i
Digitized by tine Internet Arciiive
in 2008 with funding from
IVIicrosoft Corporation
http://www.archive.org/details/afghanistancentrOOfishrich
AFGHANISTAN
AND
THE CENTRAL ASIAN QUESTION.
AFGHANISTAN
AND
THE CENTRAL ASIAN QUESTION
BY I
FRED. H. FISHER,
A. LOND., OK THP: MIDDLE TEMPLE, AND H.M. BENGAL CIVIL SERVICE:
Aict/ioi- of ^' Cy/>>iis, our Nciv Colony, ajid what we know about it."
WITH MAP.
lLontion :
JAMES CLARKE & CO., 13 & 14, FLEET STREET, E.C.
1878.
D52>5
T5
'^ For my own part, I will only say that though I sliould have
preferred, in the interest of peace, that Russia had not entered on
a career of conquest along the Jaxartes and the Oxus, yet I see
no reason at present to feel any anxiety about the advance towards
India, Asia is large enough for both of us, and we may well pursue
our respective paths, ajid fulfil our respective missions, without
jostling or jealousy. Our positio7i in Asia is quiescent, while hers
is progressive. . . . We can, therefore^ well affoi'd to wait, forbearing,
but vigilant, and conscious that if real danger approaches at any
time, we are strong enoiigh to arrest and crush it." — SiR Henky
Rawlinson's "Notes on Khiva," March, iSyj.
HENRY MORSE STEPHENS
PREFACE.
The author's best apology for the present book
must be the absence of any single English work, so
far, at least, as he knows, which professes to give
a comprehensive account of the land of the Afghans,
the people, and their history, including all that is
most important in the past, as well as the more
immediately interesting subject of the present, re-
lations of Afghanistan with Great Britain. If the
following pages in any way carry out the above idea
of what is required at the present juncture of affairs
on our Indian frontier, the author's object will have
been accomplished. It remains to him to acknow-
ledge the very great obligations under which he lies
to the authors and publications named on a subsequent
page, besides many that have escaped mention.
One subject of regret the author has had in con-
nection with this work. He had hoped to have
been able himself to see it through the press ; but,
=r f J
;>94
VI Preface.
having to return to duty in India rather more
suddenly than he had expected, he has had to leave
the task of revising the proof-sheets to a friend,
to whose kindness in undertaking it the author is
deeply indebted.
Fred. H. Fisher.
P.S. — It was originally intended to have a map
prepared especially for this volume, but the ex-
cellent map published by Messrs. George Philip
and Son, of Fleet Street, having since appeared,
it has been decided by the publishers to supply j
it for the use of the readers of this volume.
The only drawback to its adoption for this purpose ;
is that the spelling of some of the names of
places differs somewhat from the author's. The
orthography used in this volume is that which
has now^ obtained almost universal currency, being
employed by Sir Henry Rawlinson and other
acknowledged masters of Indian subjects. In this
system a few names that have acquired a prescriptive
title to a conventional (although inaccurate) mode
of spelling retain the conventional form, such as
Cabul, Candahar, Calcutta, Delhi, &c. Other names
Preface. vii
are spelt according to Sir William Jones' now well-
known method of transliteration. The accentuation,
however, has been omitted, as it gives an awkward
look to names, and is of very little practical use.
To diminish any inconvenience that may arise from
having different modes of spelling in the letterpress
and the map, a list of the more important names that
are spelt differently in them is appended.
PUBLISHERS' NOTE.
From several passages which occur iii the latter portion,
it will be see?i that this work 7uas written previous to the
recent publication of the Official Correspondence on Afghan
Affairs. The foregoing Preface will explai?i why these have
remained as written.
LIST OF SOME NAMES OF PLACES
SPELT DIFFERENTLY IN MAP
AND LETTERPRESS.
In Letterpress.
In Map.
Pronounced.
Anclkhiii
Andkhooi
Andkhoo-i
Bannu
Bunnoo
Bunnoo
Bhawalpur
Bahawulpore
Baha (or Bha)
wulpoor
Cabul
Kabool
Cawbul
Candahar
Kandahar
Candahar
Cihazni
Ghuznee
Ghuznee
Hari Rud
Heri Rud
Huree Rood
Hindu Kush
Hindoo Koosh
Hindoo Koosh
Jalalabad
Jelalabad
Jelalabad
Kala-i-Ghilzai
Kelat-i-Ghiljie
Kala-i-Ghilzai
Karachi
Kurrachee
Koorachee
Khaibar
Khyber
Khyber
Merv
Merve
Merv
Multan
Mooltan
Mooltan
Nushki
Nooshky
Nobshkee
Peshawar
Peshawur
Peshawar
Pishni
Pisheen
Pishnee or Pisheen
Sarakhs
Serakhs
Serukhs
b
AUTHORITIES.
Sir Jno. Kaye"s " History of the War in Afghanistan/'
Sir Henry Rawlinson's " England and Russia in the
East."
Dr. Bellew's "Journal of a Mission to Afghanistan,"
" From the Indus to the Tigris," and " Kashmir
AND Kashgar."
Forster's "Journey from Bengal to England."
Vambery'c " Travels."
Burne's ditto.
Ferrier's " Caravan Journeys."
Wood's "Journeys."
Captain Havelock's " Narrative."
Stocqueler's " Memorials of Afghanistan."
Philip Smith's "Ancient History."
Meadowes Taylor's "History of India."
I
I Elphinstone's " History of India."
1 " Encyclopedia Britannica " (Ninth Edition), Articles
j ON "Afghanistan" and "Afghan Turkestan."
'English Cyclopedia, Article on "Afghanistan."
' Numerous Articles in the " Times," " Pall Mall
I Gazette," and other Newspapers have been made
i use of for the Account of more recent Events.
b2
CONTENTS.
CHAPTER I.
AFGHANISTAN ITS NATURAL FEATURES.
PACK-
Natural Boundaries — Approximate Extent of Afghanistan — Origin of
Name — Independent Territory — What Afghan Dominions Inckide
— Comparison of Afghanistan with Switzerland — Mountain-ranges
— Hindu Kush and its Prolongations — Safed Koh — Suliman Moun-
tains— Passes on the Indo- Afghan Frontier — Fort of Ali Musjid —
Natural Divisions — Rivers — Lakes — Provinces and Towns . . i
CHAPTER n.
AFGHANISTAN ITS CLIMATE AND PRODUCTIONS.
Variations in Climate — Mineral Wealth — Vegetable Kingdom — Agri-
culture — Irrigation — Animal Kingdom — Domestic Animals —
Industry and Commerce — Trade Routes — Povindahs . . .47
CHAPTER HI.
THE PEOPLE, LANGUAGE, LITERATURE, AND ANTIQUITIES
OF AFGHANISTAN.
The Afghans, Pathans, or Pushtanahs— Division into Tribes— Non-
Afghan Population— Estimated Population— Russian Account-
Supposed Jewish Origin— Kafirs — Sir John Kaye's Description of
the Afghans — Language and Literature — ^Judicial Institutions —
Military System — Russian Account of the Afghan Army —
Antiquities 66
xiv Contents.
CHAPTER IV.
ALEXANDER THE GREAT'S MARCH THROUGH AFGHANISTAN
ON INDIA.
PAGE
Alexander's Army — Pursuit of Darius after the Battle of Arbela—
Conquest of Parthia and Hyrcania — Founding of Herat— Con-
quest of North-Eastern Afghanistan — Campaign in Bactria —
Alexander an Oriental Potentate— Marriage with Roxana— Crosses
the Hindu Kush into India — Campaign in India — Voyage of
Nearchus from the Indus to the Euphrates— Alexander's March
across the Desert of Baluchistan— Greek Influence on the Oxus . 96
CHAPTER V.
AFGHAN HISTORY FROM MUHAMMAD TO ZAMAN SHAH.
First Appearance of Afghanistan in Mediaeval History— Arab Settle-
ments— Story of Kasim and the Rajput Princess — The Ghazni
Monarchy Founded by Alptagin— Invasion of India— Peshawar
the First Permanent Muhammadan Conquest in India — Sabak-
tagin — Plunder of Somnath — Mahmud of Ghazni — Shahabuddin
— ^Jengis Khan — Timur or Tamerlane Invades Northern India —
Babar Founds the Mughal Empire of India— Nadir Shah Invades
and Plunders the Panjab — Ahmad Shah Founds the Durani
Empire of Afghanistan— Invades India — Battle of Panipat —
Zaman Shah — Threatens to Invade India 106
CHAPTER VI.
AFGHAN HISTORY FROM ZAMAN SHAH TO THE EVE OF THE
FIRST AFGHAN WAR.
Zaman Shah Advances to Lahore — Panic in British India — Review
of Situation — Native Feeling in India — Incidents of Former
Invasions — Alarm at French Intrigues — First Symptoms of
" Russophobia " — Encroachment of Russia on Persia — Scheme
of Joint Russian and French Invasion of India — Sir John Ka3'e
on the Two Classes of Governor-General — Lords Minto and
Wellesley Compared with Lord Lytton — The Rise of the Sikhs
Contents. xv
PAGE
— British and Russian Advance Compared — Mission to the Sikhs
—Shah Suja— Rise of the Barakzais — Shah Suja an Exile— Affairs
in Afghanistan before the First Afghan War— Mission of Captain
Burnes and Siege of Herat — Eldred Pottinger — Dost Muhammad
— Sikhs Gain Peshawar — Russia Invades Persia — New Russo-
Persian Boundary — British Policy ii6
CHAPTER VII.
THE FIRST AFGHAN WAR.
vOrd Auckland's Policy in 1837— Case for Dost Muhammad stated by
Sir John Kaye— Afghan Ideas of Hereditary Claims to Sovereignty
—The Tripartite Treaty— The Army of the Indus— Passage
through Sindh Delayed — Appointment of Macnaghten as Political
Officer with the Expedition— English Gold Scattered Freely— Shah
Suja's Reception at Candahar — Assault and Capture of Ghazni —
Massacre of the Ghazis — Flight of Dost Muhammad beyond the
Hindu Kush— Failure of Pursuit through Treachery of Haji Khan
— Intrinsic V/eakness of Shah Suja's Course Demonstrated— Cost
of Living for English Officers at Cabul— Kaye's Judgment of the
British "System" introduced into Afghanistan — Honours to the
Victors — Designs of Further Interference Westwards — The Story
of Colonel Stoddart and Arthur Conolly's " Missions " — Their
Cruel Fate— Lord Ellenborough's Letter to the Amir of Bokhara
— Brief Review of "The Afghan Tragedy" of 1838-42— Story of
Dr. Brydon's Escape 137
CHAPTER VIII.
AFGHAN AFFAIRS AFTER THE WAR OF 1 838 42.
The Real Cause of the Damage to England's Position in Central Asia
from the Cabul Disaster — Lord Ellenborough's Policy in 1842 —
Native Viev/s on the Evacuation of Afghanistan — Rawlinson's
Opinion of the Afghans as Soldiers — England " The Burnt Child,"
and Afghanistan " The Fire " — Internal Affairs of Afghanistan
between the Retreat of General Elphinstone and the Advance of
General Pollock — Muhammad wShah Khan a Noble Exception to
the Generality of the Afghans — Murder of Shah Suja, the Puppet-
King — Accession of Fatih Jang — Akbar Khan Intrigues for Power
xvi Contents.
I'AGE
— Fall of Fatih Jang — Proclamation of Shuhpur — Lord Ellen-
borough's "Song of Triumph "—Policy with Regard to Dost
Muhammad Khan — England's Afghan Policy from 1842 to 1852
— Origin of the Persian War of 1856 — Herat and Treaty of Paris
of 1857 — Virtual Disregard of Treaty by Persia — Dost Muham-
mad's Neutrality in 1856-58 Purchased — Policy of Subsidies Dis-
cussed— Cost of Afghan War— The Blood-feud between the
Afghans and the English — Sir John Lawrence's Treaties with Dost
Muhammad — Extent of Dost Muhammad's Dominions — He
Subdues Candahar and Herat — His Death — Subsequent Anarchy
in Afghanistan — Rival Claimants to the " Masnad " — Shere All,
the Designated Successor — His Son, Yakub Khan, is made
Governor of Herat — Afzul Khan Obtains Possession of Cabul,
and is proclaimed Amir — Shere Ali's Defeat — Yakub Khan's
Gallant Achievements — Shere All Restored in 1868 — He Suspects
Yakub Khan of Treachery — Yakub Demands to be acknowledged
Heir- Apparent— Open Quarrel between the Amir and Yakub —
Yakub's Flight — Reconciliation and Imprisonment — Other
Claimants to the Succession 154
CHAPTER IX.
RUSSL\N ADVANCE EASTWARDS.
Chief Difficulty in understanding the Central Asian Question — Im-
portance of the News of the Arrival of a Russian Mission at
Cabul — Its Mention in Parliament — Treatment of the Russian
Mission — Reason of Importance attached to Independence of
Afghanistan — Excessive Cost of Present Indian Forces of Great
Britain— Our Real Concern with Afghanistan — Two Schools of
Opinion on our Indian Frontier Policy — Lord Beaconsfield's
Definition of " The Afghan Question " — His Enunciation of Eng-
land's Present Policy — Review of Negotiations with the Amir —
Dost Muhammad's Virtue in abstaining from Revenge in 1857 —
Lord Lawrence's so-called "Masterly Inactivity" — Succeeded
by Different Policy of " Mischievous Activity" — Recognition of
Shere Ali — The Umballa Meeting between Lord Mayo and Shere
Ali — Lord Mayo's Declaration to the Amir examined — Practical
Assistance in Money and Arms to Shere Ali — Shere Ali's over-
sanguine Expectations — View taken of Lord Mayo's Proceedings
by Home Government — Lord Mayo's Explanation — Corre-
spondence concerning a "Neutral Zone "^ — How "^Neutral
Contents. xvii
PAGE
Zone " defined in 1872 — Russian Expedition to Khiva — Its Im-
portance to India — The Worth of Russian Assurances — Lord
Granville's Remonstrances — Expedition against the Turkomans
— Shere Ali's Alarm at Russia's Advance — Sends his Confidential
Agent to Simla — His Proposals to Lord Northbrook — Failure
of Negotiations — Shere Ali communicates with General Kauf-
mann — Further Russian Ofiicial Assurances — So-called Ex-
ploring Expedition in 1875 — Expedition against Kizil Arvat in
1876— Russian Advance in Bokhara and Khokand — Choice of
Three Routes for Russian Advance on Afghan Frontier— Pro-
jected Railways — Russian Activity in Central Asia in Spring of
1878 — Last Reported Russian Assurance — Latest Advance to-
wards India 178
CHAPTER X.
THE AFGHAN POLICY OF THE LAST TWO VICEROYS.
Resume of Lord Northbrook's Negotiations with the Amir — Proposal
to permit Sir D, Forsyth to return through Afghan Territory
negatived — The "Grievances" of Shere Ali — Sir Lewis Felly's
Conference with the Afghan Agent in 1876 — The Occupation of
Quettah — Lord Lytton's Letters to Shere Ali — The English
Envoy at Ali Musjid — Repulse of the Mission— False Account
sent to England — Question of Peace or War reverts to Con-
sideration of Necessity of "Rectification" of Frontier — Is Re-
fusal to receive English Officers an Insult? — Rawlinson's Opinion
of England's Policy in the Presence of Russian Agents at Cabul
— Policy of English Cabinet in sending an Ultimatum to Shere
Ali — Lord Northbrook on the Conduct of Russia and the Amir —
And on Sir James Stephen's View of the Amir's " International"
Rights 213
Appendix A. — New Route to India 235
Appendix B, — Russia and England in Asia 237
Appendix C. — Russia's Advance Compared with that of Alexander
the Great 243
Appendix D. — Lord Lawrence on the Present Crisis .... 246
Appendix E. — Sale's Defence of Jalalabad 253
INTRODUCTION.
A FEW weeks ago the writer of these lines looked
down from a window near the site of old Temple
Bar upon a scene of triumph. An English Premier
was passing in his carriage of state through a
double row of vociferating Londoners of the un-
mistakable Jingo type. His progress was now and
again impeded by the enthusiasm of certain of the
unwashed who insisted upon climbing upon the steps
of their idol's chariot, and taking a close view of
that idol's noble features. Over the remaining stone
buttress of Temple Bar and its sham counterpart on
the opposite side of the way two unicorns were
conspicuous, and a banner bearing the now familiar
device, " Peace with Honour." The cortege passed
slowly on ; the Sphinx-like occupant of the first
coach bowing with undoubted satisfaction to the
multitude. After the great man's carriage had dis-
appeared, suddenly, almost as if by pre-arrangement,
a fire-engine swept past at full speed, clearing the
street, as if by magic, of its terror-stricken foot-
XX Introduction.
passengers. One felt for a moment somewhat of
wonder at the coincidence, and all sorts of absurd
fancies crowded upon the mind. Of what was it the
omen } Did the instant intelligence of a conflagra-
tion somewhere that was flashed upon the spectator
by the appearance of the fire-engine, in immediate
connection with the State-ceremony of a Prime
Minister's triumphal procession, prefigure a concur-
rence of analogous events in the political world } All
men know now how hollow was the '* Peace," and
how doubtful was the " Honour," that were said to
have been secured at Berlin. The peace has barely
survived the summer and autumn, and early winter
sees us locked in a struggle, which at the best will
severely tax our energies and strain our resources —
for what ? To satisfy that " Honour" which, we were
told, had been amply vindicated at Berlin.
Those who least admire Lord Beaconsfield must
be constrained, we think, to admit that he possesses,
in a degree rarely excelled, the faculty of versatility,
the crab-like power of grasping each new situation
and adapting his own programme, itself by no means
a fixed one at any time, to whatever novel circum-
stances present themselves, with such tact as to
dazzle the multitude into the belief that he had all
along foreseen, and with infinite sagacity had pro-
vided for them. The Secretary-of-State-for-India's
despatch to the Viceroy, which saw the light in the
IntrodiLction. xxi
Times of 21st November, is the latest example of
this feature in the Premier's character. No one
supposes that the document in question was other
than a manifesto for the benefit of the English
public, intended to be a vindication of the policy of
the present Government, which is quite willing to
accept all the credit of what is likely to be approved,
and to shift on to the shoulders of their predecessors
of the opposite party the responsibility of all that
is worthy of condemnation. Thus it is cleverly
shown that the present difficulty is to be traced
entirely to the follies of Lord Northbrook's Govern-
ment, the blame of which is again ingeniously
fathered upon Her Majesty's then Government at
home (Mr. Gladstone's). If Lord Northbrook had
only guaranteed the Amir's dominion against all
his foreign enemies — just as Lord Beaconsfield has
guaranteed Asiatic Turkey against Russia — all
would have been well. The Amir would have ac-
cepted our handsome subsidies, and presents of arms,
like a good boy, and been all the more prepared in
consequence to give us battle whenever the blood-
feud that has existed for the last forty years or more
should break out again ! Because Lord Northbrook,
or rather Mr. Gladstone, declined to pledge England
to support Shere AH in every case against foreign
foes — a pledge which, if once given, would have
encouraged that ruler in all sorts of aggression upon
Introdtiction.
his neighbours — the Amir became sullen and re-
served. From 1874 to the present time it has been
the constant endeavour of the Premier and his col-
leagues to break down this reserve and remove this
suUenness. The promise of protection and active
countenance which Shere Ali had vainly desired
from Lord Northbrook has been offered to him —
coupled with the condition that English Agents
should be given access to positions in his territories
other than at Cabul itself. The offer was refused,
and has been continually refused ever since.
It is quietly assumed that it would have been
accepted if made by Lord Northbrook. We ques-
tion very much if it would have met with any other
response then than the one given now. Shere Ali
was willing to accept our guarantee, our subsidies,
and our guns, but whether he would ever have con-
sented to admit British Agents, and so become re-
duced— in his own eyes, at least — to much the same
position as that held by such semi-independent
Indian potentates as Scindia, the Nizam, and
Nepal, is more than doubtful. This argument,
however, suits Lord Beaconsfield's purpose admir-
ably, which is to show that the present war has
been really necessitated by the perverse conduct of
Mr. Gladstone's Government.
In effect it does not seem that the apportionment
of praise and blame is to be made so easily. The
Introduction, xxiii
wisdom that comes after events will always be able
to indicate where a fault has been committed which
it can be shown has entailed disaster that might
otherwise have been averted. If we were to venture
to indicate the weak point in the recent foreign policy
of England, we should find it in the exaggerated idea
of Russia's designs upon India which some English-
men entertain. That Power seems rather to require
peace to recover herself after the recent devastating
war with Turkey than a war which shall urge her
still further to the verge of bankruptcy. It is pre-
mature now to discuss the morality of the present
invasion of Afghanistan. It may be justifiable, and
we must hope for the honour of England that ample
reason will be forthcoming to satisfy both the Eng-
lish Parliament and the English people that we have
not violated right in order to obtain for ourselves a
doubtful advantage.
Messina, November 28, 1878.
AFGHANISTAN
AND
THE CENTRAL ASIAN QUESTION
CHAPTER I.
AFGHANISTAN— ITS NATURAL FEATURES.
Natural Boundaries — Approximate Extent of Afghanistan — Origin of
Name — Independent Territory — What Afghan Dominions Include —
Comparison of Afghanistan with Switzerland— Mountain-ranges —
Hindu Kush and its Prolongations — Safed Koh— Suliman Mountains —
Passes on the Indo- Afghan Frontier — Fort of Ali Musjid— Natural
Divisions — Rivers — Lakes — Provinces and Towns.
! Afghanistan, or, as its name signifies, the land of
I the Afghans, may be roughly compared in area with
} Germany. The north-eastern part, called the Cabul
j valley, from the river of that name which waters it,
i is really the upper dominating section of the Indus
basin ; and there is some ground, therefore, for the
I statement which has been made that physically, at
least. Eastern Afghanistan is part and parcel of
India. And if all the nationalities of the earth were
to strike for " natural boundaries," India might have
as good a right to claim the Cabul valley as her own
X
Afghanistan.
as Spain would have to include Portugal, or Germany
to take Belgium and Holland.
What was said just now as to the extent of
Afghanistan must be regarded as a mere approxima-
tion to the truth, for the best maps can only keep
pace with skilled explorers, and these have been few
and far between in the countries between the Oxus
and the Indus, so that accurate information is not
yet to be had on many interesting points connected
with their natural features. Enough, however, can
be gathered for a rough conception of them from
scattered notes of hasty travellers, who passed
through the country keeping, so to speak, one eye
on the scenery and the other on their holsters. The
name, it should be premised, by which the country
is known so extensively outside its own limits, is
■only as old as the short-lived Durani empire of
Ahmed Shah in the middle of the last century. The
Afghans rarely use the term, speaking of them-
selves as Pushtanu (plural of Pushtu), and their
country as Wilayat. The whole Afghan dominions,
including, in addition to Afghanistan Proper,* that
part of the Oxus basin to which the name Afghan
* Afghanistan Proper is nearly co-extensive with the ancient
provinces of Aria (Herat), Dra7igiaiia (Seistan), the region of
the Pa7'opamisad(£ (Cabul), and Arachosia (Candahar), with
Gaiidaritis (Peshawar and the lands of the Yuzufzais). Of the
latter district part now is the British district of Peshawar, and
the rest independent.
Its Natural Features.
Turkestan has been applied, may be regarded as a
quadrilateral plateau, about 600 miles from east to
west, and 600 miles from north to south. Excluding
Afghan Turkestan, the extent of the country from
north to south must be decreased to 450 miles.
Both in the larger and smaller areas there would be
included some territory which is free from Afghan
control altogether, and other tracts over which the
hold of the Amir is spasmodic and precarious.
Examples of the former are the valleys north of
Peshawar in the possession of the Yuzufzais ; those to
the west and south-west of the same district, occupied
by the Mohmands, Afridis, Vaziris, and other tribes ;
and the elevated valleys of Chitral or Kashgar, and
of the independent Kafirs (non-Muhammadans)
' among the higher spurs of the Hindu Kush. To
I the semi-independent territories belong the eastern
I districts of Khost and of Kuram, which are con-
[ terminous with British territory ; the Kakar country
I in the extreme south-west ; and part of the mountain
j region in the north-west, inhabited by the Eimaks
I and Hazaras ; to which may probably be added
! Badakhshan.
The boundaries of Afghanistan, roughly stated, and
' subject to correction on account of some independent
\ and semi-independent territories included by them,
, may be thus defined : —
The Oxus forms the northern boundary line from
Afghanistan.
its source in Pamir to Khoja Salih Ferry in 65° E.
long, nearly. Thence the Afghan territories become
conterminous with those of Khiva, the line that divides
them running south-west, and skirting the Turkoman
desert to the Murghab river, and passing thence in
the same direction to a point on the Hari Rud river,
a few miles south of Sarakhs, in about lat. 36° .
On the west, the boundary line runs from the last-
mentioned point, first south-east for a short distance,
and then nearly due south to about 30° N. lat, where
it bends eastward across Lake Hamun or Seistan,
and again turns westward, being continued to the
intersection of lat. 30° with the lake, including, from
its point of divergence to its termination, a triangular
tract which forms part of the plain of Seistan. All
to the west of this line is Persia.
On the south there is no natural boundary, and it
can only be roughly given as a line from the Lake of
Seistan, in lat. 30° to the Helmand river, and thence
south-east to Nushki, whence it runs north-east
through the southern valleys of the Lova, dividing
the Pishin valley from Quettah, or the Shal territory,
belonging to the Baluch state of Kelat. P'urther
east, the boundary line has a southern declination,
and terminates not far from the Indus.
The eastern boundary from a point a few miles
distant from Mittan Kot, on the Indus, is formed by
the eastern spurs of the Suliman Mountains as far
Its Natural Features. 5
as Peshawar, and thence northward the boundary is
for a time the Indus, but thereafter Hes in almost un-
known country.
Except portions of the lower valley of the Cabul
river, small tracts towards the Indus, and the space
included in a triangle formed by joining Herat,
Candahar, and the extreme south-west point of the
Lake of Seistan, the whole of the quadrilateral
plateau of Afghanistan has a minimum height of
4,000 feet above the sea. A tract that would be in-
dicated by a straight line of 200 miles drawn from
the Kushan Pass in the Hindu Kush Mountains,
passing about 35 miles west of Cabul to Rangak, on
the road between Ghazni and Candahar, is nowhere
less than 7,000 feet above the sea. The lowest level
taken — that of a position in the Lake of Seistan — is
1,280 feet above the sea. Herat is 2,650, Candahar
3,490.
Briefly, then, Afghanistan Proper is an elevated
table land, having an area of more than 211,500
square miles, somewhat larger than France, and is
bounded, on the north by Turkestan and Khiva, on
the west by Persia, on the south by Baluchistan, and
on the east by the Panjab. Westward of the Hindu
Kush the Koh-i-Baba cuts off Afghanistan Proper
from the tract known as Afghan Turkestan, which
reaches down to the bank of the Oxus, and
includes the various minor Khanates or States
Afghanistan.
of Kunduz, Khulum, Balkh with Akcha, and the
Chahar Wilayat, or " Four Domains " of Sir-i-pul,
Shibrghan, Andkhui, and Maimana, together with
such of the Hazara tribes as He north of the Hindu
Kush and its prolongation in the Koh-i-Baba.
Besides these the name Afghanistan is sometimes
made to include also Badakhshan, a poor mountain
tract between the Hindu Kush and the Oxus, which,
though nominally it forms part of the Amir's
dominions, is of small value to its suzerain, the tri-
bute annually paid to Cabul being said to amount to
no more than about ;^ 1,500. The barren mountains
which compose Badakhshan can hardly, indeed, be
said to belong to Afghanistan by other than a pre-
carious tenure of suzerainty or protection, since the
present princes obtained the territory by the aid of
Shere Ali, from their uncle, who was anxious to
become the feudatory of the Bokharan ruler. ■
It has been pointed out that the main features of
the coast-line of Europe are repeated on a grander
scale in Asia. The peninsula of Spain and Por-
tugal finds its counterpart in Arabia ; France in
Asia Minor and Persia ; Italy in India ; Turkey,
Greece, and the Grecian Archipelago, in Burmah,
Siam, and the Eastern Archipelago ; and Russia in
the Chinese Empire ; while the British Isles on the
west of the Euro-Asian Continent are placed
symmetrically with Japan on the east. So striking
Its Natural Features.
has the parallelism between Italy and India seemed
to some writers, that they have not hesitated to state
that the Himalayas are repeated in the Alps ; the
Rhone and the Po in the Indus and Ganges ; while
Genoa (or Marseilles) is Karachi ; Venice, Calcutta ;
Milan, Delhi; Naples, Bombay; and Sicily, Ceylon.
If the authors of this comparison had carried it a
little further inland, they would hardly have failed
to find a counterpart of Switzerland in Afghanistan.
Whether or not an ingenious geographer could find
the representatives of all the chief natural features^
such as mountains, plains, rivers, and lakes, irk
sufficient correspondence to bear out the comparison,,
it cannot but be evident that in its relations to India,
on the east, Persia on the west, and Asiatic Russia,
on the north, Afghanistan is physically situated
with regard to them, not dissimilarly from the
position that Switzerland holds with reference tO'
Italy and Austria on the east, France on the west'-
and Germany on the north. Baluchistan, however,,
which is the southern boundary of the Amir's
dominions, is not yet so completely British-Indian as
Piedmont and Lombardy are Italian.
To give a detailed account of the mountain sys-
tem of Afghanistan would be to transcend the
modest limits of this work. A rough outline may,
however, be attempted. It has been a common
error with some journalists of late years to describe
8 Afghanistan.
Afghanistan as lying beyond the Himalayas. It
really lies within the Hindu Kush section of that
Indian mountain girdle. Or, to be still more cor-
rect, the Western Himalayas are extended into
Afghanistan, and form four mountain regions, which
are known from east to west by the names Hindu
Kush, Paghman Mountains, Koh-i-Baba, and Ghor
Mountains. The last were known to the Greeks
as the Paropamisus, and consist of two parallel
chains, collectively called by Persian historians the
Ghor Mountains, but distinguished now, the northern
as the Safed Koh, or White Mountains, and the
southern as the Siyah Koh, or Black Mountains.
To take all the northern mountains in order, we
find between 34° and 35° N. lat. two very lofty
mountain-ranges, between which flows the Indus.
To both of these the name of Himalaya Mountains
is applied as far as long. 70°, the eastern being
undoubtedly a part of the great Indian northern
mountain barrier, and the western as certainly a
continuation of it. A glance at the map will, how-
-ever, show that this western range, although it rises
in some places as high as 20,000 feet, and runs
from east-south-east to west-north-west, does not
form the watershed of the rivers of this region.
For the watershed, according to most geographers,
we must look farther north to a range called the
Karakoram Mountains, which run almost due east
Its Natural Feattwes.
and west, and are clearly a continuation of the
Kuenlun Mountains, which stretch across Tibet
into China. This western continuation of the
Kuenlun is called in Afghanistan the Hindu Kush,
or Hindu Koh (" koh," in Persian, meaning moun-
tain). It will be observed, further, that the Indian
range of the Himalayas and the Hindu Kush do not
run parallel, but converge and unite in one mountain-
mass between 70° and 69° east longitude, including
between them the country known to the Afghans
as Kafiristan (the land of the infidels, i.e., non-
Muhammadans).
Thus it seems to be optional with us to regard the
Hindu Kush as an extension of either the Kara-
koram or the Himalaya range of mountains, or,
better still, as the continuation in a single chain of
both.
Only the northern declivity of the Western
Himalayas is included in Kafiristan, the southern
belonging to Afghanistan. From the plains these
mountains appear to rise in terraces, so that as
many as four ridges, one overtopping the other,
may at some places be seen. There are wide valleys
among them, but only a narrow strip of cultivable
soil along the line of drainage. Between the higher
portion of the ridges, and the base of the hills, is an
inclined plane — often very wide — strewed or entirely
covered with boulders and shingle, without a particle
10 AfgJianistaji,
of soil. On the declivity of the hills, however, where
the inclination of the upper strata is less perpen-
dicular, there is found a rich soil of some depth. '
Advantage is taken of this for cultivation, and, where
this has not been done, high forest trees occupy the
ground to an elevation of 10,000 feet above the sea-
level. Up to 4,500 feet these consist chiefly of a
species of oak, called "balut"; but beyond that
height they are largely mixed with a kind of olive,
called " zaitun," up to 6,500 feet, where it gives place
to the "deodara." These forests are the most
extensive in Afghanistan.
From the point of convergence of the Himalayas
with the Hindu Kush, at about 70° E. long., the
sides of the mountains are destitute of trees, and are
devoid of soil, the rocks protruding in every direction*
and huge angular debris occupying the intervening
spaces. Dry and thorny bushes are the only vege-
tation, as far as 6^^° E. long., where the Hindu Kush,
strictly so-called, comes to an end in a huge snow-
clad mountain -mass, called by that name, which
rises to the height of 15,000 feet above the level
of the sea.
The best-known of the many populous valleys in
this region is the Panjshir valley, which has a total
length of seventy miles, and an average width of
about a mile and a-half. There are some seven thou-
sand families living in the lower part, the upper being
i
Its Natural Features. ir
uninhabited, on account of the extreme cold in
winter. Although the soil is naturally very poor,
it is extensively cultivated, orchards and mulberry
groves constituting most of the wealth of the people
in these valleys ; the mulberries, when dried, yielding
a flour which is their principal food. Through this
valley passes the high road from Cabul to Kunduz,
and at its upper end it traverses the famous Khawak
Pass, at a height of 13,200 feet above the sea.
Through another similar valley, further to the west,
watered by the Parvvan river, passes another road
across the Hindu Kush (by the Sar-alang Pass),
leading to the plain of the Oxus.
After running south-west, as just described, for
some 370 miles, the Hindu Kush ceases to be locally
known by that name, although it is still applied to
the whole chain of northern mountains. This chain
is continued in the smaller range of the Paghman
Mountains, which run nearly due south, and are of
lower elevation. This range consists of two parallel
ridges, with a valley between them of nearly ten
miles in width, having an elevation that seldom
sinks below 10,000 feet above the sea, and is, con-
sequently, unfitted for cultivation. It affords, how-
ever, a grateful refuge from the summer heats to the
pastoral tribes in its neighbourhood. The two
enclosing ridges are from 12,000 to 13,000 feet high,
and, being free from snow in the summer, several
1 2 Afghanistan.
passes lead over them to the valley of Bamlan, which
lies west of the western range, and is only 8,500 feet
above the sea. Of these passes the best known are
the Irak, attaining nearly 13,000 feet ; the Kallu,
12,480 feet ; and the Hajiyak, 12,190 feet above
the sea.
Where the Paghman Mountains end, the Koh-I-
Baba rises as a single range, and runs due west. Of
these mountains we have very much yet to learn.
We know that they commence at their eastern
extremity in an immense mass of rocks about
14,000 feet high, with still loftier snow-clad peaks
above them that attain 15,000 feet at least. To the
westward the range is continued in a series of lofty
peaks, and then breaks up into three parallel ranges,
enclosing the waters of the Murghab and Hari-rud
rivers. The northernmost of these finally loses itself
in the sands of the Turkoman desert ; the middle
one, the Koh-i-Safed, or White Mountains, has a
westerly and longer course, running north of and
past Herat, where it turns northward and also merges
into the desert ; while the southern range, called
Koh-i-Siyah, or Black Mountains, follows a course
pretty nearly parallel with the last-named one, and,
it is believed, eventually unites with the ranges that
form the northern boundary of Persia as far as the
Caspian. If this theory be proved to be a physical
fact, there would be shown to exist an unbroken
Its Natural Features. 13
connection between the mountain systems of the
Caucasus and the Eastern Himalayas. Indeed, the
whole line of Alpine watershed which we have been
describing, stretching from the southern end of
Pamir across Afghanistan to Mash-had in Khorasan
was known to Alexander's historian as the Caucasus
— a fact which seems to indicate that the probable
continuity of the ranges was even then surmised.
The southern spurs of the Koh-i-Siyah give rise to
the Khash-rud and Harut-rud rivers and to some
feeders of the Helmand river.
A recent writer in the GeograpJiical Magazine
gives a somewhat different statement of the con-
nection of the Hindu Kush proper with its western
extensions. He regards the Koh-i-Baba as the
direct continuation westward of the Hindu Kush
from the point where it changes its direction from
the south-west. A saddle connects the Hindu
Kush here with the Paghman range, which en-
closes the head streams of the Helmand and
Ghorband rivers, and runs south-west, forming the
water-parting between the Helmand and Argan-
dab, and ceasing at their confluence. According to
this account the two Paghman ridges are offshoots
from the Hindu Kush, and not links in the chain.
A spur from the Paghman range runs westward,
enclosing the source of the Argandab, and thence
extending parallel with the northern chain, bounding
Afghanistan.
throughout its length the table-land of Ghazni and
the home of the Ghilzais, and ceasing just north of
Candahar.
Along the parallel of 34° runs, due east and west,
the Safed-Koh range (not to be confounded with
the western range of that name which forms part of
the Paropamisan or Ghor Mountains), which con-
stitutes the southern water-shed of the Cabul basin.
It consists of a single range for about seventy-five
miles, when it splits into two ridges. Its connec-
tion with the Hindu Kush by means of the Attakoh
range has been asserted. The main range of the
Safed-Koh, which preserves a pretty uniform level
of about 12,500 feet in height, is richly clad with
pine, almond, and other trees. Its valleys abound
in orchards, cultivated fields and gardens, and mul-
berry, pomegranate, and other fruit trees are plentiful.
It is considered by some geographers that a net-
work of low mountains runs generally south from
this range, and is merged in the table-land of Kelat
and the mountainous system of Baluchistan.
Next in importance to this great northern range
of the Hindu Kush is the eastern range, known as
the Suliman Mountains, which on the map appear to
form the natural frontier line between the Afghan
table-land and the plains of the Indus. This is the
name applied by the best authorities to the range,
or ranges, running almost due north and south along
Its Natiwal Features. 15
the meridian of 70° E. ; from the Gomal Pass to the
twenty-ninth parallel of latitude, or thereabouts.
Major Raverty has described it as a mighty moun-
tain barrier, containing in its northern section two
ranges which increase in number as they run south-
wards, till at its southern extremity, where the Sari
river breaks through, there are as many as twelve
distinct ridges, " like battalions in columns of com-
panies at quarter distance." The mountains increase
in height from east to west, and the highest, called
Mihtar-Suliman, or Koh-i-Sujah, is snow-capped in
winter.
Colonel Macgregor holds a different view respect-
ing this range. As one running north and south
along the meridian of 70°, he does not recognise the
Suliman at all. He considers that from the Attakoh
range, between Cabul and Ghazni, there springs a
range of mountains which proceeds southward with-
out a break, throwing out spurs to the east and
west, and that this is the range which forms the
system of mountains of Eastern Afghanistan and
Baluchistan. The weight of authority, however, is
opposed to this view.
A peculiarity in connection with this range — the
Suliman — is noticeable in the large number of
streams that pierce through its sides after draining
the table-lands to the west. These naturally afford
access, by means of the passes they form, from
i^ Afghanistan.
the valley of the Indus to the high plateaus of
Afghanistan.
PASSES ON THE INDO-AFGHAN FRONTIER.
This seems to be the proper place to speak of
these gaps in the great mountain barrier that
stretches from the Oxus to the Indian Ocean, by
which commerce penetrates from Central Asia to
India, and which formerly afforded paths to the
invading hosts that poured down to obtain the
plunder of her rich cities. The four best-known
passes on the eastern frontier of Afghanistan are the
Khaibar, Kuram, Gomal, and Bolan. Besides these
there are innumerable others of every degree of
practicability, most of which are known only by
native report. In speaking of these passes, it must
be remembered that the names thus broadly given,
locally apply to only a particular part of the whole
distance to be traversed before reaching the table-
land beyond. Thus, what is commonly called the
Khaibar Pass includes a succession of gorges or
defiles, each designated by its own special name.
The Khaibar Pass may be said, generally speaking,
to commence at Jamrud, ten miles west of Peshawar,
and to extend to Dhaka, a distance of about thirty-
three miles. The actual entrance to the defile, how-
ever, is at Kadam, a place three miles out of Jamrud,
which is a small village surrounded by a mud wall.
Its Natural Features. 17
This is (or was) the site of an old Sikh fort, which
was built in 1837, after the Afghan army, under the
famous sons of Dost Muhammad, Akbar Khan and
Afzal Khan, had taken to flight at the unexpected
arrival of Ranjit Sinh, whose famous march with
a relieving army from Guzerat has been seldom
equalled. Within 1,000 yards of Kadam the gorge
narrows to 150 yards, with steep, precipitous cliffs on
either hand. Between this and the Afghan frontier
fort of Ali Musjid, distant about ten miles, the
mountains on either hand are about 1,500 feet in
height, slaty, bare, and, to all appearance, inacces-
sible. The width of the Pass varies in this part from
290 to 40 feet. The name of this fort figured for a
few days early in October last, rather conspicuously
in the Indian telegrams published in the London
daily papers. It was incorrectly stated that our
Itroops had marched upon it from Jamrud, and
,captured it from the Afghans. It was just below Ali
Musjid, too, that Major Cavagnari was in September
j2ist, 1878, told by the Afghan officer, the Mir Akhor
br Master of the Horse, that the British Mission
jvould not be allowed to proceed on its projected
ourney to Cabul.
It was here that the colloquy occurred at which,
(t was alleged, language of menace was used by the
jVfghan officer, the report of which, filtering through
he inflamed channels of fiery special correspon-
2
i8 Afghanistan.
dents, roused a section of the English people to a
sense of gross insult received, and for a time induced
some of the strongest opponents of Lord Beacons-
field's Government to clamour for immediate redress.
