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*\o. \-2.5 

of the 
Taft-Hartley Act 


N I V E R S I 




In accord with the purposes of the University as a State-supported 
educational institution, the Institute of Labor and Industrial Relations 
aims at general education as well as at the special training indicated in 
its title. It seeks to serve all the people of the State by promoting gen- 
eral understanding of our social and economic problems, as well as by 
providing specific services to groups directly concerned with labor and 
industrial relations. 

This Bulletin series is designed to present periodically information 
and ideas on topics of current interest in labor and industrial relations. 
The presentation is non-technical and is designed for general, popular 
use. No effort is made to treat the topics exhaustively. 

Additional copies of this Bulletin are available. A charge of five 
cents a copy will be made, except that the first 10 copies will be fur- 
nished free of charge to individuals and groups in Illinois. Also 
available are copies of these other Institute Bulletins. 
Seniority and Job Security Collective Bargaining by Foremen 

The Conciliation Process Municipal Mediation Plans 

Assignment and Garnishment of Wages in Illinois 
Federal Court Decisions on Labor, 1947-48 
What Tests Can Do for Industry 

Plant-Protection Employees Under Current Federal Labor Legislation 
Agricultural Workers L^^nder National Labor Relations Laws 
Health Programs in Collective Bargaining 

Phillips Bradley Milton Derber 

Director Coordinator of Research 

Dorothy Dowell 



Volume 46; Number 72; June, 1949. Published seven times each month by the Univer- 
sity of Illinois. Entered as second-class matter December 11, 1912, at the post office at 
Urbana, Illinois, under the Act of August 24, 1912. Office of Publication, 358 Administration 
Building, Urbana, Illinois. 


By Alvix L. Park 


Hartlev Act is officially named, marked a drastic change in federal 
regulation of industrial relations. In the twelve years since the pas- 
sage of the preceding National Labor Relations Act, the NLRB 
and the courts had built up a body of interpretive decisions so that 
there was little doubt as to the real meaning of the law. There was 
an established ruling covering almost any union-management 

Passage of the Taft-Hartley Act, however, added new pro- 
visions and amendments to the original Wagner Act. This meant, 
of course, that the Act's real meaning would depend upon the inter- 
pretation of these provisions by the National Labor Relations 
Board and the courts. 

To some extent, interpretations under the Wagner ^Vct remained, 
to be modified to conform with the way in which the law, as written, 
was modified. For example, the Board relied on past decisions de- 
termining an employer's refusal to bargain in good faith, in deciding 
whether or not a union was bargaining in good faith under the pro- 
visions of the new Act. 

Recent actions in Congress indicate that the Taft-Hartley Act 
may be revised. As a result, some of the decisions described in this 
bulletin may no longer appl>'. But whate\er the future of the Act, 
these administrative rulings and court decisions have become 
history. Like previous rulings under the Wagner Act, they will 
serve as a precedent to be followed or changed as the Act remains 
the same or is rewritten. And since these rulings are an important 
part of the law in operation, they doubtless will be carefully con- 
sidered by the framers of new labor legislation. The record, then, 
is worth presenting. 

When the Taft-Hartley Act was passed, what it would mean, in 
use, was anybody's guess. And almost everyone concerned with in- 
dustrial relations guessed. This speculation resulted, in part, from 
the complicated nature of the Act. It is long. Its thirty i)ages of 
print are sprinkled with "sub-sections of sub-sections." and it was 
popularly referred to as the lawyers' dream. 

Some provisions were more hotly debated than others. These 
were union unfair labor practices, the use of injunctions, the repre- 
sentation and election procedures, the damage suit provisions, cover- 
age of the Act, constitutionality of the affidavit requirement, and 
the ban on political expenditures. 

The purpose of this bulletin is to discuss those provisions of the 
Act on which the NLRB and the courts have made important inter- 
pretations affecting the operation of the Act. This is not an attempt 
to analyze the entire statute. There have been many such explana- 
tions, most of which have dealt with the law as written rather than 
as interpreted by administrative and judicial bodies. (A brief sum- 
mary of the major provisions of the Act is contained in the ILIR 
Bulletin, "Federal Labor Legislation, 1947." A subsequent bulletin 
will deal with the effects of the law on employers, labor unions, and 
government practices in industrial relations.) 

This bulletin, which covers the period from the passage of the 
Act to the end of 1948, will not attempt to present all of the 
cases that have been handled by the Board and the courts. We will 
deal only with those cases in which real interpretive decisions of the 
law have been made. We will also mention, however, those pro- 
visions of the Act about which no definite pattern has as yet been 
established by administrative or legal action. 


The number of cases from which these few^ important decisions 
are taken has reached an impressive total. From August 22, 1947, 
the date v^^hen most of the provisions of the Act became effective, 
to December 31, 1948, there were 51,991 cases filed with the NLRB. 
Of these, 45,881 were processed, leaving a backlog of 6,110 
cases. It is important to note that the great bulk of these cases are 
petitions for union shop elections. (The Act provides that before 
a union shop clause can be included in a contract, a majority of all 
the employees eligible to vote must vote affirmatively for such a 
clause in an NLRB-conducted election. Upon receipt of a petition 
signed by thirty per cent or more of the bargaining unit, the Board 
then arranges and conducts a secret ballot on the question.) As of 
December 31, 1948, 35,646 union shop cases had been filed. In these 

cases the XLRB procedure is routine. No significant interpretive 
ruling has been made on any union shop case. 

Of the remaining cases filed, most of them were concerned with 
representation and election procedures. There were 9,918 repre- 
sentation cases and 645 decertification petitions. (In questions of 
representation, the Act states that when a union has made a claim 
that it represents a majority of the employees, any individual, 
group of individuals, labor organization, or employer may petition 
the Board for a certification election. ) The Board then holds hear- 
ings, and if it finds a question of representation exists, it conducts 
an election and certifies the organization receiving a majority of 
the votes as the bargaining agent. Decertification petitions, which 
claim that the union no longer represents a majority of the em- 
ployees, may be filed by any individual. The Board then conducts 
hearings and holds an election to see if the union is to be removed 
as the bargaining agent for the unit. In both certification and de- 
certification cases, no election can be held when a valid election 
has been conducted within the preceding twelve-month period. 
Although the employer's right to request a certification election, in 
certain instances, is written into the statute, only 697 of 9,918 
representation cases were filed by employers, while 9,221 were filed 
by unions. A number of interpretive board and court cases have been 
decided on this question. These include the issues of union affidavit 
requirements, strikers' voting eligibility, and other voting and 
petitioning rules. 

