THE ADELANTAKTENTO OF FLORIDA:
1565-1568
By
EUGENE LYON
A DISSERTATION PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE COUNCIL OF
THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA IN PARTIAL
FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIRE-MENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA
1973
To Dot
PREFACE
This study arose out of a long interest in the founding
of Spanish Florida by Pedro Menendez de Avil4s. The in-
spiration for its particular emphasis came from the Geografia
universal de. las Indias of Juan L6pe2 de Velasco (Madrid
1893). The section cJaout Florida is entitled "Description
of the Provinces and Adelantamiento of Florida. " Of special
significance was the following:
This province is a government by itself, or
an adelantamiento y subject until now to no
Audiencia, even though through being so close
to Hispaniola it is described together with
its district.
This passage led to the decision to analyze the Florida
government of 1565-1568 as an adelantamiento. The seminal
article by Roscoe R. Hill, "The Office of Adelemtado, " also
came to the attention of the writer. This led to an archival
search for the asientos emd capitulaciones of a number of
Indies adelantados, and a comparison of these with the 1565
contract of Pedro Menendez de Avil^s.
Analysis of the extent and use of adelantamiento dis-
closed that a major element in sixteentii -century Spanish
conquest was the support furnished by private enterprise.
The expcuision fostered by Isabella emd Ferdinand, Charles V
iv
and Philip II was largely carried out by entrepreneurs,
including all the attempts to conquer Florida except the
De Luma and Villafane expeditions.
Once this unifying theme was identified, it was neces-
sary to explore a number of secondary points. Among these
were the personal motivations of a "contractor in conquest,"
his expectations of psychic and material gain, and the
sources of his fincincial support. Also important were his
relationships with the municipal, juridical, religious, and
commercial institutions of Castile.
The research methodology chosen for the study was
essentially to work from Spanish archival materials. In
order best to utilize one academic year for study in Spain,
amd avoid duplication with existing materials in Florida, the
writer consulted the Spanish materials at the University of
Florida. Copies of the John B. Stetson Collection microfilm
reels for the years 1559 to 1607 were taken to Spain, to-
gether with a copy of the William B. Griffen Index of that
collection. The Jeannette Thurber Connor, Buckingham Smith,
emd Woodbury Lowery Collections were surveyed. The indices
of the Connor and Smith collections prepared by Manuel
Vazquez, Dr. Paul E. Hoffmaui and James Mulholland were most
helpful.
At this point, the writer wishes to reaffirm the great
and abiding value of the Spanish document collections at the
P. K. Yonge Library of Florida History. In this study, the
writer made especial use of the Stetson Collection, Cita-
tions fjTom this collection have been made with the "new"
leqajo identification numbers, rather than with the "old"
ones with which the Stetson Collection is marked, to con-
form with the numbering system in use in the Archive of the
Indies since 1929. Dr. Paul E. Hoffman has created a con-
version table from the "old" to "new" numbers which has been
most useful for this purpose.
Coordination of the work in the Archive of the Indies
with the Florida materials proceeded more rapidly once the
writer begem to understand the organization of the archive.
He could then better appreciate how Miss Irene Wright, who
sought out much of the documentation brought to Florida in
this century, gathered her material. Aided substantially by
Dr. Hoffman's conversion table, the writer could begin to see
the eureas of her greater and lesser concentration. The
Patronato Real, Contratacidn, Indiferente General and
Gobiemo; Santo Domingo sections were generally well
covered by Miss Wright. Additional work upon the inter-
connected correspondence of the Crown and the Casa de Con-
tratacion found in Contratacion and Indiferente General was
done in Seville. It was found that the Justicia, Escribania
de Camara and Contraduria sections had been very little
utilized by Miss Wright in her investigations. It happened
that these sections, devoted to legal cases or audits
vi
involving the Adelantado or his major lieutenants, were of
particular utility in developing the "private" side of the
conquest of Florida. After this determination was made,
therefore, the major effort of the remaining months was
expended in these areas of the A.G.I.
One legajo, Escribania de Camara 1,024-A, proved to be
the corpus of the main legal case carried on by Pedro Menen-
dez cuid his heirs against the Crown over the conquest of
Florida. Although incomplete, it is most rich in content,
and appears to tie directly to the "feimily case" presented
by the Solis de Meras, Barrientos, and Barcia works. It is
also connected with the audits of Menendez' fiscal affairs
found in A.G.I. Contaduria 454 and 548.
A mere beginning was also made in a most promising
archival area: The notaries' or protocolos records. The
Archives de Protocolos of Seville, Cadiz and Madrid contain
much material on the financial network which backed Pedro
Menendez in Florida.
This has been a most absorbing study, and the writer
feels privileged indeed to have been involved in it. He
has come to feel a degree of kinship with the magnificent euid
yet very humcin figures who carried out the enterprise of
Florida. He would like to give particular thanks and appre-
ciation to Dr. Lyle McAlister, who has directed this research;
his standards have been the most important single stimulus to
carry out this work. His comments and suggestions have
vii
invariably proven cogent and frxiitful. He has continually
steered the project into connection with the wider field of
Latin-American History, emd his encyclopaedic bibliographic
knowledge continues to enrich this student, aund all of
his students.
The Unfailing interest and encouragement of other pro-
fessors at the University, notably Dr. John K. Mahon, Dr.
Paul E. Smith, Dr. George D. Winius, cmd Dr. Cornelius
Goslinga, has amplified the desire of the writer to become
fcuniliar with primary archival materials. Dr. Francis Hayes
did much, in his instruction, to revive an earlier interest
in the purity and beauty of the Spanish language. To Dr.
Goslinga and Dr. Antonio Oliveira-Marques should go special
appreciation for systematic and patient instruction in
paleography, the key to sixteenth-century documentation.
With particular reference to Florida history, the writer
is indebted to Mrs. Bessie DuBois of Jupiter, Florida, for
her long and continual urging to work in that field. Over
a period of twenty-five years, the writer has also been
encouraged in countless ways by Dr. Samuel Proctor, who has
been teacher and friend.
The P. K. Yonge Library of Florida History at the
University of Florida is truly a place of wonders. For
two years, the writer found an academic home there. Its
Librarian, Miss Elizabeth Alexander, has been unfailingly
helpful. The wealth and accessibility of the material and
viii
the ordered but friendly atmosphere of the library owes much
to her concern. Her assistant, Mrs. Ileene Dur^md, has also
aided the writer mamy, many times.
The writer is indeed grateful to the Center for Latin-
American Studies and to the Department of History for the
support of a Title VI National Defense Educational Associ-
ation scholarship, which helped greatly to meet finemcial
needs during the three years of study and research. Dr.
William E. Carter became Director of the Center during this
period. He has, together with Mrs. Vivian Nolan and other
members of his staff, aided in every possible way to solve
problems of enrollment cuid financial support which arose.
At the Archive of the Indies in Seville, many people
were of incomparable kindness and service. The Directora,
Srta. Rosario Parra Cala, has been unfailingly kind. All of
her staff, including the porteros , have shown real considera-
tion. Dr. Louis-Andr^ Vigneras, Professor Emeritus of
History at George Washington University, cLLded greatly in
initiating the writer into the mysteries of the notaries'
depositories. Srta. Maria Carmona de los Santos, the guardian
of the Archive of Protocolos in Cadiz, was roost helpful.
It is impossible to render due appreciation for the
stimulating amd fruitful association which this writer has
had with Dr. Paul E. Hoffman of Louisiana State University.
Where he could easily have chosen to retain his knowledge.
Dr. Hoffmcin has been most generous in shauring the volume of
useful materials unearthed in his own archival research.
ix
His keen Insights and thought-provoking comments on matters
relating to Pedro Menendez de Aviles have been and continue
to be invalueJale.
Finally, but not at all least worthy of mention, the
«rriter would like to acknowledge his lasting obligation to
his deaor euid patient wife, Dorothy, who has supported his
every effort. Thamks also go to his daughter, Peggy,
whose judgment of style he respects, and whose typing skill
was most helpful, and to the whole family, who have cheer-
fully cind thoughtfully met the absences emd sacrifices which
go with a study of this kind.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
PREFACE iv
ABSTRACT xiii
CHAPTER
I CONTRACTORS IN CONQUEST. , 1
NOTES 26
II PHILIP II, FLORIDA, AND PEDRO MEN^NDEZ
DE AVILES . 34
NOTES 60
III FROM ASIENTO TO JOINT-VENTURE 69
NOTES 121
IV UNDERGIRDING THE EXPEDITIONS . 129
NOTES. 172
V SPANISH VICTORY AND FIRST FOUNDATION .... 182
NOTES 228
VI THE CONSEQUENCES OF VICTORY; NEW OUTREACH
BEGINS 238
NOTES 282
VII THE STRUGGLE CONTINUES 293
NOTES 333
VIII THE ENTERPRISE RENEWED; CONCLUSIONS 339
NOTES 375
TABLE OP CONTENTS (CONTINUED)
APPENDICES Page
I 384
II 398
III 404
IV 406
V 407
BIBLIOGRAPHY 408
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH 426
xii
Abstract of Dissertation Presented to the Graduate Council
of the University of Florida in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
THE ADELANTAMIENTO OF
FLORIDA: 1565-1568
By
Eugene Lyon
December, 1973
Chairman: L. N. McAlister, Ph.D.
Major Department: History
The Florida conquest of 1565-1568 was accomplished by
an entrepreneur titled Adelantado^ in keeping with a
Castilian tradition of expansion by Royal. surrogate. Ade-
lantados underwrote the pacification and settlement of new
lemds in return for license to exploit them emd the granting
of titles, monopolies, revenues 2md lands. The Hapsburg
ruler Philip II, caught between urgent dynastic policies and
limited resources, created many adelantamientos and pro-
mulgated Royal ordinances in 1563 which defined a place for
private conquerors in Spanish expansion.
After Spamish-French negotiations over New World spheres
of influence collapsed, Philip II attempted to coxinter a
Huguenot settlement at Port Royal and appointed Lucas
Vazquez Ayll6n Adelcintado in 1563. Both the Spanish and
French attempts failed, but another French expedition built
Fort Caroline in 1564. The capture of mutineers from its
garrison eventually resulted in the dispatch of news of the
fort to Spain.
xiii
Meamwhile, the Asturiam seamcm Pedro Men^ndez de
Avil€s had become an Indies trader and Royal fleet official,
After conflict with the House of Trade led to his jailing
at Seville, Men^ndez was freed and signed a contract with
Philip II for the conquest and settlement of Florida at his
own expense. Only later, after knowledge of Fort Caroline
reached Spain, did the Crown add troops and supplies to
Menendez' own effort. Thereafter, the Florida conquest was
a joint-venture, with the resources of the Adelantado prov-
ing the more telling.
Menendez had recourse to a network of Asturian noble
fajoilies to help staff and finance his enterprise. The
Mayordomo of this network was Pedro del Castillo of C^diz,
who held a contract with Menendez to supply and sustain his
efforts in Florida. This network was built through the use
of powers-of-attomey. The events of the conquest tested
Menendez' resources to the utmost. His decision to proceed
directly to Florida in 1565 made victory over Jean Ribault
possible but cost heavily in ships, lives, and money.
Menendez had great difficulty providing for his Florida
garrisons after Royal aid promised failed to materialize,
and he lost private income potential through the loss of
memy ships. The xinruly contract soldiers' mutinies and
rebellions cost Menendez dear, cuid their treatment of the
natives undermined his Indian policies.
xiv
In spite of obstacles, Pedro Men^ndez and his norteno
coiiquest group explored much of the adelantcuniento of
Florida, which extended from the Gulf Coast around the
Keys to Newfoundland. They established forts 2md missions
in the peninsula, to the north, and inlamd to the Appal achi ems,
and founded the cities whose cabildos were to be the foci of
local government and the means of land distribution. Men^n-
dez set up a system of local government emd promulgated
ordineuices to regulate it. In keeping with his dream for
Florida development, Men^ndez arranged to fund the coming
of hundreds of settlers, and all shared in the hope for
agricxiltural cuid commercial growth in an atmosphere of
commiinity. The Adelantado himself expected to Obtain the
title of Marquis, to be backed by his huge land-grant from
the King. Jesuit missionaries labored diligently with the
Indians, but made little headway.
At the end of the first phase of the Florida conquest
in mid-1568, Pedro Men^ndez had been personally rewarded
by his King for his deeds in Florida, amd Philip II had
agreed to support a minimum garrison at Royal expense.
Real penetration of the land and pacification of the Indi-
ans had not yet been accomplished, however.
3tv
CHAPTER I
CONTRACTORS IN CONQUEST
The sixteenth-century Castilian expansion into the
Western Hemisphere proceeded in several waves. After the
voyages of Columbus, Spsmiards occupied the isleindsof
Hispcuiiola, Puerto Rico, Cuba cind Jamaica. The islands
then ser-ved as advance bases to launch expeditions of ex-
ploration and conquest around the Caribbean basin. During
these yecirs, probing attempts had also been made to discover
the North American coasts. By mid-century, the cultxires of
Spain had met and interacted with those of many native
peoples in widely scattered areas.
The purposes cuid methods of the conquerors reflected
much, if not all, of the diversity of the lands from which
they came. The motivation and organization of conquest
was as complex as the make-up of the sixteenth-century Spanish
Iberia. At any single entrada in the Indies Spaniards pur-
sued many diverse personal, dynastic, and religious objec-
tives. On this advancing frontier, elements of medievalism —
in commerce, law, and the institutions of government — co-
existed with more modem concepts of kingship auid personal
enterprise.
The very means of conquest itself was also a mixture
of ancient tradition and newer practice. The rulers in
whose names the seas, islands and mainlands of the Indies
were appropriated represented an advancing absolutism. A
preoccupation with the step-by-step increase of royal pre-
rogatives can, however, obscure the extent to which limita-
tions upon kingly power still existed. The fiscal and or-
ganizational weaknesses of the Castilian rulers through
the whole first era of conquest insured that their reach
would always exceed their grasp. From the time of Columbus
through that of Balboa, Cortes, Pizarro, Alvarado, Monte jo,
Mendoza and De Soto, conquest was accomplished or recognized
throiigh contract by licensed entrepreneurs, many of whom
carried the title of Adelantado.
The institution of adelantamiento in Castile can be
traced back at least to the twelfth century, and possibly
further.^ The earlier officer, called adelantado mayor,
functioned primarily as a surrogate of the King in hearing
legal appeals, although he also bore responsibility for the
maintenance of order in his district. The unification of
Castile and Leon in the early thirteenth century led to a
revival of the Reconquest from the Moslems. Under the
leadership of Ferdinand III, the forces of Castile drove
deeply into Andalusia, captured Cordova and Seville, and
opened a path to the sea by 1241. The older office of
adelantado was reconstituted, and given wider authority
under the title of adelantado manor. Now the peace-keeping
functions of the adelantados were expemded to become those
of the commanders of frontier military districts. Within
his district, an adelantado had great juridical amd govern-
mental powers? these were outlined and limited by law.
His services were rewarded by the gremt of revenue-producing
estates along the frontier. He could expect to profit from
his Icinds, if he proved able to defend them. Thus was
estciblished the principle of the private defensor, aided
by the grant of benefices from the Crown, so that he might
more easily mount his private effort.
When the subjugation of new kingdoms began in the
western world, the institution of private conquest was
transmitted, without visible alteration, from Castile to
the Indies. The expansion policies the Spanish Crown
developed during its dealings with Christopher Columbus
became a model for future outreach, in which adelantamiento
had its proper part. Columbus received several titles as
result of his contract with Ferdinand and Isabella, which
made him the primary entrepreneur of the Indies which
he was to discover. Among these was the title of Adelantado
Mayor, which he proceeded to subdivide by neiming his brother
Bartolome Adelantado of Hispaniola in 1497. The descendants
of the Discoverer litigated for continuation of the title
of Adelantado Mayor of the Indies, which exists today.
Although Hememdo Cortes begam his conquest of Mexico under
the authority of the licensed Adelantado, Diego Velasquez,
his success enabled him to deal directly with the Crown.
The Royal "Instructions" emd grauits to Cortes constituted
him as a major contractor in conquest, even though he did
not become Adelantado of New Spain. Francisco Pizarro,
the last of the three great conguistadores , also obtained
his royal contract after he had begun his enterprise under
the aegis of another official, the Governor of Panama. His
asiento of 1529 was a standard one, which granted him the
title of Adelantado of Peru as well as a number of other
offices and benefits. Fremcisco Montejo accomplished the
conquest of Yucatan as an Adelantado whose efforts and ex-
Q
penditures over many years overcame difficult obstacles.
Adelantamiento in the Spanish Indies rested upon the
juridical basis of personal royal title to the new lands.
This ownership and over lordship, called senorio natural,
9
had been confirmed by the donations of Pope Alexander VI.
Although the papal bulls laid spiritual obligations upon
the Castilicui rulers in their new lands, their right to
dispose of the territories was legally intact. The monarch,
as Senor natural, was the sole suzerain who could license
exploitation of his properties. The Indies adelantados
were gremted the privilege of discovering, populating and
exploiting the royal lands. The Crown also granted certain
incomes, exemptions and monopolies to its entrepreneurs.
These were of varying duration; some were perpetual in
scope, while many were to endure for the lifetime of the
grantee. The emolximents promised to an adelantado included
inheritable estates and titles. For the ambitious sixteenth-
century caballero, the benefits hoped for constituted high
rewards, in both the material euid the psychic sense.
In return for their license and privileges, the adelan-
tados bore the essential burden of the cost and risk of
their conquest. As the private instruments of their
sovereign's will, they were required to agree to carry out
royal policies of fortification for defense, the implanting
of Castilian municipal institutions in desired areas, and
the fair treatment of the Indians. The duration and extent
of their effort was dictated in substantial detail.
Final sovereignty over its territories had not been
surrendered by the Crown to its designated representative.
The history of the royal disputes with Columbus and later
conquerors demonstrates that the Spanish rulers always
guarded their prerogatives with jealous zeal. The adelan-
tados might receive enduring title to lands and lasting
privileges, but their control over the government of the
lands they had conquered was limited; within one or two
lifetimes the monarch would recapture the governmental
offices of Governor and Captain-General. During the life
of the agreement, however, effective civil and military
authority was in the hands of the adelantado. Within the
boundaries of his district, the adelantado was supreme.
The viceroyalties founded in New Spain in 1535 emd for Peru
in 1544 had no territorial jurisdiction over adelantcunientos
esteiblished by royal fiat. Neither could the Audiencias
appointed in the indies after 1511 interpose their judgments
in the legal appeal channel for cases arising in the adelan-
t£uniento — these proceeded from local justices to the adelan-
tado and from thence to the Council of the Indies. The
King would also appoint Royal financial officials to assure
that Crown revenues would be accounted for and forwarded to
Spain. The ancient devices of visita eind residencia could
also help to check excesses in the use of granted powers.
All of the mutual arrangements between the Castilian
monarchs emd their adelantados were formalized in their
asientos y capitulaciones — a series of negotiated contracts.
Examination of a number of these accords discloses that
they were, in the main, alike. By the middle of the six-
teenth century they had become largely standardized. The
asientos are therefore good indices of the abiding aims and
purposes of Crown cind contractors alike.
In every case, the two-fold mission of the conquest —
pacification and settlement — was impressed upon the contrac-
tor. He would receive the titles and properties promised,
enjoy the short-r\in incomes, exemptions and more enduring
privileges, if he complied with his obligation to fortify,
populate, and provide an atmosphere in which evangelization
of the natives could go forward. On both sides of the
contract — benefit as well as obligation — the promises and
requirements were most specific.
As captains and explorers set forth in every direction
in attempts to expand the dominions of Castile and their own
fortunes, it was inevitable that the uiiknown northern con-
tinent should come within the expanding Spanish sphere of
interest.
From Puerto Rico, Juem Ponce de Leon launched two
expeditions to his licensed area of "Bimini" and made
two voyages, the last of which culminated in his death. He
carried out his ill-starred enterprise at his own cost as
adelantado. When it was done, the general geographic out-
line of the lovely, deadly land he had named Florida had
12
become somewhat clearer to the Spanish.
The next systematic attempt to move northwestward to
conquest arose out of Sam to Domingo. Two men, Lucas
Vazquez de Ayllon and the Licenciado Matienzo, oidores of
Audiencia there, sent two caravels northward along the coast
discovered by Ponce de Leon, and fovmd fertile land lying
in thirty- five to thirty-seven degrees of north latitude.
Vazquez de Ayllon determined to attempt its settlement.
His petition for an asiento was approved in 1523, but storm
and shipwreck destroyed the expedition. The failure of
this would-be adelantado left the field open again.
In the meantime, Castile's claim to the Western Hemis-
phere lands west of the Line of Demarcation established by
the Tordesillas agreements came under challenge.
Cast ile-Ar agon and its Mediterranean and overseas posses-
sions were drawn into the Hapsburg orbit after King Ferdi-
nand had beg\in the long struggle with the Valois rulers of
France. After the beginning of the intense rivalry between
Francis I and Emperor Charles V, the lands and waters of
North America became a theater of contest. The French
monarch sponsored Giovanni di Verrazano on a voyage of
exploration and discovery along the eastern coasts of the
continent during 1524.
At Granada, on December 11, 1526, yet another adelantado
was licensed for an attempt upon Florida. A resident of
Cuba who had been involved in the conquest of Mexico,
PSnfilo de Narvaez, was given his asiento to pacify and
populate cui area between New Spain and the areas granted
to Ponce de Leon and to Vazquez Ayll6n — from the River of
Palms to the Cape of Florida. Narvaez left Spain in mid-
1527, and only reached Florida the next spring. As his
dwindling forces traversed the Gulf Coast, the expedition
lost touch with its sources of supply, and became a disaster.
Only four men, including Cabeza de Vaca, reached New Spain
14
eight years after their Florida landing.
After the battle of Pavia and the capture of Francis I
by Charles V, another short-lived peace prevailed. When
Framcis was released, however, war began again in Europe,
and this time the first French commerce-raiders appeared in
the Spanish Indies. Ignoring the Spemish and Portuguese
pretensions to exclusive title in the Americas, Framcis I
also sent Jacques Cartier in 1534 and 1535 to explore New-
foundlemd, seeking a passage westward to the Orient.
After Cabeza de Vaca returned to Spain to report in
1537, the Crown passed over his application to take up the
contract of de Nau-vaez, emd awarded it to Hernando de Soto.
The asiento of de Soto required him to fortify and settle,
and made him the usual concessions for profit and prestige.
It was continental in scope; de Soto was given all of the
areas previously promised to Vazquez Ay lion and to de
Narvaez. The vast expanse of his territories swallowed
MP Hernando de Soto emd his men; his expedition never
passed beyond the exploration stage, cind ended in death for
its leader and many of his men.
In the meantime, preparation for the third voyage of
Jacques Csurtier was well advemced. Word of its arming
reached euid alarmed the En^eror and his councillors. It
was to be a thoroughgoing colonization attempt. The Spamish
viewed the coming voyage as an act of aggression in the
rightful lands of the rulers of Castile. Charles V con-
sidered sending a war-fleet to intercept Cartier at sea;
an armada was outfitted and later sent, but became primarily
a protective fleet. In June of 1541, the Council of the
Indies suggested to the King that he send scout vessels to
follow the movements of Cartier, and practice defensive
10
settlement by giving another asiento to a Spanish nobleman
to check the French in North America.
When the Cartier voyage came to naught (as far as
lasting settlement was concerned) , no further Spanish con-
tracts for the Florida conquest were issued for many years.
In June, 1549, Father Luis Cincer de Barbastro, a Dominican
priest who had taken part in the peaceable evangelization
of Verapaz, was killed with two of his fellows at Tampa Bay
while attempting to convert the Florida Indians. After more
than thirty-five years, the Spanish had still not made
successful establishments on the southeastern mainland.
The year of Father Cancer's sacrifice also represented
a new peak in the intrusion of French vessels, which came
in numbers to raid and trade in the Spanish Indies. By
now, the distinction between peace and war had become
blurred. Corsairs sailed continually to the "hot-spots"
between Cuba and Hispaniola, where inter-island commerce
and a plentiful supply of hides and sugar attracted the
French.
By this time, Spanish trade with the Indies had grown
until it represented something of immense value to protect.
The commercial system called the Carrera de Indias was an
almost-closed monopoly, in which the Crown license mer-
chants to engage in commerce. During the first four or
five decades of the Carrera, trade was diffused among many
ports. In Spain, in 1529, the Emperor gave permission to
11
La Cortina and Bayona In Galicia, Aviles in Asturlas, Laredo
in Samtcmder, Bilbao in Vizcaya, and San Sebasti^ in
Guipuzcoa to load cargoes for the Indies. Permission was
also extended to Cadiz and Seville in Andalusia.
Many nortenos engaged in the Atleuitic commerce made
commercial ties with Caribbean trade centers — Santo Domingo,
La Yaguana, Monte Cristi, Puerto Plata cuid Puerto Real on
the isleuid of Hispaniola, Santiago in Cuba, and San Juan,
Puerto Rico. The exchange of sugar, hides, placer gold and
copper was made with the wines, iron goods, emd cloth of
Spain. As the century advanced, the agricultural products
and bullion from New Spain and Peru began slowly to eclipse
the island commerce. San Juan de Ulua, Nombre de Dios and
Cartagena became the main ports for the ingress and egress
of organized fleets. Across the Atlantic, except for
limited separate privileges granted to C^diz, all of this
trade was funnelled through Seville.
As merchants from the north of Spain lost their one-
time privileges in the Indies commerce, some of them
gravitated to Cadiz, and continued their shipping from
there. Considerable tension arose between them and the
shippers' guild at Seville.
The Royal Casa de Contrataci6n at Seville (founded
1503) and the guild of sea-merchants (Consulado de la Uni- '
versidad de Mercaderes, established 1543) composed a sym-
biotic community of interests. The traders of Seville had
12
achieved monopoly through royal patronage — they beceune a
strong and wealthy power-center. Through the Casa, the
Crown Insured the safe passage of Its Indies revenues,
including those teoces levied on the conunerce itself. The
functionaries of the Casa came to represent the merchants'
guild as much as they did the King. An official at
Cadiz insured that ships from that port conformed to the
rules. Crown policies were also carried out through the
Carrera regulation. The inspections of the Casa enforced
controls over outgoing passengers, who had to conform to the
Spanish laws of religious purity cind moral fitness before
18
they could sail.
To protect the Spanish ships against Berber pirates
and the commerce-raiders who swarmed in the waters west of
Spain, the Emperor decided to tax the trade for its own
defense. The Crown, operating through its officials in the
Casa de Contrataci6n, used the funds realized from the
averia tax to lease ships, purchase cannon and eunmunition,
and pay soldiers emd sailors to defend the fleets. By mid-
century, the practice of joint sailing in fleet convoy for
defense purposes had begun, but was not yet regularized.
Coastal patrols also protected the Mediterranean shoreline
19
and the other Spanish coasts.
On the north coast of Spain, conditions were particu-
larly favorable for the development of a vigorous culture
based upon the sea. The very nature of the rugged coast.
13
cut by endless inlets alternating with rocky headlands,
thrust men onto the oceans for livelihood. In addition
to fishing, from em early date they engaged in trade with
northern Europe emd the Indies. To the east, in Vizcaya,
the combination of rich iron ore deposits, ample supplies
of wood, and a sea-oriented people produced a long and
vital tradition of ship-building.
With excellent ships and fine seamen, the nortenos made
lasting reputations as mariners and the builders of fleets.
The stimulus which activated the area was essentially that
of war, and its more particular impetus was privateering.
During the lengthy Italian wars, and the many Mediterremeam
campaigns mounted by Ferdinand and Emperor Charles V, the
Crown freely gave letters-of-marque to Spanish ship-owners
to prey upon enemy vessels in the Bay of Biscay, the near
approaches to Europe, and the waters of the Indies.
The major incentive for privateering was the taking
of enemy prizes. The wealth which accrued to the north
coast from the corse was substantial. In 1542, Vizcayan
privateers took thirty-one French prizes; another Basque
group captured forty-two French vessels from the Newfoundland
fishing trade. Juemot de Villaviciosa from Asturias captured
more them sixty prizes during his wartime career. Other
successful contra-corsario captains were Domingo de Villa-
viciosa, Bartolome Carreno, and Alvaro S^chez of Avil^s.
One memorial lists twenty-two Guipuzcoam captains who had
made prize captures during war with Framce.
14
In addition to independent adventuring, the captains
and shipbuilders of the north coast early gained access to
royal funds and favor through the furnishing of ships. They
sailed on expeditions against the Berbers and Turks and took
part in the Mediterranecui sea-actions connected with the
Italian wars. The Crown would pay a sueldo, or ship-charter
fee, for the use of the vessel, emd would also furnish
supplies, artillery and munitions, and pay for the seamen.
The entrepreneur who provided the ships would also be given
a royal commission as Captain-General to lead them in
battle. One of the most notable of the armador fcirailies
was that of Bazan. Before the end of the fifteenth century,
Semcho de Bazan was already known for the furnishing of
vessels. Galleys and other fighting ships from the north
coast were important contingents in the expeditions against
Berbers and Turks in 1510, 1519, 1530, 1535, and 1540-41.
In 1543, Alvaro de Bazan, who had served with distinction
in the Mediterranean since the 1520s, was commissioned to
form an armada to counter a large French fleet. His forty
ships met the enemy off Galicia in the battle of Muros,
and defeated them handily, taking twenty-three prizes and
much other booty.
Pedro Menendez de Aviles was very much a part of this
sea-borne culture and of the anti-corsair milieu. Born in
1519 at Aviles, Menendez was the descendant of minor Asturian
hidalgos, and had blood and marriage connections with the
15
■ore is^ortemt Vald^s family as well as with other noble
22
norteno families. After an early marriage to Dona Maria
de Soils from nearby MerSs, Men^ndez went to sea and en-
tered the world of privateering. He had before him the ex-
ample of his elder brother Alvaro Sanchez, and such
luminaries as Alvaro Baz^. It appears that he served in
Baz&n*s fleet for two years beginning in 1543. This
ejqperience led him to buy his own patache (a small, rapid-
sadling craft) and become a privateer. Within a very few
years he became well-known for his decisive, daring seamam-
ship and for the number of prizes that he took. For Pedro
Mendndez, this proved to be a path to preferment at the
Court. He received two royal commissions to pursue corsairs,
one granted by Meucimilian in 1548, acting as regent for the
Emperor, and cuiother granted by Charles V himself. Mani-
festly, the Asturian's rise was aided by his exploits, but
family influence may have also been a factor.
Pedro Menendez armed a galleon at his own cost and went
with a crew of relatives and friends to pursue French ships
which had seized eleven Vizcayan prizes off Galicia. He
tracked down the French near La Rochelle, captured three
of the corsair's vessels, and mortally wounded the leader,
Jean Alphonse.
Menendez' second royal letter-of -marque, issued by the
En?>eror in 1550, granted a wider sphere of action to the
young sea-^captain. He could now pass to the Indies to seek
16
illegal intruders corsairing in time of peace. With this
instruction, he built t%ro galleons and went to Seville, where
the Casa de Contrataci6n registered his two ships to Tierra
Finae. With his royal privilege, Men^ndez did not have to
adhere to the convoy regulations of the Casa. In 1550,
he left for the Indies, and returned in 1551.
Daring the next voyage made by Pedro Menendez, war
erupted again with Fremce, emd all-out incursions in force
by French corsairs begem. Under leaders such as Jacques
LeClerc, called "Wooden- leg," and Jacques Sore, they prepared
to assault shipping near Spain, in the Camary and Azores
Islands and in the Caribbeem. In the midst of this tense
situation, the Asturicin had an exciting journey. While
carrying merchamdise in the Caribeem in 1552, he was captured
by a sizeable French galeass. For fifteen days, Menendez
was kept prisoner as he negotiated with the corsairs for his
ransom and release. In Scintiago de Cuba, he borrowed 1,098
27
gold pesos to reuisom his person and his ship.
Menendez had learned of French plans to raid the Indies
on a laurge scale. After refitting his ship in Santiago,
Menendez carried some stranded sailors as paid passengers
to Vera Cruz.
Once in New Spain, Pedro Menendez went to the city of
Mexico and reported personally to Viceroy Luis de Velasco,
adrising him of the danger of the coming French assault.
Then he scd-led to Havana, where he conferred with Juan de
17
Rojeis, the most powerful m2m in that port, emd with Jnan
de Lobera, Alcaide of the fort. Menendez next vent to
Santo Domingo and appeared before the Audiencia. The
thirty- four-year-old ship captain then returned to Spain,
bearing signed testimony of the threat to t .3 Indies from
the highest authorities in the Spanish Caribbecui.
To meet the demger, Menendez had a pl2ui. He appeared
before the Council of the Indies as an expert seaman ex-
perienced in dealing summarily with the corsair menace.
Drawing upon this reputation cmd his expertise, Menendez
proposed to counter the French and build four ships and four
smaller zabras at his own cost. He urged the Crown to bear
the expense of outfitting the ships and paying him a salary
as Captain-General. With the pay of his officers and the
men, the cost would be about 40,000 ducats a year. Clearly,
the Asturicin aspired to be another Alvaro Bazcin.
Pedro Menendez made his point. He received a commission
as Captain-General for the Indies voyages, and prepared to
sauLl. His appointment sparked conflict with strong influ-
ences within the Carrera de Indias. Menendez was one of
several Captains-General of the Azores and Indies fleets
imposed upon the merchants of Seville by the Crown. Diego
Lopez de las Roelas and his brother Pedro, Gonzalo and Luis
de Caurvajal, Alvaro Bazan, Alvaro Sanchez de Avil^s and
Pedro Menendez de Aviles were shipowners and expert mariners.
They were also nortenos . Menendez represented a semi-
18
independent power, Asturian in origin, with a reputation amd
high-level connections. His appointment also implied a
nore direct intervention of the Crown in fleet defense.
In the face of the burgeoning corsair threat, new ordinances
28
had been promulgated for the arming of convoy ships. The
powers of fleet generals amd Captains-General were now
considerable, emd touched the interests of merchants at
vital points — his control of the seaworthiness of vessels,
some aspects of cargo lading, emd sailing times. Pierre and
Buguette Chaxinu have written a striking description of the
Captain-General of this period:
with the economic force of a merchant, strong
in his own military and naval puissance, at
times an adelantado, almost always a ship-
armer, first provider of armadas for the King,
a grandee in his nepotism, defrauder of the
customs laws for his own account and for that
of others, carrying contraband aboard his own
vessels and favoring contraband, absolute
master in the ports of the Indies . . . such
was the Captain-General. 29
For its part, the merchcuit guild in Seville had enough influ-
ence upon the Casa officials to insure selective enforcement
of the regulations against the generals. In measuring a
vessel, bonding its master, and the approval of the outgoing
and incoming registry, many delays and obstructions were
possible. In contests between fleet general or Captain-
General emd the Casa, final appeal was to the Crown through
the Council of the Indies. Thus each opposed power-center
sought support from the throne to buttress its position in
the polycentric organism of sixteenth-century Spain. All
19
three parties involved in the Carrera were inextricably
bound together through the institution of the averia.
Salaries and ship-charter fees paid to the generals came
out of this teoc levied by the Crown upon the trade. The
administration of the averia was, however, often in the
hands of the merchants themselves, through various asientos
with the Crown, for which they acted as tax-farmers.
The three-way relationship between the King, his trade
officials, and semi-autonomous fleet Generals like Pedro
Menendez de Avil^s was replete with opportunities for
conflict. The antagonisms aroused by the assignment of
Pedro Menendez to the Indies fleets were not long in
erupting.
Before he could take his office, however, Pedro Menendez
was recalled by Prince Philip. As Charles V neared the end
of his long reign, it was decided that the Prince should
marry Mary Tudor, the eldest daughter of the late Henry
VIII, in the hopes that the union with England would bolster
and support Philip's dominions in the Netherlands. Philip
asked Menendez to be one of the troup which escorted him
to England for the wedding, and when a fleet of 150 sails
left La Coruna on July 12, 1554, the Asturian went along.
After the royal marriage, Pedro Menendez returned to Spain
with dispatches to the Regents in Valladolid, and then
resumed his interrupted preparations in Seville to sail.
After much delay, his ships sailed in October, 1555.
20
Some of the Cadiz vessels were forced to return to port by
stormy weather. A Casa representative from Seville in-
spected them in C5diz and found many violations of shipping
laws. His attempts to enforce the laws resulted in open
fighting in the town and led to his being thrown into jail
by the Cadiz magistrate. A young merchant named Pedro del
Castillo was one of those involved in the illegal trans-
actions. Pedro Menendez had permitted Castillo, who was a
distant relative, to send goods under his command in viola-
tion of the laws of the Casa de Contratacion. Enmity against
Cadiz, Pedro del Castillo and Pedro Menendez de Aviles began
to build in Seville. ^° Alvaro Sanchez, Menlndez' brother,
went with the other ships as admiral of the fleet. The
brothers and their convoy of eighty-one ships sailed directly
into danger. A new urgency gripped the traders of the
Carrera de Indias and the Spaniards in the Indies.
As the last of the Italian wars began in Europe, raids
and attacks by Frenchmen upon towns and shipping in the
Spanish overseas possessions hit a new peak. La Yaguana
in Hispaniola, Santiago de Cuba, and Havana were seized
by large, determined bands of corsairs. On July 10, 1555,
Jacques Sores had landed, thoroughly sacked Havana and put
many of its residents to the sword. Damage to the agri-
cultural and mercantile productivity of the Caribbean Islands
was severe and enduring.
21
The winter of 1554-55, beset with storms, had been even
disastrous for the Seville merchants than had the raids
of pirates. Three ships from the New Spain fleet of that
year had been lost off Padre Island, on the modern Texas
coast, while two from the Tierra Firme contingent sank in
the Bahama Channel. The Almiranta of Tierra Firme, rich in
her own cargo and heavily laden with contraband, was ship-
wrecked on the Andalusian shore near Tarifa.
Pedro Menendez' first charge as Indies fleet Captain-
General was, therefore, a heavy and responsible one. The
manner in which he accomplished it was typical of the man —
it aroused both acclaim and abuse. By all accounts, his
return passage to Spain was rapid. The Captain-General
had gone personally to Vera Cruz with the New Spain ships,
while Alvaro Sanchez took charge of the section which
discharged and collected goods and bullion at Nombre de
Dios and Cartagena. Although his return was not anticipated
until the following spring, Menendez brought the ships back
in September of 1556, richly laden with merchant goods and
Crown revenues. After the ships had been inspected by the
Casa, Pedro Menendez and his brother were arrested amd
charged with, having brought a half million ducats' worth
of cochineal and sugar outside of legal registry. They were
jailed, and litigation on their case began. After the
brothers were fined and condemned by the Audiencia of the
22
Casa de Contrataci6n» they won a reversal of the verdict on
appeal to the Council of the Indies. Menendez was then
praised by the Crown for his diligence in the 1555-56
voyage/ and directed to return as Captain-General of the
next departing armada to the Indies. Before this could
take effect, however, events in Europe led to a change in
plems. The military operations of the Spanish and their
English allies in Flanders required heavy naval support
across the Channel and from Iberiem ports.
At first it was planned that Alvaro de Bazan divert
his guard armada from Spanish waters and from the convoy of
fleets between the Azores and Seville, and move to Flanders.
Pursuant to this idea, Pedro Mendndez was ncimed to take over
34
his duties. Then this idea was abandoned, and the Asturian
entered a period of two years' busy service to the Courts
and armies in England and Flanders. He was posted as
subordinate to Luis de Carvajal of Guipdzcoa in the arduous
task of protecting supply lines and transporting personnel
across waters active with French privateers. In making up
his squadron, Pedro Menendez armed ten ships and two zabras,
and operated on Crown charters while taking occasional prizes
to bolster his income and that of his supporters. Now his
brother Bartolorae Menendez, Diego Flores Valdes, Pedro
Menendez Marquez (the son of Alvaro Sanchez) , and Esteban
de las Alas of Aviles had joined his service. Menendez'
family had grown: his son Jucui was now a young man, who
23
served with his father. Of his three legitimate daughters.
Ana and Catalina had not yet married, and Maria had become
a nun. Pedro Menendez also had fathered am illegitimate
daughter, likewise named Mauria.
As a result of his voyages in support of Spamish conmit-
ments in northern Europe, Pedro Menendez came directly to
the favorable notice of his sovereigns, and further enhanced
his reputation. His successful escort of 1,200,000 ducats
to Flemders was credited with having helped support the
Spanish offensive which ended in the victory at St. Quentin
in August, 1557. In blockade and convoy duty from Dover to
Calais in company with Carvajal he aided the English allies
so efficiently that he was commended by Queen Mary, In final
culmination of his northern duties, Menendez was selected
for the signaJ. honor of escorting Philip II to Spain from
Flamders. The Prince had now become the King, and peace
had been signed at Cateau-Cambresis in April of 1559.
The young Asturian brought his King to Laredo in safety,
amd a new era begem for him and for Spain.
While Pedro Menendez had been occupied in the last
struggles of the war with France in Europe, the "corsair
war" in Atlantic waters amd in the Spemish Indies had reached
a new high of bitterness. It had long been the practice
that Frenchman caught in the overseas dominions of Castile
should be returned as prisoners for trial in Seville. Now,
24
Alvaro de Bazin decreed that French captives should be
sentenced to serve at the oar in Spemish galleys, while
37
their officers should be hung or thrown in the sea.
Continued concern cibout further French attempts to
settle North America also led to another Crown venture in
Florida. Philip II wished to evangelize the heathen Indiems
of the Gulf Coast, who had murdered Father Cancer and
harrassed the snipwreck survivors in the 1554 fleet disaster,
and to protect other castaways. The King decided to under-
take the Florida settlement, fund it from the royal treasury
and administer it through the Viceroy of New Spain, the able
Luis de Velasco."'^
After reconnaisemce in the northeastern Gulf by Guido
de Labazaoris in 1558, Velasco launched two expeditions. The
first, coramcmded by Tristin de Luna, left Vera Cruz in mid-
summer of 1559, Icinded in Pensacola Bay cind was still un-
loading when the fleet was scattered by a hurricane. The
Viceroy also sent Angel de VillafciHe, with a skilled Asturicm
pilot, Gonazlo de Gayon, to explore cind tcike possession of
the Semta Elena area of the east coast. By suiraner of 1561,
both efforts had completely failed, and the forces had been
withdrawn. The cost to the New Spain treasuries was sub-
stantial.^^
The costly failures in Florida were an outgrowth of
the stimulus of the war upon royal spending. The realities
of peace brought a realization that Castilian finemces were
25
in parloxis state. A state bankruptcy had occxirred in 1557;
the end of the waur mecmt that substantial cut-backs in
Crowns spending were imperative. The armada of Alvaro de
Bazin wets dismissed and some of its war material sold.
The coming of peace, however, did little to relieve the
nost pressing problems of defense. When Philip cuxnounced
the signature of the treaty at Cateau-Cambr^sis to his
Indies officials, he warned that it was no time to relax
their vigilance against corsairs:
See that the said peace is observed on our part
and because, as you know, in peacetime we are
accustomed to having corsairs going to rob
against the will of their prince, it is well
that during this time, the ships which come
frcxn that aurea do not come unprepared. 40
In the diplomatic negotiations ^ich had preceded the
execution of the treaty the whole question of French intru-
sion in the domains claimed by Spain had been treated at
length. After debating the matter for weeks, the parties
reached no settlement on the issue of trespass. In 1560,
when the discussions finally broke down for lack of agree-
ment, both sides were left essentially where they had been.
For their part, the Spanish maintained the integrity of
the areas set aside for them by the Papal bulls and the
Tordesillas treaty, while the French continued to insist
that they might sail in and colonize any areas not actually
occupied by the Spanish. In that uneasy and unsettled
state, matters were left — a fertile field for future mis-
unde rs t emding .
NOTES
1. The writer is indebted to those amthropologists \iho
have studied emd written edxjut acculturation theory, cind
especially to George M. Foster for his work Culture and Con-
quest; America's Spanish Heritage (New York: Wenner-Gren
Foundation for Anthropological Research, 1960) . Professor
Foster has demonstrated the origin of many elements of Spanish
colonial culture in their Iberian agricultural, religious,
social and governmental inodels, and stresses the totality of
a culture-conquest.
2. Itemized listings of the Adelantados of the Indies
exist. Two of these are incomplete but nonetheless helpful.
The first is "Noticias extractadas de asientos y Capitulaciones
que se hicieron para descubrir en Indias despves de Colon,"
from Cesareo Fernandez Duro, Armada Espanola (9v. , Madrid:
Est. tipografico "Sxioesores de Rivadeneyra, " 1895-1903), I,
452-459; Professor Roscoe R. Hill included a chart of Indies
Adelantados in his article, "The Office of Adelantado,"
Political Science Quarterly, XXVLLL, No. 4 (December, 1913) ,
656.
3. An excellent summary of the history of Adelantamiento
in medieval Spain has been prepared by Manuel DSnvila y Col-
lado in Historia del poder civil en Espana (6 v., Madrid:
Fontanet, 1885-1886), I, 77-83. The Iberian background of
the institution is also examined thoroughly by Roscoe R. Hill
in "The Office of Adelantado," op. cit., 646-651.
4. Royal laws and ordinances governing Adelantados were
promulgated by the Castillicin King Alfonso X in a special
code entitled Leyes para los Adelantados Mayores. See
Marcelo Martinez Alcubilla, Codigos Antiguos de Espana (2
vol., Madrid: J. Lopez Camacho, 1885), I, 175-176. For
jurisdiction of Adelantados, see Leyes XIX and XXII, Titulo
IX, part II, in Las Siete Partidas. These have been repro-
duced in Codigos Antiguos de Espana, op. cit., I, 301-302.
When the Cortes was held at Alcala de Henares in 1348, Laws
VII and XX of Titulo XX of the Ordencimiento de Alcala was
concerned with the authority of the Adelantado.
26
27
5. The precise identity of Castilian with Indies
adelantamiento was discussed and affirmed in the consulta of
the Council of the Indies, dealing with the successors in
title to Pedro Menendez de Aviles. See Archive General de
Indias (hereinafter A.G.I.) Samto Domingo 231; the consulta
is given at Madrid on November 28, 1671, eind is found in the
John B. Stetson Collection at the P. K. Yonge Library of
Florida History (hereinafter Stetson Collection) , University
of Florida.
6. A good summary of the benefits, titles and legal
cases related to Christopher Columbus is found in the work
of Otto Schoenrich, The Legacy of Christopher Columbus (2
vol., Glendale, California: The Arthur H. Clark Company,
1949-1950). Columbus' contract, the Capitulaciones de Santa
Fe, was signed by Ferdinand and Isabella outside Granada on
April 17, 1492, and has been reprinted in Coleccidn de
documentos ineditos relatives al descubrimiento ... en
America y Oceania (42 vol., Madrid; Real Acaderaia de la
Historia, 1864-1884) (hereinafter D.I.), XVII, 572-574.
7. Hernando Cortes' Instructions and ordinances of
government have been reprinted in D.I. , XII, 349, 355;
XIII, 355 et seq.; XXVI, 19, 65, 135, 149, 160, 170, 185.
8. The Pizarro Capitulaci6n was dated at Toledo on
July 26, 1529, and has been reprinted in D.I. , XXII, 271-
285. A detailed account of the Montejo conquest is in Robert
S. Chamberlain, The Conquest and Colonization of Yucatan
(New York: Octagon Books, 1966).
9. A good summary of the Castiliein title to the Indies
is found in the packet of documents gathered by the Council
of the Indies in preparation for the consulta furnished to
Philip II on May 5, 1565, and found in A.G.I. Indiferente
General, 738, ramo 7. The papal bulls Inter caetera and
Dudum Siquidem were issued by Alexander VI in 149 3; they are
reproduced in full in Frances G. Davenport, ed. , European
Treaties Bearing on the History of the United States (4 v.,
Washington: Carnegie Institution of Washington, 1917-1937) ,
I, 80-82. The laws of the Indies formally conferred the
title of Senor Natural upon the monarch; see Recopilacion de
leyes de los reinos de las Indias (4 v., Madrid: J. de
Paredes, 1681), Libro III, titulo I, Ley 1-A. The theoreti-
cal background of royal authority over and ownership of the
Kingdoms of the Indies has been thoroughly developed by Frank
Jay Moreno, "The Spemish Colonial System: A Functional
i^proach," Western Political Quarterly, XX, No. 2, Pt. 1
(June, 1967) 308-320.
28
10. The injunction against interference from viceroyal-
ties is formalized in the code of laws enacted by Philip II to
govern adelantamientos , promulgated at Segovia on July 13,
1563, in "Ordenanzas sobre descubrimiento nuevo e poblaci6n,"
in D.I. , VIII, No. LXIX, 508. The applicable appeals route
and legal jurisdiction are covered in idem, No. XLIII, 501;
No. LXVIII, 507-508, and LXX, 508. Provision for officials
to guard the royal treasury is located in idem. No. LXIV,
507; the residencia. No. LXXXIV, 512, visita. No. CIII, 518.
11. Appendix II, infra. , itemizes a number of the clauses
from selected sixteenth-century asientos. For a detailed
analysis of the terms emd requirements of such an agreement,
see the description of that negotiated with Pedro Menendez
de Aviles; infra 77-97.
12. Ponce de Leon's patent for Bimini is found in D.I. ,
XXII, 26-32.
13. Vazquez Ay lion reported to the Emperor about the
northern discoveries; a summary of his narrative is appended
to the body of his asiento, which was approved at Valladolid
on June 12, 1523, and is found in A.G.I. Indiferente General
415, fol. 32-40.
14. The contract of de Narvaez is found in A.G.I.
Indiferente General 415, A.G.I. Contrataci6n 3,309, and has
been reprinted in D.I. , VIII, 224-245.
15. The agreement with Hernando de Soto is in A.G.I.
Indiferente General 415. It was entered into at Valladolid
on April 20, 1537.
16. The writer is indebted to Paul E. Hoffman for the
citation of the consulta of the Council of the Indies. It
was dated June 10, 1541, and has been reproduced in Buckingham
Snith, Colecci6n de varios docximentos para la historia de
la Florida y tierras adycentes (London: Trubner & Company,
1859) , 109-111^ Hoffman's long introductory essay about the
growth of the corsair menace and the development of land auid
naval defense of the Spanish possessions and commerce is most
cogent. It is found in Paul Everett Hoffman, "The Defense
of the Indies, 1535-1574. A Study in the Modernization of the
Spanish State" (Ph.D. dissertation. University of Florida,
Gainesville, 1969), pp. 1-18.
17. See cedula, Toledo, Jamuary 15, 1529, in Diego de
Encinas, Cedulario Indiano (5 v., 1596; Facsimile reproduc-
tion; Madrid: Ediciones Cultura Hispanica, 1945-1946), rv,
133.
29
18. A complete compendium of the Spanish colonial navi-
gation laws is that of Joseph de Veitia Linaje, Norte de la
contratacion de las indias occidentales (2 vol., 1672;
Buenos Aires: Comision Argentina de Fomento Interamericama,
1945). A stemdard work on the Spanish commercial system
is that of C. H. Haring, Trade cind Navigation Between Spain
etnd the Indies in the Time of the Hapsburgs (Ccirabridge,
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1918). Interpreta-
tion of the legal aspects of the Carrera de Indias, a deep
understanding of the institutions involved in it, cmd the
best itemized chronology of the trade from 1500 to 1650 is
found in the multi-volume work of Pierre cind Huguette Chaunu,
Seville et I'Atlantique; 1504-1650 (10 v., Paris: S.E.V.
P.E.N. , 1955-1959). The Carrera was, of course, the only
route for the return of the Indies revenues of the Crown,
including customs duties (almojarifazgo) , tithe (diezmo) ,
tribute, the royal fifth of mined bullion (quinto) court
fines (penas de camara) , and sales taxes (alcabala) . The
machinery of cargo registries, ship visitations, and the
requirement that cargoes be cleared only through Seville
were used aggressively to enhance and promote the monopoly.
19. The best study of the averia is that of Guillermo
Cespedes del Castillo, La Averia en el comercio de Indias
(Seville: Escuela de Estudios Hispano-Americanos, 1945).
Pierre cmd Huguette Chaunu, Seville et I'Atlantique, op.
cit. , discuss the averia in v. 1, 175-182. An excellent
summary of the development of fleet defense methods in the
sixteenth century is found in Paul E. Hoffman, "The Defense
of the Indies . , . ," op. cit., 1-18.
20. On June 30, 1498, at Saragossa, Ferdincuid and Isa-
bella issued unlimited license for the armadores of Guipuzcoa
emd Vizcaya to go in corse. Prince Philip, on November 24,
1551, issued a similar cedula. These are cited in Duro,
Armada Espanola, 1, 63, 427.
21. See Duro, Armada Espanola, 1, 270-274. The memorial
is "Informacion hecha en la villa de San Sebasticui para
acreditar las acciones marineras de los capitanes armadores
de Guipuzcoa, durainte la guerra con Freincia."
22. The genealogy of Pedro Men^ndez de Avil^s can be
learned, or inferred, from a variety of sources. The four
main narrative sources do not furnish data of a precise nature,
but are useful in establishing some of the relationships.
These are Andre Gonzalez de Carballido y Zuniga ("Barcia"),
Ensayo cronologico para la historia general de la Florida
(first printed 1723; translated by Anthony Kerrigan, Gaines-
ville: The University of Florida Press, 1951), Bartolome
Barrientos, Pedro Menendez de Aviles; su vida y hechos (1567)
in Genaro Garcia, ed. , Dos Antiguas Relaciones (Mexico City:
30
Tip. y. Lit. de J, Aguilar y Vera y Compania, 1902) and
printed in facsimile by the University of Florida Press,
1965. Another is Eugenio Ruidiaz y Caravia, La Florida:
su conquista y colonizaci6n por Pedro Menendez de Avil^s
(2 V. , Madrid: Imprenta de los hijos de J. A. Garcia,
1893-1894). A contemporary biography of the Florida Ade-
lantado during the conquest is that of Gonzalo Solfs de
Meras, Pedro Menendez de Avil^s. This work is found in ms.
in the Archivo del Conde de Revilla Gigedo, Madrid, herein-
after A.C.R. (in microfilm, P. K. Yonge Library) Legajo 2,
No. 2, and has been translated by Jeannete T. Conner and
published at Deland in 1923. A facsimile edition was re-
printed by University of Florida Press in 1965, with Intro-
duction by Lyle N. McAlister. Ciriaco Miguel Vigil in
Noticias bioqraf icas-qeneoloqicas de Pedro Menendez de Aviles
(AvilSs: Miguel Vigil, 1892) provides some more detail,
particularly about the relationships contemporary to and
since the time of the Adelantado. Ruidiaz relied upon Vigil
substantially, emd they shared some errors, e.g., their
confusion of Pedro Menendez Marqu^z with Pedro Menendez de
Aviles el mozo. „„,-, '""
Insights into relationships gleaned from various
interrogatories, testimonies and legal cases have been
valuable. The noted sixteenth-century historiam Gonzalo
Fernandez de Oviedo y Valdes and the Inquisitor Hernando
de Valdes came from the Valdes family, cf. Appendix III,
"Genealogy of the Enterprise of Florida."
23. Gonzalo Soils de Meras, Pedro Menendez de Aviles,
40, describes Menendez' enlistment in an Armada "against
corsairs"; it probably was the Bazan fleet.
24. Pedro Menendez says that when he was twenty-eight
or twenty-nine years of age, in 1548, he was given a royal
order to sail from Asturias against an "infestation" of
corsairs. See "Servicios del general Pedro Menendez de
Aviles," hereinafter "Servicios ..." Seville, 1564, A.G.I.
Patronato 257, No. 3, ramo 2, fol. 1 (Stetson Coll. ) . The
first commission is described in Solis de Meras, op. cit. ,
41-42.
25. The writer appreciates the citation of the 1550
commission: A.G.S., Guerra Antigua, Libros de despachos,
18, fol. 86-88vto. It was furnished by Paul E. Hoffman.
26. Although the detailed registry of his vessels is
not availcible in the Archive of the Indies, Menendez' ships
are recorded in the "Libro de Registros," A.G.I. Contratacion
2,898, 1550 Ida and 1551 Venida. Pedro Menendez took the
nao Santa Maria de la Antigua. His other vessel was
probcUbly La Concepci6n, whose master was Alonso Menendez.
31
27. Men^ndez describes his adventures in a memorial to
the Council of the Indies dated 1553, and found in A.G.I,
Santo Domingo 71, In Stetson Collection, mis-dated 1567.
28. See Crown to Casa, February 13, 1552, A.G.I,
Contratacidn 5,010.
29. Pierre and Huguette Chaunu, Seville et l*Atlantique,
I, 114. The laws relating to the authority of the generals
are found in Recopilaci6n de leyes de los reinos de las In-
dias (4 v., Madrid: J. de Paredes, 1681), III, Lib. IX,
tTET 15, le^ 13 et seq.
A direct result of the clash between interests was
a continuing argument over respective powers of the Seville
officials and the Captains-General. In 1559, a dispute arose
in Seville when Pedro de las Ruelas displayed a cedula out-
lining the powers_of the Captain-General. See Casa to Crown,
■f« ■■■'"'" I /'"■■"-■!Tni^7~1559 , from A.G.I. Contrataci6n 5,167.
30.^ The incident of 1555 in CSdiz is detailed in "In-
formacion hecha en la ciudad de Cadiz acerca de lo ocurrido
entre Francisco Duarte, factor . . . de la Casa de Contratacidn,
y el Licenciado Quevedo, Alcalde Mayor de la ciudad de C^diz,"
from A.G.I. Justicia 970. Castillo, a vecino of C^diz, was
married to the former Isabel de Ribera and was probably of
northern origins. His relationship to Pedro Men^ndez de
Aviles was affirmed by Men^ndez in his will, dated at Sanldcar
de Barrameda on January 7, 1574. The will is found in A.C.R. ,
leqajo 9, no. 21, and is also found in the Archivo de Proto-
colos de Cadiz (hereinafter A.P.C.), Escribania of Diego
de Ribera, fol. 276-277 for 1577.
31. The losses of the New Spain vessels was described
in A.G.I. Contrataci6n 2,898, fol. 193 vto. , and in A.G.I.
Contratacion 58. Material on the ill-starred Tierra Firme
ships under General Farfan is profuse, as the salvage of the
Almiranta became a notable case of theft and contraband;
see A.G.I. Contratacion 58, and A.G.I. Contratacidn 2,898,
1555, Venida, inter alia. The Tarifa shipwreck is described
in detail by Duro in Armada Espanola, 1, 215-216.
32. Menendez describes the contraband charges as mere
harrassment. See "Servicios . . . ," A.G.I. Patronato 257,
No. 3, ramo 2 . The case is found in A.G.I. Justicia 842,
No. 9, fjenendez' fleet audit for 1555-1556 is at A.G.I.
Contaduria 455.
33. Crown to Pedro Menendez de Avills, n.p., February
26, 1557, A.G.I. Indiferente General 425.
32
34. Nombramiento, Pedro Men^ndez de Avil€s by Philip
II, March 22, 1557, in A.C.R. , legajo 2, No. 3, A., 1. This
order has also been printed in D.I. , VIX, 245, and in Ruidiaz,
La Florida, II, 379 et seg. It is discussed by Duro, Armada
Espanola, II, 449.
35. See "Renunciation of Maria Men^ndez, nun," 1554,
A.G.I. Escribania de Caroara 1,024-A, The other daughter
neuned Maria later was married to Don Diego de Velasco.
36. The northern assignments of Menfindez are described
in detail by Soils de MerSs, Pedro Men6ndez de Avil^s, 45-
63. They are also discussed by Pedro Men^ndez himself in
"Servicios . . . ," A.G.I. Patronato 257, No. 3, ramo 2.
Femlindez Duro puts the exploits of Pedro Men^ndez into the
larger tradition of the Spanish marine in Armada Espanola ,
I, 320-321. Cf. "Cartas de Pedro Men^ndez de Avil^s y
D. Luis Carvajal," in A.G.S., Colecci6n Sans de Barutell,
Art. 40, No. 196-239. It was at this same time that the
Asturian was proposed by the King for the habit of a Cabal-
lero of the religious-military order of Santiago. The initial
proposal is found in a letter from Philip II to Don Diego
de Acuna of the order sent from Valladolid on May 17, 1558.
It has been printed in Ruidiaz y Caravia's La Florida, II,
739-740. Next, the long procedure of examining the back-
ground, orthodoxy and purity of Men^ndez* Catholicism began.
The corpus of the investigation has also been printed by
Ruidiaz as "Memorial de los padres y abuelos de Capitan Pero
Meh6ndez de Avil^s . . . ," from La Florida, II, 742-801.
37. The earlier order for the disposition of corsairs
was formalized in a cedula from the Queen to the Audiencia
of Peru written frcnn Valladolid on September 4, 1549, and
found in Encinas, Cedulario Indiamo, I, 406. The order of
Baz&n was dated December 31, 1558, cind is cited by Duro in
Armada Espanola, II, 462.
38. The plan for the colonization of Florida was out-
lined by Pedro de Santander in a letter to the Crown dated
July 15, 1557. See Coleccidn de documentos ineditos para
la historia de Espafta (hereinafter D.I.E.) (112 v. , Madrid:
m
keal Academia de la Historia, 1842-1895), XXVI, 340-365.
The King, overcoming a hesitation that his Viceroys
undertake discoveries and settlement, authorized the effort
in a cedula sent to Luis de Velasco from Valladolid on
December 29, 1557. It is found in A.G.I. Sto. Domingo 115
(Stetson Collection) .
33
39. The Labazaris voyage was described by the Viceroy
in a letter to the Crown from Mexico February 1, 1559,
A.G.I. Indiferente General 738, ramo 7, No. 73-A (Stetson
Collection) . Vallafane's report is found in his letter to
the Crown from Santa Elena dated May 27, 1561, and found in
A.G.I. Indiferente General 738, ramo 7, No. 73-B (Stetson
Collection) . The finding of Don Luis, the Indian Chieftain,
in the Chesapeedce region was described in a letter from the
Casa to the Crown written at Seville on September 29, 1561,
from A.G.I. Contrataci6n 5,167. De Luna's report on the
disastrous storm in Pensacola Bay is dated September 4, 1559,
smd sent from "the port of Santa Maria." It is found in
A.G.I. Patronato 179, ramo 1, Gay6n, who was a native of
Pola de Lena in Asturias, was the most experienced pilot
in Florida waters. A body of information about him is found
in "Services of Gonzalo de Gayon, 1558-66," from A.G.I.
Santo Domingo 11 (Stetson Collection) .
40. Sobrecedula to all officials in the Indies, Valla-
dolid. May 23, 1559, A.G.I. Indiferente General 427, Book
of 1543-1601.
41. Felix Zubillaga has summarized the disputes over
the right of navigation ai)d settlement in the Indies in La ,
Florida; La Mission Jesuitica (1566-1572) y la colonizacion
espanola (Rome: Institutum Historicum S.I., 1941), 134-
135. A more recent and exhaustive study of the question,
with particular reference to its effect upon Florida, has
been undertaken by Paul E. Hoffman in "Florida and the Nego-
tiations of Cateau-Cambresis and Paris, 1559-1560: A Re-
examination" (unpublished paper, typescript, Laramie,
Wyoming, 1972).
CHAPTER II
PHILIP II, FLORIDA, AND PEDRO MENENDEZ DE AVILES
The unresolved questions of overseas jurisdiction
between the courts were only part of the concerns of Philip
II. In his eyes, a flood-tide of heresy threatened to over-
whelm all of Catholic Europe. The keen and fervent apostles
of militant Protestantism, aided by the output of the busy
printing-presses in Geneva, spread Calvinism to many areas
of France, where the threat to the Catholic faith there
seemed immediate and urgent. France dissolved into chaos
after the death of Henry II and the ensuing weakness of a
Regency. After the insurrection at Amboise in March, 1560,
leading noble families piorsued their rivalries which were
now sharpened by religious differences. In the Mediter-
ranean, there was a renewed threat of Turkish naval invasion,
%^ile the Barbary raiders continued to endanger Spanish
shipping from Gibraltar to Cape St. Vincent.
Philip II, pressed as never before by his external
problems, also directed his attention to internal concerns. '
During the years after 1556, Philip moved to regularize and
control the complex of organisms which composed the Spanish
governmental system. He sought to improve the efficiency
34
35
amd revenues from the commercial network between Spain and
his possessions overseas, and strengthen defenses in the
Indies. The management and finamcing of conquest and
settlement in new leinds was also an area for royal initia-
tive.
Although he consistently sought to draw the reins of
his power ever tighter, Philip II did not cibandon the tra-
ditional means of licensing private conquerors. It is more
correct to say that he supplemented the device of adelan-
tamiento, or used it selectively to carry out his policies.
In 1557, the King gave an asiento to Jaime Rasquin to
settle eind populate the area of the Rio de la Plata. As
has been seen, the Crown authorized the royal expedition to
Florida in that same year. Thereafter, the question was
closely connected with the financial ability of the Crown
to underwrite conquest. The exhaustion of the state
treasury at the end of the 1550s clearly posed a dilemma to
the Castilian King: he sought to avoid heavy expenditure
in the conquest of new lands, and yet still exercise suffi-
cient control over their exploitation. Philip II wrestled
with the problems involved, but for the moment the pressure
of fiscal necessity overweighed other considerations.
The atmosphere of 1560 was thus one in which the
talents of Pedro Menendez de Avil^s were in greater demand
than ever. After Menendez escorted the King to Laredo,
however, he had no immediate personal employment until the
36
next fleet was ready to depart. Then he served for three
years as Captain-General of the combined New Spain and
Tierra Firme fleets alternately with Pedro de las Ruelas
and Nicholas de Cardona. Dxiring these years, Men^ndez used
his own vessels as lead-ships in the fleets which he com-
manded, gaining Crown charter-fees as well as his salary.
The Asturiam also sent his ships in other fleets on royal
errands and commercial enterprises. His private income came
largely from freight charges emd passenger fares; he does
not appear to have been a major trader, dealing for his own
account on any sizeable basis.
In Andalusia, Pedro Men^ndez had made direct and
profiteJale connection with a number of nortenos engaged in
the Carrera de Indias. Many of these merchants operated
from Cadiz, and possessed opposite numbers in the Caribbean
island ports, at San Juan de Ulua and the city of Mexico,
and the entrep3ts of Tierra Firme. Pedro del Castillo
was spokesman for the Cadiz traders and still closely associ-
ated with Pedro Menendez.
Menendez and Castillo were unfavoreibly linked together
by officials of the Casa de Contrataci6n in accusations
arising out of the return of the 1561 fleets. Pedro Menendez
had enjoyed a prosperous voyage; he captured several English
and French prizes on the return to Spain, but the day after
the ships crossed the bar and anchored at Sanlucar, the Casa
authorities inspected them and made inquiries among the crew
and in the vicinity.
37
Pedro del Castillo was arrested and charges with
smuggling goods outside of registry. Witnesses swore that
Castillo had come aboard Men^ndez' galleon at his invita-
tion after dark on the evening of its arrival, and had been
closeted with the Captain-General and a certain Domingo
Hemcuidez, the master of Castillo's ship in the convoy.
Others reported that thirty-seven chests of contraband
silver were taken from the ship at midnight, and trams-
ported to Puerto Santa Maria, where it was put into a small
boat, cuid loaded into a cart, which disappeared into the
dcirkness. Castillo was jailed in Seville. He denied that
he had received any goods except those in the official
registry. Castillo admitted that he had come to visit
Pedro Menendez at SanliScar, but he said that this was be-
cause the two men were long-time friends.
The Casa de Contratacion put Pedro del Castillo under
6,000 ducat bond. His bondsmen were two bankers of
Seville — Pedro de Morga and Caspar de Astudillo. Although
Castillo was lodged in an apartment rather than a cell, amd
was treated well enough, he became ill and was finally
released.
The mutual animosity between Pedro Menendez de Avil^s
and his friends and supporters on the one heuid eind the
merchants' guild in Seville and the Casa de Contrataci6n on
the other is evident throughout the proceedings. As Pedro
Menendez prepared for the voyage of 1562 he could be assured
38
that his every act would be closely watched amd reported
to Seville.
During these years, the tension between the broadening
scope of Spanish foreign concerns cmd the limited royal
resources continued. Heavy Spanish losses in ships and
men at Tripoli in 1560 had been a drain upon the Crown.
Philip's marriage to Elizcibeth of Valois , daughter of Cath-
erine de Medici, had brought no reassuring stability to
the French scene. Indeed, after Charles IX succeeded
Francis II, the weakness of the French Crown encouraged
rapid polarization and dissension cunong the nobility. The
disturbances, which shortly became a localized warfare, led
to the seizure of several ports by Huguenot forces. Gaspard
de Coligny, who had become Admiral of France, prepared em
expedition from the Huguenot ports for the colonization of
Florida. On February 18, 1562, Jean Ribault and Rene de
Laudonniere left Le Havre; by the last of April, the French
had made landfall in Florida and proceeded to plant their
colony at Port Royal.
Ironically, the general depression of the Spanish
Royal treasury had coincided with delayed reports of the
costly failure of the De Luna cind Villafeine expeditions
to produce a totally negative reaction about further
colonization in Florida. While the French established
their colony, the Spanish King formally eschewed further
royal support for Florida. This resolve was urged on him
in March of 1562.*
39
Meanwhile, Pedro Men^ndez de Avil€s had undertaken
another Indies voyage as Captain-General of the combined
fleets. He now owned several sizeable ships. In addition
to Magdalena, he had built a large galeass, Sctn Sebasti^,
and a galleon, Santa Maria. The galeass, under the commeind
of Pedro Menendez Marqu^z, had sailed the previous year as
Capitana of New Spain while Esteban de las Alas commanded
the New Spain division. When Menendez sailed in April,
1562, he left under strict command from Philip II to inter-
cept and castigate corsairs whom he might find in the
Indies. The orders relected the harsh tone of the period:
We are informed that in the Indies sailing
routes go some French, English and Scotch
corsair ships, seeking to steal what comes
and goes from there. This is a disservice
to God our Lord, to us, and is against the
peace agreed upon between us and the princes
of those kingdoms. Because these corsairs
should, by rights, be hung as peace-breakers
and robbers and violaters of the orders or
their own lords and rulers, I order you, if you
capture any of the said corsairs, to proceed
against them emd pionish them in conformity with
justice, executing it then upon the sea with
all rigor; in order that you might do this,
we give you full powers. ^
In accordance with previous practice, Pedro Menendez
divided his fleet into two parts; he went with the New Spain
vessels while his brother, Bartolome, took those of Tierra
Firme. Juem Menendez accompanied his father. The voyage
outbound proved costly to the ships; seven were found unfit
for further travel in San Juan de Ulua while several of the
Tierra Firme group were scarcely seaworthy. To allow more
40
time for commercial transactions and to permit the refit
of the ships, Bartolome and Pedro Men^ndez decided to lay
over in port during the winter months emd depart early in
the New Year. BartolomI had sent a courier vessel to Spain
under the command of Diego de Hevia; when it reached
Sanlucar with its news, the captain was put in prison by
the Casa de Contratacion. There he joined Esteban de las
Alas, who had been imprisoned earlier on the same charge:
8
carrying contrabcuid goods.
Royal orders reached Pedro Men^ndez in New Spain in
February, 1563. He was commanded to delay there until May
or June, and then to return via the usual route to Europe.
The King directed Bartolome Menendez to leave immediately
and be back in Spain by the end of April with the Tierra
Firme ships and bullion of Peru. Pedro Menendez did not
obey the order, or rather, he did not obey it coiqjletely.
He determined to sail straightaway from San Juan de Ulua
to Havana, join his brother there, and return to Spain with
the Tierra Firme vessels. Since the lead ships were not in
condition to navigate, Menendez prepared and designated his
own two galleons, Santa Maria and Magdalena and the patache
Santiago as Capitana, Almiranta, and escort. Only his
own ships left New Spain, while the others were left behind.
The registries of Menendez* ships show that they were laden
9
with cochineal. The shipments were from nortenos resident
in New Spain to consignees in Clidiz emd Seville, including
41
Pedro del Castillo. The ships left port on February 17,
and made uneventful passage to Havana. Once he reached
Havana, Pedro Menendez sent his son Juem back as General
in cliarge of escorting the remaining vessels to Spain.
Bartolome Menendez, who had contracted fever in Nombre de
Dios, was somewhat delayed in his arrival at Havana, but
both brothers and their combined fleets sailed April 1, en
route to Spain. They dropped their anchors off the
Guadalquivir bar on June 10, 1563.
It is likely that Pedro Menendez only heard of the new
French initiative in Florida when he arrived in Spain. The
King had received word of the Ribault settlement from his
ambassador in France in mid-February. He had immediately
written to Menendez and to Diego de Mazariegos, the royal
governor at Havcina, telling them of the fort the French
had built at the "point of Santa Elena." The two men were
ordered to discuss the matter, investigate, and take
immediate action to expel the intruders. The letter could
scarcely have reached the Captain-General before his
departure for Spain. Governor Mazariegos did not send out
10
an expedition for more than a year.
To counteract the French menace further, Philip II
determined to follow the same procedure which had been
considered in 1541: preventive settlement on the mainland.
By the end of April, 1563, the King had decided to grant
an asiento in Florida to Lucas Vazquez de Ay lion, namesake
42
and successor to the patent-holder of 1523. The contract
with Vazquez de Ayllon was a typical and classic one. It
made no mention whatever of the French, but contained the
standard benefits and obligations. The contractor was to
laxmch a full-scale colonization, taking married settlers
and a quantity of livestock. The Indiams, whom he was not
permitted to put into encomienda, were to be gathered by
missionaries into villages near the Spanish towns. He
could, however, use Indian tribute to provide pensions for
his men. The colonies, which were to be in the area of
Santa Elena, would concentrate upon planting sugar cane,
cassia fistula, the grape and the olive. The asiento was
12
issued on June 4, 1563.
At the same time, the King matured his concept of the
role of the Crown and its contractors in conquest. At
Segovia, on July 13, Philip II approved one hundred forty-
nine comprehensive ordincinces for population and conquest.
