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-A.N    A-DDRESS 


— TO  THl  — 


Solliers  i  tlic  Irmj  of  tiic  Polmiiai; 


AND  ESPSCIALLY  TO  THB 


mmm  members  of  the  fifth  corps. 


CONTAININO  A  BBIBF  REVIKW  OF  THB  CASE  OF 


Gen.  FITZ  JOHN  PORTER. 


By  one  -who  ^eryed  under  jim. 


n 


WASniNOTOK,  D.  c. : 

nomat  McGill  <f:  Co.,  Printers,  1107  B  Street  yorthtoe$t. 

1880. 


"5  43 


WASHINGTON.  D.  C,  July  i,   1880. 

To  my  former  Companions  in  Arms  the  survivors  of  the  Fifth 
Corps,  and  to  my  fellow-soldiers  of  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac. 

Comrades:  The  prominence  which  has  of  hitc  been  given  to  the 
case  of  Gen.  Fitz  John  Porter,  and  the  efforts  put  forth  to  secure  a 
decision  upon  partisan  grounds  of  the  measure  now  pending  before 
Congress  for  liis  rehef,  load  me  to  address  you  in  that  friendly  spirit 
which  should  ever  govern  the  intercourse  between  men  who  have  sliared 
hardships  and  dangers  together. 

We  may  differ  in  politics — we  may  not  agree  as  to  tacts  or  conclu- 
sions in  every  respect — but  there  is  one  broad  iilatlbrm  upon  which  we 
xn'dy  all  stand — the  platform  of  justice.  In  this  belief  I  have  conti- 
dence  that  you  w  ill  give  heed  to  my  words  a!id  approve  of  what  I  shall 
say;  or  if  you  cuunot  altogether  approve,  that  you  will  accoid  to  me 
the  credit  of  having  spoken  naught  but  the  sincere  convictions  of  an 
earnest  heart. 

Gen.  Fitz  John  Porter,  who  now  seeks,  as  he  has  unceasing! v  done 
in  the  past,  reparation  for  a  grievous  wrong  done  him  under  color  of 
law,  was  the  iirst  commander  of  the  Fifth  Corps.  For  the  first  two 
years  of  the  late  war  the  history  of  events  in  the  field  where  the  Arniy 
of  the  Potomac  was  contending  with  rebellion,  was  his  history;  and  his 
history,  I  might  almost  say,  was  the  history  of  the  Union  din'ing  the 
same  period.  His  loyalty,  energy,  and  ability  commended  him  to  pub- 
lic notice  at  tiie  very  outbreak  of  hostilities,  and  his  course  during  those 
early  da3'8  of  doubting  did  not  belie  the  record  he  had  previously  made 
in  Mexico. 

During  the  Peninsular  campaign  he  came  into  yet  greater  promi- 
nence as  the  central  figure  of  the  siege  of  Yorktown  and  of  the  mem- 
orable "Seven  Days"  of  battle  from  Mechanicsville  to  the  James. 

We  who  fought  under  his  leadership  at  Hanover,  Mechanicsville, 
Gaines'  Mill,  the;  Chickahominy,  and  Malvern  had  opportunity  for 
judging  not  only  of  his  capacity  as  a  commander,  but  were  also  ena- 
bled to  form  some  opinion  as  to  what  manner  of  man  we  had  for  a 
chieftain.  We  found  him  to  be  bold,  sagacious,  clear  and  far  sighted, 
and  proved  him  loyal  to  the  very  core  of  his  great  and  sympathetic 
heart. 

He  did  not  approve  of  the  movement  of  the  Army  of  the  Potoma*- 
fi'om  the  Peninsula,  nor  did  McCIellan,  nor  did  Sumner,  nor  did  Hoint- 
zelman,  nor  did  the  other  generals — his  brother-officers.  They  all  saw 
the  design  of  the  rebel  chieftain  ;  they  all  perceived,  and  many  of  them 
predicted,  the  change  from  the  base  of  the  James  to  the  Potomac  wouUl 
prolong  the  war,  and  even  so  it  proved.  It  was  a  fatal  mistake,  in  a 
military  point  of  view,  as  subsequent  events  made  plain.  The  war, 
which,  had  Gen.  McDowell  been  permitted  to  join  us  after  the  battle 

(3) 


of  Hanover  Court-house,  might  have  been  ended  in  18G2,  was  pro- 
tracted during  three  years  of  soitovv  and  bloody  sweat.  Thousands 
upon  thousands  of  brave  men  w^ere  sacrificed  under  Grant  to  secure 
the  base  of  operations  we  had  gained  with  comparatively  small  loss, 
and  which  we  were  compelled  to  abandon  for  want  of  proper  support, 
from  the  government  we  were  risking  our  lives  in  defending. 

The  soil  of  the  "Wilderness"  of  Virginia  was  enriched  by  the  blood 
and  shattered  forms  of  thrice  ten  thousand  heroes;  the  land  was  tilled 
with  mourning,  and  an  array  of  wounded  and  crippled  veterans  were 
sent  to  the  rear  to  march  up  and  down  life's  toilsome  way  until  death 
should  bid  them  rest, — and  all  because  somebody  blundered. 

The  withdrawal  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  let  loose  the  combined 
rebel  forces  in  Virginia  upon  the  Union  army  in  front  of  Washington, 
and  when  we  arrived  at  Acquia  Creek  Pope  was  already  enmeshed  in 
a  net  principally  of  his  own  construction. 

Without  having  taken  that  first  great  precaution  of  a  careful  com- 
mander to  protect  his  lines  of  supply,  and  in  case  of  necessity  for  retreat, 
he  was  set  upon  by  tlie  enemy  and  hedged  about  upon  every  side  by  a 
wily  foe.  From  the  Rapidan  to  Manassas  he  was  outgeneraled  at 
every  step,  and  when  he  arrived  upon  his  old  camping-ground  he  found 
himself  in  reality  surrounded.  The  capital  of  the  ]S'ation  whose  uni- 
form he  wore  was  as  inaccessible  to  his  army,  without  risking  almost 
certain  overthrow,  as  though  an  ocean  intervened. 

When  he  was  in  his  greatest  strait  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  came, 
and  its  skillful  generals  began  retrieving  the  errors  of  Pope  by  finding 
the  foe  and  holding  him  at  bay.  With  the  Potomac  arniy  came  the 
Fifth  Corps,  under  the  command  of  Gen.  Fitz  John  I^orter,  and  which, 
marching  across  the  countiy  from  Acquia  Creek  by  way  of  Kelly's 
Ford,  was  reported  for  duty  to  Gen.  Pope  at  or  near  Warrenton  Junc- 
tion on  the  27th  of  August,  1862.  A  portion  of  the  corps — the  Penn- 
sylvania Reserves — had  reported  several  days  earlier. 

It  is  of  our  march  from  Warrenton  to  Groveton,  and  concerning 
the  events  occurring  during  the  period  extending  from  the  27th  to  the 
30th  of  August,  inclusive,  that  I  intend  speaking;  for  upon  the  results 
of  that  march  and  upon  those  events  depend  the  honor  or  dishonor  of 
one  for  whom  I  then  had,  and  for  whom  I  yet  entertain,  the  very  highest 
regard. 

I  shall  endeavor  to  make  my  statements  clear;  and  if  I  am  somewhat 
tedious,  I  beg  you  to  bear  with  me,  remembering  that  the  story  I  have 
to  tell  covers  thousands  of  pages  of  printed  records  and  testimony, 

I  shall  endeavor  to  state  only  facts  as  they  were  presented  to  my 
own  observation,  or  appear  of  record;  and  if  I  err  in  any  respect  I 
hope  to  be  corrected,  for  I  would  not  knowingly  do  injustice  to  any 
one. 

At  about  10  o'clock  at  night  on  the  27th  August,  Gen.  Porter,  then 
with  his  command  at  or  near  Warrenton  Junction,  received  from  Gen. 
Pope  the  following  order : 

Headquakters  Army  of  Virginia, 
Bristoe  Station,  August  '21,  1802,  6.30  p.  m. 

General:  The  mnjor-o-eneral  comra:in(liiio^  din-ets  tli;it  you  start  at  1  o'cloc^k  to- 
night, and  come  forward  with  your  wliole  corps,  or  sucli  part  of  it  as  i.s  witli  you,  so 


as  to  be  here  by  dayliijlir;  to-iuori'ow  morniiiir.  Hooker  lias  had  a  very  sirvere  actioij 
with  the  eiiiiiiiy,  with  a  loss  of  about  300  Uiiicd  ami  woiiii(1<m1.  The  ciicuiy  has  beei> 
driven  back,  but  is  rctiriii;^  aloii;;  Mie  railroad.  We  innsr.  drive;  him  from  Manassas 
and  clear  tlie  country  between  that  place  and  Gainesville,  wheie  McDowell  is.  II 
Morell  has  not  joined  yon.  send  word  to  him  to  pnsli  forward  immediately.  Also 
send  word  to  Banks  to  hnrry  forward  with  all  speed  lo  take  yonr  i)lace  at  Warren- 
ton  Jnnetl'Hi.  It  is  necessary,  on  all  aeconnts,  that  yon  shonld  i)e  here  by  daylight. 
I  send  an  officer  with  this  dispatch  who  will  conduct  yon  to  this  i)laee.  IJe  sure  to 
send  word  to  Banks,  who  is  on  the  road  from  Fayett.oville,  probal)ly  in  tin-  direction 
of  Bi'aietoii.  Say  lo  Banks,  also,  that  he  had  best  run  back  the  railroad  trains  to 
this  sid<!  of  Cedar  Kun.  If  he  is  not  with  you,  write  him  to  that  eflect. 
Bv  command  of  Major-General  Pope  : 

GEORGE  D.  KITGGLES, 

Colonel  and  Chief  of  St;aff. 
Major-General  F.  .J.  TOHTRR, 

Warrenton  Jinictior.. 

P.  S. — If  Banks  is  not  at  Warrenton  .Tnnction,  leave  a  regiment  of  infantry  anci 
two  i>ieces  of  aiTillery  as  a  guard  till  he  comes  up,  with  iustrnctions  to  follow  yon 
hnmediat(dy.  If  Banks  is  not  at  the  Jiuiction,  instruct  Colonel  Cleary  to  run  the 
trains  back  to  this  side  of  Cedar  Run,  and  post  a  regiment  and  section  of  artillery 
with  it. 
Bv  command  of  Major-General  Pope: 

GEORGE  D.  RIIGGLES, 

Colonel  and  Chief  of  Staff. 

This  order  was  for  Gen.  Porter  to  inarch  at  1  o'clock  that  night,  and 
the  object  ot"  the  movement,  as  stated  by  Pope  himself,  was  to  driv^e  the 
enemy,  alleged  to  have  been  driven  back  and  then  retiring  along  the 
railroad,  from  Manassas,  and  clear  the  country  of  liini  between  that 
place  and  Gainesville,  whore  McDowell  was  supposed  to  be  located. 

The  order  further  required  the  Fifth  Corps,  or  so  much  of  it  as  was 
with  Porter,  to  bo  at  Bristoe  by  dayliglit  on  the  morning  of  the  28th. 

Those  of  us  who  marched  from  Falmouth  via  Kelly's  Ford  to  War- 
renton, know  full  well  the  condition  we  were  in  on  the  night  of  the 
"27th,  when  the  oi^der  to  march  came. 

Himgry,  weary,  worn-out  in  fact  by  the  last  march  of  19  miles  in 
the  heat  and  dust  of  a  sultry  midsummer  day,  we  were  illy  ])repared 
for  another  10-niile  tramp,  and  at  the  cud  of  it  bo  in  tit  condition  to 
meet  the  foe  in  shock  of  battle.  But  the  duty  of  a  soldier  is  supposed 
to  know  neither  fatigue  nor  hunger;  and  hence  we  had  scarcely  biv- 
oaacked  before  we  were  ordered  to  make  readj  for  the  next  move. 

The  night  was  exceedingl}'  dark.  I  remember  it  well.  The  roads 
were  blocked  and  jammed  with  thousands  of  wagons — the  trains  of 
Pope's  retreating  army. 

The  railroad  was  obstructed  by  passing  trains  of  cars  ar.d  hy  bridges 
over  which  an  army  could  not  well  pass  by  daylight,  much  less  at  night, 
and  everything  tended  to  make  a  literal  obedience  to  the  order  impos- 
sible. Besides,  in  addition  to  the  physical  obstructions  to  be  encoun- 
tered, there  was  the  knowledge — no  mere  passing  belief,  but  a  sound 
conviction  founded  upon  various  facts  developed  prior  to  the  reception 
of  the  order — that  Pope  misunderstood  the  situation  of  affairs;  that 
things  were  not  as  he  represented  them  to  be.  Subsequent  events 
proved  the  truth  of  this  knowledge  and  of  these  convictions. 

The  enemy  had  not  been  driven  back,  were  not  retreating  in  any  di- 
rection, but,  o!i  the  contrary,  advancing  to  a  new  and  stronger  position 
almost  exactly  opposite  from  where  Pope  supposed  him  to  be,  and  lay- 


ins:  a  trap  for  the  major-general  coninianding  the  Union  forces,  info 
which  he  was  only  too  ready  to  fall.  Gen.  Porter  nevertheless  c.xi)rosse(l 
his  desire  to  carry  out  the  order  sent  him  ;  hut  his  division  commanders, 
Morell,  Sykes,  arid  Butteriield,  all  experienced  soldiers  and  of  approved 
ioyalty.  counselled  delay  of  a  few  hours,  maintaining  that  nothing  would 
])e  lost,  hut  everything  gained  thereby. 

Gen.  Porter,  yielding"  reluctantly  to  their  advice,  changed  the  hour 
for  starting  to  3  o'clock,  and  his  troops  began  to  move  at  tliat  hour. 
Even  then'the  delays  on  account  of  darkness  and  the  obstructions  en- 
countered in  the  shape  of  wagon-trains,  artillery,  and  the  like,  proved 
conclusively  the  wisdom  of  his  subordinates. 

We  reached  Bristoe  shortlv  after  8  o'clock  in  the  morning,  and  were 
all  in  line  by  10  o'clock.  We  had  marched  10  miles;  and  McDowell, 
Kearney,  and  Tleno,  who  had  been  ordered  down  to  Bristoe  and 
Manassas  to  help  bag  the  rebel  army,  (at  that  time  taking  up  jM^sition 
In  the  neighhorhood  of  Groveton.)  and  who  had  no  obstructed  roads 
to  travel, "and  the  last  two  of  whom  had  but  five  miles  to  come,  did 
not  reach  the  designated  place  sooner  than  we. 

