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D,a,l,zc.bvG00gIC 


A  HISTORY 


MODERN  EUROPE 


O.  A.  FYFFE,  M.A. 


B*BKtSTER-A 


FROM  1848  TO  1878 


NEW  YOUK 

HENRY  HOLT  AN'D  COMPANY 

1800 


i,z<..t,CoogIf 


D,a,l,zc.bvG00gIe 


CONTENTS, 


THX  lUBCH  BITOLCTIOV,  1818. 

Enrapa'  in  17S9  and  ia  IBIS — Agitetion  in  Waatem  Oemunj  'hebaa  v^ 
After  tho  BsTolution  st  Puis — Aaatrik  uid  Hungary — The  Mmxi^ 
Bavolation  Ht  Tiamu—flight  of  Uettenuch— The  UungBiim  Diet — 
HQiutlc7  win*  ita  independence— Bobemiui  moTement — Aatoaomj 
fnmuaed  lo  Boheaiia — Intuirection  of  Lomhaidj — Of  Veoio*— Pied- 
mont makea  -war  on  Aiutno — A  geneml  Italian  mz  againft  Aiutria 
inuQiiMmt— The  March  liayVtt- Berlin— Frederiok  WiQiMD  IV.— A 
NaticHtal  Aaoembly  praniu^ — Sco]<uv>0-^aiBtfiiii-— InauireotiaQ  in 
Hobtein— War  between  Qenp^y  and  Ddnniark^Tue  Qerman  Ante- 
Parliament— Bepnhlican  Bi«^t;. ii[.^,iaen-;-Mjetiag  of  tlie  Ghnnan 
National  Ajraembly  at  Fianldort^-liljircige  jonarallj  in  March,  1M6 — 
Tfao  Kflnch  Fioniiooal  Qov^Uv^ir-Xha  .Notional  Workahapa — Iha 
QoTornment  and  the  Beit  £«pi^blkvit^^E^(j^  NtttUmal  Awemblf-^ 
Biot  of  Maj  11 — Ueaauraa  against  Uie'KaiMiwl.WorkahopB- The  Four 
Days  ctf  June — Oaraignao — Iiouia  Napoleon— Ho  ia  alooted   to   the 


OHAPTEU   n. 


Anibria  and  Italj—TJemiA  favm  Haioh  to  Uaj— Flight  of  the  Ernpens — 
Bohemian  National  Movoment — Windiacligriiti  aubdoea  Prague — Oam- 
paign  anmid  Tenoa — Papal  AllooutioQ— Naples  in  U«)' — Negotiatiaaa 
•■  to  Lombard — Baoonqnert  of  Venetia — Battle  of  OnatoiLaa — The 
Anatriana  enter  Uilan — Austrian  Court  and  Hungary — llie  Serb*  in 
Sootlietii  Hnnguy— Bcrb  Congieaa  at  Carlowiti — Jellaoia — AJIain  of 
tVfntia  Ji^lafflr,  the  Ooort  and  the  Himgaiian  Uorement — Murdor  of 
lambeig-— Manifesto  of  Ootobar  S — Vienna  on  October  < — Hie  Smpmot 
■t  Olmfitl — Windiacbi^ratB  conqnen  Vienna — The  Parliament  at 
Kiemaiar — Schmusenbeig  Uiniater—Ferdiiiaiid  abdicatea — Diaaoloticin 
of  tha  Kreznaier  Parliameot— Unitary  Edict — Hungary — The  Boo- 
maniftiw  in  Tnutaylvaniai — The  Austrian  Army  ocoapie*  Peatb— Hniw 
prian  QoTamment  at  Bebrecsia-'Tbe  AuBtriaoa  driran  out  of  Hnngatj 
— Declaration  of  Hungarian  Independence — Rueoiaii  TntnrmnHnn  i 
Oie  Hungariaa  Sanuner   Campaign — Oapitolatiea  of  Vilagoa — itfdj^,[  -, 


MODERN  mTBOPR 

— Hnrdei  of  Roid— ToBcany^Ihs  March  Ounptugn  in  Lombardy 
— Novai« — Abdication  ol  Charles  Alhert — Viotor  Enmumael— BMbna- 
Uon  in  Trucany — French  Intervention  in  Boms — Defeat  of  Ondiaot — 
Ondinot  and  Leaups— The  Pi«nch  enter  Boma— The  Beetorad  Pontifical 
Government — Fall  of  Venice — Ferdinand  Taconqnerfl  Sicilj — Qarnuuf 
— The  National  Aiaemblj  at  Fiankfort — The  Armistice  of  HalioS — 
Berlin  from  April  to  September — The  Pnmian  Armj — Laat  Dayi  of 
the  Pnuaian  Parliament — Pnmian  Constitntion  granted  hj  Edict — ^The 
Geiman  National  Agaemblj  and  Aiutria — Frederick  William  IT, 
dected  Emperor — He  rafuaea  the  Crown — End  of  the  National  Assemblj 
— Fnuaia  attempts  to  form  a  aepante  Union — The  XJnion  Parliament  at 
Erfurt — Action  of  Atutria — Eeese-Chsael— The  Diet  of  Fmnhfort  re- 
■tored — Olmiiti — Schleawig-Holatein— Qermany  after  IS4S — Anstria 
after  1B5I— France  after  IBIS— Loois  Napoleon— The  October  Heaaago 
— law  Idmiting  the  Fianohiaa — Looia  Napoleon  and  the  Ann; — Fr«- 
poeed  Beriaion  of  tiie  Constitution — The  Oonp  d'fitat— Napcdaon  TTr. 


Bn^nnd  and  Fnmce  ii^  I^L — £nidL>,v^iiier-Nioholaa — The  HnngaiJsn 
Befngeei — Dispute  lAfinqi.Tn^uv^ntatt^Boaria  on  the  H0I7  Places — 
Nioholaa  and  the  BxidA  Xjnhanador— Lord  Sbatford  da  Bedcliffe — 
MenachikifTa  Mission — Bossian  troops  enter  the  Danubian  Frincipalitiea 
— Lorf  AherdBen's  Cabinet — Hovements  of  the  Fleela— ITio  Vienna 
Note — 1^  Fleets  pass  the  Daidanellee — Tnrkiih  Squadron  deetrojed 
at  Knopa— DsclaratioQ  of  War— Policy  of  Austria— Policy  of  Pnurift 
— TOa  Western  Powen  and  the  Buroponn  Concert— Siege  of  Silistria — 
Tha  Fiininpalitiea  eracnated— Forthar  objects  of  the  Western  Powcm 
— InTsdon  of  the  Crimea — Battle  of  the  Alma— The  Flank  Mareb— 
BaladtaTa — Inkermann^Winter  in  the  Crimea— Death  of  Nicholas — 
Oontemioe  of  Vienna — Aostria — Progress  of  the  Kegs — Flans  of 
Napoleon  HX — Chnrobert  and  P£lismer — TTnsncceesfiil  Assault — Battle 
of  the  Tchemaya— Oaptnre  of  the  Ualakoff— Fall  of  SebMtopoL-XUl 
of  Ears— Negotiations  for  Peaoe— The  Conferenoe  of  Faria— TrMty  of 
Paria— The  Dannbian  Rindpalities— Continued  dijcoid  in  the  Ottoman 
Empirs-Bevision  of  the  Trttif  of  Paris  in  1B7I t 

OHAPTEB  IV. 
THl  OSEATIOV  or  TRX  TTAUAX  KUTaDOK 
nediB0Dt«fterl8«9— Ministry  of  Aieglio—Oavoar  Prima  Minister— DesEgns 
at  OaTonr^-His  Ckimean  Policy — OaTOur  at  the  Oonferaooa  of  Fuia — 
Oavoor  and  Ni^poleon  m. — ^Ilie  Meeting  at  PlomhiirM— Propaiatiaw 
in  Italy — Trca^  of  Janoaiy,  ISGe — Attmapts  at  Mediation— Ansbrira 
Uhirmtnm— Oampsign  of  13S9— Msgent*— Horemeat  in  Cenfa^lltaljr 


OONTETHTB.  i 

— floUerino — Napoleon  and  PrnBut-'Ioterriow  of  TOkimnca — Oavonr 
nmgnfr— Peue  of  Zikioli— Otalnl  Italr  after  TiUafniua— Tie  Pn>- 
poMd  GoDgren — "Tha  Pope  and  tiw  CoDgreM"—CI>Toar  resumes  offio* 
— O&TOQT  and  Napoleoo— Unum  of  th*  Dnchie*  and  the  Bomagoa  wiQi 
Piodmont — Sbtoj  and  Nice  added  to  !Fianae — ChTour  on  this  nwni'fTii — 
Europ«Hil  opinion—  -Naplea — Sicily — Oaribaldi  land*  at  Manwla — C^- 
tore  of  I^leimo — The  Heapolitaoi  oraoaktA  Sioily — Otoot  and  tiba 
Party  of  Action — Caronr'a  Policy  aa  to  Naplaa — Garibaldi  on  the  main- 
hod — Fer«aiio  and  VJlUmarina  at  Naplea — Qarihkldi  at  Naplea — The 
Kadmonteaa  Aimy  enters  Umbm  and  the  UarohM — Fall  of  Ancona — 
Garibaldi  and  Cavour — The  Annies  on  the  Yoltumo — Fall  of  Qtteta — 
Cavoni't  Policy  with  r^ard  to  Rome  and  Tsnioe — DmUi  of  Oavont — 
Dm  Free  Cbiiroh  in  the  Fi«e  Stato 2 


SBBlUn  ASCBNDESOY  WOIT  BT  FBITBBU. 
ennanyaftei  1S5S — ^le  Bcgmuty  in  Pnisaia — Aimy-reorgaiuBation — King 
WilUain  I.—  Oonfliot  between  the  Crown  and  the  Piirliament — Bismarck 
—Tita  atra^ls  continoed— Austria  tram  1S69 — Hie  October  Diploma 
— EanBtfuice  of  Hnngary — The  Seicharath  — RuMia  under  Alexander 
n.— liberation  of  the  Serfs — Poland— The  Inmireotion  of  18S3 — 
Agrarian  meaanrea  in  Poland — SchlaBwig-HoIstein — Death  of  Frederick 
TIL — Plan*  of  Blsmaick — Oampaig^n  in  Sohleawig— Confarenoe  of 
London — Treaty  of  Tienoo — England  and  Napoleon  III. — Pnuaia  and 
Auitiia — Convention  of  Gkatein — Italy — Alliaiioe  of  Pruaaia  with  Italy 
— Proposals  for  a  Coogreea  fail — Wat  between  Aortria  and  Prussia-. 
Napoleon  III. — KiniiiJ  g-iitz — Cnfitoaaa— Hediatioa  of  Napoleon — Treaty 
of  Prague— South  Oannany — Frojeds  tor  compensation  to  France — 
Aoatria  and  Hnngary— DeAk — Establishment  of  the  Dnal  System  in 
Anatria-Hoiigaiy .        .        .  t 


OHAPTEB   TI. 
TB>  VAK  BBTWEBN  TSAVCB  AND  aBBHAlTT, 

Napoleon  XEL— ^lle  Uexioan  ETpedition— Withdrawal  of  the  French  aad 
death  of  Uaiimilian — The  Lniemburg  Qneetion — Fxaapeiatioo  in 
n«nce  against  Pruaaia— Austria — Italy — Hentana— Qermany  after 
I3A6 — The  Sponiah  Candidature  of  Leopold  of  Hohenzollom — French 
declaration — Bwiedetti  and  King  William — 'Wthdrawal  of  Leopold  and 
demand  for  gnaraotees — The  telegram  from  Ems — War— Eipected 
AllianoM  of  France — Anetria— Italy — Protdan  plana — The  French 
army — Chosee  of  t'rench  inferiority — Weissenbm^ — W3rth — Spicheren 
—  Bomy  —  Hara-la-Tonr  —  Onvelotte  —  Sedan  —  The  BepubUo  pro- 
claimed at  Paria — Favre  and  BianuLTck — Siege  of  Paris  — Qambetta  at 
Toiua — The  Aimy  of  the  Loire — Fall  of  Met*— Fig^iting  at  Oi'lcan«-K_)'MC 


ifil  XODBBN  SUSOPA 

Sortja  of  Cb^mpgay—The  Ajmiei  of  Oie  North,  of  flw  L«Hifl,  of  tiie 
BbM — Boarbaki'B  min — Oapitotation  of  Parii  and  ArmiitioB — Prolimi- 
DBiiee  (rf  Pcaoe — Garmanj'— Ertabliihment  of  His  Qeraun  Empire— 
Ilia  Commime  of  Fuia — Seoond  Bioge — Sfieots  of  tba  war  m  to 
BmsU  and  Italj— Bomo .       .  tSI 

CHAPTER  VIL 

S^BTSSK       A.WWA.ntt, 

Fnuioe  after  1871— AUianoe  of  Qm  Three  Emperon—IteTDlt  of  HanxgOTina 
—The  AoiiiBBj  Nat»— Voider  of  tlie  Oongols  at  Salonika— The  Bsriin 
Hamorandum— Rejected  by  Et^Iand^AhduI  Axiz  depoaed— Mamaoiea 
in  Bulgaria — Sftrvia  and  Montenegro  declare  War — Opinion  in  Bngrland 
— Diiraell— Meeting  of  Emperora  at  Bsicbitadt — Bervian  Campaign — 
Declaraljon  of  the  Ctair— Confoenoe  at  Canitantinoplo— Ita  Failnifr— 
The  London  Frotoool— Rusraa  declaiea  War— Advance  on  the  Balkana 
d  Attack  on  FleTna— Olie  BMpka  PaM— 
;  Attack  on  Plerna— Todlebon- Fall  of  Flema— 
Paeaage  of  the  Balkmia- Aimislaoe— England- The  Fleet  paaaea  the 
PardanoIIoa  Treaty  of  Son  Stefano— England  and  Sauta— Secret 
Agreement— ConTSntion  with  Turkey — OongrMS  of  Berlin— "K^a^  of 
-   -     ~  -     -  tu 


D,a,l,zc.bvG00gIe 


MODEEN    EUEOPE. 


CHAPTER   I. 

BniDpa  in  178S  uid  in  lUS — A^Ution  ia  'Weateni  (iurmtuij  befors  and  after 
the  BeTtdatioii  at  Paria — Austria  and  Hongaij — The  Maioh  Barolation  at 
Vieona — Flight  of  Ucttarnich — Hie  Hungtuian  Diet — Hungar;  wina  ita 
isdependenoe — Bohemian  movement — Antonomy  promiied  to  Boliemia — 
Inaurrection  of  Lombaidy — Of  V^o« — Kadmont  mftkoi  war  on  Austria — 
A  general  Italian  war  against  Anttria  imminent — The  Hazoh  Daja  at  Berlin 
— Frederick  William  IV. — A  National  AMemblj  promieed — Bchleswig-Hol- 
■teio — luanirection  in  Holstein— War  between  Qurmaii;  and  Denmark — 
The  Qerman  Ante-FarliameDt — Hepublioaa  Bisiug  in  Baden— Meeting  of 
the  Oerauut  National  Aasembly  at  Frankfort— Europe  gensniUf  in  Haroh, 
1S48— Hie  French  Fraiimonal  OoTemment—The  National  Workshop*— 
Hie  Qoremment  and  the  Bed  Repnhlicani — French  National  Aassmbl; — 
Blot  of  Ma;  It — Haaauiea  against  the  National  Workahopa — The  Four 
Da^of  Jnne — CaTsignao — Looi*  Napoleon — Eeiialeoted  to  tboAMemhlj 
—Sleeted  Fre^lent. 

There  were  few  statesmen  living  in  1848  who,  like 
Mettemich  and  like  Lotus  Philippe,  could  rememher 
the  outbreak  of  the  French  Revolution.  To  those  who 
could  so  look  back  across  the  space  of  sixty  years,  a 
comparison  of  the  European  movements  that  followed 
the  snccesBive  onslaughts  upon  authority  in  France 
afforded  some  measure  of  the  change  that  had  passed 
over  the  political  atmosphere  of  the  Continent  within  a 
single  lifetime.  The  Eevolution  of  1789,  deeply  as  it 
stirred  men's  minds  in  neighbouring  coun-  ^^^^^^^^  ^  ^^ 
tries,  had  occasioned  no  popular  outbreak  ■^■^^^ 
on.  a  large  scale  outside  France.    The  e^^ulsion  of 


2  KODSBN  EUBOPB.  urn. 

Charles  X.  in  1830  had  been  followed  hj  national 
uprisings  in  Italy,  Poland,  and  Belgium,  cmd  by  a 
stm^le  for  constitutional  government  in  tbe  smaller 
States  of  Korthern  Genuanj.  The  downfall  of  Louis 
Philippe  in  1848  at  once  convulsed  the  whole  of  central 
Europe.  From  the  Rhenish  Provinces  to  the  Ottoman 
frontier  there  was  no  government  but  the  Swiss  Kepub- 
lic  that  was  not  menaced ;  there  was  no  race  which  did 
not  assert  its  claim  to  a  more  or  less  complete  inde- 
pendence. Communities  whose  long  slumber  biwl  been 
undisturbed  by  the  shocks  of  the  Napoleonic  period 
now  vibrated  with  those  same  impulses  which,  since 
1815,  no  pressure  of  absolute  power  had  been  able 
wholly  to  extinguish  in  Italy  and  Germany.  The 
borders  of  the  region  of  political  discontent  had  been 
enlarged;  where  apa.thy,  or  immemorial  loyalty  to  some 
distant  crown,  had  long  closed  the  ear  to  the  voices  of 
the  new  age,  now  all  was  restlessness,  all  eager  expecta- 
tion of  the  dawning  epoch  of  national  life.  This  was 
especially  tbe  case  with  the  Slavic  races  included  in  the 
Austriim  Empire,  i-aces  which  during  the  earlier  years 
of  this  century  had  been  wholly  mute.  These  in  their 
turn  now  felt  the  breath  of  patriotism,  and  claimed  tbe 
right  of  self-government.  Distinct  as  the  ideas  of 
national  independence  and  of  constitutional  liberty  are 
in  themselves,  they  were  not  distinct  in  their  operation 
over  a  great  part,  of  Europe  in  1848;  and  this  epoch 
will  be  wrongly  conceived  if  it  is  viewed  as  no  more 
than  a  repetition  on  a  large  scale  of  the  democratic  out- 
break of  Paris  with  which  it  opened.    More  was  sought 


M  suBOPs  nr  tm-  * 

in  Europe  in  1848  than  the  substitution  of  popular  for 
monarchical  or  aristocratic  role.  The  effort  to  make 
the  State  one  with  the  nation  excited  wider  interests 
than  the  effort  to  enhtrge  and  equalise  citizen  rights; 
and  it  is  in  the  action  of  this  principle  of  nationality 
that  we  find  the  explanation  of  tendencies  of  the  epoch 
which  appear  at  first  view  to  be  in  direct  conflict  with 
one  another.  In  Germany  a  single  race  was  divided 
under  many  goTemments :  here  the  national  instinct 
impelled  to  unity.  In  Austria  a  variety  of  races  was 
held  together  by  one  crown :  here  the  national  instinct 
impelled  to  separation.  In  both  these  States,  as  in 
It^y,  where  the  predominance  of  the  foreigner  and  the 
continuance  of  despotic  government  were  in  a  peculiar 
manner  connected  with  one  another,  the  efforts  of  1848 
iaHed ;  but  the  problems  which  then  agitated  Europe 
could  not  long  be  set  aside,  uid  the  solution  of  them, 
complete  in  the  case  of  Germany  and  Italy,  partial  and 
tentative  in  the  case  of  Austria,  renders  the  succeeding 
twenty-five  years  a  memorable  period  in  European 
history. 

The  sudden  disappearance  of  the  Orleanist  monarchy 
and  the  proclamation  of  the  Bepublic  at  Paris  struck 
with  dismay  the  Qovemments  beyond  the 
Shine.  DifScuIties  were  already  gathering  waatoaa^ 
round  them,  opposition  among  their  own 
subjects  was  daily  becoming  more  formidable  and  more 
outspoken.  In  Western  Germany  a  meeting  of 
Liberal  deputies  had  been  held  in  the  autumn  of  1847, 
in  which  the  reform  of  the  Federal  Constitution  and  the 
,  J  ,    .   .  Cooylc 


4  MODERN  EjmOFS.  UtK 

establishment  of  a  German  Parliament  had  been  de- 
manded :  a  Republican  or  revolutionaiy  party,  small  but 
virulent,  had  also  its  own  avowed  policy  and  its  recog- 
nised organs  in  the  press.  No  sooner  had  the  news  of 
the  Bevolution  at  Paris  passed  the  frontier  than  in  all 
the  minor  German  States  the  cry  for  reform  became 
irresistible.  Ministers  everywhere  resigned  ;  the  popular 
demands  were  granted ;  and  men  were  called  to  office 
whose  names  were  identified  with  the  struggle  for  the 
freedom  of  the  Press,  for  trial  by  jury,  and  for  the 
reform  of  the  Federal  Constitution.  The  Federal  Diet 
itself,  so  long  the  instrument  of  absolutism,  bowed 
beneath  the  stress  of  the  time,  abolished  the  laws  of 
censorship,  and  invited  the  Governments  to  send  Com- 
missioners to  Frankfort  to  discuss  the  reorganisation  of 
Germany.  It  was  notj  however,  at  Frankfort  or  at  the 
minor  capitals  that  the  conRict  between  authority  and 
its  antagonists  wa-s  to  be  decided.  Vienna,  the  strong- 
hold of  absolutism,  the  sanctuary  from  which  so  many 
interdicts  had  gone  forth  against  freedom  in  eveiy  part 
of  Europe,  was  itself  invaded  by  the  revolutionary 
spirit.  The  clear  sky  darkened,  and  Mettemich  found 
himself  powerless  before  the  storm. 

There  had  been  until  1848  so  complete  an  absence 
of  political  life  in  the  Austrian  capital,  that,  when  the 
conviction  suddenly  burst  upon  all  minds 
that  the  ancient  order  was  doomed,  there 
were  neither  party-leaders  to  confront  the  Government, 
nor  plans  of  reform  upon  which  any  considerable  body 
of  men  were    ^eed.     The  first  utterances  of  public 


discontent  were  petitions  drawn  up  by  the  Chamljer  of 
Commerce  and  by  literary  associations.  These  were 
vague  in  purport  and  far  from  aggressive  in  their  tone. 
A  sterner  note  sounded  when  intelligence  reached  the 
capital  of  the  resolutions  that  had  been  passed  by  the 
Hungarian  Lower  House  on  the  3rd  of  March,  and  of 
the  language  in  which  these  had  been  enforced  by 
Kossuth.  Casting  aside  all  reserve,  the  Magyar  leader 
bad  declared  that  the  reigning  dynasty  could  only  be 
saved  by  granting  to  Hungary  a  responsible  Ministry 
drawn  from  the  Diet  itself,  and  by  establishing  consti- 
tutional  government  throughout  the  Aostrian  dominions. 
"  From  the  charnel-house  of  the  Viennese  system,"  he 
cried,  "  a  poison-laden  atmosphere  steab  over  us,  which 
paralyses  our  nerves  and  bows  us  when  we  would  soar. 
The  future  of  Hungary  can  never  be  secure  while  in  the 
other  provinces  there  exists  a  system  of  government  in 
direct  antf^nism  to  every  constitutional  principle.  Our 
task  it  is  to  found  a  happier  future  on  the  brotherhood 
of  all  the  Austrian  races,  and  to  substitute  for  the 
union  enforced  by  bayonets  and  police  the  enduring 
bond  of  a  free  constitution."  When  the  Hungarian 
Assembly  had  thus  taken  into  its  own  bands  the  cause 
of  the  rest  of  the  monarchy,  it  was  not  for  the  citizens 
of  Vienna  to  fall  short  in  the  extent  of  their  demands. 
The  idea  of  a  Constitution  for  the  Empire  at  large  was 
generally  accepted,  and  it  was  proposed  that  an  address 
embodying  this  demand  should  be  sent  in  to  the 
Emperor  by  the  Provincial  Estates  of  Lower  Austria, 
whose  meeting  happened  to  he  fixed  for  the  13th  of 


<  m>DBaJ!r  eusopb.  iw 

March.  In  the  meantime  the  students  made  themBelves 
the  heroes  of  the  hour.  The  agitation  of  the  city  in- 
creased ;  mmoars  of  State  bankruptcy  and  of  the  im- 
pending repudiation  of  the  paper  currency  filled  all 
classes  with  the  belief  that  some  catastrophe  was  near 
at  hand.* 

The  Provincial  Estates  of  Lower  Austria  had  long 
fallen  into  such  insignificance  that  in  ordinary  times 

their  proceedings  were  hardly  noticed  by 
TuhjtiM     at     the  capital.    The  accident  that  they  were 

now  to  assemble  in  the  midst  of  a  great 
crisis  elevated  them  to  a  sudden  importance.  It  was 
believed  that  the  decisive  word  would  be  spoken  in  the 
course  of  their  debates ;  and  on  the  morning  of  the  I3th 
of  March  masses  of  the  populace,  led  by  a  procession  of 
students,  assembled  round  the  Hall  of  the  Diet.  While 
the  debate  proceeded  within,  street-orators  inflamed  the 
passions  of  the  crowd  outside.  The  tumult  deepened  j 
and  when  at  length  a  note  was  let  down  from  one  of  the 
windows  of  the  Hall  stating  that  the  Diet  were  inclining 
to  half-measures,  the  mob  broke  into  uproar,  and  an 
attack  was  made  upon  the  Diet  Hatl  itself.  The  lead- 
ing members  of  the  Estates  were  compelled  to  place 
themselves  at  the  head  of  a  deputation,  which  proceeded 
to  the  Emperor's  palace  in  order  to  enforce  the  demands 
of  the  people.    The  Emperor  himself,  who  at  no  time 


*  Uettenuch,  riL  538, 603 ;  Titztlitim,  Berlin  and  Wieu,  1845-62,  p.  76 1 
Eoosntfa,  Werke  (1850),  iL  78;  Filleredorff,  Rackblieke,  p.  22; 
B«schftTier,  Das  Jahr  1848,  L  191 ;  gpriager,  Oeschicht«  OMterrdcha,  IL 
185  i  Ii&iiji  et  GhMBin,  B^ralotion  dd  Hongrie.  i  128. 

I  i,z<..t,CoogIf 


Ml  nENN±  7 

was  capable  of  paying  serions  attention  to  business, 
remained  invisible  during  tbis  and  tbe  two  followiog 
days ;  the  deputation  was  received  by  Mettemich  and 
the  principal  officers  of  State,  who  were  assembled  in 
council.  Meanwhile  the  crowds  in  the  streets  became 
denser  and  more  excited ;  soldiers  approached,  to  protect 
the  Diet  Hall  and  to  guard  tbe  environs  of  the  palace ; 
there  was  an  interval  of  confusion ;  and  on  the  advance 
of  a  new  regiment,  which  was  mistaken  for  an  attack, 
the  mob  who  had  stormed  the  Diet  Hall  hurled  the 
shattered  furniture  from  the  windows  upon  the  soldiers' 
heads.  A  volley  was  now  fired,  which  cost  several  lives. 
At  tbe  sound  of  the  firing  still  deeper  agitation  seized 
the  city.  Barricades  were  erected,  and  the  people  and 
soldiers  fought  hand  to  hand.  As  evening  came 
on,  deputation  after  deputation  pressed  into  tbe  palace 
to  nrge  concession  upon  the  Government.  Met- 
temich, who,  almost  alone  in  the  Council,  had  made 
light  of  tbe  popular  uprising,  now  at  length  consented 
to  certain  definite  measures  of  reform.  He  retired  into 
an  adjoining  room  to  draft  an  order  abolishing  tbe  cen- 
sorship of  the  Press.  During  his  absence  tbe  cry  was 
raised  among  the  deputations  that  thronged  tbe  Council- 
chamber,  "  Down  with  Mettemich ! "  The  old  man 
returned,  and  found  himself  abandoned  by  his  col- 
leagues. There  were  some  among  them,  members  of 
^e  Imperial  family,  who  had  long  been  bis  opponents  ; 
others  who  had  in  vain  urged  him  to  make  concessions 
before  it  was  too  late.  Mettemich  saw  that  the  end  of 
his  career  was  come ;  he  spoke  a  few  words,  marked  by 


6  MOVBSN  SVSOPS.  im 

all  the  dignity  aud  self-possession  of  liis  greatest  days, 
and  withdrew,  to  place  his  resignation  in  the  Emperor's 
handj). 

For  thirty-nine  years  Metternich  had  been  so  com- 
plfctely  identified  with  the  Austrian  system  of  govem- 

YtigtAai  lu^^t  that  in  his  fall  that  entire  system 
seemed  to  have  vanished  away.  The  tamulfc 
of  the  capital  subsided  on  the  mere  announcement  of 
his  resignation,  though  the  hatred  which  he  had  excited 
rendered  it  unsafe  for  him  to  remain  within  reach  of 
hostile  hands.  He  was  conveyed  from  Tienna  by  a 
faithful  secretary  on  the  night  of  the  14th  of  March, 
and,  after  remaining  for  a  few  days  in  concealment, 
crossed  the  Saxon  frontier.  His  exile  was  -  destined  to 
be  of  some  duration,  but  no  exile  was  ever  more  cheer- 
fully borne,  or  sweetened  by  a  profounder  satisfaction 
at  the  evils  which  a  mad  world  had  brought  upon 
itself  by  driving  from  it  its  one  thoroughly  wise  and 
just  statesman.  Betaking  himself  in  the  general  crash 
of  the  Continental  Courts  to  Great  Britain,  which  was 
still  as  safe  aa  when  he  had  visited  it  fifty-five  years 
before,  Metternich  received  a  kindly  welcome  from  the 
Duke  of  Wellington  and  the  leaders  of  English  society; 
and  when  the  London  season  was  over  he  sought  and 
found  at  Brighton  something  of  the  liveliness  and  the 
sunshine  of  his  own  southern  home.* 

*  Uettemich,  Tiii.  181.  The  utiinatioii  of  his  remarks  on  kU  eorte  of 
poinla  in  Engliah  life  ia  wonderfnl.  After  k  halt  st  BmeBelB  and  ti,  bia 
JohuudsbnT^  eslst«  Mettemioh  returned  to  Tienna  in  1852,  and,  thongh 
not  restored  to  office,  resumed  his  great  poaition  in  aocietj.  He  lived 
through  the  Criioean  War,  on  wUcIi  te  wrot«  nomeroiu  mewonndA,  tor 


The  action  of  the  HiiDgarian  Diet  under  Kossuth's 
leadership  had  powerfullj  iDflaeaced  the  course  of  events 
at  Vieima.  The  Viennese  outbreak  in  its  B«Hni««*« 
turn  gave  irresistible  force  to  the  Hun- 
garian national  moTemeot.  Up  to  the  13th  of  Ifarch 
the  Chamber  of  Magnates  had  withheld  their  assent 
from  the  resolution  passed  by  the  Lower  House  in 
^Tour  of  a  national  executive;  they  now  accepted  it 
without  a  single  hostile  vote;  and  on  the  15th  a  depu- 
tation was  sent  to  Vienna  to  lay  before  the  Emperor  an 
address  demanding  not  only  the  establishment  of  a 
responsible  Ministry  but  the  freedom  of  the  Press,  trial 
by  jury,  equality  of  religion,  and  a  system  of  national 
education.  At  the  moment  when  this  deputation 
reached  Vienna  the  Government  was  formally  an- 
nouncing  its  eompHance  with  the  popular  demand  for  a 
Constitution  for  the  whole  of  the  Empire.  The  Hun- 
garians were  escorted  in  triumph  through  the  streets, 
and  were  received  on  the  following  day  by  the  Emperor 
himself,  who  expressed  a  general  concurrence  with  the 
terms  of  the  address.  The  deputation  returned  to  Pres- 
burg,  and  the  Palatine,  or  representative  of  the  sove- 
reign  in  Hungary,  the  Archduke  Stephen,   forthwith 

wbose  nae  it  dctes  not  ajipeu.  Etch  on  the  ontbreak  of  wax  witli  Franoe 
in  1859  ba  was  still  bnsj  witb  bis  pen.  He  HorTJTed  long  enough  to  bear 
ai  the  battle  of  Afagenta,  but  was  epored  the  aorroir  of  witneesing  the 
cieatiou  of  the  Kingdom  of  Italy.  He  died  on  the  lltb  of  June,  1859,  in 
hie  eightj-eereDtb  year.  Vettemiob  was  not  tbe  only  atAt«aman  present 
■t  the  Congress  of  Vienna  irbo  lived  to  see  the  second  Napoleonic  Empire. 
Keesdrade,  the  Bnasian  Chanoellor,  lived  till  1862;  Czartoryaki,  who  was 
Foreigii  IfinJstor  ot  Rnssia  at  tbe  time  gt  tfao  battle  o(  Ansterlitz,  till 
1861. 


10  UODBRJf  BUBOFB.  Mb. 

chai^cl  Cottot  Battbjdny,  one  of  ttie  roost  popular 
of  the  Magyar  nobles,  with  the  formation  of  a  national 
Ministry.  Thus  far  the  Diet  had  been  in  the  van  of 
the  Hungarian  movement;  it  now  sank  almost  into 
insignificance  by  the  side  of  the  revolutionary  organisa- 
tion at  Festh,  where  all  the  ardour  and  all  the  patriotism 
of  the  Magyar  race  glowed  in  their  native  forc^  un- 
tempered  by  the  political  experience  of  the  statesmen 
who  were  collected  at  Fresbui^,  and  unchecked  by  any 
of  those  influences  which  belong  to  the  neighbourhood 
of  an  Imperial  Court,  At  Festh  there  broke  out  an 
agitation  at  once  so  democratic  and  so  intensely  national 
that  all  considerations  of  policy  and  of  regard  ibr  the 
Austrian  Government  which  might  have  affected  the 
action  of  the  Diet  were  swept  away  before  it.  Kossuth, 
himself  the  genuine  representative  of  the  capital,  became 
supreme.  At  bis  bidding  the  Diet  passed  a  law  abolish- 
ing the  departments  of  the  Central  Government  by 
which  the  control  of  the  Court  over  the  Hungarian 
body  politic  had  beeti  exercised.  A  list  of  Ministers 
w^  submitted  and  approved,  including  not  only 
those  who  were  needed  for  the  transaction  of  domestic 
business,  bat  Ministers  of  War,  Finance,  and  Foreign 
Affairs ;  and  in  order  that  the  entire  nation  might  rally 
round  its  Government,  the  peasantry  were  at  one  stroke 
emancipated  from  all  services  attaching  to  the  land,  and 
converted  into  free  proprietors.  Of  the  compensation 
to  be  paid  to  the  lords  for  the  loss  of  these  serrices.  no 
more  was  said  than  that  it  was  a  debt  of  honour  to  be 
discharged  by  the  nation. 

D,a,l,zc.bvG00gIe 


Within  the  next  few  days  the  measores  thna  carried 
throagh  the  Diet  bj  Kossuth  were  presented  for  the 
Emperor's  ratification  at  Vienna.  The  fall  ^B„g,^„tm 
of  Mettemich,  important  as  it  was,  had  not  '"^'p™^™* 
in  reality  produced  tl^t  effect  upon  the  Austrian 
Government  which  was  expected  from  it  by  popular 
opinion.  The  new  Cabinet  at  Vienna  was  drawn  from 
the  ranks  of  the  official  hierarchy ;  and  ^though  some 
of  its  members  were  more  liberally  disposed  than  their 
late  chief,  tbey  had  ait  alike  passed  their  lives  in  the 
traditions  of  the  ancient  system,  and  were  far  from 
intending  to  make  tbemselves  the  willing  agents  of 
revolution.  These  men  saw  clearly  enough  that  the 
action  of  the  Diet  at  Presburg  amounted  to  nothing  less 
than  the  separation  of  Hungary  from  the  Austrian 
Empire.  With  the  Ministries  of  War,  Finance,  and 
Foreign  Affairs  established  in  independence  of  the  cen< 
tral  government,  there  would  remain  no  link,  between 
Hnngary  and  the  Hereditary  States  but  the  person  of  a 
titular,  and,  for  the  present  time,  an  imbecile  sovereign. 
Powerless  and  distracted,  Metternich's  successors  looked 
in  all  directions  for  counsel.  .  The  Palatine  argued  that 
three  courses  were  open  to  the  Austrian  Government 
It  might  endeavour  to  crush  the  Hungarian  movement 
by  force  of  arms ;  for  this  purpose,  however,  the  troops 
available  were  insufficient  -.  or  it  might  withdraw  from 
the  country  altogether,  leaving  the  peasants  to  attack 
the  nobles,  as  they  had  done  in  Galicia;  this  was  a 
dishonourable  policy,  and  the  action  of  the  Diet  had, 
moreover,  secured  to  the  peasant  everything  that  he 


12  MODSBN  BUROPB.  mu 

could  gain  by  a  social  iosurrectioQ :  or  finally,  the 
Government  might  yield  for  the  moment  to  the  inevit- 
able, make  terms  with  Batthydoy's  Ministry,  and 
qoietly  prepare  for  vigorous  resistance  when  opportunity 
should  arrive.  The  last  method  was  that  which  the 
Palatine  recommended ;  the  Court  inclined  in  the  same 
direction,  but  it  was  unwilling  to  submit  without 
making  some  further  trial  of  the  temper  of  its  an- 
tagonists. A  rescript  was  accordingly  sent  to  Presburg, 
announcing  that  the  Ministry  formed  by  Count  Batthy- 
dny  was  accepted  by  the  Emperor,  but  that  the  central 
offices  which  the  Diet  had  abolished  must  be  preserved, 
and  the  functions  of  the  Ministers  of  'War  and  Finance 
be  reduced  to  those  of  chiefs  of  dep^tments,  dependent 
on  the  orders  of  a  higher  authority  at  Vienna.  From 
the  delay  that  had  taken  place  in  the  despatch  of  tbia 
answer  the  nationalist  leaders  at  Pesth  and  at  Presbnrg 
had  augured  no  good  result.  Its  publication  brought 
the  country  to  the  verge  of  armed  revolt.  Batthydny 
refused  to  accept  office  under  the  conditions  named ; 
the  Palatine  himself  declared  that  he  could  remain  in 
Hungary  no  longer.  Terrified  at  the  result  of  its  own 
challenge,  the  Court  now  withdrew  from  the  position 
that  it  had  taken  up,  and  accepted  the  scheme  of  the 
Diet  in  its  integrity,  stipulating  only  that  the  disposal 
of  the  army  outside  Hungary  in  time  of  war,  and  the 
appointment  to  the  higher  commands,  should  remain  _ 
■  with  the  Imperial  Government.* 

*  AdlerBteio,  AicbiT  des  tTiigftriBeheii  UuiiateriiUDa,  L  27 ;  liiaji  at 
(Ihaaain,  i.  184;  Springer.il  219. 


Hangory  had  thus  made  good  its  position  as  an 
independent  State  connected  with  Austria  only  through 
the  person  of  its  monarch.     Vast  and  mo-     ^tj_,„ 
mentons    as    was  the   change,  fatal  as  it  ''^*' 

might  well  appear  to  those  who  could  conceive  of  no 
unity  but  the  unity  of  a  central  govemmeat,  the  victory 
of  the  M^yars  appears  to  have  excited  no  feeling  among 
the  German  Liberals  at  Vienna  but  one  of  satisfaction. 
So  odious,  so  detested,  was  the  fallen  system  of  despot- 
ism, that  every  victory  won  by  its  adversaries  was  hailed 
as  a  triumph  of  the  good  cause,  be  the  remoter  issues 
what  they  might.  Even  where  a  powerful  German 
element,  such  as  did  not  exist  in  Hungary  itself,  was 
threatened  by  the  assertion  of  provincial  claims,  the 
Government  could  not  hope  for  the  support  of  the 
capital  if  it  should  offer  resistance.  The  example  of 
the  Ms^yars  was  speedily  followed  by  the  Czechs  in 
Bohemia,  Foi^otten  and  obliterated  among  the  nation- 
alities of  Europe,  the  Czechs  had  preserved  in  their 
language,  and  In  that  almost  alone,  the  emblem  of 
their  national  independence.  Within  the  borders  of 
Bohemia  there  was  so  large  a  German  population  that 
the  ultimate  absorption  of  the  Slavic  element  by  this 
wealthier  and  privil^ed  body  had  at  an  earlier  time 
seemed  not  unlikely.  Since  1830,  however,  the  Czech 
national  movement  had  been  gradually  gaining  ground. 
In  the  first  days  of  the  agitation  of  1848  an  effort  had 
been  made  to  impress  a  purely  constitutional  form  upon 
the  demands  made  in  the  name  of  the  people  of  Prague, 
and  so  to  render  the  union  of  all  classes  possible.    This 


U  MODSBN  SUEOPB.  urn. 

policj,  howeTer,  received  its  death<blow  ^m  the  Bevo- 

lution  in  Vienna  and  from  the  victory  of  the  Magyars. 
The  leadership  at  Prague  passed  from  men  of  posiiion 
and  experience,  representing  rather  the  intelligence  of 
the  Gernion  element  in  Bohemia  than  the  patriotism  of 
the  Czechs,  to  the  nationalist  orators  who  commanded 
the  streets.  An  attempt  made  by  the  Cabinet  at 
Vienna  to  evade  the  demands  drawn  up  under  the 
influence  of  the  more  moderate  politicians  resulted  only 
in  the  downfall  of  this  party,  and  in  the  tender  of  a  new 
series  of  demands  of  far  more  revolutionary  character. 
The  population  of  Prague  were  beginning  to  organise  a 
national  guard;  arms  were  being  distributed';  authority 
had  collapsed.     The  Government  was  now  forced  to  con- 

ADtonomr      ^^^  ^  everything  that  was  asked  of  it,  and  a  . 

'™°^'  legislative  Assembly  with  an  independent 
local  administration  was  promised  to  Poliemia.  To  this 
Assembly,  as  soon  as  it  should  meet,  the  new  institu- 
tions of  the  kingdom  were  to  be  submitted. 

Thus  far,  if  the  authority  of  the  Court  of  Vienna 
had  been  virtually  shaken  off  by  a  great  part  of  its  sub- 
jects, the  Emperor  had  at  least  not  seen  these  subjects  in 
avowed  rebellion  against  the  House  of  Hapsburg,  nor 
supported  in  their  resistance  by  the  arms  of  a  foreign 
Power.  South  of  the  Alps  the  dynastic  connection  was 
openly  severed,  and  the  rule  of  Austria  declared  for  ever 
at  an  end.  Lombardy  had  since  the  beginning  of  the 
year  1848  been  held  in  check  only  by  the  display  of 
great  military  force.  The  Eevolution  at  Paris  had 
excited  both  hopes  and  fears ;  the  Bevolutiou  at  Vienna 


was  instanily  followed  bj  revolt  in  Milan.  Radetzkj, 
the  Austrian  commander,  a  veteran  who  had  served 
with  hoDOQJ  in  every  campaign  since  that 
against  the  Turks  in  178S,  had  lonef  fore-  Lomtudr, 
seen  the  approach  of  an  armed  conflict; 
yet  when  the  actual  crisis  arrived  his  dispositions  had 
not  been  made  for  meeting  it.  The  troops  in  Milan 
were  ill  placed ;  the  offices  of  Government  were  more- 
over separated  by  half  the  breadth  of  the  city  from  the 
military  head-quarters.  Thus  when  on  the  18th  of 
Marcb  the  insurrection  broke  out,  it  carried  everything 
before  it.  The  Vice-Qovemor,  O'Donell,  was  captured, 
and  compelled  to  sign  his  name  to  decrees  handing  over 
the  government  of  the  city  to  the  Municipal  Council. 
Radetzky  now  threw  his  soldiers  upon  the  barricades, 
and  penetrated  to  the  centre  of  the  city ;  but  he  was 
unable  to  maintain  himself  there  under  the  ceaseless 
fire  from  the  windows  and  the  housetops,  and  withdrew 
on  the  night  of  the  I9th  to  the  line  of  fortifications. 
Fighting  continued  during  the  next  two  days  in  the 
outskirts  and  at  the  gates  of  the  city.  The  garrisons  of 
all  the  neighbouring  towns  were  summoned  to  the 
assistance  of  their  general,  but  the  Italians  broke  up 
the  bridges  and  roads,  and  one  detachment  alone  out  of 
all  the  troops  in  Lombardy  succeeded  in  reaching  Milan. 
A  report  now  arrived  at  Badetzky's  camp  that  the 
King  of  Piedmont  was  on  the  march  against  him. 
Preferring  the  loss  of  Milan  to  the  possible  captui'e  of 
his  army,  he  determined  to  evacuate  the  city.  On  the 
night  of  the  23nd  of  March  the  retreat  was  begun,  and 


16  KODSRir  SVSOPB.  an 

BadetzVy  fell  ba«k  upon  the  Mincio  and  TeroDa,  which 
he  himself  had  made  the  centre  of  the  Austrian  system 
of  defence  in  Upper  Italy.* 

Venice  had  already  followed  the  example  of  the 
Lombard  capital.  The  tidiaga  received  from  Vienna 
after  the  13th  of  March  appear  to  have  completely 
bewildered  both  the  military  and  the  civil  authorities 
iDmmiition  oi  '^^  ^^®  Adriatic  coast.  They  released 
their  political  prisoners,  among  whom  was 
Daniel  Manin,  an  able  and  determined  foe  of  Austria; 
they  entered  into  constitutional  discussions  with  the 
popular  leaders ;  they  permitted  the  formation  of  a 
national  guard,  and  finally  handed  over  to  this 
guard  the  arsenals  and  the  dockyards  with  all  their 
stores.  From  this  time  all  was  over.  Manin  pro- 
claimed the  Bepublic  of  St.  Mark,  and  became  the  chief 
of  a  Provisional  Government.  The  Italian  regiments 
in  garrison  joined  the  national  cause ;  the  ships  of  war 
at  Pola,  maiined  chiefly  by  Italian  sailors,  were  only 
prevented  from  sailing  to  the  assistance  of  the  rebels  by 
batteries  that  were  levelled  gainst  them  from  the 
shore.  Thus  without  a  blow  being  struck  Venice  was 
lost  to  Austria.  The  insurrection  spread  westwards 
and  northwards  through  city  and  village  in  the  in- 
terior, till  there  remained  to  Austria  nothing  but  the 
fortresses  on  the  Adige  and  the  Mincio,  where  Radetzky, 
deaf  to    the    counsels    of    timidity,   held  bis    ground 

*  Oaaati,  Naove  BiTelftzioni,  ii.  72.  SchonlialB,  Cunpag^nea  ditalie 
de  1848  et  1849,  p.  72.  Gattaaea,  Insnrresione  di  MUno,  p.  29.  Pari. 
Faji.  1S4Q,  Ivii  ^)  210,  333.    Schneidawind,  FeldKog  in  1848,  i.  30. 