These laws provided for every detail of the exploration,
occupation and development of new Icinds by asientistas,
whether they were to be designated Adelantados, Corregidores,
Govemadores or Alcaldes. They also contained a particular
injunction against royal expenditure, which served to put
discovery and settlement upon a strictly private basis:
Even though (due to the zeal and desire which
we have that all unknown lands in the Indies
might be discovered, so that the Holy Evangel
might be proclaimed, amd the natives of them
might come to a knowledge of our Holy Catholic
43
Faith) we count as little that which might be
spent from our Royal Treasury for such a holy
purpose » experience has shown that, in many
discoveries and voyages undertaken at our cost
(due to a lack of care cmd diligence) , those
who have carried them out have tried to enrich
themselves from the Royal Treasury rather tham
carry out their designated purposes.
Thus we order that no discovery, new exploration
and settlement be undertaken at expense to our
Royal Treasury, neither may those who govern
expend emy thing from it, even though they possess
our %n:itten authority cind instructions to discover
smd explore, unless they should have special
authorization to do it at our cost. ^3
Although Vazquez de Aylldn was not permitted to place
any Indians into encomienda, the 1563 ordinamces made no such
general prohibition. On the contrary, eis added incentive
for private initiatives in conquest, the laws permitted two-
14
and three-life encomienda.
While Lucas Vazquez de Aylldn was in SanliScar preparing
three vessels for the Florida journey, Pedro Men^ndez de
Aviles had left his ships there on the evening of June 14
and went up the Guadalquivir toward Seville in a small boat.
Men^ndez took with him a priest who was a distant relative,
sane servants, and a quantity of unregistered bullion. While
his boat sailed northward through the night, the prosecutor
of the Casa de Contrataci6n was being rowed southward,
searching for evidence of the smuggling of contreiband. The
two craft met briefly on the dark river, amd the Captain-
General evaded the boat from the Casa. At dawn on June 15,
the Men^ndez party was seen to land on the riverbank just
44
south of the city gates of Seville, Witnesses state that
the priest and sailors appeared to be heavily-laden as they
walked toward the city, where closer examination revealed
that they carried bears of silver amd several chests. Once
inside the city, Men^ndez and his party went to the houses
of the Archbishop of Seville, Hernando de Vald^s, where they
received hospitality and lodging.
When the news of Men^ndez' arrival came to the Casa de
Contratacjgn, its officials sent to summon the Asturian to
appear and cinswer charges of carrying contraband into Seville.
Pedro Menendez faced the judges in the Audiencia hall of the
Alcazar cind firmly denied their jurisdiction over him. He
stated further that he had come upriver from Sanldcar with
the full knowledge of other Casa officials, emd that his
baggage had only held his own clothing, his arms emd
enough silver for personal necessities. While the judges
deliberated, the Asturian left and when they finally issued
their order to jail Menendez and seize the silver, he had
fled. Pedro Menendez had gone to Madrid to seek royal
support against his enemies.
Once at Court, the Captain-General quickly gained the
ear of his King. Philip II responded to Menendez* pleas by
sending ein immediate order to Seville tnat- the monies due
Menendez for his galleon escort be calculated cmd paid, and
concluded an agreement with the Asturian to escort the
Licenciado Castro to Tierra Firme on Crown business in the
45
early fall. For the projected voyage, Menendez would use
his fine new galeass San Pelayo, just delivered from the
Vizcaya shipyards. Pedro Menendez also took the precaution
of retaiixing an attorney to represent him at Court in his
disputes with the Casa de Contratacion. On July third,
the King sent his officials in Seville a strongly worded
defense of Menendez in which he pointed out that juris-
diction over the Captains-General belonged to the Crown,
not the Casa.
Meanwhile, the escape of Pedro Menendez de Avil^s and
the evidence of Royal favor in his behalf had stirred the
merchants and officials of Seville to angry action. A
negative reply was sent to the King about Menendez' request
for payment for the 1563 escort galleons, as the traders'
guild and the averfa deputies rejected the claim. This
was hardly surprising, for the administration of the averia,
from which amy payment would have to come, was firmly in
the hands of the merchants of Seville. After receiving
their opinion that Menendez had evidently made his return
voyage for profit and not for fleet defense, the King
replied by ordering the officials to deduct from Menendez'
payment the sums he had earned from freight and passenger
fees and settle the matter rapidly. The Casa officials'
only response to Philip's defense of Menendez in the main
dispute was to hasten the gathering of evidence against him.
46
Witnesses from the fleet painted a picture of criminal laxity
aboard the ships, in which massive amounts of contraiband
bullion were allegedly carried by representatives of the
recent Viceroy of Peru and by the Royal visitors to that
province. They accused the Captain-General of allowing a
felon to escape with his funds at Tercera, of taking a bribe
in New Spain, cind of being caught with personal contraiband
in his possession. By the time Menendez returned to Seville
on July 26, 1563, his enemies were prepared to allege
criminal charges against him.
When he faced his detractors, Pedro Menendez was con-
fident that his backing at Court would protect him, cind
that only minor offenses could be proven against him, so his
testimony was bold and forthright. Menendez denied that he
carried unregistered funds of any importance, but merely
sufficient monies for his voyage, in keeping with long
practice in the fleets. He blandly admitted accepting
money from New Spain merchants, but denied that this had
influenced his actions, and stated that in cuiy case it was
19
not a mortal sin.
After the Captain-General had posted bond and given his
testimony, he had every reason to expect that he could go
aJtKJUt his affairs. Much to his surprise, however, the
officials of the Casa de Contratacion seized his brother
Bartolome and then came, on August 19, 1563, to place Pedro
Menendez in custody. The commercial powers were determined
47
to punish Menendez and his entire coterie through the laws
of the Casa de Contrataci6n for the threat he represented
to their sphere of influence. In the course of a short
time, Estebeui de las Alas, Hevia/ Pedro del Castillo £md now
the Menendez brothers felt the power of Seville.
Although he was made comfortable as a prisoner of dis-
tinction emd was lodged in the Atarazanas of the Casa between
the old city walls and the Guadalquivir, Pedro Menendez was
distressed at the slow pace with which his case proceeded.
The Fiscal of the Casa gathered his evidence at a leisurely
rate. Although Menendez had given bond for his presence,
he could not obtain release from custody. His appeals to
the King produced royal letters to the Casa de Contrataci6n
but yielded little immediate result. No rapid settlement
was made of his galleon-lease case, and he could not get
his freedom to supervise the preparation of his galleons
for their journey. Worse troubles were in the making,
however.
Without his knowing it as yet, Pedro Menendez had
suffered some grievous losses. His galeass, the San
Sebastian, had sailed with Ruelas' fleet in May with a cargo
of royal mercury and other goods. Early in the morning
of July 22, San Sebastian and four other vessels were
shipwrecked along the reefs in the area known as the Jardines
21
de la Reina on the southwest coast of Cuba.
48
As Men^ndez chafed at the restriction of his prison
apartment, his only son Juan was drawing closer to mortal
danger in the Indies. The main body of the New Spain fleet
seLiled from San Juan de Dlua on June 15, but was delayed
by calms and contrary winds, and only reached Havana on
August 1. The eleven ships in the original convoy were
increased by two Honduran vessels; all thirteen left Havana
22
together on August 15. In so doing, Juan Men^ndez dis-
obeyed an order of his father, for Pedro Men€ndez had warned
him not to sail if his departure time would put him into
the hurricane season. As Men^ndez told the King:
I left express commands to Don Juan, my son,
that in the whole month of July he could come out
of the Bahama Channel, because in the beginning
of August, some years, they often have very
great hurricanes. 23
For almost a month, the voyage went well. On the
eighth of September, when the convoy had reached the
latitude of Bermuda, they were scattered by rising winds
and seas. By the morning of September 10, they were in
a full-scale hurricane. One of the ships lost steering
control; its hull worked open and it sank to the west of
Bermuda, while three vessels drifted or were blown southward
to the north coast of Hispaniola — the Almiranta Santa Cata-
i-^na and the two Honduras merchcmtmen. One of the Honduras
ships sank before it could reach port; its bullion was
off-loaded onto the Almiranta; the other barely made it to
the port of Monte Christi with the Santa Catalina. The
49
eight shaps which had escaped serious damage from the
storm made rendezvous at the Azores, and continued to Spain
24
together, arriving in the first week of November.
Khen several accounts which arrived at Seville were finally
sifted and analyzed, it was evident that the Capitana — La
Concepcion — was missing, together with General Men^ndez.
The lead ship had last been seen, sailing well, in the
midst of the storm, but its later fate was unknown.
As bits of information about the shipwrecks reached
Seville, Pedro Menendez learned what little he could. If
he were only free, he could lead the search for the lost
ship. Chafing at his confinement, Menendez attempted to
move his legal cases forward, but met only frustrating
inertia. The pressure he exerted at Court resulted in an
inquiry by the King eibout Mendndez' imprisonment. When
the charges gainst the Asturian were sent to the Council
of the Indies in October, that body agreed that the in-
dictment was for "grave amd ugly" faults, and seemed con-
tent for the moment to leave the persecution of them in the
hands of the Casa de Contrataci6n. The Captain-General,
who evidently had good legal advice, would have welcomed
a definite decision. Instead, the prosecuting officer
of the Casa had been granted a three-month delay in which
to gather further evidence.
In response to pressure from the Licenciado Castro,
the Casa officials granted a short term of liberty to Pedro
50
Menendez to go to Cadiz and dispatch his three ships. Since
Men^ndez had given a 40,000-ducat bond to leave on the royal
mission by September 30, he was anxious to meet his overdue
obligation, but was still unable to be present when the
ships sailed on November 9, 1563, After leaving in a rising
storm, they were scattered and damaged before they could
retuzn to port, and one of the vessels landed near Gibraltar
in battered condition. Instead of the 20,000 ducats the
ships would have earned, Menendez now faced repetir costs
which he estimated at 20,000 ducats.
Finally, the proceso against Pedro Menendez was com-
plete. The deliberations of the Casa de Contratacion were
forwarded to the Council of the Indies. Juan Gomez de
Argoraedo, attorney for Menendez, filed the plea of his
client before the Council on December 16. The Asturiaui
was not hopeful, however; his expectations of justice and
satisfaction seemed to be at a low ebb indeed. He composed
several desperate appeals to the Court emd Council of the
Indies. In a long memorial to the King, Menendez reviewed
his entire career cmd recounted the history of his struggles
with the merchants of Seville and the Casa de Contrataci6n.
He outlined each of the charges against him cind gave his own
defense against them. Pedro Menendez expressed particular
anger at the allegations of conflict-of-interest and force-
fully contradicted the complaint that he had become rich
through royal service. When he began to serve the Crown,
51
Men^ndez told Philip II r he possessed two galleons. Now,
after sixteen years / he only had three ships, euid these were
heavily mortgaged. At length he detailed his losses and
sacrifices in recent years, including the bereavement suf-
fered in the evident loss of his son emd racuiy other rela-
tives and friends in the 1563 New Spain fleet disaster.
Again, Pedro Menendez begged for settlement of his monetary
affairs, cind for release from prison. The Asturian then
made statements adDout the settlement of Florida which are
of particular interest here: Menendez labeled the De Luna
and Villafane expeditions as wasteful and misdirected, and
alleged that more than a half-million ducats cind five hundred
lives had been expended to no visible effect. It would be
far better and much less costly, said Menendez, to plant
colonies in Florida directly from Spain, Thus the expedi-
tion vrould avoid the dangerous currents of the Bahama Channel
smd the poor, low land of the extreme southeastern coast and
the peninsula. For about 50,000 ducats, claimed Menendez,
a profitable settlement could be implanted closer to New-
foundlcmd, where it would be of more strategic value.
Menendez wrote cinother letter to Juan de Sarmiento,
President of the Council of the Indies, in an humble, almost
despairing tone. It expressed emotions which Pedro Menendez
had not been able to reveal to the King, and displayed a
father's grief and anger at his powerlessness to help search
for his son Juan. He proposed to go with four pataches and
52
collect the nonies left in Hispaniola from his son*s fleet,
and also seek the lost Capitana. His proposal was rejected,
and the officials of Seville named General Juan de Velasco
28
de Baurrio to arm two heavy galleons for the task.
The nood of dejection which had assailed Pedro Menendez
proved %rell founded. When the Council of the Indies heard
the arguments of its Fiscal and read the testimonies sent
from Seville, they found Menendez guilty on the main charge
of bringing unregistered silver on his ship. The sentence
and verdict they handed down on January 17 levied a fine
of 100 gold pesos upon the Captain-General, Lawyer G<5mez
29
immediately began an appeal.
One positive benefit for Menendez did result from the
letters he had sent in January. The King wrote preen5>torily
to his officials at Seville, accused them of malicious delay
in the settlement of the 1563 galleon lease case, and directed
termination of the matter "within fifteen days." Early in
March, heeurings resumed on the case and Pedro Menendez was
taken from confinement to testify in the Audiencia hall of
the Casa de Contratacion in the Alcazar at Seville. The
Casa judges were in the position of mediating a dispute
between Menendez, who sought payment from averi^ for his
ships, and the Prior and Consuls of the guild of sea-merchants
and the deputies of the averia. In the face of the commands
of Philip II, the Casa officials were compelled to find for
Menendez. On March 8 they decreed the payment of a
53
sueldo to Pedro Men^ndez for his two galleons, less what
he had collected in freights cind passenger fares on the
voyage.
Now a storm of protest arose from the mercemtile
interests. The whole matter was a fraud, they said. Menen-
dez had brought his galleons and patache from New Spain for
his own profit, amd they served the interests of the fleet
not at all. It was illegal, they maintained, for a Captain-
General to use his own ships as paid escort vessels in his
32
own convoy. They averred that the expenses Mendndez
claimed were false, and his supporting papers were not properly
certified by a notary.
Pedro Men^ndez, scenting victory over his enemies, ap-
peared and made a strong plea for a substantial advance, for
his ships had still not sailed for Tierra Firme, and he badly
needed 4,000 ducats to finish their refit and settle with
some of his crewmen. On March tenth, the Casa awarded him
1,500 ducats. He protested strongly, but the Casa affirmed
its decision: It was that or nothing. Men^ndez contested
the case, saying that he had received nothing for his patache,
and the matter became bogged down on appeal. Frustration
continued to be the lot of the imprisoned Asturian. While
guaurds paced outside his apartment door, his financial
aif fairs seemed as far as ever from solution. Somehow,
Menendez managed to raise the funds to send his ships off
to the Indies under the command of Estebam de las Alas and
Pedro Menendez Marquez.
54
In the meemtime, although the Spanish had as yet done
nothing to erase Jean Ribault's Port Royal settlement in
Florida, the French colonists had become thoroughly dis-
couraged. Ribault himself had been in England, a part of
the time in prison. The confusion in Frcince before the
pacification of Amboise had prohibited the sending of
reinforcements. Finally, Ren€ de LaudonniSre left Le Havre
i^ril 22, just as the French prepared to leave Port Royal,
and sibandon their colony. On May 12, 1564, Governor
Mazariegos of Kavema finally dispatched the small search
ship Santa Catalina with Hernamdo Manrique de Rojas as
captain. Rojas, a thirty-year-old nephew of Juan de Rojas,
chose experienced pilot Gonzalo de Gayon to guide the expedi-
tion to seek the French settlement. None of the three groups
was destined to meet.
When the Cuban vessel reached the Florida coast, north
of Cape Canaveral, Manrique de Rojas traversed the shoreline,
carefully searching for signs of enemy settlement. Finally,
in 32-1/4'* of latitude, they located a sizeable inlet with
Indiem settlements. There, they encoxintered one Guillaume
Rouffi, a sixteen-year-old boy. Rouffi told them that the
other Frenchmen had left in a small craft some days before,
leaving him behind with the Indians. Searching further,
they found and burned a wood blockhouse the French had
built. They also discovered the six-foot marble column,
bearing the eirms of France, which had been plemted by Jean
55
Ribaiilt. The column euid Rouffi were brought 2Ux>ard ship
.and returned to Havana, where Mazariegos reported to Spain
that the French threat was over for the present.
While the Rojas party was making its report in Havana,
the ships of Lucas Vazquez de Ayll6n, which had left Sanldcar
in October, had only reached Scinto Domingo. By raid-summer,
Vazquez de Ayllon had made little progress in preparing
for departure for Florida. The royal officials of Hispaniola
began to suspect that the expedition might never sail.
During the early summer of 1564, when so much of moment
for Florida euid the Indies was occurring overseas, events
at Court began at last to develop more favorably for Pedro
Menendez de Aviles. In May, his ship-charter case had been
transferred to the Council of the Indies. On June 18,
Philip II had decided to bring the main dispute for which
Menendez had been jailed to Madrid for hearing. He sent
Menendez a formal royal summons to report within twenty
days to the Council of the Indies.
When the summons from the King reached Pedro Menendez
in his prison apartment in Seville, he determined to break
out of his confinement. He saw clearly that he would never
be free as Ipng as he remained in the power of the Seville
interests. On Saturday, July 1, Menendez bribed or evaded
his guards, and left his jail. The same day, the Menendez
brothers executed a power of attorney in Seville to a
bcuiker, Domingo de Ocaris, and a trusted young Asturian,
56
Hernando de Miranda, and left to them the responsibility
of collecting monies forthcoming from the Casa in Seville.
By the sixth of July, Pedro Men^ndez was in Madrid, where
he was placed in the Royal jail.
After Menendez' servants Ccime to take away his chests
and fumitiire, the Casa de Contrataci6n belatedly dis-
covered that their prisoner was gone. A hearing was held,
and the angry officials determined to take up the 30,000
ducat bonds. On July 14, they also seized and jailed
the bondsmen who had given surety for Pedro Menendez,
Caspar de Astudillo de Burgales and Juan Antonio Corzo.
Now the accused Captain-General had finally succeeded
in having his litigation transferred from the biased atmos-
phere of Seville, but it brought him no immediate satisfac-
tion. After an initial flurry of legal action, Pedro
Menendez languished in the Court jail. On July 24, he
lavmched a fervent appeal to the Council of the Indies,
and complained that he was confined with common criminals
and persons of low estate. This treatment, he said, was an
affront to the dignity of his person and to the prestige
of the offices which he had held through royal patronage,
Menendez asked that he be released from the jail, and given
the Court as his area of detention. On August 7, the Council
of the Indies agreed that, while the litigation was under
study, he might leave the jail cmd be placed in house-
38
arrest at his inn.
57
While the legal affairs of Pedro Men^ndez were moving
somewhat closer to resolution in Madrid, the Spamish authori-
ties had no clear view of what had occurred with regard to
Florida. Ren^ de LaudonniSre emd his colony were established
within the mouth of the River May, where they had erected
39
a fortification neuned Fort Caroline. The Castilicm King
had no knowledge of the French esteJalishment. Intelligence
from the Indies in the summer of 1564 was a blend of fact
and rumor. On August 30, the Audiencia of Santo Domingo
notified Philip II that a one-eyed Portuguese ncimed Mimoso
was supposed to have come from Calais with five ships of
Frenchmen and three of the ships had landed at Santa Elena
40
in Florida. In this case, the actual intrusion of the
Laudonni^re expedition was obscured by the multitude of
corsair reports which flowed continually to the Spanish
Crown from France, the Atlantic islands, and the Indies.
The instrument chosen by Philip II to deny the mainland
to the French through colonization proved to be a feeble
one. Lucas Vazquez de Ayllon, embroiled in financial dif-
ficulties in Santo Domingo, was forced to sell one of his
ships, and many of his men deserted. Finally, in early
August of 1564, Vazquez de Ayllon fled Santo Domingo by
night in a small craft, reportedly heading for Peru. The
latest chapter in the long history of attempts to settle
Florida had come to an inglorious end.
58
While the Spanish were failing to discover or counter
the French moves in Florida, the armada of galleons belonging
to Pedro Menfendez moved around the Caribbean with the
Tierra Firme ships. Estaban de las Alas brought San Pelayo,
Santa Clara and Magdalena to Nombre de Dios. On August 13,
they left that port for Cartagena, and, three days later,
Magdalena was wrecked on the Darien coast. The diminished
fleet left Cartagena September 20. After the ships sailed
from Havana, Santa Clara ran aground on the eastern side of
the Gulf Stream. All the crew was rescued and the treasure
transferred to the ample holds of the great galeass San
Pelayo, while Santa Clara was abandoned as a hopeless wreck.
Heavily laden (the ship carried more than 1,400 bars of
silver), Pelayo returned to Spain, and landed at CSdiz
December 4.^^ The reports of disaster it brought to Pedro
Menendftz de Avil€s were tempered no whit by the news that
no further trace of his missing son Juan had been found.
Meanwhile trouble had also visited the small French
Huguenot colony on the River May. LaudonniSre explored the
area and traded with the Indians near the fort. An in-
creasing shortage of supplies, and the desire for adventure
instigated some of the garrison to mutiny. Eleven mutineers
fled the fort first, taking a small shallop, and setting
course for the Caribbean. Three weeks later, on December 18,
1564, seventy men from the garrison held Ren^ de LaudonniSre
prisoner long enough to extort from him a document authorizing
59
their journey. They then departed on a voyage' of adventxire
among the Antilles in two small sailing craft.
The year of 1564 had thus far held little cause for
rejoicing for Pedro Men^ndez de Avil^s. When the Council
of the Indies ruled on the whole battery of chaurges against
him on November 23, it found him guilty on nine of the
fourteen charges, fined him 3,000 ducats, and sentenced him
to three years without office in the Indies. Immediately
after this low point in his fortunes, the affairs of Pedro
Menendez seemed to improve. On November 24, he was given
the court as his jcdl pending his latest appeal. On December
7, the Council ruled favorably for Menendez in the galleon
lease case and granted him the sueldo for his ships. Menen-
dez pressed his advantage and asked that his freight earnings
not be deducted from the payment, and that he be reimbursed
for the pay of the soldiers who accompcinied the ships. The
councillors took the requests under advisement. Early in
the New Year, the Council of the Indies reconsidered the
main Menendez case, and finally reduced its sentences to
six guilty charges amd the exile from Indies offices to
47
one year. Menendez* fine was cut to 1,000 ducats. Now
that the tide of influence seemed at last to be rxinning in
Pedro Menendez* favor, a major question at Court must have
been that of the future of this valuable, contentious man.
NOTES
1. The agreement with Rasquin has been printed in
D.I. y XXVI, 273 et seq. It is mentioned in the work of Duro,
Armada Espanola, in "Noticias extractadas de asientos y
capitulaciones que se hicieron para descubrir en Indias
despves de Colon," I, 459.
2. Castillo appears as a leading mercheint in Cadiz
iuid spokesman for the other traders bf that city in a
royal cedula sent by Philip II to "a certain merchant of
Cadiz" from Valladolid on May 23, 1559. The letter, which
discusses conditions surrounding the special license given
to Cadiz merchants to deal in hides and sugar from Bispaniola
and Puerto Rico, is from A.G.I. Indiferente General 425,
Book 23, fol. 396 and vto. In 1561, the King responded to
a complaint by Castillo that the royal Corregidor had been
sending the cases of Cadiz shipmasters to the Audiencia at
Granada, where they languished. At that time, Castillo had
just become a Regidor of the cabildo of Cadiz. The King's
letter was dated May 10, 1561, and is also from A.G.I.
Indiferente General 425, Book 24.
3. The case against Pedro del Castillo is found in
"Pedro del Castillo, 1561," from A.G.I. Justicia 855.
Menendez advises that he was shortly set free because he
was "without any guilt." The statement is found in
"Servicios . . . ," A.G.I. Patronato 257, No. 3, ramo 2,
fol. 11, vto.
4. See Crown to Luis de Velasco, September 23, 1561,
from A.G.I. Patronato 19, ramo 12. When the royal order to
study the matter of Florida was in the hands of the Viceroy
of New Spain, he convoked a council which included Angel
de Villafcine and several captains from the expeditions of
1557-61. Their judgment was that no further such ventures
should be attempted from New Spain. Any future attempts
upon Florida would best be mounted, they believed, from
Spain directly, and should be concerned only with the areas
north of Santa Elena. Velasco concurred in the findings.
The parecer of the council of New Spain is from Woodbury
Lowery's "Manuscripts of Florida," in microfilm at the
P. K. Yonge Library, reel 1 (box 141-A) .
5. See "1561, Ida," from A.G.I. Contrataci6n 2,898.
60
61
6. "Instructions to General Pedro Menfindez, 1562,"
A.G.I. Indiferente General 415, These are also reprinted in
RuidiaZy La Florida^ II» 40 7 .
7. Menendez describes the condition of the vessels in
his letter to Philip II from Havana (n.d., probably March,
1563, which is found in A.G.I. Patronato 257, No. 3, ramo 2
(in Stetson Collection).
8. Ibid.
9. Detail of the ships armed by MenSndez in Sam Juam
de Ulua is found, together with the registries of his
vessels, in "Fiscal con Pedro Men6ndez de Avil6s sobre
sueldos de dos galeones . . . , " A.G.I. Justicia 872,
No. 1. The case began when the Captain-General sought pay-
ment from averia for the charter of his ships. The Casa
advised the King that Menendez also carried gold, silver,
amd hides. See Crown to Casa, Madrid, July 16, 1563, from
A.G.I. Contrataci6n 5,167, Book III.
10. See the separate cedulas from the Crown to Diego
de Mazariegos and to Pedro Menendez de Avil^s, Madrid,
February 13, 1563, A.G.I. Indiferente General 427. Notice
was also sent to officials in Santo Domingo, Venezuela,
Cartagena, Tierra Firme, and San Juan, Puerto Rico.
11. In a letter from the Crown to the Casa, sent from
Madrid on April 25, 1563, the King asked his trade officials
to accommodate Vazquez de Ayll6n in his difficulties in
gathering sufficient settlers for his expedition.
12. It is found in "Asientos de Armada," A.G.I. Contra-
tacion 3,309.
13. From "Ordenanzas . . . ," D.I., VIII, No. XXV,
494-495. To a degree, the resurgence of adelantamiento during
the reign of Philip II has been overlookeH^i In the study of
the strengthening of the early modern dynastic state, some
writers have viewed the coming of the Spanish viceregal
system as coincident with the termination of the phase of
discovery and exploitation by private persons licensed by
the Crown. An example of this viewpoint is the statement of
Robert S. Chaunberlain, speaking of the 1550s:
. . . the time was past when the Crown would permit
the development of personal control anywhere in
the Indies, especially when authority of a semi-
feudal nature was concerned. The absolute monarchs
of Castile were determined to bring their overseas
possessions, which belonged to the Crown of Castile
alone, not to the nation, under their own rigid
authority. Therefore, they began early to create
62
imposing machinery of royal, eJasolute government
which left no place for personal governmental
power or wide personal holdings of a political
character.
This statement is from The Conquest and Colonization of
Yucatan (New York: Octagon Books, 1966), p. 184, On the
other hand, George P. Hammond recognizes that the 1595
asiento of Juan de Onate was issued under the royal coloni-
zation ordinances as an adelantamiento . See his article
"Ohate's Effort to Gain Political Autonomy for New Mexico,"
Hispanic American Historical Review, XXXII, No. 3 (August,
1952), 321-330. Roscoe R. Hill, in "The Office of Adelan-
tado," op. cit. , also recognizes the longer duration of
adelantamiento under Philip II.
14. The provision for encomienda is found in "Ordenan-
zas . . . ," D.I., VIII, No. LVIII, 505. For a discussion
of how financial necessity had almost impelled Philip II to
make encomienda in Peru perpetual in 1560, see C. H. Raring,
The Spanish Empire in America (3rd ed., New York: Harcourt,
Brace & World, Inc., 1963), pp. 54-55.
15. The main body of the 1563 case against Pedro Menen-
dez de Avil^s is found in "Proceso de los cargos y culpas
que resulta contra el General Pedro Men^ndez de Avil^s . . .
en la flota y armada que vin6 de Tierra Firme este ano de
1563," from A.G.I. Justicia 970.
16. The order of June 17 to pay Men^ndez is referred
to in Crown to Casa, Barcelona, February 26, 1564, from
A.G.I. Indiferente General 1,966. The King decided not to .
accept Menendez' offer to escort the Juan Menendez ships
from the Azores; see Crown to Casa, Madrid, July 16, 1563,
A.G.I. Contratacion 5,167. On July 28, 1563, the King
notified the Casa de Contratacion of the arrangement for
the escort of Castro; the letter is also from A.G.I. Con-
tratacion 5,167. The power of attorney from Pedro Menendez
to Juan G5mez de Argomedo was originally recorded in the
notaries' archives, but has been reproduced with its date
of June 24, 1563, in A.G.I. Justicia 872 and also in Justicia
865. ~
17. Pierre amd Huguette Chaunu point out that the
Consulado controlled the Indies averia contract from 1562-
1564; in Seville et 1' Atlantique, I, 20 3 .
18. Crown to Casa, Madrid, July 16, 1563, A.G.I.
Contratacion 5,167, Book III.
19. Elements of the documentation of the 1563-1565
case between Pedro Menendez de Aviles and the Casa de
Contratacion have also survived in A.G.I. Justicia 865,
63
No. 1, entitled "El fiscal de Su Magestad con el General
Pedro Menendez sobre dos barras de plata que trajo de las
Indias sin registrar." Aspects of the case are also found
in "Fiscal de Su Magestad con Pedro de Menlndez de Avil^s
y sus fiadores Juan Antonio Cor 20 y Caspar Astudillo,
vecinos de Sevilla, sobre su quiebra del prision donde
estaba," from A.G.I. Justicia 868, No. 9. Thirteen of the
charges against Menendez are detailed in the Captain-General's
own complaint to Philip II in "Servicios . . . ," A.G.I.
Patronato 257, No. 3, ramo 2. The chcirges, 2md Menendez'
responses summarized, are listed below:
1. That Menendez left Havana against royal order
(he claimed that he was trying to make the
royal deadline for the Tierra Firme ships in
April, and came as quickly as he could);
2. He landed at Tercera in the Azores, contrary
to his own order that no one in the convoy
should land there (he said that a storm arose,
making a landing am essential forthe safety
of the fleet) ;
3. Menendez allowed a certain Munoz, a prisoner,
to lamd at Tercera (he said that he was unaware
of the status of the man) ;
4. Menendez permitted certain Portuguese to land
with monies at Tercera (blame the ship-master,
not the Captain-General, said Menendez);
5. The Captain-General allowed a Portuguese ship
to sail with the armada; much unregistered
bullion and coin was passed to her from other
vessels; the Portuguese left the convoy with
these (his response was that he permitted the
Portuguese ship to accompany the convoy so
that she might not be taken by corsairs and
thus betray the route and schedule of the fleet;
the vessel left the convoy, he said, without
his permission) ;
6. Menendez failed to make the landmark of Cape
St. Vincent, as was customary on the homeward
route (the simple reply was that he did this
to avoid storms, as any fine mariner would do);
7. Pedro Menendez allowed the Licenciado Alta-
mircino to take certain monies ashore (Menendez
replied by calling the accusation "vile" and
countered by saying that there were no wit-
nesses to any such action) ;
8. He carried unregistered silver (Menendez ad-
mitted that he brought some silver for the
expenses of the voyage, unregistered. He
cladmed that only 600 ducats' worth, registered
and unregistered, was carried altogether. He
said that this was needed for working capital
64
aboard ship, emd stated that no fleet General
had ever been charged for this small sum of
expense-money) ;
9. Upon his return, Men^ndez had left his ships on
the ways at Sanliicar and come directly to Seville
(Men^ndez said his business with the Casa was
urgent, and he had no option but to leave);
10. He had his large vessels put into the shipyard
before they had undergone their official visit
by the Casa (similar response as to the above) ;
11. Men^ndez had agreed to delay his date of sail-
ing from New Spain if certain merchants there
would buy a 10,000-ducat cargo which he had
brought (Men^ndez replied that this was a lie;
he brought no cargoes and no witnesses had
testified about the charge);
12. A bribe of 700 ducats had been paid to Menendez
to linger with his fleet five leagues from San
Juem de Ulua, so that more goods could be
brought out to the horaebound ships ajid evade the
customs registry (Men^ndez said there was no
sworn testimony as to this charge) ;
13. On the voyage outbound from Spain, Pedro Mendn-
dez held up his departure until his own galleons
joined the fleet and crossed the bar, loaded
with merchandise (Men^ndez said his delay was
due to signs of a storm impending; claimed that
his ships were not then within the bar, nor did
they carry merchandise) ,
Gonzalo Solis de Meras, in Pedro Mengndez de Avil^s, de-
scribes the 1563 case in some detail, from a viewpoint thor-
oughly sympathetic to his brother-in-law, on pp. 64-70. The
unregistered bar silver was brought by Cristobal Carrecho,
master of Magdalena. Witnesses for the Casa alleged that it
was worth 688 pesos and was intended to be given to one
Diego de Molina by Capt. Diego de Amaya by orders of Pedro
Men^ndez. See A.G.I. Justicia 865, No. 1, fol. 1.
20. A letter from the Casa to the Crown on August 2,
1563, contained in A.G.I. Contrataci6n 5,167, Book II,
acknowledged royal letters of July 13, 16 and 18, and noted that
Menendez had the commercial cargoes arremged for his gal-
leons, and had obliged himself to have them loaded aboard
by September 10. Menendez described the arrest of Bartolome
in a letter to the King on July 27, and his own imprisonment
in a letter on August 21; both are found in Ruidiaz, La
Florida, II, 34-43. The King also corresponded with his
trade officials about the galleons of Pedro Menendez in
letters dated July 28 and August 11, 1563, and affirmed the
arrangements for the passage of the Licenciado Castro. These
letters are also found in A.G.I. Contrataci6n 5,167, Book III.
65
21. The loading of Sem Sebastian at Sanlticar is
described in testimony before Juan Gutierrez Tello on
March 22, 1563, found in A.G.I. Contrataci6n 5,101, Pedro
Menendez Marqu^z was her master. The shipwrecks are de-
scribed by Duro in Armada Espanola, II, 465, and by the
Chaunus in Seville et I'Atlantigue, III, 1563 aller, 41.
See also the marginal notes in A.G.I. Contratacitfn 2,898,
1563 Ida.
22. See Casa to Crown, Seville, November 2, 1563,
A.G.I. Contrataci6n 5,167. Juan Menendez, before his depar-
ture from Havana, wrote to the Casa (on August 9, 1563)
in a letter found in A.G.I. Contrataci<5n 5,104.
23. Pedro Men&adez to Crown, August 21, 1563, printed
in Ruidiaz, La Florida, II, 38-43.
24. The return of the surviving ships to Spain was
announced in Casa to Crown, Seville, November 12, 1563,
A.G.I. Contrataci6n 5,167. The shipwrecks were inscribed
on the margin of the registry book, A.G.I. Contrataci6n
2,898, fol. 231 vto. The Royal Officials from Santo
Domingo advised the King of the three vessels which arrived
in their waters from the ill-fated fleet in a letter sent
from that place on December 20, 1563, and contained in A.G.I.
Santo Domingo 71 (Stetson Collection) . The Chaunus discuss
the matter in Seville et I'Atlantigue, III, 1563 re tour, 61,
66. See also Eugene Lyon, "A Lost Son" (unpublished paper,
typescript. University of Florida, Gainesville, 1968), 9 pp.
Pilot Noriega, who had been aboard one of the ships which
reached the Azores, testified before the Casa de Contrataci6n,
which advised the King that the storm struck the ships about
180 miles south and west of Bermuda, in about 32* of lati-
tude. Another account, cited by Dave Horner in The Treasure
Galleons (New York: Dodd, Mead & Company, 1971), p. 227,
placed the ships c±>ove the latitude of Bermuda. It was from
A.G.I. Indiferente General 2,003. In 1595, several witnesses
testified that the ships had been in the vicinity of Bermuda
when they ran into hurriccine winds. See "Informacion de
algunos servicios prestadas por el Adelantado Pedro Menendez
de Aviles," Mexico, April 3, 1595, reprinted in Ruidiaz,
La Florida, II, 590 et seg. Two accounts from Florida, so to
speak, testified that the Capitana of Juan Menendez had
been wrecked in the Indiam River section of the peninsula.
Hemamdo d'Escalajite Fontaneda, in Memoir of Hernando d'
Escalante Fontaneda (translated by Buckingham Smith, edited
by David O. True, Coral Gables, Florida: University of
Miami Press, 1944), 33, claimed to have interviewed survivors
from the Menendez fleet. Another testimony came xx the
deposition of Stephan de Rojomonte (A.G.I. Patronato 19,
No. 1, ramo 14), one of the Frenchmen captured by the Spanish
in Hispaniola in January, 1565. Rojomonte stated, as had
66
Fontemeda, that two Spanish ships had been lost, the one of
Juan Menendez being wrecked close to Cape Canaveral.
25. See Coiincil of the Indies to Casa, Madrid, October
11, 1563 (copied as 1564 in error), in A.G.I. Contrataci6n
5,167, Book III.
26. See Officials of the Casa to Castro, Seville,
October 23, 1563, from A.G.I. Justicia 868, No. 9. Pedro
Menendez described his plight in "Servicios . . . ," from
A.G.I. Patronato 257, No. 3, ramo 2. The ships were San
Pelayo, the new galeass, Santa Clara, and Magdalena.
27. See inscription of Juan G6me2 de Argoraedo, Decem-
ber 16, 1563, in A.G.I. Justicia 865, No. 1.
28. The letter to Juan de Sarmiento is dated "primero
de enero" in the copy found in A.G.I. Patronato 257, No. 3,
ramo 2, in the Stetson Collection. Menendez* offer was
rejected in a letter from the Council of the Indies to the
Crown, dated at Madrid on February 14, 1564, from A.G.I.
Indiferente General 738, ramo 6, No. 73. General Velasco
described his successful journey in a letter to the Casa
from Sanlficar dated September 25, 1564, and found in A.G.I.
Contr acion 5,101.
29. The sentence of the Council of the Indies and the
appeal notations of Menendez' case are from A.G.I. Justicia
865, No. 1.
30. Crown to Casa, Barcelona, February 26, 1564,
from A.G.I. Indiferente General 1,966.
31. From "Fiscal con Pedro Menendez de Avil^s sobre
sueldos de dos galeones . . . ," A.G.I. Justicia 872, No. 1. .
32. Philip II had made such a ruling in a cedula to
the Casa dated July 15, 1562. It is cited by the Chaunus in
Seville et I'Atlantigue, III, 1563, aller.
33. Both the first Ribault and the Laudonniire expedi-
tions are described in a long narrative entitled "Informaci6n
del Gobemador Bias de Merlo," from A.G.I. Justicia 212.
Rene de Laudonni&re's own narrative, "L'Histoire Notable
de la Floride," has been reprinted in a number of places;
the writer prefers the version in the work of Suzanne
Lussagnet, Les Fran9ais en Floride (Paris: Presse Uni-
versitaire de France, 1958), pp. 37-200. The dispatch of
the Mcinrique de Rojas ship is described in "Report on the
French who went to populate Florida," Havana, July 9, 1564,
from A.G.I. Scmto Domingo 99 (Stetson Collection), and has
been translated by Lucy Wenhold in "Manrique de Rojas'
67
Report, 1564," Florida Historical Quarterly, XXXVIII, No. 1
(July, 1959), 45-62. See also "Services of Gonzalo Gayon,"
from A.G.I. Santo Domingo 11 (Stetson Collection).
34. Report of the dispatch of Vazquez de Aylltfn's
ships from Sanlucar came in a report from Captain Juan de
Texeda to the Casa written on October 4, 1563, from A.G.I.
Contrataci6n 5,167 (Stetson Collection). For reaction to
the delays in Semto Domingo, see the letter from the
Licenciado Echegoyen to the Crown, Santo Domingo, August 10,
1564 (enclosing letter from April, 1564), A.G.I. Santo
Domingo 71 (Stetson Collection).
35. Crown to Pedro Men^ndez de Avil^s, Madrid, June 18,
1564, from Justicia 868, No. 9.
36. The jailbreak was described by the discomfited
Fiscal of the Casa in a report dated July 15, 1564, from
A.G.I. Justicia 868, No. 9. The power of attorney was
executed on July 1, 1564, and was originally from the Archive
de Protocolos de Sevilla (hereinafter A.P.S.), Escribania
of Juan de la Cobaco. It has been reproduced in A.G.I.
Contrataci6n 4,802 (Stetson Collection). The main body of
the Menendez case in 1564 is found in A.G.I. Justicia 869.
37. Corzo was a shipowner, merchant cind slaver, while
Astudillo served as banker and financial agent in Seville.
Astudillo was also fiscal representative for Pedro del
Castillo and his wife Dona Isabel de Ribera for certain
■juros the Castillos held in the Casa de Contrataci6n. See
revocation of poder of July 28, 1563, in A.P.C., Escribania
of Medina, 1576-78, fol. 287, 287 vto.
38. Order of August 7, 1564, from A.G.I. Justicia 868,
No. 9. ,
39. An excellent description of the construction,
dimensions and armament of the fort is found in "Information
of Governor Bias de Merlo," from A.G.I. Justicia 212. Fort
Caroline was also described in an account and map sent with
the letter of Governor Mazariegos to the Crown, written at
Haveuia on December 22, 1564, eind found in A.G.I. Patronato
267, No. 1, ramo 37. It has been depicted by Jacques Le
Moyne du Morgues, the contemporary artist who served in the
fort; see the color reproductions in The New World by Stefan
Lorant, published by Duell, Sloan and Pearce in New York in
1946; pp. 55. Charles Bennett has also reproduced these
in the Settlement of Florida (Gainesville: University of
Florida Press, 1565), pp. 21, 23. The reconstruction of the
fort by the National Parks Service at St. Johns' Bluff has
closely followed the contemporary depictions.
68
40. The report of the Audiencia, dated August 30,
1564, from A.G.I. Patronato 254, ramo 38 (Stetson Collec-
tion) , recounts a route of the supposed Portuguese-French
fleet which does not square with the actual course of the
Laudonniere vessels. The Huguenots, who left from LeHavre,
touched at the Canary Islands, watered at Dominica, and went
directly from the Virgin Islands to the eastward of the Ba-
hamas, and thence westward to the River May. See the
description in "Information of Governor Bias de Merlo,
from A.G.I. Justicia 212. The Santo Domingo story placed
the French ships in the vicinity of Cape San Antonio on
the western tip of Cuba.
41. See letter from the Licenciado Echegoyen to the
Crown August 10, 1564, from A.G.I. Santo Domingo 71 (Stetson
Collection) .
42. See Pierre and Huguette Chaunu, Seville et I'At-
lantique, 1564 aller. III, 58.
43. The return of San Pelayo emd the loss of Santa
Clara is described in the text and margins of A.G.I. Con-
tratacion 2,898, fol. 230 vto. , and by the Chaunus in Seville
et I'Atlantique, 1564 aller. III, 60, 62. The officials
at Seville reported the arrival of San Pelayo in a letter
to Philip II dated at Seville on December 5, 1564, and
found in A.G.I. Contratacion 5,167, Book III.
44. Rene de LaudonniSre describes the mutiny in "L*
Histoire Notable . . . , " in Lussagnet, Les Francais en
Floride, pp. 124-125. Some of the mutineers recounted their
version of events, which was recorded in the "Information of
Governor Bias de Merlo," from A.G.I. Justicia 212.
45. See the sentence of November 23, 1564, from A.G.I.
Justicia 869.
46. See the petitions of Pedro Menendez and his
attorney in A.G.I. Justicia 872, No. 1.
47. From A.G.I. Justicia 869, sentence of January 24,
1565.
CHAPTER III
PROM ASIENTO TO JOINT-VENTURE
While Pedro Menendez pressed for favorable settlement
of his lawsuits and was still technically a prisoner in
Madrid, events were taking place rapidly in the Indies.
Although the Spanish were as yet unaware of Laudonniere ' s
settlement at Fort Caroline, some Frenchmen from that place
took a course of action that would shortly bring their
colony to open and dramatic attention in the Spanish Indies.
The two little vessels which had left the River May together
in mid-December, 1564, were separated in a storm. One of
these arrived at Cagay, a Spanish town within the great bay
on the southwest coast of Hispemiola. The men aboard cap-
tured a small prize, which they ransomed; after trading
their own vessel for a larger, finer Spanish ship, they
sailed off on further adventures. The second French craft
soon came to La Yagucina, a port thirty miles from Cagay.
Nhen they appeared off the harbor entrance, Spanish ships
seLiled out to intercept them, cmd the Frenchmen fled. Not
awaure of their compatriot's earlier raid on Cagay, the cor-
sairs went there. Their landing- force had surrounded some
settlers* houses when armed Speuiiards attacked them and
69
70
killed or captured several of the French, while the rest
were put to flight.
Near Cape Tiburdh, at the extreme southwest point of
Hispaniola, the two groups of Frenchmen rejoined forces.
They crossed the Windward Passage together, came within
sight of the mountains of Oriente, 2md landed at the Cuban
port of Baracoa, where they raided the town for supplies,
rcmsacked houses, and took a small caravel v^ich they found
in the bowl-shaped harbor. The little fleet then re-
crossed to Hispaniola. On January 16, 1565, they assaulted
a Spamish ship anchored close to Cape Tibur<5n. The men
eJDoard it were well armed and determined to sell their lives
dearly, and their surrender came only after three of their
force had been killed — a soldier, a slave, and one Anton
Nunez. This action of the Frenchmen was certain to bring
them to the notice of Spanish officialdom, for Nunez was
secretary of the Audiencia of Santo Domingo, who had been
travelling to Cuba on a mission for that body. In addition
to the wines cind other goods they seized, the French cap-
tured more them twenty Spamiards. Now they cibemdoned the
last remaining vessel of those brought from Florida. The
little fleet, now composed entirely of prizes, shaped its
course for the southwest euid Spanish Jamaica, where they
hoped to exchange their prisoners for food.
Meanwhile the Frenchmen in the third small craft from
Fort Caroline had decided to try their luck in Cuban
71
waters. At the town of Savanna, they captured a mulatto
and seized some supplies. When they raided the port of
Arcos» the man escaped and made his way to the governor
at Havaina. As soon as the notice reached him Governor
Mazariegos readied two small boats, sailed for Arcos, smd
surprised and captured all eleven of the French raiders.
When the prisoners were brought to Havana, they were
interrogated by Guillaume Rouffi, the French lad whom the
Spanish had found at the site of Ribault's deserted colony
at Port Royal. The captives' ncurrative was written down
on December 22, 1564.
A careful description was made of the French craft
and the stolen goods it contained. Five of the men testi-
fied, and their stories contained a startling message:
the French had again settled in Florida i They had built a
fort at a location between twenty-eight and twenty-nine
degrees of latitude. The French prisoners described the
fort, its garrison, and armament in some detail. The men,
who claimed to be Catholics, said that they had fled
Florida to avoid the harsh labors their "Lutheran" officers
imposed upon them. Governor Mazariegos prepared to send
4
three of the prisoners with their vital news to Spain.
Less theui a month after the capture of the men at
Arcos, on January 20, 1565, three sails appeared off
Point Morant, the southeast cape of the isolated island
of Jamaica. As soon as he sighted the ships. Governor
72
Bias de Merlo hastened to put his forces in a state of
defense. The Frenchmen dropped anchor and sent their
smallest craft into the harbor of Caguaya, near the capital
of Santiago de la Vega (near old Port Royal harbor and the
modem city of Kingston) . They chased down and boarded a
small caravel. Governor Merlo learned from one of the
C2iravel's crew that the raiders were French, and he pre-
pared to attack. First, he put the Frenchmen off their
guard by parleying with them and promised to trade them food
for the Spanish captives they held. While they waited for
the food to arrive, the governor came against them with
several ships. The action was short but sharp and when it
was over, two vessels and thirty-two Frenchmen were pris-
oners. One of their ships had escaped, however. It made
its way out of the harbor and began the long voyage back
to Florida.
The corsairing of the three little craft from Laudon-
ni^re's Florida was, after all, no more than small-bore
piracy, and had posed no major threat to the Carrera de
Indias. Some concern had been aroused in the Spanish
Indies, but real damage done was minor. The effects of
the adventures were, however, major ones, and would spell
disaster to the French in Florida.
Now at last, the location of the French settlement
was unmasked, and the vague menace was given definite shape.
The prisoners said that the offending colony was at aJaout
73
twenty-eight to twenty-nine degrees of north latitude. This
put it clearly within the territories of the Crown of Castile,
and those who had settled there were guilty of trespass
under Spanish law. The raiders from the settlement had also
added piracy to their crimes. The punishment thus merited
by the Huguenot colony eind compounded by its mutineers would
eventually be forthcoming. Only the factors of time and
distance could delay it, as the news slowly filtered back
to Spain. As it fell out, the message the Governor of Cuba
had sent in the ship La Vera Cruz was the first to arrive.
The urgent emd momentous dispatch about the French fort
would not reach Seville until March 26.
In the meantime, on February 3, 1565, the Council of
the Indies finally terminated the two cases affecting Pedro
Menendez. The long pleito with the Casa de Contratacidn
was definitively ended, in his favor. The two bars of
silver, now the only remaining issue, were ordered returned
to Menendez; he was absolved from all charges. At the Scime
meeting, the Council also terminated the case involving
charter fees and reimbursements for Menendez' two galleons
and patache, from the 1563 fleet. In their decision, the
councillors agreed to the terms Menendez' attorney had
asked the previous December — he would receive full repayment
for the pay of the soldiers he brought aboard the ships.
Now this able, vital amd troublesome figure could
again seance his King. In the Indies there was an area of
74
real concern where his abilities and knowledge might be most
useful. Philip II formally asked Menendez to study and
report on the problems of Florida. What, asked the King,
did he know about its coasts and lands — what did he believe
could be done to settle it, after so many failures to do so —
what measures should be taken in the event corsairs had gone
there to establish a base for raids against Spanish ships?
p
In reply, Menendez sent a lengthy memorial. He began
by recounting current rumors about corsairs who might have
settled in Florida; he had heard of two groups. The first,
captained by the infamous Portuguese Miraoso, had been re-
ported by the Audiencia of Semto Domingo the preceding
August. In Menendez' version of the story, Mimoso had
been seen at Tenerife in the Canaries in the late spring
of 1564; possibly he was now in Florida. The second expedi-
tion was composed of five heavily-armed English galleons. When
it touched briefly at El Ferrol on Spain's north coast
at the end of December, Galician fishermen learned that
the squadron planned to go to Florida. If, said Menendez,
these tales were true and an enemy colony was established
in Florida, homeward-bound ships would stemd in danger of
being taken by fast galleys from the corsair settlement.
He also raised the spectre of enemy-incited slave insurrec-
tions in the Spanish Caribbean, which could lead to the
loss of vital island strong points. Menendez also expressed
his great concern that such an establishment, if not quickly
75
eradicated, might quickly take deep root in the land, as
the English or French found favor with the Indians there.
The Asturian was strongly convinced that Protestant heretics
and American aboriginals held similar beliefs, probably
Satanic in origin. These shared beliefs naturally led them
to affinity, unless they were kept apart. An alliance be-
tween foreign intruders and the Indian peoples would prove
most difficult, if not impossible, to break.
Shifting his emphasis to the geographic features of
the North American mainland, Pedro Mene'ndez told Philip II
of the rumors he had heard of the great passage to the
South Sea. He was certain that "an arm of the sea" extended
from Newfoundland twelve hundred miles to the westward,
where it Ceune into close proximity with cinother waterway.
This last passage, Menendez believed, gave access to the
mines of Zacatecas in New Spain, and led ultimately to the
South Sea. It was only necessary to explore the first
water route, make a short overland journey to the second
passage, and the way to the Pacific lay open. It was
vital, he asserted, to let no enemy learn the secrets of
this strategic waterway and threaten the trade of the
East, or seize the rich silver mines. Menendez was also
concerned that the French could easily create trade routes
to a North Americem colony, since many vessels already came
each year to the Newfoxindland fishing banks from France.
He could even foresee the possibility that they might
76
establish sugar-works and tlocks to provide them with the
sugar 2md wool they continually sought through trade or
piracy.
Pedro Menendez then outlined concrete proposals for
Florida's settlement. If no actual intruders were in the
land, an expedition should proceed directly to Santa Elena.
A force of five hundred sailors, soldiers and farmers would
probably suffice. Menendez urged that four Jesuits accompany
the expedition to establish doctrinas cind teach the faith to
the sons of the native chiefs. While small vessels explored
and mapped the coasts north to Newfoundlcind, agricultural
settlements would be made in fertile inland areas. The cost
of such an enterprise was estimated at 80,000 ducats for all
expenses of initial outfitting and a year's supply. Menendez
suggested that the Crown bear the cost of the undertaking ,
in order to do it more quickly and secretly. If there
should turn out to be Frenchmen in the land, a different
approach would be advisable. In that case, a pvmitive ex-
pedition should be mounted with four well-armed galleons
and a thousand soldiers eind sailors. For a six-month
military effort of this kind, Menendez estimated a cost of
50,000 ducats.
After receiving and studying the memorial, Philip II
and his Council of the Indies determined to carry out the
Florida enterprise. They chose not to undertake it as a
Crown- sponsored activity, but to license it as
77
an adelantamlentO/ with Pedro Menendez as adelantado. Now
that the bothersome legal obstacles were out of the way,
the decks were clear for meaningful negotiation. At this
point/ one can amalyze the diverse motivations of the parties
to these negotiations and the purposes vrtiich they held in
common. First of all, from the standpoint of the Crown of
Castile, a number of considerations justified another at-
tempt at the settlement of Florida. The King and his ad-
visers were never forgetful of the continuing threat of
French or English incursion along the long North American
coastline. Whether or not this had already occurred, it
remained a possibility. Aggressive population and fortifi-
cation could deny any establishment to another power emd
at the same time protect the legal rights of Castile.
Exploration would unlock tne secrets of the ports, currents
and shoals, and more accurate marine charts would lead to
more secure navigation. Perhaps the storied Northwest
Passage could be found, with all which that implied for the
Eastern trade. The Carrera de Indias would be buttressed
and protected from enemy assault by the very existence of
mainland settlements. If Havana were adequately defended
and the Florida coast fortified, the strategic Bahama Channel
would be covered.
The evangelistic mission of the Catholic faith, so
inextricably mixed with the other purposes of conquest and
colonization, was an important consideration in preparing
78
the Florida asiento. As royal authority for conquest was
delegated to the adelantado as surrogate for the King, so
was a portion of responsibility for C2Lrrying out the
Patronato. All previous experience in Florida indicated
that it %K)uld be a difficult and challenging mission-
field. In the face of such difficulties, the winning of the
souls of the Florida Indians would be cm enterprise of great
spiritual merit for the Crown of Castile and its adelantado.
Conversely, for those souls to remain in their heathen
state or, even worse, to become infected with the deadly
virus of heresy would be reproach in the eyes of God,
For Pedro Menendez himself, one might wonder at his
interest in the enterprise, after his disparaging remarks
about Florida as a graveyard of hopes. For one thing, he
must have held a lingering hope that his explorations might
xmcover the fate of his son Jueui. Another was the strong
inducement to build further his family name, reputation,
and estate. An enterprise which promised lemds, revenues,
high titles, and expectation of exalted service to God
and prince would stir cuiy sixteenth -century hidalgo. In such
an undertaking, moreover, there would be honor and profit,
lands and offices enough for the whole circle of kinsmen
and friends in the Menendez orbit. In the bargaining.
Men^dez pressed for the title of Marquis and the leinds
irtiich would support it. He had before him the exeimple (
the m2u:quisate of Herncmdo Cortes in New Spain, which was
79
granted in 1529, By 1565, the extent of the private holdings
of the Marques delValle, now held by the successor to Hernando
Cortes, were «rell known. Cortes* economic empire was founded
upon Indian labor and tribute, which probably amounted to
30,000 pesos in value annually by 1560, This income per-
mitted ftirther investment in stock-raising, sugar produc-
tion, money-lending and mining ventures, while Indian cind
Negro slaves worked the agricultural properties. It was
this kind of entire that Pedro Menendez de Avil^s had in
mind when he petitioned for the title and lands of a Mar-
quis. Pedro Menendez also sought ways to gain privileged
entree into the Carrera de Indias for his maritime opera-
tions— shipping licenses granted by the Crown. At the scune
time, he wished to be freed from some of the onerous
regulations imposed upon ship-owners by the Casa de Con-
tratacion.
Certain motives were shared by both parties. The
establishment of a prosperous, thriving colony was a matter
of mutual interest--revenues from it would flow both to
the King and to his privileged adelemtado. Such a flourish-
ing settlement would be the best defense against any enemy
and the most sure guarcuitee of profit from trade and
agriculture. It would lend value to the land which could,
in txim, support a high rank for the holder of that land.
The atten5)t to populate Florida was thus to be ac-
coii^>lished through the ancient institution of the adelantado.
80
Even had they wished to do so, Philip II and his advisors
voiild scarcely have been able to conquer Florida through the
Viceroyalty of New Spain. Luis de Velasco, the aggressive
Viceroy who had sent Miguel de Legazpi to the Phillipines
just the past year, and who had dispatched the De Luna and
Villafeme e3q)editions to Florida, was dead. The government
of New Spain was currently under the control of the Audiencia
of Mexico until a new Viceroy could arrive.
It has been pointed out that royal financial limita-
tions had discouraged Crown financing of discovery, and that
Philip II had determined in 1563 that the funding of explora-
14
tion and settlement should, as a general rule, be private.
At this point, there was no reason to depart from this
policy. After all, no grave cind immediate threat was yet
Icnown to be in Florida. To the contrary, every circum-
stance dictated the continucince of the "no-cost" tactic;
a host of urgent necessities pressed in upon Philip II from
every quarter.
For four years amd more, Spanish ships and men had
been lavishly used to stem the Moslem assaults upon the
North Africam bases as Oran and Mazalquivir. Now the main
Turkish fleet threatened to break into the western Mediter-
ranean by taking the island of Malta. Don Alvaro de Baz^n's
armada of galleys had to be sent there to bolster the
Christians, but unfortunately the asiento undertaken by the
81
merchant guild of Seville to support his ships had expired.
Themselves embarrassed for fxinds because of dislocations
in the Indies trade, the Sevillieuis were dragging their
feet at renewing the agreement. The merchants felt that
the galleys should be used to protect the Indies fleets
against corsairs near Spain, instead of sending them eastward
to do battle with the Txirks, Anxious to increase his flow
of revenues from overseas, Philip II had proposed (in late
1564 and early 1565) a major re-working and tightening of
fleet sailing laws and defense. Due to his own lack of
money, the King was himself constrained to borrow from the
provate deposits in the Casa at Seville, until the next
fleet should arrive.
The Spemish Crown, moreover, faced other grave diplo-
matic problems. Amid a climate of hardening ideological
conflict, Philip II had been pursuing his own counter-
Reformation in his dominions in the Netherlcinds , where he
had published the Tridentine decrees in 1564. The King was
irritated at slow progress in their implementation and the
growth of opposition to the royal commands, and he felt
gradually compelled to show a stronger hcind.
In neighboring Fremce, personal, dynastic euid religious
involvements complicated the diplomacy of Philip II. His
own ties to the Valois kingdom were close — his wife Isabel
was daughter to the Queen Mother, Catherine de Medici, and
sister of Charles IX, the King. Catherine and her son held
82
tenuous control over a nation in an increasingly ambiguous
and difficult internal situation. After the Pacification of
Amboise in 1563, rival noble families, whose differences
were compounded by religious loyalties, lived in uneasy
proximity within the Court and ministries of the French
Crown. Philip II, who took a dogmatic position for the
Catholic faith, stood ready to furnish his mother-in-law
with concrete support against the Huguenot nobles. Under
the circumstances, he had to watch events in France closely,
for they might require sxibstantial commitment at any time.
In spite of the collapse of the adelantamiento of Lucas
Vazquez de Ayll6n, and the failures of the other would-be
adelantados of Florida, there seemed no better way to conquer
Florida at minimum royal cost. Men^ndez* suggestion of
Crown underwriting was therefore rejected, and the adelan-
tamiento of Florida was approved. Pedro Men^ndez de Avil^s
fitted the needs of the moment by offering, in addition to
his skill and zeal, one fine ship as the nucleus of a fleet.
He could also call upon a host of friends and relatives in
Asturias and the rest of the north coast of Spain who would
pledge their persons, ships and followers to his cause. In
CSdiz, Seville, and in the Indies Men^ndez had credit sources
to aid in the arming of vessels and the carrying-out of the
expedition. Without question, moreover, his drive, ability
and reputation could act as a loadstone to draw support to
the enterprise of Florida.
83
The Council of the Indies chose one of its members.
Dr. Juan Vazquez de Arce, to negotiate with Menendez and
agree upon the conditions under which the Florida expedition
and settlement would be carried out. The beurgaining ended
18
on March 15, 1565, when both men signed a lengthy asiento.
To appreciate the underlying nature of this contract cind
understand the relation of the parties to it, one must
examine the relative positions of Pedro Menendez and his
sovereign. First of all, this was clearly not an accord
between two parties of legally equal stcinding; one cemnot
view the asiento as a modern business contract. Neither the
would-be Adelantado nor his King was able, as is done today,
to deal in contractual terms limited strictly to the business
at hand. Their mutual binding on the enterprise of Florida
was done within the framework of their broader relationship
as ruler and subject. An example of this was the final
clause which the King inserted in the last version of Menen-
dez' agreement. It stated that non-con^liance by Pedro
Menendez would not be a mere contract violation; it would
be "treason to his natural Lord. " An agreement with a six-
teenth-century monarch would always exhibit this disconcert-
ingly open-ended feature: there always existed the possibil-
ity of unilateral, prejudicial action.
Yet Philip II was not a totally unlimited despot. Among
other restraints upon his power, the legalism which obtained
in sai of Spanish life also affected the King's agreements
84
with his siibjects. In this tradition, therefore, the terms
of the aslento had been set forth in great detail. For his
part, Men^ndez could rely upon receiving what had been
promised to him in the contract, provided he lived up to
his obligations . . . and provided Philip II did not decide
to recast the natiire of their relationship.
The asiento contained a rough quid pro quo of duties cmd
rewards, obligations cuid benefits which approximated what
is termed in modern business law "consideration." This
bilateral contractual balance must also be considered in its
broader setting of an agreement between a loyal subject suid
19
a patrimonial monarch.
The contract agreed to by the representative of the
King emd Pedro Menendez embodied memy of the provisions
proposed by Menendez in his earlier memorial. It is divided
into two main parts. The first enumerates the tasks eind
obligations undertaken by Menendez. In the second half,
the Crown lists the privileges which it agreed to grant
as recompense for the efforts of the Adelantado.
The asiento began with a promise that Menendez would
prepare four fast zabras emd six shallops, fully equipped
with oars, artillery, arms and munitions for any action on
the sea. Next, he agreed to bring a force of five hundred
men on his expedition, of which one hundred would be farmers,
one hundred sailors, and the rest armed men emd officers.
He agreed to carry two clerics, eind to bring stone-cutters.
85
cazp«nters, farriers, blacksmiths, barbers and sxirgeons.
All of his men would have to be fully armed with arquebuses,
crossbows, helmets and shields. The expedition would have to
leave by May 31, 1565.
Because the smaller vessels had neither the tonnage nor
the facilities to carry large bodies of men and their requi
site equipment and supplies, Men^ndez was instructed to
prepare his fine new galeass, San Pelayo, to take part in
the journey. San Pelayo was sizeaible enough to transport
three hundred of his men and most of their supplies, and
was thus admiredaly fitted to accompany the expedition. It
was, moreover, relatively fast eind maneuverable for its
size, and was Icirge enough to constitute a formideJale gun
platform. Since, however, this was Men^ndez' finest and
largest ship, and his best single source of income, a bargain
was struck. He could load it with goods for his own account
or carry merchandise for others for the freight income, up
to one-half or even two- thirds of the ship's tonnage. At
some point in the West Indian islands, he would then off-
load the men and supplies intended for Florida into the
smaller vessels, eind San Pelayo could then proceed on its
profitable journey.
Next, Men^ndez was required to sail to the coast of
Florida and seek the most advantageous places for settle-
ment. He was also to search for traces of any corsairs or
other unauthorized intruders in the lands of Philip II and
86
expel them, if such should exist. Upon leuiding, Men^ndez
was to claim and take Florida in the king's name.
The geographic limits set upon the mission of Mendndez
were immense. No bounds were set upon inland expansion,
save the implicit limitation of the existing frontiers of
the Viceroyalty of New Spain. Expressed in shoreline
terms, the confines of the adelantaroiento ranged from the
Ancones, or St. Joseph's Bay, on the Gulf of Mexico around
the Florida Keys and up the east coast to Terra Nova, in
from fifty to sixty degrees of north latitude. Thus the
coastal expanses which Men^ndez had to explore, chart cmd
protect were extremely protracted. The distances involved
were reasonably well comprehended by the Spcinish, for they
had a good grasp of the measurements of latitude. The worst
distortions of their geography seemed to arise out of an
imperfect understanding of longitude, and hence of the east-
west dimension. The wanderings of De NarvSez and De Soto
had given some indications of the extent of the North Ameri-
Ccui Icmdmass, but its true limits were not appreciated. In
any event, the areas granted in the asiento afforded a great
scope for enterprise. Completion of the first phase of ex-
ploration was required to be done as soon as possible, but
had to be completed by the end of three years.
Next, the King dictated definite terms for the effort
of population eind settlement. The initial thrust of con-
quest was to endure for one year, and supplies would have
87
to be furnished for that period. An additional four
hundred settlers were to be put into the land before the
first three yeeirs had elapsed. Of the total of five hundred
settlers, at least two hundred would have to be married men,
and at least one hundred of them farmers: the essential
purpose was to found viedble agricultural settlements. As
in SpcLin, the farmers were to cluster around villages; the
town was to be the spearhead for the advance of Castiliein
civilization. Menendez was to found two or three towns,
and to fortify each with a stronghouse of stone, adobe, or
wood with a moat auid drawbridge. It was intended that these
fortified villages would then serve as refuges for the
settlers, in the event of Indian troubles or corsair attack.
Menendez was required to bring in five hvmdred slaves
as the basic leJaor force to construct the towns, build forti-
fications and cultivate the lauid. These slaves were to plant
sugar-cane, and build the sugar-works with v^ich to grind
it. It was the contractor's responsibility to provide the
livestock essential for the self-support of the colonies
and for future commercial hide production — one hundred
horses and mares, two hundred calves, four hundred hogs,
four htmdred sheep, some goats, and other domestic animals
and birds. The effort of colonization was to continue for
the three-year term.
Relatively little was said in the asiento eibout rela-
tions with the Florida Indians, It provided that every
88
attempt should be made to bring the natives into the Christian
faith and to loyal obedience of the king. For the religious
life of the settlers, and the conversion of the Indians,
Menendez was obliged to bring ten or twelve religious of
any order desired to Florida during the long-term effort of
conquest and colonization. More specifically, four addi-
tional Jesuit missionaries had to come to establish doctrinas
among the Indians. It was, further, ordered that the
Florida enterprise be carried out in peace, friendship, and
Christianity. As to the rest, the contract advises that the
usual instructions apply as are given in regulations for those
who go to make such settlements. With regard to land tenure
and Indian service, the 1563 ordinances specify that, in such
population efforts, an adelantado might make two-life reparti-
mientos of Indiams in each village, for himself and his
heirs. They also pemit three-life encomiendas , to be grcinted
to other settlers, in areas apart from the ports or main
towns. It should be noted that Lucas Vazquez Ayllon's 1563
asiento for Florida had cautioned him that he could esteJ^lish
no encomiendas of Indians. Pedro Menendez' agreement, how-
ever, is totally silent on this point, except for the refer-
22
ence to the 1563 ordinances.
Pedro Menendez had, then, obligated himself for a
mission of exploration, population, and religious conversion.
These purposes were interdependent, were of a piece with
the requirements made of others who had signed sixteenth-
89
centxiry asientos, and were consistent with the general aims
of Spanish expansion.
The second part of the asiento begem with a statement
that Men^ndez* mission would impose such great efforts amd
expenses upon him that the king offered certain benefits
and privileges to him in remuneration. The first benefit
promised was cm immediate cash payment of 15,000 ducats.
This, the only royal outlay in the entire agreement, was to
be paid if Men^ndez sailed before the end of May. He was
required to post a valid performance bond that he would
return the fxinds if he failed to meet the sailing date.
A number of titles cmd offices were immediately granted
to Pedro Men&idez, or were held out to him as future pos-
sibilities. He was to enjoy the title of Adelantado of
Florida, and could bequeath it to his heirs in perpetuity.
To insure that both the civil and military government of the
adelantamiento would be in his hands, the offices of Governor
and Captain-General were conceded to him for two lives — his
own and that of a son or son-in-law. A salary of 2,000
ducats a year, to be paid from royal profits, accompanied the
posts. If an Audiencia were ever esteiblished in Florida,
the position of Alguacil Mayor would be set aside perpetually
for Menendez and his family. He was to be named Captain-
General of the ships which were to go on the Florida expedi-
tion. The Adelantado was allowed to name a properly qualified
lieutenant to take his place during eibsences from Florida.
90
He could, therefore, be a part-time official, amd would thus
be free to carry out his own economic interests elsewhere
in the Indies, return to Spain, or sejrve in other posts of
privilege and honor to which his sovereign might call him.
This whole assemblage of offices euid titles ccin be described
as a grant of rather complete authority for Mendndez* life-
time, with some elements of it planned to continue after
his death.
One of Men^ndez' more valuable authorizations, and
one which would help to attract eager followers to his enter-
prise, was the power to distribute leuids in Florida. The
asiento granted him the faculty of giving tracts of land for
plantations, farms, and stock-breeding facilities as he
might see fit, provided that he did not impede the rights
of Indicuis. As to his own lands, the King granted him an
estate, or estates totalling twenty-five leagues squared.
These iiranense tracts of lamd, more than fifty-five hundred
square miles, could provide the territorial backing amd,
hopefully, the revenues to support the title of Marquis.
If, the asiento recited, the expedition was accoc^lished
and the other terms of the agreement successfully completed,
the king would consider his services and grant him the
appropriate favor. Menendez' jurisdiction over the land-
greint was, however, to be limited. He would not, for
example, possess governmental powers there like the ones
exercised by the Marquis del Valle or by the Columbus family
91
in Jamaica; neither vould he possess any sub-surface mineral
rights — these would be reserved for the Crown.
A key cluster of privileges to be conceded to the Florida
adelantado and to his followers were economic ones. Of
these benefits, some were usually given to adelantados ;
Menendez could bring five hvmdred slaves free of emy duties,
provided that they were intended only for Florida; the
Adelantado and other Florida residents would receive an
exemption from customs duties (the almojarifazgo) for a
period of time, and the usual royal quinto paid on precious
metals, peaurls and other jewels would be reduced to one-
tenth for a term of ten years. Pedro Meh^ndez was promised
two fisheries — one of peeirls and one of fish — of perpetual
duration, and was guaranteed 6-2/3 percent of all net royal
profits in Florida in perpetuity. All of these provisos
were generally found in sixteenth-century asientos. Only
the number of slave licenses to be given Menendez was at all
unusual.
Some of the economic benefits were particularly linked
with the Spanish trade system, the Carrera de Indias. While
some limited shipping privileges and exemptions were often
noted in asientos for conquest and population, these were
always modest and tied specifically to trade with the pro-
posed new settlements. In the case of Pedro Menendez,
however, a significant departure was made. He was given
permission to put into the Indies trade two galleons of
92
from five hiondred to six hundred tons' burden, together
with two pataches. The Adelcintado was free to send these
ships to any port in the Indies, emd to sail them with the
fleets or outside of them, as he chose. For cargoes sent
in these ships, in no way tied to the Florida expedition,
Menendez did not have to pay the averia, or convoy-tax.
The only restrictions placed upon this trade were that the
outward-bound vessels only carry foodstuffs and beverages.
On the return voyage, any cargo could be brought, but
Menendez was forbidden to bring gold, silver, or precious
stones unless they belonged to him or were earmarked for his
account because he had earned them through freight-payments.
These ship-licenses were valid for six years.
A separate trade-privilege involved Menendez • smaller
vessels, and was more particularly tied to the Florida
enterprise. He was granted the licenses for six shallops
and four zabras, to operate between Florida and Spain, or
to Puerto Rico, Hispauiiola or Cuba. For the first year,
it was understood, these ships were dedicated to the
initial conquest; then the trade privilege would run (after
June, 1566) for six years. The cargoes of these little
vessels were intended for the Florida settlement. It was
provided, however, that Menendez could bring foodstuffs or
beverages to the islands, unload and sell them there.
Then he could load cattle or other merchandise for Florida,
which could be bought in those islemds. These ships could
93
also SBLxl freely without regard to the fleet regulations of
the Casa de Contratacion. The King allowed the Adelantado
to sail %d.th xinexcunined pilots, and waived the requirement
that a notary or ship's secretary be aboard each of the
small vessels.
Another maritime privilege given to Men^ndez allowed
him to debark some of his ships directly from the north of
Speiin irithout examination at Sanlucar, Seville or C£diz.
Instead, he was to be permitted to sail directly to the
Canazy Islands and to have his official papers approved
before the local justices there. The Adelantado 's small
vessels were exempt from averia payments on the initial
Florida expedition. After that time, if they wished to sail
in convoy with the regular fleets, it had to be paid. If
they preferred to sail singly or together outside of fleet
protection, no averia was to be collected. The asiento
specifically provided that none of Pedro Menendez ♦ ships
could be taken, or embargoed, for Royal service. Finally,
the Adelcintado was given what amounted to an open-ended
letter-of-marque. Any prizes which he might take at any
time during the six-year ship license term would belong
to him, subject only to the usual Crown share of one-third.
The asiento closed with a clause establishing the
rights of succession for all of Menendez' rights and
privileges, if he should die before the basic three-year
term had expired. It was signed by Dr. Vazquez and Pedro
Menendez.
94
Plve days later, on March 20, 1565, Philip II affixed
his signature to the formal, royal decree esteJalishing the
Florida agreement. In this instrument, no change was made
In the terms agreed to in the first asiento. The King
had, however, added a lengthy introduction, converted the
form of address to the "Vos" mode used by a monarch to
address a favored subject, 2md appended a closing related
to compliance.