The remaining 6.782 cases of the total 51,991 of all kinds of 
cases that were filed by December 31, 1948, were unfair labor 
practice cases. Of these, about one-fifth, or 1,256 cases were unfair 
labor practice charges filed against unions (a new provision in the 
Taft-Hartley Act). In the remaining four-fifths, or 5,526 cases, 
unfair labor practices were charged against employers. Because this 
latter provision was a part of the original National Labor Relations 
Act, and there were already established administrative rulings on 
this provision, the bulk of new rulings dealt with union unfair labor 

Few cases have come up under the question of what industries 
and actions are covered by the Act and the section banning political 
expenditures and contributions, but there have been important 

rulings on both of these issues. Damage suit provisions — which 
were of chief concern to labor organizations — have not been 
before the courts. Section 301 of the Act states that a union may 
sue or be sued. Section 303 states that anyone may sue for damages 
as a result of injuries arising from secondary boycotts, jurisdic- 
tional strikes, or strikes by one union against certification of another 
as bargaining agent. Several damage suits have been started — 
most of them by employers — but have been dropped before any 
final decision was reached. 


As stated earlier, the number of unfair labor practice charges 
against unions was a small part of the total number of cases dealing 
with unfair labor practices. This section appears in the law for the 
first time in the Taft-Hartley Act, and there were several important 
interpretations on this subject. The Act states that union unfair 
labor practices include: (1) coercion of employers and employees; 

(2) discrimination against employees; (3) refusal to bargain; 
(4) secondary boycotts, strikes against certification, jurisdictional 
strikes; (5) excessive initiation fees; and (6) payment for work 
not performed. 

Union Restraint or Coercion 

Section 8(b)(1) deals with union restraint or coercion of em- 
ployees in collective bargaining activities, or of employers in the 
selection of bargaining representatives. The most comprehensive 
decision on this cjuestion was one involving a local union of the 
United Shoe Workers of America and the Perry Norvell Company.^ 
In this case, the NLRB indicated some union activities which are 
prohibited, and some which are not. First, the Board held the strike 
itself was not coercive, even though it was in violation of a contract. 
The Board held the following union acts not coercive on employees 
in their selection of a bargaining agent : ( 1 ) assembling a large num- 
ber of people around the entrance of the plant, since there was no 
attempt to prevent entrance to or exit from the plant; (2) threat- 
ening to run the opposing union representative out of town ; 

(3) name-calling, such as "scab"; and (4) forming a crowd so as 
to cause non-strikers to go out of their way to get to the plant gate. 

The Board held these acts to be coercive: (Ij threatenini,^ to beat 
up non-strikers; (2) shoxing' a non-striker at the plant entrance; 
(3) chasing a non-striker and beating him np. 

In another case^ on this subject, some of these same union ac- 
tions were again held to 1)e coercive. In this case, the Board said 
name-calling was permitted under the doctrine of ])icketing as 
"freedom of speech," but threats of violence and pursuit of non- 
strikers w^ere coercive. The Board went further in this case and 
ruled that passive force, such as standing in the way of non- 
strikers' automobiles, constituted restraint and coercion. The Board 
added that success or failure in keeping non-strikers out of the 
plant was immaterial, so long as the intent to keep them out was 

In l)Oth of these cases there was a question of union liability 
for acts of its agents under Sections 8(b) and 2(lvM of the Act. 
The Board ruled in both cases that the union is liable if the act is 
directed or organized by an official of the union, such as a steward 
or picket captain, who has authority to direct the picket line. If, 
however, the acts are acts of individual members w'ithout direction 
or authorization by an officer of the union, the union is not liable. 

A similar cjuestion of coercion in mass picketing arose in a case 
under Section 8(a) (3), which prohibits discrimination against em- 
ployees by employers.^ The Board ruled that an employer's refusal 
to re-employ a striker who had participated in mass picketing and 
had openly advocated the use of force and violence, was not dis- 
criminatory action by the employer, since the picketing went beyond 
peaceful persuasion and was coercive activity not protected by the 

From these cases, it w^ould seem that the Board intends to 
classify as illegal union coercion any form of picketing in which 
there is any show of force or threat of force. Picketing is protected 
as "freedom of speech" in sititations where the action of the pickets 
is limited to peacefid persuasion. Name-calling tactics are inchuled 
in this protection. 

Union Discrimination 

There are two principal cases involving discrimination liy unions 
under Section 8(b) (2). This section makes it an unfair labor prac- 

tice for a union to discriminate against an employee for anything 
but non-payment of dues or to cause an employer to discriminate 
against an employee. There are two principal cases on this question. 
In one case* an injunction was issued restraining the International 
Typographical Union from attempting to enforce a closed shop, 
thereby, the court said, attempting to cause employers to discrimi- 
nate against non-union employees. The other case involved the 
National Maritime Union and the Texas Company.^ The Board 
ruled that the union had violated Section 8(b) (2) by insisting on 
a union hiring hall, which in practice had discriminated against non- 
union employees. The Board thus held that Section 8(b)(2) pro- 
hibits all attempts by unions to force employers to violate another 
section of the Act, 8(a) (3), which states that it is an unfair labor 
practice for an employer, by discrimination in hire or tenure of 
employment, to encourage or discourage membership in any labor 
organization, except that an employer may enter into a union shop 
agreement if the election procedures of the Act are followed. 

Union Refusal to Bargain 

Union refusal to bargain. Section 8(b)(3), was also involved 
in this Maritime case. The Board held that the union refused to 
bargain by insisting that the employer agree to a hiring hall before 
negotiating on other terms and by striking for this demand. The 
Board said that this section imposed on unions the same duty to 
bargain in good faith as that imposed on employers under the 
Wagner Act. The Board also held that past employer cases are 
significant guideposts in determining union liability under this 

Secondary Boycotts 

The part of the Act which has created more interest and concern 
than any other is the section outlawing secondary boycotts, jurisdic- 
tional strikes, and strikes against certification of a rival union. 
These provisions are included in Section 8(b) (4). Under a follow- 
ing section, 10(1), the injunction is made available to the Board 
as the first step in preventing these unfair labor practices. The pre- 
liminary investigation of all cases arising in these three situations 
are to be given priority over all other cases. Also, where the in- 


vestigating officer of the Board has reascjiiable cause lo beHeve that 
the charge made against the union is a real one. he iinisf petition 
for an injunction in federal court. 

