Skip to main content

Full text of "A History of Diplomacy in the International Development of Europe"

See other formats


This is a digital copy of a book that was preserved for generations on library shelves before it was carefully scanned by Google as part of a project 
to make the world's books discoverable online. 

It has survived long enough for the copyright to expire and the book to enter the public domain. A public domain book is one that was never subject 
to copyright or whose legal copyright term has expired. Whether a book is in the public domain may vary country to country. Public domain books 
are our gateways to the past, representing a wealth of history, culture and knowledge that's often difficult to discover. 

Marks, notations and other marginalia present in the original volume will appear in this file - a reminder of this book's long journey from the 
publisher to a library and finally to you. 

Usage guidelines 

Google is proud to partner with libraries to digitize public domain materials and make them widely accessible. Public domain books belong to the 
public and we are merely their custodians. Nevertheless, this work is expensive, so in order to keep providing this resource, we have taken steps to 
prevent abuse by commercial parties, including placing technical restrictions on automated querying. 

We also ask that you: 

+ Make non-commercial use of the files We designed Google Book Search for use by individuals, and we request that you use these files for 
personal, non-commercial purposes. 

+ Refrain from automated querying Do not send automated queries of any sort to Google's system: If you are conducting research on machine 
translation, optical character recognition or other areas where access to a large amount of text is helpful, please contact us. We encourage the 
use of public domain materials for these purposes and may be able to help. 

+ Maintain attribution The Google "watermark" you see on each file is essential for informing people about this project and helping them find 
additional materials through Google Book Search. Please do not remove it. 

+ Keep it legal Whatever your use, remember that you are responsible for ensuring that what you are doing is legal. Do not assume that just 
because we believe a book is in the public domain for users in the United States, that the work is also in the public domain for users in other 
countries. Whether a book is still in copyright varies from country to country, and we can't offer guidance on whether any specific use of 
any specific book is allowed. Please do not assume that a book's appearance in Google Book Search means it can be used in any manner 
anywhere in the world. Copyright infringement liability can be quite severe. 

About Google Book Search 

Google's mission is to organize the world's information and to make it universally accessible and useful. Google Book Search helps readers 
discover the world's books while helping authors and publishers reach new audiences. You can search through the full text of this book on the web 



at |http : //books . google . com/ 



/ -- / 

-' / 



I .; / 



C 




HARVARD 
COLLEGE 
LIBRARY 



n 



A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY 

IN THE 

INTERNATIONAL DEYELOPMENT 
OF EUROPE 



Volume III. 
THE DIPLOMACY OF THE AGE OF ABSOLUTISM 



A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY 
IN THE INTERNATIONAL 
DEVELOPMENT OF EUROPE 

BY 

DAVID JAYNE HILL, LL.D. 



Volume I. The Sfrvggle for UnivernU Empire. 
Mapfl and Tables, pp. zziii + 481 

Volume II. The EstabliehmerU of TerritorUd 
Sovereignty, Maps and Tables, pp. zxv 
+ 063 

Volume m. The Diplomacy of the Age of Aheo- 
lutiem. Maps and Tables, pp.zzvi+706 



LONGMANS, GREEN AND CO. 



A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY 

IN THE 

INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 
OF EUROPE 



BY 

DAVID JAYNE HILL, LL.D. 



Volume III. 

THE DIPLOMACY OF THE AGE OF ABSOLUTISM 



WITH MAPS AND TABLES 



LONGMAKS, GEEBN, AND CO. 

FOURTH AVENUE ft SOTH STREET, NEW YORK 

LONDON, BOMBAY, AND CALCUTTA 

1914 






Copyright 1914, 
By Longmans, Gbkbn, aitd Co. 



All righU reserved. 



HARVARD 

lUNIVERSlTYl 

LIBRARY 

MAY 28 i^lO 



THE UMVBBSITT PRKSB, CAMBRIDOB, V.t.A.. 



PREFACE 

1I7BAT has been said in the prefaces to the previous 
^^ volumes of this work regarding the nature of the 
historic process finds ample illustration in this period, which 
may be fitly designated as the Age of Absolutism. Men 
had sought refuge from anarchy by establishing the su- 
premacy of the State and concentrating power in the hands 
of a few. We behold entire nations moving en masse 'in 
directions not determined by their needs or their individual 
desires, nor yet in view of their well-being, but by the 
oommand of one man who — for reasons of his own, for 
which he had to give no account — acted as he saw fit. 
It is not an exaggeration to say, that for more than a hundred 
yeans the destinies of Europe were determined by a half 
dozen men in each generation; and their motives of action 
were largely personal. 

And yet it is impossible to explain this period in terms of 
purely individual action. The explanation lies in the ap- 
pKeation of the prevailing theory of the State. That theory 
was a condition of mind, the result of past experience. How 
could men enjoy security and live in peace without the 
unity of the State, and how could the unity of the State 
be preserved except by submitting it to one will? Those 
were the questions which determined the thought and feeling 
of the time, and it was the thought and feeling of the tune 
that made monarchy absolute. 

It is impossible to explain the history of any nation as a 
linear development, a succession of events produced mechan- 
ically by their antecedents. Every great historical event is 
a psychological phenomenon, the result of reflection upon 
experience. Many influences enter into the formation of 
public policies, and economic conditions are frequently 



VI PREFACE 

subordinated to racial, traditional, sentimental, and dynaa- 
tic considerations. The main causes in the historic process 
are dominant beliefs. 

If this statement be true as regards national progress, 
it is more obviously so regarding international develop- 
ment. Here the personal note becomes predominant. All 
international relations are based upon the judgments and 
decisions of sovereigns and statesmen. These policies may 
be good or bad, wise or xmwise, but they are essentially 
products of reflection. The reasons on which they are based 
may be dynastic or national, and may owe their origin 
to any of the conditions that influence human action; but 
the action that results from them is the outcome of the 
thought and feeling of the time as manifested in those who 
direct public policy. 

Regarded from this point of view, history has a new mean- 
ing and a new value. We are no longer invited to take an 
interest in a succession of events without relation to the 
great problems of existence, or even to one another; such as 
the sequence of dynasties, the fatalities of battles, and mere 
series of dates that serve only to place occurrences in a 
definite chronological order. History becomes to us, in- 
stead, the explanation of progress or retrogression, as the 
case may be, in the attainment of purposes that affect the 
condition of man and society. 

But if policies and the means employed for their realiza- 
tion constitute the true essence of history, the thought and 
feeling by which these policies were generated become es- 
sential to historical interpretation. There is, no doubt, 
a certain dramatic interest in the movement and engage- 
ment of armies in the fascinating game of war; but far 
greater enlightenment may.be derived from the knowledge 
of why wars were begun, why battles were fought, and 
what effect they produced upon national aims and inter- 
national development; and the plot-interest of diplomacy, 
which lies nearer to the mainsprings of action, is not less 
dramatic than that of military strategy. 

The life of nations is as little capable of isolated develop- 



FBEFACE VU 

ment along the lines of their own aims and purposes as the 
life of individuals. It is, therefore, impossible to compre- 
hend the history of any nation without considering the 
influence upon it of the international environment. One 
of the chief problems of every people has been, and con- 
tinues to be, how to maintain its existence and accom- 
plish its national destiny in the midst of its neighbors and 
competitors. A great part of its activities is, in conse- 
quence, im]X)sed upon it by the aims and policies of other 
nations. 

The first general solution of this problem attempted in 
Europe was based upon the theory of the essential imity of 
all civilized peoples and the possibility of obtaining their 
submission to the moral restraint of one central authority; 
but the contest for the sole possession of that authority 
— "The Struggle for Universal Empire" — ended in the 
failure to solve the problem in this way. 

The next solution was the formation of national dynasties, 
omnipotent within their respective jurisdictions, and to- 
gether constituting a system of sovereign states entirely 
independent of one another, but formally bound by a 
solann compact to respect one another's authority within 
the prescribed limits, resulting in "The Establishment of 
Territorial Sovereignty." 

Such was the situation of Europe in 1648 at the conclu- 
sion of the Peace of Westphalia, which ended the Thirty 
Years ' War. For the first time the European nations seemed 
to have discovered a common ground on which they could 
peaceably coexist. But the Treaties of Westphalia were 
far more the products of armed force than the voluntary 
recognition of any inherent rights. They were the result 
of a bargain between sovereign rulers, made for the sake of 
peace, which was rendered necessary by the exhaustion of 
their fighting eneigies. 

Thus the Treaties of Westphalia, while ending imperial 
pretensions for the time by recognizing the absolute char- 
acter of territorial sovereignty, opened a new era in the 
political development of Europe; but, as they were the 



Vm PREFACE 

result so also they were the consecration of force. They 
imposed peace, not as a legal or moral duty, but because 
there was no longer profit in war. They contained solemn 
promises to accept and to guarantee certain definite stipu- 
lations; but, while they formed a code of honor for the sov- 
ereigns who signed them, they were in no sense based upon 
a recognition of the inherent rights of the State as a moral 
entity, or of peoples as forming the substance of the State. 
Still, the foundations of a European system had been laid; 
and, so long as the balance of forces that was expressed 
in the terms of the treaties continued, peace among the 
signatories would endure. 

The task of diplomacy was to perpetuate the system thus 
created. The difficulty of raising money for carrying on ex- 
tensive wars, the internal troubles of France, the exhaustion 
of Spain, the feebleness of Portugal, the commercial interests 
of the United Provinces, the limited resources of Sweden and 
of the German princes, and the substitution of the Com- 
monwealth for the Stuart dynasty in England for a time 
rendered great military movements impossible; but the 
renewal of the struggle for preponderance was certain to 
occur, and it was France that was first able, through the 
complete triumph of the monarchy over dissentient elements 
and the appearance of an ambitious sovereign in the person 
of Louis XIV, to adopt and execute an aggressive policy. 

With the reign of Louis XIV begin those vast European 
combinations in which were utilized all the knowledge, all 
the influence, and all the resources that ingenious minds 
could employ to obtain dynastic aggrandizement. In these 
great enterprises all Europe was to some extent involved, 
and it is only when studied from an international point of 
view that their full significance can be understood. In self- 
defence every princeling was obliged to organize a diplo- 
matic establishment, and to enter in some capacity into the 
plots and coimterplots in which the greater powers involved 
the lesser; and it is interesting to observe how, chiefly by 
shrewd bargaining, several of them in less than a century ele- 
vated their famiUes to the eminence of recognized royalty. 



PREFACE IX 

As a result of the improved organization of diplomatic 
methods, no period of history is furnished with more com- 
plete documentation. Before the time of Mazarin each 
Eiinister of state in France and each diplomatic agent con- 
sidered the official dociunents in his possession as his own 
private property, and they were disposed of accordingly. 
Even the Cardinal, instead of committing his papers to 
public archives, bequeathed them to Colbert, who trans- 
mitted them to his son; but they were afterward in great 
part recovered for the archives of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, organized in 1680, then already enriched with the 
pj^)ers of De lionne, — confiscated by Louis XIV, — and 
also those of Pomponne. From this time forward these 
archives became the depository for France of all political 
correspondence, memoirs, and other documents, forming a 
vast collection of detailed information which, with other 
Bimiiar archives organized about the same time in other 
countries, enables the historian to follow the course of in- 
tanational events almost day by day. 

The extraction of what is important to the international 
development of Europe from this voluminous mass of 
documents is a labor of such vast extent as to be beyond the 
capacity of any single investigator in the course of a life- 
time. Happily, the task of selection and publication, 
80 conscientiously performed by qualified scholars in all 
the chief countries of Europe, renders possible a general 
synthesis, which is undertaken in this work, with only 
such further occasional reference to the archives as may be 
necessary for filling in lacunae or the verification of doubt- 
ful or disputed points. To the great company of investigators 
^ose patient toil has made possible a work of this character 
the author feels a deep sense of obligation, which he believes 
he can best express by citing their names and the titles of 
their publications among the authorities at the end of each 
chapter and in special notes wherever reference to them 
IS likely to be specially useful to the reader. 

DAVID JAYNE HILL. 
Paris, 
October 1, 1913. 



CONTENTS OF VOLUME III 

CHAPTER I.— THE ASCENDENCY OF FRANCE 

Paqb 

The state of Europe after the Peace of Westphalia 1 

I. The Diplomact of Mazarin 

The triumph of monarchy in France 3 

The national riyalries 4 

Mazarin's scheme for a Bourbon-Stuart-Orange coalition ... 6 

Negotiations of England with the Netherlands 7 

The incompatibility of the two republics 7 

The Navigation Act 9 

Character of the Anglo-Dutch conflict 10 

The treaty of the Dutch with Denmark 11 

The policies of Cromwell and De Witt 12 

The Anglo-Swedish negotiations 13 

The triumphant peace of Cromwell 14 

Mazarin's desire for an English alliance 16 

Prononitions of a Protestant league 17 

Negotiations of Mazarin with Holland and Portugal 18 

The Anglo-French rapprochement 20 

The attitude of Cromwell toward Spain 21 

Secret negotiations of Mazarin with Spain 22 

The Anglo-French alliance 23 

CromweQ's imperial conception and his death 24 

n. The Pretensions of Louis XIV 

"Uaal,<^estnun" 25 

A comedy of precedence 26 

The embarrassment of the Emperor 27 

The fidtuation in the North 27 

The Treaty of Kdnigsberg of 1656 29 

The critical position of Brandenburg 29 

The diplomacy of Lisola for Austria 30 

The vacancy in the Empire 31 



XU CONTENTS 

Pagb 

The candidacy of Leopold of Austria 31 

The attitude of Europe toward Leopold's candidacy 32 

The candidacy of Louis XIV 34 

The secret appeal to the Archbishop of Mains 35 

The opposition of Mazarin to Leopold's election 36 

The diplomacy of the "Great Elector" 37 

The election of Leopold I 38 

Mazarin's dissimulation of his defeat 38 

The origin of the League of the Rhine 39 

The adhesion of France to the League of the Rhine 40 

The utility to France of Masarin's policy in Germany 41 

The relations of France and Spain 41 

The royal comedy at Lyons 42 

The preliminary treaty of Paris 43 

Negotiations in the Isle of Pheasants 44 

The Peace of the Pyrenees 45 

The crisis in the North 46 

The rescue of Denmark 47 

The intervention of France and England 47 

The pacification of the North completed 50 

The achievements and death of Mazarin 50 

III. Thb Designs or Fbancb upon thb NsTHBRLAinw 

The personal government of Louis XIV 61 

The foreign service of France 52 

The royal instructions 52 

The French diplomatists 53 

Advantages of the French diplomacy 55 

The international influence of the Stuart restoration 55 

The affair of D'Estrades and De Watteville 56 

Ck>nce8sion of precedence to France by Spain 57 

The aims of Louis XIV in Europe 58 

The secret aid of Portugal by France 59 

The activities of Louis XIV against the Emperor 60 

Negotiations and alliance of France with the Elector of Branden- 
burg 62 

The alliance of France with Saxony 63 

The embrogUo of Louis XIV and Pope Alexander VII 64 

The pressure of Louis XIV upon the Pope 65 

The new policies of France 67 

The progress of the United Netherlands 68 

The system of John De Witt 68 

The rivalry of Spain and France for the Dutch alliance 69 

The idea of a barrier state 70 

The Anglo-Dutch war of 1664 71 



CONTENTS xiii 

Pagb 

French mediation and the Peace of Breda 72 

The theory of "d6wit4«(m" 73 

The isolation of Spain 75 

The Triple Alliance and the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle 77 

The resentment of Louis XIV toward Holland 79 

The exposed position of Holland 80 

The secret Treaty of Dover 81 

Authorities 82 

CHAPTER n. — THE PERIL AND THE RESCUE OF THE 
DUTCH REPUBLIC 

Hie Netherlands in 1670 88 

I. The Appeal to the Hottbb of Orange 

The diplomatic efforts of De Witt 89 

The iUuBioDS of De Witt 90 

The preparations of William of Orange 92 

The ambition of the Prince 93 

The embarrassments of the Prince 95 

Foreign advances to the Prince 96 

England openly arrayed against Holland 97 

The completion of Louis XIV's circle of alliances 98 

The double declaration of war against Holland 99 

The motives of Louis XIV 100 

The Republic in extremis 102 

The search for aid against France 103 

The attitude of the Emperor 103 

The Austro-French rivalry at Vienna 106 

The Emperor^s perils in the East 105 

The isolation of the Emperor in the North 107 

The Emperor^s alarm for the Empire 108 

The diange of feeling in Germany 109 

The position and policy of the Elector of Brandenbm^ .... 110 

The hesitation of Brandenbm^ Ill 

The allianioe of Brandenbm^ and the United Provinces .... 113 

The dismay at the invasion of the Republic 114 

Negotiations for peace and assault on the De Witts 115 

The Prince of Orange chosen Stadtholder 116 

II. The Coalition of The Hague 

The rupture of n^otiations with France 117 

Negotiations with the King of England 118 

The hopes and uncertainties of the Dutch Republic 120 



XIV CONTENTS 

Pagb 

Efforts of William III to detach England from France 121 

The conflict of parties in HoUand 122 

De Witt's conception of public policy 124 

The defects of De Witt's system in relation to his time .... 125 

The murder of the De Witts 126 

The new policies of Holland 127 

The awakening of Europe 127 

The influence of Louis XIV in Spain and Italy 128 

The tardiness of the allies 129 

The trials of Frederick William 130 

The delinquency of Spain 131 

The defection of Brandenburg 132 

The formation of a general alliance 133 

Changed character of the war and defection of England .... 134 

The adhesions to the new alliance 135 

Sobieski's election as King of Poland 136 

The diplomacy of Louis XIV in the East 137 

The war of Sweden and Brandenburg 138 

III. Tbb Pbacb of Ntmwbqbn and thb Pac3fig Conqxtests of 

Francb 

The changed relations of the powers 139 

The effects of the war with Sweden 140 

The situation in France 141 

Charles II's proposal of mediation 141 

The secret agreement of Charles II and Louis XIV 142 

The significance of this bargain for Louis XIV 143 

Arlington's scheme of marriage for William III 144 

The desire of the Papacy to mediate 145 

The dispositions of the powers 146 

The conflict between the States General and William III ... . 148 

The marriage of William III and its effects 149 

Louis XIV's renewed activity 150 

The separate peace between France and Holland 151 

Louis XIV's double r61e in England 152 

The dissolution of the coalition 154 

The disappointment of Brandenbm^ 155 

Results of the Peace of Nymwegen 157 

The new pretensions of Louis XIV 158 

The Chambres de lUunion 159 

The reversal of relations in the North 160 

The diplomatic paralysis of Europe 162 

The effort of Louis XIV to win the Prince of Orange 163 

The siege of Vienna 164 

The renewal of war with Spain 165 



CONTENTS XV 

Pagb 

Tlie Truce of Regensburg 166 

Aiithonties 167 

CHAPTER in. — THE FORMATION OF THE GRAND 
ALLIANCE 

The broader ambitions of Louis XIV 170 

I. The Revival of the Counteb Rbfobmation 

Louis XIV's championship of religious unity 172 

Tlie hostility of Louis XIV to the Pope 174 

Louis XIV's interest in disunion 175 

Hie alarm concerning the influence of France 176 

The revival of Catholicism by James II 177 

The efforts of William III for equilibrium 179 

Brandenburg's revulsion from the French alliance 180 

The complete alienation of Brandenburg from France 181 

Rapprockemeni of Brandenburg and the Emperor 182 

The reconciliation of Brandenbm^ and Sweden 183 

The alliance of Holland and Brandenburg 183 

The new exaction of Louis XIV 184 

The revocation of the Edict of Nantes 184 

The motives of Louis XIV in signing the Revocation 185 

The r^e of Charlemagne 186 

The indignation of Frederick William 186 

The preparations for resisting Louis XTV 187 

The rdations of William III and James II 188 

The inclination of James II toward France 189 

The new aspirations of Leopold I 190 

Louis XIV's opposition to the arrangements of Leopold I . . . 191 

The contentions of France and Austria at Madrid 192 

The League of Augsburg 193 

n. The Imternatiokal Significance of tbe English 
Revolution 

The absolutism of the Stuarts 194 

The spirit of revolt against absolutism 196 

The illusion of royal pretensions 197 

The feais for the fate of Protestantism 197 

The visit of Frederick William to Cleve 198 

The meeting of the Elector and William III 199 

The importance attached to the attitude of England 200 

The defeat of the Turks and new aggressions of Louis XTV . . 200 

The question of ''immunities" at Rome 201 



XVI CONTENTS 

Pagb 

The insubordination of Louis XIV to Rome 203 

The efforts of James II to re-establish Romanism 203 

The birth of a prince in England 205 

The attitude of William III on toleration 205 

The preparations of William III and recall of British troops . . 206 

James II accepts aid from Louis XIV 207 

The invitation to William III to bring an army to England . . 207 

The success of William III with the States General 208 

The activities of Louis XIV on the Rhine 209 

The accusations of Louis XIV against the Pope 210 

The relations of Louis XIV with James II 211 

The ambiguity of James II's attitude 212 

The antagonism of dynastic and national policies 213 

The attitude of Europe toward the English Revolution .... 214 

The subordination of religious motives 215 

The conciliatory efforts of James II 216 

The descent of William III upon England 217 

III. The Diplohact of William op Oranqb to the Peacx of 

Ryswick 

The significance of the King's flight 218 

The aims of William III 218 

The relation of the Revolution to the conflict with Louis XIV . 220 

The precautions of William III for the safety of HoUand ... 220 

Louis XIVs decision to sustain James II 222 

Louis XIV forces war upon England 222 

The prudent policy of William III 223 

Louis XIVs belief in the weakness of England 224 

The attitude of Ireland and Scotland 225 

The completion of the Grand Alliance 226 

The progress of the war on the continent 227 

The war for the recovery of Ireland 228 

The return of William III to Holland 229 

The Congress of the Grand Alliance at The Hague 230 

William III before the Congress 232 

The indecisive character of the conflict 233 

The plans for a descent upon England 234 

Dissensions of the allies 235 

The proposed mediation of Sweden 236 

The reconciliation of Louis XIV with the Papacy 237 

The separate peace of France with the Duke of Savoy 238 

Secret negotiations between France and Holland 239 

The hesitation of Leopold I 241 

The Congress of Ryswick 242 

The private negotiations of William III with Louis XIV .... 243 



CONTENTS XVU 

Paoi 

The tcnns of the Peace of Ryswick 244 

Authorities 246 

CHAPTER IV. — THE DIPLOMACY OF THE SPANISH 
SUCCESSION 

The balance of gain and loss at Ryswick 249 

I. Tbb Tbeatibs of Pabtition 

The Spanish monarchy 250 

The decadence of Spain 251 

The extravagance of the Court 252 

Decay of the army and navy 254 

The political weakness of Spain 255 

The intrigues of the Spanish Court 256 

The candidacy of the Archduke Charles 257 

The renunciations 258 

The crisis in the system of divine right 259 

The necessity for compromise 260 

The failure of Von Harrach's mission 261 

The influence of the Marquis d'Haroourt 262 

The revival of the idea of partition 263 

The effect of the situation in the East 265 

Louis XIVs return to the idea of partition 266 

Conditions favoring the Bavarian candidacy 267 

Negotiations of Louis XIV and William III 268 

The progress of Harcourt at Madrid 270 

The Partition Treaty of October 11, 1698 270 

The second will of Charles II and death of Joseph Ferdinand . 272 

The continuation of the policy of partition 274 

The Partition Treaty of Maroh 25, 1700 274 

n. The Reaction of Eubope against thb Union of France and 

Spain 

Acceptance of the throne of Spain for Philip of France 276 

The double r61e of French diplomacy 277 

The abandonment of the partition treaty 278 

The new instructions to Harcourt 280 

The acquiescence of Europe 281 

The revived ambition of Louis XIV 282 

Lofois XIVs efforts at reassurance 283 

The changed sentiment in England 284 

The revival of the coalition against France 285 

The rupture of diplomatic relations with France 286 

The death of William III 287 



XVUl CONTENTS 

Pags 

The isolation of France and Spain 289 

Louis XIV's interest in the North and East 290 

The ambitions of Peter the Great 291 

The coalition against Sweden 292 

The victories of Charles XII 293 

The efforts of the West to mediate 294 

The Franco-Russian attempts at negotiation 295 

The situation in the North and in the West 296 

The effort of Louis XIV to secure the alliance of Charles XII . 298 

The decision of Charles XII to invade Russia 299 

The effects of Charles Xirs defeat 300 

III. The Peace of Utrecht 

Conditions favorable to peace in 1710 302 

The Union of England and Scotland 303 

The disunion of the allies 304 

The diplomatic efforts of Marlborough 305 

Holland dicates the terms of peace 307 

The Anglo-Dutch Barrier Treaty 308 

Effects of these negotiations on the alliance 309 

The secret reports of Petkum and Florisson 310 

The conferences at Gertruydenberg 312 

The rejection of the French offers 313 

Secret negotiations between England and France 313 

The death of Joseph I and its consequences 314 

Progress of the Anglo-French negotiations 316 

The preponderance of the peace party in England 317 

The instructions of Manager 318 

The conclusion of the preliminaries 319 

The necessity of leading the allies 320 

The relations of England and Holland 322 

Opening of the Congress at Utrecht 323 

The instructions of England 324 

The instructions of France 325 

The instructions of the Emperor 326 

The question of separating France and Spain 326 

The renunciation of Philip V 328 

The "Restraining Orders" 329 

Bolingbroke's mission to France 330 

Execution of the renunciations 331 

The provisions of the Peace of Utrecht 332 

The end of the war of the Spanish succession 334 

Authorities 335 



CONTENTS XIX 

CHAPTER v. — THE STRUGGLE FOR SUPREMACY IN THE 

NORTH AND IN ITALY 

Pagb 

The principle of equilibrium accepted 338 

I. Thb Pbbil of Sweden and the Battle fob the Baltic 

The exile of Charles XII 340 

The defects of Charles XIPs policy 342 

The condition of Sweden in 1715 344 

The impediments to action by Western Europe 345 

The dual relations of George I 347 

The growth of British hostility to Sweden 349 

The r^ency in France and the Abb4 Dubois 349 

The plans of Alberoni 351 

The secret negotiations of George I with Peter the Great . . . 352 

The reaction against Russian intrusion 354 

The Triple Alliance of 1717 354 

Efifects of the Triple Alliance of 1717 357 

British approval of Stanhope's diplomacy 358 

The designs of Gortz 360 

The negotiations of Gortz at The Hague 361 

The Jacobite intrigue 363 

The Czar's attempt to secure a French alliance 364 

The negotiations of France and Russia 366 

The Treaty of Amsterdam 368 

n. The Quadruple Alliance and the Peace of Nybtad 

Dubois' policy of general pacification 369 

The schemes of G5rtz and Alberoni 371 

The precipitation of the conflict 372 

The embarrassments of Dubois and Stanhope 373 

Dubois' visit to London 373 

The double check to Dubois' policy 375 

The turning of the tide against Alberoni 376 

The schemes of Alberoni for the overthrow of the Regent . . . 377 

Dubois' methods and motives 378 

The attitude of Charles VI 379 

The Aland conferences 381 

The collision of the two systems 382 

The Quadruple Alliance 383 

The triumph and disappointment of Gortz 384 

Alberoni's activity in Italy 385 

The conspiracy of Cellamare 386 



XX CONTENTS 

Paos 

The triumph of Dubois 387 

Alberoni's efforts of resistance 388 

The proposals of Philip V 389 

The last intrigues and fall of Alberoni 391 

Adhesion of Philip V to the Quadruple Alliance 392 

The reconciliation of Sweden and Hanover 393 

The pacification of the North 394 

in. The Readjustment of Disturbed Relations 

The results of the general pacification 395 

Dissolution of the Quadruple Alliance 396 

The peace policy of England 397 

Dubois' ambition for the cardinalate 398 

The alliance of France, England, and Spain 399 

The Spanish marriages 400 

The triumph of Dubois 401 

The maritime ambitions of Charles VI 402 

The Pragmatic Sanction 403 

Dubois' obstruction of the Congress of Cambray 404 

The scheme of Dubois for Bourbon predominance 405 

The Cardinal's last negotiation 406 

Dubois' plan of alliance between France, England, and Russia . 408 

Dubois' hesitation and death 409 

The foreign policy of the Duke of Orleans 410 

The Duke of Bourbon's reversal of the Orleans policy 411 

The Congress of Cambray 411 

The Treaty of Vienna and the mission of Ripperda 413 

The secret instructions of Ripperda 414 

The secret understanding of the Queen and Ripperda 415 

Ripperda's negotiations at Vienna , 416 

The deliberations at Vienna 418 

The apparent triumph of Ripperda 419 

Illusory character of the Treaties of Vienna 420 

The reaction of Europe 421 

The Treaty of Hanover 422 

The success of Ripperda's diplomacy 423 

Ripperda prime minister of Spain 424 

Ripperda's equivocal policies 425 

The failure of Ripperda's administration 426 

The fall of Ripperda 427 

War between England and Spain 429 

The Congress of Soissons 431 

The Treaty of Seville 432 

England's completion of the general peace 433 

Authorities 434 



CONTENTS XXI 

CHAPTER VI. — THE RIVALRY FOR EUROPEAN AND 

COLONIAL SUPREMACY 

Paob 

The new array of the powers 438 

I. The Diplomact of thb Austrian Succbssion 

The War of the Polish Succession 439 

The first Facte de famiUe and England's neutrality 441 

England's abstention from the war 442 

The Peace of Vienna 442 

The diplomacy of France in the Orient 444 

The War of Jenkins' Ear 446 

Beginning of the worid-struggle for commerce and colonies . . . 447 

The death of Charles VI and its effects 448 

The attitude of the powers toward Austria 449 

The ideas and purposes of Frederick II 451 

The motives of Frederick II 453 

The Austrian rejection of Frederick II's proposals 453 

The deliberate character of Frederick II's plans 454 

The resistance of Austria 455 

Frederick II's position of advantage 456 

Effect of Frederick II's action upon England 457 

The intervention of France 458 

Effects of the French intervention in England and Germany . . 460 

The pro-Austrian policy of Carteret 462 

The effects of the English intervention 463 

Renewal of hostilities by Prussia 464 

The divergence of English and Austrian policies 466 

The system of D'Argenson 468 

The defection of Frederick II from France 469 

The Treaties of Dresden 470 

The advantage of the peace for Frederick II 470 

The rupture between France and Russia 471 

The failure of France to enlist the Turks 472 

The Austro-Russian alliance 472 

The Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle 473 

The Anglo-French preliminaries 474 

The Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle of 1748 476 

II. The Contest for Colonial Sufbemact 

The colonial rivalry of France and England 477 

The beginnings of Eastern trade 478 

The development of rival trading companies 480 



XXll CONTENTS 

Paob 

The transformation of the companies into States 481 

The poUtical state of India 482 

The designs and diplomacy of Dupleix 483 

Dupleix's defence of Pondicherry 486 

The capture of Madras 486 

Restoration of the balance in India 487 

Alliances with the native princes 488 

The victories of Clive 489 

The French possessions in America 492 

The disputed territories 493 

The development of hostilities in America 494 

Open conflict between France and England 496 

War in America rendered inevitable 498 

The delicacy of the European situation 499 

III. The Rbvbbsal of the Aluancss 

The secret diplomacy of Louis XV 500 

The mechanism of the secret diplomacy 501 

The interest of Louis XV in Poland 502 

Results of Louis XV's diplomacy in 1755 504 

The alignment of the powers in 1755 504 

The Anglo- Austrian impaaae 506 

The Anglo-Russian alliance 507 

The position of Frederick II 508 

The designs of Maria Theresa 509 

The mission of Kaunitz to France 510 

The inflexibility of Maria Theresa 511 

The frailty of the Franco-Prussian alliance 512 

The determination of Louis XV to renew relations with Russia . 514 

The legend of Mademoiselle de Beaumont 516 

The Anglo-Prussian negotiations 517 

The cautions of Knyphausen 518 

The alliance of England and Prussia 519 

The explanation to the powers 520 

The conferences at La Babiole 521 

The Treaty of Versailles 523 

The strained relations of Austria and England 524 

The relations of the maritime powers 525 

The attitude of Russia toward England 526 

The relations of Russia and Austria 527 

The second mission of Douglas to St. Petersburg 528 

The change in Louis XV's secret diplomacy 530 

The status of the Franco-Russian negotiations 531 

The beginning of the Seven Years' War 532 

Authorities 533 



CONTENTS XXUl 

CHAPTER VII. — THE DIPLOMACY OF THE SEVEN YEARS' 

WAR 

Pagb 

The asgressions of Frederick II 537 



I. The Coalition aqainbt Pbttbsia 

The Coalition rendered inevitable 539 

The conduct of Frederick II in Saxony 541 

The efforts of Frederick II to explain his position 542 

The plans of Kaunitz for completing the Coalition 543 

The embarrassments in the negotiations between France and Russia 544 

Louis XV's repudiation of Douglas' secret concession 545 

Completion of the Coalition against Prussia 546 

The discouragement of England 547 

The disappearance of European equilibrium 548 

The perilous position of Frederick II 550 

Prussia's plaoe in Europe 551 

The lack of cohesion in the Coalition 552 

The retreat of Frederick II and the invasion of Prussia .... 553 

The colonial war and the action of England 554 

The victories of Frederick II at Rossbach and Leuthen .... 556 

Tbe strengthening of the Anglo-Prussian alliance 557 

The f all of Bestusheff 558 

The new alliance of the Catholic powers 558 

The beginning of Choiseul's diplomacy 560 

The military results of 1758 561 

The policies of Pitt 562 

The results of Pitt's policies 563 

P rogress of the war between France and England 564 

The effects of England's sea policy on the maritime powers . . 565 

The renewed animosity of Spain toward England 566 

Choiseul's efforts to obtain the mediation of Spain 567 

Failure of Choiseul's tactics 568 

The changed attitude of France 569 

n. The Obstacles to a Eubopean Peace 

The drift toward peace 570 

The attitude of Austria toward France 571 

Impediments to a continental peace 571 

The Anglo-Prussian proposal of a general congress 573 

The attitude of the Coalition toward the congress 574 

Reply of the Coalition to the Anglo-Prussian proposal 575 

The secret diplomacy of Frederick II 577 

The results of Frederick II's secret diplomacy 578 



XXIV CONTENTS 

Paob 

End of the pourpcarlera for peace in 1760 579 

The altered relations of the allies 580 

The revival of Louis XV*s secret diplomacy 582 

The dilemma of France regarding Russia 583 

The secret instructions to Breteuil 585 

The divergent aims of Louis XV and Choiseul 586 

The fluctuations of Russia 587 

The policies of France and Russia 588 

Louis XV's mistrust of Russia 590 

The tension between France and Austria 591 

III. The Peace of Paris and of Hubebtusburq 

The renewal of negotiations with England 591 

The English conditions and the relations of France with Spain . . 593 

The intervention of Austria 594 

The Franco-Spanish Facte de famiUe 595 

The substance of the Franco-Spanish compact 596 

The resignation of Pitt 597 

England's declaration of war with Spain 598 

The accession of Peter III to the throne of Russia 599 

The alliance of Russia and Prussia 601 

The character and purposes of Peter III 601 

Assassination of Peter III and accession of Catherine II ... . 603 

The situation of the powers 604 

Renewal of negotiations for peace between England and France . 605 

Opposition to peace in England and Spain 606 

Louis XV's effort to influence Spain 607 

Peace accepted by the English Parliament 608 

The Peace of Paris 609 

The Peace of Hubertusburg 610 

Authorities 612 

CHAPTER VIII. — THE DIPLOMACY OF CONCILIATION 
AND PARTITION 

Consequences of the Seven Years' War 614 

I. The Subordination of France 

The comparative status of the powers 616 

The dependence of France upon Austria 617 

The servitude of France to Austria 617 

The passivity of France 619 

The secret designs of Russia and Prussia 620 

The ambition of Catherine II 621 



CONTENTS XXV 

Pagb 

The condition of Poland 622 

The divisions of Poland 623 

The intervention of Catherine II 625 

The attitude of France and Austria 626 

The attitude of the Sultan 627 

The declaration of Louis XV 628 

The menaces of Russia 629 

The election of Poniatowski 630 

The appeal to Turkey 631 

Recognition of Stanislas II by France and Austria 632 

Choiseul's attempt to incite the Turks 634 

The hnmobility of the Porte 635 

The system of the North 636 

Frederick II's suspicions of the system 636 

The intervention of Russia for religious equality 637 

The civil war in Poland 638 

The situation in Great Britain 639 

Pitt's return to power 641 

The renewal of Pitt's diplomacy 642 

The secret diplomacy of Louis XV at The Hague 643 

The ineffectual rapprochemerU of France and Prussia 644 

II. The Crisis in the East and the Pabtition of Poland 

Tlie Sultan's declaration of war on Russia 646 

Tlie attitude of Frederick II 647 

The attitude of Austria 648 

Flans for an Austro-Prussian rapprochemerU 649 

The tactics of Frederick II 650 

Frederick II's plan of conciliation 651 

Frederick II's proposal to partition Poland 653 

The obstructions to a triple alliance 654 

The effort for an Austro-Prussian entente 655 

The results of the conference at Neisse 657 

The divergence of the powers 658 

The fortunes of war in the East 660 

The meeting at Neustadt and its result 661 

The fall of Choiseul 662 

The aooeasion of Gustavus III in Sweden 663 

The abandonment of the East to the three powers 663 

The principle of partition accepted 664 

The Austrian counterplot 665 

The uigmcy of Frederick II for the partition of Poland .... 666 

The Austrian resistance to Frederick II's plans 667 

The Austro-Turkish alliance 669 

Frederick II's check to the plans of Kaunitz 670 



XXVI CONTENTS 

Paob 

The triumph of the policy of partition 671 

The scruples of Maria Theresa 672 

The relation of the Partition to Public Law 673 

The Acts of Partition 674 

The end of the crisis in the North 676 

The end of the Russo-Turkish war 677 

Effects of the Peace of Kutchuk-Kainardji 678 

The abasement of the monarchy in France 679 

The new conception of monarchy 680 

Premonitions of the Revolutionary Era 681 

Authorities 681 

TABLES 

I. A List of Popes, Emperors, and Ottoman Sultans from 

1648 to 1775 684 

II. Rulers of France, England, and Scotland from 1648 to 1775 685 

III. Rulers of Spain, Portugal, and the House of Savoy from 

1648 to 1775 686 

IV. Rulers of the Scandinavian Kingdoms, Poland, and Russia 

from 1648 to 1775 687 

V. Rulers of the United Provinces of the Netherlands and 

Brandenburg-Prussia from 1648 to 1775 689 

VI. Showing the Claims to the Spanish Succession 690 

VII. Showing the Claimants to the Austrian SucoessicHi .... 691 

INDEX 693 



MAPS AT END OF VOLUME 

I, Europe at the Peace of Westphalia. 

II. Acquisitions of France in the North under Louis XTV. 

m. Europe after the Peace of Nystad. 

IV. North America during the Anglo-French Wars. 

V. The Partitions of Poland. 



CHAPTER I 

THE ASCENDENCY OF FRANCE 

rwas a new Europe that emerged from the fiery crucible The stote of 
of the Thirty Years' War. In the devastation of that ^^^ 
terrific struggle had finally disappeared most of the mediae- westphaUa 
val ideals. Among these, that of chief importance for the 
future development of Europe was the venerable tradi- 
tion of the moral unity of Christendom. With its dis- 
appearance went also much of the fervor of faith and zeal 
for principles which had imparted at least an appearance 
of moral purpose to the Wars of Religion. 

From this time forward the raisan d'Stal becomes the 
controlling motive in public action, and marks the period 
from the Peace of Westphalia to the Revolutionary Era as 
a reign of Machiavellianism. All the influences of the 
preceding age had tended toward the firm establishment of 
monarchy, and the throne had become nearly everywhere 
the focal point of general interest. So absolute was the 
authority attributed to the Crown in France, that, notwith- 
standing the united opposition of powerful princes and 
accomplished jurists. Cardinal Mazarin, although of Ital- 
ian origin and acting under a queen-regent of Spanish 
birth, by adhering to the principle of royal supremacy as 
the guarantee of national unity was able to overcome the 
Fronde, and ultimately, in the name of the yoimg king, 
to exercise the royal prerogative. 

Even in England the mass of the nation never ceased to 
be at heart monarchical; and if for a time the dynasty was 
overwhelmed by the Parliament, it was on accoimt of the 
resentment felt against the treachery of Charles I, and 
not because of opposition to the principle of royalty 
itself. 

Youm. — 1 



2 A HISTORY OP DIPLOMACY 

Chap. I There were, indeed, in parts of Europe, immediately 
^•'>- after the Peace of Westphalia many signs of mirest and 

turbulence. In Russia, and to a still more marked degree 

in Poland, the aristocratic element was in a state of hos- 
tility to the royal authority. In Italy, the domination of the 
Spanish king was bitterly resented, and a revolt at Naples 
nearly ended in an act of independence. In the Nether- 
lands a nominal republic, under the administration of a 
stadtholder, had appeared to be the best form of govern- 
ment for that country; but jealousy of the House of Orange 
had already been displayed, and its union with the House 
of Stuart by the marriage of William II with Mary, daughter 
of Charles I of England, created a strong party of opposi- 
tion, which gained in influence when, on January 30, 1649, 
Charles I was beheaded, and EIngland passed under the 
temporary rule of the Commonwealth. 

In France Mazarin was for a time confronted with an 
opposition that threatened to disintegrate the kingdom. 
The Parliament of Paris refused to register the edicts for 
new taxes; and the discontent of members of the royal 
family, like the Prince of Cond^, the Duke of Orl&ms, 
and the Duchess of LongueviUe, led to open war, and resulted 
in their alliance with the Spaniards; while the hostility 
of such able generals as Turenne, and such popular eccle- 
siastics as Paul de Gondi, afterwards Cardinal de Retz, 
menaced the very existence of the regency and even threat- 
ened the unity of France. 

Yet, notwithstanding all these perils, in every European 
state, the throne soon became the unshaken seat of power, 
and nowhere was it more firmly established than in France. 
Sustained by all the sanctity of religion, and defended with 
all the ingenuity of philosophy, it became irresistible and 
undisputed. Service to the monarch soon proved to be 
the only pathway to distinction, and dynastic advantage 
the only active force in European politics.^ 

^ A cont^nporary writer says: "It is customaiy to reepect the qual- 
ity of princes, not their real merits; the wisest men have esteemed it 
better to obey the most vicious rather than to disturb that beautiful 



THE ASCENDENCY OP FRANCE 3 

I. The DiPLOMAcr op MaZABIN Chap. I 

A. D. 

Under these conditions, diplomacy rose to the eminence 1648-1670 
of a recognized profession. As in Italy after the decay of the 
Empire in the thirteenth century, so now in Europe after 
the Peace of Westphalia, diplomatic activity was more than The triumph 
ever essential to the preservation of the existing political ^ ^^^^ 
order. As in that earlier period, but upon a far grander 
scale, it assmned the form of intrigue, secret negotiation, 
and conspiracy. 

In the whole of Europe there existed at that time no 
greater master of all these arts than Giulio Mazzarini, 
the disciple and successor of Cardinal Richelieu. The 
secret of Cardinal Mazarin's power can be expressed in 
a simple formula, — the superiority of centrally directed 
influence over ill-organized and sporadic resistance. Te- 
nacious in purpose, crafty in method, supple in activity, 
and imscrupulous in the use of means, he unceasingly apn 
pealed to the instinct of unity in the French nation, placing 
his enemies in the light of rebels and traitors to France, — a 
r61e which their impetuous selfishness and political inepti- 
tude led them to play with a fidelity that confirmed his pre- 
tensions and proved fatal to their schemes. 

When the devastation of civil war had once more con- 
vinced the nation that a strong central government was 
the only remedy for perpetual anarchy in France, on 
October 21, 16S2, after a year's exile, young Louis XIV, 
under Mazarin's guidance, re-entered Paris amidst the 
wild enthusiasm of the people. On the following day, the 
King held a lit de justice in which he forbade the Parlia- 
ment to take any further part in the affairs of state or 
the administration of the finances. The members were 
compelled to bow in mute submission, and France was 

order, that excellent harmony, which God has established among men 
for the general good of the world, in order to maintain peace and keep 
eooflcienoeB at rest. To promote that trust, God has surrounded the 
thnme of kings with so much glory and majesty, with the purpose of 
wMtiritig iifl understand that they are his living images," etc. — Las 
tariiez franfoises, Paris, 1643, p. 5. 



4 



A HISTORY OP DIPLOMACY 



Chap. I 

A.D. 

1648-1670 



The nationftl 
rivalries 



gradually reorganized for that proud pre-eminence in 
Europe which Cardinal Mazarin's diplomacy was about to 
confer upon it. 

Sustained by the unwavering support of the Queen Re- 
gent, Anne of Austria, — to whom, if not secretly married, 
he stood in relations of exceptional intimacy and affection, 
even in exile, during the stormy period of the Fronde, this 
subtle Italian had been able to become the master of France 
through his appeal to the popular belief in the national need 
of the monarchy. In the person of the yoimg king, the 
nation had felt, were locked up the destinies of France. 

From the moment of his birth there was in Louis XIV 
something that appealed to the popular mind. His extraor- 
dinary vigor of will and the strength of his appetite were 
manifest from his earliest infancy. When he was only a 
few months old, Grotius, at that time ambassador of Sweden 
to France, wrote of him: '*His frightful and precocious 
avidity is a bad omen for the neighboring peoples; for he is 
at present on his ninth nurse, whom he is rending and 
murdering as he has the others. " 

It was, in truth, a young lion that the Cardinal was 
training for the rule of France. The discipline imposed 
upon him by Mazarin was not wasted on the stronger and 
bolder nature of the King; and under this tuition, in which 
craft was grafted upon strength, a new type of sovereign was 
forming, destined to combine with the pride and authority 
of a monarch the skill and adroitness of a thoroughly schooled 
diplomatist.^ 

It was in the field of international diplomacy that the 
Cardinal was to find an arena for the display of his own ex- 



^ One of the pamphlets of the time, Le CaUchisme de la Cour, Paris, 
1652, gives the credo of Mazarin thus: ''Jecrois . . . au Mazarin . . ., 
qui a ^t^ con^u de Teeprit de Machiavel . . .'' Another pamphlet of a 
later date, U Alcoran de Louis XI V, says the following lines had to be 
learned by the King: " My son, in whom do you believe? — In Nicholas 
Machiavelli. — Who was this Nicholas Machiavelli? — The father of 
politicians, and the one who has taught princes the art of reigning," etc. 
The relations between Louis XIV and Mazarin are discussed by Lacour- 
Gayet in the Revue Historique, LXVIII, (1898) pp. 226, 257. 



THE ASCENDENCY OF FRANCE 5 

traordinary powers, and the time was ripe for their active Chap, i 
exercise. ^- ^- 

In establishing beyond question the supremacy of his 

sovereign in his own reahn, Mazarin was laying the founda- 
tion of the King's future greatness. His ultimate aim was 
to extend the royal authority over the widest possible area 
of territory. Not content with maintaining their national 
independence, all the European states were at that time 
eager to expand their borders and to include within their 
dominions neighboring and even distant populations. Al- 
though the course of events had imposed upon Europe a 
state system in which theory demanded equality of rights 
between the members composing it, no power was wiUing 
to concede them, and the lust for aggrandizement was 
universal. Until the colonial question carried this rivalry 
beyond the ocean, as it was soon to do, the only path of ex- 
pansion was the despoiling of neighbors; and this became 
the principal object of international poUtics. Spain, iso- 
lated and exhausted, was bent on the recovery of the groimd 
lost by the independence of the United Provinces. There, 
in turn, the Stadtholder was ambitious to conquer a part 
at least of the Spanish Netherlands; while France was eager 
to push her borders to the Rhine, and to counterbalance 
Spain in Italy. While the German princes were coveting 
the ecclesiastical estates, the Emperor was seeking to 
compensate his loss of prestige by enlarging his domains in 
the East; Sweden was aiming to continue as the predomi- 
nant power in the North and become the mistress of the 
Baltic; Denmark was resenting every encroachment, and 
preparing to oppose the preponderance of Sweden; Russia 
was soon to enter the field of contest with unmeasured 
force and keen ambitions for westward expansion; and Eng- 
land, under the Conunonwealth, envious of the commercial 
supremacy which the Dutch had acquired on the ocean, was 
ready to overwhelm her most natural ally with her superior 
resources* 

So long as he was crippled at home by the activities of 
the Fronde, Cardinal Mazarin had not been able to carry 



6 



A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY 



Chap. I 

A.D. 

164&-1670 



Muarin's 
scheme for a 
Bourbon- 
Stuart-Orance 
coalition 



on the war with Spain with his former energy, and his 
efforts to secure allies against his enemy were for a consider- 
.able time doomed to disappointment. Until the death of 
the Stadtholder William II, in 1650, the Cardinal had 
hoped through his influence to induce the States General 
of the United Provinces to amiul their treaty with Spain 
and join with France in the conquest and partition of the 
Spanish Netherlands. On October 20, 1650, the project 
of a treaty had been prepared, by the terms of which the 
Stadtholder and the King of France, on May 1, 1651, were 
to unite in a joint attack upon the Spanish possessions, en- 
deavor to restore the House of Stuart to the throne of 
Elngland, and to form with Charles Stuart a decisive coali- 
tion against Spain; but within a month, and before Wil- 
liam II had signed the treaty, the plan was suddenly frus- 
trated by his death. Had the scheme succeeded, it is not 
impossible that William II might have added to the terri- 
tory of the United Provinces a portion of the Spanish Neth- 
erlands, combined them in an independent kingdom, and 
secured its stability by an alliance with the Bourbon and 
Stuart d3ma9ties.^ 

This combination was intended by Mazarin to extinguish 
republicanism, which he bitterly condemned, both in Eng- 
land and the Netherlands, to enforce a peace upon Spain, and 
to obtain at one boimd the preponderance of France in 
Europe; but its miscarriage left him without an effective 
aUy. 

In the meantime he dallied with a project to form an 
alliance with the Commonwealth. In August, 1652, D'Es- 
trades was directed to soimd the Protector; but Cromwell 
would not listen to his proposals. In the following December, 
however, the Cardinal decided formally to recognize the 

^ Sirtema de GrovestinB, Histoire des IvJUea el rivaliUs politiqueSf I, 
pp. 77, 80, regards the document of October 20, 1650, as more than a 
"project," and considers it a "convention,'' intended to place William 
II in full possession of the sovereignty of the Netherlands. Groen van 
Prinsterer, on the other hand, Archives, ou corresjxmdance irMUe de la 
maison d'Orange-Naeeau, IV, pp. cxix, cxxvi, absolves the Prince from 
this imputation. 



THE ASCENDENCY OF FRANCE 7 

Commonwealth^ and sent Antoine de Bordeaux to London Chap. I 

to prepare the way for more intimate relations. ^' ">• 

1 fl< t ft 1 flTn 
If Mazarin had realized the value of an alliance with the 



Netherlands against Spain, the Conunonwealth also did 

not fail to appreciate the utility of Dutch friendship. In 

the spring of 1651, Oliver St. John and Walter Strickland Negotutioiu 

had been sent as ambassadors to the States General, to^^'^J^T** 

propose ^'a more strict and intimate alliance and union,'' Netheriandi 

whereby there might be a "more mutual interest of each 

in the other than hitherto hath been, for the good of 

both.'' 

It seemed a reasonable proposition; for both govern- 
ments were nominally republican and Protestant, both had 
struggled for religious toleration, and as maritime powers 
had important interests to conciliate. So long as the Stadt- 
holder William II had lived, his family connection with the 
House of Stuart rendered a rapprochement with the Com- 
monwealth quite impossible; but now that the House of 
Orange was represented only by a posthumous infant, 
and a republican reaction against the stadtholderate had 
set in, a union of the two republics no longer seemed 
impracticable. 

It was only in appearance, however, that the interests The inoom- 
of the two peoples were compatible. The Conunonwealth ^^Jj^^ ®' 
was a military despotism, antimonarchical only in name, and nipubUos 
rapidly tending toward a personal autocracy under the 
dictatorship of Oliver Cromwell. The Dutch Republic, 
on the other hand, was a loose federation of seven sovereign 
provinces, partly maritime and partly agricultural, in 
which Holland by its greater wealth and commercial su- 
premacy enjoyed preponderance. 

But the incompatibility of the two nations was deeper 
than the differences in their forms of government. Between 
the English and the Dutch had developed a sharp rivalry 
for the carrying trade of the world, which by the enterprise 
of the Dutch merchants and sailors had become ahnost a 
monopoly of the United Provinces. To this rivalry there 
were but two possible solutions, — a pacific union based 



164^1670 



8 A HISTORY OP DIPLOMACT 

Chap. I on co-operation and reciprocity on the one hand, or open 
^'^•^ war on the other. 

The impediments to a union were serious. The chief 
of these was the unwillingness of the Netherlands to take 
a secondary place in the system the Commonwealth was 
endeavoring to create; and a military power that had just 
overturned the throne of England, conquered Ireland, and 
subdued Scotland was not likely to respect too highly the 
national feelings of its Dutch neighbors. The United Prov- 
inces, on the other hand, with intense sentiments of in- 
dependence, were not organized for unity of action in the 
realm of policy.^ A federation of separately feeble commu- 
nities, bound together chiefly by fear of aggression, and 
divided into conflicting parties, whose decisions could be 
obtained only by the slow concessions of general debate 
and free deliberation, was not to be easily brought into 
submission to the will of a foreign power. 

From March 30 until July 1, 1651, the English ambas- 
sadors, St. John and Strickland, had labored at The Hague 
to obtain an ''intimate alliance and union," but in vain. 
Among the reasons for the approaches of the Conunonwealth 
to the Netherlands was the wish to prevent the further 
machinations of the Stuarts on the continent, for which The 
Hague had been an active centre. During the residence 
of the English ambassadors in Holland, the Princess Royal 
of England and her brother, the Duke of York, who were 
living at The Hague, with great ostentation daily rode 
past the house occupied by the ambassadors, staring at it in 
a manner to excite the spirit of insult against the inmates 
on the part of the rabble that followed in their train. At 
length a warning was received by the ambassadors that the 
royalists were planning to murder them. Quite naturally, 
the expulsion of the royal refugees and of all rebels against 
the existing government of England from the territory of 



^ A diplomatist of the time said of the United Provinces: "Cest 
una imperfection dans oet £tat qu'il y ait tant de membres; chaque 
membre est une t^te, et il faut que ces tdtee soient en un chapeau avant 
qu'aucune chose se fassel" — Thurloe, State Papers, HI, p. 21. 



THE ASCENDENCY OP FRANCE 9 

the Netherlands was immediately demanded by the Com- Chap, i 
monwealth; but this proposition the Dutch negotiators i^^^q^^q 

would not accept. "We cannot," they replied, "banish 

from our soil all persons who are banished out of England. 
Our country is a refuge for the exiles of all nations. " 

The penalty for this attitude of independence was the The Navis*- 
Navigation Act of October 9, 1651.^ Its purpose was to *^" ^** 
inflict a crushing blow upon Holland by destroying its com- 
mercial supremacy; for, being unable to absorb its rival 
by diplomacy, the Commonwealth was now resolved to in- 
capacitate it by force. The chief provisions of the act are: 
(1) that "no goods or commodities whatsoever of the growth, 
production, or manufacture of Asia, Africa, or America, 
... or of any islands belonging to them," should be 
brought into England, Ireland, or other possessions of the 
Commonwealth, in any other ships than those owned, com- 
manded, and chiefly manned by EInglishmen, under penalty 
of forfeiture of the ship and its cargo; (2) that no European 
conmiodities should be brought from any country in any 
ship not owned by the people of the Conunonwealth, or 
the people of the country in which the merchandise was 
pnxluced, under the same penalty. 

Of this measure an Ekiglish historian writes: "The 
Navigation Act, which remained substantially in force for 
nearly two himdred years, is the great legislative monu- 
m^it of the Commonwealth. It was the first manifestation 
of the newly awakened consciousness of the commimity, 
the act which laid the foundation of the English conunercial 
eminre. ... By excluding the Dutch from the carrying 
trade of English commodities we now took into our own 
hands the whole work of conunerce, to which our nation 
was henceforth mainly to devote itself. But by the same 
act we struck a deadly blow at the very state to which, 
but a few months before, we had offered almost an incor- 
poratiiig union. If that state in her long struggle with 
Spain had displayed such prodigious vitality and energy. 



> For the text, see Reich, Select DocumerUSt pp. 538, 541. 



10 A HISTORY OP DIPLOMACY 

Chap. I this was because the Spaniard had never known how to 
^•»- strike her in her vital part. Her near neighbor, the other 
^ Protestant state, the other trading state, found out this 



vital part at once. The Netherlands lived by the carrying 

trade of the world; . . . and thus, though Dutch greatness 

was to last another half century, its decline commences 

here. The Navigation Act of 1651 is the first nail in its 

coffin. "1 

caiameter of The Severity of this attitude, — which a Dutch embassy 

Jjjj^^^ sent to London in December, 1651, headed by the venerable 

ffiot Grand Pensionary of Holland, the poet Jacob Cats, was 

unable to mollify, — followed by the seizure of seventy 

^ ^ V ^^^^ vessels, soon led to open war. Admiral Tromp was 

C ^^x^tU, r^ 1^/ y> (jip^cted to protect Dutch merchant ships from search and 

v^ w*> ^L *. capture, and Blake was ordered to enforce the English claim 

to sovereignty in the narrow seas by compelling foreign ves- 
sels to salute the EInglish flag; and thus it came to blows 
upon the Channel, which for a time, after first suffering a 
series of defeats, the Dutch admiral swept with a broom 
— ^ nailed to the mast-head of his ship as a symbol of his vic- 
tories. 

But this arrogance was soon avenged. The wealth of 
Holland was in her ships and cargoes, while that of EIngland 
was for the most part safe on land. Every ship and cargo 
captured enriched the Commonwealth and weakened its 
victim, imtil the security of what remained necessitated 
concessions and submission. 

Two things in this conflict are worthy of remark. One 
is that the cause of the quarrel is different from those with 
which we have hitherto been concerned. It is no longer the 
personal rivalry of Bourbon and Hapsburg, the zealous 
antagonism of Protestant and Catholic, nor yet the recur- 
rent conffict of territorial sovereignty with the imperial 
tradition; it is a contest for primacy in commerce. The 
^ other observation is that Europe is beginning to look beyond 
^ the narrow circle of the old Empire, away from Ital^ and its 
intrigues, away from Germany with its ecclesiastijbal spoils 

^ Seeley, The Growth of BritUh Policy^ II, pp. 25, 26. 



THE ASCENDENCY OP FRANCE 11 

and the secularizing appetities of its princes, away even I Chap. I 
from the question of national frontiers and the appropria- ^^^' 

tion of passive or resistant populations. We witness the ^ 

beginnings of world politics, of the struggle for sea-power, { 
and the premonitions of colonial wars. But even in the nar- 
rower circle the spirit of interstate relations had undergone 
a change. For a long period ambition had masked itself 
behind religious sentiment and pretended virtues, but now 
the age of chivalry in international poUcy had passed away. 
A rude realism, based frankly on national interest, had boldly 
entered the arena. Only the thin textiu-es of courtly cour- 
tesy, often too scantily, and sometimes without pretence of 
decency, concealed the sordid and piratical designs that 
mustered armies and created navies. Thitherto great wars 
had sprung in some manner from private or merely d3ma9tic 
interests. It now became evident that the fuel for the flames 
of battle was not alone the passions of monarchs, but the 
egoism of republics also. 

It was by its intelligence rather than by its force that the The treaty of 
Dutch republic could hope, if at all, to resist its powerful ^^^^^^^11,^ 
antagonist, now more potent than it had ever been before 
both on land and sea. In one respect the Commonwealth, 
Bke the United Provinces, was dependent upon its imports 
for its naval strength. The materials for ships — timber, 
tar, and hemp — were products of the Baltic coimtries. 
To cut off the EJnglish from this supply was to sever their 
growing marine from its very roots. A glance at the map 
discloses the power possessed by Denmark to block the path 
of commerce between the North Sea and the Baltic by clos- 
ing the Sound to its enemies and opening it only to its friends. 
In the rivalry for the mastery of the Baltic between Denmark 
and Sweden, in which Russia was soon to participate, the 
Danish kingdom was in need of friends, and of friends pos- 
sessing power on the sea. Another fact tending to facili- 
tate an alliance with the Dutch against the Commonwealth 
was that the Danish dynasty was in sympathy with the 
Stuarts. When, therefore, the Dutch foimd themselves 
in command of the Channel and the North Sea, their next 



12 



A HISTORY OP DIPLOMACY 



Chap. I 

A. D. 

1648-1670 



The poKoM 
of Cromwell 
•ad Oe Witt 



step was to seek an ally against the English at the Danish 
Court. 

The danger of being cut off from the Baltic trade had 
caused great concern in Elngland, and the preservation of it 
by alliance with the Dutch had been one of the leading 
motives for the proposed union.^ That alliance having 
proved impossible, on February 8, 1663, a treaty was con- 
cluded in which Frederick III of Denmark agreed to close 
the Sound to English ships and maintain a fleet to enforce 
the prohibition; and in exchange for this service the United 
Provinces promis^ financial aid and the protection of their 
ally from any hostilities that might be incurred as a conse- 
quence of these engagements.^ 

Cromwell had taken no personal part in the steps that 
led to the war with Holland; but, on December 16, 1653, 
the imperialism of the Commonwealth ended in the establish- 
ment of the Protectorate, the "Barebone's Parliament" 
was dissolved, and Cromwell, as Lord Protector, became the 
absolute head of the state. In the preceding July, John De 
Witt had been chosen Grand Pensionary of Holland, and 
entered upon that long course of public activity which was 
to rank him in influence with the sovereigns of Europe. 

Being sincerely and first of all a Protestant, Cromwell 
desired to perform the task which no previous ruler of Eng- 
land had ever been bold enough to attempt, the formation 
of a great Protestant international union. To him, there- 
fore, it seemed that the United Provinces should now accept 
consolidation with Great Britain, as Scotland had already 
done. Knowing that the Netherlands were divided into 
two parties, the adherents of the House of Orange and the 
advanced Republicans, he aimed, as he had done in Scot- 
land, to destroy the one by his protection of the other. 



1 See the instnictions printed from the MS. Order Book of the Coun- 
cil of State of May 9, 1661, by Geddes, Administration of John De Witt, 
p. 176, where fear is expressed that the Baltic trade might be wholly 
lost to the English. 

* See Dumont, Corpa univenel diplomatiquie, Amsterdam and The 
Hague, 1720-1731, VI, Part II, pp. 40, 46. 



THE ASCENDENCY OF FRANCE 13 

In this wish to abase the Stuari-Orange party he had a chap. i 
natural ally in John De Witt; but the Grand Pensionary had -^- ">• 

no intention of subjecting his country to foreign domina- 

lion on the one hand, or of too much strengthening its 
formal unity on the other. Far better than Cromwell, he 
understood that too strong a pressure from without could 
only result in a revival of the stadtholderate in the House 
of Orange; whereas his own aim was to continue the loose 
federation of the Provinces imder the leadership of Holland. 
There was before him, therefore, the delicate task of re- 
sisting the domination of Cromwell from without, and at 
the same time of preventing a popular demand for a regency 
in the name of the infant William III within the Netherlands. 
As an Ekiglish historian has well said, it was ''a miraculous 
performance on the tightrope'' that was required of him; 
which, with consunmiate skill and equipoise, he executed 
in the presence of the wondering powers of Europe for nearly 
twenty years. 

As an offset to the alliance of the Dutch with Denmark, The Ando- 
m November, 1653, Bulstrode Whitelocke was sent by the ^JJ^wm 
Conmionwealth as ambassador to Queen Christinaof Sweden, 
for the purpose of negotiating an offensive and defensive 
alliance with that power. His reception by the Queen at 
Upsala was cordial; but both Queen Christina and her vener- 
able Chancellor, Oxenstiem, had doubted the stability of 
the Commonwealth. The news of Cromwell's assiunption 
of the protectorate, which reached Sweden on January 12, 
1654, although Oxenstiem characterized it as an "election 
by the sword, " gave great satisfaction at Upsala; for it was 
considered as an assiirance of the permanence of the British 
government. When, however, Whitelocke received new 
credentials from Cromwell signed "Oliverius P" in analogy 
with the former ''Carolus R," the Queen, who had already 
predicted that Cromwell would be "king of England in 
conclusion," inquired, "Is your new government by a 
protector different from what it was before as to monarchy?" 
Then, not satisfied with Whitelocke 's answer, she added: 
"Why is the title 'Protector,' when the power is kingly? 



14 A HISTORY OP DIPLOMACY 

Chap. I ... New titles, with sovereign power, proved prejudicial 
^•»- to the state of Rome."^ 

But recalling that her own ancestor, Gustavus Vasa, 

had risen to the throne from the ranks of the army, she was 
even the better prepared to negotiate not, indeed, for an 
offensive and defensive alliance, — which seemed to the 
prudent Oxenstiem an imsafe venture while Ekigland was 
still at war and Sweden was at peace, — but for the format 
tion of a more effective coaUtion. Secretly a Catholic, 
and even then intending to renounce her throne, Christina 
could have no sympathy with Cromwell's league of Prot- 
estants; and proposed that, since the United Provinces 
were known to be looking anxiously for support from 
France,^ the possible combination of that kingdom with 
the Netherlands and Denmark might be counterpoised by 
another "trinity" of powers, to be composed of Sweden, 
England, and Spain.' 

Thus, within a decade of the Peace of Westphalia, a 
complete reversal of the alliances on which that settlement 
was founded was proposed, in which the only principle of 
combination was the preservation of European equilibrium, 
without any distinction of religion or form of government. 
TiM trium- But Cromwell's negotiations did not enable him to 

S^iroiT* ^ impose his own terms upon the Netherlands. Instead of a 
union with that republic foimded on community of religion, 
which he desired, he was obliged to accept a peace based 
on the pledge to maintain republicanism. He demanded 
and obtained from the Grand Pensionary a promise of the 
permanent exclusion of the House of Orange from office in 
the Netherlands, but not with the ratification of the States 
General. In the treaty of April 5, 1654, it is provided that 
whoever might hold the office of "Stadtholder" or "Captain 
General" should be required to accept this engagement.* 

1 Whitelocke's Journal, I, p. 274. 

* For these negotiations, see Waddington, La lUpyblique des Pro- 
vincea-Uniea, la Prance et Us Pays-Bas espagnols, and LefSvre-Pontalis, 
Jean de Witt, I, 160, 161. 

» Whitelocke's Jovmal, I, p. 275. 

* For the treaty, see Dumont, VI, Part II, p. 74. 



A.D. 

1648-1670 



THE ASCENDENCY OP FRANCE 15 

In a secret declaration of May 4, 1654, however, the States Chap. i 

of Holland solemnly pledged their word that they would 

not choose the Prince of Orange for any public office.* 

Little was it dreamed that the infant scion of the Houses 

of Stuart and Orange, whose hereditary privileges were 

thus denied, would one day, as William III, become not 

only Stadtholder of Holland but Eii^ of England. 

With great sagacity, but in the face of strenuous oppo- 
sition, De Witt succeeded in preserving the Republic from 
self-effacement under the too powerful pressure of the Pro- 
tector's mailed fist, and at the same time secured through 
allianoe with him a new guarantee of its continued exist- 
ence.' On the other hand, although Cromwell failed to 
obtain the "closer union," he was able to impose impor- 
tant concessions upon the United Provinces. Influenced 
by the changed conditions resulting from the peace of the 
Netherlands with England and Cromwell's commercial 
treaty with Sweden, Denmark also found it expedient to 
make a treaty with him, signed at Westminster, on Septem- 
ber 15, 1654, by which Frederick III agreed to reopen the 
Sound to English ships, and to pay an indemnity for the 
srisure of vessels and cargoes; and the Netherlands, in loyal 
recognition of their previous treaty obligations, aided 
Denmark in the payments that were demanded.' 

Great Britain had now become, imder the guidance of 
Cromwell, the foremost military state in Europe, and had 

' The divided state of the United Provinces at this time is well illus- 
trated by the selection of the commissioners who were sent to London 
to negotiate peace with Cromwell. De Witt devised the plan of sending 
a cipher code to his friends, enjoining upon them to use it in their cor- 
KBpaodence without the knowledge of his opponents in the commission. 
See Lefdvre-Pontalis, Jean de Witty I, p. 181, and p. 185. For the 
Dedaration of May 4, 1654, see Dumont, VI, Part II, pp. 85, 88. 

' For the d^ence of De Witt from the charge of duplicity with 
Oomwell, see Lefdvre-Pontalis, Jean de WiUy I, pp. 177, 178. 

' Among the other indirect losses of the Netherlands in connection 
with the war waa the recovery of Brasil by Portugal in 1654, the Dutch 
having taken it in 1640 during the war with Spain. On July 10, 1654, 
Ghnnwdl made a commercial treaty with Portugal also. For the treaty 
of the Commonwealth with Denmark, see Dtmiont, VI, Part II, p. 92. 



16 



A HISTORY OF DIPLOBiACY 



Chap. I 

A.D. 

1648-1670 



Mftsuin'i 
desire for an 

allianoe 



established relations of amity and commerce with the three 
most important Protestant powers. 
- When in January, 1653, Mazarin had returned to Paris 
.from exile, Guy Patin had said of him: ''His Eminence is 
as powerful as God the Father at the commencement of 
the world"; but at that time the hyperbole of the French 
physician applied only to Mazarin 's influence in the capital. 
In the South of France open rebellion continued, and the 
Spaniards were still in possession of French soil. It is 
not surprising, therefore, that in January, 1654, the Cardinal 
was ready to offer Dunkirk, if captured, to Cromwell, first 
with twelve hundred thousand livres, then with a much 
greater sum, if he would aid in the conquest of Flanders 
from the Spanish. On July 16, 1654, Antoine de Bordeaux 
was instructed to offer, if an alliance could not be obtained, 
as high as sixty thousand pistoles for a mere treaty of peace 
and commerce. 

The reasons for this amdety to obtain the friendship 
of Cromwell were manifold. The Commonwealth had al- 
ready treated the French merchantmen with a rude hand, 
and when in 1652 Spain had appealed to England for aid in 
taking Dunkirk, Blake had even seized French ships. 
There was in England considerable hostility to France, 
wrote De Bordeaux, and would be "so long as it was gov- 
erned by His Eminence, or a man of his profession, who are 
pillars of the Pope." In the hope of profiting by this antip- 
athy to the Cardinal the French Protestants were in- 
stinctively turning toward Cromwell, and the rebellious 
Prince of Condi's agents were seeking his support. The 
royal family of England had sought an asylum in France 
and, much to the displeasure of the Protector, had received 
there friendly hospitality. Should Cromwell ally himself 
with Spain, France — isolated and surrounded with enemies 
— would be exposed to extreme peril. If, however, not- 
withstanding these adverse circumstances, Mazarin could 
secure the friendship of Cromwell, the mere spectacle of 
military co-operation between France and England would 
go far to intimidate Spain and end the conflict with her. 



A. D. 

1648-1670 



THE A8CENDENCT OF FRANCE 17 

While Mazarin was thus soliciting the aid of Cromwell, Chap. i 
the Protector was still absorbed in his great project of or- 
ganizing a Protestant union, without any immediate pur- 
pose of either siding with France on the one hand or Spain 
on the other, or of aggressive measures against either. 
Yielding to his dominant religious impulse, his aim was to be PMmooitioDs 
the Protector of the whole Protestant world, as well as Lord °' ' f~*^ 
Protector of England. Sincerely believing in toleration 
as a principle, without imposing his own faith upon others, 
he meant to stand for it everywhere, as he had stood for the 
cause of the Independents against Charles I. 

In ELigland there was much excited apprehension of a 
strong revival of the Coimter-Reformation. Emissaries 
were sent to the Protestant cantons of Switzerland to me- 
diate between them in the adjustment of their difficulties, 
with instructions to oppose the efforts of France to renew 
its treaty with the cantons. With equal solicitude, the 
Protector was ready to guard the interests of the Hugue- 
nots in France, the Waldenses in Savoy, and all imperilled 
Protestants everywhere. Still, beyond extensive naval 
preparations, which foreshadowed some great but unknown 
movement upon the sea, there was no sign of any definite 
plan of action on Cromwell's part. 

A sudden change in the government of Sweden seemed 
for the moment to be significant for the activity of the Prot- 
estant powers. On Jime 6, 1654, at the castle of Upsala, 
Christina, Queen of Sweden, weary of her throne, voluntarily 
abdicated in favor of her cousin, Charles Augustus, who as- 
sumed the crown as Charles X. In this ambitious soldier 
and able politician Sweden seemed to have found a leader 
capable of realizing all the traditional hopes of that kingdom; 
who, in union with Cromwell, might make Protestantism 
preponderant in Europe. At London, the Protector had 
chosen the Swedish ambassador as his most intimate com- 
panion. As a contemporary writes, ''He never caressed any 
man so much, nor sought the friendship of any so much as 
the Kng of Sweden." But Charles X had no notion of be- 
coming a partner in Cromwell 's protectorate of religion. Be- 
voL. ra. — 2 



18 



A HISTORY OP DIPLOBiACY 



Chap. I 

A. D. 

1648-1670 



NegotUtions 
of Maaarin 
with Holland 
asd Portugal 



fore him lay Poland, feeble, divided, and an easy prey to 
conquest, either by Sweden on the one side or by Russia 
. on the other. To the conquest of Poland, therefore, Charles 
X bent all his energies; but this soon involved him in war 
with Denmark and excited the apprehensions of the Emperor 
Ferdinand III and the Great Elector, Frederick William, 
Margrave of Brandenburg and Duke of Prussia, who was 
thus menaced with being made a vassal of Sweden in place 
of an almost independent holder of a great fief under the 
nominal suzerainty of the less potent King of Poland.^ 

Although by these preoccupations of Charles X Crom- 
well was deprived of his support in maintaining a Protestant 
preponderance on the continent, the anxiety for peace in 
Germany enforced upon the Emperor Ferdinand III the 
pledge of neutrality by which he was bound not to afford 
assistance to the Spanish branch of the House of Hapsburg. 
In a very real sense, therefore, the Protector became the 
arbiter of Western Europe, and all the more effectually 
because of the difficulties that beset Mazarin's negotiations 
with his two other possible allies, the Dutch Republic and 
Portugal. 

At The Hague, the French resident, Chanut, was in- 
structed to press the Grand Pensionary to sever the offen- 
sive relations of the Republic with Spain, which had been 
established by the separate Peace of 1648,^ and to unite 
in action against her. To enforce this policy upon the 
Hollanders, frequent seizures had been made of Dutch 
vessels carrying Spanish goods; and the States General 
had vainly striven to renew their treaties with France on 
the principle that the neutral flag covers the merchandise. 
Determined not to be thus forced into an unnecessary war 
with Spain, the Republic resolved, on the contrary, to meet 
the imperious insistence of France with increased arma- 
ments for the protection of its commerce. 



* For the secret mission of Friesendorf, sent by Charles X in 1657 
to obtain aid from England, for which possessions on the continent 
were offered, see Erdmannsddrffer, Deutsche GesckichUy I, pp. 2S4, 285. 

' See Volume II of this work, p. 605. 



1648-1670 



THE ASCENDENCY OF FRANCE 19 

The negotiations with Portugal had not proved more Chap. I 
satisfactory to France. King John IV had resented the ,^;f ^;, 
refusal of Mazarin, — in nominal alliance with whom he was . 
carrying on war against Spain, — to make a formal pledge 
that France would insist upon the independence of Portu- 
gal when peace should finally be made. To increase the 
activity of King John, early in 1655 the ChevaUer de Jant 
was sent by Mazarin to Lisbon with instructions to begin 
his mission by inquiring (1) how John IV proposed to in- 
demnify Louis XIV for past expenses in the war which, it was 
allied, his ambassador had promised would be repaid; 
and (2) in what manner he intended to execute the clause 
of the treaty which obliged Portugal to act "continually" 
against the King of Spain, and to "attack him by land and 
sea."* The object of the mission being to bully the King 
of Portugal into action, De Jant did not hesitate to tell 
John IV to his face that he was "a prince abandoned and 
without resources," and insulted him by saying that he 
would be "the victim of a tragedy — the reunion of 
Portugal with Spain — not less easy to accomplish 
than its dismemberment by the acclamation of Your 
Majesty." 

The King replied with dignity, and was firm in rejecting 
any new engagement with France that did not take the 
form of the desired league. In July, therefore, De Jant 
departed; but, hearing that Spain had offered a truce to 
Portugal, he returned to Lisbon. Confronted with the ques- 
tion, "Will you conclude a league, or will you not?" the 
envoy vacillated; then, on September 7, 1655, signed a 
treaty binding both signatories not to make a separate peace 
with Spain. 

Before De Jant's return to Paris with the treaty, however, 
other events had occurred which brought its ratification 
into question. In vain the Chevalier by citing examples 
from Roman history excused the fact that he had ex- 
ceeded his instructions, pleading that his work was the logical 

> See Teamer, Le chevalier Jant, Paris, 1877; and Saint-Aymour, 
BectneU dee inelrucHone, III, Portug^, pp. 11, 25. 



A.D. 

1648-1670 



20 A HI8T0BY OF DIPLOMACY 

Chap. I completion of the plans of Richelieu.^ But Mazarin 
was resolved not to complicate the future peace with Spain 
by the obligation to secure his kingdom to John IV, and 
firmly declined to ratify the treaty. 
TheAnsio- It was upou the co-operation of Cromwell, therefore, 

R^ropp«K ^1^^ Mazarin was at last forced to depend for the effective 
ally of whom he was in quest; but to an alliance with the 
Protector there were serious impediments. When, in 
order to promote an enierUef in February, 1654, Mazarin 
raised the rank of the French envoy, De Bordeaux, to 
that of an ambassador accredited personally to Cromwell, 
a question of etiquette arose not unmingled with royal 
sentiment. After the execution of Charles I, the Cardinal's 
loyalty to monarchy had not restrained him from sending a 
secret representative to make purchases at the sale of the 
late king's belongings; but he found it embarrassing to 
permit the King of France to address the regicide as Man 
frire, and Cromwell refused to be called Mon cousin. 
A satisfactory compromise was found, however, in the title 
'^MonaieuT le Protedeur." 

But this mere formality was the least of the obstacles 
to an understanding. Cromwell required the expulsion 
of the Stuart family from France, where the widow of 
Charles I, Henriette Marie, and her children had sought 
asylum; and, in addition, he demanded the protection of 
Protestants and the right of worship for subjects of £}ngland 
travelling or sojourning in France. 

Upon the latter point, Mazarin was ready to make every 
concession. The E2dict of Nantes still afforded toleration 
to the Huguenots, and the Cardinal was willing to guarantee 
in a special article the immunity and privileges of English 
subjects. 

The expulsion of the Stuarts was a more delicate ques^- 
tion. The elder prince, the future Charles II, offended with 
the sending of De Bordeaux to London, had departed from 
France and taken up his residence at Kdfai. His next 



^ Richelieu had, however, in fact also refused to guarantee the inde- 
pendence of Portugal. 



THE ASCENDENCY OP FRANCE 21 

younger brother, James, Duke of York, had become an officer chap. i 

in the French army, and could easily be kept out of France, ^' ^• 

But the third son of Charles I, Henry, the young Duke of ^^^^^^^ 



Gloucester, who was then only fourteen years old, could not 
be eidled from France Tnthout creating a scandal. The re- 
sources of the Cardinal were, however, equal to the emer- 
g^cy. It fiimii^ed an occasion for reciprocity in excluding 
enonies of the State, and thereby an opportunity for pro- 
curing the expulsion of Condi's agents from England. It 
was decided, therefore, that, by a secret treaty, each govern- 
ment should agree to expel certain refugees from the terri- 
tory of the other; and in the list figured the names of -the 
three sons of Charles I; but, on account of his youth, the 
expulsion of the Duke of Gloucester was not to become effec- 
tive for ten years. 

The last difficulty to be encountered was the claim of 
the Protector to be named in the treaty as having the same 
rank as Louis XIV. Mazarin was for a time disconcerted 
by this pretension, then suggested that the Protector should 
first assume the title of king. This Cromwell would prob- 
ably have done when the royal title was offered to him in the 
"Petition and Advice'' by the Parliament, had it not been 
for the known opposition of the army.^ In the Treaty of 
Westminster, concluded with France on November 3, 1655, 
Cromwell figures as " Serenissiinus Potentiasiinusgue Domi- 
nu8 Protector Reipublicae Angliaey Scotias, et Hibemiae."^ 

It was, after all, only to obligations of amity and com- The attitude 
merce, not to a political alliance, that the Lord Protector ^^™^2n 
pledged his country in the treaty of 1655. There was in it 
no mention of a league against Spain, nor was there any 
secret understanding upon that subject. Still, the Treaty 
of Westminster was a great victory for Mazarin; for it gave 
Louis XIV the prestige of friendship with England's power- 
ful ruler, who was soon forced by events into a closer rela- 



^ For proof that Cromwell would gladly have aasumed the crown, 
ne the famous conversation with Whitelocke, MemoriaU, III, pp. 468, 
47i. 

* See Dumont, VI, Part II, p. 121. 



22 



A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY 



Chap. I 

A.D. 

164&-1670 



lOf 

ManriB with 



tion with France. In Spain^ the most intolerant of the 
Catholic nations, in which the hated Inquisition was an 
. established institution, antagonism to England, even when 
latent, was still inherent. But it was the exclusive pre- 
tensions of Spain to America that were most irritating to 
Cromwell, who saw no justice in claims extending over a great 
portion of two vast continents based primarily on titles 
of possession derived from decrees of Pope Alexander YI.^ 
The Protector had complained that, in contravention of the 
Treaty of 1630, "the English were treated by the Spaniards 
as enemies wherever they were met with in America, 
though sailing to and from their own plantations. " He had 
demanded, too, that English merchants in Spain might 
be permitted to possess and use English Bibles and other 
religious books. In reply the Spanish ambassador, Don 
Alonso de Cardefias, had declared, that to demand free 
sailing in the West Indies and exemption from the In- 
quisition in Spain was "to ask for his master's two eyes," 
and the demands certainly could not be granted. 

Thus, peace with Spain became in Cromwell's mind im- 
possible, and depredations on Spanish commerce and colo- 
nies, which in Queen Elizabeth's time were construed as acts 
for which the government was not responsible, now became 
its deliberate policy. Even before concluding the treaty 
with France, Cromwell had ordered an attack on San Do- 
mingo; which, though unsuccessful, was soon followed by the 
capture of Jamaica. It was only gradually, however, that 
he evinced a disposition to abandon his attitude of holding 
the balance of power; and it was not until 1657 that he was 
ready to seek a political alliance with France against Spain. 

In the meantime, Mazarin had profited by his relations 
of amity with Cromwell to attempt direct negotiations 
of peace with Spain. In reality exhausted and decadent, 
governed by a monarch with whom temporization had be- 
come a habit, and attacked by the vigorous navy of Eng- 
land, Spain appeared to be already doomed to ultimate 
defeat. 

» See Volume U of thia work, pp. 186, 187. 



THE ASCENDENCY OF FRANCE 23 

The brother of the Emperor Ferdinand III, Archduke Chap. I 
Leopold of Austria, who since 1646 had governed the Spanish ^' »• 
Netherlands, at once perceived the necessity of peace for 



Spain, and despatched Don Gaspard Bonifaz to urge it 
upon the Coiuii of Madrid. On his journey, Don Gaspard 
visited Paris, and had a conversation with Cardinal Mazarin 
and the Ejng, who informed him that they were ready to 
open secret negotiations of peace with Philip IV. At Madrid, 
the proposition was favorably received by the King and 
his chief minister, Don Luis de Haro; and on June 10, 
1656, aimed with full powers written by Louis XIV with his 
own hand, Hugues de Lionne, under cover of the most ab- 
solute secrecy, set out for Spain. 

The negotiations at Madrid, in the midst of whose stormy 
scenes De Lionne evinced the poise and skill in argument 
that always marked his methods, were not successful; 
for, although each side was disposed to make concessions, 
De Haro demanded for the Prince of Cond^ the restoration 
not only of all his lands and titles but of all his offices in 
the government. To this De Lionne could not consent; and, 
at the end of September, after refusing a costly present from 
the King of Spidn, he returned to France without results.^ 

Defeated in his attempt to make a secret arrangement The Ando- 
with Spain, Mazarin had, nevertheless, by his reserve during ^^^'^^ 
the course of these negotiations rendered Cromwell more 
eager than ever for a French alliance; but the revival of 
the war and the success of Cond^ against Turenne at Val- 
enciennes now made this imion far more necessary for 
France than for the Protector. Accordingly, on March 
23, 1657, a defensive and offensive treaty was signed at 
Paris for a joint attack on Spain. England was to furnish 
six thousand soldiers and a fleet, and as her share of the 
spoils, was to be put in possession of Dunkirk.^ 

It was, in truth, a war of aggression upon which the Pro- 
tector had now embarked. What, then, were Cromwell's 



> For the negDtiatioiis of De Lionne and De Haro, see Valfrey, 
Hugues de Lionne, ses ambaesades, etc., pp. 1, 63. 

> For the treaty, see Dumont, VI, Part II, p. 224. 



1648>1670 



24 A HISTORY OP DIPLOMACY 

Chap. I motives? Since the loss of Calais in 1558, England had pos- 
;^'^^ sessed no territory on the continent. In thus reversing the 
foreign policy of a century by asking for Dunkirk, did the 
Protector aim merely to prevent Charles Stuart from 
using Flanders as a base for attacking England; did he in- 
tend only to hold Dunkirk as a check on the future designs 
of France; or did he have in mind some larger enterprise 
against the Netherlands? It is certain that the possession 
of a foothold on the continent was deemed by him of great 
importance; for it had been a question whether to acquire 
Dunkirk by joining France, or Calais by joining Spain. 
CramiPBO'iim- In June, 1658, Dunkirk was captiu^ed by the IVench and 
Srl^TiSr loy^l^y delivered to the English; but Oliver Cromwell's 
death on September 3 of the same year and the succession 
of his incapable son Richard put an end to the plans which 
the Protector may have entertained. It was soon after- 
wards declared that, contrary to the interest of Engliand, he 
had made an unjust war with Spain and an impolitic league 
with France, thereby destroying the balance of power which 
Elngland had possessed when those two countries were at 
war.^ It would, perhaps, be more just to say that his in- 
tention was to establish England's maritime supremacy 
throughout the world, first by destroying the colonial pre- 
ponderance of Spain and then by commanding the Channel 
on both sides, in order to hold in check both France and the 
Netherlands. It was, indeed, France, not England, that 
was to profit by his policy; not because it was ill conceived, 
but on account of the abrupt failure of his system through 
his death. That policy was, no doubt, "the deeply planned 
aggression of a conqueror."* It was, in substance, the 
imperial policy of Great Britain's later history, the germ 
thought of that Empire of the Sea whose development in- 
volved the overthrow of Spain, the restraint of France, and 
the subordination of the Netherlands. It was, however, 
Mazarin who was to gather the fruits of that fateful alliance, 



1 Bethell, The WoMa Mistake in OUoer Cromwett, London, 1668, 
p. 4. 
« Seeley, The Orowth of Brilieh PoUcy, II, p. 74. 



1048-1670 



THE ASCENDENCY OF FRANCE 25 

and France that was to acquire in Europe that ascendency Cbaf. 
which Cromwell would gladly have conferred upon England; ^^^^- ^ 
but Cromwell had touched the keys of a far deeper and more 
lasting conception of greatness, — an empire built on trade 
and colonies, law and tolerance, thrift and enterprise, open- 
ing new paths upon the sea, and finally encircling the earth. 
With him was arrested for a time the new greatness of Eng- 
land; but the protection to trade, order, and religion which 
inspired the dictatorship of Ohver Cromwell — not, indeed, 
without its hardness and its hand of iron — became in 
time the chief problem of the race from which he sprang. 
In Asia, in America, and in the great continental islands of 
the Pacific, the war of Cromwell was to be continued for the 
conquest of the globe. His task ended in immediate fail- 
ure, but the spirit of the Lord Protector — a conqueror 
in the name of righteousness, without always emplo3dng 
the most righteous means — has created an empire far 
greater than that of which he could have dreamed. 

II. The Pretensions op Louis XIV 

In small things as in great, it had already been made **viku, «*«< 
numifest that the young king of France intended to be, "^" 
what by conunon consent he was soon to be entitled, the 
"Grand Monarque." On April 13, 1655, this youth of 
seventeen years, holding slIU de justice in his hunting cos- 
tume, prohibited the assembling of the Parliament of Paris, 
and all deliberation upon his decrees. The famous words, 
"L^itat, c'est moi," although not actually employed by 
him, are a faithfid risunU of his discourse upon that occasion, 
and of his attitude throughout his reign. They accurately 
epitomize the theory of the royal office held by Mazarin, 
and express the central thought of the King's famous 
"M&noires," written long afterward, for the instruction of 
the Dauphin. In that exposition of the royal prerogatives 
the doctrine is siunmarized in this sentence: ''It is a perver- 
sion of the natural order of things to attribute resolutions 
to subjects and deference to the sovereign; for only the head 
has the right of deUberation and resolution, and the f imctions 



26 



A HISTORY OF DIPLOBiACY 



Chap. I 

A. D. 

1648-1670 



A eomedy of 
prBOMenoo 



of the other members consist solely in executing the com- 
mandments given to them." 

As, upon this theory, the sovereign has no equal within 
the State, he can have no superior outside of it. In inter- 
national affairs this attitude was certain to provoke con- 
flicts, for other powers were also jealous of their prerogatives. 
At Paris, the envoy of the United Provinces, William 
Boreel, resenting the confiscation of Dutch vessels by the 
French as a means of driving the Republic into an al- 
liance with France against Spain, had spoken, Masarin 
declared, ''as no ambassador at that court before." The 
Cardinal was, however, eager if possible to make friends of 
the Netherlands; and, therefore, patiently endiu^ed the 
plainness of speech of the Dutch ambassador, and in April, 
1657, sent De Thou to The Hague to appease the States 
General and secure at least their neutrality in the war with 
Spain. But before the ambassador had delivered the letter 
in which the King finally promised that the embargo against 
Dutch vessels should be raised, an incident occurred which 
narrowly missed ending in acts of violence. 

De Thou had been formally instructed to expose himself 
to any risk rather than yield precedence to the ambassador 
of Spain;^ when, on August 11, 1657, returning from a 
visit to the Princess Dowager in her new palace in the wood, 
he and the Spanish ambassador, Don E^steban de Gamarra, 
about six o'clock in the evening, entered one of the alleys 
of the Voorhout at the same time. The carriage of the 
French ambassador, drawn by six horses, and that of the 
Spaniard, drawn by two, having to pass in the narrow alley 
one at a time, the driver of each demanded precedence, and 
neither would give way to the other. Their servants were 
ready to tear each other from their seats; and the crowd 
that soon gathered, irritated with the treatment the Dutch 
vessels had received from France, was disposed to take 
the part of the ambassador of Spain. The Grand Pensionary 



^ The instruction previouBly given to Chanut was: "De s'exposer 
k toute extr6mit6 plut/^t que de c6der." — Archives des Affaires £tran- 
gires, December 10, 1653. 



16ia-1670 



THE ASCENDENCY OF FRANCE 27 

and several members of the States General hastened to the Chap. I 
scene to prevent a riot; but for three hom^ the situation ,^;^-^-^, 
remained unchanged, and neither ambassador would permit . 
the other to have the right of way. Finally, when the pros- 
pect was that the night would pass without any solution of 
the problem, the diplomatist Bevemingk proposed the happy 
expedient of removing the barriers that confined the way, 
thus suffering both to depart at the same time. 

The Spanish ambassador afterwards claimed the victory, 
on the ground that his carriage occupied a position on the 
right of the thoroughfare. The French ambassador, on 
the contrary, maintained that he had won his point, because 
he had passed on without giving way to his rival.^ 



But the relative importance of France among the powers The embvma*- 

montof tl 
Emperor 



of Europe was being subjected to a more convincing test in "^* *^ *** 



a larger field. Since 1654, when the elder son of the Emperor 
Ferdinand III died, the Emperor had been anxiously plan- 
ning for the succession of his yoxmger son, Leopold, to the 
Empire; but there was a strong disposition to end the Haps- 
burg succession, and Mazarin did not fail to encourage this 
sentiment among the electors and other German princes. 

As early as October 12, 1654, the Coiuii of Vienna was 
warned of the opposition that was brewing, and informed 
that France favored the choice of the young Elector of 
Bavaria, Ferdinand Maria; and if he were not disposed to 
aeoept an election, Louis XIV might himself be a candidate.^ 

It was, however, the situation in the North that most The attuatioii 
seriously complicated the preparations for an election. ^ *** ^^'^^ 
Charles X of Sweden was at that time in the fiood tide of his 
career of conquest, and the attitude of Frederick WiUiam, 
Elector of Brandenburg, later known as the "Great Elector," 
was, therefore, of vital consequence to the Emperor. Fer- 
dinand III had hoped to seciu'e a close alliance with him; 
but, although Count Stahremberg was sent to Berlin in 



' The incident is reported by Lefdvre-Pontalis, Jean de WiU, 1, p. 
215; and alao by Chappuzeau, L'Ewrope VwarUe, II, p. 305, who claims 
to bare been an eye-witness of the scene. 

' See Pribram, Zur Wahl LeapM, I, p. 9 et seq. 



A.D. 

1048-1670 



28 A HISTORY OP DIPLOMACY 

CKiLP. I October, 1655, for that purpose, his missioii was unfruitful. 
Placed in a position where neutrality was impossible, the 
. Elector had vainly endeavored to reconcile Charles X and 
John Casimir, King of Poland; and was now forced either 
to defend his possessions against the aggressions of the Swed- 
ish king or join with him in a proposed partition of Poland, 
in which his share was to be inconsiderable.^ In his per- 
plexity he would gladly have refused the disadvantageous 
protectorate offered him by Charles X and ceased his 
negotiations with John Casimir, — which always ended in 
mere empty assurances, — if Ferdinand III had been willing 
to participate with him in a war against the Swedish con- 
queror; but the f^mperor was not inclined to assume so 
great a risk. Frederick William, on the other hand, having 
formed an alliance with Holland for eventual resistance to 
the progress of Sweden,* — which had awakened the 
fear of the Dutch that the navigation of the Sound might be 
closed to them, — was eager to strengthen himself in the 
coining conflict by securing the Emperor's support. 

On November 6, 1655, therefore, Frederick William re- 
solved to send Georg von Bonin to Vienna to propose a de- 
fensive league and the recognition of the Elector's sovereign 
right to the whole of Prussia; offering upon those terms to 
aid the Emperor to seciue for the House of Hapsburg 
the crown of Poland, and to recommend the election of his 
son Leopold as King of the Romans; but Ferdinand — who 
was receiving from the Poles assiu'ances of his son's prob- 
able succession to the Polish crown after the death of John 
Casimir, and from the King of Sweden constant declara- 
tions of his friendship — exhibited no great concern regard- 
ing the peril of Brandenburg, and declined to support him. 

Unable to obtain financial aid from Holland, imless 
he were actually attacked by Charles X; menaced with 
an invasion of his territories by the Russians who were at 



1 See Waddington, Le Orand Electeur, I, pp. 324, 329; and Haumant, 
La guerre du Nord, p. 62. 

* For the treaty of August 6, 1655, between Brandenburg and Hol- 
landi see Dumont, VI, Part II, p. 108 et seq. 



164&-1670 



THE ASCENDENCY OP FRANCE 29 

the same time engaged in war with Poland and Sweden, Chaf. I 
and abandoned by the Emperor, Frederick William felt ^^^^-^^ 
himself reduced to extremities, when an miexpected change 
in the situation occurred. The Poles, inspired by religious 
zeal against their heretical conquerors, roee in a spirit of 
anient patriotism to restore their defeated monarch, John 
Casimir, who triumphantly re-entered his kingdom, and 
the King of Sweden saw his work of conquest suddenly 
undone. 

In order to recover his lost i)osition, Charles X was Th© TiMty 
then ready to make concessions to Brandenburg, and pro- ^ JJJ^***^ 
posed to the Elector the cession in fief of the Duchy of 
Prussia, to be held under the suzerainty of Sweden. These 
tenns were accepted and embodied in the Treaty of Konigs- 
berg of January 17, 1656.^ Thus the Duchy of Prussia, the 
ancient heritage of the Teutonic Knights, and destined to 
give its name to the most vigorous of the modem states of 
Germany, was finally detached from the Kingdom of Poland 
under the rule of Frederick William, who passed into tem- 
porary vassalage to the King of Sweden. Although Freder- 
ick WilUam, as Duke of Prussia, was exempted by the treaty 
from seeking his investiture in person, empowered to hold 
his own courts, and released from annual tribute, he was 
obliged to open his territory to the passage of Swedish 
troops, and in case of war with Poland to furnish a contin- 
gent of troops to the Swedish army. In making this treaty 
he had not only accepted bonds which Charles X meant to 
tighten in the future, but he had thereby incurred the anger 
of Holland, the hostility of Poland, and the coolness of the 
Emperor. 

Standing thus in need of a friend, Frederick William The mtioai 
was in a position to welcome an alliance with France, and jS^S^,^ 
Mazarin lost no time in concluding it. The Elector had al- 
ready formed secret designs for enterprises on the Rhine 
m which France was to participate, but these were to 

' See Dumont, VI, Part II, p. 127 et seq.; for the comments, 
Waddington, Le Grand ElecUvr, I, pp. 342, 344; and Bosse, Zvr diplo- 
^atUehen GeschiehU des K6nig^}erger Vertragea, 



30 



A HI8T0BY OP DIPLOMACY 



CHiLP. I 
A. D. 

164&-1670 



The diplo- 
macy of 
Lisola for 
Austria 



lemain without execution until the conditions were more 
favorable in the North and East. On February 24, 1656, 
the King and the Elector mutually promised to protect their 
respective possessions and to share in any future conquests.^ 
Although the French ambassador, Servien, who negotiated 
this treaty, objected with some indignation to the mention 
of the King of France and the Elector of Brandenburg in 
the treaty as if they were of equal dignity, Mazarin was the 
first to ratify the compact. 

But this reaching out of tentacles on the part of Mazarin 
to grasp influence in Germany was directed against the 
Emperor and not agidnst Sweden, with which France was 
in alliance; and Frederick William, now completely drawn 
into the vortex of the Swedish wars, derived no benefit from 
his French relations. By his own insistence, however, on 
November 20, 1656, at Labiau, the Elector obtained from 
Charles X a secret treaty by which the feudal relations 
to the Swedish crown imposed by the Treaty of Kdnigs- 
berg were annulled, the Duchy of Prussia was secured to 
himself as an absolute and sovereign prince, and a perpetual 
alliance promised;^ but the lands conquered by Sweden 
from Poland so encompassed the duchy as to hold it at the 
mercy of Charles X. The fate of Brandenbiu'g-Prussia, 
therefore, still trembled in the balance. Such was the 
situation in the North when, on April 2, 1657, the death of 
the Emperor Ferdinand III left a vacancy in the Empire. 

But once more the tide was turning in favor of Poland, 
and the brilliant victories of Charles X were again counter- 
acted by the patriotism of the Poles. Exhausted by the 
vast extent of his conquests and the immensity of the terri- 
tory to be held, in May and June, 1657, the King of Sweden 
was obliged to retreat from Poland. But in this emergency 
he appealed in vain to his former vassal, for the Austrian 
diplomatist Franz von Lisola, who had brought about an 
Austro-Polish treaty on December 1, 1656, had begun the 
task of detaching the Elector from Sweden and reconciling 



1 See Dumont, VI, Part II, p. 30 et seq. 
> See Dumont, VI, Part II, p. 148 et Beq. 



THE ASCENDENCY OP FRANCE 31 

him with Poland. The interests of Frederick William, who Chap. i 
dreaded the excessive power of his Swedish protector, in- aj>- 

tAiJ P |A7fl 

duced him to listen to these proposals, and he soon promised 



not to take the offensive against Poland.^ With the Elec- 
tor of Brandenbm'g thus neutralized, on May 27, 1657, 
the new head of the House of Austria, young Leopold, 
already King of Himgary and Bohemia, at the instigation 
of liaola, concluded at Vienna an offensive alliance with 
Poland;' Russia attacked the Baltic provinces of Sweden; 
the Danes rose in opposition to the Swedish plans of con- 
quest; and the whole North combined to repress the 
ambitions of Charles X. 

Mazarin had never ceased to fear the eventual co-oper- tim ^ 
ation of the Austrian and Spanish branches of the Haps- " *** Bmpiw 
burg dynasty, and the vacancy in the Empire caused by the 
death of Ferdinand III, without having previously secured 
the imperial succession to his son Leopold, seemed to offer 
an occasion for dealing it a decisive blow. 

To win over Frederick William to an anti-Hapsbm^ 
policy, in July, 1657, Mazarin sent D'Avaugour and De 
Terlon to Eonigsberg, fiunished with ''realities" for the 
Elector and his ministers; but when these "realities" proved 
to be mere promises and not the solid gold expected, the 
tCTiptation came to naught. The efforts of Lisola, more- 
over, were systematic and indefatigable; and, although the 
Elector took the himdred thousand crowns soon afterward 
brought to him from France by the mathematician De 
Blondel, that inept diplomatist obtained no results; and 
on September 19, 1657, Frederick William yielded to Lisola 
by signing the Treaty of Wehlau, in which the King of 
Poland recognized the Elector's full sovereignty in the Duchy 
of Prussia, and the Elector became his defensive ally.^ 

In the matter of the imperial election, therefore, the posi- The oandida^y 
tion of the Elector of Brandenburg rendered Berlin one of ^l^^^ ^ 



1 See Pribram, Liwlas Berichte, p. 224. 
s See Dumont, VI, Part II, p. 179 et seq. 

* See Dumont, VI, Part II, p. 191 et seq. See also the supple- 
meatazy Treaty of Bromberg, of November 6, 1757. 



32 



A HISTOBT OF DIPIiOlCACY 



Chap. I 

A.O. 

164S-1670 



The attitude 
of Euro|M 
towards 
Leopold's 



the principal centres of diplomatic intrigue, and conferred 
upon Frederick William an importance that was felt by the 
.whole of Europe. 

The difficulties in the way of securing the Hapsburg 
succession were fully understood at \^enna, and Prince 
Auersperg, one of the most accomplished ministers of 
Austria, did not hesitate to point out that the marriage 
of Leopold with Maria Theresa, the Infanta of Spain, would 
be a far more brilliant project than election to the Empire; 
while the risks of an imperial candidacy might be for the 
time more hopefully met by proposing some other member 
of the Hapsburg family.^ The uncle of the young prince, 
the Archduke Leopold William, was a matiu*e and experi- 
enced general; and his election, it was contended, might 
prove less objectionable to the German princes than the 
choice of the seventeen-year-old King of Hungary and 
Bohemia. Once chosen, Leopold William might afterward 
renounce the crown at a time more propitious for the success 
of his nephew, who would thus eventually be able to combine 
the advantages of the Spanish marriage and the prestige of 
the imperial honor. But young Leopold would not listen to 
such considerations. For him the crown of the Caesars 
was still the consmnmate glory of the world; the Spanish 
marriage was an uncertainty, and he firmly resolved to 
stake everything on maintaining the prestige which for 
centuries lus ancestors had held in the Germanic world.* 

The opposition to the election of Leopold was wide-spread 
and vigorous. France, Sweden, England, and a multitude 
of the German princes were anxious to abase still further the 
House of Hapsburg, and the prospect of the Emperor of 
Germany becoming through marriage with the Infanta the 



> See Pribram, Zur Wahl Leopold I, pp. 23, 25. 

> The Venetian ambassador Nani writes thus of the poverty of the 
court at the time of the death of Ferdinand III : " I have observed that 
there remained in the treasury not enough money to bury him, and it 
was necessary to hold a council over his body before the breath had 
left it to find wherewith to clothe the court in mourning." — Die Rela- 
tionen der BoUchafkr Venedige Hber Deutschland und Oesterreich, II, 
p. 14. 



A. D. 

164S-1670 



THE ASCENDENCY OF FBANCB 33 

eventual King of Spain, — thus restoring in Europe the pre- chap. i 
ponderance that had been considered so dangerous in the 
time of Charles V, — was regarded by these powers with a 
feeling of alarm. On the other hand, Pope Alexander VII 
and the Kings of Spain, Denmark, and Poland, who would' 
in some degree profit by the perpetuation of the Empire in 
the hands of the Hapsburgs, were favorable to the choice 
of Leopold. 

At the death of Ferdinand III, there was only one elec- 
tor, John George of Saxony, upon whose vote the House 
of Austria could rely. John Philip von Schdnbom, Arch- 
bishop of Mainz, whose attitude as Archchancellor of the 
Empire was of supreme importance, had previously pledged 
his influence for Leopold, but he had since exhibited signs 
of wavering. The interests of the Archbishop of Trier were 
against his declaring for a Hapsburg, and the Archbishop of 
Eoln appeared even less disposed to favor the young prince; 
while the Count Palatine of the Rhine was in secret alliance 
with France by a treaty of July 19, 1656. In Bavaria 
the candidacy of the young elector, Ferdinand Maria, was 
urged by his ambitious wife, and his adherence to the Haps- 
burg succession was sustained by his Austrian mother; 
while at Berlin, Frederick William of Brandenburg, though 
in alliance with France, was secretly inclined to make a bar- 
gain with the Hapsburgs. 

Since 1654, Mazarin, in conjunction with Charles X of 
Sweden, had diligently labored with the electors to pre- 
vent the choice of Leopold; and Mazarin 's agents in Ger- 
many, Wagn^ and Gravel, were instructed to urge the 
candidacy of Ferdinand Maria. Besides the Hapsburg and 
Bavarian princes, only one other German was seriously consid- 
ered as a candidate, — Duke William of Neuburg, — who, in 
addition to that duchy on the Danube, possessed the small 
duchies of Berg and Jiilich near the Rhine; but he was so 
impecunious and so burdened with his family of seventeen 
children, that, as a contemporary said, ''to maintain him as 
an emperor it would be necessary to take up a general col- 
lection ''; and he was so much the enemy of the Elector of 
voi^ m. — 3 



34 A HISTORY OP DIPL0B1A.CT 

Chap. I Brandenburg that Frederick William would certainly never 
^- »• consent to choose him as his master. 

1 A( 4ft I ATA 

Notwithstanding all the money spent and honors promised 

by Mazarin in Germany, since the Dukeof Bavaria preferred, 
as the Venetian ambassador Nani reported, "to remain 
a rich elector rather than become an impoverished emperor, '* 
and the electors could not unite upon the Duke of Neu- 
burg, in the spring of 1657 the Hapsburgs appeared to be left 
without a rival in the field. 
The eandidMy Then it was that Mazarin felt it prudent to confide to his 
of louM XIV 3ggn^ jjjg secret desire for the election of the King of France. 
It was no new thing for the French monarchs to aspire 
to the imperial honor, although no one of them had ever 
succeeded in obtaining it.^ Claiming to be legitimate suc- 
cessors of Charles the Great, they held that the Empire be- 
longed of right as much to them as to the Germans. Since 
the failure of Francis I to ^secure the imperial crown in 
1519, the prestige of France in Germany had been much 
increased; and after the Peace of Westphalia it was to the 
King of France that many of the German princes looked for 
the guarantee of its observance. Moreover, the Cardinal had 
learned from experience in the Thirty Years' War that 
great obstacles could be removed by the free use of money. 
In April, 1657, therefore, Gravel, the most capable of 
the French agents in Germany, was ordered to ascertain the 
disposition of the Archbishop of Mainz. On the twenty- 
fom-th of that month, the Cardinal was informed that Boine- 
burg, the trusted counsellor of John Philip, had declared that 
there were only three persons — the King of France, Leo- 
pold, and the Archduke Leopold William — to whom the 
crown could be offered; and early in May, Gravel wrote to 
Mazarin that Boineburg had twenty times repeated the 
words: "We shall have, if it please God, a Lewis V."* 



» See the account of the efforts of Francis I in Volume II of this work, 
pp. 323, 349; and Vast, Let terUatives de Louis XIV potar arriver d 
VEmpire, in Revue Historique, LXV. 

* Despatches of Gravel to Mazarin, April 24, and May 1, 1657, in 
Archives des Affaires £trangdres, "Allemagne," vol. 137. 



THE ASCENDENCY OF FRANCE 35 

By the middle of the following June, Mazarin was con- chap. i 
vinoed that it was worth while to inform the Elector of ^.d. 
Mainz, in strict confidence, that an elector had proposed _____ 
for the crown of the Empire His Majesty the King of France; 
that the King had reluctantly confessed his willingness, if 
choeen, to accept the honor; that there were many kinds 
of reasons for not choosing a Hapsburg prince; and that, 
in case it should be deemed advisable to elect the King of 
France, his friends would be treated with a generous hand. 
With this instruction was sent an undated document, evi- 
dently intended to be shown to the Archbishop, in which 
an ingenious appeal was made for his support.^ 

This memorandum prudently begins with a mention of the The m»ni 
Duke of Bavaria as the first, and the Duke of Neuburg as J^J^jJ,^ ^ 
the second choice; and then proceeds to say that, if these Maini 
are not available, the alternative necessarily lies between 
the King of France and a prince of the House of Austria. In 
this case, EQs Majesty would desire the advice of the EHector; 
and, although he has no ambition for the Elmpire, if, never- 
theless, it should be deemed for the interest of the Catholic 
reli^on, for the general good of Christendom or repose of 
Germany, and for the advantage of the electors and other 
princes and states of the Empire, and that dignity should 
fall upon His Majesty rather than upon the King of Hungary, 
it would be Bis Highness, the Elector of Mainz, who would 
have all the care and fatigue of the Empire; and His Majesty, 
without being at any expense to the princes, would think 
only of employing his person, his means, and his forces to 
guarantee the Empire from all its enemies, and to maintain 
it in the grandeur and glory befitting to it. 

From this document it is evident that Mazarin really 
desired the promotion of Louis XIV to the Empire, and 
that he employed what seemed the most effective available 
means of securing it by presenting to the Archbishop of 
Matnz the most potent public and private motives for fur- 
nishing his aid. 

In the course of the following July, Mazarin was assured 

' See Pribram, Zvr WM LeopM I, pp. 110, 111. 



1648-1670 



36 A HISTOBT OF DIPLOMACY 

Chap. I by Gravel that the Elector of Mainz seemed "more inclined 
^t' ?«•,« ^ ^^^ King of France than to any other" ; * but whether 
.or not the Cardinal, even for a moment, was sanguine of 
success is by no means certain. Whatever his expectations 
The oppooi- may have been, he did not hesitate to give assurance that 
^tou!mMt °^*^*"^ should not be wanting to ensure the King's success, 
— for which he himself was ready, if necessary, to sacrifice 
his household silver. In addition, he took two energetic 
steps for the accomplishment of his purpose: (1) he threat- 
ened to oppose the election of a Hapsburg prince with a war 
of annihilation; and (2) he promoted a campaign of pam- 
phlets in Grermany against the Hapsburgs, in which were 
emphasized the dangers of a hereditary dynasty in the 
imperial office, the violations of the Peace of Westphalia al- 
ready committed, the menace of the Germanic liberties by 
the union with Spain, and the incapacity of the German 
princes named as candidates to sustain the dignity of the 
imperial office.' One of these diatribes terminated with a 
glowing eulogy of the young king of France, — "noble, 
intelligent, and virtuous," able with the aid of his great 
minister to render Germany "powerful, victorious, and se- 
cure in the enjoyment of a profoimd peace." To enforce 
these arguments upon the electors, on July 10, he sent to 
Germany an embassy, headed by the magnificent Marshal 
Gramont and the experienced Hugues de Lionne, abun- 
dantly provided with funds, and furnished with instructions 
prepared by Servien from notes written with the hand of 
Mazarin himself. 
The ^'danse des Sens'' ^ is reported to have been a lively 



1 Gravel to Mazarin, July 19, 1657, Archives des Affaires StrangftreB, 
"AUemagne," vol. 137. 

' Among other documents, he distributed ii^ Germany fictitious let- 
ters, dated from Rome, in which an Italian gentleman and a German 
from Frankfort are represented as proposing the Bang of France as the 
most worthy succeasor of Charles the Great. See Archives des Affaires 
fitrang^es, " Allemagne," vol. 137. The texts are in French and Italian. 