And  McDowell  lost  himself  by  the  way  and  did  not  get  up  at  all. 

They  were  ordered  to  march  ••  at  the  earliest  blush  of  dawn,"  the 
order  having  been  issued  two  and  a  half  hours  later  than  that  to  Gen. 
Porter.  They  had  open  roads  and  daylight  all  the  way,  and  yet  we  all 
arrived,  except  McDowell,  at  about  the  same  tune,  we  being  ahead,  if 
an\'thing. 

If  the  object  in  view  was  a  combined  movement  against  the  enemy, 
what  more  could  liave  been  required  ? 

The  movement  proved  unnecessary.  In  tact,  the  necessity  ibr  it  had 
never  existed  at  all.  On  his  arrival  Gen.  Porter  was  informed  ]:)y  Pope 
that  Ewell's  division  (the  one  to  he  bagged)  had  withdrawn  in  the  night 
towards  Manassas.  Pope  also  stated  that  he  intended  starting  with  a 
portion  of  his  force  to  '-beat  up  the  enemy,"  (which  was  equivalent  to 
an  admission  that  his  whereabouts  were  unknown.)  and  lelt  about  11 
o'clock  upon  that  undertaking. 

We  all  know  how  successful  he  was  upon  that  expedition.  Before 
nightfall  he  did  "beat  up  the  enemy"  in  a  mauner  and  location  feai- 
fully  disastrous  to  himself 

It  is  worthy  of  note  that  Gen.  Porter  reported  to  Gen.  Po[)e  the 
chanGce  in  the  hour  for  starting  from  Warrenton,  and  the  reasons  tliere- 
for,  almost  directly  upon  receipt  of  the  order. 

No  exception  was  taken  to  the  modification,  and  I  contend  that, 
under  the  discretion  vested  in  commanding  officers  of  large  bodies  of 
troops,  Gen.  Porter  did  no  more  than  he  had  a  perfect  right  to  do  under 
the  circumstances,  and  did  right. 

And  yet  disobedience  of  this  order  was  one  of  the  charges  bi-ought 
against  Gen.  Porter,  and  upon  which  he  was  tried. 

McDowell  was  not  ijlamed  for  not  obeying  the  order  to  him  and  fail- 
ing to  get  up  at  all — nor  were  Kearney  and  Reno  censured  because  they 
were  less  diligent  in  obeying  their  orders,  or  because  they  failed  to 
march  live  miles  sooner  than  Porter  marched  ten.  Porter  was  the  only 
one  upon  whom  the  heavy  hand  of  his  chief's  displeasure  fell  when  Pope 


got  it  through  his  thick  skull  that,  in  order  to  save  himself,  some  one 
must  be  sacrificed. 

The  al'ternoon  of  the  28th  found  Pope  hunting  for  the  enemy  in  tin- 
vicinity  of  Centreville,  where  there  was  no  enemy,  and  some  of  PopcV 
choicest  troops  being  cut  to  pieces  by  the  foe  between  Manassas  and 
Groveton  or  Gainesville,  where  the  commanding-general  of  the  Unioi. 
forces  insisted  there  was  no  foe. 

Pope's  only  anxiety  seemed  to  be  to  got  behind  J3ull  Run;  hence  \i'u 
desire  to  march  to  Centreville.  Porter  hit  the  nail  on  the  head  when  Ik, 
remarked,  in  one  of  liis  dispatches  to  Gen.  Burnside,  "•  We  are  working 
now  to  get  behind  Bull  Run,  and  I  presume  will  be  there  in  a  few  day&. 
if  strategy  don't  use  us  up.  The  strategy  is  magniticent,  and  tactics  in 
the  inverse  proportion." 

On  the  morning  of  the  29tli,  after  sunrise,  Gen.  Porter  received  the 
following  order; 

IIeadquartkrs  Army  uk  Virginia. 

Near  Bull  1?un,  Anr/ud  29,  1SG2,  '3  a.  m. 
General  :  McDowell  iius  interccpU'd  tlio  n^ncut  of  Jackson.  Siijei  is  injmcdiatt'ly 
on  the  ric'lit  of  Mt-Dowell.  lv<>arii('v  iinil  llooUcr  marcli  to  attack  the  enemy's  reur 
at  early  dawn.  Major-General  Pope  directs  j-on  to  iiu)ve  npon  Centreville  at  the 
first  dawn  of  day  witli  your  wliole  command,  leaving  your  trains  to  follow.  It  ik 
very  important  that  yon  slionld  bo  here  at  a  very  early  liour  in  the  morning.  A 
severe  engagement  is  likely  to  take  place,  and  yonr  presence  is  necessary. 
I  am,  General,  very  rcspectfullv,  your  obedient  servant, 

GEORGE   D.   KUGGLES. 

Colonel  and  Cliief  of  SlatT. 
Major-General  Porter. 

From  this  order  it  appeared  that  Gen.  McDowell,  who  liad  mysteri- 
ously lost  himself  the  day  previous,  had  been  found  again,  and  was  at 
that  moment  intercepting  the  retreat  of  the  rebel  Jackson. 

The  order  is  dated  near  Bull  Run,  (that  seemed  l^ope's  hobby,)  and 
the  rear  of  the  enemy  was  to  be  attacked  at  early  dawn.  Porter  was 
to  move  upon  Centreville  at  the  iirst  dawn  of  day,  &c.,  &c. 

i^o  wonder  Gen,  Porter  was  surprised  upon  receipt  of  such  an  order. 
So  would  any  one  have  been,  knowing,  as  he  did,  that  the  enemy  were 
in  an  entirely  different  direction.  The  order  carried  him  directly  away 
from  the  field  of  action  with  all  his  troops,  and  he  knew  it. 

Gen.  Pope  might  have  made  himself  aware  t)f  the  same  facts  h:id  hv 
but  chosen  to  avail  himself  of  the  means  at  hand  and  exercise  a  littL- 
foresight  and  common  sense.  Jackson  was  expecting  Longstreet  anx- 
iously, eagerlj', — needed  his  assistance, — and  was  not  apt  to  make  a 
movement  calculated  to  take  him  farther  and  farther  away  from  th< 
coming  relief.  Instead  of  going  to  Centreville  he  would  naturally,  i' 
not  from  necessity,  have  gone  in  the  direction  of  Groveton  or  Gaines- 
ville.    Thus  a  private  soldier  would  have  reasoned,  but  not  so  Pope. 

At  Manassas  Junction  Gens.  Porter  and  McDowell  met.  They  dif-- 
cussed  the  situation,  and  each  learned  from  the  other  the  facts  witliit; 
his  knowledge.  It  appears  from  their  respective  statements  that  both 
were  equally  surprised  at  the  rapidly  succeeding  and  contradictory 
orders  of  their  superior  officer. 

Neither  of  them  (^ould  understand  from  the  dispatches  directed  to 
them  the  objects  of  the  movements  they  were  required  to  make,  and 


officers  placed  in  their  situations,  to  act  intelligently  necessarily  required 
such  information.  Gen.  Porter,  while  carrying  out  the  order  above 
given,  had  received  repeated  messages  to  hasten  to  Oentreville,  where 
a  great  battle  was  expected,  posting  a  force  at  Bull  Euii  bv  the  way. 
Gen.  McDowell,  the  day  before,  (the  28th,)  had  been  ordered,  first,  to 
march  with  his  whole  force  to  Manassas;  second,  to  march  upon  Oen- 
treville ;  third,  to  march  upon  Gum  Spring,  the  enemy  being,  as  was 
probably  known  to  every  one  hut  Pope,  between  Gainesville  and 
Grovetou. 

Porter,  as  I  have  stated,  was,  at  the  time  of  his  meeting  with  Gen. 
McDowell,  on  his  way  to  Oentreville,  in  obedience  to  Gen,  Pope's  order 
of  3  A.  M.  of  the  29th.  Some  of  his  troops  had  already  passed  Manassas 
Junction  when  he  received  a  new  order,  first  verbal,  afterwai'ds  in 
writing,  as  follows: 

HlCADQUARTERS   ABMY  OF  VIRGINIA, 

Oentreville,  August  29.  1862. 
Push  forwiiid   witii  your  corps  and  King's  division,  whicii  you   will   t:ilce  with 
you,  upon  Gainesville.     I  am  following  the  enemy  down  the  Warronton  turnpike. 
Be  expeditious,  or  we  will  lose  much.  JOIIX   POPE. 

Major-Genenil  Conjuianding. 

Pope  had  evidently  given  up  the  idea  of  finding  the  enemy  at  Oen- 
treville; in  fact,  had  doubtless  had  some  glimmer  of  the  truth  beaten 
into  his  brain  by  the  pounding  of  cannon  in  the  direction  of  Gaines- 
ville, and  hence  sought  to  interpose  a  large  force  near  that  point  be- 
tween Jackson,  whom  he  had  reason  to  suppose  was  there,  and  Long- 
street,  who  was  coming  or  had  come  through  Thoroughfare  Gap  with 
his  wing  of  the  rebel  army. 

It  is  proper  here  to  mention  the  fact  that  Gens,  liicketts  and  King, 
with  a  combined  force  of  some  17,000  men,  had  been  sent  to  the  Gap 
to  hold  Longstreet  in  check,  but  had,  without,  or  rather  in  violation 
of  orders,  withdrawn  their  commands  on  the  ai'ternoon  or  night  of  the 
28th,  and  this  without  any  effort  on  their  part  to  obstruct  Longsl reefs 
advance. 

The  way  thus  left  open,  the  rebels  came  through  the  pass  the  same 
night  it  was  vacated  by  the  Union  troops,  as  above  stated,  and  during 
the  morning  of  the  29th,  and  were  well  on  their  roulse  to  reinforce 
Jackson  in  the  vicinity  of  Groveton  at  about  the  time  Pope  was  hunt- 
ing for  the  last  named  in  the  direction  of  Oentreville-. 

The  situation,  so  far  as  it  concerns  this  narrative,  was,  upon  the  morn- 
ing of  August  29,  when  Porter  received  the  order  to  march  upon 
Gainesville  and  take  King  with  him,  aljout  as  follows:  King,  with 
9,000  men,  was  at  Manassas  Junction  ;  F:*orter  was  also  there,  a  portion 
of  his  troops  having  passed  that  point  on  the  way  to  Oentreville. 

Longstreet  had  passed  through  Thoroughfare  Gap,  his  army  extend- 
ing from  a  little  south  of  the  Manassas  Gap  Railroad  in  a  northerly  or 
northeasterly  direction  toward  Groveton,  where  the  right  of  Jackson 
rested.  Jackson  occupied  a  line  extending  from  near  Groveton  to  the 
vicinity  of  Sudley's  Springs. 

Sigel  and  Rej'nolds  were  confronting  Jackson  near  Groveton ;  Heint- 
zelman  an(i  Reno  were  moving  up  from  Oentreville  to  their  support, 


9 

aiKl  Ricketts  was  on  tho  road  falling  hack  IVoni  Gainesville  to  Manassas 
Junction  by  way  of  Bristoe. 

Buford,  with  his  cavalry,  who  had  been  to  Thoroughfare  Gap  with 
Ricketts,  was  on  the  same  road  near  Gainesville  watching  Longstreet. 
Pope  himself  was  at  Centreville,  six  miles  from  Manassas  Junction. 

The  distance  from  Manassas  Junction  to  Gainesville  is  eight  miles, 
and  from  Gainesville  to  Thoroughfare  Gap  six  miles. 

Longstrcct's  force  was  about  "25,000  strong;  that  of  Porter  (Morell. 
Sjkes,  and  King)  about  17,000. 

A  portion  of  Longstreet's  command — seventeen  regiments,  one  bat- 
tery, and  five  hundred  cavalry — had  passed  through  Gainesville  before 
9  o'clock  of  the  29th,  as  was  reported  by  Gen.  Buford,  thus  showing 
that  a  considerable  force  of  the  enemy  had  alread}'  anticipated  Pope 
in  liis  occupation  of  that  position. 

On  i-eceipt  of  the  verbal  order  to  move  on  Gainesville,  Gen.  Porter 
set  his  troops  in  motion,  Morell's  division  leading,  and  met  Longstreet's 
advance  about  11  or  11-J  o'clock  a  mile  and  a  half  or  two  miles  in  a 
westerly  direction  from  Bethlehem  church  and  some  six  oi*  seven  miles 
from  Alanassas  Junction. 

Morell  inmiediately  formed  his  division  along  the  course  of  a  small 
stream  (Dawkin's  Branch)  on  the  southerly  side  of  the  Manassas  Gap 
Railroad,  his  line  occupying  the  east  side  of  a  small  valley  and  com- 
manding the  opposite  slope.  On  the  left  the  valley  was  open,  debouch- 
ing into  a  cleared  country,  but  upon  the  other  sides  it  was  surrounded 
by  timber  and  a  thick  growth  of  brush-wood. 

The  regiment  to  which  I  had  the  honor  to  belong  [13th  K".  Y.  Vols.. 
1st  Biig.,  1st  (Morell's)  Div.]  was  deployed  as  skirmishers  as  early  as 
12  o'clock,  and  advanced  across  the  valley,  passing  over  Dawkin's 
Branch  and  nearly  up  to  the  timber  crowning  the  slope  opposite  to  that 
upon  whicli  our  troops  were  deployed.  In  the  meantime  a  section  of 
artillery  had  been  run  up  by  the  rebels  upon  an  eminence  slightly  to 
our  right,  near  Carrico's  house,  and  opened  fire. 

These  guns  were  soon  silenced  by  one  of  our  own  batteries,  but  sub- 
sequently they  or  some  others  were  again  opened  on  us  farther  to  our 
right. 

From  our  advanced  position  as  skirmishers  we  were  easily  able  to 
determine  that  we  had  in  our  immediate  front  a  considerable  force  oi' 
the  enemy;  and  Porter,  knowing  Longstreet  to  have  passed  the  Gmji, 
knowing  that  a  large  force  of  rebels  had  passed  through  Gainesville  as 
early  as  SI-  or  9  o'clock  that  morning,  at  once;  judged  the  foe  opposed 
to  us  to  be  a  part  of  Longstreet's  command. 