Mft  PTEDUOm  itAKSB  WAS.  17 

tmshaken.  The  Dational  rising  carried  Piedmont  with  it. 
It  was  in  vain  that  the  British  envoy  at  Turin  mged 
the  King  to  enter  into  no  conflict  with  H^mort^ta 
Anstria.     On  the  24th  of  March  Charles  **^ 

Albert  published  a  proclamation  prontising  his  help  to 
the  liombards.  Two  days  later  his  troops  entered 
Milan* 

A^nstria  had  for  thirty  years  consistently  laid  down 
the  principle  that  its  own  sovereignty  io  Upper  Italy 
vested  it  with  the  right  to  control  the  poll- 
tical  system  of  every  other  State  in  the  SlSS.^'iS^ 
peninsula.  It  had  twice  enforced  this  prin- 
ciple hy  arms:  first  in  its  intervention  in  Naples  in 
1820,  aflerwa^s  in  its  occupation  of  the  Eoman  States 
in  1831.  The  Goveniment  of  Vienna  had,  as  it  were 
with  fixed  intention,  made  it  impossible  that  its  pre- 
sence in  any  part  of  Italy  should  be  regarded  as  the 
presence  of  an  ordinary  neighbour,  entitled  to  quiet 
possession  until  some  new  provocation  should  be  given. 
The  Italians  would  have  proved  themselves  the  simplest 
of  mankind  if,  having  any  reasonable  hope  of  military 
snecesB,  they  had  listened  to  the  counsels  of  Palmerston 
and  other  statesmen  who  ni^d  them  not  to  take 
advantage  of  the  difficulties  in  which  Austria  was  now 
placed.  The  paralysis  of  the  Austrian  State  was 
indeed  the  one  onanswerable  argument  for  immediate 
war.     So  long  ss  the  Emperor  retained  his  ascendency 

•  Vxcan,  Boenmeoto  Uas^  L  106.  Ferlbach,  Uanin,  p.  14.  Oon- 
tarini,  Ifemoiiale  Teneto,  p.  10.  Borani,  Hanin,  p.  25.  Farlumeutaty 
F»P«M,  1849,  Mi.  (2)  267. 


18  Movasist  mmova.  ih& 

in  any  part  of  Italy,  his  interests  conid  not  permanently 
Rufier  the  independence  of  the  rest.  If  the  Italians 
should  chiT^ousIy  wait  until  the  Cabinet  of  Vienna 
had  recovered  its  strength,  it  was  quite  certain  that 
their  next  efforts  in  the  cause  of  internal  liberty  would 
be  as  ruthlessly  crushed  as  their  last.  Every  clear- 
sighted patriot  understood  that  the  time  for  a  great 
.  national  effort  had  arrived.  In  some  respects  the  poli- 
tical condition  of  Italy  seemed  favourable  to  such  united 
action.  Since  the  insurrection  of  Palermo  in  January, 
1848,  absolutism  had  everywhere  fallen.  Ministries 
had  come  into  existence  containing  at  least  a  fair  pro- 
portion of  men  who  were  in  real  sympathy  with  the 
national  feeling.  Above  all,  the  Pope  seemed  disposed 
to  place  himself  at  the  head  of  a  patriotic  union  against 
the  foreigner.  Thus,  whatever  might  be  the  secret 
inclinations  of  the  reigning  Houses,  they  were  unable 
for  the  moment  to  resist  the  call  to  arms.  Without  an 
actual  declaration  of  war  troops  were  sent  northwards 
from  Naples,  from  Florence,  and  from  Kome,  to  take 
part,  as  it  was  supposed,  in  the  national  struggle  by  the 
side  of  the  King  of  Piedmont.  Volunteers  thronged  to 
the  standards.  The  Papal  benediction  seemed  for  once 
to  rest  on  the  cause  of  manhood  and  independence.  On 
the  other  hand,  the  very  impetus  which  had  brought 
Liberal  Ministries  into  power  threatened  to  pass  into  a 
phase  of  violeuce  and  disorder.  The  coDcessions  already 
made  were  mocked  by  men  who  expected  to  win  all  the 
victories  of  democracy  in  an  hour.  It  remained  to  be 
seen  whether  there  existed  in  Italy  the  political  sagacity 


which,  trinmpliing  over  aH  local  jealousies,  conlcl  bend 
to  one  great  aim  the  passions  of  the  mnltitnde  and  the 
fears  of  the  Courts,  or  whether  the  cause  oE  the  whole 
nation  would  he  wrecked  in  an  ignohle  strife  betweoi 
demagogues  and  reactionists,  between  the  rabble  of  the 
street  and  the  camarilla  round  the  throne.* 

Austria  had  with  one  hand  held  down  Italy,  with 
the  other  it  had  weighed  on  Germany.  Though  the 
Bevolationary  movement  was  in  full  course  on  the  east 
of  the  Ehine  before  Mettemich's  fall,  it  received,  espe- 
cially at  Berlin,  a  great  impetus  from  this  ni.ii»«haM» 
event.  Since  the  beginning  of  March  the  •*b«uii. 
Prussian  capital  had  worn  an  nnwonted  aspect.  In  this 
city  of  military  discipline  public  meetings  had  been 
held  day  after  day,  and  the  streets  had  been  blocked  by 
excited  crowds.  Deputations  which  laid  before  the 
King  demands  similar  to  those  now  made  in  every 
German  town  received  halting  and  evasive  answers. 
Excitement  increased,  and  on  the  13th  of  March  en- 
counters began  between  the  citizens  and  the  troops, 
which,  though  insignificant,  served  to  exasperate  the 
people  and  its  leaders.  The  King  appeared  to  be 
wavering  between  resistance  and  concession  until  the 
Bevolntion  at  Vienna,  which  became  known  at  Berlin 
on  the  15th  of  March,  brought  afbirs  to  their  crisis. 
On  the  17th  the  tumult  in  the  streets  suddenly  ceased; 
it  was  understood  that  the  following  day  would  see  the 
Government  either  reconciled  with  the  people  or  forced 

*  BUneU,  DiploBualA  EnropM,  r.  183.    Farinl,  Stato  BomuMv  IL  16. 
FkrL  FApeni,  1819,  IviL  285,  297,  319.     Puolini.  ISamoria.  ^  9L,,,^,|J 

c  i 


fl>  XOBSBN  BVBOPn.  IM 

to  deal  with  an  insurrection  on  a  great  scale.  Accord- 
ingly on  the  morning  of  the  18th  crowds  made  their 
way  towards  the  palace,  which  was  snrroanded  hj 
troops.  About  midday  there  appeared  a  Koyal  edict 
summoning  the  Prussian  United  Diet  for  the  2nd  o£ 
April,  and  announcing  that  the  King  had  determined 
to  promote  the  creation  of  a  Parliament  for  all  Ger- 
many and  the  establishment  of  Constitutional  Qovem- 
raent  in  every  German  State.  This  manifesto  drew 
fresh  masses  towards  the  palace,  desirous,  it  would  seem, 
to  express  their  satisfaction ;  its  contents,  however,  were 
imperfectly  understood  by  the  assembly  already  in  front 
of  the  p^ace,  which  the  King  vainly  attempted  to 
address.  When  called  upon  to  disperse,  the  multitude 
refused  to  do  so,  and  answered  by  cries  for  the  with- 
drawal of  the  soldiery.  In  the  midst  of  the  confusion 
two  shots  were  fired  from  the  ranks  without  orders;  a 
panic  followed,  in  which,  for  no  known  reason,  the 
cavalry  and  infantry  threw  themselves  upon  the  people. 
The  crowd  was  immediately  put  to  flight,  but  the 
combat  was  taken  up  by  the  population  of  Berlin. 
Barricades  appeared  in  the  streets ;  fighting  continued 
during  the  evening  and  night.  Meanwhile  the  King, 
who  was  shocked  and  distressed  at  the  course  that 
events  had  taken,  received  deputations  hogging  that 
the  troops  might  be  withdrawn  from  the  city.  Frederick 
WiUiam  endeavoured  for  a  while  to  make  the  surrender 
of  the  barricades  the  condition  for  an  armistice ;  but  as 
niglit  went  on  the  troops  became  exhausted,  and 
although  they  had  gained  ground,  the  resistance  of  the 


people  was  not  overcome.  Whether  doubtful  of  the 
ultimate  issue  of  the  conflict  or  unwilling  to  permit 
further  bloodshed,  the  King  gave  way,  and  at  daybreak 
on  the  19th  ordered  the  troops  to  be  withdrawn.  His 
intention  was  that  they  should  continae  to  garrison  tUe 
palace,  but  the  order  was  misunderBtood,  and  the  troops 
were  removed  to  the  outside  of  Berlin.  The  palace 
was  thus  left  unprotected,  and,  although  no  injury  was 
inflicted  upon  its  inmates,  the  King  was  made  to  feel 
thai  the  people  could  now  command  his  homage.  The 
bodies  of  the  dead  were  brought  into  the  court  of  the 
palace ;  their  wounds  were  laid  bare,  and  the  King, 
who  appeared  in  a  balcony,  was  compelled  to  descend 
into  the  court,  and  to  stand  before  them  with  uncovered 
head.  Definite  political  expression  waa  given  to  the 
changed  state  of  aflairs  by  the  appointment  of  a  new 
Ministry.* 

The  conflict  between  the  troops  and  the  people  at 
Berlin  was  described,  and  with  truth,  as  the  result  of  a 
misunderstanding.  Frederick  William  had  already  de- 
termined to  yield  to  the  principal  demands  of  his 
subjects ;  nor  ou  the  part  of  the  inhabitants  of  Berlin 
had  there  existed  any  general  hostility  towards  the 
sovereign,  although  a  small  group  of  f^tators,  in  part 
foreign,  bad  probably  sought  to  bring  about  an  armed 
attack   on  the   throne.     Accordingly,  when    once   the 


•  Die  BerliiieT  Mara-Berolatjoii,  p.  55.  Aoafiairlicho  BeschrrilniDg, 
p.  3.  Amtliclie  Berichte,  p.  16.  SUhr,  Preasidsclie  ReTolntioti,  i.  91.  S. 
Stem,  Qeechichte  dee  Dentaohen  Volken,  p.  58.  Stem  was  ui  eye- witness 
■iBeiiiD,  Ubongli  not  genenllj  a  good  anthoritj, '  )(f  Ic 


22  UODERN  EUROPE.  vm. 

combat  was  broken  off,  there  seemed  to  be  no  important 
obstacle  to  a  reconciliation  between  the  Kiog  and  the 
people.  Frederick  William  chose  a  courge  which  spared 
and  even  gratified  his  own  self-love.  In  the  political 
faith  of  all  German  Liberals  the  establishment  of 
German  unity  was  now  an  even  more  important  article 
than  the  introduction  of  free  institutions  into  each 
particular  State.  The  Revolution  at  Berlin  had  indeed 
been  occasioned  by  the  King's  delay  in  granting  internal 
reform ;  but  these  domestic  disputes  might  well  be  for- 
gotten if  in  the  great  cause  of  German  unity  the 
Prussians  saw  their  King  rising  to  the  needs  of  the 
hour.  Accordingly  the  first  resolution  of  Frederick 
William,  after  quiet  had  returned  to  the  capital,  was  to 
appear  in  public  state  as  the  champion  of  the  Father- 
land. A  proclamation  announced  on  the  morning  of 
the  2lst  of  March  that  the  King  bad  placed  himself  at 
the  head  of  the  German  nation,  and  that  he  would  on 
that  day  appear  on  horseback  wearing  the  old  German 
colours.  In  due  time  Frederick  William  came  forth  at 
the  head  of  a  procession,  wearing  the  tricolor  of  gold, 
white,  and  black,  which  since  1815  had  been  so  dear 
to  the  patriots  and  so  odious  to  the  Governments  of 
Germany.  As  he  passed  through  the  streets  he  was 
saluted  as  Emperor,  but  he  repudiated  the  title,  assert- 
ing with  oaths  and  imprecations  that  he  intended  to 
rob  no  German  prince  of  his  sovereignty.  At  each 
stage  of  his  theatrical  progress  he  repeated  to  appro- 
priate auditors  bis  sounding  but  ambiguous  allusions 
to  the  duties  imposed  upon  him  by  the  common  danger. 


IM  fREVSniOK  WILLIAU  IT.  S3 

A  manifesto,  published  at  the  close  of  the  day,  summed 
up  the  uttemnces  of  the  monarch  in  a  somewliat  less 
rhetorical  form.  "  Germany  is  in  ferment  within,  and 
exposed  from  without  to  danger  from  more  than  one 
side.  Deliverance  from  this  danger  can  come  only  from 
the  most  intimate  union  of  the  German  princes  and 
people  under  a  single  leadership.  I  take  this  leadership 
upon  me  for  the  hour  of  peril.  I  have  to-day  assumed 
the  old  German  colours,  and  placed  myself  and  my 
people  under  the  venerable  banner  of  the  German 
Empire.  Prussia  henceforth  is  merged  in  Germany."* 
The  ride  of  the  King  through  Berlin,  and  his 
assamption  of  the  character  of  German  leader,  however 
little  it  pleased  the  minor  sovereigns,  or  gratified  the 
Liberals  of  the  smaller  States,  who  con-  KiHoMiAmp*. 
sidered  that  such  authority  ought  to  be  "tp™"'~* 
conferred  by  the  nation,  not  assumed  by  a  prince,  was 
successfnl  for  the  moment  in  restoring  to  the  King 
some  popularity  among  his  own  subjects.  He  could 
now  without  humiiiation  proceed  with  the  concessions 
which  had  been  interrupted  by  the  tn^ical  events  of 
the  18th  of  March.  In  answer  to  a  deputation  from 
Breslau,  which  niged  that  the  Chamber  formed  by  the 
nnion  of  the  Provincial  Diets  should  be  replaced  by  a 
Constituent  Assembly,  the  King  promised  that  a 
national  Representative  Assembly  should  be  convoked 
as  soon  as  the  United  Diet  had  passed  the  necessary 

*  *  Frenssen  geht  forUn  in  Dentscliland  auf ."  Beden  Frieilriflh 
Willialini,  p.  9,  In  coareraation  witli  BasaormHnn  Prederick  William  at 
k  later  time  described  his  ride  through  Berlin  ae  "  a  comedy  which  ho 
Ind  been  made  to  pUj."    The  IxHnbwt  at  any  rata  was  all  Ua  own. 


a&  VOVERlf  EUROPS.  KM. 

electoral  law.  To  this  National  Assembly  the  Govem- 
ment  would  submit  measures  securing  the  liberty  of  the 
individual,  the  right  of  public  meeting  and  of  associa- 
tions, trial  by  jury,  the  responsibility  of  Ministers,  and 
the  independence  of  the  judicature.  A  civic  militia  was 
to  be  formed,  with  the  right  of  choosing  its  own 
officers,  and  the  standing  army  was  to  take  the  oath  of 
allegiance  to  the  Constitution.  Hereditary  jurisdictions 
and  manorial  rights  of  police  were  to  be  abolished ; 
equality  before  the  law  was  to  be  universally  enforced  ; 
in  short  the  entire  scheme  of  reforms  demanded  by  the 
Constitutional  Liberals  of  Prussia  was  to  be  carried 
into  effect.  In  Berlin,  as  in  every  other  capital  in  Ger- 
many, the  victory  of  the  party  of  progress  now  seemed 
to  be  assured.  The  Government  no  longer  represented 
a  power  hostile  to  popular  rights ;  and  when,  on  the 
22nd  of  March,  the  King  spontaneously  paid  the  last 
honours  to  those  who  had  fallen  in  combat  with  his 
troops,  as  the  long  funeral  procession  passed  his  palace, 
it  was  generally  believed  that  his  expression  of  feeling 
was  sincere. 

In  the  passi^  of  his  address  in  which  King  Fre- 
derick "William  spoke  of  the  external  dangers  threaten- 
ing Germany,  he  referred  to  npprehensions  which  had 
for  a  while  been  current  that  the  second  French  Eepub- 
lic  would  revive  the  aggressive  eneigy  of  the  first.  This 
fear  proved  baseless  ;  nevertheless,  for  a  sovereign  who 
really  intended  to  act  as  the  champion  of  the  German 
nation  at  large,  the  probability  of  war  with  a  neigh- 
bouring Power  wafi  far  from  remote.     The  cause  of  the 


BOBLBSwia-nozaTsm.  » 

Dachies  of  Sohleswig-Holstein,  which  were  in  rebellion 
against  the  Danish  Crown,  excited  the  utmost  interest 
and  Bympathj  in  Germany.  The  popala-  eMtnrim. 
tion  of  these  provinces,  with  the  exception  »*«*>- 
of  certain  districts  in  Scbleswig,  was  German  ;  Holstein 
was  actnally  a  member  of  the  Gemiiin  Federation.  Tlie 
legal  rehition  of  the  Duchies  to  Denmark  was,  according 
to  the  popular  view,  very  nearly  that  of  Hanover  to 
England  before  1837.  The  King  of  Denmark  was  also 
Dnke  of  Scbleswig  and  of  Holatein,  but  these  were  no 
more  an  integral  portion  of  the  Danish  State  than 
Hanover  was  of  the  British  Empire ;  and  the  laws  of 
succession  were  moreover  different,  in  Sohleswig-Holstein 
the  Crown  being  transmitted  by  males,  while  in  Denmark 
females  were  capable  of  snccession.  On  the  part  of  the 
Danes  it  was  admitted  that  in  certain  districts  in 
Holstein  the  Salic  law  held  good ;  it  was,  however, 
maintained  that  in  the  remainder  of  Uolstein  aiid  in  aU 
Schleswig  the  rules  of  succession  were  the  same  as  in 
Denmark.  The  Danish  Government  denied  that  Sohles- 
wig-Holstein formed  a  unity  in  itself,  as  alleged  by  the 
Germans,  and  that  it  possessed  separate  national  rights 
as '  ^painst  the  authority  of  the  King's  Goveramcnt  at 
Copenh^en.  The  real  heart  of  the  difficulty  lay  in  the 
fact  that  the  population  of  the  Duchies  was  German. 
So  long  as  the  Germ^is  as  a  race  possessed  no  national 
feeling,  the  union  of  the  Duchies  with  the  Danish 
Monarchy  had  not  been  felt  as  a  grievance.  It  hap- 
pened, however,  that  the  great  revival  of  German 
patriotism  resulting  from  the  War  of  Liberation  in 


M  XOBERN  EUBOFB.  tSM. 

1813  was  almost  BimultaQeoUB  wiib  the  severance  of 
Norway  from  the  Danish  Crown,  which  compelled  the 
(JoTernment  of  Copenhagea  to  increase  very  heavily  the 
hurdens  imposed  on  its  German  subjects  in  the  Duchies. 
From  this  time  discontent  gained  ground,  especially  in 
Altona  and  Kiel,  where  society  was  as  thoroughly 
German  as  in  the  neighbouring  city  of  Hamburg. 
After  1830,  when  Provincial  Estates  were  established 
in  Schleawig  and  Holstein,  the  Gorman  movement 
became  formidable.  The  reaction,  however,  which 
marked  the  succeeding  period  generally  in  Europe 
prevailed  in  Denmark  too,  and  it  was  not  until  1844, 
when  a  posthumous  work  of  Lornsen,  the  exiled  leader 
of  the  German  party,  vindicated  the  historical  rights 
of  the  Duchies,  that  the  claims  of  German  nationality 
in  these  provinces  were  ^ain  vigorously  urged.  From 
this  time  the  separation  of  Schles  wig- Holstein  from 
Denmark  became  a  question  of  practical  politics.  The 
King  of  Denmark,  Christian  VIII.,  had  but  one  son, 
who,  though  long  married,  was  childless,  and  with 
whom  the  male  line  of  the  reigoing  House  would 
expire.  Id  answer  to  an  address  of  the  Danish  Pro- 
vincial Estates  calling  upon  the  King  to  declare  the 
unity  of  the  Monarchy  and  the  validity  of  the  Danish 
law  of  Bucce^ssion  for  all  its  parts,  the  Holstein  Estates 
passed  a  resolution  in  November,  1844,  that  the  Duchies 
were  an  independent  body,  governed  by  the  rule  of  male 
descent,  and  indivisible.  After  an  interval  of  two  years, 
daring  which  a  Commission  examined  the  succession- 
laws,  King  Christian  published  a  declaration  that  .Uie 


MB.  SOHLBSWia-EOISTEZN.  87 

HDccessioD  was  the  same  in  Schleswig  as  in  Denmark 
proper,  and  that,  as  regarded  those  parts  of  Holstein 
where  a  different  mle  of  saccession  existed,  he  would 
spare  no  effort  to  maintain  the  unity  of  the  Monarchy. 
On  this  the  Provincial  Estates  both  of  Schleswig  and  of 
Holstein  addressed  protests  to  the  King,  who  refused  to 
accept  them.  The  deputies  now  resigoed  in  a  mass, 
whilst  OD  behalf  of  Holstein  an  appeal  was  made  to  the 
German  Federal  Diet.  The  Diet  merely  replied  by  a 
declaration  of  rights;  hut  in  Germany  at  large  the 
keenest  interest  was  aroused  on  behalf  of  these  severed 
members  of  the  race  who  were  so  resolutely  struggling 
against  incorporation  with  a  foreign  Power.  The 
deputies  themselves,  passing  from  village  to  village, 
excited  a  strenuous  spirit  of  resistance  throughout  the 
Duchies,  which  was  met  by  the  Danish  Government 
with  measures  of  repression  more  severe  than  any  which 
it  had  hitherto  employed.* 

Such  was  the  situation  of  affairs  when,  on  the  20th 
of  January,  1848,  King  Christian  VIII.  died,  leaving 
the  throne  to  Frederick  VII.,  the  last  of 
the  male   line  of  his  House.     Frederick's    gj^ 
first  act  was  to  publish  the  draft  of  a  Con- 
stitution, in  which  all  parts   of  the    Monarchy    were 
treated  as  on  the  same  footing.     Before  the  delegates 
coold    assemble     to     whom    the    completion    of    this 
work  was  referred,  the  shock  of  the  Paris  Kevolution 


*  Drayaen  and  Stxawer,  SchlMvrlg- Holstein,  p.  220.  Bnnaen,  Hem<4i 
on  Schloswig'-Holstein,  p.  25.  Seblos wig- Holstein,  Uebcrsicbtliehe  D>r> 
8t«lliing,  p.  5L    On  the  other  dde,  Notea  car  Beleimklung,  p.  12. 


K  MODERN  EUSOPS.  am. 

reached  the  North  Sea  ports.  A  public  meeting  at 
Altona  demanded  the  establishment  of  a  separate  con- 
stitution for  Schleswig-Holstein,  and  the  admissiqn  of 
Scbleswig  into  the  German  Federation.  The  Pro- 
vincial  Estates  accepted  this  resolution,  and  sent  a 
deputation  to  Copenliagen  to  present  this  and  other 
demands  to  the  Kiag.  But  in  the  course  of  the  next 
few  days  a  popular  movement  at  Copenhagen  brought 
into  power  a  thoroughly  Danish  Ministry,  pledged  to  the 
incorporation  of  Schleswig  with  Denmark  as  au  integral 
part  of  the  Kingdom.  Without  waiting  to  learn  the 
answer  made  by  the  King  to  the  deputation,  the  Hol- 
steiners  now  took  affairs  into  their  own  hands.  A 
Provisional  Government  was  formed  at  Kiel  (March 
24),  the  troops  joined  the  people,  and  the  insurrection 
instantly  spread  over  the  whole  province.  As  the 
proposal  to  change  the  law  of  succession  to  the  throne 
had  originated  with  the  King  of  Denmark,  the  cause 
of  the  Holsteiners  was  from  one  point  of  view  that  of 
established  right.  The  King  of  Prussia,  accepting  the 
positions  laid  down  by  the  Holstein  Estates  in  1844, 
declared  that  he  would  defend  the  claims  of  the  legiti- 
mate heir  by  force  of  arms,  and  ordered  his  troops  to 
enter  Holstein.  The  Diet  of  Frankfort,  now  forced  to 
express  the  universal  will  of  Germany,  demanded  that 
Schleswig,  as  the  sister  State  of  Holtitein, 
should  enter  the  Federation.     On  the  pass- 


ing of  this  resolution,  the  envoy  who  re- 
presented the  King  of  Denmark  at  the  Diet,  as  Duke 
of  Holstein,    quitted    Frankfort,  and  a  state    of  war 


IMl  TffB  JJTTB-PJItLIAWBST.  » 

eosned  between  Denmark  on  the  one  side  and  Frassia 
with  the  German  Federation  on  the  other. 

The  passionate  impulse  of  the  German  people  to- 
wards unity  had  already  called  into  heing  an  organ  for 
the  expression  of  national  sentiment,  which,  if  without 
any  legal  or  constitutional  authority,  was  ri-o-rniiiii 
yet  strong  enough  to  impose  its  will  upon  ^!J^£S 
the  old  and  discredited  Federal  Diet  and 
upon  most  of  the  Burriving  Governments.  At  the 
invitation  of  a  Committee,  about  five  hundred  Liberals 
who  had  in  one  form  or  another  taken  part  in  public 
affairs  assembled  at  Frankfort  on  the  30th  of  March  to 
make  the  necessary  preparations  for  the  meeting  of  a 
German  national  Parliament.  This  Assembly,  which 
is  known  as  the  Ante-Parliament,  sat  but  for  five  days. 
Its  resolutions,  so  far  as  regarded  the  method  of  electing 
the  new  Parliament,  and  the  inclusion  of  new  districts  in 
the  GermMSi  Federation,  were  accepted  by  the  Diet,  and 
in  the  main  carried  into  effect  Its  denunciation  of 
persons  concerned  in  the  repressive  measures  of  1819 
and  subsequent  reactionary  epochs  was  followed  by  the 
immediate  retirement  of  all  members  of  the  Diet  whose 
careers  dated  back  to  those  detested  days.  But  in  the 
most  important  work  that  was  expected  from  the  Ante- 
Parliament,  the  settlement  of  a  draft-Constitution  to  be 
laid  before  the  future  National  Assembly  as  a  basis  for 
its  deliberationB,  nothing  whatever  was  accomplished. 
The  debates  that  took  place  Srom  the  Slst  of  March  to 
the  4th  of  April  were  little  more  than  a  trial  of  strength 
between  the  Monarchical  and  Republican  parties.     The 


so  MODERN  EUROPB.  ms. 

Republicans,  far  outnumbered  when  tbey  submitted  a 
constitutional  scheme  of  their  own,  proposed,  after  this 
repulse,  that  the  existing  Assembly  should  continue  in 
session  until  the  National  Furliamcnt  met;  in  other 
words,  that  it  should  take  upon  itself  the  functions  and 
character  of  a  National  Convention,  Defeated  also  on 
this  proposal,  the  leaders  of  the  extreme  section  of  the 
Repoblican  party,  strangely  miscalculating  their  real 
strength,  detennined  on  armed  insurrection.  Uniting 
with  a  body  of  German  refugees  beyond  the  Rhine,  who 
were  themselves  assisted  by  French  and  Polish  soldiers 
Re  ibiinin  "^  revolution,  tbey  raised  the  Republican 
■uiiBiuB<id«n.  standard  in  Baden,  and  for  a  few  days 
maintained  a  hopeless  and  inglorious  struggle  against 
the  troops  which  were  sent  to  suppress  them.  Even  in 
Baden,  which  had  long  been  in  advance  of  all  other 
German  States  in  democratic  sentiment,  and  which  was 
peculiarly  open  to  Republican  influences  from  France 
and  Switzerland,  the  movement  was  not  seriously  sup- 
ported by  the  population,  and  in  the  remainder  of 
Germany  it  received  no  countenance  whatever.  The 
leaders  found  themselves  ruined  men.  The  best  of 
them  fled  to  the  United  States,  where,  in  the  great 
struggle  against  slavery  thirteen  years  later,  they  ren- 
dered better  service  to  their  adopted  than  they  had  ever 
rendered  to  their  natural  Fatherland. 

On  breaking  up  on  the  4th  of  April,  the  Ante-Par- 
liament left  behind  it  a  Committee  of  Fifty,  whose  task 
it  was  to  continue  the  work  of  preparation  for  the 
National  Assembly  to  which  it  had  itself  contributed  so 


urn.  OEBMAN  NATIONAL  ASSEMBLY.  SI 

little.  One  thing  alone  had  been  clearly  established, 
that  the  future  CJonstitution  of  Germany 
was  not  to  be  Republican.  That  the  SSSSia.m«. 
existing  GoTerumeDts  could  not  be  safely 
ignored  by  the  Natiunal  Assembly  in  its  work  of 
founding  the  new  Federal  Constitution  for  Germany 
was  clear  to  those  who  were  not  blinded  by  the  enthu- 
siasm of  the  moment.  In  the  Committee  of  Fifty  and 
elsewhere  plans  were  suggested  for  giving  to  the 
Governments  a  representation  within  the  Constituent 
Assembly,  or  for  uniting  their  representatives  in  a 
Chamber  co-ordinate  with  this,  so  that  each  step  in  the 
construction  of  the  new  Federal  order  should  be  at  once 
the  work  of  the  nation  and  of  the  Governments.  Such 
plans  were  suggested  and  discussed ;  but  in  the  haste 
and  inexperience  of  the  time  they  were  brought  to  no 
conclusion.  The  opening  of  the  National  Assembly 
had  been  fixed  for  the  18th  of  May,  and  this  brief 
interval  had  expired  before  tlie  few  sagacious  men  who 
understood  the  necessity  of  co-operation  between  the 
Governments  and  the  Parliament  had  decided  upon  any 
common  course  of  action.  To  the  mass  of  patriots  it 
was  enough  that  Germany,  after  thirty  years  of  disap- 
pointment, had  at  last  won  its  national  representation. 
Before  this  imposing  image  of  the  united  race.  Kings, 
Courts,  and  armies,  it  was  fondly  thought,  must  how. 
Thus,  in  the  midst  of  univer.sal  hope,  the  elections  were 
held  throughout  Germany  in  its  utmost  federal  extent, 
from  the  Baltic  to  the  Italian  border ;  Bohemia  alone, 
where  the  Czech  majority  resisted  any  closer  union  with 


82  MODERN  EUEOPS.  ISO. 

Germany,  declining  to  send  representatives  to  Frankfort. 
In  the  body  of  deputies  elected  there  were  to  be  found 
almost  all  the  foremost  Liberal  politicians  o£  every 
German  community;  a  few  still  vigorous  champions  of 
the  time  of  the  War  of  Liberation,  chief  among  them 
the  poet  Amdt;  patriots  who  in  the  evil  days  that 
followed  bad  suffered  imprisonment  and  exile ;  his- 
torians, professors,  critics,  who  in  the  sacred  cause  of 
liberty  have,  like  Gervinus,  inflicted  upon  their  readers 
worse  miseries  than  ever  they  themselves  endured  at  the 
hands  of  unregenerate  kings;  theologians,  journalists; 
m  short,  the  whole  group  of  leaders  under  whom 
Germany  expected  to  enter  into  the  promised  land  of 
national  unity  and  freedom.  No  Imperial  coronation 
ever  brought  to  Frankfort  so  many  honoured  guests,  or 
attracted  to  the  same  degree  the  sympathy  of  the 
German  race.  Greeted  with  the  cheers  of  the  citizens 
of  Frankfort,  whose  civic  militia  lined  the  streets,  the 
members  of  the  Assembly  marched  in  procession  on  the 
afternoon  of  the  18th  of  May  from  the  ancient  ban- 
queting-hall  of  the  Kaisers,  where  they  had  gathered, 
to  the  Church  of  St.  Paul,  which  had  been  chosen  aa 
their  Senate  House.  Their  President  and  officers  were 
elected  on  the  following  day.  Amdt,  who  in  the  frantic 
confusion  of  the  first  meeting  had  been  unrecognised 
and  shouted  down,  was  called  into  the  Tribune,  but 
could  speak  only  a  few  words  for  tears.  The  Assembly 
voted  him  its  thanks  for  bis  famous  song,  "What  is 
the  German's  Fatherland  ? "  and  requested  that  he 
would  add  to  it  another  stanza  commemorating  the 


am.  PBUSSIAN  NATIONAL  PA&LTAMBNT.  38 

Qnion  of  the  race  at  length  visibly  realised  in  that  great 
Parliament.  Fonr  days  after  the  opening  of  the  General 
Assembly  of  Frankfort,  the  Prussian  national  Parlia- 
ment began  its  sessions  at  Berlin.* 

At  this  point  the  first  act  in  the  Revolutionary 
drama  of  1848  in  Germany,  as  in  Europe  generally, 
may  be  considered  to  have  reached  its  close. 
A  certain  anity  marks  the  memorable  epoch  ^j'^iSIX 
known  generally  as  the  March  Days  and 
the  events  immediately  succeediug.  Bevolutioa  is 
universal ;  it  scarcely  meets  with  resistance ;  its  views 
seem  on  the  point  of  being  achieved  ;  the  baffled  aspira- 
tions of  the  last  half-century  seem  on  the  point  of 
being  fulfilled.  There  exists  no  longer  in  Central 
Europe  sach  a  thing  as  an  autocratic  Government;  and, 
while  the  French  Eepublic  maintains  an  unexpected 
attitude  of  peace,  Germany  and  Italy,  under  the  leader- 
ship of  old  dynasties  now  penetrated  with  a  new  spirit, 
appear  to  be  on  the  point  of  achieving  each  its  own 
work  of  Federal  union  and  of  the  expulsion  of  the 
foreigner  from  its  national  soil.  All  Italy  prepares 
to  move  under  Charles  Albert  to  force  the  Austrians 
from  their  last  strongholds  on  the  Mincio  and  the 
Adige;  all  Germany  is  with  the  troops  of  Frederick 
William  of  Prussia  as  they  enter  Holhtein  to  rescue 
this  and  the  neighbouring  German  province  from  the 
Bane.  In  Badetzky's  camp  alone,  and  at  the  Court  of 
8t.   Petersburg,  the  old  monarchical  order  of  Europe 

*  TerluHuUimgeii    Afs    Nftti<mal-Teraammlai]^  L  2B.     Biedemiuiii 
Drrismg  Jakre,  i.  27&    Bodowit^  Werke,  U.  36. 

^  L  ,„z..bvGoogIe 


M  MODERN  EUROPB.  im 

still  Bomves.  How  powerful  were  these  two  isolated 
centres  of  anti-popular  energy  the  world  was  soon  to 
see.  Yet  they  would  not  have  turned  back  the  tide  of 
European  affairs  and  given  one  more  victory  to  reac- 
tion had  they  not  had  their  allies  in  the  hatred  of 
race  to  ra«e,  in  the  incapacity  and  the  errors  of  peoples 
and  those  who  represented  them ;  above  all,  in  the 
enormous  difiQculties  which,  even  had  the  generation 
been  one  of  sages  and  martyrs,  the  political  circum- 
stances of  the  time  would  in  themselves  have  opposed 
to  the  accomplishment  o£  the  ends  desired. 

France  had  given  to  Central  Europe  the  signal  for 
the  Kevolution  of  1848,  and  it  was  in  France,  where 
the  conflict  was  not  one  for  national  independence  but 
for  political  and  social  interests,  that  the  Bevolution 
most  rapidly  ran  its  course  and  first  exhausted  its 
powers.  On  the  flight  of  Louis  Philippe  authority 
had  been  entrusted  by  the  Chamber  of  Deputies 
to  a  Provisional  Government,  whose  most  prominent 
member  was  the  orator  and  poet  Lamartine.  Installed 
at  the  H6tel  de  Ville,  tliis  Government  had 


substituting  the  Bed  Flag  for  the  Tricolor, 
and  from  proceeding  at  once  to  realise  the  plans  of  its 
own  leaders.  The  majority  of  the  Provisional  Govern- 
ment were  llepublicans  of  a  moderate  type,  representing 
the  ideas  of  the  urban  middle  classes  rather  than  those 
of  the  workmen  ;  but  by  their  side  were  Ledru  RoUin, 
a  rhetorician  dominated  by  the  phrases  of  1793,  and 
Louis    Blanc,    who     considered    all    political    change 


B8  bat  an  instrument  for  advancing  tbe  OTgaoisatioD 
of  laboor  and  for  the  emancipatioa  of  the  artis^i  from 
servitude,  hy  the  establishiaeat  of  State-directed  indus- 
tries affording  appropriate  employment  and  adequate 
remancration  to  all.  Among  the  first  proclamations  of 
the  Provisional  Government  was  one  in  which,  in 
answer  to  a  petition  demanding  the  recognition  oE  the 
Right  to  Labour,  they  undertook  to  guarantee  employ- 
ment to  every  citizen.  This  engagement,  the  heaviest 
perhaps  that  was  ever  voluntarily  assumed  by  any 
Government,  was, followed  in  a  few  days  by  the  opening 
of  national  workshops.  That  in  the  midst  of  a  Revolu- 
tion which  took  all  parties  by  surprise  plans  for  the 
conduct  of  a  series  of  industrial  enterprises  by  the  State 
should  have  heett  seriously  examined  was  impossible. 
The  Government  had  paid  homage  to  an  abstract  idea ; 
they  were  without  a  conception  of  the  mode  in  which  it 
was  to  be  realised.  What  articles  were  to  be  made, 
what  works  were  to  be  executed,  no  one  knew.  The 
mere  direction  of  destitute  workmen  to  the  centres 
where  they  were  to  be  employed  was  a  task  for  which  a 
new  branch  of  the  administration  had  to  be  created. 
When  this  was  achieved,  the  inen  collected  proved 
useless  for  all  purposes  of  industry.  Their  .^^  NaUood 
numbers  increased  enormously,  rising  in  the  ^"^""""i* 
course  of  four  weeks  from  fourteen  to  sixty-five  thousand. 
The  Revolution  had  itself  caused  a  financial  and  com- 
mercial panic,  interrupting  all  the  ordinary  occupations 
of  business,  and  depriving  masses  of  men  of  the  means 
of  earning  a  livelihood.  These,  with  others  who  had 
j>  2  '"^^  " 


as  MODERN  EUBOFS.  wm. 

no  intention  of  working,  thronged  to  the  State  work- 
shops ;  while  the  certainty  of  obtaining  wages  from  the 
public  purse  occasioned  a  series  of  strikes  of  workmen 
against  their  employers  and  the  abandonment  of  private 
factories.  The,  checks  which  had  been  intended  to 
confine  enrolment  at  the.public  works  to  persons  already 
domiciled  in  Paris  completely  failed;  from  all  the 
neighbouring  departments  the  idle  and  the  hungry 
streamed  into  the  capital.  Every  abuse  incidental  to  a 
system  of  public  relief  was  present  in  Paris  in  its  most 
exaggerated  form ;  every  element  of  experience,  of 
wisdom,  of  precaution,  was  absent.  If,  instead  of  a 
group  of  benevolent  theorists,  the  experiment  of  1848 
had  had  for  its  authors  a  company  of  millionaires  anxious 
to  dispel  all  hope  that  mankind  might  ever  rise  to  a 
higher  order  than  that  of  unrestricted  competition  of 
man  against  man,  it  could  not  have  been  conducted 
under  more  fatal  conditions.* 

The  leaders  of  the  democmcy  in  Paris  had  from  the 
first  considered  that  the  decision  upon  the  form  of 
_    „ , .    ,     Government  to  be    established  in    Trance 

Tha  ProTlaiHul 

QoTwmientijM  jjj  place  of  the  Orleanist  monarchy  be- 
longed rather  to  themselves  than  to  the 
nation  at  large.  They  distrusted,  and  with  good 
reason,  the  results  of  the  General  Election  which,  by 
a  decree  of  the  Provisional  Government,  was  to  be 
held  in  the  course  of  April.    A  circular  issued  by  Ledru 

*  Aotes  do  GouTemement  Frorisoire,  p.  12:  Ixiuis  Blane,  XUr^la. 
tions  Historiqnee,  i.  13S.  Gftrnier  Fag^  B^rolation  da  1S48,  tI  lOG^ 
viU.  148.    £iDile  Thomas,  ECistoin  ia»  Ateliers  NstiauMiz,  p.  93. 


am.  LEDRU  ROLLW.  87 

HoUin,  Minister  of  the  Interior,  without  the  knowledge 
of  his  colleagues,  to  the  Oommissionenj  hj  whom  he 
had  replaced  the  Prefects  of  the  Monarchy  gave  the 
first  open  indication  of  this  alarm,  and  of  the  means  of 
violence  and  intimidation  by  which  the  party  which 
Ledru  BoUin  represented  hoped  to  impose  its  will  upon 
the  country.  The  Commissioners  were  informed  in 
plain  .language  that,  as  agents  of  a  revolutionary 
authority,  their  powers  were  unlimited,  and  that  their 
task  was  to  exclude  &om  election  all  persons  who  were 
not  animated  by  revolutionary  spirit,  and  pure  from 
any  taint  of  association  with  the  past.  If  the  circular 
had  been  the  work  of  the  Government,  and  not  of  a 
single  member  of  it  who  was  at  variance  with  most  of 
his  colle^ues  and  whose  words  were  far  more  formid- 
able than  his  actions,  it  would  have  cleariy  foreshadowed 
a  return  to  the  system  of  1793.  But  the  isolation  of 
Ledru  KoIIin  was  well  understood.  The  attitude  of 
the  Government  generally  was  so  little  in  accordance 
with  the  views  of  the  Bed  Bepublicans  that  on  the 
16th  of  April  a  demonstration  was  organised  with  the 
object  of  compelling  them  to  postpone  the  elections. 
The  prompt  appearance  in  arms  of  the  National  Guard, 
which  still  represented  the  middle  classes  of  Paris, 
baffled  the  design  of  the  leaders  of  the  mob,  and  gave 
to  Lamartine  and  the  majority  in  the  Government  a 
decisive  victory  over  their  revolutionary  Ejectiom, 
colleague.  The  elections  were  held  at  the  *'^**' 
time  appointed ;  and,  in  spite  of  the  institution  of 
universal  sufirage,  they  resulted  in  the  return  of  a  body 


88  MODERN  EUBOFB.  Utt. 

of  Deputies  not  widely  different  from  those  who  had 
hitherto  appeared  in  French  Parhaments.  The  great 
majority  were  indeed  Republicans  by  profession,  but  of 
a  moderate  type  ;  and  the  session  had  no  sooner  opened 
than  it  became  clear  that  the  relation  between  the 
Socialist  democracy  of  Paris  and  the  Kational  Repre- 
sentatives could  only  be  one  of  more  or  less  violent 
antagonism. 

The  first  act  of  the  Assembly,  which  met  on  the 
4th  of  May,  was  to  declare  that  the  Provisional  Govern- 
ment had  deserved  well  of  the  country,  and 
to  reinstate  most  of  its  members  in  office 
under  the  title  of  an  Executive  Commis- 
sion. Ledru  RoUin'e  offences  were  condoned,  as  those 
of  a  man  popular  with  the  democracy,  and  likely  on  the 
whole  to  yield  to  the  influence  of  his  colleagues.  Louis 
Blanc  and  his  confederate,  Albert,  as  really  dangerous 
persons,  were  excluded.  The  Jacobin  leaders  now 
proceeded  to  organise  an  attack  on  the  Assembly  by 
main  force.  On  the  15th  of  May  the  attempt  was 
made.  Under  pretence  of  tenderiug  a  peti- 
'  tion  on  behalf  of  Poland,  a  mob  invaded 
the  Legislative  Chamber,  declared  the  Assembly  dis- 
solved, and  put  the  Deputies  to  flight.  But  the 
triumph  was  of  short  duration.  The  National  Guard, 
whose  commander  alone  was  responsible  for  the  failure 
of  measures  of  defence,  soon  rallied  in  force;  the  leaders 
of  the  insurgents,  some  of  whom  had  installed  them- 
selves as  a  Provisional  Government  at  the  H6tel  de 
Ville,  were  made  captive ;  and  after  an  interval  of  a 


IM  THE  NATIONAL  W0&K3S0PB.  » 

few  honrs  the  Assembly  resumed  possession  of  the 
Palais  Bourboa.  The  (lishonour  done  to  the  aational 
representation  by  the  scandalous  scenes  of  the  15th  of 
May,  as  well  as  the  decisively  proved  superiority  of  the 
National  Guard  over  the  half-anned  mob,  encouraged 
the  Assembly  to  declare  open  war  against  the  so-called 
social  democracy,  and  to  decree  the  abolition 
of  the  national  workshops.  The  enormous  JSaSSdWak. 
growth  of  these  establishments,  which  now 
included  over  a  hundred  thousand  men,  threatened  to 
rain  the  public  finances ;  the  demoralisation  which  they 
eugendered  seemed  likely  to  destroy  whatever  was  soand 
in  the  life  of  the  working  classes  of  Paris.  Of  honest 
industry  there  was  scarcely  a  trace  to  he  found  among 
the  masses  who  were  receiving  their  daily  w^es 
from  the  State.  Whatever  the  sincerity  of  those  who 
had  founded  the  national  workshops,  whatever  the 
anxiety  for  employment  on  the  part  of  those  who  first 
resorted  to  them,  they  had  now  become  mere  hives  of 
disorder,  where  the  resources  of  the  State  were  lavished 
in  accumnlatiug  a  force  for  its  own  overthrow.  It  was 
necessary,  at  whatever  risk,  to  extinguish  the  evil. 
Plans  for  the  gradual  dispersion  of  the  army  of  work- 
men were  drawn  up  by  Committees  and  discussed  by 
the  Assembly.  If  put  in  force  with  no  more  than  the 
necessary  delay,  these  plans  might  perhaps  have  rendered 
a  peaceful  solution  of  the  difficulty  possible.  But  the 
Government  hesitated,  and  finally,  when  a  decision 
could  no  longer  be  avoided,  determined  upon  measures 
more  violent  and  more  sudden  than  those  wlueh  the 


40  MOVBRN  BimOPB.  iM 

Committees  had  recommended.  On  the  2l8t  of  June 
an  order  was  published  that  all  occapants  of  the  public 
workshops  between  the  ages  of  seveDteen  and  tweuty- 
fire  must  enlist  in  the  army  or  cease  to  receive  support 
from  the  State,  and  that  the  removal  of  the  workmen 
who  had  come  into  Paris  from  the  provinces,  for  which 
preparations  had  already  been  made,  must  be  at  once 


The  publication  of  this  order  was  the  signal  for  an 
appeal  to  arms.  The  lemons  of  the  uational  workshops 
were  in  themselves  a  half-organised  force  equal  in 
number  to  several  army-corps,  and  now  animated  by 
something  like  the  spirit  of  military  union.  The 
TiH  TOUT  D*i«  revolt,  which  began  on  the  morning  of  the 
""''  23rd  of  June,  was  conducted  as  no  revolt  in 

Paris  had  ever  been  conducted  before.  The  eastern 
part  of  the  city  was  turned  into  a  maze  of  barricades. 
Though  the  insurgents  had  not  artillery,  they  were  in 
other  respects  fairly  armed.  The  terrible  nature  of  the 
conflict  impending  now  became  evident  to  the  Assembly. 
General  Cavaignac,  Minister  of  War,  was  placed  in 
command,  and  subsequently  invested  with  supreme 
authority,  the  Executive  Commission  resigning  its 
powers.  All  the  troops  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Paris 
were  at  once  summoned  to  the  capital.  Cavaignac  well 
understood  that  any  attempt  to  hold  the  insurrection  in 
check  by  means  of  scattered  posts  would  only  end,  as  in 

*  Bumt,  H&Qoires,  iL  103.  Canssidiere,  Mdmoices,  p.  117.  (Hni*K 
Fftgte,  X.  419.  Honnajiby,  Teat  of  Revolution,  i.  389.  Granier  d« 
GftssagnM^  Ohnte  de  liooia  Philippe,  L  359.  De  U  Oorae,  Seconds  lU- 
puUi^oe,  i.  273.    Fallonx,  lUmoirea,  I  3^ 


IM  TBB  rOUlt  DATS  Of  StTSn.  41 

IS30,  by  the  capture  or  the  demoralisation  of  the 
troops.  Se  treated  Paris  as  one  great  battle-field  in 
which  the  enemy  mast  be  attacked  in  mass  and  driven 
by  m^n  force  &om  all  his  positions.  At  times  the 
effort  appeared  almost  beyond  the  power  of  the  forces 
engaged,  and  the  insni^nts,  sheltered  by  hnge  barri- 
cades and  firing  from  tbe  windows  of  houses,  seemed 
likely  to  remain  masters  of  the  field.  The  struggle 
continued  for  four  days,  but  Cavaignac's  artillery  and 
the  discipline  of  bis  tmops  at  last  crushed  resistance ; 
and  after  the  Archbishop  of  Paris  had  been  mortally 
wounded  in  a  heroic  effort  to  stop  farther  bloodshed, 
the  last  bands  of  the  insurgents,  driven  back  into  the 
north-eastern  quarter  of  the  city,  and  there  attacked 
witii  artillery  in  front  and  flank,  were  forced  to  lay 
down  their  arms. 

