A
FARTHER EXAMINATION
******
OF I
Dr. CLARKE'S Notions of
SPACE;
With Some Coniiderations on the Poffibility of
ETERNAL CREATION.
Ift REPLY
To Mr. JOHN CLARKE'S Third Defence of
Dr. SAMUEL CLARKE'S Dtmonftration &c.
To which are added
Sorne REMARKS on Mr. JACKSON'S Excep^
tions to Dr. CLARKE'S Notions of SPA s
Examined: in his Exijience- and Unity &c.
By JOSEPH CLARKE M.A.
Fellow of Magdalen College CAMBRIDGE
Turbatq'ue Notas, & Lnmina i'evmn
Ducit in Errorem variarum Ainba^e Viar ,'n.
CAMBRIDGE
Prince-.-! For CORNELIUS CR.OWNFIELD, and JOHN CP.OXV.S-
FIELD attheAV,% Svn in St. /Ws' Church-Yard
E R R. A T A
PAG. 20. After ARGUMENT I. add From the DIFFE
RENCE, between the TOUCHING and NOT TOUCHING
of two BODIES. P. 37. 1. 31.?-. fuppofe. P. 40. 1 34.
r. examin'd. P. 41. 1. 21. r. between the touching and
not touching of. P. 79. 1. 4. r. Whitenefs. P. 114.
1. 29. r. fome. P. 122. 1. 32. r. you. P. 123. 1. 19.
r. Nutricis. P. 127. 1. ult. r. movemur. P. 152. 1. 3.
*•. Eternity.
FARTHER EXAMINATION &c,
INTRODUCTION.
WHEN I publiihed Dr. Chr&s Na
tions of SPACE Examined, in Anfwer
to your two Defences of the learned
Dottor; I told you in the Concluflon, that, if
you iliould afterwards produce any new Argu
ments, or defend the old ones with new Reaion-
mg, you might expert a Reply : But that, if
you fhould only repeat over and over again, what
has been as often confuted, it would be only tri-
• fling, and amufing the World *.
AND fmce you have now in Reply, publiflied
zThird Defence, in which you have produced fcarce
any new Arguments, or defended the old ones
With new Reafoning (unlefs Sophiftry may be
called Reafoning) f thought, as it required no
Anfwer, fo it would be unneceffary to trouble the
Pubiick, who perhaps are already tired of the Con-
trover/y, with any Thing more upon the SubjeCh
P.
I there-
a INTRODUCTION.
I therefore, Sir, intended no farther Anfwer, 'till
I recollected what you are pleaied to put me in
Mind of in your firft Page, viz,, that Sopkiflrj
may prevail with a great many Perfow, which in
duced me to give you a Reply.
WHEN I heard you proclaiming to the World,
in vour Preface, that you knew^ that Quibbles and,
wrangling upon Words were endlefs ; I flattered my
felf, that you would make life of no fuch wrangling
Methods; but that you would throughout have
kept to the ftrid Rules of Argument ; and I could
not therefore forbear wondring, to find the fame
Piece fo full of fallacious Reafoning : But, when
I recollected, that you not only knew, Quibbles
and Wrangling upon Words are endlefs , but knew
likewife, that Sophiflry would prevail with a great
many Perfons, my wonder ceafed.
I cannot find, Sir, that you have advanced any
Thing new, or material, in this your Third Defence.
Your Arguments are for the moil part dreffed
up in a Sophiftical Manner ; and feem as if cal
culated only to perplex the Subjed, to evade the
Arguments ufed againft you, and to deceive the
unwary Reader by a Labyrinth of words : So that
the chief Thing neceiTary, will be to deted Falla
cy, and unravel Sophiftry. As you have thought
proper to put on a Mask, I hope you will ex>-
cufe me, if I endeavour to pull it off, and fhew
your Arguments to the World in their true
Light.
You are pleated in your Preface to favour
me with fome Compliments, which being only-
words of Form and Ceremony are to be taken as
fuch. I fhall only beg leave to obferve, that, if
that little Piece, entitled Dr. Clarke's Notion* oj
Examined* had the good fortune to gei
anj
INTRODUCTION. 3
any Character (as you are pleafed to fay it did *)
amongft many learned Men at Cambridge ; I impute
it not to any Thing I could fay worthy their No
tice, but to the Force of Truth, which is gres-c
and will prevail. And I fliould be unwilling to
think, as you do, that mere Sophiftry could gee
a Cbaratier amongft many learned Aien at Cam*
bridge : For, tho' Sopkiftry may prevail with a great
many Perfons; yet I fliould be loth to reflect fo
much on the Learned Men of that Body, as to
reckon them in the Number.
BEFORE I enter into a particular Examination
of your Book, I (hall firft premife a Chapter or
two, concerning thofe main Principles, by whiclji
the Controverfy muft be decided.
* Preface to the Third Defence.
A a
4 Concerning the different Acceptations
CHAP. I.
Concerning the different Acceptations of the
T'erm Nothing,
THE word Thing is by Cuftom generally
applied to whatever we fpeak about, be it
either a real Exiftence ad extra, as zMan, a Tem
ple &c. or, only an Idea, as Whitenefs, Extenfan?
Knowledge &c. confidered in the abftrafl;. But,
ilrictly ipeaking, thefe are not Things, but Ideas :
for, I think, the word Thing ought to be appli
ed only to Existences ad extra, and not to abjtraft
Ideas, Modes, Properties, or Relations. AbftracT:
Ideas Ihould be called Ideas, not Things : for other-
wife they are confounded together. But, as Cuftom
has given the Name of Thing, to whatever \vefpcak
about ; So we may ufe the word according to this
common Acceptation: But then we fhould cliftin-
guiih between Things Real, and Things Ideal. We
fhould call thofe Things Real, which have an Ex
iftence ad extra; and thofe Ideal, which are no
where, but in the Mind.
Now, according to thefe two Senfes of the
\vord Thing, the Term Nothing, which is the Ne
gation, muft confequently have two Senfes ; as it
is fometimes ufed as a Negation of Things real
only ; and, at other times, as a Negation of Things
both Real, and Ideal.
THE Term Nothing is to be underftood in the
former Senfe, when it is ufed concerning abftra&
Ideas-, as when we fay Extenfion is Nothing:
for here the Term Nothing only denies Exterifion
to be a Thing Real* or an Exiftence ad extra ;
but does not deny it to be an Ideal Thing, or aa
djlratk
of the farm Nothing. £
Idea. We msy diflinguifli this Senfe of
the Term Nothing, for brevity fake, by calling it
Non- Entity.
NOTHING, in the other Senfe of the Term, is
a Negation, not only of all Real Things, but alfb
of all Ideal Things, viz. all Non-Entities^ all Pro
perties, Modes, Accidents, Relations, in the ab»
Hract ; and in fhort, all Ideas whatever ; and a-
mong the reft, SPACE, the imaginary Receptacle
of all Exigences ; in this Senfe we may difHnguifli
it, by giving it the Term of Nihiiitj.
THIS is a Diftinclion, which is and ought to
be made life of by Logicians; and 1 wifh you had
been fo conversant with them as to have known
this Diftin&ion, as well as that common one of
Genus and Species $ which you lay fo much Strefs
on to fo little Purpofe*. " Metaphyficians con-
" fider another fort of Things (fays one of thofe
Writers) <c by Abftraftiont which are neither Be-
*c ings, nor Modes of Beings, nor' yet are they
" considered as mere Nihiiitj. Such are Priva-
" tions, external Denominations, or Relations,
« and all Beings of the Mind^ [which are what I
call Ideal Things] " for thefe properly neither have
" Exigence in themfelves, nor in any otherThings ;
*c neither can they ftriflly be faid to be mere JVo-
<c thingy or Nihility ; fince v/e form Notions about
*' them, and they are connected to many of our
*< Ideas f ". Here, you fee, this Logician makes
* See Third Def. p. 4, 5, 6.
f Praeterea quaedam alia, per abftra&ionem, a Metaphy-
ficis intelliguntur, quae neque iiint Entiu, ncque modi En-
tium, neque tamen ut merum nibil concipiuntur. Ejufinodi
funt Pri<vationes, denominationes Extern* feu relatioms, &
Entia Rationis omnia. Hxc enim neque exijientiam habent
neque in aljis exiilunt, neque did proprie poiTunt
the
p Concerning the different Acceptations
the Diftin^ion of Non-Ens* and Merum
i.e. of Non-Entity and Nihilitj — Neque font En-
na, fays he, neqae tamen tit merum nihil concipiuftr
tur. They have neither real Exigence, neither are
they mere Nihilitj ; i. e. as he afterwards explains
himfelf, they are Entia Rationis. In this we
agree with this Writer. When we fay SPACE is
Nothing') we mean that it is what we call Non-Ens>
that it has not real Exiflence, or exiftentiam pro^
priam ; and, when we fay SPACE is Something* we
only mean, that, neque tamen tit merum nihil con*-
ctpittir, becaufe notiones ejtts ejformamtis, & Jdeis
variis adjuntttim eft ; that is, that it is an Ideal
Thing.
AND here I would have it obferved, that this
Divifion of the Term Nothing, into what we call
Non-Entity and Nihility is no falfe and ufelefs,
hut a true arid necelTary Divifion. For any one,
with a little Thinking will. find, that the word
Nothing is often ufed in the two different Senfes I
have mentioned; and therefore, to avoid Confu-
iion, the foregoing Diftindion will be found ne-
ceffary.
SINCE an abfiraft Idea has no objective Reality,
it may certainly be faid to be Nothing ; that is,
no Thing exifting ad extra ; but yet, fince it is
an Idea, it cannot be faid to be Nothing, in fuck
a Senfe as fhali exclude Ideas: and therefore, in
the Term Nothing we make a Diftinclion, when
it is ufed concerning thefe Ideas, and when it is
ufed, as a Negation of all Ideas as well as Realities.
IT is evident, that, when we fay Whitenefs or
Knowledge is Nothing-, we muft not be fuppofed
efle merum nihil', quandoquidem notiones eorum efForma-
mus, & Ideh variis adjunfta font. — Job. Clerici, Ontolq-«
giac. i.SeSt. 2.
6f the Term Nothing. 7
to mean that Whitenefs, and Knowledge, are not
Ideas ', and therefore the Term Nothing, does not
here exclude Ideas ; and fmce it does not, we
fhould not confound it with another "Senfe of the
word, which does exclude them ; But we fhould
remember, that when Whitenefs or Knowledge
is faid to be Nothing (and the fame is true of all
other abftrafl Ideas) it is faid to be fo, in that
Senfe which only denies it to be 2. Reality, but at the
fame time admits it to be an Idea.
WHEN therefore we fay, that Whitenefs, Know
ledge, Extenfion, or any other abftrad Ideas are
Nothing -, we do not mean, that they are not Ideas ;
but that they are Ideas, which have no real Ar
chetype exifting without the Mind.
I would not have it imagined, that I introduce
the words Non-Entity and Nihility, in order to
amufe the Reader with Scholaftick Terms ; for
(as Mr. Locke fays of the word Idea) I have no
fondnefs for any particular, Articulate Sound ;
nor do I think there is any Spell, or Fafcination in
any of them : But I ufe them only to exprefe
briefly the two Sen&s, in which the Term Nothing
is ufed. In fhort, by Non-Entity, I mean a mere
Idea, which hath no abjettwe Reality : and by A7-
hility, I mean a Negation, even of thofe Ideas>
as well as of Realities.
SINCE then the Term Nothing, may beufider-
ftood in thefe two 'very different Seafes ; if we
do not, in the ufe of it, attend to its precife Mean
ing, we ihall run into Confufion ; as you feem to
have done in the Piece now before me.
THIS being obferved, I ihall now proceed to
remark a few Things concerning Abftrad: Ideas,
as far as may be of Service in the prefent Queftion,
CHAP,
8 Of Abjlraft Ideas.
C II A P. II.
Of Abftratt Ideas.
ABSTRACT Ideas are formed by that
Power of the Mind, which is called the
Power of Abftrading ; /. e. the Power of feparating
in Idea, what are infeparable in Reality.
. BY this Ad of the Mind, we form our Vniver*
fal Ideas ; and rank Things into Sorts : Hence corne
Genus, and Species, Subftance* EJfince, &c.*
^ WE employ this Act of the mind about Proper-
ties, Modes, Relations &c. as well as Subftances;
and form general Ideas concerning them, « by
« feparating them from all other Properties ore.
« with which they are found in Nature, or from
1 all particular Subjects, in which they inhere,
' and leaving only fo much as remains' in com-
c< mon, and includes, or may be affirmed of every
' Property &c. of that .Kind. Thus obfeivin-,
c that all Bodies agree in being Extended, as well
c as Solid i tho' they differ never fo much in Ma^
{ mttide and Figure \ we take the former of thefe"
Properties apart from the latter, as alfb, from
'any Canicular Magnitude, or Shape, and call it
' Exunfion in the abftraft j which being thus
« made general, will comprehend all Articular
<c Extenfam &c, f
A^-F°r Jh^Tmanner'9f ^quiring thefe, See Mr. Law1,
Additional Notes to his firft Edition of JST/W's Orighi ef
Evil Tranflatcd. p. 10. Wattts Logic Part r \
's EfTay on H. U. B. 2. c. xi. §. o,
Addit. Notes to King- p. ii.
Of Abjlratt Ideas. g
this Power, which the Mind has, of Ab-
ling, we iometimes confider a Mode or Pro
perty of any Being, (whether Matter or Spirit)
without confidering the Being it felf, of which
it is a Mode or Property ; as when we confider
Extenfion without confidering any particular £x~
tended Body, or Thought without any particular
Thinking Being. This is abftrafting a Mods
from the Stthfttnce : but fometimes likewife we ab-
flract even from Modes themfelves; as when we
confider the Length of Body without confidering
Breadth and Depth, (which Geometricians call a
Line) or when we confider the Length and Breadth*
without confidering Depth, (which they call a
Surface.)
THERE is a PafTage in Mr. N6'RRis concern
ing Abftradion, which will farther explain th6
Nature of it. " This feparate Confideration where-
" in the Nature of Abftradion is made to con-
" fift, is to be dnderftood, not of different, Be
" ings but of the Parts of the fame Being ; tha?
" is, Attraction is not the confidering one intire
tf and complete Being without another (for they
'« being Numerically at leaf! diilmci; cannot be
c< confidered otherwife, fince one kiea will not
" include them) but the confidering one Part of
c' fuch a Being without another,"'
" BUT farther, Abflraction r< not of fiich Pans
€c neither, as are really and pl^callj diftinft, fuch
f( as we commonly call integral Parts (for T iup-
" pofe I fhould not properly be faid to abftraft
<c in confidering one Part of a human Body, or
" one Part cf a Number without confidering
Cc another ; fince thefe? tho* Phyfical Parts, are
c< yet Logi'cal Wholes; a^d To the feparate Con-
<c fideratioft of rfrcni, would be no proper Ab«
B ftraclion)
ID Of Abjlraft Ideas.
" flra&ion) but of Parts, that are intelligibly di-^
«« ftind:, and have a real Samcncfs in the Nature of
" the Thing. When one of thefe really Same, but
" intelligibly diftintt Parts, is confidered without
ft the other, or without that real Whole, whole
" intelligible Part it is ; then is my Thought ab-
« flratl ; but when there is no fuch feparate Con-
" fideration, but all is included together in one
" Idea, and considered as really it is ; then is my
* Thought concrete. So that in fhort, Abftra-
" cfiion^as 'tis a logical Affection of Thought,
•< is the confidenng one Thing without another*
«« not Abfilntetyf but in Things that are not really
cc one without the other, nor yet really deniable
" one of the other. For Abftrattion is as it were
" the drawing of a Thing away from it felf. But
" where Things are really feparate or dirtincl:,
<c the confidering them apart is not Abftrattion ;
" but only a mere divided Consideration ; nor
« would the joining them in one, be Concretion,
** but Confufion."
" ABSTRACTION then is the feparate Confi-
Cf deration of Things intelligibly diftinct, really
« indiftind." *
IT may be proper to explain a Sentence or two
in this Quotation. He fays, that AbftrdRion is
the feparate Confederation of Parts that are in-
telligibly diQinct, and have a real Samexefi in the
Nature of the Thing. But he muft not here be
uoderftood to mean, that thefe Parts which he
fays, have a real Samencjs in tke Nature of the
Thing, are really the fame Parts (by Part?) we
here mean Modes i) as for Inftance, that Ext en*
* AVrrVs EfTay towards the Theory of the Ideal- or
Intelligible W«rld. Part 2. c. 3. Se£t. 7,
pon
Of 2<lbjlra5t Ideas. II
fan and Figure* which are Modes of Body* are
really the fame ; *. *. that Extenfion is Figure,
and Figure Extenfian : He muft not, I fay, be
underftood to mean this, when he fpeaks of their
having a real Samenefi* but, that Extenfion and
Figure, which are intelligibly diftintt* are not Things
really diftintt and different in the Being, from
whence they are abflrttted, (as a Man's Arm is
from the reft of his Body) but are only the
fame Being* considered in different View*. And
this is true : For, tho' we can abftradedly
confider figure without confidering Extenfion*
and Extenfion without Figure, and both of them
without confidering any particular Extended Fi
gured Being, i. e. tho' they are intelligibly Mr-
jlintt ; yet in the Nature of the Thing, ;. e.
in the really Extended Figured Being^ Exten
fion is not any Thing really diftinct from Figure,
or Figure any Thing really diftincl from Exten
fion, or either of them any Thing really diftind
from the Extended Figured Beingt whence they are
abftra&ed : But they may both be faid to have a
real Samenefs in the Nature of the Thing ; becaufe
both of them, are only the fame Thing confidered
in different Refpeds.
BY Parts then, (/. e. Modes) intelligibly diflinft*
having a real Samenefs in the Nature of the Thing,
is meant that the Modes of any Being, tho' they
may by the Mind be conjidercd diftindly or fepa-
rately ; yet, are only the fame Being* confidered
in a clifferent Manner.
FROM what has been faid concerning ab-
ftraft Ideas, it is evident that they have no real
Exiftence without the Mind cprrefpondent to them ;
*. e. that there is no fuch real Thing ad extra* as
Whitenefs without a white Body 5 or Length
8 i
'1 2 Of Abjlraci Ideas.
•without a long Body &c. but that Whitenefs an4
Length in the abllraft are mere Ideas, ariiing
from the Confederation of Body ; the one with
Refpect to its Whitenefs only ; the other with
Refpect to its Length only ; without conlldering
any of its other Modes, or any particular Body>
or any real Subject. All abftratt Ideas then, are
Non-Entities or mere Entia Rationis.
" BUT tho* a Non-Entity, or Not-Being, is
<« really Nothing in it felf ; yet as it is introduced
« by fome Relation to Being, it may afford Foun-
fc dation for fome Sort of Thoughts or Concep-
«c tions, or fome relative Affections — We may
<c alb form a Sort of Idea of Non-Entities, or
«< Not-Beings, from their Relation to Beings."*
THUS we have an Idea and can talk of a Ska?
dow and Eytenfion in the Jlbftratt ; not that a
Shadow, or Extenfion in the Abftract, can bear
any real Relation tp Beings as if they were real
Exiftences ; but thefe Ideas are confidered rela
tively and with Refpect to Being : A Shadow is
confidered, as the Reprefentation of a Being ;
and is therefore thought upon, and conceived as
luch ; it may thence be faid to have relative Af
fections : Thus it may be faid to be here, or
there, to be near us, or far from us, or to be
long or fhoj t, great or little tyc. and Exten
fion is confidered alfo in a relative Manner ; that
is, as it may be a Mode of Being ; and we call ic
greater, or lefs, or afcribe to it certain Degrees.
And if sve look into our Minds, we (hall find,
that we always tacitly refer thefe abftract Ideas,
* A Brief Scheme of Ontology c. i . — Subjoined to a
late Book, intitled, Philofophical E/ays en Various Subject
by I. tff.
when-?
Of Abftraft Ideas. 13
"Whenever we fpeak or think about them, to Somc-
^hat ; not to any particular Being, but to loire
imaginary Sub^rMnm : For thefe abftrad Ideas,
are Ideas of pure Intellect ; i. e. are to be under-
flood, but cannot be imagined. A Man may
f*tikrjland> what we mean by Whiteneis, or Ex-
ten ii on in the Abfrraft ; but Imagination can lay
no hold of them, till the Mind iupplies an ima
ginary Substratum, to fupport them, pro hoc vice*
fuch as may ferve the Purpofe. The Mind there
fore joins the Idea of Somewhat, with the Idea
pf one OuMity only, either Extenfion, Whitenefs,
or any other abitraci Idea; and then we have
an imaginary Suoftratum prefently formed ; that
is, an ideal extended Somewhat* or an ideal white
Somewhat *.
IT is in this View, that we affirm Things
concerning akftracl Ideas. Hence it is, that £.v-
ttnfion is faid to have Parts, \vhich would be Non-
fen ;e ro fay of Extenfion it fclf, confidered as an
Idea of pttrg Intellect. Hence Diftance is faid to
be great or fmall j which we conceive, by firft ima
gining the SPACE, which we confideras between,
as a Subftratutn of Extenjion ; Thence conceiving
it as extended, (which it would be abfurd to
fay of Extension) and thence confidering it by
parts, as great, or fma.ll ; long, or ihort.
Hence likewife it is, that we fay Wifdom is ufe-
ful, that Solidity refits Bodies, that Motion is
fwift or flow &c.
AND we may farther o:>ferve that fince
Qualities, Modes, and Accidents, are not
* See this further Explained in Mr. Law's Notes &e.
Note 1 6. p. 40. Edit. i. or b Dr. Clxrkis NoficKs »f
. 83. &c.
ecs,
24 Of Abftratt Ideas.
ceS) and yet Things are affirmed of them, which
can be only affirmed of Subftances ; it isjufficient
to fhew, that they are conceived after the Manner
of Subfbnces : That is, that altho* they are con-
fidered abftraftedly from every particular Subjett,
they are yet referred to an imaginary Subftratum.
AND as we thus form an imaginary Subftratum
for the Qualities, Modes, Properties &c. of Body*
when confidered abftractedly from all particular
Bodies ; lo \ve do the fame, with refpe.cl: to the
Properties, Qualifies, &e. of Spirit^ when confi
dered in the Abfbad. Thus, when we talk of
Knowledge abftracted from every particular know
ing Man '9 the Mind here fupplies it with imagi
nary Subjects pro hac vice ; whence we have the
Idea of an intelligent Somewhat} which is fufficienc
to bring the general Idea down to a particular Sub
ject : The fame is done with Relation to Envy,
Fear, Love, Hatred, Piety, Virtue, ore. when
confidered in the j4b/tratt.
BUT from confidering abftracl; Ideas in this
planner, and thence accuttoming ourfelves to fpeak
of them, as real Things^ arife Error and Pifpute.
Men are fo ufed to think, conceive, and taljc
about them, as Things real, that they deceive
themfelves, as 'it were, into a Belief, that they are
fo : Thus, for Inflance, Nature, and Chance have
fb long, and fo much been talked of, that J make
po Doubt, but among the more ignorant and comr
inon People, they have gained an. Exiftence. For
tune has fo often been faid to be kind, or averfe,
that I am apt to believe, fome imagine it as a
real Being, in whofe Power their Welfare is pla
ced. Their Ideas of Winter •> and Summer, Spring
and .Autumn* are generally abftracted from the
Motion of the Earthy (or rather from the Sun)
and
Of Abjiratt Ideas 15
and are confidered as Things diftintt. Time and
Death likewife, with them, have their Exiftences^
but owe them only to the abftratt Ideas of the
Painter or the Statuary.
HENCE arofe the numerous Idols of the Hea
thens, Valour-> Prudence, Truth, &c. ; nor were
Revenge and Fear, without their Temples and
their Altars.
SINCE then the cuflomary way of confider*
ing, and fpeaking of Things, which is not always
to be avoided, will lead us inio Error; wefhould,
when we have a Mind to be undeceived, throw
off the Slavery impofed upon us by Words, and
be no longer governed by Sound. We ihould
change thofe Expreflions which are apt to miflead
us for others more exaft, and which will bring
us to the Knowledge of the Truth- We ihould
eonfider what the Senfe and Meaning of an Ex-
preffion is, when ftripp'd of its Difguife: This
is the only way to detect thefe Idola Fort, as
Lord BACON calls them, which by a Combination
of Words and Names, infinuate themfdves into
the Mind. Men imagine that their Reafon go
verns their Words ; but fometimes Words get the
better of their Reafon ,* and have fo great a' Force
upon the Mind, that their Philofophy lies blend
ed with Error, and their Dodtrines become ufe-
lefs and fophiftical *.
* At Idola For! omnium mofeftiffima funt, qu^ ex fce-
derc verborum & nomiuum fc infmuarunt in Intelledtum.
Gredunt enlm Homines, rationem fu.un verbis impcra^c.
Sed fit ctiam ut vcrba vim fuam fuper Intel Ic6lum rctor-
q.uennt & refledlant, quod Philofophiam Sc Scientias red-
didit fopjiilticas & ina&ivas. fran. Bat. ds Vcrul. In-
ftaur. magna, Par< Ssc. Aph. LIX,
IN-
i6 Of Abjlratt IdeaL
INSTEAD then, of faying Extenfan is long of
Jbort; we iliould fay (if we would ipeak
finally and philofophically ) that an extended
Body is long or fhort. Inftead of faying, Extcn-
jlon hath Pans ; we Ihould fay, that an extended
Body hath Parts. When we fay, that a Man h*s
Knowledge^ we mean, that a Man knows. When
\ve fay that he has Pietj> Charity &c.j we mean
that he is pious, charitable &c.
I might multiply Inftances of this Kindj but
thele already mentioned, are fufficient to fhew, that
Men, by accuftoming themfelves to fpeak, and
from thence fometimes to think inaccurately con
cerning Ideas formed by Abftrattion* will be apt
to run into great Mifhkes : They may, nay they ac
tually have imagined them to be real Exigences j o-
fherwife we ihoiild never have feen Arguments pro
duced, to prove that Knowledge is Something *di-
ftinft from the knowing Man ; that it is Some
thing, which is in him ; or, that becaufe we ufe
affirmative Expreffions concerning it, it mud there
fore be Something real*. We fee then, what
Miftakes about abftract Ideas arife from the
Force of Sound. For no fooner are the Expref
fions diverted of their common Form, but the
Ideas are divefled of their Exiftence, and reduced
to their primitive Non-Entity.
FROM what has been (aid, I obferve as follows.
FIRST, that fmce there are two different Ac
ceptations of the Term Nothing^ which I have
above explained t> it ought always to be re
membered, that whenever we call SPACS No-
thingy we call it fo in the Senfe of Non-Entity ;
and we mall find that molt, if not all your Ob-
* Sec Third Tef. p. u. f C&ap. I P- 4
Of Abjlratt Ideas. 'ff
jedions tp our calling SPACE Nothing are found
ed upon the Ambiguity of that Term.
SECONDLY, from the foregoing Remarks con
cerning Abftraftion-) and Abftratt Ideas, I obferve,
that the Modes of any Being, fuch as Exten/ion*
Figure, Solidity, Sec. are not any Thing really di-
ftintt, or different from the Being of which they
are faid to be Modes ; but that they are only the
Being it-felf, confidered under different Ideas.
From whence I argue; that if SPACE be thereat
Extension of any Being* it muft be the real ex
tended Being.
THIRDLY, I take Notice, that it is no folid
Objection rfo SPACE .being a mere dbftraft Idea,
that we can think^ conceive, and talk^ about it, fince
We may do the fame of all Abflratt Ideas what
ever,.
• FOURTHLY, I infer, that it is of no Force to
argue, that SPACE muft be Something real, becaufe
\ve ufe affirmative ExpreJJions concerning it : iince
we may and do ufe fuch ExpreiTions, concerning.
Other Abftratt Ideas.
LASTLY, I remark, that Abftratt Ideas are fome-
times looked upon as Realities : and that this arifes
from conceiving them, after the manner of Sub-
fiances, and fpeaking of them as real Things*
This cuftomary Way of fpeaking is not always
to be avoided. We may exprefs ourfelves in fuch
Phrafes, as Ufe has recommended : but then, when
we enter into Metaphyjical Debates, we mufr. not
argue from fuch Phrafes, or lay fo great a Strefs
upon Words, as to conclude, that the Ideas they are
nfed to exprefs, muft therefore be real Things. If
C we
*8 Arguments for the Reality
we would in Reality be Searchers after Truth, we
fhould carefully examine our Ideas, and {trip them
of the Mark* Men ufe for them; otherwife,
there mutt be endlefs Difpute, Wrangling, and
Jargon *.
CHAP. IIL
Arguments for the Reality of SPACE Ex*
amined, and Objections Anfwered.
HAVING premifed in the foregoing Chap
ters, what I thought necefTary, in Order to?
give you a general Light into the Caufe of thofe
Errors, which you have, during the Courfe of
Three Defences, unhappily fallen into ; proceed we
next to confider distinctly what you have ad
vanced, in Defence of your two Firft ..Pieces, and
in Objection to my Examination of them.
BUT I muft firft beg the Readers Excufe, if
lie is not fo well entertained in the following Pages,
as I could wifh. For I am very fenfible, that it
c'an be no Pleafure to him, any more than to me,
to be employed in unravelling Sophiftry, and
diftinguifhing Ambiguities. But this is what you
have made neceflary, by your Manner of handling
the Caufe you have undertaken; and fince you
are got into fuch a Road, we are obliged to fol
low you in Order to bring you back. I have
ReaJbn to believe, that whoever confiders this
your Third Defence attentively, will foon be in
duced to imagine, that you have embarked in a'
J See Locke H. U. B. z, c. ij. §. 28,
Caufe
of SPACE Examined* i£
Caufe, which you now find to be indefenfible;
and, that you have chofen to make Ufe of the
weak Defence of Sophiftry, rather than give Tip
what Dr. Clarke has advanced. Thus is the Name
and Character of a Pcrfon thought fufficient to
fupport the moiO: ridiculous Hypothecs ; fo much
Reafon had I to enter my Caveat, againfl any
Thing being brought befides rational Arguments
to determine between us; and I ftill have Rea
fon to defire the fame : For when I fee Men per-
fifting to defend a Caufe, for the Support of
which they are forced to have Recourfe to fuel}
low Artifices; I cannot think it either uncharita
ble, or unreafonable to believe; that had Dr.
Clarke advanced that Two and Two were Six,
fome of his Difciples would go on in that Me
thod of Calculation.
I would not here be thought, in the lead to
detradfrom the Character which that Author has
fo juftly gained in the learned World: No, far
be it from rne. Dr. Clarke was a Man of very
great Abilities : The World hath with Reafon
acknowledged him to be fuch : But he was ftill
a Man, therefore not infallible : And as the learn
ed Author of the Remark*, upon his Expofiion of
the Chvrch-CatechiJfo obferves, " The better he
" has performed in fome Points, the more ne-
" ceflary is it, to take Notice where he has de-,
« ferved Cenfure ; left Truth and Error, Good
« and Bad fo mingled fhould be imbibed toge-
" ther, and one ihould ferve to recommend and
« ingratiate the other." *
BUT to proceed to the Bufinefs in Hand. Since
* Remarks upon Dr. Clarke* Expofition of the Chiy-clv
Catechifm p. 2. Edit, 3.
C > ,vr
20 'Arguments for the Reality
we have fo far gained our Point, as to reduce
you to cavilling -3 all we have now to do in fuch
Places, is to bring you out from thofe Refuges,
and the Bufinefs is done That my Charge
againft you of Sophiftry is neither ill-grounded
nor •unjuft, the following Pages will I hope fuf-
ficiently evince.
I muft beg your Excufe, for not following
you exactly in the Order of your Arguments
and Objections : I fhall take fuch a Method as
will render the Whole more clear and obvious to
the Reader. This your Third Defence confifts of
two Vindications, one of your Firfti the other
of your Second Defence : I mall not confider them
feparately, but throw them into one, and confider
them together.
ARGUMENT I.
YOUR firfl Argument for the Reality of SPACE
runs thus viz. " Either there is no Difference
«c between touching and not touching , or elfe
«c That which is between two Walls, when they
<c do not touch, is really Something. And it feems
you cannot yet fee the Fallacy of this Reafoning.
« This [fay you] is a Disjunction, which feems
*c to me no Way defective. Unlefs therefore he
cc had proved, either that there wanted another
" Branch, or that there is no Difference between
" a Negative and an Affirmative, he has not pro-
Cf ved againft me." *
I imagined, Sir, that you would not any more
have infilled on this threadbare Argument of the
two Walls : But it feems ycm think they have as
* Third Def. p. a,
of SPACE Examined. 37
yet received no Breach, add that they are ftrohg
enough to withftand all our Battery. You ftifl
therefore found your Reafoning upon them 5 and
imce it is your Pkafure, we muft attend you •
But I hope >ou will be convinced that your
jpy&ffo* is derive* when you confider, that
you take for granted, the Principle on which it
s built. For when you argue, that « either there
( is no Difference between touching "and not
' touching ; or elfe That which is between two
Bodies when they do not touch, is really
Something" ; I am forry, that you either can
not, or will not fee, that you fuppofe without
any Manner of Proof, that the Exifiencc or non~
m/t&ct of Something between two Bodies is tic
Eflential Difference of touching and not touching
Tlus is the Principle which I called in Queftion
before, and I have yet feen no Reafon to alter
my Judgment; and as it is certainly not felf-
evident, it does not appear that your Disjunction
built upon it, without any Proof, is conclufive.
Every one knows that disjunctive Syllogifms are
mconcluflve, if the Enumeration be not compleat,
or, as you allow, if any one Branch be wanting
Now Sir, this is the Misfortune of your Argu
ment ; there wants a Branch : For had it been
compleat, it muft have flood thus- w*. « Eicner
c the Difference of touching and not touching
<< does not co»fift in the being of Something ktow*
- or elfe there is either no Difference between
' ?Uj f and n0t rouchi"g-or, when two
< Bodies do not touch there muft be Something
between''. And now, perhaps, you may fee
that the firft Branch is wanting in your Argu
ment : which if true will prove that the two other
Branches, which are the whole of your Argument,
ar-.
22 r Arguments for the Reality
are not conclufive : that is, if the Difference &c\
does not conjift in the being of Something between ;
then, there is no Neceffity that either there
muft be no Difference between touching and not
touching, or elfe, that when two Bodies do not
touch there muft be Something between. That it
does not confift in this, and what it does confift
in, fhall be ftiewn in the proper Place. In the
mean Time, fmce it is not (elf-evident that it does
confift in This, you ought not to have taken it
for granted ; fince it was incumbent upon you to
have proved it, before your Disjunction (which de
pends upon the Truth of it, yet neverthelefs feems
to you no Way defective) could be of any Force.
Now to take this Principle for granted, is the
very fame Thing, as to take for granted, that SPACE
is Something real : for it is fuppofing, that when
ever two Bodies do not touch, there muft always
be Something real between them ; which, when
there is only SPACE between them, is the very
Point I deny, and is what I have taxed you with
taking for^granted. My Charge therefore of beg
ging the Queftion ftands in full Force againft
you.