The  enemies  of  Gen.  Porter  have  endeavored  to  secure  credit  for  tho 
story  started  by  them  that  the  only  force  we  had  in  our  front  consisted 
of  a  few  cavalrymen  galloping  up  and  down  and  a  number  of  mules 
dragging  brush  along  the  roads  to  cause  a  dust.  The  falsity  of  that, 
story  is  known  to  every  man  who  was  under  Porter  that  day  and  who 
was  in  the  vicinity  of  Dawkin's  Branch.  We  had  seen  too  much  ser- 
vice on  the  Peninsula  not  to  l)e  able  to  distinguish  between  a  regi- 
ment of  itifajitry  and  I)rush  heaps,  or  between  the  galloping  of  a  few 
cavalry  and  the  rumble  of  army  wagons  and  artillery  supplemented  by 


10 

(he  tramp  of  arincd  men.     i3esides,  we  had  ocular  demonstration  of 
the  fact  that  the  enemy  were  before  us  in  force — we  saw  them. 

It  was  abont  this  time  (noon  of  the  29th)  when  Gen.  Porter  received 
wljat  is  known  as  the  "joint  order"  to  himself  and  McDowell,  and 
which  is  as  follows: 

HEADQUAKTERS   AllJIY  OF  ViRGIXIA, 

Centkkville.  Aitfjiist  29,  18G'2. 
[Goneral  Onlor  Xo.  5.] 

r,..iu;iiils  McDowelIj  and  Porter. 

Yon  will  please  iiKive  forward  with  your  joint  commands  towards  Gainesville.  I 
sent  Gen.  Poi'ter  written  orders  to  that  olVeet  an  lionr  and  a  lialf  aj;o.  lleintzel- 
inan,  8iir«l,  and  Keno  are  movin,;^:  on  the  Warrenton  tm-npike,  and  must  now  be 
not  far  from  Gainesville.  T  desire  that,  as  soon  as  eoinmnnication  is  established 
betwecui  this  force  and  your  own,  the  whole  command  shall  halt.  It  may  be  neces- 
sary to  fall  back  bt^hind"  Bull  Hun,  at  Centreville,  to-night.  I  presume  it  will  be  so, 
on  accoinit  of  our  supplies.  I  have  sent  no  orders  oE  any  description  toRlcketts, 
:ind  none  to  interfere  in  any  way  with  the  mov(MTients  of  McDowell's  troops,  except 
what  I  sent  by  his  aid-de-camii  last  night,  which  were  to  hold  his  position  on  the 
Warrenton  pike  nntil  the  troo))S  from  here  siionld  fall  upon  the  enemy's  tlank  and 
rear.  I  do  not  evi-n  know  Ricketts'  position,  as  I  have  not  been  able  to  Ihid  out 
where  Gen.  McDowell  was  nntil  a  late  hour  this  morning.  Gen.  McDowell  will  take 
immediate  steps  to  comnnmieate  with  Gen.  Ricketts.  and  instruct  him  to  n^join  the 
*)tiier  divisions  of  his  corps  as  .soon  as  pnicticable.  If  any  considerable  ;idvantages 
ire  to  be  gained  by  departing  from  tiil^  order  it  will  not  be  strictly  can-ied  out.  One 
thing  nnist  be  held  in  viiiw,  that  the  troops  must  occnpy  a  position  from  wiiich  they 
can  reach  Bull  Run  to-night  or  by  morning.  The  indications  are  that  th(;  whole 
force  of  the  enemy  is  moving  in  this  direction  at  a  pace  that  will  bring  them  here 
by  to-morrow  night  or  next  day.  My  own  headquarters  will  be  for  the  present  witli 
lieinlzidnKin's  corps  '^''  at  this  place. 

jonx  POPE, 

Major-General  (commanding. 

This  order,  like  some  of  those  which  had  preceded  it,  showed  that  Pope 
was  determined  to  lie  upon  the  safe  side  of  Bull  Run  in  the  event  of  a 
retreat  becoming  necessary.  It  was  dated  at  Centreville,  twelve  or 
fourteen  miles  from  Gainesville,  as  far  away  from  the  scene  of  action 
as  possible  without  tixinsf  upon  its  author  the  charge  of  cowardice. 

When  the  order  was  received  McDowell  and  Porter  were  too;ethor, 
and  the  former  being  the  ranking  oliicer,  at  once  assumed  conmiand  of 
Iho  Joint  forces  of  Porter  and  King. 

He  at  the  same  tiiTie  informed  Porter  of  Bulbrd's  report,  already  re- 
lVnx'<l  to,  concerning  the  passage  of  rebel  troops  through  Gainesville. 

This  information  confirmed  Porter's  previous  knowledge  of  Long- 
streei's  movements,  and  satisfied  him  that  it  was  the  corps  of  that  gen-> 
eral  now  opposed  to  him. 

It  is  to  1)6  o'oserved  that  the  "joint  order"  required  Porter  and  Mc- 
]';owell  to  move  forward  with  their  commands  towards  GainesviUe, 
estal)h.sh  coniiiiunication  with  Hcintzclmau.  Sigel,  and  Reno,  then — 
hiilt. 

Ft  is  also  to  be  ol^served  that  8.000  men — a  small  army — were  knock- 
i!>g  about  the  country  soniewhei'e  under  Gen.  Ricketts,  (at  what  point 
or  in  wliat  direction  Pope  did  not  know,)  and  that  for  some  time  pre- 
vious the  whereabouts  of  Gen.  McDowell  himself  had  been  unknown 
to  the  leader  whose  "headquarters"  were  "in  the  saddle,"  and  who 
should  have  kept  his  men  in  view,  even  though  compelled  now  and 
then  to  lose  .sight  of  a  sceneral. 


11 

Commeut  upon  such  generalship  as  that  displayed  by  Pope,  as  shown 
by  hi(5  own  admissions,  is  unnecessary,  and  would  be  an  impertinence 
to  the  undei'standiiig  of  the  commonest  soldier  in  the  ranks. 

The  '-joint  order"  was  directed  to  McDowell  as  well  as  Porter,  and, 
if  anything,  was  more  imperative  upon  the  former,  as  he  was  the  rank- 
iiig  othcer.  But  McDowell  saw  proper  to  disobey  the  order,  or  to  in- 
terpret it  in  a  manner  to  suit  himself;  and  hence,"after  having  directed 
a  disposition  of  Porter's  immediate  command,  withdrew,  taking  King 
and  his  9,000  men  with  him. 

This  withdrawal  left  ]\)rter  in  command  of  his  two  divisions,  (Mor- 
oll's  and  Sykes'.)  aggregating  some  8,000  or  9,000  men,  and  devolved 
upon  him  the  necessity  (^f  exercising  his  own  judgment  and  discretion 
in  further  carrying  out  the  order.  One  thing  he  was  compelled  to  bear 
in  mind,  viz.:  that  he  must  hold  himself  in  readiness  to  fall  back  behind 
Bull  Pun  by  that  night  or  next  morning;  Bull  Run  and  Ccntrevillc 
evidently  being  Pope's  strong  points — hh  forte,  if  he  had  any. 

After  McDowell  left.  Gen.  I'orter  contiiuied  making  his  dispositions 
for  attack,  and  sent  word  to  Gen.  King  not  to  leave."  Then  came  the 
following  message  from  Gen.  McDowell: 

••Give  my  coniplinK'Ufs  to  Gcii.  Porter,  ami  s;iy  I  nm  i^oinnr  to  tlio  y]^ht  ami  sliall 
t;iki'  Ki'ii:  with  mr.  XL-  [Pori.'i]  had  bi'ttcr  remain  wliorc  he  is,  but  if  necessary  to 
f:ill  h.H'k,  lie  can  do  so  on  tuy  left.'' 

This  message  was  in  all  respects  equivalent  to  an  order.  McDow(>ll, 
the  ranking  otiicer,  had  abrogated  the  joint  order  by  withdrawing  him- 
self and  half  of  the  joint  command ;  and  what  else  could  Gen.  Porter  do 
besides  using  his  own  judgment  in  disposing  of  his  own  command,  and 
conforming  to  the  plan  adopted  by  AlcDowell  in  withdrawing  King 
and  promising  to  put  him  on  Porter's  right,  and  thereby  to  complete 
the  connections  enjoined  in  the  order? 

McDcnvell's  withdrawal  set  another  considerable  fragment  of  the 
Union  army  floating  around  loose  until  evening,  and,  jxiraphrasing  u 
well-known  saying,  "[)ut  it  where  it  would  do  the  least  good." 

Gen.  Porter's  force  being  thus  depleted,  he,  as  a  wise  and  experi- 
enced general,  exercising  the  discretion  vested  in  him  when  McDowell 
withdrew,  (and  by  the  "joint  order"  itself  for  that  matter,)  resolved  to 
stand  u[»on  the  defensive  until  ordered  to  do  otherwise,  or  circum- 
stances made  a  change  necessary  or  desirable.  He  knew  he  had  a 
large  force  of  the  enemy  in  his  front  (Longstreet's  corps),  and  knew 
that  to  attack  25,000  with  otie-third  that  number  would  but  court  the 
disaster  of  defeat  sure  to  follow. 

I  repeat.  Porter  fmeio  the  situation.  In  was  no  mere  guess-work  with 
him,  as  with  Pope.  He  understood  the  situation  and  adopted  the 
wisest  and  only  proper  coui'se  under  the  circumstances.  The  force  in 
his  front  prevented  Porter  from  marching  toward  Groveton  except  i)V 
retracing  his  steps — falling  back,  as  did  McDowell — and  he  couKl  not, 
therefore,  form  a  junction  with  Sigel,  Reno,  and  Ileintzelnum,  that 
duty  having  been  assumed  by  McDowell ;  but  at  the  same  time  his 
presence  was  a  menace  to  the  rebels,  and  kept  Longstreet  from  uniting 
with  Jackson.  In  i;w't..  Porter's  generalship  delayed  for  a  day  the  deie:il 
of  Pope's  army  l>y  holding  thi'  reinforcements  of  the  enemy  in  clieck. 


12 

Yet  Porter  is  censured  for  his  conduct  on  that  day,  the  29th  of  Au- 
gust. One  of  the  charges  made  against  him  h}'  Pope  was,  that  he  dis- 
obeyed the  "joint  order"  to  him  and  McDowell. 

All  I  have  to  say  upon  tliis  point  is,  that  if  anybody  disobeyed  that 
oi'der  it  was  McDowell,  not  Porter,  and  the  roppcctive  movements  of 
the  two  commanders  establish  that  fact.  As  proot  of  Gen.  I\)rtcr's 
wish  to  carry  out  the  order  of  Gen.  Pope,  I  will  give  one  dispatch 
which  the  former  sent  to  the  commander  of  his  ni-sl  division  after  the 
departure  of  McDowell : 

"Gen.  ^roRKIjL :  Piisli  over  to  tli(-  aid  of  Sigel  and  strike  in  Iiis  real-.  If  ym! 
reach  a  road  up  whicli  King  is  movini;^,  and  lu'  lias  oot  aiiead  of  yon,  let  liini  pass. 
l)nt  see  if  yon  cannot  u^ive  help  to  Sigcl.  If  yon  find  him  retiring,  move  baeli  to- 
wtirds  Manassas,  and  siionid  necessity  reqnii-e  it,  and  yon  do  not  hear  from  me.  pnsh 
to  Centreville.  If  yon  find  the  direct  road  filled,  take  the  one  via  Union  Mills,  which 
is  to  the  right  as  yon  letnrii.  F.  J.  PORTER,  Major-Geneial. 

"Look  to  the  points  of  the  compass  for  Manassas.  F.  J.  PORTER.'" 

This  order  is  of  itself  sufficient  to  relieve  Gen.  Porter  of  any  charge 
of  willful  disobedience,  and  when  the  force  of  the  enemy  in  his  front  is 
considered,  he  is  deserving  of  commendation  rather  than  blame  for  his 
.on  duct. 

Tliat  he  did  not  succeed  in  opening  communication  with  Sigel  was 
?io  fault  of  his,  but  was  attributable  to  the  conformation  of  the  country 
and  other  physical  obstructions,  and  to  the  fact  that  Longstrcet  with 
iiis  army  presented  an  obstacle  too  serious  to  be  overcome  by  the  troops 
at  Porter's  command,  and  just  at  that  time  (when  the  order  was  given) 
was  threatening  an  attack  upon  him. 

I  now  come  to  consider  the  famous  4.30  p.  m.  order,  of  which  much 
has  been  said,  and  for  the  alleged  disobedience  of  which  Gen.  Porter 
has  been  most  strongly  condemned. 

As  already  stated,  after  McDowell  withdrew,  taking  King's  division 
with  him.  Porter  remained  with  his  troops  in  position  confronting 
Longstreet,  his  skirmishers  beinoj  continuallv  eno;a2:ed  in  feelin<r  and 
pressing  the  enemy. 

McDowell  was  kept  informed,  so  far  as  practicable,  of  the  condition 
of  affairs,  and  in  the  afternoon  Gen.  Porter  sent  word  to  Gen.  Popc' 
asking  for  infortnation  and  orders,  informing  liirn  at  the  same  time 
that  Morell  would  soon  be  engaged. 

About  6  o'clock,  information  having  been  received  from  the  viglu. 
wing  that  the  enemy  were  retreating  up  the  Warrenton  pike.  Gen. 
I'orter  ordered  an  attack,  which  Gen.  ^lorcll  began  to  execute,  but  at 
the  same  time  expressing  the  conviction  that  the  order,  it"  carried  out, 
would  result  disastrously,  the  enemy  being  so  strong  in  his  tVont  and 
showing  no  signs  of  retreating  or  abandoning  their  position,  but,  on  the 
contrary,  were  strengthening  it. 

The  following  is  the  order  of  Gen.  Porter  above  referred  to  : 

■'Gen.  Morell  :  I  wish  yon  to  pnsli  np  two  regiments,  snpponed  l)y  two  others, 
preceded  by  skirmishers,  the  regiments  at  intervals  of  two  hnndred  yards,  antl  ntlack 
the  party  with  the  si-ction  of  a rtillerj' opposed  to  .yon.  The  battle  looks  well  on  onr 
right,  r.nd  the  enemy  are  saiil  to  be  retiring  np  the  pike.  Give  tlie  ei'.emy  a  :;')(>. I 
shelling  when  onr  troops  advance.  '       F.  J.  POR'l'EH,  Major-Geiieral." 

This  order  was  issued  by  Gen.  Porter  on  receipt  by  liim  of  a  i-cr)ort 
that  the  en'^my  were  retreating,  and  which,  if  true,  showed  that  the 


13 

Itiittlo  was  looking  well  on  the  ri2;ht,  or,  in  other  words,  that  Sigel 
and  his  supports  were  driving  the  rehels  up  the  Warrenton  pike  past 
Morel I's  [)()sitioii. 