The introduction recalled the long, fruitless attempts
to settle Florida. It emphasized that the need to convert
the Indians to the holy Faith was the primary motive of the
Crown in seeking to populate the mainland. Then it repeated
the tasks Men^ndez had offered to perform at his own
expense, and accepted the offer on those terms, by virtue of
Men^ndez* evident qualifications.
In the closing, Philip II reaffirmed that Pedro Men^n-
dez would conduct the entire conquest and population at his
own cost, would honor the asiento in so doing, and would
agree to obey other, later instructions which the Crown
might make relative to the enterprise. The King then
promised to carry out his obligations, and pledged his Royal
word that each and every proviso of the agreement would be
honored if Menendez faithfully carried out his part. If he
failed to do so, he would be punished as a disloyal subject.
Comparison of the Menendez agreement with those of four
other Florida adelantados and with the asientos for
95
sixteenth- century settlement in Costa Rica, the Rio de la
Plata, and "the province of Omagua" demonstrates the similari-
ties emd differences between agreements and thus helps
establish the distinctive characteristics of Pedro Men^ndez'
24
asiento. From such a comparison, it cam be concluded that
the striking uniformity of many clauses and provisions in
the asientos bears testimony to the marked continuity of the
settlement policies of the Crown of Castile, Requirements
as to population, defense, Indian policies and the granting
of privileges remained remarkably similar over the fifty
years spanned by these contracts. Even the area of relations
with the Indians, beset as it was during those years with
dispute preceding and following the passage of the New Laws,
changed little. Indeed, differences in the asientos appear
to have been a matter of degree rather than one of kind.
With particular regard to Florida, it can be affirmed that
the 1565 compact with Pedro Menendez represented the cul-
mination of a long series of attempts to people eastern
North America through the use of the adelantado instrument.
Notwithstanding the basic and underlying similarity of
the asientos studied, one difference stands out clearly:
the unusual nature of the benefit-package afforded to Pedro
Menendez de Aviles, First, the scope of some of the bene-
fits is far greater. Five hundred slave licenses, duty-
free, are five times as many as the number permitted to any
of the other seven contractors; in 1563, Ayll6n was allowed
96
to bring only eight slaves, and he had to pay duty upon
these. Menendez was to control the government of the adelan-
taniento for two lives; the other Florida grantees could only
govern for one. The tracts of lands to be given him were
more than double the size of those offered to Narvaez, De
Soto, and the second Ayll6n; they were almost twice as large
as those provided for the first Ayllon contract. They were,
in fact, the same size as the Veragua lands tendered to Don
Luis Colon, grandson of the discoverer, in 1537.
By far the most remarkcible privileges which the new
Florida Adelantado was to receive, however, were those con-
nected with maritime trade. Taken together — the out-of-fleet
permission, averia exemptions, exemption from excimination of
ships and cargoes in Andalusia, permission to cariry unlicensed
pilots and sail without a notary, and the ship-licenses them-
selves— these represented a substantial breach of the privi-
lege-system of the Seville merchants. Thie whole collection
appears to have been tailored to the deepest inclinations of
Pedro Menendez de Avil^s — to engage freely in the Indies
trade under special royal patronage with a very minimum of re-
striction. The benefits were, moreover, almost all con-
vertible into money terms for Menendez. Ship-licenses or
slave-licenses, for example, if not used could be sold.
For the Crown, the advantages given to Pedro Menendez
represented the price of the Florida conquest. This was not
a price to be paid directly by the king. In part, its
97
payment would be realized through the granting of an estate
which the Adelaoitado would be allowed to create in Florida,
For the rest, it would be paid by giving Men^ndez license
to profit through trade — a privilege to be carved out from
the sphere of the mercantile monopolists of the Carrera de
Indias. In return, the Crown could hope for a bulwark of
Castilian civilization against any enemy incursion upon the
North American continent.
Now there was much to be done. In addition to making
copies of the asiento for the parties, another was prepared
by the royal secretary to be sent to Seville for the books
of contracts kept in the Casa de Contratacidn. Thus the
maritime privileges of Men&idez could be accounted for, and
his licenses could be granted as needed. It was also neces-
sary to draw up separate cedulas, or decrees, embodying the
main privileges allotted to Men^ndez eind to his followers in
the asiento, together with patents of the titles which he
26
had been granted. On March 22, 1565, a letter was sent
from the king to the officials of the Casa de Contrataci6n
at Seville. It asked all possible aid for Pedro Men^ndez,
so that his armadas might be sent off as soon as might be
feasible. A form letter containing the same advice was
posted to the Casa representative at C5diz, Antonio de Abalia,
and to the king's officials in Vizcaya, the "four villas of
the coast," Galicia and the Canary Islands. Two days
earlier, amother, separate dispatch had already been sent
98
to Abalia in Cadiz, pointing out that piu:iJ.cular aid would
be required for Men^ndex in that city, and asking Abalia to
see to it.^^
Pedro Menendez left Madrid, armed with the proofs of
his agreement with the Crown, to begin his journey to
Andalusia. Now he could ask for immediate payment of the
15,000 ducats which the asiento promised. With a letter
of judgment from the Council of the Indies, he could also
press for settlement of his ship-lease case. He could begin
the outfitting of hi.- expedition for Florida in CSdiz.
While the Adelantado was still travelling south from
Madrid, the merchant ship La Vera Cruz had ended its long
voyage from Havana, and had anchored within the port of
Sanlucar de Barrameda. The urgent dispatch from Diego de
Mazariegos telling of the French settlement was sent along
at once by messenger to Seville, together with the three
French prisoners sent by the Governor. A rapid courier then
forwarded the governor's letter from Seville to Philip II.
Its delivery was swift indeed: the note of enclosure was
dated March 26 and the King had it by March 30. Now the
momentous news was in Philip's hands, and he and his
counsellors knew for the first time of the French post at
Fort Caroline. They had also learned that Laudonni^re
28
shortly expected substantial reinforcement from France.
Pedro Menendez' newly authorized expedition of settle-
ment and population would go ahead, but first it would have
99
a punitive mission to perform. The same day he received
the news, Philip II wrote two insistent letters to Men&idez.
In the first, Philip tersely advised the Adelctntado of the
message from Havema. Be ordered Men^ndez to leave as quickly
as possible, as already reqxiired by his asiento and capitula-
cion. The second dispatch was even more importunate in tone:
the King asked Pedro Men^ndez to move up his depaurture date
and leave by the first of May for Florida. He asked Menendez
to keep his destination secret, and that he spread the word
29
that his goal was to be the Rio de la Plata.
The notice which Philip II had received of the French
fort and colony in his Florida territory apparently did not
disturb the friendly tenor of his correspondence with the
French monarchs. An affectionate letter from Catherine de
Medici was addressed to "the most high, excellent and
powerful Prince, our very dear and well-beloved son-in-
law, son, and cousin." Catherine's letter crossed with one
Philip wrote on April 2 to Charles IX and his mother. It
assured them that, in spite of the pressure of his affairs,
he would come with Isabel to see them as racmy times as
possible. His note closed with a warm salute "to the most
Christian Queen, my mother and lady," and was signed "the
good son cuid brother of Your Majesties."
In spite of such pleasantries, however, some concern
had arisen at the Castilian court about the projected meet-
ing of the two royal families. Both Queen Isabel and her
100
■other bellev«d that a friendly family conference would some-
how solve their mutual diplomatic problems and could even
help resolve the internal religious tensions in Freuice.
Philip was unwilling to disappoint his young wife by dis-
avowing the meeting; but his conscience was most xineasy
about the possible contact with heretics at such a con-
ference. Even after his Councils had debated the issue eind
had recommended that the King go in person to the meeting,
he demurred. At this early April date, there was real doubt
that the meeting would actually take place or, if it did, that
the King would attend. Philip could not, however, reject
the thought that he should use every means possible to
strengthen the Catholic cause in France; the royal confer-
ence might help further this aim.
Certainly a part of the ambiguity in the King's feel-
ings about Frcmce must have been related to his recent
knowledge of LaudonniSre ' s settlement at Fort Caroline.
One thing was sure in his mind — the threat which the fort
posed to the Indies and to the fleets should be erased as
soon ais possible. From his palace at Aranjuez, Philip sent xir-
gent dispatches on April 5 to the commanders of his key
defense points in the Caribbean — the Audiencia of Santo
Domingo on the isleind of Hispaniola and to his governors at
Puerto Rico auid Havana. Philip II also urged the Seville
officials to speed up payment to Pedro Menlndez of the 15,000-
ducat me reed promised to him in his asiento and to make
101
rapid money settlement with him over the long-pending
galleon lease case. The Adelantado had, the King advised,
pressing need for the funds in order to moiint his expedi-
tlon."
The dispatches warned the Indies of the dangers which
the French fort represented, amd initiated the necessary
counter- moves. With these messages, the enterprise of
Florida entered a new phase; now, for the first time, the
Crown planned to furnish its adelantado with material sup-
port. This fateful step permanently imposed a dual character
upon the maintenance of the adelantamiento of Florida. In
his letter to the Audiencia of Santo Domingo, Philip described
the message he had received from Governor Mazariegos and
reported the location of the French fort in Florida. He
ordered the Audiencia to raise two hundred armed men for
Pedro Menendez' use under "a good captain," and that a ship,
horses and ample supplies be furnished for an expedition of
four months, at the cost of the royal treasury.
The message to Havana acknowledged the Governor's
earlier report, and asked Mazariegos to provide fifty armed
men, a number of horses eind a ship. When Menendez arrived
in Havcina, the Governor was to turn the force over to him
for the Florida enterprise. Again, the estimated term of
service (amd the duration of expense) was to be four months.
By thus setting a time limit upon royal participation,
Philip demonstrated that he felt that the punitive aspect
102
of the expedition would be relatively short. The King also
cautioned that all the usual controls upon expenditure from
royal funds would be observed in this case.
The urgency of the King's commitment to this enter-
prise— and the priority which he assigned to it— can best be
measured against what is known of his finemcial position
during those days. As mentioned above, Philip II was stjnag-
gling with pressing needs in several key diplomatic and
military undertakings. He was especially concerned with the
state of the royal forces in Oran and Mazalquivir, To meet
some of his obligations, the King asked the officials of the
Casa de Contrataci6n to attempt to borrow 200,000 ducats in
Seville; the royal coffers there were entirely empty. As
for the supplemental measures the King had set in motion
for Florida in the Indies, they would not result in direct
royal expense from Spain. Crown monies used in the Indies
would, of course, never reach Seville as royal revenues. At
this point, then, the expulsion of the French at Fort Caro-
line did not seem to call for any major effort by the Spanish
Crown.
The Duke of Alba, the head of a major faction at the
Spemish Court, emd a militant hard-liner in upholding his
sovereign's dynastic rights cmd orthodox Catholicism, gave
his opinion to Philip II on April 11, Alba first expresed
great firmness in opposing the presence of any Huguenot
nobles at the pleinned conference at Bayonne, and advised
103
that if ciny of these plamned to come to the meetingr Queen
Isabel should not be permitted to attend. Turning to the
question of Florida, the Duke urged cin immediate move to
dislodge the French from their fort there, but did not
reject the diplomatic approach. Alba pointed out that
prisoner interrogations affirmed that the Queen of Frcince
and Admiral Coligny had authorized the expedition of Laudon-
ni^re. In view of this, the Duke urged the King to gather
together the proofs of Castilian title to the North Ameri-
can continent. Next he suggested that the Spanish Ambassa-
dor to Frcmce make formal presentation of the evidence
before the Valois rulers, and that he ask Catherine de
Medici and Charles IX to recall the French Huguenots in
Florida, emd cancel any reinforcements that were to be sent
there.
After study of the Duke's parecer, the King gave im-
mediate assent to the part aibout the coming royal conference
at Bayonne. On April 16, the King ordered the Ambassador
to France, Don Francis de Alava y Beaxmont, to give Catherine
de Medici formal notice that he would not permit Isabel to
attend the meeting if any religious xindesirables , e.g.,
heretics, plemned to be there. If that were the case,
Philip II would annul the visit. Ten days later, a reply
came from Catherine; the French Queen had concurred with
Philip's wish.
104
Only sporadic action had yet been taken with regard to
the French incursion in Florida. The Menendez expedition was
to be supplemented with some Crown aid from Caribbean Indies
bases, and the General of the New Spain fleet, Pedro de las
Ruelas, was to provide naval support for the Florida Adelan-
tado. Although the King and his officials had learned from
the prisoner interrogation that Laudonniere expected rein-
forcement soon, they were not yet aware that the arming of
the Ribault fleet had already begun. At this point the
Adelantado returned from a trip to the north coast of Spain
with some alarming intelligence, Menendez noted that he
heard in Vizcaya that sixteen French ships, with two thousand
men, were being outfitted in LeHavre for the Florida rein-
forcement journey. On the first of May, Philip wrote his
French cimbassador, asking him to determine the truth of Menen-
dez' report. Alava's reply, dated just six days later,
deprecated the Adelantado 's story. He noted that he em-
ployed able and diligent agents in Normandy and Brittciny to
detect any such sailings, and that none of these had given
him emy information about it. He had heard other rumors that
a fleet was being readied for Florida, but had discounted
them, believing that they were probably corsair ships being
prepared for raids on Spanish shipping lanes. The eunbassador
did promise, however, to send a skilled spy. Dr. Gabriel
34
de Enveja, to make a special investigation.
105
As concern grew in Madrid eU^out the possibility of
added French conanitroents in Florida, Philip II sent his
secreteoiy Gonzalo Perez to the President of the Council of
the Indies to carry an xirgent request, Philip II agreed
with the suggestions of the Duke of Alba cuid asked the Coun-
cil to study the proof of his title to Florida and report
quickly to him aJaout it. The Council made a diligent search
in royal archives and delivered its opinion to the King on
May 5, 1565.^^
In its findings about the rights of the Crown of Cas-
tile in Florida, the Council relied heavily upon the donation
of Pope Alexander VI, and enclosed a copy of the original
Bull. As vicar of Christ, the Pope had chosen Ferdinand
and Isabella to carry the faith to all infidels within a
certain sphere of control. Since Florida was located within
the limits established by the papal decree, no man could
exploit or even visit the land without particular license
from the rulers of Castile and Leon.
Next, the Covincil offered evidence that the rights
granted to the Reyes Catolicos had been validated in and
for Florida by the recorded actions of a long series of
explorers and conquerors. The time allowed to prepare the
memoremdum for the king had been altogether too short to
permit the Council to locate proof of all these explorations,
but reference was made to two specific instances. First
W21S the voyage of Guido de Labazaris in 1558; the second.
106
the 1561 expedition of Angel de Villafeine. The Xing*s
advisers attached sworn statements of the formal acts of
possession-taking, that essential step in the esteiblishment
of dynastic claim to the land. In its haste to render its
opinion to the king, the Council made some glsuring geo-
graphic errors. It stated that the new French fort was
built in the ssune place formally appropriated for the Crown
by both Lcibazaris and Villafeine. As a matter of fact.
Fort Caroline was nowhere near the Bahia Phillipina which
Labazaris had discovered on the Gulf coast nor the Ssmta
Elena area, where Villafane had landed. In amy event, the
Council of the Indies determined that Philip's claim to
Florida was perfectly clear and valid. The councillors
warned the King that the French fort presented a continual
threat to the safe passage of Spanish ships through the
Bahama Chcinnel. On the cover sheet of the document, a
note traced in Philip's hand indicates his approval of its
deliberations. The docxnnent illustrates the advemcing
priority of Florida as a strategic concern cuid demonstrates
a vital stage in Philip's step-by-step escalation of his
sxipport for the Florida enterprise. The proof -of -title
parecer was the first of a regular flurry of letters, dis-
patches and consultas in which the new policies were de-
veloped cuid implemented.
As a result of the Council's report, another, higher
level of royal support for Florida's conquest was approved.
107
Now direct aid was to come, in the form of troops and muni-
tions, to Menendez; five hundred men would be raised in
Spain, to be paid and supplied at royal esqpense. An increase
in the level of aid to be furnished in the Indies was also
agreed upon. Letters to this effect went out to the Casa de
Contrataci6n, to the fleet General readying for departure
in Cidiz, to Pedro Men&idez, and to officials in the Indies.
On the same day on which the Council of the Indies had
furnished the king with proof of his title to Florida, its
secretaury Erase wrote Pedro Men^ndez, enclosing a royal order
that the Ada 1 ant ado should raise two hundred more armed men ,
to be caurried with him on his voyage at Crown expense.
Eraso told Men&idez further that the king had written the
royal officials in Seville, formally ordering them to provide
the funds for the pay and provision of those men. In keeping
with its function as royal factor in the equipping of sea-
going expeditions, the Casa was to gather supplies, take
muster of the men, and provide a ship for their passage to
Florida. Men&adez, who had left for Andalucia, did not
receive these orders until May 12.
In the face of the threat from Fort Caroline, the
Crown communicated again with the Casa de Contratacitfn on
May 6 with regard to the defenses of Havana. The new
royal governor there, Garcia de Osorio Sandoval, had com-
plained to Philip that there were only four pieces of ar-
tillery in Havana, very few arquebuses, and scanty supplies
108
of gxinpowder. The king ordered that the necessary artillery
38
and niinitions be sent at once. A third letter to Seville
informed the Casa that the king had agreed to xinderwrite the
cost of the artillery amd munitions needed to batter dovm
the walls of the French fort in Florida. If, the Council
of the Indies noted, Men^ndez had not obtained enough ar-
tillery for this purpose, it should be furnished at royal
expense by the Casa.
The King sent a notice on the ninth of May to Pedro
de las Ruelas, general of the New Spain fleet being out-
fitted for its journey, and ordered him to sail to Cape Sein
Antonio at the western tip of Cuba, and detach his Capitana.
That vessel would then sail with two hundred armed men to
Havcma to await Menindez' orders. The Adelantado could use
the ship and its men in Florida, but was required to return
it in time for it to rejoin the fleet for the return voyage
40
to Spain.
Next, the Audiencia of Santo Domingo was asked to
increase the force being readied for Florida from two hundred
to three hundred men because, said the King, "We hold it to
be a very important thing to defeat those Frenchmen and expel
them from the province of Florida."
Although the Crown and Council had ordered measures to
enlarge the Florida effort, their deliberations were ham-
pered by a lack of clear intelligence about the size and
strength of the French reinforcement. Men^ndez had told
109
them of the rumor that the force was leurge, with sixteen
ships and up to two thous2md men. Two Spanish seamen,
testifying in Seville, reported that they had seen three
ships being prepared for Florida in LaHavre on April 16.
Don Francis de Alava had doubted that any such Florida ex-
pedition existed. The situation was further complicated
by the King's expressed hope that French knowledge of Menen-
dez* prepaurations might frighten the French into abandoning
their reinforcement attempt entirely. The King's counsellors
were in a qucindary. On the one hcuid, if rumors were true,
it might become necessary to increase the Spanish force
substantially, both with ships cind with men, for it was
essential to match Menendez' effort adequately against
the French. At the same time, the Council did not wish to
delay the Adelantado's depcirture even one day. The tension
generated between the need to furnish enough strength for
the sure ouster of the French and the desire to reach
Florida before the enemy reinforcements arrived formed the
atmosphere of urgency in which the Menendez expedition was
outfitted.*^
Nhen he arrived at Seville on May 12, Pedro Menendez
found awaiting him the royal order to raise two hundred
royal soldiers for Florida; he immediately sent out captains
to begin the task. Meanwhile, the officials of the Casa
de Contratacion began to accumulate supplies and equipment
for the royal troops. All was not going smoothly for the
110
Interests of the Adelantado in Seville, however. The long-
standing differences between Menendez and the merchants had
never ended, emd soon appeared that opposition to his ship-
privilege for San Pelayo had arisen among them. The entry
of such a large vessel into the closely controlled Tierra
Firme trade was cm \inwelcome intrusion in the eyes of the
Seville monopolists. After the Prior and Consuls who
represented the merchants* guild carried their discontent
to the officials of the Casa de Contratacion. the Adelantado
claimed that he experienced many obstructions and delays.
In spite of royal licenses, the Casa officials could find
many ways to hold up the measurement, loading emd inspection
of a ship, and Menendez claimed that such delays made it
impossible to load the goods from Seville aboard San Pelayo.
He further alleged that this badly damaged his credit at a
critical time, and made it difficult to raise the bond needed
to collect the 15,000 ducats promised in the asiento. To
compound his financial woes, Menendez had not been paid one
ducat of the 20,000 he claimed for the 1563 ship-charter.
The king's officials in Seville were in a dilemma, for
their old adversary and former prisoner had returned, armed
with a royal asiento and Crown-guaranteed privileges in the
Carrera de Indias. As if this were not enough, the nature
of the Florida expedition had changed rapidly since the
coming of the news of Laudonniere's fort. Now the Casa was
thrust into the position of Crown agent in helping Pedro
Ill
Menendez with royal funds, while anxious Royal dispatches
urged them to meet his needs and speed his departure ,' to
close his long-pending cstses and settle the matter of his
inability to make satisfactory bond. For his part, Pedro
Menendez was not likely to lose the opportunities inherent
in such a situation; he had not forgotten the long months
of confinement in the Torre del Pro, In a mood of thinly
veiled conflict, negotiations begem between Menendez amd the
Casa de Contratacion over the use of San Pelayo to carry
the King's troops and their supplies.
From the moment when the decision was tadcen to furnish
Crown soldiers to accompany Menendez' own men, the major
difficulty had been that of finding space for the men, their
arms and supplies. The Adelantado naturally preferred not
to interrupt his plans to send San Pelayo on a profitable
voyage, but the Council of the Indies finally determined
to lease the galeass to carry the men and goods. Their
alternative was to embargo emother ship for the purpose,
45
and that cost might be s\ibstantially more. San Pelayo
was already required to make the Florida journey, and it
would be xinder the direct command of the Adelantado. In
itself, this would make for tighter military control in the
event of action against the enemy. Another, perhaps unmen-
tioned, pressure impelling the leasing of San Pelayo was
the obvious preference of the Seville merchants that Menendez'
ship go to Florida instead of to Nombre de Dios.
112
There was room for ^u:gument in setting the compensation
which Menendez would receive for the use of his ship. Al-
though the per- ton lease charge was fixed at seven reales per
month, there were other expenses for which Menendez could
seek Crown payment, including the sums he had spent in out-
fitting San Pelayo, reimbursement for salaries and rations of
his crew after the date of taking for Crown service, and
recompense for his inability to profit from the Panama
journey. He had amticipated a profit of 12,000 ducats from
freight charges on the outbound journey along and could have
expected an immediate 2,400-ducat advance from the traders
who loaded goods for Nombre de Dios. He might also have
realized monies for passenger fares cuid for the sale of
goods carried for his own account. It was in Menendez'
interest that he would dramatize cuid meiximize his expendi-
tures and losses. In a letter to Philip II Menendez claimed,
for example, that the goods loaded by C^diz merchants had
been aboard San Pelayo since May first, but that Casa
interference had badly disturbed his commercial arreinge-
^ 46
ments.
Although discussions eibout placing the King's troops
in San Pelayo took place in Madrid and Seville prior to
May 22, it appears that this was the date of the formal order
to take the ship for royal service. After that date,
Pedro Menendez began to argue seriously for repayment of
funds he said he had expended in carpentry work, caulking.
113
and strengthening his ship to carry heavier artillery. He
also maintained that he should be paid the salary and
rations of his eighty seamen, twenty ship's boys, and ten
pages retroactive to April first, 9,000 ducats altogether.
Since the Casa treasurer, factor, and accountant only
offered 4,000 ducats, the parties were still far apart in
their negotiations.
The Adelantado was, moreover, discouraged over the slow
progress of the settlement of the sums due him from the 1563
ship-lease, and on May 22 he wrote the king that virtually
nothing had been accomplished. Menendez acknowledged that
the officials of the Casa de Contrataci6n were heavily
occupied with the dispatch of the New Spain fleet, and one
of them had been very ill. He also admitted that he had
lost or misland certain receipts amd other supporting
papers vital to his case. But, since he was so finan-
cially pressed, Menendez demanded at least seven or eight
thousand ducats on account so that he could get on with the
48
business of readying the Florida expedition.
The Seville officials had also received a list from
Menendez, in which he estimated the additional artillery
and munitions needed for his assault on the French fort in
Florida. The material which Menendez requested, which
included 100 hundredweight of gunpowder, would cost 2,500
ducats. In addition, the Casa had to find the funds to pay
and supply the king's soldiers, which it estimated at another
114
seven or eight thousamd ducats. Neither the New Spain nor
Tierra Finne fleets had yet come into port, and the Royal
coffers in Seville were still empty of Indies revenues, but
it was possible to borrow from vaurious trust funds. Some
averfa money had also begxin to come in as outbound ships
loaded for their journeys. Silver from the Guadalcamal
mines had also arrived in Seville. In spite of financial
scarcities, imperative commands from Madrid directed the
settlement of all matters with Men^ndez, and authorized the
release of four thousand pounds of gunpowder to the Ade-
49
1 ant ado. The Crown also requested that the three French
prisoners sent by Governor Mazariegas be tximed over to
Pedro Menendez, so that he might use their knowledge on his
expedition.
After a brief journey to Cadiz, Menendez reappeared in
Seville on May 26 amd offered two bondsmen for the Casa's
consideration, so that he could receive the 15,000 ducats.
Since it did not appear that the bondsmen could actually
stcmd good for such a sum, they were not accepted, Menendez
then pleaded that the cash was vital to his preparation, and
offered to accept a lesser sum, 6,000 ducats. The money was
paid to him the next day, and was tcJcen from the Guadalceinal
silver. 5°
The circular nature of the money disputes in Seville is
illustrated by Menendez' dilemma over the ordering of supplies
and mtinitions forhis own account for the Florida enterprise.
Lacking cash, he could order the goods, but delivery would
115
not be forthcoming until payment was made. Thus, Men^ndez
complained » he could not con5)lete his lading until the monies
due to him from the Crown were paid, which made it impossible
to meet the. sailing deadline of May 31. Yet the royal merced
was payable on a contingency basis — provided the expedition
sailed by the end of May. Clearly, the deadlock would have
to be resolved if Menendez were to depart soon.
On the twenty-eighth of May, both parties to the nego-
tiations over Menendez* accounts outlined their respective
positions in letter to Philip II. The Royal Officials of
the Casa advised the king that they were still working on
the Adelantado's claims. They noted that this task was
rendered much more difficult by the fact that Menendez could
not produce the documents of proof of his expenditures; thus
it was necessary to take lengthy testimony and produce sworn
statements in lieu of receipts and invoices. The Casa finally
pedd Pedro Menendez 3,000 ducats on account, while the work
continued. For his part, Menendez flatly told the king that
he just could not undertake the Florida journey until he
was completely paid.
During the negotiations in Seville, essential informa-
tion about the nature of the French reinforcement forces
finally reached Philip's court. Ambassador Alava, who had
come to Bayonne to make final preparations for the meetings
between the two royal families, was contacted there by his
spy. Dr. Enveja. The information the man gave was so
116
startling and gave such a con^lete pictiire of the French
preparations in Normandy that Alava sent Enveja to Spain
on May 27 to report to the King.
Philip II heaurd the spy's story on June 2 and had it
written down the next day. There was every reason for the
King to praise the thorough eind perceptive report which
Dr. Enveja had made, for it provided excellent intelligence
about the enemy's plans cuid dispositions. The account,
moreover, holds much of interest for the historian — it
affords a contemporary description of Ribault's second
expedition.
When he had eurrived in Dieppe on May 17, Dr. Enveja had
foiind seven ships in harbor, in am advanced stage of
preparation for the Florida journey. They were already
almost fully loaded and mauiy military contingents were
aboaurd. Only Jean Ribault's insistence upon clear under-
standing of his lines of authority, which had compelled him
to await instruction from Admiral Coligny, had delayed the
departure of the fleet.
Ribault's flagship. Trinity, was much smaller than Sam
Pelayo at 150 to 160 tons, but was also rigged amd equipped
as a galeass. Two of the other vessels were of a similar
size, while the fourth was only slightly smaller. These
three ships were probably Emerillon, Epaule de Mouton, amd
Truite. The three remaining vessels were rather small — of
from sixty to seventy tons' burden; these must have been
117
Perle, Levri^re, and another named Emerillon. Since the
ships were outfitted in LeHavre and Dieppe, their officers
and crews were almost all Norman seamen. The five hundred
soldiers who had joined the expedition came from more
Vcuried backgroxinds ; two hundred were of noble origin, and
seven were German noblemen. From a militcury stemdpoint,
the soldiers impressed Alava's investigator as well set-up
troops. Touches of color were added to their dress by their
shining helmets, fine wool tunics and long, multi-hued
breeches "in the Levantine style." Almost all of the land
forces, under the command of Captain Fran9ois de la Grange,
were equipped with arquebuses. The ships were alleged to
carry two hundred dismounted cannon to use in land fortifi-
cations, with ample powder eind shot.
The purpose of the French expedition appeared to be the
nirror-image of that being prepared by the Spanish. The
spy stated that the Huguenots planned an enterprise of
thorough-going conquest, population and improvement of the
land. As evidence of this, Enveja reported that one of the
seven ships had been converted into a veritable Noah's Ark —
it carried horses and mares, rams amd sheep, bulls and cows
and even asses for the Florida colony. A number of wives
and children had been embarked for the voyage. What most
alarmed the Spanish was the Huguenots ' avowed aim of
evangelizing with the "Lutheran" religion; seven or eight
ministers of the new, heretical faith were carried for that
very purpose.
118
With regeurd to the quality of French leadership » Dr.
Enveja did not rely upon second-hand information. He sought
and obtained an interview with Jean Ribault himself, and
ceurried away vivid impressions of the Huguenot chief.
Ribault projected the image of a man of competence and
vigor, combined with deterxaination and high temper. In
these qualities, as well as in his ruddy complexion and
reddish h2Lir, Ribault strangely resembled his future an-
tagonist, Pedro Men^ndez de Avil^s. The two men were,
moreover, of equivalent age and had both sprung from maritime
cultures of great vitality. The accidents of history had
brought these into conflict in which both men also professed
contending religions.
Like Menendez, Ribault had been given some degree of
54
control over the terrain of Florida. It is interesting
to speculate upon the extent of French royal involvement
in Ribault* s effort; indeed, it is a vital historical
question. Enveja's report contributes to our knowledge of
this matter through his statement about the position of
Admiral Coligny as arbiter of Ribault 's authority as well
as his assertion that Charles IX had pledged 100,000 francs
to the expedition. This evidence seemed to convince Philip
II that the French Crown was deeply involved and committed
to the Florida adventure, for he was moved to "amazement"
at the revelations. In a letter to his ambassador in
France, Philip II e^ressed open shock at such an action
119
by the French rulers at a time when both Crowns were for-
mally at peace. To Philip, this constituted open aggression
against a Spanish province. The Spemish King made a care-
ful distinction between past Spanish actions against un-
authorized corsairs emd what should be done in a case like
this, cind urgently required his iimbassador to determine
immediately if Ribault's fleet had already sailed. If it
had not, he commanded his envoy to lay the matter directly
before Cheirles IX and the Queen Mother in Paris, making
formal protest and asking officially that the expedition be
halted at once. The King made his next order abundantly
clear: if Alava fovmd that Jecin Ribault was already gone
beyond recall, he should say "not one word" to the French
rulers about it, but leave the matter to be discussed at
Bayonne when the two courts met there. On the same day,
Philip II wrote to Catherine and Charles, noted that he was
sending the Duke of Alba as his representative at Bayonne,
and declared that he was already rejoicing at the pleasure
they would all have, when Iseibel was in their midst.
The revelations of Dr. Enveja provided the final
spur to the anxieties of the Spanish King and his Council,
and they redoxibled the pressure upon those in Andalusia and
the Indies who were prepciring the forces for Florida. An
order to the Santo Domingo Audiencia advised that Pedro
Henendez was about to leave; if the troops, ship amd supplies
were not yet ready, they should be provided for immediately.
120
A notice was sent to Menendez, telling him of the strength
of the Huguenot forces, cmd pointing out to him that the
Frenchmen vere about to setil. If Ribault reached Florida
before he did with the fine troops seen in Dieppe, and
mounted heavy ceumon upon the raunpaurts of Fort Caroline,
Menende2^ mission might be in^ossible. The Adelcintado must
speed up his depeirture; he had already passed the date
fixed in fee asiento. Now, he was told, he might raise as
many troops as he could load aboard his ships in addition
to those already gathered; the Crown would pay for them.
To the Casa de Contratacion went another letter, urging
immediate payment of the balance of the 15,000 ducats to
Menendez, bond or no, deadline notwithstanding. As the
outfitting of the Florida expedition in C^diz cmd Seville
entered its last, most frenetic stages, the feverish pace
imposed by the court seemed to add another dimension to
the fierce and glaring heat of the Andalusian summer.
NOTES
1. The material which follows is taken from the
"Information of Governor Bias de Merlo," taken at La Vega,
Jamaica, on March 6, 1565, and found in A.G.I. Justicia
212. The "Information" is a fifty-one folio narrative of
events in all the French expeditions to Florida, taken from
the prisoners captured in Jamaica by Merlo on January 25,
1565, together with testimonies by Spanish eye-witnesses
to the corsairing activities of the French. Merlo had the
document copied at Bayamo, Cuba, and sworn to before the
alcalde ordinario there on May 13, 1566. That copy eventu-
ally found its way into the papers relating to the French
prisoners in A.G.I. Justicia 212.
2. On October 2, 1565, the Council of the Indies ad-
vised the King of the French raids on Semto Domingo; in
July, word had come to the Council from that Audiencia about
Nunez' death. The correspondence is found in A.G.I. In-
diferente General 1,218. Another account of the capture of
the ship off Cape Tiburon is the "Deposition of Francisco
Ruiz Manso," which has been translated and printed in Charles
Bennett, Laudonniere and Fort Caroline (Gainesville: Uni-
versity of Florida Press, 1964), pp. 103-106.
3. Jamaica was well-known in the Indies for its pro-
duction of beef and cassava. A comprehensive description
of Jamaica as a sixteenth-century center for the export of
cassava is found in Francisco Morales Padron, Jamaica
espemola (Seville: Escuela de Estudios Hispano-Americanos,
1952), pp. 282-284.
4. The prisoner interrogation is found in A.G.I.
Patronato 267, No. 1, ramo 37. The names of the men (as
given by the Spanish) were Alberto Melenes, Francisco Juan,
Miguel Cobin, Juanes de Sigaray, and Martin Joaber. One
of them, JocLber, testified that he had been a part of the
1562 Ribault expedition, had returned to France and had
left Le Havre with Laudonniere in April of 1564. Another
deposition, made on February 28, 1565, was given by one
Stefcm de Rojomonte, who had been with the corsairs on the
Hispcuiiola coast. Although the folder is marked "Cuba" emd
presumably had been taken there, Rojomonte was evidently
captured at Cagay and had no knowledge of the eleven French-
men tadcen at Arcos. His testimony is found in A.G.I.
Patronato 19, No. 1, ramo 14, and in A.G.I. Indiferente
General 2,081.
121
122
5. Rene de Laudonni^re advises that the ringleaders
of the corsairing expedition — Desfourneaux, LaCroix and De
Genes — got away safely from Jeunaica in the vessel which
escaped; from Laudonnifere's "L'Histoire Noteible," in
Lussagnet, Les Fran9ais en Florida, op. cit., p. 126. On
the other hand. Governor Merlo states that he had captured
the French captain in charge.
6. The officials of the Casa advised the King of the
vessel's arrival in Casa to Crown, A.G.I. Contratacion 5,167,
Book III.
7. The final sentences are found in A.G.I. Justicia
865 and Justicia 872, No. 1, respectively. The settlement
of the main case with the Casa described in A.§.I, Justicia
865 is at variance with its description by Solis de Meras
in Pedro Menendez de Avil^s, pp. 67-68.
8. The memorial, from A.G.I. Patronato 19, has been
reprinted in Ruidiaz, La Florida, II, 320-326. It bears no
date, but internal evidence indicates that it can hardly
have been written before February 1, 1565, and must have been
presented before negotiations began on the asiento signed by
Menendez on the following March 15.
9. See supra, 57. Menendez had spoken in May, 1564,
at Seville, to sailors returning from the Canary Islands.
His story added little to the version sent from Santo
Domingo .
10. There is an excellent appreciation of the geographi-
cal concepts of Pedro Menendez, as well as some discussion
of earlier hopes of the western passage in L. A. Vigneras,
"A Spanish Discovery of North Carolina in 1566," North
Carolina Historical Review, XLVI, No. 4 (October, 1969),
398-402.
11. See supra, 48. 49. Rojomonte's deposition, which ad-
vised that Juan Menendez* ships had been lost near Cape
Canaveral, could not yet have reached Spain to raise Menen-
dez' hopes.
12. See Appendix I, "Agreement between Dr. Vazquez of
the Council in the name of the King, with Pedro Menlndez
de Aviles. "
13. Hernando Cortes described the richness of his
dominions, his 23,000 vassals, and his struggle to maintain
political power as over against the municipalities in his
land-grant in a letter to Francisco Nunez, his attorney in
Spain, dated June 25, 1532. The letter is reproduced in a
work by Jorge Fernando Iturribarria entitled Oaxaca en la
123
historla (Mexico City: Editorial Stylo, 1955), pp. 64-65.
An excellent discourse on the commercial side of Cortes'
affairs was written by France V. Scholes in "The Spanish
Conqueror as a Business Man; A Chapter in the History of
Fernando Cortes," New Mexico Quarterly, XXVIII, No. 1
(Spring, 1958), 6-29.
14. See supra, 42-43;" footnote 13, Chapter II.
15. See Prior and Consuls to the Crown, Seville,
April 13, 1565, A.G.I. Indiferente General 1,093.
16. Casa to Crown, Seville, December 8, 1564, A.G.I.
Contratacion 5,167, Book III, and Ordinances of the Fleets,
March 6, 1565, A.G.I. Indiferente General 1,966.
17. Casa to Crown, Seville, April 8, 1565, A.G.I.
Indiferente General 1,093.
18. The 1565 Florida asiento can be found in many places
in the Archive of the Indies . A signed copy of the March
15 agreement is in Patronato 257, No. 3, ramo 3; it has
been reproduced for the Stetson Collection. A^signed^copy
of the March 20 contract was found in Escribania de Camara
1,024-A. Entire copies are located in Patronato 19, No. 1,
ramo 15; Contratacion 3,309, 1**; Justicia 918, No. 3;
Indiferente General 415 and in Indiferente General 2,673.
A copy is in the Archivo del Co'nde Revillagigedo (Madrid) ,
legajo 2*, No. 5; positive microfilm of this, obtained
through the kindness of Father Michael Gannon, is in the
P. K. Yonge Memorial Library of Florida History, University
of Florida. The asiento of March 20 has been printed in
Ruidiaz, La Florida, II, 415-427, and in D.I. , 2nd series,
XXIII, 242-258. As they were needed to support the claims
of Pedro Menendez or his followers for certain privileges
emd exemptions, sections of the asiento were put piece-
meal into various records in Spain and in the Indies. The
agreement is summarized in A.G.I. Contaduria 941, fol. 4;
this is available on negative microfilm at the P. K. Yonge
Library of Florida History. The contract was dissected
minutely by the Contadores Mayores in the audit they under-
took for the 1567 legal case over the asiento, in A.G.I.
Escribania de Camara 1,024-A. The March 15, 1565 agreement
is translated amd reproduced herein as Appendix I.
19. With certain reservations cibout the application of
the terms "fief" and "feudal" to sixteenth-century Castile,
the writer has accepted the model of the "decentralized
patrimonial state" as applicable to the European and
Indies kingdoms of the Hapsburg ruler Philip II. This
conceptualization is set forth by Max Weber in The Theory of
Social and Economic Organization, translated by A. M.
Henderson and Talcott Parsons (New York: Free Press, 1947),
and especially found on pp. 346-358.
124
20. See supra » 4-7, for a general discussion of the
privileges and oblxgations in the asientos of adelantados.
21. See supra y 58 , for the earlier voyage of San
Pelayo, Although the asiento recites merely that she was
■of more than 600 tonS/" San Pelayo was far greater in size
than 600 tons. Just before her Florida journey, she was
measured officially at 906 tons' burden; see the audit of
the Contadores Mayores, 1567, A.G.I. Escribania de Camara
1,024-A.
22. In the "Ordenanzas , " D.I. , VIII, provisions are
made as follows: encomienda. No. LVIII, 505; and No. CXLIX,
536; repartimiento. No. LXI, 506, and No. CXLV, 535; with
regard to tribute, see No. CXLVI, 535-536.
23. In a cedula of March 22, 1565, sent from Madrid,
the King promised Menendez a letter granting the privilege in
the land, and advising again that the title of Marquis would
be forthcoming if the expedition were successful. Perpetual
jurisdiction within the land-grant was not to be given,
however, nor were any mineral rights in the land; these were
reserved to the King. Compare the powers given to the
Columbus family in Jamaica. These are discussed at length
in Morales Padron, Jamaica espanola, 125 et seq. The March
22 cedula is also found in A.C.R. , legajo 2, No. 4, and may
be seen on microfilm at the P. K. Yonge Library of Florida
History. Expectations of a marquisate were formalized in
the "Ordenanzas" for all adelantados; in D.I. , VIII, No.
LXXXV, 512.
24. A comparative table of several asientos is found
herein as ^pendix II. The writer is indebted to Professor
Roscoe R. Hill for his creative introduction to the compara-
tive approach in the study of adelantados in his article
"The Office of Adelantado," op. cit. , passim.
25. See ■Lo que le parece a Loaysa se ha de dar a Don
Luis Colon, 1536," in A.G.I. Patronato 10, ramos 2 and 4.
26. These individual decrees, all dated March 22, 1565,
were given to Menendez. They were concerned with the reduc-
tion in the guinto, the 25-league-squared land grant, the two
fisheries, the 6 2/3% of royal profits, the title of Captain-
General of the Florida armada, the" title of Adelantado, the
ship-privileges, the slave licenses, and the 2,000 ducat
salary. These are all found in A.C.R. , legajo 2; on micro-
film at the P. K. Yonge Library of Florida History.
27. Cro%m to Abalia, Madrid, March 20, 1565, A.G.I.
Justicia 918; also in A.C.R., legajo 2, No. 3-B, Microfilm,
P. K. Yonge Libreury of Florida History,
125
28. The Casa's letter is Casa to Crown, Seville, March
26, 1565, A.G.I. .Contrataci6n 5,167, Book III. The prisoner
interrogation was also enclosed. Pedro Menendez himself said
"when Your Majesty contracted with me for the conquest and
population of the provinces of Florida, it was unknown that
the Lutheran Frenchmen were already in those places ; " this is
from "Menendez reports to the Crown, 1565 (sic)," from M. S.
Div, , Library of Congress, typescript tramslation, 1937, The
transcript is also in the P. K. Yonge Library of Florida
History. The fact that Carillo's vessel brought the news
for the first time is also found in Crown to Casa, August
27, 1565, from A.G.I. Contrataci6n 5,012 (Stetson Collec-
tion) .
29. Crown to Pedro Men€ndez de Avil^s (two letters) ,
Madrid, March 30, 1565, A.G.I. Escribania de Camara 1,024-A.
30. Catherine de Medici to Philip II, Burdeos, April 1,
1565, Archive Diplomatico Espanol (21 v., Madrid: Real
Academia de la Historia, 1950-) Thereinafter A.D.E.),
Tomo VII (1565), No. 1,019, 205. It originally appeared in
Archivo General de Simancas (hereinafter A.G.S.), Estado,
legajo K, 1503, No. 50.
31. Philip II to Charles IX and Catherine de Medici,
Madrid, April 2, 1565, A.D.E. , VII, No. 1,021, 209. From
A.G.S., Estado, legajo K, 15,03, No. 51.
32. Philip's messages of April 5 to the Audiencia of
Santo Domingo and to the governor at Haveina are found in
A.G.I. Escribania de C^ara 1,024-A. His cover letter is
Crown to Casa, Arcmjuez, April 5, 1565, A.G.I. Indiferente
General 1,966.
33. See Francisco Duarte to Crown, Seville, April 8,
1565, A.G.I. Indiferente General 1,093. The King may have
teOcen these funds. At some date prior to July, 1565, he
had incurred an obligation of 80,000 ducats to Anton Fugger.
That sum, with 120,000 ducats availc±)le in Seville, would
have totalled the 200,000 ducats Philip was seeking. See
Casa to Crown, Seville, September 4, 1565, A.G.I. Contra-
taci6n 5,167, Book II, for the Fugger debt.
34. The parecer of the Duke of Alba, April 11, 1565^
is from A.G.S., Estado, legajo K, 1503, No. 57, and has been
printed in A.D.E. , VII, No. 1,028, 235-236. The consulta of
the Council of the Indies, Madrid, May 12, 1565, from A.G.I.
Indiferente General 738, ramo 7, No. 74, maJces note of
Menendez' report. ^This consulta is also found in the Stetson
Collection. Alava's letter to Philip II was from St. Micon,
May 7, 1565, is from A.D.E., VII, No. 1,046, 313-314 (A.G.S.,
Estado, legajo K, 1503, No. 77), and refers to the report.
The emissary was identified in Alava's letter to Philip II,
126
Bayonne, May 27, 1565, from A.D.E., VII, No, 1,063, 355
(A.G.S., Estado, legajo K, 1,503, No. 93).
35. The May 5, 1565, docxunent is found, together with
supporting material, in A.G.I. Indiferente General 738,
ramo 7, No. 73-A (Stetson Collection) . It has been cited
at length in Woodbury Lowery, The Spanish Settlements (2 v..
Reprinted, New Yor)c: Russell and Russell, 1959), II, 107-
108, and may be found in D.I., IV, 136-140.
36. The act of tadcing formal posfsession of lands to be
claimed for the rulers of Castile provided the legal formality
which clearly established dynastic rights to the territories
thus taken. The manner in which this was to be done was
carefully circumscribed, emd was dictated in "Ordenanzas
sobre descubrimiento nuevo e poblacidn," D.I. , VIII, No.
XIII, 490.
37. Francisco Eraso to Pedro Men^ndez de Avil^s,
Madrid, May 5, 1565, A.G.I. Escribania de Camara 1,024-A.
Menendez acknowledged that he received word of the two hundred
troops he was to raise when he reached Seville on May 12.
See Pedro Menendez to Crown, Seville, May 18, 1565, from
Ruidiaz, La Florida, II, 60-66. The letter is in the
Stetson Collection, listed under the "old" legajo number of
148-4-9.
38. Crown to Casa, Valladolid, May 6, 1565, A.G.I.
Indiferente General 1,966. Although he had communicated
with the king earlier about Havana's defenses, Osorio did
not take office until September 18, 1565. See Garcia Osorio
to Crown, Haveina, December 18, 1565, A.G.I. Santo Domingo
115. The letter has been printed in Irene Wright, Historia
documentada de San Cristobal de la Havana (Havana: Imprenta
el Siglo XX, 1927), I, 202.
39. Council of the Indies to Casa, Madrid, May 7,
1565, A.G.I. Indiferente General 738, ramo 7, No. 74-A.
40. Crown to Pedro de Ruelas, Valladolid, May 9,
1565, I.G. Indiferente General 1,966. The ship, named the
Santa Catalina, had been embargoed in Cadiz. For its owner's
lengthy protest, and the story of the ship's adventures, see
"Ximeno de Bretendona sobre sueldo," A.G.I. Indiferente
General 2,673, bearing a date of August 8, 1569.
41. Crown to Audiencia .of Santo Domingo, Valladolid,
May 9, 1565, A.G.I. Escribania de Camara 1,024-A.
42. The dilemma was manifested in the consulta of
May 12, 1565, in A.G.I. Indiferente General 738, ramo 7,
127
Ho. 74. It is in the Stetson Collection. The seamen
testified in an infonnacion taken before the officials
of the Casa de Contratacion in Seville on May 5, 1565, emd
found in A.G.I. Indiferente General 738. It is also in the
Stetson Collection.
43. On May 20, authorization was given to expend
14,237 ducats for this purpose; A.G.I. Contrataci6n
4,98&-A, fol. 269.
44. Menindez voices his plaint in his letter to the
Crown, written at Seville on May 18, 1565, and found in
the Stetson Collection at 148-4-9. It has also been
printed in Ruidiaz, La Florida, II, 60-66. At this time,
the Prior and Consuls of the Universidad de Mercaderes
at Seville were: Pero Lopez Martinez, Consul; Diego Diaz
Bezerril, Consul; Luis Sanchez Balvo, Prior; Luis Marquez,
Consul; and four Councillers — Francisco Descobar, Gonzalo
Jorge, Gonzalo Mustrenco cind Rodrigo de Illesecas; see
listing as of March 22, 1565, Seville, in A.G.I. Contrata-
ci6n 4,981.
45. The cost of charter, for example, for the two
guarti ships carried to New Spain in 1562 had been more them
28,000 ducats, after all payments due had been settled.
See Casa to Crown, December 8, 1564, A.G.I. Contratacion
5,16Tr~Boo]c III.
46. According to Agustfn Francisco, a German resident
in Seville who was financially affiliated with Menendez,
the freight charge for merchandise from Cadiz to Nombre de
Dios in 1565 was 30 ducats per ton. Menendez had noted that
he had contracted for one hundred tons of goods with
merchants and shippers of Cadiz, and three hundred with
Seville traders. Francisco's comments cibout the lading
of San Pelayo are found in A.P.C. , Escribania de Alonso
de log Cobos, n.d. , 1565. A copy is in A.G.I. Indiferente
General 2,673.
47. On May 22, 1565, letters from the officials of
the Casa de Contratacion and from Madrid crossed. In these
dispatches, the Casa proposed and the Crown ordered that
Menendez' galeass be teJcen for lease to catrry the soldiers.
Coxincil of the Indies to Casa, Madrid, May 22, 1565, A.G.I.
Indiferente General 1,966 and Casa to Crown, Seville, May
22, 1565, A.G.I. Contrataci6n 5,167, Book III.
48. Pedro Menendez de Avil^s to Crown, Seville, May
22, 1565, at 148-4-9, Stetson Collection.
49. Council of the Indies to Casa, Madrid, May 22,
1565, A.G.I. Indiferente General 1,966.
128
50. The writer is indebted to Dr. Paul E. Hoffmem, who
furnished the citation of this payment to the Adelantado;
it is from A.G.I. Contratacion 4,680 (Libro de Guadalcanal) ,
fol. 127 vo.
51. Casa to Crown, Seville, May 28, 1565, A.G.I.
Contratacl6n 5,167, Book III, Pedro Men^ndez to Crown,
Seville, May 28, 1565, in Ruidiaz, La Florida, II, 66-67.
52. Alava to Philip 11, May 27, 1565, A.D.E., VII,
No. 1,063, 355 (originally A.G.S. Estado, legajo K, 1,503,
No. 93).
53. This key report has been printed in full by An-
tonio Tibesar, ed. , in "A Spy's Report on the Expedition of
Jean Ribault to Florida, 1565," The Americas, XI, No. 4
(April, 1955), 590-592. It comes originally from archives
of the Real Academia de la Historia (Madrid, No, J-l"-4'-3 . 90^
The new number is 9-30-3; 6271. 848
54. Dr. Enveja states that Ribault had been given a
two-year term of control; the title of "colonel of the voyage
and lieutenant of the king in New France" was allegedly given
to Ribault. This latter phrase is cited by Charles de la
Ronciere in his Histoire de la Marine Francaise (6 v. ,
Paris: LibrairLe Plon, 1910), IV, 54-55, and came from Ms.
No. 17294, Bibliotheque Nationale, fol. 231.
55. In his letter of June 2, 1565, Philip acknowledged
receipt of all of Alava 's letters bearing May dates, ex-
pressed his gratification for Enveja 's services, and
issued his orders about the Ribault fleet; in A.D.E., VIII,
No. 1,072, 372 (from A.G.S. Estado, legajo K, 1,504, No. 2).
56. Crown to the Audiencia of Santo Domingo, Madrid,
June 3, 1565, A.G.I. Escribania de Camara 1,024-A; Crown
to Pedro Menendez de Aviles, Madrid, June 3, 1565, A.G.I.
Escribania de Camara 1,024-A. The letter to Menendez
mentioned the king's note to the Casa de Contrataci6n and
advised of its contents.
CHAPTER IV
UNDERGIRDING THE EXPEDITIONS
Both parties to the Florida contract faced a host of
urgent tasks in preparing the expeditions for early de-
parture. The officials of the Casa de Contrataci6ny as
Crown agents / had to assemble the Royal troops, purchase
supplies and munitions, euid arramge ship-charters; they had
somehow to finance this from their treasury at Seville. To
meet his contract obligations, Menendez had to furnish and
supply the ships, troops cind seamen required of him. The
new Royal support of the Florida expedition had in no way
relieved the Adelantado of these necessities, but had
merely added additional striking power to his own forces.
Pedro Menendez* main fleet was to sail from Cadiz, but he
also prepcLTed to dispatch forces from the north of Spain.
The Matrix of Conquest
In organizing and administering the enterprise of
Florida, Pedro Menendez placed his trust in a small number
of associates. At the heart of Menendez' command structure
were men who stood in close personal relationship with the
129
130
Adelantado, for they shared with him common bonds of blood
or nuurriage. All were Asturiem hidalgos » amd all were
seamen with long experience in European and Mediterremean
waters and in the Carrera de Indias.
In the first rank of Pedro Men^ndez' lieutenamts in
1565 were his brother Bartolomd, Esteban de las Alas, Pedro
Menendez Margu^z, and Diego Flores de Vald^s. Bartolom^
Menendez had served long and loyally with his brother, had
commanded the Tierra Firme ships in 1562-63, emd shared the
lengthy imprisonment in Seville in 1563-1564. Although he had
been released from prison and planned to go to Florida with
the Cadiz contingent, the illness he had contracted on the
2
1562-1563 voyage still dogged him.
Since 1553, another kinsmcm of Pedro Menendez, Estebcin
de las Alas, had been a close associate of the Adelantado.
Bom in the village of Aviles, he was married to Dona Maria
de Valdes. He was General of the 1561 New Spain fleet. In
1562, de las Alas had been imprisoned by the Casa de Con-
trataci6n, upon return from the Indies, thus sharing
a similar experience with his chief. During the Menendez
brothers' confinement, de las Alas commcuided the Menendez
ships in 1564, and was responsible for taking the Royal
visitor Castro to Peru. It was he who had directed the
salvage operation when the galleon Santa Clara had stranded
on the eastern side of the Bahcima Channel on the return
voyage. The Adelantado placed Esteban de las Alas in charge
of the two northern elements of his Florida expedition.
131
which were to leave Asturias and rendezvous with Men^ndez in
the Canary Islands. He would sail from Men^dez' native city
of Aviles. With that trusted and reli2JDle lieutenant in
charge of the Asturlan ships, Menlndez could safely concen-
trate his own efforts in the south, where the main con-
tingent was being eunned.
Pedro Menendez' nephew, Pedro Men^ndez Marquez, was
the son of Alvaro Sinchez de Aviles. By his uncle's own
testimony in 1568, he "had served me twenty years in the
armadas of my charge as captain of armada ships , and is one
of the most expert mariners which your Majesty has in
kingdoms." This meant that Marquez had been affiliated
with Pedro Menendez since the date of his first entry into
the Carrera de Indias in 1548. He was maestre of Menendez'
own ships in 1551 cind 1564. Now Marquez had been designated
by the Adelantado as second-in-command, or Almirante, of
the Asturian vessels.
In the southern fleet which was to sail from C5diz,
Diego Flores Valdes had a similar position to that of
Menendez Marquez in the north, Flores, a native of Laredo,
was named Almirante of the Cadiz division of ships as the
Adelantado' s maritime lieutencuit. Menendez noted that
Flores had been with him since 1550, and had greatly in-
debted himself in so serving, having encumbered all of the
patrimony inherited from his parents. Pedro Menendez
extolled Flores' careful and loyal service and evidently
thought highly of him as a subordinate.
132
All of these top-level lieutenants of Menlndez could
count many years of command experience emd were thus quali-
fied to serve in the Florida expedition by virtue of their
accomplishments as well as by their relationship with the
Adelantado. Their careers, however, like that of their
chief, had been oriented entirely around the sea — in pri-
vateering, freighting for the Indies trade, or carrying
out naval functions for the Crown. Although they were
accustomed to the handling of troops as men-of-war aboard
ships, none of these men had become experienced in land-
based operations with bodies of soldiers,
A mcui who might have been able to supply that lack of
experience was Pedro de Valdes of Tineo, inAsturias. He
was the twenty-five-year-old son of the founder of the
Valdes mayorazgo and had served the Crown for more theui five
yeeirs with land forces in Italy, had also been a gentleman
officer in the galleys, and received the habit of caballero
in the order of Santiago. Since Valdes had been recently
betrothed to Pedro Menendez' daughter. Ana, however, the
Adelantado had directed that he not risk his person on the
g
expedition to Florida.
Another yo\ing noblemam, Hemcindo de Miranda, from
Aviles, was enrolled, together with his brother Gutierre,
as an ordinary soldier in the Florida expedition, but he
was marked out for adveuicement within the orgeuiization of
9
the Adelantado.
133
A number of loyal Asturians occupied a second echelon
among Menendez* subordinates, including the J\inco brothers,
Juan and Rodrigo, Alonso Nen^dez Marques, Thomas Alonso
de las Alas, Diego de Hevia, and Diego de Amaya, a fine pilot
and skilled ship-handler. The brother-in-law of the Ade-
lantado, Gonzalo Solis de MerSs, also planned to join in
the enterprise of Florida. Some of these men remained in
the north of Spain to sail with the contingents preparing
for sea in Gij6n and Aviles; others joined Menendez in C5diz.
In addition to these, a sizeable group of old associates of
the Adelantado in his ship crews were enrolled for Florida
as soldiers, seamen or skilled workers.
What was most remarkable about Menendez • men was the
close-knit nature of their inter-relationships. Almost
without exception, the men who shared the confidence of
Pedro Menendez and were scheduled to hold the posts of
responsibility in Florida, belonged to a number of Asturian
families which were tied together by complex kinship links.
Scores of rank- 2md- file soldiers cind sailors from the same
families also participated in the Florida enterprise. It
was a family affair, or rather the affair of a small number
of closely connected families from the north of Spain. In
addition to the Menendez and Valdes clans, these included
the Miranda, de las Alas, Quiros, Sanchez, Arango, Solis,
de Soto, Recalde, Floras, Ribera, Arguelles, Junco, Marqu^z,
Hevia, and La Bandera families. These families had inter-
married at mcuiy points over several generations.
134
This faiaily complex was rooted in the fishing villates
and valley and mountain hamlets of the rugged coast of
Asturias and Santander. Men came to take part in the
Florida expeditions from villages vhich for more than fifty
years had sent out conquistadores , encoroenderos and priests
to the Indies. They Cciroe from Avil^s, Tineo, Villaviciosa,
Gijon, Colunga, Siero, Grado, and Pari lea. They came from
Rivadesella, and from the "four villas of the coast," San-
tander, Santona, Castro Urdiales, and Laredo, Some also
came from as far west as La Coruna in Galicia and from Sam
Sebastiein and other towns in Guipuzcoa, near the French
border. The force which linked these localities and pro-
duced men, money, ships amd supplies for the enterprise of
Florida was that of family. An inter- connected web of kin-
dred provided the backing for Pedro Men^ndez de Avil^s, but
he had not created it. The network pre-dated 1565, and was
to continue its influence in the maritime and political
life of Spain and the Indies long after the death of the
Adelantado.
Bound together by common ties, the Adelantado *s command
and control structure shared in his hopes of patrimony in
Florida. As patron of his supporters, Men^ndez was the
fountainhead of royal privilege, the source of present
employment, and the focus of the future expectations of
his subordinates. Under his asiento powers, Pedro Menendez
could divide substauitial allotments of land among these men.
The major civil and military offices would be theirs.
135
Successes in Florida would evoke royal approbation emd the
award of honors to the Adelantado. A portion of this glory
would, in txirn, be reflected upon the lieutenamts £md upon
their houses. By establishing themselves in Men^ndez'
service, members of the group might also hope to rise in
the service of Philip II.
Neither the command elite, nor its supporting group,
was a static orgcinization, with a fixed membership. Indi-
viduals might enter or leave the group, but its character
did not chamge markedly. Men^ndez' criteria for selection
of men for the highest level of his establishment remained
the same: that they be Asturicin or at least norteno in
origin, that they' be noblemen and related in some meaningful
way to himself. An administrative organism arose out of
the group, as various persons were appointed to formal office
within the military units amd the governmental structure of
Florida. Their relationship with their commander was ,
however, deeper than the formal and legal. In a sense, they
were stockholders in the Florida enterprise. They acted
at least in part out of feelings of deep loyalty to their
chief, mixed with hopes of substantial gain. In turn,
the Adelantado could delegate his powers legally to these
men, but his delegation could be made with more certainty
because he knew that his trust reposed in those who held
14
his purpose in common loyalty,
136
A genealogy chart of the enterprise of Florida, such
aa the one furnished in this study, does not demonstrate
the full complexity of the familial matrix from which
Menendez* conquest effort spr2mg, Mamy subtle ties, perhaps
even vital connections, eu:e not completely understood.
Some individuals who aire termed "deudos" of Pedro Men^ndez
cannot presently be related directly by his biographers
Vigil cind Ruidiaz to the Adelantado. Neither can a chart
illustrate the full meaning of such an interlocking or-
geuiism, for it c2uinot depict the human forces present in
such a complex. This homogenous group, bound together by
common cultural and familial ties, could provide great
reserves of purpose for the conquest. The fierce loyalties
engendered within it and the common expectations sheu:«d by
its members afforded a source of vital energy for the tasks
of conquest cuid population. The organism was self-
reinforcing in nature, eind could maintain a united front
against outsiders. It gave depth to the efforts of an
Adelantado. This was, therefore, a regional reservoir of
talent. The strength of arms, the provision of ships and
financial backing and many skills and abilities could be
drawn from this pool for Men^ndez' use. Representatives of
these Asturian families could also be found in Andalusia,
in a number of key ports and centers in the Indies. A
certain stiffening of purpose was also added to the
Florida effort by the back-up of a sizeable company of
137
friends, relatives and allies— their hopes could cause them
to persevere in their venture in the face of whatever ad-
versity. This was the matrix of the adelantamiento of
Florida.
Ways cind Means
In seeking to fund the effort of arming and manning
the Florida expeditions, the newly named Adelantado found
himself hard-pressed. He had emerged from his long imprison-
ment without substantial cash reserves, cind his maritime
assets had been reduced to one sizeable new vessel and
several smaller ones. Pedro Men^ndez had an urgent need
for ready money, for little of what he had to purchase could
be obtained on credit, and he needed cash to keep his ship
crews from deserting and to make the customary three months '
advance to his soldiers. His first approach was to press
for the monies owed him by the Crown; it would not only help
him meet his obligations, but would undergird his credit
through the aura of Royal patronage it imparted to the
Florida enterprise.
Under daily pressure from the Adelantado and after
receiving a number of communications from Philip II about
the matter, the Casa officials finally paid Pedro Menendez
the remaining 9,000 ducats of his me reed, in spite of the
fact that it was to have been contingent upon his leaving
by May 31. They also indemnified Menendez with 2,000 ducats
138
for the profits lost through the diversion of San Pelavo to
Florida. In order to give Pedro Men^ndez this money he so
badly needed, the officials at Seville had to borrow from
the merchants' deposits in the Casa. By June seventh, how-
ever, the Royal accountants had not yet been able to total
the sums due to Menendez from the 1563 ship charter case,
as they struggled with a mass of incomplete data.^^
On the twelfth of June, Pedro Menendez appeared before
the tribunal of the Casa de Contratacion and made a lengthy
plea. The Adelantado reviewed his total expenses in the
preparation of San Pelavo for its voyage to Tierra Firme.
and asked for reimbursement of 1,500 ducats which he spent
for carpentry and caulking. He also demanded repayment of
the salaries and rations for his entire 110-man crew,
retroactive to April first. Menendez also asked the Casa
to grant a five-month advance in pay and rations, to offset
the risk and uncertainty of the hazardous journey in his fine
new ship. The rate of pay Menendez asked was, moreover,
much higher than ordinary. Many Spanish seamen were paid '
as little as three ducats per month, and the Adelantado
admitted that his own men from Vizcaya would be paid five
pesos. Menendez asked, however, that the mariners aboard
San Pelayo, being a picked and loyal crew, should have seven
or eight ducats' pay. Otherwise, he stated, they might
desert or become so dissatisfied that the expedition might
be endangered .
139
Menendez' ambitious demands were disposed of coolly
and rapidly. After reviewing a report of Factor Duarte's
Inspection of San Pelayo» the three royal officials decided
to allot only 500 ducats for in^jrovements made to the
vessel, to be paid when proper receipts were presented in
evidence. They flatly declined to authorize any pay or
allowances for Menendez* crewmen before May 22, the date
San Pelayo was officially taken for Crown service.
Finally, Pedro Menendez received his last payment from the
Casa de Contrataci6n — 2,300 ducats, paid on June 23, 1565,
as advance on the San Pelayo charter. Although he con-
tinued to request further payments, time had simply run
out, and no amount of Royal compulsion could enforce a rapid
and full settlement between Pedro Menendez and the func-
tionaries of the Casa over the bitterly disputed matters of
1563. Since returning to Seville from Madrid with his
asiento in late March, Pedro Menendez had collected 22,300
ducats in cash from a variety of claims on the royal treas-
ury.^® Although far less than he had asked, this money was
very helpful indeed. In a very real sense. Royal funds were
helping underwrite the Adelantado who was to supply the
■private" effort to support the Crown's hand in Florida.
Pedro Menendez de Aviles had to meet the rest of his
money needs from other sources, and he bent his efforts to
the difficult task of fund-raising. Since Menendez' ships
were pledged to Florida for most of 1565, he could not
140
count on much income from freight or passenger revenue. He
was to collect one partida of 893 pesos which came consigned
to him from Spain in the 1565 Vera Cruz ships, but the New
Spain vessel which brought it did not dock in SanKicar
until June 24. The money could sceircely have reached him
19
before his departure. Another thing Men^ndez could do was
to collect or assign any outstanding obligations which
others had made in his favor. On Jxine 25, the Adelantado
discounted a debt due him from the estate of one Seintiago
Bozino for almost 400 ducats by turning it over to Domingo
de Ocaris of Seville for cash. In this way, however, only
a modest sum could be realized, compared with the funds he
urgently required. For the bulk of his monetary needs,
Pedro Menendez had recourse to a financial con^lex which
merits description.
In the last half of the sixteenth century, the main
source of liquid funds was commerce. The injection of
bullion from Peru and Mexico into the mercantile stream
undergirded the economy amd added to the liquidity of
traders emd bankers in Seville eind elsewhere in Europe.
Contained within the registries of each homeward-bound ship
were partidas of monies due to merchants , suppliers and ship-
owners in Spain, as the result of sales transactions. A
sophisticated system of exchange values easily comprehended
a variety of bullion forms — gold and silver came in bars
or were worked into plate or jewelry, while silver was
141
coined in several forms. Quantities of various agricultural
products — tobacco, sugar, hides, cochineal and indigo —
also came in the ships to be sold in Spain.
Although the registry documents themselves (certified
as correct by the ship-masters and accepted by the Casa de
Contratacion) served as valid commercial instruments in
the Indies trade, other meeins were developed to facilitate
credit. Execution of an ordinary poder, or power of
attorney, proved to be a most flexible way to extend a man's
finemcial reach. By the uncounted thousands, these poderes
fill the notaries' archives of Spain; they make up the very
fabric of trade. They represent a time when money and property
rights were entirely and intensely personal, when it was often
essential to name a properly empowered surrogate to represent
one before courts, tribunals cind justices. Such a surrogate
could thus receive a delegation of the grantor's inherent
prerogatives.
The poder could also be directly and immediately applied
to the commercial sphere, as a means of collecting obliga-
tions due another. The grantee was given the faculty to
stand in Ihe grantor's place, to receive the goods or funds
which were due, and give valid receipts in the name of the
originating party. Since the steindard poder recited that the
grantee could then proceed to substitute another party for
himself, a theoretically endless chain of right and obliga-
tion could be created from a single original grant of
authority.
142
The credit aspect of the poder becomes evident when one
considers that a poder was usually granted for consideration,
Thus, merchant A could grant trader B his poder to collect
a sum due him from a third party. The sum due might not be
immediately available, and might not actually mature for
some period of time. The first party could, however, dis-
count his obligation and obtain immediate advamtage by trad-
ing off a future collectible. As a practical matter, there-
fore, poder obligations could not be greatly removed in time
from the real money sources which had nurtured them. An
individual's credit could be extended substantially by such
a paper network, but was ultimately no better than the
genuine assets which backed them.
The development of late-medieval commercial organiza-
tions had been centered on what might be termed "associa-
tions of trust." The esurliest Italian companies were,
therefore, built around family groups or a small number of
inter-related families. Within this circle of close rela-
tionship, business transactions could be most safely carried
out. Since credit obtained under this system was limited
and personal, such an arrangement was best adapted to close-
knit groups whose other relationships reinforced their
paper obligations. Much the same tendency could be seen in
sixteenth-century Spain. Commercial ties were supported by
stronger underlying connections of blood, marriage or
regional identification. In the case of Pedro Men^ndez de
143
Avilesy the web of inter-related Asturiem families which
was involved in his comsumd org2mization also had its
fiscal aspect. Long-established ties existed between Men^n-
dez and norteno bondsmen, bsmkers amd merchants living in the
authorized trading centers of Seville and Cadiz. As a man
deeply involved in advamcing his fortunes, Pedro Menendez
de Aviles fitted well into the atmosphere of growth, pros-
perity and diversity in the Andalusian ports in 1565. In
Seville and in Cadiz, the socially mobile, acquisitive
society described by Ruth Pike featured much interaction
22
between upper merchemts emd the lower nobility. Some of
these men were of converse origin, who had, long since,
created commercial bases in the Indies. For Pedro Menendez
and his associates, there were such bases at Sam Jueui,
Puerto Rico, in the city of Mexico, at Sauato Domingo on the
Island of Hispaniola and in the city of Sam Cristobal de
la Havana. In San Juam, for instaince, lived Diego Montanes
and Pedro Menendez Valdes, who acted as representatives for
the Adelantado there. The familial inter-connections
between Samto Domingo, Cadiz, the Indies and the north of
Spain are illustrated by a later poder from one Diego Menen-
dez de la Aspriella, a vecino of Santo Domingo, to Faviam
de Soils, merchamt, a vecino of Aviles, but residing in
«-j- 24
Cadxz.
The central figure of Pedro del Castillo, regidor of
Cadiz and a sxibstantial merchamt there, and a kinsmam of
144
Menendez, has previously been linked to that of the Ade-
lantado. Pedro del Castillo was related to Men^ndez, but
the degree of relationship is not known. Castillo had
developed trade ties to New Spain, with representatives in
Vera Cruz emd the City of Mexico. Caspar de Serf ate, vrtio
resided in Mexico, had shipped cochineal to Castillo as
early as 1562. In Seville, Castillo's banker was Caspar
de Astudillo de Burgales. Astudillo had also served as
Men^ndez* bondsman in 1563 and was to act for him in the
future. All three men, Menendez, Castillo and Astudillo,
employed the same norteno attorney, Sebastian de Santander,
He acted as their counsel in cases involving them before
the Casa de Contratacion emd the Council of the Indies.
Miss Irene Wright has ably outlined the role of the
linked Rojas and De Soto families in the early development
of the Cubcm city of Seui Cristobal de la Havcma. The real
founder of the clan vrtiich was to rule the economic and po-
litical life of Havana for much of the sixteenty century
vas Diego de Soto, of norteno origins, who first came to
Cuba in 1529. In Pedro Menendez' time, the most influential
member was Juan de Rojas, whose kinfolk dominated the cabildo
of Havana and occupied most of the other local posts of
honor and privilege there. Rojas' wife. Dona Maria de Lovera,
had demonstrated her close ties to Pedro Menendez de Aviles.
She named him in her 1563 will as executor of a bequest,
vital to the peace of her soul, for the building of a chapel
145
28
in her memory in Spain. Juan de Hinestrosa, who had
testified in Seville for Men^ndez in his 1564 ^ail-break
case, was the son of Mcuiuel de Rojas de Bayeuno, emd served
29
after 1565 as one of the Royal Officials in Havana.
In his need for money, therefore, Pedro Men^ndez turned
to those of his associates who had access to funds gained
in the Indies trade. Most particularly, he turned to Pedro
del Castillo. On June 25, in Castillo's house in C^diz,
Menendez executed a lengthy poder. In some ways, the
instrument follows the usual pattern of documents of its
kind. It lawfully esteiblishes Castillo as Menendez' repre-
sentative in prosecuting civil or criminal actions in his
name, in receiving monies due the Adelantado, and ends in the
standard recitation that the goods and wealth of the grantor
are pledged to support the powers given.
The poder to Castillo was, however, far more than a
limited, ad hoc delegation. It was quite broad in nature
2uid was deeply involved with the asiento which Pedro Menendez
had received from Philip II. In it, the Adelantado conceded
full use and exploitation of the Florida contract to Pedro
del Castillo, giving him the free use in his name of all
clauses and sections. Castillo was given exclusive right to
hamdle the purchase and embarkation of the five hundred
Negro slaves whose licenses had been gremted to Menlndez
in the asiento. In fact, the entire business side of the
administration of the king's contract and Menendez' private
146
financial affairs was given over to Pedro del Castillo.
He was to have charge of the ship-licenses which had been
promised to Men^ndez. He was empowered to buy amd sell
vessels, hire emd dismiss masters emd crews, purchase
supplies, equipment eind cargoes, amd see that Men^ndez'
maritiiae ventxires were carried out with dispatch, in C^diz
and in the north of Spain. All other poderes granted by
Menendez were emnulled, except those which the Adelantado
stated were still valid in the north coast cities.