You proceed — " But he allows, that if then
" was no SPACE between them, they would touchy
•< and yet neverthelefs, fays, that SPACE is No-
«< thing." *
AND pray where is the Abfurdity of this ? I
allow, that when all Matter is removed from be
tween two Bodies, and there is likewife no SPACE
between them, they will ' touch : and yet never-
thelefs I fay, that if there was SPACE between
them, SPACE would be Nothing real. I am not
• Third Def. p, 2,
fenfible
of SPACE Examined. 23
fenfible that there is any Thing in this, which
contradicts either Reafon or Truth. But yet,
let us fee what Work you are pleafed to make
with it — By putting the Term Nothing, inftead
of SPACE) you would make me afTert, it feems,
that if there was Something between two Bodies
they would touch. — <c if this [fay you] be the
c« Truth of the Cafe [i.e. if SPACE bz Nothing]
«c let us put Nothing tor Space in the foregoing
cc Sentence, and then fee what Senfeit will make.
" If there was no Nothing between them they
«c would touch j that is, if there was Something be-
<e tween them they would touch ; but when
" there is any Thing between them, they do not
<f touch : Therefore they do touch, and do not
" touch, at the fame Time." *
THIS is fo pretty a jingle of Words, that 'tis
Pity they are to fo little Purpofe. If there was.
no SPACE between two Bodies (from between which
all other Matter is fkppofed away) They would touch :
This is True. If there was no Nothing i. e. if
there was Something bet ween two Bodies, they would
touch: This is abfurd. The Truth is mine, the
Abfurdicy is your own; and proceeds from a
low Quibble upon the word Between.
I allowed, that if there was no SPACE between
two Bodies they would touch: But you ought to
have remembered, that I allowed this, in that par
ticular Inftance of your two Walls, from be
tween which all other Matter was fuppofed away :
For the Obje&ion which you here raife, could
only be urged againft One, who mould allow,
that two Bodies would touch, if there -was no
SPACE between them, tho' Matter fhould, at the
* Third Dcf. p. 3,
fame
24 Arguments for the Reality
fame Time, be.fuppofed * ft \iz\\y filling ^ ^ /#,
termediatc Space: For it is in this ^Cafe only,
that when we fay> there is no SPACE between them>
it will follow that there is Something
them.
FOR although* SPACE be AW%, no Space
be »<? Nothing, and #0 A^//?/^ be Something ;
yet, when I allow, that, if there be no Space
between two Bodies, (from whence all Matter is'
firft fvppojed -away} they will touch; it will not
foHow, that-I'by this Means allow, that the two
Bodies would touch, if there was Something be-
SfaW^thWl It will only follow, that I tllow
they would touch, if there was Something where*
the SPACE was : and this is true : But then the'
Something here fignified by no SPACE, is only the '
Bootes themfdves which touch, therefore is n6t be
tween the Bodies/. e. the Bodies are nor between
themfelves, which your Argument proves, if it •
proves any Thing: This Attempt therefore, Sir,
to fhewme guilty of an Abfurdky,- ferves only
to difplay your Skill in Sophiftry, which you will
excufe me for having unravelled ; fince it is m Or
der to undeceive fome of thofe^r&fc many Perfons,
with whom it might otherwife prev-ail.
HAVING delivered y our felf of ; this 'Quibble,
you are pleafed to come to Particutxrs; and cite*
from me the' following PafTage. viz,. « Though'
£ it be necefTary to two Bodies touching, 'that No-
' thing Hiould be between them, yet it does not
follow that to their" not touching it is neceffary
;' that Something fhould be between them." * This,
it feerm, you are furprized at, and is Something
too Orange for your Belief: You ask, « If the-
'* Tkird Def, p. 3.
" latter
r of SPACE Examined. zg
" latter Part of this Sentence is true, where is
<c the Difference between touching and not touch-
« ing* 2" By thisQueftion it is plain, that you
<c have all along taken it for granted, that the
Exigence of Something between two Bodies, is
the efTential Difference of touching and not touch
ing. As this is the Prime Error on which you
proceed, it will be proper to fet you right, by
Ihewing you wherein the Difference &c» does
really confift.
THE Difference of touching and not touching,
confifts in. the Bodies themfelves being, or not
being diflant ; *. e. in their being in a different
Situation, or bearing a different Relation of Pofi-
tion to each other, without RefpecT: to any Thing
elfe : And this Situation, or Relation of Pojition,
is not (as you would have us imagine) any real
Affection of SPACE, nor does it arife from the
Exigence of SPACE between ; but it has Refpecl:
only to the Bodies tkemfches ; to them it is con
fined, and has nothing to do with any Thing
elfe. If you ask, what is being diftant, but hav
ing Something between them ? and what is being
not diftant, but having Nothing between them? I
anfwer, that whoever confults his own Ideas, will
foon find, that the Idea of being diflant is not
the Idea of Something between : and that the Idea
of being not diftait, is not the Idea of Nothing be
tween. When we have the Idea of Bodies not diftant^
the Idea of there being Nothing between them
will perhaps follow the former Idea in the Mind,
not as if they were Ideas of the fame Thing;
but as the latter is a Confequence of the former.
The being of Nothing between them is not the
* Third Def, p. 3.
D Canfc
2~6 Arguments for the Reality
Caufe or Reafon why they are not diftant: ndr
has it any Thing to do with the Idea of their
not being diftant : but their not being diftant is
the Caule or Reafon, why there can be Nothing
between them. So in the other Cafe ; when two
Bodies are diftanr, the being of Something between
them is not the Caufe or Reafon of their being
diflant ; but their being diftant^ is the Caufe or
Reafon, why there may be Something between them:
But then as in this Cafe there may not be Some
thing between them ; the being, or not being of
Something between, is here an Accident only of
their being difhnr. And therefore, although there
is Nothing between two Walls which do not
touch, yet it is no Confequence, that there is no
Difference between touching and not touching.
You ask — "Can Nothing conftitute a Dif-
" ference between two Somethings ? according to
" this Author" [you fay] " it can; becaufe he
<c grants that there is a Difference ; and fays alfo,
€l that Space is fafficient t& conftitute that Diffe-
« rence ; and yet SPACE, according to him, is
« Nothing."*
IN Anfwer to this, I muft obferve, that in
fpeaking on this Subject of SPACE (as of all ab-
ftrad Ideas) we ufe Terms and Expreffions, which
are not true in a flrid Metaphyfical Senfe. Con
ceiving them after the Manner of Subfhnces, for
?he Help of the Under ftanding, we are apt to
be led into Error : and under the Difguife of
Words, and common Forms of Speech, they do
as it were by Artifice intrude on our Minds, as
real Beings. Since then we may be deceived,
andrmpofed on, even by ourfelves; it ihould al-
* Third Dcf. p. 3,
ways
of SPACE Examined. 27
ways be our Care to guard againft it ; and to
diftinguifh between Words and Things, Appear
ances and Realities. Much more fliould it be
our Care not to argue from Jifch Terms ; or tp
pretend to defend our Point by laying a Strefs on
fetch ExpreJJlons of our Opponents, when we are
confcious at the fame Time, that they do not
mean them in a ftrift Metaphyfical Senfe. For
there is juft the fame Difference, between being
deceived ourfelves by a Form of Words, and ar
guing from fuch Words of another Perfon, know
ing at the fame Time that he does not mean them
in a ftrid Senfe; as there is between an Error, and
a . 'voluntary perjtfting in it.
IT was neglecting to diftinguifh between Ex-
trcjjions which may be ufed according to the
common Way of fpeaking, and what is True
in a ftri6t Metaphyfical Senfe, that has led you
to urge, that SPACE muft be Something real, be-
caufe I happen'd to fay that it was Efficient to
conflitute a Difference. This is the Sentence you
catch Hold on, and imagine that you can prove
from hence, that SPACE, even according ^to
me, muft be Something real : But my Meaning
to any unprejudiced Reader, is eafy an4 ob
vious.
IT is indeed, ftridly and Metaphyfically fpeak
ing, improper to fay, that SPACE, is foment to
conftitute, or that SPACE is between', But when
we fay that SPACE is between Bodies, it is from
conceiving it after the Manner of a Subftance, i.e.
from conceiving Nothing after the Manner of Some*
ttongi and thence affirming Something pofitive of
it ; whereas all the pofitive Lxpreffions are appli
cable to the Bodies only. Thus it is not SPACE,
which is, or cxilts between the Bodies 5 but the
P a
2 8 Arguments for the Reality
Bodies are diftoMt, and there is not any Matter, or
any Thing between them.
^ WHEN I (aid therefore, that pure SPACE is
fafficient to conftitute the Difference', it was fpoke
in Compliance with the common Forms of Speech ;
not, that I fancied SPACE any Thing able, or fitf-
fcient to conjlitute ; and the Meaning of that Sen
tence explained in a Stria Metaphyfical Senfe,
is this, viz. that the Difference of not touching
and touching of two Bodies does not confift in
the Ejfijfatce of Something between them : it is
fufficient that the Bodies are diftant. The Bodies
themfdves being diftant are Sufficient to covftitute
that Difference : which is all I meant by laying,
that pure Space, or pure Diftance, is fufficient to
conftitute the Difference'; without fuppofing, as
[ there add, this pure SPACF, or pure Diftance,
to be any Thing exifling between the Bodies, but
a mere rbid. It is not therefore SPACE, or Di-
ftauce, or a mere Void, that ftridly can be faid
to conftitute ; but it is the Bodies themfdves, which
being diftant, are of themfelves Efficient to con
ftitute the Difference between their touching and
not touching. From hence then my Meaning is
clear, and it is to no Purpofe for you to argue
from inaccurate Expreffious, unlefs it be to fup-
piy the Want of found Argument, and to prop
a falling Caufe. .Many Inftances might be brought
to ihew, that pofitive Expreffions do not prove,
that What they are ufed /about, is Something real.
What is it that coaftitutes the Difference between a
Jong Body, and a mort one ? In the common
Way of fpeaking Length is faid to conftitute this
Dilterence : yet it does not follow, becaufe this
pofmve Expreffion of conflicting a Difference is
led concerning Length, that therefore Length fa
th&
of SPACE Examined. 29
the AbflraB; is any Thing real; and the Rea-
fon is, becaufe ftri&ly fpeaking, it is not Length,
but the long Body which conjiittttes the Difference.
Thus in our Cafe, Dtftance, or SPACE may, in
the common Way of fpeaking, be faid to confttntt*
the Difference; though ftric~tly it is the Bodies
themfelves. I own it requires fome Fxadtnefs and
Care to conceive thefe Things aright. We are too
liable to be deceived by the cuftomary Forms of
Expreffion ; we are too apt to realise our abftraffc
Ideas, which is owing to the Forwardnefs of the
Imagination, in giving Afliflance to the Intellect,
for the greater Eafe in conceiving, and Readinefs in
talking upon Subjects Abftrafted and Intellectual.
For meafuring Difhnces in Imagination, we have
Recourfe to imaginary Subftrata^ as in attual mea
furing we make Ufe of real ones. Try the Cafe
in other Ideas that are confeflcdly abftraft, and it
may affift you in uiaderftanding That before us>
Weight is an ahftra(5b Jdea; there is a Difference
betwixt a Pound and an Ounce : Now what is
it, that ftri&ly fpeaking conftitfttes this Difference?
Is it the Idea of Weight /* or the Bodies themfelves.
being more or lefs weighty ? And thus there is a
Difiance between two Bodies: Now what is it that
conftitfttes this Diftance S What, but the Bodies
themfelves bearing fuch a Relation of Site to one
another. And what has this to do with the Ex-
iftence, or non-Exiftence of any Thing between 2
This feems- to me to be the Truth of the Cafe,
and as to your Cavils at that Expreffion of Space
being fttfficient to conflittite the Difference, without
being any Thing real ; what I have faid is a fuf-
fkient Anfwer. It is <c hardly poffible (as a late
Writer well obferves) " to fpeak on this Subject of
^ Non-Entities, or Nothings , without ufing the
" Terms
3.0 Arguments for the Reality.
rc Terms, that reprefent pofaive Beings, and red
*' Properties." * But an Argument founded up
on mere Terms, and common Expreflions, can,
be only ufed when the Difputant wants a^etter.
I doubt not but you may find many more of my
Expreflions, liable to the fame Cavils as This be
fore us ; and if you think this Sort of Argument
will be of any Service to you, you are heartily
welcome to make the heft of it. Our Caufe, as
it requires no fuch Kind of arguing in its Defence,
fb it fears it not when ufed againft it : It gathers
Strength from fuch Blows, and flands the firmer
for fuch an Oppofition.
I fhall now beg leave to take Notice of a Paf-
£jge, which (as it appears to me) if it be not
cleared up, will leave your Notions in great Ob-
fcurity. I had obferved, that you <e fuppofed the
<c Difference of touching , and not touching of
« two Bodies, to confift merely in the Exiftence
cc of Something real between them &c. f. This
you quote in your Third Defence, and make the
following Remark upon it. " Something real [lay
you] " mud, I think, either mean a Subftmce ;
cc and then W2 are agreed ; for neither of m fitp-
<c pofe that there muft be a Stibftance between
«* the two Bodies-) when they do not touch, or
*e that elfe there would be no Difference between
ec touching and not touching &e. ** ". Here
you infift that the Difference does confift in the
Exiftence of Something between them: but you
jfeem much afraid of the word real : you are ap-
prehenfive it may mean a Subftance j and then it
* Philofophical EfTays on Various Subjeds. Eff. I.
Se£t. XL p. 40.
f Dr. Clarkis Notions of SPACE Examined p. 14, ic.
** Third Def. p. 13.
of SPACE Examined. 31
feems, you would not fay, that the Difference con-
f i fled in the Exiftence of Something real between them.
No; ifit means a Subftance, " we are agreed, [fay
you] " for neither o/ #J fuppofe, that there muft be a
<e Subftance between the two Bodies when they
" do not touch." That I do not fuppofe fo, is
indeed very true : but that yon muft either fup
pofe fo, or elfe, that you muft fuppofe nothing
at all between 'em, I fhall make appear.
THE Force of your Remark feems to be this;
you would urge, that there are fome Things which
are not Sttbfiances: and therefore, although you do
not fuppofe there muft be a Subftance ; yet, that
you may without any Abfurdity fay, there is
Something. But now, if fo ; I ask, what you
call that Something? you will anfwer in your
ufual Language, a A4ode. If then you fay there
muft be Something^ and yet do not fuppofe that
there muft be a Subftance^ and That Something be
a Mode ; it will follow, that you fuppofe there
muft be a Mode between them, and yet do not
fuppofe that there muft be a Subftance', which is
nothing lets than fuppofing, that there may be a
Mode between them without a Subftance ; which,
I believe, even you will hardly venture to affirm :
and yet, if you do not, you muft contradict
your felf. For if there cannot be a Mode be
tween them without a Subftance ; then, if there
be a Mode at all, I prefume it will follow, than
it muft be with a Subftance; directly contrary
to you, who fay, that there muft be Something
between the two Bodies ; (which Something you
call a Mode ;) and yet confefs you do not fappofe
that there wuft be a Subftance.
IF therefore you will afiferr, that, when two
Bodies do not touch, there muft be Something
between
3 2 Arguments for the Reality
between them; you muft fay that there is a
fiance. That there muft be a Sttbjiancey or no
thing at ally will appear from confidering, that
by your granting there need not be a Stibflance^
you grant that there need not be any Thing at all.
— For, fince there cannot be a Mode without
a Subftance-, and fince you own that there need
not be a Subftance ; who does not immediately
fee, that you own there need not be a Mode \
(which yet, at the fame time you fay there muft
be; ftrange Inconfiftency !) i.e. that there need
not be either Subftance or Mode : and, if there
need not be either Subftance or Mode, and yet
Something; you mud be fo kind, as to oblige the
World with the Difcovery of a new Sort of
Somethings.
" IT is very needful [you tell us] cc to put
ft our Author in Mind of that common and
«c necefTary Divifion or Diuindion of Things
<c made Ufe of by Logicians, viz,, into Genus
<c and Species; the not confidering which, feems
" to be whar led him into the Miftake, which
cc runs through his whole Book." * Your Au
thor is very much obliged to you for this Piece
of Service, and I dare fay, that no one will pre-
fume to imagine, that your Memory fhould fail
you, during the Courfe of this Work ; or that
I fhould be obliged to put you in Mind of this
Very fame common and neccjfcrj Diftinttion : How
ever, if the not confidering This, has led me in
to any Miftake, it is to be hoped that the Re-
colle&ion of it, will by your Affiftance, be able
to lead me out again.
* Third Dcf. p. 4.
of SPACE "Examined* 33
*e THE Words Thing, Something, 'Being) or the
*c like, are ufed [you are fo kind to inform us]
*c to fignify the GenuS) or are genera! and uni-
<c verfal Terms, comprehending all Things what-
<c foever under them, whether they be Sub (lances,
<c Properties, or Relations &c. This firft Genus
cc comprehended under the Name Thing* is divided
** into two SpscieS) viz,. Subftance and Property." *
;You go oh with a great Deal more about
Cenns and Species, which is to as little Purpofe, as
it would be for me to repeat it. The Force of
it feems to be This ; that Subftance is only one
Species of Things ; and therefore, that although
Space be not a Sub/lance, yet it is not improper
to call it a Thing; becaufe, though it comes
Hot under that Species of Things called a S Kb fanes ;
yet it comes under another Species of Things cal
led a Property.' -But you mould have remem
bered alfo, Sir, that Things are divided into Things
&al) and Things Ideal. Things jfa«/are fuch as have
a real Exigence : Things Ideal are fuch as have no
real Exiftence) but are ony Ideas in the Mind.
OUR Difpute is, whether Space be any Thing
Real ) for that it is an Ideal Thing) I am very ready
to grant. " It is very proper [jay you] <c to call
*{ SPACE Something, though it be no Subfhnce
<c &c." t But if no Things befides Sttbftances are
Things real, it follows, that SPACE muft either
be a Stibftaftcey or no Thing real : Now, that no
.Things are Things real) but Subftances, will eafily
appear. Your own Divifion of Things is into
"Sttbflance and Property : If a Property therefore be
tlo Thing real) then no Things but Stibftonces are
Things real : Now, a Property muft either be con-
* Third Def. p. 4, f Ibid, p. 6.
JB fidered
34 Arguments for the Reality
fidered as in the ^bftraft, or as in a SiAjeft :
It is plain that a Property in the sdbjtratt is only
an Ideal Thing, or has no Exiftence ad extra,
and that a Property in a Subject, a Subftance, or
Being, is only the Subllance or Being it felf, un
der a particular Confideration. If therefore it be
proper to call SPACE Something* though it be no
Subftance ; it can be only in the Senle of Some
thing Ideal. To what Purpofe then, is this long
Account of Genus and Species introduced here ?
For though the Word Thing be a Genus, under
which are contained the two Species, Subftance and
Property, yet *tis plain that SPACE muft either
be the former, viz,, a Subftance, or elfe it is no
Thing real. What have you gained then, Sir, by
infilling on the Propriety of calling SPACE a Thingl
Since if it be not a Subftance it may as well be
no Thing at all ; becaufe it is then a Thing in Idea
only : and if you mean no more than This, as
you can prove no more ; I am very ready to a-
gree with you, and to own, that in fuch a Senfe,
•we can very properly fay that SPACE is Some
thing : and fo we can fay likewife of WVtteneft
in the jibjlratt* or any other abftrad Idea what-
foever.
BUT alas! Sir, of what Service is all This to
your Queftion? SPACE muft not only be a Thing*
but a Thing real; a Thing which has Exiftence
ad extra, or you lofe your Caufe: and if it be a
Property, and yet Something real, it muft be more
than a Property ; it muft be a Subftance ; other-
wife, how can it be between Walls ? can a Pro
perty be faid to be there, any otherwife than as
the Subftance is there? can Extenjion be between
any Thing? If any Thing is really between^ is it
not the Extended * Subftanw? If SPACE be not
Some*
of SPACE Examined. 3£
Something more than a Property, how can it be
Infinite, Eternal &c.\ can a mere Property be fo?
or muft it not be the Subftance, if any Thing I
Nay if SPACE be not more than an abftrad Pro
perty, how can it be at all ? The Reafon why
I concluded that SPACE muft be a Subftance, if
any Thing, was becaufe I could not but take it
for granted, that when you called it Something*
you meant Something real; which if you do, I
have fliewn that I rightly concluded from your
calling it Something, that it was a Subftance : and if
you do not mean Something real, then your Ar
gument that <e it may bs Something yet not a $#&•*
" fiance, is nothing to the Purpofe.
BUT I may add, that the Difpute about the
Propriety of calling the Properties or Modes of
any particular Being Somethings real, when con-
fidered in any other View, than as the "Being it
felf under a certain Modification, can be of no Ser
vice to the main Queftion. For you contend
that Space is Something^ becaufe it is a Property
of fome Subftance ; but now fuppofing that Pro
perties, confidered merely as fuch> are Somethings
real*, yet this conduces nothing towards proving
that SPACE is Something real, 'till SPACE is proved
to be a real Property of fome Being. When you
have done this Sir, then, and not till then, you
will have done the Bufinefs ; and I (hall not any lon
ger contend, whether Properties are Things real or
not. Prove SPACE to be a real Property, the Pro
perty, the Extenfion (as you affirm it to be) of
the Self-exigent and Eternal 'Being \ and I will then
allow it to be Something in what Senfe you pleafe.
IT mould here be obferved, that whenever I
fay that Things real muft be St*bftahces9 I do not
xnean. thereby, any unknown Subftraww : This is
F * 09S
3$ Arguments for the Reality
not the Difpute here. v Bur
only fome Thing which
orfomc B*t. Ve know
, hath
not
touch, and do o at t e
of SPACE Examined. 37
die Reafon why they did not touch, is now
when they do touch, neither annihilated, nor re
moved ; 1 think it neceffarily follows, that it
muft, if it had any real Exiflence, exift between
them ftill. To tell us, that it is neither removed,
nor annihilated, neither^ is it between the two Bodies
, but it is jttji where it was ; is the lame as to
fay, that the Thing, which exijled between the
Bodies before, is now not fuppofed to be annihi
lated* and yet (tho' the Bodies are increafed in a di*
reel: Line) is not removed from between them ;
and yet is not between them; but yet is juft
where it was ; which feems to carry an Air of
Legerdemain with it, and to be Something like
telling us, that it is here ; and it is not here ; and
yet — High pafs ! — it is juft where it was before.
But however you have been fo kind as to let us
into this Secrer, by acquainting us, that it is pe
netrated by the Increase of the Bodies. * ; fo that,
tho' it was between 'em before, and is now nei
ther removed nor annihilated, yet it is not be
tween the two Bodies ftill, " but it is juft where
<c it was ; only with this Difference, that, as it
* e was before between the Bodies, it is now pene
trated by the Increafe of the Bodies f»"
TO explain this, you inftance as follows, c< Let
there be twp Bodies each of them a Yard Cube,
« and let them be placed at a Yard Diftance from
each other; and let us alfo fuppofe all Matter
to be taken from between them; that is, let
us fuprofe a cubic Yard of empty SPACE be
tween them. If thefe two Bodies be crouded
together, fo as that their two Superficies fa
cing each other touch, and any Perfon fhould
$•• Third Pef. p.
3 S 'Arguments for the Reality
" ask- what was become of the cubic Yard of
«c SPACE that was between them; I would an-
" fwer, that it was neither removed, nor anni-
" hilated, but that it is now where the two in-
** ternal half cubic Yards of the Bodies are ; and
« that, as before the Removal of the two Bodies!
" the SPACE was between them, that is, between
« the internal Superficies of each Body ; it is
*« not now between the two whole Bodies, but
" only between the two external half- cubic Yards,
" and penetrated by the two Jnternal half-cubic
*< Yards of the Bodies*.
To This I reply as follows.
FIRST I prefume, that when you fay the Space
is penetrated by the two half-cubic Yards of the
Bodies, you mean, that every Part of the SPAC$
(to fpeak in your Language) is penetrated by every
Part of the two half-cubic Yards of the Bodies ;
or, that this cubic Yard of SPACE which was be
tween the Bodies is, when the Bodies touch,
fo diffufed throughout the two half- cubic Yards
of the Bodies, that wherever there is Body, there
is SPACE. This, I think, muft be your Meaning;
becaufe, if there be any Point of thefe two half-
cubic Yards of Body, where there is not SPACEJ
then the SPACE cannot be jnfl where it was,
Now, if this is your Meaning, it is blending
Body and SPACE together in fuch a Manner, as
to make them be One and the Same : For, if then
is no one Point of the Bodies, where there is nol
Space -3 and no one Point of the Space, where then
is not Body ; I doubt it will be difficult to di
ftingtiim One from the Other; or to teil us, whe
ther this cubic Yard be Body or Space} that is
* Third Def. p. 8, Q>
/
(
I
cf SPACE Examined. ^A
in plain Englifh, you run inJo Confufioii and
Abfurdity.
SECONDLY, fince no Point of Matter, in this
Inftance, can be afligaed, where there is not
Space 3 if we take that Point where thefe Bodies
touch, iince that Point is Matter, it will follow
that there is Space at the very Point where they
touch : And I doubt you will have need of
fome very nice Diftin&ion, to ihew how there
may be SPACE at the very Point where they
touch ,• without fhewing at the fame Time, ei
ther that there is SPACE between them, or that
That Point is Space. If there is SPACE between
them, then the Abfurdity I before charged yo'i
with follows clofe, viz,, that the Bodies do touch
and do not touch at the fame Time : If you fay,
that That Point where they touch, is Space; then,
fince it is pretty evident that it is Matter, it is
as evident that it muft be both Matter and Space :
and if fo, I would defire to be informed whe»
ther it is Space or Matter which touches.
— — Dignus Pindice Nodus.
THE Reafon why you imagine, that the SPACE,
which was fuppofed to exift between the Bodies
before they touched is now, when they do touch,
neither annihilated nor removed, but exifts juft
where it was, feems to me to be This; you con
ceive SPACE to be Something exifting between
the Bodies atfirft; and when they touch, you
find you cannot fuppofe SPACE to be annihilated
or removed, and thence you conclude, that it
muft be juft where it was. But if you would
confider what I take to be the Reafon, why you
cannot fuppofe it either annihilated or removed ;
That will fhevv you the Reafon, why it does not
therefore follow, that it muft exift there ftill ;
f;
Arguments for the Reality
Becaufe it is not any Thing exi/ling at all.'
In ihort, the Idea of SPACE, and of its attual
ExijhncC) is fo fixed in your Mind, that (as you
fay in your Second Defence) you can by no meant
et rid of it * : and therefore, becaufe the Idea of
uch adual Exiftence remains ; you conclude that
SPACE muft remain, and actually exift* where you
had an Idea of its adual Exiftence before, even
tho' there be Matter : But if every one may con
clude, that All thofe Ideas which he fhall chance not
to be able to get rid of, muft therefore have real
Archetypes j every Creature of the Brain may
have a real Exiftence in Nature.
HAVING fhewn the Abfurdity which follow
ed from your fuppofing SPACE to be Something
really existing between the Bodies, I proceeded to
obferve, that " from our fuppofing SPACE to be
<c Nothing but the Abfence of Matter, no fuch
<c Abfurdities would follow ; for when two Bo-
cc dies do not touch, and there is only SPACE be-
«e tween them, we fay there is nothing between
« them Let their Extremities be extended
" 'till they touch, and there is ftill, we fay, no-
" thing between them." f
You tell us that, if we confider this PaflTage,1
we fhall fee that what I before applied to you,
of proving that there is no Difference between
touching and not touching, .""may be much more
juftly turned upon my feff**. To lupport this
Accufation you argue as follows " If SPACE is
*' really Nothing, then Nothing may be SPACE.
<c I hope the Author will not deny This: If
* Second Def. p. 6.
*|- Dr. Clarke's Notions of SPACE Eyamined p. 10.
** See Third Def. p. 9.
*f then
of SPACE 'Examined. 41
** then Nothing be SPACE* I beg leave to repeat
*c the preceeding PafTage of this Author, and put
«* the Word SPACE inftead of the Word Nothing •
« for he allows, that all we can affirm of SPACE,
« we may affirm of Nothing; and therefore What
« we can affirm of Nothing, we may affirm of
« SPACE. Let us then try the PafTage in that
«« Manner, and fee what it will prove. Wuen two.
" Bodies do not touch) and there is only Nothing
«< between them, we fay there it SPACE between.
<c them. — Let their Extremities be extended
" '//// they touch* and there is ft ill, we fay, SPACE
«c between them. That is, when the two Bodies
" do touch, there is SPACE between them ; and
« when they do not touch > there is alfo SPACE
« between them : where therefore can the DifFe-
<c rence be between touching, and not touching ?
« and will it not alfo follow, that they do touch.
*' and do not touch* at the fame Time ? * "
WHERE the Difference lies> between the touch
ing of two Bodies* tho* in both Cafes there be
Nothing between them, I have elfewhere fhewn f.
And it will appear presently, that you have here
failed in your Endeavours to prove it a Con-
fequence from What I have faid, that there is
SPACE in both Cafes between them ; and thac
the Bodies touch, and do not touch at the fame
Time. For pray, good Sir, from whence do you
derive this Licence of putting one Word for ano
ther, juft as your Fancy leads you ? one would
imagine, you thought that Words were like the
Sybil's Leaves, which might be blown about, and
changed with every Breath. The Fallacy to be detect
ed lies in the latter Part of your Argument. My;
* Third Def, p. 9, 10. f See p. 25.
*
4-2 Arguments for the Reality
Expreffion was This viz. " Let their Extremi- '
*' ties be extended 'till they touch, and there is
'< flill we fay Nothing between them." This
Sentence, changing the word Nothing into Space,
you thus repeat viz. " Let their Extremities be
<r extended till they touch, and there is ftill, we
<c fay, SPACE between them." Now to this
Twill of Words, I anfwer that although when
<wo Bodies touch, there is Nothing between them,
yet it does not follow, that becaufe Space is No
thing, therefore there mult be SPACE between them :
For, when it is faid, that there is Nothing be
tween two Bod'ies which touch ; the Term'AV
thing is ufed in one Senfe; and when SPACE is
faid to be Nothing, it is ufed in another. When
we fay that SPACE is Nothing, it is ufed in that
Senfe which excludes only Things Real: But when
it is faid, that there is Nothing between two Bo
dies which touch, it is fo be underftood in that
Senfe which excludes, not only ail Real Things,
but all Ideal Things, or all Ideas of any Thing
as bet-ween. The meaning therefore of this F.x-
preflion is, that there is not any Thing Real or
Ideal between them ,- /. e. There is no ^ Red Ex
igence between them, neither have we that Idea
which reprefents Diftancc or SPACE, as be
tween them.. The Term Nothing, when un
derftood in the Senfe we here ufe it does, you
fee, by being a Negation of all Ideal, as well as
Real Exigences, exclude SPACE, which is an Ideal
Exiftence, from being, as we fay, between the
Bodies which touch.
IT appears then, that to fay there is Nothing
Wween two Bodies when they touch, therefore, face
SPACE is Nothing, there is SPACE between them ;
is the fame as to urge, that becaufe SPACE is No
thing,
, . of SPACE Examined. 43
thin?, in that Senfe which is only a Negation.of
Things ^4/5 therefore when there is Nothing
between two Bodies, in that Senfe which is a
Negation of all Ideal Things (and therefore ok
SPA"CE among the reft) as well as of all Real Things,
there is therefore SPACE between them; which
is confounding thefe two different Acceptations
of the Term Nothing together, in fuch a manner
as to deftroy the Ufe of" Language, which I fup-
pofe was defigned to make Men underftand one
another ; and is arguing in fo many Words, that
becaufe there is Nothing between two Bodies m
that Senfe which excludes Things both Real and
Ideal; therefore (obferve the Confequence !) there
is Nothing between them in that Senfe which
excludes only Things Real ; i. e. becaufe there is
not any Thing Real 'or Ideal between them, there
fore there is Something Ideal between them; there
is Something Ideal between them, becaufe there is
not Something Ideal between them. — This is your
Argument, and a curious One it is ! But ]
lieve it will hardly be thought fufficient to (hew,
that it follows from any Thing I had faid, that
there is SPACE in both Cafes (w*. when they
touch and do not touch) between the Bodies;
or, that the Bodies touch, and do not touch at
the fame Time ; but that you have been amuiing
your Readers, by playing upon the Ambiguity
of a Word.
IF you underftand the Term Nothing in this
Place, in the Senfe I here ufe it vi*. as a Ne
gation of Things both Real and Ideal', your Ar
gument has no Manner of Force. If you under
ftand it in that Senfe in which I do not here
ufe it, w*. as a Negation of Things Real only
{which is the Senfe I ufe it in when there is
44 Arguments for tke Reality.
SPACE between the Bodies) then you are not
objecting to me, but to Somebody elfe, who,
like the SPACE you are treating of, is Ideal
only.
IN ihort, the whole Myftery of the Inftance
above is This : When two Bodies do not
touch, and there is only SPACE between them,
we fay there is Nothing between them ; becaufe
there is not any Thing really exifting between
them ; yet the Bodies being diftant, give us the
Idea of Diftance or SPACE as between them ; but
ftill, as Diftance and SPACE, according to my
Apprehenfion, are only Ideas which have no Ar-
chetypes ad extra ; fo we fay, that although we
have the Idea of Diftance or SPACE, as between
them ; yet there is Nothing or No-Thing Real be
tween them, Now when the Bodies do touch,
we ilill fay there is Nothing between them ; but
then, the Bodies not being diftant, we have not,
as we had before, the Idea of Diftance, or of
SPACE : So that in the former Cafe, there is
Nothing between them, but then we had the Idea
of Diftance or SPACE : in the latter Cafe there is
Nothing between them, but then we have not
the Idea of Diftance or of SPACE.— To fay then
that there is Nothing between two Bodies when
they touch, therefore there is SPACE, or there is
Diftance, becaufe SPACE and Diftance are No
thing ; is to fay that becaufe there is Nothing be
tween them, therefore we muft have the Idea of
their being dtftant> becaufe Dijlance in the Abftracl
is Nothing.
BUT you may farther confider that the Term
Nothing confifts of two Words, and that it is
truly a Negation every one knows who underftands
jEngliftij and it is therefore alfo as evident, that
of SPACE Examined. 4$
when we fay SPACE is No-Thing, we mean, that
.SPACE is not a Thing: Inftead then of faying as
you do, that « if SPACE is Nothing then Nothing
** is SPACE *' ; Let us, to render the Propofition
true and intelligible, repeat it thus viz,. « If
" SPACE is not a Thing, then a Thing is not
<*•• SPACE " : Now we are got at the Truth, but
it is fuch Truth, as utterly deftroys your Ar
gument, and lays open the Fallacy of it. For will
it follow, that becaufe SPACE is not a Thingt or
becaufe a Thing is not Space, will it therefore fol
low, I fay, when there is not a Thing between
two Bodies which touch, that there muft be
SPACE between them * No : The Reader fees your
Argument depends upon its Obfcurity, and when
brought into the £-ight, its Fallacy is glaring :
when ftripp'd of its ambiguous Phrafe, and re
duced to plain Senfe, every one fees that it has
not the leaft Appearance of Force in it. When
you fay that, If Nothing is Space, then if there is
Nothing between two Bodies which tottch> there is
Space; the Fallacy in this Sentence, may not per
haps fo plainly appear; but explain it, and fay
that If a Thing is not Space, then, if there is not a
Thing between two Bodies which touch, there mtift
be Space ; reduce it thus to its proper Meaning, and
every one muft fee, that there is no Manner of
Confequence, or Connection in the Propofition.
You fay that, « If the Words [Space and No-
<c thing'] cannot be fo altered, then it is moftma-
*' nifeft, that SPACE cannot poflibly be Nothing,
« that is, it muft certainly be Something." * It
is moft manifeft, that this PafTage is Nothing to
the Purpofe. SPACE is not Nothing, in that Senfe
{.Third Def. p. io?
which
46 'Arguments for the Reality
which excludes Things both Red and Ideal, but
what then ? does it follow that it cannot be No
thing in that Senfe which excludes only Things Real?
