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The ri(fht 0/ TranalatioH U reserved. 

FRO»: V ' 'i ' ^ OF 

fredf:.. : i^. .'.no 

MRS. CA) ■ : 





Batde of Plataea 


to fact 17 

Plan of the Battle between thcv Athenian Fleet under Phormio 

and the Peloponnedan Fleet to face 463 






Platjba avd MtkaiiS.— Fivazi Bxpvzisa or tb« 



The Fenian fleet, after retiring 
from Greece^ winteri at Kym6, 
and collects in the spring at 
Samoa 1 

The Greek fleet aseemhlee in 
the spring at iBgina .... 3 

General adherence of the me- 
diHng Greeks to Mardonius— 
revolt of Potidtea~which is 
besieged in vain by Artabazns 8 

Mardoninsi after wintering in 
Thessaly, resnmes operations 
in the spring in Boeotia. He 
consults the Boeotian oracles {b, 

Slardonins sends Alexander of 
Macedon to Athen% to offer 
the most honourable terms of 
peace .. .. .. 4 

Temptations to Athens to ac- 
cept this offer— fear of the 
liacedflemonians that she 
would accept it— Lacedsemo- 
nian envoys sent to Athens 
to prevent it 6 

Besolute reply of the Atheni- 
ansy and determination to 
carry on the war, in spite of 
great present suffering . • •• 6 


Selfish indifference .displayed 
by Sparta and the Pelopon- 
nesians towards Athens . . fi 

The Spartans, having fortified 
the Isthmus, leave Attica 
undefended : Mardonius oc- 
cupies Athens a second time 8 

Second migration of the Athe- 
nians to Salamis— their bitter 
disappointment and anger 
against Sparta for deserting 
them iK 

Second offer of Mardonius to 
the Athenians — again refused 
— intense resolution which 
they display .. .. f 

Bemonstrance sent by the Athe- 
nians to Sparta — ungenerous 
slackness of the Spartans . . <\ 

Large Spartan force collected 
under Pausanias at the Isth- 
mus 11 

Mardonius, after ravaging At- 

tica, retires into Bosotia . . 
Discouragement in the army of 
Mardonius generally: Ther- 
sander of Orchomenns at the 
banquet: jealousies between 





CHAPTER XLII continued. 


Mardonias and Artabazas, the 
second in command — zeal and 
eagerness of the Thebans . . 13 

Numbers of the Greeks col- 
lected nnder Pausanias . . 16 

March of Pausanias overKithae- 
ron into Boeotia 17 

He is attacked by the Persian 
cavalry under Masistius, and 
n^nch harassed— superior effi- 
ciency of the Athenians 
against cavalry— Masistius is 
slain %b. 

The Greeks quit the protection 
of the mountain-grounds and 
take up a position nearer to 
Plateea, along the Asdpus . . 19 

Mardonius alters his position, 
and posts himself nearly op- 
posite to the G-reeks on the 
other side of the AsOpus . . 20 

Unwillingness of both armies 
to begin the attack — the pro- 
phets on both sides discourage 
first aggression 21 

Mardonius annoys the Greeks 
with his cavalry, and cuts 
off their supplies in the rear 23 

Impatience of Mardonius — in 
spite of the reluctance of 
Artabazus and other officers, 
he determines on a general 
attack : he tries to show that 
the prophecies are favourable 
to him 23 

His intention communicated to 
the Athenians in the night 
by Alexander of Macedon . . 24 

Pausanias changes places in the 
line between the Spartans 
and Athenians 26 

Mardonius again attacks them 
with his cavalry 26 

In consequence of the annoy- 
ance of the Persian cavalry, 
Pausanias determines to move 
in the night into the Island ib, 

Oonfusion of the Grecian army 

in executing this night-move- 
ment 27 

Befusal of the Spartan lochage 
Amompharetus to obey the 
order for the night-march . . 23 

Mistrust of Pausanias and the 
Spartans, exhibited by the 
Athenians 29 

Pausanias moves without 
Amompharetus, who speedily 
follows him 80 

Astonishment of Mardonius on 
discovering that the Greeks 
had retreated during the 
night— he pursues and attacks 
them with disorderly impa- 
tience , . {b. 

Battle of Platsa 31 

Great personal bravery of the 
Persians— they are totally de- 
feated, and Mardonius slain 33 

The Athenians on the left wing 
defeat the Thebans 83 

Artabazus, with a large Persian 
corps^ abandons the contest 
and retires out of Greece— 
the rest of the Persian army 
take up their position in the 
fortified camp 84 

Bmall proportion of the armies 
on each side which really 
fought {A. 

The Greeks attack and carry 
the fortified camp .. .. .. 55 

Loss on both sides 36 

Funeral obsequies by the Greeks 
—monuments— dead body of 
Mardonius— distribution of 
booty S7 

Pausanias summons Thebes, re- 
quiring the surrender of the 
leaders— these men give them- 
selves up, and are put to 
death 40 

Honours and distinctions 
among the Greek warriors .. 41 

Beverential tribute to Platea, 
as the scene of the victoryi 


CHAPTER XLlL'-contmuciL 

and to the FlatSBans: solem- 
nities decreed to be periodic- 
ally celebrated by the latter, 
in honour of the slain . . . . 43 

Permanent Grecian confeder- 
acy decreed by the yictors to 
hold meetings at Platsea . . 43 

Proceedings of the Grecian 
fleet: it mores to the rescue 
of Samos from the Persians 44 

The Persian fleet abandons Sa- 
mos and retires to Mykal6 in 
Ionia 45 

Histrust of the fidelity of the 
lonians entertained by the 
Persian generals 48 

The Greeks land to attack the 
Persians ashore — revelation 
of the victory of Platsea, 
gained by their countrymen 
on the same morning, is com- 
municated to them before the 
battle 47 

Battle of Hykald— revolt of the 

lonians In the Persian camp 
•—complete defeat of the Per- 
sians 60 

fietirement of the defeated Per- 
sian army to Sardis . . . . 51 

Beluctance of the Spartans to 
adopt the continental lonians 
into their alliance— proposi- 
tion to transport them across 
the ^gean into Western 
Greece— rejected by the Athe- 
nians 62 

The Grecian "fleet sails to the 
Hellespont : the Spartans re- 
turn home, but the Athenians 
remain to attack the Cherso- 

Siege of Sestus— antipathy of 
the Ghersonesites against Ar- 
layKtes •• •• •• •• •• •• 

Capture of Sestus— crucifixion 
of Artayktds 6i> 

Heturn of the fleet to Athens 6U 





Agrigentum and Gela superior 
to Syracuse before 600 B.C. — 
Phalaris despot of Agrigen- 
tum , 68 

(Syracuse in 600 b.o.— oligarchi- 
cal government under the 
Gamori or privileged des- 
cendants of the original pro- 
prietary colonists— the Demos 
—the Kyllyrii or Serfs . . . . 69 

£arly governments of the Greek 
cities in Sicily — original 
oligarchies subverted in many 
places by despots— attempted 
colony of the Spartan prince 
Borieus .. •* 60 

Kleander despot of Gela— b^. , 
about 500— First rise of Gelo 
and iBneisiddmus in his ser- 
vice. Tftlinds, the first marked 
ancestor of Gelo 62 

Gelo— in high command among 
the mercenaries of Hippokra- 
tds despot of Gela 64 

Fate of the Ionic town of 
Zankl6, afterwards Messina 
—it is seized by the Samians 
—conduct of Hippokratds . . 66 

Hippokratds is victorious over 
the Syracusans— takes Kama- 
rina— dies— Gelo becomes in 
his place despot of Gela . . 67 


CHAPTER XLUL-'-continued. 

Greatness of Gelo— he gets po8- • Thfiro of Agrlgentnm — ap- 

session of Syracuse — and peased by the poet Bimonidds 6% 

transfers the seat of his power Severe treatment of the inhab- 

from Gela to Syracuse . . . . 67 itants of Himera by Thdro ib» 

Conquest of various Sicilian Power and exploits of Hiero— 

towns by Gelo— he. transports against the Carthaginians and 

the oligarchy to Syracuse^ Tyrrhenians— against Anaxi- 

and sells the Demos for slaves 69 laus — ^he founds the city of 

Increased power and popula- ^tna — new wholesale trans- 

tion of Syracuse under Gelo plantation of inhabitants — 

—it becomes the first city in compliments of Pindar . , . . $2 

Sioily 70 Death of Anaxilaus of Bhegi- 

Power of Gelo when tlie envoys um, and of Thdro of Agri- 

from Sparta and Athens came gentum. Thrasydaeus, son of 

to entreat his aid— b.g. 481 .. 71 Thdco, rules Agrigentum and 

Plans of Gelo for strengthening Himera. His cruel govern- 

Sicilian Hellenism against ment — he is defeated by Hiero 

the barbaric interests in the and expelled 84 

island ,•&. Great power of Hiero after tho 

Spartan and Athenian envoys defeat of Thrasydsus his 

apply to Gelo— his answer . , 73 death 85 

Carthaginian invasion of Sicily, Thrasybulus, brother and suc- 

simultaneous with the in- cesser of Hiero — disputes 

vasion of Greece by Xerxes 74 among the members of the 

The Carthaginian army under Gelonian family — Cruelties 

Hamilkar besiege Himera— and unpopularity of Thrasy- 

battle of Himera — complete bulus-^mutiny against him at 

victory gained over them by Syracuse qq 

Gelo . . . . . . 76 Expulsion of Thiasybulus, and 

Supremacy of Gelo in Sicily— extinction of the Gelonian 

he grants peace to the Car- dynasty ,, , 88 

thaginians .. 77 Popular governments establish- 

Conduct of Gelo towards the ed in all the Sicilian cities 

confederate Greeks who were — confusion and disputes 

contending against Xerxes .. 78 arising out of the number of 

Number of prisoners taken at new citizens and mercenaries 

the battle of Himera and djs- domiciliated by the Gelonian 

tributed among the Carthagi- princes 89 

nian cities— their prosperity, Internal dissensions and com- 

ospecially that of Agrigentum 79 bats in Syracuse 00 

Death and obsequies of Gelo ib. Defeat of the Gelonians- Syra- 

Number of new citizens whom cuse made into one popular 

Gelo had introduced at Syra- government •• •« 01 

cuse 80 Disorders in other Sicilian 

HierOf brother and successor cities, arising from the return 

of Gelo at Syracuse— jealous of exiles who had been dis- 

of his brother Polyzdlus — possessed under the Gelonian 

harsh as a ruler— quarrel be- dynasty. Eatana and ^tna i^ 

tween Hiero of Syracuse and General congress and compxo* 



CHAFT£B JLUL-^eonHtmed. 

mlse— the exiles ftre prorided 
for— Kanuurina again restored 
as a separate autonomoos city 92 
XUactionary feelings againstthe 
prerions despotism, and in 
XaTOor of popular gorern* 

nent, at STraeusa and In the 
other cities • • • . j • • • . . 98 
Italiot Greeks— destructive de- 
feat of the inhabitants of 
Tarentum and ofBhegium., ib. 


Vbom ski Bavvlss ov Platjba avd MtkalI dowv vo vbb Duatub 

09 THBMiBTOxiiis AiiB AniBTainis. 

Causes of the disgraceful re* Snlargement of the walls of 

pulse of Xerxes f^m Greece Athens •• •• .. .. ^. .. 103 

—his own defects— inferior I'ftrge plans of ThemistokUs 

quality and slackness of most for the naral aggnukdisement 

of his army. — Tendency to of the city— fortified town 

exaggerate the heroism of ftnd harbour prorided atPei- 

the Greeks . . 95 mus- rast height and thick* 

Comparison of the invasion of ness projected for the walls 104 
Greece by Xerxes with the Advantages of the enlarged 
invasion of Persia afterwards and fortified harbour — in* 
by Alexander the Ghreat.— No crease of metics and of corn- 
improvement in warfare merce at Athens 106 

among the Persians during Besolution to build twenty 

that interval of 160 years— new triremes annually . . . . 107 

great improvement among Expeditionof the united Greek 

the Greeks 96 fleet against Asia, under the 

Progressive spirit in Greece— Spartan Pausanias— capture 

operating through Athenian of Bysantium 108 

initiative 97 Misconduct of Pansanias— re- 
conduct of Athens In the re* fusal of the allies to obey 
pulse of the Persians— her him — ^his treasonable eorre- 

* position, temper, and influ- spondence with Xerxds . . 109 

ence, after that event . . ,, ib, Pausanias, having assurances 

Proceedings of the Athenians of aid from Xerxes, becomes 

to restore their city— jealous more intolerable in hisbeha- 

obstructions caused by the viour. He is recalled to 

Peloponnesians .. 98 Sparta ., . . llo 

Stratagem of Themistoklds to The allies transfer the head- 
procure for the Athenians the ship f^om Sparta to Athens 113 
opportunity of fortifying Importance of this change in 
their city . . . . . . . . . . 100 the relations of the Grecian 

Athens fortified— confusion of states •• •• .. .. .. .. 113 

the Spartans— disappointment Tendency of the Spartan kings 

of the allies •• .. .. .. 101 to become oorrupted on for- 

Sffeet of this intended, but eign service— Leotyebidds . . Hi 

baifled^ intervention upon Momentary Pan-hellenic union 

Athenian feelings 102 under Sparta, immediately 



CHAPTER JLIY. -^continued. 

Page Paeo 

after the repnlse of Xerxes Alteration of the Kleisthenean 

—now broken up and paising oonititution — all eitisens 

into a Bchiem with two die- without exception are ren- 

tinot parties and ohiefs, Sparta dered politicallj admisiible 

and Athens 116 to office: first, anirersal eli- 

Proceedings of Athens in her gibilitj and election of ma- 
capacity of leader— good con- gistrates — ^next, sortition or 
dnot of Aristeidds 118 drawing by lot 181 

formation of the confederacy Increase of the power of the 

of DeloS| under Athens as Stratdgi— alteration in the 

president— general meetings functions and diminution of 

of allies held in that island 119 the importance of the Ar- 

Assessment of the confederacy chons . . 18a 

and all its members made by Administration of Athens en- 

Aristeidds— definite obliga- larged — ^new functionaries ap- 

tion in ships and money— pointed — distribution be- 

money-total— HelUnotamisB 120 tween Athens and Peinsus 1S3 

Bapid growth, early magni- Political career and precarious 

tudc^ of the confederacy of tenure of ThemistokUs — bit- 

Belos! willing adhesion of ter rivals against him— Ki- 

the members . . 121 mon, Alkmteon, Ac— his lia- 

State and power of Persia at bility to charges of corrup- 

the time when the confeder- tion |5. 

acy of Delot was first form- Themistoklds is charged with 

ed ..122 accepting bribes from Persia 

Conduct of Pausanias after —acquitted at Athens . . . . 185 

being removed from the com- Increased bitterness of feud, 

mand— he prosecutes his trea- between him and his politi- 

tonable designs in coojuno- oal rivals, after this.acquit- 

tion with Persia 123 tal. He is ostracised .. ..137 

He is recalled to Sparta — im- While in banishment under 

prisoned— put on his trial— ostracism, the Lacedsemoni- 

tries to provoke the Helots *n> prefer a charge of trea- 

to revolt 125 son against him <5-. 

He is detected by the revela- Flight and adventures of The- 

tion of a slave— incredulity mistoklds • • 188 

or fear of the Ephors .. ..126 Themistoklds gets over to Asia 

His arrest and death— atone- and seeks refuge with the 

ment made for offended sano- Persian king 139 

tuary .127 Stories about the relations be- 

Ihemistoklds is compromised tween the Persian king and 

in the detected treason of Themistoklds .. .. .. .. UO 

Pausanias 128 Beal treatment of Themistoklds 

Position of Themistoklds at in Persia Ul 

Athens— tendency of Athe- Influence which he acquires 

nian parties and politics ..129 with the Persian king .. .. ib. 

Effect of the events of the Per- Large reward which he receives 

sian war upon Athenian po- —his death at Magnesia . . 143 

litlcal sentiment— stimulus to . peath of Aristeidds—his pov- 

demooracy 130 erty .. .. ..144 




VuoawwnniQB ow thx Oovtxdxbact uwdbb Athbvs as hbad. — Fibst 




Contequenee of the formation 
of the confederacy of Delos. 
— ^Bifurcation of Grecian po- 
litics between Sparta and 

Athens 146 

Distinction between the Con- 
federacy of Deloi, with 
Athens as president— and the 
Athenian empire which grew 

out of it ih, 

tendency to confuse these two, 
and to impute to Atheni 
long-sighted plans of ambi- 
tion 149 

The early years, after the for- 
mation of the confederacy of 
Delosy were years of actire 
exertions on the part of 
Athens.— Our imperfect know- 
ledge of them 160 

Necessity of continued action 
against the Persians even 
after the battles of Plataa 
and Hykald. This necessity 
was the cause both of the 
willing organisation of the 
confederacy of Delos — and of 
the maritime improrement of 

Athens 152 

Confederacy of Delos — sworn 
to by all the members— per- 
petual and peremptory— not 
allowing retirement nor eva- 

sion .. .. 163 

]*jaforcing sanction of Athens, 
strictly exercised, in har- 
mony with the general synod 164 
Gradual alteration in the re- 
lations of the allies— substi- 
tution of money-payment for 
personal serrice, demanded 
by the allies themselres, suit- 
able to the interests and 

feelings of Athens ib. 

Change in the position as well 
. AS in the feelings of Athens 165 


Growing unpopularity of 
Athens throughout Greece — 
causes of it 167 

Synod of Delos— gradually de- 
clines in importance and 
ranishes. Superior qualities 
and merit of the Athenians 
as compared with the con- 
federates of Delus generally 158 

Tribute first raised by the synod 
of Delos— assessment of Ari- 
steidds t5. 

Events between B.C. 476-4M. 
Eion- Skyros— Karystos .. 15f 

Athens as guardian of the 
iEgean sea against piracy— 
the Hero Theseus 160 

First revolt among the members 
of the confederacy of Delos 
— Naxos revolts and is re- 
conquered 102 

Operations of Athens and the 
confederacy against Persia.— 
Defeat of the Persians by Ki- 
mon at the river Eurymedon 163 

Bevolt of Thasos ftrom the con- 
federacy of Delos.— Siege of 
Tbasos by the Athenians 
under Kimon. — Mines in 
Thrace 166 

Pirst attempt of Athens to 
found a city at Ennea Hodoi 
on the Strymon above Eion. 
The attempt fails and the 
settlers are slain • . . . . . 166 

B eduction of Thasos after a 
blockade of two years — it is 
disarmed and dismantled . . 1G7 

Application of the Thasians to 
Sparta for aid— granted, but 
not carried into effect—* 
glimpse of hostilities be- 
tween Sparta and Athens . . 168 

Trial and acquittal of Kimon 
at Athens t6. 

X ooNTsirrs ov yolumb y« 

CHAPTER TLY.—eonHnued. 

Page Pag4 

Great increaie of the Athenian Athenians under HTrdnidfts 179 

power 168 The Long Walls between 

Proceedings in Oentral Greece Athens and Peirseus are pro« 

between 470-464 b.o. Thebes jected^espoused by PedkUs, 

and the Bceotian towns. Dig- opposed by Kimon — political 

credit of Thebes 169 contentions at Athens— im- 

Sparta restores and upholds portance of the Long Walls 163 
the supremacy of Thebes Expedition of the Lacednmo- 
over the lesser Boootian nians into Bceotia — they re- 
towns 170 store the ascendency of 

Events inPeloponnesos — Area- Thebes • 182 

dia— Ells, Ac. . • • 171 Intention of the Spartan army 

Terrible earthquake at Sparta in Boeotia to threaten Athens, 

'-464 B.O.— Beyolt of the He- and sustain the Athenian oli- 

lots ih» garchical party opposed to 

TheLacedemonians invoke the the Long Walls 133 

aid of their allies against the Battle of Tanagra— defeat of 

revolted Helots. March the Athenians 184 

of the Athenians under Ki- EfFects of the battle— generous 

mon into Laoonia to aid behaviour of. Kimon— he is 

them 172 recalled from ostracism . • 1 6. 

Mistrust conceived by the La- Compromise and reconciliation 

cednmonians of their Atbe- between the rival leaders 

nian auxiliaries, who are dis- and parties at Athens • . . . 185 

missed from Laconia. Dis- Victory of QiSnophyta gained 

pleasure and change of po- by the Athenians— they ao- 

licy at Athens 174 quire ascendency oyer all 

The Athenians renounce the Bceotia, Phokis, and Lokris 18S 

alliance of Sparta, and con- Completion of the Long Walls 

tract alliance with Argos. —conquest of ^gina, which 

Position of Argos— her con- is disarmed^ dismantled, and 

quest of Myk6n» and other rendered tributary 187 

towns . . . . • 176 The Athenians first sail round 

Hegara becomes allied with Peloponnesus — their opera- 
Athens. Growing hatred of tions in the Gulf of Corinth ib, 
Corinth and the neighbour- Defeat and losses of the Athe- 

ing Peloponnesian states to- nians in Egypt 188 

wards Athens 177 The revolted Helots in Laco- 

Energetic simultaneous action nia capitulate and leave the 

of the Athenians— in Cyprus, country 189 

Phoenicia, Egypt, and Greece Truce for five years concluded 
—they build the first *'Long between Athens and the La- 
Wall" from Megara to Nisaea 178 cedsmonians, through the 

War of Athens against Co- influence of Kimon. Fresh 

rinth, iBigina, Ac Total de- expeditions of Kimon against 

feat of the JiSginetans at sea ib. Persia .. • 190 

The Athenians besiege iBgina Death of Kimon at Cyprus— 

— the Corinthians, Epidau- victories of the Athenian fleet 

fians, Ac. are defeated by the —it returns home 191 





CHAPTER XLY.-^conimued. 

No farther expedition! of the 
Athenians against Persia— 
convention concluded be- 
tween them 191 

Mistakes and exaggerations re- 
specting this conTcntion — 
doubts raised as to its histor- 
ical reality. Discussion of 
those doubts— confirmatory 
hints of Thucydidfis .. ..192 

Thucydidds, son of Meldsias, 
succeeds Kimon as leading 
opponent of Periklds . . . . 196 

Transfer of the common fund 
of the confederacy from De- 
los to Athens. — Gradual 
passage of the confederacy 
into an Athenian empire .. 198 

Transfer of the fund was pro- 
posed by the Samians . . . . tb. 


Position of Athens with a nu- 
merous alliance both of in- 
land and maritime states .. 199 

Commencement of rcTcrses and 
decline of power to Athens 201 

Bevolt of BoBotia from Athens 
—defeat of the Athenians at 
Kordneia — they eraonate 
BoBotia 203 

Beyolt of Phokis, Lokris, En- 
boea, and Megarat invasion 
of Attica by the Peloponne- 
sians under the Lacedsemo- 
nian king Pleistoanax .. ..201 

Eubcea reconquered byPerikUs 201 

Humiliation and despondency 
of Athens. — Conclusion of 
the .thirty years' truce— Di- 
minution of Athenian power 20*> 

JTeud between Athens and Me- 
gara • 206 



Urst establishment of the de- 
mocratical judicial system at 
Athens 208 

Union in the same. hands, of 
functions both administrative 
and judicial in early Athens 
—great powers of the magis- 
trateSf as well as of the se- 
nate of Areopagus t&. 

Magistrates generally wealthy 
men — oligarchical tendencies 
of tbe senate of Areopagus 
— increase of democratical 
aentiment among the bulk of 
the citizens 210 

Political parties in Athens. 
PerikUs and Ephialtds, de- 
mocratical: Kimon, oligar- 
chical or conservative . . . . 211 

Democratical Dikasteries or 
Juryxourts constituted by 
Periklfts and Ephialtds. How 

these Dikasteries were ar- 
ranged 211 

Pay to the Dikasts introduced 
and made regular 213 

The magistrates are deprived 
of their judicial, and confined 
to administrative functions ih. 

Senate of Areopagus— its an- 
tiquity—semi-religious char- 
acter-large and undefined 
controlling power 214 

Large powers of the senate of 
Areopagus, in part abused, 
became* inconsistent with the 
feelings of the people after 
the Persian invasion. New 
interests and tendencies then 
growing up at Athens .. ..213 

Senate of Areopagus- a centre 
of action for the conservative 
party and Kimon 21S 

Opposition between Himou and 



CHAPTER JLYL— continued. 





. PerikUi— inherited from their 
fathers— character and work* 
ing of Periklds 217 

Keseryed, philosophicali and 
husiness-like habits of Peri- 
klds— his little pains to court 
popularity — less of the de- 
magogue than Kimon . • 

Ephialtds belonging to the de- 
mocratical party, and origin- 
ally equal to Periklds in in- 
fluenoe. Efforts of Epbialtdi 
against magisterial abuse 

Kimon and his party more 
powerful than Ephialtds and 
Periklfis, until the time when 
the Athenian troops were 
dismissed from Laconia. 
Ostracism of Kimon «. 

Measures carried by Ephialtds 
and PerikUs to abridge the 
power of the senate of Areo- 
pagus as well as of indivi- 
dual magistrates. Institu- 
tion of the paid dikasteries 222 

Separation of Judicial from 
administrative functions . . ib. 

Assassination of Epbialtds by 
the consexvatlye party . . . . 226 

Commencement of the great 
ascendency of Periklda^ after 
the death of Ephialtds. Com- 
promise between him and Ki- 
mon. Brilliant successes of 
Athens, and sra of the maxi- 
mum of her power ib. 

Other constitutional changes. 
—The Nomophylakes . . . . 226 

The Nomothetn — distinction 
between laws and psephisms 
or special decrees — process 
by which laws were enacted 
and repealed 228 

Procedure in making or re- 
pealing of laws assimilated 
to the procedure in judicial 
trials 229 

Gxapbfi Paranom6n— indictment 
against the mover of illegal 

or unoonititutional proposi- 
tions 230 

Working of the Graphft Para- 
nomdn. — Conservative spirit 
in which it is framed.— Be- 
straint upon new proposi- 
tions, and upon the unlimit- 
ed initiative belonging to 
every citizen 232 

Abusive extension of the 
Graphft Paranomdn after- 
wards 233 

It was often used as a simple 
way of procuring the repeal 
of an existing law— without 
personal aim against the 
author of the law 23i 

Numbers and pay of the di- 
kasts, as provided by Peri- 
kUs ib. 

The Athenian democracy, as 
constituted by Periklds, re- 
mained substantially unal- 
tered . afterwards down to the 
loss 'of Athenian Independ- 
ence — excepting the tem- 
porary interruptions of the 
Four Hundred and the Thirty 236 

Working of the numerous di- 
kasteries^their large num- 
bers essential to exclude cor- 
ruption or intimidation — 
liability of individual ma- 
gistrates to corruption . . . . 237 

The Athenian dikasteries are 
Jury-trial applied on the 
broadest scale — exhibiting 
both its excellences and its 
defects in an exaggerated 
form 242 

The encomiums usually pro- 
nounced upon the theory of 
jury -trial would apply yet 
more strongly to the Athe- 
nian dikasteries 244 

Imperfections of jury-trial — 
exaggerated in the procedure 
of the dikasteries 246 

Powerful efifects of the di- 



CHAPTER JLYL— continued. 

kasterles in exercising and 
stimulating the intellect and 
feelings of individual citi- 
sena 256 

Necessity of learning to speak 
— gro'wth of professional 
teachers of rhetoric — pro- 
fassional composers of speech- 
es for others 267 

Bhetors and Sophists . . . . 268 

Polemics of Sokraifts, himself 
a sophist, against the sophists 

generally 260 

Sophists and rhetors were the 
natural product of the age 
and of the democracy . . , , ib. 
The dikasteries were composed, 
not exclusiyely of poor men, 
hut of middling and poorer 
citiaens indiscriminately • . 261 



Personal activity now preya- 
lent among the Athenian 
citizens — empire of Athens 
again exclusively maritime, 
after the Thirty years* truce 263 

Chios, SamoB, and Legbos, 
were now the only free allies 
of Athens, on the same foot- 
ing as the original confeder- 
ates of Del OS— the rest were 
subject and tributary . . . . 264 

Athens took no pains to in- 
spire her allies with the idea 
of a common interest—uever- 
thelesB the allies were 
gainers by the continuance 
of her empire 266 

Conception of PerikUs— Athens, 
an imperial city, owing pro- 
tection to the subject-allies; 
who on their part, owed obe- 

' dience and tribute 266 

Large amount of revenue laid 
by and accumulated by 
Athens, during the years pre- 
ceding the Peloponnesian 
war 271 

Pride felt by Athenian citizens 
in the imperial power of their 
city 272 

Numerous Athenian citizens 
planted out as kleruchs by 

Periklfis. Chersonesus of 
Thrace. Sindpd 273 

Active personal and commer- 
cial relations between Athens 
and all parts of the ^gean 274 

Amphipolis in Thrace founded 
by Athens. Agnon is sent 
out as (Ekist ib. 

Situation and importance of 
Amphipolis 276 

Foundatioi^ by the Athenians, 
of Thurii, on the southern 
coast of Italy 276 

Conduct of the refugee inhabit- 
ants of the ruined Sybaris— 
their encroachments in the 
foundation of Thurii: they 
are expelled, and Thurii re- 
constituted ib, 

Herodotus and Lysias— both 
domiciliated as citizens at 
Thurii. Few Athenian citi- 
zens settled there as colo- 
nists 273 

Period from 446-431 B.C. Athens 
at peace. Her political con- 
dition. Rivalry of Periklds 
with Thucydidds son of Me- 
Idsias . . • , • • ib. 

Points of condition between 
the two parties. 1. Peace 



CHAPTER JLYU.'^orUinued. 

Page Pag« 

with Penis. S. Expenditure ed the democracy which they 

of money for the decoration had recently established . . S93 

of Athens . . . . • 879 Pnneral oration pronounced 

Defence of PerikUs perfectly by PerikUs npon the Athe- 

good against his political nian citizens slain in the 

rival 280 Samian war 294 

Pan-Hellenic schemes and sen- Position of the Athenian em- 

timent of Periklds 281 pire— relation of Athens to 

Bitter contention of parties at her subject-allies — their feel- 
Athens — Yote of ostracism— ings towards her generall]^ 
Thucydidds is ostracised— were those of indifference 
about 443 B.o 282 and acquiescence, not ot 

New works undertaken at hatred 295 

Athens. Third Long Wall. Particular gricTances complain- 

Docks in Peirseus— which is ed of in the dealing of 

newly laid out as a town, Athens with her allies . . . . 298 

by the architect Hippodamus 283 Annual tribute— changes made 

Odeon, Parthenon, Propylsea. in its amount. Athenian 

Other temples. Statues of officers and inspectors through- 

AthdnA 284 out the empire 299 

Illustrious artists and archi- Disputes and offences in and 

tects — Pheidias, Iktinus, Kal- among the subject-allies, were 

likratds 285 brought for triul before the 

Effect of these creations of art dikasteries at Athens .. ..A. 

and architecture upon the Productiye of some disadvant- 

minds of contemporaries . . 286 age, but of preponderance of 

Attempt of Periklds to conTcne advantage to the subjeci- 

a general congress at Athens, allies themselyes 801 

of deputies from all the Ore- Imperial Athens compared with 

cian states ,. ..287 imperial Sparta 302 

Beyolt of Samos from the Numerous Athenian dtizens 

Athenians 288 spread over the ^gean— the 

Athenian armament against allies had no redress against 

Samos, under PerikUs, So- them, except through the 

phoklds the tragedian, Ac. .. 290 Athenian dikasteries .. •• 803 

Doubtful and prolonged con- The dikasteries afforded pro- 
test — great power of Samos tection against misconduct 
—it is at last reconquered, both of Athenian citisens 
disarmedi and dismantled . . 291 snd Athenian officers . . . . S04 

None of the other allies of The dikasteries, defectiye or 

Athens^ except Byzantium, not, were the same tribunals 

reyolted at the same time . . 292 under which every Athenian 

Application of the Samians to held his own security . . . . 805 

Sparta for aid against Athens Athenian empire was affected 

— it is refused chiefly through for the worse by the oiroum* 

the Corinthians 293 stances of the Peloponnesiaa 

Government of Samos after war: more violence was in* 

the reconqnest — doubtful troduced into it by that war 

whether the Athenians renew- ttian had prevailed before •• 809 




Pag* Pagt 

*th% B«ti|e«i-aIliM of Athens the AthenlMi aisembljr in 

had few practio»l grieyanoea 'aply 888 

to complain of 810 Deciiion of the Athenian!— a 

The Grecian world wae now qualified oomplianoe with 

dirided into two great eye- the request of Korkyr*. 1 he 

terns: with a right supposed Athenien triremes sent to 

to be Test^ in eaeh, of pun- Korkyra • • 824 

iflhing its own refractory Nayal combat between the Go- 
members 812 rinthians and Korkyrvsns; 

Policy of Corinth, from being rude tactics on both sides 826 

pacific^ becomes warlike . . 818 The Eorkyneans are defeated 827 

Disputes arise between Corinth Arriyal of a reinforcement from 

and Korkyra — case of Epi- Athens— the Corinthian fleet 

damnns . . 81i retires, carrying off nnmer- 

The £pidaninians apply for aid ous Eorkyr»an prisoners . . 829 

in their distress to Korkyra Hostilities not yet professedly 

— they are refused— the Co- begun between Athens and 

rinthians send aid to the Corinth ib, 

place 816 Hatred cdViceiyed by the Co- 

The Korkyrseans attack Epi- rinthians towards Athens .. 830 
danmus — armament sent They begin to stir up reyoU 
thither by Corinth 816 among the Athenian allies- 
remonstrance of the Korky- Potideea, a colony of Corinth, 

rseans with Corinth and the but ally of Athens (h. 

Peloponnesians 817 Belations of Athens with Per- 

Hostilities between Corinth dikkas king of Macedonia, 

and Korkyra — nayal yictory his intrigues along with Co- 

of the latter 818 rinth against her— he induces 

^arge preparations made by the Chalkidians to revolt 

Corinth for renewing the war 819 from her— increase of Olyn- 

•^Pplication of the Korkyrseans thus 831 

to be received among the Revolt of Potidna- armament 

allies of Athens 820 sent thither from Athens ..882 

Address of the Korkyrcan Combat near Potidsea between 

envoys to the Athenian pub- the Athenian force, and the 

lie assembly 821 allied Corinthians, Potidn- 

Principal topics upon which it ans, and Chalkidians. Yic- 

insists^ as given in Thucy- tory of the Athenians . . . . 336 

didds ib. Potidsea placed in blockade by 

Envoys from Corinth address the Athenians •• •• .. .. 837 



Blookadv or Porro-aiA down to ths Ein> o» thb Fibs* 


State of feeling in Greece be- 
tween the Thirty years' truce 
and the Peloponnesian war 
— irecognised probability of 

war— Athens af that time not 
encroaching — decree inter- 
dicting trade with the Me- 
garians •• •• *• 4, .. ..839 



CHAPTER JLYllI.-'Contmucd. 

P»go Pago 

Zealous importnnitj of the ' Host Spartan speaken are in' 

Corinthians in bringing about favour of war. King Archi- 

a general war, for the pur- damus opposes war. His 

pose of preserving Potidsa 841 speech 351 

Belations of Sparta with her The speech of Archidamus is 

allies— they had a vote thus ineffectual. Short, but warw 

far— whether they would, or like appeal of the Ephor 

would not, approve of a Sthenelaidas 853 

course of policy which had Vote of the Spartan assembly 

been previously resolved by in favour of war 354 

Sparta separately 842 The Spartans send to Delphi — 

Assembly of the Spartans se- obtain an encouraging reply 355 
parately addressed by envoys General congress of allies at 
of the allied powers^ com- Sparta. Second speech of 
plaining that Athens had the Corinthian envoy, en- 
violated the truce 343 forcing the necessity and pro- 

The Corinthian envoys ad- priety of war ib, 

dress the assembly last, after Vote of the majority of the 

the envoys of the ottier al- allies in favour of war— b.o. 

lies have inflamed it against 432 357 

Athens i5. Views and motives of the op- 
International customs of the posing powers <ft« 

time, as bearing upon the The hopes and confidence on 

points in dispute between the side of Sparta, the fears 

Athens and Corinth— Athens on the side of Athens. Her- 

in the right 344 aids sent from Sparta to 

Tenor of the Corinthian address Athens with complaints and 

—little allusion to recent requisitions: meanwhile the 

wrong — strong efforts to raise preparations for war go on 3C0 

hatred and alarm against Bequisitions addressed by 

Athens 346 Sparta to Athens— demand 

Bemarkable picture drawn of for the expulsion of theAlk- 

Athens by her enemies . . 346 meeonidee as impious— aimed 

Beply made by an Athenian at Periklds 361 

envoy, accidentally present Position ofPerikUs at Athens: 

in Sparta 348 bitter hostility of his politi- 

His account of the empire of cal opponents: attacks made 

Athens — how it had been ac- upon him. Prosecution of 

quired, and how it was main- Aspasia. Her character and 

tained .. i ib, accomplishments (b^ 

He adjures them not to break Family relations of PerikUs — 

the truce, but to adjust all his connection with Aspasia. 

differences by that paciHc Licence of the comic writers 

appeal which the truce pro- in their attacks upon both 864 

vided 350 Prosecution of Anaxagoras the 

The Spartans exclude strangers, philosopher as well as of 

and discuss the point Aspasia— Anaxagoras retires 

among themselves in the as- from Athens— Periklfts de* 

sembly ,, f*.v* f* •• •• t&* fends Aspasia before the di-* 



CHAPTER XLYIU.— continued. 

Page Paffo 

IcftBtery, and obtains her ac- proclaimed— first blow struck 

qaittal 365 not by Athens but by her 

Prosecution of the sculptor enemies 870 

Pbeidias for embezslement Open violation of the trace by 
—instituted by the political the Thebans — they surprise 

opponents of PerikUs. Charge Platsa in the night . . . , it, 

of peculation against Perik- The gates of Platasa are opened 

Us himself 366 by an oligarchical party 

Probability that Periklds was within— a Theban detachment 

never even tried for pecula- are admitted into the agora 

tion, certainly that he never at night— at first apparently 

was found guilty of it . . . . 367 successfal| afterwards over- 

Bequisition from the Lacedee- powered and captured . . . . 378 

monians, for the banishment Large force intended to arrive 
of Periklds — arrived when from Thebes to support the 

Periklgs was thus pressed by assailants early in the mom- 

his political enemies— reject- ing— they are delayed by the 

ed 368 rain and the swelling of tbo 

Counter-requisition sent by the Asdpus — they commence 

Athenians to Sparta for ex- hostilities against the Pla- 

piation of sacrilege . . . . 3C9 tsan persons and property 

Fresh requisitions sent from without the walls 831 

Sparta to Athens— to with- Parley between the Platseans 
draw the troops from Poti- and the Theban force without 

dsa — to leave iBgina free— —the latter evacuate the ter- 

to readmit the Megarians to ritory — the Theban prisoners 

Athenian harbours ib, in Platsea are slain ib, 

Pinal and peremptory requisi- Messages from Platsea to Athens 

tion of Sparta— public as- — answer 382 

sembly held at Athens on Grecian feeling, already pre- 
the whole subject of war and disposed to the war, was 

peace 370 wound up to the highest 

Great difference of opinion in pitch by the striking incident 

the assembly — important at Plateea 388 

speech of Periklds ib. Preparations for war on the 

Periklds strenuously urges the part of Athens— intimations 

Athenians not to yield .. ..371 sent round to her allies — 

His review of the comparative Akarnanians recently ac- 

forces, and probable chances quired by Athens as allies — 

of success or defeat in the war 372 recent capture of the Amphi- 

The assembly adopts the re- lochian Argos by the Athe- 

commendation of Periklds— nian Phormio 384 

firm and determined reply Strength and resources of 

sent to Sparta 374 Athens and her allies— milit- 

Yiews of Thucydidds respect- ary and naval means— 

ing the grounds, feelings, and treasure 3CS 

projecte of the two parties Ample grounds for the con- 
now about to embark in -war ib. fidence expressed by Periklds 

Equivocal period— war not yet in the result 383 

VOL. V. , * 



CHAPTER JIjyilL—coniinued. 


Position ftnd power of Sparta 
and the Peloponnesian allies 
—they are full of hope and 
eonfldence of patting down 
Athens speedily S87 

Efforts of Sparta to get up a 
naval force 388 

Muster of the combined Pelo- 
ponnesian force at the isth- 
mus of Corinth, under Arch i- 
damus, to invade Attica . . 389 

Last envoy sent to Athens — ^he 
is dismissed without being 
allowed to enter the town 390 

March of Archidamus into At- 
tica—his fruitless siege of 
OBnoft ,' ..• " i^' 

Expectation of Archidamus that 
Athens would yield at the 
last moment. — Difficulty of 
Periklds in persuading the 
Athenians to abandon their 
tenitory and see it all 
ravaged 391 

Attica deserted— the population 
flock within the walls of 
Athens. Hardships, priva- 
tions, and distress endured 802 

March of Archidamus into At- 393 
tica Archidamus advances to 
Aohamse, within seven miles 
of Athens 394 

Intense clamour within the 
walls of Athens— eagerness 
to go forth and fight . . . . 396 

Trying position, firmness and 
sustained ascendancy, of Pe- 
riklds, in dissuading them 
from going forth %b. 

The Athenians remain within 
their walls : partial skirmish- 
es only, no general action . . 397 

Athenian fleet is despatched 
to ravage the coast of Pelo- 
ponnesus— flrst notice of the 
Spartan Brasidas— operations 
of the Athenians in Akarna- 
nia, Eephalldnia, &c 398 

The Athenians expel theiEgi- 
netani from iBgina, and 

people the island with Athe- 
nian kleruchs. The^ginetans 
settle at Thyrea in Pelopon- 
nesus 399 

The Athenians invade and 
ravage the Megarid : suffer- 
ings of the Megarians . . . . i5. 

Measures taken by Athens for 
permanent defence.— Sum put 
by in the acropolis, against 
urgent need, not to be touched 
unless under certain defined 
dangers.— Capital punishment 
against any one who shonld 
propose otherwise 401 

Bemarks on this decree . . . . to. 

Blockade of Potidsea— -Sitalkfis 
king of the Odrysian Thraci- 
ans— alliance made between 
him and Athens 404 

Perikl6s is chosen orator to 
deliver the funeral discourse 
over the citizens slain during 
the year 4C5 

Funeral oration of Periklds . . ib. 

Sketch of Athenian political 
constitution, and social life, 
as conceived by Perikl3s . . 407 

Eulogy upon Athens and the 
Athenian character 408 

Mutual tolerance of diversity of 
tastes and pursuits in Athens 411 

It is only true partially and in 
some memorable instances 
that the state interfered to 
an exorbitant degree with 
individual liberty in Greece 413 

Free play of individual taste 
and impulse in Athens — im- 
portance of this phenomenon 
in society ilk. 

Extraordinary and many-sided 
activity of Athens 41S 

Peculiar and interesting mo- 
ment at which the discourse 
of PerikUs was delivered. 
Athens now at the maximum 
of her power— declining tend- 
ency commences soon after- 
wards 415 





«HB Thibb Ybab or tub Pblopobxeiian Wab. 

Page Page 

Barren restiltt of the operations He is re-elected StratAgns— re - 
daring the first year of war 417 stored to power and to the 

Second invasion of Attica by confidence of the people . . 4SS 

the Peloponnesians — more Last moments and death of 

spreading and ruinous than PerikUs 434 

the first ib. His life and character . . . . 486 

Commencement of the pesti- Judgement of Thucydidds re- 

lence or epidemic at Athens 418 specting Perikl6s 438 

Description of the ej»idemic by Earlier and later political life 
Thncydidds — hit conception of Perikl6s— how far the one 

of the duty of exactly observ- differed from the other . . . . 437 

ing and recording 419 Accusation against PerikUs of 

Extensive and terrible suffering having corrupted the Athe- 

of Athens 422 nian people — untrue and not 

Inefficacy of remedies— despair believed by Thucydidds . . . . 439 

and demoralisation of the Great progress and improve- 

Athenians 423 ment of the Athenian^ under 

Lawless recklessness of con- Perikl3s 440 

duct engendered 425 PerikUs is not to blame for 

Great loss of life among the the Peloponnesian war .. 441 

citizens— blow to the power Operations of war languid, 

of Athens 426 under the pressure of the 

Athenian armament sent first epidemic. Attack of the 
against PeloponnesuSi next Ambrakiots on the Amphi- 
against Potidsea — it is at- ' lochian Argos: the Athenian 
tacked and ruined by the Phormio is sent with a squad- 
epidemic 427 roQ to Naupaktus 443 

Irritation of the Athenians an- Injury done to Athenian com- 
der their sufferings and losses merce by Peloponnesian pri- 

•^they become incensed vateers. The Lacedeemonians 

against Periklda — his un- put to death all their prison- 

shaken firmness in defending ers taken at sea, even neu- 

himself 428 trals * 444 

Athenian public assembly — last Lacedsemonian envoys seized 
speech of Periklds— his high on their way to Persia and 

tone of self-esteem against put to death by the Athe- 

the public discontent . . . . 429 nians 445 

Powerful effect of his address Surrender of Potideea— indul- 
—new resolution shown for gent capitulation granted by 

continuing' the war — never- the Athenian generals .. ..447 

theless,'the discontent against Third year of the war — king 
PerikUs still continues . . 431 Archidamus marches to the 

He is accused and condemned invasion of Attica 448 

in a fine ih. Bemonstrance of the Platseans 

Old age of Periklds— his family to Archidamus— his reply- 

misfortunes — and suffering . . 432 he summons Platsea in vain 449 


CHAPTER XLlX.—continued. 

Page Page 

The Plateeans reiolye to itand nians at the late naval de- 

out and defy the Laced»mo- feat : they collect a larger 

nian force 460 fleet under Kndmus to act 

Invocation and excuse of Ar- against Phormio 4C3 

chidamus on hearing the re- Inferior numbers of Phormio— 

fusal of the Platnans . . . . 461 his manoeuvring 467 

Commencement of the siege of The Peloponnesian fleet forces 

PlatsBa 452 Phormio to a battle on the 

Operations of attack and de- line of coast near Naupaktus. 

fence— the besiegers make no Dispositions and harangues 

progress, and are obliged to on both sides 468 

resort to blockade 463 Battle near Naupaktus . . . . 469 

Wall of circumvallation built The Peloponnesian fleet at first 
round Plateea — the place com- successful, but afterwards 

pletely beleaguered and a defeated 471 

force left to maintain the Betirement of the defeated Pe- 

blockade 464 loponnesian fleet. Phormio 

Athenian armament sent to is reinforced — ^his operations 
Potideea and Ghalkidic Thrace in Akarnania— he returns to 
—it is defeated and returns 456 Athens 473 

Operations on the coast of Attempt of Kndmus and Bra- 
Akamania. — Joint attack sidas to surprise Peireeus, 

upon Akarnania, by land from Corinth 473 

and sea, concerted between Alliance of the Athenians with 
the Ambrakiots and Pelo- the Odrysian king Sitalkds 474 

ponnesians 466 Power of the Odrysians in 

Assemblage of the Ambrakiots, Thrace — their extensive do- 
Peloponnesians, and Epirotic minion over the other Thra- 
allies— divisions of Epirots ib. cian tribes 47Q 

They march to attack the Akar- Sitalkds, at the instigation of 
nanian town of Stratus . . 467 Athens, undertakes to attack 

Bashness of the Epirots— de- Perdikkas and the Chalki- 
f eat and repulse of the army 468 dians of Thrace ib. 

The Peloponnesian fleet comes His vast and multifarious host 
from Corinth to Akamania— of Thracians and other bar- 
movements of the Athenian barians 478 

Phormio to oppose it .... 469 He invades and ravages Ma- 
Naval battle between Phormio oedonia and Ghalkidikft . . ib, 

and the Peloponnesian fleet He is forced to retire by the 
— ^his complete victory . . . . 463 severity of the season and 

Beflections upon these two de- want of Athenian co-opera- 
feats of the Peloponnesians 466 tion 479 

Indignation of the Lacedeemo- Appendix . . 4Cd 


PART n. 






Though the defeat at Salamis deprived the Persians of all 
hope from farther maritime attack of Greece, they still 
anticipated success by land from the ensuing 
campaign of Mardonius. Their fleet, after gjaS fleet, 
having conveyed the monarch himself with his a'ter re- 
accompanying land-force across the Hellespont, Greece,'**™ 
retired to winter at Kyme and Samos ; in the winters at 
latter of which places large rewards were amTcoi- 
bestowed upon Theomestor and Phylakus, two lects in the 
Samian captains who had distinguished them- lamol** 
selves in the late engagement. Theomestor 
was even nominated despot of Samos under Persian pro- 
tection. 1 Early in the spring they were reassembled — to 
the number of 400 sail, but without the Phoenicians — at 
the naval station of Samos, intending however only to 
maintain a watchful guard over Ionia, and hardly sup- 
posing that the Greek fleet would venture to attack 
them. 2 

For a long time, the conduct of that fleet was such as 
to justify such belief in its enemies. Assembled at JEgina 
in the spring, to the number of 11 ships, under the Spartan 

■ Herodot. viii. 86. * Herodot. viii. 130 ; Diodor. xi. 27. 

VOL. V. B 


king Leotychides, it advanced as far as Delos, but not 
B.C. 479. farther eastward: nor could all the persuasions 
The Greek of Chian and other Ionian envoys, despatched 
bies ?n\he ^^^^ ^^ ^^® Spartan authorities and to the fleet, 
spring at and promising to revolt from Persia as soon as 
iEgina. ^j^g Grecian fleet should appear, prevail upon 
Leotychides to hazard any aggressive enterprise. Ionia 
and the eastern waters of the -^gean had now been 
for fifteen years completely under the Persians, and so 
little visited by the Greeks, that a voyage thither appeared 
especially to the maritime inexperience of a Spartan king, 
like going to the Pillars of Herakles:* not less venture- 
some than the same voyage appeared, fifty-two years after- 
wards, to the Lacedaemonian admiral Alkidas, when he 
first hazarded his fleet amidst the preserved waters of the 
Athenian empire. 

Meanwhile the hurried and disastrous retreat of 
Xerxes had produced less disaffection among his subjects 
and allies than might have been anticipated. Alexander 
king of Macedon, the Thessalian AleuaaaB,^ and the Boeo- 
tian leaders, still remained in hearty co-operation with 
Mardonius: nor were there any, except tne Phokians, 
whose fidelity to him appeared questionable, among all 
the Greeks northwest of the boundaries of Attica and 
Megaris. It was only in the Chalkidic peninsula, that any 
actual revolt occurred. Potidaea, situated on the Isthmus 
of Pallene, as well as the neighbouring towns in the long 

' Herodot. viii.131, 132: compare no inferences of this kind ought 

Thncyd. iii. 29-32. to be founded upon it: it marks 

Herodotus says, that the Chian fear of an enemy^s country which 

envoys had great difficulty in in- they had not been accustomed to 

ducing Leotichidds to proceed even visit, and where they could not 

as far as Delos — t6 fftp •Kpoamxipuy calculate the risk beforehand — 

icav 6tiv6v ^v xoiat *£XX-i]at, o&tc rather than any serious compari- 

Ttbv x^ptov iouai i|i.ictlpoiai, axpa- son between one distance and an- 

Ti^c TC icdvxa icXia c86xtc clvai* Tif)v other. Speaking of our forefathers, 

hi Sdfxov cictoxiaTo h6^xi *^^ *Hpa- such of them as were little used 

xXiac ffxiQXo? taov dici^^tiv. to the sea, we might say — "A vo- 

This last expression of Herodotus yage to Bordeaux or Lisbon seem- 

has been erroneously interpreted ed to them as distant as a voyage 

by some of the commentators as to the Indies," — by which we should 

if it were a measure of the gee- merely affirm something as to their 

graphical ignorance, either of He- state of feeling , not as to their 

rodotus himself, or of those whom geographical knowledge. 
Ke i» describing. In my judgement, * Herodot. ix. 1, 2, 67; viii. 136. 


Chaf. XLH. pebsian fobcb undeb mabdonius. 3 

tongue of PallenSy declared themselves independent: and 
the neighbouring town of Olynthus, occupied oy General 
the semi-Grecian tribe of Bottiaeans, was on the •dherenct 
point of following their example. The Persian Sfedising 
general Artabazus, on his return from escorting Greekt to 
Xerxes to the Hellespont, undertook the re- ^"you"o'f 
duction of these towns, and succeeded perfectly Potidae*— 
with Olynthus. He took the town, slew aU the J2i\eged in 
inhabitants, and handed it over to a fresh popu- vain by Ar- 
lation, consisting of Chalkidic Greeks under *»*>"«■• 
Kritobulus of Torone. It was in this manner that Olyn- 
thus, afterwards a city of so much consequence and inter- 
est, first became Grecian and Chalkidic. But Artabazus 
was not equally successful in the siege of Fetidsea, the 
defence of which was aided by citizens from the other 
towns in Pallene. A plot which he concerted with Timo- 
xenns, commander of the 6ki6n8ean auxiliaries in the town, 
became accidentally disclosed: a considerable body of his 
troops perished while attempting to pass at low tide 
under the walls of the city, which were built across the 
entire breadth of the narrow isthmus joining the Palle- 
naean peninsula to the mainland: and after three mouths 
of blockade, he was forced to renounce the enterprise, 
withdrawing his troops to rejoin Mardonius in Thessaly. ^ 
Mardonius, before he put himself in motion for the 
spring campaign, thought it advisable to consult jij^y^^nin 
the Grecian oracles, especially those within the after win- * 
limits of BcBotia and Phokis. He sent a Karian ^P^^ \^ 
named Mys, familiar with the Greek as well as resumes^' 
the Karian language, to consult Trophdnius at operationa 
Lebadeia, Amphiaraus and the Ismenian Apollo spring in 
at Thebes, Apollo at Mount Ptoon near AkrsB- Bceotia. 
phiae, and Apollo at the Phokian Abse. This guus^the 
step was probably intended as a sort of osten- Bteotian 
tatious respect towards the religious feelings of ^^^ ^** 
allies upon whom he was now very much dependent. But 
neither the questions put, nor the answers given, were 
made public. The only remarkable fact which Herodotus 
had heard, was, that the priests of the Ptoian Apollo deli- 
vered his answer in Karian, or at least in a language 
intelligible to no person present except the Karian Mys 
himself. 2 It appears however that at this period, when 

> Herodot. viii. 128, 129. * Herodot. viii. 134, 136 ; Pausanias, ix. 24^ 3^ 



Mardonius was seeking to strengthen himself by oracles, 
and laying his plans for establishing a separate peace and 
alliance with Athens against the Peloponnesians, some 
persons in his interest circulated predictions, that the day 
was approaching when the Persians and the Athenians 
jointly would expel the Dorians from Peloponnesus.* The 
way was thus paved for him to send an envoy to Athens — 
„ ^ . Alexander kinff of Macedon; who was instructed 

Mardonius , ij.T_j.jj.'ir x 

sends Alex- to make the most seductive oners — to promise 
ander of reparation of all the damage done in Attica, 

Macedon to '^ n ,■• ,. « i *• • j t.* c j.i_ 

Athens, to as woU as the active future friendship of the 
offer the Great King — and to hold out to the Athen- 

most ho- • 1 • -J • p X 'J. xi- 

nourabie lans a large acquisition oi new territory as the 
terms of price of their consent to form with him an 
peace. equal and independent alliance. 2 The Macedonian 

prince added warm expressions of his own interest in 
the welfare of the Athenians, recommending them as a 
sincere friend to embrace propositions so advantageous 
as well as so honourable: especially as the Persian 
power must in the end prove too much for them, and 
Attica lay exposed to Mardonius and his Grecian allies, 
without being covered by any common defence as Pelo- 
ponnesus was protected by its Isthmus. 3 

This offer, despatched in the spring, found the Athen- 
ians re-established wholly or partially in their half-ruined 
city. A simple tender of mercy and tolerable treatment, 
if despatched by Xerxes from Thermopyla the year be- 

^ Herodot. vili.lil. Aaitc6ai|«.6vtt)i here "to call to mind the prophe- 

8ft, .. . dvflrjxvt)a68vTa« ttbv XoyIwv, cies,"— as if these latter were old, 

(uc 99sacxps(^v so'c^ ^f-^ Totdi &XXoi9v and not now produced for the first 

Au>pieu9i exfclicretv sx tleXonovviQOOU time. But we must recollect that 

6ic6 Miq6u>v ts xal *A07]vatu>v, xapxa a fabricator of prophecies, such as 

te ifistoav i^lt] 6(i.t)Xt>YiQ0u><Tt xqi Ilipo^ Onomakritus, would in all proha- 

'AOYjvatoi, Ac. bility at onoe circulate them as 

Buch oracles must have been old; that is, as forming part of 
generated by the hopes of the some 4>ld colleetion like that of 
medising party in Oreece at this Sakis or Musaeus. And Herodotus 
particular moment: there Ss nO doubtless himself believed them to 
other point of time to Which be old, so that he would naturally 
they eould be at all adapted— giviB credit to the Lacedeemonians 
no other, in which eicpulsi-on of for the same knowledge, and sup- 
all the Dorians from Peloponnesus, pose them to be alarmed by "call- 
by united Persians and Athenians, ing these prophecies to mind." 
could be eten dreamt of. The * Herodot. ix. 7. 
Lacedeemonians are indeed said * Herodot. viii. 142. 


fore, might perhaps have gone far to detach them from 
the cause of Kelias: and even at the present moment, 
though the pressure of overwhelming terror had disappear- 
edf there were many inducements for them to accede to 
the proposition of Mardonius. The alliance of Athens 
would ensure to the Persian general unquestionable pre- 
dominance in Greece, and to Athens herself protection 
from farther ravage as well as the advantage of playing a 
winning game: while his force, his position, and his alhances, 
even as they then stood, threatened a desolating and doubt- 
ful war, of which Attica would bear the chief brunt. More- 
over the Athenians were at this time suffering privations 
of the severest character; for not only did their ruined 
houses and temples require to be restored, but they had 
lost the harvest of the past summer together with the 
seed of the past autumn, i The prudential view of the case 
being thus favourable to Mardonius rather than otherwise, 
and especially strengthened by the distress which reigned 
at Athens, the LacedsBmonians were so much afraid lest 
Alexander should carry his point, that they sent Temptation 
envoys to dissuade the Athenians from listen- ^° Athens 

• y-i* nj.j.j accept 

mg to nim, as well as to tender succour during this offer-. 
the existing poverty of the city. After having ^®»' 9^ *^^ 
heard both parties, the Athenians delivered niansthat' 
their reply in terms of solemn and dignified reso- *^® would 
lution, which their descendants delighted in re- Laced ffi*~ 
peating. To Alexander they said; "Cast not in monian 
our teeth that the power of the Persian is many gent^^o 
times greater than ours: we too know that, as Athens to 
well as thou: but we nevertheless love freedom p'®^®°* *• 
well enough to resist him in the best manner we can. 
Attempt not the vain task of talking us over into alliance 
with him. Tell Mardonius that as long as the sun shall 
continue in his present path, we will never contract alli- 
ance with Xerxes: we will encounter him in our own de- 
fence, putting our trust in the aid of those gods and heroes 

* Herodot. viii. 142. UisCeufjisvoiai the seed of the preceding autumn : 

(ilvxot Opt.iv a\)'tai^6[i.iBa (say the and the advice of Themistokl^s to 

Spartan envoys to the Athenians), his countrymen— xai xi? olxlr|v xe 

xol 3x1 -xapTcobv 49X8pi^9>)xs 8i5u>v "^St), AvaTtXaadaSio, xal aicopoo dv«xu)« 

xoi 3x1 olxo»96p7)998 ypAvov -^Stj itoX- e^rexto (viii. 109) — must have been 

Xov. Seeing that this is spoken found impracticable in most cases 

before the invasion of Mardonius, to carry into effect. 
the loss of two cropa must include 


to whom he has shown no reverence, and whose houses 
and statues he has burnt. Come thou not to us again 
with similar propositions, nor persuade us even in the 
spirit of good-will, into imholy proceedings: thou art the 
guest and friend of Athens, and we would not that thou 
shouldst suffer injury at our hands." ^ 

To the Spartans, the n3ply of the Athenians was of a 
Besoiute similar decisive tenor; protesting their uncon- 
th^^Ath'- qiierable devotion to the common cause and 
nians, and liberties of Hellas, and promising that no con- 
determi- ceivablo temptations, either of money or terri- 
carry on tory, should induce them to desert the ties of 
the war, brotherhood, common language, and religion, 
o^ great So long as a single Athenian survived, no alli- 
present suf- ance should ever be made with Xerxes. They 
^' then thanked the Spartans for offering them aid 

during the present privations: but while declining such 
offers, they reminded them that Mardonius, when apprised 
that his propositions were refused, would probably advance 
immediately, and they therefore earnestly desired the 
presence of a Peloponnesian army in Boeotia to assist in 
the defence of Attica. * The Spartan envoys, promising 
fulfilment of this request, 3 and satisfied to have ascertained 
the sentiments of Athens, departed. 

Such unshaken fidelity on the part of the Athenians 
Selfish in- *^ ^^® general cause of Greece, in spite of 
difference present suffering combined with seductive offers 
by Sparta ^^^ ^^® future, was the just admiration of their 
and the descendants and the frequent theme of applause 
nesianTto- ^^y^^^eir orators.* But among the contemporary 
wards Greeks it was hailed* only as a relief from 

Athens. danger, and repaid by a selfish and ungenerous 

* Lykurgns the Athenian orator, to be delivered. Bat here as else- 

in alluding to this incident a cen- where, the loose, exaggerating 

tury and a half afterwards, repre- style of Plutarch contrasts unfa- 

sents the Athenians as having vourably with the simplicity and 

been *'on the point of stoning directness of Herodotus. 

Alexander"— {Aixpou 6«iv xatiXsuaav ' Herodot. ix. 7. ouvOd{j.evot Si 

(Lykurg. cont. Leokrat. c. 17, p. r](tiv t6v nipoT]v &vxtu>oco8ai e< t7)v 

l86)^one among many specimens Boiu>tIt)v, &c, 

of the careless manner in which Diodorus gives the account of 

these orators deal with past history, this embassy to Athens substan- 

2 Herodot. viii. 143, 144; Plu- tially in the same manner, coup- 

tarch, Aristeides, c. 10. According ling It however with some erro- 

to Plutarch, it was Aristeidds who neous motives (xi. 28). 

proposed and prepared the reply * Herodot. ix. 7. CTcia-rdpLSvol xs 


neglect. The same feeling of indifference towards all 
Greeks outside of their own isthmus, which had so deeply 
endangered the march of affairs before the battle of 
Salamis, now 'manifested itself a second time among the 
Spartans and Peloponnesians. The wall across the Isthmus, 
which they had been so busy in constructing and on which 
they had relied for protection against the land-force of 
Xerxes, had been intermitted and left unfinished when he 
retired: but it was resumed as soon as the forward march 
of Mardonius was anticipated. It was however still un- 
finished at the time of the embassy of the Macedonian 
prince to Athens, and this incomplete condition of their 
special defence was one reason of their alarm lest the 
Athenians should accept terms proposed. That danger 
being for the time averted, they redoubled their exertions 
at the Isthmus, so that the wall was speedily brought into 
an adequate state of defence and the battlements along 
the summit were in course of being constructed. Thus 
safe behind their own bulwark, they thought nothing more 
of their promise to join the Athenians in Boeotia and to 
assist in defending Attica against Mardonius. Indeed 
their king Kleombrotus, who commanded the force at the 
Isthmus, was so terrified by an obscuration of the sun at 
the moment when he was sacrificing to ascertain the in- 
clinations of the gods in reference to the coming war, that 
he even thought it necessary to retreat with the main 
force to Sparta, where he soon after died, i Besides these 
two reasons — indifference and unfavourable omens — which 
restrained the Spartans from aiding Attica, there was also 
a third: they were engaged in celebrating the festival of 
the Hyakinthia, and it ^as their paramount object (says 
the historian) 2 to fulfil "the exigences of the god." As the 

Sti «cp$aXtu>Ttp^v eoTt ^ixoXofistv ' Herodot. iz. 10. 

TcpIIcpaiQ (laXXov ^ noXsixisiv, Ac. * Herodot. ix. 7. 02 7^ 8^ Aaxc- 

The orators are not always sa- Saiudvioi SpxaCdv xt toutov t6v X9^' 

tisfied with giving to Athens the vov xal 091 ^v ^TaxlvOia* ncpi. icXcU 

credit which she really deserved: oxou S' rffO'* ti xou Oeou icopa6vciv* 

they veoture to represent the Athe- Sfxa 8i xi tcix6< o^t t6 iv xtj) *IaO{j.(f> 

nians as having refused these bril- ixelxeov, xal ^$t] indX^cic eXa(ji()avs. 

liant offers ftrom Xerxes on his first Nearly a century after this, we 

invasion, instead of from Mardo- are told that it was always the 

nius in the ensuing summer. Xer- practice for the Amykleean hop- 

xes never made any offers to them, lites to go home for the celebra- 

See Isokratds, Or. iv. Panegyric, tion of the Hyakinthia, on what- 

c 27, p. 6U ever expedition they might happen 




Pabt II. 


haying for 
tified the 
Attica un- 
defended : 
Athens a 

Olympia and the Kameia in the preceding year, so now 
did the Hyakinthia, prevail over the necessities of defence, 
putting out of sight both the duties of fidelity towards 
an exposed ally, and the bond of an express promise. 

Meanwhile Mardonius, informed of the unfavourable 
reception which his proposals had received at Athens, put 
his army in motion forthwith from Thessaly, joined by all 
his Grecian auxiliaries, and by fresh troops from Thrace 
and Macedonia. As he marched through Boeotia, 
the Thebans, who heartily espoused his cause, 
endeavoured to dissuade him from farther mili- 
tary operations against the united force of his 
enemies — urging him to try the efficacy of bribes, 
presented to the leading men in the different 
cities, for the purpose of disuniting them. But 
Mardonius, eager to repossess himself of Attica, 
heeded not their advice. About ten months 
after the retreat of Xerxes, he entered the 
country without resistance, and again established the Per- 
sian head quarters in Athens (May or June — 479 b.c.).^ 
Before he arrived, the Athenians had again removed 
to Salamis, under feelings of bitter disappoint- 
ment and indignation. They had in vain awaited 
the fulfilment of the Spartan promise that a 
Peloponnesian army should join them inBoBotia 
for the defence of their frontier; at length, being 
unable to make head against the enemy alone, 
they found themselves compelled to transport 
their families across to Salamis. 2 The migration 
was far less terrible than that of the preceding 
summer, since Mardonius had no fleet to harass 
them. But it was more gratuitous, and might 
have been obviated had the Spartans executed their co- 
venant, which would have brought about the battle of 
Platsea two months earlier than it actually was fought. 

Mardonius, though master of Athens, was so anxious 
to conciliate the Athenians, that he at first abstained from 
damaging either the city or the country, and despatched 
a second envoy to Salamis to repeat the offers made 

Second mi- 
of the 
to Salamis 
bitter dis- 
ment and 
Sparta for 

to be employed (Xenoph. Hellen. arpaTiTjv xal auveaipaXov i« *A9igvac 

iv. 6, 11). 8901 iceplfjLT^fiiCov^EXXigvwvTtbvTaiT^ 

» Diodor. xi. 28; Herodot. ix. 2, olx7]{xdvu)v, Ac. 

3, 17. ol {liv iXXoi navTt? Ttotpeixov * Herodot. ix. 4. 



through Alexander of Ifacedon. He thought that they 
might now be listened to, since he could oner 
the exemption of Attica from ravage, as an offer^of 
additional temptation. Mury chides, a Helles- Mardoniui 
pontine Greek, was sent to renew these pro- Athenians 
positions to the Athenian senate at Salamis; —again 
but he experienced a refusal, not less resolute [nJense"" 
than what bad been returned to Alexander of resolution 
Macedon, and all but unanimous. One unfor- di^pi^y*^*^ 
tunate senator, Lykidas, made an exception to 
this unanimity, venturing to recommend acceptance of the 
propositions of Murychides. So furious was the wrath, or 
so strong the suspicion of corruption, which his single- 
voiced negative provoked, that senators and people both 
combined to stone him to death; while the Athenian women 
in Salamis, hearing what had passed, went of their own 
accord to the house of Lykidas, and stoned to death his 
wife and children. In the desperate pitch of resolution to 
which the Athenians were now wound up, an opponent 
passed for a traitor; unanimity, even though extorted 
by terror, was essential to their feelings. ^ Murychides, though 
his propositions were refused, was dismissed without injury. 
While the Athenians thus gave renewed proofs of their 
stedfast attachment to the cause of Hellas, they ^^^q^, 
at the same time sent envoys, conjointly with strance 
Megara and Plataea, to remonstrate with the fhe^Athe- 
Spartans on their backwardness and breach of niana to 
faith, and to invoke them even thus late to come Sparta— 
forth at once and meet Mardonius in Attica; not slackness 
omitting to intimate, that if they were thus g' **^® 
deserted, itwouldbecome imperatively necessary ^*' *"'* 
for them, against their will, to make terms with the enemy. 

* Herodot. ix. 6. 1 dare not reject between the two, the story of 

this story about Lykidas (see Ly- Herodotus is far the more probable, 

kurgus cont. Leokrat. c. 30, p. In the migration of the preceding 

222), though other authors recount year, we know that a certain 

the same incident as having hap- number of Athenians actually did 

pened to a person named Kyrsilus, stay behind in the acropolis, and 

during the preceding year, when Kyrsilus might have been among 

the Athenians quitted Athens: see them, if he had chosen. Moreover 

Demosthen. de Coronfi., p. 296. c. Xerxes held out no offers, and 

59 ; and Cicero do Offlciis, iii. 11. gave occasion to no deliberation : 

That two such acts were perpe- while the offers of Mardonius might 

trated by the Athenians is noway really appear to a well-minded 

probable : and if we are to choose citizen deserving of attention. 


So careless, however, were the Spartan Ephors respecting 
Attica and the Megarid, that they postponed giving an 
answer to these envoys for ten successive days, while in the 
mean time they pressed with all their efforts the completion 
of the Isthmic fortifications. And after having thus 
amused the envoys as long as they could, they would have 
dismissed them at last with a negative answer — such was 
their fear of adventuring heyond the Isthmus — had not a 
Tegean named Chileos, whom they much esteemed and td 
whom they communicated the application, reminded them 
that no fortifications at the Isthmus would suffice for the 
defence of Peloponnesus, if the Athenians became allied 
with Mardonius, and thus laid the peninsula open by sea. 
The strong opinion of this respected Tegean, proved 
to the Ephors that their selfitsh policy would not be seconded 
by their chief Peloponnesian allies ; and brought to their 
attention, probably for the first time, that danger by sea 
might again be renewed, though the Persian fleet had been 
beaten in the preceding year, and was now at a distance 
from Greece. It changed their resolution, not less com- 
pletely than suddenly; so that they despatched forthwith in 
the night 5000 Spartan citizens to the Isthmus — each man 
with seven Helots attached to him. And when the Athenian 
envoys, ignorant of this sudden change of policy, came on 
the next day to give peremptory notice that Athens would 
no longer endure such treacherous betrayal, but would 
forthwith take measures for her own security and separate 
pacification — the Ephors affirmed on their oath that the 
troops were already on their march, and were probably by 
this time out of the Spartan territory, i Considering that 
this step was an expiation, imperfect, tardy, and reluctant, 

Isokrat^a (Or. iv. Panegyric. 8. ' Herodot. ix. 10, 11 ; Plutarch, 
184. c. 42) states that the Athenian? Aristeidds, c. 10. Plutarch had 
condemned many persons to death read a decree ascribed to Aristei- 
for mediam (in allusion doubtless d6s, in -which Kimon, Xanthippus^ 
to Themistoklds as one), but he and Myrdnidds, were named en- 
adds — "even now they imprecate voys to Sparta. But it is imposs- 
curses on any citizen who enters ible that Xanthippus could have 
into amicable negotiation with the taken part in the embassy, seeing 
Persians" — sv Si tok ouXX6yoi< Sti that he was now in command of 
xal vuv dp&< ffoiouvTat, evxi^ eicixY]- the fleet. 

puxeucxai IlipoaicTwv itoXiTU>v. This Probably the Helots must hare 

must haye been an ancient custom, followed : one hardly sees how so 

continued after it had ceased to be great a number could have been 

pertinent ox appropriate. all suddenly collected, and march- 


for foregoing desertion and breach of promise — the Ephors 
may probably have thought that the mystery of the night 
march, and the sudden communication of it as an actual 
fact to the envoys, in the way of reply, would impress more 
emphatically the minds of the latter; who returned with 
the welcome tidings to Salamis, and prepared their coun- 
trymen for speedy action. Five thousand Spartan citizens, 
each with seven light-armed Helots as attendants, were thus 
on their march to the theatre of war. Throughout the 
whole course of Grecian history, we never hear of any 
number of Spartan citizens at all approaching to 5000 being 
put on foreign service at the same time. But this was not 
all: 5000 IJacedsemonian Periceki, each with one j^^^ e Spar- 
light-armed Helot to attend him, were also des- tan force 
patched to the Isthmus, to take part in the same ^n"|j*p^„. 
struggle. Such imparalleled efforts afford Buffi- sanias 
cient measure of the alarm which, though late J\^*^® 
yet real, now reigned at Sparta. Other Pelo- 
ponnesian cities followed the example, and a large army 
was thus collected under the Spartan Pausanias. 

It appears that Mardonius was at this moment in 
secret correspondence with the Argeians, who, Mardonius, 
though professing neutrality, are said to have after rava- 
promised him that they would arrest the march Anfca, re- 
of the Spartans beyond their own borders, i If tires into 
they ever made su6h a promise, the suddenness ^*®'****- 
of the march, as well as the greatness of the force, pre- 
vented them from fulfilling it, and may perhaps have been 
so intended by the Ephors, under the apprehension that 
resistance might possibly be offered by the Argeians. At 
any rate, the latter were forced to content themselves with 
apprising Mardonius instantly of the fact, through their 
swiftest courier. It determined that general to evacuate 

ed ofF in one night, no prepara- there was no public discussion ot 

tions haying been made beforehand, criticism. Now the conduct of 

Dr. Thirlwall (Hist. 6r. ch. xri. these Ephors is consistent and in- 

P' 366) suspects the correctness of telligible— though selfish, narrow- 

the narrative of Herodotus, on minded, and insensible to anj 

grounds which do not appear to dangers except what are present 

me couTincing. It seems to me and obvious. Nor can I think 

that, after all, the literal narrative (with Dr. Thirlwall) that the 

is more probable than anything manner of communication ulti- 

'Which we can substitute in its mately adopted is of the nature of 

place. The Spartan foreign policy a jest, 

all depended on the five Ephors: * Herodot. is. 12. 


Attica, and to carry on the war in Boeotia — a country in 
every way more favourable to him. He had for some time 
refrained from committing devastations in or round Athens, 
hoping that the Athenians miffht be induced to listen to 
his propositions; but the last S&jb of his stay were employ- 
ed in burning and destroyihg whatever had been spared 
by the host of Xerxes during the preceding summer. After 
a fruitless attempt to surprise a body of lOOOLacedeemoni- 
ans which had been detached for the protection of Megara, ^ 
he withdrew all his army into Boeotia, not taking either 
the straight road to Platsea, through Eleutherse, or to 
Thebes through Phyle, both which roads were mountain- 
ous and inconvenient for cavalry, but marching in the 
north-easterly direction to Dekeleia, where he was met by 
some guides from the adjoining regions near the river 
Asopus, and conducted through the deme of Sphendaleis 
to Tanagra. He thus found himself after a route longer 
but easier, in Boeotia on the plain of the Asopus; along 
which river he next day marched westward to Skolus, a 
town in the territory of Thebes seemingly near to that of 
Platsea. ^ He then took up a position not far o£F, in the 
plain on the left bank of the Asopus: his left wing over 
against Erythrse, his centre over against Hysise, and his 
right in the territory of Platsea: and he employed his army 
in constructing a fortified camp 3 of ten furlongs square, 
defended by wooden walls and towers, cut from trees in 
the Theban territory. 

* There were stories current at Mr. Finlay (Oropus and Diakria, 
Megara, even in the time of Pau- p. 88) says that ''Malakasa is the 
sanias, respecting some of these only place on this road where a 
Persians, who were said to have been considerable body of cavalry could 
brought to destruction by the inter- conveniently halt." 

vention of Artemis (Pausan. i. 40, 2). It appears that the Boeotians from 

* Herodot. ix. 16. The situation the neighbourhood of the Asdpus 
of the Attic deme Sphendald or were necessary as guides for this 
Sphendaleis seems not certainly road. Perhaps even the territory 
known (Boss, Ueber die Demen of Ordpus was at this time still a 
von Attika, p. 138): but Colonel part of Boeotia: we do not certainly 
Leake and Mr. Finlay think that know at what period it was first 
it stood "near Aio Merkurio, which conquered by the Athenians, 
now gives name to the pass leading The combats between Athenians 
from Dekelia through the ridges and Boeotians will be found to 
of Parnes into the extremity of the take place most frequently in this 
Tanagrian plain, at a place called south-eastern region of Boeotia, — 
Malakasa." (Leake, Athens and the Tanagra, CEnophyta, Delium, dtc. 
Demi of Attica, vol. ii. sect. iv.p.l23.) > Herodot. ix. 16. 



Mardonius found himself thus with his numerous 
army, in a plain favourable for cavalry; with a camp more 
or less defensible, — the fortified city of Thebes * Diicourage- 
in his rear, — and a considerable stock of provi- ment in 
sions as well as a friendly region behind him o^^Mardo- 
frona whence to draw more. Few among his nius geuor- 
army, however, were either hearty in the cause Jande7of'' 
or confident of success: 2 even the native Persians Orchome- 
had been disheartened by the flight of the SJ^q*„*^J^® 
mionarch the year before, and were fidl of melan- jealousies 

choly auguries u- ,, xu mv. k M"'-°- 

A splendid banquet to which the Theban and Arta- 

leader Attaginus invited Mardonius along with ^•'^^^*i® 
fifty Persian and fifty Theban or Boeotian guests, command— 
exhibited proofs of this depressed feelinff, *®*^ *^^ 
which were afterwards recounted to Herodotus ©f the 
himself by one of the guests present — an Thebans. 
Orchomenian citizen of note named Thersander. The 
banquet being so arranged that each couch was occupied 
by one Persian and one Theban, this man was accosted in 
Greek by his Persian neighbour, who inquired to what 
city he belonged; and upon learning that he was an Orcho- 
menian, 3 continued thus: "Since thou hast now partaken 
with me in the same table and cup, I desire to leave with 
thee some memorial of my convictions; the rather in order 
that thou mayest be thyself forewarned so as to take the 
best counsel for thine own safety. Seest thou these Per- 
sians here feasting, and the army which we left yonder 
encamped near the river? Yet a little while, and out of 
all these, thou shalt behold but few surviving." Thersander 
listened to these words with astonishment, spoken as they 
were with strong emotion and a flood of tears, and replied 
— "Surely thou art bound to reveal this to Mardonius, 
and to his confidential advisers:" but the Persian rejoined — 

1 The strong town of Thebes was Is farther illustrated by Pindar, 

ofmnch service to him (Thuoyd.i. 90). Isthm. i. 61 (compare the Scholia 

* Herodot. iz.40,45, 67; Plutarch, ad loc. and at the beginning of the 

Aristeidds, c. 18. Ode), respecting the Theban family 

'Herodot. ix. 16. Thersander, of Herodotus and Asftpoddrus. The 

though an Orchomenian, passes as ancient mythical feud appears to 

a Theban— Heporjv tt %ai 6r][ioiov have gone to sleep, but a deadly 

ev xXlv^ ixdoT^ — a proof of the in- hatred will be found to grow up 

timate connexion between Thebes in later times between these two 

and Orchomenus at this time, which towns. 

14 HISTOBY OF GBEEOB. Past 1 1. 

"My friend, man cannot avert that which God hath decreed 
to come : no one will believe the revelation, sure though it 
be. Many of us Persians know this well, and are here 
serving only under the bond of necessity. And truly this 
is the most hateful of all human sufferings — to be full of 
knowledge and at the same time to have no power over 
any result." * — "This (observes Herodotus) I heard myself 
from the Orchomenian Thersander, who told me farther 
that he mentioned the fact to several persons about him 
even before the battle of Platsea." It is certainly one of 
the most curious revelations in the whole history; not 
merely as it brings forward the historian in his own person- 
ality, communicating with a personal friend of the Thebaii 
leaders, and thus provided with good means of infor- 
mation as to the general events of the campaign — but also 
as it discloses to us, on testimony not to be suspected, the 
real temper of the native Persians, and even of the chief 
men among them. If so many of these chiefs were not 
merely apathetic, but despondent, in the cause, much more 
decided would be the same absence of will and hope in 
their followers and the subject aUies. To follow the 
monarch in his overwhelming march of the preceding year, 
was gratifying in many ways to the native Persians: but 
every man was sick of the enterprise as now cut down 
under Mardonius: and Artabazus, the second in command, 
was not merely slack, but jealous of his superior. 2 Under 
such circumstances we shall presently not be surprised to 
find the whole army disappearing forthwith, the moment 
Mardonius is slain. 

Among the Grecian allies of Mardonius, the Theb&ns and 
Boeotians were active and zealous, most of the remainder luke- 
warm, and thePhokians even of doubtful fidelity. Their con- 
tingent of 1 000 hoplites, under Harmokyd^, had been tardy 
in joining him, having only come up since he retired from 
Attica intoBoeotia: and some of the JPhokians even remained 

1 Herodot. ix. 16, 17. The last the philosophy of happiness and 

obserration here quoted is striking duty as conceived by Aristotle. If 

and emphatic — i^QlatT] 8i 68uvv) iaxi carried fally out, this position is 

TU>v iv dvOpu>icoi9i aSxT], icoXXd 9po- the direct negative of what Aristotle 

viovxa {j.Y]88v6^ xpaT^stv. It will have lays down in his Ethics as to the 

to be more carefully considered at superior happiness of the f)io* 6cu>« 

a later period of this history, when pv)Tix6< or life of scientific obser- 

we come to touch upon the scien- yation and reflection, 

tiflc life of the Greeks, and upon * Herodot. iz. 66. 


behind in the neighbourhood of FamassuSt prosecuting 
manifest hostilities against the Persians. Aware of the 
feeling among this contingent, which the Thessalians took 
care to place before him in an unfavourable point of view, 
Mardonius determined to impress upon them a lesson of 
intimidation. Causing them to form in a separate body 
on the plain, he brought up his numerous cavalry all around 
them; while thePheme, or sudden simultaneous impression, 
ran through the Greek allies as well as the Phokians 
themselves, that he was about to shoot them down. ^ The 
general Harmokydes, directing his men to form a square 
and close their ranks, addressed to them short exhortations 
to sell their lives dearly, and to behave like brave Greeks 
against barbarian assassins — when the cavalry rode up 
apparently to the charge, and advanced clctse to the square, 
with uplifted javelins and arrows on the string, some few 
of which were even actually discharged. The Phokians 
maintained, as enjoined, steady ranks with a firm counten- 
ance, and the cavalry wheeled about without any actual 
attack or damage. After this mysterious demonstration, 
Mardonius condescended to compliment the Phokians on 
their courage, and to assure them by means of a herald 
that he had been greatly misinformed respecting them. 
He at the same time exhorted them to be faithful and for- 
ward in service for the future, and promised that all good 
l?ehaviour should be amply recompensed. Herodotus 
seems uncertain,— difficult as the supposition is to enter- 
tain, — whether Mardonius did not really intend at first to 
massacre the Phokians in the field, and desisted from the 
intention only on seeinc how much blood it would cost to 
accomplish. However this may be, the scene itself was a re- 
markable reality, and presented one amongmanyotherproofs 
of the lukewarmness and suspicious fidelity of the army.^ 

■ Herodot. ix. 17. 6ie^'^X9s ^T^fAiQ, * Oux {)^(o iTpsxio)? tlicelv, oSxt 

a>C xaTaxovTisi affitt^. Bespecting cl ^X9ov {i^v dicoXiovxtc touc Ou>x^a<, 

9Tjf&7), see a note a little farther 6e-)f]84vTu>v tu)v 639oaXu>v, &o. (He- 

on, at the hattle of Mykald, in this rodot. ix. 18). 

same chapter. This confession of uncertainty 

Compare the case of the Delians as to motives and plans, distin- 

at Adramyttium, surrounded and guishing between them and the 

slain with missiles by the Persian visible facts which he is describing, 

satrap, though not his enemies— is not without importance as streng-^ 

nfpioTTQaac TOO? iaoToo xatijxbvTios thening our confidence in the hi- 

CThuoyd. viii. 108). storian. 


Conformably to the suggestion of the Thebans, the 
Numbers of liberties of Greece were now to be disputed in 
the Greeks BoBotia: and not only had the position of Mar- 

collected !• 1 jv 11 T_xi' 1 

under Fau> donius already been taken, but bis camp also 
sanias. fortified, before the united Grecian army 

approached Kithaeron in its forward march from the 
Isthmus. After the full force of the Lacedaemonians had 
reached the Isthmus, they had to await the arrival of their 
Peloponnesian and other confederates. The hoplites who 
joined them were as follows: from Tegea, 1500; from 
Corinth, 5000, besides a small body of 300 from 
the Corinthian colony of Potidsea; from the Arcadian 
Orohomenus, 600; from Sikyon, 3000; from Epidaurus, 
800; from Troezen, 1000; from Lepreon, 200; from Mykense 
and Tiryns, 400; from Phlius, 1000; from Hermione, 300; 
from Eretria and Styra, 600 ; from Chalkis, 400; from Am- 
brakia, 500; from Leukas and Anaktorium, 800; from 
Pale in Kephallenia, 200; from -^gina, 500. On marching 
from the Isthmus to Megara, they took up 3000 Megarian 
hoplites; and as soon as they reached Eleusis in their for- 
ward progress, the army was completed by the junction of 
8000 Athenian hoplites, and 600 Platsean, under Aristeides, 
who passed over from Salamis. i The total force of hoplites 

' Compare this list of Herodotus With respect to the name of the 

'with the enumeration which Fau- Eleians, the suspicion of Brond- 

eanias read inscribed on the statue stedt is plausible, that Fausanias 

of Zeus, erected at Olympia by may have mistaken the name of 

the Greeks who took part in the the FaUs of Kephallenia for theirs, 

battle of Flatea (Fausan. v. 23, 1). and may have fancied that he read 

Fausanias found inscribed all FAAEIOI when it was really 

the names here indicated by He- written IIAAEIS, in an inscription 

rodotus, except the Falds of Ke- at that time about 600 years old. 

phallenia; and he found in addi- The place in the series wherein 

tion the Eleians, Keans, Eyth- Fausanias places the name of the 

nians, Tenians, Naxians and Md- Eleians strengthens this suspicion, 

lians. The five last names are Unless it be admitted, we shall be 

islanders in the^gean: their con- driven, as the most probable alter- 

tingents sent to Flatcea roust at native, to suppose a fraud com- 

all events have been very small, mitted by the vanity of the Eleians, 

and it is surprising to hear that which may easily have led them 

they sent any— especially when we to alter a name originally belong- 

recoUect tliat there was a Greek ingto the PaUs. The reader will re* 

fleet at this moment on service, to collect that the Eleians were them- 

which it would be natural that selves the superintendents andcu* 

they should join themselves in rators at Olympia. 

preference to land-service. Plutarch seems to have read the 

Oh£.p. xlii. numbers of GBEEKS UNDEB PAUSANIAS. 17 

or heavy-armed troops was thus 38,700 men. There were 
no cavalry, and but very few bowmen — but if we add those 
who are called light-armed or unarmed generally, some 
perhaps with javelins or swords, but none with any defen- 
sive armour — the grand total was not less than 1 1 0,000 
men. Of these light-armed or unarmed, there were, as 
computed by Herodotus, 35,000 in attendance on the 5000 
Spartan citizens, and 34,500 in attendance on the other 
hoplites ; together with 1 800 Thespians who were properly 
hoplites, yet so badly armed as not to be reckoned in the 
ranks. ^ 

Such was the number of Greeks present or near at 
hand in the combat against the Persians at Platsea, which 
took place some little time afterwards. But it seemed that 
the contingents were not at first completely full, March of 
and that new additions 2 continued to arrive Pa««an>a8 
until a few days before the battle, along with ron'into* 
the convoys of cattle and provisions which came B®otia. 
for the subsistence of the army. Pausanias marched first 
from the Isthmus to Eleusis, where he was joined by the 
Athenians from Salamis. At Eleusis as well as at the 
Isthmus, the sacrifices were found encouraging, and the 
united army then advanced across the ridge of Kithaeron, 
so as to come within sight of the Persians. When Pausanias 
saw them occupying the line of the Asopus in the plain 
beneath, he kept his own army on the mountain declivity 
near Ervthrae, without choosing to adventure himself in 
the level ground. Mardonius, finding them not „^ j^ ^_ 
disposed to seek battle in the plain, despatched tacked by 
his numerous and excellent cavalry under Ma- *^® Peraiaa 
sistius, the most distinguished officer in his army, under ^ 
to attack them. For the most part, the ground Masistius, 
was so uneven as to check their approach; but Sarassed- 
the Megarian contingent, which happened to be superior 
more exposed than the rest, were so hard pressed of thT°^ 
that they were forced to send to Pausanias for Atheniana 
aid. They appear to have had not only no Sfvairy- 
cavalry, but no bowmen or light-armed troops ^lasistiua 
of any sort with missile weapons; while the 
Persians, excellent archers and darters, using very large 

same inscription as Pausanias (De * Herodot. Ix. 28. oi intcpotTubv- 
Herodoti Malignit. p. 873). xi? ts %a{ oi dpxV fXQdvxsc 'EXXi^- 

< Herodot. ix. 19, 28, 29. v<i)v. 

VOL. V. 


bows and trained in such accomplishments from their 
earliest childhood, charged in successive squadrons and over- 
whelmed the Greeks with darts and arrows — not omitting 
contemptuous taunts on their cowardice for keeping back 
from the plain, i So general was then the fear of the 
Persian cavalry, that Pausanias could find none of the 
Grreeks, except the Athenians, willing to volunteer and go 
to the rescue of the Megarians. A body of Athenians, 
however, especially 300 chosen troops under Olympiodorus, 
strengthened with some bowmen, immediately marched to 
the spot and took up the combat with the Persian 
cavalry. For some time the struggle was sharp and doubtful : 
at length the general Masistius, — a man renowned for 
bravery, lofty in stature, clad in conspicuous armour, and 
mounted on aNisaeanhorse with golden trappings — charging 
at the head of his troops, had his horse struck by an 
arrow in the side. The animal immediately reared and 
threw his master on the ground, close to the ranks of the 
Athenians, who, rushing forward, seized the horse, and 
overpowered Masistius before he could rise. So impene- 
trable were the defences of his helmet and breastplate 2 
however, that ibhey had considerable difficulty in killing 
him, though he was in their power: at length a spearman 
pierced him in the eye. The death of the general passed 
unobserved by the Persian cavalry, but as soon as they 
missed him and became aware of the loss, they charged 
furiously and in one mass, to recover the dead body. At 
first the Athenians, too few in number to resist the onset, 
were compelled for a time to give way, abandoning the 
body; but reinforcements presently arriving at their call, 
the Persians were driven back with loss, and it finally 
remained in their possession. 3 

The death of Masistius, coupled with that final repulse 
of the cavalry which left his body in possession of the 
Greeks, produced a strong effect on both armies, encouraging 
the one as much as it disheartened the other. Through- 
out the camp of Mardonius, the grief was violent and un- 

> About the missile weapons and 26; i. 9, 6: compare -Cyropeed. i. 

skill of the Persians, see Hero- 2, 4). 

dot. i. 186; Xenophon, Anabas. iii. * See Quintus Cnrtins, iii. 11, 15 ; 

4, 17. and the note of Miitzel. 

Gyrus the younger was eminent * Herodot. ix. 21, 22, 23 ; Fltt« 

in the use both of the bow and tarch, Aristeidds, c. 14. 
the javelin (Xenoph. Anab. i. 8, 


bounded, manifested by wailing so loud as to echo over 
all Boeotia; while the hair of men, horses and rj-he Greeks 
cattle, was abundantly cut in token of mourning, quit the 
The Greeks, on the other hand, overjoyed at JfVhe**'*" 
their success, placed the dead body in a cart mountain- 
and paraded it round the army: even the hop- fnd^J^ake 
lites ran out of their ranks to look at it; not only up a posi- 
hailing it as a valuable trophy, but admiring its Vo'piatwL 
stature and proportions. ^ along the 

So much was their confidence increased, that -^"^p^- 
Pausaniasnow ventured to quit the protection of themount- 
ain-^ound, inconvenient from its scanty supply of water, and 
to take up his position in the plain beneath, interspersed only 
with low nillocks. Marching fromErythrse ina westerlydirec- 
tion along the declivities of Elithaeron, and passing by Hysiae, 
the Greeks occupied a line of camp in the J?lat»an territory 
along the Asopus and on its right bank; with their right 
wing near to the fountain called Gturgaphia,^ and their left 

> Herodot. iz. 24, 25, oI|xu>y^ ts Whicheyer armj oommenced the 

ypsu>{Aevoi dicXiT<]>* Sicaaav fap tfjv attack had to begin by paaaing the 

Boiu)tIt)v xaTtTx> i^X^) ^^* Asdpus (c. 86-69). 

The exaggerated demonstrations For the topography of this region, 

of grief, ascribed to Xerxes and and of the positions occupied by 

Atossa in the Persae of ^schylus, the two armies, compare Squire, 

have often been blamed by critics : in Walpole's Turkey, p. 838 ; Eruse, 

■we may see from this passage how Hellas, vol. ii. ch. ▼!. p. 9 aeq.^ and 

much they are in the manners of eh. riii. p. 692 aeq.: and the still 

Orientals of that day. more copious and accux^te infor- 

* Herodot. ix. 26-30; Plutarch, mation of Colonel Leake, Travels 

Aristeidds, c. 11. ib tou 'AvSpoxpd- in Northern Greece, ch. xvi. toI. 

Touc fipcpov IyT^C iXasi icuxvwy xal ii. p. 324-360. Both of them haye 

0uaxlu>v SIvSptuv ictpis^6|Acvov. given plans of the region ; that 

The expression of Herodotus re- which I annex is borrowed from 

specting this position taken by Kiepert's maps. I cannot but think 

Paasanias, OGtoi (tiv ouv ts^^^'^'^ ^^^^ ^^^ fountain Gargaphia is not 

ckI T<j|> 'Aatt>ic<p iaTpaxoitsStOovTo, as yet identified, and that both Kruse 

well as the words which follow in and Leake place the Grecian posi* 

the next chapter (31)— Ol /8dpf)ocpoi, tion farther from the river Asdpus 

icuQ6f<.tvoi sTvai ToO«*£XX7)va( tv IlXa- than is consistent with the words 

tat^ai, icap^aav xal aOxol ini 'c6v of Herodotus; which words seem 

'A9u>it6v t&v.tsOt^ piovxa — show to specify points near the two 

plainly that the Grecian troops extremities, indicating that the 

were encamped along the Asdpus fountain of Gargaphia was near 

on the Platsean side, while the the river towards the right of the 

Persians in their second position Grecian position, and the chapel 

occupied the ground on the op- of Androkratfts alsotiear the river 

posite or Theban side of the river, towards the left of that position, 

C 2 


winff near to the chapel, surrounded by a shady grove, of 
the I^lataeaii hero Androkrat^s. In this position they were 
mturshalled according to nations, or separate fractions of 
the Greek name — the Lacedaemonians on the right wing, 
with the Tegeans and Corinthians immediately joining 
them — and tne Athenians on the left wing; a post, which 
as second in point of dignity, was at first claimed by the 
Tegeans, chiefly on grounds of mythical exploits, to the 
exclusion of the Athenians, but ultimately adjudged by 
the Spartans, after hearing both sides, to Athens. ^ In the 
field even Lacedaemonians followed those democratical 
forms which pervaded so generally G-recian military opera- 
tions: in this case, it was not the generals, but the Lace- 
daemonian troops in a body, who heard the argument and 
delivered the verdict by unanimous acclamation. 

Mardonius, apprised of this change of position, marched 
Mardonius his army also a little further to the westward, 
alters his and posted himself opposite to the Greeks, 
and posts divided from them by the river Asopus. At the 
himself suggestion of the Thebans, he himself with his 
posite to*' Persians and Medes, the picked men of his army, 

*^\^'^th * *^^^ P^®* ^° ^^® ^^^^ wij^gj immediately opposite 
side of the to the Lacedaemonians on the Greek right, and 
As6pu8. even extending so far as to cover the Tegean 
ranks on the left of the Lacedaemonians: Baktrians, Indians, 
Sakae, with other Asiatics and Egyptians, filled the centre ; 
and the Greeks and Macedonians in the service of Persia, 
the right — over against the hoplites of Athens. The 
numbers of these last-mentioned Greeks Herodotus could 
not learn, though he estimates them conjecturally at 

where the Athenians were posted. Colonel Squire and Dr. Clarke, ap. 

Nor would such a site for a chapel pear to be suitable for Gargaphia. 

of Androkratds be inconsistent The errors of that plan of the 

with Thucydidds (iii. 24), who battleofPlateea which accompanies 

merely mentions that chapel as the Voyage d'Anacharsis, are now 

being on the right-hand of the first well understood, 

mileof road from Platfea to Thebes. ^ Herodot. iz. 26-29. Judging 

Considering the length of time ttom the battles of Corinth (b.g. 

which has elapsed since the battle, 896) and Mantineia (b.g. 418), the 

it would not be surprising if the Tegeaus seem afterwards to have 

spring of Gargaphia were no longer dropped this pretension to occupy 

recognisable. At any rate, neither the left wing, and to have pre- 

the fountain pointed out by Colonel f erred the post in the line next to 

Leake (p. 832) nor that of Vergu- the Lacedaemonians (Xenoph. Hel- 

tiani which had been supposed by len. It. 2, 19). 



50,000 M nor can we place any confidence in the total of 
300,000 which he gives as belonging to the other troops 
of MardoniuSy though probably it cannot have been much 

In this position lay the two armies, separated only by 
a narrow space including the river As6pus, and ^ .^j. 
each expecting a battle, whilst the sacrifices on neasof bo^ 
behalf of each were offered up. Fausanias, J"°j**%w 
Mardonius, and the Greeks in the Persian army, suaok-the 
had each a separate prophet to offer sacrifice, ?'x?***A"**'^ 
and to ascertain the dispositions of the gods; the discourage 
two first had men from the most distin^shed fi"taggrei- 
prophetic families in Elis — the latter invited 
one from Leukas.^ All received large pay, and the prophet 
of Pausanias had indeed been honoured with a recompense 
above all pay — the gift of full Spartan citizenship for 
himself as well as for his brother. It happened that the 
prophets on both sides delivered the same report of their 
respective sacrifices: favourable for resistance if attacked 
— unfavourable for beginning the battle. At a moment 
when doubt and indecision was the reigning feeling on 
both sides, this was the safest answer for the prophet to 
give, and the most satisfactory for the soldiers to hear. 
And though the answer from Delphi had been sufficiently 
encouraging, and the kindness of the patron-heroes of 
Plataea^ had been solemnly invoked, yet Pausanias did not 
venture to cross the As6pus and begin the attack, in the 
face of a pronounced declaration from his prophet. Nor 
did even Hegesistratus, the prophet employed by Mar- 
donius, choose on his side to urge an aggressive movement, 
though he had a deadly personal hatred against the Lace- 
dssmonians, and would nave been delighted to see them 
worsted. There arose commencements of conspiracy, 
perhaps encouraged by promises or bribes from the enemy, 
among the wealthier Athenian hoplites, to establish an 
oligarchy at Athens under Persian supremacy, like that 
wmch now existed at Thebes, — a conspiracy full of danger 

' Herodot. ix. 31, 32. rodotus gires respecting their ad- 

* Herodot. iz. 86, 38. |A8{Aia9u>- ventures : compare also the history 

fiivoc oOx 6X(you. of Euenius, ix. 93. 

These prophets were men of great ' Plutarch, Aristeidds, o. xi. ; 

individual consequence, as may Thucyd. ii. 74. 

be seen by the details which He- 



at such a moment, though fortunately repressed* by 
Aristeides, with a hand at once gentle and decisive. 

The annoyance inflicted by the Persian cavalry, under 
the guidance of the Thebans, was incessant. Their constant 
assaults, and missile weapons from the other side of the 
As6pus, prevented the Greeks from using the river for 
supplies of water, so that the whole army was forced to 
water at the fountain Gargaphia^ at the extreme right of 
the position, 2 near the Lacedaemonian hoplites. Moreover 
Mardonius ^® Theban leader Timegenidas, remarking the 
annoys the convoys which arrived over the passes of 
with^iis Kithgeron in the rear of the Grecian camp, and 
cavalry, the constant reinforcements of hoplites which 
ofl^their accompanied them, prevailed upon Mardonius 
supplies In to employ his cavalry in cutting off such com- 
the rear. munication. The first movement of this sort, 
undertaken by night against the pass called the Oak Heads, 
was eminently successful. A train of 500 beasts of burden 
with supplies, was attacked descending into the plain with 
its escort, all of whom were either slain or carried prisoners 
to the Persian camp; so that it became unsafe for any 
further convoys to approach the Greeks. 3 Eight days had 
already been passed in inaction before Timegenidas sug- 
gested, or Mardonius executed this manoeuvre; which it 
is fortunate for the Greeks that he did not attempt earlier, 
and which afforded clear proof how much might be hoped 
from an efficient employment of his cavalry, without the 
ruinous risk of a general action. Nevertheless, after 
waiting two days longer, his impatience became uncon- 

> Plutarch, Aristeidds, c. 18. count of Herodotus that this is 

* Herodot. ix. 40, 49, 60. tiqv ts quite incorrect. The position seems 

TipiQvijvTf|vrapYa<pi'»jv, oit' ^<; OSpsiexo to hare had no protection except 

1COV xb oTpaTeufxa t6 *EXXt)vix6v— what it derived from the river 

epux6|ievoi 8e dic6 tou 'Aoiuicou, o5tu) Asdpus, and the Greeks were ul- 

§7) snl TVjv TcpiQvvjv e9oiTeov* anb tou timately forced to abandon it by 

icoxapiou -^ap o«pi o6x en^v uSwp «po- the incessant attacks of the Per* 

pieoQai, 0ic6 xc xu>v iicitiwv xal xo- sian cavalry. The whole account, 

Uu(i.dxu>v. at once difTuse and uninstructive, 

Diodorus (xi. SO) aflirms that the given by Diodorus of this battle 

Greek position was so well de- (xi. 80-36) forms a strong contrast 

fendedby the nature of the ground, with the clear, impressive, and 

and so ditBcult of attack, that circumstantial narrative of Heio- 

Hardonius was prevented from dotus. 
making use of his superior num- « Herodot. ix. 88, 89. 
bers. It is evident from the ac- 


troUable, and he determined on a general battle forthwith. » 
In vain did Artabazus endeavour to dissuade him from the 
step; taking the same view as the Thebans, that in a 
pitched battle the united Grecian army was invincible, and 
that the only successful policy was that of delay and 
corruption to disunite them. He recommended standing 
on the defensive, by means of Thebes, well fortified and 
amply provisioned: so as to allow time of distributing 
effective bribes among the leading men throughout the 
various Grrecian cities. This suggestion, which Herodotus 
considers as wise and likely to succeed, was repudiated 
by Mardonius as cowardly and unworthy of the recognized 
superiority of the Persian arms. 2 

But while he overruled, by virtue of superior author- 
ity, the objections of all around him, Persians as impatience 
well as Greek, he could not but feel daunted .of Mardo- 
by their reluctant obedience, which he suspected J^pUe"of the 
to arise from their having heard oracles or pro- reluctance 
phecies, of unfavourable' augury. He therefore bLurand 
summoned the chief officers, Greek as well as other of- 
Persian, and put the question to them whether detMndSes 
they knew any prophecy announcing that the on a gener- 
Persians were doomed to destruction in Greece. Ji tries^o 
All were silent: some did not know the pro- show that 
phecies, but others ^Herodotus intimates) knew c^lg^are^^®" 
them full well, thougn they did not dare to speak, favourable 
E-eceiving no answer, Mardonius said, "Since ye *® ^*™' 
either do not know, or will not tell, I who know well will 
myself speak out. There is an oracle to the effect, that 
Persian invaders of Greece shall plunder the temple of 
Delphi, and shall afterwards all be destroyed. Now we, 
being awarfe of this, shall neither go against that temple, 
nor try to plunder it: on that ground therefore we snail 
not be destroyed. Rejoice ye therefore, ye who are well- 
affected to the Persians — we shall get the better of the 
Greeks." With that he gave orders to prepare everything 
for a general attack and battle on the morrow. ^ 

It is not improbable that the Orchomenian Thersander 
was present at this interview, and may have reported it to 
Herodotus. But the reflection of the historian himself is 
not the least curious part of the whole, as illustrating the 

* Herodo't. ix. 40, 41. « Herodot. ix. 42, 

' Herodot. ix. 42, 





Fabt n. 

manner in which these prophecies sunk into men*s minds, 
and determined their judgements. Herodotus knew (though 
he does not cite it) the particular prophecy to which Mar- 
donius made allusion; and he pronounces, in the most affir- 
mative tone,* that it had no reference to the Persians: it 
referred to an ancient invasion of Greece by the Illyrians 
and the Encheleis. But both Bakis (from whom he quotes 
four lines) and Musseus had prophesied, in the plainest 
manner, the destruction of the Persian army on the banks 
of the Thermodon and Asopus. And these' are the pro- 
phecies which we must suppose the officers convoked by 
Mardonius to have known also, though they did not dare 
to speak out: it was the fault of Mardonius himself that 
he did not take warning. 

The attack of a multitude like that of Mardonius was 
not likely under any circumstances to be made so rapidly 
His inten- 8,8 to take the Greeks by surprise : but the latter 
tion com- were forewarned of it by a secret visit from 
To^SeAthe- Alexander king of Macedon; who, riding up to 
nians in the the Athenian advanced posts in the middle of 
Aiwcandet ^^® night, desired to speak with Aristeides and 
of Mace- the other generals. Announcing to them alone 
**®°- his name and proclaiming his earnest sympathy 

for the Grecian cause, as well as the hazard which he in- 
curred by this nightly visit — he apprised them that Mar- 
donius, though eager for a battle long ago, could not by 
any effort obtain favourable sacrifices, but was nevertheless, 
even in spite of this obstacle, determined on an attack the 
next morning. "Be ye prepared accordingly; and if ye 
succeed in this war (said he), remember to liberate me also 
from the Persian yoke; I too am a Greek by descent, and 
thus risk my head because I cannot endure to see Greece 
enslaved." 2 

The communication of this important message, made 
by Aristeides to Pausanias, elicited from him a proposal 

> Herodot. Ix. 43. Tootov 8' Iycwy* 
Tov j^pTjopiov t6v MapSdvto^ elite ic 
Ildpaac iyj^^^t >< 'IXXuplouc tt xal 
Tov *EYx«Xeu)v axpaxAv ol8aic«- 
icoivjiAivov, dXX' oOx i« Uipaa^. 
*AXXo TO (xev BdxiSi 4< TaixTjv •djv 
|jLdty-r)v iaxi iceicot7)(i.iva, &c. 

s'lior. ix. 44-45. The language 

about the sacrifices is remark- 
able— XsYiu 8i u>v 8x1 Map8ovl(|> xs 
xal x^ oxpaxi^ od 8uvaxai xa 
a^i'^Ka xaxa66|xta YevioOai* 
icaXai Yotp &v i|xdxto9s, Ac. 

Mardonius had tr\ed manj un- 
availing efforts to procure better 
sacrifices: it could not be done. 


not a little surprising as coming from a Spartan general. 
He requested the Athenians to change places Paasanias 
with the Lacedaemonians in the line. "We Lace- c^angeg 
dsemonians (said he) now stand opposed to the fhe^lne^ 
Persians and Medes against whom we have never ^etween the 
yet contended, while ye Athenians have fought and'Athe- 
and conquered them at Marathon. March ye ni»n«- 
then over to the right wing and take our places, while we 
will take yours in the left wing against the Boeotians and 
Thessalians, with whose arms and attack we are familiar." 
The Athenians readily acceded, and the reciprocal change 
of order was accordingly directed. It was not yet quite 
completed, when day broke and the Theban allies of Mar- 
donius immediately took notice of what had been done. 
That general commanded a corresponding change in his 
own line, so as to place the native Persians once more over 
against the Lacedaemonians; upon which Pausanias, seeing 
that his manceuvre had failed, led back his Lacedaemonians 
to the right wing, while a second movement on the part of 
Mardonius replaced both armies in the order originally ob- 
served. 1 

No incident similar to this will be found throughout 
the whole course of Lacedaemonian history. To evade en- 
countering the best troops in the enemy's line, and to de- 
part for this purpose from their privileged post on the 
right wing, was a step well-calculated to lower them in the 
eyes of Greece, and could hardly have failed to produce 
that effect, if the intention had been realized. It is at 
the same time no mean compliment to the formidable re- 
putation of the native Persian troops — a reputation re- 
cognised by Herodotus, and well-sustained at least by their 
personal bravery. 2 Nor can we wonder that this publicly 
manifested reluctance on the part of the leading troops in 
the Grecian army contributed much to exalt the rash con- 
fidence of Mardonius : a feeling which Herodotus, in Ho- 
meric style, 3 casts into the speech of a Persian herald sent 
to upbraid the Lacedaemonians, and challenge them to a 
"single combat with champions of equal numbers, Lace- 

» Herodot. ix. 47; Plutarch, Aria- * Herodot. ix. 71. 

teidds, c. 16. Here, as on many ' Compare the reproaches of 

other occasions, Plutarch rather Hektor to Diomddes (Iliad, viii. 

spoils than assists the narrative of 161). 


daemonians against Persians.'' This herald, whom no one 
Mardonius heard Of cared for, and who serves but as a 
again at- mouthpiece for brinffinff out the feelinffs be- 

tacks them i -xii x rn jv 

with his longing to the moment, was followed by some- 
cavalry. thing very real and terrible — a vigorous attack 
on the Greek line by the Persian cavalry; whose rapid mo- 
tions, and showers of arrows and javelins, annoyed the 
Greeks on this day more than ever. The latter (as has 
been before stated) had no cavalry whatever; nor do their 
light troops, though sufficiently numerous, appear to have 
rendered any service, with the exception of the Athenian 
bowmen. How great was the advantage gained by the 
Persian cavalry, is shown by the fact that they for a time 
drove away the Lacedaemonians from the fountain of Gar- 
gaphia, so as to choke it up and render it unfit for use. As 
the army had been prevented by the cavalry from resorting 
to the river Asopus, this fountain had been of late the 
only watering-place; and without it the position which 
they then occupied became untenable — ^while their pro- 
visions also were exhausted, inasmuch as the convoys, from 
fear of the Persian cavalry, could not descend from Kithse- 
ron to join them, i 

In this dilemma Pausanias summoned the Grecian 
chiefs to his tent. After an anxious debate, the resolution 
was taken, in case Mardonius should not bring on a general 
action in the course of the day, to change their position 
In conse- during the night, when there would be no inter- 
quence of ruption from the cavalry; and to occupy the 
ance*of °the gTound Called the Island, distant about ten fur- 
Persian lougs in a direction nearly west, and seemingly 
Paula'nias Borth of the towu of Platsea, which was itself, 
determines about twenty furlougs distant. This island, im- 
in Se^* properly so denominated, included the ground 
night into comprised between two branches of the river 
the Island. Oeroe;^ both of which flow from Kithaeron, and 
after flowing for a certain time in channels about three fur- 
longs apart, form a junction and run in a north-westerly 

* Her. iz. 49, 60. Pausanias men- if he had himself seen it (is. 
tions that the Platseans restored 4, 2). 

the fountain of Gargaphia after * See a good description of the 
the victory (t6 5Su)p dvtoibaavTo) ; ground in Colonel Leake, Travels 
but he hardly seems to speak as in Northern Greece, ch. zvi. vol, 

ii. p. 35S. 


direction towards one of the recesses of the Gulf of Co- 
rinth — quite distinct from the Asdpus, which, though also 
rising near at hand in the lowest declivities under Kithee- 
ron, takes an easterly direction and discharges itself into 
the sea opposite Euhcea. When encamped in this so- 
called Island, the armj would he secure of water from the 
stream in their rear; nor would they, as now, expose an ex- 
tended breadth, of front to a numerous hostile cavalry 
separated from them only by the Asopus. * It was farther 
resolved, that so soon as the army should once be in oc- 
cupation of the Island, half of the troops should forthwith 
march onward to disengage the convoys blocked up on 
Kithaeron and conduct them to the camp. Such was the 
plan settled in council among the different Grecian chiefs; 
the march was to be commenced at the beginning of the 
second night-watch, when the enemy's cavalry would have 
completely withdrawn. 

In spite of what Mardonius is said to have determined, 
he passed the whole day without any general at- ^ . . 
tack. But his cavalry, probably elated by the of the 
recent demonstration of the Lacedaemonians, <5'«ci»n 
were on that day more daring and indefatigable e^cuting 
than ever, and inflicted much loss asv^ell as ***" "^^^^^J 
severe suffering; 2 insomuch that the centre of 
the Greek force (Corinthians, Megarians, &c., between the 
Lacedaemonians and Tegeans on the right, and the Athe- 
nians on the left), when the hour arrived for retiring to 
the Island, commenced their march indeed, but forgot or 
disregarded the preconcerted plan and the orders of Pau- 
sanias in their impatience to obtain a complete shelter 
against the attacks of the cavalry. Instead of proceed- 
ing to the. Island, they marched a distance of twenty fur- 
longs directly to the town of Plataea, and took up a posi- 
tion in front of the Herseum or temple of Here, where they 
were protected partly by the buildings, partly by the com- 
paratively high ground on which the town with its temple 
stood. Between the position which the Greeks were about 

■ Herodot; ix. 61. *£c toutov 8f) to the position of 'the two hostile 

t6v ^u>pov e^ouXeuaavTo (leTaar^vai, armies, extended front to front 

Tva xal SSaTi I^coai )rpao6at d906v({}, along the course of the Asdpns. 
xal ol iTCttiec a<pia« fiiQ otvotato, oia- * Herodot. ix. 52. xtivTjv jjiiv ttjv 

«ip xax' l9o idvTtov. flH'-^P'')'' ««ffav, itpoaxsifxsvT)? t^« Tn- 

The last -words have reference nou, tl^^ov tc6vov dxpuxov. 


to leave and that which they had resolved to occupy («. e., 
between the course of Asdpus and that of the Oeroe), there 
appear to have been a range of low hills. The Lacedaemo- 
nians, starting from the right wing, had to march directly 
over these hills, while the Athenians, from the left, were 
to turn them and get into the plain on the other side.* 
Pausanias, apprised that the divisions of the centre had 
commenced their night-march, and concluding of course 
that they would proceed to the Island according to orders, 
allowed a certain interval of time in order to prevent con- 
fusion, and then directed that the Lacedaemonians and 
Tegeans should also begin their movement towards that 
same position. But here he found himself embarrassed by 
an unexpected obstacle. The movement was retrograde, 
receding from the enemy, and not consistent with the mili- 
tary honour of a Spartan: nevertheless most of the taxi- 
archs or leaders of companies obeyed without murmuring, 
Refusal of ^^^ Amompharetus, lochage or captain of that 
the Spartan band which Herodotus calls the lochus of Pitana, * 
Anufinpha- obstinately refused. Not having been present 
retuB to at the meeting in which the resolution had been 
order *fo* taken, he now heard it for the first time with 
the night astonishment and disdain, declaring "that he for 
march. ^jjg would never so far disgrace Sparta as to run 

away from the foreigner." 3 Pausanias, with the second in 
command Euryanax, exhausted every eflFort to overcome 
his reluctance. But they could by no means induce him 
to retreat; nor did they dare to move without him, leaving 
his entire lochus exposed alone to the enemy.* 

» Herodot. Ix. 66. Ilaooavl???— plain :— MapSovio? — iffst^t iitl Aaxc- 

or)(x T^va!; dit^Y* ^** "^^^ xoXu)vu>v 6ai|xovloo« xal Tv{fr^xa^ («.ouvouc. 

ToOc Xoinoi>« itdvxar eTitovTO 84 xol 'A9T)vatooc Y&p xpanofxivoo? ic t6 nt- 

TiY«'^Tai. *AOt)vatoi 84 Tax®^"*^*^ ^^O"* ^"^^ "f*"^ Sx®***"* ^^ xaxftbpa. 

