 

Aeneas Tacticus, Asclepiodotus and Onasander. The 

Illinois Greek Club. 
Aeschines. C. D. Adams. 
Aeschylus. H. Weir Smyth. 2 Vols. 
Alciphron, Aelian, Philostratus : Letters. A. R. Benner 

and F. H. Fobes. 
Andocides, Antiphon, Cf. Minor Attic Orators. 
Apollodorus. Sir James G. Frazer. 2 Vols. 
Apollontus Rhodius. R. C. Seaton. 
The Apostolic Fathers. Kirsopp Lake. 2 Vols. 
Appian: Roman History. Horace White. 4 Vols. 
Aratus. Cf. Callimachus. 
Aristophanes. Benjamin Bickley Rogers. 3 Vols. Verse 

Aristotle: Art of Rhetoric. J. H. Freese. 
Aristotle: Athenian Constitution, Eudemian Ethics, 

Vices and Virtues. H. Rackham. 
Aristotle: Generation of Animals. A. L. Peck. 
Aristotle: Metaphysics. H. Tredennick. 2 Vols. 
Aristotle: Meteorologica. H. D. P. Lee. 
Aristotle: Minor Works. W, S. Hett. On Colours, On 

Things Heard, On Physiognomies, On Plants, On Marvellous 

Things Heard, Mechanical Problems, On Indivisible Lines, 

On Situations and Names of Winds, On Melissus, Xenophanes, 

and Gorgias. 
Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics. H. Rackham. 
Aristotle: Oeconomica and Magna Moralia. G. C, Arm- 
strong; (with Metaphysics, Vol. II.). 
Aristotle: On the Heavens. W. K. C. Guthrie. 
Aristotle: On the Soul. Parva Naturalia. On Breath. 

W. S. Hett. 
Aristotle: Categories, On Interpretation, Prior 

Analytics. H. P. Cooke and H. Tredennick. 
Aristotle: Posterior Analytics, Topics. H. Tredennick 

and E. S. Forster. 
Aristotle: On Sophistical Refutations. 

On Coming to be and Passing Away, On the Cosmos. E. S. 

Forster and D. J. Furley. 
Aristotle: Parts of Animals. A. L. Peck; Motiqn A^Q 

Progression of Animaxs. E. S. Forster, 

Aristotle: Physics, Rev. P. Wicksteed and F. M. Comford. 

2 Vols. 
Aristotle: Poetics and Longinus. W. Hamilton Fyfe; 

Demetrius on Style. W. Khys Roberts. 
Aristotle: Politics. H. Rackham. 
Aristotle: Problems. W. S. Hett. 2 Vols. 
Aristotle: Rhetorica Ad Alexandrum (with Problems. 

Vol. II.) H. Rackham. 
Arrian: History of Alexander and Indica. Rev. E, Ilifie 

Robson. 2 Vols. 
Athenaeus: Deipnosophistae. C. B. Gulick. 7 Vols. 
St, Basil: Letters. R. J. Deferrari. 4 V^ols. 
Cajllimachus : Fragments. C. A. Trypanis. 
Callimachus, Hymns and Epigrams, and Lycophron, A. W. 

Mair; Aratus. G. R. Mair. 
Clement of Alexandria. Rev. G. \V. Butt^rworth. 
Colluthus. Cf. Oppian. 
Daphnis and Chloe. Thomley's Translation revised by 

J. M. Edmonds; and Parthenius. S. Gaselee. 
Demosthenes I.: Olvnthiacs, Philippics and Minor Ora- 
tions. I.-XVII. AND XX. J. H. Vince. 
Demosthenes II.: De Corona and De Falsa Legatione. 

C. A. Vince and J. H. Vince. 
Demosthenes III.: Meidias, Androtion, Aristocrates, 

TiMOCRATEs and Aristogeiton, I. and II. J. H. Vince. 
Demosthenes IV.-VI.: Private Orations and In Neaeram. 

A. T. Murray. 
Demosthenes VII . : Funeral Speech, Erotic Essay, Exordia 

and Letters. N. \V. and N. J. DeWitt. 
Did Casshjs: Roman History'. E. Gary. 9 Vols. 
Dio Chrysostom. J. \V. Cohoon and H. Lamar Crosby. 5 Vols. 
DiODORUs SiCTTLUs. 12 Vols. Vols. I. -VI. C. H. Oldfather. 

Vol. VII. C. L. Sherman. Vol. VIII. C. B. Welles. Vols. 

IX. and X. R. M. Geer, Vol. XI. F. Walton. 
Diogenes Laeritius. R. D. Hicks. 2 Vols. 
DioNYsiurs OF Halicarnassus: Roman Antiquities. Spel- 

man's translation revised by E. Gary. 7 Vols, 
Epictetus. W. a. Oldfather. 2 Vols. 
Euripides. A. S. Way. 4 Vols. Verse trans, 
EtTSEBrus: Ecclesiastical History. Kirsopp Lake and 

J, E, L, Oulton. 2 Vols. 
Galen: On the Natural Faculties, A. J. Brock. 
The Greek Anthology. W. R. Paton. 5 Vols. 
Greek Elegy and Iambus with the Anacbeontea. J. M. 

Edmoilds. 2 Vols, 


The Gbkek Bucolic Poets (Theocritus, Bion, Moschus). 

J. M. Edmonds. 
Greek Mathematical Works. Ivor Thomas. 2 Vols. 
Hebodes. Cf. Theophrastus : Characters. 
Herodotus. A. D. Godley. 4 Vols. 

Hesiod and The Homeric Hymns. H. G. Evelyn White. ■ 
Hippocrates and the Fragments of Heracleitus. W. H. S. 