A.  personal  examination  of  the  situation  by  Gen.  Porter  shortly  after 
he  issued  the  order  to  advance  contirmed  ^lorell's  statements  as  to  the 
danger  and  bad  policy  of  a  forward  movement.  He  became  fully 
;;atistied  that  the  enemy  were  not  retreating,  as  had  been  reported  to 
him,  and,  therefore,  in  view  of  the  nearness  of  night  (it  was  then  about 

0  o'clock)  and  of  the  facts  above  stated,  he  issued  the  following  order 

placing  the  troops  in  position  for  the  night : 

•'Gen.  Morell  :  Pcit  3-om-  iik-ii  in  position  to  irmuin  dnriiii;  tiic  nifiht,  .and 
liav(!  ()  it.  yoiu-  [tickets.     Put  thcni  so  tli.'it  tlu-y  will  bo  in  position  to  resist  anything. 

1  am  about  a  mile  from  you.  jMcDowoH  says  all  goes  well  and  we  are  getling  the 
best  of  the  tight.  I  wish  yon  would  send  ine  a  dozen  men  from  the  cavalry.  Keep 
me.  informed.  'rroo[)S  arc  passing  up  to  Gainesville,  pushinii'  the  eiieniv;  Ricketts 
has  gone,  also  King.  F.  J.  PORTER,  Major-General." 

There  is  not  a  word  in  the  above  order  that  even  hints  at  a  retreat. 
On  the  contrary,  it  conveys  the  impression  by  its  very  language  that 
i'orter  intended  to  remain  there  until  forcibly  driven  back  or  ordered 
away  by  his  superior  officer.  He  had  been  sent  to  stay,  and  intended 
doing  so,  as  his  order  to  Morel  I  clearly  indicated. 

We  on  the  skirmish  line  did  not  fall  back  at  all,  but  picketed  the 
front  until  we  marched  the  next  morning.  The  rest  of  our  force  lay 
within  easy  supporting  distance  upon  the  high  ground  to  our  rear. 
Porter  himself  was  on  the  field  only  a  short  distance  from  Morell,  and 
thus  matters  were  when  Lieut.  Weld,  whom  he  had  dispatched  to  Gen. 
Pope,  returned. 

This  was  between  sundown  and  dark,  or,  to  be  more  precise,  a  httlo 
after  tl  o'clock  P.  M. 

Lieut.  AVeld,  as  he  informed  Gen.  Porter,  had  delivered  the  note  to 
Gen.  I\)pe  near  Grovetou,  but  brought  back  no  commands  and  but 
little  information. 

After  his  return,  however.  Gen.  Porter  received  the  following: 

Headquarters  in  the  Field, 

Avgnst^2^,  186-2— 4:;{0  p.  u. 
Tour  line  of  march  brings  you  in  on  the  enemy's  flunk.  I  desire  you  to  push  for- 
ward into  action  at  once  on  the  enemy's  right  flank,  and,  if  i)0ssible,  on  his  rear, 
keeping  vonr  right  in  connuiuru'ation  with  Gen.  Reynolds.  Tlie  enemy  is  mas.sed 
in  the  "voi, (Is  in  front  of  us,  but  he  can  be  shelled  out  as  soon  as  you  engage  their 
tlank.  Keep  heavy  reserves  and  use  your  batteries,  keeping  well  closed  to  your  right 
all  the  time.  In  case  yon  are  obliged  to  fall  back,  do  so  to  3'onr  right  an<l  rear,  so 
a<  to  keeii  von  in  close  connnuni^ation  with  the  right  wing. 

JOHN   POPE, 
Major-General  Comniai-.din'^. 
Major-Geiieral    PoRTER. 

This  is  the  4.30  p.  31.  order  upon  which  so  much  stress  is  laid  by  Pope 
and  his  adherents,  and  it  is  for  the  alleged  disobedience  of  this  order, 
more  than  any  other,  that  the  hand  of  public  censure  has  been  most 
heavily  laid  upon  him  to  whom  it  was  directed. 

There  are  two  questions  involved  in  the  consideration  of  this  order, 
viz.:  1st.  The  exact  time  of  its  reception  by  Gen.  Porter;  2d.  The  ex- 
act situittion  of  affairs  at  the  time  it  was  received. 

And  lirst,  as  to  the  date  of  its  reception :  Pope  insists  it  must  have  been 


14 

delivered  to  Gen.  Porter  between  5  and  half-piist  5  in  the  ai'ternooti. 
basing  his  behef  upon  the  hour  of  its  date  and  tlie  etatenicnt  of  the 
person  who  carried  it.    Porter  alleges  that  he  received  it  after  G.30  p.  m. 

I  believe  the  time  fixed  by  Gen.  Porter  to  be  correct,  and  for  the 
following  reasons: 

1st.  llie  person  who  carried  the  note  did  not  look  at  his  watch  or 
tinje  himself,  and  in  the  then  condition  of  the  roads,  blocked  up  as  they 
were  liy  moving  bodies  of  troops,  the  messenger  was  more  apt  to  be 
detained  by  the  way,  and,  besides,  he  was  not  familiar  with  the  country, 
and,  judging  from  his  testimony,  could  hardly  have  proceeded  in  any- 
thing like  a  direct  course. 

2d.  It  is  clearly  established  that  the  order  had  not  been  received  by 
Gen.  Porter  up  to  the  hour  of  the  return  of  his  aid  from  Gen.  l\)[)e, 
which  was  after  6  o'clock. 

3d.  I  remember  distinctly  the  movements  made  about  0  o'clock, 
when  Gen.  Porter  oi'dered  \lorell  to  advance  and  attack  the  enemy, 
anfl  it  was  nearly  dark  when  orders  came  for  us  to  resume  position  for 
the  night.     It  was  after  sundown. 

4th.  I  remember  also  of  having  heard,  while  at  the  front,  as  soldic're 
will  hear  such  news,  that  there  had  been  or  was  to  bo  another  order 
for  attack,  but  then  it  was  already  dusk  and  night  close  at  hand.  This 
rumor  must  have  reached  us  on  receipt  by  Porter  of  the  4.30  order; 
and  as  Gen.  Locke  was  inmiediately  dispatched  to  Gen.  Morell  uith 
instructions  to  attack,  the  natural  conclusion  is  that  we  got  the  news  on 
the  picket  line  within  a  few  minutes,  as  there  was  constant  coiumuiii- 
cation  between  us  and  the  main  body. 

The  most  important  evidence,  however,  showing  the  hour  when  (len. 
Porter  received  the  4.30  i*.  m.  order,  is  this: 

Gen.  Porter,  upon  receiving  it,  and  after  having  ordered  Morel  I  lo 
attack  with  his  whole  torce,  acknowledged  its  receipt  in  writing,  sub- 
stantially stating  that  although  he  thought  the  order  had  arrived  too 
late  to  be  executed,  he  would  do  all  that  was  possible  to  carry  it  into 
effect,  &c. 

Gen.  Porter  also  stated  in  the  acknowlexh/nient  of  Gen.  Pope's  order,  or 
upon  the  envelope  containing  it,  the  exact  hoar  when  he  had  received  the  one 
sent  him. 

This  communication  frorii  Gqw.  Porter,  although  Pope  admits  haxing 
received  it,  or  one  substantially  as  set  out,  has  never  been  produced^ 
although  Gen.  Porter  has  earnestly  sought  l)y  every  means  in  his  power 
to  bring  it  to  light. 

This  brief  note  would  confirm  the  guilt  of  Gen.  Porter,  iixing  upon 
him  a  lasting  stain  of  dishoiior  and  disgrace,  or  it  would  establish  his 
innocence  beyond  the  shadow  of  a  doubt.  Why  has  Gen.  Pope  with- 
held it  ?  Of  all  the  voluminous  correspondence  between  him  and  Gen. 
Porter  during  the  memorable  last  three  days  of  August,  this,  the  most 
important  of  all  to  the  cause  of  justice,  alone  is  missing.  Th*e  conclu- 
sion is  irresistible  that  Pope  has  either  willlully  destroyed  or  kept  it 
back;  and  if  such  be  the  case,  the  only  reason  that  can  be  assigned  for 
his  so  doing  is  that  it  would  prove  himself  a  liar  and  Porter  a  deeply- 
injured   person — injured   through  his  instrumentality.      And  in  the 


15 

absence  ot"  that  little  scrap  of  paper,  or  some  more  reasonable  excnse  for 
its  non-production  than  has  yet  been  given,  the  unanimous  verdict  of 
nil  jnst-ininded  persons  must  be  tbat  its  production  would  be  Porter's 
justiiication  ;  and  Justitication  for  Porter  means  condemnation  for  Pope. 

From  the  facts  coming  personally  to  my  knowledge,  and  after  a  full 
and  careful  examination  of  all  the  testimony,  I  am  thoroughly  con- 
vinced that  the  4,30  P.  m.  order  was  not  received  until  too  late  to  be 
executed,  and  that  Gen.  Porter's  failure  to  attack  was  through  no  fault 
or  disobedience  on  his  part. 

The  second  important  question  to  be  considered  is  the  situation — the 
positions  of  the  troops  of  both  armies  at  the  time  when  the  4.30  p.  m. 
order  was  issued  by  Pope,  and  subsequently  when  received  by  Porter. 

The  order  says : 

"Your  line  of  march  brings  yon  in  on  tJie  enemy's  flank.  I  desire  you  to  push 
forward  into  action  at  once  on  tiie  enemy's  right  flank^  and,  if  possible,  on  his  rear, 
keepinij;  yonr  risht  in  communication  with  Gen.  Reynolds.  The  enemy  is  massed 
in  the  woods  in  front  of  us,  but  he  can  he  shelled  out  as  soon  as  you  engage  theh* 
flank." 

At  the  time  Gen.  Pope  wrote  the  above  order,  Longstreet's  right 
extended  vso  far  around  as  to  almost  envelop  Porter's  left  flank,  and 
J  jongstreet's  left  was  within  easy  supporting  distance  of  Jackson's  right 
wing,  which  wo  were  expected  to  attack.  The  gap  between  the  two 
wings  of  the  rebel  army  was  held  by  cavalry  and  artillery. 

And  the  above  had  l)een  the  situation  since  12  o'clock  in  the  day. 

Porter's  line  of  march,  instead  of  bringing  him  in  on  the  enemy's 
(.lackson's)  right  flank,  led  him  against  the  right  centre  of  Longstreet's 
25,000,  drawn  up  in  line  of  battle  across  our  front. 

Pope's  order  presumed:  1st.  That  Longstreet  had  not  arrived ;  2d. 
That  Porter  was  at  least  a  mile  and  a  half  in  advance  of  the  position 
he  really  occupied. 

Both  of  these  presumptions  were  erroneous,  and  clearly  showed  that 
Pope  either  had  no  knowledge  of  the  exact  situation,  or  that  he  was 
not  possessed  of  sufflcient  sense  to  be  governed  by  it. 

Indeed,  it  is  now  a  matter  of  history  that  he  assigned  to  Porter  a 
pOvsition  that  day  which,  at  the  time,  was  actually  occupied  by  Long- 
street's  line  of  battle.  Such  ignorance  or  stupidity,  or  both,  on  the  part 
of  the  commander  of  60,000  soldiers,  is  wholly  inexcusable. 

Between  Porter's  right  and  the  left  of  Reynolds  was  a  gap  of  some 
two  miles,  the  obstacles  lying  lietween  consisting  of  heavy  forests  and 
a  rough  country,  diliicnlt  to  pass  over  for  want  of  roads. 

To"  have  united  with  Keynolds,  Porter  must  have  marched  back  on 
the  route  taken  by  McDowell  earlier  in  the  day;  and  had  he  done  this 
he  might  have  laid  himself  open  to  the  charge  of  retreating  in  the  face 
of  the  enemy,  which  Pope  makes  against  him. 

Had  l\)rter  not  been  hampered  by  the  foe  in  his  immediate  front, 
the  movement  mifjht  have  been  made;  but  as  matters  were  it  was  im- 
possible. Besides,  had  not  McDowell  started  oft'  with  9,000  men  osten- 
>.ibly  to  till  the  gap  between  Porter,  remaining  where  he  was  ordered 
to  sta}',  and  Reynolds  ? 

Porter  could  not  have  withdrawn  without  bringing  on  an  engage- 


16 

ment  disastrous  to  the  Union  arms.  His  9,000  men,  moving  to  the 
rear,  could  not  possible  have  withstood  the  onslaught  of  Ijongstreet's 
25,000. 

Porter  could  not  have  struck  Jackson's  rear,  nor  even  his  right 
flank,  because  to  have  done  so  he  must  have  tirst  overcome  Longstreet, 
who  protected  it. 

Pope,  however,  claimed  then,  and  yet  asserts,  that  there  was  no  con- 
siderable force  of  the  enemy  in  Porter's  front  that  day,  which  only 
goes  to  show  that  a  person  may  wear  the  uniform  of  a  general  and  yet 
be  a  fool. 

Porter  maintained  at  the  time  that  Pope  entirely  misunderstood 
the  situation ;  and  the  evidence  on  his  court-martial,  which  ^yas  suffi- 
cient to  convince  any  but  the  most  pig-headed  that  he  was  right,  has 
since  been  amply  confirmed  by  testimony  not  then  accessible.  I^ong- 
street,  (a  good  republican  now,)  Wilcox,  Hood,  Ewcll,  and  other  prom- 
inent rebel  officers,  must  certainly  know  what  positions  tliey  occLii»ied 
on  the  20th  of  August,  and  they  sustain  Porter  in  every  essential  i>ur- 
ticular. 

And  that  the  enemy  were  in  force  in  Porter's  immediate  vicinity,  is 
amply  shown  by  the  testimony  of  his  own  officers  and  that  of  Gen. 
Buford,  who  had  reported  17  regiments  of  rebel  infantry,  a  battery, 
and  500  cavalry  as  passing  through  Gainesville  before  9  o'clock  in  the 
morning;  and  these  were  some  of  Longstreet's  men. 

AH  these  facts  were  known  to  Porter  when  he  received  the  4.30  p. 
M.  order,  and  had  been  in  his  possession  for  hours  previous ;  hence, 
while  endeavoring  to  carry  out  faithfully  the  orders  of  Pope,  he  was 
obliged,  as  a  careful  commander,  to  consider  things  as  they  actually 
existed,  instead  of  as  the}'  were  supposed  to  be  by  one  who  was  miles 
away  and  had  no  personal  knowledge  of  the  situation. 