There ha\e been ^4 mandatory injunctions issued as of De- 
cember 31, 1^H8. involving secondary boycotts, jurisdictional 
strikes, and strikes against decertification. Most of these have been 
in secondary boycott cases. (A secondary boycott has generally 
been defined as a strike or concerted refusal by employees to use, 
handle, or transport goods where a purpose of the strike or refusal 
is to prevent the employer from doing business with another em- 
ployer.) One such case involved the Distillery Workers Union and 
the Schenley and Jardine Corporations." In this case employees of 
the Schenley Corporation in Kentucky were on strike following a 
deadlock of negotiations for a collective bargaining contract in that 
plant. Employees of the Jardine Corporation, an independent liquor 
distributor in New York who handles Schenley Products, also went 
on strike, in an attempt to force the Schenley Corporation in Ken- 
tucky to agree to a collective bargaining agreement with its em- 
ployees there. The U. S. District Court of Southern New York 
issued a temporary restraining order against the striking Jardine 
local. Later the dispute in Kentucky was settled, and the companies 
rec[uested that the case be dropped. The court did drop the injunc- 
tion proceedings, but the Board continued to press the unfair labor 
practice charges against the union. The Board ruled that the strike 
constituted a secondary boycott despite the fact that: ( 1 ) only one 
of the objects was forbidden by law — the union had argued that 
one purpose of the strike was to speed up grievance settlement at 
Jardine Corporation itself; (2) the unions involved were sister 
organizations, and the two companies had a imity of interest as 
manufacturer and distributor of the same product; and (3) the 
disptite was over terms of employment rather than to further the 
organizational interests of the union. 

In an(jther case which adds to the definition of an illegal sec- 
ondarv boycott,^ \\'atson's Specialt}- Store was a local establish- 
ment which handled and installed wall and floor coverings for 
homes. The carpenters' local in that town had tried unsuccessfully 
to organize Watson's employees and had picketed the store for 
some months. A contractor who employed union carpenters took 

a job of renovating a house. The contractor purchased floor cover- 
ing from Watson's Store, and Watson insisted on doing the instal- 
lation work. When Watson's men appeared on the job, the union 
carpenters quit work and did not go back, the job being completed 
soon afterwards. 

The NLRB sought an injunction against this strike, but it was 
denied, the court holding that the strike was begun before the effec- 
tive date of the Act, and that all the work on the house had been 
completed by the time the petition for the injunction was filed. ^ 
The Board, however, as in the Schenley case referred to above, 
continued to litigate the case as an unfair labor practice. (The 
Board may do this since the injunction is merely an aid in the pre- 
vention of unfair labor practices and apart from the hearings and 
rulings made by the Board in the final handling of unfair labor 
charges.) The Board ruled that the strike had continued after the 
effective date of the Act and so was subject to its provisions. The 
Board's decision stated that the union's action went beyond re- 
fusing to work on a job with non-union men because the real 
purpose was to organize Watson's Store. The Board issued a cease 
and desist order against the union. (This case is important also in 
that it dealt with a local construction situation. This will be men- 
tioned again in the section on the coverage of the Act.) 

A wide-sweeping decision involving a union's "We Do Not Pa- 
tronize" list has just been handed down by the Board in another 
local building dispute. ^° In this case, employees of the Wadsworth 
Company, manufacturer of prefabricated houses, went on strike 
in a dispute over the terms of a new contract. The Wadsw'Orth 
plant was picketed, but the plant continued to operate on a non- 
union basis, with the striking employees being replaced. 

Klassen, a builder of W^adsworth prefabricated houses, hired a 
carpenter who was a member of the union which was engaged in 
the dispute with the manufacturer. The local building trades council 
voted to place Klassen on its "We Do Not Patronize" list, the 
union carpenter left his job, and the building site was picketed. The 
picketing was wholly peaceful in character. As a result of the picket- 
ing, drivers for several trucking companies refused to carry goods 
through the picket lines. 


Wadsworth and Klassen then brought an unfair labor practice 
charge against the union, alleging a secondary boycott. The union 
argued that its action in boycotting Klassen was a justifiable one 
in that its purpose was to protect the standards of the union. The 
Board ruled, however, that such a product boycott is one of the 
precise evils which Congress intended to eliminate by the Act's 
secondary boycott section. The union argued that Klassen was not 
a neutral party but was profiting by the position taken by Wads- 
worth. The Board ruled, however, that a customer of an employer 
with whom the union has a dispute is a neutral party intended by 
the law to be protected from union pressures. 

The Board overruled other union arguments by saying peaceful 
picketing and the "Do Not Patronize" lists must be viewed as a 
direct appeal to employees not to perform services for the employer 
and thus are included within the actions banned by the section. In 
such cases, unions are not protected by the free speech provision of 
Section 8(c). the Board said, since they are engaged in an illegal 

In another secondary boycott case" which involved picketing in 
a local situation, a manufacturing company had undertaken some 
construction work in its plant. This work was contracted to a con- 
struction firm and a special gate cut for use by the construction 
workers. Some time later, the production workers struck the plant, 
and began picketing the gates, including the one made for the con- 
struction workers. The U. S. District Court granted the injunction 
sought by the Board, saying that the act of picketing the special gate 
for construction workers constituted an attempt to force the con- 
struction firm to cease doing business with the manufacturing com- 
pany. This, the Board said, was a violation of Section 8(b) (4) (A). 
The Board has not issued a final order on the case. 

How^ever. union activity which is not an illegal secondary boy- 
cott is defined in Douds v. Metropolitan Architects}'^ In this case. 
Ebasco Company was an engineering services firm that contracted 
part of its work out to Project Company, a large part of whose 
work came from Ebasco. A labor dispute arose at Ebasco Company, 
and the employees went out on strike. When this happened, an even 
greater portion of Project's work — about 75 per cent — was on 

11 ^ 

contract from Ebasco. Some work, started at Ebasco, was trans- 
ferred to Project Company. The miion of Ebasco employees then 
picketed Project Company. When an attempt was made to secure 
an injunction against the picketing at Project, the court held that 
this picketing did not constitute a secondary boycott because Project 
was doing w'ork that, prior to the strike, was done by Ebasco em- 
ployees, and this w'as. in effect, strike-breaking. Therefore, the in- 
junction was denied. The trial examiner of the Board later made 
the same findings and recommended that the case be dismissed. 

Injunctions in Unfair Labor Practices 

In addition to the required use of the injunction in secondary 
boycotts and other cases coming under Section 8(b) (4) of the 
Act, the NLRB General Counsel may petition for injunctions in any 
other unfair labor practice case. To date this discretionary power 
of the general counsel has been used sparingly. There had been only 
six such requests for injunctions as of December 31. 1948. The 
most important case was the ITU case, mentioned above, involv- 
ing discrimination and refusal to bargain. Injunctions were also 
granted against the United Mine Workers for refusal to bargain 
with the Southern Coal Operator's representative,^' and a tempo- 
rary restraining order was granted against the General Motors 
Company insurance plan.^^ The request for an injunction was de- 
nied in a case in which Boeing Airplane Companv was accused of 
refusal to bargain.^' Two other cases were withdrawn. 