In order to enable Castillo to recover what he had
advamced for the Florida outfitting, Menendez gave him full
power to collect monies due from the 1563 sueldo case, the
carpentry work on San Pelayo, as well as whatever might be
realized from another claim Menendez had made against the
Casa for the loss of Santa Clara in 1564. He empowered
Castillo to dun Factor Duarte for the balance of San
Pelayo 's sueldo, as it should come due. General authority
was given for Castillo to collect any cash or valuables
which were owed to the Adelantado from his own trade enter-
prises. The poder especially referred to the uncollected
sums due Menendez from freight-charges of goods that the
merchants Alonso Rodrigues and Juan Dias Bezino had shipped
in Scm Pelayo the previous year.
The Castillo poder is a business-like document; it
sets forth crisply the authority which the Cadiz entrepreneur
should have in Menendez' affairs. Yet the instrtjment was
147
also a real expression of trust emd confidence. Castillo
could draw freely upon all the monies of the Adelantado
to satisfy debts which had been incxirred in his name emd
his figures were to be accepted by Men^ndez amd could set up
his own accounts for these matters. This merely emphasizes
the degree to which this relationship was not merely a
legal amd fiduciary one. The formal dealings of the two
Bien were buttressed and enhemced by their closer ties.
When Pedro del Castillo and Pedro Menendez signed the poder
on the eve of the departure of the Florida expedition from
Cadiz, Castillo had acted as general factor for the Florida
outfitting, expending more than 20,000 ducats for the Ade-
lantado. He had also involved his own friends eind relatives
in the effort. It was Castillo's task to recover this
money by collecting funds due Menendez in the Casa, and from
private parties; he could then repay himself from those
sources. Menendez' royal patronage (evidenced by the asiento
and its titles, privileges and licenses), the earning power
of the Adelantado 's own ships, and the back-up of friends
amd relatives would, hopefully, keep the money-machine
going. In carrying out his mission, Castillo proceeded to
delegate his authority under the poder from Menendez by
siibstituting in his own place a German residing in Seville,
one Agustln Framcisco, who was given an instrument to that
effect. Francisco was to solicit the 500 ducats which had
been promised by the officials of the Casa de Contratacion
32
but which remained unpaid.
148
Next, Pedro del Castillo esteJiJlished a branch office,
so to speak, of Pedro Men^ndez' business concerns in New
Spain. He executed a poder to Caspar Serf ate, the merchemt
living in the city of Mexico. Castillo passed along to
Serf ate the rights Men^ndez had ceded to Castillo in C5diz.
Serfate was given the capacity to collect monies which
one Isidro de Soils owed to Pedro Menendez, and was invested
with the power to receive emy sums due the Adelantado from
other dealings. He could also handle the details of cargo
purchases and the loading of ships from New Spain in Menen-
dez' name, euid could further subdivide this authority if he
wished. ^"^
By their own testimony, both Pedro Menendez eind Pedro
del Castillo had made heavy expenditures in the preparation
of the enterprise of Florida. They had also noted that many
of their own friends and relatives were also deeply en-
cumbered as a result of the outfitting of the Florida
expedition. As the main financial backer of the adelcintamiento
34
of Florida, Castillo was clearly a man of substance. His
own resources were essentially derived from his activities
in the Indies trade, although he was also a ship-chandler.
Five of the 1565 New Spain ships which had arrived in San-
lucar late in June carried a total of 12,706 pesos in silver
for Castillo, which somewhat renewed the funds of the Cadiz
merchant after his heavy expenditures in Menendez' behalf.
He acted as banker and factor for the Adelantado out of his
149
Ofwn commercial resoxirces, but the financial support of the
enterprise of Florida was not the work of any one man.
Although its administration was centered in Pedro del Cas-
tillo, the network could enable the tapping of commercial
sources and royal monies in many areas, to keep the venture
going. Through the associates and allies of Men^ndez
located in CSdiz and in the north of Spain, fresh shipments
of soldiers, settlers, men emd supplies could be made to
Florida. Resources in the Indies could be utilized there .
to buttress the effort. These arrangements could serve as
a partial hedge against the hazards of the sea and the
vagaries and dangers of the discovery, conquest and settle-
ment of the new Florida colonies.
Thus it was that a combination of merchant and Crown
money served to support Pedro Menendez' efforts in Florida.
Since a great part of the royal revenues used to help launch
and. support the effort also arose originally out of some tauc
upon the Carrera de Indies, it might be said that the first
successful settlement of Florida was largely xinderwritten
by trade and commerce.
Due to careful and detailed records, which have sur-
vived, one may gain a rather precise estimate of the
aggregate of Royal expenditure in the outfitting of the
Florida expedition. Direct Crown costs were 17,681
ducats. The merced paid to Menendez was 15,000 ducats and
the Adelcintado was also paid 2,000 ducats to recompense him
150
for losses sustained through missing his trading voyage to
Tierra Firme. He had received 3,000 ducats on account of
the sums due in the 1563 case. This total of 37,681 ducats
thus represented the down payment on the Crown shcure of the
Florida costs. It covered all supplies bought for the
Royal account in Spain and the intial sueldo payments for
sailors, soldiers and vessels xinderwritten by ftie King. Set
over against this were the funds expended by the Adelantado.
For several reasons, it is not a simple task to furnish a
reliable total of Menendez' costs. In the first place, his
private records are not to be found in cmy single continuous
series comparable to the apcount books of the Casa de Con-
tratacion. Where his contribution was officially audited,
good materials survive. For the Cadiz effort, for example.
Factor Duarte's itemized list of materials, ships and men
may serve as a reasonable basis for conjectured cost. At
Aviles, Gijon and S ant ander, where the northern contingents
of ships and men were prepared, dociomentation is not as
complete but can still yield enough data for some estimate
of the Adelantado* s expenses.
There is a second complicating factor; Menendez' costs
were directly shared by others in his organization. Some of
his lieutenants cind supporters absorbed these expenses as
their own investment in the enterprise of Florida. For
exaii5>le, one of the Asturiem ships was furnished by its
master, Alonso Menendez Marques. Likewise, there are
151
indications that Diego Flores de Vald^s encuinberes his
patrimony in the Florida effort, while Francisco de Reinoso
made Pedro Men&idez a loan of 2,000 ducats. The Adelantado
also noted that he had borrowed from "brothers, relatives,
and friends." One thing, however, was certain. The
sixteenth-century soldier, sailor eind artisein had to be
paid in cash; he required some money before he would begin
his service. Catsh funds had to be provided at once, or the
needed ccurpentry and caulking would not be accomplished and
the manning of the ships would never tcJce place. Likewise,
ready money was essential for the purchase of foodstuffs,
munitions, and equipment. The settlers emd clergy who
accoK^anied the expedition were not paid salaries as such,
but their medntenance and defense was the responsibility
of the Adelctntado. Religious materials and agricultural
"capital" — hoes, axes, livestock — were also furnished by
Menendez. He had also found it necessary to buy a galiot
and berqantin to supplement the Cadiz contingent of ships.
Considering, then, all conceivable items, it appears
that the initial outfitting of the Florida enterprise cannot
have cost Pedro Menendez de Aviles emd his supporters much
less than 50,000 ducats. Thus, in the first phase of the
effort, the Adelantado was the heavier investor (partly
with Crown money) , although both parties made substantial
and manifest contributions. The efforts of the Adelantado
152
and his entourage represented, moreover, far more than any
investment of cash. It amounted to a major risk of their
persons and capital. For the ship-owners emd their men, the
vessels pledged to the Florida expedition represented
their livelihood. Whether their income was earned in the
Indies trade or through Crown sueldos, these ships were its
source. They were the matin property at hazard in the voyage.
In addition, the men and women aboard the craft — the
captains and soldiers, airtisans, the settlers and priests —
constituted a very special kind of asset. They were the
human resources at hazard in the enterprise. Lives, careers,
reputations and patrimonies hung in the balance. Florida
represented an immense speculation, a gamble undertaken for
great stakes. It was not, moreover, the risk of any one man.
The enterprise of Florida was a group effort. The hopes cmd
the lives of many depended upon its outcome.
The joint nature of the underteJcing made it essential
that the Speuiish Crown exercise a degree of control over
the expenditure of its monies and the payment of its
soldiery. Wherever Crown money or supplies were to be
provided, it was required by law cind by precedent that a
38
royal official be appointed to protect the King's interest.
The three main offices of treasurer, accountant and factor,
called in practice Royal Officials, had for sixty years
been a bulwark of Crown authority in the Indies, and long
predated the establishment of the Viceroyalties . A system
153
of Cajas, or royal treasuries, had spread by 1565 through
the Ceiribbean islands and the mainleuid settlements of the
Spanish. Royal revenues, such as customs duties, court
fines, the tithe emd cruzada income, Indiem tributes, emd
the quinto vere collected, safeguarded, and accounted for
by the RoyaJ. Officials. Any expenditures from Crown funds
voxild pass through their records. Even though the Florida
asiento privileges %Jo\ild diminish some of these revenues or
exempt the payment of some for a period of years, it was
still planned that these three positions would shortly be
filled. Since the salaries for the positions were to be
paid out of royal income, the jobs would not mean much until
the settlements were a going concern. An Adelantado was
given the authority to propose individuals for the posts,
but final confirmation of the appointments was in the
39
King's hands. Even though Royal Officials were not
immediately neimed, a lesser position, that of tenedor de
bastimentos — was created. It was the duty of the Tenedor
to keep records of the Crown property received, cuid to
account for its proper distribution.
Pedro Menendez made the appointment himself, on June 1,
in Seville, exercising his powers in the King's naune. The
circxnnstances %^ere significant — Menendez named Juan de Junco
of Oviedo, a f ad. thfxil member of his own retinue. Junco
was not reqtiired to post amy bond, which was unusual.
He Weis to draw a salary of 300 ducats annually, and would
154
be responsible for all artillery, munitions and other
supplies furnished by the King. Junco could maXe distribu-
tion from Royal stores eis ordered by the King or the Ade-
lantado. The ostensible purpose of this office was to provide
for an independent defensor of the King's goods amd inter-
ests. In actuality, ho%raver, the nature of the appointment
of Juein de Junco made such objectivity impossible from the
beginning. The close-Jcnit structure of Pedro Men^ndez'
40
adelcintamiento militated against effective Royal control.
Preparation for Departure
In a very short time, Pedro Menendez de Avil^s had to
provide additional ships, gather his soldiers, cind purchase
and load supplies and munitions for the Florida journey.
He took personal chaurge of preparations at Cadiz, emd
delegated the tasks of equipping the three contingents from
Aviles, Gijon and Scmtemder to trusted lieutenants. Menendez
placed Esteban de las Alas in overall command of the effort
in northern Spain, and named Pedro Menendez Marqu^z as his
second in coxranauid. Meanwhile, Casa factor Francisco
Duarte and his representative in Cadiz, Juan Carrillo,
labored diligently to prepare the Crown shcure of the Cadiz
expedition.
It had been an unusually late and stormy winter along
the coast of the Bay of Biscay, where continuous rains and
heavy winds delayed the work of outfitting and equipping the
155
vessels. On the twenty-seventh of Jiine, 1565, de lets Alas
appeared before Pedro de Valdes, the judge in Aviles , emd
42
made a statement of conpliance with the royal asiento.
De las Alas averred that he had, in the name of Pedro
Menendez, readied and st^plied certain ships to go from
Gijon and perhaps Bilbao ais well as from Aviles. When the
local justices made their ship visits, he would be ready to
leave with the first good weather to join the Adelantado
for a Canary Islamds rendezvous.
The judge then required the shipmasters to open their
hatches, list their cargoes, cuid name the officials and men
who would be embarking. The men listed included 237
soldiers smd 20 sailors. The meui chosen as pilot of the
ships from Aviles was a highly qualified Asturian, Alonso
Candamo.
From Aviles eastward it is scarcely fifteen miles by
land to the port of Gijon. Alongside the village mole in
Gijon, two ships were being readied, and Pedro Menendez
Marquez, made application to the local justice on May 31,
1565, for a visit of his ships. The two vessels — Espiritu
Sctnto and Nuestra Senora del Rosario — were small zabras, of
from fifty to fifty-five tons. Menendez Marquez stated that
bad weather and heavy rauins had delayed the work of pre-
paring the ships for depeirture. This justification was put
on record, since Menendez Marquez knew that the asiento
reqxiired depeurture by the end of May.
156
On the same day, one of the ships, Espiritu Santo,
was visited by the Judge and Regidor, Juan de Valdtfs. The
ship's registry showed that she Ccurried 55 pipes of wine,
sails, anchors, rigging and other gear, two barrels of
powder, six thousand pounds of sea-blscult emd thirty hams.
Her master, Alonso Men^ndez Marqu^z, swore that nothing had
been hidden or overlooked amd presented a list of the men
aboard. The two small vessels carried fifty soldiers and
seventeen sailors.
In the meantime, the first vessel from Vlzcaya was
rejected as being too small. Another vessel was prepared
for the Florida voyage almost a hundred miles to the east,
in Seuitcmder. This ship was a new galeoncete, from Vlzcaya,
owned by Pedro de Lexalde. She was to be used to carry
six hundred arquebuses made In Vlzcaya, a supply of oars
and other bulky arms and munitions purchased for the account
of the Adelantado. Lexalde had been associated with Pedro
Menendez for nine years. When, finally, the ships sailed
from Avlles, Glj6n, and Santander, it was so late that the
possibility of making the rendezvous with Pedro Menendez
at the Ceinary Islands was only a remote one.
While the enlistment of ships' crews and soldiers and
the outfitting of vessels continued in Asturlas and San-
tander, work went forward rapidly in Andalusia as well.
Pedro Menlndez and the Casa de Contrataclon engaged
three caravels in order to spread the troops and cargoes
157
around more evenly among the c£dlz ships and provide needed
space. One, nauned San Antonio, of one hiindred twenty tons
burden, had been found in Puerto Santa Maria, was embargoed
by the Casa de Contrataci6n for the journey, amd was rowed
across the bay to Cadiz. The other two caravels were smaller.
It was plemned that they should all carry supplies as far
as the Canary Islands, where the consumption of food and
vine amd the rendezvous with the Asturian ships would
encUt>le the re-distribution of cargoes. The caravels would
then be sent back to Spain. Work began at once upon the
building of new bulkheads aboard them so that they would
have sufficient store-rooms and magazines.
In addition to his flagship and Capitana, San Pelayo,
and the caravels, Pedro Menendez armed four small one-deck
shallops which ranged from sixty to seventy-five tons in
size. These were Magdalena, San Miguel, San Andres, and
La Concepcion. The Adelantado had also purchased a fine
galiot with eighteen banks of oars, La Vitoria, and a large
bergcuitin of twelve banks. La Esperanza.
It is useful to compare the materials and supplies
provided in Cadiz by the Crown and those furnished by Pedro
Menendez de Avil^s under his asiento obligations, although
such comparison Ccuinot be reduced precisely to money terms,
47
for all of the price data are not known. Furthermore, the
lists are not identical. The Crown's effort involved the
equipping and supply of some three hvmdred soldiers , and the
158
furnishing of certain artillery, ammunition and marine
supplies intended to bolster the expedition and insure the
ouster of the Huguenots from Florida. The broader-scale
nature of Menendez* commitment is reflected in the enumera-
tion of the things he purchased for the expedition. First,
both Crown and Adelantado provided large quantities of
the components of the basic sea-ration, wine emd sea-biscuit,
as well as the supplementary foodstuffs — olive oil, vinegar,
rice, euid beans. Menendez was to carry supplies for one
year, while the royal forces were supplied for a shorter
period.
With regard to military supplies, the Crown furnished
armed troops and cannon with which to besiege and capture
Port Caroline, and the powder and shot with which to do it.
Sixteen large bronze cannon were provided by the Crown. The
Adelantado bought two hundred fifty arquebuses and also
provided one hundred helmets, thirty cross-bows and a quan-
tity of pikes, breastplates, and the harness for fifty
horses. Six hundred more firearms were coming from Vizcaya
for Menendez. To supply the cannon aboard San Pelayo cuid his
other ships, Pedro Menendez brought substantial amounts of
gunpowder and iron shot.
Although the ships were fully equipped, additional
marine supplies were also carried for the unkeep and repair
of hulls, sails emd oars on a long voyage. The materials
of husbandry and colonization were, moreover, supplied in
159
qusmtity by Pedro Menendez. For the smithy, six tons of
bulk iron and a half-ton of steel were brought eiboard
San Pelayo. Fifty eoces, and four hundred fifty shovels cuid
mattocks of iron were brought to clear emd work the land.
Fish-nets, in the number of two hxindred, were provided;
shoe-making supplies were included. Cloth for trade with
the Indians was loaded on the ship. For the religious life
of the new colonies, the Adelantado contributed eight
church bells and the altar furnishings necessary for the
celebration of the Mass.
In addition to items of supply and equipment for Florida,
Pedro Menendez brought in his Cadiz ships one hundred
thirty-eight soldiers who also held the "office," or possessed
the skills, of artisans and craftsmen. These seamen were
enrolled, equipped and paid as soldiers, but were qualified
by experience in their particular trade. Virtually all the
crafts of sixteenth-century Spain were represented: There
were ten stone-masons, fifteen carpenters, twenty-one
tailors, ten shoe-makers, eight smiths, five barberos and
two surgeons. There were hose-makers, metal-smelters, cloth-
weavers cUid cloth-shearers. Two specialists in the making
of lime and mortar were aboard, as well as tcinners, farriers,
wool-carders, a hat maker, a book-seller emd em embroiderer.
Weapon experts there were in the persons of three sword-
makers, a gunsmith and a cross-bow repairmem. There were
coopers, bakers, gardeners, a dealer in silks, a blanket
160
maiker and two men skilled in the working of flax to make
linen. An apothecary, a keeper of gremaries, amd a master
brewer rounded out the list. That essential of the paper-
bound, legalistic Spaniard — the escribano pdblico, the
notary *rtio would record all formal actions — came along,
together with twenty-foxir reeuns of paper and a quantity of
ink. Also, one hundred seventeen of the soldiers were
listed as labradores, or farmers; these men were ready to
make settlement on theland when their militeury duties would
permit. Twenty-six of them had brought their wives and
children.
The Adelantado was thus preparing a full-scale transfer
of Castilian civilization to the cities he plamned to found
in Florida. He carried in his ships enough skilled persons
to service the needs of the colonies and to aid in the
exploitation of their agricultural potential.
Both parties to the outfitting of the Florida Jornada
incurred direct expenses arising out of the immediate
advance pay of officials, of soldiers and mariners, the
purchase of equipment and supplies for the expedition, and
lease or purchase of ships in which to carry them. Like-
wise, both the Crown of Castile and its Adelantado obli-
gated themselves for subst2mtial continuing expense for the
later pay and supply of their men and for the operation
of the vessels which would serve the Florida conquest and
population. Of the two obligations, Men^ndez* was the
heavier and the more enduring; it was to last for at least
161
three years. As it was seen in Madrid, the royal support
in Florida was intended to be a temporary thing, lasting only
long enough to see the intruders defeated and ousted from
the latnd.
The remaining days before sailing proved hectic for
all parties. Much of the labor of preparing cmd loading
the materials purchased by the Casa de Contratacion fell
upon the shoulders of its escribano, Juan Carrillo, at CSdiz.
Supplies purchased by his agents came in on oxcarts, on
mule-back, and in small boats. Wine, sea-biscuit, rice,
beef emd pork, sides of bacon, fish, beams, cheese, gar-
bcuizos, olive oil, salt eind vinegair — even a medicine chest —
was supplied by the Crown. Coopers knocked together the
casks emd barrels in which the bulk items would be stored.
Goods, bought from many vendors, came from all of lower
Andalusia — from Ronda, Jerez de la Frontera, Puerto de
Sauita Maria and Puerto Real, from cis far away as Seville,
and from Cadiz itself. So much came, in fact, that it
was necessary to lease storage space in the town. Some of
the supplies were even stockpiled on the beach opposite
the open roadstead where San Pelayo and the other ships
rode at emchor. In the meantime, Menendez had stowed
away the supplies which he had bought.
In order that some basis might be established for the
payment of the ship-lease fee for Scm Pelayo, the Casa sent
Fremcisco Bemal of Seville to measure the galeass. He
162
figured it at nine hundred six tons, and the rate of payment
49
for the ship-lease could be calculated.
The two hundred royal soldiers gathered by Men^ndez
during May 1565 embarked from Seville. In mid-June they
%iere transported by boat to Sanlficar, from whence they were
brought to C5dir. The Adelemtado advemced them a sum of
earnest-money — about one-third of a ducat apiece — for which
he was shortly reimbursed by the Casa. Two hundred fine
new Vizcayan surquebuses were purchased for these men,
together with the lead, match-cord and powder for the
weapons.
Because of the shortness of time in which the troops
were recruited (Pedro Men^ndez had stated that the first two
hundred had come in on May 18; he had only received the order
to raise them on May 12), their enlistment must have teiken
place in Andalusia. An examination of a list of these men
and their birthplaces, however, indicates that they came
from villages and towns all over the peninsula. Some few
were from Catalonia, but most were Castilian; many places
in Estremadura, the northern meseta, the north coast, and
Andalusia were represented. These were professional soldiers,
available because eii5)loyment in Italy or elsewhere was not
obtainable at the present. When he sought to provide the
military arm to fill out his t£±)le of orgemization for the
Florida conquest, Menendez sought experienced men, blooded
in the last of the Italian wars, in the Mediterraneam
163
galleys, and in North African expeditions. By May 28,
the Adelantado had made a muster of his ovm troops and pre-
sented it to the Casa de Contrataci6n, so that each mam (emd
wife, if she were coming on the expedition) could be
exaunined for religious status amd approved for the Indies
52
journey. In mid-June, 1565, the first two hundred who
were to be paid by the Crown came down river from Seville
to SamliScar de Barrameda, amd were then tramsported to
Cadiz. On Sunday, June 17, a muster was held. At that
time, or shortly thereafter, arquebuses were issued to the
men.
Due to the exigencies of loading the ships for Florida,
it was not possible to put the Royal troops aboard immedi-
ately. Menendez had to maintain amd feed them ashore,
before they could reach San Pelayo and begin to draw upon
the rations which awaited them there. He provided for the
men from his own supplies until Thursday, June 22, when
ninety-nine more royal soliders arrived. The Adelantado
then provided for the whole body of Crown troops ashore
until they could be transported aboard ship on the twenty-
sixth.^ All the men received a payment of two months'
54
advance salary, dating from the day of their muster.
The sixteenty-century professional soldier was a hired
mam. The Spanish tercios were all composed of contract men
who had been recruited by a captain amd signed agreements
with him. In the case of Menendez' own soldiers, or those
164
^iham he enlisted for the royal account, each mem signed
his own asiento, received his advance pay and equipment,
and began to draw rations. By terms of his contract, as
long as he served, each soldier would be paid and receive
his rations, worth thirty maravedis a day. Since the tools
of his trade, his weapon and his accoutrements were fur-
nished by his employer, the cost of these was given in lieu
of one month's pay. In posts or circumstcmces deemed to be
particularly hazardous, isolated, or non-productive of loot,
ventajas, or additional-duty pay, might also be forth-
coming.
In orgamizing his own assortment of soldiers at Cadiz,
Pedro Menendez did not make an appointment of a full number
of captains. The non-commissioned corporals named for the
voyage kept order, drew supplies and served to keep the
units organized until regular companies could be set up.
Artillerymen were in great demand, were difficult to
find and could command a high wage. Pedro Menendez had
looked all along the Andalusian coasts as far as Malaga cind
Gibraltar without finding the men he needed. Finally, he
was able to fill the position of chief gunner and eventually
enlisted a total of eighteen artillerymen. Diego L6pez, who
became artillero mayor, was only twenty-four, but could
already count long years of service in his specialty. A
native of Villaneuva de Alcaraz, near Toledo, Lopez had
served for six years in the galleys of Don Alvaro de Bazin
165
and had been at the tciking of the Penon. His lombardero,
Antonino Escopo, was a native of Naples, aund forty-four
years old in 1565. Escopo had been paid twenty ducats
at the muster, 'as had Gil Tal6n, emother lombardero aboard
San Pelayo.
From the list made at the muster of the King's soldiers,
it is evident that Pedro Menendez recruited several men who
had a close connection with him and let the Crown pay for
their support. These included Diego de Hevia of Oviedo,
Pedro de Coronas of Tineo and Gutierre de Miranda, also of
Tineo in Asturias.
Meauiwhile, a question which related to the Menendez
mission had been decided in Madrid. The King sent a dis-
patch to Ambassador Alava, asking him to determine if the
Ribault expedition had sailed, and proposing that the matter
be brought to an open confrontation if it had not. Alava
replied on June 8 that the Huguenot ships had indeed weighed
anchor cibout May 26. He had no immediate way of knowing
that the fleet had only crossed the channel and taken
refuge in England from a spring storm. They were still
within recall. In so far as Philip II was concerned, however,
the die was cast. Isabel journeyed to the border of the
kingdoms of France, proceeding to Bayonne with the Duke of
Alba for the long-heralded Royal conference. While the par-
ley begem, preparations for conflict in Florida were to go
on in Cadiz, at Gijon, Aviles and Santamder, as the ships
made ready to sail.
166
In Cadiz, fin2mcial arramgements had at last been com-
pleted, and all the men 2md equpment were placed aJt>oard the
vessels. Final preparations for the ships' departure were
made. Castillo bought fifteen hundred water-bottles, for
which the Casa reimbursed him, for the royal soldiers.
Three men filled the bottles eind casks at the C5diz wells,
and the fresh water was then stowed aboard. A last muster
and pay of the officials euid mariners of San Pelayo was
arranged by the Casa's representative, Carrillo, One ad-
ditional official had been added — the Crown decided to retain
Gonzalo Gay6n, a skilled Asturian pilot, at its expense.
Gayon would act as chief pilot to guide the expedition to
Florida waters. For this, he was to be paid four hundred
ducats. As a final touch, the Casa officials presented
Menendez with a ship's lantern for each of the vessels, and
gave him four standards painted with the royal arms, to be
58
flown from the mastheads of San Pelayo and San Andres.
Shortly before Menendez was to sail, his brother-in-
law, Gonzalo Solis de Meras, appeared at Cadiz. Solis had
left his studies at Salamanca and wished to embark on the
Florida adventure. Since he had almost completed the re-
quirements for his degree, amd was a married man, the
Adelantado was much loth to permit him to come. He could
not, however, resist the importunity of Solis de Meras,
59
and finally gave his consent.
167
By this time, the issue of Men^ndez* compliemce with
the royal asiento was already very much at issue. The King
and his Council of the Indies had every intention of holding
the Florida Adelamtado to his agreement. The Casa, charged
with the overseeing of the prep^u:ation of the Crown's part
of the expedition, also had the responsibility of checking
upon Menendez' fulfillment of his contract. On June 23,
1565, Factor Duarte made a formal requeremiento. He asked
Menendez to show proof that he had carried out his obliga-
tions. In reply, Men&idez furnished the list of equipment
euid supplies which he had bought, or which had been pur-
chased for him by Pedro del Castillo. Then, Duarte made
a personal inspection of the vessels einchored in the Bay of
Cadiz, after all lading had been completed. From Monday
noon, June 25, until Wednesday the twenty-seventh, he was
rowed from ship to ship in a bergantin, counting heads and
verifying cargoes. He also gathered the muster rolls of
the royal troops and lists of Pedro Menendez* own personnel
in the registries of each ship. His report is most useful
in that it summarizes the entire effort emd furnishes the
best list of ships, armament cuid the distribution of men.
In the meantime, similcir reports had been made from northern
Spain, from the ports of Aviles, Gijon 2md Semtander directly
to the Council of the Indies.
At this point, Menendez clearly established his position
on the question of compliance with the asiento. In Duarte 's
words :
168
He responded that with the ships, people, and
artillery, arms, munitions and supplies con-
tained in this relation amd with the ships which
he says go from Vizcaya, Asturias, and Galicia
and with the personnel, arms and artillery,
munitions and supplies which go in them, he
has complied with the asiento which his Majesty
ordered be taken with him more ccr.ipletely and in
greater quantity than he was obliged to do . , .
61
On Wednesday, June 27, 1565, in the afternoon, the
weather appeared favorable. Pedro Men^ndez' whole fleet of
ships left their anchorage and passed along the bay side of
the ancient city of Cadiz with sails drawing and flags
flying, on their way to the Atlantic. Factor Duarte, do'obt-
less relieved to have dispatched the fleet, sat down to
write up his report.
Now there occurred an event, about which much contro-
versy was later to arise. It bore directly on the question
of Menendez* compliance with his asiento. According to the
Adelamtado and a number of other witnesses, the ships had
no sooner left the harbor entrance on Wednesday when strong
and contrary winds sprang up. After endeavoring to hold the
fleet together and make headway against the winds, Men^ndez
gave up the attempt and brought the ships back to C5diz.
Toward nightfall, he anchored off the ancient fort of San
Sebastieui at the farthest point of the peninsula. Here,
claimed Menendez, contact was made with the shore. A large
number of additional men were ferried out and came aboard
the vessels during the night. One witness later testified
that one hundred fifty more people had come out to the
169
ships; emother stated that three hundred additional passen-
gers had embarked in C^diz. Then Pedro Men^ndez and his
Florida fleet set sail for the second time,
Pedro Men^ndez claimed that his Ci[diz expedition had
sailed from Spain with a total of 1,504 souls aboard. The
total of Duarte's muster was 995 persons. Duaurte had not,
however, included the wives or children of the twenty-six
married soldiers aboard San Pelayo, nor had he counted the
sailors eiboard the caravel, San Antonio. All of these
together could probably not, however, have exceeded seventy-
five in number; the two sums were still far apart.
It is evident, however, that some would-be voyagers
to Florida had been left behind when the fleet sailed. On
Thursday, the twenty-eighth. Captain Diego de Luna, a pro-
fessional soldier from Malaga, arrived in Cadiz, too late
to catch Menendez' ships. De Luna immediately applied to
Factor Duarte, saying that he wished to chaurter a vessel to
caurry himself and his men to meet the Adelantado at the Cemary
Isleuids, so that they might yet be a part of the Florida
expedition. Duarte simply told the Captain to see Pedro
del Castillo, who was in charge of all Menendez* affairs,
in order to make any such arrangements. The Casa de Con-
trataci6n would neither accept the responsibility nor the
63
expense.
The same day, the frustrated officer went to see
Castillo. Be stated that he had gathered a fine group of
170
almost seventy experienced soldiers who had served in Italy,
had exhausted his own resources in bringing them to the
48
port, and needed help to find transport to the Canaries.
Since it was known that Pedro del Castillo was Pedro Menendez*
deputy in Spain, de Luna came to him, having nowhere else
to turn.
Castillo replied directly to de Luna, amd stated that
he had indebted himself and his kinsmen deeply, in the cunount
of 20,000 ducats, for the arming of Menendez* Florida enter-
prise. Nevertheless, he said, the troops would be needed,
and Castillo agreed to provide the needed supplies so that
de Luna could embark immediately. The caravel Nuestra
Senora de los Virtudes was chartered and made ready to sail
that very day.
When the delayed armadas finally set sail for Florida
from Cadiz cind from Spain's north coast, what then was the
character of the effort? First, as to support of the ex-
peditions, it was a mixed enterprise, with the larger share
of the cost and risk borne by the Adelantado. To sustain
his part of the burden, Pedro Menendez committed ein entire
coterie of relatives, friends cind associates, well-experienced
upon the sea. He hired, paid and equipped some additional
soldiers to round out his own organization, and took into
his own forces three hundred Crown- supported soldiers.
Almost half of his own costs were, in fact, paid indirectly
171
by Crown gremts to the Adelemtado. In order to underwrite
his efforts, Men^ndez had recourse to sources of credit
linked with his regional and familial associations. He
entrusted financial and logistical maintenamce to his
relative Pedro del Castillo, a Cadiz mercheuit and long-time
colleague.
The bureaucrats of the King had conscientiously fur-
nished the funds, arms auid supplies their master had ordered.
Philip II had also obligated the royal fisc for substantial
additional sums in support of the expedition from overseas
treasuries and from the New Spain fleet.
The Florida expenditions thus represented a joint-
venture in conquest — both Adelantado and Crown shcired the
costs of the effort. The parties had other joint considera-
tions as well. The royal desire to erase the French presence
in Florida was deeply shared by Pedro Menendez. In their
most cherished hopes, however, both parties looked beyond the
coming battles. They looked for glory and profit, and to
the enlargement of their own domains emd holdings. The ships
which sailed carried more than soldiers, supplies, and
cannon. They were laden with a full cargo of expectation.
NOTES
1. The careers of Pedro Men^ndez' main lieutenants
are well documented, as most of them achieved prominence
as fleet Generals or Admirals in the Carrera de Indias, as
governors or in other official posts, in positions in the
Armada Real or .in other fleets or expeditions. The corre-
spondence relating to their offices, the audits of their
accounts, the corpus of legal cases affecting them, and the
sentences of the Council of the Indies sitting as judicial
chamber, contain much about these men. In secondary litera-
ture, two accounts have devoted some space to the subor-
dinates of Men^ndez. Ciracio Miguel Vigil gives a brief
sketch of each figure associated with the Adelajitado in his
work Noticias biograficos-geneal6gicos de Pedro Menendez
de Aviles (Aviles; Miguel Vigil, 1892) . Following Vigil
Eugenic Ruidiaz de Caravia did much the same in La Florida,
I and II. Both men erred in confusing Pedro Menendez
Marques with Pedro Menendez el mozo, another son of Alvaro
Sanchez de Avilgs, brother of the Adelantado.
2. Pedro Menendez' own description of his brother's
services and his illness during the Seville imprisonment of
1563-1564 are found in "Memorial of Pedro Menendez de Aviles
asking grace from His Majesty," Seville, 1564, in A.G.I.
Patronato 257, No. 3, ramo 2. Bartolom^'s selection as
fleet general is described by the Adelantado in the same
Memorial. An accumulation of material about Bartolome
Menendez is found in "Bartolome Menendez sobre sueldo,"
Madrid, 1570, in A.G.I. Indif erente General 1,219. The
long service of Bartolome Menendez is described by the
Adelantado in a letter written to the King from Santander
on May 15, 1568, and found in Ruidiaz, La Florida, II, 171.
3. Descriptions of various services by Estebem de las
Alas are found in A.G.I. Patronato, legajos 179, No. 5, ramo
4; 254, No. 2, ramo 1; 254, No. 3. Correspondence and
legal matters relating to him are foundin A.G.I. Contratacion
2,937 and in Contrataci6n 135, No. 5 (autos fiscales) , which
deal with de las Alas' presence in San Juan de Ulua in
1562. Reports of de las Alas' voyages in 1564 are in two
letters; Casa to Crown, Seville, Dec. 5 and Dec. 5, 1564
A.G.I. , Contratacion 5,167, Book III. A pertinent sentencia
of the Council of the Indies is found in A.G.I. Escribania
de Camara 952. Audits of De las Alas accounts in various
posts in the fleets are found in A.G.I. Contaduria 466 and 547,
172
173
4. Pedro Menendez de Aviles to Crown, Semtander,
May 15, 1568, from Ruidiaz, La Florida, II, 171,
5. Pedro NenSndez Marquiz does not lacX for archival
data of a biographical nature. As fleet General, material
may be found about him in the "Papeles de eunnada" series for
the fleets under his commcuid, in A.G.I. Contrataci6n 2,946
to 2,948. Marqu4z is listed as maestre of one of Pedro
Nenendez' ships in 1561 in Huguette and Pierre Chaunu,
Seville et I'Atlantigue, III, 6. Bonds of Marquez are
listed in A.G.I. Contrataci6n 9. Sentences against him^are
found in A.G.I. Patronato 177, No. 1, ramo 25, Escribania
de Camara 967, 1010 and 1011 An audit of Marquez* fleet
accounts is found in A.G.I. Contadxiria 464. Various de-
scriptions of his service are in A.G.I. Patronato 257,
No. 4, ramos 1, 6, 8, amd 11, He testifies at length about
his early services in Florida in A.G.I, Patronato 257,
No. 3, ramo 20, "Danos de los indios de la Florida."
Consultas and cedulas about Pedro Mendndez Marquez during his
term as Governor and Captain-General of Florida are found in
A.G.I. Santo Domingo 2,528 and Indiferente General 738, as
cited infra. Ciracio M. Vigil discusses Menendez Marquez in
Noticias . . . de Pedro Menlndez de Aviles, pp. 49-50, as
does Ruidiaz in La Florida, II, 629-629 (see note 4, supra,
for their mutual error) . Jeemnette Thurber Connor devotes
considerable sgace and exhibits great interest in Pedro
Menendez Marquez in the introduction to Colonial Records
of Spanish Florida (2 v., Deland, FloridaT Florida Historical
Society, 1925-1930), I, xxiii-xxvi.
6. Pedro Menendez had recommended Diego Flores Valdes
as one of three qualified to be fleet General for Tierra
yirme in 1562; see Memorial of Pedro Menendez de Aviles to
Crown, n.d., in 1564, Seville, A.G.I. Patronato 257, No, 3,
ramo 2. Sentencias relating to Flores are found in A.G.I.
Escribania de Camara 952 amd 967. He is praised in fulsome
terms by the Adelantado in his letter to Philip II dated at
St. Augustine, September 11, 1565, and found in A.G.I.
Santo Domingo 231 (in the Stetson Collection) .
7. It is certainly true that no clear-cut distinction
between "navy" and "army" existed in the sixteenth century,
and that a commission as "ordinary Captain" in the King's
service could be utilized on lamd or at sea. What is under
discussion here, however, is the matter of experience.
8. Pedro de Valdes' qualifications are discussed by
the Adelantado in his letter to the Crown in the letter sent
from St. Augustine on September 11, 1565, and found in A.G.I.
Santo Domingo 231 (in Stetson Collection) .
174
9. Miranda appears on a ration list of the first
soldiers of the Menendez contingent; this is "Lista de la
gente de guerra que fueron con el Adelantado Pedro Menlndez
a la conquista de la Florida," from A.G.I, Contaduria 941,
fol. 9. This is found in microfilm at the P. K. Yonge
Library of Florida History. On June 1, 1565, he served as
a witness to the appointment of Juan de Jxinco as Tenedor de
Bastimentos; this is from "Relaci6n de los bastimentos,
■a^tilleria, armas, y municiones que recibio Juan de Junco
..." and is found in A.G.I. Contaduria 941, ramo 2.
10. See "Genealogy of the Enterprise of Florida,"
Appendix III.
11. For example, Pedro Menendez married his cousin.
Dona Maria de Solis, and was thus required to seek Papal
dispensation^ for marriage within the forbidden degrees;
Solis de Meras, op. cit. , p. 40. He was at times himself
called Pedro Menendez Valdes (see Libro de Registros. 1551,
Ida, A.G.I. Contratacion 2,898), and married his daughter
Ana to Pedro de Valdes, who was also at times called Pedro
Menendez Valdes.
12. There are extant various lists of participants in
the Florida enterprise. Several lengthy lists of officials
and soldiers and some shorter ones of mariners are found in
the Florida accounts in A.G.I. Contaduria 941 ration lists
from 1566-69. Three similar lists of the royal troops in
the Cadiz contingent are found in A.G.I. Justicia 817. In
many cases, together with the names of men (or women) the
birthplace and/or place of citizenship is given. Thus, the
origin of key figures of rank-and-file in the conquest of
Florida may be determined.
13. Peter Boyd-Bowman, fndice geobiogr^fico de cuarenta
mj.lpobl adores espanoles de America en el Siglo XVI (2 v .
**®^ico: Editorial Jus, 1958), describes (page 9 and passim)
the activities of the Miranda, de la Ribera, del Busto]:
Junco, Valdes, Hevia, de las Alas, del Castillo, Solis and
other Asturian families in Cuba, Santo Domingo, Cartagena,
Yucatan, Puerto Rico and New Spain.
14. Menendez recognized the strength of this motivation.
In a letter to the Crown, he noted that he preferred men from
Asturias and Vizcaya, "who are the people best fitted to
work in Florida, some because of their nature and some be-
cause of kinship and friendship." Pedro Menendez to Crown,
f^Xii^^' December 3, 1570, A.G.I. Indiferente General
175
15. The trade officials reported to Philip II in a
letter which bore no date. Apparently, however, it was
%rritten on June 7, 1565, for the payment if mentions was
made^on that day. The letter is found in A.G.I. Contra-
tacion 5,167, Book III. Payment of the 9,000 ducats is
from A.G.I. Contrataci6n 4,680 (Libro de Guadalcanal) , fol.
128; this citation kindly furnished by Paul E. Hoffmcin.
16. See "Petition of Pedro Men^ndez de Avills before
the Casa de Contratacion, * Seville, June 12, 1565, A.G.I.
Escribania de Camara 1,024-A.
17. The payment is listed in A.G.I. Contaduria 310-B;
455: 2.
18. This includes the entire 15,000-ducat merced, the
3,000-ducat advance on the galleon lease case settlement and
the 2,000 ducats paid as recompense for losing the Tierra
Firme voyage for San Pelayo. At mid-June, the Adelantado
was still due cin advance on the sums which would be payable
for the lease of San Pelayo and the 500 ducats for repair
%rork done on the galeass.
19. The author is indebted to Paul E. Hoffman for this
citation; "Fe de registro, Santa Maria de Ondiz," A.G.S,
Junta de Hacienda, 67.
20. Poder, Pedro Men^ndez de Avil^s to Domingo de
Ocaris, Cadiz, June 25, 1565, A.P.C., Escribania of de los
Cobos, fol. 297.
21. Some apt insights into the relationship of families
in commerce appear in Armando Sapori, The Italicin Merchant
in the Middle Ages (tremslated by Patricia Ann Kennen. New
York: W. W. Norton, 1970), pp. 45-46. Sapori states the
matter well: "... in the early Middle Ages, these men
(in a con^sany) belonged to the seune family, which formed a
closed block of interests and individuals. They lived under
the same roof, submitted to the authority of the eldest among
them, and broke bread around the same table. Like the family,
a compact group by reason of its ties of blood, the company
had its honor to safeguard in society, and this family-
con^Jany identity imposed on each of its members a line of
irreprochable conduct in business affairs. Anyone who
committed a fraud would ruin both his own ncune and that of
his entire family . . . In this way there was a rigorous
reciprocal control, which was made bearable by the affection
uniting the families.
As the business grew, it required more capital, amd
there forev outsiders, capable of supplying the necessary funds,
had to be admitted. These men were chosen from a wide circle
of relatives and associates and finally people who had no
particular ties to the old family group."
176
22. See Ruth Pike, Aristocrats and Traders; Sevillian
Society in the 16th Century (Ithaca and London; Cornell
University Press, 1972), especially p. 99 et seq.
23. The presence of Diego Montem^s zmd Pedro Men^ndez
Valdes in Puerto Rico is mentioned by Pedro Men^ndez Marquee
in his visit to San Juan in September, 1566, The documents
are from A.G.I. Patronato 257, No. 4, ramo 1,
24. Poder, Diego Men^ndez de la Aspriella to Favian
de Soils, A.P.C, Escribania of de Ribera, 1577, fol. 176.
25. See "Registro de la nao Santa Maria," A.G.I,
Justicia 872, fol, 217 vto,-221.
26. Astudillo, a vecino of Seville, testifies for
Men^ndez in his claim to recover funds allegedly advanced to
Florida soldiers. The testimony, on March 27, 1572, is from
A, G.I, Justicia 817, Astudillo served as bondsmcin for the
Adelantado in the 1564 jailbreak case. See "Fiscal de Su
Magestad contra Pedro Men6ndez de Avil^s y sus fiadores,"
A, G.I. Justicia 868, pieza 9. Sebastian de Santander repre-
sented the Adelantado through much of the^main case involving
the asiento, and found in A.G.I. Escribania de Camara 1,024-A,
emd represented Astudillo in the jailbreak case. Ruth Pike,
in Aristocrats and Traders; Sevillian Society in the 16th
Century, p. 123, describes the Astudillo banking fcimily.
27. Irene A. Wright, Historia documentada de San
Cristobal de la Habana en el siglo XVI, I, 82, 83.
28. The Lovera will is found in A,H,P. (Madrid),
Escribania of Nicolas Mufioz, No. 635, fol. 4 of 1568.
29. Hinestrosa's antecedents are discussed by Irene
Wright, op. cit. , 82. His role in the 1564 case is outlined
in A.G.I. Justicia 868, pieza 9.
30. The poder from Pedro Men^ndez to Pedro del Castillo
is in A.P.C, Escribania of Alonso de los Cobos, 1565. A
copy is in the A.G.I. , at Indiferente General 2,673.
31. Castillo describes his expenditures amd those of
his "friends and kinsmen" in "Requeremiento de Luna a
Castillo ..." found in A.G.I. Escribania de Clmara 1,024-A
under the date of June 28, 1565, in Cadiz. He outlines his
fin2uicial sacrifices further in a letter to the King,
received in Madrid on January 30, 1566, and found in A.G.I.
Indiferente General 2,673.
32. The August in Francisco substitution is found in
A.G.I. Indiferente General 2,673. It comes originally from
A.P.C, Escribcmia of Alonso de los Cobos, 1565.
177
33. Sxibstitution by Pedro del Castillo, C^diz, August
17, 1565, A.P.C., Escribanfa of Alonso de los Cobos, 1565,
fol. 409.
34. Castillo, who had served in 1563-64 as Receptor
de Averfa in Cadiz, was adjudged guilty of undervaluation of
goods shipped for the tax. For a shortage in his books of
238,524 maravedis, he was fined 50,000 maravedfs. Castillo
had, however, also been the supplia: for the galleys for
which he was to have collected the averia, and was owed
224,531 maravedis for this service. See "Culpas y cargos
contra Pedro del Castillo," A.G.I. Justicia 956. Shipments
from New Spain for Castillo are listed in the Fe de registros
for the vessels La Maria, Santa Maria de Ondiz, La Trinidad,
San Juan, and Santa Maria. These were found in A.G.S.
Junta de Hacienda, 67, and furnished through the kindness
of Paul E. Hoffman.
35. See Appendix IV.
36. See Appendix V.
37. Pedro Menendez mentions Flores' investment in the
enterprise in his October 15, 1565, letter to Philip II
found in A.G.I. Santo Domingo 231 (in Stetson Collection).
Woodbury Lowery, in The Spanish Settlements, II, 146, ad-
vises that Flores had pawned his patrimony to support
Menendez. The Adelantado discusses his loan from Reinoso
in his Havana letter to the Spanish King written on Christmas
Day, 1565, from A.G.I. Santo Domingo 231 (in Stetson Collec-
tion). It has also been reproduced in Lawson, Letters of
Menendez, I, 271. Menendez reminds the King of the loans
from his brothers, relatives and friends in "Menendez re-
ports to the Crown, 1565 [sic]," from Ms. Division, Library
of Congress, typescript translation, 1937. It probably
dates from 1568. The transcript is found in the P. K. Yonge
Library of Florida History, University of Florida.
38. A good general description of the place of the
Royal Officials in the Spanish colonial financial system may
be found in C. H. Haring's The Spanish Empire in America (3rd
ed. New York: Har court. Brace & World, 1963),, pp. 279-282.
A more recent and far more detailed study has been done by
Ismael Sanchez-Bella in La organizacion financiera de las
Indias, Siglo XVI (Seville: Escuela de Estudios Hispano-
Americanas, 1968). See especially Chapter 1, "Desarrollo
historico," pp. 7-68.
39. "Ordenezas," D.I., LXIV, 507.
178
40. It was, of coxirse, difficult to guareintee a posi-
tion for Indies Royal Officials independent of local power
centers. This, however, was the reason for their separate
salary arremgements . Sanchez-Bella discusses this problem
in La organizacion financiera de las Indias, p. 28, The
point here is that no member of Menendez* own orgemizational
apparatus was likely to establish such independence, even if
he should desire to do so. Juan de Junco's brother Rodrigo
was affiliated with Pedro Menlndez by 1562. See registry
of vessel Magdalena, in "Fiscal with Pedro Menendez de
Aviles over pay of Sueldos . . . 1563," A.G.I. Justicia 872.
The Junco appointment, dated June 1, 1565, is found in A.G.I.
Contaduria 941 (Microfilm, P. K. Yonge Library of Florida
History, Reel 1).
41. The documentation of the arming of the northern
expeditions has been accumulated in the legajo, A.G.I.
Escribania de Camara 1,024-A, which contains the corpus of
the suit by Pedro Menendez over his asiento with the Crown.
The Adelantado and his heirs inserted the material into the
record in order to prove the extent of complicuice with the
Florida contract. From the text of their works, it appears
that the material was available to Gonzalo Solis de Meras and
to Eugenic Ruidiaz y Caravia. The data is, however, scanty
as compared with that for the C£diz section of the enter-
prise. The author assumes that perusal of the north-coast
notaries* archives may uncover much more material.
42. The document is ^entitled "La lista que hizo el
(sic) de las Alas en Aviles de 257 personas." It was copied
in Aviles on September 27, 1567, from the original, which
was dated June 27, 1565. The copy is found in A.G.I.
Escribania de Camara 1,024-A. Unfortunately the ship
registries, enclosed with the original, were not included
or at least are not now found with the copy. The supplies
and men listed from Menendez' native town would be invaluable.
43. "Visita y registro de los navies y gente en Gijon,"
Gijon, May 25, 1565, and "Visita y registro del navio
Espiritu Santo," May 31, 1565, also at Gijon, from A.G.I.
Escribania de Camara 1,024-A,
44. The Lexalde ship is described briefly in "Memorial
de los navios cargados de bastimentos y municiones que se
perderon el Adeleintado Pero Menendez yendo a echarlos luteranos
que estavan poblando en aquella tierra de la Florida," A.G.I.
Escribania de Camara 1,024-A; cf. "replica el Adelantado,"
loc. cit.
179
45. Pedro Menendez describes the embargo of San Antonio
in his letter to the King sent from Matanzas, Cuba, on
December 5, 1565, and found in A.G.I. Santo Domingo 231
(in Stetson Collection). Payment for the tow of the caravel,
for loading water eind wine into the caravels, amd the car-
pentry work is itemized in A.G.I. Contadurfa 310-B; 451:
4; 452: 1 and 2. Another description of the lading of the
caravels and their subsequent journey is found in "Pedro
del Castillo — informaci6n sximaria hecha en C^diz," September
22, 1567, in A.G.I. Escribania de c£inara 1,024-A,
46. The ncimes of the vessels are found in the list of
ships, men, emd supplies made by Casa factor Duarte in C^diz,
June 28, 1565, which has been reproduced in toto in A.G.I.
Escribania de Camara 1,024-A. It has been printed in Rui-
diaz. La Florida, II, 558-566, whwere it is cited as coming
from A.G.S., Consejo de Hacienda, leg, 67. Menendez
describes the purchase of the two ships in his letter
to Philip II from Seville, May 18, 1565, which is printed
in Ruidiaz, La Florida, II, 60-66,
47. See "Relacion de los navios, gente, bastimentos,
artilleria, armas, municiones . . . que lleva el adelantado
Pedro Menendez de Aviles en su armada para la conquista de
la Florida," A.G.I. Escribania de Camara 1,024-A, and the
royal list immediately following it.
48. There is a rich accretion of data on Casa pay for
San Pelayo and Royal troops in A.G.I, Contadurfa 310-B
accounts of Factor Duarte. This was kindly furnished by
Paul E. Hoffman.
49. See report of Contadores Mayores, A.G.I. Escribania
de Camara 1,024-A.
50. Menendez' advance of 23,800 maravedfs to the troops
was repaid by the Casa as per the record found in A.G.I.
Contaduria 310-B, fol. 437.
51. When the Adelantado described the non-commissioned
officers and captains whom he had appointed (including
Sergeant-Ma j or Villaroel, the alfereces and other sergeants),
he noted that "those without experience are few . . . they
were soldiers of Italy skilled in war." Menendez described
this quality of his men in the letter dated September 11,
1565, and sent to Philip II from St. Augustine; from A.G.I.
Scmto Domingo 231 (in Stetson Collection) .
52. The Royal Officials of the Casa notified Philip II
of the muster in a letter sent from Seville on that date cmd
found in A.G.I. Contrataci6n 5,167, Book III.
180
53. Repayment to Pedro MenSndez is itemized: A.G.I.
Contaduria 310-B, fol. 447; 4; fol. 455; 2.
54. Gabriel de Ayala de Salzedo, who later served as
Alf^rez for the 300 Royal troops in Florida and then became
a Captain in Menendez* Armada Rectl^ describes the muster and
payment in Cidiz. He noted that, as em arquebusier, he
received his weapon aid four ducats, representing two months*
salary from June 17 at 2 ducats per month. The full pay of
em arquebusier would have been four ducats per month. In
"Captain Graviel Ayala de Salzedo," A.G.I. Indiferente
General 1,222. At the payment, which evidently was made
close to the sailing date, eleven corporals and 288 soldiers,
299 men in all, were paid. Each corporal received 8 ducats
and each soldier four, as Ayala de Salzedo had said. See
A.G.I. Contaduria 310-B, fol. 472-4. Pedro Menendez criti-
cized the payment Duarte made as "ruin" in his letter to
the Crown of October 15, 1565, from St, Augustine, and found
in A.G.I. Santo Domingo 231; in the Stetson collection.
55. See Diego L6pez to Crown and ff . , Madrid, December
7, 1571, in A.G.I. Indiferente General 1,222, and "Antonino
Escopo. Artillero," November 8, 1570, Seville, loc. cit.;
Talon's bond, in which he agrees to serve c±>oard San Pelayo
and not absent himself, and in which he acknowledges that
Pedro Menendez has paid him 20 ducats, is found at the date
of June 25, 1565, in A.P.C. Escribania de los Cobos, fol.
297 vto.
56. Three copies of the 1565 muster roll are found in
a 115-folio section of A.G.I. Justicia 817, at No. 5, within
testimony before the Casa de Contratacion and the Council
of the Indies over Pedro Menendez' attempt to recover funds
he claimed to have paid the soldiers. The dating begins
with June, 1570, and continues for three years. Labels on
the various numeros of the legajo have been switched, and
the pieza can only be identified by its content.
57. Alava to Philip II, Bayoime, June 8, 1565, A.D.E.,
VII, No. 1,076, 384-390.
58. The final payment to the men aboard San Pelayo is
in A.G.I. Contaduria 310-B, 472-3. Castillo's reimbursement
for the water-bottles is in the same legajo, at 4 88-2/3.
The first payment of 56,250 maravedis, as part of the 400
ducats due to the pilot Gay6n, is also recorded in A.G.I.
Contaduria 310-B, 452-4. His final payment on this sum was
recorded in A.G.I. Contaduria 299; 19: 3. The writer is
indebted to Paul E. Hoffman for these citations.
181
59. The Adelantado discusses Solfs' joining the ex-
pedition in his letter to the Crown from Havana, July 1,
1566, from A.G.I. Santo Domingo 168 (Stetson Collection).
60. "Los bastimentos, armas, artilleria y municiones
que el dicho Adelemtado Pero Menendez lleba en los dichos
neJsios de su armada ... en quenta de lo gue hes obligado
conforme a su asiento ... por una relacion jurada y f irmada
del dicho Adelantado Pero Menendez . , . y Pedro del
Castillo . . . que es la persona por cuta mano se an comprado
y probeedo la mayor parte de todo hello . . . ," from A.G.I.
Escribania de Camara 1,024-A. On May 28, 1565, the Casa
officials had assured Philip II that they would send veedores
to Cadiz to insure that Pedro Menendez lived up to his asiento.
From A.G.I. Contratacion 5,167, Book III.
61. From "Los bastimentos, armas . . . ," A.G.I,
Escribania de Camara 1,024-A.
62. Menendez' claims of his return to Cadiz and the
loading of additional men aboard his ships is found in
"Informacion ante el Alcalde deste Corte," Madrid, October
16, 1567, in A.G.I. Escribania de Camara 1,024-A. In their
1567 audit, found in the same legajo, the Contadores Mayores
treated Menendez' claim as a "pretension." It was, however,
not refuted by any testimony appended to the trial record.
63. From "El Capitan Luna dize ante Factor Duarte
• . . ," in A.G.I. Escribania de Camara 1,024-A.
64. In "Requeremiento de Luna a Castillo que le de
para los fletes y costa de los soldados," A.G.I. Escribanfa
de Camara 1,024-A.
65. loc. cit.
CHAPTER V
SPANISH VICTORY AND FIRST FOUNDATION
Pedro Men^ndez* basic plan of operations for the
Florida conquest involved a joint rendezvous at the Ccmary
Islamds of several contingents which sailed at different
times. The united ships would then sail to the Indies,
join the Santo Domingo forces and Ruelas* vessel and pro-
ceed to Florida. The expedition which left C5diz on June
29, however, was really Menendez' main spearhead, for it
included his largest vessel, ample artillery for land and
sea use, emd the bulk of the troops, private and Royal.
At the time he sailed, Menendez' main concern was to
reach the French fort before Ribault's reinforcement fleet
arrived. The intelligence in the hands of the Adelantado
was really rather complete, for he had good knowledge of
the French works at Fort Caroline, and he knew exactly the
composition of the forces of Jean Ribault. Since discovery
of the French settlement on the river May, the Florida enter-
prise had assumed military, pxinitive cind ideological aspects,
Pedro Menendez had especial reason for hostility toward "the
Lutheran French," for they stood in the way of his hopes for
colonization auid profits, emd represented the long-time
182
183
enemy, now tagged xinioisteJceibly with the stigma of religious
heresy. Men^ndez was particularly alert to the charge that
there were heretics cunong the crewmen £iboard San Pelayo, and
he arrested and confined several men on the ship.
The first stage of the voyage went well, for the ex-
pedition sighted the easternmost islands of the Canary group
only five days after setting sail. On July the fourth,
Menendez* fleet entered the harbor of Las Palmas on the
isleuid of Great Ccinary, having come more than 750 miles.
At once Pedro Menendez saw that his ships from Asturias had
missed the rendezvous. Since he could not delay further to
await their arrival, Menendez left word that, when they
should arrive, they were to proceed to Puerto Rico and
Havcuia. He would then make arramgements to meet them in the
Indies.
Menendez replenished his wood and water and rearranged
the lading of his vessels in the Canaries. To correct the
overcrowding which had resulted from the hasty loading of
the vessels in Cadiz, it was decided to take to Florida the
caravel of Jorge Dias which was originally to have returned
to Spain. Menendez then made muster of all the soldiers and
seameui in the fleet, which revealed the presence of a noble
stowaway, if the Adelcintado had not realized it before.
Pedro de Valdes, the man betrothed to the Adelantado's
daughter Ana, had come along in defiance of Menendez*
wishes. With Vald4s aboard, the fleet of eight vessels
184
left Las Palmas on July 8, 1565 and took their departure
from the great, cone-shaped peaik of Teneriffe. Two of the
cetravels had remained in the Canary Islcuids to return to
Spain, and the Florida fleet consisted of the Capitana, San
Pelayo, the large galeota La Vitoria, the bergantfn La
Esperanza, the caravel San Antonio and the four shallops,
Magdalena, San Miguel, La Concepci6n and San Andres. The
last named shallop served as Almircuita of the fleet, under
the commcmd of Diego Flores Valdls.
After an initial breeze carried the ships from port,
they encountered light winds and began to separate, in spite
of Men^ndez' every effort to keep them together. In one
group was the San Pelayo, and a smaller vessel, whose voyage
is described in Menendez' own account of the voyage. Five
other vessels clustered around the Almiranta. The expedi-
tion's chaplain, Francisco L6pez de Mendoza Grajales, sailed
in this group. Father Mendoza Grajales has left a vivid
neurrative of the events of the voyage of the ships which
accompeuiied the Almiranta. Both versions of the journey
repor-t that, in less than two weeks of their departure from
the Canaries, the ships were struck by a major storm while
en route to their projected landfall in the Windward Islands.
Even large and staunch San Pelayo was roughly treated by
towering seas and gusting winds. Since the galeass was pre-
pcured for action against the French, and had mounted heavy
artillery on her upper decks , Pelayo was in some consideraUble
185
danger of foundering. After the wind carried away two of
the vessel's masts, Men^ndez had several pieces of artillery
thrown in the sea to lighten ship. After the weather
moderated, the Adelantado had jury-masts rigged from spare
yards and was able to sail moderately well. The condition
of his ship was such, however, that he determined to make
straight for the Puerto Rico instead of attempting the usual
landfall in the Windward Islemds. San Pelayo and its
accompanying vessel entered the harbor of San Juan on August
According to Father L6pez, trouble began for the other
ships, even before the hurricane struck. One of the shallops
began to leak badly, left the other five vessels in the
convoy and retxirned to the Canaries. By this time, strong
winds had already begun to blow. By early morning of July
21, full hurricane winds were lashing the little vessels,
while they wallowed in a wild confusion of sea and spray.
All the iron cannon aboard the Almiranta were thrown into
the sea^ and many casks of water euid other supplies, in-
cluding seven millstones destined for use in Florida, were
thrown overboard to lighten ship. The priest had all he
could do to hear the seaunans' confessions and lead them in
fervent prayers for deliverance. When the winds finally
moderated at noon on July 23, the Almiranta found itself
sauLling alone. Meamwhile, the galiot La Vitoria, which
carried none of Menendez* troops but transported large
186
quantities of supplies, was lost on the windward coast of
Guadaloupe, in the Windward Islands, and its crew drowned
or fell victim to the Carib Indians. The caravel San
Antonio was blown far westward and finally arrived at the
port of Santo Domingo on Hispamiola. It was eventually
lost to the Florida expedition; French corsairs took the
vessel with more them a hundred of Pedro Men^ndez' soldiers
and substemtial cunounts of his own supplies.
The two remaining ships amchored on the leeward side of
Dominica, cmd sent ashore to seek wood and water. They left
Dominica August 8, passed Guadaloupe and Montserrat, nego-
tiated the Virgin Islands, and entered the harbor of San
Juan on August 13.
When the Adelantado had brought his small convoy through
the rocky harbor entrance and dropped emchor in San Juan har-
bor, it was evident that the first stage of his voyage to
conquer Florida had been disastrous. There had been a
serious depletion of Menendez* striking force, for several
vessels were missing, and he could see that the ships
gathered in Sam Juan had been badly maltreated by the storm.
Only hasty repairs were possible in Puerto Rico, but the
vessels were put in some semblence of sailing condition.
Other disappointments came to the Adelantado. As he
realized that Pedro de Las Ruelas, who was to provide him
with a major ship and its soldiers, had fallen behind him on
the journey. When Menendez left Spain he was 22 days behind
187
Ruelas' fleet — at the Canauries he had cut the time between
them to eight days. Now the Adeletntado had reached Puerto
Rico before them. Neither this reinforcement nor his own
contingent from the north of Spain would be immediately
availcible. Menendez also learned that the Seuito Domingo
authorities had not yet prepared their share of the striking
force for the Florida enterprise. In view of such defi-
ciencies, Menendez found it difficult to gather his
scattered forces and meet the French challenge. The
Adelantado could, nonetheless, perceive some very real
assets. One of these was the spearhead of the striking
force — San Pelayo. The ship was fast, heavily armed, amd
could carry a substcuitial number of soldiers and tonnage of
supplies. The Adelantado also discovered a fine ally in one
of the Royal Officials of Puerto Rico, Juan Ponce de Leon.
Ponce spremg from the founding feimily of the islcuid, that of
the first Adelantado of Florida, was a large landholder and
also served as Alcaide of the Fortaleza. Pedro Menendez
made common cause with Juan Ponce de Leon, gave him his
poder, cuid thus established another base in his personal
supply network. The Adelantado was able in this way to tap
a source of credit at San Juem, in return for which he granted
Ponce some rights expected to arise out of Menendez* trade
privilege in the Caribbeem. This would also facilitate the
planned purchase of cattle emd horses for Florida, Menendea
was able to obtain a ship in San Juan amd two small boats to
188
bolster his shattered fleet, and also enlisted 42 soldiers
in Scm Juan. This gain was partly offset by the desertion
of 30 of his men emd three of the priests who had come on
the Adelantado's ships. Menendez threatened the deserters
with perpetual galley sentences if they should ever be
caught, but there was little else that he could do. A
sixteenth-century military leader had often to face such
wholesale desertions.
While rapid repairs were made to the ships, the
Adelantado rearremged the organization of his soldiers to
replace the temporary, hasty formations established in
Cadiz. Menendez turned to the traditional Spanish military
formation, the tercio, perfected in the long Italian wars,
which ordinarily enrolled 12 to 15 companies under a
Maes t re de Campo. Each company was enrolled under a captain
and bore his name. The executive officer of the tercio was
a Sargento Mayor, emd the company was also served by an
Ensign, Chaplain, Sergeant, piper and drummer. Each was
further sub-divided into squadrons and a squadron-leader
p
(Cabo de esquadra) assigned to each.
To command his soldiery, Pedro Menendez chose his
future son-in-law, Pedro Menendez de Valdes. In this choice,
the Adelantado was consistent with his earlier selection of
lieutenants, for Valdes was of a major Asturian noble family
and related to the Archbishop of Seville. He was a trained
soldier in the arts of war who had served the Spanish Crown
189
in Italy. Although only 25 years of age, he was an experi-
9
enced soldier. He was, moreover, to be closely tied to
Hen^ndez by his coming mcurriage. On Aug\ist 13, 1565, aboard
Sam Pelayo in San J\iaxx harbor, Pedro Men^ndez de Vald^s was
invested with the office of Maestre de Campo for the Florida
enterprise in the following words:
"Pedro Men^ndez de Aviles, Governor and Captain
General of the land and of the provinces of
Florida emd Adelantado of then, says that I
have need for good government of these provinces
in order to expel the Lutheran French who are in
the said provinces, to discover the land and to
bring its natives to the service of God, our
Lord, and to the obedience of His Majesty. Thus,
I have need of naming a proper and sufficient
person, from among those I bring with me, to
be Maestre de Campo. Thus, Pedro Menendez de
Valdes, since you have the necessary qualities
... in the name of His Majesty, I name you to
such office for this enterprise. "10
Valdes* salary was to be 300 ducats a yeair, paid from the
Adelantado' s own resources. The two men began to create a
coherent organization from the formless mass of manpower
aboard the ships.
With the reorgcmization of his forces somewhat in hand,
the Adelantado reviewed his strategy for the conquest of
Florida. Although he knew that the French reinforcement had
left Dieppe before he had departed Cadiz, Menendez still felt
fairly sure that he could arrive at the River May before
Ribault's fleet. Since the French prisoners had advised him
of the location of Laudonni&re ' s fort, Menendez planned to
seize the river mouth and divide the French forces. He would
next fortify his base, and hold it until reinforcements frcan
190
Asturlas or the Indies would enable him to wipe out the
French. This plam was risky but urgently necessary, for if
the French should arrive first and unite their forces, it
would be very difficult to dislodge them. In order to en-
courage the lagging officials in Samto Domingo to provide
his reinforcements, Pedro Menendez sent Hernando de Miranda
there with the message that the royal contingent should
immediately be sent to Havana to join the Adelantado there.
As added inducement, he sent along a pilot skilled in the
navigation of the old Bahama Channel, together with a
current marine chart of the area.
One essential element in Menendez' plan was to use
mounted men to give his Florida campaign power and mobility
and to overawe the Florida Indians. Menendez arranged for
the purchase of some horses from Puerto Rico, but rough
weather sprang up as they loaded the animals aboard ship in
San Jucui harbor. Some of the horses got loose and knocked
down some of the ships' bulkheads, and most of the animals
had to be destroyed. Adding further to his growing sense
of unease, Menendez learned that a French corsair had cap-
tured the King's courier vessel carrying instructions to the
Audiencia in Santo Domingo about the rendezvous with the
Adelantado. He begem to fear a French ambush somewhere
along his known route to Florida.
On August 15, 1565, the little fleet left port. It
consisted of San Pelayo, the almiranta San Andres, the
191
shallop San Miguel, the galiot La Esperanza and the ship
which Menendez had obtained in Puerto Rico. The vessels
made their way westward along the north shore of Puerto
Rico, crossed the Mona Passage and came into sight of the
Hispanola coast on August 17, 1565. At this point, all of
the doubts emd concerns which had been building up in the
mind of Pedro Menendez coalesced, and compelled an abrupt
change in his plans. If he continued to Havcuia in the
doubtful hope of finding reinforcement there, he would run
the risk of interception by the French. The Adelantado
determined to forego any reinforcements eind strike out
directly for Florida. He chose to take an untried route
through the channels, shoals and islands of the Bcihamas,
which would avoid possible ambush amd would save precious
days. In taking this risky step with his diminished forces,
Pedro Menendez de Aviles was staking his whole enterprise
upon the gamble of first arrival in Florida,
As the ships set forth on their new couse, Pedro
Menendez and Maestre de Campo Valdes completed their military
reorganization amd auinounced the appointment of ten captains.
Each of his captcdns was in command of a company of 50 men.
Examination of the Adelantado 's military captains discloses
that they were all noblemen and experienced soldiers. Only
two of Menendez' 12 captains were soldiers paid by the
Crown; the rest were carried on his own account. Nine
captains — Baurtolome Menendez, Martxn Ochoa, Juan V^lez de
192
Medreuno, Juan de San Vicente, Antonio G6mez, Frcuicisco de
Recalde, Gonzalo Solis de Meras, Diego de Amaya and
Francisco de Castaneda were nortenos . Two of the men —
the Adelantado's brother Bartolom^ and Solis de Herds were
closely related to the Adelantado. Pedro Men^ndez thus
attempted to insure control over his organization by placing
his troops under the overall command of his Asturian son-in-
law, and relying upon those whom he trusted most — men from
the north of Spain. He appointed Gonzalo de Villareal to
the position of Sargento Mayor, and chose sergeants and en-
signs who were skilled in war and experienced in Italy.
Pedro Menendez* firm organization of his troops, which in-
cluded those 300 men who had been furnished by the Spanish
Crown, shows clearly that he assumed full jurisdiction as
Captain General for the enterprise of Florida. The Royal
troops were thoroughly integrated into his organization, and
there was no question of separate command. The seven
days' journey through Bahcima waters afforded time to accustom
the men to their new commanders, and to carry out some
training for the most inexperienced. An area was provided
on Scui Pelayo's decks where the men could practice the
loading, firing and cleaning of their arquebuses. The
Adelantado's fleet finally emerged into the Gulf Streeim, in
the vicinity of Grand Bahama Island, and sailed north and
west, taking advantage of the strong current of the Gulf
Stream, to seek landfall in Florida.
193
The chaplain's narrative describes a sign seen in the
heavens by the Spamish, diiring their first night in the
Bahama channel. Toward morning, there appeared to the
watcher's eyes the bright light of a comet which rapidly
made its way across the sky in the direction of Florida.
It seemed a good omen for the coming enterprise. After a
day and a half in the channel, the low coastline was finally
sighted in the vicinity of Cape Canaveral.
Meanwhile, the summer months in Spain were passing in
a fever of anxiety and activity for Philip II. At the time
of Menendez' departure from Cadiz, the Spanish King knew
that Ribault's fleet of reinforcement had already sailed.
In view of its departure, he had decided not to treat
directly with the French rulers about the matter, but rather
to send a copy of the May 5 parecer of the Council of the
Indies to his representative at Bayonne, the Duke of Alba.
Alba was then to bring the matter up on the proper occasion.
Later it was decided that the issue of Florida should not be
raised at all at Bayonne, since it might becloud the major
concern of Spain at the meeting — that of the conservation
and advancement of the Catholic faith in France. Thus the
two monarchs most concerned chose to avoid a direct con-
frontation over Florida vrfiile their fleets sailed to their
inevitable clash there.
During the long time of waiting, before any real
intelligence could come from the Indies, it was inevitable
194
that mixnors and intrigue should flourish. Early in July,
Philip II heard from his ambassador in London who reported
the rumor that eight French ships and 1,200 men were being
18
prepared in Englamd to go to Florida. Perhaps this re-
ferred to the second reinforcement which the Spcmish feared
was forthcoming to back up Ribault's fleet eind further
strengthen French fortifications in Florida.
In the meemtime, in Andalusia, the fincmcial embarrass-
ment of the Seville mercheints was relieved somewhat by the
arrival of the New Spain fleet on July 10 but commercial
conditions continued somewhat disturbed. Governor Mazariegos
of Havana had sent five of the Frenchmen captured in the
port of Arcos the previous December in one of the ships.
After interrogation, the men were placed in the Casa jail.
While Frenchmen's confessions were being taken, the Seville
officials were still discussing another deposition recorded
four days before the fleet dropped anchor in the Bay of
Cadiz, when one Juan Sanchez had stated to the Casa officials
at Cadiz that he had just come from Florida. Sanchez
claimed that he had been captured seven months before in the
Beihama channel by a 500-ton French ship. According to the
man's story, he was carried a prisoner to the French fort in
Florida, which he described in great detail. He claimed
that it was a stone fortress with four towers which mounted
40 pieces of artillery and had a garrison of 3,000 English-
men and 2,000 Frenchmen. The Captain of this supposed
195
settlement, said Slinchez, was one Robert Hawkins, an English-
man. Having given his testimony, the man disappeared, emd
neither he nor his con5>anions could be found by agents of
the Casa de Contrataci6n. On August 15, the Seville dffi-
19
cials sent the message to the King.
Now Philip II had occasion to weigh the adequacy of his
me2isures to expel the French and expunge their threat to
the Spanish Indies. He and his counsellors had previously
understood that a sizeable French reinforcement would be
forthcoming. After they learned of the departure of
Ribault's ships, the Spanish came to believe that other
French vessels were also being prepared to go to Florida.
By the end of July, the Speinish King decided that the mea- .
sures previously taken — the sending of the Menendez expedi-
tion eind the troops and ships to be provided for the
Adelantado in the Indies — were insufficient. Philip
notified the Casa in Seville that the previous efforts were
not enough to dislodge the French already in Florida cind the
others who had gone and would shortly go to reinforce them.
The King saw the threat as substantial and widespread, ex-
teding to all the islands of the Spanish Caribbean, and told
his officials in Seville that planned to reinforce Menendez
further by raising fifteen hundred armed troops and sending
another armada to Florida. Philip added that he felt that
this reinforcing fleet should be sent, if possible, that
very Augvist and should go supplied for a year.