Such  was  the  conflict  of  the  Four  Days  of  June, 
a  conflict  memorable  as  one  in  which  the  combatants 
fought  not  for  a  political  principle  or  form  of  Govern- 
ment, but  for  the  preservation  or  the  overthrow 
of  society  based  on  the  Institution  of  private  pro- 
perty. The  National  Guard,  with  some  exceptions, 
fought  side  by  side  with  the  regiments  of  the  line, 
braved  the  same  perils,  and  sustained  an  equal  loss. 
The  workmen  threw  themselves  the  more  passionately 
into  the  struggle,  inasmuch  as  defeat  threatened  them 
with  deprivation  of  the  very  means  of  life.  On  both 
sides  acts  of  savagery  were  committed  which  the 
fniy  of  the  conflict  could  not  excuse.  Tbe  ven- 
geance  of  the   conquerors  in  the  moment  of  success 


48  MODERN  EUItOPB.  IMS. 

appetffs,  bowever,  to  hare  been  less  unTeleoting  than 
that  which  followed  the  overthrow  of  the  Commune  in 
1871,  though,  after  the  stru^le  was  over,  the  Assembly- 
had  no  Bcraple  in  transporting  without  trial  the  whole 
mass  of  prisoners  taken  with  arms  in  their  hands. 
Cavaignac'e  victory  left  the  classes  for  whom  he  had 
Ften  left  br  the  fought  terror-striclten  at  the  peril  from 
*"*  ™*'  which  they  had  escaped,  and  almost  hope- 
less of  their  own  security  under  any  popular  form  of 
Government  in  the  future.  Against  the  rash  and  weak 
concessions  to  popular  demands  that  had  been  made  by 
the  administration  since  February,  especially  in  the 
matter  of  taxation  and  Bnance,  there  was  now  a  deep, 
if  not  loudly  proclaimed,  reaction.  The  national  work- 
shops disappeared  ;  grants  were  made  by  the  Legislalare 
for  the  assistance  of  the  masses  who  were  left  without 
resource,  but  the  money  was  bestowed  in  charitable 
relief  or  in  the  form  of  loans  to  associations,  not  as 
wages  from  the  State.  On  every  side  among  the  holders 
of  property  the  cry  was  for  a  return  to  sound  principles 
of  finance  in  the  economy  of  the  State,  and  for  the 
establishment  of  a  strong  central  power. 

General  Cavaignac  after  the  re.-^toration  of  order  liad 
laid  down  the  supreme  authority  which  had  been  con- 
ferred on  him,  but  at  the  desire  of  the  Assembly  he 
continued  to  exercise  it  until  the  new  Constitution 
<hnig7>HHid  should  be  drawn  up  and  an  Executive  ap- 
^^™^  '  pointed  in  accordance  with  its  provisions. 

Events  had  suddenly  raised  Cavaignac  from  obscurity 
to  eminence,  and  seemed  to  mark  him  out  as  the  fature 


MK.  £01775  NAPOLEON.  48 

ruler  of  France.  But  he  displayed  during  the  six 
months  following  the  suppression  of  the  revolt  no  great 
capacity  for  government,  and  his  virtues  as  well  as  his 
defects  made  against  his  personal  success.  A  sincere 
Eepuhlican,  while  at  the  same  time  a  rigid  upholder  of 
law,  he  refused  to  lend  himself  to  those  who  were, 
except  in  name,  enemies  of  Republicanism  ;  and  in  his 
official  acts  and  utterances  he  spared  the  feelings  of  the 
reactionary  classes  as  little  as  he  would  have  spared 
those  of  rioters  and  Socialists.  As  the  influence  of 
Cavaignac  declined,  another  name  hegan  to  fill  men's 
thoughts.  Louis  Napoleon,  son  of  the  Emperor's 
brother  Louis,  l^ing  of  Holland,  had  while  still  in 
exile  been  elected  to  the  National  Assembly  by  four 
Departments.  He  was  as  yet  almost  unknown  except 
by  name  to  his  fellow-countrymen.  Bom  in  the 
Tuileries  in  1S08,  he  had  been  involved  as  a  child  in 
the  ruin  of  the  Empire,  and  had  passed  into  banish- 
ment with  his  mother  Kortense,  under  the  law  that 
expelled  from  France  all  members  of  Napoleon's 
family.  He  had  been  brought  up  at  Augsburg  and  on 
the  shores  of  the  Lake  of  Constance,  and  as  a  volunteer 
in  a  Swiss  camp  of  artillery  he  had  gained  some  little 
acquaintance  with  military  life.  In  1831  he  had  joined 
the  insurgents  in  the  Romagoa  who  were  in  arms 
against  the  Papal  Government.  The  death  of  his  own 
elder  brother,  followed  in  1832  by  that  of  Napoleon's 
son,  the  Duke  of  Beichstadt,  made  him  chief  of  the 
house  of  Bonaparte.  Though  far  more  of  a  recluse 
than  a  man  of  action,  though  so  little  of  his  own  nation 


M  MOBEUN  SUSOFS.  Ui*. 

that  he  conld  not  pronounce  a  sentence  of  French  with- 
out a  marked  German  accent,  and  had  never  even  seen 
a  French  play  performed,  he  now  became  possessed  by  the 
fixed  idea  that  he  was  one  day  to  wear  the  French 
Crown.  A  few  obscure  adventurers  attached  themselves 
to  his  fortunes,  and  in  183G  he  appeared  at  Strasburg 
and  presented  himself  to  the  troops  as  Emperor.  The 
enterprise  ended  in  failure  and  ridicule.  Louis  Napo- 
leon was  shipped  to  America  by  the  Orleanist  Govern- 
ment, which  supplied  him  with  money,  and  thought  it 
unnecessary  even  to  bring  him  to  trial.  He  recrossed 
the  Atlantic,  made  his  home  in  England,  and  in  1840 
repeated  at  Boulogne  the  attempt  that  bad  failed  at 
Strasburg.  The  result  was  again  disastrous.  He  was 
now  sentenced  to  perpetual  imprisonment.  Mid  passed 
the  neit  six  years  in  captivity  at  Ham,  where  he 
produced  a  treatise  on  the  Napoleonic  Ideas,  and  certain 
fragments  on  political  and  social  questions.  The 
enthusiasm  for  Napoleon,  of  which  there  had  been  little 
trace  in  France  since  1815,  was  now  reviving;  the 
sufferings  of  the  epoch  of  conquest  were  forgotten  ;  the 
steady  maintenance  of  peace  by  Louis  Philippe  seemed 
humiliating  to  young  and  ardent  spirits  who  had  not 
known  the  actual  presence  of  the  foreigner.  In  literature 
two  men  of  eminence  worked  powerfully  upon  the 
national  imagination.  The  history  of  Thiers  gave  the 
nation  a  great  stage-picture  of  Napoleon's  exploits ; 
Stranger's  lyrics  invested  bis  exile  at  St.  Helena  with 
an  irresistible,  though  spurious,  pathos.  Thus,  little  as 
the  world  concerned  itself  with  the  prisoner  at  Ham. 


18«.  LOUIB  NAPOLEON.  45 

the  tendencies  of  the  time  were  working  in  his  faroar ; 
and  his  confinement,  which  lasted  six  years  and  was 
tenninated  hj  hia  escape  and  return  to  England,  appears 
to  have  deepened  his  hrooding  nature,  and  to  have 
strengthened  rather  than  diminished  his  confidence  in 
himself.  On  the  overthrow  of  Louis  Philippe  he  visited 
Paris,  but  was  requested  by  the  Provisional  Govern- 
ment, on  the  ground  of  the  unrepealed  law  banishing 
the  Bonaparte  family,  to  quit  the  country.  He  obeyed, 
probably  foreseeing  that  the  difficulties  of  the  Republic 
would  create  better  opportunities  for  his  reappearance. 
Meanwhile  the  group  of  unknown  men  who  sought 
their  fortunes  in  a  Napoleonic  restoration  busily  can- 
vassed and  wrote  on  behalf  of  the  Prince,  and  with 
such  success  that,  in  the  supplementary  elections  that 
were  held  at  the  beginning  of  Juik  ,  he  obtained  a  four- 
fold triumph.  The  Assembly,  in  spite  of  the  efforts  of 
the    Government,    pronounced    his    return 

^  Louis  Napoleoii 

valid.  Yet  with  rare  self-command  the  t^'^^^' 
Prince  still  adhered  to  his  policy  of  reserve, 
resigning  his  seat  on  the  ground  that  hia  election  had 
been  made  a  pretest  for  movements  of  which  he  dis- 
approved, while  at  the  same  time  he  declared  in  his 
letter  to  the  President  of  the  Assembly  that  if  duties 
shoold  be  imposed  upon  him  by  the  people  he  should 
know  how  to  fulfil  them.* 

From  this  time  Louis'  Napoleon  was  a  recognised 
aspirant  to  power.    The  Constitution  of  the  Ecpublic 

*  CEorTM  de  Napoleon  m.,  iii.  13,  2A.    Onuiier  de  Csssagnu,  li.  16. 
Jerrold.  NajMltou  IH,  ii.  393, 


IS  MODERN  EUBOPS.  ISM. 

was  now  beings  drawn  ap  by  the  Assembly.  The 
Executive  Commission  had  disappeared  in  the  convul- 
sion of  June  I  Cavaignac  was  holding  the  balance  be- 
tween parties  rather  than  governing  himself.     In  the 

midst  of  the  debates,  on  the  Constitution 
•^•loctoi.        Louis  Napoleon  was  again  returned  to  the 

Assembly  by  the  votes  of  five  Departments. 
He  saw  that  he  ought  to  remain  no  longer  in  the 
background,  and,  accepting  the  call  of  the  electors,  he  took 
his  seat  in  the  Chamber.  It  was  clear  that  he  wonld 
become  a  candidate  for  the  Presidency  of  the  Bepublic, 
and  that  the  popularity  of  his  name  among  the  masses 
was  enormous.  He  had  twice  presented  himself  to 
France  as  the  heir  to  Napoleon's  throne ;  he  had  never 
directly  abandoned  his  dynastic  claim ;  he  had  but 
recently  declared,  in  almost  threatening  language,  that 
he  should  know  how  to  fulfil  the  duties  that  the  people 
might  impose  upon  him.  Yet  with  all  these  facts 
before  it  the  Assembly,  misled  by  the  puerile  rhetoric 
of  Lamartioe,  decided  that  in  the  new  Constitution  the 
President  of  the  Republic,  in  whom  was  vested  the 
executive  power,  should  be  chosen  by  the  direct  vote  of 
all  Frenchmen,  and  rejected  the  amendment  of  M. 
Gr^vy,  who,  with  real  insight  into  the  future,  declared 
that  such  direct  election  by  the  people  could  only  give 
France  a  Dictator,  and  demanded  that  the  President 
should  be  appointed  not  by  the  masses  but  by  the 
Chamber.  Thus  was  the  way  paved  for  Louis  Napoleon's 
march  to  power.  The  events  of  June  had  dispelled  any 
attraction  that  he  had  hitherto  felt  towards  Socialistie 


iw  XOPrS  NAPOLEON,  PSBSIDENT.  47 

theories.  He  saw  that  France  required  an  upholder  of 
order  and  of  property.  In  his  address  to  the  nation  an- 
nouncing his  candidatare  for  the  Presidency  he  declared 
thathe  would  shrink  from  no  sacrifice  in  defending  society, 
so  andacionsly  attacked ;  that  he  would  devote  himself 
without  reserve  to  the  maintenance  of  the  Repuhlic,  and 
make  it  his  pride  to  leave  to  his  successor  at  the  end  of 
four  years  authority  strengthened,  liberty  unimpaired, 
and  real  progress  accomplished.  Behind  these  gener- 
alities the  address  dexterously  touched  on  the  special 
wants  of  classes  and  parties,  and  promised  something  to 
each.  The  French  nation  in  the  election  which  followed 
showed  that  it  believed  in  Louis  Napoleon  even  more 
than  he  did  in  himself.  If  there  existed  in  the  opinion 
of  the  great  mass  any  element  beyond  the  mere  instinct 
of  self-defence  against  real  or  supposed  schemes  of  spolia- 
tion, it  was  reverence  for  Napoleon's  memory.  Out  of 
seven  millionsof  votes  given,  liouis  Napoleon 
received  above  five,  Cavaignac,  who  alone  eiKie^  f-^- 
entered  into  serious  competition  with  him,  re- 
ceiving about  a  fourth  part  of  that  number.  Lamartine 
and  the  men  who  ten  months  before  had  represented  all 
the  hopes  of  the  nation  now  found  but  a  handful  of 
supporters.  Though  none  yet  openly  spoke  of  Monar- 
chy, on  all  sides  there  was  the  desire  for  the  restoration 
of  power.  The  day-dreams  of  the  second  llopiiblic 
had  fled.  France  had  shown  that  its  choice  lay  only 
between  a  soldier  who  had  crushed  rebellion  and  a 
stranger  who  brought  no  title  to  its  confidence  but  an 
Imperial  name.  ^        , 

D,=,l,z..tvLnOOgIf 


CHAPTEB   n. 

Auatri*  uid  Ilslj— Vienna  from  Harch  to  May— Fliglit  of  ttie  Empcrar — 
Bohemian  NalionBl  Hovement  — WindiBch^;tati  lubduee  Pm^pie — Campugn 
around  Verooa — Papal  Alloflution — NnplM  in  Maj' — Negotiationa  aa  to  Lom- 
bardy — Baconquost  of  Vcnetia— Battle  of  CugtosEa-pThe  Anttrian*  eDt«r 
Alitan — Auatrion  Court  and  Hungary — The  Serbs  ia  Southern  Hungary — 
8erb  CopgroM  at  Carlowit*— Jellaciu — AfEaira  of  Ctoatia—JeUncic,  the 
Coart  and  the  Hungarian  Movement — Murder  of  Lamberg — Manifesto  of 
October  3— Yiennn  on  October  6 — The  Emperor  at  Olmiitz—  Windiichgriti 
conquers  Vienna — The  Piirliament  at  KremBier— Schwarxenberg  Uinjitca^ — 
Ferdinand  Bbdicut<>B — Dissolution  of  the  Krenuier  Parliament — Unitary 
Edict — Hungary — -The  Houmanians  in  Transylvania — The  Anstrian  Army 
oooupieB  Pcelh — HungHrian  Government  at  Debrecsin — The  Auatriana 
driven  out  of  Hungary — Declaration  of  Hungarian  Independence — RuBsiail 
Intervention — The  Huogiirian  Summer  Campaign — Capitulation  of  VitagOB 
— Italy— Murder  of  Eossi— Tuscnny — The  March  Goinpaign  in  Iiombanly — 
Noi-ara — Abdication  of  Charloe  Albert — Victor  Emmanuel — Rertoration  in 
Tiincany — French  Intervcntiiin  in  Rome— Defeat  of  Oudinot^OudinOt  and 
Lw«oj»— The  French  entjir  liomii-  -The  Itfistored  Pontifloal  Ooveroment — 
Full  of  Venice — Ferdinand  retonqutrs  Sicily — Oermany — Hie  National 
ARscmbly  at  Frankfort — The  Armistice  of  Malmii— Uerlin  from  April  to 
Seplembor — The  ['ruaaian  Army— Laat  dayi  of  the  Pruaaian  Parliament — 
Pruaaian  Constitution  gmnted  by  Edict — The  German  National  Assembly 
and  Austria— Frederick  William  IV.  elected  Emperor— He  refuses  tha 
Crown — Kudof  the  National  Aasembly^Prusela  attempts  to  form  a  eeparats 
Union — The  nniun  Parliament  nt  Erfurt — Action  of  Austria — Hesee-Caasel 
— The  Diet  of  Frankfort  rostoii  d — Olmiitz — Schleairig-HolBtiiin — Germany 
after  1349— Austria  after  ISIil— France  after  1848 — Louis  Hapoleon — Tha 
Octobor  Message — Law  Limiting  tlio  Franchise — Louis  Napoleon  and  tha 
Army  —  Proposed  Revision  of  the  ConstituUon  —  The  Coup  d'etat  — 
N^ioleon  III.  EnipctOT. 

The  plain  of  Northern  Italy  has  ever  heen  an  arena  on 

which  the  contest  between  interests  greater 

^^^'  than  those  of  Italy  itself  has  been  brongbt 

to  an  issue ;   and  it  may  perhaps   be  truly  said  that 

ia    the    struggle    between    established    Govenunenta 


tm.  AUSTRIA  ASD  ITALY.  « 

and  Bevolution  thronglioat  Central  £urope  in  184S 
the  real  tamiDg-point,  if  it  can  anywhere  be  fixed,  lay 
rather  in  the  fortunes  of  a  campaign  in  Lombardy  than 
in  any  single  combination  of  events  at  Vienna  or  Berlin. 
The  very  existence  of  the  Austrian  Monarchy  depended 
on  the  victory  of  Badetzky's  forces  over  the  national 
movement  at  the  head  of  which  Piedmont  had  now  placed 
itself.  If  Italian  independence  should  be  established 
upon  the  ruin  of  the  Austrian  arms,  and  the  influence 
and  example  of  the  victorious  Italian  people  be  thrown 
into  the  scale  j^ainst  the  Imperial  Government  in  its 
struggle  with  the  separatist  forces  that  convulsed  every 
part  of  the  Austrian  dominions,  it  was  scarcely  possible 
that  any  stroke  of  fortune  or  policy  could  save  the 
Empire  of  the  Hapshurga  from  dissolution.  But  on 
the  prostration  or  recovery  of  Austria,  as  represented 
by  its  central  power  at  Vienna,  the  future  of  Germany 
in  great  part  depended.  Whatever  compromise  might 
be  effected  between  popular  and  monarchical  forces  in 
the  other  German  States  if  left  free  from  Austria's 
interference,  the  whole  influence  of  a  resurgent  Austrian 
power  could  not  but  be  directed  against  the  principles 
of  popular  sovereignty  and  national  union.  The  Par- 
liament of  Frankfort  might  then  in  vain  affect  to  fulfil 
its  mandate  without  reckoning  with  the  Court  of 
Vienna.  All  this  was  indeed  obscured  in  the  tempests 
that  for  a  while  shut  out  the  political  horizon.  The 
Liberals  of  Northern  Germany  had  little  sympathy 
with  the  Italian  cause  in  the  decisive  days  of  1848. 
Their  inclinations  went  rather  with  the  combatant  who, 


60  UODBBN  EVBOPB.  ma. 

though  bent  oa  tnalntainiDg  an  oppressive  dominion, 
was  nevertheless  a  memher  of  the  German  race  and  paid 
homage  for  the  moment  to  Constitutional  rights.  Yet, 
as  later  events  were  to  prove,  the  fetters  which  crushed 
liberty  beyond  the  Alps  could  fit  as  closely  on  to 
German  Hmbs ;  and  in  the  warfare  of  Upper  Italy  for 
its  own  freedom  the  battle  of  German  Liberalism  was 
in  no  small  measure  fought  and  lost. 

Mettemich  once  banished  from  Vienna,  the  first 
popular  demand  was  for  a  Constitution.  His  successors 
in  office,  with  a  certain  characteristic  pedantry,  devoted 
■vimn.(roni  their  studics  to  the  Belgian  Constitution  of 
tttnbtaibj.       j^ggj  _  ^^^  ^i^gj,  gQjjjg  weeks  a  Constitution 

was  published  by  edict  for  the  non- Hungarian  part  of 
the  Empire,  including  a  Parliament  of  two  Chambers, 
the  Lower  to  be  chosen  by  indirect  election,  the  Upper 
consisting  of  nominees  of  the  Crown  and  representatives 
of  the  great  landowners.  The  provisions  of  this  Con- 
stitution in  favour  of  the  Crown  and  the  Aristocracy,  as 
well  as  the  arbitrary  mode  of  its  promulgation,  dis- 
pleased the  Viennese.  Agitation  recommenced  in  the 
city ;  unpopular  ofiicials  were  roughly  handled ;  the 
Press  grew  ever  more  violent  and  more  scurrilous. 
One  strange  result  of  the  tutelage  In  which  Austrian 
society  had  been  held  was  that  the  students  of  the 
University  became,  and  for  some  time  continued  to  be, 
the  most  important  political  body  of  the  capital.  Their 
principal  rivals  in  influence  were  the  National  Guard 
drawn  from  citizens  of  the  middle  class,  the  workmen 
t8  yet  remaining  in  the  background.     Keither  in  the 


laa.  TTSSSA.  U 

Hall  of  the  ITmTeTsitj  nor  at  the  taverns  where  the 
dvic  mOitia  discussed  the  events  of  the  hour  did  the 
office-drawn  Constitntion  find  &vour.  On  the  13th  of 
May  it  was  determined,  with  the  view  of  exercising 
stronger  pressure  upon  the  Q-overnment,  that  the  exist- 
ing committees  of  the  Kational  Guard  and  of  the 
students  should  be  superseded  bj  one  central  committee 
representing  both  bodies.  The  elections  to  this  com- 
mittee had  been  held,  and  its  sittings  had  begun,'  when 
the  commtuider  of  the  National  Guard  declared  such  pro- 
ceedings to  he  inconsistent  with  military  discipline,  and 
ordered  the  dissolution  of  the  committee.  Riots  followed, 
during  which  the  students  and  the  mob  made  their  way 
into  the  Emperor's  palace  and  demanded  from  his 
Ministers  not  only  the  re-establishment  of  the  central 
committee  but  the  abolition  of  the  Upper  Chamber  in 
the  projected  Constitution,  and  the  removal  of  the 
chet^s  imposed  on  popular  sovereignty  by  a  limited 
fianchise  and  the  system  of  indirect  elections.  On 
point  after  point  the  Ministry  gave  way ;  and,  in  spite 
of  the  resistance  and  reproaches  of  the  Imperial  house- 
holdf  they  obtuned  the  Emperor's  siguatore  to  a 
document  promising  that  for  the  future  all  the  important 
military  posts  in  the  oity  should  be  held  by  the  National 
Quard  jointly  with  the  regular  troops,  that  the  latter 
should  never  be  called  oat  except  on  the  requisition  of 
tiie  National  Guard,  and  that  the  projected  Constitution 
should  remain  without  force  until  it  should  have  been 
sobmitted  for  confirmation  to  a  single  Constituent 
Aiisembly  elected  by  universal  sufErage. 

i2  L  ,„..,=,  Coogk- 


fia  MODERN  SUSOFS.  IM 

The  weakness  of  the  Emperor's  intelligence  rendered 
him  a  mere  puppet  in  the  hands  of  those  who  for  the 
moment  exercised  control  oyer  his  actions.  During  the 
riot  of  the  15th  of  May  he  obeyed  his  Ministers  ;  a  few 
hours  afterwards  he  fell  under  the  sway  of  the  Court 

party,  and  consented  to  fly  from  Vienna. 
&BPTO,         On  the  18th  the  Viennese  learnt  to  their 

astonishment  that  Ferdinand  was  far  on  the 
road  to  the  Tyrol.  Soon  afterwards  a  manifesto  was 
published,  stating  that  the  violence  and  anarchy  of  the 
capital  had  compelled  the  Emperor  to  transfer  his 
residence  to  Innsbruck ;  that  he  remained  true,  however, 
to  the  promises  made  in  March  and  to  their  legitimate 
consequences;  and  that  proof  must  be  given  of  the 
return  of  the  Viennese  to  their  old  sentiments  of  loyalty 
before  he  could  again  appear  among  them.  A  certain 
revulsion  of  feeling  in  the  Emperor's  favour  now  became 
manifest  in  the  capital,  and  emboldened  the  Ministers 
to  take  the  first  step  necessary  towards  obtaining  his 
return,  namely  the  dissolution  of  the  Students'  Legion. 
They  could  count  with  some  confidence  on  the  support 
of  the  wealthier  part  of  the  middle  class^  who  were 
now  becoming  wearied  of  the  students'  extravj^nces 
and  alarmed  at  the  interruption  of  business  caused  by 
the  Bevolution ;  moreover,  the  ordinary  termination  of 
the  academic  year  was  near  at  hand.  The  order  was 
Tnonitof  accordingly  given  for  the  dissolution  of  the 
"''**'  Legion  and  the  closing  of  the  University. 
But  the  students  met  the  order  with  the  stoutest  resist- 
ance.   The  workmen  poured  in  from  the  suburbs  to 


join  in  their  defence.  Barricades  were  erected,  and  the 
insurrection  (^  March  seemed  on  the  point  of  being 
renewed.  Once  more  the  Government  gave  way,  and 
not  only  revoked  its  order,  tint  declared  itself  incapable 
of  preserving  tranquillity  in  the  capital  unless  it  should 
receive  the  assistance  of  the  leaders  of  the  people. 
With  the  full  concurrence  of  the  Ministers,  a  Committee 
of  Public  Safety  was  formed,  representing  at  once  the 
students,  the  middle  class,  and  the  workmen ;  and  it 
entered  upon  its  duties  with  an  authority  exceeding^ 
within  the  hmits  of  the  capital,  that  of  the  shadowy 
functionaries  of  State.* 

In  the  meantime  the  antagonism  between  the  Czechs. 
and  the  G-ermaus  in  Bohemia  was  daUy  becoming  more 
bitter.  The  influence  of  the  party  of  com- 
promise, which  had  been  dominant  in  the 
early  days  of  March,  had  disappeared  before 
the  ill-timed  attempt  of  the  German  national  leaders 
at  Frankfort  to  include  Bohemia  within  the  territory 
sending  representatives  to  the  German  national  Parlia- 
ment. By  consenting  to  this  incorporation  the  Czech 
population  would  have  dehaitely  renounced  its  newly 
asserted  claim  to  nationality.  If  the  growth  of  demo- 
cratic spirit  at  Vienna  was  accompanied  by  a  mure 
intense  German  national  feeling  in  the  capital,  the 
popular  movements  at  Vienna  and  at  Prague  must 
necessarily    pass  into   a   relation   of   conflict  with  one 

•  Titothnm,  Wion,  p.  108.  Springer,  ii  293.  PillerHdorff,  Buck- 
bHoke,  p.  63 ;  NacU^SB,  p.  118.  BesdiAtier,  ii  176.  Dntider,  October 
BeTolntioD,  p.  6.    Kcquelnum^  Anfldarangen,  ^  65. 


S4  UODESlSr  BUBOPB.  am. 

anotter.  On  the  flight  of  the  Emperor  becoming 
known  at  Prague,  Count  Thun,  the  governor,  who  was 
also  the  chief  of  the  moderate  Bohemian  paHy,  invited 
Ferdinand  to  make  Fn^jue  the  seat  of  his  Government. 
This  invitation,  which  would  have  directly  connected 
the  Crown  with  Czech  national  interests,  was  not  ac- 
cepted. The  rasher  politicians,  chiefly  students  and 
workmen,  continued  to  hold  their  meetings  and  to  patrol 
the  streets ;  and  a  Congress  of  Slavs  from  all  parts  of 
the  Empire,  which  was  opened  on  the  2nd  of  June, 
excited  national  passions  still  further.  So  threaten- 
ing grew  the  attitude  of  the  btudents  and  workmen 
that  Count  Windischgratz,  commander  of  the  troops  at 
Prague,  prepared  to  act  with  artillery.  On  the  12th  of 
June,  the  day  on  which  the  Congress  of 
nMoH^ligiw,  Slavs  broke  up,  fighting  began.  Windisch- 
gratz, whose  wife  was  killed  by  a  bullet, 
appears  to  have  acted  with  calmness,  and  to  have 
sought  to  arrive  at  some  peaceful  settlement.  He 
withdrew  his  troops,  and  desisted  from  a  bombardment 
that  he  had  begun,  on  the  undenitunding  that  the  barri- 
cades which  had  been  erected  should  be  removed.  This 
condition  was  not  fulfilled.  New  acts  of  violence  occurred 
in  the  city,  and  on  the  17th  Windischgratz  reopened 
fire.  On  the  following  day  Prague  surrendered,  and 
Windischgratz  re-entered  the  city  aa  Dictator.  The 
autonomy  of  Bohemia  was  at  an  end.  The  army  had 
for  the  first  time  acted  with  eifect  against  a  popular 
rising ;  the .  first  blow  had  been  struck  on  behalf  of 
the   central   power  against  the  revolution  which   till 


sn  WAR  IN  NOBTHEBIT  ITALT.  65 

now  had  seemed  about  to  dissolve  the  Aoatrian  State 
into  its  fr^raente. 

At  this  point  the  dominant  interest  in  Austrian 
affairs  passes  from  the  capital  and  the  northern  provinces 
to  Badetzky's  army  and  the  Italians  with  whom  it 
stood  face  to  face.  Once  convinced  of  the  necessity  of 
a  retreat  from  Milan,  the  Austrian  com- 
mander had  moved  with  sufficient  rapidity     uonnd  vvou, 

'  •'        April— H^. 

to  save  Verona  and  Mantua  from  passing 
into  the  hands  of  the  insurgents.  He  was  thus  enabled 
to  place  his  army  in  one  of  the  best  defensive  positions 
in  Europe,  the  Quadrilateral  flanked  by  the  rivers 
Mincio  and  Adige,  and  protecU'd  by  the  fortresses  of 
Verona,  Mantua,  Peschiera,  and  Legnano.  With  his 
front  on  the  Mincio  he  awaited  at  once  the  attack  of 
the  Piedmontese  and  the  arrival  of  reinforcements  from 
the  north-east.  On  the  8th  of  April  the  first  attack  was 
made,  and  after  a  sharp  engagement  at  Goito  the  pas- 
sage of  the  Mincio  was  effected  by  the  Sardinian  army. 
Siege  was  now  laid  to  Peschiera ;  and  while  a  Tuscan 
contingent  watched  Mantua,  the  bulk  of  Charles  Albert's 
forces  operated  farther  northward  with  the  view  of  cutting 
off  Verona  from  the  roads  to  the  Tyrol.  This  result  was 
for  a  moment  achieved,  but  the  troops  at  the  King's 
disposal  were  far  too  weak  for  the  task  of  reducing  the 
fortresses;  and  in  an  attempt  that  was  made  on  the  6th 
of  May  to  drive  the  Austrians  out  of  their  positions  in 
front  of  Verona,  Charles  Albert  was  defeated  at  Santa 
Lucia  and  compelled  to  fall  back  towards  the  Mincio.* 
•  Sehonhals,  p.  U7.    F«rini,a.».    ParLPtp.  18*9,  Wi  ^^y],. 


S6  UODEBN  SUEOPB.  iMtL 

A  pause  in  the  war  ensued,  filled  by  political  events 
of  evil  omen  for  Italy.  Of  all  the  princes  who  had 
permitted  their  troops  to  march  northwards  to  the 
assistance  of  the  Lombards,  not  one  was  acting  in  full 
sincerity.  The  first  to  show  himself  in  his  true  colours 
was  the  Pope.  On  the  29tb  of  April  an  Allocution 
was  addressed  to  the  Cardinals,  in  which  Pius  disavowed 
Bip^juioei*.  *'^  participation  in  the  war  against  Austria, 
tion,  April  M.  ^^^  declared  that  his  own  troops  should  do 
no  more  than  defend  the  integrity  of  the  Koman  States. 
Though  at  the  moment  an  outburst  of  popular  indigna- 
tion in  Bome  forced  a  still  more  liberal  Ministry  into 
power,  and  Durando,  the  Papal  general,  continued  his 
advance  into  Venetia,  the  Pope's  renunciation  of  his 
supposed  national  leadership  produced  the  effect  which 
its  author  desired,  encouraging  every  open  and  every 
secret  enemy  of  the  Italian  cause,  and  perplexing  those 
who  had  believed  themselves  to  he  engaged  in  a  sacred 
as  well  as  a  patriotic  war.  In  Naples  things  hurried 
far  more  rapidly  to  a  catastrophe.  Elections  had  been 
held  to  the  Chamber  of  Deputies,  which 
was  to  be  opened  on  the  1 5tli  of  May,  and 
most  of  the  members  returned  were  men  who,  while 
devoted  to  the  Italian  national  cause,  were  neither  lie- 
publicans  nor  enemies  of  the  Bourbon  dynasty,  but 
anxious  to  co-operate  with  their  King  in  tlie  work  of 
Constitutional  reform.  Politicians  of  another  character, 
however,  commanded  the  streets  of  Naples.  Humours 
were  spread  that  the  Court  was  on  the  point  of  restoring; 
despotic  government  and  abandoning  the  It^iaa  cause. 


Disorder  and  agitation  increased  from  daj,  to  day; 
and  after  the  Deputies  had  arrived  in  the  city  and 
begun  a .  series  of  informal  meetings  preparatory  to  the 
opening  of  the  Parliament,  an  ill-advised  act  of  Ferdi- 
nand gave  to  the  party  of  disorder,  who  were  weakly 
represented  in  the  Assembly,  occasion  for  an  insurrec- 
tion. After  promulgating  the  Constitution  on  Fehruaiy 
10th,  Ferdinand  had  agreed  that  it  should  be  submitted 
to  the  two  Chambers  for  revision.  He  notified,  how- 
ever, to  the  Representatives  on  the  eve  of  the  opening 
of  Parliament  that  they  would  he  required  to  take 
an  oath  of  fidelity  to  the  Constitution.  They  urged 
that  such  an  oath  would  deprive  them  of  their 
right  of  revision.  The  King,  after  some  hours,  con- 
sented to  a  change  in  the  formula  of  the  oath ;  hut  his 
demand  had  ahready  thrown  the  city  into  tumult. 
Barricades  were  erected,  the  Deputies  in  vain  en- 
deavouring to  calm  the  rioters  and  to  prevent  a  conflict 
with  the  troops.  While  negotiations  were  still  in  pro- 
gress shots  were  fired.  The  troops  now  threw  them- 
selves upon  the  people ;  there  was  a  stru^le,  short  in 
duration,  hut  sanguinary  and  merciless ;  the  barricades 
were  captured,  some  hundreds  of  the  insurgents  slain, 
and  Ferdinand  was  once  more  absolute  master  of 
Naples.  The  Assembly  was  dissolved  on  the  day  after 
thai  on  which  it  should  have  met.  Orders  were  at  once 
sent  by  the  Eing  to  0enetal  Pepe,  commaoder  of  the 
troops  that  were  on  the  march  to  Lombardy,  to  return 
with  his  army  to  Naples.  Though  Pepe  continued 
true  to  the  national  cause,  and  endeavoured  to  lead  his 


«8  XODEBN  EUBOFB.  tm. 

army  foriyard  from  Bologna  in  defiance  of  the  King's 
instructions,  his  troops  now  melted  away ;  and  when  he 
crossed  the  Fo  and  placed  himself  under  the  standard 
of  Charles  Alhert  in  Venetia  there  remained  with  him 
scarcely  fifteen  hundred  men. 

It  thus  became  clear  before  the  end  of  May  that 
the  Lombards  would  receive  no  considerable  help  from 
the  Southern  States  in  their  struggle  for  freedom,  and 
that  the  promised  league  of  the  Governments  in  the 
national  cause  was  but  a  dream  from  which  there 
was  a  bitter  awakening.  Nor  in  Northern  Italy  itself 
was  there  the  unity  in  aim  and  action  without  which 
success  was  impossible.  The  RepubUcan  party  ac- 
cused the  King  and  the  Provisional  Government  at 
KKwiiaiiinu  m  Milan  of  an  unwillingness  to  arm  the 
*"  "''^''  people ;  Charles  Albert  on  his  part  regarded 
every  Republican  as  an  enemy.  On  entering  Lombardy 
the  King  had  stated  that  no  question  as  to  the  political 
organisation  of  the  future  should  be  raised  until  the 
war  was  ended  ;  nevertheless,  before  a  fortress  had  been 
captured,  he  had  allowed  Modena  and  Parma  to  declare 
themselves  incorporated  with  the  Piedmonteae  mon- 
archy; and,  in  spite  of  Mazzini's  protest,  their  example 
was  followed  by  Lombardy  and  some  Venetian  districts. 
In  the  recriminations  that  passed  between  the  Republi- 
cans and  the  Monarchists  it  was  even  suggested  that 
Austria  had  friends  of  its  own  in  certain  classes  of  the 
population.  This  was  not  the  view  taken  by  the 
Viennese  Government,  which  from  the  first  appeara  to 
have  considered  its  cause  in  I^ombardy  as  virtually  lost. 


tarn.  AUSTRIA  AND  ITALY.  W 

The  mediation  of  Great  Britain  was  invoked  bj  Metier- 
nicb's  successors,  and  a  willingness  expressed  to  grant 
to  the  Italian  provinces  complete  autonomy  under  the 
Emperor's  sceptre.  Palmerston,  in  reply  to  the  sappli- 
cations  of  a  Court  which  had  hitherto  cursed  his  influ- 
ence, ui^ed  that  Lombardy  and  the  greater  part  of 
Venetia  should  be  ceded  to  the  King  of  Piedmont. 
The  Austrian  Government  would  have  given  up  Lom- 
bardy to  their  enemy ;  they  hesitated  to  increase  his 
power  to  the  extent  demanded  by  Palmerston,  the  more 
so  as  the  French  Ministry  was  known  to  be  jealous  of 
the  aggrandisemeDt  of  Sardinia,  and  to  desire  the 
efitablishment  of  weak  Bepublics  like  those  formed  in 
1796.  Withdrawing  from  its  negotiations  at  London, 
the  Emperor's  Cabinet  now  entered  into  direct  commu- 
nication with  the  Provisional  GoverDmcnt  at  Milan, 
and,  without  making  any  reference  to  Piedmont  or 
Venice,  offered  complete  independence  to  Lombardy. 
As  the  union  of  this  province  with  Piedmont  had 
already  been  voted  by  its  inhabitants,  the  offer  was  at 
once  rejected.  Moreover,  even  if  the  It^iaus  had  shown 
a  disposition  to  compromise  their  cause  fuid  abandon 
Venice,  Eadetzky  would  not  have  broken  off  the  com- 
bat while  any  possibility  remained  of  winning  over 
the  Emperor  from  the  side  of  the  peace-party.  In 
reply  to  instructions  directing  him  to  offer  an  armistice 
to  the  enemy,  he  sent  Prince  Felix  Schwarzenberg  to 
Innsbruck  to  implore  the  Emperor  to  trust  to  the  valour 
of  his  soldiers  and  to  continue  the  combat.  Already 
there  were  signs  that  the  victory  would  ultimately  be 


eO  X0BEB2T  EUROPE.  ma. 

with  Austria.  Reinforcemeots  had  cut  their  way 
through  the  iusurgoDt  territory  and  renched  Veroua; 
aud  although  a  movement  by  which  Kadetzky  threatened 
to  sever  Charles  Albert's  communications  was  frustrated 
by  a  second  engagement  at  Goito,  and  Peschiera  passed 
into  the  besiegerii'  hands,  this  was  the  last  success  wod 
by  the  Italians.  Throwing  himself  suddenly  eastwards, 
Radetzky  appeared  before  Viccnza,  and  compelled  this 
city,    with    the   entire    Papal    army,    commanded    by 

General  Durando,  to  capitulate.  The  fail 
VMeumJuiM.      of  Vicenza  was  followed  by  that  of  the 

other  cities  on  the  Venetian  mainland  till 
Venice  alone  on  the  east  of  the  Adige  defied  the 
Austrian  arms.  As  the  invader  pressed  onward,  an 
Assembly  which  Manin  had  convoked  at  Venice  decided 
on  union  with  Piedmont.  Manin  himself  had  been  the 
most  zealous  opponent  of  what  be  considered  the 
sacrifice  of  Venetian  independence.  He  gave  way 
nevertheless  at  the  last,  and  made  no  attempt  to  fetter 
the  decision  of  the  Assembly ;  but  when  this  decision 
bad  been  given  he  handed  over  the  conduct  of  affairs  to 
others,  and  retired  for  a  while  into  private  life,  declining 
to  serve  under  a  king.* 

Charles  Albert  now  renewed  his  attempt  to  wrest 
BBioeofc™-  ^''^  central  fortresses  from  the  Austrians. 
toiii,  jiiii  as.  Leaving  half  his  army  at  Peschiera  and 
farther  north,  he  proceeded  with  the  other  half  to 

*  Fi<»|nelnioiit,  p.  6.  PUlersdorff,  Kftchkas,  93.  Hdfeii,  if.  1^ 
Schonhala,  p.  177.  Parliwueotary  Papers,  id.  332,  472,  597.  Coiit«riiii, 
p.  67-  Azeglio,  Operazioni  del  DnrRiido,  p.  6.  Wfttiip,  Dooomeiit^  1 
289.     Bionchi,  Diplomada,  t.  857.     Fasoiini,  p.  100  , 


Wtt  BADETZS7  IN  MILAN,  tt 

blockade  Mantua.  Kadetzky  took  advantage  oE  the  ua- 
skilfol  generalship  of  his  oppoaent,  and  threw  hiiDBclE 
npon  the  weakly  guarded  centre  of  the  long  Sardinian  line. 
The  King  perceived  his  error,  and  sought  to  unite  with 
his  the  northern  detachments,  now  separated  from  him 
by  the  Mincio.  His  efforts  were  baffled,  and  on  the 
25th  of  July,  after  a  brave  resistance,  his  troops  were 
defeated  at  Custozza.  The  retreat  across  the  Mincio 
was  conducted  in  fair  order,  but  disasters  sustained  by 
the  northern  division,  which  should  hare  held  the 
enemy  in  check,  destroyed  all  hope,  and  the  retreat  then 
became  a  flight.  Badetzky  followed  in  close  pursuit. 
Charles  Albert  entered  Milan,  but  declared  himself 
unable  to  defend  the  city.  A  storm  of  indignation 
broke  out  against  the  unhappy  King  amongst  the 
Milanese,  whom  he  was  declared  to  have  betrayed. 
The  palace  where  he  had  taken  up  his  quarters  was 
besieged  by  the  mob ;  his  life  was  threatened ;  and  he 
escaped  with  difhcolty  on  the  night  of  August  5th 
under  the  protection  of  General  La  Marmora  and  a  few 
^thfiil  Guards.  A  capitulation  was  signed,  and  as  the 
Piedmontese  army  evacuated  the  city  Radetzky's  troops 
entered  it  in  triumph.  Not  less  than  sixty 
thousand  of  the  inhabitants,  according  to     mutMiiui, 

"  Aug.  B. 

Italian  statements,  abandoned  their  homes 
and  sought  refuge  in  Switzerland  or  Piedmont  rather 
than  submit  to  the  conqueror's  rule.  Eadetzky  could 
now  have  followed  his  retreating  enemy  without  diffi- 
culty to  Turin,  and  have  crushed  Piedmont  itself  under 
foot ;  but  the  fear  of  France  and  Great  Britain  checked 


M  MOBESJH  BVBOFB.  urn, 

his  career  of  victory,  and  hostilities  were  brought  to  a 
close  by  an  armistice  at  Tigevano  on  August  9th.* 

The  effects  of  Radetzky's  triomph  were  felt  in  every 
province  of  the   Empire.     The   first   open   expression 

given  to  the  changed  state  of  affairs  was 
oportaud  the  retum  of .  the  Imperial  Court  from  its 

refuge  at  Innsbruck  to  Yienna.  The  elec- 
tion promised  in  May  had  been  held,  and  an  Assembly 
representing  all  the  non-Hungarian  parts  of  the  Mon- 
archy, with  the  exception  of  the  Italian  provinces,  had 
been  opened  by  the  Archduke  John,  as  representative 
of  the  Emperor,  on  the  33nd  of  July.  Ministers  and 
Deputies  united  in  demanding  the  retum  of  the  Emperor 
to  the  capital.  With  Radetzky  and  Windischgratz 
within  call,  the  Emperor  could  now  with  some  eon- 
fidence  face  his  students  and  his  Parliament.  But  of 
far  greater  importance  than  the  retum  of  the  Court 
to  Vienna  was  the  attitude  which  it  now  assumed 
towards  the  Diet  and  the  national  Government  of 
Hungary.  The  concessions  made  in  April,  inevitable 
as  they  were,  had  in  fact  raised  Huogaiy  to  the 
position  of  an  independent  State.  When  such  matters 
as  the  employment  of  Hungarian  troops  against  Italy 
or  the  distribution  of  the  burden  of  taxation  came  into 
question,  the  Emperor  had  to  treat  with  the  Hungarian 
Ministry  almost  as  if  it  represented  a  foreign  and  a 
rival  Power.     Eor  some  months  this  humiliation  had  to 


*  ParliamentaiT  Papers,  1849,  ItuL  p.  128.  Tenice  refused  to  «»- 
knowledge  the  uuuetiee,  and  deUcbed  itself  from  SudiuU,  restoriog 
Uimis  to  |>ower. 


be  borne,  and  tbe  appearance  of  fidelity  to  the  new 
Constitutional  law  maintained.  But  a  deep,  resentful 
hatred  against  the  Magyar  cause  penetrated  the  circles 
in  which  the  old  military  and  official  absolutism  of 
Anstria  yet  survived ;  and  behind  the  men  and  tbe 
policy  still  representing  with  some  degree  of  siDcerity 
the  new  order  of  thiogs,  there  gathered  the  passions  and 
the  intrigues  of  a  reaction  that  waited  only  for  the 
ontbrcak  of  civil  war  within  Hungary  itself,  and  the 
restoration  of  confidence  to  the  Austrian  army,  to  draw 
the  sword  t^ainst  its  foe.  Already,  while  Italy  was 
still  unsubdued,  and  the  Emperor  was  scarcely  safe  in 
his  palace  at  Vienna,  the  popular  forces  that  might'  be 
employed  against  the  Govemment  at  Peath  came  into 
view. 