It was generally believed that private persons had no right to 
seek injunctive relief against alleged unfair labor practices under 
the new law. There has been some difference of opinion among the 
district courts, but in the onl\- case to reach a circuit court of ap- 
peals^'' the court upheld the Board's position and overruled a district 
court which had granted an injunction to a union against an em- 
plo}er who refused to bargain. This injunction had been granted by 
the lower court, despite the fact that the union had filed the case 
with the Board. The circuit court said that the courts did not have 
jurisdiction to grant the injunction, since the union had adequate 
administrative remedy before the Board; that is. the union would 
file the case with the Board, after w'hich hearings would be held 
and a final order issued against the unfair practice. 


A district court in California also denied a union's request for 
injunctive relief against an employer's alleged refusal to bargain. 
The court held that the Board has exclusive power to determine 
whether the unfair labor practice had been committed.^' Another 
district court^"^ granted an injunction sought by a company, restrain- 
ing the union from picketing in a secondary boycott situation. The 
court based its decision on Section 303 of the Act, which allows 
damage suits in such cases. The court held that since the company 
was suffering irreparable damage for which the remedy provided 
by the Act was inadequate, the injunction should be granted. A 
private injunction was granted in another secondary boycott case 
where the union was striking to prevent the hiring of certain em- 
ployees. The court said that its power to issue the injunction was 
contained in the damage suit provision (Section 303).^^ 

In summarizing these secondary boycott and injunction cases, 
it can be seen that illegal secondary boycotts have been clearl\- 
defined as any attempt to force union demands or organization on 
employers by striking or picketing other employers. This has been 
extended to include local construction situations, as well as actions 
by two locals of the same union. Generally, the courts have re- 
fused to issue an injunction, where the dispute was clearly intra- 
state, or where a strike-breaking situation was involved. The very 
important question of the private injunction, ruled out since the 
Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932, is still unanswered. The final 
interpretation will depend on a U. S. Supreme Court ruling, since 
there is difference of opinion among the lower courts. 

Other Union Unfair Practices 

The remainder of the union unfair labor practices cases have 
not been decided in sufiicient number to set any pattern. This means 
that the question of jurisdictional strikes, strikes against certifica- 
tion, excessive initiation fees, and payment for work not performed 
have yet to be clarified. In one case involving a strike against certi- 
fication,"'^ an injunction was granted against a union which was on 
strike to force recognition as the bargaining agent where another 
union had been certified by the Board. The striking union had not 
complied with the Act's filing requirements and so was not placed 
on the ballot. 



The biggest change in employer unfair labor practices has re- 
sulted from Section 8(c) of the Act. the "freedom of speech" clause. 
The Act states that the "expression of any views" bv an employer 
shall not constitute an unfair practice unless the expression contains 
a threat of reprisal or force or a promise of benefit. This means 
that interference, restraint, or coercion by employers is not broadl\- 
defined as it was under the Wagner Act. 

In several cases where unions alleged that employer interference 
and coercion had been used, the Board has ruled that certain em- 
ployer actions are legal under the free speech provision. An em- 
ployer's pre-election letters and notices to employees, stating that 
the interest of the employees and the employer would be best 
serA'ed by a vote against the union, were permissible, the Board 
ruled, since they contained no language which was coercive, either 
expressed or implied."^ In one case,^~ the distribution of sample 
ballots marked against the union, when not accompanied by threats 
of reprisal against those who voted for the union, was held to be 
a simple expression of the company's opinion. In another case,"' 
however, the Board, while finding that the company's pre-election 
campaign was not coercive and so was protected as "free speech," 
still cancelled the election results on the ground that the extreme 
campaign methods had created an atmosphere in which it was im- 
possible for the emplo}ees to vote freely. In another case.^* the 
Board ruled that a supervisor's statement that "if unionized, the 
employees would have to take a cut in salary" and other such state- 
ments constituted coercion of the employees. However, the Tenth 
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the Board and held that such 
statements where "no employee was led to believe that union mem- 
bership w^ould affect his employment" were protected free speech 
and did not constitute an unfair labor practice. The Board has 
clearly shown that the "captive audience" doctrine no longer applies. 
Under the Wagner Act, it was held to be an unfair lal)or practice 
for an employer to require attendance at a meeting called by the 
employer on company time. The Board ruled in the Babcock and 
Wilcox case^'' that although the employer rec(uired the employees 
to attend and listen to the speeches, it was not a violati(^n of the Act. 


Some limits on em[)l()\er tree speech lia\e i)eeii recoj^nized by 
the Board, however. It was ruled tiiat an employer coerced em- 
ployees by posting a notice saying that he would never recognize 
a union and would move the jjlant to avoid bargaining."" The Board 
held that the statement of a foreman, saying that the entrance of a 
union would result in cutting the work-week to 4(1 hours, was a 
threat of economic reprisal.'"' The Board has also ruled'""* that 
cjuestioning employees about union membership was interference 
and not merely dissemination of "views, argument, or opinion" 
allowed in the free speech provision of the Act. 

Employer Domination of Labor Organizations 

The Board has departed from former standards it followed 
under the Wagner Act, in applying Section 8(a)(2) of the Taft- 
Hartley Act which designates company domination, interference, 
or support of a union as an unfair labor practice. In the Carpenter 
Steel Company Case,^'' the Board ruled that when a compan\' has 
dominated, interfered, or supported a union (regardless of whether 
or not the union is affiliated with an outside organization ) dis- 
establishment of the union will be the appropriate remedy. However, 
where the unfair labor practice is limited to interference and sup- 
port and has never reached the point of domination, the Board shall 
order only that recognition be withheld. This policy was later ap- 
plied in the Hershey jMetal Products Case^** when the Board ruled 
that certain employer actions — permitting members of the inde- 
pendent union to organize on company time, offering legal assist- 
ance, and granting a pay increase demanded by the independent — 
constituted interference and support, but not domination, and the 
Board ordered onlv that the company withhold recognition until 
Board certification. 

Discrimination Because of Union Membership 

There have been no interi)retive rulings in\ohing Section 
8(a)(3), emplover discrimination, and the union security- pro- 
visions, other than those cases discussed earlier on union discrimi- 
nation. This is one of the controversial sections of the Act that has 
not been the subject of interpretive rulings. 