Jones and E. T. Withington. 4 Vols. 
Homer: Iliad. A. T. Mmray. 2 Vols. 
Homer: Odyssey. A. T. Murray. 2 Vols. 
Isaeus. E. W. Forster. 

IsocRATEs. George Norlin and LaRue Van Hook. 3 Vols. 
St. John Damascene: Barlaam and Ioasaph. Rev. G. R. 

Woodward and Harold Mattingly. 
JosEPHUS. 9 Vols. Vols. I.-IV.; H. Thackeray. Vol. V.; 

H. Thackeray and R. Marcus. Vols, VI.-VII.; R. Marcus. 

Vol. VIII.; R. Marcus and Allen Wikgren. VoK IX. L. H. 

Julian. Wilmer Cave Wright. 3 Vols. 
LuciAN. 8 Vols. Vols. I.-V. A.M.Harmon. Vol. VI. K. 

Kilbum. Vol. VII. M. D. Macleod. 
Lycophron. Cf . Callimachus. ; , I 

Lyra Graeca. J. M. Edmonds. 3 Vols. 
Lysias. W. R. M. Lamb. 
Manetho. W. G. Waddell: Ptolemy: Tetrabiblos. F. E. 

Marcus Aurelius. C. R. Haines. 

Menander. F. G. Allinson. ■ 

Minor Attic Orators (Antiphon, Andocides, Lycurgus, 

Demades, Dinarchus, Hyperides). K. J. Maidment and 

J. O. Burrt. 2 Vols. . v ' 

NoNNOS: DiONYsiACA. W. H. D. Rouse. 3 Vols. 
Oppian, CoLLUTHus, Tryphiodorus. A. W. Mair. 
Papyri. Non-Literary Selections. A. S. Hunt and C. C. 

Edgar. 2 Vols. Literary Selections (Poetry). D.L.Page.- 
Parthenius. Cf. Daphnis and Chloe. 
Pausanias: Description of Greece. W. H. S. Jones. 4 

Vols, and Companion Vol. arranged by R. E. Wycherley. . 
Philo. 10 Vols. Vols. I.-V-; F. H. Colson and Rev. G. H. 

Whitaker. Vols. VI.-IX.; F. H. Colson. Vol. X. F. H, 

Colson and the Rev. J. W. Earp. 
Philo : two supplementary Vols. (Translation only.) Ralph 

Philostratus : The Life of Apollonius of Tyana. F. C. 

Conybeare. 2 Vols. 



PHiLOSTRATrs and Eunapid3 : Lives of the Sophists. Wilmer 

Cavo Wright. 
Pindar. Sir J. E. Sandys, 
Plato: Charmidks, ALnniADRS, Hipparchus, The Lovers, 

Theages, Minos and Epinomis. W. K. M. Lamb. 
Plato: Cratylus, Parmenides, Greater Hippias, Lesser 

HiPPiAS. H. N'. Fowler. 
Plato: Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, Phaedo, Phaedbus. 

H. N. Fowler. 
Plato: Laches, Protagoras, Meno, Euthydemus. \V. R. M. 

Plato: Laws. Rev. R. G. Bury. 2 Vols. 
Plato: Lysis, Symposium, Gorgias. W. R. M. Lamb, 
Plato: Republic. Paul Shorey. 2 Vols. 
Plato: Statesman, Philebus. H. N. Fowler; Ion. W. R. M. 

Plato: Theaetetus and Sophist. H. N. Fowler. 
Plato: Timaeus, Critias, Clitopho, Menexenus, Epistulae, 

Rev. R. G. Bury. 
Plutarch: Moralia. 15 Vols. Vols. I.-V. F. C. Babbitt. 

Vol. VI. W. C. Helmbold. Vol. VII, P, H. De Lacy and 

B, Einarson. Vol. IX. E, L. Minar, Jr., F. H. Sandbach, 

W. C. Helmbold. Vol. X. H. N. Fowler. Vol. XI. L. 

Pearson and F. H. Sandbach. Vol. XII. H. Chemiss and 

W, C. Helmbold, 
Plutarch: The Parallel Lives. B. Perrin. 11 Vols. 
Polybius. W. R. Paton. 6 Vols. 

Procopius : History of the Wars. H. B. Dewing. 7 Vols. 
Ptolemy: Tetrabiblos. Cf, Manetho, 
QuiNTUS Smyrnaeus, a, S. Way. Verse trans. 
Sextus Empiricus. Rev. R. G. Bury. 4 Vols. 
Sophocles. F. Storr. 2 Vols. Verse trans. 
Stkabo: Geography. Horace L. Jones. 8 Vols. 
Theophkastus : Characters. J. M, Edmonds. Herodes, 

etc. A. D. Knox. 
Theophrastus : Enquiry into Plants. Sir Arthiir Hort, 

Bart. 2 Vols. 
Thucydides. C. F. Smith. 4 Vols. 
Tryphiodorus. Cf. Oppian. 

Xenophon : Cyropaedia. Walter Miller. 2 Vols. 
Xenophon: Hellexica, Anabasis, Apology, and Symposium. 
• C. L. Brownson and O. J. Todd. 3 Vols. 
Xenophon : Memorabilia and Oeconomicus. E. C. Marchant. 
Xenophon: Scbipta Minora. E. C. Marchant. 


Aristotle: Histobia Animauum (Greek). A. L. Peck. 

Plotinus (Greek). A. H. Armstrong. 

Babrius (Greek) and Phaedkus (Latin). Ben E. Perry. 




PA Rhetonca ad Herennium. Latin and 
6304 English 

.R7 Ad C Herennium de natione 

1954 dicendi (Rhetorica ad Herennium)