196
As the effort began to locate appropriate vessels for
Royal embargo auid to begin the recruitment of troops for the
new expedition, still more news and rumor Ccune to the
Spanish officials.
As Pedro Menendez' ships sighted the Florida coast and
moved northward toward Fort Caroline, testimony was being
taken in Seville from yet another witness of French activity,
The treasurer of the Casa de Contrataci6n received the sworn
deposition of a man who claimed to have left Le Havre on
the previous August 16, where he saw four ships being armed
and equipped for a voyage to Florida.
As the summer of alarms and rumors drew to a close,
concrete activity for the arming of the second Florida ex-
pedition slowly got underway, but the fleet was not ready
to sail by the end of September. On September 4, however,
the Seville officials reported to Philip II that captains
had been appointed to recruit 1,500 troops and supplies and
munitions for the airmada were being slowly gathered and
placed in the storehouses in Seville. The Casa had pre-
viously advised Philip of their difficulty in finding
suitably seaworthy vessels and cannon. It was now clear
that the Spanish reinforcement could not arrive in Florida
in time to aid Pedro Menendez in his immediate tactical
situation. They might still arrive in time to bolster what
the Crown now saw as a lengthy effort to dislodge a numerous
and demgerous foe. Meeuiwhile, the issue lay firmly in the
197
hands of the Adelcintado. Since he had decided to strike
directly with the slim forces at his disposal, the contest
would be decided in Florida.
As Pedro Men^ndez sighted Cape Camaveral and turned his
course northward, the French fleet of reinforcement under
Jean Ribault was just about to cirri ve at the mouth of the
River May. Its outbound voyage from Freince had tedcen place
in two stages. As the Speinish had been told, Ribault had
indeed sailed from Dieppe on May 22, 1565 after receiving
his final orders from Admiral Coligny. It is evident that
the French commander had also received some word of the
22
Menendez expedition being prepared in Ccidiz. Weather com-
pelled the French fleet to take refuge on the Isle of
Wight for more than two weeks. After their Atlantic
crossing, the French arrived at the Gulf Stream in the
vicinity of 27** of north latitude, and they crossed directly
to the Indian River area. When they landed to seek fresh
water at a small inlet, the Frenchmen traded with Indians
for silver from wrecked Spanish ships, and found a Spanish
castaway who had been captive there for 20 years. Ribault
took the man cJaoeurd his ships cind sailed northward to find
Laudonniere ' s fort .
There is striking contrast between the voyages of Pedro
Menendez and Jean Ribault. Although both fleets required
two months for their ocean crossings, the French dissipated
the two-week lead they held over the Spanish. While Pedro
198
Menendez was driven by urgency to risk the Bahama passage
with his reduced forces, Ribault was leisurely cruising the
Florida coast on his way to Fort Caroline. Thus, on the day
that Jecin Ribault dropped emchor off the St. Johns, Pedro
Menendez had already made his Florida landfall at Cape
Canaveral .
While the opposing fleets made their way to Florida,
the Laudonni^re settlement had undergone a summer of crisis.
After the return of the mutineers from the Caribbean late in
May and the punishment of their ringleaders, Rene de
Laudonni^re had found himself increasingly hcird-pressed to
keep order among his men as their necessity increased. The
reinforcements he had long expected from France had not
arrived, cmd the search for food among the Indians had en-
dangered the good relations LaudonniSre had sought to main-
tain with the natives. On August 3, the colony had been
revived by the visit of John Hawkins, who brought food and
sold a small ship to the Frenchmen. After the English
corsair had left, Laudonni^re and his men prepared to vacate
Fort Caroline and return to France. By August 15, their
supplies were ready, and only a fair wind was lacking to
speed their departure.
When the Indians brought word to the French fort that
several sails were in sight off the river mouth, LaudonniSre
feeu'ed that his Spanish enemy had come upon him. His suspense
wets ended the next afternoon when seven small craft crossed
199
the river bar, loaded with armed soldiers, and with banners
snapping in the breeze. The Hugenots ashore could see the
hulls of seven larger vessels euichored offshore, and
fineilly the forces met, to be mutually identified as French.
The Ribault reinforcement had almost come too late, but it
had at last arrived.
Ribault began the lengthy process of unloading sup-
plies, munitions and troops from his ships. He had arrived
with %n:itten Royal orders that he replace Rene de Laudonni^re
and send him home, but the newly-arrived French leader
offered to keep his predecessor in charge at Fort Caroline.
Laudonniere set to work with his own men and the newly
arrived Frenchmen to put the defenses of the fort in good
order, while the discharge of the ships was accomplished by
Pierre d'Ully, Ribault 's chief of finance and supply.
Laudonniere was worn by strain and labor, and fell ill for
Bore than a week while unloading continued. Finally, the
three smaller vessels Ribault had brought from France were
lightened enough by the discharge of their cargoes to pass
over the bar and enter the river, which they did on the
fourth of September. Off the inlet, the four main French
ships had swung around their cmchors to face a steady south
wind.
By mid-afternoon of the same day, lookouts eJaoard the
anchored vessels could see five sails coming north before
the wind. Then they were blotted from view by a summer
200
thunderstorm, which swept torrents of rain, laced with
lightning, across the sea. The oncoming ships, pushed
ahead by the squall winds, came to within a mile and a half
of the French anchorage before the breeze lightened and then
died con^letely. As the Frenchmen strained to identify the
limp flags on the mastheads of the strange ships, they could
not help but wonder if the Spanish had at last arrived in
Florida.
They were indeed the ships of Pedro Men^ndez. Since the
French prisoners had told him that the French fort lay in from
28** to 29" latitude, the Adelantado coasted northward from
his landfall, exploring every inlet and every plume of smoke
rising from the shore. On September 2, he had reached the
latitude of 29 1/2** and sent a shore party to examine an
24
Indiein settlement. After its captaiin reported to the
Adelantado that the Indicins seemed to possess information
about the French fort, Men^ndez went ashore himself to par-
ley with them. It was most important to Men^ndez to impress
upon the natives his own personal authority as surrogate of
the Castilian King, in order to seek allies against the
French and to aid in his future plans for colonization. The
visit was most successful, cind convinced the Adelantado that
even though he had passed the latitude where the French fort
was supposed to bo, he should continue to the north to seek
it.
201
On the next morning, which was the 4th of September,
the five Spanish vessels picked their way along a shoreline
of wide and spacious beaches. About two in the afternoon,
they sighted four anchored vessels moored off the mouth of a
great river. As the afternoon thunderstorm swelled and
burst in a shower of rain, Men^ndez' look-outs discerned
French standards flying fran the Trinity, Ribault's flag-
ship. Immediately the news was brought to him, Pedro
Menendez experienced a great revulsion of feeling. Since
he had learned in C5diz that French reinforcements had
sailed from Dieppe, every fibre of Men€ndez' being had been
stretched to beat the French to Florida. His entire voyage,
and his vital decision to go directly to Florida without
reinforcements was predicated on one thing — to arrive first
at the mouth of the River May. Now he had lost the race and
Jeem Ribault had won. As the gusty winds of the summer
squall died and choppy waters became glassy calm, the
Spanish ships drifted, making no headway toward the enemy.
The Adelantado quickly weighed the state of his forces cmd
determined, as soon as the wind would permit, to attack at
sea."
Finally, well after night had fallen, the breeze began
to blow again, filling the sails of the Spanish ships and
bringing them closer to the amchored French. Menendez
determined to proceed in the dark, anchor closely among the
French ships and be in position to attack them at first dawn.
202
In that way, the French men within the river would not have
time to furnish any aid to their f oxir larger ships , As the
great San Pelayo and the four smaller Spanish vessels
glided among the French ships cuid let go their anchors,
hails and shouts were exchanged. The first questions were
meant, by both sides, to furnish positive identification.
The Spanish asked specifically who commcuided the French
forces, amd were told in reply that Jean Ribault was the
leader authorized by the King of France. The French then
queried the Spanish flagship, put the same question, and
received the reply that they were indeed Spanish, led by the
rightful Adelantado of the provinces of Florida, Pedro
Menendez de Aviles. They were further told that the right-
ful ruler of these lands emd waters. King Philip II, had
given his Adelantado orders to bum eind hang the Lutheran
French he might find there. In the morning, the French
vessels would be boarded, and if they proved to be such
people, the justice of the Spanish King would surely be
carried out.
After this exchange, an outburst of shouts and curses
came in a babble of tongues. Someone called out from the
'frinite, taunting the Spanish and asking why they should
wait xintil morning. Pedro Menendez decided to attack, even
though it was dark. He had anchored San Pelayo so closely
to the French flagship that the current had swxing the great
galeass' stern right around to the bow of Trinity. Menendez
203
ordered his anchor line to be paid out, so that the two
vessels %rould come alongside each other for boarding. As he
gave this order, all the French ships cut their anchor
lines, raised their sails, emd began to move away to lee-
ward. Since the large bronze cannon on San Pelayo's decks
were shotted for action against the French, the artilleros
got off five shots at the fleeing Frenchmen, but could not
discern in the darkness what damage had been done to
Trinite by the Spanish fire.
As soon as they could get underway, Menendez and Diego
Flores Valdes led contingents of the Spanish fleet in a
night-long chase of the French, but, with vessels still
bearing the marks of the July hurricane, the Spanish were
unable to catch the more rapid-sailing French. At dawn,
it was evident to Menendez that his enemy had escaped, so he
determined to put his original plan into motion. Calling
his scattered forces together, he sailed back again to the
river mouth, where he proposed to seize the point of land
adjoining the inlet. By interdicting the river to the
French forces off-shore, he could carry out his first ob-
jective. What the Adelantado had not coxinted on, however,
was that almost all of the French soldiery had disembarked
and was, in fact, drawn up in fine order on shore, while the
three smaller French vessels had stationed themselves as a
barrier right across the river mouth. Since Pelayo could
204
not cross the bar and heavy forces opposed him ashore,
Menendez decided not to accept the challenge. He sailed
south to make his own estaJalishment and take up what might
prove to be a long campaign.
Examination of the opposing forces in Florida at this
point can provide some evaluation of their relative
strengths, as they faced each other for mastery. Insofar as
naval tonnage was concerned, the Spanish held an almost
two-for-one edge, but a large part of this tonnage was in
one ship — the galeass San Pelayo. That great gun-platform
could indeed outrange any opponent, but was still not fully
re-rigged after the hurricane had struck it west of the
Canaries. The Friench had, in fact, just demonstrated that
26
they could outsail Men^ndez' vessels. In the holds of the
French vessels lay an enormous wealth of bronze artillery,
which remained only a potential weapon until the dismounted
gxjuis could be put into service. Insofar as manpower was
concerned, the two opponents were nearly equal. Menendez
advised that he commanded some 800 souls — 500 soldiers, 200
seamen and 100 others. On the French side, there were an
equivalent number of soldiers, possibly 200 hundred officers
and sailors, and the remaining effectives from Laudonni&re's
original garrison of 300, depleted by death, disease and
27
corsairing in the Caribbean. The main striking force, in
any land action would be the armed and trained arquebusier,
of which each side possessed 500. With regard to the matter
205
of supply, it appears that the ship losses Pedro Men^ndez
had suffered to date had not destroyed his basic store of
supplies, food, cmd munitions, much of which was still
safely stowed aboard San Pelayo. On their side, the French
had come well supplied for cm expedition of settlement and
conquest, a part of which had been unloaded. In sum, after
striking some balemce of advantages and disadvemtages , the
two sides were roughly equal. Under such circumstances,
the decisive factor would be that of leadership, as the
action begem.
The Spanish fleet sailed southward, then anchored off the
wide bar of St. Augustine, which they had discovered a few
days before. On the 8th of September, with ceremony and
ritual, the Adelantado of Florida was landed from his
vessels and formally took possession of the Icmd in the name
of the King of Spain. Pedro Menendez de Avil^s was then
sworn in as Adelantado as well as Captain General and
Governor, together with the captains and officials of the
expedition. The occasion was not a mere ceremony nor did it
simply mark a beginning date for the Spanish occupation of
Florida. It held much greater significance.
The first stage of a Spanish conquest — that of the
construction of the political foundation upon which its
social and economic structure should be built — was then and
there accomplished. The first essential, the act of
possession-t2Jcing itself, done with solemnity cmd made a
206
public record, fulfilled the requirements of the King's
28
ordinances for conquest.
To halt at this point, however, would be to overlook a
vital part of the machinery for Spanish conquest and settle-
ment. A major purpose of an Adelantado was to introduce a
most significant medium of conquest — the municipal institu-
tions of Spain. ^^ One of these institutions — the concejo —
was juridically based on the military and governmental cen-
ter which was the city proper, but its limits and its in-
fluence extended far beyond that area. In St. Augustine,
each man could expect to become a vecino or citizen of the
municipality who would be granted a city lot, his solar, and
would also be given Icind to cultivate in the rural sections
of the concejo. Through the estates thus granted, the
Spanish municipality reached out into the country as the
primary institution of settlement. The role of the Adelan-
tado was essential in establishing, protecting and commanding
this organism. In each of the Florida settlements to be
made, beginning with St. Augustine, Men^ndez named the Al-
calde and Reqidores of the first cabildo. Royal Treasury
officials would later be named. There was thus created a
microcosm of Castilian civilization to effect the conquest,
as the Spanish ventured forth into new and uncertain terri-
tory, basing their enterprise firmly upon their cuicient
urban customs. Pedro Menendez moved to fulfill these tra-
ditions. As noted by Barcia:
207
"The Adelantado had set up the courts and the
municipal government in St. Augustine and left
as Alcalde his brother Bartolome, who had al-
ways been a governor. He held the first
session of the Cabildo with the officers of the
AyuntamientOy who were the captains. It was
decided that appeal from the sentences handed
down by the Alcalde and Regidores would be
handled by the Maestre de Campoy whom he had
named his Lieutenant General/ in accordance
with the royal authority he possessed. "^l
At St. Augustine, the first step had been made. To
those who took part that day in the ceremonies of establish-
ment, the other steps would shortly follow. Their expecta-
tions were great, for every free man, no matter how humble,
could hope at least for the status of labrador, farmer, and
would gain land for his own cultivation. Each man hoped to
raise his status, but this advance would be along a well
known and traditional scale. As a matter of course, the
hierarchial society of Asturias or Andalusia would be re-
produced in Florida. The higher the rank of the settler,
the more exalted his vision of his future estate. If he
were but a soldier, he could hope for land and profit. If
he were noble, his expectations were greater — he could
picture his city and country homes, complete with Spanish
and Indian vassals, land, cattle, and horses. He hoped for
profit through familiar and established agricultural enter-
prise: the raising of cattle for local consxamption and
hides and the cultivation and refining of sugar for export.
It was evident that this hoped-for Utopia of mutual
hopes could only be built where there were peaceful and
208
fmitful relationships with the Florida Indicms, a number of
whom attended emd observed the ceremonies of possession-
teJcing and governmental establishment that day in St.
Augustine. The Spemish who came to Florida found themselves
in the midst of one of the great culture-areas of the
native peoples of the southeast. From a line north of the
St. Johns and St. Marys rivers westward to the Aucilla River
southward to Charlotte Harbor and Cape Canaveral lived the
people known as Timucuans. Although these Indians generally
shared cultural characteristics, they were divided into
separate, warring groupings. The most powerful chief was
Saturiba, whose seat of authority was located close to Fort
Ccuroline, near present-day Mayport. Further north dwelt
the Tacatacuru. To the south, up the St. Johns River, was
the home of chief Calibay. Even further south dwelt the
rival to Saturiba, Utina, and in the very upper reaches of
the St. Johns lay the kingdom of Macoya or Mayaca. Some of
the best descriptions of the life and culture of the north-
eastern Florida Indiems came from the French, particularly
through the narrative and pictures of Jacques Le Moyne de
Morgues and the insights recorded by Ren^ de LaudonniSre.
The 16th century Adelantados such as Pedro Men^ndez had no
appreciation of compeurative religion or interest in anthro-
pology. Menendez does, however, describe the northeastern
Florida Indians with some insight in the following passage:
209
"The ceremonies of these natives, for the
greater part, are to worship the Sun and
Moon; they have dead stags emd other animals
for idols. Each year they make three or
four feasts for their devotions , where they
worship the Sun. They are three days with-
out food, drink or sleep; these are their
fasts. He who is weak, who cannot suffer
this, is taken for a bad Indian. He goes
about scorned by the noble people. He who
passes best through these troubles is taken
for the principal, and is given the most
courtesy. They are a people of many
strengths, swift, and great swimmers. They
have many wars with each other, and no chief
among them is recognized as powerful. "32
If is the best measure of the distance which the
Florida conquest would have to travel in order to realize
the expectations of the Spaniards that relations with the
Florida Indians were in a very primitive first stage, one
of mutual exploration at arms' length. In this time of
first contact, Men^ndez elected to act with caution, because
of legal proscriptions against the exploitation of the
Indians, and because of the existing state of affairs in
Florida. The Spanish had landed in a place where the French
had clearly established a degree of influence with the
Indians, cmd the native cultures were in a condition of
strong organization. By contrast, the Spanish invaders had
as yet insufficient number and power to effect a total
conquest, so Menendez sought to implant Spanish settlements
alongside of the Indian cultures without disturbing their
essential rights in the land. He did not endeavor to change
at once their religious and political arremgements .
210
Kherever he went in Florida, the Adelantado proclainved the
overlordship of Philip II as rightful ruler of the land, and
sought to make agreements with the Indiems based upon this
concept. As a practical matter, however, the Spanish
lacked the power to enforce the relationship. They were,
Boreover, dealing in a situation of war; even though the
Crown forbade alliances with one Indian group against em-
other, the realities of the French-Spanish struggle
dictated that some Indiams would be friends and some would
be enemies.
Far from reaching the stage of encomienda or reparti-
miento, relations between the Spanish emd the Florida
Indians were still in the stage of trade for booty known as
rescate. Under the agreement with his Indian friends, Pedro
Menendez was to receive tribute in the name of his King.
Before the pacification of the country had reached the state
where outlying agricultural settlements could function in
peace, tribute was to be paid at the top level — from Indian
chiefs directly to the Adelantado. Evangelization of the
natives had to await further developments. In this first
stage, when the number of interpreters was few and the
language barrier requisitely great, religious contact was
limited. The clergymen who had come on the first expedition
were intended to provide religious examples to the Indians
and to furnish the sacraments to the Spaniards in the expedi-
tion. They could accustom the natives to the broad outlines
211
of the Christian faith amd give some hint of the mystic
power of its chief symbols, but more complete religious in-
struction and the use of the doctrina would have to await
the coming of trained missionaries and a more settled rela-
tionship with the Indians.
On the day of the formal possession-tadcing at St.
Augustine, Pedro Men^ndez named his brother Bartolom^
Governor of the district of St. Augustine, which extended
from San Mateo to the river of Mosquitos. Bartolomd was also
designated Alcaide, or warder of the fort. As the Adelantado
signed the formal certificate of appointment for his brother,
the men in^jroved that part of Chief Seloy's village which
they were Iciboring to convert into a fort. The language of
the document imparts the atmosphere in St. Augustine that
day :
Because the Lutheran French are fortified
... teaching their evil sect among the
Indians, I need to establish arrangements
here, while I go to expel them ... it is
necessary to make a fort in the port of St.
Augustine to guard the port so that His
Majesty's vessels Ccin navigate freely . . .
they are making a place in it where the
artillery and munitions will be . . .^-^
In the meantime, the French, having felt out the Spanish
forces in their first skirmish, and having reconnoitered the
Spanish establishment at St. Augustine, returned to Fort
Ceuroline where Jean Ribualt and his captains assembled for a
council in the bedroom of the ailing Rene de Laudonniere.
From the friendly Indian Emola, they had word that the
212
Spanish had begun to build a fort, and had landed in force
to establish themselves there. It was decided in the coun-
cil that they should descend upon the Spanish with all their
leur^er ships, for the enemy might be caught with his forces
divided %^ile unloading supplies. In spite of Laudonni^re's
objection to the plan, the motion carried amd most of the
French left the fort, even taking along 38 of LaudonniSre ' s
soldiers. Estimates of the garrison remaining in Fort
Caroline ranged from 150 to 240. It had been substantially
weeJcened in order to bolster up the marine striking force.
Ribault left the Sieur de Lys to aid Laudonniere in the
fort. After delaying two days to assemble their forces, the
four meiin vessels of Ribault 's fleet sailed southward to-
gether with a number of small craft, carrying altogether
400 soldiers and 200 seamen.
In the meantime, Pedro Men^ndez was increasingly anx-
ious over the safety of his most valuable asset, San Pelayo,
and was fearful that it might be captured by the French or
lost in a September storm on the little-known Florida coast.
Even though its cargo was not fully discharged, Men^ndez
determined to send the galeass to Hispaniola. He unloaded
much of the arms and ammunition from the great ship, but
left the bulk of the food supplies aboard. This left him
enough rations ashore to last him into January, when he
hoped to have San Pelayo back. It was after midnight on
the 10th of September when San Pelayo sailed, and when dawn
213
broke on the morning of the 11th, Spanish seamen and sol-
diers were caught unloading munitions near the St. Augustine
bar when the French fleet suddenly appeared. Even though
the tide was low, Menendez was able to escape across the bar
to safety. The French, after sailing around briefly, went
off to the southward, seeking to find and destroy the San
Pelayo.
On the second day after the French attack, a storm,
which may well have been a hurricane — struck the area. It
began with strong and heavy north winds, which (as Menendez
sensed at once) prevented the French from returning immed-
iately to their base. His instincts also told him that the
French had left no great garrison at Fort Caroline, and had
probably put their best troops into their marine assault.
He was told by friendly Indians that one could reach the
lower St. Johns and Fort Caroline by way of the Matanzas
River, and could thus take the French works from the rear.
Pedro Menendez decided to attack, left less than 300 men at
St. Augustine under the charge of Bartolom^ Menendez, and
set out on the 18th of September to assault Fort Caroline.
Menendez' 500 arquebusiers, led by their captains, were
guided by Pedro de Valdes and the Adelantado himself in the
general direction given by the Indians. Once they reached
the neeir vicinity of the fort, they would be guided by one
of the French prisoners brought from Spain. During the
storm, heavy rains had fallen and continued to fall during
214
the next several days. The route of the Spaniards carried
them along low areas west of the samdy coastal ridge and led
them alongside broad, grassy sloughs. In normal weather,
small streams wound through the marsh grass in these low
areas, but the inundations of rain had converted these low-
lands into lakes. The normal banks were overrun and the
water rose into the tangled underbrush which lay beyond. In
such conditions, the march was difficult and arduous. In
the vanguard went Basque axmen who could prepare the way for
the little army. By the evening of Septen±>er 19, the
Adelantado estimated that they had come 45 miles, and were
less than three miles from the site of the fort. The
Spanish column left the low and marshy land, crossed open
pine-barrens, and finally reached rolling country. Here,
near the banks of the river, was deep virgin forest, studded
with many magnificent oak and maple trees and covered
thickly by wild grapevines.
At nightfall, the leaders and their captains labored to
gather the straggling forces and camped for the night in
great discomfort from the continuing rains. Sometime before
daybreak, the men were aroused and the Frenchman begem to
direct the Spanish toward Fort Caroline. At this point,
Menendez* puarpose was only to try the defenses of the fort
after an approach under cover of the woods on the south side.
The French garrison inside the works was markedly in-
ferior in numbers to the Spanish force which approached it.
215
in about the ratio of one to two. The make-up of the
garrison itself, moreover, rendered its inferiority even
greater. Perhaps less them 100 of those within the fort
were capable of bearing arms. The worst weakness of Fort
Caroline, however, was its lack of vigorous leadership,
for authority for the garrison was divided between the Sieur
de Lys cind Rene de Laudonni^re. As a result of this divi-
sion of command and the illness of Laudonni^re, little had
been done to put the fort into a state of defense. Some
work had been accomplished on the palisades, but a strong
and vigilant guard was not being maintained.
As dawn broke over Fort Caroline amid pelting rain,
some of the sentinels left their posts because of the
weather. The Spanish drew near the fort, discovered a lone
French sentry outside and captured him. Pedro de Vald^s then
led the way as the Spanish quickly forced the poorly defended
main gate with two battle standards carried by his side.
The Spanicirds swarmed in after their flags and quickly took
the fort. As the Frenchmen poured out of their lodgings in
their nightclothing, they were cut down. One hundred and
thirty-two were killed within the fort in what, by all
accounts, must have been a confused, violent scene. A French
eyewitness has described the slaughter:
They made a pretty butchery of it, except for a
small enough number, among which were the
deponent, three drummers (one from Dieppe, the
other two from Rouen) , and four trumpeters (three
from Normamdy and the other, named Jacque DuLac,
from Bordeaux) . 36
216
Forty-five men climbed the stockade amd escaped into the
woods, or plunged into the river in an attempt to reach the
French vessels anchored near the fort. Among these were
Rene de Laudonni^re himself, the carpenter Le Challeux, and
the artist Jacques Le Moyne. Pedro Men^ndez, who entered
the fort after the first wave of attackers, called out to
his men to spare the women cind children huddled within the
huts. Some 50 of these were granted their lives.
When he had gained control of the fort, Mendndez held
parley with Jacques Ribault, son of the French commander,
aboard the Pearl anchored just off the fort stockade. When
negotiations broke down, the Spanish opened fire with a
cannon and sank one of the small vessels. The men aboard
Pearl and Levri^re cut their cables and moved down closer
to the river mouth, to a place of comparative safety,"'^
The Adelantado surveyed the arms of the captured fort,
but found only a few bronze guns with some ammunition. The
spoils of war also included 200 casks of flour and wine,
some hogs, sheep and donkeys, and a quantity of silver the
French had obtained from the Indians. The victorious
Spanish soldiery appropriated most of the booty, except for
the food, artillery and ammunition, which Menendez put under
guard. He also had come into possession of two small French
craft as well as the sunken ship in the river; another boat
was found under construction near the fort.
217
The rejoicing and feasting of the victors was somewhat
tempered by the discovery in the fort of some of the books
and symbols of the Huguenot religion. These, and the
presence of the heretic women and children, gave the Spcuri-
iards deep disquiet. Men^ndez made a mental note to have
the French dependents sent away as soon as possible. He
began to negotiate with the Indians for the ransoming of
some of those men who had fled Fort Caroline and been
captured by Satxiriba's Indians. The French nobles would be
valuable properties whose ransom could bring large sums
38
from their families in Fraince.
Those surviving Frenchmen who had escaped searching
Spaniards and the Indiems gathered aboard a little cluster
of 2mchored vessels near the river mouth. After consulta-
tion between Jacques Ribault cuid Ren^ de LaudonniSre, the
three smaller craft were scuttled cind sunk in the river.
On September 25, the French set out in the Pearl and Levridre
for France without any attempt to join Jean Ribault. Pedro
Menendez wished to take the escaped Frenchmen and return to
his St. Augustine base to protect it against assault by Jeein
Ribault. On September 23, the Adelantado set out across the
same country he had traversed the week before, and left a
garrison behind in the captxired fort, now renamed San Mateo,
under the commcind of Gonzalo de Villaroel. At St. Augustine,
his welcome and the celebration of his victory was tumul-
tuous .
218
In deep contrast, there was no joy whatever among the
men who had been aboard Jeein Ribault's ships. The storm
which had lashed the coast and interrupted the raid on
Pedro Menendez on the 11th of September had driven the
ships to the southward. Desperately, the shipmasters
attempted to claw their way out to sea, but as the strong
winds shifted and they lost sails, masts and rudders, the
vessels were driven toward the shore. One by one, they
stranded and broke up in the heavy surf. Three of the
heavier ships were wrecked in the vicinity of the Mosquito
(Ponce de Leon) inlet, and many of their men drowned in the
churning seas. The flagship Trinite, with its commander and
crew, grounded intact not far from Cape Canaveral and most
of its men came safely ashore. One smaller craft managed to
make its way free of the winds and seas. Its crew decided
to leave Florida waters and go to the Caribbean. ^^
The shipwrecked men found themselves lost upon a hos-
tile shore, with their supplies destroyed or damaged in the
storm. As Indians appeared along the beaches to raid the
scattered survivors, the castaways gathered into two large
parties for mutual defense. One of these was formed of
survivors from the Trinite; the other of men from the other
ships. After mutual communication the separate groups began
a long trek northward, headed for Fort Caroline.
In the mecmtime, Pedro Menendez had begun to take stock
of his resources in order to be ready to strike again at his
219
enemies. Having disposed of the French fort, his major con-
cern was the marine striking force of Jeam Ribault. He was
now ready for San Pelayo to retxirn with his reinforcements
from Santo Domingo and Havana, for he realized that the
supplies aboard his galeass would soon be sorely needed in
Florida. He sent Gonzalo Gay6n in San Andres to search for
Pelayo in the islands, and dispatched Juan Rodriguez on the
same errand in San Mateo, a renamed vessel which had once
been French. It was also necessary to resupply the sol-
diers sent by the Crown and outfitted at C^diz, for many of
them, Menendez claimed, had left their arms and clothing
aboard San Pelayo in the haste of its departure. Pedro
Menendez furnished the men from his own stores, and the men
signed a document agreeing that they had received 150 reales'
41
worth of goods apiece.
On September 28, friendly Indians brought the
Adelantado the news that mamy Frenchmen had gathered on the
south shore of a small inlet of the sea 18 miles from St.
Augustine. With one company of men. Chaplain Mendoza
Grajales, and a French prisoner for interpreter, Menendez
set out and arrived at the inlet at dawn on September 29.
After some shouted exchanges across the water, Menendez and
his interpreter spoke at length with a French pilot and ship-
master. The Frenchman told Menendez frankly the situation
of his marooned countrymen. After Pedro Menendez broke the
news of the taking of Fort Caroline to the envoy, he sent
220
him back to his fellows with the message that he was their
enemy, bound to pursue them with fire and blood war to
extermination. Shortly a French nobleman came to parley
with Men^ndez, asking for their lives in return for
surrender. The Adelantado claims that he said that they
could place themselves at his mercy, but that he made them
no guaramtees of safety.
As a practical matter, the options open to the French
at Matanzas were few and poor. If they turned away to the
southward, they could only expect starvation, death or
captivity at the hands of the Indians. The friendly base
to which they had been marching was now occupied by their
enemy. They chose to surrender, and were ferried across
the inlet in small parties. Their hands were tied, and
they were taken a short distcince beyond, to a place out of
sight behind the dunes. Pedro Men^ndez removed the French
pilot, four carpenters and caulkers, and 12 Breton sailors
from the group of bound men. He spaured their lives, and
43
had the rest put to the knife.
Menendez returned to St. Augustine with his prisoners.
Since he had learned that Jean Ribault still lived, he
feared that Ribault might refloat his flagship and threaten
the Spanish settlement. The Adelantado placed cannon at the
St. Augustine bar and posted sentinels and lookouts. He
began his first report to his King since the taking of the
French fort. Writing with an obvious feeling of elation.
221
the Asturian recounted the events of his victories over the
enemy, listed the booty found in the fort and described his
general strategic situation. Men^ndez emphasized anew the
continuing threat posed by the French to the whole Atleintic
coastline and to the galleon routes. To counter the danger,
the Adelantado proposed to build a fort further south, to
anchor the Bcihama Cheinnel and complement the works at Havana
and St. Augustine. He then shifted his subject to a major
interest — his future settlements in the north.
Men^ndez stated that he would go first to Santa Elena
to found a colony. Then he would pass along to the Bay of
Santa Maria, where, he again reminded Philip II, lay the key
to the entire continent. It was there that the great water-
way to the southwest, which offered a new and shorter route
to return the New Spain silver to Spain, lay waiting. He
pleumed to protect this route by fortifying a town in the
Province of Co9a, inland at the foot of the mountains. The
^reat kingdom thus secured would be rich in cattle, vine-
yards, and sugar plantings. Its timber resources would pro-
vide naval stores, so that ship-building could flourish
along its coasts. In Menendez* view, his mission in the
vast stretches of land called Florida was to "fix our fron-
tier lines here, gain the waterway of the Bahamas, and work
the mines of New Spcdn."
The King's Adelantado reminded his sovereign of the
costs he had undergone in his Florida effort. He advised
222
that he had committed a thousamd people so far to the
enterprise, counting those en route to Florida but not yet
arrived. Although the contract only obliged him to bring
500 persons for the conquest, he had asked Pedro del
Castillo to send 300 soldiers in addition to the 1,000
already committed. Menendez urged the King to increase the
Royal forces in Florida to the level of the promised 500.
For his own costs, the Adelantado stated that he would need
30,000 ducats. He pledged his willingness to devote all the
funds he could earn or borrow from his friends or kinsmen,
but begged that the King hasten the payment of monies due
him in Seville.
Pedro Menendez' letter writing was interrupted at this
point. First, news was brought to him of the burning of
Fort San Mateo; he dispatched food and munitions to the
place at once by sea, and realized that supplies would now
be shorter than ever. Then there came another urgent mes-
sage to the Adelantado; more Frenchmen had come to the in-
let where the first group had been killed, and among them
was Jeein Ribault. This time, Menendez took 150 armed men
emd arrived at the place at dawn on October 11. The drama
played out on the bauiks of the inlet now called Matemzas
followed much the same course as before. After almost an
entire day of negotiation, the French leader came himself
under a flag of truce to see the Adelantado of Florida.
When the two antagonists faced each other personally for the
223
first and last time, they met under vastly different cir-
cumstances than when the two fleets had clashed off the St.
Johns river mouth a month before. Although he attempted to
do so, Ribault could not move Pedro Menendez from his terms
of surrender: The Frenchmen must yield themselves entirely
to the mercies of the Spaniard. The next morning, half of
the French force chose to retain their liberty — they re-
treated southward away from the Spanish. Jean Ribault,
together with several of his captains and 70 of his men,
came to surrender amd be taken across the water. A few of
the Frenchmen were taken as captives and the rest were
killed. Among the dead was Jean Ribault. The major enemy
figrire had now been eliminated, together with the greater
45
part of his forces.
Menendez commissioned Diego Flores de Vald^s to sail at
once in the Scin Miguel to carry the tidings of victory to
Philip II. At the same time, he dispatched Francisco
Genoves to Puerto Rico with 50 Huguenot women and children,
survivors from Fort Caroline. Genovds was also to seek and
inquire further about the whereabouts of San Pelayo, now gone
more than a month from Florida. At this moment of triumph
for Pedro Menendez, he had no way of knowing that his great
ship had been seized by heretic mutineers aboard, and was
even then on its way to Europe where it was shortly lost on
the coast of Denmark.
224
Within two weeks after the second slaughter of the
French at the inlet of Matanzas, word came that many survi-
vors from the lost Ribault ships had gathered and fortified
themselves at Cape Canaveral. Pedro Men^ndez determined to
make a foray into the area of the great cape. The expedition
would serve to expunge the remaining French, to explore a
section where the Adelantado hoped to plant a fort, and
would also enable further search for Juan Men^ndez. In the
last of October, Pedro Men^ndez left St. Augustine with 250
men divided between a land and sea force. Three small craft
commanded by Diego de Amaya sailed southward close to shore.
Along the beaches marched the Adelantado with 150 of his
soldiers. The boats offshore carried the bulk of the
supplies and munitions for the expedition.
One early dawn in the very first of November, Pedro
Menendez approached a point just a few miles cibove the head-
Icmd of Cape Canaveral. There the Frenchmen had created a
rough earthworks surmounted by six bronze cannon from the
Trinite. Nearby, they had a small boat well along in con-
struction. Huguenot sentries gave the alarm as they spied
the morning sun flashing upon the helmets and armor of the
Spaniards. From the sea they could see three boats closing
in upon them. Alarmed, the Frenchmen fled over the sand
ridges through the low palmetto into deeper woods to the
westward. The Adelantado sent a French prisoner, a
trumpeter, to offer safety to the enemy if they would
225
surrender. Except for a few of their leaders, the French-
men ceune in and yielded to the Spemish. Perhaps 75 were
thus captured. The crude fort was burned, the boat des-
troyed, the cannon buried in the sand, cind the expedition
47
continued southward.
As his leind forces, swollen by the number of the French
prisoners, slogged along the long expanse of beach which
stretches like a cresent moon south from Cape Canaveral, the
Adelantado of Florida entered a new eind distinctive part of
his kingdoms. As the marching men moved down the narrowing
island they soon caught glimpses of the broad open waters of
the Indian River. Menendez could quickly see that the
waterway would afford protected navigation by small craft
which would enable more rapid and secure communication
along the central East Coast.
The Spcuiish had also entered a quite different culture-
area of the Florida Indians. The people who lived in this
area, who were called the Ais, had built a long and stable
culture organized almost entirely around the sea. Their
life was sustained by turtles, fish and shellfish from the
river, inlets and the ocean. Over 20 years of acquaintance
with Spanish shipwrecks along the east coast had accustomed
the Indiams to the taking of white prisoners and the salvage
of ships. By 1565, they had already built a reputation for
ferocity and cruelty which compelled the advamcing Spanish
to move with caution. When they ccune to the place where the
226
ISLXid between river eind oceem was a mere sand-spit, they had
arrived at a thick cluster of Indian villages and the
48
dwelling place of the chief of the Ais.
The first meeting between the Spanish and the Indian
chiefs went very well indeed. Although communication was
difficult between the men, Pedro Men^ndez cind the Cacique
Ais concluded em agreement, in which the Indian swore
fealty to Philip II and promised peace and obedience.
Menendez sealed the treaty with gifts of clothing and per-
sonal jewelry. He undertook no direct trade for bullion,
but noted the gold and silver ornaments worn by the Indians.
A number of the soldiers did engage in trading for the
precious metals. Since the need of the Spanish who had come
by land for food was becoming acute, they welcomed the
coming of the three supply boats with joy. When Amaya
lemded there was momentary relaxation from the tension which
short rations had brought, and the place was named "Puerto
de Socorro." It was soon realized, however, that the food-
stuffs on hand could not last the Spaniards and their French
prisoners for long and the Indians had little food which the
Spaniards would eat. To return to the forts in the north
would be no solution, for they had no reserves after the
burning of Fort San Mateo. The Adelantado decided, after
consultation with his captains, to proceed with his original
design to fortify the area, emd determined to leave Captain
Juan Velez de Medrano there with 200 men and 50 of the French
227
captives. His intention to populate the Indian River was
shown by the appointment of V^lez de Medrano as Civil
49
Governor as well as military commander of the district.
He himself would take two of the small craft, 50 men and
20 of his prisoners, and proceed directly to Cuba, and make
a link-up with the reinforcements coming from the north of
Spain or with the New Spain Capitana which was to await his
orders in Havana. After locating his men in a better
situation somewhat to the south of the complex of Indian
villages immediately surrounding that of the chief, Men^ndez
put to sea in the two small ships, pushed toward Cuba by
the strong north winds of winter. For the Adelantado, the
first phase of the conquest of Florida had ended.
NOTES
1. Pedro Men^ndez to Crown, n.d. (prob. October, 1567),
A.G.I. Escribania de Camara 1024-A. In this letter Men^ndez
describes the arrest of the heretics and their confinement.
2. A description of the re-arrangement of Men^ndez'
fleet at the Canary Islands is found in "Informaci6n sumaria
hecha en Cadiz," Pedro del Castillo, Cadiz, September 22,
1567, A.G.I. Escribania de Camara 1024-A. The muster is
described in "Informacion ante Alcalde," by Pedro Men^ndez
de Aviles, Madrid, October 16, 1567, in the same legajo.
Menendez mentions the stowaway of Valdes in his letter to
the Crown from Florida dated September 11, 1565, A.G.I.
Santo Domingo 231. This letter has also been reproduced in
Ruidiaz, La Florida II, 74-84. It has been translated and
reprinted in Charles Bennett, The Settlement of Florida
(Gainesville, Florida: University of Florida Press, 1968),
pp. 148-155, and is also in the Stetson Collection.
3. The Grajales narrative comes from A.G.I. Patronato
19. It has been reprinted in the Collecion Munoz. See
Real Academic de La Historia, Catalogo de la Collection de
J. B. Munoz (3 v., Madrid: Real Academic de la Historia,
1954-1956), II, folio 283-200 vto. It has also been repro-
duced in D.I., III, 441-479, as "Relacion del capellan
Francisco Lopez de Menanza Grajales." The narrative was
trcuislated by Benjamin F. French, and is found in his work
Historical Collections of Louisiana and Florida (New York:
A. Mason, 1875), pp. 191-234. Edward H. Lawson has made a
translation in his book Letters of Menendez (2 v., type-
script; St. Augustine: E. H. Lawson, 1955), pp. 167-176;
180-195. A more effective translation is found in Charles E.
Bennett, Laudonniere and Fort Caroline (Gainesville: Uni-
versity of Florida Press, 1964), pp. 141-163.
4. See Pedro Menendez to Crown, Puerto Rico, August 13,
1565, A.G.I. Santo Domingo 224. In Stetson Collection.
5. The loss of La Vitoria is described in "Ship Losses
of the Adelantado," n.d. (Noveir±>er, 1567), A.G.I. Escribania
de C£mara 1024-A. Menendez describes the loss of the caravel
in his letter to the Crown, Matanzas, December 5, 1565,
Seuito Domingo 115.
228
229
6. There are many discrepancies between the chronology
of the Mendoza Grajales narrative and that given by Pedro
Menendez in his letters to the Crown. The priest's story
was, however, written at some later date, while Menendez'
letters were current. Where there is conflict between dates,
therefore, the writer has chosen that given by the Adelan-
tado. For instance, Mendoza Grajales states that they
arrived at San Juan on the 10th of August while Menendez
gives the date as the 13th. As a check on the correctness
of Menendez' dating, the Adelantado mentions the arrival of
the Almiranta, in correspondence dated August 15, 1565,
and found in A.G.I. Santo Domingo 71. A previous letter,
which bore the date of August 13, did not mention that the
other ships had yet arrived, Solfs de Mer^s, in Pedro
Menendez de Aviles, 78, gives the date of arrival as
August 9.
7. Ponce advised that the poder enabled him to buy
amd sell goods so as to supply ships bound for Florida;
see his letter to the Crown, San Juan, April 20, 1566,
A.G.I. Santo Domingo 71, Stetson Collection. The King
acknowledged these services in a letter to Juan Ponce de
Leon from Madrid dated May 12, 1566, found in A.G.I.
Justicia 1,000, Stetson Collection. Menendez' description
of his connection with Ponce de Leon is found in his letter
to the Crown, dated August 15, 1565, from A.G.I. Santo
Domingo 71.
8. An effective description of the sixteenth century
Spanish military organization may be found in Rafael
Altamira y Crevea, Historia de Espana y de la civilizacidn
esoanola (4th ed. , Barcelona: J. Giu, 1928) , Tomo III,
2d5-294.
9. See supra, 132.
10. "Nombramiento de Pedro Menendez de Vald^s . . .
Maestre de Campo," in "Relacion de los bastimentos, artilleria,
armas . . . munioiones que recibio Juan de Junco . , .,•*
A.G.I. Contaduria 941, ramo 1 ... in microfilm, P. K.
Yonge Library of Florida History, University of Florida.
11. Menendez' plans and actions in Puerto Rico are well
described in his two letters to the Crown dated August 13
amd August 15, 1565, op. cit.
12. The decision to sail directly to Florida without any
stop in Havcuia is described by the Adelantado in his letter
to Philip II from St. Augustine, dated September 11, 1565,
A.G.I. Santo Domingo 231. From the Stetson Collection.
230
13. Father Lopez describes the ncunlng of the captains
in his narrative, on page 148 of the Bennett tr2mslation.
The Adelantado describes amd names ten of the captains whom
he had chosen in his letter of September 11, op. cit.
The naunes of the other captains were Diego de Alvarado,
Pedro de Laurrcuidia, and Francisco de Mexia.
14. A case in point was that of Graviel Ayala Salredo,
who was appointed Ensign at this time, Ayala was a member
of the three hundred-man Royal contingent, but was appointed
by the Adelantado to the reinX of Ensign in the troop
reorganization. Upon his return to Spain in 1570, Ayala
attempted to collect from the Crown the additional pay due
him for his post as Ensign, The Casa de Contratacion
demurred, saying that when the troops left Spain there
really were no officials, only squadron leaders. The Crown,
however, insisted on payment. Ayala 's petition is found in
A.G.I. Indiferente General 1,222 under the date of Deceinber 9,
1570, in Seville.
15. Father Mendoza Grajales and Pedrp Menendez are far
apcurt in the dates they assign to the sighting of Florida,
In his letter of September 11, the Adelantado advises that
the landfall was made around noon on "Sunday the 25th.''
The priest advises that the landfall did not occur until
"afternoon of Tuesday September 28th." Menendez erred —
the date of August 25 fell on a Saturday; Father Mendoza
Grajales had the days of the week right. The Adelantado 's
letter was, however, written much closer in time to the
event. Perhaps his dating is correct even though he has
erred in assigning the correct dates to the days of the
week. Gonzalo Solis de Meras' account of the landfall
agrees with that of the priest.
16. Woodbury Lowery in The Speinish Settlements, II,
111, cites a letter from Philip II to the Duke of Alba,
written on June 15th.
17. See Alba to Philip II, June 28, 1565, A.D.E.,
K. 1504, 30.
18. Amb. de Silva to the Crown, London, June 25,
1565, printed in D.I.E. LXXXIX, 173.
19. Sanchez' deposition is found in A.G.I. Patronato
267, No. 1, ramo 41; it is also in the Stetson Collection.
Notice of SSnchez' testimony was sent to Philip II in Casa
to Crown, Seville, August 15, 1565, from A.G.I. Contrataci6n
5167, Book III. It is obvious that Sanchez* description of
Fort Caroline is extravagemt, if not totally imaginary.
It is, fxirther, doubtful that any French vessel of the size
he described was necir the French colony at the end of 1564
231
or the beginning of 1565. Woodbury Lowery expresses his
conoplete skepticism of Sanchez' testimony in "Manuscripts
of Florida," microfilm, P. K. Yonge Library of History,
reel 1.
20. See Crown to Casa, Bosque de Segovia, July 30,
1565, A.G.I. Contrataci6n 5,012; in Stetson Collection.
21. The Casa's letter of August 22, 1565, is referred
to in Crown to Casa, Bosque de Segovia, September 6, 1565,
A.G.I. Contratacion 5,012; in Stetson Collection. The letter
of September 4, 1565, from Seville is found in A.G.I,
Contrataci6n 5,167, Book II.
22. See Admiral Coligny to Jean Ribault, cited in
Woodbury Lowery, The Spanish Settlements, II, 95. One of
the best descriptions of the departure of the French rein-
forcement fleet is found in Nicholas Le Challeux, "Discourse
de I'histoire de la Florida," in Suzanne Lussagnet, ed.,
Les Franpais en Floride (Paris: Presse Universitaire
de France, 1958), pp. 208-209. Le Challeux, who shipped as
a carpenter with the expedition, has given a simple and
graphic narrative of the Ribault expedition and its fate.
23. The episode is described in Le Challeux, "Dis-
course," p. 209. It appears that this man was Pedro de
Bustin<yury, who is probably the man known as Don Pedro
Vizcaino, of the Escalante Fontenada narrative. See
Eugene Lyon, "Captives of Florida," Florida Historical
Quarterly, L, No. 1 (July, 1971), 6, 15.
24. It is quite likely that this landfall was at the
Ponce de Leon inlet, between present-day New Smyrna Beach
cuid Daytona Beach, where there was a sizeable concentration
of Indian population. This description of Menendez' north-
ward journey from Cape Canaveral and the first clash with
Ribault' s ships was taken from his letter of September 11,
1565, op. cit.
25. Menendez describes no^deliberation in reaching his
decision. Gonzalo Solis de Meras, however, states that a
council of officers was held. He advises that the majority
of his lieutencints proposed cin immediate return to Santo
Domingo to collect the forces prepared by its Audiencia,
await the vessels of de las Alas and Pedro Menendez Marquez
and the galleon of Ruelas. Menendez, says Solis de Meras,
then said "no," believiijg that he had the advantage of
surprise. Solis de Meras, Pedro Menendez de Aviles, 84.
26. The spy's report (supra, 116) assigned T-rinite a
tonnage of 150 to 160. Two of the other French vessels
150 tons apiece, one of 120, and three smaller craft, at
232
between 60 and 70 tons. On the Spanish side, their chief
vessel was rated at more than 900 tons, with the ber^antfn
La Esperanza at 150 tons and San Miguel and San Andres at
60 and 70 respectively. The tonnage of the vessel purchased
in San Juan is not known.
27. Men&idez estimate of forces is found in his letter
of September 11, 1565, op. cit. The French forces are
estimated in the spy's report and Laudonni&re's "L'Histoire
Notable." It appears that Men^ndez' September 11th estimate
gives the lie to his later claim that some 1,504 left C^diz
xinder his commcmd (see supra. , 169 ). It appears, in
fact, that Factor Duarte's original muster must have been
essentially correct and that few, if any, additional persons
could have embarked at Cadiz. This evaluation comes from
deducting the men lost through the sinking of La Vitoria,
the turning-back of La Concepci6n and the straying and even-
tual loss of the caravel San Ant"onio. It further involves
allowance for the gain of 43 men at San Juan balanced against
the desertion of 33 others.
28. See "Ordenanzas . . . ," D.I., XIV, No. XII, 490.
29. Many historians have discussed the significance
of the concejo and other municipal institutions in Castilian
conquest and settlement. Richard M. Morse has done a fruit-
ful analysis of the concejo in "Some Characteristics of
Latin American Urban History," American HistoricaJ. Review,
LXVII (January, 1962), 317-388. His cogent statement (on
page 325) runs: "The city is the point of departure for
the settlement of the soil." Francisco Dominguez y Company,
in "Funciones econoraicas del cabildo colonial hispano-
Americano," in .Rafael Altamira y Crevea etal . , eds . , Con-
tribuciones a la historia municipal de America (Mexico
City: Pan American Institute of Geography and History,
1951), has the following comment (page 166): "The munici-
pality is in fact the juridical agent authorized by the Crown
to effect concessions and allotments of land, whether rural
or urban." Perhaps the most detailed outline of the func-
tioning of the Castilian municipality in the Indies has
been done by John Preston Moore in The Cabildo in Peru
Under the Hapsburgs (Durham, N.C.: The Duke University
Press, 1954), pp. 15-28. James Lockhart discusses a
variety of applications of the basic municipal institutions
in different parts of the Spanish Indies. He also proposes
an evolutionary connection between the colonial city and
the hacienda system. Of particular value to this writer
was his article "Encomienda emd Hacienda: The Evolution of
the Great Estate in the Spanish Indies , " Hispanic American
Historical Review, XLIX (1969), 419-429.
233
30. See the statement of Manuel Ballesteros Gaibrois
in La Idea Colonial de Ponce de Leon; un ensayo de interpre-
tacion (San Juan, Puerto Rico: Instituto de Cultura Puerto-
rriquena/ 1960) , p. 14. Speaking of Ponce de Leon, Balles-
teros says: "He had no utopicin ideas of creating a new
society, but simply wished to reproduce, on a small scale,
that of Castile." As a good example of the way an Adelan-
tado moved in practice in the Indies to create the municipal
framework is found in the way that young Montejo founded
Ciudad Real at Chichenitza in Yucatan. He appointed the
first cabildo, designated one hundred of his soldiers as
vecinos, and assigned plots of land to each. This is
described by Robert S. Chamberlain in The Conquest and
Colonization of Yucatan, p. 136.
31. Barcia, Chronological History, p. 98. Although no
books of the acts of the Florida cabildos have been found, a
number of documents refer to these acts and bear the signa-
tures of the Alcaldes and the escribanos of the cabildos
in St. Augustine, San Mateo and Santa Elena. See certifica-
tions of Alcalde Peleaz and his escribano in "Probanza
hecha a pedimento de Gonzalo Gayon . I T"," St. Augustine,
October 28, 1566, A.G.I. Santo Domingo 11 (Stetson Collec-
tion) ; those of Diego de Valles as escribano of the cabildo
at St. Augustine during September, 1566, from A.G.I.
Contratacion 58, ramo 2, No. 3 ("Criminales") ; the memorial
of the settlers and cabildo at Santa Elena, July 15, 1569,
from A.G.I. Contaduria 941 (in microfilm, P. K. Yonge
Library of Florida History, reel 1, frame 35). Formal re-
quirements for the foundation of the concejo, republica, and
appointment of the legal officials for the cabildo in newly
discovered territories are outlined in "Ordenanzas . . . ,"
D.I., XIV, No. XLIII, 501.
32. Pedro Menendez de Aviles to a Jesuit friend at
Cadiz, St. Augustine, October 15, 1566, in Ruidiaz, La
Florida, II, 155-156. Juan Lopez de Velasco, in Geografia
universal de las Indias (1571-1574) (Madrid: D. Justo
Zaragoza, 1894), pp. 159-160, provides a good description
of the customs of the aboriginal Florida Indians. The cul-
ture area of the Timucuan is described by Ripley P. Bullen
in "The Southern Limit of Timucua Territory," Florida His-
torical Quarterly, XLVII, No. 4 (April, 1969), 414-419.
The matter of language is discussed by Father Francisco
Pare j a in Catecismo en lengua Timuquana y castellano (Mexico
City: Imprenta de Juan Ruyz, 1627).
33. Nombramiento of Bartolome Menendez by Pedro
Menendez de Aviles, St. Augustine, September 7, 1565,
A.G.I. Indiferente General 1,219.
234
34. Laudonni^re • s own account of the circumstances
surrounding the departure of Ribault and his remaining garri-
son are foundin his "L'Histoire Notable," from Lussagnet,
Las Fran(^ais en Floride/ pp. 176-178.
35. For the French commander's version of events prior
to and during the taking of Fort Caroline, see ibid., pp.
179-182.
36. From "Deposition of Jean Mennin," from Paul
Gaffarel, Histoire de la Floride Francaise (Paris: Firmin-
Didot et Cie., 1875), p. 445.
37. For an outline of events concerning the Frenchmen
captured by the Spanish at various times see Eugene Lyon,
"Captives of Florida," Florida Historical Quarterly, L,
No. 1 (July, 1971), 1-24.
38. The Adelantado describes the taking of the fort
with its booty and the captured ships in his letter to the
Crown sent to Philip II from his base at St. Augustine on
October 15, 1565; from A.G.I. Santo Domingo 231 (Stetson
Collection). The unease felt by the Spanish, which led to
the sending away of the French women and children is
described by Hernando de Baeza in "Los despachos que^se
hicieron en la Florida . . . ," from A.G.I. Escribania de
Camara 1,024-A. The rescue and ransom of the French noblemcin
Pierre d'Ully is described by the Adelantado in his letter
to the King sent from St. Augustine on October 20, 1566, cind
found in A.G.I. Santo Domingo 115 (Stetson Collection).
39. The estimate of the location of the three major
French shipwrecks was given to Pedro Menendez by survivors
of the first massacre at Matanzas. From the same source he
lieamed that Trinite was grounded some five to ten leagues
from the other vessels. See his letter to Philip II from
St. Augustine on October 15, 1565, from A.G.I. Santo Domingo
231 (Stetson Collection) . The story of the small French
craft which survived the storm and sailed to the Caribbean
is found in "Papers relating to various Frenchmen who came
as prisoners in the fleets and were captives in the jail
of the Contratacion of Seville; 1571;" from A.G.I.
Patronato 267, No. 2, ramo 7.
40.^ See "Los despachos que se hicieron , . . ," A.G.I.
Escribania de Camara 1,024-A.
41. See the hearing before the Casa de Contrataci6n in
Seville in February and March of 1572, and found in A.G.I.
Justicia 817. Menendez claimed a total of 4,080 ducats for
this aid to the Crown soldiery.
235
42. The writer will not attempt to render judgment upon
the vexed question of the good faith of Pedro Menendez de
Aviles in the episodes at Matemzas. Rumor that he had in
fact offered Ribault and the others their lives and then had
them killed in contravention of his word was transmitted from
Madrid by the Sieur de Fourquevaux in letters to the French
rulers sent from Segovia on July 5, 1566; from "Lettres et
Papiers d'etat de Fourquevaxix , " in Paul Gaffarel's work.
La Floride Francaise, pp. 439-441. In his own letter to his
sovereign Pedro Menendez states that he obtained the surrender
of the French without any specific promise as to treatment,
2md then simply had them quickly and systematically killed.
He evidently neither asked nor expected any further justifica-
tion of his actions than that dictated by the exigencies of
war and supply and felt himself to be fully empowered by
royal authority to carry out his action. See the descrip-
tion of the executions at Matanzas in Menendez* letter to
Philip II written from St. Augustine on October 15, 1565,
from A.G.I. Santo Domingo 231 (Stetson Collection).
43. Observers at the scene of the first slaughter at
Matanzas differed as to the number of those who died and who
had been saved. Father Mendoza says that 111 were killed,
and "ten or twelve" were given their lives because they were
Catholics; see "narrative of Francisco L6pez de Mendoza
Grajales," in the book of Charles E. Bennett, Laudonni^re and
Fort Caroline (Gainesville: University of Florida Press,
1964), p. 163. Gonzalo Solis de Meras, in contrast, states
that eight were saved and two hundred were executed: from
Pedro Menendez de Aviles, 115. The Adelantado gave no total
of the slain.
44. Pedro Menendez de Aviles to Crown, St. Augustine,
October 15, 1565, from A.G.I. Santo Domingo 231 (Stetson
Collection) .
45. The Adelcuitado estimated the number which sur-
rendered at seventy; Solis de Meras put the figure at 150.
While Pedro Menendez states that he spared five men, Solis
de Meras says that the lives of sixteen were saved. See
Soils de Meras, Pedro Menendez de Aviles, 115.
46. The Adelantado mentions his sending of Flores in
his letter of October 15, 1565, from A.G.I. Santo Domingo
231 (Stetson Collection). The dispatch of Genoves is
described in "Los despachos que se hicieron . . . ," A.G.I.
Escribania de Camara 1,024-A. The loss of San Pelayo through
its seizure by "Lutherans" aboard, and its subsequent ship-
wreck, is described in expository statement by Pedro Menendez
introducing his case against the Crown. It bears no date,
but is probably from October, 1567, and is contained in
A.G.I. Escribania de Camara 1,024-A. The event is also
236
described in "Ship Losses of the Adelantado," n.d. (November,
1567), from the same legajo. News of the loss of San Pelayo
had come to the Spanish Court by April 9, 1566, on which date
it was transmitted to the Queen Mother of Framce by her
ambassador Fourquevaux; the letter is from "Lettres et
Papiers d'etat de Fourquevaux," found in Paul Gaffarel,
Histoire de la Floride Frangaise, p. 436,
47. Pedro Menendez describes the taking of the French
force at Cape Canaveral in his letters to Philip II
dated December 5, 1565, at Matsmzas, Cuba, from A.G.I.
Santo Domingo 115 (Stetson Collection) and dated January 30,
1566, from Havana, from A.G.I. Santo Domingo 168 (Stetson
Collection). Irving Rouse, in his Indian River Archaeology
(New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1951), p.
192, lists a site numbered BR 84 not far above the extremity
of Cape Canaveral. He believes this to have been a possible
site for the French works.
48. Although the Indian background of the Indian River
area has not been thoroughly developed by historians and
anthropologists, some very useful studies have been made.
The basic theory of the location of the Ais culture-center
was developed by Mr. Homer N. Cato of Micco, Florida, who
has done much fruitful field work in a number of Ais sites
in the vicinity of the Sebastian River and the ocean inlet
opposite it. His work on the Spanish salvage site and on
the Cato site led to later investigations by Dr. and Mrs.
Ripley Bullen and Mr. Carl J. Clausen. See Homer N. Cato,
"Foxind — Ancient Sebastian Man," Florida Sportcamping, II,
No. 3 (September, 1966), 32-34. Also see Ripley P. Bullen,
Adelaide K. Bullen, and Carl J. Clausen, "The Cato Site near
Sebastian Inlet, Florida," The Florida Anthropologist,
XXI, No. 1 (March, 1968), 14-16. Charles D. Higgs studied
some sites and wrote "Some Archaeological Findings and In-
vestigations in the Land of Ais" (unpublished manuscript at
office of the National Park Service, St. Augustine, 1941),
and "Spanish Contacts with the Ais," in the Florida His-
torical Quarterly, XXI (1942), 25-30. Irving Rouse summed
up all the archaeological publications to 1950 in Indian
River Archaeology (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University
Press, 1951). Work was also done by Dr. Hale G. Smithj see
Two Archaeological Sites in Brevard County, Florida (Gaines-
ville: University of Florida Press, 1949). The writer
attempted to summarize the ethnology of the Ais in "More
Light on the Indians of the Ays Coast" (unpublished paper,
typescript, Gainesville, 1967). As to the culture-boundary
between the Ais emd Indian groupings to the north, it is
fairly well established by the "Useful, profitable, emd
totally correct geographical course-description of the rivers,
inlet-chcuinels, lagoons, woods, villages, stream-crossings
. . . from the city of St. Augustine to the bar of Ais,"
237
written in 1605 by Captain Alvaro Mexia and found in A.G.I,
Santo Domingo 224 (from a recent translation by Homer N,
Cato cind Eugene Lyon) . The cultural line is also empha-
sized by Fray Francisco Pcireja in Catecismo en Lengua Timu-
guana y castellano (Mexico City: Imprenta de Juan Ruyz,
1627), in which Brother Pareja pointed out that speakers of
the Icinguages of the south coast could not be understood
by the Timucuans.
49. The appointment of Juan Velez de Medrano is found
in "Testimonio de los documentos de Capt. Juan Velez de
Medrano," in A.H.P., Protocolo 646, fol. 256-259.
CHAPTER VI
THE CONSEQUENCES OF VICTORY;
NEW OUTREACH BEGINS
When he arrived in the Cuban port of Bahiahonda, Pedro
Menendez had behind him a remarkable small-boat journey. It
had been more than just a hasty voyage through rough autximn
seas, impelled by the urgencies of supply. It was a trip of
exploration and discovery. As the two barcos had threaded
their way southward along a low shoreline, the features of
Florida's southeast coast were gradually revealed to the
eyes of a master seaman. Menendez had made an important
navigational discovery: one could sail southward inside
the north-setting Gulf Stream with a vessel of euiy usual
draft. He had also found and reconnoitered two ports
suitable for Indies ships seeking refuge from storm or
corsairs. The combination of easy round-trip navigation
from Florida to Cuba suddenly made Cuba very importamt to
the Adelcintado, for it offered the best way to chcinnel
supplies and reinforcements from the Indies to the Florida
garrisons.
Pedro Menendez did not remain long in Bahiahonda, By
November 13, he was within the great harbor of Havana,
where mauiy vessels were anchored. He shortly found that at
238
239
least one peurt of his Asturias fleet had arrived — his nephew
Pedro Men^ndez Marqu^z had axae with the two Gij6n ships emd
a Portugese prize they had taken. Gonzalo Gay6n and
Francisco Genoves were also in hetrbor with San Andres, euid
the patache Espiritu Santo after returning from their un-
successful search for San Pelayo. Men^ndez could also see
the nao Santa Catalina, the promised Capiteina of Pedro de
las Roelas, anchored in somewhat deeper water.
From his nephew, Men^ndez learned that the whole
northern fleet had also had a stormy passage from Spain,
After a halt at the Canary Islands, where they met Captain
Luna, the ships had reached San Juan in badly damaged con-
dition and Juan Ponce de Leon gave them substcuitial help.
Off the north coast of Hispaniola, the convoy had sighted
two Portuguese ceiravels and given chase. Estevcui de las
Klas took the larger vessel, while Marqu^z captured the
smaller. Since they were found to be present in the Indies
without legal registry, the Ceiravels were fair game. The
fleet continued around the precipitous shore towards the
port of La Yaguana and, on October 8, saw three vessels off-
shore. They were discovered to be am urea, a fregata, and
a captured French patache with the Santo Domingo aid for
Florida under the command of Captain Gonzalo de Penalosa,
It caurried 250 men, 20 horses, cind the necessary supplies
and munitions. Penalosa had also indulged in some corsair-
chasing and had just captured a French patax when he met
240
Esteban de las Alas. After the united convoys entered the
harbor of La Yaguana for water, Pedro Menendez Marqu^z left
with his prize, emd came directly to Havana. He brought 200
men and a qucintity of arms and munitions, but little food.
Gayon and Genoves had been utterly unable to find any
trace of the great galeass, San Pelayo. She had not come in-
to cmy island port. The unavailability of the supplies
eUtJOeurd the missing ship only made Menendez' need the more
pressing. The supplies from Santo Domingo had not yet
arrived. Menendez also received another piece of bad news:
the caravel San Antonio, outfitted at his expense, had been
seized by French corsairs and then lost in a storm off Cuba.
The French survivors had been hung by the Governor of Havana,
Garcia Osorio de Sandoval and all the supplies were lost.
Menendez had little in the way of money at hand; he began to
explore all possible means to raise cash.
The Adelantado began by selling the Portuguese prize cind
its cargo at public auction. With his share of the proceeds,
Pedro Menendez bought seabiscuit, meat, cassava, corn and
some cattle, and loaded these for Florida. Scin Andres was
sent with supplies to St. Augustine and San Mateo under the
command of Diego de Amaya, while the second captured French
patax, renamed Santiago, went to Puerto de Principe, Bayamo,
euid Santiago de Cuba to seek out supplies.
When he turned to examine the Capitana of de las Roelas,
and learned the circvimstances of her stay in Havana, Pedro
241
Menendez beceune embroiled in controversy. The Adelantado
learned that the ship had been detached at Cape San Antonio
by Roelas, who had placed Captain Juan de la Parra in
connnand of the ship, iintil he could turn it over to Menendez
in Havana. On his way to Havana, Parra also went hunting for
prizes. Off Matanzas, he surprised and took another
Portuguese caravel, which proved to be richly laden with
hides, pearls, gold and Negro slaves. The capture was
escorted into Havana by Parra, who then made the necessary
legal proceso against the Portuguese. As soon as he had
emchored, the Cuban Governor, Garcia Osorio, sent armed men
to take charge of the caravel. The Governor's men roughed
up Parra 's prize-master cind Osorio had the captain jailed in
irons .
When he learned of the arrest and confinement of Parra,
Pedro Menendez was furious. His anger was rooted in two
things which always moved him powerfully: a matter of his
authority and a matter of his money. Parra, the ship he had
commanded and the prize he had taken, were now under
Menendez' authority, and the Governor's action against
Menendez' subordinates was an affront to the Adelantado.
The Portuguese ship represented, moreover, a value of between
13 to 14,000 ducats and his share would go far towards
replenishing the depleted funds of the Adelantado.
For three days, the two antagonists exchanged regueri-
mientos. Since these had no visible effect, the men finally
242
met, and joined conflict personally. Other tensions lay be-
tween Pedro Menendez and Garcia Osorio. Men^ndez had strong
and long-standing affiliations with some of the members of
the most powerful local faction, that of the linked Rojas,
De Soto, Lobera and Hinestrosa families, and Osorio knew it.
Menendez had further angered Osorio by moving into the house
of Juan de Hinestrosa, the Treasurer at Havana, and hiring
Gonzalo Gallego, Parra's maltreated prize-master, and sending
him to Florida as a ship captain. Pedro Menendez repre-
sented another threat to Osorio: he held dirct evidence of
Royal favor in his asiento. Cedulas had come to Havana,
bidding special attention to the needs of Florida, and Pedro
Menendez, with privileges from the King in hand, prepared to
make demands and assert his authority against that of the
Royal Governor. Both men were intensely proud personalities,
jealous of their prerogatives and highly sensitive to any
encroachment upon them, and their rivalry rapidly became a
deadly one.
Pedro Menendez and Garcia Osorio were unlikely to
achieve any meeting of minds. Menendez asked for the re-
lease of Parra, and the release of some of the goods from
the prize caravel. If he could have these, Menendez
averred, he would use the money he realized to supply the
Royal troops in Florida. Osorio refused to release the ship
or anything from it. Menendez then asked for a loan, so
that he could better supply his own men in Florida. This was
243
also refused. Discussion of the royal order to furnish 50
supplied soldiers also resulted in deadlock. Men^ndez
needed no more troops in Florida, and Osorio would furnish
no separate supplies. Finally, Pedro Men^ndez tried to take
possession of the four bronze artillery pieces which had
just arrived for the fort at Havcuia. Osorio, anxious for
the defense of the place cOid concerned about its weakness,
refused this as well.
In einy event, it is unlikely that Garcia Osorio could
have done much for the Florida supply. It does appear that
the Governor had cm obligation to help supply the Royal men
in Florida, if not Pedro Menendez' private soldiers. Al-
though Menendez was already moving to meet his needs in
other ways, the Governor's obstructions did impede and
embarrass him. While he outwardly concealed his deepest
feelings about the Governor, Menendez began a campaign
against him at the highest levels. He accumulated materials
about the Parra case, made other procesos against Osorio,
and prepared to send them to the King. He began to explore
the possibility of obtaining the Cuban government for him-
self.
After being rebuffed by Osorio, Menendez attempted to
obtain supplies from friendly Havana merchants. He estab-
lished a warehouse, stored the munitions brought by
Menendez Marquez to Havana, and begem to sell or trade them
for food stuffs, but prices in Havana were high emd food was
244
scarce. Men^ndez gave Rinestrosa his poder to hamdle
business matters in Havama. From the captain of a fregata,
Men^ndez learned that the Santo Domingo support fleet had
met with disaster, and that the urea had been sunk, but could
find out nothing about the fate of Esteban de las Alas. He
decided to outfit an expedition, search the old Bahama
Chcuinel for de las Alas, emd attempt to negotiate a loan
from the Audiencia of Scinto Domingo. Most of all, however,
he hoped to capture other valuable corsair ships. This was
his best opportunity to realize enough money to relieve his
financial necessities, cind was, after all, in line with
Menendez' most deeply-held inclinations and longest experi-
ence. Menendez had to justify his taking the crown-leased
New Spain Capitana on such em adventure. In order to do
this he established it as a contra-cosario expedition, and
later told Philip II that there was great danger that Juan
Ribault's son, who had fled Florida with two "armada ships"
would come to the Caribbean, join with other roaming pirates
there, and assault the shipping and settlements of His
Majesty's loyal subjects.
In order to refit and supply the vessels for the cor-
sairing voyage, the Adelantado spent or encumbered himself
for 4,000 ducats. Menendez hoped that this investment,
probadjly realized from the sale of arquebuses and munitions
and credit from Hinestrosa, would pay real dividends. To
help cover his expenses, Menendez dispatched Captain Luna
245
to Verz Cruz with am urgent request that the Audiencia of
Mexico lend him 3,000 to 4,000 ducats. At the same time, he
asked the New Spain officials to send him Don Luis Velasco,
the Indian from the Chesapeedce Bay area, so that he might
be available to Men^ndez in his projected northern explora-
tion and colonization in the spring. Men^ndez left Havcma
November 30, 1565, with his ships and men. At the very
beginning, it appeared that fortune smiled upon the Ade-
lantado. A short distance to the east of Havana, his look-
outs sighted a sail. Since it seemed to be a Portuguese
caravel, Men^ndez sent his nephew to chase it down. The
vessel took refuge in the port of Matemzas, and Men^ndez
followed with his four ships. It turned out that the caravel
was in reality a Spanish dispatch ship sent from Seville
with messages to the authorities in Santo Domingo and Cuba.
In one of those fortuitous accretions of information which
occurred in an age of infrequent communications , the
Adelantado was suddenly brought up to date on events in
Europe .
Nothing aboard the caravel was addressed to Pedro
Menendez, but he took the liberty of reading the cedulas the
King had directed to the Santo Domingo and Cuban officials.
Th^ contained a revelation. Obviously Menendez' suggestions
that a backup fleet be sent to reinforce and support his
efforts against the French had borne fruit, for the King
advised that he was sending many ships with 1,800 men to
246
Florida by way of the islands, and asked the Indies offi-
cials to provide supplies for the force for nine months.
This momentous news roused a mixture of feelings in
the Adelantado of Florida. While greatly relieved to hear
that Crown-paid reinforcements were coming, Menendez felt it
imperative that the succor fleet save valuable time by
sailing directly to Florida. He also felt a nagging concern
that, if the Royal forces were coming to Florida in the
spring, he had best attend more decidely to the supply and
maintenance of the forts cuid garrisons he had left in
Florida, or he might feel the weight of Royal censure.
Pedro Menendez decided to protect himself and advance his
cause by doing some corresponding of his own.
First, he wrote to the Audiencia of Santo Domingo, and
objected to the King's supply plan, proposing instead that
he provide fresh meat from the islands and fresh fish in
Florida at less cost to the Crown and with better results
for the health of the garrisons. He also advised that he
would not be financially able to return to Florida before
March, but was concerned that the men there be provided for
properly. Next, Menendez sent Philip II his first letter
since October, reported on all that had taken place since
Q
the death of Jean Ribault. He repeated the recommendations
he had made to the Santo Domingo Audiencia and noted that he
was sending a pilot to Spain who could guide the ships
directly to Florida. Menendez also made ccsnplaint against
247
Garcia Osorio, and sent along certain formal allegations
in the Parra case.
Next, Men^ndez looked beyond the immediate problems of
logistics. He sketched out to the King his broad proposals
to benefit the kingdom and himself by vigorous action on the
sea. If Philip would grant him the title of "Captain-
General" of these parts of the Indies, Tierra Firme and the
Ocean Sea, Pedro Menendez would provide and command a fleet
of small, fast and mobile fregatas. Two of these, to be
equipped with oars and powerful guns, he had already ordered
for delivery in the spring. With two more, Menendez could
secure the entire Atlantic coast from Newfoundland to the
Caribbeem islands. All he wanted in return, said Menendez,
was the title and a thousand slave-licenses. He could sell
some of these to finance his operations, and would use the
other licenses to obtain Negroes for the guard fleet.
While he was in Matanzas, the Adelantado prepared to
actuate his small vessel trade privilege. He told Philip
that am error had been made in the asiento, when the tonnage
of the shallops had been listed at 50 instead of 100 tons
apiece and asked that the asiento be amended, thus increasing
his tonnage permission substantially. While at Matanzas,
Menendez organized his trade fleet, named Pedro Menendez
Marquez as commander of the six shallops emd four zabras,
and prepared to send him to Spain with dispatches and to
seek supplies to put into the Indies trade for the provision
248
A
of Florida. He was able to utilize the Portuguese captured
by Menendez Marqu^z as galley-slaves, as well as some of the
French prisoners captured in Florida.