In  One  of  the  stormy  sessions  of  the  Hungarian 
Diet  at  the  time  when  the  attempt  was  first  made  to 
impose  the  Magyar  language  upon  Croatia  the  Illyrian 
leader,  Gai,  bad  thus  addressed  the  Assembly :  "  You 
Magyars  are  an  island  in  the  ocean  of  Slavism.  Take 
heed  that  its  waves  do  not  rise  and  overwhelm  you." 
The  station  of  the  spring  of  1848  first  revealed  in  its 
full  extent  the  peril  thus  foreshadowed. 
Croatia  had  for  above  a  year  been  in  almost     southam 

*  BlIDgUJ. 

open  mutiny,  but  the  spirit  of  revolt  now 

spread  through  ^e  whole  of  the  Serb  population  of 

Southern  Hungaiy,  from  the  eastern  limits  of  Slavonia,* 

*  SlATonlft  ttaelf  waa  sHached  bo  Grutia ;  Dslmstia  «1m  was  clumed 
Mftmember  of  thie  triple  Eiugdom  under  the  Hnngariaa  Grown  in  rirtna 
of  tncient  riglitfl,  tboagb  iuie«  its  iuiiieiali<Mi  in  1797  it  lud  been  goveiBsd   , 


M  MODBBN  EUBOPB.  im 

acroBa  the  plain  known  aa  the  Banat  beyond  the  junc- 
tion of  the  Theiss  and  the  Danube,  up  to  the  borders 
of  Transylvania.  The  Serbs  had  been  welcomed  into 
these  provinces  in  the  sixteenth  and  seventeenth  cen- 
turies by  the  sovereigns  of  Austria  as  a  bulwark  against 
the  Turks.  Chartera  had  been  given  to  them,  which 
were  still  preserved,  promising  them  a  distinct  political 
administration  under  their  own  elected  Voivode,  and 
ecclesiastical  independence  under  their  own  Patriarch  of 
the  Greek  Church.*  These  provincial  rights  had  fared 
much  as  others  in  the  Austrian  Empire.  The  Patriarch 
and  the  Voivode  bad  disappeared,  and  the  Banat  had 
been  completely  merged  in  Hungary.  Enough,  how- 
ever, of  Serb  nationality  remained  to  kindle  at  the  sum- 
mons of  1848,  and  to  resent  with  a  sudden  fierceness 
the  determination  of  the  Magyar  i-ulera  at  Pesth  that 
the  Magyar  language,  as  the  language  of  State,  should 
thenceforward  bind  together  all  the  races  of  Hungary 
in  the  enjoymeot  of  a  common  national  life.  The  Serbs 
had  demanded  from  Kossuth  and  his  colleagues  the 
restoration  of  the  local  and  ecclesiastical  autonomy  of 
which  the  Hapsburgs  had  deprived  them,  and  the  recog- 
nition of  their  own  national  language  and  customs.  They 
found,  or  believed,  that  instead  of  a  Grerman  they  were 
now  to  have  a  Magyar  lord,  and  one  more  near,  more 
energetic,  more  aggressive.     Their  reply  to  Kossuth's 

direcUj  from  Tienua,  and  in  1848  was  repreaented  in  the  Reicliatag  of 
Vienna,  not  in  that  of  FeaUi. 

*  The  real  meaning  of  the  OhartoTS  is,  howefer.  coatMted.  Sprinip^, 
U.281.  Adlerstein,  Arebir,  i.  166.  Helfeii,  U.  2&5.  Inltiji  et  ChMmn, 
L  236.    Di«  Serbbche  Wojwodschaftof ro^  p.  7. 


nn  CBjOATIA.  0S 

defence  of  Magyar  ascendency  was  the  sammoning  of  a 
CoBgress  of  Serbs  at  Carlowitz  on  the  Lower 
Danube.  Here  it  was  declared  that  the  cjri<iwit.,M.f 
Serbs  of  Austria  formed  a  free  and  inde- 
pendent nation  under  the  Austrian  sceptre  and  the  com- 
mon Hungarian  Crown.  A  Voivode  was  elected  and  the 
limits  of  his  province  were  defined.  A  National  Com- 
mittee was  charged  with  the  duty  of  organising  a  Govern- 
ment and  of  entering  into  intimate  connection  with  the 
neighbouring  Slavic  Kingdom  of  Croatia, 

At  Agram,  the  Croatian  capital,  all  established 
authority  had  sunk  in  the  catastrophe  of  March,  and  a 
National  Committee  had  assumed  power.  It  happened 
that  the  office  of  Governor,  or  Ban,  of  Croatia  was  then 
vacant.  The  Committee  sent  a  deputation  je„,^j„ 
to  Vienna  requesting  that  the  colonel  of 
the  first  Croatian  regiment,  Jellacic,  might  be  ap- 
pointed. Without  waiting  for  the  arrival  of  the  depu- 
tation, the  Court,  by  a  patent  dated  the  23rd  of  March, 
-  nominated  Jellacic  to  the  vacant  post.  The  date  of  this 
appointment,  and  the  assumption  of  office  by  Jellacic 
on  the  14th  of  April,  the  very  day  before  the  Hungarian 
Ministry  entered  upon  its  powers,  have  been  considered 
proof  that  a  secret  understanding  existed  from  the  first 
between  Jellacic  and  the  Court  No  further  evidence 
of  this  secret  relation  has,  however,  been  made  public, 
and  the  belief  long  current  among  all  friends  of 
the  Magyar  cause  that  Croatia  was  deliberately  insti- 
gated to  revolt  agjainst  the  Himgarian  Government  by 
persons  ajx)and  the  Emperor  seems  to  rest  on  no  solid 


66  MODEElf  SV&OPa.  im 

foundation.  The  Croats  would  have  beeu  unlike  all 
other  communities  in  the  Austrian  Empire  i£  thej  had 
not  risen  under  the  national  impulse  of  1848.  They 
had  beeu  murmuring  against  Magyar  ascendency  for 
years  past,  and  the  fire  long  smouldering  now  probably 
burst  into  flame  here  as  elsewhere  without  the  touch  of 
an  incendiary  hand.  With  regard  to  Jellacic's  sudden 
appointment  it  is  possible  that  the  Court,  powerless  to 
check  the  Croatian  movement,  may  have  desired  to 
escape  the  appearance  of  compulsion  by  spontaneously 
conferring  office  on  the  popular  soldier,  who  was  at  least 
more  likely  to  regard  the  Emperor's  interests  than  the 
lawyers  and  demagogues  around  bim.  Whether  .iTeUacic 
was  at  this  time  genuinely  concerned  for  Croatian 
autonomy,  or  whether  from  the  first,  while  he  appar- 
ently acted  with  the  Croatian  nationalists,  his  deepest 
synipatliies  were  with  the  Austrian  army,  and  his  sole 
design  was  that  of  serving  the  Imperial  Crown  with  or 
without  its  own  avowed  concurrence,  it  is  impossible  to 
say.  That,  like  most  of  his  countrymen,  he  cordially 
hated  the  Magyars,  is  beyond  doubt.  The  general  im- 
pression left  by  his  character  liardly  accords  with  the 
Magyar  conception  of  him  as  the  profound  and  far- 
sighted  conspirator;  he  would  seem,  on  the  contrary, 
to  have  been  a  man  easily  yielding  to  the  impulses  of 
the  moment,  and  capable  of  playing  contradictory  parts 
with  little  sense  of  his  own  inconsistency.* 

*  Bat  tee  Kooanth,  Schrifton  (1880)  ii.  21S,  for  s  conTersatJon  betweea 
JelUcio  and  BatlLj&n;,  said  to  have  been  samted  to  Kosmth  by  tha 
latter.  11  anthentic,  Ihie  cerfAiiil;  pniToa  Jcllaeic  to  haTe  naed  the  Slavia 
agitation  from  the  first  aolely  for  Aostrian  ends.   See  alaoTitcthoiR,  p.  207. 


Installed  m  office,  Jellacic  cast  to  the  winds  all 
eonsideratioa  due  to  the  Emperor's  personal  engage- 
ments towards  Hungary,  and  forthwith 
permitted  the  Magyar  officials  to  be  driven  g^"**-  ^f* 
oat  of  the  country.  On  the  2nd  of  May 
he  issued  an  order  forbidding  all  Croatian  authorities 
to  correspond  with  the  G-ovemment  at  Pesth.  Battby- 
finy,  the  Hungarian  Premier,  at  once  hurried  to  Vienna, 
and  obtained  from  the  Emperor  a  letter  commanding 
Jellacic  to  submit  to  the  Hungarian  Ministry.  As 
the  Ban  paid  no  attention  to  this  mandate,  General 
Hrabowsky,  commander  of  the  troops  in  the  southern 
provinces,  received  orders  from  Pesth  to  annul  all  that 
Jellacic  had  done,  to  suspend  him  from  his  office,  and 
to  bring  him  to  trial  for  high  treason.  Nothing 
daunted,  Jellacic  on  his  own  authority  convoked  the 
Diet  of  Croatia  for  the  5th  of  June ;  the  populace  of 
Agram,  on  hearing  of  Hrabowsky 'a  mission,  burnt  the 
Palatine  in  effigy.  This  was  a  direct  outr^^  on  the 
Imperial  family,  and  Batthy^y  turned  it  to  account. 
The  Emperor  had  just  been  driven  from  Vienna  by  the 
riot  of  the  15th  of  May.  Batthyiny  sought  him  at 
Innsbruck,  and  by  assuring  him  of  the  support  of  his 
loyal  Hungarians  against  both  the  Italians  and  the 
Viennese  obtained  his  signature  on  June  10th  to  a 
rescript  vehemently  condemning  the  Ban's  action  and 
suspending  him  from  office.  Jellacic  had  already  been 
summoned  to  appear  at  Innsbruck.  He  set  out,  taking 
with  him  a  deputation  of  Croats  and  Serbs,  and  leaving 
behind  him  a  popular  Assembly  sitting  at  Agram,  in 


08  MOtBRN  EUBOFS.  tM. 

whicli,  besides  the  representatives  of  Croatia,  there 
were  seventy  jDepnties  from  the  Serb  provinces.  On 
the  very  day  on  which  the  Ban  reached  Innsbruck,  the 
Imperial  order  condemning  him  and  suspending  him 
from  his  functions  was  published  by  Batthydny  at 
Pesth.  Nor  was  the  situation  made  easier  by  the 
almost  simultaDeons  announcement  that  civil  war  had 
broken  out  on  the  Lower  Danube,  and  that  Q-eneral 
Hrabowsty,  on  attempting  to  occupy  Carlowitz,  had 
been  attacked  and  compelled  to  retreat  by  the  Serbs 
under  their  national  leader  Stratlmirovic* 

It  is  said  that  the  Emperor  Ferdinand,  daring 
deliberations  in  council  on  which  the  fate  of  the  Austrian 
Empire  depended,  was  accustomed  to  occupy 
himself  with  counting  the  number  of 
carriages  that  passed  from  right  and  left 
respectively  under  tlie  windows.  In  the  struggle  be- 
tween Croatia  and  Hungary  he  appears  to  have  avoided 
even  the  formal  exercise  of  authority,  preferring  to 
commit  the  decision  between  the  contending  parties  to 
the  Archduke  John,  as  mediator  or  judge.  John  waa 
too  deeply  immersed  in  other  business  to  give  much 
attention  to  the  matter.  What  really  passed  between 
Jellacic  and  the  Imperial  family  at  Innsbruck  is  un- 
known. The  official  request  of  the  Ban  was  for  the 
withdrawal  or  suppression  of  the  rescript  signed  by  the 
Emperor  on  June  10th.  Prince  Esterhazy,  who  repre- 
sented the  Hungarian  Government  at  Innsbruck,  was 

*  Adleratein,  Ardiiv,  I.  146,  156.      EUpkft,  Erlnnenuigen,  p.  SOw 
Ir&uji  et  OhKSBin,  L  3^    Serbuehe  Bewegnng,  p.  IVd. 


ready  to  mate  this  concession ;  but  before  the  documeiit 
could  be  revoked,  it  liad  been  made  public  by  Batthyany. 
With  ihe  object  of  proving  his  fidelity  to  the  Court, 
Jellacic  now  published  an  address  to  the  Croatian 
regiments  serving  in  Lombardy,  entreating  them  not 
to  be  diverted  from  their  duty  to  the  Emperor  in  the 
field  by  any  report  of  danger  to  their  rights  and  their 
nationality  nearer  home.  So  great  was  Jellacic's  influ- 
ence with  his  countrymen  that  an  appeal  from  him  of 
opposite  tenor  would  probably  have  caused  the  Croatian 
regiments  to  quit  Badetzky  in  a,  maa^,  and  so  have 
brought  the  war  in  Italy  to  an  ignominious  end.  His 
action  won  for  him  a  great  popularity  in  the  higher 
ranks  of  the  Austrian  army,  and  probably  gained  for  him, 
even  if  he  did  not  possess  it  before,  the  secret  confidence 
of  the  Court.  That  some  understanding  now  existed  is 
almost  certain,  for,  in  spite  of  the  unrepealed  declara- 
tion of  June  10th,  and  the  postponement  of  the  Arch- 
duke's judgment,  Jellacic  was  permitted  to  return  to 
Croatia  and  to  resume  his  govemment.  The  Diet  at 
Agram  occupied  itself  with  far-reaching  schemes  for  a 
confederation  of  the  southern  Slavs  ;  but  its  discussions 
were  of  no  practical  effect,  and  after  some  weeks  it  was 
extinguished  under  the  form  of  an  adjournment.  From 
this  time  Jellacic  held  dictatorial  power.  It  was  un- 
necessary for  him  in  his  relations  with  Hungary  any 
longer  to  keep  up  the  fiction  of  a  mere  defence  of 
Croatian  rights ;  he  appeared  openly  as  the  champion 
of  Austrian  unity.  In  negotiations  which  he  held  with 
Batthyany  at  Vienna  during  the  last  days  of  July,  he 


70  MODERN  EVBOPS.  am. 

demanded  the  restoratiou  of  siogle  Mioistries  for  War, 
Finance,  and  Foreign  Affairs  for  the  whole  Austrian 
Fmpire.'  The  demand  was  indignantly  refused,  and  the 
chieftains  of  the  two  rival  races  quitted  Vienna  to  pre- 
pare for  war. 

The  Hungarian  National  Parliament,  elected  under 
the  new  Constitution,  had  been  opened  at  Pesth  on 
July  5th.  Great  efforts  had  heen  made,  in  view  of  the 
difficulties  with  Croatia  and  of  the  suspected  intrigues 
between  the  Ban  and  the  Court  party,  to  induce  the 
^^  Emperor  Ferdinand  to  appear  at  Pesth  in 

te^behram  persoH.  Hc  excused  himself  from  this  on 
the  ground  of  illness,  but  sent  a  letter  to 
the  Parliament  condemning  not  only  in  his  own  name 
but  in  that  of  every  member  of  the  Imperial  family 
the  resistance  offered  to  the  Hungarian  Government  in 
the  southern  provinces.  If  words  bore  any  meaning, 
the  Emperor  stood  pledged  to  a  loyal  co-operation  with 
the  Hungarian  Ministers  in  defence  of  the  unity  and 
the  constitution  of  the  Hungarian  Kingdom  as  estab- 
lished by  the  laws  of  April.  Yet  at  this  very  time  the 
Minister  of  War  at  Vienna  was  encouraging  Austrian 
officers  to  join  the  Serb  insurgents.  Kossuth,  who  con- 
ducted most  of  the  business  of  the  Hungarian  Govern- 
ment in  the  Lower  Chamber  at  Pesth,  made  no  secret 
of  his  hostility  to  the  central  powers.  While  his  col- 
leagues sought  to  avoid  a  breach  with  the  other  half 
of  the  Monarchy,  it  seemed  to  be  Kossuth's  object 
rather  to  provoke  it.  In  calling  for  a  levy  of  two 
hundred  thousand  men  to  crush  the  Slavic  rebellion, 


UA  AUSTRIA  AtU)  SVNQAMY.  71 

he  openly  denounced  the  Viennese  Ministry  and  the 
Court  as  its  promoters.  In  leading  the  debate  upon 
the  Italian  War,  he  endeavoured  without  the  know- 
ledge of  his  colleagues  to  make  the  cession  of  the 
territory  west  of  the  Adige  a  condition  of  Hun- 
gary's participation-  in  the  struggle.  As  Minister  of 
Finance,  he  spared  neither  word  nor  act  to  demon- 
strate his  contempt  for  the  financial  interests  of 
Austria.  Whether  a  gentler  policy  on  t!ie  part  of 
the  most  powerful  statesman  in  Hungary  might  have 
averted  the  impending  conflict  it  is  vain  to  ask  ;  but  in 
the  uncompromising  ^enmity  of  Kossuth  the  Austrian 
Court  found  its  own  excuse  for  acts  in  which  shamolcss- 
ness  seemed  almost  to  rise  into  political  virtue.  No 
sooner  had  Kadetzky's  victories  and  the  fall  of  Milan 
brought  the  Emperor  back  to  Vienna  than  the  new 
policy  came  into  efiect.  The  veto  of  the  sovereign  was 
placed  upon  the  laws  passed  by  the  Diet  at  Festb  for 
the  defence  of  the  kingdom.  The  Hungarian  Govern- 
ment was  required  to  reinstate  Jellacic  in  his  dignities, 
to  enter  into  negotiations  at  Vienna  with  him  and  the 
Austrian  Ministry,  and  finally  to  desist  from  all  mili- 
tary preparations  against  the  rebellions  provinces.  In 
answer  to  these  demands  the  Diet  sent  a  hundred  of  its 
members  to  Vienna  to  daim  from  the  Emperor  the 
fulfilment  of  his  plighted  word.  The  miserable  man 
received  them  on  the  9th  of  September  with  protesta- 
tions of  his  sincerity ;  but  even  before  the  deputation 
liad  passed  the  palace-gates,  there  appeared  in  the 
official  gazette  a  letter    under    the    Emperor's    own 


78  UODEBN  EUBOFB.  Ma 

hand  replacing  Jellacic  in   office  and  acquitting  him 

of  every  charge  that  had  heen  hrought  against  him.     It 

was  for  this  formal  recoErnition  alone  that 

Jallubi  mtond  '^ 

He^SSiS^     Jellacic  had  been  waiting.      On  the  11th 
of  September  he  crossed  the  Drave  with  hia 
army,  and  began  his  march  against  the  Hungarian 
capital.* 

The  Ministry  now  in  office  at  Vienna  was  composed 
m  part  of  men  who  had  been  known  as  reformers  in  the 
early  days  of  1848 ;  but  the  old  order  was  represented 
in  it  by  Count  Wessenbei^,  who  had  been 
^iJ^^  Metternich's  assistant  at  the  Congress  of 
Vienna,  and  by  Latonr,  the  War  Minister, 
a  soldier  of  high  birth  whose  career  dated  hack  to  the 
campaign  of  Austerlitz.  Whatever  contempt  might  be 
felt  by  one  section  of  tbe  Cabinet  for  the  other,  its 
members  were  able  to  unite  against  the  independence  of 
Hungary  as  they  had  united  against  the  independence 
of  Italy.  They  handed  in  to  the  Emperor  a  memorial 
in  which  the  very  concessions  to  which  they  owed  their 
own  existence  as  a  Constitutional  Ministry  were  made  a 
ground  for  declaring  tbe  laws  establishing  Hungarian 
autonomy  null  and  void.  In  a  tissue  of  transparent 
sophistries  they  argued  that  the  Emperor's  promise  of  a 
Constitution  to  all  his  dominions  on  the  1 5tb  of  March 
disabled  him  from  assenting,  without  the  advice  of  his 
Viennese  Ministry,  to  the  resolutions  subsequently 
passed  by  the  Hungarian  Diet,  although  the  union 
between  Hungary  and  the  other  Hereditary  States  had 
*  IrdnTi  «^  Gbaasin.  iL  5&    Codex  der  nesen  0«ee(w  (Festli},  L  7. 


a*.  AUSTRIA  AND  SUNaABT.  78 

from  tiie  first  rested  solely  on  the  person  of  the 
monarch,  and  no  German  official  had  ever  pretended  to 
exercise'  authority  over  Hungarians  otherviae  than  by 
order  of  the  sovereign  as  Hungarian  King.  The  pub- 
lication of  this  Cabinet  memorial,  which  appeared  in 
the  journals  at  Festh  on  the  17th  of  September,  gave 
plain  warning  to  the  Hungarians  that,  if  they  were  not 
to  be  attacked  by  JeUacic  and  the  Austrian  army  simul- 
taneously, they  must  make  some  compromise  with  the 
Government  at  Vienna.  Batthyany  was  inclined  to 
concession,  and  after  resigning  oEBce  in  consequence  of 
the  Emperor's  desertion  be  had  already  re-assumed  his 
post  with  coUe^ues  disposed  to  accept  his  own  pacific 
policy.  Kossuth  spoke  openly  of  war  with  Austria  and 
of  a  dictatorship.  As  Jellacio  advanced  towards  Festh, 
the  Palatine  took  command  of  the  Hungarian  army  and 
marched  southwards.  On  reaching  Lake  Baloton,  on 
whose  southern  shore  the  Croats  were  encamped,  he 
requested  a  personal  conference  with  Jellacio,  and  sailed 
to  the  appointed  place  of  meeting.  But  he  waited  in 
vain  for  the  Ban ;  and  rightly  interpreting  this  rejec- 
tion of  bis  overtures,  he  fled  from  the  army  and  laid 
down  hia  office.  The  Emperor  now  sent  General  Lam- 
bei^  from  Vienna  with  orders  to  assume  the  supreme 
command  alike  over  the  Magyar  and  the  Croatian 
forces,  and  to  prevent  an  encounter.  On  the  success  of 
I^mberg's  mission  hung  the  last  chance  of  reconcilia- 
tion between  Hungary  and  Austria.  Batthyany,  still 
clinging  to  the  hope  of  peace,  set  out  for  the  camp  in 
wder  to  meet  the  eirvoy  on  bis  arrival.     Lamberg, 


74  MODERN  EUBOPS.  iM 

desirous  of  obtaioing  the  necessary  credentials  from  the 
Hungarian  OoTernment,  made  his  way  to  Pestb.  There 
he  found  Kossuth  and  a  Committee  of  Six  inutulled  in 
power.  Under  their  influence  the  Diet  passed  a  resolu- 
tion forbidding  Lambei^  to  assume  command  of  the 
Hungarian  troops,  and  declaring  bim  a  traitor  if  he 
should  attempt  to  do  so.  The  report  spread  through  ■ 
Pesth  that  Lamberg  had  come  to  seize  the  citadel  and 
bombard  the  town  ;  and  before  he  could  reach  a  place 
of  safety  he  was  attacked  and  murdered  by  a  raging 
mob.  It  was  in  vain  that  Batthyany,  who  now  laid 
down  his  office,  besought  the  Government  at  Vienna  to 
take  no  rash  step  of  vengeance.  The  pretext  for  anni- 
hilating Hungarian  independence  had  been  given,  and 
the  mask  was  cast  aside.  A  manifesto  published  by 
the  Emperor  on  the  3rd  of  October  declared  the  Hun- 
garian Parliament  dissolved,  and  its  acts  null  and  void. 
ji,;a,fy^ot  Martial  law  was  proclaimed,  and  Jellacic 
**^''  appointed  commander  of  all  the  forces  and 
representative  of  the  sovereign.  In  the  course  of  the 
next  few  days  it  was  expected  that  he  would  enter 
Pesth  as  conqueror. 

In  the  meantime,  however  confidently  the  Govern- 
ment might  reckon  on  Jellacic's  victory,  the  passions  of 
revolution  were  again  breaking  loose  in  Vienna  itself. 
Increasing  misery  among  the  poor,  financial  panics,  the 

reviving  efforts  of  professional  agitators,  had 
£iS^^        renewed  the  disturbances  of  the  spring  in 

forms  which   alarmed  the  middle   classes 
almost  as  much  as  the  holders  of  power.    The  conflict 


of  the  GoTemment  with  Hungary  broaght  afiairs  to  a 
crisis.  After  discovering  the  nsel^sness  of  negotiations 
with  the  Emperor,  the  Hangariaa  Parliament  had  sent 
some  of  its  ablest  members  to  request  an  audience  from 
the  Assembly  sitting  at  Vienna,  in  order  that  the  re- 
presentatives  of  the  western  half  of  the  Empire  might, 
even  at  the  last  moment,  hare  the  opportunity  of  pro- 
nouncing a  judgment  npon  the  action  of  the  Court. 
The  most  numerous  group  in  the  Assembly  was  formed 
by  the  Czech  deputies  from  Bohemia.  As  Slavs,  the 
Bohemian  deputies  had  sympathised  with  the  Croats 
and  Serbs  in  their  struggle  against  Magyar  ascendency, 
and  in  their  eyes  Jellacic  was  still  the  champion  of  a 
national  cause.  Bhnded  by  their  sympathies  of  race  to 
the  danger  involved  to  all  nationalities  alike  by  the 
restoration  of  absolutism,  the  Czech  majority,  in  spite 
of  a  singularly  impressive  warning  given  by  a  leader  of 
the  German  Liberals,  refused  a  hearing  to  the  Hou- 
garian  representatives.  The  Magyars,  repelled  by  the 
Aasembly,  sought  and  found  allies  in  the  democracy  of 
Vienna  itself.  The  popular  clubs  rang  with  acclama- 
tions for  the  cause  of  Hungarian  freedom  and  with 
invectives  against  the  Czech  instruments  of  tyranny. 
In  the  midst  of  this  deepening  agitation  tidings  arrived 
at  Vienna  that  Jellacic  had  been  repulsed  in  bis  march 
on  Festh  and  forced  to  retire  within  the  Austrian 
frontier.  It  became  necessary  for  the  Viennese  Govern- 
ment to  throw  its  own  forces  into  the  stru^le,  and  an 
order  was  given  by  Latour  to  the  regiments  in  the 
capital  to  set  out  for  the  scene  of  war&re.    This  order 


76  UOBERS  EVBOPB.  im. 

had,  however,  been  anticipated  by  the  democratic 
leaders,  and  a  portion  of  the  troops  had  been  won  over 
to  the  popular  side.  Latour's  commands  were  resisted  ; 
and  upon  an  attempt  being  madfe  to  enforce  the  depar- 
ture of  the  troops,  the  regiments  fired  on  one  another 
(October  6th).  The  battalions  of  the  National  Guard 
which  rallied  to  the  support  of  the  Government  were 
overpowered  by  those  belonging  to  the  working  men's 
districts.  The  insurrection  was  victorious ;  the  Minis- 
ters submitted  once  more  to  the  masters  of  the  streets, 
"  and  the  orders  given  to  the  troops  were  withdrawn. 
But  the  fiercer  part  of  the  mob  was  not  satisfied  with  a 
political  victory.  Tliere  were  criminals  and  madmen 
among  its  leaders  who.  after  the  offices  of  Government 
had  been  stormed  and  Latour  had  been  captured, 
determined  upon  his  death.  It  was  in  vain  that  some 
of  the  keenest  political  opponents  of  the  Minister 
sought  at  the  peril  of  their  own  lives  to  protect  him 
from  his  murderers.  He  was  dragged  into  the  court  in 
front  of  the  War  Office,  and  there  slain  with  ferocious 
and  yet  deliberate  barbarity.* 

The  Emperor,  while  the  city  was  still  in  tumult, 

had    in  his  usual  fashion  promised  that  the    popular 

Th«  Bnpmrrt     demauds  should  be  satisfied ;  but  as  soon  as 

""*"         he  was  unobserved  he  fled  from  Vienna,  and 

in  his  flight  he  was  followed  by  the  Czech  deputies  and 


•  Adleratein,  it  296.  Helfert,  aesohiehte  OcBtorreiolu,  I  79,  ii.  192. 
Dnnder,  p.  77.  Springer,  ii.  520.  VitBtlinm,  p.  143.  £ossath,  Selirifton 
(1881),  u.  284  Reaoliauer,  U.  563.  PillersdorfE,  NschUss,  p.  163.  Irinji 
«t  Cbasris,  iL  9&. 


D,a,l,zc.bvG00gIC 


urn.  WJKDJSOSQBATZ.  77 

many  German  CoDservutirea,  who  declared  that  their 
lives  were  no  longer  safe  in  the  capital.  Most  of  the 
Ministers  gathered  round  the  Emperor  at  Olmutz  in 
Moravia ,  the  Assembly,  however,  continued  to  hold  its 
sittings  in  Vienna,  and  the  Finance  Minister,  apparently 
nnder  instructions  from  the  Court,  remained  at  his  post, 
and  treated  the  Assembly  as  still  possessed  of  legal 
powers.  But  for  all  practical  purposes  the  western  half 
of  the  Austrian  Empire  had  now  ceased  to  have  any 
Government  whatever ;  and  the  real  state  of  affairs  was 
bluntly  exposed  in  a  manifesto  published  by  Count 
Windisohgratz  at  Prague  on  the  11th  of  October,  in 
which,  without  professing  to  have  received  any  commis- 
sion irom  the  Emperor,  he  announced  his 
intention  of  marching  on  Vienna  in  order  mi^baDu 
to  protect  the  sovereign  and  maintain  the 
unity  of  the  Empire.  In  due  course  the  Emperor 
ratified  the  action  of  his  enei^etic  soldier ;  Windischgratz 
was  appointed  to  the  supreme  command  over  all  the 
troops  of  the  Empire  with  the  exception  of  Eadetzky's 
army,  and  his  march  against  Vienna  was  begun. 

To  the  Hungarian  Parliament,  exasperated  by  the 
decree  ordering  its  own  dissolution  and  the  war  openly 
levied  agiunafc  the  country  by  the  Court  in  di_*u_itt, 
alliance  with  Jellacic,  the  revolt  of  the  capi-  ?;^^rbot 
tal  seemed  to  bring  a  sudden  deliverance 
from  all  danger.  The  Viennese  had  saved  Hungary, 
and  the  Diet  was  willing,  if  summoned  by  the  Assembly 
at  Vienna,  to  send  its  troops  to  the  defence  of  the  capital. 
But  the  urgency  of  the  need  was  not  understood  on  either 


78  MODERN  EUS.OPB.  »«. 

side  till  too  late.  The  Viennese  Assembly,  treating  it- 
self as  a  legitimate  and  constitutional  power  threatened 
by  a  group  of  soldiers  who  had  usurped  the  monarch's 
authority,  hesitated  to  compromise  its  legal  cliaracter 
by  calling  in  a  Hungarian  army.  The  Magyar  generals 
on  the  other  hand  were  so  anxious  not  to  paiis  beyond 
the  strict  defence  of  their  own  kingdom,  that,  in  the  ab- 
sence of  communication  from  a  Viennese  authority,  they 
twice  withdrew  from  Austrian  soil  after  following 
Jelliicic  in  pursuit  beyond  the  frontier.  It  was  not 
until  Windischgratz  had  encamped  within  sight  of 
Vienna,  and  had  detained  as  a  rebel  the  envoy  sent  to 
him  by  the  Hungarian  Government,  that  Kossuth's 
will  prevailed  over  the  scruples  of  weaker  men,  and 
the  Hungarian  army  marched  against  the  besiegers. 
In  the  meantime  Windischgratz  had  begun  his  attack 
on  the  suburbs,  which  were  weakly  defended  by  the 
National  Guard  and  by  companies  of  students  and 
voluuteers,  tiie  nominal  commander  being  one  Messen- 
liaustT,  formerly  an  ofliccr  in  the  regular  army,  who 
was  assisted  by  a  soldier  of  far  greater  merit  than 
himself,  the  Polish  general  Bern.  Among  those  who 
fought  were  two  members  of  the  German  Parliament  of 
Frankfort,  Uobert  Blum  and  Frobel,  who  had  been  sent  to 
mediate  between  the  Emperor. and  his  subjects,  but  had 
remained  at  Vienna  as  combatants.  The  besiegers  had 
captured  the  outskirts  of  the  city,  and  negotiations  for  ' 
surrender  were  in  progress,  when,  on  the  30th  of 
October,  Messenhauser  from  the  top  of  the  cathedral 
tower  saw  beyond   the  line  of  the    besiegers   on    the 


UM.  WJNDiaOSQBlTZ  SNTItBd  VIENNA.  19 

Eouth-east  the  smoke  of  battle,  and  annoanced  that  the 
SoDgarian  army  was  approaching.  An  eng^ement 
had  ID  fact  begun  on  the  plain  of  Schwechat  between 
the  Hungarians  and  Jellacic,  reinforced  by  divisions  of 
Windiscbgratz'  troops.  In  a  moment  of  wild  excite- 
ment the  defenders  of  the  capital  threw  themselves  once 
more  npoo  their  foe,  disregai-ding  the  offer  of  surrender 
that  had  been  already  made.  But  the  tide  of  battle  at 
Schwechat  tamed  against  the  Hungarians.  They  were 
compelled  to  retreat,  and  Windiscbgratz,  reopening  his 
cannonade  upon  the  rebels  who  were  also  violators  of 
their  truce,  became  in  a  few  hours  master  of  Yienna. 
He  made  his  entry  on  the  Slst  of  October,  and  treated 
Yienna  as  a  conquered  city.  The  troops  had  behaved 
with  ferocity  during  the  combat  in  the  suburbs,  and 
slaughtered  scores  of  unarmed  persons.  No  Oriental 
tynmt  ever  addressed  his  fallen  foes  with  greater  insolence 
and  contempt  for  human  right  than  Windiscbgratz  in 
tbe  proclamations  which,  on  assuming  government,  he 
addressed  to  the  Yiennese  ;  yet,  whatever  might  be  the 
number  of  persons  arrested  and  imprisoned,  the  number 
now  put  to  death  was  not  great.  The  victims  were  in- 
deed carefully  selected;  the  most  prominent  being  Robert 
Blum,  in  whom,  as  a  leader  of  the  German  Liberals  and 
a  Deputy  of  the  German  Parliament  inviolable  by  law, 
the  Austrian  Government  struck  ostentatiouBly  at  the 
Parliament  itself  and  at  German  democracy  at  large. 

In  the  subjugation  of  Yienna  the  army  had  again 
proved  itself  the  real  political  power  in  Austria ;  bat 
the  time  bad  not  yet  arrived  when  absolute  government 


80  UODEBN  BUBOPB.  MM. 

could  be  opeiily  restored.  The  BohemiaD  deputies, 
fatally  as  they  had  injured  the  cause  of  constitutional 
rule  by  their  secession  from  Vienna,  were 
still  in  earnest  in  the  cause  of  provincial 
autonomy,  and  would  vehemently  have  re- 
pelled the  charge  of  an  alliance  with  despotism.  Even 
the  mutilated  Parliament  of  Vienna  bad  been  recog- 
nised by  the  Court  as  in  lawful  session  until  the  22nd 
of  October,  when  an  order  was  issued  proroguing  the 
Parliament  and  bidding  it  re-assemble  a  month  later  at 
Kremsier,  in  Moravia.  There  were  indications  in  the 
weeks  succeeding  the  fall  of  Vienna  of  a  conflict  between 
the  reactionary  and  the  more  liberal  influences  sur- 
rounding the  Emperor,  and  of  an  impending  coup  tfetai  : 
but  counsels  of  prudence  prevailed  for  the  moment; 
the  Assembly  was  permitted  to  meet  at  Kremsier, 
and  professions  of  constitutiooal  principle  were  still 
made  with  every  show  of  sincerity.  A  new  Ministry, 
8ch»««..b«>  however,  came  into  office,  with  Prince 
Felix  Scbwarzenherg  at  its  head.  Schwarz- 
enberg  belonged  to  one  of  the  greatest  Austrian  families. 
He  had  been  ambassador  at  Naples  when  the  revolu- 
tion of  1848  broke  out,  and  had  quitted  the  city  with 
words  of  menace  when  insult  was  offered  to  the 
Austrian  flag.  Exchanging  diplomacy  for  war  iie 
served  under  Eadetzky.  and  was  soon  recognUed  as 
the  statesman  in  whom  the  army,  as  a  political  power 
hITJ*  V'''  ^'"''^''  ^^P'-esentative.  His  career  had 
mtnerto  been  illustrated  chiefly  by  scandals  of  private 
I'f«  «o  flagrant  that  England  and  oth.r  p^uutri  Jwbere 


ISM.  BOHWjiSZBtTBSBa.  81 

he  had  held  diplomatic  posts  had  iDsisted  on  his  re- 
moral  ;  hut  the  cynical  and  reckless  audacity  of  the 
man  rose  in  his  new  calling  as  Minister  of  Austria  to 
something  of  political  greatness.  Few  statesmen  have 
been  more  daring  tbau  Schwarzenberg ;  few  hare  pushed 
to  more  excessive  lengths  the  advantages  to  be  derived 
from  the  moral  or  the  material  weakness  of  an  adver- 
sary. His  rule  was  the  debauch  of  forces  respited  in 
their  extremity  for  one  last  and  worst  exertion.  Like 
the  Boman  Sulla,  he  gave  to  a  condemned  and  perishing 
cause  the  passing  semblance  of  restored  vigour,  and 
died  before  the  next  great  wave  of  change  swept  his 
creations  away. 

Schwarzenberg's  first  act  was  the  deposition  of  his 
sovereign.  The  imbecility  of  the  Emperor  Ferdinand 
had  long  suggested  his  abdication  or  dethronement,  and 
the  time  for  decisive  action  bad  now  arrived.  He 
gladly  withdrew  into  private  life :  the  crown,  declined 
by  his  brother  and  heir,  was  passed  on  to  „_,,  ^  ^^ 
his  nephew,  Francis  Joseph,  a  yonth  of  S^„^o^b 
eighteen.  This  prince  had  at  least  not  ''""' 
made  in  person,  not  uttered  with  his  own  lips,  iiot 
signed  with  his  own  hand,  those  solemn  engagements 
with  the  Hungarian  nation  which  Austria  was  now 
about  to  annihilate  with  fire  and  sword.  He  had  not 
moved  in  friendly  intercourse  with  men  who  were  hence- 
forth doomed  to  the  scaffold.  He  came  to  the  throne 
as  littie  implicated  in  the  acts  of  his  predecessor  as 
anj  nominal  chief  of  a  State  conid  be;  as  fitting  an 
instrnment  in  the  bands  of  Court  and  army,  as  auT 


82  MODERN  BUROPX.  UMl 

reactioDaTy  faction  could  desire.  Helpless  and  well- 
meaning,  Francis  Joseph,  while  his  troops  poured  into 
Hungary,  played  for  a  while  in  Austria  the  part  of  a 
loyal  observer  of  his  Parliament;  then,  when  the  moment 
Dtwdutton  trf  ^^  come  for  its  destruction,  he  obeyed  his 
v^^^C  soldier-minister  as  Ferdinand  had  in  earlier 
days  obeyed  the  students,  and  signed  the 
decree  for  its  dissolution  (March  4,  1849).  The  Assem- 
bly, during  its  sittings  at  Vienna,  had  accomplished  one 
important  task:  it  had  freed  the  peasantry  from  the 
burdens  attaching  to  their  land  and  converted  them  into 
independent  proprietors.  This  part  of  its  work  sur- 
vived it,  and  remained  almost  the  sole  gain  that  Austria 
derived  from  the  struggle  of  1848-  After  the  removal 
to  Kremsier,  a  Committee  of  the  Assembly  bad  been 
engaged  with  the  formation  of  a  Constitution  for 
Austria,  and  the  draft  was  now  completed.  In  the  course 
of  debate  something  had  been  gained  by  the  repre- 
sentatives of  theOerman  and  the  Slavic  races  in  the  way  of 
respect  for  one  another's  interests  and  prejudices ;  some 
political  knowledge  hud  been  acquired ;  some  approach 
made  to  an  adjustment  between  the  (ilaims  of  the  cen- 
tral power  and  of  provincial  autonomy.  If  the  Consti- 
tution sketched  at  Kremsier  had  come  into  being,  it 
woTild  at  least  have  given  to  "Western  Austria  and  to 
Galicia,  which  belonged  to  this  half  of  the  Empire,  a 
system  of  government  based  on  popular  desires  and 
worthy,  on  the  part  of  the  Crown,  of  a  iair  trial.  But, 
apart  from  its  own  defects  from  the  monarchical  point 
of  view,  this  Constitution  rested  on  the  division  of  the 


Ml  THB  UNITABY  EDKJT.  88 

Empire  into  two  independent  parts ;  it  assumed  the 
Beparation  of  Hungary  from  the  other  Hereditary 
States;  and  of  a  separate  Hungarian  Kingdom  the 
Minister  now  in  power  would  hear  no  longer.  That 
Hungary  had  for  centuriea  possessed  and  maintained  its 
rights ;  that,  with  the  single  exception  of  the  English, 
no  nation  in  Europe  had  equalled  the  Magyars  in  the 
stubhorn  aud  unwearied  defence  of  Constitutional  law ; 
that,  in  an  age  when  national  spirit  was  far  less  hotty 
ioflamed,  the  Emperor  Joseph  had  well-nigh  lost  his 
throne  and  wrecked  his  Empire  in  the  attempt  to 
suhject  this  resolute  race  to  a  centralised  administration, 
was  nothing  to  Schwarzenbci^  and  the  soldiers  who 
were  now  trampling  upon  revolution.  Hungary  was 
deelwed  to  have  forfeited  by  rebellion  alike  its  ancient 
rights  and  the  contracts  of  1848.  The  dissolution  of 
the  Parliament  of  Kremsier  was  followed  by 

■'        The    UnitiUT 

the  publication  of  an  edict  affecting  to  ^^^X 
bestow  a  uniform  and  centralised  Constitu- 
tion upon  the  entire  Austrian  Empire.  All  existing 
public  rights  were  thereby  extinguished ;  and,  inasmuch 
as  the  new  Constitution,  in  so  far  as  it  provided  for  a 
representative  system,  never  came  into  existence,  but 
remained  in  abeyance  until  it  was  formally  abrogated  iu 
1851,  the  real  efEect  of  the  Unitary  Edict  of  March, 
1849,  which  professed  to  close  the  period  of  revolution 
hy  granting  the  same  rights  to  all,  was  to  establish 
absolute  government  and  the  rule  of  the  sword  through- 
out the  Emperor's  dominions.  ProTincial  institutions 
giving  to  some  of  the  German  and  Slaric  districts  a, 
0  % 


84  MODERN  EUROPE.  u«. 

shadowy  control  of  their  own  local  affairs  only  marked 
the  distinction  hetwecn  the  favoured  and  tlie  dreaded 
parts  of  the  Empire.  Ten  years  passed  before  freedom 
again  came  within  sight  of  the  Austrian  peoples.* 

The  Hungarian  Diet,  on  learning  of  the  transfer  of 
the  crown  from  Ferdinand  to  Francis  Joseph,  had  re- 
fused to  acknowledge  this  act  as  valid,  on  the  ground 
that  it  had  taken  place  vrithout  the  consent  of  the 
Legislature,  and  that  Francis  Joseph  had  not  been 
crowned  King  of  Hungary.  Ferdinand  was 
"*^'  treated  as  still  the  reigning  sovereign,  and 
the  war  now  hecame,  according  to  the  Hungarian  view, 
more  than  ever  a  war  in  defence  of  established  right, 
inasmuch  as  the  assailants  of  Hungary  were  not  only 
violators  of  a  settled  constitution  but  agents  of  a 
usurping  prince.  The  whole  nation  was  summoned  to 
arms;  and  in  order  that  there  might  he  no  faltering 
at  headquarters,  tbe  command  over  the  forces  on  the 
Danube  was  given  by  Kossuth  to  Gorgei,  a  young  officer 
of  whom  little  was  yet  known  to  the  world  but  that 
he  had  executed  Count  Eugene  Zichy,  a  powerful  noble, 
for  holding  communications  with  'Jellacic.  It  was  the 
design  of  the  Austrian  Government  to  attack  Hungary 
at  once  by  the  line  of  the  Danube  and  from  the  frontier 
of  Galicia  on  the  north-east.  The  Sorbs  were  to  be 
led  forward  from  their  border- provinces  against  the 
capital ;  and  another  race,  which  centuries  of  oppres- 
sion had  filled  with  bitter  hatred  of  the  Magyars,  was 
to  be  thrown  into  the  struggle.  The  mass  of  the 
*  CMwt  dec  aenen  GegetM^  i.  S7.     Helfert,  ir.  C8)  3SL 


UML  TBANSTLFAmA.  85 

population  of  Trahsylvania  belonged  to  the  RoamaDiaa 
stock.  The  Magyars,  here  known  by  the  nw-p-n— 1_ 
name  of  Czeklers,  and  a  community  of  •"^''™^'*""'^ 
Germans,  descended  from  immigrants  who  settled  m 
TraosylTania  about  the  twelfth  century,  formed  a  small 
but  a  privileged  minority,  in  whose  presence  the  Rou- 
manian peasantry,  poor,  savage,  and  absolutely  without 
political  rights,  felt  themselves  before  1848  scarcely 
removed  from  serfdom.  In  the  Diet  of  Transylvania 
the  Magyars  held  command,  and  In  spite  of  tbe  resist- 
ance of  the  Germans,  they  had  succeeded  in  carrying  an 
Act,  in  May,  1848,  uniting  the  country  with  Hungary. 
This  Act  had  been  ratified  by  the  Emperor  Ferdinand, 
but  it  was  followed  by  a  widespread  insurrection  of  the 
Roumanian  peasantry,  who  were  already  asserting  their 
claims  as  a  separate  nation  and  demanding  equality  with 
their  oppressors.  The  rising  of  the  Boumanians  had 
indeed  more  of  the  character  of  an  agrarian  revolt  than 
of  a  movement  for  national  independence.  It  was 
marked  by  atrocious  cruelty  ;  and  although  the  Hapa- 
bui^  standard  was  raised,  tbe  Austrian  commandant, 
General  Puchner,  hesitated  long  before  lending  the  in- 
surgents his  countenance.  At  length,  in  October,  he 
declared  against  the  Hungarian  Government.  The 
union  of  the  regular  troops  with  the  peasantry  over- 
powered for  a  time  all  resistance.  The  towns  fell 
under  Austrian  sway,  and  although  the  Czeklers  were 
not  yet  disarmed,  Transylvania  seemed  to  be  lost  to 
Hungary.  General  Puchner  received  orders  to  lead 
his  troops,  with  tiie  newly  formed  Boumauiun  militia,^ 


86  MODERN  EVBOFB.  Uml 

westward  into  the  Banat,  in  order  to  co-operate  in  the 
attack  which  was  to  overwhelm  the  HuDgarians  from 
every  quarter  of  the  kingdom.* 

On  the  15th  of  December,  Windischgratz,  in  com- 
mand of  the  main  Austrian  army,  crossed  the  river 
Leithu,  the  border  between  G^erman  and  Magyar  terri- 
tory. Gorgei,  who  was  opposed  to  him, 
oorapr  pMiS!  had  from  the  first  declared  that  Pesth  must 
he  abandoned  and  a  war  of  defence  carried 
on  in  Central  Hungary.  Kossuth,  however,  had  scorned 
this  counsel,  and  announced  that  he  would  defend  Pesth 
to  the  last.  The  backwardness  of  the  Hungarian  pre- 
parations  and  the  disorder  of  the  newlevies  jastiSed  the 
young  general,  who  from  this  time  assumed  the  attitude 
of  contempt  and  hostility  towards  the  Committee  of 
Defence.  Kossuth  bad  in  fact  been  strangely  served  by 
fortune  In  his  choice  of  Gorgei.  He  had  raised  him  to 
command  on  account  of  one  irretrievable  act  of  severity 
against  an  Austrian  partisan,  and  without  any  proof  of 
bis  military  capacity.  In  the  untried  soldier  he  had 
found  a  general  of  unusual  skill;  in  the  supposed 
devotee  to  Magyar  patriotism  he  had  found  a  mihtory 
politician  as  self-willed  and  as  insubordinate  as  any  who 
have  ever  distracted  the  councils  of  a  falling  State. 
Dissensions  and  misunderstandings  aggravated  the 
weakness  of  the  Hungarians  in  the  field.  Position 
after  position  was  lost,  and  it  soon  became  evident  that 
the  Parliament  and  Government  could  remain  no  longer 

«  BevolatiouRkrieg  in  SiebeubQrgon,  L  30.     Helfwt,  ii.  207.    Ibm. 
tiftoo  et  liiiiji,  Lettrea  Hougra-Koumaiues,  Adlereteiu,  iL  105. 