Employer Refusal to Bargain 

Section 8(a)(5) of the Act makes it an unfair labor practice 
for an employer to refuse to bargain in good faith. In one case,^^ 
an employer was ordered to bargain on a pension plan. The Seventh 
Circuit Court of Appeals upheld this ruling, saying that the terms 
"wages" and "other conditions of employment" as used in the col- 
lective bargaining provisions of the Act clearly include pension and 
retirement plans. The Board applied the same principles in another 
case by ruling that the employer was required to bargain on group 
health and insurance plans. ^^ Earlier, at the request of the Board, 
the court issued a temporary restraining order against General 
Motors Corporation to prevent the company from changing its in- 
surance plan without consulting the union. ^^ 

In general, however, interpretations of "bargaining in good 
faith" have been favorable to the employer. The Board ruled that 
an employer had not given evidence of bad faith bargaining when 
he refused to discuss terms until the union withdrew its union shop 
demand. The Board found that the employer had bargained in good 
faith at all other times and his refusal on this point did not change 
the over-all picture.^* In another case,^^ the Fifth Circuit Court of 
Appeals, reversing the Board, ruled an employer could refuse to 
grant an increase in negotiations with the union, and then subse- 
quently give an increase to his employees on his own, without vio- 
lating the Act's provision for "bargaining in good faith." The Court 
based its ruling on the ground that negotiations had broken down 
and a strike vote had been called when the increase was given. The 
court also said that the raise was made to meet competition from 
other firms in that area. 

In summarizing the employer unfair labor practices, it can be 
said that employers now have considerably more freedom than was 
accorded them under the same provisions in the Wagner Act. This 
added freedom has largely been the result of the employer free 
speech provision in the Act. "Bargaining in good faith" has also 
been favorably interpreted, so that the employer enjoys freedom of 
action not available before. The major exception to this trend has 
been in the area of bargaining subjects where the Board and the 
courts have included pension and welfare plans as issues on which 


the company must barj^aiii collectively. This matter is still to he 
finally decided by the courts and its final outcome is uncertain. 


On the subject of elections to determine a bargaininji;- represen- 
tative, under Section 9 of the Act, the majority of the cases have 
followed principles established under the Wagner Act. There have 
been modifications, however. 

Exceptions to the One-Year Rule 

Despite the Act's limitation of one valid election in each twelve- 
month period, the Board has allowed a second election in certain 
instances. In one case"*' the Board allowed a second election l)ecause 
the results of the first — held within the year — had not been con- 
clusi\e. In another,'' the Board allowed a second election because 
the union winning the first election was not certified with the Board 
due to its failure to file the affidavits as required b}' the Act. Since 
the passage of the Act, the Board has continued its former policy of 
not holding an election while a contract is in force, e\en though 
the contract is for a period oi two years. '^^ 

Who May Vote in Elections 

On the question of who may vote in elections, the Board has 
followed the exact letter of the law, which states that "employees 
on strike who are not entitled to reinstatement shall not be eligible 
to vote" — Section 9(c)(3). In a leading case,^^ the union was 
engaged in a strike over wages. While the strike was going on, the 
employer hired replacements for some of the strikers and the jobs 
of others were discontinued. The Board ruled that all those em- 
ployees who had replaced the strikers on a permanent basis, and 
strikers who had been reinstated, were eligible to vote; while those 
employees who had been permanently replaced were not entitled 
to reinstatement and were not eligible to vote. The Board stated 
a company's claim that the strikers were i)ermanently replaced is 
not the deciding factor ; "the actual facts in ever\- case nuist be 
weighed." The Board added that this provision [jlaces no limitation 


on the right to strike, but conceded that it may discourage the exer- 
cise of the right in some instances. 

Appropriate Bargaining Unit 

The question of the appropriate bargaining unit has been the 
subject of considerable Htigation, but in the main there has been 
little in the way of actual interpretation of the provision. On pro- 
fessional employees, the Board has ruled that where the majority of 
employees in a unit are professional, no special election is necessary 
to determine if these employees want to be included in the unit.*° 
Section 2(12) defines professional employees as any engaged in 
work that is (1) predominantly intellectual, (2) involves consistent 
use of discretion and judgment, (3) of such a character that output 
cannot be standardized, and (4) requiring knowledge normally 
gained by a prolonged course of specialized instruction. The Board 
has used these standards in holding that time study men are pro- 
fessional and not supervisory employees ;*^ in ruling that estimators 
for a construction firm are professional ;*" and in finding that 
newspaper editorial employees are not professional.'*^ 

On the subject of craft units, the Board has shown, by a series 
of rulings, that it will grant a severance election to a craft unit even 
though there has been a long history of bargaining on a plant-wide 
basis, and although the craft employees constitute a very small 
group. (In these elections the craft unit decides whether it wishes 
to remain a part of a larger bargaining unit or form a separate 
bargaining unit of its own.) Craft groups which have been granted 
such elections include pattern makers,** die room employees,*'' ma- 
chine shop employees,**^ and engineers.*^ The Board denied a craft- 
unit election to electricians who worked with other craft groups 
in an "integrated production process."*^ The Board also denied a 
severance election to another craft group, pointing out that the Act 
gave it discretion to do so.*^ The Act places only one restriction on 
this use of its discretion by the Board — that prior practice not be 
the onlv guide. In this case, the Board also considered bargaining 
history, separateness of the craft jobs, and the nature of the em- 
ployee's duties. 

The provision concerning plant guards, section 9(b) (3), states 
that guards may not be a part of a bargaining which includes other 


workers in the plant and that no organization may be certified as 
bargaining agent for guards if the organization is affiliated w ith one 
which admits employees other than guards. On this provision the 
Board has consistently defined guard as "anyone who spends 50 
per cent or more of his time performing watchmen's duties. "''° The 
Board has also denied certification to a union, chartered for guards 
only, because it was affiliated with the AFL."^ 


There are a few important decisions involving decertification 
elections. The Board ruled that a decertification petition could be 
withdrawn, although the employer claimed that the union had co- 
erced the employees into withdrawing. (The Board is authorized 
to conduct such elections on petition by an employee or group of 
employees asserting that the union no longer represents them.) In 
another case,°" the union notified the Board that it no longer claimed 
to represent the employees. Such a disavowal, the Board ruled, 
eliminated the representation c^uestion, and the pending election was 
set aside and the petition dismissed. The employer argued that the 
decertification election should be conducted anyway. The Board 
held that to direct the election despite the union's disclaimer would 
mean that for the following 12-month period, the employer could 
"refuse to engage in collective bargaining, not only with this union 
but with any other." (This would be true because of the provision 
limiting elections to one per year.) The Board said that it is not the 
purpose of the Act to aid such an objective. 

Affidavit Requirements 

The filing and affidavit requirements. Sections 9(f),(g), and 
(h), have probably created more problems than any other pro- 
vision of Section 9. These sections require unions to file certain in- 
formation regarding finances, officers, and organization and bar- 
gaining procedures and all union officers to sign non-comnumist 
affidavits if they wash to use the machinery of the Board. These pro- 
visions have been the subject of considerable litigation. 