Porter  was  right ;  and  for  holding  the  foe  in  check,  as  he  did,  deserves 
praise,  instead  of  the  opprobrium  sought  to  be  cast  upon  him  by  his 
accusers. 

But  Pope  insists  on  another  statement,  viz. :  That  there  was  a  heavy 
battle  progressing  diu'ing  the  entire  day  of  the  29th,  and  that  Porter, 
instead  of  going  to  the  assistance  of  his  brethren  in  the  licld,  marched 
to  the  rear  to  the  sound  of  the  enemy's  cannon. 

Comrades,  this  is  a  serious 'charge  to  make  against  an  officer,  but  it 
becomes  much  more  serious  when  one  reflects  that  it  casts  the  stain  of 
cowardice  or  disloyalty  upon  a  whole  corps.  We  who  were  under  Por- 
ter knew  him  to  be  brave  and  true ;  but  yet  we  would  not  have  per- 
mitted even  him  to  stand  idly  by  while  our  brothers  in  arms  were  being 
slauglitered  and  we  within  reaching  distance. 

And  especially  would  we  have  put  forth  every  effort  to  aid  our  breth- 
ren (if  any  stronger  incentive  than  duty  were  needed)  when,  as  in  the 
instance  referred  to,  they  were  a  part  of  ourselves.  The  gallant  Rey- 
nolds was  Porter's  friend,  and  he  and  his  veteran  heroes  of  the  Penn- 
sylvania Jleserves  belonged  to  the  Fifth  Corps.  Think  you,  comrades, 
that  it  is  }irobable — nay,  is  it  possible — that  we  stood  idly  by  while  they. 
the  men  who  did  so  bravely  and  succored  us  so  gallantly  in  the  flerce 
engagements  upon  the  Peflinsula,  were  being  sacrificed?     No;  you 


17 

do  not, — you  cannot  think  us  guilty  of  such  a  crime.  And  wc  were 
not. 

We  did  not  retreat  to  the  sound  of  the  enemy's  cannon,  hecause,  as 
I  have  ah'cady  shown,  there  was  no  falling  back  on  our  part.  I,  on  the 
skirmish  line,  occupied  the  same  position  when  darkness  set  in  that  I 
did  at  12  o'clock  in  the  day  and  subsequently,  or,  it  anything,  was  more 
advanced. 

We  did  not  fail  or  refuse  to  go  to  the  assistance  of  comrades  engaged 
in  a  heavy  battle,  because  there  was  no  heavy  battle  in  our  vicinity 
during  the  time  specified.  We  heard  the  sounds  of  artillery  firing,  as 
we  had  heard  them  for  a  week  previous;  and  occasionally  we  could 
hear  little  spurts  of  musketry,  both  in  our  own  front  and  from  our  own 
skirmishers,  and  off  on  the  right  toward  Groveton ;  but  there  were 
none  of  the  sounds  of  a  battle  came  to  our  oars  that  day  till  just  at 
dark. 

Gen.  lieynolds,  who  was  two  miles  further  to  our  right  and  that  much 
nearer  the  alleged  scene  of  conflict,  testified  that  he  heard  no  sounds 
of  a  battle.  80  did  others.  Who  shall  be  believed,  the  peerless  soldier 
Reynolds  or  the  braggart  Pope? 

Just  at  nightfall — between,  I  should  judge,  6  and  7  o'clock — there  was 
a  sharp  but  short  engagement  otl"  some  distance  on  our  right. 

We  could  distinctly  hear  the  volleys  of  musketry  and  cheers  of  the 
opposing  forces. 

That  engagement  was  brought  on  between  Gen.  ITatch  and  the  ene- 
my by  McDowell's  order  to  advance,  on  the  supposition  that  the  rebels 
were  in  full  retreat. 

Hatch  moved  ahead,  and,  instead  of  finding  the  enemy  retreating, 
found  them  advancing.  McDowell  persisted  in  his  first  statement,  that 
they  were  falling  back,  but  his  illusion  soon  disappeared  wheti  Hatch, 
with  the  loss  of  nearly  half  his  men,  \vas  compelled  to  retire  from  a 
su[)ertor  foe. 

At  the  time  of  the  above-mentioned  engagement  we  were  some  con- 
siderable distance  away,  with  a  wary  antagonist  in  our  front.  The  tighi 
was  over  long  before  we  could  have  marched  half-way  to  where  it 
occurred,  had  we  been  able  to  have  gotten  rid  of  Longstreet.  Porter 
did  the  only  thing  under  the  circumstances  proper  for  him  to  have 
done — held  to  the  enemy  in  his  front — and  thereby  kept  reinforcements 
from  going  to  the  aid  of  »Tackson. 

Regarding  the  above  occurrences,  I  believe  that  I  liave  only  to  ap- 
peal to  my  comrades  of  the  Fifth  Corps,  and  who  were  with  me  there 
and  then,  to  show  that  I  have  not  misstated  the  facts. 

I  now  pass  on  to  the  events  of  the  next  day.  Early  on  the  morning 
of  the  30th  (about  3  o'clock)  Gen.  Porter  received  an  order  to  march 
to  the  vicinit}'  of  Groveton,  and  reported  to  Gen.  Pope  soon  after  sun- 
rise near  the  crossing  of  the  Warrenton  pike  by  the  Sudley  Spring 
road. 

Old  soldiers  will  remember  the  locality  distinctly  by  the  *'  Old  Stone 
House"  standing  at  the  junction. 

On  the  march,  in  the  darkness  and  through  some  misunderstanding, 
but  no  fault  of  Gen.  Porter's,  GrifUn's  brigade  and  some  1,100  men 
2 


18 

under  Gen.  Pialt,  (the  latter  only  temporarily  attached  to  Porter's  com- 
mand,) became  separated,  marching  to  Pope's  great  strategic  point — 
Centreville — instead  of  turning  at  Bethlehem  Church  and  marching  to 
Groveton. 

Thus  Porter  was  able  to  report  with  only  G.OOO  troops  for  duty, 

I  shall  never  forget  the  magnificent  panorama — magnificent  but  at 
the  same  time  terrible — that  burst  upon  my  sight  as  I  reached  the  high 
ground  south  of  the  Warrcnton  pike,  on  my  way  to  the  battle-held  of 
the  30th  of  August,  1862. 

You  who  were  with  me  remember  it;  and  now,  as  you  read,  there 
rises  up  before  you  a  vision  like  this:  Below  you,  winding  sluggishly 
along  on  its  way  to  Bull  Eun,  a  small  stream;  just  beyond,  parallel 
with  its  course  and  crossing  the  Sudley  Spring  road,  in  which  you  stand, 
at  right  angles,  the  Warrcnton  pike.  Beyond  this,  and  to  your  left  a 
mile  or  little  less,  a  cluster  of  buildings,  or  Groveton ;  and  then,  stretch- 
ing from  those  buildings  far  around  to  the  right  and  across  3'our  path, 
you  behold  a  high,  rolling,  open  plateau  bounded  on  the  farther  side 
by  a  ridge  dotted  with  cannon. 

Beyond  this  ridge,  about  midway  between  Groveton  and  the  Sudley 
Springs  road  running  on  straight  before  you,  are  seen  the  roofs  and 
chimneys  of  Mrs.  Dogan's  house. 

To  the  right  of  the  Sudley  Springs  road,  embowered  in  an  orchard 
interspersed  with  a  few  forest  trees  crowning  a  loft}'  eminence,  you  see 
rising  up  the  lonely  chimneys  of  the  Henry  House — fitting  monuments 
of  the  iii'st  battle  of  Manassas. 

Here  and  there  the  prospect  is  varied  and  its  beauty  enhanced  by 
solitary  trees,  or  small  clusters  of  them,  lifting  their  leafy  crowns  in 
air,  while  life  is  given  to  the  picture  by  moving  columns  of  Idue  coats, 
glancing  bayonets,  galloping  horsemen,  and  all  the  pomp  and  panoply 
of  active  warfare. 

From  the  cannon  on  the  crest  beyond  are  shooting  out  sheets  of 
tlame  and  curling  wreaths  of  vapory  smoke;  and  yet  farther  away,  just 
in  front  of  the  heavy  timber  whose  lofty  tops  here  and  there  show  al)0ve 
the  embattled  heights  of  Groveton,  are  other  guns  from  which  the  bolts 
of  death  come  flying  over  the  marching  columns,  bursting  high  in  the 
air  or  falling  down,  mayhap,  at  your  very  feet. 

Over  all  this  inspiring  and  pulse-thrilling  spectacle  bends  heaven's 
blue  canopy,  flecked  with  light  fleecy  clouds,  through  which  the  golden, 
Ijurniug  rays  of  a  midsummer's  sun  fall  gently  down,  shimmering 
through  the  foliage  of  the  trees,  glancing  lightly  upon  the  rippling 
waters  and  gleaming  with  a  feverish,  fitful  light  upon  the  weapons  of 
friends  and  foemen. 

You  remember,  my  comrades  of  the  Fifth  Corps,  how  we  marched 
down  into  the  valley,  across  the  stream — some  of  us  stopping  to  fiJl  our 
canteens  by  the  way — and  up  the  opposite  slope  beneath  the  dropping 
shells  from  the  enemy's  guns. 

You  remember  when  we  reached  the  line  of  our  artillery.  You  can 
each  doubtless  see  even  now  in  your  mind's  eye  our  line  of  battle  cross- 
ing the  Warrenton  pike  in  the  vicinity  of  Groveton  on  the  left,  and 


19 

extending  around  in  an  irregular  semicircle  to  the  right  until  it  crossed 
the  Sudlcy  Springs  road. 

If  you  do  remember,  I  ask  you  to  follow  me  closely  as  I  attempt  to 
describe  what  subsequently  transpired,  as  I  remember  the  events  and  as 
history  has  recorded  them. 

About  12  o'clock  Gen.  Pope  issued  the  following  order: 

Hkadquartkiis  near  Groveton, 

Aurfust  30.  1802,  VI  M. 
[Special  OrtU'r  No.  — .] 
The  following  forces  will  be  immediately  tlii-owii  forward  in.  jmrsuit  of  the  enemy . 
and  uress  him  viii^oroiisly  duriii:^'  tin',  wiioic;  day  : 

Major-Crcnerai  McDowell  is  as<i;>-iie(l  to  the  command  of  the  pursuit ;  Major-General 
PorLcr's  i-or[)S  will  push  forward  on  the  Warreiitou  turnpike,  followed  by  tiie  divis- 
ions of  ]Jrii;adier-Generals  Kiiit;-  and  Reynolds. 

Th<i  division  of  ]Jrij;adier-G<'neral  Kioketts  will  purine  the  llaymarket  road,  fol- 
lowed b}' the  eorp.s  of  Major-Gcneral  Ileintzelman.  The  necessary  cavalry  will  Iv 
assij,'ned  to  these  columns  by  Major-General  McDowell,  to  whom  n!<;ular"aud  fre- 
quent reports  will  bo  made. 

The  ijeneral  headquarters  will  be  somewhere  on  the  Warreiiton  turnpike. 
Bv  command  of  Major-General  Pope  : 

GEO.  D.  RUGGLES, 
Col.  and  Ciiief  of  Staff. 

And  Gen.  McDowell  the  following: 

Headquarters  3d  Corps,  Army  of  Virginia, 

August  30,  18G2. 
Major-General  McDowell  beinu;  ehari,'ed  witli  the  advanced  forces  ordered  in  pur- 
sue the  enemj/,  (.Wvectn  uie  to  inform  you  tl)atyoiu'  corps  will  be  followed  immediately 
by  Kini>-'s  division,  supported  i>y  Reynolds.  Ileiiilzelman,  wiili  his  co;ps.  iireceded 
by  Ricketts'  division,  will  move  nn  your  riii^lit,  on  the  road  frum  Sndley  Spiinus  to 
Haymarket.  lie  is  instructed  to  I  brow  out  ski-mi-heis  to  tiie  left,  wiiicli  if  is  desir- 
able you  should  join  with  your  ri^iit.  General  ^leDowell's  head(piarters  will  be  at 
_the  head  of  Reynolds'  division,  on  the  Warreuton  road.  Ori;;ani7A!  a  strou2;  advauc*^ 
to  prei-ede  your  command,  and  push  on  rapidly  in  pursuit  of  the  enenij'  until  3'ou 
coiui!  in  (!outact  with  him.  R  -poi'i  freqnenlly.  Hayard's  i>n;;adc  will  be  ordered  to 
report  to  you.  Push  it  w(dl  to  I  he  left  as  you  advance. 
Very  respectfullv,  your  obedient  servant. 

ED.  SCIIRIVER. 

Col.  and  Chief  of  Staff. 
Major-GeiKM-al  PoRTER, 

(.'ommanding,  &c.,  &e. 

Both  of  the  preceding  orders,  as  a  reading  of  them  will  ^liow,  as- 
sumed that  the  enem}'  wei'c  retreating.  In  fact,  it  seems  that  during  all 
that  momentous  campaign  Pope  had  l)ut  two  ideas,  viz.:  One,  that  the 
enemy  were  continually  fall.ng  back; — the  other,  that  he  oiiglit  to  be 
at  Centreville,  which  is  doubtless  the  place  meant  when  he  fixed  his 
headquarters  "somewhere  on  the  Warreuton  pike." 

From  our  elevated  position  on  the  high  gi-ound  we  could  distin- 
guish no  movement  on  the  part  of  the  i-ebels  indicating  a  retreat  on 
their  part;  tmd  Gen.  Porter  took  a  contrary  view  to  that  expi'esscd  in 
the  orders. 

He  nevertheless  set  his  troops  in  motion  to  "pKr.^'/e  the  enoivj.''' 

Now,  allow  mo  to  dcscril)e  more  particularly  the  situation  at  the  time 
the  aliove-stated  movement  was  begun: 

Jackson's  corps  of  the  relx'l  army  occupied  the  line  of  the  abandoned 
Independent  railroad,  his  left  resting  in  the  vicinity  of  Sndley's  Mill?, 
and  his  risrht  to  the  north  and  west  of  Groveton.    LonsTstreet  was-niai'clv- 


20 

ing  down  to  unite  with  him  irom  the  direction  of  Thoroughfare  Gap, 
his  cohiiiin  forming,  wifn  that  of  Jackson,  an  obtuse  angle.  Between 
Jackson  antl  Longstreet,  however,  wlien  the  battle  of  tlie  30th  began, 
there  was  a  small  gap,  thus  leaving  the  right  wing  of  tlie  army  of  the 
former  exposed  to  a  tiaiik  attack  from  the  Union  forces;  but  the  rebel 
leader  had  foreseen  his  weakness  and  strengthened  his  position  by  mass- 
ing his  artillery  at  the  point  of  threatened  danger.  The  Union  forces 
were  within  the  angle  thus  formed  and  to  the  south  and  east  of  it,  their 
lines  facing  w'est  and  north. 