.oogic 


UML  TBS  WAS  IN  BUNQABT.  S7 

at  Festh.  They  withdrew  to  Debreczin  beyond  the 
Theiss,  and  on  tbe  5th  of  January,  1849,  Windiscbgratz 
made  his  entry  into  the  capital.* 

The  Austrians  now  supposed  the  war  to  be  at  an 
end.  It  was  in  fact  but  beginning.  The  fortress  of 
Comom,  on  the  Upper  Danube,  remained 


ducting  his  retreat  northwards  into  a  moun- 
tainous country  where  tbe  Austrians  could  not  foUow 
him  Gorgei  gained  the  power  either  of  operating  against 
Windiscbgratz's  communications  or  of  combining  with 
the  army  of  General  Klapka,  who  was  charged  with  the 
defence  of  Hungary  gainst  an  enemy  advanciog  firom 
Galicia.  While  AVindischgratz  remained  inactive  at 
Pestb,  K.Iapka  met  and  defeated  an  Austrian  division 
under  General  Schlick  which  had  crossed  the  Carpathians 
and  was  moving  southwards  towards  Debreczin.  Gorgei 
now  threw  himself  eastwards  upon  the  line  of  retreat  of 
tbe  beaten  enemy,  and  Schlick's  array  only  escjiped  cap- 
ture by  abandoning  its  communications  and  seeking 
refuge  with  Windiscbgratz  at  Festh.  A  concentration  of 
the  Magyar  forces  was  effected  on  the  Theiss,  and  the 
command  over  the  entire  army  was  given  by  Kossuth  to 
Dembinski,  a  Fole  who  had  gained  distinction  in  the 
wars  of  Napoleon  and  in  the  campaign  of  Ko»«ai  ud 
1831.  Gcirgei,  acting  as  the  representative  *""* 
of  the  officers  who  had  been  in  the  service  before  the 
Kevolution,  had  published  an  address  declaring  that  tbe 

■  Klapka,  Eiinnenuigea,  p.  56.    Helfert,  ir.  199;  Qorgei,  Ldien  nnd 
Wirkan,  i.  145.    Adkratmn,  iu.  £76, 649. 

I      l,z<..:t,C00gIf 


88  MODERN  EUBOPS.  Wft 

army  would  fight  for  no  cause  but  tbat  o£  the  Constitu- 
tion as  established  by  Ferdinand,  the  legitimate  King, 
and  tbat  it  would  accept  no  commands  but  those  of  the 
Ministers  whom  Ferdinand  had  appointed.  Interpreting 
this  manifesto  as  a  direct  act  of  defiance,  and  as  a  warn- 
ing tbat  the  army  migiit  under  Gorgoi's  command 
make  terms  on  its  own  uutburity  with  tbe  Austrian 
Government,  Kossuth  resorted  to  the  dangerous  experi- 
ment of  superseding  tbe  national  commanders  by  a  Pole 
who  was  connected  with  the  revolutionary  paHy  through- 
out Europe.  The  act  was  disastrous  in  its  moral  effects 
upon  the  army ;  and,  as  a  general,  Denibinski  entirely 
failed  to  justify  his  reputation.  After  permitting 
Schlick's  corps  to  escape  him  he  moved  forwards  from 
the  Theiss  agiiinst  Pesth.  He  was  met  by  tbe  Austrians 
and  defeated  at  Kapolna  (February  26).  Both  armies 
retired  to  their  earlier  positiuns,  and,  after  a  declara- 
tion from  the  Magyar  generals  that  they  would  no 
longer  obey  his  orders,  Dembinski  was  removed  from 
his  command,  though  be  remained  in  Hungary  to  in- 
terfere once  more  with  evil  effect  before  the  end  of 
the  war. 

The  struggle  between  Austria  and  Hungary  had 
reached  this  stage  when  tbe  Constitution  merging  all 
Ttie    Aiutriana     provlncial  riy-lits  in  one  centralised  system 

IriTBii     out    of        '^  .       "  ■' 

Hung^iry,  April,  ^-^y  published  by  Scbwarzeuberg.  The 
Croats,  tbe  Serbs,  the  Eoumanians,  who  had  so  credu- 
lously flocked  to  the  Emperor's  banner  under  tbe  belief 
that  they  were  fighting  for  their  own  independence,  at 
length  discovered   their  delusion.      Their   cntbusiasui 


wm.  WAS  IN  SUNQARY.  60   . 

Bant;  the  bolder  among  them  even  attempted  to 
detach  their  countrymen  from  the  Austrian  cause ;  but 
it  was  too  late  to  undo  what  had  already  been 
done.  Jellacic,  now  undiBtinguisbable  from  any  other 
Austrian  general,  mocked  the  politicians  of  Agram 
who  still  babbled  of  Croatian  autonomy :  Stratimirovic, 
the  national  leader  of  the  Serbs,  sank  before  his  rival 
the  Patriarch  of  Carlowitz,  a  Churchman  who  preferred 
ecclesiastical  immunities  granted  by  the  Emperor  of 
Austria  to  independence  won  on  the  field  of  battle  by, 
his  countrymen.  Had  a  wiser  or  more  generous  states- 
manship controlled  the  Hungarian  Government  in  the 
first  months  of  its  activity,  a  union  between  the 
Magyars  and  the  subordinate  races  against  Viennese 
centralisation  might  perhaps  even  now  have  been 
effected.  But  distrust  and  animosity  had  risen  too 
high  for  the  mediators  between  Slav  and  Magyar  to 
attain  any  real  success,  nor  was  any  distinct  promise  of 
self-government  even  now  to  be  drawn  from  the  offers 
of  concession  which  were  held  out  at  Debreczia.  An 
interval  of  dazzling  triumph  seemed  indeed  to  justify 
the  Hungarian  Government  in  holding  fast  to  its 
Bovereigrn  claims.  In  the  hands  of  able  leaders  no  task 
seemed  too  hard  for  Magyar  troops  to  accomplish. 
Bem,  arriving  in  Transylvania  without  a  soldier,  created 
a  new  army,  and  by  a  series  of  extraordinary  marches 
and  surprises  not  only  overthrew  the  Austrian  and 
Eoumanian  troops  opposed  to  him,  but  expelled  a 
corps  of  Russians  whom  General  Puchner  in  his  ex- 
tremity had  invited  to  garrison  Hemaannstadt.     Gorgei, 


•    W  UOPEBN  ETIBOPS.  ism 

resuming  in  the  first  week  of  April  the  movement  in 
which  Dembinski  had  failed,  inflicted  upon  the  Aus- 
trians  a  series  of  defeats  that  drove  them  back  to  the 
walls  of  Pesth;  while  Klapka,  advancing  on  Comorn, 
effected  the  relief  of  this  fortress,  and  planted  in  the 
rear  of  the  Austrians  a  force  which  threatened  to  cat 
them  off  from  Vienna.  It  was  in  vain  that  the  Austrian 
Government  removed  Windiscbgriitz  from  his  command. 
His  successor  found  that  a  force  superior  to  his  own 
•was  gathering  round  him  on  every  side.  He  saw  that 
Hungary  was  lost;  and  leaving  a  garrison  in  the 
fortress  of  Buda,  he  led  off  his  army  in  has.te  from  the 
capital,  and  only  paused  in  his  retreat  when  he  had 
reached  the  Austrian  frontier. 

The  Magyars,  rallying  from  their  first  defeats,  had 
brilliantly  achieved  the  liberation  of  their  land.  The 
D«umUon  Court  of   Vienna,    attempting  in    right  of 

""pr^raM?""  superior  force  to  overthrow  an  established 
constitution,  had  proved  itself  the  inferior 
power;  and  in  mingled  exaltation  and  resentment  it 
was  natural  that  the  party  and  the  leaders  who  had 
been  foremost  in  the  national  struggle  of  Hungary 
should  deem  a  renewed  union  with  Austria  impos- 
sible, and  submission  to  the  Hapsburg  crown  an 
indignity.  On  the  19th  of  April,  after  the  defeat 
of  Windiscbgratz  but  before  the  evacuation  of  Pesth, 
the  Diet  declared  that  the  House  of  Hapsburg 
had  forfeited  its  throne,  and  proclaimed  Hungary  an 
independent  State.  No  statement  was  made  as  to  the 
fature  form  of  government,  but  everything  indicated 


tM.  SaOLABATION  OF  INDBPENDSNOS.  91 

thai  HuDgaiy,  if  saccessful  in  maintaining  its  inde- 
pendence, would  become  a  Republic,  with  Kossuth, 
who  was  now  appointed  Governor,  for  its  chief.  Even 
in  the  revolutionary  severance  of  ancient  ties  homage 
was  paid  to  the  legal  and  constitutional  bent  of  the 
Hungarian  mind.  Nothing  was  said  in  the  Declara- 
tion of  April  19th  of  the  rights  of  man;  there  was  no 
Parisian  commonplace  on  the  sovereignty  of  the  people. 
The  necessity  of  Hungarian  independence  was  deduced 
from  '  the  offences  which  the  Austrian  House  had 
committed  against  the  written  and  unwritten  iaw 
of  the  land,  offences  continued  through  centuries 
and  crowned  by  the  invasion  under  Windlschgratz, 
by  the  destruction  of  the  Hungarian  Constitution  in 
the  edict  of  March  9th,  and  by  the  introduction  of  the 
Russians  into  Transylvania.  Though  coloured  and 
exaggerated  by  M^yar  patriotism,  the  chaises  made 
against  the  Hapsburg  dynasty  were  on  the  whole  in 
accordance  with  historical  fact;  and  if' the  affairs  of 
States  were  to  be  guided  by  no  other  considerations 
than  those  relating  to  the  performance  of  contracts, 
Hungary  had  certainly  established  its  right  to  be  quit 
of  partnership  with  Austria  and  of  its  Austrian  sovereign. 
But  the  judgment  of  history  has  condemned  Kossuth's 
declaration  of  Hungarian  independence  in  the  midst  of 
the  struggle  of  1849  as  a  great  political  error.  It 
served  no  useful  purpose ;  it  deepened  the  antagonism 
already  existing  between  the  Government  and  a  large 
part  of  the  army  ;  and  while  it  added  to  the  sources  of 
internal  discord,  it  gave  colour  to  the  interventiqn^qr 


M  MODERN  EVWPK  IM* 

Itussia  as  against  a  revolutiooary  caase.  Apart  from 
its  disiustrous  effect  upon  the  immediate  course  of  events, 
it  was  based  upon  a  narrow  and  inadequate  view  both 
of  the  needs  and  of  the  possibilities  of  the  future.  Even 
in  the  interests  of  the  Magyar  nation  itself  as  a  European 
power,  it  may  well  be  doubted  whetlier  in  severance  from 
Austria  suoh  influence  and  such  weight  could  possibly 
have  been  won  by  a  race  numerically  weak  and  sur- 
rounded by  hostile  nationalities,  as  the  ability  and  the 
political  energy  of  the  Magyars  have  since  won  for 
tl\em  in  the  direction  of  the  accumulated  forces  of  the 
Austro- Hungarian  Empire. 

It  has  generally  been  considered  a  fatal  error  on  the 
part  of  the  Hungarian  commanders  that,  after  expelling 

the  Austrian  army,  they  did  not  at  once 
wnoonsffiinit      march  upon  Vienna,  but  returned    to  lay 

siege  to  the  fortress  of  Buda,  wliich  re- 
sisted long  enough  to  enable  the  Austrian  Government 
to  reot^anise  and  to  multiply  its  forces.  But  the  inter^ 
vention  of  Russia  would  probably  have  been  fatal  to  Hun- 
garian independence,  even  if  Vienna  had  been  captured 
and  a  democratic  government  established  there  for  a 
while  in  opposition  to  the  Court  at  OlmQtz.  The  plan 
of  a  Russian  intervention,  though  this  intervention  wa.s 
now  explained  by  the  community  of  interest  between 
Polish  and  Hungarian  rebels,  was  no  new  thing. 
Soon  after  the  outbreak  of  the  March  Revolution  the 
Czar  had  desired  to  send  his  troops  both  into  Fmssia 
and  into  Austria  as  the  restorers  of  monarchical  author- 
ilj-      His  help  was    declined  on  behalf  of  the  King 


ia«.  BUSSlAJf  intervention:  » 

of  Frnssia ;  in  Austria  the  project  had  been  discussed 
at  saccessire  moments  of  danger,  and  after  the  over- 
throw of  the  Imperial  troops  in  Transylvania  by  Bern 
the  proffered  aid  was  accepted.  The  Bussians  who 
then  occupied  Hermannstadt  did  not,  however,  enter 
the  country  as  combatants ;  their  task  was  to  garrison 
certain  positions  still  held  by  the  Austrians,  and  so  to 
set  free  the  Emperor's  troops  for  service  in  the  field. 
On  the  declaration  of  Hungarian  independence,  it  be- 
came necessary  for  Francis  Joseph  to  accept  hia  pro- 
tector's help  without  qualification  or  disguise.  An 
army  of  eighty  thousand  Kussiaos  marched  across 
Galicia  to  assist  the  Austrians  in  grappling  with  an 
enemy  before  whom,  when  single-handed,  they  had 
succumbed.  Other  Russian  divisions,  while  Austria 
massed  its  troops  on  the  Upper  Danube,  entered  Tran- 
sylvania from  the  south  and  east,  and  the  Magyars  in 
the  summer  of  1849  found  themselves  compelled  to 
defend  their  country  against  forces  three  times  more 
numerous  than  their  own.* 

When  it  became  known  that  the  Czar  had  deter- 
mined to  throw  all  his  strength  into  the  scale,  Kossuth 
saw  that  no  ordinary  operations  of  war  could  possibly 
avert  defeat,  and  called  upon  his  country- 
men to  destroy  their  homes  and  property  at  huiS^'jIIijS 
the  approach  of  the  enemy,  and  to  leave  to  "«"  '  ■ 
the  invader  a  flaming  and  devastated  solitude.  But 
the  area  of  warfare  was  too  vast  for  the  execution  of 

•  Helfeii,  ir.  (2)  326.     Elapka,  Wit  in  Hungary,  L  23.     MutI  at 
Chuaiii.  li  531.    Odigel,U.61.  ,, 


M  HODERN  EUBOPM.  torn. 

this  design,  even  if  the  nation  had  been  prepared  for 
80  desperate  s  course.  The  defence  of  Hungary  was 
left  to  its  armies,  and  Qorgei  became  the  leading  figure 
in  the  calamitous  epoch  that  followed.  While  the 
Government  prepared  to  retire  to  Czegedin,  far  in  the 
south-east,  Gorgei  took  post  on  the  Upper  Danube,  to 
meet  the  powerful  force  which  the  Emperor  of  Austria 
had  placed  under  the  orders  of  General  Haynan,  a 
soldier  whose  mingled  energy  and  ferocity  in  Italy  had 
marked  him  out  as  a  fitting  scoui^e  for  the  Hungarians, 
and  had  won  for  him  supreme  civil  as  well  as  militaty 
powers.  Gorgei  naturally  believed  that  tlie  first  object 
of  the  Austrian  commander  woald  be  to  effect  a  junction 
with  the  Russians,  who,  under  Paskiewitsch,  the  con- 
queror of  Kara  in  1829,  were  now  crossing  the  Car- 
pathians; and  he  therefore  directed  all  his  efforts 
i^inst  the  left  of  the  Austrian  line.  While  Tie  was 
unsuccessfully  attacking  the  enemy  on  the  river  Waag 
north  of  Comom,  Haynau  with  the  mass  of  his  forces 
advanced  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Danube,  and 
captured  Raab  (June  28th).  Qorgei  .  threw  himself 
southwards,  bnt  his  efforts  to  stop  Haynau  were 
in  vain,  and  the  Austrians  occupied  Pesth  (July 
1 1th).  The  Russians  meanwhile  were  advancing 
southwards  by  an  independent  line  of  march.  Their 
vanguard  reached  the  Danube  and  the  Upper  Theiss, 
and  Gorgei  seemed  to  be  enveloped  by  the  enemy.  The 
Hungarian  Government  adjured  him  to  hasten  towards 
Czegedin  and  Axad,  where  Kossuth  was  concentrating 
all  the  other  divisions  for  a  final  atruj^le ;  bnt  Ctdrgei 


MM.  OAPITJTLATTON  OF  VILAQ08.  95 

held  on  to  his  position  about  Comorn  until  his  rctroat 
oould  only  be  effected  by  means  of  a  vast  detour  north- 
wards,  and  before  he  could  reach  Arad  all  was  lost. 
Dembinski  waa  again  in  command.  Charged  with  the 
defence  of  the  passage  of  the  Theiss  about  Czegedin,  he 
failed  to  prevent  the  Austriana  from  crossing  the  river, 
and  on  the  5th  of  August  was  defeated  at  Czoreg  with 
heavy  loss.  Kossuth  now  gave  the  command  to  Bern, 
who  had  hurried  from  Transylvania,  where  overpowering 
forces  had  at  length  wrested  victory  from  his  grasp. 
Bern  fought  the  last  battle  of  the  campaign  at  Temes- 
var.  He  was  overthrown  and  driven  eastwards,  but 
succeeded  in  leading  a  remnant  of  his  army  across  the 
Moldavian  frontier  and  so  escaped  capture.  Gorgei, 
who  was  now  close  to  Arad,  had  some 
strange  fancy  that  it  woidd  dishonour  his  vil^?Augn<* 
army  to  seek  refuge  on  neutral  soil.  He 
turned  northwards  so  as  to  encounter  Russian  and 
not  Austrian  regiments,  and  without  striking  a 
blow,  without  stipulating  even  for  the  lives  of  tlie 
civilians  in  his  camp,  he  led  his  army  within  tht-:  Kus- 
sian  lines  at  Vilagos,  and  surrendered  unconditionally 
to  the  generals  of  the  Czar.  His  own  life  was  spared  ; 
no  mercy  was  shown  to  those  who  were  handed  over  as 
his  fellow -prisoners  by  the  Kiissian  to  the  Austrian 
Government,  or  who  were  seized  by  Hayiiau  as  his 
troops  advanced.  Tribunals  more  rescm-  vj„^.„  „, 
bling  those  of  the  French  Reign  of  Terror  *"-'■""- 
than  the  Courts  of  a  civilised  Government  sei.t  tlie 
Doblest  patriots  and  soldiers  of  Hungary  to  the  scalf^ld^ 


fte  MODEBK  BITROPS.  um 

To  the  deep  disgrace  of  the  Austrian  Crown,  Count 
Batthy^ny,  the  Minister  of  Ferdinand,  was  included 
among  those  whose  lives  were  sacrificed.  The  ven- 
geance of  the  conqueror  seemed  the  more  frenzied  and 
the  more  insatiable  because  it  had  only  been  rendered 
possible  by  foreign  aid.  Crushed  under  an  iron  rale, 
exhausted  by  war,  the  prey  of  a  Government  which  knew 
only  how  to  employ  its  subject-races  as  gaolers  over  one 
another,  Hungary  passed  for  some  years  into  silence 
and  almost  into  despair.  Every  vestige  of  its  old  con- 
stitutional rights  was  extinguished.  Its  territory  was 
curtailed  by  the  separation  of  Transylvania  and  Croatia; 
its  administration  was  handed  over  to  G-ermana  from 
Vienna.  A  conscription,  enforced  not  for  the  ends  of 
military  service  but  as  the  surest  means  of  breaking 
the  national  spirit,  enrolled  its  youth  in  Austrian  regi- 
menla,  and  banished  them  to  the  extremities  of  the 
empire.  Ko  darker  period  was  known  in  the  history  of 
Hungary  since  the  wars  of  the  seventeenth  century 
than  that  which  followed  the  catastrophe  of  1849.* 

The  gloom  which  followed    Austrian   victory    was 

now  descending  not  on   Hungary  alone  but  on  Italy 

also.     The  armistice  made  between  Eadetzky  and  the 

King  of  Piedmont  at  Vigevano  in  August, 

Anjmrt.  1818-       1848,  lasted  for  seven  months,  durin?  which 

Mansb,  iW».  _   _  »  O 

the  British  and  French  Governments  en- 
deavoured, but  in  vain,  to  arrange  terms  of  peace  be- 
tween the  combatants.     "With  military  tyranny  in  its 

*  Khpka,  Ww,  U.  106.  Eriunemngeii,  58.    Goi^,  ii.  378.   Kossuth, 
Schriflen  (18&0J,  IL  281.    Codex  der  nenen  Oesetn^  L  75, 10&. 


most  bmtal  fonn  crashing  down  Lombardy,  it  was 
impossible  that  Charles  Albert  should  reaoance  ib( 
work  of  deliveraace  to  wbicb  he  had  pledged  himself. 
Austria,  on  the  other  hand,  had  now  sufficiently  re- 
eorered  its  strength  to  repudiate  the  concessions  wluch 
it  had  offered  at  an  earlier  time,  and  Schwarzenberg  on 
assuming  pover  announced  that  the  Emperor  would 
maintain  Lombardy  at  every  cost.  The  prospects  of 
Sardinia  as  regarded  help  from  the  rest  o£  the  Peninsula 
were  far  worse  than  when  it  took  up  arms  in  the  spring 
of  184)8.  Projects  of  a  general  Italian  federation,  of  a 
military  union  between  the  central  States  and  Piedmont, 
of  an  Italian  Constitoent  Assembly,  had  succeeded  one 
another  and  left  no  result.  Naples  had  fallen  back 
into  absolutism;  Rome  and  Tuscany,  from  which  aid 
might  still  have  been  expected,  were  distracted  by  in- 
ternal contentions,  and  hastening  as  it  seemed  towards 
anarchy.  After  the  defeat  of  Charles  Albert  at  Cus- 
tozza,  Pius  IX.,  who  was  still  uneasily  playing  his  part 
as  a  constitutional  sovereign,  had  called  to  office  Pelle- 
grino  Rossi,  an  Italian  patriot  of  an  earlier  time,  who 
had  since  been  ambassador  of  Lonis  Philippe  at  Rome, 
and  by  his  connection  with  the  Orleanist  Monarchy 
had  incurred  the  hatred  of  the  Republican 
party  throughout  Italy.  Rossi,  as  a  vigorous  Sp^j^^ 
and  independent  reformer,  was  as  much  de- 
tested in  clerical  and  reactionary  circles  as  he  was  by 
the  demagogues  and  their  followers.  This,  however, 
profited  him  nothing;  and  on  the  15th  of  November, 
as  he  was  proceeding  to  the  opening  of  the  Chambers. 


M  MODEBN  SUBOPB.  W» 

he  was  asBaseinated  by  an  unknown  hand.  Terrified 
hy  this  crime,  and  by  an  attack  upon  his  own  palace  by 
which  it  was  followed,  Pius  fied  to  Oaeta  and  placed 
himself  under  the  protection  of  the  King  of  Naples.  A 
BomuBtipab-  Coustituent  Assembly  was  summoned  and 
ti<>,Fai>.B,iatt.  ^  Republic  proclaimed  at  Eome,  between 
which  and  the  Sardinian  Government  there  was  so  little 
community  of  feeling  that  Charles  Albert  would,  if  the 
Pope  had  accepted  bis  protection,  have  sent  bis  troops 
to  restore  him  to  a  position  of  security.  In  Tuscany 
affaira  were  in  a  similar  condition.  The  Grand  Duke 
had  for  some  months  been  regarded  as  a  sincere,  though 
reserved,  friend  of  the  Italian  cause,  and  he  bad  even 
spoken  of  surrendering  his  crown  if  this  should  be  for 
the  good  of  the  Italian  nation.  When,  however,  the 
Pope  had  fled  to  Gaeta,  and  the  project  was  openly 
avowed  of  uniting  Tuscany  with  the  lloman 
States  in  a  Republic,  the  Grand  Duke, 
moved  more  by  the  fulminations  of  Pius  against  his 
despoilcTs  than  by  care  for  his  own  crown,  fled  in  his 
turn,  leaving  the  IJepublicans  masters  of  Florence.  A 
miHerable  exhibition  of  vanity,  riot,  and  braggadocio 
was  given  to  the  world  by  the  politicians 'of  the  Tuscan 
State.  Alite  in  Florence  and  in  Kome  all  sense  of  the 
true  needs  of  the  moment,  of  the  absolute  uselessuess 
of  internal  changes  of  Government  if  Austria  was  to 
maintain  its  dominion,  seemed  to  have  vanished  from 
men's  minds.  Republican  phantoms  distracted  the  heart 
and  the  understanding  ;  no  soldier,  no  military  adminis- 
trator arose  till  too  late  by  the  side  of  the  rhetoricians 


iML  AU8TBIA  AND  FIBDMOST.  99 

and  mob-leaders  who  filled  the  st^e;  and  when,  on 
the  1 9th  of  March,  the  armistice  was  hrought  to  a 
close  in  Upper  Italy,  Piedmont  took  the  field  alone.* 

The  campaign  which  now  began  lasted  hot  for 
five  days.  While  Charles  Albert  scattered  his  forces 
from  L^o  Maggiore  to  Stradella  on  the  south  of  the 
Po,  hoping  to  move  by  the  northern  road  npoo  Milan, 
Badetzky  concentiated  his  troops  near  Pavia,  where  he 
intended  to  cross  the  Ticino.  In  an  evil  -riaXMivhemn^ 
moment  Charles  Albert  had  given  the  com-  '*'*°'  ***■ 
mand  of  his  army  to  Chrzanowski,  a  Pole,  and  Ad 
entrusted  its  southern  division,  composed  chiefly  of 
Lombard  volunteers,  to  another  Pole,  Ramorino,  who 
had  been  engaged  in  Mazzioi's  incursion  into  Savoy  in 
1833.  Ramorino  had  then,  rightly  or  wrongly,  incurred 
the  charge  of  treachery.  His  relations  with  Chrzanow- 
ski were  of  the  worst  character,  and  the  habit  of  mili- 
tary obedience  was  as  much  wanting  to  him  as  the 
sentiment  of  loyalty  to  the  sovereign  from  whom 
he  had  now  accepted  a  command.  The  wilfulness  of 
this  adventurer  made  the  Fiedmontese  army  an  easy 
prey.  Bamorino  was  posted  on  the  south  of  the 
Po,  near  its  junction  with  the  Ticino,  but  received 
orders  on  the  commencement  of  hostilities  to  move 
northwards  and  defend  the  passive  of  the  Ticino  at 
Pavia,  breaking  up  the  Iwidges  behind  him.  Instead 
of  obeying  this  order  he  kept  his  division  lingering 
about  Stradella.     Badetzky,  approaching  the  Ticino  at 


•  Farini,  a  404.    Pul.  Pftp^  1849,  Itu.  607 ;  IriiL  (2)  117. 
Di^omuii^  tL  67.    Geon&reUi,  STentim^  p.  29.     FaMliiii,  {>.  139. 


100  MODEMN  BUSOPS.  mm 

Pavia,  foand  the  passage  unguarded.  He  crossed  the 
river  with  the  mass  of  his  axmj,  and,  cutting  off  Bamo- 
rino's  division,  threw  himself  upon  the  flank  of  tlie 
scattered  Piedmontese.  Charles  Albert,  whose  head- 
quarters were  at  Novara,  hurried  southwards.  Before 
be  could  concentrate  his  troops,  he  was  attacked  at 
Mortara  by  the  Austrians  and  driven  back.  The  line 
of  retreat  upon  Turin  and  Alessandria  was  already 
lost ;  an  attempt  was  made  to  bold  Novara  against  the 
BatOB  oi  Ng-  advaHciog  Austrians.  The  battle  which 
ni^Mutiii3.  ^^  fought  in  front  of  this  town  on  the 
23rd  of  March  ended  with  the  utter  overthrow  of  the 
Sardinian  army.  So  complete  was  the  demoralisation  of 
the  troops  that  the  cavalry  were  compelled  to  attack 
bodies  of  half-maddened  infantry  in  the  streets  of 
Novara  in  order  to  save  the  town  from  pill^e.* 

Charles  Albert  had  throughout  the  battle  of  the 
33rd  appeared  to  seek  death.  The  reproaches  levelled 
against  him  for  the  abandonment  of  Milan  in  the 
previous  year,  the  charges  of  treachery  which  awoke  to 
new  life  the  miserable  record  of  his  waverings  in  1821, 
had  sunk  into  the  very  depths  of  his  being.  Weak 
and  irresolute  in  his  earlier  political  career,  harsh  and 
illiberal  towards  the  pioneers  of  Italian  freedom  during 
a  great  part  of  his  reign,  Charles  had  thrown  his  whole 
heart  and  soul  into  the  final  struggle  of  his  country 
against  Austria.     This  struggle  lost,  life  had  nothing 

•  SchoDlulB,  p.  332.  Pftri.  P^.,  1849,  IviiL  (2)  216.  Bianehi,  Folitiat 
Anatiiacv  p.  VH.  Lsmarmon,  Ud  Episodio,  p.  175-  Fortkfog'li  di 
RatuoriiM^  p.  4L    Biunoriao  was  ooDdemned  to  deaib,  and  eieonlfld. 


more  for  Mm.  The  personal  hatred  borne  towards  him 
by  the  mlers  of  Austria  caused  him  to  believe  that 
easier  terma  of  peace  might  be  granted  to 
Piedmont  if  another  sovereign  were  on  its 
throne,  and  bis  resolution,  in  case  oE  defeat,  was  fixed 
and  settled.  When  night  fell  after  the  battle  of  Novara 
he  called  together  his  generals,  and  in  their  presence 
abdicated  his  crown.  Bidding  an  eternal  farewell  to  his 
SOD  Victor  Emmanuel,  who  knelt  weeping  before  him, 
he  quitted  the  army  accompanied  by  but  one  attendant, 
and  passed  unrecognised  through  the  enemy's  guards. 
He  left  his  queen,  his  capital,  nnvisited  as  he  journej'ed 
into  exile.  The  brief  residue  of  his  life  was  spent  in 
solitude  near  Oporto.  Six  months  after  the  battle  of 
Kovara  he  was  carried  to  the  grave. 

It  may  he  truly  said  of  Charles  Albert  that  nothing 
in  his  reign  became  him  like  the  ending  of  it.     Hope- 
less as  the  conflict  of  1849  might  well  appear,  it  proved 
that  there  was  one  sovereign  in  Italy  who  was  willing 
to  stake  his  throne,  his  life,  the  whole  sum  of  his  per- 
sonal  interests,  for  the   national    cause ;  one   dynasty 
whose  sons  knew  no  fear  save  that  others  should  en- 
counter death  before  them  on  Italy's  behalf. 
Had   the    profoundest    statesmanship,    the     VKCEnimm- 
keenest  political  genius,  governed  the  coun- 
sels of  Piedmont  in  1849,  it  would,  with  full  prescience 
of  the  ruin  of  Novara,  have  bidden  the  sovereign  and 
the  army  strike  in  self-sacrifice  their  last  xmaided  blow. 
From  this  time  there  was  but  one  possible  head  for 
Italy.     The  faults  o£  the  Government  of  Turin  during 


Xtt  MODESN  SVSOPS.  M* 

Charles  Albert's  years  of  peace  liad  ceased  to  have  any 
hearing  on  Italian  affairs;  the  sharpest  tongues  no 
longer  repeated,  the  most  credulous  ear  no  longer 
harboured  the  slanders  of  1848;  the  man  who,  beaten 
and  outnumbered,  had  for  hours  sat  immovable  in 
front  of  the  Austrian  cannon  at  Novara  had,  in  the 
depth  of  his  misfortune,  given  to  his  son  not  the  crown 
of  Piedmont  only  but  the  crown  of  Italy.  Honour, 
patriotism,  had  made  the  young  Victor  Emmanuel  the 
hope  of  the  Sardinian  army ;  the  same  honour  and 
patriotism  carried  him  safely  past  the  lures  which  Aus- 
tria set  for  the  inheritor  of  a  ruined  kingdom,  and  gave 
in  the  first  hours  of  his  reign  an  earnest  of  the  policy 
which  was  to  end  in  Italian  union.  It  was  necessary 
for  him  to  visit  Radetzky  in  his  camp  in  order  to 
arrange  the  preliminaries  of  peace.  There,  amid  flat- 
teries offered  to  him  at  his  father's  expense,  it  was 
notified  to  him  that  if  he  would  annul  the  Constitution 
that  his  father  had  miide,  he  might  reckon  not  only  on 
an  ea.sy  quittance  with  the  conqueror  but  on  the  friend- 
ship and  support  of  Austria,  Tliis  demand,  though 
streuuously  pressed  in  later  negutiations,  Victor  Em- 
manuel unconditionally  refused.  He  had  to  endure  for 
a  while  the  presence  of  Austrian  troops  in  his  kingdom, 
and  to  furnish  an  indemnity  which  fell  heavily  on  so 
small  a  State  ;  but  tlie  liljerties  of  his  people  remained 
intact,  and  the  pledge  given  by  his  father  inviolate. 
Amid  the  ruin  of  all  hopes  and  the  bankruptcy  of  all 
other  royal  reputations  throughout  Italy,  there  proved  to 
he  one  man,  cue  government,  in  which  the  Italian  people 


could  trast.  This  compensation  at  leaat  waa  given  in 
the  disasters  of  1849,  that  the  traitors  to  the  cause  of 
Italy  and  of  freedom  could  not  again  deceive,  nor  the 
dream  of  a  federation  of  princes  ^^ain  obscure  the 
necessity  of  a  single  national  government.  In  the 
fidelity  of  Victor  Emmanuel  to  the  Piedmontese  Con- 
Btitution  lay  the  pledge  that  when  Italy's  next  opportu- 
nity  should  arrive,  the  chief  would  be  there  who  would 
meet  the  nation's  need. 

The  battle  of  Novara  had  not  long  been  fought 
when  the  Grand  Duke  of  Tuscany  was  restored  to  his 
throne  under  an  Austrian  garrison,  and  his  „ 
late  democratic  Minister,  Guerazzi,  who  had  towdj. 
endeavoured  by  submission  to  the  Court-party  to  avert 
an  Austrian  occupation,  was  sent  into  imprisonment. 
At  Borne  a  far  bolder  spirit  was  shown.  Mazzini  had 
arrived  in  the  iirst  week  of  March,  and,  though  his 
exhortation  to  the  Roman  Assembly  to  for-  Boa»»a& 
get  the  offences  of  Charles  Albert  and  to  ■'~^ 
unite  against  the  Austrians  in  Lombardy  came  too  late, 
he  was  able,  as  one  of  a  Triumvirate  with  dictatorial 
powers,  to  throw  much  of  his  own  ardour  into  the 
Roman  populace  in  defence  of  their  own  city  and  State. 
The  enemy  against  whom  Borne  had  to  be  defeoded 
proved  indeed  to  be  other  than  that  against  whom  pre- 
parations were  being  made.  The  victories  of  Austria 
had  aroused  the  apprehension  of  the  French  Govern- 
ment; and  though  the  fall  of  Piedmont  and  Lombardy 
could  not  now  be  undone,  it  was  determined  by  Louis 
Napoleon  and   hia   Ministers    to  antidpate  Austrian's 


IIM  MODBBN  EUBOFB.  MM. 

restoration  of  the  Papal  power  by  tlie  despatch  of 
French  troops  to  llome.  All  the  traditions  of  French 
national  policy  pointed  indeed  to  such  an  intervention. 
Austria  had  already  invaded  the  Roman  States  from  the 
north,  and  the  political  conditions  which  in  1832  had 
led  so  pacific  a  minister  as  Casimir  Perier  to  occupy 
Ancona  were  now  present  in  much  fjreater  force.  Lonis 
Napoleon  could  not,  without  ahrnd  ning  a  recognised 
interest  and  surrendering  something  of  the  due  infiuence 
of  France,  have  permitted  Austrian  generals  to  conduct 
the  Pope  back  to  his  capital  and  to  assume  the  govern- 
ment of  Central  Italy.  If  the  first  impulses  of  the 
Eevolotion  of  1848  had  still  beenkactive  in  France,  its 
intervention  would  probably  have  taken  the  form  of  a 
direct  alliance  with  the  Boman  Republic;  hut  public 
opinion  had  travelled  far  in  the  opposite  direction  since 
the  Four  Days  of  June  ;  and  the  new  President,  if  he 
had  not  forgotten  his  own  youtliful  relations  with  the 
Carbonari,  was  now  a  suitor  for  the  solid  favours  of 
French  conservative  and  religious  sentiment.  His 
Ministers  had  not  recognised  the  Eoman  Republic. 
They  were  friends,  no  doubt,  to  liberty ;  but  when  it 
was  certain  that  the  Austrians,  the  Spaniards,  the  Nea- 
politans, were  determined  to  restore  the  Pope,  it  might 
be  assumed  that  the  continuance  of  tlie  Roman  Republic 
was  an  impossibility,  rniuce,  as  a  Catholic  and  at  the 
same  time  a  Liberal  Power,  might  well,  under  these 
circumstances,  address  itself  to  the  task  of  reconciling 
Roman  liberty  with  the  inevitable  return  of  the  Holy 
Father  to  his  temporal  throne-    Events  were  moving 


■K  FRSNOB  mTSSVENTIOlT.  105 

too  fast  for  diplomacy;  troops  mast  be  at  once  de- 
spatched, or  the  next  French  envoy  would  find  Hadetzky 
on  the  Tiber.     The  misgivings  of  the  Bepuhlican  part 
of  the  Assembly  at  Paris  were  stilled  by  assurances  of 
the  generous  intentions  of  the  Qovemment 
towards  the  Roman  populations,  and  of  its     Tuitjoa  dcto^ 
anxiety  to  shelter  them  from  Austrian  do- 
mination.   President,  Ministers,  and  generals  resolutely 
shut  their  eyes  to  the  possibility  that  a  French  occupa- 
tion of  Rome  might  be  resisted  by  force  by  the  Romans 
themselves;  and  on  the  22nd  of  April  an  armament  of 
about  ten  thousand  men  set   sail    for   Civita   Yeccliia 
under  the  command  of  Qeneral  Oudinot,  a  sod  of  the 
Marshal  of  that  name. 

Before    landing  on  the   Italian   coast,  the   French 
general  sent  envoys  to  the  authorities  at 
Civita  Vecchia,  statin?  that  his  troops  came     ciriu  vecctais, 

•^  ^  April  a,  IWll. 

as  friends,  and  demanding  that  they  should 
be  admitted  into  the  town.  The  Municipal  Council 
determined  not  to  offer  resistance,  and  the  French  thus 
gained  a  footing  on  Italian  soil  and  a  basis  for  their 
operations.  Mess^es  came  from  French  diplomatists 
in  Rome  encouraging  the  general  to  advance  without 
delay.  The  mass  of  the  population,  it  wivs  said,  would 
welcome  his  appearance;  the  democratic  faction,  if 
reckless,  was  too  small  to  offer  any  serious  resistance, 
and  would  disappear  as  soon  as  the  French  should  enter 
the  city.  On  this  point,  however,  Oudinot  was  speedily 
undeceived.  In  reply  to  a  military  envoy  who  was 
sent  to  assure  the  Triumvirs  of  the  benevolent  designs 


loe  UODEBN  EUBOFS.  am 

of  the  French,  Mazzini  bluntly  answered  that  no  le- 
conciliatioQ  with  the  Pope  was  possible ;  and  on  the 
26th  of  April  the  Roman  A^Bembly  called  upon  the 
Executive  to  repel  force  by  force.  Oudinot  now 
proclaimed  a  state  of  siege  at  Civita  Vecchia,  seized 
the  citadel,  and  disarmed  the  garrison.  On  the  28th 
he  began  his  march  on  Rome.  As  he  approached, 
energetic  preparations  were  made  for  resistance.  Gari- 
baldi, who  had  fought  at  the  head  of  a 
^meuidun-  free  corps  against  the  Austrians  in  Upper 
Italy  in  1848,  had  now  brought  some  hun- 
dredfl  of  his  followers  to  Rome.  A  regiment  of  JJom- 
bard  volunteers,  under  their  young  leader  Manara,  had 
escaped  after  the  catastrophe  of  Kovara,  and  had  come 
to  fight  for  liberty  in  its  last  stronghold  on  Italian 
soil  Heroes,  exiles,  desperadoes  from  all  parts  of  the 
Peninsula,  met  In  the  streets  of  Rome,  and  imparted  to 
its  people  a  vigour  and  resolution  of  which  the  world 
had  long  deemed  them  iocapable.  Even  the  remnant 
of  the  Pontifical  Guard  took  part  in  the  work  of  de- 
fence. Oudinot,  advancing  with  his  little  corps  of 
seven  thousand  men,  found  himself,  without  heavy 
artillery,  in  front  of  a  city  still  sheltered  by  its  ancient 
fortifications,  and  in  the  presence  of  a  body  of  com- 
batants more  resolute  than  his  own  troops  and  twice  as 
numerous.  He  attacked  on  the  SOth^  was  checked  at 
every  point,  and  compelled  to  retreat  towards  Civita 
Vecchia,  leaving  two  hundred  and  fifty  prisoners  in 
the  hands  of  the  enemy.* 

•  Ouil»ldi,EpistoUrio,L3a    DelTeocMoiL'aMeaiodi  Bom^&SO: 


£[i8igmficant  as  was  this  misfortune  of  the  French 
.inns,  it  occasioned  no  small  stir  in  Paris  and  in  the 
Assemhly.  The  Government,  which  had  declared  that 
the  armament  was  intended  only  to  protect  ^^  ^^ 
Borne  against  Aiistria,  was  vehemently  re-  ■*»^-"*»- 
proached  For  its  duplicity,  and  a  vote  was  passed  de- 
manding that  the  expedition  should  not  be  permanently 
diverted  from  the  end  assigned  to  it.  Had  the  As- 
sembly not  been  on  the  verge  of  dissolution  it  would 
probably  have  forced  upon  the  Government  a  real 
change  of  policy.  A  general  election,  however,  was 
but  a  few  days  distant,  and  until  the  result  of  this 
election  should  be  known  the  Ministry  determined  to 
temporise.  M.  Lesseps,  since  famous  as  the  creator  of 
the  Suez  Canal,  was  sent  to  Bome  with  instructions  to 
negotiate  for  some  peaceable  settlement.  More  houest 
than  his  employers,  Lesseps  sought  with  heart  and 
sold  to  fulfil  his  task.  While  he  laboured  in  city  and 
camp,  the  French  elections  for  which  the  President  and 
Ministers  were  waiting  took  place,  resulting  in  the 
return  of  a  Conservative  and  reactionary  majority.  The 
new  Assembly  met  on  the  28th  of  May.  In  the  course 
of  the  next  few  days  Lesseps  accepted  ternas  proposed 
by  the  Roman  Government,  which  would  have  pre- 
cluded the  French  from  entering  Rome.  Oudinot,  who 
had  been  in  open  conflict  with  the  envoy  throughout 
his  mission,  refused  his  sanction  to  the  treaty,  and  the 

TailLut,  Siege  de  Rome,  p.  12.  Bisnebi,  DiploIIUui(^  Ti  213.  Gnemml, 
Garibaldi,  i.  26S.  Omuet  de  CasBagtiac,  iL  £&.  Leaaepa,  USouure,  f.  61. 
BuTot,iu.l9L    Diseonn de Nft|>oleoa ^ p. 38.  C'OO'^lc 


108  MODBRN  BUMOPM.  im 

altercations  between  the  general  and  the  diplomatist 
were  still  at  their  height  when  despatches  arrived 
from  Paris  announcing  that  the  powers  given  to 
Lesseps  were  at  an  end,  and  ordering  Oudinot  to  re- 
"  commence  hostilities.  The  pretence  of  further  negotia- 
tion would  have  been  out  of  place  with  the  new  Par- 
liament. On  the  4th  of  June  the  French  general,  now 
strongly  reinforced,  occupied  the  positions  necessary  for 
a  regular  siege  of  Rome. 