Constitutionality of these filing requirements has been decided 
in two cases. In National Maritime Union v. Hcrzog,'''' the Supreme 


Court upheld the cunstitutionality of Sections 9(f) and (g), re- 
quiring tlie fihng of union finances, names of officers, and collective 
bargaining procedures. The Court ruled that it was not required in 
this case to rule on the constitutionality of Section 9(h), the non- 
communist afiidavit provision. There was no opinion given by the 
Court explaining either ruling. The Seventh Circuit Court of Ap- 
peals has upheld the validity of the non-communist affidavit. This 
Court ruled that the filing requirement was constitutional in that it 
was an exercise of Congress's power to control interstate commerce 
and to legislate under the "general welfare" clause of the consti- 
tution.^* The filing requirements, the Court said, were reasonable 
cjualifications for those who seek to enjoy the "extraordinary privi- 
lege" of being exclusive bargaining agents. 

The Board has ruled that parent organizations, AFL and CIO, 
normally are not "international labor organizations" within the 
meaning of the law, and thus are not required to file.'' The Board 
said in another ruling that an individual petitioning for a represen- 
tation election need not comply with filing requirements."'*^ In this 
case the union was seeking to dismiss an individual's petition for 
decertification of the union. In a somewhat similar case, however, 
the Board held that an individual should be denied a place on a 
representation ballot where evidence showed that he was "fronting" 
for a non-complying union.'' There are other cases where sufficient 
evidence was not found to show that the individual was "fronting" 
and the name was placed on the ballot. 

The law clearly states that no investigation shall be made con- 
cerning representation if the union has not complied with the filing 
requirements. This, of course, bars a non-complying union from a 
place on the ballot in a certification election. In decertification elec- 
tions, however, the Board has ruled that a non-complying union's 
name should be placed on the ballot. However, if the non-complying 
union should "win" the election, only the arithmetic results of the 
election, and not the union, are to be certified.'® The Board stated 
that to rule otherwise would give non-complying unions the power 
to prevent being decertified 

The Board has consistently dismissed representation petitions 
by the complying internationals when there is any evidence that 
they are acting on behalf of non-complying locals.'''' 


The whole question of representation, certification, and decerti- 
fication has not met with any major interpretive changes in this 
period of Taft-Hartley administration. As mentioned earlier, most 
of the decisions have followed the interpretive pattern set under 
the Wagner Act, or have followed closely the language of the 
present law. 


There are several serious questions involving coverage of the 
Act. Perhaps the most important of these is the extension of the 
Board's jurisdiction to the local construction industr}-. It seems 
reasonably clear now that the Board intends to extend the coverage 
of the law to include almost any type of local business as long as 
there is an indirect relationship to interstate commerce. In the 
Watson Specialty Store case, mentioned earlier under secondary 
boycotts, the Board extended its jurisdiction to construction work 
on a private home. In this case the Board stated, "the legislative 
history shows that Congress intended the Board to exercise its 
plenary power to protect small and relatively local enterprises 
against the impact of unfair boycotts aimed at the installation of 
materials furnished by primary employers, the interstate commerce 
character of whose business is clear." 

Earlier, the Board had held that a concern which manufactured 
and sold doors and sashes was covered by the Act, although all the 
sales were intrastate.*'" The interstate commerce was involved in 
the materials used, 27 per cent of which were purchased outside the 
state. This extension of the coverage has been questioned in some 
of the district courts. In two quite similar cases, a district court in 
Denver refused injunctions to the Board in alleged secondary boy- 
cott cases on the grounds that the disputes were not covered by the 
law. One case, Sperry v. Denver Building Council,'^^ was concerned 
with the electrical w^ork done on construction jobs that were mostly 
private residences. The other case. Slater v. Denver Building Coun- 
cil,^^ involved a local business which manufactured and installed 
soda fountains and counters. However, in a later case, the Tenth 
Circuit Court of Appeals sustained an injunction granted against 
a secondary boycott on a local construction job."' This court said 
that it was the intent of Congress to apply the provisions of the 


law to local situations where there i> anv effect on interstate 

The Board has also accepted jurisdiction over cases that in- 
volved a local trucking concern which hauled building supplies and 
coaP and a retail automobile dealer.'^'^ 


Another question raised in regard to coverage is the exemp- 
tion of supervisors, Section 2(3). The Board has ruled that duties 
— hiring, firing, promotions, and transfer recommendations — shall 
govern in deciding supervisory capacity, rather than title. This, of 
course, is the definition given to the term "supervisor" in Section 
2(11). In some sample cases, the Board declared check inspectors 
to be supervisors because they could effectivelv recommend dis- 
missal. ''''^ The Board also ruled that section men in a plant were 
classified as supervisors and excluded from the production unit 
because they reported violations of rules to an overseer and relayed 
instructions to the men.*^' In another case, the Board ruled that store 
managers of a laundry and dry cleaning companv who had no 
authority to hire or fire were not supervisors.*^* 

Independent Contractors 

A third important Cjuestion of coverage arises from the exclu- 
sion of independent contractors from coverage by the Act — Sec- 
tion 2{3). The legislative history of the law shows that this 
provision was aimed at new^s vendors and that it was largely the 
result of one case, the Hearst Publications case,"^'^ in which the 
Supreme Court ruled that the Board had the power to decide 
whether paper vendors w^ere employees. In the first case decided 
under the Taft-Hartley Act,'° the Board held that newsboys who 
have home routes under contract with the publishers are not em- 
ployees, but are independent contractors under the Act. The Board 
stated this to be true because (1) the carriers aren't paid wages, 
but get their earnings from profits, (2) they determine their own 
methods of servicing their routes and have very little supervision 
from the company, and (3) the company exercises no real control 
over the manner in which routes are transferred or divided. Thus, 
the real test was the degree of control exercised over the carrier 
by the company. 


The Board ai)plied these same standards in decidin<4- that insur- 
ance salesmen were employees and not independent contractors.'^ 
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals agreed in this case. In its 
ruling the Court relied on the fact that the company demanded that 
the salesmen devote all their time to the husiness, and that the\- 
produce a specified minimum of new business each \ear. Ihe com- 
pany trains the men and keeps a close check b\- records and reports 
on the salesmen at all times. 