^iaav T& i{AicaXiv ^ Aaxt8ai(i.6vtot. * There is on this point a differ- 

Oi {liv 7ap TubvTC Sx^wv dvxtlxovxo ence between Thncydidds and 

xal T'^c &itu>pfl7)c toO Kt9atpu>voq. Herodotus: the former affirms that 

'AOvjvoiot 8i xdxu) Tpa(pQ4vTec e« th there never was any Spartan lo- 

it£8iov. chus so called (Thucyd. i. 21). 

With which we must combine We have no means of reconoi- 

another passage, e. 59, intimating ling the difference, nor can we be 

that the track of the Athenians certain that Thucydidds is right in 

led them to turn and get behind his negative comprehending all 

the hills, which prevented Mar* past time— o« o68' t^i'tttQ itwicoTs. 

donias from seeing them, though ' Herodot. iz. 63, 64. 

they were marching along thtt « Herodot. iz. 62, 63. 


Amidst the darkness of night, and in this scene of in- 
decision and dispute, an Athenian messenger o;i ^^^^ 
horseback reached Pausanias, instructed to ascer- Pausanias 
tain what was passing, and to ask for the last g"* *•»« 
directions. For in spite of the resolution taken exhfbited 
after formal debate, the Athenian generals still JjJ ***® 
mistrusted the Lacedaemonians, and doubted ®° *°'' 
whether, after all, they would act as they had promised. 
The movement of the central division havinff become known 
to them, they sent at the last moment before they commenced 
their own march, to assure themselves that the Spartans 
were about to move also. A profound, and even an exag- 
gerated mistrust, but too well justified by the previous 
behaviour of the Spartans towards Athens, is visible in this 
proceeding; 1 yet it proved fortunate in its results — for if 
the Athenians, satisfied with executing their part in the 
preconcerted plan, had marched at once to the Island, the 
Grecian army would have been severed without the possi- 
bility of reuniting, and the issue of the battle might have 
proved altogether different. The Athenian herald found 
the Liacedsemonians still stationary in their position, and 
the generals in hot dispute with Amompharetus, who 
despised the threat of being left alone to make head 
against the Persians, and when reminded that the re- 
solution had been taken by general vote of the officers, 
took up with both hands a vast rock fit for the hands 
of Ajax or Hektor, and cast it at the feet of Pausaniae, 
saying — "This is my pebble, wherewith I give my vote 
not to run away from the strangers." Pausanias de- 
nounced him as a madman — desiring the herald to report 
the scene of embarrassment which he had just come to 
witness, and to entreat the Athenian generals not to com- 
mence their retreat until the Lacedaemonians should also 
be in march. In the meantime the dispute continued, and 
was even prolonged by the perverseness of Amompharetus 
until the morning began to dawn; when Pausanias, afraid 
to remain longer, gave the signal for retreat — calculating 
that the refractory captain, when he saw his lochus really 
left alone, would probably make up his mind to follow. 
Having marched about ten furlongs, across the hilly ground 

« Herodot. ix. 64. 'ABiivaToi— eixov vj^fxaxot, u)« SXXa 9pov»6vTu>v xal aXXa 
ixiaxdiitvoi x& Aaxt8ai(jiovlu)v <ppo- 


which divided him from the Island, he commanded a 
Paasaniaa halt; either to await Amompharetus if he chose 
with*" t ^^ follow, or to be near enough to render aid and 
Amompha- save him, if he were rash enough to stand his 
r*e^5ir^** ground single-handed. Happily the latter, seeing 
foUows^ that his general had really departed, overcame 
him. his scruples, and followed him; overtaking and 

joining the main hody in its first halt near the river Moloeis 
and the temple of Eleusinian Demeter. i The Athenians, 
commencing their movement at the same time \f ith Pausanias, 
got round the hills to the plain on the other side and pro- 
ceeded on their march towards the Island. 

When the day hroke, the Persian cavalry were astonish- 
t igh. ®^ ^o ^^ ^^® Grecian position deserted. They 
xnent of " immediately set themselves to the pursuit of the 
Marfonius Spartans, whose march lay along the higher and 
vering that morc conspicuous ground, and whose progress 
the Greeks had moreover been retarded hy the long delay 
treated of Amompharetus: the Athenians on the con- 
^^"^f-h^* trary, marching without halt, and being already 
puMues and behind the hills, were not open to view. To 
attacks Mardonius, this retreat of his enemy inspired an 
wit? disor- extravagant and contemptuous confidence which 
deriy impa^ he . vented in full measure .to the Thessalian 
tience. AJeuadsB — "These are your boasted Spartans, 

who changed their place just now in the line, rather than 
fight the Persians, and have here shown by a barefaced 
flight what they are really worth!" With that he imme- 
diately directed his whole army to pursue and attack with 
the utmost expedition. The Persians crossed the As6pu8, 
and ran after the Greeks at their best speed, pell-meU, 
without any thought of order or preparations for over- 
coming resistance: the army already rang with shouts of vic- 
tory, in full confidence of swallowing up the fugitives as 
soon as they were overtaken. 

The Asiatic allies all followed the example of this dis- 
orderly rush forward :^ but the Thebans and the other 

* Herodot. ix. 66, 67. the reckless and disorderly manner 

* Herodot. ix. 59. iS(u>xov (i>c in which the Persians adyanced: 
«o8u>v SxaoTOC *^X^'') o^tt x6a{A<]> Plutarch, on the contrary, says of 
oOSevl «09(i.T)6rvTec, oOte x&^u Kal Mardonius — Sxu>v auvTSxaYH^ivigv 
ouTOV {liv Po^ Tt xa\ 6(i.lX(|} iri^ivav, tV)v 86va|Aiv iitt^iptto xoi^ AaxsSat- 
cuc dvapna96(itvoi Tot)« *£XX7]va(. fiovloic, Ac. (Plutarch, Aristeld.c. 17). 

Herodotus dwells especially on Plutarch also says that Pausanias 


Grecian allies on the rioht wing of Mardonius, appear to 
have maintained somewhat better order. 

Pausanias had not been able to retreat farther than 
the neighbourhood of the Demetrion or temple Battle of 
ofEleusinian Demeter, where he had halted to Piat«a- 
take up Amompharetus. Overtaken first by the Persian 
horse and next by Mardonius with the main body, he sent 
a horseman forthwith to apprise the Athenians, and to en- 
treat their aid. The Athenians were prompt in complying 
with bis request: but they speedily found themselves en- 
gaged in conflict against the Theban allies of the enemy, 
and therefore unable to reach him.i Accordingly the 
Lacedaemonians and Tegeans had to encounter the Per- 
sians single-handed without any assistance from the other 
Greeks. The Persians, on arriving within bowshot of their 
enemies, planted in the ground tha spiked extremities of 
their gerrha (or long wicker shields), forming a continuous 
breastwork, from behind which they poured upon the 
Greeks a shower of arrows: 2 their bows were of the largest 
size, and drawn with no less power than skill. In spite of 
the wounds and distress thus inflicted, Pausanias persisted 
in the indispensable duty of oifering the battle-sacrifice, 
and the victims were for some time unfavourable, so that 
he did not venture to give orders for advance and close 
combat. Many were here wounded or slain in the ranks, 3 
among' them the brave Kallikrates, the handsomest and 
strongest man in the army: until Pausanias, wearied out 
with this compulsory and painful delay, at length raised 
his eyes to the conspicuous Herseum of the Platseans, and 
invoked the merciful intervention of Here to remove that 
obstacle which confined him to the spot. Hardly had he 
pronounced the words, when the victims changed and be- 
came favourable:* buttheTegeans,whilehe was yet praying^ 

^T* "^f)^ SXXtjv 86va{Atv icpic xi? • Herodot. ix. 62. Kal roTot Aaxe- 

nXaxat&c, &c.\ which is quite Sai|xov(otoi autlxa fASxa X7)v tu)(T)v 

contrary to the real narrative of xt)v Ilauoavltu) iY^''*'^^^ Ouo|A.ivot9t xa 

Herodotus. Pausanias intended to o<pdYia xP'^'xi. Plutarch ezagge- 

march to the Island, not to Plateea: rates the long-8u£fering of Pausanias 

h3 did not reach either the one or (Aristot. c. 17, ad finem). 

the other. The lofty and conspicuous site 

1 Herodot. ix. 60, 61. of the Herseon, visible to Pausanias 

* About the Persian bow, see at the distance where he was, is 
Xenoph. Anabas. iii. 4, 17. plainly marked in Herodotus (ix. 

* Herodot. ix. 72. 6A). 


anticipated the effect and hastened forward against 
the enemy, followed by the Lacedaemonians as soon as 
Pausanias gave the word. The wicker breastwork before 
the Persians was soon overthrown by the Grecian charge : 
nevertheless the Persians, though thus deprived of their 
tutelary hedge and having no defensive armour, maintained 
the fight with individual courage, the more remarkable 
because it was totally unassisted by discipline or trained 
collective movement, against the drilled array, the regulated 
step, the well-defended persons, and the long spears, of the 
Greeks. ^ They threw themselves upon the Lacedaemonians, 
seizing hold of their spears, and breaking them : many of 
Great them devoted themselves in small parties often 

personal to force by their bodies a way into the lines, 
of*the^Per- *°^ *^ S^^ ^^ individual close combat with the 
sians— they short spear and the dagger. 2 Mardonius him- 
SoU'Jj'd"' self, conspicuous upon a white horse, was among 
and Mardo- the foremost warriors, and the thousand select 
niuB Biain. troops who formed his body-guard distinguished 

For incidents illastrating the in which 1400 half-armed Swiss 

hardships which a Grecian army overcame a large body of fully- 

endured from its reluctance to moTO armed Austrians, with an impene- 

without favourable sacrifices, see trable front of projecting spears ; 

Xenophon, Anabasis, ri. 4, 10-25; which for some time they were 

Hellenic, iii. 2, 17. unable to break in upon, until at 

' Herodot. iz. 62, 63. His words length one of their warriors^ Arnold 
about the courage of the Persians von Winkelried, grasped an arm- 
are remarkable : Xi^(xaTi (tiv vuv xal ful of spears, and precipitated him* 
pu>(i.^ oux Io90vt« '^aav ol Ilipffai* self upon them, making a way for 
avonXoi H e6vTe«, xal lepoc, dvs«i- his countrymen over his dead 
9TiQ|Aov8c ^oav, xal oux 6|xoioi Toiai body. See Vogelin, Geschichte 
evavxiotat ooflvjv . . . icXsiffxoy ^6ip der Schweizerischen Eidgenossen- 
aftac sSTjXitTO t] 8a87)c tp>]|xoc eouaa schaft, ch. vi. p. 240, or indeed any 
SitXu>v, icpo? Y"P OTtXlxa? tivTtc Y'*H'" J^isto'y of Switzerland, for a des- 
v^Ttc dYiuva iicottuvTO. Compare the cription of this memorable incident, 
striking conversation between Xer- * For the arms of the Fersiaas, 
xes and Demaratus (Herodot. viL see Herodot. vii. 61. 
104). Herodotus states in another place 

The description given by Hero- that the Persian troops adopted 

dotus of the gallant rush made by the Egyptian breastplates (Qtopt)- 

these badly-armed Persians, upon xaO: probably this may have been 

the presented line of spears in the after the battle of Platsea. Even 

Lacedaemonian ranks, may be com- at this battle, the Persian leaders 

pared with Livy (xxzii. 17), a des- on horseback had strong defensive 

cription of the Bomans attacking armour, as we may see by the case 

the Macedonian phalanx,— and with of Masistius above narrated: by 

the battle of Sempach (June, 1386)^ the time of the battle of Kunaxa^ 


themselves beyond all the rest. At length he was slain by 
the hand of a distingnished Spartan named Aeimnestus*, 
his thousand guards mostly perished around him, and the 
courage of the remaining Persians, already worn out by 
the superior troops against which they had been long 
contending, was at last thoroughly broken by the death of 
their general. They turned their backs and fled, not rest- 
ing until they got mto the wooden fortified camp, con- 
stracted by Mardonius behind the Asdpus. The Asiatic 
allies also, as soon as they saw the Persians defeated, took 
to flight without striking a blow. ^ 

The Athenians on the left, meanwhile, had been 
engaged in a serious conflict with the fioeotians; The Athe- 
especially theTheban leaders with the hoplites f*Jf '/*■* ?*• 
immediately around them, who fought with feat©d°he*" 
great bravery, but were at length driven back, Thebant. 
after the loss of 300 of their best troops. The Theban 
cavalry however still maintained a good front, protecting 
the retreat of the infantry and checking the Athenian 
pursuit, so that the fugitives were enabled to reach Thebes 
in safety; a better refuge than the Persian fortified camp.' 
With tlie exception of the Thebans and Boeotians, none 
of the other medising Greeks rendered any real service. 
Instead of sustaining or reinforcing the Thebans, they 
never once advanced to the charge, but merely followed 
in the first movement of flight. So that in point of fact 
the only troops in this numerous Perso-Grecian army who 
really fouffht, were, the native Persians and Sakae on the 
left, and the Boeotians on the right; the former against 
the Lacedaemonians, the latter against the Athenians. ^ 

Nor did even all the native Persians take part in the 
combat. A body of 40,000 men under Artabazus, of 
whom some must doubtless have been native Persians, left 
the field without fighting and without loss. That general, 
seemingly the ablest man in the Persian army, had been 
from the first disgusted with the nomination of Mardonius 
as commander-in-chief, and had farther incurred his 

the habit had become more widely * Herodot. is. 67, 68. Twv 8« 

diffased (Xenoph. Anabas. i. 8, 6; &XXu>v *£XX'^vu>v tu>v (Aeta fiatatX^oc 

Brisson, De Begno Persarum, lib. t9tXoxax86vTU>y . . . xal tu>v &XXu>v 

iii. p. 861), for the cavalry at least. ou|ji(iL(i^u)v 6 na^ SfiiXo^ o&ts Sta|j.a^8- 

* Herodot. is. 64, 66. ad|j.svoc ouStvl o&tc xx dRoS«^d|xtvoc 

* Herodot. ix, 67, 68. {(puY^''^* 

VOL. V. D 


displeasure by deprecating any general action. Apprised 
. ^ . that Mardonius was hasteninsr forward to attack 

with a largo the retreating Greeks, he marshalled his division 
Persian and led them out towards the scene of action, 
abandons though despairing of success and perhaps not 
**^ d ^'^J^*®^* very anxious that his own prophecies should be 
out of proved false. And such had been the headlong 

Greece-- impetuosity of Mardonius in his first forward 

the rest of * ,•' ii.i.' n^ /» 

the Persian uiovemeijt, — SO complete his confidence ot over- 
army take whelming the Greeks when he discovered their 
position in retreat, — that he took no pains to ensure the 
the fortified concerted action of his whole army. Accord- 
camp, ingly before Artabazus arrived at the scene 

of action, he saw the Persian troops, who had been 
engaged under the commander-in-chief, already defeated 
and in flight. Without making the least attempt either 
to save them or to retrieve the battle, he immediately 
gave orders to his own division to retreat; not repairing, 
however, either to the fortified camp or to Thebes, but 
abandoning at once the whole campaign, and taking the 
direct road through Phokis to Thessaly, Macedonia, and 
the Hellespont. 1 

As the native Persians, the SaksB, and the Boeotians 

Small ro- ^®^® ^^® ^^^7 ^®*^ combatants on the one side, 
portion of SO also were the Lacedaemonians, Tegeans, and 
on^eaS^^* Athenians, on the other. It has already been 
tide which mentioned that the central troops of the Grecian 
r*^ M *rmy, disobeying the general order of march, 

^"* * had gone during the night to the town of 
Platsea instead of to the Island. They were thus completely 
severed from Pausanias, and the first thing which they 
heard about the 43attle was, that the Lacedsemonians were 
gaining the victory. Elate with this news, and anxious 
to com« in for some share of the honour, they rushed to 
the scene of action, without any heed of military order: 
the Corinthians taking the direct track across the hills, 
while the Megarians, jPhliasians and others, marched by 
the longer route along the plain, so as to turn the hills, 
And arrive at the Athenian position. The Theban horse 
under Asopodorus, employed in checking the pursuit of 
the victorious Athenian hoplites, seeing these fresh troops 
coming up in thorough disorder, charged them vigorously 

4 Herodot. ix. 66. 





and drove them back, to take refuse in the high ground, 
with the loss of 600 men.^ But tnis partial success had 
no effect in mitigating the general defeat. 

Following up their pursuit, the Lacedaemonians 
proceeded to attack the wooden redoubt The Greek 
wherein the Persians had taken refuge. But J*^°\^J* 
though they were here aided by all or most of fortified 
the central Grecian divisions, who had taken no «*™p* 
part in the battle, they were yet so ignorant of the mode 
of assailing walls, that they made no progress, and were 
completely baffled, until the Athenians arrived to their 
assistance. The redoubt was then stormed, not without a 
gallant and prolonged resistance on the part of its 
defenders. The Tegeans, being the first to penetrate into 
the interior, plundered the rich tent of Mardonius, whose 
manger for his horses, made of brass, remained long after- 
wards exhibited in their temple of Athene Alea — while 
his silver-footed throne, and scimitar, ^ were preserved in 
the acropolis of Athens, along with the breastplate of 
Masistius. Once within the wall, effective resistance 
ceased, and the Greeks slaughtered without mercy as well 
as without limit; so that if we are to credit Herodotus, 
there survived only 3000 men out of the 300,000 which 
had composed the army of Mardonius — save and except 
the 40,000 men who accompanied Artabazus in his retreat. ^ 

E;especting these numbers, the historian had probably 
little to give except some vague reports, without any 
pretence of computation: about the Grecian loss his 
statement deserves more attention, when he tells us that 
there perished ninety-one Spartans, sixteen Tegeans, and 
fifty-two Athenians. Herein however is not included the 
loss of the Megarians when attacked by the Theban cavalry, 

A Herodot. Iz. 69. Persians at Platcea— yery justly. 

s Herodot. ix. 70 ; Demosthends Dr. Blomfield is surprised at this 

cent. Timokrat. p. 741. c. 33. Pan-' compliment; but it is to be recol- 

sanias (i. 27, 2) doubts whether leoted that all the earlier part of 

this was really the scimitar of the tragedy had been employed in 

Mardonius, contending that the setting forth the glory of Athens 

Lacedaemonians would never hare at Salamis, and he might well 

permitted the Athenians to take afford to give the Peloponnesians 

it. the credit which they deserved at 

' Herodot. iz. 70: compare Flateea. Pindar distributes the 

^schyl. Pers. 805-824. He singles honour between Sparta and Athens 

out «the Dorian spear" as the in like manner (Pyth. L 76). 
great weapon of destruction to tha 


fg"'^igTfiiB^f^T~~'=^:irr^'^^^""niiinn~~T'TiTn-'~ •• 't _— '^^^-~^-— —-'^^-^^^■t^— ■' -""■■ -i - i ^i ■ u. , ■ ..i 


nor is the number of slain Lacedaemonians; not Spartans, 
liOBs on specified: while even the other numbers actually 
both sides, stated are decidedly smaller than the probable 
truth, considering the multitude of Persian arrows and 
the unshielded right side of the Grecian hoplite. On the 
i^hole^ the affirmation of Plutarch; that not less than 1360 
Greeks were slain in the action appears probable: all 
doubtless hoplites — for little account was then made of 
the light-armed, nor indeed are we told that they took 
any active part in the battle, i "Whatever may have been 
the numerical loss of the Persians, this defeat proved the 
total ruin of their army: but we may fairly presume that 
many were spared and sold into slavery, 2 while many of 
the fugitives probably found means to join the retreating 
division of Artabazus. That general made a rapid march 
across Thessaly and Macedonia, keeping strict silence 
about the recent battle, and pretending to be sent on a 
special enterprise by Mardonius, whom he reported to be 
himself approaching. If Herodotus is correct (though it 
may well be doubted whether the change of sentiment in 
Thessaly and the other medising Grecian states was so 
rapid as he implies), Artabazus succeeded in traversing 
these countries before the news of the battle became 
generally known, and then retreated by the straightest 
and shortest route through the interior of Thrace to 
Byzantium, from whence he passed into Asia. The interior 
tribes, unconquered and predatory, harassed his retreat 
considerably; but we shall find long afterwards Persian 
garrisons in possession of many principal places on the 
Thracian coast. 3 It will be seen that Artabazus sub- 
sequently rose higher than ever in the estimation of 

> Plutarch, Ariflteidds, e. 19. qaarter or take any prisoners (id. 

Eleidemus, quoted by Plutarch, 32); but this is hardly to be be- 

stated that all the fifty-two Athe- lieyed, in spite of his assertion* 

nians who perished belonged to His statement that the Greeks 

the tribe iBantis, which distinguish- lost 10,000 men is still less ad- 

ed itself in the Athenian ranks, missible. 

But it seems impossible to believe > Herodot. ix. 89. The allusions 

that no citizens belonging to the of Demosthends to Perdikkas king 

other nine tribes were ki.led. of Macedonia, who is said to have 

' Diodorus indeed states that attacked the Persians on their 

Pausanias was so apprehensive of flight from Plateea, and to have 

the numbers of the Persians, that rendered their ruin complete, are 

he forbade' his soldiers to give too loose to deserve attention ; 


Ten days did the Greeks employ after their victory, 
first in burying the slain, next in collecting and Fanerai 
apportioning the booty. The Lacedaemonians, ?**'JJ"*®* 
th« Athenians, the Tegeans, the Megarians and Greeks— 
the Phliasians each buried their dead apart, monumentt 
erecting a separate tomb in commemoration, body of 
The Lacedaemonians, indeed, distributed their ^J^*^i^* 
dead into three fractions, in three several burial- tion of 
places: one for those champions who enjoyed i»ooty. 
individual renown at Sparta, and among whom were in- 
cluded the most distinguished men slain in the recent battle, 
such as Poseidonius, Amompharetus the refractory* captain, 
Philokyon, and Kallikrat^s — a second for the otner Spar- 
tans and Lacedaemonians 1 — and a third for the Helots. 
Besides these sepulchral monuments, erected in the neigh- 
bourhood of Plataea by those cities whose citizens had 
really fought and fallen, there were several similar monu- 
ments to be seen in the days of Herodotus, raised by other 
cities which falsely pretended to the same honour, with the 
connivance and aid of the Plataeans.^ The body of Mardo- 
uius was discovered among the slain, and treated with 
respect by Pausanias, who is even said to have indignantly 
repudiated advice offered to him by an -^ginetan, that he 
should retaliate upon it the ignominious treatment inflicted 
by Xerxes upon the dead Leonidas.3 On the morrow the 

more especially as Perdikkas was possible to arrire at any certainty : 

not then king of Macedonia (De- we do not know by what name 

mosthengs cont. Aristokrat. p. 687. these select warriors were called. 

c. 61 ; and icepl Suvxa^etoc, p . 173. * Herodot. ix. 86. Tu)v S' SXXu)v 

e. 9). Soot xal (potlvowai iv IlXaxat^ai £6v- 

' Herodot. ix. 84. Herodotus Te? Td9oi, to6too? 64, u)« ifix) 

indeed assigns this second burial-, iicei9xu'>'<>M^^*'( "^Ti 

place only to the other Spartan8f diceotoi t^c ixdj^T]?, ixdaxou? x"*{xaTa 

apart from the Select. He takes ^u)oai xeivd, xtbv eictytvotievtov 

no notice of the Lacedeemonians ttvexsv dv9pu>7iu)v' iicel xal AlYivt)- 

not Spartans, either in the battle xituv ijxl aOx69i xaXe6(<.evoc xdcpoc, 

or in reference to burial, though x6v eY«> dxo6u) xal 8ixa Ixeai Soxe- 

he had informed us that 6000 of pov (lexd xauxa, Ss7]8dvxu>v xu>v Al- 

them were included in the army. YivTjxicuv, yibaai KXed57)v x6v Aoxo- 

Some of them must have been Sixou, dvSpa IlXaxaida, icp6^eivov 

slain, and we may fairly presume t6vxa aOxu>v. 

that they were buried along with This is a curious statement, de- 

the Spartan citizens generally, rived by Herodotus doubtless 

As to the word Ipeac, or eipsvacj or from personal inquiries made at 

iicxeac (the two last being both Plateea. 

conjectural readings), it seems im- * Her. ix. 78, 79. This suggestion 


body was stolen away and buried; by whom was never 
certainly known, for there were many different pretenders 
who obtained reward on this plea from ArtyntSs, the son of 
Mardonius. The funereal monument was yet to be seen in 
the time of Pausauias. ^ 

The spoil was rich and multifarious — gold and silver 
in Darics as well as in implements and ornaments, carpets, 
splendid arms and clothing, horses, camels, &c., even the 
magnificent tent of Xerxes, left on his retreat with Mardo- 
nius, was included. 2 By order of the general Pausanias, 
the Helots collected all the valuable articles into one spot 
for division; not. without stealing many of the golden 
ornaments, which, in ignorance of the value, they were 
persuaded by the -^ginetans to sell as brass. After reser- 
ving a tithe for the Delphian Apollo, together with ample 
offerings for the Olympic Zeus and the Isthmian Poseidon, 
as well as for Pausanias as general — the remaining booty 
was distributed among the different contingents of the 
army in proportion to their respective numbers.' The 
concubines of the Persian chiefs were among the prizes 
distributed: there were probably however among them 

80 abhorrent to Grecian feel- —which has more the air of a poet- 

ing, is put by the historian ical contrivance for bringing out 

into the mouth of the JEginetan an* honourable sentiment, than of 

Lampdn. In mj preceding note a real incident. But there seems 

I have alluded to another state- no reason to doubt the truth of 

mentmade by Herodotus, not very the other two stories. Herodotus 

creditable to the ^ginetans: there does but too rarely specify his 

is moreover a third (is. 80), in informants: it is interesting to 

which he represents them as hav- scent out the track in which his 

ing cheated the Helots, in their inquiries haye been prosecuted, 

purchases of the booty. We may After the battle of Kunaxa, and 

presume him to have hesfrd all the death of Gyrus the younger, 

these anecdotes at Flateea: at the his dead body had the head and 

time when he probably visited that hands cut off, by order of Arta- 

place, not long before the Pelo- zerxes, and nailed to a cross 

ponnesian war, the inhabitants (Xenoph. Anab. i. 10, 1; iii. 1, 

were united in the most intimate 17). 

manner with Athens, and doubt- > Herodot, ix. 84 ; Pausanias, ix. 

less sympathised in the hatred of 2, 2. 

the Athenians against iBgina. It * Herodot. ix. 80, 81 : compare vii. 

does not from hence follow that 41-83. 

the stories are all untrue. I dis- ' Diodorus (xi. 88) states this 
believe, indeed, the advice said to proportional distribution. Hero- 
have been given by Lampdn to dotus only says — eXaf)ov Ixaaxoi tu>v 
crucify the body of Mardonius &^ioi ^aav (ix. 81). 

Chap. XIjU. 



many of Grecian birth, restored to their families ; and one 
especially, overtaken in her chariot amidst the flying Per- 
sians, with rich jewels and a numerous suite, threw herself 
at the feet of Fausanias himself, imploring his protection* 
She proved to be the daughter of his personal friend Hege- 
torides of Kos, carried off by the Persian Fharandat^; 
and he had the satisfaction of restoring her to her father. ^ 
Large as the booty collected was, there yet remained many 
valuable treasures buried in the ground, which the Plataean 
inhabitants afterwards discovered and appropriated. 

The real victors in the battle of Plataea were the 
Lacedaemonians, Athenians and Tegeans. The Corinthians 
and others, forming part of the army opposed to Mardonius, 
did not reach the neld until the battle was ended, though 
they doubtless aided both in the assault of the fortified 
camp and in the subsequent operations against Thebes, and 
were universally recognised, in inscriptions and panegyrics, 
among the champions who had contributed to the liberation 
of Greece.2 It was not till after the taking of the Persian 
camp that the contingents of Elis and Mantineia, who may 
perhaps have been among the convoys prevented by the 
Persian cavalry from descending the passes of Kithseron, 
first reached the scene of action. Mortified at having 

« Herodot. ix. 76, 80, 81, 83. Th« 
fate of these female companions 
of the Persian grandees, on the 
taking of the camp by an enemy, 
forms a melancholy picture here 
as well as at Issns, and even at 
Kanaxa: see Diodor. zvii. 86; 
Quintns Gortins, iii xi. 21; Ze- 
noph. Anab. L 10, 2. 

* Plutarch animadrerts seyerely 
(De Malign. Herodot. p. 878 ; com- 
pare Pint. Aristeid. c. 19) npon 
Herodotus, because he states that 
none of the Greeks had any share 
in the battle of Platsea except the 
liacedsemonians, Tegeans, and 
Athenians: the orator Lysias re* 
peats the same statement (Oratio 
Funebr. o. 9). If this were the fact 
(Plutarch asks) how comes it that 
the inscriptions and poems of the 
time recognise the exploit as per- 
formed by the whole Qreciau army, 

Corinthians and others included f 
But these inscriptions do not re> 
ally contradict what is affirmed by 
Herodotus. The actual battle was 
fought only by a part of the col- 
lective Grecian army ; but this hap- 
pened in a great measure by acci- 
dent; the rest were little more 
than a mile off, and until within 
a few hours had been occupying 
part of the same continuous line 
of position : moreover, if the battle 
had lasted a little longer, they 
would have come up in time to 
render actual help. They would 
naturally be considered, therefore, 
as entitled to partake in the glory 
of the entire result. 

When however in after-times a 
stranger visited Platsea, and saw 
Lacedaemonian, Tegean, and Athe- 
nian tombs, but no Corinthian nor 
iBginetan, dto., he would naturally 


missed their share in the glorious exploit, the new-comers 
were at first eager to set off in pursuit of Artabazus: but 
the Lacedaemonian commander forbade them, and they 
returned home without any other consolation than that of 
banishing their generals for not having led them forth more 
promptly, i 

There yet remained the most efficientally of Mardoniuf 
Fansanias — ^^^ ^i^J ^f Thebes ; which Fausanias summonei 
summons on the eleventh day after theJ^attle, requiring 
requixing ^^*^ ^^® medistng leaders should be delivered up 
thesurrend- especially Timegenidas and Attaginus. On re- 
the^'ieaders ceiving a refusal, he began to batter their walls, 
—these men and to adopt the still more effective measure o\ 
selve^u™* laying waste their territory; giving notice that 
and are put the work of destruction would be continued until 
to death. these chiefs were given up. After twenty days 
of endurance, the chiefs at length proposed, if it should 
prove that Fausanias peremptorily required their persons 
and refused to accept a sum of money in commutation, to 
surrender themselves voluntarily as tne price of liberation 
for their country. A negociation was accordingly entered 
into with Fausanias, and the persons demanded were sur- 
rendered to him, excepting Attaginus, who found means to 
escape at the last moment. His sons, whom he left behind, 
were delivered up as substitutes, but Fausanias refused to 
touch them, with the just remark, which in those times 
was even generous, ^ that they were nowise implicated in 
the medism of their father. Timegenidas and the remaining 
prisoners were carried off to Corinth and immediately put 
to death, without the smallest discussion or form of trial: 
Fausanias was apprehensive that if any delay or consulta- 
tion were granted, their wealth and that of their friends 
would effectually purchase voices for their acquittal, — 
indeed the prisoners themselves had been induced to give 
themselves up partly in that expectation. ^ It is remarkable 

enquire how it happened that none individual Platasans* 
of these latter had fallen in the * Herodot. iz. 77. 
battle, and would then be informed * See, a little above in this chap- 
that they were not really present ter, the treatment of the wife and 
at it. Hence the motive for these children of the Athenian senator 
cities to erect empty sepulchral Lykidas (Herodot. ix. 6). CompskTe 
monuments on the spot, as Hero- also Herodot. iii. 116; ix. 120, 
dotus informs us that they after- * Herodot. Ix. 87, 88. 
wards did or caused to be done by 


that Pausanias himself only a few years afterwards, when 
attainted of treason, returned and surrendered himself at 
Sparta under similar hopes of being able to buy himself off 
by money. ^ In this hope indeed he found himself deceived, 
as Timegenidas had been deceived before: but the fact is 
not the less to be noted as indicating the general impression 
that the leading men in a Grecian city were usually open 
to bribes in jumcial matters, and that individuals superior 
to this temptation were rare exceptions. I shall have 
occasion to dwell upon this recognised untrustworthiness 
of the leading Greeks when I come to explain the extreme- 
ly p op ular cast of the Athenian judicature. 

Whether there was any positive vote taken among the 
Greeks respecting the prize of valour at the Honour* 
battle of Piatsea may well be doubted: and the anddistine- 
silence of Herodotus goes far to negative an **^o* ^^^ 
important statement of Plutarch, that the Athe- Greek war- 
nians and Lacedsemonians were on the point of '^°'*' 
coming to an open rupture, each thinking themselves 
entitled to the prize — that Aristeides appeased the Athe- 
nians, and prevailed upon them to submit to the general 
decision of the -allies — and that Megarian and Connthian 
leaders contrived to elude the dangerous rock by bestowing 
the prize on the Plataeans, to which proposition both 
Aristeides and Pausanias acceded. > But it seems that the 
general opinion recognised the LacedsBmonians and Pausa- 
nias as bravest among the brave, seeing that they had 
overcome the best troops of the enemy and slain the general. 
In burying their dead warriors, the Lacedeemonians singled 
out for peculiar distinction Philokyon, Poseidonius, and 
Amompharetus the lochage, whose conduct in the fight 
atoned for his disobedience to orders. There was one 
Spartan howeverwho had surpassed them all — Aristodemus, 
the single survivor of the troop of Leonidas at Thermopylae. 
Having ever since experienced nothing but disgrace and 

' Thucyd. i. 131. xal ici9Tet»u>v their country : also e. 49 of the 
Xpni.^ai 8iaX69eiv tI|v Sia^oXi^v. same book about the Lacedeemo- 
Compare Thucyd. yiii. 45, where nian general Astyochus. The bribes 
he states that the trierarchs and received by the Spartan kings Leo- 
generals of the Lacedemonian and tychidds and Pleiatoanax are re- 
allied fleet (all except Hermokratds corded (Herodot. yi. 7S; Thucyd. 
of Syracuse) reoeired bribes from ii. 21). 

Tissaphernes to betray the inter- ' Plutarch, Aristeides, c. 20; De 

eats both of their seamen and of Herodot. Malign, p. 873. 

42 HISTOBT or GBEBCE. Paet H. 

insult from his fellow-citizens, this unfortunate man had 
become reckless of life, and at Plataea he stepped forth 
single-handed from his place in the ranks, performing deeds 
of the most heroic valour and determined to regain by his 
death the esteem of his countrymen. But the Spartans 
refused to assign to him the same funereal honours as 
were paid to the other distinguished warriors, who had 
manifested exemplary forwardness and skill, yet without 
any desperate rashness, and without any previous taint 
such as to render life a burthen to them. Subsequent 
valour might be held to eflFace this taint, but could not 
suffice to exalt Aristodemus to a level with the most 
honoured citizens.* 

But though we cannot believe the statement of Plutarch 
that the Plataeans received by general vote the 
tiar^tribute P^ize of valour, it is certain that they were 
to Piat»a, largely honoured and recompensed, as the pro- 
scene^ of prietors of that ground on which the liberation 
the victory, of Greece had been achieved. The market-place 
piatcean?:^ and Centre of their town was selected as the 
solemnities scene for the solemn sacrifice of thanksgiving, 
beTerio- ° offered up by Pausanias after the battle, to Zeus 
dicaiiy ce- Eleutherius, in the name and presence of all the 
by^the^*^ assembled allies. The local gods and heroes of 
later, in the Platseau territory, who had been invoked in 
the* s?ain.' Player before the battle, and who had granted 
their soil as a propitious field for the Greek 
arms, were made partakers of the ceremony, and witnesses 
as well as guarantees of the engagements with which it was 
accompanied. 2 The Plataeans, now re-entering their city, 
which the Persian invasion had compelled them to desert, 
were invested with the honourable duty of celebrating the 
periodical sacrifice in commemoration of this great victory, 
as well as of rendering care and religious service at the 
tombs of 4he fallen warriors. As an aid to enable them to 
discharge this obligation, which probably might have pressed 
hard upon them at a time when their city was half-ruined 
and their fields unsown, they received out of the prize- 
money the large allotment of eighty talents, which was 
partly employed in building and adorning a handsome 

* Herodot. iz. 71, 72. his troops had recently been vie- 

u « Thucyd. ii. 71, 7?. So the Ho- torious, "instaurabat sacrum Diis 

man Emperor Vitellius, on visit- loci" (Tacitus, Histor. ii. 70). 
ing the field of Bebriacum where 


temple of Ath^n^ — the symbol probably of renewed con- 
nexion with Athens. They undertook to render religious 
honours every year to the tombs of the warriors, and to 
celebrate in every fifth year the grand public solemnity of 
the Eleutheria with gymnastic matches analogous to the 
other great festival games of Greece. ^ In consideration 
of the discharge of these duties, together with the sanctity 
of the ground, I^ausanias and the whole body of allies bound 
themselves by oath to guarantee the autonomy of Platsea, 
and the inviolability of her territory. This was an eman- 
cipation of the town from the bond of the Boeotian federa- 
tion, and from the enforcing supremacy of Thebes as its . ^ 

But the engagement of the allies appears to have had 
other objects also, larger than that of protecting Pennanent * 

Plataea, or establishing commemorative ceremo- Grecian 
nies. The defensive league affainst the Persians acy^decreed * 

was again sworn to by all of tnem, and rendered by the 
permanent. An aggregate force of 1 0,00 hoplites, Joid* me*e*t- 
1000 cavalry, and 100 triremes, for the purpose ings at 
of carrying on the war, was agreed to and pro- ^^**®*' 
mised, the contingent of each ally being specified. Moreover 
the town of Platsea was fixed on as the annual place of 
meeting, where deputies from all of them were annually to 
assemble. 2 

This resolution is said to have been adopted on the 
proposition of Aristeides, whose motives it is not difficult ' 

to trace. Though the Persian army had sustained a * 

signal defeat, no one knew how soon it might re-assemble, 
or be reinforced. Indeed, even later, after the battle of 
Mykale had become known, a fresh invasion of the Persians > 

was still regarded as not improbable; 3 nor did any one then 
anticipate that extraordinary fortune and activity whereby 
the Athenians afterwards organized an alliance such as to 
throw Persia on the defensive. Moreover, th^ northern 

' Thncyd. il. 71 ; Plutarch, Aria- honour of the deceased, took place 

teidds, c. 19-21; Btrabo, iz. p. 412; on the sixteenth of the Attic month 

Pausanias, iz. 2, 4. Msemaktdrion. K. P. Hermann 

The Eleutheria were celebrated (GottesdieDstliche Alterthiimer der 

on the fourth of the Attic month Griechen, ch. 63, note 9) has treat - 

Boedromion, which was the day ed these two celebrations as if they 

on which the battle itself was were one. 

fought; while the annual decoration ' PIutarc{i,f Aristeidds, c. 21. 

of the tombs, and ceremonies in * Thucyd. i. 90. 


44 HI8T0BY OF OBEEOB. Pabt U. 

half of Greece was still medisingt either in reality or in 
appearance, and new eflfbrts on the part of Xerxes might 
probably keep up his ascendency in those parts. Now 
assuming the war to be renewed, Aristeides and the Athe- 
nians had the strongest interest in providing a line of 
defence which should cover Attica as well as Peloponnesus; 
and in preventing the Peloponnesians from confining them- 
selves to their Isthmus, as they had done before. To take 
advantage for this purpose of the new-bom reverence and 
gratitude which now bound the Lacedaemonians to Flatsea, 
was an idea eminently suitable to the moment; though the 
unforeseen subsequent start of Athens, combined with other 
events, prevented both the extensive alliance and the 
inviolability of Platsea, projected by Aristeides, from taking 
effect. * 

On the same day that Pausanias and the Grecian land 
Proceed- SkTmy Conquered at Platsea, the naval armament 
ings of under Leotychides and Xanthippus was engaged 
fleetf'u'^**^ in operations hardly less important at Mykal^ 
moves to on the Asiatic coast. The Grecian commanders 
o^^Samo^* of the fleet (which numbered 110 triremes), 
from the having advanced as far as Delos, were afraid to 
Persians. proceed farther eastward, or to undertake any 

> It is to this general and solemn forty years after the battle, tried 

meeting, held at Platsea after the to convoke a Pan-Hellenic assem- 

victory, that we might probably bly at Athens, for the purpose of 

refer another vow noticed by the deliberating what should be done 

historians and orators of the sub- with these temples (Plutarch, Pe- 

eequent century, if that vow were riklds, c. 17). Yet Theopompus 

not of suspicious authenticity, pronounced this alleged oath to 

The Greeks, while promising faith- be a fabrication, though both the 

ful attachment, and continued orator Lykurgus and Diodorus 

peaceful dealing among themselves, profess to report it verbatim. We 

and engaging at the same time may safely assert that the oath, 

to amerce in a tithe of their pro- as they give it, is not genuine ; but 

perty all who had mediaed — are perhaps the vow of tithing those 

said to have vowed that they would who had voluntarily joined Xer- 

not repair or rebuild the temples xes, which Herodotus refers to an 

which the Persian invader had earlier period, when success was 

burnt ; but would leave them in doubtful, may not have been renew- 

their half-ruined condition as a ed in the moment of victory : 

monument of his sacrilege. Some see Diodor. is. 29 ; Lykurgus cont. 

of the injured temples near Athens Leokrat. c. 19, p. 193 ; Polybius, ix. 

were seen in their half-burnt state 88; Isokratds, Or. iv. ; Panegyr. o. 

even by the traveller Pausanias 41, p. 74 ; Theopompus, Fragm. 167| 

(X. 35, 2), in his time. Periklds, ed. Didotj Suidas, v. Atxatsutiv, 


offensive operations against the Persians at Samos, for the 
rescue of Ionia — although Ionian envoys, especially from 
Chios and Samos, had urgently solicited aid both at Sparta 
and at Delos. Three Samians, one of them named Hegesis* 
tratus, came to assure Leotychides, that their countrymen 
were ready to revolt from the despot Theomestor, whom 
the Persians had installed there, so soon as the Greek fleet 
should appear off the island. In spite of emphatic appeals 
to the community of reliffion and race, Leotychides was 
long deaf to the entreaty ; but his reluctance gradually gave 
way before the persevering earnestness of the orator. 
While yet not thoroughly determined, he happened to ask 
the Samian speaker what was his name. To which the 
latter replied, "Segesistratus, i. e. army-leader." "I accept 
Hegesistratus as an omen (replied Leotychides, struck with 
the significance of this name), pledge thou thy faith to 
accompany us — let thy companions prepare the Samians 
to receive us, and we will go forthwith." Engagements 
were at once exchanged, and while the other two envoys 
were sent forward to prepare matters in the island, Hegesis- 
tratus remained to conduct the fleet, which was farther 
encouraged by favourable sacrifices, and by the assurances 
of the prophet Deiphonus, hired from the Corinthian colony 
of Apollonia. i 

When they reached the Heraeum nearKalami inSamos,' 
and had prepared themselves for a naval engage- ^he Persian 
ment, they discovered that the enemy's fleet had fleet aban- 
already been withdrawn from the island to the ^Sd'retiJe^s' 
neighbouring continent. For the Persian com- to Mykaie 
manders had been so disheartened with the ^^ ^om^. 

Cicero de Bepablic&, iii. 9, and and interesting (Herodot. iz. 93, 

the beginning of the chapter last 94). Euenins, as a recompense for 

bnt one preceding, of this His- haying been unjustly blinded by 

tory. his countrymen, had received from 

' Herodot. iz. 91, 92, 95 ; viii. the gods the grant of prophecy 

132, 133. The prophet of Mardo- transmissible to his descendants : 

nius at Plataea bore the name— He- a new prophetic family was thus 

gesistratus : and was probably the created, alongside of the lamids, 

more highly esteemed for it (He- Telliads, Elytiads, Ac. 

rodot. iz. 37). « Herodot. iz. 96. iitel 8i lyi- 

Biodorus states the fleet as com- vovto t^< SapilTjc icpi; KaXdpLoiat^ 

prising 250 triremes (zi. 34). ol {x4v aixoo 6pfji.i(j<i|xevoi x at a to 

The anecdotes respecting the 'H pa lov t6 Ta6T^, napsaxsudCovto 

ApoUoniate Euenius, the father of i^ vau{xa^(T]v. * 

Deiphonus, will be found curious It is by no means certain that 


defeat of Salamis that they were not disposed to fight again 
at sea: we do not know the numbers of their fleet, but 
perhaps a considerable proportion of it may have consisted 
of Ionic Greeks, whose fidelity was now very doubtful. 
Having abandoned the idea of a sea-fight, they permitted 
their x*hoenician squadron to depart, and sailed with their 
remaining fleet to the promontory of Mykale near Miletus, i 
Here they were under the protection of a land-force of 
60,000 men, under the command of Tigranes — the main 
reliance of Xerxes for the defence of Ionia. The ships 
were dragged ashore, and a rampart of stones and stakes 
was erected to protect them, while the defending army lined 
the shore, and seemed amply sufficient to repel attack from 
seaward. 2 

It was not long before the Greek fleet arrived. Dis- 
appointed of their intention of fighting, by the flight of the 
Mistrust enemy from Samos, they had at first proposed 
fid *iit f ®i^^®^ *o return home, or to turn aside to the 
the lonians Hellespont: but they were at last persuaded by 
b^*th**^^*^ the Ionian envoys to pursue the enemy's fleet 
Persian and again offer battle at Mykald. On reaching 
generals. that point, they discovered that the Persians 
had abandoned the sea, intending to fight only on land. So 
much had the Greeks now become emboldened, that they 
ventured to disembark and attack the united land-force and 
sea-force before them. But since much of their chance of 
success depended on the desertion of the lonians, the first 
proceeding of Leotychides was, to copy the previous 
manoeuvro of Themistokles, when retreating from Arte- 
misium, at the watering-places of Euboea. Sailing along 

the Hereeum here indicated is the gnage of Herodotus, we may sup- 

celebrated temple which stood pose that Geeson was the name of 

near the city of Samos (iii. 80): a town as well as of a river 

the words ofHerodotus rather seem (Euphorus ap. Athenae. vi. p. 311). 

to indicate that another temple of The eastern promontory (Gape 

Hdrd, in some other part of the Poseidion) of Samos was separated 

island, is intended. only by seven stadia from Mykald 

' Herodotus describes the Per- (Strabo, ziv. p. 637), near to the 

sian position by topographical in- place where Glaukd was situated 

dications known to his readers, (Thucyd. yiii. 79)— modern obser- 

but not open to be determined by vers make the distance rather more 

us— Geeson, Skolopoeis, the chapel than a mile (Poppo, Prolegg. ap. 

of Ddmdtdr, built by Philistus one Thucyd. vol. ii. p. 466). 

of the primitive colonists of Mi- * Herodot. iz. 96, 97* 
letuB, &c. (is. 96): from the Ian- 


close to the coast, he addressed; through a herald of loud 
Yoice, earnest appeals to the lonians among the enemy to 
revolt ; calculating, even if they did not listen to him, that 
he should at least render them mistrusted hy the Persians. 
He then disemharked his troops, and marshalled them for 
the purpose of attacking the Persian camp on land: while 
the Persian generals, surprised hy this daring manifestation 
and suspecting, either from his manoeuvre, or from previous 
evidences, that the lonians were in secret collusion with 
him, ordered the Samian contingent to he disarmed, and 
the Milesians to retire to the rear of the army, for the 
purpose of occupying the various mountain roads up to the 
summit of Mykale — with which the latter were familiar as 
a part of their own territory. * 

Serving as these Greeks in the fleet were, at a distance 
firom their own homes, and having left a powerful army of 
Persians and Greeks under Mardonius in Boeotia, they were 
of course full of anxiety lest his arms might prove The Greeks 
victorious and extinguish the freedom of their ^^^^ *J ***• 
country. It was under these feelings of solicitude Persian* 
for their absent brethren that they dis- ashore— re- 
embark^ and were made ready for attack by Jh^ vSo?/ 
the afternoon. But it was the afternoon of an of Piat«a, 
ever-memorable day — the fourth of the month fheL* coun- 
Boedromion (about September), 479 b. a By a tj^men on 
remarkable coincidence, the victory of Plataea mornfng* is 
in Boeotia had been gained by Pausanias that commum- 
very morning. At the moment when the Greeks JJem before 
were advancing to the charge, a divine PhemS the battle. 
or message flew into the camp. Whilst a herald*s staff 
was seen floated to the shore by the western wave, the 
symbol of electric transmission across the JSgean — the 
revelation, sudden, simultaneous, irresistible, struck at 
once upon the minds of all, as if the multitude had one 
common soul and sense, acquainting them that on that 
very morning their countrymen in Boeotia had gained 
a complete victory over Mardonius. At once the previ- 
ous anxiety was dissipated, and the whole army, full of 
joy and confidence, charged with redoubled energy. Such 
is the account given by Herodotus, 2 and doubtless 

■ Herodot. iz. 98, 99, 104. i< ^6 aTpatiitcSov icav, xal 

» Herodot. ix. 100, 101. looai 54 nTjpuxigiov t^dtvTj in\ t^« xupiaTtuY'^c 

48 HI8T0BT OF OBBKCB. Tabt H. 

universally accepted in his time, when the combatants of 
Mykale were alive to tell their own story. He moreover 

«&8t, u>c ol 'EXXT)vec t^jv MapSovlou human speaker or Informant — ^v 

aTpaTiif)v vixi^tv iv Boitotl^ V'^^y^^V^*' "^^^ "^^^ etic^ai ppoTu>v, ^ 'Oaaav dxou- 

voi. A'ijXa 6ij noXXotai xexftiQploial ff-j; *Ex Ai6c, ^xt |i,dXiffTa <pipti 

iffTt T& Oeta Tu>v icpT)Y|A.dlTu>v* cl xocl xXioc dvOptbicoiai ; and Odyss. xxiv. 

rixt tr^t: afix-^c "^M-^pic ao|i,7cticT0UffiQc *12. 'Oatfa 8^ 4p* dYjeXoc wxa xarot 

TOO T« 8v nXarai^at x«l too 4v Mo- icT6Xtv tpx**"* «4>'T11, Mvijan^pcov oto- 

xdcX^ |jt.iXXovToc ioeaOat Tpu>|A.aT0Cy y'P^^ OavocTov xal x^p' iviicooaa. The 

91QIA.1] Toiai "EXXtjji Totai xaOt^ iva- word xX^Stuv is used in the same 

iclxsTO, w9Tt 6apai]9al xt xVjv oxpoc- meaning by Sophoklfts, Philoktet. 

xiTjv icoXXq) |A.dXXov, xal iO^Xeiv icpo- 255: KX^8u>v at Smyrna had altars 

0o{i6xepov xiv8ove6etv . . . •jt-jo^titai as a goddess, Aristeidfts, Drat. 3tl. 

(Si vlx7)v xd>v |Jt.tx& Ilaoaatvitu) *£XXi^- p. 607. ed. Dindorf, p. 764 (see An- 

vu)v dpOu>< 991 ^ V^M>il 90vi- dokidfis de Mysteriis, c. 22, p. 64) ; 

Pocivc iXOooaa* x6 (liv yap iv Herodotus in the passage now be- 

nXaxociiQai icpu)t ixi xij^ ijpiipTic fore us considers the two as identi- 

iYlvcTO' x6 tk iv MuxdX^, icepl SelXvjv cal — eompate also Herodot. ▼. 72. 

. . . ^v 8i d^^SlT) 9f I icplv xi^v 9i^(JiT]v Both words are used also to signify 

ftoanixiaOai) o6xt ictpl (r9iu>v adxu>v an oknen conveyed by some unde* 

o3xu>, u>c xu>v ^EXX-i^vtov, p.ii ictpl signed human word or speech, 

MapSovlcp icxaiai] f) 'EXXic* u>< fiiivxoi which in that particular case is 

7) xX^fituv aSx'v) 991 ioiicxaxo, considered as determined by the 

ftaXXov XI xal xoc^^xepov x^v icpdaoSov special intervention of the gods, 

ticotcovxo: cotnpare Plutarch, Paul, for the information of some person 

Emilins, c. 24, 26, about the battle who hears it : see Homer, Odyss. 

of Pydna.—- The ^^7i which circu- xx. 100 : compare also Aristophan. 

lated through the assembled army Ayes, 719: Sophoklfts, (Edip. Tyr. 

of Mardonius in BcBotia« respect- 43-472; Xenophon, Symposion, o. 

ing his intention to kill the Pho- 14. s. 48. 

kians, turned out incorrect (Hero- The descriptions of Fama by 

dot. ix. 17). Virgil, iBneid, ir. 176 9«q., and 

Two passages in iBschines (cont. Ovid, Metamorph. zii. 40 «eg., are 

Timarchum, o. 27, p. 67, and De more difiFuse and overcharged, de- 

Fals. Legat. c. 46, p. 290) are peculi- parting from the simplicity of the 

arly valuable as illustrating the Greek conception, 

ancient idea of <I>iQ|A.T]>~a divine We may notice, as partial illu- 

voice or vocal goddess, generally strations of what is here intended, 

considered as informing a crowd those sudden, unaccountable im- 

of persons at once, or moving them pressions of panic terror which 

all by one and the same unanim- occasionally ran through the an- 

ous feeling— the Vox Dei passing cient armies or assembled multi- 

into the Vox Populi. There was tudes, and which were supposed 

an altar to <l>r\\t.ri at Athens (Pau- to be produced by Pan or by 

san. i. 17, 1) ; compare Hesiod. 0pp. Nymphs— indeed sudden, violent 

Di. 761, and the 'Oaooc of Homer, and contagious impressions of 

which is essentially the same idea every kind, not merely of fear, 

as <I>f|pL7): Iliad, ii. 93. ftexA 8i 091- Livy, x. 28. "Victorem equitatum 

aiv 'Oaaa 8e6i^«t 'OxpOvooa' Uvai, velut lymphaticus pavor dissipat." 

Atoc &TYeXo«; also Odyssey, i. 282 ix. 27. ''Milites, incertum ob quam 

•—opposed to the idea of a distinct causam, lytnphatia similes ad arma 


mentions another of those coincidences which the Greek 

mind always seized upon with so much avidity: there 

discurmnt"— in Greek vu(i.96XT]icTot : matin. Le loir Atoit plein d« 

compare Poljten. ir. S, 26, and an troubles, de fnreur disordonnA. 

inftractiye note of Miitsel, ad Le matin fat lumineux et d*ane 

Qnint. Cnrt. ir. 46, 1 (ir. 13, 14). lirAnitA terrible. 

But I cannot better illustrate « Une idie 9e leva aur Paria avee 

that idea -which the Greeks in- le jour, et tou* virent la mime lu- 

vested with diyinity under the name miire. Une lumiire dana lea eaprita, ' 

of <I>i^)av) than by transcribing a et dana ehaque ccntr unevoix: Va, 

striking passage from M. Michelet*i et tu prendras la Bastille t 

Histoire de la B^rolution Fran- '^Cela itoit impossible, insens^, 

^ise. Thd illustration is the more strange k dire; . . . Et tous le, 

instructiye, because the religious crurent nianmoins. Et cela se fit. 

point of view, which in Herodotus "LaBastille, pour dtre une vieille 

is predominant, — and which, to the forteresse, n'en 6toit pas moins 

believing mind, furnishes an ez- imprenable, k moins d^y mettre 

planation pre-eminently satisfac- plnsieurt jourt, et beanconp d*ar- ' 

tory— has passed away in the his- tillerie. Le peuple n^avoit en 

torian of the nineteenth century, oette crise ni le temps ni les mo- 

and gives place to a graphic des- yens de faire un si^ge r^gulier. 

cription of the real phenomenon, L'e1it-il fait, la Bastille n*avoit 

of high importance in human af- pas k craindre, ayant asses de vi- 

fairs ; the common susceptibilities, vres pour attendre un secours si 

common inspiration, and common proche, et d'immenses munitions 

spontaneous impulse, of a multi- de guerre. Ses murs de dix pieds 

tnde, effacing for the time each d'ipaisseur au sommet des tours, 

man's separate individuality. de trente et quarante k la base, 

M. Michelet is about to describe pouvaient rire longtemps des bou- 

that ever-memorable event— the lets: et ses batteries, k elle, dont 

capture of the Bastile, on the 14th le feu plongeoit sur Paris, auroient 

of July, 1789 (ch. vii. vol. L p. pu en attendant dimolir tout le 

106). Mantis, tout le Faubourg St. An- 

^^Yersailles, aveo un gouveme- toine. 

ment organist, unroi, des ministres, "L'attaque de la Bastille ne fut 

un g6n6ral, une armde, n*6toit un acte nullement raisonnable. Ce 

qu*h6sitation, doute, incertitude, fut un acte de foi. 

dans la plus complete anarchic *^Personne ne propoaa. Maia toua 

morale. erurent et toua agirent. Le long 

«Pari8, bouleversd, d61ais86 de des rues, des quais, des ponts, des 

tottte autorit6 legale, dans un d68- boulevards, la foule criait k la ^ 

ordre apparent, atteignit, le 14 foule — A la Bastille— it la Bastille. 

Juillet, ce qui moralement est Et dans le tocsin qui sonnoit, tous 

I'ordre le plus profond, I'unani- entendoient : A la Bastille. 

mit6 des esprits. <<Per«onne, je le ripHe, ne donna 

"Le 13 Juillet, Paris ne songeait Vimpulaion. Les parleurs du Palais 

qvL*k se defendre. Le 14, 11 at- Boy al passdrent le temps & dresser 

taqua. une liste de proscription, k juger 

■Le 18, au soir, il y avoit encore k mort la Beine, le Polignac, 

del doutes, il n*y en ent plus le Artois, le pr6vdt Flesselles, d*au- 

TOL. V. B 


was a chapel of the Eleusinian Demet^r close to the 
field of battle at Mykale, ' as well as at Plataea. Dio- 
dorus and other later writers,* who wrote when the 
impressions of the time had vanished, and when divine 
interventions were less easily and literally admitted, 
treat the whole proceeding as if it were a report design- 
edly circulated by the generals, for the purpose of 
encouraging their army. 

The Eacedeemonians on the right wing, and the 
Battle of portion of the army near them, had a difficult 
Mykai6— path before them, over hilly ground and ravine; 
the lonians while the Athenians, Corinthians, Sikyonians 
ni the and Troezenians, and the left half of the army, 

camp— marching only along the beach, came much 
complete sooner into conflict with the enemy. The 
of the Pet- Persians, as at Plataea, employed their gerrha, 
Bians. or wicker bucklers planted by spikes in the 

ground, as a breastwork, from behind which they dis- 
charged their arrows; and they made a strenuous resist- 
ance to prevent this defence from being overthrown. 
Ultimately, the Greeks succeeded in demolishing it; 
driving the enemy into the interior of the fortification, 
where they in vain tried to maintain themselves against 
the ardour of their pursuers, who forced their way into 
it almost along with the defenders. Even when this 
last rampart was carried, and when the Persian allies 
had fledj the native Persians still continued to prolong 
the struggle with undiminished bravery. Unpractised 
in line and drill, and acting only in small knots, 2 with 

tres encore. Lee noms dee vain- l^attaqueroit pas. Les ^lectenrs ne 
queurs de la Bastille n'offrent pas trahissoient pas comme lis en fa- 
un seul des faiseurs de motions. r6nt accuses; mais lis u^avoient 
Le Palais l^oyal ne fut pas le pas la foi. 

point de depart, et ce n'est pas ''Qui I'eut? Gelui qui eut aussi 

non plus au Palais Boyal que les le d^vouement, la force, pour ac- 

vainqueurs ramendrent l68d6pouil- complir sa foi. Qui? Le peuple, 

les et les prisonniers. tout le monde." 

"Encore moins les ^lecteurs qui • Diodor. xi. 85; Polyaen. i. 33. 

eidgeaient&PHoteideyille eurent- Justin (ii. 14) is astonished in 

ils I'idde de I'attaque. .Loin de relating ''tantam famae velocita- 

\kf pour Pempdcher, pour pr6venir tem.** 

le carnage que la Bastille pouvoit ^ Herodot. ix. 1()2, 103. Ourot 8i 

faire si ais^ment, ils all6rent (n^p9ai),xaT' oXiyouc Ifivdpisvoi, epid' 

ju8qu'& promettre au gouverneur, yovto toiffi olel e^ t6 xsixo? ioiri- 

que s'il retirait set canons, on ne ictouoi "EXXrjvuiv. 



disadvantages of armour such as had been felt severely 
at PlatsBa, they still maintained an unequal conflict with 
the Greek hoplites; nor was it until the Lacedaemonians 
with their half of the army arrived to join in the attack 
that the defence was abandoned as hopeless. The revolt 
of the lonians in the camp put the nnishing stroke to 
this ruinous defeat. First, the disarmed Samians — next, 
other lonians and ^olians — lastly, the Milesians, who 
had been posted to guard the passes in the rear — not 
only deserted, but took an active part in the attack. 
The Milesians especially, to whom the Persians had 
trusted for guidance up to the summits of MykalS, led 
them by wrong roads, threw them into the hands of their 
pursuers, and at last set upon them with their own hands. 
A large number of the native Persians, together with both 
the generals of the land-force, Tigranes and Mardontes, 
perished in this disastrous battle : the two Persian admi- 
rals, Artaynt^s and Ithamithres, escaped, but the army 
was irretrievably dispersed, while all the ships which had 
been dragged up on the shore fell into the hands of the 
assailants, and were burnt. But the victory of the Greeks 
was by no means bloodless. Among the left wing, upon 
which the brunt of the action had fallen, a considerable 
number of men were slain, especially Sikyonians, with 
their commander Perilaus.^ The honours of the battle 
were awarded, first to the Athenians, next to the Corin- 
thians, Sikyonians, and Troezenians ; the Lacedsemonians 
having done comparatively little. Hermolykus the Athe- 
nian, a celebrated pankratiast, was the warrior most dis- 
tinguished for individual feats of arms.^ 

The dispersed Persian army, so much of it at least as 
had at first found protection on the heights of Betirement 
Mykale, was withdrawn from the coast forth- p **»e ^- 
with to Sardis under the command of Artayntes, sian^army'" 
whom Masistes, the brother of Xerxes, bitterly *<> Sardis. 
reproached on the score of cowardice in the recent defeat. 
The general was at length so maddened by a repetition of 

' Herodot. iz. 104, 105. Diodorut lots on either side, nor Diodorus 

(xi. 86) seems to follow different that of the Greeks ; bat the latter 

tuthorities from Herodotus: his says that 40,000 Persians and allies 

statement yaries in many partica- were slain, 

lars, hut is less probable. * Herodot. iz. 105* 

Herodotus does not specify the 

B 2 


these insultSy tliat he drew his Bcimitar and would have 
slain Masistes, had he not been prevented by a Greek of 
Halikamassus named Xenagoras,^ who was rewarded by 
Xerxes with the government of Kilikia. Xerxes was still 
at SardiS; where he had remained ever since his return, and 
where he conceived a passion for the wife of his brother 
Masistes. The consequences of his passion entailed upon 
that unfortunate woman sufferings too tragical to be de- 
scribed, by the orders of his own queen, the jealous and 
savage Amestris.' But he had no fresh army ready to 
fiend down to the coast; so that i.he Greek cities, even on 
*he continent, were for the time practically liberated from 
Persian supremacy, while the insular Greeks were in a 
position of still greater safety. 

The commanders of the victorious Grecian fleet, hav- 
ing full confidence in their power of defending the islands, 
willingly admitted the Chians, Samians, Lesbians, and the 
other islanders hitherto subjects of Persia, to the protec- 
tion and reciprocal engagements of their alliance. We 
may presume that the despots Strattis and Theomestor 
were expelled from Chios and Samos.^ But the Pelopon- 
nesian commanders hesitated in guaranteeing the same 
secure autonomy to the continental cities, which could not 
Beiuctance be upheld against the great inland power with- 
of the out efforts incessant as well as exhausting. 

to*adopt Nevertheless not enduring to abandon these 
t?* ^t°i continental lonians to the mercy of Xerxes, 
Ionian^ they made the offer to transplant them into 
into their European Greece, and to make room for them 
propost." ^y expelling the medising Greeks from their 
lion to sea-port towns. But this proposition was at 
them^woss ouce repudiated by the Athenians, who would 
the -ffigean not permit that colonies originally planted by 
Western themselves should be abandoned, thus impairing 
<^«ece-- the metropolitan dignity of Athens. * The Lace- 
the* Athe- ^ dsBmonians readily acquiesced in this objection, 
nian». and were glad, in all probability, to find honour- 

' Herodot. is. 107. I do not know the interior of the Persian regal 

whether we may suppose Herodotus palace, 

to have heard this ttom his fellow- * Herodot. viii. 132. 

citisen Xenagoras. * Herodot. ix. 106; Diodor. xi. 87, 

* Herodot. ix. 108-118. He giyes The latter represents the lonians 

the story at considerahle length: and ^olians as having actually 

it illustrates forcibly and painfully consented to remove into European 


<!hap. Xlill. AAtTLE 07 MTKALB. 53 

able grottilds for renouncing a scheme of wholesale dis- 
possession eminently difficult to execute > — yet at the same 
time to be absolved from onerous obligations towards the 
lonianSy and to throw upon Athens either the burden of 
defending or the shame of abandoning them. The first 
step was thus taken, which we shall quickly see followed 
by others, for giving to Athens a separate ascendency and 
separate duties in regard to the Asiatic Greeks, and for in- 
troducing first, the confederacy of Delos — next, Athenian 
maritime empire. 

From the coast of Ionia the Greek fleet sailed north- 
ward to the Hellespont, chiefly at the instance of ^^^ ^^^ 
the Athenians, and for the purpose of breaking cian fleet 
down the Xerxeian bridge. For so imperfect JJ**^h**ii 
was their information, that they believed this pont -. the 
bridge to be still firm and in passable condition Spa'tan" 
in September 479 b.c, though it had been broken ho ™ but 
and useless at the time when Xerxes crossed the *^® Ath©- 
strait in his retreat, ten months before (about mah? t'o " 
November 480 b.c).' Having ascertained on *"*<^^ **»« 
their arrival at Abydos the destruction of ^*»«"^^"«- 
the bridge, Leoty chides and the Peloponnesians returned 
home forthwith ; but Xanthippus with the Athenian squad- 
ron resolved to remain and expel the Persians from the 
Thracian Chersonese. This peninsula had been in great 
part an Athenian possession, for the space of more than 
forty years, from the first settlement of the elder Miltiades^ 
down to the suppression of the Ionic revolt, although 
during part of that time tributary to Persia. From the flight 
of the second Miltiades to the expulsion of Xerxes from 
Greece (493-480 b.c), a period during which the Persian 
monarch was irresistible and full of hatred to Athens, no 

Greece, and indeed the Athenians hare been impracticable, 

themselves as haying at first con- See Von Hammer, Geschichte des 

sented to it, thongh the latter after- Osmanischen Beichs, toI. i. book 

wards repented and opposed the vi. p. 261, for the forced migrations 

scheme. of people from Asia into Europe 

■ Such wholesale transportations directed by the Turkish Sultan 

of population from one continent Bajazet (A-D. 1390-1400). 

to another haye always been more « Herodot. yiii. 116, 117; ix. 106, 

or less in the habits of Oriental 114. 

despots, the Persians in ancient * See the preceding yolume of 

times and the Turks in more modem this History, eh. xxx., ch. xxkiy., 

times: to a conjunction of free ch. zzzy. 
states like the Greeks they must 

54 HISTOBT OF aBEEGE. Past ll 

Athenian citizen would find it safe to live there. But the 
Athenian squadron from Mykale were now naturally eager 
both to re-establish the ascendency of Athens, and to re- 

fain the properties of Athenian citizens in the Chersonese, 
'robably many of the leading men, especially Kimon son 
of Miltiades, had extensive poa3essions there to recover, as 
Alkibiades had in after days, with private forts of his own. ^ 
To this motive for attacking the Chersonese may be added 
another — the importance of its corn-produce, as well as of 
a clear passage through the Hellespont for the corn ships 
out of the Propontis to Athens and iEgina.2 Such were 
the reasons which induced Xanthippus and the leading 
Athenians, even without the cooperation of the Pelopon- 
nesians, to undertake the siege of Sestus — the strongest 
place in the peninsula, the key of the strait, and the centre 
in which all the neighbouring Persian garrisons, from Kar- 
dia and elsewhere, had got together under (Eobazus and 

The Grecian inhabitants of the Chersonese readily 
g.^ ^ joined the Athenians in expelling the Persians, 
SettuB— who, taken altogether by surprise, had been 
*'?*\p**}iy constrained to throw themselves into Sestus, 

of the Cher- ..-• . , « . . <• i • 

Bonesites Without stores of provisions or means of making 
t**ktr '^'" ^ ^^°^ defence. But of all the Chersonesites 
*^ ** the most forward and exasperated were the in- 
habitants of Elseus — the southernmost town of the pen- 
insula, celebrated for its tomb, temple, and sacred grove 
of the hero Protesilaus, who figured in the Trojan legend 
as the foremost warrior in the host of Agamemnon to leap 
ashore, and as the first victim to the spear of Hektor. The 
temple of Protesilaus, conspicuously placed on the sea- 
shore,* was a scene of worship and pilgrimage not merely 
for the inhabitants of Elseus, but also for the neighbouring 
Greeks generally, insomuch that it had been enriched with 
ample votive offerings and probably deposits for security — 
money, gold and silver saucers, brazen implements, robes, 
and various other presents. The story ran that when Xerxes 

* Xenoph. Hellen. i. 6, 17. rdc Fals. Legat. o. 69. 

iauTou ttix'l' * Herodot. ix. 114, 116, STiativ— 

* Herodot. yii. 147. Sohol. ad ^poupiov xal tpuXaxi^v too icavtoc 
Aristophan. Equites, 262. *£XXT]9n6vTou--Thucyd.Tiii.62:com- 

In illustration of the yalae set pare Xenophon, Hellenic, ii. 1, 2S. 
by Athens upon the command of « Thucyd. yiii. 102. 
Hellespont, see Demosthends, De 

Gs^. Xlill. 8IE01S OF SSSTUS. 55 

was on his march across the Hellespont into Greece, Ar- 
tayktesy greedy of all this wealth, and aware that the 
monarch would not knowingly permit the sanctuary to be 
despoiled, preferred a wily request to him — "Master, here 
is the house of a Greek, who in invading thy territory met 
his just reward and perished: I pray thee give his house 
to me, in order that people may learn for the future not 
to invade /Ay land" — the whole soil of Asia being regarded 
by the Persian monarchs as their rightful possession, and 
Protesilaus having been in this sense an aggressor against 
them. Xerxes, interpreting the request literally, and not 
troubling himself to ask who the invader was, consented: 
upon which, Artayktes, while the army were engaged in 
their forward march into Greece, stripped the sacred grove 
of Protesilaus, carrying all the treasures to Sestus. He 
was not content without still farther outraging Grecian 
sentiment: he turned cattle into the grove, ploughed and 
sowed it, and was even said to have profaned the sanctuary 
by visiting it with his concubines. ^ Such proceedings were 
more than enough to raise the strongest antipathy against 
him among the Chersonesite Greeks, who now crowded to 
reinforce the Athenians and blocked him up in Sestus. 
After a certain length of siege, the stock of provisions in 
the town failed, and famine began to make itself felt among 
the garrison; which nevertheless still held out, by painfiu 
shifts and endurance, until a late period in the autumn, 
when the patience even of the Athenian besiegers was 
well nigh exhausted. It was with difl&culty that the leaders 
repressed the clamorous desire manifested in their own 
camp to return to Athens. 

Impatience having been appeased, and the seameii 
kept together, the siege was pressed without relaxation, 
and presently the privations of the garrison became in- 
tolerable ; so that Artayktes and (Eobazus were at last re- 
duced to the necessity of escaping by stealth, let- Captare of 
ting themselves down with a few followers from ®®**j^^jl^ 
the wall at a point where it was imperfectly ©f Artayk- 
blockaded. (Eobazus found his way into Thrace, *68, 
where however he was taken captive by tha Abysinthian 

■ Herodot. ix. 116: compare i. 4. rTpu>TeolXeu> too *T9UXou xP^I*^'^^ 
'AprauxTTjCt av7)p nip97]<, Setvo^ Se eE 'EXqciouvtoc C>9sX6{j.svoc. Oomparo 
xaX dTdsOotXo?* h<, xal fiaaiXia iXa6- Herodot. ii. 64. 

^ HI6T0BY 01< altREOE. Par* ft. 

natives and offered up as a sacrifice to their god Pleis- 
t6rus: Artayktes fled northward along the shores of the 
Hellespont^ but was pursued by the Greeks, and made 
prisoner near ^gospotamiy after a strenuous resistance. He 
was brought with his son in chains to Sestus, which im- 
mediately after his departure had been cheerfully sur- 
rendered by its inhabitiants to the Athenians. It was in 
vain that he offered a sum of 100 talents as compensation 
to the treasury of Protesilaus, and a farther sum of 200 
talents to the Athenians as personal ransom for himself 
and his son. So deep was the wrath inspired by his in- 
sults to the sacred ground, that both the Athenian com- 
mander Xanthippus, and the citizens of EIsbus, disdained 
everything less than a severe and even cruel personal 
atonement for the outraged Protesilaus. Artayktes, after 
having first seen his son stoned to death before his eyes, 
was hung up to a lofty board fixed for the purpose, and 
left to perisn, on the spot where the Xerxeian bridge had 
been fixed. ^ There is something in this proceeding more 
Oriental than Grecian: it is not in the Grecian character 
to aggravate death by artificial and lingering preliminaries. 

After the capture of Sestus the Athenian fleets re- 
Keturn of tumed homo with their plunder, towards the 
the fleet to commencement of winter, not omitting to carry 
Athens. ^-^j^ ^j^g^^ thevast cables of the Xerxeian bridge, 
which had been taken in the town, as a trophy to adorn 
the acropolis of Athens. > 

1 Herodot. ix. 118, 119, 120. Ol Han harbour of Pagaue, when 

ydp 'EXatoOuioi TifMupcovtsc t^ Themistoklds formed the project 

TlfMUTCoiXe^ ihio'*'i6 fjkvi %oi'V'xypr^a^^- of burning all the sother Grecian 

vai xal aOxou too etpQ(T7]Yoo xaux^] ships except the Athenian, in or- 

h v^oc S^eps. der that no city except Athens 

* Herodot. ix. 1S1. It must be might have a naval foroe. The- 

either to the joint Grecian arma- mistokUs (he tells us) intimated 

ment of this year, or to that of to the people, that he had a 

the former year, that Plutarch proposition, yery adyantageous 

must intend his celebrated story to the state, to communicate; but 

respecting the proposition advanced that it could not be pub- 

by Themistoklfts and condemn- lidy proclaimed and discussed: 

•d by Aristeidds, to apply (Flu- upon which they desired him to 

taroh, ThemistokUs, c. 20; Aris- mention it privately to Aristeldds. 

teidds, c. 22). He tells us that ThemistokUs did so ; and Aristei- 

the Greek fleet was all assembled dfts told the people, that the pro- 

to pass the winter in the Thessa- > jeci vas at once eminently ad> 





▼antageous and not less eminently 
unjust. Upon which the people 
renounced it forthwith, without 
asking what it was. 

Considering the great celebrity 
which this story has obtained, 
some allusion to it was necessary, 
though it has long ceased to be 
received as matter of history. It 
is quite inconsistent with the nar- 
rative of Herodotus, as well at 
with all the conditions of the time : 
Pagasn was Tlie««altan, and as 
such, hostile to the Greek fleet 
rather than otherwise: the fleet 
seems to have never been there: 
moreover we may add, that taking 
matters as they then stood, when 

the fear from Persia wis not at 
all terminated, the Athenians 
would have lost more than they 
gained by burning the ships of 
the other Greeks, so that Themi- 
stokl^s was not very likely to con- 
ceive the scheme, nor Aritteidfts 
to describe it in the language put 
into his mouth. 

The story is probably the in- 
vention of some Greek of the Pla- 
tonic age, who wished to contrast 
justice with expediency and Ari- 
steidds with Tbemistoklfts— as well 
as to bestow at the same time 
panegyric upon Athens in the days 
of her glory^ 




I HAVE already mentioned, in the preceding volume of this 
History, the foundation of the Greek colonies in Italy and 
Sicily, together with the general fact, that in the sixth 
century before the Christian sera, they were among the 
most powerful and flourishing cities that bore the Hellenic 
name. Beyond this general fact, we obtain little insight 
into their history. 

Though Syracuse, after it fell into the hands of Gelo, 
Agrigen- about 485 B.C., became the most powerful city 
G Ta*°u- ^^ Sicily, yet in the preceding century Gela and 
perior to Agrigentum, on the south side of the island, 
Syracuse j^^d been its superiors. The latter, within a 
600 B.C.— few years of its foundation, fell under the 
Phaiaris dominion of one of its own citizens named 
Agrigen*- Phalaris ; a despot energetic, warlike, and cruel, 
turn. ^n exile from Astypalaea near Rhodes, but a 

rich man, and an early settler at Agrigentum, he contrived 
to make himself despot seemingly about the year 570 b.c. 
He had been named to one of the chief posts in the city, 
and having undertaken at his own cost the erection of a 
temple to Zeus Polieus in the acropolis (as the Athenian 
Alkmaeonids rebuilt the burnt temple of Delphi), he was 
allowed on this pretence to assemble therein a considerable 
number of men; whom he armed, and availed himself of 
the opportunity of a festival of Demeter to turn them 
against the people. He is said to have made many con- 
quests over the petty Sikan communities in the neighbour- 
hood: but exaction and cruelties towards his own subjects 
are noticed as his most prominent characteristic, and hi% 
brazen bull passed into imperishable memory. This piece 
of mechanism was hoUoW; and sufficiently capacious to 



contain one or more victims enclosed within it, to perish 
in tortures when the metal was heated: the cries of these 
suffering prisoners passed for the roarings of the animal. 
The artist was named PerilluS; and is said to have been 
himself the first person burnt in it by order of the despot. 
In spite of the odium thus incurred, Phalaris maintained 
himself as despot for sixteen years; at the end of which 
period, a general rising of the people, headed by a leading 
man named Telemachus, terminated both his reign and his 
life. I Whether Telemachus became despot or not, we 
have no information: sixty years afterwards, we shall find 
his descendant Thero established in that position. 

It was about the period of the death of Phalaris that 
the Syracusans reconquered their revolted Sjrftcase 
colony of Kamarina (in the south-east of the |^ ^^® *•?• 
island between S^acuse and Gela), expelled or cai g^^yern- 
dispNOSsessed the inhabitants, and resumed the rj®°G"°^®^ 
territory.' With the exception of this accidental or priv? ' 
circumstance, we are without information about ^^b®* ^««- 
the Sicilian cities until a time rather before of"the*ori- 
500 B.C., just when the war between Kroton and 8»?a^ p'o- 
Sybaris had extinguished the power of the latter, ^oionSta— 
and when the despotism of the Peisistratids at the Demoa 
Athens had been exchanged for the democratical Kyiiyrii 
constitution of Kleisthenes. «>' Serfs. 

* Eyery thing which has eyer been Polyb. xii. 26; Diodor. xiii. 90; 

said aboat Phalaris is noticed and Cicero in Verr. iy. 83. 

discussed in the learned and acute It does not appear that Timseus 

Dissertation of Bentley on the really called in question the his- 

Letters of Phalaris : compare also torical reality of the bull of Pha- 

Seyffert, Akragas und sein Gebiet, laris, though he has been errone- 

p. 57-61, who howeyer treats the ously supposed to haye done so. 

pretended letters of Phalaris with Timaeus a£Brmed that the bull 

more consideration than the read- which was shown in his own time 

ers of Dr. Bentley will generally at Agrigentum was not the iden- 

be disposed to sanction. tical machine: which was correct, 

The story of the brazen bull of for it must haye been then atCar- 

Phalaris seems to rest on sufficient thage, from whence it was not re- 

eyidence : it is expressly mention- stored to Agrigentum until after 

ed by Pindar, and the bull itself, 146 b.o. See a note of Boeckh on 

after haying been carried away to the Scholia ad Pindar. Pyth. U 

Carthage when the Carthaginians 186. 

took Agrigentum, was restored > Thucyd. yi. 6; Sohol. ad Pindar, 

to the Agrigentines by Scipio when Olymp. y. 19: compara Wesseling 

he took Carthage. See Aristot. ad Piodor. xi. 76. 
Polit. T. 8, 4; Pindar, Pyth. i. 185; 


■ — - ij i<» ■ ■' 1.- - 

t60 HISTOBT Ot OBEEOE. Pabv it. 


The first forms of government among the Sicilian 
Greeks, as among the cities of Greece Proper in the early- 
historical age, appear to have been all oligarchical. We 
do not know under what particular modifications they 
were kept up, but probably all more or less resembled 
that of Syracuse, where the Gamori (or wealthy proprietors 
descended from the original colonising chiefs), possessing 
large landed properties tilled by a numerous Sikel serf 
population called Kyllyrii, formed the qualified citizens — 
out of whom, as well as by whom, magistrates and generals 
were chosen: while the Demos, or non-privileged freemen, 
comprised, first, the small proprietary cultivators who 
maintained themselves, by manual labour and without 
slaves, from their own lands or gardens — next, the artii^ans 
and tradesmen. In the course of two or three generations, 
many individuals of the privileged class would have fallen 
into poverty, and would find themselves more nearly on 
a par with the non-privileged; while such members of the 
latter as might rise to opulence were not for that reason 
admitted into the privileged body.' Here were ample 
materials for discontent. Ambitious leaders, often them- 
selves members of the privileged body, put themselves at 
the head of the popular opposition, overthrew the oligarchy, 
-;, , and made themselves despots; democracy being 

vfrnmfnt'a at that time hardly known anywhere in Greece. 
Gt **k it! ^^® general fact of this change, preceded by 
in Sicily occasional violent dissensions among the pri- 
—originai vilegcd class themselvcs,* is all that we are 
subverted^ permitted to know, without those modifying 
in many circumstances by which it must have been 
despots— accompanied in every separate city. Towards 
attempted or near the year 500 b.c, we find Anaxilaus 
the^s'partan dcspot at B/hegium, Skythes at Zankle, Terillus 
prince Do- at Himera, Peithagoras at Selinus, Kleander 
"®^** at Gela, and Pansetius at Leontini.^ It was 

about the year 509 b.c. that the Spartan prince Dorieus 
conducted l body of emigrants to the territories of Eryx 
and Egegta, near the north-western comer of the island, 

^ At Gela, Herodot. vii. 153; at 86v ctl ic'X«iaT«» rwv dpx«ici>v 4v At- 

Syracnse, Aristot. Politic, v. 8, 1. ovtivoi^ tU t^jv Ilavai-rlou xupocvvlSa, 

. » Aristot. Politic, y. 8, 4; v. 10, noi «v TiXa, lU trjv KXeivfipoo, xol 

4. Kal sU TupavvlSa (jLexapdcXXei ti iv &XXai^ icoXXaic n6Xeoiv (boauttu^ 
6XiYaDyla^, wonsp ev 2ixeXif ox^' 



CsA». Xliin. DB8P0TS OF GBLA. 61) 

in hopes of expelling the non-Helletiic inhabitants and 
found a new Grecian colony. But the Carthaginians, whose 
Sicilian possessions were close adjoining and who had' 
already aided in driving Dorieus from a previous establish- 
ment at Kinyps in Libya, — now lent such vigorous assist- 
ance to the Egestsean inhabitants, that the Spartan prince, 
after a short period of prosperity, was defeated and slain 
with most of his companions. Such of them as escaped, 
under the orders of Euryleon, took possession of Minoa, 
which bore from henceforward the name of Herakleia i — a 
colony and dependency of the neighbouring town of 
Selinus, of which Peithagoras was then despot. Euryleon 
joined the malcontents at Selinus, overthrew Peithagoras, 
and established himself as despot, until, after a short 
possession of power, he was slain in a popular mutiny. ^ 

"We are here introduced to the nrst known instance 
of that series of contests between the Phoenicians and 
Greeks in Sicily, which, like the struggles between tho 
Saracens and the Normans in the eleventh and twelfth 
centuries after the Christian sera, were destined to deter- 
mine whether the island should be a part of Africa or a 
part of Europe — and which were only terminated, after the 
lapse of three centui'ies, by the absorption of both into the 
vast bosom of £.ome. It seems that the Carthaginians and 
Egestseans not only overwhelmed Dorieus, but also made 
some conquests of the neighbouring Grecian possessions, 
which were subsequently recovered by Gelo of Syracuse. ^ 

Not long after the death of Dorieus, Kleander despot 
of Gela began to raise his city to ascendency over the 
other Sicilian Greeks, who had hitherto been, if not all 
equal, at least all independent. His powerful mercenary 
force, levied in part among the Sikel tribes, ^ did not. 

■ Diodorus ascribes the founda- A fanereal monument in honour^ 
tion of Herakleia to Doriens: this of Athenseus, one of the settlers 
seems not consistent with the ac- who perished with Dorieus, was 
count of Herodotus, unless we are seen by Fausanias at Sparta (Pan- 
to assume that the town of He- sanias, lii. 16, 4). 
rakleia which Dorieus founded * Herodot. t. 43, 46. 
was destroyed by the Garthagini- * Herodot. vii. 15S. The extreme. 
ans, and that the name 9erakleia brevity ofhisallusionis perplexing, 
was afterwards given by Euryleon as we have no collateral know*, 
or his successors to that which ledge to illustrate it. 
bad before been called Minoa (Di- * Folyeenus, y. 6. 
odor. Iv. 23). ..... 



preserve him from the sword of a Geloan citizen named 

About B.C. Sabyllus, who slew him after a reign of seven 

xfeander years: but it enabled his brother and successor 

despot of Hippokrates to extend his dominion over nearly 

»bout~6^o.* half of the island. In that mercenary force two 

—First rise ofl&cers, Gelo and -^nesidemus (the latter a citizen 

and^^ne- ^^ Agrigentum, of the conspicuous family of the 

Ridgmas EmmenidsB, and descended from Telemachus 

service. ^^® deposer of Phalaris), particularly distinguish- 

Tdiin68,the ed themselves. G-elo was descended from a 

«"ce?to?of »»*iv® P{ Telos near the Triopian Cape, one of 
Gelo. the original settlers who accompanied the 

Khodian Antiphemus to Sicily. His immediate ancestor, 
named Telines, had first raised the family to distinction 
by valuable aid to a defeated political party, who had been 
worsted in a struggle and forced to seek shelter in the 
neighbouring town of Maktorium. Telines was possessed 
of certain peculiar sacred rites (or visible and portable holy 
symbols, with a privileged knowledge of the ceremonial 
acts and formalities of divine service under which they 
were to be shown) for propitiating the Subterranean 
Goddesses, Demeter and Persephone: "from whom he 
obtained them, or how he got at them himself (says Hero- 
dotus), I cannot say;" but such was the imposing effect of 
his presence and manner of exhibiting them, that he ven- 
tured to march into Gela at the head of the exiles from 
Maktorium, and was enabled to reinstate them in power — 
deterring the people from resistance in the same manner 
as the Athenians had been overawed by the spectacle of 
Phye- Athene in the chariot along with Peisistratus. The 
extraordinary boldness of this proceeding excites the 
admiration of Herodotus, especially as he had been in- 
formed that Telines was of an unwarlike temperament. 
The restored exiles rewarded it by granting to him, and to 
his descendants after him, the hereditary dignity of hiero- 
phants of the two goddesses i — a function certainly honour- 
able, and probably lucrative, connected with the adminis- 

* See about Tdlinds and this he- iclauvo? eu)v, xangYoye, 4ic' <p t« oi 
reditary priesthood, Herodot. yii. dic6Yovoi a^xou Ipo^ivxati tu>v 6eu)v 
163. TouTou? u)v 6TT)Xlvr)c xavfifOL^t loovxai: compare a preyious pas- 
te riXTjv, iyui^ o6Se|A.lav dvSpwv sage of this History, yol. i. chap. i. 
S6-;a{jLtV) dXX' ipd toutudv tu)v 6cu)v. It appears from Pindar that Hiero 
28ev H ttOtd iXttpt, ^ a^TOc exxrjaaTo, exercised this hereditary priesthood 
TouTO o6x l/u> eluai. toutoioi 6i u>v (Olymp. y. 160 (95), with the Scholia 

Chap. XLIII. 



tration of consecrated property and with the enjoyment of 
a large portion of its fruits. 

adloc. and SoholU ad Pindar. Pyth. 
ii. 27). 

About the Btory of PhyA per- 
lonifying Ath6n6 at Athens, tea 
above, ch. xxx. of this History. 

The ancient religions worship 
addressed itself more to the eye 
than to the ear ; the words spoken 
were of less importance than the 
things exhibited, the persons per- 
forming^ and the actions done. 
The vague sense of the Greek and 
Latin neuter, Upo or aaera^ in- 
cludes the entire ceremony, and 
is difficult to translate into a mo- 
dem language: but the verbs con- 
nected with it, Ixtiv, xtxT^sOai, 
xofjLi^etv, 9oiv8iv, lepo — ltpo<pavT7]c, 
&c., relate to exhibition and action. 
This was particularly the case with 
the mysteries (or solemnities not 
thrown open to the general public, 
but accessible only to those who 
went through certain preliminary 
forms, and under certain restric- 
tions) in honour of D^mdtdr and 
Persephond, as well as of other 
deities in different parts of Chreece. 
The XsYOftsva, or things said on 
these occasions, were of less 
importance than the Sstxvuf&sva 
and Sptbfxsva, or matters shoton and 
things done (see Fausanias, ii. 37, 
3). Herodotus says about the lake 
of Sais in Egypt, 'Ev 8i ttq Xljxv^) 
Tao-c^j TO fielxrjXa twv icoftstuv 
auTou (of Osiris) vuxt6« icoieuoi, Ta 
xaXsouot pLoaTTipia AlY^nxioi: he 
proceeds to' state that the Thes- 
mophoria celebrated in honour of 
Ddmdtfir in Greece were of the same 
nature, and gives his opinion that 
they were imported into Greece 
from Egypt. Homer (Hymn. Cerer. 
476); compare Pausan ii. 14, 2. 

AtUev Tpm-coXiixtfi te, Ai6xX»tTt 

AptjafioauviQv itpd)r xal ini- 
9paStv 6pY^<> icaiol 

Upia^uxipiQ^ KtXioio 

•QX^ioc, &« tdfi' fintuietv im- 
70o'iu>v dvOpu>icu>v, Ac. 
Compare Eurip. Hippolyt. 28; Pin- 
dar, Fragm. xcvi. ; Sophokl. Frag. 
Iviii. ed. Brunck; Plutarch, De 
Prefect in Virtute, c. 10, p. 81: 
De Isid. et Osir. p. 863, o. 8. w« 
Yap oi TtXou|ASvoi xar opyd? iv 
eopo{)<|> xol po^ itp6c oXXiqXooc u)9o6- 
|jLtvot ouvlaat, Spu>|JLivu>v Si xal 
Stixvu(tdvu>v TU)v itptbv, itpoai- 
youoiv ^St) {jLtTQt 96[)ou xal oiwicijc: 
and Isokratds, Panegyric, c. 6, 
about Eleusis, tk Upd xal >uv 
StlxvU|jitv xaB' IxaoTov eviauxiv. 
These mysteries consisted thus 
chiefly of exhibition and action 
addressed to the eyes of the com- 
municants, and Clemens Alexan- 
drinus calls them a mystic drama — 
AtjU) xol K6pTi Cpojxa lYevioOov jtuo- 
tixov, xol T7)v icXdvrjv xol ttjv dp|i.o- 
■y^v xol TO ic4v9oc t) 'EXtooU fiq^Souxsi. 
The wordSpYio is originally nothing 
more than a consecrated expression 
for epT«— l6p« JfPT« (8®® Pausanias, 
iv. 1, 4, 6), though it comes after- 
wards to designate the whole cere- 
mony, matters shown as well at 
matters done — Td Spyio xo|jli(1u)v — 
dp^ltDv itovTolcDv oov9dTir)c, Ac: com- 
pare Plutarch, Alkibiad. 22-34. 

The sacred objects exhibited form-" 
ed an essential part of the cere- 
mony, together with the chest in 
which such of them as were move- 
able were brought out— TeXtTij? 
CYxu|jLOvo liUOTifio xloT7)v (Nounus, 
ix. 127). .SIschines, in assisting 
the religious lustrations performed 
by his mother, was bearer of the 
chest — xioTocpApoc xol Xixvo^opoc 
(Demosthen. de Coron&, c. 79. 
p. 313). Clemens Alexandrinus 
(Cohort, ad Gent. p. 14) describe^ 


Oelo thus belonged to an ancient and distinffiiished 
Oeio— in hierophantic family at Gela, being the eldest of 
high com- four brothers, sons of Deinomenes — Geloj Hiero, 
among the Polyzelus Mid Thrasybulos: and he further 
mercena- ennobled himself by such pdlrsonal exploits, in 
pokratS*''* the army of the despot HippokratSs, as to be 
despot of promoted to the supreme command of the cavalry. . 
^®^** It was greatly to* the activity of Gelo that the 

despot owed a succession of victories and conquests, in 
which the Ionic or Chalkidic cities of ILallipolis, Naxos, 

the objects which were contained Namque non solnm in templis ferd 

in these mystic chests of the Elen- omnibus cimelia renerandas anti- 

sinfan mysteries— cakes of parti- qnitatis condita erant, sed in mys- 

cular shape, pomegranates, salt, teriis ipsis talinm rerum mentio 

ferules, ivy, Ac. The communicant occnrrit, qnas initiati snmm& cum 

was permitted, as a part of the reneratione aspicerent, non initia- 

ceremony, to take these out of the tis ne aspicere qnidem liceret . . . 

chest and put them into a basket, Ex his testimoniis eiBcitnr (p. 61) 

afterwards putting them back again sacra quae Hierophanta ostendit, 

>— "Jejunavi et ebibi cyceonem: ex ilia ipse ftiisse ayia 9do|j.«Ta sive 

ciatft sumpsi et in calathum misi: simulacra Deorum, eorumque a8« 

accepi rnrsusjincistulamtranstuli" pectum qui prsebeant Sst^atxa Upd 

(Arnobius ad Gent. v. p. 176, ed, vel itapi/ttv vel ^alvtiv dici, et ab 

Elmenhorst), while the uninitiated hoc quasi primario Hierophantse 

were excluded from seeing it, and actu tum Eleusiniorum sacerdotum 

forbidden from looking at it "even principem nomen accepisse, tum 

from the house-top." totum negotium esse nuncupatum." 

T6vxdXaOovxaTi6vxaxa|xalOoi9«i90t Compare also K. F. Hermann, 

f)s()aXot Oottesdienstliche Alterthttmer der 

Uifi' dico Tu> TtYSoc. Griechen, part ii. ch. ii. sect. 82. 
(Eallimachus,Hymn.inGererem,4.) A passage in Cicero de Haruspi- 

Lobeck, in his learned and ex- cum Besponsis (c. 11), which is 

cellent treatise, Aglaophamus (L transcribed almost entirely by Ar- 

p. 51), says, «8acrorum nomine tarn nobius ady. Gentes, iy. p. 148, 

Greci, quam Bomani, prscipud demonstrates the minute precision 

•igna et imagines Deorum, omnem- required at Bome in the perform- 

que sacram supellectilem dignari, anoe of the festival of the Mega- 

solent. Que res animum illuc lesia: the smallest omission or 

potiuB inclinat, ut putem Hiero- alteration was supposed to render 

phantas ejusmodi Upd in conspe- the festival unsatisfactory to the 

ctnm hominum protulisse, aive gods. 

deorum simulacra, sive vasa sacra The memorable history of the 

et instrumenta aliave priscas reli- Holy Tunic at Treves in 1845, shows 

gionis monumenta; qualia in sa- what immense and wide -spread 

crario Eleusinio asservata fuisse, effect upon the human mind may be 

etsi nullo testimonio afflrmare pos- produced, even in th^ nineteeuth 

sumus, tamett probabilitatis spe- centuryi by Upd Stixvufisvou 
ciem habet testimonio similem. 


Leontini and ZanklS, were successively reduced to depend- 
ence. 1 

The fate of Zankle — seemingly held by its despot 
Skythes in a state of dependent alliance under HippokratSs, 
and in standing feud with Anaxilaus of Rhegium on the 
opposite side of the strait of Messina — was remarkable. 
At the time when the Ionic revolt in Asia was suppressed, 
and Miletus reconquered by the Persians (b.c. 494, 493), a 
natural sympathy was manifested by the Ionic Fate of the 
Greeks in Sicily towards the sufferers of the ^J'zankil'' 
same race on the east of the JBgean sea. Projects afterwards 
were devised for assisting the Asiatic refugees Measinaj— 
to a new abode; and the 2janklseans, especially, by the 8a. 
invited them to form a new Pan-Ionic colony ™**2*"1 
upon the territory of the Sikels, called Kald of Hip- 
Akte, on the north coast of Sicily; a coast pre- pokrat6«. 
senting fertile and attractive situations, and along the whole 
line of which there was only one Grecian colony — Himera. 
This invitation was accepted by the refugees from Samos 
and Miletus, who accordingly put themselves on shipboard 
for Zankle; steering, as was usual, along the coast of 
Akamania to Korkyra, from thence across to Tarentum, 
and along the Italian coast to the strait of Messina. It 
happened that when they reached the town of Epizephyrian 
Lokri, Skythes, the despot of ZanklS^ was absent from his 
city, together with the larger portion of his military force, 
on an expedition against the Sikels — perhaps undertaken 
to facilitate the contemplated colony at Kald Akt6. His 
enemy the Rhegian prince Anaxilaus, taking advantage of 
this accident, proposed to the refugees at Lokri that they 
should seize for themselves, and retain, the unguarded city 
of Zankle. They followed his suggestion, and possessed 
themselves of the city, together with the families and pro- 
perty of the absent Zanklaeans; who speedily returned to 
repair their loss, while their prince Skythes farther invoked 
the powerful aid of his ally and superior, Hippokrates. 
The latter, however, provoked at the loss of one of his 
dependent cities, seized and imprisoned Skythes, whom he 
considered as the cause of it,^ at Inykus, in the interior of 

* Herodot. rii, 164. ict8i^ffa«, xal t6v dScXtps&v ofttoo'IItt- 

* Herodot. yi. 23, 23. 2x60t)v (liv OoYivsa, i< Ivuxov ic6Xiv iniitty-'^t. 
t6v fiouvapxov TU^ Za7xXa(u>v, d>c The words d>« dnof)aX6vTa seem 
aicoPoiX6yca ty^v ic6Xtv, 6 MnnoxpixT]; to imply the relation pre-exitting 

VOL. V, Jf 


the island. But he found it at the same time advantageous 
to accept a proposition made to him by the Samians, captors 
of the city^ and to betray the Zanklseans whom he had come 
to aid. By a convention ratified with an oath, it was 
agreed that Hippokrates should receive for himself all the 
extra-mural, and half the intra-mural, property and slaves 
belonging to the Zanklssans, leaving the other half to the 
Samians. Among the property without the walls, not the 
least valuable part consisted in the persons of those Zank- 
IsBans whom Hippokrates had come to assist, but whom he 
now carried away as slaves: excepting however from this 
lot, three hundred of the principal citizens, whom he 
delivered over to the Samians to be slaughtered — probably 
lest they might find friends to procure their ransom, and 
afterwards disturb the Samian possession of the town* 
Their lives were however spared oy the Samians, though 
we are not told what became of them. This transaction, 
alike perfidious on the part of the Samians and of Hippo- 
krates, secured to the former a flourishing city, and to the 
latter an abundant booty. We are glad to learn that the 
imprisoned Skythes found means to escape to Darius, king 
of Persia, from whom he received a generous shelter: im-. 
perfect compensation for the iniquity of his fellow Greeks, i 
The Samians however did not long retain possession of 
their conquest, but were expelled by the very person who 
had instigated them to seize it — Anaxilaus of Rhegium^ 
He planted in it new inhabitants, of Dorian and Messenian 
race, recolonizing it under the name of Messene — a name 
which it ever afterwards bore ; 2 and it appears to have been 
governed either by himself or by his son Kleophron, until 
his death about b.c. 476. 

Besides the conquests above-mentioned, Hippokrates 
of Gela was on the point of making the still more import- 
ant acquisition of Syracuse, and was only prevented from 
doing so, after defeating the Syracusans at the river Hel- 
orus, and capturing many prisoners, by the mediation of 

between Hippokratds and Skythds, ally teoeived into Zankld, and 

as superior and subject; and pun- afterwards expelling the prior in« 

ishment inflicted by the former habitants: his brief notice is noi 

upon the latter for having lost an to be set against the perspicuous 

, important post. narratiye of Herodotus* 

> Herodot. vi. 23, 24. Aristotle * Thucyd. vi. 4 ; Schol. ad Pindar. 

(Politic, v. 2, 11) represents the Pyth. ii. 8i} Diodor. xi. 48. 
Samians as having been first actu- 

Chav. Xliin. OELO DESPOT OF 6BLA. 67 

the Corinthians and Korkyrseans, who prevailed on him to 
be satisfied with the cession of Kamarina and ^^ pokr»- 
its territory as a ransom. Having repeopled utiu 
this territory, which became thus annexed to Tictorioui 
Qela, he was prosecuting his conquests farther STracasftni 
among the Sikels, when he died or was killed £*^®^ 
at Hybla. His death caused a mutiny among the _diet— 
Greloans, who refused to acknowledge his sons, ^®^o ^«- 
and strove to regain their freedom; but Gelo, the bis place 
general of horse in the army, espousing the cause despot of 
of the sons with energy, put down by force the 
resistance of the people. As soon as this was done, he 
threw off the mask, deposed the sons of Hippokrates, and 
seized the sceptre himself. ^ 

Thus master of Gela, and succeeding probably to the 
ascendency enjoyed by his predecessor over the Ionic cities, 
Gelo became the most powerful man in the island; 
but an incident which occurred a few years after- 
wards (b.c. 485), while it aggrandised him still farther, 
transferred the seat of his power from Gela to Greatnesi 
Syracuse. The Syracusan Gamori, or oligar- of Geio— 
chical order of proprietary families, probably poBfession 
humbled by their ruinous defeat at the Helorus, of Syra- 
were dispossessed of the government by a com- transfers^ 
bination between their serf-cultivators called the seat 
the Kyllyrii, and the smaller freemen called the p'^er from 
Demos; they were forced to retire to KasmensB, Geia to Sy- 
where they invoked the aid of Gelo to restore '^*®"«®* 
them. That ambitious prince undertook the task, and 
accomplished it with facility; for the Syracusan people, 
probably unable to resist their political opponents when 
backed by such powerful foreign aid, surrendered to him 
without striking a blow.^ But instead of restoring the 

> Herodot. Tii. 156 ; Thuoyd.yi. 6. to the Syracasan democracy prior 

The ninth Kemean Ode of Pindar to the despotism of Gelo as a case 

(y. 40), addressed to Ghromius the of democracy mined by its own 

friend of Hiero of Syracuse, com- lawlessness and disorder. But sach 

memorates, among other exploits, can hardly have been the fact, if 

his conduct at the battle of the the narrative of Herodotus is to 

Hel6rus. be trusted. The expulsion of the 

* Herodot. vii. 156. *0 yap ^^(jlo« Gamori was not an act of lawless 

h xu>v 2upaxouolu>v iici6vTt F^Xutvt democracy, but the rising of free 

KapaSiSoi TiQv noXiv xal iuouxdv. subjects and slayei against a 

Aristotle (Politic, y. a, 6) alludes governing oligarchy. After the 

F 2 


place to tlie previous oligarchy, Gelo appropriated it to 
himself, leaving Gela to be governed by his brother Hiero. 
He greatly enlarged the city of Syracuse, and strengthened 
its fortifications : probably it was he who first carried it 
beyond the islet of Ortygia, so as to include a larger space 
of the adjacent mainland (or rather island of Sicily) wnich 
bore the name of Achradina. To people this enlarged 
space he brought all the residents in Kamarina, which 
town he dismantled — and more than half of those in Gela; 
which was thus reduced in importance, while Syracuse 
became the first city in Sicily, and even received fresh ad- 
dition of inhabitants from the neighbouring towns of 
Megara and EubcBa. 

Both these towns, Megara and Euboea, like Syracuse, 
were governed by ^oligarchies, with serf-cultivators depend- 
ent upon them, and a Demos or body of smaller freemen 
excluded from the political franchise: both were involved 
in war with Gelo, probably to resist his encroachments : 
both were besieged and taken. The oligarchy who ruled 
these cities, and who were the authors as well as leaders 
Qi . onxA/ » of the year, anticipated nothing but ruin at the hands of 
the conqueror; while the Demos, who had not been con- 

Oainori were expelled, there was vcircumstances which enabled him 

no time for the democracy to con- to acquire the supreme power ; but 

stitnte itself, or to show in what a similar assertion can hardly be 

degree it possessed capacity for made applicable to the early timet 

government, since the narrative of preceding Gelo, in which indeed 

Herodotus indicates that the resto- democracy was only just beginning 

ration by Gelo followed closely in Greece. 

npon the expnlsion. And the The oonftision often made by 

superior force which Gelo brought hasty historians between the names 

to the aid of the expelled Gamori, of Gelo and Dionysius, is severely 

is quite sufficient to explain the commented on by Dionysius of 

submission of the Syracusan Halikamassus (Antiq. Roman, yii. 

people, had they been ever so well 1. p. 13U): the latter however, in 

Administered. Perhaps Aristotle his own statement respecting Gelo, 

may have had before him reports is not altogether free ftom. error, 

different from those of Herodotus: since he describes Hippokratds as 

unless indeed we might venture to "brother of Gelo. We must accept 

suspect that the name of Oelo ap- the supposition of Larcher, that 

pears in Aristotle by lapse of mem- Pausanias (vi. 9, 2), while profess- 

ory in place of that of DionysifM, ing to give the date of Gelo*s oc- 

It is highly probable that the par- cupation of Syracuse, has really 

tial disorder into which the Syra- given the date of Gelo*s occupation 

eusan democracy had fallen im- Df Oela (see Mr. Fynes Clinton, 

mediately before the despotism of Fast. Helien. ad ann. 491 b.o.) 
Dionytiuti was ono of the main 






suited and had taken no part in the war (which we must 
presume to have been carried on by the oligarchy and 
their serfs alone); felt assured that no harm would be done 
to them. His behaviour disappointed the expectations of 
both. After transporting both of them to Syracuse, he 
established the oligarchs in that town as citizens, and sold 
the Demos as slaves under covenant that they should be 
exported from Sicily. "His conduct (says Herodotus •) was 
dictated by the conviction, that a Demos was a most 
troublesome companion to live with." It appears that the 
state of society which he wished to establish was that of 
Patricians and clients, without any Flebs; something like 
that of Thessaly, where there was a proprietary oligarchy 
living in the cities, with Penestse or dependent cultivators 
occupying and tilling the land on their account — but no 
small, self-working proprietors or tradesmen in sufficient 
number to form a recognised class. And since conquest 
Grelo was removing the free population from of various 
these conquered towns, leaving in or around the fo wis^bj 
towns no one except the serf-cultivators, we Geio— he 
may presume that the oligarchical proprietors IbV^cSr'" 
when removed might still continue, even as garchy to 
residents at Syracuse, to receive the produce and* miIs 
raised for them by others : but the small self- the Demos 
working proprietors, if removed in like manner, '°' slaves- 
would be deprived of subsistence, because their land would 
be too distant for personal tillage, and they had no serfs. 
"While therefore we fully believe, with Herodotus, that 
Gelo considered the small free proprietors as "trouble- 
some yoke-fellows" — a sentiment perfectly natural to a 
Grecian despot, unless where he found them useful aids to 
his own ambition against a hostile oligarchy — we must add 
that they would become peculiarly troublesome in his 
scheme of concentrating the free population of Syracuse, 
seeing that he would have to give them land in the 

' Herodot. rii. 166. MsYapia^ xt f^oov xaxb^ o^Siv icslosaGai, ^yoct^^ 

DO? ev 2ixeX'- '•' — "^ — » -— ^- -^- ^ -— -^--- 

e^ 6)toXo7i')f)v 

•! -• -- |->----- _--_, ....... J _ J .- , — . 

tout ev SixeX^^, u>c icoXiopxe6|jLevoi xal toutouc i^ t&c Sup^xouaa^, dns- 
iijv icpoytx^pfioa^f too? 8oto i«' ilaycDY^ ix SixeXiijc. 

TU)v MsYapi<0v, o6x idvta pLtTalxtov ratov. 
too roXejxoo louioy, o65i irpo 352x6- 

70 HI8T0BT OF aREECB. Paut II. 

neighbourhood or to provide in some other way for their 

So large an accession of size, .walls, and population, 
Increased rendered Syracuse the first Greek city in Sicily, 
power and And the power of Gelo, embracing as it did not 
IX^-"" «"«"ly Syracuse, but so consideral&le a portion 
case under of the rest of the island, Greek as well as Sikel, 
be^comesthe '^^^ ^^® greatest Hellenic force then existing, 
first city It appears to have comprised the Grecian cities 
in Sicily, ^jj |.jjg g^g^ ^^^ south-east of the island from the 

borders of Agrigentum to those of Zankle or Messen^, 
together with no small proportion of the Sikel tribes. 
MessSnS was under the rule of Anaxilaus of Rhegium, 
Agrigentum under that of Thero son of jEnesidemus, 
Himera under that of Terillus; while Selinus, close on the 
borders of Egesta and the Carthaginian possession, had 
its own government free or despotic, but appears to have 
been allied with or dependent upon Carthage. ^ A domin* 
ion thus extensive doubtless furnished ample tribute, 
besides which Gelo, having conquered and dispossessed 
many landed proprietors and having recolonised Syracuse, 
could easily provide both lands and citizenship to recom- 
pense adherents. Hence he was enabled to enlarge ma- 
terially the military force transmitted to him by Hippo- 
krates, and to form a naval force besides. Phormis^ the 
MsBualian, who took service under him and became citizen 
of Syracuse, with fortune enough to send donatives to 
Olympia — and Ag^sias the lamid prophet from Stympha- 
lus3 — are doubtless not the only examples of emigrants 
joining him from Arcadia. For tne Arcadian population 

' Diodor. xi. 21. only by the Scholiast on v. 167, 

* Fausan. v. 27, 1, 2. We find the where Agdsias is rightly termed 
elder Dionysius, about a century both 'Apxa<; and Supaxooioc; 1i}ut 
afterwards, transferring the entire also by the better evidence of 
freepopnlationof conquered towns Pindar's own expressions— ouvoi« 
(Kaulonia and Hipponium in Italy, xiarigp xt toIv xXeivav Supaxoaaoiv— 
Ac.) to Syracuse (Diodor. xiy. 106, olxoOev otxaSz, with reference to 
107). Stjrmph&lus and Syracuse— 6u' dYxu- 

* See the sixth Olympic Ode of pai (v. 6, 99, lOlel 66-174). 
]?indar, addressed to the Syracnsan Ergotelds, an exile from EnOssns 
Agdsias. The Scholiast on v. 6 of inKrete, must have migrated some- 
that ode — ^who says that not Agd- where about this time to Himera 
sias himself, but some of his pro- in Sicily. See the twelfth Olympio 
genitors migrated from Stymph&lus Ode of Pindar. 

to Syracuse— is contradicted not 

Chap. XLni, TOWEB OF OELO. 71 

were poor, brave, and ready for mercenary soldiership; 
while the service of a Greek despot in Sicily must have 
been more attractive to them than tnat of Xerxes. ^ More- 
over durinff the ten years between the battles of Mara- 
thon and Salamisy when not only so large a portion of the 
Greek cities had become subject to Persia, but the prospect 
of Persian invasion hung like a cloud over Greece Proper 
— ^the increased feeling of insecurity throughout the 
latter probably rendered emigration to Sicily unusually 

These circumstances in part explain the immense 
power and position which Herodotus represents Gelo to 
have enjoyed, towards the autumn of 481 B.C., when the 
Greeks from the Isthmus of Corinth, confederated to resist 
Xerxes, sent to solicit his aid. He was then im- power of 
perial leader of Sicily: he could oflfer to the <*eio when 
Greeks (so the historian tells us) 20,000 hopHtes, ftonf sJSrta 
200 triremes, 2000 cavalry, 2000 archers, 2000 and Athena 
slingers, 2000 light-armed horse, besides furnish- entxeaV* 
ing provisions for the entire Grecian force as his aid- 
long as the war might last, 2 If this numerical ■•°* *®^' 
statement could be at all trusted (which I do not believe), 
Herodotus would be much within the truth in saying, that 
there was no other Hellenic power which would bear the 
least comparison with that of Gelo: 3 and we may well 
assume such general superiority to be substantially true, 
though the numbers above-mentioned may be an empty 
boast rather than a reality. 

Owing to the great power of Gelo, we now for the first 
time trace an incipient tendency in Sicily to com- pj^^g ^f 
bined and central operations. It appears that Geio for 
Gelo had formed the plan of uniting the Greek J*'g®Sf ^JjiJ; 
forces in Sicily for the purpose of expelling the Hellenism 
Carthaginians and Egestseans, either wholly or Jf^^^ric**** 
partially, from their maritime possessions in the interests 
western comer of the island, and of avenging ^ *^® 
the death of the Spartan prince Dorieus — -that 

> Herodot. viii. 26. ^pxT), snoh as that of the Athenians, 

* Herodot. vii. 167. ab 5e 8uvdi(Ai6c and is less strong than x^pavvoc. 

re ijxti? ^t-(6LXri<i, xal [koXpi xot x^c The numerical statement is con- 

*EXXi6oc o6x tXoxlaxT) |A«xa, fipxovxl tained in the speech composed by 

ft SixeXirjc: and even still stronger, Herodotus for Gelo (vii. 168). 

c. 163. eu>v 2ixeXl7)« xupavvo?. ■ Herodot. vii. 146. xo 8t riXu>vo< 
The word &px*^^ corresponds with 



he even attempted, though in vain, to induce the Spar- 
tans and other central Greeks to cooperate in this plan — and 
that upon their refusal, he had in part executed it with 
the Sicilian forces alone, i We have nothing but a brief 
and vague allusion to this exploit, wherein Gelo appears 
as the chief and champion of Hellenic against barbaric 
interests in Sicily — the forerunner of Dionysius, Timoleon, 
and Agathokles. But he had already begun to conceive 
himself, and had already been recognised by others, in this 
commanding position, when the envoys of Sparta, Athens, 
Spartan Corinth, &c., reached him from the Isthmus of 
and Athe- Corinth, in 481 B.C., to entreat his aid for the 
vo^ ^appiy repulse of the vast host of invaders about to 
to Gelo— cross the Hellespont. Gelo, after reminding 
his answer, ^jj^^ ^j^^t they had refused a similar application 
for aid from him, said that, far from requiting them at the 
hour of need in the like ungenerous spirit, he would bring 
to them an overwhelming reinforcement (the numbers as 
given by Herodotus have been already stated), but upon 
one condition only — that he should be .recognised as ge- 
neralissimo of the entire Grecian force against the Persians. 
His oflfer was repudiated, with indignant scorn, by the 

lepi^Y^taTa f&t^dXa iXiytTO ttvat* o^Sa- we have no farther information 

fLU)v ^EXXiQvtxibv T<i>v ou icoXXov |jLsCu>. respecting the events which these 

' Herodot. yii. 168. Gelo says to words glance at. They seem to 

the envoys from Peloponnesus — indicate that the Carthaginians and 

'Av8pe< "EXXtjvcc, Xdyov I/ovtc^ icXeo- Egestseanshad made some encroach- 

vexTiQv, etoXiJLi^aaTC c|jLe o6|jL(tayov iirl ments and threatened to make more : 

Tov pdp^apov icapaxaXsovTtc eXGstv. that Gelo had repelled them by 

AuToi 8c, i\kth icpixspov 6e7)QivToc actual and successful war. t 

f)7p3apixou OTparou oo^ttiza'^aaHixXf think it strange however that he 

lit (tot irpoc Kap)rif)Soviouc vetxo< should be made to say— "Foti (the 

oov^itTo, t^tiffX'^TCTOvTd? TS Tov Atopiioc Pcloponnesians) have derived great 

Tou 'Ava^av8piStu> icp6^ 'EYcsxaltuv and signal advantages from these 

•povov ixitpiQ^aoQaii OitoTtlvovti?. Tt sea-ports" — the profit derived from 

xa i(tT:6pta auvtXsuQspouV} die' (uv the latter by fAe PeZopotine«tana can 

0(Aiv {jieYdXaii dxptXlai xt xal titau- never have been so great as to be 

peait< '^v^6>ta9t.' o&xe i[xtu etvsxa singled out in this pointed manner* 

^XQtxt Potj^i^oovxtc, o&xe x6v Au>ptto< I should rather have expected — 

96VOV ix7tpT)56|i.tvoi* x6 6ixax* b\ki<x^, d«' u)v ijjAiv (and not die' u>v 0(«.tv) 

xdSt Sicavxa bico f)apf)dpoiai >i{jLexai. — which must have been true in 

'AXXo ih 7 dp TjjjLiv xal ewl xh ojitivov point of fact, and will be found 

xaxioxrj* vov 8s, ewtiSyj icepiaXi^XoS* 6 to read quite consistently with 

ic6Xs|j.o< xal dntxxai ic Ofiiiac, ouxtt) the general purport of Gelo*a 

6f) FiXwvoc (tv^oxt^ Yiyovt. speech. 