* The sums expended by France to influence this election were con- 
siderable. The Elector Palatine had received 60,000 6cus, and 40,000 
more was promised him after the election. The price of the Elector of 



THE ASCENDENCY OF FRANCE 37 

ODe, and eager hands were ready to receive the French Chap. i 
coins; but the candidacy of Louis XIV, if in Mazarin's ^'^• 

mind it was ever more than an ingenious expedient to obtain -i 

the defeat of Leopold, soon ended in failiu-e.^ 

While the astute Cardinal was engaged in the endeavor ThadipiomMy 
to defeat the Hapsburg aspirations, Frederick William of e,^^!P"** 
Brandenburg was shrewdly forecasting the probable result 
of the election, and preparing to reap whatever advantages 
it might have to offer. His agents, John Portmann and 
John Frederick Loben, had been sent on circular missions 
to sound the real intentions of the electors; and by the 
middle of July, 1657, he had reached the conclusion that 
every vote, except, perhaps that of the Coimt Palatine, 
would finally be cast for Leopold. Accordingly, he confided 
to Lisola his intention to support him, steadily used his 
influence in his behalf, and without giving a written promise 
took measures to obtain the highest price for his vote. 
As a result, on February 14, 1668, he was able to conclude 
with Lisola and the Austrian General Montecuccoli a 
treaty of alliance with Austria, in which Leopold was pledged 
to aid him with an army of ten thousand men in case of 
war with Sweden. By a secret article it was further agreed 
that any territory taken from Sweden in Western Pomerania 
should be garrisoned by the troops of Brandenburg. It 
was a step toward the formation of the futtu^e Kingdom 
of Prussia beside which the gold of France presented only a 
slight temptation. 

Ksndenbui^ was 100,000 6cus, but the pasrments were stopi)ed because 
of his attitude. The Elector of KOhi was acted upon throu^ the Counts 
Eson Ton FOrstenberg, Wilhelm receiving the bishopric of Metz with 
Rvenue of 12,000 ^cus, and Franz the abbey of Saint-Amould with a 
KTome of 4,000. The Elector of Trier received considerable sums, and 
the Elector of Mainz was offered 40,000 rixtalers. So great was the 
demand for funds that the German bankers refused to cash the drafts; 
ttd, as in ibe election of 1519, some of them refused to aid in excluding 
a German prince. See Vast, Revue Historique, LXV, pp. 11, 12. 

* PreooB, Historische Vierteljahrschrift, VII, 1904, in a searching 
oatiaem of Pribram, Vast, and others who have written on the subject 
of the candidacy of Louis XTV for the imperial crown in 1657, maintains 
that there was, in fact, no real candidacy. 



38 



A HISTORY OP DIPLOMACY 



Chap. I 

AJ>. 

1648-1670 



The election 
of Leopold I 



MftiBrin*fl dis- 
nmulation of 
his defeat 



Qn March 19, 1658, the electors began to arrive at Frank- 
fort. The Archbishop of Mainz had labored assiduously 
for peace between France and Spain, but neither side was 
inclined to accept his mediation. Upon one point only 
were the electors disposed to act favorably to France. All 
had a common interest in limiting the power of the new 
emperor; and to this end, on May 15, Gramont and De 
Lionne were able to secure the adoption of a condusum by 
which the Emperor was forbidden to furnish aid to the 
Spaniards against the French or their allies. The Spanish 
ambassador Pefiaranda offered a hundred thousand crowns 
for the suppression of the two words "foederatos GaUiae," 
but without success. Thus, the only profitable result 
of the mission of Gramont and De Lionne, so far as the 
election was concerned, was to impose upon Leopold I 
a capitulation which restrained his liberty of action. This 
the Archbishop of Mainz had repeatedly offered, but up 
to the last moment De Lionne had indignantly rejected 
it. The French case was, nevertheless, astutely handled, 
and Gramont, De Lionne, and Gravel did all that was 
possible for France; still the result accomplished by so 
much labor, so much gold, and so many sumptuous din- 
ners and "lonQiies bv/veries" can hardly be considered 
a signally triumphal achievement.'-' On July 18, 1658, 
the Austrian minister Coimt Isaac Volmar could boast 
of a more decisive victory in the election of Leopold I 
as Emperor. 

T^th admirable tact, Cardinal Mazarin had prepared for 
this adverse result. On November 28, 1657, the birth of 
a male heir to the throne of Spain had been annoimced at 
Madrid. The occurrence afforded to Mazarin an occasion 
for writing to his ambassadors soon afterward, that the 
birth of the Spanish Infante Philip "might furnish an 
honorable pretext, since the infidelity of Mainz has reduced 
us to the state of not being able to do better, — to relax a 
little our opposition."^ When, therefore, the final disap- 



1 Mazarin to Gramont, January 10, 1658. 
£trang6re8, ''AUemagne," vol. 140. 



Archives des Affaires 



THE ASCENDENCY OP FRANCE 39 

pointment came, the Cardinal had rendered his acqui- Chap. I 

escence in the final result so plausible, that the "WaJdcor ^-^ 

pfltttoion" enforced by the electors upon Leopold I was 



claimed as a decisive victory for France.* 

The Treaties of Westphalia had left the German princes The origin of 
free to form alliances with one another, and even with ^ ^^ ^ 

' the Rhine 

foreign powers; and as early as March 21, 1651, they had 
availed themselves of this privilege by the recess of that 
date to provide for their common defence.* On December 
15, 1654, a defensive league^ composed of the Archbishops 
of Koln and Trier, the Duke of Neuburg, and the Bishop 
of Munster, had been concluded. In the course of time, the 
interests of peace, commerce, and political safety pointed to 
the wider extension and better organization of this league. 
In 1656, therefore, an effort was made to form an alliance 
with Holland; but De Witt was more interested in adjusting 
relations with the powers of the North to prevent the 
predominance of Sweden in the Baltic, and after long 
but fruitless negotiations, in which it was proposed that 
some of the Protestant princes, especially the Duke of 
Brandenburg and the Landgrave of Hesse-Cassel, be 
admitted to the league, the attempt was abandoned. The 
entrance of France into this combination, although taken 
into consideration by Mazarin as early as 1656, was not at 
once realized; for the Cardinal desired, as a condition of 
i<Mning it, to extend the league so as to include both rehgious 
oonfessionis, with a view of preventing its ever falling under 
the influence of the Emperor, — as the Catholic leagues of 
former times had always fallen, — in case the imperial office 
should continue in the House of Hapsbiu'g. If, however, 
France should be successful in the imperial election, such a 



> Not umiaturally, Gramont's Mhnoires, which has until recently 
been the chief source of information on this subject, tended toward an 
oagBeration of the French mission as a brilliant diplomatic triumph; 
and this is the view expressed by most writers. According to the docu- 
nentB dted by Pribram, Zvr Wahl etc., pp. 135, 143, however, it ia 
cndcnt that Mazarin himself did not entertain this view. 

* Pribram, Beilrag zur Geschichte des RheinJbundea von 1658, p. 6. 



40 A HISTORY OP DIPL0B1A.CY 

Chap. I confederation might be embarrassing;^ and in no case, there- 
^•^- fore, were Gramont and DeLionne to encom'age the fur- 

1 ft i f ft — t A'Tfl 

ther development of the league, unless it could be transformed 

by admitting the King of Sweden, the Elector of Branden- 
burg, and other princes beheved to be favorable to France. 
Thus, the policy of Mazarin had been to hold the League of 
the Rhine in abeyance imtil after the imperial election. 
The adhesion When, howcvcr, by the election of Leopold I another Haps- 
tL^LM^nieof ^^^2 ascended the imperial throne, there was left to Maz- 
the Rhine arin no othcr resort in Germany than to enter into an 
alliance with the princes of the Empire, by which he might, 
perhaps, hold the Emperor in check. Accordingly, al- 
though he had said only a few months before, ''The King 
cannot be content with the elevation to the empire of any 
prince of the House of Austria, whatever offers may be 
made, and whatever precautions may be proposed for brid- 
ling his power, for we cannot imagine any restraint strong 
enough to produce that effect";* nevertheless, having 
failed to prevent the election of Leopold I, and also in his 
plans for concluding particular treaties with the German 
princes — which he would have preferred to joining the 
League of the Rhine — Mazarin authorized the adhesion of 
France on August 15, 1658, at Mainz, to a treaty enlarging 
the earlier association, signed on the previous day at Frank- 
fort by ten German princes, and including the King of 
Sweden, but not the Elector of Brandenburg, for the main- 
tenance of the Peace of Westphalia.' 

For more than two centuries, historians were accustomed 
to consider the League of the Rhine as the ''brilliant crea- 
tion" of Mazarin. It was, in truth, of great advantage to 
Louis XIV in his opposition to the Hapsburgs to be associa^ 
ted with a strong body of German princes, and the King of 

^ See the interesting instruction to Gramont and De Lionne, British 
Mnseiim, Harliana, 4531. 

* Archives des Affaires fitrang^res, "Allemagne," vol. 140. 

< It was not without hesitation that Mazarin reached this decision, 
as is shown in the Archives des Affairies fitrang^res, "Allemagne," vol. 
138. The treaty as signed by France is given by Vast, Lea grands 
traiUs, I, pp. 72, 78. 



THE ASCENDENCY OF FRANCE 41 

France was in the future to make the most of it; but in the chap. I 
light of the facts now known to us the League of the Rhine ^- »• 

1 A 4fl l A7A 

must be regarded as chiefly the work of John Philip von 

Schdnbom, Archbishop of Mainz, who wished to add new 
guarantees to the Treaties of Westphalia by a closer union 
of the German princes. 

But even from this point of view the negotiations of The utUHy to 
Giamont and De lionne were of immense utility to France. ^^^<^}^»^ 

arm 8 poiMy 

It was presumptuous to suppose that Louis XIV could be in 
debated to the Empire, in which France really had no part; 
but it was an advantage to that kingdom to possess allies 
that were opposed to a Hapsburg predominance through the 
imperial office. In the eyes of the German princes, they had 
merely formed a defensive league within the Empire; and, 
in admitting France and Sweden to their compact, they be- 
lieved they were only seciuring new guarantees of their 
own independence. In reality, however, the success of Ma»- 
arin's diplomacy was considerable; for by the capitulation 
of Leopold I he had obtained a solenm pledge that the Grer- 
man branch of the House of Austria would furnish no fur- 
ther aid to the Spaniards, and by imion with the German 
princes he had made provision to enforce it. 

The primary aim of the Cardinal in continuing the war The 
with Spain had been the acquisition of the Spanish Nether- ^^** *^ 
lands. This, he had long maintained, ''would fiunish to 
Paris an inexpugnable bulwark, and render it truly the heart 
of France by placing it in the least vulnerable part of the 
kmgdom." 

The decisive battle of the Dimes, on Jime 14, 1658, rendered 
the realization of this project more probable than it had 
evCT been before; for the exhaustion of Spain — at war with 
Sigland and Portugal as well as with France — was evident. 

The military leaders were eager to push their victory 
to a conclusion; but Mazarin was influenced by another 
conaderation, — the marriage of the King and the succes- 
wm to the throne. Already Louis XIV had displayed his 
pasBion for the Cardinal's attractive niece, Maria Mancini, 
and it was with difficulty that the royal lover was dissuaded 



42 A HISTORY OF DIPLOB1A.CY 

Chap. I by his minister from a marriage which that statesman knew 

^^">- would be injurious to the djmastic interests of the monarchy 

and ultimately, perhaps, disastrous to himself. It had 



ooDwdy at 
Ijroni 



long been the desire of the Queen Mother that Louis XIV 
should marry her niece, the Infanta of Spain. To please Anne 
of Austria, therefore, and to end a situation which the in- 
clinations of the King were rendering dangerous to the State, 
Mazarin resolved to force the hand of the King of Spain. 
The royal The idea of the Spanish marriage had been first suggested 

diuring the Congress of Westphalia, and the Spanish pleni- 
potentiaries had employed it as a means of promoting 
a separate peace with the United Provinces, which were 
naturally opposed to it. The union of Louis XIV and 
Maria Theresa, it was insinuated, might involve a French 
claim to the Spanish Netherlands as a marriage portion. 
If this were granted, France, as possessor of all the Spanish 
rights in the Netherlands, would become a dangerous 
neighbor. 

In his secret mission to Madrid in 1656, De Lionne had 
proposed the marriage as the most practicable basis of a 
peace; but Don Luis de Haro had steadily declined to con- 
sider it, for Spain did not have the Salic law, and as there was 
at that time no male heir to the Spanish throne, it was 
possible that the kingdom might thus pass by marriage into 
the practical possession of a French prince.^ 

To force the hand of Philip IV, Mazarin now pretended 
to favor the marriage of Louis XIV to the Princess Margaret 
of Savoy. The arrangements for the betrothal were ap- 
pointed to take place at Lyons; and on October 26, 1658, 
the French Court, accompanied by Cardinal Mazarin, with 
an enormous suite of ladies and gentlemen, set out upon an 
intentionally protracted joiuney to that city. 



^ Ten years before, on January 20, 1646, Masarin had distinctly 
formed the project of obtaining for France the entire successbn of 
Spain, and had written: "The Infanta being married to His Majesty, 
we could aspire to the kingdoms of Spain, whatever renunciation might 
be required to be made." — Mignet, Niffociatioiu relatives d la nieces- 
tion d^Eepagne sous Louis XIV, I, p. 33. 



THE ASCENDENCY OF FRANCE 43 

The Duchess Dowager Christine and the Princess Mar- Chap. I 

garet having arrived some weeks previously, on November ^- ^• 

24 the interviews and festivities began. 1648-16 o 



Louis XIV appears to have been charmed with the young 
princess, who responded to his gallantry, when suddenly 
there fell upon her an unexpected blow. The joimiey of 
the French Court, studiously retarded for the purpose, 
had awakened lively emotions in Spain, and the Spanish 
ambassador, Antonio Pimentel, was sent post haste to Lyons. 
The ruse of Mazarin proved entirely successful. The am- 
bassador offered the hand of the Infanta in marriage, the 
Princess of Savoy was sent home laden with costly gifts, and 
the negotiations between France and Spain were resumed 
at Paris. 

Prom February until Jime, 1659, Pimentel struggled with The 
Mazarin, as De Lionne had previously struggled at Madrid ^^J^l^ 
with Don Luis de Haro, for honorable terms of peace. 
The difficulties were very great. Not \mtil May 7, was a 
sqspension of arms concluded; and then against the opposi- 
tion of Turenne, who regarded the Spanish Netherlands as 
an easy prey to France. 

The chief obstacle to an agreement was the future of 
Cond£. At Paris, he was regarded as a traitor deserving of 
death. At Madrid, the honor of the King of Spain was pledged 
to see him restored to his possessions and offices in France. 
For a time no solution of the problem seemed possible, for 
Philip rV insisted that he should not be treated ''as a 
criminal,'' and Mazarin retorted that it was not for the 
King of Spain "to lay down the law for a king who would 
not receive it." 

After long and trying discussions, Pimentel was obliged 
to yield to the firmness of the Cardinal. Cond6 was re- 
quired to offer complete submission, sacrifice all his public 
ehazg^es, and accept nothing but the restitution of his 
poaseasions. But the treaty signed by PimentaJ at Paris, ^ 
on June 4, 1659, was not definitive, and only served as a 
scaffolding for the final treaty. At Madrid, where the 
agents of Cond^ were active, a storm of denimciation was 



44 



A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY 



Chap. I 

A. D. 

1648-1670 



Neeotiatioiis 
in the lale of 



showered upon the head of the unhappy ambassador, who 
was even declared deserving of decapitation for having thus 
. betrayed the honor of his master. Still, in the hope that 
further negotiations between the chief ministers might 
smooth away the difficulties, toward the end of June the 
ratification of the treaty was sent to Paris. 

Peace being thus rendered practically certain, the Cardi- 
nal deemed it opportune before his departure for his final 
negotiations with Don Luis de Haro at the Franco-Spanish 
frontier, to dispel the illusions of the Duchess of Savoy 
regarding the marriage of her daughter. This he did by 
ungraciously insinuating that the Duchess had been guilty 
of intrigues with Spain, against which she energetically pro- 
tested; but, fearing lest the interests of Savoy might suffer if 
she offered reproaches, she humbly besought the favor of 
the King without complaining of Mazarin's conduct, and 
was rewarded by the restitution to the Duke of Savoy of 
the castle of Vercelh. 

In the middle of the Bidassoa, on a little neutralized 
island known as the Isle of Pheasants, the two ministers 
were to meet for the completion of the peace. There, from 
August 13 to November 7, 1659, twenty-four conferences 
were held by Cardinal Mazarin and Don Luis de Haro 
in the pavilion, constructed for the purpose. The programme 
of procedure was carefully arranged in advance, but it was 
modified to suit the views of the two negotiators, to whose 
personal skill in treating with each other the interests of 
both kingdoms were now intrusted. 

The future of Cond^ continued to be the central problem. \ 
De Haro obstinately insisted on the restoration of his rank 
and offices. Mazarin was firm in demanding his absolute 
submission to the King as a condition of pardon. It was 
finally agreed that the office of *' Grand MaUre de France^' 
should be exercised by his son, the Duke of Ekighien; and 
that the Prince of Cond6, having made known to Cardinal 
Mazarin his sorrow for his hostility, his request for grace, 
and his promise of obedience for the future, should be par- 
doned and restored to the free possession of all his goods, 



THE ASCENDENCY OF FBANCE 45 

honors, and privileges as a prince of the bloody with the Chap. I 
government of Burgundy and Bresse. ^- **• 

In view of the possibility of the death of the Infants Philip, . 



the Court of Spain insisted upon an absolute renunciation 
of the rights of Maria Theresa to the Spanish throne. This, 
it was recalled, had been required of Anne of Austria upon 
her marriage to Louis XIII. In reply, Don Luis was re- 
minded that that princess had received a wedding portion of 
five hundred thousand 6cus. It was agreed, therefore, that 
the renunciation should be made and the dowry given; 
but the impoverished condition of Spain made it necessary 
that this diould be only promised, not immediately paid. 
The occasion was thus presented for De Lionne to make 
the ingenious stipulation — destined to afford an apparent 
justification of future pretensions to the crown of Spain — 
that the renunciation of rights to the throne should be con- 
ditional upon the payment of the wedding portion within 
the period named in the treaty. 

The last difficulty was the delimitation of the Nether- 
lands frontier. The extensive restitutions to Spain did not 
meet the expectation of the French generals who had made 
Bach large conquests in the Netherlands, but Mazarin had 
designs for the future. On the side of the Pyrenees, however, 
France reached its ''natural limit" through the cession by 
Spain of Roussillon and Cerdagne. The French conquests 
in Catalonia and Italy were abandoned by France to Spain, 
Donkirk was confirmed to England, and Jtllich assured to the 
Doke of Neuburg. Portugal was offered French mediation; 
but left, unaided, to fight for her own independence. 

On November 7, 1659, the last conference was held in the Th« Pteoe of 
Ue of Pheasants and the peace was signed.^ While the ***• Py»n«» 
Peace of the Pyrenees is generally regarded as the greatest 
mcmmnent to the diplomacy of Mazarin, he has been re- 
proached for frustrating by it the French conquest of the 
Spanish Netherlands, which seemed so imminent. 

Amidst the Cardinal's labors to conclude the treaty, fresh 

^ The beet text of the treaty, with admirable introduction and com- 
18 found in Vast, Lea ffrands traiUSf I, pp. 93, 107. 



46 



A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY 



Chap. I 

A.D. 

1648-1670 



Theoriiliiii 
the North 



efforts had been necessary to induce his young monarch to 
forget the charms of Maria Mancini and consent to accept 
. the Infanta*. Only the most resolute determination on the 
part of Mazarin in urging the raison d'Stai finally pre- 
vailed over the King's infatuation. It was not, however, 
until the Cardinal threatened to retire from his service and 
abandon the country, that Louis XIV decided to give up 
the fair Italian for the peace of France.* When, in June, 
1660, the marriage had been solemnized and the royal pair 
proceeded on their journey to Paris, the nation could 
not repress its joy at having so glorious a monarch, and the 
progress of the King and Queen through France resembled 
a march of triumph. 

The Peace of the Pjrrenees not only marks the victory 
of Mazarin over the civil dissensions which attended his 
advent to power but of the theory of government he had 
striven to impose on France. The King was greeted at his 
capital as a "young god," the rightful repository of omni- 
potence in his realm, who could do no wrong. 

One of the articles of the Peace of the Pyrenees provided for 
the joint efforts of France and Spain to secure the pacifica- 
tion of the North, where the war between Sweden and the 
coalition of Austria, Poland, Denmark, and Brandenburg 
had reached a crisis. 

In the winter of 1658, by wonderful marches over the 
ice, Charles X had almost without resistance crossed the 
Little and the Great Belt and threatened Copenhagen. 
Denmark was thus at the mercy of the conqueror, who by 
the Peace of Roskilde of February 26, 1658, obtained the 
cession of Scania, the island of Bomholm, and the Norwegian 
provinces of Badhus and Trondhjem; the transfer of four 
thousand soldiers to Sweden; the renunciation of all anti- 
Swedish alliances; the exclusion of all hostile war-ships 
from passing through the Sound and the Belts; the exemption 
of Swedish vessels from tolls; and the restoration to his 
estates of the traitor Korfits Ulfeld. But the peace had 
proved only transitory. After friendly intercourse between 

^ See Valfrey, Huguea de lAonne^ pp. 280, 285. 



A. D. 

1648-1670 



THE ASCENDENCY OF FRANCE 47 

Charles X and Frederick III at the castle of Frederiksborg^ Chap. I 
celebrated with sumptuous banquets, the King of Sweden 
made fresh demands. When these were reluctantly con- 
ceded, the conqueror, still unsatisfied, resolved to renew his 
attack and efface Denmark from the map of Europe.^ 

"I will die in my own nest," was the answer of Fred- The nmaw of 
erick III to those who counselled flight from his kingdom; '^**™"** 
and his people, animated by his example, prepared for the 
defence of their capital. But all Eurox)e was now interested 
in the struggle. The United Provinces were filled with anx- 
iety at the thought of the annihilation of their ally and 
the control of the Sound by Sweden. The States General 
promptly sent to the Baltic a powerful fleet, and a naval 
combat followed in which Dutch heroism reached its climax, 
with the result that provisions and reinforcements were 
furnished to Copenhagen, and Charles X was compelled 
to raise the si^e. In the ceded territories, the Danes rose 
to recover their nationality; the Swedish possessions in 
Prussia were invaded by a force of Poles, Austrians, and 
Brandenburgers under Frederick William and Montecuccoli; 
another army under Czamiecki swept over Holstein and 
drove the Swedish troops from Jutland; and by January, 
1659, Charles X was struggling to maintain his foothold in 
the Danish islands. Exposed to the vengeance of the coal- 
ition of the North, the future fate of the recent conqueror 
had suddenly become an object of solicitude to France and 
England. 

Esther the unlimited preponderance or the total defeat of The intorven- 
the King of Sweden was seen to involve a danger for the ^^^^^^ 

* The Chevalier de Terlon, French ambassador to Sweden, thus re- 
ports in his Mimaires the intentions of Charles X confided to himself: 
"I shall destroy Copenhagen; . . . then I shall transfer the privileges 
of that city to Malm5, or to Landscrona in Scania, and make my resi- 
dence in that province, which will become the centre of the State. 
After that, I shall render myself absolute master of the Baltic, and for 
that parpose I shall have a fleet of a hundred war-ships. . . . The 
eooqoest of Norway will follow that of Denmark. . . . Finally, I wish 
to BD to Italy with a powerful army and navy, like a second Alaric, to 
pbee the city of Rome once more under the power of the Goths." 



48 A HISTORY OP DIPLOMACY 

CHiLP. I system of equilibrium in Europe. The successful establish- 

^•^' ment of the Baltic empire he was aiminir to create im- 
164S-1670 ^ ^ 



. plied the extinction of Denmark, the absorption of Poland, 
the exclusion of Russia from the Baltic, the subordination 
of Austria, the appropriation of Brandenburg and other 
German territories, and the prohibition of commerce with 
the North except on such terms as Sweden might be disposed 
to dictate. The ruin of the Swedish state, on the other hand, 
would involve the preponderance of Austria in the Empire, 
the probable development of Brandenburg in Northern 
Germany, and the undisputed control of the Sound by Den- 
mark. For France and Elngland, therefore, the integrity of 
Sweden was of supreme importance; and, as the Netherlands 
had opposed the extinction of Denmark, so now those powers 
were anxious to prevent the entire defeat of Sweden. 

Accordingly, in January, 1659, an agreement had been 
made between France and the Protector, Richard Cromwell, 
for the purpose of securing peace in the North. In pur- 
suance of this object, on May 21, 1659, was signed at The 
Hague by France, England, and the Netherlands a compact, 
known as the "First Hague Concert," to endeavor by their 
mediation to terminate the war between Denmark and 
Sweden on the terms contained in the Treaty of Roskilde. 
On the twenty-fourth of the following July, was signed the 
"Second Hague Concert," by which England and the 
Netherlands agreed to employ their fleets, then in the 
Baltic, to compel a peace upon the basis already indicated 
within a fortnight; but Mazarin, who knew the obstinacy of 
his ally and was unwilling to use force against him, refused 
to accede to this proposal. 

Before the mediation at The Hague had reached any 
decisive result, however, the victory of the coalition of the 
North over the smaU Swedish army in Denmark on Novem- 
ber 24, 1659, at Nyborg, broke the power of Charles X; 
who, after endeavoring to renew the war by offering the 
United Provinces a portion of the spoils, on February 13, 
1660, suddenly died, worn out with his exertions. 

Before the death of Charles X — who was succeeded by 



1648-1670 



THE ASCENDENCY OF FRANCE 49 

his four-year-old son, Charles XI, under a regency — a con- Chap. i 
gpess had been arranged to assemble in the monastery of ^^^^-f;^ 
Oliva near Danzig. There, in January, 1660, the plenipoten- . 
tiaries of the fknperor, Sweden, Poland, and Brandenburg 
met for the purpose of negotiating a peace. In the course 
of the negotiations, representatives of Holland, Denmark, 
and Courland arrived at the Congress, but took only a 
secondary place. The mediation of the French ambassador 
to Poland, Antoine de Lumbres, was accepted by all except 
the Emperor, who refused to recognize the French.* The 
idai of the occasion may be judged by the fact that weeks 
were required to arrange the ceremonial, and even the dele- 
gation of Brandenburg contained sixty-five persons, with 
thirty-five horses.* 

On May 3, 1660, was signed the Peace of Oliva, in which 
the King of Poland, John Casimir, renounced his heredi- 
tary claims to the Swedish crown; Livonia was assigned to 
Sweden, and the quarrel between that kingdom and Poland 
was thus ended.' The most significant provision of the 
peace for the futiu^ of Europe, however, was the confirmation 
of the Duchy of Prussia to the Elector of Brandenburg in 
full sovereignty; for Frederick William was thus permanently 
rendered a figure of consequence beyond the Umits of the 
Germanic world, and in his x)erson a HohenzoUem entered 
the family of recognized sovereign rulers. His temporary 
conquests in Swedish Pomerania he was obliged to re-> 
finquish; but he had won his place — more by astute diplom- 
acy than by war — among the great founders of modem 
Europe. 



Dipkunatic rdations between Austria and France had not existed 
! 1648, and Leopold I had not notified Louis XIV of his election to 
tbe Empire. Referring to the Emperor, whom he could not recognise 
imtjl duly noftified, Louis XIV always used the expression, "La Cour 
dt Vienne" See Sorel, RecueU des instructions, 1, Autriche, pp. 41, 64. 
' A list of the plenipotentiaries and a full account of the proceedings 
may be found in Waddington, Le Grand ElecUur, I, pp. 464, 478. 

* For the treaty, see Dumont, VI, Part II, p. 303 et seq.; for the 
negotiationay Friese, (7e6er den dttsseren Gang der Verhandlungen heim 
Friedenwn OUea. 
vou in. — 4 



60 



A HISTORY OP DIPLOMACY 



Chap. I 

▲. D. 
1648-1670 



The padfio*- 
tion of the 
North eom- 
pleted 



The I 
mentfl and 
death of 
Masaiin 



Abandoned by his allies, who had concluded the Peace 
of Oliva without safeguarding the interests of Denmark, 
. Frederick III was disposed to restore the integrity of his 
kingdom by continuing war with Sweden; but the United 
Provinces, fearful of the consequences of further war, made 
a treaty with Sweden and employed their fleet to impose 
peace upon Denmark by immobilizing the Danish army. On 
June 6, 1660, a peace was signed at Copenhagen, whereby 
Trondhjem and Bomholm were recovered; but the rich prov- 
inces of Scania were lost. Denmark retained, however, the 
right to admit foreign fleets to the Baltic and to collect the 
Sound tolls as before; but the ships of Swedjen were to be 
allowed free passage.^ 

Only one other step was necessary to complete the paci- 
fication of the North. On July 1, 1661, was concluded the 
Treaty of Kardis, by which the Czar Alexis restored to 
Sweden all the places he had taken in Livonia, and granted 
to the Swedes the privilege of free commerce with Russia 
and the right of worship according to their creed.* 

like the League of the Rhine, the pacification of the 
North has figured in French history as one of the trophies 
of Mazarin's diplomacy. That it was so in a certain sense 
cannot be denied, but the success of his mediation was de- 
pendent almost entirely upon the decisive action of the 
Netherlands, the exhaustion of Sweden, the desire of Poland 
for repose, the weariness of the Emperor with the whole 
enterprise, and the willingness of the Great Elector to 
accept full sovereignty in his Prussian duchy. 

One fact is, however, incontestable, — upon his death 
on March 9, 1661, Mazarin left France the first power in 
Europe. That supremacy was not the result of any single 
triumph, but of a multitude of successful applications of one 
line of policy, — the exaltation of the French monarchy by 
consolidation within the State, and the persistent extension 
of the influence of France in every part of Europe in pur- 
suance of the plans of Richelieu. In the struggle for position, 

1 For the treaty, see Dumont, VI, Part II, p. 319 et seq. 
» For the treaty, see Dumont, VI, Part II, p. 363 et seq. 



THE ASCENDENCY OF FRANCE 51 

the death of Oliver Cromwell had ended the temporary as- Chap. I 
oendency of England ; the division of the Hapsburg power had ^- »- 

reduced both Austria and Spain to a secondary rank; and 

Sweden, though still a great kingdom, had failed to estab- 
lish her empire on the Baltic. The United Provinces by their 
vigorous diplomacy, supported by their naval and commer- 
cial prestige, had acquired a prominence never before pos- 
sessed by so smaU a country; but France, ruled by a sover- 
eign who was completely master in his own reahn, had 
attained a primacy which no other power could dispute. 
Masarin had failed in his ambition to place upon the head 
of his young king the diadem of the Caesars, but he had 
succeeded in making him far more potent in reality than the 
Emperor who wore it. 

m. The Designs of France xtpon the Netheblands 

The cruel trials which civil war had inflicted upon France The penoiuu 
had powerfully promoted that deference for the royal J^^^^'j^ 
prerogatives upon which the rule of Cardinal Mazarin re- 
posed; and, under his inspiration, the ''cuUe du roi^' had 
become for France almost what the apotheosis of the Roman 
emperors had been for the Empire in the days of the "Par 
R(nnana. " " The seat of Your Majesty represents the throne 
of the living God," Omer Talon had declared in the lit 
de justice when the regency of Anne of Austria was procl^med. 
"This company regards you as the living image of divinity, " 
the scrupulous Lamoignon had said to Louis XIV in the 
presence of the Parliament of Paris. A short time after- 
wards, Bossuet, in a subtle argument drawn from the 
Holy Scriptures, was to write: "The royal throne is not the 
throne of a man, but the throne of God himself. . . . The 
prince should render to no one an account for what he 
does. . . . Without that absolute authority, he can neither 
accomplish what is good nor repress that which is evil. " ^ 

A king by divine right, in his own belief and in that of 
Ms people, Louis XIV naturally became the incarnation 



Bossuet, Politique tirie des propre8 paroles de VScrUureSainte, 1709. 



62 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY 

Chap. I of the pride, the power, and the imperial aspirations of the 
^- ^- French nation. For him and for his people, Versailles was 

164&-1670 



.like a second Rome; whence he was divinely ordained to 



of 



France 



extend the power of France, and diffuse its riper civilization 
throughout the world. 

Of this high responsibility the King had a clear con- 
ception. '^ It is by toil that a sovereign rules, and it is for this 
that he reigns," he afterwards wrote; and history has ac- 
corded to him the praise he coveted of 'Moing conscien- 
tiously the business of a king." With unlimited confi- 
dence in his own powers, with which the tuition of Mazarin 
had inspired him, he resolved to gather into his own hands 
the entire administration of the state, to improve its oi^gan- 
ization, and to be his own prime minister. 

The foreicn Immediately after the death of Cardinal Mazarin, at seven 

o'clock in the morning, a council was assembled, and the 
King said to the Chancellor, the venerable Pierre Siguier: 
"I have called you with my ministers and secretaries of 
state, to inform you that until the present I have been 
pleased to leave the direction of my affairs to the Cardinal; 
it is now time that I govern myself. You will aid me with 
your counsels, when I shall ask for them." Then, turning 
to De Lionne, "You are assured of my affection; I am con- 
tent with your services. You, Brienne, will act in concert 
with him in foreign affairs, and you will send to my ambas- 
sadors all that he shaU authorize on my part, without a new 
order from me. The face of things has changed. I shall 
have other principles in the government of my estate, in 
the regulation of my finances, and in foreign negotiations 
than those of the late Cardinal. You know my wishes; 
it is for you now, gentlemen, to execute them. " 

Thexoyai Not cvcu his most trustcd minister was permitted to 

form a policy or instruct an ambassador without the direc- 
tion of the King. After his line of action had been ascer- 
tained by conversation, the formal written instructions to 
ambassadors were usually prepared by the chief of the de- 
partment; but these docimients were always read aloud to 
the King, and were often annotated and revised by him with 



THE ASCENDENCY OF FRANCE 



53 



CSAP. I 
A. D. 

1648-1670 



his own hand. Many of them have been recently pub- 
lished; and they are, in general, models of clear, direct, 
and systematic style and method.^ They contain elaborate 
analyses of the political conditions of the time and indicate 
not only the aims and policy of France, but those of other 
countries which were to be frustrated or promoted according 
to the interests of the monarchy. Supplemented by the 
correspondence addressed to ambassadors already at their 
posts, they not only reveal the motives of the French 
Court, but disclose the whole mechanism of European pol- 
itics as seen from the French point of view. 

But Louis XIV was not content with these merely formal 
ezpootions of his political system, or that the foreign repre- 
sentatives of France should be the best informed in Europe. 
Every ambassador, before his departure for his post, was 
ealkd into the presence of the King and impressed with 
the real aim and significance of his mission by a few words 
fnnn the monairch's own lips. He was thus sent forth as 
an apostle of French prestige rather than as a mere pubtic 
functionary; and the foreign service of France, which ^ 
Richelieu and Mazarin had raised to the dignity of a pro- 
fession, under the personal rule of Louis XIV acquired al- 
most the character of a priesthood. 

Chosen chiefly from a class of men likely to prove per- The Franoh 
aonally loyal to the King, and rarely from the ranks of ^p***""**^ 
ecclesiastics, — whose dual relations rendered their devotion 
less certain, — the diplomatic agents of Louis XIV were 
followed and directed in the field with incessant oversight. 
To secure strict obedience to the King's orders, every am- 
bassador was closely watched. Everything coming under 
Ins observation affecting the political, military, or commercial 
interests of France he was expected to report. By this means, 
the monarch became the best informed person in Europe. 
He was familiar with all the parties and factions of every 
ooontry, and all the intrigues of every court were known, to 



^ See BeeueU dea Instruetiona donniea aux Ambcuisadeura et Minia-' 
fret de France depvis let TraiUs de Westphalie jusqu'd la Rivolvium 
froHfoiae. 



164&-ld70 



64 A HISTORY OF DIPLOBfACY 

Chap. I him. Even the characters, the weaknesses, and the dis- 
.o" ?I*^ positions of his fellow sovereigns and of their ministers were 
of interest to him; for they were all considered useful items 
of knowledge in suggesting the means by which his ends 
might be accomplished. 

Under the exacting admmistration of the Elng, the 
labors of the diplomatic agents of France, as shown by the 
existing archives, were often enormous. Every ambassador 
was expected to be well informed of the state of affairs in 
every European country. For this purpose a lively cor- 
respondence was kept up by the ambassadors with one 
another. As many of these conmiunications were sent 
in cipher, diplomacy became a serious industry. The long 
distances to be traversed, the slowness of communication, 
and the frequent necessity of prompt action often rendered 
imperative on the part of ambassadors a bold initiative, and 
the responsibility was great. The expenses of representa- 
tion were sometimes inmiense. Journeys lasting weeks and 
months, with extensive trains of servants and baggage, were 
necessary incidents of diplomatic life. Frequently the sov- 
ereign to whom an ambassador was accredited had to be 
followed on long marches, and even on the field of battle. 
Thus Charles X was accompanied across the belts of the 
Baltic on the ice by the French ambassador, and Colbert 
de Croissy at a later time had an audience of Charles XII 
in the trenches while bullets were flying through the air. 

For all this service and exposure, the ambassador received 
but meagre pay, usually much in arrears. Feuqui&res 
had thirty horses and eighty persons to maintain on an 
income of thirty-six thousand livres. It was not unusual 
for an ambassador to pawn or sell his silver, and even ruin 
his private fortune, in order to sustain the dignity of his 
king. And yet the ambassadors of France handled for their 
sovereign vast smns of money, bribing and pensioning min- 
isters and princes, and sometimes even kings. The chief 
rewards for so much sacrifice and responsibility were usually 
a word of praise from the monarch, the order of St. Louis, 
or a post of increased honor and importance. 



A. D. 

1648-1670 



THE ASCENDENCY OF FRANCE 55 

The misfflonary zeal of the French diplomatists is the Chap. I 
more necessary to comprehend because it was through the 
machinery of this eystem that the King of France was to 
complete his ascendency in Europe, and because its organi- 
zation was soon to be imitated by every European country. Adva&tacM u 
Other monarchs were not wanting in able diplomatists, who *?*.*^*™* 
in devotion and intelligence were equal to the French. No 
more skilful or more loyal service could be imagined than 
that of Franz von Lisola to the House of Austria, and Spain 
was served with equal fidelity by Esteban de Gamarra and 
many others; but in the perfection of its organization the 
diplomatic service of France was without an equal. Another 
advantage was the central position of Paris. The distance 
which separated Madrid from Vienna, and both from the 
field of influence and expansion of France on and near the 
Rhine, gave to the French the benefit of more swift intelU- 
gence and more rapid action. At London, Portugal could 
be secretly aided in its struggle with Spain, almost with- 
out suspicion; and The Hague, only a short journey from 
Paris, had become the chief centre of diplomacy, while from 
these points it usually required three weeks for a courier 
to reach Madrid, and two months for an exchange of notes. 
When to this it is added that Louis XIV never failed 
prcHnptly and energetically to sustain his representatives, 
while Spain and Austria were lethargic in action and even 
divided in coimsel, it is easy to comprehend the superior 
effectiveness of French diplomacy. 

But there was still another reason for the growing ascen- 
dency of France. All her rivals were passing through a 
period of transition and confusion. 

Li March, 1660, General Monk had reorganized the The intema- 
British Parliament; on April 14, Charles Stuart had issued ^°J2i sfil!^* 
the conciliatory Declaration of Breda; and on May 25, he had restoration 
landed at Dover, amidst the applause of a nation weary of 
military rule and always monarchical at heart. But Charles 
II had not returned to England as a friend of France, nor 
wss the French alliance made by Cromwell popular with 
his subjects. One of the first steps of the new king was a 



56 



A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY 



Chap. I 

•A. D. 

1648-1670 



The affair of 
D'Ertrades 
and Do 
Watteville 



notice to the French ambassador, De Bordeaux, to quit the 
country; and he left England on July 7, 1660. It was 
. toward Spain that English sentiment was at that time turn- 
ing, not only for commercial reasons, but because it was 
judicious for two weak nations in the presence of a stronger to 
unite in resisting its aggressive policy. The return of Dim- 
kirk to Spain and a Spanish marriage for Charles II were 
seriously discussed in the summer of 1660; but it was soon 
made to appear that it was for the interest of the Crown in 
its struggle with the nation to possess apowerful rather than a 
feeble ally, and the militant diplomacy of Louis XIV soon 
turned the tide in favor of France. Thus England, against its 
will, was soon condemned by Charles II to assume the position 
of a mere satellite in the system of French preponderance. 

An incident connected with this transition is too sig- 
nificant of the temper of the time to be passed over without 
notice. In August, 1661, the contention of France and 
Spain over the question of precedence induced Charles II 
to exclude all foreign ministers from the public escort of 
the Venetian Embassy then arriving at London. Louis XIV 
was incensed with his cousin for denying to his ambassador, 
the Count D'EIstrades, the precedence claimed by him over 
the Spanish ambassador, De Watteville, who thus seemed 
to be placed on an equality with his French colleague; and 
D'Estrades was not only rebuked for submitting to the 
order, but instructed to seize the first occasion to repair the 
indignity to his master. Accordingly, on October 10, at 
the entry of the Swedish ambasador. Count Brahe, into 
London, the carriages of the two rivals were sent to join the 
procession, when a bloody encounter occurred between their 
servants, the hamstrings of the horses attached to the car- 
riage of Count D'Estrades were cut, several of his servants 
were killed and others wounded, and the Spaniards, aided 
by the populace, alone secured a place in the escort.^ 



^ According to De Martens' account, Causes cMibres, I, p. 353, the 
number of armed people on the side of Spain was 2,000. The French 
side was sustained by 500, so that the conflict took the form of a pitched 
battle. 



THE ASCENDENCY OF FRANCE 57 

Charles II escaped the wrath of the King of France by Chap. I 
immediately expressing his regrets and chastising his own ^•'^• 
sabjects who were connected with the affair, but the indig- 



nation of Louis XIV toward Spain was unbounded. On 
the day after the news reached him at Fontainebleau, the 
Spanish ambassador, Count Fuensaldafia, was ordered to 
leave France immediately; the Marquis de la Fuente, who 
was then on his way to supersede him, was warned not to 
continue his journey; the Marquis de Caracena, a former 
governor of the Spanish Netherlands, who had been ac- 
corded permission to pass through France, was ordered 
not to appear on French soil; and the Baron du Vouldy was 
despatched to Madrid to inform the French ambassador 
to Spain, La Feuillade, Archbishop of Embrun, of the 
mcident and to demand instant reparation for the insult. 

The time was an esx)ecially trying one for the Spanish ConoMnon of 
Court; for on November 1 the Infante Philip Prosper ^!^^ ^ 
died, and the attitude of Louis XIV on the question of spam 
succession was a matter of deep concern. After a long 
discussion with Don Luis de Haro, it was agreed that De 
WatteviUe's letter of recall should be placed in the hands 
of Du Vouldy, accompanied with an order to appear at 
Madrid and give an account of his conduct; and at the 
same time a letter of credence was sent for the new Spanish 
minister, La Fuente, who at his first audience was to pledge 
tile King's word that the Spanish ambassadors would hence- 
forth abstain from demanding precedence in Ekigland. 

But Louis XIV was not satisfied with these concessions. 
He sent M. de Nantia to express to Philip IV his condolence 
QD the death of the Infante, but charged him to direct the 
French ambassador at Madrid to demand not only that 
the 'King of Spain should include his declaration in the 
text of the new letter of credence sent for La Fuente, or 
eqiress it in some equally public and unquestionable form, 
bat also that the renunciation of precedence in favor of 
France, which had been confined to England, should be 
Grtended to all other countries. 

During the controversy, Don Luis de Haro died, and 



164&-1670 



68 A HISTOBY OF DIPLOMACY 

Chap. I the Infante Charles — the future Charles II of Spain — was 
'?!•,« bom. It was not, therefore, until January 6, 1662, that, 
after much difficulty, the final modifications were accorded. 
On March 24, La Fuente, in the presence of the papal nuncio 
and all the ambassadors, was received by the King of 
France in solemn audience and read a declaration expressing 
the regrets of His Most Catholic Majesty.^ Then, after 
La Fuente had withdrawn, the King addressed the other 
envoys in these words: "You have heard the declaration 
which the ambassador of Spain has made to me. I pray 
you to write to yoiu* masters, in order that they may know 
that the Catholic King has given orders to all his ambassa- 
dors to yield precedence to mine upon all occasions.' 
Theaimsof At Court there was an organized conspiracy to plunge 
^^J^^ the young king into an abyss of sensuous pleasure, in the 
hope that, by the influence of mistresses and preoccupa- 
tion in amusements, others might rule in his ^lace. For a 
time the illusion prevailed that these intrigues would prove 
successful. The King was entertained with ballets, fStes, 
hunting parties, and theatrical representations, in which 
Molifere's own troupe presented the plays of that master. 
But in the midst of all this frivolity Louis XIV never for 
a moment neglected his mitier de roij and De Lionne was 
required to write despatches in the presence of the King, 
article by article, which His Majesty corrected when his 
minister did not exactly express his thought. 

Exposed to no danger from any of his neighbors, the policy 
of Louis XIV in foreign affairs was, from the moment 
of Cardinal Mazarin's death, clear, comprehensive, and 
aggressive. '^ Immoderately desirous of glory and of establish- 



1 The text may be found in Dumont, VI, Part II, p. 405. In order 
to perpetuate the memory of that event, says De Martens, Louis XIV 
caused a medal to be engraved on which he was represented on the 
steps of his throne and the Spanish ambassador in the posture of making 
an apology in the presence of the papal nuncio and other ministers. 
The legend on its face was: Jim praecedendi asBertum; the reverse^ 
Hiapanorum accuwiiio coram XXX Legatis principum. 

* The best account is found in Recueil des InstructumSf XI, Espagne^ 
pp. 164, 170. 



THE ASCENDENCY OF FRANCE 59 

ing his reputation in the world, " as Jean Baptiste Colbert Chap. i 
has described him, he entertained no illusions, and perfectly ^' »• 

Ifilfi 1670 

understood what he wished to accomplish. Mazarin had 



extended France to the Pyrenees. Louis XIV wished to 
extend it to the Rhine and the Alps. Thus would be realized 
those ''natural limits" which had belonged to ancient Gaul. 
Beyond this hovered indistinctly the future succession to the 
throne of Spain. Even the crown of the Empire was 
not yet excluded from his dreams; for, as we shaU have 
occasion to observe, he was repeatedly recurring to plans 
for the gratification of this ambition. The first step to the 
realization of this vast programme of French expansion 
was, however, the possession of the Netherlands; and it was 
toward this end that all his energies were directed. 

With a broader knowledge of the complex relations of the The wtem wu 
European powers than any sovereign had ever yet possessed, ^^^j^J^ 
Louis XIV comprehended that his diplomacy must be 
secret, systematic, and all-pervasive. Spain and Austria 
were not only to be kept apart, but both were to be rendered 
pow^Iess in order that the territories West of the Rhine, 
partly Spanish and partly Imperial, might be left without 
defence. 

In order to weaken Spain, it was desirable that Portugal 
should be sustained. Many years afterward, in his '' M4- 
moires '' the King thus described his evasion of his treaty 
obligations not to aid that kingdom in its war with Spain: 
"I saw that the Portuguese, if they were deprived of my as- 
sistance, would not be able to resist alone the forces of the 
House of Austria. I did not doubt that the Spaniards, 
having vanquished that domestic foe, would more easily 
undertake to oppose the establishments I was mediating 
for the good of my state; and yet I had a scruple about aid- 
mg Portugal openly, on accoimt of the Treaty of the Pyre- 
nees. The most natural expedient for relieving myself of 
that embarrassment was to place the King of England in a 
pootion to permit that, in his name, I. should give to Portu- 
gal all the assistance necessary." 

In pursuance of this expedient, La Bastide de la Croix 



60 



A HISTORY OF DIPLOBfACT 



Chap. I 

A.D. 

1648-1670 



The ae ti v i t i et 
of Louia XIV 
4«aixtat the 
£iiipeior 



was secretly sent to London to promote the marriage of 
Charles II with Catherine, the Infanta of Portugal. Under the 
. pretext of buying lead in England for the roofs of the royal 
palace, La Bastide carried letters of credit for five hundred 
thousand livres, and Edward Hyde, the first Earl of Clar- 
endon, Prime Minister and Lord Chancellor of Charles II, 
was won for France. Notwithstanding the lively oppo- 
sition of the Spanish ambassador, on June 23, 1661, the 
marriage was arranged, and the King of England promised 
to furnish Portugal with three thousand men and eight 
frigates for the war with Spain. By a secret contract, Louis 
XIV bore the whole expense; and Portugal was thus enabled 
to continue its resistance to Spain.^ 

With the King of Elngland thus actually in the service 
of France, and, the King of Spain intimidated by the arro- 
gance of his haughty son-in-law, who now disavowed the 
validity of the renunciation of the right of succession to the 
Spanish throne on the part of Maria Theresa, there was no 
monarch in Europe who could contest the primacy of this 
young sovereign, still in his twenty-fourth year. Racine 
did not greatly exaggerate when in the dedication of his 
"Alexandre," employing the words used of the great Mace- 
donian in the Scriptures, he exalted Louis XIV as a prince 
"before whom all the people of the earth are silent." 

Beside the superb independence of the King of France, the 
Emperor Leopold I seemed the victim of a perpetual con- 
spiracy against his imperial pretensions. Gravel had la- 
bored incessantly to extend the League of the Rhine and 
fortify French infiuence in Germany. Through his efforts 
the French party constantly grew in munbers and strength 
of organization; while the Austrian party, at first the 
stronger, gradually became enfeebled.* The principal aims 
of Louis XIV in his opposition to Leopold I were to dissolve 
the Austro-Polish alliance, dictate the Polish succession, win 



1 In 1662, Charles II sold Dunkirk to France for £200,000, quite 
against the popular will in England. 

s On the state of the two parties in Germany in 1660, see Pag^, Le 
Grand Electew el Louis XIV, p. 35 et seq. 



164&-1670 



THE ASCENDENCY OF FRANCE 61 

over the adhesion of the Elector of Brandenburg, and CHiiF. I 
confirm the predommance of Sweden in the North; thus _^^'f;^, 
stripping the Emperor of all external support, and leaving . 
him imjwtent in international afiFairs. 

The question of the Polish succession offered a paint 
d'appid for the influence of France. The Queen, Louise 
Marie, who has been described as the ''veritable King of 
Poland, " was weary of the Austrian alliance, and eager to 
secure the crown to the Duke of Enghien, son of the Great 
Cond^, who was to marry her niece and become the successor 
of her childless husband, John Casimir. Until the Peace of 
the Pyrenees, Mazarin had opposed this idea; but, after the 
reconciliation of Cond4, the project had been seriously en- 
tertained, and Louis XIV now joined his influence with that 
of the Polish queen to promote the election of the French 
prince. 

In this contest, in which the ingenuity of the French 
minister, De Lumbres, was opposed by the astuteness and 
perspicacity of Lisola, the Elector of Brandenburg was the 
secret opponent of both; for Frederick William perceived 
in the success of France the triumph of a power in alliance 
with his enemies, and was opposed to any increase of prestige 
for the House of Austria. The truth is, Frederick William 
himself — as is now clearly proved — secretly aspired to the 
kingship of Poland; and with such ardor that he was even 
willing if necessary to abandon rights which he had acquired 
for Brandenburg, in order to obtain it.^ 

Entirely ignorant of the Elector's ambition in respect to 
Poland, Louis XIV, needing his support in the execution of 
his own designs, attempted to bring him into the circle of 
his alliances, first by the mediation of Abraham Wicque- 
fort, — half diplomatist and half adventurer, and author of 
the famous work ''The Ambassador," who had passed from 
the service of Brandenburg into the Bastille as a prisoner of 
Louis XIV, and from the Bastille into the secret service of 
Enmce, — and afterwird b^' the more formal negotiations 



^ See WaddingtoD, Le Grand EUdeur^ H, p. 84; 



62 A HISTORY OF DIPLOBiACY 

Chap. I of De Lesseins, who in November, 1661, was sent to Berlin 
A. D. to enroll Frederick William among the allies of France. 

1 A4A— 1 A7n 

The attitude of the Elector, whose chief desire was to 

maintain his own independence and to incur no obligations, 

Negotiatioiis was cxprcsscd in his declaration that he was "neither 

^FhuawtJith Austrian nor Spanish, neither French nor Swedish; but 

tiM Eiaotor of purely and solely German. " The instructions of De Lesseins 

Bnodenbun reviewed the former relations of France and Brandenburg, 

asserted that the interests of both in the Empire were the 

same, emphasized the danger to the Elector of an Austrian 

king of Poland, who would covet Prussia, promised security 

to Frederick William if a French prince were chosen, and in 

exchange for this demanded two things, — adhesion to the 

League of the Rhine, and a loyal supix>rt of the candidature 

of the Duke of Enghien.^ 

The reception of the French envoy was apparently cor- 
dial; but Frederick William, as usual, was coy and wary. 
The health of the King, the Queen, and the new-bom Dau- 
phin was drunk at the Elector's table, and all the cannon in 
Berlin were fired in salute; but the designs of France were 
too evident; and, in February, 1662, the negotiations were 
suspended, then resumed, and in April — after an illusory 
revival of hopes — terminated by the departure of Lesseins. 
It was now the Elector's turn to seek the protection of 
France. Sweden was rumored to be entering into the 
plans of France and the Queen of Poland; reports of a bar- 
gain with the Duke of Neuburg, — the rival and enemy 
of Frederick William, — by which France was to give him 
rewards in Poland in exchange for the duchies of Jdlich and 
Berg, reached the ears of the Elector; and, menaced by these 
intrigues, he began to tremble for the security of Prussia 
and of his Rhenish possessions. In November, his agent, 
Ktft^ von Blumenthal, was sent as special ambassador to 
Stockholm and Paris; but little was accomplished in Sweden, 
and nothing in France. It was Louis XIV who was now dic- 
tating the terms of alliances; and, in the midst of universal 
dissimulation, Frederick William, although unequalled as 

1 For the ixutructaons, see Recueil, XVI, Pruase, p. 69 et seq. 



THE ASCENDENCY OF FRANCE 63 

a subtle and astute dissembler, was disquieted with the fear Chap. I 
that he might have no refuge but "slavery to France;" to ^- ">• 
which, as he alleged, he would prefer thfe "protection of the 



Turks!" The desperate battle of intrigue, temporization, 
and equivocation ended, however, in a nominal alliance 
between Louis XIV and Frederick William. The Elector 
entered the League of the Rhine; but he was not pledged 
to promote the designs of France in Poland, or to renounce 
his relations with Austria. Based neither upon common 
interests nor mutual confidence, the treaty was almost as 
ambiguous as the negotiations had been insincere; yet it 
was, in appearance at least, a triumph for the diplomacy 
of France, and a new symptom of French predominance in 
Euroi>e.^ 

The negotiations with the Elector of Brandenburg had The alliance of 
not remained a secret, and John George II of Saxony had ^J^^'^**' 
been much perturbed in mind by the progress of French in- 
fluence in Germany. Originally a loyal friend of Austria, his 
ardor for the Hapsburgs had been cooled by the refusal of 
the Emperor to marry his daughter; and, not wishing to be 
isolated, he was disposed to secure his interests by an entente 
with Louis XIV. Accordingly, one of his chamberlains, 
Kaspar von Clengel, who was hostile to Austria, in January, 
1664, was secretly sent to Paris to seek a subvention and to 
promise in return that Saxony would aid no one who re- 
sisted the interests of France. 

At Paris, Clengel did not hesitate to reveal the enfeebled 
position of his master, — whose possession of the electorate 
was threatened by family quarrels, and whose independence 
of action was hampered by the rivalries of his ministers, — 
frankly admitting the need of money to operate a coup 
d'SuU by which the authority of the Elector might be re- 
gained. Having, in truth, nothing of value to offer, he was 
naturally accorded nothing in return. In February, the 
probable adhesion of the Mector of Brandenburg to the 



* For the negotiatioDS, see the elaborate account in Pagte, Le Grand 
EUeteur el LouU XIV; for the treaty, dated March 6, 1664, see 
DumoDt, VI, Part U, p. 129 et seq. 



64 A HISTORY OF DIPLOBiACT 

Chap. I League of the Rhine became known at Paris, and John 
^- »• George II grew alarmed at his own exposed position. When, 
soon, afterward, he gave an audience to Gravel in the pres- 
ence of his ministers, he clasped the French envoy warmly 
by the hand and whispered in his ear: "I beg you to rec- 
onmiend me to the good graces of the King your master, 
I will have more to say on the subject one of these days. " 
To DeLionne and Gravel it was amusing to negotiate 
with such an easy prey, who seemed satisfied with the 
pleasure of feeling himself able to conclude a treaty with 
so powerful a protector. Practically without negotiations, 
on April 6, 1664, the Treaty of Regensburg, drawn up by 
Gravel "in terms not disadvantageous for the Elector," 
as he blandly promised the Saxon plenipotentiary, was signed 
between Louis XIV and John George 11.^ The Elector was 
bound to aid the King against anyone who should attempt 
to oppose him "in the enjoyment of his rights" in the 
Empire; and the King agreed to protect the Elector in the 
possession of his electorate. The secret articles were more 
explicit. Louis XIV would supply the Electoral Prince 
with an "annual gratification," the amount of which was 
left to "the generosity of His Majesty;" and, in return, 
John George II would vote in the assemblies of the Empire 
"conformably to the good intentions of the King!"* If 
Louis XIV should become a candidate for the imperial 
throne, the Elector of Saxony was thus pledged to vote 
for him. 
The embracUo There remained in Europe only two ix)wers whose oppo- 
^d^"^^^ sition the King of France had cause to dread, — the Pope 
Aiexaadn VII and Holland. The one he hoped to conciliate; the other he 
intended first to beguile and isolate, then finally to crush. 
Pope Alexander VII — that Fabio Chigi who as papa;! 
nuncio had aided in mediating the Peace of Westphalia — 
had bitterly hated Cardinal Mazarin, who had opposed 



> For the details, see Auerbach, La diphmatie fran^ise el la cour de 
8axet pp. 117, 148; fcxr the treaty, Dumont, VI, Part III, p. 7 et seq. 

* The secret articles have been publish^ by Vast in the Revue 
Hiatorique, LXV, pp. 20, 21. 



THE ASC£ND£NCT OF FRANCE 65 

Ms election, resented his protection of the recalcitrant Car- Chap. i 
dinal de Retz, and described the Pope as possessing neither ^* »• 
"knowledge nor solid virtues," with a "head filled with ^^48-1670 
false maxims touching the afiFairs of the world and the in- 
terests of Christian princes." The pretensions of Louis 
XIV and the adulations of France towards the King, which 
threatened to subordinate the papal authority to the cuUe 
du roi, had excited in Alexander VII an almost equally 
intense animosity. From the beginning of his independent 
role, the King of France had endeavored to propitiate the 
Pope; but the Spanish and imperial influences were strong 
at Rome, and although there was a French party among the 
cardinals, up to the arrival of the Duke of Cr^ui as ambas- 
sador of France in June, 1662, no progress toward a reconcil- 
iation had been made. 

This bellicose diplomatist, described by a contemporary as 
a "proud man whose face did not belie his character, "... 
who "needed to humanize himself," . . . and ''who be- 
came more disdainful after he was clothed with the quality 
of ambassador, " was ill adapted for a work of peace. His 
audiences of the Pope were mutually unsatisfactory, and the 
tension between the ambassador and the papal court was 
strained. In these circumstances on the evening of August 
20, the Famese Palace, in which the French embassy was 
lodged, was made the object of a violent attack by Cor- 
aican soldiers of the papal guard. The outrage originated 
from a quarrel between the Corsicans and domestics belong- 
ing to the embassy, in which innocent persons were killed 
and woimded, leading to a terrific battle in the streets, and 
ending in an assault upon the carriage of the Duchess of 
Cr6qui, the death of one of her pages by a musket shot, the 
exposure of her life amidst a shower of bullets, and a siege 
of the palace itself so furious as for a time to prevent her 
approach and to imperil the safety of the ambassador.^ 

The recriminations growing out of this occurrence not The j 



only for the time put an end to all hope of an entente between f^"^ ^^ 



upon the Pope 



^ The incident is exhaustively related by MoCly, UamJbas9adp du 
due de Criqtd, 
VOL. ni. — 6 



1648-1670 



66 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY 

Chap. I France and the Holy See, but excited Europe with the 
.t' f;.-^ dread of a conflict that might change the whole course of 
European politics. The Duke of Cr^ui proceeded to 
fortify his palace like a fortress, with the intention, he al- 
leged, of preventing such insults in the future. The papal 
court, on the other hand, complained that the arrogance 
of the French and their preparations for resistance were 
responsible for the occurrence. The French charged the 
officials of Rome with complicity in the assault, and charac- 
terized it as a ''papal conspiracy." Finally, after varioua 
attempts to adjust the matter, further negotiations became 
impossible, and the ambassador left Rome, which hastened 
to put itself in a state of defence against the indignation of 
the King of France. 

The wrath of Louis XIV was equal to the papal expecta- 
tion. The King wrote bitterly to the Pope of the " aversion " 
which the Holy See had for his person and his crown, to 
the cardinals of the ''consequences" which the afiFair might 
entail, and to his chargi d'affaires of the "amends" he 
would require. In the draft of his letter to the Pope, he 
wrote on the margin that it was needless for the copyist 
to insert the usual closing formula, " Je pne Dieu de Voua 
ienir en sa sairUe garde.*' The nuncio at Paris was dismissed 
and at once conducted to the frontier, without being al- 
lowed to see his confessor or hear mass before his departure. 
When the Venetian and the Spanish ambassadors pro- 
tested to the ministers against such rigorous treatment of 
the representative of the Holy See, they were informed 
that the orders given to the soldiers did not concern foreign 
envoys. 

But Louis XIV did not confine himself to mere diplo- 
matic reprisals. Refusing all mediation, and demanding 
that reparation should be made to him only through the 
Duke of Cr^ui, in whose person he had been wronged, he 
gave meaning to his attitude by immediately occupying 
Avignon and the Coimty of Venaissin. On July 26, 1663, 
the County was declared by the Parliament of Provence 
united with France. As the Pope did not show himself 



THE ASCENDENCY OF FRANCE 67 

sufficiently humble, the King ostentatiously began prepara- chap. i 
lions for the invasion of Italy, and by the commencement ^- ^' 

1A4ft— 1A7A 

of 1664, French troops were quartered at Parma and Modena. 



In February the negotiations were resumed with a more 
lively interest, and on the twelfth of that month was signed 
the Treaty of Pisa, in which Pope Alexander VII agreed to 
require of his ministers ''to show to the ambassador of His 
Majesty the respect which is due to him who represents the 
person of so great a king, the eldest son of the Church," 
to exclude forever the Corsican race from the pontifical ser- 
vice in every ecclesiastical state, and to erect at Rome 
an expiatory pyramid as a memorial of his humihation. 
In return, Louis XIV consented to evacuate Italy, and to 
restore to the Holy See Avignon and the Coimty of Ven- 
aissin, but the pontifical garrison of Avignon was to be sup- 
pressed.^ The Duke of Cr&jui returned to Rome, and the 
appearance of friendly relations was resumed; but, in truth, 
the reconciliation was illusory. Alexander VII had vainly 
endeavored to form a coalition again^ France, and had 
yielded only to force majeure. He could forgive the trium- 
phant monarch neither his pretensions nor his victory, and 
it was discerned that, under the guise of a faithful son, the 
King of France was for the Holy See a formidable rival and 
a dangerous foe. 

It was not enough for Louis XIV to subordinate England The new poii- 
and Spain, to frustrate the Emperor's designs in Germany, «««<rfFrMu» 
and to humiliate the Pope; his real plans were constructive 
rather than competitive, and all his vast international 
machinery, all his insistence upon primacy in rank were in- 
tended to support the material expansion and predominance 
of France. To extend his territories to the Rhine by the 
annexation and incorporation of the Netherlands, Franche- 
Comt£y Lornune, and Alsace; and to raise France, thus 
augptented, to the height of a great industrial, commercial, 
and colonial ix>wer, thereby making it the richest and most 
domniaiit of civilized states, — such was the ambition of 
the King. Before his vision opened a great world of develop- 

* For the toeaty, see Dumont, VI, Part III, p. 1 et seq. 



68 



A HISTORY OF DIPLOBiACY 



Chap. I 

A. D. 

1648-1670 



xho pffOCTHB 

of the United 
Netheriandi 



The qyttem 
of John De 
Witt 



ment such as had never entered into the thoughts of Riche- 
lieu or Mazarin. Child of a new age, and heir of a recon- 
. stituted France, Louis XIV dreamed, indeed, of the Empire 
and of the Spanish succession, as any one of his ambitious 
predecessors might have dreamed; but, unlike them, he 
realised the value and significance of the economic ele- 
ments of national greatness. He was the first of the French 
kings to found his state upon the principles of political 
economy. His army, his navy, his finances, and his internal 
administration were all reorganized with this end in view. 
With this purpose also, under the inspiration of his great 
minister, Jean Baptiste Colbert, and in imitation of the 
Dutch, in 1664, he founded the East and West India Com- 
panies, and began that quest of colonial empire which was 
to give a new direction to the course of history.* 

It was the Dutch Republic that had thus far best repre- 
sented the new forces which were to shape the future of the 
world. Like Venice in the mediaeval period, the United 
Provinces, as the result of their commercial enterprise, had 
developed a vast colonial system, and their population had 
become the most prosperous then existing. 

Within the confederation, Holland, representing the mari- 
time power and the chief wealth of the Republic, controlled 
its administration, and dictated its foreign poUcy. Two par- 
ties continued to exist within the State. The adherents of 
the House of Orange desired the restoration of the stadt- 
holderate, and through it a revival of military strength^ 
which, with the aid of England, it was believed, would 
guarantee the integrity of the coimtry against the designs of 
France. The republicans, who were strongest in Holland, and 
particularly in Amsterdam, found their chief interest in the 
prosecution of trade, in which England was their rival, and 
feared the effect of a strong central and mihtary authority 
upon their commerce and their liberties. 

Under the leadership of the Grand Pensionary, John De 
Witt, the republicans were still in power; but, forced by his 

^ See Sottas, Histoire de la Campagnie Rouale dea Inde$ orienialet, 
Paris, 1905, p. 6. 



THE ASCENDENCY OF FRANCE 69 

position to n^otiate with the States General as well as with Chap. I 
foreign ix>tentates, he had cause to realize the relative weak- ^- ^• 
nesB of a form of government in which so many "High Might- 



had to be consulted.^ All the sovereigns of Ewx)pe 
courted the favor of Holland, but only for the purpose of prof- 
iting by its resources in the advancement of their schemes; 
and to maintain with any one of them a relation of close 
friendship without provoking a counterbalancing enmity, 
required the utmost skill. 

Amidst dangers that arose almost as much from the 
choice of friends as from the designs of enemies, DeWitt 
sought to preserve good relations with all, to substitute in- 
teUigence for force, and by a dexterous counterpoise of all 
the powers to obtain for the Republic peace, security, and 
prosperity. In an age when glory and dominion were almost 
universal i>assions, and war was the chief argument of rulers, 
he was charged with the task of preserving the independence 
of a state in which trade, industry, science, and literature 
were regarded as the normal pursuits of mankind. To 
foster them, Holland had become the chief emporiimi of 
Europe, the asylum of reUgious and intellectual liberty, 
and the only country where a free press, exempt from official 
oversight and censure, sent forth in various lajiguages books 
and gazettes, elsewhere prohibited, which found their way 
by mysterious avenues to every European country. 

If in governmental theory De Witt was an idealist in The rhndiy of 
an age of political realism, in his diplomatic negotiations ^^"^ ^j^^ 
be was not less astute than the most expert of his antagon- Dutch aiiiaaoe 
ists. In the life and death struggle of Spain with France 
he was forced to choose between them. At the time when 
Dunkirk was sold to France, the Spanish ambassador, 
Gamarra, pointed out that it was far better for Holland that 
this stronghold should return to Spain, which was less able 
to use it against the interests of the Republic; but at that 
time the ambitious designs of Louis XIV were not as ap- 

■ For the maimer in which De Witt manipulated, — and sometimes 
deodyed, — the States General, see Lefdyr^-Pontalis, Jean de WiU^ I, 
pp. 329, 330. 



A. D. 

1648-1670 



70 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY 

Chap. I parent as they afterward became, and the favorable treaty 
of alliance, commerce, and navigation made by Holland 
with France on April 17, 1662, seemed a suflBicient compensa- 
tion for the sanction of the bargain which France had then 
made with England regarding Dmikirk. 

To win Holland away from this alliance, Gamarra offered 
to place the Grand Pensionary in the comicil of finance for 
the Spanish Netherlands, by which he would be in possession 
of the secret plans of Spain; but De Witt declined this prop- 
osition. At that time he was disposed to solve the problem 
of the Netherlands by allowing France to annex a portion 
of the Spanish provinces, the Republic taking also a certain 
portion, on condition that a federal republic, like that of the 
Swiss Cantons, be formed of the remainder as a barrier 
between that kingdom and the United Provinces; but this 
project, which had been first suggested by Richelieu, was 
invested with peculiar difficulties.^ On the one hand, the 
King of France hesitated to limit in this manner his field of 
future expansion; and, on the other, the merchants of Am- 
sterdam were resolved not to tolerate the revival of Antwerp. 
At the same time, Gamarra, who was not ignorant of the 
plans for the total expulsion of Spain from the Netherlands, 
on five separate occasions urged upon the Grand Pensionary 
a close league with Spain as the only expedient for resisting 
the designs of France. 
The idea of a The anxicty of De Witt for the future of the Spanish Neth- 
barrierstote erlauds was increased by the reports of the contemplated 
marriage of the Emperor Leopold I with Margaret, the 
second Spanish Infanta, to whom, it was feared, the Spanish 
Netherlands might be given as a dowry, whereby the old 
Hapsburg imion would be restored and both France and the 
United Provinces exposed to a revival of the old danger.' 
If such a restoration of Hapsburg power were realized, even 
if the United Provinces were not recovered by Spain, the 



^ See Mignet, NSgociatuma relatives d la succession d'Espagne 9ous 
Louis XIV, I, p. 199 et seq. 

* The marriage contract had been signed at Madrid on December 
18, 1663. See Dumont, VI, Part II, p. 283 et eeq. 



THE ASCENDENCT OF FRANCE 71 

stadtholderate might be restored and the republican party Cbap. I 
doomed to extinction. ^' ^• 
As the case presented itself to his mind, there was no 



possible chance of preserving the Dutch Republic by an 
alliance with Spain. In March, 1664, he described that 
power as a "skeleton whose parts are attached, not with 
nerveSy but with wires, so that no confidence can be placed 
in its friendship or its ability to succor." His estimate of 
the aid that might be obtained from the Emperor, or from 
the princes of the Empire, so largely under the influence 
of France, was equally low. While, therefore, he clearly saw 
that danger to the Republic might come from France, he be- 
heved that there was no way to avert it except to yield to 
Louis XIV a part of what he claimed. This, with great in- 
genuity, he attempted to do; but it had not fully dawned 
upon him how insatiable the King of France would be. 
Determined to share his prey with no one, Louis XIV was 
from first to last negotiating with De Witt only to prevent 
his forming a league with Spain; and, if for a time he seemed 
to favor the idea of partition and the erection of a barrier 
state, it was with the purpose of first weakening the power 
of Spanish resistance, in order that his triumph might be the 
easier when he should advance his claims to the Spanish 
crown. These were ah-eady in process of elaboration, and 
it was because Holland would not formally acknowledge 
his pretended rights of inheritance that in April, 1664, 
he suddenly broke off the negotiations, and left the Republic 
to be weakened by its war with England.^ 

If England had envied the prosperity of the Dutch in the The Ando- 
tone of Cromwell, there was additional reason for doing so ^"iSm'*' 
in the time of Charles II. Dutch conmierce had again re- 
vived and the Dutch colonies were flourishing. In addition, 
Charles II was hostile to the Republic as such, both on 
account of its treatment of the House of Orange and its atti- 
tude toward himself in the time of Cromwell. No pains were 
taken on his part, therefore, to prevent insults to the Dutch 



* For these negotiatioiis, see Legrelle, La dipUmatie frangaiw et la 
; iTEspagne, I, pp. 67, 100. 



72 A HISTORY OP DIPLOMACY 

Chap. I flag and violenoe to the Dutch colonies on the part of his 
A. D. , naval officers, which the Dutch admiral Ruyter was ordered 

to resent; and thus, without a declaration of war, the conffict 

broke out once more, first in Africa, then in America, and 
the iOng's brother, the Duke of York, assumed conunand 
at sea. 

At the moment of the Stuart restoration, De Witt had 
seen that the EngUsh monarchy must be propitiated, and 
had attempted to conciliate Charles II. On September 
29, 1660, therefore, the act of exclusion against the House 
of Orange had been revoked by the States General, on the 
ground that it had been forcibly exacted by Cromwell; but 
the concession had proved imavailing. Charles II was not 
only disposed to maintain the rights of his nephew, the 
future William III, he was determined to abase the power 
of Holland. He especially needed at that time the influence 
and supix>rt at home which only a foreign war could evoke, 
and at the moment there was no foe to face with whom battle 
would create so much enthusiasm as the Dutch. Accord- 
ingly, in April, 1664, a fleet of four war vessels was sent to 
New Amsterdam, and in September that city and the Hud- 
son river were surrendered to the English before war had 
been formally declared. In December, Parliament voted 
large subsidies to drive Dutch conmierce from the ocean, 
and for the first time Charles II discovered the secret 
of how to obtain money from a reluctant people. 
Franeh madi»- Boimd by the Treaty of 1662 to aid the Republic in re- 
^^^ **^ sisting this aggression, Louis XIV nevertheless complained 
BredA because Van Beuningen, who had negotiated the treaty, was 

sent to Paris to press its execution. Unable to deny his ob- 
ligation, he pleaded his right to four months' preparation 
before offering active aid; and endeavored to evade the de- 
mand for immediate support by claiming that he had prom- 
ised assistance only in case the States General were attacked 
"in Europe." In order, however, to prevent the United 
Provinces from falling under the power of England or seek- 
ing an alliance with Spain, he finally decided, after permitting 
the Republic to be weakened, to propose mediation. 



THE ASCENDENCY OF FRANCE 73 

But it was not to his interposition that the Republic owed Cbap. I 
its salvation. While negotiations for peace were dragging ^- ''• 
cm unsuccessfully, in July, 1667, a Dutch fleet under Ruyter 



entered the mouth of the unprotected Thames and sailed 
up the Medway, capturing the "Royal Charles," burning 
the dockyards where new ships were building at Chatham, 
and blockaded London for several weeks. As a consequence, 
the Peace of Breda, signed on July 31, 1667, closed the war, 
leaving each belligerent in possession of what had been taken 
before May 20 of that year.^ 

Surinam thus fell to the Dutch, and New Amsterdam 
to the English, who renamed it in honor of the Duke of 
York. The Navigation Act was not annulled, but it was 
80 modified as to permit Dutch vessels to convey to Ekigland 
the conmierce of the Rhine. To De Witt the victory gave 
a new lease of power, but the net was already gathering about 
his feet. For England the chief gains of the war were the 
diiDination of Holland as a rival in North America, and the 
establishment of a closer territorial bond between the col- 
onies of New England and Virginia; but the mismanage- 
ment of the war had the further consequence of causing the 
downfall of the Clarendon ministry and the beginning of the 
reaction against Charles II. 

The death of Philip IV of Spain on September 17, 1665, The theory o« 
bad furnished the occasion for an action long contemplated 
by the King of France. From the beginning, he had con- 
sidered the renunciation of the Spanish crown on behalf of 
^laria Theresa an invalid act; and had never ceased his 
Aorta to obtain from the King of Spain an acknowledg- 
OKQt of that view.^ By his last will and testament, dated 
three days before his death, Philip IV had bequeathed the 
^ttoiah monarchy and all its possessions, in case the child 
Charles II — who was bom November 6, 1661, three days 



* See Dumont, VII, Part II, p. 44 et seq. 

' Sinoe August, 1661, these negotiations were pursued at Madrid by 
FcoiOade. See his instructions, RecueU, Espagne, XI, p. 161. An ex- 
cdokt digest of the negotiations is given by Vast, Lea grands iraUis, II» 
pp. 1, 10. 



1648-1670 



74 A HISTORY OF DIPLOBiACY 

Chap. I after the death of Philip Prosper — should die without heirs, 
> ^1^^ to his second daughter, Margaret, affianced to the Emperor 
.Leopold I.^ In this document the renunciation of Maria 
Theresa's claims was not only declared to be valid, but the 
incompatibility of a union of the two crowns of France and 
Spain was declared to be a ''fundamental law.'' 

Notwithstanding the terms of this testament, Louis XIV 
had no thought of abandoning the ultimate claims of the 
Queen of France to the throne of Spain. On the contrary, 
he was not even willing to await the death of the infant king 
before asserting a part of the claims in her behalf. Franche- 
Comt6, Luxemburg, Hainault, Cambray, Aire, and Saint- 
Omer he demanded immediately, on the ground of a local 
custom of certain Spanish provinces, particularly of Brabant, 
by which a daughter of a first marriage was preferred to a son 
by a second marriage in the inheritance of real estate. The 
territories just named, it was pretended, had thus " devolved" 
upon Maria Theresa before her marriage. They could not, 
therefore, belong to Charles II, who was bom afterwards. 
Such was the droit de dAfoliUion by which the King of France 
claimed in the name of his queen immediate possession of 
the lands in question. 

The Spanish jurisconsults argued that the custom referred 
only to private property, and could not be applied as, a 
doctrine of public law to the inheritance of political rights; 
and, further, that it was opposed to the Pragmatic Sanction 
of the Emperor Charles V, which made the Netherlands 
indivisible.^ 

But Louis XIV was not disposed to listen to objections. 
He caused a manifesto to be prepared and printed in Latin, 
French, and Spanish, in which his jurisconsults attempted to 
prove the illegality of the renimciation imposed on the 
Queen of France, and to set forth her rights. The renuncia- 
tion was claimed to be invalid (1) because it is contrary to 



' See Mignet, NSgodatians, etc., I, p. 382. 

* For the arguments of the Spanish and Imperialist jurisconsults, 
see Lonchay, La rivaliU de la France et de VEspagne aux Pays-Bos, pp. 
226,227. 



THB ASCENDENCY OF FRANCE 75 

natnral and civil law, and rests only on a decretal of Pope chap. i 
Boniface VIII having no application to sovereign kingdoms; ^'^^ 
(2) the King of Spain in reality gave nothing to his daughter, ^^^^^^^ 
for even the five hundred thousand £cus promised and not 
paid were only a legitimate inheritance from her mother, 
who had brought that sum to her husband; (3) the renun- 
ciation did not apply to future successors, and by the 
death of her mother and her brother, Maria Theresa was, 
at the moment of her marriage, heiress by full right; (4) 
the renunciation of a minor is not valid; and (5) a king cannot 
change the order of succession without consultation with the 
councils established in his states, which Philip IV had 
not done.^ The rights of the Queen were then fully recited, 
with the reasons for demanding their execution in each case.* 

As Si>ain would neither admit the invalidity of the renun- Th« inution 
eiation nor the right of " dSvdtOum," Louis XIV resolved °'***" 
to assert his claims by force of arms. Only a few dexterous 
strokes were necessary to complete the isolation of Spain 
and render her an easy victim. The first was a new offensive 
and defensive treaty with Portugal, signed on March 31, 
1667, with the intention of keeping Spain occupied in the 
Iberian peninsula while the French army invaded Flanders.* 
The second was the master stroke of securing the non-inter- 
vention of the Emperor. 

As early as 1664, the idea was suggested that the best 
solution of the Spanish succession, when the male line 
became extmct, would be to divide the heritage of Spain 
between France and Austria. The Archbishops of Mains 
and Koln had favored such a solution as a possible means 
of aiding the rivalry between the Emperor and the King 
of France; thus securing the peace of Europe, and rendering 

^ Don Luis de Haio, who had negotiated the treaty for Spain, was 
obliged to admit that such a renunciation did not set aside the Spanish 
eoostitution, which recognised the right of females to the throne. 

* The Trails des droiU de la reine is a volume of 270 quarto pages 
printed in 1667. Replies were published by lisola, Boudier d'Stat et de 
Jvtliee, and Kamoe del Mansafio. Reepuesta de Espafia. For the litera- 
ture, see Vast, Les grands traiUay II, p. 4, note. 

* For the treaty, see Dumont, VII, Part I, p. 27 et seq. 



76 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY 

Chap. I Catholicism once more predominant by the fraternal union 
^* '>• of these two sovereigns. 

164a-1670 



After unsuccessful attempts by the two archbishops to 
interest the Court of Vienna in this scheme, the idea was 
taken up by De Lionne and with the approbation of Louis. 
XIV intrusted to the skilful hands of the French ambassa- 
dor, the Chevalier de Grftnonville.* 

After long negotiations with Prince Auersperg, — who 
was ambitious to possess the red hat of a cardinal, — Gr6- 
monville succeeded not only in winning over 'the minister to 
the plan of partition, but obtained from him concessions 
that were no doubt surprising to the ambassador himself. 

The transaction was conducted with such secrecy that 
false instructions were employed to deceive the officers 
of the great seal of France; and Gr&nonville's interviews 
with Auersperg were held at night, the ambassador visiting 
him on foot to prevent suspicions by his own servants. 
At these midnight meetings these two men, each striving 
to outdo the other, divided between France and Austria the 
whole heritage of Spain. Throughout this extraordinary 
comedy, the "red hat" for "the cardinal of peace" was from 
time to time shaken when Gr^monville was not satisfied 
with the course of the negotiations; and, at one of the heated 
points of the controversy it was suggested that it was not 
worth while "to quarrel about such a little matter as the 
Kingdom of Naples," whichever way it went! Finally, 
at two o'clock in the morning, on January 20, 1668, the 
secret treaty was signed; in which it was agreed that, if 
Charles II of Spain died without children, Leopold I was to 
have Spain, Milan, and most of the Spanish colonies; while 
France was to take all that Spain yet possessed in the 
Netherlands, with Franche-Comt^, Navarre, Naples, Sicily, 
and the Philippines.* 

1 An objection first raised at Vienna to the idea of partition was that 
the marriage of Leopold I and the Spanish Infanta Margaret had not 
yet been celebrated. The marriage having taken place on April 25, 
1666, this objection was now removed. 

* Details of the negotiation are given by LegreUe, La diplomats 
fran^aise et la succession d'Espoffne, I, pp. 101, 148; and Mignet 



THE ASCENDENCY OF FRANCE 77 

By this astonishing compact, the monarch who had the Chap. I 
best reason to dispute the pretensions of Louis XIV was ^'^' 

lAdA— 1A70 

made a clandestine partner with him in the project of dis- . 



membering the heritage of Spain. While all Europe was 
being thus bound to the chariot wheels of Louis XIV or 
mystified by his sophisms,^ and sovereigns and statesmen 
were reading the famous ''Traits des Droits de la Beine/' 
without a declaration of war, in June, 1667, the King of 
France had silently occupied with his troops the cities of 
Flandersy which were ahnost defenceless, in order to execute 
his plan of immediate expropriation. 

While Gravel was quieting apprehensions among theTbeTnpie 
Gennans at Regensburg, and Count d'Estrades was allay- ^^^^ 
mg irritation at The Hague, the Marquis de Ruvigny was Aiz-ia- 
despatched to London to prevent opposition in England, ^"p*"* 
Although the English Parliament was suspicious of the de- 
signs of France, and the prime minister, the Earl of Arling- 
ton, was inclined toward a Spanish alliance, Louis XIV 
was hopeful of gaining the ear of Charles II by promises 
of money and the prospect of securing some colonies from 
Spain. 

In Holland, De Witt had become alarmed at the preten- 
sions of France, and the Dutch ambassador Van Beuningen 
was instructed to demand of the King how far he intended to 
carry his plans of annexation. The answer did not allay 
the feeling of uneasiness, and for the first time De Witt fully 

NigodaUonM^ etc., II, pp. 342, 441. The treaty, being secret, was not 
publiahed until recent times, but was seen by Voltaire, who says of it: 
''Leopold had no sooner signed it than he repented of his act. He de- 
manded at least that no other court should know of its existence; that 
a double copy be not made according to custom; and that the unique • 

iDfltrument be enclosed in a metal casket, of which the Emperor should 
possess one key and the King the other." — SikiU de Louis XIV, p. 141. 
The precautions mentioned were not in reality carried out, but the ex- 
trtenoe of the treaty was first publicly revealed by Torcy in his Me- 
moires, I, p. 36, published in 1756. 

^ For the details of the diplomatic web woven by De Lionne under 
the direction of Louis XIV between 1662 and 1667, by which all Europe 
seeoEied to be axrayed against Spain, see Vast, Les grands (raiUs, II, 
pp. 5, 6. 



78 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY 

Cbap. I realized the peril to which the Republic might in the future 
A.D. be exposed. 

1648-1670 



But the danger foreshadowed by the dominance of 
France had already begun to be felt in other quarters. The 
Elector of Brandenburg had long been alarmed by the 
French influence in Poland, and in order to hold him 
to his alliance Louis XIV had been obliged to promise 
new concessions. Sweden, already disturbed on account 
of the attitude of Louis XIV regarding the throne of 
Poland, had shown signs of jealousy because of the 
protection France was offering to Denmark, and began to 
realize that the King was becoming too powerful in the 
Empire. 

In Januaiy, 1666, the Marquis de Pomponne had been 
sent to Stockholm to strengthen the relaxing bonds of the 
Swedish alliance, and especially to prevent the possibility 
of the partition of Poland by the Emperor, Russia, and the 
Elector of Brandenburg after the death of John Casimir.^ 
But De Pomponne had not been successful in this mission; 
and as early as August, 1667, that ambassador had an- 
nounced to Louis XIV the possible formation of a general 
league against France in which Sweden might take a part. 
At The Hague, the Swedish ambassador. Count Dohna, sug- 
gested that, in concert with Holland and England, Sweden 
might agree to a joint mediation, and thus enforce a recon- 
ciliation of Louis XIV with Spain. 

Thus was sounded the first note of the Triple Alliance 
of Holland, England, and Sweden; which, with the help of 
Sir William Temple, whom Arlington sent to The Hague 
on special mission in December, 1667, in co-operation with 
De Witt and Count Dohna, soon took effective form. On 
January 23, 1668, England and Holland agreed to unite 
in a coalition, to which Sweden adhered in the following 
May, for the purpose of enforcing upon Spain the conditions 
demanded by Louis XIV, and thereby arresting his am- 



1 This appears to be the first clear indication of what the fate of 
Poland was finally to be. See Mignet, Nigociaticna, etc. II, p. 303 
etseq. 



THE ASCENDENCY OF FRANCE 79 

bitious designs.^ At the same tune, Spain was relieved of Chap. i 
the war with Portugal; which, through the mediation ^'^^ 
of England, received from Spain on February 13, 1668, the ^^^^^^^^ 
reoognition of its independence.' On April 15, at Saint- 
Germain-en-Laye, the Triple Alliance laid down the condi- 
tions which it was proposed to enforce as the basis of peace; 
and, on May 2, the Treaty of Aix-larChapelle was signed, 
in which Spain agreed to recognize all the conquests thus 
far made by France, and Louis XIV consented to restore 
Franche-Gomt^, which had been occupied in the previous 
February, together with Cambray, Aire, and SainlnOmer. 
Thus ended the ''War of DSvobdian."^ But the interven- 
tion of the Triple Alliance had aroused in Louis XIV a re- 
sentment for which Holland was to pay a heavy penalty. 

Ostenfflbly, the purpose of the Triple Alliance was to The rasent- 
enforce upon Spain the acceptance of the demands made ^^^jy 
by the King of France, and thus terminate the war; but, in toward 
reality, it was intended to present a permanent barrier to ^®"*«* 
further pretensions by Louis XIV. The whole significance 
of the coalition lay in the secret articles, and especially 
the third; which was to the effect that, if the ''Roi Trds 
ChrMen*' had intentions that could induce him to refuse 
to sign the treaty of peace when the Spaniards consented 
to cede to him the places taken by him in the last campaign, 
or their equivalent, or rejected the guarantees to be required 
of him, then the three powers were bound to unite with 
tiie IQng of Spain in enforcing these conditions upon the 
Kng of France. 

The Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle imposed no restriction 
upon the will of Louis XIV, but simply required that 
he should loyally execute what he himself had sJready pro- 
posed.^ But this was a serious cause of offence to him. 
Having secured by the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle all that 



■ For the treaty, see Dumont, VII, Part II, p. 66 et seq. 
' For the treaty, see Dumont, VII, Part II, p. 70 et seq. 
' For the treaty, see Vast, Les ffranda UmJUs, II, pp. 14, 22. 
^ See the Memorandum ctf November 18, 1667, in Dumont, VII, 
Ptet n, p. 09. 



80 



A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY 



Chap. I 

A.D. 

1648-1670 



The exposed 
poflition of 
HoUaad 



he had at the time demanded, and having obtained through 
his secret treaty of January 20, 1668, with the Emperor an 
. agreement to his eventual possession of the entire Spanish 
Netherlands, he had really obtained in principle all he could 
hope to gain from Spain by continuation of the war. He, 
therefore, resolved to conceal his indignation, dissolve the 
coalition, and in time wreak his vengeance upon the chief 
offender, the Dutch Republic.^ 

But the attitude of Holland was hardly less resented in 
other quarters. Spain felt deeply wounded by the exactions 
imposed upon her, and the Papacy was incidentally aggrieved. 
The new pope, Clement IX, had been anxious to restore the 
international influence of the Holy See by acting as mediar* 
tor at Aix-la-Chapelle, and for this distinction all the 
resources of Rome had been brought into action; but it 
was a Dutch burgomaster. Van Beuningen, who had really 
settled the essential conditions of the peace, and at Aix-la- 
Chapelle the only r6Ie left for the papal nuncio was to be, 
as Voltaire has expressed it, "a phantom of an arbitrator 
among phantoms of plenipotentiaries." The treaty there 
ratified with so much solemnity had been already written 
at Saint-Germain. 

Deliberately and sagaciously, Louis XIV now planned the 
total annihilation of the Republic. The first step was to be 
its complete isolation. The task was not difficult, for Spain, 
forced to make a disadvantageous peace, was much en- 
feebled, the Emperor and many of the chief princes of the 



^ In a memorandum found by Rousset in the archives of the War 
Department at Paris we have these words from the King himself re- 
garding the Hollanders: ''J'avoue que leur insolence me piqua au vif, 
au risque de ce qui pourrait arriver de mes conqudtes, de toumer toutes 
mes forces oontre cette alti^ et ingrate nation. Mais ayant appel6 la 
prudence k mon seoours et consid6r6 que je n'avais ni le nombre dea 
troupes, ni la quality des alli^ requis pour une pareille entreprise, je 
dissimulai, je oonclus la paix k des conditions honorables, rSaolu de 
remettre la punition de cette perfidie d un autre tempe." — Rousset, 
Histoire de Louvois, I, p. 233. Louis XIV was especially irritated by a 
medal struck in Holland representing Van Beuningen as Joshua arrest- 
ing the sun (Louis XIV) in his course. 



THE ASCENDENCY OF FRANCE 81 

Empire were already in league with France, and only Chap, i 
EDgland and Sweden were in alliance with Holland. With ^* ^* 
prompt insight Louis XIV perceived that the Triple Alliance 



was in reality a mere rope of sand. The Stuarts needed his 
support, and the English people could be made to feel 
hostile to the Dutch by reviving the quarrels of the past. 
Sir William Temple's diplomacy might not receive the 
sustained approval necessary to make it of permanent 
importance; for the memory of past defeats, joined with 
the prospect of obtwung spoils from the Dutch commerce 
and colonies, could be made to counteract it, and with the 
desertion of England the coalition would be practically 
dissolved. 

To the Machiavellian mind of Charles II the overthrow The 
of the Dutch Republic appeared a profitable scheme, and '^^^ ^ 
he easily yielded to the influence of the King of France.- 
In September, 1670, Temple was recalled from The Hague, 
to find a cold reception at the English Court. Colbert de 
Croissy, who had been sent to London in 1668, had quietly 
done his work; the King was fully committed to the designs 
of Louis XIV against Holland; Arlington found it to his 
interest to give way; and the negotiator of the Triple Alliance 
retired to the tranqiidllity of private life, writing soon after- 
ward to Wicquefort that the fruits of his garden seemed to 
him "to have the quality of preserving themselves better 
than the fruits of his embassies." 

While De Witt was unmindful of the plot that was forming, 
lisola, who had been sent as Imperial ambassador at The 
Hague, tried to induce the Elmperor to join the Triple Al- 
liance; and that inconstant sovereign — of whqm Gr^ 
monville once said that he was ''like a clock that always 
needed winding" — wrote to Charles II offering his adhe- 
sion.^ He applied too late. The King of England had al- 
ready made a new compact with Louis XIV, and declined 



* The Emperor's decision to enter the Triple Alliance was brought 
about by the counsels of Lisola, the urgency of Malagon, Spanish am- 
hmmdar at Vienna, and the purchased assent of Auersperg and Lob- 
kowits. See Legrelle, La diplomatie fran^oMe, etc., pp. 178, 180. 
▼OL. ni. — 6 



82 



A HI8TOBY OF DIPLOMACY 



Chap. I 

A.D. 

164^1670 



to admit the Emperor to a coalition which he had in fact 
deserted. The conspiracy which De Croissy had begun had 
. been completed bythe Princess Henriette of Orleans. Charles 
II had received his sister at Dover; and, on Jmie 1, 1670, 
Arlington and De Croissy had signed a secret treaty of 
offensive alliance against Holland. 

By the secret Treaty of Dover, Charles II was to receive 
two million livres to be employed in defending his royal 
authority and making England Catholic; and in return he 
was to f lurnish six thousand soldiers and fifty vessels of war 
for an attack upon the United Provinces. When the country- 
was conquered England was promised Walcheren, the 
mouths of the Scheldt, and the island of Cadsandt, as her 
share of the spoils.^ Arlington was offered eight thousand 
crowns for his complicity, which the King authorized him to 
accept. 

The Triple Alliance being thus secretly disrupted, it 
only remained to dissolve it openly. After the Dutch Re- 
public had been completely isolated, the united forces of 
France and England were to attack it by land and sea. 



AUTHORITIES 



Documents • The opening of the archives of aU the European governments relating 
to foreign afiFairs to historical research has within the last half century 
thrown a flood of light upon the history of international relations. Prac- 
tically all the documents of first importance have been published either 
in fuU, in the form of digests, or by definite citation of the facts which 
they record. There remains, however, a great mass of detail which is 
of value for the perfect understanding of special questions but is of com- 
paratively httle significance for the general student of history. 



1 The Treaty of Dover, being secret, was not known to Dumont, 
and therefore does not appear in his collection of treaties. The text 
may be found in Mignet, Nigociatians, etc., Ill, p. 187. To give it effect 
and follow it up with advantage to France, a beautiful Breton girl, 
Louise de K^roualle, maid of honor to the Princess Henriette, having 
pleased the fancy of Charles II, was sent to England, where she became 
the King's mistress and under the title of the Duchess of Portsmouth 
exercised a powerful influence over his foreign policy. See Fomeron» 
Louise de KfyrouaUe, Paris, 1886. 



THE ASCENDENCY OF FRANCE 83 

For those who wiah to make Independent investigations in the ar- Chap. I 
ehiyesy the following works may be useful: Bfir, Lettfaden far Archith ^. q. 
hemdxary Leipzig, 1896; Burchhardt, Hand- und Adresdmch der 1648-1670 

dnittehen ArckwCf Leipsig, 1887; Baschet, Hitioire du d^pdt des 

Arddves des Affaires Stranghres, Paris, 1875; InoerUaire wmmaire 
da ArMoea dea Affaires Strangbrea, Paris, 1896; Rye, Records and 
Record Searching, London, 1888; Maszatinti, Gli archwi deUa etoria 
d^IiaHa^ Rooca S. Casoiano, 1897; Flammermont, Rapport sur les 
conegpondances dee agents diphmatiques itrangbre en France avant la 
rholtUum conservies dans ks Archwes de Berlin, Dresde, Genkve, Turin, 
Gines, Florence, Naples, Simancas, Ldthonne, Landres, La Haye el Vienne, 
Paris, 1896. 

On the value and use of diplomatic documents some useful sugges- 
tioDS may be found in Ulmann, tiher den Wert diphmatischer Depescken 
als GeschichtsqueUcn, Leipsig, 1874; and Schiemann, Einige Gedanken 
i&er die Benuteung diplomaiischer Depeschen, in Historische Zeitschrif t, 

Lxxxni. 

The most important printed collections of public documents for the 
present chapter are: Ltonard, RecueU des traitis de paix, Paris, 1693, 
rontaming only treaties of which the kingB of France were signatories; 
Leibnits, Codex juris gentium diplomaticus, Hanover, 1693-1700; 
Domont, Corps unwersel diplomatique, Amsterdam, 1726-1731, the 
most complete for the period and usually cited ; Saint-Prest, Histoire des 
traiUs de paix du XVII* siede, Amsterdam, 1725; Ouroussow, RSsumi 
hittarique des prineipaux traitis de paix, Evreux, 1884, with brief in- 
troductory notes. For the present chapter the best authority on the 
treaties of a general character is Vast» Les grands traitSs du rhgne de 
Louis XIV, Paris, 1893. 

Pabhc documents rekting to England are found in Thurloe, State 
Papen (1638-1661), London, 1742. Thurloe was Secretary of State 
under Oliver and Richard Cromwell. 

Documents relating to the Netherlands may be found in Aitsema, 
Hisiarie of Verhad van Saken van Staet en Oorlog, The Hague, 1658; 
Khnt^ Hisioria foederum, Leyden, 1790; and Codex Diplomaticus Neer- 
landieus, Utrecht, 1851-1860. 

For Brandenburg and Prussian documents, see in Urkunden und 
AktengtOcke zur Oeschichie des KurfHrsten Friedrieh WUhdm von Bran- ^ 
detdnerg, Auswftrtige Akten, Bd. II, Simson, Frankreich, 1640-1667; 
Bd. m; Peter, Niederlande 1640-1688; Bd. XIV, 1, Pribram, Oster- 
reieh, 1640-1675; Berlin, 1864 et seq. Also Mdmer, Kurbrandenburgs 
Staatsvertrdge van 1601-1700, Berlin, 1867. 

Hie Austrian Staatsvertrdge are being prepared by the Commission 
for the Modem History of Austria. One volume, Pribram, England 
(1525-1748), Innsbruck, 1907, has appeared. Others are to follow for 
France, Netherlands, etc. 

In finding the place of pubtication of treaties Tetot, Repertoire des 



«4 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY 

Chap. I traiU9 de poix, de commerce, d'aUiance, etc., — Partie chronologique, 

A. D. Paris, 1866, and Partie alphab^tique, Paris, 1867 — is useful. 
1648-1670 Koch and Schdll, Hiaiaire abr6gi des traiUa de paix, Brussels, 1837; 

and De Garden, Hietoire G&rUraU dee traiUe de paix, Paris, 1848-1859, 

which is in great part a reproduction of it, are antiquated. 

The most complete collection of diplomatic instructions yet published 
18 RecueU dee iruiructione donnSee atuc ambaesadeurs el minieirea de 
France depuis lea traiUa de Weelphalie juequ'd la rivoltUion fran^iee, 
Paris, 1884 et seq., comprising: I Sorel, AtUriche; II Geffroy, Suede; 
III Saint-Aymour, Portugal; IV and V Farges, Pologne; VI Hanotaux, 
Rome; VII Lebon, Bavi^, PaiaUnal, et Deux-PorUe; VIII and IX 
Rambaud, Rueeie; X Reinach, Najdes et Parme; XI Morel-Fatio 
and L^nardon, Eapoffne, Tome I (1649-1750), XII and Xllbis Tome 
II and III (1760-1789); XIII Geflfroy, Ddnemark; XIV and XV Beau- 
caire, Savoie-Mantoue; XVI Waddington, A., Prusse, The instructions 
were, however, often soon modified; so that they do not constitute a 
complete source. The introductions are valuable, being frequently 
based on a fiurther study of the archives. 

Of contemporary memoirs and letters, the following are the most 
important for the present chapter : Chdruel, LeUree du cardinal Mataarin, 
Paris, 1872; MSmoirea de TerUm, Paris, 1681; Dreyss, Mimoirea de 
Lovxa XIV, Paris, 1860; Louis XTV, Mimoiree pour Vinatruction du 
Dauphin, Paris, 1806; and Lettrea aux princea de V Europe, Paris, 1755; 
Pathi, Gui, LeUrea, Paris, 1846; Whitelock, Journal of the Swediah 
Ambaaay in the Yeara 1653 and 10^ from the Commonwealth of England, 
Scotland, and Ireland, London, 1772; and Memoriala of the Engliah 
Affaire (1625-1661), Oxford, 1853; Jean de Witt, Lettrea et nigodationa, 
Amsterdam, 1725; and new edition in Dutch by Fruin and Kemkamp» 
Amsterdam, 1906-1909; the Mhnoirea of Gramont, Gourville, and 
Temple, in the collections of Petitot and Michaud et Poujoulat; Tem- 
ple's Lettera (1665-1679) have been published in English, London, 1698 
and 1703, and also his Memoira (1672-1680), London, 1691 and 1709; 
see also his complete works, London, 1770; Arlington, Lettera (1664— 
1674), London, 1701 ; and D'Estrades, Lettrea et nSgociationa, Amster- 
dam, 1719. Lady FanshaVs Memovra, London, 1909, contain an account 
of Lord Fanshaw's mission to Portugal to arrange the marriage of 
Charles II. 

Other contemporary documents of the period covered in the present 
chapter are the following: Barozisi and Berchet, Rdazioni degli etati 
europei, Venice, 1861; Fiedler, Die Relationen der Botachafter Venedigs 
aber Deutachland und Oaterreich in aiebzehnien Jahrhundert, Vienna, 
1867; Pribram, Venezianiache Depeachen v, Kaiaerhofe, I, Abt. 2 (1657— 
1661), Vienna, 1902; Groen van Prinsterer, Archivea ou correapondance 
incite de la maiaon d^Orange-Naaaau, II Series, V (1650-1688), Utrecht, 
1867; Levinaon, Die Nuntiatureberichte dea Petrua Victoria Hber den nord-- 
iachen Krieg, 1655-1658, Vienna, 1906; Mignet, Nigociationa rekUwea d 



THE ASCENDENCY OF FRANCE 85 

k miocetsiem dTEtpagne, Paris, 1835-1842; Cooper, Samie CorreBpondence Chap. I 
(1061-1689), Camden Society, 1858, being the letters of Henry Savile, a. d. 
En^idi ambassador in Paris. The MSS. of Heathoote, Reports of 1M8-1670 
the Historical Mantucripts Commiasion, London, 1809, contain the 
Fandiaw Papers relating to the marriage of Charles II and rela- 
tions of England to Spain and Portugal down to 1666. Gardner 
and Atkinson have published letters and papers regarding the first 
Angb-Duteh war in vol. XXX of Publications of the Navy Records 
Sodely. 

It is impossible to name here more than a few of the works dealing liteniun 
with the international relations of this period. Of the general histories 
the most useful to consult are: for France, Voltaire, Sihcle de Louis XIV ^ 
Bouiigeois' edition, Paris, 1905; Lavisse, HisUnre de France, VII, 2, 
Paris, 1907; for Germany, Erdmannsddrffer, Deutsche Gesckichte, I, 
Berlin, 1892; for England, Burnet, History of His Own Time, London, 
1724; Gardiner, History of the Commonwealth and the Protectorate, Lon- 
don, 1903; Ungard, History of England, London, 1849; Klopp, Der 
¥aU des Houses Stvart, Vienna, 1875-1879, the latter partisan in tone 
but containing valuable documents printed for the first time; and Seeley 
Growth of British Policy, I, Cambridge, 1895; for Holland, Blok, 
Gesehiedenis van het Nederlandsche Volk, V, (1648-1702), Groningen, 
1896, and the translation into English by Ruth Putnam, New York and 
London, 1900; Vreede, Inteiding tot eene geschiedenis der Nederlandsche 
^plomaHe, Utrecht, 1856; Hora Siccama, Schets van de diplomatieke 
hetrddngen tttssehen Nederland en Brandenburg (1596-1678), Utrecht, 
1867; for Sweden, Carlson, Geschichte Schwedens, Gotha, 1875; Bain, 
Seandinama, a PotUical History of Denmark, Norway, and Sweden, Cam- 
bridge, 1906, and ChrisHna, Queen of Sweden, London, 1890. 

Of general works on diplomacy the following may be named : Wicque- 
fort, Mimoires touchant les ambassadeurs et les ministres publics, The 
Hague, 1677; Flaasan, Histdre ghUrole et raisonrUe de la diplomatie 
ffongaiae, III, Paris, 1811; De Barral, ^tude sur Vhistoire diplomatigue 
de VEurope, I, Paris, 1880; D'Alta Rupe, Ahr^^ de VHistoire dipto- 
matique de ^Europe (1648-1885), Vienna, 1888; Malet, Histoire dipLo- 
mstique de PEurope aux XVI* et XVIII* sibdes, Paris, 1894; Bourgeois, 
E., Manud hislorique de politique Urangbre, 1, Paris, 1897. 

More specific histories are : Valfrey, Hugues de Lionne, see ambassades 
m Bspagne et en AUemagne, la Paix des PyrSnies, Paris, 1881 ; Auerbach, 
La diphmatie franfoise et la cour de Saxe (1648-1680), Paris, 1887; 
Ghfiraely La politique extSrieure de Louis XIV au dSbut de son gouveme- 
wtaii personnel, in Revue d'Histoire Diplomatique, FV, 1890; Carutti, 
Storia deUa diplomazia ddle cprte di Savoia, III Turin, 1897; Wadding- 
ton, La R&pubHque des Provinces-Unies la France et les Pays-Bays 
ttpagnoU de 1630 d 1660, Paris, 1895-1897. 

In addition to the literature on Masarin cited in Volume II of this 
VQck, see Guakio-Priorato, Historia del ministerio cardinale Oiulio 



- 86 A HISTORY OF DIPLOBCACY 

Chap. I MaxarinOj K6ln, 1662, and after; with translations into French, K6hi, 

A.D. 1662; German, Frankfort, 1665; and English, London, 1669. 
1648r-1670 For Oliver CromweU, see the biographies by Forster, London, 1860; 
H6nig, Berlin, 1887; Harrison, London, 1888; Palgraye, London, 1890; 
Church, New York and London, 1899; Gardiner, London, 1899; Firth, 
London, 1900; Morley, London, 1900; Roosevelt, New York, 1900; 
Michael, Berlin, 1907; Catterall, Some Recent Ldieraiure on Olwer 
CramiweUj Chicago, 1901; and Jones, The Dipiomatic RdatUms between 
CromweU and Charles X of Sweden, London, 1897. 

For the relations of France, Spain, and the United Provinces and the 
question of the Spanish Netherlands, see Lef^vre-Pontalis, Jean de 
Witt, Utrecht, 1882; Lonchay, La rivaliU de la France et de VEepagne 
aux Paye-Bas (1635-1700), Brussels, 1896; and Molsbergen, Frankrijk 
en de Repybliek der Vereenigde Nederlanden (1648-1662), Rotterdam, 
1902. 

For the imperial idea in legend and prophecy, see Kampers, Die 
deutsche Kaieeridee in Prophetie und Saga, Munich, 1896; and Chauf- 
fard, ProphMies anciennee ou modemes et coneidtraHone hxetoriquee et 
philoeophiquee sur la France et eon prochain reHkoemeni, Paris, 1886. On 
the imperial election of 1658, see Pribram, Zur Wahl Leopold I (1654- 
1658), Vienna, 1888; Vast, Lee tentativee de Louie XIV pour arrioer d 
V Empire, in Revue Historique, LXV (1897); and Plreuss, Maearin 
und die Bewerbung Ludwigs XIV um die deutsche Kaieerkrone, in His- 
tonsche Viertelji^irschrift, October, 1904. On the r61e of French 
money in Germany under Louis XIV, see Pagte, Contributiona drhie^ 
ioire de la politique frangaxae en AUemagne eoue Louis XIV, Paris, 1905. 

On the development of the League of the Rhine, see Joachim, Die 
Entwickelung dee Rheinbundes vom Jahre, 1658, Leipsig, 1886; Pribram, 
Beitrag ewr Oeschichte dee Rheinbundes vom 1658, Vienna, 1888; and 
Ments, Johann Philipp von Sck&nbom, Jena, 1896. 

For the diplomacy of Frederick William, Elector of Brandenbuig, see 
Bosse, Zur diplomatischen Vorgesckichte dee Kdnigsberger Vertrages 
(1654-1661), Berlin, 1887; Philippson, Der Grosse KurfHrst, Berlin, 1897, 
1903; Pagte, Le Grand Electeur et Louis XIV, Paris, 1905; Waddington, 
A., Le Orand Electeur Fr4dMc QuxUaume de Brandenbourg: sa poli- 
tiqye extSrieure, I, Paris, 1905; Fehling, BeitrOge zur Oeschichte der 
AUianzvertrdge dee Grossen KwrfHrsten mU Ludwig XIV, Leipsig, 1906. 

For the Austrian diplomacy of the period, see Pribram, Die Berichte 
dee Kaiserlichen Oesandten Franz von Lisola aus den Jakren, 1655-1660, 
Vienna, 1887; Pribram, Franz von Lisola und die PoUtik seiner Zeii, 
Leipzig, 1894; and Wolf, FUrst Wenzd LobkowiU, erster Oeh, Rat Kaiser 
Leopolds I (1609-1677), Vienna, 1869. 

For the crisis in the North and the Peace of Oliva, see Vauciennes, 
Mimovres de ce qui s^est passi en Suede, etc. (1649-1652), Kdhi, 1677, 
which treats of the embassy of Chanut in Sweden; Lhomel, RelationB 
d'Antoine Lumbres iouchant see nigodoHons et ambassades, Paris, 1911, 



THE ASCENDENCY OF FRANCE 87 

particularly for Poland; Hirsch, Der daiemickUehe Diplomat Fram Chap. I 
von Lisola tmd seine Tdtigkeit wdkrend dea nordischen Kriegea (1655- a. d. 
1660), in Hiatorische Zeitachrift, N. F. XXIV (1888); Haumant, La 1648-1670 
gyerre du Nord et la paix d'Olufa, Paris, 1893; Friese, Ober den duaseren 
Gang der Verhandltmgen beim Frieden van Oliva (1659-1661), Kiel, 1890. 

The relations of Louis XIV with Rome are treated of in MoQy, Vam- 
hatsade du due de Criqui, Paris, 1893; ChanteUuze, Le cardinal de ReU 
H see miaeions diphmaHqueay Paris, 1899; and Cappelli, Vambaaceria 
dd duca di Criqui, Florence, 1900. 

In addition to the works already referred to the foUowing are useful 
for the formation of the Triple Alliance and the Treaty of Aix-la-Cha- 
peDe: Courtenay, Tlie Life, Worka and Correapondence of Sir WiUiam 
TempUf London, 1836, which gave rise to Macaulay's essay on Sir 
Wiltiam Temple in the Edinburgh Review (1838), republished in his 
Critical and Hiatorical Eaaaya; Grossman, Der KaiaerUche Geaandte 
Franz von Ldaola im Haag, in Archiv f Or deterreichische Geschichte, LI, 
(1873); Emerton, Sir WiUiam Temple und die TnpleaUiam vom Jakre 
1668, Berlin, 1877; and Bulard, Lea traiUa de Saini^ermain, Paris, 1898. 

JoBserand, A French Amhaaaador at the Court of Charlea II; le Comla 
de Cominge, London, 1892, gives an interesting picture of the English 
court in 1663. 