Jackson  was  endeavoring  to  push  his  way  eastward  far  enough  to 
enable  him  to  intercept  Pope's  retreat  on  Washington,  and  Pope  him- 
self was  endeavoring  to  recover  the  position  he  had  lost  by  bad  gener- 
alship and  once  more  reconstruct  his  lines  between  the  enemy  and  the 
capital.  At  the  time  of  which  I  am  writing  his  right  wing  was  nearly 
parallel  with  and  south  of  Jackson's,  thus  bringing  the  latter  nearly 
across  his  line  of  retreat.  We — that  is,  Porter's  corjjs — occupied  the  left 
of  Pope's  line,  which  was  a  little  to  the  eastward  of  and  part  of  it  fac- 
ing Groveton.  We  of  the  1st  brigade  had  the  Warrenton  pike  at  our 
backs  and  the  Independent  railroad  line  in  our  front. 

]^[ow  for  a  more  particular  description  of  the  ground  upon  which  the 
battle  was  fought:  The  high  ground  to  the  west  of  Groveton  was  held 
by  the  enemy,  (the  extreme  right  of  Jackson,)  thus  commanding  the 
Warrenton  pike.  The  railway  to  which  I  have  alluded  runs  in  nearly 
an  easterly  and  westerly  direction,  and,  like  all  graded  roads,  presents 
sometimes  an  embankment — sometimes  a  cut.  Imagine,  if  you  can,  a 
heavy  piece  of  timber,  out  of  which  emerges  an  embankment  or  "till" 
of  some  twenty  or  thirty  feet  in  height,  flat  on  top,  and  which,  running 
westward  perhaps  a  hundred  and  twenty  yards,  terminates  in  a  cut  of 
from  eight  to  ten  feet  deep  and  about  the  same  width  at  the  bottom, 
which  cut  continues  on  in  the  same  direction,  for  about  two  lumdrcd 
yards  and  then  tends  slightly  to  the  northward,  debouching  upon  tho 
open  elevated  ground.  IS''ow  imagine  yourself  standing  upon  the  south- 
ern edge  of  this  cut,  midway  between  the  timber  whence  the  embank- 
ment issues  and  the  slight  northward  bend  where  the  road-bod  debouches 
on  the  open  plain,  and  face  the  south.  Upon  your  left  you  have  woods 
crossing  the  railway  at  riglit  angles  and  extending  in  a  direct  line  for 
six  hundred  yards,  forming  one  side  of  a  parallelogram;  in  your  front, 
running  from  east  to  west,  another  piece  of  timber,  free  from  under- 
brush on  the  side  nearest  you,  and  say  three  or  four  hundred  yards  from 
left  to  riglit,  forms  the  second  side;  and  the  railway  line  at  your  hack 
makes  the  third  side.  The  remaining  side,  to  the  west,  is  open  rolling 
country,  except  that  where  the  line  of  the  road  makes  the  bend  toward 
the  north  there  is,  on  the  southern  side,  and  at  right  angles  to  it,  a  small 
ravine  fringed  with  bushes  and  stmUed  trees.  From  your  feet,  to- 
ward the  south  the  ground  falls  slifirhtlv  for  five  or  six  vards,  and 
then  drops  away  more  rapidly  till  it  forms  an  elevation  or  ridge,  upon 
which  you  stand,  of  some  lifty  feet  in  height.  From  the  foot  of  this 
declivity  it  stretches  out  into  a  level  plain,  crossing  which  you  ascend 
a  gentle,  even  slope  to  the  timber  which,  as  already  observed,  faces  the 
cut.     Now  turn  directly  about,  and  you  will  perceive  that  on  the  oppo- 


21 

site  side  ol  tlio  road-bed  the  ground  slopes  gently  upward  until  it  has 
attained  an  elevation  of  three  or  four  feet  above  that  whereon  jou  stand, 
and  then  gradually  and  evenly  falls  away  to  heavy  timber  a  couple  of 
hundred  yards  distaui,  thus  forming  u  ridge  parallel  with  the  cut,  and 
a  commanding  position  overlooking  the  ground  descril)ed  as  lying  to 
the  southward.  Upon  this  i-idge,  on  the  day  of  baUle,  about  thirty 
yards  in  rear  of  the  cut,  the  rebel  batteries  were  i)lanted.  There  were 
six  guns— 12-pounders — at  a  point  where  the  einbankiuent  tern)inates  in 
the  open  iield,  six  guns — howitzers — of  the  same  calibre  the  same  dis- 
tance in  rear  of  the  centre  of  the  cut,  (midway  between  the  timber  and 
the  bond  in  the  road,)  and  four  guns  just  bovond  the  bend,  but  masked 
from  troops  approaching  in  front  by  the  small  ravine  already  mention- 
ed. Behind  those  guns  lay  the  main  body  of  Jackson's  army,  and  the 
cut  and  embankment  in  front  of  them  were  occupied  by  a  heavy  force 
of  his  infantry.  Behind  the  timber,  in  rear  of  this  formidable  position, 
was  stationed,  on  elevated  ground,  the  reniainder  of  the  rebel  artillery, 
which,  when  the  Union  forces  advanced,  shelled  them  over  the  heads 
of  the  Confederates. 

I  have  thus  hastily  sketched  the  position  of  the  right  wing  of  Jack- 
son, and  will  now  briefly  point  out  that  of  the  left  of  our  own  line 
confronting  him.  In  the  strip  of  timber  running  parallel  with  and 
about  six  hundred  yards  distant  from  the  abandoned  railroad,  lay  the 
1st  l)rigade,  1st  division  of  the  Fifth  Corps,  composed  of  the  18th  Mas- 
sachusetts, on  the  left,  extending  westward  to  the  open  fields,  the  13th 
New  York,  "•  T-iochester  regiment,"  next,  then  the  25th  New  Yoik.  2d 
Maine,  22d  Massachusetts,  and  1st  Michigan,  the  latter  extending  into 
the  timber  running  north  up  to  the  embankment  by  about  one  com- 
pany. This  brigade  mimbered  about  1,500  men.  Farther  to  the  west, 
but  deflecting  toward  the  south  so  as  to  face  in  the  direction  of  Jack- 
:son's  extreme  right  and  from  whence  Longstreot  was  expected,  and 
partly  crossing  the  Warrenton  pike,  stretched  the  other  troops  of  the 
corps,  some  4,500  men. 

I  have  been  thus  particular  in  describing  the  general  situation  in 
order  that  the  movements  following  may  be  more  clearly  understood. 
Henceforth  I  will  more  especially  follow  the  fortunes  of  my  own  regi- 
ment and  brigade. 

As  we  lay  waiting  for  tlie  order  to  attack,  we  could  look  into  the 
black-throated  muzzles  of  the  guns  crowning  the  crest  of  the  ridge 
l>efore  us,  except  those  of  the  four  |)ieces  screened  from  view  by  the 
ravine  in  our  front  and  a  little  to  our  left.  Just  before  us,  along  the 
edge  of  the  timber,  iurnishing  us  a  temporary  shelter,  was  a  rail  fence, 
"staked  and  ridered,"  about  six  feet  high,  and  between  it  and  us  a 
wagon  road. 

But  I'will  not  dwell  longer  upon  these  details.  The  order  came  for 
us  to  advance.  The  1st  brigade  was  to  open  the  conflict  by  storming 
the  height.  We  left  the  tmiber  and  began  climbing  the  fence.  The 
rebel  guns  in  sight  opened  upon  us  with  grape  and  canister,  while  from 
beyond,  the  heavier  batteries  of  the  enemv  sent  a  perfect  tempest  of 
shot  and  shell  upon  our  devoted  heads.  We  passed  down  the  slope  in 
splendid  order,  our  ranks  closed  up  and  our  alignment  almost  perfect 


22 

We  lost  men,  it  is  true,  but  the  gaps  were  filled.  We  kept  our  front,  l)ut 
a  shortened  line  evidenced  our  losses.  We  reached  the  level  gi-ound, 
through  the  centre  of  which,  parallel  to  our  line,  ran  a  ditch  or  dead- 
furrow.  Across  it  we  went,  leaving  many  onthewa}'; — on,  on  we 
pressed  to  the  foot  of  the  declivity,  and  all  the  while  the  heavens  rained 
death  from  bursting  shell;— all  the  while  the  rebel  skirmishers  and 
sharpshooters  poured  into  our  i-anks  the  leaden  hail.  When  w^e  reached 
the  level,  the  guns  in  our  immediate  front,  no  longer  able  to  do  us  harm, 
ceased  belching  forth  their  deadly  missiles,  and  as  we  began  to  climb  the 
steep  ascent  we  thought  tlic  day  was  oin's.  Ilalf-way  up,  and  onward 
with  ci  rush  and  hurruh  we  dashed.  J3nt,  alas!  our  hopes  were  short- 
lived. From  our  left,  within  a  hundred  yards  of  us,  the  guns  hitherto 
kept  concealed  opened  upon  us.  Enfilading  our  lines,  their  tire  swept 
down  scores  at  every  discharge;  yet  we  did  not  falter.  I  doubt  if  any 
man  thought  of  going  back.  We  gained  the  high  ground  on  a  level 
with  the  top  of  the  cut;  then  we  saw  the  rebel  infantry, — the  trap  intf) 
whicli  we  liad  fallen.  For  the  first  time  during  our  charge  our  rifles 
rang  their  notes  of  death; — for  the  fii'st  time  since  we  stai'ted  ii'om  the 
wood  we  realized  the  fullness  of  our  danger. 

The  rebel  infantry  [)Oured  in  their  volleys,  and  we  were  scarce  a 
dozen  feet  from  the  nmzzles  of  their  muskets.  Oh,  it  w'as  terrible! 
Down  went  Galpin,  lieese,  Kiehle,  Stewart,  Beniamin— all  from  my 
own  comjtany  of  thirty  men— killed;  down  went  Buimell,  Ilasler. 
Savage,  Thomas,  Jen-olds,  Ilertendorf,  and  scores  of  brave  men  until 
a  [teiiect  windi'ow  of  dead  and  woimded  marked  where  valor  hafl  come 
to  stay;  down  went  your  humble  servant  an«l  many  more  until  the  loth 
Gould  count  nearly  half  of  its  members  lying  beneath  its  flag.  And 
the  regiments  to  our  rii2:ht  and  left  fared  no  better.  For  twenlv  min- 
utes  the  shattered  rennunits  of  the  1st  brigade  held  the  slope  swept  by 
a  hurricane  of  death,  and  each  minute  seemed  twenty  hours  long.  For 
twenty  minutes  the  bullets  hunnned  like  swarming  bees,  and  the  parch- 
ed lierbage  was  nourisbed  by  streams  of  gore  from  gallant  hearts, 
while  the  accursed  railroad  cut  began  to  fill  with  rebel  dead  and 
wounded; — for  twenty  minutes,  and  then  those  yet  alive  and  able  to  do 
8o  received  orders  to  fall  back.  We  who  fell — the  dead,  the  dying, 
and  tlie  disabled — held  the  field. 

I  lav  near  where  I  fell,  partly  supported  by  a  huge  rock  jutting  from 
tlio  side  hill  at  my  back,  and  beside  me  Cai)t.  Savage,  who  died  before 
the  combat  was  fairly  over.  And  I  thought  then,  as  I  do  now,  that 
had  Pope,  instead  of  making  such  cowardly  and  indecent  haste  to  get 
to  Washington,  where  there  was  no  dangei',  supported  Porter,  we  would 
have  won  the  day.  We  would  have  crushed  the  right  wing  of  Jack- 
son's corps,  interposed  ourselves  between  him  and  Longstreet,  who 
came  up  just  at  the  close  of  the  engagement,  and,  with  our  numerical 
superiority,  have  beaten  them  in  detail.  Porter's  troops  opened  up 
the  way,  but  were  not  sustained.  Why  they  were  not,  let  Gen.  Pope 
answer. 

After  the  retreat  of  the  remnants  of  my  brigade,  (and  how  any  of 
them  escaped  is  a  wonder  to  me.)  I  crawled  up  into  the  cut  just  at  the 
bend,  it  being  more  sheltered  from  the  fire  of  one  of  our  batteries  cov- 


o:-ing  tlie  rotreat,  and  had  lain  there  but  a  few  moments  when  Jackson 
rode  up  to  with  hi  six  feet  of  me.  His  troops  were  ah'eady  following 
on  after  tlie  Union  forees,  who  were  making  a  8tul)l)orn  stand  in  the 
timber  wlienee  they  had  issued  at  the  commencement  of  tlie  action. 

The  rebels  came,  helped  me  up,  and  bore  me  back  a  short  distance, 
where  all  our  wounded,  some  1,800  men,  were  gathered  under  guard, 
and  there,  until  the  3d  of  September,  I  lay  in  agony,  men  dying  almost 
hourly  for  want  of  care.  On  the  3d  I  started  for  Centreville  to  be 
]>aroIed,  and  ci'oirised  the  fated  field.  Our  dead  boys  lay  there  as  they 
fell,  stark  and  gliastly ;  and  the  tears  c;nne  to  my  eyes  as  I  passed  along 
the  line  and  recognized  one  and  another  and  bade  them  ffood-bv  lor- 
ever  more. 

That  was  long  ago;  but  yet  now,  as  I  write,  the  old  times  conic  back 
lo  me  in  all  their  freshness,  and  through  the  long  vista  of  eighteen 
years  that  fatal  field  rises  up  to  view. 

In  my  mind's  eye  I  see  the  cannon-crowned  crest,  the  long  waving 
lines  of  blue  as  the}' advance  to  the  charge,  the  flags,  the  gleaming 
steel,  the  smoke  of  battle.  I  hear  the  roar  of  cannon,  the  bursting 
shell,  the  screaming  grape,  the  rattling  musketry,  the  shrill  commands, 
the  groans  of  agony,  the  cries  of  pain,  and,  sadder  far,  I  seem  to  behold 
<>nce  more  the  faces  of  comrades  upturned  to  the  blue  sk}',  I)nt  into 
whose  eves  the  filling  sunshine  slieds  no  golden  lijirht.  Ah!  lanirua'rc! 
cannot  describe  my  feelings  as  the  past  returns,  l)ringing  with  it  the 
terrible,  bloody  scenes  of  that  fateful  day. 