It is much to be regretted that 


Spartan envoy: and Gelo then so far abated in his demand, 
as to be content with the commaDd either of the land force 
or the naval force, whichever might be judged preferable. 
But here the Athenian envoy interposed his protest — "We 
are sent here (said he) to ask for an army, and not for a 
general; and thou givest us the army, only in order to make 
thyself general. Know, that even if the Spartans would 
allow thee to command at sea, we would not. The naval 
command is ours, if they decline it: we Athenians, the 
oldest nation in Greece — the only Greeks who have never 
migrated from home^ — whose leader before Troy stands 
proclaimed by Homer as the best of all the Greeks for 
marshalling and keeping order in an army — we, who more- 
over furnish the largest naval contingent in the fleet — we 
will never submit to be commanded by a Syracusan." 

"Athenian stranger (replied Gelo), ye seem to be pro- 
vided with commanders, but ye are not likely to have 
soldiers to be commanded. Te may return as soon as you 
please, and tell the Greeks that their year is deprived of 
its spring." * 

That envoys were sent from Peloponnesus to solicit 
assistance from Gelo against Xerxes, and that they solicited 
in vain, is an incident not to be disputed: but the reason 
assigned for refusal — conflicting pretensions about the 
supreme command — may be suspected to have arisen less 
from historical transmission, than from the conceptions of 
the historian, or of his informants, respecting the relations 
between the parties. In his time, Sparta, Athens, and 
Syracuse were the three great imperial cities of Greece; 
and his Sicilian witnesses, proud of the great past power 
of Gelo, might well ascribe to him that competition for pre- 
eminence and command which Herodotus has dramatised. 
The immense total of forces which Gelo is made to promise 
becomes the more incredible, when we reflect that he had 
another and a better reason for refusing aid altogether. 
He was attacked at home, and was fully employed in defend- 
ing himself. 

■ Herodot. vii. 161, 162. Polybins of the answer which they made to 

(zii. 26) does not seem to have Gelo : an answer (not insolent, 

read this embassy as related by but) business-like and evasive — 

Herodotus— or at least he must itpaYfiaTutOTatov ditdxpipia, Ac. See 

have preferred some other account Timseus, Fragm. 87, ed. Didot. 
of it. He gives a different account 



The same spring which brought Xerxes across the 
480 B Hellespont into Greece, also witnessed a for- 

Oarthagi- midable Carthaginian invasion of Sicily. Gelo 
Tl8?on°"of ^*^ already been engaged in war against them 
fiiciij, ii- (as has been above stated) and had obtained 
with^the^'*' successes, which they would naturally seek the 
Invasion of first Opportunity of retrieving. The vast Per- 
Greece by gjan invasion of Greece, organised for three years 
before, and drawing contingents not onl^ from 
the whole eastern world, but especially from their own 
metropolitan brethren at Tyre and Sidon, was well calculated 
to encourage them: and there seems good reason for be- 
lieving that the simultaneous attack oH the Greeks both in 
Peloponnesus and in Sicily, was concerted between the 
Carthaginians and Xerxes * — probably by the Phoenicians 
on behalf of Xerxes. Nevertheless this alliance does not 
exclude other concurrent circumstances in the interior of 
the island, which supplied the Carthaginians both with in- 
vitation and with help. Agrigentum, though not under 
the dominion of Gelo, was ruled by his friend and relative 
Th^ro ; while B>he^um and MessSne under the government 
of Anaxilaus, — Himera under that of his father-in-law 
Terillus — and Selinus, — seem to have formed an imposing 
minority amonff the Sicilian Greeks ; at variance with Gelo 
andThSro,but m amity and correspondence with Carthage. 2 
It was seemingly about the year 481 b.c, that Thero, per- 
haps invited by an Himersean party, expelled from Himera 
the despot Terillus, and became possessed of the town. 
Terillus applied for aid to Carthage; backed by his son-in- 
law Anaxilaus, who espoused the quarrel so warmly, as 
even to tender his own children as hostages to Hanulcar 
the Carthaginian Suffet or general, the personal friend or 
guest of Terillus. The application was favourably enter- 
tained, and Hamilkar, arriving at Panormus in the event- 
ful year 480 b.c, with a fleet of 3000 ships of war and a 
still larger number of store ships, disembarked a land-force 
of 300,000 men: which would even have been larger, had 

' EphoTUs, Fragment 111, ed. grounds, in my judgment. 

Didot ; Diodor. xi. 1, 20. Mitford > Herodot. vii. 166 ; Dlodor. xi. 

and Dablmann (Forschnngen, Ht- 28: compare also xlii. 66, 69. In 

ro^LOiM^Sy Ac., sect. 86, p. 186) call like manner Rheglum and MessdnA 

in question this alliance or under- formed the opposing interest to 

standing between Xerxes and the Syracuse, under Dionysius thQ 

Carthaginians ; but on no sufficient elder (Diodor. xiy. 44). 


not the vessels durying the cavalry and the chariots hap- 
pened to be dispersed by storms. ^ These numbers we can 
only repeat as we find them, without trusting them any 
farther than as proof that the armament was on ^^^ carth«- 
the most extensive scale. But the different ginianarmj 
nations of whom Herodotus reports the land- Jjf^J,^*" 
force to have consisted are trustworthy and besiege 
curious: it included Phoenicians, Libyans, j^\™®'*7 
Iberians, Ligyes, HeHsyki, Sardinians, and Cor- Himera— 
sicans.2 This is the first example known to us complete 
of those numerous mercenary armies which it gained o^er 
was the poHcy of Carthage to compose of nations *J«™ ^J 
different in race and language, ^ in order to ob- 
viate conspiracy or mutiny against the generaL 

Having landed at Panormus, Hamilkar marched to 
SLimera, dragged his vessels on shore under the shelter of 
a rampart, and then laid siege to the town; while the 
Himerians, reinforced by There and the army of Agriff en- 
tum, determined on an obstinate defence, and even bricked 
up the gates. Pressing messages were despatched to solicit 
aid from Gelo, who collected his whole force, said to have 
amounted to 50,000 foot and 5000 horse, and marched to 
Himera. His arrival restored the courage of the inhabit- 
ants, and after some partial fighting, which turned out to 
the advantage of the Greeks, a general battle ensued. It 
was obstinate and bloody, lasting from sunrise until late 
in the afternoon ; and its success was mainly determined by 
an intercepted letter which fell into the hands of Gelo — a 
communication from the Selinuntines to Hamilkar, promis- 
ing to send a body of horse to his aid, and intimating the 
time at which they would arrive. A party of Gelo's horse, 
instructed to personate this reinforcement from Selinus, 
were received into the camp of Hamilkar, where they spread 
consternation and disorder, and are even said to have slain 
the general and set fire to the ships ; while the Greek army, 

> Herodot. (vii. 165) and Diodor, Niebuhr considers them to have 
(zi. 20) both give the number of been the Volaei: an ingenious 
the land-force : the latter alone conjecture. 

giyes that of the fleet. * Polyb. i. 67. His description 

> Herodot. yii. 166. The Ligyes of the mutiny of the Carthaginian 
came from the southern junction mercenaries, after the conclusion 
of Italy and France ; the Gulfs of of the first Panic war, is highly 
lijons and Genoa. The Helisyki instructive. 

Ctennot be satisfactorily verified; 



brought to action at this opportune moment, at length suc- 
ceeded in triumphing over both superior numbers and a 
determined resistance. If we are to believe Diodorus^ 
150;000 men were slain on the side of the Carthaginians; 
the rest fled — partly to the Sikanian mountains where they 
became prisoners of the Agrigentines — partly to a hilly 
ground, where, from want of water, they were obliged to 
surrender at discretion. Twenty ships alone escaped with 
a few fugitives, and these twenty were destroyed by a 
storm on the passage, so that only one small boat arrived 
at Carthage with the disastrous tidings. ^ Dismissing such 
unreasonable exaggerations, we can only venture to assert 
that the battle was strenuously disputed, the victory 
complete, and the slain as well as the prisoners numerous. 
The body of Hamilkar was never discovered, in spite of 
careful search ordered by Gelo : the Carthaginians amrmed, 
that as soon as the defeat of his army became irreparable^ 
he had cast himself into the great sacrificial fire wherein 
he had been offering entire victims (the usual sacrifice con- 
sisting only of a small part of the beast 2) to propitiate the 
gods, and had there been consumed* The Carthaginians 
erected funereal monuments to him, graced with periodical 
sacrifices, both in Carthage and in their principal colonies: ^ 
on the field of battle itself also, a monument was raised to 
him by the Greeks. On that monument, seventy years 

' Diodor. xi. 21-24. kar was son of a Syracnsan 

* Herodotus, rii. 167. 9<b{jLaTa mother: a carious proof of connU' 
Z\oL xaxaYiCuiv. This passage of bium between Carthage and Syra- 
Herodotus receives illustration cuse. At the moment when the 
from the learned comment of Mo- elder Dionysius declared war 
vers on the Phoenician inscription against Carthage, in 898 B.C., there 
recently discovered at Marseilles, were many Carthaginian merchants 
It was the usual custom of the dwelling both in Syracuse and in 
Jews, and it had been in old times other Greco-Sicilian cities, to* 
the custom with the Phoenicians gether with ships and other pro- 
(Porphyr. de Abstin. iv. 15), to perty. Dionysius gave licence to 
bum the victim entire: the Phoe- the Syracusans, at the first instant 
nicians departed from this prac- when he had determined on de* 
tice, but the departure seems to daring war, to plunder all this pro- 
have been considered as not strictly perty (Diodor. xiv. 46). This speedy 
correct, and in times of great mis- multiplication of Carthaginians 
fortune or anxiety the old habit with merchandise in the Grecian 
was resumed (Movers, Das Opfer- cities so soon after a bloody war 
wesen der Karthager. £reslau, had been concluded, is a strong 
1847, p. 71-118). proof of the spQutaneous tenden- 

* Herodot. vii. 166, 167. Hamil- cies of trade. 


afterwards, his victorious grandson, fresh from the plunder 
of this same city of Himera, offered the hloody sacrifice of 
3000 Grecian prisoners.! 

We may presume that Anaxilaus with the forces of 
Rhegium shared in the defeat of the foreign in- g^ rem»o 
vader whom he had called in, and probahly other of Geio in 
Greeks besides. All of them were now com- Sicily— he 
polled to sue for peace from Gelo, and to solicit peace to 
the privilege of being enrolled as his dependent * J® ^*'' 
allies, which was granted to them without any 
harder imposition than the tribute probably involved in 
that relation. 2 Even the Carthaginians themselves were 
so intimidated by the defeat, that they sent envoys to ask for 
peace at Syracuse, which they are said to have obtained 
mainly by the solicitation of Damarete wife of Gelo, on con- 
dition of paying 2000 talents to defray the costs of the 
war, and of erecting two temples in which the terms of the 
treaty were to be permanently recorded. ^ If we could 
believe the assertion of Theophrastus, Gelo exacted from 
the Carthaginians a stipulation that they would for the 
fhture abstain from human sacrifices in their religious wor» 
ship.^ But such an interference with foreign religious rites 
would be unexampled in that age, and we know moreover 
that the practice was not permanently discontinued at 
Carthage.* Indeed we may considerably suspect that Dio* 
dorus, copying from writers like Ephorus and Timaeus, long 
after the events, has exaggerated considerably the defeats 
the humiliation, and the amercement of the Carthaginians. 
For the words of the poet Pindar, a very few years after 
the battle of Himera^ represent a fresh Carthaginian 

A Diodor. xiii. 62. According to ent from Diodorus. Under such 

Herodotus, the hattle of Himera circumstances, I cannot venture 

took place on the same day as to trust the details given by the 

-that of Salamis ; according to Di. latter. 

odorus, on the same day as that * I presume this treatment of 
of Thermopylae. If we are forced Anaxilaus by Gelo must be alluded 
to choose between the two wit- to in Diodorus, xl. 66: at least 
Besses, there can be no hesitation it is difficult to understand what 
in preferring the former: but it other "great benefit" Gelo had con- 
seems more probable that neither ferred on Anaxilaus, 
is correct. * Diodor. xi. 26. 

As far as we can judge from the * Schol. ad Pindar. Pyth. ii. 8; 

brief allusions of Herodotus, he Plutarch, De Ser& Numinis Yindi- 

most have conceived the battle of ct&, p. 652, c. 6. 

Himera in » manner totally differ- * Diodor. xx. 14. 

78 HI8T0BT 01* GBEEOB. Pxbt H. 

invasion as matter of present uneasiness and alarm: ^ and the 
Carthaginian fleet is found engaged in aggressive warfare 
on the coast of Italy, requiring to be coerced by the brother 
and successor of G-elo. 

The victory of Himera procured for the Sicilian cities 
Conduct of immunity from foreign war, together with a large 
Geio to- plunder. Splendid offerings of thanksgiving to 
confederate ^^® g^ds were dedicated in the temples of 
Greeks who Himera, Syracuse, and Delphi; while the epi- 
tending^' grsLm of Simonides,* composed for the tripod 
against offered in the latter temple, described Q-elo with 
Xerxes. j^-g ^j^p^g brothers Hiero, Polyzelus, and Thrasy- 
bulus, as the joint liberators of Greece from the Barbarian, 
along with the victors of Salamis and Flatsea. And the 
Sicilians alleged that he was on the point of actually send- 
ing reinforcements to the Greeks against Xerxes, in spite 
of the necessity of submitting to Spartan command, when 
the intelligence of the defeat and retreat of that prince 
reached him. But we find another statement decidedly 
more probable — that he sent a confidential envoy named 
Kadmus to Delphi with orders to watch the turn of the 
Xerxeian invasion, and in case it should prove successful 
(as he thought that it probably would be) to tender pre- 
sents and submission to the victorious invader on behalf of 
Syracuse. 3 When we consider that until the very morning 
of the battle of Salamis, the cause of Grecian independence 
must have appeared to an impartial spectator almost 
desperate, we cannot wonder that Gelo should take pre- 
cautions for preventing the onward progress of the Per- 
sians towards Sicily, which was already sufficiently im- 
perilled by its formidable enemies in Africa. The defeat 
of the Persians at Salamis and of the Carthaginians at 
Himera cleared away suddenly and unexpectedly the ter- 
rific cloud from Greece as well as from Sicily, and left a 
sky comparatively brilliant with prosperous hopes. 

To the victorious army of Gelo, there was abundant* 
plunder for recompense as well as distribution. Among 
the most valuable part of the plunder were the numerous 
prisoners taken, who were divided among the cities in 

1 Pindar, Kem. is. 67 (araSB.) * Herodot. rii. 168.166 : compare 
with the Scholia. Diodor. xL 26; Ephorus, Fragm. 

* Simonidds,Epigr.Ul, ed.Bnrgk. Ill, ed. DidoU 


proportion to the number of troops fumished ^ i, * 
by each. Of course the largest shares must prisoners^ 
have fallen to Syracuse and Agrigentum; while *J|^®J* f* 
the number acquired by the latter was still far- of^Himeim 
ther increased by the separate capture of those »*}J **«- 
prisoners who had dispersed throughout the among the 
mountains in and near the Agrigentine territory. Carthagi- 
All the Sicilian cities ^allied with or dependent LSJe^ * ^' 
on Gelo, but especially the two last-mentioned, prosperity, 
were thus put in possession of a number of that*©? ^ 
slaves as public property, who were kept in Agrigen- 
chains to work, * and were either employed on *^°*' 
public undertaking for defence, ornament, and religious 
solemnity — or let out to private masters so as to afford a 
revenue to the state. So great was the total of these 
public slaves at Agrigentum, that though many were em- 
ployed on state-works, which elevated the city to signal 
grandeur during the flourishing period of seventy years 
which intervened between the recent battle and its sub- 
sequent capture by the Carthaginians — there nevertheless 
remained great numbers to be let out to private individuals, 
some of whom had no less than Ave hundred slaves respect- 
ively in their employment. 2 

The peace which now ensued left Gelo master of 
Syracuse and Gela, with the Chalkidic Greek Death and 
towns on the east of the island; while Thero obsequies 
governed in Agrigentum, and his son Thrasy- ^^ ^"^^• 
dsBUs in Himera. In power as well as in reputation, Gelo 
was unquestionably the chief person in the island; more- 
over he was connected by marriage, and lived on terms of 
uninterrupted friendship, with Thero. His conduct, both 
at Syracuse and towards the cities dependent upon him, 
was mild and conciliating. But his subsequent career 
was very short: he died of a dropsical complaint not much 
more than a year after the battle of Himera, while the 

> Diodor. xi. 26. al 8i ic6Xei<8U rodot. i. 66; iii. 39. 
«48a? xaTiaxTQoav to6« 8iaipe9evToc • Diodor. xi. 26. Bespecting 

al/jiaXwTouC; xal t& SY)(jL6oia tu)v slayes belonging to the public, 

■ epT<0v 8ta tootudv iiceoxeuaCov. and let out for hire to individual 

Vox analogous instances of cap- employers, compare the large fi- 
tly es taken in war being employed nancial project conceived by Xe- 
in public works by the captors, nophon, De Yectigalibns, oapp. 3 
and labouring in chains, see the and 4. 
cases of Tegea and Samoa in He- 




glories of that day were fresh in every one's recollection. 
As the Syracusan law rigorously interdicted expensive 
funerals, Gelo had commanded that his own obsequies 
should be conducted in strict conformity to the law: never- 
theless the zeal of his successor as well as the attachment 
of the people disobeyed these commands. The great mass 
of citizens followed his funeral procession from the city to 
the estate of his wife, fifteen miles distant: nine massive 
towers were erected to distinguish the spot; and the 
solemnities of heroic worship were rendered to him. The 
respectful recollections of the conqueror of Himera never 
afterwards died out among the Syracusan people, though 
his tomb was defaced first by the Carthaginians, and after- 
wards by the despot of Agathokles.* And when we re- 
collect the destructive effects caused by the subsequent 
Carthaginian invasions, we shall be sensible how great 
was the debt of gratitude owing to Gelo by his contem- 

It was not merely as conqueror of Himera, but as a 
„ sort of second founder of Syracuse, 2 that Gelo 

of new was thus Solemnly worshipped. The size, the 
** h^^^G 1 strength, and the population, of the town were 
had intro- &11 greatly increased under him. Besides the 
duced at number of the new inhabitants which he brought 
yracuse. £j.qjjj Q-^la, the Hyblsean Megara, and the Sicilian 
Euboea, we are informed that he also inscribed on the 
roll of citizens no less than 10,000 mercenary soldiers. It 
will moreover appear that these new-made citizens were in 
possession of the islet of Ortygia^ — the interior stronghold 
of Syracuse. It has already been stated that Ortygia was 
the original settlement, and that the city did not overstep 
the boundaries of the islet before the enlargements of 
Gelo. We do not know by what arrangements G^lo 
provided new lands for so large a number of new-comers: 
but when we come to notice the antipathy with which 
these latter were regarded by the remaining citizens, we 
shall be inclined to believe that the old citizens had been 
dispossessed and degraded. 

Gelo left a son in tender years, but his power passed, 
by his own direction, to two of his brothers, Polyzelus 

> Diodor. zi. 88, 67: Plutarch, mann. 
Timoleon, o. 29 ; Aristotle TtXtboDv ' Diodor. zi. 49. 
noXtteia; Fragm. p. 106, ed. Keu- * Diodor. zi. 72, 78. 


and Hiero; the former of whom married the widow of 
the deceased prince, and was named, according ^ ^ ^^^ 
to his testamentary directions, commander of * * 
the military force — while Hiero was intended to enjoy the 
government of the city. Whatever may have been the 
wishes of Gelo, however, the real power fell to Hiero, bro- 
Hiero: a man of enercnr and determination, and *5!L***^ 

. ' , X ®*' i» J. X •«cceMor 

munmcent as a patron of contemporarv poets, of Geio at 
Pindar, Simonides, Bacchylides, Epicharmus, ?;ii*^'y'®7 
^schylus, and others ; but the victim of a painful his brother 
internal complaint — jealous in his temper — ^har'h^' 
cruel, and rapacious in his government ^ — and a ruler— 
noted as an organizer of that systematic quarrel 
espionage which broke up all freedom of speech Hiero of 
amonff his subjects. Especially jealous of his ®y'*SJi'.® 
brother PolyzSlus, who was very popular in the SJiXn- 
city, he despatched him on a military expedition *"™~JP" 
against the Krotoniates, with a view of indirectly ?h *'poet ^ 
accomplishing his destruction. But Polyzelus, Bimonidfts. 
aware of the snare, fled to Agrigentum, and sought pro- 
tection from ,his brother-in-law the despot Thero; from 
whom Hiero redemanded him, and on receiving a refusal, 
prepared to enforce the demand by arms. He had already 
advanced on his march as far as the river Oela, but no 
actual battle appears to have taken place. It is interesting 
to hear that Simonides the poet, esteemed and rewarded 
by both these princes, was the mediator of peace between 
them. 2 

The temporary breach, and sudden reconciliation, 
between these two powerful despots, proved geyere 
the cause of sorrow and ruin at Himera. That treatment 
city, under the dominion of the Agrigentine habitant^ 
Thero, was administered by his son Thrasydaeus of Himera 
— a youth whose oppressive conduct speedily ^^ Th6ro. 
excited the strongest antipathy. The Himerseans, knowing 
that they had little chance of redress from Thero against 
his son, took advantage of the quarrel between him and 

* Diodor. xi. 67; Aristotel. Poll- monitions and hints sufficient! j 

tic. T. 9, 8. In spite of the com- attest the real character (see Dissen 

pliments directly paid by Pindar ad Pindar. Pyth. i. and ii. p. 161- 

to Hiero (icpauc daxoK, o6 fSoviwv 182). 

if A^otc, ^tlvotc 8i OauftaaToc Kaxiljp, * Diodor. xi. 48 ; Schol. Pindar, 

Pyth. iii. 71«126), hit indirect ad- Olymp. it 29. 

VOL. V. Q 



Hiero to make propositions to the latter, and to entreat 
his aid for the expulsion of Thrasydseus, tendering them- 
selves as subjects of Syracuse. It appears that Kapys 
and Hippokrates, cousins of Thero, but at variance with 
him, and also candidates for the protection of Hiero, were 
concerned in this scheme for detaching Himera from the 
dominion of Thero. But so soon as peace had been con- 
cluded, Hiero betrayed to Thero both the schemes and the 
malcontents at Himera. "We seem to make out that Kapys 
and Hippokrates collected some forces to resist Thero, but 
were defeated by him at the river Himera :* his victory 
was followed up by seizing and putting to death a large 
number of Himersean citizens. So great was the number 
slain, coupled with the loss of others who fled for fear of 
being slain, that the population of the city was sensibly 
and inconveniently diminished. Thero invited and enrolled 
a large addition of new citizens, chiefly of Dorian blood. 2 
The power of Hiero, now reconciled both with Thero 
Power and and with his brother Polyzelus, is marked by 
«pioit8 of several circumstances as noway inferior to that 
against the of Gelo, and probably the greatest, not merely 
^fim8*a *d ^^ Sicily, but throughout the Grecian worli 
Tyrrhe- The citizens of the distant city of Cumse, on the 
nians— coast of Italy, harassed by Carthaffinian and 

affainst . *' *" ^ 

Anaxiiaus Tyrrhenian fleets, entreated his aid, and received 

--he founds from him a squadron which defeated and drove 

MxuiJ- ° off" their enemies: 3 he even settled a Syracusan 

new whole- colony in the neighbouring island of Pithekusa. 

plantation Anaxilaus, despot of £.hegmm and Messene, had 

of inhabit- attacked, and might probably have overpowered, 

p?iment8°of his neighbours the Epizephyrian Lokrians; but 

Pindar. the menaces of Hiero, invoked by the Lokrians, , 
and conveyed by the envoy Chromius, compelled him to 

1 Schol. ad Pindar. Olymp. ii. 178. * Diodor. xi. 48, 49. 

For the few facts which can be * The brazen helmet, discorered 

made out respecting the family and near the site of Olympia with the 

genealogy of Thdro, see 0811er, name of Hiero and the victory at 

De Situ et Origine Syracusarum, Gum» inscribed on it, yet remains 

ch. yii. p. 19-22. The Scholiasts of as an interesting relic to 00m- 

Pindar are occasionally useful in memorate this erent : it was among 

explaining the brief historical al- the offerings presented by Hiero 

lusions of the poet; but they seem to the Olympic Zeus: see Boeckh, 

to haye had very few trustworthy Corp. Inscriptt. Gr»c. No. 16; part 

materials before them for so doing, i. p. Si. 



Chap. Xliin. POWEB OF HIEBO. 83 

desist. 1 Those heroic honours, which in Greece belonged 
to the (Ekist of a new city, were yet wanting to him. He 
procured them by the foundation of the new city of -^tna,* 
on the site and in the' place of Katana, the inhabitants of 
which he expelled, as well as those of Naxos. While 
these Naxians and Elatanseans were directed to take up 
their abode at Leontini along with the existing inhabitants, 
ELiero planted 10,000 new inhabitants in his adopted city 
of ^tna; 5000 of them from Syracuse and Gela — with an 
equal number from Peloponnesus. They served as an 
auxiliary force, ready to be called forth in the event of 
discontents at Syracuse, as we shall see by the history of 
his successor: he gave them not only the territory which 
had before belonged to Katana, but also a large addition 
besides, chiefly at the expense of the neighbouring Sikel 
tribes. His son Deinomenes, and his friend and confidant 
Chromius, enrolled as an JStnsean, became joint ad- 
ministrators of the city, whose religious and socisd customs 
were assimilated to the Dorian model. 3 Pindar dreams 
of future relations between the despot and citizens of 
^tna, analogous to those between king and citizens at 
Sparta. Hoth Hiero and Chromius were proclaimed as 
iBtnseans at the Pythian and Nemean games, when their 
chariots gained victories ; on which occasion the assembled 
crowd heard for the first time of the new Hellenic city of 
^tna. "We see, by the compliments of Pindar,* that 
Hiero was vain of Ins new title of founder. But we must 

* Diodor. xi. 51 ; Pindar, i. 74 » Chromius iiclTponoc t^c ATtvijc 
(ssl40); ii. 17 (===85) with the Scho- (Schol. Find. Nem. ix. 1). About 
lia; Epicharmus, Fragment, p. 19, the Dorian institutions of ^tna, 
ed.Krusemann; Schol. Pindar. Pyth. Ac, Pindar, Pyth. i. 60-71. 

i. 93; Strabo, v. p. 247. Deinomenes surrived his father, 

* *Hp<ov olxt atiQC dvxlTUpiv ftnd commemorated the Olympic 
ifou PooX6(ttvoc tlvat, KaTivY]v Tictories of the latter by costly 
e(cX«l>v AtTv-y]v (UTtov^ftaat tiqv ic6Xtv, offerings at Olympia (Pausan. yi. 
iauTOvoUtoTTjvicpooaYopcuaac (Schol. 12, 1). 

ad Pindar. Nem. i. 1). « Pindar. Pyth. i. 60 (sll7); iii. 

Compare the subsequent case of 69 (sl2l). Pindar, ap. Btrabo. yi. 

the foundation of Thurii, among p. 269. Compare Nemea, ix. 1-80, 

the citizens of which yiolent dis- addressed to Chromius. Hiero is 

pates arose, in determining who proclaimed in some odes as a Sy- 

sbould be recognised as OSkist of racusan: but Syracuse and the 

the place. On referring to the newly-founded .^tna are inti- 

oracle, Apollo directed them to mately joined together : see Nemea, 

oommemorate him§€lf as <^ki8t i. inii. 
(Diodor. xii. 86). 




Pabt H. 

remark that it was procured, not, as in most cases, by 
planting Greeks on a spot previously barbarous, but by 
the dispossession and impoverishment of other Grecian 
citizens, who seem to have given no ground of offence. 
Both in Gelo and Hiero we see the first exhibition of that 

Eropensity to violent and wholesale transplantation of in- 
abitants from one seat to another, which was not un- 
common among Assyrian and Persian despots, and which 
was exhibited on a still larger scale by the successors of 
Alexander the Great in their numerous new-built cities. 
Anaxilaus of B/hegium died shortly after that message 
. of Hiero wmch had compelled him to spare the 
Anaxilaus Lokriaus. Such was the esteem entertained for 
**iu^^^and ^^® memory, and so efficient the government of 
of^'Hiftro Mikythus, a manumitted slave whom he con- 
tuiif^Th^Sl stituted regent, that Rhegium and Messene 
8yd«u8,8on Were preserved for his children, yet minors. * 
*'^i^'**A*' "^^^ * ^^^^ more important change in Sicily wag 
gentum and caused by the death of the Agrigentine There, 
Himera. which took place seemingly about 472 b.c. This 
govern- prince, a partner with Gelo in the great victory 
over the Carthaginians, left a reputation of 
good government as well as ability among the 
Agrigentines, which we find perpetuated in the 
laureat strains of Pindar: and his memory 
doubtless became still farther endeared from comparison 
with his son and successor. Thrasydseus, now master both 
of Himera and Agrigentum, displayed on a larger scale 
the same oppressive and sanguinary dispositions which 
had before provoked rebellion at the former city. Feeling 
himself detested by his subjects, he enlarged the mihtary 
force which had been left by his father, and engaged so 
many new mercenaries, that he became master of a force 
of 20,000 men, horse and foot. And in his own territory, 
perhaps he might long have trodden with impunity in the 
footsteps of Phalaris, had he not imprudently provoked 
his more powerful neighbour Hiero. In an obstinate and 
murderous battle between these two princes, 2000 men 
were slain on the side of the Syracusans, and 4000 on that 
of the Agrigentines: an immense slaughter, considering 
that it mostly fell upon the Greeks in the two armies, ana 
Bot upon the non-Hellenic mercenaries. > Hut the defeat 

* Justin, iy. 2. > So I conceive the words of * 

he is de- 
feated by 
Hiero and 


Chap THBASTD^US. 85 

of Thrasydseus was so complete, that be was compelled to 
flee not^only from Agrigentum, but from Sicily: be retired 
to Megara in Greece I^roper, where he was condemned to 
death and perished. ^ The Agrigentines, thus happily 
released from their oppressor, sued for and obtained peace 
from Blero. They are said to have established a demo- 
cratical government, but we learn that Hiero sent many 
citizens into banishment from Agrigentum and Himera, as 
well as from Qela,^ nor can we doubt that all the three 
were numbered among his subject cities. The moment of 
freedom only commenced for them when the Qelonian dy- 
nasty shared the fate of the Theronian. 

The victory over Thrasydseus rendered Hiero more 
completely master of Sicily than his brother ^ 
Gelo had been before him. The last act which power of 
we hear of him is, his interference on behalf of S**^'^*'*/' 
his brothers-in-law, 3 the sons of Anaxilaus of ot\hT^ 
Bhegium, who were now of age to govern. He f?^*!'*'"^ 
encouraged them to prefer, and probably show- 
ed himself ready to enforce, their claim against Miln^hus, 
who had administered Rhegium since the death of Anaxi. 
laus, for the property as well as the sceptre. Mikythus 
complied readily with the demand, rendering an account so 
exact and faithful, that the sons of Anaxilaus themselves 
entreated him to remain and govern — or more probably to 
lend his aid to their government. This request he was 
wise enough to refuse: he removed his own property and 
retired to Tegea in Arcadia. Hiero died shortly after- 

DiodoroB are to be understood—- patot. 

itXeiaTOi Tu)v napaTa^ajtlvcov 'EXXi^- ■ HJero had married the daughter 

v<uv itpbc *£XXi)va<; iictaov (Diodor. of Anaxilaus, but he seems also to 

xi. 63). have had two other wires — the 

' Diodor. xi. 63. ixtl Oavdlxou xa- sister or cousin of Thftro , and the 

TafvtoaOelc iteXeOxijotv. This is a daughter of a Byracusan named 

remarkable specimen of the feeling Nikoklds : this last was the mother 

in a foreign city towards an oppres- of his son Deinomenfts (Schol. 

sire TUpavvoc. The Megarians of Pindar. Pyth. i. 112). 

Greece Proper were much con- We read of Kleophron son of 

nected with Sicily, through the Hy- Anaxilaus, governing Mess6n6 

blcean Megara, as well as Selinus. during his father's lifetime : prob- 

* Diodor. xi. 76. Ol xata ttjv ably this young man must have 

*lipu>vo« Suvaaxclav ixiceicTu)x6Tcc ix died, otherwise Mikythus would 

TU)v I8ia>v ic6Xt(i>v~To6Ttt>^ f ^aav not have succeeded (Schol. Pindar. 

FeXuboi xal 'AxpiTf^vTwoi xol *Iuls- Pyth. ii. 84). 


■ «.- 


:wards, of the complaint under which he had so long suffer ed, 
after a reign of ten years, i 

On the death of Hiero, the succession was disputed 
between his brother Thrasybulus, and his ne- 
Thrasybu- P^^w the vouthful SOU of Gelo, SO that the part- 
ing' bxother isans of the family became thus divided. Thra- 
and sue- gybulus, surroundiuff his nephew with tempta- 

cessor of .y ,', . ^ -, * x-jxj. 

Hiero— tious to luxurious pleasure, contrived to put 
disputes jjim indirectly aside, and thus to seize the 
members government for himself. 2 This family division — 
of the Geio- ^ curse often resting upon the blood-relations 
mfiy— " of Grecian despots, and leading to the greatest 
Cruelties atrocities 3 — coupled with the conduct of Thra- 
puiarity^of sybulus himself, caused the downfall of the 
Thrasybu- mighty Gelonian dynasty. The bad qualities 
mutiny of Hiero were now seen greatly exaggerated, 
against hut without his accompanying energy, in Thra- 
Ssnracuse. sybulus; who put to death many citizens, and 
banished still more, for the purpose of seizing 
their property, until at length he provoked among the 
Syracusans intense and universal hatred, shared even 
by many of the old Gelonian partisans. Though he 
tried to strengthen himself by increasing his mercenary 
force, he could not prevent a general revolt from breaking 
out among the Syracusan population. By summoning 
those cities which Hiero had planted in his new city of 
j^tna, as well as various troops from his dependent allies, 
he fouDd himself at the head of 1 5,000 men, and master of 
the inner city; that is, the islet of Ortygia, which was the 

* Diodor. xi. 66. topavvlaiv AXXTjXo^ivou? YeYevrifti- 

* Aristotel. Politic, v. 8, 19. Dio- vou?, itoXXouc hk xol 6ic6 Yuvatxu>v 
dorus does not mention the son of tu)v iauTU>v Tupdcvvoucdie^Oapfjiivouc, 
Gelo. xal &ic6 ixalpoov Y' "^^^ (jidXiaxv 

Mr. Fynes Clinton (Past! Helle- 8oxo6vxu>v flXcuv clvai : compare Iso- 

nici, App. chap. 10, p. 264 seq.) has kratgs, De Face, Orat. yiii. p. 182, 

discussed all the main points con- § 138. 

nected with Syracusan and Sicilian So also Tacitus (Hist. ▼. 9) re- 
chronology, specting the native kings of Judeea, 

* Xenophon, Hiero, iii. 8. £1 after the expulsion of the Syrian 
Tolvuv iOiXeic xaxavosiv, eOpiQosic ixev dynasty— "Sibi ipsi reges imposn- 
Touc ISitoTac Oico TouTcuv (jidXtaTa ere : qui, mobilitate yulgi ezpulsi, 
:ptXoupiivouc, Touc 8i xupdcvvouc icoX- resumptft per arma dominatione, 
Xoi)< (xiv itaiSac iauxubv antxxov-)f]x6- fugas ciyium, urbium eversiones, — 
rac, icoXXouc 6' 6tc6 icaifiu>v aOxoi)^ fratrumfConjugum^parentum^neceB 
a«oX(uX6xac, icoXXoi)^ Si dSeXcpou^ cv •^aZtaijue aolita regibua ausi,^ &o. 



primitive settlement of Syracuse, and was not only distinct 
and defensible in itself, but also contained the docks, the 
shipping, and command of the harbour. The revolted 
people on their side were masters of the outer city, better 
known under its latter name of Achradina, which lay on 
the adjacent mainland of Sicily, was surrounded by a sepa- 
rate wall of its own, and was divided from Ortygia by an 
intervening space of low ground used for burials. ^ Though 

' Bespecting the topography of 
Syracuse at the time of these dis- 
torhances, immediately preceding 
and following the fall of the Gelon- 
ian dynasty— my statements in the 
present edition will be found some- 
what modified as compared with 
the first. In describing the siege 
of the city by the Athenian army 
under Nikias, I found it necessary 
to study the local details of Thu- 
cydidds with great minuteness, be- 
sides consulting fuller modern 
authorities. The conclusion which 
I have formed will be found stated, 
— partly in the early part of chap- 
ter liz.— but chiefly in a separate 
dissertation annexed as an Appen- 
dix to that chapter, and illustrated 
by two plans. To the. latter Dis- 
sertation with its Plans, I request 
the reader to refer. 

Diodorus here states (xi. 67, 68) 
that Thrasybulus was master both 
of the Island (Ortygia) and Achra- 
dina, while the revolted Syracus- 
ans held the rest of the city, of 
which Itykd or Tychft was a part. 
He evidently conceives Syracuse 
as having comprised, in 463 b. g., 
substantially the same great space 
and the same number of four quart- 
ers or portions, as it afterwards 
came to contain tiom the time of 
the despot Dionysius down to the 
Boman empire, and as it is set forth 
in the description of Cicero (Drat, in 
Yerr. iv. 53, 118 — 120) enumerating 
the four quarters Ortygia, Achra- 
dina, Tychd, and Neapolis. I be- 
lieve this to be a mistake. I take 

the general conception of the to- 
pography of Syracuse given by 
Thucydidds in 416 B.C., as repre- 
senting in the main what it had 
been fifty years before. Thucydi- 
d6s (vi. 3) mentions only the Inner 
City, which was in the Islet of 
Ortygia (tj ic4Xi« ^ evxi?)— and the 
Outer City (f| it6Xic ^ i^co). This 
latter was afterwards known by 
the name of Achradina, though that 
name does not occur in Thucydi- 
dds. Diodorus expressly mentions 
that both Ortygia and Achradina 
had each separate fortifications 
(xi. 73). 

In these disputes connected with 
the fall of the Gelonian dynasty, 
I conceive Thrasybulus to have 
held possession of Ortygia, which 
was at all times the inner strong- 
hold and the most valuable por- 
tion of Syracuse; insomuch that 
under the Boroan dominion, Mar- 
cellus prohibited any native Syra- 
cusan from dwelling in it. (Cicero 
cont. Verr. v. 32-84. 38. 98.) The 
enemies of Thrasybulus, on the 
contrary, I conceive to have occu- 
pied Achradina. 

There is no doubt that this bi- 
section of Syracuse into two sepa- 
rate fortifications must have afford- 
ed great additional facility for 
civil dispute, if there were any 
causes abroad tending to foment 
it; conformably to a remark of 
Aristotle (Polit. v. 2, 12.), which 
the philosopher illustrates by re- 
ference to Koloph6n and xNotium. 


superior in number, yet being no match in military effi- 
ciency for the forces of Thrasybulus, they were obliged to 
invoke aid from the other cities in Sicily, as well as from 
the Sikel tribes — proclaiming the Gelonian dynasty as 
the common enemy of freedom in the island, and holding 
out universal independence as the reward of victory. It 
was fortunate for tnem that there was no brother-despot 
like the powerful Thero to espouse the cause of Thrasy- 
bulus. Gela, Agrigentum, Selinus, Himera, and even the 
Sikel tribes, all responded to the call with alacrity, so that 
a large force, both mihtary and naval, came to reinforce 
the Syracusans ; and Thrasybulus, being totally defeated, 
first in naval action, next on land, was obliged to shut him- 
self up in Ortygia, where he soon found his situation hope- 
less. He accordingly opened a negotiation with his 
opponents, which ended in his abdication and retirement 
to Lokri, while the mercenary troops whom he had # 
brought together were also permitted to depart unmo- 
lested. 1 The expelled Thrasybulus afterwards lived and 
died as a private citizen at Lokri — a very diflFerent fate 
from that which had befallen Thrasidaeus (son of Thero) 
at Megara, though both seem to have given the same 

Thus fell the powerful Gelonian dynasty at Syra- 
cuse, after a continuance of eighteen years, i Its fall 
B.C. 466. was nothing less than an extensive revolution 
"^f^Thi*****^ throughout Sicily. Among the various cities 
buiusj'and of the island there had grown up many petty 
extinction despots, each with his separate mercenary 

.of the Ge- i.*^'.* xt-*x j. j i« 

Ionian dy- force; acting as the instruments, and relying 
nasty. qu the protection, of the sreat despot at Sy- 

racuse. All these were now expelled, and governments 
more or less democratical were established everywhere. 3 
The sons of Anaxilaus maintained themselves a little 
longer at £,hegium and Messene, but the citizens of 
these two towns at length followed the general example, 
compelled them to retire,* and began their aera of 

But though the Sicilian despots had thus been ex- 
pelled, the free governments established in their place 

»8 well as to the insular and con- > Ariatotel. Politic, v. 8, 23, 

tinental portions of KlazomenoB. ' Diodor. zi. 68, 

* Diodor. ix. 67. 68. « Diodor. xi. 76. 


were exposed at first to much difficulty and collision. It 
has been already mentioned that Gelo, Hiero, pq«^i„ 
Thero, ThrasidseuSjThrasybulus, &c., had all con- yernmentg*' 
demned many citizens to exile with confiscation fn*Jn *^®* 
of property; and had planted on the soil new Sicilian 
citizens and mercenaries, in numbers no less 5^**""*^®?" 
considerable. To what race these mercenaries disputes 
belonged, we are not told: it is probable that "*'^8 **"' 
they were only in part Greeks. Such violent number 
mutations, both of persons and property, could °j^^^ ^ *^^: 
not occur without raising bitter connicts, of mercena- 
interest as well as of feelini?, between the old, '*?".,<*o: ^ 

., J iv J* J 'J. miciliated 

the new, and the dispossessed proprietors, as hj the Ge- 
soon as the iron hand of compression was re- Ionian 
moved. This source of angry dissension was com- ^'*^*^'"- 
mon to all the Sicilian cities, but in none did it flow more 
profusely than in Syracuse. In that city, the new merce- 
naries last introduced by Thrasybulus, had retired at the 
same time with him, many of them to the Hieronian city of 
iEtna, from whence they had been brought. But there 
yet remained the more numerous body introduced princi- 
pally by Gelo, partly also by Hiero; the former alone hav- 
ing enrolled 10,000, of whom more than 7000 yet remained. 
What part these Gelonian citizens had taken in the late 
revolution, we do not find distinctly stated: they seem not 
to have supported Thrasybulus as a body, and probably 
many of them took part against him. 

After the revolution had been accomplished, a public 
assembly of the Syracusans was convened, in which the 
first resolution was, to provide for the religious comme- 
moration of the event, by erecting a colossal statue of 
Zeus Eleutherius, and by celebrating an annual festival to 
be called the Eleutheria, with solemn matches and sacri- 
fices. They next proceeded to determine the political 
constitution, and such was the predominant reaction^ 
doubtless aggravated by the returned exiles, of hatred and 
fear against the expelled dynasty — that the whole body of 
new citizens, who had been domiciliated under Gelo and 
Hiero, were declared ineligible to magistracy or honour. 
This harsh and sweeping disqualification, falling at once 
upon a numerous minority, naturally provoked renewed 
irritation and civil war. The Gelonian citizens, the most 
warlike individuals in the state, and occupying, as favoured 



partisans of the previous dynasty, the inner section of 
Syracuse 1 — Ortygia — placed themselves in open revolt; 
Internal whilo the general mass of citizens, masters of 
dissensions the outer clty, were not strong enough to assail 
bafs^hT" with success this defensible position.* But 
Syracuse, they Contrived to block it up nearly altogether, 
and to intercept both its supplies and its communication 
with the country, by means of a new fortification carried 
out from the outer city towards the Great Harbour, and 
stretching between Ortygia and Epipolse. The garrison 
within could thus only obtain supplies at the cost of per- 
petual conflicts. This disastrous internal war continued 
for some months, with many partial engagements both by 
land and sea: whereby the general body of citizens became 
accustomed to arms, while a chosen regiment of 600 train- 
ed volunteers acquired especial efl&ciency. Unable to 
maintain themselves longer, the Gelonians were forced to 

> Aristotle (Politic, t. 2, 11) men- p. 282). 
tions, as one of his illustrations * Diodor. xl. 78. 01 8i 2upaxo6- 
of the mischief of receiving new oiot icdlXiv ifAictaivxtc elc 'capax'H^* 
citizens, that the Syracusans, after t6 Xoiic6v t^« icoXeux xdrea^ov, xal 
the Gelonian dynasty, admitted xb icp6< xac 'ETcticoXd^ TexpapLiiivov 
the foreign mercenaries to ci- aOxijc intTelx^ovv, xal noXXfjv do^dl- 
tizenship, and ttom hence came to Xeiav iauroU xaxtaxeuaoav* euQo Yocp 
sedition and armed conflict. But x^c ivl v/f* ^^''^pav i^65o(> xoiic d^pe- 
the incident cannot fairly be quo- axv]x6xotc tOxepu>< ctpYov xal xa^u 
ted in illustration of that prin- xu)v intxiQdslwv cicolTjoav dicopetv. 
ciple which he brings it to support. Diodorus here repeats the same 
The mercenaries, so long as the misconception as I have noticed 
dynasty lasted, had been the first in a previous note. He supposes 
citizens in the community: after that the Gelonians were in pos- 
its overthrow, they became the session both of Ortygia and of 
inferior, and were rendered inad- Achradina, whereas they were only 
missible to honours. It is hardly in possession of the former, as 
matter of surprise that so great a Thrasybulus had been in the former 
change of position excited them contest. 

to rebel: but this is not a case The opposing party were in 

properly adducible to prove the possession of the outer city or 

difficulty of adjusting matters with Achradina : and it would be easy 

new -coming citizens. for them, by throwing out a for- 

After the expulsion of Agatho- tiflcation between Epipolse and the 

kUs from Syracuse, nearly two Great Harbour, to straiten the 

centuries after these events, the communication of Ortygia with 

same quarrel and sedition was the country around; as may be 

renewed, by the exclusion of his seen by referring to the Plans of 

mercenaries from magistracy and Syracuse annexed to chap. lix. of 

posts of honour (Diodor.xxi.Fragm. this History. 


hazard a general battle, which; after an obstinate struggle, 
terminated in their complete defeat. The chosen band of 
600, who had eminently contributed to this victory, receiv- 
ed from their fellow-citizens a crown of honour, and a 
reward of one mina per head. * 

The meagre annals, wherein these interesting events 
are indicated rather than described, tell us Defeat of 
scarcely anything of the political arrangements Q^J^^g*'. 
which resulted from so important a victory, racuee 
Probably many of the Gelonians were expelled: ™»f « *•**<> 
but we may assume as certain, that tney were puiar go- 
deprived of the dangerous privilege of a separate ▼•'^m^nt- 
residence in the inner stronghold or islet Ortygia.' 

Meanwhile the rest of Sicily had experienced disorders 
analogous in character to those of Syracuse. At Digorders 
Qela, at Agrigentum, at EUmera, the reaction in other 
against the Qelonian dynasty had brought back fie*i"M?8ing 
in crowds the dispossessed exiles; who, claiming f^om the 
restitution of their properties and influence, J^ne? who 
found their demands sustained })y the population had been 
generally. The Katanaeans, whom Hiero had J^'P^der"" 
driven from their own city to Leontini, in order the Geio- 
that he might convert Katana into his own settle- JagLf ^xa- 
ment JQtna, assembled in arms and allied them- tana and 
selves with the Sikel prince Duketius, to recon- -®*'*»« 
quer their former home and to restore to the Sikels that 
which Hiero had taken from them for enlargement of the 
-ffitnaean territory. They were aided by the Syracusans, 
to whom the neighbourhood of these ELieronian partisans 
was dangerous: but they did not accomplish their object 
until after a long contest and several battles with the 
-ZEtnaeans. A convention was at length concluded, by which 
the latter evacuated Katana and were allowed to occupy 
the town and territory (seemingly Sikel) of Ennesia or 
Inessa, upon which they bestowed the name of JEtna, 3 with 
monuments commemorating Hiero as the founder — while 
the tomb of the latter at ICatana was demolished by the 
restored inhabitants. 

> Diodor. zi. 72, 73, 76. flees erected in the market-place 

* Diodoms, xiv. 7. of Amphipolis, in honour of 'the 

* Diodorus, zi. 76; Strabo, ri. Athenian Agnon the CEkist, after 
268. Compare, as an analogous the reyolt of that city from Athens 
■event, the destruction of the edi- (Thucyd. y. 11). 



These conflicts, disturbing the peace of all Sicily, came 
^ to be so intolerable, that a general congress was 

congress held between the various cities to adjust them, 
and conw jt ^as determined by joint resolution to re-admit 
the'ex^les the exiles and to extrude the Gelonian settlers 
d'd f'°— ' everywhere: but an establishment was provided 
Kamarina for these latter in the teratory of Messene. It 
»«a*o '6- appears that the exiles received back their pro- 
separate" perty, or at least an assignment of other laAds 
autono- in compensation for it. Tne inhabitants of Gela 
mous c y. ^g^g enabled to provide for their own exiles by 
re-establishing the city of Kamarina, ^ which had been 
^ ^ti4^' conquered from Syracuse by^ Hippokrates despot of Gelo, 
but which Gelo, on transferring his abode to Syracuse, Ead 
made a portion of the Syracusan territory, conveying its 
inhabitants to the city of Syracuse. The Syracusans now 
renounced the possession of it — a cession to be explained 
probably by the fact, that among the new-comers transferred 
by Gelo to Syracuse, there were included not only the 
previous Kamarinseans, but also many who had before been 
citizens of Gela. 2 For these men, now obliged to quit 
Syracuse, it would be convenient to provide an abode at 
Kamarina, as well as for the other restored Geioan exiles; 
and we may farther presume that this new city served as 
a receptacle for other homeless citizens from all parts of 
the island. It was consecrated by the Geloans as an in- 
dependent city, with Dorian rites and customs: its lands 
were distributed anew, and among its settlers were men 
lich enough to send prize chariots to Peloponnesus, as 
well as to pay for odes of Pindar. The Olympic victories 
of the Kamarinaean Psaumis secured for his new city 
an Hellenic celebrity, at a moment when it had hardly 
yet emerged from the hardships of an initiatory settle- 
ment. 3 

' Diodor. xi. 76. |i.eTO 8i raOxa • Herodot. vii. 166. 

Kojxaplvav (tiv FeXubot xatoixlaovxtc » See the fourth and fifth Olym- 

i; dpx^C xaxexXijpooxijaov. pi© odes of Pindar, referred to 

. See the note of Wesseling npon Olympiad 82, or 462 b.g., about 

this passage. There can he little nine years after the Geloans bad 

doubt that in Thucydidds (yi. 6) re-established Kamarina. Totv vtoi- 

the correction of xax(f>xlo87) 6tc6 xov I8pav (Olymp. v. 9); die* diAO- 

FeXuxuv (in place of uic6 FiXwvoO x*'^^^^ &7u>v i; ^doc x6vSt Safiiov 

is correct. doxu>v (Olymp. v. 14). 


Such was the ffreat reactionary movement in Sicily 
against the high-handed violences of the previous Reaction- 
despots. We are only enahled to follow it gener- ary feei- 
ally, hut we see that all their transplantations J^g^'ng^ ^he 
and expulsions of inhabitants were reversed, and previous 
all their arrangements overthrown. In the cor- ^nJ^j^n^J"' 
rection of the past injustice, we cannot doubt vour of 
that new injustice was in many cases committed, g^^^^" 
nor are we surprised to hear that at Syracuse meat, at 
many new enrolments of citizens took place fJ5*in** 
without any rightful claim, » probably accompa- the other 
nied by grants of land. The reigning feelmg ^^i**®"* 
at Syracuse would now be quite opposite to that of the 
days of Gelo, when the Demos or aggregate of small self- 
working proprietors was considered as "a troublesome yoke- 
fellow," fit only to be sold into slavery for exportation. It 
is highly probable that the new table of citizens now pre- 
pared included that class of men in larger number than 
ever, on principles analogous to the liberal enrolments of 
Kleisthenes at Athens. .In spite of all the confusion 
however with which this period of popular government 
opens, lasting for more than fifty years until the despotism 
01 the elder Dionysius, we shall find it far the best and 
most prosperous portion of Sicilian history. We shall 
arrive at it in a subsequent chapter. 

Respecting the Grecian cities along the coast of Italy, 
during tne period of the Gelonian dynasty, a few words 
will exhaust the whole of our knowledge. Rhegium, with 
its despots Anaxilaus and Mikythus, figures chiefiy as a 
Sicilian city, and has been noticed as such in the 
stream of Sicilian politics. But it is also in- Q*Jg?*_ 
volved in the only event which has been pre- destructive 
served to us respecting this portion of the history ^®^®** ®^. 
of the Italian Greeks. It was about the year ants^of* 
B.C. 473, that the Tarentines undertook an ex- Tarentum 
pedition against their non-Hellenic neighbours Rhegium. 
the lapygians, in hopes of conquering Hyria and 
the other towns belonging to them. Mikythus, despot of 
Rhegium, against the will of his citizens, despatched 3000 
of them by constraint as auxiliaries to the Tarentines. 
But the expedition proved signally disastrous to both. 
The lapygians, to the number of 20,000 men, encountered 

* Diodor. xi. 86. icoXXu>v slx'^ xal u>( t'cux* nticoXiTOYpafiUfcivwy* 


the united Grecian forces in the field, and completely 
defeated them. The battle having taken place in a hostile 
country, it seems that the larger portion both ofBhegians 
and Tarentines perished, insomuch that Herodotus pro- 
nounces it to have been the greatest Hellenic slaughter 
within his knowledge. ^ Of the Tarentines slain a great 
proportion were opulent and substantial citizens, the loss 
of whom sensibly affected the government of the city; 
strengthening the Demos, and rendering the constitution 
more democratical. In what particulars the change con- 
sisted we do not know: the expression of Aristotle gives 
reason to suppose that even before this event the constitu- 
tion had been popular. 2 

> Herodot. Tii. 170 ; Diodor. xi. southern Italy, to talk of pturauit 

62. The latter asserti that the and flight from Japygia to Bht' 

lapygian victors divided their for- gium. 

ces« part of them pursuing the * Aristotel. Polit. t. S, 8. Ari- 

Bhegian fugitives, the rest pur- stotle has another passage (vL 8, 

suing the Tarentines. Those who 6) in which he comments on the 

followed the former were so rapid government of Tarentum: and 

in their movements, that they en- O. MUller applies this second pas- 

tered (he says) along with the sage to illustrate the particular 

fugitives into the town of Bhegi- constitutional changes which were 

nm, and even became masters of it. made after the lapygian disaster. 

To say nothing of the fact, that I think this Juxtaposition of the 
Rhegium continues afterwards, as two passages unauthorized : there 
before, under the rule of Mikythus is nothing at all to connect them 
—we may remark that Diodorus together. See History of the Do- 
must have formed to himself a rians, iii. 9, li, 
strange idea of the geography of 





AvTEB having in the last chapter followed the repulse of 
the Carthaginians by the Sicilian Greeks, we now return 
to the central Greeks and the Persians — a case in which 
the triumph was yet more interesting to the cause of human 
improvement generally. 

The disproportion between the immense host assembled 
by Xerxes, and the little which he accomplished, naturally 
provokes both a contempt for Persian force and an ad- 
miration for the comparative handful of men by whom they 
were so ignominiously beaten. Both these sentiments are 
just, but both are often exaggerated beyond the causes of 
point which attentive contemplation of the facts *h« dis- 
will justify. The Persian mode of making war repuise^of 
(which we m^y liken to that of the modem Xerxes 
Turks,! now that the period of their energetic ^l^hTs^w^* 
fanaticism has passed away) was in a high de- defects— 
ffree disorderly and inefficient. The men in- ^aiity and 
deed, individually taken^ especially the native slackness 
Persians, were not deficient in the qualities of his°Mrray!— 
soldiers, but their arms and their organisation Tendency 
were wretched — and their leaders yet worse. iate*the^*" 
On the other hand, the Greeks, equal, if not heroism of 
superior, in individual bravery, were incompar- ***• Greeks, 
ably superior in soldier-like order as well as in arms: but 
here too the leadership was defective, and the disunion a 
constant source of peril. Those who, like Plutarch (or 
rather the Pseudo-Plutarch) in his treatise on the Malignity 
of Herodotus, insist on acknowledging nothing but magna- 
nimity and heroism in the proceedings of the Greeks 

* Mr. Waddington's Letters from kish warfare: compare also the 

Greece, describing the Oreek re- second rolame of the Memoirs of 

▼olation of 1821, will convey a Baron de Tott, part. ilL 
good idea of the stupidity of Tar- 


throughout these critical years, are forced to deal harshly 
with the inestimable witness on whom our knowledge of 
the facts depends. That witness intimates plainly that, in 
spite of the devoted courage displayed not less by the 
vanquished at Thermopylae, than by the victors at Salamis, 
Greece owed her salvation chiefly to the imbecility, coward- 
ice, and credulous rashness, of Xerxes. ^ Had ne indeed 
possessed either the personal energy of Cyrus, or the 
judgement of Artemisia, it may be doubted whether any 
excellence of management, or any intimacy of union, could 
Comparison ^*ve preserved the Greeks against so great a 
of the in- superiority of force. But it is certain that all 
Greece by their courage as soldiers in line would have been 
Xerxes unavailiuff for that purpose, without a higher 
rnva.ioa degree of generalship, and a more hearty spirit 
of Persia of Cooperation, than that which they actually 

Sy* aLx-*' manifested. 

ander the One hundred and fifty years after this event- 

N"im~ ^^1 period, we shall see the tables turned, and 
provement the United forces of Greece under Alexander of 
ISnong^the ^acedon becoming invaders of Persia. We 
Persians shall find that in Persia no improvement has 
fn^^li* of* ^^^^ Pl*c® during this long interval— that the 
160 years scheme of defence under Darius Oodomannus 
provemen?" ^^^^ours Under the same defects as 'that of attack 
among the under Xerxos — that there is the same blind and 
Greeks. exclusive confidence in pitched battles with su- 
perior numbers 2 — that the advice of Mentor the Bhodian, 
and of Charidemus, is despised like that of Demaratus and 
Artemisia — that Darius Oodomannus, essentially of the 
same stamp as Xerxes, is hurried into the battle of Issus 
by the same ruinous temerity as that which threw away the 
Persian fleet at Salamis — and that the Persian native in- 
fantry (not the cavalry) even appear to have lost that in- 
dividual gallantry which they displayed so conspicuously 
at Plat sea. But on the Grecian side, the improvement in 
every way is very creat: the orderly courage of the soldier 
has been sustained and even augmented, while the general- 
ship and power of military combination has reached a point 
unexampled in the previous history of mankind* Military 

' Thncyd. 1. 69. iiciOTiftcvot nal cyd. vi. 88. 
Tov pdppipo^ a()T&v «tpl a^Tiji t4 • Thucyd. i. 142. icXi^Oti -ri^v ijAa- 
icXtlu) afaXtvxa^ Ac. : compare Tha- Slav OpaoOvovxtc, Ao« 


science may be esteemed a sort of creation during this 
interyal, and will be found to go through various stages — 
Demosthenes and Brasidas — the Oyreian army and Xeno- 
phon — Agesilaus — Iphikrates — Epaminondas — ^ PhiUp of 
Macedon — Alexander .-^ for th^ Macedonian princes are 
borrowers of Greek tactics, though extending and applying 
them with a personal energy peculiar to themselves, and 
with advantages of position such as no Athenian or Spartan 
ever enjoyed. In this comparison between the invasion of 
Xerxes and that of Alexander, we contrast the progressive 
spirit of Greece, serving as herald and stimulus to the 
like spirit in Europe — with the stationary mind of Asia, 
occasionally roused by some splendid individual, but never 
appropriating to itself new social ideas or powers, either 
for a war or for peace. 

It is out of the invasion of Xerxes that those new 
powers of combination, political as well as mili- 
tary, which lighten up Grecian history during spirftTn*^^ 
the next century and more, take their rise. Gteece- 
They are brought into agency through the through^ 
altered position and character of the Athenians Athenian 

'• , , . 1 i. <• 'ta initiative. 

— improvers, to a certain extent, of military 
operations on land, but the great creators of marine tactics 
and manceuvring in Greece — and the earliest of all Greeks 
who showed themselves capable of organising and direct- 
ing the joint action of numerous allies and dependents: 
thus uniting the two distinctive qualities of the Homeric 
Agamemnon 2 — ability in command, with vigour in execu- 

In the general Hellenic confederacy, which had acted 
against Persia under the presidency of Sparta, Conduct of 
Athens could hardly be said to occupy any t^^^^^ *° 
ostensible rank above that of an ordinary mem- of the 
her. The post of second dignity in the line at Je^ian^— 
Plataea had indeed been a(^udged to her, yet tionf Tem- 
only after a contending claim from Tegea. But p®'» »»* 
without any difiPerence in ostensible rank, she after that 
was in the eye and feeling of Greece no longer ©▼©^t. 
the same power as before. She had suffered more, and at 
sea had certainly done more, than all the other allies put 

* See a remarkable passage in * 'Afx^oTspov, f)aaiXtuc t' dYaOoci 
the third Philippic of Demosthenes, xpaTtp6< t' at^|jL-i^Tt)c. 

e. 10, p. 128. Corner, Iliad, iii. 179. 

VOL. V. n 


together. Even on land at Platsea, her hoplites had mani- 
fested a combination of bravery, discipline, and efi&ciency 
against the formidable Persian cavalry, superior even to 
the Spartans. No Athenian officer had committed so 
perilous an act of disobedience as the Spartan Amom- 
pharetus. After the victory of Mykalej when the Pelo- 
ponnesians all hastened home to enjoy their triumph, the 
Athenian forces did not shrink from prolonged service for 
the important object of clearing the Hellespont, thus 
standing forth as the willing and forward champions of 
the Asiatic Greeks against Persia. Besides these exploits 
of Athens collectively, the only two individuals, gifted 
with any talents for command, whom this momentous 
contest had thrown up, were both of them Athenians: 
fii*st, Themistokles; next, Aristeides. Prom the beginning 
to the end of the struggle, Athens had displayed an un- 
reserved Pan-Hellenic patriotism which had been most un- 
generously requited by the Peloponnesians; who had kept 
within their Isthmian walls, and betrayed Attica twice to 
hostile ravage; the first time, perhaps, unavoidably — but 
the second time by a culpable neglect in postponing their 
outwatd inarch against Mardonius. And the Peloponne- 
sians could not but feel, that while they had left Attica 
unprotected, they owed their own salvation at Salamis al- 
together to the dexterity of Themistokles and to the im- 
posing Athenian naval force. 

Considering that the Peloponnesians had sustained 
Proceed- little or no mischief oy the invasion, while the 
th^Vth - Athenians had lost for the time even their city 
nians to rft- and Country, with a large proportion of their 
store^ their moveable property irrecoverably destroyed — we 
jcafoua Ob- might naturally expect to find the fonner, if not 
Btructions lending their grateful and active aid to repair 
the'peiof the damage in Attica, at least cordially wel- 
ponnesiang. coming tlie restoration of the ruined city by its 
former inhabitants. Instead of this, we find the selfishness 
again prevalent among theuu Ill-will and mistrust for the 
future, aggravated by an admiration which they could 
not heJp feeling) overlays all their gratitude and sym- 

The Athenians, on returning from Salarais after the 
battle of Plataea, found a desolate home to harbour them. 
Their country was laid waste, — their city burnt or de- 


Btroyed, so that there remained but a few houses stauding, 
wherein the Persian officers had taken up their Quarters — 
and their fortifications for the most part razed or over- 
thrown. It was their first task to bring home their families 
and effects from the temporary places of shelter at Tra3zeu, 
JBgina, and Salamis. After providing ^hat was indiKpens- 
ably necessary for immediate wants, thev began to rebuild 
their city and its fortifications on a scale of enlarged size 
in every direction, i But as soon as they were seen to be 
employed on this indispensable work, without which 
neither political existence nor personal safety was practic- 
able, the allies took the alarm, preferred complaints to 
Sparta, and urged her to arrest the work. In the front of 
these complainants probably stood the JSglnetans, as the 
old enemies of Athens, and as having most to apprehend 
from her might at sea. The Spartans, perfectly sym- 
pathising with the jealousy and uneasiness of their allies, 
were even disposed, from old association, to carry their 
dislike of fortifications still farther, so that they would 
have been pleased to see all the other Grecian cities sys- 
tematically defenceless like Sparta itself. 2 But while 
sending an embassy to Athens, to offer a friendly remon- 
strance against the project of re-fortifying th,e city, they 
could not openly and peremptorily forbid the exercise of a 
right common to every autonomous community. Nor did 
they even venture, at a moment when the events of the 
past months were fresh in every one's remembrance, to 
divulffe their real jealousies as to the future. They af- 
fected to offer prudential reasons against the scheme, 
founded on the chance of a future Persian invasion; in 
which case it would be a dangerous advantage for the in- 
vader to find any fortified city outside of Peloponnesus to 
further his operations, as Thebes had recently seconded 
Mardonius. They proposed to the Athenians therefore^ 
not merely to desist from their own fortifications, but also 
to assist them in demolishing all fortifications of other 
cities beyond the limits of Peloponnesus — promising shel- 
ter within the Isthmus, in case of need to all exposed par- 

* Thticyd. i. 89. icXiov, twv ^u[jL|Aa)ru>v e5oTpuv6vtuw 

* Thucyd. i. 90. to p.iv xal a^Tol xal(po{)ou(xivu)VTOu Tcvautixou a>JTu><r 
^8iov a-* 6p<I)'<Te« jj-i^Tt extivoo? [xtjt' to itX^Oo^, h icpiv oiix '^^^PX®' **^ 
aXXov {iirjSiva xsij^oc s^^vxa, to 6i 

H 2 


A statesman like ThemistoklSs was not likely to be 
imposed upon by this diplomacy: but he saw 
of The^-*™ that the Spartans had the power of preventing 
mistokifts the work if they chose, and that it could only be 
for^the ^'* executed by the help of successful deceit. By 
Athenians j^ig advlte the Athenians dismissed the Spartan 
tunitVof'" envoys, saying that they would themselves send 
fortifying to Sparta and explain their views. Accordingly 
the r c y. Themifitokles himself was presently despatched 
thither, as one among three envoys instructed to enter 
into explanations with the Spartan authorities. But his 
two colleagues, Aristeides and Abronichus, by previous 
concert, were tardy in arriving — and he remained inactive 
at Sparta, making use of their absence as an excuse for 
not even demanding an audience, yet affecting surprise 
that their coming was so long delayed. But while 
Aristeides and Abronichus, the other two envoys, were 
thus studiously kept back, the whole population of Athens 
laboured unremittingly at the walls. Men, women, and 
children, all tasked their strength to the utmost during 
this precious interval. Neither private houses, nor sacred 
edifices, were spared to furnish materials; and such was 
their ardour in the enterprise, that before the three envoys 
were united at Sparta, the wall had already attained a 
height sufficient at least to attempt defence. Yet the 
interval had been long enough to provoke suspicion, even 
in the slow mind of the Spartans; while the more watchful 
^ginetans sent them positive intelligence that the wall 
was rapidly advancing. 

Themistokles, on hearing this allegation, peremptorily 
denied the truth of it; and the personal esteem entertained 
towards him was at that time so great, that his assurance ^ 
obtained for some time unqualified credit, until fresh 
messengers again raised suspicions in the minds of the 
Spartans. In reply to these, Themistokles urged the 
Ephors to send envoys of their own to Athens, and thus 
convince themselves of the state of the facts. They un- 
suspectingly acted upon his recommendation, while he at 
the same time transmitted a private communication to 
Athens, desiring that the envoys might not be suffered to 
depart until the safe return of himself and his colleagues, 


djy i^ tbv Mi]Six&y it6Xt}ioy T6X}iav * Thucyd. i. 91. tqi fiiv Bsfi.t9- 
Ycvo(iivi]y. TOxXti tntiOovTO Sii fiUav a6xoik 


which he feared might be denied them when his trick came 
to be divulged. Aristeides and Abronichus had now 
arrived — the wall was announced to be of a height at least 
above contempt — and Themistokles at once threw off the 
mask. He avowed the stratagem practised — told the 
Spartans that Athens was already fortified sufficiently to 
ensure the safety and free will of its inhabitants — and 
warned them that the hour of constraint was now past, the 
Athenians being in a condition to define and vindicate for 
themselves their own rights and duties in reference to 
Sparta and the allies. He reminded them that the Athenians 
had always been found competent to judge for themselves, 
whether in joint consultation, or in any separate affair 
such as the momentous crisis of abandoning their city and 
taking to their ships. They had now, in the exercise of 
this self-judgement, resolved on fortifying their city, as a 
step indispensable to themselves and advantageous even 
to the allies generally. No equal or fair interchange of 
opinion could subsist, unless all the allies had equal means 
of defence: either all must be unfortified, or Athens must 
be fortified as well as the rest, i 

Mortified as the Spartans were by a revelation which 
showed that they had not only been detected Athens 
in a dishonest purpose, but completely out- fortified— 
witted — they were at the same time overawed of"the 
by the decisive tone of Themistokles, whom ^^'^^^r 
they never afterwards forgave. To arrest be- ment^f the < 
forehand erection of the walls, would have been allies, 
practicable, though not perhaps without difficulty; to deal 
by force with the fact accomplished, was perilous in a 
high degree. Moreover the inestimable services just 
rendered by Athens became again predominant in their 
minds, so that sentiment ana prudence for the time 
coincided. They affected therefore to accept the com- 
munication without manifesting any offence, nor had they 
indeed put forward any pretence which required to be 
formally retracted. The envoys on both sides returned 
home, dnd the Athenians completed their fortifications, 
without obstruction 2 — yet not without murmurs on the 

• Thucyd. i. 91. 06 fip oldv t« I^tj XP^***^ ^'*l*f*'«X*^'»» ^ **^ '^*** 

tlvat (XT) dic6 dvTindXou icapocoxeu'^^ vofiiCciv 6p9u}c l^civ. 

6|<.ot6v Ti j) toov t< TO xoivov ()ouXsO- * We are fortunate enough to 

soOai. *U icdrroc o^ dTttxi^xou^ possesi this narrative, respecting 


part of the allies, who bitterly reproached Sparta after- 
wards for having let slip this golden opportunity of arrest- 
ing the growth of the giant. * 

If the allies were apprehensive of Athens before, the 
mixture of audacity, invention, and deceit, 
thu^in^' whereby she had just eluded the hindrance op- 
tended, but posed to her fortifications, was well calculated 
m'Jtn/fon ^^ aggravate their uneasiness. On the other 
upon Athe- hand, to the Athenians, the mere hint of inter- 
?n^. '^^ vention to debar them from that common right 
of self-defence which was exercised by every 
autonomous city except Sparta, must have appeared 
outrageous injustice — aggravated by the fact that it was 
brought upon them by flieir peculiar sufferings in the com- 
mon cause, and by the very allies who without their devoted 
forwardness would now have been slaves of the Great King. 
And the intention of the allies to obstruct the fortifications 
must have been known to every soul in Athens, from the 
universal press of hands required to hurry the work and 
escape interference ; just as it was proclaimed to after-ge- 
nerations by the shapeless fragments and irregular structure 
of the wall, in which even sepulchral stones and inscribed 
columns were seen imbedded. 2 Assuredly the sentiment 
connected with this work — performed as it was alike by 
rich and poor, strong and weak—men, women, and children 
— must have been intense as well as equalising. All had 
endured the common miseries of exile, all had contributed 
to the victory, all were now sharing the same fatigue for 
the defence of their recovered city, in order to counterwork 
the ungenerous hindrance of their Peloponnesian allies. 

the rebuilding of the walls of would not be improbable in itself 

Athens, as recounted by Thucydi- —nor is it inconsistent with the 

dds. It is the first incident which narrative of Thucydidfts ; but the 

he relates, in that f^eneral sketch latter either had not heard or did 

of events between the Persian and not believe it. 

Peloponnesian war, which precedes ' Thncyd. i. 69. Kal TU>vSt 6p.tT« 

his professed history (i. 89-92). atrtot (says the Corinthian envoy 

Diodorus (xi. 88, 40), Plutarch, addressing the Lacedspinnnians), 

(ThemistokUs, c. 19), and Cornelius t4 t« icpijbTOv tdaavxtc o^tou^ (the 

Nepos (Themist. c. 6, 7) seem all to Athenians) t>]v ic6Xiv jieTi ta Mtj- 

have followed Thucydidds, though 8ixa xpatuvoi, xol Gaxspov xot (laxpdi 

Plutarch also notices a statement ar^occi xuyy\, Ao. 

of Theoporapus, to the effect that * Thucyd. i.93. Cornelius Kepos 

ThemistokUs accomplished his oh- (Themist. c. 7) exaggerates thig 

ject by bribing the Kphors. Thig into a foolish conceit. 


We must take notice of these stirring circumstances, pe- 
culiar to the Athenians and acting upon a generation which 
had now been nursed in democracy for a quarter of a 
century and had achieved unaided the victory of Marathon 
— if we would understand that still stronger burst of ag- 
gressive activity, persevering self-confidence, and aptitude 
as well as thirst for command — together with that still 
wider spread of democratical organisation — which marks 
their character during the age immediately following. 

The plan of the new fortification was projected on a 
scale not unworthy of the future grandeur of the jj^j^^ 
city. Its circuit was sixty stadia or about seven ment of 
miles, with the acropolis nearly in the centre: *^VJ?"' 
but the circuit of the previous walls is unknown^ 
so that we are unable to measure the extent of that en- 
liirgement which Thucydides testifies to have been carried 
out on every side. It included within the town the three 
hills of the Areopagus, Pnyx, and the Museum; while on 
the south of the town it was carried for a space even on 
the southern bank of the Ilissus, thus aIso comprising the 
fountain Kallirhoe. * In spite of the excessive hurry in 
which it was raised, the structure was thoroughly solid and 
sufficient against every external enemy: but there is reason 
to believe that its very large inner area was never filled 
with buildings. Empty spaces, for the temporary shelter 
of inhabitants driven in from the country with their pro- 
perty, were eminently useful to a Grecian city^-community; 
to none more useful than to the Athenians, whose principal 
strength lay in their fleet, and whose citizens habitually 
resided in large proportion in their separate domes through- 
out Attica. 

The first indispensable step in the renovation of 
Athens after her temporary extinction, was now happily 
accomplished: the city was made secure against external 
enemies. But Themistokles, to whom the Athenians owed 
the late successful stratagem, and whose influence must 

» For the dimensions and direc- The plan of Athens, prepared by 

tion of the Themistoklean walls Kiepert after his own researclies 

f^t Athens, see especially the ex- and published among his recent 

cellent Treatise of Forchhammer— maps, adopts for the most part the 

Topographie TonAthen— published ideas of Forchhammer as to the 

intheKielerPhilologischeStndien, course of the walls. 
Kiel, 1811. 



Part II. 

Large plans 
of Themi- 
BtokUs for 
the naval 
ment of 
the city- 
town and 
provided at 

have been much strengthened by its success, had con- 
ceived plans of a wider and more ambitious 
range. He had been the original adviser of the 
great maritime start taken by his countrymen, 
as well as of the powerful naval force which 
they had created during the last few years, and 
which had so recently proved their salvation. 
He saw in that force both the only chance of 
salvation for the future, in case the Persians 
should renew their attack by sea — a contingency 
and* thick-* *** that time seemingly probable — and boundless 
ness pro- prospccts of future ascendency over the Grecian 
the ^walls' coasts and islands. It was the great engine of 
defence, of offence, and of ambition. To continue 
this movement required much less foresight and genius than 
to begin it. Themistokles, the moment that the walls of 
the city had been finished, brought back the attention of 
his countrymen to those wooden walls which had served 
them as a refuge against the Persian monarch. He pre- 
vailed upon them to provide harbour-room at once safe and 
adequate, by the enlargement and foi*tification of the 
Peirseus. This again was only the prosecution of an enter- 
prise previously begun; for he had already, while in office 
two or three years before, i made his countrymen sensible 

■ Thncyd. i. 93. iittiat hi xal toI} 
Hsipaistuc fa Xotitd 6 6s(aiotoxX^? 
olxoSo[jLetv (OnrjpxTo 8' aoxovi itpdTe- 
pov eirl T-^c exebou apx'j^j ^« i""^' 
iviaoTOv 'AOiQvaloi? ^p^e.) 

Upon which words the Scholiast 
observes (Kox* svioutov) — xaxd tiva 
eviouTov "iiYepLibv eYiveto' itpo 8e 
TUJv Mrj8ixu)v ^p^e 6s(xiotoxX^« ivi- 
aoTOv 2va. 

It seems hardly possible, having 
no fuller evidence to proceed upon, 
to determine to which of the pre- 
ceding years Thucydidds means to 
refer this dp^T) of, Themistoklds. 
Mr. Fynes Clinton, after discussing 
the opinions of Dodwell and Cor- 
fiini (see Fasti Hellenici, ad ann. 
481 B.C. and Preface, p.xv.), inserts 
Themistoklds as Archon Epony- 
mus in 481 B.C., the year before 
ihe invasion of Xerxes, and sup- 

poses the PeirsBus to have been 
commenced in that year. This is 
not in itself improbable: bat he 
cites the Scholiast as having as- 
serted the same thing before him 
(icpo Tu>v MiqSixu)v ^p^c 9§(i.taToxX^c 
tviauTOv eva), in which I appre- 
hend that he is not borne out by 
the analogy of the language : evt- 
auTOv Iva in the accusative case 
denotes only the duration ot apyii^ 
not the position of the year (com- 
pare Thucyd. iii. 68). 

I do not feel certain that Thu- 
cydidds meant to designate The- 
mistoklds as having been Archon 
Eponymus, or even as having 
been one of the nine Archons. 
He may have meant "during the 
year when ThcmistokUs was Stra- 
tdgus (or general)," and the ex- 
planation of the Scholiast} who 




that the open roadstead of PhalSrum was thoroughly in- 
secure, imd had prevailed upon them to improve and employ 
in part the more spacious harbours of Peirseus and Jiuny- 
chia — three natural basins, all capable of being closed and 
defended. Something had then been done towards the en- 
largement of this port, though it had probably been sub- 
sequently ruined by the Persian invaders. But Themis- 
toldes now resumed the scheme on a scale far grander than 
he could then have ventured to propose— a scale which 
demonstrates the vast auguries present to his mind respect- 
ing the destinies of Athens. 

Peirseus and Munychia, in his new plan, constituted a 
fortified space as large as the enlarged Athens, and with a 
wail far more elaborate and unassailable. The wall which 
surrounded them, sixty stadia in circuit, i was intended by 
him to be so stupendous, both in height and thickness, as 
to render assault hopeless, and to enable the whole military 
population to act on shipboard, leaving only old men and 
boys as a garrison. 2 We may judge how vast his project 
was, when we learn that the wall, though in practice always 
found suflBicient, was only carried up to half the heignt 
which he had contemplated. 3 In respect to thickness 
however his ideas were exactly followed: two carts meeting 
one another brought stones which were laid together right 
and left on the outer side of each, and thus formed two 
primary parallel walls, between which the interior space 
(of course at least as broad as the joint breadth of the two 
carts) was filled up, "not with rubble, in the usual manner 
of the Greeks, but constructed, throughout the whole 
thickness, of squared stones, cramped together with metal."^ 

employs the word ajycpKov, rather jidtXtaxa trcXioQ?] ov> Sievoetro' e()oO« 

implies that he so understood it. Xcto Yap Ttp pieYsBst xal t^ ^^X'^ 

The Stratdgi were annual as well d9iaTavai Tot? tu)v noXefxicuv eiciPou- 

as the Archons. Now we know Xi«, dvOpu>nu>v 6s ev6fi.iC«v 6XiYu>v 

that Themistoklds was one of the xai tu)v dxpitotdTcuv. dpxiasiv ttjv 

generals in 480 B.C., and that he ^uXax-rjv, tou^ I* &XXou< tc td« vaut 

commanded in Thessaly, at Arte- ia^i^vsoOai. 

misium, and at Salamis. The Pel- * Thucyd. i. 93. The expressions 

raeus may have heen begun in the are those of Colonel Leake, derived 

early part of 480 B.O., when Xer- from inspection of the scanty 

xes was already on his march, or remnant of these famous walls 

at least at Sardis. still to be seen— Topography of 

' Thucyd. ii. 13. Athens, oh. ix. p. 411 : see edit. p. 

* Thucyd. i. 93. 293, Germ, transl. Compare Aris- 

' Thucyd. i. 93. To Si Q'j/o; {(iiau tophan. Aves. 1127, about the 

106 mSTOBT 07 6BBE0B. Pabt II. 

The result was a solid wall, probably not less than fourteen 
or fifteen feet thick, since it was intended to carry so very 
unusual a height. In the exhortations whereby he animated 
the people to this fatiguing and costly work, he laboured 
to impress upon them that Peirseus was of more value to 
them than Athens itself, and that it afforded a shelter into 
which, if their territory should be again overwhelmed by 
a superior land-force, they might securely retire, with fuU 
libertv of that maritime action in which they were a match 
for all the world. * "We may even suspect that if Themis- 
tokles could have followed his own feelings, he would have 
altered the site of the city from Athens to Peiraeus: the 
attachment of the people to their ancient and holy rock 
doubtless prevented any such proposition. Nor did he at 
that time, probably, contemplate the possibility of those 
long walls which in a few years afterwards consolidated 
the two cities into one. 

Porty.five years afterwards, at the beginning of the 
Advanta es ^^^^^^P^^^csian war, we shall hear from Perikles. 
of the en- who espoused and carried out the large ideas of 
frff^d**^ Themistokles, this same language about the 
harbour— capacity of Athens to sustain a great power 
increase of exclusively or chiefly upon maritime action. But 
of com- the Athenian empire was then an established 
Ath°® ** reality, whereas in the time of Themistokles it 
was yet a dream, and his bold predictions, sur- 
passed as they were by the future reality, mark that extra- 
ordinary power of practical divination which Thucydides 
so emphatically extols in him. And it proves the exuberant 
hope which had now passed into the temper of the Athenian 
people, when we find them, on the faith of these predictions, 
undertaking a new enterprise of so much toil and expense ; 
and that too when just returned from exile into a desolated 
country, at a moment of private distress and public im- 

However, Peiraeus served other purposes besides its 
direct use as a dockyard for military marine. Its secure 
fortifications and the protection of the Athenian navy were 
well-calculated to call back those metics or resident for* 
eigners, who had been driven away by the invasion of 

breadth of the wall of Nephelokok- Nepos, Themistok. c. 6). rai^vaual 
kygia. Kp6« Snavca? av9ia":aa9«t. 

* Thucyd. i. 93 (compare Cornel. 


Xerxes, and who might feel themselyes insecure in returning 
unless some new and conspicuous means of protection were 
exhibited. To invite them oack, and to attract new residents 
of a similar description, Themistokles proposed to exempt 
them from the Metoikion or non-freeman*s annual tax:* 
but this exemption can only have lasted for a time, and the 
great temptation for them to return must have consisted 
in the new securities and facilities for trade, which Athens, 
with her fortified ports and navy, now aflPorded. The pre- 
sence of numerous metics was profitable to the Athenians, 
both privately and publicly. Much of the trading, pro- 
fessional and handicTEift business, was in their hands : and 
the Athenian legislation, while it excluded them from the 
political franchise, was in other respects equitable and 
protective to them. In regard to trading pursuits, the 
metics had this advantage over the citizens— that they were 
less frequently carried away for foreign military service. 
The great increase of their numbers, from this period 
forward, while it tended materially to increase the value of 
property all throughout Attica, but especially in Peireeus 
and Athens, where they mostly resided, helps us to explain 
the extraordinary prosperity, together witn the excellent 
cultivation, prevalent throughout the country before the 
Peloponnesian war. The barley, vegetables, figs, and oil, 
produced in most parts of the territory — the charcoal pre- 
pared in the flourishing deme of Acharnse^ — and the fish 
obtained in abundance near the coast — all found opulent 
buyers and a constant demand from the augmenting town 

"We are farther told that Themistokles ^ prevailed on 
the Athenians to build every year twenty new Resolution 
ships of the line — so we may designate the trireme. *<> ^^p^ 
Whether this number was always strictly adhered trlre'raM^^^ 
to, it is impossible to say : but to repair the ships, annually, 
as well as to keep up their numbers, was always regarded 
among the most indispensable obligations of the executive 

* Diodor. xi. 43. the observations of Isokratfes, 

» See the lively picture of the more than a century after this 

Achamian demots in the comedy period, Orat. iv. De Pace, p. 163, 

of Aristophanes so entitled. and Xenophon, Do Vectigalibust 

Respecting the advantages de- c. iv. 

rived fronr the residence of metics ■ Diodor. xi. 43. 

and from foreign visitors, compare 


108 HI8T0BY OF 6BEB0E. Past II. 

It does not appear that the Spartans offered any 
opposition to the fortification of the Peirseus, though it was 
an enterprise greater, more novel, and more menacing, than 
that of Athens. But Diodorus tells us, probably enough, 
that Themistokles thought it necessary to send an embassy 
to Sparta, ^ intimating that his scheme was to provide a 
safe harbour for the collective navy of Greece, in the ey&ai 
of future Persian attack. 

Works on so vast a scale must have taken a consider- 
able time, and absorbed much of the Athenian force: yet 
they did not prevent Athens from lending active aid 
towards the expedition which, in the year after the battle 
Expedition of Platsea (b.c. 47S), set sau for Asia under the 
°'V*d Spartan Pausanias. Twenty ships from the 

Greek fleet various cities of Peloponnesus 2 were under his 
»«*"»** command: the Athenians alone furnished thirty, 
the spartan Under the orders of Aristeides and Kimon: other 
Pausania* tnromes abo came from the Ionian and insular 
o?Bys6a'n- allies. They first sailed to Cyprus, in which 
tium. island they liberated most of the Grecian cities 

from the Persian government. Next they turned to the 
Bosphorus of Thrace, and undertook the siege of Byzantium, 
which, like Sestus in the Chersonese, was a post of great 
moment as well as of great strength — occupied by a con- 
siderable Persian force, with several leading Persians and 
even kinsmen of the monarch. The place was captured, ^ 
seemingly after a prolonged siege: it might probably hold 
out even longer than Sestus, as being taken less unprepared. 
The line of communication between the Euxine sea and 
Greece was thus cleared of obstruction. 

' Biodor. xi. 41, 42, 43. I mean, confidentially and judge of it— 

tbat the fact of such an embassy seems to indicate that Diodorus 

being sent to Sparta is probable had read the well-known tale of 

enough — separating that fact from the project of ThemistokUs to bum 

the preliminary discussions which the Grecian fleet in the harbour 

Diodorus describes as haying pre- of Pagasae, and that he jumbled it 

ceded it in the assembly of Athens, in his memory with this other 

and which seem unmeaning as well project for enlarging and fortifying 

as incredible. His story— that The- the Peineus. 

mistokUs told the assembly that * Thucyd. i. 94; Plutarch, Ari- 

he had conceived a scheme of steiddS| c. 23. Diodorus (zi. 44) 

great moment to the state, but says that the Feloponnesian ships 

that it did not admit of being were fifty in number : his statement 

made public beforehand, upon is not to be accepted, in opposition 

which the assembly named Aris- to Thuoydidds. 

teidds and Xanthippus to hear it * Thucyd. i. 94. 


The capture of Byzantium proved the signal for a 
capital and unexpected change in the relations Mitoonduot 
of the various Grecian cities; a change, of of Paut»- 
whicb the proximate cause lay in the misconduct f usai of 
of Pausanias, but towards which other causes, J**® ?"^«« 
deep-seated as well as various, also tended. In Mm-^s 
recounting the history of Miltiades, » I noticed treasonable 
the deplorable liability of the Grecian leading encTe^ wuh 
men to be spoiled by success. This distemper Xerxes. 
worked with singular rapidity on Pausanias. As conqueror 
of Plataea, he had acquired a renown unparalleled in 
Grecian experience, together with a prodigious share of 
the plunder. The concubines, horses, > camels, and gold 
plate, which had thus passed into his possession, were 
well calculated to make the sobriety and discipline of 
Spartan life irksome, while his power also, though great 
on foreign command, became subordinate to that of the 
Bphors when he returned home. His newly-acquired in- 
solence was manifested immediately after the battle, in the 
commemorative tripod dedicated by his order at Delphi, 
which proclaimed himself by name and singly, as com- 
mander of the Greeks and destroyer of the Persians: an 
unseemly boast, of which the LacedsBmonians themselves 
were the first to mark their disapprobation, by causing the 
inscription to be erased, and the names of the cities who 
had tak^i part in the combat to be all enumerated on the 
tripod. 3 Nevertheless he was still sent on the command 
against Cyprus and Byzantium, and it was on the capture 
of this latter place that 'his ambition and discontent first 
ripened into distinct treason. He entered into correspond- 
ence with Gongylus the Eretrian exile (now a subject of 
Persia, and invested with the property and government 
of a district in Mysia), to whom he entrusted his new 
acquisition of Byzantium, and the care of the valuable 
prisoners taken in it. 

* See the yolame of this History mentioned (Plutarch, Eimon, e. 7; 
immediately preceding, ch. zxxvi. Diodor. xi. 62). 

* Herodot. ix. 81. A jstrong protest, apparently fa- 
' In the Athenian inscriptions miliar to Grecian feeling, against 

on the votive offerings dedicated singling out the general parti- 

ftfter the captnre of Eion, as well cularly, to receive the honours of 

M after the great victories near victory, appears in Euripid. An- 

the river Eurymedon, the name of dromach. 694: — striking verses, 

Kimon the commander is not even which are said (truly or falsely) 


These prisoners were presently suffered to escape, or 
rather sent away underhand to Xerxes; together with a 
letter from the hand of Pausanias himself, to the following 
effect: — "Pausanias the Spartan commander having taken 
these captives, sends them back in his anxiety to oblige 
thee. I am minded, if it so please thee, to marry thy 
daughter, and to bring under thy dominion both Sparta 
and the rest of Greece: with thy aid I think myself 
competent to achieve this. If my proposition be accept- 
able, send some confidential person down to the seaboard, 
through whom we may hereafter correspond." Xerxes, 
highly pleased with the opening thus held out, imme- 
diately sent down Artabazus (the same who had been 
second in command in Bceotia), to supersede Megabates in 
the satrapy of Daskylium. The new satrap, furnished 
with a letter of reply bearing the regal seal, was instructed 
to promote actively the projects of Pausanias. The letter 
was to this purport: — "Thus saith King Xerxes to Pau- 
sanias. Thy name stands for ever recorded in my house 
as a well-doer, on account of the men whom thou hast 
saved for me beyond sea at Byzantium; and thy propo- 
sitions now received are acceptable to me. Relax not 
either night or day in accomplishing that which thou 
promisest, nor let thyself be held back by cost, either gold 
or silver, or numbers of men, if thou standest in need of 
them; but transact in confidence thy business and mine 
jointly with Artabazus, the good man whom I have now 
sent, in such manner as may be best for both of us."i 

Throughout the whole of this expedition, Pausanias 
Pausanias ^^^ been insolent and domineering; degrading 
having ' the allies at quarters and watering-places in the 
oraicT^rom "^^st offensive manner as compared with the 
Xerxes, be- Spartaus, and treating the whole armament in 
?n "of erabie* ^ manner which Greek warriors could not tolerate, 
in bis even in a Spartan Herakleid and a victorious 

He'ts^re*-'* general. But when he received the letter from 
called to Xcrxes, and found himself in immediate com* 
Sparta. muiiication with Artabazus, as well as supplied 

to have been indignantly repeated > These letters are given hy 

byKleitns, daring the intoxication Thucydidfts verbatim (i. 128, 129): 

of the banquet wherein he was slain he had seen them or obtained copies 

by Alexander (Quint. Curtius, viii. (cb« uaxtpov dvtupiOi])— they were 

4, 29 (viii. 4) ; Plutarch, Alexand. doubtless communicated along with 

e. 61). the final revelations of the confi. 


with funds for corruption,^ his insane hopes knew no 
bounds, and he already fancied himself son-in-law of the 
Great King as well as despot of Hellas. Fortunately for 
Greece, his treasonable plans were neither deliberately laid, 
nor veiled until ripe for execution, but manifested with 
childish impatience. He clothed himself in Persian attire 
(a proceeding which the Macedonian army, a century and 
a half afterwards, could not tolerate 2 even in Alexander 
the Great) — he traversed Thrace with a body of Median 
and Egyptian guards — he copied the Persian chiefs both 
in the luxury of his table and . in his conduct towards the 
free women of Byzantium. Kleonike, a Byzantine maiden 
of conspicuous family, having been ravished from her 
parents by his order, was brought to his chamber at night: 
he happened to be asleep, and being suddenly awakened, 
knew not at first who was the person approaching his bed, 
but seized his sword and slew her.^ Moreover his haughty 
reserve, with uncontrolled bursts of wrath, rendered him 
unapproachable ; and the allies at length came to regard 
him as a despot rather than a general. The news of such 
outrageous behaviour, and the manifest evidences of his 
alliance with the Persians, were soon transmitted to the 
Spartans, who recalled him to answer for his conduct, and 
seemingly the Spartan vessels along with him. 4 

In spite of the flagrant conduct of Pausanias, the 
LacedaepoLonians acquitted him on the allegations „ .„„ ,^^ 

« ... J . j.^. J 1 X • i i* ^'O* 477-476. 

of positive and individual wrong ; yet mistrusting 
his conduct in reference to collusion with the enemy, they 
sent out Dorkis to supersede him as commander. But a 
revolution, of immense importance for Greece, had taken 
place in the minds of the allies. The headship, or hege- 

dential Argilian slave. As they tiL 8, 4; Quint. Curt. vi. 6, 10 (vi. 

axe autographs, I have translated 21, 11). 

them literally, retaining that ab- ' Plutarch, Kimon, 0. 6; also 

mpt transition from the third per- Plutarch, De Ser. Numin. Vind. 

son to the first, which is one of c. 10, p. 655. Pausanias, iii. 17, 8. 

theirpeculiarities. CorneliusNepos, It is remarkable that the latter 

who translates the letter of Pausa^ heard the story of the death of 

niasy has effaced this peculiarity^ Kleonikft from the lips of a Byzan- 

He carries the third person from tine citizen of his own day, and 

the beginning to the end (Cornel, seems to think that it had never 

STep. Pausan. c. 2). found place in any written work. 

» Diodor. xi. 44. • Thucyd. i. 96-131 : compare £>uri s 

* Arrian. Exp. Alex. iv. 7, 7; and Nymphis apud Athenseum, xii. 

p. 535. 

ii% HIST0B7 OF &RBECB. Past II. 

mony; was in the hands of Athens, and Dorkis the Spartan 
found the allies not disposed to recognize his authority. 

Even before the battle of Salamis, the question had 
Tha allies been raised, ^ whether Athens was not entitled 
h" d'^h' *^* ^^ ^^® command at sea, in consequence of the 
from Sparta preponderance of her naval contingent. The 
to Athens, repugnance of the allies to any command except 
that of Sparta, either on land or water, had induced the 
Athenians to waive their pretensions at that critical moment. 
But the subsequent victories had materially exalted the 
latter in the eyes of Greece; while the armament now 
serving, differently composed from that which had fought 
at Salamis, contained a lar^e proportion of the newly- 
enfranchised Ionic Greeks, who not only had no preference 
for Spartan command, but were attached to the Athenians 
on every ground — as well from kindred race, as from the 
certainty that Athens with her superior fleet was the only 
protector upon whom they could rely against the Persians. 
Moreover, it happened that the Athenian generals on this 
expedition, Aristeides and Kimon, were personally just and 
conciliating, forming a striking contrast with Pausanias. 
Hence the Ionic Greeks in the fleet, when they found that 
the behaviour of the latter was not only oppressive towards 
themselves but also revolting to Grecian sentiment gener- 
ally — addressed themselves to the Athenian commanders 
for protection and redress, on the plausible ground of 
kindred race;^ entreating to be allowed to serve under 
Athens, as leader instead of Sparta. 

Plutarch tells us that Aristeides not only tried to 
remonstrate with Pausanias, who repelled him with arro- 
gance — which is exceedingly probable — but that he also 
required, as a condition of his compliance with the request 
of the Ionic allies, that they should personally insult Pau- 
sanias, so as to make reconciliation impracticable: upon 
which a Samian and a Chian captain deliberately attacked 
and damaged the Spartan admiral-ship in the harbour of 
Byzantium. 3 The historians from whom Plutarch copied 
this latter statement must have presumed in the Athenians 

• Herodot. viii. 2 , 8. Compare ^jtffcdvac o^cbv jtviaOai xaxi t6 ^07- 
the language of the Athenian en- jtvU xal Ilauaavlqi (a^ iicitpiittiv ^« 
yoy, as it stands in Herodotns kqu fiiditlTjTQtt. 

(vii. 166), addressed to Gelo. * Plutarch, Aristeidfts, c 23. 

* Thuoyd. i. 26. ifi^louv a^TO^ 


a disposition to provoke that quarrel with Sparta which 
afterwards sprung up as it were spontaneously: but the 
Athenians had no interest in doing so, nor can we credit 
the story — which is moreover unnoticed by Thucydides. 
To give the Spartans a just ground of indignation, would 
have been glaring imprudence on the part of Aristeid^s. 
Yet having every motive to entertain the request of the 
allies, he began to take his measures for acting as their 
protector and chief. And his proceedings were much 
facilitated by the circumstance that the Spartan government 
about this time recalled Pausanias to undergo an examina- 
tion, in consequence of the universal complaints against 
him which had reached them. He seems to have left no 
Spartan authority behind him — even the small Spartan 
squadron accompanied him home: so that the Athenian 
generals had the best opportunity for ensuring to them- 
selves and exercising tnat command which the allies 
besought them to undertake. So effectually did they 
improve the moment, that when Dorkis arrived to replace 
Pausanias, they were already in full supremacy; while 
Dorkis, having only a small force and being in no condition 
to employ cons^aint^ found himself obliged to return 
home. * 

This incident, though not a declaration of war against 
Sparta, was the first open renunciation of her j^ ^^^ 
authority as presiding state among the Greeks; ance of 
the first avowed manifestation of a competitor J^^^+h^'^Je^* 
for that dignity, with numerous and willing lations of 
followers; the first separation of Greece (con- the^ Grecian 
sidered in herself alone and apart from foreign 
solicitations such as the Persian invasion) into two distinct 
organized camps, each with collective interests and projects 
of its own. In spite of mortified pride, Sparta was con- 
strained, and even in some points of view not indisposed, 
to patient acquiescence. She had no means of forcing the 
dispositions of the Ionic allies, while the war with Persia 
altogether — having now become no longer strictly defen- 
sive, and being withal maritime as well as distant from 
her own territory — had ceased to be in harmony with her 
home-routine and strict discipline. Her grave senators, 
especially an ancient Herakleid named Hetcemaridas, re- 
proved the impatience of the younger citizens, and 

> Thacyd. i. 96; Diodortts, zi. 44.47. 
VOL. V, I 


discountenanced the idea of permanent maritime command as 
a dangerous innovation. They even treated it as an advan- 
tage, that Athens should take the lead in carrying on the 
Persian war, since it could not be altogether dropped; 
nor had the Athenians as yet manifested any sentiments 
positively hostile to excite their alarm. * Nay, the Spar- 
tans actually took credit in the eyes of Athens, about a 
century afterwards, for having themselves advised this 
separation of command at sea from command on land.^ 
Moreover, if the war continued under Spartan guidance, 
there would be a continued necessity for sending out their 
kings or chief men to command: and the example of Pau- 
sanias showed them the depraving effect of such military 
power, remote as well as unchecked. 

The example of their king Leotychides, too, near 
about this time, was a second illustration of the same tend- 
^ ency. At the same time, apparently, that 

of "he'*^'''^ Pausanias embarked for Asia to carry on the 
Spartan ^aj« against the Persians, Leotychides was sent 
become^ with an army into Thessaly to put down the 
comipted AleuadflB and those Thessalian parties who had 
servic'e— ^"^ sided with Xerxes and Mardonius. Successful 
Lcotychi- jn this expedition, he suffered himself to be 
bribed, and was even detected with a large sum 
of money actually on his person ; in consequence of which 
the Lacedaemonians condemned him to banishment and 
razed his house to the ground. He died afterwards in 

' Thucyd. i. 95. Pollowing Thu- aslsokratds, the master of Ephorus, 

cydidds in his conception of these treats it in his Orat. yiii. De Face, 

events, I have embodied in the p. 179, 180. 

narrative as much as seems con- * Xenophon. Hellen. yi. 6, 84. 

sistent with it in Diodorus (xi. fiO), It was at the moment when the 

who evidently did not here copy Spartans were soliciting Athenian 

Thucydidds, but probably had Epho- aid, after their defeat at Leuktra. 

rus for his guide. The name of OTcojjLiftviQffxovTe? ftiv, <uc tov pdtp- 

HetoBmarldas, as an influential f)apov xoiv^ dnefxa^ioavTO — dvafj.i|i.- 

Spartan statesman on this occasion, v^axovxtc Se, cb^ 'AOiQvaiol xe it-no tu>v 

is probable enough; but his alleged *£XXi^vu>v ^^pdOijaav ^yefxdvtc too vao- 

speech on the mischiefs of maritime tixoOy xal tu)v xotvtbv XP^IM-O'tcov 

empire, which Diodorus seems to <puXaxtc, tu)v AaxeSaifxovlwv xauxa 

have had before him composed by 9Uftf)ouXtuo^ivu>y* aOxol xt xaxdc ^i^v 

Ephorus, would probably have re- 6(xoXoYoup,ivu>c 69* dndvxtov xd>v 

presented the views and feelings 'EXXi^vwv ^jYtjtdvtc irpoxpi8«ir)aa», 

of the year 860 B.O., and not those auixpouXtuojAivtuv au xauxa xu>v 'AOi|- 

of 476 B.C. The lubject would have vaituv. 
been treated in the same manner 


exile at Tegea. * Two such instances were well calculated 
to make the LacedaBmonians distrust the conduct of their 
Herakleid leaders when on foreign service, and this feeling 
weighed much in inducing them to abandon the Asiatic 
headship in favour of Athens. It appears that their Pelo- 
ponnesian allies retired from this contest at the same time 
as they did, so that the prosecution of the war was thus 
left to Athens as chief of the newly-emancipated Greeks. 2 

It was from these considerations that the Spartans 
were induced to submit to that loss of command which the 
misconduct of Pausanias had brought upon them. Their 
acquiescence facilitated the immense change about to take 
place in Grecian politics. 

According to the tendencies in progress prior to the 
Persian invasion, Sparta had become gradually more and 

■ Herodot. Ti. 72; Diodor. xi. 48; patting them down and making 

Pansanias, iii. 7, 8: compare Plu- the opposite party in Thessaly 

tarch, De Herodoti Malign, c. 21, predominant. 

p. 869. Considering how imperfectly we 

Iieotychidds died, according to know the Lacedaemonian chrono- 
Diodoms, in 476 B.C.: he had com- logy of this date, it is very possible 
manded at Mykald in 479 b.o. The that some confusion may have arisen 
expedition into Thessaly must in the case of Leotychidds from the 
therefore have been in one of the difference between the date of his 
two intermediate years, if the banishment and that of his deaiK 
chronology of Diodorus were in King Fleistoanaz afterwards, hav- 
this case thoroughly trustworthy, ing been banished for the same 
But Mr. Clinton (Fasti Hellenici, offence as that committed by Leo- 
Appendix, ch. iii. p. 210) has shown tychidds, and having lived many 
that Diodorus is contradicted byPlu- -years in banishment, was after- 
tarch, about the date of the accession wards restored: and the years 
of Archidamus — and by others, which he had passed in banishment 
about the date of the revolt at were counted as a part of his reign 
Sparta. Mr. Clinton places the (Fast. Hellen. 1. c. p. 211). The date 
accession of Archidamus and the of Archidamus may perhaps have 
banishment of Leotychidds (of been reckoned in one account from 
course therefore the expedition into the banishment of Leotycbidds— in 
Thessaly) in 469 B.C. I, incline another from his death; the rather, 
ratherto believe that the expedition as Archidamus must have been 
of Leotychidds against the Thes- very young, since he reigned forty< 
■alian Alenadse took place in the two years even after 469 B.C. And 
year or in the second year follow- the date which Diodorus has given 
ing the battle of Plateea, because as that of the death of Leotychidfts, 
they had been the ardent and hearty may really be only the date of his 
allies of Mardonius in Boeotia, and banishment| in which ha lived until 
because the war would seem not 469 B.C. 
to have been completed without > Thuoyd. i. 18« 


116 HI8T0BY OF GBEBGB. Pabt II. 

more the president of something like a Pan-hell enic union. 
Momentary comprising the greater part of the Grecian 
Pan-belle- states. Such at least was the point towards 
under^*^'* which things seemed to be tending; and if many 
Sparta, im- Separate states stood aloof from this union^ 
after*t*he^ none of them at least sought to form any counter- 
repulse of union, if we except the obsolete and impotent 
^^wbroken P^etensions of Argos. 

up and The preceding volumes of this history have 

pasBinginto gJiown that Sparta had risen to such ascendency, 

a schism . « , *^ . . • i •'^ 

with two not irom her superior competence m the man- 
disWnct agement of collective interests, nor even, in the 
and^chiefg, main, from ambitious efforts on her own part to 
Sparta and acquire it — but from the converfirinff tendencies 

Athens. «>>, • n ^• i.- l • j i, 

of Grecian leeling, which required some such 
presiding state — and from the commanding military power, 
rigid discipline,and ancient undisturbed constitution, which 
attracted that feeling towards Sparta. Thenecessities of com- 
mon defence against Persia greatly strengthened these 
tendencies; and the success of the defence, whereby so many 
Greeks were emancipated who required protection against 
their former master, seemed destined to have the like effect 
atill more. For an instant, after the battles of Platsea and 
Mykale — when the town of Plataea was set apart as a con- 
secrated neutral spot for an armed confederacy against the 
Persian, with periodical solemnities andmeetings of deputies 
— Sparta was exalted to be the chief of a full Pan-hellenic 
union, Athens being only one of the principal members. 
And had Sparta been capable either of comprehensive 
policy, of self-directed and persevering efforts, or of the 
requisite flexibility of dealing, embracing distant Greeks 
as well as near^ — her position. was now such, that her own 
ascendency, together with undivided Pan-hellenic union, 
might long have been maintained. But she was lamentably 
deficient in all the requisite qualities, and the larger the 
union became, the more her deficiency stood manifest. On 
tlie other hand, Athens, now entering into rivalry as a sort 
of leader of opposition, possessed all those qualities in a 
remarkable degree, over and above that actual maritime 
force which was the want of the day; so that the opening 
made by Spartan incompetence and crime (so far as 
Pausanias was concerned) found her in every respect 


But the sympathies of the Peloponnesians still clung 
to Sparta, while those of the Ionian Greeks had turned to 
Athens: and thus not only the short-lived symptoms of an 
established Pan-hellenic union, hut even all tendencies to- 
wards it, from this time disappear. There now stands out 
a manifest schism, with two pronounced parties, towards 
one of which nearly all the constituent atoms of the Grecian 
world gravitate: the maritime states, newly enfranchised 
from Persia, towards Athens — the land-states, which had 
formed most part of the confederate army at PJataea, to- 
wards Sparta. ^ Along with this national schism, and called 

' Thnoyd. i. 18. Kal lujdiXou xiv- Sparta and Athani in thalr way 

Suvou ifftxpefiaaOivToc ot tt AaxtSat- of dealing with thair allies respect- 

|fc6vtoi Tu>y ^u(iicoXt|AY)9dvtu>v *£XXi)- Ively. He then states the striking 

i9u>v iifiiaa^xo 6uvd|j.ti icpoO^^'^'^'S ^^^^y ^^^ ^^® military force put 

xa\ ol 'A6i)vatoi, Siavoi]9ivTt< ixXi- forth separately hy Athens and 

neiv r^v ic6Xiv xal dvaaxtuaadficvoi, her allies on the one side, and by 

ec T&c vauc efA^dyrcc vau'cuol iyi* Sparta and her allies on the other, 

vovTo. Koiv^ Si dxtt>od(tevoi t6v f)dfH during the Peloponnesian war, 

Papov, u9Ttpov o& icoXX4> SicxplOT)- were each, of them greater than 

oav itp6( T< 'AOi]valouc xal AaxtSai- the entire force which had been 

)jLOviou<, oT tt dicoaxavxtc potoiXiux employed by both together in the 

*£XX-r)vtc xal ol ^u(i.icoXt{i.iQ9avTtc. most powerful juncture of their con- 

Auvd|tti jap Tauxa yiifXTCti Sic<pdvi]* federacy against the Persian inva- 

IffX^ov Ydp oi fitv xard 7-)jv, ol Si ders— Kal sfivcxo a6xoi< e< t6v6c 

vauoi. Kal 6XIyov '(itv ^povov auvi- t6v icdXtpioy ^ 18 la icapaoxtui^ 

ftstvev ^ 6)i.aiXH'lo') inetxa 8t 8tt- |i,elCu>v {) u>< xd xpdxtoxd icoxs jjitxd 

ve^Bivxtc ol Aaxt8ai(i6vioi xal ol dx paitpvouc x^C CuH-H^aX^^^ ^''* 

'A9T)vaioi iitoXKf«,Y)aav iitxd xu>v ^q\l- QTjaav (i. 19). 

I&d^tov icpoc dXXi^Xouc* xal xiuv &XXu>v I notide this last passage espe- 

*EXXiQvu>v etxivic icou SiaaxaUv, icp6c cially (construing it as the Scho- 

Touxouc ^8t] exu>pou^ *Qaxt d k 6 liast seems to do), not less because 

xu>v Mt)$ixu>v ic xdvSs del it conveys an interesting compar- 

X 6v ic6Xt(i.ov, 4io. ison, than because it has been 

This is a clear and concise state- understood by Dr. Arnold, GdUer, 
ment of the great rerolution in and other commentators in a sense 
Grecian affairs, comparing the pe- which seems to me erroneous. They 
riod before and after the Persian interpret thus~a&xoK to mean the 
war. Thucydidds goes on to trace Athenians only, and not the Lace- 
briefly the consequences of this dsmonians— 4) 181a itapavxsuTJ to de- 
bisection of the Grecian world note the forces equipped by Athens 
into two great ]eagues->the grow- herself, apart from her allies— and 
mg improvement in military skill, d«pat<pvou< ^UfifAa^rlac to refer "to the 
and the increasing stretch of mi- Athenian alliance only, at a period 
litary effort on both sides from a little before the conclusion of 
the Persian invasion down to the the thirty years* treaty, when the 
Peloponnesian war. He remarks Athenians were masters not only 
also upon the difference between of the islands, and the Asiatic 


into action by it, appears the internal political schism in 
each separate city between oligarchy and democracy. Of 
course the germ of these parties had already previously 
existed in the separate states. But the energetic demo- 
cracy of Athens, and the pronounced tendency of Sparta 
to rest upon the native oligarchies in each separate city as 
her chief support, now began to bestow, on the conflict of 
internal pohtical parties, an Hellenic importance, and an 
aggravated bitterness, which had never before belonged 
to it. 

The departure of the Spartan Dorkis left the Athenian 
Proceed- generals at liberty; and their situation imposed 
ing8 of upon them the duty of organising the new con- 
he*r capa^ federacy which they had been chosen to conduct, 
city of The Ionic allies were at this time not merely 

goo^T'con- willing and unanimous, but acted as the forward 
duct of Ari- movers in the enterprise; for they stood in ob- 
steidfis. vious need of protection against the attacks of 
Persia, and had no farther kindness to expect from Sparta 
or the Peloponnesians. But even had they been less under 
the pressure of necessity, the conduct of Athens, and of 
Aristeides as the representative of Athens, might have 
sufficed to bring them into harmonious cooperation. The 
new leader was no less equitable towards the confederates 

Greek colonies^ bat had also minished in magnitude, and thus 

united to their confederacy Boeotia was no longer dxpai^v^^: without 

and Achaia on the continent of which previous notification, the 

Greece itself" (Dr. Arnold's note), comparison supposed by Dr. Arnold 

Now so far as the words go, the could not be clearly understood. I 

meaning assigned by Dr. Arnold conceive that there are two periods, 

might be admissible; but if we and two sets of circumstances, which 

trace the thread of ideas in Thu- throughout all this passage Thucy. 

cydidds, we shall see that the com- did6s means to contrast : first, con- 

parison^ as these commentators federate Greece at the time of the 

conceive it, between Athens alone Persian war ; next, bisected Greece 

and Athens aided by her allies — in a state of war, under the double 

between the Athenian empire as headship of Sparta and Athens. 

it stood during the Peloponnesian Auxoic refers as much to Sparta 

war, and the same empire as it had as to Athens— d«pai<pvou( rijc ^ofx- 

stood before the thirty years' truce fjiot^^iac means what had been before 

—is quite foreign to his thoughts, expressed by dfxai^fita— and itoTs 

Nor had Thucydidfis said one word set against T6v8e tov itdXsftov, is 

to inform the reader, that the equivalent to the expression which 

Athenian empire at the beginning had before been used — dico ttbv 

of the Peloponnesian war had di- Mr^Suubv 8« to/Ss del tov n6X&(jL0v« 


than energetic against the common enemy. The Formation 
izeneral conditions of the confederacy were of the con- 
regulated in a common synod of the members, ^f J>'i7., 
appointed to liieet periodically for deliberative under 
purposes, in the temple of Apollo and Artemis ^e^USen" 
at Delos — of old the venerated spot for the —general 
rehgious festivals of the Ionic cities, and at the ™/aiife?' 
same time a convenient centre for the members, held in that 
A definite obligation, either in equipped ships **^*'*<** 
of war or in money, was imposed upon every separate city, 
and the Athenians, as leaders, determined in which form 
contribution should be made by each. Their assessment 
must of course have been reviewed by the synod. They had 
no power at this time to enforce any regulation not ap- 
proved by that body. 

It had been the good fortune of Athens to profit by 
the genius of Themistokles on two recent critical occasions 
(the battle of Salamis and the rebuilding of her walls), 
where sagacity, craft, and decision were required in extra- 
ordinary measure, and where pecuniary probity was of less 
necessity. It was no less her good fortune now, — in the 
delicate business of assessing a new tax and determining 
how much each state should bear, when unimpeachable 
honesty in the assessor was the first of all qualities — not to 
have Themistokles; but to employ in his stead the well- 
known, we miffht almost say the ostentatious, probity of 
Aristeides. This must be accounted good fortune, since 
at the moment when Aristeides was sent out, the Athenians 
could not have anticipated that any such duty would devolve 
upon him. His assessment not only found favour at the 
time of its original proposition, when it must have been 
freely canvassed by the assembled allies — but also main- 
tained its place in general esteem, as equitable and moderate, 
after the once responsible headship of Athens had degener- 
ated into an unpopular empire. ^ 

* Thncyd. r. 18; Plutarch, Ari- of the lonians against Pansaniaa 

steid^B, c. 24. Plutarch states that occurred, and was the person to 

the allies expressly asked the -whom they applied for protection. 

Athenians to send Aristeidds for As such, he was the natural person 

the purpose of assessing the tribute, to undertake such duties as de- 

This is not at all probable: Ari- volved upon Athens, without any 

•teidSs, as commander of the Athen- necessity of supposing that he was 

ian contingent under Pausanias, specially asked for to perform it. 