CHAPTER n 

THE PERIL AND THE RESCUE OF THE DUTCH REPUBLIC 

TheNethMw A LTHOUGH a century of civil liberty had produced 
laodamKiro /x jj^ the United Provinces a social organization more 
modem both in form and spirit than any other then existing 
in Europe, the peril to which the Republic was exposed was, 
perhaps chiefly for that reason, extremely great. Com- 
pelled by its military weakness and its geographic situation 
to depend upon foreign alliances for the maintenance of its 
independence, it was as a consequence obliged to incur the 
enmity of those from whose friendship it was alienated 
by its relations with other powers. Possessing valuable 
ports, an extensive mercantile marine, rich colonies, and 
great accumulated wealth, the United Provinces — and 
especially Holland — were naturally objects of envy to 
their less favored neighbors, and presented particularly at- 
tractive spoils to the eyes of France. 

The form of government being neither monarchical nor 
democratic but in effect a federal oligarchy, the rulers of the 
country were fettered by the organization of the State, which 
required a constant reference to local decisions. 

Notwithstanding this embarrassment, John DeWitt, 
by his patriotism, probity, and sagacity, had for nearly 
twenty years maintained and promoted the prestige of the 
Republic. He had, in truth, acquired an influence far in 
excess of the material resources of his country, and the day 
of reckoning was now at hand. The triumph of the Triple 
Alliance in the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle had been celebrated 
by striking a memorial medal symbolical of liberty united 
with power, and bearing the inscription in Latin: "After 
having reconciled kings, re-established liberty on the sea, 
caused peace to reign on earth by the force of arms, and 



1670-1684 



PERIL AND BESCX7E OF THE DX7TCH REPUBLIC 89 

conferred upon Ehirope a stable repose, the States of the Cbap. ii 
United Provinces caused this medal to be made in 1668." >•»• 

It was a presumptuous boast. Belying too much upon the . 
support of other powers, and fearing the restoration of the 
House of Orange through the army, the Grand Pensionary 
had discouraged the strengthening and organization of the 
land forces, while building up the navy in the belief that the 
chief danger to Holland was the commercial rivalry of 
'EiUgland. 

DeWitt was not blind to the ambitions of Louis XIV; 
but, so far as the Netherlands were concerned, he expected 
to defeat them by the skill of his diplomacy. His success 
at Aix-la-Chapelle led him to regard Holland as the arbiter 
of Euroi)e, able to protect itself on every side by balancing 
the powers against one another. He had failed to foresee 
that the day would come when his circle of alliances would 
be broken; and the Republic, completely isolated, would 
have to preserve its existence by its own force. That hour 
had arrived, but the Grand Pensionary was unable to meet 
its requirements. They demanded a different policy and 
a stronger hand. 

I. The Appeal to the House of Orange 

The Grand Pensionary had the merit of faith in his policy, The 
and negotiated desperately imtil the foe had crossed *J^®^S!^Jj^ 
frontier. A full treasury, the result of wise fiscal adminis- 
tration, gave him the advantage of abimdant ready money. 
The diplomatic agents of the BepubUc were provided for 
with a munificence which excited the envy even of the am- 
bassadors of France. Count d'EIstrades wrote, that he 
would be happy to be treated as well as the Dutch am- 
bassadors, who were well supplied at the expense of the 
States, while he was obliged to expend far more than he 
received. 

No opportunity was neglected to make diplomatic rep- 
resentation effective through the agents chosen to serve 
the interests of the Republic. There was no court of im- 



1«70-1684 



90 A HISTORY OP DIPLOMACY 

Chap. II portance where they were not present. They were received 
; ^'^^^ with the pomp and consideration accorded to the represen- 
.tatives of sovereign monarchs, held their heads high, and 
their success was often remarkable. The Sultan guaran- 
teed to the Dutch ships free navigation in the Mediterran- 
ean, where they were menaced by the corsairs of Tunis 
and Algiers. Denmark and Sweden were long rivals for 
good relations with the Republic. The Swiss were heavily 
subventioned by Louis XIV; but Colbert's economies led* 
to the mission of Frangois de Bonstetten to The Hague 
to propose the employment of Swiss mercenaries; to which 
De Witt was favorably inclined by the probability that they 
would not be subservient to the House of Orange. 

The Grand Pensionary had never placed much reliance 
upon aid from Germany. The only German princes whose 
assistance might possibly be counted upon were the Duke of 
Brunswick-Luneburg and the Elector of Brandenburg, with 
whom alliances had been made in 1666; but De Witt had 
alwajrs regarded Frederick William with suspicion and dis- 
like because of his connection with the House of Orange- 
Nassau. 

The relations of the Republic with the Scandinavian 
states were extremely uncertain. The members of the 
Triple Alliance had guaranteed to Spain the protection of 
the Spanish Netherlands; and, in return, Spain had agreed, 
with the guarantee of England and the United Provinces, 
to pay to Sweden four hundred and eighty thousand 6cus 
for the maintenance of the army.^ When England aban- 
doned the coalition Sweden clamored for the fulfilment of 
the agreement; but, since one of the guarantors of the 
subsidy had withdrawn, the Republic threw the burden en- 
tirely upon Spain, which was not prepared to offer pay- 
ment. 
TVsiihiBioiia De Witt ucvcr ceased to entertain the hope that, by some 
QfDeWiu fortunate combination of circumstances, it would be pos- 
sible to transform the Spanish Netherlands into an in- 
dependent state; thus conceding to France the security of 

» For the treaty of May 7, 1669, see Dumont, VII, Part I, p. 107. 



1670-1684 



PEBIL AND RESCTJE OF THE DTTTCH REPUBLIC 91 

her {Tontier, and at the same time erecting a barrier between Chap, n 
France and the United Provinces. Such an arrangement ^^J^^'^ 
would, if acceded to, have rendered possible a continu-. 
ation of the traditional relations of friendship between 
France and the United Provinces, and thereby have given 
repose to Europe. To facilitate this result, DeWitt was 
ready to permit France to profit by the partition of the 
other Spanish possessions upon the death of the King of 
Spain; but Louis XIV, feeling confident of finally obtain- 
ing all that was assured to him by the secret treaty of 
partition with the Emperor, had resolved to crush the 
power of Holland, and thus leave all his aspirations un- 
opposed. Acting in conformity with this idea, in Febru- 
ary, 1670, be resolved to discontinue all negotiations with 
De Witt and to treat the States General as a negligible 
quantity. 

From this time forward, the Grand Pensionary had no 
other recourse than to seek the grace of the King of France; 
which he did by sending Admiral Van Obdam in the follow- 
ing April on a special mission, to assure the King of the 
"continued affection of the Republic"; but the ambassador 
was received with cold politeness, and reconciliation was 
found to be impossible. 

The dispossession of Charles IV, Duke of Lorraine, and the 
appropriation of his duchy by the King of France in August, 
1670, without a declaration of war, might have opened the 
eyes of De Witt to the danger that threatened Holland; but, 
ifflintimidated, the States General took up the cause of the 
Duke so far as to inquire what reasons the King had for 
his action, and proposed that the duchy might be restored 
to the Intimate heir. Without directly discussing the 
subject, Louis XIV accused the Duke of having negotiated 
with the Grand Pensionary for the protection of his estates, 
with the intention of placing his forces at the disposal of 
Spam. When afterward the Emperor sent Count Gottlieb 
von Windischgr^tz to the King of France to remind him 
that Lorraine was a constituent part of the Empire, the im- 
perial ambassador was told by the King, ''That duchy 



92 A HISTORY OP DIPLOMACY 

Cbap. II belongs to me, and no one today has a better right to it 
^•»- than L"i 

Notwithstanding all these premonitions, it was not 

mitil December, 1670, when the Grand Pensionary was in- 
formed by the Dutch ambassador to France that he had 
learned through private sources of the conclusion of the 
secret alliance of France and England, that he began to 
realize the real intentions of Louis XIV. 
ThemeiMni- The adherents of the House of Orange had long been 
Um^OMgfi hostile to the Grand Pensionary and the policies he represen- 
ted. The "Perpetual Edict" of January 12, 1668, which 
prohibited the revival of the stadtholderate in the province 
of Holland, had been bitterly resented by the believers in a 
strong central government, who recalled with pride and 
gratitude the splendid services rendered by the Orange 
princes in the early days of the Republic. It was not un- 
nat\u*al for those who had been excluded from oflSce in the 
State by the republican oligarchy to wish for the overthrow 
of the existing regime and the restoration of the princely 
family to the position of which it had been, as many felt, 
tmjustly deprived. Some of the provinces had retained the 
stadtholderate after Holland had rejected it. Friesland and 
Groningen were firm in their loyalty to the past; and Zee- 
land, as a rival of Holland for leadership in the federation, 
was ready to utilize the latent sentiment for the House of 
Orange throughout the coimtry. 

While these influences were indirectly acting against the 
existing form of administration, they were specially con- 
centrated against John De Witt, who had gathered into his 
own hands the chief direction of affairs, and had become 
practically the ruler of the coimtry. 

In addition to the personal animosity felt toward the 
Grand Pensionary, there was a lively interest in the person 
of the yoimg prince, — the posthupious son of the last stadt- 
holder, William II, — left motherless at the age of ten by the 
death of the Princess Mary, sister of Charles II, King of 
England. As a child, his misfortunes had taken a strong 

* Mignet, Nigociationa, etc., Ill, pp. 4d4, 498. 



PERIL AND RE8CX7E OP THE DUTCH REPUBLIC 93 

bold on popular sympathies; and as he approached manhood Chap, n 
his person, his talents, and his known aspirations appealed ^^^""^^^ 
with equal strength to the imagination of the people. Unit 



ing in himself the lineage of the House of Orange and the 
blood of the House of Stuart, what might he not yet become 
to the little country in which he stood out as a unique per- 
sonality? Cromwell, who had persecuted him in his infancy, 
had not been insensible to the possibilities of his future; 
and had said of him to the Dutch ambassador Bevemingk, 
"This William, bom of the daughter of the dead king, wiU 
grow with increasing greatness!" 

Physically delicate, yet endowed with a restless energy 
of body as well as of mind, the young prince was conscious 
of his royal origin and almost consumed with ambition. 
Grave, retiring, sober, and industrious, fond of open-air 
exercise, and full of courage, in spite of fears regarding his 
health which followed him all his life, he was clearly bom 
for action, and rejoiced in combat. Without pretending 
to great intellectual attainments, he was at the age of 
twenty well versed in current politics and an excellent lin- 
^st, speaking Dutch, French, English, and German, with a 
fair knowledge of Spanish, Itahan, and Latin. Under the 
stem discipline of De Witt he had learned that intelligence 
is often more than a match for power. He knew how to fix 
his aim, keep his own counsel, and bide his time for action. 

It was to the Dutch rather than to the Elnglish side of 
his ancestry that'the Prince looked for the principles and 
the inspiration by which he intended to shape his life. A 
Protestant in religion and a liberal in politics, he was yet 
a royalist at heart; believing in the royal prerogatives as 
essential to the unity and eiSlciency of the State, and in 
royal reeponsibility as necessary to its peace and prosperity. 
D'Estrades' judgment of him, formed when he was yet a 
youth, was that his ancestors, William the Silent, Maurice, 
and Frederick Henry, would live and act agam through him. 

In 1668, at the age of eighteen, William of Orange re- The unbition 
solved to reclaim the heritage of his ancestors. Excluded *^ ^ ^*™^ 
from this hope in Holland by the ''Perpetual Edict," he 



94 A HISTOBT OF DIPLOMACY 

Chap. II decided to vindicate his claims in 2ieeland, where eight 
^t'^lo^ years before he bad been declared by the States "First 

ie70-1684 ^^^^^^,, 

Eluding the watchful Grand Pensionary and profiting 
by the absence of his tutor, he proceeded to Breda, and from 
there to Berg-op-Zoom, where a waiting yacht transported 
him to Zeeland; and, having previously announced his com- 
ing, on September 23, he arrived at Middleburg, where the 
States of Zeeland were in session. Amidst the plaudits of 
the populace he rode on horseback to the ancient palace of 
the House of Orange, where a deputation of the States came 
to offer their felicitations. On the foUowing day he was 
received in the hall of the States of Zeeland, and delivered 
an address, which he terminated by saying that he in- 
tended to walk in the footsteps of his ancestors, "to whom 
no sacrifice had been too great for the preservation of 
liberty and the reformed religion.'' 

The cabal against De Witt, promoted by influential 
former associates, marched apace with the growing con- 
centration of public attention upon the Prince of Orange, 
in whom the Grand Pensionary now discovered earlier than 
, he had expected a popular pretender to power; and when the 
Princess Dowager resolved immediately to proclaim the 
majority of the Prince, and thus prepare him at once for a 
public career, it became evident that a new political force 
had entered upon the scene. 

In the midst of the increasing signs of meditated aggression 
from without, indications multiplied of a revolution brewing 
within the Republic. De Witt was suddenly called upon to 
give an account of certain secret funds which had been con- 
fided to his discretion. Suspicions were aroused that his 
policy was too subservient to the interests of France, and 
that he was in secret relations with the King, whose attitude 
was menacing. The States General became more difiicult 
to control; and while he acted with moderation toward those 
who opposed him, he considered it necessary to take effective 
measures against the procedure of the Prince. 

Fearing that the "First Noble" of Zeeland might soon 



PERIL AND RESCUE OF THE DUTCH REPUBLIC 95 

be dected stadtholder of that province, if steps were not Chap. II 
taken to prevent it, the Grand Pensionary induced the States ^- »• 

of Holland to charge their representatives in the States 

General to urge the adoption of an instruction to the Coimcil 
of State excluding all provincial stadtholders from member- 
diip in that body. Friesland and Groningen opposed this 
step, as an encroachment upon their constitutional right to 
make a free choice of their representatives; but the States 
of Holland replied, that they would not permit any stadt- 
holder to sit in the Coimcil without the previous consent 
of the confederate provinces. 

Thus excluded by the preponderating power of Holland 
from sitting as a stadtholder, it was still possible for his sup- 
porters to offer the Prince a seat in the Council without 
possessing the title which he claimed; but to this — although 
it was advised by his xmcle, Charles II, and urged by the 
Princess Dowager — the proud youth objected that it was 
a disparagement of his dignity to enter the Council at the 
price of renoxmcing the right to all civil and military offices, 
^ch the statutes required of him. Finally, however, see- 
ing the force of the remark, that, "in order to mount a 
horse, it is necessary first to place a foot in the stirrup, " he 
consented to pursue this course. 

The impediments thrown in the way of William 's advance- The embMw 
ment, while no doubt resulting from honest convictions on f""^** ^ 
toe part of De Witt, caused the Grand Pensionary's conduct 
to seem equivocal, and greatly increased the opposition of 
the Orangist party. 

Finally, a change in the feelings of the deputies of Amster- 
dam, inspired partly by their suspicions of De Witt, caused 
a marked transition in the States of Holland in favor of 
the Prince. De Witt was obliged to accept a compromise; 
and on May 31, 1670, William was solemnly conducted 
before the States General of the Republic, took the oath of 
office, and received his commission as a member of the Great 
Council with the right to cast a vote. 

He had placed his foot in the stirrup by which he was 
finally to mount to power. De Witt was one of the first to 



▲. D. 

1670-1684 



96 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY 

Chap, n recogniiBe the fact; and soon afterward, wrote: "I fear, 
to my regret, we have laid the first stone of an edifice which 
threatens our liberty. " 

Presently, communications to the Council began to be 
addressed to "jffw Highness and the Council," — the form 
used in the time of the stadtholders. Not long afterward, 
taking advantage of a temporary absence of the Grand 
Pensionary, the adherents of the Prince supported his claim 
to a place in the States General, on the groimd that his 
commission, which contained the identical formula used 
in that of his father, permitted him to sit in that body. Six 
provinces sustained this contention, but the deputies of Hol- 
land opposed it; and DeWitt, hastening to the scene, de- 
nounced the attempt as an "impertinence." 
Foraicnad- It was uot Unnatural for the partisans of the House 

vwMtotho ^f Orange to believe that the blood relationship existing 
between the Prince and Charles II of England would en- 
able the Prince to effect a reconciliation between that 
monarch and the United Provinces, obtain the King's 
mediation with Louis XIV , and procure at the same time the 
overthrow of De Witt and the establishment of the Prince 
in the stadtholderate. 

Pleased with the growing disunion of the political parties 
in Holland, Louis XIV offered to the Prince the assurance 
of his friendship, and congratulated him upon the success 
he had already achieved and the prospect of "another 
still greater," — "the establishment of the same authority 
as his fathers had possessed in the State." 

Charles II also manifested a sudden interest in the for- 
times of his nephew, and invited him to visit England. 
DeWitt, solicitous regarding the possible consequences of 
such a journey, strongly opposed it; but, having been eman- 
cipated from his tutelage, the Prince disregarded this oppo- 
sition; and, in the autumn of 1670, attended by a numerous 
suite, accepted the invitation. 

Cordially welcomed by Charles II, who in the hope of 
winning his confidence flattered him with lavish entertain- 
ments and conferred upon him the Order of the Garter, he 



PEBIL AND RESCT7E OF THE DUTCH REPUBLIC 97 

was also honored with an address by the Lord Mayor and Chap. ll 
aldennen of London, and received the degree of Doctor of ^- ^- 
Laws at Oxford. But the phlegmatic nature of the Prince 



did not respond to the seductions of his uncle. Serious and 
reserved in his manners, he took little pleasure in the diver- 
sioDs offered to him; — an attitude which won him the 
respect of sober Elnglishmen, who were critical of the levity 
of the King. 

The impression made upon Charles II was not favorable. 
He found the Prince, as Colbert de Croissy wrote to his 
sovereign, "too Dutch and too Protestant" for the encour- 
agement of his hopes. The information led Louis XIV to 
dissuade Charles II from taking the young man into his 
confidence, on the ground that his extreme youth might 
lead him to indiscretion, and he thought his true sentimentd 
were too uncertain to be trusted. 

It was prudent of Charles II not to reveal to his visitor 
the terms of the secret treaty of Dover, in which he had 
]<Mned in a conspiracy to subjugate and partition the coimtry 
of William the Silent. 

De Witt, who had suspected the existence of this conspir- EngUod 
acy without knowing its terms, had kept up his courage in SJJiJ]^^***™* 
the belief that the English Parliament — which was not un- 
friendly to the Dutch, and had lately voted for an increase 
of armaments with the object of restraining the designs of 
Louis XIV — would remain loyal to the Triple Alliance, 
whatever might be the engagements of Charles II with the 
King of France. Unforttmately for the Republic, but most 
conveniently for the secret schemes of the King, it was 
easy to find a cause of offence in the too frequent indul- 
gence on the part of Holland in the spirit of boastfulness. 

In 1667 the Dutch had successfully bombarded Chatham; 
and, in continued celebration of this heroic action, they had 
printed books, painted pictures, and struck medals designed 
to perpetuate the memory of this victory over the English. 
At Dordrecht there had been hung in the town-hall a paint- 
ing representing ComeUus De Witt, — commissioner of the 
Dntch fleet, and brother of the Grand Pensionary — crowned 

VOL, m. — 7 



98 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY 

Chap. II by victory in the presence of the English ships burnt at 
1670-1684 Chatham; and the "Royal Charles," which had been cap- 

tured from the English, was anchored at the mouth of the 

Maas as a permanent pubhc exhibition. The Grand Pen- 
sionary, when complaint was made of these alleged insults, 
did all in his power to offer satisfaction; but Charles II, 
seeking a quarrel, made the most of them in arousing hostile 
sentiment in England. 
The secret treaty of Dover, which was in reality directed 
^^ quite as much against the English Protestants as against 
/ the Dutch, had been negotiated with the knowledge and 
connivance of Catholics only. Gradually, however, the 
Protestant advisers of the King were skilfully drawn into the 
plan of a war with Holland; and on December 10, 1670, 
while the Prince of Orange was still in England, was signed 
the Treaty of Whitehall, by which it was pledged that 
England and France should together attack the Republic.^ 
Tbe Qompift. The circle of Louis XIV 's diplomatic activities for the iso- 
^v?drete ^^^^on of Holland was now rapidly rounding to its close. 
On December 31, 1669, he had procured from the Elector 
of Brandenburg a secret altiance for four hundred thousand 
thalers, to be paid in ten annual instalments, together with 
a promise of money for his troops in case they should be 
called upon, and the prospect of sovereignty in portions of 
Gelderland, if France should acquire the Spanish Netherlands 
either by war or diplomacy.* On February 17, 1670, a treaty 
of alliance was signed at Munich with the Elector of Bavaria; 
who for five hundred thousand florins promised to prevent 
the Reichstag from supporting the Emperor, and to help 
elect Louis XIV, if the imperial office became vacant.* 



1 For the treaty, see Saint-Prest, Histaire des traiUs de paiXf I, p. 
284et8eq. 

* The treaty was signed on January 4, 1670. It remained secret until 
the nineteenth century, and was first printed in full by Moemer, Kur- 
brandenburgs StaatsoerMge, Berlm, 1867, pp. 335, 337. For digest and 
comments, see Waddington, Le Grand Sletdeur, II, pp. 211, 213. 

* The text is printed by LegreUe, La diplomoHe fran^aiae, etc., I, 
p. 230. In a second treaty, of November 28, Louis XIV agrees, in oaae 



PEBIL AND RESCUE OF THE DUTCH REPUBLIC 99 

The Hector of K6ln, by a treaty of July 11, 1671, promised Chap. Ii 
neutrality, and gave pennission to the French army to pass ,^7^11^04 



through his territories.^ The Duke of Brunswick-Liine- 
buig and the Bishops of Mtinster, Osnabruck, and Pader- 
bom were soon added to the list of allies, with the privilege 
of using their possessions for a base in making the attack 
on the United Provinces. 

Thus, one after another, Louis XIV had drawn into his 
system of paid alliances some of the most powerful princes 
of the Empire. On November 1, 1671, the linperor himself, 
compelled by his poverty and menaced with the prospect 
of French aid being offered to the Turks and his own Him- 
garian rebels if he refused, upon the imderstanding that the 
war with Holland would be carried on entirely outside of 
Gennany, signed with the King of France a treaty of al- 
liance and mutual surety.^ 

There remained only Sweden to be added to the list. 
Early in 1671, Pomponne had been sent to Stockholm to 
give the final coup de grdce to the Triple Alliance. Before 
the end of November, the Chancellor, Magnus de la Gardie, 
onder the pressure of Sweden's financial needs and the dim 
prospect of obtsdning money from Spain, had yielded 
to the ambassador's seductions; and, although Pomponne 
was recalled to succeed De lionne, — who had died in 
September, — in the direction of the foreign affairs of France, 
his successor, Honors Courtin, on April 14, 1672, concluded 
the treaty with Sweden. By its terms. Prance promised 
an annual subsidy of six hundred thousand crowns in ex- 
change for the services of sixteen thousand Swedish soldiers 
to prevent the sending of aid to Holland from Germany.' 

On January 4, 1672, in response to the pleadings of the The doable 
Dutch amba^ador, Peter De Groot, against a rupture be- ^~^™*«'"' ^ 



war against 
HoUaikd 



Leopold 1 shoukl die without leaving male offspring, to furnish the 
Beetor with means for the conquest of Bohemia. 

' For the treaty, see Saint-Prest, Uistoire des traiUs de paix, I, pp. 
470,472. 

' For the treaty, see Dimiont, VII, Part I, p. 154 et seq. 

' For the treaty, see Dimiont, VII, Part II, p. 171 et seq. 



100 A HISTORY OP DIPLOMACY 

Chap, h tween France and the Republic; Louis XIV coolly informed 
i«m-ifiR4 ^™^ ^^^f having begun his armaments, he would complete 

them, and would then take the course dictated by his "glory 

and his interests." Two days later, he terminated a de- 
spatch to the States General with the words: "We shall 
augment our armament by land and by sea, . . . and we 
shall make the use of it which we judge suitable to our 
dignity, of which we owe account to no one."^ 

Following close upon this announcement, Charles II 
sent a message to the States General by a special envoy, 
"the most overbearing of diplomatists," George Downing, 
demanding for the Elnglish Crown recognition of the sov- 
ereignty of the seas.* On March 29, 1672, war with Holland 
was publicly declared at London,* and on April 6 at Ver- 
sailles. An army of one hxmdred and fifty thousand men 
commanded by Cond6, Turenne, and Luxembourg was sent 
to invade the United Provinces ; while fifty English and thirty 
French war-vessels combined to destroy the commerce and 
captiire the ships of the Republic. In June the army had 



^ A few clear-sisjhtod thinken had already begun to realise the peril 
to which the power and ambition of Louis XIV were now exposing 
Europe and to wonder how it might be averted. Among theee the phi- 
losopher Leibnitz was the foremost. He sought by a carefully drawn 
plan to divert the King's attention from his designs upon the Nether- 
lands to the conquest of Egsrpt and the control of the Mediterranean, 
which he represented as a vastly more profitable and magnificent enter- 
prise. Both the Elector of Mainz and Frederick William of Branden- 
burg used such influence as they could in favor of a diversion that would 
absorb the energies of the French monarch in a distant part of the world. 
This scheme, however, which later appealed so powerfully to the imagi- 
nation of Bonaparte, did not beguile the practical intelligence of the 
Grand Monarch, who preferred at the same time to gratify his ven- 
geance and pursue his poUtical interests in a nearer field. For the text 
of the Connlium AegypUcum, see Testa, Recueil des traiUSf etc., I, p. 525. 

* Downing's instructions were, not to obtain satisfaction, but so to 
embroil the relations with the Republic that the English would wish to 
sustain the war. See the despatch of Colbert de Croissy, of November 
5, 1671, cited by Sirtema de Grovestins, OuUlaume III et Louis XIV, 11, 
p. 289. 

* The English ships had, however, abeady attacked the Dutch com- 
merce without a declaration of war. 



PERIL AND REBCTJE OP THE DUTCH REPUBLIC 101 

croesed the Rhine and taken possession of Wesel, Emmerich, Chap, ii 
and other places. Holland seemed doomed to certain sub- ,^7^^004 
jugation. 



ThuSy within less than a quarter of a century^ the Treaties nw moUvea 
of Westphaha, which all the signatories were solemnly ^^ ^"** ^^^ 
bound to defend, were completely set at nought, and a great 
part of Europe was in collusion with the King of France in 
forcing upon a friendly nation a war of conquest. 

What were the motives that led to such a wanton exhibi- 
tion of power? Louis XIV has himself ^ven us the answer. 
He informs us, ^' I had resolved to place this people in a posi- 
tion where they could not oppose my designs."^ 

What then were his designs? The ultimate object was to 
secure unopposed possession of the heritage of Spain. 
A more immediate purpose was to destroy Dutch rivalry 
to French commerce on the sea. The keys to both these 
enterprises were to be sought at The Hague. The Dutch 
Republic had opposed, and already partially frustrated, 
the Kill's designs. It had created the Triple Alliance 
for the purpose of preserving to Spain the Spanish Neth- 
erlands, and it had thus far maintained its own supremacy 
over the French on the sea. It would, if permitted to live and 
prosper, hold the balance of power in Western Em*ope, and 
thus at every point endanger the success of the King's 
ulterior plans of expansion. Therefore, Batama ddenda est 

Five months before the declaration of war, Louvois wrote 
to the Prince of Cond6, "The effective means of accomplish- 
ing the conquest of the Spanish Netherlands is to abase 
the Hollanders; and, if possible, to destroy them."^ 

For this violation of sovereign rights, Louis XIV could 
plead neither the m^ency of his people nor the exigency of 
his state. While the French nation might rejoice in the glory 
of their monarch and the extension of the monarchy, they 
had no just cciaua belli against the Republic, and none was 
alleged. Although the Hollanders were successful competi- 

^ Unpubliahed memoir of Louis XIV cited by Rousset, Histoire de 
Lowois, 1, p. 323, from the Archivee du D4p6t de U Guerre. 
' See Mignet, NigociatianSf etc., Ill, p. 665. 



102 



A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY 



Chap. II toFs in commerce, they had deprived the French of none of 
1670-1684 *^®"^ rights.^ Prom every point of view, the war was a 

personal one, prompted by a spirit of vengeance and executed 

by all means that were available. Almost a fourth of the 
French army was made up of mercenary troops, twenty 
thousand Swiss and about twelve thousand adventurers 
gathered from England, Germany, and Italy, — profes- 
sional fighting men, ready to serve the one who paid them 
best. 

Nor were the aims upon which Louis XIV was bending 
his energies the real interests of France. In December, 
1671, De Witt offered to yield to the King of France all 
the concessions he had demanded; but, suddenly, as if 
seeking to raise impassable barriers to peace, Louis XIV 
proposed the restoration of Catholicism in Holland, with 
the obligation to furnish the population with Catholic 
churches and to pay the priests from the public funds. 
Not content with the offer of Nymwegen, Gelderland, and 
the island of Bommel as the price of peace, he required that 
the Hollanders should recognize their perpetual vassalage 
to him by sending annually to Versailles a gold medal attest- 
ing their dependence upon him I 

The Republic To defend their coimtry, there was, indeed, one last 
resort, — to open the sluices and convert it into a lake. 
When Gr^monville, the French ambassador at Vienna, 
heard of this intention, he could not pardon the use of such 
an obstacle to the power of his royal master, and said to the 
Emperor's ministers: "If they can only use such an im- 
faithful element as water, it would seem that they must 
presently submit to the yoke; but the obstinate rage of that 
rabble shows that they evidently see God intends to punish 
them; and, in place of humbling themselves, they become 
the more ch\u*lish, and prefer to ruin and destroy their 
country, and expose themselves to be drowned, rather than 
to submit to such a glorious and triumphant conqueror!" 

1 In the k>Dg list of reasons for Louis XlV's hostility to the Dutch 
given by Legrelle, La dipUmotie frangaise, I, pp. 201, 208, there is no 
instance mentioned of violated ri|^t. 



PERIL AND BESCUE OF THE DX7TCH REPUBLIC 103 

The "glorious and triumphant conqueror" took a different Chap. U 
view, and afterward wrote in his memoir on the Dutch war: J"- ^* 
"The resolution to put the country under water was indeed 



rather violent; but what will one not do to escape foreign 
domination?" 

Inundation could arrest the progress of a French army. The aawoh for 
but it could not save the Republic. vrJ^!^^ 

But whence could succor for the Republic be expected, 
sinee Louis XIV held a great part of Europe in his pay, or 
subject to the fear of his hostility? The States General 
knocked at every door for assistance, but in vain. The appeal 
to Denmark met with an apparently favorable response, 
and toi thousand men were at one time promised, but their 
arrival was indefinitely postponed. The Protestant cantons 
of Switzerland were inclined to assist the Republic, and the 
Catholic cantons were urged to do so by Spain; but, to reach 
the seat of war, it was necessary to pass through the states 
of the Empire, and the Imperial Diet was not disposed to 
offend the King of France, the Swiss were themselves not 
prepared to forego the subsidies they were already receiving 
from him, and the effort ended merely in an order to the 
Swiss officers in the French army not to take an active part 
in the campaign against the United Provinces. The Prince 
of Cond^ made short work of this decision by surrounding 
the Swiss contingent with other troops and menacing them 
with death if they did not obey. 

It was necessary, therefore, finally to turn to Spain; but 
v> great activity could be expected in that quarter. After 
indent n^otiations, however, on December 17, 1671, the 
Republic had succeeded in inducing the Queen-Regent to join 
in a "declaration" for mutual defence;^ but, even if better 
(fiqsosed, the financial condition of Spain was not such as 
to render its support decisive in a war with France. 

There remained the hope that the Emperor, with the The attitade 
wpport of some of the princes of the Empire, seeing the ^^J^ 
perilous condition in which Europe was placed by the ambi- 
tions of Louis XIV, would absolve himself from his treaty 

' For the declaration, see Dumont, VII, Part I, p. 155. 



104 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY 

Chap. II engagements with him, and come to the rescue of the 
^- ^- Republic. 

1A7A— 1AA4 

The Treaty of November 1, 1671, had in reality been ex- 
torted from Leopold I more by intimidation than through 
any positive advantage to be gained from it for Austria 
or the linpire. Its third article had expressly provided for 
the case of war with Holland; and Louis XIV had frankly 
informed the Emperor that he intended ''to deprive the 
Hollanders once for all of the power to oppose his designs. "^ 
It had been stipulated that the interests of the Empire were 
not to be affected, and that hostilities were not to be car- 
ried on within its limits. But there were always at Vienna 
suspicions of the ulterior intentions of Louis XIV. In 
truth, the greed and duplicity of Louis XIV in plotting the 
dismemberment of Spain during the life-time of the King 
had rendered Leopold I suspicious of all his acts. 

Unhappily for the Emperor, there were two influences 
which alternated in obtaining ascendency over his wavering 
will: that of Lisola, an honest man, who was determined 
to defeat the schemes of Louis XIV; and that of Prince 
"Auersperg, Leopold's Chief Minister of State, who never 
ceased longing for the hat of a cardinal and hoped to profit 
by French favor in obtaining it. Between them was the 
venal courtier. Prince Lobkowitz, eager to obtain prefer- 
ment by any means. With such coimsellors to bend his 
pliant will; with two camps of princely interests in the Em- 
pire, one favorable to the Emperor and the other in league 
with France; and deriving all his real strength from his 
resources as an Austrian, Bohemian, and Hungarian mon- 
arch, the head of the Germanic body found constancy a 
virtue difficult of cultivation. As Prince Lobkowitz is 
' reported to have said of him, Leopold I was ''like a 
statue which one carries where one wishes, and replaces at 
pleasure." 

Before the negotiation of the Treaty of November 1, 
1671, Prince Auersperg, accused at Rome of being the crea- 
ture of France, had not only been refused the coveted red 

^ See Legrelle, La diplomatie fran^crisef etc., I, p. 164. 



PERIL AND RESCUE OF THE DUTCH REPX7BLIC 105 

hat but had been exiled to his estates in Styria; and Prince Chap, il 
Lobkowitz had come to power as first minister. "Seeking j-^tj^go- 

to make his pot boil," as he himself expressed it, he did 

not hesitate openly to ask for gratuities from France. 

Realizing the great value of the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle The Aiwtro- 
for the further security of Spain, the Spanish ambassador, f^^'"''^ 
Malagon, had urged upon the Emperor the duty of becom- 
ing one of its guarantors; and in the autimm of 1670 Lisola, 
joining his efforts with those of the ambassador of Spain, 
had obtained from Leopold I a promise to oppose France, 
if Louis XIV made an attack on the United Provinces. 
But Grftnonville, who was aware of this proceeding, had 
by Louis XIV 's instructions, informed the Emperor that 
if, in violation of his engagements with the King of France, 
he undertook to aid those who were against him, the King 
would reserve to himself a like liberty to take advantage 
wherever he could. 

To balance the menace conveyed in this message, Spain 
had no counterweight to offer. Leopold I had not forgotten 
that, in 1666, before negotiating the treaty of partition, 
Louis XIV had aided the Hungarian rebels. It was well 
known that the King was in secret correspondence with the 
Hungarian magnate, Coimt Zrinyi, who had already proved 
a dangerous foe; and it was certain that Louis XIV would 
i^y interference in Holland with new incitement to re- 
bellion in Hui^ary. 

Caring nothing for the Dutch Republic, Leopold I, 
nnder the influence of Gr^monville's skilful diplomacy, 
had decided to leave it to the tender mercies of the King, 
leserving the right to intervene in behalf of the Empire, 
in case its interests were impaired. 

£bqx)sed to the recurring assaults of the Turks upon his The Emperor's 
Eastern dominions, and ^nbarrassed by the rebellious ^^ ™ ***• 
ffiiit of his Hungarian subjects, whom he was persecuting 
on account of their religion, the Emperor's position was 
Always critical. The Ottoman pressure upon Eiu'ope 
engaged his constant attention to the eastward, and com- • 
pelted him to bear the brunt of invasions which, though inter- 



106 A HISTORY OP DIPLOMACY 

Chap. II mittent, were often serious. The German princes, who had 
1670-1684 practically won their autonomy by the Treaties of West- 

phalia, were able to combine among themselves for their 

own protection, and responded with hesitation to calls 
for aid in repelling dangers to the Empire so distant as 
Ottoman inroads into Hungary; but both as King of Hungary 
and as head of the Germanic body, it was the duty of the 
Emperor to defend the frontiers of Christendom. 

In 1656, under the energetic Sultan, Mohammed IV, a 
long period of Turkish lethargy had come to an end; and, 
fired by a new spirit of conquest, the Turks were making 
a desperate struggle to secure predominance in the Medi- 
terranean, and to extend their rule on the Danube, which 
they already controlled as far North as Buda. 

The Venetians, single-handed, had long valiantly de- 
fended their possessions; and, after the Peace of Aix-la- 
Chapelle, had besought from France the aid which the Em- 
peror was unable to afford them. Pope Clement IX had 
called earnestly for a general crusade; but with the decline 
of the faith that had once inspired it the crusading spirit 
had passed away, and there were only feeble responses. As 
the *^Roi Trie Chretien*' and the eldest son of the Church, it 
was especially the duty of Louis XIV to obey the summons 
of the Pope; but the King, engrossed with his schemes of 
conquest, offered no assistance, and merely permitted French 
officers to fight against the Turks on condition that they 
did not fly the French flag. 

The secret of the indifference of the King of France to the 
defence of Christendom is to be found in his private rela- 
tions with the Sultan. Following the example of Francis I, 
he had negotiated treaties of amity with him, partly to 
hold the Emperor in check, and partly to advance the 
commercial interests of France in the Orient and the Medi- 
terranean; and, although the commerce of France had some- 
times suffered from the corsairs of Tunis and Algiers, it 
was no part of his policy to offend the Sultan. 

The experience of the Emperor had taught him that op- 
position to the will of Louis XIV was liable at any time to 



PERIL AND RESCX7E OP THE DUTCH REPUBLIC 107 

involve him in hostilities on the side where he was most Chap. ll 
exposed. Even as an ally Louis XIV had proved to be a j-J^"l«- 
source of danger. When, in 1663, Pope Alexander VII had 



ordered a crusade against the Infidel, who was invading 
Hungary, the "flat Tris Chretien*' had manifested to the 
world his devotion to the Church by sending some troops 
with those of the German princes; but had taken pains to 
inform the Sultan by a special envoy that he had done this 
only in fulfilment of his obligations as a member of the League 
of the Rhine, and not as the King of France I 

But it was not from the East alone that the Elmperor The iBoUUon 
feared new dangers. Louis XIV was now once more in^l^^^e 
close alliance with Sweden. The long foreign wars had North 
drained that kingdom of its manhood to an extent that left 
it with increased territories but weakened force. Never- 
theless, although it was no longer the formidable power that 
it had been during the reign of Gustavus Adolphus, it was 
still able to furnish a hardy soldiery; and the financial needs 
of the country made it possible for its participation in any 
profitable military ventiu*e to be bought. It appeared 
quite practicable, therefore, for the King of France to con- 
tinue to neutralize through his subsidies to Sweden any 
effective intervention of the Emperor in the affairs of Hol- 
land by threatening him with a Swedish invasion. 

To balance these restraints upon his action, the Elmperor 
bad no ally in the North upon whom he could depend for 
inunediate support. Since the Peace of Oliva, France had 
shown a constant interest in maintaining the pacification of 
the North, with the purpose of leaving Sweden free to use its 
forces in promoting the French designs. During the wars be- 
tween Sweden and Poland, the Emperor, on the other hand, 
had supported the latter; and it was natural that he should 
expect in return the friendship of the Poles. But even 
without the constant efforts of French diplomacy to alien- 
ate Poland from the Emperor, no great amount of effec- 
tive support could be looked for from that country, whose 
great geographical extent exposed it to the peril of becoming 
& prey to the rapacity of its neighbors, while its defective 



108 A HISTORY OP DIPLOMACY 

Chap. II political organization and the rivalries of its nobles seriously 
i6m-T684 ™P*^^^ i*® powers of self-defence. The mutual hostilities 

of the nobles had rendered it difficult even to select any Pole 

as King of Poland, and before every election had caused 
the creation of confficting parties as numerous as the for- 
eign interests they were created to subserve. An influential 
French party had been formed to secure the crown upon 
the death of John Casimir for someone acceptable to France; 

;, . ,^ . and, although in 1669 Michael Eoributh - Wi i Bjnaw ulBy a 
native Pole, had been elected King, and was friendly to 
the Emperor, a strong French faction continued to exist, 
and it was not to be expected that any material aid coidd 
be obtained by the Emperor from Poland. 

Russia, which was beginning to be regarded as a factor 
in European politics, and was eager to obtain a foothold 
upon the Baltic, — from which it had been excluded by 
the Peace of Kardis, — was the only power in the North 
that would be able to render important aid to Leopold I. 
For the time, however, the active interest of Russia lay in 
the direction of subjugating the wild tribes of the Volga 
and extending its dominions to the Black Sea. 

Til© Emperof"! Thus, ou evcry side, Leopold I seemed powerless, even 

^OT^or the jj jjigp^g^^ ^ intervene for the rescue of the Dutch Re- 
public. All Europe seemed to have fallen under the spell 
of the Grand Monarch. But the more this fact was con- 
templated the more it became evident that there were causes 
of alarm in the projects of Louis XIV. Had he not already 
dispossessed the Duke of Lorraine, a member of the Einpire? 
Had he not pursued a policy of constant intrusion into the 
afifairs of the Empire itself, claiming to be the defender 
of the Germanic liberties in allying himself with the princes 
for the purpose of rendering them independent of the 
Elmperor? And now came the report that he was intending 
to cause himself to be elected "King of the Romans," in 
order to be promoted to the imperial office at the next elec- 
tion; and, in confirmation of this suspicion, it was rumored 
from Paris that the King had already prepared jewelled 
ornaments — particularly a sword decorated with precious 



PEBIL AND RESCUE OF THE DtTTCH REPX7BUC 109 

stones at a cost of three hundred thousand livres — for Chap, il 
that occasion; which was taken to signify "that His Majesty ^' ^' 
had other designs than those upon Holland." 

True or false, these speculations were diligently used 
against him. lisola, the implacable enemy of Louis XIV, 
had neglected no opportunity to magnify the dangers with 
which he beUeved Germany to be threatened. His insistence 
that after subduing the United Provinces the insatiable 
ambition of the victorious monarch would lead him on, 
not only to appropriate the entire Spanish heritage, but to 
make himself master of the Rhine and to lay down the 
law to the Electoral College of the Empire, could not fail 
to make a deep impression upon the Emperor. His only 
remedy against complete isolation and final humiliation in 
the Empire itself, Idsola contended, was an alliance with 
Spain for the preservation of the Dutch Republic. 

These importunities did not fail to bear fruit in preparing The 
the way for a new order of things. Leopold I, usually unde- ^^^^^ 
dded, and always timid, was finally so far convinced by 
Lisola's arguments as cautiously to inquire into the disposi- 
tions of the German princes regarding the attack on the 
Republic. 

Among the electors, three were in general inclined to 
sustain tiie Elmperor: the Archbishop of Trier, the Elector 
<tf Saxony, and the Count Palatine; while two — the Arch- 
bishop of Eoln and the Duke of Bavaria — were in com- 
idete dQ)endence upon the King of France. The Arch- 
bishop of Mainz was a member of the League of the Rhine, 
but he did not wish to render Louis XIV in any sense master 
in Germany. His aim was merely to use his influence as a 
means of assuring the autonomy of the German princes and 
maintaining the Treaties of Westphalia. Since 1668, 
he had witnessed with anxiety the growth of Louis XIV's 
l^eponderance in Europe, and had striven to counteract 
it by forming an independent defensive league composed 
adely of German princes;^ *and he did not hesitate to in- 

> See Dumont, VII, Part I, p. 210 et seq. The date October 10, 
197% dioukl be January 10, 1672. 



110 



A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY 



Chap. II 

A. D. 

1670-1684 



The position 
•nd policy of 
the Elector of 
Bnmdenbuis 



form the Marquis de Feuquidres that his master was miming 
the risk of making himself suspected throughout Europe 
- of designs that would eventually, if he did not cease his con- 
quests, array it against him. 

Although Frederick William of Brandenburg was still ia 
alliance with Louis XIV by the Treaty of 1669, together 
with the Archbishop of Mainz he had become disquieted 
by the military preparations of his ally. 

The position of the Elector of Brandenburg in Germany 
was unique. He had for a long time withstood the seduc- 
tions of France and held aloof from the League of the Rhine, 
where he knew his accession would at any time be welcome, 
imtil it suited his convenience to enter it as a caution to 
the Emperor. Of all the German princes, Frederick William, 
was the one who had a clearly outlined forward policy of 
his own; and his flexible mind did not hesitate to make any 
changes in his foreign relations which the success of this 
policy seemed to demand. Keenly alive to the interests of 
Brandenburg, he was also a stalwart Protestant and intensely 
German. As an uncle of the Prince of Orange, it was to be 
expected that he would have some interest in the fate of 
Holland; and it was in fact the Elector of Brandenburg who 
was to turn the tide in Germany. 

When in January, 1672, the Dutch envoy. Baron Van 
Amerongen, arrived in Berlin, he found much sympathy 
with his cause among the officers of the Brandenburg army, 
but only one of the Elector's ministers was in favor of 
intervention. All the others were firm for the French al- 
liance, in which they had a personal interest; for, as the 
French ambassador, Saint-G^ran, reported, the French 
^us were very acceptable at Berlin. 

In the midst of opposing counsels, Frederick William at 
first manifested little sympathy for the Republic. He 
detested its form of government, personally disliked De 
Witt, was irritated by the arrogance of these proud repub- 
licans, whom he despised as a race of merchants and money- 
changers, and bitterly resented the occupation of his duchy 
of Cleve by Dutch garrisons to seciu« the payment of a 



PERIL AND RESCUE OP THE DUTCH REPUBLIC 111 

local debt. But, on the other hand, the Hollanders were Chap, ii 
his co-religionists, and the Great Elector was sincerely .gJ^jlg. 
religious; they were also of Teutonic blood, and above all 



fhey were at this moment the protagonists of the Germanic 
liberties. What might happen to him, and to his growing 
power in Germany, if the King of France became omnipo- 
tent? His stake was great in the destinies of the Rhine; 
for there were situated, in close proximity to the United 
Provinces, some of his richest possessions. 

A glance at the map of Europe as it was in 1672 reveals 
the nature of the Great Elector's solicitude. His terri- 
tories, which were scattered from the Duchy of Prussia 
on the Baltic to the Duchies of Cleve and Mark on the 
Shine, spanned a distance greater than the entire width 
of Germany. He could travel from the Vistula to the 
Maas ahnost on his own lands, without passing more than 
a night or two out of his own jiuisdiction. To bind these 
scattered possessions together, and to give them unity and 
security, required of Brandenburg an expansive policy 
which would be impossible of execution without great mil- 
itary force and sagacious statesmanship. Frederick William 
had resolved to create in Germany, by connecting and 
enlarging these fragments of a future kingdom, a state 
powerful enough to maintain its own independence and 
to play a large r61e in the politics of Europe. 

The time was now approaching when Frederick William tii© hentation 
must make a decision. In the spring of 1672 it was no^'®""**"*"**"^ 
kmger a question whether the Elector should keep his en- 
gagements with France. The Triple Alliance, which in 1669 
appeared able to protect the Republic from harm, and there- 
fore i)ermitted Brandenburg to drive a good bargain with- 
out really endangering the existence of the United Prov- 
inces, had disappeared; Louis XIV had associated both 
England and Sweden with his plans; and a Protestant state 
was in immediate danger of being removed from the map. 
In these circumstances active aid to France was not to be 
seriously considered by the Elector of Brandenburg. Coun- 
sels were still divided, but the parties had shifted their 



112 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY 

Chap. II grounds, and the Elector was face to face with two alter- 
7(UM± ^^^^^^9 — intervention or neutrality. The loss of the prom- 

ised subsidies from France, the exposure of the Rhenish 

provinces to the vengeance of Louis XIV, the sacrifice of 
a share in the spoils of the apparently doomed Republic, 
— these were serious considerations for a little state like 
Brandenburg. The voice of the raiaon d'Stat was clearly 
for neutrality at least. But, on the other hand, the thought 
of the total effacement of the asylum of Protestantism, where 
he himself had passed his youth, for the advantages to be 
gained by the Electorate moved the Elector's personal 
feelings to their depths. 

It was fortunate, perhaps, for his mission that the Dutch 
envoy, Amerongen, belonged to the Orangist party and rep- 
resented the States General, with which he corresponded 
directly and not with De Witt. He had come to Branden- 
bui^ to seek ''twelve or sixteen thousand men for the pro- 
tection of the Republic," for whose services proportional 
subsidies would be paid. 

Saint-G^ran was there to thwart him, insisting that the 
war was inevitable; that opposition to the King of France 
would be unavailing; and that the prudent coiu-se for the 
Elector would be to continue the alliance, for which he woidd 
be well paid; and, if active aid from him were not needed, 
he should at least remain neutral. 

During the months of February and March, the diplo- 
matic duel had been hard fought, but without result. Al- 
though Amerongen spent sixteen hundred florins in presents 
when the Elector's new son was bom, and had the honor 
of representing the States General as godfather at the bap- 
tism, — to which Saint-G6ran was not even invited, — the 
States General were so blind to their interests and main- 
tained such a lofty tone in their negotiations, that in spite 
of his cordial reception and the evident good will 'of the 
Elector, he was unable to obtain an alliance. With Den- 
mark neutral, Sweden under bonds to France, and England 
actually hostile, it seemed as if the Protestant world had 
abandoned Holland to its fate. 



PEBIL AND RESCUE OF THE DUTCH REPUBLIC 113 

Too prudent to undertake single-handed a campaign for Chap, ii 
the United Provinces with such enormous odds against .|.^^Jy>. 

him, Frederick William had, nevertheless, the perspicacity 

to realize the danger to Germany that would result from 

the destruction of the Republic; and, during his negotia- tim *uiAaoe 

tions with Amerongen and Saint-G^ran, he was in ^tive ^J^^^^'J^ 

correspondence with the German princes, whom he openly ProvincM 

warned of the consequences of their indifference. To the 

Archbishop of Mainz he sent a special envoy, to persuade 

him of the impending danger; but John Philip von Schon- 

bom wafi not inclined to intervene so long as the Empire 

was not attacked, and expressed his reliance on his new 

protective league, which he invited Frederick William to 

join. 

On every side the Hector met with, indifference or in- 
decision; but, on April 13, alone and unsupported, he re- 
solved to accept the terms offered by the States General and 
form an alliance with the Republic.^ On May 6, 1672, the 
treaty was signed, in which the Elector agreed to provide 
an army of twenty thousand men for the defence of the 
United Provinces in case they were invaded; for which the 
States General were to pay five hundred and fifty thousand 
florins and half the expenses of maintenance. The troops 
were to be ready in two months, and to march toward 
Westphalia under the command of the Elector himself, if 
his health permitted him to conduct the army.' 

It was a bold step for Frederick William to take, and at 
once raised Brandenburg to a position of unportance in 
Ekiropean politics. In the middle of May the Elector opened 
active negotiations at Vienna to procure the support' of 
Leopold I; and, as the result of persistent efforts, on June 
23, 1672, a treaty of alliance was obtained from the Emperor 
for the maintenance of the Peace of Westphalia, the pro- 
tection of the Eknpire, and the defence of the treaties of 



' It e rare for a diplomatist to attribute his success to another than 
htmaelf; but Amerongen wrote to one of his friends: ''Here is the work 
of the Saviour, and it is a miracle in the eyes of men! " 

* For the ti«aty, see Dumont, VII, Part I, p. 194 et seq. 
VOL. m. — 8 



114 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY 

Chap. II the Pyrenees and of Aix-la-Chapelle. The Elmperor and the 
.«*t*^l«. Elector were each to furnish twelve thousand men, to 

execute this agreement; and the Elector undertook the task 

of soliciting the adhesion of Denmark and the Dukes of 
Brunswick and Hesse-Cassel. 
ThedicmAyat There was great rejoicing at Berlin, but it was sooa 
^KwJuMc**' d^'^P®'!^ by the news from Holland. At the time when 
the treaty with the Elmperor was signed, the army of Louis 
XIV had akeady crossed the Rhine, and was advancing^ 
almost without resistance into the territories of the Re- 
public. 

"The King is perfectly happy," wrote Madame de 
S6vign6 on June 13, "that he will have only to say what 
he wishes in Europe, without taking the trouble to go to the 
head of his army. They will be happy to give it to him. 
I assure you, he will pass the Yssel as easily as the Seine. 
The joy of the courtesans is a good augury. Terror is pre- 
paring an easy submission everywhere." 

The power and vengeance of the invader were soon to be 
felt by the imfortunate Amerongen. After the occupation 
of Utrecht by the French army, Louis XIV demanded his 
recall as a subject of that province; but this ardent patriot 
dared to remain at Berlin, where his presence was still 
necessary to the complete success of his cause. As a con- 
sequence, he was condemned to make a heavy contribution 
to the invader's war chest. Being unable to pay it, his es- 
tates were seized, his house and gardens destroyed, and he 
was left so impoverished that his children were almost 
without bread. With heroic devotion, and at the risk of 
his life, he remained at his post and continued his activity. 
The party in power in the United Provmces had been so 
absorbed in defending their liberties against the House of 
Orange that they had neglected the defence of the country 
against the real enemy, who was now within their gates. 
In order to prevent the army from rallying round Prince 
William and proclaiming him stadtholder, many of the 
troops had been disbanded, the chief military posts were 
in the hands of mere civilians, and the feeble garrisons 



PERIL AND HBSCUE OF THS DX7TCH REPUBLIC 115 

of the cities approached by the French army had opened Chap. II 
their gates almost without resistance. But, as the people ^^7^^^ 

became convinced of their peril and of the designs of the 

invader, reUgious zeal kindled their patriotism, all the 
memories of their glorious past mingled with their fear and 
humiliation, and the old cry of ''Oranje bovenl'' soon began 
to be heard upon the streets. 

Elncouraged by the prospect of deliverance, De Witt, NegotutioM 
who had attempted to reopen negotiations with Louis XIV 1^,^!^^*^^ 
and Charles II, now sent a commission to ask for conditions De witta 
of peace. Pomponne and Louvois inquired what terms they 
had to offer; to which the commissioners modestly replied 
that, out of respect to the King of France, they had come to 
seek rather than to propose conditions. They were then 
informed that, until they came with full powers to conclude 
a peace, the King refused to negotiate with them; adding 
that, if the States General wished to avoid ''complete ruin," 
tiiey should hasten to end the war. 

While the States General were deliberating upon what 
couise they would pursue, in the night of June 21 three 
aimed assassins made an attempt on the life of the Grand 
Pensionary, who received in his struggle with his assail- 
ants such serious wounds that he was thereafter incapable 
of attending to public business.^ Foiu* days afterward his 
brother, Cornelius DeWitt, who had been recalled from 
the fleet, also narrowly escaped assassination. 

It was evident that the revolution which had been pre- 
paring was now at hand. Rumors had been set afloat 
tiiat the Prince of Orange was dead; and the excited popu- 
hoe, misled by these reports, were ready to wreak their 
vengeance on those who had opposed him. 

On June 27, De Groot carried to the camp of Louis XTV 
at Zeist an offer of ten million livres and the cession of all 
the principal places of the "Generality, " — a broad band of 
tenitory situated half in Brabant and half in Flanders, and 
ecmstitutiiig a province belonging to the Republic as a 

> The account of this attack is fully given by Lef ^vre-Pontalis, Jean 
dt WiU, n, pp. 395, 400. 



116 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY 

Chap. II whole, much as the *^ Reichdand^' now belongs to the Ger- 

Jt^' DMua Empire, — if the King would make peace; but Louis 

would not listen to it. The offer involved the surrender of 



Orance ehooen 
StedthoMer 



all that the United Provinces had conquered in their long 
wars with Spain, and would have left them powerless 
before him in the futiu^; but Louvois would not hear 
of it, and the King resolved to bring the Republic to a still 
deeper humiliation. 
The Prinoe of The day for the triumph of the Orange party had arrived. 
To the masses of the people, it appeared that the country 
was on the verge of destruction because of the need of a 
strong hand and a military policy. The inundations had 
only checked the advance of the invader, and the promised 
help from abroad had not arrived and might never come. 
The Prince had already, under the most difficult circum- 
stances, displayed his qualities in the field; and his friends 
were pointing to him as the foreordained savioiu* of the 
Republic. 

The first general demonstration of the popular feeling 
was in the viUage of Ter Veere, in Zeeland, where the Prince 
of Orange had estates. The inhabitants demanded of the 
Council that he be proclaimed stadtholder; and the authori- 
ties, intimidated by their fury, were forced to yield. 

The movement spread like a conflagration. At Dord- 
recht, the home of the De Witts, the deputies to the States 
General had favored peace, and it was believed that they 
were ready to negotiate the capitulation of the town. The 
presence of the Prince was demanded; and, after excuses 
that he was too much occupied at the front, he came. His 
conduct was modest and irreproachable. He argued against 
their wish to make him stadtholder that he had taken aa 
oath to respect the "Perpetual Edict." The pastors of 
the place solemnly undertook to absolve him from this 
obligation, and to this he finally yielded. 

The only attempt at resistance came from Cornelius 
De Witt. The crowd forced its way into his house and dele- 
gates surrounded his bed, imploring him to sign the act of 
the local authorities. A tragic scene ensued. After long 



PERIL AND RESCUE OF THE DX7TCH REPUBLIC 117 

resistance, subdued by the tears and pleadings of his wife. Chap, u 
he finally signed the act of Revocation of the Edict; but, to j^J^^'-g. 

show that he did so only by order of the authorities, he added 

his title as "Pensionary of Dordrecht"; which his wife, in 
her fear for his life, secretly erased. 

The example of Dordrecht was the tocsin of the revolu- 
tion. On July 3, 1672, the States of Holland abrogated the 
"Perpetual Edict"; on July 4, under the title of William III, 
the Prince of Orange was proclaimed "Stadtholder, Captain, 
and Admiral General of Holland;" and, on July 8, the States 
General took the same action for the United Provinces, 
bestowing upon the Prince these titles and their preroga- 
tives for life. 



II. The CoAunoN of the Hague 

In the midst of the commotion that placed the Prince The mptun 
of Orange at the head of the United Provinces, De Groot ^^^^ 
returned to The Hague from the camp of Louis XIV bear- Pranoe 
ing the King's conditions of peace. They were so onerous 
as to involve the complete vassalage of the provinces, and 
the excitement was intense. The word ''treason" had been 
aheady whispered, and it was proposed to associate Van 
Beuningen with De Groot in the subsequent negotiations; 
but, peremptorily refusing to participate in this mission, 
Van Beuningen, on July 7, — the day before the Prince was 
chosen stadtholder by the States General, — in an eloquent 
address before that body, denounced the continuation of 
negotiations, pointed out their imfavorable effect upon the 
activity of the allies, and terminated his discourse with a 
peroration which contained the whole programme of action 
of the Orangist party. 

As seen by the adherents of the House of Orange, the 
woes and humiliation of the Republic were the results of 
the policies pursued by the republican oligarchy under 
the direction of John De Witt. A change of attitude would 
rescue the country. The King and the Parliament of Eng- 
land, it was allied, had a high regard for the Prince of 



118 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY 

Chap. II Orange. For his sake and in his interest, they would cease 
1670-1684 *^®^^ attack on the Republic; and the King of England 
would mediate a peace with the King of France. The oc- 
casion, Van Beimingen concluded, called for a stout resistance 
and the conduct of all further negotiations by the Prince 
of Orange. 

This discourse made a deep impression; and, on the fol- 
lowing day, having elevated the Prince to the high position 
of his ancestors, it was decided to ask his opinion regarding 
the conditions of peace. Without hesitation William III 
expressed his conviction that the conditions were impos- 
sible, and that the independence of the Republic could still 
be maintained without such humiliating sacrifices. The 
States General thereupon decided to name a colleague to 
accompany De Groot upon his return to the French camp, 
with the reply that the ''insupportable hardness" of the 
terms of peace made it impossible to accept them; but De 
Groot, convinced that his usefulness was at an end, and 
alarmed by the fear of assassination, — which he had nar- 
rowly escaped at Rotterdam, — decided to abandon his 
mission. 
Negotiations It was a hcavy responsibility for a young man of twenty- 
^EngiM^*"* two to advise the continuation of resistance, but the Prince 
was firm in his resolution. Feeling the great importance of 
detaching the King of England from his alliance with Louis 
XIV, he had, upon his own authority, privately sent a 
trusted friend, Gabriel Sylvius, to open negotiations with 
Charles 11.^ Far from being discouraged by the indispo- 
sition of his uncle to change his attitude, the Prince de- 
spatched a second emissary, Frederick Reede, to renew the 
appeal; but Charles II took no action, except to send to 
The Hague a commission, composed of Lord Halifax, a mem- 
ber of his privy council, the Duke of Buckingham, and 
Arlington; at the same time informing Louis XIV that 
the object of this embassy was merely ''to delude the 



^ For further details concerning Sylvius and his mission, see Siccama* 
Sir Gabriel de Syhriua, in the Revue d'Histoire Diplomatique, XV, 1901, 
p. 109 et seq. 



PEBIL AND RESCUE OF THE DX7TCH REPXTBIiIC 119 

public with the hope of peace" and prevent the acquisition CHiLP. ii 
of support by Holland. His commissioners were, however, j^jjj_^'^j«. 

secretly instructed to sound the intentions of the Prince, 

and ascertain if he was disposed to become an accomplice 
with the two Kings in the hmnihation of the United 
Provinces. 

Assured of pacific intentions by the Duke of Buckingham, 
the States General appointed a conunittee — of which Van 
Beuningen, Bevemii^, and two others were members — 
to negotiate with the commissioners under the direction of 
the Prince, with instructions to cede no territories; but to 
make^ if possible, an advantageous use of money. 

Having received the commissioners in his camp at Bode- 
grave, the Prince was asked what conditions of peace 
they could communicate to Louis XIV; but, instead of 
transmitting his resolute reply, which they evidently 
thought useless, they embraced the opportunity, on July 
16, to make a new treaty with the King of France. In this 
convention it was stipulated that, in addition to all the 
concessions demanded through De Groot or contained in the 
previous treaty between France and England, peace should 
not be made by either power without the consent of the 
other; the Dutch flag must be lowered in presence of the 
Ekiglish, even on the coasts of Holland and Zeeland; a 
million pounds sterling must be paid to England as a war 
indenmity; Surinam must be ceded to England; and a pre- 
mium of ten thousand pounds sterling must be paid for the 
right to catch herring on the English coasts.^ 

The sixth article of the treaty provided that "the sov- 
erdgnty of what remained of the United Provinces after the 
parts detached by the two Kings and their allies, " should be 
accorded to the Prince of Orange; "or at least the perpetuity 
of the stadtholderate in his family." 

This last-named provision profoundly touched the honor 
of the Prince, for it was of a nature to compromise him fatally 
in the eyes of his people. He, therefore, hastened to lay the 
treaty, which had been sent to him, before the States General. 

' For the treaty, see Dumont, VII, Part I, p. 206 et seq. 



120 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY 

Crap. II He emphasized its ruinous consequences for the state, and 
iB7a-TfiS4 ^®^^*"^- '"^^ ^8^ ^^f is to be lost; even to discuss it is 

dangerous; but if the majority of this assembly decides 

otherwise, there remains only one course for the friends of 
Protestantism and liberty; that is, to withdraw to the East 
India colonies, and there create a new country, where their 
consciences and their persons will have shelter from tyranny 
and despotism."^ 

He then pointed out that the cause of the Republic was 
the cause of all Europe, and that the English Parliament 
would soon perceive the pernicious consequences of an al- 
liance with the King of France and the attempt to ruin the 
Republic, and would upon its next convocation put an end 
to that policy. The arrival of the German troops on the 
Rhine would, he declared, be the signal for a change in the 
situation, and the retreat of the enemy. 
ThehopM The Prince had rightly interpreted the spirit and the 

uiitiMi^Ttiie ^^*^ ^' ^® people. The new terms of peace imposed by 
Dutch R»* the Anglo-French alliance were, on July 21, tersely but firmly 
pubuo rejected by the States General. The announcement, to- 

gether with the proposed conditions themselves, placarded 
throughout Holland, inspired the whole population with new 
courage and resolution. 

On July 13, Baron Van Amerongen, accompanied by 
General von Pollnitz, governor of Berlin, after a journey 
of two weeks, had arrived at The Hague. They reported 
the ardent activity of Frederick William, who had every- 
where urged support from the German princes, and was 
preparing to lead his troops to the rescue. The news, no 
doubt, greatly influenced the hopes and determination of 
William III in circumstances that were extremely disheart- 
ening. The visitors found the province of Holland inun- 
dated with water by the act of its inhabitants, who were con« 
fined within the cities as if they were besieged. Everywhere 
else, except in the islands of Zeeland and parts of Fries- 
land and Groningen, the French troops were already in 



^ Sirtema de Grovestins, GuUiaume III et LouU XIV , II, p. 382. 



PEEIL AND RESCUE OP THE DUTCH REPUBLIC 121 

possession of the country; but the people were full of hope, Chap, il 
and the authority of the stadtholder was incontestable. i67a-i684 



At Berlin, Louis XIV, indefatigable in his eflforts to 
xnaintiun the isolation of the Republic, was again endeavor- 
ing through his new envoy, Count de la Vauguyon, to dis^ 
courage the Elector from rendering assistance to the Republic 
and to win him over to a policy of neutrality. In order to 
elude his insistence, Frederick William professed that he was 
interested only in the maintenance of the Treaties of West- 
phalia, and in the safety of his duchy of Cleve, already oc- 
cupied by the French troops. The French diplomatist was 
not deceived; but took pains to inform himself regarding 
the condition and activities of the Elector's army up to the 
moment of its westward march, when he took his departure 
from Berlin without having accomplished the purpose of 
his mission. 

On July 25, 1672, through the efforts of Lisola, a treaty 
of alliance was signed at The Hague between the Republic 
and the Emperor;^ but, like so many of the engagements 
of Leopold I, it was devoid of sincerity. Gr^monville was 
assured by Lobkowitz that it was merely a diplomatic 
(fiveraion, and, like the Austrian treaty with Brandenburg, 
not to be taken seriously. He had explained the engage- 
ments with the Elector by saying, that for the good of 
the Empire Frederick William had to be treated like a 
"wild horse that needed to be harnessed with a tamer one." 
If, he now stated, the King of France could only see the 
secret instructions given to Montecuccoli, who conmianded 
the Austrian troops, he would realize that the treaty with 
the Republic was only a sham.' 

Having repudiated with indignation the personal offers ^^^^ of 
inade to him by the Kings of France and England, William wmiam iii 
ni — notwithstanding the endeavors of the commissioners EngUmd from 
of Charles II as they passed through Brussels to induce F»noe 
Spain to desert the Republic — persisted in his determinar 



* For the treaty, see Dumont, VII, Part I, p. 208. 

* See Waddington, Le Grand Slecteur, II, p. 270. 



122 



A HISTORY OP DIPLOMACY 



CHiLP. II 
1670-1684 



The oonfliot 
of paitiea in 
HolUad 



tion to detach the King of England from the alliance with 
France. 

A private letter from Charles II, dated July 28, — only 
three days after the signature of the new Anglo-French con- 
vention, — fully justified high hopes on the part of the Prince; 
but he was yet to learn that the pretended friendship of 
that Machiavellian monarch was intended only to win his 
confidence and bring him into complicity with the enemy.^ 

William III has been accused of exceeding his powers 
in his private correspondence with Charles II, and even 
of aiming to obtain for himself hereditary royal rights in 
the United Provinces, under the protection of England and 
France;* but the evidence for the truth of this accusation 
is not convincing.' The conduct of the Prince is a sufficient 
proof of its unfairness. Instead of yielding to the solicita- 
tions of Charles II to aid in obtaining from the Republic 
the concessions demanded, — which would have meant the 
virtual dismemberment of the United Provinces, — he 
declined to be a traitor to his country; energetically con- 
tinued his measures for defence; and awaited the assembling 
of the English Parliament, to which he now looked for the 
means of forcing the King to terminate the alliance with 
France. But Charles II also foresaw this possibility; and 
to prevent it prorogued the Parliament — which was to 
meet on October 30, 1672 — until the month of February 
in the following year. 

In the midst of external dangers to the Republic that 
threatened to destroy its existence, the strife of parties now- 
assumed a tragic intensity which added greatly to its perils. 
The adherents of the Orangist party believed that the sal- 
vation of the country depended upon the unqualified resto- 
ration of the power and prerogatives formerly enjoyed 
by the stadtholders, the exclusion of the existing republican 
administration from all public authority, and the appoint- 



^ See B^snage, Annales des Province9-Unie8, II, p. 331. 
« See Lefdvre-Pontalis, Jean de WiU, II, p. 437. 
* These accusations rest entirely on the alleged correspondence 
published by Coeterus, which is believed to be apocryphal. 



PERIL AND RESCUE OP THE DUTCH REPUBUC 123 

ment of new public officials by the Prince. The party of Chap. ll 
De Witt, on the other hand, regarded the centralization of ,--^^'^04 

power in the hands of William III and the transfer of au 

thority from themselves to him and his subordinates as a vio- 
lation of the republican constitution of the country, and full 
of danger to the liberties of the people, which the represen- 
tative and federal theory of the government was intended to 
preserve. 

Since they felt themselves too weak in a military sense 
to overwhelm and expel the invader, the republicans were 
anxious to make peace; for only upon that condition could 
they expect to continue in power. The Orangists, on the 
other hand, found it to their interest to continue the war afi 
long as possible; for its evils could be urged as a constant 
ground of reproach to those who were allied to have oc- 
casioned it without themselves being capable of defending 
tiie country, and its duration afforded an opportunity for 
continuing the concentration of power in the hands of the 
stadtholder, to whom the Orangists now looked for defence 
and the negotiation of a peace based on the capacity for 
self-protection. In addition to these differences, the cry of 
"usurpation" on the part of the republicans was answered 
by the cry of "treason" on the part of the Orangists. 

The calumnies incident to this quarrel have been to a 
certain extent re-echoed in the histories which have been 
inspired by these opposing points of view. On the one 
side, John De Witt is charged with being a wily politician, 
selfish, ambitious, incompetent, and at heart a traitor, 
who carried on secret correspondence with the enemy of 
his country, in order to purchase by ceding a part of its 
territories the privilege of continuing in power.^ On the 
other side, DeWitt is glorified as the embodiment of all 
human virtues and excellences, an upright and imselfish 
patriot, and a martyr to the principles of popular liberty; 
while William III is represented as a self-seeking usurper 
of power, aiming to obtain for himself a royal crown by 



1 Sirtema de GroveBtinB, OuiUaume III et LouU XIV, 



124 A HISTORY OP DIPLOMACY 

Chap. II coUnsion with conspirators against the very existence of the 
.n^n^'^o. Republic* 

1670-1684 J; . . . 

It IS m no respect necessary for the purpose we have in 

view to enter upon the controversy regarding the personal 

De Witt's characters of these two great men, or even to estimate the 

3!^**^u **' inherent merits of the systems of government of which 

they were the champions. Our task is concerned only with 

the international effects of their conduct and policies, which 

i cannot be justly appreciated without considering the age 

: in which they lived and acted. 

» De Witt's conception of statecraft was controlled by 
!the idea of material prosperity as the end for which the 
: State exists, and in that respect he was thoroughly modem. 
The freedom in which he believed was the privilege of every 
citizen to exercise his powers in his own way and for his 
own profit, with only such restraint as might be necessary 
for the maintenance of good order and public security. To 
preserve this freedom was for him the purpose of the Re- 
public, and all his policies grew out of this conception. 

Seeing a great field of enterprise for Holland in foreign 
trade, he had aimed to develop it, protect it, and retain it; 
and, for that purpose, he had favored the maintenance of a 
navy strong enough to overmatch the strength of other 
maritime powers, particularly that of E2ngland. For the same 
reason he dreaded the creation of a royal dynasty in the 
Netherlands; for such a dynasty would tend toward mili- 
tary adventures upon the continent and ignore maritime 
enterprise, upon which the prosperity of Holland had been 
erected. If the stadtholderate were continued and put in 

. possession of military force, it would, he believed, even- 

' tually transform itself — as it had threatened to do under 
the last stadtholder, William II — into a royal dynasty; 
and thus, in the end, result in the extinction of the Republic, 

i and with it the decline of prosperity. In this belief he had 
proposed and defended the '^ Perpetual Edict," and had 

. thereby brought upon himself the hatred of the Orangist 



1 Leffivre-Pontalis, Jean de Witt. 



PERIL AND RESCUE OF THE DUTCH REPUBLIC 125 

party, which regarded his policy as designed merely for the Chap. II 
purpose of retaining power in his own hands. \(vm^\Mu 

In his foreign policy also De'V^^tt was inspired by his 

conception of the purpose of the Republic. He feared 
the power of England, and was determined as far as possible 
to resist it on the sea. On the continent he relied upon his 
diplomatic skill to counteract the waning influence of 
Spain by invoking the aid of France. He had not fully 
realized the inordinate appetite for territory and the spirit 
of depredation which the ally on whom he had most de- 
pended had now developed. Above all, he had not, until 
it was too late, suspected the resentment provoked by the 
formation of the Triple Alliance and the limits the Republic 
had endeavored to set to the ambition of Louis XIY. 

In the modem constitutional era the result of De Witt's The deieots of 
policies might have been diflferent. They would at least have ?!^*^ 
the benefit of such support as may be derived from the relation to 
nominal acceptance of some principles of international ^ **°* 
justice. But it was an age in which no principles had a 
chance of prevailing unless supported by armed force, and 
in which armed force was seldom controlled by just prin- 
ciples. In such a time political idealism was certain to 
be mismiderstood, and the instinct of national self-preser- 
vation turned toward the centralization of political authority 
and the development of military force as the sole guarantees 
of independence. Of these tendencies William III was 
the natmral beneficiary, and he was certainly not the most 
unworthy. DeWitt had incurred the hostility of Louis 
XiV, and the Republic appeared to be at his mercy. It 
is unnecessary to speak of other faults than those of judgment 
as the cause of the peril in which the Republic was thus placed, 
but it is not surprising that other faults were imputed. 
We now have reason to believe that DeWitt honorably 
and heroically did all in his power to defend and to save 
Us country, but the division of parties and the slow moving 
machinery of the federal administration rendered his 
efforts futile. In a time when political power was so little 
subjected to regulative principles, either in the constitution 



126 



A HISTORY OP DIPLOMACY 



Chap. II 

A. D. 

1670-1684 



The murder 
of theDe 
Witte 



of the State or in its international relations, the unstable 
equilibrium of a federative system was an inadequate con- 
- struction. In such a time a free people, working out the 
problem of its own interests by the slow process of public 
debate, and finding its chief security in the balance of foreign 
powers, was an anachronism; and of this anachronism De 
Witt was destined to be the victim. 

It was unfortunate for him that just at the moment when 
the salvation of the Republic demanded imity of action 
the State was torn and enfeebled by conflicting factions. 
For the immediate past De Witt was held to be ahnost solely- 
responsible; and for the future William III, glorified by the 
sacred memories of a remoter and still more tragic past, 
was believed by many to be the only hope. 

On a charge that Cornelius DeWitt had attempted to 
employ an obscure man of proved criminal character to 
assassinate the Prince, — a charge supported only by this 
ruffian's own testimony, but which posterity has refused to 
credit, — that ardent patriot was arrested and imprisoned 
at The Hague. 

The Grand Pensionary resigned his office and devoted 
himself to establishing his brother's innocence; but, un- 
happily for them, the populace was persuaded that both 
were traitors, and resolved upon summary vengeance. 
Cornelius De Witt was sentenced to perpetual banishment, 
but another fate was in store for him. While John De Witt 
was visiting his brother in prison preparatory to his exile, 
on August 20, 1672, the infuriated populace, crying "Kill 
the traitors, " broke into the building, dragged both brothers 
into the street, and after brutally murdering them hung their 
mutilated bodies in the public square. 

It is due to the memory of John De Witt to record the 
fact that the commission appointed to examine all his 
papers, private as well as official, — in which it was im- 
agined some evidence of treason might be found, — in answer 
to the question what had been discovered, reported to the 
States General: "Nothing but honor and virtue." 

After this sad tragedy, which sealed the unity of the 



PERIL AND RESCUE OP THE DUTCH REPUBUC 127 

United Provinces with the blood of martyrdom, the Re- Chap, ii 
public Bet itself with renewed vigor to the task of its deliv- i^J^i^oa 
eranoe. The murderers of John and Cornelius DeWitt 



were not pimished; for they were not regarded by public 
opinion as criminals, but as the mere instruments of aThanewpoU- 
political revolution, — the irresponsible perpetrators of "*■ "^ HoUand 
▼lolenoe exercised in the name of the raisan d'Staiy that 
veiled divinity whose most atrocious enormities are habitu- 
ally excused on the ground that they are intended for the 
public good. 

The new Grand Pensionary of Holland, Gaspard Fagel, 
gave himself unreservedly to the execution of the orders of 
the stadtholder. 

From the moment when his domination began William 
in made opposition to French expansion the mainspring 
of all his vigorous and sometimes complex diplomacy, and 
with consequences to the ascendency of France in Europe 
which at the beginning of his career it would have been . 
difficult to imagine. Thenceforth, diudng the remainder of \ 
his life, William III became the champion of the balance of 1 
power in Europe, and he fulfilled his mission with a zeal 
inspired by the union of political expediency with the ardor 
of religious faith. 

It was in one respect a propitious moment for William III The awaken- 
to begin the great task to which he devoted the remainder *"• ^ ^"™^ 
of his existence. Louis XIV had not concealed his contempt 
for the ''cheese-mongers, herringfishers and spice-peddlers" 
of Holland, nor for the purely mercantile conceptions of 
De Witt's diplomacy. To him it seemed an unpardonable 
impertinence that a race of mere tradesmen should dare 
to oppose his sovereign will. And the sentiment of the 
princes of Europe in general was not widely different from 
that of the King regarding the pretensions of the Dutch 
Bepublic. Its independence, commercialism, and especially 
the new forms of power which had been developed by the 
industry and economy of these self-governing people, were 
antipathetic — in so far as they were intelligible — to the 
tastefif^ the ideas, and the caste prejudices of all who adhered 



128 A HISTORY OP DIPLOMACY 

Chap, ii to a System of absolute rule. Upstarts in govemment and 
,^Ji:^'-o. heretics in religion, the Dutch burghers had no friends in 

1670-1684 . ^ X. . 1 1 

anstocratic circles anywhere. 

But when by a political revolution a prince of royal blood, 
whose lineage inspired respect, was struggling to defend 
his country from annihilation, the scene was changed, and 
all Europe became interested in the spectacle. Then at 
last it was understood that Holland was the bulwark not 
only of the Germanic liberties but of the political equi- 
librium of Europe. If Louis XIV held Holland in his grasp 
he would soon be in possession of the Spanish Netherlands; 
the Rhine would then present no formidable obstacle to his 
advance; and with such augmented power even the Alps 
could not restrain him. Already it was apparent that there 
was no single power in Europe that could successfully op- 
pose him. 

The ease with which in a few weeks Louis XIY had made 
himself master of all that part of the United Provinces that 
was not protected by the inundations proved with what 
rapidity he was able to make conquests. It had not seemed 
so serious a matter to take money in exchange for mere 
neutrality, but now even the princes who were in the King's 
pay began to feel that they had become conspirators in an 
enterprise that had gone far beyond their expectations; 
and they began to wonder who among themselves might 
be the next victim, and who indeed would be the last. 
Tiie inflonm The wider the circle of observation was extended the more 
jJ^]|S^ ominous appeared the preparations of Louis XIV for the 
it^ establishment of a universal monarchy. Undoubtedly, 

the alarm would have been greatly augmented had the 
secret treaty of partition with the Emperor been suspected. 
But enough was known to excite general apprehension. Not 
only had Germany manifested an apathy which showed how 
completely the princes were already in the hands of Louis 
XIV, but there was an influential French party in Spain 
which had nearly succeeded in preventing the defensive 
alliance of that country with the Republic in 1671, and was 
even then actively engaged in striving to render it inefiFectual; 



FEBIL AND RESCX7E OF THE DUTCH REPUBLIC 129 

for it had been ingeniously suggested at Madrid that, after Chap, ii 
all, the Dutch Republic was nothing but a revolted province ^^j^.'^u 
of Spain that should be punished for its past rebellion, and 



tiiat Spain might profit by recovering something from its 
dismemberment.^ 

And when attention was turned toward Italy, the pre- 
dominance which Louis XIV had already acquired in 
the peninsula seemed alarming. Through the influence of 
the French princesses who had married into the House of 
Savoy, that duchy — the gateway of Prance to Italy — was 
completely gallicized; and Charles Emmanuel had become 
ahnost a vassal of the King of France. Cosimo III, the 
Grand Duke of Tuscany, was seeking to obtain the favor 
of Louis XIV, of whose hostility he stood in awe; Venice and 
Genoa were too much reduced to resist him; and the friend- 
diip of Parma and Modena had been won by his good offices 
in reconciling their differences with Pope Alexander VII. 
finally, Clement X, who at the time occupied the Holy See, 
would have been pleased to see all Christendom united 
under the Emperor and the Most Christian King, if only they 
would carry out his wish to join in a crusade against the 
Turks and drive them out of Europe. Nowhere in Italy, 
as it appeared, was there any effectual barrier to the advance 
of Louis XIV if after his conquest of Holland he should be 
inspired by the idea of restoring the Empire in its ancient 
Beat of power by subordinating the petty Italian princes and 
sane day demanding the imperial crown at the hands of 
the Pope at Rome. 

Much of this alarm was no doubt unjustified, but it is The 
greatly to the credit of William III that, beyond any other "^ ^ 
niler of his generation, he was able to appreciate the peril 
to Europe. It was not in his power, with the resources at 
his oommand, to save his country by force of arms; but he 
perceived the possibility of saving it by the organization of 
Europe against his foe. 

When on September 24, 1672, the junction was at last 



* See Lecestre, La Mission de GmurvtUe en Espagne, 
VOL. m. — 9 



130 



A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY 



Chap. II 

A.D. 

1670-1684 



The trialfl of 

Frederick 

William 



effected between the troops of Austria and Brandenburg 
in the valley of the Leine near Hildesheim, the strenuous 
efforts of Frederick William to form a coalition of the German 
princes for the protection of the Empire had resulted in 
little more than timid promises; but the situation had be- 
come clear. On the twenty-second, a purely defensive 
alliance, after long debates, had been signed at Brunswick 
for the maintenance of the Peace of Westphalia by represen- 
tatives of the Emperor, Denmark, Brandenburg, the Dukes 
of Celle and Wolfenbtittel, and the Landgrave of Hesse; 
but there was as yet no rupture with Louis XIV on the part 
of the Germans. The alliance was merely precautionaiy, 
but troops were present to give it emphasis. The war with 
Holland was threatening to become a European war. 

The problem now was how to bring these forces into 
action, without which there could be no real aid to the United 
Provinces. The inarch toward the Weser and afterward 
toward the Rhine was painfully slow; and Amerongen, who 
accompanied the Elector, watched it with deep anxiety. 
Frederick William wished earnestly to hasten the deliver- 
ance of Holland, but Montecuccoli knew the reluctance of the 
Emperor to break with Louis XIV, and tried to temporize. 

Obstructed by the pacific aims of the Archbishops of 
Mainz and Trier, the Elector of Brandenburg found it 
difficult to advance. After three months of wandering, the 
allies had brought no effective aid to Holland; and Fagel, the 
Grand Pensionary, compared their peregrinations to those 
of the children of Israel in the desert. The Republic would 
have already ceased to exist if it had not been for the inunda- 
tions. In the meantime, the Prince of Orange was sturdily 
defending the points where the approach of the enemy was 
possible, but he had seen that more vigorous diplomacy was 
needed. 

Frederick William's position was extremely hazardous 
to his interests; for, while he was the life of the German 
opposition to Louis XIV, his duchy of Cleve was already- 
occupied by French troops, he was cut off from his own 
territory, the Emperor — who had again fallen under the 



PERIL AND BE8CUE OP THE DUTCH REPUBLIC 131 

influence of Gr^monville and Lobkowitz — was only half- Chap. II 
hearted, and the other German princes, undecided what .^J^'g^o. 

oourse to take, were disposed to wait and see what would 

happen before disclosing their growing apprehensions. At 
the same time, Holland, which had paid for service which 
it was not receiving, was uttering loud complaints and 
tfareatening to withhold the subsidies. 

Almost deserted on the continent, where everyone was 
willing to profit by his action and disinclined to risk coming 
to his aid, the Elector sent his trusted representative Lorenz 
von Crockow to the King of England to press upon him the 
interests of Protestantism and represent the peril to which 
the Republic was exposed, at the same time offering his 
services as a mediator. It was a vain appeal. Charles II 
received the Elector's envoy coldly, announced his firm 
resolution to continue the war, and insinuated that Freder- 
ick William should not speak of ''religion" when he was him- 
self allied with so good a Catholic as Leopold I. 

Ill provided with means, his soldiers drenched by the 
autumn rains, himself scolded by the States General for 
his tardy movements, his duchy at the mercy of Louis XIV, 
the cold of winter approaching, Poland invaded by the Turks 
and calling for his assistance, Frederick William found his 
loyalty as an ally and his faith as a Protestant put to a 
trying test. It was not to be wondered at that he began to 
consider seriously the idea of a separate peace with France. 



Unfortunately for the Dutch Republic, neither Spain nor The deUn* 

quenoy 
Spain 



Austria intended to do more than defend their own interests; *>"®""y ^ 



and both were indisposed to bring on a final rupture with 
France. For the salvation of Holland, on the other hand, it 
was desirable that the conflict should as quickly as possible 
take on a European character. With this in view William III 
was urgently pressing for a prompt junction of the allied 
annies with his own troops, and at the same time carrying 
on active n^otiations at The Hague with Spain and Austria 
in the hope of stimulating more decisive action. 

Although the Spanish government had issued a ''declara- 
tHm" that it would defend the Republic, no aid had thus 



132 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY 

Chap. II far been furnished by its authority. Count Monterey^ 
A. D. Governor of the Spanish Netherlands, without orders from 

167Q— 1684 

Madrid, had promptly put himself at the head of his troops; 

but in Spain public opinion was still divided, and there was 
little disposition to take risks for the sake of the Hollanders. 
Adrien Paets, who was sent by the States General as am- 
bassador to Madrid, had experienced great diflSculty in 
awakening Spanish interest; while Manuel de Lira, the am- 
bassador of Spain at The Hague, complained of the tenacity 
of the States General in trying to dictate the course of con- 
duct to be taken by their ally. 

The Dutch insisted that the true solution was for Spain to 
take the "Generality," and offer an equivalent to France 
in Flanders or Hainault, which would give to France & 
better frontier and &t the same time separate French terri- 
tory from that of the Republic; on the principle that it 
was desirable to have France as a friend but not as a neigh- 
bor. But De Lira would not listen to such a suggestion. 

Notwithstanding the difficulties of the negotiation, it was 
evident that Spain could not totally abandon the Republic. 
This was made even more clear by the exaggerated demands 
of Louis XIV, at a short-lived congress convoked at Koln 
in May, 1673, for the purpose of negotiating a general peace. 
No one of the alternatives proposed by him was acceptable 
either to Holland or to Spain, and it was made apparent 
that united resistance was the only course remaining. 
The defection Until March, 1673, it appeared possible that the menace 
of Brandenbuis ^f ^ coalition would change the mind of Louis XIV; but by 
that time the ultimate* defection of Frederick William 
was deemed certain. On June 21, discouraged by the ob- 
stacles he had encountered and the failure of the Republic 
to pay the subsidies, the Elector signed with Louis XIY the 
Treaty of Vossem, in which he agreed "not to give aid in 
the future to the enemies of His Majesty," and to keep 
his army on the farther side of the Weser. In return, the 
King of France promised to forget the past and restore to 
the Elector the places occupied by the French troops. It 
was a great victory for the King's diplomacy, by which 



PERIL AND RESCUE OF THE DUTCH REPUBLIC 133 



the Republic was deprived of its only important ally. As Chap, ii 

A. D. 

1670-1684 



an inducement Louis XIV had promised to sustain the ^'^' 



Elector's claim for the unpaid subsidies due from the States • 
General, and in additional to pay him three hundred thou- 
sand livres when the ratifications were exchanged, and one 
hundred thousand yearly for five years, beginning with 
July 1, 1674.1 

The defection of Brandenburg was bitterly condemned in Th« formation 
Holland, but it proved a benefit to the cause of the Republic °' •«**"**^ 
by placing it temporarily entirely at the mercy of Louis XIV. 
Turenne, sent to prevent the approach of the allied armies, 
had already done his work too well; for he had not only 
prevented their advance, he had followed them in their 
letreat, and had invaded the Empire. 

It was the moment for which William III and Lisola 
had anxiously waited. Unless the Emperor was prepared 
to lose all prestige, it was now necessary for him to show his 
hand. Spain was at last ready for action, and her ambas- 
sador at Vienna, Don Pedro Ronquillo, informed the Em- 
peror that the purpose of Louis XIV was not merely to 
rum the Republic, but to take possession of the Spanish 
Netherlands also, as a step to the establishment of a univer- 
sal monarchy.* 

The reign of the Chevalier Gr^monville and Prince 
Lobkowitz was at an end. The former soon left Vienna, 
where for nine years he had beguiled Leopold I, and Prince 
Lobkowitz was soon overthrown. On August 28, 1673, 
Austria and Spain united for their mutual protection; 
snd, on August 30, was signed at The Hague an alliance 
between the Republic, Austria, Spain, and the Duke of 
Lorraine.' 

It was the triumph of the persistent efforts of Lisola 



* The treaty was antedated June 6, 1673. The complete text is 
Riven by Puf endoif , De rebus gesHa Friderici Wiihdmi Magni, Berlin, 
inS; the published part by Dumont, VII, Part I, p. 234 et seq. 

' For the instructions, see Lonchay, La rwalUS de la France et de 
^itpofpie aux Paue-Bae, p. 264. 

' For the treaty, see Dumont, VII, Part I, p. 240. 



134 A HISTORY OP DIPLOMACY 

Chap, ii and the final defeat of Gr^monville in the long diplomatic 
^* ^- duel in which they had been engaged. The secret treaty of 

partition was now at last mere waste paper. Hapsburg and 

Bourbon were again at war, and Ihe two branches of the 
House of Austria were again united by a solemn bond in 
a common cause, — the rescue of the Dutch Republic, 
chsogod ohar- With such a coalition arrayed against him, it appeared 
invand^eo- ^^' ^ moment probablc that Louis XIV would confine his 
tkm of England attention to the United Provinces, and thus avoid a general 
European war. It was clearly possible for him to insist upon 
the terms which had been already offered him by the Re- 
public, — namely, the cession of the "Generality, " — which 
would have sufficiently humiliated the United Provinces 
without de8tro3ring them, and at the same time would 
have removed the raiaan d'etre of the new alliance. But 
the rescue of Holland was only the ostensible object of the 
coalition, and this was soon apparent to Louis XIY. Its 
real purpose was, like that of the Triple Alliance, to put 
an end to his policy of expansion; and Spain now enter- 
tained the hope of winning back all that had been lost by 
the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle. 

It was, therefore, too late for the King of France to conceal 
his real intention, which was to obtain by force the coveted 
Spanish Netherlands. At Aix-la-Chapelle he could well afford 
to make terms which disarmed the coalition, for at that 
time he felt sure of ultimately attaining his end by means 
of the treaty of partition with the Emperor; but, now that 
he and the Emperor were at war, that agreement had no 
longer any existence. 

Compelled, therefore, to continue the war or abandon 
all he had so far gained by it, Louis XIV found the centre of 
hostilities suddenly changed. The struggle was no longer 
that of the Dutch Republic against the vengeance of the 
invader, it was a renewal of the old conflict between the 
Bourbon and Hapsburg dynasties for supremacy in Europe. 
A French army was already in possession of cities of the 
Empire, the Spanish Netherlands had again become a battle- 
ground, and hostilities had spread as far as Sicily. The war 



PEBIL AND RESCUE OF THE DUTCH REPUBLIC 135 

had in fact become European, and William III had little Chap. II 
difficulty in developing the coalition of The Hague into a ,^^^^004 
*T more formidable array of powers. 



In England public opinion had at last found expression. 
The marriage of the King's brother James, Duke of York, 
with a Catholic princess, Mary of Modena, had produced 
great excitement; and it was believed that the troops which 
Charles II was preparing to send to Zeeland for the Dutch 
war were really intended to be employed in destroying 
reli^ous freedom in England and imposing Catholicism upon 
the country. Sir William Coventry violently attacked 
the French alliance in Parliament, demanded peace with 
the Republic, and carried a resolution refusing supplies 
until an effort to make peace had been made and failed. 
The contents of the secret treaty of Dover were more than 
suspected, and Charles II was finally compelled against his 
will to discontinue the war. Sir William Temple, through 
the mediation of the Spanish ambassador, found it easy 
to negotiate the Treaty of Westminster,^ which the Re- 
public was eager to conclude, and it was signed on Feb- 
ruary 9, 1674, thus ending the Anglo-French alliance.* 

After the tardy awakening of the Emperor, the German The 
princes — even some of those most closely allied with Louis *<> **^ ^ew 
XIY — began to take courage, and resolved to oppose 
him. In June, 1674, the Diet of Regensburg declared war 
on the King of France in the name of the Empire. Then 
followed a long procession of adhesions. On June 20, the 
Duke of Brunswick-Ltineburg; on July 1, the Elector of 
Brandenburg; on July 10, the King of Denmark; on Janu- 
vy 26, 1675, the Bishop of Osnabriick, and on August 
16, 1675, the Bishop of Miinster abandoned Louis XIV and 
joined the coalition. It appeared for a time as if all Europe 
had united to stay the advance of the conqueror. 

The desertion of the Republic by the Elector of Bran- 

' For the details of the negotiation of peace between the United 
^Winces and England, see Siccama, Sir Gabriel de SyUnua, in the 
Swue d'Histoire Dipbmatique, XV, pp. 113, 116. 

' For the treaty, see Dumont, VII, Part I, p. 253. 



136 



A HISTORY OP DIPLOMACY 



Chap. II 

A. D. 

1670-1684 

Sobie8ki*8 
election aa 
King of 
Poland 



denburg and the renewal of his treaty with Louis XIV, 
followed so quickly by his adhesion to the new alUance, is 
-explained in part by conditions in the East. Events in 
Poland had revived the Elector's interest in that kingdom 
and renewed his aspirations to the Polish throne. 

On October 18, 1672, King Michael, unable to with- 
stand the assaults of the Turks and threatened with a revolt 
of the npbles, had signed a humiUating peace with the 
Sultan. The resentment felt throughout Poland, seconded 
by the influence of Pope Clement X, — who sent money 
from Rome to renew the war, — brought to the front a 
heroic figure in the person of John Sobieski, who threw him- 
self passionately into the cause, and led a new attack upon 
the Turks which resulted in a series of brilliant victories. 

The death of King Michael on November 10, 1673, 
rendered necessary a new election to the throne of Poland, 
and even before his last illness the customary intrigues 
at Warsaw to secure or control the succession had recom- 
menced. 

It was in expectation of the King's death that Frederick 
William had abandoned his campaign and returned to 
Berlin, for he was once more hopeful that either he or his 
son might be the successful candidate. But his hopes were 
once more frustrated; and, as he no doubt believed, largely 
through the influence of Louis XIV. Sobieski, who had 
been brought up in France and had married a French woman, 
was on May 21, 1674, chosen King of Poland. He was, no 
doubt, primarily indebted for this elevation to the popu- 
larity he had won by his heroic deeds; but he was known 
to be devoted to French interests, and his election had re- 
ceived French support. 

Neither the Elector of Brandenburg nor the Eknperor could 
forgive the interference of France in this election, in which 
the hopes of both had been bitterly disappointed. Leo- 
pold I had a twofold cause for resentment; for Sobieski 's 
election had not only resulted in the defeat of the Eknperor 's 
candidate, — Prince Charles of Lorraine, — it had elevated 
to the throne of Poland an enemy who had been in coUu- 



PERIL AND RESCUE OP THE DUTCH REPUBLIC 137 

sion with rebels against his authority in Hungary, where Chap. II 
Sobieski was so popular that it had been at one time pro- ig7^^go4 



posed to elect him Eang. 

Even during the period of his neutrality, Frederick tim dipiomaoy 
William never ceased to feel a sincere interest in the rescue ^ ^^^^ 
of Holland; and, after his recent disappointment, he hardly 
needed the urgency of the Emperor to induce him to join 
the new alliance. He had, indeed, suffered from the parsi- 
mony of the Dutch Republic regarding the subsidies, and 
from the apathy of the Elmperor in the previous campaign; 
but he now had a new cause of offence on the part of Louis 
XIY, which he regarded as sufficient to absolve him from 
his recent treaty obligations. 

Having succeeded in putting upon the throne of Poland 
ft king of whom the French ambassador at Warsaw wrote 
that he was as zealous for Louis XIY ''as if he had the honor 
of being bom his subject, " the King of France had exercised 
all his influence to bring about a peace between Poland and 
the Turks, in order that Sobieski might be free to turn his 
forces against the Elmperor and the Elector of Branden- 
burg, and thus cripple their activities on the Rhine by keep- 
ing them occupied at home. To the Elmperor, Sobieski 's 
interference might mean the loss of Hungary; to Frederick 
William, the loss of Prussia, — which he had once held as a 
^^assal to Poland, — and which the King of Poland might 
now endeavor to reclaim. 

But this ingenious move on the part of Louis XIV was 
doMned to failure. Clement X persistently inspired the 
patriotism and religious zeal of the Poles in their fierce 
struggle with the Turks; and the King of France was obliged 
to content himself with promoting turbulence among the 
Hungarian rebels, and the more promising prospect of pro- 
voking an attack on Brandenburg by the Swedes. 

Temporarily relieved of anxiety regarding the East, 
Frederick William, with renewed promises of subsidies from 
Holland and Spain, again placed himself at the head of his 
>nny, and marched to the defence of the Count Palatine 
of the Rhine, whose territories Turenne, with the purpose 



138 



A HISTORY OP DIPLOMACY 



Chap. II 

A. D. 

1670-1684 



The war of 
Sweden and 
Brandenbuig 



of preventing a German advance for the defence of Tranche* 
Comt^, was then devastating. 

But Louis XIV required only a short time to create a situ- 
ation in the North that recalled the Elector of Branden- 
burg for the protection of his own domain. The bitter 
poverty of Sweden rendered it easy for the Bang of Prance 
to turn the hungry troops of that nursery of mercenary 
soldiers toward the spoils of Brandenburg. Swedish credit 
had fallen so low that the young king, Charles XI, who had 
just begun his reign, was not able to equip the necessary 
ships for the protection of Swedish commerce, or even to pay 
the expenses of an embassy which he wished to send to 
Russia. 

In these circumstances the mere threat of the French 
envoy that the subsidies would be no longer paid if the 
Swedes did not make war on Brandenburg, was sufficient 
to set that impecunious government in motion. Frederick 
William was thereby rendered innocuous to Louis XIV 
so far as activity on the Rhine was concerned, and obliged 
to face a new enemy in the North. 

After personal interviews with William III, in March and 
May, 1675, at Cleve and at The Hague, with a view to en- 
gaging the sea power of Holland in an attack upon Bremen, 
— which, with the bishopric of Verden, had fallen to Sweden, 
by the Peace of Westphalia, — the Elector succeeded in 
obtaining an agreement, signed on May 15 by the Prince 
of Orange, the deputies of the States- General, the represen- 
tatives of the Elmperor, and those of Spain and the three 
Dukes of Brunswick, whereby these allies were bound to ui^ge 
upon the King of Denmark an attack on Sweden in the 
region of Bremen, to imite in opposing all who in any way 
aided the King of France, and on June 15 imitedly to declare 
war on the Swedes. 

The Swedish army had already invaded Brandenburg; 
but, on June 28, 1675, at Fehrbellin, Frederick William 
routed the enemy with such brilliant success as to win for 
himself the surname of the ''Great Elector"; and it is from 
this victory that, in the opinion of one of its most illus- 



PEBIL AND RESCUE OP THE DUTCH REPUBLIC 139 

trious representatives, the House of HohenzoUem dates Chap. II 

He success in laying the foundations of its future greatness. ^^J"'^'^ 

"' ^ 1670-1684 



in. The Peace op Ntmwbqen and the Pacipic Con- 
quests OP France 



The community of interest which had awakened Europe tim ohanfed 

relatioDfl of 
the powers 



from its lethargy and mspired the Coalition of The Hague ~>»**^™»^' 



was now disappearing in the conflict of particular interests 
which were not only inharmonious but incompatible. 

The success which had attended the efforts of the Prince 
of OraDge in Holland placed him at once in the front rank 
of the military commanders and diplomatists of his time. 
He had already so far rescued his country from the destruc- 
tion with which it had been threatened as to expel the in- 
vader from Utrecht, Gelderland, and Overyssel. In truth, 
even at the beginning of 1674, Holland was practically saved; 
and the Hollanders were ready to recognize the change as the 
work of 'VTiUiam III. On February 2, 1674, the States of 
Holland had declared the stadtholderate hereditary in the 
male line of the House of Orange-Nassau, the States of 
Zeeland had promptly followed their example, and on 
April 20, 1674, the States General had ratified this action. 

But since the formation of the Coalition of The Hague 
great changes had taken place in the relations of the powers. 
The war for the repression of the ambitions of Louis XIV 
was passing into a conflict of particular interests that carried 
it beyond all central control. Even in Holland, for whose res- 
cue the war had begun, now that the danger-point was passed 
there was strong desire for peace upon such terms as it 
ought in the changed conditions be possible to obtain. In 
truth, the main object of continuing the conflict was the 
pttservation of the Spanish Netherlands to Spain; yet the 
IWHnises of military and financial aid from Madrid were 
other unfulfilled or performed in a dilatory manner that 
rendered them ineffectual. The Dutch burghers, particu- 
Iwly those of Amsterdam, were growing weary of a war 
in which Holland was exhausting its resources without 



140 



A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY 



Chap. II 

A.D. 

1670-1084 



The efifeote of 
the war witb 
Sweden 



making perceptible progress toward the conclusion of a 
favorable peace; and certain others of the allies were de- 
- sirons of ending a war from which they were to derive no 
direct benefit. 

With the attack of Sweden on Brandenburg the conflict 
had passed into a new phase of its development; for, while 
this assault was an immediate outgrowth of the previous 
conditions, it was in reality not only a separate engagement 
but one involving entirely new motives and consequences. 
Holland had embarked in the war with Sweden in order 
to prevent the imion of the Swedish forces with those of 
France on the Rhine; but now that this junction had been 
prevented there was no particular advantage to be gained by 
the Republic in continuing the war, which was seriously 
affecting the conmiercial interests of the Dutch merchants 
and shipowners. After so much cost and suffering, a strictly 
foreign war seemed to them a burden which they were not 
called upon to bear. 

On July 17, 1675, the Elector of Brandenburg had obtained 
from the Imperial Diet a formal declaration of war upon 
Sweden; but now that it had been shown that Louis XIV 
could not completely paralyze the energies of the Empire 
by calling in the Swedes, the purpose of that declaration 
seemed to the Germans to have been in the main accom- 
plished. On the other hand, the vigor exhibited by Freder- 
ick William, who was loudly demanding "satisfaction" 
in the form of territorial concessions, had become alarming. 
If he should annex Western Pomerania, — which had been 
acquired by Sweden through the Peace of Westphalia, — it 
would seriously disturb the equilibrium of Germany. Not 
wishing Sweden expelled from the Empire for the sole profit 
of the Elector of Brandenburg, there was no enthusiasm 
on the part of the other German princes in the further prose- 
cution of the war. Only Christian V of Denmark, the 
Bishop of Mlinster, and the Dukes of Brunswick, who hoped 
to receive some of the spoils stripped from Denmark's 
hereditary enemy, were anxious to impose a crushing defeat 
on Sweden. 



PUBIL AND RESCUE OF THE DUTCH REPUBLIC 141 

On the other hand, Louis XIV and Charles XI were \m- Chap. ll 
ceasingly active in preparing new embarrassments for .^J^^* 
the Elector. In Poland the Marquis of Bethunei brother- 



iDr-Iaw of Sobieski, had induced the King to sign with Louis 
XIT, on June 11, 1675, the secret treaty of Jaworow; in 7 
which he promised, for two hundred thousimd ^cus, to . 
attack Frederick William in the Duchy of Prussia as soon 
as peace with the Turks should be concluded.* 

The campaigns of 1675 were not so favorable to France The lituAtion 
as they had promised to be at the beginning of the year. ^ '^""^ 
A revolt against Spanish rule at Messina had resulted in 
an invitation to Louis XIV to intervene and take possession 
of that city; but the diversion had not borne the expected 
fniitB. The population, once free from Spanish rule, left to 
the French the trouble of protecting the independence of 
the city, without rendering any aid in return. Sicily did not 
rise in revolt, as had been expected, while Naples and the 
other Spanish possessions in Italy displayed no desire for 
a substitution of French rule. The only result of the enter- 
prise advantageous to France was the withdrawal of the 
Spanish troops from Roussillon, which was in consequence 
surrendered to the French. 

On the Rhine Montecucooli showed himself an equal match 
for Turenne, who was killed in battle, while Marshal Cr6qui 
was taken prisoner, with no substantial gains to balance 
these misfortunes. 

In Germany the energetic movements of Frederick 
William against the Swedes had produced a bewildering 
effect upon the allies of France. The tradition of Swedish 
invincibility had been rudely shattered by the check given 
to the Swedes in their march toward the Rhine and their 
expulsion from Brandenburg. 

Inmiediately after the withdrawal from the alliance charies ii's 
with France and his separate peace with the Dutch Republic, ^^JJJ^^ * 
Charles II had regarded the occasion as favorable for win- 
ning personal glory as the arbiter of Europe, conciliating 

^ This treaty, which remained secret until the nineteenth century, 
may be found in Moemer, StacUsvertrdgCf pp. 701, 704. 



142 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY 

Chap. II public opinion in England, and incidentally rendering 
1670-^684 ^^^ service to Louis XIV, of whom he secretly remained 

a friend and even a paid dependent. He had, therefore, 

promptly ofiFered to mediate between Louis XIV and the 
coalition, and proposed the assembling of a congress for 
peace at Nymwegen. 

Although official negotiations regarding the Congress 
were opened early in 1675, there was no serious thought 
of meeting until January, 1676. D'Estrades, Colbert de 
Croissy, and D'Avaux — whom Louis XIV named as 
his representatives — were among the first to arrive at 
Nymwegen, which they reached in the following June; 
but the policy of the King of France being to negotiate 
a separate peace with each of the members of the coalition, 
and these being indisposed to be thus separated in detail, 
the negotiations did not begin efiFectively until 1677. 

In truth, William III not only from the first distrusted 
the mediation of Charles II, but he had no inclination to 
end the war; partly because he wished fmther to consoli- 
date his own authority in the United Provinces by contin- 
uing the struggle to a point where he could make his own 
terms and become the virtual master, as well as the saviour, 
of the Republic; and partly because he was unwilling to 
abandon his allies. The time had passed when the Prince, 
who had once hoped to save his country through the in- 
fluence of Charles II with Louis XIV, was willing to accept 
his mediation, which he now felt would be prejudicial to 
the interests of the Republic. 
Tbeieent In his suspicion of the real purposes of Charles II the 

chirfMn ukd Prince displayed a keen penetration. When the King 
Louia XIV of England abandoned the French alliance, Ruvigny — who 
had replaced Colbert de Croissy as French ambassador 
at London — was inclined to abuse him for his perfidy; but 
he soon received instructions from Louis XIV to continue 
good relations with Charles II, and to offer him the same 
subsidy for England's neutrality as had been given for the 
alliance. For years Louis XIV had paid Charles II an 
annual pension of one hundred thousand pounds sterling. 



PERIL AND BESCUE OP THE DUTCH REPUBLIC 143 

He was now ready to continue the pension in exchange for Chap, il 
the King^s clandestine assistance. Charles II did not j^j^^'^g^ 

dare to entrust this transaction to his responsible ministers; 

but, on February 26, 1676, he personally transcribed, signed, 
and sealed with his own hand the secret treaty which Ru- 
vigny laid before him.^ In this manner Charles II received 
from the King of France the money he coveted but could 
not obtain from Parliament for his own private purposes, 
and Louis XIV received from him all the assurance such 
a shameful transaction could give that England would 
not range herself with his enemies, as he feared might 
otherwise be the case. Ruvigny was able to write trium- 
phantly to his royal master: ''The King of Great Britain has 
engaged not to conclude a treaty without the consent of 
the King of France, and to prorogue or dissolve Parliament, 
if that be necessary." Charles II had ''upon his honor as 
a King" placed the foreign policy of his kingdom, and even 
the meeting of its Parliament, in the hands of the King of 
France. 

In nfntlHug this secret bargiun with Charles II Louis XIV Thedcnifi- 
fully realised the immense value of the neutrality of England ^^^^ 
and of the personal friendship of the King in the execution of Louis xiv 
hb designs. He perceived that the character of the war on 
the continent had been radically altered by the alliance of 
Spain and the Emperor with the Republic. It was now on 
his part in reality a war for the reduction of the combined 
power of the Hapsburgs, and no longer merely a question 
of humiliating or further weakening the Dutch Republic, 
the complete overthrow of which had been found impos- 
sible. What the King of France now aimed at was the 
immediate conquest or cession to himself of Franche- 
C(»nt£ and as much as possible of the Spanish Netherlands. 
The coalition, on the other hand, was fighting to prevent 
any gains by France, and hoped to recover from her the 
acquisitions made by the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, to restore 



^ For the treaty, see Surtema de GroveetiiiB, GuiUaume III et Louis 
XIV, II, pp. 639, 640. 



144 



A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY 



Chap. II 

A. D. 

1670-1684 



Arlingtoii'a 
■oheme of 
marriace for 
WlDuunlll 



to the Duke of Lorraine his lost duchy, and to reconquer 
Alsace for Austria. 

In these circumstances, if Louis XIV could not have the 
alliance of England, his next best advantage was in possess- 
ing its neutrality. This was difficult to seeing; for public 
opinion in England was opposed to France, and the King 
and the Parliament were in perpetual conffict. As there was 
little hope of winning the Parliament, he had pursued the 
more practicable course of retaining the good offices of the 
King, which might prove sufficient for his purpose in keep- 
ing England neutral through the King's prerogative of pro- 
roguing or dissolving Parliament. 

The most important step to be taken in the dissolution 
of the Coalition of The Hague was to secure, if possible, 
the immediate separation of the Dutch Republic from its 
allies; but the chief impediment to this act of desertion was 
the firm resistance of William III. As a means of over- 
coming the opposition of the Prince of Orange, after Sir 
William Temple's failure to enter into private negotiations 
with him on that subject, Arlington, — who hoped by some 
good fortune to recover his former position at Court, — with 
the idea that William III might thus be brought under Eng- 
lish influence, had devised and urged the scheme of offering to 
the Prince in marriage his cousin Mary, eldest daughter of 
James, Duke of York; and, in spite of the misgivings of Ru- 
vigny, who feared that such a marriage might be prejudicial 
to the interests of his master, Arlington was sent to The 
Hague to make the proposal.^ 

As grandson of Charles I, William of Orange stood next 
to the daughters of the Duke of York in the succession to the 
EJnglish throne; and by his marriage with Mary the re- 
lationship to the House of Stuart — which a few years later 
was to make him king of England — would have received an 
added bond. But the Prince of Orange suspected the inten- 
tions of Arlington, whom he felt he had reason to distrust ; 
and, alleging as his reason the youth of the Princess, who 



^ On the visit of ArUngton to The Hague, see Siccama, Sir Gabriel 
de SyhiuSf in the Revue d'Histoire Diplomatique, XV, pp. 118, 119. 



PERIL AND RESCUE OF THE DXTTCH REPUBLIC 145 

was then only thirteen years old, he declmed the ofiFer. Chap. II 
m puipoBe was to renuun loyal to the allies of the Repub- ^^^^--^ 



Gc, to obtain for it a peace that would leave its possessions 
and its integrity unaffected, and above all to guarantee 
the future security of the United Provinces and of Europe 
agUDst the ambitious designs of the King of France. 