Is it a Confequence, that becaufe it is not No
thing, in a Senfe which denies it to be any Thing
Ideal, therefore it cannot be Nothing, in a Senfe
which yet allows it to be a Thing Ideal? There
fore when you argue, that SPACE muft be Some
thing, if it be not Nothing; as we only allow it
to be not Nothing^ in that Senfe of the Word, which
excludes it from being any Thing either Real or
Ideal; it can only be faid, that SPACE is Some
thing, becaufe it is not Nv>thing in that Senfe of
the Term juft mentioned: But then as Something
Is diftinguifhed into Real and Ideal, it cannot be
faid, that becaufe SPACE is not Nothing in that
Senfe which excludes it from being any Thing
either Real or Ideal, therefore it is Something Real:
No; becaufe it may be, as it is, Something AsW:
and therefore to fay, that SPACE mufl certainty
be Something becaufe it is not Nothing, as you do
in the abovecited Paffage, will do you no Ser
vice; tinlefs that Argument would prove it to be
Something Real ; i. e. Something which has an Ex-
iftence ad extra ; which that it will not, I hope I
have fufficiently mewn.
You argue, that if SPACE be not Nothing, it
muft be Something ; or, that I muft have <c found
«c out a Thing that is between Something snd
<c Nothing, which exifts, but does not really exift,
" which kerns [fay you] to be his Notion of
« SPACE."*
To fay that SPACE is Something Ideal, is n<
to find out a Thing between Something and N<
* See Third Dcf. p. 10, ir.
thing
of SPACE Examined. 47
|| thing : It is only diftinguifhing Things into Real
and Ideal y a Diftinftion which you have made
BnccefTary, by calling Modes, Relations in the^-
\fttafti and all abftract Ideas, Things.
MY Notion of SPACE therefore is not, that it
is a Thing between Something and Nothing,
which exifts, but does not really exift : No;
but that it is a mere abftrad Idea: an Idea which
my Mind has formed, from confidering Extenfion
in the General : but as Extenfion in the General
is an Idea of pure Intellect, my Imagination
therefore fupplies this Idea with an Imaginary*
Subftratum, for the Help of the Underftanding,
as has been before explained. My Mind, by this
Means, reprefents SPACE to me as a Thing: but,
lince this Thing is only my own Idea, and has no
objettivc Realty, I therefore call it an Ideal Thing.
" IF he will tell me [fay you] what Sort of
Cf a Thing that is, which is neither Something
« nor Nothing, and can fhew me the Difference
«' between the real and not real Exigence, of that
" which has fome Exiftence ; I ihall be very ready
te to give up the whole Difpute." *
IT is not fo very difficult, to fhew the diffe
rence, between the real and not real Exigence of
that, which has (according to thecuftomiry Way
of fpeaking) fome Exiftence. SPACE, if we
would fpeak ftridly, has no Exiftence at all. But
-as Properties Relations, and all abftraft Ideas are
'in common Speech faid to exift in the Mind ;
fo SPACE is faid to have an Ideal Exiftence, in
Contradiftinction to thofe Things which have an
Exiftence *d extra. The Difference therefore,
between the real and not red Exiftence, of that
.
* Third Def, p. u,
which
48 Arguments for the Reality
which has fome Exigence, is this ; w*. a Thing
is faid to have real Exiftence, when it exifts ad
extra ; and not to have real Exiftence, and yet
fome Exiftence, when it exifts only in the Mind.
THE Queftion between us is whether SPACE
has real Exiftence. Now I conceive! that real
Exiftence can only be applied to What exifts ad
extra. The Difpute then turns upon This */«,.
whether SPACE exifts ad extra: Your Anfwer
would be, I prefume, that Modes exift ad extra j
SPACE is a Mode ; and therefore SPACE exifts ad
extra. To which I reply
FIRST, That Modes do not exift ad extra, un*
der any other Confideration, than that of a mo*
dified Stibftance$ and are Nothing but the Stibftance :
But you grant that SPACE is not a modified Sub-
ftance ; and confequently, SPACE does not exift
ad extra: Ergo, if real Exiftence be Exiftence ad
extra, it has no real Exiftewe, by your own Cort-
feflion* — Secondly, fuppofing, but not granting,
that Alodes exift ad extra> confidered as Modes ;
yet, till SPACE is proved to be a Mode* which is
a Point that ihall be confidered in due Time, you
will not have proved, that SPACE exifts ad extra,
even upon fuch a Suppofition.
You proceed as follows — - " I faid in my firft
tf Defence, when I afTerted SPACE to be Some-
cc thing, that / would not be underftood by Tkingf
*c to mean a Subftance &c. I doubt then, anfwers
<c he, he will find it pretty difficult to be under*
<c ftood at all ; for if it be a Thing exift ing and yet
<c not a Sttbftance, then it is a Thing that is nei-
*c ther Body nor Spirit &c. I need not trouble
tc the Reader with any more of this Page. Ic
" feems very odd> that any Perfon fhould try to
" exclude
of SPACE Examined. 49
cs exclude Properties, from coming under the Ge-
" nns comprehended in the Word Thing*.
IT feems very odd, that you iliould imagine
this Sort of Reafoning would do you any Service :
For, in the firft Place, I do not exclude Proper
ties from coming under the Genus comprehended
in the Word Thing : But then I fay, that in the
j&ftra& they come under that Genus, only as Ide.«l
Things j and in the Subjett are Real Things, in no
other Senfe, than as they are the Stibjeft it felf,
under fuch, or fuch a Confederation. If there
fore by Thing you mean a mere Property, or a
Property in the j4bflratt ; then I may readily
franc SPACE to be a Thing: but then you are
ut juft where you fet out; for, fince it does not
follow from this Argument, that SPACE is a Real
Thing, or that it hath Exigence ad extra, you
have been talking in vain. But if you mean that
it is a Property in fome Snbje^ ; then indeed it
will be a Real Thing ; but yet in no other Senfe,
than as it is the Subjeft it Jeif under fuch a Con-
fideration. The Reafon therefore why I faid
that SPACE, if it was a Thing, muft either -be
Body or Spirit, was, becaufe I imagined you in
tended to prove it to be a Real Thing, i. e. to have
Exigence ad extra: And if it be a Real Thing',
then, for the Reafons juft given, my Argument
was found and conclufive ; and I ftill repeat, that
it muft be either Body or Spirit : and therefore
I fancy, that the Reafon why you did notm>«£/£'
the Reader with any more of the following Pages
was, becaufe it might have troubled you to an-
fwer them.
* Third Def. p. n,
-
£o Arguments for the Reality
SECONDLY, fuppoflng Properties to come under
the Gentts comprehended in the Word Thing, in
any Senfe you pleafe ; fuppofe 'em to be Real
Things ; yet you have done Nothing, unlefs you
had proved that Space is a Property. When you
have evinced This, I will grant SPACE to be a
Thin* in any Senfe you (hall chufe : Nay, I now
grant it to be a7te£, if abjlrttl Ideas are Things.
But what will follow from hence? will it follow,
that SPACE is a real Property of any Vcivg, or that
SP\CE is a Property of the Almighty ? I conteis
this is a Conclufion too abftrufe for my narrow
Underftanding to comprehend ; and, if this does
not follow, what have you gained by your Am-
baves Perbontm, your Genus and your Species, fince
you are ne'er the nearer having proved what you
contend for?
You go on — " would any one lay, that be-
" caufe Knowledge is not a Subflance, it is there-
« fore Nothing"" - and a little farther -" I dare
« iav that this Author will not allow Knowledge
« to be either Body or Spirit, and yet it muft
« certainly be Something."' * To This I anfwer,
that, if by Something, you mean That which has
Exiftence, in the more true and ftrift Senfe of
the Word, i.e. Exiftence ad extra, then I deny
Knowledge to be Some-Thing : But, if you mean
by it only, Something Ideal, in which Senfe
Whitcnefs; Exterfon, and all other d/lr*& Idea*
are called Somethings* then I grant Knowledge to
be Something. .
You ask ~" If Knowledge is really Nothing,
« where is the Difference between a Wife and an
« Ignorant Man, when by theSuppofition, there
* Third Dcf p. n» is.
of SPACE 'Examined. £1
<* is Nothing more in the One than in the Other." *
This is fallacious : But however, to fatisfy you,
Sir, the Difference between a Wife and an Igno
rant Man is, that the Wife Man knows, what
the Ignorant Man does not : yet Knowledge and
Ignorance in the Abffiratt are Nothing butabjhatt
Ideas ; and the Difference re, to (peak properly,
con touted only by the Men themfelves j one of
whom Knows, whilft the other is Ignorant.
IF Knowledge be Nothing, then you urge,
that by the Sttppo/ition, there is Nothing mere m
the One than in the Other. When we fay
that Knowledge is Nothing* we mean, that Know-
ledge coniidered abftraftedly, is No-Thing really
exifting : and therefore, it only follows, that
by the Suppofition, there is NoThing really ex-
ifting, more in the One, than in the Other:
And This is true. For do you imagine, that
Knowledge is a Thing really exifling with'w a
Man ? If you do, I can't help it : But all that
I underftand by Knowledge being in a Man, is,
that a Man Knows. Thus Length, considered
merely as Lengthy or in the Abftratt, is no real
Thing : and it is as true, that Length is not any
real Thing exifling in a long Body, any more
than it is in a fhort one. But does it follow*
that bscaufe Length in the abftratt^ is Nothing
real, nor any Thing exifling in a Body, therefore
there is no Difference between a long Body and
a (hort one? The Cafe here is the fame, as in
your Inftance -of the Wife and the Ignorant Man;
Length and Knowledge, are not Things exi/iing
within the Body, or within the Man : Knowledge
is not one Thing, and the Man another j or Length
* Third Def. p, u.
G i pne
£2 Arguments for the Reality
one Thing, and the Body another; But the Man,
and the Body, are the only real Things ; and Know
ledge and Length are only Ideas formed by Abftra-
chon: Tho' Length and Knowledge therefore are
Nothing, nor can be properly faid to exift in thofe
Things which are called their Subjects ; yet it
does not follow, that there is no Difference be
tween a long Body and a iliort one, a wife
and an ignorant Man. There is Nothing, 'tis
true, in one more than in the other : but then,
one happens to be Long, and the other Short ;
one to be Wife, and the other Ignorant : Here is
the Difference, which is not conftituted by any
Thing within 'em, but by Themfelves. — I wifh,
Sir, you had known here, as well as in your
P re face, that Quibbles and Wrangling upon Words
are endlcfs : For it no more follows, that Know
ledge muft be Something real> becaufe we common
ly fay, that there is Knowledge in Men; than
that Difference muft be Something red, becaufe
we fay there is Difference in Men.
BUT you proceed — f< were it Nothing, we
" could truly deny every Thing of it, and then
" there could be no Difference between a Per/ons
« having, or not having it." *
WHEN we fay, that a Man has Knowledge, we
mean only that he Knows : not, that Knowledge
is any Thing really exifting, which he actually
has, and poffijfts, as he has, and pojfejfes his Eft ate.
We fay a Man has Knowledge, as we fay a Man
has Sobriety ; that is, that he is Sober ; not that
Sobriety is any Thing of it felf di ftinft from the
Man, which He can be faid to have: No; So
briety is not one Thing real, and the Man ano
* Third Def. p. 12.
thcr;
of SPACE Examined. 53
ther ; but it is either a mere abftrati Idea, or elfe
the Sober Man himfelf.
BUT does it follow that, becaufe Sobriety is not
any Thing diftinct by it felf, and cannot be had
by any Man, as He has his Bottle, therefore that
there is no Difference between a Sober Man and
a Drunkard ? No fober Man, I am fure, can
think fo ; and yet unlefs you had proved this,
you have not proved what you aim at, namely,
that if Knowledge be not Something of it feif,
there is no Difference between a Wiie and an Ig
norant Man.
BUT you teil me, 'c There is no Way to efcape
cc this Rock without failing between Something
<c and Nothing."* If fo, I muft beg the
favour of you, Sir, to be my Pilot ! for this is a
Courfe you are well acquainted with ; and which
am afraid you muft often yet Steer, before we
jhave done with SPACE. But I cannot efcape
this Rock, it feems, <£ without imagining that
cc Knowledge may be Nothing, and yet that
tc Something may be affirmed of it &c" t This
is the Charibdis to your Scjlla ; but I hope I fhall
sfcape 'em both. For there is no Neceflity, that
if Knowledge in the tbftraft be Nothing, there
fore there muft either be no Difference between a
Wife and an Ignorant Man ; or elfe, that I muffc
imagine Knowledge to be Nothing, and yet that
Something may be affirmed of it : There is no
Neceility for either of thefe, I fay ; for though
knowledge in the abflratt is Nothing ; yet a Wife
Vlan differs from an Ignorant Man, in that he
Ktaw, whilft the Ignorant Man does not : and
i/et this is pot to imagine that Knowledge is No-
* Third Def. p. 12, \ Ibid,
thing
££• Arguments for the Reality
thing, and yet that Something may be affirmed of
it : For I do not affirm any Thing of Know
ledge as a real Thing ; but, as we ought to do, of
the Knowing Man only. Jt is not Knowledge
which the Man has in him, that makes him differ
from the Ignorant Man j but it is He him/elf which
conftitutes the Difference. There is no Neceflity
therefore, to Sail between thefe two Difficulties,
when (to ufe your Words) / can fe eafily go
wide of them both.
You Remark — "The Gentleman, T think, had
<c no R eafon to be fo defirous to be toici, what SPACI
<c is, (uppoiing it to be neither Body nor Spirit :
*f I hsd often enough (aid in my fir ft Defence,
" thit it was a Property."* Now, in my Opi
nion, the Gentleman had very good Reaion to be
fo defirous of knowing, what that ftrange Kind
of a Thing could be, which was neither Body
nor Spirit, and yet was a real Exigence: For, tho*
it is true, you had often enough faid in your
JFirft Defence, that it was a Property ; yet it hap
pened, that you never proved it : And therefore,
if you had Jaid it ten Times oftner than you did,
the Gentleman would flill have had the fame Rca-
fon, to have made farther Enquiries about it.
Befides, had you proved it to have been a Pro
perty, it muit then have been either Body or Spirit^
or dfe a Property in the Abftratt only; to fay
therefore, that SPACE is neither Body nor Spirit..
but a Property, is indeed, as you fay, going wtdt
of 'em both ; but then it is running directly upor
a Property in the Abffiraft.
I had faid that, " Although when two Bo
<c dus touch, and when they do not touch (i
* Thirl Tef. p. 12,.
of SPACE Examined* te
*J d tj
all Matter be removed [from between) there is
in both Gales Nothing between them , yet it
does not follow, that there is no Difference be
tween touching and not touching : That they
cc do not differ in this Kefpecl", is very true, but
j« they do differ in there being SPACE between
them : Yet it will not follow that SPACE muft
be Something really exifting" * To this you
reply — " I confefs I do not clearly underftand
" this Paffage : He leems to own that there is a
" Difference in there being or not being SPACE
«* between the two Bodies; and yet fays that it
does not therefore follow that SPACE is any
«c Thing. I fhould be very glad to fee what
the Difference is, if that which Caufes the
«.« Difference be Nothing." f
As to your not clearly under/landing this Paffage,
it is none of my Fault : I think it is clear enough
for any Body to underftand, but thofe whofe In-
tereft it is not to underftand it. / own that there
is a Difference in there being or not being Space be
tween the two Bodies ; i. e. i own that there is a
Difference in there being, or not being Diftame
between the two Bodies, or in the Bodies being
dijhinty without any Matter between them; and
yet I fay, that it does not therefore follow, that Space
is any Thing ; i. e. it does not therefore follow,
that Diftance is any Thing. You flwuld be v&y
glad to fie, you fay, what the Difference is, if that
which catifcs tiie Difference bs Nothing : but that
which caufes the Difference is not Nothing; for
it is not Space, or Dijiance^ which caufes the Dif
ference, but the Bodies thcmiclves.
* Dr. Clarke's Notions of SPACE Examined p. 15.
f Third Def. p. 14.
" THE
£6 Arguments for the Reality
« THE Difference [you fay] between us feems4
cc now to be brought to a very narrow Compafs,
*' and is no more than This : whether it does
•c not follow, from their being a Difference be-
et between touching, and not touching, as he grants
<c there is ; that when two Bodies do not touch,
<c there muft be Something between them." *
It feems then, you have but juft now found out I
where the Pinch of the Queftion lay; and, that
you have been all along fuppofing the wain Pointy
without knowing any thing at all of the Matter :
But I am glad you [fee it at laft ; for, I perceive
you now begin to be fenfible, that the Reafon
why you imagined, that when two Bodies did
not touch, there muft be Something between them,
was, becaufe you thought it felf-evident, that
the Difference of touching and not touching, con-
iifted in the Exiftence or non- Exigence of Some
thing between: but this is fo far from being felf-
evident, that it is manifeftly falfe : yet this is
the Principle on which your whole Dcmonftra-
rion is founded; and 'tis to this we owe fuch a
curious Chain of Reafoning.
BUT furely, Sir, now you have found out
where the Difference lies between us, and have
brought it to fo narrow a Compafs; we might rea-
fona::ly have expected, that you fhould have en
deavoured to give us fome Proof, of what you
had before taken for granted ; and have fhewn us,
how it followed, from there being a Difference
between touching and not touching, that when
two Bodies do not touch there muft be Something
between 'em ; and not have left your Subject juft
where you found it : you fee that the Truth of
* Third Def. p. 15,
your
of SPACE Examined, 57
your Argument depends upon fhewing, that the
Difference &c. confifts in the Exigence, or non-
Exiftence of Something between ; and yet you do
not fo much as offer at any Pr6of of it ; but
leave it to me to fhevv where' the Difference lies,
if it does not lie where you imagine ; which is
fhifting off the Proof from your lelf. What is
it to me where the Difference lies ? you argue
upon Suppofition that it conlifts in the Exigence
or non-Exiftence of Something between : This is
what therefore you ought to prove; otherwife
your Argument is built upon a Principle, which
does not appear to be true, and is confequently no
Argument at all.
You think it fufficient to {hut up all with
faying, that, <f If this Gentleman can any Way
" fhew the Difference which he allows, between
«c touching and not touching, fuppofing two
« Bodies to have Nothing between them, and
<c yet not to touch; he will -then, and not till
«c then prove what he has fpent fo many Pages here
c< in trying to do." * What I (pent fo many Pages
in trying to do, was, I think, to fhev/ chat you
tftfpofed the 'very Point to be proved: which if I
have clone, I fhould fancy it will be but litde
Satisfaction to you, to number the Pages, and to
refled: how many I have /pent in doing it. Now
in Order to do This, there was no Occafion for
me to foew the Difference between touching and not
'touching, fappofing two Bodies to havs Nothing be
tween them-, and yet not to touch : but only to prove
that you took^ it for granted, that the Difference
conjifted in the Exigence, or non-Exiftcnce of Some
thing between ; and this I have done : It is youc
* Third Def. p. 15.
H Bufinefs
£8 Arguments for the Reality
Bufinefs therefore, to (hew us, that the Difference
does confift in what you have hitherto fitppofedy
and you will then, and not till then, prove what you
have [pent fo nfany Pages here, in trying to do.
BUT however, Sir, you find that I have not
flood fo preciiely on the drift Rules of Contro-
verfy ; for I have complyed with your Requeft,
and have {hewn you, wherein the Difference of
the touching and not touching of two Bodies
confifts; tho' in each Cafe there is fuppofed to
be Nothing between them*.
To conclude this Argument— I charged you
with fuppofing the very Point to be proved in
the In fiance of your two Walls : You have la
boured to get off; and after much Quibbling .and
many Doublings and Turnings confefs at lad:, that
the main Point of Difpute between us is, whe
ther it does not follow from there being a Dif
ference between touching and not touching; that
when two Bodies do not touch there muft be
Something between them ; that is, that the main
Point of Difpute is, whether the Difference of
touching and not touching, confifts in the Ex-
iftence or non-Ex iftence of Something between;
which you have all along taken for granted ; and
on which your whole Argument depends : yet,
you have not offer 'd at any Proof of it ,* even
now, when you own it to be the only Diffe
rence between us : which is ending as you be
gun with foppo/tvg the very Poir.t to be proved, :
I therefore repeat that Charge once more, and
leave you, to get clear of it at your leifure.
AND thus I have confidered every Thing which
bears the Fa;e of an Argument for the Reality of
* Sec p. 25. &c.
SPACE,
of SPACE Examined. £9
SPACE, from the Difference between two Walls
touching and not touching j and have anfwered
your Objections relating to this Point ; and I
hope it appears, that you have added no Rein
forcement to your former Argument above the
Dignity of a Sophifm, or a Quibble in Language.
I fear the Reader will think I have been too mi
nute and particular, and I can only offer in Ex-
cufe, that you led me through a Path, wherein I
have been obliged to follow you, as I had no
other way of unravelling your Sophiftry, and
guarding againft future Cavils.
ARGUMENT II.
That the Idea of SPACE is not the Idea
of a PRIVATION.
ct THE Idea [fay you] arifing from a Priva-
*' tion is not an Idea of the mere Abfence of
" the Thing only; for that would be an Idea of
" Nothing."* The Idea arifing from a Priva
tion is not in one Senfe an Idea of the mere
Ahfence of the Thing ; becaufe it is always an
Idea conneded with the Idea of That whofe Ab
fence you confider: but though it be not an Idea
of mere Abfince* yet it is not therefore, as you
would argue, an fcba of Some Place which hark
real Exiftence without That Thing. It is not an
Idea of a Place, as any Thing diitincl: and fepa-
rate from that Body ; it is only a reflection that
the Body which once did bear a certain Relation
* Third Dcf. p. 22.
H * to
60 Arguments for the Reality
to other Bodies, docs no longer bear that Rela
tion.
You tell us, that you " have a Pofirive Idea
<c of a Dog : Now fuppofe [you add] by any
<c Accident, all the Dogs in the World were
" dead ; would this Author fay, that he had a
<c Pofitive Idea of no Dog*?" No Sir; unlefs
you take 'em out oF the World after their De-
ceafe : for otherv/ife, my Idea would cnly be an
Idea of a Parcel of dead Dogs inftead of living
Ones. But, if you fuppole all Dogs to ceafe to
exift; Then I affirm, that I fhould have the Po-
fitive Idea of No-Do# ; which I fhould gain by
reflecting, that Dogs did once exift, but that they
now do not; i.e. i fhould reflect, that they were
all dead and gone; which is a Pofitive Idea-, for
pray what is a Negative Idea? I think he who
found Fault with Negative Properties, mould have
been aware of Negative Ideas: and I may anfwer
you in your own Words, viz,. The Author fiould
have explained what he means by a Pofitive Idea:
are there any Ideas that are not Po/itive \ That ^hich
is called an Idea^ mufl be either an Idea, or not an
Idea ; or, is there Something bet-ween an Idea, and
no Idea ? as he feems to imagine Abfence to be, I
know not what, between an Idea, and no Idea. /
confefs I cannot frame to my felf^any Notion at ail
of a Negative Idea : If there are fttch, I foal bs
obliged to this Gentleman, if he will foew me what
Sort of an Idea, a Negattve Idea is j and makg
appear the Difference between that, and A Pofttivs
one f.
THE Difference, which Mr. Locke may feem
to make between Poftive and Privative Ideas, is
* Third Def. p. 22. f See Ibid. p. 18, 19.
only
of SPACE Examined. 61
only in their Cattfes, or rather Reafons, not in the
Ideas, as they are in the Mind. All Ideas are
Pofitive ; tho' the Reafons of fuch Ideas, may
fometimes be Privations . — " Whatever (fays he)
" may be the external Caufe of it, when it comes
(C to be taken Notice of by our difcerning Fa-
" culty, it is by the Mind looked on and confi-
cc dered there, to be a real Pofitive Idea in the
" Undemanding, as much as any other whatfo-
" ever; though perhaps the Cauie of it be but
** a Privation in the Sui jed." * The Idea there
fore of the mere Abfence of a Dog, tho* the
Caufe be a Privation, is a real Pofitive Idea in the
Under ft an ding, as much as any other wkatjoever :
and therefore 'tis plain from Mr. Locke-, ihat he
would have faid, he could have a Pofitive Idea
of No- Dog.
You ask, "what would the Idea of the real,
" or fuppofed Abfence of all Dogs be? I appeal
" to himfclf, whether it would not be an Idea
" of fome Place without a Dog, where he had
" either feen, or fuppofed a Dog to be." f I an-
fvver, that it would be a Reflation that fuch and
fuch Things, which did once bear a Relation of
Site to Dogs, no longer bear any fuch Relation
ro that Sort of Animal : it would not be an Idea
of the Place of thofe Dogs as Something exifting
ad extra ; but only the abftraft Idea of that Re
lation of 'Site ', which I had either feen, or fuppofed
Dogs to bear to other Things.
IF I have a Pofitive Idea of no Dog, then you
fay, " That all Ideas whatever arifing from Pri-
" vations, muft be Nothing, becaufe they muft
* Locke Hum. Underlhnd. B. 2. c. 8. §. I.
f Third Def. p. 22.
" be
62 Arguments for the Reality
" be all alike ; for an Idea of no Dog, cannot be
« different from an Idea of no Horfe." * That
all Ideas whatever arifing from Privations muft
be all alike, is what I defy you to prove: for an
Idea of no Dog is juft as different from the Idea
of no Horfe, as a Dog is from an Horfe : for,
otherwife we might fay the very fame Thing to
you, upon a Suppofition that the Idea of no Dog
was an Idea of fome really exifting Place without
a Dog ; as you imagine it : for I would then ask,
where is the Difference between the Idea of a
Place without a Dog, and the Idea of a Place
without an Horfe ?
" THE Idea of the Abfence of Something
[you fay] "muft be the Idea of Nothing ^." t
Very true ! the Idea of the Abfence of Some
thing, quatenus Abfence^ is the Idea of no Thing ;
/". e. no Thing ad extra : but what then ? is it
tkerefore no Idea? yes furely it is! and a Pofi-
tive one too, made by reflecting on the Thing
whofe Abfence you confider.
You think "it is incumbent upon this Au-
" thor, fince he has an Idea of Nothing, and of
" different Nothings, to tell us what Sort of an
" Idea it is ; and how the Ideas of different No-
" things are dilHnguifhcd amongft one another ;
" and wherein they differ from other Ideas/' **
Thefe are mere Words — when I have the Ideas
of the Abfence of different Things, thefe are not
Ideas of different Nothings : they are only different
Jdeas, which have no objective Realities -, and are
formed from reflecting on thofe different Things^
whole Abfence I confider : Thefe different Ideas
* Third Def. p. 22. f Ibid, p, 3
** Ibid.
are
of SPACE Examined. 63
are diftinguifhed amongft one another, according
to the different Things, whofe Abfence they are
Ideas of.
As to our Idea of SPACE, I have all along
faid, that I think Reflection muft be taken into the
Account* : I imagine, that t\\z Idea of SPACE is
formed from reflecting upon Body, tho' we may
not always take Notice of fuch Reflection. It is
formed from conceiving Body away : This Con
ception (we having at the fame time the Idea of
the Extenfion of Body) leaves us the Idea of Ex-
tenfion in t\\z general, without any particular ex
tended Subftance. This is not the Idea of red
Place, as any Thing exifting ad extra; but it is
the Idea of the Abfence of Body, conceived after
the Manner of Extenfion. The Idea therefore of
the Abfence of Body, feems to me to be an Idea
of Reflection : and fuch an Idea is as pofitive
as any other Idea whatfoever, tho' it be the
Idea of a Privation. The Abfence of Body is as
pofitive an Idea, as the Idea of Body : 7'he Idea
of the Abfence of any Thing is not fas you
would have us imagine) the pofitive Idea of a
red Place exifting ad extra without that Thing:
It is only a pofitive Idea of the Relation of She *
which any Body did once bear to another, confi-
dered now without the Real Body. To fuppofe a
Body abfent from any Place is only fuppofing it
to ceare from bearing fitch a Relation, as it once
did; but Relation is Nothing ad extra. By daily
confidering Bodies bearing fuch and fuch Rela
tions to each other, which we call exijling in
Place j when we imagine thefe Bodies away, we
apply their Dimenfions to an imaginary Pan of
* See Dr. Clarkis Notions of SPACE Examined p- 67.
SPACE :
64 Arguments for tie
SPACE : and as we before confidered thefe real
Dimenfions to bear a Relation to other Bodies;
fo we conceive thefe imaginarj Dimensions to do;
and thence ibme are led to confider this imaginary
Part of SPACE, thus clothed with Ideal Dimen-
fions, to be a Place really exifting without Body.
I fhall take occafion here, to ihew the Weak-
nefs of an O :>jeclion I meet with in the Vindica
tion of your Second Defence. I had told you that,
«c when we fuppofe the Bodies away, we are apt
^ to apply their Dimenfions to that imaginary Part
cc of SPACE where we confidered them before
«c exifting." * To which you anfwer — <« what
*c is This, but faying that Nothing exifls but
" in Imagination ? for, if Bodies exift only in
<e fome imaginary Place, they cannot really and
" truly 'exift at all." f Pray Sir, who told you,
that Bodies exifted in imaginary Place? This is a
mere Imagination of your own. I faid that Bo
dies ex i (led in an imaginary Part of Space. We
deny SPACE to have real Parts, or to be any
Thing real; and therefore, when we talk of the
Parts of SPACE, thofe Parts are Imaginary ; ima
ginary Subftrata of imaginary Extenfion. I faid
not that Bodies exifted in imaginary Place: No;
the Place is real ; /'. e. real Place ; For Place is
the Relation of Site which one Body bears to ano
ther ; and this Relation is real Relation. A Body
therefore, tho* it exifts in an imaginary Part of
SPACE yet exifls in a real Place; that is, it bears
a Relation of Sire to other Bodies. When we
fuppofe the Bodies away ; then indeed the Place
is imaginary : it is the alftraft Idea of Relation, as
* Dr. Clarkfs Notions of SPACE Examined p. 131.
t Third Def. p. 92,
has
of SPACE Examined. 6£
has been before explained. Thus much for
the Objection as it occurs in the nndtittiox of
your Second Defence*
You fay, you — " Know of. no Privation
" that we can have an Idea of, merely as the Ab~
" fence of the Thing, He inftances [fay you]
« in the Cafe of Darknefs, which is a Privation
« of Light. To which I fay, that no Man can
<c have an Idea of Darknefs no where &c." * Light
is That, by means of which we fee the various
Objects which furround us, and confider them- as
exiftins in Place; i.e. as bearing different Rela
tions of Site to each other. We are accuftomed
to refer all our Ideas, of Imagination at ieaft, to
Something without us ; and to confider SPACE as
a common Receptacle. Hence we refer the Ids* of
Light to Something without us, as correfpondent
to that Idea: and as every Thing is conceived
ro exift in Place, we at length imagine Light as
exiting in fome Place : and becaufe Darkgefi ii
only a Privation of Light, we in like Manner re
fer the Idea of Darknefs to without, and fancy-
it as a Place without Light. Thus we refer
Sound and Silence to without ; and thence ima
gine Sound to be in Place, and Silence to be
a Place without Sound: whereas, whoever will
confider his own Ideas, and reflect a little upon
his Manner of acquiring them, will find, that
the Idea of Darknefs, &c. is truly an Idea of a
mere Privation.
You take the Truth to be «c that we are fo
<c very converfanr with Place, Space, &c. that,
<c when any Thing by being taken away, cau-
(( fes a privative Idea, we confider it only as
* Third Dcf. p. 24. fcfV.
X « the
66 Arguments for the Reality
<c the Abfence of the Thing, without confider-
<f ing the Place." *
Now, Sir, i take the Truth to be this — we
are ufed to confider Things exifting without us,
as bearing Relations to one another; and when
any oi- thefe Things, by being taken away, cau-
fes a privative Idea ; we, by reflecting on thd
Relation which we have feen or fuppofed it to
bear to other Things, are apt to fancy fuch Ideal
Relation as a Real Place without that Thing; where
as, it is only the abjiraft Idea of Relation.
You add « If we try to find out the Na-
<f cure of fuch an Idea, we fhall fee that we can-
cc not frame to ourfelves the Idea of any Priva-
5C tion at all, merely as a Privation." f
IF, by merely as a Privation, you mean, that
we cannot frame to ourfelves an idea of the Ab
fence of any Thing, without an Idea of fome
really exifting Place, from whence we fuppofe the
Thing to be abfent, then I fay, we can frame to
ourfelves an Idea of the Abfence of a Thing,
merely as a Privation; becaufe it is only faming
an Idea of a Thing, ceafing to bear fuch or fuch
a Relation to other Things ; which is not an
Idea of any real Place, exifriog ad extra ; but on
ly an abftratt Idea of Relation. — If, by merely as
a Privation, you mean, that we cannot form an
Idea of the Abfence of a Thing, without con-
fidcring the7l?/w it f elf, and fuppofing it to ceafe
from bearing a Relation to other Things ; then
I allow we cannot frame to ourfelves the Idea of
any Privation, merely as a Privation : But what
then ? Relation of Situation is not a really exift
ing Place: it is Nothing but the Bodies thern-
* Third Def, p. 25. f Ibid.
fclves
of SPACE Examined. 6j
felves bearing fuch Relation-* and confidered with
out the Bodies, is but an abftratt Idea. A Place
without a particular Body is the Relation of that
Both confidered in the <Abflr*%> and is not any
Thing ad extra : and this is, truly fpeakmg, an.
Idea of a Privation, merely as a Privation.
You obferve — "If this be true [if we can-
« not frame an Idea of a Privation merely as a
« Privation] then it is impoffible for us to have
« any fimple Ideas from Nothing ; contrary to
« what this Author offer ts page 30." *
THIS, Sir, is charging me with what is di
rectly falfe in Fad ; as any one will find, who
turns to the Page you cite : I there fay, that Mr.
Locke " gives us a Reafon why a privative Canfe,
« may in fome Cafes at leaft, produce a pofitive
Idea &c" But is this averting, that we may
have fimple Ideas from Nothing, in fuch a Senfe
as will do you any Service \ No ; for you may
remember that I told you in p. 68, that, " when
« Mr. Locke fays, that Privations may be Caufe*
« of Ideas in the Mind [which is what you call
« having Ideas from Nothing] he does noc
" mean, that Privations, which are Nothing ad
a extrat may be aftftal Cattfes, but rather Reafons
«« why we have Thofe Ideas." Now, who
would imagine, after fuch an Explanation of what
I underftood MV. Locks to mean, by faying jhac
a privative Caufe may produce a pojttive Idea ; who
would think, I fay, that after this, you fliould
venture to affert that I faid, we might have fim
ple Ideas from Nothing ? and who will not (till
wonder more at this your Aflertion, when he
turns to my 66th Page, where he will read (what
* Third Def. p. 25,
I % you
68 Arguments for the Reality
you ought to have remember'd) the following
Words, which are in Terms directly oppofite to
what you here pretend to fix upon me? The
Words are Thefe - " I grant it is impoffible,
( and contradictory that we fhould have a fimple
" Idea, or indeed any Idea at all from Nothing ;
" or, that Nothing mould be the Canfe of a fim-
<c pie, or of any Idea in us : But to have an
<c Idea, or a fimple Idea of Nothing (/'. e. to have
" an Idea, or a fimple Idea which has Nothing
" exifting without us, correfpondent to it) is far
"from impoflible." * .-Let any one compare
this with what I had faid in p. 30, and judge
whether you had any Reafon to think I meant,
that we might have fimple Ideas from Nothing !
or whether you have not afTerted Something directly
contrary to what I faid, and what you willfind im-
poffible to make good.-I anfwer then to your pre
sent Argument, that our Ideas of Privations, or of
the Abfende of any Thing, are not Ideas from No
thing : We have not the Idea of the Abfence of
Body from mere Abfence (confidered in any other
Senfe than as a Reafon) but from Body; that is,
from reflecting on Body : yet this is an Idea of a
Privation, merely as a Privation; i. e. without fup-
pofing it abfent from any realty exijting Place.