«M at Byzantium when the mutiny Plutarch farther states that a 


Respecting this first assessment we scarcely know more 
than one single fact — the aggregate in money was 460 
talents (= about 10 6,000 /.sterfinff). Of the items composing 
such aggregate— of the individual cities which paid it 
— of the distribution of obligations to furnish ships and to 
Assess- furnish money — we are entirely ignorant. The 
ment of little information which we possess on these 
federacy points relates to a period considerably later, 
and all its shortly before the Peloponnesian war, under the 
made^by' uncontrolled empire then exercised by Athens. 
Aristeidds Thucydides in his brief sketch makes us clearly 
obligation Understand the difference between presiding 
in ships and Athens with her autonomous and regularly 
SoSeyTotai assembled allies in 476 b.c, and tmpmo/ Athens 
— Heiidnota- with her subject allies in 432 b.c. The Greek 
miae. word equivalent to ally left either of these 

epithets to be understood, by an ambiguity exceedingly 
convenient to the powerful states. From the same author, 
too, we learn the general causes of the change: but he 
gives us few particulars as to the modifying circumstances, 
and none at all as to the first start. He tells us only that 
the Athenians appointed a peculiar board of officers called 
the HellenotamisB, to receive and administer the common 
fund — that Delos was constituted the general treasury, 
where the money was to be kept — and that the payment 
thus levied was called the phorus ; * a name which appears 
then to have been first put into circulation, though after- 
wards usual — and to have conveyed at first no degrading 
import, though it afterwards became so odious as to be 
exchanged for a more innocent synonym. 

Endeavouring as well as we can to conceive the Athe- 
nian alliance in its infancy, we are first struck with the 

certain contribution had been le- Pansanias statesi- bat I think 

vied from the Greeks towards the quite erroneously, that the name 

war, even during the headship of ofAristeidds was robbed of its due 

Sparta. This statement also is honour because he was the first 

highly improbable. The headship person who exa^t ^dpouc toIc*CXXv}9i 

of Sparta covers only one single (Pausan. viii. 62, 2). Neither the 

campaign, in which Pansanias had assessment nor the name of Ari- 

the command : the Ionic Greeks steidSs was otherwise than popular, 

sent their ships to the fleet, which Aristotle employs the name of 

would be held sufficient, and there Aristeidds as a symbol of unriyalled 

was no time for measuring com- probity (Bhetoric. ii. 24, 2). 

mutations into money. > Thucyd. i. 95, 96. 


magnitude oftbe total sum contributed; which will appear 

the more remarkable when we reflect that many Bapid 

of the contributing cities furnished ships be- growth, 

sides. We may be certain that all which was Situde^of 

done at first was done by general consent, and *^? «o*^- 

by a freely determining majority. For Athens, ©f dSos: 

at the time when the Ionic allies besouirht her ^jl^>"fif 

... ., 1J1.-I.J adhesion 

protection against arrogance, could nave had of the 
no power of constraining parties, especially members, 
when the loss of supremacy, though quietly borne, was yet 
fresh and rankling among the countrymen of Pausanias. 
So large a total implies, from the very first, a great number 
of contributing states, and we learn from hence to ap- 
preciate the powerful, wide-spread, and voluntary move- 
ment which then brought together the maritime and in- 
sular Greeks distributed throughout the JSgean sea and 
the Hellespont. 

The Phoenician fleet, and the Persian land-force, 
might at any moment re-appear, and there was no hope of 
resisting either except by confederacy: so that confeder- 
acy imder such circumstances became with these exposed 
Greeks not merely a genuine feeling, but at that time the 
first of all their feelings. It was their common fear, rather 
than Athenian ambition, which gave birth to the alliance; 
and they were grateful to Athens for organising it. The 
public import of the name Hellenotamise, coined for the 
occasion — the selection of Delos as a centre — and the pro- 
vision for regular meetings of the members — demonstrate 
the patriotic and fraternal purpose which the league was 
destined to serve. In truth the protection of the -^gean 
sea against foreign maritime force and lawless piracy, as 
well as that of the Hellespont and Bosphorus against the 
transit of a Persian force, was a purpose essentidly public, 
for which all the parties interested were bound in equity 
to provide by way of common contribution. Any island, 
or seaport which might refrain from contributing, was a 
gainer at the cost of others. The general feeling of this 
common danger, as well as equitable obligation, at a mo- 
ment when the fear of Persia was yet serious, was the real 
cause which brought together so many contributing mem- 
bers, and enabled the forward parties to shame into con- 
currence such as were more backward. How the con- 
federacy came to be turned afterwards to the purposes 


of Athenian ambition, we shall see at the proper time: 
but in its origin it was an equal alliance, in so far as 
alliance between the strong and the weak can ever be 
equal — not an Athenian empire. Nay, it was an alliance 
in which every individual member was more exposed, 
more defenceless, and more essentially benefited in the 
way of protection than Athens. We nave here in truth 
one of the fe^ moments in Grecian history wherein a 
purpose at once common, equal, useful, and innocent, 
brought together spontaneously many fragments of this 
disunited race, and overlaid for a time that exclusive bent 
towards petty and isolated autononomy which ultimately 
made slaves of them all. It was a proceeding equitable 
and prudent, in principle as well as in detail; promising at 
the time the most beneficent consequences — not merely 
protection against the Persians, but a standing police of 
the JSgean sea, regulated by a common superintending 
authority. And if such promise was not realised, we shaU 
find that the inherent defects of the allies, indisposing them 
to the hearty appreciation and steady performance of 
their duties as equal confederates, are at least as much 
chargeable with the failure as the ambition of Athens. 
We may add, that in selecting Delos as a centre, the Ionic 
allies were conciliated by a renovation of the solemnities 
which their fathers, in the days of former freedom, had 
crowded to witness in that sacred island. 

At the time when this alliance was formed, the Per- 
st te d sians still held not only the important posts of 
power of Eion ou the Strymon and Doriskus in Thrace, 
Persia at jjut also Several other posts in that country i 
when the which are not specified to us. We may thus 
confeder- understand why the Greek cities on and near 
tSIios the Chalkidic peninsula — Argilus, Stageirus, 

was first Akanthus, Skolus, Olynthus, &c. — ^which we 
know to have joined under the first assessment 
of Aristeides, were not less anxious 2 to seek protection in 
the bosom of the new confederacy, than the Dorian islands 
of Rhodes and Kos, the Ionic islands of Samos and Chios, 

* Herodot. vii. 106. uitapxoi ev tSiQpsOTiaov, Ac. 

•CX) OpTjtx^ xal TOO *EXXt]oic6vtou * Thucyd. v. 18. Ta« 8i «6Xsi<, 

icavxay"^. Outoi U)v irdvrt^, ot t« <ptpo6ffa« xov ^pApov tov tit' 'ApiaTsi- 

ix 6pr,txT]c xal tou ^EXXfjoitivTou, Sou, aOxovifiouc tlvai .... elal 6c, 

icX^jv TOO ev Aopi9X(|>, Oito 'EXXiqvcov ^ApYtXo?, StdiYttpoc, 'AxavQo?, 2xu)- 

Gatspov Tau-ci]< x^^ aTpaTi]Xaol'/]c Xoc, 'OXuvQoc, 2icdpTu>Xo(. 


the JSolic Lesbos and Tenedos, or continental towns such 
as Miletus and Byzantium: by all of whom adhesion to 
this alliance must have been contemplated, in 477 or 
476 B.c.y as the sole condition of emancipation from Persia. 
Nothing more was required, for the success of a foreign 
enemy against Greece generally, than complete autonomy 
of every Grecian city, small as well as great — such as the 
Persian monarch prescribed and tried to enforce ninety 
years afterwards, through the Lacedaemonian Antalkidas, 
in the pacification which bears the name of the latter. 
Some sort of union, organised and obligatory upon each 
city, was indispensable to the safety of all. Lideed even 
with that aid, at the time when the confederacy of Delos 
was first formed, it was by no means certain the Asiatic 
enemy would be effectually kept out; especially as the 
Persians were strong not merely &om their own force, but 
also from the aid of internal parties in many of the Grecian 
states — traitors within, as well as exiles without. 

Among these traitors, the first in rank as well 
as the most formidable, was the Spartan Pausanias. Sum- 
moned home from Byzantium to Sparta, in (.^j^^^^j^ ^^ 
order that the loud complaints against him Pausanias 
might be examined, he haa been acquitted ^ of *'*®' hemg 

.1 ° r /• 1 • 'J. removed 

the charges of wrong and oppression agamst from the 
mdividuals. Yet the presumptions of medism command 
(or treacherous correspondence with the Per- seoutes hia 
sians) appeared so strong, that, though not treasonable 
found guuty, he was still not reappointed to to*conjuuc- 
the command. Such treatment seems to have «on with 
only emboldened him in the prosecution of his 
designs against Greece; for which purpose he came out 
to Byzantium in a trireme belonging to Hermione, under 
pretence of aiding as a volunteer without any formal 
authority in the war. He there resumed his negotiations 
with Artabazus. His great station and celebrity still gave 
him BO ■ strong a hold on men's opinions, that he appears 
to have established a sort of mastery in Byzantium, from 
whence the Athenians, already recognised heads of the 
confederacy, were constrained to expel him by force. 2 

* Oomelius Kepos states that he subsequent circumstances con- 

"was fined (Pausanias, c. 2), which nected with him. 

is neither noticed by Thucydidds, • Thucyd. i. 130, 131. Kal ix too 

nor at all probable, looking at the Bol^avxlou pia 0k6 tu)v 'AQ7]vatu>^ 

124 HI8T0BT 07 OBEECS. Past II. 

And we may be sure that the terror excited by his 
presence, as well as by his known designs; tended materially 
to accelerate the organisation of the confederacy under 
Athens. He then retired to Kolonse in the Troad, where 
he continued for some time in the farther prosecution of 
his schemes, trying to form a Persian party, despatching 
emissaries to distribute Persian gold among various cities 
of Greece, and probably employing the name of Sparta 
to impede the formation of the new confederacy: ^ until 
at length the Spartan authorities, apprised of his pro- 
ceedings, sent a herald out to him with peremptory orders 
that he should come home immediately alonff with the 
herald: if he disobeyed, ^he Spartans would declare war 
against him," or constitute him a public enemy. 

ixicoXtopxT)6eU, Ac.: these words Plvtereh (TheraistokUfl, e. 6, ftnd 
teem to imply that he hitd acquired Aristeidds, torn. iL p. 218) tells ns 
a strong position in the town. that Themistoklfis proposed this 
* It is to this time that I refer decree against Arthmius and caused 
the mission of Arthmius of Zeleia it to be passed. But Plutarch re- 
(an Asiatic town, between Mount fers it to the time when Xerxes 
Ida and the southern coast of the was on the point of invading 
Propontis) to gain over such Greeks Oreece. Now it appears to me that 
as he could by means of Persian the incident cannot well belong 
gold. In the course of his risit to to that point of time. Xerxes did 
Greece, Arthmius went to Athens : not rely upon bribes, but upon 
his purpose was discorered, and other and different means, for con- 
he was compelled to flee: while quering Greece: besides, the rery 
the Athenians, at the instance of tenor of tht decree shows that it 
Themistoklds, passed an indignant must have been passed after the 
decree, declaring him and his race formation of the confederacy of 
enemies of Athens, and of all the Delos— for it pronounces Arthmius 
allies of Athens— and proclaiming to bean enemy of Athens and of all 
that whoerer should slay him would the allies of Athens. To a native 
be guitless ; because he had brought of Zeleia it might be a serious 
iu Persian gold to bribe the Greeks, penalty to be excluded and pro- 
This decree was engraven on a scribed from all the cities in alliance 
brazen column, and placed on re- with Athens ; many of them being 
cord in the acropolis, where it on the coast of Asia. I know no 
stood near the great statue of point of time to which the mission 
Atb^nd Promachos, even in the of Arthmius can be so conveniently 
time of Bemosthends and his con« referred as this — when Pausanias 
temporary orators. See Demosthen. and Artabazus were engaged in 
Philippic, iii. c. 9. p. 122, and De this very part of Asia, in contriving 
Fals. Legat. c. 76, p. 428; ^schin. plots to get up a party in Greece, 
vont. Ktesipbont. ad fin. Harpokrat. Pausanias was thus engaged for 
V. 'Axifioc — Beinarchus cont. Aristo- some years—before the banishment 
geiton. sect. 25, 26. of TbemistokUs. 


As the execution of this threat would have frustrated 
all the ulterior schemes of Pausanias, he thought j 
it prudent to obey; the rather, as he felt entire called to 
confidence of escaping all the charges against 8part»— 
him at Sparta by the employment of bribes, i — /Jt'on 
the means for which were doubtless abundantly ^J ^^^ai 
furnished to him through Artabazus. He provoke the 
accordingly returned along with the herald, and Heiote to 
was, in the first moments of indignation, im- 
prisoned by order of the Ephors — who, it seems, were 
legally competent to imprison him, even had he been king 
instead of regent. But he was soon let out, on his own 
requisition and under a private arrangement with friends 
and partisans, to take his trial against all accusers. ^ Even 
to stand forth as accuser against, so powerful a man was a 
serious peril: to undertake the proof of specific matter of 
treason against him was yet more serious: nor does it 
appear that any Spartan ventured to do either. It was 
known that nothing short of the most manifest and in- 
vincible proof would be held to justify his condemnation, 
and amidst a long chain of acts carrying conviction when 
taken in the aggregate, there was no single treason 
sufficiently demonstrable for the purpose. Accordingly 
Pausanias remained not only at large but unaccused, still 
audaciously persisting both in his intrigues at home and 
his correspondence abroad with Artabazus. He ventured 
to assail the unshielded side of Sparta by opening negotia- 
tions with the Helots, and instigating them to revolt; 
promising them both liberation and admission to political 
privilege; 3 with a view, first to destroy the board of 

* Thucyd. \. 181. *0 8i 3ouX6|xt- hand arrangement: very prohahly 
w< u>c rixisra Sicoicto? eTvai xal by a bribe, though the word does 
■TCiffTtinov ypi^fiaai StaXoasiv t7)v 5ia- not necessarily imply it. The 
PoXiQv« dvs}^u)psi to SsuTspov ii Scholiast says so distinctly— ^pig- 
2icdpT7)v. (xaat xal Xdyoi^ 6ta7cpa^d|x8vO(; 6t)Xov- 

* Thucyd. 1. 131. Kal ic {x4v rfyt 6ti 8iaxpouaa|ji«vo« ttjv xaT^jyopiav. 
•ipxT^v ia;tl7tTsi t6 itpu)Tov bnb twv Dr. Arnold translates 6ianpa^d|xevoc 
4?6po)v* eitaiTot SiotTtpa^dpisvoc oatepov "having settled the business." 
•£^X0e, xoti xot^iaTYjaiv ftaoT6v ec xpJ- • Aristotel. Politic, iv. 13, 13; 
9ivToU PouXopiivotc icepl aOxov iXsY- ^' ^y ^; v. 6, 2; Herodot. v. 82. 
X£tv. Aristotle calls Pausanias king, 

The word Starpa^dfxavo^ indicates though he was only regent: the 

first, that Pausanias himself ori- tnith is, that he had all the power 

ginated the efforts to get free, of a Spartan king, and seemingly 

—next that he came to an under- more, if we compare bis treatment 


Ephors and render himself despot in his own country — 
next, to acquire through Persian help the supremacy of 
Greece. Some of those Helots to whom he addressed 
himself revealed the plot to the Ephors, who nevertheless, 
in spite of such grave peril, did not choose to take 
measures against Pausanias upon no better information — 
so imposing was still his name and position. But though 
some few Helots might inform, probably many others both 
gladly heard the proposition and faithfully kept the secret: 
we shall find, by what happened a few years afterwards, 
that there were a large number of them who had their 
spears in readiness for revolt. Suspected as Pausanias 
was, yet by the fears of some and the connivance of others, 
he was allowed to bring his plans to the very brink of con- 
summation; and his last letters to Artabazus,i intimating 
that he was ready for action, and bespeaking immediate 
performance of the engagements concerted between them, 
were actually in the hands of the messenger. Sparta was 
saved from an outbreak of the most formidable kind, 
not by the prudence of her authorities, but by a mere 
accident — or rather by the fact that Pausanias was not 
only a traitor to his country, but also base and cruel in 
his private relations. 

The messenger to whom these last letters were 
H© is de- entrusted was a native of Argilus in Thrace, a 
tected by favourite and faithful slave of Pausanias; once 

T h A 1* A V A I Am 

tion of a Connected with him by that intimate relation 
*^*d* r *°' which Grecian manners tolerated — and admitted 
fear ^f the' cveu to the fuU Confidence of his treasonable 
Ephora, projects. It was by no means the intention of 
this Argilian to betray his master. But on receiving the 
letter to carry, he recollected with some uneasiness that 
none of the previous messengers had ever come back. 
Accordingly he broke the seal and read it, with the full 
view of carrying it forward to its destination if he found 
nothing inconsistent with his own personal safety: he had 
farther taken the precaution to counterfeit his master's 
seal, so that he could easily re-close the letter. On readine 
it, he found his suspicious confirmed by an express in- 
junction that the bearer was to be put to death — a dis- 

with that of the Prokleid king xeXeutalac ()39iXcicict9ToX&cnp^C 
Leotychid^g. 'AptdfiaCov xo{«.tstv^ dvT)p 'ApylXtoC} 

* Thucyd. i. 132. 6 («.iXXu>v xdc &o. 


covery which left him no alternative except to deliver it 
to the Ephors. But those magistrates, wno had hefore 
disbelieved the Helot informers, still refused to believe 
even the confidential slave with his master's autograph 
and seal, and with the full account besides, which doubtless 
he would communicate at the same time, of all that 
had previously passed in the Persian correspondence, not 
omitting copies of those letters between Pausanias and 
Xerxes which I have already cited from Thucydides — for 
in no other way can they nave become public. Partly 
from the suspicion which in antiquity always attachea 
to the testimony of slaves, except when it was obtained 
under the pretended guarantee of torture — partly from 
the peril of dealing with so exalted a criminal — the Ephors 
would not be satisfied with aiw evidence less than his 
own speech and their own ears. They directed the Argilian 
slave to plant himself as a suppliant in the sacred precinct 
of Poseidon, near Cape Tsenarus, under the shelter of a 
double tent or hut, behind which two of them concealed 
themselves. Apprised of this unexpected mark of alarm, 
Pausanias hastened to the temple, and demanded the 
reason: upon which the slave disclosed his knowledge of 
the contents of the letter, and complained bitterly that 
after long and faithful service, — with a secrecy never once 
betrayed, throughout this dangerous correspondence, — he 
was at length rewarded with nothing better than the same 
miserable fate which had befallen the previous messengers. 
Pausanias, admitting all these facts, tried to appease the 
slave's disquietude, and gave him a solemn assurance of 
safety if he would quit the sanctuary ; urging him at the 
same time to proceed on the journey forthwith, in order 
that the schemes in progress might not be retarded. 

All this passed within the hearing of the concealed 
Ephors; who at length, thoroughly satisfied, determined 
to arrest Pausanias immediately on his return ^ig arrest 
to Sparta. They met him in the public street and death— 
not far from the temple of Athene Chalkioekus Sfade^o?* 
(or of the Brazen House). But as they came offended 
near, either their menacing looks, or a signifi- ■**^<5*"*'y« 
cant nod from one of them, revealed to this guilty man 
their purpose. He fled for refuge to the temple, which 
was so near that he reached it before they could overtake 
him. He planted himself as a suppliant, far more hopeless 

1 28 HI8T0BT OF OBBECB. Pabt IT. 

than the Argilian slave whom he had so recently talked 
over at Tsenams, in a narrow roofed chamber belonging 
to the sacred building; where the Ephors, not warranted 
in touching him, took off the roof, built up the doors, and 
kept watch until he was on the point of death by starvation. 
According to a current story ^ — not recognised by Thucy- 
dides, yet consistent with Spartan manners — his own 
mother was the person who placed the first stone to build 
up the door, in deep abhorrence of his treason. His last 
moments being carefully observed, he was brought away 
just in time to expire without, and thus to avoid the 
desecration of the temple. The first impulse of the 
Ephors was tocasthisbody into the ravine orhoUow called the 
Kseadas, the usual place of punishment for criminals: prob- 
ably his powerful friends averted this disgrace, and he was 
buried not far off, until some time afterwards, under the 
mandate of the Delphian oracle, his body was exhumed 
and transported to the exact spot where he had died. 
However, the oracle, not satisfied even with this reinter- 
ment, pronounced the whole proceeding to be a profanation 
of the sanctity of Athene, enjoining that two bodies should 
be presented to her as an atonement for the one carried 
away. In the very early days of Greece — or among the 
Carthaginians, even at this period — such an injunction, would 
probably have produced the slaughter of two human, vic- 
tims: on the present occasion, Athene, or Hikesius the 
tutelary god of suppliants, was supposed to be satisfied by 
two brazen statues ; not however without some attempts 
to make out that the expiation was inadequate.^ 

Thus perished a Greek who reached the pinnacle of 
About renown simply from the accidents of his lofty 

BO. 467. descent and of his being general at Platsea, 
where it does not appear that he displayed any superior 
qualities. His treasonable projects implicated and brought 
to disgrace a man far greater than himself — the Athenian 

The chronology of this important period is not so 
Themiato- fully known as to enable us to make out the 
piomised™* precise dates of particular events. But we are 
in the obliged (in consequence of the subsequent inci* 

frewon^of ^^^^^ Connected with Themistokles, whose flighi 
Pausaniaa. to Persia is tolerably well-marked as to date) to 

> Diodor. xi. 45 ; Cornel. Nepos, * Tbncyd. i. 133, 134 ; Pansanias, 
Pausan. c. B; Polysn, viii. 61. ili. 17, 9. 


admit an interval of about nine years between the 
retirement of Pausanias from his command at Byzan- 
tiam, and his death. To suppose so long an interval en- 
gaged in treasonable correspondence, is perplexing; and we 
can only explain it to ourselves very imperfectly by con- 
sidering that the Spartans were habitually slow in their 
movements, and that the suspected regent may perhaps 
have communicated with partisans, resd or expected^ in 
many parts of Greece. Among those whom he sought to 
enlist as accomplices was Themistokles, still in great power 
— though, as it would seem, in declining power — at Athens. 
The charge of collusion with the Persians connects itself 
with the previous movement of political parties in 
The rivalry of Themistokles and Aristeides had been 
greatly appeased by the invasion.of Xerxes, which Position of 
had imposed uponboth the peremptory necessity J?/™^?*^" 
of cooperation against a common enemv. And Athens— 
apparently it was not resumed during the times jf J}f ^'J®^ ®' 
whicb immediately succeeded the return of the parties '^and 
Athenians to their country-: at least we hear of politics, 
both, in effective service and in prominent posts. The- 
mistokles stands forward as the contriver of the 4;ity walls 
and architect of Peirseus: Aristeides is commander of the 
fleet, and first organiser of the confederacy of Delos. 
Moreover we seem to detect it change in the character of 
the latter. He had ceased to be the champion of Athenian 
old-fashioned landed interest, against Themistokles as the 
originator of the maritime innovations. Those innovations 
had now, since the battle of Salamis, become an established 
fact; a fact of overwhelming influence on the destinies and 
character, public .as well as private, of the Athenians. 
During the .expatriation at Salamis, every man, rich or 
poor, landed proprietor or artisan, had been for the 4ime a 
seaman: and the $inecdote of Kimon, .who dedicated the 
bridle of his horse in the acropolis as a token that he was 
about to pass from the .cavalry to service on shipboard, i 
is a type of that change ,of feeling which must have been 
impressed more or less upon every rich man in Athens. 
Erom henceforward the fleet is endeared to every man as 
the grand force, offensive and defensive, of the state, in 
which character aH the political leaders agree in accepting 
it. We ou^ht to add, at the same time, 3iat this .change 

^ Pl.utiurch, K\vao^, c. .S, 
VOL. V. 'ft 




was attended with no detriment either to the land-force or 
to the landed cultivation of Attica, both of which will be 
found to acquire extraordinary development during the 
interval between the Persian and Peloponnesian wars. 
Still the triremes, and the men who manned them, taken 
collectively, were now the determining element in the state. 
Moreover the men who manned them had just returned 
from Salamis^ fresh from a scene of trial and danger, and 
from a harvest of victory, which had equalized for the 
moment all Athenians as sufferers, as combatants, and as 

gatriots. Such predominance of the maritime impulse 
aving become pronounced immediately after the return 
from Salamis, was farther greatly strengthened by the 
construction and fortification of the Peirseus — a new mari- 
time Athens as large as the old inland city — as well as by 
the unexpected formation of the confederacy at Delos, 
with all its untried prospects and stimulating duties. 

The political change arising from hence in Athens 
was not less important than the military. "The maritime 
multitude, authors of the victory of Salamis," i and instru- 
ments of the new vocation of Athens as head of the Delian 
confederacy, appear now ascendant in the political consti- 
Etfect of tution also; not in any way as a separate or 
the events privileged class, but as leavening the whole mass, 
of the Per- strenfftheninfif the democratical sentiment, and 
upon A the- protesting against all recognised political in- 
nian poll- equalities. Li fact, during the struggle at Sala- 
timent— ' mis, the whole city of Athens had been nothing 
Btimuius to else than **a maritime multitude,** amons: which 

demoerac|r« ,i ., ji-r -ijr 

the proprietors and chief men had been con- 
founded, until, by the efforts of all, the common countnr 
had been reconquered. Nor was it likely that this multi- 
tude, after a trying period of forced equality, during which 
political privilege had been effaced, would patiently 
acquiesce in the full restoration of such privilege at home. 
We see by the active political sentiment of the German 
people, after the great struggles of 1813 and 1814, how 
much an energetic and successful military effort of the 
people at large, blended with endurance of serious hard- 

» Aristotel. Politic. V. 3, 6. Kal 8ia tVjv xata OdXoddov 86va(Aiv, tfyw 

ndiXtv 6 vauTixoc S^Xo<, ifevi* 67}|xoxpoTlav loxopoTepav enoiT)9ev. 

(levoc otxioc t^? ttcpl SaXapiiva vixT)^, *0 vauTix6< 6^Xo( (Thucyd. viii.Ta 

xal 8ia TauTTjc iy^ 7)Y«)tovia( xal And •pa%9xm)* 


ship, tends to stimulate the sense of political dig^ty and 
the demand for developed citizenship: and if this be the 
tendency even among a people habitually passive on such 
gnbjects, much more was it to be expected in the Athenian 
population, who had gone through a previous training of 
near thirty years under the democracy of Kleisthen^. At 
the time when that constitution was first establishedy^ it 
was perhaps the most democratical in Greece. It had 
worked extremely well, and had diffused amonff the people 
a sentiment favourable to equal citizenship and unfriendly 
to avowed privilege : so that the impressions made by the 
struggle at Salamis found the popular mind prepared to 
receive them. , 

Early after the return to Attica, the Kleisthenean 
constitution was enlarged as respects eligibility 
to the magistracy. According to that constitu- o/^'^xiei- 
tion, the fourth or last class on the Solonian stbenean 
census, including the considerable majority of Jf "■^*?{ 
the freemen, were not admissible to offices of citizens 
state, thouffh they possessed votes in common ^**boo* 

•j.i_ j.1. X V ^^.t X 1- exception 

With the rest: no person was ehgible to be a are render- 
magistrate unless he belonged to one of the •^j?**^^^*; 
three higher classes. This restriction was now missibie 
annulle(^ and eligibility extended to all the *<> ^^^H. 
citizens. "We may appreciate the strength of rersai 
feeling with which such reform was demanded, eligibility 
when we find that it was proposed by Aristeides; tion of ' 
a man the reverse of what is called a demagogue, magistrates 
and a strenuous friend of the Kleisthenean con- tition or 
stitution. No political system would work, ?'*j^*?* 
after the Persian war, which formally excluded ^ 
"the maritime multitude" from holding magistracy. I 
rather imagine (as has been stated in my preceding volume) 
that election of magistrates was still retained, and not 
exchanged for drawing lots until a certain time, though 
not a long time afterwards. That which the public senti- 
ment first demanded was the recognition of the equal and 
open principle; after a certain length of experience it was 
found that poor men, though legally qualified to be chosen, 
were in point of fact rarely chosen : then came the lot, to 
give them an equal chance with the rich. The principle 
of sortition or choice by lot, was never applied (as I have 

' For the constitution of Kleiathenfts, see ch. xxxi. of this History. 



132 HI8T0BT 07 OBBBOB. Pabv II. 

before remarked) to all offices at Athens — ^neyer for ex- 
ample to the StratSgi or Generals, whose functions were 
more graye and responsible than those of any other person 
in the service of the state, and who always continued to be 
elected by show of hands. 

In the new position into which Athens was now thrown, 
increftse of "^^^ SO great an extension of what may be termed 
the power her foreign relations, and with a confederacy 
stratlgi— which imposed the necessity of distant military 
•Iteration fiervice, the functions of the Strategi naturally 
t?on8*and*** tended to become both more absorbing and com- 
diminutiou plicated; while the civil administration became 
porunce*' "aore troublesome if .not move difficult, from the 
of the enlargement of the city and the stiU greater 

Archons. enlargement of Peirseus — leading to an increase 
of town population, and especially to an increase of the 
metics or resident non-freemen. And it was probably about 
this period, during the years immediately succeeding the 
battle of Salamis — when the force of old habit and tracution 
hadbeenpartially enfeebled by so many stirring novelties,— 
that the Archons were withdrawn altogether &om political 
and military duties, and confined to civil or judicial ad- 
ministration. At the battle of Marathon, the Polemarch 
is a military commander, president of the ten Strategi: ^ we 
know him afterwards only as a civil magistrate, administer- 
ing justice to the metics or non-freemen, while the Stra- 
tegi perform military duties without him: a change not 
umike that which took place at Bome, when the Prsetor 
was created to undertake the judicial branch of the large 
original duties of the Consul. I conceive that this altera- 
tion, indicating as it does a change in the character of the 
Archons generally, must have taken place at the time which 
we have now reached 2 — a time when the Athenian establish- 
ments on all sides required a more elaborate distribution 
of functionaries. The distribution of so many Athenian 
boards of functionaries, part to do duty in the city, and 
part in the Peirseus, cannot have commenced until after 
this period, when Peiraeus had been raised by Themistokles 
to the dignity of town, fortress, and state-harbour. Such 

• Herodot. vi. 109. t. noXi(i.apxo< ; Pollux, riii. W: 

* Aristotel. IloXiTetwv Fragm. compare Meier and Schomann, Der 
xlTii. ed. Neumann, Harpokration, Attische Prozess, ch. ii. p. 60 aegg. 


boards were the Astynomi and Agoranomi^ wlio Adminie- 
maintained the police of streets and markets — tration of 
the Metronomi, who watched over weights and uiged— ^"^ 
measures — the Sitophylakes, who carried into nerw funo- 
effect various state regulations respecting the appointed 
custody and sale of com — with various others — dietribu- 
who acted not less in Perseus than in the city. * tween ^ 
We may presume that each of these boards was Athens and 
originally created as the exigency appeared to ^«*»»"»- 
caU for it,, at a period, later than that which we have 
now reached; most of these duties of detail having been at 
first discharged by the Archons, and afterwards (when 
these latter became- too full of occupation) confided to 
separate administrators. The special and important change 
which characterised the period immediately succeeding tne 
battle of Salamis; was, the more accurate line drawn be- 
tween the Archons and theStrategi; assigning the foreign 
and military department entirely to the Strateffi, and 
rendering the Archons purely civil magistrates, — adminis- 
trative as well as judicial: while the first creation of the 
separate boards above-named was probably an ulterior en- 
largement, arising out of increase of population, power, 
and trade, between the Persian and Peloponnesian wars. 
It was by some such steps that the Athenian administration 
gradually attained that complete development which it 
exhibits in practice during the century from the Pelopon- 
nesian war downward, to which nearly all our positive and 
direct information relates. 

> With this expansion both of democratical feeling and 
of military activity at Athens, Aristeides appears political 
to have sympathized. And the popularity thus career and 
ensured to him, probably heightened by some tenure ^of' 
regret for his previous ostracism, was calculated Themisto- 
to acquire permanence from his straightforward SmeTri; 
and incorruptible character, now brought into vais against 
strong relief by his function as assessor to the xi^on, 
new Delian confederacy. Aikmaon, 

On the other hand, the ascendency of The- SabTuty to 
mistokles, though so often exalted by his un- charges of 
rivalled political genius and daring, as well as by ®®'"*p* **"• 
the signal value of his public recommendations, was as 

> Bee Aristotel. IIoXtTetu>v Fragm. Schomann, Antiqq. Jur. 
it T. xziii. zxxTiii. 1. ed Neumann ; Grsec. c. xli. zlii. xliii. 



often overthrown by his duplicity of means and unprin- 
cipled thirst for money. New political opponents sprung 
up against him, men sympathising with Aristeides and far 
more violent in their antipathy than Aristeides himselfl 
Of these the chief were Eamon (son of Miltiades) and Alk- 
maeon: moreover it seems that the Lacedsemonians, though 
full of esteem for Themistokles immediately after the battle 
of Salamis, had now become extremely hostile to him — a 
change which may be sufficiently explained from his stra- 
tagem respecting the fortifications of Athens, and his sub- 
sequent ambitious projects in reference to the PeirsBUS. 
The Lacedaemonian influence, then not inconsiderable in 
Athens, was employed to second the political combinations 
against him. i He is said to have given offence by mani- 
festations of personal vanity — by continual boasting of his 
great services to the state, and by the erection of a private 
chapel, close to his own house, in honour of Artemis Aris- 
tobule, or Artemis of admirable counsel; just as Pausanias 
had irritated the Lacedaemonians by inscribing his own 
single name on the Delphian tripod, and as the friends of 
Aristeides had displeased the Athenians by endless en- 
comiums upon his justice. 2 

But the main cause of his discredit was, the prostitu- 
tion of his great influence for arbitrary and corrupt pur- 
poses. In the unsettled condition of so many different 
Grecian communities, recently emancipated from Persia, 
when there was past misrule to avenge, wrong-doers to be 
deposed and perhaps punished, exiles to be restored, and 
all the disturbance and suspicions accompanying so great 
a change of political condition as well as of foreign policy 
— the influence of the leading men at Athens must have 
been great in determining the treatment of particular in- 
dividuals. Themistokles, placed at the head of an Athe- 
nian squadron and sailing among the islands, partly for the 
purposes of war against Persia, partly for organising the 
new confederacy — is affirmed to have accepted bribes 
without scruple, for executing sentences just and unjust — 
restoring some citizens, expeUing others, and even putting 
some to death. We learn this from a friend and guest of 
Themistokles — the poet Timokreon of lalysus in Ilhodes, 

* Platarcb, Kimon, o. 16; Scho- Kimon, o. 6-8; Aristeiddi, o. 96) \ 
lion 2, ad Aristopban. Equit. 84. Diodorus, zi. 64. 
> Plutarch (ThemistokUs, c. 22; 


who had expected his own restoration from the Athenian 
commander, hut found that it was thwarted hy a brihe of 
three talents from his opponents ; so that he was still kept 
in exile on the charge of medism. The assertions of Timo- 
kreon, personally incensed on this ground against Themis- 
iokles, are doubtless to be considered as passionate and 
exaggerated: nevertheless they are a valuable memorial 
of the feelings of the time, and are far too much in harmony 
with the general character of this eminent man to allow of 
our disbelieving them entirely. Timokreon is as emphatic 
in his admiration of Aristeides as in his censure of Themis- 
tokles, whom he denounces as ^'a lying and unjust trai- 
tor." » 

Such conduct as that described by this new Archi- 
lochus, even making every allowance for exag' Themisto- 
geration, must have caused Themistokles to be kUs is 
both hated and feared among the insular allies, ^jJJ^ac- 
whose opinion was now of considerable import- cepting 
ance to the Athenians, A similar sentiment pe^^^jj?"^™ 
grew up partially against him in Athens itself, acquitted at 
and appears to have been connected with suspi* -A^^^^"*- 
cions of treasonable inclinations towards the Persians. As 
the Persians could offer the highest bribes, a man open to 
corruption might naturally be suspected of inclinations to- 
wards their cause; and if Themistokles had rendered pre- 
eminent service against them, so also had Pausanias, whose 
conduct had undergone so fatal a change for the worse. It 
was the treason of Pausanias— suspected and believed 
against him by the Athenians even when he was in com- 
mand at Byzantium, though not proved against him at 
Sparta until long afterwards— which first seems to have 
raised the presumption of medism against Themistokles 
also, when combined with the corrupt proceedings which 
stained his public conduct. We must recollect also, that 
Themistokles had given some colour to these presumptions 
even by the stratagems in reference to Xerxes, which wore 
a double-faced aspect, capable of being construed either in 
a Persian or in a Grecian sense. The Lacedaemonians, 
hostile to Themistokles since the time when he had out- 
witted them respecting the walls of Athens, — and fearing 
him also as a supposed accomplice of the suspected Pausa- 
nias — procured the charge of medismto be preferred against 

1 Plutarch. Themist. c. 21. 


him at Athens; by secret instigations, and as it is said, by 
bribes to his political opponents. ^ But no satisfactory 
proof could be furnished of the accusation, which Themis* 
tokles himself strenuously denied, not without emphatic 
appeals to his illustrious services. In spite of violent in- 
vectives against him from Alkmseon and Kimon, tempered 
indeed by a generous moderation on the part of Aristeid^> 
his defence was successful. He carried the people with 
him and was acquitted of the charge. Nor was he merely 
acquitted, but as might naturally be expected, a reaction 
took place in his favour. His splendid qualities and ex- 
ploits were brought im{)res8ively before the public mind, 
and he seemed for the time to acquire greater ascendency 
than ever.3 

Such a charge, and such a failure, must have exas- 
perated to the utmost the. animosity between him and his 
chief opponents — Aristeides, Kimon, AlkmsBon, and others; 
and we can hardly wonder that they were anxious to get 

■ This accusation of treason tans, probably relates to the first 

brought against ThemistokUs at accusation at which Themistoklds 

Athena, prior fo His oatracisfny was acquitted. For when Themi- 

and at the instigation of the Lace- stoklds was arraigned after the 

dsemonians— is mentioned hj Dio-^ discovery of Pausanias, he did not 

dorus (xi. 64). Thucydidds and' choose to stay, nor was there any 

Plutarch take notice only of the actual trial: it is not therefore 

second accusation, '' a/ler his ostra- likely that the name of the accuser 

cism. But Diodorus has made his would be preserved— '0 8c ypa'j/di- 

narrative confused, by supposing (xevoc autov icpo8oala< Aeu)f)6TT)c ^v 

the first accusation preferred at 'AXxfjiotituvd^, i.^9. 90veicaiTia>(<.ivu>v 

Athens to have come after the full tu>v SicapxiaTuby (Plutarch, Themist. 

detection of Pausabias and ex- c. 28). 

posure of his correspondence ; Gompare the second Scholion on 

whereas these latter events, coming Aristophan. Equit. 84^ and Ari- 

after the first accusation, siipplied' steidds, Orat. xlyi. ^Ticip tuivTct- 

new proofs before' unknown, and tipwv (vol. ii. p. 818, ed. Dindorf, 

thus brought on the second, after p. 243, Jebb). 

Themistoklds had been ostracised^ * Plutarch, Aristeidds, c. 25. 

But Diodorus has preserved to us ' Diodor. zi.64. t6tb fiiv aici- 

the important notice of thir first 7U7C r^v xijc npodoalac xpifftv* dt^ 

accusation at Athens, followed by xal to |jiiv icpu>Tov |ast& ti^v dic6Xu9iv 

trial* acqnittaly and temporary pt-iYac ^v icapi to t< 'AOv)valoi<* -iiYdiictov 

glorification tf Themistoklds— aild yap a^Tov 8ia<pcp6vT«t>c oi itoXtxtti* 

preceding his ostracism. |act& Si TauTa, ol |Aiv, 9of)T)9ivTS< 

The indictment stated by Plutarch auTou ti]v OntpfioXfiv, ol 6t, tfBor^- 

to have been preferred against The- vavTSc t^ ^<^^10i '^^'* H-i^ euepYeatu>v 

mistokUs byLedbotas son of Alk- iiccXiQovTo, ttjv 8e tayuv xal t6 9fd- 

msBon, at tht instance of the Spar- vr^i«.a Tanctvouv jfoiccuSov. 


lid of him by ostracism. In explaining this peculiar pro- 
cess, I have already stated, that it could never t -^ ^ 
be raised against any one mdividual separately bitterness 
^ad ostensibly; and that it could never be v'x^^J 
brought into operation at all, unless its neces- him and his 
«ity were made clear, not merely to violent party E®"{**^*L 
sien, but also to the assembled senate and people, this acquit- 
includinir of course a considerable proportion of **V ?« ]■ 

xi_ J 1. 'x' ITT 1-1 ostracised. 

the more moderate citizens. We may reasonably 
conceive that the conjuncture was deemed by many dis- 
passionate Athenians well-suited for the tutelary interven- 
tion of ostracism, the express benefit of which consisted 
in its separating political opponents when the antipathy 
between them threatened to push one or the other into 
extra-constitutional proceedings — especially when one of 
those parties was Themistokles, a man alike vast in his 
abilities and unscrupulous in his morality. Probably also 
there were not a few who wished to revenge the previous 
ostracism of Aristeides: and lastly, the friends of Themis- 
tokl^ himself, elate with> his acquittal and his seeming 
augmented popularity, might indulge hopes that the vote 
of ostracism would turn out in his favour, and remove one 
or other of his chief political opponents. From all these 
circumstances we learn without astonishment, that a vote 
of ostracism was soon after resorted to. It ended in the 
temporary banishment of Themistokles. 

He retired into exile, and was residing at Argos, 
whither he carried a considerable property, yet ^^ ^^^ 
occasionally visiting other parts of Peloponnesus * While in 
—when the exposure and death of Pausanias, u*5er*"**°* 
together with the discovery of his correspond- ostracism, 
ence, took place at Sparta. Among this cor- Ji^ni^Jians 
respondence were found proofs, which Thucy- prefer a 
didSs seems to have considered as real and ^^wKm**^ 
sufficient, of the privity of Themistokles. By against 
Ephorus and others, he is admitted to have been ***™- 

> Thucyd. 1. 187. ^XQc yap auxip there is bo eridence positirely to 

SffTcpov ix TS 'AOi]vu)v icapa tu>v contradict it: but I think Mr. Clin- 

f(X.u>v, xal c^ ''ApYou^ & One^i- ton states it too confidently, as 

xsiTO, Ac. be admits that Diodorus includes, 

I follow Mr. Fynes Clinton in in the chapters which he devotes 

considering the year 471 b.o. to be to one archon, eyents which must 

ihe date of the ostracism of The- haye happened in several different 

xnistoklfts. It may probably be so ; years (see Fast. Hellen. b.o. 471)> 


solicited by PausaniaS; and to have known his plans — but 
to have kept them secret while refusing to cooperate in 
them. 1 Probably after his exile he took a more decided 
share in them than before; being well-placed for that pur- 
pose at Arffos, a city not only unfriendly to Sparta, but 
strongly beiieyed to have been in collusion with Xerxes at 
his invasion of Greece. On this occasion theLacedsBmonians 
sent to Athens publicly to prefer a formal charge of treason 
against him, and to urge the necessity of trying him as a 
Pan-hellenic criminal b^ore the synod of the alues assem- 
bled at Sparta.) 

Whether this latter request would have been granted 
or whether Themistokl^s would have been tried 
at Athens, we cannot tell: for no sooner was he 
apprised that joint envoys from Sparta and Athens had 
been despatched to arrest him, than he fled forthwith from 
Argos to Korkyra. The inhabitants of that island, though 
Fii ht and ^^^^^g gratitude to him and favourably disposed, 
adV^ntnres could uot Venture to protect him against the two 
**t k?/™*' °^®st powerful states in Greece, but sent him to 
the neighbouring continent. Here however, 
being still tracked and followed by the envoys, he was 
obliged to seek protection from a man whom he had for- 
merly thwarted in a demand at Athens, and who had become 
his personal enemy — Admetus king of the Molossians. 
Fortunately for him, at the moment when he arrived, 
Admetus was not at home; and Themistokles, becoming a 
suppliant to his wife, conciliated her sympathy so entirely, 
that she placed her child in his arms and planted hyn at 
the hearth in the full solemnity of supplication to soften 
her husband. As soon as Admetus returned, Themistokles 
revealed his name, his pursuers, and his danger — entreating 
protection as a helpless suppliant in the last extremity. 

After the expedition under the sanias : for the other erents of this 

command of Pansanias in 478 b.o., period, we are reduced to a mora 

we hare no one date at once oer- ragne approximation, and can as- 

tain and accurate, until we come certain little heyond their order of 

to the death of Xerxes, where Dio- succession. 

dorus is confirmed by the Canon > Thucyd. i 136; Ephorus ap. 

of the Persian hings, b.o. 465. This Plutarch, de Malign. Herodoti, c. 5, 

last erent determines by dose p. 866; Diodor. xi. 54; Plutarch, 

approximation and inference, the Themist. c. 23. 

flight of Themistokles , the siege * Diodor. xL 66. 
of Naxos, and the death of Pau- 

/-■''■'■ - L. (^ J ^ ■ -•. '^•J'Jf W 


He appealed to the generosity of the Epirotic prince not 
to take revenge on a man now defenceless, for offence Riven 
imder such very different circumstances ; and for an offence 
too, after all, not of capital moment, while the protection 
BOW entreated was to the suppliant a matter of life or 
death. Adm^tus raised him up from the hearth with the 
child in his arms — an evidence that he accepted the appeal 
and engaged to protect him; refusing to give him up to the 
envoys, and at last only sending him away on the expression 
of his own wish to visit the King of Persia. Two Macedonian 
guides conducted him across the mountains to Pydna in 
the Thermaic gulf, where he found a merchantship about 
to set sail for the coast of Asia Minor, and took a passage 
on board; neither the master nor the crew knowing ms 
name. An untoward storm drove the vessel to the island 
of Naxos, at that moment besieged by an Athenian arma- 
ment. Had he been forced to land there, he would of course 
have been recognised and seized, but his wonted subtlety 
did not desert him. Having communicated both his name 
and the peril which awaited him, he conjured the master 
of the ship to assist in saving him, and not to suffer any 
one of the crew to land; menacing that if by any accident 
he were discovered, he would bring the master to ruin 
along with himself, by representing him as an accomplice 
induced by money to facilitate the escape of Themistokles: 
on the other hand, in case of safety, he promised a large 
reward. Such promises and threats weighed with the 
master, who controlled his crew, and forced them to beat 
about during a day and a night off the coast without seeking 
to land. After that dangerous interval, the storm abated 
and the ship reached Ephesus in safety. ^ 

Thus did Themistokles, after a series of perils, find 
himself safe on the Persian side of the ^gean. Themisto. 
At Athens he was proclaimed a traitor, and his ^^^^ ^®*» 
property confiscated: nevertheless(as it frequently Asia, and 
happened in cases of confiscation), his friends J®®^» "■ 
secreted a considerable sum, and sent it over to the%Ir- 
him in Asia, together with the money which he ^^^^ ^^^9- 

' Thueyd. i. 137. Oornelins Ne- lations between ThemistokUs and 

p08 (Themist. c. 8) for the most Admdtus. Dioddrus (xi. 66) seems 

part follows Thucydidds, and pro- to follow chiefly other guides, as 

fesses to do so ; yet he is not rery Plutarch does also to a great ex- 

aocnrate, especially about the re- tent (Themist. c. 24-26). There 


had left at Argos; so that he was thus enabled liberally to 
reward the ship-captain who had preserved him. With 
all this deduction, the property which he possessed of a 
character not susceptible of concealment, and which was 
therefore actually seized, was found to amount to eighi^ 
talents, according to Theophrastus — to 1 00 talents, accord- 
ing to Theopompus. In contrast with this lar^e sum, it is 
melancholy to learn that he had begun his political career 
with a property not greater than three talents. ^ The 
poverty of Aristeides at the end of his life presents an 
impressive contrast to the enrichment of his rival. 

The escape of Themistokles, and his adventures in 
stories Persia, appear to have jfbrmed a favourite theme 
*V ti **** ^^^ *^® fancy and exaggeration of authors a cen- 
between tury afterwards.^ We have thus many anecdotes 
*^® ^vf " which contradict either directly or by implication 
wS^Themi- the simple narrative of Thucydid^s. Thus we 
■tokifes. are tola that at the moment when he was running 
away from the Greeks, the Persian king also had proclaimed 
a reward of 200 talents for his head, and that some Greeks 
on the coast of Asia were watching to take him for this 
reward: that he was forced to conceal himself strictly near 
the coast, until means were found to send him up to Susa, 
in a closed litter, under pretence that it was a woman for 
the king's harem: that Mandane, sister of Xerxes, insisted 
upon having him delivered up to her as an expiation for 
the loss of her son at the battle of Salamis: that he learnt 
Persian so well, and discoursed in it so eloquently, as to 
procure for himself an acquittal from the Persian judges, 
when put upon his trial through the importunity of l&n- 
danS: that the officers of the kind's household at »usa, and 
the satraps in his way back, threatened him with still 
farther perils: that he was admitted to see the king in 
person, after having received a lecture from the chamberlain 
on the indispensable duty of falling down before him to do 
homage, &c., with several other uncertified details, ^ which 
make us value more highly the narrative of Thucydides. 
Indeed Ephorus, Dein6, Kleitarchus, and Herakleides, from 

were evidently different accounts ' Plutarch, Themist. o. 25; also 

of his voyage, which represented Eritias ap. Jasiian. Y. H. x. 17 : 

him as reaching, not Ephesus, hut compare Herodot. viii. 12. 

the JBolic Eymd. Diodoms does * Diodor. xi. 66; Plutarch, The- 

not notice his voyage by sea. mist. c. 24-80. 


whom these anecdotes appear mostly to he deriyed, even 
affirmed that ThemistoklSs had found Xerxes himself alive 
and seen him; whereas ThucvdidSs and Charon, the two 
contemporary authors (for the former is nearly contem- 
porary ), asserted that he had found Xerxes recently dead, 
imd his son Artaxerxes on the throne. 

According to ThucydidSs, the eminent exile does not 
jseem to have been exposed to the least danger 
in Persia. He presented himself as a deserter ^ent *of *** 
£rom Greece, and was accepted as such : moreover Themisto- 
— what is more strange, though it seems true — peiii! 
he was received as an actual benefactor of the 
Persian king, and a sufferer from the Greeks on account 
of such dispositions — in consequence of his communications 
made to Xerxes respecting the intended retreat of the 
Greeks from Salamis, and respecting the contemplated 
destruction oftheHellespontine oridge. He was conducted 
by some Persians on the coast up to Susa, where he ad- 
dressed a letter to the king couched in the following terms, 
such as probably no modem European king would tolerate 
except from a qu€ifker: — "I,Themistokles, am come to thee, 
having done to thy house more mischief than any other 
Greek, as long as I was compelled in my own defence to 
resist the attack of thy father — but having also done him 
yet greater good, when I could do so with safety to myself, 
and when his retreat was endangered. Reward is yet owing 
to me for my past service: moreover, I am now here, chased 
away by the Greeks in consequence of my attachment to 
thee, » but able still to serve thee with great effect. I wish 
to wait a year, and then to come before thee in person to 
explain my views." 

Whether the Persian interpreters, who read this letter 
to Artaxerxes Longimanus, exactly rendered its influence 
brief and direct expression, we cannot say> But which he 
it made a strong impression upon him, combined ^Xthl 
with the previous reputation of the writer — and Persian 
he willingly granted the prayer for delay : though ^^°^' 

> "Proditionen vitro imputc^ant spatiam longi ^ante proeliam iti- 

(says Tacitus, Hist. it. 60, respect- neris, fatigationem Othonianorum, 

ing PauUinus and Proculns, the permiztnm vehicalis agmen, ao 

generals of the army of Otho, pleraque fortuita fraudi suob assi- 

when they surrendered to Yitellius gnantes.—'Ei Yitellius credidit do 

after the defeat at Bebriacum), perfLdift, et firaudem absolyit." 


we sball not readil^r believe that lie was so transported as 
to show his joy by immediate sacrifice to the gods, by an 
unusual measure of convivial indulgence, and by crying 
out thrice in his sleep, "I have got Themistokl^s the Athe* 
nian" — as some of Plutarch's authors informed him. ^ In 
the course of the year granted, Themistokles had learned 
so much of the Persian language and customs as to be able 
to communicate personally with the king, and acquire his 
confidence. No Greek (says Thucydides) had ever before 
attained such a commanding influence and position at the 
Persian court. His ingenuity was now displayed in laving 
out schemes for the subjugation of Greece to Persia, wnich 
were evidently captivating to the monarch, who rewarded 
him with a Persian wife and lar^e presents, sending him 
down to Magnesia on the Meander, not far from the coast 
of Ionia. Tne revenues of the district round that town, 
amounting to the large sum of fifty talents yearly, were 
assigned to him for bread: those of the neighbouring sea* 
port of Myus, for articles of condiment to his bread, which 
was always accounted the main nourishment: those of 
Lampsakus on the Hellespont, for wine. 2 Not knowing 
the amount of these two latter items, we cannot determine 
how much revenue Themistokles received altogether; but 
there can be no doubt, judging from the revenues of Mag- 
nesia alone, that he was a great pecuniary gainer by his 
change of country. After having visited various parts of 
Asia, 3 he lived for a certain time at Magnesia, in which 
place his family joined him from Athens. 

1 Plutarch, Themist. c. 28. Thnoydidds. I doubt his statement 

* Thucyd. i. 138; Diodor. ,xi. 67. however about the land-tax or 

Besides the three above - named rent ; I do not think that it was a 

places, Neanthds and Phanias de- tenth or a fifth of the produce of 

soribe the grant as being still fuller the soil in these districts which was 

and more specific: they state that granted to Themistoklds, but the 

Perk6te was granted to Themisto- portion of regal revenue or tribute 

kl6s for bedding, and Paleeskdpsis levied in them. The Persian kings 

for clothing (Plutarch, Themist. c. did not take the trouble to assess 

Sg, Athene&us, L p. 29). and collect the tribute : they prob- 

This seems to have been a fre- ably left that to the inhabitants 

quent form of grants from the Per- themselves, provided the sum total 

sian and Egyptian kings, to their were duly paid, 

queens, relatives, or friends — a * Plutarch, Themistokles, e. 81. 

grant nominally to supply some irXavu)|jitvoc ictpl tt)v 'Aoiav: this 

particular want or taste: see Dr. statement seems probable enough, 

Amold^s note on the passage of though Plutarch rejects it. 


How long his residence at Magnesia lasted, we do not 
know, but seemingly long enough to acquire ^arge re- 
local estimation and leave mementos behind him. ward which 
He at length died of sickness, when sixty-five ^j^^eceiyes 
years old, without having taken any step towards death at 
the accomplishment of those victorious cam- Magnesia, 
paigns which he had promised to Artaxerxes. That sick- 
ness was the real cause of his death, we may believe on the 
distinct statement of Thucydides;^ who at the same time 
notices a rumour partially current in his own time, of 
poison voluntarily taken, from painful consciousness on the 
part of ThemistoKles himself tnat the promises made could 
never be performed — a fartherproof of the general tendency 
to surround the last years of this distinguished man with 
impressive adventures, and to dignify his last moments 
with a revived feeling not unworthy of ms earlier patriotism. 
The report may possibly have been designedly circulated 
by his friends and relatives, in order to conciliate some 
tenderness towards his memory; since his sons still con- 
tinued citizens at Athens, and his daughters were married 
there. These friends farther stated that they had brought 
back his bones to Attica at his own express command, and 
buried them privately without the knowledge of the 
Athenians ; no condemned traitor being permitted to be 
buried in Attic soil. If however we even suppose that 
this statement was true, no one could point out with cer- 
tainty the spot wherein such interment had taken place. 
Nor does it seem, when we mark the cautious expressions 

^ Thuoyd. t 138. NooiQaac 8i xt* Plntarch (Themist. c. 81, and 

XcuT^ tbv f)lov* X^Youat Si tivtc* xa\ Kimon, c. 18) and Diodorus both 

ixeotftov 9ocp|xdx(|> dicoSavtiv aOtov, state as an unqnestionable fact, 

ifiuvaxov vofjLiaavTa tlvat ticittXiaat that Themistoklds died by poison- 

^aviXsi & (»icio](tTo. ing himself; omitting even to 

This current story, as old as notice the statement of Thucydid^s 

Aristophands (Equit. 88, compare that he died of disease. Cornelius 

the Scholia), alleged that Themi- Nepos (Themist. c. 10) follows Thu- 

stoklte had poisoned himself by cydidds. Cicero (Brutus, c. 11) 

drinking builds blood (see Diodor. refers the story of the suicide by 

zi. 68). Diodorus assigns to this poison to Clitarchus and Strato- 

act of taking poison a still more kl6s, recognising it as contrary to 

sublime and patriotic character, by Thucydidds. He puts into the 

connecting it with a design on the mouth of his fellow dialogist Atti- 

part of Themistoklds to restrain cus a just rebuke of the facility with 

the Persian king from waning which historical truth was sacri- 

against Greece. flced to rhetorical purpose. 


of Thucydides, ^ that he himself was satisfied of the fact. 
Moreover we may affirm with confidence that the inhabit- 
ants of Magnesia, when they showed the splendid sepul- 
chral monument erected in honour of Themistokles in their 
own market-place, were persuaded that his bones were 
really enclosed within it. 

Aristeides died about three or four years after the 
D th f ostracism of Themistokles; 2 but respecting the 
Aristeides place and manner of his death, there were several 
—his po- contradictions amongthe authors whom Plutarcb 
^*' ^* had before him. Some affirmed that he perished 

on foreign service in the Euxine sea; others, that he died 
at home, amidst the universal esteem and grief of his 
fellow-citizens. A third story, confined to the single state- 
ment of Kraterus, and strenuously rejected by Plutarch, 
represents Aristeides as having been falsely accused before 
the Athenian judicature and condemned to a fine of fifty 
minae, on the allegation of having taken bribes during the 
assessment of the tribute upon the allies — ^which fine he 
was unable to pay, and was therefore obliged to retire to 
Ionia, where he died. Dismissing this last story, we find 
nothing certain about his death except one fact — but that 
fact at the same time the most honourable ^of all — that he 
died very poor. It is even asserted that he did not leave 
enough to pay funeral expenses — that a sepulchre was 
provided for him at Phalerum at the public cost, besides 
a handsome donation to his son Lysimachus and a dowry 
to each of his two daughters. In "the two or three ensuing 
generations, however, his descendants still continued poor, 

■ Thucyd. 1. 188. rii 8i bati fto often cite: Tbueydidds is cer- 

faal xofiiaG'^vat sOtou oi tainly not a .witness for the fact: 

npoai^xovTecotxaSexeXtuaav if anything, -he may be said to 

Toc exelvou, xal Ts^vai xp6cpa count somewhat against it. 

*A9r)vaiu>v iv t^ 'Attix^* o6 Y^p eSijv -^lutaroh (Themist. c. 82) shows 

9dicTtiV| u>c inl icpoSoola (psuYovToc. that the burial-place of Themisto- 

Cornelins Nepos, who here copies kids, supposed to be in Attica, 

Thucydidds, gives this statement was yet never verified before his 

by mistake, as if Thuoydidds had time : the guides of Pausanias, how- 

himself afi^rmed it: ''Idem (sc. Tbfi- ever, in the succeeding century, 

cydidds) ossa ejus clam in Attic& had become more confident (Pau- 

ab amicis sepulta, quoniam legibus sanias, i. 1, 8). 

non ooncederetur, quod proditionis * Bespecting the probity of Aris- 

esset damnfftus, memorise prodidit." teidds, see an interesting fragment 

This shows the haste or inaccuracy of Eupolis the comic writer (A7](i.oi, 

with which these secondary authors Fragm. iv. p. 467, ed. Meineke). 


and even at that remote day some of them received aid 
out of the public purse, from the recollection of their in- 
corruptible ancestor. Near a century and a half affcerwards, 
a poor man named Lysimachus, descendant of the Just 
Aristeides, was to be seen at Athens near the chapel of 
lacchus, carrying a mysterious tablet, and obtaining his 
scanty fee of two oboli for interpreting the dreams of the 
passers-by: Demetrius the Phalerean procured from the 

Seople, for the mother and aunt of this poor man, a small 
ally allowance. ^ On all these points the contrast is marked 
when we compare Aristeides with Themistokles. The 
latter, having distinguished himself by ostentatious cost at 
Olymnia, and by a choregic victory at Athens, with little 
scruple as to the means of acquisition — ended his life at 
Magnesia in dishonourable affluence greater than ever, and 
left an enriched posterity both at that place and at Athens. 
More than five centuries afterwards, his descendant the 
Athenian Themistokles attended the lectures of the philo- 
sopher Ammonius at Athens, as the comrade and Mend of 
Plutarch himselt^ 

1 Plutarch, Arist. o. 26, 27 ; Co^• Aristophan. Vesp, 63. 
nelius Nepos, Axist. o. 8: oomparc * Plntarch, Tbemist. o. 6— S2t' 

VOli. Y. 

146 aiSTOBY OF OBEEOE, T^wx It 



I HATB already recounted, in the preceding chapter, how 
Conse- ^^® Asiatic Greeks, breaking loose from the 

quence of Spartan Pausanias, entreated Athens to 

M«V°of"5:. "'•g"^^ a new confederacy, and to act as 

Confe- presiding city (Yorort) — and how this con- 

tSSoI-^^ federacy, framed not only for common and 

Bifurcation pressing objects, but also on principles of equal 

^oHUc«^*° rights and constant control on the part of the 

between members, attracted soon the spontaneous adhe- 

Ath'** ^^^ ®^®^ ^^ * large proportion of Greeks, insular or 
maritime, near the JEgean sea. I also noticed 
this event as giving commencement to a new aera in 
Grecian politics. For whereas there had been before a 
tendency, not very powerful, yet on the whole steady and 
increasing, towards something like one Pan-hellenic league 
under Sparta as president — ^from henceforward that ten- 
dency disappears, and a bifurcation begins: Athens and 
Sparta divide the Grecian world between them, and bring 
a much larger number of its members into cooperation, 
either with one or the other, than had ever been so 
arranged before. 

Thucydides marks precisely, as far as general words 
Distinction ^an go, the character of the new confederacy 
between during the first years after its commencement. 
federacy" P^^ Unhappily h e gives us scarcely any particular 
of DeioB, facts; and in the absence of such controlling 
as^presi-*^' evidence, a habit has grown up of describing 
dent— and loosely the entire period between 477 b.c. and 
San empire 405 B.C. (the latter date is that of the battle of 
which grew JEgos-potami) as constituting **the Athenian 
out of t. empire." This word denotes correctly enough 
the last part, perhaps the last forty years, of the seventy- 
two years indicated; but it is misleading when applied to 



the first part: nor indeed can any single word be found 
Avhich faithfirlly characterizes as well the one part as the 
other. A great and serious change had taken place, and 
we disguise the fact of that change if we talk of the 
Athenian hegemony or headship as a portion of the 
Athenian empire. Thucydides carefully distinguishes the 
two, speaking of the Spartans as having lost, and of the 
Athenians as having acquired, not empire, but headship 
or hegemony. ^ 

' Thncyd. i. 94. i^icoXtipXTjaav from the fjYCftovla to the apx?) is 

(BuC^vTtov) ivT^St T^ ^Y^H'O''^?) described in the oration of the 

i. e. under the Spartan hegemony, Athenian enroy at Sparta, shortly 

before the Athenians were inyited before the Peloponnesian war (1. 

to assume the hegemony : compare 76) : but as it was rather the inter- 

7]77)9dfisvot, i. 77, and Herodot. yiii. est of the Athenian orator to con- 

2, 3. Next we have (i. 96) 9oitu>v- found the difference between tj^s- 

ti^ Tt (the lonians, Ac.) icp6« touc l^ovla and ipx^f ^^ after he has 

*A97)valooc -^^louv autouc T}Yeji.6vo< clearly stated what the relation of 

ecpttiv yMo^ax xocxa to ^uyYevic. Athens to her allies had been at 

Again, when the Spartans send out first, and how it afterwards became 

Dorkis in place of Pausanias, the totally changed, Thucydidds makes 

allies ouxdTt ecpisaocv xiqv ^Ycpio- him slur over the distinction, and 

viav. Then, as to the ensuing pro- say— o5tu)« ou8* f)fitT« Qau(iaox6>» 

ceedings of the Athenians (i. 96) oOfiev iceicon^xoftsv . . . el ipx^^* f« 

— icapaXapdvxec 8i oi .'AOTjvaioi xt)v 8i8ojiiv>jv iSt^ApieOoxal xaoxrjv 

j^Y^f-O'v^^v xooxy x^ xpdictp 4x6 V- C-t) «v8if«,tv, Ac; and he then pro- 

tu>v xu)v ^uutidyctiv 8ia x6 Hocuaavlou ceeds to defend the title of Athens 

(iT90<, Ac.: compare i. 76.— Tjfiiv H to command on the ground of 

icpoaeX96vxa)v tu)v EupLpLd^tov xal oto- superior force and worth: whieh 

Xtt)v 8«T}9<vTu>v i]ft\K6t(i^ xotxaoxn- ^Mt plea is advanced a few years 

yat, and vi. 76. afterwards still more nakedly and 

Then the transition from the offensively by the Athenian speak- 

flYepiovla to the dpx^ (i. 97)— tjyoo- ere. Read also the language of 

ttevoi 8i a6TOv6itu>v x6 icpu>Tov tu>v ^^^ Athenian Euphemus at Kama- 

^upi|jidy(ov xal dna xoivtbv £uv68(ov 'ina (^i* ^^)f 'where a similar con- 

PooXeo6vTu)v, Td<r«5eew^Xeovico- fusion appears, as being suitable 

Xipwp xs xal Siaxtipioci icpaYpiATtov *o **»« argument, 

pisxa^o Too5t TOtt KoXipLoo xal xoo I* i« *o be recollected that the 

M7)6ixou. "^o'*^ hegemony or headship is ex- 

Thucydidds then goes on to say tremely general, denoting any case 

that he shall notice these "many of following a leader, and of obedi- 

strides in advance"— which Athens ence, however temporary, quali- 

made* staarting from her original fled, or indeed little more than 

hegemony, so as to show in what honorary. Thus it is used by the 

manner the Athenian empire or Thebans to express their relation 

dpxi^ was originally formed — 5pia towards the Boeotian confederated 

8i xol x^c dpxn« AiciSti^iv ^X'* towns (TjYtpLOveotaOai 69' fjpiwv^ 

T^C xu)v 'A9T)vaiu>v, iv oty Tp6ictj> Thuc. iii. 61, where Dr. Arnold 

tat iaxri. The same transition draws attention to the distlnotioa 


148 HI8T0BT OP OBEEClS. Pabt H. 

The transition from the Athenian hegemony to the 
Athenian empire was doubtless gradual, so that no one 
could determine precisely where the former ends and the 
latter begins: but it had been consummated before the 
thirty years' truce, which was concluded fourteen years 
before the Peloponnesian war — and it was in fact the sub- 
stantial cause of that war. Empire then came to be held 
by Athens — partly as a fact established, resting on acqui- 
escence rather than attachment or consent on the minds 
of the subjects — partly as a corollary from necessity of 
union combined with her superior force: while this latter 
point, superiority of force as a legitimate title, stood more 
and more forward both in the language of her speakers 
and in the conceptions of her citizens. Kay, the Athenian 
orators of the middle of the Peloponnesian war venture to 
affirm that their empire had been of this same character 
ever since the repulse of the Persians: an inaccuracy so 
manifest, that if we could suppose the speech made by the 
Athenian EuphSmus at Kamarina in 41 5 b.c. to have been 
heard by Themistokles or Aristeid^s fifty years before, it 
would have been alike offensive to the prudence of the 
one and to the justice of the other. 

The imperial condition of Athens, that which she 
held at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, when her i 

allies (except Chios and Lesbos) were tributary subjects, 
and when the 2Qgean sea was an Athenian lake, — was of 
course the period of her greatest splendour and greatest 
action upon the Grecian world. It was also the period 

between that verb ftad fipxe^v, and authority to a greater or less ex- 
holds language respecting the tent : compare Thncyd. t. 69 ; ii. 8, 
Athenian ipx^y more precise than Ac. The x6Xi< ^PXT)'* ixooaa is ana- 
his language in the note ad Thu- logons to dvfjp xOpovvoc (vi. 86). 
eyd. i. 94), and by the Corinthians Herodotus is less careful in dit- 
to express their claims as metro- tinguishing the meanings of these 
polisofKorkyra, which vere really words than Thucydidfts: see the 
little more than honorary—iicl t^ discussion of the Laoedsemonian 
T]Yt|x6vec Tt tlvtti xal ta tlx6Tci and Athenian envoys with G^lo 
9au|xdCto9ai (Thucyd. 1. 88): com- (vii. 166-162). But it is to be ob- 
pare vii. 66. Indeed it sometimes senred that he makes Gelo ask for 
means simply a guide (iiL 98; yii. the ^jtiiovia and not for the dp)rT) 
60). —putting the claim in the least j 

But the words Ap^ilji Sp^^ttv, Sp- offensire form: compare also the 

ytoOat, Toc. pass., are more specific claim of the Argeian for fjYtfiovla 

in their application, and imply (Tit U8)« I 
both superior dignity and coercive 


most impressive to Kistorians, orators, and philosophers — 
suggesting the idea of some one state exercising dominion 
over the JQgean, as the natural condition of Greece, so 
that if Athens lost such dominion, it would he transferred 
to Sparta — holding out the dispersed maritime Greeks as 
a tempting prize for the aggressive schemes of some new 
conqueror — and even bringing up by association into men's 
fancies the mythical Minos of Krete, and others, as having 
been rulers of the JSgean in times anterior to Athens. 

Even those who lived under the full-grown Athenian 
empire had before them no good accounts of ^^^^ ^^ 
the incidents between 479-450 b.c. For we may toMnfuse 
gather from the intimation of Thucydides, as ***®f ® *Y°» 
well as from his barrenness of facts, that while pate to 
there were chroniclers both for the Persian in- ^*hen» 
vasion and for the times before it, no one cared sighted 
for the time immediately succeeding. 1 Hence, plans of 
the little light which has fallen upon this blank *"^^ ^^' 
has all been borrowed (if we except the careful Thucydides) 
from a subsequent age; and the Athenian hegemony has 
been treated as a mere commencement of the Athenian 
empire. Credit has been given to Athens for a long- 
sighted ambition, aiming from the Persian war downwards 
at results, which perhaps Themistokles^ may have partially 
divined, but which only time and successive accidents 
opened even to distant view. But such systematic 

' Thucyd. i. 97. roic icpo i(jLou think it refers to an earlier period 

fiicaoiv cxXmic ^v touto to ^u>plov, —that point of time when Themi- 

xa\ ^ xa icp6 tu>v Mt]8ixwv EuvtxlOt- stoklds first counselled the build- 

oav ^ ab-za to MT)8ixd* toutuiv 6i ing of the fleet, or at least when 

tontp xal TJ'I'^'co iv t'q 'Attix^ he counselled them to abandon 

EuYYpa?^ *£XXdcvtxoc; ()pa)^£u>< tt xal their city and repose all their hopes 

toI<; xpovoic oOx dxpt()u>c dTCtftv^oGi]. In their fleet. It is only by this 

Hellanikus therefore had done supposition that we get a reason- 

no more than touch upon the eyents Able meaning for the words tT^X- 

of this period: and he found so fx7]os tlicstv, "he was the first who 

little good information within his dared to say" — which implies a 

reach, as to fall into chronological counsel of extraordinary boldness, 

blunders. *<For he was the first who dared 

* Thucyd. i. 98. t^c 7&p $^ OaXdiff- to adrise them to grasp at the sea, 

eri^ npu>To< eT6X(jLT)9sv iliceiv u)c av- and from that moment forward he 

OsxTta eaxl, xal t^iv apxf)v eOBuc helped to establish their empire." 

(uYxaTeffxcuaCt. The word ^UYxaTSffxtuaCt seems 

Dr. Arnold says in his note "c^Oibc to denote a collateral consequence, 

signifies probably immediately after not directly contemplated, though 

tlie retreat of the Persians." I divined, by Themistoklda. 

150 HI8T0BY OF GBEECS. Past II. 

aDticipation of snbseqnent results is fatal to any correct 
understandiDg, either of the real agents or of the real 
period; both of which are to be explained from the circum- 
stances preceding and actually present, with some help, 
though cautious and sparing, from our acquaintance with 
that which was then an unknown future. When Aristeides 
and Kimon dismissed the Lacedaemonian admiral Dorkis, 
and drove Pausanias away from Byzantium on his second 
arrival, they had to deal with the problem immediately 
before them. They had to complete the defeat of the 
Persian power, still formidable — and to create and organize 
a confederacy as yet only inchoate. This was quite enough 
to occupy their attention, without ascribing to them 
distant views of Atheni&n maritime empire. 

In that brief sketch of incidents preceding the 
The early P^loponnesian war, which Thucydides intro- 
years, after duces as "the digression from this narrative,'' ^ 
tion'of"** ^® neither gives, nor professes to give, a complete 
the confe- enumeration of all which actually occurred, 
dency of During the interval between the first desertion 
years of of the Asiatic allies from Pausanias to Athens, 
active exOT- j^ 477 ^^^ — an^ the revolt of Naxos in 466 b.c. 

part of — he recites three incidents only: first, the siege 
Athen*.— and capture of Eion on the Strymon with its 
feet know- Persian garrison — next, the capture of Skyros, 
ledge of and appropriation of the island to Athenian 
^™* kleruchs or out-citizens, — thirdly, the war with 

Karystus in Eubcea, and reduction of the place by capitula- 
tion. It has been too much the practice to reason as if 
these three events were the full history of ten or eleven 
years. Considering what Thucydides states respecting 
the darkness of this period, we might perhaps suspect that 
they were all which he could learn about it on good 
authority: and they are all, in truth, events having a near 
and special bearing on the subsequent history of Athens 
herself — for Eion was the first stepping-stone to the 
important settlement of Amphipolis, and Skyros in the 
time of Thucydides was the property of outlying Athenian 
citizens or kleruchs. Still, we are left in almost entire 
ignorance of the proceedings of Athens, as conducting the 
newly-established confederate force: for it is certain that 

* Thucyd. i. 97, lYpa'j;a 8e ooTaxai xi^v sx^oXi^v xou X670U tnoiijo 
oaf«.i]v Side Tofit, &c. 


the first ten years of the Athenian hegemony must have 
been years of most active warfare against the Persians. 
One positive testimony to this effect has been accidentally 
preserved to us by Herodotus, who mentions that "before 
the invasion of Xerxes, there were Persian commanders 
and garrisons everywhere in Thrace and the Hellespont, i 
all of whom were conquered by the Greeks after that in- 
vasion, with the single exception of MaskamSs governor of 
Doriskus, who could never be taken, though many different 
Grecian attempts were made upon the fortress." 

Of those who were captured by the Greeks, not one 
made any defence sufficient to attract the admiration of 
Xerxes, except Boges ffovernor of Eion. Boges, after 
bravely defending himself, and refusinff offers of capitula- 
tion, found his provisions exhausted, and farther resistance 
impracticable. He then kindled a vast funeral pile — slew 
his wives, children, concubines, and family, and cast them 
into it — threw his precious effects over the wall into the 
Strymon — and lastly, precipitated himself into the flames. 2 
His brave despair was the theme of warm encomium 
among the Persians, and his relatives in Persia were 
liberjuly rewarded by Xerxes. This capture of Eion, 
effected by Kimon, has been mentioned (as already stated) 
byThucydides; but Herodotus here gives us to understand 
that it was only one of a string of enterprises, all unnoticed 

' Herodot. rii. 106, 107. KaT^vTaaocv the last place held by the Persian! 

Jap Iti icp6T«pov TaoTTjc t^« eXdaiof in Europe." 

oitopxot iv T^ BpT^txTQ xal TOO *EXX'»)a- Weissenbom (Hellen, oder Bei- 

icovTou icavTa^f^. Outoi <ov icavtec, trage zur genaueren Erforschung 

oT tz ix BpTjtxTj? xal too ^EXXtjaiciv- der alt-griechischen Geschichte. 

TOO, «Xr)v TOO 4v Aoplaxcp, bitb *EXXt^- Jena, 1844, p. 144, i^ote 81) has 

v<uv SvTspov Ta^Tvic T^c 9TpaTT)Xa9l'y)c taken notice of this important pas- 

e^'Qp^QTjoav* t6v ti iv Aoplvxcp Mao- sage of Herodotus, as well as of 

xduLiQv o6dauo( xu> iSovdoOTjaav eU- that in Plutarch; but he does not 

Xeiv, icoXXu>v ictipif]aa(jLiv(uv. see how much it embarrasses all 

The loose chronology of Plutarch attempts to frame a certain chro - 

is little to be trusted; but he, too, nology for those two or three 

acknowledges the continuance of eyents which Thucydidds gives us 

Persian occupations in Thrace, by between 476-466 b.o. 

aid of the natires, until a period * Kutzen (De Atheniensinm Im- 

later than the battle of the perio Gimonis atque Periclis tem« 

£urymedon (Plutarch, Kimon, c. pore constitute. GrimsD, 1837. Com- 

14). mentatio, i. p. 8) has good reason 

It is a mistake to suppose, with to call in question the stratagem 

Dr. Arnold in his note on Thucyd. ascribed to Eimon by Pausanias 

Tiii. 62, ''that Sestus was almost (viii. 8, 2) for the capture of Eion. 

152 HI8T0BY OF eBSEOE. Pabt IL 

by Thacydides, against the Persians. Kay, it wonld seem 
from his language that Maskames maintained himself in 
Doriskus during the whole reign of Xerxes, and perhaps 
longer, repelling successive Grecian assaults. 

The valuable indication here cited from Herodotus 
Kecessity would be itself a sufficient^ proof that the first 
of con- years of the Athenian hegemony were full of 
tion against husy and successful hostifity against the Per- 
the Per- sians. And in truth this is what we should ex- 
IfSr the"" pect. The battles of Salamis, Plataea, and My- 
batties of kale, drove the Persians out of Greece and over- 
MySfe.*''^ powered their main armaments, but did not re- 
This neces- move them at once from all the various posts 
tho cause which they occupied throughout the ^gean and 
both of Thrace. Without doubt tne Athenians had to 
oTganiaa-"^ clear the coasts and the islands of a great num- 
tion of ber of different Persian detachments; an opera- 
deracy°of " *^^^ neither short nor easy, with the then im- 
Deios and perfect means of siege, as we may see by the 
thne^m-*"' cases of Sestus and Eion; nor indeed always 
proremeni practicable, as the case of Doriskus teaches us. 
of Athens, ^^le fear of these Persians, yet remaining in 
the neighbourhood, i and even the chance of a renewed Per- 
sian invading armament, formed one pressing motive for 
Grecian cities to join the new confederacy; while the ex- 

Eulsion of the enemy added to it those places which he 
ad occupied. It was by these years of active operations 
at sea against the common enemy, that the Athenians first 
established 2 that constant^ systematic, and laborious train- 
ing, among their own ships' crews, which transmitted itself 

1 To these "remaining operations SiavoetaOai u>c sictxtipi^mov icdXiv esl 

against the Persians" the Athenian to6c "EXXiQvac, Ac. 
envoy at Laoedeemon alludes, in * The Athenian nautical training 

his speech prior to the Pelopon- begins directly after the repulse 

nesian war— u(i.u>v (asv (you Spar- of the Persians. T6 6i x^c OaXdovv]^ 

tans) o&x t6eXT]advTu>v icapa|xeTvai iniariQiJiovac y*''^'^°'^ (says Periklfis 

icpoctdOnbXotica too pap^d- respecting the Peloponnesians, 

poo, fjfjiiv hi icpo9eX66vTU>v Tu>v ^u|x- just at the commencement of the 

(Ad^ujv xai aOTU)v 8s7)6ivTu>v fjYCfii- Peloponnesian war) ob p^Slux; a&- 

va« ;xaTa9'C^vai, Ac, (Thucyd. i. 75): toi« wpooysvi^fftTai* o65i y«P 6h^«^«i 

and again, iii. 11. xa On6Xotica tu)y f«.sXeTu)vTec aOtb sOQ^c dico tu>v 

SpYwv. Mt)6ixu>v, i^s!pYaa6ticu>(Thucyd4 

Compare also Plato, Menezen. i. 142). 
o. 11. aOxot 6i ^YjiXXsTo paaiXeoc 


with continual improTements down to the Peloponnesian 
-war. It was by these, combined with present fear, that 
they were enabled to organise the largest and most efficient 
confederacy ever known among Greeks — to bring together 
deliberative deputies — to plant their own ascendency as 
enforcers of the collective resolutions — and to raise a 
prodigious tax from universal contribution. Lastly, it was 
by the same operations, prosecuted so successfully as to 
remove present alarm, that they at length fatigued the 
more lukewarm and passive members of the confederacy, 
and created in them a wish either to commute personal 
service for pecuniary contribution, or to escape from the 
obligation of service in any way. The Athenian nautical 
training would never have been acquired — the confederacy 
would never have become a working reality — the fatigue 
and discontents among its members would never have 
arisen — unless there had been a real fear of the Persians, 
and a pressing necessity for vigorous and organised 
operations against them, during the ten years between 477 
and 466 b.c. 

As to these ten years, then, we are by no means to 
assume that the particular incidents mentioned q^^^^^^ 
by Thucydides about Eion, Skyros, Karystus, deracy of 
and Naxos, constitute the sum total of events. ^^^^^~o 
To contradict this assumption, I have suggested by aii the 
proof sufficient, though indirect, that they are "^^YuaT 
only part of the stock of a very busy period — Sn?per- 
the remaining details of which, indicated in out- ®°\p^^iJ~. 
line by the large general language of Thucydides, ing retire- 
we are condemned not to know. Nor are we ™®°* "^^ 
admitted to be present at the synod of Delos, 
which during all this time continued its periodical meetings: 
though it would have been highly interesting to trace the 
steps whereby an institution which at first promised to ' 
protect not less the separate rights of the members than 
the security of the whole, so lamentably failed in its object. 
We must recollect that this confederacy, formed for ob- 
jects common to all, limited to a certain extent the autonomy 
of each member; both conferring definite rights, and im- 
posing definite obliffations. Solemnly sworn to by all, and 
by Aristeides on behalf of Athens, it was intended to bind 
the members in perpetuity — marked even in the form of 
the oath, which was performed by casting heavy lumps of 


iron into tbe sea nerer again to l>e seen.* As this con- 
federacy was thus both perpetual and peremptory, binding 
each member to the rest and not allowing either retirement 
or evasion, so it was essential that it should be sustained 
by some determining^ authority and enforcing sanction. 
The determining authority was provided by the synod at 
Delos: the enforcing sanction was exercised by Athens as 
president. And there is every reason to presume that 
Enforcing Athens, for a long time, performed this duty in 
sanctions of a legitimate and honourable manner, acting in 
^®5y' execution of the resolves of the synod, or at 
exercised, least in full harmony with its general purposes, 
mony'with ^^® exacted from every member the regulated 
the general quota of men Or money, employing coercion 
■ jnod. against recusants, and visiting neglect of military 

duty with penalties. In all these requirements she only 
discharged her appropriate functions as chosen leader of 
the confederacy. There can be no reasonable doubt that 
the general synod went cordially along with her 2 in strict- 
ness of dealing towards those defaulters who obtained 
protection without bearing their share of the burthen. 

But after a few years, several of the confederates, be- 
^^ J coming weary of personal military service, pre- 
aiteration vailed upon the Athenians to provide ships and 
in the re- men in their place, and imposed upon themselves 

lations of . •, r 7 ^ x i* -j. 1.1 a 

the allies m exchange a money-pi^ment of suitable amount, 
—substitu- This commutation, at first probably introduced 

tion of mo- . x • i 5 • • to meet some special case of inconvenience, was 

ment for found SO Suitable to the taste of all parties, that 

serviced de- it gradually spread through the larger portion 

manded by of the confederacy. To unwarlike allies, hating 

themselves, labour and privation, it was a welcome relief: 

suitable while to the Athenians, full of ardour, and 

terests and patient of labour as well as discipline for the 

^eiings of aggrandisement of their country, it afforded con- 

*"* stant pay for a fleet more numerous than they 

> Plntarch, Aristeidfts, c. 24. prononnced by parties altogether 

* Such concurrence of the gene- hostile to Athens (Thucyd. iii. 11) 

ral synod is in fact implied in the —S.y.a \ "(ap (i.apTupl(]> iypib'vxo 

speech put by Thuoydidds into the (the Athenians) (i.^ &v to6< 7c 

mouth of the Mityleneean envoys l90'|>iQ9ouc &xovxa<, cl [jli^ ti 

at Olympia, in the third year of -^Slxouv oil in^Qtaav, ^uffxpaTC^- 

the Peloponnesian war: a speech ttv. 


could otherwise have kept afloat. It is plain from the 
statement of Thacydides that this altered practice was 
introduced from the petition of the confederates themselves, 
not from any pressure or stratagem on the part of Athens. ^ 
But though such was its real source, it did not the less 
fatally degrade the allies in reference to Athens, and extin- 
guish the original feeling of equal rights and partnership 
in the confederacy, with communion of danger as well as 
of glory, which had once hound them together. The Athe- 
nians came to consider themselves as military chiefs and 
soldiers, with a body of tribute-paying subjects, whom they 
were entitled to hold in dominion, and restrict, both as to 
foreign policy and internal government, to such extent as 
they thought expedient — but whom they were also bound 
to protect against foreign enemies. The military force of 
these subject-states was thus in a great degree transferred 
to Athens by their own act, just as that of so many of the 
native princes in India has been made over to the English. 
But the military efficiency of the confederacy against the 
Persians was much increased, in proportion as the vigorous 
resolves of Athens 2 were less and less paralysed by the 
contentions and irregularity of a synod: so that the war 
was prosecuted with greater success than ever, while those 
motives of alarm, which had served as the first pressing 
stimulus to the formation of the confederacy, became every 
year farther and farther removed. 

Under such circumstances, several of the confederate 
states grew tired even of paying their tribute — change in 
and averse to continuance as members. They the posi- 
made successive attempts to secede : but Athens, ^lf{ " j^ 
acting seemingly in conjunction with the synod, the feelings 
repressed their attempts one after the other — ^^ Athens. 

■ Thncyd. 1. 97-99.— AlxUt Si &>.- vt)<iiv Ta6TT)v Ttov 9TpacTCtu>v, ol 

Xai ^9av Tu>v dico9T&atu>v, xal {xi- icXtlouc a6xu>v, Tva pL-ij die' otxou 

Ytoxai, al xu)v 96pu>v xal vcu>v ixSsiat, (uoi, ^p^ftaxa ixd^avxo dvxl xu)v 

xal XcticooxpdxtoV) ct x({> i^i^txo* ol veu>v x6 lxvou(&tvov dvdXu>(ia (pipetV| 

fap 'AOYjvaioi dxpif)u)< enpaooov, xal xat xoi^ (tiv 'AOT]valoic YjO^sxo to 

XoioQpol ^9av, o&x elu>Q69iv o.68i {)ou- vauxix6v dit6 x^< SaicdvTj^ t^v ixeivoi 

Xo(i.ivot< taXaiicu>psiv wpoffa^o^xt^ ^upitpipoicv, auxol ScSicoxt dTcovxaiev, 

xd< dvdYxac. Hoav H icu>c xal dnapdoxcuoi xal diceipoi ic xov it6- 

dXXu>c oi 'AQTjvaioi ooxixi 6{xolu>c 4v Xefxov xaQiaxavxo. 

•ijSov^ fipXOvxe«, xol ooxe ^uveaxpd- * See the contemptuous remarks 

xsoov d«6 xoo Tffou, pa8i6v xs itpoa- ofPerikUs upon the debates of the 

dY«a9aji ^v aixoU too« d^iaxajti- Lacedaemonian allies at Sparta 

voor a»v aOxol atxioi k^i^o^xo (Thucyd. i, 141), 
ol ^U(A.(«.axoi* 8id T*P tii' dit6x- 


conqueriDg, fining, and disarming the revolters; which was 
the more easily done^ since in most cases their naval force 
had been in great part handed over to her. As these 
events took place, not all at once, but successively in different 
years — the number of mere tribute-paying allies as well as 
of subdued revolters continually increasing — so there was 
never any one moment of conspicuous change in the char- 
acter of the confederacy. The allies slid unconsciously 
into subjects, while Athens, without any predetermined 
plan, passed from a chief into a despot. By strictly enfor- 
cing the obligations of the pact upon unwUlin^ members, 
and by employing coercion against revolters, she nad become 
unpopular in the same proportion as she acquired new 
power — and that too witnout any guilt of her own. In 
this position, even if she had been inclined to relax her 
hold upon the tributary subjects, considerations of her own 
safety would have deterred her from doing so ; for there 
was reason to apprehend that they might place their strength 
at the disposal of her enemies. It is very certain that she 
never was so inclined. It would have required a more 
self-denying public morality than has ever been practised 
by any state, either ancient or modem, even to conceive 
the idea of relinquishing voluntarily an immense ascendency 
as well as a lucrative revenue: least of all was such an 
idea likelv to be conceived by Athenian citizens, whose 
ambition increased with their power, and among whom the 
love of Athenian ascendency was both passion and patriotism. 
But though the Athenians were both disposed, and quali- 
fied, to push all the advantages offered and even to look 
out for new — we must not forget that the foundations of 
their empire were laid in the most honourable causes; 
voluntary invitation — efforts both unwearied and successful 
against a common enemy — unpopularity incurred in dis- 
charge of an imperative duty — and inability to break up 
the confederacy, without endangering themselves as well 
as laying open the jEgean sea to the Persians. ^ 

* The speech of the Athenian to a great extent and certainly as 

•nyoy at Sparta, a little before the to its first origin, unavoidable aa 

Peloponnesian war, sets forth the well as undeserved. He of course, 

growth of the Athenian empire, in as might be supposed, omits those 

the main, with perfect justice (Thu- other proceedings by which Athena 

cyd. i. 76, 76). He admits and even had herself aggravated it. 

exaggerates its unpopularity, but Kal y«P aOTtjv ti^vfi* (.tif* otpX'^v) 

.shows that such unpopularity was, EXd3o{ o6 |)ta7d|x£vo(. . • . s^ aOxou 


There were two other canseS; besides that which has 
been just adverted to, for the unpopularity of Growing 
imperial Athens. First, the existence of the j»npopu- 
confederacy, imposing permanent obligations, Athena* 
was in conflict with the general instinct of the throughout 
Greek mind, tending towards separate political cauwf^ 
autonomy of each city — as well as with the <>' it- 
particular turn of the Ionic mind, incapable of that steady 
personal effort which was requisite for maintaining the synod 
of Delos on its first large and equal basis. Next— -and this 
is the great cause of all — Athens, having defeated the 
Persians and thrust them to a distance, began to employ 
the force and the tribute of her subject-allies in warfare 
against Greeks, wherein these allies had nothing to gain 
from success — everything to apprehend from defeat — and 
a banner to fight for, offensive to Hellenic sympathies. 
Gn this head the subject-allies had great reason to complain, 
throughout the prolonged wars of Greek against Greek , 
for the purpose of sustaining Athenian predominance. 
But on the point of practical grievances or oppressions, 
they had little ground for discontent, and little feeling of 
actual discontent, as I shall show more fully hereafter. 
Among the general body of citizens in the subject-allied 
cities, the feeling towards Athens was rather indifference 
than hatred. The movement of revolt against her pro- 
ceeded from small parties of leading men, acting apart 
from the citizens, and generally with collateral views of 
ambition for themselves. The positive hatred towards 
hor was felt chiefly by those who were not her subjects. 

It is probable that the same indisposition to personal 
effort, which prompted the confederates of Delos to tender 
money-payment as a substitute for military service, also 
induced them to neglect attendance at the svnod. But we 
do not know the steps whereby this assemoly, at first an 
effective reality, gradually dwindled into a mere form, and 

8t TOO ipTou xaTT]va7xdi98T]f«.cy tb xac xivSuvcuciv* %a\ 7&p &v al Aico- 

«pu>Tov icpoayaYctv aOtfiv i< t68c, oxdacic itp6c OpiSc t(i'(w^'zo* icaat 

ffcdXioxa (xiv bicb 8eouC| iiccixa 8i xal 8i dvtTcl^Sovov t& ^U(&9ipovxa xu>v 

Ttfji^^y fioxtpov xal tb^sXclac. Kal |A8yl9xu>v itcpl xivd6v<i>v cu xlQta9ai. 

oox ia^aXk^ ixi tSoxct clvott, xotc The whole speech well merits 

icoXXoTc &RT)xOT]ftivouc, xai xivcDv xal attentive- study : compare also the 

^8i) dicoax&vxtov xtxctpu>(«.ivtt>v, 6fiu)v speech of PerikUs at Athens, in 

Tt^pitv o6xixi 6|i«:ilu)( flXuiv dXX' the second year of the Felopon- 

6icdicxtt>v xal fiia76pu>v 6vxtt>v, dviv- nesian war (Thncyd. ii. 68). 


Yanished. Nothing however can more forcibly illustrate 

Synod of the difference of character between the mari* 

^ad*~ii *^°^® allies of Athens and the Feloponnesian 

Seciinea^ allies of Sparta, than the fact — that while the 

in import- former shrank from personal service and thought 

▼anishes. it an advantage to tax themselves in place of it — 

Snperior the latter were "ready enoui?h with their bodies,** 

qualities , . , . • S . '^ j.« -ri j. 

and merit out Uncomplying and impracticable as to con- 
of the tributions. > The contempt felt by these Dorian 

^tnenians i i /» ii "tx a* • ^ ±.1 t * 

as com- landsmen for the military emciency 01 the lom* 
pared with ^j^ recurs frequently, and appears even to ex- 
federates ceed what the reality justified. But when we 
of Deios turn to the conduct of the latter twenty years 
genera y. gariigj.^ |^t the battle of Lade, in the very 
crisis of the Ionic revolt from Persia 2 — we detect the 
same want of energy, the sameincapacity of personal effort 
and labour, as that which broke up the Confederacy of 
Delos with all its beneficial promise. To appreciate ftilly 
the indefatigable activity and daring, together with the 
patient endurance of laborious maritime training, which 
characterised the Athenians of that day — ^we have only to 
contrast them with these confederates, so remarkably des- 
titute of both. Amidst such glaring inequalities of merit, 
capacity, and power, to maintain a confederacy of equal 
members was impossible. It was in the nature of things 
that the confederacy should either break up, or be trans- 
muted into an Athenian empire. 

I have already mentioned that the first aggregate 
assessment of tribute, proposed by Aristeides and adopted 
by the synod at Delos, was four hundred and sixty talents 
in money. At that time many of the confederates paid their 
quota, not in money, but in ships. But this practice 
Trib t graduallydiminished, as the commutations above 

first raised alluded to, of money in place of ships, were multi* 
8^n*d* f pli®^> while the aggregate tribute of course 
SSos-as- became larger. It was no more than six hundred 
3Si"?lda **' talents 3 at the commencement of the Felopon- 
nesian war, forty-six years after the first forma- 
tion of the confederacy ; from whence we may infer that it 

* Thncyd. i. 141. ou>{jLaat li itot- preceding volume of this History, 

^ixcpot ol aOxoupYol xu)v 'dvOpibnuiv chap. xzxy. 

^ XP^t^"'^^ icoXc|AcXv| Ac. * Thucyd. ii. 13. 

s gee Herodot. tL 13, and the 


was never at all increased upon individual members dorinf? 
the intervaL For the difference between four hundred and 
sixty talents and six hundred, admits of being fully explained 
by the numerous commutations of service for money as well 
as by the acquisitions of new members, which doubtless 
Athens had more or less the opportunity of making. It is 
not to be imagined that the confederacy had attained its 
maximum number at the date of the first assessment of 
tribute: there must have been various cities, like Sinope 
and JBgina, subsequently added. > 

Without some such preliminary statements as those 
just given, respecting the new state of Greece Events be- 
between the Persian and Peloponnesian wars, tween b.c. 
beginning with the Athenian hegemony or head- E^ion— 
ship, ana ending with the Athenian empire — Skyros— 
the reader would hardly understand the bearing ^*'y'*°"* 
of those particular events which our authorities enable us 
to recount; events unhappily few in nimiber, though the 
period must have been full of action — and not well-authen- 
ticated as to dates. The first known enterprise of the 
Athenians in their new capacity (whether the first absolutely 
or not we cannot determine) between 476 b.c. and 466 b.c, 
was the conquest of the important post of Eion on the 
Strymon, where the Persian governor Boges, starved out 
after a desperate resistance, destroyed himself rather than 
capitulate, together with his family and precious effects — 
as has already been stated. The next events named are 
their enterprises against the Dolopes and Pelasgi in the 
island of Skyros (seemingly about 470 b.c.) and the Dry opes 
in the town and district of Karystus in Euboea. To the 
latter, who were of a different kindred from the inhabitants 
of Chalkis and Eretria, and received no aid from them, they 
granted a capitulation: the former were more rigorously 
dealt with and expelled from their island. Skyros was 
barren, and had little to recommend it except a good mari- 
time position and an excellent harbour; while its inhabitants, 
seemingly akin to the Pelasgian residents in Lemnos prior 
to the Athenian occupation of that spot, were alike piratical 
and cruel. Some Thessalian traders, recentlv plundered 
and imprisoned by them, had raised a complaint against 
them before the Amphictyonic synod, whicn condemned 
the island to make restitution. The mass of the islanders 

' Thucyd. i. 108; Plutarch, Periklds, o. ao. 


threw the bnrden upon those who had committed the crime: 
and these men^ in order to evade payment, invoked Kimon 
with the Athenian armament. He conquered the island, 
expelled the inhabitants, and peopled it with Athenian 

Such clearance was a beneficial act, suitable to the 
.,. new character of Athens as miardian of the 

guardian of ^gcau sca agaiust piracy: but it seems also 
the -ffigean connected with Athenian plans. The island lay 
p^rac*y— °" very convenient for the communication with 
The hero Lemnos (which the Athenians had doubtless 
reoccupied after the expulsion of the Persians *), 
and became, as well as Lemnos, a recognized adjunct or 
outlying p ortion of Attica. Moreover there were old legends 
which connected the Athenians with it, as the tomb of their 
hero Theseus; whose name, as the mythical champion of 
democracy, was in peculiar favour at the period immedi- 
ately following the return from Salamis. It was in the year 
476 B.C., that the oracle had directed them to bring home 
the bones of Theseus from Skyros, and to prepare for that 
hero a splendid entombment and edifice in their new city. 
They had tried to effect this, but the unsocial manners of 
the JDolopians had prevented a search, and it was only after 
Kimon had taken the island that he found, or pretended 
to find, the body. It was brought to Athens in the year 
469 B.c.,2 and after being welcomed by the people in solemn 

' Xenophon, Hellenic. ▼. 1, 81. was not procured till six or MTen 
* Mr. Fynes Olinton (Fasti Hel- years afterwards." 
lenic. ad ann. 476 b.o.) places the Plutarch has many sins to ans- 
conquestof Bkyros by Kimon in the wer for against chronological ex- 
year 476 B.C. He says, after citing actness ; but the charge here made 
a passage from Thucyd. i. 98, and against him is undeserved. Ho 
from Plutarch, Theseus, c. 86, as states that the oracle was given in 
well as a proposed correction of (476 b.o.) the year of the archon 
Bentley, which he justly rejects— Phedon ; and that the body of 
"The island was actually conquer- Theseus was brought back to 
ed in the year of the archon PhsB- Athens in (469 B.C.) the year of 
don, B.o. 476. This we know from the archon Aphepsion. There i« 
Thucyd. i. 98, and Diodor. xi. 41- nothing to contradict either state* 
48 combined. Plutarch named the ment; nor do the passages of 
archon Phsedon with reference to Thucydidfts and Diodorus, which 
the conquest of the island: then, Mr. Clinton adduces, prove that 
by a negligence not unusual with which he asserts. The two pas- 
him, connected the oracle with sages of Diodorus have indeed no 
that fact, as a contemporary trans- bearing upon the event: and in* 
action: although in truth the oracle tofar as Diodorus is in this case 


and joyous procession, as if the hero himself had come back, 

was deposited in the interior of the city. On the spot was 

an anthority at all, he goes against Persian war down to the close of 
Mr. Clinton, for he states Skyros the Peloponnesian war. He has 
to hare been conquered in470B.o. rendered mnch service by correct- 
(Diodor. xi. 60). Thucydidfts only ing the mistake of Dodwell, Wes- 
tells as that the operations against seling and Mitford (founded upon 
Eion, Skyros, and Karystns, took an inaccurate construction of a 
place in the order here indicated, passage in Isokratds) in supposing, 
and at some periods between 476 after the Persian invasion of Greece, 
and 466 B.C.: but he does not en- a Spartan hegemony, lasting ten 
able us to determine positively yeiars, prior to the commencement 
the date of either. Upon what of the Athenian hegemony. He 
authority Mr. Clinton states that has shown that the latter must 
"the oracle was not procured till be reckoned as commencing in 
six or seven years afterwards" {i, e, 477, or 476 B.C., immediately after 
after the conquest), I do not know: the mutiny of the allies against 
the account of Plutarch goes Pansanias— whose command, how- 
rather to show that it was procured ever, need not be peremptorily 
six or seven years before the con- restricted to one year, as Mr. Glin- 
quest : and this may stand good ton (p. 252) and Dodwell maintain : 
until some better testimony is for the words .of Thucydidds, iv 
produced to contradict it. As our t^Ss t^ '^Y^t^^''^?) imply nothing 
information now stands, we have as to annual duration, and desig- 
no testimony as to the year of the nate merely "the hegemony which 
conquest except that of Diodorus, preceded that of Athens." 
who assigns it to 470 B.C., but as But the refutation of this mis- 
he assigns both the conquest of take does not enable us to estab- 
Eion, and the expeditions of Ki- lish any good positive chronology 
mon against Earia and Pampbylia for the period between 477 and 
with the victories of Eurymedon, 466 b.o. It will not do to con- 
all to the same year, we cannot strue ITpwTOv (xiv (Thuc. i. 98) in 
much trust his authority. Never- reference to the Athenian conquest 
theless I incline to believe him of Eion, as if it must necessarily 
as to the date of the conquest of mean Hhe year after^ 477 b.o. If 
Skyros : because it seems to me we could imagine that Thucydidds 
very probable that this conquest had told us all the military oper- 
took place in the year immedi- ations between 477-466 B.C., we 
ately before that in which the body should be compelled -to admit 
of Theseus was brought to Athens, plenty of that "interval of inac- 
which latter event may be referred tion" against which Mr. Clinton 
with great confidence to 469 b.o, go strongly protests (p. 262). ITn- 
in consequence of the interesting happily Thucydidfis has told us 
anecdote related by Plutarch about but a small portion of the events 
the first prize gained by the poet which really happened. 
SophokUs. Mr. Clinton compares the various 
Mr. Clinton has given in his Ap- periods of duration assigned by 
pendix (No. vi.-viii. p. ' 248-253) ancient authors to that which is 
two Dissertations respecting the improperly called the Athenian 
chronology of the period from the "empire"— between 477-405 b.o. (pp. 

VOL. V, M 


built the monument called the Theseium with its sacred 
precinct, invested with the privilege of a sanctuary for 
men of poor condition who might feel ground for dreading 
the oppressions of the powerful, as well as for slaves in 
case of cruel usa^e. * Such were the protective functions 
of the mythical hero of democracy, whose installation is 
interesting as marking the growing intensity of democrati- 
cal feeling in Athens since the Persian war. 

It was about two years or more after this incident that 
At) t 467 *^® ^^^ breach of union in the Confederacy of 
486°B.o. ' Delos took place. The important island of 
^*it* '*" Naxos, the largest of the Cyclades — an island 
the m^^^ which thirty years before had boasted a large 
bers of the marine force and 8000 hoplites — revolted; on 
racy^o/" what Special ground we do not know: but 
^eios— probably the greater islands fancied themselves 
▼oit**and* better able to dispense with the protection of 
is recon- the Confederacy than the smaller — at the same 
quere . Hiae that they were more jealous of Athens. 
After a siege of unknown duration, by Athens and the con- 

248, 249). I oonfest that I rather fire years" (Ibid.). Kor ought -we 

agree with Dr. Gillies, who admits to Justify a computation by Demo- 

the discrepancy between these sthends of sixty-fire years, by 

authors broadly and undisguisedly, saying "that it terminates at the 

than with Mr. Clinton, who seeks Athenian defeat in Sicily" (p. 240). 

to bring them into comparative The truth is, that there is more 

agreement. His explanation is only or less chronological inaccuracy 

successful in regard to one of in all these passages, except those 

them — Demosthenfis; whose two of Demosthen6s~and historical 

statements (forty-fire years in one inaccuracy in aU of them, not 

place and serenty-three years in an* eren excepting those. It is not 

other) are shown to be consistent true that the Athenians ^p^av r^c 

with each other as well as chro- OaX&aaTjc — ^p^av tu)v*£XXi^vu>v — icpo« 

nologically just. But surely it is ffxaxai ^oav tubv ^EXXiqvcdv— for se- 

not reasonable to correct the text renty-three years. The historical 

of the orator Lykurgus from tv- language of Demosthends, Plato^ 

vcvijxovxa to i3SopLiQXOvTa, and then Lysias, Isokratfts, Andokidds, Ly« 

to say that *^Lykurgus may be kurgus, requires to be carefully 

added to the number of those who examined before we rely upon it. 

describe the period as seventy > Plutarch (Kimon, c. 8; The- 

years" (p. 250). Neither are we to tens, o. 86). taxi 8i tpu^tov olxixat; 

bring Andokidds into harmony xal icaoi xotc xancivoxipotc xal Sc- 

with others, by supposing that 81691 xpclxxovac, u>< xal xou 6T)(riu>c 

^his calculation ascends to the icpovxaxixou xiv6« xal Pot]9t)xixou yc- 

battle of Marathon, from the date vo{xivou xal icpoaSs^ofAivou fiXav 

of which (B.o. 490) to the battle Op<i>ictt>c t&« tu)v xanetvoxipwv 8si^- 

4>t iSSgospotami, are just eighty- osic* 


federate force, it was forced to surrender, and reduced to 
the condition of a tributary subject; * its armed ships 
being doubtless taken away, and its fortifications razed. 
"Whether any fine or ulterior penalty was levied, we have 
no information. 

We cannot doubt that the reduction of this powerful 
island, however untoward in its effects upon the 
equal and self-maintairfed character of the con- operaUons' 
federacy, strengthened its military force by of Athens 
placing the whole Naxian fleet with new pe- Jfderacy^"' 
cuniary contributions in the hands of the chief, against 
Nor is it surprising to hear that Athens sought DefeatTf 
both to employ this new force, and to obliterate the Per- 
the late act of severity, by increased exertions ximon^t 
against the common enemy. Though we know the nver 
no particulars respecting operations against fonf"^*" 
Persia, since the attack on Eion, such operations 
must have been going on; but the expedition under Kimon, 
undertaken not long after the Naxian revolt, was attended 
with memorable results. That commander, having under 
him 200 triremes from Athens, and 100 from the various 
confederates, was despatched to attack the Persians on the 
south-western and southern coast of Asia Minor. He 
attacked and drove out several of their garrisons from 
various Grecian settlements, both in Karia and Lykia: 
amon^ others, the important trading city of Phaselis, 
though at first resisting and even standing a siege, was 
prevailed upon by the friendly suggestions of the Chians 
in Kimon's armament to pay a contribution of ten talents 
and join in the expedition. From the length of time oc- 
cupied in these various undertakings, the Persian satraps 
had been enabled to assemble a powerful force, both fleet 
and army, near the mouth of the river Eurymedon in Pam- 
phylia, under the command of Tithraustes andPherendates, 
both of the regal blood. The fleet, chiefly Phoenician, seems 
to have consisted of 200 ships, but a farther reinforcement 
of eighty Phoenician ships was expected, and was actually 
near at hand, so that the commanders were unwilling to 
hazard a battle before its arrival. Kim on, anxious for the 
same reason to hasten on the combat, attacked them 

' Thuoyd. i. 98. It has already tire, passed close to Naxos while 
been stated in the preceding chap- it was under siege, and incurred 
ter, that ThemistokUs, as a fugi- great danger of being taken. 

H 2 


vigorously. Partly from their inferiority of numbers, 
partly from discouragement at the absence of the reinforce- 
ment, they seem to have made no strenuous resistance. 
They were put to flight and driven ashore; so speedily, 
and with so little loss to the Greeks, that Kimon was 
enabled to disembark his men forthwith, and attack the 
land-force which was drawn up on shore to protect them. 
The battle on land was long and gallantly contested, but 
Kimon at length gained a complete victory, dispersed 
the army with the capture of many prisoners, and either 
took or destroyed the entire fleet. As soon as his victory 
and his prisoners were secured, he sailed to Cyprus for the 
purpose of intercepting the reinforcement of eighty Phoe- 
nician ships in their way, and was fortunate enough to 
attack them while yet they were ignorant of the victories 
of the Eurymedon. These ships too were all destroyed, 
though most of the crews appear to have escaped ashore 
on the island. Two great victories, one at sea and the 
other on land, gained on the same day by the same arma- 
ment, counted with reason among the most glorious of all 
Grecian exploits, and were extolled as such in the inscription 
on the commemorative offering to Apollo, set up out of the 
tithe of the spoils. ^ The number of prisoners, as well as 
the booty taken by the victors, was immense. 

> For the battles of the Eary- to me a very credible oircnmstaneei 

medon, see Thucyd. i. 100; Diodor. explaining the easy nautical rio- 

xi 60-62; Plutarch, Kimon, 12, 13. tory of Kimon at the Eurymedon, 

The accounts of the two latter From Thucydidfts we know that 

appear chiefly derived from Epho- the vanquished fleet at the Eury- 

rus and Kallisthends , authors of medon consisted of no more than 

the following century; and from two hundred ships. For so I yen* 

Phanodemus, an author later still, ture to construe the words of Thu- 

I borrow sparingly from them, and cydidds, in spite of the authority 

only so far as consists with the of Dr. Arnold— Kal ctXov CA9T]vaTot) 

brief statement of Thucydidfts. The tpii^petc <l>otvUu>v xal Sii^Qttpav x&< 

narrative of Diodorus is exceeding- icdoa^ t«(xdOSta(voolac. Upon which 

ly confused, indeed hardly intelli- Dr. Arnold observes,— "Amounting 

gible. in all to two hundred ; that is, that 

Phanodemus stated the number the whole number of ships taken 
of the Persian fleet at six hundred or destroyed was two hundred- 
ships; Ephorus, at three hundred not that the whole fleet consisted 
and flfty. Diodorus (following the of no more." Admitting the cor- 
latter) gives three hundred and rectness of this construction (which 
forty. Plutarch mentions the ex- may be defended by viii. 21), we 
pected reinforcement of eighty may remark that the defeated 
AuBnician ships; which appears Phoenician fleet, according to the 


A victory thus remarkable, which thrust back the 
Persians to the region eastward of Phaselis, doubtless 
fortified materially the position of the Athenian con- 
federacy against tnem. But it tended not less to exalt the 
reputation of Athens, and even to popularize her with 
the confederates generally, from the large amount of 
plunder divisible among them. Probably this increased 
power and popularity stood her in stead throughout her 
approaching contest with Thasos, at the same time that 
it explains the increasing fear and dislike of the Pelopon- 

Thasos was a member of the confederacy ofDelos; 
but her quarrel with Athens seems to have _ ,^ . 
arisen out of causes quite distinct from con- Thasos 
federate relations. It nas been already stated ^'<>™ *^® 
that the Athenians had within the last few racy of' 
years expelled the Persians from the important ^.®^°'-""- 
post of Eion on the Strymon, the most con- Thasos*^ by 
venient post for the neighbouring region of *^® Mhe- 
Thrace, which was not less distinguished for Kimon.— ' 
its fertility than for its mining wealth. In the ^ines in 
occupation of this post, the Athenians had had 
time to become acquainted with the productive character 
of the adjoining region, chiefly occupied by the Edonian 
Thracians; and it is extremely probable that many private 
settlers arrived from Athens, with the view of procuring 
grants, or making their fortunes by partnership with 
powerful Thracians in working the gold-mines round Mount 
Pangseus. In so doing, they speedily found themselves in 
collision with the Greeks of the opposite island of Mount 
Thasos, who possessed a considerable strip of land with 

nnlTeraal praotice of antiquity, land battle on the eame day. 
ran ashore to seek protection from It is remarkable that the inscrip- 
its accompanying land-force. When tion on the commdmoratire offering 
therefore this land-force was itself only specifies ''one hundred Phoani- 
defeated and dispersed, the ships cian ships with their crews" as 
would all naturally fall into the ha-ving been captured (Diodor. xi. 
power of the victors { or if any 62). The other hundred ships were 
escaped, it would be merely by probably destroyed. Diodorus re- 
accident. Moreover, the smaller presents Kimon as having captured 
number is in this case more likely three hundred and forty ships, 
to be the truth, as we must sup- though he himself cites the in- 
pose an easy naval victory, in order scription which mentions only one 
to leave strength for a. strenuous hundred. 


various dependent towns on the continent of Thrace, and 
derived a large revenue from the mines of Skapte Hyle, 
as well as from others in the neighbourhood. * The con- 
dition of Thasos at this time (about 465 b.g.) indicates to 
us the proffress which the Grecian states in the ^gean 
had made since their liberation from Persia. It had been 
deprived both of its fortifications and of its maritime force, 
by order of Darius, about 491 B.C., and must have remained 
in this condition until after the repulse of Xerxes; but 
we now find it well-fortified and possessing a powerful 
maritime force. 

In what precise manner the quarrel between the 
Thasians and the Athenians of Eion manifested itself, 
respecting the trade and the mines in Thrace, we are not 
informed. But it reached such a height that the Athenians 
were induced to send a powerful armament against the 
island, under the command of Kimon.' Having vanquished 
the Thasian force at sea, they disembarked, gained various 
battles, and blocked up the city by land as well as by sea. 
And at the same time they undertook — what seems to 
have been part and parcel of the same scheme — the 
establishment of a larger and more powerful colony on 
First Thracian ground not far from Eion. On the 

Athe^^^t^' Strymon, about three miles higher up than 
found a Eion, near the spot where the river narrows 
^ty at itself again out of a broad expanse of the nature 
Hodoi on of a lake, was situated the Edonian town or 
the stry- settlement called Ennea Hodoi (Nine Ways), a 
Eion. The little abovo the bridge, which here served as an 
attempt important communication for all the people of 
the settiera the interior. Both Histiaeus and Aristagoras, 
are slain. the two Milesian despots, had been tempted by 
the advantages of this place to commence a settlement 
there: both of them had failed, and a third failure on a 
still grander scale was now about to be added. The 

> About Thasos, see Herodot. vl. find an account of the large gains 

46-48; vii. 118. The position of made in that city by its contracts 

Bagusa in the Adriatic, in reference to work the gold and silver mines 

to the despots of Servia and Bosnia belonging to these princes (Engel, 

in the fifteenth and sixteenth cen- Geschichte des FreystaatesBagusa, 

turies, was very similar to that of sect. 86, p. 163. Wien, 1807). 

Athens and Thasos in regard to * Thucyd. i. 100, 101; Plutarch, 

the Thracian princes of the interior. Kimon, c. 14 ; Diodor. xi. 70. 
In Engel's History of Bagusa we 


Athenians sent thither a large body of colonists, ten 
thousand in number, partly from their own citizens, partly 
collected from their allies; the temptations of the site 
probably rendering volunteers numerous. As far as 
Ennea Hodoi was concerned, they were successful in con- 
quering it and driving away the Edonian possessors. But 
on trying to extend themselves farther to the eastward, to 
a spot called Drabekus convenient for the mining re^on, 
they encountered a more formidable resistance from a 
powerful alliance of Thracian tribes, who had come to aid 
the Edonians in decisive hostility against the new colony 
— probably not without instigation from the inhabitants 
of Thasos. All or most of the ten thousand colonists were 
slain in this warfare, and the new colony was for the time 
completely abandoned. We shall find it resumed here- 
after. 1 

Disappointed as the Athenians were in this enterprise, 
they did not abandon the blockade of Thasos, m^_^q^ ^ ^ 
which held out more than two years, and only Keduction * 
surrendered in the third year. Its fortifications of Thasoa 
were razed; its ships of war, thirty-three in blockade 
number, were taken away: 2 its possessions and *>' *^°4* 
mining establishments on the opposite continent UdU^rL 
were relinquished. Moreover an immediate ®^ *°^^, , 

,.!..*. J jji» iv dismantled. 

contribution in money was demanded from the 
inhabitants, over and above the annual payment assessed 
upon them for the future. The subjugation of this power- 
ful island was another step in the growing, dominion of 
Athens over her confederates. 