While William III was seeking to evade the mediation The dean of 
of Charles II, Louis XIV was anxious, for reasons already ^J^'^**^ ^ 
stated, to avoid any other outside influence. Pope Clement 
X had desired to mediate between the Catholic powers, and 
in a letter to the Emperor had offered his good offices. He 
had expressed his wish that a congress should not be held 
in a Protestant city, as had been proposed, on the ground 
that he could not send his nuncios into a heretical country. 
His plan was for the negotiations to be managed by three 
representatives of the Holy See, who should be stationed 
respectively at Versailles, Vienna, and Madrid. This ar- 
rangement, which entirely ignored the Protestant powers, 
was, however, pleasing neither to Louis XIV nor to the 
Emperor; for the former expected to be supported by Eng- 
land, and the latter by the Dutch Republic and the Protes- 
tant princes of Germany. The proposab of the Pope were, 
therefore, rejected. 

Offended on account of the disregard of his wishes by the 
Catiiolic sovereigns, Clement X had decided to take no 
part in the Congress; especially since Nymwegen, a Prot- 
estant town, had been designated as the place of meeting. 
But Clement X having died while the negotiations were in 
progress. Innocent XI — who was chosen Pope on Septem- 
ber 21, 1676 — decided to pursue a different course, and 
appomted the papal nuncio at Vienna, Bevilacqua, to rep- 
resent him at Nymwegen. 

Although the papal nuncio displayed an impartial spirit, 
— which he carried so far as even to select his dwelling at a 
pomt equidistant between those of the French and the 
Spanish plenipotentiaries, — and visited and received with 
^ same cordiality both Catholic and Protestant delegates, 
lie was not able to overcome the prejudices of Louis XIV, 

VOL. m. — 10 



146 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY 

Chap. II who from the beginning resented his presence, as if it were 
^'^' directed against himself. In preparing the credentials of 

1670-1684 



TlMduiKMi- 



Bevilacqua the papal chancellery had used the expression 
"tUrumque regem, " thus placing the King of France and the 
King of Spain on the same level. Louis XIV considered 
this an offence to his dignity and complained of it as an 
insult. 

The struggle in England between Charles II and the Par- 
liament seriously complicated his functions as mediator, 
and nearly paralyzed his efforts to serve the interests of 
Louis XrV. To conduct the mediation at Nymwegen he 
had chosen Lord Berkeley, Sir William Temple, and Sir 
Leoline Jenkins, — the latter a "typical royalist," who 
had formerly served as Secretary of State. It was, how- 
ever, upon Sir William Temple that the responsibility of 
the mission principally rested. 

"Our counsels and our conduct," writes Sir William^ 
epeaking of the Congress, "resemble those floating islands 
which wind and sea chase hither and thither." Without 
effective organization, impeded by vexatious contentions 
r^arding precedence and ceremony, like the Congress of 
Westphalia, the Congress of Nymwegen drifted on with 
small results. In the meantime the war was briskly waged 
on all sides, in the hope that a victory in the field would have 
its effect upon the councils of the various powers. But, in 
truth, the peace which finally emerged from the negotia- 
tions was not decided either by arms or by an appeal to 
definite principles of settlement; it was the work of the per- 
sistent diplomatic activity of Louis XIV, who controlled 
the proceedings of the Congress through the mediation of 
Charles II, and at the same time prosecuted his private 
negotiations with the separate powers with the purpose of 
mfiJdng a good bargain with each of them. 

The bond of union between the allies most difficult to 
sever was that which united the Emperor and Spain. Leo- 
pold I wished to effect a settlement on the basis of the 
Peace of Westphalia. His plenipotentiaries proposed that 
the King of France should restore to the Ebnperor and the 



PERIL AND RESCUE OP THE DUTCH REPUBLIC 147 

other allies all that had been taken from them, with in- Chap. ll 
demnity for the damages they had suflfered. Spain took j^J^^gg^ 

for its base the Treaty of the Pyrenees. " His Most Catholic 

Majesty," ran the Spanish note, "demands the restitution 
of all that which has been taken from the kingdoms of 
Spain since 1655; all the ruins, demolitions, and conflagra- 
tions should be made good." 

The Elector of Brandenburg and the King of Denmark 
wished to continue the war until the Swedes should be 
driven out of Germany. The Elector would thus keep 
and extend his conquests in Pomerania, and Christian V 
would claim the recovery of what had been taken from 
Denmark by Sweden through the Treaty of Copenhagen 
of 1660. 

Since these powers were disposed to prolong the struggle 
until their objects were accomplished, it was necessary 
dther (1) to accede to their demands, (2) continue the 
conflict, or (3) detach them one after another from the 
coalition. 

There was at the Court of France a strong disposition to 
end the war, which had become a heavy burden. The people 
were murmuring under their load of taxation; deputies of 
Bordeaux, whose trade had been greatly injured, had 
secretly visited the Prince of Orange in the hope of peace; 
and in Brittany and Normandy discontent had reached the 
point of open revolt. Colbert's able administration of the 
finances had not been adequate to the growing needs of 
the war; and, while Louvois was urging its continuance, Col- 
bert was pointing out the ruin that might follow from its 
longer duration.^ 

Determined not to yield to the Hapsburg demands, and at 
the same time wishing to end the cost of the war, Louis XIV 
leaolved first to win the friendship of the United Provinces 



> From 1670 to 1679 the annual expenses of the kingdom had m- 
creased from 77 million to 128 million livres. The country had been 
impoveriBhed by the war, and Colbert resorted to every expedient to 
iaaeaae the revenues. See Lavisse, Histoire de Francef Tome VII, p. 

an. 



148 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY 

Gbap. II by his moderation, and then to deal with the other members 
^'^' of the coalition one by one.^ 

1670-1684 "^ 



For a time it seemed as if it would be impossible to make 

a separate peace with the Dutch Republic on account 

The oonfliet of the stout resistance of William III. When Colbert de 

^Jl^^J^Jj^Jl^ Croissy opened this subject with Sir William Temple, the 

III reply showed plainly that the Prince of Orange would 

oppose all plans to substitute private arrangements for a 

general peace. "As to the Prince," said Sir William, "his 

good faith and his loyalty are too well known to me to permit 

me to suppose that he would sacrifice the interests of the 

allies for advantages personal to himself." And when 

Sir William spoke of the subject directly to the Prince, his 

reply was, "It is necessary above everything else to satisfy 

Spain, and my particular interest will never previdl in a 

negotiation with which the future of Europe is intimately 

connected." 

But legally the States General possessed the right to make 
peace and to declare war, and the Prince of Orange had not 
yet so firmly established his authority in the Republic as 
to bend that body entirely to his will. Even Fagel, the 
Grand Pensionary, who was devoted to the cause of the 
Prince, was convinced that, after such a long and trying 
struggle, peace was indispensable to the Republic; and he 
confided to Sir William Temple that it was inevitable, 
since theref was "not a single person in Holland who was 
not in favor of it." 

In July, 1677, as a result of the intrigues of the French 
agents at The Hague, the peace party, headed by the city 
of Amsterdam, was ready and eager to make a separate 
treaty with France. The Prince, however, remained im- 
shaken in his position; but the tide was too strong for him 
to resist. 

^ The little consideration that Louis XTV had for the loss of life by 
continuing the war is shown in the following sentence of a letter to his 
ambassador, Ck>urtin, written on July 3, 1677: "Whatever the loss of 
men which the continual action of arms may cause, I am always easily 
able to complete the troops which I oppose with so much success to my 
enemies." See Mignet, Nigociations, etc., IV, p. 487. 



PEBm AND RESCUE OP THE DUTCH REPUBLIC 149 

The situation was now different from that which existed Chap. II 
three years before, when William III had decided to hold fJ^d^'aoA 
aloof from Ili^lish influence. The Coalition of The Hague 



was morally disintegrated, since the Republic, which had 
inspired it, was about to desert it. The Prince, therefore, The marriage 
decided to go to London and use his mfluence with Charles II. ^dTto^S^" 

In the previous year the subject of the English marriage 
had been reopened by Sir William Temple, and William III 
had given it new consideration. He was now impressed 
with the idea that this union might have great advantages ; 
and that, instead of subjecting himself to other influences 
by an Ekiglish marriage, his own influence might perhaps 
dominate the situation. In Jime, 1677, therefore, one of the 
Prince's favorite chamberlains, Bentinck, was sent to Lon- 
don to prepare for his visit to England, which followed in 
October. 

With a frankness and promptitude that astonished his 
unclesy William III urgently asked for the hand of Mary. 
The King and the Duke of York wished first to speak of in- 
ternational politics, and took the groimd that peace should 
come first and marriage afterwards. But the Prince in- 
asted upon the marriage as a preliminary to any discussion of 
affairs whatever; and on November 4, 1677, the marriage 
ceremony was performed. 

Before the end of November William III had returned 
with his bride to Holland, but not without having proved 
his quality in England. Charles II and the Duke of York 
had proposed terms for a general peace which would be 
acceptable to Louis XIV and retain his good will toward 
the Stuart d3masty; but WilUam III, aided by the King's 
first minister, Danby, who knew the temper of Parliament 
and wished to end the influence of the King of France over 
Charles II, recommended terms which it was certain would 
not be accepted without compulsion. In the end, however, 
a compromise was agreed to, according to which Louis XIV 
was to keep Franche-Comt4, but to restore Lorraine to the 
son of Charles III, and all conquests in the Spanish Nether- 
lands to Spain, except Maestricht, which was to be re- 



150 



A HISTORY OP DIPLOMACY 



Chap. II 

A.D. 

1670-1684 



Louis XlV'a 



activity 



turned to Holland. Seven "barrier" cities also were to 
be surrendered to Spain. 

Charles II was of the opinion that Louis XIV would be 
content with this arrangement, and the Earl of Feversham 
was sent to France to submit these proposals; but, as the 
Prince had hoped and believed, they were promptly rejected. 

This was a decided triumph for William III. Under the 
influence of Danby, who urged Charles II to resent the reboff 
implied in the rejection of his proposals, on December 
31, 1677, a treaty of alliance was concluded between England 
and Holland, for the purpose of enforcing peace on the terms 
previously proposed.^ To give this new alliance effect, the 
English troops that had been in the service of France were 
recalled, and an army of twelve thousand soldiers and a fleet 
of thirty ships were ordered to be fitted out for the aid of the 
coalition. 

Thus, in the course of a few months, Louis XIV foimd his 
royal prot^£, under the influence of William III, not only 
dictating to him an inacceptable peace, but actually ia 
alliance with Holland and apparently arming to attack him. 
What seemed worst of all, the King of England had sum- 
moned Parliament — which by previous agreement had beea 
adjourned until the following April — to meet on January 
28, 1678.* 

Holding William of Orange responsible for the changed 
situation, Louis XIV now resolved that he would at any 
price make a separate peace with Holland. Taking advan- 
tage of the fears among the Dutch republicans that the mat- 
rimonial alliance of William III with the House of Stuart 
would too greatly increase the power of the stadtholder, 
he used every means to revive the republican party in 
Holland; and the strong desire for peace among the Dutch 



^ For the treaty, see Dumont, VII, Part I, p. 341 et seq. 

* In December, 1677, Charles II had accepted two million livrea 
after long bargaining as the price of his promise, at the same time re- 
proaching the King of France with risking nothing but his money, 
while he was risking his crown ''in opposing the universal desire of his 
subjects." See Mignet, Nigociationa, etc., IV, p. 499. 



PERIL AND BESCXTE OF THE DX7TCH BEPUBUC 151 

burghersy combined with the intrigues of the French agi- Chap. U 
tators, finally determined the States General, in opposition J- ^' 

to the wishes of the stadtholder, to conclude a separate 

peace. To force the issue, Louis XIV announced that, unless 
an aip'eement were reached before August 10, hostilities 
would be resumed. The negotiations suddenly displayed 
new life; but on August 9, when the Dutch were disposed 
to conclude a treaty, the French plenipotentiaries insisted 
upon two new requirements: (1) that Holland should cause 
the conquests made from Sweden by Denmark to be im- 
mediately restored; and (2) that the Republic should send 
an embassy to Louis XIV to compliment him on the con- 
clusion of the peace. 

On the morning of August 10, 1678, while the allies were 
lejoidng that the negotiations had been broken off and 
the negotiators were preparing for their departure, D'Es- 
trades, Colbert de Croissy, and D'Avaxix visited the 
Dutch delegation, and complained that the obstinacy of 
its niembers was preventing peace. Bevemingk objected 
that the last requirements could not be conceded. ''You 
bold then only to that? and, that obstruction removed, 
you are willing at once to sign a peace?" "Yes," replied 
the Dutch delegates; and within five hours, at a single 
fitting, the treaty was finished and the separate peace was 



The Prince of Orange, considering that it was dishonorable The aeparate 
to abandon the allies, continued fighting after the treaty was ^^^J^^^°^ 
asned, apparently in the hope that it would not be ratified HoUand 
at The Hague,' — yet the treaty was in substance a com- 
plete triumph for the Republic. By its terms France re- 
stored to Holland all that had been conquered, including 
Maestricht; the King promised to return to the Prince 
oi Orange all his estates, which he had appropriated; a 
favorable treaty of commerce was concluded; the droit 

* For the treaty, see Dumont, VII, Part I, p. 350 et seq. 

* In a letter of August 15 to Fagel, William III declared that it was 
only QD that day that he had heard that the peace was signed. He had, 
^ever, already learned that it would be signed. 



152 



A HISTORY OP DIPLOMACY 



Chap. II 

A.D. 

1670-1684 



Louis XIV*8 
double r6le in 



d^aubaine was abolished; and full liberty of trade was ac- 
corded to the Dutch ships, even with the enemies of France. 

But, from another point of view, the treaty was also a 
triumph for the King of France. He had by the long war 
inflicted a heavy punishment on the Republic for its part 
in the Triple Alliance, and by the separate peace he had 
begun the dissolution of the coalition. Besides, the new 
treaty of peace with France rendered nugatory the Anglo- 
Dutch alliance for the enforcement of a peace with Spain 
and the Emperor. He was now free to deal with each 
of them in the manner most advantageous to himself. 

But Louis XIV had not trusted to this separate peace alone 
to repair his relations with EIngland. Uncertain whether 
he could ultimately depend upon Charles II, he had adopted 
new tactics with him. Through Barillon, his new ambassa- 
dor in London, he had offered Charles II two hundred 
thousand pounds sterling, and had consented to cede to 
Spain three of the seven barrier cities, if the King would 
prorogue Parliament. When, however, through the op- 
position of Danby, this offer was declined, he had provided 
the ambassador with fimds to induce Parliament to refuse to 
vote money for the war, on the plea that the King did not 
really mean to prosecute it, but was intending to employ 
the money in raising troops for the restoration of Catholi- 
cism and the suppression of Protestantism in EIngland. 

The hostile relations of the King and the Parliament had 
rendered easy the secret control of England in the matter 
of neutrality. So long as the King was able and willing 
to carry out his private engagements with Louis XIV, 
the King of France was ready to pay him for his complicity; 
but, the moment he failed in this, he found it not difficult to 
alarm the Parliament regarding the purposes of the King — 
who was more than suspected of treasonable intentions — 
and thus to cut off his supplies of men and money. 

Although public opinion in Elngland was in favor of a 
Dutch alliance and a war with France, the Bong did not 
enjoy sufficient public confidence to obtain a favorable re- 
sponse to his demands. To his announcement that, ''in 



PEBIIi AND HESCUfi OF THE DUTCH REPUBLIC 153 

accordance with the wishes of the country, " he had made Chap, n 
an alliance with the Dutch Republic, in order to defend jgy^^ljg^ 

Flanders from falling to Liouis XIV, the House of Com 

mons had replied, that he must begm by insisting upon the 
reduction of the French conquests to a x>oint which would 
r^tore the conditions which existed at the Peace of the 



As Charles II had no intention of going so far as this, 
and was merely aiming to increase his supplies of money 
either from the Parliament or from Louis XIV, he was 
greatly irritated at this venture of the Parliament to control 
his foreign policy, and decided to resmne his pecuniary 
relations with his royal patron of France. Accordingly, 
Montagu, the English ambassador at Versailles, was in- 
structed to offer, for six million livres yearly, to be paid for 
three years, the renewed support of England in bringing 
the coalition to terms; but Louis XIV, who perfectly under- 
stood why the offer was made, and knew the inability of 
Charles II to do what he proposed, considered the bribe 
too high and declined to pay it. At a later time, when Par- 
liament in its iu*gency for immediate intervention seemed 
to be beyond his secret control, Louis XIV decided as a 
last resort to comply with the demands of Charles II; 
but, although a new private treaty to this effect had been 
drawn up on May 17, 1678, the separate peace of France 
with the Republic in August rendered its execution tmnec- 
essary to Louis XIV; and, there being qp service rendered, 
ihe money was never paid. Finally, the Parliament, fearing 
that the impaid troops the King had already raised might 
be used by him against the Protestants, voted the sum 
necessary to pay them off, on the condition that they be at 
once disbanded; and thus war with France was finally 
averted.^ 



1 On aooount of his hostility to Danby, — the minister of Charles 
n who wrote the letter of March 25, 1678, instructing Montagu to 
iifw^MMJ money of Louis XIV, — the ambassador revealed to Parliament 
the whole transaction, which reflected on the King and caused Danby's 
fan. 



154 



A HISTOBT OF DIPLOMACY 



Chap. II 

A. D. 

1670-1684 



The dlanlu- 
tion of the 
eoalitioa 



The Anglo-Dutch menace being now practically removed^ 
Louis XIV next turned his attention to a peace with Spain. 
In the preceding April he had drawn up in his negotiations 
with Holland a list of demands and concessions.^ It em- 
bodied what he considered indispensable to the defence of 
France. It is true that, when the war was begun, France 
was not threatened; but now that it was to be closed, it 
was not unreasonable, and not without advantage to the 
peace of Europe, that the frontiers of France should be fixed 
at such a remove from the capital as to increase the safety 
of the kingdom from invasion. 

To Spain, however, the new exactions, which threw upon 
that monarchy the whole burden of loss occasioned by the 
war, while the Dutch Republic came out of it without 
losing any territory, seemed insupportable. Exhausted, 
and almost ruined, as the coimtry was, Spain was indisposed 
to make the required sacrifice.' 

At The Hague, both William III and Sir William Temple 
were active in postponing the ratification of the treaty of 
August 10; and the difficulties of effecting a reconciliation 
between France and Spain were put forward as an excuse 
for delay. The Spanish ambassador, DeLira, urged that 
Spain could not possibly give up Bouvines and Beaumont, 
and implored the States General to add in obtaining their 
release. The mediation thus undertaken proved successful, 
and on September 17, 1678, a treaty of peace was signed at 
Nymwegen by the French and Spanish plenipotentiaries, 
by which the King of France returned to Spain nine places, 
— including Charleroi, Ghent, and Limburg, — but kept 
Franche-Comtfi, Valenciennes, Cambrai, Cond6, Bouchain, 
Aire, Saint-Omer, Cassel, Ypres, Mauberge and other towns, 
thus considerably extending the frontiers of France. 



^ For details, see Lonchay, La rwaliU de la France el de VEspagne aux 
Pays-Baa, pp. 286, 287. 

' The relations between the French and the Spanish ambassadors at 
The Hague had become so strained that, on August 2, 1678, the people 
of the French embassy were attacked with pistols by those of the 
Spanish embassy; and two Frenchmen were wounded. 



PERIL AND RESCTJB OF THE DT7TCH REPUBLIC 155 

Spain having been thus separated from the coaJitioni on Chap. II 
February 5, 1679, the Emperor also abandoned it. The .^J^^qoa 
Treaty of Miinster was renewed; Freiburg in the Breisgau 



was ceded to France; Philipsburg having fallen into the 
hands of the ImperiaJs, the previous right of the French to 
garrison it was renounced; and the Duchy of Lorraine was to 
be restored to the young duke, Charles IV; but, on accoimt 
of his refusal to accept the conditions, this last stipulation did 
not become effective. 

Separate treaties were soon negotiated with the Dukes 
of Brunswick also, at Zell, on February 5, 1679, and with 
the Bishop of Miinster, at Nymwegen, on March 29, 1679, 
by which their portions of the conquests from the Swedes in 
Bremen and Verden were restored to Sweden. 

For a time it appeared as if the Elector of Brandenburg tim < 
would be the favorite of fortune in the war. He had not ^^^ «' 
only expelled the Swedes entirely from Western Pomera- 
nia; but when, in December, 1678, Charles XI invaded 
tte Duchy of Prussia and proposed to restore it to Poland, 
the Elector, hastening to the rescue on the ice of the Frisches 
Haff, nearly annihilated the Swedish army, and in the fol- 
lowing February drove the remnant of it into Livonia. 

Abandoned by the Emperor, who had made his peace 
with Louis XIV without recognizing his obligations to his 
ally, Frederick William, elated with his victories, deter- 
mined not merely to retain his conquests but to pimish the 
Emperor for deserting him, and seized the occasion to revive 
and assert the ancient claims of the Hohenzollems to a good 
part of Silesia.* 

But permanent victory does not consist merely in winning 
battles. A triumphant conqueror in the field, Frederick 
William was vanquished at N3miwegen. His plenipoten- 
tiaries at the Congress, William von Blaspeil and Christopher 
von Somnitz,* had been instructed to insist on Brandenburg 
being considered not merely as a member of the Elmpire but 



' For the nature of these daims, see Himly, Histoire de la formation 
tmiloriaUdeaStaUderEwvpecenirale, II, pp. 49, 50. 
' A part of the time Otto yon Schwerin. 



156 A HI8TOBT OF DIPLOMACY 

OiAP. n as a belligterent power on its own account, and as such de- 
iism-ii»4 "^^"^^8 "satisfaction" in the form of the cession of Pom- 

erania and the complete exclusion of Sweden from Germany. 

This, the Elector contended, was necessary both for the 
security of Brandenburg and for the peace of the Empire. 

In March, 1679, however, after all the strenuous ef- 
forts of his representatives at Nymw^en and the ineffec- 
tual importunities of Schwerin with Charles II at London, 
to intervene in behalf of Brandenburg, Frederick William 
found himself isolated, with no friend in Europe except 
the King of Denmark. The situation was rendered more 
embarrassmg by the fact that, even before the separate 
peace between France and Holland, the Elector's minister, 
Meinders, had been furnished with elaborate instructions 
'for privately negotiating a peace between Brandenburg and 
France; which made it impossible for Frederick William 
to justify his loud and bitter complaints of desertion by his 
allies. 

It is needless to follow the long and sinuous course of the 
negotiations for peace with France. Louis XIV, whom 
Frederick William had so many times deceived, was re- 
solved this time to inflict upon him a humiliation and a 
punishment that would be deeply felt. The Rhenish prov- 
inces of Brandenburg were at his mercy, and it hardly 
needed a military menace to bring the Elector to terms. 
Accordingly, on June 29, 1679, at Saint-Germain-en-Laye, 
a treaty of peace was signed by the Elector with France 
and Sweden, by which the Treaties of Westphalia were 
recognized as ''the most solid and most assured foundation 
of the tranquillity of the Empire''; and Brandenburg re- 
stored to Sweden all the conquests in Pomerania, with a 
slight rectification of the frontier.^ 

On October 12, at Nymwegen, the Swedes made peace 
with Holland also, and on November 27, at Fontainebleau, 
Denmark concluded a treaty by which Wismar and the 
island of RUgen were restored to Sweden. 

On November 15 was concluded at Saint-Germain-en- 

» For the treaty, see Dumont, VII, Part I, p. 408. 



PEBIL AND RESCUE OF THE DUCTH REPUBLIC 157 

Laye a new treaty of alliance with Saxony, by which another Chap. II 
dector was added to the influence of Louis XIV. , /•■ ^- 
This general pacification, which in its totality is known as 



the "Peace of Nymwegen/' was a bitter disappointment 
to Frederick William and Christian V of Denmark, whose Retnits of the 
brilliant military exploits were made entirely unavailing ^^^ ^' ^ 
through the dissolution of the coalition without their ob- 
taining '' satisfaction" from Sweden. On the other hand, 
Louis XIV seemed for the moment to have won the firm 
allegiance of his Swedish ally by insisting upon the return 
of the conquered provinces. As for the Emperor, if he 
made no gains he at least suffered no great loss, except 
the diminished prestige of having waged war without 
important results. 

The one clear inference from the terms of the Peace of 
Nymwegen was that Louis XIV had no one to fear. He 
had not only accomplished practically all that he intended 
at that time, but he had prepared for free action in the 
future. He had shown his moderation — one might say 
ahnost his generosity — in his treatment of Holland/ which 
had come out of the war not only without the loss of terri- 
tory but with a highly advantageous treaty of commerce. 
He had demonstrated his military power in resisting single- 
handed a European coalition in a war fought entirely on 
foreign soil. He had displayed his diplomatic skill in 
promptly dissolving the coalition which he had successfully 
opposed in the field, and in dictating his own terms to every 
one of the allies. He had besides this considerably in- 
creased the territories and strengthened the frontiers 
of France at the expense of Spain, which was compelled 
to yield to all of his demands. The Peace of Nymwegen 
was, therefore, from every point of view a triumph for 
Louis XIV; but it was not of a nature to give tranquillity 
to Europe, and contained the seeds of future strife. The 
King of France had not negotiated as an equal, but as a 
master.^ 



* The negotiations of the Peace of N)rmwegen are recorded in full 
in the series of M&moirea et Documents, in the Archives des Affaires 



158 A mSTORY OF DIPLOMACY 

Chap. II But the triumph of Louis XIV did not end with the sig- 
1070-1684 ^^^^^"^ ^' *^® treaties. He had discovered a way to make new 
conquests in a time of peace. As a memorial of his achieve- 
ments and a prelude to his further pretensions, he caused 
The new pro- a medal to be made at Paris which bore the inscription: 
JJT^^ "Pace in leges suaa confecta*' — "Peace made in accordance 
with his own laws.'' 

like the Emperor Frederick I in 1158 at the Diet of Ron- 
caglia,^ and Philip IV of France in expropriating the English 
possessions in Guyenne,* Louis XIV laid claim in the name 
of the law to that which he had, through the subtle phrase- 
ology of the treaties, acquired indirectly by the sword. 

The French jurists were now set to work to discover 
what rights had been conveyed to France by such expres- 
sions in the treaties as "leurs bailliages, chastellenies, 
gouvemances, prevostez, territoires, domaines, seigneuries, 
appartenances, dependanoes, et annexes/' — which included 
everything possessed, or to which there was an ancient claim, 
by any of the cities or overlordships that had come under 
his dominion, "by whatever name they might be called." 
The first indication of this procedure grew out of the 
trouble with Spain, in December, 1679, over the title "Duke 
of Burgundy" employed in the full powers of the Spanish 
plenipotentiary. Baron de Christin. The French coim- 
cillors Pelletier and De Worden refused to accept his cre- 
dentials, on the ground that this title did not belong to the 
King of Spain. In the Spanish reply of May, 1680, a modi- 
fication of the full powers was refused. Louis XIV then 
announced that if by the following July 15 — afterward 
extended to September 15 — the title was not renounced, he 
would "take possession of all that he believed belonged to 
him by virtue of the Treaty of Nymwegen." The King of 
Spain under this pressure renounced the title of Duke of 
Burgundy; but the military executions previously ordered 



fitrang^res at Paris. A good general rimwU may be found in Vast, Les 
grands traiUa, II, pp. 23, 46. 

1 See Volume I of this work, pp. 287, 289. 

* See Volume II of this work, pp. 4, 5. 



PEBIL AND BESCT7E OF THE DUTCH REPUBLIC 159 

were not countennanded, and French soldiers proceeded to Chap. II 
occupy some twenty-odd places, which rendered the i^^^^g^ 



Eng of France practically master of the entire Duchy of ■ 
Luxemburg. 

In order to give a form of legality to this novel procedure The cftombrM 
in the interpretation of treaties, Colbert de Croissy in- * ^^'^••^ 
stituted a judicial examination of the titles acquired by 
France through the treaties with Spain and the Emperor, 
including the disputed territories which had been com- 
priaed in the Treaty of Mtinster at the Peace of West- 
phalia. In taking this course Louis XIV was not entirely 
without justification, since the Empire had itself raised ques- 
tions of interpretation, based on certain ambiguities of the 
text, in the case of the cessions in Alsace; the Germans con- 
tending that the feudal and imperial privileges of certain 
dties and princes under the Empire still belonged to the 
Eknpire and were not absorbed by the cession of these terri- 
tories in the sovereignty of the King of France, while the 
French jmrists maintained that not only were these privileges 
entirely transferred to the sovereignty of the King, but also 
all the dependencies of every kind of which these cities 
and princes were the suzerains. 

To settle these points, Louis XIV organized the cele- 
brated Charnbrea de Riunion, — one at Metz in 1679, the 
other at Breisach in 1680. The duty of these chambers 
was to examine into the fiefs in Alsace and in the three 
Bishoprics of Verdim, Metz, and Toul which might thus be 
claimed by the Kmg of BVance as ultimate possessor of 
all the feudal rights of his subjects. The Parliament of 
BesanQon also was charged with similar duties for Franche- 
Comt«. 

Thus by the application of the principles of feudal law 
as understood by his own jurists, in a period of peace, 
Louis XIV adjudged to himself, and afterward occupied 
by force wherever there was resistance, some eighty fiefs 
which were not, it was held, intended to be included in 
the cessions. 

The policy of the riuniam, while professing to be legal, 



160 



A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY 



Chap. II 

A. D. 

1670-1684 



The rareiMd 
of relatiom in 
the North 



7 



gave no opportunity for legal defence on the part of those 
who were dispossessed. The avidity with which the pro- 
cedure was conducted and the remorseless cruelty with 
which the decrees were executed soon completely destroyed 
the confidence in the good faith of the King which had been 
inspired by his comparative moderation in negotiating the 
treaties. Not only the cities and princes whose preroga- 
tives were thus absorbed by the sovereign, but all the coun- 
tries of Europe were astonished if not enraged by this 
summary procedure. It was imdoubtedly one of the greatest 
errors of the Grand Monarch's reign. 

As regards the technical legality of the rhmiona, opinions 
have differed widely; and it is no part of our purpose to dis- 
cuss it here. But practically and historically the benefits 
to France were more than overbalanced by the bitter hos- 
tility to Louis XIV which this course created. The worst 
mistake of all, perhaps, was the annexation of the Duchy 
of Zweibrtlcken, which was then claimed through inheri- 
tance by the King of Sweden. Louis XIV coolly informed 
his faithful ally, Charles XI, that he must do homage to 
him as suzerain for Zweibriicken, or the duchy would be 
united directly with the crown of France. The King of 
Sweden of course refused, and Louis XIV, as a consequence, 
lost the good will of the only ally who had remained faith- 
ful to him throughout his war with the Coalition of The 
Hague. 
It is true that at this time Frederick William had re- 
' turned to his alliance with Louis XIV, from whom he was 

^ ^ again receiving a subsidy of ten thousand livres per annum, 

' uul ^^^ ^^ pledged his vote as Elector to the King of France 

" ^ / in case of a vacancy in the Empire;^ but the alliance was, 
as it had always been, in reality an enforced relation; for 
the Elector had great need of the French subsidies, and 
entertained the hope that the detachment of Sweden from 
France might render Louis XIV less disposed to sustain the 
Swedish cause in Germany. 



* See the treaty of October 25, 1679, in Moemer, StaatsoertrOffe, pp. 



704, 708. 



./"rr 



PERIL AND RESCUE OP THE DUTCH REPUBLIC 161 

And yet, even for such equivocal friendship as Frederick Chap. U 
William showed to France Louis XIV was willing to pay the . -J^^J^g. 

price so welcome to the empty pockets of Brandenburg. 

In the four years from 1680 to 1684, the French envoy 
R^benac disbursed in presents alone a hundred and sixty 
thousand livres, of which forty-seven thousand went to 
Meinders, the Elector's Secretary of State, and thirty- cl -^--^ ^ * 
two thousand to Paul Fuchs, an influential privy coimcillor. 
The wife of the Elector, Dorothea, was loaded with presents, 
and promised to cultivate the "perfect friendship" of her 
husband with the King of France. Even the Elector him- 
self was not forgotten, and at one time he received as an 
"exceptional present" the sum of one hundred thousand 
livres.* 

Notwithstanding all these evidences of personal favor, 
Frederick William, who was German to the core, winced 
under the encroachments upon the Empire occasioned by the 
rhmions; but when B^benac pointed out that these were 
merely the legal consequences of the Treaties of Nymw^^en, 
the Elector, who deeply resented the desertion of himself 
by the Elmperor in his separate peace with France, was in- 
clined to consider them as judgments visited upon the 
Empire for which he was not responsible. With this feeling, 
cm January 11, 1681, he gave his practical sanction to the 
rkmians by signing a new treaty with Louis XIV in which 
he promised his aid to France without reserve. 

The capture of Strasburg in a time of peace, however, 
deeply touched the pride and affections of Frederick Wil- 
liam; but the annexation of Zweibriicken was welcome to 
him, and served to hold in check his feelings of resentment. 
Believing that he would now have an opportimity to chase 
the Swedes out of Germany with French approval, on Jan- 
uary 22, 1682, he signed still another treaty with France, 
in which Louis XIV promised to end his aggressions upon 
the Empire with the appropriation of Strasburg, at the 
same time increasing his annual subsidy to four hundred 
thousand livres, while the Elector on his part agreed to 

^ For detaik, see Waddington, Le Grand Eledeur, II, pp. 468, 469. 
VOL. m. — 11 



162 A HISTORY OP DIPLOMACY 

Chap. U sanction all the results of the rSuniana that had been so far 
1670-^684 acconipli8lied.i 
Unfortunately for the repose of Europe, the Peace of 



Westphalia had left the fate of Strasburg and the ten im- 
The dqrfomatio perial cities quite uncertain; for, although Upper and Lower 
g^^^ Alsace and the Sundgau, with the "prefecture" of the 
ten cities had been ceded in full sovereignty by the Treaty 
of Mtinster, the eighty-seventh article of that treaty had 
introduced a qualification that enveloped the cession, 
in a veil of obscurity. Mazarin had left the question un- 
settled, and in the early part of his reign Louis XIV himself 
had treated the city of Strasburg as an independent city- 
republic under the protection of France. 

Since the Treaty of Nymw^en, however, Louis XIV 
considered the discussion regarding the meaning of the 
Treaty of Mtinster as permanently closed; for, although 
restitution of the Alsatian cities had been urged by the 
Emperor's plenipotentiaries, their claims had been re- 
jected.* At all events, Strasburg having through the 
astute audacity of Louvois, on September 30, 1681, capitu- 
lated, he enjoyed the advantage of full possession. 

The Emperor having shown his inability to protect the 
Empire, the EHector of Mainz had suggested that ''a new 
emperor" was necessary; and the proposal was put forth 
that, as a preliminary, the Dauphin be at once chosen King 
of the Romans, with the understanding that Alsace be re- 
stored to the Empire, and that a united effort be made to 
expel the Turks from Eiu'ope. 

Leopold I, at last alive to the peril of his dynasty, was in 
the meantime earnestly endeavoring to reconcile the Him- 
garians by treating them with greater liberality, and to 
maintain peace with the Turks; but Louis XIV, deter- 
mined to keep him preoccupied in the East, had brought 



1 For the treaty, see Moemer, Staatavertrdge, p. 715 et seq. 

' For the terms proposed and refused regarding the question of 
Alsace at Nymwegen, see Dumont, VII, Part I, p. 382; also Vast, Les 
grands traiUs, note to p. 117; and the full discussion by Legrelle, Louia 
XIV et Strasbourg, 



PERIL AND RESCUE OF THE DUTCH REPUBLIC 163 

his impalpable and mysterious influence over the Oriental Chap. ll 
enemies of the Elmpire to the height of its efficiency. Tekeli, ^fJ^^oA 
the chief of the Hungarian rebels, was receiving subsidies 



from France, and the Grand Vizier, Kara-Mustapha, was 
started on the road to Vienna. 

Contemplating still further inroads upon both the Empire The eifort of 
and the Spanish Netherlands, Louis XIV was desirous of JlSniw SrinL 
securing at least the neutrality, and if possible the support, of 
of the United Provinces; but the hostility of William III 
seemed to be unconquerable. Unable to destroy the influence 
of the stadtholder by sowing the seeds of opposition among 
the remnants of the DeWitt administration, and accus- 
tomed to the bribery of sovereigns, the King resolved to 
obtun the Prince's favor by secret purchase. 

Count D'Avaux, who knew the character of William III, 
was convinced beforehand of the uselessness of such an 
imdertaking; but, in obedience to the commands of his 
royal master, he ventured to approach the Grand Pension^ 
ary Fagel with an oflfer of two million livres, if he could 
dispose the Prince^ to unite with France; proposing as an 
inducement to the Prince the title of Coimt of Holland, 
the rank of generalissimo in the French army, and several 
millions in cash. 

Fagel, amazed at this audacity, repelled the offer with 
indignation, and declined to offend the Prince by even 
addressing him upon the subject. Incapable of compre- 
hendmg how any one could spurn his "generosity," Louis 
XIV next resolved to accomplish his end by the use of 
compulsion. 

The Principality of Orange, a small enclave in the heart 
of Fiance, which gave the title of "Prince" to its sovereign 
rulers, the C!o\mts of Nassau, had long been an asylum 
for French adherents of the Calvinistic faith, and especially 
ance the guarantees accorded them by the Edict of Nantes 
had been so openly and violently disregarded. In order to 
constrain the Prince, the King decreed first that French stu- 
dents should no longer be permitted to attend the Cal- 
vinist College; then that all French subjects within the limits 



164 



A HISTORY OP DIPLOMACY 



Chap. II 

A. D. 

1670-1684 



The nege of 
Vienna 



of the principality must leave its territory; then that its 
walls and fortifications be destroyed; and finally, in 1682, he 
- appropriated it altogether. 

Although Holland was not in a position to aid the E2m- 
peror in the defence of his capital against the attack of 
the Turks, the Prince of Orange and the States General 
urged him to make terms with Tekeli; for they realized 
how powerless Europe was to resist the aggressions of 
Louis XIV so long as the whole force of the Empire was 
directed toward the East. In May, 1683, the Sultan's 
army was at Belgrade, and on July 17 began the siege of 
Vienna. Resistance to French aggressions on the Rhine 
was for the moment impossible. 

While the Pope was straining every nerve to encourage 
activity against the Infidel in Poland, the French diplo- 
matists were using all their powers of dissuasion; but So- 
bieski had passed completely from under French influence 
and took pleasure in showing his independence. As an 
elective king, he had been refused the honor of the title 
''Majesty,'' and had been forced to content himself with 
the lower rank of "Serene Highness"; and the Queen of 
Pdand, who had planned a triumphant visit to her native 
France, having been informed that, not being an equal, she 
would not be accorded the hand of the Queen, had abandoned 
her journey. Urged on by the Pope, Poland plimged actively 
into the fray under the energetic leadership of Sobieski; 
and most of the princes of the Empire, both Protestant and 
Catholic, with the conspicuous exception of the Elector of 
Brandenburg, offered aid. But Louis XIV forbade his 
subjects to join in the struggle against the Turks, resumed 
the work of the r&unionsy and assembled an army in Alsace. 
In September, 1683, when the danger at Vienna was at its 
height, he again invaded the Spanish Netherlands with 
thirty-five thousand men.^ 



1 While Vienna was besieged, Louis XIV was preparing, in case it 
fell, to assert himself as the saviour of the Empire, and thus establish 
his complete predominance. For this pxirpose, says Voltaire, "He had 
an army on the frontiers of the Empire ready to defend it against the 



PERIL AND RESCUE OP THE DUTCH REPUBLIC 166 

Too proud, even in a state of debility and prostration, Chap. li 
to submit without resistance to the process of vivisection iQ>^fi^'Qo^ 



so exasperatingly carried on by the rSunions, Spain, which • 
under the influence of Don John had been vainly seeking 
the friendship of France, resolved to declare war. 

On September 12, 1683, the united armies of Germany The renewal 
and Poland defeated the Turks. Vienna was saved and ^^ ^^ 
the piursuit of the invaders began. But the conflict between 
Spain and France, begun on December 11, came too quickly 
for the Empire to render assistance. 

Aid was sought by Spain at every court in Europe, but 
none was prepared to offer effective intervention. Leo- 
pold I had, in 1682, negotiated with Sweden,^ with Holland,* 
and even with England for a new alliance against Louis 
XIY, and William of Orange had done all in his power 
to revive the coalition; but the Prince was still embarrassed 
by the republican traditions, and was rendered powerless 
to act by the peaceful inclinations of the rich traders and 
shipowners, no longer distrustful of the monarch who had 
in the Peace of Njmiwegen treated them with unexpected 
moderation and restored their commercial privileges. 

In England Charles II was still the pensioner of Louis 
XIV, and so entirely at odds with the ParUament that both 
were incapable of effective action. 

In vain was help implored by Spain. All the powers proved 
unresponsive, and resistance only increased the suffering 
of the beleaguered towns, subjected to a merciless bombard* 
ment in which women and children perished by hundreds 
in their homes. Of the six hundred houses which com- 
posed the city of Luxemburg, seventy-seven were entirely 
destroyed by fire, ninety-seven were left in complete ruins, 
one hundred and seventy-three were partly demolished, and 
ninety-five were found roofless when the city, on June 4, 
1684, capitulated. 



Turks whom his previous negotiations had brought there.'' — Stkle de 
LouU XIV, p. 234. 

> See Dumont, VII, Part 11, p. 37. 

• See Dumont, VII, Part II, p. 19. 



166 



A HISTORY OP DIPLOMACY 



Chap. II 

A.D. 

1670-1684 



The Triiee of 
Regenibiiii 



Under the influence of William of Orange, Holland 
finally proposed a diplomatic inquiry; and in Jime, 1684, 
- a conference was held at The Hague to discuss the preten- 
sions of Louis XIV. The threat of the Spanish ambassador, 
the Marquis de Moncayo, to abandon the Spanish Nether- 
lands to France revived for a time the fears of the Hollanders, 
who dreaded the complete loss of equilibrium in Europe, 
in which they had found their safety; but, once more, 
Louis XIV outwitted the powers by treating separately with 
the States General. By a treaty signed at The Hague on 
Jime 29, 1684, France was allowed to retain Luxemburg, 
Chimai, Beaumont, and Bouvines, restoring to Spain only 
Dixmund and Courtrai,^ with the promise of a truce of 
twenty years, which the States General agreed to enforce 
upon the King of Spain.* 

In the meantime Louis XIV had offered a similar truce 
of twenty years to the Empire also. At the Imperial Diet 
held at R^^nsburg, with the aid of his German allies and 
the persuasion of the French ambassador, Verjus de Cr6cy, 
— who was liberal in subsidies and prodigal in assurances, — 
all the pretensions of the King of France were recognized, 
and on August 15, 1684, the truce was signed. It left 
France in possession of Strasburg with full sovereignty, 
and in peaceable occupation of all the cities and seigneuries 
awarded to the King by his Chambres de R&union.* Spain, 
which had authorized Leopold I to negotiate in her behalf 
at Regensburg, soon afterward accepted the conditions 
recommended by the Elmperor; and thus was completed 
the diplomatic triumph of ''Louis le Grand" — as the 
municipality of Paris had entitled the King — by the 
Truce of Regensburg, which was the crown and conclusion 
of the Treaties of N3rmwegen. 



* For the seizures of territory in the Spanish Netherlands through 
the rhaiions, see Lonchay, La rivcdiU de la Prance et de VEepagne avx 
Paye-Bas, p. 297 et seq. 

* For the treaty, see Dumont, VII, Part II, p. 79 et seq. 

* For the text, see Dumont, VII, Part II, p. 81 et seq. 



PERIL AND RESCTJE OF THE DUTCH BEPUBLIC 167 



AUTHORITIES Chap. II 

A. D. 

In addition to the oollectionB cited in the previous chapter, — par- 1670-1684 
ticularly Dumont, Vast, M5mer, and the contemporary oorrespond- 
eooe, — see Mimoire inidit de LouU XIV rdatif d la campOQne de Dooumeau 
167S, published in the appendix to Rousset, L'Histoire de Lotwoois, I, 
Paris, 1872; Boyer, Histaire de GtnUaume Illy Amsterdam, 1692, is a 
biography by a contemporary and contains important information; 
Sanderson, Original LeUere from King WiUiam III, then Prince of 
Orange, to King Charles II, Lord Arlington, etc., London, 1704. Mavi- 
dal, Mimoiree du marquie de Pomponne, Paris, 1861, is useful but in- 
complete; an unpublished MS. containing Correspondance politique 
du Marquis de Pomponne (MS. fr. 7133 et acq. fr. 3646-8) exists in the 
Biblioth^ue Nationale in Paris, and there is also an unpublished 
Tableau des jStats de VEurope en 1679 in the Archives des Affaires 
Strang^res, France, Mimoires et documents, vol. 417, on Pomponne's 
embassy to Sweden. 

For the treaties of France and other powers with the Sultan of Turkey, 
see Testa, RecueU des traitis de la Porte Ottomane aivee les puissances 
Strangles, Paris 1864r-1896. 

Q68iiage, Annales des Proinnees-Unies, Rotterdam, 1716, contains ' j 

much contemporary material; also The Essex Papers, 1 (1672-1670), 
published by the Camden Society, 1890. 

Other contemporary documents are Comte d'Avaux, Nigociations en 
HoOande (1670-1684), Paris, 1752-1753; D'Estrades, Lettres, nUmoires 
el nigodaiums, London, 1743 (reviewed in part by Qoll in Revue His- 
torique, III (1877), with reference to authenticity; Lettres et nigocia* 
tions de MM. le marichal d'Estrades, Colbert marquis de Croissy, et comte 
d^Avaux . . , et les r^ponses et ifistructions du Roi et de M, de 
Pomponne (1676-1677), The Hague, 1710; Gallois, Lettres inSdites de 
FeuquQres, Paris, 1846; Curren, The Correspondence of an English 
Diplomatic Agent in Paris, 1669-1677, in the Transactions of the Royal 
Historical Society, New Series, XV (1901); letters by and to Lord 
IVeston, English ambassador in France (1682-1685), under title of The 
Graham Papers, in Report of the Historical MS. Commission, VII 
(1879); Michaud, Innocent XI, sa politique gSnirdle et see intrigues 
centre la France, Paris, 1882-1883, considered a one-sided presentation 
of facts; Saint-Didier, Histoire des nSgociatums de Nimhgue, Paris, 
1680; Moetjens, Aetes et mhnoires des nSgociaiions de la paix de Nv- 
mhgue, Amsterdam and Nymwegen, 1679-1680; Mignet, NSgociations, 
etc., previously cited, is, however, the best single authority on the nego- 
tiations preceding the Peace of Nymwegen. 

In addition to some of the literature cited for the previous chapter, litenitare 
the following works are useful for the period 1672-1684: 

Immich, GesckicfUe des europdischen Siaaiensystems von 1660 bis 



168 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY 

Chap. II 1789, Munich, 1905, containing exhaustive bibliography; Michels, Zwr 
A. D. VorgeschichU van Ludvnga XIV EinfaU in Holland, Halle, 1900; Sirtema 
1670-16&4 ^je Qrovestins, GuUlaume III et Louis XIV: kisUrire dea luUea et rivaliUs 
polUiquea entre lea puiaaancea maritimea et la France, Paris, 1868. 

On the secret diplomacy of Charles II, see Akennan, Secret Service 
Expenaea of Charlea II and Jamea II, Camden Society, London, 1851. 

For the Dutch diplomacy of the time, see Bylandt, Het diplomatiah 
heleid von Hieronymua van Bevemingk (1672-1678), Leyden, 1863; 
Kr&mer, De nederlandache-apaanache diplomaiie, Utrecht, 1872; and 
Hora Siccama, Sir Gabriel de Sylviua (1660-1696), in Revue d'Histoire 
Diplomatique, XIV (1900) and XV (1901); Van Sypestein, Nederland 
en Brandenburg (1672-1673), The Hague, 1863; MOller, Nederlanda 
eerate betrekkingen met Ooatenrijk, Amsterdam, 1870. 

The biographies of William III of Orange by Harris, Dublin, 1749; 
Trevor, London, 1835; and Trail, London, 1902, are all inadequate and 
unsatisfactory so far as continental affairs are concerned. A definitive 
life of William III is still a desideratum. 

On the situation of the German states, see Vehse, Geackichte dea 
daterreickiachen Hofa und Adda und der daterreickiachen Diplomatie, 
Hamburg, 1852; and Geackichte der deutachen Hdfe aeit der Reformaiion, 
Hamburg, 1854-1860, for much curious but not very important informa- 
tion. For the state of opinion in Germany regarding the aims of Louis 
XIV, see Dieffenbach, Der franzdaiatke Einfluaa in Deutachland unter 
Ludwig XIV, Dresden, 1889; and Haller, Deutache Pyblinatik in den 
Jakren 1668-1674: ein BeUrag zwr Geackichte der Ravbhriege Ludwiga 
XIV, Heidelberg, 1892. For the plans and proposals of Leibnits, see 
Fabre, La diplomatie de Letbnite, in Revue d'Histoire Diplomatique, 
XIX (1905), XX (1906), and XXI (1907). For the poUcy of Branden- 
burg, see in addition to Pagds and Waddington, previously cited, Droy- 
sen, Geackichte der pretiaaiacken Politik, Berlin, 1855-1886, whose theory 
that the policy of the Great Elector was a national German policy rather 
than mainly Brandenbuigian is, however, now generally aJbandoned. 

The best single work on the policy of Louis XIV during this period is 
Rousset, Hiatoire de Lotwoia et de aon adminiatroHon politique et mUv- 
iaire, Paris, 1874; documents relating to Pomponne are to be found in 
the appendix to Delavand, Le marquia de Pomponne, Paris, 1911. 

The relations of Louis XIV to Rome are discussed by Petrucelli della 
Gattina, Hiatoire diplomatique dea condavea, III, Paris, 1865; G4rin, 
Louia XIV et le SaintSihge, Paris, 1894, and Le pape Innocent XI et 
le aiige de Vienne en 1683, in Revue de Questions Historiques, 
XXXIX (1886); and Immich, Papat Innocenz XI, Berlin, 1900. 

On the negotiations at N3rmwegen, see Temple, Complete Worka, 
London, 1720; and Wynne, Life and Lettera of Sir Leoline Jenkina, 
London, 1724. 

On the appropriations of territory made by Louis XIV through the 
Chambrea de Biunion, in addition to the literature cited in Volume II, 



PERIL AND RESCUE OF THE DUTCH REPUBLIC 169 

Chapter V, pp. 610, 611 of this work regarding the Akacian question, Chap. II 
see Legrelle, LouU XIV et Sircubourgf Paris, 1881; Bourgeois, E. Col- a. d. 
hertdsCraisayetleaChambres de B^imiow, in Revue Historique, XXXTV 1670-1684 
(1887); Pfister, Les rhmions en Alsace, in Revue d' Alsace, 1895; 
Hobcher, Die dffenUiche Meinung in Deuttchland aber den Fall Stras»- 
hurffs, Munich, 1896; Bardot, La prtfectvre dee dix miles Ubres impMales 
d^Alaaee, Lyons, 1899; and Kaufmann, Die Reunionskammer zu MeU^ 
Mets, 1900. 

For the relations of Louis XIV with the Ottoman Empire, see Van- 
dal, Les voyages du marquis de NoirUel (1670-1680), Paris, 1900; 
Seheffer, Minujvre histarique star Vambassade de France d ConstanU' 
nopfe par le marquis de Bonnac, Paris, 1894. 

For the state of morals at the Court of Charles II of England, see 
Fomeron, Louise de Kiroualle, duehesse de Portemouth (1649-1734), 
hn8,1886. 



CHAPTER m 

THE FORMATION OF THE GRAND ALLIANCE 



Th» hntd&t 



THE outlook of Louis XIV for a vast extension of per- 
j^^,^ j^^^ sonal power in Europe was never so brilliant as in the 

years immediately following the Peace of Nymw^en. In 
the long duel between Bourbons and Hapsburgs the advan- 
tage of the kings of France had never been so great. The 
larger part of the great heritage of Charles the Bold had now 
passed from the House of Hapsburg, and the last war had 
shown that Louis XIV was capable of resisting the combined 
power of the two branches of that dynasty. Three great 
fields of conquest now seemed to offer to the vision of the 
triumphant king the glory of increased dominion. 

Of these the first was the dream of the Spanish succession. 
Charles 11, King of Spain, — who had lived on his nurses 
until he was five years old, and was such an imperfect sketch 
of a human being that he was not expected to outlive his 
prolonged infancy, — had in defiance of all expectation 
reached a marriageable age, and immediately after the 
Peace of Nymw^en had married Marie-Louise of Orl&ms, 
a niece of the King of France; but six unfruitful years had 
practically proved the marital incapacity of the King, and 
left the question of succession always open. 

Notwithstanding the ancient theory of ''natural limits," 
which assigned to the Kingdom of France all the territory 
between the I^renees, the Alps, and the Rhine, those limits 
had never been fully reached. Pursuant to the policy of 
Richelieu and Mazarin, — the classic standard of French 
diplomacy, — even should the dream of the Spanish suc- 
cession come true, there might be still further territorial 
acquisitions from the Empire. The complete appropriation 



TH£ fobmahon of the grand alliance 171 

of Alsace by the reunions and the recent capitulation of Cbap. m 
Strasburg were long steps in this direction, but further en- ^o^^^m 

croachments upon the Elmpire would still be necessary for 

the rounding out of the kingdom if the aspiration for a re- 
united Gaul was to be fully satisfied.^ 

But the ''natural limits" of France in the direction of the 
Iknpire were not the boundaries of Louis XIV's ambition. 
If Leopold I should die, what was to prevent the election of 
the Kng of France to the throne of the Caesars? And even 
if Leopold continued to live, what was there to hinder the 
election of the Dauphin as ''King of the Romans '7 

It is true that, to appease the Germans, Aubrfy had 
been sent for a short time to the Bastille for writing his book 
on ''Les Justes Pretentions du Boi sur TEmpire " in which 
he vindicated the historic claims of Louis XIV to the crown 
of the Empire. But this was merely because the publication 
was considered untimely and impolitic; and Bossuet, with 
entire approval, in 1685, in his funeral oration on Le Tellier, 
did not hesitate to refer to Louis XIV as "ce ruytweau Con- 
siantin^* and "c6 norweau Charlemagne.'^ Nor were these 
expressions mere figures of rhetoric employed by a court 
preacher for the purpose of flattering the vanity of a sov- 
ereign. Directly after the Peace of Nymwegen the King had 
secretly negotiated with three Electors at once for the con- 
trol of their votes, in case the imperial throne should be- 
come vacant; and at one time he seemed to have all the 
suffrages in hand except that of Bohemia.* 

But it was not in Grermany alone that he intended to 
become a new Charlemagne. He had already displayed his 
power at Rome; and, outside of the Papacy, Italy presented 
no formidable obstacle to his domination. The Venetians 
had become mere observers of the political drama of Europe. 
The Spanish possessions in Italy were as helpless as were 
those in the Netherlands. The Dukes of Modena, Mantua, 
and Savoy were counted and treated as ''mere valets of a 
powerful master." Of the two keys of Northern Italy, 

* See Volume I of this work, p. 601. 

' See Vast, Revue Historique, LXV, p. 23 et seq. 



172 



A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY 



Chap. Ill 

A.D. 

1684-1697 



Pinerolo and Casale, the former had been m the possession 
of the French since 1631, and the latter, to the surprise of 
• Europe, had been occupied by French troops in 1681.^ 

Thus far, with the exception of the attempt to crush Hol- 
land, the policy of Louis XIV had been, in the main, in some 
sense a national policy. He had aimed to extend and to 
strengthen the frontiers of France, and this was the continu- 
ation of the system of Richelieu and Mazarin. But after 
the Peace of Nymwegen, a new period opens in the history 
of France and of Europe; for the broader designs of the King, 
hitherto concealed, were now becoming manifest. Not con- 
tent with the security of France, he was now thinking of 
winning for himself other kingdoms, and even dreaming of 
imperial dominion. ''All-powerful in the Mediterranean, 
heir of the Crown of Spain, holding England at his discre- 
tion, he believed he had succeeded in infeodating Grermany. 
Emperor and King, he would have governed directly the 
half of Europe. ... He would have become the sovereign 
arbitrator of all quarrels, the judge of crowned heads, the 
providence of peoples, the pacificator of the world." * 



Louis XIV*8 
ohampionahip 
of reUcioiiB 
iinitj 



I. The Revival op the Counter-Reformation 

It is interesting to note with what unanimity great mon- 
archs have sought support for their political aspirations in 
the realm of religion. Nearly all of the great organizers of 
empire have become the apostles of some form of religious 
faith, to which they have sought to make the rest of the world 

^ Casale was occupied on the same day as the capitulation of Stras- 
burg, and the incident gave to the power of Louis XIV an appearance 
of omnipresence that frightened Italy as the rontons had frightened 
the Empire. The negotiations for this citadel had been conducted 
with the dissipated Duke of Mantua, Charles III, to whom it belonged, 
through Count Mattioli, who 0old the secret to the Spaniards. The 
occupation was, however, afterward forced on the Duke of Mantua, 
and Mattioli strangely disappeared. He is supposed to be the **Man 
vnih the Iron Mask,^^ the mysterious prisoner who died in the Bastille 
in 1703. See Funck-Brentano, Vhomme an masque de velotare noir dU Is 
masque defer, Paris, 1894. 

" Vast, Revue Historique, LXV, p. 44. 



THE fobmahon of the grand alliance 173 

conform. So far as their personal lives were concerned. Chap, hi 
neither Constantine nor Charlemagne was a very consistent .g^^'ggy 

Christian, but they were strenuous champions of religion, 

and found advantage in its unity. It is true also that this 
championship assumed a new intensity, and even a new 
ferocity, at the moment when they realized that the conquest 
of nations was greatly facilitated by a previous conquest of 
souls. 

For nearly a century the Edict of Nantes, which had made 
an end of the internal religious wars of France by securing 
toleration to the Huguenots and opening to them on equal 
terms all offices in the State, had stood as a monument to 
the wisdom of Henry IV. The austerity of life habitual 
among the Calvinists and the increasing worldliness of the 
Court had practically kept them in the background, and so 
far as the peace of France was concerned there was no new 
reason for opposing them. 

But for the King a new motive for crushing out heresy had 
come into being. If he wished to renew the glories of the 
reign of Charlemagne, it would be necessary to discover 
some form of human interest more universal than merely 
personal devotion to which appeal might be made. Like 
other imperial rulers, he perceived that, in order to 
dominate Ehux)pe, he must become the champion of relig- 
ious unity. 

In 1681, in the midst of the r&unwns, Louis XIV suddenly 
conunanded the Court to be religious; and, forthwith, every 
courtier became a missionary. The intendants in the prov- 
inces occupied by Huguenots were instructed to make "con- 
verts," not of the ungodly but of the Calvinists, and immense 
seal was displayed in the work of "conversion." From the 
moment it was understood that piety was esteemed at Court, 
and that blasphemy, libertinage, and indifference would 
obstruct preferment, religion suddenly became the fashion. 
Not being adepts in theological argmnent, the intendants 
resorted to more palpable forms of persuasion and invented 
the dragonnadea. IViests and soldiers were quartered in 
pairs in the houses of the Huguenots; the former to show 



174 



A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY 



Chap. Ill 

A.D. 

1684-1697 



The bottOfty 
of Louis XIV 
to the Pope 



them the way of life, and the latter to supply sufficient 
motives for pursuing it. 

If Louis XIV could not tolerate any authority but his 
own within the State, it was even harder to accept the exist- 
ence .of a superior power outside of it. Throughout the whole 
of his reign he had been at variance with every occupant of 
the Holy See. During the persecution of the Huguenots, 
up to the moment of the total suppression of their rights in 
France, the Pope had never been consulted. When at last 
his judgment was expressed, Innocent XI declared that the 
methods adopted were against the true interest of the Roman 
Catholic Church.^ 

Apparently more Catholic than the Pope, the King was 
nevertheless perpetually at war with Rome. The reason for 
this anomaly is obvious. He regarded himself as the head of 
the Church in France. The truth is, Louis XIV was not a 
Roman Catholic in the ordinary sense; but an advocate of 
the independent rights of national churches, presided over 
in each case by the ruling monarch. For him religion was 
an appanage of royalty. 

When, in 1677, the papal nuncio, by direction of Innocent 
XI, urged Louis XIV to request the Kings of England and 
Sweden to moUify the laws concerning Catholicism in their 
kingdoms, he declined to take any action, on the ground 
that the King, ''as their master," had a right ''to impose on 
his subjects whatever laws were pleasing to him." ^ 

The nature and education of Louis XIV completely im- 
fitted him for any form of obedience. He had no sense of the 
sacredness of obligations, whether in law, religion, or morals. 
It seems never to have occurred to his mind that the Edict 
of Nantes was a solemn compact, expressly declaring itself 
to be '' perpetual," which he himself had sworn to observe. 
His inordinate personal vanity and egoism beclouded and 



* "Le pape ne regoit pas fort bien lea nouvelles de toutes les oonver- 
Bions qui se font en France, et a m6me dit qu'on se relevait d'une erreur 
pour retomber dans une autre.'' — G^rin, Recherches, p. 319. 

* The King to the Duke d'Estr^es, January 8, 1677, Archives des 
Affaires fitrangSres, "Rome/' vol. 250. 



THE FORMATION OF THE GRAND ALLIANCE 175 

distorted every human relation. He never considered him- Chap, ill 
self bound by a treaty, and in his " M6moires " he assures his ^' ^' 
son that "treaties" have no more serious significance than 



, intereit in 



'compliments"! His conduct was as contradictory as his 
principles were arbitrary. Exterminating Calvinism at home, 
he promoted it in Hungary; holding that kings rule by divine 
right, he nevertheless encouraged their subjects to revolt 
against them; establishing Catholicism in France as the sole 
form of tolerated faith, he conspired with the Sultan to 
wage a murderous war with Christendom; and having failed 
to accomplish his purposes by bribing the Ejng of England, 
he rendered him impotent by bribing Parliament. 

Had Louis XIV been capable of seriously considering any Loob xiv'i 
large human interest beyond art and literature, — which he | 
encouraged because they reflected glory upon his reign, — 
Ehnrope might have entered upon an era of legal and relig- 
ious development that would have changed the course of 
all subsequent history. It was at this time that the philos- 
opher Leibnits, whose great intellect had grasped the need 
of applying reason to the problems of existence, was engaged 
in forming a plan for reconciling and reuniting the Catholic 
and Protestant princes of Germany by a larger spirit of 
toleration and the recognition of fundamental truths that 
were held in common. Innocent XI, who earnestly and sin- 
cerely deabred to restore the unity of Christendom, and was 
devoting his energies to policies of conciliation, with the 
support of the Sacred College, expressed his approbation of 
the plan in writing. The Elmperor and fourteen Protestant 
princes of Grermany had shown themselves favorable to it; 
but "Louis XIV, not content with enfeebling the Pope in 
his own State, . . . traversed his policy even in Rome, and 
opposed with all his power, through his ambassador, the 
success of the project of union." ^ 

For the xinity of Christendom as a whole, or the progress 
of justice and mutual confidence among princes, Louis XIV 
had no sjonpathy. He preferred a divided Europe. To him 
force was the highest court of appeal, and apart from force 

' Foucault, M^moireSf II, p. 245. 



> v^ 



176 



A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY 



Chap. HI 

A. D. 

1684-1697 



The Alarm 

tbe inflnenoe 
of IVanoe 



he had no conception of authority. The root of his antipathy 
to Innocent XI was not a mere difference of personal opin- 
-ions or interests, it was a contradiction of fundamental 
principles. He practically denied the authority of the Pope 
altogether, and instructed his ambassador at Rome to say 
to Innocent XI: "I am absolute master of my subjects, 
ecclesiastic as well as laic, and no one whatever has the right 
to interfere with what I think fit to command them." ^ 

The attitude of Louis XIV toward the Papacy explains 
the practical impossibility of reviving Roman Catholicism 
as a universal religion in Europe. The national monarchies 
were in rebellion against it. The absolutism of the Church 
was opposed by the absolutism of the State, and the "di- 
vine right" to command was equally claimed by both. The 
terrors of another world and the terrors of this world were 
in conflict. 

As an aspirant to imperial power Louis XIV had need of 
the Pope, but he was unwilling to yield to his authority. 
For this reason he was anxious to seem more religious than 
Innocent XI; for, as the Abb6 Legendre well said, "When 
princes are in bad relations with Rome it is precisely then 
that they testify the most zeal for religion, for fear that the 
people, seeing them embroiled with the Pope, will accuse 
them of having no religion whatever." * 

The efforts of Louis XIV to place himself at the head of 
Christendom did not, however, appeal to those who were 
loyal to the Roman Church. It was too evident that he 
regarded religion not as a matter of conviction and obliga- 
tion but as merely an instrument of power, and his zeal de- 
prived him of the confidence and sympathy of the Catholic 
world almost as completely as of that of the Protestants. 
While the Protestants — particularly in Holland and Eng- 
land — regarded him as the chief protagonist of Romanism, 
and therefore a dangerous enemy of their faith, Romanists 
perceived on the other hand that he was not a loyal servant 



^ The King to the Duke d'Esti^es, September 27, 1685, Archives des 
Affaires fitrangdres, "Rome/' vol. 296. 
" Legendre, M^moires, Paris, 1083. 



THE FOBMATION OF THB GRAND ALLIANCE 177 

of the Roman Church and that he really took no part in Chap, hi 
the great forward movement for the revival of Catholicism ^^^^^^^ 
in Europe. 

As a result of this equivocal position the influence of France 
was dreaded on every side. In the eyes of faithful Catholics 
Louis XIV was regarded as disloyal to Rome, an ally of 
the Sultan, and an organizer of rebellion on the part of here- 
tics agsunst a Catholic ruler who was endeavoring to repress 
heresy and defend Christendom. 

On the other hand, Protestants were convinced that he 
intended their total destruction. Daniel Cosnac, Bishop of 
Valence, did not hesitate to say before the Assembly of the 
French Clergy that Protestantism must be everywhere 
esEterminated. In Holland and in England this announce- 
ment awakened a feeling of terror regarding the intentions 
of Louis XIV. In England, the designs of France had long 
been suspected. The negotiations of Louis XIV with Charles 
II had not remained an absolute secret, and even the exist- 
ence of the Treaty of Dover and the personal subsidies paid 
to the King of England were fully known to a few and partly 
understood by many. The idea that Roman Catholicism 
was through French aid to be revived in England had as a 
consequence become a kind of popular obsession, and behind 
the scenes the influence of the King of France was generally 
believed to be working in the dark. The story of Titus Gates 
regarding the alleged "popish plot" had not only created 
among English Protestants needless panic at the time, it 
had excited the popular imagination to such a degree that 
French influence in every form had come to be detested. 

Until his death, on February 6, 1685, Charles II was se- The revirwi 
cretly in the pay and imder the influence of Louis XIV as by^l^^il^n™ 
regards the foreign policy of England; but, in reality, the 
interest of the King of France did not extend far beyond the 
wish to maintain the neutrality of England, in order that 
he might be free to carry out his schemes upon the conti- 
nent. The power of England, if left free to act according to 
the wishes of the nation, would have been exercised against 
these schemes. It was necessary, therefore, to paralyze 

vou ni. — 12 



178 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY 

Chap. Ill the action of Parliament by controlling the policy of the 
I684^ie97 ^^"^' Under cover of furnishing funds for the promotion 

of Roman Catholicism, which served Charles II also as a 

reason for receiving them, the independence of England had 
been sold to France. 

By seeming to comply with the wishes of the country 
during the .last years of his life, Charles II had been able to 
govern without Parliament, which, he privately informed 
Barillon, he intended never again to assemble. Selfish and 
corrupt as his existence was, his purposes had never been so 
far carried into effect as to produce revolt; and his rule, 
which was at least nominally Protestant, had seemed more 
acceptable than that which was expected upon his death, 
when his brother James, Duke of York, an avowed Roman 
Catholic, would come to the throne. 

On the second Simday after the accession of James II, it 
became evident that Roman Catholicism was to be actively 
revived in England, for the Queen's chapel was at once 
opened and the celebration of mass made public. The Prot- 
estant preachers of London were loud in their denimciations, 
but the King showed no signs of concealing his religious fiuth. 

It was soon clear that James II desired and expected the 
continuance of the French subsidies; but, as he had promptly 
summoned Parliament, — for the suppression of which Louis 
XIV had been paying, — he had nothing to offer, and pay- 
ment was accordingly withheld.^ 

Thus, at the beginning of the reign of James II, instead 
of still more intimate relations with the Court of France, 
which had been expected, all the signs of the time pointed 
to a new foreign policy from which French influence was to 
be eliminated. The treaties with Holland were renewed, the 
centre of French intrigue was broken up by sending the 
Duchess of Portsmouth back to France, and the Austrian 
ambassador, Count Thun, wrote a jubilant despatch to the 
Emperor rejoicing in the prospects of the new reign. 



^ At the begiiming of his reign James II received five hundred thou- 
sand livres from Louis XIV, for which he expressed his lasting gratitude; 
but there being no further need, the payments were discontinued. 



THE FORMATION OF THE GRAND ALLIANCE 179 

But the obstinate sincerity of James II in contending for Chap. Ill 
what he esteemed his royal prerogatives soon brought him ^g^^'^j 
into conflict with the Elnglish nation. Parliament was 



promptly dismissed, never to meet again while James II 
occupied the throne, and an open campaign for the revival 
of Roman Catholicism in England was begun. The revo- 
lution, which had long been preparing, was becoming a fact; 
and Louis XIV, who cared more for the neutrality of Eng- 
land than for the fate of the Elnglish Cathohcs, obtained 
without subsidies all that he desired, — the continued im- 
potence of England for effective international action. 

The mantle of distinction for active n^otiation which The 
Louis XIV had so long borne was now to fall upon other and ^^^^' '^ 
younger shoulders. Since the Peace of Nymwegen William 
of Orange had never ceased his efforts to form a new coali- 
tion for the purpose of restraining the further ambitions of 
the King of France. 

Unable to interest the thrifty burghers of Amsterdam in 
any ventures likely to bring upon them the vengeance of 
Louis XIV, and therefore not fully master of the decisions 
of the States General, he could not carry on strictly official 
n^tiations; but this did not prevent his employment of his 
trusted friend, George Frederick, Count of Waldeck, in 
sounding and inspiring the German princes. 

The controlling idea of William Ill's policy was the re- 
establishment of European equilibrium, which had been 
destroyed by the predominance of Louis XIV and the dis- 
solution of the coalition against him by the Peace of Nym- 
w^en; but in the conditions which then existed the task 
seemed one of superhuman magnitude. On October 10, 
1681, an "Association" with Sweden had been formed by 
Holland for the purpose of maintaining the treaties of West- 
phalia and Nymw^en,^ to which the Eknperor had adhered 
on February 28, 1682, and Spain on May 2 of the same year; 
but the compact was purely defensive and of little real sig- 
nificance, except as the beginning of a wider union. 



' See Dumont, VU, Part II, p. 15 et seq. 



180 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY 

Chap. Ill More modesty and yet more practical, were Waldeck's 
1684^697 ^^^'^ imder the personal direction of William III to form 

a military combination among the smaller German princes 

for the defence of the Elmpire. Gradually augmented by 
accessions of greater importance, this union was joined by 
the Elmperor on June 10, 1682, in what is known as the 
"Laxenburg Recess," or "Waldeck's Alliance," in which 
the Elmperor and the Elector of Bavaria agreed to place 
twenty thousand men on the Upper Rhine, the Allies twenty 
thousand on the Middle Rhine, and the Duke of Brunswick- 
Luneburg was urged to place twenty thousand on the Lower 
Rhine, for the defence of the Empire.^ Thus, through the 
quiet but persistent activity of William III and Waldeck, 
the protection of the Empire from French invasion had been 
prepared for when the siege of Vienna by the Turks attracted 
the attention of Europe toward the East. 
BraadenbuiB'i In spitc of all efforts to win his allegiance to the union, the 
JJ^'^JjJ^'^*"^ prince most important to its effectiveness, the Elector of 
aiiianoe Braudcnburg, had remained firm in his alliance with the 

King of France. In strained relations with Leopold I, on 
account of his desertion at Nymwegen and his disregard of 
Frederick William's claims in Silesia, and with the United 
Provinces on account of the unpaid subsidies, in January, 
1685, the Elector still belonged among the clients of France 
in the Empire. But the accession of the Duke of York to 
the throne of England, combined with the persecution of the 
Huguenots in France, made a deep impression upon Freder- 
ick William, who perceived in these events a heavy blow to 
Protestantism in Europe. 

Soon afterward followed a visit from the Brandenburg 
General Spaen to the Prince of Orange at The Hague. His 
frequent conversations with William III and Fagel excited 
the suspicions of the wary Count d'Avaux, always on the 
watch for any defection from his royal master; and the 
arrival of Amerongen ''as if to report upon some matter 
which he could not trust to the pea" confirmed the appre- 
hensions of the French ambassador. 



^ For the text, see Dumont, VII, Part II, p. 23 et aeq. 



THE FORMATION OF THE GRAND ALLIANCE 181 

These visits were in reality the prelude of a new entente Chap, hi 
between the United Provinces and Brandenburg. Encour- tg^^og7 
aged by the confidences of Spaen and the report of Ameron- 



gen, the Prince sent a Huguenot pastor, Gaultier de Saint- 
Blancardi as a secret emissary to Berlin to sound the feelings 
of the Mector regarding the dangers to Protestantism. 

The mission was opportune, for Frederick William, whose 
mind was already filled with the idea that a powerful league 
existed for the total extermination of Protestantism, was 
eager to discuss the subject with the ardent Huguenot. The 
result of the discussion was that Frederick Diest, the Bran- 
denburg envoy at The Hague, was instructed to propose a 
coalition of the Protestant countries for their mutual pro- 
tection. But the zeal of the Elector did not stop with this 
proposal. Upon his return to The Hague in March, Samt- 
Blancard reported to the Prince of Orange that Frederick 
William counselled him to dispute the right of James II to 
the throne of England, and to effect a landing for this pur- ' 
pose on the English coast with ten thousand men.^ As 
evidence of his interest in the Protestant cause, his own 
well-advanced plans for the conquest of Swedish Pomerania 
were at once abandoned, on the ground that all the Prot- 
estant nations should stand together and that the support 
of Sweden was necessary in the coming conflict. 

A succession of events now served to widen the chasm The oompiete 
that had opened between the Elector and his French ally, ^^^^u^ 
On May 26, 1685, the death of the Elector Palatine Charles from Franoe 
opened the way for the accession of a Catholic prince, Philip 
William of Neuburg, to the Palatinate of the Rhine, thus 
leaving the Electoral College of the Empire with only two 
Protestant electors against six Catholics. The change was 
so important that the French diplomatist Chevemy ex- 
cbumed, "Adieu! le parti protestant!'* 

To the mind of Frederick William, the one who most in- 
tended to profit by the destruction of Protestantism without 
being subject to the restraints imposed by the Papacy was 

> See Ennan et Reclam, M^noirea pour servir d Vhistoire des riJugUa 
fransaUy I, 386. 



182 



A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY 



Chap. Ill 
1684-1697 



mentui Bran- 
denburg and 
the Emperor 



his own powerful atly, the head and front of militant Cathol- 
icism in Europe, Louis XIV. When, therefore, the King of 
■ France, in the name of his sister-in-law, Elizabeth-Charlotte 
of Orleans, only daughter of the Elector Charles, advanced 
pretensions to a large portion of the Palatine inheritance, 
Frederick William — although Philip William of Neuburg 
was a rival and a Catholic — firmly supported his cause 
against the French claims. 

According to French law, these claims may have had some 
foundation; but, according to the German laws, as under- 
stood by Frederick William, and by which he contended the 
case should be governed, they bad none; and his envoy, 
Spanheim, was instructed to present strongly at Versailles 
the judicial arguments in favor of Philip William. The 
opposition of Brandenburg was further shown by the fact 
that, although the French ambassador at Berlin, Count 
R^benac, was furnished with credentials from Louis XIV 
authorizing him to be present when the last testament of 
Charles was examined, it was read in the Privy Council 
without notice to the ambassador. On the next day, Fred- 
erick William publicly announced his decision to support 
the claims of Neuburg and counselled rejection of an arbi- 
tration by the Pope, which Louis XIV had proposed. At 
the same time, to reinforce the Protestants in the Electoral 
College, it was suggested that a ninth electorate be estab- 
lished to be filled by Ernest Augustus, Duke of Hanover, of 
the House of Brunswick-Ltineburg. 

As usual the voUe-faee of Frederick William was in appear- 
ance not abrupt; but a steady trend toward reconciliation 
with the enemies of Louis XIV showed plainly that he was 
once more about to reverse his alliances. 

His relations with Austria were still tensely strained, es- 
pecially as regards his Silesian claims; fbr Leopold I had de- 
cided that it was not possible to permit a Protestant prince 
to establish himself in Silesia. Nevertheless, Meinders and 
Fuchs were charged to discuss with the Emperor's envoy. 
Baron von Fridag, the means of settling that question; and, 
to win the friendship of Leopold I, the Elector resolved to 



THE FORMATION OF THE GRAND ALLIANCE 183 

send a contingent of five thousand troops to aid him in his Chap, hi 
war with the Turks. At the same time, his relations with --^^gg- 

R£benac, who was aware of the secret defection from France, 

became so unpleasant that in the heat of his passion the 
Elector at one time so far forgot himself as to threaten to 
have the ambassador thrown out of the window. 

The same motives that inspired the Elector to cultivate The xeoondii*- 
closer relations with the Emperor impelled him to a change ^^^ ®~" 
in his policy toward Sweden. Animated by his ardor for the Swedan 
cause of Protestantism, which now took entire possession of 
him, he instructed his envoy, Pierre Falaiseau, sent on spe- 
cial mission to Stockholm, to urge upon the Swedish Court 
the formation of a great Protestant coalition to oppose the 
designs of France, and fiu-nished him with a secret memoir 
in which were set forth the perils to which the Protestant 
countries, Lutheran and Calvinist alike, were exposed by 
the Koman CathoUc revival. 

Assured of the co-operation of Charles XI in ot>posing the The aIIudm 
designs of France, Frederick William next turned his at- ^.^^^^ 
tention to Holland, and sent his most trusted privy council- 
lor, Paul Fuchs, to The Hague to lay foundations for imited 
action. R^benac, who suspected his intention, endeavored 
to prevent the journey, but his efforts were imavailing. 

In truth, the Prince of Orange was even more anxious for 
an understanding than Frederick William himself, and his 
influence was steadily growing in Holland. The dragonnadea 
with which Louis XIV was pursuing the Huguenots in France 
and the accession of James II to the throne of England had 
filled even the stolid merchants of Amsterdam with alarm. 
Calvinist dominies and French refugees at The Hague 
seemed to divine the meaning of Fuchs' mission, and in- 
creased effect was given to it by their indefatigable appeals 
to the religious sentiments of the burghers, always ending 
with the question, "Is not the Elector of Brandenburg the 
true protector of our faith?" 

Having thoroughly sounded the feelings of the country, 
Fuchs finally disclosed his instructions to the States Gen- 
eral; and, on August 23, 1685, a treaty of amity was signed. 



184 



A HISTORY OP DIPLOMACY 



Chap. Ill 

A.D. 

1684-1607 



The new 
ezMtionof 
Louis XTV 



Thereroe*- 
tkmofthe 
Edict of Nantee 



in which a compFomise was effected regarding the overdue 
subsidies, indemnity was offered and accepted for the capn 
■ ture of a Brandenburg vessel by the Dutch in Guinea, and 
the defensive alliance of 1678 was renewed until 1700.* 

The most importapt article of the treaty was the fourth, 
which provided that, in case of new troubles in Christendom, 
the contractants would unite upon the measures to be taken 
for their common defence. D'Avaux, who day by day had 
kept a close watch on the movements of Fuchs, was appre- 
hensive that there was a transaction taking place prejudicial 
to his royal master, but found it difficult to penetrate the 
secret. B6benac had been promised the privil^e of seeing all 
the official correspondence, but it was so arranged that this 
should be of a merely perfunctory character, and that the 
real negotiations should be reported to Berlin only in private 
letters addressed directly to the Elector, so that even his 
Secretary of State, Meinders, did not know their contents. 

In spite of this well-guarded secrecy, D'Avaux, a few days 
after the treaty was signed, managed to secure a copy of it, 
which he hastened to communicate to Louis XIV. 

The King's action was prompt and vigorous. Il6benac 
was ordered in the following October to obtain from Fred- 
erick William a written declaration promising that he would 
inviolably observe all his previous engagements with the 
King of France, and binding himself to take no future steps 
with any other power that would in any respect enfeeble the 
force of the treaties he had previously concluded with him, 
— a statement which, if shown to the States General by 
D'Avaux, would deprive the new alliance of all its value and 
place the Elector in a position of complete vassalage to the 
King of France. His reply was, that, having already given 
His Majesty all necessary assurances, any further declara- 
tion would be not only superfluous but in a sense ''outra- 
geous," as implying a lack of confidence on the part of the 
King. 

It was in these acute circumstances that a blow fell upon 
Europe which filled every Protestant coimtry with dismay. 

" For the treaty, see Dumont, VII, Part II, p. Ill et seq. 



THE FORMATION OF THE GRAND ALLIANCE 185 

In January, 1685, the Hugueiiots, finding their position Chap, m 
intolerable, had complained to the King that the Edict of jgg'V^gg- 

Nantes, which had afforded them a peaceful refuge, "seemed 

to have lost its protecting leaves and branches, and that 
nothing remained of it to offer them shelter from x>ersecu- 
tion except the deca3ning tnmk." On October 18, 1685, their 
humble petition was answered by the revocation of the Edict. 

By this one act the hand was turned back on the dial of 
French history more than a hundred years. As a conse- 
quence of it, more than two hundred thousand of the most 
earnest, industrious, and skilful subjects of the King were 
moved to emigrate to countries where they were permitted 
to worship in their own way; thereby depriving France almost 
entirely of certain branches of profitable industry, which 
were transplanted to England, Holland, Prussia, and Amer- 
ica. But the economic loss to France was small compared 
with the blow to the moral prestige of the King and the bitter 
hostility created against him in every Protestant country. 

It has been generally represented that Louis XIV signed The motives 
the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes as an act of religious ^ ^^^^^ 
devotion under the influence of Madame de Maintenon and Revocation 
his indulgent confessor, P^re La Chaise. It is true, that 
between the Peace of Nymwegen and the Revocation of the 
Edict the King had passed through a distinct change in his 
interior life, but it does not fully account for this complete 
alteration in his policy. He had been an ardent lover of a 
succession of women; and, outside of wedlock, there had 
been bom to him eleven children, whom he publicly ac- 
knowledged as entitled to the recognition of the "dignity of 
their birth." But the procession of beauties capable of pro- 
foundly touching his now waning passions had alreadypassed. 
The last of them, Madame de Maintenon, the "pious" 
widow of the crippled Scarron, had dared to apx>eal to the 
King's conscience, on account of his double adultery with 
Madame de Montespan, had induced his return to his mari- 
tal duties to the Queen while she lived, and soon after the 
Queen's death in 1683, had been clandestinely married to him. 

In 1681, Madame de Maintenon wrote: "The Eang begins 



186 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY 

Chap, m to think seriously of his salvation." And a few weeks after 
^'^' the Queen's death she wrote again: "Pfere La Chaise in- 

1684-1697 ^^ 

spires the King to great things. All his subjects will soon 



serve God in spirit and in truth." * 

There were, however, deeper reasons for the King's act 
than Madame de Maintenon suggested, and the deepest of 
them all was certainly not a state of penitence for a sinful 
life.* 
TheiAieof Beginning with the riunions, Louis XIV seriously re- 

^^'***'°**°* garded himself as the "new Charlemagne," and aspired to 
conform to the traditions of his prototype. With the idea 
that he was destined to be the continuator of the Holy 
Roman Empire, a new motive took possession of his mind. 
It was easier now to direct his action, and P^re La Chaise 
had an easy task. Charlemagne had not been embarrassed 
by Calvinism. The Protestant heresies not only divided 
belief, they profoimdly aflfected its character. They recog- 
nized an authority superior to that of the King. As La 
Bniyfere well said, Calvinism was a '^cuUe ennemi de la 
sowerainU." It was the parent of independence, personal 
and national. It respected the individual, and laid the f otm- 
dations of the State on the rights of the individual as its only 
logical basis. Protestantism must, therefore, be rooted out. 
An influence so powerful as religion must be solely at the 
service and command of the King. 
The rndtgna- Considered merely as an act of internal administration, 
^H^l^l the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes would no doubt have 
awakened strong feelings of revulsion among the co-reli- 
gionists of the Huguenots everywhere; but this blow, struck 
by the hand of the professed protector of the Germanic 
liberties, at the height of his power and at the moment of 
his violent encroachments upon the Empire, made a far 
deei)er impression. Frederick William, already exasperated, 



* Lavisse, Hisioire de France, Tome VII, II, p. 61. 

' "La question religieuse eut si peu de poids dans les decisions du 
gouvemement que le clerg6 et les catholiques firent entendre k maintes 
reprises de g^ndreuses protestations." — De Rochas, Note sur quelques 
documerUa irUdits relatifs d 2a revocation, Paris, 1880, p. 31. 



THE FORMATION OF THE GRAND ALLIANCE 187 

notwithstanding his customary prudence, could not suppress Chap, in 
his indignation. On November 8, the Elector replied with jg^^™ 
his celebrated Edict of Potsdam, in which he deplored the 



"persecutions" directed against the Protestants in France 
and promised them an inviolable asylum in his own terri- 
tories, even marking out the route to be followed imder the 
protection of his ministers resident, and offering to the 
refugees exemption from taxes for ten years. 

It was a noble act, which did equal credit to the Elector's 
humanity and his judgment, for it resulted in bringing a 
valuable accession to the population of Brandenburg and 
the Rhenish provinces afterward forming the Kingdom of 
Prussia. But it was also an act of bravery, for the King of 
France challenged the word "i)ersecution" as if it were 
meant as an insult. Frederick WilUam replied that he had 
as much right to call the King's action "i)ersecution," as 
His Majesty had to characterize Protestantism as "heresy," 
Calvinism being the Elector's own religion. In his zeal he 
placed an interdict on the "papal cult," and even forbade 
under pain of corporal punishment attendance upon mass 
by his own subjects in the Roman Catholic embassies, where 
some hundreds were accustomed to worship at Berlin. But, 
having made this display of righteous indignation, which 
had carried him beyond the rule of tolerance, he did not 
really execute his prohibitions; and, in the following De* 
cember, acting in the interest of peace, he gave new assur- 
ances of loyalty to his treaty engagements with France. 

It was not, however, in Brandenburg alone that the Revo- The 
cation excited deep animosity against Louis XIV. I^^°°jJ^xr? 
Holland it had the effect of finally reconciling the merchants 
of Amsterdam with the stadtholder, and rendered popular 
the alliance with Brandenburg, which proved the wisdom 
and foresight of William III. In all the Protestant countries 
of Europe the sentiment excited by the Revocation became 
at once a bond of mutual sympathy between them, and the 
common wish to resist the designs of Louis XIV served to 
unite them as participants in a common cause. 

A few days after the news of the Revocation was received 



188 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY 

Chap. Ill at The Hague, it was reported by the French charge, Saint- 
1684-1607 ''^^^®^> *^*^ ^^^ Prince of Orange had said he could not be- 

lieve that the King acted in that matter "from pure zeal 

for the Catholic religion, nor from his hatred of Protestant- 
ism," but that "His Majesty's whole policy was by this 
means to range all Catholic princes by his side"; and that 
"it was time for the Protestants to see what they had to do, 
since that which had been begun in France was the com- 
mencement of a general conspiracy against the Protestants."^ 

Two steps must, therefore, be taken in opposition to this 
movement: first, the Protestant states must be combined in 
a powerful league for their common defence; and, second, the 
Hapsburg powers must be united for the protection of Spain 
and the Empire from the encroachments of Louis XIV. 

A third step, which in the mind of William III was daily 
assuming increasing importance, was to prevent an active 
alliance between France and Elngland; and, if possible, to 
throw the weight of England, essentially a Protestant power, 
into the opposite scale of the balance, and thus redress the 
lost equilibrium of Europe. 
The raUiioiii The realization of this last-mentioned purpose by means 
MdjM»«iii^ ^' direct influence over James II was obviously impossible. 
Always imbued with an exaggerated notion of royal au- 
thority, since he had ascended the throne he had become the 
impersonation of the most intense spirit of absolutism. So 
long as he was merely Duke of York, his relations with his 
son-in-law, the Prince of Orange, had been friendly and even 
amiable; but, as King of Elngland, he demanded instant and 
unqualified obedience to his commands, and treated his son- 
in-law as merely a junior member of his family. 

For every reason, — personal, religious, and political, — 
the aims and activities of these two members of the House 
of Stuart were certain to come into collision. One of the 
fiirst demands of James II had been that the illegitimate son 
of Charles II, the Duke of Monmouth, who was in exile at 
The Hague, be required to leave Holland, and this request 

^ Archives des Affaires fitrangdres, November 8, 1685, ** Holland/' 
143. 



THE FORMATION OF THE GRAND ALLIANCE 189 

was granted. The son of the late King by Lucy Walters, — Chap, hi 
a mistress who had subsequently become infamous for her ^^' 

lewd life, — the Duke aspired to the Crown of England; 

and, declaring himself a Protestant, endeavored by this 
means to displace his Catholic imcle. Several attempts had 
been made to induce Charles II to declare the legitimacy of 
the Duke of Monmouth; but, although he could pardon him 
for many irregularities, it was well known that the Duke 
was not recognized by his father as entitled to the throne, 
and James II had no serious difficulty in suppressing the 
Monmouth rebellion, which ended on July 15, 1685, with 
the execution of the presumptuous duke. 

The success of James II in crushing the revolt of Mon- The faMiinii. 
mouth exalted his sense of power, but it also excited his ap- Jj^to^l^ 
prehensions for the future. The growing importance of Franoe 
William of Orange, who was already regarded by many as 
the most serious and capable champion of Protestantism, 
was beginning to be felt in England as well as upon the con- 
tinent; and it was not imnatural that James II should see in 
him, the grandson of Charles I and the husband of the legiti- 
mate successor to the throne, a more dangerous rival than 
the enemy of whom he had disposed by the execution of 
Monmouth. 

Had James II been willing to accept a line of action per- 
mitting the free expression of the national will, there would 
have been nothing for him to fear from the Prince of Orange. 
He would in that case have won his friendship and at the same 
time have removed every ground of hostility on the part of 
the nation. But Jam^ II distrusted Parliament and was 
not sincere in his relations with the United Provinces. He 
wished to restore Roman CathoUcism, abolish the Habeas 
Corpus Act, establish a close alliance with France, and by 
means of a centralized political administration govern Eng- 
land as an absolute ruler. 

On July 16, 1685, James II assured Barillon that ''he had 
been educated in France and eaten the bread of His Majesty, 
and his heart was still French." And yet he did not have 
the steadiness of character to avail himself of the benefits 



190 A HISTORY OP DIPLOMACY 

Chap. Ill which a frank and loyal friendship with France might have 

ififii-Tfi07 *^^^^®^ ^™- Resolute only in his absolutism, he wholly 

neglected the means by which he could make his will effec- 



rations of 
Leopold I 



tual. With all his professions of friendship, Louis XIV could 
not trust him, and Barillon was again instructed to resort 
to his old tactics of keeping King and Parliament divided; 
but the indiscretions of the King rendered the task 
sux>erfluous. 
The new aspi- Abandoning the prospect of obtaining any immediate aid 
from England in his plans for resisting the dictatorship of 
Louis XIV in Europe, William of Orange became all the 
more active on the continent. The Protestant powers alone 
were not strong enough to resist the ambitions of Louis XIV; 
and Waldeck — now raised by the Emperor to the rank of 
a prince — was, therefore, set to the task of imiting the 
Hapsburgs with the Protestant princes in opposition to 
Louis XIV. 

Everything, so far as Leopold I was concerned, seemed 
favorable for such a imion. The marriage of Charles II of 
Spain with Marie-Louise of Orleans had suggested a possible 
solution of the Spanish succession; but, several years having 
passed without the birth of an heir, the previous situation 
had not been essentially changed. 

Leopold I, who regarded himself as the rightful head of 
the House of Hapsburg, had been more fortunate than the 
King of Spain in maintaining the family line. By his mar- 
riage with the Spanish Infanta Margaret, who had died in 
1673, he possessed an advantage in the game of the Spanish 
succession in the x>erson of a marriageable daughter, Maria 
Antonia. By his second wife, Eleanor of Neuburg, who had 
in 1678 borne him a son, the Archduke Joseph, he was likely 
to have still other children, and one was soon expected. 

By a judicious distribution of family claims the Emperor 
now hoped eventually to absorb the whole of the Spanish 
inheritance. Maria Antonia was to be married to Max 
Emmanuel, the young elector of Bavaria, whom Leopold I 
hoped by this means to attach to the fortunes of his House 
by securing for him, even during the lifetime of the King 



THE FORMATION OF THE GRAND ALLIANCE 191 

of Spain, the viceroyalty of the Netherlands. Joseph would, Chap, hi 
of course, succeed to the Empu^; and Maria Antonia waa ig^^^ggy 
required to sign a renunciation, to be ratified by her hus 



band, of the right to succeed to the throne of Spain, which 
would thus be reserved for a son who might be bom to 
him. 

It remained, however, for the Elmperor to render his de- Louib xiva 
vices acceptable to the Court of Madrid, where the marris^e opi»«tion to 



' the 

contract with Max Emmanuel might meet with opposition, ments of 
and would certainly be regarded as hostile by Louis XIV. In ^^'^^ ' 
spite of the attempt at secrecy, the King of France was not 
long kept in ignorance of the fact that his previous co-partner 
in partitioning the spoils of Spain was scheming to outwit 
him; and the Marquis de FeuquiSres was speedily despatched 
to Madrid to defend the interests of his royal master. 

Intending to keep the renimciation on the part of Maria 
Antonia entirely secret, Leopold I requested the King of 
Spain to approve the marriage, but failed to commimicate 
the marriage contract. When this docmnent was asked for 
at Madrid, not daring to furnish it, the announcement was 
made by the Court of Vienna that the courier to whom it was 
entrusted had fallen into the hands of corsairs. 

When Feuqui^res arrived at Madrid at the end of March, 
1685, he foimd the Court uninformed of the terms and con- 
ditions of the proposed marriage, and not altogether favor- 
able to it; and he was at once able to thwart the most 
important part of the Emperor's scheme. He had been in- 
structed by every means to oppose making Max Emmanuel 
^oeroy of the Spanish Netherlands, and he promptly placed 
in the hands of Charles II a memoir which in substance 
threatened him with war if he should decide to establish 
the Elector of Bavaria in the Spanish provinces.^ 

The excitement at Madrid was intense, and for the first 
time in his life Charles II attended in person a meeting of 
his council. His reply was conciliatory but indefinite. The 
Queen urged him to make an explicit promise for the sake 

> The instructioiis of Feuquidres are printed by Morel-Fado, RecueU 
du IfubrucHans, XI, Espagne, I, p. 341. 



192 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY 

Chap, iu of peace; but, feeble and inexperienced as he was, the King 
.-o^^'^'o^* replied that he "would rather die" than yield to the threats 

1084-1697 .*^_, .. "^ 

of Feuquieres. 



Not being able to extort a more satisfactory answer than 
he had already received, Louis XIV decided to treat it as if 
it were a complete compliance with his wishes. At the same 
time it was pointed out that any change in the Spanish 
Netherlands would be regarded as a violation of the peace. 
At The Hague Count d'Avaux represented that the alleged 
plan of Leopold I was a "pure chimera." But on July 15, 
1685, the marriage of Max Emmanuel and Maria Antonia 
was celebrated with great pomp at Vienna. In the following 
October the Elmpress Eleanor presented Leopold I with a 
second son, Charles, — the expected candidate for the throne 
of Spain. 
The oonteiH It was a dccisivc moment for the plans of William of 
^^j^i^l^ Orange. A collision between Louis XTV and Leopold I, 
Madrid which the Prince of Orange above all desired, now seemed 

inevitable. 

An important element in the situation was the attitude 
of Madrid, and a heated diplomatic battle was begun at the 
Spanish Court. Undoubtedly the Queen had great influ- 
ence with the feeble Charles II, and it was vigorously exer- 
cised in the interest of France; but the Queen-Mother, Maria 
of Austria, was a more experienced antagonist. With her 
powerful aid the Austrian ambassador, Count von Mansfeld, 
was using every effort to destroy French influence in Spain. 
It was perhaps, he intimated, the Queen's fault that Charles 
II had no children. It was even proposed to put the ques- 
tion to a test by giving the King a mistress; with the inten- 
tion, if the supposition proved correct, of applying to Rome 
for a divorce. 

Max Emmanuel already enjoyed a great reputation in 
Spain because of the valor he was displaying in the war 
with the Infidel, and the Queen-Mother was strongly in- 
clined toward the Elector's young bride, her granddaughter, 
Maria Antonia, as a possible future Queen of Spain. Every 
day the French ambassador grew more unpopular at Madrid, 



THE FORMATION OF THE GRAND ALLIANCE 193 

until at last he was insulted and his people were stoned in Chap, iii 
the streets. ^'^' ^ 

•»»v oi»«^^vD. 1684-1507 

Abandoning for the moment the claims of the Dauphin, - 



Louis XIV suggested that, in case Charles II should have no 
direct heir, the Kingdom of Spain might go to the Dauphin's 
second son, Philip, Duke of Artois; and thus the union of 
France and Spain under one crown might be avoided. But 
this proposal did not appease the wounded feelings of the 
Spanish nobles, who preferred to choose their own sovereign 
rather than to have one forced upon them. 

Nor did Leopold I succeed better in his plans for his sec- 
ond son, — called "Charles" to flatter the King whose heir 
he was intended to become, — with the intention of sending 
hun to Spain, there to grow up as a Spanish prince. When 
at last the enforced "renunciation" of Maria Antonia be- 
came known at Madrid, the Spaniards would not hear of it, 
and thus were repudiated all the foreign schemes. 

In the meantime, the Elector of Brandenburg and the tim i 
Prince of Orange were busily engaged in weaving a network ^ ^'^^^'^ 
of alliances by which the Protestant and Catholic powers 
were to be combined against Louis XIV. In spite of the 
opposition of Bibenac, on January 4, 1686, a treaty between 
Bnindenburg and Austria was concluded, by which the Mec- 
tor, who felt the necessity of awaiting the end of the war in 
the East before an open rupture with France, pledged him- 
self to aid Leopold I by furnishing seven thousand men for 
the protection of Hungary.^ On January 12, the United 
Provinces renewed the defensive treaties with Sweden. On 
February 10 a similar compact was concluded between Swe- 
den and Brandenburg, and on April 1, the Elector con- 
cluded with the Emperor a defensive alliance for twenty 
years.* 

But the notable single achievement of the year was the 
formation of the League of Augsburg, of July 9, 1686, be- 
tween the Emperor, the Eongs of Spain and Sweden, and 
the German princes of the circles of Bavaria, Suabia, and 



' For the text, see Londorp, XII, p. 255. 
* Moemer, StacUwertrdge, p. 750 et seq. 
VOL. m. — 13 



194 A HISTORY OP DIPLOMACY 

Chap, ni Franconla for the defence of the Treaties of Westphalia and 
168^^697 Nymwegen, to which the Elector Palatine and the Duke of 

Holstein-^ottorp adhered in the following September.^ 

Although the precise origin of this league is veiled in con- 
siderable obscurity, it is probable that Prince Waldeck, at 
the instigation of William of Orange, had no small part in 
promoting it. It is evident from the absence of records, 
however, that the negotiations were conducted with great 
secrecy, and it is probable that Waldeck's part in them was 
chiefly oral.* It is known that its final conclusion was due 
chiefly to the activity of Coimt Gustave von Hohenlohe, the 
Emperor's representative in Franconia.' Neither Branden- 
burg nor the United Provinces were, in fact, signatories of this 
treaty, and the practical importance of it was long greatly 
exaggerated, particularly in France, where it was considered 
as an act of aggression.^ The abstention of the United 
Provinces and of Brandenburg from participation in this 
league, which they had certainly favored and promoted, 
seems at first remarkable; but it ceases to be so in the light 
of the greater enterprise which they were then considering. 
That enterprise, for which they wished to be untrammelled, 
was of a far bolder nature. The League of Augsburg was 
intended merely to hold Louis XIV in check upon the conti- 
nent; but the Prince of Orange, supported by the Elector of 
Brandenburg, perceived that the key to the security of 
Protestantism and the maintenance of European equilibrium 
was to be sought in the control of the power of EIngland. 

II. The International Significance of the English 
Revolution 

The abeoiuiinn During the reign of Charles II, England had witnessed a 

of the Stuarts guccessiou of intrfgucs and conspiracies in which the King 

himself was the central figure and the most culpable partici- 

1 Dumont, Vll, Part II, p. 122 et seq. 

* See Muller, Wilhdm III wm Oranien und George Friedrich von WdU- 
deck, II, p. 12, 13. 

' Erdmannsddrffer, Deutsche Geachichte, I, p. 717. 

* FeBter, Die AugabuTffer AUiani von 1686. 



THE FOBMATION OF THE GRAND ALLIANCE 195 

pant. Under James II there was a momentary promise of Chap. HI 
better things, but the fanatical nature of the monarch, sup- t-JL ^'^97 

ported by his serene sense of absolute authority, soon de- 

stroyed aU hopes of improvement. 

The fundamental vice of the Stuart dynasty had always 
been an exaggerated conception of the rights of the Crown, 
wholly excluding any solenm sense of obligation to admin- 
ister the affairs of Elngland in conformity with the laws of 
Parliament. 

Not only the practice of the dynasty but the theory in- 
vented by servile scholars and ecclesiastics to support its 
unmeasured pretensions had aroused dissent among thought- 
ful men. "The royal power," says Sir Robert Filmer in his 
"Patriarcha," "exists by the law of God; there is no inferior 
power that can limit it. The father of a family governs with- 
out other law than his own will, not by the laws and wishes 
of his sons or his servants. . . . No man can say that there is 
a law for the King. . . . General laws, made by Parliament, 
can for reasons known to the King, and by his authority, be 
mitigated or suspended as he alone may judge advisable; 
and by his oath of coronation he is bound to observe only 
good laws, of which he is the judge." * The Parliament of 
England, the same writer declares, is only an imitation of 
the States General of France, which have no other power than 
to present requests to the King. 

In his " Jus R^um," George Mackenzie, Lord Advocate 
of Scotland, declares that "monarchy by its nature is abso- 
lute; and consequently all pretended limitations are contrary 
to the nature of monarchy." * 

Thomas Hobbes, in his "Leviathan," notwithstanding the 
fact that he bases monarchy upon an alleged "contract" be- 
tween king and people, maintains that the will of the prince 
is the touchstone of good and evil, and that "every subject 
should be willing to profess Popery, Mohanunedanism, or 
Paganism, if the King ordains it." ' 

1 Filmer, PairUxrcha, London, 1680. 

* Mackenzie, Jus Regium, London, 1684. 

* Hobbes, Leviaihan, London, 1651. 



196 



A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY 



Chap. Ill 

A. D. 

1684-1697 



The spirit of 
revolt acainst 
•beolntiim 



On July 21, 1683, the University of Oxford in solemn con- 
vocation commended the principles of absolutism in a man- 
- ner so positive that Hallam was provoked to regard its action 
as "covering the University with shame/' The decree de- 
nounced all the liberal literature of the time as "destructive 
to the sacred persons of princes"; but this decision was 
afterward the subject of repentance when James II imperi- 
ously dictated his will to Magdalen College, and in 1709 the 
decree was publicly burned by order of the House of Lords. 

There was never a moment even during the reign of the 
Stuarts when beneath the surface there was not among the 
Elnglish people a spirit of revolt against absolute govern- 
ment. There were always those who felt with Algernon 
Sydney, — who dared to say it, — that "what is not just 
is not law"; although it seemed for a time that those who 
expressed that sentiment would follow him to the scaffold. 
John Locke, who became the accepted theorist of the Revo- 
lution of 1688, sought safety in exile, and remained in Hol- 
land imtil the tide turned against the King. The subse- 
quent popularity of his writings proves how completely he 
expressed what was already vaguely in the minds of the 
people, — a revolt of convictions that preceded the revolt 
under arms. 

It is true, that in its first expression this revolt was reli- 
^ous rather than political; but this fact only proves how in- 
timately associated are forms of religious feeling and types of 
government. As a general rule, revolutions have their birth 
in some form of violence done to the consciences of men; and 
empires have been founded and destroyed by mutations of 
religious faith. 

In England the bond of association between the monarchy 
and Protestantism was extremely strong, for it was through 
the religious independence of the kingdom that its political 
independence had been developed and maintained.^ When, 
therefore. Protestantism was menaced by the behavior of 
James II, and the future of England seemed in danger 



* See Volume II of this work, pp. 416, 417. 



THE FORMATION OF THE GRAND ALLIANCE 197 

through alliance with a dominant Catholic power on the Chap, hi 
continent, the national existence was believed by many -^•^• 
Englishmen to be at stake, and revolution was regarded as a 



sacred obligation. 

It is an instructive commentary on the theory of absolute The muoon of 
monarchy to note that those who have most profited by it ^^ p">*^- 
have ahnost invariably disregarded in others the prerogatives 
they have claimed for themselves. We have seen how, in 
his anxiety to take advantage of the neutrality of England 
by rendering it imx>otent for action on the continent, Louis 
XIV continually thwarted the efforts of Charles II in rela- 
tion to Parliament. Actii^ by ''divine right," as his own 
theory of royal prerogatives maintained, it probably never 
occurred to Louis XIV that it was shameful for one king to 
frustrate the wiU of another, since his opx>onent was, upon 
his own theory, equally with himself the medium of the divine 
will upon the earth. 

But the treatment of Charles II by Louis XIV was in no 
respect an exceptional instance. He had acted in a similar 
manner with every other monarch, including the Pope, ex- 
cept the Sultan. 

When James II found that the former subsidies from 
France were not continued, in spite of his assurances to 
Barillon that ''his heart was still French," he had passed 
for a time entirely from under the influence of Louis XIV. 
However much the King of France may have desired the re- 
establishment of Roman Catholicism in England, which he 
continued to urge upon James II as a sacred obligation, he 
mstructed his ambassador to let it be known by the leaders 
of the party in opposition to the King that they need enter- 
tain no fear of France in case they made trouble for their 
sovereign in Parliament. 

Upon one point, however, notwithstanding the intima- The lean for 
tions of the French ambassador to the contrary, there was ^^J^^ 
general agreement in England. It was the universal con- 
viction that the two kings were secretly in league to destroy 
Ph>te8tantism; and a rejwrt received at The Hague early in 
August, 1686, from the Dutch envoy at London, Van Citters, 



198 



A HISTORY OP DIPLOMACT 



Chap. UI 

A.D. 

1684>1697 



TheviMtof 
Fxvderiek 
WUlUmto 
Cleve 



contained forebodings of an Anglo-French alliance for the 
purpose of an attack on the Republic. 
- Although it is not credible that James II intended at that 
time to undertake the responsibilities of an unpopular for- 
eign war, it is certain that he regarded with little favor his 
Protestant nephew, who was so clearly eligible to the throne 
of England; and that Louis XIV resented both the attitude 
and the growing influence of WilUam of Orange, whose 
negotiations on the continent had not escaped his attention. 

In the meantime, while Europe was seeking means to 
defend itself against the aggressions of Louis XIV, William 
of Orange made no secret of his personal hostility to him, 
and openly declared that a union of France and England 
under the direction of the monarch who had revoked the 
Edict of Nantes would signify the ruin of Protestantism, 
the subjection of the United Provinces, and the permanent 
impossibility of restoring the political equilibrium of Europe. 
Believing himself designated by Providence to prevent that 
catastrophe, he resolved that, cost what it might, such a 
union should never be accomplished. 
^ It was in these circumstances, that the Elector of Branden- 
burg, in the summer of 1686, made his famous visit to Cleve 
to meet in person the Prince of Orange. 

The journey was planned long before it occurred, and had 
given great disquietude to R^benac, who fully understood 
its purpose. Frederick William had been deeply stirred by 
the anti-Protestant attitude of Louis XIV; and his own fail- 
ing health, which had several times interrupted the plans 
forthe journey, had caused him to brood over the persecution 
of his co-religionists and his own duty regarding them. 

Hesitating, in his condition of health, to break openly his 
aUiance with the King of France, he could not repress an 
unconquerable hostility toward him. While the League of 
Augsburg was forming, he had with his own gouty fingers 
prepared a military plan which he had hoped might be 
adopted by the allies, in which he coimselled the raising of a 
himdred and forty-two thousand men by the Emperor, the 
Empire, and Spain, to operate in two corps from Lorraine 



THE FORMATION OF THE GBAND ALLIANCE 199 

and Burgundy, leaving Sweden to hold back Denmark, Chap, hi 
while he himself with the Prince of Orange should lead fifty- - -j^^' - 
seven thousand Brandenburgers and Hollanders ''directly 



upon Paris''!^ 

A few months later, although strongly pressed to join the 
League of Augsburg, distrusting the x>olicy of a combination 
against Louis XIV that was wanting both in aggressive pur- 
pose and sufficiency of means, he declined to do so; but wrote 
that he regarded it as "conformed to the interests of the 
Empire," and promised to promote it. It was to the Prince 
of Orange rather than to the ill-organized League of Augs- 
burg that he turned for the realization of his hopes. 

Having arrived at Cleve at the end of July, 1686, between The 
the fourth and the seventh of August the Elector held long ^f^,^^ 
conversations with the Prince of Orange, and on the four- ni 
teenth attended a review of the Dutch troops on the plain 
of Mookerheide, near Nymwegen, where in 1574 Louis and 
Henry of Nassau fell in battle with the Spaniards. 

All the memories that clustered round the scene of that 
stn^gle for reli^ous freedom and all the circumstances of 
the time in which they met combined to fix their attention 
upon the dangers that then confronted Protestantism. The 
presence of leading Huguenot refugees at Cleve, among 
them the celebrated pastor Claude, — who is mentioned in 
a letter as visiting the Elector on August 9, — and the ar- 
rival of the despatch of Van Citters regarding the alleged 
Anglo-French designs on Holland in the midst of these con- 
versations render it certain that the resistance of the Prot- 
estant powers to the policy of Louis XIV was one of the 
subjects seriously discussed. 

For a long time historians gave credit to the story of Pu- 
fendorf, that the invasion of Ekigland by William III for 
the purpose of constraining James II was one of the propo- 
sitions discussed by the Elector and the Stadtholder; but 
since Von Ranke dismissed it as a legend, because ex- 
Marshal Schomberg, who was said to have been present, is 
proved to have been at the time in Portugal, Pufendorf has 

* See Fester, Die Augshurger AUianzy pp. 71, 72. 



200 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY 

Chap. Ill been treated as the inventor of a fable. But the absence of 
^'^' Schomberg by no means proves that an ultimate invasion 
of Biigland by William III for the purpose of constraining 



James II to conform to the will of the nation may not have 
been discussed in these interviews, as Pufendorf , a well- 
informed contemx>orary and an experienced historian, re- 
ported: first, because such a course of action had been sug- 
gested to the Prince of Orange by Frederick William himself 
at the time of James II's accession; and, second, because it 
is known from the letters of Schomberg that he encouraged 
an alliance for this pinpose between the Stadtholder and the 
EHector through his fellow-countryman and co-religionist, 
pastor Claude, who was present at Cleve.* 
Theimpor- There is, therefore, no reason to doubt the substantial 

tT^tttitode ^ru*^^ of Pufendorf 's report that plans of action against 
of Ensiand James II of England were disciissed at Cleve, and became 
from that time forward the basis of the policies of the Prince 
of Orange and Frederick William upon the continent. The 
time was not then ripe for the invasion of England, nor 
for any aggressive action against Louis XIV. The League 
of Augsburg was, therefore, to be encouraged, but restrained 
from becoming prematurely aggressive. Until the Emperor 
could be liberat-ed from preoccupation in the East by a de- 
cisive victory over the Turks, there was little chance of 
success in an open conflict with Louis XIV; nor would it 
be prudent to provoke him to action so long as there was 
danger of a union between France and England. The key 
to the future security of Protestantism was to be foimd in 
changing the attitude of £}ngland toward Holland and the 
Protestant cause on the continent; for if, as in 1672, France 
and England were again to make war on the Dutch Republic, 
the old danger of the dismemberment of the United Provinces 
would be revived. 
The defeat of Before the Elector had returned to Potsdam an event of 
Mw^I^ra^** immense importance for the futm^ of the Empire had oc- 

aoDB of Louia currcd. On September 2, 1686, Buda was taken by assault by 
XIV 



» See Pag^, Le Grand Eledeur el Louis XI F, pp. 573, 574; and Wad- 
dington, Le Grand Eledeur, II, pp. 567, 568. 