Against  the  forces  now  brought  into  action  it  was 
impossible  that  the  Roman  Republic  could  long  defend 
itself.  One  hope  remained,  and  that  was  in  a  revo- 
lution within  France  itself.  The  recent 
taaJa^  to  elections  had  united  on  the  one  side  all 
Conservative  interests,  on  the  other  the 
Socialists  and  all  the  more  extreme  factions  of  the 
Republican  party.  It  was  determined  that  a  trial  of 
strength  should  first  be  made  within  the  Assembly 
itself  upon  the  Roman  quetition,  and  that,  if  the  majority 
there  should  stand  ilrm,  an  appeal  should  be  made  to 
insurrection.  Accordingly  on  the  11th  of  June,  after 
the  renewal  of  hostilities  bad  been  announced  in  Paris, 
Ledru  RolHo  demanded  the  impeachment  of  the  Minis- 
try. His  motion  was  rejected,  and  the  signal  was 
given  for  an  outbreak  not  only  in  the  capital  but  in 
Lyons  and  other  cities.  But  the  Government  were  on 
their  guard,  aod  it  was  in  vain  that  the  resources  of 
revolution  were  once  more  brought  into  play.  General 
Changarnier  suppressed  without  bloodshed  a  tumult  in 
Paris  on  Jun«  13th;  and  though  fighting  took  place 


BHi  TSS  FRENOH  BlfTBB  EOIO.  100 

at  LyoDB,  the  insuirectiou  proved  feeble  in  comparison 
wiih  the  movements  of  the  previous  year.  Louis  Napo- 
leon and  his  Ministry  remained  unshaken,  and  the  siege 
of  Rome  was  accordingly  pressed  to  its  ooDclosion. 
Oadinot,  who  at  the  beginniog  of  the  month  had  carried 
the  positions  held  by  the  Roman  troops  outside  the 
walla,  opened  fire  with  heavy  artillery  on  the  14th. 
The  defence  was  gallantly  sustained  by  Qaribaldi  and 
his  companions  until  the  end  of  the  month,  when  the 
breaches  made  in  the  walls  were  stormed  by  the  enemy, 
and  further  resistance  became  impossible.  The  French 
made  their  entry  into  Rome  on  the  3rd  of  July,  Gari- 
baldi leading  his  troops  northwards  in  order 
to  prolong  the  struggle  with  the  Austrians  sdm-bodm^ 
who  were  now  in  possession  of  Bologna,  and, 
if  possible,  to  reach  Venice,  which  was  still  uncaptured. 
Driven  to  the  eastern  coast  and  surrounded  by  the 
enemy,  he  was  forced  to  put  to  sea.  He  landed  again, 
but  only  to  be  hunted  over  mountain  and  forest.  His 
wife  died  by  his  side.  Rescued  by  the  devotion  of 
Italian  patriots,  he  made  his  escape  to  Piedmont  and 
thence  to  America,  to  reappear  in  all  the  fame  of  his 
heroic  deeds  and  sufferings  at  the  next  great  crisis  in 
the  history  of  his  country. 

It  had  been  an  easy  task  for  a  French  army  to  con- 
qn^  Rome ;  it  was  not  so  easy  for  the  French  Govern- 
ment  to  escape  from  the  embarrassments 
of  its  victory.  Liberalism  was  still  the  official    Poniflaj 
creed  of  the  Republic,  and  the  protection  of 
the  Roman  population  from  a  reaction  under  Austriw 


UO  UODEBN  EUBOPB.  IM, 

auspices  had  been  one  of  the  alleged  objects  of  the 
Italian  expedition.  No  stipulation  had,  however,  been 
made  with  the  Pope  during  the  siege  as  to  the  future 
institutions  of  Borne ;  and  when,  on  the  14th  of  July, 
the  restoration  of  Papal  authority  was  formally  an- 
nounced by  Oudinot,  Pius  and  his  Minister  Antonelli 
still  remained  unfettered  by  any  binding  engagement. 
Kor  did  the  Pontiff  show  the  least  inclination  to  place 
himself  in  the  power  of  his  protectors.  He  remained 
at  Gaeta,  sending  a  Commission  of  three  Cardinals  to 
assume  the  government  of  Rome.  The  first  acts  of 
the  Cardinals  dispelled  any  illusion  that  the  French 
might  have  formed  as  to  the  docility  of  the  Holy  See. 
In  the  presence  of  a  French  Eepublican  army  they 
restored  the  Inquisition,  and  appointed  a  Board  to 
bring  to  trial  all  oflficials  compromised  in  the  events 
that  had  taken  place  since  the  murder  of  Rossi  in 
November,  184S.  So  great  was  the  impression  made 
on  public  opinion  by  the  action  of  the  Cardinals  that 
Louis  Napoleon  considered  it  well  to  enter  the  lists  in 
person  on  behalf  of  Roman  liberty  ;  and  in  a  letter  to 
Colonel  Ney,  a  son  of  the  Marehal,  he  denounced  in 
language  of  great  violence  the  efforts  that  were  being 
made  by  a  party  antagonistic  to  France  to  base  the 
Pope's  return  upon  proscription  and  tyranny.  Strong 
in  the  support  of  Austria  and  the  other  Catholic  Powers, 
the  Papal  Government  at  Gaeta  received  this  menace 
with  indifference,  and  even  made  the  discourtesy  of  th^ 
President  a  ground  for  withholding  concessions.  Of 
the  re-establishment  of  the  Constitution   granted   by 


Pins  in  1848  tbeie  was  now  do  qneation;  all  tbat  the 
French  Ministry  could  hope  was  to  Bave  some  frug- 
ments  in  the  general  shipwreck  of  representative  govern- 
ment, and  to  avert  the  vengeance  that  seemed  likely  to 
fall  upon  the  defeated  party.  A  Pontifical  edict,  known 
as  the  Motu  Proprio,  oltiinatcly  bestowed  upun  the 
manicipalities  certain  local  powers,  and  gave  to  a  Coun- 
cil, nominated  by  the  Pope  from  among  the  persons 
chosen  by  tbe  municipalities,  the  right  of  consultation 
on  matters  of  finance.  More  tlian  this  Pius  refused  to 
grant,  and  when  he  returned  to  Itome  it  was  as  an 
absolute  sovereign.  In  its  efforts  on  behalf  of  the  large 
body  of  persons  threatened  with  prosecutioQ  the  French 
Government  was  more  successful.  The  so-called  am- 
nesty which  was  publi.shed  by  Antonelli  with  the  Motu 
Proprio  seemed  indeed  to  have  for  its  object  the  classi-. 
fixation  of  victims  rather  than  tlie  announcement  of 
pardon ;  but  under  pressui'e  from  the  French  the  ex- 
cepted persons  were  gradually  diminished  in  number, 
and  all  were  finally  allowed  to  escape  other  penbilties 
by  going  into  exile.  To  those  who  were  so  driveu  from 
their  homes  Piedmont  offered  a  ii'fuge. 

Thus  the  pall  of  priestly  absolutism  and  misrule 
fell  once  more  over  the  Komau  States,  and  tlie  dfejHT 
tbe  hostility  of  the  educated  classes  to  the  n'stored 
power  the  more  active  became  the  system  of  repres-sloii. 
For  liberty  of  person  there  wiis  no  security  whatever, 
irtfd,  though  the  offences  of  1848  were  now  professedly 
amnestied,  the  prisuns  were  soon  thronged  witti  persons 
arrested    on  indefinite    charges    and  detained. {or  aa^ 


lis  XODSRS  BUBOPM.  jM 

unlimited  time  without  trial.  Nor  was  Borne  more  nofor- 
luiaiVMiM  tunate  in  its  condition  tban  Italy  generally. 
Aug.tt.  ijijjg  restoration  of  Austrian   authority  in 

the  north  was  completed  by  the  fall  of  Venice.  For 
months  after  the  subjugation  of  the  maialand,  Yenice, 
where  the  Republic  had  again  been  proclaimed  and 
Manin  had  been  recalled  to  power,  had  withstood  all 
the  efforts  of  the  Emperor's  forces.  Its  hopes  had  been 
raised  by  the  victories  of  the  Hungarians,  which  for  a 
moment  seemed  almost  to  undo  the  catastrophe  of 
Novara.  But  with  the  extinction  of  all  possibility  of 
Haogarian  aid  the  inevitable  end  came  in  view. 
Cholera  and  famine  worked  with  the  enemy ;  and  a 
fortnight  after  Oorgei  bad  laid  down  his  arms  at 
Vilagos  the  long  and  honourable  resistance  of  Venice 
ended  with  the  entry  of  the  Austrians  (August  25th). 
In  the  south,  Ferdinand  of  Naples  was  again  ruling  as 
despot  throughout  the  full  extent  of  his 
bj  'f^SSSS,    dominions.    Palermo,  which  had  atrucfc  the 

April,  Msf. 

first  blow  for  freedom  in  1848,  had  Boon 
afterwards  become  the  seat  of  a  Sicilian  Parliament, 
which  deposed  the  Bourbon  dynasty  and  offered  the 
throne  of  Sicily  to  the  younger  brother  of  Victor 
Emmanuel.  To  this  Ferdinand  replied  by  sending 
a  fleet  to  Messina,  which  bombarded  that  city  for  five 
days  and  laid  a  great  part  of  it  in  ashes.  His  violence 
caused  the  British  and  French  fleets  to  interpose,  and 
hostilities  were  snspended  until  the  spring  of  1849,  the 
Western  Powers  ineffectually  seeking  to  frame  some 
compromise  acceptable  at  once  to  the  Sicilians  and  to 


IMl  KAPLSS  AKD   BIOJLY.  113 

the  Bourbon  dynasty.  After  the  triumph  of  Badetzky 
at  Novara  and  the  rejection  by  the  SictUan  ParUatnent 
of  the  offer  of  a  separate  coDstitution  and  administra- 
tion for  the  island,  Ferdinuid  refused  to  remain  any 
longer  inactive.  His  fleet  and  mtdj  moved  southwards 
from  Messina,  and  a  victory  won  at  the  foot  of  Mount 
Etna  over  the  Sicilian  forces,  followed  by  the  capture  of 
Catania,  brought  the  struggle  to  a  close.  The  Assembly 
at  Palermo  dispersed,  and  the  Neapolitan  troops  made 
their  entry  into  the  capital  without  resistance  on  the 
15th  of  May.  It  was  in  vain  that  Gtreat  Britain  now 
urged  Ferdinand  to  grant  to  Sicily  the  liberties  which 
he  had  hitherto  professed  himself  willing  to  bestow. 
Autocrat  he  was,  and  autocrat  he  intended  to  remain. 
On  the  mainland  the  iniquities  practised  by  his  agents 
seem  to  have  been  even  worse  than  in  Sicily,  where  at 
least  some  attempt  was  made  to  use  the  powers  of  the 
State  for  the  purposes  of  material  improvement.  For 
those  who  had  incurred  the  enmity  of  Ferdinand's 
Government  there  was  no  law  and  no  mercy.  Ten 
years  of  violence  and  oppression,  denounced  by  the 
voice  of  freer  lands,  had  still  to  be  home  by  the  subjects 
of  this  obstinate  tyrant  ere  the  reckoning-day  arrived, 
and  the  deeply  rooted  jealousy  between  Sicily  and 
Naples,  which  had  wrought  so  much  ill  to  the  cause 
of  Italian  freedom,  was  appeased  by  the  &U  of  the 
Bourbon  throne.* 

We   have  thus  far  traced  the  st^es  of  conflict 

*  M^nirij  Doonmeiita,  iL  310.    Ferlbiujh,  Htuun,  p.  37.    Gl«DDarelIi, 
Gorerua  Pontificiia^  i,  32.    Gontariui,  p.  22^ 


lU  JSOBERS  EOBOPB.  imel 

between  the  old  monarcliical  order  and  the  forces  of 
GtrmMnitma      rcvolution  in  the  Austrian  empire  and  in 

"*''  that  Mediterranean  land  whose  destiny  was 

so  closely  interwoven  with  that  of  Austria,  We  have 
now  to  pass  back  into  Germany,  and  to-  resume  the 
history  of  the  German  revolution  at  the  point  where 
the  national  movement  seemed  to  concentrate  itself  in' 
visible  form,  the  opening  of  the  Parliament  of  Frank- 
fort on  the  18th  of  May,  1848.  That  an  Assembly 
representing    the    entire    German    people, 

AnembiT  at      elccted  in  unbounded  enthusiasm  and  com- 

Fnuklort. 

prising  within  it  nearly  every  man  of  poli- 
tical or  intellectual  eminence  who  sj'mpathised  with  the 
national  cause,  should  be  able  to  impose  its  will  upon 
the  tottering  Governments  of  the  individual  German 
States,  was  not  an  unnatural  belief  in  the  circum- 
staiicoa  of  the  moment.  No  second  Chamber  represented 
the  interests  of  the  ruling  Houses,  nor  had  they  within 
the  Assembly  itself  the  organs  for  the  expression  of 
their  own  real  or  unreal  claims.  With  all  the  freedom 
of  a  debating  club  or  of  a  sovereign  authority  like  the 
French  Convention,  the  Parliament  of  Frankfort  entered 
upon  its  work  of  moulding  Germany  afresh,  limited 
only  by  its  own  discretion  as  to  what  it  should  make 
matter  of  consultation  with  any  other  power.  There 
were  thirty-six  Governments  in  Germany,  and  to 
negotiate  with  each  of  these  on  the  future  Constitu- 
tion might  well  seem  a  harder  task  than  to  enforce  a 
Constitution  on  all  alike.  In  the  creation  of  a  pro- 
visional executive  authority  there  was  something  of  the 


wa.  QEBMAS  SATIOKAt   AaBBMSLY.  115 

same  difficulty.  Each  of  the  lai^r  States  might,  if 
consulted,  resist  the  selection  of  a  proTisional  chief  from 
one  of  its  rivals;  and  though  the  risk  of  bold  action 
was  not  denied,  the  Assembly,  on  the  instance  of  its 
President,  Yon  Qagem,  a  former  Minister  of  Hesse- 
Darmstadt,  resolved  to  appoint  an  Administrator  of 
the  Empire  by  a  direct  vote  of  its  own.  The 
Archdnte  John  of  Austria,  long  known  as  sn  enemy 
of  Uettemicb's  system  of  repression  and  as  a  patron 
of  the  idea  of  German  anion,  was  chosen  Adminis- 
trator, and  he  accepted  the  office.  Prussia  and  the 
other  States  acquiesced  in  the  nomination,  though 
the    choice    of    a    Hapsbuig   prince    was 

nnpopular   with  the    Prussian  nation  and     — -.. 

army,  and  did  not  improve   the  relations 
between  the    Frankfort  Assembly  and    the   Court   of 
Berlin.*     Schmerling,  an  Austrian,  was  placed  at  the 
head  of  the  Archduke's  Ministry. 

In  the  preparation  of  a  Constitution  for  Germany 
the  Assembly  could  draw  little  help  from  the  work  of 
l^islatora  in  other  countries.     Belgium,  whose  institu- 
tions were  at  ,once  recent  and  successful, 
was  not  a  Federal  State :  the  founders  of  the    A-«bir. 
American  Union  had  not  had  to  reckon  with 
(our  kings  and  to  include  in  their  federal  territory  part 
of  the  dominions  of  an  emperor.    Instead  of  grappling 
at  once   with  the   formidable  difficulties  of  political 

'TerliaadloiigflnderK'atioiulTeraaiiimlimg,  1.576.  lUdowit^  Weifa^ 
iases.  Bri«twaehMlFriedricliWiUielm^p.20fi.  Biedranuum,  Drdaslff 
Jilin,L295. 


/2 


>;lc 


116  MODERN  BtmOPS.  Utf 

oiganisatioD,  the  Committee  charged  with  the  draftiog 
of  a  Constitution  determined  first  to  lay  down  the  prin- 
ciples of  civil  right  which  were  to  be  the  basis  of  tbe 
'  German  commonwealth.  There  was  something  of  the 
scientific  spirit  of  the  Germans  in  thua  working  out  the 
Rubstructure  of  public  law  on  which  all  other  iastitu- 
tions  were  to  rest ;  moreover,  the  remembrance  of  the 
Decrees  of  Carlsbad  and  of  the  otlier  exceptional  legis- 
lation from  which  Germany  had  so  heavily  suffered  ex- 
cited a  strong  demand  for  the  most  solemn  guarantees 
against  arbitrary  departure  from  settled  law  in  the 
future.  Thus,  regardless  of  the  absence  of  any  material 
power  by  which  its  conclusions  were  to  be  enforced,  the 
Assembly,  in  the  intervals  between  its  stormy  debates 
on  the  politics  of  the  hour,  traced  with  philosophic 
thoroughness  the  consequences  of  the  pri  ucJples  of 
personal  liberty  and  of  equality  before  the  !aw,  and 
fiishioned  the  order  of  a  modem  society  in  which  pri- 
vileges of  chiss,  diversity  of  jurisdictions,  and  tlie  tram- 
mels of  feudalism  on  industrial  life  were  alike  swept 
away.  Four  months  had  passed,  and  the  discussion  of 
the  so-called  Primary  Rights  was  still  unfinished,  when 
the  Assembly  was  warned  by  an  outbreak  of  popular 
violence  in  Frankfort  itself  of  the  necessity  of  hasten. 
ing  towards  a  constitutional  settlement. 

The  progress  of  the  insurrection  in  Scbleswig-Hol- 
TheAmtrtto,  ^^^"  Hgaiust  Danish  sovereignty  had  been 
3f^^  watched  with  the  greatest  interest  through- 

out Germany;  and  in  the  struggle  of  these 
provinces  for  their  independence    the  rights  and   the 

,  ......Coogic 


Ml  BOBLsawm-soisTEitT.  va 

honour  of  the  Gbrman  nation  at  large  were  held  to 
be  deeply  inrolved.  As  the  representative  of  the 
Federal  authority,  King  Frederick  William  of  Prussia 
had  sent  his  troops  into  Holstein,  and  they  arrived 
there  in  time  to  prevent  the  Danish  army  from  follow- 
ing up  its  first  successes  and  crushing  the  insui^nt 
forces.  Taking  up  the  offensive,  General  Wrangel  at 
the  head  of  the  Prussian  troops  succeeded  in  driving 
the  Danes  out  of  Schleswig,  uid  at  the  beginning  of 
May  he  crossed  the  border  between  Schleswig  and 
Jutland  and  occupied  the  Danish  fortress  of  Fredericia. 
His  advance  into  purely  Danish  territory  occasioned  the 
diplomatic  intervention  of  Russia  and  Great  Britain; 
and,  to  the  deep  disappointment  of  the  German  nation 
and  its  Parliament,  the  King  of  Prussia  ordered  his 
general  to  retire  into  Schleswig.  The  Danes  were  in 
the  meantime  blockading  the  harbours  and  capturing 
the  merchant-vessels  of  the  Germans,  as  neither  Prussia 
nor  the  Federal  Government  possessed  a  fleet  of  war. 
For  some  weeks  hostilities  were  irresolutely  continued 
in  Schleswig,  while  negotiations  were  pursued  in  foreign 
capitals  and  various  forms  of  compromise  urged  by 
foreign  Powers.  At  length,  on  the  20th  of  August,  an 
armistice  of  seven  months  was  agreed  upon  at  Malmo  in 
Sweden  by  the  representatives  of  Denmark  and  Prussia, 
the  Court  of  Copenhagen  refusing  to  recognise  the  Ger- 
man central  Government  at  Frankfort  or  to  admit  its 
envoy  to  the  conferences.  The  terms  of  this  armistice, 
when  announced  in  Germany,  excited  the  greatest  in- 
dignatioDi  inasmuch  as  they  declared  all  the  acts  of  the 


118  MODERN  EVROPB.  iHa 

FrovisioDal  GoTemment  of  Sdileewig-Holstem  null  and 
Toid,  removed  all  German  troops  from  tbe  Duchies,  and 
handed  over  their  government  during  the  duration  of 
the  armistice  to  a  Commission  of  which  half  the  mem- 
bers were  to  be  appointed  by  the  King  of  Denmark. 
Scornfully  as  Denmark  had  treated  the  Assembly  of 
Frankfort,  the  terms  of  the  armistice  nevertheless  re- 
quired its  sanction.  The  question  was  referred  to  a 
committee,  which,  under  the  influence  of  the  his- 
torian Dahlmann,  himself  formerly  an  official  in  Hol- 
Btein,  pronounced  for  the  rejection  of  the  treaty. 
The  Assembly,  in  a  scene  of  great  excitement,  re- 
solved that  the  execution  of  tbe  measures  at- 
tendant on  the  armi-stice  should  be  suspended. 
The  Ministry  in  consequence  resigned,  and  Dahl- 
mann was  called  upon  to  replace  it  by  one  under 
his  own  leadership.  He  proved  unable  to  do  so. 
Schmerling  resumed  office,  and  demanded  that  the 
Assembly  should  reverse  its  vote.  Though  in  sever- 
ance from  Prussia  the  Central  Government  had  no  real 
means  of  carrying  on  a  war  with  Denmark,  the  most 
passionate  opposition  was  made  to  this  demand.  The 
armistice  was,  however,  ultimately  ratified  by  a  small 
majority.  Defeated  in  the  Assembly,  tbe  leaders  of  the 
extreme  Democratic  faction  allied  themselves  with  the 

populace  of  Frankfort,  which  was  ready  for 
^^^  acts    of    violence.       Tumultuous   meetings 

were  held ;  the  deputies  who  had  voted  for 
the  armistice  were  declared  traitors  to  Germany.  Barri- 
cades  were  erected,    and  although  the  appearance  of 


Prassian  tnxips  prevented  an  assaoH  from  being 
made  on  the  Assembly,  its  members  were  attacked 
in  the  streets,  and  two  of  them  murdered  bj  the  mob 
(Sept.  17th).  A  Itepnbltcan  insaTTectioo  was  once 
more  attempted  in  Baden,  but  it  was  quelled  without 
difficulty.* 

The  interrention  of  foreign  Courts  oa  behalf  of 
Denmark  bad  g^iven  ostensible  ground  to  the  Prus- 
sian Government  for  not  pursuing  the  war  with 
greater  resolution ;  but  though  the  fear  of  iEussia  un- 
doubtedly checked  King  Frederick  William,  this  was 
not  the  sole,  nor  perhaps  the  most  powerful  influence 
that  worked  upon  him.  The  cause  of  Schleswig-Hol- 
stein  was,  in  spite  of  its  legal  basis,  in  the  main  a 
popular  and  a  revolutionary  one,  and  between  the 
King  of  Prussia  and  the  revolution  there  was  an  in- 
tense and  a  constantly  deepening  antago-  g^,„  ^j^,_ 
nism.  Since  the  meeting  of  the  National  ^^p*-'""- 
Assembly  at  Berlin  on  the  22nd  of  May  the  capital  had 
been  the  scene  of  an  almost  unbroken  course  of  disorder. 
The  Assembly,  which  was  far  inferior  in  ability  and 
character  to  that  of  Frankfort,  soon  showed  itself 
unable  to  resist  the  influence  of  the  populace.  On  the 
8th  of  June  a  resolution  was  moved  that  the  combat- 
ants in  the  insurrection  of  March  deserved  well  of  their 
country.  Had  this  motion  been  carried  the  King 
woold  have  dissolved  the  Assembly :  it  was  outvoted, 

•  TeriuudliuigBii  der  N&tioiul  TerBMiimliin)^,  H.  1877,  2185.  Heraog 
Ernet  IX,  Am  meinem  Leben,  i.  313.  Bicdernutnn,  I  306.  Beeeler, 
Erlebtci^  p.  68.    Waits,  Ftiede  mit  Sanemttrk.    Badowit^  iiL  M9. 


120  MODBiar  Etmops.  »» 

but  the  mob  punished  this  conceasioa  to  the  feelings  ol 
the   monarch  by  outrages  upon  the  members  of  the 
majority.     A  Civic  Guard  was  enrolled  from  citizens 
of  the  middle  class,  but  it  proved  unable  to  maintain 
order,  and  wholly  failed  to  acquire  the  political  import- 
ance  which   was  gained    by   the   National   Guard    of 
Paris    after  the  revolution  of  1830.     Exasperated  by 
their  exclusion  from  service  in   the  Guard,  the  mob 
on  the  14th  of  June  stormed  an  arsenal  and  destroyed 
the  trophies  of  arras  which  they  found  there.     Thoagh 
violence  reigned  in  the  streets  the  Assembly  rejected  a 
proposal  for  declaring  the  inviolability  of  its  members, 
and  placed  itself  under  the  protection  of  the  citizens  of 
Berlin.      King    Frederick  William  had  withdrawn  to 
Potsdam,  where  the  leaders  of  reaction  gathered  round 
him.     He  detested  his  Constitutional  Ministers,  who, 
between  a  petulant  king  and  a  suspicious  Parliament, 
were  unable  to  effect  any  useful  work  and  soon  found 
themselves    compelled   to    relinquish    their   office.      In 
Berlin  the  violence  of  the  working  classes,  the  inter- 
ruption of  business,  the  example  of  civil  war  in  Paris, 
inclined  men  of  quiet  disposition  to  a  return  to  settled 
government  at  any  price.     Measures  brought  forward 
by  the    new  Ministry  for  the  abolition   of  the   patri- 
monial  jurisdictions,  the  hunting-rights  and  other  feudal 
privileges    of   the   greater   landowners,   occasioned    the 
organisation  of  a  league  for  the  defence  of  property;  which 
Boon  became  the  focus  of  powerful  conservative  interests. 

niHustrator  of  the  Empire,  to  iLe  homage  of  the  army. 


and  tie  hostile  attitude  assumed  towards  tbe  anoy 
by  the  Prassian  Parliament  itself,  exasperated  the  . 
mUitaiy  class  and  encouraged  the  king  to  venture  on 
open  resistance.  A  tumult  having  taken  place  at 
Schweidnitz  in  SUesia,  in  which  several  persons  were 
shot  by  the  soldiery,  the  Assembly,  pending  an  in- 
vestigation into  the  circumstances,  demanded  that  the 
Minister  oE  War  should  publish  an  order  requiring  the 
officers  of  the  array  to  work  with  the  citizens  for  the 
realisation  of  Constitutional  Government ;  and  it  called 
upon  all  officers  not  loyally  inclined  to  a  Constitutional 
system  to  resign  their  commissions  as  a  matter  of 
honour.  Denying  the  right  of  the  Chamber  to  act  as  a 
military  executive,  the  Minister  of  War  refu.sed  to  pub- 
lish the  order  required.  The  vote  was  repeated,  and 
in  the  midst  of  threatening  demonstrations  in  the  streets' 
the  Ministry  resigned  (Sept.  7th).* 

It  bad  been  the  distinguishing  feature  of  the  Prus- 
sian revolution  that  the  army  had  never  for  a  moment 
wavered,  in  its  fidelity  to  the  throne.  The  ThePTu«i»n 
success  of  the  insurrection  of  March  18th  ""'' 
had  been  due  to  the  paucity  of  troops  and  the  errors  of 
those  in  command,  not  to  any  military  disaffection 
isuch  as  bad  paralysed  authority  in  Paris  and  in  the 
Mediterranean  States.  Each  affront  offered  to  the 
army  by  the  democratic  majority  in  the  Assembly  sup- 
plied the  King  with  new  weapons ;  each  slight  passed 
upon  the  royal  authority  deepened  the  indignation  of 

•  Brief  weehral  Friedrioh  WilbelmB,  p.  181.    Waganer,  ErlebtM,  p.  28. 
StiLr,  FreiiBBuche  Revoliitioii,  i.  453. 

I  i,z<..t,CoogIc 


122  XODSBN  BUROPn.  MK 

tlie  officers.  The  armistice  of  Malmd  brought  bacV  to 
the  neighboorhood  of  the  capital  a  general  who  was 
longing  to  crush  the  party  of  disorder,  and  regimenta 
on  whom  he  could  rely  ;  but  though  there  was  now  no 
military  reaeon  for  delay,  it  was  not  until  the  capture  of 
Yiemia  by  Windischgmtz  had  dealt  a  fatal  blow  at 
democracy  in  Germany  that  Frederick  "William  deter- 
mined to  have  done  with  his  own  mutinous  Parliament 
and  the  mobs  by  which  it  was  controlled.  During 
September  and  October  the  riots  and  tumults  in  the 
streets  of  Berlin  continued.  The  Assembly,  which  had 
rejected  the  draft  of  a  Constitution  submitted  to  it  by 
the  Cabinet,  debated  the  clauses  of  one  drawn  up  by 
a  Committee  of  its  own  members,  abolished  nobility, 
orders  and  titles,  and  struck  out  from  the  style  of  the 
sovereign  the  words  that  described  him  as  King  by  the 
Grace  of  God.  When  intelligence  arrived  in  Berlin 
that  the  attack  of  Windischgriitz  upon  Vienna  had 
actually  begun,  popular  passion  redoubled.  The  As- 
sembly was  besieged  by  an  angry  crowd,  and  a  resolu- 
tion in  favour  of  the  intervention  of  Prussia  was  brought 
forward  within  the  House.  This  was  rejected,  and  it 
was  determined  instead  to  invoke  the  mediation  of  the 
Central  Government  at  Frankfort  between  the  Emperor 
and  his  subjects.  But  the  decision  of  the  Assembly  on 
this  and  every  other  point  was  now  matter 
burg  Ministw,  of  indiffereuce.  Events  outstripped  its  de- 
liberations, and  with  the  fall  of  Vienna 
its  own  course  was  run.  On  the  3nd  of  November  the 
King  dismissed  his  Ministers  and  called  to  office  the 

D,a,l,zc.bvG00gIe 


IM.  END   OF   TBS  PBUBBIAN  PASUAXBlfT.  123 

Goant  (J  BTandenbai|r, .  a  nataral  son  of  Frederick 
William  II.,  a  soldier  in  high  command,  and  one  of 
the  most  outspoken  representatives  of  the  monarchical 
spirit  of  the  army.  The  meaning  of  the  appointment 
was  at  once  anderatood.  A  deputation  from  the  Ag- 
semhij  coDveyed  its  protest  to  the  King  at  Potsdam. 
The  King  turned  his  hack  upon  them  with- 
out Gfivin?  an  answer,  and  on  the  9t;h  of  Fn«^nA«w 
November  an  order  was  issued  proroguing 
the  Assembly,  and  bidding  it  to  meet  on  the  27th  at 
Brandenburg,  not  at  Berlin.    " 

The  order  of  prorogatdoQi  as  soon  as  signed  hy  the 
King,  was  brought  into  the  Assembly  by  the  Ministers, 
who  demanded  that  it  should  he  obeyed  immediately 
and  without  discussion.  The  President 
aUowing  a  debate  to  commence,  the  Minis- 
ters  and  Beventy-eighfConserratiTe  deputies 
left  the  Hall.  The  remtuning  deputies,  two  hundred 
and  eighly  in  namher,  then  passed  a  resolution  declaring 
that  they  would  not  meet  at  Brandenburg ;  that  the 
King  had  no  power  to  remove,  to  prorogue,  or  to 
dissolve  the  Assembly  without  its  own  consent ;  and 
that  the  Ministers  were  unfit  to  hold  office.  This  chal- 
lenge was  answered  by  a  prodamatioa  of  the  Ministers 
declaring  the  further  meeting  of  the  deputies  il- 
l^al,  and  calling  upon  the  Civic  Guard  not  to  recog- 
nise them  as  a  Parliament.  On  the  following  day 
Gteneral  Wrangel  and  his  troops  entered  Berlin  and 
surrounded  the  Assembly  Halh  In  reply  to  the  pro- 
tests of  the  President,  Wrangel  answered  that  the 


IM  MODERN  EITROPE.  IM« 

Parliament  had  been  prorogued  and  must  disappear. 
The  members  peaceably  left  the  Hall,  but  reassembled 
at  another  spot  that  they  had  selected  in  anticipation  of 
expulsion ;  and  for  some  days  they  were  pursued  by 
the  military  from  one  place  of  meeting  to  another.  On 
the  l5th  of  November  they  passed  a  resolution  declaring 
the  expenditure  of  state-funds  and  the  raising  of  taxes 
by  the  Government  to  be  illegal  bo  long  as  the  Assem- 
bly should  not  be  permitted  to  continue  its  delibera- 
tions. The  Ministry  on  its  part  showed  that  it  was 
determined  not  to  brook  resistance.  The  Civic  Guard 
was  dissolved  and  ordered  to  surrender  its  arms.  It 
did  so  without  striking  a  blow,  and  vanished  from  the 
scene,  a  memorable  illustration  of  the  political  nullity 
of  the  middle  class  in  Berlin  as  compared  with  that  of 
Paris.  The  state  of  siege  was  proclaimed,  the  freedom 
of  the  Press  and  the  right  of  public  meeting  were  sus- 
pended. On  the  27th  of  November  a  portion  of  the 
Assembly  appeared,  according  to  the  King's  order, 
at  Brandenburg,  but  the  numbers  present  were  not 
sufficient  for  the  transaction  of  business.  The 
presence  of  the  majority,  however,  was  not  required, 
for  the  King  had  determined  to  give  no  further 
legal  opportunities  to  the  men  who  had  defied  him. 
Treating  the  vote  of  November  15th  as  an  act  of  rebel- 
lion on  the  part  of  those  concerned  in  it, 
t^AiemMr.  the  King  dissolved  the  Assembly  (Decem- 
ber 5th),  and  conferred  upon  Prussia  a  Con- 
stitution drawn  up  by  his  own  advisers,  with  the  pro- 
mise that  this  Constitution  should  be  subject  to  revision 


is«.  PSVBBIAlf  CONSTITUTION.  125 

by  the  fatore  representatJTe  body.    Thongh  the  dis- 
BolatioD  of  the  Assembly  occaeioued  tumults  ia  Brealau 
and  Cologne  it  was  not  actively  resented  by 
the  nation  at  lare'e.     The  violence  of  the     taaaa  nutad 

.  .  .  bjsdint 

fallen  body  during  its  last  weeks  of  exist- 
«aoe  bad  exposed  it  to  general  discredit;  its  vote  of 
the  1 6tb  of  November  had  been  formally  condemned  by 
the  Parliament  of  Frankfort ;  and  the  liberal  character 
of  the  n^w  Constitution,  which  agreed  in  the  main  with 
the  draft-ConstitatioQ  produced  by  the  Committee  of 
the  Assembly,  disposed  moderate  men  to  the  belief  that 
in  the  conflict  between  the  King  and  the  popular  repre- 
sentatives the  fault  had  not  been  on  the  side  of  the 
sovereign. 

In  the  meantime  the  Parliament  of  Frankfort, 
warned  against  longer  delay  by  the  disturbances  of 
September  17th.  had  addressed  itself  in  earnest  to  the 
settlement  of  the  Fedend  Constitution  of  Gtermany. 
Above  a  host  of  minor  difficulties  two  great  problems 
oonfronted  it  at  the  outset.    The  first  was 

Ths     naokturt 

the  relation  of  the  Austrian  Empire,  with  ^^^1^1 
its  partly  Qerman  and  partly  foreign  terri- 
tory, to  the  German  national  State ;  the  other  was  the 
nature  of  the  headship  to  be  established.  As  it  was 
clear  that  the  Austrian  Government  could  not  apply  the 
public  law  of  Germany  to  its  Slavic  and  Hungarian  pro- 
vinces, it  was  enacted  in  the  second  article  of  the  Frank- 
fort Constitatdon  that  where  a  German  and  a  nou-German 
territory  had  the  same  sovereign,  the  relation  between 
these  conntriea  most  be  one  of  purely  personal  union 


m  m>D»SS  VTJROM.  mm, 

uucleT  the  BOTereigo,  do  part  of  Gertnanj  being  incor- 
porated into  a  single  State  with  any  DOD-Germaa  laud. 
At  the  time  when  this  article  was  drafted  the  disintegra- 
tion of  Austria  seemed  more  probable  than  the  re-estab- 
lishment of  its  unity ;  no  sooner,  however,  had  Prince 
Schwarzenbei^  been  brought  into  power  by  the  subju- 
gation of  Vienna,  than  he  made  it  plain  that  the 
government  of  Austria  was  to  be  centralised  as  it  bad 
never  been  before.  In  the  first  public  declaration  of 
his  policy  he  announced  that  Austria  would  maintain 
its  unity  aud  permit  no  exterior  influence  to  modify  its 
internal  organisation ;  that  the  settlement  of  the  rela- 
tions between  Austria  and  Germany  could  only  be 
efiectcd  after  each  had  gained  some  new  and  abiding 
political  form ;  and  that  in  the  meantime  Austria  would 
continue  to  fulfil  its  duties  as  a  confederate.*  The  in- 
terpretation put  upon  this  statement  at  Frankfort  was 
tliat  Austria,  in  the  interest  of  its  own  unity,  preferred 
not  to  enter  the  German  body,  but  looked  forward  to 
the  establishment  of  some  intimate  alliance  with  it  at  • 
a  future  time.  As  the  Court  of  Vienna  had  evidently 
determined  not  to  apply  to  itself  the  second  article  of 
the  Constitution,  and  an  antagonism  between  Qerman 
and  Austrian  policy  came  within  view,  Schmerling,  as 
un  Austrian  subject,  was  induced  to  resign  his  oSice. 
and  was  succeeded  in  it  by  Gagem,  hitherto  President 
of  the  Assembly  (Dec.  16th).t 

*  Seine  Bunde»)>fiic3itfti  i  an  ambignoiw  exfnvssion  that  miirlit  nean 
.iflier  its  dntiee  M  an  ally  or  iffi  dutiaa  as  a  member  of  tbfl  German 
Federation.    The  obaonritj  was  probahlj  iuteutioiiaL 

f  Yerhaudlnugeii   dec   Kattuual   YarBammliuig,    tL  i225.     Hajm, 


n«  OBBXAN  NATIONAL  ABBEMBLY.  127 

In  aDDonncmg  the  policy  of  the  new  Ministrj, 
Cragem  assumed  the  exclusion  of  Austria  from  the  Ger- 
man Federation.  Claiming  for  the  As-  _  _  , ,  _ 
sembly,  as  the  representatiTe  of  the  German  SSSST'sSt 
nation,  sovereign  power  in  drawing  up  the 
Constitution,  he  denied  that  the  Constitution  could  be 
made  an  object  of  negotiation  with  Austria.  As 
Austria  refused  to  fulfil  the  conditions  of  the  second 
article,  it  must  remain  outside  the  Federation ;  the 
Ministry  desired,  however,  to  frame  some  close  and 
special  connectioo  between  Austria  and  Germany,  luad 
asked  for  authority  to  negotiate  with  the  Court  of 
Vienna  for  this  purpose.  Gagem'a  declaration  of  the 
exclusion  of  Austria  occasioned  a  vehement  and  natural 
outburst  of  feeling  among  the  Austrian  deputies,  and 
was  met  by  their  almost  unanimous  protest.  Some  days 
later  there  arrived  a  note  from  Schwarzenberg  which 
struck  at  the  root  of  all  that  had  been  done  and  all 
that  was  claimed  by  the  Assembly.  Repudiating  the 
interpretation  that  had  been  placed  upon  his  words, 
Schwarzenbeig  declared  that  the  affairs  of  Germany 
could  only  be  settled  by  an  nnderstanding  between  the 
Assembly  uid  the  Courts,  and  by  an  anaogement  with 
Austria,  which  was  the  recognised  chief  of  the  Govern- 
ments and  intended  to  remain  so  in  the  new  Federation. 
The  question  of  the  inclusion  or  exclusion  of  Austria 
now  threw  into  the  shade  all  the  earlier  differences 
bettreeu  parties  in  the  Assembly.     A  new  dividing-line 

Deafaehe  KkBonal  Twaammlanff,  iL  112.    lUdowit^  ifi.  4S».    Helf  erit 
lr.63. 

^  L  ,i,z<,.f,GoogIf 


128  MODERN  EUBOPB.  wm. 

was  drawn.  On  tlie  one  side  appeared  a  gronp  com- 
posed of  the  Austrian  representatives,  of  Ultramontanes 
wlio  feared  a  Proteistant  ascendency  if  Austria  should 
be  excluded,  and  of  deputies  from  some  of  the  smaller 
States  who  had  begun  to  dread  Prussian  domination. 
On  the  other  side  was  the  great  body  of  representatives 
who  set  before  all  the  cause  of  German  national  nnion, 
who  saw  that  this  union  would  never  be  effected  in  any 
real  form  if  it  was  made  to  depend  upon  negotiations 
with  the  Austrian  Court,  and  who  held,  with  tlie 
Minister,  that  to  create  a  true  German  national  State 
without  the  Austrian  provinces  was  better  than  to 
accept  a  phantom  of  complete  union  in  which  the 
German  people  should  he  nothing  and  the  Cabinet  of 
Vienna  everything.  Though  coalitions  and  intrigues 
of  parties  obscured  the  political  prospect  from  day  to 
day,  the  principles  of  Gagem  were  affirmed  by  a 
majority  of  the  Assembly,  and  authority  to  negotiate 
some  new  form  of  connection  with  Austria,  as  a  power 
outside  the  Federation,  was  granted  to  the  Ministry. 

The  second  great  difficulty  of  the  Assembly  was  the 
settlement  of  the  Federal  headship.  Some  were  for  a 
TbaVMtni  hereditary  Emperor,  some  for  a  President 
""^''^  or  Board,  some  for  a  monarchy  alternating 
between  the  Houses  of  Prussia  and  Austria,  some  for 
a  sovereign  elected  for  life  or  for  a  fixed  period.  The 
first  decision  arrived  at  was  that  the  head  should  be  one 
of  the  reigning  princes  of  Germany,  and  that  he  should 
bear  the  title  of  Emperor.  Against  the  hereditary 
principle  there  was  a  strong  and,  at  first,  a  sQCcessfal 


urn.  QSBXAN  OOSBTPTimoS^  129 

opposition.  Besemng  for  fbtare  diBCossion  other 
questions  relating  to  the  imperial  office,  the  Assembly 
passed  the  Constitation  through  the  first  reading  on 
February  3rd,  1 849.  It  was  now  communicated  to  all 
the  German  QoTemmenta,  with  the  request  that  they 
would  offer  their  opinions  upon  it  The  four  minor 
kingdoms — Saxony,  Hanover,  Bavaria,  and  Wiirtem- 
bei^ — with  one  consent  declared  f^inst  any  Federation 
in  which  Austria  should  not  be  included ;  the  Cabinet 
of  Vienna  protested  against  the  subordination  of  the 
Emperor  of  Austria  to  a  central  power  vested  in  any 
other  German  prince,  and  proposed  that  the  entire 
Austrian  Empire,  with  its  foreign  as  well  as  its  German 
elements,  shonld  enter  the  Federation.  This  note  was 
enough  to  prove  that  Austria  was  in  direct  conflict 
with  the  scheme  of  national  union  which  the  Assembly 
had  accepted ;  bnt  the  full  peril  of.  the  situation  was 
not  perceived  till  on  the  9th  of  March  Schwarzen- 
berg  published  the  Constitution  of  Olmutz,  which  ex- 
tinguished all  separate  rights  throughout  the  Austrian 
Empire,  and  confounded  in  one  mass,  as  subjects  of  the 
Emperor  Francis  Joseph,  Hungarians,  Germans,  Slavs 
and  Italians.  The  import  of  the  Austrian  demand  now 
stood  ont  clear  and  nndisguised.  Austria  claimed  to 
range  itself  with  a  foreign  population  of  thirty  millions 
witjiin  the  German  Federation ;  in  other  words,  to 
reduce  the  German  national  union  to  a  partnership 
with  all  the  nationalities  of  Central  Europe,  to  throw 
the  weight  of  an  overwhelming  influence  against  any 
system  of  free  represoitative  government,  ^  and  to 
J  .   ■  C.ooolc 


130  liODSBN  SUROFB.  UMl 

expose  Germany  to  war  where  no  interests  but  those 
of  the  Pole  or  the  Magyar  might  be  at  stake.  So 
deep  was  the  impression  made  at  Frankfort  by  the 
f^l  of  the  Kremsier  Parliament  and  the  publication  of 
Schwarzenberg's  unitary  edict,  that  one  of  the  most 
eminent  of  the  politicians  who  had  hitherto  opposed 
the  exclusion  of  Austria — the  Baden  deputy  "Welcker — 
declared  'that  further  persistence  in  this  course  would 
be  treason  to  Germany.  Banging  himself  with  the 
.  Ministry,  he  proposed  that  the  entire  German  Constitu- 
tion, completed  by  a  hereditary  chieftainship,  should 
be  passed  at  a  single  vote  on  the  second  reading,  and 
that  the  dignity  of  Emperor  should  be  at  once  offered 
to  the  King  of  Prussia.  Though  the  Assembly  de- 
clined to  pass  the  Constitution  by  a  single  vote,  it 
agreed  to  vote  upon  clause  by  clause  without  discussion. 
The  hereditary  principle  was  affirmed  by  the  narrow 
majority  of  four  in  a  House  of  above  five  hundred. 
The  second  reading  of  the  Constitution  was  completed 
on  the  27th  of  March,  and  on  the  followinsr 

Kins  rndsiiiA  ° 

Ail*!dEi^ii«,  ^^y  t'lfi  election  of  the  sovereign  took  place. 
Two  huiidp'd  and  ninety  votes  were  given 
for  the  King  of  Prussia.  Two  hundred  and  forty-eight 
members,  hostile  to  the  hereditary  principle  or  to  the 
prince  selected,  abstained  from  voting.* 

Frederick  William  had  from  early  years  cherished 
the  hope  of  seeing  some  closer  union  of  Germany  estab- 
lished under   Prussian   influence.     But  he  dwelt  in  a 

•  Teriuudlangen,  riii  609a    B«sel«r,  p.  82.      Hdfert,  It.  ($)  8BQ. 
Hayin,  il  317.    lUdonitz,  t.  477. 