Of the exact nature of these proceedings between
the Afghan and English officers we shall come to
speak later on. We may mention here that the little
fort of Ali Musjid takes its name from the ruins of
a small Muhammadan mosque (" Musjid " being
Persian for mosque) in its vicinity. Its situation is
nearly midway between Peshawar and Dhaka, about
ten miles from the eastern end of the Khaibar Pass,
as above stated, and twenty-six miles from the western
end, while it is seventy miles from Jalalabad. It
stands on the south side of the Pass, at the height of
2,433 feet above the sea, on the summit of beetling
crags, which tower perpendicularly above the road-
way. The crests of the hills at this spot are barely
150 yards from each other; and as on the northern
slopes a smaller masonry blockhouse has been con-
structed, a very effective cross-fire can be poured on
troops advancing through the defile. The fort itself
is said to be not more than 150 feet long and 60 feet
wide, and is commanded, fortunately for an invader
from the Indian side, by higher positions, both on ,
the south and west. It was by attacking it on these
faces that Colonel Wade succeeded in taking it in
1839. Although, however, he commenced the attack
Its Natural Features. 19
on the 25th of July, and was enabled in a few hours
to drive the defenders from their outworks by the
accuracy of his shell-fire, the Afghans being armed
only with matchlocks, it was not until three days
later that the place surrendered. Its garrison was
under 1,000 strong, of whom 500 were irregular
Jazailchis (matchlock men), the remainder being
levies from the Afridi and Shinwari tribes. Wade's
loss was over 150 killed and wounded. After its
capture the fort was placed under a garrison of
Yusufzai Pathans, with the object of keeping open
free communication between Peshawar and our
; forces in Jalalabad and Cabul. In November, 1841,
I a desperate attack was made on the fort by a body
j of about 2,000 men belonging to the neighbouring
I Afghan tribes. They cut off the water supply, and
j reduced the place to dreadful straits ; but the British
i commandant. Lieutenant Mackeson, with his usual
' fertility of resource, bought them off. A force,
under Colonel Moseley, consisting of 2,500, was
' then sent to hold it ; but, owing to insufficiency of
provisions, that officer was compelled to retire in
eight days, with the loss of 180 killed and
) wounded. Sir George Pollock, on his advance
f through the Khaibar with the avenging army in
'I842, left a garrison in Ali Musjid ; and on
I evacuating Afghanistan in November of the same
iycar, he destroyed the works, but they were
2 — 2
I
I
20 Afghanistan.
speedily reconstructed by the orders of Dost
Muhammad.
The great drawback to the occupation of this
advanced fort is its extreme unhealthiness. In 1839
the mortality in the British detachment holding it
under Colonel Wade was something terrible. In less
than eight weeks there were 250 deaths out of a
strength of a little over 2,400 men. This v/as mainly
owing to the water, which is strongly impregnated
with antimony ; and even this supply is only ob-
tained from the Khaibar stream below, so that the
place can easily be forced into capitulation, should
time be no object with an advancing army. It
would have been unwise in the present instance to
have exposed our troops to the sickness that proved
so fatal forty years ago, unless an immediate advance
upon Cabul had been intended. Several roads,
moreover, are known to us now by which this posi-
tion of Ali Musjid, the most formidable obstacle
between Peshawar and Jalalabad, can be completely
turned, so that its capture under the circum-
stances was wisely deferred. Among these roads
are the Tatara road, which enters the hills about
nine miles north of Jamrud, and joins the main
route at Dhaka. The Kadapa road, and one
through the Bara Valley also — both of them avoid
Ali Musjid — are practicable for lightly-equipped
columns.
Its Natural Feattcres. 21
After this digression, which the importance that
has been attached in some quarters to the early cap-
ture of the fort of Ali Musjid seemed to warrant, we
continue the description of the Khaibar Pass. For
a distance of two and a-half miles beyond Ali Musjid
it retains its difficult character. It then enters the
Lala Beg Valley, about six miles in length, with an
average breadth of a mile and a-half. The western
end of the valley finds the road entering a still
narrower defile, there being scarcely room in it for
two camels to pass each other. The Landi Khana
Pass — which is by some said to be the highest point
in the Khaibar — is distant from this point about a
mile and a-half, the ascent over it being narrow,
rugged, steep, and generally the most difficult part
of the road. Guns could not be drawn here except
by men, and then only after the improvement of the
track. The descent, however, is along a well-made
, road, and is not so difficult. On the west side of the
I Pass the mountains gradually open out, and lose
I much of their inaccessible nature. Dhaka is distant
' about eight miles, and here the defile ends. The
; main road to Cabul is continued from this point
■ through other passes to the town and fortress of
^Jalalabad — famous for General Sale's defence of it
in 1842 — passing on the way through the villages of
I Lalpura, Hazarnau, Basawal, Batikot, Chardeh, Bari
iKab, and Ali Baghan. From Peshawar to Jalalabad
22 Afghanistan,
by road is about ninety miles, and thence to Cabul,
through the Jagdallak, Lattaband, Khurd Cabul, and
other passes, is loo miles. It was in these latter
defiles, within a few marches of Cabul, that the
^' Cabul massacre " occurred, and not in the Khaibar
Pass, which none of the unfortunate army ever
reached on that occasion.
Of the passes to the north of the Khaibar the
most important are the Baroghil and Karambar
passes leading from Cashmere, our outlying feudatory
principality, to Khokand, the latest officially an-
nounced Russian acquisition in Central Asia. They
also lead from Kashgar to Cabul and Cashmere by
routes that cross at Chitral. The Baroghil Pass is
known to us from the reports of the Mullah em-
ployed by Colonel Montgomerie, who travelled from
Chitral into Badakhshan by this route.
Captain Biddulph, who was attached to Sir Douglas
Forsyth's mission, visited Sarhad, the town at the
northern extremity of the Pass, but it is doubtful if
any Englishman has traversed these routes through-
out. Khokand, or Farghana, is separated from British
territory by the Pamir Plateau, and although the
actual distance in a direct line between the Czar's
territory and ours is not much greater than 200 miles
at this point, yet the road that connects them is not
one which a modern army could follow. Leaving
Khokand (1,540 feet above the sea), it passes through
Its Natural Features. 23
Marghilan to Uch Kurgan (3,100 feet). These
places are said to have been the scenes of indiscrimi-
nate slaughter of the Khokandians in the campaign
of January, 1876. Bearing south, the road passes
through Isfairam, and over the Little Alai Plateau,
which stands 12,000 feet above sea level ; then,
crossing the Great Alai, at an altitude of 14,000
feet, it descends into the valley of Muk Su, following
a south-easterly course to Sirich ; bending round to
the west it strikes the Oxus at Kila Panjab, the ele-
vation of which is 9,090 feet ; then, ascending the
stream to Sarhad, which Biddulph determined to be
10,975 feet, the road crosses the Baroghil fifteen
miles to the southward, the altitude being 12,000 feet.
From this point a road branches off to Mastoj, and,
following the course of the Kunad stream, passes
through Chitral (7,140 feet), Dir, and Pashat to
Jalalabad.
At Chitral another road from Samarcand, through
Penjakand, Hissar, Kolab, Faizabad, and Zebak,
joins this route. The road through the Baroghil
Pass into Cashmere is a most difficult and moun-
tainous pathway. It touches few villages, the chief
being Yasin, in Afghan territory (height 7,770 feet),
and crosses the Maharajah of Cashmere's border at
Gaon Kuch. It then runs through Gilgit (5,270 feet)
to Bunji on the Indus, and so through Iskardo and
Dras to Sirinagar.
24 Afghanistan.
The Karambar Pass is merely a subsidiary road to
that by the Baroghil. Leaving Sarhad, it follows a
more easterly course, passing by the Karambar Lake
and joining the main road at Gaon Kuch on the
frontier.
These passes, it seems, were recently secured for
us by the Maharajah of Cashmere's troops, but the
danger to be apprehended from that side is not very
great, owing to the enormous natural difficulties of
the road.
Along the north-western frontier there are in-
numerable passes, of which at least seventeen are
well-defined roads, practicable for the movements of
lightly-equipped columns, and there are certainly
four up which guns could be taken. Of these, the
Khaibar, already described, and the Bolan are the
best known, the Kuram and Gomal being the other
two chief ones. The great drawback to the two
latter being utilised in the event of war is the fact
that our means of communication within our own
border are of a very imperfect kind, so that some
military authorities are of opinion that the difficulties
a force would encounter before it could reach the
eastern end of the Kuram or Gomal Passes, would be
almost as great as those to be met with in the moun-
tains themselves.
The Kuram Pass is so called from the river of that
name, which debouches through it and flows south-,
Its Natural Features. 25
west through Thai and Bannu to the Indus, receiving
as tributaries the Shamii, Tochi, Gambela, and other
streams. The road through the Kuram Valley,
which was traversed by Sir H. Lumsden's Mission in
1857, leads from Thai to Ghazni and Cabul, the route
to the latter city branching off near the Shutargardan
(Camel's Neck) Pass, north-west of the Paivvar. By
this route, Cabul is distant from Thai not more than
150 miles. There is a longer road, available at
seasons when the Shutargardan is not so, which fol-
lows the Ghazni road as far as Khushi. It is described
as a fairly good road, but the turbulent conduct of
the Jajis involved Lumsden's party in great difficulties.
These tribes being hardly restrained by the Amir's
troops from massacring the mission — a fact which
will scarcely warrant our regarding them as very
friendly to us. The climate of the Kuram Valley is
described as being magnificent : for about six weeks
the winter is severe, but during the spring and autumn
it is most charming. It is very fertile, filled with
orchards, and exceedingly well cultivated.
The Gomal Pass is the next in importance, and is
similarly formed by a river, from which it is named.
General Chamberlain in i860 led a force against the
Mahsuds up the Zam Valley from Tank, to the north
of the Gomal River. Kaniguram, the capital, was
taken, and considerable chastisement inflicted on the
marauding tribe. From the facts collected during
26 Afgha7iistan.
this expedition is derived most of our knowledge of
the Gomal Pass, which leads direct to Ghazni, and is
credited with being the route by which Mahmud of
Ghazni made most of his invasions of India.
Besides the Drapan Pass, from Dera Ismail Khan,
and others north and south of it, Major Raverty gives
details of no less than thirty-four passes (exclusive of
small ones) between the Kaura and the Sari. These
are too distant from the Indus to be of much use for
military purposes. The principal are the Kaura,
Vihowa, Barkoi, Wrug, Trundi, Saunra, Sari, and
Vador Passes, the last of which leads from Dera
Ghazi Khan.
The Bolan Pass leads direct to Quettah, which is
at present our most advanced post westward, being
beyond the 67th degree of longitude, while Cabul
itself is to the east of the 69th degree. Sir John
Kaye speaks of the Bolan as commencing at Dadur,
but it is, perhaps, more correct to say that it begins
about five miles to the north-west of that place.
From Shikarpur in Sindh to Dadur is 146 miles, and
this distance was traversed by the Bengal column in
February and March, 1839, i^^ sixteen painful
marches. Water and forage were so scarce that the
cattle suffered terribly on the way, the camels falling
dead by scores on the desert. The Bolan Pass is
60 miles in length, and the passage was accomplished
by the column just spoken of in six days. It is
Its Natural Features. 27
everywhere practicable for artillery, and, though
formidable in appearance — in one part being only
from 70 feet to 80 feet broad, with steep cliffs on each
side — can be easily forced by a British column. Its
summit is stated to be 5,800 feet above sea-level, and
its average ascent 90 feet to the mile. At Sir-i-
Bolan (the head of the Pass) a mountain-torrent
sometimes bars the way during the height of the
rainy season. On emerging from the Bolan Pass the
traveller enters the beautiful valley of Shal, '* a
favoured spot in a country of little favour." The
clear, crisp climate is one peculiarly suited to the
European constitution, and over the wide plain,
bounded by noble mountain-ranges, intersected by
many sparkling streams, and dotted with orchards
and vineyards, the eye ranges with delight. Quettah
itself, which is ten miles off, is described by Hough
as " a most miserable mud town, with a small castle
on a mound, on which there was a small gun on a
rickety carriage."
There are other passes besides the Bolan through
the Brahu range, of which the principal are the Mula,
Nagau, and Bhor Passes. The Mula, otherwise
known as the Gandava, follows the windings of the
Mula river, which has to be crossed repeatedly, and
is considerably to the south of the Bolan. It leads
through Nard to Kelat, a cross-road leading through
Gaz to Khozdar, a Baluch town of some importance.
2 8 Afghaii is fa n .
Anjira, a village at the top of the Pass, is at an
elevation of 5,250 feet, but the inclination is, on an
average, only 45 feet to the mile for the whole dis-
tance— 102 miles. This greater length, and the fact
that it only leads to Kelat — which is 100 miles south
of Quettah — render the Bolan, although a more diffi-
cult road, the preferable one for an advance upon
Candahar.
NATURAL DIVISIONS OF AFGHANISTAN.
\
I
Having taken a rapid survey of the mountain
systems of Afghanistan, and the means by which
access is to be had to her chief cities from the one
side of Russian Turkestan and British India, we
pass on to consider the natural divisions of the
country. These we shall find it convenient to classify
as follows : — a
(I.) The Valley or Basin of the Cabul River.
(II.) The Central Table-land, on which stand
Ghazni and Kalat-i-Ghilzai, embracing the upper
valleys of ancient Arachosia.
(III.) The Upper Helmand Basin.
(IV.) The Lower Helmand Basin, embracing
Giriskh, and the Afghan portion of Seistan.
(V.) The Basin of the Herat River ; and
(VI.) The Eastern Portion of the Table-land, drain
ing by streams, which are chiefly occasional torrents,
towards the Indus.
1
i
Its Natural Features. 29
To these some add —
(VII.) The northern mountain regions ; and,
(VIII.) The Southern Table-land, lying between
the Khoja Amram range and the Murl and Bugti
mountains, and descending to the west, where it
terminates In the desert of Baluchistan, just short
of 65° E. long.
(I.) The Valley of the Cabul River. — This has Its
northerti limit in the range of the Hindu Kush,
beginning on the west at the foot of the Paghman
Mountains, and stretching eastward to the banks of
the Indus, a distance of about 200 miles, in a
straight line. In the extreme west the valley is
10,000 feet above the sea ; but at Its eastern
end, near the Indus, It Is not more than 750
feet above sea level. The southern boundary of
the valley Is formed by an uninterrupted chain of
heights of varying deviation, which Is separated from
the Paghman range by the narrow plain, called the
Valley of Maidan, which Is 7,747 feet above the sea
and Is well cultivated.
The road from Cabul to Ghaznl and Candahar
passes through this plain. To the east of this
road commences the chain just spoken of, which
consists at first of isolated hills of moderate eleva-
tion. They are described as low, with little grass,
bad water, and treeless, their dismal appearance
corresponding with that of other mountain regions
30 Afghanistan.
that have been found to contain great metallic
riches. While the English occupation existed many
beds of very rich copper ore were discovered in
several places, but the natives work them only to a
small extent.
At Tazin, twenty miles from Maidan, these hills
change their aspect, rising higher and becoming
clothed with trees. They merge into the Safedkoh
range, of which, indeed, they may be considered the
western extension, this elevated rocky mass occu-
pying a distance of some thirty to forty miles from
west to east, and from fifteen to twenty miles from
north to south.
The highest summits of the Safed Koh reach to
16,000 feet above the sea, and the sides are covered
to the height of 10,000 feet, with forests, chiefly of
deodara, while orchards, cultivated fields, and pasture-
grounds skirt the base. The peaks are snow-capped
all the year round, and from the snow rise many
streams, that flow uninterruptedly through the
sumxmer.
The high mountains of the Safed Koh terminate
at about 70° E. long., and the Tira or Khaibar hills,
that succeed them to the east, are of lower eleva-
tion, declining steadily in height as they approach
the Indus.
The northern slopes of the Khaibar hills are
steep, and generally bare, or clothed with scanty
Its Natural Features. 31
grass, except after the autumnal rains. There are
plateaus of some extent, however, on these high hills,
which have a deep soil, and furnish good crops where
irrigation is possible.
The Cabul river (the CopJien of Alexander) rises in
the Unai Pass, about thirty-seven miles west of Cabul
in the near nei2;hbourhood of the source of its rival,
the Helmand. It drains the Maidan valley, and below
Cabul is joined by the Logar river, which flows north
from the Ghilzai plateau.
It flows in a westerly course for about 300 miles,
draining the southern slopes of the Hindu Kush on
the left and the northern watershed of the Safed
Koh on the right, and falls into the Indus at Attok.
Its tributaries on the right are numerous, but,
excepting the Logar, are insignificant in volume,
owing to the nearness of the watershed. On the
north or left bank the Cabul river receives the large
streams of the Panjshir, Alishang, Kunar, and
Landai Sin. Of these the Kunar or Chitral river is
the longest, and, indeed, as regards length, might
count as the main stream. Higher up in its course
it is called the river of KasJigar and the Bailarn, and
has been identified with the Choaspes and Mala-
niantus of the ancients. It rises in a small lake
near the borders of Pamir, and flows in a south-west
direction through the length of Kashgar, its whole
length to its junction with the Cabul river being not
32 Afghanistan.
less than 250 miles. The Cabul river, in part of its
course, between Cabul and Jalalabad, descends 4,000
feet in fifty miles, and its banks and bed consist of
huge rocks. The lowest ford (a dry season one) is
near Jalalabad, before the junction of the river with
the Kunar. From this point a safe and rapid
descent is made by means of rafts on inflated skins,
and boats of 50 tons can be floated from Jalalabad
downwards. During the floods the distance between
Jalalabad and Peshawar (not less than 100 miles)
can be traversed in this way in twelve hours. The
river is lowest in the winter, and is at its greatest
height in August, when the upper snows begin to
descend.
At a point sixty miles from the Kunar confluence,
the Cabul river issues from the mountains, by which j
it has been hitherto hemmed in, and enters the plain j
of Peshawar. It soon after receives the Landai Sin,
which is the name given to the joint streams of the
Swat and Panj Kora, which drain the great valleys
of the Yuzufzais ; Landai Siiiy or Little River, being
appHed to it by way of distinguishing it from the
Abba Sijt, or Indus. Both rivers, on entering the
plain, form deltas, which are increased by artificial
canals made for irrigation.
The valley of the Cabul river is naturally divided,
by the mountain-ranges of the Lataband on the
west and the Khaibar on the east, into three basins,.
Its Natural Features. 33
called, from the principal towns in them, the Cabul,
Jalalabad, and Peshawar basins.
The basin of Cabul includes a tract about
thirty-six miles from east to west, and from eight
to sixteen miles from north to south. This tract
is again divided by two ridges of hills into three
plains. The western plain, called Chahar-deh (or
"Four villages") is about eight miles wide and
twelve long. The town of Cabul stands at the
base of a ridge of hills (called the Tak-i-shat)
running from south to north, through which the
Cabul river flows in a deep gorge. The Chahar-deh
plain, which is to the west of this ridge, is very
fertile, and abounds in fruit trees.
The eastern portion of the basin is wider, and is
; called Kohistan. On the west it is hemmed in by
the Paghman Mountains, and on the north and east
; by the Hindu Kush. Its length is thirty miles, and
; average width seven miles. The western side of the
I plain of Kohistan is much higher than the eastern,
i along which flows the drainage of the opposite
i mountain. It is the favourite country residence of
ithe Cabul inhabitants, and is thickly-studded with
Itheir strongly-built dwellings and well-cultivated
igardens.
\ The plain of Logar is the third of the plains that
are included in the upper basin of the Cabul river.
It is about twenty miles wide from east to west, and
3
3 4 Afghan is tan .
about half that distance in length from north to
south. Much of it is a swamp during- part of the
year, and it is surmised that the whole was at one
time a lake. It is chiefly valuable as a grazing
ground for the cattle, and especially the horses, of
the Cabulese, but it also contains orchards and
vineyards.
The Lataband Pass leads from the Cabul to the
Jalalabad division of the valley. This mountainous
region extends for about thirty miles, and numerous
offsets reach it from the Safed Koh, leaving narrow
valleys intervening. A series of steep ascents and
descents is here met with, the ridges sometimes
rising i,ooo or 1,500 feet above the valley, which are
overhung with frowning boulders. To the south of
this barren region is the Khurd Cabul Pass, through
which runs the road from Cabul to Tazin and Jag-
dallak. At Jagdallak this road is joined by the road
from Cabul through the Lataband Pass, which
thence proceeds eastward through Gandamak to
Jalalabad and Peshawar.
A marked change in the character of the valley of
the Cabul river occurs at Gandamak, where the
Jalalabad division of it may be said to begin. This
extends from west to east about forty miles, and is
on an average about ten miles wide. It is reached
from Gandamak by a sudden descent from an eleva-
tion of 5,000 feet to one of 2,000. The description
Its Natural Features. 35
of the change given by the Emperor Baber has been
often quoted: — "The moment you descend you see
quite another world. The timber is different ; its
grains are of another sort ; its animals are of a
different species ; and the manners and customs of
its inhabitants are of a different kind." It is possible
to leave the wheat harvest in progress at Jalalabad,
and to find at Gandamak, only twenty-five miles
distant, that it is but a few inches above the ground.
" Here," exclaims one writer, " nature has planted
the gates of India. The valleys of the upper basin„
though still in the height of summer affected by a.
sun of fierce pov/er, recall the climate and products>
of the finest part of temperate Europe ; the region
below is a chain of narrow, low, and hot plains, with
climate and vegetation of an Indian character."
A narrow tract along the Cabul river is richly
cultivated ; beyond that on either side are barren
wastes up to the foot of the hills, where village life
and cultivation again appear. In April and May
this region is visited by the same fierce hot winds
that at this season prevail in the plains of India.
The Khaibar Pass leads from this central division
of the Cabul basin to its most eastern portion,
the plain of Peshawar, now British territory, but
formerly, along with Sindh, an* integral part of the
Afghan dominions. It has been conjectured that
down to a comparatively late date in the tertiary
36 Afghanistan,
period a great inland lake filled up the deep basin of
Peshawar, and even rose to a considerable height
along the sides of the neighbouring hills, being fed
by the Cabul and Swat rivers. It is supposed that
in course of time the outlet by which the lake
emptied its surplus stores into the Indus created a
deep gorge through the rocky barrier that hemmed
it in, and, step by step, the waters subsided to lower
and yet lower levels, until at length the whole valley
was drained of its overflowing flood, and became a
mere circular glen, traversed by the united stream of
the Cabul and the Swat, which had formerly filled its
whole expanse. Yet even to the present day many
signs of this primeval condition remain stamped
indelibly upon the face of the Peshawar basin. Its
bottom consists of a thick alluvial deposit, the relic
of its ancient lacustrine state ; and through the
yielding soil the rivers cut their way in numerous
divergent channels, which still recall the memory of
the almost forgotten lake. Especially in the rich
wedge of land known as the Doab {i.e., the tract
between two rivers) do these numberless minor water-
courses carry off and distribute the swollen current
of the great mountain streams, thus preventing the
possibility of inundation, and parcelling out the
fertilising waters to the green fields around. In this
way the Peshawar valley is freed from the danger of
those two ever-present and alternative Indian curses,
Its Natural Features. 37
flood and famine, which usually succeed one another
with such appalling rapidity during the wet and dry
seasons respectively.
The fertility of the valley is so famous that the rice
of Bara, grown along the banks of a stream bearing
the same name, has the reputation throughout India
of being food fit for princes.
The plain of Peshawar falls short of the Indus.
Its elevation is 5,000 feet lower than the plain of
Cabul, Peshawar itself being only 1,165 ^^^t above
the sea.
(II.) The Central Table-land is hardly more than
twenty miles wide at its northern extremity, where
it meets the plains of Maidan and the Logar river^
which lies between it and the basin of Cabul. It
widens in its length from N.E. to S.W., till at
Ghazni it is nearly one hundred miles across, and
this width is continued to its southern extremity,
near Candahar. Its greatest elevation is reached at
the Sher-i-dana Pass, north of Ghazni, and it slopes
down on the northern side from 9,000 feet, near
Ghazni, to less than 8,000 feet in the Maidan plain,
and in the south it sinks towards Candahar as low
as 3,500 feet. The variations of temperature expe-
rienced in this tract are, consequently, very great,
ranging from a cold climate in the north to a com-
paratively hot one in the south. Thus Ghazni is
very cold, and has a winter that lasts four or five
"38 Afghanistan,
months, during which hard frosts are experienced,
the ice in the pools attaining a thickness of several
feet even in a mild season. Candahar has, however,
a temperate climate, with only slight frosts, and
great heat in the summer, while the thermometer
often varies as much as 40° between sunrise and
three p.m. The rainfall here is small, and recourse
has to be had to irrigation, for which ingenious
methods are adopted. In the northern part good
crops of barley and wheat are obtained by these
means. The fruit of this region is considered in-
ferior to that of Cabul. In the middle and southern
tracts, occupied by the Ghilzais, a nomadic tribe,
there is little cultivation, and that only near the
large rivers, but pasture-grounds are numerous.
Near Candahar, on the banks of the Argandab,
wheat, rice, barley, and Indian corn are cultivated,
and orchards are plentiful.
(III.) The Upper Helmand Basin is the tract to
the north-west of the Central Table-land, and is the
least-known tract of Afghanistan. The Helmand
river (the classical Etymander) has its highest sources
in the Koh-i-Baba and Paghman Mountains, between
Cabul and Bamian. It exceeds the Cabul river in
length, and probably also in volume. Its upper
course is through the Hazarah country, and it is
believed that for a course of nearly 300 miles this
river has not been seen by a European. This un-
Its NatiLval Features. 39
known part of the river ends at Girishk, where the
principal route from Candahar to Herat crosses it.
From native sources of information it is gathered
that the Helmand, until about forty miles above
Girishk, has all the characteristics of a mountain
stream. It receives its chief tributary, the Argandab
(supposed to be the ancient Arachotus), about forty
miles below Girishk, and here becomes a consider-
able stream, 300 yards wide and 9 feet deep. It
continues fordable, however, to within 100 miles of
its mouth. In its lower course the left bank is
within a mile or so of the desert with its moving
sands, but the vegetation on the banks is luxuriant.
Cultivation seems to have fallen off from what it was
in former times, the lower outlet appearing to have
been the seat at some more or less remote period of
a flourishing population.
Following generally a south-west course from its
source till it enters Seistan, the Helmand there
turns nearly northwards from a point situated a
little to the north of 30° north latitude, and con-
tinues to flow in that direction to its outfall by
several mouths in the lake of Seistan or Hamun
(the ancient Aria Palus). The whole length is
about 700 miles.
(IV.) The Lower Helmand Basin extends from
the road leading from Girishk to Farrah on the
north to the desert of Baluchistan on the south and
40 Afghanistan.
south-east. On the west the plain of Seistan is its
boundary, part of this plain being now included in
the Persian kingdom. _
(V.) The Basin of the Herat River lies between ^
the Hazarah country on the east, and the Ghurian
hills in Persian territory on the west. The Hari-rud
or Herat river rises in the lofty Hazareh country,
not far from the source of the Balkh river. For
more than lOO miles its course is westward, at a
height of many thousand feet above the sea. It
then descends rapidly in the same direction to Aoba,
where it begins to be used for irrigation. About
sixty miles beyond this place it flows past Herat,
at a distance of three miles south of the city. The
Candahar road crosses the river near Herat by a
masonry bridge of twenty-six arches. Numerous
deep canals are here drawn off. The river turns
north-west below Herat, and rapidly decreases in
volume, owing to the immense stores taken from it
for irrigation. It flows past Sarakhs, having pre-
viously received the Tejend or Mash-had stream,
but accurate information of its further course is
wanting. In a recent map the Tejend-rud (or Tejend
river) is given as the main stream, into which the
Hari-rud falls at Agha Derbend, fifty miles south of
Sarakhs. Beyond that town a conjectural north-
west course is indicated for the point of stream of
at least 250 miles, and it is made to end in a lake
Its Natural Features. 4^
called Lake Tejend, about fifty miles south of the
ancient bed of the Oxus, on the borders of the
Turkoman desert.
The plain of Herat is of considerable extent, and
is covered with fortified villages, orchards, gardens,
vineyards, and cornfields. The heat is excessive for
two months, but the winter is cold, and snow falls
in great quantities. South of Herat is the plain of
Sabzawar, thirty miles long and twenty wide, and
partly cultivated. This plain and the Anandara to
the south of it are watered by the Harut-rud, and
the canals drawn from it. This river, besides
receiving a considerable affluent, the Khushkak, or
Khushrudak, forms a true delta with fifteen branches.
The Harut-rud has a course of about 250 miles to
its outfall in the Lake of Seistan. It has been
confounded with the Hari-rud, or river of Herat,
which has led, perhaps, to the long-prevalent mis-
take that the latter flowed south into the Seistan
Lake.
(VL) The Eastern Portion of the Table-land is very
little known, as it has been rarely visited by Euro-
peans. It is believed to be little cultivated, and to
be occupied by nomadic tribes, of whom the Ghil-
zais in the north, the Kakars in the south, and the
Vaziris in the east, are the principal. The Gomal
river drains the northern part, but rarely reaches the
Indus except in times of flood. This region may be
42 Afghanistan.
said to extend from the Suliman Mountains to the
watershed between the tributaries of the Indus on
the east and the Helmand on the west respectively.
This watershed is a ridge about i,ooo feet above the
table-land, and is known by several names, such as
the Jadran Mountains in the north, and the Kohnak,
Kand, and Kapar Mountains in the centre and south.
(VII.) The Northern Moimtain regions of the
Hazarah and Eimak occupy, together with the Koh-
i-Baba, the whole country between 34° and 36° N. lat.,
and between 6^"" and 63° E. long., covering an area
of about 50,000 square miles. The climate of the
northern part is very severe on account of its high
elevation, and the Hazarahs are obliged to cut great
quantities of grass for their sheep, which, during
three months of the winter, are generally housed
under the same roof with their owners. The country
of the Hazarahs has an average elevation of 10,000
feet. In the Eimak country the elevation of the
mountains is less, and the general level is also lower.
During the heats of summer pastures are sought here
by the Durani tribes, who come up from the plains
below, where all the grass is completely burnt up
in that season.
(VIII.) The Southern Table-land is the tract be-
tween the Khoja Amran range and the Mari and
Bagti Mountains, and consists of the valley of the
river Lora, and the country of Thai. This, river
! Its Natural Features. 43
I . ,
from the Pishni valley westward is unknown, and,
j although it is usually considered to belong to the Hel-
I mand basin, it has not been ascertained that its waters
ever reach that river. It rises near the Kand and
I Joba peaks in an offset of the Suliman Mountains,
I and flows westward. The greater part of the Khoja
i Amran range is unknown, as, indeed, are the upper
i courses of the Arghasan and Kadani streams, which
i join the Dori, a confluent of the Argandab.
' Besides these main natural divisions of Afghanistan
Proper, the Khanates of Afghan Turkestan and
Badakhshan are included in the Afghan dominions,
1 as the former are subject, and the latter tributary,
to the Amir of Cabul. Afghan Turkestan includes
I the Khanates of Kunduz, Khulm, Balkh, with
j Akcha ; the western Khanates of Sir-i-pul, Shibrghan,
j Andkhui, and Maimana, which are known as the
I " Four Domains " (Chiliar Wilayat) ; and such of the
t Hazarah tribes as lie to the north of the Hindu Kush
and the Paropamisan chain. This tract includes the
whole southern half of the Oxus basin, from the
I Kokcha to the Murghab river.
Between the district of Swat and the dependencies
; of Badakhshan and Kunduz, and in the heart of the
I hill-country beyond the Indian frontier, lies the in-
teresting tract called Kafiristan, or the land of the
! Kafirs (the term used by Muhammadans for all who
I have not embraced Islam). Roughly speaking, it
44 Afghanistan.
may be defined as the country that lies on the eastern
slopes of the Hindu Kush, from the Valley of
Panjkir, near Cabul, and as far north as Mastoj and
Chitral, or Kashkar.
RIVERS.
The chief are the Cabul, Helmand, Harut, Hari-
rud, Gomal, and Lora, with their tributaries, which
have, perhaps, been sufficiently described in the pre-
ceding pages.
The Kuram river rises in the Safed Koh Moun-
tains, and drains the southern slopes of the Salt
Range. The upper part of its valley is known as the
Bangash-i-bala, or Upper Bangash, and the lower,
part descends gradually to the Indus, forming the,
plain of Bannu. This plain, as well as the tract
called Danian, which lies south of Bannu and to the
east of the Suliman Mountains as far as Mittan-Kot,
is included in British territory.
The rivers of Afghan Turkestan and Badakhshan :
are mostly tributaries of the Oxus, which forms the
boundary of these provinces as far as Khoja Salih
ferry. The Kokcha, or river of Badakhshan, is
famous for the mines of lapis lazuli in its neighbour-
hood. The Kunduz river has its chief source in the
Bamian stream, and just where the latter receives a
confluent from the Hajihak Pass, extensive ruins
are found, the name of which, Zohak, connects
Its Natural Features. 45
them with the most ancient legends of Persian
history.
I The Khulm, Balkh, and Murghab are the other
[chief rivers of this part of the Afghan dominions ;
land they have numerous tributaries. The last is
known to reach Merv, and is then lost in the desert.
LAKES.
I Besides the Lora Hamun, the name given to the
(lake in which the Lora river is supposed to end, a
'small part of the Lake of Seistan or Zarah is
iincluded in Afghanistan ; and there is also a salt
!lake called the Ab-i-istada (standing water) on the
'Ghilzai plateau. This last is about forty miles in
icircuit, and very shallow, nowhere, perhaps, exceed-
ling twelve feet in depth. The chief feeder is the
iGhazni river, but the waters of the lake itself are so
isalt and bitter, that fish entering them sicken and
jdie. The dreary and barren aspect of the shores of
this lake is said to rival that of the shores of the
Dead Sea.
j PROVINCES AND TOWNS.
I The present political divisions of Afghanistan are
not known with accuracy, but they probably consist
pf Cabul, Herat, Ghazni, Candahar, Jalalabad,
Afghan Turkestan, and the Hazarah division.
Besides Cabul, Herat, Ghazni, Candahar, and
sjalalabad, there are few places of such importance as
46 Afghanistan.
to deserve the name of towns. Istalif, Charikar,
Kala't-i-Ghilzai, and Girlshk, are all places connected
with our former occupation of Afghanistan, at some
of which British troops were stationed.
Farrah and Sabzawar, in the west, are places of
some importance, from a military point of view.
Zarni, to the east of Herat, is noted for the ruins in
its neighbourhood, supposed to be those of the
ancient capital of Ghor, the seat of a monarchy
which supplanted the Ghaznavites, and obtained
extensive dominion in the twelfth and thirteenth
centuries. The rule of the Ghori Kings extended
at one time over Khorasan, Afghanistan, Sindh, and
Lahore.
Kunduz, the capital of an old Khanate, is a
mere collection of mud huts. Balkh, the ancient
Bactra (of which no certain trace remains), is now
entirely deserted for another site, Taktapul, eight
miles east of the old city. Akcha, the capital of a
recently-conquered Uzbek Khanate, is a fortified
town, with a citadel.
The chief towns in the "Four Domains" are
Shibrghan (12,000 inhabitants), Andkhui, Maimana,
and Sir-i-pul.
Having now completed our rapid survey of the
natural features of Afghanistan, we pass on to con-
sider the climate, productions, and commerce of the
country, which form the subject of the next chapter.
CHAPTER II.
AFGHANISTAN— ITS CLIMATE AND
PRODUCTIONS.
Variations in Climate — Mineral Wealth — Vegetable Kingdom — Agriculture
— Irrigation — Animal Kingdom — Domestic Animals — Industry and
Commerce— Trade Routes — Povindahs,
CLIMATE.
The diversity of climate found in Afghanistan, of
which frequent mention has been made in the pre-
ceding pages, is due to difference of elevation rather
than of latitude. So severe are the winters at
Ghazni (7,730 feet) that the people stay in their
houses nearly all the winter. Indeed, if tradition Is
to be credited, the entire population has perished in
former times from severe snow-storms. On the
other hand, the summer heat, except in the very
elevated parts of the Hindu Kush and other high
mountains, is everywhere very great. The south-
western portion of the country is exposed during the
summer to a deadly hot wind, which renders the
whole country a sandy and almost uninhabited
desert. Ferrier says that at Herat the wind blows
48 Afgha7iistan.
constantly from May to September from the north-
west, and its violence is equal to prostrating houses,
uprooting trees, and other similar devastation. The
summer heat in the province of Candahar is intense,
and in Seistan almost unbearable. The rains of the
south-west monsoon reach the eastern border of the
Afghan table-land, but owing to the distance from the
sea they are scanty, and last only for a month, from
the middle of July to the middle of August. They
do not extend beyond Jalalabad in the valley of the
Cabul river, but they fall at the head of the Kuram
valley. They are not experienced to the west of the
Suliman range.
In the higher regions the summer is dry, rain
not falling from May to September or October,
and being rare in November.
The winter rains are the most considerable, and
are accompanied with falls of snow, while sleet falls
with the spring rains in the valley of the Cabul river.
Herat is credited with a milder climate, the most
agreeable, it is said, in Asia. The temperature, says
Ferrier, rarely exceeds 91° to 93° (Fahr.), and was
never more than 98° while he was there. The
winter, too, is so mild that only in one year out of
four is there enough ice to enable it to be stored.
The Emperor Baber, speaking of the extent to
which change of climate can be obtained near Cabul
by change of place, says that at one day's journey
il
Its Climate and Productions. 49
from that city you may find a place where snow
never falls, and, at two hours' journey, a place where
snow never melts !
Some local climates are much lauded by the
Afghans for healthiness and comfort, such as the
Toba hills and some valleys of the Safed Koh range
of mountains.
PRODUCTIONS.
I The knowledge we have of the geology of Afghan-
' istan is meagre ; but there seems reason to believe
, that the mineral wealth of the country is great,
j although little utilised. Dr. Lord, who was with the
army of occupation in 1839, remarks that antimony,
I iron, and lead are found in the Ghorband valley,
, and marble quarries in the hills near Maidan.
I According to a Russian authority, the hills south-
jwest of Cabul and the Hazarah districts are the
I richest in mineral wealth.
> Gold (on the same authority) is found in the
I rivulets of Paghman, in the rivers Cabul, Kunar,.
land their tributaries. The principal places where
Igold is washed down on the Cabul river are said to-
be Jalalabad and Michni ; on the Kunar, Chachar-
Bag, Peshat, and Kirch. It is believed that all the
jrivers coming from the western side of the Hindu
iKush are auriferous. Silver, formerly mined in large
jquantities in Kohistan, is now only gathered in the
I 4
50 Afghanistan.
valley of Ghorband. Lead occurs in the Hazarah
district north of Candahar, and in the Ghorband
valley. Of copper, there are large quantities in the
Gal Koh hills, in the territory of the Jaguri tribe of
the Hazarah. Here there is also antimony, which is
also met with north of Candahar, and in the Khaibar
hills. Sulphur, saltpetre, and salammoniac may be
dug out of the Ghorband and Jaguri territories.
Iron is abundant along the western slopes of the
Hindu Kush. There are mines in the valley of the
Panjkora, and in the hills west of Bunnu, whence the
article is exported to India. Iron works also exist
in Badakhshan, near Faizabad, and in Southern
Cabul, near Kaniguram. The iron, being entirely,
smelted with charcoal, is highly valued in the;
.adjoining countries. ]
Coal is said to be found in places between theii
Upper Kuram and the Gomal valleys. Nitre is.
abundant in the soil, all over the south-west of
Afghanistan, and affects the water of the subter-
ranean canals, called " Karez," which are made for
purposes of irrigation. Salt is found in ample
quantities in the Salt Range, a chain of low hills
that do not rise more than 2,000 feet above the leve!
of the Indus, and extend from its western bank
W.N.W. to the Suliman Mountains, which theji
touch a few miles south of the Safed Koh. Th(
chief workings of this rock-salt are at Kalabagh, oi
Its Climate and Productions. 51
the Indus, whence it is exported to different parts of
Upper India.
VEGETABLE KINGDOM.
From Dr. Bellew's interesting Journal, and other
works, an exhaustive account of the distribution of
vegetation on the mountains of Afghanistan can be
obtained. Vegetation is almost entirely absent from
the distant and terminal prolongation of the great
mountain chains ; but there is abundant growth of
forest trees, and, indeed, every form of vegetation on
the main ranges and their larger off-shoots.
i On the Safed Koh and its immediate branches, we
have abundant growth of large forest-trees, at a
{height of 6,000 to 10,000 feet, among which are
j enumerated Cedrus deodara, Abies excelsa, Pimis
\longifolia, P. Pinaster, the edible pine, and the larch.
The yew, hazel, juniper, walnut, wild peach, and
almond are also found. Under these grow the rose,
jhoneysuckle, gooseberry, currant, hawthorn, rhodo-
idendron, and a greensward of the richest kind. The
lemon and wild-vine are commoner on the northern
[mountains.
i I Down to 3,000 feet the wild-olive, rock-rose, wild-
[ privet, acacias, and mimosas, barberry, and zizypJms
ire met with. To the eastward ChanicBrops, Big-
tonia, shisham, Salvadora persica, verbena, and
icanthus are found. The scanty vegetation on the
4—2
52 Afghanistan.
terminal ridges is mostly herbal, with rare and
stunted shrubs ; but many of them are naked rocks.
Ferns and mosses are confined to the lofty ranges. j
The rue and wormwood found among the low
brushwood of the dreary plains south of Herat are
used as domestic medicines, the former for rheu
matism and neuralgia, the latter in fever, debility
and dyspepsia, as well as for a vermifuge. The rue
owing to its nauseous odour, is believed to drive awa)
evil spirits.