THE FORMATION OP THE GRAND ALLIANCE 201 

the Imperial anny, and the capital of Hungary, after remain- Chap, ill 
ing for nearly a hmidred and fifty years in the hands of the ac^^Jjot 
Infidel, was at last once more occupied by the Hapsburgs. 



The victories of the Elmperor in the East revealed to Louis 
XIV the necessity of prompt action if he wished to profit 
by the preoccupations of Leox>old I, for the end of the war 
against the Infidel would permit the Elmperor to demand the 
restoration of the territories annexed to France through the 
rhmians. In September, 1686, therefore, Louis XIV re- 
sumed his aggressions, hopii^ thereby to transform the Truce 
of B^ensburg into a permanent recognition of his terri- 
torial acquisitions, upon the condition that they were not 
to be extended. 

As a justification for violating the truce, the King of France 
complained that he was menaced by the League of Augs- 
burg, — a compact which, as we have seen, was in no sense 
aggressive, — and in December, 1686, he demanded of the 
Emperor and the Empire the conclusion of a peace on the 
basis of the Truce of Regensburg, by which all his expro- 
priations would be recognized, setting as a limit of time for 
these concessions March 31, 1687. 

This demand created in Grermany a great commotion, 
and the Elector of Brandenburg in particular was highly 
exasperated; but, realizing how inopx>ortune a conflict at 
that time would be, he did everything in his jwwer to avert 
it. Intent upon his war with the Turks, Leopold I also was 
disposed, if possible, to avoid a conflict on the Rhine. 
Innocent XI gave assurance of the Emperor's intention to 
adhere to the truce, even if the war in the East were ended; 
and Louis XIV, satisfied for the moment with the tacit 
recognition of his right to erect new fortifications at HUningen 
and Giesenheim, in April, 1687, abandoned his demand 
for the definitive recognition of his annexations. 

Although the time for contesting the claims of Louis XIV The quMtioo 
bad not arrived, and the intention to continue the observ- °j^ ".^^^ 
ance of the truce was sincere, the tension of feeling in Europe 
was still great. On every side the pretensions of the Grand 
Monarch kept alive a spirit of opx>osition to him. 



202 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY 

Chap. Ill With incomprehensible obstinacy he had disputed the 
1684^^697 ^'^^^^S^ rights of the Pope within the city of Rome. The 

immunity granted to foreign embassies had there been 

carried to an excess not only abusive but intolerable. The 
practice had grown up of extending exemption from the 
municipal laws to persons and to houses having no connec- 
tion with the families or palaces of the foreign ambassadors. 
In this way, whole streets had been filled with thieves, lewd 
women, counterfeiters, and professional assassins, who were 
beyond the reach of the courts of justice, because the arms 
of a foreign power were placed over the doors of their domi- 
ciles, or because they bore a lettre de famUiariU attesting 
their dependence upon some ambassador. These privileges 
were openly sold by the majordomos of the embassies, thus 
affording to them a source of income and a means of exer- 
cising authority in their neighborhoods. Under cover of 
this protection every form of crime was practised, and whole 
quarters of the city — at one time amoimting to nearly a 
third — were thus withdrawn from the jurisdiction of the 
police.^ 

The Holy See had long resented and endeavored to sup- 
press this evil, but had encountered great difficulties in the 
attempt. Most of the powers had, however, respected the 
earnest wish of Innocent XI to abolish it, but Louis XIV per- 
sistently maintained the right of his ambassador to accord 
these "immunities." 

Soon after his accession, Innocent XI had announced that 
he would receive no diplomatic officer who would not pre- 
viously consent to abandon this practice; and with the death 
of the French ambassador, D'Estr^es, in January, 1687, an 
opportunity was presented for testing this decision. 

Disputing the Pope's right to lay down conditions to his 
representative, Louis XIV instructed the new envoy, Lavar- 
din, to enter Rome with an escort of a thousand soldiers and 
demand an audience of the Pope. Innocent XI not only 
refused to receive Lavardin, he promptly excommunicated 
him, and placed the church in which he was to take the com- 

^ See Revue des Questions Historiques, XXIII, pp. 20, 21. 



THE FORMATION OF THE GHAND ALLIANCE 203 

munion under interdict. In response, the King caused an Chap, m 
edict to be registered by his parliament declaring the Pope's ^^^: ^* 

lo84— lo97 



bull invalid, and threatened to confiscate the papal estates • 
if it was not withdrawn; but his opposition was unavailing. 

Whatever profit Louis XIV had expected to derive from The inmibor- 
his strenuous Catholicism was completely neutralized by his Jj^J^^y 
unfortunate relations with the Pope, whose authority hetoRamio 
could not tolerate. Not only in the matter of the appoint- 
ment of ecclesiastics in his own kingdom, — where he dis- 
puted the supremacy of the Holy See over the bishops, — 
but everywhere he found himself in conflict with the policies 
of Rome. All of the Catholic princes of Germany had been 
gradually alienated from him, and even Victor Amadeus, the 
gallant young duke of Savoy, had finally dared to disobey 
him. Much against his inclination, in 1686, the Duke, afraid 
of his powerful neighbor, had at his command inflicted a 
bloody persecution upon the feeble sect of Waldenses; but, 
in 1687, so strong was the influence of the papal interest in 
the war with the Turks, that he ventured to disobey the 
King by answering the call of Innocent XI to take part in 
the war against the Infidel, and imdertook the forbidden 
journey to Venice. 

The effort of Louis XIV to secure for his devoted follower, 
William von Fiirstenberg, the post of coadjutor to the Arch- 
bishop of Koln, cum fviura stuxessume, supported as it was 
by the use of French money and the menace of French arms, 
created in the Empire a universal irritation; for it was not 
only an imwarranted encroachment upon ecclesiastical 
jurisdiction, it plainly had for its object the military subordi- 
nation of the archbishopric to France. Leopold I urged 
the Pope to annul the proceedings; but Innot^ent XI, who 
did not wish unnecessarily to arouse the King of France, 
suspended action until a later time.^ 

In England, the re-establishment of Roman Catholicism The e«Forta of 
was moving forward at a rapid rate. In June, 1687, James ^I^^Jj^k^ 
II insisted upon a public reception to the papal nuncio, and Romaniam 
in the following January three ax)ostolic vicars arrived from 

^ See Revue des Questions Historiques, XXX, pp. 76, 127. 



204 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY 

Chap, ui Rome to aid in reorganising the Catholic hierarchy in the 
^^' kingdom. A month later, the King's illegal attack upon 

Magdalen College at Oxford ended in the installation of one 

of these vicars as the head of that ancient fomidation, 
which was then transformed into a Roman Catholic seminary. 

Had it not been for the King's obvious intention to restore 
the Roman religion by the exercise of his absolute authority, 
it would have been difficult, perhaps, to place James II in 
the wrong. The Declaration of Indulgence of April 27, 1688, 
in principle, appeared to be most just and reasonable. All 
dissenters from the Established Church were treated by it 
with equal liberality; and Quakers, Anabaptists, and Inde- 
pendents, equally with Roman Catholics, rejoiced in the 
freedom it accorded them. William Penn, who was believed 
by many to be the chief author of the Declaration, appeared 
at the head of a deputation to thank the King for this act of 
religious toleration; and grateful addresses were presented 
by all the previously proscribed bodies. But even the non- 
conformist Protestants recoiled before the obvious deter- 
mination of James II to re-establish Roman Catholicism as 
a dominant religion. To them this meant the ultimate loss 
of both religious and poUtical liberty. What they desired 
was a form of toleration which would respect the rights of 
conscience in the individual without the risk of placing Ro- 
manists in control of the State. 

Had James II been willing to govern England as a con- 
stitutional monarch, his efforts for the relief of the Roman 
Catholics from their religious disabilities might have proved 
effectual. The laws forbidding them the right of public 
worship were in fact unjust, but the nation did not have 
faith in the ^Qng's sincerity. If, like Louis XIV, he had 
managed to have a genuine quarrel with the Pope, it would 
no doubt have rendered him more x>opular in Ekgland; but 
his differences with Innocent XI over appointments, while 
they alienated from him the sympathies and confidence of 
Rome, were not of a nature to win for him the popular 
support. 

The advantage of this situation to the Prince of Orange 



THE FORMATION OF THE GRAND ALUANCE 205 

was soon to become apparent. The allied, but disputed, Chap, hi 
birth of a son to the Queen of England, on June 10, 1688, j^^^'^g- 

after six years had passed without a sign of maternity, 

proved to be the turning-point in the tide of Elnglish senti- 
ment. Until this unexpected event occurred the succession tim birth of 
to the throne seemed secure to Mary of Orange, but with ^^^ ^ 
it suddenly ended the prospect of a Protestant sovereign as 
the successor of James II. The popular disappointment led 
to scandals of a kind that thoroughly agitated the nation. 
The suddenness of the birth had prevented the presence of 
the dignitaries whose testimony is usual on such occasions, 
and a charge of fraud was invented and circulated. Persons 
highly placed in the kingdom reported, and many were led 
to believe, that the child presented as the lawful heir to the 
throne had been foisted on the coimtry by being introduced 
into the Queen's bed in a warming-pan. 

The trial of seven Protestant bishops, including the Arch- 
bishop of Canterbiury, for petitioning the King to withdraw 
his second declaration of indulgence, coming in close connec- 
tion with the appearance of the Catholic heir to the throne, 
— as it was assumed the supposititious child of Mary of 
Modena was intended to be, — created a feverish popular 
excitement, accompanied by public rejoicing when the jury 
m the ease of the bishops finally returned its verdict of not 
guilty. 

This combination of occurrences rendered inevitable the 
revolution that had long been preparing. The King had 
now completely lost public confidence. Fear existed that, 
in addition to the foreign troops already at his command, 
French aid would be invoked; and behind all these suspicions 
was the gratuitous supposition of a ''popish plot." 

For this extraordinary situation William of Orange was The attitude of 
already prepared. He had long believed that, in order to ^*'^JJ^^^ 
restrain England from a future alliance with France, it was 
necessary to detach the English people from the poUcies of 
James II. Since £}ngland was a Protestant coimtry, it 
should be made to count as a Protestant force in the equilib- 
rium of Europe, where it was needed as a coimterweight to 



206 



A HISTORY OP DIPLOMACY 



Chap. Ill 

A.D. 

1684-1697 



The prepar»- 
tioDS of Wil- 
liam III and 
reoaU of Brit- 
ish tioopa 



the predominance of France. With this conviction he had 
cahnly awaited the occasion when he would be called upon 
- to intervene for this purpose by force of arms. That oc- 
casion had now arrived. 

Fully and accurately informed regarding the state of pub- 
lic feeling in Ekigland through the reports of Dykvelt,^ who 
in 1687 had been sent to London for the purpose of entering 
into confidential relations with the English Protestants, 
William III had advocated granting religious toleration, 
but he had refused to express his sanction of the revocation 
of the Test Act, which excluded Roman Catholics from public 
o£Sice. On November 4, 1687, this decision had been made 
in the form of a public declaration widely circulated both in 
England and on the continent.^ 

James II had not only proposed, he had insisted upon 
toleration; but it was believed that he intended eventually 
by the exercise of his royal prerogative to make England an 
exclusively Roman Catholic coimtry. William III, on the 
other hand, was believed to be sincere in his love of tolera- 
tion, limited only by the determination to prevent Romanism 
from dominating the State. In advocating the principle of 
toleration so far as the rights of conscience are concerned, 
while opposing the abolition of the Test Act, the Prince of 
Orange had found the formula which expressed the desire of 
the English nation. 

As a result of the mission of Dykvelt and the later reports 
of another confidential agent, Zuylestein, an imderstanding 
was finally reached that, if military action should at any 
time become advisable, the Prince of Orange should be 
consulted and should assume the leadership. In these nego- 
tiations with political personages in London, the Prince 
seems not to have contemplated the complete overthrow of 
James II, much less the substitution of himself as King of 
England. At The Hague prayers continued to be offered 



* Everard van Weede, Lord of Dykvelt. 

* Over forty-five thousand copies of FagePs letter containing the 
declaration of the Prince of Orange regarding toleration are said to 
have been sold in England before 1688. 



THE FORMATION OP THE GRAND ALLIANCE 207 

for the royal family of England, including the infant prince Chap, hi 
now regarded as the probable heir to the throne, and out- ^0^1^97 

wardly there was every sign of friendship. The aim of Wil 

liam III was the control of the foreign policy of England by 
the friends of Holland and of Protestantism, and the frus- 
tration of the designs of Louis XIV. 

Such was the attitude of William III when a series of 
events occurred which seemed to render necessary some 
decisive action. 

After the end of Monmouth's rebellion, the six regiments 
of English and Scotch troops which had been recalled from 
Holland had been returned. The demand of James II that 
they be placed under Roman Catholic oflSicers had, however, 
ezdted suspicion. This demand had been refused by the 
States General, and their peremptory recall early in 1688, — 
which it was believed had been ordered under the influence 
of Barillon, — was taken as a signal of alarm; for it was at 
this moment that Louis XIV was disclosing his designs upon 
Edln, and his attitude toward the United Provinces was 
considered menacing. When the release of the troops was 
refused, James II did not conceal his indignation, and in 
March he ordered all British subjects engaged in foreign 
service to return to England. 

Takii^ advantage of the state of feeling between James II JamM n 
and the United Provinces, Louis XIV advised the Kmg to j;^^ 
intimidate the Dutch by making a show of hostility against xiv 
them; and James II had the weakness to accept the advice. 
On April 19, 1688, an agreement was concluded with Louis 
XrV by which the King of France promised to contribute 
five hundred thousand livres for fittii^ out an English fleet, 
and also to pay for the maintenance of two regiments of the 
British troops recalled from Holland. 

This action confirmed the truth of Van Citters' reports The invita- 
that there was collusion between James II and Louis XIV, ^ ^it^ 
and gave color to the supposition of their intended co-opera- brine an vmy 
tion in continental affairs. In May, William III had reached ^ ^^^°«*^ 
the conclusion that, imless there was armed opposition, 
James II would attach England to the policies of Louis XIV, 



208 A HISTORY OP DIPLOMACY 

CKiLP. Ill with the result that the conditions of 1672 would be repeated; 
lew^Teo? ^^^ ^^^ United Provinces would be again left without de- 

fence. He did not hesitate, therefore, to say to Edward 

Russell, that, if he should receive an invitation from impor- 
tant persons in England, he was disposed to bring an army 
to their aid in settling the afifairs of the kingdom. 

The message did not long remain unanswered. On June 
30, 1688, a letter to the Prince of Orange was signed by seven 
of the most influential statesmen in England, extending to 
him an invitation to land there with an armed force before 
the end of the year.* Admiral Herbert, an eminent oflScer 
who had been displaced because of his opposition to the repeal 
of the Test Act, in the guise of a common sailor, carried this 
extraordinary invitation to Holland and delivered it to the 
Prince. 

So bold a step could probably never have been taken by 
men of high intelligence had it not been for the peculiar cir- 
cumstances of the moment; but it was not doubted that the 
Prince of Orange, representing the deepest convictions of the 
English nation, would have a far different reception from 
that which had been accorded to the Duke of Monmouth. 
The luooen of From the point of view of William III the enterprise ne- 
^2^ ''' cessarily assumed a serious character. He was not an ab- 
sutetCtonena solutc monarch, ruling over a people accustomed to obey 
his will and ready to follow him wherever he might lead. 
His people were republicans, accustomed to consider care- 
fully all that they undertook, and little disposed to embark 
upon a sea of military adventure. Without their support 
he would be entirely helpless, and there was in the United 
Provinces a party certain to obstruct and if possible to thwart 
his plans. Even if he should win the assent of the States 
General to his enterprise and with their aid be provided with 
troops and a fleet to transport them to England, the with- 
drawal of these forces would leave the United Provinces ex- 
posed to invasion by Louis XIV. 
While the Prince was conscious of all the impediments to 

* The signers were Lords Shrewsbury, Devonshire, Danby, and 
Lumley, Bishop Compton, Edward Russell, and Henry Sidney. 



THE FOBBIATION OF THE GRAND ALUANCE 209 

the success of his plan, he was not for a moment inclined to Chap, hi 
abandon it as chimerical. He had solicited the invitation j^^^ggy 

to come to England, and he was not disposed to disappoint 

those who had imperilled their lives in a cause which he felt 
was his as well as theirs. 

Opposition in the United Provinces was, however, soon 
overcome. Count d'Avaux labored incessantly to revive 
and embolden the anti-Orange party, but his efforts were 
unavailing. Since the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes 
there had been awakened among the Dutch burghers a bitter 
feeling of resentment toward Louis XIV. Against this sen- 
timent of sympathy with the outraged Huguenots, Count 
d'Avaux, who was already persona rum grata to the Prince, 
was powerless. The recall of the British troops by James II 
had produced a double effect upon the Hollanders; it de- 
prived them of a valued means for their own defence, and it 
suggested their use in England as an instrument for the re- 
pression of Protestantism. When to this state of feeling was 
added evidence that a secret understanding existed between 
James II and Louis XIV, the Prince of Orange had com- 
pletely won his cause in the States General. To the imag- 
ination of the time the only alternative to the success of 
the expedition was another humiliation and probable defeat 
of Holland through an Anglo-French alliance.^ 

The i)olicy of Louis XIV in this critical situation was The aotivitiM 
peculiarly complicated. It would have been easy for him ol tt^^RSH 
to check the plans of William III by preventing his leaving 
the continent, but he had other interests to consider. If 
he could not force England into an active alliance with 
hhnself , which he found difficult, he could at least keep the 
English occupied, and thus render them powerless on the 
continent as he had so long succeeded in doing, by leaving 
James II to contend with his domestic troubles. His own 
interest seemed to him to lie in preparing for the inevitable 
contest over the Spanish succession by rendering the fron- 
tiers of France as strong as possible on the Rhine; for he 

> See Sirtema de GroveBtins, OuiUaume III et Louis XIV, V, pp. 462, 
466. 

VOL. ni. — 14 



210 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY 

Chap. Ill would there ultimately have to face the combmed forces of 
^' ^' the Empire, which was already organizing to resist his plans 

with regard to Spain. With the progress of the war in the 

East, it was becoming evident that this resistance would 
be more formidable than it had ever been. By the beginning 
of 1688, Hungary had not only been redeemed from occupa- 
tion by the Turks, but the crown of that kingdom had been 
declared hereditary in the male line of the House of Hapsburg, 
and the eldest son of Leopold I, Joseph, had been crowned 
king with the assent of the nation. 

The death of Maximilian Henry, Archbishop of K5ln, in 
Jime, 1688, finally opened the question of succession to the 
archbishopric; and Louis XIV, determined to force the elec- 
tion of Fiirstenberg, prepared to occupy the principality 
with his troops. The election did not result in a choice; and 
the final selection, therefore, fell to the Holy See. Innocent 
XI submitted the question to the College of Cardinals, who, 
on August 26, named the rival candidate, Joseph Clemens of 
Bavaria; and the Pope confirmed their choice. 

Louis XIV was enraged, and resolved to make an exhibition 
of his power. The time was not propitious for engaging in a 
general war, for France was not in a financial condition to 
resist the whole of Europe; and the fall of Belgrade, on 
September 6, 1688, foreshadowed a speedy termination of 
the conflict with the Turks, by which the Emperor and the 
German princes would be released for the defence of the 
Empire in the West. If, however, the King of France 
could quickly strike a few telling blows, he might be able to 
force an early peace, by which he could confirm his previous 
conquests. On September 24, 1688, therefore, he issued a 
declaration of war, and two armies crossed the German 
frontier. The Dauphin with the mtdn body of troops began 
the siege of Philipsburg, another division invaded the Palat- 
inate, and to intimidate the Pope Avignon was occupied. 
The axsouM- To justify his action, Louis XIV complained of the exist- 
Sv ^'Jnrt** ^^^^ ^^ ^^^ League of Augsburg, — which really had no 
the Pope aggressive intention, — and claimed that the entrance of 
his troops into the archbishopric of Koln had for its main 



THE FORMATION OF THE GRAND ALLIANCE 211 

object to retain the Prince of Orange upon the continent and CHiLP. ill 
save Elnidand. ^ ^' 

c ^- 1684-1697 

In a spirit of rather inconsequent accusation, Louis XIV 

further declared that the real cause of the war was the con- 
duct of Innocent XI. To his ambassador at Rome he wrote: 
''The cessation of the war which is still progressing advan- 
tageously to Christendom in Hungary can be imputed only 
to the Pope, as well as the disadvantages which our religion 
may suffer from the divisions which His Holiness is fomenting 
among all the Catholic princes." At the same time he 
wrote to his ambassador at Constantinople: ''I have de- 
cided to give protection to Cardinal Piirstenberg, . . . and 
to garrison my troops at Bonn and Kaiserwerth to prevent 
those of the Emperor from taking possession of those places; 
but I shall send a greater number into the Palatinate." He 
then added, that, as he was about to attack the Emperor 
and compel him to withdraw his troops from Hungary in 
order to employ them on the Rhine and in Italy, " the am- 
bassador is authorized to let these intentions be known at 
Constantinople, with the purpose of showing how weak the 
Court of Vienna really is, and how easily the Turks could re- 
gain all they have lost in the last campaigns, if they took 
advantage of the present state of affairs in Europe." "I do 
not doubt," he says, in a despatch of October 18, 1688, 
"that the Tiurks are profiting from the terror which my arms 
have carried into the entire Empire." ^ 

It is from these side-lights upon the policy of Louis XIV The : 

of Lg 

with Junas II 



that we are able to comprehend his inactivity regarding the ®' ^"" ^^ 



expedition of the Prince of Orange to England. At the price 
of a solid alliance with England, Louis XIV would perhaps 
have endeavored to prevent the departure of the Prince 
from Holland; but the comparative indifference of James II 
and his own immediate interests made it convenient for 
him to remain passive. He had, in fact, previously offered 
to aid in preventing the embarkation of the Prince and his 
army; but James II, not wishing to seem dependent upon him 

' See the citations in Revue des Questions Historiques, XXXIII, 
pp. 119, 127. 



212 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY 

Chap. Ill for protection against invasion, refused to accept the offer. 
1684-^697 ^ **^' ^* ^^ ^^* believed at the English Court until it 

was too late that the armament of William III was really 

intended for the invasion of England. 
From the beginning of his reign the foreign policy of James 
■ II had been undecided; but indecision at this critical moment 
was certain to prove fatal. His attitude on the subject of 
defence against the Prince of Orange was to Louis XIV so 
inconsiderate that at one moment the King of France made 
an effort to save him in spite of himself. The Ekiglish am- 
bassador at Versailles, Bevil Skelton, becoming alanned by 
the preparations of the Prince of Orange for his expedition, 
requested Louis XIV to instruct Count d'Avaux to inform 
the States General that he, the King, was under obligation 
to regard any hostile movement against James II as a rup- 
ture with France; and, believing that this statement would 
check the plans of William III, this instruction was author- 
ized. Had James II supported this representation, it is not 
improbable that the States Greneral would have considered 
it inexpedient to provoke the hostility of Louis XIV; but 
when Van Citters inquired of the King if it was true that 
he had a secret treaty with France, he declared that he had 
no such treaty, that he was no ''Flirstenberg requiring the 
protection of a patron," and that the King of France had no 
authority to act for him. To emphasize the indignation of 
James II with this transaction, Skelton was recalled from 
France and committed to the Tower. 
The ambicuity It was difficult for Louis XIV to insist upon an under- 
attitttSr^^'* standing of which James II denied the existence, and in 
fact there was no formal treaty. While Van Citters refused 
to believe the truth of the King's reply, Louis XIV was too 
much offended by the tone of it to attempt any further 
assistance, and decided to permit James II to work out his. 
own problem of defence. 

The importation of troops into England from Ireland and 
Scotland without a frank and clear declaration of the use to 
be made of them served to augment the suspicion with which 
the King was regarded, and the fact that the new additions 



A. D. 

1684-1697 



THE FORMATION OP THE GRAND ALLIANCE 213 

to the army were largely composed of Roman Catholic Csulp. hi 
troops commanded by Roman Catholic officers gave to these 
preparations a sinister appearance. 

There were two courses open to James II, either of which 
might have prevented his fall; a firm alliance with France 
on the one hand, or an alliance with Holland on the other. 
By the first he might at least have secured the active inter- 
vention of Louis XIV to occupy "William III in Holland and 
prevent his expedition to England; and by the second, which 
would have made the Prince of Orange a supporter rather 
than a foe, he might have re-established himself in the con- 
fidence of his people. Unhappily for him, he was indisposed 
to accept either alternative; and, in consequence, he at the 
same time incurred the hostility of the Prince and lost the 
protection of the King of France. 

It was this blindness to the importance of a wise and con- The antago- 
sistent foreign policy that led to the final overthrow of James ^^t?^^** 
II. While his conduct in domestic matters was exasperating poHdes 
to the English people, this alone would probably not have 
proved fatal to him. It is true, that he was not trusted by 
the nation; but the cause of distrust was not merely that the 
King was a Roman Catholic in his religious convictions. He 
might have been avowedly a Catholic king, so far as his 
personal faith was concerned, and still have retained the 
confidence of the nation had his public policy been truly 
national. What alienated confidence from the King was 
that his policy was strictly djnoastic, and in opposition to 
the will of the nation. It was never forgotten that he was 
half-French by lineage and wholly French in his ideas and 
sympathies, a Bourbon of the Bourbons. As such he was 
an absolutist in feeling, and aimed at establishing absolut- 
ism as a system. Like his brother, Charles II, he was be- 
lieved to be in secret relations with Louis XIV; and since 
the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes, Louis XIV, always 
regarded with aversion in England, was universally detested. 

In spite of his denials, judged by every practical test, 
James II was in sympathy with the most atrocious acts of 
Louis XrV. In 1686 he had caused to be burned by the 



214 A HISTORY OF DIPLOHACY 

Chap, ui public executioner the book of the Huguenot pastor Claude, 

1684-^697 "^ which he recounted the persecutions to which his church 

had been subjected; and had prevented by an arbitrary de- 



cision the charity of the English people in behalf of the suf- 
fering refugees, requiring that, in order to be eligible to 
obtain it, they must first receive the sacrament in the Angli- 
can church. No previous king of E2ngland had ever so dis- 
regarded the feeling of the nation concerning the dominance 
of France upon the continent. Even Charles II had been 
compelled by Parliament to abandon his open treaty re- 
lations with Louis XIV for the subjugation of Holland, and 
was forced by the will of the nation to make peace with the 
United Provinces. The conflict between the national and 
the dynastic policies had in 1688 become so tense that the 
King did not dare to call a parliament to abrogate the Test 
Act, knowing that it would with practical unanimity vote 
for resistance to the aggressions of France. 
The atutodA of It is, in f act, impossible to comprehend the English Revo- 
Sn^iS''^ lution of 1688 without an understanding of the European 
B«voiution situation which rendered it inevitable. The conflict between 
the dynastic and the national policies in Ekigland was in 
reality not only a local but a European issue. Locally, the 
question was whether the personal will of the sovereign or 
the will of the nation as expressed through Parliament should 
prevail. But, even locally considered, that issue was vitally 
related to the Emx>pean situation, because it practically 
determined the part England was to play in the course of 
events in Europe. 

The same conflict that was agitating England was divid- 
ing Europe also, and the English Revolution was only part 
of a greater movement of resistance. In England, James II 
was disputing the authority of the laws of Parliament; on 
the continent, Louis XIV was violating the treaties which 
constituted the public law of Europe. In both cases the 
aggressions were actuated by the same spirit and defended 
by the same theory, — the non-existence of legal restrictions 
upon the will of the sovereign.^ 

^ This was clearly seen by the Huguenot pamphleteers in Holland, 



THE FORMATION OF THE GRAND ALLIANCE 215 

The Catholic princes of Europe, and even the Pope, could, Chap, hi 
therefore, passively look on while the Protestant Prince of jg^iggy 

Orange crossed the North Sea with an army and dethroned a 

Catholic king; for as much as the Protestants of England 
needed William of Orange to help them in resisting the ab- The mbor- 
solutism of James II, the sovereigns of Europe needed the ^^^ ^ 
aid of Elngland in overcoming the absolutism of Louis XIV. moHym 
In the eyes of the Pope, the Emperor, and all the princes of 
the Elmpire, William of Orange had a better right to invade 
England than Louis XIV had to take possession of the arch- 
bishopric of Koln and to subjugate the Palatinate. 

It is impossible to deny that considerations of reli^on 
played a certain r61e in causing the English Revolution of 
1688, but an analysis of the motives immediately operative 
in the minds of the principal actors in that extraordinary 
drama shows that it was not caused by differences of reli- 
gious faith alone. It is true, no doubt, that without the ex- 
citement produced over questions of religion the English 
Revolution of 1688 would not have occurred, or at least 
would not have occurred in the way it did. The strong 
undercurrent of feeling that led to the revolution was the 
terror of the English and the Dutch Protestants, produced 
by the foreboding that, if not resisted, a reign of absolutism 
like that which had crushed the Huguenots in France would 
in time overwhelm and destroy them also. They were, 
therefore, they believed, compelled to resist in order to pre- 
serve their existence. But, when it came to the time of 
action, the danger to liberty of conscience was not so great 
as it had seemed. In Ekigland, in spite of the popular cry 
of "No popery!" the Pope was not arrayed among the ene- 
mies of the English nation; and Louis XIV was openly ac- 
cusing him of encouraging the expedition of the Prince of 



who produced a quantity of literature against royal absolutism. The 
chief of these writings was the series of memoirs by Jurien, Les aoupirs 
de la Prance escUwe qui aspire aprhs la UberUf published in 1688, and fol- 
lowed by many others. The State, Jurien argues, ought to be reformed, 
for states are depositories of sovereignty superior to that of kin^s. See 
Sirtema de Grovestins, GuiUaume III et Louie XIV, V, pp. 424, 427. 



216 A HISTORY OF DIPLOHACY 

Chap. Ill Orange.^ In Holland, the King of France, although he had 

^' ^- said there would be a diplomatic rupture with France if the 

States General moved against James 11, was not threatening 



an invasion of the country. In the Empire, there was no 
alignment of Catholics against Protestants, and the aggres- 
sions of Louis XIV at that moment were all directed against 
Catholics; — against the Pope in Avignon, against the de- 
cision of the College of Cardinals in Koln, and against a 
Catholic Elector in the Palatinate. His only ally, who was 
soon to desert him, was the Protestant £jng of Denmark, 
while included in the League of Augsburg were the Emperor 
and the King of Spain. 

Outside of Elngland, there was nowhere any strictly re- 
ligious question in controversy, and even in Elngland there 
was no doctrinal debate. It was the political aspect of re- 
ligion only that was anywhere at issue, — the right of the 
sovereign to dictate in matters of a religious nature and to 
abolish laws and guarantees ahready in existence. The fears 
in which the spirit of revolt had its origin no doubt in part 
persisted, but the revolt itself was not to be suppressed by 
removing immediate apprehensions. A resolution had been 
reached to dispute the pretensions of the King as being 
in principle dangerous, and a conflict had thus become 
inevitable. 
The oonoiii*- When at last, in September, 1688, James II became con- 
vinced that William of Orange was really intending to in- 
vade England with an army, he sought to r^ain popular 
favor by making concessions; but it was too late. On Sep- 
tember 21 his minister at The Hague was authorized to 
deny the existence of any treaty with France, and to offer 
as a proof of it to unite with the Dutch in maintaining the 
Treaty of Nymwegen and the Truce of Regensburg. 

But these concessions and assiu'ances made no serious im- 
pression. The English attributed the King's conciliatory 
spirit to his fear of the Prince of Orange, to whom alone they 
felt indebted for the concessions granted; while the Dutch 

^ See the letter to Cardinal d'Estrto, in Dumont, VII, Part II, p. 
167. 



tocy efforU of 
JamwII 



THE FORMATION OP THE GRA:t7D ALLIANCE 217 

accepted the explanation of Van Citters^ who affirmed that Chap, hi 
the King's professions of amity were intended only to arrest . ^-^^J.q^ 
the preparations of the Prince. The only practical effect, 



theref ore, was to complete the alienation of Louis XIV, who 
had already violated the treaties which James II offered to 
aid in defending. When afterward James II implored the 
assistance previously offered and refused, Louis XIV coolly 
informed him that he was not at that time prepared to fur- 
nish any aid. 

Thus delivered from the fear of an attack upon Holland, The descent 
the Prince of Orange was ready in October for his descent J|^*^iJ[J| 
upon England. The ''papist wind," as the unfavorable 
breeze from the West was called, which had prevented his 
sailing, having ceased on the nineteenth, he set sail from 
Helvoetsluis with about fifty vessels of war and a fleet of 
transports bearing an army of more than twelve thousand 
men; but a storm dispersed his fleet in the middle of the 
North Sea, and he was obliged to return. On November 1, 
without the loss of a ship, he was again ready to set sail; 
and, four days later, after eluding the English fleet which 
lay at Harwich, William III, accompanied by ex-Marshal 
Schomberg, with his entire armament entered the bay of 
Torbay, where he landed without opposition. 

The banners of the Prince of Orange bore the legend: 

PRO religions PROTESTANTE — PRO LIBERO PARLAMENTO 
JE MAINTIENDRAI 

To the intense disappointment of the Prince there was no 
popular demonstration in his favor, and the foreign army 
seemed for a tune to be an object of aversion. Had the King 
shown wisdom and courage, the Prince of Orange would no 
doubt soon have found himself without support in England; 
but from the first James II had entertained the idea of flight 
and prepared for it. The alternatives before him were the 
acceptance of a free parliament and submission to its con- 
clusions on the one hand, or a temporary asylum with Louis 
XIV and the hope of full restoration with the aid of France 



218 



A HI8TOBT OP DIPLOMACY 



GsiUP. Ill 

A. D. 

1684-1697 



on the other. He decided to seek refuge in France, and after 
some mishaps, on December 22, succeeded in leaving England. 
Unwilling to use force unnecessarily, the Prince of Orange 
had quietly waited, in conference with his English friends, 
with the intention of finally imposing conditions upon the 
King; but the flight of James II left England without a 
monarch. On December 24 the Peers invited the Prince 
to summon a Parliament, and on the twenty-sixth the 
Commoners made a similar request. Parliament having as- 
sembled, on February 6, 1689, the throne was declared va- 
cant by the Peers, and the Prince of Orange and the Princess 
Mary were declared King and Queen of England. The 
two Houses confinned the act, and on the thirteenth William 
III and Mary II were fonnally proclaimed the sovereigns. 



TlMaignifi- 
flanmof th6 
King's flight 



The aims of 
WiUiunlU 



III. The Diplomact op William op Orange to the 
Peace op Rtswick 

The flight of James II to France confirmed in the minds 
of the English people the convictions they had formed re- 
garding the King's secret intentions. If he had been willing 
to call a parliament and confonn to its decisions, there was 
no reason why he should resort to flight at all; and, if his 
object was simply to avoid bloodshed by temporary with- 
drawal, he might have retired to Scotland or Ireland in his 
own dominions. The fact that the fugitive king took refuge 
in France was an open confession that, as he had assured 
Barillon, ''his heart was still French," and that it was upon 
French support that he intended to rely in his extremity. 

Although the Prince of Orange was a foreigner by birth 
and personally cold, reserved, and unsympathetic, he had 
rightly interpreted the national sentiment regarding the 
attitude of the King, and the flight to France was proof that 
even in the King's own judgment it was William of Orange 
and not himself who represented the will of the nation. 

William III had, indeed, come to England to contend for 
a free parliament and the Protestant religion; but it was 
not the internal interests of the English nation that had 



A. D. 

1684-1697 



THE FORMATION OF THE GRAND ALLIANCE 219 

brought him there with a Dutch army. The expedition Chap. Ill 
could never have received the support of the States Greneral 
and the people of the United ftovinces if its purpose had 
been merely to place the Prince upon the throne of Ei^land, 
much less if it had been only to settle certain constitutional 
questions for the benefit of Englishmen. 

The invasion of England by the Prince of Orange was in- 
tended by him as an indirect attack upon the policies of 
Louis XIV. This was the understanding in Holland, and 
without it participation in the expedition by the Dutch 
army and navy would have been impossible. The interest of 
the United Provinces in this bold and dangerous adventure 
grew out of the fear of ultimate extinction as a Protestant 
nation in case there should be an eventual alliance between 
Louis XIV and the King of Ekigland. From this point of 
view their salvation depended upon success in changing the 
attitude of Ekigland toward the struggle with France. So 
long as Elngland continued to be held in a state of neutrality 
by the controversies between King and Parliament, the 
Grand Monarch would have a free hand up>on the continent. 
To the imagination of the time this signified that he would 
gradually encroach upon the Empire until he was master 
of its destinies, then annex the Spanish Netherlands and 
absorb the United Provinces, and finally unite the crowns 
of France and Spain; thus establishing a practically universal 
monarchy in which Catholicism would be the ofiicial reli- 
gion, and every form of dissent would ultimately be exter- 
minated. If, as was feared, England should fall sd completely 
under the control of James II that he would be able to form 
an open alliance with Louis XIV for the annihilation of 
Protestantism, the destruction of the Republic and the subju- 
gation of Europe would be even more speedily accomplished. 
To prevent this catastrophe, England must be ranged with 
the United Provinces and the other Protestant powers of 
Europe in their conflict with the King of France. 

This then was the chief purpose of the bold enterprise of 
William III in invading England. Louis XIV perfectly 
understood it, and had for that reason offered his aid to 



220 



A HISTOBY OF DIPLOMACY 



Chap. Ill 

A. D. 

1684-1697 

The relation 
of the Revolu- 
tion to the con- 
lliot with 
Louis XIV 



The piecau- 
tiona of 
William III 
for the safety 
of Holland 



James II to prevent it. James II miderstood it also, but 
it was only after William III had actually landed in Ekigland 
that he became fully aware that he had to choose between 
submission to the will of the nation and the abandonment of 
his kingdom. The way was still open to him to retain his 
throne. There was no attempt to force his abdication. He 
still had the opportunity to abandon his d3nQastic policies 
and accept the wiU of the nation. ELad he embraced that 
opportunity, he would have received the support of his 
people, the Prince of Orange and his army would have quietly 
withdrawn from Ekigland, the United Provinces would have 
been satisfied, all the continental powers, including the Pope, 
would have approved his action, and his rule would have 
continued. The alternative was an appeal to Louis XIV to 
compel the Ekiglish nation to restore him to his throne and 
sustain his prerogatives as an absolute monarch. In E2ng- 
land, therefore, after the King's flight, the conflict was not so 
much with James II as with the power that since the Treaty 
of Dover had frustrated the will of the nation in international 
affairs. Seen in its wider relations, the English Revolution 
of 1688 was merely an act in a more comprehensive drama, 
— the conflict of Europe with the plans and pretensions of 
Louis XIV. Had it not been for the interest of Holland in 
that conflict and the relations believed to exist between the 
Kings of France and England, the Revolution might never 
have occurred. 

Prom the first, William of Orange and Frederick William 
of Brandenburg had comprehended the wider import of the 
opposition to James II that had been preparing in England; 
and together they had labored to fortify resistance to Louis 
XIV on every side. The Great Elector did not live to witness 
the invasion of England, but he was deeply interested in it, 
and to the last encouraged the Prince of Orange to carry out 
the plan he had proposed at the time of James II's accession 
to challenge his tenure of the throne. 

In preparing for his expedition to England William III had 
taken care not to leave the United Provinces unprotected. 
When in 1687 the Prince of Wales was bom, the Elector had 



▲. D. 

1684-1697 



THE FORMATION OF THS GRAND ALLIANCE 221 

been deeply moved. At his court was a noted Huguenot Chap, in 

refugee, the French ex-Marshal Schomberg, whom he had 

taken mto his service and made the generalissimo of his 

armies. That experienced officer, who bitterly resented the 

persecution of his co-religionists in France, was devoted to 

the Prince of Orange, and accompanied him on his voyage of 

invasion. In February, 1688, General Spaen had been sent 

to The Hague; and, according to Count d'Avaux, the Elector 

then promised to place nine thousand Brandenburg troops 

in the Duchy of Cleve to cover the defence of Holland on 

the lower Rhine, while the Prince was absent in England.^ 

^th characteristic finesse, Frederick William denied the 

report; but after his death, which occurred on May 9, 1688, 

the promised troops were furnished by his son, Frederick III, 

who succeeded him as Elector.* 

In June of that year a new and closer alliance with Bran- 
denburg had been concluded, and Frederick III, — as zealous 
for the common cause as his father, the Great Elector, — 
had in July united with the Landgrave of Hesse, the Elector 
of Saxony, the King of Sweden, the Bishop of Miinster, the 
Elector Palatine, and the princes of the Circle of Westphalia 
to resist an attack by Louis XIV.' A few weeks before his 
embarkation, William of Orange and Frederick III held a 
conference at which the last military agreements were made; 
and soon afterward Brandenburg troops took possession of 
Edln to prevent a sudden sally of the French, and the prom- 
ised army for protecting the United Provinces was sent to 
Cleve.* On October 22, Ernest Augustus of Hanover joined 
the other confederates in the Magdeburg Concert,^ and 



1 See Waddington, Le Grand Eledeur, II, pp. 585, 586. 

* To the last moment of his life Frederick WiUiam was deeply inter- 
ested in the invasion of England. Only a few days before his death the 
password given out to the garrison at Potsdam was ''London and 
Amsterdam." 

' See Moemer, Staat9vertrdge, p. 500 et seq. 

* Erdmannsddrffer, Deutsche Geschichte, 1, p. 728. 

* Although the Magdeburg Concert is far less referred to by histo- 
rians than the League of Augsburg, it was vastly more important. It 



222 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY 

Chap. Ill twenty-two thousand men were stationed on the middle 
A.. D. 3j^j lower Rhine. 

The ability of William III to accomplish his main pur- 



pose of throwing the weight of England into the balance of 
Louis xiv'B Europe depended upon the action of Louis XIV. It seemed 
quite certain that the new ruler of England, surrounded on 
u every side by domestic problems, would soon suffer from a 
reaction by which he would be kept fully occupied in Eng- 
land; and that the English nation, once rid of its absolute 
monarch and confronted with constitutional questions, 
would have little inclination to plunge into a foreign war in 
which the national interests were not seriously at stake. 
In that case, Louis XIV would still have the advantage of 
England's neutrality, while the United Provinces would 
remain weakened by the absence of the stadtholder, its chief 
military commander, together with a great portion of its 
army. If, therefore, the Bang of France, without making a 
show of hostility, should leave England to reckon alone with 
her new sovereign, his own position on the continent would 
for some time at least remain essentially imaltered, leaving 
him free to employ all his resources against his continental 
foes. 

But Louis XrV had abready decided this question. He 
had resolved that he would never passively submit to the 
loss of control in England. 
Louti XIV The decision of Louis XIV to take up the cause of the fu- 

gitive king and compel his restoration enabled William III 
to attain the chief object he had in view in the invasion, 
namely, to enlist all the forces of Ekigland against the Grand 
Monarch. Without Louis XIV's open hostility, the whole 
theory underlying the Revolution might soon have been 
discredited. Opposition to James II was chiefly based on 
the supposition that he was acting in collusion with France, 
and that Louis XIV was in reality the deus ex machina of his 
dynastic policies. Had the King of France not interfered 
in the conflict between James II and his people, the pre- 

was aggressive in character, whereas the League of Augsburg was only 
defensive. See Moemer, StaatsvertrOge, pp. 505 and 772. 



foroMwar 
upon England 



THE FORMATION OF THE GRAND ALLIANCE 223 

ponderant influenoe of Louis XIV over the last two sovereigns Chap, hi 
might soon have been forgotten, and William of Orange might 15^^597 
have been made to appear as the hated foreigner and usurper. 

In fact, William III was not received in Ekigland with 
enthusiasm, and he did not possess the personal quaUties 
to make himself liked on his own account. He had come and 
had been accepted as a political necessity. But in the ab- 
sence of manifest hostility on the part of Louis XIV, William 
III could not easily have drawn England into a war with 
France. It is true, that English sympathies were against 
the persecutions and English interests were adverse to the 
aggressions of the King of France; but there were too many 
domestic problems to be solved in England to allow a for- 
eign war in which no great material advantage was to be 
gained to become popular. The most that William III 
could have done without an open challenge from Louis XIV 
would have been to throw the moral weight of England 
against the policies of the King of France. 

But, to the great delight of William III, his antagonist 
without hesitation espoused the cause of James II and at- 
tempted to enforce his restoration to the throne; and from 
that moment the die was cast. It was thereafter indisput- 
able that, as an English historian has expressed it, in taking 
refuge in France the fugitive king had simply ''gone home.'' 
The whole theory of the Revolution was thereby justified. 
Elngland had no choice. If the struggle of constitutionalism 
against absolutism was to be maintained, England must 
join the continental powers in resisting the predominance of 
France. 

The circumstances in which William of Orange came to The pradent 
England presented many serious obstacles to the realiza- ^^^'m 
tion of his purpose. There was in England a strong party 
attached to the fortunes of James II and expecting to derive 
advantage from his policies. Violence on the part of the 
stranger who had brought a foreign army to the soil of a 
proud and independent nation would mstantly have turned 
the popular sentiment against him. The proposal on his 
part to involve England in a continental war for the defence 



224 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY 

Chap. Ill of Holland would have alienated a large portion of the nation 
10^^697 ^^^ ^™^' ^"* ** ^^ ^ characteristic of William III to do 



nothing to force public opinion. In the matter dearest to 
him he did nothing even to hasten its development. The 
English nation desired to re-establish its constitution, and 
the Parliament was its normal instrument for the ascertain- 
ment and expression of the national will. It was to its free 
decisions that he owed his accession to the throne, and it 
was only through its free deliberations that he could hope to 
retain it. 

As regards religion, although the Queen was an Anglican 
and he was a Calvinist, thus representing together the con- 
victions of the greater part of the nation, he did nothing 
to embarrass or exasperate the Roman Catholics.^ Having 
amiounced the broad principle of toleration, in spite of op- 
position he remained true to its spirit. 

His high intelligence as a statesman was soon made evi- 
dent by his abstention from every form of arbitrary action. 
While maintaining the authority of the Crown, he recognized 
that the source of its power was the will of the nation. He 
did not even try to impose upon Parliament his own ideas. 
The time came when he found it necessary to silence its 
dissensions, but not until the nation realized the danger of 
its internal conflicts. Since the time of Elizabeth England 
had never been so free to follow in the way marked out by 
the national will. When at last it found itself engaged in war 
because of French aggression, instead of reproaches for having 
caused the conflict William III received the loyal support of 
the nation he had come to save, and to which he was more 
than ever indispensable. 
Louis xiv's If William III was chiefly indebted for his success to his 
hef in the ^,^^^ self-control and moderation, he owed it in part also to 



England Louis XIV's scusc of his owu Omnipotence. Accustomed 

to think lightly of England's power of resistance, Louis XIV 



^ Parliament, however, was not so lenient. A statute was passed 
expelling Roman Catholics from London and Westminster. Subse- 
quently they were deprived of arms and forbidden to possess a horse 
worth more than five pounds. 



THE FORMATION OP THE GRAND ALLIANCE 225 

did not realize the immensity of the task that was before Chap, hi 
him. Since the Treaty of Dover he had regarded Ekigland i-^i^g- 

as a mere dependency. Had the national will been entirely 

free to express itself, there would have been no attempt to 
hmniliate the United Provinces, no dictation by him of the 
Treaties of Nymwegen, no confiscations by the Charnbres de 
Reunion, no appropriation of Luxemburg and Strasburg, and 
X)erhaps no Revocation of the Edict of Nantes. The efface- 
ment of England's international influence by means of sub- 
sidies had proved a comparatively easy imdertaking, and 
Louis XIV believed that a few heavy blows on his part 
would still ruin the cause of William III and restore the 
country to James II. As a naval power, France was still 
superior to England; and with Ireland anti-Orangist, Scot- 
land still doubtful, and the loyalty of the army to the new 
sovereign as yet untried, it seemed probable that the Revo- 
lution might end in failure. 

It was, however, necessary to strike quickly. On Novem- 
ber 26, 1688, soon after the landing of the Dutch army in 
England, Louis XIV declared war on the United Provinces. 
Receiving with cordiality James II and his family upon their 
arrival in France, without a formal declaration of war with 
England he immediately began preparations for the restora- 
tion of the fugitive king. 

The prospects of success were greatly heightened by the TheattitudA 
situation in Ireland, which at once declared for James 11. J^2^ *^ 
On March 12, 1689, James II, in response to an invitation 
to come to Ireland, arrived at iijnsale with a fleet fitted out 
by Louis XIV at Brest, well supplied with money, arms, 
munitions, and a body of French officers, accompanied by 
Ck>unt d'Avaux as political adviser. 

The plan of James II was, after organizing the undisci- 
plined and ill-armed Irish forces numbering some fifty thou- 
sand men, to drive the adherents of William III from the 
North of Ireland, then to proceed to Scotland, where a ris- 
ing in the highlands in favor of James II was expected, and 
finally to descend into England for the recovery of the throne. 

In Scotland there had been a period of indecision growing 

VOL. ra. — 15 



226 



A HISTORY OF DIPLOBiACY 



Chap. UI 

A. D. 

1684-1697 



The comple- 
tion of tha 
Grand 



out of the conflict of parties; but soon after the arrival of 
James II in Ireland, on March 26, a convention assembled 
• at Edinburgh decided that he had "forfeited the crown" and 
a commission was sent to London to offer it to William and 
Mary. Without waiting for their acceptance, the new rulers 
were publicly proclaimed in Scotland. 

On May 4, after Ireland was in full revolt with the sup- 
port of France, William III published a manifesto setting 
forth the manner in which Louis XIV was supporting James 
II, and on the seventeenth followed it with a declaration of 
war. 

England was now at last, with its full consent, brought 
into open hostility with Louis XIV, but it still remained 
uncertain who would profit by this conflict; for, although 
William III was now permitted to employ the forces of 
England against the King of France, it was certain that he 
would be for some time occupied with the revolt of Ireland 
and prevented from acting freely on the continent. 

Diplomatic action on the part of William III was, however, 
now greatly facilitated. He had resolved from the first to 
retain in his own hands as a royal prerogative the direction 
of foreign policy, but to act in harmony with the prevailing 
desires of the nation. The preliminaries for the Grand 
Alliance — as the offensive union for the war with France 
was afterward called — had been already arranged at The 
Hague. The attack of Louis XIV upon the Empire and his 
declaration of war upon Holland had made their union nec- 
essary, and on May 12, 1689, the treaty of offensive alliance 
was signed at Vienna.^ 

With the progress of the revolution in England the tide 
had turned on the continent, and the intimidations of Louis 
XIV were answered with defiance. Continued victories 
over the Turks had inspired new courage in the Empire and 
permitted resistance to the new aggressions of France. At 
Madrid French influence had received a blow by the death 
of the Queen, and Charles II was more closely drawn to the 
Court of Vienna through his marriage with Maria of Neu- 

1 See Dumont, VII, Part II, p. 229 et seq. 



A. D. 

1684-1697 



THE FORMATION OF THE GRAND ALLIANCE 227 

burg, a sister of the Empress. The purely defensive League Chap, hi 
of Augsburg was being rapidly transformed into a network 
of aggressive alliances inspired with new confidence by the 
accession of the Prince of Orange to the throne of England. 
Before the end of the year, on December 20, after having 
previously concluded compacts with the United Provinces 
for aggressive action in the war with France,^ William III 
added England to the Grand Alliance, with the announced 
purpose of reinstating the conditions prescribed by the 
Treaties of Westphalia and the Treaty of the Pyrenees.* 
All Europe was now leagued against France.' 

In place of the vast diplomatic combination by which The ] 
Louis XIV had isolated the United Provinces in 1672, the J^J^»^^ 
Prince of Orange had gradually built up a coalition greater 
than any which had previously existed in Europe, by which 
in turn Louis XIV was left in complete isolation. Diplomacy 
had reached its limit, and for the next four years there are 
few diplomatic changes or negotiations to record. William 
III had succeeded in uniting Europe so completely that little 
remained for him to do; and the Grand Monarch, cut off 
from regular diplomatic intercourse by the dismissal of his 
ambassadors from most of the foreign courts, was reduced to 
secret operations through obscure agencies, mostly of an 
ecclesiastical character.* 

Since the autumn of 1688, when Louii^ XIV began his 
open attack on the Empire, he had taken possession of Phil- 
ipsburg, Mannheim, and Frankenthal, and had devastated 
the Palatinate with fire and sword, burning Heidelberg, 
Speyer, Worms, and many other cities. He had created a 
feeling of horror throughout Germany by re-enacting the 

* For the treaties with the United Provinces, of August, 1689, see 
Dumont, VII, Part II, p. 236 et seq. 

* See Dumont, VII, Part II, p. 241. Spain acceded to the Grand 
Anianoe on June 6, 1690. See Dumont, VII, Part II, p. 267. 

' Denmark had formed an alliance with England on August 15, 1689. 
See Dumont, VII, Part II, p. 237. 

^ BariUon had been immediately sent away from England on the ac- 
ceasion of William III, and R^benac left Madrid on March 25, 1689, 
aft^ the failure of his mission. 



228 



A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY 



Chap. Ill 

A. D. 

1684>1697 



The war for 
the reeovery 
of Ireland 



scenes of the Thirty Years' War. But these cruelties were 
a sign of weakness rather than of strength. Fully compre- 
. hending that in the end he could not overcome the powerful 
coalition that confronted him, Louis XIV wished as quickly 
as possible by his excesses to strike terror into the hearts of 
his enemies, and thus force upon them an early peace. The 
area of the conflict was, however, rapidly widening; and, 
while the Brandenburg troops drove the French out of the 
electorate of Edln, occupied Kaiserswerth and besieged Bonn, 
the Prince of Waldeck, as generalissimo of the United Prov- 
inces, under the orders of William III, led the Dutch forces: 
augmented by Spanish and English auxiliaries under Marl- 
borough into Brabant, and the Duke of Lorraine with sixty 
thousand men invested Mainz. Driven back from the Rhine, 
the French, under the command of Luitemburg, — the ablest 
disciple of Cond6 in the art of war, — soon made the Span- 
ish Netherlands the principal seat of hostilities, which by 
concentration changed the character of the conflict in both 
a military and a political sense; for the Grerman princes, 
imited for the defence of their coimtry , presently showed signs 
of weakening when the struggle was diverted from the Rhine 
and centred upon Brabant and Flanders.^ 

In the meantime, William III was preoccupied with the 
war in Ireland. The island had suJBPered much from the stem 
domination of England, and had never forgotten that it was 
subject to a conqueror. Cherishing fondly the tradition of 
its independence, it had never ceased to struggle imder the 
yoke imposed upon it. Devotedly Roman Catholic in re- 
ligion, the majority of the population had long suffered a 
cruel deprivation of religious freedom, which had been partly 
restored during the latter part of the rule of James II. The 
welcome accorded to him was, therefore, fervent and the de- 
votion of the people manifest, but from the first there was 
a contradiction of purposes fatal to the perfect concord of 
the fugitive king and the Irish patriots. 

James II's idea in coming to Ireland with the aid of the 



* The military movements are well outlined by Lonchay, La rwaliU 
de la France et de VEapagne, pp. 311, 322. 



THE FORMATION OF THE GRAND ALLIANCE 229 

King of France was to use the island as a stepping-stone for Chap, hi 
remounting the throne of England. The aim of the Irish, on jg^^^g^ 

the contrary, — with the exception of the Protestants, who 

were greatly in the minority, — was to secure the entire in- 
dependence of the kingdom, and to make Roman Catholicism 
the official religion to the exclusion of every other. 

The harsh and arbitrary measures resulting from the at- 
tempt of James II to rule the country, with whose sentiments 
his own policies were in conflict, together with the poverty 
from which it suffered, rendered his short reign an imhappy 
one for all. The heroic defence of Londonderry by its Prot- 
estant population, the sending of Schomberg to Ireland with 
an inadequate army, and the efforts of William III to rouse 
the English Parliament to the serious character of the situa- 
tion produced no change. It was not imtil William III, dis- 
couraged with the quarrels of Whigs and Tories, dissolved 
the Parliament which had placed him upon the throne and 
called a new one, that he was able to embark for Ireland. 

On Jime 14, 1690, William III landed with his army at 
Carrickfergus. At the battle of the Boyne, fought on July 
1, in which William III was woimded and Schomberg was 
killed, the forces of James II were so completely routed and 
demoralized that he fled at once to Dublin, and soon after- 
ward to France. The war in Ireland had still to be continued, 
but the battle of the Boyne was the turning point. In assert- 
ing that this brief conflict decided the future of Europe as 
wdl as of Ireland, as a historian has done,^ there may seem 
at fij-st to be some exaggeration, for it is by the combination 
of events, and not by any single action, that the course of 
history is determined; but the reconquest of Ireland, which 
followed as a result of this battle, established beyond ques- 
tion the position of William III in England, which in turn 
was decisive for the success of the Revolution of 1688 and for 
the fate of Europe in the struggle on the continent. 

Returning to England in the following September, Wil- The mtum of 
liam III, though received as a hero, was encompassed with J^'^tXS^ 
serious parliamentary problems. The English navy had 

1 Sirteoia de Grovestins, GuiUaume III et Louia XIV, VI, p. 205. 



A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY 

Chap. Ill suffered a damaging defeat by the French, on June 30, in 
ii«4-Tfiq7 ^^® battle of Beachy Head, which left France triumphant on 

the sea. While the war in Ireland continued and while the 

French were in command of the channel, the prospect of 
rendering active aid to the allies on the continent was not 
promising. Yet, on January 18, 1691, William III set out 
for Holland, which he reached with difficulty. 

During the absence of the Stadtholder in England, the 
Grand Pensionary, Fagel, to whose hands the government 
of Holland had been confided, had died, and had been suc- 
ceeded by Anthony Heinsius, who was thenceforth the con- 
fidential representative of William III and practically the 
governor of the United Provinces. 

The presence of William III, returning from his successful 
expedition not only a crowned king but a victor in battle, 
made a deep impression upon the Dutch people and upon all 
Europe. 

In his speech to the States General he said: ''When I 
took leave of you, I informed you of my intention to go to 
England to save that kingdom, thanks to your aid, from a 
deluge of evils present and to come. Providence has blessed 
my enterprise, and the nation has offered me the crown of 
three kingdoms. I have accepted it, not through ambition, 
— God is my witness, — but to place the religion, the wel- 
fare, and the peace of Great Britain in a position of safety, 
and to be able to protect more effectually the allies, and 
particularly the Republic, from the preponderance of 
France. ... If it please God for me to become the instru- 
ment which Providence may use in restoring peace to 
Europe and establishing the security of your state, I shall 
have Uved sufficiently and shall descend with tranquillity to 
my grave." 
The GongnH At the time of the King's arrival there had assembled at 
of th« GrMid rpj^^ Hague representatives of all the states composing the 



Tho Hague Grand Alliance. On October 20, 1690, the Duke of Savoy 
had joined the Alliance, and had accepted a condition stip- 
ulated by the Protestant princes to the effect that he would 
release all the Waldenses whom he held in prison, and restore 



THE FORMATION OF THE GRAND ALLIANCE 231 

to their parents the children who had been taken from them Chap, ill 
to be educated in the Roman faith.^ ^- '^• 

Besides the ambassadors and other diplomatic agents of 

the greater powers, many princes of the Empire were pres- 
ent in person; among them the Elector of Brandenburg, the 
Elector of Bavaria, Max Emmanuel, — who, on December 
12, 1691, was to receive his letters patent as governor of 
the Spanish Netherlands,* — the Landgrave of Hesse- 
Darmstadt, and the Dukes of Brunswick, Wiirtemberg, and 
Holstein. 

The representatives of the allies had just signed an agree- 
ment that no one of the powers that had joined the Grand 
Alliance would treat with the King of France until he had 
subscribed to the following conditions: First, the restitution 
of all the conquests made by France since the Peace of West- 
phalia; second, satisfaction to the Holy See and reparation 
of the outrages conmiitted against the Court of Rome under 
the pontificate of Innocent XI; and third, rehabilitation of 
the Protestants in France and a promise to accord to them 
the liberty of conscience of which they had been deprived 
by the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes. 

The moment seemed to have arrived when merely local 
political interests were to be temporarily laid aside in the 
eflfort to enforce the recognition of principles of justice as 
the basis of international relations. It is true, that the last 
of the three conditions just named implies a right of inter- 
vention on the part of the associated powers which had not 
been established, and would not have been generally accepted 
by themselves; for the Peace of Westphalia left the regula- 
tion of religion to each separate sovereign within his own 
jmisdiction, and the right of foreign powers to enforce tol- 
eration upon one another had never been asserted or even 

» See Dumont, VII, Part II, p. 272 et seq. 

* For the efforts of Louis XIV to win over Max Emmanuel by the 
intermediary of Villars and the means used by Leopold I to retain his 
allegJance through the influence of Kaunitz and to secure for him the 
govemoTBhip of the Spanish Netherlands, see the details given by 
L^p^lle, La diplamatie frangaise et la auccesaion (TEspagne, I, p. 289 
et seq. 



232 



A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY 



Chap. Ill 

A. D. 

1684>1697 



William III 
before the 
Coognm 



recognized by any one of them. From this point of view, 
the last demand of the allies, though just, was no doubt ex- 
-cessive; still, these resolutions indicate a deeper sense of 
equity and a firmer resolution to support it than had ever 
before been displayed by any similar international conference. 
It was at least an effort to challenge the reign of absolutism, 
and to impose upon the disturber of the peace of Europe a 
respect for treaties and for the rights which they embodied. 

The welcome given by the Congress to William III was a 
tribute such as had nevfer been paid to any sovereign of his 
generation. It was sincere, spontaneous, and enthusiastic, 
recognizing in him not only the King of England, Scotland, 
and Ireland but the champion of the national liberties of 
EJurope. He was hailed and treated as a great deliverer. 
With a spirit of fraternity imknown in any previous inter- 
national assembly, the princes had waived among them- 
selves all regard for ceremonial, and had met upon a plane 
of equality; but to Vniliam III they displayed every mark of 
deference. 

A man of action and not of words, he earnestly wished to 
inspire his allies with courage. In his discourse to the Con- 
gress he said: 

"The states of Europe have too long given themselves up 
to a spirit of division, of indolence, and of inattention to 
their highest interests; but, if the dangers with which France 
threatens them recall them to the realization of their past 
errors, they also show the necessity of repairing them. It 
is no longer a time to deliberate but to act. Already the 
King of France has rendered himself master of all the strong 
places bordering upon his kingdom, which were the only 
barriers that we possessed against his ambition; if we do not 
at once oppose him in this, he will soon take all the rest. 
The special interest of each is boimd up with the general 
interest of all. The forces of the enemy are considerable, 
and he will sweep everything before him like a torrent. We 
must rescue with the sword the liberties of Europe which 
he means to stifle, or else submit for ever to the yoke of 
servitude. As for me, I shall spare neither my credit, nor 



THE FORMATION OF THE GRAND ALLIANCE 233 

my forces, nor my person to obtain this glorious result; Chap, hi 
and I shall come in the spring at the head of my troops to .fj^^tf^g^ 
conquer or to perish with my allies/' 



The courage and energy of William III had an electrical 
effect upon the Congress, which immediately imdertook to 
fix the quota of troops to be furnished by each of the allies. 
The Emperor, England^ and Spain each agreed to place in 
the field twenty thousand men; the United Provinces, thirty- 
five thousand; the Duke of Savoy and the Elector of Bran- 
denburg each twenty thousand; the Elector of Bavaria, 
eighteen thousand; the Dukes of Brunswick, sixteen thou- 
sand; the Elector of Saxony, twelve thousand; the Circles of 
Suabia and Franconia, ten thousand; the Landgrave of Hesse, 
eight thousand; the Bishop of Mtinster, seven thousand; the 
Duke of Wtirtemberg and the Bishop of li^e, each six 
thousand; the Elector Palatine, four thousand; making in all 
an army of two himdred and twenty-two thousand men. 
When this formidable roll-call was ended, it seemed as if 
Louis XIV was doomed to complete overthrow. 

The absence of Sweden and Denmark from the list of con- The mdednve 
tingents just given requires explanation. During the Con- 2^^^^' 
gress of The Hague they had proposed mediation. Secure 
from attack by IVance, owing to their geographical position, 
and anxious to profit from the war by seciuing the trade 
which the other maritime powers were losing on account of it, 
the Scandinavian kingdoms were not enthusiastic in oppos- 
ing Louis XIV. Denmark had already in exchange for lib- 
eral subsidies made an agreement with England, and was, 
therefore, less independent; but Sweden, relying largely 
upon the traffic in mercenaries, was eager to obtain money 
for military service. Taking advantage of these propensities 
of the Scandinavian powers, Louis XIV was ready to pay 
for the division and discouragement of the allies by schemes 
of mediation; but William III would not listen to proposals 
which could only have the effect of weakening the Grand 
Alliance. As for subsidies, all the Cerman princes were in 
need of money, and the maintenance of their armies fell by 
necessity very heavily upon England and the United Prov- 



234 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY 

Chap. Ill inces, already overburdened. William Ill's policy, therefore, 
^- ^' was to make a quick campaign and to bring his opponent 

to a peaceful disposition by a rapid succession of telling 

blows. 

The Congress of TheHague foreshadowed adecisive victory 
for the Grand Alliance, but its promises were never fully kept. 
As in every great coalition composed of stronger and weaker 
powers, the weaker placed their reliance upon the stronger, 
and there were many disappointments. The delinquencies 
of Spam caused the loss of the important fortress of Mons, 
taken by the French in March, 1691, just as William III was 
coming to the rescue. The Bishop of Mtinster and the Duke 
of Hanover remained immobile. The capitulation of Namur 
brought the enemy within three days' march of the Dutch 
frontier. The Elector Palatine was occupied in defending 
his own territory; the French troops released by the fall of 
Namur were sent to the Rhine; and the Hessians, who should 
have joined the army of the Rhine, went by orders from 
Vienna to protect the Mosel. It was only when the King of 
England was personally on the scene that the allies made 
I)erceptible progress in the field. Yet nothing decisive hap- 
I)ened on either side. 
The pUDfl for In the meantime, every one was growing weary of the war. 
Ireland had been reduced to obedience, but political condi- 
tions in England gave new hope to James II, who in January, 
1692, believed that he would be welcomed by the nation, if 
he landed there. 

William III had, indeed, many troubles, and had made 
mistakes. He had not foimd it possible to accept party 
government, the Whigs were jealous of the favor shown to 
the Tories, there was the full measure of court intrigues, 
Parliament had not adopted the King's conception of tol- 
eration in matters of religion, and taxation had become bur- 
densome. In these circumstances, James II believed that a 
descent upon England with an armed force would secure his 
restoration to the throne. 

Louis XIV assented to his views, and a fieet was fitted 
out imder the command of Admiral Tourville to clear the 



THE FORMATION OF THE GRAND ALLIANCE 235 

Channel and prepare the way for James II to follow with ^=^- ^^ 
an army. A general pardon — with certain prominent ex- i0^^6g7 

oeptions — was prepared; and, in the middle of April, 1692, 

James II proceeded to Normandy to await the action of the 
fleet. 

A contrary wind prevented the expedition from sailing 
for several weeks, and in the meantime the Dutch and Eng- 
lish vessels were assembled to dispute the passage. On May 
19, the great naval battle of La Hogue was fought, in which 
the heavier ships of the French fleet were burned and the 
lighter ones dispersed, utterly destroying French dominance 
upon the sea; and the invasion of England had to be 
abandoned. 

Although diplomatic activity was rendered diflJcult by: 
the fact that nearly all Europe was engaged in hostilities ^^ ' 
with France, Louis XIV lost no opportunity to discourage 
and divide the allies, with the purpose of dissolving the Grand 
Alliance, as he had dissolved the coalition against him in 
1684. 

In 1691 he attempted to gain the ear of the King of Spain 
through P6re Blandini^res, who had access to the confessor 
of Charles II, and afterward through P^re Guzman and the 
papal nimcio at Madrid; but these efforts produced no results. 

With Earnest Augustus, Duke of Hanover, he had for a 
time more success. Through his influence a "third party," 
as it was called, began to be organized in Germany with the 
aid of Sweden, for the purpose of insisting upon peace without 
further warfare. The new elector of Saxony, John George 
III, was at the same time engaged in suspicious negotiations 
with France. To break up this movement, Leopold I de- 
cided to attach the Duke of Hanover to himself by creating 
for him a ninth electorate in the Empire; and, on March 22, 
1692, an "eternal union" was signed between the Houses of 
Hapsburg and Hanover. Finding himself isolated by this 
desertion, the Elector of Saxony was compelled to adhere 
once more to the Grand Alliance; but the elevation of Han- 
over to the rankof an electorate created great jealousy among 
the German princes. Christian V of Denmark and Ulrich 



236 



A HISTOBY OF DIPLOMACY 



Chap. Ill 

A. D. 

1684-1697 



The propofled 
mediation of 
Sweden 



of Brunswick-Wolfenbtittel were greatly offended by the 
favor shown to Ernest Augustus, who by a succession 
•of mheritances had from a mere princeling come to be 
the head of the House of Brunswick-Luneburg, and now 
claimed possession of nearly the whole Brunswick inheri- 
tance.* 

Max Emmanuel, Elector of Bavaria, who by the grace of 
the King of Spain was enjoying almost royal authority in the 
Spanish Netherlands, was especially irritated by the pro- 
motion of Ernest Augustus. There was also another reason 
for believing that Max Emmanuel might be approached with 
proposals by Louis XIV. Before the birth of their son, 
Joseph Ferdinand, — destined to play an interesting part 
in the Spanish succession, — the Elector's wife, Maria An- 
tonia, daughter of Leopold I, angered by her husband's 
marital infidelities, and wishing to spite him, had voluntarily 
renewed the renunciation of the Spanish succession which 
the Emperor had forced upon her in the interest of his son 
Charles at the time of her marriage, and had died in giving 
birth to the Prince. 

Li the hope that Sweden might succeed in obtaining con- 
sent to mediation. Count d'Avaux was sent to Stockholm, 
and in July, 1693, was furnished with a memorial containing 
a list of the concessions to the Grand Alliance which Louis 
XIV was then ready to grant; for, being unable to strike a 
decisive blow, the King of France was now desirous of mak- 
ing peace. Having devastated the coimtries occupied by his 
armies, they could no longer live upon the products of the 
fields, the crops were poor, and the treasury of France was 
depleted. He therefore declared himself willing to renounce 
in favor of the Elector of Bavaria all his rights in the Span- 
ish Netherlands, in case of the death of Charles II without 
an heir, — intending to exchange them afterward for the 



^ It was claimed that the creation of the ninth electorate by the Em- 
peror for his own advantage was illegal, being a violation of the Peace 
of Westphalia and the Golden Bull of Charles IV, the Constitution of 
the Empire. See Volume I of this work, p. 39. The eighth electorate 
had been created by the Treaty of Westphalia. 



THE FORMATION OF THE GRAND ALLIANCE 237 

Kingdom of Naples or the Duchy of Milan; * to surrender Chap, hi 
Montroyal and Trarbach in compensation for Strasburg; j^^ijjgy 



to demolish his recently erected fortifications and bridges- 
on the Rhine; to return Philipsburg fortified, and Freiburg 
in the condition in which it was when taken; to procure 
from the Princess of Orleans a renunciation of her territorial 
claims in the Palatinate; and to treat equitably the Duke 
of Lorraine. But the £}mperor required the return of Stras- 
burg, the States General were indisposed at the time to end 
a war in which they had gained nothing, and William III 
demanded to be recognized by Louis XIV as King of 
England. 

The Hector of Bavaria, so far as he was personally con- 
cerned, would gladly have accepted the offer of Louis XIV; 
but the mediation of Sweden was too strongly opposed by 
the Emperor and William III to render it avaUable, and 
the proposals were without result. 

Although the arms of Louis XIV were in general victorious The noonds*- 
whenever battles were fought, he gained no victory sufB-^y°^^'^ 
ciently decisive to destroy the hopes of the coalition and P-pwy 
render possible a general peace; yet an early termination 
of the war was becoming imperative. France was exhausted; 
the King had passed the age of military ambition; and Lou- 
vois, who had chiefly inspired the war and organized the 
French armies, had died in 1691.* 

The most conspicuous indication of a chastened spirit on 
the part of Louis XIV was his inclination to resume friendly 
relations with the Papacy. He had found it decidedly un- 
profitable to be more Catholic than the Pope, — a course 
which had alienated the Holy See from the policies of France 
and imited the Catholic powers with the interests of the 
Protestants. 



^ For the miasion of Delahaye to induce Max Emmanuel's accep- 
tance, see Legrelle, La diplomaHe frangaise, etc., I, p. 373. 

* Upon the death of Louvois, Pomponne was recalled from his long 
retirement and replaced Colbert de Ooissy as Minister of Foreign 
Affairs; a position which he held until his death in 1609, when he was 
succeeded by his son-in-law the Marquis de Torcy. 



A HISTORY OF DIPLOBiACT 



Chap. Ill 

A. D. 

1684-1697 



The Kpante 
peace of 
France with 
the Duke 
of Savoy 



Innocent XI, who had died in 1689, had triumphed in the 
conflict over the "immunities," and Louis XIV had been 
. compelled to abandon his pretensions in that controversy. 
Under the next pope, Alexander VIII, who reigned only- 
two years, to the great grief of that pontiff conditions re- 
mained essentially unaltered; for the King would not annul 
the offensive ordinances of 1682 regarding the independence 
of the Gallican Church, and the Pope like his predecessor 
insisted that they were null and void. At the next papal 
election, in July, 1691, the French cardinals employed 
every means to obtain a conciliatory successor to Alexander 
VIII, and succeeded in electing Innocent XII; who, although 
of a pacific disposition, insisted upon the rights of the Holy 
See. After two years of negotiation, in 1693, the French 
clergy were compelled to admit that the resolutions of 1682 
were in violation of the canons of the Roman Church. "At 
the feet of Your Holiness, we declare our inexpressible sor- 
row," ran the humble retraction. Peace was then re-estab- 
lished, and Louis XIV wrote to Innocent XII that he would 
withdraw the orders he had given for the execution of the 
odious articles. 

It was his impotence to overcome with force alone the 
troops of the Grand Alliance that wrung from the King these 
tardy concessions. To his endeavors to prevent a peace 
with the Turks, — who had profited by the double attack 
upon the Empire, — he had endeavored to add a vigorous 
anti-imperial movement in Italy; and for the success of this 
enterprise he required at least the neutrality of the Pope. 

The Duke of Savoy, Victor Amadeus, although a member 
of the Grand Alliance, had never entirely severed his rela- 
tions with the Court of Versailles. Considering the danger 
to which he would be exposed in case separate agreements 
should be made by the allies without regard to his interests, 
this prudence was justifiable; for, at the same time, the Em- 
peror himself, by the intermediation of a Venetian agent, 
Count Velo, was in secret relations with Verjus de Cr6cy 
and Morel, representatives of the King of France, regarding 
the terms of peace. 



THE FORMATION OF THE GRAND ALLIANCE 239 

Anxious to recover the places taken from him by the French Chap, hi 
during the war, Victor Amadeus received with pleasure the j^J^^ggy 

offer of Louis XIV to restore to him most of the captured 

cities and fortresses; but indiscreetly revealed these secret 
proposals to Heinsius and the Emperor, who discouraged 
his acceptance. After long negotiations, however, since 
William III refused to admit as a condition of peace the ces- 
sion of the fortress of Pinerolo to the Duke of Savoy, — 
who really had no claim upon it, as it had been taken from 
the Duke of Mantua, * — Victor Amadeus, fearing that his 
interests would not be protected by the allies, on July 29, 
1696, concluded a separate peace with France.' The condi- 
tions were a vague promise to put him in possession of the 
Duchy of Milan in exchange for Savoy, in case the King of 
Spain should die without an heir; the marriageof his daughter, 
the Princess Adelaide, to the Emg's eldest grandson, the 
Duke of Burgundy; and, in consideration of this marriage, 
the enjo3nnent of "the honors reserved for crowned heads." • 

Having mollified the feelings of the Catholic princes by seont nego- 
his concessions to the Pope, and having made a break in the ^J^°jJ^^ 
Grand Alliance by detaching the Duke of Savoy, Louis XIV and Holland 
now b^an a systematic attempt to dissolve the coalition.^ 

The heavy burden of the war was beginning to be seriously 
felt in Holland, whose trade had suffered seriously from it in 
addition to bearing a great part of its cost, and the merchants 
and shipowners were complaining of the military policy which 
the stadtholder had brought upon the coimtry. 

Diplomatic relations with France having ceased with the 
outbreak of the war, the Polish resident at The Hague, an 
Italian named Mollo, was secretly sent to Paris by the States 



* See page 172 of this volume. 

' For details, see Vast, Les grands traitis, II, p. 157. 

' For details of these negotiations, see Legrelle, La diplomaiie franr 
(otae et la 9iuxe89wn d^Enpagne, I, p. 437 et seq. 

^ The weakness of the coalition was already becoming evident. By 
the Treaty of Vigerano, of October 7, 1696, the Emperor and the King 
of Spain agreed to withdraw their troops from Italy; which permitted 
Louis XIV to concentrate his forces in the Netherlands and on the 
Rhine. 



240 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY 

Chap. Ill General to express the desire for peace in Holland. Mae- 
- ^'^' ^ stricht was chosen for a confidential exchange of views, and 

1684—1697 

on October 15, 1694, Dykvelt was sent to confer with the 

French agents, Harlay de Bonneuil and Callidres, who had 
left France clandestinely for this purpose. Dykvelt de- 
manded the recognition of William III as King of E}ngland, 
the restitution of Strasburg to the Empire, and the erection 
of barrier fortresses in the Spanish Netherlands for the future 
protection of the United Provinces. 

These negotiations, which came to nothing on account of 
Dykvelt's impatience with the meagre offers and tardy pro- 
cedure of the French agents, were resumed in June, 1695, 
at Utrecht, between Calli^res and Boreel, burgomaster of 
Amsterdam. Better conditions were then offered by France, 
including a secret article recognizing William III; but in 
September, the allies having learned of these interviews, 
they were broken off without result.* 

In March, 1696, Calligres again returned to Holland with 
new instructions, and Heinsius presented a project which 
included the recognition of William III; the restitution of 
Strasburg, Luxemburg, and all the places taken by the 
rSunions, with Lorraine and Pinerolo; the exemption of 
Dutch vessels from the tax of fifty sous a ton; protection for 
the Protestant consuls established in France; and finally 
the regulation of all outstanding questions on the basis of 
the treaties of Westphalia and Nymwegen.^ 

The King of France was imwilling to submit to these 
terms. He declined to recognize William III until after the 
peace was signed, whereas Heinsius demanded recognition 
as a previous condition of signature; he was not disposed to 
surrender Strasburg; and would permit prayers to be made 
in the houses of Dutch consuls only on condition that no 
Frenchman be allowed to be present. 

When through his ambassador at The Hague, Count von 



^ CalliSres wrote a famous book on diplomacy entitled, De la 
manihre de nigocier avec lea eouveraine, Paris, 1716. 

* For the details of these negotiations, see Legrelle, La diphmalie 
frangaiae et la euccesnon d'Eapagne, I, p. 457 et seq. 



THE FORMATION OF THE GRAND ALLIANCE 241 

ICaunitZy the Emperor's views were consulted, he at first Chap, hi 
insisted absolutely upon the restitution of Strasburg, Lor- ^- '^• 

raine, and Hnerolo. The negotiations over Strasburg eon 

sumed a year. The renewed instructions to Callidres indi- The hMttotion 
cate the sincere desire of Louis XIV to conclude a peace, **' ^^p°^^ ^ 
and betray a solicitude for the security of France. He 
consented, first, to restore Philipsburg, Eehl, Breisach, and 
Freiburg, if he were allowed to retain Strasburg; later, to 
surrender both Freiburg and Strasburg, provided the latter 
place were stripped of its fortifications and delivered over 
to its own citizens; and, finally, to return it to the Elmpire 
as it was when he took it, if the obligation were accepted not 
to increase its defences, and to permit the continuation of 
worship by the Catholics; but the Emperor would not accept 
these terms, and demanded in addition, that, the King of 
France and the Dauphin should formally renounce the 
Spanish succession. 

In making this demand he had touched upon the King's 
most sensitive point. The declining health of Charles II 
rendered it probable that his death was imminent, and it 
was Louis XIV's anxiety to secure the succession that in- 
spired his eagerness to end the war and dissolve the coalition 
before the question of the succession became definitive. 

The allies also were interested in the new problem which 
Europe would soon have to solve. The States General were 
particularly disquieted. Even William III was at this time 
desirous of peace, for neither England nor the United 
Provinces wished the Spanish Netherlands to fall either to 
Louis XIV or to Leopold I.^ The addition of those provinces 
either to France or to the Elmpire would disturb the equilib- 
rium of Europe, and the union of the Crown of Spain with 
that of France or with the Crown of Austria would create 
a still greater preponderance of either the Bourbons or the 



^ To the original treaty of the Grand Alliance, of May 12, 1689, was 
appended a separate secret article, by which, in case Charles II of Spain 
should die without an heir, Leopold I and his heirs should be recognized 
as the rightful sovereigns of all the Spanish possessions. See Dumont, 
VII, Part II, p. 230. 
VOL. ni. — 16 



242 



A HISTORY OP DIPLOMACY 



Chap. Ill 

A. D. 

1684-1697 



TbeConcTMS 
of Ryswiek 



Hapsburgs in Europe. Both England and the United Prov- 
inces preferred that the Elector of Bavaria, or one of the 
-junior grandsons of Louis XIV, — the Duke of Anjou, or 
the Duke of Berry, — should become King of Spain, upon 
condition that these princes and their posterity should be 
ineligible to the throne of France, with the Spanish Nether- 
lands under a separate government. Callidres, understand- 
ing the wishes of his royal master, would discuss none of these 
solutions; maintaining that the question of the Spanish suc- 
cession had no relation to any of the provisions of the treaties 
of Westphalia and Nymwegen, which were to be the basis 
of the proposed peace. 

On September 6, 1696, Heinsius annoimced that, in view 
of Louis XIV's proposals, there seemed to be no obstacle to 
peace, and officially accepted the mediation of Sweden. On 
February 4, 1697, the other allies, with the exception of Spain, 
followed the example of Holland. Harlay de Bonneuil, 
Verjus de Cr6cy, and Calliferes received instructions from 
Louis XIV to meet the plenipotentiaries of the allies and to 
sign a treaty of peace on the basis of the treaties of West- 
phalia and Nymwegen, restoring all the places taken by the 
riunuma, including Strasburg. 

With Sweden as mediator, in the person of Baron Lilien- 
roth, a congress was appointed to be held in the ch&teau of 
Ryswick near The Hague.^ The Emperor, not wishing the 
coalition dissolved before the question of the Spanish suc- 
cession was ripe for solution, which was almost momentarily 
expected, endeavored to postpone the opening of the nego- 
tiations; but, imderstanding that William III and the United 
Provinces intended to proceed without him, he sent his dele- 
gates to Holland, and the C!ongress opened on May 9, 1697. 



^ The Emperor had proposed Aix-larChapelle as the place for the 
meeting of the Congress, but Louis XIV objected to sending his pleni- 
potentiaries to an Imperial city. Leopold I returned the compliment by 
objecting to Ryswick, which Louis XIV had proposed and William III 
approved. The ch&teau was admirably adapted to the ceremonial of a 
Congress, being situated midway between The Hague, where the allies 
were to reside, and Delft, where the French were to take their quarters. 



THE FORMATION OF THE GRAND ALLIANCE 243 

like the other great mtemational congresses that had pre- Chap, hi 
ceded it, the Congress of Ryswick assembled tardily, pro- ifJii^a^ 
gressed slowly, and gave little promise of results. 

The States Greneral were represented by Heinsins, Dykvelt, 
and William van Haren; the Emperor, by Count von Kau- 
nitz. Von Stratmann, and Baron von Seilem; the Eang of 
England, by the Earl of Pembroke, Viscount de Villiers, and 
Sir Joseph Williamson; the King of Spain, by Francis de 
Quiros,* resident at The Hague, and Coimt de Tirimont; 
and the Elector of Brandenburg, by Von Schmettau and 
Von Danckelmann. The princes of the Empire were not, 
however, permitted to treat separately, and the negotia- 
tions for the Empire were conducted exclusively by the Im- 
perial delegates under the instructions of the Emperor. 

The Congress would apparently never have concluded its The private 
labors but for the intervention of William III. He greatly ^^**in ""* 
desired peace, but wished it to be general, and not as at with loum 
Nymwegen based upon a group of separate settlements die- ^^ 
tated by the King of France.* 

For him the future attitude of Louis XIV toward England 
was of first importance; and, early in July, his trusted friend 
and servant, William Bentinck, whom he had made Earl of 
Portland, was sent to consult with Marshal Boufflers near 
the French camp and to ask for satisfaction upon three 
points: — First, that the King of France should not further 
support James II, who should be invited to leave France; 
second, that he should not require that the partisans of 
James II be amnestied and restored to the possession of their 
goods; and, third, that he should not forbid the Prince of 
Orange to receive in his principality the French who wished 
to establish themselves there. Upon these conditions, 



* For his persistent and successful pleading for the return of Lux- 
emburg to Spain, see Lonchay, La rioaliU de la France et (TEspagney p. 
337 et seq. 

* The financial condition of England was deplorable, the country be- 
ing on the verge of bankruptcy. For a detailed account of the fimmcial 
situation, see Koch, Die Friedenabestrebungen WHkelma III, pp. 
45,47. 



244 



A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY 



CSAP. Ill 
A. D. 

1084-1697 



The terms of 
the Peace of 
Rytwiek 



William III was ready to urge Spain and the Emperor to 
make peace.^ 

- Louis XIV replied, that he could not honorably expel 
James II from France, but he would promise not to assist 
him. He would not require amnesty for the partisans of 
James II. As for the Principality of Orange, he could not 
allow it to become an asylum for malcontents, who in the 
very heart of France might sow the seeds of discontent and 
become a cause of new conflicts. 

When, in the course of the negotiations, Bentinck proposed 
an article to be inserted in the treaty of peace in which the 
two kings should mutually promise '4n the same terms'' that 
neither would aid directly or indirectly the enemies of the 
other, Louis XIV seemed greatly shocked that William III 
should assume an equal footing with himself, and replied: 
"This equality can not be admitted, since the submission of 
my subjects and the tranquillity of my kingdom do not cause 
me to fear either factions or rebeUions."* As the result of 
patient and skilful negotiation, however, Bentinck finally 
carried the points essential to an honorable peace, and 
from this moment the proceedings at Ryswick rapidly moved 
to a conclusion.' 

The Peace of Rjrswick was embodied in four separate trea- 
ties between France and Spain, England, the States General 
of the United Provinces, and the Emperor and the Elmpire, 
respectively, and a separate commercial treaty with Holland. 
All of these treaties, except the one with the Emperor and 
the Elmpire, were signed on September 20, 1697; and all the 



^ For the details, see Grimblot, Leilera of WiUiam III and Louis XIV 
and of Their Ministers, 1, pp. 8, 16. 

' William III was, however, in no respect disposed to admit the 
superiority of any other sovereign. In his instructions to his plenipo- 
tentiaries at Ryswick he had enjoined upon them "to take care in no 
sort to yield the precedence to the ambaesador of any king whatsoever." 
— Koch, Friedensbesirebungen, etc., p. 57. 

* For the correspondence containing the negotiations, see Legrelle, 
Notes ei documents sur la paix de Ryswick; and for the activity of Wil- 
liam III in the peace negotiations generally, Koch, Die Friedenthestr^ 
bungen Williams III von England in den Jakren 1694-1697. 



THE FORMATION OF THE GRAND ALLIANCE 245 

allies were treated with a degree of moderation that marked Chap, hi 
a decided change in the attitude of Louis XIV. j^- ^• 

1684-1697 

Spain obtained the restitution of the towns in the Spanish 



peninsula taken by the French in the last war, and in the 
Spanish Netherlands Luxemburg, Courtrai, Mons, Ath, and 
their dependencies, together with all the places annexed 
to France since the Peace of Nymwegen, except eighty-two 
cities and villages retained by France for special reasons.^ 

In the treaty with England, William III was recognized 
as King, and the King of France agreed not to aid his ene- 
mies; restitution was made of everything taken during the 
war; commissioners were to be named to regulate the con- 
flicting claims regarding Hudson's Bay; and the Principality 
of Orange was returned to William III.* 

The States General promised to restore Pondicherry to 
the French East India Company; the Dutch were exempted 
from the droit d'avbaine in France; the treaty of commerce 
relieved the Dutch vessels of the tax of fifty sous per ton; 
and, in case of war, a free ship was permitted to discharge 
its cai^o, if it did not consist of contraband of war.' 

The term fixed by France for the signature of the treaties 
having passed, the Emperor still hesitated in the hope of 
obtaining an agreement from Louis XIV regarding the Span- 
ish succession; but the King of France, who was ready to 
sacrifice much to retain a free hand in that transaction, 
havmg consented to abandon the Spanish Netherlands to the 
Duke of Bavaria, firmly refused to make a further concession. 

By disputing over the terms of the promised restitutions, 
the Einperor lost Strasburg altogether, Louis XIV now re- 
fusing to abandon it. On October 30, unable to continue the 
war alone, Leopold I accepted for himself and the Empire 
the following terms: the obligations of the Peace of West- 
phalia and the Peace of Nymwegen were renewed; France 
restored all that had been taken outside of Alsace by the 
r^niona, Strasburg being formally ceded to France; in re- 



1 For the treaty, see Vast, Les grands traiUSf II, p. 214 et seq. 
' For the treaty, see Vast, Les grands traiUs, II, p. 202 et seq. 
* For the treaty, see Vast, Les grands traiUSf II, p. 190 et seq. 



246 



A HISTORY OP DIPLOMACY 



Chap. IH 

A. D. 

1684r-1697 



turn, Kehly Freiburg, Breisach and its dependencies on the 
right bank of the Rhine, together with Philipsburg, were 
-restored to the Empire; the Duke of Lorraine to be re- 
established in his duchy, with free passage for French troops 
across his territories. 

Such extensive concessions, after a struggle that had cost 
so much of the blood and treasure of France, seemed to 
denote the substantial defeat and humiliation of the Grand 
Monarch; for he was surrendering nearly all he had gained 
during the whole of his reign of more than fifty years. But 
Louis XIV was not thinking chiefly of the security and pros- 
perity of France, which were easily within his grasp. His 
mind was dominated by a dynastic ambition which France 
alone could not satisfy; and instead of a permanent peace 
on the basis of the great principles laid down at Mtinster and 
Osnabrilck, the Congress of Ryswick gave to France the 
doubtful benefit of freedom for new adventures more costly 
and less fruitful than those which have just been recorded. 



AUTHORITIES 

Doeumsnts In addition to the collections of documents already mentioned coy- 

ering tHe present chapter, — particularly Dumont, Vast, and MOmer, 
— the following are of importance: Comte d'Avaux, NSgodaHana en 
HoUande dejmU 1679 d 1688 sous Louis XIV, Paris, 1753; Spanheim, 
ReUUian wr la amr de France en 1690, Paris, 1882; Hdm, Het Archief 
van dem Raadpeneionare^s Aniaine Heineiue, The Hague, 1868-1880; 
Kr&mer, Archives ou correspondance irUdite de la maison d^Orange^ 
Nassau (1689-1702), Leyden, 1907-1909; Sir John Dalrymple, Memoirs 
o/ Greai Britain and Ireland, London, 1771; Girardot, Correspondance 
de Louis XIV avec le marquis Amdot, son ambassadeur en Portugal 
(1685-1688), Nantes, 1863; and particularly the Mimoires of Feuqul^res 
during his mission in Spain, with his instructions in Morel-Fatio, Ae- 
caeil des Instructions, XI, Espagne, I Partie. 

For the state of mind in England regarding absolute rule, see Sir 
Robert Filmer, The Necessity of the Ahwlute Power of Kings; and in 
particular of the Kings of England, London, 1648; and Patriarcha, Lon- 
don, 1680; Hobbes, Leviathan, London, 1651; Mackenzie, Jus Regum, 
London, 1684; and Sidney, Letters to the Hon, Henry SavUe, London, 
1740. 

Many side-lights are thrown upon the period by Clarendon, Letters 
and Diary, Oxford, 1763; Bentinck, Lettres et mhnoires de Marie reins 



THE FORMATION OF THE GRAND ALLIANCE 247 

d'AngleUrrej ipouae de QuiUayme III, The Hague, 1880; Grimblot, Chap. Ill 
Letters of WiUiatn III and of Louis XIV, with those cf Their Ministers, a. d. 
London, 1848; and Campana de CavelU, Les demiers Stuarts d Satnt" 1684-1697 
Germainren-Laye, Paris, 1871. 

For the negotiations leading up to and including the Peace of R3r9^ 
wick, see Solar de la Marguerite, Traits de la maison de Sawne aoec les 
puissances Hranffires depuis la paix de CateatirCambrSsis, Turin, 1836- 
1861; Ltonaid, Pr&iminaires des traitis, avee les odes eoneemant les 
nigociations de la paix condue d Turin et de ceUe de Ryswick, Paris, 1697; 
Van Duren, Actes et in6moires de la paix de Ryswick, The Hague, 1725. 
The papers of Matthew Prior, secretary of the English plenipotentiaries 
at Ryswick, are found in volume III of the Bath MSS., published in the 
Reports of the Historical MSS. Commission, London, 1908. 

Regarding the impression produced at the time by the annexation of litenittm 
Alsace, see the works mentioned in the last chapter, especially Hdlscher, 
Die dffenJUiche Meinung in DeiUschland Hber den Fall Strasthurgs, Munich 
1896; also Halles Clapardde, lUunian de V Alsace d la France, Paris, 
1844. 

On the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes, see Hoist, Ludwig XIV 
wnd die Hugonotten, in Historische Zeitschrift, XV (1866); Puaux, La 
responsabUiU de la Revocation de VSdit de Nantes, in Revue Historique, 
XXIX (1882); and G^rin, Le pape Innocent XI et la lUoocation de 
rSdit de Nantes, in Revue des Questions Historiques, XXTV (1878). 

For the attitude of Brandenburg, Pag^ and Waddington, already 
cited, should be specially consulted, and Pruts, Aus des Orossen KurfUr^ 
sten letzten Jahren, Berlin, 1897, which is based on the despatches of the 
French ambassador in Berlin in 1680-1685. 

The policy of William III of Orange is discussed in Meinberg, Das 
Gleichgewichtssystem WUhelms III, etc., Berlin, 1869. On the prepara- 
tion for the Grand Alliance, see Miiller, WiUielm III von Oranien und 
Georg von Waldeck Korreepondenz, *The Hague, 1873; Immich, Zur 
Vorgeschichie des Orleanschen Krieges, Heidelb^g, 1888; Fester, Die 
Augtburger AUianz, Munich, 1893; and Legrelle, Xa mission de M, de 
Ribenac (168&-1689), Paris, 1894. 

On the English Revolution and the accession of William III, see 
Figgis, The Theory of the Divine Right of Kings, (Cambridge, 1896; Sir 
James Mackintosh, History of the Revolution, London, 1834, which con* 
tains the despatches of the papal nuncio; Fruin, Prinz WiUem III in 
zijn Verhouding tot Engdand, in Verspreide Geschriften, V, 1902; and 
Blok, in Handdingen en Medededingen van de Maatschapij der NederL 
Letterkunde, 190&-1907, where he treats of the transactions of William 
III of Orange with England. 

The relations of Louis XIV with Rome in this period are discussed by 
Bojani, Vaffaire de **Qiuxrtier** d Rome, in Revue d'Histoire Diploma- 
tique, XXII (1908); G^rin, Vambassade de Lavardin d la sequestration 
du nonce Ramuzi, in Revue des Questions Historiques, XVI (1874); 



248 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY 

Chap. Ill and Le pape Innocent XI et VSleeiian de Coloifney in Revue dee Questions 
A.D. Historiques, XXXII (1883). 

1684-1607 An account of Tourville's naval expedition for the invasion of Eng- 
land may be found in Coquelle, Les prcjeta de descente en Angleterre 
d^aprhe les Archives des Affaires Stranghres, in Revue d'Histoire Diploma- 
tique, XV (1901). 

On the negotiations preceding the Peace of Ryswick, see particularly 
the comments of Vast, the lett^^ of Marshal Boufflera and the Earl of 
Portland in Grimblot, and the following: D'Haussonville, La reprise des 
relaHons diphmaHques enire la France et la Savoie au moment de la paix 
de Ryswick, in Revue d'Histoire Diplomatique, XIU (1890); Dumont, 
Mhnoires politiques pour servir d la parfaiie intelligence de la paix de 
Ryswick, The Hague, 1699; Neuhaus, Der Friede xu Rysvrick, Freiburg, 
1873; Wynne, Les nigociaHons de MM Comte d*Avaux, ambassadewr d 
la oour de SiMe, Utrecht, 1882; Legrelle, Les wnfirefnces secrHes de 
Diessenhofen et Steckbam (1694), Braine-leOomte, 1893; Koch, Die 
Friedentbestrebtmgen Wilhehns III von England in den Jakren 169J^1697, 
TQbingen, 1903; Legrelle, Notes el documents sur la paix de Ryswick, 
Ulle, 1894. 

The conception of the duties of a dipbmatist prevalent at that time 
is presented by Calli^res, be la maniire de nigoder avec les souverainSf 
London, 1716, who participated in the negotiations preparatory to the 
Peace of Ryswick. 



CHAPTER IV 

THE DIPLOMACY OF THE SPANISH SUCCESSION 

Fhis conflict with the Grand Alliance, Louis XIV had Th© balance 
three points to gain: first, to obtain by treaty the sano- ^^ *°^ 
tion of Europe for retaining the territorial acquisitions RyBwiok 
provisionally conceded by the Truce of Regensburg; second, 
to overthrow William III and restore James II; and, third, 
to punish the United Provinces for aiding in the English Rev- 
olution. He had failed in every one of these objects. 

William III, on the other hand, had also three points to 
gain: first, to obtain the recognition of himself as King 
of England, and thus end the support of James II by Louis 
XIV; second, to associate England and the United Provinces 
for their mutual protection in the future; and, third, to 
destroy the power of Louis XIV in Germany, and thus 
establish the permanent security of the Protestant states. 
The Peace of Ryswick accorded to him every one of these 
results. 

Measured by any fair criterion of success, therefore, 
Louis XIV was defeated; yet France remained not only 
unconquered but by far the most powerful single state in 
Europe. 

For the first time during the reign of the "Grand Mo- , 
narque" the feeling was openly expressed by Frenchmen 
that the national interests had been neglected. The Peace 
of Ryswick was so unpopular at Paris that the expression 
*^Tu €8 Mte comme la paix** became an idiom; and the 
gamins of the city sang on the streets: 

" Les trois ministreB habiles 
En un seul jour 
Ont rendu trentcnleux villes 

Et Luxembourg 
A peine ont-ils 8auv6 Paris 
Charivari." 



250 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY 

Chap. IV Yet Louis XIV, who had it m his power both to give to 
1807-^715 ^^^"^P^ * permanent peace and to France added security, 
was apparently regardless of the national interests. 

The policy of Richelieu and Mazarin, which was truly 
national, had been to strengthen the frontiers of France 
by the acquisition of the Spanish Netherlands. In 1697 
Louis XIV had almost secured that result. Had he not 
thwarted his own plans by ambitious encroachments upon 
the Empire, he might with apparent ease have obtained 
a better frontier for France; but his main thought was of 
the Spanish succession, and to enter upon the pursuit of 
it with a free hand he sacrificed nearly all he had won by 
a lifetime of war and diplomacy. 

And yet he pretended that the Peace of Ryswick was to 
him a satisfactory settlement. "I have dictated the condi- 
tions of all the treaties, I have prescribed the limits of 
time within which they might be accepted," he wrote to 
Chateauneuf, his ambassador to the Sultan; ''and that 
superiority which I have always preserved would have still 
longer postponed the conclusion of the treaties, if the powers 
leagued against me had been in a condition to make new 
efforts." 

In this estimate of his achievements France and Europe 
receive no consideration. It was from his sense of personal 
superiority, and not from the benefits secured for his people, 
that he derived his satisfaction. He was now, it is true, 
free to use all the resources of his kingdom for an object that 
did not concern the nation, namely, to place a member of 
his family upon a foreign throne; and that freedom was the 
only triumph he had won at Ryswick. 



I. The Treaties op Partition 

Tiw Spanuh The time had now come for active negotiation to obtain 

""'•"•'*^ the Spanish succession; for the frail life of Charles II of 

Spain was on the point of extinction. His second marriage 

had brought him no children, and the future o!^s kingdom 

had become a subject of European interest. 



THE DIPLOMACY OP THE SPANISH SUCCESSION 251 

The purpose of Louis XIV was, having dissolved the ^"^- ^^ 
coalition against himself and having made peace, to obtain 1597-1715 

by diplomacy what Europe in a state of open hostility would 

not have permitted him to claim. 

The Spanish monarchy was in some respects the richest 
heritage then existing in the world. Comprising the whole 
of the Iberian peninsula, except Portugal, Spain held the 
key to the Mediterranean, and could lock the door at Gibral- 
tar against all the ports of the Atlantic. Guarded on the 
north by the I^renees, her other frontiers, with one exception, 
were her own maritime coasts. Under the rule of the 
monarchy were also the Balearic islands, Sardinia, the King- 
doms of Naples and Sicily, Milan, and the Catholic Nether- 
lands; these last filling a great part of the basin formed 
by the Meuse and the Mosel, including the greater part of 
Hainault, Flanders, Brabant, Namur, and Luxemburg. 

Such were, in rude outline, the possessions of the Spanish 
monarchy in Europe. To these must be added the vast 
and rich colonies in Africa, America, and the oceanic islands, 
— forming together the most magnificent empire then 
existing. Held in absolute sovereignty by a childless ruler, 
this stupendous heritage was to be disposed of either by his 
will and testament, by the laws of inheritance, or by an 
agreement of partition among the claimants. It seemed 
not improbable, in view of various claims and rivalries, 
that partition in some form would be the fate awaiting the 
monarchy. 

Materially, morally, and economically Spain had fallen ""** ^««^ 
into decadence.^ No coimtry has been more fortimate in spain 
the gifts bestowed upon it by nature and happy chances, 
or more deeply cursed with blight and unpotence, than 
Spain between the fifteenth and eighteenth centuries. In 
the time of the Arab domination the peninsula was a rich 
garden, supporting a population of thirty millions. In 
1500 it had been reduced to ten millions and at the end of the 



^ For the condition of Spain under Charles II see Gadeke, Die PoU- 
iik Osterreichs in der spaniMhen Erbfolgrfrage, I, Chap. III. 



252 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY 

Chap, iv seventeenth century, under Charles II, to five millions.^ 

^_^' The long and costly wars, the siBkcrifices made to military 

life in conquered lands, the emigrations of colonists to Amer- 



ica, the decrees of the Inquisition,' the deportation of the 
Jews and Arabs, and the sterility of the inhabitants who re- 
mained left the country weakened in its vital forces. 

The dominance of ecclesiasticism not only withdrew 
from the population nearly a third of its whole mass to 
live a life of contemplation in monasteries and convents, 
but its dogmatism devitalised the energies of the laity. 
A fourth part of the year was devoted to religious f dtes and 
ceremonies, or to preparations for them. Industry was re- 
garded with contempt, and business enterprise was looked 
down upon. Idleness and mendicancy sapped the country 
of its productive strength. Manual labor was almost en- 
tirely laid upon the shoulders of foreigners. Together with 
the vigor that had been developed in earlier generations by 
toil and struggle, the power of military and political organ- 
ization also had departed. The control of the coimtry passed 
under mortmain to corporations of the clergy. The price 
of commodities was fixed by law, and the exportation of 
manufactures was forbidden. Roads and canals were 
neglected. Gold and silver were received in great quantities 
from Peru and Mexico, and as far as possible were kept in 
the country. Thus for a time everything seemed without 
effort to pour into the lap of indolence; with the result that 
ignorance, superstition, lethargy, and stagnation became 
the characteristic traits of a people who a century earlier 
had come near to the realization of a universal empire. 
The aztamn Unhappily, the pride, the pomp, and the luxury of a 
court that still aimed to be the most magnificent in Europe 
lingered on in the midst of increasing poverty. Its prodi- 
gality was notorious. The civil list of the King's household 

^ See Gfideke, Die Politik Otterreidu in der tpanischen Brbfolgefragej 
I, p. 67. 

* The Inquisition caused 31,912 persons to be burned alive in Spain; 
291 ,450 were sentenced to punishment and the confiscation of their goods ; 
and more than 100,000 families voluntarily left the country to escape 
its judgments. Llorente, Hiataire de VInquintian d'Espagnet IV« p. 271. 



caaoeof tlid 
Court 



THE DIPLOMACY OF THE SPANISH SUCCESSION 263 

amounted to much more than a third of all the revenues of Chap. IV 
the kingdom. When money was plentiful it had been lav- ^^- 

ished in the most reckless fashion upon objects of no im 

X)ortance. Even the gratings of the prisons of Madrid were 
covered with elaborate in-wrought decorations and carefully- 
gilded. In one year the candles burned in the royal chapel 
cost seven thousand ducats. Public ceremonies absorbed 
vast sums. One of the journeys of Philip IV is said to 
have been accompanied by a cortege of carriages six leagues 
in length. 

A horde of courtiers and officials sapped the public 
treasury with salaries and pensions. According to a report 
of the elder Count von Harrach, more than forty thousand 
persons were employed in two or three departments of 
the administration. By a curious system of accumulation, 
a person promoted to a higher office in the State retained 
the salaries of the lower ones which he no longer occupied, 
in such a fashion that the same individual often received 
four or five salaries at once.^ 

As the Spanish nation gradually lost its military vigor, 
it had been necessary to depend more and more upon the 
forces of its allies, who were insistent upon money for their 
troops, which was usually freely promised but always tardily 
paid. The drains upon the resources of Spain made by the 
Triple Alliance and the League of Augsburg were consid- 
erable; and yet the records of the time are full of complaints 
of the financial delinquencies of Spain. 

In the midst of this eictravagance and impoverishment, 
great sums were expended in presents to foreign princes, 
ambassadors, and other influential personages, for the pur- 
pose of promoting the interests of Spain. At Rome and 
Vienna in particular millions were disbursed in gratuities. 
Nearly all the great aristocratic families of Rome received 
money from Madrid, and the chief ecclesiastics of Vienna 
were regularly in the pay of Spain. 



> Between four and five hundred lackeys were employed in the royal 
palace, yet the state carriages had become useless because there was no 
money with which to repair them. 



254 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY 

Chap. IV To meet these enormous expenses, there was no adequate 
1607-1715 ^^^^ system. The direct taxes were imequal m the different 

parts of the monarchy, the nobles were universally exempt, 

and the burden fell almost entirely upon the common 
people. It was chiefly from lotteries and from indirect 
duties that revenue was raised.^ This indirect taxation was 
a heavy burden. Practically all the necessaries of life were 
taxed, both food and clothing. ''Les imp6t8 montent jua- 
qu'atix herb€8 au pot,'* wrote the French ambassador at 
Madrid in 1698; and another writer informs us that the 
peasants ate most of their vegetables without salt or 
vinegar, because the taxes upon them were so heavy. 

Since 1500 the mines of Potosi had furnished enormous 
sums of precious metal from which the Spanish government 
had collected a large percentage in the form of an import 
tax; but the amoimt of metal extracted had steadily di- 
minished since 1589, and in 1698 this was only a quarter of 
what it once had been. Moreover, the richly laden treasure- 
ships had long since excited the cupidity of corsairs, and 
depredations upon them had become an industry in which 
Dutch, Portuguese, and English pirates were engaged, not 
to mention the treasure taken as prize in war. To make 
good some of these losses, the temptation arose to put more 
alloy in the coin of the realm, and millions were fabricated 
by the debasement of the coinage. 
Decay of the In Buch circumstSAces, it was plainly impossible for 
army and navy gpgjjj ^ occupy an important position as a military power. 
In fact, the once splendid army no longer existed. At one 
time it had been reduced to two or three thousand men; 
and at the end of the last war in the Spanish Netherlands the 
monarchy had not been able to place in the field more than 
eight thousand ill-paid soldiers, who hved by rapine. It is 
incredible to what an extent the military spirit had become 
extinct in Spain. During the war between France and the 
Grand Alliance it had required a month to recruit and equip 
a regiment at Madrid. Only vagabonds were disposed to 

^ At the end of the seventeenth centuiy the total income of the 
Crown had fallen from 500 to 30 million reales. 



THE DIPLOMACY OF THE SPANISH SUCCESSION 255 

join the army, and these deserted after a few parades. Chap, iv 
Even the officers were lacking in discipline, and for money ja^-^Vis 

released the conscripts who wished to return to their homes. 

When they were rebuked, they replied: "The King com- 
mands in the palace, but here we command.'' And the 
Council of War, instead of infficting punishment, replied: 
"What of that? We shall have peace in one way or an- 
other!" 

From a great naval power Spain was reduced almost to 
impotence. At the beginning of his reign Charles II pos- 
sessed eighteen war-ships. In 1698 there were but two to 
guard the ports and coasts of Spain, and the colonies were 
practically without protection. Of the thirteen at his dis- 
posal in Italy, seven were hired from (jenoa. 

Nominally a despotism built up by the energetic con- *"»• «»*>*»«^ 
centration of power and ruthless conquest, the Spanish mon- si>ain 
archy in the hands of a feeble sovereign was exposed to 
serious dangers from within. Composite in its origin, it 
had never been made entirely coherent. Castile was the 
dominant constituent, but Aragon, Catalonia, and the other 
ancient kingdoms retained many of their laws and customs, 
as well as the traditions of their autonomy, not unmixed with 
jealousies and antagonisms. 

As for the outlying portions of the Spanish dominions, 
they were in no sense truly Spanish; and many of them cher- 
ished the resentment of conquered provinces. We have 
seen how readily Messina threw itself into the hands of 
France. Naples was always on the edge of revolution, and 
subject to the ancient pretensions of the Holy See. At Milan 
the municipal senate embodied the traditions of the Lom- 
bard liberties, and was exposed to the ambitions of France 
and Savoy. 

At Madrid itself the power of the King was not in reality 
absolute. It was limited by the authority of the Cortes, 
and especially by the influence of the Church, which had 
through the power of the Inquisitor General transformed the 
kingdom into a theocracy, and made of the sovereign its 
docile servitor. 



256 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY 

Chap. IV With a monarch mentally and physically as feeble as 

ifi^-^7ij5 ^'^*^^®^ ^^9 there was an opportimity for a great states- 

man, acting as his minister, to rehabilitate the monarchy; 



of the SpADiBh 
Court 



but during his entire reign no really master mind had ap- 
peared upon the scene. Antonio Toledo, Count d'Oro- 
pesa, was designated by Alexander Stanhope, the English 
ambassador, as the ''ablest man" of his time in Spain; 
but, in 1691, accused of too intimate relations with Portugal, 
he was sununarily dismissed by Charles II and banished to 
his estates. Guided alternately by the conflicting counsels 
of venerable dignitaries without foresight, energy, or initia- 
tive, often supplemented or frustrated by the dominating 
influence of the Queen, Maria of Neuburg, the imhappy 
monarch saw his administration drift aimlessly on to the 
impotence and humiliation that inevitably awaited its end. 
The intnguee It would be Unprofitable to follow in detail the struggle of 
the adverse elements to gain ascendency by the exercise of 
direct influence upon the King. 