* Dr. Clarke's Notions of SPACE, Examined p. 66, 67.
ARCU-
of SPACE Examined. 69
ARGUMENT III.
Tibat SPACE is not, like WHITENESS, an
ABSTRACT IDEA.
THE Subftance of what you fay in Defence
of this Point, is This — « An abftrad Idea
" is an Idea of a Quality of Body, which we
" may conceive without any particular Body, but
*£ yet not without any Body at all : Thus, tho' we
cc can have the Idea of Whitenefs, without any
'<c particular white Body, yet we cannot have the
" Idea of Whitenefs without any Body at all:
" But we can have an Idea of SPACE, 'without
" any Body, or material Subftance at all. The
" Difference therefore between Whitenefs and Space
*<> is plain : and confequently Space is not like
«< Waitenefs, or an abftratt Idea" * This I be
lieve you will acknowledge to be your Argument
inks full Force: But I am apt to think, if you
would impartially confider, that you would find,
there is not this Difference between Whitenefs and
SPACE.
IT is very true, we cannot have the Idea of
Whitenefs without any Body at all: but then, this
Body may be only an Imaginary Sttbflratum, form
ed by the Mind, for the help of the Under-
flanding. It is an Idea of Somewhat, with
\one Quality only, namely Whitenefs:, that is,
an Ideal white Somewhat y and that's all. Nor
is the Cafe different in SPACE : for we cannot
have, as you would urge, an Idea of SPACE,
* Sec Third Def. p. 17, 18,
With-
>;o Arguments for the Reality
without any Body or material Subftance at all: The
Mind is always ready with an imaginary Suhflra*
turn upon the Occafion. We can indeed have the
Idea of SPACE, without confidering it as the
Extenfion of any -particular Body ; but not with
out confidering ir, as Somewhat with the Idea
of one Quality only, namely Extenfion. Thus
you fee, or at leaft may fee, that Whitenefs and
Space exadly agree in that, wherein you imagin
ed them to differ. The Idea of Whitenefs is an
Ideal 'white Somewhat : and the Idea of SPACE is
an Ideal extended Somewhat : We can no more
therefore have the Idea of SPACE without any
Body or material Subftance at all, /'. e. without an
extended Somewhat, than we can have an Idea of
Whitcnefs without any Body at all /. e. without
a white Somewhat ; unlefs Spirit can be extended
like Matter.
Cf Let any Perfon try [fay you] whether he
w can frame to himfelf an Idea of a white No-
<* thing.' '* And, in return I fay, Let any Per
fon try, whether he can frame to himfelf an Idea
of an Extended Nothing : I believe he will find
one, full as eafy as the other.
IN the Inftance of your two Bodies, you talk
of a cubic Yard of Space between them ; whereby
it is mod evident, that you yourfelf cannot fpeak
of SPACE, but your Mind prefently fuggefts to
you a material Subftratum, for your Thoughts to
reft on ; and thatyou cannot have the Idea of SPACE,
without any Body or material Subftance at all. To ar
gue therefore, that you can, and yet to talk of cubic
* Third D:£ p, 17.
Tardt
of SPACE Examined. ji
Tards of Space, is to argue, that you can have an
Idea, which 'tis plain you cannot ; and is confe-
quently arguing againft your own Ideas; unlefs
you would talk of cubic Tards of Spirit, and cubic
Yards of the Divine Subftance. For, however har (h
and abfurd thele Expreflions may appear, they muft
be your own: For, if SPACE be the real £xten-
fion of the Self-exiftent Being, and you meafure
that Extension by cubic Yards; 'tis Nothing
lefs then faying, what I have mentioned. If you
deny your Meaning to be this ; and own, that
cubic Yards are only material Meafures ; then fmce
you apply them to SPACE, it appears, that when
you have the Idea of SPACE, you confider ic
either as a Real, or Ideal extended material Some
what: and if you cannot have the Idea of SPACE,
without the Ideas of fuch material Meafures fas ic
appears you cannot, by your general Expreflions
concerning it) then, I think, we may with Rea-
fon conclude, that you cannot have, what you
would perfuade us that you can, viz,, the Idea of
SPACE, without any Body or material Subftance
at all.
You appeal to me — "Let him fay in the fore-
«c mentioned Inftance of two Bodies that are di-
<e ftant from each other, without having any Mat-
<c ter between them, whether he has not an Idea
cc of SPACE between the two Bodies." *
I anfwer, yes ; allowing for the Impropriety of
faying, that any Thing ideal can be between. But
altho', Sir, there be no Matter between the Bo
dies, and I have the Idea of SPACE; yet, I have
not the Idea of SPACE, without any material Sub-
fiance at ail, as you would from hence infer ; but
* Third Def. p. 184
my
^2 ' Arguments for the Reality
my Idea, is an imaginary material Subftratum, *. e.
an ideal extended Somewhat. For till Spirit is
proved to be extended, Extenfion is only applica
ble to Matter.
cc Let him alfo fay [you continue] whether he
cc can poffibly have any Idea of frhitenefs between
<c them, whilft there is no Matter there." *
I Reply, yes; as well as I can of SPACE : for
it is only forming an imaginary Subftratum in
my Mind; and then I have an Idea of Whitenefs
between them, or an Ideal white Somewhat, as
much as I have of SPACE, or an Ideal extended
Somewhat.
You had (aid, that fc Whitenefs is only owing
ec to a particular Texture of Parts upon the Surface
cc of the white Body &c. But the Extension of,
« or the SPACE in which sny Body exifts, nei-
cc ther is, nor can poffibly be owing to any Tex-
(f ture of Parts or Difference of Surface ; fince,
cc were Matter either fquare or round, or sny o-
cc ther Shape whatever, it mult neceflariiy be
ff extended; that is, mult exift in fome Part of
« SPACE."!
THIS, I thought, was cc little to our Purpofe:
<c For, of what Significancy in the prefent Di-
fc fpute is it, whether the Ideas of Extcniion and
cc Whitenefs be excited in the fame Manner or
" not ? " **
BUT you now tell us, that your Meaning is
not* what it feemed to be; for, that "theDifFe-
<<r rencewasnot fuppofeci to confift in any different
Cf Excitement, but in the one's being diftinft and
* Third Dcf. p. 1 8.
f Firit Dcf. p. 3.
* Dr. Clarke's Notions of SPA.CE, Examined p. 19.
" fepa-
of SPACE Examined. 73
« feparate from Body, and in the other's being
" necefTarily joined with it."
LET This be your Meaning, yet I muft own,
Sir, I cannot fee any Foice in this Argument.
Wbitenejs is an Idea owing to a particular Tex
ture of Parts, but Extenfwn is not ; Wkitenep is
not necelTarily join'd with Body in general,
as Extenfion is, but only to particular Bodies : and
what then ? can we not have the Idea of Exten-
fan in the jflftrdl, as we have an Idea of White-
nefs in the ufbftraft .? what, tho' one is joined with
all Bodies, and the other not .? does that hinder
us from juftly illuftrating our abftraft Idea of Ex-
tenfion by the abftratt Idea of Whitenefs? White-
nefs confidered without a white Body is an a&-
ftract Idea, which can have no Subfiftence of it
felf: So is pure Extenfani in this they agree;
and this is all the agreement between them, that
Mr. Law, I believe, ever intended.
THO* Whitenefs is not a Quality of all Bo
dies, yet it is confidered as a Quality of Body :
and the Idea of this Quality in general* or in the
jlbftratt, without any particular Body, I think,
may be very well uied to illuftrate the Idea of
Extenfion in general, or in the ; >4&/?r*#, without
any particular Body. -~ If you think otherwife,
we can't help it : The Caufe by no means depends
upon this 3 fo that your Objection is but trifling at
beft ; for I imagine, you would hardly make ic
an Argument, even fuppofmg Mr. Law's Inftance
to be improper, which he ules to illuftrate his
Notion of SPACE, therefore that his Notion of
SPACE was -wrong: For, would it follow that his
Notion of SPACE, as Extenfan in the Abjlratt, is
* Third Def. p. 18.
74 Arguments for the Reality
wrong ; becaufe Wnitemft* which in the Abflraft
is the Initance he makes ufe of, is not, like Ex*
ten/ton, a Quality or Mode of Body in general ?
No furely ! But however, the Queftio'n to' be
asked here is only this ; whether or no, becaufe
Whitencfi does not agree with Extcnjton^ in being
a Quality of all Bodies ; it therefore follows, that
fFhitcttefs in the dbftrdft does not agree with Ex-
tenjion in the ^Abflracl^ in being an abflracl Idea
which can have no Subfiflence of it fclf ? for, as I
obferved before, this was all the Agreement Mr.
Law fuppofed between them : If they do agree in
this, Mr. Law has properly ufed the Inftance , and
you have been talking to no Purpofe. There is
no Occafion therefore, to take any further Notice
of what you fay upon this, in the Vindication of
your Second Defence p. 81.
BUT there is an Objection which you make
in Relation to my Reafoning, which I muft not
forget to remark upon. It had been faid that
SPACE is Ext en/ion considered abftraftctily \ as White-
nefs without a white Body. Upon which you ob-
ferve very gravely; that i£ This Gentleman's Rea-
" foning will prove Whitenefs to be SPACE." *
I dare fay the Reader muft be big with Expecta
tion of what this Mountain will bring forth ! —
It is This — cl If Whitenefs be Nothing, and SPACE
<c alfo be Nothing, Whitenefs is SPACE ; it be-
*' ing as impoilible, that two Things mould be
" a Third, without being one another; as that
Cr two Things fliould be equal to a Third, with-
c< out being equal to one another."! To whaC
Purpofe, Sir, have you been fo converfant with
Logicians, if it was only to make ufe of their
f Third Def. p. 16. f Ibid.
Sophiftry?
of SPACE Examined. 'y$
Sophiftry ? Of what Service was it to you, to
know that Quibbles find Wrangling upon Words arc
endlefs*, if you ftill take that endlefs Path.
THE Term Nothing is here a Negation of all
real Things: To fay then, that, if Whitenefs be
No-2^K»f real) and SPACE be No-7%*»g real) then
Whitenefs is SPACE, is juft the fame as to ar
gue, that, if all abflracl Ideas are no Realities, then
ail abflract Ideas muft be the fame.
You will allow, that white and black^ in the
j4bftraft are Nothing, *. e. no Realities : Now, if
white is No-Thing, and black^ is No-Thing, then
according to your Way of drawing Confequences,
white is black. -* — ^ Whether a Man, who would
endeavour to prove that white is black^ is not to
|DC deem'd paft Confutation, Jet the Reader judge!
Mr. Locke obferves that cc there were Philofopher$
<e found, who had Learning and Subtlety enough
c* to prove, that Snow was blac^ /• e. to prove,
cc that white was blac^ whereby they had the
<c Advantage to deftroy the laftrurnents and
«' Means of Difcourfe, Converfation, Inftrudion,
« and Society." t We fee that Sed of Phi-
lofophers is not entirely extinct !
BUT give me leave to obferve, that if this Sort
of Argument be conclufive, your own Reafoning
will prove, what perhaps you are not aware of?
that SPACE is DURATION, and that DURATION
is SPACE. — I faid, that Whitenefs is Nothing, and
SPACE is Nothing; from whence youcouclude, that
Whitenefs is SPACE : Now, you fay that SPACE is
Something^ and DURATION is Something ; and I fancy,
you by this time perceive,, that (to argue as you
do) If SPACE be Something^ and DURATION alfo b§
* Preface to the Third Defence.
f Locke Hum. Underiknd. B. 3. c. x. §. 10.— Edit. 9.
K z Some-
Arguments for the Reality
Something ; SPACE is DURATION ; Cf it being as im-
<c pofTibie, that two Things ihould be a Third,
«c without being one another; as, that two Things
4C fhould be equal to a Third, without being e-
<c qual to one another." — If the Argument is
conclusive in one Place, I apprehend that it has
the fame Force here : Anfwer this, and you an-
fwer your own !
THO* it may be true, that when two Things
are a third Thing) they muft be one another ; yet,
when the third Thing happens to be no Thing, it
muft be falie ; which is manifeftly the Cafe in
your Argument; where the three Things zvzJ$rhite-
ne/Sy Space, and Nothing. Now,, I prefume, this
general Term Nothing is not a Thing, but only a
Negation of the two former Ideas to be Things
real. The third Term in my Argument concern
ing DURATION and SPACE, viz,. Something, has,
of the two, a better Pretence to be a Thing ; as
Something is more like a Thing, than Nothing: and
confequently, if your Argument is good, mine is
better. But the Truth is, the third Term in
both, viz*, the Terms Nothing and Something are
neither of 'em to be confidered as Things, but as
mere general Terms : For, if your Way of Rea-
foning was true, and general Terms were thus to
be underftaod, as Things; we might prove any
two Things whatever to be the fame : for it is
but affirming two Species of their Genus ; and then,
if your Rule be true, they are the fame. It
might therefore have been of Service to you, to
have remember* d here that common and neceffary
Divifon, or Biflinftion of Genus and Species, or of
General and Special Terms. — But how (hort are
our Memories, when our Neceffities require it !
FURTHER,'
of SPACE Examined. 77
FURTHER, the third Term in your Argument be
ing Negative, makes it ftill worfe. For, if two Ideas
muft be the fame, becauie they are each no Tfanfy
i.e. no Thing real', it is but denying any two
Terms of a Third, and they will be the fame^:
Thus becaufe a Stone is no- Animal, and a Tree is
no- Animal* a Stone muft be a Tree: for, if no-
Animal be taken for a Thing (which I think it
may be, as well as No-Thing) then your Rule does
the Bufinefs prefently.
BUT I cannot avoid telling you, that your
Rule in general is deluiive. It is indeed impofli-
ble that two Things fhould be a Third, or agree
with a Third in all Refpetts, without being one
another : but, it is not impoffible, that two Things
may be, or agree with a Third, in fome Refpetts,
without being one another.
Two Things cannot be equal to a Third, with
out being equal to one another; but then it on
ly means, that they cannot be equal to a Third,
without being equal to one another, in that Refpeft,
in which they are equal to the Third. So it is im-
poflible, that two Things ftiould be, or agree with,
a Third, without being, or agreeing with one
another, in that Refpett, in which they are, or agree
with, the Third: but it does not follow, that be
caufe two Things agree with a Third in one Re~
fpett, therefore they muft agree with each other
'in all Re/petts ; atiy more than it follows, that,
becaufe two Things are equal to a Third in one
Refpett, therefore they muft be equal to one ano
ther in all Rejpeffs.
WE may thus cohfider the Terms Wmtenefs
and SPACE, agreeing with the third Term No
thing, as it is a Negation of real Things; and White*
nefi and SPACE, may be laid for that Reafon, to
agree
yZ Arguments for the Reality
agree with one another, in that Rejpett ; i.e. as
they are neither of them real Things : but, it does
not follow, that becaufe they both agree with
the Term Nothing in that Rejpett, therefore they
muft agree with each other in all Refpetts, and be
come both the fame Ideas. But, Sir, you ought
to have remember'd that Rule in Logick, that,
from two Negative Premifes Nothing can be con-
eluded* and that, when two Ideas difagree to a Third*
we cannot infer that they either agree or difagree with
each other*, unlefs in their mutual difagreeing with
the Third. - This is the Cafe here. SPACE is
»o-7v&w, and Whitenefs is no-Thing : Both thefe
Propofitions are Negative : And thefe two Ideas,
SPACE and PFhitenefi, difagree tc a Third Idea,
viz* Thing, and therefore, by the foregoing Rule,
we cannot infer that they agree with each other,
unlefs in their mutual difagreeing with the Third
Idea : Confequently, we cannot infer (as you do)
that if SPACE is no Thing, and Whitenefs is no
Thing, then Whitenefs is SPACE: all that we can
infer is, that neither Whitenefs nor SPACE are
Things real, /. e. that thofe two Ideas, have no
Mefftoc Realities 1 am forry lam obliged to
rake Notice, that you deviate from the common
and known Rules of Syllogizing.
BUT fince you have found out fuch an acute
Way ofReafoning, I wonder you gave your felf
fo much needlefs Trouble, in proving SPACE to
be a Property, when you might fo foon have done
it by the foregoing Method: For, if SPACE be
Something, and a Property be Something ; then you
fcnow that, according to you, Space is a Property:
How clear the Rcafoning ! How evident the
* See Watt?* Logick Part 3 . c. 2. Se£t. 2. Rule 6.
of SPACE Examined. 79
Confequence ! and you might by the fame Argu
ment, have proved it to be an Elephant, or any
other Creature you had a Mind to.
IN fhort, when we fay that Wbiteneft and
Space are Nothing; we mean that the/^j, White-
nefs and SPACE, have no objective Realities. But
is it lound Reafoning to fay, that, if the Idea of
tfhitenefs has no obje&ive Reality, and the Idea
of Space has no objective Reality, then the Idea,
of Space is the Idea of Whitenefs? If it be, your
Argument is valid : and you may by the fame
Method prove all abftrad Ideas to be the fame.
THE Reader will readily excufe me, from
troubling him any longer upon fuch an Argument :
It feems calculated rather for thofe Schools, where
Sophiflry is at leaft allowable : Where Perfons
Ibmetimes fhnd obliged, and therefore determined
to defend that Side of a Queftion, which at the
fame Time they know to be wrong ; and are, for
that Reafon, to fupport a bad Caufe, forced to
have recourfe to Art and Wile: But this, believe
me ! will never do from the Prefs, where the Pub
lic are to be Judges of the Difpute : Where both
Parties are fuppofed to be in Earned:, to believe
chemfelves in the Right ; and where the Learned,
in that view, are to determine. The Arts of So-
phiftry are here to be difdained, at once the Sup
ports and Signs of a weak Caufe ! and whoever
fees thefe in a Second, or Third Defence, will per
haps be induced to conclude, that the Author is
refolved to defend, tho' by fuch Methods, what
ever he has once afTerted.
WE are not difputing here for the Sake of
difputing only, or to fhew our Talents, but to
weigh the Merits of the Caufe : For it is but
of imall Importance to the World, who is the
better
8o Arguments for the Reality
better Difputant; You, or I. But how irrecon
cilable is it, to hear any one profeffing, that he
has no Ptirfuit here, after any Thing but Truth;
and yet to fee him thus rambling after it, through
the Labyrinth of Error, and taking that Road,
which is defigned on purpofe to lead Men aftray ?
If this be to purfue Truth> I doubt you may
purfue it long enough, before you overtake it.
ARGUMENT IV.
From SPACE having PROPERTIES.
I took Notice, that the Tranilator of Arch-
Bifhop Kings Origin of Evil, " ufed the Ex-
" preilion of SPACE having fome Properties, for
*c Inftance Penetrability^ or a Capacity of receiving
«c Body ; but ufes it in fuch a Manner, as plairi-
*c ly ihews he never meant, nor ever thought
cc SPACE to be endued with any pofitive Pro-
*c perty."* Here you tell me that "the Author
cc ihould have explained what he means by a po-
<f iitive Property : are there any Properties that
<c are not pofitive ?f" No Sir; There are no
Properties which are not pofaive: Thofe which
you apply to SPACE are not pofitive ; and there
fore they are no Properties. The very Reafon of
my ufing the Expreffion of positive Properties, was
to diftinguifli true Properties from fftitious ones ;
Properties from no Properties. You called the re
ceiving all Body, a Property of SPACE ; and would
conclude that SPACE, mufl be Something, becaufe
,
* Dr. Clarke's, Notions of SPACE, Examined p. 23.
f Third Def. p. 18.
it
bf SPACE Examined. 81
' it has fitch Proper ties : " That SPACE has the Pro"
" pertj [faid you] or the Capacity of receiving
" all Body &c. no Perfon was ever fo abfurd as to
«e deny."* To this I anfwered, that the Trari-
flator did deny it. He does indeed call Penetra
bility or a Capacity of receiving Body by the
Name of Property ; (not In his own Name as we
mall fee prefently) but he fpeaks in fuch a Man
ner, as evidently mews he never imagined it to
be a Property ; or that SPACE was endued with
any Property ; but that it was a mere Negation*
That this is truly Mr. Lav's Meaning is plain
from his own Words ; which, if you had turned
over to the next Leaf, you would have feen in
my Quotation from him ; where he explains him-
felf by telling you, that to argue from fuch Pro
perties, is the fame as et to aflign abfolute Negations,
" and fuch as by the fame Way of Reafoning may
" be applied to Nothing, and then call them
«c po/ttive Properties.'1 f And in the very nexc
Sentence he calls them pretended Properties, and
fuppofed Properties. From whence it is plain, that
when he ufes the Exprefiion of SPACE having
Properties) he ufes it only as an Argument which
the Gentlemen on your Side of the Qpcdion bring;
and the Tenor of his Di-courfe ihews that he
does not think SPACE has any Properties ; thac
what you aflign as a Property, and argue from as
fuch, is no true Property, but a pretended, and a
falfly fitppo/ed one i is Nothing pofitive, but a mere
Negation : and the Lxpreffion of a pojitive Pro
perty, you fee, he makes Uie of only in OppoG-
* Firft Def. p. 4.
f TranflLition of ABp. King. Note 5. Ed. i .— N. 3- Ed. 2.
— Dr, Clarkis Notions of SPACE, Examined p. 24, 2£.
L lion
tion to a mere Negation* This is what he Stieant i
and inftead of laying in Anfwer to my 13^ Page*
fix Author foottld have explained what he means by
a qoptive Property j you might have turned to pi
2,7, where you would have found that I only
meant to oppofe po/itive Properties to nv Properties :
not as if wfc believed any fuch Things as Nega*
ttoe Properties, as we were only diftinguilhing be
tween Properties and Negations; a Diftin&ion which
your perplexed Manner of treating the Subject
gave me occafion to infift upon*
BY calling mere Negations Properties > you make
the Diftindion of foptivc Properties neceflary ;
and then ask, if there are any Properties that art
mt pvfaive* as if we believed any fuch Things as
negative Properties} when we are only arguing
againft you, and fhewing, fince what you call
Properties are mere Negations, i, e. are not pojitwct
that they are m Properties at all.
Mr. Law argued - - "To fay that Si>ACfe
" muft have Exigence becaufe it has fome Proper-
*c tiesj for Inftance Penetrabilityj or a Capacity
«c of receiving Body, feems to me the fame as to
*e urge* that J>ark»ejs muft be Something, becaufe
*< it has the Power or Property of receiving Light
«c &c."* To this Paflage and my Explanation
of it, you objed " Thefe are the Tranflator's
«« own Words: But this Gentleman tells us^ that
*6 he did not rriean either that SPACE Was [had
*< you mould have faid for that was my Word!
«€ a Capacity; or that Darknefs Was a Capacity t
" but only, that they wens Supposition* alike
5s km. If this was really the Tranflator's
* Tranflatioft of ABp. Kings Oriefo of Evil: N. -.
Mt,
ef SPACE Examine^ 83
«c ing, to what Purpofe did he fay, in the Man"
« ner he did, that it did not from thence follow,
c< that they muft exift, or be Something^."*
The Error which you here run into proceeds, I
find, from your miftaking the Senfe of the Tran-
flator. You imagine that the Words, becaufe it
has fome Properties •> for Inflance Penetrability, or a
Capacity of receiving Body — and Because it has
the Power of receiving Light* are Sentences fpoken
by the Tranflator, as if he allowed SPACE ta have
a Property of receiving Body, and Dark^eft of
receiving Light ; and that he would argue from
thence, that it did not follow, fuppoftng them to
have thefe Properties, that they had Exiftence*
Bus This, if I underftand that Gentleman, was
not his Meaning : But that thofe Sentences above
in Mies* were fpoken as the abfurd Reafons which
fome Perfons give, in order to prove the real Ex-
iftence of SPACE, andDart&sjs* The Tranflator*s
Meaning therefore is evidently This j " to. fay
<« SPACE snuft have Exiftence, and to give tbi$
« Reafon for it viz. becaufe it has fome Proper-
<* ties, for Inftance Penetrability, or a Capacity
** of receiving Body, feems to me the fame as to
« urge, that Darknefs rnuft be Something, and t®.
« give this Reafon fir it-, viz, becaufe it has the
<c Power of receiving Light \ whereas neither of
<{ them have any Properties j and thofe which
« are affigned them are mere Negations/' — This
I underftand to be all the Tranflator meant, a
Meaning right and true s and |ufUy did he urge
it againft Thofe, who pretend to prove the real
Exifenc^ of SPACE? by fuch Sort of Arguments
is he ter§ (hews ths Weaknefs of,
* Third Ekf. f. i9u
&f Arguments for the Reality
as good a Pretenfion to real Exiftence as SPACE;
imce receiving Light may as well be called a Pro-
fen -j of Dar/tnefs, as receiving Body be called a 7V0-
/w^ofSpAciij but the Truth is, neither of them
are Properties but mere Negations.
THIS Inftance of Darknefs puts me in Mind
of a plcafant Objection made to my laft Piece, by
one who is in the Way of Thinking with the
Anti-Gravitarian Mr. // n ; and is confe-
quently one of thofe deep- penetrating Gentlemen,
•who can fee Things in Scripture which never
were there ; and find out Myileries which no-
Body can underftand. He was greatly offended,
that I had denied the Exiftence o£D#rk&efi ', This,
it feems, he looked upon as a flranqe Kind of Afr
fertion, nothing lefs than a Denial of Scripture ;
for he remember'd Mofes had told him, that Dark?
nefs was upon the Face of the Deep. And if he
had remea ber'd Gen. i. 6. and 7. he would, no
Doubt, have brought that Text to prove that
Space was Created on the Second Day ; which
would have been both as good Senfe, and as good
Divinity as That of fome confiderable Writers,
who make SPACE a Conference of God's Exiftence.
But thefe Gentlemen are to be left to the unin
terrupted Enjoyment of their own Speculations ;
whofe Notions feem to be too fublimated, for
Heads that are (as a certain Writer exprefTes it)
lefs exalted in the Clouds, and Under/landings
more terreftrial than their own.
BUT I return — fc There feems [you fay] to
" be no Occafion to take Notice of' all our ^Au-
" thor has fa-id in the 2jth and i^th Pages.'*
Thefe are the very Pages, Sir, where you might
pave feen what I meant by a pofitive Property :
.To fay therefore, that fhe 4utkor jhoald have
'
of SPACE Examined. 85
explain *d what he means by a pofitive Property ; and
prefently afterwards to tell us, that There feems
to be no Occajion to take Notice of ail our Author
has fad in thofe very Pages, where the Author
has explained what you wanted to know ; plainly
fhews, that you induftrioufly avoided to under-
fhnd the Author's Meaning.
BUT it is proper the Reader fhould be told
what thele Pages contain, which you think there
is no Ocwjion to take Notice of. You had faid that,
" whatever is endued with Properties muft adual-
*' ly exift j that SPACE has the Property or Ca-
" pacity of receiving all Body &c. no Perfon
" was e'ver fo abfurd as to deny." * Now, Sir,
the Defign of thefe 2jth and z%th Pages was, in
Anfwer to you, to mew, that Space was endued
with no Property^ Attribute &c. that receiving Body
was no pofaive Property ; that is, was truly no Pro
perty at all) but an abfolute Negation : That the
Property -which is applied to SPACE, of receiving Body,
is Nothing but a Property in Body to exift-> where no
Body exijied before &c.
INSTEAD of anfwering This, as you ought to
have done, you pafs it off with faying, £< There
" feems to be no Occafion to take Notice of all
<e our Author has faid in the ijth and z8th Pages :
ic for, tho' he may deny SPACE to have any At-
" tribute or Property, yet he has himfeli affirmed
" Something of it, to wit, that it is fufficient to
^ conftitute a Difference between Things ; and
<f therefore he cannot deny it to be Something." f
Now was it not incumbent on you to have
defended what you had aiferted, againft the Ob-
f Firft Def. p. 4.
f Third Def. p. so,
jeclions
fit* the
I there advanced \ Had not you affirmed^
SPACF- had the Property or the Capacity of
Deceiving all Body ? and did not- 1 ohjeft that this,
was no Property, but a mere Negation, which might
3, well be applied to Nothing, as to SPACED dkt
not you fay that no Perfon was ever fo abfurd
& to deny, that SPACE had fuch a. Property as
)?ou: menrioned ? and did not I tell you in thefe
f ages,, that / deny.'d it \ Surely then you ought
fere to have offered at iome Proof that SPACE
was e#aued with a Property : Should you not have
(tuckavoured, to- confirm what you had, before af--
ferred*. namely that receiving Body was & Proper*
ty> md 2 Property- of SPACE \ \ believe the Reader
think you fliould: For, not to take Notice
of theft Objedions and Arguments,, is to,give up.
^ie Point concerning SPACE having the Property
Q£ receiving Body ;. at leaft, while "thofe ArguV,
ifien-ts rernam unanfwered, they ftandfom, againft-
5jou,. and fupport the Caufe I defend. Nay it k
*npit plain, that you do give up the- Point^ OE-
pafs it over at leaft, of SPACE having the Pro-
gerty of receiving Body ; for you urge, TV fe
^47- aery. Space- to hav$ any Attribm ^ Prwerty*
yt he has. himftlf affirm* d Something of it &C*!— is.
Sot this paiEng over your former Argument ibc
t4ie ;Exi (fence of SPACE, and putting the €ontro^
j(erfy upon another Foot i But to- drop youe-
Argument of SPAGB bwfw tfa Proves*
y, and to lay a. Strefi upon^^i
only that you are forced; ta flue*
from one Argument ta another j and tha^
©t being, able ta keep your £ej£ above Water*,
the Juftijce of your Caufc *b^ the force of
'
n; you are willing to, lay HoU of aay
kee '
tho* you will not take Notice of all If
faid in thofe forementioned i;ages, yet ydia.
pleas'd to make fome Remarks upon themi;
« The Difference between a pofitive snd a
c negative Property, which he lays fo much Strds
*c on> I before own'd I did not unckrftand 3
" for they feem> each of them, from the Nature
s of our Language, capable of being put ont for
" another." * What I meant by a pofitive Pro
perty, I think you might eafily fee: If you dil
not, I have again explained it* The only Que--
ftion is, whether receiving Body can be called &
Property at all ? I think it cannot : and that
this Property which is applied to SpA'CEi is only
a Property in Body to exift where no Body efcifh
ed before : The Property is in ^^y, not in Space.**
This I objeded to you> but you have thought
fit to give no further Anfwer. You argu€
indeed, that pofitive Properties^ and negative
Properties are capable of being put one for ano
ther : You Inftance **. " Body is endued with &
Ki pofitive Property of excluding t>t4ier Sadies $
*' but it is a negative £5cpreffion to fay* that it
<c is not capable^ or has not a Capacity of Ve^
*€ ceiving other Bodies into its Place." t But this^
at moft proves only-, that a Property -of Body ma'y
be changed to a toegative Exprejfi&n concerning Bodj^
and yet Body be Ml endued with a Property 'c
but it does not prove* that becaufe the Property
of Body to exift where no Body exifled before*,
imay be reprefented in a negative Expcffiov
cerning SPACE 5 therefore SPACE mull, be
with a Property \ yet, unlefs you had proved
your Inftance is wide of the Point,
* Third Def j>, 29, f (bid, p, 20-,
88 Arguments for the Reality
YOUR next Attempt is to prove, that either'
SPACE muft be really Something; or elfe, that I
tilk downright Contradiction* and Ntnfenfe^ as you
are pleafed to exprefs it ; which I fuppofe was
defigned as a Specimen of your Endeavours, to
treat the Author of Dr. Clarke's Notions &c. with
all the Civility you could*. But you begin— "It
" is, he fays, a Property of one Body to exclude
" another. I ask then fiom whence? His Anfwer
cc I fuppofe will be, from the fame Place, from
cc that Place in which the other exifts." f True !
but my Meaning in fuch an Anfwer would be—
from bearing the fame Relation ; from bearing that
Relation of Site to other Bodies, which the excluding
Body bears.
You advance — ct I ask again, what is Place ?
" Why, I fuppofe he will fay, a Part of SPACE."**
But I fee no Reafon you have to fuppofe fo>
when I have fo often denied SPACE to haw Parts;
and have fo frequently told you, that by Place ,
I mean only the Relation of Site which one Bo
dy bears to another. But taking this for granted,
you go on mod triumphantly in the following
Strain. — "What then is SPACE ? Here I know
cc he will anfwer, Nothing. If therefore SPACE
cc be Nothing ; Place, which is only a Part of
" Nothing, muft be Nothing too." ft But, if
Place be not a Part of SPACE (which is what
you hang this fine String of Arguments upon,
as that which you fappofe would be my Anfwer)
but only the Relation of Bodies to each other ;
then, you know, it does not follow, thatifSpA£J
* Sec Preface to Third Defence.
f Third Dcf. p. 21. ** Ibid.
ft Ibid.
is
bf SPACE Examined.
is Nothing, Place mud be a Part of Nothing;
which is your own Nonfenje. — The latter Part of
your Sentence indeed happens to be true not-
withftanding, viz*, that Place is Nothing : For Re
lation, or Place in the Abflratty is moft certainly
Nothing ; that is, no-Thing exifting ad extra*
but an Idea only : for what is Relation, confider-
ed abftraftedly from Things related? Well, but if
Place is Nothing, let us hear what Sort of a Con-
clufion you draw: It is this— "So that when
" one Body has the Property of excluding ano-
" ther, it has the Property of excluding it from
" Nothing, or from No-where; that is, it has
" the Property of excluding it, and it has not,
« at the iame Time." * One Body has the Pro
perty of excluding another from that Place wnere
it exifts; not from a Part of Nothing; but from
hearing the fame Relation which it (elf does to other
'Bodies, at the fame Time. But tho' Relation in
the jlbfiratt be Nothing ; does it therefore follow,
that one Body mutt have a Property of excluding
another Body from Nothing, in luch a Senfe as
to fignify, that it has the Property of excluding
it from No-wkere> or, of not excluding it at all ?
Whoever fays it does, confounds Words and Ideas
together in fu.ch a Manner, as fhould render him
beneath our Notice. The remaining Par; of your
Argument which extends beyond the Bottom of
this your 2 iy? Page is of the fame Sort with the
former : it proceeds upon the fame Suppo/inon, that
1 mould anfwer, Place is a Part of Space: But
I would have yotf look over this Part of your
Argument again ; remembring as you go along,
*hat I fhould not make the Anfwer which
i-
* third Dcf,-p; *i.-
go Arguments for the Reality
fttppofe ; and obferving that Place is not a Part of
SPACE ; that it is not any Thing diftinft and
feparate from the Bodies; but is only the Relation
which they bear one to another.