D,a,l,zc.bvG00gIe 


m.  FBEDBBIOK  WILLIAX  IV.  131 

woild  where  there  was  more  of  picturesque  mirage  than 
of  real  insight.  He  was  almost  superstitiously  loyal  to 
the  House  of  Austria ;  and  he  failed  to  per- 
ceive, what  was  palpable  to  men  of  far  in- 
ferior endowments  to  his  own,  that  bj  setting  Prussia 
at  the  head  of  tlie  constitutional  movement  of  the  epoch 
he  might  at  any  time  from  the  commencement  of  his 
reign  have  rallied  all  Germany  round  it.  Thus  the 
revolution  of  184S  burst  upon  him,  and  he  was  not  the 
man  to  act  or  to  lead  in  time  of  revolution.  Even  in 
1848,  had  he  given  promptly  and  with  dignity  what, 
after  blood  had  been  shed  in  his  streets,  he  bad  to  give 
with  humiliattOD,  he  would  probably  have  been  ac- 
claimed Emperor  on  the  opening  of  the  Parliament  of 
Frankfort,  and  have  been  accepted  by  the  universal  voice 
of  Germany.  But  the  odium  cast  upon  him  by  the 
struggle  of  March  18th  was  so  great  that  in  the  election 
of  a  temporary  Administrator  of  the  Empire  in  June 
no  single  member  at  Frankfort  gave  him  a  vote.  Time 
was  needed  to  repair  his  credit,  and  while  time  passed 
Austria  rose  from  its  ruins.  In  the  spring  of  1849 
Frederick  William  could  not  have  assumed  the  office  of 
Emperor  of  Germany  without  risk  of  a  war  with  Aus- 
tria, even  had  he  been  willing  to  accept  this  office  on 
the  nomination  of  the  Frankfort  Parliament.  But  to 
accept  the  Imperial  Crown  from  a  popular  Assembly 
was  repugnant  to  his.  deepest  convictions.  Clear  as  the 
Frankfort  Parliament  had  been,  as  a  whole,  from  the 
taint  of  liepublicanism  or  of  revolutionary  violence,  it 
had  nevertheless  had  its  birth  in  revelation :  the  crown 


I3S  MODERN   SUROPR  uMl 

which  it  offered  would,  in  the  King's  expression,  have 
been  picked  up  from  blood  and  mire.  Had  the  princes 
of  Germany  by  any  arrangement  with  the  Assembly 
tendered  the  crown  to  Frederick  William  the  case 
would  have  been  different ;  a  new  Divine  right  would 
have  emanated  from  the  old,  and  conditions  fixed  by 
negotiation  between  the  princes  and  the  popular  As- 
sembly might  have  been  endured.  That  Frederick  Wil- 
liam still  aspired  to  German  leadership  in  one  form 
or  another  no  one  doubted ;  his  disposition  to  seek 
or  to  reject  an  accommodation  with  the  Frankfort 
Parliament  varied  with  the  influences  which  surrounded 
him.  The  Ministry  led  by  the  Count  of  Brand^iburg, 
though  anti-popular  in  its  domestic  measures,  was  de- 
sirous of  arriving  at  some  undor»tanding  with  Gagem 
and  the  friends  of  German  union.  Shortly  before  the 
first  reading  of  the  Constitution  at  Frankfort,  a  note 
had  been  drafted  in  the  Berlin  Cabinet  admitting  under 
certain  provisions  the  exclusion  of  Austria  from  the 
Federation,  and  proposing,  not  that  the  Assembly 
should  admit  the  right  of  each  Government  to  accept 
or  reject  the  Constitution,  but  tbat  it  should  meet  in  a 
fair  spirit  such  recommendations  as  all  the  Governments 
together  should  by  a  joint  act  submit  to  it.  This  note, 
which  would  have  rendered  an  ^reement  between  the 
Prussian  Court  and  the  Assembly  possible,  Frederick 
William  at  first  refused  to  sign..  He  was  induced  to 
do  so  (Jan.  23rd)  by  his  confidant  Bunsen,  who  him- 
self was  authorised  to  proceed  to  Frankfort.  During 
Bunsea's  ftb^ace  despatches  arrived  at  Berlin   &om 


nw.       FBBBERIOK  WnJ.IAM  SSFUSES  TSB  OROWS,      133 

Scliirarzenbei^,  who,  in  his  usiial  resolute  way,  proposed 
to  dissolve  the  Frankfort  Assemhly,  and  to  divide  Gei^ 
manj  between  Austria,  Prussia,  and  the  four  secondary 
kingdoms.  Bunsen  on  his  return  found  his  work  an- 
done  ;  the  King  recoiled  under  Austrian  pressure  from 
the  position  which  he  had  taken  up,  and  sent  a  note 
to  Frankfort  on  the  16th  of  February,  which  described 
Austria  as  a  necessary  part  of  Germany  and  claimed 
for  each  separate  Goyemment  the  right  to  accept  or 
reject  the  Constitution  as  it  might  think  fit.  Thus 
the  acceptance  of  the  headship  by  Frederick  William 
under  any  conditions  compatible  with  the  claims  of 
the  Assembly  was  known  to  be  doubtful  when,  on 
the  28tb  of  March,  the  majority  resolved  to  offer  him 
the  Imperial  Crown.  The  disposition  of  the  Ministry 
at  Berlin  was  indeed  still  fevourable  to  an  accom- 
modation; and  when,  on  the  2nd  of  April,  the  members 
of  the  Assembly  who  were  charged  to  lay  its  offer 
before  Frederick  "William  arrived  at  Berlin,  they  were 
received  with  such  cordiality  by  Brandenburg  that  it 
was  believed  the  King's  consent  had  been  won.  The 
reply  of  the  King  to  the  deputation  on  the  _^^. 
following  day  rudely  dispelled  these  hopes.  SSiSai^ 
He  declared  that  before  he  could  accept  the  ^'^ '' 
Crown  not  only  must  he  be  summoned  to  it  by  the 
Princes  of  Germany,  but  the  consent  of  all  the  Govern- 
ments must  be  given  to  the  Constitution.  In  other 
words,  he  required  that  the  Assembly  should  sur- 
render its  claims  to  legislative  supremacy,  and  abandon 
all  those  parts  of  the  Federal  Constitution  of  which  any 


13*  MODEBM  SWBOPB.  lam. 

of  the  existing  GoTeroments  disapproved.  As  it  was 
certain  that  Austria  and  the  four  minor  kingdoms  would 
never  agree  to  any  Federal  union  worthy  of  the  name, 
and  that  the  Assembly  could  not  now,  without  re- 
nouncing its  past,  admit  that  the  right  of  framing 
the  Constitution  lay  outside  itself,  the  answer  of  tlie 
King  was  understood  to  amount  to  a  refusal.  The 
deputation  lefb  Berlin  in  the  sorrowful  conviction  that 
their  mission  had  failed ;  and  a  note  which  was  soon 
afterwards  received  at  Frankfort  from  the  King  showed 
that  this  belief  was  correct.* 

The  answer  of  King  Frederick  William  proved  in- 
deed much  more  than  that  he  had  refused  the  Crown 
-^  »-  ^__.      of    Germany ;    it  proved   that    he    would 

rfbriii.  i>ot  accept  the  Constitution  which  the 
Assembly  had  enacted.  The  full  import  of 
this  determination,  and  the  serious  nature  of  the  cribis 
now  impending  over  Germany,  were  at  once  under- 
stood. Though  twenty-eight  Governments  successively 
accepted  the  Constitution,  these  were  without  exception 
petty  States,  and  their  united  forces  would  scarcely 
have  been  a  match  for  one  of  its  more  powerful  enemies. 
On  the  6th.  of  April  the  Austrian  Cabinet  declared 
the  Assembly  to  have  been  guilty  of  illegality  in  pub- 
lishing the  Constitution,  and  called  upon  all  Austrian 
deputies  to  quit  Frankfort.  The  Prussian  Lower 
Chamber,  elected  under  the  King's  recent  edict,  having 

•  Brief  wechsel  FriedrtchWiDielms,  pp.  2S3, 269.  Beee]er,87.  Bieder. 
■imiiii,L388.    Wi>genor,Polim[FriedriehWUhelmIT^p.6S.    BrnstlL, 


u»        THB  ASSSUBLT  AND  TBS  QOVSB.SMESTB.    .     1S5 

protested  against  the  state  of  siege  in  Berlin,  and  having 
passed  a  resolntion  in  favour  of  the  Frankfort  Constitu- 
tion, was  forthwith  dissolved.  Within  the  Frankfort 
Parliament  the  resistance  of  Governments  excited  a 
patriotic  resentment  and  caused  for  the  moment  a  union 
of  parties.  Resolutions  were  passed  declaring  that  the 
Assembly  would  adhere  to  the  Constitution.  A  Com- 
mittee was  charged  with  the  ascertainment  of  measures 
to  be  adopted  for  enforcing  its  reci^nition  ;  and  a  note 
was  addressed  to  all  the  hostile  Governments  demand- 
ing that  they  should  abstain  from  proroguing  or  dis- 
solving the  representative  bodies  within  their  dominions 
with  the  view  of  suppressing  the  free  utterance  of 
opinions  in  favour  of  the  Constitution. 

On  the  ground  of  this  last  demand  the  Prussian 
official  Press  now  began  to  denounce  the  Assembly  of 
Frankfort  ■as  a  revolutionary  body.  The  situation  of 
affairs  daily  became  worse.     It  was  in  vain 

J  End  of  tb«  Qm<- 

that  the  Assembly  appealed  to  the  Govern-  SS^biJ'j^ 
ments,  the  legislative  Chambers,  the  local 
bodies,  the  whole  German  people,  to  bring  the  Constitution 
into  effect.  The  moral  force  on  which  it  had  determined 
to  rely  proved  powerless,  and  in  despair  of  conquering  the 
Governments  by  public  opinion  the  more  violent  mem- 
bers of  the  democratic  party  determined  to  appeal  to 
insurrection.  On  the  4th  of  May  a  popular  rising 
began  at  Dresden,  where  the  King,  under  the  influence 
of  Prussia,  had  dismissed  those  of  bis  Ministers  who 
urged  him  to  accept  the  Constitution,  and  had  dissolved 
his  Parliament.    The  ontbreak  drove  the  £iii2.froin, 

".OOglf 


IM  UODEEN  SUROFS.  IM 

his  capital ;  bat  only  five  days  had  passed  when  a 
Prussian  army-corps  entered  the  city  and  crushed  the 
rebellion.  In  this  interval,  short  as  it  was,  there  had 
been  indications  that  the  real  leaders  of  the  insurrection 
were  fighting  not  for  the  Fraukfort  Constitution  but 
for  a  Republic,  and  that  in  the  event  of  tlieir  victory  a 
revolutionary  Government,  connected  with  French  and 
Polish  schemes  of  subversion,  would  come  into  power. 
In  Baden  this  was  made  still  clfarer.  There  the 
Government  of  the  Qnind  Duke  had  actually  accepted 
the  Frankfort  Constitution,  and  had  ordered  elections 
to  be  held  for  the  Federal  legislative  body  by  which 
the  Assembly  was  to  be  succeeded.  Insurrection 
nevertheless  broke  out.  The  Republic  was  openly  pro- 
claimed;  the  troops  joined  the  insurgents ;  and  a  Pro- 
visional Goveninient  allied  itself  with  a  similar  body 
that  had  sprung  into  being  with  the  help  of  French  and 
Polish  refugees  in  the  neighbouring  Palatinate.  Con- 
scious that  those  insurrections  must  utterly  ruin  its  own 
cause,  the  Frankfort  Assembly  on  the  suggestion  of 
Gagern  called  upon  the  Archduke  John  to  suppress  them 
by  force  of  arms,  and  at  the  same  time  to  protect  the 
free  expression  of  opinion  on  behalf  of  the  Constitution 
where  threatened  by  Governments.  John,  who  had 
long  clung  to  his  office  only  to  further  the  ends  of 
Austria,  refused  to  do  so,  and  Gagern  in  consequence 
resigned.  With  his  fall  ended  the  real  political  ex- 
istence of  the  Assembly.  In  reply  to  a  resolution 
which  it  passed  on  the  10th  of  May,  calling  upon  John 
to  employ  ^1  the  forces  of  Germany  in  del'euce  of  the 


um.      SM)  Of  Tna  OSRMAN  ITATIOtfAl  AB3SMBLT.      137 

Constitntion,  the  Archduke  placed  a  mock-Ministry  in 
office.  The  Prussian  Government,  declaring  the  vote  of 
the  1 0th  of  May  to  be  a  summons  to  civil  war,  ordered  all 
Prussian  deputies  to  withdraw  from  the  Assembly,  and 
a  few  days  later  its  example  was  imitated  by  Saiony 
and  Hanover.  On  the  20th  of  May  sixty-five  of  the 
best  known  of  the  members,  including  Aradt  and  Dahl- 
mann,  placed  on  record  their  belief  that  in  the  actual 
situation  the  re.linquishment  of  the  task  of  the  Assembly 
was  the  least  of  evils,  and  declared  their  work  at  Frank- 
fort ended.  Other  groups  followed  them  till  there 
remained  only  the  party  of  the  extreme  Left,  which  had 
hitherto  been  a  weak  minority,  and  which  in  no  sense 
represented  the  real  opinions  of  Germany.  This  Uurap- 
Parliament,  troubling  itself  little  with  John  and  his 
Ministers,  determined  to  withdraw  from  Frankfort, 
wlicre  it  dreaded  the  appearance  of  Prussian  troops, 
into  Wurtemberg,  where  it  might  expect  some  support 
from  the  revolutionary  Governments  of  liuden  and  the 
Palatinate.  On  the  6th  of  June  a  hundred  and  five 
deputies  assembled  at  Stuttgart.  There  they  proceeded 
to  appoint  a  governing  Committee  for  all  Gerinany, 
calling  upon  the  King  of  Wurteraberg  to  supply  Ihem 
with  seven  thousand  soldiers,  and  sending  out  cmissancs 
to  stir  up  the  neighbouring  population.  But  the  world 
disregarded  them.  The  Governnicnt  at  Stuttgart,  after 
an  interval  of  patience,  hade  them  begone;  and  on  the 
ISth  of  June  their  hall  was  closed  iigaliist  tliem  and 
they  were  dispersed  by  troops,  no  one  rai>;in!:f  a  linnd  on 
their  behalf.     The  overthi-ow  of  the    insurgents    who 


138  XODBSN  SUSOPS.  iM 

had  taken  up  arma  in  Baden  and  the  Palatinate  was 
not  80  eaay  a  matter.     A  campaign  of  six  weets  was 

necessary,  in  which  the  army  of  Prussia, 
^^T 1^,     Id  hy  the  Crown  Prince,  sustained  some 

reverses,  before  the  Republican  levies  were 
crushed,  and  with  the  fall  of  Bastadt  the  insurrection 
was  brought  to  a  close.* 

The  end  of  the  German  Parliament,  on  which  the 
nation  had  set  such  high  hopes  and  to  which  it  had 
sent  so  much  of  what  was  noblest  in  itself,  contrasted 
lamentably  with  the  splendour  of  its  opening.  Whether 
a  better  result  would  have  been  attained  if,  instead  of 
claiming  supreme  authority  in  the  construction  of 
Federal  union,  the  Assembly  had  from  the  first  sought 
the  co-operation  of  the  Governments,  must  remain  matter 
of  conjecture.  Austria  would  under  all  circumstances 
have  been  the  great  hindrance  in  the  way ;  and  after 
the  failure  of  the  efforts  made  at  Frankfort  to  establish 
the  general  union  of  Germany,  Austria  was  able  com- 
pletely to  frustrate  the  attempts  which  were  now  made 
at  Berlin  to  establish  partial  union  upon  a  different 
basis.     In  notifying  to  the  Assembly   his    refusal    of 

the  Imperial  Crown,  King  Frederick  Wil- 
to^ft™^"!*    iiam  had  stated  that  he  was  resolved  to  place 

himself  at  the  head  of  a  Federation  to  be 
formed  by  States  voluntarily  uniting  with  him  under 
terms  to  be  subsequently  arranged ;  and  in  a  circular 
note  addressed  to  the  German  Governments  he  invited  , 

•  Verhandliingen,  ifl,  U.  ,6695,  6886.     Hajm,  iil.  185.    Bambaraw, 
Erlebniaae,  p.  6. 


UK         T3B  LSAOWa  OF  TBB  TEBES  KIKODOMB.         139 

such  as  were  disposed  to  take  counsel  with  Prussia  to 
unite  in  Conference  ac  Berlin.  The  opening  of  the 
Conference  was  fixed  for  the  17th  of  May.  Two  days 
before  this  the  King  issued  a  proclamation  to  the  Frus- 
sian  people  announcing  that  in  apite  of  the  fiulure  of 
the  Assemhly  of  Frankfort  a  G-erman  union  was  still  to 
be  forined.  When  the  Conference  opened  at  .Berlin, 
no  envoys  appeared  but  those  of  Austria,  Saxony, 
Hanover,  and  Bavaria.  The  Austrian  representative 
withdrew  at  the  end  of  the  first  sitting,  the  Bavarian 
rather  later,  leaving  Prussia  to  lay  such  foaudations  as  it 
could  for  German  unity  with  the  temporising  support 
of  Saxony  and  Hanover.  A  confederation  was  formed, 
known  as  the  League  of  the  Three  Kingdoms.  An 
undertaking  was  given  that  a  Federal  Parliament 
should  be  summoned,  and  that  a  Constitution  should  be 
made  jointly  by  this  Parliament  and  the  Governments 
(May  26th).  On  the  11th  of  June  the  draft  of  a 
Federal  Constitution  was  published.  As  the  King  of 
Prussia  was  apparently  acting  in  good  faith,  and  the 
draft-Constitution  in  spite  of  some  defects  seemed  to 
afford  a  fair  basis  for  union,  the  question  now  arose  among 
the  leaders  of  the  German  national  movement  whether 
the  twenty-eight  States  wliich  had  accepted  the  ill-fated 
Constitution  of  Frankfort  ought  or  ought  not  to  enter 
the  new  Prussian  League.  A  meeting  of  a  hundred 
and  fifty  ei-members  of  the  Frankfort  Parliiimnnt  was 
held  at  Gotha  ;  and  although  great  indignation  was  ex- 
pressed by  the  more  democratic  faction,  it  was  determined 
thai  the  scheme  now  put  forward  by  Prussia  deserved 


140  UODS&lf  SUItOPa.  ttlB. 

a  fair  trial.  The  whole  of  the  twenty-eight  minor  States 
consequently  entered  the  League,  which  thus  embraced 
all  Germany  with  the  exception  of  Austria,  Bavana  and 
Wiirtembei^.  But  the  Courts  of  Saxony  and  Hanover 
had  from  the  first  been  acting  with  duplicity.  The 
military  influence  of  Prussia,  and  the  fear  which  tbey 
still  felt  of  their  own  subjects,  bad  prevented  tbem  from 
offering  open  resistance  to  the  renewed  work  of  FederSi- 
tion  ;  but  they  had  throughout  been  in  communication 
with  Austria,  and  were  only  waiting  for  the  moment 
when  the  complete  restoration  of  Austria's  military 
strength  should  enable  them  to  display  their  true 
colours.  During  the  spring  of  1849,  while  tbe 
Conferences  at  Berlin  were  being  held,  Austria  was  still 
occupied  with  Hungary  and  Venice.  The  final  over- 
throw of  these  enemies  enabled  it  to  cast  its  entire 
weight  upon  Germany.  The  result  was  seen  in  the 
action  o£  Hanover  and  Saxony,  which  now  formally 
seceded  from  the  Federation.  Prussia  thus  remained 
at  the  end  of  1849  with  no  support  but  that  of  the 
twenty-eight  minor  States.  Against  it,  in  open  or  in 
tacit  antagonism  to  the  establishment  of  Germaa  unity 
m  any  effective  form,  the  four  secondary  Kingdoms 
stood  ranged  by  the  side  of  Austria. 

It  was  not  until  the  20th  of  March,  1850,  that  the 

Federal   Parliament,    which    had    been     proimsed   ten 

months  before  on  the  incorporation  of  the 

new  League,  assembled  at    Erfurt.      In  the 

meantime  reaction    had    gone  far  in  many  a  German 

State.     In  Prussia,  after  the  dissolution  o£  the  Ijower 


Chatnbw  on  April  27th,  1849,  the  Eing  had  abrogated 
the  electoral  proTisions  of  the  Oonstitation  so  recently 
granted  by  himself,  and  had  substituted  for  them  a 
system  based  on  the  representation  of  classes.  Treating 
this  act  as  a  breach  of  faith,  the  Democratic  party' 
had  abstained  from  Toting  at  the  elections,  with  the 
result  that  in  the  Berlin  Parliament  of  1850  Con- 
servatives, Eeactionists,  and  oflSciaU  formed  the  great 
majority.  The  revision  of  the  Prussian  Constitution, 
promised  at  first  as  a  concession  to  Liberalism,  was 
conducted  in  the  opposite  sense.  The  King  demanded 
the  strengthening  of  monarchical  power;  the  Feudal- 
ists, going  iar  beyond  him,  attacked  the  municipal  and 
social  reforms  of  the  last  two  years,  and  sought  to  lead 
Prussia  back  to  the  system  of  its  mediaeval  estates.  It 
was  in  the  midst  of  this  victory  of  reaction  in  Prussia 
that  the  Federal  Parliament  at  Erfurt  began  its  sittings. 
Though  the  moderate  Liberals,  led  by  Gagern  and 
other  tried  politicians  of  Frankfort,  held  the  majority 
in  both  Houses,  a  strong  Absolutist  party  from 
Prussia  confronted  them,  and  it  soon  became  clear 
that  the.  Prussian  Government  was  ready  to  play 
into  the  haodB  of  this  party.  The  draft  of 
the  Federal  Constitution,  which  had  been 
made  at  Berlin,  was  presented,  according 
to  the  undertaking  of  May  26th,  1849,  to  the  Erfurt 
Afisembly.  Aware  of  the  gathering  strength  of  the 
r<action  and  of  the  danger  of  delay,  the  Liberal  majority 
declared  itself  ready  to  pass  the  draft  into  law  with- 
out a  single   alteration.      The   reactionary   minority 

hmWc 


The  UbIoii  P«p. 
linmi-nt  lit  Kr. 
fiut,Mu(!h,lua. 


142  MODERN  EUBOPB.  uso. 

demanded  that  a  revision  should  take  place ;  and,  to 
the  Bcandal  of  all  who  understood  the  methods  or 
the  spirit  of  Parliamentary  role,  the  Prussian  Minis- 
ters united  with  the  party  which  demanded  altera- 
tions in  the  project  which  they  themselves  had  hronght 
forward.  A  compromise  was  ultimately  ■  effected ;  but 
the  action  of  the  Court  of  Prussia  and  the  conduct 
of  its  Ministers  throughout  the  £r£urt  dehates  struck 
with  deep  despondency  those  who  had  believed  that 
Frederick  William  might  still  effect  the  work  in  which 
the  Assembly  of  Frankfort  had  failed.  The  trust  in 
the  King's  sincerity  or  consistence  of  purpose  sank  low. 
The  sympathy  of  the  national  Liberal  party  throughout 
Germany  was  to  a  great  extent  alienated  from  Prossia ; 
while,  if  any  expectation  existed  at  Berlin  that  the 
adoption  of  a'  reactionary  policy  would  disarm  the  hos- 
tility of  the  Austrian  Government  to  the  new  League, 
this  hope  was  wliolly  vain  and  baseless.* 

Austria  had  from  the  first  protested  against  the 
attempt  of  the  King  of  Prussia  to  establish  aoy  new 
form  of  union  in  Germany,  and  had  declared  that  it 
jj_,j,^  ^  would  recognise  none  of  the  conclilsions  of 
*"**■  the  Federal  Parliament  of  Erfurt.  Accord- 
ing to  the  theory  now  advanced  by  the  Cabinet  of 
Vienna  the  ancient  Federal  Constitution  of  Germany 
was  still  in  force.  All  that  had  happened  since  March, 
1848,  was  so  much  wan^n  and  futile  mischief-making. 
The  disturbance  of  order  had  at  length  come  to  an  end, 

•  TraliaiidlDiigeii  m  Erfoit,  L  114;  il.  143.    Biedemuan,  L  469. 
Badowifas  iL  138. 


and  with  the  exit  of  the  rioters  the  legitimate  powers 
re-eatered  into  their  rights.  Accordingly,  there  could 
be  no  question  of  the  establishment  of  new  Leagues. 
The  old  relation  of  all  the  German  States  to  one 
another  under  the  ascendency  of  Austria  remained  in 
full  strength  ;  the  Diet  of  Frankfort,  which  had  merely 
suspended  its  functions  and  by  no  means  suffered  ex- 
tinction, was  still  the  legitimate  central  authority. 
Tbat  some  modifications  might  be  necessary  in  the 
ancient  Constitution  was  the  most  tbat  Austria  was 
willing  to  admit.  This,  however,  was  an  affair  not  for 
the  German  people  hut  for  its  rulers,  and  Austria  ac- 
cordingly inrited  all  the  Governments  to  Sf  Congress 
at  Fraakfort,  where  the  changes  necessary  might  be 
discussed.  In  reply  to  this  summons,  Prussia  strenuously 
denied  that  the  old  Federal  Constitution  was  still  in 
existence.  The  princes  of  the  numerous  petty  States 
which  were  included  in  the  new  Union  assembled  at 
Berlin  round  Frederick  Wilham,  and  resolved  that 
they  would  not  attend  the  Conference  at  Frankfort 
except  under  reservations  and  conditions  which  Austria 
would  not  admit.  Arguments  and  counter-ai^uments 
were  exchanged ;  bat  the  controversy  between  an  old 
and  a  new  Germany  was  one  to  be  decided  by  force  of 
will  or  force  of  arms,  not  by  political  logic.  The 
stru^le  was  to  be  one  between  Prussia  and  Austria, 
and  the  Austrian  Cabinet  had.  well  gauged  the  temper 
of  its  opponent.  A  direct  summons  to  submission 
would  have  roused  all  the  King's  pride,  and  have  been 
answered  by  war.     Befor«  demanding  from   Frederick 


144  UODSRN  EjmOFa.  IM 

William  tlie  dissolution  of  the  tinion  which  he  had 
foonded,  Schwarzenberg  determined  to  fix  upon  a  quarrel 
in  which  the  King  shonld  he  perplexed  or  alarmed  at 
the  results  of  his  own  policy.  The  dominant  convic- 
tion in  the  mjpd  of  Frederick  William  was  that  of  the 
Banctity  of  monarchical  rule.  If  the  League  of  Berlin 
could  he  committed  to  some  enterprise  hostile  to  mon- 
archical power,  and  could  he  charged  with  an  alliance 
with  rebellion,  Frederick  William  would  probably  falter 
in  his  resolutions,  and  a  resort  to  arms,  for  which, 
however.  Austria  was  well  prepared,  would  become 
unnecessary.* 

Among  the  States  whose  Governments   had  been 

forced  by  public  opinion  to  join  the  new  Federation 

was  the  Electorate  of  Hesse-Cassel.     The  Elector  was, 

like  his  predecessors,  a  thorough  despot  at 

heart,    and   chafed    under   the    restrictions 

which  a  constitutional  system  imposed  apon  his  rule. 

Acting  under  Austrian  instigation,  he  dismissed    his 

Ministers  in  the  spring  of  1850,  and  placed  in  office 

one  Hassenpflug,  a  type  of  the  worst  and  most  violent 

class  of  petty  tyrants  produced    by  the  officialiBm    of 

s.     Hassenpflug   immediately 

eA  at  Cassel,  and    twice  dis- 

le  proceeded  to  levy  taxes  by 

[eclared  his  acts  ill^al;  the 

iialled  on  for  assistance,  b^an 

Beden  Friadrioh  TPllIielma,  It.  p.  SS, 
150,  pp.  26,  &a  Beoa^  ErinnenngeD, 
,  TIv  Moiikt^  p.  41 


MML    AVBTRIA  SE8T0BBS  TBS  DIET  OF  FRANKFORT.    \4& 

to  resign.  The  conflict  between  the  Minister  and  the 
Hessian  population  was  in  full  progress  when,  at  the 
be^nning  of  September,  Austria  with  its  vassal  Qovem- 
ments  proclaimed  the  re-establishment  of  the  Diet  of 
Frankfort.  Though  Prussia  and  most  of  the  twenty- 
eight  States  confederate  with  it  treated  this  announce- 
ment as  null  and  void,  the  Diet,  constituted  by  the 
envoys  of  Austria,  the  four  minor  Kingdoms,  and  a  few 
secedera  from  the  Prussian  Union,  com-  .^^pj^^ 
menced  its  sittings.  To  the  Diet  the  S3^S!s<iFt., 
Elector  .of  Hesse  forthwith  appealed  for 
help  against  his  subjects,  and  the  decision  was  given 
that  the  refusal  of  the  Hessian  Estates  to  grant  the 
taxes  was  an  oSence  justifying  the  intervention  of  the 
central  power.  Fortified  by  this  judgment,  Hassenpflug 
now  ordered  that  every  person  offering  resistance  to  the 
Government  should  be  tried  by  court-martial.  He  was 
baffled  by  the  resignation  of  the  entire  body  of  officers 
in  the  Hessian  army ;  and  as  this  completed  the  dis- 
comfitnre  of  the  Elector,  the  armed  intervention  of 
Austria,  as  identified  with  the  Diet  of  Frankfort,  now 
became  a  certainty.  But  to  the  protection  of  the 
people  of  Hesse  in  their  constitutional  rights  Prussia, 
as  chief  of  the  Iieague  which  Hesse  had  joined,  stood 
morally  pledged.  It  remained  for  the  King  to  decide 
between  armed  resistance  to  Austria  or  the  humiliation 
of  a  total  abandonment  of  Prussia's  claim  p„,^,^ 
to  leadership  in  any  German  union.  Con-  -^""^ 
flicting  influences  swayed  the  King  in  one  direction  and 
another.     The  friends  of  Austria  and  of  absolutism 


IM  MODB&IT  SUBOPB.  mt. 

declared  tbat  the  employment  of  the  Prussian  army  on 
behalf  of  the  Hessians  would  make  the  King  an  accom- 
plice of  revolution  ;  the  bolder  and  more  patriotic  spirits 
protested  against  the  abdication  of  Prussia's  just  claims 
and  the  evasion  of  its  responsibilities  towards  Germany. 
For  a  moment  the  party  of  action,  led  by  the  Crown 
Prince,  gained  the  ascendant.  General  Radowitz, 
the  projector  of  the  Union,  was  called  to  the  Foreign 
Ministry,  and  Prussian  troops  entered  Hesse.  Austria 
now  ostentatiously  prepared  for  war.  Frederick  Wil- 
liam, terrified  by  the  danger  confronting  him,  yet  un- 
willing to  yield  all,  sought  the  mediation  of  the  Czar 
of  Kussia.  Hicholas  came  to  Warsaw,  where  the  Em- 
peror of  Austria  and  Prince  Charles,  brother 
m^ungroS^  of  the  King  of  Prussia,  attended  by  the 
Ministers  of  their  States,  met  him.  The 
closest  family  ties  united  the  Courts  of  St.  Petersburg 
and  Berlin ;  but  the  Russian  sovereign  was  still  the 
putron  of  Austria  as  he  had  been  in  the  Hungarian 
caiii[iaign.  He  resented  the  action  of  Prussia  in 
Schleswig  -  Holstein,  and  was  oflended  that  King 
Frederick  William  had  not  presented  himself  at  War- 
saw in  person.  He  declared  in  favour  of  all  Austria's 
demands,  and  treated  Count  Brandenburg  with  such 
indignity  that  the  Count,  a  high-spirited  patriot, 
never  recovered  from  its  effect.  He  returned  to  Berlin 
only  to  give  in  his  report  and  die,  Manteuffel,  Minister 
of  the  Interior,  assured  the  King  that  the  Prussian 
army  was  so  weak  in  numbers  and  so  defective  in 
orgftuisation  that,  if  it  took  the  field  gainst  Austria 


Mb.  OLM&PZ.  147 

aod  its  ^lies,  it  irould  meet  with  certain  mm.  Bavarian 
troops,  representing  the  Diet  of  Fraokfort,  now  entered 
Hesse  at  Aastria'a  bidding,  and  stood  face  to  face  with 
the  Pmssians.  The  moment  had  come  when  the  de- 
cision must  be  ipade  between  peace  and  war.  At  a 
Coundl  held  at  Berlin  on  November  2ud  the  peace- 
party  carried  the  King  with  them.  Badowitz  gave 
up  office ;  Manteuffel,  the  Minister  of  repression 
within  and  of  submission  without,  was  set  at  the  head 
of  the  Government.  The  meaning  of  his  appointment 
was  well  understood,  and  with  each  new  proof  of  the 
weakness  of  the  King  the  tone  of  the  Court  of  Austria 
became  more  imperious.  On  the  9th  of  November 
Sdiwarzenbeig  categorically  demanded  the  dissolution 
of  the  Prussian  Union,  the  recognition  of  the  Federal 
Diet,  and  the  evacuation  of  Hesse  bj  the  Prussian 
troops.  The  first  point  was  at  once  conceded,  and  in 
hollow,  equivocating  language  Manteuffel  made  the  fact 
known  to  the  members  of  the  Confederacy.  The  other 
conditions  not  being  so  speedily  fulfilled,  Schwarzen- 
berg  set  Austrian  regiments  in  motion,  and  demanded 
the  withdrawal  of  the  Prussian  troops  &om  Hesse 
within  twenty-four  hours.  Manteuffel  begged  the 
Austrian  Minister  for  an  interview,  and,  without  wait- 
ing for  an  answer,  set  out  for  Olmiitz.  His  instructions 
bade  him  to  press  for  certain  concessions ;  none  of  these 
did  he  obtain,  and  he  made  the  necessary  w...t-riM  ^ 
submission  without  them.  On  the  29th  of  o"^*^"-* 
November  a  convention  was  signed  at  Olmiitz,  in  which 
Prussia  rect^nised  the   German  Federal   Constitution 


148  MODERif  EUBOFB.  am. 

of  181S  as  still  existing,  undertook  to  withdraw  all 
its  troops  from  Hesse  with  the  exception  of  a  single 
battalion,  and  consented  to  the  settlement  of  affairs  both 
in  Hesse  and  in  Schleswig-Holstein  by  the  Federal 
Diet.  One  point  alone  in  the  scheme  of  the  Austrian 
statesman  was  wanting  among  the  fruits  of  his  Tictory 
at  Olmiitz  and  of  the  negotiations  at  Dresden  by  which 
this  was  followed.  Schwarzenberg  had  intended  that 
the  entire  Austrian  Empire  should  enter  the  German 
Federation  ;  and  if  he  had  had  to  reckon  with  no  oppo- 
nents  but  the  beaten  and  humbled  Prussia,  he  would 
have  effected  his  design.  But  the  prospect  of  a  central 
European  Power,  with  a  population  of  seventy  millions, 
controlled  as  this  would  virtually  be  by  the  Cabinet  of 
Yienna,  alarmed  other  nations.  England  declared  that 
such  a  combination  would  undo  the  balance  of  power  in 
Europe  and  menace  the  independence  of  Germany ; 
France  protested  in  more  threatening  terms  ;  and  the 
project  fell  to  the  ground,  to  be  remembered  only  as 
the  boldest  ima^nation  of  a  statesnuan  for  whom 
fortune,  veiling  the  !N^emesis  in  store,  seemed  to  set  no 
limit  to  its  favours. 

The  cause  of  Schleswig-Holstein,  so  intimately 
bound  up  with  the  efforts  of  the  Germans  towards 
national  union,  sank  with  the  failure  of 
these  efforts ;  and  in  the  final  humiliation  of 
Prussia  it  received  what  might  well  seem  its  death- 
blow. The  armistice  of  Malm6,  which  was  sanc- 
tioned by  the  Assembly  of  Frankfort  in  the  autumn  of 
1848,  lasted  until  March  26th,  1849.     War  was  then 


tM  BOBLESWJO'BOtBTBJS.  149 

recommenced  bj  Prassia,  and  the  lines  of  DGppel 
were  stormed  by  its  troops,  while  the  volunteer  forces 
of  Schleswig-Koktein  uiiBuccessfuIly  laid  siege  to  Frede- 
ricia.  Hostilities  had  coDtinued  for  three  months,  when 
a  second  armistice,  to  lat^t  for  a  year,  and  Preliminaries 
of  Peace,  were  agreed  upon.  At  the  conclusion  of  this 
armistice,  in  July,  1850,  Prussia,  in  the  name  of  Ger- 
many, made  peace  with  Denmark.  The  inhabitants  of 
the  Duchies  in  consequence  continued  the  war  for 
themselves,  aud  though  defeated  with  great  loss  at 
Idstedt  on  the  24th  of  July,  they  remained  uncon- 
quered  at  the  end  of  the  year.  This  was  the  situation 
of  affairs  when  Prassia,  by  the  Treaty  of  Olmiitz,  agreed 
that  the  restored  Federal  Diet  should  take  upon  itself 
the  restoration  of  order  in  Schleswig-Holstein,  and  that 
the  troops  of  Prussia  should  unite  with  those  of  Austria 
to  enforce  its  decrees.  To  the  Cabinet  of  Vienna,  the 
foe  in  equal  measure  of  German  national  union  and  of 
every  democratic  cause,  the  Schleswig-Holsteiners  were 
simply  rebels  in  insurrection  against  their  sovereign. 
They  were  required  by  the  Diet,  under  Austrian  dicta- 
tion, to  lay  down  their  arms ;  and  commissioners  from 
Austria  and  Prussia  entered  the  Ducliies  to  compel 
them  to  do  so.  Against  Denmark,  Austria,  aud  Pru.>iyia 
together,  it  was  impossible  for  Schleswig-Holstein  to 
prolong  its  resistance.  The  army  was  dissolved,  and 
the  Duchies  were  handed  over  to  the  King  of  Denmark, 
to  return  to  the  legal  status  which  was  defined  in  the 
Treaties  of  Peace.  This  was  the  nominal  condition  of 
the    transfer;    bat    the   Danish  Government   treated 


160  MODERN  BUBOPS.  ma. 

Schleswig  ae  part  of  its  national  territory,  tuid  ia 
the  nortliem  part  of  the  Duchy  the  process  of  sah- 
etituting  Danish  for  German  nationality  was  actively 
pursued.  The  policy  of  foreign  Courts,  little  interested 
in  the  wish  of  the  inhabitants,  had  from  the  beginning' 
of  the  struggle  of  the  Duchies  against  Denmark  favoured 
the  maintenance  and  consolidation  of  the  Danish  Kiog- 
dom.  The  claims  of  the  Duke  of  Augustenburg,  as 
next  heir  to  the  Duchies  in  the  male  Hoe,  were  not 
considered  worth  the  risk  of  a  new  war;  and  by  a 
protocol  signed  at  London  on  the  2nd  of  August,  1850, 
the  Powers,  with  the  exception  of  Prussia,  declared 
themselves  in  favour  of  a  single  rule  of  succession  in  all 
parts  of  the  Danish  State.  By  a  Treaty  of  the  8th  of 
May,  1852,  to  which  Prussia  gave  its  assent,  the  pre- 
tensions of  all  other  claimants  to  the  disputed  succession 
were  set  aside,  and  Prince  Christian,  of  the  House  of 
Gliicksburg,  was  declared  heir  to  the  throne,  the  rights 
of  the  German  Federation  as  established  by  the  Treaties 
of  1815  being  reserved.  In  spite  of  this  reservation 
of  Federal  rights,  and  of  the  stipulations  in  favour  of 
Schleswig  and  Holstein  made  in  the  earlier  agreements, 
the  Duchies  appeared  to  be  now  practically  united  with 
the  Danish  State.  Prussia,  for  a  moment  their  cham- 
pion, had  joined  with  Austria  in  coercing  their  army, 
in  dissolving  their  Government,  in  annulling  the  legis- 
lation by  which  the  Parliament  of  Frankfort  bad  made 
them  participators  in  public  rights  thenceforward  to  be 
the  inheritance  of  all  Germans.  A  page  in  the  national 
histoiy  was  obliterated ;  Prussia  had  tarned  its  back  on 

......Google 


m.  BOBLBSWia-HOLBTBIN.  Ul 

its  own  professions ;  there  remained  but  one  relic  from 
the  time  when  the  whole  German  people  seemed  so  ardent 
for  the  emancipation  of  its  brethren  beyond  the  frontier. 
The  national  fleet,  created  bj  the  Assembly  of  Frankfort 
for  the  prosecution  of  the  straggle  with  Denmark,  atiU 
lay  at  the  mouth  of  tlte  Elbe.  But  the  same  power 
which  had  determined  that  Germany  was  not  to  be  a 
nation  had  also  determined  that  it  could  have  no 
national  raaritime  interests.     After  all  that  __^ 

had  passed,  authority  had  little  call  to  be     STtTSi. 
nice  about  appearances;  and  the  national 
fieet  was  sold  by  auction,  in  accordance  with  a  decree 
of  the  restored  Diet  of  Frankfort,  in  the  summer  of 
1852.« 

It  was  with  deep  disappointment  and  humiliation 
that  the  Liberals  of  Germany,  and  all  in  whom  the 
hatred  of  democratic  change  had  not  overpowered  the 
love  of  eountiy,  witnessed  the  issue  of  the  aBni«iw«*i« 
movement  of  1848.    In  so  far  as  that  move-  * 

ment  was  one.  directed  towards  national  anion  it  had 
totally  failed,  and  the  state  of  things  that  had  existed 
before  1848  was  restored  without  change.  As  a  move- 
ment  of  constitutional  and  social  reform,  it  had  not 
been  so  entirely  vain ;  nor  in  this  respect  can  it  be  said 
that  Germany  after  the  year  1848  returned  altogether 
to  what  it  was  before  it.  Many  of  the  leading  figures 
of  the  earlier  time  re-appeared  indeed  with  more  or 
less  of  lustre  upon    the   stage.      Mettemich  though 

•  Einst  n.,  L  377.    Hwtolet^  Utp  of  Eoiope,  U.  1106, 1129,  llKt 
Fari.Pftpen.lSHsb^)!'^'  18H  Ixr.,  ]^  30^  187. 

L  ,i,z<,.f,GoogIf 


152  MODSRN  EITROFE.  UM-tsi 

excluded  from  office  by  younger  men,  beamed  upon 
Vienna  with  the  serenity  of  a  prophet  who  had  lived  to 
see  most  of  his  enemies  shot  and  of  a  martyr  who  had 
returned  to  one  of  the  most  enviable  Salons  in  Europe. 
No  dynasty  lost  its  throne,  no  class  of  the  population 
had  been  struck  down  with  proscription  as  were  the 
clergy  and  the  nobles  of  Prance  fifty  years  before.  Yet 
the  traveller  familiar  with  Germany  before  the  revolu- 
tion found  that  much  of  the  old  had  now  vanished, 
much  of  a  new  world  come  into  being.  It  was  not 
sought  by  the  re-established  Governments  to  undo  at 
one  stroke  the  whole  of  the  political,  the  social,  the 
agrarian  legislation  of  the  preceding  time,  as  in  some 
other  periods  of  reaction.  The  nearest  approach  that 
was  made  to  this  was  in  a  decree  of  the  Diet  annulling 
the  Declaration  of  Rights  drawn  up  by  the  Frankfort 
Assembly,  and  requiring  the  Governments  to  bring  into 
conformity  with  the  Federal  Constitution  all  laws  and 
institutions  made  since  the  beginning  of  1848.  Parlia- 
mentary government  was  thereby  enfeebled,  but  not 
necessarily  extinguished.  Governments  narrowed  the 
franchise,  curtailed  the  functions  of  representative 
assemblies,  filled  these  with  their  creatures,  coerced 
voters  at  elections  ;  but,  except  in  Austria,  there  was 
no  open  abandonment  of  constitutional  forms.  In  some 
States,  as  in  Saxony  under  the  reactionary  rule  of  Count 
Beust,  the  system  of  national  representation  established 
in  1848  was  abolished  and  the  earlier  Estates  were  re- 
vived ;  in  Prussia  the  two  Houses  of  Parliament  con- 
tinued in  existence,  but  in  such  dependence  upon  the 
CooVc 


VM-mat,  PBUBSIA    UNBEB    MANTEUFFEL.  158 

Tojal  authority,  and  under  such  strong  pressure  oE  an 
aristocratic  and  official  reaction,  that,  after  struggling 
for  some  years  in  the  Lower  House,  the  Liberal  leaders 
at  length  withdrew  in  despair.  The  chardcter  which 
GoTemment  now  assunti  d  in  Prussia  was  indeed  far 
more  typical  of  the  condition  of  Germany  at  large  than 
■was  the  bold  and  uncompromising  despotism  of  PriDCe 
Schwarzenberg  in  Austria.  Manteuffel,  in  whora  the 
Prussian  epoch  of  reaction  was  symbolised,  was  not  a 
crnel  or  a  violent  Minister;  but  his  rule  was  stamped 
with  a  peculiar'  and  degrading  meanness,  more  irritating 
to  those  who  suffered  under  it  than  harsher  wrong.  In 
his  hands  government  was  a  thing  of  eavesdropping 
and  espionage,  a  system  of  petty  persecution,  a  school 
of  subservience  and  hypocrisy.  He  had  been  the  instru- 
ment at  Olmutz  of  such  a  surrender  of  national  honour 
and  national  interests  as  few  nations  have  ever  endured 
with  the  chances  of  war  still  untried.  This  surrender 
may,  in  the  actual  condition  of  the  Prussian  army,  have 
been  necessary,  but  the  abasement  of  it  seemed  to  cling 
to  Manteuffel  and  to  lower  all  his  conceptions  of  govern- 
ment. Even  where  the  conclusions  of  his  policy  were 
correct  they  seemed  to  have  been  reached  by  some 
unworthy  process.  Like  Germany  at  lai^,  Prui^sia 
breathed  uneasily  under  an  oppression  which  was  every- 
where felt  and  yet  was  hard  to  define.  Its  best  elements 
were  those  which  suffered  the  most :  its  highest  intel- 
lectual and  political  aims  were  those  which  most  ex- 
cited the  suspicion  of  the  Government.  Its  King 
bad  lost  whatever  was  stimulating  or  elevate^  in  his 


lU  MODSBN  EUROPE.  u»mi 

illusiotiB.  From  him  do  second  alliance  with  Liberal- 
ism, 00  further  effort  on  behalf  of  German  unity,  was  to 
be  expected :  the  hope  for  Germany  and  for  Prussia, 
if  hope  there  was,  lay  in  a  future  reign. 