Since the marriage of Charles II with Maria of Neuburg, 
her power over the mind of her husband had become un- 
limited, and for a long time it was exercised vigorously 
against France and in the interest of Austria. So complete 
was her authority after the fall of Oropesa, and under the 
nominal primacy of her creature. Admiral Melgar, that, 
although the King hated her, and even mocked her behind her 
back, "when she looked at him," as an observer wrote, "she 
made him tremble to his very bones." Supported by the 
Queen Mother and a group of Germans whom she had made 
her intimates at Madrid, she had waged a continual warfare 
against the hopes and designs of Louis XIV. The Queen 
Mother had been still more active. To the end of her life 
she had labored earnestly to cause the entire succession to 
be transferred to her grandson, the young electoral prince 
of Bavaria, Joseph Ferdinand. Soon after her death, the 
ecclesiastical primate of Spain, Cardinal Porto Carrero, 
Archbishop of Toledo, and Coimt Oropesa, — who, to the 
surprise of the Court, was admitted in his riding habit into 
the chamber where the King was believed to be dying, 



A. D. 

1697-1716 



THE DIPLOMACY OP THE SPANISH SUCCESSION 257 

— after a midnight meeting and decision of the Council Chap, rv 
of State, had obtained in the interest of the young electoral 
prince of Bavaria a secret testament conveying to him the 
succession, subject to the approval of the clergy and the 
Cortes.^ 

Had it not been for the King's imexpected recovery, 
this coup de main might have rendered unnecessary the 
long contest over the Spanish succession; but the appar- 
ently mortal illness turned out to be nothing worse than a 
case of indigestion. The secret will was deposited in the 
archives of the Coimcil of State, but as soon as the influence 
of the Queen — who was ill at the time when the act was 
obtained — could be brought to bear upon the King, Oro- 
pesa was compelled to resume his exile. 

Although Maria of Neuburg was bitterly opposed to The <»iididaoy 
the pretensions of France, she was almost equally hostile d^ito'c^Sw 
to the succession of Joseph Ferdinand. Her candidate was 
her nephew, the second son of Leopold I and her sister, 
Eleanor of Neuburg, the young archduke Charles. To this 
project as well as to the designs of France, the secret testa- 
ment promised for a time to be a fatal blow. It was, however, 
owing to the temporary illness of the Queen that her mori- 
bund husband had been induced to sign it, and upon her 
recovery she is believed to have lost no time in compelling • 
him to destroy the document. 

The field being thus again clear for action, a serious cam- 
paign was imdertaken in behalf of the Archduke Charles, 
first by sending to Madrid the younger Count von Harrach* 
from Vienna to sound the disposition of the Court, and later 
by the permanent mission of the elder Von Harrach,'one 



1 By the last will and testament of Philip IV, September 14, 1665, 
his daughter Margaret, grandmother of Joseph Ferdinand, had been 
expressly designated as the successor to the entire heritage in case of 
the death of Charles II without heirs. For the full text in Spanish, see 
Legrelle, lAi diphmatie franQoUet etc., I, p. 550 et seq. 

> For the f uU text of the report of Aloys Louis von Harrach, called 
the younger, in which he gives interesting sketches of all the chief per- 
sonages of Spain, see Historische Zeitschrift, XXIX, p. 91 et seq. 

• Ferdinand Bonaventura von Harrach. 
VOL. m. — 17 



258 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY 

Chap, iv of the most astute and experienced of the counsellors of 

1697-1*716 I^POWI. 

To the official instructions of the elder Von Harrach, 

which related mainly to questions connected with the Peace 
of Ryswick, was added a secret supplement, consisting of an 
elaborate argument to establish the claim of the Archduke 
Charles to the whole of the Spanish succession. The method 
pursued in this demonstration was very simple. It con- 
sisted in counting the generations from Philip I, the father 
of the Emx)eror Charles V, which showed that the Arch- 
duke Charles represented the sixth generation of that mon- 
arch 's successors. All others living of that or any previous 
generation, it was contended, were excluded by formal 
renunciations.^ 

ThennoD- An examination of the Hapsburg genealogy from the 

time of Philip III shows three lines of descent: (1) through 
Anna, whose marriage with Louis XIII gave birth to Louis 
XIV; (2) through Philip IV, whose children were Maria 
Theresa by his first wife, and Charles II and Margaret 
by his second wife; and (3) Maria, the mother of Leopold I. 
The descendants of Anna, it was contended, were excluded 
from the succession by her renunciation of her clcdm to the 
throne in favor of her younger sister, Maria. The descend- 
ants of Maria Theresa were excluded by the renimciation 
made at the time of her marriage with Louis XIV. The 
descendants of Margaret also were excluded by the renim- 
ciation of Maria Antonia made upon her marriage with Max 
Emmanuel of Bavaria. There remained, therefore, only 
the descendants of Maria, the mother of Leopold I, whose 
claim was represented by the Archduke Charles. 

Upon the assumption that these renimciations were valid, 
it would be difficult to answer the argument which Count 
von Harrach was instructed to present; still, there were 
plainly two exceptions to be taken. Margaret had been ex- 
pressly recognized in her father's will as entitled to the 



1 For the claims to the Spanish succession, see Table VI, at the end 
of this volume. 



THE DIPLOMACY OF THE SPANISH SUCCESSION 269 

succession after her brother Charles and his descendants/ Chap, rv 
which would appear to exclude the collateral claims through i^^^^ib 

Maria; and, if Maria's descendants were to be considered, 

it would not be the Archduke Charles, but Leopold I, and 
after him his elder son, Joseph, who would be the immediate 
heir to the Spanish throne. 

But were the renunciations valid? If, as the theory of 
"divine right" through strict priority of birth maintains, 
sovereignty passes by inheritance on the principle of pri- 
mogeniture, by what right can a hiunan will intervene to 
set aside by an arbitrary act the order of nature, which is 
in efiFect a divine decree? If such an act can be justified 
on the groimd of mere political expediency, then any other 
convenient ground may furnish an excuse for thwarting 
the divine will, and the whole theory of "divine right" 
is swept away. 

But to disprove the Austrian thesis, it was not necessary 
to show that every renunciation is invalid. In the case 
of Maria Theresa, the renimciation was only conditional, and 
had been bought for a price that had never been paid. Louis 
XIV could, therefore, justly contend that, since the contract 
had not been fulfilled by Spain, the renimciation of Maria 
Theresa was invalid; and, there being no Salic law in Spain, 
the Dauphin was the legitimate heir to the throne, if Charles 
II left no descendant. In the case of Margaret the renun- 
ciation was, in the first instance, forced upon her by her 
father, Leopold I; and, if afterward she herself repeated it, 
she could only renounce her own right, not the right of her 
unborn son, Joseph Ferdinand, over which she had no 
control. If the will of Philip IV was valid, the claim of 
Joseph Ferdinand could not be thus set aside in favor of 
the Archduke Charles. 

To the modem mind all these discussions seem arid and The oruia in 
academic, but to that age they appeared to be vital. The ^l^^^^ 
unity of the State required the sanctity and the perpetuity 
of the dynasty; and, to support this dignity, the theory of 

* For the will of Philip IV, eee Legrelle, La diplomatie franQoUej etc., 
I, p. 558. 



260 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY 

Chap. IV divine right had been invented, and the absolute authority 

1697-^715 ^^ *^® King had been proclaimed. 

Dismissing the renimciations as incompatible with the 

fundamental law of the monarchy, and in themselves mere 
accommodations to avoid the consequences of a rigorous ap- 
plication of the theory of divine right, it is clear that, from 
the point of view of strict legitimacy, if not Louis XIV 
himself, then certainly the Dauphin stood nearest to the 
throne of Spain in case Charles II should die without heirs. 
To Spain this would signify the practical annexation of the 
Spanish monarchy, with all its possessions, to the Crown 
of France. To Europe it would mean the establishment 
of a imiversal monarchy; for such a concentration of power 
and resources in a single absolute ruler would destroy 
the equilibrium of Europe, and render his will everywhere 
preponderant. 

In some form, therefore, it was necessary to avoid the log- 
ical consequences of the theory on which the whole system 
of absolutism was now seen to repose. In the person and 
pretensions of Louis XIV, this system was soon to be chal- 
lenged by the rest of Europe, and particularly by William III 
of England, who represented a different order of ideas based 
on national independence and the sovereignty of the na- 
tional will, as exemplified by his own election to the English 
throne.* 
The oeoeMity It was uot, howcver, in the clear light of consistent theory 
or oompronuse ^^^^ ^j^^ battle was to be fought or the triumph won; for 
political development seldom moves forward on the straight 
lines of logical reasoning. As at an earlier time it had been 
expedient to concentrate and consecrate royal rights and 
authority for the preservation of the State; so it was now 
found necessary to set limits to the power thus created to 
prevent a universal monarchy. France and Spain could 
not be permitted, whatever "divine right" might have to 
say about it, to be under the control of the same absolute 
master. 

^ And yet not consistently, as his part in negotiating the partition 
treaties will show. 



THE DIPLOMACY OF THE SPANISH SUCCESSION 261 

Even Louis XIV, whose interests as well as his convictions Chap, iv 
called for a rigid application of the principle of heredi- ^^^^^^^^ 

tary divine right, was not entirely averse to compromise. 

He had himself advocated it by proposing to divide the 
whole Spanish inheritance between himself and Leopold I. 
He had again suggested it by offering to send one of the 
sons of the Dauphin to Spain, to be reared and educated 
as a Spanish prince, with the pledge that, if he should be 
permitted to wear the crown of Spain he should renounce 
all claims to the crown of France. Thus his proposals, 
like those of Leopold I, were confessions that '^ divine right" 
must be set aside in the interest of peace and amity between 
nations, as he himself had already set it aside in recognizing 
William III as King of England. All these acts were, in 
truth, so many tacit admissions that the system of absolu- 
tism, deriving its authority from a superior source and not 
from the will of the nation, is not entirely adapted to the 
uses of this world. 

EJven with the co-operation of the Queen, who informed "^^ '"'"" of 
C!ount von Harrach that it would be easy to secure the , °° 
consent of the King to the succession of the Archduke 
Charles, but difficult to obtain the approval of his ministers, 
that persistent diplomatist failed to advance the cause 
of the Archduke at Madrid.^ The sentiment of Spain was 
plainly against him. When the Peace of Ryswick was 
signed, the joy at Madrid was great, and the reluctance of 
Leopold I to sign the treaty, after having failed to satisfy 
the Spanish expectations of aid in the war, rendered tl}6 
Germans impopular at the Court. The Queen also suffered 
in public esteem through her German associations and 
sympathies; and at last Count von Harrach, weary of a 



X OoJune 25, 1607, Harrach had succeeded with the aid of the Queen 
in obtaining a letter from Charles II substantially promising the suo- 
oesBion to the Archduke Charles, but it proved illusory. This letter 
may be found in Gfideke, Die Politik Osterreichs in der apanischen 
Erhfdlgefragef I, p. 25 of the Appendix. By a typographical error the 
date is there given as May. That this date is erroneous is shown by 
Hairach's Tag^hwch^ p. 26, and the text in the Staatsarchiv. 



262 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY 

CHiLP. IV hopeless task, and feeling that his close relations with Maria 
i6^-i7ii5 ^^ Neuburg were an embarrassment rather than a help to 

him in obtaining the good will of the ministers, ended in 

denomicing her to her friends.^ 

In truth, so strong was the hostility toward the Queen, 
whose influence was deeply resented by Cardinal Porto 
Carrero, that in order to preserve her power at Court, she 
was obliged, much against her inclination, to induce the 
King to recall Count Oropesa; and, on March 5, 1698, he 
reappeared at the palace under a pledge to sustain the 
Queen and to favor the Archduke Charles. But the Car- 
dinal had by no means lost his personal ascendency over the 
King. Availing himself of the absence of the Queen at her 
devotions, he and his ecclesiastical friends surrounded the 
superstitious king and persuaded him ''by irrefutable argu- 
ments" that his vigorous consort was possessed of devils, 
— a compliment which the people had already ascribed to 
himself! When the Queen returned and learned of this effort 
to destroy her authority over her feeble husband her fury 
seemed to justify the accusation agamst her. A terrific 
scene ensued, and the poor king, completely unnerved and 
undecided whom to obey, turned for a time to his eccle- 
siastical advisers. During the short remainder of his life 
his misery and indecision stripped him of the little power 
he had formerly possessed, and left him a helpless victim to 
the prevailing influence of the moment. 
TiM infliwioe Diuing the x)eriod of estrangement between Spain and 
d'£!L^l^!r^ France Louis XIV had relied upon his ecclesiastical agents, 
F6re Blandini^res and Pdre Duval, for information regarding 
the Court of Madrid; but after the Peace of Ryswick he 
began to reconstitute his diplomatic representation, which 
had been since 1689 almost non-existent; and one of the 
ablest of French diplomatists, the Marquis d'Harcourt, was 
sent to Madrid. His mission was to inform his master 



A satirical poem of the time had the verae: 

'* R«7 innoosnto 
Reina tnidora 
Pueblo oobarde 
Qrandea ain honora." 



THE DIPLOMACY OF THE SPANISH SUCCESSION 263 

accurately of the disposition of Spain regarding the Spanish Chap. IV 
succession, in the belief that the Spaniards could be made ^- ^• 

favorable, if a party were formed to promote the idea, to the 

candidacy of the Dauphin or one of his sons. The diffi- 
culties to be overcome were well understood; but, as the 
instruction ran, ''if it is considered how much hatred the 
Spaniards have for the Queen and the Germans, the general 
sentiment of the whole nation permits of the belief that there 
will be foimd enough persons dissatisfied with the govern- 
ment to reveal their most secret thoughts to the King's 
ambassador."^ That this expectation was not unfoimded 
is evident from the report of the English ambassador, 
Alexander Stanhope, who in March, 1698, wrote: "The 
general inclination as to the succession is altogether French, 
their aversion to the Queen having set them against all her 
countrymen; and, if the French king will content himself 
that one of his younger grandchildren be king of Spain, 
without pretending to incorporate the two monarchies 
together, he will find no opposition either from grandees or 
common people." 

The Marquis d'Harcourt neglected no opportimity to 
cultivate the good will of the ministers who in case of an 
interregnum caused by the death of Charles II would have 
a voice in the government of Spain; and the Cardinal 
Porto Carrero, as the chief ecclesiastic of the kingdom, 
was especially propitiated. As Louis XIV became more 
certain of his ground, the ambassador was instructed to 
insist upon the rights of the Dauphin, and to let it be known 
at Madrid that the King of France ''would employ all his 
force to secure that great succession." 

Owing to the diminished influence of the Germans at The nvirtx 
Madrid, the disfavor in which the Queen was held, and the ^JStiJ^ ^ 
inability of Leopold I to send troops to Spain to support 
the pro-Austrian party, it would not perhaps have been diffi- 
cult, so far as Spain itself was concerned, if the occasion 
had arisen, for Louis XIV to impose his will upon the coun- 

* For the detailed iostructions to Harcourt, see Legrelle, La diph- 
maiie fran^aiae, etc., II, p. 140 et seq. 



264 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY 

Chap. IV try. The Hessian regiment that was already at Madrid 
1607-4716 ^ created so much irritation that it had to be sent away. 

The acceptance of one of Louis XIV's grandsons as king, 

it was felt, would at least preserve peace with France 
without the absorption of the Spanish monarchy by its 
powerful neighbor, and this solution was constantly meeting 
with increased public favor. But, as Harcourt pointed out 
in his despatches, it was less with Spain than with the rest 
of Europe that the real difficulty lay. The attempt to force 
the situation would be sure to cause a European war. 

Of this Louis XIV also was persuaded, and his immediate 
problem, therefore, was in what manner to avert the general 
opposition which he foresaw. The succession was in fact 
a European question, and for a long time every failing pulse- 
beat of the languishing king had caused renewed anxiety 
in every European capital. 

One of the best informed and most brilliant of the his- 
torians of France has at this point asserted, but without 
furnishing the evidence with which he usually supports his 
statements, that Louis XIV at this time had the prudence 
to recoil from encumbering his dynasty with the d6bris 
of the Spanish monarchy, because the absorption of such 
a mass of scattered dominions would destroy the nationality 
of France, whose power lay in its compact unity.^ But, 
while it may well be argued that such a ''poUtical agglu- 
tination'' would have been disastrous for the French nation, 
if it had been possible to insist upon it, there is no evidence 
whatever that the question was regarded by the Grand 
Monarch from this point of view, or that he was for a 
moment deterred by this thought from forcing the hand of 
Spain.* That which actually restrained his action was 
not the result that might follow from the union of the two 
monarchies, but the evident obstacles in the way of accom- 
plishing that union. He knew that Europe would not con- 
sent without a fierce struggle to the accession of the Dauphin 



^ Legrelle, La diplomaUe frangcMe, etc., II, p. 184. 
* The instructions to Haroourt prove that Louis XIV at that time 
wanted Charles II to recognize the Dauphin as his only heir. 



THE DIPLOMACY OF THE SPANISH SUCCESSION 265 

to the whole of the Spanish succession. And what would be Chap, iv 
the situation in Spain if, in order to place the Dauphin iq^^^.k 



upon the throne, parts of the heritage were awarded to- 
other powers as the price of their assent? 

It was not easy for Louis XIV to accept the alternative The effeot of 
of partition, but circiunstances led him to incline toward Ij^^^*^^ 
it. Important changes had occurred in Europe which had 
a bearing on his decision. During the war that preceded 
the Peace of Ryswick he had strenuously endeavored to 
revive his influence in the East, and to aid his cause as far 
as possible by inducing Poland to attack Austria or Bran- 
denbui^, and also by encouraging the Turks in their war 
with the Empire. 

In both these efforts he had been disappointed. In 
Poland, John Sobieski, whose wife was bitter in her feelings 
of resentment toward France, and in his latter years en- 
tirely dominated her husband, had remained wholly beyond 
the influence of French diplomacy until his death in 1696. 
In the election which followed the candidate of Louis XIV 
for the throne of Poland, the Prince of Conti, had been de- 
feated; and, after a hard contest, the prize had been borne 
off, with the aid of Leopold I, by the Elector Frederick 
Augustus of Saxony, a vigorous prince devoted to the House 
of Austria.^ 

But an incidental result of this election was more im- 
portant to the European situation than the election itself. It 
brought to the front as the conunander of the Imperial forces 
in the war with the Turks in place of the Elector, who had 
been in command, Prince Eugene of Savoy, whose energy 
and skill as a general, in July, 1696, destroyed and scattered 
the Turkish army. In the meantime, Peter, the young 
czar of Russia, had declared war upon the Turks. Over- 
whelmed with enemies, in January, 1698, the Sultan had 
accepted the mediation of England and the United Provinces 
in the hope of securing an early peace, to which Leopold I 

^ In order to become King of Poland, the Elector of Saxony, who waa 
the head of the Corpus Evangelicorum, was obliged to become a Cath^ 
olic, which he did without hesitation. 



266 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY 

Chap. IV — whose treasury was depleted and who at this time wished 
\nv7-i7iR ^ devote his attention to the Spanish succession — was 

also strongly inclined. After long negotiations, in Novem- 
ber, 1698, the plenipotentiaries met at Carlowitz; and, on 
January 26, 1699, peace was signed between the Emperor, 
Poland, Venice, and the Sultan.^ 

The Peace of Carlowitz disclosed an immense decline in 
the force of the Ottoman Empire, which surrendered nearly 
half of the territory it had formerly possessed in Europe. 
It marked the end of the period during which the Turldsh 
power seriously threatened Christendom. The greatest 
-gains fell to Austria, which received Transylvania, almost 
all of Himgary, and the greater part of Croatia and Slavonia. 
Poland obtained Kameniec, and niunerous conquests in 
Podolia and the Ukraine. To Venice were ceded the Morea 
and portions of Dalmatia. Russia still continued the war. 
At last, the policy of crippling the Elmpire by revolution 
in Hungary and war with Turkey had met with a decided 
check. The Austro-Himgarian monarchy was now for the 
first time during the reign of Leopold I free to act effec- 
tively in the affairs of Western Europe. 

Lomaxiva Thesc changes imposed a new r61e upon Louis XIV. 

the"idf» of I* was evident that Europe would not in these circumstances 

putition permit the union of the French and Spanish monarchies. 
But the success of Leopold I in the East might also have 
another consequence. The Elmperor had been diligently 
working to obtain from Charles II a testament by which the 
whole of the Spanish heritage would pass to his son Charles.* 
In that event, the old empire of the Hapsburgs would, per- 
haps, in time be reunited; and, even if it were not, the House 
of Austria would acquire a new preponderance in Europe. 
It was, therefore, the turn of the King of France to appeal 



^ For the treaty, see Dumont, VII, Part II, p. 448 et eeq. 

> BesidcB the somewhat illusory proroise abeady given by Charles 
II to Leopold I, there was the will of Philip IV, which expressly named 
the descendants of the Infanta Maria, mother of Leopold I, as the heirs 
of the entire monarchy in case those of Margaret should fail. See the 
will in Legrelle, La diplomatie frangcMe, etc., I, p. 558. 



THE DIPLOMACY OF THE SPANISH SUCCESSION 267 

to the principle of equilibrium, — a principle which since Chap. IV 
the Peace of the I^nrenees France had systematically ^^^^^,^ 



disr^arded. 

The serious financial distress caused by the previous 
war rendered it extremely doubtful if France could again 
face a European coalition for the purpose of acquiring the 
whole of the Spanish succession. The King of France had 
not only lost his former prestige among the princes of 
Germany, but the Emperor had made great progress in 
binding them closer to himself by his successful war in the 
East. Other influences also aided in giving; him ascendency. 
Frederick of Brandenburg was ambitious to obtain the title 
of King of Prussia, and needed the good will of the Emperor. 
The Elector of Hanover and the King of Poland owed their 
elevation in a great degree to the favor of Leopold I. Max 
Emmanuel of Bavaria, though disposed to be agreeable to 
France, was not inclined to deliver himself over to his 
powerful neighbor without reward. Undoubtedly, to change 
this adverse situation would require time; and yet the slender 
thread upon which hung the life of Charles II was liable 
to snap at any moment. Without ceasing to utilize Har- 
court's expert services in building up a pro-French party 
in Spain, therefore, Louis XIV set himself with diligence to 
sounding the King of England regarding the candidacy of 
Joseph Ferdinand of Bavaria and a scheme of partition 
in which England should first of all be consulted. 

The candidacy of the young electoral prince for the throne Conditions 
of Spain was now seen to possess certain advantages for gj^^jj^*** 
France. There had been an influential party at Madrid in candidM7 
favor of it, and it would satisfy the Spanish desire to main- 
tain the index)endence of the monarchy. The accession 
of the Prince would place the House of Wittelsbach under 
lasting obligations to France; with which there was already 
a close connection, the Dauphin having married the sister 
of Max Emmanuel. If England and Holland should approve, 
the wishes of Leopold I need not be consulted. He would 
be assigned some morsel of the inheritance; but the House 
of Bourbon would have the choice of its portion, — which 



268 A HISTORY OP DIPLOMACY 

CHiLP. iv it might afterwards trade off to its advantage, — and the 

1697 1716 ^^^^^ grandsons would thus be provided for. Such an ar- 

rangement would at least secure peace for France until the 



treasury could be made more adequate for war; for, with 
England and the United Provinces against him, Leopold I 
could not prevent partition. 

In England the Peace of Ryswick had been received 
with great enthusiasm. Its advantages to English prestige 
and commerce were incontestable; for it not only marked 
the definitive triumph of the Revolution of 1688, it placed 
in the hands of William III the balance of power upon the 
continent, and thus created a powerful means of contributing 
to the pacific development of British interests. With this 
rejoicing in victory there was also in England a strong desire 
for peace. The cost of the war had created not only a new 
burden of • taxation but the beginning of an enormous 
national debt, which had its origin in the effort to raise 
money for the war in 1692.^ Having obtained an advanta- 
geous peace. Parliament was opposed to the further main- 
tenance of a large army, on the ground that a standing army 
is '^ inconsistent with a free government, and absolutely 
destructive to the constitution of the English monarchy." 
In these circumstances, William III was well pleased 
with the disposition of Louis XIV to support the cause 
of a neutral candidate for the throne of Spain and to divide 
the heritage. It is true that during the war the allies were 
boimd by the secret article promising to sustain the claims 
of Leopold I to the Spanish succession; but time had en- 
tirely changed the conditions. The war was over, the treaty 
of alliance had been sux)er8eded by the treaty of peace, and 
a new candidate, Joseph Ferdinand, had come into the 
world, whose accession would avoid the too great increase 
of either the Bourbon or the Hapsburg power. 
Nesotiations The ucw position of Louis XIV was, in March, 1698, 
^J'^Jj^^ taken with extreme adroitness. At Madrid he was through 
ni Harcourt urging the claims of the Dauphin to the whole 

1 See Lodge, The History of England^ p. 381, for the origin of the 
national debt of England. 



THE DIPLOMACY OF THE SPANISH SUCCESSION 269 

succession. At Versailles he was negotiating through Chap, iv 
the new Elnglish ambassador, William Bentinck, Earl of la^^^^^m 

Portland, and at London through Count Tallard, the new 

French ambassador, with William III for the participation 
of England and the United Provinces in a treaty of parti- 
tion.^ In case he succeeded at Madrid, he could claim 
that he was following the expressed wishes of the Spanish 
nation. If he failed there, he could defeat the aims of 
Leopold I by demanding the execution of the partition 
treaty. In any event, each operation would help the other; 
for Spain would prefer to be ruled by a French prince rather 
than submit to a division of the monarchy, and the mari- 
time powers would sooner 3rield to the wishes of France in 
dividing the spoils than see a French prince mount the 
throne of Spain.* 

In the correspondence of William III and the Dutch 
Grand Pensionary, Heinsius, we have a clear revelation of 
the King's state of mind. "I shudder," he says, on March 
25, 1698, "when I think of the unprepared state of the 
allies to begin a war and the present dilapidated state 
of Spain." He was expecting few concessions from France, 
which, he believed, still possessed the military force to compel 
the acceptance of the Dauphin or one of his sons by Spain. 
Such a step, however, would necessitate war, and neither 
Europe nor France desired it. In truth, it was fear on 
both sides that brought William III and Louis XIV together; 
for, while the acceptance by Spain of a French prince was 
dreaded by the Anglo-Dutch interests, the King of France 
was in constant apprehension that Leopold I might prevail 
at Madrid. 



^ For details of these negotiations, see LegreUe, La diplomaiie fran- 
foisef etc., II, p. 226 et seq.; and for the instructions to Tallard and 
Portland's report of conversations, Grimblot, Letters of WiUiam III 
and Louis XIV, 1, pp. 243, 290. 

* That Louis XIV in the course of these negotiations did not abandon 
the idea, if circumstances favored it, of pressing the fuU clainos of the 
Dauphin, we have ample proof in the instructions to Harcourt concur- 
rently with the negotiation of the partition treaties. 



270 A HISTORY OP DIPLOMACY 

Chap, iy The general idea of a partition having been accepted 
1697-^715 ^^ *^® ^^^ monarchs, the difficulty of fixing its terms 
soon became apparent. Tallard at London, imder the in- 
structions of his royal master, although one of the keenest 
of traders, foimd William III an equally astute bargainer; 
and the transaction which was designed to dispose of whole 
kingdoms belonging to neither of the contestants advanced 
but slowly. 
Theprasran In the meantime Harcourt and the two Von Harrachs 
^M^Sr *iad*been busy at Madrid. With consummate skill the 
former was steadily building up a French party; and in 
April, 1698, had succeeded in winning the favor of Cardinal 
Porto Carrero for the cause of France. With the aid of the 
secret agent of Louis XIV, P^re Blandinidres, he made 
much progress with the other influential ecclesiastics also. 
Even the Queen was not proof against his subtle advances, 
for which the way was paved by means of importing from 
Paris numerous presents which appealed to her feminine 
nature, and which were administered in small quantities, in 
order to continue and extend her interest. 

In July, 1698, after desperate efforts, Von Harrach learned, 
in answer to his demand, that an act on the part of Charles 
II in favor of the Archduke Charles would require ap- 
proval by the Cortes, and that great obstacles existed on 
accoimt of the claims of the electoral prince of Bavaria, 
whose mother's renunciation had never been confirmed at 
Madrid. About the same time the English ambassador 
wrote: "This people's inclination is for a French prince, 
provided they can be assured the same shall never be 
king of France. . . . They would rather have the devil than 
see France and Spain imited; but it is scarce conceivable 
the abhorrence they have for Vienna, most of which is 
owing to the Queen's very impudent conduct. . . . They 
have much kinder thoughts for the Bavarian, but still 
rather desire a French prince." 
The Parti- On May 29 Louis XIV had instructed Tallard to lay 

tion Treaty bcforc William III two alternatives, to which he added 

of October 11, 

1698 a third, as follows: 



THE DIPLOMACY OP THE SPANISH SUCCESSION 271 

First, "one of my grandsons would have Spain, the Chap, iv 
Indies, the islands, countries, and places which belong at f;^' 

present to that monarchy, with the exception of the King 

doms of Naples and Sicily, and Milan, which the Archduke 
would have for his share, on condition that they should never 
be imited to the Imperial Crown; the Low Countries, in 
the state in which they now are, would be ceded to the elec- 
toral prince of Bavaria. Though England and Holland 
cannot pretend to have any claim to share in this partition, 
I would nevertheless consent, out of regard to the King of 
England, to leave to those two nations, by this first 
alternative, Ceuta and Oran, for the seciuity of their 
commerce. " ^ 

Second, 'Hhe electoral* prince of Bavaria shall have 
the kingdom of Spain and all that depends at present 
on that monarchy, with the reserve of what is contained 
in the following exceptions, viz.: the Kingdom of Navarre, 
the towns of Fontarabia and St. Sebastian, and the Duchy 
of Luxemburg, which should be given to the Dauphin; 
the Kingdoms of Naples and Sicily, and Milan, to the 
Archduke."* 

Third, ''if the King of England should still make the same 
difficulties on the cession of the Duchy of Luxemburg, 
I consent that you shall propose to him a new alternative. 
The electoral prince of Bavaria should have the monarchy 
of Spain and what now depends upon it, with the exception 
of the Kingdom of Navarre, which should be ceded to my 
son, with Milan, Finale, and the places on the coast of 
Tuscany; the Archduke should have the Kingdoms of Naples 
and Sicily. "« 

William III having demurred to many of the conditions 
proposed, on July 11, Louis XIV was so cheerful over 
the news sent to him by Harcourt from Madrid that he in- 
formed his ambassador, he would no longer ''treat with the 



" See Grimblot, Letters of WiUiam III and Louis XIV, II, pp. 9, 10. 
' Grimblot, as before, p. 11. The King of France also consented that 
the Spanish part of San Domingo might be taken by the English. 
' Grimblot, as before, p. 12. 



272 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY 

Chaf. IV King of England regarding the partition of the Spanish 
1607-1715 '^^^^^ssion, except on advantageous conditions. " ^ 

But, notwithstanding this resolution, the negotiations 

moved slowly on, with the certainty — as now appears from 
the full correspondence — that an agreement would at 
last be reached. It was not, however, until September 
8, after Count Tallard had followed William III to Holland, 
that everything was concluded at The Loo, the summer 
residence of the Prince of Orange. The treaty was not de- 
finitively signed for both England and the United Provinces 
" until October 11, 1698. It was then agreed that, in case 
Charles II died without issue, the Kingdoms of Naples 
and Sicily, with the places then depending upon the Spanish 
monarchy situated on the coast of Tuscany, the province 
of Guipuscoa, and particularly the towns of Fontarabia 
and St. Sebastian, and likewise all places on the French side 
of the Pyrenees should be given to the Dauphin, in consid^ 
eration of his right; that the Crown of Spain, and the other 
kingdoms and places both within and without Europe should 
descend to the electoral prince of Bavaria, whose father, 
the Elector, was to be the guardian of his son and the ad- 
ministrator of his affcurs till he came of age; and that the 
Duchy of Milan should be reserved for the Archduke Charles. 
The treaty was to be communicated to the Emperor and the 
Elector by the King of England and the States General. 
If they did not agree to it, the portion of the party not 
agreeing should remain sequestered until an accommodation 
could be reached. By a secret clause it was provided that, 
in case the electoral prince should receive his share, but die 
without issue before his father, the EHector was to succeed 
him in that portion.* 
The noond Until the middle of August, when the terms of partition 

iiNuJdS^ were virtually settled, no one of William Ill's English 
of joMph ministers had been taken into his confidence; and even after 

Ferdioand 



" Grimblot, LeUers of WiUiam III and Louis XIV, p. 59. 
* For the treaty, see Qrimblot, as before, II, Appendix. Also Du- 
mont, VII, Part II, p. 442 et aeq. 



THE DIPLOMACY OF THB SPANISH STTCCESSION 273 

the treaty was signed its provisions were not generally Chap, iv 
known in England. I697-1715 

At Vienna and at Madrid, with the exception of Harcourt, 

there was equal ignorance of what was happening. In the 
meantime, Yon Harrach had quarrelled with the Queen, 
while the cause of France had been greatly improved. 
But when the Court of Spain learned that a partition treaty 
had been signed between Louis XIY and William III, by 
which the monarchy was secretly parcelled out without 
regard to the wishes of the King and Cortes of Spain, a 
storm of indignation followed. Charles II promptly called 
a council of state; and, on November 14, the will of Philip IV 
was confirmed, and the whole succession awarded by a 
new testament to the electoral prince of Bavaria, the Queen 
being named as regent during his minority. 

Louis XIV offered a formal protest against the complete 
disinheritance of the Dauphin, but he relied upon Max 
Emmanuel to prefer the treaty rather than the will of 
Charles II, since the former made the Mector guardian of 
the Prince, while the latter placed him under the regency 
of the Queen. The Emperor also, though defeated in his 
expectations, it was thought, would prefer the treaty to the 
will; since the former secured Milan to the Archduke, while 
the latter excluded him altogether. 

When at last the news reached Leopold I, who had not even 
suspected the existence of the treaty of partition, he en- 
deavored to bear his misfortime with good grace. What 
he might have done eventually is, however, uncertain; for 
on February 6, 1699, all these elaborate negotiations were 
nullified by the death of Joseph Ferdinand, at Brussels.^ 

In these circiunstances William III was inclined to apply 
the secret clause of the previous treaty by which, in case of 



1 The age of Joseph Ferdinand is erroneously stated by different 
writers. G&deke, I, p. 49, the best authority on the point, places his 
birth on October 26, 1692; which would make him six years, three 
months, and ten days old at the time of his death. There were stories 
that the chikl was poisoned, but it is considered by the best authoritieB 
that these were malicious inventions. 
VOL. m. — 18 



274 



A HI8T0RT OF DIPLOMACY 



Chap. IV 

A. D. 

1697-1716 



The ooDtinu- 
ation of the 
polioy of 
partition 



The Partition 
Treaty of 
March 25, 
1700 



the death of the electoral prince, the Elector of Bavaria 
should take his place; but, as William III himself realized, 
-there were serious obstacles to be overcome. "I caimot 
comprehend,'* he wrote to Heinsius, "how we shall ever be 
able to declare our having intended the succession to the 
monarchy for the EHector of Bavaria; and still less to com- 
municate it to the Imperial Court; so that we are in no small 
labyrinth, and may it please God to help us out of it!'' 
Clearly, since whatever right Joseph Ferdinand had possessed 
came to him through his mother, Max Emmanuel had no 
just claim to any portion of the Spanish inheritance; and 
even in the partition treaty nothing had been accorded to 
him, except conditional succession to his son after the 
Prince had entered upon his heritage. 

Louis XIV had no intention of transferring even a part 
of the Spanish monarchy to the Elector of Bavaria. As 
there were now only two legitimate pretenders, the Dauphin 
and the Archduke Charles, negotiations were continued on 
the same general plan as before, with the added advantage 
to the cause of Louis XIV that he knew from the reports of 
Harcourt the Spaniards would never permit the Kingdom 
either to be divided or to pass to the Archduke Charles. 
It would be a French prince, not a German, who would 
be preferred at Madrid. Given the alternatives of a parti- 
tion or a French prince without partition, there could be 
no doubt what the final decision would be. A new treaty 
would, however, serve the purpose of propitiating the mar- 
itime powers and at the same time render easier the coup 
de main that was necessary to settle the question at Madrid. 
The new partition treaty of March 25, 1700, was a masterly 
stroke on the part of Louis XIV, but it is unnecessary to 
dwell upon the details of the negotiations by which it was 
completed. During the whole process the French ambas- 
sador at Vienna, the Marquis de Villars, was tranquillizing 
the Emperor and his councillors, while Harcourt was striving 
night and day through his powerful pro-French party 
at Madrid to obtain a testament from Charles II bequeath- 
ing the whole monarchy to one of Louis XIV's grandsons! 



THE DIPLOMACT OP THE SPANISH SUCCESSION 275 

On May 6 a copy of the new partition treaty was sent to the Chap, rv 
Emperor for his adhesion without alteration within three ,gjl;_^7,- 

months, in default of which the part assigned to the Arch 

duke Charles would be awarded to some other prince! 

Stupefaction reigned at Vienna. Although flattering in 
appearance, the treaty was deeply humiliating to the Em- 
peror. The Archduke Charles was accorded the Crown of 
Spain with all 'Hhe other kingdoms, islands, estates, coun- 
tries, and places which the Catholic King now possesses, as 
well outside of Europe as within, " except that the Dauphin 
reserved, for himself and his heirs, the territories named 
in the previous treaty of partition, together with the Duchy 
of Lorraine, in exchange for which the Duke of Lorraine was 
to have the Duchy of Milan. The exceptions excluded the 
House of Austria entirely from Italy, augmented the power 
of France immensely, and left the future king of Spain al- 
most at the mercy of his powerful neighbor. But the most 
painful wound of all was to have the portion of Austria 
measured off and handed out by the King of France, the King 
of EIngland, and half a dozen Dutch deputies, through the 
Dutch envoy, Hopp, as the designated intermediary! 
It was "admirable," said the Emperor, with biting sarcasm, 
to see the King of France treat with other foreign powers 
who had nothing to do with the division of the monarchy, 
and refuse to treat with him as the legitimate heir to the 
entire succession. "Think only of the treaty," replied 
Villars; "do not lose time in forming useless projects!" 

If Yienna was indignant, Madrid was furious at this 
second project of dismemberment.^ In June the Council 
of State of Spain met and decided with only one dissenting 
voice that the monarchy should be accorded undivided to a 
French prince. Innocent XII, whose advice was sought, 
referred the matter to the cardinals, who reconunended 
the same solution.* The Spanish jurisconsults, after a 



^ The Queen is said to have been so angry that upon hearing of it she 
broke all the furniture in her room. 

« Klopp, FaU des Hauses StuaH, VIII, 625, IX, 33, X, 162, denies the 
authenticity of this correspondence, and considers the letter of Inno- 



276 A HISTORY OP DIPLOMACY 

Chap. IV solemn consultation, recognized the right of succession as 
±^' belonging to the French line. The clergy and the people 

of Spain became excited over the false report that by a 

secret treaty portions of the American colonies were divided 
between the Protestant nations, England and Holland. The 
pressure upon the King's resistance became irresistible. 
On October 2, 1700, he signed a last will and testament in 
favor of one of the grandsons of Louis XIV, Philip, Duke 
of Anjou;^ and on November 1 it became ^ective by his 
death. 



II. The Reaction op Europe against the Union of 
France and Spain 

Aooeptanoe The last will and testament of Charles II, by which the 

Ss^infor* grandson of Louis XIV was designated as the future king 
Philip of of Spain, imdoubtedly expressed the deliberate preference 
of the Spanish nation. The decision to name a French prince 
combined the advantages of respect for the established 
principles of legitimacy, of terminating peacefully the long 
and bitter state of hostility between two neighboring coun- 
tries, and of preserving imimpaired the integrity of the 
Spanish monarchy. 

All Europe at once asked the question, Would Louis XIV 
accept the will, or would he insist upon the execution of the 
treaty of partition? When, on November 9, 1700, informs^ 
tion of the purport of the testament of Charles II reached 
Fontainebleau, where the Court was then residing, the 
answer was uncertain. The King at once assembled in the 
apartment of Madame de Maintenon the Dauphin, the Chan- 
cellor of France, the governor of the royal household, and 
Torcy, the secretary of state for foreign aBfauB, to deliberate 



IVanoe 



cent a fraud on the part of Forbin-Janson in the year 1702; and Landau, 
Rom, Wien, Neapd wGkrend dea spaniachen Erbfolgekriege8f Leipzig, 
1885, has written an excursus on the question. See, however, Legrelle, 
La diplomaiie frangaiae, etc., Ill, p. 372 et aeq., who reprints the corre- 
spondence in the ^^ppendix. 
» For the last wiU of Charles II, see Dumont, VII, Part II, p. 485. 



THE DIPLOBIACY OP THE SPANISH SUCCESSION 277 

upon the action to be taken. The Dauphin insisted upon Chap, iv 
the prompt acceptance of the testament; but the King ^•^' 

withheld his decision. The next day Torcy proposed to 

accept the testament in secret, in order to reassure the 
Spaniards, but to negotiate with England and Holland for 
their approval as the most certain way to avoid a war; 
but it was decided to accept the inheritance at once, and 
the Spanish ambassador was so informed. On the six- 
teenth, at Versailles, Louis XIV presented his grandson to 
the ambassador with the words: **V<m8 ponvez le saiuer 
comme voire roiJ' After Castelldosrius had kissed the 
hand of the yoimg prince and made a complimentary 
speech to him in Spanish, — of which the seventeen-year-old 
boy did not understand a word, — the King had the doors 
flung open and presented the Prince to the waiting courtiers 
with the announcement: **Me8sieur8y voUd le roi d*Ea- 
pagne!" "Be a good Spaniard," was the royal injunction, 
"... but remember that you were bom French, to maint>ain 
the union between the two nations; it is the means of ren- 
dering them happy and of conserving the peace of Europe. " 
When the ambassador was informed that Philip V would 
begin his journey to Spain on December Ij he exclaimed: 
"QueUe jaiel II n'y a plvs de Pyr&nies; eUes aont dbimieSf 
et nous aommea plus qu'unl*' ^ 

The question has been much discussed, how far and in The doaUe 
what sense the will of Charles II was a triumph of French "^^^J^ 
diplomacy. The result finally obtained was persistently . 
sought by every means within the power of Harcourt, and / '' ^^ ^ 
he pursued this course with the knowledge and approval ' 
of Louis XIV, who rewarded him by making him a duke. '• ' ' ' ' 
It is, however, unjust to Louis XIV to represent, as 
some writers have done, that he had consciously and pur- ,. 

posely duped William III and Heinsius. The truth is, ^ ' 
that the partition treaties contained greater advantages for 
the French nation than the inheritance by a French prince. / /, .. !^ 
of the Crown of Spain; for they would have added consid- 

^ This expreesion, "Iln*y a plus de PyrirUes! " hsm been erroneously 
attributed to Louis XIV. 



. ) 



278 A HISTORY OP DIPLOMACY 

Chap. IV erably to the strength of France as a European power, 

\tiVT-\7\R whereas a mere djmastic triumph by which a Bourbon prince 

was placed on the Spanish throne was of no great national 



importance to the people of France. The chief motive 
which inspired the treaties of partition was not, however, 
the greater advantage of France, but the fear that the 
whole succession might otherwise fall by the will of Charles 
II to the Archduke Charles; which would restore the Haps- 
burg Empire by the union of Spain, Italy, and Germany 
under the rule of a single monarch.^ 

The logic of Louis XIV's diplomacy regarding the suc- 
cession did not involve insincerity toward England and 
Holland, or even toward Leopold I. It consisted in pre- 
senting to Spain two alternatives, — either of which would 
prevent the triumph of the House of Hapsburg and re- 
dound to the glory of the Bourbon dynasty, — the partition 
of the Spanish monarchy or the succession of a French 
prince to the entire inheritance. For three years the Grand 
Monarch did not know which of these alternatives 
would be accepted. When at last the patriotism of the 
Spanish nation and the pride of the dying king prevented 
the monarchy from being dismembered and called for 
his grandson to be the future king of Spain, the die fell 
as Louis XIV had wished it to fall; but it was a result 
which he had almost ceased to expect. 
The abtfidoii- Louis XIV has been accused not only of insincerity in his 
StftitkL*** negotiations with England and Holland, but also of down- 
tnaty right perfidy in not executing the treaty of partition to which 

he had solemnly agreed. It is true, that, whenever his view 
of expediency affected the fulfilment of his engagements, 
his regard for treaty obligations was not great; but in this 
case his decision to abandon the treaty was not without 
extenuation. It was, in fact, monstrous for three foreign 



1 The will of Charles II provided that if the crown of Spain were 
not accepted by the Duke of Anjou, or if he should die without leaving 
descendants, it should go next to the Dauphin's third son, the Duke of 
Berry, then to the Archduke Charles of Austria, and finaUy to the 
Duke of Savoy, or their descendants, under the same conditions. 



THE DIPLOMACY OF THE SPANISH SUCCESSION 279 

powers to conspire in secrecy for the dismemberment and Chap, rv 
distribution of an inheritance to which two of them had no ,«j^_^^jk 

claim whatever. If the justification of such a measure 

was to be found in the necessity for the peace of Europe, 
that appeared to be equally provided for by the will of 
Charles II; which, with the approval of the Spanish nation, 
designated a foreign prince as King of Spain, with the 
qualification that he should never be King of France; a 
condition that did not exist when the partition treaty was 
negotiated, and which now seemed to render it unnecessary. 
To insist upon the fulfilment of that treaty against the will 
of Spain would undoubtedly have caused a European war; 
and, even in the event of sustaining the treaty, its execution 
would have imposed upon an independent nation not only 
the loss of a great portion of its territory but a monarch whom 
it had deliberately rejected.* 

It is no reproach to Louis XIY, therefore, that he did 
not plunge Europe into war in fulfilment of an unjust 
engagement. William III and Heinsius, who distrusted 
the intentions of Louis XIV, were none the less full of re- 
sentment when they saw that their laborious negotiations 
had come to nought, and that a French prince was to have 
the entire succession; and the apology of Louis XIV for 
abandoning the treaty, set forth on November 12, 1700, 
in an elaborate memorial, did not abate their indignation. 
''The two monarchies of France and Spain remain separated, 
as they have been for so many years," ran this ingenious 
document. ''This equal balance, desired by all Europe, 
subsists much better than if France were aggrandized by 
the acquisition of the frontiers of Spain, or of Lorraine, or 
even of the kingdoms of Naples and Sicily. ... It may 
be added, that the uneasiness which the English and the 
Dutch have expressed for their commerce in the Mediter- 
ranean will cease when they learn that the kingdoms of 
Naples and Sicily do not change masters, and that they 
will find in their ports the same advantages which they 

1 In all these negotiations no voice was raised in defenoe of the 
people's right to determine their own destiny or even to intervene. 



280 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY 

Chap. IV feared to lose by the union of those kingdoms with the 

lei^'-ms ^^^^ ^^ France. "1 

These arguments had little effect upon William III, 



who in a letter to Heinsius, of November 16, calls the motives 
of the memorial "shameful." "We must confess we are 
dupes," he says; "but if one's word and faith are not to be 
kept, it is easy to cheat any man. " 

The people of England and Holland, however, were 
not so much displeased with the situation as William III 
and Heinsius were; and it soon became evident that public 
opinion in both countries r^arded the will of Charles II 
as a far better solution of the succession problem than the 
treaties of partition. In fact, if France and Spain were to 
be kept distinctly separate as before, Europe saw many 
advantages in the accession of a French prince to the Spanish 
throne. Leopold I naturally thought differently; but the 
prospect of amity between the two monarchies, which had 
so long disturbed the peace of Europe with their quarrels, 
was welcomed not only by themselves but by most of their 
neighbors. 
The new ia- Under a monarch of a different temperament from that 
Hflreottrt *** of Louis XIV, the closer relationship between France and 
Spain might have inaugurated a new era of well-being; 
but his spirit of personal domination could not be long 
repressed. His instructions to Harcourt, written on Novem- 
ber 17, foreshadow the evils which William III and Hein- 
sius feared. "The good of his kingdom," says the letter 
of the King, "will demand some day that the King of 
Spain take measures to exclude the English and the Dutch 
from the commerce of the Indies"! "Finally," concludes 
this remarkable document, "you ought to make evident 
the certain advantages which religion will receive from the 
perfect understanding between my crown and that of 
Spain"! « 



^ For this memorial, see Grimblot, Letters of WiUiam III and Louis 
XIV, II, p. 463 et seq. 

' For the mstnictions, see Legrelle, La diplomatie fratiQaise, etc., IV, 
pp. 495, 505. 



THE DIPLOMACY OF THE SPANISH SUCCESSION 281 

Thus, on the first day after the public acceptance of the Chap, iv 
Spanish inheritance, Louis XIV began to frame policies i^^^iyje 

for the joint action of the two monarchies, to which he 

gave the assurance of his armed support; and among these 
policies were the exclusion of the English and the Dutch 
from the commerce of the Indies, which the treaty of parti- 
tion was intended to secure to them, and a united support 
of the Catholic religion! 



With the exception of the Emperor, the powers of Europe, The aoquii 

oenoe of 
Europe 



after a short period of surprise and indecision, decided to ®"* ^ 



acknowledge Philip V as King of Spain. WiUiam III would 
have offered resistance, if he could have obtained support 
in England; but this was impossible. ''I am pressed on 
every side to recognize the King of Spain," he wrote to 
Heinsius; but he resolved to postpone recognition as 
long as possible and insensibly to lead the people on to war.^ 
Heinsius was equally powerless in Holland, where the in- 
terest in trade dominated over every other, and fear existed 
that another war would not only completely exhaust the 
country but render it entirely subject either to William III 
or Louis XIV. 

When, therefore, Leopold I imdertook to obtain allies for 
the purpose of disputing the claim of the Duke of Anjou 
to the entire Spanish succession, he found that the indig- 
nation of Vienna was not widely shared. Villars was openly 
insulted in the streets and war was theatened, but without 
the support of the maritime powers there was no hope of 
preventing the accession of Philip V. In the Empire itself 
Leopold I could count upon the Elector Palatine and the 
Elector of Hanover, and by recognizing Frederick III as 
King >0f Prussia he won the alliance of the Elector of 
Brandenburg;* but, as this recognition was known to 
be against the real wishes of the Eknperor, it was in effect 



^ William III was convinced that Louis XIV meant to dupe him, 
and that war would necessarily follow. 

* For the treaty conceding the royal dignity to the Elector of Bran- 
denburg, dated November 16, 1700, see Dumont, II, Part I, supplement, 
p. 400. 



282 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY 

Chajp. IV a diminution of his own prestige, and proved to be a 

iam'-Ttis ^^^^^^ o^ offence to other German princes, who resented 

the establishment of a new royal house in the German 



Ambition of 
LouiiXIV 



Empire. 

Ohi the other hand, while Leopold I was powerless to re- 
organize the Grand Alliance against Louis XIY, the 
princes of Europe were flocking to the King of France. 
The King of Portugal, the Duke of Savoy, the Electors 
of Bavaria and Koln, and most significant of all the new 
pope, Clement XI, all sought to enter into cordial rela- 
tions with France and promptly recognized Philip V as King 
of Spain. 
The raviv«d Long discipline as a ruler seemed for a time to have taught 
Louis XIV lessons of wisdom; but the elation of spirits pro- 
duced by the triumphal entry of Philip V into Spain and 
his enthusiastic welcome at Madrid destroyed in a moment 
all that years of trial and experience had done to balance the 
mind of the Grand Monarch. He now felt that he was him- 
self not only King of France but practically King of Spain 
also, and a new access of his disposition to dominate soon 
plimged all Europe into war. 

The redeeming features of the accession of a French 
prince to the whole of the Spanish monarchy were: first, 
the provision that the two crowns were to be kept forever 
separate; second, that the Spanish Netherlands, being 
permanently secured to Spain, — a weak and distant power, 
— would always stand as a quasi-neutral barrier between 
the United Provinces and France; and, third, that Anglo- 
Dutch commerce would suffer no disadvantage because of 
the new relations between France and Spain. It required 
only a few months to show that all these supposed benefits 
were illusory; that Louis XIV intended to prepare for the 
ultimate union of the two monarchies, and in the mean- 
time to impose his own will in Spain as he had imposed it 
in France. 

On February 1, 1701, the King registered in the Parlia- 
ment of Paris letters patent, already prepared in December, 
by which he reserved to the Duke of Anjou and his de- 



THE DIPLOMACY OP THE SPANISH SUCCESSION 283 

scendants all their natural rights to the Crown of France.* Chap, iv 
This was a plain infraction of the form of security which i^^.^yje 

the will of Charles II had furnished; for, although there 

were two lives and many possibilities between the Duke of 
Anjou and his immediate right of accession to the throne 
of France, the action of Louis XIV could have no other 
motive than to provide for an ultimate union of the two 
monarchies. Five days later, without notice, French 
troops were sent into the Spanish Netherlands to replace 
the Dutch garrisons located in the barrier cities, which 
they were occupying in conformity ^rith previous agree- 
ments. The Dutch soldiers were not expelled, but they 
were virtually made prisoners of war, to await the action 
of the States General. 

Although the Republic, for the time, suppressed its in- ixmii xivs 
dignation at this action, and, on February 28, 1701, recog- J**^**'** '* 
nized the new king of Spain, it did not hesitate to demand 
the evacuation of the Spanish Netherlands by the troops 
of France, to concentrate its vessels of war, to increase its 
land forces, and to call upon England to render aid in 
maintaining its rights. 

Louis XIV quickly perceived that his action had pro- 
duced a rising tide of hostility both in Holland and in 
England, and he took prompt measures to offer reassurance. 
Early in March he annoimced that he would withdraw 
the French troops as soon as Spanish soldiers could take 
their placC; and proposed a conference to settle the points 
at issue. But the States General resolved not to be isolated, 
and asked that the English ambassador be admitted to 
the conference, at the same time handing to Count d'Avaux 
a statement of their demands, which included ten barrier 
cities, the entire withdrawal of French troops from the 



^ For the text, see Legrelle, La diplomatie frangaise, etc., IV, p. 215. 
A few days before signing the letters patent, Louis XIV said to the 
Constable of Castile: "Les nations fran^ise et espagnole seront telle- 
ment unies, que les deux ddsormais n'en formeront plus qu'ime." See 
Flassan, Histoire gSrUrale et raisamUe de la diplomatie fransaue, IV, 
p. 209. 



284 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY 

Chap. IV Spanish Netherlands, a promise that no part of them should 
1697-^716 ^^^^ ^ ceded to France, and some " satisfaction *' for the 

Emperor in regard to the succession. 

Seeing in this manifesto a covert intimation that the 
Grand Alliance might be revived by an appeal to 
England and the Emperor, Louis XIV offered to confirm 
the Peace of Ryswick; but immediately began to build 
defences at Antwerp and Ostend and to construct a line 
of fortifications between the Scheldt and the Maas, while 
resorting to the old tactics of appealing to the commer- 
cial interests of Amsterdam for the maintenance of 
peace. 

The refusal to admit the English ambassador to the 
negotiations as a contracting participant confirmed the 
Dutch suspicions of the intention to isolate as well as divide 
the Republic, and a new and more forcible appeal for pro- 
tection was made to William III. 
The ohiuised In the meantime, the conduct of Louis XIV had pro- 
^JJ^^**" duced its effect in England also. The Tories were indif- 
ferent to the fate of Holland, but as the evidence of the 
danger to Europe accumulated, public sentiment, which 
William III was steadily directing toward resistance to the 
new designs of his enemy, was slowly awakening. Reports 
of a Jacobite plot to assassinate the King and maJce a 
descent upon England for the restoration of James II, what- 
ever their origin, led the Parliament to regulate the succession 
to the throne by designating a Protestant princess, Sophia, 
the widow of Ernest Augustus, Elector of Hanover, — a 
granddaughter of James I, — and her descendants, in case 
William III and the Princess Anne should die without leav- 
ing children. Following upon this important decision, came 
the appeal of the States General for aid; and Parliament, 
incited by the renewed fear of French intrigues, not only 
voted large appropriations for the army and navy, but 
ordered ten thousand men to be sent to the Netherlands and 
authorized the King to conclude alliances for the safety of 
England and the independence of Europe. 
William III had again succeeded in drawing England 



THE DIPLOMACY OF THE SPANISH STTCCESSION 285 

once more into opposition to Louis XIV; but he was not Chap. IV 
disposed to reconunence open hostilities at once. At ^^Jti^'^ 

The Hag^e, on June 9, Count d Avaux was mstructed 

to permit the English ambassador, Alexander Stanhope, 
to join in the negotiations; but Stanhope insisted that 
he could not proceed without a representative of the 
Emperor. As Leopold I had already begun a campaign 
against France in Italy for the possession of Milan, 
Louis XIV refused to admit an Imperial plenipotentiary 
to the conference; holding that he could not allow 
England and Holland to act as arbitrators between him- 
self and the Emperor, with whom he was at war. In 
consequence, Count d 'Avaux was recalled from The Hague, 
all negotiations were ended, and war became apparently 
inevitable. 

In these circximstances it was natural that Leopold I The nrivBi oi 
should seek the alliance of the two maritime powers, and ^j|^^J*^J^ 
that, they in turn should associate themselves with him; 
but the difference between their aims was an obstacle to 
the full satisfaction of the Emperor. England and Holland 
had already formally recognized Philip V as ICing of Spain. 
They could not, therefore, consistently unite with Leopold I 
to dethrone him, and to put the Archduke Charles in his 
place. Nor was it their purpose to force Spain to abandon 
the king whom the nation had chosen and so enthusiasti- 
cally welcomed. Their object was to prevent the ultimate 
union of Spain with France, and particularly that imme- 
diate exercise of authority by Louis XIV in Spain and in the 
Spanish possessions which was almost equivalent to the 
immediate annexation of the country to the French 
monarchy. 

At every available point thus far, Louis XIV was acthig 
as if he were virtually King of Spain. In fact, Spain seemed 
ahnost to have lost its identity and to be absorbed by 
France. French soldiers were defending Milan, French 
ships were guarding the coasts of the Spanish colonies in 
America, French merchants were carrying on the Spanish 
trade, French slave-vessels had the monopoly of the 



286 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY 

Chap, iy ^'Asiento/' and the garrisons of the Spanish Netherlands 
^' ^' took their orders from French officers.* 

But in the opposition to the overweening power of France 



there was enough of common interest to furnish a basis for 
an alliance, and under the direction of William III and 
Heinsius it was soon found. On September 7, 1701, a treaty 
was signed at The Hague between the Emperor, England, 
and the United Provinces by which it was agreed that, "if 
war became necessary," Leopold I should receive "a just 
and reasonable satisfaction" in the matter of the Spanish 
succession, and that the maritime powers should be granted 
"a particular security" as respects their commerce and their 
territory.* 

Louis XIV was to have two months within which to make 
a friendly arrangement upon this basis. If he declined to 
make such an arrangement, the three allies would unite to 
conquer the Spanish Netherlands, to be erected into a bar- 
rier between France and the United Provinces; Milan, as 
an Imperial fief should be restored to the Emperor as nec- 
essary to the security of the Austrian possessions; and Naples 
and Sicily should also be delivered to the Emperor, as a 
further security and to maintain the commercial rights 
of England and Holland. Whatever parts of the American 
colonies might, in case of war, fall into the hands of the 
allies as necessary to their commerce should be retained at 
the conclusion of hostilities, for which the contractants 
pledged themselves not to treat separately. While the 
commercial privileges enjoyed under Charles II by the 
Ekiglish and the Dutch should be continued, trade with 
the Spanish colonies should be prohibited to the French. 
The rupture Thcsc wcrc drastic demands, which Louis XIV was cer- 
rei^w^Kth ^^^ ^^^ ^ admit; yet it was through his own intemperate 
Fnmoe couduct that they were made. Still it is doubtful if the 

English people would have sustained William III in the 



» After June, 1701, says Baudrillart, Philippe V el la cour de France^ 
I, p. 71, ** Louis XIV parla et agtt en mattre." See also the examples 
cited to show the extent of his authority in Spain. 

* For the treaty, see Dumont, VIII, Part I, p. 89 et seq. 



THE DIPLOMACY OF THE SPANISH SUCCESSION 287 

long and costly war necessary to maintain all these require- Chap, rv 
ments had it not been for a fresh act of hostility on the part t* \ 

t T • vTTr 1697-1715 

of Louis XIV. 



On September 16, 1701, at Saint-Germain, where the 
Grand Monarch had generously maintained James II in 
royal state, the exiled kii^ died after a long illness. As 
a consolation to his dying relative, Louis XIV promised 
to recognize his son, James Edward, a boy of fourteen, as 
James III, King of England.. 

When William III, who was at The Loo, heard of this 
violation of the Treaty of Ryswick, he ordered the Ekiglish 
ambassador at Versailles to return to England at once 
without a farewell audience. Heinsius gave a correspond- 
ing order to the Dutch ambassador; and, owing to this 
rupture of diplomatic relations, the treaty of September 7 
was never formally submitted to Louis XIV. 

The effect in Ekigland of the imprudent and wholly use- 
less act of recognizing James Edward was as much of an 
offence to Parliament, which had just determined the royal 
succession, as to William III. The whole English nation 
was aroused. The new parliament voted large appropria- 
tions for the conduct of the war, and passed a bill of at- 
tainder, which declared that James Edward would be guilty 
of high treason if he ever set foot on EInglish soil, and a 
bill of abjuration, by which all officers of the Crown were 
required to repudiate his claims. 

Thus, at last, the hostility of William III to Louis XIV The death oi 
was transformed into a permanent traditional opposition ^*"*^ ^^ 
on the part of the English nation. It was a costly and yet 
a useful legacy to England, and it was his last; for before 
war had been declared, on March 9, 1702, this strenuous war- 
rior and astute statesman, whose fortimes had been so won- 
derfully advanced by the mistakes of his enemies, suddenly 
died. For fourteen years he had ruled three kii^doms to 
which he was essentially an alien. Personally unsympa- 
thetic and never really loved in England, he had neverthe- 
less been politically necessary to the nation. Voluntarily 
chosen as the instrument for asserting the national will. 



288 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY 

Chap. IV he had in reality bent it to his own purposes. With a 
1697-^715 '^^^®'' ^®^ ^f continental politics than was possessed by 

any Englishman of his time, he had seen the relation of 

Elngland's well-being to the affairs of the continent, and 
events had forced the country to follow him. 

It is no small merit in a statesman to penetrate to realities 
where others are misled by appearances, yet this distinc- 
tion can justly be claimed for William III. The highest pos- 
sible tribute to his discernment is the fact that his policy 
became the permanent policy of England. The coalition he 
had formed to prevent the absorption of the Spanish mon- 
archy by France continued to resist the forces of Louis XIV 
until it won a final victory and saved Europe from the 
reign of absolutism by which it was again threatened at the 
time of his death. As an English historian has well said 
of him: ''No one is unaware that he established our Con- 
stitution upon a permanent basis. But it is not for our 
Constitution only, but for our policy, for our definitive 
situation among the nations of the world, that we are in- 
debted to him. " ^ 

It is only in the light of two centuries of international 
development that the full significance of these words can 
be appreciated; for it was not merely the annexation of 
the Spanish Netherlands, or even the appropriation of all 
the European territories of Spain, that was involved in the 
threatened absorption of the Spanish monarchy by France. 
It was the control of the chief Atlantic and Mediterranean 
ports, of the American colonies, and of the commerce of the 
world that was at stake. The rescue of Holland, the per- 
manent separation of France and Spain, and the indepen- 
dence of the states of Germany, — these were the objects 
to which William III devoted his life; and these were the 
foundations of the future development of Europe as a 
system of independent sovereign states and of the future 
formation of the British Empire. 

In her speech before the House of Lords three days after 
the King's death, his successor, Anne, the daughter of 

1 Seeley, The Growth of BritUh Policy, II. 



THE DIPLOMACY OP THE SPANISH SUCCESSION 

James 11, revived courage at The Hague and Vienna by Chap, rv 
declaring her determination to maintain the alliance and ^'^' 
^'to reduce the exorbitant power of France." : 



On May 15, 1702, the alhes unitedly declared war on The 

of F 
and SiMun 



Louis XIV, and on September 28 the Imperial Diet for- "^ ^^"^ 



mally associated itself with the Emperor in prosecuting 
the war. Thus practically all Europe was, in form at 
least, arrayed against France and Spain in a conflict which 
for more than a decade was to be bitterly contested in 
Italy, in Bavaria, on the Rhine, and in the Netherlands. 

To aid himself in facing this powerful coalition, Louis XIV 
had endeavored to form a league of resistance; but the fi- 
nancial condition of France no longer permitted the extrava- 
gant expenditures in subsidies which marked the early years 
of his reign. On April 6, 1701, Victor Amadeus II, after 
much hesitation, in return for a promise of marriage of his 
second daughter to Philip V, a heavy subsidy for his troops, 
and the title of generalissimo of the French army in Italy, 
had formed a new alliance with Louis XIV; and on June 
18, 1701, King Peter II of Portugal had recognized Philip V 
and closed his sea-ports to the enemies of France and Spain; 
but they were not long faithful to their engagements. 

On May 16, 1703, the English resident, Paul Methuen, 
concluded a treaty of alliance with Portugal by which 
Peter II agreed to fiunish troops and open his ports for an 
attack on Spain, and at the same time to admit English 
cotamierce in the Portuguese colonies.^ 

In September, 1703, Bavaria having fallen into the hands 



1 For this treaty of aUianoe, to which all the allies were admitted, 
see Dumont, VIII, Part I, p. 127. The famous "Methuen Treaty" is, 
however, that of December 27, 1703, which was negotiated by John 
Methuen, father of the English resident, the object of which was to 
procure for English commerce, particularly woollen goods, a market in 
Portugal in exchange for preferential duties on Portuguese wines. It 
gave to England and to Portugal the advantage of an alliance through 
which Spain could be held in restraint, and was the basis of permanent 
commercial relations between the two countries until its abrogation in 
1834. For the latter treaty, see Martens, RecueU des principaux 
traiUa, etc., 1791, 1817, Supplement I, p. 41 et seq. 
vol*, ra. — 19 



290 A HISTORY OF DIPIX)MACY 

Chap. IV of the enemy after the battle of Hochstadt, the Elector 
^_^* was driven from his electorate, but compensated for his loss 



. by being permitted to exercise practically full sovereignty 
in the Spanish Netherlands, of which Louis XIV had 
vainly endeavored to obtain the complete cession to France 
in payment of the services he was rendering to the Spanish 
monarchy. 

In October, 1703, Victor Amadeus II, having received 
attractive offers from the Emperor, with whom he had been 
constantly in secret negotiation, and fearing that Louis XIV 
meant eventually to deprive him of Savoy without obtain- 
ing for him possession of Milan, abandoned his alliance with 
Fntnce and became generalissimo of the Imperial forces in 
Italy. 

The year 1704 added to these misfortunes, and on July 
24 Gibraltar was captured by the English. 
Louis xiVi In this extremity Louis XIV looked vainly for new al- 
S« N^rS liances, and awoke to the fact that Europe had undergone 
andEaat a great transformation. The time had passed when the 
King of France by an alliance with the Sultan could pre- 
occupy the Emperor in the East, and when he could paralyze 
the princes of the Empire by subsidizing Sweden. 

Northeastern Europe had become the theatre of new am- 
bitions, and entirely new forces had entered upon the 
scene. Henceforth there were to be two great centres of 
political and military activity in Europe, and the course 
of events in each was to be more and more affected by the 
operations of the other. 

Until the end of the seventeenth centiuy Russia had been 
excluded from participation in the international develop- 
ment of Western Europe. Within a vast area a great em- 
pire had been gradually forming that was now to be brought 
into contact with the more fully developed civilization of the 
West and South. With the accession of the Romanoffs 
in 1613 order had been restored in Russia, and its wonderful 
modem development began. Before 1689, when Peter the 
Great came to the throne as sole master of the Russian 
Empire, the Moscovite power had reached such a height 



THE DIPLOMACY OF THE SPANISH SUCCESSION 291 

that instead of being the prey of Sweden and Poland, as Chap. IV 
had been expected, it had turned the tide of their pre- ^•'^• 

ponderance, and was threatening to overwhehn them with 

its invasions.^ It was to this new situation in the North 
and East that Europe was now compelled to devote a por- 
tion of its attention. 

Isolation from the rest of Europe and the long struggle The amutioiu 
with barbaric tribes upon its eastern borders had held Russia qJ^^ **** 
since its Christianization in the tenth century in a state 
of comparatively arrested development similar to that 
of Western Europe four or five centuries earlier. When in 
the fifteenth century Constantinople was taken by the 
Turks, Moscow, which was a centre of Greek civilization, 
became in a sense its successor, and aspired to be for the 
East what Rome had been for the West, thus becoming a 
seat of the ancient imperial culture as modified by the 
authority of the Christian religion in its Greek as distin- 
guished from its Latin form. 

It is the distinction of Peter the Great to have blended 
with this survival of the past something of the practical 
arts and the modem spirit borrowed from England and 
Holland as the result of his visits to those countries in 
1697 and 1698. Abolishing the patriarchate, he made him- 
self the head of the Church, as Henry VIII had done in 
England. His reforms having been resisted by the old- 
time militia, or Streliziy he destroyed its organization and 
created a modem army obedient to his will. Possessing 
no ports and no navy, he built ships and endeavored to open 
his empire to maritime commerce. 

Russia having emerged from the condition in which it waa 
occupied chiefly with internal organization and provisions 
for its own defence, he gave to the traditional foreign policy 
of his country a new direction. To expel the Turks from 
Europe and regain Constantinople had long been the dream ^ 
of the Russian Church, which regarded itself as an exile 
from its ancient capital. To give this aim efficiency Peter 

^ For the previous attempt at negotiation between France and 
Russia, see Vassileff, Rusfisch'franzdsische Politik, 1689-1717 ^ pp. 1, 13. 



292 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY 

Chap. IV the Great conceived the policy of constructing a navy on 
^'^' the Black Sea with the intention of pushing out to the 
~ Mediterranean and developing foreign commerce. At 



the same time he formed the design of obtaining a port on 
the Baltic, at the mouth of the Neva, where St. Petersbtu^ 
was afterward built and the Russian capital established. 
Thenceforth, Russia, until then regarded as a n^ligible 
quantity in the affairs of Europe, had to be counted with 
as an important Ehiropean power. 
The oMOitUm The immediate obstacles to the new policy of Russian 
expansion were Sweden, Poland, and Turkey. At the close 
of the Thirty Years' War Sweden was one of the most 
vigorous of the European nations, and war was its chief 
industry. Had its resources permitted the kii^dom to 
sustain and employ its military strength for its own develop- 
ment, instead of shedding the blood of its sons upon foreign 
battlefields, Sweden might have become, as at one time it 
promised to be, the undisputed mistress of the Baltic; but 
the poverty of its soil and the policy of selling its military 
force to other countries, in spite of niunerous wars fought 
on its own account with Denmark, Poland, and Russia^ 
prevented the expansion of Swedish power. The acquisitions 
of Sweden on the Baltic were, however, of great extent; and 
the possession of Esthonia, Livonia, Ingria, and Carelia 
effectually excluded Russia from the coveted coasts of the 
Baltic. 

When, in 1697, Charles XI of Sweden died, leaving his 
son Charles XII, who was only fifteen years old, as his 
successor, the opportunity had seemed to be offered for 
Russia to divest Sweden of her Baltic empire. 

Frederick Augustus I, King of Poland, was an ambitious 
soldier whose base of action in Saxony as well as Poland 
rendered him a formidable competitor for territorial ex- 
pansion. He had formed the design of obtaining from the 
war with Turkey Moldavia and Wallachia, which would 
have extended the dominions of Poland to the Black Sea. 
He hoped also eventually to absorb Silesia, which would 
have connected Saxony with Poland. Had he succeeded in 



THE DIPLOBdACY OP THE SPANISH SUCCESSION 293 

executing these plans, he would have possessed an empire Chap, iy 
extending from the Baltic to the Black Sea, and from the • J^_'^l 
Elbe to the Dnieper, an area greater than the whole of Ger- 



many, with every advantage for still wider extension. 

To Frederick Augustus I, Patkul, a Livonian nobleman 
who had been despoiled of his estates by Sweden, made ap- 
peal for the reconquest of Livonia by Poland in the hope 
of obtaining their restoration. Since peace had been made 
at Carlowitz between the Sultan and the Emperor, the 
time did not seem favorable for the greater design of Freder- 
ick Augustus I, and Patkul was entrusted by him with the 
formation of an anti-Swedish coalition. In September, 
1699, an offensive alliance was formed with Denmark against 
Sweden, and in the following November the Czar adhered 
to it. The Elector of Brandenburg was invited to join 
this league, with permission to take Swedish Pomerania; 
but not wishing to embark upon that enterprise before he 
had fully confirmed his new dignity as King of Prussia, 
Frederick III decided to maintain his neutrality. 

Tmagining that Sweden would prove defenceless against The Yiotoriw of 
the triple combination, Poland, Denmark, and Russia, <^'***» ^^^ 
, each with the expectation of territorial aggrandizement, 
began a war with the intention of dividing among them- 
selves the Swedish possessions on the Southern and East- 
em shores of the Baltic. 

Never had there been a more erroneous calculation. 
The young kii^, Charles XII, who was still a mere boy, 
proved to be a most energetic and courageous warrior. 
His enthusiasm was so contagious that in a few months the 
military spirit of Sweden was fully aroused. Without 
giving his enemies time to unite, he struck out at them with 
a violence and a certainty of aim that astonished Europe. 
The Danes had attacked the Duke of Holstein, brother-in- 
law of Charles XII, whose duchy they intended to ap- 
propriate; but the young king at the head of eleven thousand 
men, having rendered the Danish fleet inactive, promptly 
threatened Copenhagen, and King Frederick IV was com- 
pelled at Travendal to accept all the Duke's demands. 



294 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY 

Chap. IV Having won this unexpected victory, he next proceeded, 
aj^% against the urgent advice of his generals, to the Gulf of 
Finland, where the Czar was entrenched at Narva, and 



the West to 



with only eight thousand men attacked and defeated an army 
of forty thousand Russians. Then, landing in Livonia, he 
inarched to Warsaw, where he attacked Frederick Augustus I 
of Poland, and in 1702 compelled him to retire to his elec- 
torate of Saxony. 
The^fforuof The desperate struggle in the North, although discon- 
nected with the question of the Spanish succession, in which 
the Northern powers had no direct interest, was not with- 
out its effect upon the course of events in Western Europe. 
Regarding Charles XII and Frederick Augustus I as de- 
sirable allies, whose united forces if turned against Leopold I 
would greatly embarrass and possibly entirely prevent the 
Emperor's activities against France, Louis XIV, in the 
hope of turning the armies of Sweden and Poland against 
the Emperor, in April, 1700, had sent an envoy, Du H^ron, 
to Warsaw to negotiate for an alliance with Frederick Au- 
gustus I and a ''solid peace'' between Poland, Sweden, and 
Denmark; but Du H^ron soon became convinced that rec- 
onciliation between Poland and Sweden was impossible. 

In February, 1701, at Birsen, where a conference was held 
between Frederick Augustus I and Peter the Great to 
strengthen their alliance against Sweden, Du H4ron endeav- 
ored to persuade the Czar to permit the King of France 
to mediate between him and Charles XII; but, although 
diplomatic correspondence was for some time continued 
with the Russian Chancellor, Golowin, the negotiation 
bore no fruit.^ 

In the effort to obtain the good will of Charles XII in 
the war of the Spanish succession, England and Holland 
also had sought to divert Russia from the attack on Sweden. 
The main interest of the maritime powers was not, however, 
the expectation of active aid against Louis XIV, but the 
preservation of their Baltic trade; for they feared the Rus- 
sian mastery of the Baltic. Urging their dissatisfaction with 

1 See RecueU dea VMtructwnSy VIII, Russie, pp. 93, 94. 



THE DIPLOMACY OF THE SPANISH SUCCESSION 295 

the assault of the Czar upon their "friend and ally," — ag Chap, iv 
they called Sweden, — the pressure of their mediation had .^^^{j.j^ 
the effect of impelling Russia to approach France with as 



surances of friendship, and Golowin in his correspondence 
referred to Louis XIV and the Czar as "the two heroes of 
the century," whose alliance would be "an object of ad- 
miration to all Eiux)pe." But Louis XIV did not fully 
relish the presiunption of the Russian chancellor in ranking 
his own half-barbaric master with himself, and after the Czar 
had politely declined French mediation and genially prom- 
ised to "recompense" the offer of the King of France on 
"some similar occasion," Louis XIV had for a time desisted 
from his attempt to induce Russia to end the war. 

Having declined the mediation of France, the virility of The Fra&oo- 
Russian diplomacy, imschooled as it was, soon became evi- ^^^^ 
dent in the attempt of the Russian envoy Dolgorouki to negotution 
persuade Du H^ron that it was for the French interest that 
the war should continue, as it would prevent Sweden and 
Poland from uniting with the coalition against France; and 
especially that it would be in the French interest to aid 
the Czar in obtaining a Baltic port, which would ruin the 
Dutch commerce in the North, and enable Russia with the 
help of France to control the Baltic trade. Patkul also 
in a x>ersonal interview with Du H^ron urged the advantage 
to France that would result from promoting the designs of 
Russia; but Louis XIV, who was seeking to obtain imme- 
diate help in resisting his enemies, was not disposed to 
advance Russian interests, and had long refrained from 
sending an envoy to the Czar at Moscow, fearing that this 
"night offend Charles XII, whom he wished to draw to his 
side in the war of the succession. 

It was, however, impossible for Louis XIV to regard with- 
out interest the situation in the North, from which he al- 
ways hoped to derive some profit. What he really aimed at 
was, if practicable, to end the attack on Sweden, which he 
then hoped to use to his advantage in Germany, and to 
induce Poland and Russia to make war on the Emperor. 

The outlook for this scheme was not at any time pro- 



296 A HISTORY OP DIPLOBCACT 

Chap, iy pitioiis, but Louis XIV did not entirely abandon it. On 

^'^' September 28, 1702, elaborate instructions had been pre- 

pared for Baluze, secretary of the mission to Poland, who 



was designated as a special envoy to the Czar.^ 

As appears from these instructions, the first object was to 
prevent a union of Russia with the enemies of France. Of 
this there was great danger. On January 16, 1702, the King 
of Poland had concluded an offensive and defensive al- 
liance with the Emperor against France. The Czar was 
not unlikely to do the same. He was already disposed to 
furnish troops to the coalition, and had already offered in 
exchange for subsidies to lend soldiers to Holland.' 

The envoy was further instructed always to work dili- 
gently for a reconciliation between Russia and Sweden. As 
a diversion an invasion of Transylvania by the Cossacks 
was proposed; and the conquest of that province was de- 
clared to be easy, since the Emperor was fully preoccupied 
on the Rhine and in Italy, and Russia could count upon 
the help of France. 

On March 24, 1703, Baluze arrived in Moscow, where 
he was received by Golowin on the day of his arrival; and 
soon afterward, in the Chancellor's dwelling, the Czar, who 
came incognito^ gave him his first audience. Suspicion was, 
however, strong on both sides, and neither ventured to 
make proposals; and in the following July this first mission 
of Louis XIV to Peter the Great came to an end without 
result. 
The aiiuation The battles won by the young king of Sweden promised 
^^^^^^^ for a time to give him a predominating rfile in Europe. 
Wert "He dreams only of war," wrote one of his generals; "he 

listens no longer to advice; he believes that he is divinely 
inspired to do what he does." A brilliant succession of 
victories seemed to justify the self-confidence of Charles XII. 
In 1703 he capt\u*ed Thorn and Dantzig; and in February, 
1704, convoked an assembly at Warsaw, deposed Frederick 



^ For the instructioiis, see Recueil de8 inetruduma, Russie, I, p. ^ 
et seq. 
' See Vajssilefif, Russiachrframdsische PoUiik, p. 24. 



THE DIPLOMACY OF THE SPANISH SUCCESSION 297 

Augustus I, and named a Polish noble, Stanislas Leszczin- Chap. IV 
ski, King of Poland. ^^-^^^^^ 

But in the meantime Peter the Great had repaired the 

defeat of Narva. In 1703 he had taken the Swedish fort at 
the mouth of the Neva, demolished it, and laid the founda- 
tions of St. Petersburg on the ground where Saint Alexander 
Nevski had formerly won his glorious renown. In the 
same year he justified his maritime poUcy by captiuing two 
Swedish vessels, "an unheard-of victory." In 1704 he re- 
captured Narva, and devastated Livonia and Esthonia with 
a vigor that recalled the exploits of Ivan the Terrible. 

In the meantime Charles XII was wreaking his vengeance 
on Frederick Augustus I, whom he had chased from Poland 
into Saxony, where he was levying contributions from the 
electorate from his camp under the walls of Leipzig. 

The moment seemed to Louis XIV opportune for inducing 
the impetuous King of Sweden to turn his forces against 
the Emperor. In May, 1705, Leopold I died, and his son, 
Joseph I, was chosen Emperor. As if to show his indiffer- 
ence to the Imperial authority, Charles XII traversed Sile- 
sia without asking for permission, and was receiving and 
redressing the complaints of the Protestants of Austria and 
Hungary. Europe, divided, was trembling before him; for 
on whichever side he might throw the weight of his influence 
in the war of succession, it was believed, his will could 
determine the issue. France, on the point of being invaded, 
had been beaten at RamilUes and Tiuin, the greater part 
of the Spanish Netherlands was in the hands of the allies, 
and on June 6, 1706, the Archduke Charles, whom the aUies 
had now resolved to support for the entire succession, had 
been unanimously recognized as king by the States of Flan- 
ders. On the twenty-fifth of the same month the allies, 
having advanced upon Madrid from Portugal, had driven 
Philip V from his capital and had proclaimed Charles III 
King of Spain. 

At this low ebb of his fortunes Louis XIV hoped that 
Sweden, his long subsidized ally, would be under Charles 
XII, as it had been under Gustavus Adolphus, the firm 



298 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY 

Chap. IY friend of France in the conflict with the Emperor. All the 
1607-471S ^^^"^ ^' ^ envoys were, therefore, directed toward that 

result. French diplomacy was at the same time active 

in trying to induce the Sultan to attack the Emperor and 

The effort of also Russia. The Czar, it was argued, as soon as he had made 

Mue^ *** peace with Sweden would build a great fleet on the Black 

•nieiioeof Sca and unite with the Emperor to drive the Turks from 

*-'"'■*■ ^^ Europe. In the meantime, while the Sultan was being urged 

to attack the Czar, peace with Russia was to be lu^ed upon 

Sweden, in order that the Swedish army might be retained 

in Germany to fight for France against the Emperor. 

The maritime powers well understood that the imion 
of France and Sweden at that moment would change the 
face of Europe. The Peace of Alt-Ranstadt, signed on Sep- 
tember 24, 1706, by which Frederick Augustus I renounced 
the crown of Poland, and surrendered Patkul to be broken 
on the wheel as a traitor, left Charles XII free to employ his 
sixty thousand soldiers, already in the heart of Germany, 
against Joseph I. He had also, besides the French urgency, 
a strong motive for doing so; for Joseph I had refused to 
deliver twelve thoiisand Russian prisoners who had taken 
refuge in Austria, and Charles XII was disposed to march 
on Vienna to demand that they be surrendered to him. 

Having already lost Italy, failed in his efforts to make 
a separate peace with Holland, and strongly desiring to 
terminate the war, on January 20, 1707, Louis XIV ordered 
a French officer, Ricous, to the camp of Charles XII to ask 
for the King's mediation; but Ricous fell ill, and Jean 
Victor de Besenval was sent instead, with the same instruc- 
tions, arriving at the Swedish camp in March. 

At this juncture, Marlborough, on April 26, 1707, arrived 
from The Hague at the camp of Charles XII, to divert 
him if possible from interfering with the plans of the Grand 
Alliance. Graciously received, the English general soon 
discerned that, whatever the disposition of Charles XII 
toward Joseph I might be, as a firm Protestant the King 
of Sweden had no thought of aiding the monarch who had 
revoked the Edict of Nantes. Seeing a map of Russia spread 



THE DIPLOBCACY OF THE SPANISH SUCCESSION 299 

out on the King's table, and observing the fire in his eye Cbap. IV 
when the name of the Czar was mentioned, Marlborough's ^' ^' 

discernment reassured him that it was not the Emperor 

who had most to fear from Charles XII. Under pressure 
brought at Vienna, Joseph I soon afterward not only de- 
livered the Russian prisoners, but recalled the Austrian 
officers who had passed into the service of the Czar, and upon 
the demand of Charles XII surrendered to the Protestants 
of Silesia a hundred churches of which they had been 
deprived. 

Peter the Great, who was at the time quite ready to make The deenion 
peace with Sweden, had sought to obtain the mediation ^^)[Jj^^'^ 
of England and Holland; but those powers, not wishing RunUi 
Charles XII to be left free to attack the Emperor, pre- 
ferred to keep him occupied with Russia, and declined to 
mediate.^ 

In May, 1707, the Czar sought to approach France 
in the hope of procuring the mediation of Louis XIV. In 
Hungary the French agents had again succeeded in stirring 
up revolt against the Emperor, using Prince Rakoczy as the 
instrument of French diplomacy, and it was through Rakoczy 
that the Czar now made his appeal to France.' On Sep- 
tember 4, 1707, a treaty was entered into between the Czar 
and Rakoczy, in which the Prince was offered the crown of 
Poland as his reward if through the mediation of Louis XIV 
a favorable peace could be obtained with Charles XII.' 
In addition, the Czar promised after peace with Sweden 
was concluded to declare war upon the Emperor and to 
sustain the cause of Rakoczy in Hungary. 

In the meantime French diplomacy had not been inactive 
in trying to promote a peace between Charles XII and the 
Czar. Besenval had been instructed to propose to the 
King of Sweden a treaty of peace with Russia, and a mo- 



^ See Vaaailefif, Rtusisch-framdnsche Politik, p. 36. 

* For the negotiations, see Fiedler, AktenatUcke zur Oesckichte Franz 
Rakocgys tmd seiner Verbindungen mit dem Auslandef Vienna, 1855, I, 
p. 312. 

' For the treaty, see Fiedler, as before, I, p. 308 et seq. 



300 A HISTORY OF DIPLOBCACT 

Chap. IV mentary hope was created at Versailles that the Swedish 
^ iVis ^^^ Russian armies could be united against the Emperor. 
In order to win over Charles XII, De Solar was sent to 



urge French mediation upon him; but negotiation was found 
to be impossible. The King would not listen to the sug- 
gestion of peace until everything won from Sweden should 
be restored. In August, 1707, he had already decided upon 
the invasion of Russia. In January, 1708, he advanced 
toward Grodno, in Lithuania. On July 15, at Golowtschin, 
the Russians were beaten; but the impetuous youth was des- 
tined to learn a lesson of which he had no expectation. As 
the Russian army retreated it left for the Swedes to trav- 
erse a country so completely ravished that existence in it 
was impossible. "I will treat with the Czar in Moscow," 
was the proud boast of the King. But winter came on, the 
Cossacks clung like wolves to the flanks of his army, his 
provisions were captured or had to be destroyed to save them 
from falling into the hands of the enemy. Twelve thousand 
men were lost in one day from cold, fatigue, or wounds re- 
ceived. At Poltawa, which Charles XII attempted to be- 
siege, the Czar's troops descended upon his half starved 
and ill clothed army of thirty thousand survivors with sixty 
\ thousand men. On June 27, 1709, the army that had made 
all Europe tremble during the moment of indecision at Leip- 
zig was completely annihilated; and Charles XII, painfully 
wounded, fled to Turkey and took refuge with the Sultan. 
The effeeta of The defeat of Charles XII at Poltawa was more than a 
S^t*^"* victory for Peter the Great, it marked the beginning of a 
new era in the history of Russia and a new adjustment of 
relations in Europe. In one day Sweden transferred to 
her Muscovite rival the military prestige which she had 
enjoyed since the Thirty Years' War, and fell to the rank 
of a third-class power. Russia had upon that battlefield 
definitively entered upon the scene of European politics. 

While this victory gave Peter the Great an opportunity 
to complete the internal reforms necessary to his empire, it 
seciured the future of his new capital, St. Petersburg, and 
gave him a firm foothold on the Baltic. Stanislas Leszczin- 



THE DIPLOMACY OF THB SPANISH SUCCESSION 301 

ski, — whom Chaxles XII had made King of Poland, and Chap, iv 
who had been recognized by France, — fled to Swedish jg^l^y^r 

Pomerania, and Frederick Augustus I was restored to his 

throne. In October, 1709, the former alliance between Russia, 
Poland, and Denmark against Sweden was renewed, with 
Russia the virtual master in the North. 

The success of Peter the Great found Louis XIV at the 
lowest point of the ebb-tide of his fortunes. Since 1706 
he had been desperately striving to dissolve the coalition, 
but the "triumvirate," as it was called, — Heinsius, Marl- 
borough, and Prince Eugene of Savoy, — was inseparable 
and imconquerable. The war had proved, costly, but the 
determination to control Louis XIV was strong, and the 
resources of the allies were superior to those of France. 
The French ministers who directed the finances and organ- 
ized the French armies were not remarkable either for talent 
or for administration. The conunanding generals were often 
coiui^ favorites to whom, as Saint Simon complained, "the 
King believed he could give, as also to his ministers, capacity 
together with their commission. '' 

French diplomacy had long proved impotent, because 
it was no longer capable of making friends. To Marl- 
borough the war was both an interesting and a profitable 
occupation; Heinsius easily overcame the renewed appeals 
to cupidity with which the French agents endeavored to 
win over the Dutch merchants and shipowners; and Prince 
Eugene was winning laurels in Italy, while the pride of Vienna 
had received a wound too deep to be easily healed. 

The defeat and flight of Charles XII, with whose help 
Louis XIV had hoped to be able to retrieve his fortunes, 
were, therefore, a heavy blow to the King of France. An 
elaborate memorial by an unknown but evidently practised 
hand has come down to us,^ in which the King is advised 
to abandon all hope of Sweden and to form an alliance with 



^ This M^moire aur une nigociotion d faire pour le service du rci has 
been attributed with high probability by Rambaud to Torcy, but the 
authorship is not certain. The text may be found in Becueil dee in- 
etnieiians, VIII, Russie, p. 114 et seq. 



A. D. 

1697-1716 



302 A HISTORY OP DIPLOMACY 

Chap. IV Russia, Poland, and Denmark, to which, it is suggested, 
Brandenburg might easily be added; but, although nego- 
tiations with the Czar in a different sense were soon begun, 
this proposal did not meet with the approval of the King, 
who regarded the existence of Sweden as necessary to the 
maintenance of a balance between the powers of the North. 
Left thus without the support of a new ally, Louis XIV 
now turned his thoughts toward peace. 



Ill, The Peace op Utrecht 

Condhkms At the beginning of 1710 there were many conditions 

fmvorabk to ^hich Seemed favorable to the conclusion of peace. Since 

nM*M| m 1710 

the death of William III the stadtholderate had again been 
suspended in the United Provinces, which had revived the 
ancient republican traditions, with Heinsius as Grand Pen- 
sionary. The change had considerably affected the position 
of the Republic as a military power; for the maritime and 
commercial interests, which had been overruled under Wil- 
liam III, had again resumed their influence, and these were 
favorable to peace. 

Connected with this change in the Republic was the al- 
tered attitude of Prussia. Dying without a direct heir, 
William III had made his kinsman. Prince Friso of Nassau- 
Dietz, by his last will and testament the heir of all the pos- 
sessions of the House of Orange. In opposition to this act, 
Frederick I of Prussia claimed priority of right through 
descent from Prince Frederick Henry of Orange, the father 
of Louisa, wife of the Great Elector. Unwilling to permit 
this rich inheritance to pass to the King of Prussia, the 
States General had ignored the Brandenburg claims; and, 
as executors of the will of William III, had assumed the 
administration of his estates in so far as they were within 
their jurisdiction, and had protested against the Prussian 
occupation of Mors and lingen lying within the territories 
of the Empire. 

Dissatisfied with this treatment, and with the delays 
in paying the subsidies promised by the maritime powers. 



THE DIPLOMACY OP THE SPANISH SUCCESSION 303 

Frederick I was not less discontented with the attitude Chap, iv 
of the new emperor, Joseph I. Ambitious, energetic, and i^g^LiViK 

domineering by nature, that monarch pursued a policy in 

marked contrast with the wavering and unstable disposition 
of his father, Leopold I. Compelled to make terms with 
the victorious Charles XII in 1707, and released from fear 
of his interference by the conflict waging between Sweden 
and Russia, Joseph I had become more peremptory than be- . 
fore in his relations with his allies, offering Prussia no aid 
in its claims to the Orange inheritance, and pursuing his 
own interests with a zeal and independence that boded 
ill for the future of the alliance. Friction between the 
Dutch and the English interests also had from time to time 
strained their relations; and of this coolness Louis XIV 
had been quick to take advantage, particularly as to the 
Dutch claims for "barrier" territory, which the Republic 
was eager to occupy, but which Marlborough, for fear of 
wounding the pride of the Spanish Netherlands, was dis- 
posed to limit as much as possible. 

More than a century had passed since James YI of Scot- The union of 
land had ascended the English throne as James I, thus^^"J"^ 
forming a dynastic union of the two crowns in the person of 
the same sovereign; but the constitutional imion of the 
two countries had not been consummated until 1707. There 
had been diflicult problems to solve, religious and economic, 
and during this long period a definitive solution had not 
been found. 

While this separation continued, the danger was very 
great that a conflict of interests would not only sever the 
slender tie that bound the two crowns together, but that 
Scotland, where a pro-French party existed, might accept 
the claims of the Pretender, James Edward, and thus 
confront England with an enemy in the North. A French 
invasion of Scotland at a critical moment might conceivably 
determine the issues of the war. 

The Act of Union of May 1, 1707, was at once followed by 
a French plot to excite rebellion in Scotland and to land 
an army there. An expedition was assembled at Dunkirk 



304 A HISTORY OP DIPLOMACY 

Chap, iy with the papal blessing and the gift of a hundred thousand 

^'^' crowns from the papal treasiuy; and, on March 1, 1708, 

James Ekiward issued a proclamation charging Queen Anne 



of the I 



with being a '^ usurper/' promising amnesty to those who 
offered no resistance, and attempting to disarm the fears 
of the Presbyterians and Episcopalians regarding religion 
with equivocal promises of toleration; but the expedition 
ended in failure. 

The sole result of this misguided enterprise was to arouse 
and confirm the patriotism of England. With greater 
unity of purpose and more intense enthusiasm than before, 
the English people resolved to support the war with France. 
The diaamon Notwithstanding the new stimulation of warlike feeling 
in Elngland, the tide of influences tending toward peace had 
considerably increased. The exhaustion of France, empha- 
sized by the victories of Marlborough in the Netherlands in 
1708-1709, pressed Louis XIV toward negotiation; but, 
urgent as peace had become for the Grand Monarch, he was , 
not blind to the divisions of his foes. 

It had become clear to all that in the relations of the 
allies particular interests were prevailing over the common 
cause. In 1708 Louis XIV had obtained possession of a 
copy of a secret treaty which James Stanhope had forced 
upon the Archduke Charles, in which it was agreed that 
during the continuance of the war and after the conclusion 
of peace English merchants were to enjoy the exclusive 
privilege of sending ten ships yearly to trade with the Spanish 
colonies in America. The King of France lost no time in 
sending this document to the States General, who were thus 
made acquainted with the march their ally was stealing 
upon them. 

While this clandestine act tended to alienate the States 
General from England and prepared the way for secret 
negotiations on their part with France, the Emperor was 
widening the gulf between himself and the princes of the 
Elmpire, who bitterly complained of his course. At Vienna 
Catholic influence was powerful, and in court circles the 
question b^an to be asked if it would not be better for 



THE DIPLOMACY OF THS SPANISH SUCCESSION 305 

Joseph I to make peace with the Most Christian King and Chap, iv 
cease his alliance with heretics against him. The Emperor ^-^* 
himself had gradually come more and more imder Roman 



Catholic influence, but he was inflexible in his resolution 
to continue the war. The religious attitude of Joseph I 
did not, however, win for him the favor of the Pope, who was 
using all his power to aid France and defeat the allies. Joseph 
I was forbidden to demand taxes in Parma and Piacenza 
for the prosecution of the war, and Clement XI threatened 
with excommunication all who paid them. Charles III, as 
the Archduke now styled himself, as King of Spain demanded 
recognition in Naples, but the Pope refused it. When the 
Elmperor replied by making reprisals in the papal terri- 
tories, Clement XI, having failed to curb him with eeclesiaa- 
tical anathemas, resorted to arms in defence of his rights; 
but, receiving no support from Louis XIV, the Pope was 
soon obliged to make a formal peace with his antagonist. 

The drift of Joseph I toward Rome in religion, while it 
did not prevent opposition to the Pope in temporal affairs^ 
occasioned serious personal defections among the Prot- 
estant princes of Germany, who feared a revival of the 
Hapsburg pretensions to sovereign authority in the Empire 
based upon the idea of religious unity. 

In addition to the defections from the Emperor's cause 
in Germany, the maritime powers regarded with distrust 
the growing power of Joseph I in Italy, while he gave so 
little support to the military operations in Spain. The 
Duke of Savoy was dissatisfied with the limited lot which 
the Elmperor assigned him in the Italian peninsula, and was 
at the same time jealous of the progress England was making 
in the Mediterranean, where Gibraltar and Port Mahon 
were retained as military and naval bases for the sole bene- 
fit of the British Empire. Finally, Portugal, deriving little 
profit from the war, was seeking a private understanding 
with France. 

No man of his time combined in equal d^ree the military The dipiommtio 
genius and the conciliatory temper of the Duke of Marl- ^^Jj^^ ^ 
borough. Almost equally great in war and diplomacy, the 

VOL. ra. — 20 



306 A HISTORY OP DIPLOMACY 

Chap. IV hero of Blenheim clearly comprehended the dissolution of 
1807-^715 *^® Grand Alliance that was impending, and foresaw the 

consequences that would follow to the advantage of 

Louis XIV.i 

The desertion of the common cause by the United Prov- 
inces would have been a deathblow to the coalition, and 
of this there was real danger; for Heinsius had been for some 
time in secret communication with Versailles through Pet- 
kum, the resident minister of the Duke of Holstein-Gottorp 
at The Hague.* To prevent this desertion, in March, 1709, 
Marlborough Was appointed a conmiissioner to negotiate 
with Holland a treaty by which Elngland would secure 
Dutch support in the matter of the Protestant succession 
in exchange for the aid of England in obtaining for the 
Republic the coveted ''barrier" against France. 

The need for a new agreement between England and 
Holland had become imperative; for Louis XIV had ahnost 
incessantly endeavored to make approaches to Heinsius for 
the purpose of a private understanding. Nothing but the 
firmness of the Grand Pensionary had stood in the way of 
his success. The inclinations of the commercial classes, who 
had suffered much from the war, were as usual pacific; 
but, as one of the French emissaries remarked, **C*itaU 
un opSra d^approcher ce ministreP' 

On March 5, 1709, Rouill^, President of the Parliament 
of Paris, was sent by Louis XIV to Holland to offer the 
abandonment of the whole Spanish monarchy by Philip V, 
with the exception of Naples and Sicily, and the cession 
of Ypres and Menin to the Dutch as a barrier, if the States 
General would make peace. The Dutch agents who met 
him were, however, not disposed to accept this bait. Later 

^ Since 1703 Marlborough had been secretly endeavoring to negotiate 
a peace advantageous to England through correspondence with Ber- 
wick, a natural son of James II, who had married Marlborough's sister, 
Arabella Churchill, and entered into the military service of France. 
For the correspondence, which extended over five years but came to 
nothing, see Lc^elle, La dipUmatiefrangaiaej etc., V, pp. 664, 680. 

" The correspondence of Petkum is printed in Appendix V of the 
Fourteenth Report of the Historical MSS. Commission, pp. 317, 366. 



THE DIPLOMACY OF THE SPANISH SUCCESSION 307 

even larger concessions were offered. It seemed as if the Chap, rv 
Grand Monarch were at last upon his knees begging for ,«^*^7ig 
peace with the Dutch Republic.^ 

On May 18, Marlborough arrived at The Hague, where the 
French minister of foreign affairs had ahready been sent by 
Louis XrV to reinforce the persuasion of Bouill6. We have 
from the hand of Torcy himself striking portraits of his two 
antagonists: Marlborough, elegant in manner, fascinating 
in speech, apologetic for the attitude of his country, in- 
sinuating and captivating, appealing to noble and lofty 
sentiments, and carefully concealing the advantages he 
hoped to win; on the other hand, Heinsius, direct and 
straightforward, simple in speech, and sturdy in support- 
ing the right of the Republic to adequate means of defence. 

Believing that every man has his price, Louis XIV en- 
deavored to use bribes, ofifering two million livres each for 
the concession of Naples, the retention of Strasburg, and the 
maintenance of the fortifications at Dunkirk. But Marl- 
borough, whose character was in his time bitterly attacked, 
and who was certainly not faultless, as well as Heinsius, re- 
fused to be bought. On the other hand, the zeal of Torcy 
had revealed the weakness of France and the discourage- 
ment of the humbled king, who with his own hand had 
written his approval on his minister's instructions.* 

Marlborough won a victory for England in holding the Hoiund dio- 
United Provinces to the alliance, but he had in reality over- ^^^ 
shot the mark. It was Heinsius who now, in the name of peaoe 
the Republic, drew up a series of preliminaries to a peace, 
forty in number, which treated Louis XIV as an utterly pros- 
trate foe. For England this document demanded the rec- 
ognition of the Protestant succession, the destruction of 
Dunkirk, the cession of Newfoundland, the expulsion of the 
Pretender from France, and a favorable treaty of commerce. 
For itself the Republic demanded of France the cession out- 
right of seven towns, including Lille. All the places which 



1 For the details of the negotiations, see L^relle, La diplomatie franr 
gaUe, etc., V, pp. 446, 465. 
" The details are fully given by Torcy, in his Mhnoirea, I. 



308 A HISTORY OF DIPLOBiACT 

Chap. IV had been taken from the Spanish Netherlands were to be 
I6d7-i7i5 surrendered, and either to be occupied as barriers or delivered 

to Charles III as King of Spain. A part of Spanish Gelder- 

land was to be annexed by the Republic, and the reduc- 
tions of the French tariff oif 1664 on Dutch goods were to be 
restored. French trade with the West Indies was to be pro- 
hibited, and such additional concessions were to be granted 
to the other allies as might be determined by a congress to 
be called for the conclusion of a general peace. The King 
of France was to obtain the entire abandonment of the 
Spanish monarchy by Philip V to Charles III within two 
months from June 1, 1709. The thirty-seventh article even 
required Louis XIV, in case of resistance, to furnish the 
allies with French troops for the purpose of enforcing these 
conditions upon Spain. 

As might have been foreseen, these drastic demands, 
handed to the French plenipotentiaries on May 22, 1709, 
awakened deep resentment in France. On Jime 2 Bouill6 
was ordered to leave The Hague, whence Torcy had ahready 
departed, and all of Louis XIV's offers were recalled. 
The Ajicio- Marlborough's success in reviving the interest of Holland 

^it^Barner j^ ^j^^ Grand Alliance had been prociured by the promise 
of aid in obtaining the barrier cities for the protection of 
the Republic, but it was not without reluctance on the part 
of England that this concession had been made; for the 
Dutch, once masters of the frontiers of the Spanish Nether- 
lands, might easily close them to British trade. English 
policy was, therefore, to restrict their number as far as 
possible; while Dutch policy, on the other hand, was to 
obtain the greatest available increase of protection for the 
Republic. 

Charles Townshend, whom Marlborough left at The Hague 
to complete the Barrier Treaty, had, therefore, a difficult 
task before him; for, in addition to the disclosmre regarding 
the secret commercial treaty of England with the Archduke 
Charles, ahready referred to, it was discovered that, in August, 
1709, another secret treaty had been forced upon the Arch- 
duke, by which the island of Minorca had been formally 



THE DIPLOMACY OF THE SPANISH SUCCESSION 309 

ceded to Great Britain. Heinsius denounced this second Chap, iv 
treaty as a grave violation of the terms of the Grand ^^^^' 
Alliance, and accused England of bad faith. 



While Marlborough was declaring that he would never 
sign a treaty which accorded all that the Dutch demanded 
in their claims for a barrier, Heinsius was so deeply offended 
by the secret negotiations with Spain that Townshend was 
compelled to make new concessions in order to appease him; 
with the result that the Barrier Treaty of October 29, 1709, 
between Great Britain and the United Provinces granted to 
the Dutch the right to occupy and fortify some twenty bor- 
der towns in the Spanish Netherlands, and to close the 
Scheldt, — to the great injury of British conunerce, as well 
as to that of Flanders, — together with the promise of Eng- 
lish support of the Dutch claims in Spanish Gelderland, and 
other important advantages. In return England obtained 
no benefit, except the promise of the Republic to require 
as a condition of peace that Louis XTV should recognize 
the rightful title of Queen Anne and the Protestant succes- 
sion, which was really no concession but an ahnost nec- 
essary part of Dutch policy.^ 

Townshend had, in fact, imder the pressure of circum- 
stances, exceeded his instructions; and at first the coimcil 
of British ministers refused to ratify the treaty. But Hein- 
sius, who believed he had obtained by it the predominant 
influence of Holland in the future settlement with France, 
was firm in his insistence; and, in the face of violent denun- 
ciation in England, the treaty was ratified. 

The success of Holland in forcing upon England dispro- Eifeeu of 
portionate concessions, like that of England in securing ^^ ^^^ 
by secret treaties exclusive advantages from Spain, illus- •iiian« 
trates the impolitic character of such short-sighted pro- 
cedmre; for no treaty of this kind is likely to be of substantial 
and lasting benefit unless it creates mutual satisfaction. 
The evil consequences of all these separate agreements were 
soon apparent. Instead of drawing England and Holland 
closer together, the Barrier Treaty, being unequal, drove 

1 For the treaty, see Dumont, VIII, Part I, p. 243 et seq. 



310 A HISTORY OP DIPLOBiACY 

Chap. IV them farther apart; for the British ministry at once began 
1697-^715 ^ think of establishing a better balance by demanding 
concessions in other matters to compensate the private bene- 
fits afforded to their ally. On the other hand, the apparently 
closer intimacy of the two maritime powers, each of which 
seemed to be acquiring special advantages with the conni- 
vance of the other, awakened the jealousy of the other mem- 
bers of the Grand Alliance, who seemed to be left out of the 
bargain. Prussia resented the action of England in favoring 
the Dutch acquisition of Spanish Gelderland, which Fred- 
erick I coveted; the other German princes saw no prospect 
of corresponding benefits; and Portugal was alarmed by the 
progress of the two rival sea powers, especially England's 
strong foothold in the Mediterranean. When, in addition 
to the Anglo-Dutch arrangements between themselves, 
the demands made of Louis XIV by the two powers in the 
forty articles were made known, all the allies, perceiving to 
what extent their private expectations had been disap- 
pointed, relaxed their interest in the contest. At the end 
of 1709 the bond between the maritime powers was, there- 
fore, far less strong than it seemed, and the Grand Alliance 
as a whole had suffered a serious relapse. 
Theaeeratra. At the beginning of 1710 the only obstacle to an early 
ports of Fst- peace was the mistaken idea that it could be concluded 
upon the terms dictated m the forty preliminary articles al- 
ready mentioned. Although Louis XIV had rejected these 
demands and recalled his plenipotentiaries from The Hague^ 
he abandoned the negotiations with reluctance. The defeat 
of Charles XII of Sweden at Poltawa had ended all hope 
of aid from the North, and he was prepared to make all 
reasonable sacrifices. Heinsius was fully aware of the 
Grand Monarch's extreme exhaustion, and the situation 
of France was further affected by the evident disposition 
of Philip V to make a separate peace with the allies.^ 

Notwithstanding the poverty of his treasury, the harsh 
terms imposed upon him, and the danger of isolation by the 
desertion of Spain, Louis XIV bravely resisted the effort 

^ See Legrelle, La diplomatie francaise, etc., V, p. 479. 



THE DIPLOMACY OF THE SPANISH SUCCESSION 311 

to administer to him the humiliation proix>sed by the thirty- Chap, rsr 
seventh article of the Anglo-Dutch demands. He negotiated .f^^^^.t^ 

with the Jewish money lenders, sent the ornaments of the 

palace to the mint, and prepared to pawn the jewels of the 
crown to meet the expenses of further resistance.^ In 
the meantime diplomacy, which after the rupture at The 
Hague could no longer operate openly, continued to seek for 
better conditions of peace through secret and subterranean 
channels. Use was again made of the obscure but indefati- 
gable Petkimi, who oscillated more or less in the shadow 
between Heinsius and Torcy. The French minister was 
prepared for almost any concession, if Heinsius would 
only retract the demand that the King of France should 
turn his arms against his grandson to expel him from the 
throne of Spain, in opposition to the wishes of the Spanish 
people, and enforce the succession of the Archduke Charles. 
This was a humiliation to which the King, no matter what 
the consequences, could never give his consent. 

Notwithstanding the stolid insistence of Heinsius and 
the States General that the preliminaries dictated at The 
Hague be accepted as the basis of peace, on January 3, 1710, 
Torcy sent from Versailles, with the approval of the King 
and his Council, a counter-project composed of five articles. 

In the meantime, further soundings of the disposition of 
the Repubhc toward peace were taken by the interme- 
diation of a merchant of Ypres named Florisson, whose 
Dutch origin conmiended him for such a secret mission. 
Florisson was received by Heinsius with coolness; but 
through this medium it was learned at Versailles that five 
of the provinces had not approved of the demands so deeply 
hmniliating to Louis XIV, and that article thirty-seven might 
be open to revision. On January 27, however, Petkmn 
reported that nothing could be changed in the preliminaries 
of May 22, except perhaps the demand that Louis XIV 
should promise, if necessary, to use force against his grand- 



^ Discontent in France was at this time so great that bread riots were 
frequent, and th^ statues of the King were plastered with iosulting 
placards; while his life was threatened in anonymous letters. 



312 A HISTORY OP DIPLOMACY 

Chap, iy son; adding that in this sense the negotiations might be 

1607-1715 resumed. 

The situation of France was now desperate. The kingdom, 

in spite of all the sacrifices made and new taxes imposed, 
The oonfeiw possessed neither money nor credit. The army was in a 
^^J^^^ condition of distress, and Villars was regarded as the only 
general capable of commanding it. Unless an unexpected 
victory could be won in the field, France was at the mercy 
of her enemies. 

In these circumstances the Abb^ de Polignac, a suave 
and persuasive ecclesiastic, and Marshal d'Huxelles, a 
taciturn but imposing soldier, were chosen as plenipoten- 
tiaries to open negotiations for peace. 

On February 15, it was learned at Versailles that all 
the articles except the thirty-seventh must be accepted as 
final before further negotiations could begin. It was, 
therefore, "to treat of article thirty-seven" that the pleni- 
potentiaries started on their journey to meet the Dutch 
agents, Buys and Van der Dussen, on March 9, 1710, in 
the little village of Gertruydenberg near Dordrecht. 

The discussion between the four plenipotentiaries b^an 
with the assumption on the part of the Dutch representa- 
tives that, since Louis XIV possessed absolutely no right 
to the Spanish succession, he was responsible for all the 
cost and inconvenience that had resulted from his deter- 
mination to exclude the rightful heir, Charles III; to which 
the French envoys replied that, since the United Provinces 
had signed two partition treaties which recognized the rights 
of the House of Bourbon, it was too late to consider the asser- 
tion that Louis XFV possessed no right whatever in the mat- 
ter of the Spanish succession. At this point, Buys asserted 
that it was useless to discuss article thirty-seven; since it 
was substantially implied in article four of the preliminaries, 
to which the King of France had already assented. To this 
the French envoys answered, that, since they had met to 
discuss and modify article thirty-seven, it was impossible 
to admit that it had already been substantially accepted; 
or even any part of the preliminaries, which were to serve as 



THE DIPLOBIACY OF THE SPANISH SUCCESSION 313 

a basis of peace only upon condition that an agreement Chap, iv 
should be reached regarding the form of the article in dispute. i^otL^Vis 



It is unnecessary to follow in detail the long and tedious - 
negotiations in which a determination to impose upon France 
the humiliation of expelling the grandson of Louis XIV — The re}eoti<m 
who had ah^ady been recognized by the United Provinces ^^l^ ^^^^^ 
as the legitimate king of Spain — was met by the moral 
impossibiUty of accepting such a task. The French pleni- 
potentiaries offered to renounce all compensation on the part 
of France, and finally Torcy went to the extreme length 
of proposing the grant of liberal subsidies to the allies to 
enable them, in case of resistance, to compel the abdication 
of Philip V. The King and the Dauphin assented to it; 
and on June 5, the King of France wrote personally to his 
envojrs, instructing them as a last resort, in order to re- 
store peace to Europe, to present this offer to the Dutch 
deputies. 