Planted by the hand of man are such trees as th(
mulberry, willow, poplar, ash, and plane, found onb
in cultivated districts. The gum-resin of Westeri
Afghanistan (Candahar and Herat) is a valuabL
article of commerce, being used in India as a coi
diment. Edible rhubarb is mentioned as a gre;
luxury. It grows wild in the hills, and is eaten bot^
raw and cooked. Sanjit and salep are names of a
edible fruit and root exported to India. Th
pistachio-nut is found in the extreme north. Musi
rooms and similar fungi are largely consume(
There are two kinds of manna sold ; one, tnranjbi,
is taken from the camel-thorn and dwarf tamarislj
the other, sar-kasht, from a tree called " black-wooci
(siyah chob) by the natives.
The fruit of the mulberry-tree, of which there a J
as many as twelve varieties, is ground into a flor,
and forms an important article of food in the countj''
Its Climate and Productions. 53
near the Hindu Kush. Some individuals possess as
many as 10,000 trees. A tree of the best kind will
sometimes bear 800 lbs. of mulberries, and taking a
third of this as the average produce, a larger popu-
lation could be supported by it than by tillage. Silk
is not produced to any great extent, and only in a
few places.
AGRICULTURE.
So far as is known, the land belongs to local chief-
tains, who, while letting it to vassals, themselves have
to pay a tribute to their suzerains. Only on the
well-watered banks of rivers and canals, where agri-
culture attains to some degree of perfection, is the
land owned or rented by individuals. Pastures are
always the common property of the clans, steppes
being considered nobody's property. Like all other
rights and personal possessions, title-deeds are worth
but little in Afghanistan. Everybody's hand being
against everybody, landed proprietors are frequently
expelled, or else expelling others, to transfer them-
selves to fresh scenes. Some emigrate to neighbour-
ing Khanates, and by dint of the strong arm manage
to establish themselves on ground belonging to
another clan.
Speaking generally, there are in Afghanistan, as
in India, two harvests, the spring {babarak) sown in
October and reaped in April, consisting of wheat,
54 Afghanistan.
barley, and lentils ; and the autumnal (tirmai), sown
in April or May and reaped in September, of which
rice, millet and vorghum, maize {Phaseolus Mu?2go)y
tobacco, beet, and turnips are the chief crops. The
higher districts have, however, but one harvest-
In consequence of the difference of climate in
various parts of the country, agriculture is by no
means the same thing in the north as in the south.
In Cabul the land is well-watered by canals, and very
fertile. In the valley of the river Cabul, from the
Khaibar hills to the capital, there is no barren,
unproductive soil. Arable land in those parts is so
extremely valuable that — a rare thing in Afghanistan
— it is amply provided with roads. There are here
plenty of ariks or open canals, not to speak of the
underground rills, artificially laid down in some
parts. These water-courses are constructed by the
Government or village authorities, or by charitable
individuals wishing to confer a benefit upon their
neighbours. In the case of Government waterworks,
a tax has to be paid for their use ; whereas, village
canals are frequently the joint property of the
community.
The kind of subterranean canal called " Karez,"
which enables the water of a hill or rising ground
to be brought out at its foot in a rivulet, so as to be
disposed of at the pleasure of the cultivator, is
common in the tracts to the south of Ghazni, where
i
Its Climate and Productions. 55
the rainfall is small, and the rivers of small volume.
The mode of their construction is thus described : —
At the spot where it is wished that the water shall
issue, a well is dug ; and above it, in the acclivity,
another is made at the distance of five to twenty
yards. Other wells are made above at similar
distances from each other, the highest being made
the deepest, so that its bottom may be slightly
above the level of that of the one below, and so on.
When as many wells have been thus made as the
farmer can afford, or thinks necessary, a subterranean
passage is burrowed from the lowest, joining the
bottom of each well, and the water rushes forth in
such force sometimes as to be able to turn a mill.
Some of these Kai^ezes extend to two or more
miles — a celebrated one near Ghazni, ascribed to
Sultan Mahmud, being said to be thirty miles long,
including offsets.
In the Kafiristan Mountains agriculture ascends
to a considerable height, wherever an arable plot is
to be found. In other parts, where corn cannot be
sown, the hills are planted with fruit trees in terraces.
The harvest in these parts principally depends upon
the amount of rainfall.
South of the Safed Koh hills, in the district of
Kuram, agriculture is confined to the valley of the
Kuram, which in some parts is twenty-two miles
wide. In this valley, as in all other valleys of East
56 Afghanistan.
Afghanistan, there Is a stony ledge of ground at the
foot of the hills unfit for agriculture. The moun-
tains have plenty of arable land that cannot be
cultivated for want of rain or wells. Still, further,
south, in the district occupied by the Mahsud Waziri
tribe, the cultivated land forms only two or three
per cent, of the entire area ; the rest being barren for
want of water. The few fields there are close to the
rivers, where they enjoy the benefit of an occasional
inundation.
The Logar and Ghazni districts, in the far west Oj
Cabul, are well cultivated, and supply corn to the
whole Principality.
In Candahar, from the source of the river Tarnal<
(a tributary of the Argandab), to the capital, the'
country offers but scanty opportunity for agriculture
Fields, as a rule, follow the river- bank in narrovi
strips, or sometimes cluster round water-courses
mostly subterranean in those parts ; nor is the lowe
valley of the Tarnak much more productive. A
more cheerful aspect is offered by the Helmanc
valley, having fields and gardens to about a mik
and a-half to two miles on either bank, as far as th(
Seistan Lake. South of the Helmand, the deser
appears rather unexpectedly. North of the river;
however, stretching away to the hills, it is here anc
there studded with villages surrounded by oases witl
artificial irrigation.
Its Climate and Productiofts. 57
Herat, possessing a good soil traversed by several
rivers, is considered the most fertile part of the
plateau of Afghanistan. Here the harvests are
uniformly good, yielding forty-fold. The district of
Ghorband is the storehouse of the country ; and such
is the superabundance of land, that where corn might
be grown cattle are frequently pastured. Every
now and then the country is the scene of Persian
warfare, which prevents the development of agri-
culture.
Seistan, the jbasin of Lake Hamun, and of the
deltas of surrounding rivers, is a plain intersected
by low ridges. Two-thirds of the surface is sand,
the remaining third being alluvial soil, capable of
high cultivation, but mostly occupied by tamarind
trees. The delta of the Helmand, with its many
parallel water-courses, is very fertile, and wholly
under the plough. The fields are here separated by
quick-set hedges ; the harvests are abundant, and
much is exported.
Of the Turkestan Khanates under Afghan control
Balkh is the most productive, thanks to its extensive
system of irrigation. Notwithstanding political
troubles, and the consequent decrease of the popu-
lation, Balkh still yields enough to supply some of
the neighbouring Principalities. The valley of
Kunduz, though fertile, is swampy, and has an
unhealthy climate, compelling people to live in the
5 8 Afghan is tan .
hill districts. All attempts at agriculture have failed,
colonists invariably succumbing to malaria.
There is a deal of arable, well-irrigated ground in
the other Khanates; but they are too frequently
exposed to war and robbery to permit of the labour
of the husbandman. In all these parts plenty of
good land lies fallow.
The agricultural produce of Afghanistan is very
various. Wheat, maize, barley, and millet form the
principal food of the population. Rice requiring
much water is only planted in the valleys of the
tributaries of the Indus, in Kunduz, Balkh, and some
localities of Herat. Every variety of fruit known
in Europe grows well, the rhubarb being especially
fine. Indeed, fruit is one of the great staples of food
in the country, and a principal article of exportation.
The Cabul valley gardens are famous for peaches,
apricots, cherries, apples, pears, pomegranates, figs,
and quince ; the Jalalabad valley has also lemons
and dates. The white mulberry-tree is found every-
where ; the other species with red fruit is also
there. It has been mentioned already that the mul-
berries themselves are dried, ground into flour, and
made into cakes, either with or without corn-flour.
Pistachio-nuts are grown in such quantities in the
neighbourhood of Maimana that they are exported
in caravans to Persia and Bagdad. It is a pecu-
liarity of the climate that ^all these excellent comes-
Its Climate and Productions. 59
tibles get ripe at a considerable altitude. Pome-
granates flourish at 4,500 feet above the sea, while
apricots ascend to 8,000 feet, and mulberries to 9,000
feet. Grapes are plentiful, and the making of wine
is a chief branch of industry, especially in Kafiristan.
Considerable quantities of grapes are dried and
eaten as raisins. Some sorts are gathered before
they are ripe, and exported to Bombay, and other
parts of India. In Herat a special tax is imposed
upon the manufacture of wine, which can only be
carried on by Government licence. Tobacco is
much grown and used. The three most approved
growths in East Afghanistan are the Candahar,
Balkh, and Mansurabad, of which the last is the
best. In Herat there :are two tobacco harvests in
the year, the first being accounted the best. There
is little cotton produced in the country, except in
j the Bangash district, near the Indian frontier ; but
I this, too, is indifferent in quality and quantity. Of
I other plants we may mention the madder, in Can-
I dahar and Ghazni, much employed for dyeing
! woollen cloth, and also exported ; Indian hemp used
I in brewing a narcotic beverage ; a species of rhu-
j barb, producing oil for lamps ; assafoetida, a shrub
i encountered everywhere, but more especially in the
I south, from which pitch is extracted. This pitch,
I used in Afghanistan for medical purposes only, is
frequently exported to India. A decoction made
6o Afghanistan.
from the young leaves is drunk by the Afghans and
Baluchis in Seistan.
ANIMAL KINGDOM.
The tiger is found in the north-eastern hill
country. The leopard, panther, hyaena, the wolf
(said sometimes to attack single horsemen in the
wilder tracts), wild dog, and small Indian fox are
more or less common. Bears of two Himalayan
species are met with. Wild sheep, Indian deer,
especially the bara singha, the wild hog, and the
wild ass, are found. No elephant or rhinoceros
has been traced within many hundred miles of
Afghanistan ; but they formerly existed in the
Peshaw^ar plain. Only one species of bird is known
to be peculiar to the country ; but vast numbers
of birds of Indian and desert forms flock to
it in the breeding season. Among reptiles a
tortoise peculiar to Afghanistan has been dis-
covered. Our knowledge of the zoology of the
country is confessedly fragmentary and imperfect
in the extreme.
Of domestic animals the most important are the
sheep, of which there are two kinds, both having the
broad, fat tail, which in some parts of the Eimak
Mountains is said to be of such a size that a small
cart is put under the tail. They are the chief pro-
perty of the Hazarah and Eimak tribes, who live
Its Climate and Productions. 6i
chiefly by selling wool and woollen stuffs. The
sheep on the mountains give two fleeces, the spring
one being coarser than the autumn one. Mutton is
the principal animal food of the people. The goats,
generally of a black variety, seem to be of an
inferior breed, except in the higher ranges of the
Koh-i-Baba and Paropamisan Mountains.
Cattle-breeding here, as in the steppes and hills
I of Russian Asia, requires in this climate a frequent
I change of pasture. Thus the Ghilzae, Afridi, and
j other clans pass the summer in the Safed Koh hills,
j descending for the winter to the plain of Candahar
I and the Indus valley, and sometimes crossing the
! frontier into British territory. The Baluchis noma-
I dise in summer near the river Helmand ; but in
I autumn, with the first frost, may be seen wandering
1 to the southern steppes, where water is found only at
j that season. Excepting in the Cabul valley, cattle
I breeding is carried on in all parts of Afghanistan by
I a nomad population, living side by side with the
j sedentary and agricultural inhabitants. The nomads
i rarely apply themselves to agricultural pursuits. Of
\ the domestic animals, camels, dromedaries, and a
I cross between the two, are used for riding and
\ draught, as well as for the milk and butter they
yield ; their flesh is only eaten by the very poorest.
! The clan Gesarai, living in the hills where camels are
I of little use, value them, however, for their wool.
62 Afghanistan.
Cabul has few camels, and only a cart-horse sort of
horse. The species of horse called yabu is em-
ployed for draught in the hills. A finer breed is seen
among the Hazarahs, in the Khanate of Maimana.
In the south, the breeding and sale of horses are
almost exclusively in the hands of the Baluchis ;
but a peculiarly valuable kind introduced by Nadir
Shah from Persia is only met with among the Afghan
tribe.
The cows of Candahar and Seistan are said to give
very large quantities of milk.
Dog-breeding is pursued with advantage, owing
to the favourable climate.
The so-called " Persian " cats in reality chiefly come
from Afghanistan.
INDUSTRY AND COMMERCE.
The industrial products of Afghanistan are con-
fined to a little silk, chiefly used in domestic manu-
facture ; carpets from Herat, some of which are soft,
brilliant, and durable, and pass in India for "Persian"
carpets ; felts and woven goods made from the wool
of the sheep, goats, and Bactrian camel ; sheep-
skins ; and rosaries made from chrysolite.
The manufactures of Afghanistan include a list of
the simplest trades of semi-civilised life, such as
jewellers, gold and silver smiths, sellers of armour,
sellers of bows and arrows, sellers of glass ornaments
Its Climate and Productio?is. 63
for women, confectioners, tobacconists, embroiderers,
and such like. To these are added a few booksellers
and bookbinders. The inhabitants of the Eimak and
Hazarah Mountains do not export their wool, but
manufacture it into carpets, grain-bags, rugs, &c. As
there are few, if any, navigable rivers in Afghanistan,
nor any wheeled carriage, the mode of conveyance of
goods is by beasts of burden, chiefly camels, though
mules and asses are largely used in the mountainous
districts. The principal trade of India with Western
Asia and Europe has from time immemorial been by
sea ; yet large and valuable caravans at one time
carried Indian products into Persia, Turkestan, and
China by the four lines of communication that pass
through or near Afghan territory. The most northern
leads from Leh in Ladakh to Yarkand in Chinese Tur-
kestan, and is the most difficult and dangerous. The
second passes through Lahore, Peshawar, the Khaibar
Pass, to Cabul, where it divides into two roads, one
passing over the Bamian and other passes Into
Afghan Turkestan, and the other running through
Ghazni to Candahar, where it meets the two southern
lines. These last are divergent portions of the
third line which passes through the Gomal Pass
from Dera Ismail Khan, and divides on the table-
land into two roads, one running to Cabul and the
ther to Ghazni and Candahar. The fourth road
Ibegins at Karachi, follows the Indus to Shikar-
64 Afghan i stall .
pur, diverges thence to the north-west, and passes
through the Bolan Pass into the valley of Shal. It
continues through Ouettah to Candahar. From Can-
dahar the joint road passes westward across the
Helmand, through Farrah, Sabzawar, and Herat, to
Mash-had in Persia, and thence to Teheran, the
capital. From Herat to Merv and Bokhara is another
trade route. The Syads of Herat, who are large
horsedealers, used to carry on a considerable trade in
slaves, getting their chief victims from the Hazarahs,
whom they sold to the Turkomans. A large traffic
in wool has of late years sprung up from the regions
west of the Indus, some millions of pounds being
annually shipped from Karachi, the port of Sindh.
The Povhidahs, a class of merchants that are the
representatives of the oldest Asiatic traders, carry
on traffic between India, Khorasan, and Bokhara,
by means of long strings of camels and ponies
banded in large, armed caravans. They battle their
way twice a-year between Bokhara and the Indus,
bullying, fighting, evading, or bribing the hostile
and marauding foes in their path. It is interesting
to observe how these ancient traders accommodate
themselves to modern conditions of commerce.
They cannot pass armed through British territory,
so they quietly deposit their weapons at the Indus.
Leaving their camels and families in the plains of
the Panjab, they take their goods by rail to the
Its Climate and Productions.
great cities of Hindustan, and even penetrate as far
as Bombay and Rangoon. In March they return to
their families, and back again to the Ghilzai Table-
land, whence they despatch caravans again to Cabul
Bokhara, and other cities in Western Asia.
CHAPTER III.
THE PEOPLE, LANGUAGE, LITERATURE, AND
ANTIQUITIES OF AFGHANISTAN.
The Afghans, Pathans, or Pushtanahs— Division into Tribes— Non-Afghan
Population — Estimated Population — Russian Account — Supposed
Jewish Origin — Kafirs — Sir John Kaye's Description of the Afghans
— Language and Literature — ^Judicial Institutions — Military System —
Russian Account of the Afghan Army — Antiquities.
Although the country derives Its name from the
Afghans, these people are but a portion — barely
half, it is conjectured — of the total inhabitants.
According to some authorities, the name Afghan is
not applied to any tribe by its own members ; but
the better opinion seems to be that the Afghans, or
Pathans, or Pushtanahs, as they are variously called,
include a large number of tribes, of which the most
important are the following : —
(i.) Diiraiii or Abdali, to which Ahmad Shah
belonged. They dwell in the south and south-west.
(2). Ghilzai, the strongest and bravest, said to be
identical with the Khiliji dynasty of Delhi kings of
the tenth and eleventh centuries.
(3.) Yusiifzai, a turbulent race, dwelling partly in
People, Language, a7td Antiquities, Gy
the British district of Peshawar, and partly as an
independent tribe in the hill country north of the
Khaibar.
(4.) Kakars, chiefly Independent, in the south-east
of Afghanistan, near Baluchistan.
The non-Afghan population consists of numerous
tribes, among which the Tajiks and KadbasJds
include the most industrious of all the inhabitants of
Afghanistan. The Hazarahs are supposed to be of
Mongol or Mughal origin, and pay tribute to the
Afghans only when compelled. These people are
said to be notorious for loose domestic morals, like
the ancient MassagctcB who occupied their mountains.
They are found all over Afghanistan as menial ser-
vants, and are, or were, often sold as slaves. Einiak
is the name given to a nomadic tribe dwelling near
the Hazaras. Hindkis, or people of Hindu descent,
\Xats, and Bahichis, are names of other tribes. Colonel
IMacgregor makes the following estimate of the
population : — •
Afghan Turkestan ...
Chitralis and Kafirs ...
Emiaks and Hazarahs
Tajiks
Kazlbashis ... ...
Hindkis and Jats
Kohistanis
Afghans and Pathans (including 400,000
independent Yusufzais, &c.) 2,359,000
642,000
150,000
400,000
500,000
150,000
500,000
200,000
4,901,000
5-:
68 Afghanistan.
The Russian Military Department sets down the
total population of Afghanistan at 6,000,000, oc-
cupying an area of 10,000 geographical square miles.
The sparsity of the population on this estimate may
be concluded from the fact that Germany on the
same area supports over 40,000,000 people. An
attempt has also been made by the Russian Military
Department to estimate the population of each pro-
vince and district, but as these figures are admittedly
conjectural to the last degree, we will not burden our,
pages by quoting them.
The very elaborate account of the races and tribes
which has been published by the same department
deserves more attention. It states the number of
distinct races to be nine — Afghans, Tajiks, Kazlbashis,
Hazaris, Usbeks, Hindus, Jats, Kafirs, and Arabs.
The Afghans are said to number about 3,000,000,
and to be divided into five tribes, and these again to
be subdivided into 405 clans (khail), each of which
includes numerous families. Of the 405 clans, 277
call themselves Afghans, and the remaining 128 pre-
fer the patronymic of Pathan. All boast of deriving
their descent from the Ten Tribes of Israel, their owr
chroniclers calling the Afghans Bani-Israel (Arabic
for Sons of Israel). They claim to be the offspring
of King Saul, through a son whom they ascribe tc
him named Jeremiah, who again had a son namec
Afghana. The descendants of Afghana were, accord
People, Language, and Antiquities. 69
ing- to the legend, removed by Nebuchadnezzar, and
found their way to the mountains north of Herat.
They embraced the faith of Muhammad, by their
own showing, nine years after the prophet's announce-
ment of his mission. The earliest written statement
of this story dates from the sixteenth century. We
cannot enter at any length into the arguments which
have been advanced in favourof the Jewish origin of the
Afghans. The most weighty appears to be the facial
resemblance they bear to the Jews ; but this is shared
by the inhabitants of Cashmere, the Tajiks, and other
Asiatics.
Though spread over the whole country, the bulk of
the Afghan population live in the eastern and south-
eastern provinces, being inveterate mountaineers, and
preferring the lofty hills on the Indian frontier to any
i more profitable and convenient residence. Of those
1 living in the adjoining valleys some are in the
I habit of nomadising on British territory part of the
I year.
' The principal clans in the north-east are the
! Shijivari, north of Cabul, almost independent ; the
; Tarkalanai, in the south-western basin of the
(Panjkora, capable of sending 10,000 men into the
i field ; the Yttsiifzai, divided into two branches,
(having separate khans and about 70,000 fighting
jmen, whose country has already been indicated ; the
I Utman Khels on the left bank of the Cabul river,
70 Afghanistan.
who muster 10,000 fighting men ; and the Upper
Momunds.
South of the Cabul river in CabuHstan and the
Panjab hills, lining the Indus valley, the Tarnokhi
muster 6,000 fighting men. The Afridi, the most
numerous of the border tribes, spending the greater
part of the year on the Cabul hills, and descending
only in summer into the Indus valley, glory in the
possession of 15,000 armed men. To them belong
the Khaibar and Shinvari people, famous for their
martial and savage characteristics. Protected by the
Khaibar hills, they are entirely independent, and
receive from 10,000 to 20,000 rupees a year from
the Cabul Government as a consideration for allow-
ing caravans to pass. Some thirty years ago there
Avere counted some 20,000 armed men in and near
the Khaibar Pass. The Khaibar men are divided
into many sections, each of them having a separate
Khan and refusing to acknowledge any superior
authority. Among the more prominent branches of
the Afridi, the Jawaki, the Zaka-Khel, the Galli, and
the Adam Khail deserve to be mentioned. The
Lower Momund (12,000 armed men) occupy the
south-western corner of the district of Peshawar.
The strip of land separating the British districts of
Peshawar and Kohat takes its name from the
Khattak, who, notwithstanding their 15,000 warriors,
lead a pacific agricultural life. The Orakzai inhabit
mA\
People^ Lajiguagey and Antiqidtics. yi
the Ganga valley south-west of Kohat, and the
Tirak valley. West of them there are the Bangash,
in the valley of the Miranzai and part of the Kuram
valley, within the boundaries of Cabul. South of the
Kuram valley, between the districts of Bannu and
Tank, the country is infested by the robber tribes of
' the Batani (5,000 fighting-men), living partly on
English, partly on Cabul territory. The Suliman
' hills (Takhti Suliman, Anglicc the Throne of
^ Solomon), in the south-eastern extremity of Af-
I ghanistan, harbours the three martial brotherhoods
j of the Shirani, Ushterani, and Kazrani. The
I Shirani, 10,000 armed men, make constant inroads
into the valleys, and up to the pacification of the
1 country by the English were the terror of the whole
l«region. They live in the direction of Dera Ismail
iKhan. The Kazrani have about 5,000 rifles and arc
I less warlike.
West of these, and still included in the Cabul
frontiers, there is the extensive district of Daur,
reaching from the river Gomal to the river Kuram,
and inhabited by the Vezir people, divided into the
three branches of the Makhsud, the Vezir in the
south, the Derveshkhel in the centre, and the
Kabulkhel in the north. The Vezir are a powerful
and independent race, mostly nomads, leading a
I pastoral life, staying in the hills in summer ; the
•winter entices them down to the Indus valley.
72 Afghanistan.
Their principal centres are the towns of Kaniguram
and Makin. The upper valley of the Kuram is in-
habited by the Turi and Jaji, of the Pathan division
of the people. Further down the valley we meet
with a portion of the Zaimakht, whose principal
mass reside south-west. The mountainous district of
Khost, south of the Kuram, is the property of small
hill tribes — the Driplara, the Drikuti, Mattun, Gurbus,
Torzai, and others.
The powerful clan of the Ghilzai or Ghilji, with
numerous sub-divisions, are the owners of the Kilat-
i-Ghilzai region. Their southern frontier is formed
by the Durani country, which extends to Candahar.
In the environs of Candahar and Ghazni there are
also the Ashaksai and Nurzai, and others whose
territories are less clearly divided.
Of the branches of the Afghan people living in
the western parts of the kingdom we know but little.
The most numerous are the Berduran. The Barak-
zai to whom belongs the Khan, have 60,000 families,
and accordingly are one of the strongest Afghan
tribes.
Next to the Afghans, the Tajiks are the most
numerous race in the country. They are the
aboriginal element in the Western Provinces, and,
being a sedentary people, are called Tajik — i.e.,
peasants, in contradistinction to the Turk or warrior.
They are now divided into a sedentary portion call-
People ^ Language, and Antiquities. 73
ing themselves Parsivan or Parsi Zuban (that is,
Persian speaking), and nomads known as Eimaks.
The latter wander about in the hills surrounding the
upper basin of the Hari-rud, and are mixed up with
the Turkish tribes who immigrated under Jengis and
Timur. Of these mixed tribes we know the Char
Eimak, the Jamshedi, the Firoz Kuzi, Taimuni or
Tegmuni, and the Zuri. Cognate to them are the
Timurs, formed by Timur Shah out of the heteroge-
neous mob of his camp towards the end of the last
century. The Taimuns are settled in the three
districts of Teivere, Darya Dere, and Devaza, each
having a separate Khan. Up to 1844, when the
ruler of Herat transplanted 45,000 to the country
adjoining his capital, they were estimated at ic,ooo
souls. The Taimun territory is situated on the
i southern declivity of the Sakh Kug hills, and was
! anciently called Gur. The Zuri is an insignificant
I clan. The Firoz Kuzi formerly lived further west in
I Persian Khorasan, but were transferred by Timur to
j their present settlement in Herat. They are now
: divided into five branches with five chiefs living in
: the forts of Kades, Darzi, Kuche, Chicharan, and
1 Daulat Yar, situated in the upper valleys of the Hari-
: rud and Murghab. Kades was subjugated in 1844 by
the Hazarah, but the other branches remained inde-
i pendent. The Zuri and Jamshedi, formerly potent
and respected, now occupy the small territory in the
74 Afghanistan.
Murghab, to which they emigrated in the heroic period
of Persian history. Their Khan resides at Bala
Murghab, whence many raids are undertaken into
neighbouring lands. The sedentary portion of the
Tajiks are numerously represented only in Cabul
Kohistan, in the valleys of Ghorband, Panjshir, and
Nijaur, where they amounted to 40,000 families at
the beginning of this century. They are warlike,
almost entirely independent, and divided into small
fraternities under the direction of special Khans.
The Tajik branch in Logar, 8,000 families strong, is
distinguished for its bravery. In the other parts of
Afghanistan the Tajiks are more or less mixed up
with the Afghans, living sometimes in Afghan
villages, sometimes in separate colonies, under the
direction of Ketkhuds or Elders. In these parts
they have no landed property, but rent land from the
Afghans, and altogether occupy a very inferior posi-
tion. In the towns they are a gentle, hardworking
race, and take to trades which the Afghans despise ;
in the villages they are justly famous for the excel-
lence of their husbandry. Many of these Cabul
Tajiks serve in the Anglo-Indian forces, where they
are called Turks, and enjoy a good character. The
Tajiks also form the original population of the
Badakhshan region, where they are divided into the
three groups of Raman, Shagnan, and Vashan. John
Wood regarded the Chitral and Kafir people also as
People, Language, and Antiquities. 75
Tajiks ; but these being undoubtedly of different
extraction, the Persian origin of the Badakshan
Tajiks must appear very problematic.
The third race are the Kazlbashi, transferred by
Nadir Shah from Persia to Cabul in 1737. They are
a medley of Persians and Turks, of the Jevanshir,
Afshar, and Muradshahi tribes, who speak Persian,
I and, indeed, are Persian in every respect. They have
i an influential colony at Cabul, and are accounted the
best-instructed part of the population.
j The Hazarah, according to some, are Mongols,
I introduced by Jengis Khan ; according to others,
} Turkish Usbeks of the Berlas tribe, formerly noma-
I dising near Shazhrisab. Timur in the year 799 of
! the Hijra despatched a thousand families of this
I tribe to the valley of Badgis, on the Upper Murghab,
1 where they were called Hazarah, or " Thousanders.'
I Thence they extended as far as Cabul on the east,
1 and Herat on the west. Their division into tribes and
I clans is very complex, and they are most of them
I nomads and independent. The Eastern sections of
1 the race owe allegiance to Cabul. Their clans have
! separate Khans, and are in perpetual feud with each
} other.
I The Usbeks, of the Kutagan tribe, are the dc-
I scendants of the Turkoman conquerors of Afghan-
; istan, and the ruling clement in the Khanates north
of the Hindu Kush.
76 Afghanistan.
The Hindus belong to the Kshatra or warrior
caste, are 300,000 strong, and live chiefly in the
towns.
The Jat, also about 300,000 strong, of unknown
origin, are probably aborigines. They are scattered
over the whole country.
The Kafirs, or Siyahposh, about 150,000, live on
the slopes of the Hindu Kush, north of Cabul. Of
Caucasian type, their origin remains to be explained.
They are divided into eighteen clans. The Swat,
Chitrals, and Safi belonging to the aboriginals border
upon the Kafirs. They are said to number no less
than 500,000 souls.
The Arabs, known as Syads, or descendants of the
Prophet, form a compact mass in the district of
Kunar, in Northern Cabulistan. They are also found
dispersed over the other districts, like Armenians
and Jews.
The Afghan tribes frequently intermingle, and
increase or decrease in consequence of families
leaving their old associations to form new ties.
Wars and feuds frequently result in the forcible
transfer of tribes, or parts of tribes, to new localities,
when embodiment with other tribes usually ensues.
The tribes are least distinct in the towns. In some
of them only one-fifth of the population are Afghans,
four-fifths consisting of Tajiks, Hindus, Jews, Per-
sians, &c.
People, Language, and Antiquities. yy
The most densely-inhabited parts of the country
are the valleys of the Cabul and Kuram, with their
tributaries. In the wastes that occupy a consider-
able portion of the southern provinces, people crowd
round the rivers, leaving the rest of the country
empty. The regions bordering on Baluchistan are
the least inhabited. The inhabitants live mostly in
villages, isolated tenements being rendered impos-
sible by the frequent wars. The villages, always
large and surrounded by walls, frequently — espe-
cially in Northern Cabul — have up to 3,000 houses.
The inhabitants are almost exclusively Sunnis, the
Hazarah and Kazlbashi alone being Shiahs. The
small number of Armenians in the country profess
Christianity.
The Kafirs follow a nondescript religion, having
some affinity to Hinduism, but none whatever, as
some have supposed, to Christianity. Their proper
name is Siyahposh (the "black-legged," from their
wearing leggings of goat-skins), and they are men-
tioned by Strabo under the name of %t Ba^.
Ethnologically they are a most interesting race,
having a considerable resemblance to Europeans,
j and some have supposed them to represent the
original Aryan inhabitants of Afghanistan and the
regions of the Hindu Kush. The Kafir women are
said to be as beautiful as the men are handsome ; but
! before a young man is allowed to marry he
y8 AfgJiaiiistan.
is required to furnish proof of having slain a
Mussulman.
The Kafirs, however, seem well disposed to the
English, and a recent writer says : " The Kafirs look
to us as kinsmen and natural allies ; but the moun-
tainous tracts of Buner, Swat, and Bajour forbid
intercourse, and in the far valleys of Kashgar and
of the Kunar river there yet rages the blood feud
caused by past wrongs inflicted and received between
the idolatrous Kafir and the fanatical Mussulman."
Sir John Kaye has left an eloquent description of
the Afghans as they were at the beginning of the
century, and they have probably altered very little
in character since that time. " The people," he tells
us, " were a race — or a group of races — of hardy,
vigorous mountaineers. The physical character of
the country had stamped itself on the moral con-
formation of its inhabitants. Brave, independent,
but of a turbulent, vindictive character, their very
existence seemed to depend upon a constant succes-
sion of internal feuds. The wisest of them would
probably have shaken their heads in negation of the
adage — * Happy is the country whose annals are a
blank.' They knew no happiness in anything but
strife. It was their delight to live in a state of
chronic warfare." It has been said that every
Afghan is more or less a soldier or a bandit. The
very shepherds carry their matchlocks ready for an
I
People y Language, and Antiquities. 79
affray or a robbery at any moment. It may seem
strange that pastoral and predatory habits could
thus be blended : but, so it is, " the tented canton-
ments of the sheep-drivers often bristle into camps
of war."
It is but fair to say there is a brighter side to the
picture. Outwardly grave, they are of a cheerful,
lively disposition, and this, notwithstanding their
long beards and sober garments. They are fond of
children, and delight in listening to the longest
stories, however improbable or romantic. Their
generosity and hospitality have been often described.
They will entertain strangers without grudging,
and their deadliest enemy is secure if he comes
beneath their roof. The simplicity of their courtesy
is refreshing when contrasted with the polished
insincerity of the Persian, or the fierce arrogance of
the Indian Pathan. Their respect for truth and
honesty would not be great if judged by a
Christian standard, but is striking as compared
with some of their Asiatic neighbours. They treat
their dependents with kindness and consideration,
and are rewarded by fidelity and zeal in service.
There is little of the tyranny seen in other Eastern
countries towards the inmates of the Zanana and
domestic slaves. They care less for learning than
|for manly exercises, and simplicity takes with them
the place of wit and eloquence.
8o Afghanistan.
Summing up his description of Afghan poHtics in
the time of Zemaun Shah (1800), Sir John Kaye
says — " The history of the Afghan monarchy is a
history of a long series of revolutions. Seldom has
the country rested from strife ; seldom has the sword
reposed in the scabbard. The temper of the people
has never been attuned to peace. They are impa-
tient of the restraints of a settled government, and
are continually panting after change. Half a cen-
tury of turbulence and anarchy has witnessed but
little variation in the national character, and the
Afghan of the present day is the same strange
mixture of impetuosity and cunning, of boldness
and treachery, of generosity and selfishness, of kind-
ness and cruelty, as he was when Zemaun Shah
haunted the Council Chamber of Calcutta with a
phantom of invasion ; and the vision was all the
more terrible because ' the shape thereof ' no one
could discern."
The vernacular of a large part of the non-Afghan
population is Persian, and this is familiar to all
educated Afghans. But the proper language of
the Afghans is Pushtu or Pukhtu, an Aryan or
Indo-Persian (not Semitic) dialect. The oldest
known work in Pushtu is a " History of the
Conquest of Swat," by Shaikh Mali, chief of
the Yuzufzais, and leader in the conquest (A.D.
1413-24). Their literature is rich in poetry, Abdur-
People, Language, and Antiquities. 8i
rahman (seventeenth century) being the best known
poet.
Major Raverty has made us acquainted with
some specimens of Afghan poetry, which convey
the idea of deep feeling. Most of it is of the
mystical kind so familiar in Persian literature, by
which spiritual meaning is hidden in very worldly
similes. In the hills to the north, among the Kafirs
and other independent and semi-independent tribes,
dialects more approaching the Sanskrit type are
found.
The judicial institutions of the Afghans are
rude in the extreme. The functions of judges in
riminal cases are discharged by the popular
^assemblies of the tribes, assisted by Mullahs or
uhammadan priests. Minor offences are punished
by the village elders. The Muhammadan law has
of course general authority, but there is a special
:ode of peculiar Afghan usages, known as Pushtun-
Wali, which has the force of law. In towns we
,ind the courts of the Muhammadan judges called
Kazis, aided by the Muftis. The Amir-i-Mah-
';ama is a kind of chief clerk and treasurer, and
he Darogha superintends the whole proceedings.
ustice, however, is a commodity to be bought
ery largely here, as in other Muhammadan
ountries.
We have heard a good deal lately of the large
6
82 Afghanistan.
standing army of Shere Ali, the present Amir.
According to some authorities, he has 60,000 men in
the field. This is not improbable, seeing that it was
believed that Zaman Shah, at the beginning of the
century, could collect 200,000 men round his stan-
dard for any national object. Of the constitution of
the Afghan army our information is necessarily im-
perfect, but a part of it, at any rate, is modelled on
the European system, as far as drill, dress, and
equipments are concerned.
Of their arms we have good reason to know
something, as the best of them are probably the
rifles, Enfield and Snider, supplied to the Amir by
former Viceroys of India, to the number of 20,000,
with ammunition, as well as a field-battery of
guns. The chief difficulty the Afghans have had
in using European weapons has been, it is said,
from their inability to manufacture percussion-caps
for them, and their importation through British
India has been prevented by the Indian Govern-'
ment. Native arms are the formidable "jazail,"
or long-rifled matchlock, with which an Afghan
can hit a mark at 800 yards, the sword or knife, and
shield.
The following more detailed account of the military
strength of Afghanistan, extracted from the records
of the Russian Central Staff Office at St. Peters'
burg, was supplied to the Times by its Berlin corre-
People y Language, and Antiqidiies. 83
spondent in October, and seems to deserve quoting at
length : —
" Afghanistan is portioned out among many semi-
independent tribes, each of which has a separate ruler
and a standing army.
" Cabul and Candahar have a considerable regular
force, consisting of infantry, cavalry, and artillery.
The greater part of these troops is distributed over
rural garrisons, and under the control of the local
governors. The regular Cabul force, which does
not seem to have been increased in the thirty years
intervening between 1838 and 1868, is as follows : —
Infantry (Jazailchi), 2,500 men ; regular cavalry,
3,000 ; irregular cavalry, 10,000 ; artillery, 45 guns.
Besides these, there were, in times of peace, one
regiment of infantry at Candahar, one regiment at
Ghuznee, one regiment and five guns at Kala-i-
Ghilzai, one regiment of infantry, one of rifles, and
I five guns at Kuram, and a force of full 10,000 men,
! with three batteries, at Balkh. The regular troops
are maintained and reinforced by conscription, irre-
[gulars being called in as time and circumstances
'require. In Cabul, the troops receive pay and pro-
visions, a practice which can hardly be said to obtain
with any degree of regularity in the provinces. The
infantry are armed partly with matchlocks, partly
with excellent modern rifles, the gift of the British
iGovernment. They also carry swords and daggers.
i 6-2
84 Afghanistmi.
The Jazailchis, or rifles, are armed with long solid
muskets, rested on a forked support when firing,
while the cavalry boast a large variety of weapons.
The infantry are, many of them, arrayed in cast-off
English uniforms, bought up by special agents of the
Cabul Government at Peshawar and Sindh. Some
regiments wear uniforms of European cut, made of
Afghan cloth — the coats are brown, the trousers
white. The troops quartered in country towns
generally live upon the people. All the Afghan
troops endeavour to imitate the Anglo-Indian forces
in their tactics, drill, and commissariat service ; but
in this respect the success of the Cabul military
is small in comparison with that of the Herat
men.
" The Herat regular force was originally organised
by Sultan Jan, and consists of five regiments of
infantry of 500 men each, five detachments of
cavalry, one in each district, of 450 men each, and
eight guns. The whole forms a total of about 5,000.
Young men of the peasant class are liable to con-
scription at an age when they may almost be regarded
as children. The cavalry being the more national
force, its recruits are supplied by the district
authorities. There is a Commander-in-Chief, subject
to the personal commands of the Sovereign. The
artillery is under the direction of a special commander,
the Topchi Bashi. The regiments are divided into
People, Language, and Antiquities. 85
companies. Officers' titles are taken from the English
army; the Jarnal, Koronel, and Midjar answering
respectively to the General, Colonel, and Major.
The Sovereign has a special adjutant called Adjutant
Bashi, a post occupied in the days of Sultan Jan by a
Russian ensign. Prince Vatchnadse. Discipline is
exceedingly strict. Commanders have unlimited
power, and may kill subordinates with impunity.
The soldiers live in special houses with their families,
and receive pay, food, uniforms, and arms from the
Government. The cavalry, too, get pay from the
Government, but have to find their own arms and
horses. The infantry are provided with flintlocks,
modern rifles, the crooked Afghan sword and daggers,
from I ft. to 1 1 ft. long. The uniform is of light
sky-blue cotton, after the English pattern, with ample
folds, stand-up collar, and metal buttons. The
trousers are of white cotton, very tight and short.
They wear a sort of slipper on their naked feet, black
Persian hats when on duty, and red flat hats in un-
dress. In the case of recruits these hats are yellow.
All the difl'erent regiments wear the same uniform.
The cavalry are distinguished by the national Afghan
dress, and armed with pikes, matchlocks, daggers,
and crooked swords. Drill, as a rule, is entrusted to
Anglo-Indian deserters, and carried on in accordance
with English rules. There is a great deal of regi-
mental service going on, with a fair degree of success
86
Afghanistan.
in tactics and manceuvring capacity. The word of
command is given in English.
"The small Usbek Khanates in Northern Cabu-
listan also have standing armies, the strength of
which some time ago may be seen from the following
list :—
Infantry.
Men.
Maimana .
Shibrgan
Aktcha
Balkh
Khulm
Kunduz
Cabulistan-
Navasai
Lendai Sind
Dyar
Babusi
loo
1,500
IG,000
500
400
500
Cavalry.
Artillery
Horses.
Guns.
1,500
—
2,000
—
200
—
2,500
—
200
50
200
10
6
13
All these troops are liable to take the field at the
summons of the Amir of Cabul, their feudal lord and
sovereign. In addition to these regulars there is a
militia — a numerous force in a country, every male
inhabitant of which is ready to take up arms at a
moment's notice. As was proved in 1839, one-eighth
of the entire population may be assembled, fully
equipped, and sent out with the utmost despatch.
By the side of the general levy there is a special
militia, called Defteri, whose members have their
names registered in time of peace, and are in receipt
of a small salary, or a certain quantity of corn, or
People, Language, and Antiquities. 8/
else enjoy the free use of canal water. The strength
and division of the mihtia is the subject of the
following table : —
Horse. Infantry.