BUT I cannot forbear remarking, that in-
flead of replying to what I objected, concern
ing SPACE being endued with Properties ; or giving
an Anfwer to what I obferved with Refped to
thofe Properties (which you attribute to SPACE)
being no Properties at all', inftead of anfwering
thefe, as I had Reafon to expect you fhould,
you pafs 'em over; and only feled a particular
PafTage, where you firft fuppoje me to fay Some
thing which may ferve your Purpofe ; and then
proceed to argue from fuch a Sappofition. Thus,
inftead of anfwering what I do fay, you fappoje.
me to fay Things which I do not fay, and anfwer
them very ingenioufly. You drefs up a Man
of Straw, and when you have attacked, and
tnoft manfully defeated him, you imagine you
have confuted my Opinion : Which puts me
in mind of a PafTage I have fomewhere met
-with, where a Difputant of this Kind is com
pared to the Hero of a certain famous Ro
mance, who fancied he faw Monfrers in every
Paflenger he met upon the Road; and by this
Means (never feeing any Thing in its true
Light, or calling any Thing by its right Name)
was perpetually fighting with Phantoms of his
own railing.
of S p A c E Examined. g t
ARGUMENT V.
From SPACE having PARTS.
" SPACE [fay you] is one, uniform, conti-
" nued Thing, yet it has neverthelefs affignable
c' Parts; and may have Things predicated of fome
cc of them, different from Thofe which may be
€C predicated of others." * That is, SPACE is
one, uniform, continued Thing ; and yet is never
thelefs composed of many^ different) affignable Parts :
Query therefore, whether That which is compo-
fed of many, different, affignable Parts, can be one
uniform Thing ? If it can, rhen it is incumbent
upon you to explain what you mean by one uni
form Thing.
BUT I attend to your Illuftration — <c Thus I
<c can fay that the Part of SPACE which this
cc World exifts in, is different from that Parr, in
" which the Sun exi!ls." t But to fay is one
Thing, and to frove is another : For the Diffe
rence you affign, is not any Difference in your
Parts of SPACE ; but is only telling us that the
Sun, and this World are diltant : But does their
being diftant, make any Difference in the Parts of
SPACE ? or, does it prove that SPACE has Parts ac
all \ What you call two affignable Parts of SPACE,
are only two affignable Eidies, namely this Globe,
and the Sun. If they are the Parts of SPACE
which differ; then they would differ as much, if
the Sun and this World did not exift as you fuppofe
them now to do : and therefore, upon a Supposition
* Third Def, p. 25. f Ibid. p. 25, 26.
M z that
gz Arguments for tfo Reality
that neither this World, nor the Sun did exift, I
pefire you would fhew the Difference of thefe two
Pans of SPACE : If you cannot; then it is plain
the Difference is not in any fuch Parts, but in
Something elfe.
THIS is like an Argument which occurs in a
yery late Author*; and which by Reafon of its
marvellous Force, I beg Leave to take Notice of !
'<• If SPACE [fays he] is Nothing, and therefore
" hath no Exiftence, there could be no fuch Thing
«f as here or there ; for here and there are certainly
«£ Affedions of Something &c." f True ! but
they are not Affections of SPACE ; but of thoft
Things which are faid to exift in SPACE. It is
not SPACE, pr any Part of It, that is here or there*,
but the Things which exift are here or there; that
is, they bear fuch or fuch Relation of Situation
to other Things. That here and there arc Affec
tions of Something, by no Means proves SPACE
to be Something ; unlefs here nnd there were pro
ved to be Affections of SPAC^ ; which this Au
thor fhould have done ; or elfe he leaves his Ar
gument — juft as he found it.
I MAY take Notice that Mr. Locke has ob-
fcrved that WHERE and WHEN are Qttcftions be
longing to finite Exigences; ** and as the Advocates
for the Reality of SPACE contend likewife for
its Infinity, they muft acknowledge that accord?
ing to Mr. Locks 's Opinion WHERE is not appli
cable to SPACE.
THE Book where the forementioned Argument
appears, is a late Piece, to which the Anonymous
* An Effay concerning Rational Notions &c. ••
Anonymous. f P. 187.
?* l,9fke Hum. Underiland. B. 2, c.J5- §. 8.— Edit. 9.
Authoy
of SPACE Examined. 93
Author has prefixed the Title of An Eflay con
cerning rational Notions &c. Towards the end of
Prop. VIII he profeffes to fay Somewhat con
cerning Space. He tells us that « the Opinion or
«c Conceit of Some that SPACE is nothing at all,
" is a wild and extravagant Notion : for Nothing
*< hath no Manner of Exiftence, which we are
«c fure from continual Experience SPACE has." *
Jt would have been kind in this Author, if he
had informed us what Manner of Exiftence SPACB
has : and I fhould be glad to know what Expe
rience he has had of SPACE, that makes him fofttre
it has Exiftence. f£ Nothing [he fays] hath no
<c Manner of Exiftence, which we are fure from
« continual Experience SPACE has : " that is, if
we ask him why SPACE is Something* lie anfwers
— becaufe it has Exiftence , i. e. becaufe it is Some
thing. If we ask how he knows that it has Ex
iftence ? why, he knows it, becaufe he's fure of it:
That is, SPACE is Something, becaufe he's fure of
It ; which is an Argument of fuch Force, that I
lhall not attempt to anfwer it. This Author feems
to me, not to know what the Gentlemen on our
Side the Queftion have faid; or to fee the Diffi
culties and Objections which oppofe this Rational
Notion of his : For if he had, he could never
have thought it fufficient to fay, that the Conceit
of Some, that SPACE is Nothing, is a wild and
extravagant Notion ; or tp think he had done the
Bufine's, by adding a trice Objection or two,
which had more than once been anfwered. He
js miftaken if he thinks his Arguments are new ;
or that the Queftion may be treated in fuch a wild
* Eflay concerning Rational Notions p. 186.
94 Arguments for the Reality
and extravagant Manner, as he has done. — But
enough of this Author and his Notions.
You quote from me tha following Paflage viz,.
€C If it [SPACE] has Para, it muft bedivifible;
<c for the very Notion of Parts implies Difcerpi-
" bility : to fay that any Thing has Parts, and
*c yet that thofe Parts are infeparable, feems to be
<c near a Contradiction. I think the Ideas of
<c Extenfion, and indivifibility, are incompati-
" ble." * You anfwer — " This is a bare AiTer-
" tion, and without any Colour of Proof &c" f
If the very Notion of Parts, implies Difcerpibilitj,
then there was no Occafion to give any other
Proof: and whether it did not imply it, I thought
fufficknt in this Place to leave with the Reader.
But in my Anfwer to your Second Defence, I had
given you a Proof of it : But you have not
thought proper in either of thefe Places, to make
any Anfwer to it. Inftead therefore of faying
that I had here given a bare aflertion without any
Colour of Proofs you ftiould have confidered the
Prcof which you might have found by turning
over a few Pages ; and either have anfwered it,
or given up the Point. Your taking Notice that
I have not here produced a Proof, is no doubt
defigned to make the Reader believe, that I had
produced no Proof of it at all, and fince I had
given a Proof of it in p. 126", to take no Notice
of That is a mere Evafion.
You fay— "It is true indeed, that whatever
" is not extended, fuppofing an unextended Sub-
" fiance poffible to be, fuch a Subftance would
*< be indivisible : but it does not follow, that
* Dr. Clarke s Notions of SPACE, Examined p. 31.
f Third Dcf. p. 26,
€C what
of SPACE Examined. 95
cc what is extended, muft be divifible : I am fure
<c it is plainly otherwifein the Cafe of SPACE/'*
— I am fure this is a hare j4flertiony and without
my Colour of Proof. I ask, what is the Reafon
that an unextended Subftance would be indivifible?
Is it nor, becaufe it has no Parts ? and if this be
the Reafon, does it not imply that if it had Parts
it would be divifible ? I doubt you will find it
difficult to avoid this Confequence.
WHATEVER is extended, has Parts; This, I
prefume, will be allowed me : The Queftion then
is, whether that which has Partsy muft not have
divifible Parts ? And here we ought, I think, to
argue according to the common, and received
Meaning of the Words Extenfion, and having Parts ;
or elfe you fhould have told us what you mean
by thofe Expreflions. Every Man, who makes
Ufe of Terms where Doubts may arife about their
Signification, is obliged either to explain his Mean
ing, or to ufe them according to that which is
the common, and received one ; i.e. He is obliged
either to give us his own peculiar Senfe, or elfe
to talk according to common Senfe.— -Now, I flip-
pofe every one underftands, that to have Parts is
to be compounded of Parts; and to be compound
ed of Parts is to confifi of Parts joined together *
and Parts that are joind together, may be fuppofed
ajunder; i. e. may be divifible. — In the Idea then
of Parts, is plainly implied Divifibilitj : If every
Thing then which is extended has Parts, then
every Thing which is extended has divifible Parts ;
and that every Thing which is extendedhis Parts,
I fancy won will hardly deny: Whatever there
fore is extended, muft be divifible.
* Third Def. p. 26.
§6 Arguments for the Reality
I ARGUED to this Purpofe in my laft Pieces
to prove the very fame Thing, namely that what
is extended is divijible: but you have thought pro
per, as I jufl now obferved, not to attempt any
Anfwer to it, as I defire the Reader to remark'
by confulting Dr. Clarke's Notions of SPACE ex
amined p. 125, 126. and this your Third Defence
p. 89, 90 : and therefore fince you repeat the
fame Aflertion, namely, that what is extended need
not be divi/ibie^ without taking any Notice of the
Anfwer before made to it, I have a Right to repeat
here that Anfwer; which, if it had any Force be
fore, muft have the fame Force flill.
You fay in the Page before mentioned *, that
you cc fuppoie I endeavour to maintain the No-
rc tion of the Soul's being an unextended Sub-
*c fiance.'* I muft confefs that at prefent it is:
my Opinion ; and though it may be difficult to
us in this prefent State, to conceive an unextend-
ed Subflance ; which I imagine proceeds from our
being converfant with none but extended Sub-
fiances ; yet, unlefs I could conceive, that an
Immaterial Stibftance could be divijible, or that Ex-
tenfion '.-oes- not imply Divtfibilitj, I mufl flill re
tain the Notion, that the Soul is not extended —
That k muft be divifible, if extended MJM the Ar
gument I there urged, by (hewing that Extenjion
implied Divifibility : This Argument, I fay, yoft
make no Reply to : but inftead of it you tell
ti^, that an Immaterial Subflance may be divifible,
for -what you kgow f : and in another Place, you
fay that - <f A Spirit may be, for all this Gen-
<c tkman Can (hew to the contrary, an extended
* Third Dcf. p. 90
t See Third Def. p. 90.
of SPACE Examined*
*c divifible Subftance." * I muft obferve there
fore, that your Conduct looks as if you faw
the Difficulties attending Indivifible Extent/ton : and
therefore, inftead of faying any Thing againft my
Argument brought in Anfwer to your Second
Defence, to confute that Notion j or producing
any Thing againft it here, except a certain Inftance
of an extended, indivijible Thing, which I ihall take
further Notice of prefently ; you chufe to argue
that, for "what Ton know an immaterial Sttbjtance
way be divijible ; and therefore, that my Argu
ment to prove it not extended, becaufe it would
then be divijible, required no Anfwer. This, Sir,
may feem a plaufible Way of evading a Defence
of indivijible Extenjion, when we argue that a Spirit
muft be divifible, if extended: But fince you have
thought proper to maintain the Notion of indi-
•vifible Extenjion in other Parts of your Book ;
you ought to have anfwered the Argument which
J produced againft it : But you have not done it,
,snd therefore till you do, you have not anfwer-
:ed me> nor defended your fel£— . To tell us, as
you do here> that you are fare it is plainly other*
wife in the Cafe of Spaced, is a downright begging
the Queftion : for we are here difputing (which
furely you forget) whether SPACE, if i: has Parts,
•muft not be divifible; and it is therefore arguing,
like the Anonymous Author juit now remarked
upon, that it is fo, becaufe you are fare of it ,
which the Reader, if he pleafes, is to take for
a Proof.
BUT although you will not attempt to defend
Indivifible Extenjion, by anfwering my Arguments ;
yet you will endeavour, you fay, ts to give the
* Third Deff p. 28. f Ibid. p. 26.
N <c Au-
98 Arguments for the Reality
" Author an Idea of an extended indivifiblc
*' Thing; or at leaft ihew him, that the two Ideas
fc of Extenfion and Indivifibility are not in-
t( compatible.*' * — And *now let the Reader pre
pare for a very curious Invention ! It is this —
*f Let us fuppofe a Yard Cube of Matter free
" from all Pores, fo that it ftiould be perfectly
ce folid : Suppofe this Matter furrounded with
" Something, that fhould hinder its being fepa-
<c rated into any Parts whatever ; that is, fhould
" hinder the Body from taking more Room." f
— I cannot think, Sir, but you muft fmile at
your felf, when you produced this extraordinary
Inftance, this QuintefTence of Proof. — - « It is
<c plain, you fay, that this Matter is extended,
<e and it cannot be divided $-£."** It is very
plain indeed, Sir, that this Matter cannot be
actually divided, fo long as it is furrounded with
Something that JbalL hinder it ; that is, it cannot
be divided, when it cannot be divided. But
you affign an external accidental Impediment : You
faffoje this Alatter furrotinded with Something, that
Jhotild hinder its being feparated into any Parts what
ever : A notable Inftancc indeed, of an extended
indivifible Thing ! and if you had fuppoied this
Thing locked up in a Cheft, it might have pro
ved full as much. It is like binding Something
over a Man's Eyes ; and then producing him,
as an Inftance of one who hath Eyes, and yet
cannot fee. Do you really flatter your felf, you
have fhewn by this Inftance, that what is ex
tended may be, in its own Nature, indivifible?
* Third Def. p. 26. f Ibid. p. 27,
** Ibid,
THIS
cf SPACE Examined. 9^
THIS is what you muft explain to me; or
elfe you are fighting with the Wind. My Af-
fertion was this, that the Ideas of Extenfan, and
Indivifibility, were incompatible : Now, it is evident
I muft mean, that what was extended, muft, as
fuck, and in its own Nature* be divijible ; not, that
what is extended, cannot by accidental Impediment*
be fecured from attual Divifion. To what Pur-
pofe then have you been talking about a Piece
of Matter-) furrounded with Something that jhould
hinder it from being feparated ? You might as well
have told us, of a Piece of Matter at the Bottom
of the Sea, which no Body can come at j or that
Matter is not, as Matter, divifible in infinitum%
becaufe I cannot cleave a Grain of Sand with a
common Hatchet, You feem not to know the
Diftin&ion, of a Thing being indivifible, as it is
that Thing, or in its own Nature ; and being acci
dentally fb : The extended Piece of Matter which
you mention, is ftill, in its own Nature, and as it
is extended, divifible, let it be furrounded with a
Rock of Adamant : Such an accidental Impedi
ment may hinder it from being attually divided;
but does • not alter the Nature of Extenjton, or of
the Thing extended: It ftill retains the Nature of
j)wipbilityi notwithftanding it cannot, in your In-
ftance, be attually divided. You have therefore
failed, Sir, in your Endeavours to mew me by
this Inftance, that the two Ideas of Ext en/ion, and
Indivifibility, are not incompatible : They feem to
me to be as incompatible as ever : And let any
one try, whether or no, in the Inftance you men
tion, he can have an Idea of that Piece of Matter
being extended-, without having at the fame Time,
the Idea of its being, in its own Nature, divifible ;
Jf h$ cannot, you have been labouring in vain.
N * I?
Arguments for the Reality
" IF we fuppofe this folid Matter tfo be infi-
c' nite, it will be a tolerable Reprefentation [you
" fay] of the Jndivifibility, and Extenflon of
*« SPACE."* In Anfwer to this, I muft ob-
ferve
FIRST, that If ivc fuppofe this folid Matter to be
Infinite, i. t.pofoivelyy and metaphyfcally infinite ; by
\vhich we mean perfeft, or, to which Nothing can
\->zadded-y if we fuppofe this folid j Matter, I fay, to
be infinite, in this Senfe ; we fuppofe, what feems
to me to be an Impoffibility and a Contradiction.
For, as it confifts of Parts, it muft be confidered
as Quantity , or Number \ which in their very Na
ture include perpetual Increafablenefs or *dddibility $
and muft therefore, in their very Nature, be in
capable of this po/itivt) or metaphjfaal Infinity*
And to fuppofe this folid Matter to be infinite
in the other Senfe; -z//^. negatively infinite, which
is the only Infinity that can be applied to Quan-*
tity, is nothing more than to fuppofe^ that the
Mind of Man has a Faculty of going on in infi-
nitum y and enlarging this Matter in his Mind,
without being able to flop any where : but this
Senfe of Infinity will not here ferve your Turn ;
and the other, as I have obferved, is a Contra*
diftion.
SECONDLY, I anfwer, that I cannot conceive
any extended Being without Parts ; nor confequent-
ly either Infinite, or indivijible : I cannot con*
ceive it to be pofitwely infinite for the Reafons
above given: and I cannot conceive it to be indi:
"jifeble ; becaufe I can never think of Parts, but
immediately my mind anfwers* pivifibilitj : and
* Third Dsf. p. 57,
there**
of SPACE Examined. Jot
therefore, till you can produce a Proof, that the
very Notion of Parti does not imply Divifibility ;
or, that a Thing may be extended, without having
Parts-,1 lhall never be able to coniider an extended
'Being, under any Circumftances whatfoever, with
out, at the fame Time, confidering it as Divifible.
THIRDLY — The fuppofed pofitive Infinity of
this folid Matter, is affigned as a Reafon for its
being indivifible, though it be extended: and as
this Inftance is brought as a Reprefen ration of
the Indtvi/ibilityy and Extcnfion of SPACE; fo I
prefume, that the pojttive Infinity of SPACE is
affigned as the Reafon, for its being indivifible*
notwithftanding it is extended: If fo, I muft beg
Leave to inform you, that the pofitive Infinity of
SPACE, muft never be alledged to me, as a Proof
of its being indivifiblei or as a Proof of any
Thing at all about it ; becaufe I deny it to be
any Thing pojitrvely infinite, as well as to be tx-
tended. You muft not therefore go on quite fb
faft with me ; but prove firft, that SPACE is real
Extenfon, and that it is pojttive ly infinite ; and then,
but not before, you may boldly affign Jkch Infi~
nity for a Proof, where it will be of any Service
to you. But at prefent, Sir, we are but juft where
we fet out ! For if you tell me Space is extended,
And has Parts; I anfwer, It is then divi/ible: If you
urge, that it is poptively infinite; I reply, you
have not proved it. I deny it to be real Exten-
Jion ; but if it was, I deny that there can be any
real Extenfion po/itively infinite, or That to which
nothing can be added : And you muft prove that
there can, before you affign the Infinity of real
Extcnfion, as a Proof tha; real Exttnfon may be
f 02 'Arguments for the Reality
INFINITY (i.e. fofitive Infinity or Perfettnefs)
and Extenjton are in my Ideas, as incompatible,
as Extcnjiony and Indivijibilitj ; and will to me re
main fo, until I can find out a Number, to which
nothing can be added, and clear up all the Abfur-
dities of an infinite Series.
THE Ideas then of Extenjion and Indivijibilitjy
which you have been endeavouring to reconcile,
will, I believe, appear as incompatible as ever, to
thofe who thought them fo before. You have
hitherto failed in producing any Proof; and there
fore, if you think it worth your While, you
muft try once again, to invent another Inftance
of an extended indivifible Thing ; but I dare fay, you
will find none comparable to the former.
You remark that — (< the Difference [between
<•« SPACE, and your infinite extended Matter] is
«< only this, that to feparate the Parts of SPACE,
« is both to croud thofe Parts into one another,
" and to leave SPACE between ; but to feparate
«' the Parts of the Matter, is only to croud the
" Parts into one another ; both which we fee,
*6 from the Nature of each of them, is impoili-
*c ble." * If we could by an impoffible Suppo-
iition imagine Matter infinitely extended^ yet, there
ieems ,to me to be no Occaiion, to croud tbe Pans
into one another, in order to its feparation : for let
Matter be fuppofed to be extended ad Infinitum*,
yet, whilft you and I confider it as confining of
Parts ; in (read of being at the Trouble of cronding
ths Parts into one another ; we need only fuppoie
one fingle Part to be annihilate^ and the Bufinefs
is done: And this, by the Way, fuggefh to me
an Abfurdity, which follows upon fuppofing thac
* Third Def. p. 27,
Matter
of SPACE Examined. loj
Matter can be po/itivelj infinite : For, if when we
have imagined (as far as we can imagine) Matter to
be infinite, in the Senfe above mentioned!; if, I fay,
we can after this, fuppofe an Inch of it to be an-
nilated; then it muft either ftill remain infimtt3
and then one Infinite will be bigger by an Inch,
than another ; or elfe, the Addition of an Inch,
would make that infinite, which w as finite before;
both which Suppofitions are alike abfurd. — As
to the other Part of your Remark, viz,, that " to
*• feparate the Parts of SPACE, is to leave SPACE
<c between" ; I muft obferve, that it is indeed
very true, that we cannot feparate the Parts of
SPACE ; but not becaufe it is to croud thofe Parts
into one another ', And to leave SPACE between ; but
becaufe SPACE has not any Parts to be feparated:
and when you try to feparate the fuppofed Parts,
the Reafon why you ftill muft always leave SPACE,
is only this, viz*. Take Nothing from Nothing and
there remains Nothing.
I HAD faid, that ° a Spirit is indivifible, and
«c for that very Reafon, not extended ; for it is
rc very manifeft that an indivifible ~Being cannot ad
mit of a divijibie Quality, which Extenjion is C-TT." *
Upon this you exclaim — " Where has our Au-
" thor proved Extenfion to be a divifible Quality?
*c and if he has not proved it, I muft take the
«« Liberty to fay, that it is not." t I reply,
that I had proved it in the 126", and izyr/j Pa
ges : and therefore, inftead of taking the Liberty
of faying, that it is not; and asking," where I had
f roved it to be fi\ it would have looked much
* Dr. darkis Notions of SPACE, Examined p. 31,
f Third Def. p. 28.
fairer.
IO4 Arguments for the Reality
fairer, if you had turned to the forementioned
Pages, and had taken the Liberty to anfiver them.
BUT you proceed— <c A Spirit, he fays, is in*
«e divifible, and for that Reafon not extended*
«c If he means by Spirit an Immaterial Subftance*
" then I fay, that it may be queried whether it
<c is indivifible, or no, and frill the Argument
cc againft Matter's thinking be equally conclufive
« &c." * I muft obferve here, that you artfully
turn off the Point of indivifible Extenfan : we are
difputing, whether or no That which is extended,
muft not be divijible ; I afferted that it muft 5 and
then added, " I know the Reply to this is ready,
« -y/^. Is not a Spirit extended, and is it not in*
«c divifible .? I anfwer ; that a Spirit is indivifible*
ec and for that very Reafon, not extended : For
" it is very manifeft, that an indivifible Being
*c cannot admit of a divifible Quality, 'which Ex-
<c tenfion is; any more than a divifible Being
<c can admit of an indivifible Quality j which is
<« the Reafon, that no Syftem of Matter can be
<c intelligent." t
Now, inftead of defending your Notion, that
what is extended may be indivijible (which is the
Point in Hand) you take Occafion to drop Thar,
and proceed to tell us, that it way be Queried, whe
ther an immaterial Sub fiance is indivijible or no, and
and ft ill the Argument agalnfl Matter's thinking* be
eqttalij conclttjive. Now fuppofing this PafTage to
be as true, as it appears to me to be falfe ; it is
dropping, I fay, your Notion of indivijible Exten*
fan : For to Query, whether an Immaterial Sub-
ftance may not be divifible, as well as extended ;
* Third Def p. 28,
•j- Dr. Cfar&s Notions of SPA c 3? Examined p. 31.
at
bf SPACE tLxamined.
at a Time when I am arguing that That, or
any other Thing, mttft be atotfitfir, if extended ;
is rather 'admitting, that the Ideas of Extenfion and
Indivijibility are incompatible, than arguing again ft
it. According to my Apprehenfion, it would
have been more to your Purpofe in this Place
to have ftill infifled upon it, that an immaterial
Subfhnce was extended, and yet indivifible : here
Would have been an AfTertion at lead (which
is very often all the Proof you will condefcend
to give us in other Points) of indivtfible Extenjion.
But the Truth is, you feem confcious of the Ab-
furdities of that Notion ; and are therefore will
ing to wave the Point : And, as you had main
tained in other Places, that the Soul is extended ;
and as I had urged that it muft then be diuifible ->
you here chufe to Ottery, whether an immaterial
Sub (lance may not be divifible ; rather than put
it on the other Foot, namely, that a Thing may
be extended-, and yet indivifible^ left if you fhould
be unable to make that good, your Notion of ex
tended Spirit mould be utterly confuted. — But le:
us confider this. Notion of divifible Spirit.
I MUST firft obferve, that you icem to have
changed your Opinion, with Refpefit to this Poinr.
It is not long fince you believed, that immaterial
Beings muft neceflarily be indifcerpible (as the Reader
may fee, by turning to p. 43544- of your Fir ft
Defence} and that as evidently as the knoivn- Proper-*
ties of Matter prove it to be certainly a difcerpible
Subftance ; Jo evidently t the kgoivn and cohfefled Pro-
\ perties of immaterial Beings prove them to be indi-
| Jcerpible : But notwirhftanding you there believed
I them to be indifcerpible ; and tell us, that they ate
; f roved to be fo, from their %02y#and confeftd Prg<*
Q par fit* \
Id6 Arguments for the Reality
ferties\ yet now, it feems, that an immaterial Sub-
fiance may, for what you know, be divifible.
You will perhaps anfwer, that your Notions
are now confident with what they were before;
for that when you talked of the Indiviftbility of
immaterial Sttbftances; you meant, as you in your
Third Defence exprefs your felf, that they were
ivdtvifiblC) as thinking Sitbftances ; but that, as im
material SubftanceS) they might be divijible: This
might feem a plaufible Way of reconciling your
Sentiments, were it not for another Paffage which
occurs in your Fir ft Defence ; where you fay, that
<c according to the Suppofition of the Soul's be-
" ing fo extended, as to conftft of more than one
e< Point, yet thefe Points would be a Continuumy
cc they could not be feparable, any more than eve-
«c ry Point of the Deity is." * Now, by this
PafTage it is plain, that you then thought, that
an immaterial Subftance could not be fcparable (ft
all : For that which cannot be feparable, any more
than every Point of the Deity isy cannot be fepara
ble in any Senfe whatfeever.—B\it befides, Sir, the
Purport of your Argument fhews you meant,
that an immaterial l>eing was indivifible, in all
Senfes : For the PafTage which you quote from
!Dr. Clarke t is brought to confirm what you (had
before f&id ; namely, that though a Spirit be ex-
tendedy yet there is no Neceffity that it muft be
extended in the fame Manner as.4^/o"is; which
you fuppofe to be Dr. Cudworttis Meaning; who
cc feems [you fay] to confound the two Ideas of
', Indivihbility and Non-Extenfion together, as
" if they were the fame Thing, when they are
*c certainly as wide and diflin^t from one another?
* Firft Dcf. p. 42. f Ibid. jr. 43, 44
« as
of SPACE Examined.
" as any two Ideas poflibly can be. That they
*c are fo, is very plain, from the Confideration
" of the Nature of SPACE , which no-Body
" can be fo abfurd, as to fay is not extended,
<c and yet muft allow, that it is indivifible and in-
<c feparable." * — It is evident from hence, that
your Meaning was, to maintain the Notion, that
the Soul might be extended, and yet indivijible ;
for that Extenjion did not imply Divijibility : But
if you had only meant, that the Soul might be
indivifible as a thinking Subftance, and divifible as an
immaterial Subftance; then your whole Argument
will be Nothing at all to the Purpofe. For to fay
that any extended Being is indtvifble as a thinking
Subftance, tho' it may be divifible as an immate
rial Subftance, is no Proof or Reafon, that what
is extended, may be indivijible .: For if it be divifi-
ble in any Confideration -whatever, it is Jimply divi
fible : And confequently you would leave the No
tion of indivijible Extenjion, by fuch an Argument,
juft where you found it. — It is plain therefore
from the foregoing Obfervations, that the Author
of the Firfl Defence, and the Author of the
Third Defence, tho' the fame Perfon, yet widely
differ in their Sentiments.
Now I cannot affign any other Reafon you
could have, for admitting here, what you had de
nied before; but, that you was fenfible of what
Doctor Clarke confefTes, in the Paffage you have
cited from him t ; vk» that, " How far fuch
<£ Indifcerpibility can be reconciled, and be confift-
« ent with fome kind of Expanfion — is another
«{ Queftion of confiderable Difficulty." And
finding this wnfidtfable Difficulty hanging heavy
* Firft Def, p. 42. f Ibid. p. 43, 44.
Q a over
*o8 Arguments for the Reality
over you ; and that you would be reduced to
this Dilemma ; either to give up the Extenjion,
or the Indiuijibility of Spirit ; you chofe to Query
the latter. You will not fay that it is diviftble;
left you fhould be forced, one time or other, to
contradict your (elf: Nor will you fay, that it
is not divifible ; left you fhould not then be able
to maintain its Extenfion : and therefore you find
out a Medium, and tell us, that it may he queried
wheth. r it i s indivifible or no, and ftill the Argument
again ft Matter's thinking would be equally coa-
clufive *.
THIS you affert; whether you have made it
good, comes now to be examined : And I beg
Leave to fay, you are fo far from it, that I will
ihevv you have by your own Arguments which
you have brought to fupport it, proved the di-
red contrary.
THAT this may appear, J fliali produce what
you admit to be the Argument ufed by All .Aiir
floors who have argued againft Matter's Thinking ;
and I ill all fhew, that if Spirit be divifible, in
the Manner you here afTert it tq be, the fame
Argument will equally prove againft a Spirit* s
Thinking: If I do this; then I fliali hereby (hew,
that you prove (becaufe it will follow) from your
own Arguments, that, // a Spirit be divijible, th$
Argument •' tgainft Matter's Thixkivg* will not be c-
qud'.y conclufi've.
" ALL Authors [you fay] that were for con-
*' futing the Notion of Matter's Capacity of
i£ thinking, always endeavoured to prove the Im-*
c< poiTibiliry of ir, from its having fo many di*,
*c Jhxcl Percipients in it | that is [yo^ co^tinue]
f Third Def. p, 28
I'fees
of SPACE Examined. 109
« becaufe it conjifted, of an infinite Number of 4&-
« ftintt whole Sttbft antes. "* Thefe are your own
Words : And a little before, you tell us, that a
Spirit may, by Divifon, become <c feveral imma-
" terial Subftances." f— Now, from hence will I
ftiew, that a Spirit, according to your Notion
of it, muft confift of feveral diftincl whole Sttbftances
(as you are pleafed to call 'em) fever -at diftincl
Percipients ; from whence it will appear, that the
Argument, which you allow to be conclufive a-
gainft Matter's Thinking^ (viz,, its having fo many
diftinft Percipients in it) will be equally conclufive
againft Spirits Thinking.
IF a Spirit may be divided, and by fuch Di-
vifion become feveral immaterial Subftances ; as you
| grant it may; then it is obvious, that a Spirit
muft conjtft of fever at immaterial Subftances : For
otherwife you muft fay, that a Spirit may be di
vided into thofe Things, of which it does not
conjifl ; and that the Whole does not confift of its
Parts. Now, if a Spirit confifts of feveral Sub-
fiances, it muft, as well as Matter, confift of fe
veral, diftintt) whole Subflances ; unlefs you have
jfound out a Diftinftion of whole Subftances, and
fyot whole Subftances ; if you have pray acquaint
ius, what Sort of Subftances Thofe are, which are
faot whole Subftances ! According to the little
Knowledge I have of Things, That which is
ot an whole Subftance, can be no Subflance at all>
' \ whatever Senfe the Word Subftance be under-
ood : For, to talk of an Half -Subftance^ would,
prefume, be thought no better Senfe, than to
ilk of an Half-Being, or an Half-Property ; which
rould be dividing Beings, Properties &c. into
? Third Def, p. 29, f Ibid. p. 28.
no Arguments for the Reality
whole Eeings, and half Beings, whole Properties, and
half Properties — a Divifioi^ to which my Meta-
phyfics have never yet carried me !
Now fince that which confifts of diflintt whole
Subflances, muft confift of fo many diftintt Perci
pients (as ybu allow ; by making the having di-
ftm ft Percipients, and the conjifling of diftintt whole
Subflances to fignify the fame *) it follows, that a
Spirit confifts of feveral diftinft Percipient*.
SINCE then you admit that Ail Authors wbc
were for confuting the Notion of Matter's Capacity
of thinking, always endeavoured to prove the ImpoJ>
jibility of tf, from in having fo many diftinft Per
cipients in it j that is, becaufe it confifled of an in
fnite Number of diftind: whole Subflances : An
jfince I have fhewn from your own Notions c
a Spirit's Divifion, that a Spirit mutt, according t
you, conjift of feveral dlflinc~l whole Subflances, an
therefore of feveral diflinft Percipients, as well
Matter; the natural Conclufion is, either that it
impoffible for a Spirit to thinkj or elfe that tl:
Argument againft Matter 's Thinking is by n
Means conclufive.
I MUST therefore farther obferve, that if t
Argument againft Matter's Thinking be conclufiv
then, fince upon Supposition that a Spirit is dw
fible, it would not be conclufive ; as I hope I ha
proved ; it follows, that a Spirit cannot be d
fible, as you aflert it may be for what you k$
I cannot therefore but wifh, Sir, that you had
ther known more, or afferted lefs.
* See Third Def. p. 29. Your Words are thefe
** its having fo many diftinft Percipient [s in it ; thai
becaufe it cwfijled of an infinite Number of diflinff tu
To
of SPACE Examined. n\
You argue much to the fame Purpofe, in the
Vindication of your Second Defence *. What there
fore I have faid here, is a fufficient Anfwer to
both. — But, fince in this laft mentioned Place>
you tell us that " the Soul is a Continuum* or
*c one, uniform Thing t ; " it is incumbent upon
you, to explain your Meaning; and reconcile it
to your Notion, that the Soul cc may be divifible*
*' for what you know/* which you aflert a few-
Lines above it. You fay indeed, that it may be
divifibk) as an immaterial Subftance, but indwifi~
ble> as a thinking Subftance ** ; but this will be
of no Service to you in the prefent Cafe : For
if it be divijible into Jeveral immaterial Stances*
as you aflert it may, for what you know ; and
is yet oney uniform Thing, which you likewife
aflert ; you muft either reconcile thefe Notions ;
or we muft conclude, that you are irreconcileably
inconfiftent.
I SHALL conclude this Point with obferving
briefly, that the Reafon which has induced Men
to imagine that Spirits are extended, feems to me
to be This. They fuppofe that no Properties
can fubfift but in fome Subftratum ; that is, in
Something different, and diftind from all its ef-
fential and constituent Properties ; Something, in
which all thefe Qualities, Properties &c. are ftuck^
and by which they are fupported. They fuppofe
therefore, that Tftwi^ofg, andJ$7/w| &c. muft have
fuch a Subftratum. Now, being convesfant with
material Objects, and confidering them as having
a Subilratum, and finding them all to be extend
ed j hence they have afibciated their two Ideas of
* Third Def. p. 90. f See Ibid.
** See Ibid,
H2 Arguments for the Reality
a S*bftr*tum* and Extenjion together ; in fucn a
Manner, as whenever they think of a Stibftratum,
they always conceive it extended : And from hence
confidering Spirits to have a Subftratttm, and al
ways joining the Idea of Extenfion to every Sub-
ftratum, they conceive Spirits to be extended. — *—
But I pafs on to another Argument.