Menendez next turned to matters of personal privilege
and appealed to the King for certain key appointments in
Florida. For the principal Royal posts in Florida, he
exercised his adelantamiento powers and proposed four men.
He described the Asturian hidalgos nominated as follows:
They are people of confidence cind high
stcinding who have served your Majesty many
years in my company, amd are all married to
noblewomen. Out of covetousness for the
offices (for which they are proposed) , and
out of love for me, it could be that they
might bring their wives and households. Be-
cause of these cOid of others who would come
with their wives, it is a fine beginning for
the population of the provinces of Florida
with persons of noble blood, ^
Those proposed were Esteban de las Alas, Pedro Menendez
Margu^z, cuid Hernando de Miranda, as Treasurer, Accountant,
and Factor — the three Royal financial posts in Florida. He
also suggested Diego de Miranda, successor to the Miramda
mayorazgo, as Escribano Mayor of Florida and Secretary of
the government there. Thus, before the struggling Florida
garrisons had achieved more than a foothold, Menendez
looked cQiead to the fulfillment of the dream he sheured with
his principal lieutenants and supporters. The letter was
immediately sent to Spain in a patache, with a request that
its crew be paid by the King or, failing that, by Pedro del
Castillo.
249
In steurk contrast to his exalted plans for gain emd ex-
pansion expressed to the King, Pedro Men^ndez had to face
unpleasant realities when he returned to Havauia amd aJDan-
doned his voyage. By December 12, he had received full
news of the disaster which had befallen the Scinto Domingo
expedition. A storm north of Cuba had sunk the urea and the
Zctbra of Candamo which left Avil^s the previous summer with
all the supplies they had carried, and a host of shipwrecked
sailors eind soldiers were stranded 350 miles east of Havana.
Pedro Menendez Marquez and Estebah de las Alas joined to-
gether to ferry the men across to the mainlcind. It was
decided that the men should go to Bayamo or Puerto Principe
to seek food at Menendez* expense, and Menendez sent them a
letter of credit, drawn upon Juan de Hinestrosa. Pedro
Menendez commissioned Diego de Miranda to go to eastern Cuba
with 2,000 ducats and estcJDlish supply sources in the
Savanna of Vasco Porcallo, Puerto Principe, Bayamo, and
Baracoa. He authorized his lieutenant to purchase more
than 16,000 arrobas of meat a year, to build warehouses to
store the provisions, and to draw upon Menendez* credit
freely in so doing. He also made arrangements in Puerto de
Plata with Francisco de Zavallos to furnish supplies for
Florida. The Adelantado also decided to dismiss the sol-
diers from Santo Domingo cuid reduce the expense of their
maintencince . The prize caravel of Esteban de las Alas,
still half laden with valuable hides, remained in Matanzas.
250
Menendez tried to sell the caravel and its Ccurgo, but none
voold buy it sight unseen. Finally a deal was struck with
Francisco de Reinoso, of Men^ndez* entourage. Reinoso
agreed to buy the caravel and the 2,000 hides remaining in
it, for 4,000 ducats. He would cancel the 2,000-ducat debt
already owed him, pay cind supply the caravel crew, and give
Menendez 1,000 ducats in cash. The Adelantado then sent one
of the captured French barcos, renamed Buenaventura, to the
garrison which had been left with Captain Velez de Medrano
at the Ms village with 10,000 pounds of sea biscuit, cassava,
meat euid com.
Pedro Men&idez, worn by the strain of recent months,
fell ill, seriously enough to require the attentions of a
physician. After 10 days' sickness, he recovered suffi-
ciently to write a lengthy letter to the King, Menendez
conqplained again of the lack of cooperation he had received
from Governor Osorio, and noted that 40 men had taken ad-
vantage of his illness to desert. He accused the Governor
of permitting some of these deserters to escape the city
and flee inland. Another witness, more favorable to the
Governor, notes that Osorio had quite properly subdued many
14
of the soldiers who had fled.
Menendez now redoubled his efforts to provide cind send
supplies to his Florida forts. Armed with the 3,000 ducat
loem sent by the Audiencia of Mexico and the money he ob-
tained from Reinoso, the Adelantado shortly also received
251
the remaining arms and munitions which had come from
Astiirias and Vizcaya. He established a warehouse in Havana,
gathered foodstuffs and livestock from his Indies sources,
and named! Hernamdo de Baeza as Tenedor de Bastimentos for
the Florida supply.
The Adelantado purchased Penalosa's fregata, and leased
a Portuguese caravel named La Asenci6n from its master,
Alvaro Gomez. He sent the caravel to buy corn in Yucatan,
where it was cheap and plentiful. By January 28, two small
vessels had already been sent to Florida with hams, chickens,
cassava, and corn when Diego de Amaya returned to Havcina
with more xinpleasant tidings. Amaya had gone first to St.
Augustine, where he had found that cui early and harsh win-
ter cuid the poor state of supply had led to more than 100
deaths in the two forts. After leaving off foodstuffs for
the St. Augustine garrison, Amaya had sailed northward with
San Andres with supplies for San Mateo, only to be caught
in a strong gale off the St. Johns' river bar. Amaya tried
to cross the lines of breakers which marked the bar entrance,
but the vetercin San Andres was driven ashore and broken up
in the surf. The rest of the supplies were lost, and Amaya
had to return to Havana in another vessel. On his return
voyage, he could not locate the garrison at Ais, and had
sailed to a point just south of the St. Lucie Inlet when he
sighted a small boat with Captain Juan Velez de Medrano
aboard. Vel^z told a harrowing tale of hardship and mutiny.
252
Soon after the departure of the Adelantado the previous
November, the garrison's rations had given out. The
friendly Indians possessed no store of food sufficient for
such a large body of men. As discipline disintegrated,
roaming bands of soldiers roved the area seeking food.
Friction between the Indians euid the Spanish became outright
war.
A soldier named Escobar persuaded 100 of his fellows to
desert and to march southward with him, seeking an escape
from Florida and passage to New Spain. Captain Vel^z
followed in the small boat the Adelantado had left him, and
found the mutineers encamped 45 miles south. They had
reached the north side of the wide St. Lucie River and could
go no further. Keeping his distance from the rebels, Vel^z
told them he would go to Havcina to seek supplies. Soon
after he reached the open Atlantic, the two vessels met,
Diego de Amaya and the Captain sailed together along
the coast and found a promising harbor at the Jupiter Inlet,
where cm elevation commanded a good view of land and sea.
There, on December 13, 1566, St. Lucie's Day, they built the
fort Scinta Lucia. Amaya left supplies, and went on to
Havcuia to report to Pedro Men^ndez, while Vel^z recovered
his rebel soldiers and ferried them south 18 miles to the
new fort. Artillerist Diego Lopez aided in the placing and
siting of the ccinnon in the works, and the men began to
trade with the Indians, called the Jeaga, for bits of gold
253
and silver recovered from Spanish shipwrecks. News that
many men from Velez' garrison had died came to Havema with
the supply ship. Discontent with Florida was expressed in
many private letters which then spread from Cxiba to other
18
parts of the Indies. Pedro Men^ndez determined to re-
19
lieve the garrison by March.
When, at last, Esteban de las Alas had rejoined his
chief in Havana, Men^ndez could arm his ships and prepare
his next move. He had established a supply pipeline from
Cuba to Florida, even though it was poorly funded for any
long-run operation. Help was coming from Spain: He knew
of the large, heavily-laden reinforcement fleet which should
shortly leave Andalucia and come directly to Florida, In
addition, the Adelantado had sent by Menendez Marquez a
request to Pedro del Castillo to furnish wine, shoes, and
Indian trade goods, together with some settlers and their
equipment. He could send no money, but could repay Castillo
with the slave licenses. He was still hopeful that the
missing San Pelayo could be found.
Menendez' plans now were clear: he would continue the
mission of exploration and conquest interrupted by the ex-
pulsion of the Laudonniere and Ribault French. His next
expedition had multiple purposes. First, he would explore
the lower keys for a passage east of Tortugas for the home-
bound New Spain fleets on their way to Havema. Then, with
254
pilot Gonzalo Gay6n (who knew the eurea from the time of the
De Luna expedition) he would skirt the western coast of the
peninsula and seek a good port near the Bay of Juan Ponce.
Pedro Men^ndez* settlement strategy was tied to his
belief that the Florida peninsula was crossed by a navigable
river system. He believed that the St. Johns emptied into
the Gulf at some point on the southwest coast, and wished
to place his fort and found a settlement near that place.
Thus, easy water communication between his cities would
facilitate the interchange of men and supplies and help in
their mutual defense against any enemy. The southwestern
port would be in the best position to receive supplies from
Havana, from Yucatan and from his galleons in the New Spain
trade. Settlers and missionaries could then solidify the
establishments. Menendez planned to leave Esteban de las
Alas in charge of all the forts, and direct his attentions
to eradicating the supposed French presence in Guale, and
building his main base of operations at Santa Elena. Always
in the background, as the matter of the highest priority,
was Menendez' search for the great interconnecting passage
to the New Spain mines and the South Sea, and the urgent
need to deny the secret of it to the French. He would
launch himself northward to explore and populate this area
at the earliest possible moment. Another continuing motive
was the hope that Christian prisoners, perhaps even his son
Juan, might be recovered from Indian captivity.
255
On February 10, 1566, Menendez made a proclamation in
Havana, to justify his use of the New Spain ship Santa
Catalina in his proposed expedition. He stressed the
possibility of finding French corsairs, and the need to
eliminate the threat they represented to the Florida coasts,
the other Indies and the Spanish fleets. Next, he took
formal control of the supplies and rations aboard Santa
Catalina. There were some 86 soldiers and sailors still
£d>oard; some had deserted in Havana. Several months'
supplies were turned over to Menendez. He bought some addi-
tional materials of his own, and prepared to sail.
While Pedro Menlndez prepared to return to the scene
of his triumphs in Florida, no solid news of the September
clash between Frenchman and Spemiard had yet reached Europe
by the first days of 1566. In the absence of any real
intelligence, the military and diplomatic lines of action
already decided upon by the King and his Councils went for-
ward. Concrete actions were begun to implement a heavy re-
inforcement of Pedro Menendez with Royal troops and instruc-
tions were sent to the Casa de Contratacidn to embargo pri-
vate ships for the new Florida fleet, and to gather supplies
of foodstuffs and ammunition. The difficult task of
locating artillery, powder, helmets and arquebuses for the
journey was begun.
The choice of a commcuider for the relief and reinforce-
ment expedition had been made — Philip II selected Sancho de
256
Archiniega, a Basque seafarer, on September 14, 1565. On
September 26, the King had written to his Florida Adelantado
explaining that he was sending him 1,500 soldiers. Philip
II was careful to spell out the touchy issue of jurisdiction
over the new force, and ruled that General Archiniega and
Colonel Hernando de Orsuna would have full legal control
over their troops once they left Spain, When they arrived
in the adelantcimiento of Florida, the King assured Menendez
that the commcuiders had instructions to obey and defer to
him as "the person in whose charge was the enterprise of
22
that Icind." Philip II did urge Pedro Menendez to cooper-
ate with amd seek military advice from these men who were so
experienced in war. In addition to Colonel Orsuna, who
%rould raise a company himself. Captains Juan Pardo, Pedro
Redroban, Pedro de Andrada, Miguel Enriquez and Juan de
Zurita began to assemble their companies. They concentrated
their recruiting in lower Andalusia.
In the mecintime, the Spanish King felt it was time to
disclose to the French that Pedro Menendez had been sent to
Florida. He instructed Ambassador Alava to speak to
Catherine de Medici and advise that the Spanish had learned
of "usurpers" in their land and had taken action to punish
them. Before this formal notice was finally given them on
November 23, 1565, the French already knew of the Mendndez
expedition. When the announcement was made, a dispute then
arose between Alava, the Queen, and Councillors of the
257
French King, in which the old argxnaents about territorial
jurisdiction were repeated without any agreement. In actual
fact, the actions of Pedro Menendez in Florida had already
Bade the question a moot one. The Spctnish Queen had already
warned the French Ambassador to Spain that Philip II would
not tolerate any French colonies in his lands or near the
fleet routes of Spain. Late in December, Ambassador
Fourquevaux had an interview with the Duke of Alba on the
question of Florida. The Dxoke flatly told the Frenchmcm
that, in spite of the lack of agreement on the question of
territorial rights after the signing of the treaty of
Cateau-Cambresis, the Spanish position was that this treaty
definitively denied any land rights in the Indies to the
French. The Florida incursion would, therefore, be vigor-
ously resisted and ejected.
This position brought no relief for the Spanish from
their concern over further French reinforcements to Florida.
In August and September, reports had come to the Court that
a new atrmada for Florida was being outfitted in LeHavre.
The eagerly awaited news of what had happened in
Florida was contained in the Adelantado's letter of October
15, 1565, entrusted to Captain Diego Flores de Vald^s, and
had been long delayed in reaching the Spanish Court. The San
Miguel, which carried the message, had been wrecked in the
Azores and Flores had great difficulty in finding another
258
27
vessel to brave the winter gales and carry him to Spain.
Although Pedro Men^ndez Marqu^z was also enroute to Spain,
he had not aurrived either.
It was after the first of the new year that any in-
telligence came from Florida to the Spanish King, and this
news came by way of France. Philip received, by mid-
January, a letter from his Ambassador in France, advising
of the arrival there of Jacques Ribault. Thus word of the
taking of Fort Caroline, but not of the massacres of
Matanzas, was communicated to the Spainish Court. Another,
more direct messenger Ccime shortly to Philip II. Pedro de
Bustin9ury, a Vizcayan prisoner eiboard young Ribault 's
ship, escaped the French, cuid made his way to Madrid. This
man, the shipwreck survivor who had been an Indian captive
among the Ais Indieins on the Florida east coast, told the
King of the Spanish victory at the French fort. He so
in^ressed Philip II that he was commissioned to return to
Florida to aid Pedro Menendez in his relations with the
28
Indians of that area.
The vessel which had brought Rene de Laudonni^re back
from the tragedy in Florida had been much slower in arriving
in France. His ship had arrived in England in mid-November,
After experiencing illness and difficulty there, the
Huguenot leader had finally reached the French Court on
March 18. Another captive Spemiard who had been kept aboard
29
Laudonniere ' s vessel also escaped and came to Spain.
259
In the meantime, the long-awaited news from Pedro
Menendez finally came to Philip II in Madrid. Diego Flores
VcQdes arrived in Seville on February 13, and dispatches
telling of his coming probably just preceded the arrival of
the man himself at Court. When Philip II learned of the
clear-cut and decisive victory of arras won by Pedro Menendez
in Florida, the monarch wasted little time in rejoicing.
Because of the eradication of the French garrisons in Florida,
he could change the extent cmd en^hasis of his committments
in the Indies. The King sent the news to Sancho de
Archiniega, and began to consider alteration of his military
force. He also took immediate steps to reaffirm the contract
obligation of his Adelantado in Florida.
Since the danger in Florida was clearly lessened,
Philip II toyed with the idea of cutting the force the Crown
was to send from 1,500 to 1,000 men. He finally concluded
that it could now be put to a wider use than duty in Florida,
and directed that the Archiniega force, under the direction
of Pedro Menendez de Avil€s, should serve as the response to
a widespread menace to the Spanish Indies. A part of the
expedition would be used to reinforce the Florida troops,
«rtiile the greater portion would become a mobile defense
force for use elsewhere in the Indies. By the last days of
March, 1566, these decisions had been taken cuid advices of
them sent to the Casa de Contrataci6n and to Pedro
Menendez.
260
The private side of the Florida conquest was not
neglected by the Spanish King. In a letter to his officials
in Seville, the monarch advised that he expected that Pedro
Menendez would supply and pay 300 of the men who were to go
with Archiniega. Pedro del Castillo, who had already pro-
tested that he had not yet received the Casa de Contratacidn
money due Pedro Menendez, reacted strongly to this news,
Castillo said that there was no way that he could underwrite
any new draft of soldiers nor even supply the Adelantado's
own men currently in Florida without the 20,000 ducats which
was owed to Menendez. Creditors were pressing him for out-
standing obligations, cmd he pleaded also for payment of
the additional charter fees earned by San Pelayo. According
to the accountants of the Casa, perhaps 16,000 ducats in
all could be owing and Castillo had not yet presented all of
the proper supporting papers. The King directed that
Menendez be paid 6,000 ducats, including reimbursement for
the journey of Flores Valdes even though the ship had not
made the complete voyage to Spain. The Casa de Contrataci6n
did not make the payment.
As he made certain that the private obligations of his
Adelantado in Florida were not neglected, the King also
moved to improve the supply of his own Florida troops from
the Indies. On February 24, 1566, he directed the Royal
Officials at Havcma to furnish ample supplies for this pur-
pose. Unfortunately for Pedro Menendez, however, the order
261.
was not a very realistic one. In view of the poverty of
the public treasury of the little community at Havana and
the hostility of its Governor, cmy such aid for Menendez
34
was as unlikely in 1566 as it had been in 1565.
Seventeen ships, laden with supplies, sailed for
Florida with the 1,500 men originally planned for on April
19, 1566. The Archiniega expedition, originally intended
to help in the expulsion of Jean Ribault and the capture of
the fort built by Rene de Laudoxvni^re, would now serve to
reinforce the general defense of the Indies. The continuing
menace to Spain represented by French marauders had served
to encourage another substantial royal investment. The
responsibility of utilizing this great force, whether in
Florida or the Caribbean, had been put in the hands of Pedro
Menendez de Avil^s.
In the meamtime, the King's Adelantado had left his
winter base at Havcina eind sailed with his convoy toward the
lower Florida Keys. The seven vessels, led by Santa
Catalina amd the ship which had come with De las Alas from
Santander, probed cautiously among the shallows and dis-
covered an ample channel to the eastward of Tortugas. This
was the passageway Menendez had been seeking for the New
Spctin fleets. Sailing through the new chcmnel, the ships
continued in a northeasterly direction iintil they sighted
the Florida coast in the vicinity of the Ten Thousand
Islands. Then the vessels moved in closer to shore, seeking
262
the Bay of Juam Ponce. Leaving Estebem de las Alas off-
shore with the larger ships, Pedro Men^ndez went in to
shallower water, and soon came to an inlet where he spied
an Indiem canoe. In the canoe was Herneindo Escalemte
Fontaneda, who had been 20 years a captive. The Adelantado
describes the young man who came out to greet him in the
following terms:
. . . very good looking, of noble parents,
the son of the late Garcia Descalante, a
conquistador of Cartagena . . . (one) of
two brothers, boys of 10 years of age:
they were being sent to Salamanca when
their ship was lost. The people aboard
escaped, but over the years the father
of this (chief) Carlos had killed 42 of
the captives, among whom was his elder
brother. ^^
Pedro Menendez had arrived in the land of Carlos, or the
Calusa.
In his contact with the principal chief of Carlos, it
was the Adelantado' s purpose to assure the security of his
communications network and that of the settlers which he
hoped to leave in the area. He hoped to accomplish this by
making friendly connections with the Indian whose sway ex-
tended over much of extreme southwestern Florida, the Keys,
and the southeast of the peninsula as well.
The Soils de Meras narrative pictures the arrival of
the Adelantado at the island kingdom of Carlos as one of
consideraible pomp. Accompanied by cm entourage of arque-
busiers with matchcords lit and weapons ready, Menendez
lemded at the village to the music of fife, drum and trumpet.
263
The ruler of a large part of the southwest end of the
Florida peninsula was seated in state, to receive the homage
of a leirge assemblage of his own people and to greet the
Spanish leader as cm equal.
Menendez persuaded Chief Carlos to release the ship-
wreck survivors who had been held captive there, and to con-
clude an agreement of peace emd friendship with the Spanish.
The Adelantado advises that he found five men, five mestiza
women from Peru, cmd one black woman as living prisoners in
the area of Carlos. The Chief promised also to free three
other Christians who were held captive at some distance in-
land.^®
The Adelantado and Cacique Carlos exchanged gifts and
entertcLined each other with food and drink. Carlos granted
to Menendez the highest honors that he could in light of
his traditions by giving his sister, later christened and
renamed Dona Antonia, to the Adelantado as wife. In order to
seal this agreement, Menendez felt it advisable to consxammate
the meirriage while at Carlos. At this time, he did not leave
religious missionaries nor colonists at Carlos, but did re-
indoctrinate the shipwreck survivors who chose to remain
there, auid he left behind symbols of Christianity and of
Spain. He had endeavored to some degree to instruct the
Indians in the basic tenets of Catholicism, emd hoped to
accustom them to worship of the Cross.
264
Pedro Menendez' approach to Carlos embodied many of the
elements of his developing policies towards the Indians of
Florida. He believed that the mouth of the strategic cross-
peninsular waterway was nearby. When the friendship with
Chief Carlos had sufficiently developed, he would anchor the
Gulf entrance to this vital channel with a Spanish settle-
ment. The three- fold purpose of the conquest — colonization
for economic exploitation, evangelization of the native
peoples in the Catholic faith, and the establishment of a
military base for Spain — would thus be accomplished.
Menendez restrained himself considerably in the matter
of the obtaining of trade through booty. While his men
entered enthusiastically into the exchange of trinkets for
gold amd silver recovered by the Indians from shipwrecks,
Menendez did not do so. Where the men gathered perhaps
3,500 ducats worth of treasure, Menendez simply received the
gift of a single gold bar from the Chief. He then sailed
away, to double the Keys and proceed to the northward. The
news of the expedition was sent back directly to Spain in
the vessel which had been brought from Santcinder, so that
the King might have word of the recovery of the shipwrecked
39
Christians and of the alliance with Indians of Carlos.
Pedro Menendez turned his fleet northward on the east
side of the Florida peninsula, sailing through rough seas.
On March 19, 1566, as his convoy moved along the lower south-
east coast, lookouts sighted the sails of a southbound
265
caravel. As they drew closer, it was evident that the ship
was the Ascension, which had been loaded with corn in
Yucatan amd sent to supply the forts. When the Adelcintado
boeurded the ceuravel, he could insnediately sense what had
occurred; he had intercepted the escape of a shipload of
mutineers! In addition to the crew of the vessel, the cap-
tauin, ensign, and entire surviving garrison of the fort at
Santa Lucia were aboard. In the last weeks before the
relief ship came, rations in the little fort had been
systematically reduced — for two weeks, the men received
nothing but a bowlful of com a day. The last four days be-
fore the caravel arrived, there was nothing: the supplies
had run out. Only 75 of the 250 Spanish soldiers and French
prisoners left at Ais had survived. When the ship came to
amchor outside the Jupiter inlet, the rebellious soldiers
seized it cind forced Captain Juan V^lez de Medrano and En-
sign Ayala to come along in am escape from Florida. Grimly,
Menendez took command emd turned the caravel around in the
40
direction of St. Augustine.
Worse troubles awaited the Adelantado in the north.
When he entered the port of St. Augustine on March 21, he
quickly learned that there had been a general rising of the
soldiery in that fort and at San Mateo. His coming inter-
rupted a formal investigation being conducted by Maestre de
Ccunpo Valdes, who brought his superior up to date on the
mutinies. The events had been both gruelling and dramatic.
266
Disaffection had begun in the two forts more them two
months before. Although some supplies had come to the
garrisons from Havana, rations were often meager. Also in
short supply were opportunities for entertainment amd loot,
those essential needs of the 16th century private soldier.
Foci of discontent arose in both forts, and correspondence
between the two groups of malcontents was advanced by mid-
January. Their purpose was to leave Florida as soon as
possible. Pressure from the disaffected men forced Vald^s
to grant permission for work to begin on the uncompleted
frigate left by the French on the ways near the former
Fort Caroline. Sergeant Gutierre de Valverde came from St.
Augustine to supervise the construction, and persuaded 12
captive Frenchmen who were skilled at carpentry amd ship-
building, to help get the ship ready for an escape to the
Indies .
By mid-February, it was evident that Captains Recalde,
Mexia emd San Vicente, some of their noncommissioned
sergeants and many of the men were affected by the rebellious
mood — Licenciado Rueda, Chaplain of the tercio at St.
Augustine, was a leader in the plot. Several of the married
settlers were also involved in the conspiracy. One night,
while searching for food, a large group of soldiers assembled
at the armory and forced Valdes to let them examine the
building to see if amy supplies had been buried there. They
also searched the houses of Juain de Junco and Pedro de
267
Coronas / who were known to be close associates of the
Adeleintado emd of Bartolome Menendez, None of the civil or
military officials could do much in the face of such wide-
spread disaffection. Significamtly , those officials who
remained loyal were all close associates or relatives of
Pedro Menendez — Pedro de Vald^s, Bartolom^ Menendez, Jucui
de Junco, Captain Ochoa, Diego de Hevia, Pedro de Coronas,
Antonio Gomez, Rodrigo Montes and Martin de ArgUelles.
Valdes fortified himself in the armory to guard the arms
and munitions stored there. As things settled into an un-
easy truce, it was apparent that only a spark was needed to
set off a full-scale revolt.
That spark was provided by the coming of the frigate
La Concepcion, which arrived at the port of St. Augustine
in the first week of March, 1566. The vessel brought a
quantity of com, more than a ton of prepared meat, wine,
oil and live hogs — more than two months ' rations for both
forts. As the news spread that a supply ship had come, the
plans of the mutineers quickly took final shape. When the
word reached San Mateo, Valverde and Captain San Vicente
set out for St. Augustine. On the night of March 8, led by
Sebastian de Lezcano, a large number of soldiers assaulted
the armory where Pedro de Valdds was lying ill. Shouting
and beating on the doors with their halberds, the soldiers
broke their way in cuid seized Valdes. Soon the other
officials were in their power. The Maestre de Campo was
268
confined in Captain San Vicente's house, and the others
were placed in the stocks. The rebels next went to the
shore, took small craft and shortly possessed the frigate
at anchor, which they began to prepare for their escape. It
appeared that the authority of the King and his Adelantado
in St. Augustine had come to an end.
It would seem, however, that Pedro de Valdes was as
resourceful as was Pedro Men^ndez de Avil^s. The Maestre de
Campo escaped from his imprisonment, freed Junco and others
and gathered a small nucleus of loyal troops. With these,
he hurried to the water's edge, where the mutineers were
busily engaged in loading munitions aboard the captured
frigate.
Valdes and his men assaulted and took the small boat
into which the rebels were loading artillery from the fort.
Lezcano was taken prisoner and the loyalist forces again
took charge of the city and the fort. The frigate withdrew
to the bar, and prepared to sail. Valdes mounted a bronze
cannon in a small craft cuid went to parley with the
mutineers, whom he urged not to leave the men, women and
children of St. Augustine without food and munitions. When
negotiations broke down, Valdes fired several shots at the
rebel vessel, and it sailed away.
Pedro de Valdes began formal legal hearings on the
mutinies, heard Lezcano confess his role in the uprising,
and had him hung on the public gallows. Many of the other
269
guilty parties had departed with the frigate, while some
fled inlcmd emd were killed by the Indiems. About 120 £rom
St. Augustine had left; a similar number, had fled San
Mateo in the other vessel. The mutineers took with them
42
the books of the cabildo and other papers.
Pedro Menendez was infuriated when he arrived to find
that such "great mutinies, disgraceful insubordinations and
43
. . . treason" had occurred among his garrisons. He
moved immediately to restore the discipline of the troops
and attempt to locate and punish those who had fled. In a
bando proclaimed the day after his arrival, the Adelantado
labelled the actions of the rebel troops as mutiny and
treason. He noted the sacrifices which had been made to
undertake the jomada to Florida, and added that he fully
expected another French attempt to conquer the territory.
Because he wanted no disaffected soldiers or settlers in
his provinces, Menendez freely offered to anyone who wished
44
the privilege to leave Florida, at their own expense. A
number availed themselves of the opportunity.
On March 24, word came to Pedro Menendez at St.
Augustine that the rebel frigate had sailed to the bar of
the St. Johns, to await the other mutineers of the San Mateo
garrison, cind sail together to the West Indies or to New
Spain. He took three small craft and went directly to the
spot, and loaded one of his vessels with com, to demon-
strate that supplies would be furnished to those who
270
renounced the mutiny. Indeed, these seemed to be reluctant
rebels. Some of the men returned to the fort at San Mateo,
and the frigate delayed its departure while negotiations
continued. The Adelctntado offered amnesty to the men aboard
the ship, and some of the men ashore accepted the offer,
but the ships finally left in a powerful storm which covered
their departure. The mutinies of March had come to an end,
but the trials continued so that action could be taken
45
against those who had fled to other parts of the Indies.
The desertions of 1565-1566, and deaths caused by
illness, starvation or by Indian action, had cut the original
Speinish forces in Florida by almost one-half. The fresh
soldiers which Pedro Menendez had brought from C\iba were
essential to maintain a presence in the adelantamiento , and
to support the start of a new impetus of exploration and
colonization. After the garrisons at St. Augustine and San
Mateo had been reinforced with more than 200 men, the
Adelantado directed his fleet northward in early April,
1566. He took his primary Lieutenant, Esteban de las Alas,
to begin the first exploration of the seacoasts of his
northern dominions. From the time of the first Ay lion voy-
age to that of Angel de Villafane, much information about
these coasts had entered the store of mariners ' common know-
ledge, but this was a more systematic examination of the
lands and waters which could yield substcintial fruit in the
prosecution of the Florida conquest. The official royal
271
geographer, Jucin Lopez de Velasco, who used the accoxmts of
Pedro Men^ndez' explorations in his work, has described the
shore which Men^ndez saw:
Prom the river of San Mateo, the coast
mns to the northeast to Santa Elena.
The coast is made up entirely of great
and small islands, which create many
bars cind inlets so that, although it
seems to be a mainland, it is not. 46
Across this maze of inlets, sounds and sea-islcuids,
land communication was difficult, if not impossible. The
Florida Adelantado cind his entourage, mariners all, chose to
conquer, establish, and supply their provinces by sea. The
sea-route they pioneered was rapid and convenient — it would
become the lifeline linking the Florida forts and settlements
to the Havana supply-base and other points in the Caribbean.
A vessel of any size, Menendez learned, could sail from the
St. Augustine-San Mateo area all the way to Santa Elena in
a safe depth of more than 60 feet of water. As the low
coastline slowly unrolled before the appraising eyes of
Pedro Menendez, his evaluation of each inlet had to do
directly with the amount of water over its bar. Thus the
large and deep entry at the bar of Sena, where the St. Mary's
flows out to the sea at the south end of Cumberland Island,
was marked down as a strategic place: Ships upwards of 200
tons' burden could enter and find harbor there. Since the
people who inhabited the area, the Tacatacuru, were allied
with Saturiba and hostile to the Spanish, it might be
272
necessary to fortify the river mouth. Other inlets to the
north, Gualequeni, Osao, and Ospoque, were ishallow and
dangerous, and only fregatas or chalupas could traverse them.
As the Santa Catalina and the smaller escort ships that
made up Menendez* armada of discovery approached the next
opening in the belt of shoreline, it became evident that it
was a far more commodious and convenient port. The bar and
its principal Indiem settlements bore the name of Guale.
It was evidently the pass at the south end of the island
presently called St. Catherine's. Soundings indicated a
safe depth of 19 feet over the bar at low water, enough
for substantial vessels.
■ Leaving his armada at anchor in charge of Esteban de
las Alas, Pedro Menendez took two small craft with 50 men
and entered the sound to the westward of the sea-island. He
moved with caution, as it was here that he expected the
possibility of a colony of French, fled from the defeats or
shipwrecks of the past year. At about 1,000 yards from
the bank of the sound, he discovered a village of Indicms.
The village, a few huts of wattle-and-daub thatched with
sabal fronds, was no more impressive than its surroundings.
The lamd west of the sound was marsh, interspersed with low
oeJc-hammocks and other trees; what soil could be seen was
seuidy. The scemt population of Indians eked out part of
their living from scattered cornfields, hunted the deer and
small game in the scrub or the deeper woods, or fished along
the shores.
273
Menendez did find his "Frenchmaui" here — a Spaniard who
had come to the area as a part of Ribault's 1562 expedition
to Port Royal. With this ready-made interpreter, named
Guillermo, the Adelantado explained his presence, appealed
to the Indicuis for obedience to Philip II, and for their
acceptcince of the Catholic faith. The chief at Guale had
heard of the triumphs of the Spanish at Fort Caroline and
Matanzas, and was glad to acquiesce in Menendez' demands.
A cross was erected in the village, and the Speinish and
Indiem leaders joined in evening and morning ceremonies of
litany and adoration of the Christian symbol,
A central part of Menendez' Indian policy was the
bringing of order to broad areas of his provinces — reaching
across the parochial culture-boundaries of warring native
groups to enforce peace in the name of the Hapsburg monarch.
Thus an over lordship of power could pacify the land and pave
the way for peaceable exploitation. The Adelantado had
learned that Guale was at war with the Indians of Crista,
in the vicinity of Santa Elena in the north, where he hoped
to make a major settlement. How he asked the chief at Guale
to yield up to him two captive Indians from Crista; in re-
turn Menendez would leave Alonso Menendez Marqu^z and seven
other Spciniards as hostage. Menendez assured the chief,
however, that any injury to the men would mean his return to
cut off the heads of those guilty of the offense.
274
In spite of its poverty, the Spanish retained favoreUale
impressions of Guale as a future site for colonization. The
Indians seemed tractcible, cind there was a good port for
marine supply and reinforcement. If the soil was poor, then
at least the spot could serve as entrep6t into the interior,
where richer lands and mines surely beckoned. As he had
done in Carlos, Menendez evaluated Guale for its fitness in
his scheme of peripheral settlement at places of strategic
importcince easily reached by water. If friendly Indian re-
lations could be established at these key points, his rear
would be protected and he would have a safe path for retreat
to the sea.*^
The fleet left with its hostages, and departed for the
north. The northeasterly course of the Adelantado's ships
carried them past several more inlets, none of which would
admit vessels of any draft. They sailed by the shoals at
the mouth of the Savannah River and soon approached the
great point now called Hilton Head, but long known to the
Spcmish as the Punta Santa Elena. Beyond it lay the finest
harbor in the provinces of Florida, which the French had
named Port Royal.
As the Spanish rounded the point they saw a wide en-
tr2mce, more than six miles across, containing several
islands. The south bar lay deep enough to allow the Santa
Catalina to pass within, but it was swept by strong cur-
rents. Pedro Menendez brought the large ship to anchor, and
275
proceeded to explore the harbor in two bergantines with Alas
and 100 soldiers. The Adelantado spied an islcind placed
advantageously in the center of the harbor entramce. Its
seawgurd point, he noted, held a white sauid-hill eminence
49
that would be ideal for fortification.
The expedition passed further into the port cmd sur-
prised a number of Indians near an old burned village. With
the aid of the interpreter brought from Guale, they identi-
fied themselves, to the mutual pleasure of both parties.
When the Indians leanred that Menendez had brought back the
captive Oristans, their delight increased, and a formal
parley was arranged with cacique Crista. The Adelantado of
Florida utilized the ceremony of returning the prisoners who
had been held in Guale to proffer Spanish peace emd order
and the Christicuiization of the tribe. Chief Crista retired
to consult with his council and returned directly to accept
the offer. Menendez then agreed to leave men among them to
learn their language and to teach them the rudiments of
Christianity.
The Crista Indians lived in several groupings around and
to the north of the main harbor of Port Royal. They were
somewhat greater in numbers thcin the Guale people and they
appecLT to have been more closely integrated in culture. Al-
though dedicated to the cultivation of com cind other crops,
they were still attuned to the rhythms of the acorn haurvest
emd the seasonal runs of fish in the ocean and bays, and
moved their residence during these times.
276
The Spanish commander chose the site for his city with
an eye to strategic considerations and in line with his
desire to be near the centers of Indian population, yet not
directly among them. The central islcuxd in the harbor, now
named Parris Islcind, became the location of the second munici-
pality founded in the adelantamiento of Florida. Here the
dual entities — the city of Santa Elena and the fort of San
Salvador — were built around the high sand bluffs, a little
distance from the Ribault settlement of 1562-1564. Although
there was fertile soil to be found in some parts of the
great bay, the island chosen for settlement and fortifica-
tion '••^.s not particularly blessed with good soil. Menendez
named Esteban de las Alas to govern both the civil and
military elements of the district, making him Alcaide of
the fort and Governor of the province of Santa Elena.
The municipal regimiento and cabildo was formed for what
promised to be the center of the King's dominions in Florida.
Again, the location of settlement was directly related to
marine access and established in this case upon a fine deep-
water port.
It was now time for Menendez to begin the return voyage
down the east coast of his territories, for it would shortly
be necessary to return the large galleon and her crew to the
New Spain fleet as escort for the homeward journey to Spain.
On his way south, he would stop at Guale and then inspect
the peninsular garrisons, still shaky in morale after the
277
mutinies. At Havcma Men^ndez vould endeavor to pump more
resources into his supply pipeline » %^ich had continued to
function during the late winter and early spring of 1566,
bringing com from Yucatan, wine, biscuit, cassava, vege-
tables, pork, live chickens, goats and sheep from Cuba.
Now that Santa Elena had been added to the route, the small
ships would touch there also. The Adelantado promised the
men he had left in Fort San Salvador that he would send them
supplies in very short order, but keeping that promise might
be difficult, for Men^ndez' resources were becoming slim in-
deed; if the promised fleet of reinforcement from Spain did
not soon arrive, it would be difficult for him to continue
the enterprise.
When Menendez came to St. Augustine he found that
redding Indians had attacked cmd burned the fort built near
Seloy's village. Many of the papers of the expedition, a
qucuitity of food and munitions, and the French banners and
trophies captured the previous fall were destroyed in the
fire. The fire sharpened the problem of supplying all of
the forts, for there was little left in Florida, and an-
other voyage to Havana had become urgently necessary.
The Adelantado arrived at the Cuban port in mid-May,
1566. The supplies he had found atboard Santa Catalina when
it was taken for his service had been exhausted, and
Menendez had to supply the soldiers and crew aboard at his
cost. Menendez was not yet ready to release the big ship
278
from his service, for he had another voyage to make. On May
25, 1566, he left Havana to make a rapid trip to Carlos. He
wemted to further cement his relationship with the chief
there, and had promised to bring Dona Antonia, his "wife,"
to HaveUia with other Indieins for instruction in the Christicui
faith. ^^
The little fleet from Florida reentered the harbor at
Havcma on June 7, and Pedro Men^ndez dismissed the large
ship which had served him so well. The rough seas along the
Florida coasts that winter had taken their toll, for Santa
Catalina's owner complained that the vessel was returned in
badly damaged condition. Four of the crew had died on the
voyages (one at the hands of the Indians) , and 26 remained
54
in Florida. The Adelantado established the first house-
hold of instruction for the Indians of Florida in Havana;
when the religious personnel arrived to take charge they
would have a body of potential Christians for their pupils.
Again the Florida leader attempted to obtain aid for
the Royal troops in Florida from the Governor at Havana,
For the second time, Garcia Osorio refused to use funds of
the Havana treasury for any such purpose; this time, a
member of the Council of the Indies and the Royal Officials
at Havana were also involved in his action. In February,
1566, the King had written the Havana officials, ordering
them to give the Florida Adelantado the supplies he needed,
since they had not been forthcoming from Sauito Domingo. .
279
When the royal cedxala was received in Cuba, the Licenciado
Geronimo Valderrama was present. The Governor, Valderrama,
and the King's officials met to discuss Men^ndez* requests
for supplies and aid. It was Valderrama ' s opinion that
nothing should be given until a specific order should come
from the Audiencia of Santo Domingo to that effect, Garcia
Osorio, for his part, Sciid that Pedro Men^ndez would have to
pay for whatever he got. Geronimo Valderrama, who had
been away from Spain for more than two years, was hardly in
any position to have had much knowledge of the Florida ven-
ture. His involvement with Osorio, Mendndez and the Royal
Officials in Havana must have been nothing more than a
matter of momentary judgment, and was not a formal examina-
tion of the affairs of Florida. His record in New Spain
indicates that the man was inclined to weight all government
matters in the light of strict observance of his Majesty's
ordinamces and stem protection of the royal fisc. His
legalistic reaction was entirely predictable.
In the first week of July, and just before the depar-
ture of Menendez for Florida again, both Garcia Osorio and
Pedro Menendez wrote to the King. The Adelantado's letter is
disappointing to the historian, for it refers to a letter
Menendez had written Philip II from Santa Elena in early May,
and notes that Gonzalo Solis de Merds, who was coming to
Spain, would furnish more particular information. Both men,
in their letters, asked the King to seek further data about
280
the Florida enterprise from Valderrama, who was returning
to SpcLin with the same fleet after his visit to New Spain.
In his dispatch. Governor Osorio refuted cooly the
accusations Menendez had made against him to the King,
saying that he had done all he reasonably could for
Menendez, and that Valderrama would vindicate him.^^
The Adelantado obtained more cash or credit, and was
able to purchase additional supplies and munitions for his
enterprise. On the same day he had written his letter to
the King, Menendez left Haveina to carry supplies to his
forts along the now well-known route. As Pedro Menendez
returned to the Florida provinces, the expedition sent from
Spain under the command of Sancho de Archiniega was com-
pleting its voyage. The ships had followed the usual route
for vessels outbound from Spain to the Indies; they had
reached Grand Canary on May 4. On June 10, the worst of
their journey over, the fleet entered the harbor of San
Juan in Puerto Rico after watering at Dominica. Sancho de
Archiniega wrote Philip II that he received a letter in
Puerto Rico which described the sufferings and starvation
of the Spciniards and French at Santa Lucia in Florida. It
also told him of Menendez' "marriage" to the sister of an
Indian cacique — evidently a reference to the happenings in
Carlos. Archiniega also advised his King that cannibal
Carib Indians had killed most of the survivors from Pedro
Menendez' ship lost the year before in Guadeloupe. ^^
281
The further journey from Puerto Rico to Florida was
routine, except that one of the vessels, San Salvador,
strayed from the rest and found harbor at Puerto de Plata
on the northeast coast of Santo Domingo. There 60 men from
the compciny of Captain Andrada became embroiled in contro-
versy when their sergeant, Diego de Buytrago, attempted to
lead them in the capture of a Portuguese ship which had
anchored in that port. The arrival of the men in Florida
was delayed while the case was tried; the Audiencia of
Santo Domingo sentenced Buytrago to three years at the oar
in the galleys, for a soldier had been killed in the
58
action.
Great was the rejoicing in the fort and town of St.
Augustine when, on Jvine 29, 1566, a large fleet of Spanish
vessels was seen off the bar. Their coming meant reinforce-
ment, supplies, and the bolstering of the will to persist
in Florida. Since the Adelantado had not yet returned from
his last voyage to Havana, Bartolome Men^ndez made the
necessary formal welcomes in his name. Hernando de Miranda
begem his duties as Royal Factor by receiving the ships
officially. Then he and Juan de Junco acknowledged receipt
of the soldiers emd cargoes that the vessels had brought.
The King's reinforcements had arrived, and the belated
59
Royal support could not have come at a better time.
NOTES
1. See Menendez' assessment cf the navigational dis-
coveries in his letter to Philip II from Matanzas dated
December 5, 1565, from A.G.I. Santo Domingo 115 (Stetson
Collection). An excellent description of the journey of the
Adelantado from Florida is foxond in Solis de MerSs, Pedro
Menendez de Aviles, pp. 129-131.
2. Garcia Osorio states that the Adelantado arrived
in Havana November 13, in his letter to the Crown from
Havana, December 18, 1565, F.M. A.G.I. Santo Domingo 115
(Stetson Collection) .
3. Ponce describes his aid to Alas' ships in his letter
to the Crown, San Juan, April 20, 1566, A.G.I. Santo Domingo
71 (Stetson Collection) .
4. The send-off of Penalosa and his subsequent ad-
ventures is described in "Copia de una relacion que Capitan
Gonzalo de Penalosa dio de un viaje que hizo a la Florida
con socorro de las armada del Adelantado Pedro Menendez
de Aviles," from A.G.I. Patronato 257, No. 3, ramo 22
(Stetson Collection). The Audiencia of Santo Domingo dis-
cusses its role in the dispatching of the expedition in its
letter to Philip II, sent from Santo Domingo on December 12,
1565, cind found in A.G.I. Sainto Domingo 71 (Stetson Collec-
tion) . The Royal Officials of that place also reported on
the matter to the King in a dispatch dated November 26,
1565, A.G.I. Santo Domingo 74 (Stetson Collection).
5. Menendez describes the sale in his letter to
Philip II from Matanzas dated December 5, 1565, op. cit.
Hemcindo Baeza recounts the return of San Andres from Havana
in "Los despachos que se hizieron en la Florida ..." from
A.G.I. Escribania de Camara 1,024-A.
6. In reality, of course, young Ribault had returned
to France. In any event, his feeble force would have posed
little dcinger to Spanish fleets, and could only have done
scattered raiding. Menendez outlines the supposed threat
and the arming of the expedition, in his letter to the
Crown from Matanzas on December 5, 1565, A.G.I. Santo
Domingo 115 (Stetson Collection) .
282
283
7. Men^ndez mentions the Luna mission in the December
5 letter, op. cit. Confirmation of the loan request is found
in Royal Officials of Mexico to Crown, Mexico City, March 30,
1566, A.G.I. Mexico 323.
8. See Pedro Men^ndez de Avil^s to Audencia of Scinto
Domingo, Matanzas, December 2, 1565, from A.G.I. Santo
Domingo 71 (Stetson Collection) . The letter to the King
is the December 5 letter, op. cit.
9. The nombramiento is addressed to Pedro Men^ndez
Marquez, dated December 4, 1565, at Matcinzas, and is found
in A.G.I. Patronato 257, No. 4, ramo 1.
10. The Adelantado mentions the use of the Portugese
in his December 5 letter, A.G.I. Santo Domingo 115 (Stetson
Collection). The French are shown on ration lists ^for 1566
and 1567 as ship crew emd foxind in A.G.I. Contaduria 941
(in microfilm at the P. K, Yonge Library of Florida History,
University of Florida) .
11. Pedro Men^ndez to Crown, Matanzas, December 5,
1565.
12. The events described here are outlined by Pedro
Menendez in his letter to the Crown from Havana dated
December 12, 1565. Menendez wrote that letter and mailed
it separately. This separate letter is also included as a
part of Menendez' letter of December 25. It appears that,
when he had recovered from his illness, he also mailed both
letters together, thus repeating the contents of the earlier
letter. In the Stetson Collection are found the combined
letters of December 12/25, and also a separate copy of the
December 12 letter, all from A.G.I. Santo Domingo 2 31. It
is the separate December 12 letter which bears the marginal
comment of Philip II. The letter of December 12, but not
the one of December 25, is included in "Siete cartas escritas
al Rey," 45 fol. , from "Cartas de Indias," in the Coleccion
Navarrete, XIV, fol. 281-326. The letter has been reprinted
from Lhe collection of Francis Parkman in Proceedings of
the Massachusetts Historical Society, series 2, Vlll (ia94) ,
459. For the supply data, see "Instruction of Pedro Menen-
dez de Aviles to Diego de Mircuida," Havana, November 8 (sic),
1565, from Santo Domingo 11. The arraingement with Zavallos
is described in Menendez' letter to Philip II written from
St. Augustine on October 20, 1566, from A.G.I. Santo Domingo
115 (Stetson Collection).
13. See "Despachos que se hicieron," A.G.I. Escribania
de Camara 1,0 2 4- A.
284
14. Menendez' letter is that of December 25, 1565.
The royal accountant at Havana, Diego L6pez Osorio, wrote
to Philip II from Havana on Jcmuary 26, 1566, found in A.G.I.
Santo Domingo 115. In Stetson Collection, misdated
December 26, 1565.
15. Baeza came with Menendez on the Cadiz ships. His
caureer is described by witnesses in "Cargo y data de la
cuenta que dio Fernando de^Baeca," Havema, February 10,
1569, from A.G.I. Contaduria 94l, in microfilm, P. K. Yonge
Library of Florida History. His commission as a notary
public in the Indies is found in A.G.I. Indiferente General
425, Book XXV, fol. 233 and vto. Menendez describes the
establishment of the supply depot in his letter of Januairy 30,
1566. (See note 47, p. 236, supra.), op, cit. Baeza's
list of supply vessels from Havana is found in "Despachos
que se hicieron," A.G.I. Escribania de Camara 1,024-A.
In addition to Menendez' letters and the ship-dispatches of
Hexmcindo de Baeza, we eire most fortunate in having the
detailed list of supply vessels and cargoes sent by the
Adelantado from Havana from 1566 to 1574 contained in A.G.I.
Contaduria 1,174. These data, collected by the Royal
Officials of Havcina at the request of the Crown, were
gathered at Menendez' request to support his position that
he had supplied royal soldiers at his own expense. There
is record of Baeza's dealing in Yucatem with one Juan
Fernandez of Campeche; see ^Declaration of February 17,
1569, from A.G.I. Contaduria 454.
16. Pedro Menendez discusses Amaya's report in his
letter of January 30, 1566, from A.G.I. Santo Domingo 168,
which he directed to the King from Havcma.
17. Captain Velez' recollections are from his "Testi-
monies . . . ," St. Augustine,. May 15, 1566, from A.G.I.
Justicia 999. A description of the sufferings of the men
in Fort Santa Lucia is found in "Meritos y servicios de
Diego Lopez," St. Augustine, December 16, 1569, from the
Woodbury Lowery Collection, in microfilm, P. K. Yonge
Library of Florida History, I: 2: 414: 265-290. In his
narrative, Lopez baldly stated that the Spanish in the
Velez garrison resorted to cannibalism. As to location of
Santa Lucia, Woodbury Lowery, in The Spainish Settlements,
Appendix S, II, 434, places it at the present St. Lucie
River inlet near Stuart, Florida. On the other hand. Captain
Juan de Soto placed the location of Santa Lucia in "Xega" in
his testimony in "Daiios de los indios de la Florida," A.G.I.
Patronato 257, No. 3, ramo 20. After working with Mr. Homer
N. Cato of Micco, Florida, in the translation of the Mexia
derrotero, the writer believes that the beginning point of
the mutineers' southward journey was not far south of the
Sebastian River in Indian River County. Their course,
estimated at from twelve to fifteen leagues in length.
285
would have brought them to the north side of the wide
St. Lucie River, from whence it is about eighteen miles,
or six leagues, to the Jupiter Inlet.
18. See Diego L6pez Osorio to Crown, Havana, January
26, 1566, A.G.I. Santo Domingo 115. The news of trouble
and disaster in Florida reached San Juan before the arrival
of Semcho de Archiniega there in June of 1566. See Ar-
chiniega to Crown, Sam Juan, June 11, 1566, from A.G.I.
Santo Domingo 71 (Stetson Collection) . Many deserters also
carried the news to Santo Domingo and other places in the
island Indies.
19. The Adelcuitado's decision is mentioned in his
letter to Philip II from Havema dated January 30, 1566,
and from A.G.I. Santo Domingo 168.
20. There is much material eibout this ship-arming in
"Infonnacion de Pedro Menendez de Aviles," Seville, 1567-
1568, which was assembled in an attempt to prove that
Menendez had spent much of his own money in feeding and
supplying the crew of Santa Catalina. This is found in
A.G.I. Contratacion 4,802 (Stetson Collection). There are two
lists of ships engaged in the expedition; one, in A.G.I.
Contaduria 1,174, gives the sailing date as March 1, 1566;
the other, from "Despachos que se hicieron," in A.G.I.
Escribanxa de Camara 1,024-A, gives the date as February 20.
Soils de Meras, in Pedro Menendez de Aviles, sets the date
at February 10 (page 138) .
21. On September 4, 1565, the Casa officials reported
to Philip II that cannon amd arquebus powder, matchcord
and lead were being gathered in the Seville warehouses for
the expedition; from A.G.I. Contratacion 5,167, Book II,
On August 15, they had been busy trying to locate ships;
on that date, the shallop La Trinidad was embargoed in Port
Santa Maria — see A.G.I. Contaduria 299, 12: 3, 4. Evi-
dently they had difficulty finding a proper Capitana for
the fleet and in locating enough cannon; the King, in a letter
to the Casa from the Bosque de Segovia, September 6, 1565,
commented on their problems , cuid advised that he had sent
to Vizcaya for a thousand arquebuses and helmets. The letter
is from A.G.I. Contratacion 5,012 (Stetson Collection).
The orders to the proveedores of artillery at Malaga and
to the officials of Vizcaya and Guipuzcoa were dated the
same day, and come from A.G.I. Indiferente General 738,
ramo 7, No. 74, 74-C, and 74-E (Stetson Collection) .
22. Crown to Pedro Menendez de Aviles, Bosque de
Segovia, September 26, 1565, from A.G.I. Escribania de
Camara 1,024-A. Archiniega's appointment is from A.G.I.
Patronato 254, and his first day of duty was listed in
A.G.I. Contaduria 299, 12: 7.
286
23. Royal messages were taken to the captains re-
cruiting men at Utrera, Port Santa Maria, Librijia and Medina-
Sidonia; see A.G.I. Contaduria 299, 21: 2 vto. Difficulties
and a lawsuit eventually arose out of the expenses incurred
by Captain Pardo in the town of Tolox del Marques, near
Marbella on the Mediterranean coast, as the municipality
sued for reimbursement. The case, dated January 27, 1566,
somehow came to rest in A.G.I. Mexico 209, ramo 1,
24. Philip II gave his orders to Alava in a letter
dated September 30, 1565, and found in A.D.E., VII, No. ,
(A.G.S., Estado, legajo K, 1,504, No. 66). The Ambassador's
report on his meeting and arguments with the Queen and her
advisers was found in his letter to Philip II sent November
29, 1565, and fromA.D.E., VII, No. (A.G.S., Estado,
legajo K, 1,504, No. 80).
25. Isabel's comments to Fourquevaux are found in the
Ambassador's letter to the Regent written November 3, 1565,
from: Celestin Douais, ed. , Depeches de M. de Fourquevaux,
ambassadeur du roi Charles IX en Espagne, 1565-1572 (2 v. ,
Paris: E. Leroux, 1896), I, 63. The meeting of Fourquevaux
with the Duke of Alba is described in a letter from the
Ambassador to the Regent dated from Madrid on December 24,
1565, ibid. , I, 17.
26. See testimony of Sebastian de Vacoli Pedrossa,
taken by Juan Gutierrez Tello in Seville, from A.G.I.
Indiferente General 738, ramo 7, No. 74-A, and the response
from the Crown in a letter to the Casa sent from Bosque de
Segovia on September 14, 1565, from A.G.I. Contrataci6n 5,012.
27. The loss of Ssm Miguel cind the subsequent delay in
receipt of the news of Men^ndez' victory is described in a
letter from the Crown to the Casa de Contrataci6n dated
February 20, 1566, from A.G.lT~Contrataci6n 5, 012 (Stetson
Collection) . It is also contained in "Memorial de los navios
cargados de bastimentos y municiones que se perdieron el
Adelantado Pedro Menendez yendo a echarlos luteranos que
estavan poblando en aquella tierra de la Florida," in A.G.I.
Escribania de Camara 1,024-A, n.d. (probably October, 1567).
28. The letter from Alava to Philip II is dated January
6, 1566, and is found in A.D.E., VIII, No. 1, 184, 189
(A.G.S. Estado, legajo K, 1,505, 61-63). Fourquevaux wrote
back from Madrid about the coming of the Basque to the
Spanish Court in two letters: February 4 and 18, 1566,
from "Lettres et Papiers d'etat de Fourquevaux," in Gaffarel,
Histoire de la Floride Frangaise, pp. 417, 421.
287
29. Laudonniere describes his voyage in "L'Histoire
Notaibley" from Lussagnet, Les Francais en Floride, pp.. 183,
184. Alava described the coming o^ Laudonniere to the French
Court and the incident of the second captive in a letter to
Philip II dated March 16, 1566, from A.D.E., VIII, No. 1,205,
271 (A.G.S, Estado, legajo K, 1,505, 81) and one written on
March 18, 1566, to Secretary Gonzalo Perez, from A.D.E.,
VIII, No. 1,206, 272 (A.G.S. , Estado, legajo K, 1,505, 84).
30. Philip II had not received the dispatches from
Florida by February 10, when he issued a commission to
Juam de Ubilla as Almirante of the Archiniega fleet and
urged him to go and expel the French from Florida, See
cedula to Juan de Ubilla, Madrid, February 10, 1566, from
A.G.I. Contratacion 58. The arrival of the message and
Diego Flores Valdes were acknowledged by Philip II in a
letter to the Casa de Contratacion on February 21, 1566,
from A.G.I. Contratacidn 5,012 (Stetson Collection). It is
also described in Fourquevaux's letter to Charles IX dated
February 18, 1566, from "Lettres et Papiers d'etat de
Fourquevaux," in Gaffarel, Histoire de la Floride Frangaise, p,
421. ■
31. The Spanish King's letter to Archiniega was dated
February 24, 1566, and is described in the auditor's summary
of events affecting the Menendez asiento in the first pages
of A.G.I. Contaduria 941 (especially fol. 2), which is in
microfilm at the P. K. Yonge Library of Florida History.
32. After consideration by the Council of the Indies
on March 15, 1566, the King sent his decision to the Casa on
March 21 from Madrid. The letter is found in A.G.I. Contra-
tacion 5,012 (Stetson Collection). The cedula to Pedro
Menendez is outlined in A.G.I. Contaduria 941, fol. 2. In
another letter sent from Madrid on March 21, 1566, the King
also notified his officials in Havana that parts of the
Archiniega force would be used to man the fort there. This
is from A.G.I. Contaduria 454.
33. See Castillo to Crown, Cadiz, January 30, 1566,
from A.G.I. Indiferente General 2,673. Castillo had also
evidently written the King on February 15, for Philip II
replied to him in a letter sent from the Escorial on March
15, 1566; this letter is from A.G.I. Indiferente General
1,966, Book II. The trade officials discussed the matter
with the King in a letter sent from Seville on March 6,
1566, from A.G.I. Contrataci6n 5,167, Book III. On the
fifteenth of March, Philip had written the Casa functionaries,
ordering them to make a payment of 6,000 ducats. This
letter is described in a Royal cedula sent to Casa repre-
sentative Abalia in Cadiz, dated at Madrid August 28, 1566,
from A.G.I. Indiferente General 1,966 (Stetson Collection).
288
34. The cedula of February 24, 1566, to the Royal
Officials at Havana was sent from Madrid; it is foxind in
A.G.I. Santo Domingo 115 (Stetson Collection). It is
also referred to in A.G.I. Contadurla 1,174, and also in
Contaduria 454.
35. Led by the 480-ton galleon Los Tres Reyes as
Capitana, the Archiniega expedition carried four ureas,
vessels of great capacity and relatively small draft, to
transport supplies to Florida and enter its ports. The
outbound ships are listed in A.G.I. Contrataci6n 2,898 in
Yd a — 1566. The successful departure is described in a
letter of Francisco Duarte to the Casa on the same date,
found in A.G.I. Contrataci6n 5,185.
36. The departure of the expedition to Carlos is
described in "Despachos que se hicieron . . . ," A.G.I.
Escribania de Camara 1,024-A, Menendez evidently sent dis-
patches to the King from Carlos, which were lost when the
courier vessel, Nuestra Senora del Rosario, was taken off
Spain; see "Memorial de los navios . . . que se perdieron
. . . ," from A.G.I. Escribania de Camara 1,024-A. Because
of this gap in Menendez' correspondence, one must rely upon
the Solis de Meras, Barrientos, and "Barcia" narratives.
The Adelantado does, however, give some details cibout Carlos
and the Spanish prisoners there in his letter to Philip II
sent from St. Augustine on October 20, 1566, and found in"
A.G.I. Santo Domingo 231 (Stetson Collection).
37. From Menendez' letter of October 20, 1566, op. cit.
De Escalante has usually been called Fontaneda, and his
striking Memorial has appeared in a number of places. The
best and most recent edition is Memoir of Hernando d'Es-
calcinte Fontaneda (translated by Buckingham Smith, edited
by David O. True; Coral Gables, Florida: University of
Miami Press, 1944). De Escalante appears on a Spanish
ration list of 1565-66, with another captive at Carlos,
Alonso de Rojas, as an interpreter. See "Lista de la
gente . . . conquista de Florida," A.G.I. Contaduria 941,
fol. 9 and 10 (in microfilm, P. K. Yonge Library of Florida
History). The culture of Carlos, Calus, or Escampaba was
a vigorous one, whose history is well described by Pro-
fessor Charlton W. Tebeau in Florida's Last Frontier (Coral
Geibles: University of Miami Press, 1956), pp. 25-32. Dr.
John M. Goggin has identified it as a Glades III culture in
"Cultural Traditions in Florida prehistory," from The Florida
Indian and his Neighbors (edited by John W. Griffin; Winter
Park, Florida: Rollins College, 1949). The northern boun-
daries of the Calusa area on the peninsular west coast were
defined by Ripley P. Bullen in "The Southern Limit of Timucua
Territory," op. cit. Woodbury Lowery, in The Spanish
289
Settlements/ II, states his belief that the capital city of
Carlos was located at Charlotte Harbor; see pp. 230-231, n. 2.
On the other hand. Father Clifford M. Lewis posits the loca-
tion of Mound Key in Estero Bay; this view is expressed in
an unpublished manuscript entitled "The Speinish Jesuit
Mission of 1567-69 in Southwest Florida: Search for Location,"
%n:itten at Wheeling, West Virginia in 1967. After reading
the description in Juem L6pez de Velasco, Geograffa uni-
versal de las Indias, esp, 164, this writer tends to agree
with Father Lewis.
38. From Men^ndez' letter to the King, St. Augustine,
October 20, 1566. Pedro Men^ndez Marqu^z advises that eighteen
captive Christians were rescued at Carlos; see "Darios de
los Indies de la Florida," A.G.I. Patronato 257, No. 3,
ramo 20. With Rojas and Escalante appear the name of "Luis,
mulatto, interpreter of the land of Carlos" — from A.G.I.
Contaduria 941, fol. 9, in microfilm, P. K. Yonge Library
of Florida History.
39. See Menendez* letter to the King, St. Augustine,
October 20, 1566.
40. Captain Velez describes the incident in "Informa-
cion que enbio el General Pedro Melendez de Avil^s sobre
cierto motin que passo en la Florida," A.G.I. Justicia 999.
The caravel can be identified from the list in "Despachos
que se hicieron," A.G.I. Escribania de Camara 1,024-A, and
is also mentioned in A.G.I. Contaduria 1,174. The descrip-
tion of the number of survivors of the garrison is found in
the "Meritos y servicios de Diego L6pez," St. Augustine,
December 16, 1569, from the Woodbury Lowery Collection,
in microfilm, P. K. Yonge Library of Florida History, I:
2: 414: 265-290.
41. The author has utilized the detailed testimonies
about the soldiers* revolts of March, 1566, and later in
that year which are found in several piezas in A.G.I.
Justicia 999. It appears that some of this material had
originally been located in A.G.I. Contrataci5n 58, but is
not now to be found in that legajo. The papers were evi-
dently gathered in connection with appeals of the Redroban
euid Enriquez cases to the Council of the Indies.
42. See "Order to hcuig Sebastiein Lezcano," St. Augus-
tine, March 13, 1566, from "El Fiscal de Su Majestad con
el Capitan Pedro de Redroban," A.G.I. Justicia 999.
43. From statement about his arrival given on March
27, 1566, and found in "Infojnnaci6n que enbio el General
Pedro Melendez . . . ," A.G.I. Justicia 999.
290
44. Statement of Pedro Menlndez de Avil^s, St.
Augustine, March 22, 1566, from "Informacion que enbfo
. . . ," A.G.I. Justlcia 999.
45. Pedro Men^ndez forwarded the procesos of the cases
to the King with his letter written at Havana on July 1,
1566, from A.G.I. Santo Domingo 168 (Stetson Collection).
46. Juem L6pez de Velasco, Geograffa universal de las
Indias, p. 168.
47. After comparing the Velasco derrotero with later
maps, the writer would follow the identification of Guale
inlets suggested by Jofm Tate Lanning in The Spanish Mis-
sions of Georgia (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina
Press, 1935) , p. 11, and seconded by Felix Zubillaga in
La Florida, p. 353, and by Verne Chatelain, The Defenses of
Spanish Florida, 1565-1763 (Washington: Carnegie Insti-
tution of Washington, 1941), esp. 35-40. The most complete
record of the Guale visit in the spring of 1566 is in Solis
de Meras, Pedro Menendez de Aviles, 199-210. The mission-
aries' letters cited by Zubillaga give by far the best view
of Guale in the Menendez years to 1572.
48. Menendez described his policy of peripheral
settlement in his letter to Philip II, written from St.
Augustine on October 20, 1566, and found in A.G.I. Santo
Domingo 115 (Stetson Collection) .
49. The descriptions of the port of Santa Elena or
Port Royal are taken from the contemporary account of Jucin
Lopez de Velasco, in Geografia universal de las Indias,
pp. 161, 169. The specific location of Menendez' first
fort there was also described in the "Derrotero que hizo
Andres Gonzalez, piloto de la Florida, del viage que
verifico al Xacan," from A.G.I. Patronato 19, No. 1, ramo
31.
50. Alas' first appointment is affirmed in his
later nombramiento as Governor of Florida, found in A.G.I.
Contaduria 941, in microfilm, P. K. Yonge Library of Florida
History, under the date of August, 1566.
51. The shipments, carried from February through May,
1566, in the navios La Ascensi6n, Santa Ysabel, and San
Simon, in the pataches San Sebastian, Buenaventura, and
San Mateo, the fregata Espiritu Santo and the bergantin
San Anton, are detailed in A.G.I. Contaduria 1,174 and
described in "Los despachos que se hicieron," from A.G.I.
Escribania de Camara 1,024-A.
291
52. Menendez' promise to supply Santa Elena quickly
was described by Licenciado Godoy in "Governor Osorio sobre
los cuttotinados de Scinta Elena," Havana, July 5, 1566, from
A.G.I. Justicia 999. The burning of the fort and the
destruction of its contents was mentioned in A.G.I, Jus-
ticia 817, No. 5, and in "Informaci6n ante el Alcalde
desta Corte," Madrid, October 16, 1567, from A.G.I.
Escribanla de Cimara 1,024-A.
53. The Soils de MerSs narrative and the work of Felix
Zubillaga appear to have confused cind merged the two voyages
to the Calusa area, that of February and that of May, 1566.
The register of ship sailings from "Los despachos que se
hicieron," in A.G.I. Escribanfa de c£mara 1,024-A clearly
show that the second voyage was for the purpose of bringing
Dona Antonia to Havana,
54. Ximeno de Bretendona, the owner of Santa Catalina, oit-
lined the damages caused in the Florida expedition in his
petition for larger charter fees in a petition found in A.G.I.
Indiferente General 2,673. The return of the vessel is also
mentioned in "Informacidn de Pedro Menendez de Aviles,
Seville, 1567-68," A.G.I. Contratacion 4,802 (Stetson Collec-
tion) .
55. The refusal to aid Menendez is described in a
letter from Juan de Hinestrosa and Juan de Carteaga to the
Crown, Havana, December 24, 1568, from A.G.I. Santo Domingo
115 (Stetson Collection), Solis de Meras mentions the epi-
sode in Pedro Menendez de Aviles, p. 141, The visita of
Licenciado Valderrama is detailed by Mariano x:uevas in
Historia de la Iglesia en Mexico (Mexico City: Imprenta
de el Asilo "Patricio Sanz," 1922), II, 2 v., 70, 95, 122,
180-190, 252-253, 324,
56. See Pedro Menendez de Aviles to Crown, Havana,
July 1, 1566, from A.G.I. Santo Domingo 168 (Stetson Col-
lection), and Garcia Osorio to Crown, Havana, July 3, 1566,
from A.G.I. Santo Domingo 115 (Stetson Collection).
57. The passage of Archiniega's ships and the accounts
of his Almiranta are discussed in a large pieza in A.G.I.
Contratacion 3,259 (Stetson Collection). This legajo also
contains a list of the Florida troops aboard; many of these
same men can also be identified by later petitions for their
back pay; these are found in A.G.I. Contaduria 310-B; the
writer is indebted to Paul E. Hoffman for this citation.
Archiniega's letter to the King is dated at San Juan on
June 11, 1566, and is from A.G.I. Santo Domingo 71 (Stetson
Collection) .
292
58. See "Peticion de Diego de Buytrago," seen in
Madrid on March 31, 1568, from A.G.I. Indiferente General
1,220. The case itself is found in A.G.I. Justicia 1,000.
59. A record of some of the formalities at St. Augus-
tine when the fleet arrived there is found in A.G.I. Contra-
taci6n 58.
CHAPTER VII
• THE STRUGGLE CONTINUES
In contrast to his feelings of the previous summer,
the Spanish King could feel a degree of satisfaction by
inid-1566 about affairs in Florida. He had learned fully of
the victory of his Adelantado there, and had dispatched to
him a fleet of reinforcement. In a mood of approbation,
Philip II wrote Menendez late in the spring praising his acts
and acknowledging all of his dispatches sent from August
through December of the previous year. The King advised
that he was sending formal confirmation of the appointments
of captains and officials that Pedro Menendez had made,
noted his approval of Menendez' seizure of the Portuguese
caravel taken off C\aba, and supported him in the Parra con-
troversy with Garcia Osorio. On the same date, a royal
letter of commendation was sent to Bartolome Menendez.
Another of Pedro Menendez* proteges was soon to be
honored, as the Adelantado had wished. On July 5, 1566,
Captadn Diego Flores Valdes was named General of the Tierra
Fiirme fleet which would next leave Spain for the Indies.
Thus the influence of the Menendez coterie in the
293
294
Carrera de Indias continued, even while many of its members
were heavily engaged in the Florida enterprise.
By spring of 1566, the news of the slaughters at
Natcuizas and Fort Caroline had provoked a formal reaction
from the Valois court. On June 18, Ambassador Fourquevaux
filed a second written protest against the acts of Pedro
Menendez in Florida on behalf of the French King. He pre-
sented his protest in an audience with Philip II, who took
the matter under advisement. The French Ambassador followed
up his protest with a detailed letter about the situation
of individual French prisoners being held in Florida, Cuba,
Puerto Rico and Spain. When the Spcinish ruler gave
Fourquevaux his reply, he decreed that all female prisoners
and their children under 14 years of age could return to
Seville, where they would be freed. The men would also be
brought to the Andalucian port, where their cases would be
tried under Spanish law by the Casa de Contrataci6n. Philip
II refused, however, to categorize Pedro Menendez or his
acts as criminal.
By midsummer of 1566, events in the Netherlands
dominions of Philip II clearly justified substantial con-
cern. The King's efforts to enforce obedience to the
Tridentine decrees he had proclaimed, together with some
episcopal reforms of his own, had brought first passive and
then active resistance. As Philip II pondered the con-
flicting advice of his counsellors in this matter, the
295
direction he sent Margauret of Parma, the Regent, was con-
ciliatory. His decision finally to take a hard line was
dictated by the outbrecJc of the iconoclastic fervor which
swept Flanders in August, 1566. After that time, rebellion
and heresy in the Netherlcinds were fused in the mind of the
King, and he determined to send an army shortly to enforce
his will. A new battleground in the worldwide war against
"the Lutheran sect" was cibout to open, but this did not make
the needs of the Indies any less pressing. Having expended
much upon Florida, Philip II was prepared to spend more.
He authorized a shipload of supplies for the royal troops in
Florida to serve as a backup for the original Men^ndez and
the Archiniegas expeditions. The urea Pantecras was loaded
with food cind munitions and sent with its Flemish master
at a cost to the Crown of more than 26,000 ducats.
The urea contained a vital cargo of another kind: Two
priests, a brother of the Society of Jesus and an interpre-
ter, sent to Florida to begin the great effort of evangeli-
zation of the Florida Indians. Thxis the "shock-troops of
the Counter-Reformation" would furnish the necessary
spiritual weapons in the struggle against heresy. Pedro de
Bustin(jury, the Basque who had for many years been a captive
of the Ais on the east coast of the peninsula, would aid the
missionaries in their communication with the Indians until
they could themselves learn the languages of Florida.
296
Pedro Men^ndez had considered other religious orders
for the work in Florida, but he had been in contact with the
Jesuits for some time. His friendship with Diego de
Avellemeda, the provincial of Andalusia, dated back to the
time of his imprisonment in the Atarazanas in 1563-1564.
During his preparations for the 1565 journey in Seville,
Menendez had written Francisco de Borja, then vicar-general
of the order, asking for missionaries for Florida. Within
60 days, Borja replied, giving his approval and advising
that he would attempt to send three missionaries.
Although the necessary formalities with the Casa de
Contratacion were completed in time for Jesuits to sail with
the Archiniegas expedition, it appears that internal com-
plications in the Society prevented it. Examination of the
correspondence of the missionaries with their superiors and
of the qualifications of the men chosen for the task re-
veals the zeal and the quality of the Jesuit mission. The
order which served as the cutting edge of conversion and
reconversion in Europe and overseas was characterized by
orgemizational discipline and personal dedication. These
qualities would now be put to the test in the Jesuits'
first commitment to American missions. The three men
chosen were Fathers Pedro Martinez, Jucin Rogel amd Brother
Francisco Villareal. They spent the time prior to the de-
parture of the urea preaching to the men in the New Spain
fleet and preparing themselves spiritually for the tasks
ahead. The Pantecras sailed June 28, 1566.
297
Nhile the Spamish Crown was busily engaged in the
supply and support of Florida, the agents of Pedro Men^ndez
were no less so. Pedro Men^ndez Marqu^z, who had come from
Cuba with his uncle's dispatches, visited Pedro del
Castillo in CSdiz. He then went to the court and thence to
Asturias to restock the vessel San Sebastiam for the journey
to Florida. In the port of Cangas, Menendez Marqu^z super-
vised the loading of the vessel; in addition to the items of
food euid drink permitted by the Florida asiento, he also
loaded tar, rigging, ship fastenings auid cloth — illegal
cargo under the King's contract.