In summarizing the decisions on the coverage of the Act, we 
find that the Board has extended its jurisdiction to include many 
local business operations never before considered within the scope 
of the law. The most notable is the inclusion of the local building 
trades. On the cjuestions of supervisors and independent contractors, 
the Board has established certain standard measurements, men- 
tioned earlier, which are to be used in determining each indixidual 


The final major area which has been the subject of any inter- 
pretive rulings is Section 34, which bans political contril)Utions by 
unions. The big case involving political expenditures was the CIO 
News case,'^ a test case on the constitutionality of this pro\ision of 
the Act. The district court upheld the union's contention that it was 
unconstitutional as a violation of freedom of speech, but the Su- 
preme Court ruled that this decision was too broad. In a 5 to 4 
decision, the majority of the Court ruled that the case against the 
CIO should be dismissed, not because the ban on political expendi- 
tures was unconstitutional, but because the CIO did not A'iolate the 
law. The Court ruled that the Act did not intend to prohibit political 
comment in union papers published in the regular course of con- 
ducting union affairs. 

In another case which places the issue scjuarely on the question 
of constitutionality the Federal District Court of Connecticut re- 
jected all the union's arguments and declared that the section was 
constitutional as an exercise of the power of Congress to regulate 
federal elections.'^ The union had spent union funds for [iolitical 
advertising in newspapers and on the radio. 



The foregoing case summaries have been an attempt to explain, 
in part at least, some of the administrative interpretations and 
problems arising under the Taft-Hartley Act. As has been pointed 
out, some areas of the Act have been handled in such a way that 
some sort of conclusive pattern has been established. This is true of 
most of the representation and coverage cjuestions as well as the 
constitutionality of various parts of the law. There are other areas 
where there is some indication of what the law means to the Board 
and the courts, as in union coercion and secondary boycotts as well 
as employer free speech rights and bargaining duties. However, 
there are still major questions to be finally settled in these areas, 
such as the question of picketing as free speech or coercion and the 
whole matter of secondary boycotts, in which the fact situations 
vary so widely in the individual cases that it probably will be a long 
time before these provisions are clearly defined. The same is true 
of employer freedom of speech. 

There is still a third group of provisions where there have been 
so few cases, or the treatment has been so varied, that no conclusion 
can be made. This group includes, among other things, private use 
of the injunction, strikes against certification, jurisdictional strikes, 
excessive initiation fees, union liability, and political expenditures. 

Another factor contributing to the inconclusiveness of the 
meaning of various provisions is the fact that the great majority 
of the rulings handed down have been by the Board or the lower 
courts. Until these issues have been ruled upon by the higher courts, 
it is difficult to say if the current interpretation will stand. 


1. In the Matter of Perry Norvell Company and United Shoe Workers of 
America, 80 N.L.R.B. No. 40 (1948) 

2. In the Matter of International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union, 
Local 6 and Sunset Line and Twine Company, 79 N.L.R.B. No. 207 (1948) 

3. In the Matter of Dearborn Glass Company and Amalgamated Local 453, United 
Automobile, Aircraft, and Agricultural Workers of America, and Local 173, 
General Service Employees International Union, 78 N.L.R.B. No. 124 (1948) 

4. Evans, etc. v. International Typographical Union et al., 76 F. Supp. 881 (1948) 

5. In the Matter of National Maritime Union and Joseph Curran et al. and Texas 
Company, 78 N.L.R.B. No. 137 (1948) 


6. Madden, etc. v. International Union, United Mine Workers of .h)ierica, et al., 
79 F. Supp. 616 (1948) 

7. 1)1 the Matter of IVine, Liquor, and Distillery Workers Union, Local 1 and 
Schenlev Distillers Corporation; sanie and Jardine Liquor Corporation, 11 
X.L.R.B. No. 61 (1948) 

8. In the Matter of Local 74, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of 
America, and Jack Henderson, individually and as agent for Local 74, etc. and 
Watson's Specialty Store, 80 N.L.R.B. No. 91 (1948) 

9. Styles, etc. v. Local 74, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of 
America, 74 F. Supp. 499 (1947) 

10. In the Matter of United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America 
and Wadsivorth Building Companx, Inc., and Klassen and Hodgson, Inc., 81 
X.L.R.B. No. 127 (1949) 

11. Lvans, etc. v. United Electrical, Radio, and Machine Workers of America, 15 
C.C.H. Labor Cases Par. 64.718 (August 21, 1948) 

12. Douds, etc. v. Metropolitan Federation of Architects, Engineers, Chemists, 
and Technicians, Local 231, United Office and Professional Workers, 75 F. 
Supp. 499 (1948) 

13. See note 6. 

14. The case brought against the General Motors Corporation was dropped before 
hearings were held on the injunction. Thus, only the temporary restraining 
order was issued. Bozven v. General Motors Corporation, D.C.N.Y., Civ. No. 
44-674 (1948) 

15. Graham, etc. v. Boeing Airplane Company ct al., 15 C.C.H. Labor Cases Par. 
64.604 (1948) 

16. Amazon Cotton Mill Company, and National Labor Relations Board, Intervenor 
V. Textile Workers Union of America, 76 F. Supp. 165 (1948) 

17. International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union, Local 6 v. Sunset 
Line and Twine Company et al., 17 F. Supp. 119 (1948) 

18. Dixie Motor Coach Corporation v. Amalgamated Association of Street, Elec- 
tric Railway, and Motor Coach Employees of America, 14 F. Supp. 952 (1947) 

19. Mills V. United Association of J ourncymen and Apprentices of the Plumbing 
and Pipe Fitting Industry of the United States and Canada, 15 C.C.H. Labor 
Cases Par. 64.791 (Sept. 8, 1948) 

20. Douds, etc. v. Local 1250, Retail, JVholcsale Department Store Union of 
America, 170 F 2d 695 (1948) 

21. In the Matter of Wrought Iron Range Company and Stove Mounters Interna- 
tional Union of North America, Local 126, 75 N.L.R.B. No. 50 (1947) 

22. In the Matter of Merry Brothers Brick and Tile Company and United Stone 
and Allied Products Workers of America, 75 N.L.R.B. No. 15 (1947) 

23. In the Matter of General Shoe Corporation and Boot and Shoe Workers Union, 
77 X.L.R.B. No. 18 (1948) 

24. National Labor Relations Board v. Enid Cooperative Crea}ner\' Association, 
169 F 2d 986 (1948) 

25. In the Matter of Babcock and Wilcox Company and United Stone and Allied 
Products Workers of America, 77 N.L.R.B. No. 96 (1948) 

26. In the Matter of Tygart Sportswear Company and Macharcn Sportsivear Cor- 
poration and District 50, United Mine Workers of America, 77 N.L.R.B. No. 
98 (1948) 

27. In the Matter of Morrison Tuning Co)npan\, Inc. and United Furniture 
Workers of America, 77 N.L.R.B. No. 109 (1948) 


28. In the Matter of A)iies Spot Welder Company, Inc. and United Electrical, 
Radio, and Machine Workers of America, 75 N.L.R.B. No. 45 (1947) 