The year before the Thasians surrendered, however, 
they had taken a step which deserves particular notice, as 
indicating the newly-gathering clouds in the Grecian poli- 
tical horizon. They had made secret application to the 

< Thucyd. i. 101. Philip of Mace- Ennea Kodoi would have been in 

don, in his dispute more than a possession of the Macedonians at 

century after this period with the this time, when the first Athenian 

Athenians respecting the possession attempt was made upon it: but the 

of Amphipolis, pretended that his statement of Thuoydidfts shows that 

ancestor Alexander had been the it was then an Edonian township, 

first to acquire possession of the * Plutarch, Kimon, c. 14. Galdp- 

spot after the expulsion of the sua and QSsymd were among the 

Persians from Thrace (see Philippi Thasian settlements on the main- 

Epistola ap. Demosthen. p. 164, B.). land of Thrace (Thucyd. iv. 108). 
If this pretence had been true, 


Lacedemonians for aid, entreating them to draw off the 
Appiica- attentionof Athens by invading Attica; and the 
Thasians^* Lacedsemonians , without the knowledge of 
to Sparta Athens, having actually engaged to comply with 
'** anted" *^^ request, were only prevented from perform- 
bnt^ot car- ing their promise by a grave and terrible, mis- 
eff ^ct^*** fortune at home, i Though accidentally unper- 
giimpse of formed, this hostile promise is a most significant 
hoBtnities event. It marks the ffrowinir fear and hatred 
Sparta and On the part of Sparta and the Peloponnesians 
Athens. towards Athens, merely on general grounds 
of the magnitude of her power, and without any special 
provocation. Kay, not only had Athens given no provocar 
tion, but she was still actually included as a member of 
the Lacedaemonian alliance, and we shall find her presently 
both appealed to and acting as such. We shall hear so 
much of Athens, and that too with truth, as pushing and 
aggressive — and of Sparta as home-keeping and defensive 
— that the incident just mentioned becomes important to 
remark. The -first intent of unprovoked and even 
treacherous hostility — the germ of the ftiture Pelopon- 
nesian war — ^is conceived and reduced to an engagement 
by Sparta. 

We are told by Plutarch, that the Athenians, after 
Tri 1 a d *^® surrender of Thasos and the liberation of 
acquittal of the armament, had expected from Kimon some 
Ath °^ ** farther conquests in Macedonia — and even that 
^"^ he had actually entered upon that project with 
such promise of success, that its farther consummation 
was certain as well as easy. Having under these circum- 
stances relinquished it and returned to Athens, he was 
accused by Perikles and others of having been bought off 
by bribes from the Macedonian king Alexander; but was 
acquitted after a public trial. ^ 

During the period which had elapsed between the 
« . _ first formation of the confederacy of Delos and 
crease of the capture of Thasos (about thirteen or fourteen 
the Athe- years, B.C. 477-463), the Athenians seem to have 
man power. ^^^^ occupied almost entirely in their maritime 
operations, chiefly against the Persians — having been free 

' Thncyd. i. 101. ol Si Gniax^^'^** |Jiivou acia(jiou. 
(jiiv xp69a TU)v 'AOt]valu>v, xal l(xaX- * Plutarch, Eimon, c. 14* 
Xov, 6iexa>X607]aav 6i Oici tou i^t 2- 


from embarrassments immediately round Attica. But this 
freedom was not destined to last much longer. During 
the ensuing ten years, their foreign relations near home 
become both active and complicated; while their strength 
expands so wonderfully, that they are found competent at 
once to obligations on both sides of the JQgean sea, the 
distant as well as the near. 

Of the incidents which had taken place in Central 
Greece during the twelve or fifteen years Proceed- 
immediately succeeding the battle of Platsea, inga in 
we have scarcely any information. The feelings Greece^ be- 
ef the time, between those Greeks who had tween 470- 
Bupported and those who had resisted the Per- Thebes 
sian invader, must have remained unfriendly and the 
even after the war was at an end; while the ^^^s*^ 
mere occupation of the Persian numerous host Discredit of 
must have inflicted severe damage both upon Thebes. 
Thessaly and Boeotia. At the meeting of the Amphik- 
tyonic synod which succeeded the expulsion of the invaders, 
a reward was proclaimed for the life of the Melian Ephial- 
tes, who had betrayed to Xerxes the mountain-path over 
(Eta, and thus caused the ruin of Leonidas at Thermopylae. 
Moreover, if we may trust Plutarch, it was even proposed 
by Lacedsemon that all the medising Greeks should be 
expelled from the synod 1 — a proposition which the more 
long-sighted views of Themistokles successfully resisted. 
Even the stronger measure of razing the fortifications of 
all the extra-Peloponnesian cities, from fear that they 
mig\t be used to aid some future invasion, had suggested 
itself to the LacedsBmonians — as we see from their language 
en the occasion of rebuilding the walls of Athens. In 
ragard to Boeotia, it appears that the headship of Thebes 
as well as the coherence of the federation was for the time 
almost suspended. The destroyed towns of Platsea and 
Thespiae were restored, and the latter in part repeopled,2 
under Athenian influence. The general sentiment of Pelo- 
ponnesus as well as of Athens would have sugtained these 
towns against Thebes, if the latter had tried at that time 

' Plntarch, Themistokl. c. 20. whom he afterwards procnred ad- 

^ See the case of Sikinnns, the mission among the batch of newly- 

person through whom Themistok- introdnced citizens at Thespi» 

Ids communicated with Xerxes be- (Herodot. viii. 76). 
fore the battle of Salamis, and for 

170 HISTOBT OF GBEEGS. Past ir. 

to enforce her supremacy over them in the name of "ancient 
Boeotian right and usage." * The Theban government was 
then in discredit for its previous medism — even in the eyes 
of Thebans themselves ;3 while the party opposed to 
Thebes in the other towns was so powerful, that many of 
them would probably have been severed from the federa- 
tion to become allies of Athens like Platsea, if the inter- 
ference of Lacedsemon had not arrested such a tendency. 
Lacedeemon was in every other part of Greece an enemy 
Sparta re- ^ Organized aggregation of cities, either equal 
stores and or unequal, and was constantly bent on keeping 
supremacy* the little autonomous communities separate :3 
of Thebes whence she sometimes became by accident the 
tiie^iesser protector of the weaker cities against com- 
BoBotian pulsory alliance imposed upon them by the 
towns. stronger. The interest of her own ascendency 

was in this respect analogous to that of the Persians when 
they dictated the peace of Antalkidas — of the £.omans in 
administering their extensive conquests — and of the kings 
of Mediaeval Europe in breaking the authority of the 
barons over their vassals. But though such was the policy 
of Sparta elsewhere, her fear of Athens, which grew up 
during the ensuing twenty years, made her act differently 
in regard to Bceotia. She had no other means of main- 
taining that country as her own ally and as the enemy of 
Athens, except by organising the federation effectively, and 
strengthening the authority of Thebes. It is to this 
revolution in Spartan politics that Thebes owed the 
recovery of her ascendency* — a revolution so conspicuously 
marked, that the Spartans even aided in enlarging her 
circuit and improving her fortifications. It was not without 
difficulty that she maintained this position even when 
recovered, against the dangerous neighbourhood of Athens 
— a circumstance which made her not only a vehement 
partisan of Sparta, but even more furiously anti- Athenian 
than Sparta, down to the close of the Peloponnesian war. 
The revolution, just noticed, in Spartan politics 

' Ta Ttbv Boiu>T(bv icirpia — ra dences, the remarkable case of 
XDiva TU)v ic&vTtuv Botu>xu>v ndxpia the Olynthian confederacy (Xeno* 
(Thucyd. iii. 61-66). phon. Hellen. v. 2, 16). 

* Thucyd. iii. 62. 4 Diodor. xi. 81 ; Justin, iii. 6, 

* Bee among many other evi- 


towards Boeotia^ did not manifest itself until about tweniy 
years after the commencement of the Athenian Events in 
maritime confederacy. During the course of ^eiopon- 
tbose twenty years, we know that Sparta had Arcadia- 
had more than one battle to sustain in Arcadia, ^i"* *®* 
against the towns and villages of that country, in which 
she came forth victorious: but we have no particulars re- 
specting these incidents. We also know that a few years 
after the Persian invasion, the inhabitants of Elis concen- 
trated themselves from many dispersed townships into the 
one main city of Elis: i and it seems probable that Lepreum 
in Triphylia, and one or two of the towns of Achaia, were 
either formed or enlarged by a similar process near about 
the same time, 2 Such aggregation of towns out of pre- 
existing separate villages was not conformable to the views, 
nor favourable to the ascendency of Lacedgemon. But 
there can be little doubt that her foreign policy after the 
Persian invasion was both embarrassed and discredited by 
the misconduct of her two contemporary kings, Pausanias 
(who though only regent was practically equivalent to a 
king) and Leotycludes — not to mention the rapid develop- 
ment of Athens and Peirseus. 

Moreover, in the year b. c. 464 (the year preceding the 
surrender of Thasos to the Athenian armament), Terrible 
a misfortune of yet more terrific moment befel earthquake 
Sparta. A violent earthquake took place in the JJi^B.of*^ 
immediate neighbourhood ofSparta itself, destroy- Bevoit of 
ing a large portion of the town, and a vast *^® Helots, 
number of lives, many of them Spartan citizens. It was 
the judgement of the earth-shaking god Poseidon (accord- 
ing to the view of the LacedaBmonians themselves) for a 
recent violation of his sanctuary at Taenarus, from whence 
certain suppliant Helots had been dragged away not long 
before for punishment :3 not improbably some of those 
Helots whom Pausanias had instigated to revolt. The 
sentiment of the Helots, at all times one of enmity towards 
their masters, appears at this moment to have been unusu- 
ally inflammable : so that an earthquake at Sparta, espe- 
cially an earthquake construed as divine vengeance for Helot 
blood recently spilt, was sufficient to rouse many of them 

» Diodor. xi. 64; Btrabo, viii. p. ' Thucyd. i. 101-128; Diodor. xi 
837. C2. 

« Btrabo, viii. pp. 337, 348, 256, 

172 HI8T0BT OV GBBEOB. Paby n. 

at once into revolt, together with some even of the PericBki. 
The i^orgents took arms and marched directly upon 
Sparta, which they were on the point of mastering daring 
the first moments of consternation, had not the hravery 
and presence of mind of the young king Archidamus re- 
animated the surviving citizens and repelled the attack. 
But though repelled, the insurgents were not subdued. 
They maintained the field against the Spartan forcie, some- 
times with considerable advantage, since Aeimnestus (the 
warrior by whose hand Mardonius had fallen at Plataea) 
was defeated and slain with 300 followers in the plain of 
Stenyklerus, overpowered by superior numbers. ^ When 
at length defeated, they occupied and fortified the memor- 
able hUl of Ith6me, the ancient citadel of their Hiessenian 
forefathers. Here they made a long and obstinate defence, 
supportingthemselves doubtless by incursions throughout 
Laconia. JDefence indeed was not difficult, seeing thatlhe 
Lacedaemonians were at that time confessedly incapable of 
assailing even the most imperfect species of fortification. 
After the siege had lasted some two or three years, with- 
out any prospect of success, the Lacedaemonians, begin- 
ning to despair of their own sufficiency for the undertaking, 
invoked the aid of their various idlies, among whom we 
find specified the JBginetans, the Athenians, and the Pla- 
tseans.^ The Athenian troops are said to have consisted 
of 4000 men, under the command of Kimon: Athens being 
still included in the list of Lacedaemonian allies. 

So imperfect were the means of attacking walls at 
that day, even for the most intelligent Greeks, that this 
The Lace- increased force made no immediate impression 
ifv'Ske^thS ®^ *^® fortified hill of Ith6me. And when the 
aid of Lacedaemonians saw that their Athenian allies 

a^ainaV tt* ^^^^ ^^* more successful than they had been 
revolted themselves, they soon passed from surprise into 
Heiotg.— doubt, mistrust, and apprehension. The troops 

March of , , '. ' KK, i. i* t i.-1 

the Athe- had given no ground for such a feeung, while 
Khnon"nto ^^°^^^ their general was notorious for his 
Laconia to attachment to Sparta. Yet the Lacedaemoni- 
aid them. ang could not help suspecting the ever-wake- 
ful energy and ambition of these Ionic strangers whom 
they introduced into the interior of Laconia. Calling to 
mind their own promise — though doubtless a secret 

A Herodot. ix. Ci * Thucyd. i. 102; lii. 64; It. 67. 


promise — to invade Attica not long before, for the 
benefit of the Thasians — they even began to fear that 
the Athenians might turn against them, and listen to 

solicitations for espousing the cause of the besieged. 
Under the influence of such apprehensions, they dismissed 
the Athenian contingent forthwith, on pretence of having 
no farther occasion for them; while all the other allies 
were retained, and the siege or blockade went on as 
before, i 

* Thncyd. 1. 102. t?|v fx4v 6ico'|>iav This is all very telling and for- 

o5 SrjXoovTe?, elndvTS? 6e 8ti ou5ev cible, as a portion of the Aristo- 

icpoodiovxat ai»Tu>v 4ti, phanio play, but there is no his- 

Mr. Fynes Clinton (Fast. Hellen. torical truth in it except the fact 

ann. 464-461 b.o.) following Flu- of an application made and an 

tarch, recognizes two Laoedeemo- expedition sent in consequence, 

nian requests to Athens, and two We know that the earthquake 

Athenian expeditions to the aid took place at the time when the 

of the Spartans, both under Ki- siege of Thasos was yet going on, 

men; the first in 464 B.o., imme- because it was the reason which 

diately on the happening of the prevented the Lacedeemonians from 

earthquake and consequent rerolt aiding the besieged by an invasion 

— the second in 461 b.o., after the of Attica. ButKimon commanded 

war had lasted some time. at the siege of Thasos (Plutarch, 

In my judgement, there is no Kimon, c. 14), accordingly he could 

ground for supposing more than not have gone as commander to 

one application made to Athens, Laconia at the time when this 

and one expedition. The dupli-. first expedition is alleged to have 

cation has arisen from Plutarch, been undertaken, 

who has construed too much as Next, Thucydidds acknowledges 

historical reality the comic exag- no more than one expedition; nor 

geration of Aristophanes (Aristoph. indeed does Diodorus (xi. 64), 

Lysistrat. 1138; Plutarch, Kimon, though this is of minor conse- 

16). The heroine of the latter, quence. Now mere silence on the 

liysistrata, wishing to make peace part of Thucydidds, in reference 

between the Lacedeemonians and to the events of a period which 

Athenians, and reminding each of he only professes to survey briefly, 

the services which they had received is not always a very forcible ne- 

firom the other, might permit gative argument. But in this case, 

herself to say to the Lacedsemo- his account of the expedition of 

nians— "Your envoy Perikleidas 461 B.C., with its very important 

came to Athens, pale with terror, consequences, is such as to ex- 

and put himself as a suppliant at elude the supposition that ^e knew 

the altar to entreat our help as a of any prior expedition, two or 

matter of life and death, while three years earlier. Had he know 

Poseidon was still shaking the of any such, he could not have 

earth and the Messenians were written the account which now 

pressing you hard: then Kimon stands in his text. He dwells 

with 4000 hoplites went and especially on the prolongation of 

achieved your complete salvation." the war, and on the incapacity of 

174 niBTOBT OP GBEECE. Paet II. 

This dismissal, ungracious in the extreme and prob- 
ably rendered even more offensive by the habitual rough- 
ness of Spartan dealing, excited the strongest exaspera- 
tion both among the Auienian soldiers and the Athenian 
people — an exasperation heightened by circumstances 
immediately preceding. For the resolution to send 
Mistrust auxiliaries intoLaconia, when the Lacedaemo- 
conceived nians first applied for.them, had not been 
Lacediemo- ^^^^ without Considerable debate at Athens, 
nians of The party of Perikles and Ephialtes, habitually 
ir^n '^2®* ^ opposition to Kimon, and partisans of the 
liaries, ' forward democratical movement, had strongly 
who are * discountenanced it, and conjured their coun- 

dismissed . > a > > • '' j • x 

from La- trymeu not to assist in renovating and 
conia. Dig- Btrengthcuing their most formidable rival. 
ancTchange Perhaps the previous engagement of the Lace- 
Ath**^^*^^** dsemonians to invade Attica on behalf of the 
Thasians may have become known to them, 
though not so formally as to exclude denial. And even 
supposing this engagement to have remained unknown 
at that time to every one, there were not wanting other 
grounds to render the policy of refusal plausible. But 
Kimon — with an earnestness which even the philo-La- 
conian Kritias afterwards characterised as a sacrifice of 
the grandeur of Athens to the advantage «f Lacedaemon i 
— employed all his credit and infiuence in seconding the 
application. The maintenance of alliance with Sparta 
on equal footing — ^peace among the great powers of 
Grreece and common war against Persia — together with 
the prevention of all farther democratical changes in 
Athens — were the leading points of his political creed. 

the Lacedemonians for attacking brink of ruin. Let us add, that 

-walls, as the reasons why they in- the supposition of Sparta, the first 

▼oked the Athenians as well as military power in Greece, and dis- 

their other allies: he implies that tinguished for her unintermitting 

the presence of the latter in La- discipline, being reduced all at 

conia was a new and threatening once to a condition of such utter 

incident: moreover, when he tells helplessness as to owe her safety 

us how much the Athenians were to foreign intenrention— is highly 

incensed by their abrupt and mis- improbable in itself; inadmissible 

trustful dismissal, ho could not except on very good evidence, 

have omitted to notice as an ag- For the reasons here stated, I 

gravationof this feeling, that only reject the first expedition into Iia« 

two or three years before, thoy conia mentioned in Plutarch, 

had rescued Lacodnmou from tho * Plutarchi Kimon, c. 16* 


As yet, both his personal and political ascendency were 
predominant over his opponents. As yet, there was no 
manifest conflict, which had only just begun to show 
itself in the case of Thasos, between the maritime 
power of Athens and the union of land-foree under 
oparta: and Kimon could still treat both of these phse- 
nomena as coexisting necessities of Hellenic well-being. 
Though noway distinguished as a speaker, he carried 
with him the Athenian assembly by appealing to a large 
and generous patriotism, which forbade them to permit 
the humiliation of Sparta. "Consent not to see Hellas 
lamed of one leg and Athens drawing without her 
yoke-fellow ;"i — such was his language, as we learn from 
nis friend and companion the Chian poet Ion: and in the 
lips of Kimon it proved effective. It is a speech of 
almost melancholy interest, since ninety years passed 
over before such an appeal was ever again addressed to 
an Athenian assembly. 2 The despatch of the auxiliaries 
was thus dictated by a generous sentiment, to the dis- 
regard of what might seem political prudence. And we 
may imagine the violent reaction which took place in 
Athenian feeling, when the Lacedaemonians repaid them 
by singling out their troops from all the other allies as 
objects of insulting suspicion. We may imagine the 
triumph of Perikles and Ephialtes, who had opposed the 
mission — and the vast loss of influence to Kimon, who had 
brought it about — when Athens received again into her 
public assembly the hoplites sent back from Ithorae. 

Both in the internal constitution, indeed (of which 
more presently), and in the external policy, of The Athe- 
Athens, the dismissal of these soldiers was preg- nians te- 
nant with results. The Athenians immediately Jfuance *of 
passed a formal resolution to renounce the alii- Sparta, and 
ancebetween themselves andLacedsemon against iiance*w?th 
the Persians. They did more: they looked out Argo8. 
for land-enemies 01 Lacedsemon, with whom to of Argos 
ally themselves. —her con- 

Of these by far the first, both in Hellenic ^y^l^Ji 
rank and in real power, was Argos. That city, and other 
neutral during the Persian invasion, had now ***^'*** 

* Platarch, Kimon, 0. 16, *0 5* ixiQxe Tif)v it6Xiv i-ztpo^n^cty icepvifieiv 

'IcDv dicoftvTjjxovsusi xal t6v Xoyov, y*T*''^M'^^''T'* 

<p |i.4Xv«Ta TOO? 'AQrivaioo? ixlvr)08, % gee Xenophon, Hellenic yi. 
napaxaXtuv {xi^te T7)v*£XXd6a ^u>X7]Vy 


recovered the effects of the destmctive defeat suffered 
about thirty years before from the Spartan king Kleomenes. 
The sons of the ancient citizens had grown to manhood, 
and the temporary predominance of the Pericekiy acquired 
in consequence of the ruinous loss of citizens in that defeat, 
had been again put down. In the neighbourhood of Argos, 
and dependent upon it, were situated Mykense, Tiryns, and 
Midea — small in power and importance, but rich in mythi- 
cal renown. Disdaining the inglorious example of Argos 
at the period of danger, these towns had furnished con- 
tingents both to Thermopylsd and Plataea, which their 
powerful neighbour had been unable either to prevent at 
the time or to avenge afterwards, from fear of the inter- 
vention of Lacedsdmon. But so soon as the latter was seen 
to be endangered and occupied at home, with a formidable 
Messenian revolt, the Argeians availed themselves of the 
opportunity to attack not only Mykensg and Tiryns, but 
also OmesB, Midea, and other semi-dependent towns around 
them. Several of these were reduced; and the inhabitants, 
robbed of their autonomy, were incorporated with the do- 
main of Argos: but theMykenaans, partly from the superior 
gallantry of their resistance, partly from jealousy of their 
mythical renown, were either sold as slaves or driven into 
banishment. ^ Through these victories Argos was now more 
powerful than ever, and the propositions of alliance made 
to her by Athens, while strengthening both the two against 
Lacedsemon, opened to her a new chance of recovering her 
lost headship m Peloponnesus. The Thessalians became 
members of this new alliance, which was a defensive alli- 
ance against Lacedsemon: and hopes were doubtless- enter- 
tained of drawing in some of the habitual allies of the 

The new character which. Athens had thus assumed, 
as a competitor for landed alliances not less than for 
maritime ascendency, came opportunely for the protection 
of the neighbouring town of liegara. It appears that Co- 
rinth, perhaps instigated like Argos by the helplessness 
of the Lacedaemonians, had been making border encroach- 

—about 872 B.C.— a little before the but as It nndonbtedly oomes after 

battle of Leuktra. the earthquake at Sparta, we must 

> Diodor. zi. 65 ; Strabo, rili. p. suppose it to have happened about 

872; Pausan. ii. 16, 17, 26. Diodo- 463 b.o. See Mr. Fynes Clinton, 

ru8 placet this incident in 468 B.a : Fasti Hellenci, Appendix. 8. 


ments on the one side upon Kleonse — on the other side 
upon Megara: J on which ground the latter, prob- 
ably despairing of protection from Lacedaemon, 46i^460 b.o. 
renounced the Lacedaemonian connexion, and Megara be- 
obtained permission to enrol herself as an ally aiiTed' with 
of Athens. 2 This was an ac(}uisition of signal Athens. 
value to the Athenians, since it both opened to hatrld^of 
them the whole range of territory across the Corinth 
outer Isthmus of Corinth to the interior of the Sefghbour- 
Krisssean Gulf, on which the Megarian port of ing Peio- 
PegsB was situated — and placed them in pos- JS5m"^*" 
session of the passes of Mount Geraneia, so towards 
that they could arrest the march of a Pelo- '^***®""* 
ponnesian army over the Isthmus, and protect Attica from 
invasion. It was moreover of great importance in its effects 
on Grecian politics: for it was counted as a wrong by Lace- 
dsemon, gave deadly offence to the Corinthians, and lighted 
up the flames of war between them and Athens; their allies 
the Epidaurians and ^ginetans taking their part. Though 
Athens had not yet been guilty of unjust encroachment 
against any Peloponnesian state, her ambition and energy 
had inspired universal awe; while the maritime states in 
the neignbourhood, such as Corinth, Epidaurus, and ^gina, 
saw these terror-striking qualities threatening them at 
their own doors, through her alliance with Argos and 
Megara. Moreover, it is probable that the ancient feud 
between the Athenians and ^ginetans, though dormant 
since a little before the Persian invasion, had never been 
appeased or forgotten: so that the ^ginetans, dwelling 
within sight of Peirseus, were at once best able to appre- 
ciate, and most likely to dread, the enormous maritime 
power now possessed by Athens* Perikles was wont to 
call -AJgina the eyesore of Peirseus:' but we may be sure 
that Peirseus, grown into a vast fortified port within the 
existing generation, was in a much stronger degree the 
eyesore of ^gina. 

The Athenians were at this time actively engaged in 

{>rosecuting the war against Persia, having a fleet of no 
ess than two hundred sail, equipped by or from the con- 
federacy collectively, now serving in Cyprus and on the 
Phoenician coast. Moreover the revolt of the Egyptians 

* Plutarch, Simon, c. 17. » Thucyd. i. 103. 

• Plutarch, Periklfts, c. 8. 

VOL. V* H 

178 BI8T0BT OF QBEECE. Past II, 

under Inaros (about 460 b.c.) opened to them new 
means of action against the Great King. Their 
gimuita- fleet, by invitation of the revolters, sailed up 
n«ou8 ac- the Nile to Memphis, where there seemed at 
Athenians first a good prospect of throwing off the Persian 
— *«» py- dominion, x et in spite of so ffreat an abstraction 
nicia, " from their disposable force, their military opera- 
Egypt, and tions near home were conducted with unabated 
They huiid vigour: and the inscription which remains — a 
the first commemoration of their citizens of the Erechtheid 
WaU" from tribe who were slain in one and the same year 
Megara to in Cvprus, Egypt, Phoenicia, the Halieis, -^gina, 
***' and Megara — brings forcibly before us that energy 

which astonished and even alarmed their contemporaries. 

Their first proceedings at Megara were of a nature 
altogether novel, in the existing condition of Greece. It 
was necessary for the Athenians to protect their new ally 
against the superiority ofPeloponnesian land- force, and to 
ensure a constant communication with it by sea. But the city 
(like most of the ancient Hellenic towns) was situated ou 
a hill at some distance from the sea, separated from its 
port Nis8Ba by a space of nearly one mile. One of the 
earliest proceedings of the Athenians was to build two 
lines of wall, near and parallel to each other, connecting 
the city with Nissea; so that the two thus formed one 
continuous fortress, wherein a standing Athenian garrison 
was maintained, with the constant means of succour from 
Athens incase of need. These "LongWalls,^ though after- 
wards copied in other places and on a larger scale, were at that 
juncture an ingenious invention, for the purpose of 
extending the maritime arm of Athens to an inland city. 

The fii*st operations of Corinth however were not 
469-468 B.C. directed against Megara. The Athenians, having 
Yih **^ undertaken a landing in the territory of the 
against Halieis (the population of the southern Argolic 
^r nth, peninsula, bordering on Troezen and Hermione)^ 
Tou^*' ^' were defeated on land by the Corinthian and 
^f*th* Epidaurian forces: possibly it may have been 

^ginetans in this expedition that they acquired possession 
at sea. of Troezen, which we find afterwards in their 

dependance, without knowing when it became so. But in 
a sea-fight which took place off the island of Kekryphaleia 
(between ^gina and the Argolic peninsula) the Athenians 
gained the victory. After this victory and defeat, — neither 


of them apparently very dicisive, — the -/Eginetans began 
to take a more energetic part in the war, and brought out 
their full naval force together with that of their allies — 
Corinthians, Epidaurians, and other Peloponnesians: while 
Athens equipped a fleet of corresponding magnitude, 
summoning her allies also; though we do not know the 
actual numbers on either side. In the great naval battle 
which ensued off the island of -Angina, the superiority of 
the new nautical tactics acquired by twenty years' practice 
of the Athenians since the Persian war — over the old 
Hellenic ships and seamen, as shown in those states where 
at the time of the battle of Marathon the maritime strength 
of Greece had resided — was demonstrated by a victory 
most complete and decisive. The Feloponnesian and 
Dorian seamen had as yet had no experience of the improved 
seacraft of Athens, and when we find how much they 
were disconcerted with it even twenty-eight years after- 
wards at the beginning of the Feloponnesian war, we shall 
not wonder at its destructive effect upon them in this 
early battle. The maritime power of -^gina was irre- 
coverably ruined. The Athenians captured seventy ships 
of war, landed a large force upon the island, and commenced 
the siege of the city by land as well as by sea. i 

If the Lacedaemonians had not been occupied at home 
by the blockade of Ithome, they would have The Athe- 
been probably induced to invade Attica as a "**'*^ ^^' 
diversion to the -^ginetans; especially as the jEgina. 
Persian Megabazus came to Sparta at this time ''^^^Jj^?®' 
on the part of Artaxerxes to prevail upon them Epidau- * 
to do so, in order that the Athenians might be '^*°^! f *'• 
constrained to retire from Egypt. This Persian defeated 
brought with him a large sum of money, but ^^.*^®. 
was nevertheless obliged to return without under My- 
effecting his mission. 2 The Corinthians and 'Snides. 
Epidaurians however, while they carried to -^^ina a rein- 
forcement of 300 hoplites, did their best to aid ner farther 
by an attack upon Megara; which place, it was supposed, 
the Athenians could not possibly relieve without with- 
drawing their forces from -SlJgina, inasmuch as so many of 
their men were at the same time serving in Egypt. JBut 
the Athenians showed themselves equal to all these three 

' Thucyd. i. 106; LysiaS; Orat. Funebr. c. 10; Diodor. xi. 78. 
• Thucyd. i. 109. 



exigencies at one and the same time — to the great disap- 
pointment of their enemies. Myronides marched from 
Athens to Megara at the head of the citizens in the two 
extremes of military age, old and young; these heing the 
only troops at home. He fought the Corinthians near the 
town, gaining a slight, hut debateahle, advantage, which 
he commemorated by a trophy, as soon as the Corinthians 
had returned home. But the latter, when they arrived at 
home, were so much reproached by their own old citizens, 
for not having vanquished the refuse of the Athenian 
military force, i that they returned back at the end of 
twelve days and erected a trophy on their side, laying 
claim to a victory in the past battle. The Athenians, 
marching out of Megara, attacked them a second time, and 
gained on this occasion a decisive victory. The defeated 
Corinthians were still more unfortunate in their retreat; 
for a body of them, missing their road, became entangled 
in a space of private ground enclosed on every side by a 
deep ditch, and having only one narrow entrance. Myro- 
nides, detecting this fatal mistake, planted his hoplites at 
the entrance to prevent their escape, and then surrounded 
the enclosure with his light-armed troops, who with their 
missile weapons slew all the Corinthian hoplites, without 
possibility either of flight or resistance. The bulk of the 
Corinthian army eflFected their retreat, but the destruction 
of this detachment was a sad blpw to the city.^ 

Splendid as the success of the Athenians had been 
468-457 B.O. during this year, both on land and at sea, it was 
w V^°h * easy for them to foresee that the power of their 
tween ' enemies would presently be augmented by the 
Athens and LacedflBmonians taking the field. Partly on this 
projected*— account — partly also from the more energetic 
espoused by phase of democracy, and the long-sighted views 
oppc^sed 'by of Perikles, which were now becoming ascendent 
Kiraon— po- iii the City — the Athenians began the stupendous 
tentfon^s^ai Undertaking of connecting Athens with the sea 
Athens— by means of long walls. The idea of this measure 
oTthrLong h*d doubtless been first suggested by the recent 
Walls. erection of long walk, though for so much smaller 

* Lysias, Orat. Funebr. c. 10. the old men of their own city were 

ivlxu>v ftoty6{«.cvoi atcvoav tiI)v S6va(jiiv to indignant against them on their 

Tir)v ixslvtuv Tot< ^if\ diccip7)x6ai xal return, is highly charao eristic of 

Toi< oljrit«tf Suvai&ivO'Ci Ac. Grecian manners— xaxiC6|i.tvoi 6ic6 

The incident mentioned byThu- tu>v iv t^ r.oXtx icpS9[)u-;ip<]>v, Ac 

eydidfts about the Corinthians, that * TLu- yd. i. 106. itdOoc fiiya touto 


a distance^ between Megara and Kissea: for without such 
an intermediate stepping-stone, the project of a wall forty 
stadia («=»about 4Vi Engl, miles) to join Athens with 
Peirseus, and another wall of thirty-five stadia ( = nearly 
4 Engl, miles) to join it with Phalerum, would nave ap- 
peared extravagant even to the sanguine temper of Athe- 
nians — as it certainly would have seemed a few years earlier 
to ThemistoklSs himself. Coming as an immediate sequel 
of great recent victories, and while ^gina, the great Dorian 
naval power, was prostrate and under blockade, it excited 
the utmost alarm among thePeloponnesians — being regard- 
ed as the second great stride, i at once conspicuous and of 
lasting effect, in Athenian ambition, next to the fortification 
of Peiraeus. 

But besides this feeling in the bosom of enemies, the 
measure was also interwoven with the formidable conten- 
tion of political parties then going on at Athens. Kimon 
had been recently ostracised; and the democratical move- 
ment pressed by Perikles and Ephialtes (of which more 
presently) was in its full tide of success; yet not without 
a violent and unprincipled opposition on the part of those 
who supported the existing constitution. Now the long 
walls formed a part of the foreign policy of Perikles, con- 
tinuing on a gigantic scale the plans of Themistokles when 
he first schemed the Peiraeus. They were framed to render 
Athens capable of carrying on war against any superiority 
of landed attack, and of bidding defiance to the united force 
of Peloponnesus. But though thus calculated for contingen- 
cies which a long-sighted man might see gathering in the 
distance, the new walls were, almost on the same grounds, 
obnoxious to a considerable number of Athenians : to the 
party recently headed by Kimon, who were attached to the 
Jjacedsemonian connexion, and desired above all things to 
maintain peace at home, reserving the energies of the state 
for anti-Persian enterprise : to many landea proprietors in 
Attica, whom they seemed to threaten with approaching 
invasion and destruction of their territorial possessions: to 

KopivOioi^ cYtvcTO. Compare Diodor. pov ra (Jiaxpa ox^aat Ttlx'")'^' ^^^ 

xi. 78, 79— whose chronology how- language addressed by the Gorin- 

ever is very misleading. thians to the Spartans, in refer- 

' Kal Ttuv&s 0|jicl< atxtoi, t6 tt ence to Athens, a little before 

icpu>-cov cdaavTtc a^Touc ttjv icdXiv the Peloponnesian wax (Thucyd. 1. 

|i.tta xa MY^dtxd xpatuvai, xal Sstt- 69;* 


the rich men and aristocrats of Athens, averse to a still 
closer contact and amalgamation with the maritime multi- 
tude in Peiraeus: lastly, perhaps, to a certain vein of old 
Attic feeling, which might look upon the junction of Athens 
with the separate demes of Peirseus and Phalerum as 
effacing the special associations connected with the holy 
rock of Athene. When to all these grounds of opposition, 
we add, the expense and trouhle of the undertaking itself, 
the interference with private property, the peculiar violence 
of party which happened then to be raging, and the absence 
of a large proportion of military citizens in Egypt — we 
shall hardly be surprised to find that the projected long 
walls brought on a risk of the most serious character both 
for Athens and her democracy. If any farther proof were 
wanting of the vast importance of these long walls, in the 
eyes both of friends and of enemies, we might find it in the 
fact that their destruction was the prominent mark of 
Athenian humiliation after the battle of ^gospotami, and 
their restoration the immediate boon of Phamabazus and 
Xonon after the victory of Knidus. 

Under the influence of the alarm now spread by the 
Expedition proceedings of Athens, the Lacedaemonians were 
of the prevailed upon to undertake an expedition out 

nSSfs^Tnto* o^ Peloponnesus, although the Helots in Ithome 
Boeotia were not yet reduced to surrender. Their force 
Itore^the' consisted of 1 500 troops of their own, and 1 0,000 
ascendency of their various allies, under the regent Niko- 
of Thebes. • n^g^^g^ rphe ostensible motive, or the pretence, 
for this march, was the protection of the little territory 
of Doris against the Phokians, who had recently invaded 
it and taken one of its three towns. The mere approach 
of so large a force immediately compelled the Phokians to 
relinquish their conquest, but it was soon seen that this 
was only a small part of the objects of Sparta, and that 
her main purpose, under instigation of the Corinthians, was, 
to arrest the aggrandisement of Athens. It could not es- 
cape the penetration of Corinth, that the Athenians might 
presently either enlist or constrain the towns of Boeotia 
into their alliance, as they had recently acquired Megara, 
in addition to their previous ally Plataea: for the Boeotian 
federation was at this time much disorganised, and Thebes, 
its chief, had never recovered her ascendency since the dis- 
credit of her support lent to the Persian invasion. To 


strengthen Thebes and to render her ascendency effective 
over the Boeotian cities, was the best way of providing a 
neighbour at once powerful and hostile to the Athenians, 
so as to prevent their farther aggrandisement by land: it 
was the same policy as Epaminondas pursued eighty years 
afterwards, in organising Arcadia and Messene against 
Sparta. Accordingly the Peloponnesian force was now 
employed partly in enlarging and strengthening the forti- 
fications of Thebes herself, partly in constraining the other 
Boeotian cities into effective obedience to her supremacy; 
probably by placing their governments in the hands of 
citizens of known oligarchical politics, ^ and perhaps banish- 
ing suspected opponents. To this scheme the Thebans lent 
themselves with earnestness ; promising to keep down for 
the future their border neighbours, so as to spare the 
necessity of armies coming from Sparta. 2 

But there was also a farther design, yet more import- 
ant, in contemplation by the Spartans and Corinthians. 
The oligarchical opposition at Athens were so intention 
bitterly hostile to the Long Walls, to Perikles, o' the 
and to the democratical movement, that several army *n 
of them opened a secret negotiation with the Boeotia to 
Peloponnesian leaders ; inviting them into Attica, Athens^ 
and entreating their aid in an internal risins and sustain 
for the purpose not only of putting a stop to the nian oii^" 
Long Walls, but also of subverting the demo- garchic^ii 
cracy. The Peloponnesian army, while prose- JJJg^' ^J^' 
cuting its operations in Boeotia, waited in hopes the Long 
of seeing the Athenian malcontents in arms, and ^*^^8- 
encamped at Tanagra on the very borders of Attica for the 
purpose of immediate cooperation with them. The juncture 
was undoubtedly one of much hazard for Athens, especially 
as the ostracised Kimon and his remaining friends in the 
city were suspected of being implicated in the conspiracy. 
But the Athenian leaders, aware of the Lacedaemonian 
operations in Boeotia, knew also what was meant by the 
presence of the army on their immediate borders — and 

■ Diodor. xii. 81 ;' Jnstin, ili. 6. tia. lomewhere about this time, 

T^c fASv TU)v 6r)[)alu>v ii6Xcu>< }A.siCo;a full ai they were of internal dis- 

t6v icepif)oXov xaTsoxtuotoav, Ta< 6' sension, that the dictum and simile 

•V BoKuTia ic6X«i; ^vdYxaaav Onotax- of Perikles allude— which Ari- 

TtoBai To't< 6if]3aloic. stotle notices in his Bhetorio. iii. 

' Diodor. 1. c. It must probably 4, 2. 
be to the internal affairs of Boeo- 


took decisive measures to avert the danger. Having ob* 
tained a reinforcement of 1000 Argeians and some Thes- 
salian horse, they inarched out to Tanagra, with the full 
Athenian force then at home ; which must of course have 
consisted chiefly of the old and the young, the same who 
had fought under Myr6nides at Megara; for the blockade 
of jEffina was still going on. Nor was it possible for the 
Lacedsemonian army to return into Peloponnesus without 
fighting; for the Athenians, masters of the Megarid, were 
in possession of the difficult high lands of Geraneia, the 
Battle of road of march along the isthmus; while the 
TanaRra Athenian fleet, by means of the harbour of 
of the* Pegse, was prepared to intercept them if they 
Athenian!, tried to come by sea across the Krisssean Gulf, 
by which way it would appear that they had come out. 
if ear Tanagra a bloody battle took place between the two 
armies, wherein the Lacedaemonians were victorious, chiefly 
from the desertion of the Thessalian horse who passed over 
to them in the very heat of the engagement. ^ JBut though 
the advantage was on their side, it was not sufficiently de- 
cisive to favour the contemplated rising in Attica. Nor 
did the Peloponnesians gain anything by it except an 
undisturbed retreat over the high lands of Geraneia^ after 
having partially ravaged the Megarid. 

Though the battle of Tanagra was a defeat, yet there 
were circumstances connected with it which rendered its 
Effects of effects highly beneficial to Athens. The ostra- 
the battle— cised Kimon presented himself on the field, as 

behariour ^^^^ *® *^® army had passed over the boundaries 
of Kimon of Attica, requesting to be allowed to occupy 
recalled ^^^ station as a hoplite and fight in the ranks of 
from ostra- his tribe — the (EnSis. But such was the belief, 
•""*• entertained by the members of the senate and 

by his political enemies present, that he was an accomplice 
in the conspiracy known to be on foot, that permission was 
refused and he was forced to retire. In departing he con- 
jured his personal friends, Euthippus (of the deme Ana- 
phlystus) and others, to behave in such a manner as might 
wipe away the stain resting upon his fidelity, and in part 
also upon theirs. His friends retained his panoply and 
assigned to it the station in the ranks which he would him- 
self have occupied: they then entered the engagement with 

* Thucyd. i. 107. 


desperate resolution and one hundred of them fell side by 
side in their ranks. Porikles, on his part, who was present 
among the hoplites of his own tribe the Akamantis, aware 
of this application and repulse of Kimon, thought it incum- 
bent upon him to display not merelyhis ordinary personal cour- 
age, but an unusual recklessness of life and safety, though it 
happened that he escaped unwounded. All these incidents 
brought about a generous sympathy and spirit of compro- 
mise among the contending parties at Athens; while the 
unshaken patriotism of Kimon and his friends discounten- 
anced and disarmed those conspirators who had entered 
into correspondence with the enemy, at the same time that 
it roused a repentant admiration towards the ostracised 
leader himself. Such was the happy working of oompro- 
this new sentiment that a decree was shortly mise and 
proposed and carried — proposed too by Perikles tion^be-**" 
himself — ^to abridge the ten years of Kimon's tween the 
ostracism, and permit his immediate return. * i^rs^and*^" 
"We may recollect that under circumstances parties at 
partly analogous, Themistokles had himself pro- ■^***®^"- 
posed the restoration of his rival AristeidSs from ostracism, 
a little before the battle of Salamis:^ and in both cases, 
the suspension of enmity between the two leaders was 

Sartly the sign, partly also the auxiliary cause, of reconci- 
ation and renewed fraternity among the general body of 
citizens. It was a moment analogous to that salutary im- 
pulse of compromise, and harmony ofparties, which follow- 
ed the extinction of the Oligarchy of Four Hundred, forty- 
six years afterwards, and on which Thucydides dwells empha- 
tically as the salvation of Athens in her distress — a moment 
rare in free communities generally, not less than among the 
jealous competitors for political ascendency at Athens. 3 

^ Plutarch, Kimon, e. 14; Peri- of fear at that juncture, and that 
kl68, c. 10. Plutarch represents the the recall of Kimoin proceeded from 
Athenians as having recalled Ki- quite different feelings. Moreover 
men Arom fear of the Lacedsemo- the peace with Sparta was not 
nians who had just beaten them made till some years afterwards, 
at Tanagra, and for the purp6se * Plutarch, Themistoklds, o. 10. 
of procuring peace. He adds that * Plutarch, Kimon, c. 17 ; Peri- 
Kimon obtained peace for them kids, o. 10; Thuoyd. yiii. 07. Plu- 
forthwith. Both these assertions tarch observes, respecting this re- 
are Incorrect. The extraordinary conciliation of parties after the 
successes in Boeotia, which fol- battle of Tanagra, after having 
lowed so quickly after the defeat mentioned that PerikUs himself 
at Tanagra, show that the Athe- proposed the restoration of Ki^ 
nians were under no impressions mon— 


So powerful was this burst of fresh patriotism and 
unanimity after the battle of Tanagra, which produced the 
recall of Kimon and appears to have overlaid the pre- 
existing conspiracy, that the Athenians were quickly in a 
condition to wipe off the stain of their defeat. It was on 
the sixty-second day after the battle that they undertook 
an aggressive march under Myr6nides into Boeotia: the 
B.o. 466. extreme precision of this date — being the single 
Victory of case throughout the summary of events between 
^ined b*y ^^® Persian and Peloponnesian wars wherein 
the Athe- Thucydid^s is thus precise — marks how strong 
acquire*a8? an impressiou it made upon the memory of the 
cendency Athenians. At the battle of CEnophy ta, engaged 
BoBotfa^ against the aggregate Theban and Boeotian 
Phokiijand forces — or, if CiodoruB is to be trusted, in two 
Lokris. battles, of which that of CEnophyta was the last 
— Myr6nides was completely victorious. The Athenians 

OuTu> Tixt icoXtTixal ftcv ^aav at change take place? T6v icpu>Tov 

8ta«popal, fAttptot St oi Oupiol xal icp6c )rp6vov can hardly apply to the 

TO xo(,v6v tOavaxX^jTOi oufxcpspov, f) 8s whole remaining term of the war, 

'fiXoTifxla TCoivcwv tTcixpaxouoa tu>v as if this improved constitution 

itaOu>v TOic T^^ naxpifio^ bict^uDpsi had been first subverted by the 

xalpoi^. triumph of the oligarchy under the 

Which remarks are very i^nalog* Thirty, and then superseded by 
ous to those of Thucydidds in re- the restoration of the old demo- 
counting the memorable proceed- cracy after their overthrow. Tet 
ings of the year 411 B.C., after the Xenophon mentions no inter- 
deposition of the oligarchy of mediate change in the government 
Four Hundred (Thucyd. viii. 97). between the beginning of his his- 

Kal ot>x ^x^v^a ^ '^^v icpu>TOv ^p6- tory and the end of the war," Ac. 

vov till Y< iH-oV 'A6T)vaioi 9atvovTai I think that the words to icoXi- 

tu icoXtTcoaavTtc* {AtTpla y&p ^ tc i^ TcuaavTC^ are understood by Dr. 

Tooc 6XIyouc xal xobi icoXXou< ^oy- Arnold in a sense too special and 

xpaot< c7ivsT0, xal tx icovr,p(I>v tu>v limited— as denoting merely the 

Kpoii[[iLixit>t Y*vopitvu>v TouTo icpu>Tov uow constitution, or positive or- 

dviQvcYxc Tf)v ic6Xiv. Dr. Arnold says ganic enactments, which the Athe- 

in his note — "It appears that the nians now introduced. It appears 

constitution as now fixed was at to me that the words are of wider 

first J in the opinion of Thucydi- import; meaning the general tem- 

dds, the best that Athens had ever per of political parties both re- 

.enjoyed within his memory; that .ciprocally towards each other and 

is, the best since the complete as- towards the commonwealth; their 

cendency of the democracy effect- inclination to relinquish anti- 

ed under Periklds. But how long pathies, to accommodate points of 

a period is meant to be included difference, and to cooperate with 

by the words t6v itpcuxov ypo'to-tf each other heartily against the 

and when and how did the implied enemy, suspending those I6la« 91- 


became masters of Thebes as well as of the remaining Boe- 
otian towns : reversing all the arrangements recently made 
by Sparta — establishing democratical governments — and 
forcing the aristocratical leaders, favourable to Theban as- 
cendency and Lacedaemonian connexion, to become exiles. 
Nor was it only Boeotia which the Athenians thus acquired: 
Phokis and Lokris were both successively added to the list 
of their dependent allies — the former being in the main 
friendly to Athens and not disinclined to the change, while 
the latter were so decidedly hostile that one hundred of 
their chiefs were detained and sent to Athens as hostages. 
The Athenians thus extended their influence — maintained 
through internal party-management, backed by the dread 
of interference from without in case of need — from the 
borders of the Corinthian territory, including both Megara 
and PegsB, to the strait of Thermopylae. * 

These important acquisitions were soon crowned by the 
completion of the Long Walls and the conquest of JSgina. 
That island, doubtless starved out by its protrac- ^q 455 
ted blockade, was forced to capitulate on condi- Completion 
tion of destroying its fortifications, surrender- wails— **°^' 
ing all its ships of war, and submitting to annual conquest of 
tribute as a dependent ally of Athens. The ^^ich^U 
reduction of this once powerful maritime city disarmed, 
marked Athens as mistress of the sea on the »„ "Je'i!-^''' 
Peloponnesian coast not less than on the -^gean. dered 
Her admiral Tolmides displayed her strength *'**>'**»'y- 
by sailing round Peloponnesus, and even by the insult of 
burning the Lacedaemonian ports of Methone andof Gyth- 
ium. He took Chalkis, a possession of the Co- rpj^^ ^^the- 
rinthians, and Naupaktus belonging to the nians frst 
Ozolian Lokrians, near the mouth of the Corinth- peioponne- 
ian Gulf — disembarked troops near Sikyon, s us— their 
with some advantage in a battle against oppo- iJuTe*"*^* 
nents from that town — and either gained or Gulf of 
forced into the Athenian alliance not only ^o"*****- 

XoTifxlac, ISlac 8iaf)oXa^ ictpl xij^ tou form a part of what is commended 

Srj}j.ou irpoaxaolac (ii. 65) noticed as by Thucydidds : but his commen- 

having been so mischievous before, dation is not confined to them 

Of course any constitutional ar- specially. Compare the phrase ii. 

rangements introduced at such a 38. tXsu9ipu>< 6s xd xt icpoc x6 xot- 

period would partake of the mo- v6v iroXix86o|i.2v, Ac. 

derate and harn^onious spirit then * Thucyd. i. ICS; Diodor. xi. 81| 

prevaleutj aud would therefore 82, 


Zakyntbus and KephallSnia, but also some of tbe towns of 
Achaia; for we afterwards find these latter attached to 
Athens without knowing when the connexion began. ^ 
During the ensuing year the Athenians renewed their 
attack upon Sikyon, with a force of 1 000 hoplites under 
Perikles himself, sailing from the Megarian harbour of 
Pegse in the Krissaean Gulf. This eminent man, however, 
gained no greater advantage than Tolmides — defeating the 
Sikonyan forces in the field and driving them within their 
walls. He afterwards made an expedition into Akamania, 
taking the Achaean allies in addition to his own forces, but 
miscarried in his attack on (Eniadae and accom« 
plished nothing. Nor were the Athenians more 
successful in a march undertaken this same year against 
Thessaly, for the purpose of restoring Orestes, one of the 
exiled princes or nobles of Fharsalus. Though they took 
with them an imposing force, including their Soeotian and 
Fhokian allies, the powerful Thessalian cavalry forced 
them to keep in a compact body and confined them to the 
ground actually occupied by their hoplites: while all their 
attempts against the city failed, and their hopes of inter- 
nal rising were disappointed. 3 

Had the Athenians succeeded in Thessaly, they would 
Defeat and have acquired to their alliance nearly the whole 
th^Ath' ^^ extra-Peloponnesian Greece. But even 
nians iu without Thossaly their power was prodigious, 
^ffypt* and had now attained a maximum height from 

which it never varied except to decline. As a counter- 
balancing loss against so many successes, we have to 
reckon their ruinous defeat in Egypt, after a war of six 
years against the Persians (b.c. 460-455). At first they 
nad gained brilliant advantages, in conjunction with the 
insurgent prince Inards ; expelling the Persians from all 
Memphis except the strongest part called the White 
Fortress. And such was the alarm of the Persian king 
Artaxerxes at the presence of the Athenians in Egypt, 
that he sent Megabazus with a large sum of money to 
Sparta, in order to induce the Lacedaemonians to invade 
Attica. This envoy however failed, and an augmented 
Persian force, being sent to Egypt under Megabyzus, son 
ofZopyrus,3 drove the Athenians and their allies, after 

^ • Thucjrd. i- 108-115; Diodor. xi. 84. « Thucyd. i 111} Diodor. xi. 85- 

* Hecodot. iiL 160. 


an obstinate struggle, out of Memphis into the island of 
the Nile called Prosopitis. Here they were blocked up 
for eighteen months, until at length Megabyzus turned the 
arm of the river, laid the channel dry, and stormed the 
island by land. A very few Athenians escaped by land to 
Xyrene : the rest were either slain or made captive, and 
Inaros himself was crucified. And the calamity of Athens 
was farther aggravated by the arrival of fifty fresh Athe- 
nian ships, which, coming after the defeat, but without 
being aware of it, sailed into the Mendesian branch of the 
Nile, and thus fell unawares into the power of the Per- 
sians and Phoenicians; very few either of the ships or men 
escaping. The whole of Egypt became again subject 
to the Persians, except Amyrtseus, who contrived by re- 
tiring into the inaccessible fens still to maintain his in- 
dependence. One of the largest armaments ever sent 
forth by Athens and her confederacy was thus utterly 
ruined. * 

It was about the time of the destruction of the Athe- 
nian army in Egypt, and of the circumnavigation b.o. 466. 
of Peloponnesus by Tolmides, that the internal "^^^ '?- 

• J 1. J. i_ X J • -J- volted He- 

war, carried on by the ijacedsBmonians against lots u La- 
the Helots or Messenians at Ith6m^, ended. f<>J»*» «»p*- 
These besieged men, no longer able to stand out leave the 
against a protracted blockade, were forced to country, 
abandon this last fortress of ancient Messenian independ- 
ence, stipulating for a safe retreat from Peloponnesus 
with their wives and families; with the proviso that if any 
one of them ever returned to Peloponnesus, he should 
become the slave of the first person who seized him. They 
were established by Tolmides at Naupaktus (recently taken 
by the Athenians from the Ozolian Lokrians),^ where they 
will be found rendering good service to Athens in the 
following wars. 

After the victory of Tanagra, the Lacedaemonians made 
no farther expeditions out of Peloponnesus for several 
succeeding years, not even to prevent Boeotia and Phokis 

> Thucyd. i. 104, 109,110; Diodor. granted hj the Persian generals-^ 
zi. 77 ; zii. 3. The story of Dio- is contradicted hy the total rain 
dorns in the first of these two pas- which he himself states to hare 
sages — that most of the Athenian befallen them In the latter pas- 
forces were allowed to come back sages, as well as by Thuoydidds. 
tinder a favourable capitulation * Thucyd. i. 103; Diodor. xi. 84. 



Paki II. 

from being absorbed into the Athenian alliance. The reason 
Truce for ^^ *^^® remissness lay, partly, in their general 
five years character; partly, in the continuance of the siege 
bStween^^ of lth6m§, which Occupied them at home; but 
Athens and stiU more, perhaps, in the fact that the Atheni* 
daSnonians *^^> masters of the Megarid, were in occupation 
through the of the road over the high lands of Geraneia, 
Khnon** °' *"^ could therefore obstruct the march of any 
Fresh expe- army out from Peloponnesus. Even after the 
surrender of Ith6me, the Lacedaemonians re- 
mained inactive for three years, after which 
time a formal truce was concluded with Athens 
B.O. 466-452. ^y ^^® Peloponnesians generally, for five years 
longer. * This truce was concluded in a great 
degree through the influence of Kimon,2 who 
was eager to resume effective operations against the Per- 
sians; while it was not less suitable to the political interest 
of Perikles that his most distinguished rival should be 
absent on foreign service, 3 so as not to interfere with his 

ditions of 

B.C. 452-447. 

» Thucyd. 1. 112. 

* Theopompus, Fragm. 92, ed. 
Didot; Plutarch, Kimon, c. 18; 
Diodor. xi. 86. 

It is to be presumed that this is 
the peace which ^schinds (De Fals. 
Legat. c. 64. p. 300) and Andokidds 
(De Pace. c. 1) state to have been 
made by Miltiadta son of Kimon, 
proxenus of the Lacedaemonians ; 
assuming that Miltiadds son of 
Kimon is put by them, through 
lapse of memory, for Kimon son 
of Miltiadds. But the passages of 
these orators involve so much both 
of historical and chronological in- 
accuracy, that it is unsafe to cite 
them, and impossible to amend 
them except by conjecture. Mr. 
Fynes Clinton (Fasti Hellen. Ap. 
pendix, 8. p. 267) has pointed out 
some of these inaccuracies; and 
there are others besides, not less 
grave, especially in the oration 
ascribed to Andokidfts. It is re- 
markable that both of them seem 
to recognise only (too long walls, 
the northern and the southern wall ; 

whereas in the time of Thucydidds 
there were three long walls: the 
two near and parallel, connecting 
Athens with Peiraeus, and a third 
connecting it with Phaldrum. This 
last was never renewed, after all 
of them had been partially de- 
stroyed at the disastrous close of 
the Peloponnesian war: and it ap- 
pears to have passed out of the 
recollection of ^schinds, who 
speaks of the two walls as they 
existed in his time. 

* Plutarch, Periklfts, c 10, and 
Beipublic. Gerend. Prcecep. p. 812. 

An understanding to this effect 
between the two rivals is so natural 
that we need not resort to the sup- 
position of a secret agreement 
concluded between them through 
the mediation of Elplnikd sister of 
Kimon, which Plutarch had read 
in some authors. The charms as 
well as the intrigues of ElpMikA 
appear to have figured..«oiispicu- 
ously in the memoirs of Athenian 
biographers: they wer« employed 
by one party as a means of calum- 


influence at home. Accordingly Kimon, having equipped 
a fleet of 200 triremes from Athens and her confederates, 
set sail for Cyprus, from whence he despatched sixty ships 
to Egypt, at the request of the insurgent prince AmyrtaBUS, 
who was still maintaining himself against thePersiansamidst 
the fens — while with the remaining armament Death of 
he laid siege to Kitium. In the prosecution of Kimon at 
this siege, he died either of disease or of a wound, victories of 
The armament, under his successor Anaxikrat^s, the Atheni- 

, V J /• ± tf . . ' an fleet— it 

became so embarrassed lor want oi provisions, returns 
that they abandoned the undertaking altogether, home, 
and went to fight the Phoenician and Kilikian. fleet near 
Salamis in Cyprus. They were here victorious, first on 
sea and afterwards on land, though probably not on the 
same day, as at the Eurymedon; after which they returned 
home, followed by the sixty ships which had gone to Egypt 
for the purpose of aiding Amyrtseus.* 

From this time forward no farther operations were 
undertaken by Athens and her confederacy ^^ ^ 
against the Persians. And it appears that a expedition! 
convention was concluded between them,whereby ^L***®^ 
the Great King on his part promised two things : against 
To leave free, undisturbed, and untaxed, the Persia - 

A . .. ...' /^ -t . !• . convention 

Asiatic mavitime Greeks, not sending troops concluded 
within a given distance of the coast: To refrain between 
from sending any ships of war either westward 
of Phaselis (others place the boundary at the Chelidonean 
islands, rather more to the westward) or within the Kyanean 
rocks at the confluence of the Thracian Bosphorus with 
the Euxine. On their side the Athenians agreed to leave 
him in undisturbed possession of Cyprus and Egypt, 
Kallias, an Athenian of distinguished family, with some 
others of his countrymen, went up to Susa to negotiate 
this convention: and certain envoys from Argos, then in 
alliance with Athens, took the opportunity of going thither 
at the same time,, to renew the friendly understanding 

oiating Kimon, hj the other for also to gain these two victories, 
discrediting Periklfts. But the authority of Thucydidds, 
' Thucyd. i.ll2; Diodoms, xii. 13. superior on every ground to Dio* 
Diodorus mentions the name of the dorus, is more particularly superior 
general Anaxikratds. He affirms as to the death of Kimon, with 
farther that Kimon lived not only whom he was connected by rela- 
te take Kitium and Mallus, but tionship. 




Pab* n. 

which' their city had established with Xerxes at the period 

of his invasion of Greece, ^ 

As is generally the case with treaties after hostility— 

Hiiukes this convention did little more than recognise 
the existing state of things, without introducing 
any new advantage or disadvantage on either 
side, or calling for any measures to be taken in 
consequence of it. We may hence assign a 

raised as to reasonable irround for the silence of ThucydidSs, 

iti bistori- v j ® . j.» xi. x- 

cai reality, who does not even notice the convention as 
having been made : we are to recollect always 
that in the interval between the Persian and 
Peloponnesian wars, he does not profess to do 
more than glance briefly at the main events. 
But the boastful and inaccurate authors of the 
ensuing century, orators, rhetors, and historians, indulged 
in so much exaggeration and untruth respecting this con- 
vention, both as to date and as to details — and extolled us 
something so glorious the fact of having imposed such hard 
conditions on the Great King — that they have raised a 
suspicion against themselves. Especially, they have 
occasioned critics to ask the very natural question, how 
this splendid achievement of Athens came to be lefb un- 
noticed by Thucydides? Now the answer to such question 
is, that the treaty itself was really of no great moment: it 
is the state of facts and relations implied in the treaty, and 
existing substantially before it was concluded, which con- 
stitutes the real glory of Athens. But to the later writers. 

and exag- 
this con- 

of those 
confirm a- 
tory hints 
of Thucy- 

> Herodot. vii. 151 ; Diodor. xii. 
8, 4 ; Demosthenes (De Falsa Legat. 
c. 77, p. 428 B. : compare De Bho- 
dior. Libert, c. 13, p. 199) speaks 
of this peace as tijv &ic6 icdvxtov 
OpuXXouiA-ivYiv elp-^vTiv, Compare Ly- 
kurgus cont. Leokrat. o. 17, p. 187 ; 
Isokratds (Panegyr. c. S3, 34, p. 
244; Areopagitic. c. 87, pp. 160, 
229; Panathenaic. c 20, p. 860). 

The loose language of these ora^ 
tors makes it impossible to deter- 
mine what was the precise limit 
in respect of -vicinity to the coast, 
Isokratds is careless enough to 
talk of the river Halys as the 
boundary; Demosthends states it 

as "a day's course for a horse." 

The two boundaries marked by 
sea, on the other hand« are both 
clear and natural, in reference to 
the Athenian empire— tb« Kyaauean 
rooks at one end — Phaselis or the 
Chelidonean islands (there is no 
material distance between these 
two last-mentioned places) on the 

Dahlmann, at the end of his Die* 
sertation on the reality of this 
Kimonian peace, collects the va- 
rious passages of authors wh«rehi 
it is mentioned: among them are 
several out of the rhetor AristeidAe 
(Forschungen, p. 140-148). 



the treaty stood forth as the legible evidence of facts which 
in their time were past and gone: while Thucydides and 
his contemporaries, living in the actual fulness of the 
Athenian empire, would certainly not appeal to the treaty 
as an evidence, and might well pass it over even as an event, 
when studying to condense the narrative. Though Thu- 
cydides has not mentioned the treaty, he says nothing 
which dispioves its reality, and much which is in full 
harmony with it. For we may show even from him, — 1. 
That all open and direct hostilities between Athens and 
Persia ceased, after the last mentioned victories af the 
Athenians near Cyprus: that this island is renounced by 
Athens, not being included by^Thucydides in his catalogue 
of Athenian allies prior to the Peloponnesian war;* and 
that no farther aid is given by Athens to the revolted 
Amyrtseus in Egypt. 2. That down to the time when the 
Athenian power was prostrated by the ruinous failure at 
Syracuse, no tribute was collected by the Persian satraps 
in Asia Minor from the Greek cities on the coast, nor were 
Persian ships of war allowed to appear in the waters of 
iEgean,2 nor was the Persian king admitted to be sovereign 

• Thucyd. ii. 14. promises of aid — sicigYSTO xal oTio- 

* Thucyd. viii. 6, 6, 66. As this aa^lpvr]^ too? IliXoTCOvvrjoiou? xal 
is a point on which very erroneous OitivyvstTo Tpo(p7)v icsps^eiv. Tub 
representations have been made by ()oc9tXsu)< yop vcwoxi exuYx^'^- 
some learned critics, especially by icaicp^aY|xivo< rob^ ex t^c iiutou vpyr^z 
Dahlmann and Manso (see the treat- 96pouc, ou; Si* 'ABvivaiouc aico tu>v 
ises cited in the subsequent note, *£X.Xt]v18u)v tc6Xeu>v oCi SuvdifLSvoc 
p. 196), I transcribe the passage of itpdooeoOai tnuxp tlX7)os. To6< rt 
Thucydidds. He is speaking of the ouv ^dpou? }A.aXXov ivofti^e KOfAitia- 
winter of b.o. 412, immediately Oat, xaxiuoa? too? 'AOTjvaiou?, xal 
succeeding the ruin of the Athe- &p,a fiaoiXai ^ufxpid^rouc AaxsSatf*o- 
nian army at Syracuse, and after re- vlou? itoti^^ttv, Ac. In the next 
doubled exertions bad been making chapter, Thucydides tells us that 
(even some months before that the satrap Fharnabazus wanted to 
ruin actually took place) to excite obtain Lacedaemonian aid in the 
active hostile proceedings against same manner as Tissaphemes for 
Athens from every quarter (Thn- his satrapy also, in order that he 
cydid. vii. 25): it being seen might detach the Greek cities from 
that there was ft promising Athens and be able to levy the 
opportunity for striking a heavy tribute upon them. Two Greeks 
blow at the Athenian power. The go to Sparta, sent by Phamabazus, 
satrap Tissaphemes encouraged Sru>< vau« xo}A.l9ciav i^ tot *CXXig9- 
the Chians and Erythrseans to re- hovtov, xal autoc, el S6vatT0 &nep 
▼olt, sending an envoy along with 6 Tio9a9ipvi]c icpo6QupitiTO, rAi ti 
them to Sparta with persna'sions and iv t^ iautou dpxi ic^Xcic 'AOr^vaUov 

VOL, V. O 

194 HI8T0BT OF GBEECE. Past n 

of the country down to the coast. Granting, therefore, that 
we were even bound, from the silence of Thucydides, to 

aro9TiQ9tis -Side Tot)< 96pouc, xal when Athens was In fall powef. 
d<p* iauT«u f)a9tXtt tt)v ^ufjifta/lav We learn from these passages 
Tu>v Aaxefiatpiovltuv icotiQacts. two raluable facts. 1. That the 
These passages (strange to say) maritime Asiatic cities belonging 
are considered hy Manso and Dahl- to the Athenian empire paid no 
mann as showing t^at the Grecian tribute to Susa, from the date of 
cities on the Asiatic coast, though the full organization of the Athen- 
subject to the Athenian empire, ian confederacy down to a period 
continued nevertheless to pay their after the Athenian defeat in Sicily, 
tribute regularly to Susa. To mev 2. That nevertheless these cities 
the passages appear to disprove always continued, throughout this 
this very supposition ; they show period, to stand rated in the Persian 
that it was essential for the satrap king^s books each for its appro- 
to detach these^ cities &om the priate tribute; the court of Susa 
Athenian empire, as a means of waiting for a convenient moment 
procuring tribute from them to to occur, when it should be able 
Persia: that the Athenian empire, to enforce its demands, from mis- 
while it lasted, prevented him from fortune accruing to Athens, 
getting any tribute from the cities This state of relations, between 
subject to it. Manso and Dahl- the Asiatic Greeks and the Persian 
mann have overlooked the import- court under the Athenian empire, 
ant meaning of the adverb of time authenticated by Thucydidds, en- 
vetuorl— ''lately." By that word ables us t6 explain a passage of He- 
Thucydidds expressly intimates rodotus, on which also both Manso 
that the court of Susa had only and Pahlmann have dwelt (p. 94) 
recently demanded from Tissapher- with rather more apparent plans!- 
nes and Fharnabazus, tribute from bility, as proving their view of the 
the maritime Greeks within their case. Herodotui|, after describing 
satrapies: and he implies that until there-arrangemen^ andre-measiue^ 
recently no 8%ieh demand had been ment of the territories of the lonle 
made upon them. The court of cities by the satrap Artaphernet 
Susa, apprised doubtless by Grecian (about 493 B.C. after the suppression 
exiles and agents of the embarrass- of the Ionic revolt), proceeds to 
ments into which Athens had fallen, state that he assessed the tribute 
conceived this a suitable moment of each with reference to this new 
for exacting tributes, to which measurement, and that the assess- 
doubtless it always considered it- ment remained unchanged until 
self entitled, though the power of his own (Herodotus's) time— xoil 
Athens had compelled it to forego xdc X'^P^^ 09cu)v fjcsxpi^aac xatit 
them. Accordingly the demand was icapaadYYa^ •••• <p6pou< sTa^g ixi* 
now for the first time sent down to axoioi, ot xaTa x'^P'^l^ 6iateXiou«t 
Tissaph^neSy and he '^became a S^ovcsc ex xouxou tou ypo^Q aUi in 
debtor for them" to the court (tica>- x«l «c eH-s, u>« eTd^^aav e€ 'Apt«» 
9slX)}(r€), until he could collect cpspvso^* exd^rOTjaav 6s o)re8ov xavA 
them: which he could not at first xa auxa xa xat icpoxepov tXyot (vi. 
do, even then, embarrassed as 42). Now Dahlmann and Manso 
Athens was — and which, d fortiori, contend that Herodotus here afiirms 
be could not have done before, the tribute of the Ipnio citiet to 


infer that no treaty was concluded, we should still be 
obliged also to infer, from his positive averments, that a 
^tate of historical fact, such as the treaty acknowledged 
and prescribed, became actually realized. But when we 
reflect farther, that Herodotus ^ certifies the visit of Kallias 
and other Athenian envoys to the court of Susa, we can 
assign no other explanation of such visit so probable as 
the reality of this treaty. Certainly no envoys would have 
gone thitner during a state of recognized war; and though 
it may be advanced as possible that they may have gone 
with the view to conclude a treaty, and yet not have 
succeeded — this woujd be straining the limits of possibility 
beyond what is reasonable. 2 

Persia to havo been continuously on the Asiatic coast paid no tri- 

and regularly paid down to his bute to Persia during the conti- 

own time. But in my judgement nuance of the Athenian empire, 

this is a mistake; Herodotus speaks But if there -were no such positive 

iu>t about the payment, but about proof, I should still maintain the 

the ataessment : and these were two same opinion. For if these Greeks 

very different things, as Thucydidds went on paying tribute, what is 

dearly intimates in the passage meant by the phrases, of their ha- 

which I have cited above. The ving "revoWed from Persia," of their 

Msessmeni of all the Ionic cities ''having been liberated from the king" 

in the Persian king's books re- (oi dTcouTAvTS? (iaoiXstoc "EXX-ijve^— 

mained unaltered all through the oi anb 'Ituvtac xai *£XXt]otc6vtou ^St) 

Athenian empire; but the payment d^soTTjxiTec dno ^aoiXsiuc— Sooi dicb 

vas not enforced until immediately ^aoiXiux vstuoTt i^XeuGiptuvTo. Thu- 

befoie 412 B.C., when the Athenians oyd. i. 18, 89, 95)? 

were supposed to be too weak to So much respecting the payment 

binder it. It it evident by the of tribute. As to the other point 

neeottnt of the general Persian re- —that between 477 and 412 b.o., no 

▼eniiM, throughout all the satra- Persian ships were tolerated along 

piet^ which we find in the third the coast of Ionia, which coast, 

bo(^ of Herodotus, that he had though claimed by the Persian 

aooees to official accounts of the king, was not recognised by the 

Persian finances, or at least to Greeks as belonging to him — proof 

€^eek secretaries who knew those will be found in Thuoyd. viii. 56: 

aceeunts. He would be told that compare Diodor. iv. 26. 

these assessments remained un- ^ Herodot. viii. 151. Diodorus 

changed from the time of Arta- also states that this peac^ was 

phernes downward: whether they concluded by Kallias the Athenian 

were realised or not was another (xii. 4). 

question, which the "books" would ^ I conclude, on the whole, in 

probably not answer, and which favour of this treaty as an histori* 

be might or might not know. cal fact — though sensible that some 

The passages above cited from of the arguments urged against it 

Thucydidds appear to me to afford are not without force. Mr. Mitford 

positive proof that the Greek cities and Dr. Thirlwall (ch. xvii. p. 474), 




Part U. 

We may therefore believe in the reality of this treaty 
between Athens and Persia, improperly called 
the Kimonian treaty: improperly, since not only 
was it concluded after the death of Kimon, but 
the Athenian victories by which it was imme- 
diately brought on, were gained after his death. 
Nay more — the probability is, that if Kimon had 
lived, it would not have been concluded at alL 
For his interest as well as his glory led him to prosecute 

d68, son of 
Kimon as 
leading op- 
ponent of 

afl well as Hanso and Dahlmann, 
not to mention others, have im- 
pugned the reality of the treaty: 
and the last-mentioned anthor par- 
ticularly has examined the case at 
length and set forth all the grounds 
of objection ; urging, among some 
which are really serious, others 
which appear to me weak and un- 
tenable (Manso, Sparta, yol. iii. 
Beylage, z. p. 471; Dahlmann, 
Forschungen auf dem Gebiete der 
Gesohichte, vol. i. Ueber den Ki- 
monischen Frieden, p. 1-148). Boeckh 
admits the treaty as an historical 

If we deny altogether the histo- 
rical reality of the treaty, we must 
adopt some such hypothesis as that 
of Dahlmann (p. 40):— "The distinct 
mention and averment of such a 
peace as having been formally con- 
cluded, appears to have first arisen 
among the schools of the rhetors 
at Athens, shortly after the peace 
of Antalkidas, and as an oratori- 
cal antithesis to oppose to that 

To which we must add the sup- 
position, that some persons must 
have taken the trouble to cause 
this fabricated peace to be engraved 
on a plUar, and placed either in 
the Metrdon or somewhere else in 
Athens among the records of Athe- 
nian glories. For that it was so 
engraved on a column is certain 
(Theopompus ap. Harpokration. 
'AxTixoK 7pi|A(«>a90* The suspicion 
started by Theopompus (and found- 

ed on the fact that the peace was 
engraved, not in ancient Attic, but 
in Ionic* letters — tbe latter sort 
having been only legalized in 
Athens after the archonsbip of 
Eukleid6s), that this treaty was a 
subsequent invention and not oa 
historical reality, does not weigh 
with me very much. Assuming the 
peace to be real, it would naturally 
be drawn up and engraved in the 
character habitually used among 
the Ionic cities of Asia Minor, 
since they were the parties most 
specially interested in it : or it might 
even have been re-engraved, seeing 
that nearly a century must have 
elapsed between the conclusion of 
the treaty and the time when Theo- 
pompus saw the pillar. I confess 
that the hypothesis of Dahlmann 
appears to me more improbable 
than the historical reality of the 
treaty. I think it more likely that 
there teas a treaty, and that the 
orators talked exaggerated and 
false matters respecting it — rather 
than that they fabricated the treaty 
from the beginning with a delibe- 
rate purpose, and with the false 
name of an envoy conjoined. 

Dahlmann exposes justly and for- 
cibly (an easy task indeed) the 
loose, inconsistent and vain-glori- 
ous statements of the orators re- 
specting this treaty. The chrono- 
logical error by which it was 
asserted to have been made shortly 
after the victories of the Euryme- 
don (and was thus connected with 



the war against Persia, since he was no match for his rival 
Perikles either as a statesman or as an orator, and could 
only maintain his popularity by the same means whereby 
he had earned it — victories and plunder at the cost of the 
Persians. His death ensured more complete ascendency 
to Perikles, whose policy and character were of a cast 
altogether opposite: ' while even Thucydides, son of Mele- 
sias, who succeeded Kimon his relation as leader of the 
anti-Periklean party, was also a man of the senate and 
public assembly rather than of campaigns and conquests. ^^^^^ 
Averse to distant enterprises and precarious acquisition^/'^^^v 
Perikles was only anxious to maintain unimpaired ^"he 
Hellenic ascendency of Athens, now at its very maximum. 
He was well aware that the undivided force and vigilance 
of Athens would not be too much for this object — nor did 
they in fact prove sufficient, as we shlwl presently see. 
With such dispositions he was naturally glad to conclude 
a peace, which excluded the Persians from all the coasts 
of Asia Minor westward of the Chelidoneans, as well as 
from all the waters of the JEgean, under the simple con- 
dition of renouncing on the part of Athens farther ag- 
gressions against Cyprus, Phoenicia, Kilikia, and Egypt. 
The Great King on his side had had sufficient experience 
of Athenian energy to fear the consequences of such ag- 
gressions, if prosecuted. He did not lose much by relin- 
quishing formally a tribute which at the time he could have 
little hope of realizing, and which of course he intended 
to resume on the first favourable opportunity. Weighing 
all these circumstancesi we shall find that the peace,. 

the name of Kimon'), is one of the firom Thucydidds: on tliis point 

circumstances which have most Diodorus speaks equivooally, but 

tended to discredit the attesting rather giving it to be understood 

witnesses : but we must not forget that Kimon lived to complete the 

that Ephorus (assuming that Dio- whole, and then died of sickness, 

dorus in this case copies Ephorus, The absurd exaggeration of Iso- 

which is highly probable— xii. 3, kratSs, that the treaty bound the Per* 

4) did not fall into this mistake, sian kings not to come westward 

but placed the treaty in its right of the river Halys, has also been 

chronological place, after the Athe- very properly censured. He makes 

niau expedition under Kimon this statement in two different 

against Cyprus and Egypt in 450- orations (Areopagitic. p. 150; Fana- 

449 B.C. Kimon died before the thenaic. p. 462). 

great results of this expedition ' Plutarch, Perikles, c. 21-28. 
were consummated, as we know 


improperly called Kimoniaiiy results naturally from the 
position and feelings of the contracting parties. 

Athens was now at peace both abroad and at home, 
B.o. 449. under the administration of PeriklSs, with a 
Se'com. **' great empire, a great fleet, and a great accumu- 
mon fund lated treasure. The common fund collected 
collide- from the contributions of the confederates, and 
Tftcy txom originally deposited at Delos, had before this 
Athens!— timebecu transferred to the acropolis at Athens. 
Oraduai At what precise time such transfer took place, 
fh"con-**' ^® cannot state. Nor are we enabled to assign 
tederacy the succcssive stagcs whereby the confederacy, 
Athenian chiefly with the freewill of its own members, 
empire. became transformed from a body of armed and 
active warriors under the guidance of Athens, into dis- 
armed and passis^e tribute-payers defended by the military 
force of Athens :^ from allies free, meeting at Delos, and 
self-determining — into subjects isolated, sending their an- 
nual tribute, and awaiting Athenian orders. But it would 
appear that the change had been made before this time. 
Some of the more resolute of the allies had tried to secede, 
but Athens had coerced them by force, and reduced them 
to the condition of tribute-payers without ships or defence. 
Chios, Lesbos, and Samos were now the only allies free and 
armed on the original footing. Every successive change 
of an armed ally into a tributary — every subjugation of a 
seceder — tended of course to cut down the numbers, and 
enfeeble the authority, of the Delian synod. And what 
was still worse, it altered the reciprocal relation and feelings 
both of Athens and her allies — exalting the former into 
something like a despot, and degrading the latter into mere 
passive subjects. 

Of course the palpable manifestation of the change 
Transfer must have been the transfer of the confederate 
of the fund from Delos to Athens. The only circum- 

pMpo8?d stance which we know respecting this transfer 
by the is, that it was proposed by theSamians^ — the 

am ans. gecond power in the confederacy, inferior only to 
Athens, and least of all likely to favour any job or sinister 
purpose of the Athenians. It is farther said that when 
the Samians proposed it, Aristeides characterised it as* a 
motion unjust, out useful: we may reasonably doubt, 

> Plutarch, Arigteid«i, o. 25, 


however, whether it was made during his lifetime. "When 
the synod at Delos ceased to be so fully attended as to com- 
mand respect — when war was lighted up not only with 
Persia, but with -^gina and Peloponnesus — the Samians 
might not unnaturally feel that the large accumulated fund, 
with its constant annual accessions, would be safer at Athens 
than at Delos, which latter island would require a per- 
manent garrison and squadron to ensure it against attack. 
But whatever may have been the grounds on which the 
Samians proceeded, when we find them coming forward to 
propose the transfer, we may fairly infer that it was not 
displeasing, and did not appear unjust, to the larger 
members of the confederacy; and that it was no high-handed 
and arbitrary exercise of power, as it is often called^ on the 
part of Athens. 

After the conclusion of the war with -Sgina, and the 
Consequences of the battle of (Enophyta, the Position of 
position of Athens became altered more and ^uh^J 
more. She acquired a large catalogue of new numerotig 
allies, partly tributary, like -^gina — partly in Joth^oV 
the same relation as Chios, Lesbos, and Samos; inland and 
that is, obliged only to a conformity of foreign SJ5b. 
policy and to military service. In this last category were 
Megara, the Boeotian cities, the Phokians, Lokrians, &c. 
All these, though allies of Athens, were strangers to 
Delos and the confederacy against Persia; and accord- 
ingly that confederacy passed insensibly into a matter of 
history, giving place to the new conception of imperial 
Athens with her extensive list of allies, partly free» partly 
subject. Such transition, arising spontaneously out of the 
character and circumstances of the confederates them- 
selves, was thus materially forwarded by the acquisitions 
of Athens extraneous to the confederacy. She was now 
not merely the first maritime state in Greece, but perhaps 
equal to Sparta even in land-power — possessing in her 
alliance Megara, Bceotia, Phokis, Lokris, together with 
Achsea and Troezen in Peloponnesus. Large as this aggre- 
gate already was, both at sea and on land, yet the mag- 
nitude of the annual tribute, and still more the character 
of the Athenians themselves, superior to all Greeks in 
that combination of energy and discipline which is the 
grand cause of progress, threatened still farther increase. 
Occupying the Megarian harbour of Pegae, the Athenians 


had full means of naval action on both sides of the Corinth- 
ian Isthmus: but what was of still greater importance 
to them, by their possession of the Megarid and of the 
high lands of Geraneia, they could restrain any land-force 
from marching out of Peloponnesus, and were thus (con- 
sidering besides their mastery at sea) completely unassail- 
able in Attica. 

Ever since the repulse of Xerxes, Athens had been 
advancing in an uninterrupted course of power and 
prosperity at home, as well as of victory and ascendency 
abroad — to which there was no exception except the 
ruinous enterprise in £gypt. Looking at the position of 
Greece therefore about 488 b.c., — after the conclusion of 
the five years' truce between the Peloponnesiansand Athens, 
and of the so-called Kimonian peace between Persia and 
Athens, — a discerning Greek might well calculate upon 
farther aggrandisemeut of this imperial state as the tend- 
ency of the age. And accustomed as every Greek was 
to the conception of separate town-autonomy as essential 
to a freeman and a citizen, such prospect could not but' 
inspire terror and aversion. The sympathy of the Pelo- 
ponnesians for the islanders and ultra-maritime states, who 
constituted the original confederacy of Athens, was not. 
considerable. But when the Dorian island of -/Egina was 
subjugated also, and passed into the condition of a defence- 
less tributary, they felt the blow sorely on every ground. 
The ancient celebrity, and eminent service rendered at the 
battle of Salamis, of this memorable island, had not been 
able to protect it; while those great JEginetan families, 
whose victories at the sacred festival-games Pindar cele- 
brates in a large proportion of his odes, would spread the 
language of complaint and indignation throughout their 
numerous "guests" in every Hellenic city. Of course, the 
same anti- Athenian feeling would pervade those Pelopon- 
nesian states who had been engaged in actual hostility 
with Athens — Corinth, Sikyon, Epidaurus, &c., as well as 
Sparta, the once-recognised head of Hellas, but now tacitly 
degraded from her preeminence, baffled in her projecte 
respecting Boeotia, and exposed to the burning of her port 
at Gythium without being able even to retaliate upon 
Attica. Putting all those circumstances together, we may 
comprehend the powerful feeling of dislike and apprehen- 
sion now diffused so widely over Greece against tho 


upstart despot-city; whose ascendeDcy, newly acquired, 
maintained by superior force, and not recognised as legi- 
timate — threatened nevertheless still farther increase. 
Sixteen years hence^ this same sentiment will be found 
exploding into the Peloponnesian war. But it became 
rooted in the Greek mind during the period which, we 
have now reached, when Athens was much more formid- 
able than she had come to be at the commencement of 
that war. We can hardly explain or appreciate the ideas 
of that later period, unless we take them as handed down 
from the earlier date of the five years' truce (about 451- 
446 B.C.). 

Formidable as the Athenian empire both really was 
and appeared to be, however, this wide-spread commence- 
feeling of antipathy proved still stronger, so meut of re- 
that instead of the threatened increase, the I!!!^?* *"? 

, . , , ' ^ -I' ' ,' decline of 

empire underwent a most material diminution, power to 
This did not arise from the attack of open -^.thens. 
enemies; for during the five years* truce, Sparta undertook 
only one movement, and that not against Attica: she sent 
troops to Delphi, in an expedition dignified with the name 
of the Sacred War — expelled the Phokians, who had as- 
sumed to themselves the management of the temple — and 
restored it to the native Delphians. To this the Athenians 
made no direct opposition: out as soon as the Lacedaemo- 
nians were gone, they themselves marched thither and 
placed the temple again in the hands of the Phokians, who 
were then their allies. * The Delphians were members of 
the Phokian league, and there was a dispute of old standing 
as to the administration of the temple — whether it belonged 
to them separately or to the Phokians collectively. The 
favour of those wno administered it counted as an element 
of considerable moment in Grecian politics; the sympathies 
of the leading Delphians led them to embrace the side of 
■ Sparta, but the Athenians now hoped to counteract this 
tendency by means of their preponderance in Phokis. We 
are not told that the Lacedaemonians took any ulterior step 
in consequence of their views being frustrated by Athens 
— a significant evidence of the politics of that day. 

The blow which brought down the Athenian empire 
from this its greatest exaltation was struck by the subjects 
themselves. The Athenian ascendency over Boeotia, Phokis, 

' Thudyd. i. 112: compare Philochor. Fragm. 88, ed. Didot. 



Lokris, and Euboea, was maintained, not by means of gar- 
B.o. 447. risons, but through domestic parties favourable 
Kevoit of to Athens, and a suitable form of government-^ 
from just in the same way as Sparta maintained her 

d *?*^'"f iiifluence over her Peloponnesian allies. * After 
the Athe- the victory of (Enophyta, the Athenians had bro- 
nians at ^ ken up the governments in the Boeotian cities 
they evaca- established by Sparta before the battle of Ta* 
ate BoBotia. nagra, and converted them into democracies at 
Thebes and elsewhere. Many of the previous leading men 
had thus been sent into exile: and as the same process had 
taken place in Phokis and Lokris, there was at this time a 
considerable aggregate body of exiles, Boeotian, Phokian, 
Lokrian, Euboean, JQginetan, &c., all bitterly hostile- to 
Athens, and ready to join in any attack upon her power. 
"We learn farther that the democracy 2 established at Thebes 
after the battle of (Enophyta was ill-conducted and dis- 
orderly; which circumstance laid open Boeotia still farther 
to the schemes of assailants on the watch for every weak 

These various exiles, all joining their forces and con- 
certing measures with their partisans in the interior, suc- 
ceeded in mastering Orchomenus, Chaeroneia, and some 
other less important places in Bceotia. The Athenian 
general Tolmides marched to expel them, with 1000 Athe- 
nian hoplites and an auxiliary body of allies. It appears 
that this march was undertaken in haste and rashness. 
The hoplites of Tolmides, principally youthful volunteers 
and belonging to the best families of Athens, disdained the 
enemy too much to await a larger and more commanding 
force: nor would the people listen even to Porikles, when 
he admonished them that the march would be full of hazard., 
and adjured them not to attempt it without greater numbers 
as well as greater caution. 3 Fatally indeed were his pre- 

* Thucyd. i. 19. Aaxs6ai|jL6vioi, ' Plutarch, PerikUs, c. 38; al«o 

o^x OitotsXsi^ IxovTsc 96pou touc his comparison between Perikl6s 

^Ufxfxdyou^, xax* oXtYap^riav 6e o^piaiv and Fabius Maximns, c. 3. 

auToic (xovov eTcttiQSslioc S7:u>cicoX.iTs6- Kleinias, father of the celebrated 

eouai SspxiteOovTCc — the same also Alkibiadds, was slain in this 

i. 76>144. battle: he had served thirty-three 

a Aristotel. Politic. ▼. 2, 6. Kotl years before at the sea-fight of 

4v 6ig3**? fJiSTo TT|v 4v Oivotp'JTOi? Artcmisium : he cannot therefore 

piaj^iQv, xax(b< itoXiTSUO|i.ivu>V} 7] 87](io- be numbered among the youthful 

xpaxla fiit^QdpT]* warriors, though a person of the 


tlictions justified. Though Tolmid^s was successful in his 
first enterprise — the recapture of Chseroneia, wherein he 
placed a garrison — yet in his march, probably incautious 
and disorderly, when departing from that place, he was 
sui^rised and attacked unawares, near Kordneia, by the 
united body of exiles and their partisans. No defeat in 
Q-recian history was ever more complete or ruinous. Tol- 
mid^ himself was slain, together with many of the Athenian 
hoplites, while a large number of them were taken prisoners. 
In order to recover these prisoners, who belonged to the 
best families in the city, the Athenians submitted to a con-> 
vention whereby they agreed to evacuate Boeotia altogether. 
In all the cities of that country the exiles were restored, 
the democratical government overthrown, and Boeotia was 
transformed from an ally of Athens into her bitter enemy. » 
Long indeed did the fatal issue of this action dwell in the 
memory of the Athenians, 2 and inspire them with an 
apprehension of Boeotian superiority in heavy armour on 
land. But if the hoplites under Tolmides had been all slain 
on the field, their death would probably have been avenged 
and Boeotia would not have been lost-— whereas in the case 
of living citizens, the Athenians deemed no sacrifice too 
great to redeem them. We shall discover hereafter in 
the Lacedsemonians a feeling very similar, respecting their 
brethren captured at Sphakteria. 

The calamitous consequences of this defeat came upon 
Athens in thick and rapid succession. The ^.o. 445. 
united exiles, having carried their point in Revolt of 
Boeotia, proceeded to expel the philo-Athenian LokriJ' 
government both from Phokis and Lokris, and Eubosa' and 
to carry the flame of revolt into Euboea. To JJ^ISoii of 
this important island Perikles himself proceeded Attica by 
forthwith, at the head of a powerful force; but ponn^ians 
before he had time to complete the reconquest, under the 
he was summoned home by news of a still more Ji^lf *king* 
formidable character. The Megarians had re- Pieiitoa- 
volted from Athens. By a conspiracy previously "*** 
planned, a division of hoplites from Corinth, Slkyon, and 
Epidaurus, was already admitted as garrison into their 

first rank (Plutarch, Alkibiad. c. 1). Boeotia: it remained in connexion 

' Thucyd. i. 113; Diodor. xii. 6. with Athens as intimately as be- 

Platsea appears to have been con- fore, 

sidered as quite dissevered from * Xenophon. Memorabil. iii. 6^ 4. 


city: the Athenian soldiers who kept watch over the lon^ 
walls had been overpowered and slain, except a few who 
escaped into Jthe fortified port of Kissea. As if to make 
the Athenians at once sensible how seriously this disaster 
affected them, by throwing open the road over Geraneia — 
Pleistoanax king of Sparta was announced as already on 
his march for an invasion of Attica. He did in truth con- 
duct an army, of mixed Lacedaemonians and Peloponnesian 
allies, into Attica, as far as the neighbourhood of Eleusis 
and the Thriasian plain. He was a very young man, so 
that a Spartan of mature years, Kleandrides, had been 
attached to him by the Ephors as adjutant and counsellor. 
Perikles (it is said) persuaded both the one and the other, 
by means of large bribes, to evacuate Attica without 
advancing to Athens. "We may fairly doubt whether they 
had force enough to adventure so far 4nto the interior, and 
we shall hereafter observe the great precautions with 
which Archidamus thought it necessary to conduct his 
invasion, during the first year of the Peloponnesian war, 
though at the head of a more commanding force. Never- 
theless, on their return, the Lacedaemonians, believing that 
they might have achieved it, found both of them guilty of 
corruption. Both were banished : Kleandrides never came 
back, and Pleistoanax himself lived for a long time in 
sanctuary near the temple of Athene at Tegea, until at 
length he procured his restoration by tampering with the 
Pythian priestess, and by bringing her bought admonitions 
to act upon the authorities at Sparta. *■ 

So soon as the Lacedaemonians had retired from 
Euboea re- Attica, Perikles returned with his forces to 
conquered Euboea, and reconquered the island completely, 
by PerikUs. 'With that caution which always distinguished 
him as a military man, so opposite to the fatal rashness of 
Tolmides, he took with him an overwhelming force of fifty 
triremes and 5000 hoplites. He admitted most of the 
Euboean towns to surrender, altering the government of 
Chalkis by the expulsion of the wealthy oligarchy called 
the Hippobotae. But the inhabitants of Histiaea at the 
north of the island, who had taken an Athenian merchant- 
man and massacred all the crew, were more severely dealt 
with — the free population being all or in great part ex* 

• Thucyd. i. 114; r. 16} Plutarch, PerikUs, c. 23. 


pelled; and the land distributed among Athenian klerucha 
or out-settled citizens. ^ 

Yet the reconquest of Euboea was far from restoring 
Athens to the position which she had occupied Humiiia- 
before the fatal engagement of Koroneia. Her tion and 
land-empire was irretrievably gone, together ency°of 
with her recently acquired influence over the Athens.— 
Delphian oracle; and she reverted to her former of the'thirrr 
condition of an exclusively maritime potentate, years' truce. 
For though she still continued to hold Nisaea I^o^J™/'''" 
and PegBB, yet her communication with the Athenian 
latter harbour was now cut off by the loss of p°^®' 
Megara and its appertaining territory, so that she thus 
lost her means of acting in the Corinthian Gulf, and of 
protecting as well as of constraining her allies in Achaia. 
Nor was the port of Kissea of much value to her, discon- 
nected from tne city to which it belonged, except as a post 
for annoying that city. 

Moreover, the precarious hold which she possessed 
over unwilling allies had been demonstrated in a manner 
likely to encourage similar attempts among her maritime 
subjects; attempts which would now be seconded by 
Peloponnesian armies invading Attica. The fear of such 
a combination of embarrassments, and especially of an 
irresistible enemy carrying ruin over the flourishing terri- 
tory round Eleusis and Athens, was at this moment 
predominant in the Athenian mind. We shall find Perikles, 
at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war fourteen years 
afterwards, exhausting all his persuasive force, and not 
succeeding without great difficulty, in prevailing upon his 
coontryraen to endure the hardship of invasion — even in 
defence of their maritime empire, and when events had 
been gradually so ripening as to render the prospect of 
war familiar, if not inevitable. But the late series of mis- 
fortunes had burst upon them so rapidly and unexpectedly, 
as to discourage even Athenian confidence, and to render 
the prospect of continued war full of gloom and danger. 
The prudence of Perikles would doubtless counsel the 
surrender of their remaining landed possessions or alliances, 
which had now become unprofitable, in order to purchase 
peace. But we may be sure that nothing short of extreme 
temporary despondency could have induced the Athenian 

* Thuoyd. i. lU; Plutarch, PerikUs, c. 28; Diodor. xii. 7. 

206 HI8T0BY OF QBEEGE. Pxbt H. 

assembly to listen to such advice; and to accept the inglorious 
peace which followed. A truce for thirty years was con- 
cluded with Sparta and her allies, in the beginning of 
445 B.C., whereby Athens surrendered Nissea, P^gae, Achaia, 
and Troezen — ^thus abandoning Peloponnesus altogether,^ 
and leaving the Megarians (with their full territory and 
their two ports) to be included among the Peloponnesian 
allies of Sparta. 

It was to the Megarians, especially, that the altered 
„ ^ ^ position of Athens after this truce was owing: 
tween it was their secession from Attica and junction 

Athens and ^jth the Peloponnesians, which laid open Attica 
®^*'** to invasion. Hence arose the deadly hatred on 
the part of the Athenians towards Megara, manifested 
during the ensuing years — a sentiment the more natural, as 
Mogara had spontaneously sought the alliance of Athens 

* Thacyd. i. 114, 115 ; ii. 21 ; Bio- Mr. Clinton seemi to me to allow 

dor. xii. 6. I do not at all doubt a longer interval thiin is probable : 

that the word Achaia here used I incline to think that the revolt 

means the country in the north of Eubcda and Megara followed 

part of Peloponnesus, usually more closely upon the disasters in 

known by that name. The suspi- Bceotia, in spite of the statement 

cions of Goller and others, that it of archons given by Diodorus: ou 

means, not this territory, but some noXXtp usTspov, the expression of 

unknown town, appear to me quite Thucydidds, means probably no 

unfounded. Thucydidds had never more than three or four months; 

noticed the exact time when the and the whole series of events 

Athenians acquired Achaia as a were evidently the product of one 

dependent ally, though he notices impulse. The truce having been 

the Achnans (i. Ill) in that capa- concluded in the beginning of 446 

city. This is one argument, among B.a, it seems reasonable to place 

many, to show that we must be the revolt of Euboea and Megara, 

cautious in reasoning from the si- as well as the invasion of Attica 

lence of Thucydidds against the by Pleistoanax, in 446 B.C.— and 

reality of an event — in reference the disasters in Boeotia either in 

to this period between the Persian the beginning of 446 B.C., or the 

and Peloponnesian wars, where hie close of 447 B.C. 

whole summary is so brief. It is hardly safe to assume, more- 

In regard to the chronology of over (as Mr. Clinton does ad 

these events, Mr. Fynes Clinton ann. 450, as well as Dr. Thirlwall, 

remarks, "The disasters in Boeotia Hist. Or. ch. xvii. p. 478), that the 

produced the revolt of Eubosa and five years* truce must have been 

Megara about eighteen months actually expired before Pleistoa- 

»fter, in Anthestftrion 445 B.C.; and nax and the Lacedaemonians in- 

the Peloponnesian invasion of At- vaded Attica: the thirty years* 

tica, on the expiration of the five truce, afterwards concluded, did 

years* ttruce" (ad ann. 447 B.c.)» not run out its full time* 


a few years before as a protection against the Corinthians, 
and had then afterwards, without any known ill-usage on 
the part of Athens, broken off from the alliance and become 
her enemy, with the fatal consequence of rendering her 
vulnerable on the land-side. Under such circumstances 
we shall not be sui*prised to find the antipathy of the Athe- 
nians against Megara strongly pronounced, insomuch that 
the system of exclusion which they adopted against her 
was among the most prominent causes of the Pelopon- 
nesian war. 

Having traced what we may call the foreign relations 
of Athens down to this thirty years' truce, we must notice 
the important internal and constitutional changes which 
she had experienced during the same interval 





The period which we have now passed over appears to 
have been that in which the democratical cast of Athenian 
public life was first brought into its fullest play and de- 
velopment, as to judicature, legislation, and administration. 
The great judicial change was made by the methodical 
_. . ^ . distribution of a large proportion of the citizens 
lishment mto distmct judicial divisions, by the great 

of the de- extension of their direct agency in that depart- 
in ocraticai , jT_xi. • J./* i. r 
judicial ment, and by the assignment of a constant pay 

system at to every citizen so engaged. It has been already 
mentioned, that even under the democracy of 
Kleisthenes, and uotil the time succeeding the battle of 
Platsea, large powers still remained vested both in the in- 
dividual archons and in the senate of Areopagus (which 
latter was composed exclusively of the past archons after 
their year of office, sitting in it for life); though the check 
Union exercised by the general body of citizens, assem- 

in the same Wq^ for law-making in the Ekklesia and for 
functions judging in the Helisea, was at the same time mate- 
^Vi^ *?"**" rially increased. We must farther recollect, 
and judicial that the distinction between powers administra- 
Ath*'^L ^^^^ ^^^ judicial, so highly valued among the 
great"* more elaborate governments of modern Europe, 
powers of sincethepolitical speculations of the lastcentury, 
strat™*f as was in the early history of Athens almost un- 
well as of known. Like the Roman kings, > and the Roman 
of Are^o- consuls before the appointment of the Praetor, 
pagus. the Athenian archons not only administered, but 

also exercisedjurisdiction,voluntary as well as contentious 

■ See K. F. Hermann, Grieohisobe sches Privatrecht, pp. 26, 408. Leips. 

Staatsalterthiimer, sect. 63-107, and 1836. M. Laboulaye also insists 

his treatise De Jure et Auctoritate particnlary upon the confusion of 

Magistratnum ap. Athen. p. 63 administrative and judiciary func> 

(Heidelb. 1829); also Bein, Bomi- tions among the Bomant (Essai 


— decided disputes, inquired into crimes, and inflicted 
punishment. Of the same mixed nature were the functions 
of the senate of Areopagus, and even of the annual senate 
of Five Hundred, the creation of Kleisthenes. The Strategic 
too, as well as the archons, had doubtless the double com- 
petence, in reference to military, naval, and foreign affairs, 
of issuing orders and of punishing by their own authority 
disobedient parties: the imperium of the magistrates, 
generally, enabled them to enforce their own mandates as 
well as to decide in cases of doubt whether any private 
citizen had or had not been guilty of infringement. Nor was 
there any appeal from these magisterial judgements: 
though the magistrates were subject, under the Kleis- 
thenean constitution, to personal responsibility for their 
general behaviour, before the people judicially assembled, 
at the expiration of their year of office — and to the farther 
Animadversion of the Ekklesia (or public deliberative 
assembly) meeting periodically during the course of that 
year: in some of which assemblies, the question might 
formally be raised for deposing any magistrate even before 
his year was expired, i Still, in spite of such partial checks, 

sur les Loix Criminelles des Ro- la justice et administroient les in>- 

maini, pp. 23, 79, 107, Ac). Com> t6r6t8 nationaux ou locaux dans 

pare Sir G. G. Lewis, Essay on una seule et m^me assembl^e: 

the Government of Dependencies, sous le regime f^odal, le roi ou 

p. 42, with his citation from Hugo, Pempereur dans son conseil, sa 

Geschichte des Romischen Rechts, cour, son parlement compos6 des 

p. 42. Sir G. Lewis has given just hauts barons ecclSsiastiques et 

and valuable remarks upon the laYcs, exergoit tous les droits de 

goodness of the received classifi- 80uverainet6 comme de justice: 

cation of powers as a theory, and dans lacommune, le bailli, mayeur, 

upon the extent to which the se- ou autre fonctionnaire aomm6 par 

paration of them either has been, le prince, administroient les im>- 

or can be, carried in practice: see t^r^ts communaux et jugeoient les 

also Note £. in the same work, bourgeois de Pavis de la eommu- 

p. 847. uaut6 entidre, des corporations 

The separation of administrative qui la composoient, on des auto- 

from judicial functions appears rit^ et eonseils qui la repc68ea»' 

unknown in early societies. M. toient: on n'avoit pas encore 

Meyer observes, respecting the soupQonnd que le jugement d'une 

judicial institutions of modern cause entre particuliers -piLi 6tr6 

Europe, *^Anciennement les fonc- 6tranger & la cause commune." — 

tions administratives et judiciaires Meyer, Esprit des Institutions Ju- 

n*Moient pas distinctes. Du temps diciaires, book v. chcup. 11, vol. 

de la liberty des Germains et mdme iii. p. 339; also chap. 1%. p. 883. 

long temps aprds, les plaids de la * A case of such deposition of 

nation ou ceuxdu comtA reAdoieut aa atchon <b<y vote of the publie 

VOL. v. F 

210 niSTOBY OF GBEBCB. Past n. 

the accumulation, in the same hand, of powers to administer, 
judge, punish, and decide civil disputes, without any other 
canon tnan the few laws then existing, and without any ap- 
peal — must have been painfully felt, and must have often led 
to corrupt, arbitrary, and oppressive dealing. And if this be 
true of individual magistrates, exposed to annual accounta- 
bility, it is not likely to have been less true of the senate of 
Areopagus, which, acting collectively, could hardly be 
rendered accountable, and in which the members sat for life, i 
I have already mentioned that shortly after the return 
of the expatriated Athenians from Salamis, Aristeides had 
been impelled by the strong democratical sentiment which 
he found among his countrymen to propose the abolition 
Ma istrat ^^ ^^^ pecuniary qualification for magistracies, 
gen^eraiiy^* SO as to render every citizen legally eligible, 
wealthy This innovation, however, was chiefly valuable 
garchicai SLB a victory and as an index of the predominiuit 
^Tth"^''*' sentiment. Notwithstanding the enlarged 
senate of promise of eligibility, little change probaily 
Areopagus took place in the fact, and rich men were still 
of^demo- most commouly chosen. Hence the magistrates, 
craticai possessing the large powers administrative and 

sentiment » j« • i t_ j -v j j xm xi. 

among the judicial abovc described — and still more the 
bulk of the senate of Areopagus, which sat for life — still 
ci izens. belonging almost entirely to the wealthier class, 
remained animated more or less with the same oligarchical 
interests and sympathies, which manifested themselves in 
the abuse of authority. At the same time the democratical 
sentiment among the mass of Athenians went on steadily 
increasing from the time of Aristeides to that of Perikles: 
Athens became more and more maritime, the population 
of Peiraeus augmented in number as well as in importance, 
and the spirit even of the poorest citizen was stimulated 

assembly, even before the year of cotintability could be practically 

office was expired, occurs in De- enforced against such a body, 

mosthends cont. Theokrin. c. 7 : They could only be responsible in 

another, the deposition of a stra* this sense— that if any one of their 

t6gus, in Bemosthen. cont. Timoth. number could be proved to have 

e. 3. received a bribe, he would be in* 

' JBschinds (cont* Ktesiphont. c. dividually punished. But in thin 

9. p; 373) speaks of the senate of sense the dikasteries them8«lve« 

Areopagus as (ticsuQuvoc, and so it would also be responsible : though 

was doubtless understood to be: it is always afftrmed of them that 

but it is difficult to see how ao- they were not responsible. 




by that collective aggrandisement of his city to which he 
himself individually contributed. Before twenty years had 
elapsed, reckoning from the battle of Plataea, this new 
fervour of democratical sentiment made itself felt in the 
political contests of Athens, and found able champions in 
Perikles and Ephialtes, rivals of what may be called the 
conservative party headed by Kimon. 

We have no positive information thai it was Perikles 
who introduced the lot, in place of election, for Poutioai 
the choice of archons and various other magis- ^^il\ ^^ 
trates. But the change must have been intro- feHkUs, 
duced nearly at this time, and with a view of ^^ ^J^ *- 
equalizing the chances of office to every candi- craticai : 
date, poor as well as rich, who chose to give in Kimon, ou- 
his name and who fulfilled certain personal and Sr 'eonser- 
family conditions ascertained in the dokimasy or vative. 
preliminary examination. But it was certainly to Perikles 
Mid Ephialtes that Athens owed the elaborate constitution 
of her popular Dikasteries or Jury-courts regularly paid, 
which exercised so important an influence upon the charac- 
ter of the citizens. These two eminent men deprived both 
the magistrates, and the senate of Areopagus, of all the 
judicial and penal competence which they had 5)^^^,^, ^. 
hitherto possessed, save and except the power cai di- 
of imposing a small fine. This judicial power, i^*8*«'io8 
civil as well as criminal, was transferred to courufcon- 
numerous dikasts, or panels of jurors selected p**^*f? ^^ 
from the citizens; 6000 of whom were annually and 
drawn by lot, sworn, and then distributed into S'^''**}J!*"* 
ten panels of 500 each; the remainder forming Dikasteries 
a supplement in case of vacancies. The magistrate, ^®'^ *'- 
instead of deciding causes or inflicting punish- '****^® 
ment by his own authority, was now constrained to impanel 
a jury — that is, to submit each particular case, which might 
call for a penalty greater than the small flne to which he 
was competent, to the judgement of one or other among 
these numerous popular dikasteries. Which of the ten he 
should take, was determined by lot, so that no one knew 
beforehand what dikastery would try any particular cause. 
The magistrate himself presided over it during the trial 
and submitted to it the question at issue, together with 
the results of his own preliminary examination; after which 
came the speeches of accuser and accused with the 

p 2 



statements of their witnesses. So also the civil judicature, 
which had hefore been exercised in controversies between 
man and man by the archons, was withdrawn from them 
and transferred to these dikasteries under the presidence 
of an archon. It is to be remarked, that the system of 
reference to arbitration, for private causes, * was extensively 
applied at Athens. A certain number of public arbitrators 
were annually appointed, to one of whom (or to some other 
citizen adopted by mutual consent of the parties), all 
private disputes were submitted in the first instance. If 
dissatisfied with the decision, either party might after- 
wards carry the matter before the dikastery; but it appears 
that in many cases the decision of the arbitrator was ao» 
quiesced in without this ultimate resort. 

I do not here mean to affirm that there never was any 
trial by the people before the time of Perikles and 
Ephialties. I doubt not that before their time the numerous 
judicial assembly, called Helisea, pronounced upon charges 
against accountable magistrates as well as upon various 
other accusations of public importance; and perhaps in 
some cases separate bodies of them may have been drawn 

* Bespeoting the procedure of etetse or arbitrators was unknown 

arbitration at Athens, and the pub- when Hudtwalcker^s book was 

lie as well as private arbitrators, published. An inscription since 

see the inatructiye treatise of Hudt- discovered by Professor Boss and 

walcker,UeberdieofFentliohen und published in his work, Ueber die 

Priyat-Schiedsrichter (Diaeteten) Bemen von Attika, p. 22, records the 

Bu Athen: Jena, 1812. names of all the Dioeteta for the 

Each arbitrator seems to hare year of the archon Antikl6s, B.C. 
•at alone to inquire into and de- S25, with the name of the tribe to 
cide disputes : he received a small which each belonged, 
fee of one drachma from both par- The total number is 104 : the 
ties; also an additional fee when number in each tribe is unequal: 
application was made for delay the largest number is in Eekropis, 
(p. 16).^ Parties might by mutual which furnishes, sixteen: thesmalf- 
eonsent fix upon any citizen to est in Gandionis, which sends only 
act as arbitrator: but there were three. They must have been either 
a certain number of public arbi- elected or drawn by lot from the 
trators, elected or drawn by lot general body of citizens, without 
from the citizens every year: and any reference to tribes. The ie^ 
a plaintiff might bring his cause scription records the names of the 
before any one of these. They were Disetetce for this year b.o. 325, in 
liable to be punished under sli9u- consequence of their being crown- 
vat, at the end of their year of ed or receiving a vote of thanks 
ofQce, if accused and convicted of from the people. The fragment 
corruption or unfair dealing. of a like inscription for the yeai 

The number of these public Di- b.o. 337, also exists. 


by lot for particular trials. But it is not the less true, 
that the systematic distribution and constant Pay to the 
employment of the numerous dikasts of Athens ?*^?'*" V^' 
cannot have begun before the age of these two and made 
statesmen, since it was only then that the »«g«i*'- 
practice of paying them began. For so large a sacrifice 
of time on the part of poor men, wherein M. Boeckh states ^ 
(in somewhat exaggerated language) that ^'nearly one 
third of the citizens sat as judges every day," cannot be 
conceived without an assured remuneration. From and 
after the time of Perikles, these dikasteries were the ex- 
clusive assemblies for trial of all causes civil as well as 
criminal, with some special exceptions, such as cases of 
homicide and a few others: but before his time, the greater 
number of such causes had been adjudged either by indi- 
vidual magistrates or by the senate of Areopagus. We 
may therefore conceive how great and important was the 
revolution wrought by that statesman, when he first 
organized these dikastic assemblies into systematic action, 
sam transferred to them nearly all the judicial power which 
had before been exercised by magistrates and senate. The 
position and influence of these latter became The magi- 
radically altered. The most commanding func- strates are 
tions of the archon were abrogated, so that he thS" jSdi^^ 
retained only the power of receiving complaints, ciai, and 
inquiring into them, exercising some small ?ri!im?nis- 
preliminary interference with the parties fqr trative 
the furtherance of the cause or accusation, fixing '**'*®*'®'*'- 
the day for trial, and presiding over the dikastic assembly 
by whom peremptory verdict was pronounced. His ad- 
ministrative functions remained unaltered, but his powers, 
inquisitorial and determining, as a judge, passed away.> 

* Public Economy of the Athe- See the more accurate remark of 

nfans, book ii. chap. xiv. p. 227, Schomann, Antiquit. Juris Public. 

Engl, transl. Grsecor., sect. Ixxi. p. 310. 

M. Boeckh must mean that the * Aristotel. Politic, ii. 9, 8. Kal 

v^ole 600*), or nearly the whole, xfjv {<.iv ev 'Apel<p tci-fip f)ouXi^v 

were employed every day. It ap- 'E^iiXxri^ ix6Xou9t xa\ TIspixX^c tqi 

pears to me tbat this supposition 8i Sixaari^pia )iio9o94p« xatiaxi^ot 

gtaatly overstates both the number [liptxX^;* xal touxov Si^ t6v xpAicov 

of days, and the number of men, {xaatoc tuiv 8v]|&ot7U)Yu>y icpoiJ^TaYtv, 

actually employed. For the infer- au^wv sU T7)v vuv ^vj^toxpaxiav. Oal- 

enee in the text, however, a much vstoti S' ou xatxi xiqv 26Xtt>vo< ytvia- 

smaller number is sufficient. Oaixouto icpoaipcoiv, aXXa {loiXXov 


In reference to the senate of Areopagus also, the 
Senate of changes introduced were not less considerable. 
— its'***^?' That senate, anterior to the democracy in -point 
qaity— ~ of date, and standing alone in the enjoyment of 
'i°**"'2ift * life-tenure, appears to have exercised an un- 
raoter— defined and extensive control which long con- 
large «ad tinuance had firadually consecrated. It was in- 
controlling vested With a kind of religious respect, and be- 
power. lieved to possess mysterious traditions ema- 

nating from a divine source, y Especially, the cognizance 
which it took of intentional homicide was a part of old 
Attic religion not less than of judicature. Though put in 
the background for a time after the expulsion of the 
Peisistratids, it had gradually recovered itself when 
recruited by the new archons under the Kleisthenean con- 
stitution; and during the calamitous sufferings of the Per- 
sian invasion, its forwardness and patriotism had been so 
highly appreciated as to procure for it an increased sphere 
of ascendency. Trials for homicide were only a small 
part of its attributions. It exercised judicial competence 
m many other cases besides: and what was of still greater 
moment, it maintained a sort of censorial police over the 
lives and habits of the citizens — it professed to enforce a 
tutelary and paternal discipline beyond that which the 
strict letter oi the law could mark out, over the indolent, 
the prodigal, the undutiful, and the deserters from old rite 
and custom^ To crown all, the senate of Areopagus also 
exercised a supervision over the public assembly, taking 

4ff6 ouf«.icTu>fi.«Toc. T^c vaucp^ia^ compare also cont. Timarchum, o. 

fap tv Totc M7)6ixoI< 6 S^fioc atTio^ 16, p. 41; Demosth. eont. Aristo* 

7<v6pL«vo< i^povvjpiaTioOv], xai $7))jLa- krat. c. 65, p. 641). Plutarch, So- 

YtDfOuc {Xa()s (pauXooc, avTiuoXiteuo- Ion, c. 19. ti)v avu> f)ouXiqv tictoxo- 

fiivwv TU)v enttixwv iicst 26Xu>v y* vov icavtu>v xal ^uXaxa xu>v v6' 

2oix< T^v «vaYxateTaTV)y diiio8tS6vai }<.tt>v Ae. 

tq) ^i&tf S6va)jLiv, TO Tttc ttpx^^ ^^* 'CSixaCov ouv el 'ApeoirfleyiTai letpl 

piloOai xai tuOuvctv |jiy)S4 fdp tootou icdvtUDv a^^Sov -tu)v ocpaXfidlTtuv xal 

K6ftoc u»v 6 S%«.oc, ftouXoc &v <(v)xal icapavOf«.tu>v, (u< &icavTdl f i)9tv 'AvSpo- 

icoXtfAio;. tUi>v iv npu>T^ xal ^iX6^op<K tv 

1 Deinarobus oont. Demosthen. Seuxspa xai tpir^ Tu>v'AT9i8a>v (Phi- 

Or. i. p. 91. (puXaxxet xac aitoppi^- lochorus, Fr. 17-58, ed. Didot, p. 19, 

Tou< 8t«9iQX9C> iv ale t& t^« iriXcu»c ^d. Siebelis). 

tfuoTifpia xcitai, Ac. 8o »lto iEschi- See about the Areopagus, 8oh6- 

nfts calls this senate tiqv oxuOptoicbv mann, Antiq. Jur. Att. seot. Izri.; 

xal Ttbv (xKY^o'^*''^ xupiav f)ouX^v K. F. Hermann. Ortecb. Btaatsal- 

(eont. Ktesiphont. e. 9, p. 373: terthiimer, seot. 109. 


care that none of the proceedings of those meetings should 
be snch as to infringe the established laws of the country. 
These were powers immense as well as undefined, not 
derived from any formal grant of the people, but having 
their source in immemorial antiquity and sustained by 
general awe and reverence. When we read the serious 
expressions of this sentiment in the mouths of the later 
orators — Demosthenes, -^chines, or Deinarchus — we shall 
comprehend how strong it must have been a century and 
a half before them, at the period of the Persian invasion. 
Isokrates, in his Discourse usually called Areopagiticus, 
written a century and a quarter after that invasion, draws 
a picture of what the senate of Areopagus had been while 
its competence was yet undiminished, and ascribes to it 
a power of interference little short of paternal despotism, 
which he asserts to have been most salutaiy and im- 
proving in its eifect. That the picture of this rhetor is in- 
accurate — and to a great degree indeed ideal, insinuating 
his own recommendations under the colour of past realities 
— is sufficiently obvious. But it enables us to presume 
generally the extensive regulating power of the senate of 
Areopagus, in aflFairs both public and private, at the time 
whicn we are now describing. 