ARGUMENT VI.
From BODY being extended INTO
SPACE.
You argue, that if a Body be extended into
SPACE, and SPACE be Nothing ; « then is the
cc Body extended into Nothing, what therefore
" is the Difference between being extended into
" Nothing [into no where] and not being ex-
« tended at all * ? I am obliged to repeat, that
when I fay SPACE is Nothing* I mean that SPACE
is not a Thing, that it is not a real Exiflent : Is it
then any Confequence, that whar is not extend
ed into a real Exiflent* muft not be ext 'ended at all?
But your Miftake lies in imagining that what is
extended into Nothing, muft be extended no where ;
for Somewhere* or Jome Place is not a Thing* unlefs
in the Senfe that Relations are Things ; viz Ideal
Things. Place is a Relation of Site, which one
Body bears to another ; and when we fay that a
Body is extended into a Place, we mean that the
Part of the Body which is the Increafe, bears a
certain Relation to other Bodies, which before it
did not. A Body may therefore be extended in-
* Third Def p. 30.
to
of SPACE Examined, 113
to no-Thing -3 and yet be extended Somewhere ;
i. e. not extended into Nowhere.
BUT I had faid that " when" the Body is ex-
" tended into a Void, that Void becomes full,
" which is all the Myftery." * — To this you
anfwer-" If all the Myftery is, that Nothing be-
" comes full ; I beg this Author to tell me the
" Difference between the Fulnefs of Nothing,
*c and no Fulnefs at all &c." f To fay that a
Void becomes full, is only faying that ther£ is
real Extenfon, whereas before there was not : and
that when there is real Extenfion, there is not a
Void. But to talk, as you do, of the Ftilncfs of
Nothing* or the Fulnefs of a Void, is confounding
Words; and amounts to the fame as talking of a
full Void, or a full Nothing. It is making the
Void one Thing* and Fulnefs another ; whereas,
where Body is, there is no Void. If you would
pieafe therefore, to ask your Queftion in intelligi
ble Englifh, you mould fay " what is the Dif-
«e ference between a Void becoming full (which
" was my Expreffion) and no fulnefs at all ? ""
and then I anfwer ;' there is juft the fame Diffe
rence, as there is between a Void and no Void,
Body and no Body, real Extenfion and I final
Extenfion.
* Dr. Clarkis Notions of SPACE, Examined p, 34,
f Third Def. p. 31,
ARGU-
114 Arguments for the 'Reality
ARGUMENT VII.
From the DISTANCE and £LACE of
BODIES.
You had faid, that u If there was no Diftance
c£ exifting really, it would unavoidably follow,
" that the Sun and Moon exifted both in the
« fame individual Place/' * To which I anfwer'd
that " Diftance is the imaginary Length of SPACE,
" confidered between any two Beings &c. " t
You now reply — fc what is This but allowing
« the Confequence I mentioned ? For, if the
" Diftance of the Sun from the Moon be only
<c imaginary, it cannot be real; therefore the Sun
«c and Moon are really in the fame Place, though
sc they are in our Imagination at a Diftance," **
I SAID, that Diftance is the imaginary Length
of Space ; upon which you reply ; If the Diftance
of the Snn from the Moon, be only imaginary, it
cannot be real : But pray Sir, who faid that the
Diftance was imaginary ? The Diftance is real, \. e.
real Diftance', or the Bodies are really diftant : But
yet, when Diftance is coniidered as a Length of
Space, it is imaginary Length: that is, it is not the
Length of any really exifting 7"hing. And here
likewife may be anlwered what you offer in the
Vindication 'of your Second Lefence ; where,
becaufe I had (aid, that " when we fpeak of Things
«« being diftant, we mean ic of fone Relation, or
* FirR Def. p. 32.
"f- Dr. Clarke's Notions of SPACE, Examined p. 57.
** Third Def. p. 3 2.
" Acci-
cf S p A c E Examined. i i £
" Accident in the Things themfelves;" * — You
reply—" That is, in plain Englifh, the Diftance
" that is between two Bodies, is not between them,
*' but in them.1' f From whence you take Occa-
cafion to play upon the Words in, and internal
Relation, jfor fifteen Lines together. — It is fuffi-
cient therefore to tell you, that the Relation is
neither in them, nor between them : And that
when I fpoke of Diftance, as a Relation in Bo
dies , I meant no more, than a Relation of Bodies,
or a Relation which Bodies bear to each other.
THE Sun and Moon are not only diftant in
Imagination -y but really fb : For it does not follow,
that becaufe Diftance is imaginary Length, therefore
it muft be imaginary Diftance ; or that becaufe Di
ftance is no Thing, therefore it muft be no Di»
fiance ; any more- than that becaufe Virtue and
Vice are no Things (/'. e. no real Exiftents) there
fore that there is no Virtue or Vice in the World,
or that Men cannot be faid to be either Virtuous
or Vitious. And thus I conclude, that Diftance
is no real Thing, is only a Relation of Bodies, yet
not an imaginary Relation (which would be the
fame as no Relation) but that it is really predica-
ble of Bodies, or that Bodies [the Sun and Moon
for Inftance] may be faid to be really diftant^
and therefore do not exift in the fame Place, tho?
Diftance be no really exift ing Tlaing.
BUT it is endlefs to difpute about Words 2
and a Perfon who is refolved to do it, may go on
wrangling for ever. And This may be an Excufe
for omitting feveral little Objections of this Sort,
which run through your Performance* To fok
* Dr. Clarkis Notions of SPACE, Examined p. 113,
f Third Def. p. 80
P *
Si 6 Arguments for the 'Reality
low you minutely in every Step you have takers
might perhaps take away all Room for future
Cavils, and leave you nothing to fay ; but as I
am fenfible, it could afford but very little Enter
tainment, or improvement to the Reader, I may
very well be excufed.
You take Notice of an Expreffion of Mr. Locke*
viz. beyond the ZJmverfej from whence you would
prove SPACE to be Something real. You argue
that — " To fay beyond the Phjenomena of Na-
" ture, means either that there is Something be-
cc yond them ; or elfe there is no Difference be-
" tween Finity and Infinity ; becaufe we can in
«' both Cafes fay, there is nothing beyond them.'* *
Let us conficier what is meant by BEYOND, for
herein lies the Fallacy. Could we fuppofe the
fhaenomena of Nature infinite, in a pofitive Senfe,
we could not fay beyond them, but why ? not
merely becaufe there could be no Thing exifting be
yond them j but becaufe there could be no beyond.
Now if the Phenomena of Nature be finite, it
is proper and true to fay beyond them, becaufe
there may be Something exifting beyond them, or
becaufe there is beyond. Space and CoWare here
the fame : And if you can prove beyond to be a
"Thing, a fiebsg) a Property of God ; then, and not
before, will this Expreflion of Mr. Locks prove
SPACE to be Something. — In fhort, to fay beyond
the Phenomena of Nature does not mean that there
is any Thing exifting beyond them ; but only, that
the Phenomena of Nature are finite.
THE Sum of what you fay farther on this
Head is This ; viz,. That " our Idea of the ab-
«f folute Place of any Thing, is an Idea pf its
* Thi?d Def. p. 35.
"Ex-
of S p A c E Examined, 117
*£ Exigence in fome Pare of the Univerfe " : and,
that " there can be no relative Place without
<c an abfolute Place:" and, that " if Diftance be
" Nothing, there can neither be any relative, or
*c abfolute Place.'** My Anfwer to which is
This— If by Exiftence in fome Pan of the Uni
verfe, you mean Exiftence in fome really exifting
Part of SPACE ; this is fuppofmg that SPACE
is Something really exifting) which is the Queftion :
And it will remain to be (hewn, that Bodies can
not exiil: in a relative Place, without exifting in
an abfolute one, in fuch a Senfe of abjblttte Place :
that is, it will remain for you to fhew, that Bo
dies cannot bear a Relation of Site to each other,
unlefs SPACE be a real Exiftent. If you fay
that a Body cannot exift at all, tmlefs it has fome
abfolute Place ; and by abfolute Place you mean as
above ; then you mutt fhew, that a Body can
not exift, unlefs SPACE be really exifting too.
By a Body's cxiftcncc in Space> I underftand no
thing more than extended Exiftence : And it is no
Confequence, that if SPACE be not a real Ex
iftent, an extended Being cannot exift. A Body
indeed cannot be extended, unlefs there be a Void*
or a fojpbility of its being extended : But then it
irmft be proved, that this PoJJibility is a real Thing,
we mud, 'tis true, prefuppofe SPACE to the Ex
iftence of every Thing which is to exift in it ;
but this is only to prefuppofe a PoJJibility of their
Exiftence: The Prefitppojition of SPACE does not
prove its real Exiflence.
WHEN we fay that a Body exifts in abfolute
Place ; the Meaning is, that we confider its Ex
iftence abftraffiedl] from the Relation which it bears
* Third Def. p. 35, 36,
n8 Arguments for the Reality
to other Bodies : And then, what we call the *£-
felttte Place of that Body, is only its mere Exifl-
ence. This I take to be the true Meaning of ah-
folttte Place: And then indeed there can be no
relative Place without an abfolutc Place ; that is>
Bodies cannot bear Relation of Situation to other
Bodies, unlefs they exifl ; or, they cannot exift
in Place (for, properly fpeaking, there is .3 Place
by relative) if they do nor exift at all. But
This, I apprehend, is no Proof of the real Ex-
iftence of SPACE.
ARGUMENT VIII.
From the IMPOSSIBILITY of ANNIHI
LATING SPACE.
DR. CLARKE argued, that SPACE could not,
even in Thought, be annihilated; that it would
remain, even after it was fuppofed to be annihi
lated : and from hence the learned Doctor would
prove SPACE to be NECESSARILY EXISTING.*
Jn Defence of this Argument you urged — fC To
<c fuppofe SPACE away, certainly amounts to the
<c forementioned Abfurdity [/. e. that it remains,
even after it is taken away, or fuppofed to be an
nihilated] " for the Idea of it neceffarily rufhes
<c into our Minds ; and we cannot but fuppofe
c< it to exifi, even after we have tried to fuppofe
" it annihilated." t In this Argument I could
fee no Force ; and in anfwer to it, I obferved,
that if it fhould be admitted, that the Idea of
* See Dr. CLARKE'S Anfwer to the Jtxtb Letter.
f Firil Def. p. 47,
SPACED
of SPACE Examined. 119
SPACE, after all Endeavours to fuppofe SPACE
awaj, would (till rttfb into our Minds \ yet, it
would not from thence follow, that SPACE mud
have real Exiftence, much lefs necejfarj or Je If Ex*
iftence — that Ideas may ru(h into our Minds,
which have nothing ad extra correfpondent to
them — that it feemed evident to me, that the very
Reafon why SPACE i. e. the Idea of SPACE, af
ter all Endeavours to the contrary, does (till rufh
into the Mind, is becaufe SPACE is mere No
thing; and to fuppofe NOTHING away* or to
endeavour, even in Thought to annihilate NO
THING, is a Contradiction ; becaufe in the Idea
of Annihilation, we always prefuppofe the Exift-
€nce of Something ; and when we endeavour to
imagine NOTHING annihilated^ Nothing will re
main ; for to annihilate Nothing-, is to turn No-
thing into Nothing, and therefore the frfl Idecy
after all our Suppofitions, ftill recurs, and confe-
quently, if this be an Argument for the NECES
SARY EXISTENCE of SPACE, it is full as good
for the NECESSARY EXISTENCE of NOTHING.
BUT you are pleafed in Reply, to ask the fol
lowing Queftions — viz,. cc If after all Things, by
«c which I now mean all created Subftances, and
«' their Properties, are fuppofed to be annihilated,
«c this Author has an Idea of Nothing^ which
" rulhes into his Mind, whether he will or no ;
« I ask, Firfly what Sort of an Idea it is? Secondly
cc whether it be an Idea of Nothing, nowhere,
" or Somewhere &c.ft * To your firft QuefKon
I anfwer, that it is an Idea arifing necefTai i]y from
the Supped tion which you make : It i
of Reflection. I had before an Ids* of Thefe Sub-
* Third Def. p. 37.
fiances,
I2O Arguments for the Reality
fiances, that is, of their Exiftence : I now confi-
der their Exiftence to ceafe ; and what is my Idea
then, but an Idea of the Negation of all created
Exiftences ? and if I ask iny felf what remains?
will not my Mind immediately anfwer, Nothing £
(for the Supreme Being is out of the Queftion)
and if, after This, I endeavour to annihilate, or
to fuppofe NOTHING awajy and again confuk
my Ideas ; (hall I not find, that I have the fame
Idea I had before? To your fecond Queftion I
anfwer, that it is neither an Idea of Nothing No-
where, nor Somewhere ; unlefs in fuch a Senfe, as
Ideas may be faid to be Somewhere. It is a mere
Idea arifing from imagining the Exiftence of all
created Subftances to ceafe. The remaining Part
of this your $jth Page, is only ringing Changes
upon the Words Nothing Somewhere, and Nothing
Nowhere, and therefore I ihall leave you to enter
tain your felf with the Mufic.
THIS Argument, urged by Dr. Clarke for
the necefTary Exiftence of SPACE, viz*, that it
cannot be annihilated, is as it feems, a favourite
one with Thofe Gentlemen on his Side the Que
ftion. I muft own, I have often wondered, that
the learned Doctor could think there was fo much
Force in this Argument as he feems to do; till
I chanced to meet with the following Paffage in
Mr. WHISTON'S Hiftorical Memoirs; where he
relates a Circumftance of Dr. CLARKE'S Life,
which he fays was communicated to him from
the Doctor's own Mouth. — " One of his [Dr.
" CLARKE'S] Parents asked him, when he was
<f very young, whether God could do every Thing?
" He anfwered] yes. He was asked again, whe-
« ther God could do one particular Thing, could
" tell a Lie ? He anfwered, no. And he under-
« ftood
of SPACE Examined,
" flood the Queftion to fuppofe, that this was
c the only Thing, that God could nor do :
*4 Nor durft be fay, Jo young wat he then, he
' thought there was any Thing elfe which God
Cc could not do : While yet, he well remember'd,
<c he had even then, a clear Conviction in his
Cc own Mind, that there was one other Thing
" which God could not do ; z/«,. that he could
" not annihilate that SPACE which was in the
'c Room wherein they were. Which Impoffi.
Cf biliry now appears even in Sir ISAAC NEW-
« TON'S own Philofophy." *
FROM this Memoir, I am not at all furprifed
that Dr. CLARKE believed SPACE to have real
Exiflence j or to find the ImpoJJibility of its beinv
annihilated, alledged in his Writings, as a Proof
of its nece/ary Exigence. Mr. WHISTON has fee
the Matter in its true Light. It appears that the
Notion of SPACE being Something really exiftino-
ad extra, and the Impoffibility of its Annihilation,
were natural to him 5 Notions which he had
when he was very young: And it is well known,
that whatever is ftrongly imbibed at fuch an A^e,
too often remains with us all our Lives after. If
the Idea of a Phantom, in our infant Years makes
any ftrong Impreffion upon our tender Minds •
we find it ever after very hard* if not impoffible
to get rid of it; it almoft neceflarily r*J1:es into
otir Minds, after all onr Endeavours to the con
trary.
> DR. CLARKE'S Principle,- that SPACE cannot
be annihilated is, I think, a very true one: But
then the Qiieflion is, whether it cannot be anni-
* Mr. V/HISTON'S Eijlorical Memoirs 'of tie Life of
(Dr. SAMUEL CLARKE p. 15. Edit, 2,
P. hilated,
*a2 Arguments for the Reality
liilated, becaufe it is neceflarily cxifting\ or whe
ther, becaufe it is Nothing ? you aiTert the former,
and I the latter ; it is therefore incumbent upon
you to prove your Affirmative. As I apprehend,
the ImpoJJibtlitj of Annihilation can be no Proof of
the neceffitrj Exiftence of any Thing, unlefs thac
Thing be firft proved to cxift : For otherwife,
the ImpoffibilitJ of Annihilation will prove the ne-
ceffarj Exijlcnce of Nothing. Your Argument be
gins at the wrong End : You fir ft fuppofc SPACE
to have real exigence ; and then finding you can
not fuppofe it annihilated, \ou conclude that it
nm ft be necejfarily exifting. But it fliould firft be
put out of all Doubt, that SPACL has real Ex-
iftence-, and then indeed, if it cannot be fuppofed
to be annihilated, it will follow that it is nccej-
farilj exlfting: Whereas, in this Argument, its
teal Exiftence is taken for granted; and then you
endeavour to prove its necejfary Exiftence, by an
Argument which will, as I have obferved, equal
ly prove the ncctfary Exiftence of Nothing.^
You tell me 'the "actual remaining of SPACE
« follows from the Impoflibility of getting rid
« of the Idea of its real Exiftence, that is, from
« the Contradiction implied in fuppofing it not
<>< to exift." * I muft take the Liberty, Sir, to
inform you, that the actual Exiftence of SPACE
ad extra, by no means follows from your not be-
inq able to get rid of the Idea of its actual Exift
ence, or from your imagining (without ihewing)
that there is a Contradiction implied in fuppofing
it not to exift. What if yon could not get rid
of the Idea of a Caflle in the 4ir? ~ muft there be
really fuch a Thing \ If then, after all the lieafon-
* Tliird Dcf. p. 80,
ing
of SPACE Examined.
ing that has been ufed to convince you, all the
Arguments that have been urged, you ftill find,
that you can by no means get rid of this trouble-
fome Idea ; it is your Misfortune : But you muft
not endeavour to perfuade us, that becaufe you
cannot help thinking that SPACE is a real Exijient,
therefore it mult really be fo A Man that
fhould have the Jaundice from his Birth, would
by no means perhaps be able to get rid of the
Idea of every Thing he faw being yellow : But
I fuppofe, he would be thought to have a worfe
Diftemper, fhould he endeavour to perfuade all
Mankind, that therefore they really were fo.
To conclude this Point. Ic appears, that Dr.
CLARKE received into his Mind this Notion of
the neceffary Exiftence of SPACE, when he was
very joung. It was one of the earlieft of all his
Thoughts: He feems as it were cum laEte Nutri-
els errorem faxiffe * And it is no ftrarge
Thing, that Men fhoiild become zealous Vota
ries to thole Opinions, which they have entertain'd
in their Minds from their very Infancy — and a
propos in this Place, are the Words of Mr. LOCKE;
<f It is eafy to imagine, how by thefe Means
<c it comes to pafs, that Men worjbip the Idols that
" have been fet up in their Minds ; grow fond
<c of the Notions they have been long acquaint*-
ce ed with there ; and ft amp the Characters ofDi-
<fi VINITY upon Absurdities and Errors" t
* Cicer.
| Eflay on Hum. Underihnd. B. i. c. 3, f. 26.— Edit. 9.
Q z
'124 Arguments for the Reality
ARGUMENT IX.
That SPACE is a MODE or PROPERTY
of GOD.
IN Defence of Dr. CLARKE, you fay that
<c in proving SPACE to be Something from its
" Qualities, he did not colder it ftri&ly as a
«f Property, but as its own Subfiatum." * — The
Meaning of this you explain, by what you call
a parallel Inftance ; « A Capacity, you fay, of di-
«< flinguiftiing betwixt Right and Wrong, Truth
«< and Falfhood, are Qualifies accompanying
« Knowledge ; if therefore we fee thefe diftin-
<£ guifhing Qualities in any Being, fhould we
** not immediately apply Knowledge to this Be-
<c ing, and conclude that it was a Property of
<< this Being ? So likewife, in the Cafe before
*c us : If we perceive that Something is pene-
<c trable, extended, &c. and that no Being could
f< be fo, except SPACE was Something j will it
<* not molt evidently follow, that SPACE is Some-
« thing 2 and if it be a Property, that it is a
' Property of that Being ? " f You here imagine,
that the Capacity of difiingmjhing betwixt right and
wrong £c. is Something diftintt from Knowledge ;
whereas it is Knowledge it felf: And therefore, if
we fee this diftingmjhing Quality in any Being, we
Ihould undoubtedly apply Knowledge to it, and
conclude that ir is a Property of this Being: why?
— Becaufe this diftifiguijhmg Quality is Knowledge j
and therefore this is only faying, that if we fee
Third Def. p 3g. | |bid. p. 39.
of SPACE Examined. 125
Knowledge in any Being, we fhould conclude that
Knowleage is a Property of this Being — But the
Caie before us is widely different. Penetrability
and Extenfan are no Properties of God. And
tho' Immobility, Indifcerpibility, and Infinity are,
yet this will not prove SPACE to be a Property
of him, as a Capacity of diftinguifoing between Right
and Wrong, Truth and Faljhood, will prove Know
ledge to be a Property of that Being, in whom
we find fuch a Capacity: And for this plain
Real on j viz,, becaufe fuch a Capacity is Knowledge :
but Immobility, IndifcerpibiUty, and Infinity are not
SPACE; your parallel Inftance is therefore not pa
rallel in the leaft.
As to Penetrability, I told you — "To fay
*' that Penetrability is a Property of the Infinite
« Being, /. e. of God, is faying that the Infinite
: Being, i.e. God impenetrable; which is fo ap-
*f parently blafphemous, that it cannot by any on*
<c be allowed to be a Property of him.".* Now-
let us hear what Reply you make to this. It is
an Anfwer drawn from the Sacred Writings, and
ufher'd in with all the Pomp of Words — " God
f< forbid ! it greatly behoves this Author, to con-
«c fider upon whom this Accufation of Bkfphemy
« will fall : For if by a Being's being penetrable,
«c can only be meant that fuch a Being may have
" other Beings in it (and whether it can poffi-
« bly mean any thing elfe I appeal to all the
*c World ; ) then let him remember whofe the
4C following Words are, in him -we live and move*
*' and have our Being"}- I well remember,
Sir, whofe Words they are : But I mud beg Leave
* Dr. Clarke's Notions of SPACE Examined p, 46.
f Third Def. p. <J.Q.
to
126 Arguments for the Reality
to obferve, that they are no Proof of what you
contend for.
LITTLF, I believe, did St. PAUL ever imagine,
that he fhould be called upon as a VVitnefs in fuch.
a Caufc i little did he think, that his Words would
be produced to prove, that we live and move
in the E fence of God:, and, that as we are in SPACE
we are in God; i.e. that SPACE is GOD ! St.
PAUL was fpeaking to the Men of ATHENS, and
endeavouring to abolifli the Worfhip of Idols ;
and he would hardly have fet up another in their
Room. No ; SPACE was an Idol, unknown to
thofe Times ! an Idol, referved to theie latter
Ages, and for the Difcovery of fome modern En-
glimmen ! But I mull confefs, Sir, you are not
the only Perfon who has quoted theie Words of
St. PAUL to the fame Purpofe, and underftood them
in fuch a Senfe : For the Learned Dr. CLARKE
has done the fame. Mr. LEIBNITZ calls it zftrange
Exprejllon, to fay that what is in SPACE, is in
God's Immenjtty *. To which the Learned Doctor
replies, This flrange Dotlrine is the exprejs j4ffertion
of St. Paul. Ads XVII. 27, 28.
I MUST own, it is to me Something ftrange,
that either the Learned Dr. CLARKE, or any Bo
dy elfe fhould ever underftand thefe Words in
the Manner you do. Had you not been content
ed to be your own Commentator^ you would have
found this PafTage explained in a very different
Manner by the moft Learned Interpreters f. Bun
* Leibnitz's Fifth Paper §. 44.
-j- Dr. WHITBY'S Explanation is this; vix. "For in
" (or £y) him we live, and move, and hive our Being."
Dr. HAMMOND'S Paraphrafe upon the Place is, — " For
" our Life, Motion, and Subfiftcnce is wholly through
? him." The Learned GROTIUS remarks that it is an
what
of SPACE Examined. 127
what is fufficient to put St. PAUL'S Meaning pad
all Doubt, is the Context. When he has laid, that
in him ive live, find move, and have our Being ; he
immediately adds, as certain alfo of your oivn Poet shave
faid, for we are alfo his Offspring, rS yap xj ye-
vs$ tv/LLtv. From whence it is plain, that by thefe
Words, in him we live, and move, and have ottr
Being, St. PAUL means the fame, as he does by,
we are alfo his Offspring ', becaufe he mentions this
faying from ARATUS, as importing the fame Do-
drine which he was teaching. Whatever then is
the Meaning of we are his Offspring, the fame muft
be intended by in him we live, and move, and have
our Being. Now the true Import of the Former
is plainly this viz,, that God is the common Pa
rent of Mankind, the Protestor and Preferver of
us all : That we derive our Being from him ; and
owe the Continuance of it to him: That it is wholly
through him, or through his Power, and Protection,
that we have our Life, Motion, and Subfiftencc ;
which muft therefore likewife be the true Mean
ing of thofe Words of St. PAUL, In him welive^
and move, and have our Being. It appears then
Hebraifm, and underftands in ipfo, to fignify the fame as
per ipfum. His whole Note runs thus eviz. " Eit Hebraifmus.
*' In ipfo, id eft, per ipfum, ipfius Beneficio. Per ipfum cx-
" iftimus : ipfe nobis Vitam Homini congruentem, £ Motus
<( tali vitae refpondentes dedit." — And if you will enquire
farther ; you may find that the Prepofition '£» is rendered
by Per, as well as In ; and '£» ocurt/ in this Place is, you
lee, render'd by the Learned; Per ipfum ; i.e. per iplius
Omnipotentiam, & Patrocinium ; through, or by Means of
him, or his Power and Protection. And agreeable to this,
you will find that the Arabick Verfion actually has it, not
in Ipfo, but Per ipfum — " fiquidem per ipfum vivimus, mo-
" vanus, & exiftimus." WALTQN Polyg*
that
Arguments for the Reality
that St. PAUL, in the Paffage you have cited from'
him to prove it, meant not (as you do) that God
is penetrable, or that he may have other Beings
in him. -. To charge the Apoftle with teaching
fuch Doctrine, mult proceed, either from Igno
rance of his plain Meaning, or from a grofs Mif-
repreientation of it.
You object to the Inftance, which I brought
to ihew your Argument (vi<,. that SPACE is the
Property of the infinite Being) fallacious. My
Inftance was this w*. « God is Omnifcient ; he
« could not be Omnifcient, unlefs there were
<f Things for him to know : But does it from
" hence follow, that thefe knowable Things are
" Properties of God ? * " This you think is not
a parallel Cafe: And therefore reduce it to fuch
an one, as you think may be of Service to you.
<f The Argument [fay you] fhould have flood
<c thus, and then let the Author judge whether
" it be conclufive, or no. An ImpoCTihiliry of
«• ever being deceived belongs to God ; but with-
cc out Omniscience^ this Impoffibility of ever being
" deceived could not belong to God; therefore
" God is omnifcient." f But this Argument is
no more parallel, than you imagine mine to be.
It is very plain, that it would not be impojjible for
God to be deceived, if Omniscience was not a Pro
perty of him: Arid therefore, fince it is impoflible
for God to be deceived; it necelTarily follows,
that Omniscience is a Property of him. But is it
fo evident, that God cannot be Omniprefent^ if
Space be TUX * Property of him? This wants Proof;
for as yet we have feen Nothing but bare Af-
Dr. Clarkis Notions of SPACE, Examined p. 47.
f Third Def. p. 41.
fertions
of SPACE Examined. 129
ferrions, — An Impoffibitity of ever being deceived is
Omnifcience ; but Omniprcfence is not SPACE ;
This fhews, that your Cafe is by no means pa
rallel.
You fay, "If we confider it, we fhall find
" that it is impoffible for a Being, to which SPACE
" do?s not belong as a Property, to be indifcerp-
" ible." * ~ I prefume you will hardly fay, that
SPACE is a Property of any finite Spirit : And if
not, then it is inpojjible for any finite Spirit to i:e
indifierpible. You have here, Sir, advanced in Know
ledge ; for you have written bur fix Leaves, fince
you was fo uncertain in this Matter, as to fay
only, that an immaterial Subir.ar.ee may be dit-
cerpible* for ail that you knoiv f: Bur now it (ecms,
It is impojjlble for any finite immaterial Suhibnce
to be indijcerpible. Yet, what is Something ftrange,
we ih ail find, if we look farther, that you have
loft all this wonderful Knowledge again, and are
reduced to your former Uncertainty : For, in
the Vindication of your Second Defence^ you tell us
again, that an immaterial Subftance may, for what
you know, be divifible ¥J|C. — But let us hear your
Realon why it is irnpoilible fora Being to which
SPACE does not belong as a Property, to be in-
difcennble : It is this; you fay, that f£as SPACE
(< is a neceffarily exiftent Properry, there mud
" be fome Subftance to which it belongs; and
" that Subftance muft be Self-exiilvu, and there-
"<c fore fuperior to all other Subftances, and con-
«c lequenriy indifcerpible.'* ft
IN the fir ft Place, we deny SPACE to be a »o
txifting Property : And, in the next Place,
Third Def. p. 41, f Ibid. p. 29.
Ibid. p. 90, ft Ibid, p, 41,
R tho'
130 Arguments for the Reality
tho* it be true, that // SPACE be a neceflarily ex-
iftin"- Property, there muii be iotne Subftance to
whidi it belongs, and that Subftance muft be&ff-
cxijlent ; yet it does not appear, that there <**«<*
be * S-lf-exiftent Subftance, unlefs SPACE he a
neceffarily exifting Property. You go on ro (hew
that SPACE may be a Property, and yet have Pro
perties , and that />r^r//« may «d*r« in one ano
ther. In order to this, you tell ihe Reader^ that
what I fay upon this Point, "• is only railing a
" Dilute about the Word-,, Figure and Shape ;
« bur whichever of them is the Genus [fay you]
« is nothinc to our Purpofe: Figure, or Shape,
« let him take which he pleafes ibr the Genus,
<< in its general Meaning, is a Property of Fimte-
" nets, or of all finite Subflances." -What .
laid was nor merely rat/in* * Dilute tbout the Words
•piture and Shye : My Obfervation, that Shape
may be (aid to be the General of all ri^re, as well
as Ft"ftre to he the General of all Shape, was to iliew
nd Figure were only two different
that^ and Figure were ony two
Words for the fame Thing : That they could
not there fore be laid to be Modes of each other.
Shape or Figure mud be confider'd either in die
siktlraft or ^Concrete ; irf the former Scnfc it is a
wre Idea, and therefore can have no Properties
ascribed to it. In the latter, it has Exiftence m
Body only, and therefore different Modes of it
will in a'ftrid Sen'e be only different Modifca*
lions of fad], or Body exifting under differe^
Shapes, To iay that particular Shapes are Modes
of Fhure is talking of fared Figure: and to tell
us, that " Rottndnefs is "not a Quality of Body,
*« becaufe it cannot be applied io all Bodies 1 " is
* Third Def. p. 42. t Ibid-
trifling :
of SPACE Examined. 131
trifling : And I might as well tell you again,
that it is not a Mode of Figure, for the hrne Rea-
ion : For I would have you recoiled, whether
it can be applied to all Figures,
ARGUMENT X.
*Tbe two DEMONSTRATIONS of the REAL
EXISTENCE of SPACE.
" SPACE is either abfoltttelj Nothing, or a mere
<c Idsay or a Relation between one Thing and ano-
" ther ; or it is Body* or fome Suhjiance, or the
<c Property of fome Subftance. But it is neither
<c Nothing, nor a mere Idea, nor a Relation, nor
Cf Body, nor any Subftance ; therefore it muft be a
" Property of iome Sub'hnce." * This is Dr.
CLARKE'S famous Demonftration (a? 'tis called)
of the real Exigence of SPACE, which you had
produced in your Firft Defence}. And this De-
monflration you likewife endeavoured to fupporr,
by other A4edia of your oivn, for the Benefit of
Thofe who might not fee the Force of the Doctor's.
Upon thefe I offered fbme Remarks **. You
have fince endeavoured to vindicate the Doctor,
and your felf, from the Difficulties I had raifed
sgainfl you ; but { meet with little or nothing,
but what has been already obviated; and therefore
I fhould want the Reader's Excufe, were I to re-
examine them minutely, and particularly. But
leaft you ihould think what you have urged to
* Dr. CLARKE'S $fb Reply to Mr. LEJENITZ.
f Finl Dcf. p. 59.
** Dr. Clarke* Notions of SPACE, Examined.
R^ t:
1 32 Arguments for the Reality
be unanfwerable, were I to pafs them by without
Notice, i Pnall make a few Strictures upon them,
FIRST, SPACH ('tr, (aid) is not absolutely No-
thing, in Proof of which you offer thefe three
Things.
1. '• ft has Quantity, becaufe it has Length,
<c which is Quantity " * — that is, Quantity is
Quantify, SPACE has Quantity, therefore SPACE
has Quantity. Wonderfully edifying This ! But
I mu ft put you in Mind, that I deny SPACE to
have Length which is Quantity. You fay "it is
" plain that it has Length, for otherwile all Bo-
<c dies would be equal and alike." f If this Ar
gument has any Force, it lies too deep for me
to fathom it ; and till it is brought to Li^ht, I
iliall only fay, that I never yet heard of any other
Reafon, for Bodies not being equal in Length,
but that one was longer than another. The Dif
ference is only in the Bodies themfelves.
2. // has Dimenfions. All the Proof you bring
of This is, that ft Dimeniions are only Lengths
<c every way, or Length, Breadth, and Depth. " **
This Argument mu.it therefore ihnd, or fall with
the Former, for tinlefs you can prove SPACE to
have Length, it will hardly appear to have Breadih>
or Depth*
5. It has Properties — This you tell us, "has
<c been fufficiently fhewn, and is unqueftionable."tt
But thofe Arguments by which you think you
SPACH to have Proerties,
are fujjicientlj avfiverd in their Place. You add
thefe Words 'viz,. cc unlefs This, or fome other
" Author can ftiew the Impoffibility of Properties
« Third Dcf. p. 45. f Ibid
** Ibid. P. 46. ff Ibid.
" in-
of SPACE Examined. 13 ^
« inhering in one another/' * But herein, Sir, you
are greatly miilaken 1 for it is by no means in
cumbent on us here to ihew, that Properties can
not inhere in one another : No ; 'tis your Bufi-
ne;s to prove that SPACE has Properties in order
to prove us Exigence. We don't argue that SPACE
is a Property, and therefore cannot have Properties •
No; we deny SPACE to be a Property; and on
ly urge that Properties cannot inhere in Proper
ties, to (hew your Inconfiftency, who, at the fame
1 ime that you fay it is a Property, contend for
its having Properties.
BUT my Principles, it Teems, tend towards A-
t ; and why ? becaufe you affert that I fup-
pofe SPACE to be ^Property of Body **. But what
Rearon you could have for this I know not,
when I neither affirm'd, nor intimated any Thino-
like it. You ought, Sir, to have laid the PalT^e
before the Reader, in which you pretend that I
make: fuch a Suppofition : But the Cafe is, there
u no Jkch Pajfrn as will fupport your Charge,
and if the Reader will give himfelf the Trouble
to turn to p. 53. of Dr. Claris Notions of SPACE
examined, againft which Page, itfeems, the Accu-
fation lies, he will foon be convinced that what
you fay is without Foundation. To fuppofc SPACE
a Property of Body, would DC a Suppofition aMb-
lutely mconfiltent with my conllant Defcriprion
of SPACE, as mere Nothing* or an Idea only, or
tne Abjcnce of Body ,• snd few, I believe, will "ima
gine, that I ftiould fuppofe the Abfencc of Body
to be a Property of Body -The Reafon therefo/c
f Third Def. p. 46. f Ibid,
** Ibid.
of
134 Arguments for the Reality
of this Aflcrtion of yours, is what you are dill
to account for.