On Jime 23, the deputies still showing no signs of re- 
lenting, Louis XIV sent to his envoys their final instructions. 
The monthly subsidy offered to aid the allies in dethroning 
Philip V was raised from five hundred thousand to a million 
livres; Valenciennes would be ceded to Holland, if the 
Dutch would renounce further demands in behalf of their 
allies; Alsace, with the exception of Belfort, should be given 
to the Duke of Lorraine, on condition that the fortifications 
were to be destroyed; every claim of compensation to 
Philip V was abandoned; only the restoration of their estates 
to the Electors of Koln and Bavaria was required. These 
conditions were stubbornly declined. The deputies insisted 
imperatively on the execution of article thirty-seven within 
two months, and on July 25 PoUgnac and Huxelles retiimed 
to France. 

The Dutch burghers seemed for the moment to be having Secret negotia- 
their revenge for the hmniliation of 1672, and peace appeared e°°ui^*I^° 
to be farther off than ever. By the end of 1710 the vie- Franoe 
tories of Venddme in Spain and the political changes in 
England had, however, completely altered the situation. 
The battle of Villaviciosa, fought on December 10, 1710, 



314 A HISTORY OP DIPLOBiACY 

Chap. IV proved that it was not in the power of the allies to expel 
1697-1715 ^^^P ^ ^^^™ Spain; while the weakening of Marlborough's 

influence at court, the dismissal of his relatives Godolphin 

and Sunderland from the government, and the ascendency of 
the Tories over the Whigs in the English elections revealed 
a situation advantageous to the interests of France. 

After being for twenty-two years in the minority, the 
Tories, who had opposed the war, were again supreme in 
England; and the Duchess of Marlborough no longer enjoyed 
the intimacy and confidence of the Queen. The time had 
come when England could be approached by Louis XIV in 
the hope of tempering the harsh terms that Marlborough 
and Heinsius had imposed upon him. 

Although the new ministry under Robert Harley, Earl 
of Oxford, was eager to end the war and have an understand- 
ing with France, the situation in England did not permit of 
the summary dismissal of a popular hero like Marlborough 
or of a sudden defection from the Grand Alliance. By means 
of an obscure person, the Abb^ Gaultier, who had been as 
a priest attached to the French embassy during the mission 
of Tallard in- London, communications were opened be- 
tween the Earl of Jersey and other members of the Catholic 
party in England and Torcy, by which the French minister 
was assured of Harley 's disposition to make peace with 
France.^ The rdle of mediation in the pacification of 
Europe thus passed from The Hague to London; and, on 
January 21, 1711, Gaultier was able to present to Torcy at 
Versailles the suggestion of a plan for peace with England 
which, he represented, would undermine and destroy the 
Grand Alliance.* 
Th« death of On April 17, 1711, occiuTed an event which altered 
kflomoouKwes *^^ entire situation regarding the Spanish succession. The 
death of the Elmperor, Joseph I, gave the throne of the 



^ Gatdtler's first secret despatch to Torcy is dated December 18, 
1710. 

' The outline of the plan originated in England, but was made to 
appear to come from France. See Weber, Der Friede van Utrecht, pp. 
32, 34; and Courcy, La caalUion de 1701, I, pp. 269, 273. 



THE DIPLOMACY OF THE SPANISH SUCCESSION 315 

Hapsburgs to the Archduke Charles. From that moment Chap, iv 
insistence upon the Austrian right to the crown of Spain jg^.^y^g 

would be equivalent to a demand for the reconstitution of the 

Hapsburg predominance in Europe. This was almost as 
objectionable as the complete imion of France and Spain. 
In the name of European equilibrium, therefore, a change 
of policy was now justifiable. 

While the death of Joseph I thus withdrew from the 
Archduke Charles the support which the maritime powers 
had given him in his aspiration for the throne of Spain, it 
gave occasion to Louis XIV to oppose his accession to the 
Elmpire. To prevent the perpetuation of the Hapsburg 
dynasty in the imperial office, the Grand Monarch declared 
himself in favor of Frederick Augustus, Elector of Saxony 
and King of Poland, as the successor of Joseph I. 

To promote this candidacy, and in the hope of making 
himself a mediator in securii^ the pacification of the North 
and the rehabilitation of Sweden, Louis XIV entered into 
negotiations with Peter the Great, at the same time send- 
ing an envoy to Warsaw to offer his support in the imperial 
election to the King of Poland. 

In July, 1710, at the instigation of Louis XIV, the Sul- 
tan had declared war on Russia; and the knowledge of 
this fact had so offended the Czar that he had ignored the 
direct and indirect approaches of France.^ But at this 
time Peter the Great was anxious to sectire French mediation 
with Turkey; and, in June, 1711, Gregor Volkoff was sent to 
Paris to request this service. Louis XIV was ready to offer 
it, but upon terms which the Czar could not accept: (1) 
Russian aid to the Hungarians; (2) the Czar's opposition 
to the election of the Archduke Charles and his support of 
the King of Poland; and (3) intervention to obtain the 
recall of the Danish and Saxon troops serving as mercena- 
ries to the allies. In addition to these demands, Louis XIV 
was eager to restore Charles XII, then a fugitive at Bender, 
to his kingdom, and to make peace between him and Peter 

^ See the account of the missions of Baluze and Vet^ in Vassileff, 
Bu88i8ch'framdn8che Poliiik, pp. 49, 52. 



316 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY 

Chap. IV the Great. But all these enterprises failed. On July 21, 

1697-1715 ^^^^' **^® ^^^ signed a peace with Turkey without the aid 

of French mediation, and Volkoflf was recalled. Frederick 



Augustus did not bestir himself for the mediation with the 
Grand Alliance which Louis XIV expected of him; and, on 
October 12, 1711, the Archduke was elected Emperor to 
succeed his brother, with the title of Charles VI.^ 
Progrewofthe In the meantime the secret negotiations between Louis 
n^rdiiSM** XIV and England were making astonishing progress. 
Through the correspondence between Gaultier and Torcy it 
was known at Versailles that England was ready to make 
peace, if Louis XIV would erect a barrier satisfactory to Hol- 
land and the Empire; invest the Duke of Savoy with the 
places the allies had promised him; recognize Queen Anne 
as the legitimate sovereign of Great Britain, and accept 
the Protestant succession; demolish the port and fortifica- 
tions of Dunkirk; concede to England the permanent pos- 
session of Gibraltar, Port Mahon, Newfoimdland, and 
Hudson's Bay, with most favored nation treatment by 
Spain; and renounce the "Asiento,"* or French monopoly 
of the slave-trade. 

Owing to the ilhiess of Harley, at. the end of July, 1711, 
the negotiations fell into the hands of Henry St. John, — 
afterward created Viscount Bolingbroke, — then secretary 
of state for the Northern Department, a man of quick 
intelligence, astute character, and undeveloped conscience, 
who was destined to play the leading part in the conclusion 
of peace.* 
Matthew Prior, who had been secretly sent to Paris to 



^ See Recueil des instructions, VIII, Russie, p. 128; and Pologne, I^ 
p. LXIV. 

« The word "Asiento" is the Spanish for "treaty," but applies spe- 
cifically to the slave-trade, of which France had been given a monopoly. 

* There was in England no Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in 
the proper sense until March 27, 1782. Foreign policy was practically 
in the hands of the Prime Minister, the details being carried out since 
1539 by two Secretaries of State, at the head of the Northern and the 
Southern Departments, as they were called, and usually jealous of each 
other. 



THE DIPLOMACY OF THE SPANISH SUCCESSION 317 

explain the English demands to Torcy, after an animated Chap. IV 
discussion of the terms of peace, in the beginning of August, ^- ^' 

1711, returned to London with the assurance of an entente. 

From this time on the negotiations assumed a more open 
and official character, and Nicolas Manager, deputy of 
Rouen in the Coimcil of Commerce, on account of his ex- 
pert knowledge of commercial affairs, having assisted at 
Gertruydenberg, was sent with Gaultier to London to 
arrange preliminaries. 

Li England the question was now gravely asked, For The pnpon- 
what had the war been carried on with so much sacrifice? iJI^J*'!^^^ 
The nation had spent a hundred million pounds sterling 
in battling with France. St. John answered: "To win the 
Spanish inheritance for the Hapsburgers; to conquer a pro- 
tecting barrier against France for the States General; and 
to secure English commerce." 

Stated in this manner, the folly of longer continuing the 
war was self-evident; for it was known that there was no ad- 
vantage to England in placing the Archduke Charles on the 
throne of Spain, if he were to be likewise Emperor, that a 
satisfactory barrier could be secured for the Dutch, and 
that English commerce and colonies were not at the time 
greatly endangered by France. St. John's statement was 
meant as an argument for peace and as a reproach to the 
Whigs, who, he claimed, had carried on the war in their 
own commercial and financial interest. 

But so summary an answer did not quite truly state the 
case. England had been menaced by the prospect of a close 
union between France and Spain, by consequent exclusion 
from the commerce of the world, and by the disturbance of 
that balance between the powers of Europe upon which the 
safety, and even the independence, of England depended. 
Opposition to Louis XIV's dynastic ambitions had, there- 
fore, been a necessary policy for the welfare of the English 
people. 

But the time had now come when war seemed no longer 
advantageous, and peace was earnestly desired. It was felt 
in England that the preliminary articles in which Heinsius 



318 A HISTOBT OF DIPLOMACY 

Chap, iv had dictated the terms of peace were too severe. In seek- 
ifigT-Tris ^ ^ modify them, therefore, the Tory government was 



. undoubtedly acting in what it believed to be the best interest 
of the country. As for the allies, circumstances had changed; 
and all of them were either accused or suspected of making 
private arrangements with France to their own advantage.^ 
The iiMtruo- The coucessious which Louis XIV was at this time ready 
^^^ to make were already well known by the English ministry. 
They were officially and formally stated in the instructions 
to Manager of August 3, 1711. First of all, the recognition 
of Philip V as King of Spain would be required. The Treaty 
of Ryswick would form the basis of an understanding with the 
Empire; Breisach and Kehl would be surrendered by France, 
and the Rhine would become the frontier; the electors of 
Bavaria and Eolnwouldbe re-established in their possessions; 
France would retain Lille, Toumai, Aire, B^thime, Douai, 
Ypres, and Cond^; the Emperor Charles VI would have Sar- 
dinia, Sicily, and Naples; the Duke of Savoy would be 
assigned Milan. The question regarding the demolition of 
Dunkirk was to be postponed as long as possible, but Eng- 
land would receive Gibraltar, with entire freedom of com- 
merce in all Spanish ports and the privilege of the '' Asiento"; 
Newfoundland, if necessary, would be ceded, with the 
reservation of a French right to catch and dry fish upon 
its &ores, but not Nova Scotia. 

At the end of August, Manager and Gaultier were in the 
full tide of bargaining with the English negotiators at 
London, consisting of Harley, — who had then become 
Lord Oxford, — Shrewsbury, St. John, Dartmouth, and 
Jersey, with Matthew Prior as secretary. 

To block the proceedings, the Whigs, who, although 
no longer in power, wished to urge the further prosecution 
of the war, started the tale that the negotiations were at 
bottom intended to secure the royal succession to the Pre- 
tender; and that even Queen Anne, who had long counte- 
nanced the idea that James Edward's birth was illegitimate, 

^ See a summary of these accusations in Sichel, BoUngbroke and Hi9 
Times, I, pp. 330, 335. 



THE DIPLOMACY OF THE SPANISH SUCCESSION 319 

had developed an affection for him and secretly hoped for Chap, iv 
his final recognition. The participation of Jersey, an ar- ^q^^{j^^ 

dent Jacobite, in the negotiations for peace, gave color to 

this construction; and certain misguided adherents of the 
Pretender undoubtedly expected that peace with France 
would be followed by the desired restoration.^ 

Upon one point the mind of Louis XIV was now fixed, The wmoiu- 
— Philip V must remain King of Spain. At Gertruyden- ^KmiMuies 
berg he had been ready to abandon his grandson, even to 
furnish financial aid in forcing his abdication; but the strong 
desire of England for peace had revived his hopes, and he 
was no longer willing to make sacrifices without compen- 
sating concessions. 

So far as the English commissioners were concerned, it 
was St. John who was the soul of the negotiations. His 
one constant thought was to obtain commercial advantage 
and colonial expansion for England; for it was only by ma- 
terial gains in this direction that he could hope to justify 
the Tory leadership in concluding a peace with France. 
As for the allies, their interests would be considered in the 
congress that would be called when the Anglo-French 
preliminaries were concluded; and beyond mere prelim- 
inaries neither St. John nor Manager intended at that time 
to go. When St. John for strategic effect declared that the 
Queen was unwilling to make peace with a power that 
harbored the Pretender, the French agent replied, that 
they were not negotiating a peace, but merely the condi- 
tions of a peace to be determined by a future congress in 
which such questions could be properly regulated; and this 
reply was accepted.* 

On October 8, after the preliminaries had been elab- 
orated, altered, rejected, and finally under the pressure of 
St. John accepted, three docmnents were signed: the first 
containing the special advantages to be secured by Eng- 
land; the second a general article regarding the treatment 

1 See Sichel, BoUnghroke and His Times, I, pp. 335, 356. 
* With the death of Lord Jersey on September 6, the influenoe oper- 
ating in the interest of James Edward seems to have disappeared. 



320 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY 

Chap. IV to be accorded to the allies; and the third relating to the 

16^^-4715 ^^® ^^ Savoy.* 

The first document, kept strictly secret, bound the King 



of France to make the concessions which England had de- 
manded as conditions of peace; and, to deceive the Whigs, 
specifically declared that the initiative in the negotiations 
had been taken by the King of France. Manager, after 
passing by ''deserted staircases imder the guidance of dis- 
creet servitors," was received in private audience by the 
Queen and assured by her of her personal interest in con- 
cluding peace; and on the fourteenth returned to France 
with the preliminaries duly signed, leaving Gaultier in 
London. 

The second and third documents alone were intended to 
be shown to the allies. Lord StraflFord was sent to Hol- 
land to explain the situation; but the States General mani- 
fested their discontent with the indefinite character of the 
satisfaction proposed for the Republic and for the other 
members of the Grand Alliance. 
The naoMsity The problem now was to induce the States General, the 
^j^^*^*^ Duke of Savoy, the King of Prussia, and the Elector of 
Hanover to participate in a congress for concluding peace. 
Torcy was rather pleased than otherwise with the dissatis- 
faction of the States General; for he now hoped to be able 
to conclude a separate peace with England, and on Novem- 
ber 2 made a proposal to this effect. But the English 
ministry were not prepared to face the country with the 
total abandonment of their allies. The Imperial ambassa- 
dor, Count Gallas, had aheady indignantly withdrawn 
from the court; the friendship of the Dutch, of the German 
princes, and of the Duke of Savoy was too valuable to be 
thrown away; and even the further offer on the part of Louis 
XIV to demolish the port and fortifications of Dimkirk 
without compensation was not sufficient to induce a total 
desertion of the allies. Without their assent it was in- 
expedient to recognize Philip V as King of Spain, and at this 

^ For the details of the negotiation, see Weber, Der Friede von 
Utrechiy pp. 45, 58. 



▲. D. 

1697-1715 



THE DIPLOMACY OF THE SPANISH SUCCESSION 321 

price accept the concessions offered to England. Peace Chap. iv 
for England was to be desired, but consideration for the 
allies was also necessary. The question was how far that 
consideration should go and what form it should take. 
St. John's hatred of Austria, his fear of the commercial 
rivalry of Holland,, and his indifference to the fortunes 
of the German princes rendered it certain that this con- 
sideration would go no farther than necessity required. 

As early as April, 1711, St. John had instructed the 
English ambassador at The Hague to inform Heinsius that 
the English ministers were engaged in trying to arrange pre- 
liminaries of peace with France; but the interests of the 
Republic, it was assured, would be carefully considered, 
and the Grand Pensionary was given to understand that 
Holland must trust to the Queen's loyalty and follow in 
England's wake. 

The adherence of Holland to England's programme was, 
in fact, necessary to its success. The constant endeavor 
to secure it, while stoutly asserting that no private and 
special advantages were being sought, sufficiently proves 
how essential the English ministry regarded it. But the. 
desire to go forward with the assent, if not with the inward 
approval, of Holland was not inspired by the sense of com- 
plete solidarity between the two countries that had pre- 
vailed in the last years of William III. In truth, they had 
become rivals rather than partners. Dutch policy was en- 
tirely actuated by the exigencies of commerce; and, as has 
been said, ''varied according to the most profitable direction 
in which to ship barrels of herring and sacks of coffee." 
If the English deceived the Dutch with regard to the advan- 
tages they were secretly obtaining from France, the Dutch 
statesmen were equally anxious to resmne secret negotia- 
tions for their own benefit with Louis XIV. In fact, the 
coalition was dissolving, as all coalitions in the end dissolve, 
because it was believed to be no longer advantageous to 
continue it. 

The chief interest of Holland lay in the execution of 
the Barrier Treaty of 1709 with England, but St. John 

VOL. m.— 21 



322 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY 

Chap, iy contended that circumstances had changed since it was 
1607 T715 concluded, and that so extensive a barrier as had then been 

promised would be prejudicial to the other allies. Still, 

ran the correspondence, Holland should have her barrier; 
The raiationfl but to get it shc must make peace upon terms agreeable 
^^^^^^ to England. The congress would be held in any one of four 
cities, two of them Dutch, which France might prefer;^ 
but it must be held quickly, or the war would have to go on, 
in which England could not longer bear the principal burden. 

When, on December 22, 1711, the treaty of friendship 
and alliance was renewed between England and the United 
Provinces, its omissions marked the coolness which had 
developed between them. There was no confirmation of the 
Barrier Treaty of 1709. The alliance was, indeed, nominally 
renewed; but it was no longer really cordial. England had 
taken the Republic in tow, and the period of Holland's 
subordination had begun. 

The date for the opening of the peace congress was fixed 
for January 12, 1712, at Utrecht, and accepted by France. 
On December 17 the Parliament assembled, and the Queen, 
in high state, in her address from the throne announced 
her continued adherence to the Grand Alliance, her inten- 
tion to obtain ''reasonable satisfaction" for the allies or to 
continue the war, and the arrival of the plenipotentiaries 
at Utrecht; she then left the House of Lords, in which the 
Parliament was assembled, returning inmiediately after- 
ward incognito to hear the debate, in which Lord Notting- 
ham declared that ''no peace could be secure and honorable 
which left Spain and the Lidies to the Bourbons!" 

The effect was electric. The preliminaries, although they 
had not specifically pledged the ministry to the continuance 
of Philip y as King of Spain, were really based upon that 
assmnption. 

As a counterpoise, resolutions were passed by the min- 
istry in the House of Commons denoimcing in turn the short- 
comings of each of the allies, condemning the Barrier Treaty 

^ The four cities propoeed were Nymwegen, Utrecht, Li^, and 
Aix-lflrChapelle. 



THE DIPLOMACY OF THE SPANISH SUCCESSION 323 

of 1709 as "destructive to the trade and interests of Great Chap, iv 
Britain, " and flaying Townshend and the ministry that had ^* ^• 
negotiated the treaty as "enemies of the Kingdom." 



The Congress for the conclusion of peace at Utrecht, 
after ten days spent in fixing the ceremonial, opened on opening of 
January 29, 1712. England was represented by Dr. John ^u^X" 
Robinson, Bishop of Bristol, who had resided thirty-six 
years at the Scandinavian courts and had mediated peace 
between Sweden and Denmark; and Lord Strafford, ambas- 
sador at The Ha^e, described by St. John as "wn seigneur 
propre a hrusquer une entreprise comme un colonel de dragons." 
Prior was named as third plenipotentiary, but was retained 
at Paris. For France appeared Marshal d'Huxelles, the 
Abb^ Polignac, and Manager. Each of the seven States of 
the United Provinces had one representative, — except 
Holland, which had two, — of whom Van der Dussen and 
Buys were the best known and most prominent in the 
conferences. The Emperor had declared that, until he 
was assured that the preliminaries arranged in London 
were not binding, and were not prejudicial to the allies, 
he could not participate in the Congress. The Portuguese 
envoy at The Ha^e announced that he had received no 
mandate regarding the conclusion of peace. The repre- 
sentatives of Prussia and Savoy said the same, but added 
that they would probably soon receive orders to go to 
Utrecht. The resident ministers of Saxony, Hesse, and the 
other German princes asserted that they must wait upon the 
decision of the Emperor. 

Thus the conferences began at Utrecht with only two 
members of the Grand Alliance represented; but, it having 
been agreed in the first session that the London prehmina- 
ries were binding only upon France, and not upon the aUies, 
early in February Zinzendorf, the Imperial ambassador at 
The Hague, and his colleague. Von Consbriich, together 
with the representatives of the German princes, appeared 
at Utrecht.^ 



1 A full list of the plenipotentiaries is given by Vast, Lea grands 
IraiUs, III, pp. 44, 45. 



324 A HISTORY OP DIPLOMACY 

Chap, iy The ceremonial had already been agreed upon, and such 
f:_^* momentous questions as the kind of carriage, the number of 

horses, and the staff of servants to be allowed to each pleni- 
potentiary having been settled, it was decided that all 
were to enter the conference room at the same time, and 
seat themselves without distinction. But Zinzendorf, 
who had come more with the intention of hindering than 
promoting an understanding, insisted that, as the represent- 
ative of the Emperor, he must have precedence over all, 
and that Charles VI should at once be formally recognized 
as Emperor. To this the French would not listen. The 
E!nglish and the Dutch also felt scandalized by such pre- 
tensions. In the meantime all further proceedings were 
blocked, until it was agreed that the allies should be re- 
ferred to only in general terms imtil the question of the 
Emperor's title was determined. 

Theinrtruo- The positious of the powers in the Congress and the 
^^ aims and motives of their representatives can be best under- 

stood by a brief simmiary of their official instructions. 

The English ministry desired an immediate conclusion 
of a general peace that would afford to Great Britain the 
advantages which France had agreed to accord in the pre- 
liminaries. Robinson and Strafford were, therefore, directed 
to win the support of the United Provinces by promising 
them a satisfactory barrier against France and certain ad- 
vantages to their commerce. The English plenipotentiaries 
were to maintain the obligations of the preliminaries so far 
as the concessions to England by France were concerned 
against all opposition. As regards the crown of Spain, it 
must not be united with the crown of France; but, this point 
settled, there was no obligation either to maintain Philip V 
on the throne of Spain or to remove him from it. As re- 
gards the allies generally, it was intended to carry out 
the promise of the Queen and secure for them a "reason- 
able satisfaction." Strasburg should be restored to the 
Empire as a free city; Kehl and Breisach also should be 
returned; in Alsace the provisions of the Treaty of West- 
phalia should be observed; Landau should be returned to the 



THE DIPLOMACY OF THS SPANISH SUCCESSION 325 

Empire, the fortifications between Basel and Philipsburg Chap, iy 
destroyed, and Rheinfels delivered to the Landgrave of .g^_^"-,E 

Hesse-Cassel; the Elector of Brandenburg must be recog 

nized as King of Prussia, and put in possession of Neuch&tel; 
the Elector of Hanover must be recognized as a ninth elector 
of the Elmpire; the Principality of Orange and other estates 
of William III within the limits of France should be re- 
stored to their rightful owners; Portugal was to be treated 
as the engagements in the English treaties required; the 
Duke of Savoy was to recover Nice and all other territories 
taken from him by France, with certain towns as a barrier. 
But most of these terms were subject to modification, and 
certainly did not reveal the full intentions of the ministry, 
which were not confided to Robinson and Strafford. 

In the French instructions it was pointed out that there The iiwtruo- 
existed in Elngland both popular and official reasons for de- ^^^ 
siring peace, which would no doubt be concluded by the 
English government mainly with a view to the interests of 
England rather than with regard to the benefit of Europe as 
a whole. As a consequence, preliminaries had been agreed 
upon which were substantially equivalent to a private assur- 
ance of peace. This friendly relation was to be recognized 
and maintained throughout the conferences, with the ex- 
pectation and belief that England also would adhere to 
it, and thus the two powers would practically act together 
in constraining the others to an acceptance of the terms which 
they would agree upon. The King of Spain was to be as- 
sured of his throne and retain the Indies, but a partition 
of the Spanish dominions in Italy and the Netherlands 
might be necessary to satisfy the demands of the allies. 
The Spanish Netherlands might, for the sake of peace, be 
given to a foreign prince; the Duke of Savoy might be pro- 
pitiated with Milan; as the Dutch would be separated from 
France by the disposal to be made of the Spanish Nether- 
lands, a limited barrier would suffice for ^em, and this 
would be accorded. The Elector of Bavaria, Max Emman- 
uel, must be restored to his electorate and indemnified 
for his losses. If the Spanish Netherlands were not given 



326 



A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY 



Chap. IV 

A. D. 

1697-1715 



The ioBtruo- 
tioos of the 
Emperor 



The question 
of eeparatiDg 
France and 
Spain 



to him, and he were not restored to his hereditary estates, 
then he should be given the Kingdom of Naples, to which 
- the King of Spain would add Sicily. The King of Prussia 
and the Elector of Hanover would be recognized as right- 
fully possessing these titles; but, as to the Orange possessions, 
it was contrary to French interest to deliver them to a for- 
eign and above all a Protestant prince. As for the demands 
of Austria, the King of France was not disposed to make 
concessions; and the restoration of Strasburg and the sur- 
render of sovereignty in the ten Alsatian cities could not 
be considered. 

As regards the order of procedure, the fate of the Spanish 
monarchy should have the first place; next, the satisfaction 
of the Electors of Bavaria and Koln; then, questions of 
commerce; and, finally, the barriers for Holland and the 
Empire.^ 

The one enemy to whom Louis XIV had no concession 
to make, and against whom all his wrath continued to 
bum, was the Emperor. This was perfectly understood 
by Charles VI. He was aware that the Congress of Utrecht 
was about to decide the question of the Spanish succession, 
that England and France had substantially come to a 
separate agreement, and that the Dutch RepubUc would 
be obliged to follow the lead of England. Expecting no 
benefit from the Congress, the Emperor's policy was, if 
possible, to prevent it; if not, to obstruct and finally dissolve 
it without permitting it to reach any positive result. 

The results of the Congress were determined more by 
events occurring outside of its walls than by any of its 
deliberations. The Marshal d'Huxelles, in accordance 
with his instructions, presented proposals which reserved 
for Philip V the retention of Spain and the Indies. The 
concessions to England were faithfully adhered to, but the 
other allies were treated as if France were the victor and 
entitled to dictate the terms of peace. Not one of the allies 



* Details are fuUy given by Weber, Der Friede von Utrecht, pp. 175, 
190, where the disposition of Louis XIV toward the North and the 
Italian princes is also stated. 



A. D. 

1697-1716 



THE DIPLOMACY OF THE SPANISH SUCCESSION 327 

outside of England was disposed to accept them, and Chap, iv 
even in England loud and indignant protests were uttered 
by the opposition, which advocated continuing the war. 

The effect of protest was simply to drive the French and 
the English negotiators closer together by giving them a 
new solidarity of interests. They had initiated the peace 
conferences, and they must not fail; but it was not at 
Utrecht that they could be made to succeed. 

St. John was prepared to grant to Philip V the whole 
kingdom of Spain and the Indies, as the French required; 
but on February 8, 1712, the Duke of Burgundy, who had 
become the Dauphin, died, and on March 8 his eldest son, 
the Duke of Brittany, passed away, leaving only one frail 
and sickly child of two years as heir to the crown of France. 
Nothing but the doubtful chance of this child's survival, 
it now appeared, could prevent the ultimate union of the 
crowns of France and Spain in the person of Philip V. 

The question of the Spanish succession had reached 
its most menacing stage. A renunciation of the French 
crown by Philip V might solve the problem; but the French 
jurists declared that, even if procured, the renunciation 
would not be valid. An individual act could not set aside 
a constitutional right imposed by a higher power. 

While the situation thus created was a delicate one for 
France it was equally difficult for England. Marlborough 
had been recalled and deprived of office, Halifax was thunder- 
ing against the conspiracy of the ministry with the French, 
and the Pretender was believed by the Whigs to be in some 
way mixed up with the course of events. 

The unwillingness of Philip V either to surrender the 
Kingdom of Spain or to renounce the throne of France for 
the moment completelyparalyzed the proceedings at Utrecht. 
But it was not an easy task, even if Philip V were willing 
to renounce the throne of France, to make Europe believe 
that a renunciation previously declared to be legally in- 
valid could secure the permanent separation of the two 
monarchies, and it was certain that their union could 
never be accepted. 



328 A HISTORY OP DIPLOMACY 

Chap. IV The real problem now was to settle the question of sue- 
^' ^- cession in such a manner as to satisfy the demands of Europe 

1 regarding its future security. As matters stood, if Philip V 

made no decision, he was by the letters patent registered 
The renan- in the Parliament of Paris, while still King of Spain, sep- 
^p'^y ' arated from the throne of France by only one fragile barrier, 
the life of a feeble infant. How, in these circumstances, 
could satisfactory guarantees against a union of the two 
monarchies be obtained? 

The pressure of Oxford and Bolingbroke was insistent 
that such absolute renunciations be furnished as would 
satisfy the European powers that the two crowns would 
never be united. To Englishmen, who had already rejected 
that doctrine, the dogma of ''divine right" made no appeal. 
The French plea of the invalidity of a royal renimciation 
based upon this principle was, therefore, wholly inaccept- 
able; and Louis XIV was made to understand that with- 
out the assurance of a permanent separation of the two 
crowns, the English ministry was powerless to conclude a 
peace. 

It thus became necessary for the Grand Monarch to choose 
between the abandonment of Spain or France by Philip V, 
and to press this choice upon his grandson. It was for 
the aged king a hard struggle. On April 18 he wrote to 
Philip: "Every day increases the necessity for peace; and, 
the means of continuing the war being exhausted, I shall 
find myself obliged to treat upon conditions equally dis- 
agreeable for me and for Your Majesty." 

Philip V remained for a time immovable. He was un- 
willing to renounce his rights in France and determined 
not to abdicate the Spanish throne. The correspondence 
of Louis XIV with his grandson during this period is pathetic 
in its pleadings and its despair.^ Not until every argument 
had been exhausted, after the most strenuous efforts of 



^ See for the correspondence, Courcy, RenonciaHan dea Boxarhons 
d^Evpagne an tr&ne de France, pp. 121, 141. Also Baudrillart, Philippe V 
et la Cour de France^ I, pp. 449, 501 . 



THE DIPLOMACY OF THE SPANISH SUCCESSION 329 

the French ambassador at Madrid, Bonnac,^ with the aid Chap, iv 
of the powerful Princess des Ursins, who ruled the King nm\ 
through her dominating influence over the Queen, did 



Philip y finally, on May 29, choose between the alternatives 
of abandoning Spain with the promise of an Italian kingdom 
composed of Savoy and Sicily, or retaining Spain by re- 
nouncing France. His preference was to remain King of 
Spain, but the decision had to be forced upon him. As a 
last resort, to compel action by Philip V, Bonnac had been 
furnished with an autograph letter from Louis XIV in which 
he said to the King of Spain: ''After having given to Your 
Majesty all possible marks of the tenderness which I have 
for you, it is just that I think of my kingdom, and that I end 
the war which it is no longer able to continue. You will not 
be astonished then if I sign the peace without you, on the 
conditions which my enemies propose to me."^ 

But it was not necessary to deliver the letter; and it was 
returned, as directed, unopened to the writer. The re- 
nunciation was now but a question of time. 

The decision of Louis XIV to end the war was already The "Re- 
known by the English ministry. St. John, who could not ^JJ^^ 
hasten peace at the council board at Utrecht, now resolved 
to enforce it in the field. Without any other authority than 
his own decision, on May 10, he took the dangerous step 
— for which the ministry was afterward impeached — of send- 
ing to the Duke of Ormond, who had taken Marlborough's 
place as captain-general of the British troops, a secret order 
forbidding him to engage in battle with the enemy, at the 
same time communicating this order to the Court of France. 
Ormond obeyed the order and tried to keep the secret, but it 
reached the ear of Prince Eugene, who by proposing a battle 
obtained the open admission that the Duke was under 
orders not to participate further in the war. 

Since May, 1712, England had been in reality, though not 
officially, at peace with France; and the Grand Alliance was 

1 The instnictioDS of Bonnac may be found in Revue Diplomatique, 
XI, p. 102. 
' See Gourcy, Renoncialian, etc., p. 113. 



330 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY 

Chap. IV thus subetantially at an end. The withdrawal of the Ekig- 
^'^' lish forces from the conflict left the French preponderant 

1097-1716 



- in the field, with the result that after the battle of Denain, 
of July 24, important fortresses fell into their hands, and 
the campaign which Marlborough believed would end with 
the occupation of Paris terminated in the strengthening 
of France.* Thus, at Utrecht, Louis XIV was able to treat 
the members of the Grand Alliance, with the exception of 
England, as if they, and not he, were the vanquished. 

The defection of England from the Grand Alliance was 
now virtually complete. St. John — who on July 7 was 
created Viscount Bolingbroke — was sent to France, for it 
was at London and Paris, and not at Utrecht, that England 
was to demand the reward of her services. 

To relieve the ministry as far as possible of responsibility, 
the legality of the renunciations was referred to the learned 
doctors of the University of Oxford; and to them the 
drafts of these documents were accordingly sent. In the 
meantime, Bolingbroke endeavored to obtain from Louis 
XIV the highest price for the advantages accorded to France. 
Graciously received by the King at Fontainebleau on August 
20, he charmed the Grand Monarch with his courteous 
manners, his alert intelligence, and his excellent French. 
The Duke of Savoy was regarded as a traitor to France, 
but was esteemed by Queen Anne as her most loyal friend. 
To obtain for him a satisfactory barrier and the cession of 
Sicily by Philip V was the chief mission of Bolingbroke. 

Returning to London laden with rare gifts from the 
King of France, and elated with the success of his mission, 
Bolingbroke bore a letter in which the King commended 
him to the Queen as *^un ministre le pliLS capable d'abrSger 
et d^aplanir les dijficulUs de la nigodation," 

It was too much for the jealousy of Lord Oxford, who 



* After the battle of Denain, Louis XIV wrote, on July 27, 1712: 
"Rien n'est plus capable de favoriser et d'avancer les ndgociations de la 
paix . . . que de reprendre cette superiority que mes troupes avaient 
eue pendant si longtemps et qu'elles avaient malheureusement perdue 
depuis quelques anndes." 



THE DIPLOMACY OF THE SPANISH SUCCESSION 331 

for a time placed the negotiations in the hands of Lord Chap, iv 
Dartmouth; but in his care they prospered so indifferently ^' ^' 
that they were afterwards again intrusted to Bolingbroke, 



who may be regarded as the responsible author of the Peace 
of Utrecht. 

On November 5, 1712, at Madrid, in the presence of the Execotioii of 
Spanish Cortes, the grandson of Louis XIV, with his right ^ ' 
hand on the Gospel, swore that he, for himself and his de- 
scendants, solemnly renounced the throne of France. The 
document signed by him had been carefully prepared and 
approved by the jurists of Oxford as well as by those of the 
two kingdoms.^ On the nineteenth and twenty-fourth 
of the same month were executed corresponding renuncia- 
tions of the crown of Spain by the Duke of Berry and the 
Duke of Orleans.' These renunciations, with the cancel- 
lation of the letters patent of 1700 by which Philip V re- 
tained his rights in France, were ratified, and on March 
15, 1713, duly registered, in that kingdom. 

What, then, had become of the "divine right" on which 
Louis XIV had built his life and his reign? It had been 
nullified and solenmly set aside in the interest of political 
expediency. The system of absolutism did not fall with 
it, but its logical foundation was swept away. Another "in- 
violable law" had been substituted for it, — a contract 
between princes dictated by the interests of their peoples. 

And this new principle of public law, thus solenmly 
recognized, had made possible what the doctrine of legit- 
imacy, under the conception of droit divin as the basis of 
human government, had not been able to secure, namely, 
the peace of Europe. 

At the end of the ceremonies of March 15, Lord Shrews- 
bury, the new English ambassador to France, despatched 
two couriers, one to London and one to Utrecht, to announce 
that the stone of stumbling had been removed. The bitter, 



* See Bonnac's account of the ceremony in Courcy, RenonciaHon^ 
etc., pp. 211, 224. See also the text of the Act, pp. 230, 239. Also in 
Vast, Les graruU traiUSf III, pp. 50, 54. 

' See the text in Courcy, as before, pp. 240, 242. 



332 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY 

Chap. IV costly Strife that had for twelve years agitated Europe, 
f:_^' nimed France, exhausted Spain, and drained the resources 

of all the powers engaged, could now be terminated. 

We need not return to Utrecht, except to record the terms 
upon which peace was concluded, for it was not made pos- 
sible by anything that had happened there.* The Queen 
TheproviaioM of England declared that, if the allies did not promptly 
ofutreofeT* accept the conditions offered them, she would negotiate a 
separate peace with the King of France. That peace had, 
in fact, already been assured by the renunciations; and was 
rendered certain by the signature, on January 30, 1713, of 
a treaty between Great Britain and Holland recognizing the 
Protestant succession and promising the barrier.' 

On April 11, 1713, seven treaties were signed at Utrecht 
between France and Great Britain, the United Provinces, 
Prussia, Portugal, and the Duke of Savoy.* Only the 
Emperor and certain princes of the Empire refused to ac- 
cept the conditions offered by France and resolved to 
continue the war. 

The results of the peace, so far as the general interests 
of Europe are concerned, were as follows: 

^ A complete history of the negotiations is found in Weber, Der Friede 
von Utrecht, 

* For the text, see Dumont, VIII, Part I, p. 314. 

' These seven treaties included a treaty of peace and friendship and 
a commercial treaty with Great Britain (see Dumont, VIII, Part I, p. 
330 and p. 345; and Vast, III, p. 68 and p. 87, with valuable notes); 
a treaty of peace and friendship and a treaty of commerce with the 
United Provinces (see Dumont as above, p. 336 and p. 377; and Vast, 
p. 141); a treaty of peace, friendship, and commerce with Prussia (see 
Dumont, p. 356, and Vast, p. 120); a treaty of peace, friendship, and 
commerce with Portugal (see Dumont, p. 353, and Vast, p. 112); and a 
treaty of peace, friendship, and conmierce with the Duke of Savoy (s^ 
Dumont, as above, p. 362, and Vast, p. 129). As the interests of Spain 
were in the hands of Louis XFV, there was no Spanish plenipotentiary 
at Utrecht, and no treaties were at that time signed by Spain. On 
March 26, 1713, however, the "Asiento" had been transferred to Great 
Britain at Madrid. See Calvo, Recueil des TraiUs, II, p. 78. All the 
treaties of Utrecht were, however, afterward confirmed there by Span- 
ish plenipotentiaries, those with England and Savoy on July 13, 1713; 
that with Holland on June 26, 1714. 



THE DIPLOMACY OF THE SPANISH SUCCESSION 333 

Queen Anne and the Protestant succession in Great Chap, iv 
Britain were recognized by France; contested possessions ^•'^• 

in America, — Hudson's Bay, Newfoundland with Nova ^ — i- 

Scotia,^ and St. Christopher, — besides Gibraltar and Mi- 
*norca, were ceded to EJngland, together with the exclusive 
monopoly of the slave trade, or rights of the "Asiento'^ • ". \ 
^freedoffl^-(rf trade with the colonies and a moderate tariff 
were likewise accorded; and the port and fortifications of » • ' 
Dunkirk were to be destroyed. 

These colonial and commercial gains, although not suffi* 
cient in the eyes of the Whigs, who insisted upon further 
advantages, marked an immense advance in the develop- 
ment of the British Empire, and popular joy in England 
expressed itself in public celebrations of the peace. 

The United Provinces were allowed to retain certain 
cities of the Spanish Netherlands until the Emperor was 
ready to make peace; when, it was agreed, they would be 
delivered to him, with suitable barriers to be occupied by 
Dutch troops, and a part of Upper Gelderland would be 
permanently annexed to the Republic. 

Portugal was recognized as sovereign on both banks of 
the Amazon, but obtained no other advantage. 

Frederick III, Elector of Brandenburg, abeady recog- 
nized as king by the Emperor as Frederick I of Prussia, who 
had been succeeded by his son Frederick William on Feb- 
ruary 25, 1713, was now formally recognized as the first 
king of Prussia, and King Frederick William I was accorded 
a part of Upper Gelderland and the Principality of Neu- 
chAtel, but renounced all claim to the Orange possessions 
in France. 

The Duke of Savoy, Victor Amadeus II, was ceded 
Sicily, with Savoy and Nice restored to him, and in addi- 
tion permitted to retain the territories in Italy given him 
by the Emperor Joseph I, and granted the title of King; 
thus laying the foundation of an important Italian monarchy, 
destined in the course of time to extend to the entire 



^ With regard to the French fishing rights, see the valuable histori- 
cal note in Vast, Im Qranda traiUs, III, pp. 79, 81. 



334 A raSTORY OF DIPLOBCACT 

Chap. IV peninsula. He was besides accorded the right of future 
^' ^' succession in Spain, in case the Bourbon dynasty should 

1607-1715 m __x» A 1 

become extinct.* 

Thus isolated, Charles VI could not vindicate the claims 
Th« «nd of his plenipotentiaries had made for him at Utrecht. In the 
!h! ft^^A following August, Villars took possession of Landau, and 
in November of Freiburg and Breisgau. On November 26, 
negotiations between the Elmperor and France were opened 
at Rastadt. On December 4, it was agreed that peace should 
be concluded between them on the basis of the treaties of 
Ryswick; and, on March 6, 1714, the Treaty of Rastadt 
was signed by the Emperor. At Baden in Aargau, on Sep- 
tember 7, the princes of the EJmpire adhered to the Treaty 
of Rastadt. France retained Strasburg and Alsace, with 
Landau in addition. The Elmperor acquired the Spanish 
Netherlands, Milan, Tuscany, Naples, and Sardinia, in full 
sovereignty.* Breisach, Kehl, and Freiburg were also re- 
stored to the Empire. In return the Elmperor re-established 
the Electors of Bavaria and K5hi in their electorates. 

On November 15, 1715, at Antwerp, the transfer of the 
Spanish Netherlands from Spain to Austria was consum- 
mated, and the promised barrier for the United Provinces 
was erected with the guarantee of Great Britain.* 

Thus were finally liquidated the problems of the Spanish 
succession. It was also the end of the long struggle between 
the forces brought into collision by the dynastic ambitions 
of Louis XIV and the determination of William of Orange 
to defeat them. The victory was on the side of the Sovereign 
State System established by the Peace of Westphalia, 
which France had done so much to create and Louis XIV 
so much to endanger. The Treaties of Utrecht, Rastadt, 
and Baden, like the Treaties of Westphalia, mark the close 

^ For an account of the Auto AccordatOf changing the Spanish law of 
succession, see Courcy, Renandatianf etc., pp. 243, 252, and 294. 

' The details of the n^^tiation of the treaties of Rastadt and Baden, 
are given by Courcy, La coalition de 1701 ^ II, pp. 101, 353. Also a very 
full account of the treaties between Spain, Savoy, England, HoUand 
and Portugal on pp. 357, 517, with important documents. 

' For the treaty, see Dumont, VIII, Part I, p. 458 et seq. 



THE DIPLOMACY OP THE SPANISH SUCCESSION 335 

of a conflict between abstract rights in which the spirit of Chap, iv 
imperialism suffered defeat; and even more decisively than j^g^.j^ig 

in 1648 the principle of diffused and balanced power had 

been asserted. 

But the year 1715 also marked the end of an epoch by 
the disappearance from the scene of many of the personages 
who had given it character. On June 8 the Electress- 
dowager Sophia of Hanover passed away, chagrined that at 
the age of eighty-four she must die without having become 
Queen of England, leaving her son, George Lewis, heir to 
the throne. On August 1 Queen Anne followed her, and 
George I was proclaimed King of Elngland, — a change 
which ended Bolingbroke's diplomacy with France and 
Spain, and drove him and the Tory party from office. On 
September 1 the Grand Monarch also ended his career. 

With the exception of Charles VI and Philip V, the 
contestants in the war of the Spanish succession were now at 
peace; but new problems had arisen and were pressing for 
solution. New actors also had come upon the scene, and the 
centre of interest was transferred to another field. It was 
the North and the struggle for the Baltic that now engaged 
the chief attention of statesmen and threatened radical 
changes in the map of Ehirope. 

AUTHORITIES 

For this chapter, besides Dumont, Vast, and Grimblot, the volumes Doomneitto 
of the Recueil des irutrucUona aux ambastadeurs relating to Spain, Aus- 
tria, Portugal, Sweden, Denmark, and Bavaria are specially important. 
For Anglo-Dutch relations, see Vreede, Correspondance diplomcUique 
et miUtaire du due de MarVbofimgh, du grand-jtensionaire Heinnus, et du 
tritorier'if^niral des Provinoes-UmeSf Jacques Hop, Amsterdam, 1850; 
Coze, Memoirs of John Duke of Marlborough, vrith his Original Cor- 
respondence, London, 1820. Additional collections of treaties relating 
to this period are: De Brosses, Recueil des traiUs et conxferUions diplo- 
maHques concemant VAulriche et Vltalie (1703-1859), Paris, 1859; and 
Del Castillo, Traiados 4 conventos de la casa de Borbon, Madrid, 1843. 

The most important memoirs of the time are those of Marquis de 
Torcy (1687-1713), Paris, 1850; Louville, Mimaires secrets sur VUMisse- 
ment de la maison de Bovrbon en Espagne, Paris, 1818; Masson, Journal 
v/Mit de Torcy, Paris, 1884; De la Torre, Mimoires et nigociations 



336 A HISTORY OF DIPLOBIACT 

Chap. IV secrket de Ferdinand BanaverUura, CanUe d^Harraeh, The Hague, 1720 
A. D. (is not entirely trustworthy); G&deke, Das Tagebuch des Orctfen Ferdi- 
1697-1715 nand BanaverUura van Harrach, etc., in Archiv fUr Osterreichische 
Geschichte, XLVIII (1872); VogQ6, Mhnoires du marMial de ViUars, 
Paris, 1885; Saint-Simon, Mhnoires pour aervir d VkisUnre des nSffo^ 
datums depuis le traiti de Ryswick jttsqu'd la paix d* Utrecht, Paris, 1717; 
Saint-Philippe, Mhnoires Untchant les guerres et nSgociations povr la «uc- 
cession de la numarchie espagnole, Paris, 1752. 

The despatches of Haroourt are reprinted in Hippeau, Vavkne- 
ment des Bourbons au tr&ne d^Espagne, Paris, 1870; Girardot, Corre- 
spondance de Loins XIV aoec M. Amdot, Paris, 1864, throws light on 
the relations of France with Portugal; and Stanhope, Spain under 
Charles II y London, 1844, contains extracts from the correspondence of 
the English ambassador at Madrid in 1690-1699. 

For the n^^tiations and results of the Peace of Utrecht and the sup- 
plementary treaties of Rastadt and Baden, see Actes, mtmoires, et 
autres pikces authintiques concemant la paix d' Utrecht, 2d ed., Utrecht, 
1714; Parke, Letters and Correspondence . , , of BoUngbroke while 
Secretary of State, London, 1778; and Freschot, Histoire du congrhs et 
de la paix d'Utrecht camme aussi de ceUe de Rastadt et de Bade, Utrecht, 
1716. 

Besides the general histories already mentioned, see Topin, L' Europe 
et les Bourbons sous Louis XIV, Paris, 1868; Courcy, La coaUtion de 
1701 contre la France, Paris, 1886; but especially BaudriUart, PhUip V 
et la cow de France de 1700-1716, Paris, 1889 et seq., based on a careful 
study of the archives, including those of Spain. 

The literature of the Spanish succession is especially rich. The work 
of Mignet, ab-eady cited, ends with 1679. The definitive treatment of 
the subject so far as research is concerned may be found in Legrelle, La 
diplomatie frangaise et la succession d^Espagne (1659-1725), Braine-le- 
Comte, 1895-1899, of which Pagds sa3rs: "II n'y a plus k refaire aprds 
lui." While the book is a valuable magazine of facts and extremely 
well written, the point of view and the innuendos conveyed through its 
trenchant style render it a S3rstematic apology for the procedure of Louis 
XrV. Earlier works of value are G&deke, Die PoliHk Osterreichs in 
der spanischen Erbfolgefrage, Leipzig, 1877, based on a thorough exam- 
ination of the Austrian archives; Renauld, SuccessiMt d^Espagne: 
Louis XIV et GuiUaume III, Paris, 1883, based on the unpublished 
correspondence of Louis XIV and William III. 

On the r^le of the Princess Orsini at Madrid, see Combes, La Princesse 
des Ursins, Paris, 1858; and Du Bled, Unefemme premier ministre: la 
princesse des Ursins, in Revue d'Histoire Diplomatique, XI (1897). 

The attitude of Brandenburg-Prussia to the Spanish succession is 
stated by Von Noorden, Europdische Geschichte im 18 Jahrhunderl, 
Leipzig, 1870-1882, Abteilung I, "Der spanisdie Erbfolgekrieg," and 
Die preussische PoUHk im spanischen Erbfolgekriege, in Historische 



THE DIPLOBIACY OF THE SPANISH SUCCESSION 337 

Zeitschrift, XVIII (1867), in which he criticizes the views of Droysen Chap. IV 
expressed in his Ge9chichte der preu8sischen Politik, IV. a. d. 

The formation of the kingdom of Prussia is discussed by A. Wad- 1697-1715 
dington, L*acquintum de la courcnne royale de Pruaae par lea Hohen- 
zoUemf Paris, 1888; Zwiedeneck-Sddenhorst, Deutsche GeechicfUe im 
Zeilalter der OrHndung dee preiusiechen KdniQiume, Stuttgart, 1887-1804; 
and Bemer, Die auetodrtige Politik dee KurfUraien Friedrich von Branr 
denburgf Konig Friedrich I von Preiueen, in Hohensollera-Jahrbuch, 
IV (1901). 

The part played by Bavaria and Savoy in the Spanish succession may 
be studied in Heigel, Kurprim Ferdiruind-Joeeph von Bayem und die 
epanische Erbfolge, Munich, 1879; Preuss, Oeterreich, Frankreichy und 
Baiem in der epanischen Erbfolgrfrage (1685-1689), in Historische Vier- 
teljahrschrift, IV (1901) ; and Wiihelm III von England und doe Haua 
Witieltbach im Zeitaiter der epaniechen Erbfolgefrage, Breslau, 1904; 
Parri, VUtario Amadeo II ed Eugenio di Savoia neUe guerre deUa euc^ 
ceeeUme epagnuola, Milan, 1888; Costa de Beauregard, Relassioni dipUh 
matiche della monorchia di Savoia (1559-1814), Turin, 1890; and Ameth, 
Prim Eugen von Savoyen, Vienna, 1859. 

For the affairs of the North, see Voltaire, Hietoire de Charlea XII, 
Rouen and London, 1727-1728, and later in numerous editions at Paris, 
still valuable because of knowledge obtained from contempararies; 
Combes, Hietoire de la diplomaiie slave et ecandinave, Paris, 1858; Le 
Glay, Les originee de V alliance franco-rueee: juequ'au traiU d'Ameterdam^ 
Paris, 1897; VassUeff, Ruseiech-framdsisch PoliHk, 1698-1717, Gotha, 
1902, based on Russian archives; Bain, Charlea XII and the CoUapae cf 
the Swediah Empire (1682-1719), London and New York, 1895; Syve- 
ton, Louia XIV et Charlea XII, in Revue d'Histoire Diplomatique, 
XII (1898); Au camp d^Altrandatadt: Beaenval et Marlborough (1707), 
in Revue d'Histoire Diplomatique, XII (1898); Une hypothkae swr 
Charlea XII, in Revue Historique, LXTV (1897); and Louia XIV et 
Charlea XII, Paris, 1900. 

The literature relating to Peter the Great is more conveniently given 
at the end of the following chapter. 

The negotiations preceding iJie Treaty of Utrecht are discussed from 
a French point of view by Giraud, Le traits d^ Utrecht, Paris, 1847; and 
Courcy, Renonciation dee Bourbona d*Eapagne au trdne de France, Paris, 
1889; but the most exhaustive treatment, based on the archives of 
England, France, Austria, and the United Provinces, is found in Weber, 
Der Friede von Utrecht, Gotha, 1891. The part played by Bolingbroke 
in the Peace of Utrecht is fully stated in Sichd, Bolingbroke and Hia 
Timea, London, 1901. 

VOL. m.— 22 



CHAPTER V 

THE STRUGGLE FOR SUPREMACY IN THE NORTH AND 

IN ITALY 

The prindpie ^T^HE Peaoe of Utrecht appeared for the moment to have 
^^J^^"^^ -■- restored to Europe the equilibrium that had been so 
long disturbed by the ambitions of France. Not only the 
importance of balanced power among the nations but a deeper 
and broader view of international obligation was now again 
brought home to the thoughts of men. 

Knowing how much both France and the rest of Europe 
had suffered from the ambitions of Louis XIV, F^nelon, in a 
dissertation presented before the Congress of Utrecht, wrote: 
''Neighboring states are not only under obligation to treat 
one another according to the rules of justice and good faith; 
they ought in addition, for their own safety, as well as for 
the common interest, to form a kind of general society and 
republic." He then proceeds to point out that, the passions 
of men and the ambitions of rulers being what they are, 
''each nation is on this account under the necessity of inces- 
sant watchfulness to prevent the excessive aggrandizement 
of each one of its neighbors, ... for the aggrandizement 
of a nation beyond a certain limit changes the general 
sjTstem of all the nations that have relation to it. . . . 
Everything which changes or alters this general Sjrstem of 
Europe is dangerous and entails infinite evils." ^ 

The principle thus enunciated is as old as international 
diplomacy,* and it had at length come to be distinctly recog- 
nized by the statesmen of Europe as the foundation of public 
security.' Louis XIV, who had done more than any other 

1 (Eturres de F^ndon, PariB, 1872, IV, p. 360. 
* See Volume I of this work, p. 361. 

' See Dupuis, Le principe cPiquUibre et le Concert EuropSm, pp. 25, 
31. 



SUPREMACY IN THE NORTH AND IN ITALY 339 

sovereign of his time to violate it, had at last not only ac- Chaf. v 
cepted but had openly appealed to it, and in the phrasing j^jj^j^g^ 

of the renunciations distinctly avowed it. In them it was 

formally stated that their purpose was ''to establish an 
equilibrium between the powers of such a kind as to prevent; 
the \mion of many in a single one, so that the balance of 
equality, which it ia desired to assure, could not incline to ' 
the advantage of one of these powers to the risk and injury 
of the others." ^ 

In fact, the great problem at Utrecht was how best to set 
the equilibrium of the European states against the private 
interests of the dynasties. The result was, in effect, the crea- 
tion of a dynastic deadlock in which the ambition of sover- 
eigns to absorb one another's possessions might thenceforth 
be rendered impotent.' In this sense the Peace of Utrecht 
was a protest against absolutism, and especially against the 
idea that nations are, like private properties, transmissible 
by inheritance. It was the vindication and the triumph of 
the constitutional ideas of William III over the absolutist 
ideas of Louis XIV.* 

But this was not the only result of the long and ruinous 
war of the Spanish succession. It had also furnished an 
impulse to constructive thought. The Abb6 de Saint-Pierre, 
impressed by the miseries inflicted upon France and the hol- 
lowness of the glory attributed to Louis XIV, not only re- 
fused to accord to him the title *'Le Grand/' but boldly laid 
down the doctrine that ''great power cannot make a great 
man." 

Starting with the idea of the moral and legal equality of 
sovereign states, Saint-Pierre wrote his essay on the "Projet 
de la Paix Perp^tuelle," published at Utrecht in 1713, dur- 



» See Giraud, Le traiU cP Utrecht, p. 124. 

' Note the formal recognition of the principle of equilibrium in Art. ^ 
II of the treaty between Spain and England of July 13, 1713. 

' Emile Bourgeois la3rs emphasis upon the fact that after 1713 the 
ideas of Locke not only superseded those of Bossuet even in France, 
but became recognized as principles of international law. Manud 
historique de poliHque &rai%gbre, I, p. 240. 



340 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY 

Chap. V ing the conferences kA the Congress, in which he pointed out 
^' ^' the causes of the misfortunes that had befallen Europe, and 
elaborated a plan for avoiding them in the future. 

Founded primarily on the conceptions of £meric Cruc6 in 
the " Nouveau Cyn6e " ^ and of SuUy in the " Great Design,"* 
the plan of Saint-Pierre comprised the formation of a uni- 
versal alliance of sovereigns to secure themselves against the 
misfortunes of war by abolishing the separate use of force, 
perfecting their laws, and submitting their differences to 
judicial decision; with the understanding that, in case of 
refusal to execute treaties or to obey the rules and judg- 
ments imposed, the other members of the alliance should 
compel a refractory sovereign to comply by arming unitedly 
against him, and charging to his account the expense of this 
forcible restraint.' 

Admirable as the aims of the excellent Abb6 were, they 
overlooked certain elements of human nature which two cen- 
turies of further development have not entirely eliminated 
from the life of nations. It was in the name of real, as dis- 
tinguished from merely ideal, equality, and for the rule of 
justice as men saw it from their own point of view, that inter- 
national strife was yet to continue. Prevented, or at least 
postponed, by the exhaustion and domestic troubles of the 
powers that had made their peace at Utrecht, war was soon 
again to agitate Elurope by the renewal of the conflict that 
was still smouldering in the North. 



I. The Peril of Sweden and the Battle for the 
Baltic 

iiweiifeof In 1709, the alliance between Denmark, Poland, and 

' ^^ Russia against Sweden had been renewed, and Pope Clement 
XI had absolved the Poles from their allegiance to King 
Stanislas. Projects for the partition of Poland were made and 



^ See Volume II of this work, p. 574. 

* See Volume II of this work, pp. 550, 552. 

• See Molinari, L'AbM de Saint^Pierre, Paris, 1857; and Paaoal, Lea 
pnj§U de VabU SairU-Pierre, Paris, 1900. 



SUPRBBIACT IN THE NORTH AND IN ITALY 341 

discussed, but Frederick Augustus of Saxony, after offering Chap, v 
to divide Poland with King Stanislas, repudiated the pro- ^7,^^Vqi 

posals of Prussia for a partition and decided to maintain the 

integrity of the kingdom and permit Sweden to furnish the 
spoils of war. 

In order to prevent the commotion in the North from in- 
fluencing the war of the Spanish succession, the Elmperor, 
England, and Holland had, on March 31, 1710, signed a 
treaty neutralizing the Empire, which had had the effect of 
holding the two conflicts apart, but did not obtain the ad- 
hesion of Charles XII.^ Since his flight from Poltawa, that 
headstrong and impracticable monarch had remained at the 
Turkish fortress of Bender on the Dniester. EaAy in 1711 
the Grand Vizier had offered at the head of a hundred thou- 
sand Turks "to carve a way home for the King of Sweden in 
whichever direction he liked best"; but Charles XII chose 
to remain in his asylum in the vain belief that he might even- 
tually lead a Turkish armyinto Poland; and, on July 21, 1711, 
peace was concluded between the Czar and the Sultan at the 
Pruth. Broken soon afterward at the instigation of Charles 
XII, peace was again renewed by the mediation of England 
and Holland on April 15, 1712,' and finally confirmed at 
Adrianople on June 5, 1713. 

In the meantime Charles XII had abused the Turkish 
hospitality, diverted the money that had been given him to 
pay the expenses of his departure, refused to leave Bender, 
and at last, when force was resorted to, engaged in a pitched 
battle with his hosts, in which he was twice wounded and with 
only forty adherents kept at bay twelve thousand men until 
the house in which he had taken refuge was binned down 
and he was overpowered and cc^ptured by the Janissaries.' 

^ See Dumont, VIII, Part I, p. 249. A ooDgresa of the neutral Ger- 
man powers was assembled at Brunswick in December, 1712, for the 
purpose of enforcing neutrality, but ended in March, 1713, without 
producing any result. It was reassembled in 1714, but bore no fruit. 

* Sir Robert Sutton, the British ambassador, was, however, recalled 
for his activity in promoting the peace. 

' See the gn^hic account in Bain, Charlet XII and the Coflapw of 
th€ SvoedUh Empire, pp. 212, 217. 



342 



A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY 



Chap. V 

A. D. 

1715-1731 



The defaoto 
of Charles 
Xll'e policy 



While astonished Europe compared his heroism to that of 
Achilles and Hercules, and a medal was struck to commemo- 
rate the event, Peter the Great and Frederick Augustus I 
rejoiced in his quarrel with his only effective ally.* A turn 
in the tide of feeling toward Russia brought his assailants 
into disgrace and the King found himself for a time again in 
favor at Stamboul, but the Peace of Utrecht had in the mean- 
time changed the situation in Europe; and the treaty of 
June 5, 1713, ended the Russo-Turkish conflict.' Although 
Charles XII then decided to return to Sweden, it was not 
until November 11, 1714, that the exiled king, after an 
absence of fifteen years from his kingdom, arrived at 
Stralsund. 

During this long absence, Sweden had fallen into a des- 
perate condition. Its resources exhausted, its throne prac- 
tically vacant, many of its possessions lost or imperilled, the 
kingdom which Gustavus Adolphus had expanded to a vast 
empire, appeared at the mercy of its foes. 

At first glance it seems unaccountable that a warrior so 
impetuous as Charles XII could have been content to remain 
so long in a foreign land while his kingdom was falling into 
decay. The explanation is to be found in the fact that, 
comprehending the limitations of his own resources, he enter- 
tained the chimerical idea of overpowering Russia by stimu- 
lating the Turks to exhaust the resources of the Czar. By 
this expedient he believed he was seriously crippling his most 
powerful enemy without expense to his own kingdom, and 
making the Sultan fight his battles for him. 

In order to estimate correctly the value of Charles XII's 
policy, it is, however, necessary to recall what had occurred 
during the years of his exile and the condition of his country 
upon his return. 



^ In the hope of drawing Charles XII into the war of the Spanish 
succession, Louis XIV had, on September 1, 1712, made an alliance 
with him at Bender; but, apart from the subsidies then promised and 
afterward paid, Charles XII derived no benefit from the alliance, and 
none was received by France. 

* For the treaty, see Dumont, Supplement II, Part II, p. 110. 



SUPRBBIACY IN THE NORTH AND IN ITALY 343 

The battle of Poltawa was by no means a final defeat of Chj^. v 
Sweden, but merely the temporary relief of Russia. It was, ^' ^' 

indeed, the end of Charles XII's mad scheme of a Swedish 

invasion into the heart of that vast empire, but it would not 
have prevented the further defence of the territories of Swe- 
den, or even further aggression upon Russia, if Charles XII 
had promptly returned to his kingdom; while he might have 
accomplished through diplomatic representatives all the 
results effected by his presence in Turkey. 

The absence of the King, who insisted upon regulating the 
minutest affairs from a distance, was disastrous to his king-* 
dom, which suffered much from division of counsels but 
chiefly by delay. In November, 1709, the Danes, disregard- 
ing the Peace of Travendal, made an attack upon Scania 
which ended in their establishing a foothold there; and only 
the splendid generalship of Stenbock in 1710 had held the 
enemy at bay. In the meantime, all of Sweden's Baltic 
provinces had fallen into the possession of the Czar, who had 
also successfully invaded Finland. As a consequence, Po- 
land had been evacuated by the Swedes and the army with- 
drawn to Swedish Pomerania, with King Stanislas as a 
refugee in the Swedish camp. 

Although without the possibility of obtaining effective 
allies during the war of the Spanish succession, Charles XII 
might nevertheless have profited from it by adhering to the 
compact of neutrality of March 31, 1710, which would have 
secured the safety of his German possessions without cost 
to him; but, believing that the maritime powers, in spite 
of their absorption in a costly war, would aid him against 
Denmark, on November 30, 1710, he had, against the advice 
of his friends, formally repudiated the offer of neutrality. 

Thus, the security of the Swedish possessions was made to 
depend solely upon their own defensive powers against all 
his enemies at once, while he awaited the uncertain fortunes 
of the Russo-Turkish conflict. 

With this opportimity of aggression, the Danes in 1712 had 
invaded and occupied the Duchy of Bremen, while the coali- 
tion against Sweden worked its will on the Baltic. It is true 



344 A HlgFOBY OF DIPLOMACY 

Ckap. V that the Peace of the Pmth was broken and war with Russia 
171A.1731 '®™™^ ^ **** Turks at the instigatioii of Charies XII; but 

this was ol no direct pn&t to Sweden, and even if the war 

had not soon ended with the Peace of Adrianople, it is difli- 
cult to see how the conflict between Turkey and Russia could 
ever have been more than a diversion of the attack upon 
Sweden. Whatever the personal influence of Charles XII at 
Bender may for a time have been, it is certain that his re- 
turn to Sweden was too long delayed, and that his separa- 
tion from Stockholm by a distance of seven hundred nules 
rendered impossible the needed unity and promptness of 
counsel regarding public policy between him and the Swedish 
Senate. 
Th* «»4iti<m There was rejoicing in Sweden when it was learned that 
of^wtiku ia ^]^^ King had arrived at Stralsund; but, instead of returning 
to his capital, where confusion and despair were almost 
universal, he remained in his Pomeranian fortress, ordering 
troops to be sent to him, and at the same time opposing by 
his royal authority all the measures for the salvation of the 
kingdom suggested by the Senate and the Riksdag. Fred- 
erick I of Prussia had at one time been ready to promise 
him aid, and the Emperor Charles VI had also been favor- 
ably disposed toward him ; but the time had now passed when 
an alliance with either would have been possible upon any 
terms that Charles XII was inclined to consider. Frederick 
William I, having become King of Prussia, was endeavoring 
to expel the Swedes from Germany, and the Emperor, of- 
fended by the obstinacy and discourtesy of Charles XII, had 
lost all sympathy with him. At this moment of Sweden's 
helplessness Prussia had already acquired possession of 
Stettin in sequestration,^ and the Elector of Hanover, long 
considered by Charles XII as his ''best friend," had occu- 
pied Verden and was coveting Bremen, then in possession 
of the Danes, who were willing to sell it to Hanover. 



^ This was by agreement of Prussia with Russia and Poland in the 
Treaty of Schwedt, of October 6, 1713; see Dumont, VIII, Part I, p, 
407. Droysen regards this treaty as one of the most important in the 
history of Prussia, it being the decisive step in Pmssia's Baltic policy. 



SUPREMACY IN THE NORTH AND IN ITALY 345 

Frederick William I would have been ready to aid Sweden Chap, v 
in opposing Russia in exchange for Swedish possessions in i^j^j'-gj 

Pomerania; but, finding Charles XII utterly intractable, 

on June 12, 1714, Prussia had formed an alliance with 
Russia, and in the spring of 1715 declared war on Sweden.^ 
The Elector of Hanover soon afterward also declared war,' 
and before the autumn of 1715, Sweden was confronted by 
a formidable confederacy of foes, consisting of Russia, Saxony, 
Denmark, Poland, Prussia, and Hanover, who had formed 
a compact to divide among themselves the spoils of the 
Swedish empire now steadily crumbling to pieces. 

At this critical moment Sweden was internally plunged in 
the depths of the most bitter poverty. Her last army had 
been dispersed, and only half the number of troops neces- 
sary to defend the frontiers of the kingdom could be raised. 
The taxes, which had long been on a war basis, did not fur- 
nish a third of the funds needed for defence. The bells of 
the churches were sold, and the cannons captiu^ in former 
wars were sent to the mint to be coined into money. Nothing 
but the firm statesmanship of Count Horn prevented revolu- 
tion and the dethronement of Charles XII. 

With unfailing courage and a tranquillity of mind that re- 
vealed the invincible quality of his nature, the King gathered 
about him seventeen thousand men to defend Stralsund 
against the united forces of his enemies; but, on December 
12, 1715, the battered remains of the fortress had to be aban- 
doned, and Charles XII, after narrowly escaping capture 
by the Danish ships, landed from a small boat on the shores 
of Sweden. 

Had events not radically altered the traditional relations The impedi- 
of Sweden and France, there might have been a last hope ^^*^^ 

;. em Europe 



^ For the treaty, see F. Martens, BecueU des TraUis, V, " Allemagne," 
p. 112. 

* The Elector's treaty with the Czar was signed on October 28, 
1715, at Greifswald. It may be found in Stdrk, Da8 Greifstoalder BUnd- 
nu, where a history of the negotiations is given. It guaranteed to 
Hanover Bremen and Verden, and to Russia Ingria, Carelia, and 
Esthonia; but not Livonia, as Ranke erroneously states. 



346 A Hmonr cm dipumact 



Omt. r for Cfatfks Xll in a Fnmeo-Swec&h allianee; bat the entire 

nvi^\i7\ ^'^^^^'^^^^'^^'^ iitafttaon was in a state of transition that ren- 

'- — dered France for the momoit powerless to offer aid. The 



a c ec t -gon of the Elector of Hanorer to the throne of England 
as Geon^ I had not onlj reversed the Kngtwh ministry, it 
had vitally affected the whole system of England's foreign 
policy, and particularly the recent friendship with France. 
The Whig^, who had jost come into power, were making 
political capital of the cnlfalf with their ancient enemy and 
bitterly condenming the Peace of Utrecht. Marlbnoagh 
had been replaced at the head of the army, Bohn^^roke and 
Ormond were accused of treason and had sou^t refuge in 
France, and Oxford was impeached and sent to the Tower. 
Towniih end, who had been commended to George I, was made 
the head of the new ministry with the duties of secretary of 
the Northern Department, and James Stanhope, a distin- 
guished soldier and an able diplcHuatist, was placed in charge 
of the Southern Department for the conduct of foreign affairs. 

At Paris, Lord Stiur had accused Louis XIV just before 
his death of violating the treaty of peace because so little 
progress was made with the demolition of Dunkirk, and es- 
pecially because of the construction of an immense canal at 
Mardyk; which, it was alleged, was designed to create a 
new port to take the place of Dunkirk. One of the last acts 
of Louis XIV was to refuse to discontinue this construction; 
which, it was alleged, was intended only for the necessary 
drainage of the country. 

In the meantime the Pretender, who had been compelled, 
as the treaty required, to leave France and had taken refuge 
in Lorraine, issued a proclamation, claiming the succession 
to the English throne. The conduct of Louis XIV r^arding 
the Pretender had been entirely correct; but the Protestant 
succession was believed in England to be seriously threatened, 
and the intentions of France were r^arded with distrust.^ 



^ Count de Croissy, a brother of Torcy, who in May, 1715, had been 
sent to Berlin to arrange a peace for Sweden, had urged Charles XII 
to make peace in the North and send troops against England to aid the 
'^ Pretender/' See Chance, Qwrgt I and the Northern War, pp. 77, 78. 



SUPREMACY IN THE NORTH AND IN ITALY 347 

Philip V had perforce submitted to the demand for the Chap, v 
renimciations, but with wounded dignity, and had secretly ^' ^• 

aimed at securing for himself the regency during the minority 

of the infant Louis XV. He was openly favorable to the 
Pretender, and a strong party inclined to support him was 
believed to exist in France. 

In these circumstances, there was small hope of active 
mtervention in the affairs of the North on the part of France, 
which was too much absorbed in repairing its own f ortimes 
to indulge in needless foreign complications. In truth, the 
effort to obtain equilibrium in Western Europe had created 
a condition that seriously impeded further international 
action.^ Even England, notwithstanding the interests of 
George I as Elector of Hanover, had no inclination at the 
moment to imdertake a new foreign war, or to embark pre- 
cipitately in the affairs of the North. The only real interest 
of Great Britain in the Baltic was for the safety of her com- 
merce;* but the policy of Hanover was not without in- 
fluence upon the action of the British ministry. As for the 
Dutch Republic, its chief preoccupation was the execution 
of the Barrier Treaty. With a depleted treasury, and 
solicitous chiefly for its commercial interests, there was 
little likelihood that it would waste much substance in 
the North. 

While as Eling of England the policy prescribed for George The dual 
I was one of moderation, with a general interest in maintain- q||^*"°°5 **' 
ing a state of equilibrium in the North, as Elector of Hanover 
he was called upon to play a different and even to some ex- 
tent a conflicting rdle; for it was greatly to the advantage of 
the electorate to round out its territory by retaining Verden 
and acquiring Bremen, which involved complicity with the 
enemies of Sweden. 

With any reasonable degree of skill and caution on the 



^ In 1714, while still at Bender, Charles XII had received subsidies 
from Louis XIV, who also offered his mediation. See Chance, George I 
and the Northern War, pp. 76, 80, for the futile mission of De Croissy. 

' Interesting statistics regarding the amoimt of British trade in the 
North are given by Chance, Qeorge I and the Northern War, p. 6. 



348 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY 

Chap. V part of Charles XII, the existing treaties between England 
^^' and Sweden and the indisposition of the English people to 

be made the tool of Hanover would have prevented hostile 

action against him by Great Britain; but Charles XII 
scorned anjrthing that savored of diplomacy. George I had 
become King of fkigland not because of any preference for 
his person or any design to form a closer union with the House 
of Brunswick, but because he was a Protestant and main- 
tained the Protestant succession. Had James Edward been 
willing to change his religion, he would have been far more 
acceptable; for he had personal charms and graces, as well as 
accomplishments, which the German prince entirely lacked. 
Ignorant of the English language, laws, and sentiments; 
coarse in person, low in morals, and cold in his manners, 
George I was ill adapted for winning the hearts of English- 
men. Being, as he was, merely a political necessity, there 
was for him and the suite of foreign courtiers and advisers 
who accompanied him to England, and whose dictatorial 
pretensions were offensive, no affection and no enthusiasm. 
Any wish or policy that was merely personal to the King or 
suggested by his Hanoverian entourage was quite certain to 
awaken English opposition. 

When, therefore. Count Gyllenborg came to London as the 
ambassador of Charles XII to plead for the friendship of 
EIngland, the circumstances would not have been unfavorable 
to his cause' had it not been for the blind obstinacy of the 
Swedish Eling, whose ships were at the time preying upon 
British commerce in the Baltic. 

The Privateering Ordinance of February 8, 1715, author- 
ized commissions to be issued not only to Swedish but to 
foreign privateers to capture and condemn as prize enemy 
or neutral ships imder conditions that seriously hampered 
all commerce in the Baltic; and many English as well as 
Dutch vessels had been condemned without reasonable 
warning. The result was, that, without the least intention 
to aid the predatory designs of George I as Elector of Han- 
over, a British fleet was sent to the Baltic to compel the re- 
spect of the Swedes for the rights of British commerce; and 



SUPREMACY IN THE NORTH AND IN ITALY 349 

George I was thus enabled to engage privately with the Chap, v 
King of Prussia that it should be used "in support of the i^i^jUj 
operations in Pomerania against Sweden." 

The continued indifference of the King of Sweden to the 
British complaints regarding the injury to neutral commerce The growth 
not unnaturally justified the ministry in treating Sweden as J^J^j^^^ 
an enemy; while, on the other hand, the course of George I Sweden 
in appropriating Bremen and Verden led Charles XII to 
consider him his most treacherous foe. Between the King 
of England and the Elector of Hanover the Swedish King 
made no distinction, with the result that he was less and 
less disposed to make terms with a power that might 
have been of great utility to him at the moment of his 
extremity. 

Great Britain, whose interest it was to maintain political 
equilibrium in the North and to prevent the preponderant 
intrusion of Russia upon the Baltic, was thus insensibly led 
into hostility to Sweden and made the accomplice of Hano- 
verian expansion upon the continent. Without doubt, it 
was to the advantage of England to have so important a port 
as Bremen in the possession of Hanover; and, when Sweden 
was so blindly and incorrigibly unfriendly, it was almost 
inevitable that England should prefer relations with the 
Czar, whose mastery of the Baltic did not at the moment 
appear to be a conspicuous danger. 

A not less important transformation than that which had TheRflceimriB 
taken place in Eagland had occurred in Prance. Determined STAbbT* 
that his influence should survive himself, and resolved to Dubob 
transmit his power to no single individual, Louis XIV had 
refused to appomt Philip V Regent during the minority of 
the child Louis XV, and had put the government of Prance 
in commission. The Council of Regency established by the 
will of the Grand Monarch was composed of the Duke of 
Orleans, the Duke of Bourbon, the Duke of Maine, and the 
Count of Toulouse, with Marshal Villeroy, Huxelles, Tallard, 
and Harcourt, and the existing ministry. Thus, by a smgu- 
lar inconsequence, Louis XIV, the inaugurator of absolute 
monarchy, at his death transferred his authority to a select 



350 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY 

Chap. V oligarchy composed of widely differing elements, with a 
^' ^* prescribed division of powers.^ 

1715 IT^l 

As constituted by Louis XIV, the regency included two 

conflicting parties: the first, an old court party, headed by 
the Duke of Maine and closely associated with Spain, Ultra- 
montane influence, and Madame de Maintenon; the other, 
headed by the Duke of Orleans, inclining toward association 
with the Jansenists, the Parliament, and the younger and 
less satisfied forces in the nation. 

The "Regent" himself, — as Philip of Orleans was soon 
entitled, — intelligent, accomplished, devoid of conscience, 
and dissipated in his habits, was without marked personal 
ambition; but, under the influence of the Abb6 Dubois, who 
had been his preceptor, and other advisers, he resolved to 
form his own council and to undertake the command of the 
military household, which together with the tutelage of the 
young king had been left by the will to the Duke of Maine 
On September 12, 1715, the will of Louis XIV was substan- 
tially set aside, the Duke of Orleans was duly legalized 
as Regent, and the Abb6 Dubois became at first the confi- 
dential, and soon afterward the official, chief counsellor of 
the regency. 

The son of a coimtry physician, Dubois had been educated 
at Paris, at thirty-four had become the preceptor of the 
Duke of Orleans, — at that time the Duke of Chartres, — 
and had obtained a powerful influence over him, which he 
had not ceased to exert. As a secretary of Tallard in London, 
in 1698, he had acquired a taste for diplomacy and some ex- 
perience in it. He had also accompanied the Duke of Or- 
leans during his military campaign in Spain in 1708, when the 
Duke incurred the undying hatred of Philip V on account of 
the popularity he had won, which led to the suspicion on the 
part of the King that the Duke aspired to be a compromise 
candidate for the Spanish throne. 

Upon Dubois' experience in England, and especially the 
friendships that had been formed there, — which included 
an acquaintance with James Stanhope, — and upon the 

» See Laviase, HiMaire de Prance, VIII, Part II, p. 2. 



SUPREMACY IN THE NORTH AND IN ITALY 351 

alienation between Philip V and the Regent, the future of Chap, v 
France and of Europe were soon in great measure to turn; ^' ^' 
for Dubois was deeply impressed with the value for the re- 



gency of an alliance with England, since the Regent, as head 
of a party, was compelled to pursue a policy of his own in 
opposition to the aims of Philip V. 

Although at first occupying only a modest position as a 
councillor in ecclesiastical affairs, Dubois soon became the 
secret director of the foreign relations of France. The 
system adopted by him was entirely different from that 
of Louis XIV; for the stability of the regency, menaced 
by the machinations of the Spanish Court and its French 
adherents, seemed to him to require a new international 
alignment. 

Compelled, as he had been, by Louis XIV to renoimce the The 
throne of France, Philip V had not relinquished the idea of ^^•«»" 
obtaining the regency; and, in case of the death of the infant 
Louis XV, he hoped to place one of his own sons upon the 
French throne. In these plans he was inspired by his second 
wife, Elizabeth Famese, — niece of Francis Duke of Parma, 
and Cosmos, Grand Duke of Tuscany, — who was ambitious 
for her sons, and by the Ahh6 Alberoni, his adventurous prime 
minister. 

An Italian, like the Queen, whose marriage he had brought 
about, Alberoni, the son of a Parmesan gardener, had been 
brought to Spain by Vend6me as a humble but talented ec- 
clesiastic, had won the favor of the all-powerful Princess 
Orsini,* had thereby gained the confidence of Philip V, and 
had risen to the highest place of power in the kingdom. 
With marvellous insight into the needs of the decayed 
monarchy, he had repaired its finances, reorganized its army 
and navy, and cherished the hope of restoring its ancient 
predominance in Europe. 



^ This remarkable woman, known in France as the Prinoesse des 
Ursins, during the period of her power at Madrid may be said to have 
almost governed Spain. The arrival of Elisabeth Famese as Queen 
was, however, the end of her domination and was immediately followed 
by her public disgrace. 



352 



A HISTORY OP DIPLOMACY 



Chap. V 

A. D. 

1715-1731 



negotiatioiM 
of Georte I 
with FlBter 
the Great 



To accomplish his purpose, Alberoni aimed at destro3ring 
Austrian influence and expelling the Austrians from Italy, — 
- which he intended to reconquer for Spain, — overthrowing 
the regency in France, and eventually placmg one of the sons 
of Elizabeth Famese upon the French throne. With Italy 
recovered and France in close alliance with Spain, that mon- 
archy, reinvigorated and reorganized within, would possess 
more than its ancient grandeur. 

The task which Alberoni had set for himself rendered de- 
sirable the friendship of England, which he studiously en- 
deavored to gain; and, on December 14, 1716, Philip V, in 
spite of his aversion to heretics, signed a treaty of commerce 
with England which was intended to supplement the Treaties 
of Utrecht.1 

There was, however, a serious obstacle in the way of a 
close intimacy on the part of England with Spain, which was 
still at war with the Emperor; for George I, who desired the 
support of Charles VI for his claims to the throne of England, 
— to which there was strong opposition in Vienna, — and 
also the Imperial investiture of Bremen and Verden, was not 
disposed to incur the Emperor's disfavor by too close an 
entente with Spain. On the other hand, Charles VI, who was 
seriously menaced by Spain in Italy, was greatly in need of 
the naval support of England. A rapprochement between 
them was thereby facilitated which soon resulted in their 
reciprocal guarantee of their possessions.* Debarred by 
this alliance from the close relations with England desired 
by Alberoni, Philip V, ah^ady in strained relations with 
France on account of his hostility to the Regent, was placed 
in a position of practical isolation. 

While George I was anxious to obtain from Sweden the 
cession of Bremen and Verden for Hanover, he was even more 
solicitous regarding his security upon the throne of England; 
for since his accession the Pretender had been actively plot- 
ting to supplant him, and rebellion aided by conspiracies in 
England was brewing in Scotland, while France was covertly 

1 For the treaty, see Martens, A., Supplement I, p. 111. 

> See the treaty of June 5, 1716, in Dumont, VIII, Part I, p. 476. 



SUPREMACY IN THE NORTH AND IN ITALY 353 

and Spain more openly encouraging James Edward by fur- Chap, v 
niahing him with fmids to promote invasion. ^- ^' 

In his anger with George I on account of his wish to ap- 

propriate Bremen and Verden, Charles XII, it was reported, 
intended to furnish military aid to the Pretender; and, in 
fact, liberal offers had been made to the King of Sweden to 
induce him to furnish troops for the invasion of England, but 
he had refused to accept them. 

To guard against the international conspiracy that was 
forming to accomplish his dethronement, George I was 
negotiating on all sides for recognition and support. He had 
succeeded in winning the EJmperor, the United Provinces, 
and Denmark, but Prussia had declined to take any risks. 

At London,' in March, 1716, the Russian ambassador, 
Kurakin, was informed by Townshend that, if the Czar 
would guarantee the Hanoverian succession, George I would, 
as Eling of England, guarantee the Russian conquests; but, 
on accoimt of the long friendship of England and Sweden, it 
would be necessary first to negotiate with Russia a treaty 
of commerce favorable to English trade in the Baltic, which 
would then render possible a political alliance. England, 
Townshend assured the ambassador, would furnish twelve 
or fifteen war-ships, if Russia would furnish eight or ten 
thousand men, for the purpose of forcing immediate peace 
upon Sweden on terms advantageous to themselves. 

Drafts of treaties were prepared, and EIngland was about 
to embark in open war with her ancient ally; but during 
the delays in completing the negotiations, in August, 1716, 
the Jacobite rebellion was ended, so that the guarantee of the 
Hanoverian succession had ceased to be of first importance. 
With the argument that the aid of Russia was needed against 
Swedish support of the Pretender swept away, there was no 
sufficient groimd on which an offensive alliance with Russia 
agahist Sweden could be defended before the Parliament; 
and thus England was saved from plunging openly into the 
Northern war. 

It was not long, however, before George I comprehended 
what a misfortune it would have been if he had committed 
VOL. in. — 23 



351 



A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY 



Chap. V 
▲. D. 

1715-1731 



The reaction 
against Rue- 
flian intnuion 



The Triple 
Allianoe of 
1717 



England to the support of the Czar agamst Sweden. The 
capture of Wismar and the occupation of Mecklenburg by 
- Russian troops filled him, as it did also other Grerman princes, 
with alarm; and the marriage of the Czar's daughter Anna 
to the Duke of Holstein-Gottorp and his niece with the Duke 
of Mecklenburg, celebrated at Dantzig in the midst of Rus- 
sian troops, added to the fear that Peter the Great had the 
intention of making permanent conquests on the German 
coast of the Baltic.^ 

At London Gyllenborg protested that his master, Charles 
XII, was not in league with the Pretender, that the Privateer- 
ing Ordinance was only meant for Sweden's legitimate pro- 
tection, that satisfaction would be given for damages to 
EIngland's trade, and intimated that Charles XII might be 
induced, in exchange for England's support against Russia, 
to cede Bremen and Verden to Hanover. For a time it seemed 
as if the fear of Russian designs in the Baltic would turn the 
tide in favor of Sweden; but, as usual, Charles XII showed 
no disposition to accept the advice of his ambassador, and 
the negotiations had no result except to temper the instruc- 
tions to Admiral Norris, in command of the Baltic fleet, who 
was directed to send a memorial to the King of Sweden be- 
fore making any attack. As imperturbable as ever, Charles 
XII sent the document back unopened. 

In Hanover the retention of Russian troops in Mecklen- 
burg created a feeling of violent antagonism to the Czar; 
and Bemstorff, George I's Hanoverian minister, is said to 
have proposed the seizure of the Russian ships, and even the 
person of Peter the Great, until his soldiers had evacuated 
Germany. 

In order to deal with such a delicate situation at closer 
range, in spite of objections from his English ministers, 
George I, accompanied by Stanhope, in July, 1716, left 
London for his electorate. He came with a firm determina- 



^ See Ward, Oreat Britain and Hanover, Oxford, 1899, pp. 95, 96. 
Alflo the diplomatic correspondence between England and Russia pub- 
lished in Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, New Series, 
XIV (1900). 



SUFREMACT IN THE NORTH AND IN ITALY 355 

tion not to enter into closer relations with the Czar, whom he Chap, v 
was beginning to regard as a greater menace to the peace of lyj^^^oj 

Germany and to the equilibrium of the North than the King 

of Sweden, then braving the attack of a powerful coalition. 
To all of Peter the Great's proposals, therefore, he resolved 
to turn a deaf ear imtil the Russian troops were withdrawn 
from Grermany. 

In the meantime, the affairs of England had taken on a 
new form. In 1715, nothing had appeared more improbable 
than an alliance between England and France. French 
public opinion and the influence of the old court party were 
imdoubtedly favorable to the Pretender, while the blood 
and treasure so freely expended by France to secure the 
establishment of Philip V on the throne of Spain rendered 
logical a warm sympathy between those two monarchies. 

The ambition of Philip V to become the Regent of France 
and to control the succession in the interest of one of his sons 
in the event of the young king's death, and the existence of 
a strong party in France in favor of Philip V's designs seri- 
ously complicated the relations of the Duke of Orleans with 
Spain. To overcome the opposition to himself as Regent, 
it was necessary for him either to yield to the wishes of 
Philip V regarding the succession or to coimterbalance his 
influence by some new form of policy. 

In the situation then existing George I and the Regent 
each needed external support; the former to secure his suc- 
cession against the ambitions of the Pretender, the latter to 
protect the regency against the opposition of Philip V. An 
alliance between George I and the Regent would have the 
effect, on the one hand, of preventing France from uniting 
with Spain to sustain the claims of the Pretender, and on the 
other, of affording to the Duke of Orl^ns a means of neu- 
tralizii^ the hostility of the King of Spain to the regency. 

Although this policy was the reverse of that which had 
become traditional, it commended itself to the Abb6 Dubois 
as possessing a practical advantage for the Regent; and he, 
therefore, urged its adoption. As England and the United 
Provinces were already in close alliance, and Holland fur- 



366 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY 

Chap. V nished a convenient avenue of approach, it was decided that 
A. D. ^ Franco-Dutch entente should be the first step to be taken 

in the new direction. Accordingly, the French ambassador 

at The Hague, Ch&teauneuf, in May, 1716, was instructed 
to open with the Grand Pensionaiy negotiations upon the 
subject of an alliance, and at the same time to pay court to 
the merchants of Amsterdam; while Dubois renewed tus 
acquaintance with James Stanhope by opening a friendly 
correspondence with him. 

When it was learned at Versailles that George I and Stan- 
hope would pass through The Hague on their way to Han- 
over, in July, 1716, Dubois, travelling imder the disguise 
of a private collector of rare books and manuscripts, under- 
took a secret mission to The Hague, where as if by accident 
he intercepted Stanhope, with whom he had a number of 
personal interviews, at last leading up to the subject of an 
Anglo-French alliance.^ 

Stanhope's first demand, before entering upon negotiations^ 
was that the Pretender should be expelled from France, 
whither he had returned since the failure of his cause in 
Scotland. He also pointed out that it would be difficult for 
the King of England to accept the Treaty of Utrecht as a 
basis for a future alliance, since George I was already the 
ally of Charles VI, who had never recognized that treaty. 

Undeterred by these obstacles, Dubois succeeded in ob- 
taining the assent of Stanhope and of the King to a further 
discussion. In the following August, fiunished with full 
powers to negotiate, he proceeded to Hanover; and there 
lodgmg in the same house with Stanhope in relations of closest 
intimacy, the terms of a Franco-English alliance were, after 
an interesting diplomatic battle, finally agreed upon. 

At the price of abandoning the Pretender and demolishing 
Mardyk, Dubois obtained on October 10, 1716, the confir- 
mation by England of the Treaties of Utrecht; thus securing 
for the Regent England's guarantee of the exclusion of the 
Spanish Bourbons from the throne of France, which prac- 

^ See the full aooount of these interviews and of the succeeding nego- 
tiiLtions in Bourgeois, Le secret du Bigent, p. 95 et seq. 



SUPRBB1A.CY IN THE NORTH AND IN ITALY 357 

tically assured the succession to the Duke of Orleans in case Chap, v 
of the death of the infant king. On the other hand, the treaty --.j^j^, . 

procured for Geoi^ I the French support of the Hanoverian 

succession against the Stuart pretensions, and thereby a free 
hand in pursuing his interests in his electorate.^ 

Returning to The Hague, on January 4, 1717, Dubois 
obtained from the States General their adherence to the 
treaty signed at Hanover, thus creating the Triple Alliance 
of England, France, and the United Provinces.^ 

If the Triple Alliance of 1717 served the purpose of the Bffeote of 
Regent in creating for him a formidable defence against the ^J^l^ 
designs of Philip V and Alberoni, it was still more useful to i7i7 
George I and his Hanoverian ambitions. With the support 
of the Elmperor, secured, in the previous summer, and that 
of France and Holland, England was now free from anxiety 
regarding the succession, and George I could bring pressure 
upon Prussia in his opposition to Peter the Great. In truth, 
the Triple Alliance of 1717 was Stanhope's triumph, making 
England the virtual arbiter of Europe, and placing in the 
hands of George I the balance of power in the North. 

Hostile as the Whigs had been to the Treaties of Utrecht, 
they now began to perceive their value to England. They 
had not only accomplished the main object of the long and 
costly war to prevent the union of France and Spain, they had 
incidentally secured the Protestant succession, improved the 
commercial position of Great Britain, and made George I 
predominant on the continent. It was in vain, therefore, 
that the extreme Whigs, under the lead of Townshend, de- 
nounced Stanhope's diplomacy as Hanoverian rather than 
English. Whatever its leading motive, it placed the King 
of England in the ascendency and gave that country the 
first place in international influence. 

In France the effect was different. While the Triple Alli- 
ance secured allies for the R^ent, it did not satisfy the pre- 
vailing sentiment of the French nation, which was strongly 
Jacobite and favorable to close relations with Spain. To 

^ For the text, see Lamberty, IX, p. 660. 

> For the treaty, see Dumont, VIII, Part I, p. 484. 



358 



A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY 



Chap. V 

A. D. 

1716-1731 



Britiih ap- 
proval of 
Stanhope** 



the French public the alliance seemed mysterious and in- 
comprehensible; but by the few who knew of the secret mis- 
- sion of Louviile to Spain for the purpose of sounding and if 
possible conciliating Philip V, which had resulted in igno- 
minious failure, the new alliance was imderstood to be a 
necessary part of the Regent's system of self-defence.* 

In a certain sense, the poUcy initiated by the alliance with 
England was personal and secret, primarily conceived in the 
private interest of the Regent. His position in France was 
new and peculiar. Under Louis XIV the foreign policy of 
France was openly and frankly dynastic, for the interest 
of the nation was assumed to be, as the absolutist theory of 
government required, the interest of the sovereign, who re- 
garded the kingdom as his property. But the regency was 
merely a public office, and the R^ent himself only the first 
servant of the State. Still, aspiring to the throne, and tem- 
porarily representing it, he had need of power and prestige, 
which without a personal policy it was impossible for him 
to obtain. Hence the development of a secret diplomacy 
alongside the public and official diplomacy, which it aimed 
covertly and indirectly either to guide and direct or clandes- 
tinely to obstruct and render abortive. While Marshal 
d'Huxelles, who had displaced Torcy at the head of the coun- 
cil for foreign affairs, prepared the official instructions, it 
was henceforth Dubois who saw to it that they were executed 
as he and the Regent personally desired. 

The opposition of Townshend and of his brother-in-law, 
Horace Walpole, at that time British charge d'affaires at 
The Hague, to the Triple Alliance was based on the assump- 
tion that Stanhope's diplomacy was merely personal to 
George I rather than national. "That war of the North," 
Townshend had exclaimed, "will be our ruin"; and Horace 
Walpole had declared, "I do not see why the whole system 
of Europe should be turned upside down on account of Meck- 
lenburg." But the King was firm in his decision, and the 
efforts to arouse opposition had no result, except to dis- 

^ For aa account of Louyille's zniasion, see Bourgeois, Le secret du 
RSgerUf p. 64 et seq. 



SUPREMACY IN THE NORTH AND IN ITALY 359 

credit Stanhope's opponents.^ In Holland Heinsius had Chap. V 
o£Fered a like resistance; but public opinion had overwhehned jy^^'-ji 

him, and the commercial advantages which it secured to 

the Republic placed the seal of approval upon the Triple 
Alliance. 

The participation of Holland in the new combination 
of powers served to mask the personal character of Stan- 
hope's and Dubois' negotiations; for, on the one hand, 
it prevented the Whigs from asserting that George I was 
being subordinated by France as Charles II had been by 
Louis XIV; and, on the other, it enabled the Regent to point 
to the Triple Alliance as a safeguard to European peace. 

In the middle of January, 1717, Greorge I returned to Lon- 
don, and early in February public feeling was set ablaze by 
the startling annoimcement that the Swedish ambassador. 
Count Gyllenborg, had been arrested in London and his 
papers seized. A short time afterward Baron G6rtz, the chief 
adviser of Charles XII, was by order of the States General 
at the request of George I detained and imprisoned at Am- 
heim, while on his way from Holland to Germany, and his 
papers also were taken from him.^ 

Such a double violation of the law of nations caused a great 
commotion, which was not diminished when it was dis- 
covered that the correspondence related to a plot on the part 
of Gyllenborg, Gdrtz, and Sparre, the Swedish ambassador 
in Paris, to support the cause of the Pretender by landing 
in Scotland twelve thousand Swedish soldiers; and it was 
reported that Charles XII was already preparing ships for 
their transp)ortation.' 

The menace of foreign invasion caused liberal appropria- 
tions to be made by the Parliament for the national defence 



^ Townahend was soon afterward dismissed from the Northern De- 
partment and Paul Methuen took his place. 

' Notwithstanding much urgency, the papers were not sent to Eng- 
land but placed under seal and retained in Holland. 

' Some knowledge of the plot had long been possessed by the British 
government, the correspondence having been sjrstematically opened 
and examined. 



360 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY 

Cbap. v and silenced for the time the criticism of Stanhope's diplo- 
i7i&-mi '^^^^^y- It was undeniable that Great Britain was being drawn 
into the operations against Sweden through Hanover's ac- 



ofOAite 



quisition of Bremen and Verden, but this was now offset by 
the exposure of what was denounced as an attack on English 
liberty. ''How can the King of Sweden better secure him- 
self the recovery and possession of his duchy/' Grdrtz had 
Written in a letter to Gyllenborg, "than by reducing King 
George to be nothing more than an elector of the Empire?" 
The Swedish opposition to George I had, indeed, been pro- 
voked by his conduct as Elector of Hanover; but it was now, 
as it appeared, acting against him as King of England, and 
had assumed the form of an assault upon the Protestant 
succession. 
The dadgoB There was both truth and error in the conclusions of the 
English people regarding the disclosures made by the inter- 
cepted correspondence of G5rtz and Gyllenborg. 

George Henry Baron von Gortz, descended from a noble 
Franconian family, had at the beginning of the century, 
entered into the service of the Duke of Holstein-Gottorp, 
by whom he was held in great esteem. But the little duchy 
offered too limited a field for the abilities and ambitions of 
this extraordinary man, who greatly admired Charles XII; 
and, at the time of Sweden's lowest estate, G5rtz passed into 
his service. 

Feared and hated by the Swedish people as a meddling 
foreigner, Gortz nevertheless enjoyed from the first the com- 
plete confidence of Charles XII, and became so powerful in 
the State, although nominally in the employ of the Duke 
of Holstein, that he was called in Sweden the King's "Grand 
Vizier." 

Perceiving that, with the sea-power of Great Britain and 
the land-power of Russia combined against her, Sweden must 
eventually be completely at their mercy, G6rtz had resolved 
to eliminate either Peter the Great or George I from the 
coahtion against Sweden, and then to turn all the force of 
the kingdom against the remaining enemy. 

Of the two antagonists Peter the Great seemed the more 



SUPREMACY IN THE NORTH AND IN ITALY 361 

likely to make terms which Charles XII would accept. The Chap, v 
Czar had been seriously offended with the demand of George ^"^Vq 
I that the Russian troops be driven out of Grermany; and it 



was believed that in return for some concessions to Russia 
on the Baltic he would be inclined to permit Sweden to 
compensate herself for her losses there by the annexation of 
Norway at the expense of Denmark. 

To carry out his scheme of making terms with one or the 
other of the chief antagonists of Sweden, and also in the hope 
of raising a loan of money, in the month of July, 1716, — 
about the same time as Dubois' first interviews with Stan- 
hope, — Gortz had established himself at The Hague.^ 

In choosing The Hague as the scene of his efforts to save Tbe 
Sweden from ruin Gortz merely followed the example of all ^^^^^ 
who wished to survey Europe from its political centre; for 
Holland was at that time not only the seat of publicity, 
where gazettes were published and the news of the world 
first made known, but The Hague was then considered the 
most important diplomatic post in Europe, from which all 
the great capitals were easily accessible, and where all the 
powers were in the habit of sending their most mature and 
sagacious diplomatists.* 

Upon his arrival at The Hague Gortz had made his first 
visit to ChAteauneuf, the veteran representative of France, 
to whom he proposed that the Regent should mediate a peace 
between Sweden and Russia. It was the moment when the 
Triple Alliance was forming, and the Regent was disinclined 
to intervene, on the ground that it would "give umbrage 
to the allies of the North." 

At the same time the Russian ambassador, Eurakin, had 
applied to ChAteauneuf to conclude an alliance between 
France, Russia, Prussia, and Frederick Augustus I of Poland, 
"or such other princes of the Empire as the Regent might 



^ For the endeavors of Gdrtz to obtain loans of money in Holland for 
Sweden, see Chance, George I and the Northern War, pp. 157, 162. 

' The Hague in the eighteenth century has been justly described as 
''Le rendex-vous des ambitions, la foire des nouvelles, I'auberge de 
I'Europe politique et politiquante." 



362 A HISTORY OP DIPLOMACY 

Chap. V judge good." But the Regent did not wish to be drawn into 
1715-1731 ^^^ Northern war, and Eurakin had received the answer 

that France was willing to negotiate with Russia a treaty of 

commerce, but was not disposed to form any new political 
relations. 

The truth was, that the regency had in fact abandoned 
Sweden to its fate, and was aligning itself with the Anglo- 
German interests. On September 17, 1716, a secret treaty 
with Prussia had committed France to support the surrender 
by Sweden of Stettin, Usedom, and Wollin to Frederick 
William I,^ and the Triple Alliance had soon afterward bound 
the regency to defend the claims of Hanover against Sweden. 

Thus debarred from obtaining the mediation of France, 
Gortz decided upon a double negotiation with Russia and 
England, in which he hoped to play off the one against the 
other, in order to make peace with the one that would accept 
the terms least disadvantageous to Charles XII. 

In this decision Gortz displayed his prudence, for these 
were the only really dangerous antagonists of Sweden, being 
the centres of two groups of powers whose interests were dif- 
ferent and even opposed: first, Denmark and Hanover, which 
had drawn England into the fray; and, second, Russia, 
Prussia, and Poland. The first group was interested in se- 
curing the Baltic and North Sea ports; the second, in strip- 
ping Sweden of the Baltic provinces. But neither Denmark 
and Hanover on the one hand, nor Prussia and Poland on 
the other, would by themselves constitute a serious menace 
to Sweden. 

While Gyllenborg had been striving to conciliate the Eng- 
lish ministry at London, Gortz had used every effort to open 
negotiations with Peter the Great. Already in possession of 
Livonia, Ingria, Carelia, and a part of Finland, with a fleet 
of thirty vessels at his command, the Czar was in fact al- 
ready master of the Baltic. By making peace with him 
Gortz hoped to save the Swedish possessions in Grermany. 

To promote his plan Gortz boldly gave out that he was 

^ The secret treaty is printed by Droysen, Oeachichte der preus- 
nachen P<diHk, IV, 2, 1, p. 179. 



SUPREMACY IN THE NORTH AND IN ITALY 363 

already in negotiation with the Czar's agents; but, in fact, Chap, v 
up to the time of his arrest and the loss of his papers he had j-.V^L^i 
received no other encouragement than mere rumors that 



Peter the Great was disposed toward peace and would grant 
him an audience when he came to Holland on his approach- 
ing visit to Western Europe. 

For the moment Gortz had been placed in great embarrass- The jaoointe 
ment. He had expected to raise a loan of money in Holland, "^*'^*^ 
to procure French mediation with Russia, and through 
Gyllenborg to carry on negotiations with England; but all 
his plans had ended in failure. Hemmed in by his enemies 
on the Baltic, Charles XII had made a bold dash to master 
Norway, then held by the Danes; for thus he hoped, if com- 
X)elledto suffer losseson the inlandsea,to open for his kingdom 
a greater future on the Atlantic. The lack of means had 
compelled his retreat, but the movement had the advantage 
of indicating to the Czar that Charles XII had turned from 
the defence of his Baltic provinces to obtain compensation 
from Denmark, and that freedom to pursue that enterprise 
might be bought by peace with Russia. 

For Charles XII money had now become a pressing ne- 
cessity, and Gortz in his desperation began to think of ob- 
taining it from the adherents of the Pretender, who were 
numerous in France and Scotland and by no means entirely 
discouraged even in England itself. To promote this scheme, 
Sparre at Paris and Gyllenborg at London were directed by 
Gortz to sound the disposition of the Jacobites. The Pre- 
tender himself was known to be actively plotting at Avignon, 
where under papal protection he was holding his little court 
as "James III, King of Great Britain and Ireland." On 
October 23, 1716, Gyllenborg sent word to Gortz that Sweden 
must renounce Bremen and Verden or overthrow the Hano- 
verian d3masty; which, on account of the general dissatis- 
faction with the government, could, he represented, be easily 
accomplished. Ten thousand Swedish troops with arms for 
fifteen or twenty thousand English and Scotch revolutionists, 
would be sufficient to overthrow George I and establish James 
Edward in the kingdom. A few days later he informed Gortz 



364 



A mSTOBT OF DIPLOBCACT 



Gs4P. y 

A.D. 

1715-1731 



The Csv'a 
attempt to 
■Mura A 
Franob 



that he had conferred with the Jacobite leaders in London, 
who were ready to send to The Hague or to Sweden, as might 
- be preferred, sixty thousand pounds sterling for the expedi- 
tion, if they could have a word from Charles XII promising 
his aid. Similar assurances were soon afterward received 
by Gortz through Sparre from Avignon. 

In the meantime Gdrtz had obtained from Charles XII 
his written permission to make "a loan of money from any 
source, and upon any conditions, that would be for the ser- 
vice and interest of his master"; but Charles XII had in no 
way entered into the conspiracy regarding the Pretender, 
and Gortz dared not in the King's name undertake to sign 
or promise a contract of the kind demanded. 

When, therefore, the English government apprehended 
Gyllenborg, although the correspondence with the Jacobites 
disclosed a Swedish intention to borrow money and a Jacobite 
intention to purchase Swedish aid for the Pretender, it did 
not convict the King of Sweden of personal complicity with 
the Jacobites. On the contrary, the correspondence itself 
showed plainly, as was the fact, that pains had been taken to 
conceal from Charles XII the real nature of the transaction 
Gortz was endeavoring to negotiate. It was intended by 
the conspirators, if England were actually to be invaded by 
Swedish troops, to employ some other motive for the inva- 
sion, in order to obtain the King's consent.^ 

In December, 1716, Peter the Great had arrived at Am- 
sterdam and remained in Holland until the following April, 
engaged in securing artisans and sailors and in trying to 
borrow money to complete his navy. Between Russia, 
which was threatening to absorb or control the Baltic trade, 
and England, which was now convinced that Sweden was 
conspiring with the Pretender to overthrow the Hanoverian 
dynasty, the position of Charles XII was, indeed, desperate.* 

^ See for the complot, Chance, as before, pp. 167, 1S4; Syveton, 
Ueirrewr de G&rU in Revue d'Histoire Diplomatique, IX (1895) and X 
(1906); and Lemontey, Hittoire de la Riffence, II, p. 386. 

' Although war had not been formally declared upon Sweden by 
England, on April 2, 1717, a British fleet had sailed for the Baltic 
under command of Sir George Byng, with orders "to join in all opera- 



SUPRE5MACY IN THE NORTH AND IN ITALY 365 

If British commerce could have been protected, Gortz and Chap, v 
Gyllenborg disavowed, and Bremen ceded to Hanover, the j^.^^U. 

treaties of friendship between England and Sweden might 

have been renewed and the navy of England employed for 
the recovery of the Swedish provinces, the possession of 
which by the Czar was a menace to Great Britain's Baltic 
trade. It was the fear of such an agreement that made Peter 
the Great anxious for a French alliance; but Charles XII 
was too much blinded by resentment toward George I, and 
by his determination to yield to no one, to seek or accept con- 
ciliation with England. On the contrary, he demanded the 
immediate surrender of Gyllenborg; and Jackson, the English 
minister at Stockholm, was at once arrested, to be held until 
the Swedish minister was delivered to Charles XII. 

It was in these circumstances that Peter the Great made 
his famous visit to Paris in April, 1717. The Regent would 
have preferred that he remain in Holland, for he had no 
desire to enter into political relations with the enemy of 
George I, nor, in fact, to take any part in the northern 
embroglio.^ But courtesy to so powerful a sovereign could 
not be prudently withheld, and the Czar was received at 
Paris with marked civility, ffited and banqueted, with his 
numerous suite, who bore away the most vivid impressions 
of the charms and delights of Parisian hospitality.* 

It was not, however, for pleasure that the Czar had come 



tioDs with the Dane^ as may most effectually annoy the Swedish fleet 
and prevent their oomitry from being supplied with provisions." If 
the Russians asked his help, he was to reply, that the friendship of Hia 
Majesty with the Emperor would not permit aiding them while Rusman 
troops remained in the Empire. See Chance, George I and the Northern 
War, pp. 214, 215. 

^ The Czar also had been suspected of complicity in the Jacobite 
conspiracy against George I, but although this suspicion had been 
removed (see the correspondence in Guichen, Pierre le Grand el le pro- 
mier traiU FranahRuseef pp. 103, 127), the relations between George I 
and Peter the Great continued to be imf riendly on account of the reten^ 
tion of Russian troops in Mecklenburg. 

' For a detailed account of his reception, see Le Glay, Lee ariginee 
hietoriques de VaUiance fran^iae, p. 221 et seq.; and Guichen, Pierre 
le Grand, p. 166 et seq. 



366 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY 

Chap, v to Paris. He had been successful in the war with Sweden, 
^^- and he was seeking an ally who would help him to retain the 

spoils he had won. In the possession of these he felt himself 

to be far from secure; for England and Hanover were hostile 
to Russia, the Emperor was in alliance with England, Den- 
mark was as much opposed to Russia as to Sweden, and 
since the presence of Russian troops in Germany Frederick 
Augustus I of Poland had mistrusted the Czar's designs and 
had been seeking closer relations with George I. Thus, 
Peter the Great found himself in danger of complete isolation 
in the North, with the chance of a strong combination against 
him. 

Before his arrest and imprisonment, Gortz had visited 
Paris and laid siege to the Regent to obtain his mediation 
with Russia, but in vain. At an earlier period the Regent, 
fearing the Czar's possible union with the Hapsburgs,-had 
endeavored to approach him with a view to an understand- 
ing, and Prussia had used good offices to promote this end; ^ 
but since the conclusion of the Triple Alliance in the previous 
January the situation had entirely changed. 

Up to the moment of this last event, the regency had been 

deeply interested in the prospect of an alliance with Russia, 

even though it might involve the ruin of Sweden. Subsidies 

had, indeed, been continually supplied by France to Charles 

XII; * but the weakness of Sweden had greatly diminished 

the value of that kingdom as a foil to be used against the 

flmperor, and it was hoped that Russia and Prussia might in 

futiu-e serve the purpose for which the Swedes, along with 

the Turks and Hungarians, had been employed by Louis 

XIV. The Triple Alliance had, however, r^idered this plan 

impracticable. 

Tbenofo- The approaches of France to Russia had already so far 

^J^^ committed the Regent before the Triple Alliance was con- 

RuMi* eluded that the blank refusal of an entente would have given 



^ For these negotiatioiis, see Vassileff, RiMsischrfranzdsiache Politik, 
pp. 63, 71. 

> These subsidies had been promised to Charles XII at Bender by 
a treaty of September 1, 1712. 



SUPREMACY IN THE NORTH AND IN ITALY 367 

offence to Peter the Great; and the Regent was, therefore, Chap, v 
disposed to act with caution. Huxelles had strongly favored i^^v^rrsi 

close political relations with Russia and was opposed to the 

Triple Alliance, which he disliked and would have been 
pleased to destroy. Dubois, on the contrary, was determined 
that no political alliance should be made with the Czar 
which would be offensive to George I; maintaining that 
Russia was a distant power, whose predominance in the 
North, even if it could be made useful to France, was not 
certam to be continued when Peter the Great should pass 
away and his unpromising son should succeed him. 

In this contest between the official and the secret diplo- 
macies of France, it was Dubois who bore off the palm of 
victory. To him the one important matter was to maintain 
intact the Treaties of Utrecht, which barred the Spanish 
Boiu-bons from the throne of France; and the Anglo-Dutch 
alliance was for this purpose the mainstay of the regency. 