Cabul ... ... 21,000 10,000
Candahar ... ... 12,000 6,000
Herat ... ... 8,000 10,000
Lash (Siestan) ... 500 5,000
Khulm ... ... 8,000 3,000
Balkh ... ... 2,500 1,000
Sir-i-pul 2,000 2,000
Kunduz ... ... 2,000 —
Aktcha ... ... 200 —
Andhkui ... ... 1,800 600
Shibrgan ... ... 2,000 500
Maimana ... ... 1,500 1,000
Gesaraiz —
Seidnat ... ... 4,000 —
Pusht Kug 5,000 3,000
Yekikholin ... ... 1,000 300
Desansji ... ... 400 1,200
Siir Jingeli ... ... 500 800
Firuz Kugi ... ... 3,750 6,400
Kiptchak ... ... — 400
Taimun 1,200 10,000
Total ... 77,350 61,200
138,550
" Almost every town and village in Afghanistan is
surrounded by a brick wall, and may be easily con-
verted into a defensive position. There is also a
large number of small towers distributed over the
country, for the protection of passes, ravines, and
village grounds. Some of these towers, thanks to
88 Afglianistan.
their advantageous situation, are formidable enough
to check the march of European troops, though none
could hold out against a regular siege.
" The most important fortress in the western parts
is Herat, enclosed within a square wall, each side
4,200 feet in length. The wall is of brick, thirty-five
feet high, and stands on ground artificially raised.
It is protected by a moat, and on two sides by a
glacis, constructed by the English in 1838. Six
gates, defended by brick towers, lead to the city.
There is also a citadel, Chagar Bagh, in the south-
eastern corner of the city, likewise built of brick.
The town is provided with water by the Hari-rud
river. Farrah, another fortress near the Persian
frontier, is built on the same plan as Herat, but only
half the size. The walls of this place are of a very
solid sort of brick. Farrah protects the road from
southern Persia to Afghanistan.
" Northern Afghanistan is defended by the fort of
Maimana, situated on a small river, in a mountainous
region. Its wall is five feet thick and 12 feet high.
The moat is shallow.
** On the eastern frontier there is Jalalabad, a place
of respectable strength, but now abandoned. The
citadel of Cabul is Hkewise a strong place, and acces-
sible only by a winding path. The citadel can hold
out against a prolonged siege, and commands the
town, which has no walls.
People, Language y and Antiquities. 89
"In the interior of Afghanistan the most important
fort is Ghazni, the citadel of which was accounted
unconquerable before its capture by the English.
Candahar is a large but weak fortress, being com-
manded by adjacent heights. The place has no
glacis and an insignificant moat. It is easy to cut
off the water supply. The citadel occupies the
northern part of the town.
" All the important roads of Afghanistan lead from
east to west, and are merely tracks, without the
slightest attempt at assisting nature. In the more
open parts, however, they are serviceable for vehicles
and field artillery. Taking Herat as a starting point,
we have a whole network of roads leading respec-
tively to Mash-had, Merv, Maimana, Candahar, and
Siestan."
ANTIQUITIES.
Under this head we have only room for a brief
notice of two or three of the more celebrated " relics
of the past."
The first of these are the caves of Bamian. Up to
the present day we have no complete description of
them, nor, as far as we know, any careful drawings
of the objects ; but when they have been properly
described and photographed these remains at Bamian
will probably rank as wonders in celebrity with the
Rock-cut Temples of India, or the Pyramids of
Egypt. There are some slight accounts of the place
90 Afghanistan.
in more than one writer, from which we may gather
some idea of the archaeological remains at this
spot. It is about eighty miles in a straight line to
the north-west of Cabul, and is on the direct road
between that town and Balkh, and in one of the
principal passes leading to the valley of the Oxus.
The high road from Bactria to India went through
this Pass, and it was on the line of conquest in the
time of Alexander. In the Pass there is a high
cliff of rock, extending for some distance, and the
whole face of the rock is perforated with a multitude
of caves. These are all excavated, and have
galleries of communication and stairs, also exca-
vated, so that the rock resembles a piece of sponge,
and have been compared with the City of Caverns
at Inkermann. In addition to the caves there are
two niches hollowed out in the face of the scarp, and
in these niches the rock has been carved into two
enormous figures about ico feet high. There is a
third and smaller figure which has no niche ; some
projecting mass of rock has been cut away, and the
figure left standing out into the valley. As we have
no exact date to go upon, it cannot be said as yet
whether these figures existed or not when Alexander
with his Macedonian hosts went past. Certainly
these figures must have looked down on many con-
querors as they went on towards the Indus. In our
own period a battle was fought in the valley under
People, Language, and Antiquities. 91
these figures, between Dost Muhammad and Brigadier
Dennie, on the i8th September, 1840. Later still
another battle took place between the sons of Dost
Muhammad, when they were fighting for the throne
after his death.
The Greeks who went with Alexander reported
that they had seen the Cave of Prometheus in the
Paropamisus, or the Indian Caucasus, and some
writers conclude, as the geographical position suits
the theory, that this report must have been founded
on the caves at Bamian, and that they existed at
that time. The Hindoos ascribe them to the "Panch
Pandu Ke Bhai," or the Five Pandu Brothers, who
are something like the Cyclops of the Greeks or
giants of the Northern nations, and get the credit of
all gigantic works. There is a long ridge of rock
like a petrified serpent, the origin of which is thus
described : — According to the Hindu legend, Arjuna,
one of the five brothers, went out walking, and when
about four miles away he found on his path a snake
of huge dimensions and of dreadful shape. It
attempted to swallow up Arjuna, but he struck it
dead at the first blow, cutting it into two halves.
The stony monster is still to be seen, and still re-
sembles a serpent, with water flowing through it.
This is, no doubt, some old aqueduct connected
with the water supply of the place, to which the story
has been tacked on. The Muhammadans call the
92 Afghanistan.
two principal figures Lat and Manat, and identify
them with two idols, which have similar names, men-
tioned in the fifty-third chapter of the Koran.
These are only a few of the traditions which, as
might be expected, such a very remarkable place as
this has given birth to. The general impression is
that the ruins belong to the Buddhist period.
According to this theory, the caves were the cells of
a vast monastery of Buddhist monks. At Ajunta,
near Bombay, as well as at other places, there are
numerous caves of this description. Such places
are called Viharas, and every monk had his separate
cell ; while some of the larger caves were called
Chaityas, and in them they met as a congregation
for worship. From one or two slight sketches of
the colossal figures which have been brought home,
it is thought that a resemblance can be traced to
the style of the Buddhist figures found in the Pes-
hawar district, which seems to bear evidence of
Greek influence. If this theory of these caves and
figures being Buddhist should turn out to be the
true one, then, as Buddhism is not supposed to have
progressed so far north at the date of Alexander's
march upon India, the conclusion will be that they
did not exist at his time. Religious ascetics who
lived in the woods and in caves most probably
existed long before Buddhism, and it is quite pos-
sible that there may have been caves at Bamian at
People, Language, and Antiquities. 93
a very early period, and they might have originated
the story of the Cave of Prometheus. If we suppose
that the place had acquired a celebrity for holy
men, it would be exactly such a place which the
Buddhist monks would adopt for their Viharas ; and,
if they did this, they may have extended the caves
and produced the large figures, which, so far as we
can at present judge, seem to be figures of Buddha.
A few accurate plans of the caves and a careful
sketch or two of the figures would soon put this
point beyond dispute.
The following relic belongs to a later period of
Afghan history. The tomb of Mahmud still exists,
and the two celebrated minars of red brick are still
erect, but the mosques to which they belonged have
long since passed away.
The " Gates of Somnath " were supposed to have
been removed by Mahmud of Ghazni, along with
the other treasure of the temple, which he plundered
in the course of his last invasion of India. These
gates were of sandalwood, and were said to have
been placed on his tomb. This piece of history,
although dating as far back as the end of the tenth
century, was so well known over India that on our
troops having retrieved the reputation which was
supposed to have been lost in the Cabul disasters,
the gates on Mahmud's tomb were brought back by
the conquering army, and Lord Ellenborough's pro-
94 Afghanistan.
clamation pointed out to the Hindoos that these j
gates of their temple, which had been carried off as
trophies by Mahmud, we had again borne back as
trophies, and as visible evidence to the people of ^
India that our arms had triumphed, and that our
power was supreme. So celebrated was this event
at the time that Lord EUenborough was represented
in caricatures as a new Samson carrying off the
gates of Gaza. The military authorities who
brought these relics away had assumed that the
wooden gates on the tomb of Mahmud must neces-
sarily be the sandalwood gates of Somnath, but if
they had had only a very slight knowledge of Indian
art, these gates would most probably never have
been heard of. It was only when the political fuss
was ended and the gates were resting in peace,
that those who knew something of Indian ornament
began to inspect them, and declared, in spite even
of the Governor-General's proclamation, that they
could not possibly be the gates of Somnath. Those
who neither knew nor cared for art refused to accept
this judgment, but a microscope demonstrated that
the wood of which they were made was deodar pine,
and not sandalwood. That they are not the gates
of the old Hindu shrine is now an accepted point.
If the sandalwood gates ever really went to Ghazni
and ornamented the tomb of Mahmud, they must
have been destroyed at some time or other, and new
People y Language y and Antiquities. 95
ones had been made of deodar, a wood which grows
plentifully on the Safed Koh and the Hindu Kush.
The ornament upon them is so distinctly Muham-
madan that the wonder is no one with the avenging
army was able to discern the truth and point out
the inevitable conclusion.
CHAPTER IV.
ALEXANDER THE GREAT'S MARCH THROUGH
AFGHANISTAN ON INDIA.
Alexander's Army — Pursuit of Darius After the Battle of Arbela— Con-
quest of Parthia and Hyrcania — Founding of Herat— Conquest of
North-Eastern Afghanistan — Campaign in Bactria — Alexander an
Oriental Potentate— Marriage with Roxana— Crosses the Hindu Kush
into India— Campaign in India — Voyage of Nearchus from the Indus
to the Euphrates— Alexander's March Across the Desert of Baluchistan
— Greek Influence on the Oxus.
The first invasion of India from the West in histori-
cal times deserves more than a passing notice, as
exhibiting the vast difference in the conditions of
conquest which the inventions of modern times have
imported into the art of war. From the day
when Alexander, son of Philip, a youth not yet
twenty-two years of age, but generalissimo of the
armies of Greece, marched from Pella in Macedonia
to the conquest of Asia, his small, but highly dis-
ciplined army received no check in its steady course
of victory, till its own mutinous refusal to go further
made the great conqueror turn back from the banks
of the Satlaj. The army with which Alexander
set out, in April 334 B.C., numbered 30,000 infantry
The MacedoJiian Invasion. 97
and 4,503 cavalry. The historian tells us that the
smallness of this force must not be viewed as a
matter of vague wonder, seeing that one of the
three modes by which an invader may attempt
the conquest of a country is by " the movable
column, which throws itself into the heart of an
enemy's country, trusting to rapid success for
safety."
When we remember what this " movable column "
did, how for eleven years it marched over the greater
part of Asia west of the Indus — reinforced, it is
true, by fresh levies from Macedon, and absorbing
into its ranks many of the Greek mercenaries that
were found in Asia Minor — how, besides fighting
great battles against incalculable odds, it traversed
trackless deserts, crossed lofty mountains and mighty
rivers, and, moreover, founded cities which remain
to this day, it may be safely remarked that it did
what no movable column ever did before, has done
since, or is likely to do to the end of the world's
history.
The countries through which this army passed
from Macedonia to Babylon were, doubtless, not
unwilling to see in the youthful conqueror a deliverer
from the hated Persian yoke, and the terrible
examples which he set at Tyre and Gaza may have
had much to do with "securing his rear." The
moral effect of the battles of the Granicus and of
7
q8 Afghanistan.
the IssLis was enormous, so that distant cities sent
to announce their submission.
It is, however, with Alexander's most wonderful
marches that we have to do now, which he made
after the Battle of Arbela, in pursuit of the Persian
Monarch, whose last hope was thus broken ; and
afterwards in the conquest of his most outlying
provinces, those of Aria {Herat), Drangiana {Scistan),
Arachosia {CandaJiar), Bactria {Balkh), Sogdiana
{Saniarcand), to the confines of Scythia, beyond the
Jaxartes {Syr Darya), on the north, and of the
Gandaridae, beyond the Hyphasis {SatlaJ) on the
east. After the conqueror had come up with the
fugitive King, Darius, only to find him dead in his
chariot, transfixed by the spears of his satraps, who
wished to deprive the victorious invader of any
advantage he might have derived from the possession
of the Monarch's person as a prisoner, Alexander
rejoined his main army, and set before it the task of
subjugating the northern and eastern provinces,
beginning with Parthia and Hyrcania, to the east of
the Caspian. Thence he quickly passed into Aria,
and here he founded the city of Alexandria Ariorum,
the modern Herat. Reserving Bactria for his last
attack, he turned southwards into Drangiana
{Seistan), on the banks of the river Erymandus
{Helmand). His stay at the capital Prophthasia was
rendered but too memorable by the fate of Philotas
The Macedonian Invasion. gg
and his father Parmenio, whose death for alleged
treason followed upon the reports of some self-
laudatory speeches displeasing to their master which
they were said to have made.
Having spent the winter in completing the con-
quest of the provinces which occupy the north-
eastern part of the table-land of what is now
Afghanistan— during which time he founded two
more cities, Alexandria in Arachosia (probably
Candahar), and Alexandria ad Caucasum, about
fifty miles north-west of Cabul — he crossed the
Hindu Kush, while the passes were still covered with
snow. His soldiers, whose imagination had been
fed with the traditions of the Greek poets respecting-
Mount Caucasus, to pass which they deemed the
highest achievement of foreign adventure, either
conceived this range to be a continuation of that
cliain, or flattered their chief into the belief that it
was so by applying to it the title of the " Indian
Caucasus."
Alexander was now in Bactria, having crossed, in
all probability, by the Bamian, the only one of the
four principal passes over the Hindu Kush practic-
able in winter. Bessus, the last of the satraps to
yield, had crossed from Bactria, his own province,
which he was too weak to defend, into Sogdiana, on
the other side of the Oxus {Amu). Alexander
pressed on through the sandy deserts, amidst great
7—2
100 Afghanistan.
sufferings, to the most difficult river he had yet
crossed, and transported his army on their tent-skins,
filled with air and straw — a mode of transport which
is represented on the old Assyrian sculptures. After
the capture of Bessus and his punishment for the
murder of Darius had been decreed, Alexander gave
a proof of the growth of Oriental vices in his
character by the massacre of the Greek colony of the
Branchidae, in Sogdiana — the descendants of the
guardians of the temple of Apollo, near Miletus,
who had surrendered its treasures to Xerxes, by
whom they were removed to Sogdiana, out of reach
of the vengeance of the Greeks. Having taken
Maracanda {Saviai'cand), the capital of Sogdiana,
Alexander advanced to the Jaxartes {^Syr Darya).
On its banks he founded the most distant of the
cities that bore his name, Alexandreschata (probably
on the site of Khojend)^ near that which marked
the limits of the Empire of Cyrus, who had failed
in that attempt to subdue the Scythians, which
Alexander proposed soon to renew.
Returning for the winter (B.C. 339) to Bactria, or
Zariaspe (the modern Balkh), he was recalled to
Sogdiana in the following year, to put down a for-
midable revolt headed by the late Satrap Spita-
menes. It was after this successful campaign and
on his return to Maracanda, that the fatal banquet
was held at which the great conqueror, in a fit of
N
The Macedonian Invasion. loi
drunken passion, slew his bosom friend, Clitus.
The only relief which he could find from the pangs
of remorse at this act was in renewed action. For
a whole year the Sogdians, assisted by the ScythianSj,
carried on a desultory warfare with Alexander's in-
vincible army, during which it penetrated their
deserts and mountains, and subdued their fortresses,
until Spitanienes was slain by his Sogdian allies, and
his head sent to Alexander. It was at the famous
storming of the impregnable "Sogdian rock" that
the beautiful Roxana, the daughter of a Bactrian
chief, who afterwards became the first Asiatic wife
of Alexander, fell into his hands as a captive. The
marriage was celebrated with great pomp at Bactria,
and Alexander showed his progress towards Orien-
talism by attempting to exact the ceremony of pro-
stration even from his Greek followers.
With the return of summer Alexander left
Bactria to re-cross the Paropamisus {Koh-i-baba)
and subdue the still unknown lands of India.
That name appears but once or twice in ancient
history ; as a region that excited, only to disappoint,
the ambition of conquerors such as Semiramis,
Darius, and Alexander ; and chiefly known, after his
time, by the rich products by which it rewarded the
commercial enterprise which had its centre at
Alexandria. The India with which Alexander
made his brief acquaintance of a year or two, was
102 Afghanistan.
only the region so-called in the proper, but narrower,
sense of the name, the Land of the Indus and its
tributaries ; in other words, Sindh and the Panjab, or
country of the Five Rivers. The details of Alexan-
der's march through Afghanistan are full of interest
for the geographer, but are chiefly remarkable for the
historian, on account of the facility with which he
subdued the mountaineers, whose descendants have
proved so troublesome in our time. The campaign,
like his former passage of the Paropamisus, was
made in the depth of winter. Following the course
of the river Cophen {Cabid), he crossed the Indus
near Attock, and was met by the prince of the
country that lay between the Indus and the
Hydaspes {Jhilani), who came out to meet Alexander
with valuable presents, amongst which were twenty-
five war-elephants, and brought a reinforcement of
5,000 men. We would gladly linger over the recital
of Alexander's battle with Porus (said to be a corrup-
tion of the Sanscrit Paurnsha, a hero, and, therefore,
rather a title than a name of an individual), which
was fought on the left bank of the Hydaspes
{Jhilavi). The Indian King became a tributary to
the conqueror, who founded the town of Nicoea, to
commemorate the victory. The rest of the Panjab
was easily subdued. The swollen stream of the
Acesines {Chenab) was crossed on inflated skins ;
and the Hydrastes (Ravi) w^ith less difficulty. The
The Macedonian Invasion. 103
Cathoeans and other Independent tribes made some
resistance, but their capital, Sangala (probably
Lahore), was stormed ; 17,000 of the Inhabitants being
put to the sword, and 70,000 taken prisoners.
Alexander had now reached the farthest limits of
his conquests. At the Hyphasis {Satlaj) his ambition
was stirred afresh by the Intelligence that he could In
eleven days be on the great Ganges River, and meet
in battle the powerful nation of the Gandarldse. But
the soldiers of his army, even the officers, who might
have been supposed to share his longing for universal
conquest, refused to proceed further, and Alexander
wept, " not that there were no regions left to conquer,
but because he was at length made to feel the curb
which dependence on fellow-men Imposes on the
strongest will."
His return was marked by the same daring spirit
that had characterised his advance. Instead of re-
tracing his steps through what Is now called the
Khaibar Pass, he adopted the plan of following the
course of the Indus to Its mouth, and exploring the
shores of the Indian Ocean to the Euphrates.
Before leaving the Hyphasis twelve Immense
altars were built on Its banks to mark the
furthest limits of his progress, in Imitation of
-Hercules and Dionysus. At the Hydaspes he
was joined- by a reinforcement which had marched
from Europe, a fact which testifies to the wonderful
I04 Afghanistan.
tranquillity of his Empire. It should not be for-
Sfotten, too, that Alexander's double march across
the Panjab was performed during the rainy season.
It is difficult in these days to estimate the magni-
tude of the daring involved in that wonderful voyage,
on which Nearchus, Alexander's Admiral, now em-
barked. Nine months were occupied in reaching the
mouth of the Indus. The difficulty of the voyage
was enhanced by the barrenness of the shores along
which it lay, for navigation then was dependent on
communication with the land. He brought the fleet i
safely, however, to the port of Harmozia {Ornmz), i
where he landed to report progress to Alexander in
Carmania, and then returned to complete the voyage
to the Euphrates. He finally rejoined Alexander
on the Pasitigris, near Susa, about February, B.C. 325, •
having set sail from the Indus at the preceding 1
autumnal equinox. His reward of a crown of gold
was merited.
Meanwhile, Alexander with his veterans had been
accomplishing his celebrated march through the
deserts of Gedrosia {Baluchistan), in which he shared
to the full the terrible sufferings of fatigue and thirst
with his soldiers. The remainder of the march was
through his recently-conquered Persian provinces,
and appears to have been free from difficulty.
Although the outlying provinces of Alexander's
empire fell away in rapid succession after his death —
!
11
The Macedonian Invasion. 105
Bactria alone remaining a Greek kingdom as late as
B.C. 125, when it was overthrown by the Parthians,
who had previously shorn the empire of all the
other provinces beyond the Euphrates — a distinct
Hellenising influence pervaded these new Asiatic
kingdoms from the large intermixture of Greek
elements in their government, their population, and
their language. It would be beyond the limits
assigned to this work to enter further into this
interesting subject, but the materials are available for
its pursuit, and few fields of research are more
inviting. The visible material monuments of Greek
influence which are known to exist in these regions,
and those which still await discovery, may yet throw
much light upon the early history of the present
races that occupy the countries round the Oxus and
the valleys of the Hindu Kush and its connected
chains.
CHAPTER V.
AFGHAN HISTORY FROM MUHAMMAD TO
ZAMAN SHAH.
First Appearance of Afghanistan in Mediceval History— Arab Settlements
—Story of Kasim and the Rajput Princess— The Ghazni Monarchy
Founded by Alptagin — Invasion of India — Peshawar the First
Permanent Muhammadan Conquest in India— Sabaktagin— Plunder
of Somnath— Mahmud of Ghazni — Shahabuddin— Jengis Khan —
Timur or Tamerlane Invades Northern India— Babar Founds the
Mughal Empire of India— Nadir Shah Invades and Plunders the
Panjab— Ahmad Shah Founds the Durani Empire of Afghanistan-
Invades India — Battle of Panipat — Zaman Shah— Threatens to Invade
India.
We may date the appearance of Afghanistan in
mediaeval history from the forty-third year after the
Hijra,* or flight of Muhammad from Mecca to
Medina. The warriors of Islam, urged on by fana-
tical zeal on the one hand, and love of plunder on
the other, had quickly overrun Central Asia, and
in A.D. 664 had advanced to Cabul, while the inter-
vening provinces of Persia had been already brought
under the sway of the Arab Caliphs. We need not
attempt to trace the fluctuations of power that fol-
lowed the first Arab settlements in Afghanistan.
* A.D. 622.
Early Afghan History. 107
Suffice It to say that they resulted in the acceptance
of the Muhammadan faith, and a nominal, if not in
some instances an actual, submission to the central
Muhammadan government. The further extension
of Muhammadan power into Northern India did not
succeed beyond a temporary hold on Sindh by
Kasim early in the eighth century. This Kasim
was nephew of Hejaz, Governor of Basra {Bassorah)
and it is he of whom the story is related Avhich the
lovers of Eastern romance never tire of telling.
Two beautiful daughters of the Rajah Dahu having
fallen into his hands, Kasim despatched them as a
present to the Caliph's harem. Arrived at Damascus,
one of them, who had attracted the Caliph's gaze,
declared herself unworthy of his attention, owing to
her having been dishonoured by Kasim. In obe-
dience to the royal mandate Kasim was executed in
Sindh, and his body sewn up in a raw hide and
sent to the Caliph. When the body arrived at
Damascus the Princess admitted her falsehood, but
gloried in having thus avenged her father's death.
It may be doubted whether this legend is strictly
true ; but it is certain that, by Kasim's death or
recall, the Muhammadan power in Sindh was much
weakened, and, after a time, became a mere tra-
dition. Caliph Haroun-al-Raschid (to adopt the
traditional orthography) died in A.D. 806, and the
Arab Caliphate was not long in dissolving.
1 08 Afghanistan .
Khorasan and Trans-Oxiana became independen
under the Tahirites, or successors of Tahir, who had
successfully headed a rebellion.
To them succeeded the Sofarides, in A.D. 872 ; the
founder of this short-lived dynasty being Yakub,
brazier of Seistan. These gave way to the Samanisj
in A.D. 903, a dynasty which continued to exist in
Central Asia for 120 years.
The fifth prince, Abdul-Malik, possessed a Turki
slave named Alptagin, to whom he had committed
the high office of governor of Khorasan. In A.D.
961 he had to flee from the suspicious anger of his
patron's successor on the throne, and having escaped
with a iQ.\Y followers to Ghazni, an outlying province
to the south-eastward, flanked by the Suliman
Mountains, he made himself independent, by the aid
chiefly of the rude Afghan population of that region.
We have alluded elsewhere to the claim which
Afghan chroniclers have set up to a Jewish descent.
Apart from this tradition, the earliest account we
have of the Afghans is their establishment in the
east of the table-land, where they were found
efficient allies by Alptagin. The son of Alptagin,
who succeeded to the newly- erected throne of
Ghazni on his father's death in A.D. 976, died
(according to Farishta, the Persian historian) in less
than two years without issue, and Sabaktagin, who,
like Alptagin, had been a slave, but had risen to
Early Afgha?i History. 109
such favour as to be admitted to an alliance with
the daughter of Alptagin, was elected to succeed
the latter's son.
Sabaktagin, although bought by a merchant in
Turkestan as a slave, claimed descent from Yazda-
gird, the last of the Persian kings. His talent in
warlike enterprise, chiefly against the Indian tribes
on the Indus, had commended him to notice, and
gained him the throne.
He was not long in subduing Candahar, which he
annexed to his small kingdom of Ghazni, and then
set his face towards India. He invaded the Panjab,
took forts, built mosques, and carried off a large
booty, thereby setting the example which other
invaders of India never failed to imitate.
This was not suffered to pass without an attempt
at revenge, and we soon find an immense army —
the best of the Aryan chivalry — led by the Kings
of Lahore, Delhi, Ajmir, Kalinga, and Kananj,
assembled to resist the aggressive Ghaznavites.
Twice did a great Hindu army march across the
Indus. The first time a furious storm so disheartened
the superstitious Hindus that they sued for terms
instead of giving battle. On the second occasion
the Muhammadans were victorious, and took posses-
sion of the Valley of Peshawar, their first permanent
occupation of Indian territory.
Sabaktagin did not renew his attacks on India,
no Afghanistan .
and died in A.D. 997. His illegitimate son, Mahmud
of Ghazni, first defeated his legitimate brother,
Ismail, who had been nominated successor, and then
obtained the whole kingdom, which he enlarged to a
greater extent than had been done by Sabaktagin.
During his reign of thirty-three years, he made ten
great invasions of India, the last being directed
against the sacred temple of Somnath, to destroy
which seemed an act of great virtue to the zealous
Muhammadan Sultan, for he had assumed this title.
The Brahmins offered an immense sum if he would
spare the sacred temple, but he replied that he
wished to be known to posterity as *' Mahmud the
Idol-breaker," and not as the " Idol-seller." He him-
self struck off the nose of the idol, which was nine
feet high, and was rewarded for his religious zeal by
finding in its inside precious stones and pearls of a
value far exceeding what had been offered, and the
other wealth of the temple was immense. Invaders
in all ages have been rarely afflicted with twinges of
conscience in the matter of spoiling the temples and
palaces of the countries they honour with their
presence. The armies of even such civilised nations
as France and England found it impossible to resist
the temptation to plunder the royal palaces of Pekin.
We are aware that there are always excellent reasons
forthcoming to defend such acts in modern times,
and we veil the real motive of such deeds — the love
Early AfgJian History. iii
of plunder — by alleging the necessity of " reading the
barbarians a salutary lesson ;" " striking awe into the
enemy ; " and so on. We do not read that Mahmud
of Ghazni troubled himself to make any such hypo-
critical excuses for his very natural conduct. It is
said to his credit, however, that if he plundered
temples and murdered priests in the name of religion,
he committed no revengeful massacres or wanton
executions upon the people generally, or his prisoners.
" Tried by the slanders of his times," says the modern
historian, "Mahmud must be considered, on the
whole, humane, and his unquenchable thirst for
plunder is the worst feature of his character." At his
death, his dominions extended as far as Ispahan,
westward, and a great part of India owned his
supremacy. Altogether, he invaded India thirteen
times, but ten only of these inroads were of con-
sequence.
Mahmud's dynasty lasted till A.D. 1159, andwas
succeeded by the house of Ghor, which reigned in
Afghanistan till the death of Shahabuddin, in 1206.
For the events of this period, which are of the most
thrilling interest to the student of early Afghan and
Indian history, we must refer the reader to the works of
Elphinstone and other historians. We can here take
but a very cursory view of the period. After Shaha-
buddin's death, his successor, Mahmud, resigned India
to Kutb-ud-din, originally a slave, but subsequently a
112 Afghanistan .
great general, to whom the late monarch chiefly owed
his conquests in India. In 12 1 5, Tajuddin Elduz,
the successor of Mahmud on the throne of Ghazni,
attempted to regain his Indian dominions, but failed,
and was taken prisoner.
Meanwhile, in A.D. 12 17, the first echoes of the
name of Jengis Khan, the Mughal conqueror, after-
wards so dreaded throughout Western Asia, were
heard. He invaded the dominion of the Sultan of
Kharizm, overran the country, and penetrated as
far as Ghazni. His career of conquest did not,
however, extend to India. We cannot attempt to
follow in detail the course of Mughal conquest
during the next two centuries. In A.D. 1398, Timur
or Tamerlane, himself a Tartar, headed the most
famous, though by no means the first, Mughal inva-
sion of India, and was proclaimed Emperor of India.
He only remained, however, fifteen days in Delhi,
and then returned home, after a general and indis-
criminate massacre of the people.
From 1478 to 1526, an Afghan dynasty (Lodi)
reigned over Northern India, simultaneously with the
rule of the Mughals, descendants of Timur, at
Cabul, although their capital was at Samarcand.
The most celebrated of these last, Babar, sixth in
descent from Timur, invaded India in 1526, at the
invitation of a member of the Afghan family that
ruled at Delhi, and founded the Mughal dynasty of
Early AfgJian History. 1 1 3
India. On the death of Babar, Afghanistan, and the
whole of the Panjab, became a separate kingdom,
under his son Kamran. The history of Afghanistan
for the next two centuries is almost inextricably
mixed up with that of Persia and Hindostan, the
plains of Afghanistan being divided more or less
equally between these empires. To those, however,
who rejected a foreign yoke the mountains afforded
an asylum.
L In 1720, the Afghan tribes threw off their allegiance
to Persia, and, advancing into the country, took
Ispahan. In 1728, they were compelled to retrace
their steps by Nadir Shah, the celebrated usurper,
who followed up his advantage by occupying the
whole of Afghanistan, the western provinces of
which were still a nominal dependency of the Delhi
kings. "^
"^ Then followed Nadir Shah's invasion of India,
into the causes of which we cannot now enter.
Suffice it to say, that the Persian king surpassed
former invaders in the booty he obtained, carrying
off treasure valued at from ^T 9, 000, 000 to /;" 30,000,000
sterling, besides the celebrated peacock-throne, which
Tavernier valued at ;^ 6,000,000, but which other
authorities make to have been worth only ^^ 2,000,000.
The King's share was ;;^ 15,000,000. On leaving
Delhi, Nadir Shah presented Muhammad Shah, the
conquered Emperor of India, with his crown, and
8
114 Afghan is tan .
seated him on his throne ; but he annexed to his
own dominions all the western provinces of the
empire beyond the passes, together with Multan and
Sindh.
On the death of Nadir Shah, in 1747, an Afghan
officer, of the Durani or Abdali tribe, who had
obtained a high command in Nadir Shah's army,
united the Afghan tribes into a monarchy under
himself. He was young, ambitious, and capable;
and, mindful of the rich spoil India had recently
furnished, turned his attention to that empire. His
invasions were continued till the famous Battle of
Panipat, fought on January 7th, 1761, when the
Mahratta forces were completely defeated. Ahmad'
Shah did not assume the government of India, but
contented himself with his Afghan kingdom and the
Panjab. It may be noted that Clive had broken th
power of the Muhammadan ruler of Bengal at th
Battle of Plassy, on June 22nd, 1757, three and a^
half years before the victory of the Afghan king over!
the Mahrattas at Panipat. The foundation of the
British Empire in India may justly be dated from
Clive's famous victory.
Ahmad Shah died in 1773, and was succeeded by
an indolent and despotic son, Timur Shah, who left
his throne to his two sons, Humayun and Zaman
Shah. In the conflict for undivided rule which
followed, Zaman Shah was victorious.
Early Afghan History. 115
/ In 1798, Zaman Shah wrote to the Governor-
General of India, Lord Mornlngton, announcing his
intention of invading Hindostan, and claiming the
assistance of the English. At the same time Tippu
Sahib, the Sultan of Mysore, was urging Zaman Shah
to advance and join him in a crusade against all
infidels. Tippu was also in league with the French
Government, from whom he looked for assistance
against the English. Napoleon had landed in Egypt,
and Tippu looked forward to his rapid conquest of
that country, and anticipated a triumphant march of
the French conqueror across Asia into India, follow-
ing the precedent of the great " Sekandar," as
Alexander the Great is designated in India.
But we have now carried our necessarily brief and
imperfect review of Afghan history to the point
! where Afghan politics come into contact with those
I of the nations of Western Europe, and it will be
convenient to continue the narrative in another
chapter.
8—2
CHAPTER VI.
AFGHAN HISTORY FROM ZAMAN SHAH TO THE\
EVE OF THE FIRST AFGHAN WAR.
Zaman Shah Advances to Lahore — Panic in British India — Review of jl
Situation — Native Feeling in India — Incidents of Former Invasions — >
Alarm at French Intrigues— First Symptoms of " Russophobia " — ■
Encroachment of Russia on Persia — Scheme of Joint Russian and ,1
French Invasion of India — Sir John Kaye on the Two Classes ot|
Governor-General — Lords Minto and Wellesley Compared with LordJ
Lytton — The Rise of the Sikhs — British and Russian Advance Com-|
pared — Mission to the Sikhs — Shah Suja — Rise of the Barakzais —
Shah Suja an Exile — Affairs in Afghanistan before the First Afghan
War — Mission of Captain Burnes and Siege of Herat — Eldred Pottinger|
— Dost Muhammad — Sikhs Gain Peshawar — Russia Invades Persia-
New Russo-Persian Boundary — British Policy.
Zaman Shah, King of the Afghans, the grandson]
of Ahmad Shah, cherished, as we have said, designsj
of Indian conquest similar to those that had impelled)
his grandfather to the invasion of the Panjab. Wei
have seen that in 1798 he had invoked the assistance]
of the English Governor-General against the Mah-«
rattas, who had established themselves virtually as
the m.ost powerful State in Northern India, although^,
the Mughal Emperor at Delhi remained nominall}/ =
supreme. The Afghan King had advanced as far as
I
F^'om Z avian Shah to Dost Miihaniniad. 117
Lahore, with the avowed object of extending the
Durani Empire (as it was called after its consolida-
tion by Ahmad Shah) to the Ganges. But he was
compelled precipitately to return to resist an invasion
of Khorasan by the Persian troops. In the previous
year he had been similarly recalled to put down a
rebellion headed by his brother Mahmud. For years
afterwards the threat of an Afghan invasion kept the
British Indian Empire in a chronic state of alarm,
and Lord Wellesley, immediately on his accession to
the office of Governor-General, had augmented the
native army on this account.
However ridiculous now this constant panic may
seem to us, it must be remembered that at the
beginning of the century the English in India knew
little of the resources of the Durani Empire, and less
of the people, and their monarch's unfitness for a
great enterprise. Nor were the fears entertained so
groundless as may appear at first sight. The
numerous enemies of the English in India looked to
Cabul for deliverance from their encroaching empire
with, says Kaye, " malicious expectancy." From
the rocky defiles of that romantic country they
expected to see swarms of the Faithful hasten to
save Islam from the yoke of the usurping Feringhees.
All the Muhammadan princes from Tippu in Mysore
to Vazir Ali in Oudh, had promised money and men,
and even Hindu rajahs had avowed their sympathy
1 1 8 Afghanistan.
with the cause. What Sir John Kaye says of his
own day (1857) reads rather strangely now, when we
are told that thoughts of an invasion of India again
agitate the breasts of some among Shere Ali's
advisers. He writes: "We, who in these times
trustingly contemplate the settled tranquillity of the
north-western provinces of India, and remember
Zaman Shah only as the old, blind pensioner of
Ludhiana, can hardly estimate aright the real im-
portance of the threatened movement."
If the English in India felt such anxiety at the
prospect of an Afghan invasion, how are we to
picture to ourselves the feelings of the unprotected
myriads who knew by tradition what were the tender
mercies they might expect from barbarous hordes
such as those that swooped down upon the plains of
India with Tamerlane the Tartar, Nadir Shah the
Persian, and Ahmad Shah the Durani. The his-
torian tells us that when Tamerlane (or Timur)
invaded India, his army pillaged the Panjab up to
Delhi, taking vast numbers of captives. Finding it
troublesome to carry these along with him, he
ordered all of them above the age of fifteen — to
the number, says Farishta, of 100,000— to be put to
death in cold blood.
The refusal of the people of Delhi to pay
a heavy contribution brought upon them a general
and indiscriminate massacre and plunder, during
From Zaniaii Shah to Dost Muhammad. 119
which the monarch gave a great entertainment to
his officers.
Again, in 1738, Nadir Shah gave orders at Delhi
I for a general massacre ; and when his soldiers had
feasted on blood they gave themselves up for fifty-
eight days to plunder, which they sought from the
Emperor's palace to the lowest hovels of the poor.
In 1755, Ahmad Shah proceeded to Delhi, and
extorted a vast sum of money from the people by
torture and massacre. He then attacked the rich
city of Mathura, while a religious festival was being
held ; and thousands of Hindu worshippers were
slaughtered without mercy by the Afghans.
After the Battle of Panipat, in 1761, referred to
before, between Ahmad Shah and the Mahrattas,
I which ended in the victory of the Afghans, we read
that, " Of all that were taken in the [Indian] camp,
women and children became slaves, and next morning
I the males were cruelly butchered in cold blood."
I Such are some of the gentle memories which the
I barbarians west of the Suliman and Hindu Kush
I Mountains have left with the people of the plains
i' of Northern India. What wonder that, in 1798,
when another attack was threatened from the same
' quarter, the English, who only echoed the sentiments
of their native subjects, should have viewed it with
alarm.
It was not, however, simply the Durani King
1 20 Afghanistan .
who was dreaded. The French Emperor was cre-
dited with designs of almost universal conquest. The
French were known to be eager for an alliance with
Persia, and what was more probable to the minds of
the rulers of British India then than that an offensive
alliance between France, Persia, and Cabul should
make those dangers, that once merely seemed to
threaten them from the north-west, only too real and
imminent.
The great object then appeared to be to gain the
friendship of Persia, so that by this means French in-
trigue might be baffled in Central Asia. In that case,
also, Zaman Shah would have in Persia a British ally
behind him, ready to avail herself of his absence
on the Indian frontier to invade and reclaim some
of the provinces of Afghanistan that had once
belonged to her. To bring about so favourable
a condition of affairs, Lord Wellesley, therefore, sent
Captain Malcolm as Envoy of the British Indian
Government to Persia.
It is not possible in these pages to trace the
history of the negotiations that followed, in which
the rare spectacle was seen of an English Ambas-
sador from the Court of St. James, acting in almost
open hostility to the British Indian Government.
The end to be sought was to keep Persia friendly
to ourselves, and prevent French influence gaining
any ground.
I
From Zainan Shah to Dost AluJianiniad. 121
To understand the politics of that day another
Power has to be taken into account, and that Power
is Russia. That formidable northern State had been
extending its conquests eastwards for years, before
the Shah of Persia, in 1805, addressed a letter to
Napoleon, whose fortunes were then at their highest
point, requesting aid from the Western " Rustam "
to stem the tide of Russian aggression. " Before,"
says Sir John Kaye, " the English trader had begun
to organise armies in Hindostan, and to swallow up
ancient principalities, the grand idea of founding an
Eastern Empire had been grasped by the capacious
mind of Peter the Great." The policy he inaugu-
rated was zealously followed by his successors for
more than a century. Especially had Russian
ambition been directed to acquiring the country
between the Black Sea and the Caspian. A small
part of it, held by a race of sturdy, brave moun-
taineers, still declines to bow to the rule of the Czar,
and, from time to time, when efforts to subjugate
them are made, the natural difficulties of the country
to the invaders aids the people in disposing of their
assailants. But Georgia had been conquered from
the Persians before the beginning of the century,
after a succession of wars notorious for their cruel
and barbarous incidents. Thus Russia and Persia
had, in 1800, become conterminous, and perpetual
struggles between the great Russian frontier officers
122 Afghanistan .
and the Persians marked the early years of the
century. Treachery and cruelty mark the annals of
this period. The Russian general had received
orders to extend the Russian frontier to the river
Aras, and nothing short of that boundary would
satisfy him. It was when matters seemed at
their blackest that the Persian Court applied to
Napoleon.
The French emissaries, who soon after found
their way to Teheran, not only persuaded the
Persians that England was an effete nation, doomed
to fall before Napoleon, and, therefore, not of value
as a friend, but negotiations were on foot for a
Franco-Persian treaty for the joint invasion of India
by a French and Persian army.
It is believed that a treaty to this effect was
actually sent home for the approval of Napoleon.
But any hopes Persia may have entertained of
French aid against Russia in return for her services
against the English in India were doomed to dis-
appointment by the peaceful meeting of the Em-
peror Alexander and Napoleon Buonaparte upon
the river Breinen, near Tilsit, in July, 1807, when a
bloody campaign was ended by a scene, in which
the two Emperors " embraced like brothers." Among
the joint schemes of conquest the two Emperors
discussed, one was an invasion of India by a con-
federate army uniting on the plains of Persia.