SECONDLY, "SPACE [fays Dr. Clarke] is not
" a mere Idea; for no Idea of SPACE can poili-
fC bly be framed greater than finite, yet Reafon
<f mews that it muft be infinite."* To which
J anfwer.
SPACE may be confidered, either as a Void, a
mere Negation of Body ; or as the Idea of Ext en/ion.
All \he Infinity which can be applied to it under
the former Confederation is inch as may be ap
plied to Nothing. -It may be faicl to have no Bounds
or Limits, not becaufe it is a Being really extend
ed in infinitum* but becaufe it is no Being at all;
and therefore has not Reality, or Exifience, fo as
to be capable of having Bounds. The Infinity which
is attributed to SPACE under the latrer Confide-
ration viz,, as the Idea of Extenfon, is only the
Impoflibility of fetting Bounds to that Faculty,
which the Mind has of enlarging the Idea of Ex-
ten/ton. Such Infinity is only a mere roving Idea,
an indefinite Increafablenefs f. To imagine this
to be a true pojitive Infinity, and to attribute it
to a really exigent Being is all over Contradiction,
and Abfurdiry; 'tis fuppofing it to \xpojitively in
finite, and yet continually capable of being mcrea/ed* _
i.e. infinite and finite at the fame Time: oreife
'tis to find out a Number fo great as to admir of
no ^Addition-, which is what has been always look*
e.d upon to be the greateil Abfurdity poilible in
* Third Def. p. 47.
f To this Purpofe {peaks Mr. LOCKE. " Our Idea of
(C Infinity even wlren applied to EF pan/ion, and Duration,
f( fcems "to be Nothing but the Infinity of Number" —
on H. U. B. 2. c. 16. §. 8.
of SPACE "Examined^ 135
Philofophy ; too great for any one to maintain,
till Mr. JACKSON, in a late Piece, thought fit to
obi ge the World with the Difcovery *
BUT it is laid, that we cannot but conceive
SpACh to be infinite; that the Mind is not on
ly capable of enlarging its Idea of Extenfion in in-
pmtumy but that it cannot but enlarge it in infini*
tu;n-\. I reply, this muft either mean in Reofon^
or in Imagination ; in Redjon we cannot but enlarge
our Id a of Extenfion without Bounds, for other-
wife our Faculty of enlarging muft be bounded ;
but in Imagination^ what Idea we have of SPACE
or Exunjion, is necefTarily finite and limited. We
can think of a Yard, or Mile in length, or of the
Diameter of the Orbis Magnus \ which will be
having an Idea of a determinate Length, /. e. in
the Language of thefe Gentlemen, of a determinate
Quantity of SPACE.
IN the Vindication of your Second Defence p.
82. you fay, " were SPACE not truly, and pofi-
" tively infinite, there muft be a Poffibility of
•c flopping Somewhere, when we add finite SPA-
<£ CES together."— To this I reply, that the Rea-
fon why we cannot flop, in adding finite SPACES
together (/. e. why we cannot ftop if we try to
go on, for otherwife we may flop) is becaufe there
are no Limits to our Faculty of Numbering, and
therefore the Faculty of Numbering being bound -
lefs is the Reafon, not only why we can go num
bering on, or can enlarge our Idea of Extenfion
in infinitum; but why we cannot but do it, if we
t endeavour at ir. But this no more proves SPACE
* Sc-c Th? Exigence ami Unity of God proved from his
Nature and Attributes — p. 87.
f See Exigence and Unity &c. p. 86,
to
136 Arguments for the Reality
to be any Thing pofitively infinite ad extra, than
it proves Number to be fo. Ail the Truth then
that I can find in this Proportion of Dr. Clarke's
(viz,, no Idea of SPACE can poflibly he framed
greater than finite, yet Reafon (hews it mutt be
infinite) is This. viz,. That our Idea, of SPACE
as Extenfon being an Idea of Imagination, fuch an
Idea mud bz finite, yet Reafon fhews that we can
repeat thefe Ideas, without ever finding any Limits*
or Bounds to our faculty of Repeating.
MR. JACKSON obierves, that " we find we
y" cannot but add in infinitum-> not to the Ideas
" formed in the Imagination, there is foon an
<l End of them, but to the Ideaturas or Thiws
" Themjews." * But I think he might have
known, that we deny there are xny Ideata or
Things themfches in the Cafe. What he calls the
Ideatum, in the Cafe of SPACE, is what we call
a fold, or mere Nothing ; and why there is no End
to SPACE under that Confideration, requires no
great Sagacity to account. SPACE, confider'das
a Foidy or a Negation of Body, has no End or Li
mits, in the fame Senfe as Nothing has no End :
And coniidered as the Idea of Extenfon, has no
End or Limits, in the Senfe that Number has no
End.
BUT you charge me with fuppojinr Matter to
be infinitely expanded, i. c. as you explain it, that
Matter may be made infinite f. And from hence
you argue, that « if SPACE be a Poffibility of
" the Exigence of Matter (as we allow) SPACE
" muft be infinite." ** But you (hould have
been careful here to have diiHnguiPaed between
* Exigence and Unity bV. p. 83.
f Third Dcf. p. 47 ** iSid. p. 47, 4g.
fofoive
if SPACE Examined.
fofiiw Infinity, and fuch an Indefinitenefs (impro
per y called Infinity) as is predicate of Quantity
I allow Matter may be infinitely expanded in the
senfe; i.e. a Quantity may be fuppofed
greater than .any given (for I have not as yet
found out the laft Number.) But to fuppofe it
capable of pofitive Infinity, is to fuppofe that no
thing can be. added to it, that 'tis boundlefs and
unmeafurable, that 'tis more than either Imagina
tion or Number (without the help of Mr. [ACK-
s.°*'s. Numeration Table) can poffibly reach to.
Arid if any one will maintain fuch Abfurdities,
I aflurc him, he fhall have no Controverfy with
me.
You proceed next to argue for the real Exifl-
tnce of SPACE, from the Difference betwixt That
and Duration. Your whole Argument is petith
Pnncipii. Becaufe we can talk of certain Ideas and
make Proportions about them, therefore you would
argue that they are real Entities : Becaufe we can
predicate Things o£ Krtve, which cannot be pre
dicated of ric€, therefore, according to you, they
ftiuft be real Entia. SPACE or Extenfion has Re-
fjteft to the flrft of a Body ; DURATION has
nor, (which is the true Meaning of the notable
Difference you have found between SPACE and
DURATION viz,. «• that the bigger any Body is,
< the greater Part of SPACE it requires for its
Exiftence, whereas in DURATION, it takes up
c the fame Part of it, whether it be great or
«' imall.)"* This Difference I acknpwledge ^o
be between SPACE and DURATION ; but it is
only a Difference of Ideas. SPACE and DURA-
I TION are two dffirem Ideas, applied to Body in
* Firlt Dcf, p. 6r,
two
Arguments for the Reality
two different Refpects, the one as to its Ex-
tenfion, the other as to its mere Exigence con-
fider^d as continuing. But this does not prove
that SPACE and DURATION are any real Things
differing in Themfelves : It proves only that they
are different Ideas ; and not that either, or both of
them muft have an objective Reality.
THE other Part of the DoclorS Disjunction
we are both agreed in viz,, that SPACE is neither
a Relation, nor Body nor fome Sub fiance. But in
the Sequel, you carp at fome of my Expreflions,
and endeavour to fuoport your Arguments, by a
fuppofed Defect, or Inconfiftency in mine. Thus
you obferve :
1. tc HE calls SPACE Nothing, and yet allows
<c it to have a Relation to Something. Can No-
" thing have a Relation to Something ? " * Can
you really think that this deferves an Anfwer ?
Has not Anatomj a Relation to the Unman Bodyy
and Botany to Plants ; and yet will you fay that
Anatomy ) and Botany are real Entia ? or thus ; the
Quantity of Gold has Relation to its J$tdk^> which
the Quality has not ; is Quantity therefore a real
Entity ? — Pleafe, Sir, but to turn to my Fir ft
Chapter concerning the different Senfes of the Term
Nothing ; and I believe it will help you out of
all your Difficulties.
2. You obferve £f that I feem throughout my
€£ Reply, to imagine we can have an Idea of No-
<f thing, from the Ai; fence of Something." f
I anfwer -— we have an Idea of SPACE from, or
by Reafon of the Abfence of Body : /'. e. We have
firft an Idea of Body from S nfation ; snd then
fuppolmg Body awaj, \vehave an Idea of SPACE:
* Third Def. p. Ji. f Ibid. p. 52,
of SPACE Examined. I 3 9
By refle&ing on what it is for Body to occupy
Space, or to be endued with Solidity, or Impenetra
bility, we perceive what is the Reverfe of This,
or what Extenfion is without Solidity.
3. You call upon me to explain what I mean
by an Idea of Nothing * ; which 1 do, by explain
ing the Term Nothing, which is equivocal. If
by Nothing, be meant a Negation of all Things both
Real and Ideal, then an Idea of Nothing is no Idea;
but if it means a Negation only of real Exiften-
cies ad extra (in which Scnfe I have always ap
plied it to SPACE) then an Idea of Nothing will
be an Idea without an objective Reality ; and fuch
may be the Idea of SPACE, for any Thing you
have faid.
4. You fay that — cc as he thinks that ilmple
cc Ideas may be Ideas of Nothings, he fhould find
" out fome new Way to prove, that Things exift
" without us &c." t
BUT I apprehend the old one to be (till very
fufficient : Tho' I think 'tis pretty plain, that
you make no Ufe of it. Your Way is to argue
from Ideas to Things-, whereas Mr. LOCKE is of
Opinion, that " the having the Idea of any Thing
« in our Mind, no more proves the Existence of
<c that Thing, than the Picture of a Man evi-
cc denccs his being in the World, or the Vifions
ec of a Dream make thereby a true Hiftory." **
The Cafe is, we are not fo to depend upon our
Perceptions (be they Simple or Complex) as to
conclude immediately, that every one of them
mud: neceffarily have Objects ad extra corref-
pondent to them. We muft examine them by;
* Third Def. p. 52. f Ibid,
f* May en H. U. B. 4. c. xi. §. i.
S z thofs
T.A.O Arguments for the Reality
thofe Ways which we are furnifti'd with, by
Reafon, Experience, Attention,^, and I am per-
fuaded, that none of Thefe will ever bear Tefti-
mony to the real Exigence of SPACE.
BUT you "grant that the Idea of SPACE is
c firft got from Body, that is, the Idea of the
" Space or Extenjton of Body &c."* Pray Sir
what do you mean by the Space of Body ? You
are here fallen into the very Hypothec's you was
fo lately fixing upon me; arid if therefore to make
SPACE a Property of Bodj, be tending towards A-
theijm, I hope you will remember whole Princi
ples they are: And will likewife find our fome
new Diftindion, to reconcile the two Hyporhe-
fes, of SPACE being a Property of God, as well
as a Property of Body -You fee, Sir, I do not
think it fufficient to tell the Reader, that our Au
thor fuppofa SPACE the Property of Body at the
Top, or Bottom of a Page ; but I fairly produce
the PafTage, againft which my Exceptions lie ;
that any one may judge, whether I tax you falfly
or not : To do otherwife, is an Art to which I
can never prevail with my felf to defcend.
I HAD faidthat "we have no Idea, no Notion
c at all of the Subftance of which SPACE is /aid
c to be a Mode viz,, of the Self-exiftent Subftance :
•—how then can SPACE be affirm'd to be a
Mode of him." f In anfwer to This, you
would fliew that my Argument proves too much.
You endeavour to make it follow from my Prin
ciples, that we cannot know any of the Proper
ties or Attributes of God. The Sum of your
)bjedion may be thus comprifed w*f " He afT
* Third Def. p. 53.
r Br, Clark's Notions of SPACE, Examined p. 74.
" firm?
of SPACE Examined. 141
?c firms [fay you] that we cannot tell whether
;*' a particular Property can be applied to any Sub-
I*' ftance, unlefs we have fome Idea, fome Notion
>< of that Thing which we call the Subftance.
" He lays likewife, that we have no Idea, no No-
" tion at all of the Self-exiftent Subflance : How
*' then can he prove Omnifcience, Omnipotence, and
<c Eternity i to be Properties of God ; fince with-
*c out knowing his Sttbflance (which he fays we
fc know nothing of) we cannot tell whether they
<c belong to him or no." And then you con
clude, as before, with flinging out your Charge
of ^4iheifm: "I fhould be loth [fay you] to en-
<c tertain Principles whofe natural Confequences
" lead fo near Atheifm, as thefe feem to do."*--
To this I anfwer, that there is no NeceiTicy of
knowing the Subflance of God, in order to a Proof
of fiich Attributes as relate not at ail to the Mo-
dm of the Divine Exiftence. The Exigence it felf
is one Thing, and the Alodus of that Exiftence
quite another; a Perfon may know the former, and
yet be wholly ignorant of the latter. We prove
the Exiftence of God a pofleriori, or by afcending
from Ejfett to Cattfi ; and from thence we deduce
Qmnifcience, Omnipotence &c. Attributes which we
pay, and do know to belong to God, tho* under
an entire Ignorance of the Divine Stibftance, or
of the Modus of his Exiftence. Nor when we call
him Omnipotent, or Omnifcient, do we at all
define his Subftance, any more than we define the
Subpance of a King, by calling him Wife or Power
ful. But how widely different is the Point with
RefpecT: to SPACE, which you call his real Extcn-
fon: For in Order to know that Extenjion is a Pro-
* Third Dcf. p. 58.
perry
j 42 Arguments for the Reality
perty of God, it is not diffident to know that
he ixifls ', but a Knowledge is required hkewife
of the Modus of his Exiftence, becau'e Exterfon
relates to the Modus of Exigence: And therefore,
fmce we know nothing at all of the Modus of God s
Exiftence (which is what I meant by faying that
we have no Idea, no Notion at all of the Suhftancc
of which SPACE is affirmed to be a Mode) How
can any one prefume to affirm, that SPACE is a
Property of the Deity ? But you pretend to be clear
in Subjeds the moft dark and my -enous, and
to comprehend, what all Writers whether Divines
or Philofophers, have allowed to be Incomprehen-
fible. The Divine Subftance is be-ter known to
you. than what you are daily and hourly con-
verfant with: For you ask " will any one pe-
« fume to fay that he knows not as much of the
« SELF-EXISTENT SUBSTANCE as he does of
*< MATTER?"* — Such Preemption deferves
Rebuke rather than, an Anfwer ; 1 foall only ob-
ferve with Relation to the Point in Hand, that to
know that God cxilts, or to know thole Proper
ties only which we p'ove muft belong to God,
as being the Firfl Caufa is not fufficient to let
us into the Knowledge, whether SPACE be a Pro
perty of him or no, for the Reafons before given;
(inlets SPACE be a Property of him, as being the
Firft Caufe ; and if it be, then there cannot be a
Firft Caufc, that is a God, without SPACE being
a Property of him. But if there cannot, then,
if the Proof ihould fail that SPACE is the Proper
ty of God, or a Property ar all ; it will follow,
that it cannot be proved there is a God -were I
difpofed therefore, I might retort upon you witii
* Third Def. p. 58.
of SPACE Examined. 143
the utmoft JufHce the Charge of entertaining Prin
ciples n>hofe natural Confeqttences leadfo near Atkeifm:
» But I am fenfible that every ferious Debate fhould
• be carried on with C almnefs, and that calling
our Adverfary an Atheifl at every turn can be
only to fupply the Defect of Argument, and fill
up the Vacancies of Reafon ; a Charge as trite as
it is defpicable : Nor could fome of the moil
Learned and Religious efcape the Cenfure, when
they have fallen into the Hands of malicious and
calumniating Adverfaries *.
I AM far from fufpeding either you, or the
Perfon in whofe Defence yoa are writing, to be
lieve any of thofe ill Confequences to Religion,
which feern to me to follow from your Doctrine.
You contend that SPACE is the red Extenfion of
the Divine Sttbftance ; now according to my Me-
taphyfics, this is to Deify SPACE, and make it
God himfelf. For I can think of Modes in no o-
ther Way than thefe, either as ab ft ratt general Ideas
(in which Senfe they have no Exigence ad extra)
or as the modified Subftance it felf. Thus Ext en-
fan is either in Ab/hafto, or in. Concrete ; in Ab-
ftraolo 'tis a mere Idea, and in Concreto 'tis Body
it felf : And I could never fee any Foundation
* Jac Frid. REIMMANNI £c. Hiftoria Uniuerfali? A-
iheifmi &c. — Hildeji& apud Ludotphum Scbroeder — 1725 —
This Author fliews that GROTIUSU, CUDWORTHD,
LOCKE c, nay even the learned Dr. CLARKE himfelf have
not been always free from this Accufation. --- His Words
are thefe _ " SAMUEL CLARCK S. B. D. Reftor Ecclefiae
" S. Jacobi Weftmonafterienfis & Sereniffimre Regime a
" Sacris Ordinariis, Vir in Philofophia & Mathefi exerci-
" tatiffimus, Arianifmi femet ipfum fecit reum, & Atheifmi
" Infamia ab aliis not at us eft" — Sedl. 3. c. 8. §. n.
3.c.
344 Arguments for the Reality
for that Diftinftion of Sir ISAAC NEWTON.*
and Dr. CLARKE f betwixt Immen/itas and 1m-
wenfitm. If SPACE be Immenfaas Dei, if it be,
as the Doclor calls it, rS lmmenfi\ it muft Be
Pens ipfi, the TO Immcnfum. I fuppofe it would
be thought a too fine-fpun Diftin&ion, if I fhould
fay that the Deity of the Supreme Being is not
the Divine Being himjelfi becaufe the Divine Be
ing is DetiS) not Deltas. You fee what your Ar
guments when examined will prove, if they prove
any Thing : And does it not betray a fecret
Doubt, a confcious Miftruft in Men, that they
are svrong in a Point which yet they ftrenuoufly
defend ; when they wrap up their Arguments in
myilerious Expreffions, and hang as it were a Veil
over their Reafoning ? If your own Sentiments-
are not what your Arguments, if true, would
prove; it may be neceflary for you to explain
the following Paffage in your Firft Defence viz,.
«' It may ^not appear fo proper to fay that He
<c [God] is co-extended, or co-expanded with e-
*' very Point of the botmdlefs Immenfity : For
<e it is Hey his Exiftence, that ccnftittties every Point
Cf of this Immenfity, IT is HE ALONE THAT
«f is IMIVIENSE, and even Space it felf is not in-
" finite independent of him." ^^ — Thefe are your
Words, which I {hall leave the Reader to make
liis own Remarks upon.
As to the Notion of God being extended', thatr
it feems^ is thought a very defenfible Hypothefisl
To me it appears big with Absurdities. In my
Anfwer to your Second Defence, I remarked that
* Sec his Princ. Muh. Schol. Gen.
f Dr. CLARKE'S $tb Reply to LEIBNITZ.
;a* Firil Dcf. p. 57.
<c tO
of SPACE Examined.
" to fuppofe God extended is a very grofs No-
<c tion." * But in your Vindication of that De
fence, you tell me that, " if we put any other
44 Word for Extenfion that has the fame Mean-
" ing, as Expanfion fuppofe, the GroiTnefs imme-
<c diately vanifhes." f But I beg of you Sir,
put me not off with empty Sounds ! If Expanfan
has the fame Cleaning (which you here admit; as
Extenjton ; then the Meaning is as grojs as ever.
I conftfs Expanfon is a much prettier Kind of
Word than Extenfan ; and a Poet would undoubt
edly chufe it : But Poetry is not always
Truth, any more than Rhime is Reafon. The
Sound will not alter the Senfe. Exyanded> Gody
tho* a fmoother Exprejflon, is yet as grojs a Notion,
as Extended God, You may call Matter expanded
if you pleafe, inftead of extended: But if you do,
I believe every one, not excepting your felf,
would ftill have the fame Idea of Matter they had
before.
I SHALL next proceed to the Point of Eternal
Creation.
* Dr. Clarke's Notions of SPACE Examined p. 128.
f Third Def. p. 91.
CHAP,
146 Of ETERNAL CREATION,
CHAP. IV.
Of ETERNAL CREATION.
LE T us now proceed to enquire how the Con-
troverfy {lands between us, in Relation to the
Poffibility of an ETERNAL CREATION.
THAT a Being may have exifted from Eternity,
without Beginning, and yet have been created by
Another f has always Teemed to me to be an Hypo-
thefis which carries its own Confutation with it,
and is nothing lefs than a Contradiction in Terms.
But what is there, which Some will not advance?
2nd when advanced by Some, that Others will not
defend ? — I fliall endeavour to reduce the Difpute
to as narrow a Compafs as I can. What we have
to fay, may be diftributed under the three follow
ing Heads.
1. THE Nature of Creation.
2. OF Caufe and Effeft.
3. OF Eternity.
i. FROM the Nature of Creation, I argued that
God could not make an Eternal Creature, becaufe
it implied a Contradiction : For That which is
created, begun to exift, and therefore, to make an
Eternal Creature is caulingThat to exift without
Beginning^ Which yet, by being created, is fuppofed
to have a Beginning. To this you anfwer by " de-
<e nying that Creation implies a Beginning of Ex*
*fi iftence*" that is, by denying That to be the
true Senfe of Creation^ which all Writers, Logical
and AJetapkytfealy have ever underftood it in.
5 Third Def. p. 66,
" Crca-
Of ETERNAL CREATION. 147
c Creation (fays one of them) is the Production of
" Something out of Nothing, therefore That which
cc is created cannot be eternal: For there nuift
*' have been Nothing before there could be a Crea-
" rwv." * And in another Place, ci a creating Caufi
tc is that which produces an £$?$ «w/ of Nothing" |
In this Senfe likewife Mr. LOCKE underftands
Creation: " When the Thing (fays he) is wholly
" made new, fo that no Parr thereof did ever exift
" before \ as when a new Particle of Matter doth
u begin to exift, in rerwn Natura^ which had bc-
<c fore no #«'#£,— this we call Creation." ** And
indeed, if this be not the Meaning of Creation, I
would defire to know the Difference between
Creation and Confers ation\\ ? Ic would be endlefs
to mention All who have underflood Creation in
this Senfe : It would be more proper for you to
mention 0;;^who ever under/food it in any other.
Since then every Creature muft have had a Begin
ning of Exigence, it is evident that no Creature
could have exifted from Eternity, or co-eval with
his Creator. And indeed it appears to be fuch an
Ablurdity, that one would wonder how any Man
can maintain it : A dcjpifcd and abfurd Tenet, as
* Creitio eft Produftio Rei ex Nihilo, ergo quod crea-
tur non poteil ciTe icternum : oportet enim ninil fuifie,
antequam cre.iretur, — Burgerf. Injlitut. Mctapbyf. Lib. 2.
c. X. Nk VII.
f Caufa Creans eft quze producit eftcclam ex nihilo-
Ibid. L. i. c. 26. NJ. IV.
** Eiiay Ox^i H. U. B. 2. c. 26. §. 2,
-\-\- Caufa procreans dicitur, qace Rein efficit, quae antea
non erat : Confer<vans9 quss efficit Rei exiftentis Darationem,
EtiiZerf. In/lit. Met, L, I. c. 26. N". IL
T z Mr,
148 Of ETERNAL CREATION.
Mr. WHISTON, in his Reply to Lord NOT
TINGHAM, juftly ftiles it*.
I SAID that tc whatever was created, did once
<c not exifl" f This [fay you] " is true only in
cc a certain Senfe, that whatever was created in Time,
<f did once not cxifly but That which was from
" Eternity, whether it was created or not, did m-
«• ver not exift" ** But this is only begging
the Queftion viz.. That what is created, may yet
be from Eternity ; and aflerting that Creation does
DO: imply a Beoinninv of Exiftence, and therefore it
• r J r i • r
requires no further Aniwer.
You object— ct If God had exerted this Power
Cc from Eternity, and yet the EfFecl: was not from
16 Eternity, it is evident that there muft be a
" whole Eternity pafs'd between the Exertion of
<c the Power, and the Effed confequent upon that
" Exertion; becaufe the EfFed has a Beginning,
" and the Exertion of the Power has none." ft
I anfwer : Jf by the Exertion of the Power, you
mean the mere Att of the Will, then I fay, that
* " Nor do I quite defpair of feeing fuch fhrewd and
cunning dtbanapaits, as Dr. W, driven to this loft E<va-
fan, and of hearing them broach This other great Atba-
nafian Myftery, how defpifed and abfurd an one foever,
that any Creature whatsoever may be ftridly fpeaking,
in Point of Duration, coeternal with its Creator" —
Wbiftoits Reply to Lord Nottingham, p. 30.— -But it is proper
that the Remark upon this Paffiige fhould be here added —
* Mr. Whifton ]\\ft\j calls it a defpifed and as fur d Tenet :
' only he happen'd to have his Thoughts a little \van-
' dering, when he cali'd it an Athanafian Myftery, inftead
* of calling it an Art an one. For I never heard of any
f one Athanajian but what defpifed and rejected it. —
Waterlanfs Second Defence &c. QUERY XV. p. 363.
*f Dr. Clarke's Notions of SPACE Examined p. 93.
?* Third Def. p. 70. ff Ibid. p. 69.
the
Of ETERNAL CREATION. 149
the Exertion of the Power might have been from
Eternity ) and yet the Ejfetl would not have exift-
ed from Eternity. But then fay you Cf there mud
<c be a whole Eternity pafs'd between the Exer-
<c tion of the Power, and the Effed: confequent
c< upon that Exertion." This Confufion arifes from
confidering the Eternity of God, as Something really
flowing fucceffively ; whereas your Difficulty would
foon vaniili, if you would conceive it in than
Scnfe, which feems to me to be the only true one ;
and that is, <f uniform^ invariable Exiftence : or
" Jlmple Exiftence , joined with Necejjity : by
" which laft Word we only underrtand an Im-
cc pojfibility of having ever begun , or of ever
<e ceafing" * And if this be the true Meaning
of God's eternal Exiftence^ then the Eternity of his
Power of Willing muft be confider'd in the fame
Light viz,, as an Impoflioiliry of its having be
gun, or of ceafing : And then to fay that God
wiWd This, or That Thing from Eternity will
iignify no more, than that fuch a Thing was the
invariable Will of God. Let us fuppofe then the
Exiftence of his Creatures to be the invariable
Will of God : Yet, as thefe are external Effefts of
this Wdl-t they mud begin to exift : And then in
this Way of considering it, the Eternity which
you conceive Prior to their Exiftence^ and to be
Something actually paft between the Aft of the Wilt,
and the Exiftence of the Effeff, is only the pmfle
Exiftence of the Deity.
IF by Exertion of the Power , be meant the
fame as the aft ft at Production of the Creature (as
indeed, to fpeak properly, it ought to be : For the
Effect fhould be confidered in the Exertion of the
* Tranf of ABp. Kinfs Orig. of Evil - Remark [XC.l
Ed, i. [R. C.]p. 66. Ed. 2.
• -Power,
Of ETERNAL CREATION.
Power ; becaufe the Power is not, ftrictly fpeak-
ing, alluallj exerted,, till the Creature is produced)
then I deny that the Power' could be attually ex
erted from Eternity : For in this Senfe, the Exer
tion of the Power has a Beginning, namely with
the Exigence of the Creature.
BUT then you " delire to know the Difference
" between having a Power from Eternity, with-
" out being able to exert it from Eternity, and
not having that Power from Eternity at all." *
I anfwer here (as before) that if by exerting the
Power from Eternity, be meant t\\Q Jtmple *dcl of the
Will, then God could exert this Power from EternN
ty. If the Effeft be taken into the Idea of the Exer~
tion of the Power) then indeed he could not exert
the Power from Eternity ; but then there will
Hill be a wide Difference, between not being a-
ble to exert the Power from Eternity, in this Senfe,
and not having the Power from Eternity at all. For
to fuppofe the Power of creating attually exerted
from Eternity mfuch a Senfe is, as has been {hewn,
to fuppofe a Contradiction : And therefore, fince
God cannot work Contradictions, the Power of
creating cannot be attually exerted by him from
Eternity /. e. he cannot produce an eternal Crea~
tare. But yet tho' he cannot make an eternal
Creature, he has neverthelefs the eternal Power of
Creating: Though he cannot exert the Aclion
of eternal Creation? yet flill he has an eternal Power
of exerting the Action of Creation : The Power
is eternal, or invariable, but the ^Aciion^ the Crea
tion muft be in Time, or muft begin. And fu re
ly it is not difficult, to fee the Difference between
having an eternal Power (tho' the aftaal Exertion,
* Third Dcf. p. 69, 70.
or
Of ETERNAL CREATION. 151
or Effect of this Power would be in Time) and
not having the Power from Eternity at all.
I ARGUED that « the very Suppofition that
God had a Power from Eternity to create* or
c bring any Thing into Being, implies that What
he had a Power to create, or bring into Bein^,
' muft be once out of Being." * « That is [faV
' you] in other Words The very Suppofinon
( that God had a Power from Eternity to create,
c implies that he could not exert that Power from
c Eternity /. e. he had not that Power from E-
" ternity." f _ I aniwer : Power is one Thing,
The Exertion of the Power is another. The Ex
ertion of the Power is (ftridly) the aitn.il Crea
tion, and Creation implies a 'Beginning of Exiftence :
Therefore the Suppofition that God had a Power
from Eternity to create, is that he had the Power
from Eternity <£ giving Beginning to what was not;
Ergo the very Suppofition that he had a Power to
create, implies that What he had Power to create
was not from Eternity. The very Power of do-
*ȣ fuppofes the Thing not done-, becaufe if the
Thing be done, it cannot be faid, that it is in the
Power of any Being to do it : For to have a Pow
er of doing that which is already done, is a Con
tradiction. Thus if any created Beings always ex-
ifted, it cannot be faid, that it was ever in the
Power of any Being to caufe them to ex if! : For
they were never in Potentia> but always in Atlu.
The voluntary Power rf doing miifi be Previous to
the ning done: And therefore God might from
Eternity have the Power of doing what, in the Na
ture of the Thing, could not be actuaTy done from
* Dr. Clarke's Notion? of SPACE Examined p. 121.
t Third Def. p. 83.
Eternity.
TS2 Of ETERNAL CREATION.
Eternity. But it does not follow, becaufe tfee
actual Exertion of the Power, /'. e. the Thing created
was not from Eternity, therefore God had not the
Power from Lternity of creating. The Power of
creating he had from Eternity, but the Thing created
mud begin to exift. But it feems you can fee
no Difference in that Diftindion, which I made
between a Power from Eternity of creating,
and a Power of creating from Eternity. I ar
gued thus " that God had in himfelf a Power
" from all Eternity of creating whatfoever, and
<c whenfoever he pleafed, is moft undoubtedly true :
" But that he had a Power of creating Beings from
" all Eternity, i. e. that he had a Power to create
<c eternal Beings, is undoubtedly falfe." * To
this you anfwer " I beg leave to obferve here, that
" This is undoubtedly inconfiftent with his own
*« Notion ; for if God could create wkenfoever
" he pleafed, he could create from all Eternity, be-
" cauie he could certainly pleafe from all Eternity,
<c otherwife he had not free Will from all Erer-
" nity." t To which I reply.
FIRST, God could not create from all Eternity
i. e. he could not make an ct.rnal Creature, becaufe
it is^a Con trad id ion ; yet he had a Power from
Eternity of creating wkenfocwr, that is, ar whan
Time foever he pleafed : But creating in Time is
not creating from Eternity, therefore I am undoubt
edly confident.
SECONDLY. God had always the Power of
creating, and could create whenfoever he pleafed ;
but yet he could not create a Being, which fhould
neverthelefs cxifi from Eternity ; becaufe Creation
is an Attion, and has Relation to an external Effttk,
* Dr. Clarke's Notions of SPACE Examined p. 91.
f Third Def. p. 67,
and
Of ETERNAL CREATION.
and therefore muft be in Time} and although God
was always free to exert this Power of creating,
yet he could not exert it fo as that this 'voluntary
Exertion (in which I include the Lffett) fhould
be without Beginning. « The fuppofing an Adion
c (fays a late judicious Writer) fuch as theeffed-
c mg of Matter muft be, deftroys the Idea of
< Eternity in the Thing effected by that Adion.
c Every Adion muft have a Beginning and an
c Endy thefe are included in the Conception of
c Adion ; for if it were without a Beginning,
f the Thing is not yet begun ; and what was
c never begun cannot be now ended, as the Pro-
' dudion of Matter is. The denying theje Li-
c mits to Adion, amounts ftill ro an abfolute
' Negation of it. And to fay Matter was pro-
c duced without Adion, is as much as to fay,
c it was efFeded without Agency or Efficiency!
c -. Tho- it be certain that 'the 4gent is eternal^
c it will never follow that any particular Att is
" eternal. It is the Nature of any particular Ad
• to be circumfcrib'd and temporary, that is, in
«' other Words to be limited both before and be-
c kind, which is a Condition inconfiftent with E-
< ternity/»f-In Ihort there may be an eternal
Power, yet not an eternal jlttion. For as the <A-
gent is eternal, the Power muft be fo too, becaufe
Power is one of his e/ential Attribute^ and there
fore that Being whose Attribute it IF, cannot be
fuppofed to exift without it. But then the aftttal
Exertion of this Power relates to Somerhing ex-
theattttal Exertion of the Power of creating
Soul —
con*
154 Qf ETERNAL CREATION.
confider'd as the adual Creation, muft have a Be
ginning.
i. FROM the Nature of Caufe and Effeft, I ar
gue that an eternal Creation is impoiTible. Caufes
may be confidered, either as Voluntary, or Necef-
farj* The Caufe which we are here concern'd
with is a voluntary Caufe : For it is admitted,
that God is the voluntary Caufe of thole Things
which he has created, that is, that he did not
create them necejfarily, but out of his Ovvn free
Wdl and Pleafure: that they did not flow from
him as Light from the Sun, but that they were
the Effects of a free Agent *. If then the Exigence
of a voluntary Caufe muft be prior to the Exiflence
of the Ejfeft, then it is plain, that the Effett
could not exifl from Eternity ^ or coeval with the
Exiftence of the voluntary Laufe. There is indeed
a Senfe, in which an Effeft may be faid to be
coeval V7\th involuntary Caufe viz. as No Thing is
ftridly fpeaking a Caufe, till it produces an Effett.
Thus if I put a Body into Motion, I am not
properly a Mover till the other Body is moved y
or, a Father is not a Father^ till he has a Son. The
Caufe and Effett* in this Scnfe, may perhaps be
allowed to be coeval, confider'd merely as Caufe
and Effeft : For this is a Relation which equally
depends upon bothy and cannot fubfifl in one alone :
The Effed is not an EJfeft, before it be cattfcd,
nor can the Caufe be ftriclly a Caufey till it pro
duces an Ejfeft. But this will be of no Service
to you in the prefent Quefrion, nor prove that
a Creature may exift coeval with its Creator : For
in the forementioned Senfe, every Effect mud be
coeval with its voluntary Caufe : livery Thing
* See Tbirj Dcf. p. 74.
which
Of ETERNAL CREATION,
which God has created, or will create, mud be
coeval with him confider'd merely as Creator of
thoie Things. If God mould create a Being to
Day, this Being would be coeval with GocUon-
fider'd merely as the Cattfi of it, for he was not
the Cauje or Creator of this Being, till the Being
was produced. But this I fay makes nothing for
you in the prefent Debate: For the Queftion here
is, not whether an Effeft may be coeval with its
Cattfe, confider'd merely as Cattfe and Effect, but
whether the Exiftence of the Thing effctted can be
coeval with the Exlflence of the voluntary dvent,
which produced it, not confider'd in the relative
Senfe of Cauje, but in the abfolute Senfe of Being:
If it cannot, then the Exiftence of a Creature can*
not be coeval with the Exiftence of its Creator, and
confequently no Creature could exift from Eternity
i. e. there could not be an Eternal Creation.