After Menendez Marqu^z' departure from Ccidiz, bad news
reached Pedro del Castillo there. One of Mendndez' pataches
had been teiken by Turkish galleys off the Andalusian coast
on its way from Santo Domingo, the second ship from Florida
to be seized in a few months. Castillo had other problems
as well, for the Casa representative in Cadiz, Juan de
Abalia, was delaying the sailing of other vessels of the
Adelantado. Pedro del Castillo protested eibout this to the
King cind also asked again for the payment of back charter
fees due on San Miguel cind San Pelayo. The great galeass
was now known to have been totally destroyed upon the
D2Uiish coast.
As the ships beairing supplies, reinforcements, eind
missionaries left Spain for Florida, the French were also
298
preparing ships for an Indies venture. More than 20 vessels
were being outfitted in Norman emd Breton ports for a major
raid upon Spamish amd Portuguese commerce.
Meanwhile, in Florida, while the Archiniega expedition
began to disembark its soldiery and unload supplies and
mimitions in St. Augustine, Pedro Menendez had not yet re-
turned from his most recent trip to Havana. His major
lieutenants at St. Augustine, Pedro de Vald^s, Bartolom^
Menendez, Hernando de Miranda and Juan de Junco agreed with
the leaders of the expedition to send the two largest ships
to Santa Elena with supplies. It was agreed that pilot
Gonzalo Gayon, experienced from the Villafane and Manrique
de Rojas expeditions to that place, would guide the ships.
Captain Juan Pardo's company of 250 men was embarked aboard
as reinforcement for the northern garrison. By July 18, the
8
relief ships had arrived at Santa Elena.
When the Adelantado landed again in Florida, he touched
first at the St. Johns' River and learned to his inexpress-
ible relief .and satisfaction, that the Archiniega fleet had
arrived. By July 10, Menendez was in St. Augustine where he
met with Sancho de Archiniega to arrange the disposition and
division of the forces which he had brought.
The two men agreed that 750 soldiers, one half of the
new reinforcements, would remain in the Florida forts. Cap-
tain Pedro de Redroban, em experienced military engineer,
remained in St. Augustine with his company to aid in
299
reconstruction of the fort. Another officer who had arrived
with Archiniega, Miguel de Enriquez, was also stationed at
the first settlement. Colonel Orsuna did not come to
Florida, emd his company was assigned to Juan de Vascocaval.
The compamy of Captain Martin de Ochoa remained at Sem
Mateo; the fort there was still commanded by Sargento Mayor
Gonzalo de Villaroel. Death and the desertion of some
officers had left some companies decimated and others leader-
less. Fremcisco de Reinoso was promoted to Captain and
assigned the men who would shortly leave for the new fort
at Ccurlos. Captain Juan Velez de Medrano of Ais and
Captain Zurita would go with the Adelantado on his voyage
to reinforce the Caribbean islands. Until they left, the
forces designated for the West Indies expedition could
stiffen Menendez* forces for special missions he had planned
in Florida.
To replace the military organization he had used to
defeat the French, Pedro Menendez had prepared a system of
regional lieutenants exercising civil cmd military powers
tinder the overall commauid of another subordinate. As the
Adelantado pleinned a journey of some months in the Islcuids
and a lengthy voyage to Spain in the coming year, he decided
to act as an absentee overlord, while Florida would be ad-
ministered by his nortefio associates.
It was now time for Pedro Menendez to go northward for
his final tour of inspection of the new settlements made
300
there in the spring. After his vessels left St. Augustine
the Adelantado paused at San Mateo on August 1 to commission
am expedition to the north. It was Menendez' plan that it
probe for the "Bahia de Santa Maria" and the Western Passage
while Don Luis de Velasco, the Jacan chieftain, made the
first contact with the Indians there. The Adelantado also
instructed his men to reaffirm the Spanish dynastic claims
by taking formal possession of the Icinds in the name of
Philip II. An Asturian relative of Menendez, Pedro de
Coronas, was promoted to Captain and directed to share
authority for the expedition with Dominican friar Pablo de
San Pedro. A skilled pilot, Domingo Fernandez, and 15
soldiers rounded out the contingent, which sailed in the
patache La Trinidad on August 3, 1566. Pedro Menendez
had already sailed for Santa Elena.
When the Adelantado dropped anchor in the Santa Elena
harbor, he discovered that the garrison had almost been
wiped out in June by a mutiny which had followed much the
same course as those in the south. The arrival of the
promised supply vessel had precipitated a full scale
revolt. Trouble had flared earlier when a junta of dis-
satisfied soldiers forced Esteban de las Alas to permit them
to wander inland seeking food from the Indians. Now the
leaders of the mutineers seized the Spanish commander cind
Captain Pedro de Larrsmdia and put them in irons. The
rebels divided the meager supplies euid munitions in the fort
301
and left some with the twenty-six men who chose to remain
with their leaders at Santa Elena. The mutineers then
deserted the enterprise of Florida by sailing away with
the captxired vessel emd a French Huguenot pilot, Phillipe
Buser. Their adventure ended at Tequesta in Biscayne Bay
for some; for the rest, it ended in their capture by Governor
Osorio in Cuba more than a month later.
The infusion of men and supplies provided by the
Archiniega expedition allowed Pedro Men^ndez to turn the
situation at Samta Elena around. When he arrived, Men^ndez
found that Pardo emd de las Alas had the situation under
control and had arrived at a modus vivendi, in which the
Captain scrupulously observed the jurisdiction of the senior
official. The Adelantado allotted enough soldiers to build
and man a larger and better fort. With the rest, Juan Pardo
was to undertake a lengthy exploration into the interior of
Florida and was to seek the land and water route to New
Spain, thus coitpleting the unfinished work of Hernando de
Soto. Menendez' most significant action at Santa Elena was
governmental, for he shifted the center of the Adelantamiento
of Florida. Esteban de las Alas was nauned Chief Lieutenant
and was to exercise his control from Santa Elena, which
became the capital of Florida. Alas' appointment as Gov-
ernor and Captain-General was dated August, 1566. In St
Augustine and at San Mateo, regional Governors Bartolome
302
Men^ndez and Gonzalo Villaroel would continue to exercise
their offices. Jucin de Junco remained in the office of
Tenedor de Bastimentos at St. Augustine while Thomas Alonso
de Alas carried out the same duties in Seuita Elena.
On August 17, Men^ndez paused on his return journey
south to leave Captain Pedro de Larrandia, whom he had
detached from the Santa Elena garrison, at Guale. Six sol-
diers were left at Guale where they began a small fort near
the Indicm settlements. By the 28th of the month, the
Adelantado reached San Mateo and foiond that there had been
a second rebellion in the peninsular garrisons. This time,
the uprising had been rapidly discovered and contained, and
there was little for Menendez to do but hear the legal
appeals of the prisoners who were still alive. This time,
the troubles had also begun in the garrison of Fort San
Mateo. Dissension centered in the company of Captain
Pedro Redroban, although soldiers from other companies
were also involved. Unhappy with the land and their assign-
ment in Florida, the soldiers had been brought to a state
of tension by continual Indian raids and began to whisper
of desertion. In the forts, there was talk of the treasure
there was in the land of Carlos for einy man to take.
Redroban 's sergeant, Pedro de Pando, and his cousin, Joaquin
de Redroban, formed a party whose aim it was to go overland
to Carlos. After mcdcing themselves rich, the rebels plamned
to make their way to New Spain and be forever freed of the
303
misery of service in Florida. More than 100 men bemded
together and set out, but had gone only a short disteuice
«rtien they %rere intercepted and halted by Pedro de Valdes.
He pron^tly put the leaders of the pcirty on trial. Gonzalo
Villaroel arrested Joaquin de Redrobcui at Seui Mateo and his
trial began August 13. On the 24th, Valdes issued a formal
order that the mcin be hung for his "enormous and atrocious
guilt." As Villaroel prepared to carry out the order,
Redroban approached the coiort through his procurador to
make a formal appeal to the Adelantado.
The time had come for Men^ndez to grasp firmly the
nettle of the Indian problem which his garrisons faced in
the whole of the lower St. Johns. Throughout the year,
the Spanish continued to suffer casualties from annoying
Indian raids. Succinct marginal comments in the Florida
ration lists indicate that many of the killed and wounded
had been caught in ambush. When the Indiems suddenly
attacked with bows and arrows, the Spanish were uneible
quickly to return fire with their arquebuses, and the little
skirmishes often ended with several Spanish dead left on
the groxind. Menendez proposed to protect his men with
padded cotton jackets (escupiles) which had been used in
New Spain and Yucatan and further plcuined to augment his
firepower with crossbows, which could come into action
rapidly and cover the arquebusman while he prepared to fire
his awkward weapon.
304
In contravention of his royal orders and contrary to
his ovm expressed policy, Pedro Men^dez found himself
forced to practice alliemce politics with the Indians in
order to lessen the attacks upon his men. The hostility
of Saturiba and his allies, who occupied the lower St. Johns
and the mouth of the St. Mary's River, made some action
essential. The Adelcintado chose to attempt to immobilize
his opposition, eind Menendez prepared for a voyage up the
St. Johns. Among the allies and enemies of Saturiba, still
uneasy from the wars in the time of Laudonniere, he might
be able to meike profitaible treaties. At the saiae time, the
Adelantado could test his theory of a water route across the
peninsula.
At the end of August, 1566, with three small craft and
100 men, Menendez made his way upriver. Not 20 miles from
San Mateo, he came to the village of Otina, who had once
been captured by Laudonniere. That chief was most wary of
entanglements with the Spauiish, as he had already suffered
considerably from involvement with Europeams, cind he refused
to treat with Menendez. The expedition passed on southward,
camping at nights under guard on river beaches on the cypress
shoreline. The Spanish bypassed the towns of Chief Calabay,
near the great double bend in the river near the present
Palatka, traversed Lake George emd found the river notice-
ably more naurrow. Further on, they knew, lay the land of
Mayaca.^^
305
Menendez met with no success in dealing with the Mayaca
Indians. After finding the main village empty amd deserted,
the Speuiiards advanced in their boats until they reached a
narrow point in the river. There they were threatened by
hos tiles with bow cmd arrow and they found the waterway
blocked with stakes. There was no negotiation with Chief
Mayaca, neither had the water passage to the Gulf been
found. There was nothing to do but to return the way they
had come.
On the voyage down river, however, Men^ndez realized
some fruitful adveuitage from his expedition. After tenta-
tive but favorable contact with the Calabay chief, the
Spemiards left some soldiers to begin the teaching of a
simplified Gospel. This move stirred the jealousy of
Saturiba and the interest of Utina and even of Mayaca. The
Adelantado was finally cUble to send catechists and gifts to
Utina and Mayaca.
When he returned to San Mateo, Pedro Men^ndez was in
time to preside over the appeal of the mutiny case against
Joaquin Redroban. The case was heard aboard a ship anchored
off the fort and was very brief, for the Adelantado simply
noted that he busily occupied with the disptach of his West
Indies expedition and remanded the convicted man back to
Sargento Mayor Villaroel. Redrobcin was probably hung;
Vald4s notes that three of the guilty were executed euid
three others sentenced to 10 years' galley service. A
306
continually widening circle of suspicion soon included Cap-
tain Pedro de Redroban. Although there seems no" valid
evidence that he was involved in the mutiny plot. Captain
Redroban was arrested on September 12, The mutinies of
1566 had come to an end, but their unwholesome effects
continued to be felt.
After his return to St. Augustine, Pedro Men^ndez
commissioned his experienced Piloto Mayor Gonzalo Gay6n, to
make a journey to Mayaca. Gay6n was ordered to take a small
ship down the east coast and treat with the chief for the
ransom of French and Spanish captives reputedly in his
power. Menendez also sent Francisco de Reinoso, promoted
to- Captain, to establish a fort and colony at Carlos, near
the other end of the supposed waterway. With him went 12
soldiers, six of them noblemen and six farmer-soldiers, the
Indiem heir to Chief Carlos and two interpreters. The
mission of Reinoso and the others was to win the confidence
of the chief, build a fort and begin the cultivation of
the land.-"-^
As he prepared the ships and men which were to embark
with him on his anti-corsair expedition, Pedro Men€ndez was
saddened to learn of the unfortunate results of the voyage
of the urea Pantecras. News was brought to St. Augustine
that the relief ship had lost its way and put a small craft
ashore to seek directions to St. Augustine. The boat, with
Father Martinez, one of the Jesuit missionaries, aboard
307
was attacked by the Indians on September 29, 1566. The
priest and three other men were killed, not far from San
Mateo. Before their mission had fairly begun, the Jesuits
had already obtained a martyr. The urea, unable to find
18
the Florida ports, went on to Havana to unload its supplies.
After establishing more firmly his system of government
for the control of the Florida provinces, the Adelantado
next filled out his scheme with more detailed regulations.
The lessons of the mutinies on the Indieui River, at St.
Augustine, San Mateo and Santa Elena were not lost upon
him. After due consideration by the cabildo in St. Augustine,
Pedro Menendez published seventeen ordinances for the govern-
ing of Florida. These regulations ran the gamut from mili-
tary discipline, through religious instruction in the forts,
19
to the powers and functions of the cabildos.
By voice and trumpet, Menendez had the ordinances pro-
claimed in the fort and city of St. Augustine and had them
conveyed also to the other Spanish Florida settlements.
The Adelantado prefaced his laws with a discourse on why
previous attempts to settle Florida had been a dismal
failure; he felt that poor discipline euid lack of firm
authority had doomed the other efforts of conquest and
evangelization. Now, he said, victory had been gained
over the French heretics and His Majesty had sent fifteen
hundred troops to support his untiring efforts in the land.
So that this enterprise, too, should not fail, the regula-
tions had been established.
308
The punishments set in the ordinances for deviations
from military order and discipline were harsh. Insubordina-
tion, blasphemy or fighting with sword or dagger were
punished with time in the stocks, whipping, deprivation of
rations, months at hard labor on the fortifications, by
perpetual sentencing to the galleys or by death. Attendance
at mass and the learning of the catechism was obligatory
upon the garrison, on pain of punishment.
In Florida, the ancient Spanish municipal institutions
were utilized as the means for both civil emd military
government. In each fort, the cabildo was to meet twice
weekly to consider current business. Its membership would
consist of the Governor, military captains, the royal
treasury officials, the alcaldes, procurador, a representa-
tive of the clergy and the tenedor de bastimentos. The
members would choose the alcalde, procurador, an alquacil
and the alcaide of the public jail in annual elections.
The whole body would deal with matters of coramxinity concern
and legal matters, both civil and military. The clergy
member was given a vote only in civil cases. Jurisdiction
euid authority were given to deal with legal cases and
execute sentence (barring appeal by the convicted party)
in cases of mutiny and sentences of ten thousand maravedis
and less. During military emergencies, the cabildo called
to deal with such situations should consist only of the
Governor and Captains. Appeals taken from the legal
309
processes of the alcalde and cabildo would be to the
Adelantado and thence to the Council of the Indies.
On October 20, 1566, Pedro Menendez de Avills sailed
from St. Augustine with a sizeaible force of ships and men on
his emti-corsair voyage. The Adelantado had prepared his
provinces for his absence by the appointment of regional
lieutenants emd that of an overall governor at Santa Elena.
He had fleshed out the structure of the Florida govern-
ment with ordinances regulating its governance. Menendez
had staffed and financed a supply network to furnish the
garrisons and settlements with food and munitions, even
if this at times functioned haltingly. He had prepared
the ground in Florida and in Europe for the coming of a band
of dedicated missionaries who would undertake the conversion
of the Indians of Florida. Important initiatives in the
exploration of his far flung territories had been undertaken
or commissioned on both coasts and inland on the peninsula,
north and westward from the base at Santa Elena, and
northward to the Bahia de Santa Maria.
As soon as he left St. Augustine in the fall of 1566,
the proprietor of Florida began a new relationship with
the territories granted him by contract of the King. From
this time forward until his death, Pedro Menlndez would
lead a dual existence, vis-2l-vis Florida. As Adelantado,
he would continue to act as the directing spirit of the
enterprise. Between his visits there, lieutenemts would
310
govern the provinces in his name and in that of the King,
while Menendez sought preferment emd profit elsewhere. The
monies and benefits gained in this way would help support
his efforts in Florida. The heightened menace of French
attacks in the Indies, of which the Ribault and Laudonni&re
thrusts had been a part, furnished the rationale for his
wider role. Menendez' dual interests made heavy dememds
\jqpon his time emd energies, and often each separate area
of his concerns would suffer from his momentary preoccupa-
tion with the other.
The first of these extra-Florida activities, the
expedition to the Windward Islands, lasted from late
October 1566 until the return of the Adelantado to Spain
in May of the next year. Except as they might touch upon
Florida, its details lie outside the scope of this work.
Suffice it to say that Pedro Menendez and his chief lieu-
tenant, Pedro de Valdes, passed systematically from point
to point, fortifying the rim of the northern Caribbean
against possible enemy attack and seeking French corsair
ships. News of the French assault upon Madeira gave fresh
impetus to his efforts. As he studied local forts and
established garrisons in the major ports, Menendez moved
with his usual decisive rapidity. As they often had, these
characteristics sometimes brought him into direct conflict
with the jurisdiction of local officials.
3U
When the Adelantado reached S2mto Domingo emd began
to treat with the Audiencia there, he found that body willing
enough to cooperate in matters of defense. The Audiencia
wanted the troops he had brought, but suggested the Adelcintado
return to Florida. When Menendez attempted to bring action
against Captain Juan de San Vicente and other deserters
from Florida who were living at Santo Domingo, he found
three of the Oidores airrayed against him. Although Sem
Vicente was indicted by the fiscal and was jailed, influ-
ence exerted by the three officials got him quickly freed.
The problems of his Florida colonies were never com-
pletely out of Menendez' mind. During his visit to Santo
Domingo, he wrote the King, describing his Indies defense
dispositions. The Asturian went on to remind his sovereign
that supplies for Florida would continue to be em urgent
necessity, and hinted to Philip II of a great secret, which
would serve greatly to increase the King's patrimony. This
must have been the discovery of the great northern water-
passage, which he hoped his mission to Jacan would have
found by that time. Menendez told the King that he planned
to re-visit Florida early in the spring of 1567, and would
thereafter come to Spain with news of the momentous dis-
22
covery.
By the first of the New Year, Pedro Menendez had ac-
complished his main purpose in Puerto Rico, Santo Domingo,
and eastern Cuba: the establishment of garrisons in key
312
points. After leaving a small force in Santiago de C\iba
in mid-JcUiuary, the Adelantado moved west along the south
shore of the island, heading to Havana. Pedro de Vald^s
had already arrived there with the larger ships and the
remaining soldiery. Until his chief should arrive, it
was up to Valdes to represent Men^ndez and begin to prepare
the defenses of Havana. On Janucury 21, 1567, Valdes pre-
sented his credentials and displayed the King's order to
Menendez. Governor Osorio and his cabildo cooly heard
Valdes state that he had come with sizeable forces to
strengthen Havana against enemy attack and proposed to build
a watch tower and strong point at the Morro in Havana harbor.
The first to speak after Menendez' lieutenant had made
his presentation was Garcia Osorio. The Governor objected
professionally to Valdisf fortification plans, but his
strongest objections touched upon matters of jurisdiction.
Osorio stressed the fact that he, as the King's Governor
and Captain-General of Cuba, was the person responsible
for defense in that island. The royal orders to Pedro
Menendez seemed to him a direct affront, emd he proposed
that the force of soldiers brought by Menendez and Valdes
should be given to him, and Menendez should return to
defend Florida, **.ich was his own particular responsibility.
A vote weis taken of the cabildo members on the question,
and the majority backed the Governor. Even Juan de
Hinestrosa, long a friend of Menendez, cast his ballot for
Garcia Osorio. In the new battle vrtiich was forming
313
between the Florida Adelantado and the Governor of Cuba,
Pedro Menendez had lost the first round.
Shortly afterwards, the Adelantado himself arrived in
Havana and took charge of his affairs there. He paid otf
the Crown ships and sent them back to Spain. The Cuban
port was now heavily occupied with the comings and goings of
the supply ships of the Florida proprietor. From Spain
itself, and from the Indies, from San Juan to Yucatan, they
converged upon Havana and were sent on to the forts in
Florida by Hernando de Baeza. Menendez found the battered
urea Pantecras, which had come the previous December with
the surviving Jesuits, anchored at Havana. The valuable
cargo which the ship had brought was intact, and was trans-
ferred formally to Menendez and his agent. Pedro Menendez
then bought the urea, rechristened it Espiritu Santo, and
put his own captain in charge. The large store of goods
thus received was of vital importance to the Florida enter-
prise— it acted as a massive transfusion, renewing the flow
of supplies. From the middle of February, 1567, until the
last of that month, foodstuffs, munitions, cloth and apparel
from the urea were parcelled out and sent in several direc-
tions.^* By written authprization of Pedro Menendez,
Baeza allegedly sent six shiploads of cloth and foodstuffs
to St. Augustine and Santa Elena. An auditor, following
up the supposed deliveries, found that the Florida officials
could not show receipt of all of the goods. In one case*
314
that of the patax San Christovaly the shipmaster was
supposed to have received oil emd vinegar from the urea's
cargo, but he later s%rore that he had received nothing.
It is evident that Pedro Menendez diverted much of
the royal property to uses not intended by the King, and
that he converted some of it to private use. Although
Henendez continued to purchase and send large quantities
of com, cassava, and meat to Florida, a good bit of this
was bought with the royal supplies, or with money obtained
from their sale. Juan de Orduna, a servant of Pedro Mendndez,
Ccurried two hundred hats and a substantial amount of cloth
from the urea to Yucatan to trade for corn, honey and
25
chickens which was then transshipped to Florida.
Pedro Menendez utilized the goods sent from Spain for
the Florida garrisons to supply some of the soldiers he
had posted in the Caribbean. The renamed urea was sent to
Samto Domingo with one hundred pipes of four for the garrison,
and Menendez turned over a quantity of clothing to Baltasar
de Barreda, whom he had named as captain of the company he
left in Havana. The Adelantado issued thirty pipes of the
royal wine and some of the oil and vinegar to his servant,
Juliem Garcia, for his own use. An audit made two years
later resulted in the charge, already current at the Spanish
Coiirt, that Herneuido de Baeza had openly sold a large quan-
tity of goods from the Pantecras at public auction in Havana.
To this charge Menendez responded that if goods were sold
315
in Havana amd Campeche, the proceeds of the sales were used
to send things necessary for the supply of the Florida
soldiers of the King. As a matter of fact, it appears
that the intermingling of royal and personal funds and goods
was such that the Crown had virtually no control over the
use of its property. This situation resulted in part from
the structure of am adelantamiento, in which the contractor
had such personal influence that his control of operations
within his little kingdom was almost total.
Bolstered by the infusion of supplies and money re-
sulting from the arrival of the Pantecras, Pedro Menendez
greatly expanded his shipments to Florida. In addition to
the biscuit, wine, oil, vinegar, cloth and munitions directly
unloaded from Pantecras, Baeza sent meat in cask, large
amounts of corn, live chickens cuid hogs, and (in April,
1567) a shipload of horses and mares. For mounted defense,
agricultural purposes, and breeding, these animals would
27
strengthen the colonies.
The Adelantado, looking beyond the exhaustion of the
supplies which had arrived with the urea, wrote the King on
February tenth asking for another shipment. Estimating
the royal troops then in Florida at nine hundred in niamber,
Menendez requested eight shiploads of goods, including two
thousand pipes of wine cind five hundred tons each of flour
28
and biscuit. This, he believed, would last for eight months.
316
Among other actions he took to raise money for the Florida
enterprise, Pedro Men^ndez had arranged to ransom some of
his noble prisoners in their native France. One of these,
Pierre d'Ully, had already been sent to Spain, and Men^ndez
29
awaited the ransom. Although no records have survived
to furnish proof of the allegations, Andres de Equino, the
Florida auditor, charged that Men^ndez and his lieutenants
used Crown property to barter for gold and silver with the
South Florida Indians. According to Garcia Osorio, qucin-
tities of this treasure had come into Havana from the north,
and the royal percentage had been paid on none of it.
The quarrel between Garcia Osorio and Pedro Mendndez de
Avil^s had been diminished no whit by the coming of the
Adelantado to Havana, but was moving toward a major confron-
tation. When it came, the conflict centered on the matter
of jurisdiction over the royal troops Men^ndez had brought to
Havana, and featured Captains Baltasar de Barreda and Pedro
de Redroban. Among the unfinished business before the
Adelantado in Havauia was the completion of the trial of
Redrobem for mutiny, which had begun in St. Augustine the
previous fail. The Captain-engineer had been removed from
command of his company, which had been given to Barreda and
stationed in Havana. As Menendez prepared to leave for
Florida, he formally put Barreda in charge of these troops,
under his command, not that of Osorio. The Governor immedi-
ately began secret negotiations with Pedro de Redroban, with
317
an eye to a possible merger of their interests, and the de-
feat of the Menendez faction.
The Adelantado next undertook another voyage to the
west coast of Florida, where he proposed to continue the
effort to find the water passage which would link up the
east and west coasts of the peninsula. The failure of
previous expeditions from Carlos and up the St. Johns only
encouraged another attempt. Pedro de Valdes was sent to
St, Augustine with instructions to try again from that coast,
and Hernando de Miranda preceded the Adelantado to the Gulf
coast to begin the explorations there.
As hostage for the good intentions of Chief Carlos,
Captain Reinoso had sent Menendez' "wife" Dona Antonia to
Havana, where she had passed the winter. Now Pedro Menendez
planned to return her to her brother in Florida and at the
same time establish more securely the garrison there. Some
Indians from Tequesta, on the lower southeast coast, had
also come to Havana, and Menendez could take them there and
pursue Spanish objectives in that place. Father Juan Rogel
and Brother Francisco Villaroel would also go to Florida with
the Adelantado to make the first Jesuit mission establishment
in the Spanish Empire. On March first, a fleet of seven
sails left Havana for Carlos, led by Menendez in the new fast
frigate El Aguila. That vessel, which had been made to order
in Havcina, was commanded by Pedro Menendez Marquez.
318
When he eurrlved at the Indiem settlement, Menendez
saw at once that the fierce and intracteUsle nature of Chief
Carlos and his people had been little affected by all of
his initiatives towards them. The surface amity which had
prevailed when Carlos had given his sister to Men6ndez and
when he had released the Christian captives had largely
dissolved. The return of Dona Antonia was no palliative
to the situation, for she told her brother that the "marriage"
to Pedro Menendez was artificial and unfulfilled. The pro-
posal which Menendez next made puzzled and infuriated the
Indian chieftain: The Adelantado urged reconcilation of
the Calusa Indians with the Tocobaga nation, their hereditary
enemies to the north. For the moment, however, Menendez
was able to persuade Carlos to come on cin expedition to
Tocobaga. It appears that Hernando Escalcmte also came,
serving as interpreter.
After coasting northward along the shoreline of the
Gulf for several days, the Spanish ships reached the en-
trance of Tampa Bay amd had passed from one distinct culture-
area into another one: the Tocobaga were related to the
Timuqucui grouping. Without being discovered by the Indians,
the Spaniards entered Old Tampa Bay and approached the main
village of the Tocobaga, located on the shores of Safety
Harbor. Here Carlos showed that all of his instincts were
intact, as he proposed to Menendez that they attack the
village, seeing that they had caught the enemy by surprise.
319
Patiently the Adelantado reiterated to Carlos that the
mission on which they had come to Tocobaga was a peaceful
one, but mollified Carlos, by promising that he would negoti-
ate for the return of Calusa prisoners whom Tocobaga held.
After an initial meeting with the chieftain of Toco-
baga, the Indian consulted with sub-chiefs and advisers from
the surrounding country and finally agreed to a joint treaty
vith the Spanish and the Calusas. Tocobaga returned several
prisoners to Carlos, and Menendez left a garrison of thirty
men headed by Captain Garcia Martinez de Cos. Since the
Adelcintado had been unaJile to follow up the search for the
supposed water route across the peninsula, Martinez' detach-
ment could explore for the waterway, and begin to accustom
the Indicins of Tocobaga to the Catholic faith.
Events on the voyage back to Carlos and after the party
returned there made it clear that Menendez ' attempted
rapprochment between Indian groups had only exacerbated
hostility to the Spanish. Although Dona Antonia remained
with the Christians, it was evident that Menendez' "marriage"
with her had failed to tie the Indians more closely to the
Spanish. Tension between two noble factions among the
Calusas brought Indians opposing Carlos into contact with
the Christians through the little community of Spaniards who
had been prisoner there, and the news could reach the Spanish
in time to learn of danger. For example, when Pedro Menendez
decided to settle his colony on cinother island apart from
320
that on which Carlos held his court, the chief offered
canoes emd men to help make the move. When the SpcUiish
learned through their friendly grapevine that Carlos plamned
to overturn the canoes and drown the Spanish en route they
used Menendez' small boats instead. The fort-mission of
San Anton de Padua had been born. In the prevailing atmos-
phere. Father Rogel was unable to preach directly to individu-
al Indians, but had to confine himself to worship at the
centrally located Cross. It was not a promising beginning
for the Jesuit mission, but Pedro Menendez had no choice. He
could not remain; news from Havana forced his immediate re-
turn there to deal with a serious challenge to his authority:
Menendez received word that Pedro de Redroban had escaped
from custody and that Garcia Osorio had arrested Baltasar de
Barreda and had assumed control over the garrison Menendez
had left there. After reinforcing the Carlos fort with fifty
soldiers, the Adelantado departed for Havana.
When Pedro Menendez arrived in Havana in the last week
of March, he found a conflict raging just short of armed
combat. Baltasar de Barreda has escaped from confinement,
emd he emd the Adelantado quickly reassumed control over the
royal soldiery Menendez had left there. Menendez found out
the hiding place of Pedro de Redroban and seized the rebel
captain. On April 12,1567, Redroban was sentenced to be
beheaded in the town square of Havcina, but he formally
requested an appeal to the Council of the Indies. Pedro
321
Menendez granted Uie request, and agreed to take Redroban
with him to Spain so that his case could be heard in Madrid.
The battle between two rival power-centers still continued
in Havana, but Menendez had maintained and augmented his
own position in that city so important for his supply of
Florida.
At this time, as the Adelantado prepared for one last
visit to Florida before his voyage to Spain, Pedro Menendez
Marquez' network of small supply craft was most active. In
a report prepared at the end of March, 1567, Hernando de
Baeza noted that 150 men and more than ten vessels were then
involved in the effort. On March 25, he advised, the pataches
Buenabentura and San Christoval had left for Campeche to load
com for Florida, while the oatax San Mateo departed the same
day for the Savanna of Basco Porcallo to load meat and
cassava. The bergantin San Julian had already gone to
Tequesta to return the Indians to their village, and the
freqata Espiritu Santo was loading horses , mares and hogs
for Florida.
The renamed urea, now also called Espiritu Santo, was
still on its voyage to Santo Domingo, while yet another
vessel by the same name had been lost off Havana while
returning from Puerto de Plata with calves. Three ships.
El Aquila, a new shallop named Buenabentura, and the Sevilla
were being prepared for Menendez' planned voyage to Florida.
Two more vessels, the patax San Anton and a large shallop
^ ^ 35
%rere being outfitted to go to Campeche for com.
322
The first stop made by the Adelantado on his way north
was the Indian settlement located where the Miami River
flows into Biscayne Bay. Here lived the Tequesta, and it
was at this place that rebel Spaniards had been shipwrecked
in 1566. Pedro Menendez halted at Tequesta to establish
formally the Spanish mission. Evidently the earlier Spanish
presence there had encouraged the Indians to break to a
degree from their vassalage to Carlos, so that the Adelantado
was in a more favorable position in Tequesta than he had
enjoyed on the west coast. Concord between the Spanish and
the Indians progressed so well and so rapidly that Menendez
was able to leave Brother Villareal and a thirty-man company
there to begin the erection of a fort and mission. When he
departed Tequesta, Pedro Menendez took with him three Indians,
including the brother of the chief, to go with him to Spain.
As he had done the previous July, Pedro Menendez made
his landfall first at San Mateo. At the fort there, his
district Governor Villaroel quickly brought the Adelantado
up to date on occurrences in the vicinity of San Mateo since
his departure. Another reconnaisscince up the St. Johns,
this time by Pedro de Valdes, had failed to yield the secrets
of the water route from Mayaca to the Gulf. The soldiers
at San Mateo experienced all of the unease of those within
a beseiged fortress; Indian raiders made any forays outside
patiently unsafe. On the previous November 30, Captain
Pedro de Larrandia and several of his men had been attacked
323
from ambush on their way to San Mateo from the fort at
Guale, and killed. In counter-retids, Villaroel had been
able to capture sixteen of Saturiba's warriors, including
his son Emola. Using the Indiam hostages to draw the inter-
est of Saturiba, Pedro Menendez aurranged a face-to-face
confrontation with the Timucuan chief. The meeting took
place near the St. Johns bar, where the Adelantado anchored
offshore vrfiile Saturiba remained back some distance from the
beach. After some hours of fruitless parley, the Spamish
suspected a plot to ambush their shore party amd lure Menen-
dez to his death, while Saturiba refused to negotiate
personally with the Spanish leader, and the meeting broke
up in renewed mutual enmity. The uncertainty and hostility
of the Timucuams in the vicinity of San Mateo would continue.
Faced with continuing attacks upon his communications and
sorts, Pedro Menendez gave orders for the construction of
a protective line of blockhouses from Matanzas to Guale.
One of these, named Alicamini, was located near the place
of the parley with Satiruba, on the north bank of the
St. Johns. ^^
Even though St, Augustine had been supplied reasonably
well during the months since Menendez' departure the previous
October, the community and gaurrison had suffered the same
uncertainties then current at San Mateo. Tensions between
the faction of the Adelantado, his brother, and other
Asturians amd that of the captains who had come in July,
324
1566, with Sancho de Archiniega had flared up on several
occasions.
This time, the trouble had begun the December before,
after the cabildo had established a daily ration of one-
qucurter pound of bread per man. Captain Miguel de Enriquez,
who had come to Florida with one of Archiniega 's companies,
objected to the decision of the cabildo, amd said that he
would appeal it to the Audiencia of Santo Domingo. Witnesses
testified that Enriquez had scoffed at the jurisdiction
of the cabildo, and had offered obscene comments about its
authority. Bartolome Menendez, whom his brother had left in
charge as regional governor at St. Augustine, clashed with
Enriquez on several occasions. The governor had intervened
to punish one of the soldiers in Enriquez' company, whom
he had apprehended giving cloth to a prostitute at the public
fountain of St. Augustine. In another instance, Bartolom^
Menendez piiblicly rebuked the captain for the laxity of his
men on the sentinel posts. His remarks upon that occasion
are indicative of the tension in St. Augustine:
It is notorious that numerous French Lutherans
have been expelled from these provinces, and
the fort at San Mateo and other forts which
they had occupied in the kingdom and jurisdiction
of His Majesty . . . taken from them. It can
now be expected that they may come and that they
will come to revenge themselves for such great
slaughter and destruction of their people.
If this took place, it would be a great dis-
service to God Our Lord and to His Majesty,
if we were found as careless and unprepared as
we have been on the occasions when Captain
Miguel Enriquez' sentinels were so careless.
325
Miguel Enriquez was arrested and charged with insub-
ordination. Beginning April 27, 1567, Pedro Men^ndez heard
testimony from Enriquez emd from those appearing against
him. The officer was adjudged guilty, and sentenced to lose
his command euid have his salary reduced. Enriquez also
appealed his sentence to the Council of the Indies.
In the first week of May, Pedro Men^ndez de Avil^s bid
farewell to his brother and to the other captains and offi-
cials at St. Augustine, euid set sail in El Aguila and another
small ship for Santa Elena. With him went the Indians from
Tequesta, the officer prisoners, Pedro de Valdes, and a
small force of soldiers and seaman. He also carried three
of the Timucuan Indians, including one who had been christened
Juan de Valdes, to go with him to the Spanish Court. Pedro
de Bustin9ury, the Vizcayan who had been captive of the Ais
Indians and whom the French had taken to the Valois Court,
38
went with the Indians as interpreter.
When he reached Santa Elena, Pedro Men^ndez focused
his attention upon the exploration and exploitation of the
fertile continental areas of his domains and the discovery
of a more rapid passage from Spain to New Spain and the
Pacific. Menendez therefore called upon Juan Pardo to
report on his four-month journey deep inlcmd, in which the
energetic Captain had travelled more than five hundred miles
and had reached the foot of the Appalachian Mountains.
Pardo and his men had left Santa Elena on December 1, 1566,
326
and had seen traversed a great variety of terrain from the
relatively warm seacocist to the snow-covered eminences of the
Blue Ridge, all within the boundaries of the present state
of South Carolina. At the sizeable Indian city called Joada
near the mountains, Juan Pardo had founded a city called
Cuenca, built Fort Joada and left a sergeant and garrison
to man the fort. The Captain reported to Pedro Men^ndez
that he had found rich clay soils and heavy forest growth
which promised great fertility. He also advised that the
inland areas were watered and drained by several great
rivers which could offer access for their development.
No trace had been found of the storied waterway which
should lead to the Viceroyalty of New Spain or to the South
Sea, but the Pardo exploration was an important initiative.
It established in Menendez' mind the fertility of the vast
inland areas and their suitability for his own future
agricultural enterprise. The first contact was made with
the Indians, and many new tribes had been marked out for
evamgelization and conversion.
The Adelantado probably already knew that his Jacan
expedition had failed. Instead of finding the homeland of
Don Luis, it had landed near the Outer Banks of present
North Carolina. After being discouraged by stormy fall
weather, Pedro de Coronas cind his men had returned directly
to Spain, «Lrriving in Seville by November 5, 1566. The
327
"Bahia de Santa Maria" emd the water passage would have to
39
await futiire explorations.
When he left Scmta Elena for Spain on May 18, 1567,
Pedro Menendez de Aviles had behind hira more them eighteen
months' labor in and for his new provinces of Florida. His
short-run, military objective imposed by the presence of
the Laudohniere garrison had been successful. The French
fort had been tadcen cuid the reinforcing fleet of Jecin Ribault
destroyed.
The first actions had been costly, and not only to the
French. Thanks largely to the work of Paul E. Hoffman, the
cost of the Florida enterprise to the Spanish crown can be
itemized rather precisely. To Hoffman's totals, this writer
could add the sums paid directly to the Adelantado in con-
junction with his contract. After making this adjustment,
the royal cost at Cadiz, the expenses of the aborted expedi-
tion from Santo Domingo and the shipments made in the urea
Pantecras in 1566 total about 108,000 ducats. In addition,
some charges attributable to Florida accrued when Menendez
used the fleet ship Santa Catalina, its crew and supplies
during the winter of 1565-66. As to the Archiniega expedi-
tion, which Hoffman has demonstrated to have cost more than
130,000 ducats, it is felt that only about half of its
expense should be allocated to Florida. Many of the
Archiniega ships cuid men were sent in 1566 to the West
Indiem islcuids under Menendez' command to provide for their
328
defense. After making these adjustxnents, it appears that
Philip II spent about 200,000 ducats directly on support
of the Florida enterprise during its first phase — virtually
all of the monies spent by the Crown for Indies defense
during those years.
The direct "private" costs of the Florida conquest in
its first phase cem also be approximated. Men^ndez' initial
outfitting cost has already been estimated at 50,000 ducats,
Menendez had spent 10,400 ducats in 1566 for the purchase
41
of supplies in Havcina, for his Florida enterprise. He had
also spent at least 7,000 ducats in other Cviban ports, and
had expended additional sums in Yucatcin, Santo Domingo,
Puerto de Plata, and San Juan, Puerto Rico. Menendez also
expended some 7,000 ducats in Spain. His costs probably
totalled more than 75,000 ducats in the first phase of
conquest.
The goods and supplies bought by Pedro Menendez and
his agents had to be delivered and there was substantial
cost involved in the operation of his fleet of small boats.
Another kind of cost, related to these shipping routes, was
the loss of ships and men that had steadily eroded the Menen-
dez forces throughout the first yeeir of the Florida conquest.
Within less than two years after Menendez' first expedi-
tion sailed from Cadiz, eleven ships had been lost to the
enterprise of Florida. The sinking of these vessels,
large amd small, represented the loss of the greater part
329
of the marine assets of Menendez and his coterie. To offset
these damages, there was little in the way of income.
Ransoms emd booty from the Florida conquest did exist but
were not appreciable. Profits from the small cargoes
carried by Menendez Marqu^z could not approach the potential
that San Pelayo would have represented in the rich New
Spain or Tierra Firme trade. Faced with such losses, Pedro
Menendez had left Florida. His command of the Windward
IslcUids expedition enabled him to sail at Royal cost. During
his voyage to Spain, the Adelantado would endeavor to trade
his deeds in Florida for royal recognition. The defeat emd
expulsion of the French colony of Laudonniere and Ribault
would surely be rewarded by his sovereign, and soon.
Evaluation of the first phase in Florida also demon-
strates that Pedro Menendez' inost vital contribution was
that of acting as Captain-General and entrepreneur on-the-
spot. It was his own presence and leadership that had
defeated the French. The Crown exerted a more passive,
supporting role in the Florida conflict of 1565-66. During
its active stages, the resources of the Adelantado proved
the more telling; much of the royal support was wasted
or came too late to influence the outcome. Because of his
slim finauicial reserves and due to the loss of many of his
supplies and his largest ship, Pedro Menendez and his men
in Florida suffered many hardships and privations directly
traceable to the single-minded way in which he had come to
330
the taisk of erasing the French colony. Men^ndez can
scarcely be faulted for the zeal he displayed in striking
out stredghtavay for Florida to meet the French, but the
cost of this decision was a heavy one. Once his victory
had been von, short supplies forced the Adelantado to try
to link up with his own missing forces, and those promised
by the King.
When he left Florida, Pedro Ken^dez removed his
unifying and commanding presence from the scene. The men
he left in charge of the sepeirated garrisons had been unaUble
to cope with the situations which eirose. Indeed, it might
have been in^Kjssible for any leader to deal with the indepen-
dent-minded sixteenth-century Spanish soldiery in such cir-
cumstances. Men whose clothing and food supplies were low,
fearful of death in a hostile land, might have rebelled in
any event, but Menendez* four-month absence seems to have
been critical.
Once in Cuba, the Adelantado sought with all means at
his command to supply his Florida enterprise. The expedients
he employed were generally successful. The charge that
Pedro Menendez deserted his Florida responsibilities to go
hunting corsairs begs the question; he actually spent little
time in this; the sale of the two Poirtugese prizes yielded
him some badly needed operating funds.
On the otner hand, it does appear that the Adelcintado
could have taken sane rapid measures to relieve Scuita Lucia,
331
once news of the difficulties there reached him in Havama.
Menendez* presence in St. Augustine and San Mateo could have
forestalled the Mcurch mutinies. Instead, he scLiled first
to Carlos.
Pedro Menfindez' funding arremgements are subject to
the same criticisms which one might level against those of
the Crown; they had proven insufficient to provide ample
and continuous support for the Florida enterprise. In spite
of losses and setbacks, however, Menendez persisted in his
efforts. By early 1567, he had set up a vicible pipeline for
the supply of Florida through Cuba, and other Caribbean
areas, was preparing further groups of soldiers and settlers
in Spain and had installed the first group of Jesuit mis-
sioncuries. Menendez left the Florida establishments in
reasonably good condition. Fortified by the soldiery and
supplies which had come in mid-summer of 1566, the garrisons
had been extended nortn and south of the initial settlement.
The Adelantado had founded cities at Santa Elena eind St.
Augustine, and had set up regional government xinder major
lieutenants. In view of widespread Indian hostility in this
critical phase of colonization, internal defense continued
to be essential. The task of exploring the new lands had
proceeded remarkcibly well in a short time. Reliable naviga-
tion routes had been discovered, linking the Florida settle-
ments cuid tying them to the supply base at Havana. The
coastal features, harbors and ports of a long shoreline had
332
been studied cmd recorded. Pedro Menendez had also dis-
covered a short-cut for the New Spain fleets coining to Havana-
the passage east of the Dry Tortugais , which would ever there-
after be in the official derroteros of the Carrera de Indias.
He had taken formal legal possession of territories from the
extreme south of the Florida peninsula to the North Carolina
capes.
One may therefore evaluate the Florida conquest at the
end of its first phase in early 1567. First, the immediate
niliteury objectives had been rather completely fulfilled
by the eaq)unging of the French forces. There remained,
however, an uncertain quality to this victory. The Spanish
had been uncible to destroy French corsair power in the
Indies, emd new enemy incursions were expected momentarily
at points along the long continental frontier which Pedro
Menendez had to defend. It seemed the destiny of Florida
never to be free of peril, always to be an enterprise
endangered. The vital elements in the conquest of a land —
the construction of am economy and a society — were in a
critical stage. The essentials of Spanish settlement: the
military presence, the municipal institutions, cind the
evangelizing Church were only tentatively estetblished at a
few outpKJsts over a thousand miles of frontier. Profitable
exploitation of the lands and native peoples of Florida
through economically viable colonies was still to be realized*
At great cost, the enterprise of Florida had been bom, but
its existence was indeed precarious.
NOTES
1. The King's letter is dated at Madrid on May 12,
1566, and has been reprinted in Lawson, "Letters of Menen-
dez," II, 296-300.^ The^letter to Bartolome Menendez is
found in "Bartolome Menendez con el Fiscal sobre sueldo,
1570," from A.G.I. Indiferente General 1,219. The King also
granted to Pedro Menendez Marquez a merced of three hundred
ducats for the news he brought in dispatches from Florida.
This is cited by Martin Menendez de Aviles in a letter dated
at Madrid on June 9, 1633, and found in A.G.I. Santo Domingo
233.
2. The appointment of Diego Flores Valdes as Fleet
General is from A.G.I. Indiferente General 738, ramo 8.
3. For a discussion and documentation of Fourquevaux'
plaint and the reply of the Spanish King, see Eugene Lyon,
"Captives of Florida," pp. 18-20.
4. The cost of Pantecras is described in items from
A.G.I. Contaduria; 294, No. 2b, 6: 2-4; 304, No. 1, 102:
4-103: 1; 306, No. 2, 124: 1. These citations were
kindly furnished by Paul E. Hoffman.
5. For the Florida Jesuit missions, the writer relies
upon a body of materials from Jesuit archives published in
three fine works. The first, in point of time, is Ruben
Vargas Ugarte, "The First Jesuit Mission in Florida," U.S.
Catholic Historical Society, Historical Records and Studies,
XV (1935), 59-148. Next is Felix Zubillaga's La Florida, and
the last is the work in which he published the documentation,
Monumenta Antiquae Floridae (Rome: Monumenta Historica
Societatis lesu, 1946). The mission had begun with a request
from Pedro Menendez de Aviles to Francisco de Borja, sent
from Madrid in March, 1565, and reprinted in Monumenta
Antiquae Floridae, 1-4, Borja replied favorable to the
Adelantado from Rome on May 12, 1565 (Monumenta Antiquae
Floridae, 6-8). Royal approval of the mission was given by
Philip II in a letter sent to Diego Carrillo, Provincial
of the Order, from Ucles on April 9, 1565 (Monumenta Antiquae
Floridae, 42-44). The voyages of Pedro de Bustin9ury are
described in a letter from the Casa to the Crown, Seville,
February 17, 1568, from A.G.I. Contratacion 5,168, in a pay-
ment to him before his journey in 1566 authorized in A.G.I.
Contaduria 294, No. 2, Data 123: 1-124: 1.
333
334
6. MenSndez Marqu6z' voyage and the cargo of his ship
are detailed in A.G.I. Patronato 257, No. 4, rcuno 1.
7. The loss of Menfindez' patache is described in a
letter from the Casa to the Crown, Seville, August 2, 1566,
from A.G.I. Contratacidn 5,167. Philip II chided Abalia
for delaying the sailing of Men^ndez' ships in a letter
sent August 28, 1566, and found in A.G.I. Indiferente
General 1,967. The loss of San Pelayo is mentioned in
"Memorial de los navios cargados de bastimentos y municiones
que se perdieron el Adelantado . . . ," from A.G.I.
Escribania de C^ara 1,024-A.
8. See the declaration of Estaban de las Alas, from
the city of San Salvador, punta of Santa Elena, July 18,
1566, from A.G.I. Santo Domingo 11 (Stetson Collection).
9. The abortive expedition to the land of Jacan has
been depicted in an excellent monograph by Louis-Andre
Vigneras, entitled "A Spanish Discovery of North Carolina
in 1566," North Carolina Historical Review, XLVI, No. 4
(October, 1969), 398-414. The main primary source is A.G.I.
Patronato 257, No. 3, ramo 4 (Stetson Collection) , dated
August 1, 1566. The names of the soldiers assigned to the
expedition are found in the ration list in A.G.I. Contaduria
941 (microfilm, P. K. Yonge Library of Florida History) .
10. Best source of information about the Santa Elena
mutiny is the testimony before Governor Osorio of Cuba taken
in Havana on July 19, 1566, from A.G.I. Justicia 999.
11. Nombramiento of Estebcin de las Alas, Governador y
Capitan-General," August, 1566, Santa Elena, from A.G.I.
Contaduria 941, fol. 2 vto. (microfilm, P. K. Yonge Library
of Florida History).
12. The names of the soldiers of Guale are found in the
ration lists in A.G.I. Contaduria 941 (microfilm, P. K. Yonge
Library of Florida History) , under the date of assignment of
August 17, 1566.
13. Documentation of this mutiny is from "El Fiscal de
sue Majestad con el Capitan Pedro de Redroban," A.G.I.
Justicia 999. Pedro de Vald^s describes the events in his
letter to the King sent from St. Augustine on September 12,
1566, from A.G.I. Santo Domingo 168 (Stetson Collection,
incorrectly labeled as from Juan de Vald6s) .
14. The Adelamtado analyzed the warfare methods of the
Florida Indicins and his suggested counter-measures in his
letter to Philip II from St. Augustine on October 2€, 1566,
from A.G.I. Santo Domingo 115 (Stetson Collection). A
335
typical action, related by Pedro de Vald^s in his September
12 letter (see note 13 supra.) , ended in the death of three
Spaniards in a cornfield ten miles from St. Augustine on
September 1, 1566. Gonzalo Solis de Mer^s recounts the
casualties in Indian raids in Pedro Men^ndez de Avilgs, p.
196. Deaths of men by Indian action are listed in the mar-
ginal comments written upon the ration lists in A.G.I.
Contaduria 941 (microfilm, P. K. Yonge Library of Florida
History) . The writer disagrees with the chronology of the
St. Johns expedition given by Solis de Mer^s in Pedro Mendn-
dez de Aviles. pp. 237-252, and repeated by Zubillaga, La
Florida, p. 262, no. 23, in which they fix the date at
July, 1566. The Valdes letter of September 12 fixes the
limits of Mendndez' trip to Guale and Santa Elena as from
August 1 to August 28; this is confirmed by the appearance
of the Adelantado at the Redrobal appeal on September 13.
On this point, Solis de Meras is not an eyewitness— he had
already left for Spain.
15. The outline of the lands under direct or indirect
control of Chief MayaCa can be roughly estimated by consult-
ing two Spanish derroteros. The first is "Provanza hecha a
pedimiento de Gonzalo de Gay6n," from A.G.I. Santo Domingo
11 (Stetson Collection). Gayon was sent south in the fall
of 1566 from St. Augustine to seek Mayaca from the seacoast,
and stated that the villages near the coast ov/ed allegiance
to Mayaca. In the Mexfa derrotero of 1605 (see n. 48,
Chapter V) , the explorer wrote that "Mayaca and its surround-
ing towns are on the San Mateo River (the St. Johns) , three
days' travel from Nocoroco oh a poor road." Nocoroco was
an Indian town located north of the Mosquito (Ponce de
Leon) Inlet. See John W. Griffin and Hale G. Smith,
"Nocoroco — A Timucua Village of 1605 Now in Tomoka State
Park," Florida Historical Quarterly. XXVII, No. 4 (April,
1949), 340-361. This writer feels that a line drawn south
of Lake George eastward to the seacoast and one from the
Orlando metropolitan area to the Cape would probably define
the northern and southern boundaries of the Mayaca culture.
16. From "Provanza hecha . . . Gonzalo de Gay6n" (see
n. 15 supra. ) .
17. See Menendez' letter to Philip II, St. Augustine,
October 20, 1566, from A.G.I. Santo Domingo 115 (Stetson
Collbction). The soldiers assigned to Carlos are listed in
A.G.I. Contaduria 941 (microfilm, P. K. Yonge Library of
Florida History) .
18. The Adelantado described the loss of Father
Martinez in a letter to Diego de Avellaneda written from
St. Augustine on October 15, 1566, and reprinted in Monu-
menta Antiquae Floridae. 89-99. Father Juan Rogel ali^
336
related the killing of the priest in his letters to Pedro
Hemeindez sent from Monte Christi on November 11, 1566,
and reproduced in Monumenta Antiquae FJoridae, 99-128.
19. "Ordinemces which the very illustrous Senor Pedro
Menendez, Governor and Captain-General of the land and the
coast of the Provinces of Florida for His Majesty cind Ade-
lantado of them provided cind instituted in these said
provinces of Florida," n.d. (September, 1566), from A.G.I.
Justicia 999.
20. An excellent account of the Windward Islands
expedition of 1566-67 has been given at length by Paul E.
• Hoffman in "The Background and Development of Pedro Men^ndez •
Cbntribution to the Defense of the Spanish Indies," M.A.
thesis (Gainesville: University of Florida, 1965).
21. This affair is related in "Probanza de Alonso de
Grafeda," Santo Domingo, February 15, 1569, from A.G.I.
Santo Domingo 12.
22. See Pedro Menendez to Crown, Santo Domingo,
November 29, 1566, from Lawson, "Letters of Menendez," II,
309-320.
23. The documentation of Vald^s' appearance in Havana,
dated January 21, 1567, also contains a copy of the March
21, 1566, Royal cedula to Menendez about the Windward
Islands expedition, and a copy of Menendez' poder to Vald^s,
dated at Monte Christi on January 3, 1567. This material
is from A.G.I. Santo Domingo 115 (Stetson Collection).
Another copy is in A.G.I. Patronato 257, No. 3, ramo 5.
24. The controversial question of the distribution
of goods from the urea Pantecras can be traced in several
primary sources. Casa Factor Duarte's original list of
goods aboard was received in Havana by Menendez' repre-
sentative, Juan de Hinestrosa on December 12, 1566; this is
from A.G.I. Contaduria 941 (microfilm, P. K. Yonge Library
of Florida History) . In the same legajo is the body of
material gathered by Andres de Equmo for his audit of Baeza's
books in 1569. More material on the audit is found in A.G.I.
Patronato 257, No. 3, ramo 8. The ship movements can be
followed in A.G.I. Contaduria 1,174 and in "Despachos que
se hicieron," from A.G.I. Escribania de Camara 1,024-A.
25. The Orduna voyage is confirmed by Bishop Toral in
a letter written at Merida, Yucatan on April 5, 1567, and
found in Lawson, "Letters of Menendez," II, 320-324.
337
26. See "Memorial of Pedro Men^ndez de Avilds to the
Casa de Contratacion^ " Madrid, September 21, 1567, from
A.G.I, Contratacion 5,012 (Stetson Collection).
27. The shipments are listed in A.G.I. Contadurfa
1,174, under the date of 1567.
28. The Adelantado's letter of February 10, 1567,
dated at Havana, is found in A.G.I. Contrataci6n 5,012
(Stetson Collection).
29. Menendez had told Philip II of his plams to
ransom d'Ully in his letter of October 20, 1566, sent from
St. Augustine, and from A.G.I. Santo Domingo 115 (Stetson
Collection). The arrival and imprisonment of the French
noble in Seville was recounted in a letter from the Casa
to the King sent from Seville on January 11, 1567, and from
A.G.I, Contratacion 5,167 (Stetson Collection).
30. See charge number 24 in the audit, from A.G.I.
Patronato 257, No. 3, ramo 8. Osorio's letter, dated
simply "1567" at Havana, is from A.G.I. Santo Domingo 115
(Stetson Collection) .
31. See Menendez to Casa, Havana, February 12, 1567,
from A.G.I. Contratacion 5,101.
32. The writer bases this supposition on the fact that
Hernando de Escalante is described as being conversant with
the language of Tocobaga as well as that of Carlos. This
statement is found opposite the name of Escalante in the
distribution of cloth and weapons for the years 1566-1596
in A, G.I. Contadurfa 941 (microfilm, P. K. Yonge Library of
Florida History),
33. Father Rogel depicts the situation at Carlos after
the return of the Spanish from Tocobaga in April, 1567, in
a letter to Geronimo Ruiz del Portillo sent from Havana on
April 25, 1568, and reprinted in Zubillaga, Monximenta An-
tiquae Floridae, 306-307,
34. The Redroban-Barreda case involving Pedro Menendez
and Garcia Osorio is developed in "El Senor Fiscal con Capitan
Pedro de Redroban, 1567," from A.G.I. Justicia 999. It is also
featured in the body of Osorio's residencia; the charges are
itemized in ^Traslado de la sentencia que se dio contra
Garcia Osorio Gobemador y Capitan General desta Ysla de
Cuba . . . ," from A.G.I. Santo Domingo 99. The best
narrative of the dispute is by Solis de Meras in Pedro
Menendez de Aviles, pp. 230-232.
338
35. Data contained in Baeza's "Despachos que se hicier-
on," from A.G.I. Escribamia de Camara 1,024-A Ceui be con-
firmed by comparing the ships and cargoes listed in A.G.I.
Contaduria 1,174.
36. The parley with Saturiba is narrated in Soils de
Nereis, Pedro Menendez de Avil6s, pp. 233-235.
37. Testimony of Bartolome Menendez from "La Florida,
ano de 1567, El Senor Fiscal con Miguel Enriquez," A.G.I.
Justicia 999.
38. Bustincury's return to Spain is mentioned in a
letter from the Casa to the Crown, Seville, March 4, 1568,
A.G.I. Contratacion 5,168.
39. Record of the first journey of Captain Juan Pardo
to the inland areas lias survived in a report made at Santa
Elena on July 11, 1567, by Francisco Martinez, a soldier
on the expedition. This report has been reprinted by Rui-
diaz in La Florida, pp. 474-4 80, and by Lawson in "Letters
of Menendez," II, 324-327. Payment to the friars and to
Don Luis after their arrival at Seville from the ill-fated
Jacan expedition are found in A.G.I. Contaduria 299; 3: 1,
dated November 1, 1566.
40. Dr. Hoffman's most recent and explicit application
of his research to expenditures in Florida by the Spanish
Crown has been published as Paul E. Hoffman, "A Study of
Defense Costs, 1565-1585: A Quantification of Florida
History," Florida Historical Quarterly, LI, No. 4 (April,
1973), 401-422. In this article. Dr. Hoffman has listed the
total Royal spending allocated to Florida defense costs for
1565-1568 as 208,401 ducats.
41. See Appendix V. In 1566 Pedro Menendez had sent
from Havana 505 loads of cassava, 854 fanegas of corn, 492
pumpkin-squashes, 26,700 lb. of sea-biscuit, 28 pipes of
wine, 325 jugs of wine, 58 jugs of oil, 442 yards of cotton
print cloth, 775 yards of coarse linen, 65,800 lb. of jerked
beef, 27 calves, 600 chickens, 80 goats or sheep, 550 sows,
and 47 hams. These items, extended at the prices given by
the Havana officials, total 10,396 ducats as shown in A.G.I.
Contaduria 1,174. A witness in Mexico in 1591 testified
that Menendez bought, over an uncertain period, 2,700 fanega
of corn, 3,000 chickens, and beans, honey, was cind hemp
sandals from yucatan; see Ruidiaz, La Florida, II, 622.
42. The ship losses are detailed in "Memorial de los
navios cargados de bastimentos y municiones^que se perdieron
el Adelantado . . . ," from A.G.I. Escribania de Camara
1,024-A.
CHAPTER VIII
THE ENTERPRISE RENEWED; CONCLUSIONS
In the fast fregata El Aguila, the Menendez paorty made
a very rapid Atlantic voyage indeed, cuid reached the Azores
in seventeen days. There Menendez learned that Philip II
might be going to the Netherlands to supervise military
operations against the rebels. The Adelantado therefore
decided to sail directly for the north coast of Spain to
intercept his King and report on the Florida enterprise.
On June 29, the Florida party arrived off La Cor\ina
and were forced by the presence of corsair ships to put into
Vivero in Galicia. There the two prisoners, Enriquez emd
Redroban, were sent to Madrid under guard. There Menendez
learned that the King was still at Court.
Pedro Menendez was able to pass a few days in Aviles
with his wife euid other family before pressing on to the
Court, where he arrived July 20, 1567. The two captives
had arrived three days earlier. The Florida Adelantado
made a striking entrance into the presence of Philip II,
accompanied by the six Florida Indians and preceded by his
reputation of battle and victory, exploration and foundation.
He found, however, a sovereign and Court preoccupied with
339
340
the events of an exciting spring cuid svunmer. The Spamish
King had been pushed beyond his tolerance by the rebels in
the Netherlands, and he had ordered the Duke of Alba to
bring Spanish troops from Milan to enforce royal power in
the Low Countries. While Calvinist Geneva held its breath
and all Europe watched in fearful cmticipation, the world's
finest army marched overland directly to Antwerp. By mid-
summer, the Spanish had begun a full-scale costly commitment
in tile Netherlands. The short but sharp actions against the
Huguenot French in Florida, the wider-ranging expedition of
Pedro Menendez in the Caribbean, and the disciplining of the
Netherlands were all seen by Philip as part of one war.
Within Spain, tightening ideologies were also leading to
disturbcuice. On November, 1566, a pragmatic had been
adopted which required the Moriscos of eastern Andalusia to
change their Moorish customs as a part of their complete
Christicinization. Philip II was fearful that connection
between Moriscos and the Turkish enemy could lead to an
invasion of Spain. After the new law was openly published
on January 1, 1567, discontent began to grow among the
Moriscos. Sooner or later, it was bound to result in open
revolt.
The French representative at the Spanish Court, Ambas-
sador Fourquevaux, had continued to press for action on
the prisoners Pedro Menendez had made in his Florida con-
quest. Philip's policy of the previous summer to release
341
the captives had been carried out slowly after continual
pleas by the French Ambassador. The Sieur de Lys was freed
after a long term in the Madrid jail. In May, Philip had
also released eight other prisoners of the Florida French
who had been brought to Seville. Still concerned with
seeking some general recompense by the Spanish Crown for
Menendez* actions in Florida, Fourquevaux viewed the Ade-
lantado's arrival at Court with interest and with malice.
The Frenchman sought out Captain Miguel Enriquez, cuid
pressed him for details of Menendez' circumstances. The
Spaniard, awaiting trial before the Council of the Indies on
the appeal of his case from Menendez' service, told the
French Ambassador that the Spanish estcQ)lishment in Florida
was meager. He said, moreover, that Pedro Menendez had
come in part to defend himself against charges that he had
permitted many men to die of hunger and that he had embezzled
royal goods emd sold them at auction in Havana. Forquevaux
passed word of his confidences with Enriquez to his own
4
royal master.
Prior to the cirrival of Pedro Menendez at Madrid, the
King has already begxin to act upon his request for a new
royal supply expedition for Florida. In May, the Crown
had sent along to Seville Menendez' order list for new
supplies for the royal troops in the adelantcimiento . In
mid-June, Philip II sent another letter to the Casa,
advising that he had cut the asking for wine for Florida
342
from two thousamd to twenty pipes, but had otherwise
approved the supply list. On June 23, the trade officials
replied that they had only 12,000 ducats available for such
expenditure, and that it was already too late to send the
goods in the New Spain convoy, for it was due to sail the
next day. They suggested instead a shipment in a large
shallow-draft urea direct to the Florida ports.
When he had completed the formalities of his appearance
before Philip II, Pedro Menendez was ordered by the King to
report by written memorandum to the Council of the Indies.
The Adelantado did so, narrating the history of his defeat
of Jean Ribault and Rene de LaudonniSre, the far-reaching
explorations which had been made in Florida, and the forts
and cities he had founded there. Menendez went on to give
his considered opinion on the state of defense of the
Caribbeein Indies against the forces threatening the Empire
there. After he made his report, it appeared that Pedro
Menendez had faced down his detractors for the moment, and
his return became a triumph.
After his initial duties had been completed, the
Adelcintado inquired about the status of arrangements for
the supply of the royal soldiers in Florida, and was taken
aback to learn that nothing had yet been sent. The forts
had only eJoout three months' supp ' / left when he had sailed,
and the summer was now far advanced; thus it appeared that
his own network might again have to bear the full burden
343
of sustaining both the royal amd private soldiery. Menendez
pressed the King to speed up the provisioning and dispatch
of the ships which were to go to Florida, but also objected
strongly to the diminished amount of wine which was to be
sent. Menendez proposed, and the King passed along to the
Casa, the suggestion that the supplies could be loaded on
one of Menendez' own ships which Pedro del Castillo was
then loading to go to Florida.
After he had made report of his services in Florida,
Pedro Menendez naturally expected some substantial royal
reward for his deeds. His expectations, and the actions he
took to bring these hopes to fruition, took two distinct
channels. First, Menendez pressed for appointment to
salaried office of high distinction and other mercedes from
his sovereign.
The second course of action taken by Pedro Menendez
was most illustrative of the nature of his position as a
private conqueror. In September, 1567, he filed suit against
the Spemish Crown, seeking recompense for heavy expenditures
and losses in the conquest of Florida. This action was
not a suit between parties, but rather one between an
individual subject of Castile and the royal patrimony,
defended by the Crown Fiscal. It was the duty of the Fiscal
to keep charge of the asientds and capitulaciones of the
Indies Adelcmtados, and allege amd charge individuals freely
o
where the interest of his King was at stake. The legalism
344
of Spanish life and the niceties of the relationship between
Philip II and his vassals is evidenced by the fact that the
Crowns prepared to reward Menendez for his services in
Florida at the same time that the lawsuit over the contract
was being argued.
The body of testimony, allegations and documents which
make up this lawsuit remains the best single primary source
exteuit about the contract with Pedro Menendez de Aviles for
q
the conquest of Florida. The material included covers some
seventy- five years. The corpus of the case begun by Menendez
in 1567 also includes a wide variety of biographical, geo-
graphical, and financial data about the Menendez years in
Florida.
The main line taken by Menendez in his case was to
attempt to prove that he had over-performed his contract
for Florida, and to list and itemize his losses in the con-
quest, thus demonstrating overwhelming personal loss and
damage in the effort. To this end, Pedro Menendez and his
attorney put on record plea after plea to prove their case.
On September 22, they filed a list of the ships with which
Menendez had sailed from Cadiz two years before. On
October 16, the Adelantado and his associates testified that
the Florida expedition had carried, in fact, many more men
them Francisco Duarte had showed in his muster in June,
1565. There was added material describing the addition oi
the Luna contingent at Cadiz and the men and ships taken to
345
Florida from Aviles, Gijon, and Santander. Now Men^ndez
was ready to demonstrate his concrete losses in the enter-
prise of Florida. He filed a memorial describing the eleven
vessels lost in the effort up to the time of his departure.
He also detailed the performance of his network of small
supply ships which had served Florida in 1566-67 from Havana
and other points in the Caribbeam.
Pedro Menendez had not as yet decided upon the amount
of money or other considerations which he might finally ask
in recompense for his efforts and losses. His decision upon
that point in the late fall of 1567 was also related to
the benefits which the Crown was then in the process of
granting to Menendez. Also involved, as matters of his pride
and prestige, were the Enriquez and Redroban cases, and the
case of Captain Parra, which Menendez had furthered. The
latter two suits, of course, concerned Garcia Osorio,
against whom Pedro Menendez was determined to gain satis-
faction.
Although the Adelantado's position in disciplining the
two captains who had served in Florida was not upheld (both
were given token fines and freed) , the evidence presented
against Osorio in the Redroban and Parra cases found its
mark. On October 24, 1567, Philip II issued a cedula
naming Pedro Menendez de Aviles Governor and Captain-General
of Cuba, with no prejudice to his Florida titles. Menendez
would also have the right to serve in absentia through
346
lieutenants as he had done in Florida. Osorlo would have to
undergo residencia at the hands of his hated rival, and had
still to answer the charges being developed in the Parra
case."
Of far more importaince to Pedro Menendez was the ap-
pointment which next came to him. On November 2, 1567,
Philip II granted Menendez the office, title, salary and
privileges of Captain-General of a new Royal Armada vrtiich
was to act as the main line of Caribbecm and fleet defense.
Menendez' long past services and his most recent efforts in
Florida and the Caribbean thus received substantial recogni-
tion. In addition to salary, the new Captain-General would
receive the King's fifth share of any prizes taken as well
as his own share of the other four-fifths. The twelve
ships of his armada would be of his own design, and were to
be built in Vizcaya under Menendez' supervision by a close
associate, Juan Martinez de Recalde. In prize money, paid
appointments for a host of friends and followers, and the
chance for profits through contreiband, Pedro Menendez stood
to gain greatly from his appointment. In a sense, the Captain-
Generalcy of the Royal Armada offered the conquerors of
Florida an escape hatch and a safety valve for the pressures
of financial insolvency which they faced. The royal
appointment came none too soon; the next month Menendez
was embargoed by his creditors for debt in Seville.
347
The honors poured upon Pedro Men^ndez de Avil^s had not
yet ceased. Philip II began the formalities connected with
the granting of am encomienda in the military order of
S2uitiago to Menendez. Soon it was emnounced that Men^ndez
had been greinted the title and revenues of the Comendador
of Santa Cruz de la Zarza, a property of the order located
at Campos, near Palencia in Castile. It carried an smnual
revenue, which would help bolster the sagging finances of
the Adelantado.-*-^
Philip II also took steps to revise the Menendez con-
tract so as to make its trade privileges conform to the
actual state of the ships which Menendez now possessed. On
October 6, the Crown ruled that the section of the asiento
which granted Menendez licenses for two 600-ton galleons
be changed to allow for three 400-ton vessels. Another
cedula sent the same day approved the change of the size of
Menendez' shallop licenses from fifty to eighty tons apiece.
Menendez now moved through Pedro del Castillo to send a
galleon into the Indies trade. ^^
As the Florida Adelantado moved from triumph to triumph,
enlarging notably his sphere of influence and gathering the
visible tokens of royal favor, his case over Florida losses
atnd expenses continued. The documents he had presented in
evidence and the entire status of his contract with the
King were subjected to careful review by the chief auditors
of the realm. The accountants issued a lengthy analysis of
348
the case on October 22, 1567, setting forth all of the
pertinent facts but making no conclusions. Lists %rere
appended detailing the costs of the Crovm emd the Adelantado
at Cadiz, After placing Factor Duarte's original 1565
muster at Cadiz of record, the Fiscal challenged Pedro
Menendez' contention that he had in truth carried five
hundred more men than Duarte had showed. Since the muster
Menendez claimed to have made at the Canary Island had been
destroyed when the St, Augustine fort had been burned, it
was difficult for the Adelantado to prove his case.
Now Pedro Menendez asked the Crown for 25,000 ducats
for the value of San Pelayo, a sum for the aviso he had sent
Philip II in October, 1565, and payment for what he had
over-spent in Florida. Altogether, his askings were for
more than 50,000 ducats. On February 9, 1568, the Council
of the Indies passed its definitive sentence in the case.
Menendez was to receive 500 ducats for the aviso San Miguel,
sent with Captain Diego Flores Valdes amd lost in the Azores,
and six reales per ton charter-fee for San Pelayo during the
four and one-half months she served in the Florida enter-
prise, altogether some 3,500 ducats. As for the rest, the
Council left it up to Philip II. Shortly, the King granted
a me reed to Pedro Menendez of 10,000 ducats for his services
and losses in the enterprise of Florida. The Adelantado
made arrcuigements in Seville for a fellow Asturian, Diego
de Valdes, who served as aide to the Archbishop of Seville,
349
to collect the 2,000 ducats of the me reed which wafe to be
paid by the Casa. The other claims Pedro Men^ndez had made
had not been finally settled by this payment, and the case
of 1567-68 would be taken up again at a later date. Other
minor requests for reimbursement — for the pay of Roelas'
men Menendez took from Havana and for supplies he furnished
for the royal troops in Florida — would also be continued by
22
the Adelantado and his attorneys.
It was apparent that Pedro Menendez de Avil€s had gained
greatly as a result of his trip to Spain, In the face of
much rumor and some fact about his misappropriations and
carelessness in the Florida conquest, the Adelantado had
received evidence of royal favor. The concrete realization
of cash sums from the benefits and offices he had received
would be somewhat slower in coming. It is evident, however,
that Castillo had by now received the back charter-fees due
Menendez from 1563, and that the Adelantado now had been
voted those from the 1565 voyage. With more supplies coming
to Florida, and with the forthcoming collection of salaries
and me r cedes, the worst time seemed to be past. Best of all,
the gaining of the fleet and Cuba offices would open many
doors for Pedro Menendez and his associates. Legal and
illegal sources of funds would now become available, if
properly exploited. His private trade could continue, and
the gramd design for the settlement of Florida could now
proceed.
350
Most particularly, Men^ndez could now begin to carry
out the population of Florida with settlers emd their
families — that key to conquest without which the adelanta-
miento could never prosper. It was common knowledge at
Court that the settlement of Florida was to be accomplished
during 1568. The previous year, Men^ndez had contracted
with one Heman Perez, a Portugese, to bring from the Azores
two hundred farmers emd their families. The arramgement fell
through, for Perez emd Pedro Menendez disagreed and became
24
bitter enemies. Now, however, the Adelantado could go
ahead with his plsm, using instead settlers from the province
of Toledo, in Castile. Under individual contracts with each
settler family, Menendez agreed that their passage and
freight would be paid for them. Upon arrival, the Adelantado
would grant them lands for farms and pastures. Within two
years, he contracted to furnish each farmer twelve cows emd
a bull, two oxen for plowing, two mares, a dozen sheep,
goats, hogs, and chickens. He agreed to give the farmers
vine- shoots for their own vineyards. For each family,
Menendez woxHd build a house, fvimish a shepherd boy, and
give one male and one female slave. Pedro Menendez also
hoped that merchants, learning of the richness of the Florida
lands, would invest enough to create large stock-raising
haciendas and sugar-mills, sizeable vineyards and grain-
fields. After ten years, he assxired Philip II, the Crown
25
%rould receive fine profits from such a land. The
351
gathering of the settlers in Toledo begsm, and Pedro del
Castillo began to prepare to receive them in C5diz to
arreinge for their passage overseas to Florida.