From Zainan Shah to Dost Ahihaimnad, 123
Lucien Buonaparte, the brother of Napoleon, was
sent to Teheran on a mission to prepare the way for
a hostile demonstration against British India in the
spring-.
The " non-intervention " policy of the English
Government was now regarded as out of place.
Lord Minto was Governor-General, and felt that
action was called for. Sir John Kaye makes a
remark concerning this crisis, which we cannot
refrain from quoting, as its application at the present
juncture of Indian' affairs to the supposed rival
policies of Lord Lytton and Lord Lawrence, the
former an ex-diplomatist, and the latter one who
rose from the ranks of the East India Company's
service, cannot but be acknowledged.
He says : — " It is observable that statesmen trained
in the Cabinets and Courts of Europe have ever
been more sensitively alive to the dangers of inva-
sion from the North than those whose experience
has been gathered in the fields of Indian diplomacy.
Lord Wellesley and Lord Minto were ever tremu-
lous with intense apprehension of danger from
without, whilst Sir John Shore and Sir George
Barlov/ possessed themselves in comparative confi-
dence and tranquillity, and if they were not wholly
blind to the peril, at all events did not exaggerate it.
There is a sense of security engendered by long
habit and familiarity with apparent danger, which
124 Afghanistan.
renders a man mistrustful of the reality of that
which has so often been shown to be a counterfeit.
The inexperience of English statesmen suddenly
transplanted to a new sphere of action often sees in
the most ordinary political phenomena strange and
alarming portents."
We, of course, can afford to smile now at the fears
excited by French aggression ; but looking at what
Napoleon and his marshals had done, and remember-
ing the apparent ease of Alexander's conquests in
Asia, the presence of a grand French army on the
Ganges did not seem an altogether impossible or
improbable prospect.
The alliance between Russia and France, instead,
however, of increasing the danger to British rule in
the East, added to its security, by throwing Persia,
whose whole hatred was directed against Russia for
her encroaching policy on the Caspian, into the arms
of England. England's right policy at that time
seems clearer to us now than it did to the Home or
British Indian Government. Our former policy had
been to hold Persia as a buffer against our European
enemies, the French, on the west, and to have her as
a useful ally against Afghanistan on her eastern
frontier. During the seven or eight years, however,
since the last threat of Afghan invasion had been
made, the Afghan Power had ceased to be formidable,
owing to intestine quarrels. At the same time a new \
From Zaman Shah to Dost Miihainmad. 125
Power — that of the Sikhs — was rising on our northern
borders out of a dismembered province (the Panjab)
of the once formidable Durani Empire. The Sikhs
hated — and still hate — the Muhammadans, and hence
the desirability of enlisting them on our side against
the French and Persian confederacy, which was still
believed to exist.
We have alluded already to the rival missions of
Captain Malcolm and Sir Harford Jones, the one
despatched by the British Indian, and the other by
the English Government to the Court of Persia.
The incidents of these missions are of interest at the
present time, as they throw much light on the atti-
tude which would be naturally taken by Persia at any
time if England found herself — which God forbid ! —
at war with Russia. Captain Malcolm advanced
very specious arguments for the occupation by Eng-
land of the island of Karak, in the Persian Gulf. He
urged that with an established footing there, which
would soon become an emporium of our trade, we
should be able to exclude other European Powers,
and carry on whatever military operations we deemed
consistent with and necessary to our honour and
security. But British India then belonged to a
trading company, and did not acknowledge an
Empress as its ruler. Whether British honour and
security have suffered by the neglect of Malcolm's
advice will, of course, be answered differently by
126 Afghanistan .
people holding different views on England's foreign
policy.
In pursuance of the new policy, which consisted in
an endeavour to unite the States of Afghanistan and
the Panjab against the supposed Franco-Persian
alliance — for it had not yet been seen that that
alliance must fall to the ground on the reconciliation
of Russia, Persia's enemy, to France — missions were
sent to Cabul and Lahore, in September and October,
1808. It is thus just seventy years since Mr. Elphin-
stone set out in obedience to the then Governor-
General, Lord Minto, to do at Cabul very much
what Sir Neville Chamberlain would have tried to do
for Lord Lytton, only in the former case the danger
anticipated was from France, not Russia.
The necessity of including the Sikh ruler in the
alliance that was desired no longer complicates the
Indian Viceroy's policy. There is no " Lion of the
Panjab " to be courted and conciliated now. British
legions have swept away his magnificent Khalsa
army, the modern representatives of his soldiers
forming the finest of the Imperial troops ; while his
exiled descendant lives as an English nobleman on
an estate in Norfolk, and is proud of being a friend
of the Heir to the British Throne. Ranjit Sinh's
provinces have long been administered by English
commissioners and English magistrates, and could
he revisit his capital, he would find an English
From Zmnan Shah to Dost Mithannnad. 127
Lieutenant-Governor and a Chief-Court in pos-
session.
It is as well to reflect now and then on the advance
of England, as well as on that of Russia, if only to
enable ourselves to see that an advancing Empire
may not necessarily be wilfully aggressive, but may
be forced by irresistible influences to extend its
boundaries, and absorb seml-clvlllsed and barbarous
States on its borders, without this being any valid
ground for apprehension on the part of a great
European Power that may be doing the very same
thing, under exactly the same impulses, elsewhere.
When it comes, of course, to such a pass that both
the Powers are standing with open jaws ready to
swallow the last remaining independent State that
lies between their immense territories, we get a con-
dition of things for which It is difficult to find a
precedent. In the absence of a " leading case," the
parties that now divide English opinion on the
" Afghan Question " would seem to think — the one
that England should hasten to forestall her neigh-
bour, and secure the by no means tempting morsel,
and the other that there is no need for either Power
to devour it, but that each can quite comfortably do
with what it has already swallowed and is scarcely
able to digest. This may be a rather vulgar way
of putting It, savouring of the similes we have lately
seen drawn of a thief holding a loaded pistol to a
128 Afghanistan .
householder's head, and of the householder snatch-
ino; up a baby to place it between himself and the
thief; to which a reply was made, we believe,
asking how would the matter of right stand if the
thief held up a " loaded baby " — whether then the
householder might strike it down without too deli-
cate an inquiry into questions of international law.
Much advantage can rarely, however, be gained
by far-fetched metaphorical argum.ents.
The Sikhs were still a Power in 1808 — a young
and rising Power — and Lord Minto had much
difficulty to decide whether the best policy required
him to curb the Sikhs, or to foster them as useful
allies against the French. A middle course was
pursued, and Mr. (afterwards Sir Charles) Metcalfe
gained his spurs in diplomacy in carrying out this
temporising policy. It was difficult, however, to
enlist the sympathy of Ranjit Sinh for the danger
to the British Empire in India from French aggres-
sion, and at the same time deny him the right he
claimed of extending his rule over neighbouring
States not in alliance with ourselves.
Shah Suja was now King of Afghanistan, having
succeeded his brother, Zaman Shah, who had been
dethroned and rendered blind by the Barakzai leader,
Fateh Khan, in revenge for the death of the latter's
father, which had been decreed by the King on the
discovery of a treasonable plot against himself and his
From Zam^n Shah to Dost MithammaJ. 129
Minister, in which Poinda Khan, the father of Fateh
Khan and chief of the Barakzais, was impHcated.
The rise of these Barakzais to power commenced
with this ill-judged severity on the part of Zaman
Khan, whose family belonged to another branch — the
Sadduzai — of the great Durani clan, of which both
were branches.
The twenty-one sons of Poinda Khan seemed for
a time to live only to avenge their father's death —
revenge being an Afghan s first duty. That they
rose — some at least among them, notably Dost
Muhammad, the future Amir — was but an incidental
consequence of the pursuit of their main object. For
a full description of the varying fortunes of the
Barakzai brothers we have not space at our command.
Shah Suja for a time made head against them, but
in June, 1809, was disastrously defeated, and had to
withdraw beyond the frontier, barely, indeed, escaping
with his life. The wanderings of Shah Suja and his
many misfortunes ; his futile attempts to regain
% his throne ; his imprisonment in Cashmere by
its governor, and afterwards in Lahore by Ranjit
Sinh, to whom he lost the Koh-i-nur by a stratagem,
the story of which has been often told,* — these are
* The trick was this : The Shah, for safety, carried the jewel
in his turban, and Ranjit Sinh, having suggested an exchange
of turbans, the unfortunate prince was obhged, by the law of
courtesy, to comply.
9
130 Afghanistan.
recounted in Shah Suja's own autobiography, and
will be found in some detail in Sir John Kaye's work.
He found a resting-place and a pension in Ludhiana,
in British territory, in i8i6, and from that time until
1838, never ceased to entertain hopes of regaining his
ancestral throne. These hopes were destined to be ful-
filled, but with fatal result to himself and his patrons.
Before coming to the causes of the First Afghan
War, which had for its direct object the restoration of
Shah Suja to his throne, it is necessary to review the
course of affairs in Afghanistan itself, and also the
condition of things as they affected British Indian
foreign policy.
Dost Muhammad, the most capable of the Barakzai
brothers, had established himself firmly at Cabul, but
Prince Kamran, of the old Saddozai family — the
legitimate line — reigned supreme at Herat. Sultan
Muhammad, a brother of Dost Muhammad, held
Peshawar, and other brothers held Candahar.
Thus mutilated, the Durani Empire seemed to
have lost all its former menacing attitude towards
India. On the contrary, however, in 183 1, Peshawar
fell to the Sikh ruler, Ranjit Sinh, and remained in
his power until it passed with the rest of his
dominions into British occupation.
The anxiety of Dost Muhammad to regain this
province of Peshawar from the Sikhs became the
great aim of his life, and he looked round to see on
Front Zauian Shall to Dost Mnhamniad. 131
what allies he could trust for assistance. He found
the Persians and English most suitable for this pur-
pose, and, it is said, was willing, in 1837, to ally
himself with either if he could be assured of aid
against the Sihks.
In the autumn of 1837, however, rumours of two
great events were heard, which vastly affected the
future of Dost Muhammad and of others besides him.
These were — a British envoy. Captain Burnes, came
to Cabul as ''commercial " resident, and Muhammad
Shah, the Persian King, was laying siege to Herat.
Persia had been struggling against Russian aggres-
sion during the years intervening between 18 10 and
1837. A period of outward observance of peace is
included in this length of time, viz., from 18 13 to
1826, but it was a hollow one, soon to be broken. A
massacre of the isolated Russian garrisons and out-
posts in Gokchar brought down an avenging army,
and so low was Persia reduced that, in 1828, she was
compelled to cede Erivan and Nakhichevan, and
consent to the Russians drawing their frontier-line
considerably eastward. An indemnity to Russia of
eighty millions of roubles was also stipulated for.
Thus was Persia "delivered, bound hand and foot, to
the Court of St. Petersburg."
The English policy pursued at this time has been
severely criticised, as we appear to have purchased a
release from engagements which bound us to assist
9—2
132 Afghanistan.
the Persians against Russia. The result was the
immense advance of Russian influence at the Court
of Persia, the heir-apparent having, it is said, married
a Russian princess, and adopted the Christian faith.
Then began thepohcy of making Persia play Russia's
game. It became the object of Russia to use the
resources of Persia in furtherance of her own ends,
Avithout overt action on her part, thereby avoiding a
collision with other European Powers, whose jealousy
it was her aim not to arouse. The first outcome of
this new Russian move was an encroachment by
Persia on Khorasan. It became the common talk of
the bazaars of Khorasan, Afghanistan, and even of
Bombay, that an allied Russian and Persian army
would march upon Herat, Cabul, and India.
In 1836, the Herat campaign commenced, and the
story of the memorable siege of that city deserves to
be read by all who would know what is the value of
one brave Englishman in a cause upon which he had
set his heart.
It may be safely affirmed that Herat would have
fallen to the Persian King if it had not been for the
courage and firmness of Eldred Pottinger, a young
English officer, who found his way to Herat just as
the Persians began their attack.
On the 23rd November, 1837, the siege of Herat
actually began, and continued until the 9th of Sep-
tember of the following year.
Fjvm Zanian ShaJi to Dost Muhammad. 133
Herat is described as surrounded by a fair expanse
of country, filled with cornfields, vineyards, and
gardens ; little fortified villages studded the plain,
and the bright waters of small running streams
lightened the pleasant landscape. The beauty of
Herat was, however, without the walls ; within, all
was dirt and desolation. Strongly fortified on every
side by a wet ditch, and a solid outer wall, with five
gates, each defended by a small outwork, the city
presented but few claims to the admiration of the
traveller. Herat was divided into four quarters, con-
sisting of four long bazaars, roofed with arched brick-
work, meeting in a small domed quadrangle in the
centre of the city. The total population is estimated
as having been about 45,000. Mosques and caravan-
serais, public baths and public reservoirs, varied the
wretched uniformity of the narrow, dirty streets, and
these were roofed across so as to be little better than
dark tunnels, where every conceivable description
of dirt collected and putrified. When wonder was
expressed by Arthur ConoUy that people could live
in such filth, the reply was, " The climate is fine, and
if dirt killed people, where would the Afghans be 1 "
The picture drawn by Kaye of the political and
moral condition of the people of Herat, forms a
fitting counterpart to the description of the outward
imperfections of the city. Every kind of cruelty and
vice, and every form of tyranny and misrule, seem
134 Afghanistan .
to have been concentrated here ; and if ever a clean
sweep of a city and its inhabitants seemed likely to
be a matter of small loss to the rest of the human
race, it might have appeared so in the case of Herat.
But high moral character and honesty are not
necessary concomitants of valour and martial prowess,
although even these qualities are not the worse for
being conjoined with the former. One man, at least,
in Herat, possessed all these qualifications, and he
saved Herat. It would be unfair, however, to leave
it to be supposed that the besieging army of the
Persians was much, if at all, superior to the Heratis
in those moral qualities in which the latter were so
wanting. But the Persian King's troops were in-
finitely better soldiers, and quite as brave men as the
Afghans. Their non-success was the fault of their
leaders, while opposed to them was an English officer,
who showed himself worthy to rank with some of the
best generals of his country, but who had devoted
himself to the cause of the besieged simply as a
volunteer.
Russian officers aided the Persians at Herat, and
Russian diplomatists urged them to the expedition.
It was a natural conclusion that, so encouraging and
so aiding Persia, Russia had ulterior designs not
wholly unconnected with thoughts of the British
Empire in India. It is certain that such was the
feeling of the English Ministry. But when an ex-
Front Zaman Shah to Dost Mnhanimad.
5^
planation was desired by Lord Durham from the
Russian Minister of conduct so contrary to the
declarations of the Czar's Government, the reply was
that if Count Simonich, the Russian Minister at the
Court of Persia, had encouraged the Persian King
to proceed against Herat, he had acted in direct
violation of his instructions. This, however, was but
an early example of that persistent course of en-
croachment in Central Asia which Russian generals
and diplomatists have carried out in direct contra-
vention of the instructions they are said to have
received from St. Petersburg.
While the siege of Herat was in progress, Captain
Burnes had been prosecuting his "commercial "
mission at Cabul at the Court of Dost Muhammad,
the Amir or ruler of that part of Afghanistan. The
Amir was believed, however, to be intriguing with
the Persians for their assistance in a projected war
against the Sikhs to recover Peshawar. To the
English in India the security of the Anglo-Indian
Empire seemed in 1837-38, to be threatened both
from within and without. From Nepal to Burma
the Native States were evincing signs of feverish
interest in the advance of what they supposed was
a Muhammadan invasion from beyond the Afghan
frontier. Public securities declined in value, and the
rumour spread from mouth to mouth that the Com-
pany's reign was nearly at an end.
136 Afghanistan.
To the high officers of the British Indian Govern-
ment matters appeared somewhat differently, but
were sufficiently black. Herat was being besieged
by the Persian King-of-Kings, Russian officers were
directing the siege, the Barakzai Sirdars, including
Dost Muhammad, were intriguing with Persia. It
seemed probable, therefore, that having taken Herat,
the Persian King would either push on his conquests
to Cabul and Candahar, or render Dost Muhammad
the vassal of Persia by aiding him against the Sikhs,
and thereby make Afghanistan the basis of future
operations to be undertaken not only by the Persians
themselves, but by them jointly with the Russians,
who were now their allies.
It was then the true policy of the British Govern-
ment to keep Afghanistan independent, and to
cement a friendly alliance with its ruler or rulers.
This, broadly, was the aim of Lord Auckland in all
the diplomacy that followed.
We have now arrived at the threshold of the First
Afghan War, which arose directly out of this policy,
the ostensible object of which was, it must be remem-
bered, to make Afghanistan independent, if possible,
or as much as possible, but at any rate friendly to
British interests — to prevent its falling into the hands
of the Persians, and through them into that of
the Russians ; to be used as a weapon against the
British Empire in India.
CHAPTER VII.
THE FIRST AFGHAN WAR.
Lord Auckland's Policy in 1837 — Case for Dost Muhammad Stated by Sir
John Kaye — Afghan Ideas of Hereditary Claims to Sovereignty — The
Tripartite Treaty — The Army of the Indus— Passage Through Sindh
Delayed — Appointment of Macnaghten as Political Officer with the
Expedition — Enghsh Gold Scattered Freely — Shah Suja's Reception
at Candahar— Assault and Capture of Ghazni — Massacre of the Ghazis
— Flight of Dost Muhammad beyond the Hindu Kush — Failure of
Pursuit through Treachery of Haji Khan— Intrinsic Weakness of
Shah Suja's Course Demonstrated — Cost of Living for English Officers
at Cabul — Kaye's Judgment of the British " System" introduced into
Afghanistan — Honours to the Victors — Designs of Further Inter-
ference Westwards — The Story of Colonel Stoddart and Arthur
Conolly's "Missions" — Their Cruel Fate — Lord EUenborough's
Letter to the Amir of Bokhara — Brief Review of ' ' The i\fghan
Tragedy " of 1838-42 — Story of Dr. Brydon's Escape.
It is easy to be wise after the event. It is clear to
every one now that Lord Auckland's mode of carry-
ing out the policy of making Afghanistan a free and
independent State, to act as a buffer against Persia
and Russia, was not the wisest plan to effect that
object, and did indeed result in making that State
bitterly hostile and independent, not through our
aid, but, it may be said, in spite of it. In 1837,
however, matters were not so plain to the eyes of
statesmen, whose days and nights were made
138 Afghan is tan .
anxious by the rumours of great preparations across
the frontier, while the internal sources of disquiet
were not few.
It was believed, whether rightly or wrongly may
now be questioned, that Dost Muhammad was not
likely to be a sincere friend to the English, however
ostensibly so he might appear. In the words of the
Simla manifesto, he and his brothers were " ill-fitted,
under any circumstances, to be useful allies to the
British." Sir John Kaye has ably stated the case for
Dost Muhammad. He has shown that that prince
really wished for the English alliance, and only
waited for some consideration to be shown to his
wishes with regard to Peshawar ; the restoration of
which province he claimed from the Sikhs, and hoped
to regain by our intercession. In that case he would
have abandoned Russia and Persia at once. It did
not suit Lord Auckland's policy to alienate the Sikhs
by pressing Dost Muhammad's claims, even if he had
believed in Dost Muhammad's sincerity. It must be
remembered, too, that Dost Muhammad was in pos-
session only of Cabul and Ghazni, Candahar and
Herat being in possession, the former of his brother,
and the latter of a Saddozai prince. To have a
series of disjointed kingdoms or chieftainships in
Afghanistan, involving a separate consideration of
the interests of each, and all the trouble of conciliating
rival princes, seemed naturally enough less favourable
The First Afghan War. 139
to the policy Lord Auckland had adopted than
the consolidation of the whole under one King.
Some idea of Dost Muhammad's position being that
of a usurper doubtless contributed to the determina-
tion to inaugurate a policy which was as startling as
it was novel. This was no other than to put forward
the exile, Shah Suja, the former legitimate King of
the Afghans, who had been driven out, as before
explained, by Dost Muhammad and his brothers,
in pursuance of a family feud that arose from the
deaths of Poinda Khan and Fateh Khan, at the
hands of Zaman Shah and Prince Kamran respec-
tively. To restore Shah Suja, the rightful sovereign,
to the throne of his ancestors, did not seem so
wrongful a proceeding then as it does to us now.
It w^as believed that the Afghans would welcome
their King if once the strength of the Barakzai family
were broken. The Duranis had been terribly op-
pressed by Dost Muhammad, and it was supposed
they would flock to Shah Suja's standard. But it
has been since learnt how little the Afghans regard
legitimacy and the hereditary rights of royal houses.
Their notions of sovereignty have little in common
with refined Western ideas of it. The strongest is the
one whom they willingly acknowledge as King. A
fatal objection, too, to the restored monarch was the
fact that he had come back to them as a puppet in the
hands of the infidels, and that his power rested on
140 Afghanistan.
no more national basis than British bayonets and
British gold. It would be tedious and of little use to
enter at length into all the workings of that policy
which we have briefly sketched above. A tripartite
treaty was signed between the British Indian Govern-
ment, Ranjit Sinh, the Sikh ruler of the Panjab, and
Shah Suja. The Sikhs were to co-operate in the
restoration of Shah Suja to the throne of Cabul, and
the King's eldest son was to march with a Sikh army
from Peshawar through the Khaibar Pass, while Shah
Suja himself, with some levies of his own, but accom-
panied by an English army of mixed European and
Sepoy soldiers, on which the brunt of the campaign
would fall, marched through the Bolan Pass, to
Ouettah, and thence to Candahar. Sir John Keane
(afterwards Lord Keane of Ghazni) led the Bombay
column, and Sir Willoughby Cotton commanded
the Southern Army, called the Army of the
Indus, which set out from Firozpur, on the Indus, on
the loth December, 1837. This army consisted of
about 9,500 men, and 38,000 camp-followers. Thirty-
thousand baggage camels, well-laden, accompanied
them. On the 14th January the army entered
Sindh. It was the i6th of March before it reached
Dadar, at the mouth of the Bolan Pass. It had been
delayed by difficulties in Sindh, which was not then
British territory. The Amirs of that country required
a good deal of over-aweing before they would grant a
The First Afghan War. 141
passage to our troops. The privations undergone by
the army in its march across the desert were extreme.
The distance from Shikarpur to Dadar is 146 miles.
It was accompHshed by the Bengal column in sixteen
painful marches. Water and forage were so scarce
that the cattle suffered terribly on the way. The
camels fell dead by scores on the desert, and further
on the Baluchi robbers carried them off with ap-
palling dexterity. When they reached cultivated
land the green crops were used as forage for the
horses.
Sir John Keane with the Bombay Army had
landed at Vikkur at the end of November, but was
compelled, from the hostility of the Sindh rulers, to
remain inactive till December 24th. On the 4th of
April he reached Ouettah, to take command of the
expedition now increased by the Bombay column,
which had made a long and difficult march through
Sindh. As the expedition had for its object the
restoration of a King and the pacification of his
country, it was deemed desirable to send with it a
civil officer, as representative of the Governor-
General of India. The choice of Lord Auckland fell
upon Mr. W. H. (afterwards Sir William) Mac-
naghten, then Foreign Secretary with the Govern-
ment of India, a man of great abilities, an eminent
Oriental scholar, and withal fully imbued with the
spirit of Lord Auckland with regard to the affair in
142 Afghanistan.
hand ; unless, as some think, it were more correct to
say that he had infused his spirit and sentiments
into Lord Auckland.
Despite the difficulties in the way of suppHes, and
the loss of beasts of burden, the army reached
Candahar without serious opposition, although a
small but resolute band of the enemy might have
barred their way at the Bolan Pass, and perhaps
effectually repelled the invading forces with disaster.
There is no doubt that English money was largely
used to buy off the adherents of the Barakzais. The
Afghans discovered that the gold of the Feringhees
was as serviceable as other gold, and Afghan alle-
giance was purchased to a large extent. The system
of corruption thus commenced could not but involve
the invaders in difficulty afterwards, when the
treasure-chest became exhausted.
Shah Suja's entrance into Candahar was more
remarkable for the curiosity than for the enthusiasm
displayed. Macnaghten interpreted the demonstra-
tion in the most favourable light, and sav/ an
unclouded prospect of success in the future. And
so for a time it seemed. Ghazni was taken by assault,
with an ease that seemed marvellous to the Afghans,
seeing that Sir John Keane had no heavy guns with
him. Treachery, however, on the part of the enemy
aided as much as British bayonets. One of the
Barakzai nobles — the nephew of Dost Muhammad —
The First Afghaii War. 143
turned traitor, and gave information which enabled
Sir John Keane's engineers to blow up part of the
walls of Ghazni by gunpowder, and so effect an
entrance, and the capture of the city. Shah Suja
showed his capacity for conciliating his subjects by
ordering the slaughter in cold blood of fifty Ghazis,
who were taken prisoners. These fanatics court
death in battle, but the massacre of them in cold
blood was in the highest degree impolitic, to say
nothing of the inhumanity of the deed. " That
martyrdom," says Kaye, "was never forgotten. The
day of reckoning came at last ; and when our unholy
policy sank buried in blood and ashes, the shrill cry
of the Ghazis sounded as its funeral wail." He refers,
of course, to that terrible death-struggle some two
years later, of the retreating army in the passes of
the Khurd-Cabul, when the Ghazis rushed in, hungry
for the blood of the infidels, and completed the
slaughter of the survivors.
At Ghazni Brigadier Sale, who afterwards became
famous at Jalalabad, commanded the main column,
and greatly distinguished himself. Although the
capture of this city was not marked by the worst
feature of war — for the women were not ill-treated —
the carnage was terrible. Upwards of 500 of the
garrison were buried by the besiegers, besides those
who fell beyond the walls ; the victors losing only
seventeen killed and 165 wounded; 1,600 prisoners
144 Afghanistan.
were taken, and immense stores of grain, many
horses, and numerous arms.
After a futile attempt at negotiation, Dost Muham-
mad, seeing that resistance was hopeless — for his
own followers were deserting him, or were luke-
warm in their support — mounted his horse at
Urghandi, a few miles to the west of Cabul, whither
he had gone out to dispute the progress of the
invaders, and, with a few followers, turned his face
towards the regions of the Hindu Kush.
On the 2nd of August Dost Muhammad fled, and
on the following day the British army, which was
marching upon Cabul, heard the news, and a party
of horsemen set out in pursuit. Haji Khan Kakar,
a man of mean origin, who had risen to be an
Afghan chief, offered to lead the pursuit. He was
all the while, however, in treasonable correspondence
with Dost Muhammad, and did all he could to mis-
direct the English officers. The pursuit failed, the
Amir escaped beyond the mountains, and Haji Khan
suffered for his treachery by banishment as a State
prisoner to Chunar.
On the 7th of August Shah Suja and a British
army entered Cabul, the former, after an absence of
thirty years, the latter for the first time. He had
been restored to his throne by the money-bags and
the bayonets of the British ; but it was a hopeless
task to attempt to keep him on it. He had fallen
The First Afghan War. 145
once miserably, and not even English soldiers and
Indian rupees could set him up permanently again.
He might have succeeded without the assistance of
the hated infidels, but the knowledge that they, and
they only, supported him on his tottering throne
alienated even those who would naturally favour the
lineal descendant of the famous Ahmad Shah.
It was no part of the original programme that an
English army should remain in occupation of the
Afghan capital and country ; but it soon became
manifest that the puppet we had set up would not
be able to retain his throne without extraneous aid.
So Macnaghten remained as British Envoy, and the
Bengal column remained as well.
On the 1 8th of September the Bombay troops
commenced their return march to India through the
Kojak and the Bolan Passes. Those who stayed
behind were disappointed, for, says Kaye, "a country,
in which wine was selling at the price of 300 rupees
(^30) a dozen, and cigars at a rupee (2s.) a-piece,
was not one in which the officers of the army were
likely to desire to pitch their tents for a sojourn of
any long continuance." A small detachment, how-
ever, of the Bengal troops afterwards returned to
India, under Sir John Keane, leaving the rest under
Sir Willoughby Cotton in occupation of Afghanistan.
Then began the system of planting small detach-
ments of British troops in isolated positions through-
10
146 Afghanistan.
out the country ; which was, in the opinion of some,
one of the great errors that marked our sojourn in
Afghanistan.
The unpopularity of Shah Suja grew daily more
manifest, but the people seemed to have settled down
into something like quiescence under the reign of
English gold, for cupidity is one of their strongest
passions. They hated the Feringhees, but did not re-
fuse their gold. The old experience, which we had
seen so often in our relations with the States of
India, began to be felt. British bayonets were
employed to execute the orders of the Shah and his
officers. Bound by treaty not to interfere with the
internal affairs of the country, they had to permit,
and even aid in enforcing, much that was unjust.
Says Sir John Kaye, " It would have been a miracle
if such a system had not soon broken down with a
desolating crash, and buried its authors in the ruins."
The more we surrounded Shah Suja wdth our autho-
rity the less firmly was he seated on the throne.
Meanwhile, the successes of the recent campaign
brought honours to the chief actors. Lord Auckland
was created an earl ; Sir John Keane became Baron
Keane of Ghazni ; Mr. Macnaghten was made a
baronet ; Colonel Wade (who had led the force
through the Khaibar) a knight ; and brevets and
Bath honours were numerous.
The extent to which our success in Afghanistan
The First Afghan War. 147
had encouraged designs of further interference with
the Powers to the west of Cabul can be understood
only by a reference to the correspondence of Sir W.
Macnaghten, and other high Anglo-Indian officers,
during the brief occupation of Afghan territory by a
British army. Not only did Macnaghten advise an
attack upon Herat, which was "giving trouble," and
its annexation to Shah Suja's dominions, but mis-
sions were sent to Bokhara, Khokand, and Khiva.
Colonel Stoddart, indeed, had been at Bokhara ever
since the close of 1838, having been sent by the
English Minister at the Court of Persia to obtain the
release of some Russians who were in captivity there,
and also to conclude a friendly treaty with the Amir
of Bokhara. The story is well known of Stoddart's
imprisonment, in violation of all the laws that regu-
late international intercourse — but what do barbarous
Khans and Amirs know of such 1 — of the gross and
wanton cruelties practised upon him, and of his final
atrocious murder. Arthur Conolly fared no better.
He started from Cabul in the autumn of 1840, osten-
sibly on a mission to Khiva and Khokand. Thence,
on an invitation of the Amir of Bokhara, he pro-
ceeded to that city, where he found Stoddart in a
state of captivity, but more honourable and less
painful than that which he had been condemned to
suffer during part of the preceding years. One of
Conolly's reasons for visiting Bokhara was, it is said,
10 — 2
148 Afghanistan.
to induce Stoddart to recant the profession of Mu-
hammadanism he had made. He found, on his
arrival, that poor Stoddart's conversion had been
effected by such gentle means as incarceration in a
pit full of vermin and filth. His grave, too, was dug,
with the threat that unless he professed the faith of
Islam he would be buried alive in it. ConoUy found
he had only been decoyed into a trap to undergo
similar treatment, and was in the end subjected to
the same fate as Stoddart suffered. It is believed
that both died by the hand of the public executioner,
but the precise period of their death is doubtful.
Native accounts make it the 17th of June, 1842 ; and
manuscripts written by Arthur Conolly himself and
despatched to Cabul bring up the sad narrative of his
sufferings to the 24th of May of that year. On the
28th of May Stoddart despatched an official letter to
the Indian Government, which was forwarded with
Conolly's journals. The neglect of the Government
they served so faithfully embittered the hard fate of
these officers. It was after their death that Lord
Ellenborough wrote a letter to the Amir of Bokhara,
in which he described them as " innocent travellers,"
and as such requested their release. Kaye rightly
says that had they been then living, such a repudia-
tion of their official character would have sealed their
fate, as it practically proclaimed them to be spies.
Let us hope this is no precedent to be followed in
The First Afghan War. 149
the case of other officers of Government who may
fall into the clutches of barbarous rulers, when
serving their country. Kaye describes the fate of
these officers as "a painful episode in the epic of the
Afghan war." It was so, truly.
The Afghan tragedy is conveniently divided into
three periods, the first of which ends with the
restoration of Shah Suja to the throne of Cabul on
the 7th August, 1839. The second period embraces
those two years of Shah Suja's short reign, during
which he was kept on his throne only by British
bayonets and British gold ; the events which led to
the insurrection of the Afghan tribes against the
Feringhee infidels, as they called the English ; the
subsequent difficulties arising, it is now believed,
more from the divided authority and incapable com-
manders of the British than from the strength of the
enemy ; and the crowning disasters of the retreat
from Cabul and massacre of the whole Cabul division
of the British army and its camp-followers, with the
exception of about a hundred prisoners and one man,
Dr. Brydon, who effected his escape, in a condition
more dead than alive, to Jalalabad, which he reached
on 13th January, 1842. The third and last period is
occupied with the march of the avenging army that
was slowly collected and despatched under General
Pollock from Peshawar to effect a junction with
General Nott's division, which had been shut up in
150 Afghanistan .
Candahar during the winter, but which now com-
menced that extraordinary "withdrawal " to the
plains of India via Ghazni, Cabul, Jalalabad, and
Peshawar, which looked so remarkably like an
advance, that Kaye has rightly designated it as a
retirement "unparalleled, perhaps, in the political
history of the world." The punishment inflicted
upon those deemed guilty of any participation in the
previous disasters to the British arms, more espe-
cially upon the tribes concerned in the massacre of
the retreating British army, was, perhaps, sufficiently
severe, and read the Afghans a lesson which they did
not soon forget. The English prisoners, too, Avho
had almost concluded that they had been abandoned
by the Government to their fate, were recovered after
adventures more thrilling and escapes more wonder-
ful than anything to be found in fiction. The policy
of withdrawal was eventually carried out, and
Afghanistan left to its own people in December
1842, after more than four years of deep anxiety
caused by our wilful interference with its rude politics.
To give anything approaching to an exhaustive
account of these events would far exceed our present
intention, and Sir John Kaye's masterly work on the
Afghan War renders it unnecessary to do so. In his
pages the student of Indian history will never cease
to find delight, for the clear and incisive judgment
which he has brought to bear upon the difficult ques-
The First Afghan War. 151
tions of policy that then arose leaves little to be
desired. The Afghans could have wished no fairer
or more impartial chronicler, while the present
generation of Englishmen may thank him for having
cleared up what was dubious, even where it involved
proving, as in so many instances it did, that our own
action was indefensible.
A correspondent of the Daily News, subscribing
himself " H.J. R.L.," sent the following interesting
account of the escape of Dr. Brydon, the sole sur-
vivor of the Cabul force, who found his way to
Jalalabad, to tell the sad story of its fate.
" H.J.R.L.'s " account agrees substantially with
that given by Sir John Kaye. He says : —
" Dr. Brydon was the doctor of my old regiment.
His pleasant face and rotund figure always made it
the more difficult to realise that he was the only
survivor of that terrible retreat, of which he was
most reluctant to speak. It was towards the end
of the Cabul Pass that a few survivors had strug-
gled. Among them was the native doctor of
Brydon's then regiment. Calling Brydon to him,
he said, ' Doctor Sahib, I cannot possibly escape ;
I am dying from cold and hunger. Take my pony,
and do the best you can for yourself.' Brydon tried
to encourage the poor man, but, seeing that he was
indeed dying, he took the pony, and through the
confusion forced his way to the front. There he
152 Afghaitistaii,
1
found a small group of mounted officers, who, know-
ing they were just at the end of the Pass, where it
opens out on the plain on which Jalalabad stands,
had determined to make a push for life. Seeing
Brydon on this wretched, half-starved pony, they
declared they could not possibly wait for him, as
any delay might cause their utter destruction. On
they went, leaving Brydon slowly toiling after
them. The Afghans saw this group approaching,
met and slew every man ; then, thinking no one else
was coming, went back to the hills. Just then
Brydon passed.
" At Jalalabad the greatest anxiety prevailed as
to the whereabouts of General Elphinstone's force,
no news having come through the Pass, though it
was known he was retreating, when one evening a
man, slowly riding a worn-out pony, was descried
at the entrance of the Pass. Some cavalry were
sent to bring him in. It was Brydon, the only sur-
vivor. As he entered the gate he fell senseless
from fatigue. When he came to himself his first
question was about the pony that had saved his life.
It was dead.
" When Brydon told me the story we were
walking home one night from mess, under the
solemn calm of an Indian night. He bade me
put my finger into the mark left by an Afghan
sabre, which, glancing from a book he had put
TJie First Afghan War. 153
into his forage cap, had sliced a piece of the skull
clean out.
" Brydon took part in the defence of Jalalabad
as one of the ' illustrious garrison,' and, strangely
enough, lived to take part in the defence of Lucknow."
CHAPTER VIII.
AFGHAN AFFAIRS AFTER THE WAR OF 1838—42.
The Real Cause of the Damage to England's Position in Central Asia
from the Cabul Disaster — Lord Ellenborough's Policy in 1842 —
Native Views on the Evacuation of Afghanistan— Rawlinson's
Opinion of the Afghans as Soldiers— England " The Burnt Child,"
and Afghanistan " The Fire "—Internal Affairs of Afghanistan
between the Retreat of General Elphinstone and the Advance of
General Pollock— Muhammad Shah Khan a Noble Exception to the
Generality of the Afghans — Murder of Shah Suja, the Puppet-King
— Accession of Fatih Jang — Akbar Khan Intrigues for Power— Fall
of Fatih Jang— Proclamation of Shuhpur— Lord Ellenborough's
"Song of Triumph" — Policy with Regard to Dost Muhammad
Khan— England's Afghan Pohcy from 1842 to 1852— Origin of the
Persian War of 1856— Herat and Treaty of Paris of 1857— Virtual
Disregard of Treaty by Persia— Dost Muhammad's Neutrality in
1856-58 Purchased— Policy of Subsidies Discussed— Cost of Afghan
War— The Blood Feud between the Afghans and the English— Sir
John Lawrence's Treaties with Dost Muhammad— Extent of Dost
Muhammad's Dominions — He Subdues Candahar and Herat — His
Death— Subsequent Anarchy in Afghanistan— Rival Claimants to the
" Masnad "— Shere Ah, the Designated Successor— His Son, Yakub
Khan, is Made Governor of Herat— Afzul Khan Obtains Possession
of Cabul, and is Proclaimed Amir— Shere All's Defeat— Yakub
Khan's Gallant Achievements— Shere Ali Restored in 1868— He
Suspects Yalvub Khan of Treachery— Yakub Demands to be Acknow-
ledged Heir - Apparent— Open Quarrel Between the Amir and
Yakub— Yakub's Flight— Reconcihation and Imprisonment— Other
Claimants to the Succession.
It was not so much our retirement from Afghan-
istan, in 1842, as the conditions under which it was
Afghan Affairs after the War. 155
carried out that injured British prestige and dis-
paraged England's position in all Central Asia. If,
after recovering the prisoners, our officers had
remained for another year in the country ; and then,
in an orderly and honourable manner, after a
suitable arrangement with the native authorities
into whose hands we might have thought it fitting
to resign the government, we had withdrawn from.
Afghan soil, the effects of our previous disasters
would have been mitigated, if not entirely removed.
But Lord Ellenborough was too anxious to rescue
the armies of Generals Pollock and Nott from what
he considered to be their critical position in an
intensely hostile country, hardly capable of furnish-
ing supplies, always at their wits' end for carriage,
and oppressed with the recollection of the fate that
had so recently befallen their predecessors, to let
delicate consideration of the honour of the English
name weigh with him against the terrible dangers
his imagination saw in a further occupation of
Afghanistan.
Indeed, it was at one time possible — nay, so pro-
bable as to be deemed by some almost certain — that
the fears of the Governor-General would so far
paralyse his judgment that a distinct refusal would
be given to Bollock to advance on Cabul " to assist
the retreat of the Candahar force " as it was the
fashion officially to style that wonderful " retirement
1 5 6 Afghanistan .
on the plains of India vm Ghazni, Cabul, and
Peshawar," to which we have already referred.
What really happened in the end, as the result of
Lord Ellenborough's policy, was that after reading
the natives certain ** lessons" the British army
retired precipitately from Afghan territory without
any understanding having been come to with the
Durani chiefs, and pursued, indeed, by an implacable
foe — generally, but not always, at a respectful
distance — down to the last pass debouching on the
plains. Thus no doubt can be entertained that the
previous ill- effects on our reputation were consider-
ably enhanced ; the general native idea being, both
in India and in Central Asia, that we were in
reality driven from the mountains. Nor has the
belief been uncommon among our own officers that
in retiring from Afghanistan we yielded to superior
strength ; whereas, in truth, never was the country
more thoroughly in our power during the whole
period from the commencement of the Afghan War
than at the moment of our retreat.
It has been asserted on the highest authority,
that, except during the fatal winter of 1841-42, when
by a concurrence of the most unforeseen events, our
forces at Cabul had become utterly demoralised, the
Afghans were never able to make a successful stand,
even for an hour, against either British soldiers or
Indian Sepoys. Sir Henry Rawlinson declared in
Afghan Affairs after the War. 157
1875 that no officer who served through the Afghan
War would hesitate to meet the whole assembled
forces of Cabul and Candahar combined with a
single brigade of British troops ; and even in moun-
tain warfare, Avhere the Afghan marksman with his
"jazail" (or rifled matchlock) had formerly an un-
doubted superiority over " old Brown Bess," the
substitution of the breechloading rifle has now
redeemed our only weakness. Whether Sir Henry
Rawlinson would be willing to commit himself to
such a statement in the fall of 1878, after the recent
information we have received of the state of the
Amir's army, drilled, it is alleged, in part at least, by
Russian officers, and with the arsenals of Russia, as
it is also asserted, to select from, we have no means
of deciding. We opine from the much larger forces
which it has been deemed necessary to assemble on
the north-west frontier that it is not the opinion of
I high military authorities in India that the Afghans
are such contemptible enemies as Sir Henry Raw-
linson, in 1875 at least, supposed. The object, we
should observe, which Sir Henry Rawlinson had in
making the above observation was not to encourage
the idea of our again ascending the passes, but
rather to correct the erroneous impression which he
believed to be generally entertained of the military
strength of Afghanistan, and the consequent over-
estimate that micrht be made of the difficulties which
158 Afghanistan.
would lie in the way of a Russian advance upon
India from any opposition the Afghans themselves
could interpose.