Out  of  my  regiment  of,  as  I  now  remember,  289  men,  nearly  it'  not 
quite  one-half  were  either  killed  or  wounded.  In  my  own  company  of 
30  men,  as  already  stated,  five  were  killed  outright,  one  died  shortly 
after  from  his  wounds,  and  of  the  remainder  scarcely  half  escaped 
without  injury.  And  the  history  of  my  regiment  was  but  that  of  every 
"thor  in  the  command.  Y"ou  who  were  with  me  there  can  testify  to 
the  truth  of  my  assertions. 

You  gallant  men  of  Maine,  Th(^  old  2d;  and  you  of  Massachusetts, 
tlie  18th  and  22d;  and  you  of  Michigan,  the  1st;  and  you  men  of  New 
York,  the  13th  and  25th,  all  of  the  1st  brigade, — what  say  you?  Did 
Torter's  troops  tight  that  day? 

What  answer  have  ^/oii  to  make,  you  men  of  Dui'yea's  regiment, 
who  followed  the  gallant  Warren,  and  )/o>t  of  Pennsylvania,  the  lie- 
serves,  whom  Heynolds  and  Meade  and  Seymour  and  Jackson  led, 
when  I  ask  the  question, — Did  i/ou  fight  that  day?  And  you  heroes 
of  the  regular  army,  veterans  of  other  fields  and  other  watx,  what  say 
you  ?     Did  )/oa  fcght  that  day  ? 

Ah,  comrades!  our  losses  that  day  give  tlie  answer, — 2,200  men 
killed  and  woundeil  out  of  6,000!  More  than  one-third  of  Porter'.s 
command  during  that  batlh^.  left  upon  the  field  in  testimony  of  the  loy- 
alty, of  all! 

And  those  who  were  then  our  enemies,  they  too  testify  to  our  disci- 
pline and  courage — to  the  vigorous  strokes  we  dealt  them  along  the  line 
of  tlie  abandoned  railroad,  and  further  on  our  left,  where  Buchaniiii  and 
(/hapman  and  Warren  held  them  at  bay  so  bravely.  \ud  ycl — and 
yet,  comrades,  wo  are  told  I>y  Pope — we  are  told  by  others  wlin  uould 


24 

make  false  history — that  on  the  30th  day  of  August,  in  tlie  year  of  grace 
eighteen  hundred  and  sixty-two,  Portefs  troops  did  notjigld,  or  that  they 
made  such  a  weak  and  feeble  attack  as  to  prove  themselves  of  little 
worth  in  the  battle  fought ! 

Think  of  it,  you  men  of  the  Fifth  Corps!  Think  of  it,  you  men  of 
the  Army  of  the  Potomac!  Tliink  of  it,  brave  soldiers  every Vv'here ! 
Think,  and  then  make  answer! 

But  allow  me  to  repeat  the  language  of  Pope  ^vhen  referring  to  the 
part  taken  by  General  Porter  and  his  troops  in  the  action  of  the  30th. 

In  his  official  report,  written  months  alter  the  dreadful  scenes  I  have 
but  faintly  described,  he  attempts  to  [)lant  the  cloven-foot  of  his  own 
dishonor  upon  the  graves  of  those  of  tbo  Fifih  Corps  who  died,  and  to 
cast  the  burden  of  his  own  shame  not  only  upon  their  memory,  but  upon 
the  name  of  every  man  who  fought  under  l^orter  that  day. 

lie  says:  "The  attack  of  Porter  ims  neit/ier  vigorous  nor  persistent,  and 
his  troops  soon  retired  in  considerable  confasiony 

And  this  is  the  calm  and  deliberate  statement  of  General  Porter's 
accuser ! 

Men  of  the  Fifth  Corps — comrades  of  the  Army  of  the  J^otomac — if 
there  be  one  among  all  your  thousands  and  tens  of  thousands  having 
a  knowledge  of  the  facts  who  does  not  believe  this  statement  of  Pope 
to  be  a  willful  and  deliberate  lie,  let  him  stand  forth. 

Let  him  visit  the  graves  of  his  comrades  from  Maine  and  from  Mas- 
sachusetts, from  New  York,  Pennsylvania,  and  from  Michigan  who 
perished  at  Groveton,  and  paint  upon  eacli  headstone  this  inscription: 
"  Here  lies  one  who,  if  not  a  coward,  was  disloyal  to  the  cause  for  ivhich  hi: 
died.     Let  his  memory  remain  only  to  be  dishonored.''^ 

Let  him  who  believes  Pope's  lying  accusation  inscribe  upon  ihe  tat- 
tered and  blood-stained  remnants  of  our  battle  Hags,  this:  ^' These  flags 
loere  dishonored  by  the  more  tJian  two  thousand  men  of  the  Fifth  Corps  tcho 
fell  at  Groveton,  August  30,  1862,  while  maldng  a  loeak  and,  feeble  attack 
upon  the  eneiny." 

Or  let  him  write  upon  the  discharge-papers  of  those  who  were  wounded 
and  maimed  there,  this  legend:  "  This  man  was  wounded  and  made  a 
cripple  for  life  at  Groveton.,  August  30,  1862,  lohile  making  neither  a  vigor- 
ous nor  persistent  attack  upon  the  foe.  He  charged.,  loith  his  brigade,  threr 
times  across  an  open  field  in  the  face  of  superior  numbers  and  a  m.urdcrous 
fire  of  artillery,  and  upon  the  fourth  charge  fell  severely  wounded,  lohen 
he  was  loithin  less  than  a  dozen  feet  of  the  muzzles  of  the  enemy'' s  guns.  Let 
him.  be  dishonored  !  " 

Let  it  be  whispered  into  the  ears  of  the  widows  and  orphans  of  the 
dead  of  Porter's  corps,  and  into  the  ears  of  all  the  mourners  who  lost 
dear  ones  who  fought  under  him  that  day:  "  Shame!  Shame!  upon  the 
name  you  bear!  Shame!  Shame!  upon  him  lohom  you  loved.  The  hero-idol 
of  your  hearts  proved  himself  a  coward  and  a  traitor  at  Groveton.  He  was 
one  of  the  ignoble  two  thousand  out  of  six  thousand  men  who  fell  in  battle 
there — he  loas  one  of  the  hundreds  loho  died — let  his  memory  perish  or  live 
on  and  on  through  ihe  bitter  years,  an  object  of  contempt  and  loatldng  to  all 
man/cind." 

Comrades,  do  you  like  the  picture  which  springs  into  being  as  you 


25 

read  that  "  the  attack  of  Porter  was  neither  vigorous  nor  persistent,"  and 
realize  the  fuUness  of  the  meaning  which  the  words  convey? 

Are  you  ready,  fellow-soldiers,  for  the  time  when  it  shall  be  consid- 
ered only  a  deep  disgrace  to  have  holougcd  to  the  Fifth  Corps,  and 
more  shameful  yet  to  have  served  under  General  Porter? 

If  you  are  not,  then  you  must  act.  Tell  General  Pope,  in  language 
too  plain  to  bo  raisuuders*^ood,  that  you  are  proud  of  your  old  com- 
mander and  of  the  organization  to  which  you  belonged.  Say  to  the 
members  of  the  packed  and  partisan  tribunal,  by  courtesy  styled  a 
military  court  of  justice,  that  the  day  has  gone  by  when  right  can  be 
controlled  by  partisan  hate  or  malice.  Say  to  them  that  Truth,  the 
handmaiden  of  Justice,  has  proclaimed  it  broadcast  over  the  land  that 
Porter  and  his  troops  did  figlit  at  Groveton  vigorously  and  persistently, 
and  that  there  is  no  longer  excuse  for  them  if  they  persist  in  upholding 
their  unrighteous  judgment,  based,  as  it  is,  upon  falsehood  and  party 
bias; — based,  as  it  is,  upon  one  man,  and  that  one,  General  Pope. 

Ah,  what  must  bo  the  heart  of  that  man  who,  in  face  of  the  record 
as  truth  has  written  it — in  the  very  presence  of  the  noble  dead  who  died 
that  day  under  ihe  command  of  Gen.  Fltz  John  Porter,  under  the  lus- 
tre and  glory  of  our  Hag — can  stand  up  and  say  that  the  Fiftli  Corps 
proved  false  to  country,  to  honor,  and  to  itself  on  that  occasion ! 

If  Porter  did  not  tight,  then  were  we  cowards  all,  or  traitors  to  the 
cause  we  all  had  sworn  to  serve. 

If  Porter  did  not  tight,  then  were  we,  his  soldiers,  recreant  to  the  high 
trust  our  country  imposed  in  us  when  she  gave  us  the  blue  to  wear  and 
placed  in  our  hands  weapons  to  use  in  her  defense! 

If  Porter  made  a  weak  and  feeble  attack,  then  were  we  who  hailed 
him  as  our  chief  false  to  the  nation,  to  honor,  and  to  ourselves! 

Comrades,  we  did  light !  You  of  the  grand  old  Army  of  the  Potomac 
will  believe  us;  for  you  know  full  woll  the  stuif  of  which  our  corps  was 
made. 

You  saw  us  on  the  Peninsula — you  stood  shoulder  to  shoulder  with 
us  during  the  "Seven  Days" — you  were  with  us  at  the  last  at  Malvern. 
You  know  we  never  flinched;  that  we  would  no  sooner  yield  than 
would  you.     Judge  us  by  yourselves,  and  we  can  ask  no  more. 

It  is  hard  for  us  who  Ibught  and  suifered  at  Manassas — wdio  gave  our 
lind)s  and  poured  out  our  blood  like  water  there,  to  have  it  continually 
rung  in  our  ears  that  we  failed  in  duty.  And  if  our  leader  failed,  we 
failed.  We  were  both  one  then  in  spirit,  as  I  believe  we  are  to-day. 
An  aspersion  cast  upon  his  good  name  and  fame  is  a  stain  upon  those 
who  served  under  him.  To  impeach  his  loyalty  is  to  impeach  the  loy- 
alty of  the  Fifth  Corps — of  every  one  who  then  had  the  right  to  wear  the 
cross  of  .Malta. 

Never  has  a  man  in  this  our  land  l)een  so  grievously  wronged  as 
Gen.  Porter. 

Never  has  a  man  in  this  our  land  suffered  injustice  so  patiently. 

It  is  hio-h  time  that  justice  be  done  him.  It  is  time  that  the  origina- 
tor of  thecharges  against  him — his  persecutor — be  shown  up  in  his  true 
light  for  the  execradon  of  every  honest  man. 


26 

And  who  was  bis  accuser — wlio  has  been  his  persecutor  ?  Oon.  Jolm 
Pope. 

What  order  of  man — what  kind  of  a  general  is  John  Pope?  I  will 
endeavor  to  answer.  Doubtless  some  who  have  taken  the  trouble  to 
read  the  history  of  his  campaign  in  Virginia  will  be  inclined  to  the 
opinion  that  he  is  an  ignoramus  by  right  of  birth  and  a  fool  I'roiri 
instinct. 

Those  more  charitably  disposed,  however,  will  possibly  conclude  that 
when  he  issued  his  "headquarters-in-thc-saddie"  manifesto  he  some- 
how changed  ends  witli  himself,  relegating  his  mental  faculties  to  the 
level  of  his  seat.  It  matters  not  which  view  is  accepted,  if  either; 
the  fact  of  his  utter  incompetency  and  \vorthlessness  remains,  and  will 
remain  while  the  story  of  his  career  lives  in  history. 

His  unlitness  for  command  is  shown  by  his  own  orders  and  the  result 
of  his  campaign.  It  was  not  the  fault  of  his  subordinates,  nor  was  it 
the  fault  of  his  men,  that  he  failed.  No  better  or  braver  soldiers  than 
his  ever  carried  musket  or  faced  a  foe  in  battle.  Their  honor  was  and 
is  stainless.  Their  loyalty  and  gallantry  was  and  is  assured.  He  alone 
was  to  blame.     Let  him  bear  the  burden. 

The  idea  of  a  commander,  educated  to  the  profession  of  arms,  having 
two  generals  of  division  w-ith  from  9,000  to  15,000  men — a  small  army — 
fioatmg  around  him  within  a  radius  of  from  live  to  eight  miles  and  he 
unable  to  find  them  for  half  a  day  or  more,  and  that,  too,  at  a  time 
when,  according  to  his  own  admissions,  he  needed  every  available  man 
that  could  be  mustered  ! 

But  incompetency  is  not  the  only  charge  that  can  be  sustained  against 
Gen.  Pope.  He  has  no  clear  perception  of  truth  in  matters  in  whicli 
he  is  deeply  interested. 

There  is  an  obliquity  in  his  mental  vision  which  causes  him  to  see 
things  and  events  other  than  they  reall}'  are. 

He  saw-  the  enemy  in  full  retreat  when  there  was  no  retreat  save  by 
himself. 

He  saw  Gen.  Porter  in  a  position  wdiere  Gen.  Porter  was  not  and 
could  not  have  been  without  first  having  defeated  Longstreet. 

He  saw  a  battle  where  there  was  no  battle,  and  where  there  was  one 
of  the  most  sanguinary  conflicts  recorded  during  all  the  war  he  saw 
no  battle  at  all — only  a  weak  and  feeble  attack — an  attack  in  which 
ever}'  third  man  of  the  0,000  engaged  was  either  killed  or  wounded. 

In  regard  to  this  same  battle,  and  in  order  to,  if  possil)Ie,  convince 
the  people  of  Porter's  alleged  guilt,  he  placed  the  2,000  and  more  men 
of  the  Fifth  Corps  who  fell  on  the  30th  of  August  to  the  credit  of  the 
engagement  and  losses  on  the  29th,  and  by  such  a  despicable  trick  sought 
to  rob  us  as  well  as  our  commander  of  whatever  of  honor  we  had  earned. 

Gen.  Pope  saw  a  heinous  oflense  in  Gen.  Porter  because  of  his  saving. 
by  his  generalship,  the  Union  army  from  utter  overtlirow  both  on  the 
29th  and  oOth  days  of  August,  but  saw  nothing  to  condemn  in  the  two 
officers  who  fell  back  from  Thoroughfare  Gap  without  orders,  and  thu.s 
permitted  Longstreet  with  his  25,000  meu  to  march  through  unmolested 
on  the  28th. 