Meamwhile, the royal agencies had finally begun to
prepare the Florida supply shipment which had been dis-
cussed since the previous summer. After repeated orders
from Philip II, the Casa de Contrataci6n selected and began
27
to stock two ureas for the Florida voyage. Once the winter
had begun, the sailing was deferred until early spring.
Also to be sent in the ureas to Florida would be a
number of persons returning to the provinces as well as a
heavy reinforcement of the Jesuit Florida mission, led by
Father Juan Bautista de Segura. The Indians who had come to
Spain with Pedro Menendez and their interpreter would also
board one of the vessels, as would Menendez' new lieutenant
Governor of Cuba, Dr. Zayas. Diego de Miranda would return
28
on the same ship to serve Pedro Menendez in Cuba.
It was, for Pedro Menendez de Aviles, a matter of
practical urgency and personal conscience that the Jesuit
mission in Florida go ahead with all possible speed. Upon
his return to Spain, the Adelantado had pressed his monarch
and the high officials of the Jesuit Order for further
missionaries. It was evident, by the fall of 1567, that
Menendez was exerting his influence so that a new contingent
of Jesuits might be approved and sent to Florida with the
29
relief ships.
352
For their part, the Jesuits appreciated the sincere
religious zeal of the Adelantado and were cognizcmt of his
power and influence at the Spamish Court. There were,
however, obstacles to the Florida mission which Men^ndez
had to overcome. Widespread deprecation of Florida as a
place of sterile soil amd hostile Indians had come to Spain
and Mas current at the Court. The news of the death of
Father Martinez could cut both ways; the dangers of Florida
might dishearten the timid, but the possibility of martyrdom
might encourage those of fervent faith. In an attempt to
overcome any hesitations which the Jesuits might have, Pedro
Menendez appeared at their college in Seville on December 16,
1567. There he described the religious efforts in Florida
to date, and outlined his plan to establish a Jesuit college
in Havana. In Cuba, the Adelantado declared, the children
of Indiam leaders from Florida would be taught the Spanish
language eind the tenets of Christianity. They might also
serve there as hostages for the safety of missionaries and
soldiers at the posts of Florida.
Menendez had delineated his design for the conversion
of the Florida Indiems in considerable detail; this he
conveyed to the General of the Jesuit Order at about the
same time. From this plan it is evident that the post at
Havana was to be only one of several regional colleges
which were to deal with the vast areas of continental Florida,
as missionaries arrived and were assigned to new areas.
353
Menendez included in his design the promising new fields
opened up by the Pardo journey eind a series of pleinned
32
settlements on the Gulf Coast route to New Spain.
In a moving ceremony on January, 1568, in the great
Cathedral at Seville, the five Florida Indians were baptized
in the Roman Catholic faith in the presence of the Adelantado
and the Royal Officials of the House of Trade. This baptism
helped to dramatize the expectation that thousands of others
would follow, and that the men going shortly to Florida would
be the means for the gaining of many souls , to the glory of
God."
Loaded with supplies for Florida, the royal expedition
left Semlucar de Barrameda on April 10, 1568. The cost to the
34
Crown had been more than 30,000 ducats. This time the
relief vessels would be going to a land in which established
cities had been founded, and means of supply were functioning
well. Hopefully, the work of mission could proceed upon the
foundations already well laid.
On the nineteenth of June, 1568, the convoy of two
ureas dropped anchor in the port of St. Augustine. The ships
had been guided directly to Florida by Gonzalo de Gayon, v^o
then formally turned over the cargoes aboard to the Governor
and Alcade at St. Augustine. The foodstuffs, clothing
and munitions were sufficient to relieve the immediate needs
of the garrisons.
354
Father Segura, newly arrived at the mission field
placed in his charge, met with Governor Bartolom^ Men^ndez
amd Chaplain Mendoza Grajales to gain first-hand impressions
and increase his knowledge of Florida. He was told that
Father Rogel, who had recently come from the South Florida
missions, was still on his voyage to Santa Elena and Guale
amd would shortly return to report to Segura. In the mean-
time, it was easy to determine that the St. Augustine garrison
was almost demoralized. The Spanish were still in a state
of shock: less than two months before, the French had
Icuided, made common cause with hostile Indiams, and taken
and burned Fort San Mateo! As the Jesuits learned about the
disaster, it beccime clear to them that its roots lay deeper
in the past. The two main causes of the loss of San Mateo
seemed to lie in the nature of Menendez' undisciplined sol-
diery and in the continued hostility of major components
of the Timucuan Indians to the Spanish.
Soon after the departure of Pedro Menendez, yet
amother mutiny plot had been uncovered at St. Augustine,
Five ringleaders had confessed under torture and had been
executed. Even among the inner circle of Menendez' faith-
ful Asturicins, moreover, dissent and argument had flourished
during his cJasence. Martin de Arguelles and Bartolom^
Menendez had come almost to blows, and Esteban de las Alas
had found it necessary to intervene and confine the two men
until they could be reconciled. Under such circumstances.
355
it was indeed difficult to maintain adequate discipline and
to keep proper guard over the posts of Florida.
In the summer of 1567, the tensions between the Spanish
garrisons and the Indians of Saturiba and his allies
reached a climax. The Timucuan chief had joined with the
Indians of the Nocoroco-Mayaca area and with those of
Potano (located near the great Alachua savanna) to wage war
upon Utina. Although it was something which the Adelantado
of Florida had sought to avoid, the Spanish again found them-
selves playing out a role opposite to that which Rene de
Laudonniere had played. The enemies of the French had,
perforce, become friends to the Spanish, and Indians who had
allied with Laudonniere were now firmly united against the
Spaniards. In August, 1567, Captain Pedro de Andrada marched
his company of eighty men deep into the interior of the
peninsula to attack the stronghold of the Potanos. While
passing a heavily wooded hammock, the Spanish company was
attacked from ambush by a sizeable force of Indians. A
cloud of arrows struck the soldiers, and Captain Andrada
and many of his men died. Circumstances were new ripe for
the very eventuality which Pedro Menendez and Philip II
had so strongly feared— the union of a French invader with
hostile Florida Indians.
It was left for a Gascon nobleman, Dominique de
Gourgues, to mount a French expedition of national revenge
for the death of Jean Ribault and the other Florida French
356
in 1567-1568. Although his voyage exhibited some of the
characteristics of a normal corsair journey, its leisurely
course to the Cape Verde Islands and westward to the Windward
38
Islands led de Gourgues at last to Florida.
Spanish and French sources agree that the three ships and
two small craft of Dominique de Gourgues arrived off the
39
St. Augustine bar on the afternoon of Good Friday, 1568,
The Spanish were already somewhat on edge due to the touchy
Indian situation. On the last of March, at dawn, a force of
four hundred Timucuems had assaulted San Mateo, forced one
side of the fortress, and withdrawn after wounding several
Spaniards. Now, at St. Augustine, the Spanish fired two
cannon shots to mark the port, if the sails were those of
friendly ships. If they proved to be those of the enemy,
they would be waimed that they would be met there with gun-
fire. The vessels sheered off, and turned their course
northward. Esteban de las Alas, who was ill of fever at
St. Augustine, sent warning of the strange ships to his
garrison at San Mateo, together with reinforcements.
When de Gourgues anchored his ships in the mouth of the
St. Mary's, he was greeted by Indians whose unfriendly aspect
soon turned to joy when they learned that the strangers were
Frenchmen. Shortly, Chief Saturiba 'himself arrived to parley
with Dominique de Gourgues. His enmity towards the Spanish
and liberal gifts from de Gourgues sealed a bargain: the
Spanish forts would be assaulted and destroyed. Intelligence
357
provided by the Indians and confirmed by Pierre de Bre, a
young Frenchmam who had found refuge with Saturiba, gave
de Gburgues a good understanding of the Spanish dispositions,
Crossing with his Indian allies in two small boats, the
French leader took a hundred 2urquesbusiers to the two small
blockhouses which the Spanish had built on the opposite
banks of the St. Johns river mouth. First one, then
the other fort was taken and burned. There is substcintial
discrepamcy between the opposing accounts as to the strength
of the Spanish garrisons and the actions which ensued at
the little stockades. It is, however, evident that some of
the Spanish got away to St. Augustine, and some few escaped
to give the warning to San Mateo.
At that fort, the news inspired little but overwhelming
fear. Instead of preparing to repel the enemy, and perhaps
to withstand a long siege, the Spanish soldiers were panic-
Stricken. They grossly overestimated the number of the
French forces, decided to flee, and began to cook up rations
euid get their possessions together. At dawn of April 25,
the men began to slip out of the fort, 3 caving the guns
unspiked and the artillery ammunition intact. None of their
officers' orders had any effect — safety was their primary
aim. They skulked through the thick woods, trying to find
their way to St. Augustine. Some were killed or captured by
the Indians. Later, a loyal captain returned to the fort
with a few men, eind remained long enough to spike the guns.
358
When the French came against San Mateo, they took it
without opposition. Two captives who had been caught by
the Indians in their headlong fight were hung outside the
fort. Dominique de Gourgues retraced his steps to the
ships in the St. Maury's; he was richer by the gaining of
some nine bronze artillery pieces and other lesser prizes.
Bidding feurewell to the Indians of Saturiba cind Tacatacuru,
the Frenchmen left Florida to return to Europe.
An expedition from St. Augustine had the melancholy
duty of visiting the burned forts and burying the dead. It
found eight men hanging from trees near the two destroyed
blockhouses, and two more outside the shell of Fort San
Mateo. A fire accidentally set by the joyous Indians of
Satxiriba had gutted the buildings inside the fort, and all
the artillery was gone. The Spanish began the customary
task of assessing the blame for the loss of the forts.
Esteban de las Alas gave it as his opinion that, of one
hundred twenty men in Scin Mateo, only a dozen or so would be
free of the stigma of cowardice in the face of the enemy.
A hearing was held, and the trial of the guilty began. The
Spcmish were determined to punish the Indians who had aided
the French, and also decided to build a strong outpost at
the island of Tacatacuru to prevent further attacks by way
of ^the hostile Indian communities near the St. Mary's.
The French triumph at the scene of their earlier
disaster was as cheaply won as had been Menendez' own assault
359
upon Fort Ceuroline. Their chief gain was in the satisfaction
of a deep need for national revenge, for the capture of an
eiq)ty fort emd the hamging of a few men was scarcely more
than a symbolic victory. The de Gourgues raid did not
succeed in dislodging the Spamish from their foothold in
Florida. In spite of this blow, the garrisons would remain.
For their part, the Spanish had even less reason to boast
of their performcmce in the action. The defense system
erected amd maintained at great cost and effort by the King
euid the Adelantado of Florida had utterly failed its first
test. If this were the way in which the dominions of the
King would be defended, eind the manner in which the settlers
now coming to Florida would be protected, it augured ill
for the future of the enterprise.
After learning of the debacle of San Mateo, the new
Jesuit Vice-Provincial and his missionaries were struck
afresh by the dangers and difficulties of their chosen
field. Within a few days of their arrival, Juan Rogel
arrived from Santa Elena to report to his superior amd
fellows. Father Rogel quickly brought the Jesuits up to
date on the missions of South Florida and on possibilities
for evcuigelization among the Indians of Guale, Crista and
inthe uplands west and north of Santa Elena.
The tale Juan Rogel had to tell of events at the fort
missions of Scui Anton in Carlos, at Tequesta eind Tocobaga
was one of struggle amd disaster. At Carlos, the main
360
Station of the Jesuit, the tension between Spaniard and
Indian had risen after the departure of Pedro Men^ndez in
the spring of 1657. At last, the Spanish were like men
beseiged in their little blockhouse — they dared not leave
it without armed guard. Rogel, who had helped mediate
between the opposing forces, left for Havana in early
;^ril, 1567. Shortly after his departure, Carlos moved
his women cmd treasure to smother island, called in his
subordinate chieftains and prepared to massacre the Christians,
After he learned of this, Captain Reinoso called Chief Carlos
40
to him near the fort, and killed him outright.
The new chief, named Philip by the Spanish, was a man
who had held a valid claim to the throne of the Indicin
kingdom. After the death of Carlos, Philip svunmoned the
sub-chiefs of the surrounding Calusa towns to swear homage
to him, amd to bring their usual gifts of women to the new
King. Philip was now the accepted leader of the Calusa,
and the Spanish could make a fresh beginning in that land.
Upon his return from Cuba with Pedro Menendez Marquez,
Father Rogel went directly to the tiny settlement the Ade-
lantado had made in Tocobaga. There he found the garrison
in good health and spirits. Chief Tocobaga and some of his
principal nobles attended the Mass celebrated by the priest,
but it was riimored that the chief was displeased at the
possibility that the images in the Indian temple would be
burned by the Spcuiiards. If that occurred, the interpreters
361
told Rogel, the Chief himself and his family had sworn to
perish in the same fire.
When the Spanish returned to Carlos, Pedro Men^ndez
Marquez confirmed Philip as chief, as a vassal of the King
of Spain. Father Rogel then began in earnest to converse
with the Calusa chief, recognizing that to win his conversion
was a vital first step in the Christianization of his people.
For six months, Rogel labored persuasively with Philip. As
his mission moved from the shallow first stage of teaching
the Indian children and a few adults the basic prayers and
the adoration of the Cross, the real difficulties began.
It now became clear that the Indians might be willing
to accept the Christian God as a coequal or even superior
deity in their pemtheon, but that claims for exclusivity on
behalf of God would meet dogged opposition. The Catholic
doctrines of the afterlife, moreover, conflicted directly
with the Indian view of a three-fold soul of the dead which
became, after transmigration, a nullity. The harsh con-
demnation by the Jesuit of strong cultural traditions, such
as the sacrifice of children, the practice of sodomy, and
polygamy for the chiefs, also raised a strong reaction on
the part of Philip. Although the Calusa chief recognized
the power of the written theology of the Christians, he
persisted in his old ceremonies, while continuing to pray
before the Cross. For his part, Jucin Rogel was determined
to baptize Philip only when he truly reached the point of
362
fall understemding and acceptance of Christian doctrine.
The Jestiit also vowed to deface and bum the Indiems* idols
and free Philip euid all of his people forever from the
heathen rites of their worship.
Prom Brother Villareal in Tequesta, Rogel heard that
the Indians on Biscayne Bay seemed more tractable and sub-
missive than those of Carlos. Even so, the work of evem-
gelization went very slowly in Tequesta. The chief permitted
the Jesuit to catechize the children in the main house,
where older Indians were often present, although they took
no part in the prayers. After meiny months of work, only one
old dying woman had accepted baptism. The Tequestas, who
were seasonal gatherers and moved their residence to the
islcuid keys in Biscayne Bay during the winter, had little
to spare from their meager store of food. Indeed, the
presence of the Spanish garrison began to be a troublesome
42
burden, as the soldiers at times abused the Indians.
At the beginning of December, 1567, Juan Rogel had again
made a trip to Havana to seek a more full and reliable supply
for the South Florida garrisons from Juan de Hinestrosa
and Hernando de Baeza in Havana. Shortly after the first of
January, 1568, the Jesuit missionary returned to Florida
with Pedro Menendez Marquez and three small craft. Again,
the Spaniards directed their vessels first to the middle
west coast of the peninsula, and approached the village of
Tocobaga. There, they beheld cin eerie spectacle. The
363
Indian tovm was completely deserted, and nothing was found
except the bodies of two dead Spanish soldiers. After
further search, they learned that all twenty-four of the
garrison had been killed by the Indians. Outraged, and
unable to find anyone to punish, Menendez Marquez burned
43
Tocobaga and returned to Carlos.
On April 4, 1568, a small boat came into the harbor
of Carlos with Brother Villareal and eighteen soldiers, the
survivors of the garrison at Tequesta. Menendez Marquez
had rescued them after the Indians had murdered four and
surrounded the other men in their wooden fort. The immediate
reason for the hostile acts of the Indians was the killing by
the soldiers of a principal native leader. Shortly after
the arrival of the survivors, Rogel and Villareal went to
Havana. The priest from Carlos then sailed north with one
of Menendez' supply vessels to meet eventually with his
fellow Jesuits.
Juan Rogel had much to tell the new company of mission-
auries from Spain about the northern settlements cind forts
established by Pedro Menendez de Aviles. He had first
stopped in Guale, emd was impressed, as the other Spaniards
had been the year before, by the mild nature of the Indians.
Rogel noted that twenty-three affiliated chieftains in and
around Guale spoke a common language, which was understood
for a good distance inland. When he arrived in Santa Elena,
Father Rogel was immediately struck by the similarities of
364
the farmland nearby to that of Spain. Wheat, grapes, amd a
kind of wild olive grew well there, and the priest had seen
a thriving vineyard at Santa Elena itself. At the time of
his stay at Santa Elena, Captain Juan Pardo had just re-
turned from his second lengthy journey inland. He discussed
his discoveries with the Jesuit, and shared his insights
about the continental reaches of Spanish Florida with him.
Juem Pardo had left garrisons on his first journey
inleuid, but instead of maintaining peaceful relationships
with the Indians, the soldiers left in the forts had waged
war upon the natives. In the fall of 1567, Pardo made a
second inland journey of exploration. After renewing his
garrisons at Guatari and Joada, the Spanish captain pressed
on through the cool lands to the westward. Skirting the
south end of the mountain chain, he crossed extreme northern
Georgia and entered present-day Alabama. Crossing the
upper reaches of the Tennessee, Chatahoochee and Coosa
rivers, the captain noted the well-watered, fertile nature
of the land. At the great Indian town of Cosa or Cossa,
Jueui Pardo again crossed the track of Hernando de Soto.
Pardo continued on for seven more days until he came to
Trascaluza, which to him marked the western boundary
of Menendez' land of Florida. From here, he maintained,
it was only nine to eleven days • travel to New Spain —
only cJbout a hundred miles. Actually, more than a thousand
miles stretched between northern Alabama and the closest
365
point in Nueva Galicia or the nearest coastal settlement in
Panuco. Menendez* chief geographic error— the foreshorten-
ing of continental distances— was thus continued.
After the end of his second continental trip, Juan
Pardo sent reinforcements to his settlements at Guatari
and Joada. By the time Father Rogel reached Santa Elena in
June, 1568, news had already reached the seacoast that many
Spanish soldiers had been massacred by Indians at the inland
44
forts.
As the one man who was in an unusually good position
to survey the entire colonization effort of Pedro Menendez
from the Florida West Coast all the way to Santa Elena, Juan
Rogel is a valuable witness for the historian. In July,
1568, he gave the General of the Jesuit Order his frank
opinion of the state of the enterprise of evangelization in
Florida. ^^
Father Rogel thought he could discern one major obstacle
which had impeded the religious mission in Florida — one
thing which he believed had led to the many Indian uprisings
in the two years immediately past. In his opinion, it was
the behavior of the Spanish soldiers which had outraged the
natives in every area of occupation. They had demanded food
from the Indians, beaten and killed natives and abused their
women. The Spaniards had been, he asserted, overbearing,
cruel and harsh; this treatment had been the proximate cause
of the loss of Santa Lucia, the troubles at Tocobaga, Carlos,
366
Tequestar and the reason for the Indian attacks upon Fort
Joada and other inland blockhouses. While the priest prayed
for restraint of the licentious soldiery, he could also see
one great hope for the Jesuit mission with the Florida
Indians. If, he said, married settlers came in numbers,
the land could be secured and the Gospel might then be
preached in an atmosphere of community instead of one of
lust and bloodshed.
What Juan Rogel could not see as clearly, or perhaps
could not admit to his superior, was that the strict incul-
cation of Christian doctrine also posed a threat to the
Indiam cultures. Under the influence of the charisma of
Pedro Menendez' driving personality and exposed to the power
euid technology of Europeeui civilization, the Indians had
taken the first steps to Christianization. The exclusive
acceptance of Catholicism by the Indians would not be as
lightly imposed, however. Elimination of the old rites,
ceremonies and beliefs would imply a thoroughgoing change in
Indian life. As they sensed, it would, in fact, mean the
total alteration of their culture. The enforcement of such
change only would be accomplished through heavy and con-
sistent pressure by the Spanish over a period of time.
The framework in which Castilian religious and social
values could best be instilled in the Indians was, as Rogel
had stated, one of successful Spanish colonization, the
only means by which the enterprise of Florida could succeed
367
as that of greater population. As the first three years
of the Florida asiento neared its end, the greater part
of the effort of settlement— ^the population of the
provinces — had still to be accomplished. Adelantado,
■lissionary and soldier all saw this to be the most
i>Q>ortant task.
To support the colonization of Florida, feverish
activities were going forward in Spain in the face of
some difficulty and opposition. While Pedro Menendez
de Aviles dedicated his remarkable energies to the con-
struction and outfitting of his fleet of fast new ships
in Vizcaya, his deputy Castillo continued to lc±)or in
Cadiz for the enterprise of Florida. He had dispatched
a C2Lravel and galleon in the winter of 1567-1568, and
had encountered a degree of obstruction by the Casa
officials in Seville.
As the Crown moved slowly to pay the men who had
served in the Archiniega expedition to Florida, the King
made a ruling which favored Pedro Menendez. Philip II
agreed to pay the pilots who had gone on the original
journey to Florida, even though the Casa de Contratacion had
disputed the payment. ^^ The King wrote the Royal Officials
of Cuba, asking that they pay the two hundred soldiers
368
Pedro Menendez had left in Havana, so that their support
49
would not become a charge upon the Adelantado. There
continued, however, a strong reaction against the privileges
and benefits the King had granted to Pedro Menendez de
Avil^s. Unfavorable reports on Florida continued to arrive
from the Indies. The ruling by the Council of the Indies
for Captains Redrobem and Enrique z was a setback for the
Adelantado who had sentenced them. With characteristic
conservatism and concern for the rights of the Crown, Philip
II shortly took another step to offset some of the power
which he had given to Pedro Menendez. In view of the accusa-
tions, the King determined to reassert royal control over the
Crown Treasury in Florida, and on May 23, 1568, he named
Fremcisco de Esquivel as Treasurer of Florida. Evidently
the monarch also thought of removing the Accountant whom
Menendez had named.
It was the controversy over the embarking of Pedro
Menendez' two hundred colonists, however, which led to the
major determination the Crown next made cJx>ut the adelanta-
miento of Florida. Pedro del Castillo asked permission of
the Casa representative in Cadiz, Antonio Abalia, to load the
urea Salvadora with the large body of married settlers in-
tended for Florida. Even though Menendez' trade privileges
had not expired, the three-year term of the asiento had ended
at the end of June, 1568. The Casa alleged, however, that
since the term had then passed in which the Adelantado was
369
to have taken five hundred settlers to Florida, the ships
could not be sent.
On August 23, 1568, the King granted specific permission
for the ship with its colonists to sail to Florida. Three
weeks later the order was followed up with a more detailed
coramcmd to the royal trade representative in C^diz. The
two hundred should immediately go, and Men^ndez would also
have permission to embark other settlers direct from the
Canary Islands to Florida. Philip II had effectively
renewed the Men^ndez contract. The King had also made a
key decision to aid his Florida Adelantado to continue his
population effort in Florida. As an intermediate stage
between the haphazard means of supply previously used to
support for royal troops in Florida and a full-fledged
sxibsidy, the King had agreed to provide regular support for
a minimum royal garrison of one hundred fifty men. This
would promote stability in royal support for Florida, and
would help regularize the financial requirements of both
54
partxes. There would now be means to encourage the
effort of population, upon which the future of the enterprise
of Florida would depend. Both parties to the adelantamiento
of Florida were deeply committed to the continuation of their
mutual enterprise. Their expecations to date had led them
into great expense but remained, as yet, unrealized.
370
Conclusions
Study of the background and events of the initial
Florida conquest of 1565-1568 discloses that it was ac-
complished by a conquest entrepreneur, or Adelantado. The
founding of Spemish Florida thus fitted into a long tradi-
tion in which much of Spanish expansion was done through Royal
surrogates, who underwrote the pacification and settlement
of new Icuids in return for license to exploit them and the
granting of titles, monopolies, Icuid-grants emd revenues.
Philip II, caught between the urgencies of his dynastic
policies and his limited resources, granted adelantamientos
upon a number of occasions and promulgated Royal ordinances
in 1563 defining the place of private conquerors in Spanish
expansion.
After the collapse of Spanish-French negotiations over
New World spheres of influence following the treaty of
Cateau-Cambresis, the Spanish monarch learned of the French
settlement at Port Royal. He ordered a punitive expedition
to sail against the intruders and licensed Lucas Vazquez
de Ayll6n as Adelantado for the settlement of the North
American mainland. Neither of these efforts succeeded, but
the French vacated Port Royal of their own volition, only
to be succeeded by another Huguenot colony which estciblished
itself in Florida and built Fort Caroline. Deserters from
that garrison went a-corsairing in the West Indies, and their
capture and confessions eventually resulted in the sending
371
of very tardy word of the French incursion to Spain.
Meemwhile, the Asturiem seeunan Pedro Menendez de Aviles
had risen, through ability and influence, to be a minor
power in the Indies trade and a major Crown official in the
fleet system. He soon Ccime into direct conflict with the
merchants of Seville cind the Casa de Contratacion over juris-
diction. After his conviction in 1563 cind 1564 upon charges
of smuggling and conflict of interest, Menendez escaped his
imprisonment in Seville and finally succeeded in having all
charges against him annulled by the Council of the Indies.
He then signed an asiento, or contract, with Philip II for
the conquest and settlement of Florida.
Lamentably, historians have concentrated upon the strik-
ing events of Fort Caroline and Matanzas and thus upon the
purely diplomatic and military aspects of the Florida con-
quest. This has resulted in general disregard of the fact
that the Menendez contract was signed before knowledge of
Rene de Laudonniere's fort on the River May. It was only
then that the dual nature of the enterprise of Florida began,
as the Crown added troops, supplies and munitions to Menendez
own effort. Even though Royal aid continued on a sporadic
basis and resulted in 1568 in the King's guarantee of payment
for a minimum number of soldiers, Menendez' private govern-
ment continued to control Florida and undergird its support
during the entire period. The very nature of an adelanta-
miento, such as that in Florida, rendered Crown control over
the use of Royal resources virtually impossible.
372
Pedro Menendez had to buy or lease ships, hire seamen
and soldiers and purchase supplies for his expeditions to
Florida; he was required to encourage emd support settlers,
and had to maintain his establishment for the term of his
contract. Examination of the resources of the Adelantado for
the conquest discloses that he utilized all the cash, loans
and credit he could obtain in order to fulfill his obliga-
tions, Menendez' origin, as a product of the north-of-
Spain contra-corsario culture and his relationship to its
great noble families, insured that his Florida conquest was
not to be a solitary effort, but a regional enterprise. Man-
power, associates in leadership and funds for Florida came
from a matrix of f ellow-nortenos , whose commercial and politi-
cal reach extended to the south of Spain and to the Indies.
The Adelantado executed a contract with Pedro del Castillo
of Cadiz, mcJcing him his surrogate, and erected a structure
of powers-of-attorney which enabled him to tap commercial
revenues emd maintain his effort in Florida. The events of
the conquest tested Menendez' resources to the utmost. His
decision to proceed directly to Florida from Puerto Rico
in 1565 made his victory possible but cost heavily in ships,
lives and money. After Royal aid promised to Menendez in
the Indies failed to materialize, the Adelantado had great
difficulty providing for the garrisons in Florida. The
conquest also seriously reduced his private income potential
through the destruction of memy of his ships, cuid Menendez
373
underwent great tribulations with the unruly contract
soldiers, whether those sent by the King or his own men.
Their mutinies emd rebellions cost Men^ndez dear, and their
treatment of the natives undermined his Indicin policies.
In spite of obstacles, Pedro Men^ndez de Avil^s and
his norteno conquest group had achieved partial success in
the realization of their Florida conquest design. Their
continental exploration had reached the Appalachians and
Chesapeake Bay while forts and missions had been built from
the peninsular Gulf coast around the southeast cape north
to Santa Elena. In spite of slow progress in converting
the Indians, dedicated Jesuits persisted in their Florida
mission in keeping with Men^ndez ' coherent plan for areal
mission centers. Despite the soldiers' mutinies, Pedro
Menendez had imposed a detailed system for local and regional
government upon his provinces. He made his establishments
in complete accordance with ancient Castilian municipal
institutions, which provided for the means of government,
justice and extension into the land under Spanish law.
Menendez had created cities whose cabildos would hopefully
govern communities where settlers, soldiers and missionaries
could build a society that would include and instruct the
native peoples. He made arrangements to bring hundreds of
settlers to Florida, with whom he would share the costs and
benefits of their establishment. Noble and commoner alike
shared expectations of a land which would prosper in local
374
self-sufficiency and in the production of hides and sugar
for export. They also hoped that Florida would profit
through discovery of a water passage to New Spain amd the
Pacifict and that naval stores emd shipbuilding would
flourish there. The Adelantado himself planned a large
domain in the fertile lamds north and west of Santa Elena,
which might support the title of Marquis, such as Cortes had
enjoyed.
At the end of the first phase of the Florida conquest
in summer, 1568, Pedro Men^ndez had been personally rewarded
for his services in Florida by profitable offices, a bonus,
and additional revenues. The King had also agreed to support
a minimxua Florida garrison of one hundred fifty men from
fleet funds, while Menendez' trade privileges were extended
in return for his continuation of the efforts of coloniza-
tion. In spite of the expulsion of the French at great
cost to both contracting parties, a bare foothold had been
gained in Florida. The small number and wide dispersal of
Spanish forces made real penetration and exploitation of the
land impossible. Successful evcingelization of the Indians
and the creation of prosperous colonies was not yet realized.
It had become ominously clear that only sizeable Spanish
population, supported by military force, could provide the
matrix for a true pacification of the vast territory of
Florida and its native peoples. The tasks of conquest had
just fairly begun.
NOTES
1. See the certificate of custody, Graviel de Ayala,
in Vivero, Galicia, July 2, X567, from A.G.I. Justicia 999.
2. The notification of receipt of the prisoners, dated
at Madrid on July 17, 1567, from A.G.I. Indiferente General
1,219.
3. The King's order of release was directed to the
Casa from Madrid on May 19, 1657, from A.G.I. Indiferente
General 1,967. Royal policy toward the French prisoners
is discussed by Eugene Lyon in "Captives of Florida," pp.
17-20.
4. See Fourquevaxix to Charles IX, Madrid, n.d. (1567),
from "Lettres et Papiers d'Etat de Fourquebaux , " in Gaffarel,
La Floride Frangaise, p. 450.
5. Philipfe letters of May 24, 1567, and June 13, 1567,
were both sent from Madrid, and are found in A.G.I. Contra-
tacion 5,012 (Stetson Collection). The reply of the Casa
came from Seville on June 23, 1567, and is from A.G.I.
Contratacion 5,167.
6. Apart from the letters of Fourquevaux, the best
description of Pedro Men^ndez' arrival at the Court is from
Solis de Meras, Pedro Menendez de Aviles, pp. 241-245.
The Soils de Meras narrative ends after that portrayal.
7. Menendez describes his discomfiture at learning of
the delay in the Florida supply in a memorial to the Casa
dated at Madrid on September 21, 1567. The King sent his
suggestion eibout using one of Menendez' ships to the Casa
from El Pardo on August 13, 1567. Both documents come from
A.G.I. Contratacion 5,012 (Stetson Collection).
8. An excellent description of the powers and duties
of the Royal Fiscal is found in "Powers of the Fiscal,"
from "Codice de Leyes," September 24, 1570, reprinted in
D.I., XVI, 431-435.
9. The case is in a single legajo — A.G.I. Escribania
de Camara 1,024-A. Although the manuscript inventario for
the Escribania de Camara section of the Archive of the Indies
375
376
lists eighteen piezas in the legajo^ only nine are now
present in the bundle. Microfilm of the legajo is now in
the P. K. Yonge Library of Florida History. The writer
believes the material so rich that he associates with it
the Soils de Meras narrative, and that it may in fact have
contained the "missing relacion" from which both the Solis
de Meras and Barrientos works were teiken. See the cogent
summary of parallels between the two narratives by Lyle N,
McAlister in his Introduction, esp. xxi and xxii. (Solis
de Meras, Pedro Menendez de Aviles). It may be that the
arrangement of papers for the Menendez lawsuit against the
Crown also paralleled the materials contained in the
I^evillagigedo archive. The asiento copy in Escribania de
Camara 1,024-A is cm original, signed by Philip II,
10. ■lnformaci6n sumaria hecho en Cadiz por Pedro del
Castillo," September 22, 1567, A.G.I. Escribania de Cimara
1,024-A.
11. ■lnformaci6n ante Alcalde," Madrid, October 16,
1567, A.G.I. Escribania de Camara 1,024-A.
12. The Luna soldiery is enumerated in "Requeremiento
de Luna a Castillo que le de para los fletes y costa de los
soldados"; the northern effort is discussed in "La lista
que hizo el [sic] de las Alas en Aviles de 257 personas,"
"Visita y registro de los navios y gente en Gijon, and Visita
y registro del navio Espiritu Santo," all of which are from
A.G.I. Escribania de Camara 1,024-A.
13. As previously cited, the ship losses are itemized
in "Memorial de los navios cargados de bastimentos y muni-
ciones que se perdieron el Adelantado ....," while the
supply sailings were listed in "Despachos que se hicieron
. . . ," both from A.G.I. Escribania de Camara 1,024-A.
14. The end of the Enriquez case is documented under
the date of August 24, 1567, in A.G.I. Indiferente General
1,219. The Parra case, which continued until 1570, is
detailed in part in A.G.I. Escribania de Camara 952. Pedro
de Redroban's appeal was finally successful; see the Cedula
to the Casa of August 2, 1568, from A.G.I. Indiferente'
General 1,967 (Stetson Collection).
15. The Menendez appointment as Governor of Cuba of
October 24, 1567, is from A.G.I. Santo Domingo 115. The
Adelamtado named Diego de Miranda as secretary for the
Osorio residencia on February 2, 1568, at Madrid; see A.H.P.,
Protocolo 521, Escribania of Diego Rodriguez. It appears
that Garcia Osorio had already been suspended from his
office when the Menendez appointment was made; on August 30,
1567, Philip II wrote from Madrid to Don Diego de Santillan
as "our Governor of the island of Cxiba," ordering him to
377
punish Osorio for his actions against Barreda. This is from
a letter in A.G.I. Santo Domingo 1,122.
16. The cedula of appointment on November 2, 1567,
is found, among other places, in A.G.I. Contadurla 454, No.
3, Menendez* arrangement to receive the Royal fifth of all
prizes as well as his usual share is discussed in a cedula
to the Casa sent from El Escorial on November 5, 1570;
from A.G.I. Santo Domingo 24.
17. The embargo is described by the Casa officials
in a letter to the King dated at Seville on December 24,
1567, and found in A.G.I. Contatacion 5,167.
18. The income of the encomienda was at least 200
ducats per year, for Menendez later pledged that sum from
the revenues of Santa Cruz to Hernando de Miranda as part
dowry for his daughter Catalina. See the dower agreement
dated at Aviles on March 27, 1574, from A.G.I. Escribania
de Camara 153-A.
19. See Crown to Casa, Madrid, October 6, 1567, from
A.G.I. Indiferente General 1,220. The shallop tonnage change
is from a Royal letter to Pedro Menendez dated at Madrid
on t he same day, from A.G.I. Indiferente General 2,67 3.
The dispatch of the galleon is described in a communication
dated May 15, 1568, from A.G.I. Indiferente General 1,220.
20. The sentence is from A.G.I. Escribanfa de C^ara
1,024-A, and is dated at Madrid on February 9, 1568.
21. The poder of Pedro Menendez to Diego de Valdes is
found in A.C.R. , legajo 2, No. 3, A7a (microfilm, P. K,
Yonge Library of Florida History). It bears the date "1568."
The me reed of 10,000 ducats was granted on April 11, 1568,
by a cedula in A.G.I. Indiferente General 1,967 (Stetson
Collection) .
22. Persuaded by Menendez, the King wrote the Royal
Officials of Havana from Madrid on February 2, 1568, and
asked them to itemize the cost to Pedro Menendez of the
supplies he had shipped to Florida from Havema. This letter
is from A.G.I. Contadurf a 1,174.
23. The Baron Fourquevaux advised Charles IX that
Menendez was to leave in the winter of 1567-1568 with 1,500
young married men emd their families to make a massive
effort to settle Florida. The letter was dated at Madrid on
September 12, 1567, and was reprinted in "Lettres et Papiers
d'etat de Fourquevaux," in Gaffarel, La Floride Frangaise, p.
452. *
378
24. Menendez describes the agreement with Perez in
his letter to the King from St. Augustine dated October 20,
1566, from A.G.I. Satnto Domingo 115 (Stetson Collection),
The rupture with Perez is evident in the letter Perez wrote
on November 28, 1567, from Scinto Domingo to the King,
castigating Menendez for selling Royal property and accusing
the Adelantado of attempting to ruin him. The letter is
from A.G.I. Santo Domingo 71 (Stetson Collection).
25. See Pedro Menendez to Crown, St. Augustine,
October 20, 1566, A.G.I. Santo Domingo 115 (Stetson Collec-
tion) for the Adelantado *s plan for the settlers emd his
arrauigement for them.
26. The collection of the settlers from Toledo in
early 1568 is described in material found with an order of
July 26, 1568, before the Casa representative in CSdiz,
from A.G.I. Indiferente General 1,220.
27. The Royal orders were sent to the Casa on August
13, 28 cind 30 of 1567; Philip II sent the Menendez Memorial
of September 21 with another dispatch to Seville on October
1, 1567, and sent yet another letter there on October 15,
1567. These are from A.G.I. Contratacion 5,012 (Stetson
Collection) . Other letters from the King to the Casa were
sent on November 3, 4, and 18; these are in A.G.I. Indiferente
General 1,967 (Stetson Collection).
28. The "Casa de Contratacion acknowledged the King's
order authorizing the Indians to sail on the relief ships in
a letter sent from Seville on February 17, 1568, from A.G.I.
Contratacion 5,16 8. From the same legajo, on March 4, 1568,
the approval for the passage of Miranda and "Pedro de Ba-
cortoqui — the Vizcaino who came with the Indians" was given.
Payment of freight for the Indians and their interpreter is
listed in A.G.I. Contaduria 299; 53: 2 and 53: 2 vto.
Dr. Zayas later wrote a letter (from Seville, August 29,
1569) to the Crown telling of his voyage on one of the ureas
of 1568. His letter is from A.G.I. Indiferente General
1,221.
29. Menendez' influence in obtaining the Royal letters
of authorization for the missionaries was mentioned in a
letter from Geronimo Ruiz del Portillo to Francisco de Morja,
now General of the Jesuit Order. The letter, dated September
25, 1567, has been reprinted in Zubillaga, Monumenta An-
tiquae Floridae, 204-205.
30. Both points of view are expressed in a letter from
Pedro de Saavedra to the General of the Order, written from
Madrid on October 10, 1567, and reprinted in Zubillaga,
Monumenta Antiquae Floridae, 206-207.
379
31. The Men^ndez visit is detailed in a third-person
narrative entitled "Anonymous Relation of a visit which
Pedro Men^ndez made to the Florida Missionaries in Spain,"
dated December 16, 1567, and reprinted in Zubillaga, Monu-
menta Antiquae Floridae, 214-218,
32. Pedro Menendez de Aviles to Francisco de Borja,
Madrid, Jemuary 18, 1568, in Ziobillaga, Monumenta Antiquae
Floridae, 228-234.
33. The baptism is described by Felix Zubillaga in
La Florida, p. 313.
34. The departure is mentioned in a letter from Gon-
zalo de Alamo to Francisco de Borja, sent from Havana on
November 17, 1568, and reprinted in Zubillaga, Monumenta
Antiquae Floridae, 349. Crown costs for the ureas are
summarized in A.G.I. Contaduria 299, No. 2, 533; No. 5-B,
11-2. The writer is indebted to Dr. Paul E. Hoffman for
this citation.
^35. The date of arrival is given by Father Antonio
Sedeno in a letter to Francisco Borja dated at Havana
November 17, 1568; in Zubillaga, Monumenta Antiquae Floridae,
351. The order of Gonzalo Gayon to Martin de Argiielles,
Alcalde, is dated at St. Augustine June 22, 1568, from A.G.I.
Contratacion 58.
36. Francisco Lopez de Mendoza Grajales recounts the
mutiny in his letter to Pedro Menendez, written from St.
Augustine on August 6, 1567, and reprinted in Lawson,
"Letters of Menendez," II, 328-332. The hanging of one of
the mutineers, Alonso Lopes de Yepes on June 1, 1567, is
mentioned in a marginal note opposite his name on the ration
list for 1566-67 in A.G.I. Contaduria 941 (microfilm, P. K.
Yonge Library of Florida History).
37. The Andrada expedition is recounted briefly by
Chaplain Mendoza Grajales in his August 7, 1567, letter;
see n. 36 supra. The death of the Captain and his men b
mentioned in the ration list marginal comments in A.G.I.
Contaduria 941. In 1569, Andrada's wife. Dona Constanza,
received a 500-ducat me reed from the King after pleading her
case before the Council of the Indies. The matter was heard
before the Council in Madrid on January 27, 1569, and the
case is from A.G.I. Indiferente General 1,220.
38. The basic source for the De Gourgues expedition
is "La Reprinse de la Floride par le captaine Gourgues,"
published in translation (Jeannette Thurber Connor) and
reprinted in Charles E. Bennett in Settlement of Florida
(Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1968), pp. 202-
380
226. According to the narrative, the Frenchmen left Europe
on August 22, 1567, and reached Florida by way of Dominica,
Puerto Rico and Scmto Domingo.
39. The first Spanish description of the De Gourgues
raid is a report from Esteban de las Alas , prob2±>ly addressed
to Juan de Hinestrosa in Havana, and dated May 9, 156 8, at
St. Augustine. It is from A.G.I. Patronato 254, No. 2, ramo
1 (Stetson Collection), and is mis-dated 1569 on the cover
sheet. The loss of San Mateo is narrated at length in the
body of the legal case against the Spanish soldiers charged
with its loss. This is from A.G.I. Justicia 998 (Stetson
Collection) .
40. Juan Rogel describes the death of Chief Carlos
and events at Tacobaga and Tequesta in a letter to Geronimo
Ruiz del Portillo dated at Havana April 25, 156 8, and re-
printed in Zubillaga, Monumenta Antiquae Floridae, 274-
311.
41. The religious differences between Philip and
Father Rogel are outlined in the priest's letter to Geronimo
Ruiz del Portillo, cited in n. 40 supra.
42. See Brother Villareal's letter to Juan Rogel,
dated at Tequesta on January 23, 1568, from Zubillaga,
Monumenta Antiquae Floridae, 235-240.
43. The voyage to Tocobaga and the subsequent flight
of the Spanish from Tequesta is discussed by Rogel in a
letter to Geronimo Ruiz del Portillo dated at Havana on
April 25, 1568, in Zubillaga, Monumenta Antiquae Floridae,
274-311. Menendez Marquiz and other^witnesses testified
to events at the two missions in "Danos de los Indios de
la Florida," in A.G.I. Patronato 257, No. 3, ramo 20 (Stet-
son Collection) .
44. The second Pardo journey inland evidently endured
from September 1, 1567, to March, 1568. The account which
has survived is that taken by Juan de la Vandera at Santa
Elena on January 23, 1569. The writer found a copy of this
in A.G.I. Contratacion 58. It has been reprinted by Ruidiaz,
La Florida, II, 465-473, and by Lawson in "Letters of Menen-
dez," II, 345-351. The deaths of several of the soldiers
left in the inland forts are mentioned in the 1566-67
ration list in A.G.I. Contadurfa 941 (microfilm, P. K.
Yonge Library of Florida History) , fol. 5-9 vto.
45. Juan Rogel to Framcisco de Borja, Havana, July 25,
1568; in Zubillaga, Monumenta Antiquae Floridae, 317-328.
381
46. The Adelantado describes his preoccupation with the
construction of the Guard Fleet Galibrazas in his letter to
the King from Santander on May 12, 1568; from Lawson,
•Letters of Menendez," II, 336-345.
47. A Jamuary dispute over the dispatch of a galleon
w£is heard before Antonio de Abalia in cSdiz on May 15, 1568;
this is from A.G.I. Indiferente General 1,220.
48. Calculation of the pay due each man was made in
A.G.I. Contaduria 310-B. The payment of Sancho de Archiniega
is listed in A.G.I. Contaduria 299; 12: 7. The payment of
Gonzalo de Gay6n and the other pilots was recorded in the
same legajo at 38: 4 and 2.
49. The cedula is dated February 2, 1568 at Madrid,
and is found in A.G.I. Contaduria 54 8.
50. See the letter from Hernan Perez to the King sent
from Santo Domingo on November 28, 1567, and from A.G.I.
Santo Domingo 71 (Stetson Collection) .
51. Esquivel's appointment was dated at Madrid on
May 23, 1568, and is from A.G.I. Indiferente General 1,220.
The Adelantado complained of the removal of his own people
from their offices in his letter to Philip II dated at
Santander on May 12, 1568, and reprinted in Lawson, "Letters
of Menendez," II, 336-345.
52. Pedro del Castillo, in attempting to load the
shallop Nuestra Senora de la Consolacion and a caravel to
carry the settlers and supplies to Florida, ran into opposi-
tion from Antonio de Abalia, representative of the Casa in
Cadiz. Abalia swore that many Portuguese people were
illegally aboard the ships. See "Informacion ante Abalia,"
Cadiz, July 26, 156 8, from A.G.I. Indiferente General
2,673. Pedro Menendez discussed the dispute and complained
to the King about Abalia in a letter, n.d. (August, 1568),
from the same legajo. The Casa alleged that the actions
of Abalia had been justified because the term of Menendez'
asiento had expired; the King referred to this charge and
ordered that the Casa let the ships and settlers go, in his
letter to Seville sent from El Escorial on August 22, 1568,
from A.G.I. Indiferente General 1,967.
53. The King admitted that Menendez had carried
Portuguese on his vessels, but extended the Adelantado 's
trade privileges and ordered that the violations be over-
looked. This is contained in a letter from Philip II to
Abalia, sent from El Pardo on August 17, 1568, and found in
A.G.I. Indiferente General 1,967. A copy is also in A.G.I.
Indiferente General 2,673.
382
54. The cedula of July 15, 1568, is cited emd sum-
marized in a later Royal order of June 17, 1570, found in
A.G.I. Contadurfa 548.
APPENDICES
APPENDIX I
"Agreement between Dr. Vazquez of the Council in the
name of the King, with Pedro Menendez de Aviles,"
March 15, 1565.
— A.G.I. Patronato 257, No. 3, ramo 3.
in Stetson Collection, P. K. Yonge
Library of Florida History,
University of Florida.
That «diich is agreed between Dr. Vazquez of the Council of
His Majesty and in his name as party of the first part and
Pedro Menendez de Aviles, Caballero of the Order of Santiago
of the other is as follows:
First, that the said Pedro Menendez obliges himself that
within the coming month of May, he will have ready and
equipped to sail in SemliScar de Barrameda or Puerto de Santa
Maria or Cadiz, to go with the first (good) weather, six
shallops, each one of fifty tons, more or less, and four
fast zabras, with their oars, artillery, arms and mxinitions,
loaded with supplies cind put in condition for war.
Item — He will carry five hundred men, one hundred farmers,
one hundred sailors and the rest men and officers of sea
and wair, and among these there will be at least two clerics
and other persons, skilled in stonecutting, Ccirpentry, and
384
385
farriers, blacksmiths and surgeons, all with their arms,
arquebuses, crossbows, helmets and shields and with the
other offensive smd defensive arms that might seem fitting
for the expedition.
Item — He will have ready within the same time-period his
galleon named San Pelayo, which is of more than six hundred
tons, new from its first voyage, which he will load emd
freight for euiy part of the Indies which he might wish.
One-half or two-thirds of the cargo he may carry and the
rest should be left vacant in order to carry in it up to
three hundred men of the said five hundred, and some food
and supplies which might be needed, as far as Dominica or
Cape Tiburdn or San Antonio, as he might deem best (which
is seventy leagues from Havana, more or less, and about the
same distance from Florida) , because the said shallops
cannot carry the said people, since they are small ships and
not covered. They would sicken and die with too much sun
and the heavy rain-squalls which there are in the said
parts. Neither Ccui they carry the supplies which are needed
for these people for such a long journey. Having arrived
as it has been said, at Dominica or some other place which
seems best to him, he will tremsfer the people from the
said galleon to the said shallops and the said galleon will
go on its voyage. He (will go) with the said shallops and
zabras, with the said five hundred men, supplied and prepared
38S
for war, as has been stated, to the Coast of Florida.
There he is obliged to see and discover places which seem to
him the best and most commodious, sailing along the coasts
by sea and discovering and investigating by land, seeking
the best site for a port and settlement and arranging to
seek information. If there are on the said coast or land
some corsair settlers or any other nations not subject to
His Majesty, arrange to throw them out by the best means
possible, which seem best to him. Take the lemd of the said
Florida for His Majesty and in his royal name, attempting
to bring its natives to the obedience of His Majesty. He
will explore from the Ancones and bay of St. Joseph, which
is in the western region of Florida to the Cabeza de los
Mar tires, which are in twenty-five degrees, and from there
to Terranova, which is at fifty to sixty degrees of east-
west, and all the coast north-south, to see and discover
the ports and currents, rocks, shoals and inlets which
might be in the said coast, marking and noting them as
precisely as he can by their latitudes and bearings, in
order that the secret of the coast and ports which are in
it might be known and understood. This year he will do
what he can and the rest within the three years for which
he is obligated in this said asiento, and of all he shall
bring testimony.
387
Item — He shall carry the necessary supplies for the said
expedition for the five hundred men for one year, which year
shall be counted from (the time) when the people are in the
ships r ready to depart.
Item — That from the day when he sets sail, in the three
years immediately following, he will put into the said
coast and land of Florida up to five hundred men who might
be settlers in it, of which two hundred shall be married
cuid at least one hundred and the rest shall be farmers and
officials, so that the land may be cultivated with more
ease. They shall be religiously clean, and not of the pro-
hibited (ones).
Item — With the said people, he shall build and populate in
the said three years two or three towns in the places and
ports which seem to him the best. In each one (there shall
be) at least one hundred vecinos, and there should be in
each one one great house of stone, adobe or wood, in ac-
cordance with the fitness and disposition of the land.
(Each should have) its moat and draw-bridge, as strong as
it could be made in accordance with the weather and lay of
the land. Thus, if it be necessary, the vecinos could be
gathered within it amd sheltered from the dangers which
might threaten from Indians, corsairs or other people.
388
Item — He will place, within the said time, among the number
of the said people that he is obliged to bring at least ten
or twelve religious of the order which seems best to him —
persons who might be of good life emd exaunple. (He shall
bring) four others of the Society of Jesus, in order that
the preaching of the Gospel might teJce place in t he said
lemd, and in order that the Indias might be converted to our
Holy Catholic faith amd to the obedience of His Majesty.
Item — He shall place, within the said time, in the said
lemd, one hundred horses cind mares, two hundred calves,
four hundred hogs, four hvindred sheep, some goats and all
the other livestock which seems fitting to him.
Item — He shall endeavor, in every way possible to carry
out the said discovery and conquest in all peace, friendship
and Christianity. The governing of the people in his charge
shall be accomplished through Christian treatment, insofar
as he can provide it, so that, in all things. Our Lord
and His Majesty might be served, conforming to the instruc-
tions which might be given to him, which is that which is
usually given to those who go to make similar settlements.
Item — He shall attempt to place, within the said three
years, five hundred slaves for his service and for that of
the people, in order that the towns might be built with
more facility and the land might be cultivated. (They
389
shall) plant sugar cane for the sugar-works which shall be
made, and to build the said sugar-works.
Item — Since, upon the coasts of Vizcaya, Asturias and Galicia
there are shallops and zabras more serviceaible than those of
Andalucia and the same applies to skilled carpenters, black-
smiths, stone-cutters, and farmers, it is understood that the
part of this armada and people which depart from those
places may go directly to the Canary Islands without coming
to the city of Sanliacar or to C^diz, being first visited
before the Justice or person whom His Majesty might name in
the port.
Item — It is agreed that the said armada which he must taike
out (as has been said) must first be visited by one of the
officials, in accordance with the customary regulation,
in order to see if he goes with the order (perscribed by)
and in compliance with the said asiento.
Item — He must give valid and sufficient bond that he will
return to His Majesty 15,000 ducats of which he has made him
me reed, if he is not prepared to sail with the first favor-
able weather by the end of May, emd if he does not have
readied all which he is obliged to carry for the said period
of time, in conformity with this asiento. He shall give the
bond in this Court or in the city of Seville, with submission
to the royal Council of the Indies and to the other Justices
of His Majesty.
390
In order to aid in the great expenses and labors which the
said Pedro Menendez must undergo in the discovery and settle-
ment, that which is offered on behalf of His Majesty is as
follows:
First, that there must at present be given cuid paid to him
15,000 ducats.
Item — That His Majesty must give authority to the said
Pedro Menendez so that he might be able to give reparta-
mientos to the said settlers of lemds and estates in the
said land for their plantations , farms and livestock-
breeding, in accordance with the qualifications of each and
what seems best to him, without prejudice to the Indians.
Item — That His Majesty must give him five hundred slave
licenses, free of all duties, with which they might be
enabled to be taken to the said land, registered for it
and for no other place.
Item — That he must be given the title of Governor and Captain-
General of the said coast and laund of Florida for all his
life and for that of a son or son-in-law, with 2,000 ducats
of salary, which he must have from the benefices emd profits
of His Majesty coming from the said land, and in no other
manner.
391
Item — That he must be given the title of adelantado of the
said land, for himself and for his heirs in perpetuity.
Item — If His Majesty establishes an Audiencia Real in the
said territory, he must be given the title of Alguacil Mayor
of the said Audiencia for himself cind his heirs and succes-
sors in perpetuity.
Item — That His Majesty gives him in the said land, for him-
self and for his heirs in perpetuity, twenty-five square
leagues in one or two locations (as he might wish it) , which
may be good land and in a place which might seem good to
him — conveniently located, without prejudice to the Indians.
With regard to the title of Marquis of the said land, which
he asks be given to him, it is agreed that, the expedition
being finished, and that which is contained in the as i en to
being complied with. His Majesty may make him the me reed
which would be fitting, in conformity with his services.
Item — Of fifteen parts, he must be given one of all the
profits of mines, gold and silver, precious stones, pearls
and benefices which His Majesty might have in the said lands
euid provinces perpetually, for himself and for his heirs and
successors, from which it is understood that the costs have
been taken.
Item — He must be given two fisheries which he may select,
one of pearls and the other of fish, for himself cind for his
heirs 2uid successors in perpetuity.
392
Item — In the first ten years, the vecinos amd settlers of
the said land of Florida will not pay any almojarifazgo on
the necessary supplies and provisions for their persons cmd
houses.
Item — In the Scd.d first ten years. Bis Majesty need not be
paid more tham one-tenth of the gold amd silver, pearls and
(precioxis) stones which might be found amd discovered in
the said land, which said ten years shall begin to be
counted from the day when the first smelting is done.
Item — That, when the said Pedro Men^ndez absents himself
from the said land, he may name and leave a deputy (who
shall have in everything the same authority as himself) for
as long as he wishes in order to come to these kingdoms
and navigate in the Indies; this deputy whom he may name
should be one who has the necessary qualities for the post.
Item — That in all the said three years that he must comply
with this asiento, he need not pay any duties of almojari-
fazgo or of the galleys, or of auiy other things, whether
of impositions upon ships or supplies, of arms or munitions,
of bcLTter with the Indians nor of any kind of good or drink.
For all the above, he does not have to pay anything, as has
been saiid; it is understood that this refers to items which
are caurried for Florida.
393
Item — That froa the day he departs from these kingdoms, he
may bring in the Indies navigation in emy one year for a
term of six years, two galleons of five to six hundred tons
and two pataches of from one hundred fifty to two hundred
tons, armed and equipped with artillery. They may sail as
merchcmt or arzzada ships, within or outside of fleets, as
might seem best to him. He may send them to any part or
parts of the Indies which he might wish, together or singly,
but they Ceuinot go loaded with any merchandise except food
emd drink. Of the goods vrtiich he may carry and bring, cmd
freight-revenues, and of the ships, he may not be required
to pay averia for any armada or for galleys; this benefit
is given him in aid of the costs and labors which he must
experience in the said settlement and provision of it. Upon
return from the Indies, he may bring (emy) merchandise %rtiich
he wishes free of averias, as it has been said, but he may
not bring gold or silver, pearls or precious stones, except
monies which belong to him cind may be his own, and that which
comes from freight- revenues from the galleons and pataches,
of vrtiich he does not have to pay averia as it has been said.
Item — That for the period of six years, he may teike frcan
these kingdoms and from any part of them to the islands of
Puerto Rico, Santo Domingo, Cuba and to Florida, and from
those parts to these, six shallops and four zabras. (These
may) sail together or singly, within or outside of fleets
391
for the trade and commerce of the said Florida emd to comply
with the said asiento, and to carry there what seems best to
hitt and may be needed for the people who may be in the said
Florida. If he might wish to discharge some goods of eating
and drinking which the said shallops and zabras carry in the
said islands, he may do it, so that in place of those goods
they may load livestock and things necessary for the said
Florida. If some shallop or zabra should be left in those
parts or might be lost, he may bring others in its place.
The said six yeaurs must r\in from the month of June, 1566.
The masters and pilots who go in these ships must be natives,
but may serve as masters and pilots even though they may
not have been examined.
Item — That all (the ships) which he might take with the
galleons, zabras and pataches during the time of the said
six yeaurs from the corsairs should be his or his heirs ' .
Also, whatever prize might be taken from them — all the above
to be without prejudice to the tercio (one-third Crown in-
terest) .
Item— It is agreed that, during the said six-year term, no-
one may in any detain or embargo for His Majesty's service
any of the said galleons, pataches, shallops or zabras, in
these Icingdoms or in the Indies. If for some urgent and
necessary reason any of the said ships may be embargoed, he
395
may put others in their places, of the same tonnage. As long
as the said six years might not have passed, he may bring
them, in conformity with this said asiento all of the time
for which they have been detetined or embargoed. The offi-
cials of the Casa de Contratacion of Seville or of Cadiz, or
any other justices of these kingdoms or of the Indies where
the said ships might arrive shall give him all favor for the
rapid and good dispatch of them. They shall give the regis-
tries with all brevity, in order that they shall not be
detained; they shall give all favor and aid to the captains
and officials who sail in them.
Item — If God should carry off the said Pedro Menlndez before
the end of the said three years in such a manner that he
might not have been able to comply with his part of that
which is contained in this said capitulaci6n, that the person
whom he shall name and designate may comply with it. In
the event that no such person has been named, the person who
inherits his estate may comply with it in order to enjoy
all the me r cedes contained in this said capitulacion.
Item — That these said shallops and zabras which are to go
during the said six years, as has been said, do not have to
pay any averias on what they carry for the first time, when
theyleave on their voyage to Florida. When, however, during
the said six-year term, they bring things from the said
Florida or the islsmds, or if they take some things from
396
this kindom (whether supplies of food and drink or other
necessary things for the said Florida) , in such case they
must pay the averias^ which are divided up for the galleys
which cruise this coast of the west of Spain, of which Don
Alvaro de BazHn is Captain-General. They must also pay the
aver X as of the armada which goes to the Indies, if the said
shallops and zabras go in convoy with them. If, however,
the shallops and zabras navigate by themselves, and do not
go in convoy with the said armada which goes to the Indies,
they do not have to pay the averia of the said armada which
goes to the Indies.
Item — With regard to the notaries public who must be carried
(cdaoard ship) — insofar as the two galleons and the two
pataches are concerned, the regulation shall be observed.
Insofar as the six shallops and four zabras are concerned,
however, for all of them together there shall not be named
for His Majesty more than one notary, in consideration of
the fact that they are the ships of the said Pedro Men^ndez
and that he must bear the cost personally of all the arms,
artillery, munitions, supplies and other things which they
carry and must carry. They are, moreover, small ships and
of small cargo, and for each one to carry its own notary
public would cost him very much.
397
Item — His Majesty must give him the title of Captain-General,
in proper form, of this entire armada and the ships and
people who go in it.
Item — Let all the above be given to the said Pedro Menendez —
the titles, cedulas and provisions in the necessary form for
that which has been given above with the favor which befits
its, and of this asiento in order that one (copy) might
remain in the possession of His Majesty and he shall carry
the other one. Done in the town of Madrid, March 15, 1565.
(rubrica) (rubrica)
Dr. Vazquez P" Menendez
398
APPENDIX II - A COMPARISON OF PROVISIONS OF VARIOUS SIXTEENTH-CENTURY ASIENTOS
Lucas V. de
Panfilo de
Hernando de Soto
Lucas V. de
Ay lion
Narvaez
Florida
Ayllon
Itea
Florida
Florida
April, 1537
Florida
June, 1523
December,
1526
June, 1563
Stated purpose
"Populate
Populate
"Conquer, pacify
"Population
of the effort
the land
and
euid populate 200
conversion and
and build
Christian-
leagues of
instruction of
forts."
ize.
coast."
naturales."
Required effort
"Arm ships
Build
Take 500 men
Take three
and duration
at your
three
with supplies for
caravels and
own cost."
forts.
Put in 200
men in two
sites in
one year;
bring
horses ,
other live-
stock from
Hispaniola,
Puerto
Rico, Cuba.
18 months.
250 men (100
married) 6
months' sup-
plies, 8
Dominicans,
100 calves,
100 horses/
mares; 200
sheep. Plamt
sugar cane,
cana fistula,
vines and
olives. 3,000
ducat perform-
amce bond.
Required
-Build
Found
Build "three
Build two towns.
founding of
forts."
three
stone forts
towns and
forts
at own ex-
forts
pense."
Governmental
Generatl
General
General govern-
General govern-
powers;
govern-
government;
ment; military
ment; military
duration
ment;
military
authority;
authority;
1 life
authority;
1 life
1 life
1 life
399
Pedro Menendez de Avil^s
Captain Pedro da
Juan Ortiz de
Diego de
Florida
Silva
ZXrate
Artiega
March, 1565
Omagua
Rio de la Plata
Costa Rica
October, 1568
July, 1569
December,
1573
Conversion of the Indi-
"Discovery, con-
"Discover and
ans to the holy Faith;
quest and popu-
populate at
conquest, exploration
lation; pacify
your cost."
and population.
the Indians."
Take, with one year's
Take 500 men.
Take four ships
Must spend
supplies, 500 men, of
or which 400
at his cost;
20,000 ducats;
which 100 farmers, 100
men of war
500 men, of
eucm three ships
sailors and rest skilled
cind 100 farmers;
which 200 farm-
of about 400
men-of-war. Must, with-
four ships, six
ers and skilled
tons, "well-
in three years, place a
clerics.
men; 4,000 cows;
provisioned,"
total of 500 settlers.
4,000 sheep; 500
with 200 men.
including skilled trades-
goats; 300 mares
100 of whom
men. 10-12 religious
and horses.
married, with
and four add. Jesuits.
supplies for
100 horses, mares; 200
one year. Must
calves; 400 hogs; 400
go with fleet.
sheep. Take galeass
Survey and dis-
San Pelayo.
cover. 1,000
cows; 1,500
sheep; 500 hogs
and goats; 100
horses and
mares. 10,000-
ducat perform-
ance bond.
Establish two or
Found one or
Build forts
three fortified
t*ro Spanish
in three sites.
towns.
towns; build
three stone
forts.
General government-
General govern-
General govem-
2 lives
ment- 2 lives
ment-2 lives
Military authority-
Military author-
Military author-
2 lives
ity-apparently
1 life
ity-2 lives
400
APPENDIX II (continued)
Lucas V. de
Panfilo de
Hern2mdo de Soto
Lucas V. de
Ayllon
Narvaez
Florida
Ayllon
Item
Florida
Florida
April, 1537
Florida
June, 1523
December,
1526
June, 1563
Titles and
Adelantado
Govemor-
Adelantado
Governor-
Adelantado
Adelantado
offices
Governor-
Governor-
promised
1 life
1 life
1 life
1 life
Alguacil
Capt.-Gen.-
Capt.-Gen.-
Capt.-Gen.-
Lieut. -
1 life
1 life
1 life
fort
Alguacil
Governor /Cuba
Alguacil
Mayor-per-
1 Fort lieut.
Mayor
petual
3 Fort
cmdrs.
Salaries
Governor-
Govemor-
Governor-
Govemor-
365,000
150,000
1,500 ducats
1,000 ducats.
mcuravedis.
maravedis.
salary; 500
Lieut. -
Fort Cmdr.-
ducats ayuda de
100,000
70,000
costa; Lieut. -
mciravedis.
maravedis.
100,00
maravedis.
Tax Exexap-
No almo-
No almo-
No royal pay-
No almojari-
tions; their
jarifazgo-
jarifazgo-
ments on gold;
fazgo 10 yrs.;
duration.
1 life.
1 life on
6 yrs . ; no almo-
Florida ma-
No diezmo
of precious
metals or
Florida
materials;
for vecinos.
jarifazgo for
terials;
vecinos, 6 yrs;
puinto reduced
pay 50% on items
to 10% for 10
other
5 yrs.
from sepulchers;
yrs.
duties.
Quinto re-
duced to
10%, 3 yrs.
No salt
tax, 5
yrs.
keep 5/6 Indian
loot.
Land-grants
15 leagues
10 leagues.
12 leagues.
15 leagues.
and land-
squared-
squared.
squared .
squared; may
privileges
can "divide
lands and
waters."
"divide lamds
and estates."
401
Pedro Menendez de Aviles
Florida
March, 1565
Captain Pedro de
Silva
Omagua
October, 1568
Juan Ortiz de
Zarate
Rio de la Plata
July, 1569
Deigo de
Artiega
Costa Rica
December,
1573
Adelantado, perpetxial
Govemor/Capt . -Gen. -
2 lives
Alguacil Mayor, per-
petual Marquis
Adelantado, per-
petual
Govemor-2 lives
Capt.-Gen. amd
Justicia Mayor-
app. 1 life.
Lieut. -3 forts
Marquis
Govemor-2 lives
Capt.-Gen. -2
lives
Alguacil Mayor-
2 lives
Lieut. -3 forts.
Govemor-2,000
ducats, from profits
Governor-2,000
ducats; Fort
Lt., 100,000
mauravedis .
Governor-2,000
ducats; from
profits.
No alrooiarifazqo for all
in Florida; 10 yrs.
Quinto reduece to 10% for
10 yrs. after 1st smelt.
No averia-larger ships,
or smaller if out of
No alcabala-
20 yrs.
No almojari-
fazgo-10 yrs.
For Artiega,
no almojari-
fazgo on first
voyage . For
settlers, no
almojarifazgo
fleets.
No almojarifazgo for
Menendez for 3 yrs.;
or alcabala
for 20 yrs.
25 leagues squared; may
"divide lands and
estates."
402
APPENDIX II (continued)
Item
Lucas V. de
Ayllon
Florida
June, 1523
Panfilo de
Sarvaez
Florida
December,
1526
Hernando de Soto
Florida
April, 1537
Lucas V. de
Ayllon
Florida
June, 1563
Trade
Privileges
Six-year
monopoly
on Florida
trade.
Encomienda,
repart amiento ,
"No en-
comienda."
"You may make
encomiendas . "
No encomiendas
and Indian
tribute
•
Slave
liceiises
50, free of
duties; later
50 more
8, pay duties.
Other Eco-
nomic
Privileges
1/15 of prof-
its; 500-du-
cat subsidy
to ratise silk
2 fisheries.
4% of royal
profits, in
perpetuity.
1/15 of profits.
500-ducats in
juros; 2 fisher-
ies; use Indian
tribute for pensions.
Royal aid
promised
500-ducat
silk subsidy.
Citation of
A.G.I. Indif-
tarente Gen-
A.G.I. Indif-
A.G.I. Indif-
erente Gen-
A.G.I. Contra-
asiento
erente Gen-
tacion 3,309.
eral 415.
eral 415 and
Coatrataci6n
3.309 D.I.,
vni, 224-
245.
eral 415.
403
Pedro Menendez de Aviles
Florida
March, 1565
Captain Pedro de
Silva
Ooagxia
October, 1568
Juan Ortir de
Zarate
Rio de la Plata
July, 1569
Diego de
Artiega
Costa Rica
December ,
1573
License for two galleons,
two pataches; 6 yrs. in
Indies trade; only slight
averia; out-of-fleet priv.
License six shallops, four
rabras, 6 yrs. after con-
quest yeaur; tied loosely
to Florida; no escribamos
each vessel; out-of-fleet
privilege.
Two ships a
year licensed,
free of almo-
jarifazgo.
Two ship
licenses to
Costa Rica
and to other
paurts for
Costa Rica
provisions.
No mention in asiento;
refers to Ordenanzas.
One repairta-
miento
May grant two-
life encomien-
das in country;
three-life in
new cities.
Two-life
repartamientos.
500, free of all duties
100
20
1/15 of profits, per-
petual. Two fisheries,
one of fish and one or
pearls.
Two
fisheries
15.000 ducat merced,
if sailed prior
May 31, 1565.
See Chapter 5, supra,
footnote 1.
A.G.I. Indif-
erente General
A.G.I. Indif-
erente General
415
A.G.I. Indif-
erente General
1,220.
415.
404
APPENDIX III— GENEALOGY OF THE ENTERPRISE OF FLORIDA
NENENDEZ
Juan Alfonso
Sanchez de
Aviles
MARQUE
Berenguela Alvaro
de -M- Sclnchez de
Vald^s I Aviles
I 1 \
•Pedro *Pedro
Men^ndez *Alonso Menendez
el mozo Menendez Marqu^z
V E L A S C O
*Diego de
Velasco
M-
Maria
Menendez
Marquesa
de
Valdes
■M- 2nd Marriage
F L O R E S
♦Diego
Flores
Catalina
Menendez y ^„_
Marquez ~ ~ Valdes
A R A N G O
405
-M-
L
Maria
Alonso de
Arcmgo
SOLIS
I ~
♦Bartolome
Menendez
^Pedro
Menendez „
de Avil^s Soils
Maria *Gonzalo
de Soils
de Meris
Juan
Menendez
Sor Maria
Menendez
VALDES
LA BANDERA
Jucm Maria de
de „ Valdes y *
Vald^sy LaBandera
^^ -M-
Menendez Valdes
2nd Marriage
-M-
DE LAS ALAS
Hernando
De las Alas
KEY:
M = Marriage
* = Official in the Enterprise of
Florida
- » Connection not fully known
406
APPENDIX IV— CROWN COSTS IN THE CADIZ EXPEDITION, 1565
Supplies and Munitions 17,381 ducats
Merced paid to the Adelantado 15,000
Payment to Pedro Menendez in recompense
for loss of Tierra Firme voyage 2,000
Payment to Pedro Menendez on account of
sueldo, 1562-1563 ships 3,000
Total 3 7,381 ducats
Sources: A.G.I. Contrataci6n 4,989-A
A.G.I. Contrataci6n 4,680
A.G.I. Contratacion 5,167
A.G.I. Contaduria 310-B
407
APPENDIX V — ESTIMATED COSTS OF PEDRO MEN^NDEZ DE AVILfS IN
THE 1565 FLORIDA EXPEDITIONS
Supplies and Munitions Purchased
Cidiz
"IT, 000
ducats
Avil^s
5,000
Scuitcmder
2,800
Gij6n
2,200
C^diz (Luna ship)
50
600 Arquebuses
1,070
Subtotal
25,120
ducats
Pay Advances
Officers and Mariners
Cadiz
1,460
ducats
North Coast
250
Soldiers
Cidiz
1,984
Avil^s
1,000
Gijdn
268
Santander
400
Subtotal
5,362
ducats
Ship Purchase and Charter; outfitting
ducats
Purchase three
13,000
small craft;
two ships
San Pelayo work
4,000
Charter San Antonio
3,000
Charter two
250
caravels
Charter Virtudes
85
Subtotal
TOTAL
20,335
50 ; 817
ducats
ducats
Sources: A.G.I. Escribania de Camara 1,024-A
A.G.I. Contratacion 5,167
A.G.I. Contaduria 310-B
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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH
Eugene Lyon was born in Miami, Florida, on April 9,
1929, and educated there. After obtaining a B.A, in
Political Science from the University of Florida in 1951,
he served in the Korean War as a naval quartermaster. After
he obtained the M.S. from the University of Denver in 1953,
he served eight years in the field of municipal administra-
tion. After some years, Lyon re-entered the- University of
Florida for graduate study in History. He is married to the
former Dorothy Mathews of Plymouth, Florida, and they have
four children. For sixteen years, the Lyons have resided in
Vero Beach.
426
I certify that I have read this study and that in my
opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly
presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality,
as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.
L. N. McAlister, Chairman
Professor of History
I certify that I have read this study and that in my
opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly
presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality,
as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.
■■^ -—
m K. Mcihon
>rofessor of History
I certify that I have read this study and that in my
opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly
presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality,
as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.
^^H-^^-^^^^.^fZj^^
Harry W. pS5i Z
Associate Professor of History
I certify that I have read this study and that in my
opinion it conforms to accepteible standards of scholarly
presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality,
as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.
Andre5„i>u«Te :
^^rofessor of /Latin American Studies,
''History and Political Science
I certify that I have read this study and that in my
opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly
presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality,
as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy,
/
Charles H, Fairbanks
Professor of Anthropology
This dissertation was submitted to the Department of
History in the College of Arts and Sciences euid to the
Graduate Council, and was accepted as partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy,
December, 1973
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