29. In the Matter of Carpenter Steel Company and United Steelivorkers of 
America, 76 N.L.R.B. No. 104 (1948) 

30. In the Matter of Hershey Metal Products Company and Ansonia Brass 
Workers Union, Local 445, International Union of Mine, Mill, and Smelter 
Workers, 76, N.L.R.B. No. 105 (1948) 

31. Inland Steel Company v. National Labor Relations Board; United Steel- 
ivorkers of America v. National Labor Relations Board, 170 F 2d 247 (1948) 

32. In the Matter of W. W. Cross and Company and United Steelivorkers of 
America, 77 N.L.R.B. No. 188 (1948) 

33. See note 14. 

34. In the Matter of Exposition Cotton Mills Co)npany and Texile Workers Union 
of America, 76 N.L.R.B. No. 183 (1948) 

35. National Labor Relations Board v. Crompton-Highlands Mills, Inc., 167 F 2d 
662 (1948) 

36. In the Matter of Napa New York JVarehouse, Inc. and Local 1146, Retail 
Clerks International Association, 76 N.L.R.B. No. 119 (1948) 

2)7. In the Matter of Nashville Corporation and International Association of Ma- 
chinists, Aero Lodge No. 735, 77 N.L.R.B. No. 19 (1948) 

38. In the Matter of Acme Boot Manufacturing Companx, Inc. and Creighton 
Neal, 76 N.L.R.B. No. 62 (1948) 

39. In the Matter of Pipe Machinery Company and P. M. Company Independent 
Union, 79 N.L.R.B. No. 181 (1948) 

40. In the Matter of Continental Motors Corporation and International Union, 
United Automobile, x-lircraft, and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, 
and its Local 113, 77 N.L.R.B. No. 50 (1948) 

41. In the Matter of Worthington Pump and Machinery Corporation and Tinie 
and Motion Study Association, 75 N.L.R.B. No. 80 (1947) 

42. In the Matter of Austin Company and Seattle Professional Engineering Em- 
ployees Association, 77 N.L.R.B. No. 148 (1948) 

43. In the Matter of Jersey Publishing Company and Hudson County Neivspapcr 
Guild, American Newspaper Guild, 76 N.L.R.B. No. 70 (1948) 

44. In the Matter of Westinghouse Electric Corporation and Pattern Makers 
League of North America, 75 N.L.R.B. No. 73 (1947) 

45. In the Matter of Atwater Manufacturing Company and Southington Die Sink- 
ers Lodge, No. 400 of International Die Sinkers Conference, 76 N.L.R.B. 
No. 84 (1948) 

46. In the Matter of National Container Corporation, Inc. and International Asso- 
ciation of Machinists, Lodge No. 731, 75 N.L.R.B. No. 92 (1948) 

47. In the Matter of Allied Mills, Inc. and American Federation of Grain 
Processors, 76 N.L.R.B. No. 138 (1948) 

48. In the Matter of Baldwin Locomotive Works and Local Union B-654, Inter- 
national Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 76 N.L.R.B. No. 124 (1948) 

49. In the Matter of National Tube Company and Bricklayers, Masons, and 
Plasterers International Union of America, 76 N.L.R.B. No. 169 (1948) 

50. The leading case is: In the Matter of Young Patrol Service and Ship Clerks 
Association, Local 34, ILWU, 75 N.L.R.B. No. 51 (1947) 


51. /;; the Mutter nf Scliculcv J hstillcries, Inc., Old Quaker Division and Indus- 
trial Guards Federal Labor Union 24312, 77 N.L.R.B. Xo. 80 (1948) 

52. In the Matter of Federal Shipbuilding and Drydock Co>npany and Joseph C. 
Balchunas et al., Emploxees, and Industrial Union of Marine and Shipbuilding 
ll-orkers, Local 116, 75 N.L.R.B. No. 57 (1948) 

53. National Maritime ['iut))i of America et al. v. Ilerzog et al., 16 Lazv Week 
3327 (1948) 

54. See note 31. 

55. In the Matter of Northern Virginia Broadcasters, Inc., Radio Station IVARL 
and Local Union No. 1215, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 
75 N.L.R.B. No. 2 (1947) 

56. See note 38. 

57. In the Matter of Ca>npbell Soup Company and Cannery Workers and Ware- 
housemen's Union, Local 1857, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauf- 
feurs, Warehousemen, and Helpers of America, Td N.L.R.B. No. 133 (1948) 

58. In the Matter of Harris Foundry and Machinery Company and Arthur Hays 
Howard and United Steehvorkers of America, 7(i N.L.R.B. No. 14 (1948) 

59. /;; the Matter of United States Gypsum Company and United Gas, Coke, and 
Chemical Workers of America, 77'N.L.R.B. 176 (1948) 

60. In the Matter of Central Sash and Door Company and International Wood- 
zvorkers of America, 76 N.L.R.B. No. 68 (1948) 

61. Sperrv, etc. v. Denver Building and Construction Trades Council et al., 77 
F. Supp. 321 (1948) 

62. Slater, etc. v. Denver Building and Construction Trades Council et al., 15 
C.C.H. Labor Cases Par. 64.759 (Sept. 22, 1948) 

63. United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, District Council of 
Kansas Cit\, Missouri, and Vicinitx et al., v. Sperry, etc. 15 C.C.H. Labor 
Cases Par. 64.814 (November 2. 1948) 

64. In the Matter of J . H. Patterson Company and General Chauffeurs, Helpers, 
and Sales Drivers, Local 325, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauf- 
feurs, Warehousemen, and Helpers of America, 79 N.L.R.B. No. 48 (1948) 

65. In the Matter of Liddon White Truck Company and International Association 
of Machinists, 76 N.L.R.B. No. 165 (1948) 

66. In the Matter of General Electric Company and International Brotherhood of 
Electrical Workers, 76 N.L.R.B. No. 142 (1948) 

67. In the Matter of Morowebb Cotton Mills Company and United Textile Workers 
of America, 75 N.L.R.B. No. 118 (1947) 

68. In the Matter of Palace Laundry Dry Cleaning Corporation and Retail Clerks 
Interttational Association, 75 N.L.R.B. No. 40 (1947) 

69. National Labor Relations Board v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. Ill 

70. In the Matter of Kansas City Star Company and Newspaper Carriers' Co- 
operative Association of Greater Kansas City No. 526, International Printing 
Pressmen and Assistants' Union, 76 N.L.R.B' No. 52 (1948) 

71. National Labor Relations Board v. Phoenix Mutual Life Insurance Company, 
167 F 2d 983 (1948) 

72. United States v. Congress of Industrial Organizations, 16 Law Week 4662 

7i. United States v. Painters Local Union No. 481 et al., 79 F. Supp. 516 (1948)