It was from this point of view that the negotiations with 
Russia were to be conducted. Since it was necessary for 
France to take a position regarding the crisis in the North, 
Dubois was resolved that it must be taken for the benefit of 
the Triple Alliance, or at least in such a manner as not to 
disturb that comer-stone of the Regent's system. It was 
between Sweden and England, therefore, rather than between 
Sweden and Russia that France was now most anxious to 
make peace.^ 

When negotiations were resmned by Peter the Great in 
person at Paris, his zeal for an alliance with France became 
from day to day more and more manifest. Russia was ready, 
he said, in all respects, to be to France more than Sweden had 
ever been; and, in fact, since that empire had fallen, to take 
its place m the French S3rstem. He asked nothing from France 
that had not already been accorded to Sweden. The subsi- 



^ See the mstructions to La Marck, the French ambassador to 
Sweden, who, on March 7, 1717, was ordered to urge Charles XII to 
make peace. Geffroy, Instnictions aux ambassadeurSf etc., II, Sudde, 
p. 283. 



Amsterdam 



A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY 

Chap. V dies France had paid to Charles XII had brought no return; 
^•"- but if paid to Russia, he argued, they would procxu^ the 

friendly and efficient cooperation of a really powerful ally 

in the North, great commercial advantages, and in addition 
the support of Prussia and Poland, already allied with 
Russia. 

But it was not a question of what Russia could or would 
do for France. The intention of the regency was fixed and 
unalterable, — nothing could be undertaken that would in 
the least endanger the Triple Alliance. 
The TiMty of Wlthout the intention of forming any political compact, 
and merely with a view of retaining his friendship, after the 
Czar's departure from Paris the Regent directed ChAteau- 
neuf to- reopen negotiations with him at Amsterdam, but to 
make no haste in reaching a conclusion. 

Much time was spent in wrangling over pmrely ceremonial 
questions, — the French firmly refusing to accord to Peter 
the Great the title "Majesty Czarienne" proposed by Kura- 
kin; — but a treaty was finally concluded on August 15, 
1717, in behalf of France, Russia, and Prussia,^ which was 
in reality neither one of alliance nor even of commerce. 
No binding future obligations were undertaken, except that 
by the secret articles Russia was to guarantee the Treaties of 
Utrecht and Baden, and France was to guarantee the peace 
that should be made in the North, but only after it should 
have been concluded by the previous agreement of the 
powers. 

In brief, the compact was, as it was intended by Dubois 
that it should be, entirely illusory. It was of such a nature 
that even the secret articles could be at once shown to Eng- 
land and Holland without giving the slightest occasion for 
offence; and this disclosm*e appears to have been promptly 
made, much to the disgust of Peter the Great, who upon 
learning of it declared that until he knew in what manner the 
contents of the treaty had been divulged he could enter 
into no further negotiations with France.* 

» For the treaty, see Dumont, VIII, Part I, p. 490. 
' Campredon to Dubois, in Sbomik, XL, p. 410. 



SUPREMACY IN THE NORTH AND IN ITALY 369 

Thus, Russia, except for the alliance of Prussia, was left Csap. v 
in isolation, while confronted by the growing hostility of her j^j^^y,. 

former allies in the North. These had been rendered dis 

trustful by the Franco-Russian negotiations, for they feared 
that France might be secretly furnishing to Russia financial 
aid that would seriously affect them; but they were soon re- 
assured upon this point. The true natm*e of the Treaty of 
Amsterdam was not difficult to infer when, soon after its 
terms were settled, the Czar withdrew his troops from 
Mecklenburg. The aggressive period of the coalition against 
Sweden was now ended, and the failure of Peter the Great 
to obtain from France the support he desired may be con- 
sidered the first decisive step toward the pacification of the 
North.1 



II. The Quadbuple Alliance and the Peace of Nystad 

In the negotiations of France with Peter the Great, Dubois, Dubois* 
having already become a member of the Council for Foreign ^^^ 
Affairs, had gained another triumph. The chief need of iMofioatiott 
France at the time was repose; and the r61e of the regency, 
if it was to render the Regent in the eyes of Ehurope the 
most eligible ruler of that monarchy, was that of a general 
peacemaker. 

This, then, was the policy which Dubois intended to pur- 
sue: in conjimction with England and the United Provinces 
to render permanent the Peace of Utrecht; and to complete 
it by composing the affairs of the North through French 
mediation, and those of Italy through the reconciliation by 
Elngland of Charles VI and Philip V upon the basis of the 
existing treaties. Personal as it was in its leading motive, 
the end sought was not unworthy of high statesmanship. 
It was intended to prove to Europe that France under the 
regency was to be no longer a disturber of the public peace, 
but the most imselfish and beneficent of peacemakers. The 



1 Although the Treaty of Amsterdam gave Peter the Great little 
satisfaction, it marked the beginning of permanent diplomatic relations 
between France and Russia. 
VOL. m. — 24 



370 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY 

Crap. V e£Fect of such a policy, it was calculated, would be to render 
^- ^' the Duke of Orleans in the eyes of all the nations necessary 
to the maintenance of the peace of Europe. 

What then were the obstacles to the execution of this mag- 
nificent programme? First of all, the hostility of Charles VI 
and Philip V; and second, the desire of the powers of the 
North to appropriate the spoils of Sweden. The two ob- 
structions to Dubois' pacific policy, though far removed in 
space, were intimately coimected in the realm of action; and, 
in fact, so closely interlaced as to present one complex Euro- 
pean problem. The future of the Baltic and the futiu^ of 
the Mediterranean were linked together in a manner that 
rendered them inseparable. 

The bond of union between the questions relating to the 
Baltic and the Mediterranean was the identification of the 
interests of the regency and of England. The hopes of 
the Regent himg upon the exclusion of the Spanish branch of 
the House of Bourbon from the throne of France. For this 
purpose the Treaties of Utrecht, which guaranteed the re- 
nunciation of Philip y, must be maintained; and for this the 
alliance with Elngland was necessary. It was, therefore, the 
secret intention of the Regent to maintain the Triple Alliance^ 
which was possible only by serving the Elnglish interests. 

In the North the interest of England was to secure its 
commerce in the Baltic both against Swedish depredations 
and Russian domination; but the interest of George I was 
also, as Elector of Hanover, to obtain permanent possession 
of Bremen and Verden for his electorate; and to acquire 
this advantage for Hanover all the influence of Great Britain 
was likely to be drawn into the conflict. 

In the Mediterranean the interest of England was, first 
of all, to retain Gibraltar and Port Mahon, taken from Spain; 
and second, to maintain a balance between the claims of the 
Emperor Charles VI and Philip V in Italy. 

Thus far neither of these contestants had abated any part 
of his pretensions. Charles VI had not recognized Philip V 
as King of Spain, and demanded as a condition new aggran- 
dizements in Italy, — Sicily, the sovereignty of Parma and 



SUPREMACY IN THE NORTH AND IN ITALY 371 

Tuscany, dear to the heart of EHizabeth Famese, and the Chap, v 
cession of Montferrat and a part of the Duchy of Milan for ,7.^^73, 

the Duke of Savoy. Philip V, on the other hand, would yield 

to none of these demands. 

Two valiant and capable diplomatists were pitted against The Mhemes 
Dubois and Stanhope in this battle for peace. In the North ^^^*°^ 
Gortz, liberated from captivity, conceived the bold idea of 
a reconciliation between Sweden and the Czar by sacrificing 
the Baltic provinces then in his possession, in order with his 
support to turn all the force of Sweden toward the conquest 
of Norway, thus making Sweden an Atlantic rather than 
merely a Baltic state, with the wide ocean for its horizon.* 

In the South Alberoni was busy with the regeneration of 
Spain. The army and navy were undergoing reorganization 
and the finances had been placed upon a soimd foundation. 
His policy was to rehabilitate and extend the entire Spanish 
monarchy, which with all its vast colonial interests was not 
only to be kept intact, but the disposal made of the Spanish 
possessions in Italy by the Treaties of Utrecht ^as to be 
challenged, and the treaties themselves were to be nullified 
by force of arms. 

While the regency had prepared the way through its treaty 
with Peter the Great for mediating a peace in the North 
that would serve the interest of England, Stanhope had in 
return undertaken to promote a reconciliation between the 
Emperor and the King of Spain, which by leaving Philip V 
secure on his Spanish throne would prevent his eligibility for 
that of France. 

For this task England was in a favorable position, for the 
alliance with the Emperor opened the door for such media- 
tion at Vienna, and the desire of Alberoni to win or neutralize 
the influence of England rendered intimacy with the British 
representative welcome at Madrid. He was instructed to 
urge upon Alberoni the importance of reconciliation with 
the flmperor, proposing to Philip V for one of his sons the 



^ There were in the meantime inconsequential negotiations con- 
ducted by the Holstein-Gottorp minister, Fabrice, for which see Chance, 
George I and the Northern War, pp. 240, 251. 



372 A HISTORY OP DIPLOMACY 

Gbap. v Duchy of Panxia and Piacenza, if he would abandon France 
^* ^' to the Regent and Italy to the Emperor; and at the same time 

the ambassador at Vienna was directed to induce Charles 

VI to recognize Philip V. 

At Madrid the British proposal was coldly received. 
Dubois would have added Sardinia to the bribe; but Stan- 
hope opposed this, on the ground that, if the Eknperor took 
Sicily, as he demanded, Sardinia must be reserved as com- 
pensation to the Duke of Savoy, who would by this transac- 
tion be divested of Sicily, already in his possession. 
Tbe imeipit»- The project of a general peace was now menaced by re- 
tion of the newed preparations for war. Relations between the flmperor 
and Philip V had been recently strained anew by the arrest 
and imprisonment at Milan of Molines, the Grand Inquisitor 
of Spain, while travelling with a passport from the Pope, 
and the seizure of his papers by the Imperialists. Urged 
on by Elizabeth Famese, Philip V thought the occasion ripe 
for the recovery of Italy, and in August, 1717, Spanish forces 
occupied Sardinia, which Philip V refused to evacuate. 

War bemg thus actively renewed, the attitude of the powers 
was soon defined. England was already bound by the treaty 
with the Emperor to defend his claims in Italy. Spain must, 
therefore, be opposed; and Alberoni, whose policy was to 
destroy the Treaties of Utrecht, must be vanquished.^ 

Would France also take sides with the Emperor against 
Philip V? That would be a complete inversion of the policy 
of Louis XIV; and, in effect, a revival with the aid of France 
itself of the Grand Alliance which had opposed the attempt 
to place Philip V upon the Spanish throne. 

In France the government of the Regent was beset with 
serious difficulties. Neither the economies suggested by 
Noailles nor the credit promised by the Scotch adventurer 
John Law, had saved his administration from vigorous cen- 
sure. In addition there were religious difficulties growing 
out of strained relations with Rome. Behind all was the 



^ For the contention that the alliance with the Emperor was itself 
a violation of the neutrality of Italy on the part of England, see Bour- 
geois, Le secret du RSgent, p. 203. 



SUPREMACY IN THE NORTH AND IN ITALY 373 

antagonism of those who condemned the Triple Alliance as Chap, v 
a surrender to England. There was, however, but one way i^j^j^gi 



to overcome this opposition, namely, to move straight for- • 
ward and insist upon the policy of pacification in the face 
of all obstacles. To retreat was now impossible, and to ad- 
vance in any direction without England was equally so. To 
abandon the Triple Alliance was to surrender the Treaties 
of Utrecht, and the abrogation of those treaties would be a 
death-blow to the hopes of the regency. If war must come, 
the Regent determined to place France in opposition to the 
ambitions of Elizabeth Famese and Alberoni, and to compel 
Philip V to recede from his pretensions. 

Fortunately for the prospects of the peace policy, the war The embu^ 
in Italy was not yet in the full tide of activity, for the Em- ^^^^^ 
peror had ^ot taken the steps he would be obliged to take stanhope 
if peace could not be obtained by mutual concession. In 
the North there was also a lull in the conflict; for, upon re- 
gaining his liberty, Gortz had met the Czar in Holland, had 
offered him large concessions for the sake of peace with Rus- 
sia, and to Frederick William I the cession of Stettin, if 
Prussia would aid Sweden in regaining Bremen and Verden. 
Both Peter the Great and the King of Prussia had listened 
with interest to the seductions of Gortz, and conferences 
were soon to be held for the purpose of negotiating a peace 
between Sweden, Russia, and Prussia. 

There was still a chance, therefore, for a general pacifica- 
tion; but it was rendered difficult by Alberoni's warlike 
operations in the South and Gortz's peace proposals in the 
North. 

Stanhope, not less than Dubois, was seriously embarrassed 
by the situation; for while he had failed to reconcile the 
Ehnperor and Philip V, Dubois had proved equally powerless 
to disengage England from the embroglio in the Baltic, and 
the Hanoverian policy of Stanhope was creating an amount 
of criticism in England which threatened to wreck the 
ministry. 

Through his influence with the Regent Dubois' policy of Dubois' ymt 
peace had now become official in France, but for this reason *® ^^^^**^^ 



374 A HISTORY OP DIPLOMACY 

Chap. V it threw upon him an enormous responsibility. The old court 
171^-1731 P^^^y* represented in the foreign office by Marshal d'Huxelles, 

inspired by a different order of ideas, was secretly impeding 

the success of Dubois' programme of action. With the Earl 
of Peterborough, — a disappointed Whig who had turned 
Jacobite and hated the flmperor bitterly because of personal 
slights received from him, — secretly serving the interest 
of the Duke of Parma, and traversing Europe with a plan of 
his own to form a league of the Bourbons and the princes 
of Italy against the Emperor, upon the understanding that 
Philip V should renounce the throne of France to the Re- 
gent; and with Huxelles, who was more interested in the suc- 
cess of Peterborough's scheme than in Dubois' peace policy, 
instructing the French agents, La Marck at Stockholm and 
Bottemboui^ at Berlin, in a sense opposed to the plan of 
pacification agreed upon, the Abb^ required all of his skill 
and patience to preserve his hold upon the Regent.^ 

If his plan of action was to be carried through, there was 
no time to be lost; and, on September 20th, 1717, Dubois 
set out for London, where he and Stanhope could take counsel 
together. To watch the situation in his absence and to pre- 
vent his adversaries from gaining the ear of the Regent, a 
capable spy, Nancr^, conunandant of the Swiss guards, was 
left on duty at Paris, with whom Dubois carried on a close 
correspondence. In addition Chavigny, a keen diplomatist 
attached to the foreign office, was charged with the task of 
watching Huxelles and reporting his actions.' 

Received in special audience by George I, Dubois explained 
his mission as aiming to obtain a reconciliation between the 
Emperor and the King of Spain, and to ascertain the views 
and expectations of His Majesty regarding peace in the 
North. 

With Stanhope his relations were friendly and intimate, 
and even the painful knowledge of the prevailing hostility 
to the Regent in France was not concealed from him. So 

^ See Bourgeois, Le secret du BigerUt pp. 228, 234. 
* For an account of Dubois' preparations and journey, see BUard, 
Cardinal Dubois, I, p. 282. 



SUPREMACY IN THE NORTH AND IN ITALY 375 

impressed was Dubois by the feeling of cordiality and sym- Chap, v 
pathy in London for the regency, that in October he wrote n^^^^^M 

to his master the assurance that he was better served by his 

friends in England than by his own ministers. 

In the midst of constant festivities, the conversations went 
on daily, Dubois insisting that if the Emperor were not mod- 
erate in his demands the R^ent could not support his claims, 
and Stanhope insinuating in reply that indifference to the 
rights of Charles VI would render the King of Spain, the 
Regent's "chief enemy," more confident and obstinate than 
ever. 

By November 1 the conclusion was reached that, if the tim double 
flmperor would surrender his claim to the throne of Spain ^^Jj* 
and recognize Philip V as King, E^ngland and France would poiioy 
unite in urging upon Philip V the abandonment of his pre- 
tensions in Italy in exchange for the estates of Parma and 
Tuscany for one of his sons. If the two sovereigns should 
agree to these terms, peace between them might be happily 
concluded. If the Emperor consented and Philip V refused, 
the Triple Alliance should array itself against Spain and 
secure peace by enforcing these conditions. 

The arrival of the Emperor's plenipotentiary, Pendten- 
riedter, sent to London to negotiate on the subject, sud- 
denly arrested these plans for peace by his blank refusal to 
entertain for a moment the idea of his master's surrender of 
his right to the crown of Spain when he was able to send an 
army of fifty thousand men into Italy to maintain it without 
making any remmciation whatever. Unless Philip V im- 
mediately evacuated Sardinia, it would be impossible, he 
affirmed, to begin any negotiation at Vienna. 

The grave assurance of this solemn and formal physical 
giant — who was more than seven feet high — was at first 
imposing; for he had acquired the conviction that George I, 
as a prince of the flmpire, would in all circumstances main- 
tain the cause of Charles VI without regard to the attitude of 
France. It required the best arguments of Stanhope to con- 
vince him that the interests of England and those of Hanover, 
while closely allied, were not in all respects identical. 



376 



A HISTORY OP DIPLOMACY 



Chap. V 

A.D. 

1716-1731 



Tha taniiit 
ol the tide 



AibOToni 



But an impediment to the progress of the negotiations 
more serious than Pendtenriedter's stolid self-complacency 
- was unexpectedly discovered in disturbing rumors from Paris 
and the official silence and indifference that followed them. 
The Regent had in Dubois' absence been won over to Peter- 
borough's scheme of a Bourbon alliance with the Italian 
princes against the Emperor. Alberoni had offered the Duke 
of Orleans the recognition of his eventual right to the crown 
of France in exchange for his support of the claims of 
Philip V in Italy. Alberoni appeared to have triumphed, 
and Dubois seemed to himself abandoned. 

The skill and coolness with which the disappointed envoy 
returned to the conflict reveal his indomitable will and his 
inexhaustible self-confidence. But, happily for his plans, 
an accidental occurrence had ahready changed the Il^;ent's 
determination. The ill health of Philip V had apparently 
endangered his life; and, at the instigation of Alberoni and 
the Duke of Parma he had made a will in favor of Elizabeth 
Famese, by which, in the event of his death or madness, she 
should assume the regency of Spain. 

With this knowledge the Regent was again eager to resume 
the negotiations with England, and on December 8 Dubois 
wrote to Stanhope that he would soon return to London 
authorized to conclude a treaty of alliance with the Emperor. 
Alberoni's eagerness to promote the Famese ambitions had 
overshot the mark, and from this time forward the Regent 
was resolved to overthrow the Italian influence at Madrid. 

On December 25, after the Regent had refused to partici- 
pate with Spain in an expedition against Charles VI, even 
with the annexation of Flanders as a reward, Dubois re- 
turned to London carrying full powers to conclude a treaty 
with the Emperor in conjunction with England and Holland; 
and Nancr^ was despatched soon afterward to Madrid to 
procure, if possible, the adhesion of Philip V to a general 
agreement for peace. 

It was Alberoni who was now to be treated as the real 
enemy of the regency in Spain. This ambitious Italian, 
having obtained the rank of a cardinal, had, with the con- 



SUPREMACY IN THE NORTH AND IN ITALY 377 



nivance and support of the Queen, to whose family interests Chap, v 

A-.D. 

1716-1731 



he was entirely committed, become in reality the master in ^' ^' 



the kingdom. To thwart his purposes, destroy his influence, 
drive him from power, and save Spain from war by promoting 
a revolt against the rule of the Italians had become in De- 
cember, 1717, the settled policy of both France and England. 

But a minister like Alberoni was scarcely less formidable The 
than a sovereign. Fully entrenched in power through the i^^^^^^. 
services he was rendering, acting in the interest of a queen throw of tha 
whose influence over her husband was unlimited, Alberoni ^^"«^* 
had akeady given to Spain forces of resistance such as that 
country had not possessed for a century, and these forces 
were practically altogether at his own command. 

Diplomatically Spain was isolated, but Alberoni was not 
long in discovering a way to repair this deficiency. The 
Triple Alliance, whose formation had for its result the iso- 
lation of Spain, was weak in two directions. In France it 
was based upon the personal interest of the Regent and did 
not conform to the traditions, S3rmpathies, and affinities of 
the French nation. In England it was more solidly founded 
upon the national interest, but here too it was at least open 
to attack on the ground that it existed for the benefit of 
George I as Elector of Hanover rs^ther than in the interest 
of Great Britain. 

For Alberoni, therefore, it was easily possible to oppose 
the Regent of France and the King of England by aiding or 
exciting rebellion in those countries. For this purpose he 
espoused the cause of the Pretender, invited him to Spain, 
and offered him money and troops for the invasion of 
Scotland. At the same time a junta was formed in Paris . 
to overthrow the regency of the Duke of Orleans, and the 
Spanish ambassador, Cellamare, was instructed to furnish 
all possible aid and encouragement to this revolt. 

In the North Gortz was laboring with equal assiduity to 
prevent Bremen from falling to Hanover, and to thwart 
every effort for an understanding between George I and Peter 
the Great. While G5rtz was urging upon the Czar peace 
with Sweden and war with Hanover, Frederick William I of 



378 



A HISTORY OP DIPLOMACY 



CH4P. V 

1715-1731 



Dabob' 

method! and 



Prussia was declining all proposals by George I, openly 
avowing fear of Russia; and Charles XII, relying upon 
-an arrangement with the Czar, — still uncompleted, — in 
January, 1718, confidently resumed hostilities against 
the Danes with an army of thirty-five thousand men in 
Norway. 

Discerning the community of interest between Sweden, 
Russia, Prussia, and Spain, Alberoni conceived the plan of a 
coalition of these powers for the purpose of first reconciling 
Russia and Sweden, and then uniting their forces to over- 
throw George I and establish the Pretender in England; in- 
tending thus to destroy the Triple Alliance and force a change 
in the regency of France. Such a combination was in com- 
plete harmony with the plans of Gortz, and it was almost 
inevitable that their schemes should be brought into such 
connection as to form one vast conspiracy.* 

But nothing of all this was hidden from Dubois. At the 
same time that Alberoni was plotting in France, the Regent 
was equally active in Spain. The overthrow of Alberoni and 
the expulsion of Italian influence from power had become the 
necessary condition of Dubois' success. While his two ad- 
versaries were uj*ging on their masters upon the path of con- 
quest, the one in Italy, the other in Norway, Dubois had the 
advantage of working for a great cause, the peace of Euj*ope; 
and, if war became necessary, he could justly claim that it 
was because the antagonists would not listen to reason and 
make due concessions in the interest of peace. 

In conjunction with Torcy, the most experienced diplo- 
matist of his time in France, he took counsel of the highest 
French authorities in the law of nations and the history of 
events. The learning of Saint-Prest, the historiographer of 
treaties; the opinions of Saint-Pierre, the theorist of peace; 
the expert information of cartographers and genealogists 



^ The statements of Voltaire regarding the perfection of an inter- 
national plot at the time of Gyllenborg's arrest, Histaire de Charles XII, 
Livre VIII, are not only without documentary bswia but are anachro- 
nisms. See Syveton, Verrevr de Qdrtz, Revue d'Histoire Diplomatique, 
X (1896), pp. 522, 526. 



SUPREMACY IN THE NORTH AND IN ITALY 379 

were solicited and studied with a view to a final formulation Chap, v 
of terms that could be openly defended. i7i&-^73i 

As for the motive underlying this procedure, it was, no 



doubt, primarily to serve the Regent, his master; but, if 
peace, a righteous peace, could be imposed upon the belli- 
gerents, would not this policy serve France and Europe also 
better than the wars of conquest proposed by Gortz and 
Alberoni? 

It is true that the idea of alliance with the Hapsburgs 
was a reversal of the traditional pohcy of France, that an 
entente with the Emperor to force the hand of Philip V may 
have seemed to Frenchmen like an act of violence to the in- 
stincts of their race, and it is certain that the official ambas- 
sadors of the time were not appropriate instruments for 
negotiations in this sense; so that a new diplomatic organism, 
a secret diplomacy in respect to its agents as well as its ob- 
jects, had to be improvised by Dubois. But, judged either 
by the customs of his time or by the standards of to-day, 
the efforts of Dubois to serve his master and to pacify Europe, 
in spite of the censure to which he has been subjected, are 
not entirely unworthy of respect, while his skill, energy, and 
constancy in circumstances of great difficulty display his 
extraordinary adaptation to his task. 

The Emperor Charles VI not less than George I had oc- The mttituds 
casion to feel distuj-bed by the growing power of Russia and **' ^•^^ ^^ 
the inclination of Peter the Great to gain a foothold in Ger- 
many. If George I, as Elector of Hanover, was anxious to 
secuj*e the Imperial investiture of Bremen and Verden, 
Charles VI was not less interested in retaining the friendship 
of a prince who was not only of importance in the Empire 
but also the King of England. 

In 1716 the Emperor had come to the rescue of the Vene- 
tians against the Turks, and a bitter struggle had followed. 
Thus preoccupied in the East, and possessing no fleet with 
which to resist the attack of Spain upon Sardinia, Charles 
VI had not been able to offer a prompt resistance to Albe- 
roni's warlike measures, which, on July 1, 1718, included 
the occupation of Sicily; but on July 21, as the consequence 



380 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY 

Chap. V of Prince Eugene's victories over the Turks at Peterwardein 
171^1731 **^® Peace of Passarowitz ended the war which the Emperor 

and Venice had waged against the Sultan, and Charles VI 

was thus at last free to concentrate all his energies upon the 
war with Spain.^ 

If the Emperor was to maintain his supremacy in Italy, 
he still needed all his resources; and the English alhance, 
which alone could render him important aid at sea, was in 
the existing circumstances more than ever necessary to him. 
Parma, Piacenza, and Tuscany, fiefs of the Empire, were 
hereditary estates of the Famese and Medici families, and 
Elizabeth Famese was urging the recognition of the right 
of her sons to the succession when the childless Duke and 
Grand Duke should pass away; while the suzerainty over 
them was also claimed by the Pope. Sicily and Sardinia were 
already in the possession of Spain, and the Austrian domina- 
tion at Naples was not too well secured. In addition, the 
Duke of Savoy, nominally King of Sicily, but in fact dispos- 
sessed by Spain, was coveting Milan as compensation. 

It is not astonishing that in this extremity Charles VI, 
who still pretended to be King of Spain, and was surrounded 
by a group of Spaniards who for reasons of their own were 
hostile to the Bourbon dynasty, should welcome aid from 
Elngland and France against the ambitions of Philip V. 

Notwithstanding the lofty assmnptions of Pendtenriedter, 
Stanhope had long known that Charles VI was not unap- 
proachable with regard to the renunciation of his pretended 
rights to the Spanish throne. As the warlike intentions of 
Alberoni became more manifest, the readiness of Charles VI 
to accept the joint alliance of England and France for the 
purpose of imposing conditions of peace upon Philip V was 
much accelerated; and as early as April 4, 1718, Count Zin- 
zendorf had conmiunicated to Stanhope the Emperor's de- 



1 For the treaty, see Dumont, VIII, Part I, p. 524 et seq. The 
peace gave the Morea to Turkey and left to Venice only the Ionian and 
a few other islands. For Austria, however, an advanced and impreg- 
nable position at Belgrade had been gained. 



SUPREMACT IN TBDB NORTH AND IN ITALY 381 

cision to participate in the treaty which the English and Chap. Y 
French negotiators were preparing at London. 171^1731 
While Stanhope and Dubois were elaborating the plan of 



pacification and endeavoring to induce the Emperor to make 
the renunciations demanded of him, Gortz was busy in the The Aumd 
island of Lofo, one of the Aland group, negotiating with the ' 
Russian commissioners a separate peace with Sweden. 

From May 23, 1718, when Gortz arrived in Lofd, "the 
eyes of all Europe were anxiously fixed upon this rocky islet 
in the Gulf of Bothnia where the peace of the North was 
about to be decided." 

So large and optimistic were the pretensions of Gdrtz that 
the Russian commissioners never suspected the extreme ex- 
haustion of Sweden. The courage of the King, the devotion 
of the army, and the pretence that Hanover and Denmark 
were on the point of concluding a treaty with Charles XII 
were all skilfully exploited by this shrewd diplomatist to 
cast a glamour over the miserable weakness of the kingdom. 

In the meantime Gortz took occasion to spread the belief 
that peace with Russia was already assured. George I, 
alarmed by the prospect of a Russo-Swedish alliance, hastened 
to offer to Charles XII a million rix-doUars and the friendly 
good offices of England if he would permit Hanover to annex 
Bremen and Verden; and Prussia, fearful of being abandoned 
by the Czar, became anxious for an understanding. 

To the proposal of George I Charles XII returned an ab- 
solute refusal; but suggested that, if England would supply 
Sweden with twelve battle-ships, he would permit Bremen to 
be retained by Hanover until the money paid for that duchy 
to Denmark had been repaid, — a proposition which the 
English government could of course not accept. 

With a show of superiority and condescension that stupe- 
fied the Russian negotiators, Gortz, with ever^rthing at stake, 
continued his desperate game at Lof5 until he had obtained 
with the sanction of the Czar an offer to restore Finland, 
Livonia, and Esthonia to Sweden, on condition that Ii^;ria, 
with Narva, St. Petersburg, and a part of Carelia, were Ceded 
to Russia. An alternative offer was that, if Ingria, Livonia, 



382 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY 

Chap. V and Elsthonia were ceded to him, the Czar would restore 

^V^- Finland to Sweden and aid Charles XII to recover his Ger- 

■ man possessions and conquer Norway. When Grortz pre- 



of the two 



sented these terms to his master at Grothenburg, the King, 
with his characteristic independence, declared that these 
terms were ''too high-flying/' and sent the diplomatist back 
to Lofo to obtain better conditions.^ 
The ooUuion The time had now arrived when the two groups that had 
been working in opposition should at last come into open 
collision. In March, 1718, Alberoni had instructed the 
Spanish ambassador at The Hague, Beretti-Landi, to form 
a union with Sweden; and negotiations had at once been 
opened with an agent in the confidence of Charles XII. At 
the same time Beretti-Landi received offers of aid from the 
Russian envoy at The Hague, Gk>lowkin; and the Russian 
ambassador at Paris, Baron Schleinitz, was directed to in- 
form the Regent that, if he continued to pursue the negoti- 
ations with England for the restraint of Spain, he would soon 
be confronted with a coalition of the powers of the North 
against France. 

The intention of this announcement was by intimidating 
the Regent, to detach him from England; thus weakening 
the support of George I, and as a result isolating the Emperor. 
For this purpose Spain was ready to furnish Charles XII with 
money; Sweden was to conclude peacewith Russia; and these 
two powers, uniting, were to restore the Swedes to their pos- 
sessions in Germany, establish the Russians in Mecklenburg, 
and thus prevent the possibility of the Emperor's action in 
Italy. 

Alberoni had thoroughly spun his web. In France the 
Regent was to be overthrown by a domestic revolt, and in 
England the Elector of Hanover was to be driven from the 
throne by the Pretender. The Duke of Maine was to be es- 
tablished in the regency, and the Pretender was to be recog- 
nized and enthroned in England. In France the Spanish 

^ For a full account of the Aland conferenoeB, see Bacmeister and 
Amdt, Beytrdge zwr GeschichU Peters des QroMen, Kiga, 1774r-1784, III, 
Appendix. 



SUPREMACY IN THE NORTH AND IN ITALY 383 

ambassador; Cellamare, under the orders of Alberoni, be- Chap, v 
came the centre of a vast conspkacy operating from Paris. ^' ^' 
Nancr6 at Madrid was so fully won over to the Famese point 



of view that he advised the Regent to abandon the negotia- 
tions with Ekigland. Huxelles, holding the same views, se- 
cretly and at last openly strove to ruin the projects of Dubois. 
Since May, 1718, the Abb4, left practically without other sup- 
port than his friends in England and the English ambassador 
at Paris, had no ground for hope except his personal influ- 
ence with the Regent, who was harassed on every side by 
secret and open enemies. 

In June, notwithstanding these embarrassments. Stan- 
hope and Dubois agreed upon four points: (1) Charles VI 
should renounce the throne of Spain and recognize Philip 
V; (2) Sardinia should be restored to Charles VI, who would 
cede it to the Duke of Savoy in exchange for Sicily; (3) the 
succession of Parma and Tuscany should be guaranteed to 
the sons of Elizabeth Famese; (4) Charles VI and Philip V 
should have four months in which to accept these conditions. 
In case of refusal, England and France would unite to en- 
force their acceptance. In order to render these conditions 
effective, on June 15, Sir George Byng sailed to the Medi- 
terranean with twenty ships of the line, under orders to 
compel the Spaniards to abandon hostilities. 

The earnestness with which England had entered into these The Quadnq>]o 
negotiations is evident from the sacrifices the ministry was ^^^^^ 
prepared to make in order to render them successful. Stan- 
hope, who in person visited Spain for the purpose, offered to 
restore Gibraltar,* if Philip V would accept the conditions 
proposed, which in substance had been presented to him 
before Admiral Byng arrived in the Mediterranean; but 
Alberoni, who was already in possession of both Sardinia 
and Sicily, relying upon the success of his military prepara- 
tions for the invasion of Italy, rejected all offers aiming at a 
peaceful settlement. 



^ Stanhope did not, however, fully appreciate the value of Gibral- 
tar to Great Britain, and has been censured for his willingness to 
sacrifice it. 



384 



A HISTORY OP DIPLOMACY 



CH4P. V 
A.D. 

1715-1731 



The triumph 

potntment of 
QOrti 



On July 17, the Regent laid the conditions agreed upon 
by Stanhope and Dubois before the Council of Regency. 
The Duke of Maine opposed the idea of an alliance ^with 
England to enforce them; but the next day the preliminaries 
were signed at Paris, and on August 2 Dubois and Stanliope 
concluded the definitive treaty at London.^ The adhesion 
of the Emperor two weeks later rendered the Quadruple 
Alliance a certainty; for, although the United Provinces did 
not openly join this coalition until more than a year after- 
ward, the union of the four powers to impose peace upon 
Spain was already practically assured. 

In the meantime the opposition had not been idle. At 
the end of July Gortz had returned to his "enchanted island," 
as Lofd was called by him, to resume negotiations for peace 
between Sweden and Russia. The Russian commissioners 
had anxiously awaited his reappearance, but the delay 
finally counted in his favor and had the effect of accelerating 
the negotiations. On August 26, at Abo, the Czar signed a 
treaty by which, in consideration of the cession to him of 
the Baltic provinces, he promised to aid Sweden to obtain 
compensation from Denmark and Hanover. 

Gdrtz in joyful triumph sought the signature of his master, 
but encountered the same obstinacy that had always char- 
acterized that impertuj*bable monarch. Charles XII, de- 
claring that he would not surrender realities in return for 
illusory promises, firmly refused to approve the treaty. 

The refusal was to Gortz a crushing blow, for it was only 
by the most strenuous exertions that he had raised money to 
equip the army, improve the navy, and impart to the king- 
dom the deceptive appearance of strength with which by 
skilful exaggeration he had imposed upon the credulity of 
the Russian commissioners. 

The obstinate King paid little attention to the protests 
and arguments of his minister, and Gortz returned to what 
seemed a hopeless task at Lofo. In doing so he was fully 
conscious of the grave danger in which he was personally 
placed, for he was in reality not a regular minister of state 



^ For the treaty, see Dumont, VIII, Part I, p. 531 et seq. 



SUPREMACY IN THE NORTH AND IN ITALY 385 

in the Swedish kingdom, but a jealously regarded alien whose Chap. V 
only authority grew out of his personal relation to the sov- .^^^^^ 
ereign who had clothed him with almost supreme power in • 



matters of administration. In his effort to serve his master 
he had incurred the resentment of the people^ and in stand- 
ing for the succession of the Duke of Holstein-Gottorp as the 
legitimate heir to the throne he was exposed to powerful 
opposition by the court faction which favored the candidacy 
of the Princess Ulrica as more likely than the young prince to 
restore peace to the realm when the tempestuous Charles XII 
should pass away. Between the fear tiiat the King's death 
might suddenly destroy all his hopes for the future of 
Sweden and the obstacles which while living the monarch 
was placing in his way, Gortz began to realize the helpless- 
ness of his situation; for, while Charles XII intrusted him 
with almost arbitrary administrative power, he treated his 
diplomatic endeavors with contempt, and refused to 
strengthen his hands by himself determining the question 
of the succession. 

Thus paralyzed by the failure of the negotiations of G5rtz Aibennrto 
in the North, the coalition which Alberoni had hoped to form J^^**^ ^ 
was menaced in the South by the Quadruple Alliance, which 
was bent upon his overthrow. He, however, had not been 
idle. Fully aware of the real significance of the alliance, he 
perceived that the Emperor's adhesion was the pivotal 
point in the treaty; for, without his renunciation of his 
claims to the Spanish throne, the Regent's motive would be 
destroyed, and without the Regent's support the Quadruple 
Alliance would fall to pieces. 

Alberoni's aim was, therefore, to overpower the Emperor 
by creating an alliance against him in Italy, and to weaken 
the Regent in France by raising a storm of dissent from his 
policies. 

Of the Duke of Parma he was sure, but the resources of 
Parma and Piacenza were inconsiderable. But other Italian 
princes might be induced to respond to the cry, "Let us 
drive the Germans out of Italy!" The Duke of Savoy was 
offered a defensive 'and offensive alliance and the service of 
VOL. m. — 26 



386 A mSTORT OP DIPLOMACY 

Chap. V Spanish troops, paid from the revenues of Sicily, for tho 
171^1731 ^^^Q^^®^ ^^ Milan. But the expulsion of the Germans from 
Italy was not an easy task. The Italians might well have re- 
sented their intrusion, but their union was impossible. The 
sense of national unity did not exist. The proposals of Spain 
were regarded with suspicion, the princes were jealous of 
one another, and Alberoni's scheme of uniting Italy agamst 
the Emperor proved impracticable. It was Spain, not the 
Emperor, that was soon to be placed on the defensive. 
Tha totwDiney The eflforts to Overthrow the Regent by creating revolution 
€i Ceiumaw ^ Fraucc wcrc equally ineflfectual. Inflammable materials 
were by no means wantmg. The adherents of the Pretender 
were scattered about Europe and particularly numerous in 
France, breathing forth enmity to the Hanoverian djmasty 
because it was Protestant, German, and, as was alleged, 
'' anti-English," and especially condemnatory of the close 
relations of the regency with George I. In France the in- 
fluence of the old court party had always been exerted to 
promote the cause of the Jacobites, and never more earnestly 
than since the advent of the regency. The Spanish ambas- 
sador, Cellamare, had long before received formal orders 
from Alberoni to enter into close relations with these mal- 
contents and to give them every encouragement. 

The question has been much discussed by contemporaries 
and by historians whether this opposition to the Regent was 
in fact more than mere rhetorical censure, and how far it 
was a real peril to the regency. Argenson in his " M^moires " 
represents that his father, by unearthing the conspiracy 
against the Regent, "saved his authority, his honor, and 
perhaps his Uberty and his life," at a moment when he was 
"betrayed and on the verge of a revolution." * Lemontey, 
on the contrary, refers to the cabal against the Regent as 
merely a '* conspiration de grammairiens/' and declares with 
one of the conspirators, Boisdavy, "It is not in the Bastille, 
but in an asylum for the feeble-minded, that such visionaries 
should be placed." * The truth is, that there were four or 

^ Argenson, Mimoirea, I, p. 39. 

* Lemontey, HUtaire de la Bigence, II, p. 411. 



SUPREMACY IN THE NORTH AND IN ITALY 387 

five factions whose antipathies, for different reasons, were Chap, v 
strongly excited against the Regent and his policies; but ,-,t'^L«- 

171&-17oI 



there was no strong leader, no heroic purpose, and no spirit - 
of personal sacrifice sufficient to create a real revolution and 
produce a civil war. As Saint-Simon has well expressed it, 
inanition was at that time the great evil in France. The ab- 
solutism of the previous reign had destroyed all personal ini- 
tiative. "No harmony, no courage, except at the fireside, a 
servile habit which ruled everywhere, and which, at the least 
lifting of the eyebrow, made every one tremble, those who 
were capable of figuring in the first or second place even more 
than the others." * Had Philip V appeared in France with 
an army, the regency might have passed into his hands. 

In another quarter diplomacy had already given place to The tmunph 
action. The occupation of Sicily by the Spanish troops had *** ^^'*'*" 
driven the Duke of Savoy into the arms of the Quadruple 
Alliance, and on August 22 Admiral Byng under orders to 
preserve the neutrality of Italy pending the acceptance of 
the terms imposed by the allies, incited to battle by the 
action of the Spanish fleet, had destroyed it off Cape Passaro 
on the coast of Sicily. 

Decisive events now followed rapidly. On September 24 
all the councils of the regency, except that of finance, were 
suppressed, and Dubois was named secretary of state for 
foreign affairs. His policy had now become openly and for- 
mally official, and the Quadruple Alliance represented the 
deliberate purpose of France. In EIngland the nomination 
was celebrated as a victory. In France he now possessed 
the authority of a minister who had won his place and was 
able to hold it firmly. 

There was still time for Alberoni to accept the terms of the 
Quadruple Alliance, but neither he nor Philip V was inclined 
to do so. On the contrary, irritated by the course pursued 
by the Regent, on December 10, the King ordered the French 
ambassador, Saint-Aignan, charged with conspiracy, to 
leave his dominions within twelve days. Unwilling to create 
a rupture, the ambassador refused to depart unless dismissed 

^ Saint-Simon, Mimoires, IX, p. 314. 



388 



A HISTORY OP DIPLOMACY 



Chap. V 

A. O. 

1715-1731 



AlberonTf 
•ffoiteof 



in writing. The ministers hesitated, but on the eleventh the 
written order of expulsion was placed in his hands, and the 
- following day, at seven o'clock in the morning, an armed de- 
tachment of troops entered the hotel of the embassy, the 
ambassador and his wife were compelled to dress in haste, 
and were then hustled into a carriage to be driven to the 
frontier. 

In the meantime Dubois had become aware of the conduct 
of Cellamare, and on December 5 his couriers had been ar- 
rested and his papers seized. Upon the ambassador's request 
they were returned to him, but twenty-four hours later they 
were confiscated and carried to the Louvre, among them the 
correspondence with Alberoni and the evidence of his con- 
spiracy. On December 13 he was sent to Blois under arrest, 
and when later he was conducted to the frontier it was ne- 
cessary to protect him from the indignation of the populace. 

The conduct of Spain, and particularly the efforts of Al- 
beroni to excite revolt against the government of France 
placed the policy of the Regent and the influence of Dubois 
in a new light. 

On December 25, 1718, Philip V published a declaration 
in which he solemnly arraigned the Regent as a ''private 
person" who, in the name of the King of France, had "trod- 
den under foot the most sacred rights and had broken the 
union which had cost the life of a million men, and for which 
Louis XIV had risked everything, even to his own State." 
Stigmatizing the Regent as ''a rebel to the Most Christian 
King and a traitor to his country," he appealed to the French 
army to unite with the Spaniards to defeat their common 
foes. 

Alberoni, while endeavoring to justify himself to the Re- 
gent, on the ground that it was the King who was respon- 
sible for the non-acceptance of the terms required by the 
Quadruple Alliance, was, nevertheless, ceaseless in his activ- 
ity to strengthen his means of resistance. 

The utter failure of G5rtz to obtain at Lofo terms of peace 
with Russia left Spain without the desired aid in the North. 
It had been expected that Sweden, Russia, and Prussia would 



SUPREMACY IN THE NORTH AND IN ITALY 

before the winter be able to place forty thousand troops in Cbap. v 
Germany, who would occupy Brunswick-Ltineburg, and by j-A^^L,. 
taking possession of Holstein force Denmark to make peace 



and support the Russians. Hanover would then be at the 
mercy of the Northern allies, and an attack on Scotland 
would so completely preoccupy England that there would 
be no disposition to carry on war in Germany for the defence 
of the electorate. The British fleet would be required at 
home; and would, therefore, be obliged to leave the Medi- 
terranean and thereby withdraw English support from the 
Emperor in Italy. But the hope of '' something considerable 
from that quarter" was now dispelled. The death of 
Charles XII, who was killed on December 11, by a shot in 
the head while in the trenches before Frederikshald ended 
all possibility of a Swedish attack in Scotland. It was 
fatal also to the plans of Gortz. Arrested immediately after 
the death of the King, he was thrown into prison, which he 
left to ascend the scaffold in expiation of his acts under the 
condemnation of hostile judges. 

It was only to Russia that Alberoni could now look for The propooaia 
aid; but, although Peter the Great was in correspondence *** ^*^p ^ 
with Beretti-Landi, and large subsidies were promised for 
Russian help, nothing practical resulted from the appeal. 
Still undaunted, Alberoni persisted in fitting out an armada 
for the invasion of Scotland under the conmiand of Ormond; 
but the ships were dispersed by storms, and the expedition 
ended in total failure. 

Practically delivered from apprehension of a serious con- 
flict with Sweden, in December, 1718, England formally 
declared war upon Spain; France followed in January, 1719; 
and by the following April the French army had invaded, the 
kingdom of Philip V. On June 12, 1719, Philip V informed 
the Prince of Conti that he had engaged in war with France 
oiily through love for his native country in the hope of de- 
livering it from what he had believed to be an unwelcome 
rule; but that, since France seemed content with the exist- 
ing government, he was disposed to unite with the Regent 
in restoring peace. To this end he was ready to yield to the 



390 A HISTORY OP DIPLOMACY 

Geap. V Emperor Sicily and Sardinia, if his eldest son by Elizabeth 
^'^' Famese could be established in the estates of Parma and 

1 Tift— 17^1 

Tuscany; he would also make a suitable arrangement with 

the Duke of Savoy, conclude peace with England on condi- 
tion that Gibraltar and Port Mahon were surrendered and 
indemnity paid for the destruction of the Spanish fleet, and 
renoimce for himself and his successors the crown of France, 
except that the Infante Don Philip, his second son, should 
succeed to the throne of France in case of the death of Louis 
XV, with the understanding that the two crowns should 
never be united. In order to manifest the "love" which had 
been inspired in him by " the great qualities and wise govern- 
ment" of the Regent, he would agree to procure from the 
Three Estates of France consent that the French Nether- 
lands and Burgundy should be ceded to the Duke of Orleans 
with the title of King; and that Alsace should be restored to 
the Emperor, whose daughter should marry the Duke's 
son, the Duke of Chartres, with the Austrian Netherlands 
as a marriage portion. 

This extraordinary programme terminated with the pro- 
posal that France, Spain, and the Emperor should unite to 
reduce the pride of George I, "who acted as if he were the 
arbiter of Europe, dividing its kingdoms to suit his fancy, 
with the purpose of raising himself above the sovereigns of 
Germany, and even the Emperor, by means of the power of 
Great Britain." To limit this power, it should be divided. 
England should be given to George I, if he accepted these 
terms of peace; Scotland and Ireland to James III, "the 
legitimate king, who, being a powerful claimant to the Eng- 
lish crown, would keep King George- within his proper 
limits." » 

To this proposal the Regent made no reply. It was too 
chimerical for serious consideration; but it well illustrates 
how completely the foundations of the absolutist theory of 
the State had been swept away. The grandson of Louis XIV 
would dispose of kingdoms as if they were mere family oma- 

* For the full text, see Baudrillart, Philip V etla cour de France, IT, 
pp. 367, 370. 



SUPREMACY IN THE NOBTH AND IN ITALY 391 

ments, but legitimacy was no longer the basis of distribution. Chap. Y 
George I, although to the Bourbon mind only an interloper, ,71^1731 



might have England, if he would only be peaceable, and the • 
''legitimate king" should be content with Scotland and 
Ireland! 

Resistance to the Quadruple Alliance had become f or tim laat in 
Alberoni a measure of self-preservation. In September, ^j^ "^ 
1719, his hopes of success appear to have been still unex- Aitwraoi 
tinguished. It was intended that a fleet, under the com- 
mand of Ormond, should sail from Santander to Brittany; 
but a rebellion of the officers prevented its departure, and 
like the other iU-organi^ed ventures of Alberoni this one also 
failed. 

Astute and resourceful as the Cardinal was, his schemes 
were too complicated to be practically fruitful. Although 
not lacking either in courage or ingenuity, he was wanting 
in energetic and consecutive action; and his plans, magnificent 
in conception, ended in disaster. 

With great practical insight. Stanhope perceived that 
Philip V could be brought to accept the Quadruple Alliance 
only through the disgrace and dismissal of Alberoni. Dubois 
joined with him in this conviction. On November 18, 
therefore, an agreement was concluded at The Hague be- 
tween France, Great Britain, and the Emperor, granting to 
Philip V three months in which to accept the terms of the 
Quadruple Alliance, and announcing that in default of ad- 
hesion to the treaty within that time the sons of Elizabeth 
Famese would be ipso facto forever excluded from the heri- 
tage of Parma, Piacenza, and Tuscany. At the same time 
the war was vigorously prosecuted in Catalonia, which was 
always eager for revolt. 

But one additional stroke was necessary to decide the fate 
of Alberoni. Regarded by Philip V as blameworthy for hav- 
ing pretended that Spain was capable not only of self-defence 
but of successful aggression, and abandoned by Elizabeth 
Famese as incapable of securing the Italian heritage for 
her children, the unfortunate minister was soon made the 
scapegoat of all the sins of the court, and held responsible 



392 



A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY 



Chap. V 

A.D. 

1715-1731 



AdhMion of 
PhUip V to 
the Quadruple 
Alliance 



for all the misfortunes of the kingdom. Even the nurses of 
the royaJ children dared to vent their petty spite upon him. 
But the coup de grdc^ was reserved for the Duke of Parma, 
whose subject he was by his birth. The agents of the Quad- 
ruple Alliance had long been in negotiation with the Duke to 
procure his influence for the disgrace of the Cardinal, and 
France and Elngland now urged that course upon him as the 
only means of escape from the vengeance of the Emperor. 
Before the end of November, the Marquis di Scotti was sent 
to Madrid with personal letters from the Duke of Parma for 
the King and the Queen, in which Alberoni was represented 
as the chief obstacle to the peace of Europe, and accused of 
asserting in his private letters that the real cause of trouble 
was the passion for power of his royal master. 

This accusation, which was not entirely without founda- 
tion, was decisive. The King issued a decree forbidding the 
Cardinal to take part in any public business, to present him- 
self in the palace, or to appear before any member of the 
royal family. He was at the same time ordered to leave 
Madrid within eight days, and Spanish territory within three 
weeks. 

In bitter anger, and with imprecations against his late 
master, Alberoni, after being accused of carrying off the will 
of Charles II, left the kingdom in disguise, never to return, 
and sought a secret asylum in a convent near Bologna. The 
announcement of his fall was received with joy at London 
and Paris, where it was regarded as a prelude of -pes^e. But 
in this Stanhope and Dubois were mistaken. There was 
truth in Alberoni's accusation that the real obstacle to peace 
was the determination of Philip V to resist the terms that 
had been imposed upon him. Having dismissed the offensive 
minister, Philip V still hoped to recover Gibraltar and Mi- 
norca, to retain Sardinia, receive indemnity for the loss of 
his fleet, obtain the restoration of all that had been taken in 
the war, and to enforce the recognition of his sons' rights to 
the Italian heritage without an Imperial investiture. 

For a time Stanhope feared that the Regent would be 
satisfied with the disgrace of Alberoni and conclude a sep- 



SUPREMACY IN THE NORTH AND IN ITALY 393 

arate peace with Spain. But the desires of Philip V were Chap, v 
thwarted by the excess of his demands. The Regent was ^" °* 

firm in his support of the terms imposed by the Quadruple 

Alliance. Elizabeth Famese was fearful that her sons would 
be excluded from Italy, and on January 26, 1720, Philip V 
issued a royal decree declaring that, in order to restore the 
peace of Europe, he would sacrifice his personal interests 
and those of his kingdom and adhere to the Quadruple Alli- 
ance. On February 16, Beretti-Landi deposited with the 
plenipotentiaries of the Emperor, the King of France, and 
the King of England the formal act of adhesion; and, on 
May 20, this adhesion was officially ratified. 

Thus was finally confirmed and renewed the renunciation 
of the crown of France by Philip V; while the evacuation of 
Sicily, the abandonment to the Emperor of the former Span- 
ish possessions in Italy, the recognition of the Famese claims 
to Parma, Piacenza, and Tuscany, and the restoration of 
Sardinia, — immediately transferred by the Emperor to the 
Duke of Savoy as compenisation for the loss of Sicily, which 
the Emperor retained, — completed the work of the Quad- 
ruple Alliance. 

In the North the death of Charles XII had suddenly The reoon- 
changed the entire situation and rendered possible negotia- ^^^^^ <>' 
tions for peace. In Sweden the execution of Gortz was hLoto 
followed by the triumph of the nobles, who had been held 
in check during the King^s lifetime, and the country fell 
under the influence of an oligarchy that excluded the Duke 
of Holstein from the throne, secured the succession to the 
Princess Ulrica, — whose husband, Frederick of Hesse, soon 
became by her abdication the recognized ruler, — under the 
leadership of the so-called ''party of freedom and parlia- 
mentary government." With the death of Charles XII 
absolute monarchy in his kingdom had come to an end. 

Although Sweden was strongly disposed toward peace, a 
general pacification presented a difficult problem; for Rus- 
sia, Denmark, Prussia, and Hanover were all demanding 
territorial concessions which in their aggregate amounted to 
a wholesale dismemberment of the former Swedish empire. 



394 



A HISTORY OP DIPLOHACT 



Chap. V 
171&-1731 



The jwdfioft- 
tion of the 
North 



The only hope for the rescue of Sweden from destruction 
lay in the mutual jealousies and hostilities of these rival 
- powers. As a means of preserving a foothold in Germany, 
the Swedish ministers would have been pleased to make peace 
first of all with Russia, in order to obtain support in resist- 
ing the claims of Denmark, Prussia, and Hanover; but Peter 
the Great was too exacting. Believing the kingdom to be 
defenceless, he arrogantly claimed possession of all his 
conquests. 

In order to withstand the wholesale demands of the Czar, 
which if granted would have left him absolute master of the 
Baltic, the Swedes were obliged to make generous terms 
with the other groups of claimants. In preparation for this 
opportunity, George I had, on August 14, 1719, made an 
agreement with Prussia by which their interests were to be 
mutually seemed in the settlement with Sweden. On No- 
vember 20 Bremen and Verden were ceded to Hanover for 
a million crowns, and Greorge I, as King of England, under- 
took the mediation of a general peace.^ 

After long and trjring negotiations, through the mediation 
of England, on January 21, 1720, Prussia concluded a sep- 
arate peace with Sweden by which, in return for the cession 
. of Stettin, Western Pomerania, Usedom and Wollin, the 
alliance of Frederick William I with the Czar was aban- 
doned;* and on the same day Great Britain and Sweden 
formed a defensive alliance.* On June 3 Sweden concluded 
peace with Denmark at the expense of the Duke of Holstein- 
Gottorp, from whom Schleswig was taken and restored to 
Denmark imder the guarantee of Elngland and France.* 
Frederick Augustus I of Poland had ah-eady signed an 
armistice with Sweden, which later was followed by a 
definitive peace. 

Thus Russia, completely isolated, remained the only power 
hostile to the Swedish kingdom. Encoinraged by England, 



* For the treaty, see Dumont, VIII, Part II, p. 15 et seq. 

• For the treaty, see Dumont, VIII, Part II, p. 21. 

• For the treaty, see Dumont, VIII, Part II, p. 18. 

* For the treaty, see Dumont, VIII, Part II, p. 29. 



SUPREMACY IN THE NORTH AND IN ITALY 395 

whose fleet was sent to the Baltic for Sweden's protection, Chap, v 
the ministers still resisted the demands of Peter the Great ,-,^^7^1 

for the surrender to him of all the conquests he had made 

on the Baltic. But, although England would gladly have 
employed means to restram the ambitions of the Czar and 
prevent the surrender of the Swedish provinces, their re- 
covery seemed too great a task to be attempted. In Febru- 
ary, 1721, Stanhope, the master mind in English diplomacy, 
who had been raised to the peerage as Viscount Mahon and 
Earl Stanhope, passed away, and the failure of John Law's 
Mississippi scheme and the bursting of the South Sea bubble 
had created a financial crisis in both England and France. 
On August 30, 1721, with the advice of both governments, 
and through the mediation of France, the Peace of Nystad 
ended the conflict between Sweden and the Czar.^ Peter 
the Great, who declared that he did "not wish to see from 
his windows the grounds of his neighbor," obtained the ces- 
sion of Livonia, Esthonia, Ingria, and a part of Carelia, but 
was induced to restore Finland, and paid an indemnity of 
two million rix-dollars. It was a small price for the mastery 
of the Baltic* 



III. The Readjustment op Disturbed Relations 

The triumph of the Quadruple AUiance and the Peace of The 
Nystad afforded to Europe a short period of tranquillity, p^^emtion 
The problems of the Spanish succession and the future of the 
Baltic had at last found what promised to be a permanent 
solution, but it was a solution which introduced into the 
system of European states two anomalies : a Bourbon dynasty 
in possession of the thrones of France and Spain, and a 
monarchy more Asiatic than European in virtual command 
of the Baltic. Both of these results could not fail to be dis- 
turbing elements in the European system; for, if the two 
Bourbon monarchies should ever really unite in a common 



» For the treaty, see Dumont, VIII, Part II, p. 36. 
' An excellent detailed account of the negotiations is given by 
Chance, George I and the Northern War, p. 444 et seq. 



396 



A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY 



Chap. V 

A. D. 

1715-1731 



Dbnlntion 
of the Quad- 



policy, they would possess a greater prepohderance than had 
ever been enjoyed by any single power of Western Europe; 
- and if the Russian Empire, invigorated by the infusion of 
Western ideas and fully armed with the weapons of a more 
highly developed civilization, should make use of its newly 
acquired power. Northeastern Europe would be almost at 
its mercy. 

A certain period of repose was, however, assured to Eu- 
rope by the wdiaustion of all the contestants after such long 
and costly wars, and by the fact that there was no vigorous 
personality to form and execute new policies, since Peter 
the Great, now approaching the end of his career, had at- 
tained the main object of his ambition in the North. 

As usual in such circumstances, diplomacy, having no very 
clear and distinct aims to direct its activities, was reduced to 
a series of experiments and readjustments by which it was 
believed some slight advantage might be obtained, but with- 
out any definite common purpose or far-reaching plan. 

The definite end for which the Quadruple Alliance had 
been formed having been accomplished, it was natural that 
it should be superseded by other combinations; and espe- 
cially as strong reasons for a new adjustment had already 
come into existence. Among these reasons was the disap- 
pointment of Spain in not securing the restoration of Gib- 
raltar, a growing coolness between France and England now 
that their common interests had been served, and a disposi- 
tion on the part of all three to prevent the too great develop- 
ment of Hapsburg power, immensely augmented by the 
concessions wrung from Spain. 

Besides the actual execution of the settlement provided 
for by the Quadruple Alliance, there were many outstanding 
questions between Charles VI and Philip V which it had 
been agreed should be considered and settled by a congress, 
in which England and France should act as mediators. After 
long discussions the place where it was to assemble had been 
decided upon, and the plenix>otentiaries had been invited to 
meet on October 15, 1720, at Cambray; but the desire of the 
powers to determine in advance certain matters pertaining 



SUPREMACY IN THE NORTH AND IN ITALY 397 

to themselves prevented its assembling until more than three Chap, v 
years had elapsed. - ^' ^' 
The most important of the differences between Spain and 



England was the question of Gibraltar. The Regent re- 
garded himself as in honor bound to aid Spain in securing 
its restoration; but, although Stanhope had at one time of- 
fered to surrender it, the occasion had passed, and English 
sentiment was opposed to the idea of restoring it to Spain. 
In Jime, 1720, in a personal letter to Philip V, George I had 
promised that, as soon as he could obtain the consent of Par- 
liament, he would return the fortress. The Spaniards were 
not satisfied with this uncertainty, and refused until Gib- 
raltar was actually restored to deliver the cedulae for the 
ships which by the terms of the "Asiento" the English were 
entitled to send to America for carrying on the slave-trade. 

Another difficulty arose from the sudden refusal of Phihp 
V to submit his renunciation of his claim to the throne of 
France to the ratification of the Spanish Cortes, unless 
Charles VI would at the same time submit his renunciation 
of the throne of Spain to the ratification of the Austrian 
Landtag; and it was not until September 27, 1721, that a 
guarantee signed by England and France was accepted in 
place of these ratifications. But even then the strife was 
not ended, for Charles VI had in his renunciation assumed the 
title "King of Spain," and Phihp V that of "Archduke of 
Austria"; and it required two months of negotiation be- 
fore the form of the documents could be rendered mutually 
acceptable. 

In April, 1721, a change in the ministry in Ehigland brought The 
Robert Walpole to power, with Townshend as secretary of ^^^ 
state for the Northern and Lord Carteret for the Southern 
Department.* Under this administration domestic poUcy, 
guided by Walpole and based firmly on the idea of peace, was 
devoted to repairing the shattered finances and extending 
foreign trade, while external relations were completely sub- 
ordinated to it, in spite of Carteret's ambitious designs, which 

^ For Carteret's able services in the pacification of the North, see 
Chance, George I and the Northern WoTf p. 333 et seq. 



3d8 



A HISTORY OP DIPLOMACY 



Cbap. V 

A. D. 

1716-1731 



Duboia'am- 
bhionfortlM 



were restrained by the less adventurous spirit of Townshend 
and the King's substantial common sense. ^ 

The success of this pacific policy, however, required a good 
understanding with Spain; which, chiefly on account of 
Gibraltar and the refusal to grant the cediUae for the slave- 
ships, it was difficult to obtain, until the personal ambition 
of Dubois finally came to the rescue. 

Since 1720 Dubois' strongest desire was to obtain the hat 
of a cardinal. As it was the custom of the papal court in 
conferring this honor upon a subject of any one of the three 
great Catholic powers, — France, Spain, and Austria, — to 
consult the wishes of the others, Dubois was anxious to win 
the favor of the Emperor and of Philip V; which, on account 
of their differences, was not an easy task. 

Before the death of Stanhope, Greorge I, at his suggestion, 
had written a personal letter to the Regent asking him to 
reward his faithful minister by securing for him the cov- 
eted honor; and much French gold, sent to Rome for this 
purpose, is said to have poured into the coffers of Clement 
XI. But the Pope declined to bestow the cardinalate, and 
it soon became evident that without the assent of Austria 
and Spain success was not to be expected. 

The situation in the North gave Dubois an opportunity 
to please the Emperor, who already had some reason to be 
well disposed toward him; but in seeking the favor of PhiUp 
V more serious obstacles had to be overcome, for there was 
at the Spanish court a strong antipathy to him as the chief 
adviser of the Regent, and even the aid of the Duke of Parma 
was not sufficient to remove it. At Madrid the vulnerable 
point was, however, the ambition of Elizabeth Fame&e for 
her sons; for since the fall of Alberoni she had been in need 
of foreign support for the accomplishment of her plans in 
Italy. 

Dubois was not long in finding a means of conciliation. 



^ Carteret is reported to have said to Henry Fox, ''I want to instill 
a noble ambition into you; to make you knock the heads of the kinge 
of Europe together, and jumble something out of it that may be of 
I to this country." See also Morley, WalpoU, pp. 68, 69. 



STJPBEMACY IN THE NORTH AND IN ITALY 399 

It was the offer of a defensive alliance between France and Chap, v 
Spain, with the prospect of a future triple coalition in which .-A;.^^,. 



Spain, France, and England would secretly unite to enforce - 
upon the Emperor the wishes of Elizabeth Famese regarding 
the establishment of her children in Italy. 

Although desirous of a good understanding with Spain, The amanos of 
the English ministry was suspicious of a close alliance between J^^^^*^°*" 
Spain and France. When, however, it was learned that, on Spain 
March 27, 1721, such an alliance had actually been concluded 
at Madrid,^ and England was invited to unite with these 
two powers in a treaty of friendship, the suggestion was 
favorably considered. 

The draft of a treaty presented at London by the French 
ambassador proposed that France and Ehigland should 
guarantee to the sons of Elizabeth Famese the immediate 
recognition by the Emperor of their hereditary right of suc- 
cession to the estates of the Duke of Parma, with a promise 
to support the interests of Spain at the Congress of Cambray. 
In reply it was declared that this engagement could be ac- 
cepted only on condition that Philip V would recognize the 
Hanoverian succession in E]ngland, and would agree to 
England's retention of Gibraltar. It was also demanded 
from France that she would never wage war against the 
Austrian Netherlands, and would even defend them from 
attack by any other power. By removing in this manner the 
chronic causes of conflict between the three powers, WaJpole 
hoped to render permanent their peace and amity .^ 

Spanish honor was deeply involved in the return of Gib- 
raltar, but the advantage to be gained by the English alliance 
was now urged as a reason for accepting the promise of George 
I to submit the question to the English Parliament with an 
agreement to restore the fortress if permission were granted. 
It was by no means probable that Parliament would ever 
freely consent to the surrender of the Key to the Mediter- 
ranean; yet, for the sake of the children of Elizabeth Famese, 

^ For the treaty, see Martens, RecueUf A, Supplement I, p. 449. 
* The negotiatkyns are fully detailed by Bourgeois, Le secret de Dubois, 
pp. 262, 290. 



400 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY 

Cbap. V Philip y agreed to recognize the Protestant succession and 
^•°- to renew the "Asiento/' 

1 71 R 1 7^1 

The proposal for the practical neutralization of the Aus- 



trian Netherlands by France met with less favor. If these 
provinces could have been erected into a separate state, as 
was done a century later by the creation of the Belgian mon- 
archy, and neutralized by all the powers together, it would 
have been the means of avoiding many future conflicts; but 
the question was not at that time of a European guarantee, 
and it was unreasonable that France alone should undertake 
to maintain the neutrality of territory belonging to a rival 
power like Austria. 

Although this concession was refused by France, so strong 
was the British interest in peace with Spain, that, on June 
13, 1721, a secret treaty of defensive alliance was concluded 
between the three powers at Madrid, by which the estates 
of Parma and Piacenza were guaranteed to the Famese chil- 
dr^i, and the signatories undertook to urge upon the Em- 
peror the demands of Spain in the Congress of Cambray.^ 
The SpMuh As for the treaty itself, whatever may be said of the mo- 
tives that inspired it, all the contractants were on the whole 
satisfied; * but it was Philip V who, in spite of the sacrifice 
of Gibraltar for the future of the children of Elizabeth 
Famese, was most happy over the alliance. Spain had at 
last emerged from her isolation among the great powers, the 
allies of the Emperor had been transferred to himself, and 
the Italian inheritance had been guaranteed to the children 
of the Queen. 

But this was not the full measure of the joy felt at the 
Spanish court. A few weeks after the signature of the new 
treaty of alliance between Spain, France, and England, 
marriages were arranged between Louis XV and the only 
daughter of Philip V, Maria Anna Victoria; and also between 
Don Louis, heir to the Spanish throne, and a daughter of the 



» For the treaty, see Dumont, VIII, Part II, p. 34; for the negotia- 
tions, Bourgeois, Le secret de Dvbois, pp. 262, 290. 

* Townshend had bitterly opposed the treaty, but the King had 
insisted upon it and Walpole supported it. 



A. D. 

1715-1731 



SXJPREMACT IN THE NORTH AND IN ITALY 401 

Regent, Mademoiselle de Montpensier. The only obstacle Chap, v 
in the way of the arrangement was the difficulty in obtaining 
the assent of the young king of France. The eleven-years-old 
lad is said to have wept bitterly when he was informed that 
he was to marry a child of three; but, with a choking voice, 
when told it was his duty, his assent was given. 

The exchange of the future royal brides was carried out 
with solemn ceremonies on the Isle of Pheasants in the Bi- 
dassoa, where Mazarin had made the peace of France and 
Spaui when Louis XIV brought Maria Theresa to Paris 
amid the national rejoicing, and both nations now acclaimed 
with equal fervor the new pledges of peace and friendship. 

The triumph of Dubois was soon rendered complete by The triumph 
his success at Rome. To the last, in spite of large sums of ^ ^^'**'®" 
money paid and influence brought to bear, in which the 
Pope's favorite nephew, Albani, and even the Pretender were 
used as instruments, Clement XI had declined to accord the 
purple to the ambitious minister, who by the favor of the 
Regent had already become Archbishop of Cambray; but 
the death of the Pope and the election of his successor af- 
forded to Dubois a better opportunity. By the adroitness 
of Cardinal Rohan a written promise was obt&ined from 
Cardinal de Conti that, if he were elected pope, Dubois 
should be made a cardinal; but when Cardinal de Conti had 
become Innocent XIII he was not willing to confer the prom- 
ised honor imtil Cardinal Rohan threatened that, if the red 
hat were not immediately bestowed, he would disclose the 
written agreement and the circumstances under which it had 
been made. Finally, on June 16, 1721, the coveted distinc- 
tion was accorded to the Archbishop of Cambray, and the 
document which had compelled it was surrendered to His 
Holiness. A week later the Regent presented the new 
cardinal to Louis XV as " a prelate whom the Pope had been 
pleased to honor for his great services in upholding the 
throne of His Majesty and preventing a schism in the 
Church!" 1 



^ The popular impression was quite different. "Tout le monde est 
indigo^ et cela fait bien du tort k la religion, de voir placer dans une 

VOL. ni. — 26 



402 



A mSTOBY OP DIPIiOMACT 



Chaf. V 
1716-1731 



Tlw mAiitiine 
•mbitioiwol 
iVI 



The alliance of France and Ekigland with Spain placed 
Charles VI in a position similar to that in which the Quad- 
- ruple Alliance had placed Philip V; since, like that compact, 
it was a combination formed with the purpose of enforcing 
certain concessions from a reluctant monarch. It promised 
to be equally effective; for Charles VI was already confronted 
by a powerful enemy in the North. Peter the Great had 
made his peace with Sweden and held Poland almost as a 
subject province, whose crown he had offered to bestow 
upon a French prince if he would marry his daughter. Fred- 
erick Augustus I of Saxony remained the nominal Polish 
king, but his tenure of the throne depended upon the vrill 
of the Czar, who was able to dethrone him. Moreover, 
Charles VI was initiating a commercial policy which made 
it seem to the advantage of Great Britain to hold firmly to 
the alliance with France and Spain. 

During his Spanish campaigns Charles VI, who had wit- 
nessed the prosperity of the seaport towns of Spain, had been 
inspired with the advantage that might accrue to Austria 
if proper use were made of the opportunities offered for the 
extension of foreign commerce. 

On the Adriatic, since by the Peace of Passarowitz Austria 
had secured the privilege of commerce with the whole of the 
Ottoman Empire, Trieste promised to become an important 
emporium of trade with the Levant; while the ports recently 
acquired by the transfer of the Spanish Netherlands to 
Austria presented an opportunity for extended commerce 
on the Atlantic. The possession of Naples and Sicily opened 
a field for commercial expansion in the Western Mediter- 
ranean; and the decline of Venice, whose power both on land 
and sea had been much reduced by the wars with the Turks, 
created an opportunity for the development of the Emperor's 
maritime projects in the East. 

While so many conditions were favorable to Austria's 
becoming a great sea-power, it was certain that both on the 



des premidres places de Pfigliae un hoxnme oonnu pour 6tre sans foi et 
sans religion." — Barfoier, Journal historique, I, p. 141. 



STJPRBfilACT IN THE NORTH AND IN ITALY 403 

Mediterranean and the North Sea opposition would arise. Chap, y 
In 1722 the Emperor founded the Ostend Commercial Com- .^.^j^-j 
pany, with glowing prospects of success;^ but Holland, whose 



policy had always been to stifle the maritime enterprise of 
the Spanish Netherlands and to control their commerce, now 
appealed to the previous concessions to Dutch ships and the 
prohibition of participation in the Indian trade imposed upon 
the ports of the Spanish Netherlands by the treaties of West- 
phalia and subsequent conventions with the Kings of Spain, 
which they held to be binding upon their Austrian succes- 
sors.' England, aiming at the empire of the sea, and fearing 
the appearance of a new competitor, supported the claims 
of Holland, and the Ostend Company soon found itself the 
object of international contention. 

The opposition of the maritime powers to the Austrian Th© 
sea-policy was rendered more eflfective by the fact that 
Charles VI was at the time and during the remainder of his 
life preoccupied with the question of the Austrian succes- 
sion, — a preoccupation which affected not only his domestic 
policies, but also his foreign diplomacy. 

After the death of his infant son, it appeared not improb- 
able that the male line of the House of Austria would become 
extinct with the death of Charles VI. In order to secure the 
possession of the Austrian estates to his own descendants, 
as head of the House of Hapsburg he issued a decree setting 
aside all collateral claims and confirming the entire succes- 
sion to Maria Theresa, the eldest of his daughters, in case 
no son should be bom to him. This decree, being only a 
household law, required the recognition of the hereditary 
estates; and, to give it complete security, that of the Empire 
and the foreign powers also. The "Pragmatic Sanction," 
as this new rule was called, being of great importance to 
Charles VI, assent to it became an item of value in the 
negotiations of foreign powers, and until the end of his life 
played a rdle in all international bargains in which the Em- 
peror was concerned far in excess of its importance to the 

^ See Rouflsety Recueil historiquef II, pp. 5, 42. 
* See Rouflset, Recueil histariquef II, pp. 43, 76. 



404 



A HISTORY OF DIPIiOBCACY 



Chap. V 

A.D. 

171^1731 



Duboia' ob- 
•truotion ot 
the CoDsrefls 
of Cambny 



peoples whose interests were bartered for it, only to prove 
illusory in the end. 
- With the Austrian estates themselves no great difficulties 
were encountered; but with some of the princes of the Empire, 
and especially with Prussia, a different fortune was experi- 
enced. Like his brother Joseph I, Charles VI was ambitious 
to render the House of Hapsburg really dominant in tha 
Empire. To this ambition the greater princes of Germany 
were opposed. So strenuous was the hostility to the Emperor's 
pretensions, and particularly to the Pragmatic Sanction, 
that diplomatic relations between Prussia and Austria were 
for a time broken off; while Bavaria and Saxony, having 
direct claims to the whole or a part of the succession, through 
marriage with descendants of Leopold I and Joseph I, were 
indisposed to abandon their rights of inheritance, even when 
they had been formally renounced.* 

Would Ehu-ope sustain the Pragmatic Sanction? That was 
the question which for twenty years dominated all others 
in the mind of Charles VI and kept him the constant prey of 
anxiety. His supremacy in Italy, the maritime interests of 
the Austrian possessions, and every other consideration 
within and outside of the Empire were subordinated to that 
dearest dream of the Emperor's life, the recognition of the 
Pragmatic Sanction. 

Li ignorance of the secret engagements of France and 
England with Spain, Charles VI wondered why the mediators 
did not meet his plenii)otentiaries at Cambray, where his 
differences with Spain were to be ended, as he supposed, with 
the aid of his friends in the Quadruple Alliance. Philip V 
and especially Elizabeth Famese were also eager for their 
secret allies to redeem their promises, and secure from the 
Emperor the recognition of their claims in Italy; but neither 
France nor England was urgent in beginning the business 
of the Congress. 

This hesitation on the part of Dubois was owing to his 
desire to render more effective the union of France and Spain 

^ The order of descent from Leopold I as shown in Table VII at the 
end of this yoliime. 



SUPREMACY IN THE NOBTH AND IN ITALY 405 

in canying out the traditional Bourbon policy of opposition Chap. V 
to the House of Austria. " It was more important," he said, ^' ^' 

171A— 17^1 

"to care for the perfection of the treaty than to hasten its 



conclusion; and the presence of a few plenipotentiaries at 
Cambray could accomplish nothing." England, on the other 
hand, was in no haste to execute a treaty from which all the 
real advantages had already been derived, or to reconcile 
Spain with the Emperor, against whom a united opposition 
might be useful in frustrating his maritime policy. 

The system created by Dubois and Stanhope had already 
borne its fruits so far as France and England were concerned. 
Walpole appeared to have no interest in foreign affairs, ex- 
cept to promote British commerce; and it was not forgotten 
by Dubois that Townshend had in the beginning not only 
opposed the Anglo-French alliance which Stanhope had cre- 
ated, but also the alliance of England with France and Spain, 
whose promises were yet to be fulfilled or frustrated at Cam- 
bray. The Congress, if assembled, might afford an oppor- 
timity for George I to show himself the arbiter of Europe. 
He was a prince of the Empire, and might find it to his in- 
terest to side with the Emperor for advantages in return. 
In that event the alliance of France, England, and Spain 
would prove a disappointment, and the whole house of cards 
would fall in ruins. It would be far better, Dubois thought, 
to hold fast to the Ehiglish alliance without exposing it to any 
new risk, and at the same time privately to strengthen the 
bonds between France and Spain. 

In January, 1722, it appeared probable that Dubois would The i 
no longer be able to postpone the work of the Congress. sLSbOTpw! 
Elizabeth Famese was becoming anxious about the Italian dominanoo 
inheritance promised to her children, and the advisers of 
Charles VI were more than ever resolved to force the powers 
to declare their intentions. 

* But Dubois had discovered a reason for delay that could 
be rendered plausible to the Court of Spain. The strife 
over the Austrian succession was comparable in importance 
to that which had involved all Europe in the war of the Span- 
ish succession. In March, 1722, he wrote to his confidant, 



406 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACT 

Chap. V Chavigny, at Madrid: "The Emperor may die without a 
^' male heir, and that death may open the splendid opportmiity 

to extend the succession of Don Carlos to almost the whole 

of Italy. In place of exposing oneself to failure in little enter- 
prises, it is preferable to form only great ones, and to combine 
everything in such a manner as to assure success." 

Chavigny, who had been sent to Spain to dissuade the 
Spanish court from precipitation in urging on the work of 
the Congress, was instructed to convince Elizabeth Famese 
that it was not for the highest interest of Don Carlos to 
demand the immediate investiture of his future heritage. 
By delaying action a far more brilliant future might await 
him, for the Austrian possessions in Italy could not be trans- 
mitted by the Emperor to his daughters, Don Carlos would 
have indisputable rights to Parma, Piacenza, and Tuscany, 
and his claims could in future be extended to all the Italian 
territories that had once belonged to Spain. 

In May, Philip V was so far convinced as to agree to accept 
the Cardinal's larger plan, but the rapacity of the Queen 
could not submit to postponement. Chavigny's advice was 
rejected, his influence resented, and his recall demanded. 
To reconcile the Regent to an immediate invasion of Italy 
in behalf of Don Carlos, his marriage with Mademoiselle de 
Beaujolais, the Regent's daughter, was proposed by Philip 
v. As the proposal promised to bind still more closely the 
two monarchies in opposition to the House of Hapsburg, the 
marriage was arranged, and Mademoiselle Beaujolais was 
sent to Madrid. 
Tbe CudiDAi'i The Famese ambitions having thus suddenly become those 
iMt nefotiation ^f ^^^ Regent also, the problem now was how to create an 
effective coalition against the Emperor. 

At the conclusion of the Peace of Nystad, Dubois had been 
disposed for a time to form an alliance between France and 
Russia, which Peter the Great had earnestly desired. Russia, 
the Czar had long before contended, would gladly perform the 
task which Sweden had performed for France in holding 
the House of Austria in check in the North, thus preoccupy- 
ing the Emperor at home. Peter the Great, it was thou^t, 



SX7PREMACT IN THE NORTH AND IN ITALY 407 

for the sake of a French alliance^ might even be mduced to chap. v 
guarantee the permanent possession by France of the prov- a. d. 
inces of which the Hapsburgs had been divested in former ^^^^^73i 
wars. By thus rendering the Czar ''the arbiter of the Em- 
pire/' the Emperor would be made powerless in the rest of 
Europe, and France and Spain could impose their will in 
Italy. 

The inexpediency of such an alliance at the time of the 
Peace of N3rstad, in spite of its apparent advantages, had 
grown out of the existence of the Quadruple Alliance, in 
which the Elmperor was a partner; and especially the danger 
of alienating George I, a prince of the Empire, who at that 
time required the Emperor's favor in regard to Hanover, 
and was bitterly hostile to the Czar. It might, however, now 
be possible, Dubois thought, under the changed conditions, 
to reconcile George I to the admission of Russia into the 
triple alliance of France, Spain, and England; or at least to 
obtain his sanction of a close entente between France and 
Russia. 

After the Peace of Nystad the "Emperor of all the Rus- 
sias," as Peter the Great now styled himself, had made war 
on Persia, and at the end of 1722 had retiuned in triiunph to 
St. Petersbiu*g, having added to his possessions some of the 
Shah's richest provinces on the Caspian Sea. 

With war against the Emperor imminent in Italy, the 
Russian alliance which in 1721 had seemed so advantageous 
to France appeared in 1722 almost necessary. Negotiations 
were, therefore, promptly resumed; and, in October, the 
French ambassador, Campredon, was instructed to let it 
be known at St. Petersburg that a marriage between the 
Regent's son, the Duke of Chartres, and the Princess Eliza- 
beth might perhaps be arranged. The essential condition, 
however, would be the previous election of the Duke of 
Chartres to the throne of Poland, which distinction would 
be accepted as the dower of the Princess.' 

The instructions to Campredon place in the foreground 
the securing of the Polish throne for the Regent's eldest son 

1 See Vandal, Lotda XV et Elisabeth de Russie, p. 53. 



408 A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY 

Chap. V as a precondition absolutely essential to the celebration of the 
i7i&-^73i ™*"^^^® J ^^^» ^* ^ plainly stated in the instruction, so eligible 

a prince as the Duke of Chartres would otherwise certainly 

not seek in marriage the Princess Elizabeth, who was said 
to have retained "gudques traces de la rudeaae de sa nation" 
The Czar, on the other hand, it was argued, should be 
"exceedingly happy" to form 'Hhe most distinguished alli- 
ance he could have in Europe"; while this relation, without 
the occupation of the throne of Poland by a French prince, 
would be of no solid value to France, since the Russian mon- 
archy after the death of Peter the Great "might easily fall 
back into the obscurity from which he had drawn it." 
Dabda' plan The advantages which France was expected to derive from 
tie«*F?Li*^ the alliance with Russia, were, in fact, far greater than the 
instructions to the French ambassador at St. Petersburg 



Ruau revealed. The Czar, according to Dubois' plan for a treaty, 

was to guarantee the European system already established 
by the Treaties of Utrecht, Rastadt, Baden, London, and 
The Hague. On the other hand, France, with England, — 
if England's participation could be obtained, — would guar- 
antee the conquests of Peter the Great on the Baltic. The 
three powers would agree mutually to defend one another 
from attack, with the exception of any difference that might 
arise between Russia and Turkey; for Dubois had no inten- 
tion to sacrifice the Ottoman Empire to Moscovite ambition, 
or to renounce the means of constraint upon the new ally by 
abandoning a traditional friendship that had so often proved 
advantageous to France.^ But there were still other benefits 
in view. The Russian Empire opened a vast field for the 
extension of the growing industry and commerce of France, 
with outlets into fertile and undeveloped provinces not yet 

* The desire to place a French prince on the throne of Poland was 
not new, and was a part of the system by which France aimed at holding 
in check the House of Austria. This system consisted in maintaining 
alliances with Sweden and Turkey, by which the Hapsburg power 
could be ooimterbalanced. Poland, situated between these allies, if 
under the influence of France, would complete the Eastern line of pos- 
sible attack, which would thus be extended almost imbroken from 
Stockholm to Constantinople. 



SUPREMACY IN THE NOBTH AND IN ITALY 409 

in contact with Western civilization, to be approached by Chap. V 
the Caspian and the Black Seas, the routes to Persia and ^^^^^^i 
unknown Central Asia. 

To secure the participation of England in the new alliance, 
Dubois conceived the idea of offering to act as mediator be- 
tween George I and Peter the Great. After long insistence, 
early m 1723, the Czar yielded to the wishes of France so 
far as to promise not to intrude upon Lower Germany, with 
special reference to reassuring George I regarding the safety 
of Hanover; but all the efforts of Chavigny, — who was sent 
on a special mission to obtain the assent of England to join 
in a triple alliance, — including the promise of a heavy bribe 
to the King's mistress, the Countess von Platen, were with- 
out result. 

Two reasons weighed with the Cardinal in hesitating to Dubob' i 
sign a separate treaty with Russia: the difficulty of securing ^*»<>"»"^ 
for the Duke of Chartres the assurance of the Polish succes- 
sion until the marriage with the Princess had been actually 
celebrated, and his preoccupation in securing his own con- 
tinuance in power after the approaching majority of Louis 
XV. For months Campredon was left without a word from 
the foreign office. Daring no longer to show himself at the 
imperial palace, and reduced to the extremity of borrowing 
money to pay the postage on his letters, the wretched am- 
bassador was at last compelled to take to his bed and give 
out word that he was ill. 

Dubois has been accused of lightening his own labors, 
when his table became too heavily freighted with diplomatic 
despatches, by throwing them unread into the fire, to avoid 
the trouble of answering them. Whatever truth there may 
be in this story, he received fifteen couriers from Campredon 
before acknowledging one of his despatches; and then in- 
formed him that in no case would France consent to the mar- 
riage until after the election of the Duke of Chartres to the 
throne of Poland. As for the treaty of alliance, it would have 
to await further negotiations with England. 

But the Cardinal never signed the despatch. Since Au- 
gust, 1722, he had been prime minister of France; and when, 



410 A HISTOBT OF DIPLOMACY 

Chap. V on February 16, 1723, the regency came to an end with the 
7iR-mi ^^^^ majority of Louis XV, the King had continued him in 
this office. Received as a member of the French Academy, 



he had been hailed as another Richelieu. Having attained 
the highest honors that could be awarded to a Frenchman, 
he had returned to the traditional policy of France, — op- 
position to the House of Hapsburg. His overtures to Peter the 
Great were intended to aid in restoring this S3rstem, in which 
he was anxious to include Great Britain. His aim was the 
complete isolation of the Emperor. What might have hap- 
pened if the negotiations with Russia had continued under 
Dubois is uncertain; for on August 10, 1723, the Cardinal's 
career suddenly ended with his death. 
Tbe fonicn The Duke of Orleans, who succeeded Dubois as prime 
^^ ^ ^^ minister of France, with Count Morville as minister of f ol*- 

Duke of ' 

oritens cigu affairs, favored the Russian alliance with Peter the 

Great, and in October, 1723, success seemed probable; for 
the Czar had expressed hiswillingness to have an understand- 
ing with England. Chavigny was instructed to impress upon 
Hanover the advantages of an English alliance with Russia, 
to urge opposition to the Pragmatic Sanction, and to propose 
a plan — said to have been suggested by Dubois — for 
abolishing the Imperial dignity altogether and transforming 
the Empire into a system of separate States.^ The maritime 
ambitions of Charles VI seemed to furnish an effective argu- 
ment; for an alliance with the Czar, it was contended, would 
impose an effective restraint upon the action of the Emperor. 
But the bad relations of George I and Peter the Great ren- 
dered illusory all hope of an alliance between them. On 
October 12, 1723, the King of England signed a family com- 
pact with his son-in-law, Frederick William I of Prussia, 
which the Czar believed to be directed against himself; and, 
as a retort, he received a Jacobite agent at St. Petersburg, 
with a proposal to unite with France and aid the Pretender. 
In the midst of the negotiations between France and Rus- 
sia, on December 2, 1723, the death of the Duke of Orleans 
put an end to his plans, and the accession of the Duke of 

1 See Bourgeois, Le secret de Dubois, p. 374. 



SUPEEMACY IN THE NOBTH AND IN ITALY 411 

Bourbon to the position of prime minister brought in a rad- Chap. V 
ical change in the foreign policy of France. His aim was to n^^^^^ni 

undo the work of Dubois in promoting the interests of the 

House of Orleans, to disregard the influence of Elizabeth 
Famese, and to maintain intact the friendship of France The Duke of 
and England, which an alliance with Russia would jeopardize. ^J^J^^ ^i^^ 

When Peter the Great learned of the change of government ori^ane poaoy 
in France, he promptly abandoned the project of marr3ang 
his daughter into the House of Orleans, but continued his 
efforts for a political alliance. These were, however, finally 
rendered fruitless by the demand of the Duke of Bourbon 
that England be included in the treaty. The Czar declared 
his willingness to resume diplomatic relations with Great 
Britain and Hanover; but to pass at once from a condition 
of open hostility to one of alliance was in his eyes impossible. 
Till the end of his life, however, he clung to the hope of ar- 
ranging a French marriage for the Princess Elizabeth. In 
October, 1724, he suggested the substitution of the Duke of 
Bourbon for the Duke of Chartres, with the expectation of 
the Polish crown; but a definite answer was not retmned. 
If we may trust a well supported tradition, Peter the Great 
never entirely lost hope of a French alliance, and the draft 
of a treaty with France was found upon his table at the time 
of his death.^ 

On January 26, 1724, in the quaint old town of Cambray, The GoncrM 
— where in 1508 the Emperor Maxunilian I, Louis XII of **'^^^**^ 
France, and Ferdinand the Catholic had formed their league 
against Venice, and where twenty-one years later the Em- 
peror Charles V and Francis I were reconciled by the famous 
**Paix des Dames," — the long postponed congress was as- 
sembled to reconcile the differences between Spain and the 
Emperor. 

But the Congress had come too late. New conditions had 
supervened which made its work more or less of an anach- 
ronism. The maritime powers had become irritated by the 
Emperor's creation of the Ostend Company, the French sup- 
port of the Famese interests had weakened, and the Duke of 

^ See Vandal, LouU XV et Elisabeth de Rustie, p. 78. 



412 A mSTORT OF DIPLOMACY 

Chap. V Bourbon was determined that the future of France should 
^' ^- not pass mto the keeping of the House of Orleans. 

Still other events not less important had occurred to change 

the situation. On January 10 Philip V, debilitated and verg- 
ing upon madness, had abdicated the throne of Spain, in 
order to end his days in reUgious devotion; and his son Don 
Louis had succeeded him. In the midst of the Congress, on 
August 31, the young king died; and Philip V resmned the 
crown. Count Monteleone, a SiciUan in the service of Spain, 
was sent to Paris and London to revive interest in the for- 
tunes of the Famese princes, and even to urge in their behalf 
immediate war upon the Emperor; but to the indisposi- 
tion of the Court of France was added the indignation of 
England when the ambassador reminded Greorge I of his 
unfulfilled promise to ask Parliament for permission to re- 
store Gibraltar, and even menaced him with the loss of 
commercial privileges if the fortress were not promptly 
surrendered.* 

Li these circumstances negotiation marched slowly at 
Cambray. Without real sympathy with Spain, and in a 
state of estrangement from the Emperor, both France and 
England offered only a cold and formal mediation which 
gave no promise of early fruits, when a blow fell which 
aroused a storm of fury at Madrid. 

On October 29, 1724, the French Council of State secretly 
resolved that the Spanish Lif anta, who had been brought to 
France for her education as the wife of Louis XV, should be 
sent back to Spain.' 



^ For an account of the negotiationB at Cambray, and Monteleone's 
mission, see Sy^eton, Revue d' Histoire Dq)lomatiquei VIII, pp. 176, 189. 

> The reason for this decision, which was kept secret until the fol- 
lowing March, was the strong desire of the Duke of Bourbon and his 
Council to prevent the possible transfer of the crown to the Duke of 
Orleans in case of the death of Louis XV without an heir. It was, 
therefore, decided that the young king should marry immediately; 
but, as the Infanta of Spain was only nine years old, immediate marriage 
necessitated the choice of another princess. On August 15, 1725, Louis 
XV was married at Strasburg to Maria Lesaczinska, daughter of Stan- 
islas, former King of Poland. 



SUPREMACY IN THE NORTH AND IN ITALY 413 

When, on March 9, 1725, the announcement of this de- Chap. V 
cision was made at Madrid by the Ahh6 Livry, who was sent ^^^{^01 

as a special ambassador for the purpose, Philip V in his rage 

cried out, "Ah the traitor I'' and returned to the trembling 
abb6 the still unopened letter of the Duke of Bourbon. 
Diplomatic relations were at once broken off, all French con- 
suls were expelled from Spain, and Mademoiselle Beaujolais, 
the fiancSe of Don Carlos, was indignantly despatched to 
Paris.^ Thus came to nothing the illnstarred mediation of 
France and England in the Congress of Cambray. 

The shock produced by the rupture between France and The xnaty 
Spain on account of the repudiation of the Spanish marriages jJ^iSdon^ 
was soon followed by an event of even deeper import. On Rappenu 
April 30, 1725, a treaty of offensive and defensive alliance 
was signed at Vienna between Spain and Austria by which 
the whole sj^tem of European politics was thrown into 
confusion. 

In November, 1724, as soon as it was perceived that Monte- 
leone's mission to Paris and London was certain to end in 
failure, a new programme of action had been decided upon at 
Madrid. Since France and England would not make war 
upon the Emperor, in order to force him to accept all that 
Spain had demanded in Italy, there remained the alternative 
of trying to secure the objects aimed at by direct negotiations 
with Charles VI. 

The fertile brain of Elizabeth Famese now conceived the 
scheme of a double imion with the House of Austria. The 
Emperor should be asked to give the hand of the Arch- 
duchess Maria Theresa, who by the Pragmatic Sanction was 
to inherit all the Austrian possessions, to Don Carlos, who 
should then be chosen King of the Romans. His yoimger 
brother, Don Philip, should be proposed for the younger 
Austrian archduchess, Maria Anna, who should be provided 
for in Italy. The two monarchies should then unite to de- 
fend and enforce all these family interests, obtain the restora- 
tion of Gibraltar and Minorca to Spain, and secure to Charles 
VI the recognition of the Pragmatic Sanction and the pro- 

1 Fdr details, see Villars, Mimoirea, p. 307. . 



414 



A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY 



Chap. V 

A.O. 

1715-1731 



The aeeret i&> 
■tniotions of 
RippeRU 



tection of the Ostend Company; which, as an extra induce- 
menty should be accorded exceptional commercial privileges 
with the Spanish colonies. 

In order to make these advances to Charles VI with due 
secrecy and reserve, it was necessary to send to Vienna a 
man of diplomatic skill and experience; yet he must be suffi- 
ciently obscure to escape public observation, and furnished 
with such credentials as would permit, if the proposals 
were rejected, of a complete disavowal of his authority to 
negotiate. 

Such an emissary was available in Baron RJpperda, an 
adventurer of Dutch birth but descended from parents of 
Spanish origin, who in 1718 had been sent to Madrid by 
Holland with the title of ambassador, but had been recalled 
and dismissed on the charge that he was more subservient 
to Spain than to the country by which he was accredited. 
Of insinuating manners, adventurous spirit, and an excellent 
linguist, he had been serviceable to Alberoni as a diplomatic 
spy; and through this association had been held in esteem 
at court until Alberoni's fall, when, having lost credit, he 
had dropped into comparative obscurity at Madrid, where he 
continued to reside. Not having any official character, yet 
possessing the desired qualifications for this delicate mission, 
without the knowledge of Grimaldo, the head of the Spanish 
foreign office, Ripperda was selected to negotiate a private 
understanding with the Emperor. 

On November 22, 1724, without exciting the slightest 
suspicion, Ripperda's formal instructions had been secretly 
prepared by the King, Elizabeth Famese, and Orenda3n[i, 
who from a clerk in the foreign office under Grimaldo had 
risen through the favor and influence of the Queen to be a 
minister of state, and since the fall of Alberoni was the person 
most in her confidence. 

If the idea of the proposed marriages were regarded with 
favor at Vienna, Maria Theresa should receive as a dowry, 
to be enjoyed after the Emperor's death, all the hereditary 
estates of Austria in Germany; while Maria Anna should 
inherit those in Italy, to which Parma, Piacenza, and Tus- 



SUPREMACY IN THE NORTH AND IN ITALY 415 

cany would be added by Don Carlos' renunciation. Thus all Chap, v 
the Austrian possessions in Germany and Italy were ulti- ^•^• 
mately to be divided between Elizabeth Famese's two 



sons. 

As for the Austrian Netherlands, they should be restored 
to Spain. If that could not be, then they were to be given 
to the younger son, Don Philip, and Maria Anna, to be re- 
tiuned to Spain in case the pair should die without heirs. 

If the marriages were agreed upon, Spain would promise 
to recognize and aid in enforcing the IVagmatic Sanction, 
and to protect and promote the Austrian plans for maritime 
and commercial development. Upon this basis the Emperor 
might be assured of a lasting peace and union with Spain, 
and through this alliance obtain a guarantee for the inheri- 
tance by his daughters of all the Austrian possessions in 
Germany and Italy. 

In return the Emperor should promise active aid in se- 
curing the restoration to Spain of Gibraltar and Minorca. 
In case of a refusal by George I to surrender them to Spain, 
the two powers would unite in a war to exclude him from the 
throne of Ekigland, and give their support to the Pretender. 

Finally, imited, the two powers would work everywhere for 
the re-establishment of the Roman Catholic faith. 

Although the instructions as a whole were secret, Ripperda The i 
was intrusted by the Queen with a secret more sacred still, ^^^'^^^ 
which was not contained in the written document. As a and Rippenu 
ruling monarch Philip V, and as a public minister Orendayn, 
were under obligations to have some consideration for the 
interests of the Spanish Kingdom; but Elizabeth Famese, 
the real author of the proposal to form an alliance with the 
Emperor, was chiefly interested in providing a brilliant future 
for her sons. Ripperda was, therefore, orally informed by the 
Queen that the principal aim of his mission was to secure the 
marriages. If that could be accomplished, all else might be 
modified. 

But Ripperda also had his secret. The mission with which 
he was intrusted could, if successful, lift him to greater heights 
than those from which Alberoni had fallen. The satisfaction 



416 



A HISTORY OF DIPLOBCACT 



Chap. V 
1715-1731 



RippeidA's 
negotiatknis 



of Elizabeth Famese's dearest ambition would make him 
prime minister of Spain. 

Having arrived at Vienna in January, 1725, Ripperda 
made no attempt to conceal his true name at the octroi of 
the city, and openly annoimced that he was charged by 
Philip y with a mission to Peter the Great at Moscow! As 
an authorized envoy he possessed the right to visit the Chan- 
cellor of the Empire, Count Zinzendorf , whom otherwise it 
might have been difficult to see. Recalling his acquaintance 
with the Count in Holland, at the first interview he disclosed 
his real object, namely, to negotiate a treaty of peace and 
alliance between Spain and Austria, on condition of marriages 
between Don Carlos and Don Philip and the Austrian arch- 
duchesses. In proof of his assertion, he handed the Chancellor 
the credentials given him by the King of Spain, which com- 
mended him to the Emperor, and requested to be allowed to 
present immediately his proposals to an authorized minister. 
Although Charles VI was astonished, he charged Zinzendorf 
to hear what Ripperda had to propose, and the pourparlers 
began at once.^ 

Without the least hesitation or embarrassment Ripperda 
represented that he was an important personage at Madrid, 
that he enjoyed the entire confidence of the Court, and that 
he was destined upon his return to be prime minister of Spain! 
He declared that he himself was the original author of the 
idea of a direct rapprochement with Austria; — a plan which, 
he alleged, as a good Catholic and a true Spaniard, he had 
long had in his mind, and which had been only recently 
accepted by the King. 

The occasion for this change of policy on the part of 
Philip V, he affirmed, had been the proposal by the Duke of 
Bourbon to conquer for him the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies. 
Sicily and Naples — possessions of Charles VI — were to 
be attacked by French and Spanish troops; while the Czar 
of Russia and the Sultan of Turkey, by arrangement with 
France, were to invade Silesia and Hungary, and thus en- 

* For a detailed account, see Syveton, Reyue d'HiBtoire Diplo- 
matique, VIII (1894), p. 365 et seq. 



SUPREMACY IN THE NORTH AND IN ITALY 417 

gage the Emperor at home. Philip V had rejected with scorn Chap. V 
this infamous proposal; and the Queen, who was a bitter .7^1^731 

enemy of France, and had long wished to recall her daughter 

from Paris and marry her to the Infante of Portugal, had 
profited by the occasion to carry out the idea of a family 
alliance with the House of Austria I 

These ingenious falsehoods, the figments of Bipperda's 
fertile fancy, appealed to the secret fears and suspicions of 
the Emperor, and received in the subsequent rejection of the 
Spanish Infanta by France an apparent confirmation. The 
Duke of Bourbon had, in fact, not only not proposed the con- 
quest of Sicily, but had positively refused to aid in the in- 
vasion of Italy which Monteleone had lurged upon him, and 
Elizabeth Famese had at the time no suspicion that the 
marriage of the Infanta with Louis XV would be repudiated 
at Versailles. 

Even more effective than Ripperda's impudent fictions was 
the manner in which the proposal of the marriages was pre- 
sented. The Spanish court, Ripperda explained, had every 
hope that the Emperor would yet be blessed with a son, who 
would succeed him in the Empire. The sons of Elizabeth 
Famese also had the most brilliant prospects. Of the children 
of Philip V by his first marriage, Don Louis was abeady dead, 
and Don Ferdinand was so frail that he would in all probar 
biUty never wear the crown. Don Carlos would almost cer- 
tainly become King of Spain, while Don Philip would inherit 
the duchies of Parma, Racenza, and Tuscany. When, 
therefore, the future son of Charles VI became Emperor, 
the archduchesses would be well provided for, and the Austro- 
Spanish alliance would be continued with Maria Theresa as 
Queen of Spain, while both monarchies would enjoy perfect 
security and unite in giving peace to Italy. 

If, on the other hand, the Emperor should have no son, 
and Maria Theresa should inherit all the Austrian posses- 
sions, Don Carlos would, in that case, renounce the throne 
of Spain to his brother Don Philip, the husband of Maria 
Anna, and assume the rule of the Austrian estates. In order 
that he might be fitted for this contingency, Don Carlos 
VOL. m. — 27 



418 A HI8TOKT OF DIFIiOHACT 

c^AP. y would be at onoe Bent to Yienna to be educated at the Im- 
iTitmi PeAd Court. 

Eag^ as the Emperor was to have peace and friendly re- 



st Vm 



lations with Spain, the marriages, which were in Ripperda's 
TiM dflfibem- proposals the preconditions of a rapprodiemerU, were from 
^ the Austrian point of view of doubtful expediency. ''What 
was to be done regarding the existing French engagements?" 
the Chancellor had asked of Ripperda; who in confusion 
had replied: ''They would be brokenl " " What, then, would 
be the value of the engagements you propose, since all the 
princes and princesses in question are still very young? 
These might also in time be broken!'' 

The Austrian Council ai^ed that although the arguments 
for a Spanish alliance were good, those for the marriages were 
open to question. Ripperda had quietly treated Don Ferdi- 
nand as practically non-existent; and yet, so far as was 
known, he might live, marry Mademoiselle Beaujolais, and 
thus place a IVench Queen upon the throne of Spain. What 
then would become of Don Carlos? In summarily desfpatch- 
ing thehdr to the Spanish throne, in order to make the pros- 
pects of the Famese princes appear more brilliant, Ripperda 
had raised a difficult question. 

But the Austrian analysis of the situation revealed other 
grounds for hesitation. If the Emperor gave two of his 
daughters to Don Carlos and Don Philip, the union of Aus- 
tria and Spain would excite the jealousy of all the other 
courts of Europe; and, if a son should be bom to the Em- 
peror before the marriages were actually celebrated, Spain, 
disappointed in losing the expected heritage, would probably 
abandon Austria in the midst of danger. 

On the other hand, if Don Carlos as husband of Maria 
Theresa should upon the Emperor's death claim all the Aus- 
trian possessions, there would undoubtedly be opposition 
from the maritime powers to a Bourbon supremacy so pre- 
dominant; a war of succession would follow; and dismem- 
berment would probably occm:. Spain, unable to preserve 
the whole Austrian monarchy for the Bourbon princes, 
would be satisfied with securing for each of them a portion, 



SUPREMACY IN THE NORTH AND IN ITALY 419 

perhaps in Italy, while Austria might fall to the lot of Ba- Chap, v 
varia, Bohemia to Saxony, and Hungary might become an 
independent kingdom. When the Hapsburg heritage was 



A. D. 

1715-1731 



thus weakened by division, France and Holland would per- 
haps divide the Austrian Netherlands between them, and 
the Turks would try to reclaim what they had lost. 

Ripperda perceived that, if he could entirely isolate the The 
Emperor from all other alliances and attach him closely to ^^^^^ 
Spain, he could then take advantage of his helplessness and 
impose the marriages as a necessity growing out of the de- 
pendent position in which Austria would then be placed. 

Leaving almost everything to Zinzendorf to formulate, 
except the question of who should be Grand Master of the 
Order of the Golden Fleece, — which both the Emperor and 
Philip V had hotly disputed, — and a few other points upon 
which his master was sensitive, — and which were, therefore, 
left out of the negotiation, — Ripperda sent to Madrid for 
approval the drafts of two treaties, one of peace and one of 
alliance. 

It was at this moment that the annoimcement of the re- 
jection of the Infanta at Paris reached Madrid and awakened 
a frenzy of indignation against France. The mediation of 
Louis XV and George I at Cambray was scornfully rejected, 
and Ripperda was informed that, with slight modifications, 
the treaties would be accepted. All engagements with France 
were considered as annulled; and in his wrath Philip V in- 
vited Charles VI to unite with him in war upon France for 
the recovery of the provinces taken from Spain and the Em- 
pire by Louis XIV, the assertion of the right of succession 
to the throne of France by the Spanish princes, and the 
amiihilation of French and English commerce. 

With regard to the marriages, Ripperda was doomed to 
disappointment; for the utmost concession he could wring 
from the Austrian Council of State was, that the Emperor 
would consent that one or the other of his three daughters, 
when of suitable age, should marry one or the other of the 
sons of Philip V. Having obtained this general promise, 
which he intended to insist should be made more definite 



420 



A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY 



Chap. V 

A. D. 

1715-1731 



Illusory char- 
acter of the 
Treatiefl of 
Viexina 



in the future, on April 30, 1726, Ripperda signed with the 
Emperor two treaties, one of peace between Spain and 
- Austria and one of defensive alliance. On May 1, a treaty 
of commerce also was signed.^ 

In appearance Ripperda had won a great diplomatic bat- 
tle, for he had made peace, and even an alliance, beti^een 
Spam and the Emperor, and rendered apparently nee<lles3 
the mediation of France and England at Cambray; but in 
reahty he had yielded every advantage to Austria and ac- 
quired practically nothing for Spain. The Emperor had 
merely bound himself to accept the friendship of his former 
enemy, and to offer his own in return; but Philip V had prom- 
ised large sums of money together with naval protection for 
Austrian commerce, and had loaded Spain with new responsi- 
bilities. The important points in dispute before the Congress 
of Cambray were left unsettled, the ItaUan duchies still re- 
mained fiefs of the Eknpire, and the Famese marriages were 
as far as ever from realization. Spain had placed herself 
virtually at the mercy of the Emperor, so far as the treaties 
were concerned. It was for Philip V a complete surrender. 

The Spanish court had, indeed, surprised Europe by a 
dexterous move in the moment of its humiliation; but why 
did Ripperda, a man of keen intelligence, sign such an un- 
equal compact? 

His main object was to secure the Famese marriages. 
The only way was first to separate Austria from other alli- 
ances, to arouse the jealousy of Europe, and especially of 
the German princes, to bind the Emperor to Spain as his 
only friend, and then to extort from him what he would not 
otherwise bestow, his consent to the desired marriages. 

If Ripperda was false to the real interests of Spain, he 
was at least true to Elizabeth Famese, whose secret agent 
he really was; for his own fortune was linked with her suc- 
cess. Aside from this, Spain and Europe were nothing to him. 
Although the treaties were in reality hollow, the mere fact 

* For the treaties, see Dumont, VIII, Part II, p. 106 et seq., and for 
a full account of the negotiations, Syveton, Revue d'Histoire Diplo- 
matique, VIII (1894), pp. 364, 394. 



SUPREMACY IN THE NORTH AND IN ITALY 421 

that a secret alliance between Spain and the Emperor had Chap. V 
been concluded at the moment of the French rebuff was suf- . ^' ^• 

£ . . . V . 1716-1731 

ficient for his purpose. 



Grimaldo, who was opposed to the whole procedure, was 
ordered to publish the treaties of peace and commerce; but 
the treaty of alliance was kept secret. Its chief value for the 
purposes of Ripperda was in letting Europe imagine it more 
dangerous than it really was. Gradually the conviction 
spread that the marriage of Maria Theresa and Don Carlos 
was stipulated in one of the secret articles. It was the effect 
Ripperda had desired to produce. Don Carlos might some 
day, it appeared, like the Emperor Charles V, become the 
master of Germany, Italy, and perhaps Spain. What then 
would become of the equilibrium of Europe? 

While the secret treaty of alliance excited the imagina- The 
tion, those of peace and commerce offered sufficient evi-^"~^ 
dence that the negotiations had been conceived in a spirit 
of hostility to England as well as to France. It is true that 
the peace between Spain and Austria formally confirmed the 
Quadruple Alliance; but in substance it was its epitaph, and 
called forth from Coimt Morville and the Duke of Bourbon 
the exclamation, *^Cette paixmonstrueuset" But it was the 
treaty of commerce that most excited London and Amster- 
dam, for they saw in it a declaration of war directed against 
their attitude toward Austria's maritime enterprises: while 
France experienced the strange sensation of picturing a Bour- 
bon prince — for such Don Carlos was — as the future heir 
of the whole Hapsburg heritage arrayed in hostility to France. 

Reaction against the Treaties of Vienna was not long de- 
layed. France and England promptly renewed their inti- 
macy. In Jime George I and Townshend set out for Hanover, 
accompanied by the French ambassador at London, Coimt 
de Broglie, for the purpose of forming a league to force the 
Emperor to abandon his new relations with Spain. 

In Germany the idea of a marriage between Don Carlos 
and Maria Theresa had been received with much appre- 
hension. For Prussia the Austro-Spanish alliance was almost 
a menace; and, in August, Frederick William I entered into 



422 A HIBTOBT OF DIPLOMACT 

Chaf. y the nq^tiatioin for the formation of a league to oppose it. 
▲.D. ^i ii^^ same time efforts were made at Madrid through the 

171&— 1731 ^_ 

aid of Grimaldo to produce a rupture with the Emperor, but 



these were doomed to failure. Qrendayiiy sustained by Elis- 
abeth Famese, was accorded new honors, the English am- 
bassador was informed that friendship with George I de- 
pended upon the inunediate restoration of Gibraltar, and 
Ripperda was named ambassador plenipotentiary at Vienna 
with the title of Duke. 

Ripperda now openly declared that he would soon return 
to Madrid as prime minister, treated with contempt the new 
French ambassador, to whom he refused precedence, — 
which France had insisted upon and enjoyed for more than 
sixty years, — and publicly announced that Spain would 
soon make war on En^and for the recovery of Gibraltar and 
Minorca. The purpose of this bravado was to force the hand 
of the Emperor regarding the Spanish marriages; which, he 
frankly avowed, were the only cause of his remaining in 
Vienna. Chiefly in order to hasten his departure, Zinxen- 
dorf was in favor of yielding to his importunities; but the 
Council was divided in opinion. Then, suddenly, on Sep- 
tember 3, 1725, at the castle of Heerenhausen, in Hanover, 
a treaty was signed by the plenipotentiaries of E2ngland, 
France, and Prusria which ensured the success of lUpperda.^ 
TiM Treat/ The real meaning of the Treaty of Hanover was well un- 

derstood at Vienna, and Ripperda lost no time in giving it 
emphasis. The signatories mutually guaranteed not only 
all their possessions but all their rights, and stipulated the 
number of armed forces they would fumish to defend them. 
These rights were so defined as to include resistance to any 
possible iojury to any one of the allies, and thus was pre- 
sented a solid front to the whole line of the Austro-Spanish 
intentions. 

In order to make the new league appear as formidable as 
possible, the signatories bound themselves to enter into no 

* For the treaty, see Dumont, VIII, Part II, p. 127 et seq.; for the 
negotiations, Syveton, Revue d'Histoire Diplomatique, VIII, pp. 414, 
418. 



of Huunrar 



SUPREMACY IN THE NORTH AND IN ITALY 423 

separate negotiations with other powers, by which they meant Chap, v 
to destroy the hope of detaching any one of the allies in the .^^^{^^^ 
interest of either Spain or Austria; and at the same time pro- 



vided for future accessions to the treaty. The maritime 
interests of Holland rendered it probable that the Dutch Re- 
public would join in the alliance, and the explicit confirma- 
tion of the Treaties of Westphalia and of Oliva indicated a 
purpose to associate not only the princes of the Empire but 
aU the powers of the North to maintain the equilibrium of 
Europe. 

The effect produced was precisely what Ripperda had an- 
ticipated. Charles VI found himself isolated and even men- 
aced. His only refuge seemed to be in a still closer compact 
with Spahi. 

Ripperda was prompt in pressing his advan