Such powers were pretty sure to be abused. When 
we learn that the Spartan senate i was lament- Large 
ably open to bribery, we can hardly presume Jife^gJJate 
much better of the life-sitting elders at Athens, of Areopa- 
But even if their powers had been guided by f JJ'g^J ^^^^ 
all that beneficence of intention which Isokrates came in- 
affirms, they were in their nature such as could ^^jJh^tiT"* 
only be exercised over a passive and station- feelings of 
ary people: while the course of events at Athens, affeHh**^^ 
at that time peculiarly, presented conditions al- Per^an in- 
together the reverse. During the pressure of J^***°?' 
the Persian invasion, indeed, the senate of Areo- est and 
pagus had been armed with more than ordinary tendencies 
authority, which it had employed so creditably ing°up^at 
as to strengthen its influence and tighten its Athens. 
supervision during the period immediately following. But 
that same trial had also called forth in the general body of 
the citizens a fresh burst of democratical sentiment, and 
an augmented consciousness of force, both individual and 

' Ari.totel. Politic, ii. 6, 18. 


national. Here then were two forces, not only distinct 
but opposite and conflicting, both put into increased action 
at the same time.i Nor was this all: a novel cast was 
just then given to Athenian life and public habits by many 
different circumstances — the enlargement of the city, th© 
creation of the fortified port and new town of Peiraeus, the 
introduction of an increased nautical population, the active 
duties of Athens as head of the Delian confederacy, &e. 
All these circumstances tended to open new veins of hope 
and feeling, and new lines of action, in the Athenians be- 
tween 480-460 B*c., and by consequence to render the inter- 
ference of the senate of Areopagus, essentially old-fashioned 
and conservative as it was, more and more difficult. But 
at the very time when prudence would have counselled 
that it should have been relaxed or modified, the senate 
appear to have rendered it stricter, or at least to have 
tried to do so; which could not fail to raise against them 
a considerable body of enemies. Not merely the democrat- 
tical innovators^ but also the representatives of new inter- 
ests generally at Athens, became opposed to the senate as 

an organ of vexatious repression, employed for oligarchical 
purposes. 2 

From the character of the senate of Areopagus and 

Senate of the ancient reverence with which it was sur- 

— '*cen?r*' Touuded, it scrved naturally as a centre of action 

of action to the oligarchical or conservative party: that 

for the party which desired to preserve the Kleisthene- 

tive party an Constitution unaltered — with undiminished 

and Kimon. authority, administrative as well as judicial, both 

• Aristotle particularly indicates Sia ti^v kotoi 0«X«tt«v 8'jv9|i(v, ti^» 

these two conflicting tendencies 8T)fi,oxpaTlavl9}^upoTtpav ticoi* 

in Athens, the one Immediately 7)9zv. 

following the other, in a remark- The word aovTOvtor^pav ("stricter, 

able passage of his Politics (▼. 3, more rigid") stands opposed in 

6): — another passage to avtipiivac (iv. 

MtTapdXXoo9i 8e xotl tU iXiYapx^av 3, 6). 

«ai tU 8^(iov xotl 8l< noXitsiav fx * Plutarch, Beipub. Ger. Pne* 

TOO eOBoxii&^aal xt v) oOEY)4^vai ti cept. p. 805. Dux oyvou) Si, on 

«pX»iov ij (lopiov xr^^ itdXtio?* oTov, Po'jXiqv Tivt? iitnyH^ xot oXifapxixij'* 

fj tv 'Apti(fi iidYy PouXi^ eu8oxt|A-^- xoXou99tvTC<;, oiaicsp 't^idXTtjc 'AftiT- 

aava tv toI< Mr,Sixotc iSo^t ouv- viQSi xal d^opfxiuiv icotp' *HXsiot<, ^ih 

rovwtlpav icot^oai ti^/ noXitciav. va(i.iv a|&a xal fio^av ioyn't. 

Kocl icdXiv 6 votutixoc o^rXo^ 7ev6|i.s- About the oligarchical character 

vo; altUK t^^ itspl 2xX9|jilvat vtxT)^ of theAreopagites, see Deinarchus 

x«l 2id tsOtyi^ TJ)< T)Yt(to<lac xal cont. Demosthen. pp. 46, 98. 


to individual magistrates and to the collective Areopa^s. 
Of this sentiment, at the time of which we are now speaking, 
Kimon was the most conspicuous leader. His brilliant 
victories at the Eurymedon, as well as his exploits in other 
warlike enterprises, doubtless strengthened very much his 
political influence at home. The same party also probably 
included the large majority of rich and old families at 
Athens; who, so long as the magistracies were elected and 
not chosen by lot, usually got themselves chosen, and had 
every interest in keeping the power of such offices as high 
as they could. Moreover the party was farther strengthened 
by the pronounced support of Sparta, imparted chiefly 
through Kimon, proxenus of Sparta at Athens. Of course 
such aid could only have been indirect, yet it, appears to 
have been of no inconsiderable moment— for when we con- 
sider that ^gina had been in ancient feud with Athens, 
and Corinth in a temper more hostile than friendly, the 
good feeling of the Lacedaemonians might well appear to 
Athenian citizens eminently desirable to preserve: and the 
philo-Laconian character of the leading men at Athens 
contributed to disarm the jealousy of Sparta during that 
critical period while the Athenian maritime ascendency 
was in progress, i. 

The political opposition between Perikles and Kimon 
was hereditary, since Xanthippus the father of the for- 
mer had been the accuser of Miltiades the father Opposition 
of the latter. Both were of the first families ^Vmon* \nd 
in the city, and this, combined with the military Perikids— 
talents o? Kimon and the great statesmanlike Jj**^"t*Jej, 
superiority of Perikles, placed both the one and fathers— 
the other at the head of the two political parties *** J'^*®T 
which divided Athens. Perikles must have ipg ©f 
be^n his political career very young, since he ^witUs. 
maintained a position first of ^reat influence, and after- 
wards of unparalleled moral and political ascendency, for 
the long period of forty years, against distinguished rivals, 
bitter assailants, and unscrupulous libellers (about 467- 
428 B.C.). His public life began about the time when 
Themistokles was ostracised, and when Aristeides was 
passing off the stage, and he soon displayed a character 
which combined the pecuniary probity of the one with the 
resource and large views of the other; superadding to both, 

' Plutarob^ Kimon, o. 16; ThemistokUs, c. 20. 

218 HI8T0BY OF 6BBBCE. Pabt H, 

a discretion and mastery of temper never disturbed — an 
excellent musical and lettered education received from 
Pythokleides — an eloquence such as no one before had 
either heard or conceived — and the best philosophy which 
the age afforded. His military duties as a youthful citizen 
were faiUifuUy and strenuously performed, but he was 
timid in his first political approaches to the people — a 
fact perfectly in unison with the caution of his tempera- 
ment, but which some of his biographers ^ explained by 
8a3ring that he was afraid of being ostracised, and that 
his countenance resembled that of the despot Peisistratus. 
We may be pretty sure however that this personal resem- 
blance Oik^ the wonderful dream ascribed to his mother > 
when pregnant of him) was an after-thouffht of enemies 
when his ascendency was already established — and that 
young beginners were in little danger of ostracism. The 
complexion of political parties in Athens •had greatly 
changed since the days of Themistokles and Aristeides. 
For the Kleisthenean constitution, though enlarged by the 
latter after the return from Salamis to the extent of making 
all citizens without exception eligible for magif^tracy, had 
become unpopular with the poorer citizens and to the 
keener democratical feeling which now ran through Athens 
and Peirffius. 

It was to this democratical party — ^the party of 
Beserved, movement against that of resistance, or of 
phiiosophi- reformers against conservatives, if we are to 
bus'iness- employ modern phraseology — that Perikles 
^ f^p***kil' <ievoted his great rank, character, and abilities, 
—his* little' From the low arts, which it is common to ascribe 
pains to to One who espouscs the political interests of 
puiarify— the poor against the rich, he was remarkably 
less of the exempt He was indefatigable in his attention 
th^**°^"^ to public business, but he went little into so- 
Kimon. ciety, and disregarded almost to excess the airs 
of popularity. His eloquence was irresistibly impressive; 
yet he was by no means prodigal of it, taking care to 
reserve himself, like the Salaminian trireme, for solemn 
occasions, and preferring for the most part to employ the 
agency of friends and partisans. ^ Moreover he imbibed 
from his friend and teacher Anaxagoras a tinge of physical 

» Plutarch, Periklfts, o. 4-7 »eq. " Plutarch. Beipub. Gerend. Prse- 

• Herodot. vi. 13L cept. p. 812 ; Periklds, c. 5, 6, 7. 


Ehilosophy which greatly strengthened his mind ^ and armed 
im against many of the reigning superstitions — but which 
at the same time tended to rob him of the sympathy of 
the vulgar, rich as well as poor. The arts of demagogy 
were in fact much more cultivated by the oligarchical 
Kimon; whose open-hearted familiarity of manner was 
extolled, by his personal friend the poet Ion, in contrast 
with the reserved and stately demeanour of his rival 
Perikles. Kimon employed the rich plunder, procured by 
his maritime expeditions, in public decorations as well as 
in largesses to the poorer citizens; throwing open his fields 
and fruits to all the inhabitants of his deme, and causing 
himself to be attended in public by well-dressed slaves, 
directed to tender their warm tunics in exchange for the 
threadbare garments of those who seemed in want. But 
the property of Perikles was administered with a strict, 
though benevolent economy, by his ancient steward Evan- 
gelus — ^the produce of his lands being all sold, and the 
consumption of his house supplied by purchase in the 
market. 2 It was by such regularity that his perfect and 
manifest independence of all pecuniary seduction was 
sustained. In taste, in talent, and in character, Kimon 
was the very opposite of Perikles : a brave and efficient 
commander, a lavish distributor, a man of convivial and 
amorous habits — but incapable of sustained attention 
to business, untaught in music or letters, and endued 
with Laconian aversion to rhetoric and philosophy; while 
the ascendency of Perikles was founded on his admirable 
combination of civil qualities — probity, firmness, diligence, 
judgement, eloquence, and power of guiding partisans. 
As a military commander, though noway deficient in per- 
sonal courage, he rarely courted distinction and was 
principally famous for his care of the lives of the 
citizens, discountenancing all rash or distant enterprises. 
His private habits were sober and recluse : his chief con- 
versation was with Anaxagoras, Protagoras, 3 Zeno, the 
musician Damon, and other philosophers — while the 
tenderest domestic attachment bound him to the engaging 
and cultivated Aspasia. 

> Plato, Pheedrns, c. 54, p. 270; Kimon, c. 10; Beipubl. Oerend. 

Plntarch, Periklfts, c. 8; Xenoph. Precept, p. 818. 

Memor. i. 2, 46. ' The personal intercourse be- 

* Plutarch, PerikUs, 0. 9, 16 j tween Perikldt and Protagoras is 


Such were the two men who stood forward at this time 
Epi)iait«8, ^3 most conspicuous in Athenian party-contest 
belonging* — the expanding democracy against the station* 
democra- ^^ democracy of the past generation, which 
ticai party, now passed by the name of oligarchy — the 
a?iy equal* ambitious and talkative energy, spread even 
to Peri. among the poor population, which was now 
influence, forming more and more the characteristic of 
Efforts of Athens, against the unlettered and uninquiring 
winaVma- valour of the conquerors of Marathon. » Ephialtes, 
gisteriai SOU of Sophonides, was at this time the leading 
abuse. auxiliary, seemingly indeed the equal of Perikles, 

and noway inferior to him in personal probity, though he 
was a poor man. 2 As to aggressive political warfare, he 
was even more active than Perikles,who appears throughout 
his long public life to have manifested but little bitterness 
against political enemies. Unfortunately our scanty know 
ledge of the history of Athens brings before us only some 
general causes and a few marked facts. The details and 
the particular persons concerned are not within our sight: 
yet the actual course of political events depends everywhere 
mainly upon these details, as well as upon the general 
causes. Before Ephialtes advanced his main proposition 
for abridging the competence of the senate of Areopagus^ 
he appears to have been strenuous in repressing the prac^ 
tical abuse of magisterial authority, by accusations brought 
against the magistrates at the period of their regular 
accountability. After repeated efforts to check the prac- 
tical abuse of these magisterial powers, ' Ephialtes and 
Perikles were at last conducted to the proposition of cut- 
ting them down permanently, and introducing an altered 

Such proceedings naturally provoked extreme bitter* 
ness of partyfeeling. It is probable that this temper may 
have partly dictated the accusation preferred against 
Kimon (about 463 b.c.) after the surrender of Thasos, for 

attested by the interesting frag- ' Plutarch, PerikUs, c. 10: com- 
ment of the latter which we find pare Valer. Maxim. iii.S, 4. 'E«tiX- 
in Plutarch, Gonsolat. ad Apollo- tnjv jiiv ouv, <po[)sp6v ovtqe Toi« oX&- 
nium, c 33, p. 110. Yap^rixoic xai Ktfx toe su46vac «al 

* Aristophan. Nubes, 972, 1000 6iu>^ci« twv tov 2)J|&ov dfiiKoOvTurv 
aeq. and Ranee, 1071. drapatT7)T0v, enf^ouXeOaavtec ot ex* 

* Plutarch, Kimon, o. 10; JElian, Opoi Si' ApioToSlxou xou Tava7pt«od 
V. H. ii. 48; xi. 9. «pu(palu>c dvciXov, &c. 


alleged reception of bribes from the Macedonian prince 
Alexander — an accusation of which he was ximon and 
acquitted. At this time the oligarchical or ^" pa't/i 
Kimonian party was decidedly the most power- powerful 
ftil: and when the question was proposed for ^»n 
sending troops to aid the Lacedaemonians in atfd PeH- 
r^ducing the revolted Helots on Ithome, Kimon kjfta, until 
carried the people along with him to comply, by when The 
an appeal to their generous feelings, in spite of Athenian 
the strenuous opposition of Ephialtes.i But when dismissed"* 
Kimon and theAthenianhoplites returned home, from La 
having been dismissed by Sparta under circum- ci8m%f 
stances of insulting suspicion (as has been men- Kimon. 
tioned in the preceding chapter), the indignation of 
the citizens was extreme. They renounced their alliance 
with Sparta, and entered into amity with A rgos. Of course 
the influence of Kimon, and the position of the oligarchical 
party, was materially changed by this incident. And in 
the existing bitterness of political parties, it is not surprising 
that his opponents should take the opportun ity for proposing 
soon afterwards a vote of ostracism ^ — a challenge, indeed, 
which may perhaps have been accepted not unwillingly by 
Kimon and his party, since they might still fancy themselves 
the strongest, and suppose that the sentence of banishment 
would fall upon Ephialtes or Perikles. However, the vote 
ended in the expulsion of Kimon, a sure proof that his 
opponents were now in the ascendent. On this occasion, 
as on the preceding, we see the ostracism invoked to meet 
a period of intense political conflict, the violence of which 
it would at least abate, by removing for the time one of 
the contending leaders. 

It was now that Perikles and Ephialtes carried their 
important scheme of judicial reform. The senate of Areo- 
pagus was deprived of its discretionary censorial power, 
as well as of all its judicial competence, except that which 

* Plutarch, Elmon, c. 16. in which the ostracism is so often 

* Plutarch, Kimon, c. 17. 01 Si described. Plutarch says — "The 
icpoQ 6pYy)v ditsX96vttc ^^>] xoU Xa- Athenians took advantage of a 
«tt>yiCou9i 9av8pu>c C]r^).8icatvo /, xotl slight pretence to ostracise Ki- 
TovKtficuvafiixpoi c ciciXafiofitvoi mon:" but it was a peculiar char- 
Kpo^daeux i^uioTpdxtoav tU i'c>2 acteristic of ostracism that it had 
£tx«. no pretence: it was a judgement 

, I transcribe this passage as a passed without specific oz assigned 

f spftoimen of the inaccurate manner cause. 




Fabt II. 

carried by 
and Peri' 
kids to 
abridge the 
power of 
the senate 
of Areopa- 
gus as well 
as of in- 

related to homicide. The individual magistrates, as well as 
the senate of Five Hundred, were also stripped of 
their judicial attributes (except the power of 
imposing a small fine i), wnich were transferred 
to the newly-created panels of salaried dikasts^ 
lotted o£F in ten divisions from the agffreeate 
Heliaea. Ephialtes^ first brought down the laws 
of Solon from the acropolis to the neighbourhood 
of the market place, where the dikasteries sat 
magTs'teateg. — » visible proof that the judicature was now 
insti- popularised. 

the*paiddi- ^^ the representations of many authors, 

kasteries. the full bearing of this great constitutional 
change is very inadequately conceived. What we are 
commonly told is, that Perikles was the first to assign 
a salary to these numerous dikasteries at Athens. He 
bribed the people with the public money (says Plu- 
tarch), in order to make head against Kimon, who 
bribed them out of his own private purse : as if the pay 
were the main feature in the case, and as if all which 
Perikles did was, to make himself popular by paying the 
dikasts for judicial service which they nad before rendered 
gratuitously. The truth is, that this numerous army of 
oikasts, distributed into ten regiments, and summoned to 
act systematically throughout the year, was now for the 
first time organised: the commencement of their pay is also 
the commencement of their regular judicial action. What 
Perikles really eflFected was, to sever for the first time from 
Separation the administrative competence of the magistrates 
f/ J'^^^^j*^^ that judicial authority which had originally gone 
nistrative " along with it. The ffreat men who had been 
functions, accustomed to hold these offices were lowered 
both in influence and authority: 3 while on the other hand 

* Bemosthen. cont. Euerg. et 
Mnesibul. c. 12. 

* Harpokration— '0 xoxtoOev v6fi.o; 
—Pollux, xiii. 128. 

» Aristot. Polit. iv. 6, 6. In 8' 
ol Taic apyrai^ iyxaXoh'txt^ t6v 8f^(i.6v 
9aai $8 IV xplvttv* 6 S' aa{«.ivu>c Siy.^' 
Toi T1QV itpixXtjaiv* (uart xaxaXoovxai 
icaaai ai (ipx^''^ ^^•* compare vi. 
1, 8. 

The remark of Aristotle is not 

justly applicable to the change 
effected by Periklfrs, which trans- 
ferred the power taken from the 
magistrates, not to the people, 
but to certain specially constituted, 
though numerous and popular 
dikasteries, sworn to decide in 
conformity with known and writ- 
ten laws. Nor is the separation 
of judicial competence from admi- 
nistrative, to be characterised as 


a new life, habit, and sense of power, sprung up among 
the poorer citizens. A plaintiff having cause of civil action, 
or an accuser invoking punishment against citizens guilty 
of injury either to himself or to the state, had still to 
address himself to one or other of the archons, but it was 
only with a view of ultimately arriving before the dikas- 
tery by whom the cause was to be tried. While the 
magistrates acting individually were thus restricted to 
simple administration and preliminary police, they experi- 
enced a still more serious loss of power in their capacity 
of members of the Areopagus, after the year of archonship 
was expired. Instead of their previous unmeasured range 
of supervision and interference, they were now deprived 
of all judicial sanction beyond that small power of fining 
which was still left both to individual magistrates, and to 
the senate of Five Hundred. But the cognizance of homicide 
was still expressly reserved to them — for the procedure, in 
this latter case religious not less than judicial, was so 
thoroughly consecrated by ancient feeling, that no reformer 
could venture to disturb or remove it. i 

"dissolving or extinguishing ma- duces as evidence a passage of 

gisterial authority." On the con- Lysias (De Cede Eratosthenis, p. 

trary, it is conformable to the best Sl-33). 

modern notions. PerikUs cannot M. Boeckh and O. Miiller adopt 

be censured for having effected the same opinion as Meier, and 

this separation, however persons seemingly on the authority of the 

may think that the judicature which same passage (see the Dissertation 

he constituted was objectionable, of O. Miiller on the Eumenides of 

Plato seems also to have con- .^schylus, p. 113, Eng. transl.). 
ceived administrative power as But in the first place, this opinion 
essentially accompanied by judi- is contradicted by an express state- 
cial (Legg. vi. p. 767)— itivxa op- ment in the anonymous biogra- 
^ovta ovaYxaiov xal Sixoottjv eivai pher of Thuoydidds, who mentions 
Ttvu>v— an opinion doubtless per- the trial of Pyrilampds for murder 
fectly just, up to a certain Jiafrow before the Areopagus ; and con- 
limit: the separation between the tradicted also, seemingly, by Xe- 
two sorts of powers cannot be ren- nophon (Memorab. iii. 6, 20); in 
dered absolutely complete. the next place, the passage of Ly- 

' Demosthen. cont.Neser. p 1372; sias appears to me to bear adiffer- 

cont. Aristokrat. p. 642. ent meaning. He says, (j> xai 

Meier (Attischer Prozess, p. 143) itaxpiov saxi x«l 69' UfiLubv aito588o- 

thinks that the senate of Areopa- Tat tou 96^00 tocc 6lxac SixdCsiv: 

gus was also deprived of its cog- now (even if we admit the con- 

nizance of homicide as well as jectural reading e(p' u{j.(I)v in place 

of its other functions, and that of e^' Opilv to be correct) still this 

this was only restored after the restoration of functions to the 

expulsion of the Thirty. He pro- Areopagus refers naturally to the 


It was upon this same ground probably that the 
stationary party defended all the prerogatives of the senate 

restored democracy after the vi- venerable part of the old demo- 
olent interruption occasioned by cracy ; even apparently with tome 
the oligarchy of the Thirty. Con- extension of privileges, 
siderlug how many persons the The inferences which 0. MiiUer 
Thirty caused to bo violently put wishes to draw, as to the facts of 
to death, and the complete sub- these times, from the Eumenides 
version of all the laws which they of iEschylus, appear to me ill- 
introduced, it seems impossible supported. In order to sustain 
to suppose that the Areopagus his view that by virtue of the pro- 
could have continued to bold its position of Ephialtfts *'the Areopa- 
sittings and try accusations for gus almost entirely ceased to be 
intentional homicide, under their a high Court of Judicature" (sect, 
government. On the return of the 86, p. 109), he is forced to alter 
democracy after the Thirty were the chronology of the events, and 
expelled, the functions of the to af&rm that the motion of Ephi- 
senate of Areopagus would return alt6s must have been carried sub- 
also, sequently to the representation of 
If the supposition of the emi- the Eumenides, though Diodorus 
nent authors mentioned above were mentions it in the year next but 
correct— if it were true that the one before, and there is nothing 
Areopagus was deprived not only to contradipt him. All that we 
of its supervising function gener- can safely infer from the very in- 
ally, but also of its cognizance distinct allusions in JEschylus, is, 
of homicide, during the fifty-five that he himself was full of rever- 
years which elapsed between the ence for the Areopagus, and that 
motion of Ephialtds and the ex- the season was one in which party 
pulsion of the Thirty— this senate bitterness ran so high as to render 
must have been without any func- something like civil war (tfx<p6Xiov 
tions at all during that long in- 'Apv), v. 864) within the scope of 
terval; it must have been for all reasonable apprehension. Probably 
practical purposes non-existent, he may have been averse to the 
But during so long a period of diminution of the privileges of the 
total suspension,the citizens would Areopagus by Ephialtds: yet even 
have lost all their respect for it ; thus much is not altogether cer- 
it could not have retained so much tain, inasmuch as be puts it for- 
influence as we know that it ac- ward prominently and specially 
tually possessed immediately be- as a tribunal for homicide, exer- 
fore the Thirty (Lysias c. Era- cisiug this jurisdiction by inherent 
tosth. c. 11. p. 126); and it would prescription, and confirmed in it 
hardly have been revived after by the Eumenides themselves. Now 
the expulsion of the Thirty. Where- when we consider that such juris- 
as by preserving during that diction was precisely the thing 
period its jurisdiction in cases of confirmed and left by Ephialtfta 
homicide, apart from those more to the Areopagus, we might plau- 
extended privileges which had for- sibly argue that iEschylus, by 
merly rendered it obnoxious, the enhancing the solemnity and pre- 
ancient traditional respect for it dieting the perpetuity of the re. 
was kept alive, and it was revived maining privilege, intended to 


after th* fall of tha Thirtj as a eoaciliate thota who retented tha I 

Chap. XLVI. CH^ 

jma to be upright and well-intentioned, 
or Areopagusrfies established by Perikles were inacces- 
Jl^phialtes as Krruption and intimidation: their number, 
theit re sentj R jffrage, and the impossibility of knowing be- 
77*°^ jpHmt individuals would sjt in any particular 

mtem Sacrum et Aven* illnstrates, throughout, the inTeter- 

ate habit of the powerful fami- 
lies to set themselves above the 
laws and judicial authority. In- 
deed he seems to regard this as 
an incorrigible chronic malady in 

Insedit. Tumque tribunes 
et alia sibi jura paravit. 
Hscordiarum et certaminis utrim- 
que finis ^ait secundum bellum 

Compare the exposition of the society, necessitating ever-recur- 

eondition of the cities throughout ring disputes between powerful 

Europe in the thirteenth, and fif- men and the body of the people, 

teenth centuries, in Hiillmann*B *'The people (he says) desire to 

Stadte-Wesen des Mittelalters, live according to the laws; the 

especially vol. iii. pp. 196-199 geqq. great men desire to overrule the 

The memorable institution which laws.: it is therefore impossible that 

spread through nearly all the Ita- the two should march in harmony." 

lian cities during these centuries, ^'Yolendo il popolo vivere secondo 

of naming as Podesta or supreme le leggi, e t potenti «omandare a 

magistrate a person not belonging quelle, non h possibile che capino 

to the city itself, to hold office insieme" (Machiavelli, Istorie Fio- 

for a short time— was the expe- rentine, liv. ii. p. 70, ad ann.1282). 

dient which they resorted to for The first book of the interesting 

escaping the extreme perversion tale, called the Promessi Sposi, 

of Judicial and administrative of Manzoni,— itself full of histor- 

power, arising out of powerful fa- ical matter, and since published 

mily connexions. The restric- with illustrative notes by the his- 

tions which were thought necessary torian Canttk — exhibits a state of 

to guard against either favour judicial administration, very 

or antipathies on the part of the similar to that above described, in 

Podesta, are extremely singular the Milanese, during the sixteenth 

(Hiillmann, vol. iii. pp. 262-261 and seventeenth centuries ; demon- 


**The proceeding of the patri- 
cian families in these cities (ob- 
serves Hiillmann) in respect to 
the debts which they owed, was 

strated by repeated edicts, all in- 
effectual, to bring powerful men 
under the real control of the laws. 
Because men of wealth and pow- 
er, in the principal governments 
among the worst of the many op* of modem Europe, are now com- 
pressions to which the trading pletely under the control of the 
classes were exposed at their laws, the modem reader is apt 
hands — one of the greatest abuses to suppose that this is the natural 
which they practised by means of state of things. It is therefore not 
their superior position. How often unimportant to produce some re- 
did they even maltreat their cred- ferences (which might be indefi- 
itors, who came to demand mere- nitely multiplied) reminding him 
ly what was due to them I" of the very different phasnomena 
(Stadte-Wesen, vol. ii. p. 229.) which past history exhibits almost 

Machiavel's History of Florence, eyerywhere. 


cause, prevented both the one and the ot*^^?^*^^y that the 
that, the magnitude of their number, extr^S^ves of the senate 
to our ideas of judicial business, was esseniof the old demo- 
lary eflFect* — ^it served farther to render thc'«'»*iy ^ith some 
and the verdict imposing on the minds of^- 
spectators, as we may see by the fact, that in tk^^^^'®' 
causes the dikastery was doubled or tripled. Nor^ 
possible by any other means than numbers 2 to give di; 

' The namber of Boman jadioes dioant. Neqae Bho^of, neqae 

•mployed to try a criminal cause alias civitates anquam suoram ju- 

nnder the qwBBiiontB perpetuee in diciomm posnitnit ; nbi promisoud 

the last centnry and a half of the diyes et pauper, at cniqne sors 

Bepnblio, seems to have varied tulit, de maximis rebus juxtik ac de 

between 100, 76, 70, 66, 61, 62, 82, minimis disceptat." 

Ac. (Laboulaye, Essai sur les Lois The necessity of a numerouYju- 

Griminellei dei Bomains, p. 836. dicature, in a republic where there 

Paris, 1845.) . is no standing army or official 

In the time of Augustus, there force professionally constituted, 

was a total of 4000 judices ^at as the only means of enforcing 

Bome, distributed into four decn- public-minded justice against pow« 

ries (Pliny, H. N. xxxiii. 1, 11). erful criminals, is insisted upon 

Thevenality as well as the party by Machiavel, Discorsi sopra Tito 

eorruption of these Boman judices Livio, lib. i. e. 7. 

or jurorsi taken from the senate- "Potrebbesi anoora allegare, a 

rial and equestrian orders, the fortificazione della soprascritta 

two highest and richest orders in conolusione, 1* accidente seguito 

the state, — was well known and pur in Firenze contra Piero Bode- 

flagrant (Appian, Bell. Civ. i. 22, rini : 11 quale al tutto segul per 

86, 37; Laboulaye, ibid. p. 217- non essere in quella republica al- 

227; Walter, Geschichte des B5- cuno modo di accuse contro alia 

mischen Bechts, oh. xxviii. sect, ambizione dei potenti cittadini: 

287, 238; Asconius in Giceron. Ver- perchd lo accusare un potente a 

rin. pp. 141-146, ed. Orell.; and Gi- otto giudici in una republica, non 

oero himself, in the remarkable basta: bisogna che 1 giudici siano 

letter to Atticus, £p. ad Attic, assai, perchd pochi sempre fanno 

I. 16). a modo de* pochi," &c. : compard 

* Numerous dikasteries taken by the whole of the same chapter, 

lot seem to have been established I add another remarkable pas- 

in later times inBhodes and other sage of Machiavel— Discorso sulla 

Grecian cities (though Bhodes was Biforma (of Florence, addressed 

notdemocratically constituted) and to Pope Leo X.), pp. 119, 120. vol. 

to have worked satisfactorily, iv. of the complete edition of his 

Ballust says (in his Oratio IL ad works. 1813. 

Gnsarem de Bepublic& ordinandi, *'B necessarissimo in una repu- 

p. 661, ed. Gort.), "Judices k pan- Mica qnesto ricorso, perchdi pochi 

cis probari, regnum est; ex pe- cittadini non hanno ardire di pu- 

cuni& legi, inhonestum. Quare nire gli uomini grandi, e perd 

omnes primse classis judicare pla- bisogna che a tale effetto con- 

cet; sod numero plures quam ja- corrano assai cittadini^ acciochd 


of Areopagus — denouncing the curtailments proposed by 
Ephialtes as impious and guilty innovations. * How extreme 
their resentment became, when these reforms were carried 
— and how fierce was the collision of political parties at 
this moment — we may judge by the result. The Assassina- 
enemies of Ephialtes caused him to be privately tion of 
assassinated, by the hand of aBoeotian of Tanagra t/ the *con- 
named Aristodikus. Such a crime — rare in the servativs 
political annals of Athens, for we come to no P^'^'y* 
known instance of it afterwards until the oligarchy of the 
Four Hundred in 411 b.c. — marks at once the gravity of 
the change now introduced, the fierceness of the opposition 
oflFered, and the unscrupulous character of the conservative 
party. Kimon was in exile and had no share in the deed. 
Doubtless the assassination of Ephialtes produced an effect 
unfavourable in every way to the party who procured it. 
The popular party in their resentment must have become 

i Btill more attached to the judicial reforms just assured to 

them, while the hands of Perikles, the superior leader left 
behind and now acting singly, must have been materially 
. strengthened. 

fi is from this point that the administration of that 
great man may be said to date : he was now the Commenoe- 
leading adviser (we might almost say Prime JJ®*** ^J 
Minister) of the Athenian people. His first ascend, 
years were marked by a series of brilliant sue- p^^f^j^' 
cesses — already mentioned — the acquisition of after the' 
Megara as an ally, and the victorious war against jf^hSiitL 
Corinth and -^gina. But when he proposed compro- ' 
the great and valuable improvement of the Lonff J»*"® ^?j 
Walls, thus making one city of Athens and and Kimon. 
Peiraeus, the same oliearchical party, which had Brilliant 

>^ opposed his judicial changes and assassinated of Athens, 

^ Ephialtes, again stood forward in vehement J^* sera of 

resistance. Finding direct opposition unavailing, mum of " 

f they did not scruple to enter into treasonable ^®' power. 

recent innovations, and to soften EphialtAe — has been discussed and 

the hatred between the two op« (in my judgement) refuted by 

posing parties. Forehhammer— in a raluable Dis* 

The opinion of Boeckh, 0. Mill- sertation— De Areopago non pri- 

ler, and Meier, —respecting the. vato per Ephialten Hbmicidii Ju- 

withdrawal from the senate of diciis. Kiel, 1628. 

Areopagus of the judgements on ■ This is the language of those 

homicide, by the proposition of authors whom Diodorus copied 

VOL. V. Q. 


correspondence with Sparta — invoking the aid of a foreign 
force for the overthrow of the democracy: so odious had 
it become in their eyes, since the recent innovations. How 
serious was the hazard incurred by Athens, near the time 
of the battle of Tanagra, has been already recounted; to- 
gether with the rapid and unexpected reconciliation of parties 
after that battle, principally owing to the generous patriotism 
of Kimon and his immediate friends, ifimon was restored 
from ostracism on this occasion, before his full time had 
expired; while the rivalry between him and Perikles hence- 
forward becomes mitigated, or even converted into a com- 
promise, I whereby the internal affairs of the city were left 
to the one, and the conduct of foreign expeditions to the 
other. The successes of Athens during the ensuing ten 
years were more brilliant than ever, and she attained the 
maximum of her power: which doubtless had a material 
effect in imparting stability to the democracy, as well as 
to the administration of Perikles — and enabled both the 
one and the other to stand the shock of those great public 
reverses, which deprived the Athenians of their dependent 
landed alliances, during the interval between the defeat of 
Koroneia and the thirty years* truce. 

Along with the important judicial revolution brought 
about by Perikles, were introduced other changes belonging 
to the same scheme and system. 

Thus a general power of supervision, both over the 
other oon- magistrates and over the public assembly, was 
stitutionai vested in seven magistrates, now named for the 

Co All ff 08 ^^ 

The Noino- first time, called Nomophylakes, or Law-Guard- 
phyiakei. iang^ and doubtless changed every year. These 

(Biodor. zi. 77)— 06 fi^v dQp6(i>< procured the assassination of 

ft 6ii9UY« T7]XixouTOtc dvo- EphialtAs, from jealousy of the 

lA.'^ IV iicipaX6fi,tvo« (Ephial- superiority of the latter (Plutarch, 

tds), dXXa 'C^<; vuxt6c dvaipcQclc, PerikUs^ o. 10). We may infer 

c(87)Xov iayt xifjv tou f)lou tcXkutiqv. from this report how great the 

Compare Pausanias, i. 29, 16. eminence of £ phial tds was. 

Plutarch (PerikUs, c. 10) cites ' The intervention of Elpinikd, 

Aristotle as haying mentioned the the sister of Kimon, in bringing 

assassin of Ephialtds. Antipho, about this compromise between 

howeyer, states that the assassin her brother and PeriklAs, is prob- 

was neyer formally known or con- able enough (Plutarch; PerikUs, 

yicted (De Cede Hero. c. 68). c. 10, and Kimon, c. 14). Oleyer 

The enemies of PerikUs circu- and engaging, she seems to haye 

lated a report (mentioned by Ido- played an actiye part in the poli^ 

Dieneut), that it was be who had tical intrigues of the day: but wQ 


Nomophylakes sat alongside of the Proedri or presidents 
both in the senate and in the public assembly, and were 
charged with the duty of interposing whenever any step 
was taken or any proposition made contrary to the existing 
laws. They were also empowered to constrain the magis- 
trates to act according to law. ^ We do not know whether 
they possessed the presidency of a dikastery — that is, 
whether they could themselves cause one of the panels of 
jurors to be summoned, and put an alleged delinquent on 
his trial before it, under their presidency— or whether they 
were restricted to entering a formal protest, laying the 
alleged illegality before the public assembly. To appoint 
magistrates however, invested with this special trust of 
watching and informing, was not an unimportant step; for 
it would probably enable Ephialtes to satisfy many object- 
ors who feared to abolish the superintending power of the 
Areopagus without introducing any substitute. The Nomo- 
phylakes were honoured with a distinguished place at the 
puolic processions and festivals, and were even allowed Hike 
the Archons) to enter the Senate of Areopagus after tneir 
year of office had expired: but they never acquired any 
considerable power such as that senate had itself exercised. 
Their interference must have been greatly superseded by 
the introduction, and increasing application of the Graphe 
Paranomon, presently to be explained. They are not even 
noticed in the description of that misguided assembly which 
condemned the six generals, after the battle of Arginusse, 
to be tried by a novel process which violated legal form 

are not at all called upon to credit Otjvto, «u>X6ovTec Tdt dguix^opa t^ 

the scandals insinuated by EupoHs n6Xci icpdTTciv Inxa 6i ^oav* xal 

mid Btesimbrotus. xaxiffTTjoav, cue OiX6)fopoc, txt '£91* 

* We hear about these Nomo- dXxTje |j,6v^ xatsXiict t^ t^ 'Apsiou 

phylakes in a distinct statement nifoo ^ouX^ tit OTcep tou ffU>|jiaTog^, 

cited from Philoohorus, by Pho- Harpokration, Pollux, and Sui- 

tius, Lexic. p. 674, Person. No- das, give substantially the same 

l«.09uXaxKc* Irepol tloi tu)v Gtatiodt- account of these magistrates, 

Twv, cue OiX6xopoc iv C'* oi |i.iv Y^P though none except Photius men- 

&PX0VT« dvif)aivov <U 'Apciov k&^O'* tions the exact date of their ap« 

e9TK9avu>(i,evoi, ol Si vofAO^uXaxec pointment. There is no adequate 

Xpuoia otpdfia &'(0'^tti' xal Tat< ground for the doubt which M. 

Bcai< ivavTiov dpx6vTU>v ixaQcCovTO' Boeckh expresses about the accu- 

xai Ti]v iiofjiici^v iicef«.icov x^ IlaXXdSi* racy of this statement: see Bch9- 

x&« 8i dp^de ^vdyxaCov xoic v6|j.otc mann, Ant. Jur. Pub. Greec. sect* 

XP^ffBvi* xal iv xig txxX7)oi<i xal tv Ixvi, ; and Cicero, Legg. iii. 20, 
ti {touXJi (itxd xu)v npoi$pcuv ixd- 



not less than substaatial justice. < After the expulsion of 
the Thirty, the senate of Areopagus was again invested 
with a supervision over magistrates, though without any- 
thing like its ancient ascendency. 

Another important change, which we may with pro- 
Th N m - ^^^^l^^y* refer to Perikles, is, the institution of 
thetae— di-* the Nomothetse. These men were in point of 
stinction fact dikasts, members of the 6000 citizens annur 
laws and ally swom in that capacity. But they were not, 
paephiemi -like the dikasts for tryinff causes, distributed 

or special . , ■• j. i i. x* i 

decrees— mto panels or regiments known by a particular 
P'oco" letter and acting together throughout the entire 
lawTwere year: they were lotted oflf to sit together only 
enactedand qh special occasion and as the necessity arose, 
repea e . According to the reform now introduced, the 
Ekklesia or public assembly, even with the sanction of the 
senate of Five Hundred, became incompetent either to pass 
a new law or to repeal a law already in existence ; it could 
only enact a,p$ephism — that is, properly speaking, a decree 
applicable only to a particular case; though the word was 
used at Athens in a very large sense, sometimes compre- 
hending decrees of general as well as permanent application. 
In reference to laws, a peculiar judicial procedure was 
established. The Thesmothetse were directed annually to 
examine the existing laws, noting any contradictions or 
double laws on the same matter; and in the first prytany 
(tenth part) of the Attic year, on the eleventh day, an 
Ekklesia was held, in which the first business was to go 
through the laws seriatim, and submit them for approval 
or rejection; first beginning with the laws relating to the 
senate, next coming to those of more general import, espe- 
cially such as determined the functions and competence of 
the magistrates. If any law was condemned by the vote 
of the public assembly, or if any citizen had a new law to 
propose, the third assembly of the Prytany was employed, 
previous to any other business, in the appointment of 
Nomothetee and in the provision of means to pay their 
salary. Previous notice was required to be given publicly 
by every citizen who had new propositions of the sort to 
make, in order that the time necessary for the sitting of 
the Nomothetae might be measured according to the number 
oi matters to be submitted to their cognizance. Public 

^Bee Xenophoui Hellenic, i. 7; Andokidds de Mysteriis, p. 40. 


advocates were farther named to undertake the formal 
defence of all the laws attacked, and the citizen who pro- 
posed to repeal them had to make out his case against this 
defence, to the satisfaction of the assembled Nomothetae. 
These latter were taken from the 6000 sworn dikasts, and 
were of diflferent numbers according to circumstances:* 
sometimes we hear of them as 500, sometimes as 1000 — 
and we may be certain that the number was always con- 

The effect of this institution was, to place the making 
or repealing of laws under the same solemnities procedure 
and guarantees as the trying of causes or accusa- in making 
tions in judicature. We must recollect that the ofUwe^*"^ 
citizens who attended the Ekklesia or public assimi. 
assembly were not sworn like the dikasts; nor Ir^Jedure** 
had they the same solemnity of procedure, nor in judicial 
the same certainty of hearing both sides of the *'**!«• 
question set forth, nor the same full preliminary notice. 
Mow much the oath sworn was brought to act upon the . 
minds of the dikasts, we may see by the frequent appeals 
to it in the orators, who contrast them with the unsworn 
public assembly. 1 And there can be no doubt that the 

I Demosthen. oont. Timokrat. o. he cites for governing the proceed- 

20, pp. 725, 726. ^Ap' ouv xtp 6oxti ings of the NomothetsB, hear un- 

oup.<pdpciv T1Q n6Xti TOiouTOc v6|jioc, equivocal evidence of a time much 

o( 6ixa9T7]plou Yvu>9eu>c aOxo; xupi- later. Schomann admits this to a 

(bxepoc iorat, xal tac un6 tu>v ifi.u>- certain extent, and in reference to 

{lOxoTCDvYvwaeiCToic dv(i>pL6TOi«icpo(- the etyle of these laws— "Illorum 

Ts^ei Xuciv; — '£v9u(Ui9((s, dii6 tou quidem fragmentorum, quse in Ti- 

6ixaaTif]piou xai t^; xaxaYvtbaeiuc ol mokrateli extant, recentiorem Solih- 

8isiciq8i]osv (Timokratds) inl t6v S^- nis cetate formam atque orationem 

{xov, ixxXiicTCDv TOvTjSixTjxdtal com- apertum eat.^ But it is not merely 

pare Demosthen. cont. Euhulid. the style which proves them to he 

c. 16. of post-Solonian date : it is the 

See, ahont the Nomethets, Scho> mention of post-Solonian institn- 

roann, De Comitiis, ch. vii. p. 248 tions, such as the ten prytanies 

eeqq.^ and Flatner, Prozess und into which the year was divided, 

Klagen hey den Attikem, Ahschn. the ten statues of the Eponymi— 

ii. S, 3, p. 33 aeqq. all derived Arom the creation of the 

Both of them maintain, in my ten trihes hy Kleisthends. On the 

opinion erroneously, that the No- careless employment of the name 

raothetn are an institution of Solon, of Solon hy the orators whenever 

Demosthends indeed ascribes it to they desire to make a strong im- 

Solon (Schomann, p. 268) : hut this pression on the dikasts, I have 

counts in my view for nothing, already remarked, 
when I see that all the laws which 


Nomothetae afforded much ^eater security than the public 
assembly, for a proper decision. That security depended 
upon the same principle as we see to pervade all the con- 
stitutional arrangements of Athens; upon a fraction of 
the people casually taken, but sufficiently numerous to 
Jbave the same interest with the whole, — not permanent 
but delegated for the occasion, — assembled under a solemn 
sanction, — and furnished with a full exposition of both 
sides of the case. The power of passing psephism, or 
special decrees, still remained with the public assembly, 
which was doubtless much more liable to be surprised into 
hasty or inconsiderate decision than either the Dikastery 
or the Nomothetae — in spite of the necessity of previous 
authority from the senate of Five Hundred, before any 
proposition could be submitted to it. 

As an additional security both to the public assembly 
Graphd and the Nomothetse against beinff entrapped 
^ a'^?'- ^^^^ decisions contrary to existing law^ another 
dictment remarkable provision has yet to be mentioned 
against the — a provision probably introduced by Perikles 
nCi or at t&e same time as the formaUties of law 
uncongti- making by means of specially delegated No- 
propofi- mothetjBB. This was the Graphe Faranomon — 
tioni, indictment for informality or illegality — which 

might be brought on certain grounds against the proposer 
of any law or any psephism, and rendered him liable to 
punishment by the dikastery. He was required in bring- 
ing forward his new measure to take care that it should 
not be in contradiction with any pre-existing law— or if 
there were any such contradiction, to give formal notice 
of it, to propose the repeal of that which existed, and to 
write up publicly beforehand what his proposition was — in 
order that there might never be two contradictory laws at 
the same time in operation, nor any illegal decree passed 
either by the senate or by the public assembly. If he 
neglected this precaution, he was liable to prosecution 
under the Grapne Faranomon, which any Athenian citizen 
might bring against him before the dikastery, through the 
intervention and under the presidency of the Thesmothetse. 

Judging from the title of this indictment, it was 
originally confined to the special ground of formal con- 
tradiction between the new and the old. But it had a 
natural tendency to extend itself: the citizen accusing 


would strengthen his case by showing that the measure 
which he attacked contradicted not merely the letter, 
but the spirit and purpose of existing laws — and he 
would proceed from hence to denounce it as generally 
mischievous and disgraceful to the state. In this un- 
measured latitude we find the Graphe Paranomon at the 
time of Demosthenes. The mover of a new law or 
psephism, even after it had been regularly discussed and 
passed; was liable to be indicted, and had to defend himself 
not only against alleged informalities in his procedure, 
but also against alleged mischiefs in the substance of his 
measure. If found guilty by the dikastery, the punishment 
inflicted upon him by them was not fixed, but variable 
according to circumstances. For the indictment belonged 
to that class wherein, after the verdict of guilty, first a 
given amount of punishment was proposed by the accuser, 
next another and lighter amount was named by the accused 
party against himself — the dikastery being bound to make 
their option between one and the other, without admitting 
any third modification — so that it was the interest even of 
the accused party to name against himself a measure of 
punishment sufficient to satisfy the sentiment of the dikasts, 
in order that they might not prefer the more severe pro- 
position of the accuser. At the same time, the accuser 
himself (as in other public indictments) was fined in the 
sum of 1000 drachms, unless the verdict of guilty obtained 
at least one-fifth of the suffrages of the dikastery. The 
personal responsibility of the mover, however, continued 
only one year after the introduction of his new law. If 
the accusation was brought at a greater distance of time 
than one year, the accuser coidd invoke no punishment 
against the mover, and the sentence of the dikasts neither 
absolved nor condemned anything but the law. Their 
condemnation of the law with or without the author, 
amounted ipso facto to a repeal of it. 

Such indictment against the author of a law or of a 
decree might be preferred either at some stage prior to 
its final enactment — as after its acceptance simply by the 
senate, if it was a decree, or after its approval by the 
public assembly, and prior to its going before the N omo- 
thetae, if it was a law — or after it had reached full comple- 
tion by the verdict of the Nomothetse. In the former 
case the indictment staid its farther progress until sentence 
had been pronounced by the dikasts. 



Pabt II. 

whioh it is 
framed. — 
upon new 
tioni^ and 
npon the 
to every 

distinctly repealing any existing law, it was 
lie to entrust the defence of the 

This regulation is framed in a thoroughly conserva- 
Working *^^® spirit, to guard the existing laws against 
of the being wholly or partially nullified by a new pro- 

pCi^o- position. As, in the procedure of the Nomo- 
mdn.— Con- thetae, whenever any proposition was made for 


•pirit in , , . - -. 

thought unsai 

law so assailed to the chance of some orator gra- 
tuitously undertaking it. Paid advocates were 
appointed for the purpose. So also, when any 
citizen made a new positive proposition, suffi- 
cient security was not supposed to be afforded bj^ 
the chance of opponents rising up at the time. \. 
Accordingly, a farther guarantee was provided \ 
in the personal responsibility of the mover. That 
the latter, before he proposed a new decree or a new 
law, should take care that there was nothing in it 
inconsistent with existing laws — or, if there were, that 
he should first formally bring forward a direct propo- 
sition for the repeal of such preexistent law — was 
in no way unreasonable. It imposed upon him an 
obligation such as he might perfectly well fulfil. It 
served as a check upon the use of that right, of free 
speech and initiative in the public s^ssembly, which belong- 
ed to every Athenian without exception, i and which was 
cherished by the democracy as much as it was condemned 
by oligarchical thinkers. It was a security to the dikasts, 
who were called upon to apply the law to particular cases, 
against the perplexity of having conflicting laws quoted 
before them, and being obliged in their verdict to set aside 
either one or the other. In modem European govern- 
ments, even the most free and constitutional, laws have 
been both made and applied either by select persons or 
select assemblies, under an organization so different as to 
put out of sight the idea of personal responsibility on the 
proposer of a new law. Moreover, even in such assemblies, 
private initiative has either not existed at all, or has been 
of comparatively little effect, in law-making; while in the 

> The privation of this right of (Demosthen. cont. Near. p. 1352, c. 

pablic speech (na^pij^U) followed 9; cont. Meidiam, p. 545, o. 27). 

on the condemnation of any citizen Compare for the oligarchical senti- 

to the pnniihment called dxifjila, ment, Xenophon, Bepubl. Athen. 

iliaftanchisement, entire or partial i. 9. 



application of laws when made, there has always been a 
permanent judicial body exercising an action of its own, 
more or less independent of the legislature, and generally 
interpreting away the text of contradictory laws so as to 
keep up a tolerably consistent course of forensic tradition. 
But at Athens, the fact that the proposer of a new decree, 
or of a new law, had induced the senate or the public 
assembly to pass ii^ was by no means supposed to cancel 
his personal responsibility, if the proposition was illegal. 
He had deceived the senate or the people, in deliberately 
keeping back from them a fact which he knew, or at least 
might and ought to have known. 

But though a full justification may thus be urged on 
• behalf of the Graphe Paranomon as originally conceived 
and intended, it will hardly apply to that in- Abusive 
dictment as applied afterwards in its plenary extension 
and abusive latitude. Thus ^schines indicts Graphs Pa- 
Ktesiphon under it for having under certain ranomdn 
circumstances proposed a crown to Demosthe- ^^^^^"^^' 
nSs. He begins by showing that the proposition was ille- 
gal — for this was the essential foundation of the indictment: 
he then goes on farther to demonstrate, in a splendid 
harangue, that Demosthenes was a vile man and a 
mischievous politician: accordingly (assuming the argu- 
ment to be just) Ktesiphon had deceived the people in an 
aggravated way — first by proposing a reward under cir- 
cumstances contrary to law, next by proposing it in favour 
of an unworthy man. The first part of the argument 
only is of the essence of the Graphe Paranomon: the 
second part is in the nature of an abuse Rowing out of 
it, — springing from that venom of personal and party en- 
mity which is inseparable, in a greater or less degree, 
from free political action, and which manifested itself with 
virulence at Athens, though within the limits of legality. 
That this indictment, as one of the most direct vents for 
such enmity, was largely applied and abused at Athens, is 
certain. But though it probably deterred unpractised 
citizens from originating new propositions, it did not 
produce the same effect upon those orators who made 
politics a regular business, and who could therefore both 
calculate the temper of the people, and reckon upon 
support from a certain knot of friends. Aristophon, to- 
wards the close of his political life, made it a boast that 


he had been thus iDclicted and acquitted seventy-five 
times. Probably the worst effect which it produced was 
that of encouraging the vein of personality and bitterness 
which pervades so large a proportion of Attic oratory, 
even in its most illustrious manifestations; turning deliber- 
ative into judicial eloquencei and interweaving the dis- 
cussion of a law or decree along with a declamatory har- 
angue against the character of its mover. We may at the 
same time add that the Graphe Paranomon was often the 
most convenient way of getting a law or a 
It wM psephism repealed, so that it was used even 

often uied *i*^.i *i'iij i j 

as a simple when the annual period had passed over, and 
way of when the mover was therefore out of danger — 
SheTepeai the indictment being then brought only against' 
^'i*S *^® ^^^ ^^ decree, as in the case which forms 

law^with- the subject of the harangue of Demosthenes 
out perso- against JJeptines. If the speaker of this har- 
agains? the angue obtained a verdict, he procured at once 
author of the repeal of the law or decree, without pro- 

*^' posing any new provision in its place; which 
he would be required to do — if not peremptorily, at least 
by common usage, — if he carried the law for repeal before 
the Nomothetae. 

The dikasteries provided under the system of Perikles 
Numbers varied in number of members: we never hear of 
and pay less than 200 members — most generally of 500 — 
Sfv*ilt- -. and sometimes also of 1 000, 1 500, 2000 members, 

aiKasts, as . iii-i x^-i ••! 

provided by on important trials.* Jbiach man received pay 
PerikUs. from the treasurers called Kolakretse, after his 
day's business was over, of three oboli or half a drachm : 
at least this was the amount paid during the early part of 
the Peloponnesian war. M. Boeckh supposes that the 
original pay proposed by Perikles was one obolus, after- 

* See Meier, Attisch. Prozess, p. See Matthise, De Judioiis Athe- 

1S9. Andokidds mentions a trial niensium, in his Miscellanea Phi- 

under the indictment of Ypocff) itapa- lologica, vol. 1. p. 252. Matthias 

v6|j.u>v, brought by his father Leo- questions the reading of that pas- 

goras against a senator named sage in Demosthends (cont. Mei- 

Speusippus, wherein 6000 dikasts diam, p. 685), wherein 200 dikasts are 

sat— that is the entire body of He- spoken of as sitting in Judgement ; 

liasts. However, tKe Ibose speech he tliinks it ought to be itcvraxoal- 

■o habitual with Andokidds renders out instead of Siaxoolouc — but this 

this statement very uncertain (An- alteration would be rash* 
dokidds de Mysterlis, p. 8, § 29). 


wards tripled by Kleon; but his opinion is open to much 
doubt. It was indispensable to propose a measure of pay 
sufficient to induce citizens to come, and come frequently, 
if not regularly. Now one obolus seems to have proved 
afterwards an inadequate temptation even to the ekklesiasts 
(or citizens who attended the public assembly), who were 
less frequently wanted, and must have had easier sittings, 
than the dikasts : much less therefore would it be sufficient 
in the case of the latter. I incline to the belief that the 
pay originally awarded was three oboli:* the rather, as 
these new institutions seem to have nearly coincided in 
point of time with the transportation of the confederate 
treasure from Delos to Athens — so that the Exchequer 
would then appear abundantly provided. As to the number 
of dikasts actually present on each day of sitting, or the 
minimum number requisite to form a sitting, we are very 
imperfectly informed. Though each of the ten panels or 
divisions of dikasts included 500 individuals, seldom prob- 
ably did all of them attend. But it also seldom happened, 
probably, that all the ten divisions sat on the same day : 
there was therefore an opportunity of making up deficien- 
cies in division A — when its lot was called and when its 
dikasts did not appear in sufficient numbers — from those 
who belonged to division B or A, besides the supplementary 
dikasts who were not comprised in any of the ten divisions: 
though on all these points we cannot go beyond conjecture. 
Certain it is, however, that the dikasteries were always 
numerous, and that none of the dikasts could know in what 
causes they would be employed, so that it was impossible 
to tamper with them beforehand. 2 

' See on this queetion, Boeckh, obolus to three, as a change back- 
Public Econ. of Athens, oh. xr. p. wards and forwards according to 
233^ K. F. Hermann, Oriech. Staats- circumstances. Now it seems that 
alt. § 184. there were some occasions when 

The proofwhichM.Boeckh brings the treasury was so very poor that 

to show, first, that the original pay it was doubtful whether the dikasts 

was one obolus— next that Kleon could be paid: see Lysias, cont. 

was the first to introduce the tri- Epikrat. c. 1 ; cont. Nikpmach. c. 

obolus— is in both cases very in- 22 ; and Aristophan. Equit. 1370. 

conclusive. The amount of pay may therefore 

Certain passages f^om the Scho- have been sometimes affected by 

liast, stating that the pay of the this cause, 
dikasts fluctuated (oOx IaTY)xev — 

• &XXoTe &XXu>c i$i8oTO) do not so * There is a remarkable passage 

naturally indicate a rise from one on this point in the treatise of 

236 HISTORY 07 OBEEGB« Pabt II. 

Such were the great constitutional innovations of 
Perikles andEphialtes — changes full of practical 
nian demo- results — the transformation, as well as the com- 
craoy, as plement, of that democratical system which 
by^erikuf fcleisthenes had begun and to which the tide of 
remained Athenian feeling had been gradually mounting 
tTaiiTS'n. up during the preceding twenty years. The 
altered entire force of tnese changes is generally not 
down'to^ perceived, because the popular dikasteries and 
the loss of the Nomothetae are so often represented as in- 
tode^pend- stitutious of Solou, and as merely supplied 
enoe— ex- with pay by Perikles. This erroneous suppo- 
femporary * sitiou prevents all clear view of the growth 
interrup. of the Athenian democracy by throwing back 
the^Four ^^ ^^^ elaborations to the period of its early 
Hundred and imperfect start. To strip the magistrates 
TWrty* ^^ ^ their judicial power, except that of im- 
posing a small fine, and the Areopagus of all 
its jurisdiction except in cases of homicide — providing 
popular, numerous, and salaried dikasts to decide all the 
iuoicial business at Athens as well as to repeal and enact 
laws — this was the consummation of the Athenian demo- 
cracy. No serious constitutional alteration (I except the 
temporary interruptions of the Four Hundred and the 
Thirty) was afterwards made until the days of Macedonian 
interference. As Perikles made it, so it remained in the 
days of Demosthenes — though with a sensible change in 
the character, and abatement in the energies, of the people, 
rich as well as poor. 

Xenoptaon, De Republic Athen. dealt with, Is very probable (see 

ill. 6. He says, — Xenoph. de Bepub. Ath. iii. 8) : and 

O^pt 6i], dXXdi 9'i]9l Tie X9^^^^ ^® ^^^ well believe that there 

6ixdC<iv p.ev, iXdxTOUc 8i 8ixdC<iv. were also particular occasions on 

'Avdyxf Toivuv, idv (tiv icoXXd (both which money was given to the 

Weiske and Schneider substitute dikasts, some of whom were punish- 

icoXXd here in place of iXixa* which ed with death for such corrupt 

latter, makes no sense) icoiu>vTai receipt (JBschinds cont. Timarch. 

SioxaoTiQpia, ^XIyoi iv £xd9T<|> ivov- o. 17-22, p. 12-16). But the passage 

Tat T((> SixaffTYjpitp* <uotk xal 6iaaxKU- above quoted from Xenophon, an 

dsxffGai paSiov ioxai npoc 6X1^00^ unfriendly witness, shows that the 

6ixaaTd<, xal vuvficxdvai (so Schnei- precautions taken to prevent cor- 

der and Matthias in place of 9UvSi- ruptionof the dikasteries were well- 

xdaai) icoXu ^ttov 8ixatu>; fiixdUiv. devised and successful, though 

That there was a good deal of these precautions might sometimes 

bribery at Athens, where indivi- be eluded, 
duals could be approached itnd 



In appreciating the practical working of these numer- 
ous dikasteries at Athens, in comparison with such 
justice as might have been expected from in- 
dividual magistrates, we have to consider, first ^^t'ho"* 
— That personal and pecuniary corruption seems numerous 
to have been a common vice among the leading ^^^ei^"®' 
men of Athens and Sparta, when acting indi- large num- 
vidually or in boards of a few members, and not J.^f to'^ex ' 
uncommon even with the kings of Sparta, — elude cor 
next, That in the Grecian cities generally, as J^fj^ida- 
we know even from the oligarchical Xenophon tion— uaM- 
(he particularly excepts Sparta), the rich and }jjfi^*]d^ai 
great men were not only insubordinate to the magiBtrates 
magistrates, but made a parade of showing J^Qn®'"^^" 
that they cared nothing about them, i We know 
also from the same unsuspected source, 2 that while the 
poorer Athenian citizens who served on shipboard were 
distinguished for the strictest discipline, the hoplites or 
middling burghers who formed the infantry were less obe- 
dient, and the rich citizens who served on horseback the 
most disobedient of all. To make rich and powerful 
criminals effectively amenable to justice has indeed been 
found so difficult everywhere, until a recent period of 
history, that we should be surprised if it were otherwise 
in Greece. When we follow tlie reckless demeanour of 
rich men like Kritias, Alkibiades,^ and Meidias, even under 

' Xenophon, De Bepubl. Laced, plci vocrstv *A87ivaloo?* 06x ^P««» *"•; 

0.8.2. TexpLttlpofiat 6i xaoxa, 8ti eSx oxto i fi,<v tlai v iv toi« vao- 

4v \ Tat<; &XXatc niXeaiv ol Suva- Tixoi«| eOTAxxcuc 8* 4v xoi« y^H-'"'" 

Ttbtspoi o5te {)o6XovTai fioxtiv xoi? oYwaiictiOovTai toTc iicifftdTOti?, 

TQtc dp/a^ 9oPeioOai, dXXd oO^ivtov 84 xaxafieiatepov iv toT^ X^- 

vofxlCouffi xooxodviXe69epov poi? Otctjpstoooi xoi? 8i6affxdXoi?; 

elvai* 4v 6i tx; 2icdpxxi ol xpdxi- Tooxo ^dp xoi, I^tj, xal Gaujiooxov 

ctoi xal Onip^ovxtti jidXioxa xd« dp- iaxl* x6 toi)c (xiv xoio6tooc ice i- 

y&^i fto. Oapx<*^v xotc i^taxcbffi, xouc 

Bespecting the yiolent proceed- Ik 6icXlTac, xal to6c iiciceic, 

ings committed by powerful men otSoxouffi xaXoxaY«Ol? icpo- 

at Thebes, whereby it became al- xexploQat xu>v icoXitwv, dicti- 

moBt impossible to procure justice 8c9xdxouc slvai icdvTu>v. 

against them for fear of being put * See Xenophon, Memorab. i. 2, 

to death, see Dikcearchus, Yit. 12-25; Thucyd.yi. 16, and the speech 

Qttto. Fragm. ed. Fabr. p. 143, and which he gives as spoken by A1-* 

Polybius, XX. 4, 6; xxiii. 2. kibiadgs in the assembly, ri. 17; 

* Xenophon, Memorab. iii. 5, 18. Plutarch, Alkibiad. c. 7-8-16, and 

M7)8apiu>(;, i(pY) 6 2u>xpdx7)<, u> lis- the Oration of Bemosthends against 

ptxXttc, o5xu>c ^-^Qo dvi}xiox<p icovv Meidias throughout: also Fragm* 


the full-grown democracy of Athens, we may be sure that 
their predecessors under the Kleisthenenn constitution 
would nave been often too formidable to be punished or 
kept down by an individual archon of ordinary firmness, i 

y. of the n^XapYot of Ariitoplia- jecti : nay, that they attended their 

n6s, Meineke, ii. p. 1128. lords to parliament, equipped in 

^ Bir Thomas Smith, in his Treat- the same military dress, and even 
ise on the Commonwealth of Eng- dared sometimes to present them- 
land, explains the Court of Star- selves before the Judge of assize, 
Chamber as originally constituted and to enter the courts of justice 
in order ''to deal with offenders in a hostile manner— while their 
too stout for the ordinary course principals sat with the Judges on 
of justice." The abundant com- the bench, intimidating the wit- 
pounds of the Greek language nesses, and influencing the juries 
furnish a single word exactly de- by looks, nods, signs and signals." 
scribing this same class of offend- (Treatise concerning Civil Govern- 
ers— Tf)piaT68ix«i— the title of one ment, p. 837, by Josiah Tucker, D.D. 
of the lost comedies of Eupolis; London, 1781.) 
see Meineke, Historia Critica Co- The whole chapter (pp. 801-866) 
micorum Grsecorum, vol. i. p. 146. contains many statutes and much 

Dean Tucker observes, in his other matter, illustrating the inti- 

Treatise on Civil Government, midation exercised by powerftil 

"There was hardly a session of men in those days over the course 

parliament from the time of Henry of justice. 

III. to Henry YIIL, but laws were A passage among the Fragmenta 
enacted for restraining the feuds, of Ballust, gives a striking pic- 
robberies and oppressions of the ture of the conduct of powerful 
barons and their dependents on citizens under the Boman Bepub- 
the one side— and to moderate and lie. (Fragm. lib. i. p. 168, ed. 
check the excesses and extortions Delph.) 

ofthe royal purveyors on the other; "At discordia, et avaritia, et 

these being the two capital evils ambitio, et csetera secundis rebus 

then felt. Bespecting the tyranny oriri sueta mala, post Carthagi* 

of the ancient baronage, even nis excidium maximd aucta sunt, 

squires as well as others were not Kam injuria validiorum, et ob 

ashamed to wear the liveries of eas disoessio plebis h Patribus, 

their leaders, and to glory in every aliseque dissensionei domi fuere 

badge or distinction, whereby they jam inde 4 principio: neque am- 

might be known to be retained as plius, quam regibus exactis, dum 

the bullies of such or such great metus 4Tarquinio et helium grave 

men, and to engage in their quar- cum EtrurlA positum est, Kquo et 

rels, just or unjust, right or wrong, modesto jure agitatum: dein, ser- 

The histories of those times, to- vili imperio patres plebem exer- 

gether with the statutes of the cere: de vit& atque tergo, regio 

realm, inform us that they asso- more consulere: agro pellere, et 

ciated (or as they called it, con- k ceteris expertibus, soli in im- 

/(Sderated together) in great bodies, perio agere. Quibus servitiis, et 

parading on horseback in fairs and maximft fotnoris on ere, oppress^ 

markets, and clad in armour, to plebes, cum assiduis bellis tribu« 

the great terror of peaceable sub- turn limul et militiam toleraret. 


to an assembly of citizens, of whom many were poor, some 
old, and all were despised individually by rich accused per- 
sons who were brought before them — as Aristophanes and 
Xenophon give us plainly to understand. * If we except 
the strict and peculiar educational discipline of Sparta, 
these numerous dikasteries afforded the only organ which 

11 giudicio si nasoonda, e nascon- v. AexdlCciv ; Plutarch, Goriolan. 

dendo8i,ciascuno sipoBsa Bcusare." c. 14; and Pollux, viii. 121) inti- 

' Aristophan. Vesp. 670; Xeno- mates that Anytns was the first 
phon, Bep. Ath. i. 18. We are person who taught the art tou 
not to suppose that all the di- Sexdc^siv ti fiixaoTTjpia, a short time 
kasts who tried a cause were very before the battle of ^gospotami. 
poor: Demosthends would not talk But besides that the information 
to very poor men as to *'the slave on this point is to the last degree 
whom each of them might have vague, we may remark that be- 
left at home" (Demosthends cont. tween the defeat of the oligarchy 
Stephan. A. c. 26. p. 1127). * of Four Hundred, and the battle 

It was criminal by law in the of iEgospotami, the financial and 
dikasts to receive bribes in the political condition of Athens was 
exercise of their functions, as well so exceedingly embarrassed, that 
as in every citizen to give money it may well be doubted whether 
to them (Demosth. cont. Steph. B. c. she could maintain the paid di> 
13. p. 1137). And it seems per- kasteries on the ordinary footing, 
fectly safe to affirm that in prac- Both all the personal service of 
tioe the dikasts were never tarn- the citizens, and all the publio 
pered with beforehand : had the money, must have been put in re- 
fact been otherwise, we must have quisition at that time for defence 
seen copious allusions to it in the against the enemy, without leaving 
many free-spoken pleadings which any surplus for other purposes; 
remain to us (lust as there are in there was not enough even to 
the Boman orators): whereas in afford constant pay to the soldiers 
point of fact there are hardly any and sailors (compare Thucyd. vi. 
iuch allusions. The word dsxdCtuv 91; viii. 69, 71, 76, 86). If therefore 
(in Isokrat&s de Pac. Or. viii. p. in this time of distress, the dika* 
169. sect. 63) does not allude to steries were rarely convoked, and 
obtaining by corrupt means ver- without any certainty of pay, » 
diets of dikasts in the dikastery, powerful accused person might 
but to obtaining by such means find it more easy to tamper with 
votes for offices in the public as- them beforehand, than it had been 
sembly, where the election took before, or than it came to be after- 
place by show of hands. Isokrates wards, when the system was re- 
says that this was often done in gularly in operation. We can 
his time, and so perhaps it may hardly reason with safety there- 
bave been ; but in the case of the fore, from the period shortly pre- 
dikasteries, much better security ceding the battle of iBgospotami, 
was taken against it. either to that which preceded the 

The statement of Aristotle (from Sicilian expedition, or to that 

his IIoXiTeiai, Fragm. xi. p. 69, ed. which followed the subversion of 

Neumann: compare Harpokration the Thirty. 

VOL. V. B 


Grecian politics could devise, for getting redress against 
powerful criminals, public as well as private, and for ob- 
taining a sincere and uncorrupt verdict. 

Taking the general woridng of the dikasteries, we 

The Athe- ^^^^^ ^^^ ^^** ^^^7 *^® nothing but Jury-trial 
nian di- ' applied on a scale broad, svstematic, unaided, 
a"*Jur'- ^ uncontrolled, beyond all other historical 
trial ap- ' experience — and that they therefore exhibit in 
br*iieV*** exagfferated proportions both the excellences 
scale— ex- and the defects characteristic of the jury-system, 
b*^h*if ^ compared with decision by trained and pro- 
exoeiiences fessional judges. All the encomiums, which it 
and iti fg customary to pronounce upon jury-trial, will 

in an ex- be found predicable of the Athenian dikasteries 
aggerated {j^ ^ gtiH greater degree: all the reproaches, 
'°'°'- which can be addressed on good ground to the 

dikasteries, will apply to modern juries also, though in a 
less degree. Such parallel is not less just, though the 
dikasteries, as the most democratical feature of democracy 
itself, have been usually criticised with marked disfavour 
— every censure or sneer or joke against them which can 
be found in ancient authors, comic as well as serious, being 
accepted as true almost to the letter; while juries are so 
popular an institution, that their merits have been over- 
stated (in England at least) and their defects kept out of 
sight. The theory of the Athenian dikastery, and the 
theorv of jury-trial as it has prevailed in England since the 
Revolution of 1688, are one and the same: recourse to a 
certain number of private citizens, taken by chance or 
without possibility of knowing beforehand who they will 
be, sworn to hear fairly and impartially plaintiff and de- 
fendant, accuser and accused, and to nnd a true verdict 
according to their consciences upon a distinct issue before 
them. But in Athens this theory was worked out to its 
natural consequences; while English practice, in this 
respect as in so many others, is at variance with English 
theory. The jury, though an ancient and a constant portion 
of the judicial system, has never been more than a portion 
— kept in subordination, trammels, and pupilage, by a 
powerful crown and by judges presiding over an artificial 
system of law. In the English state trials, down to a 
period not long before the Revolution of 1688, any jurors 
who found a verdict contrary to the dictation of the judge 


were liable to fine; and at an earlier period (if a second 
jury on being summoned found an opposite verdict) even 
to the terrible punishment of attaint, i And though, for 
the last century and a half, the verdict of the jury has been 
free as to matters of fact, new trials having taken the place 
of the old attaint — yet theascendency of the presiding judge 
over their minds, and his influence over the procedure as 
the authority on matters of law, has always been such as 
to overrule tne natural play of their feelings and judgement 
as men and citizens 2 — sometimes to the detriment, much 

> Mr. Jardine, in his interesting it was held by the Lord Chancellor 

and valuable publication, Criminal Egerton, together with the two 

Trials, vol. i. p. 116, after giving Chief Justices and the Chief Baron, 

an account of the trial of Sir Ni- that when a party indicted is found, 

cholas Throckmorton in 1653, for guilty on the trial, the jury shall 

high treason, and his acquittal, not be questioned; but on the 

observes — "There is one oircum- other side, when the jury hath ae- 

stance in this trial, which ought quitted a felon or a traitor against 

not to be passed over without an manifest proof, they may be charged 

observation. It appears that after in the Star-chamber for their 

the trial was over, the jury were partiality 'in finding a manifest 

required to give recognizances to ofiFender not guilty. After the 

answer for their verdict, and were abolition of the Star-chamber, 

afterwards imprisoned for nearly there were several instances in the 

eight months and heavily fined reign of Charles II., in which it 

by a sentence of the Star-chamber, was resolved that both grand and 

Such was the security which the petit juries might be fined for gfiv- 

trial by jury afforded to the sub- ing verdicts against plain evi- 

ject in those times: and such were dence and the directions of the 

the perils to which jurors were then court." Compare Mr. Araos's Notes 

exposed^ who ventured to act upon onFortescue, De Laudibus Legum 

theirconscientious opinions in state Angliae, c. 27. 
prosecutions I But even these pro- ' Bespecting the French juries, 

ceedings against the jury, mon- M. Cottu (Bdfiexions sur la Justice 

strous as they appear to our im- criminelle, p. 79) remarks, — 
proved notions of the administra- '*I<e dSsir ardent de bien falre 

tion of justice, must not be con- dent les jur^s sont g6n6ralement 

sidered as a wanton exercise of animus, et la orainte de s'dgarer, 

unlawful power on this particular lesjette dans uneobSissance passive 

occasion. The fact is that the judges & I'impulsion qui leur est donn^e 

of England had for centuries be* par le president de la Courd' Assise, 

fore exercised a similar authori- et si ce magistrat sait s'emparer 

ty, though not without some mur- de leur estima, alors leur confiance 

muring against it; and it was not en lui ne connott plus de homes, 

until more than a century after it, lis le considdrent comme PStoile 

in the reign of Charles II., that a qui doit les guider dans I'obscuritg 

solemn decision was pronounced qui les environne, et pleins d'un ^ 

against its legality." respect aveugle pour son opinion, ^ 

• . • • "In the reign of James I. ils n*attendent que la manifestation 

B 2 



Fabt n. 

oftener to the benefit (always exceptinff political trials), 
of substantial justice. But in Athens the dikasts judged 
of the law as well as of the fact. The laws were not numer- 
ous, and were couched in few, for the most part familiar, 
words.* To determine how the facts stood, and whether, if 
the facts were undisputed, the law invoked was properly 
applicable to them, were parts of the integral question 
submitted to them, and comprehended in their verdict. 
Moreover, each dikastery construed the law for itself with- 
out being bound to follow the decisions of those which 
had preceded it, except in so far as such analogy might 
really influence the convictions oi the members. They were 
free, self-judging persons — unassisted by the schooling, but 
at the same time untrammeled by the awe-striking ascend- 
ency, of a professional judge — obeying the spontaneous 
inspirations of their own consciences, and recognising no 
authority except the laws of the city, with which they were 

Trial by jury, as practised in England since 1688, has 
been politically most valuable, as a security 
against the encroachments of an anti-popular 
executive. Partly for this reason, partly for 
others not necessary to state here, it has had 
greater credit as an instrument of judicature 
generally, and has been supposed to produce 
much more of what is good in English adminis- 
tration of justice, than really belongs to it. 
Amidst the unqualified encomiums so frequently 
bestowed upon the honesty, the unprejudiced 

The en- 
upon the 
apply yet 
to the 

qu*il leur en fait pour la sanction- 
ner par leur declaration. Ainsi 
au lieu de deux juges que l*accas6 
devoit aroir, il n*en a Men souvent 
qu'un teuly qui est le president de 
la Oour d'AsBise." 

Anselm Feuerbaoh (in the second 
part of hit work, Ueber die Oeffent- 
lichkeit and MUndlichkeit der Ge- 
rechtigkeitspflege, which contains 
hit review of the French judicial 
system, Ueber die Gerichtsverfas- 
sung Frankreichs. Abth. iii. H. r. 
p. 477) confirms this statement from 
a large obseryation of the French 
courts of justice. 

The habit of the French juries, 
in so many doubtftil cases, to pro- 
nounce a verdict of guilty by a 
majority of seven against five (in 
which case the law threw the bur- 
den of actual condemnation upon 
the judges present in court, direct- 
ing their votes to be counted along 
with those of the jury) is a re- 
markable proof of this aversion of 
the jury to the responsibility of 
decision: see Feuerbach, ibid. p. 
481 seq. Gompare also the treatise 
of the same author, Betrachtungen 
iiber das Geschwomen - Gericht. 
p. 186-198, 



rectitude of appreciation, the practical instinct for detect^ 
falsehood and resisting sophistry, in twelve citizens 


taken by hazard and put into a jury-box — comparatively 
little account is taken either of the aids, or of the restric- 
tions, or of the corrections in the shape of new trials, under 
which they act, or of the artificial forensic medium into 
which they are plunged for the time of their service: so 
that the theory of the case presumes them to be more of 
spontaneous agents, and more analogous to the Athenian 
dikasts, than the practice confirms. Accordingly, when 
we read these encomiums in modem authors, we shall find 
that both the direct benefits ascribed to jury-trial in 
ensuring pure and even-handed justice, and still more its 
indirect benefits in improving and educating the citizens 
generally — might have been set forth yet more emphatically 
in a laudatory harangue of Perikles about the Athenian 
dikasteries. £f it be true that an Englishman or an American 
counts more certainly on an impartial and uncorrupt verdict 
from a jury of his country than from a permanent pro- 
fessional judge, much more would this be the feeling of an 
ordinary Athenian, when he compared the dikasteries with 
the archon. The juror hears and judges under full per- 
suasion that he himself individually stands in need of the 
same protection or redress invoked by others: so also did 
the dikast. As to the effects of jury-trial in diffusing 
respect to the laws and constitution — in giving to every 
citizen a personal interest in enforcing the former and 
maintaining the latter — in imparting a sentiment of dignity 
to small and poor men, through the discharge of a function 
exalted as well as useful — in calling forth the patriotic 
sympathies, and exercising the mental capacities of every 
individual — all these effects were produced in a still higher 
degree by the dikasteries at Athens; from their greater 
frequency, numbers, and spontaneity of mental action, 
without any professional judge, upon whom they could 
throw the responsibility of deciding for them. * 

> I transcribe from an eminent 
lawyer of the TTnitefl States— Mr. 
Livingston, author of a Penal Gode 
for the State of Louisiana (Preface, 
p. 12-16), an eloquent panegyric 
on Trial by Jury. It contains little 
more than the topics commonly 
insisted on, but it is expressed with 

peculiar warmth, and with the 
greater fulness, in|^much as the 
people of Louisianai for whom the 
author was writing, had no fa- 
miliarity with the institution and 
its working. The reader will ob- 
serve that almost everything here 
said, in recommendation of tbA 


On the other hand, the imperfections inherent in jury- 
imperfeo- trial were likewise oisclosed in an exaggerated 
tions of form under the Athenian system. Both juror 
ezagger^ and dikast represent the average man of the time 
ated in the ^nd of the neighbourhood, exempt indeed from 

procedure . *=• ,. ' •• ^ j •!• 

of the di- pecuniary corruption or personal fear, — deciding 
kasteries. according to what he tninks justice or to some 
genuine feeling of equity, mercy, religion, or patriotism, 

jury, might hare been urged by "olid. There are reasons, and some 

PerikUs with much truer and wider l^ft^o already been stated, to show 

application, in enforcing his trans- **»»* *1^" choice cannot be freely 

fer of judicial power from indiri- exercised. There is moreover an- 

dual magistrates to the dikasteries. other interest besides that of the 

"By our constitution (*. e. in culprit to be considered. If he be 

Louisiana), the right of a trial by guilty* the state has an interest in 

jury is secured to the accused, but ^^b conviction : and whether guilty 

it is not exclusively established, or innocent, it has a higher inter- 

This however may be done by law, cBt, — that the fact should be fairly 

and there are so many strong rea> canvassed before judges inacces- 

sons in its favour, that it hat sible to influence, and unbiassed 

been thought proper to insert in ^7 any false views of official duty, 

the code a precise declaration that It has an interest in the character 

in all criminal prosecutions, the of its administration of justice, and 

trial by jury is a privilege which a paramount duty to perform in 

cannot be renounced. W^re it left rendering it free from suspicion, 

entirely at the option of the ac- ^t is not true therefore to say, that 

cused, a desire to propitiate th« the laws do enough when they give 

favour of the judge, ignorance of the choice between a fair and im- 

his interest, or the confusion in^ partial trial, and one that is liable 

cident to his situation, might in- to the greatest objections. They 

duce him to waive the advantage must do more — they must restrict 

of a trial by his country, and thus that choice, so as not to suffer an 

by degrees accustom the people ill-advised individual to degrade 

to a spectacle which they ought them into instruments of ruin, 

never to behold— a single man though it should be voluntarily 

determining the fact, applying the inflicted ; or of death, though that 

law, and disposing at his will of death should be suicide." 

the life, liberty, and reputation "Another advantage of rendering 

of a citizen .... Those who ad- this mode of trial obligatory is, 

vocate the present disposition of that it diffuses the most valuable 

our laws say— admitting the trial information among every rank of 

by jury to be an advantage, the citizens : it is a school, of which 

law does enough when it gives the every jury that is impanelled is a 

accused the d|)inion to avail him- separate class, where the dictates 

self of its benefits : he is the best of the laws and the consequence 

judge whether it will be useful to of disobedience to them are prac- 

him: and it would be unjust to tically taught. The.frequent exercise of 

direct him in so important a choice, these important functions more- 

This argument is specious, but not over gives a sense of dignity and 


which in reference to the case before him he thinks as good 
as justice — but not exempt from sympathies; antipathies, 

self-respect, not only becoming to encroachments, and a renovating 

the character of a free citizen, but spirit that will make arbitrary 

which adds to his private hap- power despair. The enemies of 

piness. Neither party-spirit, nor freedom know this : they know how 

intrigue, nor power, can deprive admirable a vehicle it is, to con- 

him of his share in the administra- vey the contagion of those liberal 

tion of justice, though they can principles which attack the vitals 

humble the pride of every other of their power, and they therefore 

office and vacate every other place, guard against its introduction with 

Every time he is called upon to more care than they would take to 

act in this capacity, he must feel avoid pestilential disease. In coun- 

ihat though placed in perhaps the tries where it already exists, they 

humblest station, he is * yet the insidiously endeavour to innovate, 

guardian of the Vife^ the liberty f because theydarenotopenlydestroy: 

and the reputation of his fellow- changes inconsistent with the spirit 

citizens against injustice and op- of the institution are introduced, 

pression ; and that while his plain under the plausible pretext of im- 

understanding has been found the provement: the common class of 

best refuge for innocence, his incor- citizens are too ill-info.rmed to per- 

ruptible integrity is pronounced a form the functions of jurors— a 

sure pledge that guilt will not es- selection is necessary. This choice 

cape. A state whose most obscure must be confided to an agent of 

citizens axe thns individually ele- executive power, and must be made 

vated to perform these august func- among the most eminent for edu- 

tions; who are alternately) the cation, wealth, and respectability : 

defenders of the injured, the dread so that after several suocessive 

of the guilty, the vigilant guard- operations of political chemistry, 

ians of the constitution; without a shining result may be obtained, 

whose consent no punishment can freed indeed from all republican 

be inflicted, no disgrace incurred; dross, but without any of the in- 

who can by their voice arrest the trinsio value that is found in the 

blow of oppression, and direct the rugged, but inflexible integrity, 

handof justice where to strike— such and incorruptible worthy of the 

a state can never sink into slave- original composition. Men impan- 

ry, or easily submit to oppression, elled by this process bear no resem- 

Corrupt rulers may pervert the blance but in name to the sturdy j 

constitution : ambitious demago- honesty unlettered jurors who derive 

gues may violate its precepts : no dignity but from the perform- 

foreign influence may control its ance of their duties; and the 

operations: but while the people momentary exercise of whose func- 

enjoy the trial by jury, taken by tions gives no time for the worh 

lot from among themselves, ' they of corruption or the influence of 

cannot cease to be tree. The in- fear. By innovations such as these 

formation it spreads, the sense of the institution itf so changed as to 

dignity and independence it in- leave nothing to attach the aCFec- 

spires, the courage it creates — will tions or awaken the interest of the 

always give them an energy of people, and it is neglected as an. 
resistance that can grapple with 



Part II. 

and prejudices, all of which act the more powerfully because 
there is often no consciousness of their presence^and because 
they even appear essential to his idea of plain and straight- 
forward good sense. According as a jury is composed of 
Catholics or Protestants, Irishmen or Englishmen, trades- 
men, farm ei*s, or inhabitants of a frontier on which smuggling 
prevails, — there is apt to prevail among them a correspond- 
ing bias. At the time of any great national delusion, 
such as the Popish Plot — or of any powerful local excite- 
ment, such as that of the Church and King mobs at 
Birmingham in 1791 against Dr. Priestley and the Dis- 
senters — juries are found to perpetrate what a calmer age 
recognises to have been gross injustice. A jury, who 
disapprove of the infliction of capital punishment for a 
particular crime, will acquit prisoners in spite of the 

useless,, or abandoned at a mis- 
chievous eontrivance." 

Oonsistently with this earnest 
admiration of Jury-trial, Mr. Liv- 
ingston, by the provisions of his 
eode, limits very materially the 
interference of the presiding judge, 
thus bringing back the Jurors more 
nearly to a similarity with the 
Athenian dikasts (p. 86): «! re- 
strict the charge of the judge to 
an opinion of the law and to the 
repetition of the evidence, only 
when required hy any one of the 
jury. The practice of repeating all 
the testimony from notes,— always 
(from the nature of things) imper- 
fectly, not seldom inaccurately, 
and sometimes carelessly taken, — 
has a double disadvantage: it 
makes the jurors, who rely more 
on the judge's notes than on their 
own memory, inattentive to the 
•videnoe; and it gives them an 
imperfect copy of that which the 
nature of the trial by jury requires 
that they should record in their 
own minds. Forced to rely upon 
themselves, the necessity will 
quicken their attention, and it will 
be only when they disagree in 
their recollection that recourse 
will be had to the notes of. the 

judge." Mr. Livingston goes on 
to add, that the judges, from their 
old habits acquired as practising 
advocates, are scarcely ever neu- 
tral — always take a side — and 
generally against the prisoners on 

The same considerations as those 
which Mr. Livingston here sets 
forth to demonstrate the value of 
jury-trial, are also insisted upon 
by M. Charles Comte, in his trans- 
lation of Sir Bichard Phillips's 
Treatise on Juries, enlarged with 
many valuable reflections on the 
different shape which the jury- 
system has assumed in England 
and France (Des Pouvoirs et des 
Obligations des Jury, traduit de 
PAnglois, par Gharles Comte, 2d 
ed. Paris, 1828, with preliminary 
Considerations sur le Pouvoir 
Judiciaire, pp. 100 seqq.). 

The length of this note forbids 
my citing anything farther either 
from the eulogistic observations 
of Sir Bichard Phillips or from 
those of M. Comte: but they would 
be found (like those of Mr. Liv- 
ingston) even more applicable to 
the dikasteries of Athens than to 
the juries of England and America. 


clearest evidence of guilt. It is probable that a delinquent, 
indicted for any state offence before the dikastery at Athens, 
— having only a private accuser to contend against, with 
equal power of speaking in his own defence, of summoning 
L witnesses and of procuring friends to speak for him — would 

have better chance of a fair trial than he would now have 
anywhere except in England and the United States of 
America; and better than he would have had in England 
down to the seventeenth century. ^ Juries bring the common 

> Mr. Jardine (Criminal Trials, who were most partial and pre- 

Introdaot. p. 8) obserresi that the jndiced. Carew, in his account of 

"proceedings against persons ac- Cornwall, informs us that it was 

oused of state offences in the earlier a common article in an attorney's 

periods of our history, do not de- bill to charge pro amicHid vice- 

serve the name of trials : they were eomitit, 

ft mere mockery of justice," Ac. "It is likewise remarkable, that 

Bespecting what English juries partiality and pexjury in jurors of 

have been, it is curious to peruse the city of London is more parti- 

the following remarks of Mr. Daines cularly complained of than in other 

Barrlngton, Observations on the parts of England, by the preamble 

Statutes, p. 409. In remarking on of this and other statutes. Stow 

ft statute of Henry VII. ▲.». Ii94, informs us that in 1468, many jurors 

he says— of this city were punished by 

«The 21st chapter recites— 'That having papers fixed on their heads, 

perjury Is much and customarily statingtheir offence of having been 

used within the city of London, tampered with by the parties to 

among such persons as passen and the suit. He likewise complains 

been impanelled in issue, joined that this crying offence continued 

between party and party.* in the time of Queen Elizabeth, 

"This offence hath been before when he wrote his account of 
this statute complained of in pre- London: and Fuller, in his Eng- 
ftmbles to several laws, being lish Worthies, mentions it as a 
always the pexjury of a juror, who proverbial saying, that London 
finds a verdict contrary to his oath, juries hang half and save half, 
ftnd not that which we hear too Grafton also, in his Chronicle, in- 
much of at present, in the witnesses forms us that the Chancellor of the 
produced at a trial* diocese of London was indicted for 

"In the Dance of Death, written a murder, and that the bishop 

originally in French by Macharel, wrote a letter to Cardinal Wolsey, 

and translated by John Lydgate in behalf of his officer, to stop the 

in this reign, with some additions prosecution, 'because London juries 

to adapt it to English characters were so prejudiced, that they would 

1 ^a juryman is mentioned, who had find Abel guilty for the murder of 

often been bribed for giving a false Cain.' 

verdict, which shows the offence ''The punishment for a false ver- 

' to have been very common. The diet by the petty jury is by writ 

( sheriff, who summoned the jury, of attaint : and the statute directs, 

was likewise greatly accessory to that half of the grand jury, when 

this crime, by summoning those the trial is per medietatem lingua, 


feeling as well as the common reason of the public — or 
often indeed only the separate feeling of particular fractions 
of the public — to dictate the application of the law to par- 
ticular cases. They are a protection against anything 
worse — especially against such corruption or servility as 
are liable to taint permanent official persons — but they 
cannot possibly reach anything better. Now the dikast 
trial at Athens effected the same object, and had in it only 
the same ingredients of error and misdecision^as the English 
jury: but it had them in stronger dose, * without the counter- 
shall be strangers, not Londoners, claims the refleotions of an obser- 

*And there 's no London jury, Ting lawyer on the temper and 
but are led competence of the jurymen whom 

In evidence as far by common he had seen in action, and on their 
fame, disposition to pronounce the ver- 

As they are by present deposi- diet according to the feeling which 
tion.' the case before them inspired. 

(Ben Jonson's Magnetic Lady, Act "Pourquoi faut-il qu'une institu- 
in. 8c. 8.) tion qui rassure les oitoyens centre 

"It appears by 16 Henry TL c. 6 I'endurcissement et la prevention 
(which likewise recites the great si funeste k I'innocence, que pent 
increase of perjury in jurors and prdduire Phabitude de juger les 
in the strongest terms), that in crimes .... qu'une institution qui 
every attaint there were thirteen donne pour juges k un accuse, des 
defendants — the twelve jurors who citoyens inddpendans de toute 
gave the verdict and the plaintiff esp6oe d*influence, ses pairs, ses 
or defendant who had obtained it, 6gauz .... pourquoi faut-il que 
who therefore was supposed to have cette institution, dont les formes 
used corrupt means to procure sont simples, touchantes, patriar- 
it. For this reason, if the verdict chales, dont la th6orie flatte et 
was given in favour of the crown, entratne I'esprit par une seduction 
no attaint conld be brought, be- irresistible, ait 6t6 si sou vent m6- 
cause the king could not be joined connue, trompde par IMgnorance 
as a defendant with the jury who et la pusillanlmitd, prostitute peut- 
were prosecuted." dtre par une vile et coupable cor- 

Compare also the same work, p. ruption? 
894-457, and Mr. Amos*s Notes on "Bendons pourtant justice auz 
Fortescue de Laudib. Leg. Angliee, erreurs, mdme & la prevarication, 
c. 27. des jur^s: ils ont trop de fois ac- 

' In Trance, jury-trial was only quitt6 les coupables, mais il n*a 
introduced for the first time by the pas encore 6t6 prouv6 qu'ils eussent 
Constituent Assembly in 1790 ; and jamais fait oouler une goutte de 
then only for Criminal procedure: sang innocent: et si I'on ponvoit 
I transcribe the following remarks supposer qu'ils eussent vu quel- 
on the working of it from the in- quefois le crime 1& otl il n*y en 
structive article in Merlin's *B6per- avoit qn*une apparence trompeuse 
toire de Jurisprudence,* article et fausse, ce ne seroit pas leur 
JurS. Though written in a spirit conscience qu*il faudroit accuser: 
rery favourable to the jury, it pro- ce seroit la fatality malheureuse 



acting authority of a judge, and without the benefit of 
a procedure such as has now been obtained in England. 


des cizoonstanoes qui auroient ao- 
compagnd I'accusation, et qui au- 
roit trompd de mdme les juges les 
plus p6n6trans et les plus exerc6s 
& rechercher la T6rit6 et Ik la d6- 
mdler du mensonge. 

''Mais les reproohes qu*ont sou- 
vent mdritds les jurds, o^est d'avoir 
c6d6 k une fauaae commiairationf 
ou & lMnt6rdt qu'6toient parvenus 
h leur inspirer les families d'accu- 
86s qui avoient un rang dans la 
80ci6t6: c'est souvent d'etre sortis 
de leurs attributions, qui se bor- 
nent k apprScier les faits, et les 
juger d'une manidre diffSrente de 
la loi. J*ai vu cent exemples de 
eea usurpations de pouvoir et de ce 
despotisme des juris. Trop souvent 
ils ont voulu voir une action in- 
nooente, 1& ofl la loi avoit dit qu'il 
y avoit un crime, et alors ils n'ont 
pas craint de se jouer de la vdrit6 
pour tromper et binder la loi." 

''Sera-t-il possible d'a- 

m61iorer Pinstitution des jur6s, et 
d'en pr6venir les dcarts souvent 
trop scandaleuz? Gardons-nons 
d'en douter. Que I'on commence 
par composer le jury de proprid- 
taires intSressds k punir le crime 
pour le rendre plus rare : que sur- 
tout on en dloigne les artisans, 
les petits cultivateurs, hommes 
chez qui sans doute la probitd est 
heureusement fort commune, mais 
dont 1' esprit est peu exerc6, et qui 
acooutumSs aux d6f6renceS| aux 
^gards, cedent toujours k I'opinion 
de ceux de leurs colldgues dont 
le rang est plus distinguS : ou qui, 
familiarises seulement avec les 
iddes relatives k leur profession, 
n' ont jamais eu, dans tout le reste, 
que des iddes d^emprunt ou d'in- 
■piration. On salt qu'aujourd'hni ce. 
sont oes hommes qui dans presque 
toute la France forment toujours 

la majority des jur6s: mettes au 
milieu d'eux un homme d'un 6tat 
plus 61ev6, d'un esprit d61i6, d'une 
Elocution facile, il entralnera ses 
coUdgues, il dScidera la delibera- 
tion: et si oet homme a le juge- 
ment faux ou le ooeur corrompu, 
cette deliberation sera n6cessaire- 
ment mauvaise. 

"Mais pourra-t-on parvenir k 
vaincre I'insouciance des propri6- 
taires riches et 6olaires, k leur 
faire abandonner leurs affaires, 
leurs families, leurs habitudes, 
pour les entrainer dans les villes, 
et leur y faire remplir des fonc- 
tions qui tourmentent quelque- 
fois la probite, et donnent des 
inquietudes d'autant plus vives 
que la conscience est plus deli- 
cate? Fourquoi non? Pourquoi 
les mdmes classes de citoyens qui 
dans les huit ou dix premiers mois 
de 1792, se poriaient avec tant de 
zeie k I'exercice de ces fonctions^ 
les fuiroient-elles aujourdlmi? 
surtout si, pour les y rappeler, la 
loi fait mouvoir les deux grands 
resBorts qui sont dans sa main, 
si elle 8' engage k recompenser 
Inexactitude, et k punir la negli- 
gence?" (Merlin, Repertoire de 
Jurispradence, art. Jures, p. 97.) 

In these passages it deserves no- 
tice, that what is particularly 
remarked about juries, both Eng- 
lish and !E*reuch, is, their reluct- 
ance to convict accused persons 
brought before them. Now the 
character of the Athenian dikasts, 
as described by Mr. Mitford and 
by many other authors, is the 
precise reverse of this: an extreme 
severity and cruelty, and a dis- 
position to convict all accused 
persons brought before them, upon 
little or no evidence— especially 
rich accused persons. I venture 


The feelings of tlie dikasts counted for more, and their 
reason for less: not merely because of their greater numbers, 
which naturally heightened the pitch of feeling in each 
individual — but also because the addresses of orators or 
parties formed the prominent part of the procedure, and 
the depositions of witnesses only a very suoordinate part. 
The dikast^ therefore heard little of uie naked facts, the 

to affirm that td ascribe to tbem to maintain the anger wbiob had 

saoh a temper generally, is not been raised by the speech of the 

less improbable in itself, than on- accuser. (See Aristophan. Yesp. 

supported by any good eyidenoe. 674, 713, 727, 974.) Moreorer, if 

In the speeches remaining to us firom the YespsB we turn to the 

f^m defendants, we do indeed Kabes, where the poet attacks the 

find complaints made of the sever- sophists and not the dikasts, we 

ity of the dikasteries : but in those are there told that the sophists 

speeches which oome from accu- could arm any man with fallacies 

sers, there are abundance of com- and subterfuges which would enable 

plaints to the contrary— of over- him to procure acquittal from the 

indulgence on the part of the di- dikasts, whatever might be the 

kasteries, and consequent impunity crime committed, 

of criminals. Nor does Aristo- I believe that this opeu'minded- 

phands— by whom most modem ness, and impressibility of the 

authors are guided even when they feelings on all sides, by art, elo- 

do not quote him — when fairly quence, prayers, tears, invectives, 

studied, bear out the temper as- Ac, is the true character of the 

cribed by Mr. Mitford to the di- Athenian dikasts. And I also be- 

kasts; even if we admitted Aris- lieve that they were, as a general 

tophands to be a faithful and rule, more open to commiseration 

trustworthy witness, which no man than to any other feeling — like 

who knows his picture of Sokratds what is above said respecting the 

will be disposed to do. Aristo- French jurjrmen: e0xlv7]To<icp6c 6p« 

phanfts takes hold of every quality f if)v (6 'AQtivalcuv Sijftoc), tOf&STdQs- 

which will raise a laugh against to< icp6< iXeov— this expression of 

the dikasts, and his portrait of Plutarch about the Athenian demos 

them as Wasps was well*calcu- is no less true about the dikasts: 

lated for this purpose— to describe compare also the description given 

them as boiling over with acri- by Pliny (H.N. xxxv.lO) of theme- 

mony, irritation, impatience to morable picture of the Athenian 

find some one whom they could demos by the painter Parrhasius. 

convict and punish. But even he, * That the difference between 

when he comes to describe these the dikast and the juryman, in 

dikasts in action, represents them this respect, is only one of degree, 

as obeying the appeals to their I need hardly remark. M. Merlin 

pity, as well as those to their observes, "Je ne pense pas, comma 

anger— as being yielding and im- bien des gens, que pour 6tre pro* 

pressionable when their feelings pre aux fonctions de iur6, il suf- 

are approached on either side, and fise d'avoir tins intelligence ordi- 

unable, when they hear the ex- naire et de la prohiti. 8i Paccusd 

culpatory appeal of the accused, paroissoit seul aux d^bats aveo 


appropriate subjects for his reason — but he was abundantly 
supplied with the plausible falsehoods, calumnies, irrelevant 
statements and suggestions, &c., of the parties, and that 
too in a manner skilfully adapted to his temper. To keep 
the facts of the case before tne jury, apart from the false- 
hood and colouring of parties, is the most useful function 
of the modem judge, whose influence is also considerable 
as a restraint upon the pleader. The helps to the reason 

lea tdmoins, il ne faudroit sans him by the clepsydra. In civil 

doute que du bon sens pour re- causes, the defendant must have 

connoltre la v6rit6 dans des d6- been perfectly acquainted with 

clarations faites avec simplicity the plaintifiTs case, since besides 

et dSgagSesde tout raisonneroent: the Anakrisis or preliminary exa- 

mais il y parott assists presque mination before the archon, the 

toujours d'un on de plusieurs dd- cause had been for the most part 

fensenrs qui par dos interpella- already before an arbitrator. In a 

tions captieuses, embarrasscnt ou criminal case the accused party 

6garent les t6moins: et par une had only the Anakrisis to guide 

discussion subtile, souvent sophis- him, as to the matter of which he 

tique, quelquefois Eloquent e, en- was to be accused: but it appears 

▼eloppent la v6rit6 des nuages, et from the prepared speeches of ac- 

rendent Tdvidence mdme probl6- cused parties which we now pos- 

matique. Gertes, il fatlt plus que sess, that this Anakrisis must have 

de bonnes intentions, il faut plus been sufficiently copious to give him 

que du bon sens, pour ne pas se a good idea of that which he had to 

laisser entratner k ces fausses lu- rebut. The accuser was condemned 

eurs, pour se garantir des hearts to a fine of 1000 drachms, if he 

de la sensibility, et pour se main- did not obtain on the verdict one- 

tenir immuablement dans la ligne fifth of the votes of the dikasts 

du vrai, au milieu de ces impul- engaged. 

sions donnSes en mdme temps & Antipho not only composed 
resprit et au coeur" (Merlin, 116- speeches for pleaders before the 
pertoiredeJurisprudeuce,art.Jur6s, dikastery, but also gave them 
p. 98). valuable advice generally as to the 
At Athens, there were no pro- manner of conducting their case, 
fessional advocates: the accuser Ac, though he did not himself 
and the accused (or the plaintiff speak before the dikasts: so also 
and defendant, if the cause was Ktesiklds the XoYOYpd(po< (Demos- 
civil), each appeared in person thends cont. Theokrin. c. 6) acted 
with their witnesses, or sometimes as general adviser or attorney, 
with depositions which the wit- Xenophon (Memor. i. 2, 61) notices 
nesses had sworn to before the the persons ''who knew how to 
archon: each might come with a furnish advice and aid to those 
speech prepared by Antipho (Thu- engaged in a suit at law" (ol tfuv- 
cyd. viii. 6^) or some other rhetor: Sixeiv ciciOT^fAsvoi) as analogous to 
each might have one or mori ^uvt)- the surgeon when a man was sick ; 
f 6pou; to speak on his behalf after though they bore no current pro- 
himself, but seemingly only out fessional name, 
of the space of time allotted to 


of the dikast were thns materially dimmished, while the 
action upon his feelings, of anger as well as of compassion, 
was sharpened, as compared with the modem juror. * We 
see in the remaining productions of the Attic orators how 
much there is of plausible deception, departure from the 
true issue, and appeals to sympathies, antipathies, and 
prejudices of every kind, addressed to the dikasteries.s Of 

^ Aristotle in the first and feeling, and the exhibition of justice 

second chapters of his Treatise de both invoked and administered .by 

Bhetoricft^ complains that the private citizens exclnsively. The 

teachers and writers on rhetoric who nearest analogy to this^ which 

preceded him, treated almost modem justice presents, it to be 

entirely of the diiferent means of found in the Courts of Bequests 

working on the feelings of the di- and other courts for trying causes 

kasts, and of matters "extraneous limited to small stims of property 

to the real question which the di- — too small to be worth the notice 

kasts ought to try" (iccpl Td>v l^u> of judges and lawyers. 

Tou icpdYfiaTOQ tS icXstOTa icpaYp.a- These Gourts, in spite of their 

TSUovTai* Sia|)oXi^ fap xal iXtoc xal direct and important bearing on 

6pYY), 06 icepl Tou icpij(i.aT6< ioTiv, the welfare and security of the 

aXXdi icpoc tov SixaoTigv, Ac, i. 1, 1: poorer classes, have received little 

compare, i. 2, 8 and iii. 1, 2). elucidation. The History of the 

This is 8u£&cient to show how Birmingham Gourt of Bequests, 
prominent such appeals to the by Mr. William Hutton (lately re- 
feelings of the dikasts were, in published by Messrs. Chambers), 
actual fact and practice, even if forms an exception to this remark, 
we did not know it 'from the per- and is full of instruction in respect 
usal of the orations themselves. to the habits, the conduct, and the 

Bespecting the habit of accused sufferings of poor persons. It fur- 
persons to bring their wives and nishes,be8ide8,the closest approach 
children before the dikasts as sup- that I know to the feelings of 
pliants for them to obtain mercy Athenian dikasts and pleaders, 
or acquittal, see Aristophan. Yesp. though of course with many im- 
567-976; Andokidds de Mysteriis portant differences. Mr. Hutton 
(ad finem), and Lysias Orat. iv. de was for many years unremitting 
Vulnere (ad finem). in his attendance as a Commission- 

* To a person accustomed to the er, and took warm interest in the 

judicature of modem Europe, con- honourable working of the Court, 

ducted throughout all its stages His remarks upon the position, the 

by the instrumentality of pro- duties, and the difBculties of the 

fessional men (j^^SO? advocates, Commissioners, illustrated by nu- 

attomeys, Ac), and viewed by the merous cases given in detail, are 

general public as a matter in which extremely interesting, and repre- 

no private citizen either could act sent thoughts which must have 

or ought to act for himself— nothing often suggested themselves to in-> 

is more remarkable in reading the telligent dikasts at Athens. 

Attic judicial orations (to a certain *'Law and equity (he says, p. 84) 

extent also the Boman) than the often vary. If the Commissioners 

entire absence of this professional cannot decide againgt law, they 

Cbat.XLYI. changes at ATHENS TJNDEB PEBIKLES. 255 

course such artifices were resorted to by opposite speakers 
in each particular trial. "We have no means of Imowing 
to what extent they actually perverted the judgement of 
the hearers.* Probably the frequent habit of sitting in 
dikastery gave them a penetration in detecting sophistry 
not often possessed by non-professional citizens. Neverthe- 
less it cannot be doubted tnat in a considerable proportion 
of cases, success depended less upon the intrinsic merits of 
a case, than upon apparent airs of innocence and truth- 
telling; dexterity of statement, and good general character, 
in the parties, their witnesses, and the friends who addressed 
the court on their behalf. The accusatory speeches in 
Attic oratory, wherein punishment is invoked upon an 
alleged delinquent, are expressed with a bitterness which 
is now banished from English criminal judicature, though 
it was common in the state trials of two centuries ago. 
Against them may be set the impassioned and emphatic 
appeals made by defendants and their friends to the com- 
miseration of the dikasts; appeals the more often successful, 

can decide toithout it. Their oath reach it, if the judge has a heart 

binds them to proceed according to reach. Distress and pity are 

to good conscience (icspl 6too olix inseparable. 

tlai v6|xoi, yvibfi^ t^ CixoiotoT'O— "Perhaps there never was a judge, 

was the oath of the Athenian di- from seventeen to seventy, who 

kast). A man only needs informa- could look with indifference upon 

tion to be able to decide." beauty in distress; if he could, 

A few words from p. 86, about he was unfit to be a judge. He 

the sources of misjudgement. "Mis- should be a stranger to decision 

information is another source of who is a stranger to compassion, 

evil: both parties equally treat All these matters influence the 

the Commissioners with deceit, man, and warp his judgement." 

The only people who can throw This is a description, given by 

light upon the subject will not. a perfectly honest and unpro- 

"It is difBcult not to be won by fessional judge, of his own feelings 

the first speaker, if he carries the when on the bench. It will be 

air of mildness and is master of found illustrated by frequent pas- 

his tale; or not to be biassed in sages in the Attic pleaders, where 

favour of infirmity or infancy, they address themselves to the 

Those who cannot assist themsel- feelings here described in the bo- 

ves, we are much inclined to assist, som of the dikasts. 

"Nothing dissolves like tears. *• Demosthends (cent. Phormio. p. 

Though they arise from weakness, 013, c. 2) emphatically remarks 

they are powerful advocates, which how much more cautious witnesses 

instantly disarm, particularly those were of giving false testimony be- 

which the afBicted wish to hide, fore the numerous dikastery, than 

They come from the heart and will before the arbitrator. 

256 HISTOBY 07 GBEECB. Past U, 

because they came last, immediately before decision was 
pronounced. This is true of Borne as well as of Athens. ^ 
As an organ for judicial purposes, the Athenian 
Powerful dikasteries were thus a simple and plenary 
effects to manifestation of jury-trial, with its inherent 
Bteries^in excellences and defects both brought out in 
exercising exaggerated relief. They ensured a decision at 
latlng^Sie ^^^^ uncomipt, pubUc-minded, and imposing — 
intellect together with the best security which the case 
togs'of^' admitted against illegal -violences on the part 
individual of the rich and great. 2 Their extreme publicity 
citizens. — ^^ ^^jj ^ their simple and oral procedure, 
divested of that verbal and ceremonial technicality which 
marked the law of Bome even at its outset, was no small 
benefit. And as the verdicts of the dikasts, even when 
wrong, depended upon causes of misjudgement common 
to them with the general body of the citizens, so they 
never appeared to pronounce unjustly, nor lost the confid- 
ence of their fellow-citizens generally. But whatever 
may have been their defects as judicial instruments, as a 
stimulus both to thought and speech, their efficacy was 
unparalleled, in the circumstances of Athenian society. 
Doubtless they would not have produced the same effect 
if established at Thebes or Argos. The susceptibilities 
of the Athenian mind, as well as the previous practice and 
expansive tendencies of democratical citizenship, were 

^ Asconius gives an account of Soanms ipse et M. Glabrio,. sororis 

the begging oif and supplication filius, et Paulus, et P. Lentulu^, 

to the judices at Borne, when et L. ^milius Buca, et G. Memmius, 

sentence was about to be pro- supplicarerunt: ex alterik parte 

nounced upon Soaurus, whom Sylla Faustus, frater Scauri, et 

Cicero defended (Gic. Orat. pro T. Annius Milo, et T. Peduceeus, 

8cauro, p. 28. ed Orell.) : "Lauda- et G. Gato, et M. Octavius Leenas." 

Terunt Scaurum consulares novem Gompare also Gicero, Brutus, o. 

—Horum magna pars per tabellas 23, about the defence of Sergius 

laudaverunt, qui aberant: inter Galba; Quintilian, L 0. ii. 15. 

quos Pompeius quoque. Unus ' Plato, in his Treatise de Legi- 

pr»tere& adolescens laudavit, fra- bus (yi. p. 768), adopts all the 

ter ejus, Faustus Gomelius, Sylla distinguishing principles of the 

filiuB. Is in laudatione multa hu- Athenian dikasteries. He parti- 

militer et cum lacrimis looutus cularly insists, that the citizen 

non minus audientes permovit, who does not take his share in the 

quam Scaurus ipse permoverat. exercise of this function, conceives 

Ad genua Judicum, cum sententiae himself to have no concern or in- 

ferrentur, bifariam se diriserunt terest in the commonwealth— to 

qui pro eo rogabant: ab uno latere icapdicay x^c ndXttuc o6 |&ixoxo( elvot. 



also essential conditions — and that genuine taste for sitting 
in judgement and hearilig both sides fairly, which, however 
Anstophanes may caricature and deride it, was alike 
honourable and useful to the people. The first establish- 
ment of the dikasteries is nearly coincident with the great 
improvement of Attic tragedy in passing from JSschylus to 
Sophokles. The same development of the national genius, 
now preparing splendid manifestations both in tragic and 
comic poetry, was called with redoubled force into the 
path of oratory, by the new judicial system. A Necessity 
certain power of speech now became necessary, of learning 
not merely for those who intended to take a grJwth of 
prominent part in politics, but also for private profession- 
citizens to vindicate their rights or repel accusa- l\ ^^^^^Z" 
tions, in a court of justice. It was an accom- — pro- 
plishment of the greatest practical utility, even Composers 
apart from ambitious purposes; hardly less so of speeches 
than the use of arms or the practice of the '°' ^*^®"- 
gymnasium. Accordingly, the teachers of grammar and 
rhetoric, and the composers of written speeches to be 
delivered by others, now began to multiply and to acquire 
an unprecedented importance — as well at Athens &b under 
the contemporary democracy of Syracuse, * in which also 
some form of popular judicature was established. Style, 
and speech began to be reduced to a system, and so com- 
municated; not always happily, for several of the early 
rhetors 2 adopted an artificial^ ornate, and conceited, 
manner, from which Attic good taste afterwards liberated 
itself. But the very character of a teacher of rhetoric as 
an art,— a man giving precepts and putting himself for- 
ward in show-lectures as a model for others, is a feature 
first belonging to the Periklean age, and indicates a new 
demand in the minds of the citizens. 

We begin to hear, in the generation now growing up, 
of the rhetor and the sophist, as persons of influence and 

' Aristot. ap. Cicero. Brut. c. 12. * Especially Gorgias ; see Aris- 

"Itaque cum sublatit in 8icili4 total. Bhetor. iii. 1, 26; Tinuens, 

tyrannis ret privata longo inter- "Ft. ; Dionys. Halicam. De LysiA 

vallo judiciis repeterentnr, tarn Judicium, o. 8: also Foss, Disser- 

primum quod asset acuta ea gens tatio de Gorgi& Leontino, p. 30 

et controyersa natnr&, artem et (Halle, 1828); and Westermann, 

prsBceptaSlculosOoracemetTisiam Oeschichte der Beredsamkeit in 

conscripsisse," Ac. Gompare Diodor. Qrieohenland and Bom, sect. 80, 81« 
xi. 87 ; Fausan. Ti. 17, 8. 

VOL. V, 


celebrity. These two names denoted persons of similar 
Bhetorsand moral and intellectual endowments, or often in- 
sophisti. deed the same person, considered in different 
points of view;* either as professing to improve the moral 
character — or as communicating power and facility of 
expression — or as suggesting premises for persuasion, 
illustrations on the common-places of morals and politics, 
argumentative abundance on matters of ordinary ex- 
perience, dialectical subtlety in confuting an opponent, 
&C.3 Antipho of the deme Bhamnus in Attica, Thra- 
symachus of Chalkedon, Tisias of Syracuse, Gorgias of 
teontini, Protagoras of Abdera, Jrrodikus of Keos, 
Theodorus of Byzantium, Hippias of Elis, Zeno of Elea, 
were among the first who distin^ished themselves in these 
departments of teaching. Antipho was the author of the 
earliest composed speecn really spoken in a dikastery and 
preserved down to the later critics. 3 These men were 

* Plato (Gorgiai, o. SO-76 ; Pro- appertaining to it (in a treatise 
tagoras, c. 9). Lysias is sometimes which has rarely been surpassed 
designated as a sophist (Demosth. in power of philosophical analysis), 
oont. Neser. c. 7. p. 1361 ; Athens, yet when he is recommending his 
xiii. p. 692). There is no sufficient speculation to notice, he appeals 
reason for supposing with Taylor to the great practical value of rhe- 
(Vit. LysisB, p. 66, ed. Dobson) that torical teaching, as enabling a man 
there were two persons named to *'help himself" and fight his own 
Lysias, and that the person here battles in case of need— *Atotcov cl 
named is a different man from the t^ auDfiaxi ftiv ala^pov («.i^ SuvaaOat 
author of the speeches which re- poY]Ostv iauTcp, X6Yq> 8i o6x alvxp^^ 
main to us: see Mr. Fynes Clinton, (i. 1, 8: compare ilL 1, 2; Plato, 
Fast. H. p. 860, Appendix, o. 20. Gorgias, c. 41^5 ; Protagoras, o. 9 ; 

* See the first book of Aristotle's Phsedrus, c. 43-60; £uthydem. o. 1- 
Bhetorio (alluded to in a former 81; and Xenophon, Memorab. iii. 
note) for his remarks on the tech- 12, 2, 8). 

nical teachers of rhetoric before See also the character of Proxe- 

his time. He remarks (and Plato nus in the Anabasis of Xenophon, 

had remarked before him) (i. 1 and ii. 6, 16 ; Plutarch, Vit. X. Orator. 