We propose in this and the succeeding chapters of
this book to trace very rapidly, but with as much
succinctness as may be, the relations between
Afghanistan and the British Indian Government
from the evacuation of that country in 1842 to the
present time. This will enable us to consider with
more advantage, perhaps, the causes that may have
led to the present complications, and to estimate the
value, from various standpoints, of the very opposite
opinions that have been called forth upon what will
now take its place in history as " the Afghan ques-
tion of 1878," unless a deeper significance should
accrue to it, demanding a more comprehensive and
far-reaching title.
For a number of years after the Afghan War we
imitated the " burnt child," and studiously avoided
all intercourse with the country that had been the
scene of our disasters.
The three independent Governments of Cabul,
Candahar, and Herat, that had been In existence
before our advent, again asserted their rule. Persia
had too much occupation at home to Interfere with
her eastern neighbour.
Sir John Kaye, In his admirable work on the
Afghan War, has collected from various sources all
Afghmi Affairs after the War. 159
; that is known of the internal affairs of Afghanistan
after the departure of the ill-fated Cabul column,
, which marched forth to destruction under General
I Elphinstone on the 6th of January, 1842, and before
' the arrival of General Pollock with the avencfine
army. Of the wretched puppet-King we had set up
I in the place of the really capable Dost Muhammad,
we know that he remained for a time nominal ruler
of Cabul, to the astonishment indeed of those who
believed that the insurrection which had caused the
: expulsion of the English had been as much directed
against Shah Suja as against his Feringhee patrons.
The fact was that the chiefs dreaded the vengfeance
\ of the English for the fearful injuries dealt to them,
' and felt that Shah Suja was the only one that was
ever likely to stand between them and that ven-
I geance. Of Shah Suja's conduct various opinions
I have been held, some believing that he was the
j original fomenter of the insurrection, but that he
I intended it only to attain such dimensions as would
compel his English patrons to remain and support
him against his enemies ; while others suppose that
he was sincerely friendly to the English, but weak
and incapable to the last degree. There is no
doubt, however, that one Afghan Prince, Muhammad
Zaman Khan, was a noble exception to the mass of
his countrymen ; for while the independence of his
country was dear to him, he never stained his
1 60 Afghanistan .
patriotism with those foul crimes in which others
dehghted ; and it is recorded of him that nothing
could exceed the kindness of this old man to the
English hostages, who found a sanctuary in his
house. He even raised and paid from his limited
resources a force of 3,000 men, chiefly for the pro-
tection of his English guests, or (as they were really) i:
prisoners. This Nawab had been made Vazir or
Minister of Shah Suja ; but soon dissensions broke
out among the rival factions, and mutual distrust
prevented concerted action. Shah Suja was mur-
dered by the son of the Nawab, against the wish, and
notwithstanding the efforts, of the old man to save
him ; and the body of the wretched King, after it
had been stripped of its royal apparel and orna-
ments, was flung into a ditch. His death was the
consummation of the fierce strife that had been
raging between Shah Suja and the Barakzai princes
for forty years.
The second son of Shah Suja, Fatih Jang, was
now raised to the throne, and he condoned the
murder of his father on the ground that it was no fit f
time for avenging private family wrongs when all
ought to make common cause against the infidels.
But the Barakzais were not likely with patience to
see the son of their hated rival seated on the throne.
Civil war soon raged in the city ; and Akbar Khan,
who had remained at a distance with the majority
fro;;;
Afghan Affairs after the War. i6i
; of the English prisoners still in his possession,
waiting to see how matters went at the capital, now
marched on Cabul. Akbar Khan, it will be remem-
bered, was the son of Dost Muhammad, and is
known to history as the murderer of the English
Envoy, Sir William Macnaghten, at a conference
held near the walls of the cantonments at Cabul,
just previous to their evacuation. This prince,
whose character seems to have been a strange
mixture of ferocity and sensibility, besieged Fatih
Jang, the unfortunate young King, in the Bala
Hissar, or citadel of Cabul, and when, at last, the
place was taken, began himself to exercise regal
power by the usual Afghan device of keeping the
nominal sovereign as a puppet. He found it con-
venient to support, as titular prince, this Sad-
dozai youth, Fatih Jang, because the Nawab,
Muhammad Zaman Khan, of his own (Barakzai)
tribe, also claimed to be King of the Afghans. The
good Nawab, who had so nobly protected the
English captives, was defeated in battle, owing to
the desertion of his followers, and was made most
reluctantly to give up his prisoners, whom he had
treated as guests, to the High Priest, Mir Haji.
From his custody they were soon transferred — sold,
we should rather say — to Akbar Khan, who thus
bbtained possession of the persons of all the J^^nglish
ivho had been taken captive before and after the
II
1 62 Afghanistan.
massacre. His object in doing this was to make
good terms for himself on the return of the English
with an avenging army — an event he fully expected.
Fatih Jang was driven from his throne by Akbar
Khan as soon as the latter had possessed himself
of the treasure,* to which Fatih Khan had suc-
ceeded on Shah Suja's death — treasure which had
been amassed from the subsidies drawn from the
Indian Government. P'atih Jang had escaped in
rags and tatters to the camp of General Pollock,
as that officer, with the army of vengeance, was
approaching Cabul. Following General Pollock to
the capital, he was reinstalled on his throne, but was
emphatically told that the English had had enough
of supporting puppet-Kings at Cabul, and he must
now shift for himself. When he learnt this, he
peremptorily refused to wear the crown, and begged
to be allowed to accompany Pollock's camp to India,
a request which was granted both to him and the
old blind King, Zaman Shah, who had now a second
time to find refuge in British territory. Another
King, named Shahpur, of the same unlucky Sad-
dozai family, was proclaimed on the day Pollock
was leaving Cabul, but it was a mere mockery, for
he was dethroned again before the British forces
reached India.
After Lord Ellenborough had proclaimed the
^ About ;^2oo,ooo.
Afghan Affairs after the War. 163
victory of the English troops in his famous proclama-
tion of the Gates, called by the Duke of Wellington
a " Song of Triumph " — than which no document
that ever emanated from the bureau of a statesman
has been more ridiculed and censured for its bom-
bosity and folly — it became necessary to decide what
should be done with Dost Muhammad Khan, who
was, it will be remembered, a prisoner along with his
family in our hands. We had decreed and carried
out his dethronement ; and, deserted by his followers,
and feeling how hopeless was his resistance to British
might, he had surrendered himself to Sir W.
Macnaghten, by whom he was honourably treated,
and forwarded as a State prisoner to Calcutta. It is
unnecessary here to detail the intrigues which fol-
lowed the first departure of the Enghsh from Cabul.
Suffice it to say that when Dost Muhammad found
his way back to his capital, he was not long in re-
gaining his former authority as Amir, and Akbar
Khan became his Vazir, or Chief Minister. From
that time to 1852 we carefully avoided any inter-
ference with Afghan affairs. In that year, however,
died Yar Muhammad Khan, the notorious Minister
of Shah Kamran of Herat, who had, with the aid of
Eldred Pottinger, successfully conducted the siege of
that city against the Persian host in 1837-38.
Persia would gladly have taken advantage of the
confusion that followed upon the Vazir's death to
1 1 — 2
1 64 Afghanistan .
again attempt the reduction of Herat. This, however
Ave prevented by threatening to suspend diplomatic
relations, and so compelled the Shah into a conven-
tion by which he bound himself not to make any
future attack upon Afghan territory. This committed
us, doubtless, to hostilities with Persia in the event of
her breaking the convention, but it was deemed im-
perative to prevent Herat falling into her hands,
chiefly because it was feared she might exchange
that city with Russia for Erivan, or some other place.
This doctrine — that Herat must be independent of
Russia and Persia — has been a political maxim with
most English statesmen ever since.
In 1856 the contingency which had been foreseen
occurred, and Persian troops were sent to occupy Herat,
and did succeed temporarily in doing so. The war
with England followed upon this action — there were
other causes, but this was the most important — during
' the course of which Persia thought it prudent to
abandon its conquest ; and at the Peace of Paris, con-
cluded in 1857, special provisions regarding Herat were
inserted in the Treaty — an evidence of our traditional
dread of Russia. The wisdom of the provision which
burdened us with the liability to attack Persia the
moment she marched eastward has been much ques-
tioned. Still more has the barren stipulation against
the Shah's interference with the Government of Herat
been adversely criticised. That this latter one was
Afghan Affairs after the War. 165
futile soon became evident, for Sultan Ahmad Khan,
a nephew of Dost Muhammad, who was a refugee at
Teheran when the Treaty of Paris was concluded,
was sent by the Persian Shah to assume the reins of
Government immediately upon the withdrawal of the
Persian garrison from Herat, and he remained for the
next five years in undisguised dependence upon
Persia, although his independence was proclaimed, in
deference to their obligations, by both the British
Government and the Shah. A Russian mission,
under M. Khannikof, which visited Herat in 1858,
succeeded in completing the dependency of Sultan
Ahmad upon Persia. In 1857 the great importance
was seen of securing the neutrality of the Amir
Dost Muhammad during the Persian War and the
Indian Mutinies, when the fate of our Indian Empire
seemed trembling in the balance. We, therefore, for
once stepped aside from the policy of non-inter-
ference which had been pursued for fifteen years, and
sent a friendly mission to Afghanistan under Major
Lumsden. Our officers proceeded only to Candahar,
but succeeded in purchasing the Amir's goodwill for
a subsidy of a lakh of rupees (i^io,ooo) per mensem,
to be continued as long as his services might be of
advantage to us.
Of the morality of this bargain. Sir Henry
Rawlinson remarks that it may appear questionable,
and of the terms, he admits that they may seem
1 66 Afghanistan .
exorbitant to English politicians, but, he adds, " when
work is to be done, subsidies are still the rule in the
East, and experience has ever shown that true
economy consists in paying well, or not at all." In
this case the " work " stipulated for in return for
British gold and arms was in reality something which
it is very difficult to buy — viz., friendship. We
wanted — it may safely be stated that we still want
— a friendly Power to be established in Afghanistan.
We had spent seventeen millions of English money
and sacrificed many thousands of English and Indian
lives, in the endeavour to make for ourselves a King
of the Afghans who should be to our liking, and
whom a sense of eternal gratitude for the recovery
of his crown would bind to us completely. We had
failed miserably. The very King we had made
turned to plotting against us ; the people rose,
and with one great effort swept away our legions,
burying them in the dark defiles of their mountains.
The man we had hunted from his throne, and im-
prisoned for no fault, but because it suited the policy
of the Government of the day to do so, had regained
his throne in spite of us, and we expected to make
him our very good friend by a payment of money.
And for a time this mode of securing the friendship
of the Afghan King succeeded, or at least appeared
to succeed. Whether we are now, in the time of his
successor, about to reap the fruits of this subsidising
Afghan Affairs after the War. 167
policy, the effect of which has been to strengthen a
traditional enemy, to stiffen his neck with pride, and,
perhaps, instil into him the notion that, after all, we
have something to fear from his wrath, we leave to
others to decide. In all ^260,000 was paid to the
then Amir of Cabul during the years 1856-58, the
subsidy being continued for fourteen months after
the war with Persia had ceased. The chief reason
for the continuance of the subsidy scarcely needs to
be stated. We were locked in a death-struggle with
our own mutinous Indian army, and it was of the
utmost importance that Dost Muhammad should
refrain from attacking us, and should restrain his
fierce subjects from a general Afghan invasion of the
Panjab. And so Dost Muhammad — our former pri-
soner, whom we had so shabbily treated in 1838-40
— was now courted by an English Envoy, and his
neutrality purchased at the price above mentioned.
The spectacle was one not very creditable, perhaps,
to a dignified Government ; and no wonder Anglo-
Indians have felt sore about it, and made apologies,
on the ground of necessity and expediency, such as
that above quoted. Unfortunately this was not the
last occasion on which an Afghan Prince received
English arms and gold in the vain effort to keep
him " friendly." A time came — not long ago — when
in haughty disdain Shere Ali flung back the prof-
fered rupees, and has bided his time to avow the
1 6 8 Afghan is tan .
hostility that has all along only been latent. Bar-
barous nations delight in blood-feuds ; and if ever
there were grounds for a blood-feud between two
nations, they exist in the case of the Afghans and
ourselves.
It is the duty, however, of a nation calling itself
civilised, not to say Christian, to restrain to the
utmost those savage instincts which, in the case of
individuals, are readily condemned, but in the case
of nations are too often unchecked, if not actually
fostered, by false ideas of patriotism.
Before passing on to more recent events, we should
not omit to mention that Sir John (now Lord)
Lawrence, on behalf of the Indian Government,
signed a treaty in 1855 with the Amir Dost
Muhammad Khan, in which we agreed to respect the
territories of the Amir and his heirs, and the Amir,
for himself and his heirs, agreed to respect the terri-
tories then in the possession of the East India
Company, which have since devolved upon the
Crown. Mr. Henry Richard, M.P., in some letters
published recently in the Christian World, draws
especial attention to this treaty in connection with
the proposed ** rectification " of our frontier. The
only defence, we think, of which an infringement by
us of the second article of this short treaty is at all
capable is, that this second article may be held to
have been cancelled by Shere All's violation of the
AfgJian Affairs after the War. 169
first article, which declares that there shall be peace
and friendsJdp between the parties and their heirs^
Shere Ali has apparently given his friendship to
Russia. In January, 1857, Sir John Lawrence made
a second agreement with Dost Muhammad, under
which the latter received the subsidy of i^ 10,000 per
mensem (in addition to a previous present of
^50,000), to which reference has already been made.
For many years after his restoration Dost
Muhammad's possessions were much curtailed, when
compared with those that formerly owned the sway of
the Durani nionarchs before Shah Suja. Shah Suja
himself had grumbled greatly when we replaced him
on his throne at the diminished area of his kingdom,,
from which Herat, Cashmere, Peshawar, and Sindh
had been lopped off. Dost Muhammad had little
beyond the Cabul valley in his possession. His
brothers at Candahar, and his nephew at Herat, were
independent of him. When Kohandil Khan, of
Candahar, however, died. Dost Muhammad overran
the Western Afghan province, and soon afterwards
commenced a contest with his nephew. Sultan
Ahmad, for the possession of Herat. Persia
naturally resented this attack on her virtual depen-
dent, and we remonstrated with Dost Muhammad.
He persevered, however, in his designs, and the
climax was reached in the summer of 1863, without
our having interfered further in the affair — by a triple
I/O Afghanis ta7t .
and simultaneous catastrophe, the death of Sultan
Ahmad by apoplexy, the fall of Herat to the Cabul
army, and the crowning misfortune of the death of
Dost Muhammad himself.
On the death of the great Barakzai chief, who had
passed through so many vicissitudes of fortune, and
whose name will go down to future generations,
coupled with the history of the most calamitous
period in our own history, Afghanistan relapsed into
temporary anarchy amid the struggles that ensued
for the succession. Dost Muhammad had nominated
Shere Ali, a younger son by a favourite wife, to
succeed him, passing over his many other sons, of
whom Muhammad Afzal and Muhammad Azim, by
an elder wafe, were the most notable. Four pre-
tenders in different parts of the country collected
followers with a view to asserting their claims to the
" masnad," or, as we should say, " throne ;" but the
present rulers of Afghanistan avoid the title of
" Shah " or King. Shere Ali for a short time made
his authority recognised, but alienated many of the
chiefs by placing one of his youngest sons, a youth
of sixteen, named Yakub Khan, in the governorship
of Herat. The standard of revolt was raised all over
the country at almost the same moment, and Shere
Ali was compelled to bend to the storm. His elder
brother, Afzal Khan, succeeded in getting possession
of Cabul, and was there proclaimed Amir of
Afghaji Aff-airs after the War. 171
Afghanistan, although Herat still held out against
him for some time under Yakub Khan, who showed
himself even at that youthful age, a leader of no
mean capacity. He had indeed discovered a con-
spiracy in the interests of one of his uncles in Herat
itself, and had suppressed it with firmness and com-
plete success.
A few months after Shere All's defeat, which
happened in 1866, Yakub was obliged to seek
safety in flight, and Herat was captured by Afzal
Khan. Yakub and his father became exiles, and
the former ineffectually endeavoured to obtain assist-
ance from the Persians. As they declined, however,
to take part with Shere Ali, Yakub, nothing daunted
by the failure of his negotiations, collected a small
band of followers, and, after several smaller engage-
ments round Herat, took that place by a vigorous
attack at the head of 5,000 men. Many were
attracted by Yakub's gallant achievements to his
father's standard, and in 1868 he regained Candahar.
Later on he rendered material assistance in the
recapture of Cabul, when Shere Ali succeeded in
driving out Azim, who had seized the Government
on Afzal's death, in October, 1867. It was in Sep-
tember, 1868, that Shere Ali regained the throne,
and it was almost directly afterwards that the famous
quarrel broke out between him and his brave son,
Yakub Khan, to whose valiant arm it may be said
1/2 Afghanistan .
he owed his restoration. The Amir appears to
have become suspicious of his son, fearing probably
that his military capacity and reputation might
render him a dangerous rival. At the same time
Yakub discovered that Abdulla Jan's mother was
intriguing to secure the succession to her son, a boy
of tender years, but whose place in his father's
regard was shown by his appointment to the
Governorship of Candahar. Accordingly Yakub also
resorted to intrigue with the view of keeping his
hold upon Herat as governor, and at the same time
he demanded to be recognised as Wali-Ahad or
Heir-apparent. Shere Ali gave him no direct
answer, and Yakub followed up his demand by others
more sweeping, most of them relating to an enlarged
share in the administration of the country. His
father temporised by making partial concessions,
which gave Yakub a voice in the government of the
capital, but at the same time he surrounded him with
adherents of his favourite son, the boy Abdulla Jan.
Under these circumstances the position of the bold
and ambitious Yakub became untenable. He per-
ceived that nothing would prevent Abdulla Jan's
nomination as heir-apparent; and in 1870 he fled
from Cabul, accompanied by his full brother Ayub,
a boy of thirteen or fourteen years. Yakub tried
hard to provoke a rebellion against his father, but
Shere All's influence had now become too strong for
Afghan Affairs after the War. 173
all that his sons could do against it. Yakub and
his few adherents were beaten off from Candahar,
Ghazni, and Girishk, and once more he took refuge
in Persia. In the spring of 1871 — this time with
some Persian assistance — Yakub again laid siege to
Herat, and it fell into his hands. Through the
influence of Lord Mayo, father and son became
reconciled. Yakub presented himself at Cabul and
declared himself penitent ; and in September of 1871
he was made Governor of Herat, but with a strong
body of Shere All's adherents around him. Yakub
and Shere Ali's nominees were never in accord,
Yakub endeavouring to keep them from any real
: share in the administration, and they reporting to
1 Cabul everything that might turn to Yakub's dis-
I advantage. There can be little doubt that Yakub
justified their reports, especially after the formal
I nomination of Abdulla Jan as heir-apparent in 1873.
He intrigued with the Persians and the Turkomans ;
and it is believed that he also asked help of the
Russians to assist him against his father ; but he
failed all round. The Amir declined his request to
hold the governorship of Herat in perpetuity, free
from Cabul influence, and in the autumn of
1874 summoned him to Cabul. Yakub suspected
treachery, and demanded a safe conduct, which was
granted. No sooner, however, had the young man
arrived in the capital than his father put him under
1 74 Afghanistan .
arrest, and he has been in confinement ever since.
The Indian Government interceded with the Amir
to spare his hfe, and to treat him well ; but the first
request only was granted. Yakub's imprisonment has
been, according to the best accounts, very rigorous ;
and the story has filtered from Cabul into India that
his intellect has been seriously affected by the harsh-
ness of his treatment. Yakub was a man of rare
energy and talent, but he suffered from the dis-
advantage of having a mother of low birth — a
circumstance which will seriously affect his chances of
coming to the throne, if even it be untrue that he is
insane, and supposing it possible for Shere Ali to
become reconciled to him. Captain Marsh's interview
with Yakub at Herat in 1873 revealed a not unfriendly
disposition on Yakub's part towards England, and
the traveller discovered that Yakub was one of the
few Afghans who could speak English.
We may here shortly notice the other sons and
nephews of Shere Ali, of whom, probably, one will
have to be nominated to succeed the deceased youth,
Abdulla Jan, as heir-apparent.
Ayub Khan, the full brother of Yakub, took no
part in public affairs till he fled with Yakub from
Cabul in 1870. The two lived together at Herat till
Yakub set out on his hapless journey to Shere Ali
in 1874; and when Ayub heard of his brother's
arrest, he endeavoured to prepare Herat for resistance
Afghan Affairs after the War, 175
against his father, and to foment a rebellion in the
neighbourhood, a project which failed. A few
months afterwards he fled into Persian territory,
where, meeting one of the Afghan generals who had
been treacherous to Yakub's cause, he endeavoured
to put him to death. The Persians prevented this.
With Yakub's example before him, Ayub declined
Shere Ali's invitation to return to Cabul, and
we believe that Ayub has ever since lived in exile.
He married a daughter of Shere Ali's half-brother
Aslam, for whose murder Shere Ali was mainly
responsible.
Another claimant to the throne of Cabul is Abdul
Rahman, the son of Shere Ali's eldest brother Afzal.
Rahman took a very active part in his father's cause
against Shere Ali, and in the earlier stages of the
war between Shere Ali and his brothers, he displayed
as much military skill as his cousin Yakub. In the
end, however, Shere Ali defeated him, and he took
refuge at Tashkend. For the past five years the
Russians have given this man ;^ 3.000 a year as a
subsidy, so that they may have a nominee of their
own at hand if disputes again arise in the Afghan
succession. Abdul Rahman has been to St. Peters-
burg ; he is thoroughly Russianised, is considered a
very able man, and Shere Ali is said to be greatly in
fear of his Influence in the district of Balkh.
In addition to these three, Yakub, Ayub, and
176 'Afghanistan .
Abdul Rahman, there is another aspirant to the
throne who does not lie under the disadvantage of
having incurred the Amir's hostiHty. This is Ahmad
Ah*, a youth of seventeen, the son of Shere AH's
eldest son, who fell in battle at the head of his father's
army, in 1865, in a hand-to-hand encounter with his
father's uncle, who was also left dead on the field.
This young man has always been in favour with the
Amir, and would probably have been proclaimed heir-
apparent instead of the late Abdulla Jan but for the
influence of the mother of that prince. He is now
considered to have the best chance of being nominated
as Shere All's successor, Abdulla Jan having died quite
recently, since, indeed, the project of an English
Mission to Cabul was announced.
Abdul Rahman's only hope is in Russian influence.
Even if Yakubbe released, and found in full possession
of his faculties after his long and severe imprisonment,
it is doubtful whether the Afghan nobles would give
him much cordial support, as his low birth on his
mother's side stands in the way of his popularity
with the haughty Afghan chiefs. He is by the latest
accounts, however, still in prison. It is considered
unlikely that the English Government would heartily
support Yakub, because he is believed to have
intrigued with Russia during his latter days at Herat.
We have continued our account of the domestic
affairs of Afghanistan down to the present time.
Afghan Affairs after the War. 177
There is much of importance still to be said of the
foreign relations of the Amir towards Russia and
England, and these will be considered in the next
and concluding chapters.
12
CHAPTER IX.
RUSSIAN ADVANCE EASTWARDS.
Chief Difficulty in Understanding the Central Asian Question— Import-
ance of the News of the Arrival of a Russian Mission at Cabul — Its
Mention in Parliament — Treatment of the Russian Mission— Reason
of Importance Attached to Independence of Afghanistan— Excessive
Cost of Present Indian Forces of Great Britain— Our Real Concern
with Afghanistan— Two Schools of Opinion on our Indian Frontier
Policy— Lord Beaconsfield's Definition of " The Afghan Question "-
His Enunciation of England's Present Policy— Review of Negotiations i
with the Amir— Dost Muhammad's Virtue in Abstaining from Revenge
in 1857— Lord Lawrence's so-called " Masterly Inactivity "—Suc-
ceeded by Different Policy of " Mischievous Activity" — Recognition
of Shere Ali— The Amballa Meeting between Lord Mayo and Shere
Ali— Lord Mayo's Declaration to the Amir Examined— Practical
Assistance in Money and Arms to Shere Ali— Shere All's Over-
sanguine Expectations— View taken of Lord Mayo's Proceedings
by Home Government— Lord Mayo's Explanation— Correspondence
Concerning a "Neutral Zone "—How "Neutral Zone" Defined
in 1872 — Russian Expedition to Khiva — Its Importance to India
— The Worth of Russian Assurances — Lord Granville's Remon-
strances— Expedition against the Turkomans — Shere All's Alarm at
Russia's Advance — Sends his Confidential Agent to Simla — His Pro-
posals to Lord Northbrook — Failure of Negotiations — Shere Ali
Communicates with General Kauffmann — Further Russian Official
Assurances — So-called Exploring Expedition in 1875 — Expedition
against Kizil Arvat in 1876— Russian Advance in Bokhara and
Khokand— Choice of Three Routes for Russian Advance on Afghan
Frontier — Projected Railways — Russian Activity in Central Asia in
Spring of 1878— Last Reported Russian Assurance — Latest Advance
towards India.
In the last chapter we completed the outline of
Afghan history up to the present time, reserving
Rtissian Advance Eastwards. 179
Shere All's relations with his Russian and English
neighbours for consideration along with the wider
subject of what is called the Central Asian question.
Sir Henry Rawlinson and other able men have for
years been labouring to render this difficult subject
intelligible to the English reader. There is naturally
a fascination about it for Anglo-Indians which leads
them on through long and too often dreary pages
crammed full of Oriental names of men and places
dressed in such fantastic guises that they become
frequently insoluble puzzles to those who are versed
in Oriental languages, and must be the most hope-
less enigmas to the ordinary English reader.
The extremely technical nature of most discourses
on the Central Asian question has probably had
much to do with the indifference with which the
English people have treated it. They cannot be
expected to care much about matters which even
experts do not always seem to understand, and so
the news from India that a new page in the history
of Afghan foreign politics had been opened excited
about as much general interest as if it had been
announced that the Sultan of Turkey had been
deposed and another appointed in his place.
Those, however, who called to mind that the
presence of a Russian agent (Viktcvitch) at Cabul
had been one of the proximate causes of our inter-
ference in Afghan politics in 1838, and of our
12 — 2
i8o Afghanistan.
subsequent disasters, attached more importance to
the news tliat General Abramoff had been sent to
Cabul by General Kauffmann, at present Russian
Governor-General of Tashkend, but better known
perhaps as the successful commander in the expedi-
tion against Khiva. We have since learnt that the
officer sent in charge of this so-called " commercial '*
mission was General Stolieteff, not Abramoff. We
naturally credited the Russians with as much honesty
in styling their mission a " commercial " one as we
ourselves exercised when we sent Captain (afterwards
Sir Alexander) Burnes, in 1837, to Dost Muhammad's
Court with a view to gaining him over as an
ally against Russo-Persian aggression. We called
Burnes's mission "commercial," although it was
political from the first, and had an object very far
from friendly to Russia. Ei'go, we supposed Russia
meant General Stolieteff to exercise other than mere
"commercial " functions at Cabul. The closing hours
of the last Session of Parliament were harassed by
questions from anxious members as to the truth of
reports from India which spoke of the projected
despatch of an English mission to Cabul to counter-
act the influence of the Russian envoy. The news
of the latter's arrival at Cabul reached us on the nth
of August. We heard at the same time that Lord
Lytton had, on the 22nd July preceding that,
addressed letters to the Amir. The Russian mission,
Russian Advance Eastwards. iSi
we now know, had reached Cabul in June, after (it is
alleged) Shere Ali had shown great disinclination to
receive it. Once, however, in his capital, he appears
to have treated his unbidden guests well, to have
given them a royal salute, to have held a review of
his troops in their honour, and to have sent a mission
of his own to General Kauffmann in return. Part of
the Russian mission remained behind at Cabul, and
the rest returned to Tashkend with the Afghan
officers of the Amir. We have heard plenty of
rumours since of caravans of Russian arms and
ammunition having reached Cabul, and of Russian
officers swarming into Afghanistan to drill the Afghan
troops after the most approved European methods.
Of what has actually passed between the Amir
and his Russian visitors we know hardly anything,
and we can only conjecture from his conduct since
their arrival whether he has given ear to their
counsels or not.
The reader will scarcely now need to be told that
for years past it has been an axiom with most Anglo-
Indian politicians that any interference by Russia
with Afghanistan ought to be made a subject of
remonstrance and, if necessary, of war. The reason for
this state of feeling has been obviously the dread
that if Russia were permitted to establish herself in
Afghanistan, she would thereby be enabled to con-
solidate her power in Central Asia, to complete her
1 8 2 Afghanistan .
long line of communication with her European
provinces, not only through the difficult tracts of
desert and steppe that now separate Orenburgh from
Tashkend, but through the territories of Persia, over
which Alexander the Great marched with so much
apparent ease to India, and so threaten our Indian
frontier in a way that can hardly now be realised.
The consequence of Russia's possession of Afghan-
istan would, it is believed, be to put British India in
perpetual dread of Russian invasion ; and as our
Indian feudatories and fellow-subjects are supposed
to be particularly sensitive to Russophobia, and many
of them, indeed, have been even credited with a
willingness to get rid of our yoke altogether at the
risk of only changing their masters, the one certain
result of such an event would be that a large army of
observation would be required to guard our existing
frontier. Those who think we are not justified in
extending our frontier, even by peaceful negotiation
— believing that a still more advanced frontier would
be still more costly to defend — do not deny that if
Russian influence were to become paramount in
Afghanistan, we should have to keep up a larger
European army than at present in India.
Few persons are aware how large a proportion of
the revenues of India are already expended for
military purposes. The Indian army charges for the
current year are estimated at ;^ 15,800,000, while the
Ri{ssian Advance Eastwards. 183
whole revenue derived from Excise, Customs, salt
duties, stamps, and land revenue, is rather less than
;^35,ooo,ooo. We thus see that in India nearly one-
half of the taxes are spent for military purposes ;
while in England, which is as rich as India is poor,
the army expenses for the current year are estimated
^t £ 1 5»595.Soo, or less than one-fourth of the revenue
derived from Customs, Excise, stamps, land tax,
income tax, and house duty, which amounts to about
^66,500,000. Again, if the results of the army ex-
penditure in England and India are compared, it will
be seen that while the expenditure for both services
is almost identical, the strength of the English service
is — regular army, 128,037 \ ai'my reserve (first and
second class), 43,000 ; militia and militia reserve,.
^"^^^77^ ; ^nd volunteers and yeomanry, 254,734 — or a
total of 562,549 men. On the other hand, the Indian
army numbers only 62,650 European and 125,000
native troops, or a total of about 188,000 men. The
excessive cost of the Indian army — two-thirds of
which is composed of native forces — as compared
with that of England, seems to demand attention,,
with a view to a decrease, if possible, rather than an-
augmentation.
Thus, if we once grant the assumption that Russia
intends, if left alone, to advance her frontier prac-
tically to the Suliman Mountains and the Khaibar
Pass, we cannot avoid the conclusion that such a
1 84 Afghanistan .
proceeding on her part will involve us in heavy ex-
penditure.
If our present frontier were universally considered
defensible, no one could reasonably hope to persuade
England to go to war with Russia in order to keep
her out of Afghanistan. We do not ourselves want
that country for its own sake ; but the utmost concern
we could feel with regard to it is that it should either
be independent and friendly, or so under our control as
to be prevented from being used against us by Russia.
Those who regard our present frontier as a
sufficiently strong one, or as capable of being made
so, or, at least, that it is better to put up with it than
advance it any further, object with great vehemence
to the recent policy of Lord Lytton and the Con-
servative Government as needlessly involving us in
complications that may lead to a war which they think
would have no adequate cause. To this school
belong such high authorities as Lord Lawrence,
General Sir John Adye, Lords Mayo, Northbrook,
and Napier, and Sir Henry Norman. To these, Mr.
Fawcett adds the Duke of Wellington, Lord
Hardinge, Lord Sandhurst, Sir Herbert Edvvardes,
General Nicholson, General Beecher, and General
Reynell Taylor. On the other side are ranged Sir
Bartle Frere, the late Governor of Bombay, and,
apparently, the present military advisers of Lord
Lytton and the Premier.
Russian Advance Eastzvards. 185
We have spoken of " the Afghan question " hitherto
as if it were merely one concerning the rectification
of our Indian frontier. In doing so we have followed
the line taken by Lord Beaconsfield in his speech at
the Mansion House on November 9th. Our readers
will remember that on that occasion the Premier
said : — " So - far as the invasion of India in that
quarter [meaning on the north-western frontier] is
concerned, it is the opinion of Her Majesty's Govern-
ment that it is hardly practicable. The base of
operations of any possible foe is so remote, the
communications are so difficult, the aspect of the
country so forbidding, that we have long arrived at
an opinion that an invasion of our Empire by passing
the mountains which form our north-western frontier
is one which we need not dread. But it is a fact
that that frontier is a haphazard, and not a scientific
frontier ; and it is possible that it is in the power of
any foe so to embarrass and disturb our dominion
that we should, under the circumstances, be obliged
to maintain a great military force in that quarter, and,
consequently, entail upon this country and upon
India a greatly increased expenditure. These are
evils not to be despised, and, as I venture to observe,
they have for some time, under various Viceroys and
under different Administrations, occupied the attention
of our statesmen. But while our attention was
naturally drawn also to this subject, some peculiar
1 86 Afghanistan.
circumstances occurred in that part of the world
which rendered it absolutely necessary that we should
give our immediate and earnest attention to the
subject, and see whether it was not possible to ter-
minate that absolute inconvenience and possible
injury, which must or would accrue if the present
state of affairs were not touched and considered by
the Government of the Queen. With these views we
have taken such measures as we think will effect the
object we require. When these arrangements are
made — and I cannot suppose that any considerable
time will elapse before they are consummated — our
north-western frontier will no longer be a source of
anxiety to the English people. We shall live, I
hope, on good terms with our immediate neighbours*
and perhaps not on bad terms with some neigh-
bours that are more remote. But, in making
these remarks I should be sorry for it to be
believed that it was the opinion of Her Majesty's
Government that an invasion of India was im-
possible or impracticable. On the contrary, if Asia
Minor and the Valley of the Euphrates were in
the possession of a very weak or of a very powerful
State, an adequate force might march through the
passes of the Asian mountains, through Persia, and
absolutely menace the empire of the Queen. Well,
we have foreseen that possibility, and have provided
for what we believe will secure its non-occurrence.
Russian Advance Eastivards. 187
and the chief mode by which we have provided for
that result is that convention with Turkey of which
you have heard so much. By that convention we
have secured that the regions in question shall be in
the possession of an ally, and at the same time, if he
I fulfils, as we do not doubt he will fulfil, the conditions
I of that agreement, they will be in the possession of
an ally supported by subjects whose prosperity every
year will render his authority more firm and valid.
In effecting this result we have occupied the island
of Cyprus, in order to encourage and strengthen and
aid the Sultan." We have quoted the whole passage
referring to Afghan affairs, as it contained the most
authoritative statement we had had given to us up to
that date of the state of our relations with the Amir.
It was an important disclosure which informed us
that "the Afghan question" w^as one mainly of "a
rectification of frontier," and not, as the English
public for some time believed, a question of upholding
the honour of England against insult.
Without discussing further here the merits and
demerits of the rival frontier policies, we continue
our brief review of the negotiations that have passed
between the Indian Government and the Amir of
Afghanistan since the death of Dost Muhammad in
1863. It will be remembered that we had concluded
a treaty with Dost Muhammad in 1855, by which
each party bound himself to respect the integrity of
1 8 8 Afghanistan .
the other's territories, a treaty which was followed
by a subsidy of £io,OQO a month during our war
with Persia, and until we put down the Indian
mutiny. The virtue displayed by Dost Muhammad
in abstaining- from an invasion of Northern India
during the mutiny ^of 1857 has been so loudly ex-
tolled of late that it is desirable to point out to those
who would attribute it to excessive generosity on his
part that there were two very good reasons why he
did not avail himself of the opportunity to strike a
blow against us : first, that he was paid handsomely
not to do so ; and secondly, that he had seen with
what ease the English had dethroned him in 1839,
and how effectually we had avenged our subsequent
disasters. Lord Northbrook has especially referred
to Dost Muhammad's forbearance as proof of the
good results of conciliation. This latter reflection
may have had quite as much to do with keeping
him staunch as any feeling of generosity, a sentiment
which he could hardly be expected to entertain
towards the British Power.
From the death of Dost Muhammad to the year
1868 Afghanistan was the scene of internecine wars,
a short summary of which has been given in the last
chapter. Lord Lawrence was Governor-General
during that period, and as one of his successors in
the Viceroyalty (Lord Northbrook) said of his policy
the other day, '' most wisely abstained from all
RtissiaJt Advance Eastwards. 189
interference " in these domestic quarrels, " only
saying that whoever became ruler of the country
would be recognised as such by the British Govern-
ment." It was to this abstention on the part of
Lord Lawrence from interference in the affairs of
Afghanistan that the late Mr. Wyllie, an Indian
civilian whom Lord Northbrook described as '* very
able," applied the term " masterly inactivity," of
which so much has been made since. The phrase,
however, of masterly inactivity in no way applied to
the policy pursued since that day. Indeed, Mr.
Wyllie himself, who had written the article headed
" Masterly Inactivity " in the Fortnightly Review,
wrote another called " Mischievous Activity," and
gave the reasons he had to advance against the
policy afterwards pursued by Lords Lawrence and
Mayo after the civil war in Afghanistan had come to
an end. This later policy consisted in extending to
Shere Ali, who had got the upper hand of his
brothers, that moral support which had been pre-
viously withheld, and of entering into closer relations
with him. With regard to both these lines of policy
Lord Northbrook has recently given his opinion
that they were wisely adopted. When the resolve
to recognise Shere Ali was made, Lord Beaconsfield
was Premier and Sir Stafford Northcote Secre-
tary of State for India. Lord Lawrence, however,
resigned office to Lord Mayo in January, 1869,
1 90 Afghanistan.
before the new programme had been carried out.
We know that it included one of those gorgeous
State ceremonies in which the Orientals and Conser-
vative Premiers are said to delight. Lord Mayo
met Shere Ali at Amballa in March, and had a
conference with him, surrounded by all the pomp
which attends those viceregal assemblies, and, after
hearing all that Shere Ali wanted, he decided what
he would give him, and what he did not feel it con-
sistent with British interests to give him, and, as
Lord Mayo has been challenged a good deal by the
Press as to what he did, it is only fair to him to use
his own words as to what he intended to give and
what he did give on that occasion. He said on the
1st of July, 1869: — "While we distinctly intimated
to the Amir that under no circumstances should a
British soldier ever cross his frontier to assist him in
coercing his rebellious subjects ; that no European
officers should be placed as residents in his cities ;
that no fixed subsidy or money allowance should be
given for any named period ; that no promises of
assistance in other ways should be made ; that no
treaty would be entered into obliging us under any
circumstances to recognise him and his descendants?
as rulers in Afghanistan, we were prepared by the
most open and absolute present recognition, and by
every public evidence of friendly disposition, of re-
spect for his character, and interest in his fortunes, to
Russian Advance Eastwards. 191
give all the moral support in our power, and, in
addition, we were willing to assist him with money,
arms, ammunition, and native artificers, and in other
ways, whenever we deem it possible or desirable
to do so."
Three matters in this declaration specially deserve
notice. First, Lord Mayo promised that no Euro-
pean officer should be placed in Shere All's territory
without his consent. This was only following the
request of Dost Muhammad, who had said, in 1856,
to Lord Lawrence, " If we are to be friends, do not
force British officers upon me." The sound policy
of this promise, which seemed like a concession, has
been questioned, but a later Viceroy has approved of
it, for the apparently very good reason that " unless
British officers were to be there on good relations,
they would be of no use whatever." It must not be
supposed either, that because we were not to have
European officers accredited to Shere All's Court,
the Viceroy would be unrepresented. A native
Envoy has, until the present rupture in our rela-
tions with him, uninterruptedly resided at the
Amir's Court.
The second matter to be observed is the rejection
of a proposal for a treaty guaranteeing his domi-
nions unconditionally from without.
The third point is the refusal of a promise to sup-
port any one at his death whom he might have
192 Afghan is tan .
nominated heir. To have guaranteed his dominions
unconditionally would have been to encourage
him to attack his neighbours ; and to have given
the promise to support his nominee in obtain-
ing the " masnad " after his death would have
been to commit ourselves to interfere in the
domestic policy of Afghanistan, and against such
interference we had had sufficient warning in former
years.
To counter-balance our refusal of these requests
" practical assistance in the shape of money and war
materials" was offered to the extent of 12 lakhs
of rupees (^1,200,000) in all, besides arms, guns, and
ammunition. The only return which the Governor-
General expected for this being " abiding confidence,
sincerity, and goodwill."
Sir Henry Rawlinson remarks upon this trans-
action, that Lord Clarendon may have been "justified
— in so far as he possessed any knowledge of the
intentions of the Indian Government — in assuring
Prince Gortschakoff at Heidelberg that Sir John
Lawrence's policy in assisting Shere Ali Khan 'had
no reference to the advances of Russia in Central
Asia ; ' but no one conversant with the negotiations
which preceded the Amballa Conference can doubt
that these advances did exercise a very important
influence on the feelings and conduct of the Amir of
Cabul."