To all thofe Arguments which I urged again ft
you, founded upon the Supposition that the Ex
iftence of a voluntary Caufe muft be -prior to the
Exiftence of the Effect, you only anfwer by cal
ling upon me to prove it f. But that it muft be
fo, is fo very evident, that I believe there are Few,
who will think it requires any Proof. However [
lhall endeavour to give you one.
IT is admitted, that God is! the voluntary Caufe
of thofe Beings which are fuppofed to be created
from Eternity. Ex Hypotheji then, God could
cbttfe whether he would have created thefe Beings
or not; therefore it was in his Power not to have
created them , from whence it follows, that there
f See Third Dcf. p. 68, 70, ;j.
V a mull
156 Of ETERNAL CREATION.
mud be a Time pre-fuppofed to their Exiftence:
For after they arc created, it is not in the Power
of God not to have created them : If therefore
it was ever in his Power not to have created
them, it muft be before they exifted^ and confe-
quently there was a Time when they did notex-
ift : For to fuppofe that thole Things might not
have been, which always actually were> or that
there was a Time when thefe Beings might not have
been created, ana yet that there never was a Tims
when they were not aftually in Being, appears to be
a manifeft Contradiction. — Again, I would ask,
whether thefe Creatures^ which you fuppofe never
to have been out of Being, might have been created
any way different ftom what uhsy were ? If you
fay, no ; you limit Omnipotence, and in Effect
overturn the Suppofition of God's being their
'Creator in any proper Senfe, or tht voluntary Caufe
of their Production. But if you anfwer in the
Affirmative, then there muft have been a Time
when they were not in Being : For if God could
have created them in any Manner different from
what he did create them, it follows, that there was
a Time when their Modus of Exiftence was con-
lixgent: But as nothing can exifl before it exifts
in jome Manner •, fo that whofe Modus of Exiftence
was contingent i muft be contingent as to its Exiftence
alfo: For if the Modus of it was contingent,
and the Exiftence not fo, then it muft have
once exifled without any Modus of Exigence i. e.
it rauft^ have exifted, and not have exifted at the
fame Time. Whatever then was contingent as to
the Modus of its Exigence, was contingent like-
wife with Refpedt to Exiftence it fe/f; and that
whofe Exiftence was contingent i. e. which might or
Of ETERNAL CREATION. 157
wight not have exifted, could not have cxiftcd from
Eternity *.
You grant that-" God is a free aftive Being;
<e and therefore it depended upon his own good-
: Will and Pleafure, whether any Effects at all,
" or at any Time, mould proceed from his Pow-
V er."f Now this is in Confequence granting
the Queftion. For That which exifted from £-
ternity could not depend upon thePlea/ttre of any
other Being, whether it mould have exifted or not,
becaufe it always actually did exift. If it depended
upon the Will of God, whether any Effetts at all*
or at any Time flionld proceed from his Power, is
it not a neceffary .Concluiion, that there mutt
I have been a Time when there were not any Effdh
at all. Does it not plainly fuppofe a prior Time
for God to chufe ?
I HAD argued, that whatever exifted from Eter-
nity would be neccffarily-ex$ing, and therefore, if
created Beings might have been Eternal, there mi^ht
have been neceflarily-exifling Creatures, which I
looked upon as an Abfurdity**. In anfwer you
fay, that I have <c not yet ihewn, that what was
* It is certain that fame other Being determined the
Manner of Matter's Exigence at firft, and therefore the Ex
igence it felf, or gave it Exigence, fmce Exigence with-
-tout a Manner is impoffible. Now let a Man anfwer it to
nis own Underilanding, if xvhen Matter got Exigence, that
doth not plainly imply that it had it not before it %of it.
And if it ever was without Exiftence, whether its Exiil-
f encc can be Eternal. It appears to me, that to fay, an
I EffeCl may be Eternal, is the fame as to fay, a Thing
Which had a Beginning may want a Commencement ,
Enquiry Into the Nature of the Human Soul. Sect. VIII
N'. XIV. p. 357.
t Third Def. p. 74.
** See Dr, Clarke's Notions of SPACE, Examined p. 94.
tc from
158 Of ETERNAL CREATION.
" from Eternity, muft therefore be neceflarily
e<- exifting." * If the Proof which I have already
given be not fufficient, take the following viz..
Whatever always exified did never not exift , and
That which did never not exift was never under a
Poftibility of not having exifted, therefore vv hat ex
ift cd from Eternity muft be neceffarily exifting. If
you fay that what did never not exift may be un
der a Pollibiliry of not having exifted •> I ask, When
was it under fu h a Poflibility \ and by that Time
you have furnillied out an An'wer to this Qiie-
flion, you may perhaps lee the A:;furdity of your
Suppolition.
UPON the whole — Your Errors upon this
Head arife from not diftinguifliing between willing
and aftingi or betv/een determining to create, ana
aclttally creating. God's Will, Pleafure, Deter
mination, or Choice a-e eternal as his Exiftence
(becaufe he is immutable) for rh*y are not the
lame as Aftion> but follow neceflarily from his be
ing endued with fuch or fuch Attributes ; but
the affttal Execution of his Will muft, from the
Nature of the Thing, be in Time: Afts flowing
from Choice muft be fubfequcnt to fuch Choice ;
and confeqnently God muft have the Power, be
fore it coi^d be exerted. This I take to be lit
tle lef* than Demonfiration, and therefore is not
to be encounter'd with Difficulties, which muft
necefTarily attend our Endeavours to explain the
Manner of the Divine Exift ence. You may go
on objecting that he muft, according to This,
have exifted a ivMe Eternity, without being able
to exert his Power; yet this will have no Force,
when the Arguments are clear and convincing,
* Third Def. p. 70.
that
Of ETERNAL CREATION. 159
that he could not create but in Time, The Diffi
culty you throw in the Way, arifes from our
want of knowing the Manner of the Divine Ex-
iftence ; or I mould rather fay, that your Diffi
culties are owing to your conceiving his Exig
ence in a -wrong Manner, and talking about it in
improper Language. You are confidering the Di
vine Exigence in the Way of fucceffiw Duration ;
you are fpeaking of a whole Eternity ; whereas 'tis
evident that Succeffion cannot poffibly be applied
to God, nor whole to Eternity, Whole and Part
being only Relations of fnite Exigences*. But
we lhall lee the Abiurdity of This ftill more evi
dently by attending, as I pronofed,
3. To the Nature of ETERNITY; which e-
vmces beyond all Quertion the Impoffibility of
Eternal Creation. I had /aid enough upon this
Head in my laft Piece f to have convinced any at
tentive and unprejudiced Reader. Every Argument
againft an Infinite Series will prove as ftrongly
againft an Eternal Creation. For every created Be
ing is changeable, and muft therefore ex i ft per Mo-
dum fitcceffionh : But Succeffion implies Beginning ;
therefore a Creature cannot be eternal. Here die
minor Proportion only is (I think) what you
will call in Queflion ; and this has been fo fully
proved by Dr. CUDWORTH **, Dr. BENTLEY ft.
and Mr. LAW *t» in their Arguments againft aa
* See Air. LOCKE'S Eflay on Hum. Underitand. B i
c. 4. §. 6. — Edit. 9.
f See Dr. Clarke* s Notions of SPACE, Examined r.
S8. &c.
** Intcll. Syft. p. 643. — & 8-13.
-}f Boyle's Left. Serin. 3.
*f Tranfl.uion of ABp, Kin^s Origin of Exil. Note 18.
Infinite
i6o Of ETERNAL CREATION,
Infinite Series ; that it muft be needlefs to add any
Thing more to what They have faid. But let
us fee what you have offer'd in Objection.
You had advanced in your Fir ft Defence, what
I call'd a Riddle^ but as you don't like that Term,
let it be call'd an jfkjurditj, a Word which flats
it better. It (lands thus : <c There is a Time t6
*c come which never will be prefent" : and <c there
<c is a Time now actually paft which never was
<c prefent. " * This you defend, by urging that
<c there is no Abfurdity in faying that all future
" Time is to come ; and that all Time that has
cc been, is paft ; for to come^ means no more than
« future'' f Be it fo : What is future then, is
to come ; and what is not future ', is not to come.
But then, what never will be prefent, is not future,
and confequently not to come. Again — all Time,
fay you, that has been, is paft; right ! .But what
has not been, is not paft. Now that which never
was prefent, never has been ; and therefore is not
attuallj paft. A little lower you have given an In-
ftance by way of llluftration viz,. a fuppofe, a(
«c Man to move from any given Point dirt&Iy
<c forward, and to move on infinitely ; it is plain
<c that there will be SPACE for him to go through
" for ever; and the SPACE which he is to go
ct through, will be before him; and as SPACE is"
« Infinite, there will be SPACE which he never
<c will arrive at." ** Now what SPACE is That
p. 45. Ed. i. — N. 10. p. 46. Ed. ?,. Remarks referred to
in Note 18. [X fc] Edit. i. — Rema.ks refer'd to in Note
10. [R. l~\ Edit. 2. N. 5. p. 13. Edit. i. — N. 3. p. 16.
Edit. 2.
* Firft Def. p. 27.
t Third Def. p. 75. ** Ibid.
\vhiclr
Of ETERNAL CREATION. 161
which the Man will never arrive at ? I prefume ic
is the End: I ask then, again, what is the Reafon
that he will never arrive at the End of SPACE ? I
know not any Thing you can fay, but that it is,
becaufe there is no End for him to arrive at. To
/ay then, that there // SPACE which he never
will arrive at, and by That SPACE to mean the
End i is fay ing that there is an End which he will
never arrive at : and fince at the fame Time you
fuppofe, that the Reafon why he will not arrive
at the End is, becaufe there is no End ; it is plain
ly faying, that there is an End, and no End at
the fame Time. By faying that there is SPACE
which neper -will be, arrived at, you mean the fame
as you do when you fay, that there is a Time to
come> -which never will be prefent. By the SPACE
which never will be arrived at, and by the Time
which never will be prefcnt, you mean the End of
SPACE, and the End of DURATION : Bur as you
fuppofe both SPACE and DURATION to have no
Ends, it is evidently abfurd to talk of their Ends,
or of their being to come.
" To come^ [lay you] with Refpedl to TIME
rc or DURATION, means only the fame as before, in
" a Motion through SPACE; and pafl, with Re-
" fped to TIME or DURATION, may be taken in
" the fame Senfe as behind, in a Motion through
<c SPACE, fuppofing a Perfon to have moved from
" Infinity in SPACE." * But remember, Sir, thac
if DURATION be fuppofed never to have begun,
and never to end; then neither a Beginning, nor
an End, can be faid to be behind or before, or any
where elfe, any more than to be to come, or to be
faji. So if SPACE be allowed to have neither Zfr-
* Third Def. p. 75.
X
162 Of ETERNAL CREATION*
ginning nor End \ no End or 'Beginning can be (aid
to be behind, or before the Man in Motion.
THE Learned Dr. BENTLEY, in fhewing that
to fuppofe infinite Generations of Aden already pafl is
a Contradiction, began with obferving, that
" whatfoever is now paft, was once actually pre-
ec fent." * This Argument you charge with e-
qually proving " againft the Exiftence of the Dei-
cc ty from all Eternity " ; and your Reafon for
it is This ; viz,. ft Becaufe, if there is not a Time>
" or a Part of Duration paft which never was
«' prefent^ then there was a Beginning of the Exifl-
" ence of God" f Now, Sir, the Difficulty re
turns upon your felf : For I beg Leave tp affirm,
that not Dr. BENTLEY'S, but YOUR Arguments
will prove againft the eternal Exiflence of the Deity.
For you fay te there is a Time now actually paft9
" which never was prefent." Butiffo, then That
Time could not be prefent to the Exiflence of the
Deity ; confequently the Exiflence of the Deity was
not prefent to that Time ; therefore there was a Time,
to which the Exiflence of the Deity was not pre-
fent ; i. e. There was a Time when God did not
exifl. This Argument is conclufive, and the Con-
fequences unavoidable by Thofe, who imagine the
Eternity of God to be an Infinite Series of fftccejflv&
Duration : Nay, the Notions of thefe Gentlemen
will ftill appear moreabfurd, if we confider, that
they fuppofe this Sttccejflon of Time to be the Flow
ing of God's Exigence : For if it be, and there be
likewife a Time now actually paft which never
was prefent ; then it follows, that there is a Period
of God's Exiflence now actually pafl, which never
* Boyle's Left Sernl. 3,
f Firft Def. p. 27.
Of ETERNAL CREATION. 165
was prefect ; that is, God's Exigence was not pre-
fent to every Period of his Exigence /. e. he did
exift, and did not exift at the fame Time.
You fee into what inextricable Difficulties, and
Abfurdities your Notions will precipirate you !
and when you have endeavour'd to difperfe thele
Clouds, you will perhaps have Light enough to
difcern, that Succeffion cannot be applied to the
Deity.
BUT this Objection, and that which you bring
again ft Dr. BENTLEY'S Arguments, affecl: thole,
and thofe only, who fuppofe the Eternity of God
made up of fuccejfive Parts ; and you fliould have
remember'd, that this is what we conftantly deny.
'Tis a Difficulty which lies, and will for ever
lie, againft your Manner of conceiving the Di
vine Eternity ; and fuch a Difficulty, as I am
periuaded not all the Wit of Man can get over.
Eternity^ and SttcceJJion appear to me to be Ideas
quite as incompatible? as Infinity and Finitenefi: Sue-
cejjive Eternity is juft as good Senfe as red Sound,
or loud Colour. 'Tis in the very Nature of Time
to admit of a conftant Increase, and therefore ic
can never arrive at Compleaineff, or a real po/itive
Infinity •, and confequently it can never be applied
to God, whole Exiftence is perfect, whofe Conti
nuance is ft able and permanent, without 'Beginning
or Endy without Poflibility of receiving any Ad
dition or Increase, "comprehending in the Stability
lc and immutable Perfection of his own Being, l.is
f< Yefterday, and to Day, and for ever.'' * '" The
" Duration- of every Thing ({ays the very Learn
ed and Judicious Dr. CUDWORTH) " mu/l of
K NeceiFity be agreeable to its Nature , and there-*
* CUDWORTH lutellcil. Syd. p^ 644,
X i ' ««
164 Of ETERNAL CREATION.
« fore, as That whofe imperfett Nature is ever
" flowing like a River, and confifts in continual
(c Motion and Changes one after another, mult needs
Cc have accordingly a fuccejjive and flowing Dura-
ec tiofty fliding perpetually from prejent into paflt
cc and always polling on towards the Future*) ex-
<£ peding Something of its felf, which is nor yet
et in Being, but to come: So muft That, whofe
*c perfect Nature, is eflentially Immutable, and al-
*c ways the fame, and neccffarilj exijlent, have a
<c permanent Duration; never lofing any Thing of
<t it felf once prefent as 'fliding away from it;
<c nor yet running forward to meet Something of
<c it felf before, which is not yet in Being : and
^ it is as contradictious for it,- ever to have begun,
" as ever to ceafe to be." *
I SHALL quote one Paffage more from a
very Learned Writer, \vhich by the Way,
had you read, might have hinder'd you from
making that Objection to his Arguments, that
they equally proved againft the Exigence of
the Deity from all Eternity. After he has fhewn
by thofe Arguments, the Impoflibility of fuccef-
five Duration being actually, and fofttively Infinite i
or that infinite Succeffions fhould be already gone
and paft ; He well, and judicioufly obferves,
<c Neither can thefe Difficulties be applied to the
<e eternal Duration of God Almighty, For tho*
<c we cannot comprehend Eternity and Infinity :
« yet we underfland what they are not. And
<£ Something, wearefure, muft have exifted from
<c all Eternity ; becaufe all Things could not e-
<c merge and ftart out of Nothing. So that if
?' this pre-exiftent Eternity is not compatible with
* CUDWORTH Intelled. Syft. p. 645.
^
Of ETERNAL CREATION. 165
" a fucceflive Duration, as we clearly and diftindl-
ly perceive that it is not; then it remains that
" fome Being, though infinitely above our finite
c Comprehenfions, muft have an identical, inva-
c riable Continuance from all Eternity; wnich
" Being is no other than God. For as his Na-
c ture is perfecl: and immutable without the leaft
" Shadow of Change; fo his eternal Deration is
" permanent and indivifible, nor meafurable by
« Time and Motion, nor to be compared by Nuin-
<c ber of fucceflive Moments. One Day with the
<c Lord is as aTkottfand Tears, and aTi-Joufand Tear*
*s as one Day"*
THERE remains one Argument more to be taken
Notice of. You endeavour to prove, not only
that it was pojjlble for God to create }rom Eternity*
but that it is probable he actually did fo. Your Ar
gument is This. " Since God always ads upon
« fome Ground or Reafon, from thence it follows,
" that he had fome Reafon for Creation, orher-
" wife he never would have created at all. If
« then he had any Reafon, that Reafon certainly
cc was the fame from all Eternity, that it was at
« any particular Time: For Jnflance, fuppofe
" Goodnefs was the Ground of his Creation, it
<e follows that if it was good at any particular
" Time, it was equally fo from all Eternity. For
<e as he himfelf is, and always was immutable, and
«c invariable, every Thing was the fame with Re-
<c fpeft to him from Eternity; and before the
« Exiftence of any Thing but himfelf there can
" be no external Caufe to determine it either ways.
« It is therefore very probable, that as it was a!-
« ways good in him to create, that he always did
* Dr. Bentlefs Boyle's Left. Scrm. 3.
" create
i66 Of ETERNAL CREATION.
<c create, and did therefore never exifr. alone." *
This Argument muft be refolved into the follow
ing Principle viz,. That whatever God created, 'tis
probable he created from all Eternity; for " what-
<c ever it was good for God to create in Time,
«c it was equally good from all Eternity." But
if this be admitted, then it will follow, that it
is probable that he actually created the World, and
all Things in it from all Eternity, and therefore,
that, not only Angels and A/Jen> but that every other
Species of Creature^ every Planet with ail its Inha
bitants were eternal. It likewife follows from your
Principle, that God cannot ever hereafter create any
view Species of Beings ; becaufe, whatever it is good
for him to create in Time, it was equally good
from all Eternity, and therefore it is probable, ac
cording to you, that he cannot create any Beings but
what t.e created from Eternity. If your Princi
ples were purfued in all their Confequences, I know
not where they would flop : But if thefe already
mentioned, Aiall be thought extravagant, the Ar
gument from which they are deduced muft be
thought fo too.
I HAVE now, Sir, gone through your Third
Defence, and have anlwer'd your feveral .Arguments,
and Objections. I .am afFraid the Reader will
think I have been too particular, in taking Notice
oi: fome Quibbles, which, in Reality, deferve no
Anlvver : but as Sophiftry may prevail with a great
many Perfons, I thought it might not be wholly
unncceflary to detect it. With Relation to SPACE,
it appears, that you have defcended to the lowed:
Shifts in order to fupport your Hypothefis ; and
in Refpect to the Pqfffcilitj of an ETERNAL CREA-
* F;rft Dcf. p. 56,
TIONj
Of ETERNAL CREATION. 167
TION, you have been forced to deny the Truth
of two Maxims, as felf-evident, and univerfal as
any in Philofophy vi*,. that Creation implies a Be-
ginning of Exijience : and that the Exijience of a vo
luntary Efficient mnft be prior to the Exijience of the
Ejfett it produces. I fhall now, Sir, take Leave
of you for the Prefent, homing, if you fli all here
after think proper, to oblige the World with any
more Defences, and me with any more Anfoers,
that you will take a Method different from what
you have hitherto done ; and endeavour (if you
can) to fupport your Caufe, by Rational, and
Philofophical Arguments.
REMARKS
i68
REMARKS
O N
Mr. JACK SON's
EXCEPTIONS :
T O
Dr. Clarke's Notions of SPACE Examined.
MR. [ACKSON> at the end of a Piece not
long fince by him Publifhed, entitled
The Exiflence and Unity of God &c. has
thought proper to add, as he calls it, a Short Con-
Jtderation of Dr. Clarke's Notions of SPACE Ex
amined ; which Short Confederation, he tells us, he
thinks to be a Sufficient Reply. The whole is flight*
and fuperficial ; and the Author takes great Care
always to fpeak with moft jiffurancC) where his
Reafoning feems to be the weakeft : As if a De
clamatory Style was to fupply the Defeft of Proof *
and the Reader was to be put off with Words, in-
ftead of Arguments*) I find fcarce any Thing in
it but what has been already obviated, and had not
the foregoing Papers been preparing for the Prefs,
I fhould not have thought it worth my Time to
have taken any Notice of it : But I fhall now
fiing out a few brief Remarks upon what he has
^ . +** . - - ~ L. _^ ^_ .
faid.
THIS
REMARKS &c. 169
THIS Gentleman opens his Performance with
\vifely obferving that "This Author's Notion of
*c SPACE, is, that it is a mere Nothing, z mere Nc-
" gation and Absence of Things ; yet lie perpetu-
" ally ralks of it as a real Exiftent." J And what
then ? We are under a Neceflity of fo doing, trom
the very Nature of Language. We talk of *b$ra&
Idea;, as if they were real Beings, ju/t a* the Poets
talked of Fortune as a GW%/," of Virtues, Pices*
Difeafes & . as if they were real Ferfons. And if
he will turn to my Second Chapter p. 14. &c. fa
may receive farther Information,
[ SAID that " the bigger any Body i^ the more
" SPACE it requires for its Exigence, is true ,
*c The larger any Body is, the more SPACE we
" fay it requires for its Exigence." f Thde Sen
tences Mr. JA :XSON quotes from me, and then
obferves that <c Thefe Inconfiftencies and Contra-
<c diftions are tnc necelfary Confequence of deny-
" ing the Exlfle»cs of SPACE," *** The Contra-
didion here meanr, I iuppofe, is that I ihould
talk of more SPACE, and yet call SPACE Nothing?
But this Gentleman inould not have left cut the
Sentence which immediately follows one of thofe
he has quoted • For tL it v/ould have lliewn him
the true Meaning of the Expreflion, The Sentence
runs thus -z/^, ^ The larger any Body is the more'
" SPACE we-i&y it requires for its Exiftencc :•
<f that is, in plain Engfijb, the larger any Body is the
" more or tk farther i extended" ff Jn
this I fee neither IiKonfiflency, nor Ccntraciclion,
* Exigence anJ Unity &c. p. 145.
f Dr, Clarke's Notions of SPACE Examinee! p, 61, 62.
** Exigence and Unity p. 148.
. f| Dr. C/flr&'i Notions of SPACE, Examined p. 62,
REMARKS
any more than there is, in affirming Tome Bodies
to be heavier than others, and denying Wekkt to
be any thing more than m ah jlr aft Idea.
« THE^ Idea of Ab'ence [fays he] is not the
of Quantity, or Extension, as the Idea of
PACE evidently is." * I anfweY, the Idea of
JPACP, is Ideal Exterfon, 3fid fo is the Idea of the
**&Jaxe of Body, and Ideal Extcnfanis Ideal Qu*n-
tie bblerves, that "we have the fimc 7^'
SPACE, or Extender,, when Matter is pre-
nr, as when it is abfenty. artd'even as exiftinp-
«c /» and. between the Parts of foli'd Matter." f
JTo thiv I reply, that we have the /feof Extw-
: when Matter is prcjcnt, but* not of SPACF ;
I therefore it is nor, as this Author Imagines,
the jame Idea of Extenjion when Matter is prefent*
as when it is abfent: For in the former Cafe, it
rs real Extenfion, our Idea has a real Archetype -
but in the latter Cafe, it is only Ideal Extenflon\.L
SPACE, Bur what does this Author mean by
SPACE exiftingfoW«« the Parts of iolid Matter"?
For if there is SPACE between the Parts of folid
Matter, which I prefume he will allow to touch,
and two Bodies do not touch when there is SPACE
between them; I may ask, where is the Difference
between touching and not touching ?
" THR next Thing (fays Mr. J!CKSON) tO:
e taKen Notice of, is a Piece of Reafonine,
vluch this Gentleman feems to value himHf
" upon/' He then quotes a PafTage from m\ ;
where I endeavour to fhew, that the Reafon why
the Idea of SPACE, when all Matter is fuppofed
* Exigence and Unity p. 148
t IHd.
** Ibid. p. ,49.
: '
Mr. JACKSON QV.
to be annihilated, ftill rafhes into the Mind i<?
becaufe SPACE is Nothing. But pray how came
this Author to imagine, that I valued my feJf
6p6n this Reafomng ? If he means that I think
it a_ Piece of Reafoning which he cannot confute,
he is much in the Right of it. All the value
. Know m it is, that (as it feems to me) ir
is true, and Truth is valuable every where. But
Mr. JACKSON thus remarks upon it viz. '"I am
' ferry I cannot help thinking, that all this fine
" Reafonmg is arrant Nonfinjc." * —To which I
have nothing more to fay, than that I am forry
this Gentleman, above all Men, iliould not remem
ber that Calumny is no Convitiion f .
" CAN any Thing [fays he] be more abfurd,
than to talk of a mere Nothing ruihino into
" our Minds, and forcing its .Idea upon us whe-
' ther we will or no." ** It does not rum in
to our Minds whether we will or no, in one Senfe,
that is, we may chufe whether we will think at
all about it; but when we do think of it, and
try to fuppofe it annihilated then it is that the
ftme Idea ftill rufhes into our Minds : And let
any one try if he can, even in Thought, ANNI
HILATE Nothing. -Ky Nothing milling into our
Minds, I only meant, that when we fuppofed e-
very Thing annihilated, we could not help having
an Idea, that Nothing would remain : And there
fore it would be Nonfenfe to talk of any farther
Annihilation.
1 HAD remarked, that we could fay the fame
of Nothing as of SPACE - « Let him fay (then
* Exiftcnce and Unity p. 149.
f The Title of a calumniating Book written by M5r.
JACKSON.
f* Exigence and Unity p. 150,
Y z « fays
172 REMARKS on
" fays Mr. JACKSON) and be confident, that
" Nothing, a mere Nothing is ntteffarttj Exiftent,
Eternal^ Infinite, Immoveable^ Incomprehensible^
€< comprehend'- all Matter > and all finite Things ;
cc that in Nothing we live, wove, and have our Bc-
" ing*;c."* To all which I ftillanfwer, that we
may full as well *alk thus of Nothing^ as of SPACE :
One is as proper as the other, that is, they are
both Nonfenfe alike.
HE takes Notice that my Expreffion viz. " God
*< is Qmniftient ; he could not be Omnijcient unlefs
«' there were Things for him to know, is very ra Hi
*e and inconfiderate; as if the Omnilcience of God,
*( who made all Things, depended on the Exift-
<c ence of Things for him to know." f This
Charge of Railinefs, and Inronfideratcnefs, pro
ceed^ from hi? not under/landing my Meaning;
J meant no more, than that if th^re were not
certain Truths^ (uch certain Truths would not be
Objects of God's Omnifcience : Thus, if f^trttto
was not diffTcnt from Vice^ and Ficefrom Virtue ;
then, that Vice is nor Virtue and that Virtue is not
y would be no Part of God's Omnifcience.
therefore he may be pleafed to read what he
objects sgainfl over again.
I HAD urged, that " to fay any Thing which
<c is Infinite'^ has Quantity, and Dimen/ions, is not.
<e far from faying, it is Finite, and Infinite at the
€c fame time/* ** To this he replies. " Infinite
*c SPACE is as real Quantity > as finite SPACE is;
r< and an infinite Body is as real JWy, and has real
*c Quantity) as well as finite Body. Infinite Quan->
Jc tity, and Dirnenfions arc, and cannot but be
* Exiftence and Unity fcfr. p. 152. f Ibid. p. 153!
^* Dr, Clarki$ Notions of SPAC^ Examined p. 54.
" ex-
Mr. J A c K'S o N Gfc. 173
<c exiftent : Nothing is plainer.*" If calling ft Thing
plain will make it fo, then all is plain enough:
But he that knows an Infinite Series to be abfttrdy
will plainly fee the Abfurdity of an infinite Body,
infinite Dimenjions^ infinite Quantity &c.
HE tells us that to fay SPACE is an imaginary
Stibftratum of imaginary Extenjion^ "is a Definition
c< as full of mere Imagination as one fhall meet
" with/' f I fuppofe the Author imagines this
to be Wit : It may be fo; 'tis certainly no Ar
gument. It is not I, but Mr. JACKSON who is
deceived by his Imagination. I imagine SPACE to
exift, and believe its Exiftence to be imaginary ;
Mr. [ACKSON imagines it likewife to exiit, and
believes its Exigence to be real. JTis plain then
which of us is the fuller of Imagination.
" BEFORE [fays he] SPACH was Nothing but
" the Abfence of Matter ; and what has Abfence
« to do with Extenfion, or Subftratum either £
« Now it has got a Subftratum (though an ima-
*' ginary one) to make it look like real SPACE." **
—I anfwer no ; but to make it look like whac it
is, an imaginary Subftance.
HE proceeds — 4'* But if SPACE is only an ima-
*« ginary Subftratttm of an imaginary Extenjton, how
<c comes it that, as he owns and fuppoies, — . the
<e Idea of its Exigence rulhes into his Mind,
•c whether he v/ill or no.- How comes his
*c Imagination to have gotten fo much the better
«< of his Reafon £c. — " ft This is another of
our Author's Flowers of Rhetorick , but how*
* Exigence and Unity &V. p. 153.
•f Ibid. p. 154.
** Ibid.
ft Ibic
on
174 REMARKS
ever it may perhaps be thought more proper to'
lay, that his Imagination has got the better of!
his Reafon, who takes Things "for real which are
imaginary.
HE asks-" What greafer Difficulty is therein
tf fuppofing the matt-rial World to have exift'ed
« from Eternity than there is in fuppoiin^ it to
< exift to Eternity ? " * The Difference lie*? here,'
For the World to have exifted ab £tcrno, implies
the Abfurdity of an Infinite Series ; but to exift
fa aternum, is only to exift (after it has once ex
ifted) without ceafing, which is no other than a
Negative Infinity.
" IT can never be proved [fays he] that a
«* Caufe muft neceffarily be prior to the EfFed,
<c in RefpeA of Time." f - If not, then Caufe
and Effeft mean Something elfe than what they
did among antient Logicians, by whom this was
allowed a? an Axiom.
" ARISTOTLE &c. Tcontinues he) who fup,
c poled the World Eternal, fuppofed it notwith-
c ftanding, to be produced by God, as the Ori-
«c ginal Cau'e and Former of it." ^^ But Mr.
JACKSON fhould have remember'd that dfiflotlc
did not confider the World as a proper Efeft of
the Divine Power, but as a neceffarj Emanation
from him.
SPEAKING of the Ideas of Extenfan and 7W/-
vifebiiity being incompatible, "Having Parts [laid I]
-is confijting of Parts joined together, and Parts
« that are joined together, I Ihould fancy might
* Exiftence and Unity p. 156.
f Ibid..
<** Ibid.
^ be
Mr, JACKSON &c. 175
" be fuppolcd afunder, i. e. might be divifible." *
To this Mr. JACKSON replies, " The Author
" here feems diffident of his Anfwer being to
" the Purpofe, faying firft, whatever has Parts,
" #?#/2'have divifible Parts, then in Conclusion,
" that being joined together, he fancies they might-
" be fuppofed a f under/' f — This was a Remark
too curious for me to pafs over s But the whole
Scare of the Matter is? that my Diffidence hap-
pen'd to be Ironical, and Mr. JACKSON could
not fee it.
HE next endeavours to mew how Pans do not
imply Divifibility, even in Refpect of Matter.
" Supnofe [fays he] God to have created the
*c haft Body or Piece of Matter, which he can
<c create, or which is the leafl poffible to exift,
ct which is probably true of the folid Parts of
cf fome Body : I ask then, has this Body, or
a piece of Matter, Extenfion and Parts, or not S
<c He will fay, it has Extenfan and Parts ; and
<c yet to fuppofe the Parts divifible is an exprefs
cc Contradiction, hecaufe then the Body will be
" lefs when divided, than it was before, though
" it was, before it was divided, the leaft poffible
" for God to create, or exift." * *
I NEED give no other Anfwer to This, than
that the Sup f opt ion is one of the greateft Abfurdi-
ties in Philofophy. JTis to fuppole that there
may be a leafl Particle of Alatter, or one infinitely
fmall, that is, of no magnitude ; that it is extend
ed, and lias Parts, and yet is of no Quantity .
:* Dr. Clarke s Notions of SPACE, Examined p. 12;,
126.
f Exiftence and Unity p. 158,
** Ibid.
Does
176 REMARKS on
Does not he know, that Matter (like all other
Quantity) is divifible in infinitum^ and confequent-
ly that a leaft Panicle is Nonienfc ? - God c;an't
create ileaft Particle of Matter, becaufe hp bn*c
work Contradictions; So all is foreign. — But it is
pleafant enough to fee, how thefe Gentlemen are
put to it, to give us an Inftance of an extended in-
divifible Tking. Mr, CLARKE 2nd Mr. JACKSON
have both endeavour'd at it, and very curious ones
have they prefented us with. One tells us of a
Piece of Matter, furrounded with Something that
hinders it from being divided, ergo it is indivifible:
The other informs us of the le aft Particle of Matter :
A Difcovery which no one could make* but he that
could find out the loft Number.
I SHALL take Notice but of one Thing more*
and that is that Mr. JACKSON every where fpeaks
as if he thought (what I always imagin'd was a
neceffary -Confequence of thefe Centlemens Opi
nions) that SPACE is the very Subftanceof GOD.
For he tells us in one Place, that " the Idea of
<c SPACE is not the Idea of a mere Nothing, »»-
" lefs the Idea of the infinite Pretence and Exift-
<c ence of God is the Idea of a mere Nothing." *
In another Place he • obferves, that whoever denies
the Exiftencs of SPACE feffpofes the Exiftence of
God to be the Exiftence of Nothing t- What is
this lefs than deifying SPACE, and making it God
himfelf ? But not content with This, he ilill
plunges deeper, for he not only believes SPACE to
be the Extenjion of Godbut the Extsnfion of Matter
too. For he acquaints us that "the internal Quan-
4C tity of SPACE pervading the Bodies> and pof-
Exiftence and Unity p. KI.
t S^.e Ibid. p. 150.
left
-
»• >...
Mr. J A c K s o N . 177
" feft by them, is their true Extenfan,"* Mr
CLARKE mdeed talks of the Space of Body, from
whence I im*gi»'d he thought SPACE to be a
Property of Body ; But this Gentleman freaks
pur, at lea:} his own Sentiments, and tells us that
it is the true Extwfioa of Body . and He ,ikewif
holds it to be the true Exten/io» of God. If
then t^true Extenfion of Matter, be the true Ex-
ttofion of God- x le3ve the Reader to
the neceflary Confequence.
' Exiftence and Unity p. 68.
I N I S,
I
BINDING MAY 1 2 1989
Clarke, Joseph
621 A farther examination of
C53 Dr. Clarke1 s notions of space
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