2) that their teaching was for the p. 807 ; Aristoph. Nubes, 1108 ; Xe- 

most part thoroughly narrow and nophon, Memorab. i. 2, 48; Plato, 

practical, bearing exclusively on Alkibiadds, i. c. 81, p. 119; and a 

what was required for the practice striking passage in Plutarch's life 

of the dikastery (itspl tou 6ixdU- of Cato the elder, c. 1. 

<j8ai itdvTe? icetpu)vTai Tex'»o^o7«*0* • Plutarch, Vit,. X. Orator, p. 882; 

compare also a remarkable passage Quintilian, iii. 1, 10. Compare Van 

in his Treatise de Sophisticis Elen- Bpaan (or Buhnken), Dissertatio 

chis, o. 82 ad finem. And though de Antiphonte Oratore Attico, pp. 

he himself lays down a far more 8, 9, prefixed to Dobson's edition 

profound and comprehensive the- of Antipho and Andokidds. Auti- 

oxy of rhetoric and all matters pho is said to have been the teacher 

Ohap. XLYI. changes at ATHENS UNDEB PBBIELES. 259 

mostly not citizens of Athens, though many of them be- 
longed to towns comprehended in the Athenian empire, at 
a time when important judicial causes belonging to these 
towns were often carried up to be tried at Athens — while 
all of them looked to that city as a central point of action 
and distinction. The term Sophist, which Herodotus^ 
applies with sincere respect to men of distinguished wisdom 
such as Solon, Anacharsis, Pythagoras, &c., now came to 
be applied to these teachers of virtue, rhetoric, conver- 
sation, and disputation ; many of whom professed acquaint- 
ance with the whole circle of human science, physical as 
well as moral (then narrow enough), so far as was 
necessary to talk about any portion of it plausibly and 
effectively, and to answer any question which might be 
proposed to them. Though they passed from one Grecian 
town to another, partly in the capacity of envoys from 
their fellow-citizens, partly as exhibiting their talents to 
numerous hearers, with much renown and large gain, 2— 
they appear to have been viewed with jealousy and dislike 
by a large portion of the public. 3 I^or at a time when 
every citizen pleaded his own cause before the dikastery, 
they imparted, to those who were rich enough to purchase 
it, a peculiar skill in the common weapons, which made 
them like fencing-masters or professional swordsmen 
amidst a society of untrained duellists.* Moreover Sokrates, 

of the historian Thucydidds. The * Such is probably the meaning 

•tatemont of Plutarch that the of that remarkable passage in which 

father of Antipho was also a to- Thucydidds describes the Athenian 

phist, can hardly be tme. rhetor Antipho (viii. 68) : 'AvTKpwv, 

* Herodot. 1. 29; ir. 96. dv7)p 'AGT)val(uv ipex^ tc o6§ev6< 

* Plato (Hippias Major, c. 1, 2 ; uarspo?, xal xpAxiffTO? iv0u(iiT)9^vai 
Menon, p. 96; and Gorgias, c. 1, 7ev6(xsvo< xal A &v yvoIt) eliteiv xal 
with Stallbaam*8 note); Diodor. «< (liv 5^|iov 06 icaptwv ou8' k aXXov 
xii. 63; Pausan. vi. 17, 8, diftbva 4xoo<jio« o684va, dXV 6ir6ic- 

* Xenophon, Memorab. i« 2, 81. t(u<t<{> icXiqOci 8id 866av 8ti- 
To teach or learn the art of speech v6Tt)T0< 8iaxcl(«.cvo<, toi)< |xiv 
was the common reproach made by toi oYtoviCojxdvou? xol iv 8ixaaT7)pltj> 
the vulgar against philosophers and xol iv Si^ixtp, nXsiaTa »r? avifjp, SaTic 
lettered men— t6 xoiv^ xoU 91X096- 5ofjLpooX86ffaiT6Ti,8ovafi.«voca)98XtTv. 
<pot< 6tc6 t(I)v icoXXtuv iniTtfiiuDfxsvov '^Inde ilia circa occnltandam elo- 
(Xenoph. Memor. i. 2, 81). Compare qnentiam simnlatio," obserret 
iEschinds cont. Timar. about De- Qnintilian, Inst. Or. ir. 1, 8. 
mosthen6s, 0. 25, 27, which illu- Compare Plato (Protagoras, 0. 8 ; 
strates the curious fragment of Phsedrus, c. 86), Isokratds cont. 
Sophoklfts, 866. Ol->[6ip -jit Uifiy 9 poi Sophistas, Or. xiii. p. 295, where 
xzl XsYCiv 7|axi)x6Tt<. h^e complains of the teachers— oTtw 


260 HISTOBT 07 GBBEOB. Fast H. 

— himself a product of the same age, a disputant on 
p lemica f ^^® same subjects, and bearing the same name 
Sokratfis, of a Sophtst * — but despising political and judi- 
^*"h?^t * ^^^ practice, and looking to the production of 
against' the intellectual stimulus and moral impressions 
sophists upon his hearers — Sokrates — or rather, Plato 
genera y. gpeaking through the person of Sokrates-^ 
carried on throughout his life a constant polemical war- 
fare against the sophists and rhetors, in that negative vein 
in which he was unrivalled. And as the works of these 
latter have not remained, it is chiefly from the observations 
of their opponents that we know them; so that they are 
in a situation such as that in which Sokrates himself would 
have been, if we had been compelled to judge of him only 
from the Clouds of Aristophanes, or from those unfavour- 
able impressions respecting his character which we know, 
even from the Apologies of Plato and Xenophon, to have 
been generally prevalent at Athens. 

This is not the opportunity however for trying to 
distinguish the good from the evil in the working of the 
sophists and rhetors. At present it is enough that they 
were the natural product of the age; supplying those wants, 
and answering to that stimulus, which arose partly from 
the deliberations of the Ekklesia, but still more from the 
contentions before the dikastery, — in which latter a far 
greater number of citizens took active part, with or without 

their own consent. The public and frequent 
and rhetors dikasteries constituted by Perikles opened to 
were the the Athenian mind precisely that career of im- 
produ* t of provement which was best suited to its natural 
the age aptitude. They were essential to the develop- 
demo^cracy. Dient of that demand out of which grew not 

only Grecian oratory, but also, as secondary 

vs< 6itiax^'^'^<') SixdiCcffOai SiSdffxciv, p. 74. *T(«.tt< (tiv, to 'AO'vjvaiot, 2 u>- 

ixXt8&|jL8voi xh 8u9)repdaTaTov tu>v xpdixTjv (liv t6v ao«piaT7)v ditex- 

ivo(A.&T(ov, h TU>v <p8ovo6vTU>v ipyov TCtvaTe, Sxi Kptrlav c^dvT] ict;rat§EU- 

cIy) XiYsiv, dXV o6 t<I)v icposaxuDttov xu>c, Ivot tu)v Tpidxovxa xu)v xov S^(tov 

xTfi xoiaOxTjg itai8«6acu><, Demos- xaxccXuodvxtuv. 

then. De Fals. Legat. o. 70, 71, p. Among the sophists whom Iso* 

417-420; and ^schin. oont. Ktesi- kratfts severely criticises, he evi- 

phon, o. 9, p. 871— xaxoupYOv ao<pi- dently seems to include Plato, as 

axTjv, olopLtvov ^)&aai xoO^ v6)xou$ may he seen hy the contrast he- 

j&vatpiQaciv. tween 86^a and tici9Ti^|i.?), which ho 

•* iSsohiudi oont. Timarch. o. 84, particularly notes, and which is go 


product?, the speculative moral and political philosophy, 
and the didactic analysis of rhetoric and grammar, which 
long survived after Grecian creative genius had passed 
away. ^ And it was one of the first measures of the oligarchy 
of Thirty, to forbid, by an express law, any teaching of 
the art of speaking. Aristophanes derides the Athenians 
for their love of talk and controversy, as if it had enfeebled 
their military energy; but in his time most undoubtedly, 
that reproach was not true — ^nor did it become true, even 
in part, until the crushing misfortunes which marked the 
close of the Peloponnesian war. During the course of that 
war, restless and energetic action was the characteristic of 
Athens even in a greater degree than oratory or political 
discussion, though before the time of Demostnenes a mate- 
rial alteration had taken place. 

The establishment of these paid dikasteries at Athens 
was thus one of the most important and prolific The dikas- 
events in all Grecian history. The pay helped teriet were 
to furnish a maintenance for old citizens, past no™exciu- 
the age of military service. Elderly men were iiveiy of 
the best persons for such a service, and were bu?'o?®"' 
preferred for judicial purposes both at Sparta, middling 
and as it seems, in heroic Greece. Nevertheless, cUizeM '*' 
we need not suppose that all the dikasts were indiscri- 
either old or poor, though a considerable pro- "^^'^^^^ly* 
portion of them were so, and though Aristophanes selects 
these qualities as among the most suitable subjects for his 

oonspicaonsly set forth in the Pla- the indiscriminate oensnree against 

tonic writings (Isokratds cont. them as a class, which most modem 

Sophistas, Or. xiii. p. 293 : also p. writers have copied implicitly from 

396). We know also that Lysias the polemics of ancient times. This 

called both Plato and ^schinds examination will be found in oh. 

the disciple of Sokratds, by the 67 of the present history, 

name of Sophists (Aristeidds, Orat. ' Xenoph. Memor. i. 2, 81. X6yu>v 

Platonic, xlvi. Ticip tu>v Tsxtdcptuv, Ti^^'^v (xif) SiSdaxttv. Xenophon as- 

p. 407, vol. iL ed. Dindorf). Ari- cribes the passing of this law to a 

ateidds remarks justly that the name personal hatred of Kritias against 

Sophist was a general name, in- Bokratds, and connects it with an 

eluding all the philosophers, teach- anecdote exceedingly puerile, 

ers, and lettered men. when considered as the alleged 

The general name Sophists^ in cause of that hatred, as well as of 

fact, included good, bad, and in- the consequent law. But it is 

different, like "the philosophers, evident that the law had a far 

the political economists, the meta- deeper meaning, and was aimed 

physicians," Ac. I shall take a directly at one of the prominent 

future opportunity of examining democratical habits. 

262 HI8T0BT OF GBEEGB. Fast H 

ridicule. FeriklSs has been often censored for this insti- 
tution; as if he had been the first to ensure pay to dikasts 
who before served for nothing, and had thus introduced 
poor citizens into courts previously composed of citizens 
above poverty. But in the first place, this supposition is 
not correct in point of fact, inasmuch as there were no 
such constant dikasteries previously acting without pay; 
next, if it had been true, the habitual exclusion of the poor 
citizens would have nullified the popular working of these 
bodies^ and would have prevented them from answering 
any longer to the reigning sentiment at Athens. Nor 
could it be deemed unreasonable to assign a regular pay 
to those who thus rendered regular service. It was indeed 
an essential item in the whole scheme ^ and purpose, so 
that the suppression of the pay of itself seems to have sus- 
pended the dikasteries, while the oligarchy of Four Hundred 
was established — and it can only be discussed in that 
light. As the fact stands, we may suppose that the 6000 
Heliasts who filled the dikasteries were composed of the 
middling and poorer citizens indiscriminately; though 
there was nothmg to exclude the richer, if they chose to 

■ Thuoyd. yiii. 67. Compare a turn de Nomine, o. 5. xal clfAioO&c 

curioai paiiage, eren in reference inopladT) toU SixaaxijploiCi cW^Y^^ 

to the time of DemoetbenAs, in the &v i&s S^Xov Sxti &q, 
speech of that orator contra Bgbo- 




The judicial alterations effected at Athens by PeriMSs and 
Ephialtes, described in the preceding chapter, Personal 
gave to a large proportion of the citizens direct activity 
jury functions and an active interest in the con- vaieni'*" 
stitution, such as they had never before enjoyed ; among the 
the change being at once a mark of previous ^tizens— 
growth of democratical sentiment during the empire of 
past, and a cause of its farther development ^^g^veiy* 
during the future. The Athenian people were maritime, 
at this time ready for personal exertion in all fhirty***^ 
directions. Military service on land or sea was years' 
not less conformable to their dispositions than *'"°** 
attendance in the ekklesia or in the dikastery at home. The 
naval service especially was prosecuted with a degree of 
assiduity which brought about continual improvement in 
skill and efficiency; while the poorer citizens, of whom it 
chiefly consisted, were more exact in obedience and dis- 
cipline than any of the more opulent persons from whom 
the infantry or the cavalry were drawn, i The maritime 
multitude, in addition to self-confidence and courage, ac- 
quired by this laborious training an increased skill, which 
placed the Athenian navy every year more and more above 
the rest of Greece. And the perfection of this force be- 
came the more indispensable as the Athenian empire was 
now again confined to the sea and seaport towns; the re- 
verses immediately preceding the thirty years' truce having 
broken up all Athenian land ascendency over Megara, 
Boeotia, and the other continental territories adjoining to 

The maritime confederacy — originally commenced at 
Delos under the headship of Athens, but with a common 

> XenopLon, ULfimonb. iii. 5^ 18, 


synod and deliberative voice on the part of each member 
— had now become transformed into a confirmed empire 
on the part of Athens, over the remaining states as foreign 
dependencies; all of them rendering tribute except Chios, 
Samosy and Lesbos. These three still remained on their 

original footing of autonomous allies, retaining 
moV,'and* their armed force, ships, and fortifications, with 
Lesboi the obligation of furnishing military and naval 
ttTe^oniy' *^^ when required, but not of paymg tribute, 
free allies The discontinuance of the deliberative synod, 
ontoe^f^'e however, had deprived them of their original 
footing as security against the encroachments of Athens, 
mil con-* -^ horve already stated generallv the stejjs (we 
federates do not know them in detail) whereby this im- 
the^res^'" portant change was brougnt about, gradually 
wer* sub- and without any violent revolution — for even 
tribut^. ^^® transfer of the common treasure from Delos 

to Athens, which was the most palpable symbol 
and evidence of the change, was not an act of Athenian 
violence, since it was adopted on the proposition of the 
Samians. The change resulted in fact almost inevitably 
from the circumstances of the case, and from the eager ac- 
tivity of the Athenians contrasted with the backwardness 
and aversion to personal service on the part of the allies. 
We must recollect that the confederacy, even in its original 
structure, was contracted for permanent objects, and was 
permanently binding by the vote of its majority, like the 
Spartan confederacy, upon every individual member, i It 
was destined to keep out the Persian fleet, and to maintain 
the police of the ^gean. Consistently with these objects, 
no individual member could be allowed to secede from the 
confederacy, and thus to acquire the benefit of protection 
at the cost of the remainder: so that when Kaxos and other 
members actually did secede, the step was taken as a re- 
volt, and Athens only performed her duty as president of 
the confederacy in reducing them. By every such reduction, 
as well as by that exchanffe of personal service for money- 
payment, which most of the allies voluntarily sought, the 
power of Athens increased, until at length she found her- 
self with an irresistible navy in the midst of disarmed 

■ Thncyd. t. SO : about the Spar- (xdlyoav <^ri<p\ariroL\, ^ |liq Tt fteuiv 
tan confederacy — elpT)(iievov, xuptov ^ i](>tt)tt>v xu>Xu|&a "Q* 



tributaries, none of whom could escape from her constrain- 
ing power, — and mistress of the sea, the use of which 
was indispensable to them. The synod of Delos, even if 
it had not before become partially deserted, must have 
ceased at the time when the treasure was removed to Athens 
— probably about 460 B.C., or shortly afterwards. 

The relations between Athens and her allies were 
thus materially changed, by proceedings which gradually 
evolved themselves and followed one upon the other with- 
out any preconcerted plan. She became an imperial or 
despot city, governing an aggregate of dependent subjects 
all without their own active concurrence, and j^^hens 
in many cases doubtless contrary to their own took no 
sense of political right. It was not likely that p**'^" *^ 

J.I. I, 1 J • • 1 i. I. 1 inspire her 

they should conspire unanimously to break up allies with 
the confederacy, and discontinue the collection ^^^ **®* ®^ 
of contribution from each of the members; nor interest 
would it have been at all desirable that they ^ei'^®''tjj3 
should do so : for while Greece generally would allies were 
have been a great loser by such a proceeding, the F^*"^®" ^^ 
allies themselves would have been the great- tinuance 
est losers of all, inasmuch as they would have <>' *»®' 
been exposed without defence to the Persian ^^^ "* 
and Phoenician fleets. But the Athenians committed 
the capital fault of taking the whole alliance into their 
own hands, and treating the allies purely as subjects, with- 
out seeking^. to attach them by any form of political incor- 
poration or collective meeting and discussion — without 
taking anjr pains to maintain community of feeling or idea 
of a joint interest — without admitting any control, real or 
even pretended, over themselves as managers. Had they 
attempted to do this, it might have proved difficult to 
accomplish, — so powerful was the force of geographical 
dissemination, the tendency to isolated civic life, and the 
repugnance to any permanent extramural obligations, in 
every Grecian community. But they do not appear to 
have ever made the attempt. Finding Athens exalted by 
circumstances to empire, and the allies degraded into sub- 
jects, the Athenian statesmen grasped at the exaltation a^ 
a matter of pride as well as- profit.* Even Perikles, the 

> Thacyd. ii. 63. t^< Si ic6X8u>c f)ot)Ottv, xal («.j| fOyeiv toix ic6vou<| 
6(«.a< clx6c ttj) Ti(xu>(xiv(f> inb tou 9i l».yfii td^ Ttpidc 6iu)xtiv, Ao. 


most prudent and far-sighted of them, betray ed no conscious- 
ness that an empire without the cement of some all- 
pervading interest or attachment, although not practically 
oppressive, must nevertheless have a natural tendency to 
become more and more unpopular, and ultimately to 
crumble in pieces. Such was the course of events wnich, 
if the judicious counsels of Perikles had been followed, 
might have been postponed, though it could not have been 

Instead of trying to cherish or restore the feelings of 
equal alliance, Periklls formally disclaimed it. He main- 
tained that Athens owed to her subject allies no account 
of the money received from them, so long as she perform- 
ed her contract by keeping away the Persian enemy and 
maintaining the safety of the ^gean waters. ^ This was, 
as he represented, the obligation which Athens had under- 
taken; and provided it were faithfuUy dis- 
^f ¥ ^iikir ^^*rg®^ ^® allies had no right to ask questions 
—Athens, or exercise controL That it was faithfully 
rT/^it^ discharged no one could deny. No ship of war 
owing pro- except from Athens and her allies was ever seen 
^o**o*\ *o t ^®^w®®^ ^^® eastern and western shores of the 
aiuei^ -^gean. An Athenian fleet of sixty triremes 
thV ***rt ^*^ ^®P^ ^^ duty in these waters, cniefly man- 
owed ^be- ned by Athenian citizens, and beneficial as well 
dience and from the protection afforded to commerce as 
for keeping the seamen in constant pay and 
training.' And such was the effective superintendence 
maintained, that in the disastrous period preceding the 
thirty years' truce, when Athens lost Megara and Sobo- 
tia, and with diflSculty recovered Euboea, none of her 
numerous maritime subjects took the opportunity to 

The total of these distinct tributary cities is said to 
have amounted to 1000, according to a verse of Aristo- 
phanes ^ which cannot be under the truth, though it may 
well be, and probably is, greatly above the truth. The 
total annual tribute collected at the beginning of the Pelo- 
ponnesian war, and probably also for the years preceding 
it, is given by Thucydides at about 600 talents. Of the 
sums paid by particular states, however, we have little or 

' Plutarch, Periklfts, o. 12. * Plutarch, Periklds, c. 11. 

* Ariitophan. Veep. 707. 



no information.* It was placed under the superintendence 
of the Hellenotamise ; originally officers of the confederacy 

> The island of Kythdra was con- are included several Inscriptions 
quered by the Athenians from (published also for the most part 
Sparta in 426 B.C., and the annual in Bangab6's Antiquitds HelU- 
tribute then imposed upon it was niques) recently found at Athens, 
four talents (Thucyd. iv. 67). In and illustrating the tribute raised 
the Inscription No. 143, ap. Boeckh by ancient Athens from her sub- 
Gorp. Inscr., we find some names ject-allies. M. Boeckh has devoted 
enumerated of tributary towns with more than half his second volume 
the amount of tribute opposite to (from p. 869 to p. 747) to an ela- 
eaoh, but the stone is too much borate commentary for the eluci- 
damaged to give us much infer- dation of these documents, 
mation. Tyrodiza in Thrace paid Had it been our good fortune to 
1000 drachms: some other towns, recover these Inscriptions com- 
or junctions of towns, not dearly plete, we should have acquired 
discernible, are rated at 1000, 2000, important and authentic informa- 
3000 drachms, one talent, and even tion respecting the Athenian Tri- 
ton talents. This inscription must bute-system. But they are very 
be anterior to 413 B.C., when the imperfectly legible, and require 
tribute was converted into a five at every step conjectural restora- 
per cent, duty upon imports and tion as well as conjectural inter- 
exports : see Boeckh, Public Bcon« pretation. To extract from them 
of Athens, and his notes upon tho a consistent idea of the entire sy- 
above-mentioned Inscription. stem, M. Boeckh has recourse to 

It was the practice of Athens not several hypotheses, which appear 
always to rate each tributary city to me more ingenious than con- 
separately, but sometimes to join vincing. 

several in one collective rating; The stones (or at least several 
probably each responsible for the among them) form a series of ra- 
rest. This seems to have provoked cords, belonging to successive years 
occasional remonstrances from the or other periods, Inscribed by the 
allies, in some of which the rhetor ThirtyLogistss or Auditors (Boeckh, 
Antipho was employed to furnish p. 684). The point of time from 
the speech which the complainants which they begin is not positively 
pronounced before the dikastery: determinable. Bangab6 supposes 
see Antipho ap. Harpokration, v. it to be Olymp. 82. 1. (462 B.C.), 
'AitAxa^i? — SuvteXei?. It is greatly while Boeckh puts it later— Olymp. 
ta be lamented that the orations 83. 2. B.C. 447 (p. 694-696). They 
composed by Antipho for the Sa- reach down, in his opinion, to 
mothrakians and Lindians (the B.C. 406. 

latter inhabiting one of the three As to the amount of tribute 

separate towns in the island of demanded from or paid by the 

Bhodes) have not been pre- allies, collectively or individually, 

served. nothing certain appears to me 

Since my first edition, M. Boeckh obtainable from these Inscrip- 

has published a second edition of tions ; which vary surprisingly (as 

his Public Economy of the Athe- Boeckh observes p. 615, 626, 628, 

nians, with valuable additions and 646) in the sums placed opposite 

enlargements. Among the latter to the same name. We learn how- 


but now removed from Delos to Athens, and acting alto- 
gether as an Athenian treasury-board. The sum total of 
the Athenian revenue ^ from all sources, including this 
tribute, at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war is stated 
by Xenophon at 1000 talents. Customs, harbour and 

market-dues, receipt from the silver-mines at Laurium, 

ever something about the olassifl- -which the inm placed opposite to 
cation of the subject allies. They the name of each city is extremely 
were distributed under fire general high ; but in general the sum re- 
heads, — 1. Karian Tribute. 2. Ionic corded is so small, that Boeckh 
Tribute. 8. Insular Tribute. 4. affirms it not to represent the 
Hellespontine Tribute. 6. Thra- whole tribute assessed, but only 
cian Tribute. Under the first head, that small fraction of it (accord- 
Karian, we find specified 62 names ing to him Viso) ^hich was paid 
of cities ; under the second, Ionic, over as a compliment of perquisite 
42 names; under the third, Insu- to the goddess Ath6nd. His hypo- 
lar, 41; under the fourth Helles- thesis on this subject rests, in my 
pontine, 60 ; under the fifth, Thra- judgement, upon no good proof, 
cian, 68. The total of these (with nor can I think that these Inscrip- 
the addition of four undecypher- tions at all help us to discover 
ablenames not aggregated to either the actual aggregate of tribute 
class) makes 267 names of tribut- raised. He speaks too emphati- 
ary cities (Boeckh, p. 619). Tin- cally about the heavy pressure of 
doubtedly all the names of tribut- it upon the allies. Nothing in 
aries are not here included. Boeckh Thucydidds warrants this belief; 
supposes that an approximation to moreover, we know distinctly from 
the actual total may be made, by him that until the year 413 B.C., 
adding one-fifth more, making in the total tribute was something 
all 334 tributaries (p. 663). This not so' much as 6 per cent, upon 
shows a probable minimum, but imports and exports (Tbuoyd. vii. 
little more. 28). How much less it was we do 

Allusion is made in the Inscrip- not know ; but it certainly did not 

tions to certain differences in the reach that point. Mitford seems 

mode of assessment. Some are self- struck with the lightness of the 

assessed cities, icdXctc a^xal ^dpov tax (see a note in this History, 

Ta^dlfASvat — others are cities in- ch. Ixi.). It is possible that the 

scribed by private individuals on very high assessments, which ap- 

the tribute roll, ic6X6i« A( oi iSiu)- pear on a few of the stones ap- 

Tat iviYpa'{>av «p6pov <pipeiv (p. 613- pended to some names of insular 

616). These two heads (occurring tributaries, may refer to a date 

in three different Inscriptions) seem laterthan 413 b.o. during the closing 

to point to a date not long after years of the war, when Athens 

the first establishment of the tri- 'was struggling under the most 

bute. It appears that the Athe- severe pressure and peril (Boeckh, 

nian kleruohs or outlying citizens p. 647 seq.), 

were numbered among the tribu- " Xenophon. Anab. vii. 1. 27. o4 

taries, and were assessed (as far fxsiov x^^^*"*'' xaXivTcov: compare 

as can be made out) at the highest Boeckh, Public £con. of Athens, 

rate (p. 631). b. iii. ch. 7, 15, 19. 

Thee are a few Inscriptions in 


rents of public property, fines from judicial sentences, a 
tax per head upon slaves, the annual payment made by 
each metic, &c., may have made up a larger sum than 400 
talents: which sum, added to the 600 talents from tribute, 
would make the total named by Xenophon. But a verse 
of Aristophanes * during the ninth year of the Peloponne- 
sian war (b. c. 422) gives the general total of that time as 
**nearly 2000 talents:" this is in all probability much above 
the truth, though we may reasonably imagine that the 
amount of tribute-money levied upon the allies had been 
augmented during the interval. I think that the alleged 
duplication of the tribute by Alkibiades, which Thucydides 
nowhere notices, is not borne out by any good evidence, 
nor can I believe that it ever reached the sum of 1200 
talents. 2 Whatever may have been the actual magnitude 

> Aristophan. Yesp. 660. rdXavx' negative probabilities, as sufficient 

ifjb^ 6i9^lXia. for an important matter of fact. 

* Yery excellent writers on Athe- In a note on the chapter immedi- 

nian antiquity (Boeokh, Public ately preceding I have already 

Eoon. of Athens, c. 15, 19, b. iii. ; touched upon their extraordinary 

SchomanU; Antiq. J. i?. Att. sect, looseness of statement — pointed 

Ixxir. ; K. F. Hermann, Gr. Staats- out by various commentators, 

alterthiimer, sect. 167: compare among them particularly, by Mr. 

however a passage in Boeckh, ch. Fynes Clinton: see above, chap. 

17, p. 421, £ng. transl., where he xlv. 

seems to be of an opposite opinion) The assertion that the tribute 
accept this statement, that the from the Athenian allies was raised 
tribute levied by Athens upon her to a sum of 1200 talents annually, 
allies was doubled some years after comes to us only from these ora- 
tbe commencement of the Pelo- tors as original witnesses; and in 
ponnesian war (at which time it them it forms part of a tissue of 
was 600 taleats), and that it came statements alike confused and in- 
to amount to 1200 talents. Kever- correct. But against it we have a 
fheless, I cannot follow them, powerful negative argument — the 
upon evidence no stronger than perfect silence of Thucydidds. Is 
.Slsohinds (Fals. Leg. c. 64. p. 801), it possible that that historian 
Andokidds (De Pace, c. 1, s. 9), would have omitted all notice of 
and Pseudo-Andokid68,cont. Alkib. a step so very important in its 
8. 11. effects, if Athens had really adopted 

Both Andokidds, and JBschinds it? He mentions to us the com- 
who seems to c6py him, profess to mutation by Athens of the tribute 
furnish a general but brief sketch from her allies into a duty of 6 per 
of Athenian history for the century cent, payable by them on their ex- 
succeeding the Persian invasion, ports and imports (vii. 28)— this was 
But both are so full of historical in the nineteenth year of the war 
and chronological inaccuracies, — 413 b.o. But anything like the 
that we can hardly accept their duplication of the tribute all at 
authority, when opposed by any once, would have altered much 

270 HI8T0BT OT GBESGS. Past H. 

of the Atbenian budget, however, prior to the Peloponne- 
sian war, we know that daiing the larger part of Ihe ad- 
more materially the relations be- eieed, and the question is to deter- 
tveen Athens and her allies, and mine vhich of the three: accord- 
would hare constituted in the ingly the speaker dwells upon many 
minds of the latter a substantive topics calculated to raise a bad 
grievance such as to aggravate the impression of Alkibiad6s, and » 
motive for revolt in a manner favourable impression of himself^ 
which Thucydidfts could hardly fail Among the accusations against 
to notice. The orator JBschinfts Alkibiadfts, one is, that after having 
refers the augmentation of the recommended in the assembly of 
tribute, up to 1200 talents, to the the people that the inhabitants of 
time succeeding the peace of Ni- Melos should be sold as slaves, ho 
kias: M. Boeckh (Public Econ. had himself purchased a Melian 
of Athens, b. iii. oh. 16-19, p. 400- woman among the captives, and 
434) supposes it to have taken place had had a son by her: it was cri- 
earlier than the representation of minal (argues the speaker) to beget 
the YespoB of Aristophanes, that offspring by a woman whose rela- 
is, about three years before that tions he had contributed to cause 
peace, or 423 b.o. But this would to be put to death, and whose city 
have been just before the time of he had contributed to ruin (c. 8). 
the expedition of Brasidas into Upon this argument I do not here 
Thrace, and his success in exciting touch, any farther than to bring 
revolt among the dependencies of out the point of chronology. The 
Athens. Nowif Athens had doubled speech, if delivered at all, must 
her tribute upon all the allies, just have been delivered, at the earliest, 
before that expedition, Thucydidfis nearly a year after the capture of 
could not have omitted to mention Melos by the Athenians : it may 
it, as ipcreasing the chances of be of later date, but it cannot poa- 
success to Brasidas, and helping sihiy he earlier, 
to determine the resolutions of the Now Melos surrendered in the 
Akanthians and others, which were winter immediately preceding the 
by no means adopted unanimously great expedition of the Athenians 
or without hesitation, to revolt. to Sicily in 415 b.o., which expedi- 

In reference to the Oration to tion sailed about midsummer (Thu- 
which I here refer as that of Pseudo- cyd. v. 116; vi. 80). Nikias and 
Andokidds against Alkibiadds, I Alkibiadds both went as command- 
made some remarks in chap. xxxi. ers of that expedition: the latter 
of this History, tending to show was recalled to Athens for trial on 
it to be spurious and of a time con- the charge of impiety about three 
siderably later than that to which months afterwards, but escaped in 
it purports to belong. I will here the way home, was condemned and 
add one other remark, which ap- sentenced to baniehment in his 
pears to me decisive, tending to absence, and did not return to 
the same conclusion. Athens until 407 b.o., long after 

The oration professes to be de- the death of Nikias, who continued 

livered in a contest of ostracism in command of the Athenian arma- 

between Nikias, Alkibiadds, and ment in Sicily, enjoying the full 

the speaker. One of the three (he esteemof his countrymen, until its 

says) must necessarily be ostra- complete failure and ruin before 


ministration of Perikles, the revenue including tribute 
was so managed as to leave a large annual surplus; inso- 
much that a treasure of coined money was accumulated in 
the Acropolis during the years preceding the 
Peloponnesian war — which treasure when at i^a'fifo 
its maximum reached the great sum of 9700 of revenue 
talents (=2,230,000Z.), and was still at 6000 !»** ^y »i^d 
talents, after a serious dram for various pur- lated by 
poses, at the moment when that war began. * ^*^.®'^''tj, 
This system of public economy, constantly lay- years^re-* 
iiig by a considerable sum year after year — in ceding the 
which Athens stood alone, since none of the sian war?^ 
Peloponnesian states had any public reserve 
whatever, 2 goes far of itself to vindicate Perikles from the 
charge of having wasted the public money in mischievous 
distributions for the purpose of obtaining popularity; and 
also to exonerate the Athenian Demos from that reproach 
of a greedy appetite for living by the public purse which 
it is common to advance against them. After the death of 
Kimon, no farther expeditions were undertaken against 
the Persians. Even for some years before his death, not 

Syracuse— and who perished him- bute to 1300 talents (Plutarch, 

self afterwards at a Syracusan Aristeid. c. 24). 

prisoner. ■ Thucyd. ii. 13. 

Taking these circumstances to- * Thucyd. i. 80. The foresight of 

gather, it will at once be seen that the Athenian people, in abstaining 

there never can have been any from immediate use of public 

time, ten months or more after the money and laying it up for future 

capture of Melos, when Nikias and wants, would be still more con- 

Alkfbiadds cottZd have been exposed spicuously demonstrated, if the 

to a vote of ostracism at Athens, statement of ^schinds the orator 

The thing is absolutely impossible: were true, that they got together 

and the oration in which such his- 7000 talents between the peace of 

torical and chronological incom- Nikias and the Sicilian expedition, 

patibilities are embodied, must be M. Boeckh believes this statement, 

spurious; furthermore it must have and says, "It is not impossible 

been composed long after the pre- that 1000 talents might have been 

tended time of delivery, when the laid by every year, as the amount 

chronological series of events had of tribute received was so consider- 

been forgotten. able^ (Public Economy of Athens, 

I may add that the story of this oh. xx. p. 446, Eng. Trans.). I do 

duplication of the tribute by Alki- not believe the statement: but M. 

biadds is virtually contrary to the Boeckh and others, who do, ought 

statement of Plutarch, probably in fairness to set it against the 

borrowed from ^scbinSs, who many remarks which they pass in 

states that the demagogues gradu- condemnation of the democratical 

aUy increased (xaroc ^txp6v) the tri- prodigality. 

272 HI8T0BY OF GBEEOB. Pabt n. 

much appears to have been done. The tribute money 
thus remained unexpended, and kept in reserve, as the 
presidential duties of Athens prescribed, against future 
attack, which might at any time oe renewed. 

Though we do not know the exact amount of the other 
Prid f It sources of Athenian revenue, however, we know 
by Athe- that tribute received from allies was the largest 
nian oiti- j^om in It.* And altogether the exercise of 

sens in the . v -i i ° • i /• j. 

imperial empire abroad became a prominent feature in 
K*T^' it' Athenian life, and a necessity to Athenian senti- 
^ ^ ^' ment, not less than democracy at home. Athens 
was no longer, as she had been once, a single city, with 
Attica for her territory. She was a capital or imperial 
city — a despot-city, was the expression used by her enemies, 
ana even sometimes by her own citizens 2 — with many 
dependencies attached to her, and bound to follow her 
orders. Such was the manner in which not merely Perikles 
and the other leading statesmen, but even the humblest 
Athenian citizen, conceived the dignity of Athens. The 
sentiment was one which carried with it both personal 
pride and stimulus to active patriotism. To establish 
Athenian interests among the dependent territories was 
one important object in the eyes of Perikles. While 

' Thueyd. L 1S2-143; ii. IS. The cuetoms-daty was imposed at the 

icivTiixoaTV), or duty of two per cent. Feirsas during the Peloponneaian 

upon imports and exports at the war. Comparing together the two 

Peirseus, produced to the state a passages of Xenophon (Hepuhl. 

revenue of thirty-six talents in the Ath. 1, 17, and Aristophan. Vesp. 

year in which it was farmed by 667), we may suppose that the re- 

Andokidds, somewhere about 400 gular and usual rate of duty was 

B.C., after the restoration of the one per cent, or one ixaxoox^ — 

demooracyat Athens from its defeat while in case of need this may 

and subversion at the close of the hare been doubled or tripled ~ xac 

Peloponnesian war (Andokid6s de icoXXa< ixaxooTac (see Boeckh, b. 

Mysteriis, o. 23, p. 65). This was iii. oh. 1-4, p. 298-318, Eng. Trans.), 

at a period of depression in Athe- The amount of revenue derived 

nian affairs, and when trade was even from this source, however, 

doubtless not near so good as it can have borne no comparison to 

had been during the earlier part the tribute, 

of the Peloponnesian war. « By PerikUs, Thueyd. ii. 63. By 

It seems probable that this must Kleon, Thueyd. iii. 87. By the 

have been the most considerable envoys at M6I08, v. 89. By Kuphe- 

permanent source of Athenian re- mua, vi. 85. By the hostile Oorin- 

venue next to the tribute ; though thiaus, i. 124, as a matter of course. 
we do not know what rate of 


discouraging all distant i and rash enterprises, such as 
invasion of Egypt or Cyprus, he planted out many j^^^^^^ ^ 
kleruchies, and colonies of Athenian citizens Athenian 
intermingled with allies, on islands and parts of ®\**^f°| 
the coast. He conducted 1000 citizens tp the L^kierucL 
Thracian Chersonese, 500 to Naxos, and 250 to ST.^® ci 
Andros. In the Chersonese, he farther repelled eonesus *'' 
the barbarous Thracian invaders from without, gj a****^®' 
and even undertook the labour of carrying a wall ^ ^ ' 
of defence across the isthmus which conjiected the penin- 
sula with Thrace; since the barbarous Thracian tribes, 
though expelled some time before by Kimon,2 had. still 
continued to renew their incursions from time to time. 
Ever since the occupation of the elder Miltiades about 
eighty years before, there had been in this peninsula many 
Athenian proprietors, apparently intermingled with half- 
civilized Thracians: the settlers now acquired both greater 
numerical strength and better protection^ though it does 
not appear that the cross-wall was permanently maintained. 
The maritime expeditions of Perikles even extended into 
the Euxine sea, as far as the important Greek city of Sinope, 
then governed by a despot named Timesilaus, against whom 
a large proportion of the citizens were in active discontent. 
Lamachus was left with thirteen Athenian triremes to 
assist in expelling the despot, who was driven into exile 
along with his friends and party. The properties of these 
exiles were confiscated, and assigned to the maintenance 
of six hundred Athenian citizens, admitted to equal fellow- 
ship and residence with the Sinopians. We may presume 
that on this occasion Sinope became a member of the 
Athenian tributary alliance, if it had not been so before: 
but we do not know whether Kotyora and Tr^pezus, 
dependencies of Sin6pe farther eastward, which the 10,000 
Greeks found on their-retreat fifty years afterwards, existed 
in the time of Perikles or not. Moreover the numerous 
and well-equipped Athenian fleet under the command of 
Perikles produced an imposing effect upon the barbarous 
princes and tribes along the coast, 3 contributing certainly 
to the security of Grecian trade, and probably to th^ 
acquisition of new dependent allies. 

" Plutarch, Periklds, o. 2p. ^ Plutarch, Eimon, c. 14, 

* Plutarch, Periklfis, c. 19, 20. 
VOL. V. T 


It was by successive proceedings of this sort that many 
Active per- detachments of Athenian citizens became settled 
sonai and in various portions of the maritime empire of 
reiat?oM *^ the city — some rich, investing their property in 
between the islands as more secure (from the incontest- 
•nd^aii *^^® superiority of Athens at sea) even than 
parts of the Attica, which since the loss of the Megarid could 
-sigean. ^^^ j^g guarded against a Peloponnesian land 
invasion* — others poor, and hiring themselves out as 
labourers. 2 The islands of Lemnos, Imbros, and Skyros, 
as well as the territory of Estisea, on the north of Euboea, 
were completely occupied by Athenian proprietors and 
citizens: other places were partially so occupied. And it 
was doubtless advantageous to the islanders to associate 
themselves with Athenians in trading enterprises, since 
they thereby obtained a better chance of the protection of 
the Athenian fleet. It seems that Athens passed regulations 
occasionally for the commerce of her dependent allies, as 
we see by the fact that shortly before the Peloponnesian 
war she excluded the Megarians from all their ports. The 
commercial relations between Peirseus and the uEgean 
reached their maximum during the interval immediately 
preceding the Peloponnesian war. These relations were 
not confined to the country east and north of Attica: they 
reached also the western regions. The most important 
settlements founded by Athens during this period were, 
Amphipolis in Thrace and Thurii in Italy. 

Amphipolis was planted by a colony of Athenians and 
. hi 1- other Greeks, under the conduct of the Athenian 
in°Thrace Agnon, in 437 B.C. It was situated near the 
J^wnded by river Strymon in Thrace, on the eastern bank, 
Agnon is and at the spot where the Strymon resumes its 
sent out as river-course after emerging from the lake above. 
It was originally a township or settlement of the 
Edonian Thracians, called Ennea Hodoi or Nine Ways — in 
a situation doubly valuable, both as being close upon the 

* Xenophon, Bep. Ath. ii. 16. t-^v Compare also Xenophon (Me- 

(iiv ouoiav toU vi^aotc icapaTlOevxai, morabil. ii. 8, 1^ and Symposion, 

itiOTeoovTe«T^op)r'5T^xaTi9<iXoo8av iv. 31). 

TT)v 64 'Attix7)v Tfiiv itepiopu)ai xep.- * See the case of the free la- 

vo(xivY)v, fiYvtbaxovxec Sxi el aOxTjv bourer and the husbandman at Na- 

iXeiQaouaiv, ixipwv i^d^d^ [«.sit;6vu>v xos, Plato, Euthyphro. o. 8. 


bridge over the Strymon, and as a convenient centre for 
the ship-timber and gold and silver mines of the neigh- 
bouring region. It was distant about three English mues 
from the Athenian settlement of Eion at the mouth of the 
river. The previous unsuccessful attempts to form estab- 
lishments at Ennea Hodoi have already been noticed — first 
that of Histiseus the Milesian, followed up by his brother 
Aristagoras (about 497-496 b.c.), next that of the Athenians 
about 465 B.C. under Leagrus and others — on both which 
occasions the intruding settlers had been defeated and ex- 
pelled by the native Thracian tribes, though on the second 
occasion the number sent by Athens was not less than 
10,000.1 So serious a loss deterred the Athenians for a 
long time from any repetition of the attempt. But it is 
highly probable that individual Athenian citizens, from 
Eion and from Thasus, connected themselves with powerful 
Thracian families, and became in this manner actively 
engaged in mining — to their own great profit, as well as 
to the profit of the city collectively, since the property of 
the kleruchs, or Athenian citizens occupying colonial lands, 
bore its share in case of direct taxes being imposed on 
property generally. Among such fortunate adventurers 
we may number the historian Thucydides himself; seeming- 
ly descended from Athenian parents intermarrying with 
Thracians, and himself married to a wife either Thracian 
or belonging to a family of Athenian colonists in that 
region, through whom he became possessed of a large pro- 
perty in the mines, as well as of great influence in the 
districts around. 2 This was one of the various ways in 
which the collective power of Athens enabled her chief 
citizens to enrich themselves individually. 

The colony under Agnon, despatched from Athens in 
the year 437 B.C., appears to have been both situation 
numerous and well-sustained^ inasmuch as it and import- 
conquered and maintained the valuable position Amphi- 
of Ennea Hodoi in spite of those formidable p®^**- 

1 Thacyd. i. 100. with Miltiadds and Kimon, as well 
* Thucyd. ir^ 106 ; Marcellinus, as with Olorus king of one of the 
Vit. Thuoyd. c. 19. See Boscher, Thracian tribes, whose daughter 
Leben des Thucydides, ch. i. 4. p. Hegesipylft was wife of Miltiadds 
96, who gires a genealogy of Tha> the conqueror of Marathon. In 
cydidds, as far as it can be made this manner therefore he belonged 
out with any probability. The to one of the ancient heroic fa- 
historian was connected by blood miliesof Athens and even of Greece, 

T 2 



Edonian neighbours who had baffled the two preceding 
attempts. Its name of Ennea Hodoi was exchanged for 
that of Amphipolis — the hill on which the new town was 
situated being oounded on three sides by the river. The 
settlers seem to have been of mixed extraction, comprising 
no large proportion of Athenians. Some were of Chalkidic 
race, others came from Argilus, a Grecian city colonised 
from Andros,' which possessed the territory on the western 
bank of the Strymon immediately Amphipolis, i 
and which was included among the subject allies of Athens. 
Amphipolis, connected with the sea by the Strymon and 
the port of Eion, became the most important of all the 
Athenian dependencies in reference to Thrace and Mace- 

The colony of Thurii on the coast of the Gulf of 
Founda- Tarentum in Italy, near the site and on the 
Ath ^f *^^ territory of the ancient Sybaris, was founded by 
of Thurii,* Athens about seven years earlier than Amphi- 
^^ th* polls, not long after the conclusion of the Thirty 

coast *of years* truce with Sparta, b.c. 443. Since the 
Italy. destruction of the old Sybaris by the Krotoniates, 

in 509 B.C,, its territory had for the most part remained 
unappropriated. The descendants of the former inhabit- 
ants, dispersed at Laiis and in other portions of the terri- 
tory, were not strong enough to establish any new city: 
nor did it suit the views of the Krotoniates themselves to 
do so. After an interval of more than sixty years, however, 
Conduct of ^^^^'^S which one unsuccessful attempt at occu- 
tbe refugee pation had been made by some Thessalian sett- 
^*th*****'*** lers, these Sybarites at length prevailed upon 
mined Sy- the Athenians to undertake and protect the 
baris—their re-colonization ; the proposition haviner been 

encroach- j • • x ii. o j. x ® j 

ments in made in vam to the SSpartans. Ijampon and 
the founda- Xeuokritus, the former a prophet and interpreter 
Thuri*i : of oraoles, were sent by !r erikles with ten ships 
*^^^ii'd *® chiefs of the new colony of Thurii, founded 
and%hurii Under the auspices of Athens. The settlers, 
'econ- collected from all parts of Greece, included 

8t tute . Dorians, lonians, islanders, Boeotians, as well as 
Athenians. But the descendants of the ancient Sybarites 
procured themselves to be treated as privileged citizens, 

being an iEakid through Ajax and Philseus (Marcellin. c. 2). 

« Thucyd. iv. 102; v. 6. 


monopolising for themselves the possession of political 
powers as well as the most valuable lands in the immediate 
vicinity of the walls; while their wives also assumed an 
offensive pre-eminence over the other women of the city in 
the public religious processions. Such spirit of privilege 
and monopoly appears to have been a frequent manifestation 
among the ancient colonies, and often fatal either to their 
tranquillity or to their growth; sometimes to both. In the 
case of Thurii, founded under the auspices of the democratical 
Athens, it was not likely to have any lasting success. And 
we find that after no very long period,- the majority of the 
colonists rose in insurrection against the privileged Sybari- 
tes, either slew or expelled them, and divided the entire terri- 
tory of the city upon equal principles among the colonists 
of every different race. This revolution enabled them to 
make peace with the Krotoniates, who had probably been 
unfriendly so long as their ancient enemies the Sybarites 
were masters of the city and likely to turn its powers to 
the purpose of avenging their conquered ancestors. And 
the city from this time forward,- democratically governed, 
appears to have flourished steadily and without internal 
dissension for thirty years, until the ruinous disasters of 
the Athenians before Syracuse occasioned the overthrow 
of the Athenian party at Thurii. How miscellaneous the 
population of Thurii was, we may judge from the denomi- 
nations of the ten tribes — such was the number of tribes 
established, after the model of Athens — Arkas, Achai's, 
Eleia, Boeotia, Amphiktyonis, Doris, las, Athenais, Euboi's, 
Nesiotis. From this mixture of race they could not agree 
in recognizing or honouring an Athenian (Ekist, or indeed 
any (Bkist except Apollo. 1 The Spartan general Klean- 
dridas, banished a few years before for having suffered him- 
self to be bribed by Athens along with king Pleistoanax, 
removed to Thurii and was appointed general of the citizens 
in their war against Tarentum. That war was ultimately 
adjusted by the joint foundation of the new city ofHerakleia 
half-way between the two — in the fertile territory called 

The most interesting circumstance respecting Thurii 
is, that the rhetor Lysias, and the historian Herodotus, 
were both domiciliated there as citizens. The city was 
connected with Athens, yet seemingly only by a feeble tie; 

» Diodor. xii. 86. 
* Diodor. xii. 11, 12; Strabo, Ti. 264; Plutarch, Perikl6s, c. 22. 



PXB< U. 

and Iiysias 
—both do- 
as citizens 
at Thu- 
rii. Pew 
there as 

it was not numbered among the tributary subject allies. < 
Herodotus From the circumstance, that so small a proportion 
of the settlers at Thurii were native Athenians, 
we may infer that not many of the latter at that 
time were willing to put themselves so far out of 
connexion with Athens — even though tempted 
by the prospect of lots of land in a fertile 
and promising territory. And Perikles was 
probably anxious that those poor citizens, for 
whom emigration was desirable, should rather become 
kleruchs in some of the islands or ports of the ^gean, 
where they would serve (like the colonies of Home) as a 
sort of garrison for the maintenance of the Athenian 
empire. 2 

The fourteen years between the Thirty years' truce 
and the breaking out of the Peloponnesian war, are a period 
of full maritime empire on the part of Athens — partially 
indeed resisted, but never with success. They are a period 
of peace with all cities extraneous to her own empire; and 
of splendid decorations to the city itself, emanating from 
the genius of Fheidias and others, in sciilpture as well as 
in architecture. 

Since the death of Kimon, Perikles had become, 
gradually but entirely, the first citizen in the common- 
wealth. His qualities told for more, the longer 
they were known, and even the disastrous re- 
verses which preceded the Thirty years* truce 
had not overthrown him, since he had protested 
against that expedition of TolmidesintoBcsotia 
out of which they first arose. But if the per- 
sonal influence of Perikles had increased, the 
party opposed to him seems also to have be- 
come stronger and better organised than before; 
and to have acquired a leader in many respects more 
effective than Eamon — Thucydides son of Melesias. The 
new chief was a near relative of Kimon, but of a character 
and talents more analogous to that of Perikles; a states- 
man and orator rather than a general, though competent 

Period from 
446-431 B.C. 
Athens at 
peace. Her 
of Periklds 
with Thu- 
cydidfts son 
of Meldsias. 

' The Athenians pretended to no catalogue of the allies of Athens 

subject allies beyond the Ionian at the beginning of the Pelopon- 

Gulf, Thucyd. vi. 14: compare yi. nesian war (Thucyd. ii. 15). 

46, 104; yii. 84. Thucydidds does * Plutarch, Periklds, c. 11. 
not even mention Thurii. in his 



to both functions if occasion demanded, as every leading 
man in those days was required to be. Under Thucydides, 
the political and parliamentary opposition against Perikles 
assumed a constant character and organisation, such as 
Kimon with his exclusively military aptitudes had never 
been able to establish. The aristocratical party in the 
commonwealth — the "honourable and respectable" citizens, 
as we find them styled, adopting their own nomenclature 
— now imposed upon themselves the obligation of unde- 
viating regularity in their attendance on the public as- 
sembly, sitting together in a particular section so as to be 
conspicuously parted from tne Demos. In this manner 
their applause and dissent, their mutual encouragement to 
each other, their distribution of parts to different speakers, 
was made more conducive to the party purposes than it 
had been before when these distinguished persons were 
intermingled with the mass of citizens. * Thucydides him- 
self was eminent as a speaker, inferior only to Perikles — 
perhaps hardly inferior even to him. We are told that in 
reply to a question put to him by Archidamus, whether 
Perikles or he were the better wrestler, Thucydides re- 
plied — "Even when I throw him, he denies that he has fallen, 
gains his point, and talks over those who actually saw him 
fall." 2 

Such an opposition, made to Perikles in all the full 

licence which a democratical constitution per- p^.^^ ^^ 

mitted, must have been both efficient and em- contention 

barrassing. But the pointed severance of the ?^*^^'* 

aristocratical chiefs, which Thucydides son of parties. 

Metesias introduced, contributed probably at J^j^®p®® • 

once to rally the democratical majority round 2. Expen- 

Perikles, and to exasperate the bitterness of diture of 

party confiict.3 As far as we can make out the the deco-' 

grounds of the opposition, it turned partly upon J^^" °' 
the pacific policy of Perikles towards the 

• Compare the speech of Nikias, tai Tu)v5e, Ac. (Thncyd. vi. 13.) 

in reference to the younger citizens See also Aristophands, Ekklesiaz. 

and partisans of Alkibiadgs sitting 298 aeq., about partisans sitting 

together near the latter in the as- near together. 

sembly — 0&5 ifih 6pu>v vov ev948e • Plutarch, PerikUs, c. 8. "Orav 

Tt{) oixij) dvSpl icapaxeXeuaTO^c i'^isi xaxapaXu) icaXalu>v, exeivoc dv- 

xa07)fxevouc 9o()ou{, xal toic TiXiY">v *»>« ^^ 7csTfcu)x«, vixSi xal 

ttp8a[iuTipoi« dvTiTCapaxeXeuo|x«i jxVj ixexaralOsi tou« 6pu)vTa«. 

xotaiajruvOijvai, et xoi ti« itapaxaOir)- • Plutarch, Periklds, c. 11. 73 5' 

280 niBTOET OP GBEECS. Tart U, 

Persians, partly upon his expenditure for home ornament. 
Thucydides contended that Athens was disgraced in the 
eyes of the Greeks by having drawn the confederate trea- 
sure from Delos to her own acropolis, under pretence of 
greater security — and then employing it^ not in prose- 
cuting war against the Persians, ^ but in beautifying Athens 
by new temples and costly statues. To this Perikles re- 
plied that Athens had undertaken the obligation, in con- 
sideration of the tribute money, to protect her allies and 
keep off from them every foreign enemy — that she had ac- 
complished this object completely at the present, and 
retained a reserve sufficient to guarantee the like security 
for the future — that under such circumstances, she owed 
no account to her allies of the expenditure of the surplus, 
but was at liberty to employ it for purposes useful and 
honourable to the city. In this point of view it was an 
object of great public importance to render Athens impo- 
sing in the eyes both of the allies and of Hellas generally, by 
improved fortifications, — by accumulated embellishment^ 
sculptural and architectural, — and by religious festivals, 
frequent) splendid, musical and poetical. 

Such was the answer made by Perikles in defence of 

his policy against the opposition headed by Thucydides. 

And considering the grounds of the debate on both sides, 

the answer was perfectly satisfactory. For when we look 

^ at the very large sum which Perikles continu- 

Defence of n i . ''• ° • x-l j. 

Perikifis ally kept in reserve m the treasury, no one 
perfectly could reasonably complain that his expenditure 
against his ^OT Ornamental purposes was carried so far as 
political to encroach upon the exigencies of defence. 
'i^» *• What Thucydides and his partisans appear to 

have urged, was that this common fund should still continue 

exslvtuv fifxiXXa xal (piXoxijxla Ttbv &X^PM* "^^ xoivA^ to6tijv dv^pTjxe II*- 

avSu>v (iaOuTdtrjv tojxtjv TSfiouaa x^? pixX-^c, Ac. 

ic6Xeu><, TO (xiv S^{Aov, to 6' oXIyou^ Compare the speech of the Les- 

i4colv)ae xaXeioSai. bians, and their complaints against 

* Plutarch, Perikles, o. 12. lU- Athens, at the moment of their 

paXXov ev Tai? exxXrjalai? |)ou)vTe;, revolt in the fourth year of the 

u>« 6 (jLsv 8^jxo< dfioUi xol xaxu>c Peloponnesian war (Thucyd. iii. 

dxoOgi tA xoivo TU)v 'EXXi^vwv ypii- 10) ; where a similar accusation is 

(iOTa itp6« aOtov ix Ai^Xou p-STOYa- brought forward— eicsi^ 84 iuDpto- 

YU)v, t) 8' Iveotiv au'f<j) icpo? too< pL«v a6T0i)< (the Athenians) Tif|v fiiiv 

iYxoXoovTo? eiiitpaneotdTT] tu)v itpo- too MtjSoo tx^pdv dvi4vTaci xVjv 8i 

9do8U)v, 8tiffavTa too? poppdpooc tu)v ^U(x(xd^u>v SouXcuaiv ewa70|*4- 

KxslSsv dvsXioOai xal fuXdiTCiv cv voj(, &c. 


to be spent in aggressive warfare against the Persian 
king, in Egypt and elsewhere — conformably to the pro- 
jects pursued by Kimon during his life.i But Perikles 
was right in contending that such' outlay would have 
been simply wasteful; of no use either to Athens or her 
allies, though risking all the chances of distant defeat, 
such as had been experienced a few years before in Egypt. 
The Persian force was already kept away both from the 
waters of the -^gean and the coast of Asia, either by the 
stipulations of the treaty of Kallias, or (if that treaty be 
supposed apocryphal) by a conduct practically the same 
as those stipulations would have enforced. The allies in- 
deed might have had some ground of complaint against 
Perikles, either for not reducing the amount of tribute 
required from them, seeing that it was more than sufficient 
for the legitimate purposes of the confederacy, — or for 
not having collected their positive sentiment as to the 
disposal of it. But we do not find that this was the ar- 
gument adopted by Thucydides and his party; nor was it 
calculated to find favour either with aristocrats, or demo- 
crats, in the Athenian assembly. 

Admitting the injustice of Athens — an injustice 
common to both the parties in that city, not Pan-Hoi- 
less to Kimon than to Perikles — in acting as ^®J^i<^ 

T .. , -i f 1 ' e J* T i* '11 Bcnemesana 

despot instead of chiei, and m discontmumg all sentiment 
appeal to the active and hearty concurrence of *»' Perikids. 
lier numerous allies; we shall find that the schemes of 
Perikles were nevertheless eminently Pan-Hellenic. In 
strengthening and ornamenting Athens, in developing the 
full activity of her citizens, in providing temples, religious 
offerings, works of art, solemn festivak, all of surpassing 
attraction, — he intended to exalt her into something 
greater than an imperial city with numerous dependent 
allies. He wished to make her the centre of Grecian feel- 
ing, the stimulus of Grecian intellect, and the type of 
strong democratical patriotism combined with fu]l liberty 
of individual taste and aspiration. He wished not merely 
to retain the adherence of the subject states, but to attract 
the admiration and spontaneous deference of independent 
neighbours, so as to procure for Athens a moral 
ascendency much beyond the range of her direct power. 
And he succeeded in elevating the city to a visible 

* Plutarch, Periklfia, c. 20. 


grandeur, 1 which made her appear even much stronger 
than she really was — and whicn had the farther effect of 
softeninff to the minds of her subjects the humiliating 
sense of obedience; while it served as a normal school, 
open to strangers from all quarters, of energetic action 
even under full licence of criticism — of elegant pursuits 
economically followed — and of a love for knowledge without 
enervation of character. Such were the views of Perikles 
in regard to his country, during the years which preceded 
the feloponnesian war. We find them recorded in his 
celebrated Funeral Oration pronounced in the first ye^r 
of that war — an exposition for ever memorable of the 
sentiment and purpose of Athenian democracy, as con- 
ceived by its ablest president. 

So bitter however was the opposition made by Thucy- 
Bitter con- did^s and his party to this projected ex- 
tention of penditure — so violent and pointed did the 

parties at*.. f»»x j. i-i ± t 

Athens— scissiou of anstocrats and democrats become — 
vote of that the dispute came after no long time to that 

ostracism ii* • ^ ■!_• i xi. a±\. 

— Thucy- ultimate appeal which the Athenian con- 
didfis is stitution provided for the case of two opposite 

ostracised •• ■% i j. i j x r 

—about and nearly equal party-leaders — a vote of 
443 B.C. ostracism. Of the particular details which 
preceded this ostracism, we are not informed; but we see 
clearly that the general position was such as the ostracism 
was intended to meet. Probably the vote was proposed 
by the party of Thucydides, in order to procure the banish- 
ment of Perikles, the more powerful person of the two 
and the most likely to excite popular jealousy. The 
challenge was accepted by Perikles and his friends, and 
the result of the voting was such that an adequate legal 
majority condemned Thucydides to ostracism. * And it 
seems that the majority must have been very decisive, .for 
the party of Thucydides was completely broken by it. 
We hear of no other single individual equally formidable, 
as a leader of opposition, throughout all the remaining 
life of Perikles. 

■ Thucyd. i. 10. to the principle of the ostracism, 

* Plntarch, Periklds, c. 11-14. a remarkable incident at Magnesia, 

TiXo? Si tcp6<; t6-» BooxoSiStjv eU between two political rivals, Kr6- 

iyuiva nspl too oarpdxou xa-zaaia^ tinfts and Hermeias: also the just 

xal 8iaxiv6uveuoa<, ixeivov fxev reflections of Montesquieu, Esprit 

e^i^aXe, xariXoae 8i ttjv dvTixsTOY- des Loix, xxvi. c. 17; xxix. c. 7. 
(i.dvir]v ixatptlav. See, in reference 


The ostracism of Thucydides apparently took place 
about two years i after the conclusion of the Thirty years' 
truce (443-442 B.C.), and it is to the period immeiuately 
following, that the great Periklean works belong. New works 
The southern wall of the acropolis had been ^J^*^jl*^®" 
built out of the spoils brought by Kimon from Third Long 
his Persian expeditions; but the third of the ^'^^V- 
long walls connecting Athens with the harbour Peirseus— 
was the proposition of Perikles, at what precise ^^ich is 
time we do not know. The long walls originally our as a 
completed (not long after the battle of Tanagra, *?^"' ^J. 
as has already been stated) were two, one from tect Hippo - 
Athens to Peirseus, another from Athens to damns. 
Phalerum: the space between them was broad, and if in 
the hands of an enemy, the communication with Peiraeus 
would be interrupted. Accordingly Perikles now induced 
the people to construct a third or intermediate wall, 
running parallel with the first wall to Peireeus, and within 
a short distance ^ (seemingly near one furlong) from it: 
so that the communication between the city and the port 
was placed beyond all possible interruption, even assuming 
an enemy to have got within the Phaleric wall. It was 
seemingly about this time, too, that the splendid docks and 
arsenal in Peirseus, alleged by Isokrates to have cost 
1000 talents, were constructed; 3 while the town itself of 
Peirseus was laid out anew with straight streets intersect- 
ing at right angles. Apparently this was something new 
in Greece — the towns ffenerally, and Athens itself in 
particular, having been Duilt without any symmetry, or 
width, or continuity of streets.* Hippodamus the Milesian, 
a man of considerable attainments in the physical 

> Plntarch, Periklds, o. 16: the * See Diksearchus, Yit. Grrmcia, 
indication of time however is Eragm. ed. Fuhr. p. 140: compare 
vague. the description of Platsea in Thu- 

cydidds, ii. 8. 

* Plato, Gorgias, p. 456, with .„ ' ,, . 

Scholia; Plutarch, PerikWs, c. 13 ; , ^^J *^« °\^«' towns now existing 
Forchhammer, Topographic von i^ the Grecian islands are put to- 

A XV 1 vx ^ •Di.n^.i^ «-«»,« gether in this same manner— nar- 

Athen, in Kieler Philologische " ., . , 

Ox ji A»A AAA a xu fo^» muddy, crooked ways — few 

Studien, p. 279-282. See the map \ •/ ,, ,f 

- ...* *^ , ., . J: regularcontinuous lines of houses* 

of Athens and its environs ch. ** _, ^ , . , _^ ^. 

. see Boss, Beisen in den Griechi- 

schen Inseln, Letter xxvii vol. ii. 

* Isokratds, Orat.vii.; Areopagit. p. 20. 
p. 153, 0. 27. 


philosophy of the age, derived much renown as the earliest 
town architect, for having laid out the Feir»us on a 
regular plan. The market-place, or one of them at least, 
permanently bore his name — the Hippodamian agora, i At 
a time when so many great architects were displaying 
their genius in the construction of temples, we are not 
surprised to hear that the structure of towns began to be 
regularised also. Moreover we are told that the new 
colonial town of Thurii, to which Hippodamus went as a 
settler, was also constructed in the same systematic form 
as to straight and wide streets.^ 

The new scheme upon which the Peiraeus was laid out 
Ode n ^^^ ^^^ without its valuo as one visible proof 

Parthenon, of the naval grandeur of Athens. But the 
^'ppyi®** buildings in Athens and on the acropolis formed 
temples. the real glory of the Periklean age. A new 
Ath6*^6 **' theatre, termed the Odeon, was constructed for 
musical and poetical representations at the great 
Panathenaic solemnity. Next, the splendid temple of 
Athene, called the Parthenon, with all its masterpieces 
of decorative sculpture, friezes, and reliefs: lastly, the 
costly portals erected to adorn the entrance of the acro- 
polis, on the western side of the hill, through which the 
solemn processions on festival days were conducted. It 
appears that the Odeon and the Parthenon were both 
finished between 445 and 437 B.C.: the Propylaea. somewhat 
later, between 437 and 431 B.C., in which latter year the 
Peloponnesian war began. 3 Progress was also made in 
restoring or re-constructing the Erechtheion,^ or ancient 
temple of Athene Polias, the patron goddess of the city 
— ^which had been burnt in the invasion of Xerxes. But 
the breaking out of the Peloponnesian war seems to have 
prevented the completion of this, as well as of the great 
temple of Demeter at Eleusis, for the celebration of the 
Eleusinian mysteries — that of Athen^ at Sunium— and 
that of Nemesis at B^hamnus. Nor was the sculpture less 
memorable than the architecture. Three statues of Athene, 
all by the hand of Pheidias, decorated the acropolis — one 
colossal, 47 feet high, of ivory, in the Parthenon ^ — a second 

> Aristotle, Politic, ii. 6, 1 ; Xe- * Leake, Topography of Athens, 

nophon, Hellen. ii. 4, 1 : Harpo- Append, ii. and iii. p. 828-336, 2ad 

kration, v. *IicTCo8d|xtia. edit. 

» Biodor. xii. 0. « See Leake, Topography of 


of bronze, called the Lemnian Athen^ — a third of colossal 
magnitude; also in bronze, called Athene Promachos, 
placed between the Propylsea, and the Parthenon, and 
visible from afar off, even to the navigator approaching 
Peirseus by sea. 

It is not of course to Perikles that the renown of these 
splendid productions of art belongs. But the j . 
great sculptors and architects, by whom they artists and 
were conceived and executed, belonged to that "p^^*®^**' 
same period of expanding and stimulating Athe- iktinus/*^* 
nian democracy, which likewise called forth Kaiiikra- 
creative genius in oratory, in dramatic poetry, 
and in philosophical speculation. One man especially, 
of immortal name, — Pheidias,— bom a little before the 
battle of Marathon, was the original mind in whom the 
sublime ideal conceptions of genuine art appear to have 
disengaged themselves from that stiffness of execution, and 
adherence to a consecrated type, which marked the efforts 
of his predecessors. 1 He was the great director and 
superintendent of all those decorative additions, whereby 
Perikles imparted to Athens a majesty such as had never 
before belonged to any Grecian city. The architects of 
the Parthenon and the other buildings — Iktinus, Kalli- 
krates, Koroebus, Mnesikles, and others — worked under his 
instructions.: and he had besides a school of pupils and 
subordinates to whom the mechanical part of his labours 
was confided. With all the great contributions which 
Pheidias made to the grandeur of Athens, his last and 
greatest achievement was far away from Athens — the 
colossal statue of Zeus, in the ffreat temple of Olympia, 
executed in the years immediately preceding the Pelopon- 
nesian war. This stupendous work was sixty feet high, of 
ivory and gold, embodying in visible majesty some of the 
grandest conceptions of Grecian poetry and religion. Its 
effect upon the minds of all beholders, for many centuries 
successively, was such as never has been, and probably 
never will be, equalled in the annals of art, sacred or 

Athens. 2nd ed. p. Ill, Germ. Transl. polis of Athens. 

O. Miiller (De Phidia Vit&, p. 18) > Plntarch, PerikUs, o. 13-15: O. 

mentions no less than eight cele- Miiller, De Phidise Vitft, p. 34-60; 

brated statues of Athdnd, by the also his work, Archaologie der 

hand of Pheidias— four in the aero- Kunst, sect. lOS-llS. 


Considering these prodigious achievements in the field 

Effect of ^^ ^^ ^^^y ^ ^^y ^^^ upon Athenians and 
these crea- Grecian history, they are phsenomena of extra- 
Irt^and' Ordinary importance. When we learn the pro- 
•rchitec- found impression which they produced upon 
thrmiSds Gl^recian spectators of a later age, we may judge 
of contem- how immense was the effect upon that generation 
poranes. -^hich saw them both begun and finished. In 
the year 480 B.C., Athens had been ruined by the occupa- 
tion of Xerxes. Since that period, the Greeks had seen, 
first the rebuilding and fortifying of the city on an enlarged 
scale — next, the addition of PeirsBUS with its docks and 
magazines — thirdly, the junction of the two by the long 
walls, thus including the most numerous concentrated 
population, wealth, arms, ships, &c. in Greece i — lastly the 
rapid creation of so many new miracles of art — the sculp- 
tures of Fheidias as well as the paintings of the Thasian 
painter Polygnotus, in the temple of Theseus, and in the 
portico called Poekile. Plutarch observes 2 that the celerity 
with which the works were completed was the most re- 
markable circumstance connected with them; and so it 
probably might be, in respect to the effect upon the con- 
temporary Greeks. The gigantic strides by which Athens 
had reached her maritime empire were now immediately 
succeeded by a series of works which stamped her as the 
imperial city of Greece, gave to her an appearance of power 
even greater than the reality, and especially put to shame 
the old-fashioned simplicity of Sparta. ^ The cost was 
doubtless prodigious, and could only have been borne at a 
time when there was a large treasure in the acropolis, as 
well as a considerable tribute annually coming in. If we 
may trust a computation which seems to re^t on plausible 
grounds, it cannot have been much less than 3000 talents 
in the aggregate (about 690,000/.).* The expenditure of 

' Thucyd. i. 80. xal toi< iXXotc ed. Germ, transl. Colonel Leake^ 

finaaiv ipiaxa i^f^pTuvtat, nXourtp xt with much justice, contends that 

ISI<{} xal 67)(i.oal(p xal vaual xat Ticicoi< the amount of 2012 talents, stated 

xal oicXoi«, xal ^y\(p Soo^ o6x iv by Harpokration out of Philocho- 

&XX(p ivl Yt X*^P^S* '£XXT)vix(j[t iativ, rus as the cost of the Propylaea 

Ac, alone, must be greatly exaggerated. 

* Plutarch, Perikl^s, c. IS, Mr. Wilkins (Atheniensia, p. 84) 

* Thucyd. i. 10. expresses the same opinion; re- 

* See Leake, Topography of marking that the transport of 
Athens, Append, iii. p. 329, 2nd marble from Pentelikus to Atheaa 


SO large a sum was of course a source of great private gain 
to contractors, tradesmen, merchants, artizans of various 
descriptions, &c., concerned in it. In one way or another, 
it distributed itself over a large portion of the whole city. 
And it appears that the materials employed for much of 
the work were designedly of the most costly description, 
as being most consistent with the reverence due to the 
gods. Marble was rejected as too common for the statue 
of Athene, and ivory employed in its place, i Even the 
gold with which it was surrounded weighed not less than 
forty talents. 2 A large expenditure for such purposes, 
considered as pious towards the gods, was at the same time 
imposing in reference to Grecian feeling, which regarded 
with admiration every variety of public show and mag- 
nificence, and repaid with grateful deference the rich men 
who indulged in it. Perikles knew well that the visible 
splendour of the city, so new to all his contemporaries, 
would cause her great power to appear greater still, and 
would thus procure for her a real, though unacknowledged 
influence — perhaps even an ascendency — over all cities of 
the Grecian name. And it is certain that even among those 
who most hated and feared her, at the outbreak of the Pe- 
loponnesian war, there prevailed a powerful sentiment of 
involuntary deference. 

A step taken by Perikles, apparently not long after 
the commencement of the Thirty years' truce, . ^^ ^ . 

, iji. 1 '^ "^ ■ 1 • Attempt of 

evinces now much this ascendency was in his PerikUs to 
direct aim, and how much he connected it with convene a 
views both of harmony and usefulness for Greece congress at 
generally. He prevailed upon the people to ^^hens, of 
send envoys to every city of the Greek name, fro'm ill 
great and small, inviting each to appoint deputies *^® ^'«- 
for a congress to be held at Athens. Three 
points were to be discussed in this intended congress. 
1. The restitution of those temples which had been burnt 
by the Persian invaders. 2. The fulfilment of such vows, 
as on that occasion had been made to the gods. 3. The 
safety of the sea and of maritime commerce for all. 

is easy, and on a descending road, that he uttered this censnre, if he 

Demetrius Phalereus (ap. Gicer. had been led to rate the cost of 

de Officiis, ii. 17) blamed Periklfts them at 2012 talents, 

for the large sum expended upon ' Valer. Maxim, i. 7, 2. 

the Propyleea. It is not wonderful * Thucyd. ii. 13. 


Twenty elderly Athenians were sent round to obtain 
the convocation of this congress at Athens — a Pan-hellenic 
congress for Pan-hellenic purposes. But those who were 
sent to BoBotia and Peloponnesus completely failed in their 
object, from the iealousy, noway astonishing, of Sparta and 
her allies. Of tne rest we hear nothing, for this refusal 
was quite sufficient to frustrate the whole scheme. ^ It is 
to be remarked that the dependent allies of Athens appear 
to have been summoned just as much as the cities perfectly 
autonomous; so that their tributary relation to Athens was 
not understood to degrade them. We may sincerely regret 
that such congress did not take effect, as it might have 
opened some new possibilities of converging tendency and 
alliance for the dispersed fractions of the &reek name — a 
comprehensive benefit not likely to be entertained at Sparta 
even as a project, but which might perhaps have been 
realised under Athens, and seems in this case to have been 
sincerely aimed at by Perikles. The events of the Pelo- 
ponnesian war, however, extinguished all hopes of any 
such union. 

The interval of fourteen years, between the beginning 
of the Thirty years' truce and that of the Peloponnesian 
war, was by no means one of undisturbed peace to Athens. 
In the sixth year of that period occurred the formidable 
revolt of Samos. 

That island appears to have been the most powerful 
B.C. 440. of all the allies of Athens.^ It surpassed even 
Bevoit of Chios or Lesbos, standing on the same footing 

Samos from ,, , 1 1 j. • • j. 'i. j. 

the Athe- as these two : that is, paying no tribute-money — a 
nian. privilege when compared with the body of the 

allies, — but furnishing ships and men when called upon, 
and retaining, subject to this condition, its complete 
autonomy, its oligarchical government, its fortifications, 

» Plutarch, Periklfts, c. 17. Plu- fruits of her alliance with the Per- 

tarch gives no precise date, and sians; moreover, neither Athens 

O. Miiller (De Phidias Vit&, p. 9) nor PerikUs himself seems to have 

places these steps, for convocation been at that time in a situation 

of a congress, before the first war to conceive so large a project; 

between Sparta and Athens and which suits in every respect much 

the battle of Tanagra— «. «. before better for the later period, after 

460 B.C. But this date seems to the Thirty yearns truce, but before 

me improbable : Thebes was not the Peloponnesian war. 

yet renovated in power, nor had * Thucyd. i. 115; viii. 76; Plu- 

Bosotia as yet recovered foom the tarch, Periklds, c. 28. 


and its military force. Like most of the other islands 
near the coast, Samos possessed a portion of territory on 
the Asiatic mainland, between which and the territory of 
Miletus lay the small town of Priene, one of the twelve 
original members contributing to the Pan-Ionic solemnity. 
Respecting the possession of this town of Priene, a war 
broke out oetween the Samians and Milesians, in the sixth 
year of the Thirty years^ truce (b.c. 440-439). Whether 
the town had before been independent, we do not know, 
but in this war the Milesians were worsted, and it fell into 
the hands of the Samians. The defeated Milesians, enrolled 
as they were among the tributary allies of Athens, com- 
plained to her of the conduct of the Samians, and their 
complaint was seconded by a party in Samos itself, opposed 
to the oligarchy and its proceedings. The Athenians 
required the two disputing cities to bring the matter before 
discussion and award at Athens. But the Samians refused 
to comply:* whereupon an armament of forty ships was 
despatched from Athens to the island, and established in 
it a democratical government; leaving in it a garrison and 
carrying away to Lemnos fifty men and as many boys from 
the principal oligarchical families, to serve as hostages. 
Of these families, however, a certain number retired to the 
mainland, where they entered into negotiations with 
Pissuthnes the satrap of Sardes, to procure aid and restor- 
ation. Obtaining from him seven hundred mercenary 
troops, and passing over in the night to the island, by 
previous concert with the oligarchical party, they overcame 
the Samian democracy as well as the Athenian garrison, 
who were sent over as prisoners to Pissuthnes. They were 
farther lucky enough to succeed in stealing away from 
Lemnos their own recently deposited hostages, and they 

> Thucyd. i. 116; Plutarch, Peri- the satrap PissuthneSi from good- 
kids, c. 26. Most of the statements will towards Samos, offered Pe- 
whicb appear in this chapter of riklds 10,000 golden staters as an 
l*lutarob (over and above the con- inducement to spare the island. It 
cise narrative of Thucydidds) ap- may perhaps be true, however, 
pear to be borrowed from exag- that the Samian oligarchy, and 
gerated i>arty stories of the day. those wealthy men whose children, 
We need make no remark upon were likely to be taken as host- 
the story, that Periklds was in- ages, tried the effect of large bribes 
duced to take the side of Miletus upon the mind of Periklds to pre- 
against Samos by the fact that vail upon him not to alter the go- 
Aspasia was a native of Mildtus. vemment. 
Kor is it at all more credible, that 

VOL. V. tJ 



then proclaimed open revolt against Athens, in which 
Byzantium also joined. It seems remarkable, that thoagh 
by such a proceeding they would of course draw upon 
themselves the full strength of Athens, yet their first step 
was to resume aggressive hostilities against Miletus,* 
whither they sailed with a powerful force of seventy ships, 
twenty of them carrying troops. 

Immediately on the receipt of this ^ave intelligence, 
Athenian * '^eet of sixty triremes — probably all that were 
armament in Complete readiness — was despatched to Sa- 
lamos* ^^^ under ten generals, two of whom were Pe- 
«nder ' riklcs himsclf and the poet Sophokles,2 both 
Sophokiis seenaingly included among the ten ordinary 
the trage- Strategi of the year. But it was necessary to 
dian, Ac employ sixteen of these ships, partly in summon- 
ing contingents from Chios and Lesbos, to which islands 
Sophokles went in person ;3 partly in keeping watch off 
the coast of Karia for the arrival of the Phoenician fleet, 
which report stated to be approaching; so that Perikles 
had only forty-four ships remaining in his squadron. 
Yet he did not hesitate to attack the Samian fleet of 
seventy ships on his way back from Miletus, near the is- 
land of Tragia, and was victorious in the action. Presently 
he was reinforced by forty ships from Athens and by 
twenty-five from Chios and Lesbos, so as to be able to 
disembark at Samos, where he overcame the Samian land- 
force and blocked up the harbour with a portion of his 
fleet, surrounding the city on the land-side with a triple 
wall. Meanwhile the Samians had sent Stesagoras with 
five ships to press the coming of the Phoenician fleet, and 
the report of their approach became again so prevalent 
that Perikles felt obliged to take sixty ships (out of the 
total 1 25) to watch for them off the coast of Kaunus and 
Karia, where he cruised for about fourteen days. The 
Phoenician fleet* never came in sight, though Diodorus 

■ Thucyd. i. 114, 115. and graceful in society, but noway 

* Strabo, xiv. p. 638; Schol. Ari- distinguished for active capacity. 

Bteidds, t. iii. p. 486, Dindorf. SophokUs was at this time in pe- 

' See the interesting particulars culiar favour, from the success of 

recounted respecting 8ophokl6s by his tragedy Antigond the year be- 

the Chian poet Ion, who met and fore. See the chronology of these 

conversed with him during the events discussed and elucidated iu 

course of this expedition (Athe- Boeckh's preliminary Dissertation 

uffius, xiii. p. 603). He represents to the Antigond, c. 6-9. 

t\\A poet as fincommonly pleasing * Diodor. xi. 27. 


affirms that it was actually on its voyage. Pissuthnes 
certainly seems to have promised, and the Samians to 
have expected it. Yet I incline to believe that, though 
willing to hold out hopes and encourage revolt among the 
Athenian allies, the satrap did not choose openly to vio- 
late the convention of Kallias, whereby the Persians were 
forbidden to send a fleet westward of the Chelidonian pro- 
montory. The departure of Perikles, however, so much 
weakened the Athenian fleet o£P Samos, that the Samians, 
suddenly sailing out of their harbour in an op- Doubtful 
portune moment, at the instigation and under and pro- 
the command of one of their most eminent citi- test— greaT 
zens, the philosopher Melissus — surprised and power of 
disabled the blockading squadron, and even fg^J^t^iast* 
gained a victory over the remaining fleet before reconquer- 
the ships could be fairly got clear of the land, i For araed"" 
fourteen days they remained masters of the sea, and d/s- 
carrying in and out all that they thought proper. ™*°**e<^- 
It was not until the return of Perikles that they were 
again blockaded. Reinforcements however were now mul- 
tiplied to the investing squadron — from Athens, forty 
ships under Thucydides,^ Agnon, and Phormion, and 

■ Plutarch, PerikUs, o. 26. Plu- from ostracism before the regular 

tarch seems to have had before him time — a supposition indeed noway 

accounts respecting this Samian inadmissible in itself, but which 

campaign not only from Ephorus, there is nothing else to connten- 

Stesimbrotus, and Duris, but also ance. The author of the Life of 

from Aristotle: and the statements Sophoklds, as well as most of 

of the latter must have differed the recent critics, adopt this 

thus far from Thncydidfis, that he opinion. 

affirmed Melissus the Samian ge- On the other hand, it may have 

neral to have been victorious over been a third person named Thu- 

Periklds himself, which is not to cydidds; for the name seems to 

be reconciled with the narrative have been common, as we might 

of Thucydidds. guess from the two words of which 

The Samian historian Duris, liv- it is compounded. We find a third 

ing about a century after this Thucydidds mentioned viii. 92— a 

siege, seems to have introduced native of Phaisalus: and the biogra- 

many falsehoods respecting the pher Marcellinus seems to have 

cruelties of Athens; see Plutarch, read of many persons so called 

I. c. (6ouxu8i8ai icoXXol, p. xvi. ed. 

* It appears very improbable Arnold). The subsequent history 

that this Thncydid6s can be the of Thucydidds son of Meldsias is 

historian himself. If it be Thucy- involved in complete obscurity, 

didds son of Meldsias, we must We do not know the incident to 

suppose him to have been restored which the remarkable passage in 




Vknr n. 

twenty under Tlepolemus and Antikles, besides thirty 
from Chios and Lesbos — making altogether near two hun- 
dred sail. Against this overwhelming force Melissus and 
the Samians made an unavailing attempt at resistance, but 
were presently quite blocked up, and remained so for 
nearly nine months until they could hold out no longer. 
They then capitulated, being compelled to rase their forti- 
fications, to surrender all their ships of war, to give host- 
ages for their future conduct, and to make good by stated 
instalments the whole expense of the enterprise, said to 
have reached 1000 talents. The Byzantines too made 
their submission at the same time. ^ 

Two or three circumstances deserve notice respecting 
Hone of ^^^ revolt, as illustrating the existing condition 
the other of the Athenian empire. First, that the whole 
Athen8*'ex- ^<^rce of Athens, together with the contingents 
cept By- from Chios and Lesbos, was necessary in order 
revoUe™' ^^ crush it, SO that Byzantium, which joined in 
at the the revolt, seems to have been left unassailed. 

same time. -^^^ ^^ -g remarkable that none of the depend- 
ent allies near Byzantium or anywhere else, availed them- 
selves of so favourable an opportunity to revolt also: a 
fact which seems plainly to imply that there was little po- 
sitive discontent then prevalent among them. Had the 
revolt spread to other cities, probably Pissuthnes might 
have realised his promise of bringing up the Phoenician 
fleet, which would have been a serious calamity for the 
JQgean Greeks, and was only kept off by the unbroken 
maintenance of the Athenian empire. 

Next, the revolted Samians applied for aid, not only to 
Pissuthnes, but also to Sparta and her allies; among whom 

Ariatophanfis (Acham. 703) alludes 
'Compare Yespse, 946 : nor can we 
confirm the statement which the 
Scholiast cites from Idomeneus, 
to the effect that Thucydidds was 
banished and fled to Artaxerxes: 
see Bergk. Beliq. Com. Att. p. 61. 

» Thucyd. i. 117 ; Diodor. xii. 27, 
28; Isokratds, De Permutat. Or. xv. 
sect.118 ; Corn. Nep., 

The assertion of Ephorus (see 
Diodorus, xii. 28, and EphoriFragm. 

117, ed. Marx, with the note of 
Marx) that PerikUs employed bat- 
tering machines against the town, 
under the management of the Kla- 
zomenian Artemon, was called in 
question by Herakleidds Ponticus, 
on the ground that Artemon was 
a contemporary of Anakreon, near 
a century before: and ThucydidSs 
represents Periklds to have cap- 
tured the town altogether by 


at a special meeting the question of compliance Appiica- 
or refusal was formally debated. "Notwith- tion of th* 
standing the Thirty years' truce then subsistinff, to " pan* 
of which only six years had elapsed, and which for aid 
had been noway violated by Athens — many of JSie^ns-it 
the allies of Sparta voted for assisting the Sa- is refused 
mians. What part Sparta herself took, we do jJJoB^giithe 
not know — ^but the Corinthians were the main Connthi- 
and decided advocates for the negative. They ^^^' 
not only contended that the truce distinctly forbade com<^ 
pliance with the Samian request, but also recognised the 
right of each confederacy to piinish its own recusant 
members. And this was the decision ultimately adopted, 
for which the Corinthians afterwards took credit in the 
eyes of Athens, as its chief authors. * Certainly, if the 
contrary policy had been pursued, the Athenian empire 
might nave been in great danger — the Phoenician neet 
would probably have been brought in also — and the future 
course of events greatly altered. 

Again, after the reconquest of Samos, we should 
assume it almost as a matter of certainty that the Atheni- 
ans would renew the democratical government oovem- 
which they had set up just before the revolt, ment of 
Yet if they did so, it must have been again over- thTrecon-' 
thrown, without any attempt to uphold it on quest— 
the part of Athens. For we hardly hear of Sa- th^theV 
mos again, until twenty-seven years afterwards, the Athe- 
the latter division of the Peloponnesian war, in Se^wed'tiie 
412 B.C., and it then appears with an establish- democracy 
ed oligarchical government of Geomori or land- Sad'recent- 
ed proprietors, against which the people make ly estab- 
a successful rising during the course of that ^^^^^d. 
year. 2 As Samos remained, during the interval between 
439 B.C. and 412 b. c, unfortified, deprived of its fleet, 
and enrolled among the tribute-paying allies of Athens — 
and as it nevertheless either retained, or acquired, its oli- 
garchical government; so we may conclude that Athens 
cannot have systematically interfered to democratise by 
violence the subject-allies, in cases where the natural tend- 
ency of parties ran towards oligarchy. The condition of 
Lesbos at the time of its revolt (hereafter to -be related) 
will be found to confirm this conclusion. 3 

» Thucyd. i. 40, 41. « Thucyd. viii. 21. « Compare Wachsmuth, 
Helleniscbe Alterthumskunde^ sect. 68, vol. ii. p. 82. 


On returning to Athens after the reconqnest of Sa* 
Funeral mos, Perikles was chosen to pronounce the fu« 
oration neral oration over the citizens slain in the war^ 
nounced by to whom, according to custom, solemn and public 
^*on \h'e Obsequies were celebrated in the suburb called 
Athenian Kerameikus. This custom appears to have 
cj*^e^ been introduced shortly after the Persian war,» 
Samian &i^d would doubtless contribute to stimulate the 
war. patriotism of the citizens, especially when the 

speaker elected to deliver it was possessed of the personal 
dignity as well as the oratorical powers of Perikles. He 
was twice public funeral orator by the choice of the citi- 
zens ; once after the Samian success, and a second time in 
the first year of the Peloponnesian war. His discourse on 
the first occasion has not reached us,^ but the second has 
been fortunately preserved (in substance at least) by Thu- 
cydides, who also briefly describes the funeral ceremony — 
doubtless the same on all occasions. The bones of the de- 
ceased warriors were exposed in tents three days before 
the ceremony, in order that the relatives of each might 
have the opportunity of bringing offerings. They were 
then placed in coffins of cypress and carried forth on carts 
to the public burial-place at the Kerameikus; one coffin 
for each of the ten tribes, and one empty couch, formally 
laid out, to represent those warriors whose bones had not 
been discovered or collected. The female relatives of each 
followed the carts, with loud wailings, and after them a 
numerous procession both of citizens and strangers. So 
soon as the bones had been consigned to the grave, some 

1 See Westermann, G-eschichte funeral harangue. The Scholiast 

der Beredsarakeit in Chriedienland says, Solon: Weber fixes on Ki. 

und Bom; Diodor. xL 33; Dionys. mon: Westermann, on Aristeidds: 

Hal. A. B. Y. 17. another commentator on Themisto- 

Feriklds, in the funeral oration kUs. But we may reasonably doubt 

preserved by Thucydidds (ii. 86-40), whether any one very celebrated 

begins by saying— 01 (xiv noXXolTU)v man is specially indicated by the 

£v6d8s elp7]x6Tu>v tJ5t) aicaivouai tov words tov icpoaSivxa. To commend 

icpoaSivta T^ v6(j.(|> t6v X6yov the introducer of the practice, is 

tdvSe, ^. nothing more than a phrase for 

The Scholiast, and other com- commending the practice itself. 

mentators(K.F. Weber and Wester- * Some foagments of it seem to 

mann among the number), make have been preserved, in the time 

various guesses as to tphat cele- of Aristotle: see his treatise de 

brated man is here designated as Bhetoric&, i. 7; iii. 10, 3. 
the introducer of the custom of a 


distinguished citizen, specially chosen for the purpose, 
mounted on an elevated stage and addressed to the multi- 
tude an appropriate discourse. Such was the effect pro- 
duced hy that of Perikles after the Saraian expedition, that 
when he had concluded, the audience present testified 
their emotion in the liveliest manner, and the women espe- 
cially crowned him with garlands like a victorious athlete. * 
Only Elpinike, sister of the deceased Kimon, reminded 
him that the victories of her brother had been more felici- 
tous, as gained over Persians and Phoenicians, and not over 
Greeks and kinsmen. And the contemporary poet Ion, 
the friend of Eamon, reported what he thought an unseem- 
ly boast of Perikles — to the effect that Agamemnon had 
spent ten years in taking a foreign city, while he in nine 
months had reduced the first and most powerful of all the 
Ionic communities. 2 But if we possessed the actual speech 
pronounced, we^ should probably find that he assigned all 
the honour of the exploit to Athens and her citizens gener- 
ally, placing their achievement in favourable comparison 
with that of Agamemnon and his host — not himself with 

Whatever may be thought of this boast, there can 
be no doubt that the result of the Samian war not only 
rescued the Athenian empire from great peril, ^ but ren- 
dered it stronger than ever: while the foundation of Amphi- 
polis, which was effected two years afterwards, strengthened 
it still farther. Nor do we hear, during the ensuing few 
years, of any farther tendencies to disaffection among its 
members, until the period immediately before Position 
the Peloponnesian war. The feeling common °' *^®. 
among them towards Athens, seems to have emplre^e- 
been neither attachment nor hatred, but simple 5f h°° °^ 
indifference and acquiescence in her supremacy, her sub- ^ 
Such amount of positive discontent as really Ject-aiues 
existed among them, arose, not from actual f^eiingf 
hardships sunered, but from the general poli- towards her 
tical instinct of the Greek mind — desire of w^e'those 
separate autonomy; which manifested itself in of indif- 
each city, through the oligarchical party, whose i^q^uiei-***^ 
power was kept down by Athens — and was cence, not 
stimulated by the sentiment communicated from ®' ^»*'«d- 

' Compare the enthusiastic de- * Flutarch, Feriklds, o. 28; Tha- 
monstrations which welcomed Bra- cyd. ii. 34. 
Bidas at Ski6n6 (Thuoyd. iv. 121). ' A short fragment remainio^ 



Past It. 

the Grecian communities without the Athenian empire. 
According to that sentiment, the condition of a subject- 
ally of Athens was treated as one of degradation and 
servitude. In proportion as fear and hatred of Athens be- 
came predominant among the allies of Sparta, these latter 
gave utterance to the sentiment more and more emphatic- 
ally, so as to encourage discontent artificially among the 
subject-allies of the Athenian empire. Possessing complete 
mastery of the sea, and every sort of superiority requisite 
for holding empire over islands, Athens had yet no senti- 
ment to appeal to in her subjects, calculated to render her 
empire popular, except that of common democracy, which 
seems at first to have acted without any care on her part 
to encourage it, until the progress of the Peloponnesian 
war made such encouragement a part of her policy. And 
even had she tried to keep up in the allies the feeling of 
a common interest and the attachment to a permanent con- 
federacy, the instinct of political separation would probably 
have baffled all her e£forts. But she took no such pains. 
With the usual morality that grows up in the minds of the 
actual possessors of power, she conceived herself entitled 
to exact obedience as her right. Some of the Athenian 
speakers in Thucydides go so far as to disdain all pretence 
of legitimate power, even such as might fairly be set up; 
resting the supremacy of Athens on the naked plea of 
superior force. * As the allied cities were mostly under 
democracies — through the indirect influence rather than 
the systematic dictation of Athens — yet each having its 
own internal aristocracy in a state of opposition; so the 
movements for revolt against Athens originated with the 
aristocracy or with some few citizens apart; while the 
people, though sharing more or less in the desire for auto- 
nomy, had yet either a fear of their own aristocracy or a 
sympathy with Athens, which made them always backward 
in revolting, sometimes decidedly opposed to it. Neither 
Perikles nor Kleon indeed lays stress on the attachment 

from the comic poet Eupolis (Kd- 
A.axt(;, Fr. xyi. p. 493, ed. Meineke), 
attests the anxiety at Athens about 
the Samian war, and the great joy 
when the island was reconquered : 
compare Aristophan. Vesp. 283. 

» Thucyd. iii. 37 ; ii. 68. See the 
conference, at the island of Melos 

in the sixteenth year of the Felo* 
ponnesian war (Thucyd. v. 89 seq.)^ 
between the Athenian oommission- 
and the Melians. I think 


however that this conference is less 
to be trusted as based in reality, 
than the speeches in Thucydidds 
generally — of which more hereafter. 


of the people as distinguished from that of the Pew, in 
these dependent cities. But the argument is strongly in- 
sisted on by Diodotus * in the discussion respecting Mity- 
len^ after its surrender: and as the war advanced, the 
question of alliance with Athens or Sparta became more 
and more identified with the internal preponderance of 
democracy or oligarchy in each. 2 

We shall find that in most of those cases of actual 
revolt where we are informed of the preceding circum- 
stances; the step is adopted or contrived by a small number 
of oligarchical malcontents, without consulting the general 
voice; while in those cases where the general assembly is 
consulted beforehand, there is manifested indeed a prefer^ 
ence for autonomy, but nothing like a hatred of Athens 
or decided inclination to break with her. In the case of 
Mitylene,3 in the fourth year of the war, it was the aristo- 
cratical government which revolted, while the people, as 
soon as they obtained arms, actually declared in favour of 
Athens. And the secession of Chios, the greatest of all 
the allies, in the twentieth year of the Peloponnesian war 
—even after all the hardships which the allies had been 
called upon to bear in that war, and after the ruinous dis- 
asters which Athens had sustained before Syracuse — was 
both prepared beforehand and accomplished by secret 
negotiations of the Chian oligarchy, not only without the 
concurrence, but against the inclination, of their own people. * 
In like manner, the revolt of Thasos would not have occurred, 
had not the Thasian democracy been' previously subverted 
by the Athenian Peisander and his oligarchical confederates. 
So in Akanthus, in Amphipolis, in Mende, and those other 
Athenian dependencies which were wrested from Athens 
by Brasidas — we find the latter secretly introduced by a 

> Thucyd. iii. 47. NOv ixiv fap chy just set up in lieu of the pre- 

6|aTv 6 S^fAOc iv dxdaaic xalc ii6Xt- vious democracy by the Athenian 

oiv e&vouc eaxt, xal ft ou ouva^iota- oligarchical conspirators who were 

■cat ToTc 6XiYoic> "^ idv fitaoG^, Oicdp- then organising the revolution of 

ytK Totc ditooTi^aaai noXcfxtoc tuSuc, the Four Hundred at Athens— that 

&o. they immediately made prepara- 

2 See the striking observations tions for revolting from Athens— 

ofThucydid6s,iii.82, 83; Aristotel. Eovi^T) ouv a^ToU (xdXioTa A ipo6- 

Politic. V. 6, 9. XovTo, xrjv iciXiv t* dxivSuvu)^ 6p6ou- 

■ Thucyd. iii. 27. a9ai|Xai t6v iv avTiu>o6|xcvov 

* Thucyd. viii. 9-14. He observes 5^(aov xataXsXuaOai (viii. 64), 
tilsOi respecting the Thasian oligar- 


few conspirators The bulk of the citizens do not hail 
him at once as a deliverer, like men sick of Athenian 
supremacy: they acquiesce, not without debate, when 
Brasidas is already in the town, and his demeanour, just as 
well as conciliating, soon gains their esteem. But neither 
in Akanthus nor in Amphipolis would he have been ad- 
mitted by the free decision of the citizens, if they had not 
been alarmed for the safety of their friends, their properties, 
and their harvest, still exposed in the lands without the 
walls.! These particular examples warrant us in affirming, 
that though the oligarchy in the various allied cities desired 
eagerly to shake on the supremacy of Athens, the people 
were always backward in following them, sometimes even 
opposed, and hardly ever willing to make sacrifices for the 
object. They shared the universal Grecian desire for 
separate autonomy, ^ and felt the Athenian empire as an 
extraneous pressure which they would have been glad to 
shake o£P, whenever the change could be made with safety. 
But their condition was not one of positive hardship, nor 
did they overlook the hazardous side of such a change — 
partly from the coercive hand of Athens — partly from new 
enemies against whom Athens had hitherto protected them 
— and not least from their own oligarchy. Of course the 
different allied cities were not all animated by the same 
feelings, some being more averse to Athens than others. 

The particular modes, in which Athenian supremacy 
Particular pressed upon the allies and excited complaints, 
com^iain\^d *PP®*^ ^ hBrve been chiefly three. 1 . The annual 
of in the tribute. 2. The encroachments or other misdeeds 
A^h^*"^ **' committed by individual Athenians, taking ad- 
with her Vantage of their superior position: citizens either 
allies. planted out by the city as Kleruchs (out-settlers), 

on the lands of those allies who had been subdued — or 
serving in the naval armaments — or sent round as inspect- 
ors — or placed in occasional garrison — or carrying on some 
private speculation. 3. The obligation under which the 
allies were laid of bringing a large proportion of their 
judicial trials to be settled before the dikasteries at 

As to the tribute, I have before remarked that its 
amount had been but little raised from its first settlement 

> Thucyd. iv. 86, 88, 106, 123. 

* See the important passage, Thucyd. vilL 43» 



down to the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, at which 
time it was 600 talents yearly. ^ it appears to .^ , 
have been reviewed, and the apportionment cor- tribute— 
rected, in every fifth year, at which period the col- ci»ang?« 
lecting oflGicers may probably have been changed. SSount! 
Afterwards, probably, it became more bur- -Ajthenian 
densome, though when, or in what degree, we do inspectors 
not know: but the alleged duplication of it (as I throughout 
have already remarked) is both uncertified and * *™^ 
improbable. The same gradual increase may probably h& 
affirmed respecting the second head of inconvenience- 
vexation caused to the allies by individual Athenians, 
chiefly officers of armaments or powerful citizens. * Doubt- 
less this was always more or less a real grievance, from the 
moment when the Athenians became despots in place of 
chiefs. But it was probably not very serious in extent 
until after the- commencement of the Peloponnesian war, 
when revolt on the part of the allies became more apprehend- 
ed, and when garrisons, inspectors, and tribute-gathering 
ships became more essential in the working of the Athenian 

But the third circumstance above-noticed — the sub- 
jection of the allied cities to the Athenian Disputes 
dikasteries — ^has been more dwelt upon as a J"*^ ®'-. 
grievance than the second, and seems to have and among 
been unduly exafffferated. We can hardly doubt *^?, subject- 

. r J. 1 T_ r "^ • '^ i»j.i.' • • j» J.* -J allies, were 

that the beginning oi this jurisdiction exercised brought for 

by the Athenian dikasteries dates with the synod I?*^^Hf '°'® 

of Delos, at the time of the first formation of teries at 

the confederacy. It was an indispensable element Athens. 

' Xenophon, Repub. Athen. iii. S< In respect to the Klemchies, o? 

ffXiQv ai Td^eic tou 96pou* touxo 6k out-settlements of Athenian citi- 

Y^YvSTat u>( Ta icoXXa 8»' 2tou< zens on the lands of allies revolt- i 

nifAiTTou. ed and reconquered— we may re- 

* Xenophon, Bepub. Athen. 1. 14. mark that they are not noticed as 

Ilepl 8i Tu>v au(A|jkdi^u>v, ol ixnXiov- a grievance in this treatise of Xe- 

Ttc ouxo^avTouatv, u>< Soxouai, xal nophon, nor in any of the anti- 

M.t90uat Tooc XP^l^o^^t Ac* Athenian orations of Thucydidds. 

Who are the persons designated They appear, however, as matters 

by the expression ol ixnXiovTs^, of crimination after the extinction 

appears to be specified more par- of the empire, and at the moment 

ticular) J a little farther on (i. 18) ; when Athens was again rising into 

it means the generals, the officers, a position such as to inspire the 

the envoys, Ac, sent forth by hope of reviving it. For at the 

Athens. close of the Peloponnesian war, 


of that confederacy, that the members should forego their 
right of private war among each other, and submit their 
differences to peaceable arbitration — a covenant introduced 
even into alliances much less intimate than this was, and 
absolutely essential to the efficient maintenance of any 
common action against Persia. ^ Of course many causes 
of dispute, public as well as private, must have arisen 
among these wide-spread islands and seaports of theiBgean, 
connected with each other by relations of fellow-feeling, of 
trade, and of common apprehensions. The synod of Delos, 
composed of the deputies of all, was the natural board of 
arbitration for such disputes. A habit must thus have 
been formed, of recognismg a sort of federal tribunal, — ^to 
decide peaceably how far each ally had faithfully discharged 
its duties, both towards the confederacy collectively, and 
towards other allies with their individual citizens separately, 
— as well as to enforce its decisions and punish refractory 
members, pursuant to the right which Sparta and her con- 
federacy also claimed and exercised. > Now from the 

which was also the destrtiction of oause they made war upon each 

the empire, all the Klemchs were other (Thucyd. yL 76), partly also 

driven home again, and deprived on other specious pretences. How 

of their outlying property, which far this charge against Athens is 

reverted to various insular pro- borne out by the fact, we can 

prietors. These latter were terri- hardly say ; in all those particular 

fied at the idea that Athens might examples which Thucydidfts men- 

afterwards try to resume these lost tions of subjugation of allies by 

rights: hence the subsequent out- Athens, there is a cause perfectly 

cry against the Kleruchies. definite and sufficient— not a mere 

* See the expression in Thucy- pretence devised by Athenian am- 

didds (v. 27), describing the con- bition. 

ditions required when Argos was * According to the principle laid 

about to extend her alliances in down by the Corinthians shortly 

Peloponnesus. The conditions before the Peloponnesian 
were two. 1. That the city shoulU touc itpoa:^xovTa« ^uftpidt^fouc ai&Tdt 
be autonomous. 2. Next^ that it tiva xoXaCciv (Thucyd. i. 40-43). 
should be willing to submit its The Laeedsemonians, on ^efer- 
quarrels to equitable arbitrations ring their accusation of treason 
— '^Ti? a^TovofiuSc xi <9Ti, xal 8ixa« against Themistokl^s, demanded 
Caac xal 6(toiac 8iSu)ai. that he should be tried at Sparta, 
In the orations against the Athe- before the common Hellenic synod 
nians, delivered by the Syracusan which held its sitting there, and 
Hermokratfts at Kamarina, Athens of which Athens was then a mem- 
is accused of having enslaved her her; that is, the Spartan confeder- 
allies partly on the ground that acy or alliance — ini toO xoivou 
they neglected to perform their auvsSptou xuiv *£>.Xiqvu>v (Diodor. 
military obligations, partly be- xi. 65). 



beginning the Athenians were the guiding and enforcing 
presidents of this synod. When it gradually died away, 
they were found occupying its place as well as clothed 
with its functions. It was in this manner that their judicial 
authority over the allies appears first to have begun, as 
the confederacy became changed into an Athenian empire, 
— the judicial functions of the synod being transferred 
along with the common treasure to Athens, and doubtless 
much extended. And on the whole, these functions must 
have been productive of more good than evil to the allies 
themselves, especially to the weakest and most defenceless 
among them. 

Among the thousand towns which paid tribute to 
Athens (taking this numerical statement of _ , ^, 

A.ii^A°i.--i I • !_.• 1 Productive 

Aristophanes not m its exact meaning, but simply of some 
as a great number), if a small town, or one of J^^^^^'V 
its citizens, had cause of complaint against a of^prepon- 
larger, there was no channel except the synod durance of 
of Delos, or the Athenian tribunal, through to \ie * ub- 
which it could have any reasonable assurance joct-aiues 
of fair trial or lustice. It is not to be supposed 
that all the private complaints and suits between citizen 
and citizen, in each respective subject town, were carried 
up for trial to Athens: yet we do not know distinctly how 
tne line was drawn, between matters carried up thither, 
and matters tried at home. The subject cities appear to 
have been interdicted from the power of capital punishment, 
which could only be inflicted after previous trial and con- 
demnation at Athens: 1 so that the latter reserved to herself 
the cognizance of most of the grave crimes — or what may 
be called "the higher justice" generally. And the political 
accusations preferred by citizen against citizen, in any 
subject city, for alleged treason, corruption, non-fulfilment 
of public duty, &c., were doubtless carried to Athens for 
trial — perhaps the most important part of her jurisdiction. 
But the maintenance of this judicial supremacy was 
not intended by Athens for the substantive object of amend- 
ing the administration of justice in each separate allied 
city. It went rather to regulate the relations between city 
and city — between citizens of difi'erent cities — between 
Athenian citizens or officers, and any of these allied cities 


' Antipho, De Gsede Herddis^ c. *A6T]valu>vy ouSivoi Oavdrq) Xji}f.\S>» 
7 1 p. 136. h o68i icbXti iEeaxiv, &vsu oat. 

302 HI8T0BY 07 OBEEOB. Part H, 

with which they had relations — ^between each city itself, 
as a dependent government with contending political par- 
imperiai ties, and the imperial head Athens. All these 
Athens being problems which imperial Athens was called 
wiS^frnpe- on to solve, the best way of solving them would 
rial Sparta, have been through some common synod emana- 
ting from all the allies. Putting this aside, we shall find 
that the solution provided by Athens was perhaps the next 
best, and we shall be the more induced to think so when 
we compare it with the proceedings afterwards adopted by 
Sparta, when she had put down the Athenian empire. 
Imder Sparta, the general rule was, to place each of the 
dependent cities under the government of a Dekarchy (or 
oligarchical council of ten) among its chief citizens, together 
witn a Spartan harmost or governor having a small garrison 
under his orders. It will be found when we come to describe 
the Spartan maritime empire that the arrangements exposed 
each dependent city to very great violence and extortion, 
while, after all, they solved only a part of the problem. 
They served only to maintain each separate city under the 
dominion of Sparta without contributing to regulate the 
dealings between the citizens of one and those of another, 
or to bind together the empire as a whole. Now the 
Athenians did not, as a system, place in their dependent 
cities governors analogous to the harmosts, though they 
did so occasionally under special need. But their fleets 
and their officers were in frequent relation with these cities; 
and as the principal officers were noways indisposed to 
abuse their position, so the facility of complaint, constantly 
open, to the Athenian popular dikastery, served both as 
redress and guarantee against misrule of this description. 
It was a Guarantee which the allies themselves sensibly 
felt and vtdued, as we know from Thucydides. The chief 
source from whence they had to apprehend evil was, the 
misconduct of the Athenian officials and principal citizens, 
who could misemploy the power of Athens for their own 
private purposes — but they looked up to the "Athenian 
Demos as a chastener of such evil-doers and as a harbour 
of refuge to themselves." * If the popular dikasteries aV 

• Thucyd. viii. 48. Too? t* xa- i^tiv tou HiinoDf icopiata? ?vtoc xoi 

Xouc xaYaOooc ivo|j.QiCo|xi <ouc oux i9i2Y>)Tac tu>v xaxtbv x^ $^K>>H'} <^ 

iXdaou) auTo6« (that is, the subject- J>v rdt icXciu> a^Touc (u^cXctoSat* xal 

allies) vo{jLiC>iv a<piol icpdiY{Aa'ca nap- t6 fiiiv in' sxtivoi^ ctvai, xal axpiapt 


Athens had not been thus open, the allied cities would have 
suffered much more severely from the captains and officials 
of Athens in their individual capacity. And the mainten- 
ance of political harmony, between the imperial city and 
the subject ally, was ensured by Athens through the juris- 
diction of her dikasteries with much less cost of injustice 
and violence than by Sparta. For though oligarchical 
leaders in these allied cities might sometimes be unjustly 
condemned at Athens, yet such accidental wrong was 
immensely overpassed by the enormities of the Spartan 
harmosts andDekarchies,who put numbers to death without 
uny trial at all. 

So again, it is to be recollected that Athenian private 
citizens, not officially employed, were spread over the whole 
range of the empire as kleruchs, proprietors, or traders. 
Of course therefore disputes would arise between them 
and the natives of the subject cities, as well as among these 
latter themselves, in cases where both parties did not belong 
to the same city. Now in such cases the Spartan imperial 
authority was so exercised as to afford little or Numeroat 
no remedy, since the action of the harmost or Athenian 
the Dekarchy was confined to one separate city; spread over 
while the Athenian dikasteries, with universal ^® -SJgean 
competence and public trial, afforded the best bad no re- 
redress which the contingency admitted. If a ^^^^ 
Thasian citizen believed himself aggrieved by thenT,' 
the historian Thucydides, either as commander ?J*^®p*. .j^ 
of the Athenian fleet on that station, or as pro- Athenian 
prietor of gold mines in Thrace, — he had his dikasteries. 

fiv xat PtatiTcpov inoOvi^axtiv, x6h tt in the allied citieB— fines, sentenoes 

S^|jLOv ofubv Tt xaTa9UYV tlvai xal of banishment, capital punish- 

cxetvfbv 9u>9povi9TiQv. Kai Tauta icap* ments, and that the Athenian 

auTU>v tObv ipYu>v iici9Ta|«.lvac xac .people, though they had a strong 

ic6Xtt< 9a9d>c auTOc tlfiivat, Sti o8tu> public interest in the prosperity 

■vo|jLiCou9t. This is introduced as of the allies in order that their 

the deliberate judgement of the tribute might be larger, neverthe> 

Athenian commander, the oligarch less thought it better that any in- 

Phryniohus, whom Thucydidfis dividual citizen of Athens should 

greatly commends for his sagacity, pocket what he could out of the 

and with whom he seems in this plunder of the allies, and leave to 

case to have concurred. the latter nothing more than was 

Xenophon (Rep. Ath. i. 14, 16) absolutely necessary for them to 

affirms that the Athenian officers live and work, without any super- 

on service passed many unjust sen- fiuity such as might tempt them to 

tenoes upon the oligarchical part^ ravolt* 

304 HI8T0BT OF OBBBGB. Past H. 

remedy against the latter by accusation before the Athenian 
dikasteries, to which the most powerful Athenian was 
amenable not less than the meanest Thasian. To a citizen 
of any allied city it might be an occasional hardship to be 
sued before the courts at Athens ; but it was also often a 
valuable privilege to him to be able to sue, before those 
courts, others whom else he could not have reached. He 
had his share of the benefit as well as of the hardship. 
Athens, if she robbed her subject-allies of their independ- 
ence, at least gave them in exchange the advantage of a 
central and common judiciary authority; thus enabling 
each of them to enforce claims of justice against the rest, 
in a way which would not have been practicable (to the 
weaker at least) even in a state of general independence. 

Now Sparta seems not even to have attempted any- 
thing of the kind with regard to her subject-allies, being 
content to keep them under the rule of a harmost and a 
partisan oligarchy. And we read anecdotes which show 
that no justice could be obtained at Sparta even for the 
grossest outrages committed by the harmost, or by private 
Spartans out of Laconia. The two daughters of a Boeotian 
named Skedasus (of Leuktra in Boeotia) had been first 
violated and then murdered by two Spartan citizens : the 
son of a citizen of Oreus in Eubcea had been also outraged 
and killed by the harmost Aristodemus:i in both cases the 
fathers went to Sparta to lay the enormity before the 
ephors and other authorities, and in both cases a deaf ear 
The di. was turned to their complaints. But such 
^?*^ded' crimes, if committed by Athenian citizens or offi- 
protection cers, might have been brought to a formal ex- 
against posure before the public sitting of the dikastery, 
both of and there can be no doubt that both would have 
Athenian been severely punished. We shall see hereafter 

oitizensand J^ , K /•xi.- j • x- 'xj. j 

Athenian that an enormity oi this description, committed 
officers. by the Athenian general Paches at Mitylene, 
cost him his life before the Athenian dikasts.^ Xenophon, 

That the Athenian officers on intended, among other efifects, to 
service may have succeeded too open to the allies a legal redress 
often in unjust peculation at the against such misconduct on the 
cost of allies, is probable enough: part of the Athenian officers: and 
but that the Athenian people were the passage above cited from Thu- 
pleased to see their own individual cydidds proves that it really pro- 
citizens so enriching themselves, duced such an effect. 
is certainly not true. The large >Plut.,Pelop.,c.20;Plut., AnuNar. 
jurisdiction of the dikasteries was c. 3, p. 773. * See infra, chap. 49. 


in the dark and one-sided representation whicli he gives 
of the Athenian democracy, remarks, that if the subject- 
allies had not been made amenable to justice at Athens, 
they would have cared little for the people of Athens, and 
would have paid court only to those individual Athenians^ 
generals, tnerarchs, or envoys, who visited the islands on 
service; but under the existing system, the subjects were 
compelled to visit Athens either as plaiutifPs or defendants, 
and were thus under the necessity of paying court to the 
bulk of the people also — that is, to those humbler citizens 
out of whom the dikasteries were formed; they supplicated 
the dikasts in court for favour or lenient dealing. ^ But 
this is only an invidious manner of discrediting what was 
really a protection to the allies, both in purpose and in 
reality. For it was a lighter lot to be brought for trial 
before the dikastery, than to be condemned without redress 
by the general on service, or to be forced to buy off his 
condemnation by a bribe. Moreover the dikastery was 
open not merely to receive accusations against citizens of 
the allied cities, but also to entertain complaints which they 
preferred against others. 

Assuming the dikasteries at Athens to be ever so de- 
fective as tribunals for administering justice, j^^xe di- 
we must recollect that they were the same tri- kasteries, 
bunals under which every Athenian citizen held or^not ^* 
his own fortune or reputation, and that the na- were tde 
tive of any subject city was admitted to the bu^ais'un. 
same chance of justice as the native of Athens, der which 
Accordingly we find the Athenian envoy at njfj^heid^* 
Sparta, immediately before the Peloponnesian his own 
war, taking peculiar credit to the imperial city "«<^»"*y' 
on this groimd, for equal dealing with her subject-allies. 
"If our power (he says) were to pass into other hands, the 
comparison would presently show how moderate we are 
in tne use of it: but as regards us, our very moderation is 

' Xenophon, Bep. Athen. i. 18. Souvai xal Xafieiv, o6x iv &XXoic ti- 

Ilpic Si TooToiCi tl ftiv 11^1 tici 8tx«c oW, oXX* iv xqi Si^H^tp, 8« tffTi 8tj v6- 

^taav ol (ru|jL|jLa/oi) too? ixicXIovxa? pioc 'A8iQv^fft. Kal dvTiPo^ ijaai dva7- 

'AOY)valu>v ctliAUDv iv [Advouc, To6« Tt xdtC«Toi iv TOic 8ixaaTY)ploi5, xoi tlo- 

OTpatTjYouc xal TOt)c tpiTjpApxooc xal t6vT<i« too, iitiXa|jLf)ave99ai t^c x*'* 

icpiff(i«ic* vov 8* -^voYxaffTai tov 8^- p6c. Aia tooto oov oi ff6|*.tt«xo' ^o^ 

f&ov xoXaxt6ctv tu>v 'A9T)vat<t>v ttc Xot. too Sig^Loo tu>v 'AOijvaUov xaOt- 

IxaoToc TU)v oo(A(Adxo'>^i 7t7vd)arxu>v oxaai {idXXov* 
Cti 8ti (tiv df tx6|Mvov 'ASi^vaCt Clx7]v 

VOL. V, 2C 

306 niBTOBT OFGBEE01L Past H, 

unfairly turned to our disparagement rather than to our 
praise. For even though we put ourselves at disadvantage 
in matters litigated with our allies^ and though we have 
appointed such matters to be judged among ourselves, and 
under laws equal to both parties, we are represented as 

animated by nothing better than a love of litigation,** i 

" Thticyd. i. 76, 77. 'AXXooc f fiv Moreorer I think that the passage 

ouv ol6fi.t9a Ta f)(j.iTcpot Xapovxa^ of Antipho (De Caede Herodis, p. 