And  it  is  doubtless  to  Gen.  Pope's  efforts  more  than  for  any  olher 


27 

reai^oii  that  those  two  generals,  who  should  tlieinselves  have  been  eourt- 
martialed,  were  made  a  part  of  the  eonrt  which  tried  Gen.  Porter;  and 
tried  hirn  for  what  ?  Why,  because  ho  held  Longstreet  in  ehedc  on  the 
•29th  of  August  and  prevented  liim  from  adding  his  force  to  that  of 
Jackson.  Simply  for  doing  exactly  what  liicketFs  and  King  ha(J  i)een 
ordered  to  do,  and  in  the  accomplishment  of  which  they  liad  signully 
failed.  Simply  because  he  had  shown  himself  a  i)etter  soldier  than  hi's 
suijcrior  oiKcer. 

Willi  regard  to  the  composition  of  the  court  that  tried  Gen.  Porter, 
r  have  little  to  say.  It  was  partisan  throughout  j)olitically  and  to  some 
extent  pei'sonaljy.  Two  of  its  meml)ers,  as  I  have  already  intimated, 
were  themselves  delicately  situated,  their  couduct  in  withdrawing  from 
Thoroughfare  Gap  having  laid  them  open  to  censure.  To  shift  the 
l)urden  upon  Gen.  Porter  would  relieve  their  own  shoulders.  Is  it 
strange,  then,  that  Porter  was  convicted? 

(leu.  Pope,  Gen.  Porter's  real  accuser,  was  even  more  deeply  interested. 
With  liim,  blundering  had  been  the  rule  and  military  i'oresight  the  excep- 
tion; and  after  tlx;  teriiiinalion  of  the  ('ami)aign  he  began  to  see,  after 
his  stuj)i(l  lashiou.  that  s<)uiel)()dy  would  be  blamed  for  his  misconduct, 
lie  looked  around  for  a  \ictiiii  and  saw  the  commander  of  the  Fifth 
Corps.  Porter  was  a  democrat,  and  democrats  were  then  considered 
lawlul  game  by  all  srood  republicans,  and  it  was  resolved  that  lY)rter 
■should  be  "l)rought  down."  atul  he  was; — not  in  the  opinion  of  his  old 
companions  in  arms;  not  in  the  opinion  of  those  who  knew  him  well; 
not  in  the  estimation  of  th"  men  lie  had  led  to  battle.  He  was  ••  biought 
down"  only  in  the  eyes  of  the  faction  who  deposed  hini  from  his  high 
<;ommaiid  and  made  him  the  victim  fir  another's  guilt  and  blunders. 

Looking  over  the  proceedings  of  his  court-martial  and  reading  the 
liistory  o\'  the  events  that  caused  the  court  to  be  held,  it  is  dilHcult  to 
arrive  at  but  one  conclusion:  that  the  real  (piestion  at  issue  was  not  wlio 
is  the  guilty  nian,  but  whose  friends  are  strongest  with  the  party  in 
power. 

Pope  held  the  winning  hand.  It  is  true  he  sacriticed  his  manhood 
to  win  success,  and  bartered  his  honor  for  the  uniform  of  a  major-gen- 
eral;  but  lie  succeeded.  That  fact  satisfied  him,  for  the  time  being  at 
least.  But  he  was  not  long  to  remain  satisiied  with  that,  the  lirst  victory 
lie  had- ever  won.  When  General  I'orter  sought  a  rehearing  it  was 
opposed  by  Pope.  Honorable  men  and  able  statesmen,  stalwart  re[)ub- 
licans  like  the  lamented  Vice-President  Wilson  and  Governor  and  Gen- 
eral Chamberlain  ,of  Maine,  thought  the  connnander  of  the  Fifth  Corps 
ought  to  be  reheard  in  his  own  defense;  Pope  thought  otherwise,  and 
so  for  fil'teen  years  the  verdict  stood. 

President  Hayes — and  all  honor  to  him  for  the  gracious  act — took 
action  in  the  matter  to  the  end  that  Justice  might  be  done.  After  a 
report  based  upon  a  long  and  patient  investigation  by  the  military  board, 
consisting  of  Generals  Schotield,  Terry,  and  Getty,  each  of  whom  y()U 
all  know  or  know  of,  the  matter  was  referred  to  Congress. 

The  military  board  fully  acquitted  General  Porter,  and  Congress  was 
called  Ujion  to  decide  u[ion  the  means  for  re[)aration. 

It  was  hoped  by  General  Porter's  friends  that  when  the  matter  came 


up  for  consideration  it  might  be  discussed  and  acted  upon  in  that  spirit 
of  fairness  which  should  actuate  all  just-minded  men.  But  such  was 
not  to  be  the  case.  Hardly  had  the  President's  reference  been  received 
when  the  political  ball  was  set  in  motion  and  the  drawing  of  a  partisan 
line  began. 

In  politics,  as  in  boiling  brine,  the  scum  rises  to  the  surface,  and 
hence  the  hre  of  debate  brought  Logan  and  Carpenter  into  view. 

These  two  individuals  about  equally  distinguished  themselves;  the 
former,  by  artfully  concealmg  the  truth;  the  latter,  in  his  usual  erratic 
manner,  by  distorting  it.  Both  seemed  to  agree  in  one  respect,  viz.. 
that  Porter  would  serve  the  i)urposc  of  a  bugaboo  to  frighten  the  people 
into  voting  a  thii'd  term  to  General  Grant.  But  the  people  proved  not 
to  be  children,  and  the  third-term  project  met  a  disastrous  defeat  in  the 
home  of  the  very  Senator  who  delivered  a  campaign  document  four 
days  long  to  aid  the  "  boom." 

The  remarkable  efiusion  of  Mr.  Logan  holds  up  a  truly  pitiable  spec- 
tacle TO  public  gaze.  It  shows  a  great  government  of  a  great  nation 
pleading,  like  any  petty  thief  or  common  criminal,  the  statute  of  limita- 
tions in  bar  of  justice.  If  Logan  is  the  mouth-piece  of  America,  she  says, 
substantially,  that  "Porter  may  be  innocent,  he  may  have  suii'ered  un- 
justly, but  the  time  for  redress  has  gone  by.  He  must  live  on  and  suf- 
fer on  under  the  unmerited  burden  of  a  deep  disgrace,  for  there  is  no 
power  upon  the  earth  to  relieve  him  of  his  load."  And  this  shameful 
story,  if  it  be  true,  is  proclaimed  abroad  to  the  listening  ears  of  foreign 
nations,  who  would  not  dare,  despoiic  as  they  may  chance  to  be,  to 
make  such  an  admission  to  their  own  people  and  to  the  world. 

Great  God!  Is  it  true  that  here,  in  this  land  of  freedom,  if  the  gov- 
ernment througli  its  oiiicers  and  servants  commits  a  wrong,  there  is  no 
way  of  righting  it?  Is  it  true  that  here,  if  injustice  is  visited  upon  a 
citizen  there  is  no  remedy  ? 

I  am  no  military  critic,  nor  am  I  a  close  student  of  the  art  and  laws 
of  war,  but  this  I  will  say:  All  the  tine-spun  theories  and  arguments 
advanced  against  legislative  action  upon  the  case  of  General  Porter  arc 
the  merest  bosh.  The  will  of  the  peo[)le  is  supreme,  and  if  they,  through 
their  Senators  and  Representatives,  decide  to  mete  out  justice  or  amend 
a  wrong,  the  object  aimed  at  may  be  easily  and  lawfully  reached. 

But  I  do  not  believe  that  the  sentiments  expressed  by  Senator  Logan. 
and  by  Carpenter,  his  henchman,  are  the  sentiments  of  the  American 
people. 

Nor  do  I  believe  them  to  be  the  sentiments  of  the  res])ectable  ele- 
ment of  the  republican  party.  Demagogues  like  the  Senator  from 
Illinois  ma}^  preach  them,  but  those  who  love  truth  and  justice  will 
pay  little  heed.  The  friends  of  Pope  may  scatter  them  broadcast,  bui 
the  baleful  seed  will  find  no  lodgment  in  honest  hearts.  Our  people 
are  too  jealous/)f  their  rights  to  permit  any  man  or  set  of  men  to  force 
upon  them  a  theory  that  may  some  day  put  them  in  the  same  or  a  simi- 
lar position  to  that  which  Gen.  Porter  occupies  at  present. 

I  say  this  not  only  as  an  American,  and  one  who  fought  under  Gen. 
Porter,  but  as  a  republican. 

At  the  age  of  twenty-one  years,  I  voted  for  the  first  time,  in  1864, 


29 

and  voted  for  Mr.  Lincoln;  I  voted  for  Gen.  Grant;  and,  had  I  been 
possessed  of  u  vote  in  the  last  canvass,  should  have  voted  for  President 
Hayes. 

But  although  a  republican,  I  nevertheless  repudiate  such  .sentivncntb 
as  are  expressed  in  the. speeches  of  Senators  Logan  and  Carpenter  to 
which  I  have  referi'cd. 

I  re|;)udiate  theu'  a1  tempt  to  make  political  capital  out  of  the  matter. 

I  believe  in  doing  full  justice  to  even  a  political  antagonist,  and  regret 
to  see  any  disposition  on  the  part  of  rcpul)licans  to  make  it  appear  that 
Gen.  Torter's  only  hope  for  success  rests  in  the  sympathy  his  case  may 
excite  in  the  breasts  of  the  "  rebel  brigadiers,"  as  they  are  styled  by 
some,  in  Congress. 

I  thiidv  that,  inasmuch  as  the  republican  party  is  primarily  responsible 
for  the  wrong  done  Gen.  Porter,  the  republicans  should  be  the  first,  or 
among  the  lirst,  to  undo  tlmt  \vrong. 

And  I  should  exceedingly  regret  to  have  it  become  a  matter  of  history 
that  Ihe  gi-eat  republican  party  was  less  just  to  one  whom  it  had  injured 
deeply  (ban  wei'e  those  against  whom  that  one  had  l)ravely  fought  upon 
many  a  bloody  lield.  I  should  very  much  dislike  to  have  it  said  that 
Gen.  Porter,  after  nearly  eighteen  years  of  suitbring,  received  at  the 
hands  of  his  former  foes  that  justice  w'hich  was  denied  him  by  those  in 
whose  Ijchalf  he  fought. 

Such  a  record  would  be  shameful  to  the  republican  pjarty — shameful 
to  ever}"  honest  republican  in  the  land. 

The  case  of  Gen.  Porter  should  be  inquired  into  and  disposed  of,  not 
with  a  view  to  beneliting  this  or  that  political  j^arty,  but  simply  for 
the  purpose  of  doing  equity. 

Tlie  question  of  his  restoration  should  be  considered  judicially  by 
those  who  have  to  deal  with  it,  and  ought  not,  in  any  sense,  to  be  made 
a  party  measure. 

If  Gen.  Porter  has  been  wronged — and  that  he  has,  the  truth  now 
makes  plain — ever}'  honest  man,  without  regard  to  party  affiliation, 
should  join  with  his  friends  to  see  him  righted,  and  especially  should  the 
members  of  his  former  conmiand  come  to  the  front  and  sustain  him 
now  as  vigorously  and  bravely  as  they  were  wont  to  do  on  the  field  of 
battle.     So  should  his  fellow-soldiei's  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac. 

A  united  elfort  on  our  part  exerted  in  his  behalf  will  accomplish 
much.  We  may  assist  greatly  in  restoring  Justice  to  her  proper  throne 
in  the  hearts  of  those  who  make  our  laws  and  rule  over  us ;  and  this 
accomplished,  the  restoration  of  Gen.  Porter  to  the  Army  and  the 
wiping  away  of  the  stains  so  cruelly  put  upon  his  good  name  and  fame 
are  sure  to  follow. 

I  ask  you,  then,  rnen  of  the  Fifth  Corps,  and  T  ask  you  of  the  Poto- 
U'ac  Army  who  served  in  other  corps,  to  assist  in  bringing  about  such 
a  happy  result. 

It  is  due  to  Gen.  Porter;  it  is  due  to  us,  the  survivors  of  his  old  com- 
mand ;  it  is  due  to  the  memory  of  our  dead. 

I  ask  you,  thei-efore,  to  arise  in  the  majesty  of  your  sti'ength  and 
pluck  down  the  hateful  partisan  idols  worshiped  in  the  past,  signalizing 


30 

the  event  by  crowning  your  brave  deeds  with  one  noble  act  which  shall 
outlive  and  outsliine  all  otliei's  in  the  years  to  come. 

Arise  and  say  to  Gen.  Porter's  accusers  that  a  partisan  spirit  shall  no 
longer  be  permitted  to  inflict  a  never-ending  penalty  upon  an  innc^eent 
raan,  a  brave  soldier,  and  one  ever  found  loyal  and  true! 

Say  to  them  that  the  unholy  sentence  of  nearly  eighteen  years  ago 
must  be  revoked  because  justice  requires  it,  and  it  is  your  will  that 
justice  be  satisfied.  Such  an  expression  from  you  must  have  great 
weight,  for  the  will  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  cannot  be  lightly 
disi'egarded. 

Do  but  this  much,  and  in  the  days  yet  to  come  your  hearts  will  be 
cheered  by  the  recollections  of  the  part  you  had  in  restoring  to  the 
Army  one  of  its  In'ightest  intellects  and  to  tlie  country  one  of  her  bravest 
and  most  loyal  defenders,  and  to  the  Fifth  Corps  of  the  Arm}'  of  the 
Potomac  and  of  the  Union  its  honor  and  good  name. 

Do  this,  and  I  for  one  shall  ever  remain  your  debtor. 

Firm  in  the  belief  that  you  will  not  remain  silent,  and  with  expression 
of  my  sincere  regard  for  each  and  every  one  to  whom  this  is  addressed, 
I  I'cmain,  verv  trulv.  j'our  friend  and  former  companion  in  arms, 

JXO.  8.  SLATER, 

13tli  X.  Y.  v.,  1st  Bri^'.,  1st  Div.,  5tli  Corps, 

Array  of  the  Potomac, 


For  additional  <\)pies,  addreas 

JNO.  S.  SLATER, 

9  11     Sixth     Street    Northwest, 

WASHIXGTON,    D.    C. 


LIBRARY  OF  CONGRESS 


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LIBRARY   OF   CCHGRESS 

mm 

0  013  706  642  7