Russian Advance Eastwards. 193
But, however clear and unqualified the refusal of
Lord Mayo to the proposed guarantee and promise
of future support may appear to us now, it is not
certain that, in 1869, Shere Ali did not believe he
had been granted more than in fact was conceded.
For Lord Mayo did give a written declaration that
the British Government " would view with severe
displeasure any attempt on the part of his rivals to
disturb his position." Coupling this with Sir John
Lawrence's promise of " practical assistance in the
shape of money and materials of war," to be fur-
nished to him in the future " at the discretion of the
head of the administration in India," and Lord
Mayo's confirmatory declarations that " any repre-
sentation he might make would always be treated
with consideration and respect," it is believed Shere
Ali went away understanding these expressions of
general interest in a more liberal sense than they
were meant to convey. It is thought, says Sir
Henry Rawlinson, that he considered " the threat of
* severe displeasure ' to be equivalent to an assurance
of armed support against his allies, while the pro-
mised consideration of his future demands amounted
iin his view, to an almost unlimited credit on the
Indian Exchequer."
Two views of Lord Mayo's proceedings were taken
by the authorities in England. The bolder spirits
would have preferred a bolder policy, to the extent
13
1 94 Afghan istan.
of accepting the liability of an armed intervention by-
giving the Amir a direct guarantee of protection
against Insurrection and also invasion, taking due
advantage of the favourable positions we should then
have obtained to secure the Afghan frontiers, and to
establish our influence permanently in the country.
The more cautious statesmen with whom the deci-
sion rested were, on the contrary, of opinion that
Lord Mayo had already gone too far, the threat
of " severe displeasure " against Shere All's Internal
enemies having probably committed us to a more
active interference in Afghan politics than had been
contemplated, or suited the interests of India.
Lord Mayo explained that, without risking the
failure of the whole scheme, he could not avoid using
the language objected to, and pointed to the results,
in Shere All's strengthened position at Cabul, as the
best justification of his policy.
On the very day of the Umballa Conference a
very Important correspondence on Central Asian
affairs was commenced between Lord Clarendon, the
British Foreign Minister, and the Russian Govern-
ment. This had for its object the demarcation of
what has been called " a neutral zone " of territory
between the frontier of undoubted British and
Russian dominions. The suggestions for laying
down such a zone sprang from the anxiety to allay
the increasing disquietude of the Native States along
Russian Advance Eastwards. 195
the north-west frontier of India, which was caused by
the persistent approaches of Russia. The Govern-
ment of Lord Mayo regarded the proposal almost as
an attack on their independent action ; but Lord
Clarendon seems to have really thought it desirable
in the interests of both Governments to have a
neutral zone. The great objection to such an
arrangement would be that it would make either
Power responsible to the other for its dealings with
the peoples inhabiting their frontiers, many of whom
often require chastisement for marauding attacks on
the subjects of the great Powers. The correspon-
dence dragged its slow length along, characterised
by some geographical errors not creditable to our
Foreign Office, until 1872, when Her Majesty's
Government notified to Russia the extent of terri-
tory which Shere Ali claimed on the Upper Oxus,
and to which they were prepared to recognise his
I right. In expressing the boundaries native authority
I had to be followed, for we knew little or nothing of
the bend of the river Oxus to the northward, or of
I the upper feeders from Pamir. Thus it was not
defined which of the feeders was the main stream of
I the Oxus, and so for a time it seemed that part of
Wakhan had been abandoned to Russia. Subse-
quent inquiries seem to show that the feeder entitled
to be considered the main stream really forms the
northern boundary of that province. The territories
13—2
ig6 Afghanistan .
thus indicated as belonging to Afghanistan were then
formally declared by Prince Gortchakoff to be " com-
pletely outside the sphere within which Russia
might be called to exercise her influence." iThe
Russian boundary line is therefore that of her
dependencies, Khokand and Bokhara, and is con-
terminous with the frontiers of Badakhshan and
Wakhan, which were conceded by Russia to belong
to the Amir. We may here briefly refer to the
Russian conquest of Khiva in 1873.; This expedi-
tion, says Rawlinson, " afl*ords an a'pt illustration of
the normal course of Russian progress in the East."
It resulted in the annexation of a large extent of
territory to the Russian Empire, and reduced Khiva
to a perfect state of vassalage, and thus finally
secured access to those strategic lines across the
Steppe, which were essential to Russia's further
progress, and which had been, in fact, the primary
object of the expedition.
But the importance to India of the Khivan cam-
paign, and its results, perhaps, chiefly lies in the
remarkable light thrown by them upon Russian
diplomacy. More notable instances of repudia-
tion of promises could scarcely be found in modern
history than those given by Prince Gortchakoff in
the course of the representations that passed between
him and the British Foreign Office.
Khiva had been mentioned during the earlier
Russian Advance Eastzvards. 197
negotiations in 1869 that aimed at making the Oxus
the Hmit of Russian influence. The Russian Ambas-
sador in London had objected to that river being
the boundary, because it would include a portion
of Khiva which lies to the south of the Oxus,
and Russia would then be debarred from punishing
the ruler for outrages on Russian subjects. Lord
Clarendon, the English Foreign Minister, admitted
the right of the Czar to punish the Khan " on his own
territory," but added this important proviso : — " That
England would rely on the honour of Russia, as soon
as she had obtained reparation, again to revert to the
arrangement, should she have assented to it, and
consider the Upper Oxus as the boundary which was
not to be passed." Shortly after that conversation
rumours of an intended expedition against Khiva
assumed a definite shape, and Sir A. Buchanan, our
Ambassador at St. Petersburg, questioned Prince
Gortchakoff on the subject. The Chancellor denied
that the Russian Government had any intention " to
despatch a military expedition to Khiva." He
declared, moreover, that " he would never consent to
any further extension of the territory of the empire."
" Prince Gortchakoff's language was so apparently
sincere," exclaimed Sir A. Buchanan, "that, not-
withstanding the strong grounds which exist for
believing that an expedition is preparing against
Khiva, I shall endeavour " to believe every word the
I qS Afghanistan .
Russian Chancellor has said. In the course of some
further conversation on the Khivan question in June,
1870, Prince Gortchakoff assured the English
Ambassador that " Russia neither required nor
desired to possess the khanates." Khokand and
Bokhara, he said, were ready to act according to her
wishes, but Khiva was still disposed to be hostile.
Nevertheless, at the same moment, Russia was
secretly preparing an expedition to Khiva ; while as
to Bokhara, within two months of the last-mentioned
date Russia took the important Bokharian fortress
of Shahr-i-subz (August 24, 1870). But the promises
about Khiva still went on.
In June, 1871, it was admitted that an expedition
to punish the Khan of Khiva for attacks on caravans
had been thought of, but we were assured that it
would not take place. In March, 1872, the Director
of the Asiatic Department at St. Petersburg (M.
Stremooukoff) admitted that reconnaissances had
been already made against Khiva, and that the
Russian generals had found " the occupation of the
place would offer no strategical difficulties." In
summing up the result of his conversation with M.
Stremooukoff, Lord Augustus Loftus wrote : — " I
have gained the conviction that an expedition
against Khiva is decided upon, and will be made as
soon as the weather and circumstances permit."
Six or seven months later the Russian papers
Russian Advance Eastzvards. 199
announced that the expedition had been prepared,
but M. Westmann denied (in September) that
measures had advanced to such a stage. He, how-
ever, practically admitted that if the Khan interfered
with commerce, and refused to give up the Russian
prisoners, the Russian Government would punish
him. As the winter advanced evidence increased of
the Russian intention to send a force against Khiva.
The subject came up, as we have already described, in
the celebrated interview between Count Schouvaloff
and Lord Granville. The Russian representative
admitted that an expedition was decided upon for
the spring, but declared that both its composition
and its objects would be insignificant. The force
would consist of " but four-and-a-half battalions,"
and its objects would be " to punish acts of
brigandage, to recover fifty Russian prisoners, and to
teach the Khan that such conduct on his part could
not be continued. Not only," continued Count
Schouvaloff, "was it far from the intention of the
Emperor to take possession of Khiva, but positive
orders had been prepared to prevent it, and direc-
tions given that the conditions imposed should be
such as could not in any way lead to a prolonged
occupancy of Khiva." It was not long before the
departure of the expedition gave an opportunity for
testing the veracity of one of Count Schouvaloff's
promises. The insignificant force of four-and-a-half
200 AfgJianistmi.
battalions grew into three columns, which altogether
numbered about 10,000 men, and was accompanied
by forty guns. On June 10, 1873, Khiva fell, and
the time came for fulfilling the second of Count
Schouvaloff's engagements. The treaty which was
imposed upon the Khan, in face of the Russian
promise to make no territorial accessions, bestowed
on Russia the Avhole of the Khivan territory on the
right bank of the Oxus. Besides thus taking pos-
session of a large extent of country, the treaty
prepared the way for the entire absorption of the
khanate, if Russia were so minded. It imposed an
enormous indemnity, the payment of which ex-
tended over nineteen years ; it extorted a declaration
from the Khan of Russian suzerainty, and a renun-
ciation of the right to maintain diplomatic relations
or enter into treaties with the rulers of neighbouring
khanates. Russia also obtained exclusive control of
the navigation of the Oxus, and the right to establish
commercial buildings on the left bank of the river.
Lord Granville, when the treaty was communicated
to him in January, 1874, merely replied, in cold and
measured terms, that " Her Majesty's Government
saw no practical advantage in examining too
minutely how far the Khivan arrangements were
in strict accordance with the assurances given by
Count Schouvaloff as to the intentions with which
the expedition was undertaken." " This dignified
Rtissia7i Advajice Eastwards. 201
rebuke," says Sir Henry Rawlinson, " seems to have
rankled somewhat in the hearts of the Russian
statesmen, who, however, did not condescend to any
apology or explanation further than by calling their
acquisition of territory on the right bank of the
Oxus 'sterile and onerous,' and contrasting its dis-
advantages with the brilliant position they might
have gained had they yielded to the pressing invita-
tion of the Khan that they should place a garrison
in the town of Khiva." Lord Granville, however,
proposed another arrangement. He declared the
necessity of " a clear and frank understanding "
as to the relative position of British and Russian
interests in Asia, but suggested no definite plan
for the attainment of that object further than
to recommend another pledge from Russia not to
take Merv nor interfere with the independence of the
Amir of Afghanistan. Lord Granville's moderation
proved very agreeable to the Government of St.
Petersburg. Prince Gortchakoff expressed his
" entire satisfaction" at the "just view which Lord
Granville had taken." " In my opinion," he ex-
claimed, "the understanding is complete." All that
was required, according to his opinion, for the future
agreement of the two Governments was a spirit of
mutual goodwill and conciliation. The understand-
ing between the two Powers rested " not only upon
the loyalty of the two Governments, but upon mutual
202 Afghanistan.
political advantages." As a proof of this loyalty, he
repeated "the positive assurance that the Imperial
Cabinet continues to consider Afghanistan as entirely
beyond its sphere of action." This was in January,
1874.
It is necessary here to follow in some detail the
advances of Russia in Central Asia since the fall of
Khiva. The most important event, perhaps, in her
progress eastwards has been the subjugation of the
Yomut and Goklan Turkomans. This has pushed
her frontier on towards Merv, a large city and a
strong strategical position, which was supposed to be
her next object. Shere Ali, alarmed at the reported
advance upon Merv, as well as by the example of the
Khivan Expedition, had sent his confidential agent
in September, 1873, to wait on the Viceroy (Lord
Northbrook) at Simla to discuss the general question
of the Indo- Afghan relations.
In those negotiations it is curious to observe that
the Amir treated the safety of Afghanistan as essen-
tially necessary to the safety of India, and he pro-
posed that the British Government should assist
him with money and arms. Money he had already
received to the extent of two lakhs of rupees, and
he was now promised ten lakhs in addition, as well
as 10,000 Enfield and 5,000 Snider rifles. But it
soon appeared that these large grants did not satisfy
the Amir's wants. He evidently thought it the duty
Russian Advance Eastwards, 203
of England to supply him with whatever he deemed
necessary to make Afghanistan secure from invasion.
He dreaded a Russian advance upon Merv, and he
wished to make this country responsible for pro-
tecting him against the consequences of that advance
being continued to Herat. The English Govern-
ment showed no unwillingness to accept a consider-
able share of the duty which the Afghan ruler
desired to place upon them. It was declared that
" in the event of any aggression from without, the
British Government would in all probability afford
material assistance in repelling an invader," and
Lord Derby stated in the House of Lords (May 8,
1874) that "it was highly probable this country
would interfere " in the case of any attack upon the
independence of Afghanistan. Nevertheless, the
negotiations with the Amir did not progress favour-
ably. The chief obstacle to a definite course of
action arose from the refusal of Shere Ali to enter
into reciprocal engagements. He declined to accept
a proposed survey by English officers of the frontier
which he considered to be exposed to Russian
attack ; and he was equally indisposed to permit the
presence of Residents at Cabul, Herat, or Candahar,
whom the English Government desired to place there
in order to prevent this country from undertaking
any measures on behalf of Shere Ali without
knowing why. From that period we may date the
204 Afghanistan.
defection of Shere Ali from the English alliance.
Shortly after the Simla conference had revealed to
the Amir that England considered some return for
her responsibility necessary on his part, we find him
in communication with General Kaufmann. That
officer was wise enough to express horror at the
rebellion of Yakub Khan, which naturally pleased
the Amir better than our intercession in the young
Prince's behalf. But all the time that General Kauf-
mann was thus coquetting with Shere Ali, Prince
Gortchakoff was renewing his promises to have
nothing to do with Afghanistan.
For although the last official correspondence which
the English Government has thought fit to publish
dates as far back as January, 1874 — when Prince
Gortchakoff replied to Lord Granville's remon-
strance about Khiva — we have gleaned from time to
time through the Indian, German, and Russian Press
some information as to the course of events.* " Thus
in the summer of 1875, when it was supposed that a
Russian expedition directed against the Turkomans
would seize Kizil Arvat, as a step towards Merv,
it was also declared by an Indian newspaper that
Russia had pledged herself not to extend her terri-
tory in the direction of the Atrek river. "f
■^ See Publishers' Note prefixed.
+ Persia claimed that her territories extend beyond this
river to its watershed, and include the valleys of all the
r
Russian Advance Eastwards. 205
Within a few weeks of that engagement we had
news of a scientific exploring expedition, starting
from Krasnovodsk to " the old bed of the Oxus."
Instead, however, of its having that innocent object,
it turned out to be a Cossack force from Chikisliar,
along the course of the Atrek, which succeeded in
obtaining the submission of certain tribes in the
neighbourhood of that river and the Simbar. This
was in 1875, and other expeditions followed in 1876
and 1877. All this time the Russian Government,
according to their semi-official journals, were endea-
vouring to restrict General Lomakin's operations,
and it came with surprise upon this country in 1876
that in the course of that year a small Russian
expedition had actually reached Kizil Arvat. That
demonstration, however, seems to have been no
more than a reconnaissance ; but in the following
year a new expedition, consisting of 4,000 men,
marched in the same direction. Beyond the
announcement that the force reached Kizil Arvat,
the Russian newspapers threw no light upon its
operations. Current reports, which were probably
true, represented that General Lomakin suffered a
severe defeat, and this was ultimately admitted by
affluents of that river, to the north of which the Simbar is one,
and she also claimed the Yomuts inhabiting those valleys as
her subjects. Little regard, however, has been paid by Russia
to this claim, as she has estabHshed a military post on the
Atrek.
2o6 Afghanistan.
the RnssJd Mir. The information supplied by the
Indian Press respecting these expeditions indicates
that the Russian endeavour to advance towards Merv
was not overlooked by the Viceroy and his Council.
These were the days of Lord Salisbury's appeals to
large-scale maps, and he seems to have rejected all
proposals that may have been made by the Indian
Government for counteracting Russian enterprise
against the Turkomans and Merv. It may be that
the Indian Secretary received some assurances from
the Russian authorities that Merv was not to be
interfered with, and that his simple faith in Russia's
promises was undisturbed. Indeed, an Allahabad
paper recently announced that in 1876 Prince
Gortchakoff added one more to the long series of
pledges "to regard Afghanistan as remaining out-
side the sphere of Russia's action."
Meanwhile, Russia's advance was being continued
in Bokhara and Khokand. Khokand had become
Russian territory, and the last remnants of Bok-
hara's independence had been destroyed. Although
the Czar and his Chancellor had professed to regret
the conquest of the northern portion of Bokhara,
and had even promised to restore Samarkand to the
Amir of Bokhara, yet, in 1873, they compelled him
to enter into a treaty, by which he virtually placed
his country in the possession of Russia.
The course of procedure with regard to Khokand
Russian Advance Eastivards. 207
was exactly similar. In that case also there were the
professed regrets at the cruel necessity of annexing a
portion of the territory. There were the same pro-
mises that the terms of Russian advance in that
region had been reached, and that what was left
should be independent. Nevertheless, on the 7th of
February, 1876, the portion of the country that had
been suffered to remain under the rule of Khudayar
Khan was annexed, and received the name of Fer-
ghana, its feudatory State of Karateghin being alone
left in a condition of semi-independence.
Russia has thus, by means of her recent conquests,
obtained the choice of three routes by which she can
advance upon the Afghan frontier from the Oxus.
These are — first, from Charjui through Merv to
Herat ; second, from Karshi to Andkhui ; and,
third, by Khoja Salih ferry to Balkh and the
Bamian Pass. She would then have the Oxus, with
its steamboat service to and from Lake Aral, for
her base and source of supplies. It is certain, also,
that she would be able to greatly strengthen her
position in Turkestan in the course of a {i^\n years, if
allowed to do so, by railways through Persia, con-
necting the Russian possessions on the Oxus directly
with the ports of the Black Sea. There are several
such schemes at present in nubibiis, but capable of
development, if opportunity offers. The most feasible
of these seems to be the proposal to make a railway
2o8 Afghanistan.
from Batoum on the Black Sea, which has now be-
come a Russian port, to Erivan, Tabriz, and Teheran,
thus passing through the eastern extremity of Arme-
nia and the Persian provinces of Azerbijan, Ghilan,
and Mazanderan. This would have to be continued
through Khorasan for another seven or eight hun-
dred miles, to connect Batoum with Herat.
The Russian system of railways ends at present at
Orenburg, and no scheme of continuing it through
Khiva to Merv has been suggested but may be re-
garded as purely imaginary. But the expectations
that have been raised by mooting these schemes
are altogether extravagant. Persia is miserably
poor, and no railway such as the one suggested
would pay. It is doubtful, too, whether Russia, after
the late exhausting war, has any means of raising
the enormous sums that such gigantic undertakings
would require. Her hold on the newly-conquered
provinces of Turkestan Avill require to be further
strengthened, and her administration more fully
organised, before such schemes will commend them-
selves to her own or foreign capitalists ; even were
she to attempt to raise the necessary funds by
guaranteeing a remunerative rate of interest, after
the example set by the Indian Government.
That she is disposed to be inactive in Central
Asia is negatived by the recent events there. Long
before the Congress met at Berlin, and while the
Russian Advance Eastwards. 209
question of peace or war between Russia and Eng-
land seemed to be trembling in the balance, prepa-
rations, we now know, were being made to strike
a blow, or, at least, to create a diversion, in the
direction of India, England's most vulnerable
quarter. No sensible person can blame Russia for
taking such a step in what she may have fairly
deemed to be her best Interests, but nothing is surely
gained by denying that she had, or could have, any
hostile intentions towards England by any move-
ments of troops in Asia. If, as is now fully believed,
an expedition was being concentrated, as early as
April, 1878, at Krasnovodsk, on the Caspian, with
the ostensible object of attacking the Tekkeh Turko-
mans, and of seizing Merv, no one acquainted with
the importance attached by the Indian Government
to Merv as the last stage towards Herat, which is
regarded as " the Gate of India," can wonder that
this movement appeared to Anglo-Indian politicians
as intended to be a demonstration against India.
Kizil Arvat, which is the half-way house, so to
speak, to Merv, has been captured ; but we have
no intelligence whether the Krasnovodsk column
has advanced beyond that place. Some persons
are assured that it returned immediately after the
signature of the Berlin Treaty was known at St.
Petersburg. Other reports state, however, that on
the very day the Berlin Treaty was signed the
14
2 1 o Afghanistan .
Russian envoy was directed to advance to Cabul,
and that the Krasnovodsk column is still hovering
about Merv.
Accurate information is still wanting as to the real
movements of these troops, but it is stated that it
was a part of the Russian plan that the Krasnovodsk
column should act in co-operation with the army
whose movements accompanied the progress of the
Russian envoy to the Afghan capital. The Eastern
Turkestan forces are said to have numbered about
15,000 men. There were three columns, but only
one or two at the most reached the neighbourhood
of the Upper Oxus. The Tnrkestan Gazette an-
nounced that Samarkand was to be the rendezvous
of the principal column. The right wing was to
concentrate at a fort opposite Khiva and march
to Charjui, to operate, no doubt, with the Krasno-
vodsk column against Merv. The left wing was to
be established in Ferghana. How far these three
columns advanced southwards we have no intelli-
gence. Three months ago the statement was current
that the Ferghana column had suffered disaster. St.
Petersburg telegrams indicated that the central or
Samarkand forces penetrated farther than either of
the other two columns : and there is strong reason
for believing that the main body of the army
reached Karshi, and that the advanced guard even
touched the Balkh fords of the Oxus. The intelli-
Rcissian Advance Eastivards. 211
gence of this rapid advance was followed by an-
nouncements in the St. Petersburg papers that the
Eastern Turkestan army had been recalled, and
directly afterwards we had news of the reception of
a Russian mission at Cabul. We have no more
trustworthy ground for believing that the Russian
forces have been recalled in their march upon
the Oxus than paragraphs in the St. Petersburg
papers.
The news of the arrival at Cabul of a Russian
Envoy seems, at last, to have roused the English
Cabinet to a sense of possible danger. The Russian
Foreign Office was, therefore, interrogated as to the
intentions of General Kaufmann ; and so recently as
July last, when General Stolieteff was already on
Afghan territory, when a part of the Turkestan army
was a few miles from the Afghan frontier, and the
Krasnovodsk column was in full march on Kizil
Arvat, a specific pledge was given that Russia had
no intention to send an Envoy to Cabul, or to direct
an army against the Turkomans.
The story of Russian advance is not yet complete.
Her last annexation, as we have stated, was that of
Khokand in 1876, but her most recent maps show a
yet further advance ; for she has absorbed a large
part of Karateghin, and brought her frontier across
the Pamir steppe to within 150 miles of Cashmere.
This extension of territory is at present, probably,
14—2
2 1 2 Afghan istan .
only on paper, but its importance, if effectually made,
is indicated best by stating that it is a direct advance
towards the valley of Chitral, from which the
Baroghil and other passes lead into Cashmere.
CHAPTER X.
THE AFGHAN POLICY OF THE LAST TWO
VICEROYS.
Resume of Lord Northbrook's Negotiations with the Amir— Proposal to
Permit Sir D, Forsyth to Return through Afghan Territory Negatived
— The " Grievances " of Shere AH — Sir Lewis Pelly's Conference with
the Afghan Agent in 1876 — Tlie Occupation of Quettah — Lord
Lytton's Letters to Shere AH— The Enghsh Envoy at AU Musjid —
Repulse of the Mission— False Account Sent to England — Question of
Peace or War Reverts to Consideration of Necessity of ' ' Rectifica-
tion " of Frontier — Is Refusal to Receive English Officers an Insult? —
Rawlinson's Opinion of England's Policy in the Presence of Russian
Agents at Cabul— Policy of English Cabinet in Sending an Ultlmatian.
to Shere Ali — Lord Northbrook on the Conduct of Russia and the
Amir — And on Sir James Stephen's View of the Amir's ' ' International "
Rights.
We have now considered at some length the ad-
vances made by Russia since the Indian Mutiny in
the countries round the Oxus. It remains to bring
up the account of our relations with Shere Ali
Khan, Amir of Afghanistan, to the present time.
We have shown how, in 1873, when the agent of
Shere Ali visited Lord Northbrook at Simla, he
made what seemed then to be extravagant demands,
and declined to enter into reciprocal engagements.
214 Afghanistan,
We pointed out, too, that, shortly after the Simla
Conference, when he found England wanted a qidd
pro quo in return for the subsidies and protection she
was willing to give, that qtiid pro quo taking the
form chiefly of the reception of an English Envoy
at Cabul, Shere Ali entered into a correspondence
with General Kaufmann, the Russian Governor-
General of Tashkend.
Lord Northbrook, in his exposition of his own and
his predecessor's policy, at a public dinner at Win-
chester, on November 12th, 1878, gave the following
explanation of the refusal of Shere Ali to receive
English officers, and, as the point is important, we
quote his statement at length. After disclaiming
any idea of discussing matters that the Government
might wish to keep secret, he continued as follows : —
" On one matter I may say a word without any indis-
cretion, and that is about European officers ; and
here I would refer to Sir Douglas Forsyth and his
suggested return to India through Afghanistan. I
saw the Prime Minister of Shere Ali in i ^Ji, feeling
as I did that occasions might arise when it would be
of great advantage that English officers might be
sent through Afghanistan, particularly as there were
some questions about the frontier which we desired
to have known in the interests of Afghanistan by
British officers. I desired the Foreign Secretary of
the Government to consult with the Prime Minister
i
Recent Afghan Policy. 215
of Shere AH to ascertain whether he would be likely
to receive English officers if he was asked to do so,
and a confidential communication took place accord-
ingly. Shere All's Prime Minister of that time is
now dead ; therefore I can see no impropriety in
making known his opinion. This is the opinion of
the Amir of Cabul's Prime Minister in 1873, in
reference to the stationing of British officers in
Cabul. Speaking as a friend, and in the interest of
the British Government, he could not recommend a
specific request being made to station British officers
in certain places. Such a demand, however friendly
the Amir might be, would give rise to distrust and
misapprehension. The reasons he gave were that
the Afghans were deplorably ignorant, and enter-
tained an idea that a deputation of British agents is
always a precursor to annexation. He also said
there was a strong party in Cabul opposed to the
Amir entering into intimate relations with the
British Government. Soon after that the question
whether Sir Douglas Forsyth should return to India
through Afghanistan, or not, came up, and the Amir
regretted that he could not be allowed to return ;
giving as a reason that shortly before a British officer,
Colonel M'Donald, had been shot on the frontier by
the Afghans — a circumstance which had occasioned
considerable inconvenience to the country, and in-
clined him to say that he could not be answerable
2 1 6 Afghanistan .
for the safety of any English officers. I felt I had
no right under the circumstances, and under the
assurances which had been given by Lord Mayo that
British officers should not be sent against the opinion
of the Amir, to consider that any offence had been
committed against the British Government."
There is no doubt, however, that Shere Ali sulked,
and refused, indeed, for a time to take the very hand-
some subsidy of ;^ 120,000 and 15,000 rifles which
were offered him.
The Amir's "grievances," which began with our
recognising his brother's before his own accession,
and were increased by our refusing in 1869 to guar-
antee the succession to his dominion of Abdulla Jan,
his favourite son, received an addition in 1871 in the
result of an arbitration which the Indian Government
had undertaken between Persia and Afghanistan con-
cerning the boundary of Seistan. The result was a
compromise, which, as often happens, was satisfactory
to neither party, and Shere Ali resented it deeply as
an infringement of his sovereignty, which, as he
erroneously held, the Indian Government was bound
to preserve unimpaired. Again, in 1875, in return
for courtesies shown by the Ruler of Wakham, a
vassal of Shere Ali, towards the British Mission to
Yarkand, a letter and gifts were sent by the Viceroy
without previous reference to the Amir. This
Shere Ali resented as another breach of his sove-
Recent Afghan Policy. 217
reignty. But the supposed slight was manifestly
nothing worse than an oversight, and if our diplo-
matic relations with Cabul had been in a more satis-
factory condition, it would never have occurred.
Sir Lewis Felly's conference with Shere All's
agent at Peshawar in 1876 is the only other commu-
nication the Indian Government has had with the
Amir until the recent one with reference to Sir
Neville Chamberlain's intended mission. What
passed at the Peshawar Conference is not known, the
British Government not having thought fit to make
it known yet to Parliament or the public. Mr. Glad-
stone, Lord Lawrence, and others, have complained
of the delay in doing so, as it prevents the possibility
of a sound opinion being formed on the merits or
demerits, the wisdom or unwisdom, of the recent
policy of the Indian Government.*
But it is understood that Sir Lewis Pelly was
authorised by the Viceroy (Lord Northbrook) to
offer to the Amir's envoy the treaty and guarantee
which Shere Ali had previously sought in 1869 and
1873, on the condition that British officers should
have access to points of the Amir's frontier exposed
to Russia. It was not, however, proposed to establish
a British agent at Cabul, for it was already known
that such a proposal would prove unacceptable to
the Amir. The conference proved abortive. Shere
* See Publishers' Note prefixed.
^i8 Afghanistan.
All's envoy recapitulated the grievances of which his
sovereign complained, but suggested no way of
removing them, or of establishing better relations ;
at the same time, though he professed to have
no authority to conclude a definite treaty, he
declared that Shere Ali held the British Govern-
ment pledged under any circumstances to protect
his territory. We must assume, however, that he was
left in no doubt, when the conference came to an
end, as to the view which the Indian Government
took of its own obligations towards Afghanistan.
The occupation of Quettah has been the last of
the Amir's '^ grievances " which we have caused to
exist. It had for years been contemplated as neces-
sary to the security of our position in India that we
should command the entrance to the Bolan Pass.
Ouettah is not in Afghan territory, but is in Baluchis-
tan, and we occupied it in 1876 with the full consent
of the Khan of Kelat, to whom it belongs. The
Amir does not seem to have objected to our policy
of making Quettah an advanced military post before
it was accomplished, but now he is said to have made
it a ground of complaint.
All we need say here of Lord Lytton's most recent
action is that he sent letters to the Amir almost
directly after the news reached him of the reception
of a Russian mission demanding that an English
mission should be also received. The death of Ab-
Recent Afghan Policy. 219
dulla Jan, the heir-apparent, having occurred before
an answer was received. Lord Lytton despatched a
second letter, stating that the English mission would
be delayed till the days of mourning were over. On
the 2 1st September, no answer having been received
from Cabul, General Sir Neville Chamberlain ad-
vanced, according to orders from Simla, into the
Khaibar Pass.
The following account of what passed on that
occasion is taken from the Pioneer^ a newspaper
which is sometimes spoken of (with what truth we
cannot say) as the organ of the Indian Goverment :
" On the afternoon of Friday, the 20th, everything
having been ready for a move for some days, it was
announced that orders to march to Jamrud would
probably be issued about midnight. Accordingly at
I a.m. the word came ; tents were struck, camels and
mules loaded, and long before daybreak the escort,
with the whole impedimenta of the Mission, saving
only the personal baggage of Sir Neville Chamberlain
and his staff, were on the move. Many of your
readers may know the road from Peshawar to Jam-
rud, beyond which it has been given to few to pass.
For the first three or four miles it lies due west,
through rich cultivation and groves of young sissoo
trees, to Burj-i-Hari Singh, a tower where a picket
under ordinary circumstances warns peaceful travel-
lers that if they venture further west it is at the risk
220 Afghanistan.
E52r
of their lives. Beyond Burj-i-Hari Singh a bare!
gravelly desert stretches to the foot of the Khaibeii
Hills, some seven or eight miles off. Three mile«l„^gfi
from the mouth of the Pass lies the half-ruined forlI.,;;4;
of Jamrud, a somewhat picturesque structure, lyingl,,,...
just inside British territory, and held for us by the -^
chief of a village in the neighbouring plain. Just tc ^.^^
the east of its crumbling towers our not very preten-
tious camp was pitched. The total number of souh
with the Mission amounted to something under i
thousand, of whom eleven were British officers, foui
native gentlemen, and 234 fighting men, natives o.i
the escort. The rest were camp-followers, includind
over 200 people, camel- drivers and others, belongingl
to the Commissariat, which carried nine days' rational
for man and beast. The carriage consisted of 31=?
camels, about 250 mules, and 40 horses. The whok[^
would have formed a cortege considerably over a mikj
in length. Conflicting reports had been brought tC
Peshawar as to the intentions of the Amir's officials tc
admit or refuse passage to the Mission ; and opinions ;
differed as to the probability of our passing Ali .
Musjid. The one thing certain was the presence
at that place for the last two days of the Miri
Akhor, the sourest old fanatic in Afghanistan, andi
the bitterest enemy of the Kafir, English, or Russ.
It was difficult to imagine any reason for his pre-
sence, except doubt on the Amir's part as to the
}
I
Recent Afghan Policy. 221
firmness of the commandant of Ali Musjid, Faiz
Muhammad Khan, Ghilzai, in excluding the Mission.
Under these circumstances Sir Neville Chamberlain
considered that it would be unwise to send the whole
convoy into the Pass, where even the stoppage in
front, necessary during the pour parler certain to
take place under any circumstances, must necessarily
cause great confusion ; and where anything like an
immediate resource to their weapons to prevent the
passage of the Mission on the part of the garrison of
Ali Musjid would probably lead to a panic and pos-
sibly a disaster. His Excellency, therefore, ordered
Major Cavagnari to ride on towards Ali Musjid as
soon as possible after the arrival of the camp at
Jamrud, taking with him only a small escort of the
^' Guides, and the headmen of our own frontier villages,
and of the friendly Khaibaris. Thus attended he
was to proceed until met by armed resistance, or by
positive assurances on the part of the Amir's officials
that they would prevent the passage of the Mission
by force. A message was sent on some hours ahead
to inform Faiz Muhammad Khan of Major Cavag-
nari's approach. It should be premised that the
Khaibaris on our side of the Pass, that is, between
Ali Musjid and the mouth, had promised that no
opposition on their part, or on that of their friends,
should deter the Mission, or its advanced guard, from
being brought face to face with the Amir's officials.
222 Afghanistan.
This, of course, was a matter of the very highest
importance, as preventing the possibility of excuses
of non-responsibility.
" Somewhere about nine in the morning Major
Cavagnari left Jamrud ; with him were Colonel
Jenkins of the Guides, commanding the escort.
Captain Wigram Battye, and twenty-four sowars.
Three miles from camp the little party entered the
Pass, and shortly afterwards met the messenger to
Faiz Muhammad returning with an answer, begging
them not to advance, &c. Of this, of course, no
notice was taken, and a ride of four or five miles
over the capital road made by Mackeson in 1840 and
still passable for heavy artillery, brought them in
sight of AH Musjid, a picturesque little fort, perched
on a precipitous hill overhanging the valley through
which flowed a little stream. From the lofty hills to
the right, two parallel spurs of half the height of the
fort abutted on the road ; and on the nearest of
these Major Cavagnari and his party took their
stand, sending forward a messenger to announce
their arrival. Directly they were perceived, the walls
of the fort were manned ; and shortly afterwards,
seeing that no advance was made, a number of the
garrison left its protection and lined the opposite
ridge. It was then evident that the reports that
had reached Peshawar about the substitution of
regular troops for the irregular levies usually forming
■ Recent Afghan Policy. 223
I .
i the garrison were false, and that the warriors in front
were only matchlockmen. The distance to the fort,
j a mile or more down one hill and up another, made
! the exchange of messages tedious ; a couple of hours
: passed without any appearance of a satisfactory
I result ; and Major Cavagnari was beginning to
I abandon any hope of meeting a responsible official
i of the Amir face to face, and had begun to prepare
I an ultimatum, when a messenger arrived bearing the
[ welcome news that Faiz Muhammad Khan would
' come out to meet Major Cavagnari and three others
I at an indicated spot by the side of the stream half-
( way between the two ridges. Shortly afterwards he
I was seen approaching, and Major Cavagnari, taking
i with him Colonel Jenkins and two of his men, went
I down the hill to meet Faiz Muhammad, accompanied
by the headman of the tribes and of the British
i frontier villages. Captain Battye and the rest of the
I Guides remaining on the ridge. On his way the
chief of one of the other Khaibar tribes, friendly to,
or at least in the pay of, the Amir, made a show of
stopping him, saying that he had more than the
stipulated three men with him ; but Major Cavagnari
put him. aside, saying that he had not come to
talk with him, but with the Amir's people ; and
nothing further was said. On nearing each other
the two parties dismounted. Major Cavagnari and
Faiz Muhammad shook hands, and the former
224 Afgha7iistan.
remarked that the place appointed for the inter-
view was inconvenient, and suggested a grove of
trees near a watermill close by. This was accepted,
and the two parties sat down, surrounded by a couple
of hundred or so of Faiz Muhammad's ruffianly band.
The conversation, after the usual friendly greetings,
was opened by Major Cavagnari, who said that Faiz
Muhammad and he were equally servants of their
respective Governments, and therefore only carrying
out their orders. There was thus no necessity for
the discussion being carried on in any but a friendly
spirit ; that he, Faiz Muhammad must be aware of the
presence and intended advance of the Mission ; and
that Sir Neville Chamberlain had sent the speaker
on to ascertain from his own lips whether he had
orders to admit or stop the Mission. If there were
any latitude in his orders, he felt sure that Faiz
Muhammad would be aware of the heavy responsi-
bility he would incur by preventing the advance of
the Mission, as his act in so doing would be taken as
that of the Amir himself. Faiz Muhammad replied
that he himself was also actuated by friendly feelings
towards Major Cavagnari, whom he had great plea-
sure in meeting for the first time, in proof of which
he pointed out that he might, instead of coming
down to meet Major Cavagnari, have ordered his
men to fire on the party when it appeared. He then
went on to say that he had been severely repri-
Recent Afghan Policy. 225
manded for letting Nawab Gholan Husain (the Vice-
roy's native envoy) pass, and how, therefore, could he
risk the responsibility of permitting the advance of the
Mission ? He then begged that Sir Neville Chamber-
lain would halt a few days till he could communicate
with Cabul. This, Major Cavagnari replied, was not
only impossible but unnecessary, as the Cabul autho-
rities had long been aware of the approach of the
Mission. The conversation continued in this strain
for some little time. Major Cavagnari urging the
weight of the responsibility Faiz Muhammad would
incur, and the latter repeating his inability to allow
the Mission to pass without direct orders from Cabul.
At last, on the Englishman again pointing out the
friendly character of the Mission, the Afghan, showing
for the first time some warmth, said : — * Is this
friendliness, to stir up dissension in the Amir's domi-
nions by bribing his subjects to disobey his orders
by bringing you and others here t ' alluding to the
negotiations carried on with the Khaibaris for the
safe-conduct first of the Nawab and afterwards of the
Mission. At this an ambiguous murmur was heard
from the crowd, and Major Cavagnari turned the
subject by saying that was not a matter for subor-
dinates to discuss, and that if His Highness the
Amir had any complaint to make, no doubt the
British Government would give him a satisfactory
reply. He then asked Faiz Muhammad for a final
15
226 Afghan is tan .
answer ; whether he was distinctly to understand
that the Mission would be resisted by force should
it advance the next morning-. To this Faiz Muham-
mad replied that he had no alternative but to use
force, if necessary. On this Major Cavagnari asked
the chiefs with him, if they considered this a suffi-
ciently clear answer, to which they replied that it
was so. He then, thanking Faiz Muhammad for the
courteous and friendly spirit that he had shown,
hoped that they might meet under more agreeable
circumstances, shook hands with him, and departed.
It should be noticed that, though the Mir Akhor
did not show himself, his deputy was present at
the meeting, but without speaking.
" Major Cavagnari and his party at once came
back to the camp at Jumrud, whence he rode on to
Peshawar to communicate the result of his Mission
to the Envoy, who returned with him to Jamrud
late in the evening. At day-break the next morning
orders were issued for an immediate return to Pesh-
awar. Before leaving Sir Neville Chamberlain
assembled the friendly Khaibaris, and told them
that the stipulated reward would be paid them
exactly as if the Mission had passed through the
Khaibar ; and that he promised them in the name
of the British Government, whose word they knew
they could trust, that as long as there remained a
rupee in the treasury, or a sepoy in the army,
Recent Afghan Policy. 227
they should be protected from any retaliation by
the Amir or his officers."
Thus ended the Cabul Mission.
It is not too much to say that England was con-
vulsed by a different version of the interview which
appeared in the letter of the Indian correspondent
of the Times on the 23rd of September, which made
it appear that the English officers had been insulted
and threatened. Later on, the true account came
to us, and calmer feeling prevailed. The question
then reverted to the older phase of the policy, which
took the form of pushing forward (or " rectifying ")
our frontier, instead of the more urgent one of
having an insult to avenge ; unless, as some think,
the reception of a Russian Mission renders the refusal
to receive an English one an insult. On this latter
point it is of interest to notice that Sir Henry
Rawlinson, as long ago as 1874, contemplated the
possibility of Russia sending an envoy to Cabul, and
discussed the probable policy England would pursue.
He said (note on page 366 of '' England and Russia in
the East "), speaking of Prince Gortchakoff 's official
intimation to Lord Granville, that it was undesirable
that Russian agents should go to Cabul, " It is quite
possible, however, in the sequel, if matters should
become at all complicated, that this subject may be
revived, and Russia may wish to have a Mission at
Cabul. Diplomatically, perhaps, lue could hardly
IS— 2
228 Afghanistan .
object to siich an arrangement, but we might, at any
rate, insist on sending at tJie same ti7ne an English
Mission to Bokhara.'' The italics are ours. We do
not know yet what communications have passed
between the Russian Government and our own; nor
is it certain that the conflict, if there is to be one,
will be confined to a duel between British India and
the barbarous State on her frontier, or will be
extended to embrace England and Russia, and thus
do what has been so often threatened — light up two
continents with the torch of war.* The action of the
English Cabinet in giving the Amir another oppor-
tunity of retreating from the perilous position in
which his recent conduct has placed him has been
much criticised.