StiEsi &v |«.dtXt.9Ta tt Ti fUTptaCofitv* 745) proves that it was the citizens 

"iifi-tv 8i xal ex Tou iiittixou< dSo^la of plAces not in alliance with Athens 

TO nXsov -^ Inatvoc o6x clxdttuc ict- who litigated with Athenians ao- 

ptivTT). Kal eXa99o6)ACvoi ydp cv rate cording to Stxai &ic6 ^ufi.f)6Xu)v— not 

^ufi[)oXalaic icp6c robe ^\)\iL\t.iyou^ the allies of Athens while they 

fixate, in-oii nap' ^\iah aOtoT^ iv toiq resided in their own native cities ; 

6{ioiot< v6|<.oi< TC0iiQ9avTcc rac xplaei^, for I agree with the interpretation 

9vXo6ixeiv Soxoupitv, Ao. which Boeckh pats npon this pas- 

I construe EuM-f^oXaiaic Sixain as sage, in opposition to Platner and 
connected in meaning with ^up.()6- Schomann (Boeckh, Public Econ. 
Xaia and not with ^uiji^oXa— follow- of Athens, book iii. ch. zvi. p. 403, 
ing Duker and Bloomfleld in pre- Eng. transl.; 8ch<%raann, Der At- 
ference to Poppo and Ooller: see tisch. Prozess, p. 778; Platner, Pro- 
the elaborate notes of the two zess nnd Klagen bei den Attikem, 
latter editors. Alxai dub ^U{i[)6X<t>v ch. iv. 2, p. 110-112, where the lat- 
indicated the arrangements con- ter discusses both the passages of 
eluded by special convention be- Antipho and Thucydidds). 
tween two different cities, by con- The passages in Demosthends, 
Re9t of both, for the purpose of Orat. de Halones. cS, pp. 98, 99; 
determining controversies between And Andokidds cont. Alkibiad. e. 
their respective citizens ; they were 7, p. 121 (I quote this latter ora- 
something essentially apart from tion, though it is undoubtedly 
the ordinary judicial arrangements spurious, because we may well 
of either state. Now what the suppose the author of it to be 
Athenian orator here insists upon conversant with ihe nature and 
is exactly the contrary of this contents of ^U|jL()oXa), give us a 
idea: he says that the allies were sufficient idea of these judicial con- 
admitted to the benefit of Athenian ventions, or ^6|«.3oXa — special and 
trial and Athenian laws, in like liable to differ in each particu- 
raanner with the citizens them- lar case. They seem to me essen* 
selves. The judicial arrangements tially distinct from that system- 
by which the Athenian allies were atic scheme of proceeding where- 
brought before the Athenian dikas- by the dikasteries of Athens were 
teries cannot with propriety be made cognizant of all, or most, 
said to be 8lxat otnb ^U]xf)dXu>v; un- important controversies among or 
less the act of original incorpora- between the allied cities, as well 
tion into the confederacy of Deloi M of political accusations, 
is to be regarded as a ^upL^oXov or M. Boeckh draws a distinction 
agreement— which in a large sense between the autonomoua allies 
it might be, though not In the (Chios and Lesbos, at the time 
proper sense in whiQh Slxat inh immediately beTore the Pelopon* 
£u{i.f)6Xu>y are commonly mentioned, nesian war) and the «u6jec^-allie8| 



*^Our allies (he adds) would complain less if we made open 
use of our superior force with regard to them; but we dis- 

''the former class (he says) retained on this subject. •The Athenian, 
possession of nnlimited jurisdic- empire, properly so called, which 
tion, whereas the latter were com- began by the confederacy of Delos 
pelled to try all their disputes in after the Persian inyasion, was 
the courts of Athens." Doubtless completely destroyed at the close 
this distinction would prevail to of the Peloponnesian war, when 
a certain degree, but how far it Athens was conquered and taken, 
was pushed we can hardly say. But after some years had elapsed, 
Suppose that a dispute took place towards the year 377 b.o., Athens 
between Chios and one of the sub- again began to make maritime 
joct-islands — or between an indi- conquests, to acquire allies, to 
vidual Ghian and an individual receive tribute, to assemble a 
Thasian — would not the Ghian synod, and to resume her footing 
plaintiff sue, or the Ghian de- of something like an imperial city* 
fendant be sued before the Athe- Now her power over her allies 
nian dikastery? Suppose that an during this second period of em- 
Athenian citizen or officer became pire was not near so great as it 
involved in dispute with a Ghian, had been during the first, between 
would not the Athenian dikastery the Persian and Peloponnesian 
be the competent court, whichever wars : nor can we be at all sure 
of the two were plaintiff or defend- that what is true of the second is 
ant? Suppose a Ghian citizen or also true of the first. And I think 
magistrate to be suspected of it probable, that those statements 
fomenting revolt, would it not be of the grammarians, which repre- 
competent to any accuser, either sent the allies as carrying on Slxac 
Ghian or Athenian, to indict him aitb 9U|jLf)6X<t>v in ordinary practice 
before the dikastery at Athens? with the Athenians, may really be 
Abuse of power, or peculation, true about the second empire or 
committed by Athenian officers at alliance. Bekker, Anecdota, p. 436. 
Chios, must of course be brought *AQ7)vatoi inh ou|jLf)6Xu>v iSlxat^ov xoic 
before the Athenian dikasteries, &TCT)x6otc* o3tu)c 'AiciatOTiXTj^. Pol- 
Just as much as if the crime had lux, viii. 68. *An6 ou(j.f)6Xu>v H Six?) 
been committed at Thasos orNaxos. ^v, Stc oi ou|jLfi.axoi iStxdtCovto. Also 
We have no evidence to help us in Hesychius, i. 489. The statement 
regard to these questions ; but 1 in- here ascribed to Aristotle may very 
dine to believe that the difference probably be true about the second 
in respect to judicial arrangement, alliance, though it cannot be held 
between the autonomous and the true for the first. In the second, 
subject-allies, was less in degree the Athenians may really have had 
than M. Boeckh believes. We must ou(i.f)oXa, or special conventions for 
recollect that the arrangement was judicial business, with many of 
not all pure hardship to the allies their principal allies, instead of 
— the liability to be prosecuted making Athens the authoritative 
was accompanied with the privilege centre, and heir to the Delian synod, 
of prosecuting for injuries received, as they did during the first. It is 
There is one remark however to be remarked however thafHarpo- 
which appears to me of importance kration, in the explanation which 
for understanding the testimonies he gives of oOpi^oXa, treats them 



card sucb roaximSy and deal with them upon an equal foot- 
ing : and they are so accustomed to this that they think 
themselves entitled to complain at every trifling disap- 
pointment of their expectations.^ They suffered worse 
hardship under the Persians before our empire began, and 
they would suffer worse under you (the Spartans) if you 
were to succeed in conquering us and malung our empire 

History bears out the boast of the Athenian orator, 
both as to the time preceding and ^following the empire 
of Athens.^ And an Athenian citizen indeed might well 
regard it not as a hardship, but as a privilege to the sub- 
ject-allies, that they should be allowed to sue him before 
the dikastery, and to defend themselves before the same 
tribunal either in case of wrong done to him, or in case of 
alleged treason to the imperial authority of Athens: they 
were thereby put upon a level with himself. Still more 
would he And reason to eulogise the universal competence 
of these dikasteries in providing a common legal authority 
for all disputes of the numerous distinct communities of 
the empire one with another, and for the safe navigation 
and general commerce of the Jb^gean. That complaints 
were raised against it among the subject-allies is noway 
surprising. For the empire of Athens generally was incon- 
sistent with that separate autonomy to which every town 
thought itself entitled; and this central judicature was one 
of its prominent and constantly operative institutions, as 
well as a striking mark of dependence to the subordinate 
communities. Yet we may safely affirm that if empire was 
to be maintained at all, no way of maintaining it could be 
found at once less oppressive and more beneficial than the 
superintending competence of th6 dikasteries — a system 
not taking its rise m the mere "love of litigation" (if in- 
deed we are to reckon this a real feature in the Athenian 
character, which I shall take another opportunity of ex- 
amining), much less in those petty collateral interests indi- 

in a perfectly general way, as con- ttOiaftivoi icp6c ^H-ac ^^^ "co <> 

Tentions for settlement of judicial laou 6|jLiXeiv, Ac. 

•ontrorersy between city and city, • Compare Isokratds, Or. ir. Pane- 

witbout any particular allusion to gyrio. p. 62, 66. sect. 116-138; and 

Atbens and her allies. Compare Or. xii.Panathenaic. p. 247-254. sect, 

Hefrte»,*Athen&i8che Gerichtsver- 72-111 ; Or. Tiii. De Pace, p. 178. 

fassung, ill. 1, 3, p. 91. sect. 119 seqq.; Plutarch, Lysand. c. 

* Thucyd. i. 77. 01 Si (the allies) 13 ; Cornel. Nepos^ Lysand. c. 2, S. 


cated by Xenoplion,^ Bach as the increased customs duty, 
rent of houses, and hire of slaves atPeirsBUS, and the larger 

?rofits of the heralds, arising from the influx of suitors, 
t was nothing but the power, originally inherent in the 
confederacy of Delos, of arbitration between members and 
enforcement of duties towards the whole — a power inher* 
ited by Athens from that synod, and enlarged to meet the 
political wants of her empire; to which end it was essential, 
even in the view of Xenophon himself. 2 It may be that 
the dikastery was not always impartial between Athenian 
citizens privately, or the Athenian commonwealth collect- 
ively, and the subject-allies, — and insofar the latter had 
good reason to complain. But on the other hand we have 
no ground for suspecting it of deliberative or standing 
unfairness, or of any other defects than such as were in- 
separable from its constitution and procedurei whoever 
might be the parties under triaL 

We are now considering the Athenian empire as it 
stood before the Peloponnesian war; before the Athenian 
increased exactions and the multiplied revolts, ®ffjj!'ed^*r 
to which that war gave rise— before the cruelties the worse 
which accompanied the suppression of those ^^ *^® *'*'" 
revolts, and which so deeply stained the charac- ©f the 
ter of Athens — before thataffffravated fierceness, Peioponne- 
mistrust, contempt of obligation, and rapacious more vio- 
violence, which Thucydides so emphatically indi^ lence was 

J 1 • ■!_ • r J 'A xi. ?> 1 introduced 

cates as havmg been infused into the Grreek into it by 
bosom by the fever of an all-pervading contest.' *^»* TJ»'» 
There had been before this time many revolts prevailed 
of the Athenian dependencies, from the earliest i>®fore. 
at Naxos down to the latest at Samos. All had been suc- 
cessfully suppressed, but in no case had Athens displayed 

■ Xenophon, Bepab. Ath. 1. 17. tise (iii. t. 8) he represents the 

* Xenophon, Bepub. Ath. i. 16. Athenian dikasteries as oyerloaded 

He states it as one of the advan- with judicial business, much more 

tageous consequences, which in- than they could possibly get 

duced the Athenians to bring the through; insomuch that there were 

suits and complaints of the allies long delays before causes could 

to Athens for trial — that the pry- be brought on for trial. It could 

taneia, or fees paid upon entering hardly be any great object there- 

a cause for trial, became suffi- fore to multiply complaints arti- 

clently large to furnish all the pay ficially, in order to make fees for 

for the dikasts throughout the year, the dikasts. 

But in another part of his trea- . * See his well-known oommentt 

310 HI8T0BT OF OBEBCB. f abt IL 

the same unrelentinff rigour as we shall find hereafter 
manifested towards liiitylene, Skidne, and Melos. The 
policy of Perikles, now in the plenitude of his power at 
Athens, was cautious and conservative^ averse to forced 
extension of empire as well as to those increased burdens 
on the dependent allies which such schemes would have 
entailed, and tending to maintain that assured commerce 
in the JQgean by which all of them must have been gainers 
— not without a conviction that the contest must arise 
sooner or later between Athens and Sparta, and that the 
resources as well as the temper of the allies must be hus^ 
banded against that contingency. IfwereadinThucydidSs 
the speech of the envoy from Mitylene * at Olympia, delivered 
to the Lacedaemonians and their allies in the fourth year 
of the Peloponnesian war, on occasion of the revolt of the 
city from Athens — a speech imploring aid and setting forth 
the strongest impeachment against Athens which the facts 
could be made to furnish — we shall be surprised how weak 
the case is and how much the speaker is conscious of its 
weakness. . He has nothing like practical grievances and 
oppressions to urge against the imperial city. He does 
not dwell upon enormity of tribute, unpunished misconduct 
The sub- of Athenian officers, hardship of bringing causes 
o? A*h *^' for trial to Athens, or other sufferings of the 
had few Subjects generally. He has nothing to say ex- 
practical qq^\ f^ji^t they woro defenceless and degraded 
to*coml.°^' subjects, and that Athens held authority over 
plain of, them without and against their own consent: 
and in the case of Mitylene, not so much as this could be 
said, since she was on the footing of an equal, armed, and 
autonomous ally. Of course this state of forced dependence 
was one which the allies, or such of them as could stand 
alone, would naturally and reasonably shake off whenever 
they had an opportunity.*^ But the negative evidence, 
derived from the speech of the Mitylensean orator, goes 
far to make out the point contended for by the Athenian 
speaker at Sparta immediately before the war — that, beyond 

on the seditions at Eorkyra^ iii« about to be inflicted on Mityldnft^ 

82, 83. jjv Tiva eXsuOepov xal ^l^ dp^ofxevov 

* Thucyd. iii. 11-14. slxoxcuc icp6c auTovofxtaY 

* So the Athenian orator Diodo- dicoaxavTa x*(pu>9<i>Iik>^a t &% 
t«8 puts it in his speech depre- (Thucyd. iii. 4G), 

eating the extreme punishment 


the fact of such forced dependence, the allies had little 
practically to complain of. A city like Mitylene might be 
strong enough to protect itself and its own commerce 
without the help of Athens. But to the weaker allies, the 
breaking up of the Athenian empire would have greatly 
lessened the security both of individuals and of commerce, 
in the waters of the -^gean, and their freedom would thus 
have been purchased at the cost of considerable positive 

> It is to be recollected that the miliating vein of eentiment which 
Athenian empire was essentially is apt to arise in citizens of the 
» government of dependencies; supreme government towards those 
Athens as an imperial state exer* of the subordinate. 2. The protec- 
cising authority over subordinate tion which English Jury-trial, 
governments. To maintain bene- neverthelessi afforded to the citi- 
ficial relation between two govern^ zens of the dependency against op- 
ments, — one supreme — the other pression by English officers, 
subordinate — and to make the sys- ' <^An action was brought in the 
tern work to the satisfaction of Court of Common Pleas, in 1773, 
the people in the one as well as by Mr. Anthony Fabrigas, a native 
of the people in the other— has of Minorca, against General Mostyn 
.always been found a problem of the governor of the island. The 
great difficulty. Whoever reads facts proved at the trial were, that 
.the instructive volume of Sir Q-. Governor Mostyn had arrested the 
C. Lewis (Essay on the Govern- plaintiff,imprisonedhim,andtrans- 
.ment of Dependencies), and the ported him to Spain without any 
number of instances of practical form of trial, on the ground that 
misgovernment in this matter which the plaintiff had presented to him 
are set forth therein— will be in« a petition for redress of grievances 
olined to think that the empire of in a manner which he deemed im- 
, Athens over her allies makes com- proper. Mr. Justice Gould left it 
paratively. a. creditable figure. It to the jury to say, whether the 
will most certainly stand full com* plaintiff's behaviour was such as 
-parison with . the - government of to afford a just conclusion that he 
England over dependencies in the was about to stir up sedition and 
last century; as illustrated by the mutiny in the garrison, or whether 
history of Ireland, with the penal he meant no more than earnestly 
laws against the Catholics — by the to press his suit and obtain a re- 
declaration > of independence pu- dress of grievances. If they thought 
blished in 1776 by the American the latter, the plaintiff was entitled 
colonies, setting forth the grounds to recover in the action. The 
of their separation— and by the jury gave a verdict for the plain- 
pleadings of Mr. Burke against tiff toiih j^SOOO damages. In the 
.Warren Hastings. following term an application was 

A statement and legal trial al- made for a new trial, which was 

'luded to by Sir George Lewis (p. refused by the whole court. 

.867) elucidates farther two points t'The following remarks of the 

not > unimportant on the present counsel for Governor Mostyn on 

.occasion^ 1. The illiberal and hu^ this trial contain a plain and «ui»v« 


Nearly the whole of the Grecian world (pntting aside 
The Ore- Italian, Sicilian, and African Greek^ was at this 
*^* J? r^**-^ time included either in the alliance of Lacedeemon 
divided or in that of Athens, so that the truce of thirty 
lri«at*ry8- yc^rs ensured a suspension of hostilities every- 
tems : with where. Moreover the Lacedsemonian confederates 
supposed to ^*^ determined hy a majority of votes to refuse 
be vested in the request of Samos for aid in her revolt against 
^uSsWntt Athens: whereby it seemed established, as prao- 
its^own tical international law, that neither of these two 
mei^ers^ great aggregate bodies should intermeddle with 

statement of the doctrine, that a patriotiem in Minorca: for it is 

dependency ii to he governed not there destructive of our trade, and 

for it8 own iniereat, httt for that there is an end to our trade in 

of the dominant state, 'Gentlemen the Mediterranean^ if it goes there, 

of the jury (said the counsel)| it But here it i» very imU: for the 

will be time for me now to take body of the people in this countrj 

notice of another circumstance, will have it: they have demanded 

notorious to all the gentlemen who It— and in consequence of their 

have been settled in the island, demands, they have enjoyed liber- 

that the natives of Minorca are but ties which they will transmit to 

ill-affected to the English and to their posterity — and it is not in 

the English government. It is not the power of this government to 

much to be wondered at. They are deprive them of it. But they will 

the descendants of Spaniards; and take care of all our conquests 

they consider Spain as the country abroad. If that spirit prevailed in 

to which they ought naturally to Minorca, the consequence would 

belong: it is not at all to be won- be the loss of that country, and 

dered at that they are indisposed of course of our Mediterranean 

to the English whom they consider trade. We should be sorry to set 

a3 their conquerors.— —Of all the all our slaves firee in our plant*- 

Minorquins in the island, the tions.*" 

plaintiff perhaps stands singularly The prodigious sum of damages 

and eminently the most seditious, awarded by the jury shows the 

turbulent, and dissatisfied subject strength of their sympathy with 

to the crown of Great Britain that this Minorquin plaintiff against 

is to be found in Minorca. Gentle- the English officer. I doubt not 

men, he iSf or ehooeea to he, that the feeling of the dikastery 

called the patriot of Minorca, Now at Athens was much of the same 

patriotism is a very pretty thing kind, and often quite as strong; 

among ourselves, and we owe sincerely disposed to protect the 

much to it : we owe our liberties subject-allies against misconduct 

to it; but we should have but little of Athenian trierarohs or inspect* 

to value, and perhaps we should ors. 

have but little of what we now The feelings expressed in the 

enjoy, were it not for our trade, speech above-oited would also 

And for the eake of our trade^ it often find utterance from Athenian 

is noi fit that we should encourage orators in the assembly: and H 


the other, and that each should restrain or punish its own 
disobedient members. ^ 

Of this refusal, which materially affected the course 
of events, the main advisers had been the Corinthians, in 
spite of that fear and dislike of Athens which prompted 
many of the allies to vote for war.* The position of the 
Corinthians was peculiar; for while Sparta and her other 
allies were chiefly land-powers, Corinth had been from 
early times maritime, commercial, and colonising. She had 
indeed once possessed the largest nav^ in Greece, along 
with ^gina; but either she had not increased it at all 
during the last forty years, or if she had, her comparative 
naval importance had been sunk by the gigantic expansion 
of Athens. The Corinthians had both commerce and 
colonies — Leukas, Anaktorium, Ambrakia, Korkyra, &c., 
along or near the coast of Epirus: they had also their 
colony Potidssa, situated on the isthmus of Pallene in 
Thrace, and intimately connected with them: and the in- 
terest of their commerce made them averse to collision 
with the superior navy of the Athenians. It was this con- 
sideration which had mduced them to resist the poUoy of 
impulse of the Lacedaemonian allies towards Oorinth, 
war on behalf of Samos. For though their ^^"Sfli*,""^ 
feelings both of jealousy and hatred against becomes 
Athens were even now strong, 3 arising ffreatly 7«"^«- 
out of the struggle a few years before the acquisition of 
Megara to the Athenian aUiance — prudence indicated that 
in a war against the first naval power in Greece, they were 
sure to be the greatest losers. 

So long as the policv of Corinth pointed towards peace, 
there was every probability that war would be avoided, 

wonld not be dlffionlt to produce Mitford and so many others hare 

parallel passages, in which these sought to prove, 

orators imply discontent on the > See the important passage al- 

part of the allies to be the natural ready adverted to in a prior note, 

state of things, such as Athens Thucyd. i. 40. o^Si fap Tjfxsi^ 2a- 

eould not hope to escape. The |aiu>v dicovtdivTcov 4'^9ov npoacOefisQa 

speech here given shows that such ^vavtlav bpitv, ttbv &XXu>v ntXonov 

feelings arise, almost inevitablyy vTjaiov Sl^Qt i'\ni<^%oyi.i'tti>i tl /pr) au- 

out of the uncomfortable relation xoic dfi.6vsiv, ^avtptbc Siavrti- 

of two governments, one supreme, ico|Atv touc icpooiQxovTac ^U|Ji- 

and the other subordinate. They (tdyouc a6T6v xiva xo^dCtit^ 

are not the product of peculiar * Thucyd. i. SS. 

cruelty and oppression on the part * Thucyd. i. 42. 
I of the Athenian democracy, as Mr. 


or at least accepted only in a case of grave necessity, by 
the Lacedflsmonian alliance. But a contingency, distant 
as well as unexpected^ which occurred about five years 
after the revolt of Samos, reversed all these chances, and 
not only extinguished the dispositions of Corinth towards 
peace, but even transformed her into the forward instigator 
of war. 

Amidst the various colonies planted from Corinth 
along the coastofEpirus,thegreater number acknowledged 
Dispute! o^ ^®r P*rt an hegemony or supremacy. ^ "What 
arise extent of real power and interference this ack- 

CorTnth'and nowledgcmeut implied, in addition to the hono- 
Korkyra- rary dignity, we are not in a condition to say. 
damnuaf ^*' But the Corinthians were popular, and had not 
carried their interference oeyond the point 
which the colonists themselves found acceptable. To these 
amicable relations, however, the powerfulXorkyra formed 
a glaring exception — having been generally at variance, 
sometimes in themost aggravated hostility, with its mother- 
city, and withholding from her even the accustomed tri- 
butes of honorary and filial respect. It was amidst such 
relations of habitual ill-will between Corinth and Korkyra 
that a dispute grew up respecting the city of Epidamnus 
(known afterwards in the £>oman times as Dyrrhachium, 
hard by the modem Durazzo) — a colony founded by the 
Korkyrseans on the coast of Illyria in the Ionic Gulf, con^- 
siderably to the north of their own island. So strong was 
the sanctity of Grecian custom in respect to the founda- 
tion of colonies, that the Korkyrseans, in spite of their ert- 
mity to Corinth, had been obliged to select the (Ekist (or 
Founder-in-Chief) of Epidamnus from that city — a citizen 
of Herakleid descent named Phalius — along with whom 
there had also come some Corinthian settlers. And thus 
Epidamnus, though a Korkyrsean colony, was nevertheless 
a recognised grand-daughter (if the expression may be 
allowed) of Corinth, the recollection of which was per- 
petuated by the solemnities periodically celebrated in ho- 
nour of the (Ekist. 2 

Founded on the isthmus of an outlying peninsula on 
the seacoast of the lUyrian Taulantii, Epidamnus was at 
first prosperous, and acquired a considerable territory as 

> Thucyd. i. '38. i]^t^6^t^ xe slvai xal t& elxoxa OauiiiiUs'^Ai* 

» Thucyd. i. 24, £6. ' 


well as a numerous population* But during the years 
immediately preceding the period which we have The Epi- 
now reached, it had been exposed to great re- ^*™"^™ 
verses. Internal sedition between the oligarchy aid in their 
and the people, aggravated by attacks from the i***^®*\^ 
neighbouring Illyrians, had crippled its power; th*ey are 
and a recent revolution, in which the j>eople put JJ'" (?*^"" 
down the oligarchy, had reduced it still farther rinthiana 
— since the oligarchical exiles, collecting a J®"<* **^ *° 
force and allying themselves with the Illyrians, * ^ ^^^' 
harassed the city grievously both by sea and land. The 
Epidamnian democracy was in such straits as to be forced 
to send to Korkyra for aid. Their envoys sat down as 
suppliants at the temple of Here, cast themselves on the 
mercy of the Korkyrseans, and besought them to act both 
as mediators with the exiled oligarchy, and as auxiliaries 
against the Illyrians. Though the Korkyrseans, themselves 
democratically governed, might have been expected to 
sympathise with these suppliants and their prayers, yet 
their feeling was decidedly opposite. For it was the Epi- 
damnian oligarchy who were principally connected with 
Korkyra, from whence their forefathers had emigrated, 
and where their family burial-places as well as their kins- 
men were still to be found :i while the Demos, or, small 
proprietors and tradesmen of Epidamnus, may perhaps 
nave been of miscellaneous origin, and at any rate had no 
visible memorials of ancient lineage in the mother-island. 
Having been refused aid from Korkyra, and finding their 
distressed condition insupportable, the Epidamnians next 
thought of applying to Corinth. But as this was a step 
of questionable propriety, their envoys were directed first 
to take the opinion of the Delphian god. His oracle hav- 
ing given an unqualified sanction, they proceeded to Co- 
rinth with their mission; describing their distress as well 
as their unavailing application at Korkyra — tendering Epi- 
damnus to the Corinthians as to itsCEkists and chiefs, with 
the most urgent entreaties for immediate aid to preserve 
it from ruin — and not omitting to insist on the divine sanc- 
tion just obtained. It was found easy to persuade the Co- 
rinthians, who, looking upon Epidamnus as a joint colony 

* Thuoyd. i. 26. -^XSov y«P i< tT)^ vstav j)v icpo'C9x6(xsvot iSiovxo o^a^ 

KipxupavoiTu>v'Eni5a(jLvtu)v9UY^^^^» xaxdYSiv* 
td^out xt diN»6£ixvOv-t( xat- ^uyvs- 

316 HISTOBT OT 6BEE0E. Past II. 

from CorintH and Korkyra, tHoaght themselves not only 
authorised, but bound, to undertake its defence — a resolution 
much prompted by their ancient feud against Korkyra. 
They speedily organized an expedition, consisting partly 
of intended new settlers, partly of a protecting military 
force — Corinthian, Leukadian, and Ambrakiotic: whicn 
combined body, in order to avoid opposition from the 
powerful Korkyrsean navy, was marched by land as far as 
Apoll6nia, and transported from thence by sea to Epi- 
damnus. t 

The arrival of such a reinforcement rescued the city 
The Kor- ^^^ ^^® moment, but drew upon it a formidable 
kyrsans' increase of peril from the Korkyrseans; who 
attack Epi- looked upon the interference of Corinth as an 
armament infringement of their rights, and resented it in 
■ent thither the strongest manner. Their feelings were far- 
^ ° ^ ' ther inflamed by the Epidamnian oligarchical 
exiles, who, coming to the island with petitions for succour 
and appeals to the tombs of their Korkyrsean ancestors, 
found a ready sympathy. They were placed on board a 
fleet of twenty-five triremes, afterwards strengthened by 
a farther reinforcement, which was sent to Epidamnus 
with the insulting requisition that they should be forthwith 
restored and the new-comers from Corinth dismissed. No 
attention being paid to such demands, the Korkyrseans 
commenced the blockade of the city with forty ships and 
with an auxiliary land-force of Illyrians — making procla- 
mation that any person within, citizen or not, might de- 
part safely if he chose, but would be dealt with as an 
enemy if he remained. How many persons profited by this 
permission we do not know ; but at least enough to con- 
vey to Corinth the news that their troops in Epidamnus 
were closely besieged. The Corinthians immediately hasten- 
ed the equipment of a second expedition — sufficient not 
only for the rescue of the place, but to surmount that resist- 
ance which the Korkyrseans were sure to offer. In addi- 
tion to thirty triremes, and three thousand hoplites, of 
their own, they solicited aid both in ships and money from 
many of their allies. Eight ships fully manned were fur- 
nished by Megara, four by Pales in the island of Ke^hal- 
lenia, five by Epidaurus, two by Trcezen, one by Hermione, 
ten by Leukas, and eight by Ambrakia — together with 

* Thucyd. 1. 26. , 


pecuniary contributions from Thebes, Phlius, and Elis. 
Th^ farther proclaimed a public invitation for new settlers 
to Epidamnus, promising equal political rights to all; 
an option being allowed to any one, who wished to become 
a settler without being ready to depart at once, to ensure 
future admission by depositing the sum of fifty Corinthian 
drachmas. Though it might seem that the prospects of 
these new settlers were full of doubt and danger, yet such 
was the confidence entertained in the metropolitan protec- 
tion of Corinth, that many were found as well to join the 
fleet, as to pay down the deposit for liberty of future 

All these proceedings on the part of Corinth, though 
undertaken with intentional hostility towards Kemon- 
Korkyra, had not been preceded by any formal strance of 
proposition such as was customary among Gre- ty^rffians" 
cian states — a harshness of dealing arising not with Co- 
merely from her hatred towards Korkyra, but JJ^e Peio- 
also from the peculiar political position of that ponnesi- 
i^land, which stood alone and isolated, not en- ^^^' 
rolled either in the Athenian or in the Lacedaemonian 
alliance. The Korkyrseans, well aware of the serious pre- 
paration now going on at Corinth and of the union among 
so many cities against them, felt themselves hardly a match 
for it alone, in spite of their wealth and their formidable 
naval force of 120 triremes, inferioi: only to that of Athens. 
They made an effort to avert the storm by peaceable 
means, prevailing upon some mediators from Sparta and 
Sikyon to accompany them to Corinth; where, while they 
required that the forces and settlers recently despatched 
to%idamnus Bhould be withdrawn, denyin/all r^ght on 
the part of Corinth to interfere in that colony — they at 
the same time offered, if the point were disputed, to refer 
it for arbitration either to some impartial Peloponnesian 
city, or to the Delphian oracle; such arbiter to determine 
to which of the two cities Epidaranus as a colony really 
belonged — and the decision to be obeyed by both. They 
solemnly deprecated recourse to arms, which, if persisted 
in, would drive them as a matter of necessity to seek new 
allies such as they would not willingly apply to. To this 
the Corinthians answered that they could entertain no pro- 
position until the Korkyrsean besieging force was with- 
drawn from Epidamnus. Whereupon the Korkyreeans 

3t3 HI8T0BT 07 OBEECS. Pabt H, 

rejoined that they would withdraw it at once, provided the 
new settlers and the troops sent by Corinth were removed 
at the same time. Either there ought to be this recipro- 
cal retirement, or the Korkyrsans would acquiesce in the 
statu quo on both sides, until the arbiters should have de- 
cided. 1 

Although the Korkyrseans had been unwarrantably 
Hostiiitiei harsh in rejecting the first supplication from 
between Epidamnus, yet in their propositions made at 
and Kor- Corinth, right and equity were on their side, 
'^y*:- But the Corinthians had gone too far, and as- 

tory of the sumed an attitude too decidedly aggressive, to ad- 
latter. mJt of listening to arbitration. Accordingly, so 

soon as their armament was equipped, they set sail for 
Epidamnus, despatching a herald to declare war formally 
against the Kortyrseans. When the armament, consisting 
of seventy-five triremes under Aristeus, Kallikrates, and 
Timanor, with 2000 hoplites under Archetimus and Isar- 
chidas, had reached Cape Aktium at the mouth of the 
Ambrakian Gulf, it was met by a Korkyrsean herald in a 
little boat forbidding all farther advance — a summons of 
course unavailing, and quickly followed by the appearance 
of the KorkyraBan fleet. Out of the 120 triremes which 
constituted the naval establishment of the island, forty 
were engaged in the siege of Epidamnus, but all the remain- 
ing eighty were now brought into service; the older ships 
being specially repaired lor the occasion. In the action 
which ensued, they gained a complete victory, destroying 
fifteen Corinthian ships, and taking a considerable number 
of prisoners. And on the very day of the victory, Epidam- 
nus surrendered to their besieging fleet, under covenant 
that the Corinthians within it shoiUd be held as prisoners, 
and that the other new-comers should be sold as slaves. 
The Corinthians and their allies did not long keep the sea 
after their defeat, but retired home, while the Korkyrseans 
remained undisputed masters of the neighbouring sea. 
Having erected a trophy on Leukimme, the adjoining pro- 
montory of their island, they proceeded, according to the 
melancholy practice of Grecian warfare, to kill all their 
prisoners 2— rexcept the Corinthians, who were carried . 

1 Thncjd. {. 28. Greeks, I transcribe an incident 

• To illustrate this treatment of from the more recent history of 

prisoners of war among the ancient Europe. It is contained in Bas- 


home and detained as prizes of great value for purposes 
of negotiation. They next began to take vengeance on 
those allies of Corinth who had lent assistance to the re- 
cent expedition: they ravaged the territory of Leukas, 
burnt Kyllene the seaport of Elis, and inflicted so much 
damage that the Corinthians were compelled towards the 
end of the summer to send a second armament to Cape 
Aktium, for the defence of Leukas, Anaktorium, and Am- 
brakia. The Korkyrsean fleet was again assembled near 
Cape Leukimme, but no farther action took place, and at 
the approach of winter both armaments were disbanded, i 

I)eeply were the Corinthians humiliated by their de- 
feat at sea, together with the dispersion of the ^ ^ 434.433 
settlers whom they had brought together: and Large pre-' 
though their original project was frustrated by pa'ationa 
the loss of Epidamnus, they were only the more Corinth^for 
bent on complete revenge against their old renewing 
enemy Korky^ They employld themselves for **"'"• 
two entire years after the battle in building new ships and 
providing an armament adequate to their purposes : and in 
particular, they sent round not only to the Peloponnesian 
seaports, but also to the islands under the empire of 
Athens, in order to take into their pay the best class of 
seamen. By such prolonged efforts, ninety well-manned 
Corinthian ships were ready to set sail in the third year 
after the battle. The entire fleet, when reinforced by the 
allies, amounted to not less than 150 sail; twenty-seven 
triremes from Ambrakia, twelve from Megara, ten from 
Elias, as many from Leukas, and one from Anaktorium, 
Each of these allied squadrons had oiflcers of its own, 
while the Corinthian Xenokleides and four others were 
commanders-in-chief. 2 

But the elaborate preparations going on at Corinth 
were no secret to the Korkyraeans, who well knew, be- 
sides, the numerous allies which that city could command. 

■ompierre*8 description of his cam- 
paign in Hungary in 1603, with the 
German and Hungarian army under 
Count de Bossworm, against the 
Turks :— 

"Aprds cette victoire, nous repas- 
s&mes toute I'arm^e de I'autre cdt6 
du Danube en notre camp. Le 
g6n6ral commanda que I'on taftt 

tous les prisonniers du jour pr4c4- 
dent«, parcequMIs embarrassoient 
Tarm^e: qui fut une chose bieil 
cruelle, de voir tuer de sang-froid 
plus de huit cents hommes rendus." 
— M^moires de Bassompierre, p. 
808: collect. P^titot. 

^ Thucyd. i. 29, 30. 

» Tbmcyd. i.«81.46. 

320 BI8T0BT 07 OBEEOB. »abt II. 

and her extensive influence throughout Greece. So fpr« 
Appiica. midable an attack was more than thev could 
tlT'^K'rk - ^®^*^^^® ^ brave, alone and unaided. Tney had 
rseans ^o be never yet enrolled themselves among the allies 
reMired either of Athens or of Lacedsemon. ft had been 
allies of their pnde and policy to maintam a separate line 
Athens. of action, which, by means of their wealth, 
their power, and their very peculiar position, they had 
hitherto been enabled to do with safety. That they had 
been able so to proceed with safety, however, was con- 
sidered both by friends and enemies as a peculiarity belong* 
ing to their island; from whence we may draw an infer- 
ence how little the islands in the ^^ean, now under the 
Athenian empire, would have been able to maintain any 
real independence, if that empire had been broken up. 
But though Korkyra had been secure in this policy of iso- 
lation up to the present moment, such had been the in- 
crease and consolidation of forces elsewhere throughout 
Greece, that even she could pursue it no longer. To apply 
for admission into the Lacedaemonian confederacy, wherein 
her immediate enemy exercised paramount influence, being 
out of the question, she had no choice except to seek 
alliance with Athens. That city had as yet no dependen- 
cies in the Ionic Gulf; she was not of kindred lineage, nor 
had she had any previous amicable relations with the Ibe- 
rian Korkyra. But if there was thus no previous fact or 
feeling to lay the foundation of alliance, neither was there 
anything to forbid it; for in the truce between Athens and 
Sparta, it had been expressly stipulated, that any city, not 
actually enrolled in the alliance of either, might join the 
one or the other at pleasure. 1 While the proposition of 
alliance was thus formally open either for acceptance or 
refusal, the time and circumstances under which it was to 
be made rendered it full of grave contingencies to all par- 
ties. The Korkyraean envoys, who now for the first time 
visited Athens for the purpose of making it, came thither 
with doubtful hopes of success, though to their island the 
question was one of life or death. 

According to the modern theories of government, to 
declare war, to make peace, and to contract alliances, 
are functions proper to be entrusted to the executive go- 
vernment apart from the representative assembly. Accord* 

» Thucyd. i. 86-4a, 


ing to ancient ideas, these were precisely the topics most 
essential to submit for the decision of the full Address of 
assembly of the people: and in point of fact they the Korky 
were so submitted, even under governments only * '**** ®^- 
partially democratical; much more, of course, the Athe- 
under the complete democracy of Athens. The ^^^^ public 
Korkyrsean envoys on reaching that city would first ***®™ ^' 
open their business to the Strategi or generals of the state^ 
who would appoint a day for them to be heard before the 
public assembly, with full notice beforehand to the citi- 
zens. The mission was no secret, for the Korkyrgeans had 
themselves intimated their intention at Corinth, at the 
time when they proposed reference of th« quarrel to arbi- 
tration. Even without such notice, the political necessity 
of the step was obvious enough to make the Corinthians 
anticipate it. Lastly, their proxeni at Athens (Athenian 
citizens who watched over Corinthian interests public and 
private, in confidential correspondence with that govern- 
ment — and who, sometimes by appointment, sometimes as 
volunteers, discharged partly the functions of ambassadors 
in modern times) would communicate to them the arrival 
of the Korkyraean envoys. So that, on the day appointed 
for the latter to be heard before the public assembly, Co- 
rinthian envoys were also present to answer them and to 
oppose the granting of their prayer. • 

Thucydides has given in his history the speeches of 
both; that is, speeches of his own composition,, p^^^j ^j 
but representing in all probability the substance topics upoi> 
of what was actually said, and of what he per- T^^ich it 
haps himself heard. Though pervaded through- as given 
out by the peculiar style and harsh structure ^^P^°'' 
of the historian, these speeches are yet among 
the plainest and most business-like in his whole work; 
bringing before us thoroughly the existing situation; which 
was one of doubt and difficulty, presenting reasons of con- 
siderable force on each of the opposite sides. 

The Korkyraeans, after lamenting their previous im- 
providence which had induced them to defer seeking alli- 
ance until the hour of need arrived, presented themselves 
&B claimants for the friendship of Athens on the strongest 
grounds of common interest and reciprocal usefulness. 
Though their existing danger and need of Athenian support 
Mras now urgent, it had not been brought upon them in an 

VOL. V. y 

322 HI8T0BY 09 OBEEOE. Past H. 

unjust quarrel or by disgraceful conduct. They had pro- 
posed to Corinth a fair arbitration respecting EpidamnuB, 
and their application had been refused — which showed 
where the fight of the case lay: moreover they were now 
exposed single-handed, not to Corinth alone, whom they 
had already vanquished, but to a formidable confederacy 
organised under her auspices, including choice mariners 
hired even from the allies of Athens. In granting their 
prayer, Athens would in the first place neutralize this mis- 
employment of her own mariners, and would at the same 
time confer an indelible obligation, protect the cause of 
right, and secure to herself an important reinforcement. 
For next to her own, the Korkyrssan naval force was the 
most powerful in Greece, and tms was now placed within 
her reach. If by declining the present offer, she permitted 
Korkyra to be overcome, that naval force would pass to 
the side of her enemies: for such were Corinth and the 
Peloponnesian alliance — and such they would soon be 
openly declared. In the existing state of Greece, a collision 
between that alliance and Athens could not long be post- 
poned. It was with a view to this contingency that the 
Corinthians were now seeking to seize Korl^ra along with 
her naval force. ^ The policy of Athens therefore im- 
periously called upon her to frustrate such a design, by 
now assisting the feorkyrseans. She was permitted to do 
this by the terms of the Thirty years' truce. And although 
some might contend that in the present critical conjuncture, 
acceptance of Korkyra was tantamount to a declaration of 
war with Corinth, yet the fact would falsify such predic- 
tions; for Athens would so strengthen herself that her 
enemies would be more than ever unwilling to attack her. 
She would not only render her naval force irresistibly 
powerful, but would become mistress of the communication 
between Sicily and Peloponnesus, and thus prevent the 
Sicilian Dorians from sending reinforcements to the Pelo- 

To these representations on the part of theKorkyrseans, 
the Corinthian speakers made reply. They denounced the 

* Thnoyd. i.. 38. Toik AaxeSaipto- r^v Ofxeriporv eicixBipTjoiv, Tva pf^ T<p 

vlouc 96P(|) T<ft 6|A.eTip(p ico> i;|i7].aelov- xoivcp S)rQsi xat' auTu>v {tst* &XXi^Xu>v 

xa^, xal Tout KopivQiou^ 8uva|jLivouc atu>(xsv, &c. 

Tiotp* aixoic Ojaiv sx^P^^^ fivxac * Thucyd. i. 82-36. 
xol TrpoxarxaXa(i.f)dvovTa< ^\>-^^ vuv i; 

il m " i t- il l 1 1 . II ' lTTw^ . 11 . ^ i ~ mmm'$!*mgStm9mm!mmmmBmasBsss^^ 


Helfish and iniquitous policy pursued by Korkyra, not less 
in the matter of Epidamnus than in all former 
time 1 — which was the real reason why she had from Co- 
ever been ashamed of honest allies. Above all 'J^*^ ^^- 
things, she had always acted undutifuUy and Athenian 
wickedly towards Corinthher mother city, to whom "semWy 
she was bound by those ties of colonial allegiance ^ '^^ ^' 
which Grecian morality reco^iised, and which the other 
Corinthian colonies cheerfully obeyed. 2 Epidamnus was 
not a Korkyrsean, but a Corinthian colony. The Kor- 
kyraeans, having committed wrong in besieging it, had pro- 
posed arbitration without being willing to withdraw their 
troops while arbitration was pending: they now impudently 
came to ask Athens to become accessory after the fact, in 
such injustice. The provision of the Thirty years' truce 
might seem indeed to allow Athens to receive them as 
allies: but that provision was not intended to permit the 
reception of cities already under the tie of colonial alle- 
giance elsewhere — still less the reception of cities engaged 
in an active and pending quarrel, where any countenance 
to one party in the quarrel was necessarily a declaration 
of war against the opposite. If either party had a right 
to invoke the aid of Atheps on this occasion, Corinth had 
a better right than Korkyra. For the latter had never had 
any transactions with the Athenians, while Corinth was 
not only still under covenant of amity with them, through 

* The description given by Hero- jx6v«« ts eivai xai to cIxotk 9ao{xaCea- 
dotuB (vii. 168: compare Diodor. 9oi' al jouv fiXXat dTcoixiai Ti{xu>aii» 
xi. 16) of the duplicity of the Kor- f)tt3<, xal (JidXiara Otco dnolxcDv 
kyrseans when solicited to aid the atspY6[jLs8a. 

Grecian cause at the time of the This is a remarkable passage in 

iuTAsion of Xerxes, seems to imply illustration .of the position of a 

that the unfavourable character of metropolis in regard to her colony, 

them given by the Corinthians The relation was such as to be 

coincided with the general im- comprised under the general word 

pression throughout G-reece. hegemony: superiority and right to 

Bespecting the prosperity and command on the one side, inferi- 

infolenca of the Korkyrsans, see ority with duty of reverence and 

Aristotle apud Zeuob. Proverb, obedience on the other— limited in 

iv. 49. point of extent, though we do not 

* Thucyd. 1. 38. finoixot hi Svtec know where the limit was placed^ 
acpsaxdai ts Jia itocvTO? xol vuv noXs- and varyii^ probably in each in* 
(iou9i, XiyovTCc u>«; o6x ticl t^ xaxu)^ dividual case. The Corinthians sent 
r.aa/(tKH sxice{A.90ii7]9av. T]tJ.cU Se ouS* annual magistrates to Potidaea, 
auTol (pajav inl tui un6 to6tu>v 6f)pU oalled Epidemiurgi (Thucyd. i. 56). 
l^ssdai xaTOixioat, dXX* ticl Ttp tj^c- 


324 HISTOBY 07 GBSEOB. Past II. 

the Thirty years' truce — but had also rendered material 
service to them by dissuading the Peloponnesian allies 
from assisting the revolted Samos. By such dissuasion, 
the Corinthians had upheld the principle of Grecian inter- 
national law, that eacn alliance was entitled to punish its 
own refractory members. They now called upon Athens 
to respect this principle by not interfering between Corinth 
and her colonial allies, ^ especially as the violation of it 
would recoil inconveniently upon Athens herself with her 
numerous dependencies. As for the fear of an impending 
war between the Peloponnesian alliance and Athens, such 
a contingency was as yet uncertain — and might possibly 
never occur at all, if Athens dealt justly, and consented to 
conciliate Corinth on this critical occasion. But it would 
assuredly occur if she refused such conciliation, and the 
dangers thus entailed upon Athens would be far greater 
than the promised naval cooperation of Korkyra would 
compensate. 2 

Such was the substance of the arguments urged by 
_ . the contending envoys before the Athenian 

of the public assembly, in this momentous debate. For 

Athenians Jwo days did the debate continue, the assembly 
lified'c^m- being adjourned over to the morrow; so con- 
py*»«e siderable was the number of speakers, and prob- 
request of ablv also the divergence of their views. Un- 
Korkjra. luckily Thucydides does not give us any of 
nian trire- these Athenian discourses — not even that of 
raes sent Perikles, who determined the ultimate result, 
to or yra. Epidamnus with its disputed question of 

metropolitan ricnt occupied little the attention of the 
Athenian assembly. But the Korkyrsean naval force was 
indeed an immense item, since the question was whether 
it should stand on their side or against them — an item 
which nothing could counterbalance except the dangers of 
a Peloponnesian war. ^Let us avoid this last calamity 
(was the opinion of many) even at the sacrifice of seeing 
Korkyra conquered, and all her ships and seamen in the 
service of the Peloponnesian league." "You will not really 
avoid it, even by that great sacrifice (was the reply of 
others). The generating causes of war are at work — and 
it will infallibfy come whatever you may determine re- 

* Thneyd. i. 40. fpavsptp? 8i ivrcU 70UC a6T6>» Ttva xoXd^CiVw 
ico|fctv Too< icf ooi^xovtac ^u(i{&d- * Thacyd. i. ZJ*^ 


spectingKorkyra: avail yourselves of the present opening, 
instead of being driven ultimately to undertake the war at 
great comparative disadvantage." Of these two views, the 
former was at first decidedly preponderant in the assembly ; i 
but they gradually came round to the latter, which was 
conformably to the steady conviction of Perikles. It was 
however resolved to take a sort of middle course, so as to 
save Korkyra, and yet, if possible, to escape violation of 
the existing truce and the consequent Peloponnesian war. 
To comply with the request of theKorkyraeans, by adopting 
them unreservedly as allies, would have laid the Athenians 
under the necessity of accompanying them in an attack of 
Corinth, if required — which would have been a manifest 
infringement of the truce. Accordingly nothing more was 
concluded than an alliance for purposes strictly defensive, 
to preserve Korkyra and her possessions in case they were 
attacked : nor was any greater force equipped to back this 
resolve than a squadron of ten triremes, under Lacedsemo- 
nius son of Kimon. The smallness of this force would 
satisfy the Corinthians that no aggression was contemplated 
against their city, while it would save Korkyra from ruin, 
and would in fact feed the war so as to weaken and cripple 
the naval force of both parties 2 — which was the best result 
that Athens could hope for. The instructions to Lace- 
dsemonius and his two colleagues were express: not to en- 
gage in fight with the Corinthians unless they were actually 
approaching Korkyra or some Korkyrsean possession with 
a view to attack; but in that case to do his best on the 

The great Corinthian armament of 150 sail soon took 
its departure from the Gulf, and reached a har- ^avai com- 
bour on the coast of Epirus at the Cape called bat be- 
Cheimerium, nearly opposite to the southern oTrfnth^^ 
extremity of Korkyra. They there established ana and 
a naval station and camp, summoning to their fj^l^J'^ude 
aid a considerable force from the friendly Epirotic tactics on 
tribes in the neighbourhood. The Korkyrsean ^^^ *^**®** 

* Thucyd. i. 44. 'A87]vaiot 5e axo6- 06/ ^ooov in the language of 

cavTsc a|x(poT«pu>v, Y'''0(xevr]« xal Sic; Thucydid^s usually has the posi- 

exxX7]aia<} tiQ p.«v itpoxapa oux ^o- tive meaning of more, 

oov TU)v KopivQiiov dTceSi^avTo to-)? * Thucyd. i. 44. Plutarch (Peri- 

X6you<; cv Ss Tig Osxspaia (jket^Y'^^* kUs, c. 29) ascribes the smallness 

aav, &c, of the squadron despatched ondex 

326 HI8T0BY OF OBBECE. Pabt II. 

fleet of 1 10 Bail, under Meikiades and two others, together 
with the' ten Athenian ships, took station at one of the 
adjoining islands called Sybotha, while the land force and 
1000 Zakynthian hoplites were posted on the KorkyrsBan 
Cape Leukimme. Both sides prepared for battle: the 
Corinthians, taking on board three days' provisions, sailed 
by night from Cheimerium, and encountered in the morning 
the iLorkyraean fleet advancing towards them, distributed 
into three squadrons, one under each ofthe three generals, 
and having the ten Athenian ships at the extreme right. 
Opposed to them were ranged the choice vessels of the 
Corinthians, occupying the left of their aggregate fleet: 
next came the various allies, with Megarians and .^onbrakiots 
on the extreme right. Never before had two such numerous 
fleets, both Grecian, engaged in battle. But the tactics 
and manoeuvring were not commensurate to the numbers. 
The decks were crowded with hoplites and bowmen, while 
the rowers below, on the Korkyrsean side at leasi^ were 
in great part slaves. The ships on both sides, being rowed 
forward so as to drive in direct impact prow against prow, 
were grappled together, and a fierce hand-combat was then 
commenced between the troops on board of each, as if they 
were on land — or rather, like boarding-parties: all upon 
the old-fashioned system of Grecian sea-nght, without any 
of those improvements introduced into the Athenian navy 
during the last generation. In Athenian naval attack, the 
ship, the rowers, and the steersman, were of much greater 
importance than the armed soldiers on deck. By strength 
and exactness of rowing, by rapid and sudden change of 
direction, by feints calculated to deceive, the Athenian 
captain sought to drive the sharp beak of his vessel, not 
against the prow, but against the weaker and more vulnerabl e 
parts of his enemy — side, oars, or stem. The ship thus 
became in the hands of her crew the real weapon of attack, 
which was intended first to disable the enemy and leave 
him unmanageable on the water; and not until this was 
done did the armed men on deck begin their operations, i 

Lacedsemonius to a petty spite of ' IleT^ofi.'x^siv i.ich vsu>v— to tarn 

PerikUs against that commander, the naval battle into a land-battle 

as the son of his old politloal an- on shipboard — was a practice al- 

tagonist Kimou. From whom- together repugnant to Athenian 

soever he copied this statement, feelfng^ag we see remarked also 

the motive assigned seems quite in Tbacyd. iy. 14: compare also 

unworthy of credit. vii. 61. 


Lacedsemonius with his ten Athenian ships, though forbid- 
den by his instructions to share in the battle, lent as much 
aid as he could by taking position at the extremity of the 
line and by making motions as if about to attack; while 
his seamen had full leisure to contemplate what they would 
despise as lubberly handling of the ships on both sides. 
All was confusion after the battle had been joined. The 
ships on both sides became entangled, the oars broken and 
unmanageable, — orders could neither be heard nor obeyed 
— and the individual valour of the hoplites and bowmen on 
deck became the decisive point on which victory turned. 

On the right wing of the Corinthians, the left of the 
Korkyrseans was victorious. Their twenty ships The Korky- 
drove back the Ambrakiot allies of Corinth, and raans are 
not only pursued them to the shore, but also ^®^®**®^- 
landed and plundered the tents. Their rashness in thus 
keeping so long out of the battle proved incalculably 
mischievous, the rather as their total number was inferior; 
for their right wing, opposed to the best ships of Corinth, 
was after a hard struggle thoroughly beaten. Many of the 
ships were disabled, and the rest obliged to retreat as they 
could — a retreat which the victorious ships on the other 
wing might have protected, had there been any effective 
discipline in the fleet, but which now was only imperfectly 
aided by the ten Athenian ships under Lacedaemonius. 
Though at first they obeyed the instructions from home in 
abstaining from actual blows, yet — when the battle became 
doubtful, and still more, when the Corinthians were pressing 
their victory — the Athenians could no longer keep aloo^ 
but attacked the pursuers in good earnest, and did much 
to save the defeated Korkyraeans. As soon as the latter 
had been pursued as far as their own island, the victorious 
Corinthians returned to the scene of action, which was 
covered with crippled and waterlogged ships, of their own 
and their enemies, as well as with seamen, soldiers, and 
wounded men, either helpless aboard the wrecks or keeping 
above water as well as they could — among the number, 
many of their own citizens and allies, especially on their 

The Corinthian and Syracusan and forcing the Athenian Teasel 

ships ultimately came to counter- to a direct shock which its weaker 

act the Athenian manoeuyring prow was unahle to hear (Thu« 

by constructing their prows with cyd. yii. 36). 
increased solidity and strength, 

^28 HISTOBY 07 OBEBOE. Past II. 

defeated right win^. Through these disabled vessels they 
sailed, not attempting to tow them off, but looking only 
to the crews aboard, and making some of them prisoners, 
but putting the greater number to death. Some even of 
their own allies were thus slain, not being easily distinguish- 
able. The Corinthians, having picked up their own dead 
bodies as well as they could, transported them to Sybota, 
the nearest point of the coast of Epirus; after which they 
again mustered their fleet, and returned to resume the 
attack against the Korkyrseans on their own coast. The 
latter got together as many of their ships as were seaworthy, 
together with the small reserve which had remained in 
harbour, in order to prevent at any rate a landing on the 
coast: and the Athenian ships, now within the strict letter 
of their instructions, prepared to cooperate with full energy 
in the defence. It was already late in the afternoon: but 
the Corinthian fleet, though their psean had already been 
shouted for attack, were suddenly seen to back water instead 
of advancing; presently they pulled round, and steered 
direct for the Epirotic coast. The Korkyrseans did not 
comprehend the cause of this sudden retreat, until at length 
it was proclaimed that an unexpected relief of twenty fresh 
Athenian ships was approaching, under Glaukon and 
Andokides; which the Corinthians had been the flrst to 
descry, and had even believed to be the forerunners of a 
larger fleet. It was already dark when these fresh ships 
reached Cape Leukimme, having traversed the waters 
covered with wrecks and dead bodies. * At first the 
Korkyrseans even mistook them for enemies. The rein- 
forcement had been sent from Athens, probably after more 
accurate information of the comparative force of .Corinth 
and Korkyra, under the impression that the original ten 
ships would prove inadequate for the purpose of defence 
— an impression more than verified by the reality. 

Though the twenty Athenian ships were not, as the 
Corinthians had imagined, the precursors of a larger fleet, 
they were found sufficient to change completely the face 
of affairs. In the preceding action the Korkyrseans had had 
seventy ships sunk or disabled — the Corinthians only thirty 
— so that the superiority of numbers was still on the side 

* Thucyd. i. 61. 8ia tu)v vexpwv xal vauaYlu>v iipo3xo{ii.i90si93i xati« 
irKeov i^ to aTpaxoTteSov. 



of the latter, who were however encumbered with the care 
of 1000 prisoners (800 of them slaves) captured, a j j , 
not easy either to lodge or to guard in the nar- a rern- 
ro w accommodations of an ancient trireme. Even Jorcement 
apart from this embarrassment, the Corinthians A^ens- 
were in no temper to hazard a second battle *!»® ^p- 
against thirty Athenian ships in addition to fljltrnkeg. 
the remaining Korkyrsean. And when their ene- can-y- 
mies sailed across to oflfer them battle on the JJli^erous 
Epirotic coast, they not only refused it, but Korkyr«au 
thought of nothing but immediate retreat — with P'"® ^®"- 
serious alarm lest the Athenians should now act aggres- 
sively, treating all amicable relations between Athens and 
Corinth as practically extinguished by the events ^ . . 
of the day before. Having ranged their fleet in not* yet 
line not far from shore, they tested the dispo- professedly 
sitions of the Athenian commanders by sending between 
forward a little boat with a few men to address n *^®°u ^^^ 
to them the following remonstrance. The men 
carried no herald's staff (we should say, no flag of truce), 
and were therefore completely without protection against 
an enemy. "Ye act wrongfully, Athenians (they exclaimed), 
in beginning the war and violating the truce; for ye are 
using arms to oppose us in punishing our enemies. If it 
be really your intention to hinder us from sailing against 
Korkyra or anywhere else that we choose, in breach of 
the truce, take first of all us who now address you, and 
deal with us as enemies." It was not the fault of the 
Korkyrseans that this last idea was not instantly realised: 
for such of them as were near enough to hear, instigated 
the Athenians by violent shouts to kill the men in theboat. 
But the latter, far from listening to such an appeal, dis- 
missed them with the answer: "We neither begin the war 
nor break the truce, Feloponnesians: we have come simply 
to aid these Korkyrseans our allies. If ye wish to sail 
anywhere else, we make no opposition: but if ye are about 
to sail against Korkyra or any of her possessions, we shall 
use our best means to prevent you." Both the answer, 
and the treatment of the men in the boat, satisfied the 
Corinthians that their retreat would be unopposed, and 
they accordingly commenced it as soon as they could get 
ready, staying however to erect a trophy at Sybota on the 
Epirotic coast, in commemoration of their advantage on 

330 HI8T0KY OF OBSXCE. Past H. 

the preceding day. In their voyage homeward they surprised 
Anaktorium at the mouth of the Ambrakiotic Gulf, which 
they had hitherto possessed jointly with the Korkyn&ans, 
planting in it a reinforcement of Corinthian setUers as 
guarantee for future fidelity. On reaching Corinth, the 
armament was dismissed, and the ffreat majority of the 
prisoners taken, 800 slaves, were sold; but the remainder, 
250 in number, were detained, and treated with peculiar 
kindness. Many of them were of the first and richest families 
in Korkyra, and the Corinthians designed to gain them 
over, so as to make them instruments for efiPecting a revo- 
lution in the island. The calamitous incidents arising from 
their subsequent return will appear in ancyther chapter. 

Helieved now firomall danger, the Korkyrseans picked 
Hatred ^P ^^^ dead bodies and the wrecks which had 
oonoeived floated during the night on to their island, and 
ri^nthfa^''* even found sufficient pretence to erect a trophy, 
towards chiefly in consequence of their psurtial success 
Athens. ^^ ^^^ |g£^ wing. In truth, they had been only 

rescued from ruin by the unexpected coming of the last 
Athenian ships: but the last result was as iriumphant to 
them, as it was disastrous and humiliating to the Corinth- 
ians, who had incurred an immense cost, and taxed all 
their willing allies, only to leave their enemy stronger than 
she was before. From this time forward they considered 
the Thirty years' truce as broken, and conceived a hatred, 
alike deadly and undisguised, against Athens; so that the 
latter gained nothing by the moderation of her admirals 
in sparing the Corinthian fleet ofl" the coast of Epirus. An 
opportunity was not long wanting for the Corinthians to 
strike a blow at their enemy through one of her wide-spread 

On the isthmus of that lesser peninsula called Pallene, 
They begin (which forms the westernmost of the three 
to stir up prongs of the greater Thracian peninsula called 
among the Chalkidike, between theThermaic and theStry- 
Atheman monic Gulfs,) was situated the Dorian town of 
Potidca, a Potidsea, one of the tributary allies of Athens, 
colony of but Originally colonised from Corinth and still 
but ally of maintaining a certain metropolitan allegiance 
Athens. towards the latter: insomucn that every year 
certain porinthians were sent thither as magistrates under 
the title of Epidemiurgi. On various points of the neigh- 



bouring coast also there were several small towns belong- 
ing to the Chalkidians and ^ottiseans, enrolled in like 
manner in the list of Athenian tributaries. The neigh- 
bouring inland territory, Mygdonia and Chalkidike, ^ was 
held by the Macedonian king Perdikkas, son of that Alex- 
ander who had taken part fifty years before in the expe- 
dition of Xerxes. These two pnnces appear gradually to 
have extended their dominions, after the ruin of Persian 
power in Thrace by the exertions of Athens, until at length 
they acquired all the territory between the rivers Axius 
and Strymon. Now Perdikkas had been for some time 
the friend and ally of Athens; but there were other 
Macedonian princes, his brother Philip, and Beiations 
Derdas, holding independent principalities in of Athena 
the upper country2 (apparently on the higher Jikkiw kVng 
course of the Axius near the Pseonian tribes), of Mace- 
with whom he was in a state of dispute. These fntrlgue " 
princes having been accepted as the allies of along with 
Athens, Perdikkas from that time became her against her 
active enemy, and it was from his intrigues that —he in- 
all the difficulties of Athens on that coast took chliki**'*' 
their first origin. The Athenian empire was dians to 
much less complete and secure over the seaports "Jm her- 
on the mainland than over the islands. ^ For increase of 
the former were always more or less dependent ^^ly****^^^. 
on any powerful land neighbour, sometmies more depend- 
ent on him than upon the mistress of the sea; and we 
shall find Athens herself cultivating assiduously the favour 
of Sitalkes and other strong Thracian potentates, as an aid 
to her dominion over the seaports. « Perdikkas immediately 

' 8ee the geographical Comment- a remarkable passage on thia snb« 

arj of Gatterer upon Thrace, em- ject in the beginning of Or. v. ad 

bodied in Poppo^ Prolegg. ad Thu- Philippum, sect. 6-7. After point- 

cyd. vol. ii. ch. 29. ing out the impradence of found- 

The words Td tici 6p«xi^<— xd ticl ing a colony on the skirts of the 

6paxi)c ^cupla (Thucyd. ii. 29) de- territory of a powerful potentate, 

note generally the towns in Chal- and the excellent site which had 

kidikft — places in the direction or been chosen for Kyr6nd, as being 

in the akirta of Thrace, rather than near only to feeble tribes— he goes 

parts of Thrace itself. so far as to say that the possession 

' Thucyd. i. 67 ; ii. 100. of Amphipolis would be injurious 

* See two remarkable passages rather than beneficial to Athens^ 
illustrating this dififerenoe, Thu- because it would render her de- 
cyd. iv. 120-122. pendent upon Philip, through his 

* Thucyd. ii. 29-98. Isokratftf hai power of annoying her colonists 

832 HISTOBY 07 GBEEOB. Part U. 

began to incite and aid the Ghalkidians and Bottiaeans 
to revolt from Athens; and jbhe violent enmity against the 
latter, kindled in the bosoms of the Corinthians by the 
recent events at Korkyra, enabled him to extend the same 
projects to Fotidaea. Not only did he send envoys to Co- 
rinth in order to concert measures for provoking the revolt 
of Potidsea, but also to Sparta, instigating the I^eloponne- 
sian league to a general declaration of war against Athens. ^ 
And he farther prevailed on many of theChalkidian inhab- 
itants to abandon their separate small town on the sea- 
coast, for the purpose of joint residence atOlynthus, which 
was several stadia from the sea. Thus that town, as well 
as the Chalkidian interest, became much strengthened, 
while Perdikkas farther assigned some territory near Lake 
Bolbe to contribute to the temporary maintenance of the 
concentrated population. 

The Athenians were not ignorant both of his hostile 
B 432 preparations and of the dangers which awaited 
them from Corinth. Immediately after theKor- 
kyraean sea-fight they sent to take precautions against the 
revolt of Potidsea; requiring the inhabitants to take down 
their wall on the side of Pallene, so as to leave the town 
open on the side of the peninsula, or on what may be called 
Revolt of *^6 sea-side, and fortified only towards the 
Potidsea— mainland — requiring them farther both to de- 
sent^thiSier liver hostages and to dismiss the annual magis- 
from trates who came to them from Corinth. An 

Athens. Athenian armament of thirty triremes and 1000 
hoplites, under Archestratus and ten others, despatched 
to act against Perdikkas in the Thermaic Gulf, was direct- 
ed at the same time to enforce these requisitions against 
Potidaea, and to repress any dispositions to revolt among 
the neighbouring Chalkidians. Immediately on receiving 
the requisitions, thePotidseans sent envoys both to Athens, 
for the purpose of evading and gaining time — and to Sparta, 
in conjunction with Corinth, in order to determine a La- 
cedaemonian invasion of Attica, in the event of Potidsea 

— -jnst as she had heen depend- ivrauQa (at Amphipolis) xocxoivouv- 

ent before upon Medokus the xac o7av icep ctpftev M7]S6x(|} Tip xa- 

Thracian king in consequence of Xai^ Sidi to6< cv Xe^povi^9<p fSUDp- 

her colonists in the Chersonese— "^^otj^-za^. 

avaYxao9r)ff6jxiQa ttjv auT7)v eovoiotv * Thucyd. i. 66, C7, 


being attacked by Athens. From the Spartan authorities 
they obtained a distinct affirmative promise, in spite of 
the Thirty years* truce still subsisting. At Athens they 
had no success, and they accordingly openly revolted (seem- 
ingly about Midsummer 432 b.c), at the same time that 
the armament under Archestratus sailed. The Chalkidians 
and Bottiaeans revolted also, at the express instigation of 
Corinth, accompanied by solemn oaths and promises of 
assistance. ^ Archestratus with his fleet, on reaching the 
Thermaic Gulf, found them all in proclaimed enmity, but 
was obliged to confine himself to the attack of Perdikkas 
in Macedonia, not having numbers enough to admit of a 
division of his force. He accordingly laid siege to Therma, 
in cooperation with the Macedonian troops from the upper 
country under Philip and the brothers ofDerdas; after 
taking that place, he next proceeded to besiege Pydna. 
But it would probably have been wiser had he turned his 
whole force instantly to the blockade of Potidsea; for during 
the period of more than six weeks that he spent in the 
operations against Therma, the Corinthians conveyed to 
Potidaea a reinforcement of 1600 hoplites and 400 liffht- 
armed, partly their own citizens, partly Peloponnesians 
hired for the occasion — under Aristeus son of Adeimantus, 
a man of such eminent popularity, both at Corinth and at 
Potidaea, that most of the soldiers volunteered on his per- 
sonal account. Potidsea was thus put in a state of com- 
plete defence shortly after the news of its revolt reached 
Athens, and long before any second armament could be 
sent to attack it. A second armament however was speedi- 
ly sent forth — forty triremes and 2000 Athenian hoplites 
under Kallias son ofKalliades,^ with four other command- 
ers — who on reaching the Thermaic Gulf, joined the for- 
mer body at the siege of Pydna. After prosecuting the 
siege in vain for a short time, they found themselves ob- 
liged to patch up an accommodation on the best terms 
they could with Perdikkas, from the necessity of commen- 
cing immediate operations against Aristeus and Potidsea. 
They then Quitted Macedonia, first crossing by sea from 
Pydna to tne eastern coast of the Thermaic Gulf — next 

■ Thneyd. r. 80, Elea the philosopher, for rhetori- 

* Kalliat was a young Athenian cbI, philosophical, and sophistical 

of noble family, who had paid the instruction (Plato, Alkibiadds, 1. 

laige lum of lOQ min« to Zeno of c* 81, p. 110). 


attacking, though without effect, the town of Beroea — and 
then marching by land along the eastern coast of the Gulf, 

in the direction of Potidsea. On the third day of easy 
march, they reached the seaport called 6ig6nus, near whicn 
they encamped. ^ 

> Thncyd. i. 61. The ttatement ad Thucyd. toI. ii. p. 408-418). 
of Thucydidds presents some geo- 2, He uses no expression which in 
graphical difficulties which the the least implies that the attempt 
critics hare not adequately esti- on Beroea on the part of the Athe- 
mated. Are we to assume as cer- nians was treacheroutf that is, con- 
tain, that the Beraa here men- trary to the conrention just con- 
tioned must be the Macedonian eluded; though had the fact been 
town of that name, afterwards so so, he would naturally have been, 
well known, distant from the sea led to notice it, seeing that the 
westward 160 stadia, or nearly deliberate breach of ttfeconTentioa 
twenty English miles (see Tafel, was the rery first step wbieh took 
Historia Thessalonica, p. 68), on place after it was concluded, 
a river which flows into the Ha- 8. What can have induced the 
liakmon, and upon one of the Athenians to leave their fleet and 
lower ridges of Mount Bermius? march near twenty miles inland 

The words of Thucydidds here to Mount Bermius and Berosa, to 

are— 'EicsiTtt 6e ^UfjiPasiv icoiT)o&|iLC- attack a Macedonian town which 

voi xat ^upiliiaylav dvaifxaiav npoc Tov they could not possibly hold — 

IlspSixxav, u>< auTO'K xaxi^icetYsv ^ when they cannot even stay to 

noTtSocta xai 6 'AptsTSuc TcapeXr|Xu- continue the attack on Pydna, a 

&u><, dicavivravrai ex t^^ Ma- position maritime, useful, and ten* 

xcfiovlac, xal dcpixdiiicvoi i^ Bi- able— in consequence of the press- 

poiav xdxeidtv iiciaTpi'.)^avTcc, ved ing necessity of taking immediate 

iceipdffovTSc icpu»Tov tou x^piou xal measures against Potidsca? 4. If 

01)1 ^^o'ixt^f cTcopeOovTO xard f^v they were compelled by this latter 

itpo^ TTjv rioTlSaiav — olfta Si v^sc icap- necessity to patch up a peace on 

cjcXeov ip8o(jLiQXovTa. any terms with Perdikkas, would 

''The natural route f^om Pydna they immediately endanger this 

to Potidsea (observes Dr. Arnold peace by going out of their way 

in his note) lay along the coast; to attack one of his forts? Again, 

and Beroea was quite out of the Thucydidds, says "that, proceeding 

way^ at some distance to the west- by slow land-marches, they reached 

wardf near the fort of the Bermian Gigdnus, and encamped on the third 

mountains. But the hope of sur- dajf"— xax' dXlyov 8c icpoiivTcc Tpi- 

prising Beroea induced the Athe- Talot dcplxovTo sc FiYcovov xed eorpa- 

nians to deviate from their direct xoTceSsuaavTo. The computation of 

line of march ; then after the time must here be made either ftom 

failure of this treacherous attempt, Pydna, or from Beroea; and the 

they returned again to the sea- reader who examines the map will 

coast, and continued to follow it see that neither from the one nor 

till they arrived at Gigdnus." the other (assuming the Beroea on 

I would remark upon this — 1. Mount Bermius) would itbe'pos- 

The words of Thucydidds imply sible for an army to arrive at Od- 

that Beroea was not in Macedonia, g6nus on the third day, marching 

but out of it (see Poppo, Proleg. round the head of the Qwlt with 


In spite of the convention concluded at Pydna, Per- 
dikkas, whose character for faithlessness we combat 
shall have more than one occasion to notice, near Po- 
was now again on the side of the Chalkidians, tw*en tiie 
and sent 200 horse to join them under the com- Athemian 
mand of lolaus. Aristeus posted his Corinthians JhcT anied 
and Potidseans on the isthmus near Potidaea, Corinth- 
providing a market without the walls in order {fdakiJs^ 
that they might not stray in quest of provisioos. »nd Chai- 
His position was on the side towards Olynthus victory of 
— which was about seven miles off, but within the Athe- 
sight, and in a lofty and conspicuous situation. "**°*' 

easy days* marches ; the more so marched along by land to Gigftnns. 
as they woald have to cross the Whoever inspects the map will see 
riven Lydias, Axins, and Echei- that the Athenians would naturally 
d6rus, all not far from their mouths employ their large fleet to trans- 
— or if these rivers could not be port the army by the short transit 
crossed, to get on board the fleet across the Gulf from Pydna (sea 
and re-land on the other side. l^i^7) xliv. 10), and thus avoid the 
This clear mark of time laid fatiguing land -march round the 
down by Thucydidds (even apart head of the Gulf. Moreover the 
from the objections which I have language ofThucydidds would seem 
just urged in reference to Bensa to make the land-march legin at 
on Mount Bermius) made me doubt Beroea, and not at Pydna — d n avl- 
whether Dr. Arnold and the other axavxai ex t^^ MaxeSovlac, xat 
commentators have correctly con- d^ixdfjisvoi icBspotav xdxelbev 
ceived the operations of the Athe- «Tct9Tpe'.)^avTCc, xai iceipdoa<>Tec itpu>- 
nian troops between Pydna and tov tou x^^^P^^^ ^^^ ^^X i^^^vts^, 
Gigdnus. The Ber<Ba which Thu- tnopeuovTO xaxd f^v icp6< flotU 
cydidds means cannot be more Saiav— 5(ia H v^tc icapinXeov i^So- 
distant from Gig6nus, at any rate, fjii^xovta. Kax* dXiyov Si npoiovtec 
than a third day's easy march, and xpiTatot d<pixovxo tc FiYtuvov xai 
therefore cannot be the Beroea on c9xpaxonc5tuaavxo. The change of 
Mount Bermius. But there was tense between dicavlffxavxat and 
another town named Beroea either enopsuovxo— and the connexion of 
in Thraoe or in Emathia, though the participle d9ix6(jkevot with the 
we do not know its exact site (see latter verb,— seems to divide the 
Wasse ad Thucyd. i. 61 ; Steph. Bys. whole proceeding into two distinct 
T. Bipi)«: Tafel, Thessalonica, In- parts; first, departure from Mace- 
dex). This other Beroea, situated donia to Beroea, as it would seem, 
somewhere between Gigdnus and by sea— next, a land- march from 
Therma, and out of the limits of Beroea to Gig6nus, of three short 
that Macedonia which Perdikkas days. 

governed, may probably be the This it the best account, as it 

place which Thucydidds here indi- strikes me, of a passage, the real 

<sates. The Athenians, raising the difficulties of which are imperfectly 

•iege of Pydna, crossed the Gulf noticed by the commentators. 

on shipboard to Beroea, and after The site of Gig6nu8 cannot be 

vainly trying to surprise that town, exactly determined, since all that 

336 HISTOBY 09 GBEEGE. Past II« 

He here awaited the approach of the Athenians, calcula- 
ting that the Chalkidians from Olynthus would, upon the 
hoisting of a given signal, assail them in the rear when 
they attacked him. But Kallias was strong enough to place 
in reserve his Macedonian cavalry and other allies as a 
check against Olynthus; while with his Athenians and the 
main force he marched to the isthmus and took position 
in front of Aristeus. In the battle which ensued, Aristeas 
and the chosen band of Corinthians immediately about him 
were completely successful, breaking the troops opposed 
to them, and pursuing for a considerable distance. Bat 
the remaining Potidaeans and Feloponnesians were routed 
by the Athenians and driven within the walls. On returning 
from pursuit, Aristeus found the victorious Athenians 
between him and Potidsea, and was reduced to the alter- 
native either of cutting his way through them into the latter 

we know of the towns on the coast xovxo ic FIycovov: it would be a 
between Fotidsea and ^neia, is march rather rapid and fatiguing, 
derived from their enumerated especially as it would include the 
names in Herodotus (vii. 123) ; nor passage of the rivers. Nor is it 
can we be absolutely certain that likely, from the description of this 
he has enumerated them all in the battle in ThucydidSs (i. 62), that 
exact order in which they were Gigdnus could be anything like a 
placed. But I think that both Go- full day's march from Potidsea. 
lonel Leake and Kiepert's map According to his description, the 
place Glg6nu8 too far from Foti- Athenian army advance by three 
dsea; for we see, from this passage very easy marches; then arriving 
of Thucydidds, that it formed the at Gigdnus, they encamp, being 
camp from which the Athenian now near the enemy, who on their 
general went forth immediately to side are already encamped ex- 
give battle to an enemy posted pecting them — icpov^e^rofxevot touc 
between Olynthus and Potidsea; 'A07)valou< i a t p aToiceSeu.ovxo 
and the Scholiast says ofGigftnus — icp6< 'OXuvQou ev rep la6(JL<p: the im- 
ou icoXu fiice^ov IloTiSala;: and Ste- perfect tense indicates that they 
phan. Byz. rtY<i>v0C) ic6Xtc 6paxT]< were already there at the time 
icpove^'f)^ T^ IlaXXiQv^. when the Athenians took camp at 
See Colonel Leake, Travels in Gigdnus; which would hardly be 
Northern Greece, vol. ill. ch. xxxi. the case if the Athenians had come 
p. 462. That excellent observer by three successive marches from 
calculates the march from Beroea Beroea on Mount Bermius. 
on Mount Bermius to Potideea, as I would add, that it is no more 
being one of four days, about wonderful that there should be one 
twenty miles each day. Judging Bercea in Thrace and another in 
by the map, this seems lower than Macedonia— than that there should 
the reality; but admitting it to be be one Methone in Thrace and 
correct, Thucydidds would never another in Macedonia (Steph» B. 
describe such a march as xat' MsOtbvi}). 
6XI70V fii fcpotovttc TptTaioi d^U 



town, or of making a retreating march to Olynthus. He 
chose the former as the least of two hazards, and forced 
his way through the flank of the Athenians, wading into 
the sea in order to turn the extremity of the Potidaean 
wall, which reached entirely across the isthmus with a 
mole running out at each end into the water. He effected 
this daring enterprise and saved his detachment, though 
not without considerable difficulty and some loss. Mean- 
while the auxiliaries from Olynthus, though they had be- 
gun their march on seeing the concerted signal, had been 
kept in check by the Macedonian horse, so that the Poti- 
dseans had been beaten and the signal again withdrawn, 
before they could make any effective diversion: nor did 
the cavalry on either side come into action. The defeated 
Potidseans and Corinthians, having the town immediately 
in their rear, lost only 300 men, while the Athenians lost 
150, together with the general Kallias.i 

The victory was however quite complete, and the 
Athenians, after having erected their trophy Potidsea 
and given up the enemy's dead for burial, im- j}**^^ad "b 
mediately built their blockading wall across the the Atbe- 
isthmus on the side of the mainland, so as to nians* 
cut off Potidsea from all communication with Olynthus 
and the Chalkidians. To make the blockade complete, a 
second wall across the isthmus was necessary, on the other 
side towards Pallen^: but they had not force enough to 
detach a completely separate body for this purpose, until 
after some time they were joined by Phormio with 1600 
fresh hoplites from Athens. That general, landing at 
Aphytis in the peninsula of Pallene, marched slowly up 
to Potidaea, ravaging the territory in order to draw out 
the citizens to battle. But the challenge not being accept- 
ed, he undertook and finished without obstruction the 
blockading wall on the side of Pallene, so that the town 
was now completely enclosed and the harbour watched by 
the Athenian fleet. The wall once finished, a portion of 
the force sufficed to guard it, leaving Phormio at liberty 
to undertake aggressive operations against the Chalkidic 
and Bottisean townships. The capture of Potidsea being 
now only a question of more or less time, Aristeus, in 
order that the provisions might last longer, proposed to 
the citizens to choose a favourable wind, get on shipboard, 

» Thucyd. i. 62, 63. 
VOL. V. Z 


and break out suddenly from the harboar, taking tlieir 
chance of eluding the Athenian fleet, and leaving only 500 
defenders behind. Though he oflfered himself to be among 
those lefty he could not determine the citizens to so bold 
an enterjjrise, and therefore sallied forth, in the way pro- 
posed, with a small detachment, in order to try ana pro- 
cure relief from without — especially some aid or diversion 
from Peloponnesus. But he was able to accomplish nothing 
beyond some partial warlike operations among the Chal- 
kidians, i and a successful ambuscade against the citizens of 
Sermylus, which did nothing for the relief of the blockaded 
town. It had however been so well-provisioned that 
it held out for two whole years — a period full of import- 
ant events elsewhere. 

From these two contests between Athens and Corinth, 
first indirectly at Korkyra, next distinctly and avowedly 
at Fotidsea, sprang those important movements in the 
Lacedaemonian alliance which will be recounted in the 
next chapter. 

» Thucyd, I. C8. 





Even before the recent hostilities at Korkyra and Potidsea, 
it had been evident to reflecting Greeks that state of 
prolonged observance of the Thirty years* truce IJeiing in 

^ r ° - J. • J xT_ J. j.Tl • 1 j Greece be- 

was becoming uncertain, and that the mingled tween the 
hatred, fear, and admiration, which Athens Thirty- 
inspired throughout Greece would prompt Sparta Jnd"he'pe- 
and the Spartan confederacy to seize any favour- loponne- 
able opening for breaking down the Athenian 'ecogntsed 
power. That such was the disposition of Sparta, probability 
was well understood among the Athenian allies, AthenVat 
however considerations of prudence, and general that time 
slowness in resolving, might postpone the mo- croaching-- 
ment of carrying it into effect. Accordingly decree 
not only the Samians when they revolted had JSg^trade 
applied to the Spartan confederacy for aid, which with the 
they appear to have been prevented from obtain- ^^s"****'- 
ing chiefly by the pacific interests then animating the 
Corinthians — but also the Lesbians had endeavoured to 
open negotiations with Sparta for a similar purpose, though 
the authorities to whom alone the proposition could have 
been communicated, since it long remained secret and was 
never executed — had given them no encouragement, i 

The affairs of Athens had been administered, under 
the ascendency of Perikles, without any view to extension 
of empire or encroachment upon others, though with constant 
reference to the probabilities of war, and with anxiety to 
keep the city in a condition to meet it. But even the 
splendid internal ornaments, which Athens at that time 
acquired, were probably not without their effect in provoking 

> Thncyd. iii. 2-13. This propo- collision between Athens and Co- 
■ition of the Lesbians at Sparta rinth at Korkyra. 
must have been made before the 

z 2 

340 HI8T0BY OF OBSEOB. Pajit IX. 

jealousy on the part of other Greeks as to her ulti- 
mate views. 

The only known incident, wherein Athens had been 
brought into collision with a member of the Spartan con- 
federacy prior to the Korkyrsean dispute, was, her decree 
passed in regard to Megara— prohibiting the Megarians, on 
pain of death, from all trade or intercourse as well with 
Athens as with all ports within the Athenian empire. This 

Prohibition was grounded on the alleged fact, that the 
[egarians had harboured runaway slaVes from Athens, and 
had appropriated and cultivated portions of land upon her 
border; partly land, the property of the goddesses of Eleusis 
— partly a strip of territory disputed between the two states, 
and therefore left by mutual understanding in common 
pasture without any permanent enclosure. ^ In reference 
to this latter point, the Athenian herald Anthemokritus 
had been sent to Megara to remonstrate, but had been so 
rudely dealt with, that his death shortly afterwards was 
imputed to the Megarians. 2 We may reasonably suppose 

« Thuoyd. i. 139. inixoXouvxt^iictp- tic ed— wrongful cultiyation of ter- 

jaalav Msfoptoat t^c x^? ttjc Upa« ritory, and reception of runaway 

xal vqz doploTOU, Ac. Plutarch, Fe- slaves. He does not allude to the 

riklds, c. 30 ; Schol. ad Aristophan. herald Anthemokritus: still less 

Pao. 609. does he notice that gossip of the 

I agree with OSUer that two day which Aristophan^ and other 

distinct violations of right are here comedians of this period turn to 

imputed to the Megarians: one, account in fastening the Pelopon- 

that they had cultivated land the nesian war upon the personal sym- 

propertyof the goddesses at Eleusis pathies ofPeriklds, viz. that first^ 

—the other, that they had appro- some young men of Athens stole 

priated and cultivated the un- away the courtezan Simsetha from, 

settled pasture land on the border. Megara: next, the Megarian youth 

Dr. Arnold's note takes a different revenged themselves by carrying 

view, less correct in my opinion: ' off from Athens "two engaging 

"The land on the frontier was con- courtezans," one of whom was the 

secrated to prevent it from being mistress of PerikUs ; upon which 

inclosed : in which case the bound- the latter was so enraged that he 

aries might have been a subject proposed the sentence of exclusion 

of perpetual dispute between the against the Megarians (Aristoph. 

two countries," Ac. Compare Thu- Acham. 601-516 ; Plutarch, Perikl^s, 

oyd. V. 42. about the border terri- c. 30). 

tory round Panaktum. Such stories are chiefly valuable 

* Thucydidds (i. 139), in assign- as they make us acquainted wiih 

ing the reasons of this sentence the political scandal of the time, 

of exclusion passed by Athens But the story of the herald Anthe- 

against the Megarians, mentions mokritus and his death cannot be 

only the two allegations here no- altogether rejected. Though Tha« 


that ever since the revolt of Megara fourteen years before 
— which caused to Athens an irreparable mischief — the 
feeling prevalent between the two cities had been one of 
bitter enmity, manifesting itself in many ways, but so much 
exasperated by recent events as to provoke Athens to a 
signal revenge, i Exclusion from Athens and all the ports 
in her empire, comprising nearly every island and seaport 
in the jEgean, was so ruinous to the Megarians, that they 
loudly complained of it at Sparta, representing it as an 
infraction of the Thirty years* truce ; though it was undoubt- 
edly within the legitimate right of Athens to enforce — and 
was even less harsh than the systematic expulsion of for- 
eigners by Sparta, with which Perikles compared it. 

These complaints found increased attention after the 
war of Korkyra and the blockade of Potidsea Zeaiougim- 
by the Athenians. The sentiments of the Co- S?''the'*Co- 
rinthians towards Athens had now become ang- rinthians in 
ry and warlike in the highest degree. It was Jboiua^en- 
not simply resentment for the past which ani- erai war, ^' 
mated them, but also the anxiety farther to bring ^°' the pur- 
upon Athens so strong a hostile pressure as serving ?o- 
should preserve Potidsea and its garrison from tid«a- 
capture. Accordingly they lost no time in endeavouring 
to rouse the feelings of the Spartans against Athens, and 
in inducing them to invite to Sparta all such of the con- 
federates as had any grievances against that city.. Not 
merely the Megarians, but several other confederates, came 
thither as accusers ; while the JEginetans, though their in- 
sular position made it perilous for them to appear, made 

cydidSs, not mentioning the fact, rians"— altla tu)v Mtfcipiu)'* Ai:o9o- 
did not believe that the herald's vsiv SSo^e. That neither Thucydi- 
death had really been occasioned dds, norPeriklds himself, believed 
by the Megarians; yet there prob- that the Megarians had really 
ably was a popular belief at Athens caused his death, is pretty certain : 
to that effect, under the influence otherwise the fact would have been 
of which the deceased herald re- urged when the LacedsDmonians 
ceived a public burial near the sent to complain of the sentence 
Thriasian gate of Athens, leading of exclusion — being a deed so no- 
te Eleusis : see Philippi Epistol. toriously repugnant to all Grecian 
ad Athen. ap. Demosthen. p. 159 feeling. 

R.; Pausan. i. 36, 3; iii. 4, 2. The ' Thucyd. i. 67. Ms^ap^i;, 8t)Xoov- 

language of Plutarch (Periklfts, o. ts< pisv xal iitpa oux oXIyoc 6id(poprz, 

80) is probably literally correct— jjidXiaTa 5e, Xifjiivcov xs etpYeaQai tu)v 

"the herald's death appeared to ev t^ A97)valu>v apxt) ^^* 
have been caused by the Mega- 

342 HI8T0BT OF GBEECE. Past H. 

themselves vehemently heard through the mouths of 
others, complaining that Athens withheld from them the 
autonomy to which they were entitled under the truce. * 

According to the Lacedaemonian practice, it was ne- 
cessary first that the Spartans themselves, apart from their 
allies, should decide whether there existed a sufficient case 
of wrong done by Athens against themselves or against 
Peloponnesus — either in violation of the Thirty years' 
truce, or in any other way. If the determination of Sparta 
herself were in the negative, the case would never even 
Eeiationf ^® Submitted to the vote of the allies. But if 
of Sparta it were in the affirmative, then the latter would 
riiies^^they ^^ convoked to deliver their opinion also: and 
uad a vote assuming that the majority of votes coincided 
—whether "^^^^ ^^^ previous decision of Sparta, the entire 
they confederacy stood then pledged to the given 

would* not ^^°® ^^ policy — if the majority was contrary, the 
approve of Spartans would stand alone, or with such only 
poUcy^* °^ ^^ ^^® confederates as concurred. Each allied 
which had city, great or small, had an equal right of suf- 

viousfy^re- ^^^S^' I* ^^^^ appears that Sparta herself did 
solved by not vote as a member of the confederacy, but 
separately. Separately and individually as leader — and that 
the only question ever submitted to the allies 
was, whether they would or would not go along with her 
previous decision. Such was the course of proceeding now 
followed. The Corinthians, together with such other of the 

' Thacyd. i. 67. Xifovxec oux elvai Thebans (iii. 64) : but on the other 

aut6vo|iLot xatot tocc aicovfidc. O. Mill- hand, if we consult 1. 115, it will 

ler (^ginet. p. 180) and Goller in appear possible that the wording 

his note, think that the iruce (or of the Thirty years* truce may 

covenant generally) here alluded have been general, as— 'AnoSouvai 

to is, not the Thirty years* truce Se 'A07]vatouc So« ix^uai IIsXoicovvy}- 

concluded fourteen years before oicov: at any rate, the ^ginetans 

the period actually present, but may have pretended, that by the 

the ancient alliance against the same rule as Athens gave up Ni- 

Persians, solemnly ratified and con- ssea, P6g8e, Ac, she ought also to 

tinned after the victory of Flatsa. renounce ^gina. 
Dr. Arnold on the contrary thinks However, we must recollect that 

that the Thirty years truce is alluded the one plea does not exclude the 

to, which the ^ginetans interpreted other: the ^ginetans may have 

(rightly or not) as entitling them taken advantage of both in en- 

to independence. forcing theirprayer for interference. 

The former opinion might seem This seems to have be%n the idea 

to be countenanced by the allusion of the Scholiast, when he says — 

to JBgina in the speech of the xatot t^^v oufx^wviav tcuv onov^uiv. 


confederates as felt either aggrieved or alarmed by Athens, 
presented themselves before the public assembly of Spartan 
citizens, prepared to prove that the Athenians had broken 
the truce and were going on in a course of wrong towards 
Peloponnesus, i Even in the oligarchy of Sparta, such a 
question as this could only be decided by a general assem- 
bly of Spartan citizens, qualified both by age, by regular 
contribution to the public mess, and by obedience to Spar- 
tan discipline. To the assembly so constituted the deputies 
of the various allied cities addressed themselves, each set- 
ting forth his case against Athens. The Corinthians chose 
to reserve themselves to the last, after the assembly had 
been inflamed by the previous speakers. 

Of this important assembly, on which so much of the 
future fate of Greece turned, Thucydides has . ^ 
preserved an account unusually copious. First, of th™Spar- 
the speech delivered by the Corinthian envoys. *"• ■«?»- 
Next, that of some Athenian envoys, who hap- dreMed^by 
pening to be at the same time inSparta on some fu ^°^?.**f 
other matters, and being present in the assembly powers, 
so as to have heai'd the speeches both of the compiain- 
Corinthians and of the other complainants, ob- Athen^hfa 
tained permission from the magistrates to ad- violated 
dress the assembly in their turn. Thirdly, the * ^^^' 
address of the Spartan king Archidamus, on the course 
of policy proper to be adopted by Sparta. Lastly, the 
brief, but eminently characteristic, address of the Ephor 
Sthenelaidas, on putting the question for decision. These 
speeches, the composition of Thucydides himself, contain 
substantially the sentiments of the parties to whom they 
are ascribed. Neither of them is distinctly a reply to that 
which has preceded, but each presents the situation of af- 
fairs from a difierent point of view. 

The Corinthians knew well that the audience whom 
they were about to address had been favourably r^^^ corin- 
prepared for them — for the Lacedaemonian thian en- 
authorities had already given an actual promise, 3J|g"g*Je 
to them and to the Potidaeans at the moment assembly 
before Potidsea revolted, that they would invade {Je^'enToys 
Attica. Great was the revolution in sentiment of of the other 
the Spartans, since they had declined lending aid f^flf J^ed^^t 
to the much more powerful island of Lesbos when against 
it proposed to revolt — a revolution occasioned -^t^^^^s. 

* Thucyd. 1. 67, xatt36u>v iX06*/T8c tu)v 'AOtj/aliDv 8ti oiiov84« ts XeXu- 

344 HI8T0BY OF GBEEGE. Pact II. 

by tbe altered interests and sentiments of Corinth. 
Nevertheless, the Corinthians also knew that their positive 
grounds of complaint against Athens, in respect of wrong 
or violation of the existing truce, were both few and feeble. 
Neither in the dispute about Potidsea nor about Korkyra, a 

liad Athens infringed the truce or wronged the Pelopon- 1 

nesian alliance. £i both she had come into collision with 
Corinth, singly and apart from the confederacy. She had 
a right, both according to the truce and according to the 
received maxims of international law, to lend defensive aid 
internation- ^^ *^® KorkyrsBaus, at their own request: she 
ai customt had a right also, according to the principles laid 
as bearing * down by the Coriuthiaus themselves on occasion 
upon the of the revolt of Samos, to restrain the Potidaeans 
dispute^be- ^^^^ revolting. She had committed nothing 
tween which could fairly be called an aggression. In- 

corinth— "^^ deed the aggression both in the case of Potidaea 
Athens in and in that of Korkyra, was decidedly on the 
the right, gj^g ^f ^^^ Corinthians: and the Peloponnesian 
confederacy could only be so far implicated as it was under- 
stood to be bound to espouse the separate quarrels, right 
or wrong, of Corinth. All this was well knowxi to the 
Corinthian envoys; and accordingly we find that in their 
speech at Sparta, they touch but lightly and in vague terms 
on positive or recent wrongs. . Even that which they do 
say completely justifies the proceedings of Athens about 
the affair of Korkyra, since they confess without hesitation 
the design of seizing the large Korkyr«an navy for the 
use of the Peloponnesian alliance: while in respect of 
Potidsea, if we had only the speech of the Corinthian envoy 
before us without any other knowledge, we should have 
supposed it to be an independent state, not connected by 
any permanent bonds with Athens — we should have sup- 
posed that the siege ofPotidseaby Athens was an unprovoked 
aggression upon an autonomous ally of Corinth * — we should 
never have imagined that Corinth had deliberately instigated 
and aided the revolt of the Chalkidians as well as of the 
Potidaeans against Athens. It might be pretended that 

%6-zti elev xol ASmoUv t»)v IlsXoitAv- xa\ IloTlSatav ii:oXi6pxouv, a>v to fxav 

v^oov. The change of tense in these ^TcixatpoTatov ^^''^P^o^ itpoc xd snt 

two verbs is to be noticed. 6paxT)« dico^p^(f9ai, ^ 6e vouxixov 

> Thucyd. i. 68. oo 7 dp fiv Kip- &v pLSYto'Ov Ttoptayj IleXoiiovvTjaloic. 
xupdv Ts 6noXoP6vT«<; pia ^(iu)v e^x^^i 



she had a right to do this, by virtue of her undefined 
metropolitan relations with Potidsea. But at any rate the 
incident was not such as to afford any decent pretext for 
charge against the Athenians either of outrage towards 
Corinth, i or of wrongful aggression against the Pelopon- 
nesian confederacy. 

To dwell much upon specific allegations of wrong, 
would not have suited the purpose of the Co- Tenor of 
rinthian envoy; for against such, the Thirty the 
years' truce expressly provided that recourse ^^^,ggg^" 
should be had to amicable arbitration — to which mtie aiiu- 
recourse he never once alludes. He knew, that **o" *°r'n 
as between Corinth and Athens, war had already -Btrong'e^ 
befinin at Potidsea; and his business, throucfhout '0^*8*0^ , 

°ini» uj.' -L - L 1 raisehatred 

nearly all of a very emphatic speech, is, to show and alarm 
that th e Peloponnesian confederacy, and especial- Jf ?***** 
ly Sparta, is bound to take instant part in it, 
not less by prudence than by duty. He employs the most 
animated language to depict the ambition, the unwearied 
activity, the personal effort abroad as well as at home, the 
quick resolves, the sanguine hopes never dashed by failure 
— of Athens: as contrasted with the cautious, home-keeping, 
indolent, scrupulous routine of Sparta. He reproaches the 
Spartans with their backwardness and timidity, in not 
having repressed the growth of Athens before she reached 
this formidable height: especially in having allowed her to 
fortify her city after the retreat of Xerxes and afterwards 
to build the long walls from the city to the sea. 2 The 
Spartans (he observes) stood alone among all Greeks in 
the notable system of keeping down an enemy not by acting, 
but by delaying to act — not arresting his growth, out put- 
ting mm down when his force was doubled. Falsely indeed 
had they acquired the reputation of being sure, when they 
were in reality merely slow. 3 In resisting Xerxes, as in 
resisting Athens, they had always been behindhand, dis- 
appointing and leaving their friends to ruin; while both 

* Thncyd. i. 68. 4v ot? itpoaiQiisi t^ Suvijxsi xivA dXXa t^ (jkcXXiQoci 
ij|x5c oox ^xiffta elresiv, 2a(f> xaX dpLUvofitvoi, xal |iL6voi o6x dpyojxsvTjv 
fjLSYtora i'(x\r,[ eyo|jLCV| otto (i,4v xtjv a&^7]atv tu)v ty9pu>v, SiTcXaoiou- 
'A^vaiu>v 0P||^C6|xtvoi, un6 Si 0|xu)v (xiv7]v Si, xataXuovTM. Kaltot Hi- 
d(xeXou(xcvot. IfeoOc dafsXctc elvai, (bv dpa 6 X6yo< 

* Thucyd. 1. 69. too Ipyoo ixpdxtt* t6v x» -ydp M^5ov, 
■ Thucyd. i. 69. -fiooydCsTt Y^P Ac. 

j {iovoi 'EXXiQvoDv, U) Aotxe^atjAoviot, 00 

346 HI8T0BT OF GBEECr. 7abt n. 

these enemies liad only failed of complete success through 
their own mistakes. 

After half apolo^sinff for the tartness of these re- 
Bemark- proofs — ^which Eowever, as the Spartans were 
able picture now Well disposed to go to war forthwith, would 
AUiTni^' be well-timed and even agreeable — the Corinth- 
by her ene- ian orator vindicates the necessity of plain- 
"**"• speaking by the urgent peril of the emergency, 

and the formidable character of the enemy who threatened 
them. "You do not reflect (he says) how thoroughly differ- 
ent the Athenians are from yourselves. They are innova- 
tors by nature, sharp both in devising, and in executing 
what they have determined: you are sharp only in keeping 
what you have got, in determining on nothing beyond, and 
in doing even less than absolute necessity requires. ^ They 
again dare beyond their means, run risks beyond their 
own judgement, and keep alive their hopes in desperate 
circumstances: your pectuiarity is, that your performance 
comes short of your power — you have no faith even in 
what your judgement guarantees — when in difficulties, you 
despair of all escape. They never hang back — you are 
habitual laggai'ds: they love foreign service — you cannot 
stir from home: for they are always under the belief that 
their movements will lead to some farther gain, while you 
fancy that new products will endanger what you already 
have. When successful, they make the greatest forward 
march; when defeated, they fall back the least. Moreover 
they task their bodies on behalf of their city as if they 
were the bodies of others — while their minds are most 
of all their own, for exertion in her service. » When 
their plans for acquisition do not come successfully 

* Thuoyd. i. 70. 0i fAiv ^c vsco- to be understood : but we should 

Tf ponoiol, XQtl cictxctp^aat 6EeU xal thereby both depart from the more 

iiciTsX^vat EpYH* & &v Yvcboiv* Oftslc obvious syntax, and weaken the 

li toe OndipxovTd xt atbtUtv, xal em- general meaning. 

7v(I>vai fxTj54v, xal lpy<|» o684 Tdvoy- * Thucyd. i. 70. Iti Zk Tot? ftev 

xaia e^txioQai. odDpiaaiv dXXoTptu>T<xTotc 6icep r^c 

The moaning of the word o^el^ ic6Xccoc ^puivrai, t^ T'*^P^D ^^ olxcto- 

— 97tarp— when applied to the latter tAt^ i< •r6 npdoaciv tt oicep aO^^c 

half of the sentence, is in the na- It is difBcult to coj^vey in trans- 

ture of a sarcasm. But this is lation the antithesis between dX> 

suitable to the character of the XoTpiuDxdTotc and olxetoxaT^ — not 

speech. GoUer supposes some such without a certain conceit, which 

word as ixavol, instead of 6$sl(;, Thucydidfis is occasionally fond of. 


out, they feel like men robbed of what belongs to them: 
yet the acquisitions when realised appear like trifles com- 
pared with what remains to be acquired. If they some- 
times fail in an attempt, new hopes arise in some other 
direction to supply the want: for with them alone the 
possession and the hope of what they aim at is almost 
simultaneous, from their habit of quickly executing all 
that they have once resolved. And in this manner do they 
toil throughout all their lives amidst hardship and peril, 
disregarding present enjoyment in the continual thirst for 
increase — knowing no other festival recreation except the 
performance of active duty — and deeming inactive repose 
a worse condition than fatiguing occupation. To speak 
the truth in two words, such is their inborn temper, that 
they will neither remain at rest themselves, nor allow rest 
to others.* 

**Such is the city which stands opposed to you, Lace- 

dsBmonians — yet ye still hang back from action Your 

continual scruples and apathy would hardly be safe, even 
if ye had neighbours like yourselves in character: but as 
to dealings with Athens, your system is antiquated and 
out of date. In politics as in art, it is the modern improve- 
ments which are sure to come out victorious: and though 
unchanged institutions are best, if a city be not called 
upon to act — yet multiplicity of active obligations requires 
multiplicity and novelty of contrivance. 2 It is through 
these numerous trials that the means of Athens have ac- 
quired so much more new development than yours." 

The Corinthians concluded by saying, that if, after so 
many previous warnings, now repeated for the last time, 
Sparta still refused to protect her allies against Athens — if 
she delayed to perform her promise made to the Potidseans 
of immediately invading Attica — they (the Corinthians) 

■ Thucyd. I. «. %a\ tauta (xstoc (a^ts rab^ &XXou« dv9fU>icouc iqiv, 

it6vu>v icdvTa xal xivSuvcov 81' SXou 6p0u>< av tticoi. 

TOO alu)v05 (xoxOou9i, xol ditoXaoou- ' Thucyd. i. 71. ip^ai6Tpoica 0- 

aiv tXdj^iota t<I)v Oitopx^vTODv, 5ia |xu)v td iicttTjSsufxaTa itp6c oo-oOc 

TO del xTdffSat xol fi^iTe iopxTjv dXXo eoTiv. 'AvdyxTj 8*, (uaicep Tt^vr^c, dsi 

Ti ^Y'^^^^*- ^ ^^ "^^ fisovTa itpd^ai, to tniYtY"'0|*'*^« xpoTslv xol iio^yt- 

6o{x9opdv8io6x V'0"'^'''X**"* ^'^P^T* Cooa-Q |xiv K6Xti Td dxlvY)TO vojtifxx 

fAOvo ri dojfoXiov tirlicovov* a»aTJ tX dpio-o, itp6« icoXXd 6i dvoyxoCoixi- 

Ti? ooTOO? ^uvtXtbv ^oIy) nstpuxsvoi voic Uvoi, noXX^? xol t^; i-iTS^'/i^- 

ir.i Ttp jxyjTi ouTOUC sysiv Tjauyjov osui; Sii. 


would forthwith look for safety in some new alliance^ 
which they felt themselves fully justified in doing. They 
admonished her to look well to the case, and to carry for- 
ward Peloponnesus, with undiminished dignity, as it had 
been transmitted to her from her predecessors. > 

Such was the memorable picture of Athens and her 
Bepiymade citizens, as exhibited by her fiercest enemy be- 
by an Athe- fore the public assembly at Sparta. It was cal- 
aicfdentaf-' culated to impress the assembly, not by appeal 
ly present to recent or particular misdeeds, but by the 
in Sparta, general system of unprincipled and endless ag- 
gression which was imputed to Athens during the past — 
and by the certainty held out that the same system, unless 
put down by measures of decisive hostility, would be push- 
ed still farther in future to the utter ruin of Peloponne- 
sus. And to this point did the Athenian envoy (staying in 
Sparta about some other negotiation and now present in 
the assembly) address himself in reply, after having asked 
and obtained permission from the magistrates. The empire 
of Athens was now of such standing that the younger men 
present had no personal knowledge of the circumstances 
under which it had grown up: and what was needed as in- 
formation for them would be impressive as a reminder 
even to their seniors. ' 

He began by disclaiming all intention of defending his 
native city against the charges of specific wrong 
count of the or alleged infractions ofthe existing truce. This 
^pire of Yfg^Q qq part of his mission; nor did he recognise 
how it had Sparta as a competent judge in dispute between 
been ac- Athens and Corinth. But he nevertheless thought 
how^it' was it his duty to vindicate Athens against the gen- 
maintain- eral character of injustice and aggression im- 
puted to her, as well as to offer a solemn warn- 
ing to the Spartans against the policy towards which they 
were obviously tending. He then proceeded to show that 
the empire of Athens had been honourably earned and 
amply deserved — that it had been voluntarily ceded, and 
even pressed upon her — and that she could not abdicate it 
without imperilling her own separate existence and security. 
Far from thinking that the circumstances under which it 
was acquired needed apology, he appealed to them with 
pride, as a testimony of the genuine Hellenic patriotism of 

* Thucyd. i. 71. * Thucyd. i. 72. 

<•- i 


that city which the Spartan congress now seemed disposed 
to run down as an enemy, i He then dwelt upon the circum- 
stances attending the Persian invasion, setting forth the 
superior forwardness and the unflinching endurance of 
Athens, in spite of ungenerous neglect from the Spartans 
and other Greeks — the preponderance of her naval force 
in the entire armament-— the directing genius of her general 
Themistokles, complimented even by Sparta herself — and 
the title of Athens to rank on that memorable occasion as 
the principal saviour of Greece. This alone ought to save 
her empire from reproach; but this w^s not all— for that 
empire had been tendered to her by the pressing instance 
of the allies, at a time when Sparta had proved herself both 
incompetent and unwilling to prosecute the war against 
Persia. 2 By simple exercise of the constraining force in- 
separable from her presidential obligations, and by the re- 
duction of various allies who revolted, Athens had gradually 
become unpopular, while Sparta too had become her enemy 
instead of her friend. To relax her hold upon her allies 
would have been to make them the allies of Sparta against 
her; and thus the motive of fear was added to those of 
ambition and revenue, in inducing Athens to maintain her 
imperial dominion by force. In her position, no Grecian 
power either would or could have acted otherwise: — no 
Grrecian power, certainly not Sparta, would have acted with 
60 much equity and moderation, or given so little ground 
of complaint to her subjects. "Worse they had suflFered, 
while under Persia; worse they would suffer, if they came 
under Sparta, who held her own allies under the thraldom 
of an oligarchical party in each city; and if they hated 
Athens, this was only because subjects always hated the 
present dominion, whatever that might be. 3 

< Thucyd. i. 73. ^tjOi^mtoi Ik o6 Piaaafxevoi, oXX* 6fi.u)v fi,iv o5x iOj- 

iiatpaiTf/9S(U( fi.aXXov Svsxa r\ f&aptu- XrjadvTCUv napafieivat icpo^ xa uno- 

piou, xal 5ii]Xu>9cu>^ icp6c o?av Op.iv Xoiica toO f)ap3apou, 7])&iv 6i icpoaeX- 

icoXiv )&T) tu ()ouXeuo{i.ivotc, 6 dYtbv 66vtu)v tu>v ^u|x)&di^u>v, xal .auTU>v 

xoxaoTi^otTai. SsTjSevTtov r]Y«fi.6vo? xaTaaTTJvoi* t5 

« Thucyd. i. 75. "Ap* fi^ol iauev, «^o"« ^4 too IpToo xaTT)v«Txdcre7),.*v 

tS A«xt5ai^4vioi, xal irpo9oHLl«« ivsxa to Ttptoxov i:poaYaY«iv auTT)v 4<; xifis, 

Tijc t6t« x«l TvtbfXT)? aovecrsux:, ap- ^""^^^l ^^^ ''^'^ 5iou«, «7cttTa hi xal 

X^c Y« ^« «X0fx8v Tol? "EXXrioi iTt) ^^»*^^» ''"^^P^^ ^«^ uxpeXcla?. 

ouTio? ayav cnicpSivtu^ 5iaxtla9oi ; • Thucyd. i. 77. 
xal Y^P auTif]v t^qvSs tXd3o(xtv o6 


Having justified both the origin and the working of 
He ftdjures the Athenian empire, tne envoy concluded by 
them not to warning Sparta to consider calmly, without being 
truce, but hurried away by the passions and invectives of 
differ**'* *^^ others, before she took a step from which there 
by that was no retreat, and which exposed the future to 
pacific ap- chances such as no man on either side could 
the truce^ foresee. He called on her not to break the truce 
provided, mutually swom to, but to adjust all differences, 
as Athens was prepared to do, by the amicable arbitration 
which that truce provided. Should she begin war, the 
Athenians would follow her lead and resist her, calling to 
witness those gods under whose sanction the oaths were 
taken, i 

The facts recounted in the preceding chapters will 

g have shown, that the account given by the Athe- 

tans ex-' uiau envoy at Sparta of the origin and character 
elude stran- of the empire exercised by his city (though doubt- 
dfscusB^the less the account of a partisan) is in substance 
point correct and equitable. The envoys of Athens 

tkemaeives had uot yet learned to take the tone which they 
^ ***\i assumed in the sixteenth and seventeenth years 
assem y. ^^ ^j^^ coming war, at Melos and Kamarina. At 
any time previous to the affair of Korkyra, the topics in- 
sisted upon by the Athenian would probably have been 
profoundly listened to at Sparta. But now the mind of the 
Spartans was made up. Having cleared the assembly of all 
"strangers," and even all allies, they proceeded to discuss 
and determine the question among themselves. Most of 
their speakers held but one language 2 — expatiating on the 
wrongs already done by Athens, and urging the necessity 
of instant war. There was however one voice, and that a 
commanding voice^ raised against this conclusion; the 
ancient and respected king Archidamus opposed it. 

The speech of Archidamus is that of a deHberate Spar- 
tan, who, setting aside both hatred to Athens and blind 

• Thucyd. i. 78. f)(ttT« 8i 4v o68e- 0«oi>« to6« 6px(ouc {idipTUpac icoioo- 

{A'CK 1CU) ToiauT^ dp.apTla Svrec, o5t* (i.evoi, icsipao6)&s0a dc|x6vsaQat icoXs- 

ouTol oOre 6fi.a? 6pu)vT««, X^yoh^^v (xou Sp^ovtoc xadxiQ ^ fiv 6<p7]Y^a9e. 

6(i.iv, Iu>c Iti a6QaipsT0( dfji^poTlpoic * Thucyd. i. 79. xal tu)v jxiv fcXsi6- 

^ t63ouXlGc, aicov8ac l»-ii Xuetv (XYjSi vcuv iicl t6 oOto al f^G}ii.on itpspov, 

itopaPaivsivTooc 8pxouc,To 8t Siacpopo dSixeiv t« 'A9if)valouc -^Stj, xol noXe- 

olx^ XOsaOai xaxd tqv ^uv6iqx7]v* ^ {i.7]Tia slvai ev "cdx*^* 


partiality to allies, looks at the question with a view to the 
interests and honour of Sparta only — not how- ^^^^ gp„, 
ever omitting her imperial as well as her sepa- tan speak- 
rate character. The preceding native speakers, fH^^^ l^ 
indignant against Athens, had probably appealed war. King 
to Spartan pride, treating it as an intolerable "^^^^^^^ 
disgrace that almost the entire land-force of poses war. 
Dorian Peloponnesus should be thus bullied h** speech, 
by one single Ionic city, and should hesitate to commence 
a war which one invasion of Attica would probably termi- 
nate. As the Corinthians had tried to excite the Spar- 
tans by well-timed taunts and reproaches, so the subse- 
quent speakers had aimed at the same objects by pane- 
gyric upon the well-known valour and discipline of the 
city. To all these arguments Archidamus set himself to 
reply. Invoking the experience of the elders his contem- 
poraries around him, he impressed upon the assembly the 
grave responsibility, the uncertainties, difficulties, and pe- 
rils, of the war into which they were hurrying without 
preparation. * He reminded them of the wealth, the po- 
pulation (greater than that of any other Grecian city), the 
naval force, the cavalry, the hoplites, the large foreign 
dominion of Athens, — and then asked by what means they 
proposed to put her down? 2 Ships, they had few; trained 
seamen, yet fewer; wealth, next to none. They could in- 
deed invade and ravage Attica, by their superior numbers 
and land-force. But the Athenians had possessions abroad 
sufficient to enable them to dispense with the produce of 
Attica, while their great navy would retaliate the like ra- 
vages upon Peloponnesus. To suppose that one or two 
devastating expeditions into Attica would bring the war 
to an end, would be a deplorable eiTor: such proceedings 
would merely enrage the Athenians, without impairing 
their real strength, and the war would thus be prolonged, 
perhaps for a whole generation. 3 Before they determined 
upon war, it was absolutely necessary to provide more 

* Thucyd. i. FO. {ti 81 xal ^ufjifjidi^^ouc leoXXoi)^ 96poo 

» Thucyd. i. 80. iip6c 8i fivSpa^j ot 67coTeXeT« i^ouai} ltd)? ypii 7tp6?Tou- 

Y^v te ixac ix^uai xal npooixi vcoXi- tou? paSlto? it6Xe{i,ov &pao9ai, xal 

|ioo 4ji,«8ip6TOTol elffi, xol xoU fiXXoi? xlvi itiaTeOaovta? aitapoaxtOoo? mcsi- 

fiicaaiv fipiata sSi^pTUvToi, nXooTt|> te jf9>iv«i. 

I8it|> xal 8y){i.091({> xal vaoal xol Titrcoi? ' Thucyd. 1. 81. SiS'otxa 84 fxaXXov 

xol SicXoi?, xol 6x^^V> '^0^ <*'^* i^ ftiQ xal Toi« naiolv aOtovUKoXiTtioixev, 

&XX<|> 4vl ft X*»>P^4> 'EXXijvixcji iatlv, Ac. 


efficient means for carrying it on; and to multiply their 
allies not merely amon^ the Greeks, but among foreigners 
also. While this was m process, envoys ought to be sent 
to Athens to remonstrate and obtain redress for the grie- 
vances of the allies. If the Athenians granted this — which 
they very probably would do, when they saw the prepara- 
tions goinff forward, and when the ruin of the highly-cul- 
tivated sou of Attica was held over them in terrorem with- 
out being actually consummated — so much the better: if 
they refused, in the course of two or three years war 
might be commenced with some hopes of success. Archi- 
damus reminded his countrymen that their allies would 
hold them responsible for the good or bad issue of what 
was now determined; ^ admonishing them, in the true spirit 
of a conservat