But the majority of people will, in the end, we
think, at least, commend the policy of sending a
final message — an idtimattcm, as it is termed — before
proceeding to hostilities, whatever may be the
opinion held as to the original policy which has led
up to the present situation. On the 26th of October
that message was sent by Lord Lytton — not to
Cabul itself, as that would, it was thought, compro-
mise the safety of a British subject — but to the fort
of Ali Musjid, in the Khaibar Pass, and was there
delivered to the Amir's officer. Its purport is
generally believed to have been in effect a repetition
* See Publishers' Note prefixed.
Recent Afghan Policy. 229
of the terms offered by Sir Lewis Pelly, with the
intimation that an answer must be returned before
the 20th November, in order to avert a declaration of
war.
The following opinion on the conduct of Russia
and of Afghanistan, given by Lord Northbrook in the
speech before referred to, seems to deserve attention.
He said : — '' It would appear at first sight that by
sending a Mission to Cabul they had distinctly
broken through the engagements they had made ;
but we must be fair in this matter, and we must
recollect that it is not so long ago — towards the
spring of the year — that unfortunately we were on
the brink of a war with Russia. It was supposed
that Russia would not submit to the terms of the
San Stefano Treaty. We all know that the British
Government took a decided line against Russia.
Assuming such an attitude, we sent troops to
Malta ; and in point of fact it was generally sup-
posed that the question of peace and war hung at
that time on a thread. For my own part, I do not
hesitate to say that if we had the right, as I hold
that we had the right, to send native troops to
Malta, the Russians had the right to take such steps
as they thought necessary to protect Russian
territory in Asia. This is the explanation which I
give, and which I conceive to be the natural expla-
nation of the movement of troops in the spring of
230 Afghanistan.
this year, and the sending of the Mission to Afghan-
istan. I have seen it mentioned in the newspapers
that this Mission to Cabul was sent after the signa-
ture of the Treaty of Berlin, and that this shows
the animosity of the Russian Government towards
us. That statement can at any rate be disputed.
The Russian Mission arrived at Cabul on the 22nd
July. The road from Samarkand consists of
marches extending over a distance of 620 miles.
It could not have been possible for the Russian
Mission to march from Samarkand in less than a
month. It was therefore impossible that a Mission
starting on the 13th of July could arrive on the 22nd
of July. That issue was disposed of by the mere
question of distance. Now, it seems to me, with
regard to the question of Russia in this matter, to be
quite clear that the Government of this country had
a right, peace being declared, to enter into a diplo-
matic correspondence with Russia for the purpose
of asking what were her intentions, and saying that
we should like to know now whether she would
adhere to the formal arrangements with respect to
interference with Afghanistan, or what her policy
was to be. That the Government had a perfect
right to do, and my own impression is that that is
the course which the Government really has pur-
sued. We do not know all that. What we do
know is that papers were promised the day before
Recent Afghan Policy. 231
Parliament separated, and I have no doubt that
those papers will soon be produced. So far, then,
as to the conduct of Russia. Now as regards the
Amir of Afghanistan. Supposing that Shere Ali
had, when I was Governor-General of India,
received a Russian Mission at Cabul without first
consulting the British Government as to whether
it should be received, I should say that that was
an unfair act, in consequence of our previous
arrangement with him ; but now we must look at
the circumstances which went before the case. As it
has actually arisen, it was impossible for the Amir
to communicate with the British Government, for,
rightly or wrongly, our agent at his Court had been
withdrawn. We know, however, that he tried to
prevent the Russian Mission going to Cabul. That
has appeared several times in the papers, and
through other impartial sources, and I believe it to
be the fact. We cannot possibly have any evidence
that the Amir has entered into any hostile arrange-
ment with the Russian Embassy after having re-
ceived them. I have no fear of Russian intrigue in
Afghanistan. From all that I know or have ever
heard of that country, the real feeling of the Amir
of Cabul and Afghanistan is a feeling of indepen-
dence, a dislike of any interference, either by
England or by Russia, in his affairs ; and I will say
this much, that when I left India, the Amir, though
: 3 2 AfgJian is fa n .
he would have disHked any interference on the part
of England, would have resented any shown by
Russia to a far greater extent. Therefore, if Russia's
people be in the country they will only arouse more
feelings of independence, and the longer they remain
the more influence will they lose. But when we are
considering the conduct of Shere AH in this matter,
I confess that I have observed with the greatest
regret opinions which have been expressed by the
Press with regard to it ; and what I regret more is,
that Sir James Stephen, a Liberal leader, has laid
down a principle with which I can in no way agree.
Sir James Stephen has contended that the principles
of international law have no reference to our dealings
with Shere Ali. He says that there is no law by
which the case between Shere Ali and ourselves can
be tried. We are exceedingly powerful and highly
civilised. He is comparatively weak and half-bar-
barous. He cannot be permitted to follow a course
of policy which may expose us to danger, and we are
to be the judges of the cause, and we are to decide
according to our own interests. I have given you Sir
James Stephen's own words, as I do not wish to mis-
represent him. For where does the doctrine he lays
down go .? Why it goes this length, that any nation
— any civilised nation it must be — in dealing with
another weak nation, and one they conceive to be
uncivilised, may act on no other principle than their
Recent Afghan Policy. 233
might. This principle would justify the partition of
Poland, and would justify every act of Russia against
which this country has been crying out for some
time. I feel sure that Sir James Stephen cannot
know the meaning of what he has said, and that
such a doctrine as this must shock the moral sense
of all rightly-feeling people of this country. Sir
James Stephen has confounded the conventional
law of nations, and the law of nations which depends
on the practice of the Western States, with those
fundamental principles of the law of nations that are
founded on the first principles of morals, and are
derived from what Bacon calls the Fountains of
Justice, and which have been recognised not only by
Christian lawyers and statesmen, but by heathen
lawyers and statesmen, from long time past."
Lord Northbrook further pointed out that such a
lax view of international law is especially dangerous
in India, where we have treaty engagements with
many semi-civilised States. He protested strongly
against such doctrines, and expressed an opinion
that, if propounded in Parliament, they would be
instantly repudiated.
APPENDIX A.
NEW ROUTE TO INDIA.
The following note on the proposed new route to
India may be of interest at this time :—
"Consul-General Nixon, sending to the Foreign
Office the Bagdad trade returns for the Turkish official
year ending in March, 1878, observes that the country
is capable of unlimited development, and one of the
first steps to this end would be the construction of a
railway between Bagdad and the foot of the Persian
hills, and another from Bagdad to Alexandretta via
Mosul. This would give an alternative route to
India, and be more expeditious than via the Suez
Canal. Swift steamers from Kurrachee would reach
Busreh (1,547 miles) in six days; from Busreh to
Bagdad river steamers would run with ease in 72
hours, and at the outside another 60 hours by rail
would land passengers on the shores of the Mediter-
ranean ; and this period of ill days is capable ot
acceleration. A railway from Busreh to Bagdad
might be an after consideration, as the river 1 igris
affords a highway which, if traversed by steamers ot
higher power than those now used, would much
reduce the time occupied in the transit. The Consul
considers that a railway from Bagdad to Alex-
andretta would pay exceedingly well, and British
236 Appendix A.
commerce would benefit greatly, as Bagdad would
become the great mart, and drive Russian goods out
of the Persian and Southern Asian markets, owing
to the expensive bnd carriage those goods would
have to defray. The cost of a railway from Busreh,
at the head of the Persian Gulf, to Alexandretta on
the Mediterranean has been estimated at ;^7,225,ooo,
but this is at the rate of ^8,500 per mile, a high rate
considering that there is water carriage from London
to Bagdad for railway material. Deducting the
distance from Busreh to Bagdad, which is 250 miles
as the crow flies, the first expenditure would be
reduced to iJ"5, 100,000 on the 600 miles from Bagdad
to Alexandretta. The country between Bagdad and
Mosul is a dead level. The expenditure on bridges
would be inconsiderable. Bridging the Tigris,
indeed, might be avoided, if the terminus were made
on the right bank of the river at Bagdad, and from
thence ran straight to Aleppo, the line being flanked
on one side by the Tigris and on the other by the
Euphrates, and nearly the whole route a flat. The
Consul suggests that the civilising influences which
a railway through Arabia would initiate are consider-
able, and that the development of the country, with
its vast resources and its enormous ancient system of
canal irrigation, is well worthy the attention of
statesmen. The privilege of navigating the Tigris
from Busreh to Bagdad would have to be acquired
from the Turkish Government ; at present they have
a few steamers of their own on the river, and are
jealous of other nations entering into competition."
APPENDIX B.
RUSSIA AND ENGLAND IN ASIA.
The following estimate of the relative positions of
Russia and England in the East is from the pen of
Major-General Sir John Adye, in a reply to a letter
by Sir James Stephen, and a better exposition of
the subject in a few words could hardly be given : —
" First, as to the general position of Russia in
Central Asia. Sir James Stephen in his remarks
compares it with that which we held in India
in 1803 under Lord Wellesley, and, although he
does not ignore the isolated and precarious posi-
tion of the Russian troops in the Central Asian
deserts, he still appears to think that by raising
armies and by forming alliances they may gradually
develop into a great Power there, and thus become a
danger to us in India. But the circumstances are
almost entirely different. India and Central Asia do
not compare with each other. The former is a
fertile country, and rich in military resources — that
is, in warlike races, in food, forage, fuel, and, nowa-
days, in its roads and communications. It contains
about 200,000,000 people, of different races and
religions, of which the Muhammadans are a minority.
By conquering India we have, in short, obtained a
magnificent empire ; one which under our rule is
238 Appendix B.
dally rising in prosperity. Civil government is firmly
established, and the military position is far stronger
than ever. Our troops, both English and Native, are
well armed and trained ; the arsenals are fixed at
strategical points ; while our internal communica-
tions by river, road, and rail are comparatively easy,
and our resources are capable of almost indefinite
expansion.
" Russia in Central Asia holds in virtual subjection
the three great Principalities of Khiva, Bokhara, and
Khokand. This is not very difiicult, as their forces
are mere armed rabble, and if the power of Russia
in that part of the world were measured by mere
geographical extent, it would be formidable ; but, in
truth, this very extent is the cause of great weakness.
There is a general deficiency throughout the whole
vast region of food, water, fuel, forage, and roads.
The few rivers are difficult of navigation, and the
transport is almost entirely carried on by means of
camels. This latter point at once indicates the
desert nature of the country, and greatly aggravates
the difficulty of massing troops and stores at their
outposts. The whole population of Central Asia in
Russian possession does not, it is said, exceed four
millions and a-half, consisting chiefly of predatory
tribes thinly scattered over a vast area. They are
fanatical Muhammadans, and bitterly hostile, and I
have never heard that Russia has ventured to raise a
single battalion on the spot. Civil government is in
its infancy, and financially the country is a perpetual
drain. The nearest railway-station is at Orenburg,
Appendix B. 239
about 1,000 miles from Samarkand, and the country
between the Caspian and Tashkend is for the most
part a hopeless desert. It is possible that Russia
may in time, to some extent, consolidate her con-
quests, but the geographical features and permanent
condition of the country are against her.
" I can see no analogy between the precarious
position of General Kaufmann, amid barren steppes,
and that of Lord Wellesley in 1803, standing in the
fertile plains of Bengal. A consideration of all the
circumstances would appear to prove that the present
position of Russia in Central Asia is not one calcu-
kited to afford her a favourable base of operations
against our dominion in India. It is very important
to have a clear conception on these vital points of
the comparative power of Russia and England in
the East.
" For many years past that policy has been con-
sistent, and may be described as one of conciliation,
of mediation, and of subsidies. Acknowledging the
strategical importance of Afghanistan, our object
has been to gain the confidence and friendship of
the Afghan and Belooch rulers, and also of the
independent frontier tribes, in the hope that should
external danger ever arise they would be on our side,
and be ready to become the joint defenders with us
of their mountain ranges. I always contemplate
the possibility of our having to enter the country for
our own defence, and it should be prepared for by
conciliating and not by attacking our neighbours.
" ' Masterly inactivity ' is the expression commonly
240 Appendix B.
used to denote the policy which for many years has
prevailed. It is a misleading term, as it conveys
the idea that we have washed our hands of our
neighbours' concerns, whereas the real circumstances
are very different. It is true we have refrained from
interference in their internal feuds and battles.
Unless invited to mediate, we have left them to
settle their own affairs, being only anxious to see
strong and quiet Governments established on our
borders. With half-savage, fanatical people like the
Afghans and Belooches, great difficulties have
naturally arisen, but on the whole we have been
successful. For instance, so long ago as January,
1857, Sir John, now Lord, Lawrence, made a treaty
with Dost Muhammad, Shere All's father, and by a
large subsidy and present of muskets induced him to
drive the Persians from Herat ; but another result
indirectly followed from this successful effort at con-
ciliation. The great Mutiny broke out in May, 1857;
but although we were in dire extremity, and
although the Punjab was considerably denuded of
troops for the siege of Delhi, Dost Muhammad, though
much pressed by his people, refused to allow a
single Afghan to attack us in our hour of danger.
That, to my judgment, is a very pregnant instance
that conciliation and kindness are as likely to be
successful with Afghans as with other people.
Again, in 1869, the late Lord Mayo received Shere
Ali with honour at Umballa, and by gifts of money
and arms gave practical proofs of our friendship ;
and although Shere Ali may not be as reliable or as
Appendix B. 241
great a man as his father, there is no reason to believe
that Lord Mayo's policy was other than prudent and
successful. Again, in 1873, after a long diplomatic
correspondence, Lord Granville induced the Russians
to accept our view of the northern boundaries of
Afghanistan, by which Badakshan and Wakhan were
secured to Shere Ali. This was a further proof of
our friendly intervention, and throughout the corre-
spondence Prince Gortchakoff fully acknowledged
that Shere Ali was legitimately under our influence,
and beyond that of Russia. \\\ all our dealings with
the Belooch and Afghan frontier tribes, the same
general policy has been followed for years past, and
with considerable success. The border throughout
its length is far quieter now than in years gone by.
Occasional acts of outrage and robbery are treated
as matters of police. Many of the men of the
Afghan tribes beyond the border now enter our
service, and do their duty well. Some hold positions
of trust, and settle inside our territory. Therefore I
maintain that a conciliatory policy has been in a
great measure successful, and was leading straight
to the object we had in view, although time, patience,
and forbearance are required before the results
become palpable and confirmed. I do not propose
to discuss the exceptional causes which have led to
our recent rupture with Shere Ali. As regards the
military operations which now appear imminent, the
main difficulties lie in tlie necessity for collecting
the supplies of food, munitions, and transport at our
frontier posts before we can enter the country.
16
J42 Appendix B.
Whether we advance by the Khaibar or the Bolan,
our lines of communication will lie through rocky
defiles, and over stony, desert tracts, deficient in food,
forage, fuel, and often in water. Sir John Keane, in
1838, is said to have lost 20,000 camels between the
Indus and Candahar, although his march was vir-
tually unopposed. Looking at the fleeting nature of
Afghan internal politics, to the perpetual discords
which arise between the ruler at Cabul and his
insubordinate chiefs, I think it very possible that
Shere Ali may find he is not backed by his people,
and that he may still make such concessions as will
save him from the inevitable ruin which his present
conduct will otherwise bring upon him. Should we^
however, be compelled to advance in force, and
enter on a campaign, its cost will be excessive, and
the worst feature is that our chief difficulties will
arise when we find ourselves in possession of the
country with the feelings of the people roused
APPENDIX C.
RUSSIA'S ADVANCE COMPARED WITH THAT
OF ALEXANDER THE GREAT,
The following is an extract from a letter by General
M. McMurdo in the Times of November 5th : —
" Although 2,000 years have passed since the
Macedonian Greeks broke through the passes of
Afghanistan and overthrew Porus on the Jelum, the
operations of war are not less practicable under the
conditions of the nineteenth century than they were
in the days of the Phalanx. I do not mean for one
moment to assert that Russia would meet with the
same ultimate success as the Greeks ; what I desire
to show is, that up to a certain point she has already
gained the same strategical advantages as her pre-
decessor. The progress of the Greeks through Asia
was, as that of a regular army, perfect in its admini-
stration and drill, and taking along with them the
highest civilisation and culture, long afterwards
maintained by their colonies. I have no books here,
but I am satisfied that Arrian gives ample evidence
of the principles on which their advance was con-
ducted. Thus (as an example of administration) at
Babylon, where the army rested on the conclusion of
the operations that succeeded the victory of Arbela,
16—2
244 Appendix C.
Alexander sent home (by Aleppo, I think) the men
whose term of service had expired, and the officers
who conducted them brought back, in due course,
the recruits to replace them. Babylon became, in
short, a secondary base for his further advance ; and
thus, by a system of successive depots, some of which
became colonies, he effected his ultimate object of
reaching- India. The last of these depot-colonies
was in India itself The site of ancient Taxila was
determined some years ago to be about 14 miles
north-west of Rawul Pindee ; and there is still a
small race or clan (now dying out) in the neighbour-
ing hills that claims descent from these Greeks, and
whose pride on this account revolts at service of any
kind.
" Now, the Russian advance through Asia has
been conducted hitherto upon similar principles, the
chief (and perhaps only) difference being in the time
occupied. There are several sufficient reasons for
the more deliberate action of Russia, with which I
will not occupy your space ; but as Earl Grey
challenges her capability of advancing because of the
difficulties of transport and supplies, I may state
briefly that these doubtless formed one of the chief
reasons. The difference in the iuipediinenta of a
modern army in Asia compared with the Greeks
under Xenophon or Alexander consists in the trains
of artillery and ammunition. Russia had, therefore,
good reason to wait till modern science in the form
of a railway would compensate for that difference. I
believe I have said sufficient to show that with
Appendix C. 245
Orenburg and the Caspian as a secondary base, and
amply furnished magazines at Tashkend and Samar-
kand (and, it seems probable, Merv also), the strate-
gical situation of the Russians in Asia is now as
good as was that of the Greeks previous to their
attack on the passes of Afghanistan. But if Greek
had met Greek in the Khaibar, history might possibly
have told a different tale. With this observation,
therefore, the parallel necessarily terminates."
APPENDIX D.
LORD LAWRENCE ON THE PRESENT CRISIS.
The following letter of Lord Lawrence appeared
in the Daily News of October 28th, and gives very
succinctly his view of the justness, or otherwise, of
an invasion of Afghanistan : —
"AFGHANISTAN.
" TO THE EDITOR OF THE DAILY NEWS.
" Sir, — In the letter signed • Pace Tua,' which
appeared in the Times of the 26th inst., will be
found this passage : — * I venture to draw attention
to circumstances which point to the probability that
the Amir's hostility is by no means of such recent
date as that ascribed to it by Lord Lawrence, but
can be traced at least as far back as the date of the
Umballah Conference, when the Amir sought in
vain for an assurance from the Indian Government
that it would guarantee the independence of Afghan-
istan, and for the acknowledgment of the son as his
successor whom he had selected as his heir ; while
the payment of the annual donation of money and
arms which Lord Lawrence had unfortunately com-
menced was at the same time discontinued.' That
a change of policy such as is here indicated was
Appendix D. 247
then made has more than once been asserted on the
one hand, and denied on the other. I will endea-
vour to show that in point of fact no such change
then took place, and that the ^real change in the con-
duct of the Government of India towards the Amir,
in all essential points, dates back so far as April,
1876, when Lord Northbrook resigned the Govern-
ment into the hands of the present Viceroy. I
would not at this time press the consideration of the
change of policy on the public, except that on a
due appreciation of it depends whether the people
of England are in a position to form a just esti-
mate of the conduct of Shere Ali in refusing
to receive Sir Neville Chamberlain's mission. If
we wait until it pleases the Ministry to give the
public all the information which they can supply
on all points connected with the rebuff we have
received, we may wait, as I have formerly
said, until it can be of no practical value to
obtain it.
" I desire to prevent war between England and
Afghanistan, and I can have no hope of doing so
unless I can show to the minds of impartial men
that such a war would be unjust ; and this I have
no hope of doing unless these papers are produced.
In the meantime, I am restricted to arguing on the
probabilities of the case. To refer, then, to the
statements of ' Pace Tua,' above quoted. I reply
that though the Amir may have been disappointed
in regard to a refusal to comply with these pro-
posals, he could not have anticipated success, for he
248 Appendix D.
must have been well aware that so far back as
1854 — 55, when our treaty with the Afghan Govern-
ment was signed by his full brother, Sirdar Hydur
Khan, and myself, the Government of India had
refused to make an offensive and defensive treaty
with Afghanistan.
" In the second place. Amir Shere Ali may pos-
sibly have believed that we should give him a formal
guarantee recognising his favourite son as his suc-
cessor. I know not what actually took place at the
Durbar at Umballah in 1869 ; but, assuming that
Lord Mayo did refuse to guarantee the succession, he
did so no doubt by authority received from England ;
and that there was reason in such a refusal ought to
be obvious to every man conversant with Oriental
customs and habits of thought. Even to recognise,
let alone to guarantee, the succession of a particular
son is, in the eyes of an Asiatic ruler, to bind a
Government to maintain that which they have re-
cognised. Thus we should in this case have been
compelled, if necessary, to sustain the authority of
the Amir's son by force of arms ; and we would not
have done this without being prepared to act against
the wishes of the majority of the people of Afghan-
istan— a line of policy which the Amir knew well we
had sound reasons for not pursuing, and which his
own father had deprecated in earnest terms to me in
1857. There still remains the question whether
Lord Mayo's refusal of his request caused serious
offence to the Amir. I do not think so; first,
because I believe — I write under correction — that
11
Appendix D. 249
he never expressed an opinion of this kind, and
assuredly he is a chief who is not particularly reticent
by nature ; and, secondly, because at the time he
left Umballah to return to Cabul, the newspapers in
India were full of statements of the satisfaction
which the Amir had felt and expressed at his
reception.
" Then comes the point whether my gift of arms
and money to Shere Ali in 1867 was unfortunate,
that is to say, impolitic. I believe that it was
not so. The arrangement was approved of by the
Secretary of State for India at the time. People
who from their knowledge of the Afghan question
had even thought that the Government of India
was wrong in not supporting Shere Ali in the con-
test between himself and his brothers for the throne
of Cabul, and who may generally be considered the
advocates for an active and interfering policy, cannot
really object to our having thus assisted him. And
these gifts were not volunteered, but granted on his
especial application ; showing that the strugglethrough
which he had passed had bereft him of resources, and
had left him no choice but to apply to us for help.
Again, as a matter of fact, I did not grant the Amir
an annual subsidy — it was a single gift which I made
on the part of the British Government, and its re-
newal from time to time was to be dependent on the
Government of India's satisfaction with his conduct.
This arrangement was considered more likely to work
well than if we had granted Shere Ali an annual
subsidy — a subsidy which we could not justly intermit
250 Appendix D.
without showing specific reasons for so doing. It
seems unreasonable to suppose that this grant of
money and arms had an unfortunate influence on the
Amir's mind. No money has, since the Umballah
Conference, been given to him, except some two lacs
of rupees by Lord Northbrook, and ten lacs which
this Viceroy offered, and which the Amir refused.
" It is true that previous to the arrival of the pre-
sent Viceroy the Amir appears to have taken offence
on account of the decision in the Seistan boundary
dispute, which he is said to have considered very
adverse to his rights and interests ; and it was on
that account that Lord Northbrook proposed to give
him a grant of money — not that it was thought that
his interests had not been duly regarded in the above
decision, but simply with the generous intention of
softening his mind, which appeared to be brooding
over the subject.
" The Amir was also said to have felt aggrieved at
a request made to him, that some of the English
officers returning from the Yarkand Mission might
be permitted to journey to India by way of Wakhan
and Cabul. Another alleged grievance was that the
Viceroy had sent the Governor of Wakhan a small
present in recognition of his politeness to the officers
above mentioned. But these two cases were in their
nature trivial and unimportant, and cannot really be
supposed to have irritated the Amir, more parti-
cularly as in neither case were the wishes of the
Viceroy pressed on him.
" * Pace Tua ' asks what other course was to be
Appendix D. 251
pursued than ' that of sending a Mission to Cabul,
unless we were prepared to leave Russia in undis-
turbed possession of the field.' Considering the
wayward and jealous disposition of Shere Ali, ready
to take offence at trifles light as air, the best course
was to leave him alone for a time. It did not follow,
therefore, that we were indifferent, or neglectful, of
what Russia might be doing in Afghanistan.
"The Amir's real grievance arose from several
causes which I have stated in former letters, such as
the occupation of Ouettah, the pressing on him of a
Mission to Cabul with the view of placing English
oflicers in various parts of the country as a more or
less permanent measure, the withdrawal of our native
agent from that city, and our not sending any one of
the same character to take his place, the arming of
the Kashmere troops with arms of precision, and the
directions given to their chiefs to watch the passes
leading to Chitral, and the embargo laid on the
export of arms, &c., from India to Cabul.
" It has been lately stated that the Conference at
Peshawar between Sir Lewis Pelly and the Amir's
Agent took place somewhere about six months
before the occupation of Quettah, and that it could
not therefore have been one of the causes of the
failure of that Conference. But if the readers of the
Daily News will refer to the Blue-Book 'Biluchistan,'
No. 2, page 324, they will find by comparison of
dates that the occupation of Ouettah preceded and
did not follow that Conference. From a letter of
Captain Scott, commanding the detachment of the
252 Appendix D.
4th Sikh Infantry, it is shown that he arrived at
Quettah on the 2nd November, 1876, and began
marking- out barracks for his men on the 5th of that
month, whereas the Conference at Peshawar began
towards the end of December of that year, and is
stated in the Times of the 21st inst. as taking place
in January, 1877.
"In what I have now said I by no means intend
to place the rupture of our amicable relations with
the Afghans solely on the shoulders of the present
Viceroy of India. What I desire to convey is that
the causes which led to that rupture really arose
after his assumption of the Government, and that
our previous relations with the chiefs of that country
were on the whole of a friendly nature.
" In what proportion the responsibility of the state
of things in Afghanistan is to be divided between
the Viceroy and the Ministry of the day, time
and the production of the correspondence can
alone show.
" Yours faithfully,
" Lawrence.
" Stone House, St. Peter's,
'' Isle of Thanet, Oct, 28."
APPENDIX E.
SALE'S DEFENCE OF JALALABAD.
The following account of General Sale's gallant
defence of Jalalabad is taken from the Daily News
of 30th September, 1878, and is quoted here as a
very complete summary of that noble achieve-
ment : —
" Few of the many gallant feats of British soldiers
can compare with General Sale's gallant and success-
ful defence of Jalalabad. After the deeply dis-
heartening news had reached him that the Cabul
force, under General Elphinstone, had been cut to
pieces in the defiles, Sale, throughout that terrible
winter, bated no jot of heart or hope, and his example
is the more remarkable since it establishes the truth
that the calamity which had befallen our soldiers
might have been avoided if wiser counsels and a
more resolute policy had been adopted. During our
two years' occupation of Afghanistan, nothing had
been more clearly proved than the fact that the
native races were unable to withstand a resolute
attack either from British troops or Sepoys led by
British officers. Treachery and ambush, intrigue
and assassination, were still their chosen modes of
offence ; and, though they had hovered about our
254 Appe7idix E.
famished and enfeebled soldiers and camp-followers,
and assailed them cautiously in moments of difficulty
and embarrassment with only too much effect, the
very last remnant of our forces had again and again
put their assailants to flight. In the face of these
circumstances, it is impossible not to concur in Sir
John Kaye's opinion that the true policy of General
Elphinstone was not to capitulate and retreat, but
to strengthen his positions in Cabul, and endeavour
to obtain supplies by bold sorties and incursions into
the surrounding country. Such, in fact, were the
tactics of General Sale, by which, even after receipt
of intelligence of the disasters of the Koord Cabul,
he was enabled to maintain himself and protect his
army against all the efforts of Akbar Khan to obtain
possession of the fortress.
"A less cautious commander might easily have
been betrayed into a step which would have been no
less fatal than the evacuation of Cabul. Only a few
days before that event, and while as yet there was no
token of the calamity that ensued, a band of strange
horsemen had suddenly presented themselves at the
gates of the town. They carried a flag of truce,
and described themselves as the bearers of a letter
from Cabul. Conducted into the presence of General
Sale, the strangers presented their missive, which
proved to be a despatch written in English, and
signed by General Elphinstone himself. Its contents
were startling and extraordinary; but of the genuine-
ness of the document there could be no question.
It conveyed the intelligence of the convention that
Appendix E. "255
had been entered into with Akbar, and directed
General Sale forthwith to march with arms, stores,
and ammunition for Peshawar. In brief, General
Sale's superior ordered an immediate retreat in the
depth of winter by the ominous Khaibar Pass, accom-
panying his instructions with the assurance that
* our troops would not be molested on the way.' It
is needless to say that the writer had no sufficient
grounds for such an assurance. The evacuation of
Jalalabad had simply been wrung from him as one
of the conditions of the protection which was pro-
mised, but was never intended to be accorded ; and,
though General Elphinstone proved his faith in the
word of his foe, and suffered the penalty of his
confidence, the order was not the less remarkable for
the weakness and infatuation that it displayed.
Peremptory as the directions were, and serious as
was the responsibility of neglecting to obey, Sale
nevertheless wisely took the latter course. A council
of war was held, at which it was formally resolved
that ' it would not be prudent to act upon such a
document, and that the garrison would, therefore,
remain where it was until further orders.' This
timely act of disobedience unquestionably saved the
army under Sale from certain destruction. At the
very moment when the council was deliberating the
deep snows of the Koord Cabul were crimson with
the blood of the struggling mass who were vainly
endeavouring to make their way through, to rejoin
their more fortunate comrades at less than a hundred
miles distance. There can be no question that the
256 Appendix E.
despatch that had been extorted from the sick and
feeble commander-in-chief formed part of a cunning
scheme, the aim of which was to give to the destruc-
tion of the Feringhees a degree of completeness, and
an air of sudden and overwhelming retribution,
which could not but affect powerfully the imagination
of any future expedition to be despatched for the
invasion of the Afghan territory. Instead of capitu-
lating, Sale set to work to dig trenches round the
bastions of the town, and to drill every camp
follower capable of bearing arms. Only three days
after this bold and energetic determination was
taken, a sentry upon the walls on the side towards
Gundamack called aloud that he saw ' a mounted
man in the distance.' Glasses were out in a moment ;
and there was clearly to be seen, sitting upon a half-
starved pony, a rider who appeared to be a European,
and was manifestly faint or wounded. Long before
the stranger reached the walls a foreboding of his
melancholy story was in the hearts of the defenders.
It was Dr. Brydon — not the only survivor of the
final horrors of the JagduUah, but certainly the only
one who had escaped to convey the news. He was
bleeding, faint, and covered with wounds, but still
grasping in his right hand his only weapon of
defence — a small fragment of a sword.
" Nothing could now seem more forlorn than the
position of the defenders of Jalalabad, surrounded
by the triumphant Afghans and entirely cut off from
communication with Peshawar. That their late
comrades were destroyed they well knew. On the
Appendix E. 257
first news of their fate, Sale ordered the cavalry to
mount forthwith, and to patrol along the Cabul road
to the farthest reach which might seem to be com-
patible with their own safety. Many officers accom-
panied them. In the striking words of Mr. Gleig^
' They had not ridden above four miles from the
town ere they came upon the mutilated remains of
the three out of Dr. Brydon's four ill-fated com-
panions, of whom he could give no account. Not a
straggler, however — not a living soul, man, woman,
or child — appeared either there, or as far as the eye
could reach beyond. Wherefore the patrol, after
lingering about till the shadows began to deepen,
turned their horses' heads with sorrow homewards,
and rejoined their comrades. That night lanterns
were suspended from poles at different points about
the ramparts ; while from time to time the bugles
sounded the advance, in the hope that one or other
of these beacons might guide some wanderer to a
place of rest. But none came ; and though on the
morrow, and for several days and nights subsequently
a like course was pursued, not one man, European or
native, seemed to be alive — certainly none profited
by it.' On the side of Peshawar no adequate prepa-
rations had been made in view of troubles so unex-
pected ; nor did any succour come. The first
thought was to increase the stock of provisions.
While the non-combatants trained to handle pikes
manufactured out of old hooks and any other avail-
able bits of iron that could be found, were assigned
to duty on the ramparts, foraging parties were sent
17
:58 Appendix E.
forth, who in two days brought back with them 170
head of cattle and between 600 and 700 sheep. The
cattle were slaughtered immediately, and salted down,
as fodder was wanting ; the sheep were sent out
every morning to graze in the marshes between the
river and the town walls, attended by shepherds and
an armed covering-party. Every tree and bush
which could afford cover for marksmen was cut down,
and all the doors and timber-work from the houses
outside the walls were carried off and laid up as
winter fuel. About the end of the month numerous
bodies of the enemy were observed marching in vari-
ous directions, and on the morning of the 15th,
instead of the welcome sight of the advanced guard
of General Pollock's army of relief, they beheld the
white tents of Akbar Khan on the farther side of the
river, about six miles distant from the walls. Still
the men laboured cheerfully in the ditches and on
the ramparts. The works were daily becoming
stronger ; but their labours were destined to be
frustrated by an enemy more swift and destructive
than any they had yet encountered in Afghanistan.
On the 19th the men marched out as usual, with their
pickaxes and spades ; the guards were at the gates,
the sentries on the walls. Colonel Monteith, the
field officer for the day, had ascended one of the
bastions, and was scanning the horizon with his glass,
when suddenty the ground trembled, and a noise was
heard which is described as not so much like thunder
as the sound of a thousand heavily-laden waggons
rolling and jolting over an ill-paved street. The
Appendix E. 259
diggers looked around ' them with a stare of conster-
nation ; and then, as if actuated by one common
influence, the parties in the trenches, seizing their
arms, rushed out. It was well for them that they
did so ; for scarcely had the}^ reached the glacis ere
the whole of the plain began to heave like billows
on the surface of the ocean, and walls and houses,
splitting asunder, came tumbling down upon the
space which but an instant before had been crowded
with workmen.' In a moment the earthquake had
undone * all that it had taken the garrison of Jalala-
bad three months to accomplish. The whole of the
parapets which had been with so much skill and
"diligence constructed were thrown down with a fear-
ful crash into heaps of ruins. In the walls, breaches
were made, more accessible than any which the
troops found when they first entered the place ; and
the entire circuit was more or less shaken. As to the
houses in the town, there was scarcely one of them
which escaped more or less of damage. Some fell in
altogether : others had their fronts or flanks de-
stroyed and the roofs shaken down ; and the cloud
of dust which rose immicdiately on the occurrence of
the catastrophe is described as having been por-
tentous. Happily, very few lives were lost. By far
the greater number of the troops, being without the
walls when the shock came, stood upon the glacis,
or lay flat, while it heaved beneath them, to witness
the overthrow ; and the guards, making for open
spaces, escaped. Some natives were overwhelmed in
the ruins of the houses where they sojourned ; and
17 — 2
26o Appendix E.
Colonel Montelth, before he could escape from the
rampart, sustained some bruises. But, on the whole,
the casualties were wonderfully rare ; and the stores,
both of ammunition and salted provisions, sustained
no damage.'
" Nothing could better exhibit the wholesome re-
spect inspired by the attitude of the garrison than
the neglect of Akbar Khan to seize this moment for
assaulting the place. The opportunity was soon
lost. On the morrow the pickaxes and spades of
the indefatigable garrison were again busily at work.
Grass-cutting and foraging parties still went forth
daily, sustaining occasionally losses from the attacks
of the enemy's cavalry, but always repulsing their
assailants, and rarely returning empty-handed. The
rifle was not at that time the trusty friend of the
English soldier which it has since become, but the
whole country within long range of the walls had
been so carefully measured, and the practice had
been so effective that every shot thrown where a
group of Afghans assembled told. To such perfec-
tion, indeed, was the art of gunnery carried by the
besieged, that it is stated that on one occasion Cap-
tain Backhouse struck down a single horseman more
than a mile distant from the fort. As the month
wore on, the Afghan investment became closer, and
the harassment of their fire more galling to the
working parties and the men on the ramparts. On
the 2nd of March, towards evening, a party of
sappers sallied forth and drove the enemy's skir-
mishers away. The Afghans were continuously re-
Appendix E. 261
ceiving' reinforcements, but the besieged, though
compelled to husband their failing stock of am-
munition, made many successful sorties, and the
attempts to interfere with the foraging parties
were rarely completely successful. On one occasion
a party of cavalry and infantry, suddenly issuing
from the gates, boldly marched down upon the
flocks of the enemy, and, before they could be inter-
fered with, actually returned into the town, driving
before them not fewer than 500 head of sheep.
Both food and ammunition, however, began at last
to fail. For upwards of four months the garrison
had thus maintained itself isolated in the heart of an
enemy's country ; the time had come when more
decisive steps must be taken. It was now the 7th
of April, and instead of the deep snows and bitter
frosts which the forces under General Elphinstone
had to encounter, the weather was fine and favour-
able for military operations. The army was, more-
over, in comparatively good condition — inured to
hard work and harder fighting, and too well accus-
tomed to take the measure of their enemy to be
daunted by his greatly superior numbers. On that
day was fought the memorable battle outside the
walls of Jalalabad. Some of the most valuable
officers in the army of the Indus fell in that obsti-
nately-contested struggle, but the result was a
victory which could not have been more complete.
Camp baggage, artillery, standards, horses, and arms
of every kind fell into our hands, together with
abundant ammunition. The redoubtable Akbar
262 Appendix E.
fled towards Cabul with the wreck of his army ; and
in one day the besieged in Jalalabad, who had been
put on half-rations, found themselves in possession
of abundance of provisions. The tide had already
turned ; and it is important to observe that all this
was achieved before the arrival of any succour from
without. What more conclusive evidence could be
furnished of the melancholy truth that the over-
whelming disasters of the Koord Cabul were literally
of our own seeking .'' Who can reasonabl}^ doubt
that what Sale had done at Jalalabad, Elphinstone,
or some commander less enfeebled by ill-health,
could have accomplished at Cabul } To meet death
fighting in the cantonments, or within the strong
walls of the Bala Hissar, would at least have been
preferable to the tender mercies of the Afghans and
the rigours of a winter in the rugged and tortuous
passes of the White Mountains ; but, with unaccount-
able infatuation, the efforts to obtain supplies had
been delayed at Cabul until even the means of
equipping foraging parties were wanting.
"On the morrow of that battle a market was
actually opened outside the gates of Jalalabad, to
which the country people brought their wares to be
exchanged for the coin of the Feringhees. On the
1 0th, Pollock's army was heard of as having reached
the middle of the Khaibar. The difficulties of the
Pass, in spite of the resistance of the Afreedis, who
had seized the fort of Ali Musjid, had all been sur-
mounted with the loss of only one officer killed, two
or three wounded, and about 135 men killed and
Appendix E. 263
wounded. On the i6th, Pollock's column marched
into the beleaguered city, accompanied by the bands
of the garrison regiments, who had come forth to
meet them, and who greeted them, as Mr. Gleig tells
us, with the old Jacobite melody, * Oh, but ye've been
lang a comin'.' The forward movement upon Cabul,
however, was not begun until August. Wave after
wave of the troops despatched to Afghanistan arrived,
until the entire force, consisting of nine or ten
thousand well-disciplined troops, attended by five or
six thousand Sikh soldiers, and the enormous number
of 40,000 camp followers, were ready to march. In
the fatal passes of Jugdulluck and the Koord Cabul
they found the bleached bones of their unfortunate
comrades. Preparations had been made by the
Ghilzyes to oppose our advance ; but our troops
swept the heights, and their resistance was overcome
with but trifling losses. In the valley of the Tezeen,
where so many of General Elphinstone's army had
fallen, Akbar Khan made a last stand, but was de-
feated with scarcely more sacrifice of life on our side.
Similar successes attended General Nott's advance in
Western Afghanistan. Ghazni was retaken with
little difficulty, the march continued triumphantly on
both sides, and on the 17th September the combined
forces re-entered Cabul. In brief, the second inva-
sion of Afghanistan by a comparatively small English
army had been accomplished with scarcely more
difficulty than the first. Only three days later the
brave Sale had the happiness of regaining his long-
lost wife, together with his daughter, Mrs. Sturt,
264 Appendix E.
whose husband had fallen in the disastrous retreat.
The prisoners had, on the whole, been kindly treated,
though their privations, hurried as they had been
about the country, and frequently removed from
place to place, had necessarily been considerable ;
and Akbar, embittered by his defeats, had at last
threatened to make presents of them to the chiefs of
the barbarous tribes of Turkestan. Their release
Avas ultimately obtained by bribing the Khan in
charge of the fort at Bameean, to whose custody
Akbar had confided them. The total list of pri-
soners released on General Pollock's arrival at Cabul,
as given in the appendix to Lieutenant Eyre's
Journal, comprise thirty- six officers, nine ladies,
twenty-one children, and fifty- five privates and other
persons."
W. SPEAIGHT AND SONS, PRINTERS, FETTER LANE, LONDON.
^ '2 u 1 - S
f—
33
5
X f;
C
O Tl
3 rn
33
(D DD
Z
^o
H
S O
P
-
-»" n
ro
IIRCULATION D
98 Main Stacks
"
CO
m
33
H
m
H
IS
--/SIUAU
Live Music Archive
Librivox Free Audio
Metropolitan Museum
Cleveland Museum of Art
Internet Arcade
Console Living Room
Books to Borrow
Open Library
TV News
Understanding 9/11