The  powerlessness  of  Prussia  was  the  measure  of 
Austrian  influence  and  prestige.  The  contrast  pre- 
sented by  Austria  in  184S  and  Austria  in  1S51  was 
indeed  one  that  might  well  arrest  political  observera. 
Its  recovery  had  no  doubt  been  effected  partly  by 
foreign  aid,  and  in  the  struggle  with  the  Magyars  a 
Austrinkfia  dangerous  obligation  had  been  incurred  to- 
""■  wards  Bussia ;  but  scarred  and  riven  as  the 

fabric  was  within,  it  was  complete  and  imposing  without. 
Not  one  of  the  enemies  who  in  1848  had  risen  against 
the  Court  of  Vienna  now  remained  standing.  "In  Italy, 
Austria  bad  won  back  what  had  appeared  to  be  hope- 
lessly lost ;  in  Germany  it  had  more  than  vindicated  its 
old  claims.  It  had  thrown  its  rival  to  the  ground,  and 
ihe  full  measure  of  its  ambition  was  perhaps  even  yet 
not  satisfied.  "  First  to  humiliate  Prussia,  then  to 
destroy  it,"  was  the  expression  in  which  Schwarzenberg 
summed  up  his  German  policy.  Whether,  with  his 
undoubted  firmness  and  daring,  the  Minister  possessed 
the  intellectual  qualities  and  the  experience  necessary 
for  the  successful  administration  of  an  Empire  built  up, 
as  Austria  now  was,  on  violence  and  on  the  suppression 
of  every  national  force,  was  doubted  even  by  his  ad- 
mirers. The  proof,  however,  was  not  granted  to  him, 
for  a  sudden  death  carried  him  off  in  his  fourth  yeai  of 
power  (April  6th,  1852).    Weaker  men  sucoeeded  to  hia 


u»JML  AUSTRIA.  Ib5 

taik.  The  epoch  of  military  and  diplomatic  triumph 
was  now  ending,  the  gloomier  side  of  the  reaction  stood 
ont  unrelieved  by  any  new  succcetsion  of  victories. 
Financial  disorder  grew  worse  and  worse.  Clericalism 
ctairoed  its  bond  from  the  monarchy  which  it  had 
helped  to  restore.  In  the  stru^le  of  the  nationalities 
of  Austria  against  the  central  authority  the  Bishops 
bad  on  the  whole  thrown  their  influence  on  to  the  side 
of  the  Crown.  The  restored  despotism  owed  too  much 
to  their  help  and  depended  too  much  on  their  continued 
goodwill  to  be  able  to  refuse  their  demands-  Thus  the 
new  centralised  administratiou,  reproducing  in  general 
the  uniformity  of  governraent  attempted  by  the  Em- 
peror Joseph  II,,  contrasted  with  this  in  its  subservience 
to  clerical  power.  Ecclesiastical  laws  and  jurisdictions 
were  allowed  to  encroach  on  the  laws  and  jurisdiction 
of  the  State ;  education  was  made  over  to  the  priest- 
hood; within  the  Church  itself  the  bishops  were  allowed 
to  rule  uncontrolled.  The  very  Minister  who  had  taken 
office  under  Schwarzenberg  as  the  representative  of  the 
modem  (spirit,  to  which  tlie  Government 
still  professed  to  render  homage,  became  jmdu,  e«i*  is, 
the  instrument  of  an  act  of  submission  to 
the  Papacy  which  marked  the  lowest  point  to  which 
Austrian  policy  fell.  Alexander  Bach,  a  prominent 
Liberal  in  Vienna  at  the  beginning  of  1848,  had  ac- 
cepted office  at  the  price  of  his  independence,  and 
surrendered  himself  to  the  aristocratic  and  clerical 
influences  that  dominated  the  Court.  Consistent  only 
in  his  efforts  to  simplify  the  forms  of  government,  to 


IM  liOBE&S  BUEOFS.  immb» 

promote  the  ascendency  of  German  over  all  other  ele- 
ments in  the  State,  to  maintain  the  improvement  in  the 
peasant's  condition  effected  hj  the  Parliament  of  Krem- 
sier.  Bach,  as  Minister  of  the  Interior,  made  war  in  all 
other  respects  on  his  own  earlier  principles.  In  the 
former  representative  of  the  Liberalism  of  the  profes- 
sional classes  in  Vienna  absolutism  had  now  its  most  effi- 
cient instrument ;  and  the  Concordat  negotiated  by  Bach 
with  the  Papacy  in  1855  marked  the  definite  submis- 
sion of  Austria  to  the  ecclesiastical  pretensions  which 
in  these  years  of  political  languor  and  discouragement 
gained  increasiogrecognition  throughout  Central  Europe. 
Ultramontanism  had  Fought  allies  in  many  political 
camps  since  the  revolution  of  1848.  It  had  dallied  in 
some  countries  with  Republicanism ;  but  its  truer  in- 
stincts divined  in  the  victory  of  absolutist  systems  its 
own  surest  gain.  Accommodations  between  the  Papacy 
and  several  of  the  German  Governments  were  made  in 
the  years  succeeding  1S49;  and  from  the  centralised 
despotism  of  the  Emperor  Francis  Joseph  the  Church 
won  concessions  which  since  tbe  time  of  Maria  Theresa 
it  had  in  vain  sought  from  any  ruler  of  the  Austrian 
State. 

The  European   drama  which   began   in   1848  had 
more  of  unity  and  more  of  concentration  in  its  opening 
than   in   its    close.      In    Italy   it   ends    with   the   fall 
^^         of  Venice ;  in  Germany  the  interest  lingers 
'**■  till  the  days  of  Olmiitz ;   in  France  there 

is  no  decisive  hreak  in  the  action  until  the  Coup  d'Etat 
which,  at  th^   end   o{  the  year   1851,   made  Louis 


Napoleon  in  all  but  name  Emperor  of  Prance.  The  six 
million  votes  which  had  raised  Louis  Napoleon  to  the  Pre- 
sidency of  the  Bepublic  might  well  have  filled  with  alarm 
all  who  hoped  for  a  future  of  constitutional  rule ;  yet  the 
warning  conveyed  by  the  election  seems  to  have  been 
understood  by  but  few.  As  the  representative  of  order 
and  authority,  as  the  declared  enemy  of  Socialism,  Louis 
Napoleon  was  on  the  same  side  as  the  Far- 
liamentary  majority ;  he  had  even  been 
supported  in  bis  candidature  by  Parliamentary  leaders 
socb  as  M.  Thiers.  His  victory  was  welcomed  as  a 
victory  over  Socialism  and  the  Ked  Republic ;  be  had 
received  some  patronage  from  the  official  party  of  order, 
and  it  was  expected  that,  as  nominal  chief  of  the  State, 
he  would  act  as  the  instrument  of  this  party.  He  was 
an  adventurer,  but  an  adventurer  with  so  little  that  was 
imposing  about  him,  that  it  scarcely  occurred  to  men  of 
influence  in  Paris  to  credit  him  with  the  capacity  for 
mischief.  His  mean  look  and  spiritless  address,  the 
absurdities  of  his  past,  the  insignificance  of  his  political 
friends,  caused  him  to  be  regarded  -  during  his  first 
months  of  public  life  with  derision  rather  than  with 
fear.  The  French,  said  M.  Thiers  long  afterwards, 
made  two  mistakes  about  Louis  Napoleon:  the  first 
when  they  took  him  for  a  fool,  the  second  when  they 
took  him  for  a  man  of  genius.  It  was  not  until  the 
appearance  of  the  letter  to  Colonel  Ney,  in  which  the 
President  ostentatiously  separated  himself  from  his 
Ministers  and  emphasised  bis  personal  will  in  the 
direction  of  the  foreign  policy  of  France,  that  suspicions 


IM  MODERN  BUSOPB.  um. 

of  danger  to  the  Bcpublic  from  hie  ambition  arose. 
From  this  time,  in  the  narrow  circle  of  the  Ministers 
whom  official  duty  brought  into  direct  contact  with  the 
President,  a  constant  sense  of  insecarity  and  dread  of 
some  new  surprise  on  his  part  prevailed,  though  the 
accord  which  had  been  broken  by  the  letter  to  Colonel 
Ney  was  for  a  while  outwardly  re-established,  and  the 
forms  of  Parliamentary  government  remained  unim- 
paired. 

The  first  year  of  Louis  Napoleon's  term  of  office 
woe  drawing  to  a  close  when  a  message  from  him  was 
delivered  to  the  Assembly  which  seemed  to  announce 
an  immediate  attack  upon  the  Constitution.  The 
Ministry  in  office  was  composed  of  men  of  high  Parlia- 
mentary position  ;  it  enjoyed  the  entire  confidence  of  a 
wwnrfTM  great  majority  in  the  Assembly,  and  had 
"*"*  enforced  with  at  least  sufficient  energy  the 
measures  of  public  security  which  the  President  and 
the  conntiy  seemed  agreed  in  demanding.  Suddenly, 
on  the  Slst  of  October,  the  President  announced  to  the 
Assembly  by  a  message  carried  by  one  of  his  aides-de- 
camp that  the  Ministry  were  dismissed.  The  reason 
assigned  for  their  dismissal  was  the  want  of  unity  within 
the  Cabinet  itself ;  but  the  language  used  by  the  Presi- 
dent announced  much  more  than  a  ministerial  change. 
"  I^ance,  in  the  midst  of  confusion,  seeks  for  the  hand, 
the  will  of  him  whom  it  elected  on  the  10th  of  Decem- 
ber. The  victory  won  on  that  day  was  the  victory  of  a 
system,  for  the  name  of  Napoleon  is  in  itself  a  pro- 
gramme.   It  signifies  order,  authority,  religion,  national 


im  lOUm  NAPOLSOS.  159 

prosperi^  within ;  national  dignity  withoat.  It  is  this 
policy,  inaugurated  by  my  election,  that  I  desire  to 
carry  to  triumph  with  the  support  of  the  Assembly  and 
of  tlie  people.'*  In  order  to  save  the  Eepublic  from 
anarchy,  to  maintain  the  prestige  of  France  among 
other  nations,  the  President  declared  that  he  needed 
men  of  action  rather  than  of  words ;  yet  when  the  list 
of  the  new  Ministers  appeared,  it  contained  scarcely  a 
Bingle  name  of  weight.  Lonis  Napoleon  had  called  to 
oSice  persons  whose  very  obscurity  had  marked  them  as 
his  own  instruments,  and  guaranteed  to  him  the  as- 
cendency which  he  had  not  hitherto  possessed  within 
the  Cabinet.  Satisfied  with  having  given  this  proof  of 
his  power,  he  resumed  the  appearance  of  respect,  if  not 
of  cordiality,  towards  the  Assembly.  He  had  learnt  to 
beware  of  precipitate  action  ;  above  two  years  of  office 
were  still  before  him  ;  and  he  had  now  done  enough  to 
make  it  clear  to  all  who  were  disposed  to  seek  their 
fortunes  in  a  new  political  cause  that  their  services  on 
his  behalf  wonld  be  welcomed,  and  any  excess  of  zeal 
more  than  pardoned.  From  this  time  there  grew  up  a 
party  which  had  for  its  watchword  the  exaltation  of 
Louis  Napoleon  and  the  derision  of  the  methods  of 
Parliamentary  government.  Journalists,  unsucces-slul 
politicians,  adventurers  of  every  description,  were  en- 
listed in  the  ranks  of  this  obscure  but  active  band. 
For  their  acts  and  their  utterances  no  one  was  respon- 
sible but  themselves.  They  were  disavowed  without 
compunction  when  their  hardihood  went  too  far;  but 
their  ventures  brought  them  no  peril,  and  the  generositi 


160  MODBBN  SUROPS.  mil 

of  the  President  was  not  wanting  to  those  who   in- 
sisted on  serving  him  in  spite  of  himself. 

France  was  still  trembling  with  the  shock  of  the 
Four  Days  of  June ;  and  measures  of  repression 
formed  the  common  ground  upon  which  Louis  Napo- 
leon and  the  Assembly  met  without  fear  of  conflict. 
Certain  elections  which  were  held  in  the  spring  of 
1850,  and  which  gave  a  striking  victory  in  Paris  and 
elsewhere  to  Socialist  or  Ultra-Democratic  candidates, 
revived  the  alarms  of  the  owners  of  property,  and 
inspired  the  fear  that  with  universal  sufirage  the 
Legislature  itself  might  ultimately  fall  into  the 
hands  of  the  Red  Kepublicans.  The  principle  of  uni- 
versal suffrage  had  been  proclaimed  almost  by  acci- 
dent in  the  midst  of  the  revolution  of  1848.  It  had 
been  embodied  in  the  Constitution  of  that  year  because 
it  was  found  already  in  existence.  No  party  had 
seriously  considered  the  conditions  under  which  it  was 
to  be  exercised,  or  had  weighed  the  political  qualifica- 
tions of  the  mass  to  whom  it  was  so  lightly  thrown. 
When  election  after  election  returned  to  the  Chamber 
men  whose  principles  were  held  to  menace  society  itself, 
the  cry  arose  that  France  must  be  saved  from  the  hands 
of  the  vile  multitude ;  and  the  President  called  upon  a 
Committee  of  the  Assembly  to  frame  the  necessary 
measures  of  electoral  reform.  Within  a 
FrMo^rSur  week  the  work  of  the  Committee  was  com- 
pleted, and  the  law  which  it  had  drafted 
was  brought  before  the  Assembly.  It  was  proposed 
that,  instead  of  a  residence  of  six  months,  a  continuous 


M&  tlMITATIOS  or  tHE  FSAITCBISM.  l6l 

residence  of  three  years  in  the  same  coramane  should 
be  required  of  every  voter,  and  that  the  fQifilment  of  this 
condition  should  be  proved,  not  by  ordinary  evidence, 
bat  by  one  of  certain  specified  acts,  such  as  the  pay- 
ment of  personal  taxes.  With  modifications  of  little 
importance  the  Bill  was  passed  by  the  Assembly. 
Whether  its  real  effect  was  foreseen  even  by  those  who 
desired  the  greatest  possible  limitation  of  the  franchise 
is  doubtful ;  it  is  certain  that  many  who  supported  it 
believed,  in  their  ignorance  of  the  practical  working  of 
electoral  laws,  that  they  were  excluding  from  the  fran- 
chise only  the  vagabond  and  worthless  class  which 
has  no  real  place  within  the  body  politic  When  the 
electoral  Usts  drawn  up  in  pursuance  of  the  measure 
appeared,  they  astounded  all  parties  alike.  Three  out  of 
the  ten  mLlliona  of  voters  in  France  were  disfranchised. 
Not  only  the  inhabitants  of  whole  quarters  in  the  great 
cities  but  the  poorer  classes  among  the  peasantry 
throughout  Pmnce  had  disappeared  from  the  electoral 
body.  The  Assembly  had  at  one  blow  converted  into 
enemies  the  entire  mass  of  the  population  that  Uved  by 
the  wages  of  bodily  labour.  It  had  committed  an  act 
of  political  suicide,  and  had  given  to  a  man  so  little 
troubled  with  scruples  of  honour  as  Louis  Napoleon 
the  fatal  opportunity  of  appealing  to  France  as  the 
champion  of  national  sovereignty  and  the  vindicator 
of  universal  suffrage  against  an  Assembly  which  had 
mutilated  it  in  the  interests  of  class.* 

•  HsMpas,  U^moiTSB,  L  176.  (Envrea  de  Napoleon  III.,  iiL  271.  Bar- 
rot,  ir.  21.  Qnnier  de  Casaagrwe,  GhnU,  de  Ijoais  Philippe,  ii.  128 ;  B£dt 
completip.l.  Jerrold,Ni^eoiiIIL,iii.203.  TooqneviUo,  Oomapb iL  17& 


in  MODBBN  SUBOPS.  utt. 

The  duration  of  the  Presidency  was  fixed  by  the 
CoDstitntion  of  184S  at  four  years,  and  it  was  enacted 
that  the  President  should  not  be  re-eligible  to  his 
pj^__^^  dignity.  By  the  operation  of  certain  laws 
idn&Nmpoinn.  jjuperfectly  adjusted  to  one  another,  the 
tenure  of  office  by  Lonis  Napoleon  expired  on  the  8th 
of  May,  1852,  while  the  date  for  the  dissolution  of  the 
Assembly  fell  within  a  few  weeks  of  this  day.  Prance 
was  therefore  threatened  with  the  dangers  attending 
the  almost  simultaneous  extinction  of  all  authority. 
The  perils  of  1852  loomed  only  too  visibly  before  the 
country,  and  Louis  Napoleon  addressed  willing  bearers 
when,  in  the  summer  of  1850,  he  began  to  hint  at  the 
necessity  of  a  prolongation  of  his  own  power.  The 
Parliamentary  recess  was  employed  by  the  Presi- 
dent in  two  journeys  through  the  Departments  ;  the 
first  through  those  of  the  south-cast,  where  Socialism 
was  most  active,  and  where  his  appearance  served  at 
once  to  prove  his  own  confidence  and  to  invigorate  the 
friends  o£  authority ;  the  second  through  Normandy, 
where  the  prevailing  feeling  was  strongly  in  favour  of 
firm  government,  and  uttcrancos  could  safely  be  made 
by  the  President  which  would  have  brought  bim  into 
.some  risk  at  Paris.  In  suggesting  that  France  required 
his  own  continued  presence  at  the  head  of  the  State 
Louis  Napoleon  was  not  necessarily  suggesting  a  viola- 
tion of  the  law.  It  was  provided  by  the  Statutes  of 
1848  that  the  Assembly  by  a  vote  of  three-fourths 
might. order  a  revision  of  the  Constitution;  and  in 
favour   of  this   revision  petitions  were   already  being 


urn  lOVia  NAPOLEON.  163 

drawn  np  throngfcout  the  country.  Were  the  clause 
forbidding  the  re-election  of  the  President  removed 
from  the  Constitution,  Louis  Napoleon  might  fairly 
beUeve  that  an  immense  majority  of  the  French  people 
would  re-jnvest  him  with  power.  He  would  probably 
have  been  content  with  a  legal  re-election  had  this  been 
rendered  possible  ;  but  the  Assembly  showed  little  sign 
of  a  desire  to  smooth  his  way,  and  it  therefore  became 
necessary  for  him  to  seek  the  means  of  realising  his  aims 
in  violation  of  the  law.  He  had  persuaded  himself  that 
his  mission,  his  destiny,  was  to  rule  France ;  in  other 
words,  he  had  made  up  his  mind  to  run  such  risks  and 
to  sanction  such  crimes  as  might  be'  necessary  to  win 
him  sovereign  power.  With  the  loftier  impulses  of 
ambition,  motives  of  a  meaner  kind  stimulated  him 
to  acts  of  energy.  Never  wealthy,  tlie  father  of  a 
family  though  unmarried,  he  had  exhausted  his  means, 
and  would  have  returned  to  private  life  a  destitute  man, 
if  not  laden  with  debt.  When  his  Own  resolution 
flawed,  there  were  those  about  him  too  deeply  in- 
terested in  his  fortunes  to  allow  him  to  draw  back. 

It  was  by  means  of  the  army  that  Louis  Napoleon 
intended  in  the  last  resort  to  make  himself  master  of 
France,  and  the  army  had  therefore  to  be  LoniiHMioi«o» 
won  over  to  his  personal  cause.  The  generals  "■^""•™r. 
who  had  gained  distinction  either  in  the  Algeriau  wars 
or  in  the  suppression  of  insurrection  in  France  were 
without  exception  Orleanists  or  Bepublicans.  Not  a 
single  officer  of  eminence  was  as  yet  included  in  the 
Bonapartist  band.  The  President  himself  had  never  seep 
z  2  '''^^ 


IM  MODERN  EXmOPa.  IKL 

service  except  in  a  Swiss  camp  of  eiercise ;  beyond  his 
name  he  possessed  nothing  that  could  possibly  touch 
the  ima^nation  of  a  soldier.  The  heroic  element  not 
being  discoverable  in  his  person  or  his  career,  it  re- 
mained to  work  by  more  material  methods.  Louis 
Napoleon  had  learnt  many  things  in  England,  and  had 
perhaps  observed  in  the  English  elections  of  that  period 
liow  much  may  be  effected  by  the  simple  means  of 
money-bribes  and  strong  drink.  The  saviour  of  society 
was  not  ashamed  to  order  the  garrison  of  Paris  double 
rations  of  brandy  and  to  distribute  innumerable  doles  of 
half  a  franc  or  less.  Military  banquets  were  given,  in 
which  the  sergeant  and  the  corporal  sat  side  by  side 
with  the  higher  officers.  Promotion  was  skilfully 
offered  or  withheld.  Aa  the  generals  of  the  highest 
position  were  hostile  to  Bonaparte,  it  was  the  easier  to 
tempt  their  subordinates  with  the  pro.spect  of  their 
places.  In  the  acclamations  which  greeted  the  Presi- 
dent at  the  reviews  held  at  Paris  in  the  autumn  of  1850, 
in  the  behaviour  both  of  officers  and  men  in  certain 
regiments,  it  was  seen  how  successful  had  been  the 
emissaries  of  Bonapartism,  The  Committee  which  re- 
presented the  absent  Chamber  in  vain  called  the  Minis- 
ter of  War  to  account  for  these  irregularities.  It  was 
in  vain  tbat  Changarnier,  who,  as  commander  both  of 
tbe  National  Guard  of  Paris  and  of  the 
chugunkr,        first  military  division,  seemed  to  hold  the 

Jib.,  WSL  ■" 

arbitrament  between  President  and  Assembly 
in  his  hands,  openly  declared  at  the  beginning  of  1851 
in  favour  of  the  Constitution.     He  was  dismissed  from 


UU.       FBOPOSSV  SSTIBIOS  Of  THS  CONSTITUTION.      les 

liis  post;  and  althoagh  a  vote  of  eeDsnre  which  fol- 
lowed ibis  dismissal  led  to  the  resignation  of  the 
Ministry,  the  Assembly  was  anable  to  reinstate  Chan- 
gamier  in  his  command,  and  helplessly  witnessed  the 
anthority  which  he  had  held  pass  into  hostile  or 
untmstworthy  hands. 

There  now  remained  only  one  possible  means  of 
averting  the  attack  upon  the  Constitution  which  was  so 
clearly  threatened,  and  that  was  by  subject- 
ing the  Constitution  itself  to  revision  in  goo  ^  ii» 
order  that  Louis  Napoleon  might  legally 
seek  re-election  at  the  end  of  his  Presidency.  An  over- 
whelming current  of  public  opinion  pressed  indeed  in 
the  direction  of  such  a  cbange.  However  gross  and 
undisguised  the  initiative  of  the  local  functionaries  in 
preparing  the  petitions  which  showered  upon  the  As- 
sembly, the  national  character  of  the  demand  could 
not  be  doubted.  There  was  no  other  candidate  whose 
name  carried  with  it  any  geniuoe  popularity  or  prestige, 
or  around  whom  even  the  Parliamentary  sections  at 
enmity  with  the  President  could  rally.  The  Assembly 
was  divided  not  very  unevenly  between  Legitimists, 
Orleanists,  and  Republicans.  Had  indeed  the  two  mon- 
archical groups  been  able  to  act  in  accord,  they  might 
have  had  some  hope  of  re-establishing  the  throne ; 
and  an  attempt  had  already  been  made  to  effect  a 
union,  on  the  understanding  that  the  childless  Comte 
de  Cbambord  should  recognise  the  grandson  of  Louis 
Philippe  as  bis  heir,  the  House  of  Orleans  renouncing 
its  claims  during  the  lifetime  of  the    chief  of    the 


IM  MODERK  EUROPa.  ml 

elder  line.  These  plans  had  heen  fmstrated  by  the 
refosal  of  the  Comte  de  Chambord  to  sanctioii  any 
appeal  to  the  popular  vote,  and  the  restoration  of 
the  monarchy  was  therefore  hopeless  for  the  present. 
It  remained  for  the  Assembly  to  decide  whether 
it  would  facilitate  Louts  Napoleon's  re-election  as 
President  by  a  revision  of  the  Constitution  or  brave  the 
risk  of  his  violent  usurpation  of  power.  The  position 
was  a  sad  and  even  humiliating  one  for  those  who, 
while  they  could  not  disguise  their  real  feeling  towards 
the  Prince,  yet  knew  themselves  unable  to  count  on  the 
sapport  of  the  nation  if  they  should  resist  him.  The 
Legitimists,  more  sanguine  in  temper,  kept  in  view  an 
ultimate  restoration  of  the  monarchy,  and  lent  them- 
selves gladly  to  any  policy  which  might  weaken  the 
constitutional  safeguards  of  the  Republic.  The  Eepub- 
lican  minority  alone  determined  to  resist  any  proposal 
for  revision,  and  to  stake  everything  upon  t)ie  mainten- 
ance of  the  Constitution  in  its  existing 
ctHutJhiUon  form.  "Weak  as  the  Republicans  were  as 
compared  with  the  other  groups  in  the 
Assembly  when  united  against  them,  they  were  yet 
strong  enough  to  prevent  the  Ministry  from  securing 
that  majority  of  three-fourths  without  which  the  re- 
vision of  the  Constitution  could  not  be  undertaken. 
Four  hundred  and  fifty  votes  were  given  in  favour  of 
revision,  two  hundred  and  seventy  against  it  (July 
19th).  The  proposal  therefore  fell  to  tlie  ground,  and 
Louis  Napoleon,  who  could  already  chaise  the  Assem- 
bly with  having  by  its  majority  destroyed  universal 


iteL  PBSPARATIONB  F0&   TBS   COUP  IfSTAT.  167 

suflrage,  could  now  charge  it  with  having  hy  its 
minority  forbidden  the  nation  to  choose  its  own  head. 
Nothing  more  was  needed  by  him.  He  had  only 
to  decide  upon  the  time  and  the  circumstances  of  the 
couj)  d'etat  which  was  to  rid  him  of  his  adversaries  and 
to  make  him  master  of  France. 

Louis  Napoleon  had  few  intimate  confidants;  the 
chief  among  these  were  his  half-brother  Momy,  one  of 
the  illegitimate  offspring  of  Queen  Hortense,  a  man  of 
fashion  and  speculator  in  the  stocks;  Fialia  p_„,tion,,„ 
or  Persigny,  a  person  of  humble  origin  who  ***  '"'  ^"'^' 
had  proved  himself  a  devoted  follower  of  the  Prince 
throngh  good  and  evil ;  and  Fleury,  an  officer  -at  this 
time  on  a  mission  in  Algiers.  These  were  not  men 
out  of  whom  Louis  Napoleon  could  form  an  ad- 
ministration, but  they  were  useful  to  him  in  dis- 
covering and  winning  over  soldiers  and  officials  of 
sufficient  standing  to  give  to  the  execution  of  the  con- 
spiracy something  of  the  appearance  of  an  act  of 
Government.  A  general  was  needed  at  the  War  Office 
who  wonid  go  all  lengths  in  illegality.  Such  a  man 
had  already  been  found  in  St.  Amaud,  commander  of  a 
brigade  in  Algiers,  a  brilliant  soldier  who  had  redeemed 
a  disreputable  past  by  years  of  hard  service,  and  who 
was  known  to  be  ready  to  treat  his  French  fellow- 
citizens  exactly  as  he  would  treat  the  Arabs.  As  St. 
Amaud's  name  was  not -yet  familiar  in  Paris,  a  ciun- 
paign  was  arranged  in  the  summer  of  1851  for  the 
purpose  of  winning  him  distinction.  At  the  cost  of 
some  hundreds  of    lives  St.  Amaud  was  pushed  into 


U8  MODBBN  XJTSOPB.  ML 

sufficient  £ame ;  and  after  receiving  oongratolations 
proportioned  to  his  exploits  from  the  President's 
own  hand,  he  was  summoned  to  Paris,  in  order  at 
the  right  moment  to  be  made  Minister  of  War.  A 
troop  of  younger  oflScers,  many  of  whom  gained  a 
lamentable  celebrity  as  the  generals  of  1870,  were 
gradually  brought  orer  from  Algiers  and  placed  round 
the  Minister  in  the  capital.  The  command  of  the  army 
of  Paris  was  given  to  General  Magnan,  who,  though 
he  preferred  not  to  share  in  the  deliberations  on  the 
coup  d'itat,  had  promised  his  co-operation  when  the 
moment  should  arrive.  The  support,  or  at  least  the 
acquiescence,  of  the  army  seemed  thus  to  be  assured. 
The  National  Guard,  which,  under  Changamier,  would 
probably  have  rallied  in  defence  of  the  Assembly,  had 
been  placed  under  an  officer  pledged  to  keep  it  in 
inaction.  Per  the  management  of  the  police  Iionis 
Napoleon  had  fixed  upon  M.  Maupas,  Pr^fet  of  the 
Haute  Garonne.  This  person,  to  whose  shamelessness 
we  owe  the  most  authentic  information  that  exists  on 
the  coup  d'elat,  had,  while  in  an  inferior  station,  made 
it  his  business  to  ingratisite  himself  with  the  President 
hy  sending  to  him  persoually  police  reports  which  ought 
to  have  been  sent  to  the  Ministers.  The  objects  and 
the  character  of  M.  Maupas  were  soon  enough  under^ 
stood  by  Louis  Napoleon.  He  promoted  him  to  high 
office ,  sheltered  him  from  the  censure  of  his  superiors ; 
and,  when  the  coup  d'etat  wa.s  drawing  nigh,  called  him 
to  Paris,  in  the  full  and  well-grounded  confidence  that, 
whatever  the  most  perfidious  ingenuity  could  oontriva 


tm.  ST.    ASNAUD.  16» 

in  tnming  the  gnardiana  of  tlie  law  against  the  law 
itself,  that  M.  Manpas.  as  Piefet  of  Police,  might  be 
relied  upon  to  accompliBh. 

Preparations  for  tiie  coup  d'etat  had  been  so  far 
advanced  in  September  that  a  majority  of  the  conspirators 
had  then  urged  Lonis  Napoleon  to  strike  the  blow  with- 
out  delay,  while  the  members  of  the  Assembly  were  still 
dispersed  over  France  in  the  vacation.  St. 
Amaud,  however,  refused  his  assent,  de-  &»d(arDB- 
claring  that  the  deputies,  if  left  free,  would 
assemble  at  a  distance  from  Paris,  summon  to  them  the 
generals  loyal  to  the  Constitation,  and  commence  a 
civil  war.  He  urged  that,  in  order  to  avoid  greater 
subseqaent  nsls,  it  would  be  necessary  to  seize  all  the 
leading  representatives  and  generals  from  whom  re- 
sistance might  be  expected,  and  to  hold  them  under 
durance  until  the  crisis  should  be  over.  This  simul- 
taneous arrest  of  all  the  foremost  public  mea  iu  France 
could  only  be  effected  at  a  time  when  tbe  Assembly 
was  sitting.  St.  Amaud  therefore  demanded  that  the 
coup  d'etat  should  be  postponed  till  the  winter.  Another 
reason  made  for  delay.  Little  as  the  populace  of  Paris 
loved  the  reactionary  Assembly,  Louis  Napoleon  was 
not  alti^ether  assured  that  it  would  quietly  witness  his 
own  usurpation  of  power.  In  waiting  until  the  Oham- 
ber  should  agun  be  in  session,  he  saw  the  opportunity 
of  exhibiting  his  cause  as  that  of  the  masses  themselves, 
and  of  justifyiDg  his  action  as  the  sole  means  of  en- 
forcing popular  rights  against  a  legislatnxe  obstinately 
bent  on  denying  ihem.   Ijonis  Napoleon's  own  If  inistcrtf 


1?»  MODEBy   EUBOPB.  ML 

bad  overthrown  universal  snfin^.  This  might  indeed 
be  matter  for  comment  on  the  part  of  the  censorioua, 
hot  it  was  not  a  circumstance  to  stand  in  the  way  of 
the  execution  of  a  great  design.  Accordingly  Louis 
Napoleon  determined  to  demand  from  the  Assembly  at 
the  opening  of  the  winter  session  the  repeal  of  the 
electoral  law  of  Hay  Slst,  and  to  make  its  refusal,  on 
which  be  could  confidently  reckon,  the  occasion  of  its 
destiTiction. 

The  conspirators  were  up  to  this  time  conspirators 
and  nothing  more.  A  Ministry  still  subsisted  which 
was  not  initiated  in  the  President's  designs  nor  alto- 
gether at  his  command.  On  his  requiring  that  the 
repeal  of  the  law  of  May  Slst  should  be  proposed  to 
the  Assembly,  the  Cabinet  resigned.  The  way  to  the 
highest  functions  of  State  was  thus  finally  opened  for 
the  agents  of  the  coup  d'etat.  St.  Amaud  was  placed 
at  the  War  Office,  Maupas  at  the  Prefecture  of  Police. 
The  colle^ues  assigned  to  them  were  too  insignificant 
to  exercise  any  control  over  their  actions.  -  At  the  re- 
opening of  the  Assembly  on  the  4tb  of  November  an 
energetic  message  from  the  President  was  read.  On 
the  one  hand  he  denounced  a  vast  and  perilous  com- 
biuation  of  all  the  most  dangerous  elements  of  society 
which  threatened  to  overwhelm  France  in  the  following 
year ;  on  the  other  hand  he  demanded,  with 
rf'iiSJ'of^  certain  undefined  safeguards,  the  re-establish- 
ment of  universal  suffrage.  The  middle 
classes  were  scared  with  the  prospect  of  a  Socialist  revo- 
lution; the  Assembly  was  divided  against  itself,  and  the 

C.oo;;lc      ; 


! 


IBL  XHS  MBEMBLY  AT  PABI8.  171 

democracy  of  Paris  flattered  by  the  homage  p^d  to  the 
popular  vote.  With  veiy  little  delay  a  measure  repeal- 
ing the  Lav  of  May  Slst  was  introduced  into  the 
A^embly.  It  was  supported  by  the  Eepablicans  and 
by  many  members  of  the  other  groups;  bat  the  majority 
of  the  Assembly,  while  anxious  to  devise  some  com- 
promise, refused  to  condemn  its  own  work  in  the 
unqualified  form  on  which  the  President  insisted.  The 
Bill  was  thrown  out  by  seven  votes.  Forth-  .j^  A«mKr 
with  the  rumoiir  of  an  impending  coop  "'"**■ 
d'etai  spread  through  Paris.  The  Qaestors,  or  members 
chared  with  the  safeguarding  of  the  Assembly,  moved 
the  resolutions  necessary  to  enable  them  to  secure 
sufficient  military  aid.  Even  now  prompt  action 
might  perhaps  have  saved  the  Chamber.  But  the 
Bepublican  deputies,  inceosed  by  their  defeat  on  the 
question  of  universal  8u£frage,  pluoged  headloog  into 
the  snare  set  for  them  by  the  President,  and  combined 
with  his  open  or  secret  partisans  to  reject  the  proposi- 
tiorrof  the  Questors.  Changamier  had  blindly  vouched 
for  the  fidelity  of  the  array ;  one  Republican  deputy, 
more  imaginative  than  his  colleagues,  bade  the  Assembly 
confide  in  their  invisible  sentinel,  the  people.  Thus 
the  majority  of  the  Chamber,  with  the  clearest  warning 
of  danger,  insisted  on  giving  the  aggressor  every  pos- 
sible advantage.  If  the  imbecility  of  opponents  is  the 
best  augury  of  success  in  a  bold  enterprise,  the  Presi- 
dent had  indeed  little  reason  to  anticipate  failure. 

The  execution  of  the  coup  d'etat  vf as  fixed  for  the 
early   morning  of  December   2nd.     On   the  previous 


173  UODSBS  EVaOPB.  aa. 

evening  Louis  Kapoleon  held  a  public  reception  at  the 
Elys^e,  his  qoiet  self-possessed  manner  indicating 
Tbtmpim,  T^ofiung  of  the  stru^le  at  hand.  Before 
the  gaests  dispersed  the  President  with- 
drew to  his  study.  There  the  last  council  of  the  con- 
spirators was  held,  and  thej  parted,  each  to  the  execa- 
tiou  of  the  work  assigned  to  him.  The  central  element 
in  the  plan  was  the  arrest  of  Cavaignac,  of  Changamier 
and  three  other  generals  who  were  members  of  the 
Assembly,  of  eleven  civilian  deputies  including  M. 
Thiers,  and  of  sixty-two  other  politicians  of  influence. 
Maupas  sammoned  to  the  Prefecture  of  Police  in  the 
dead  of  nigbt  a  sufficient  number  of  his  trusted  agents^ 
received  each  of  them  on  his  arrival  in  a  separate  room, 
and  charged  each  with  the  arrest  of  one  of  the  victims. 
The  arrests  were  accomplished  before  dawn,  and  the 
leading  soldiers  and  citizens  of  France  met  one  another 
in  the  prison  of  Mazas.  The  Palais  Bourbon,  the 
meeting-place  of  the  Assembly,  was  occupied  by  troops. 
The  national  printing  establishment  was  seized  by 
gendarmes,  and  the  proclamations  of  Louis  Napoleon, 
distributed  sentence  by  sentence  to  different  composi- 
tors, were  set  in  type  before  the  workmen  knew  upon 
what  they  were  engaged.  When  day  broke  the  Paris- 
ians found  the  soldiers  in  the  streets,  and  the  walls 
placarded  with  manifestoes  of  Louis  Napoleon.  The 
first  of  these  was  a  decree  which  announced  in  the  name 
of  the  French  people  that  the  National  Assembly  and 
the  Council  of  State  were  dissolved,  that  universal  suf- 
frage was  restored,  and  that  the  nation  was  convoked 


un.  TBS  COUP  D'STAT.  173 

in  its  electoral  colleges  £rom  the  I4th  to  the  21st 
o£  December.  The  second  was  a  proclamation  to  the 
people,  in  which  IJouis  Napoleon  denounced  at  once  the 
monarchical  conspirators  within  the  Assembly  and  the 
ajiarchists  who  sought  to  overthrow  all  government.  TTin 
duty  called  upon  him  to  save  the  Republic  by  an  appeal 
to  the  nation.  He  proposed  the  establishment  of  a 
decennial  executive  authority,  with  a  Senate,  a  Council 
of  State,  a  Legislative  Body,  and  other  institutions 
borrowed  from  the  Consulate  of  1799.  If  the  nation 
refused  him  a  majority  o^  its  votes  he  would  summon 
a  new  Assembly  and  resign  his  powers ;  if  the  nation 
believed  in  the  cause  of  which  his  name  was  the  symbol, 
in  Prance  regenerated  by  the  Revolution  and  organised 
by  the  Emperor,  it  would  prove  this  by  ratifying  his 
authority.  A  third  proclamation  was  addressed  to  the 
army.  In  1830  and  in  1848  the  army  had  been  treated 
as  the  conquered,  but  its  voice  was  now  to  be  heard. 
Common  glories  and  sorrows  united  the  soldiers  of 
France  with  Napoleon's  heir,  and  the  future  would 
unite  them  in  common  devotion  to  the  repose  and 
greatness  of  their  country. 

The  full  meaning  of  these  manifestoes  was  not  at 
first  understood  by  the  groups  who  read  them.  The 
Assembly  was  so  unpopular  that  the  announcemeat  of 
its  dissolution,  with  the  restoration  of  uni- 
versal suffrage,  pleased  rather  than  alarmed 
tiie  democratic  quarters  of  Paris.  It  was  not  until 
some  hours  had  passed  that  the  arrests  became  gener- 
ally known,  and  that  the  first  symptoms  of  resifitance 


174  MOVERS  amtOPE.  un. 

appeared.  Cfroups  of  deputies  assembled  at  the  houses  of 
the  Parliamentary  leaders ;  a  body  of  fifty  even  succeeded 
in  entering  the  Palais  Bourbon  and  in  commencing  a 
debate :  they  were,  however,  soon  dispersed  by  soldiers. 
Lutcr  in  the  day  above  two  hundred  members  assembled 
ut  the  M^rie  of  the  Tenth  Arrondissement.  There 
they  passed  resolutions  declaring  the  President  removed 
from  his  office,  and  appointing  a  commander  of  the 
troops  at  Fans.  The  first  officers  who  were  sent  to 
clear  the  Mairie  flinched  in  the  execution  of  their  work, 
and  withdrew  for  further  orders.  The  Magistrates  of 
the  High  Court,  whose  duty  it  was  to  order  the  im- 
peachment of  the  President  in  case  of  the  violation  of 
bis  oath  to  the  Constitution,  assembled,  and  commenced 
the  necessary  proceedings;  but  before  they  could  sign  a 
warraut,  soldiers  forced  their  way  into  the  hall  and  drove 
the  judges  from  the  Bench.  In  due  course  General  Forey 
appeared  with  a  strong  body  of  troops  at  the  Mairie, 
where  the  two  hundred  deputies  were  assembled.  Ee- 
fusing  to  disperse,  they  were  one  and  all  arrested,  and 
conducted  as  prisoners  between  files  of  troops  to  the 
Barracks  of  the  Quai  d'Orsay.  The  National  Guard, 
whose  drums  had  been  removed  hy  their  commander  in 
view  of  any  spontaneous  movement  to  arms,  remained 
invisible,  Louis  Napoleon  rode  out  amidst  the  accla- 
mations of  the  soldiery;  and  when  the  day  closed  it 
seemed  as  if  Paris  had  resolved  to  accept  the  change  of 
Government  and  the  overthrow  of  the  ConstitutioD 
without  a  struggle. 

There  were,  however,  a  few  resolute  men  at  work  in 


18U.  TEE  COUP  le&TAT.  175 

the  workmen's  quarters ;  and  in  the  wealthier  part  of 
the  dtj  the  outrage  upon  the  National  Bepresentation 
gradoallj  roused  a  spirit  of  resistance.  On  the  morning 
of  December  3rd  the  Deputy  Baadin  met 
with  his  death  in  attempting  to  defend  a 
barricade  which  had  been  erected  in  the  Fanbooi^  St. 
Antoine.  The  artisans  of  eastern  Paris  showed, 
however,  little  inclination  to  take  up  arms  on 
behalf  of  those  who  had  crushed  them  in  the  Four 
Days  of  June ;  the  agitation  was  strongest  within  the 
Boulevards,  and  spread  westwards  towards  the  stateliest 
district  of  Paris.  The  barricades  erected  on  the  south 
of  the  Boulevards  were  so  numerous,  the  crowds  so  for- 
midable, that  towards  the  close  of  the  day  the  troops 
were  withdrawn,  and  it  was  determined  that  after  a  night 
of  quiet  they  should  make  a  general  attack  and  end 
the  struggle  at  one  blow.  At  midday  on 
December  4th  divisions  of  the  army  con- 
veiged  from  all  directions  upon  the  insurgent  quarter. 
The  barricades  were  captured  or  levelled  by  artillery, 
and  with  a  loss  on  the  part  of  the  troops  of  twenty-eight 
killed  and  a  hundred  and  eighty  wounded  resistanoe 
was  overcome.  But  the  soldiers  had  been  taught  to 
regard  the  inhabitants  of  Paris  as  their  enemies,  and 
they  bettered  the  instructions  given  them.  Maddened 
by  drink  or  panic,  they  commenced  indiscriminate 
firing  in  the  Boulevards  after  the  conflict  was  over, 
and  slaughtered  all  who  either  in  the  street  or  at  the 
windows  of  the  houses  came  within  range  of  their 
bullets.     According  to  official  admissions,  the  lives  of 


176  MODBSlf  XUEOPa.  m 

sixteen  dvilians  paid  for  every  soldier  slain ;  inde- 
pendent estimates  place  ia,T  higher  the  number  of  the 
victims  of  this  massacre.  Two  thousand  arrests  followed, 
and  every  Frenchman  who  appeared  dangerous  to  Louis 
Kapoleon's  myrmidons,  from  Thiers  and  Victor  Hugo 
down  to  the  anarchist  oratora  of  the  wineshops,  was 
either  transported,  exiled,  or  lodged  in  prison.  Thus 
was  the  Eepuhiic  preserved  and  society  saved. 

Prance  in  general  received  the  news  of  the  cfWjp 
d'etat  with  indifference :  where  It  excited  popular  move- 
ments these  movements  were  of  such  a  character  that 
Louis  Napoleon  drew  irom  them  the  utmost  profit.  A 
TheHftrf«it«  certain  fierce,  blind  Socialism  had  spread 
^*"'  "■  among  the  poorest  of  the  rural  classes  in  the 

centre  and  south  of  France.  In  these  departments  there 
were  isolated  risings,  accompanied  by  acts  of  such  moX' 
derous  outr^e  and  folly  that  a  general  terror  seized  the 
surrounding  districts.  In  the  course  of  a  few  days  the 
predatory  bands  were  dispersed,  aud  an  unsparing 
chastisement  inflicted  on  all  whe  were  concerned  in 
their  misdeeds;  but  the  reports  sent  to  Paris  were  too 
serviceable  to  Louis  Napoleon  to  be  left  in  obscurity; 
and  these  brutish  village-outbreaks,  which  collapsed  at 
the  first  appearance  of  a  handful  of  soldiers,  were  re- 
presented as  the  prelude  to  a  vast  Socialist  revolution 
from  which  the  coup  d'etat,  and  that  alone,  had  saved 
France.  Terrified  by  the  re-appearance  of  the  Eed 
Spectre,  the  French  nation  proceeded  on  the  20th  of 
December  to  pass  its  judgment  on  the  accomplished 
usurpation.    The  question  submitted  for  the  plebiadie 


un  NAPOLBOS  HL  171 

was,  whether  the  people  desired  the  maintenance  of 
LoaiB  Napoleon's  authority  and  committed  to  him  the 
necessary  powers  for  establishing  a  Constitatlon  on  the 
basis  laid  down  in  his  proclamation  of  December  2nd. 
Seven  million  votes  answered  this  question  in  the  affirm- 
ative, less  than  one-tenth  of  that  number  in  the  nega- 
tive. The  result  was  made  known  on  the  last  day  of 
the  year  1851.  On  the  first  day  of  the  new  year  Louis 
Napoleon  attended  a  service  of  thanksgiving  at  Notre 
Dame,  took  possession  of  the  Tuileries,  and  restored  the 
ei^le  as  the  military  emblem  of  France.  He  was  now 
in  all  but  name  an  absolute  sovereign.  The  Church, 
the  army,  the  ever-servile  body  of  the  civil  administra- 
tion, waited  impatiently  for  the  revival  of  the  Imperial 
title.  Nor  was  the  saviour  of  society  the  man  to  shrink 
from  further  responsibilities.  Before  the  year  closed 
the  people  was  once  more  called  upon  to 
express  its  will.  Seven  millions  of  votes  Bmmor.DeB. 
pronounced  for  hereditary  power;  and  on 
the  anniversary  of  the  coup  d'etat  Napoleon  III.  was 
proclaimed  !EmperoT  of  the  French. 


D,a,l,zc.bvG00gIe 


OHAPTBE  m. 

Eng-UiHlaDdFmuMiiilStl— BluiuiimdsTNitliolu—The  HDngMian  BafogeM 
— Dilputa  between  F^uoe  and  Biubu  on  the  Holy  Places — Nicliolaa  and 
the  British  Amhasiador  —  Loid  Stratford  de  Beddifle  —  UenachikoFi 
UiMion— Ruuiui  Troops  akt«r  the  Dacubiaa  Principalitiee — Lord  Aber- 
deea'i  GBbinet — Hovements  of  the  Fleota — 'Dia  Vioniui  Note — The  FJeeti 
pua  the  Dardanellea — Turkuh  SqtwulroD  destmyed  at  Sinope — Dedaralion 
ol  War— Policy  of  Angtria — Policy  of  Pnuaia — The  Westom  Powera  and 
the  European  Concert— Siege  of  Siliatiia — The  Friccipalitiee  evaounted — 
Further  objecta  of  the  Weatem  Powera — iDvaeiuD  of  Ihe  Crimea — BattU 
of  Qke  Alma — The  Flank  Hatch— Balaclava— Inkenoann— Winter  in  the 
Crimea — Death  of  NichoU* — Conference  ot  Vienna- AuBtria — FTogreae  of 
the  Siege — Plant  of  Napoleon  III. — Canrobort  and  Fflisaier — TTiimii  i  iiwriil 
Aaaault— Battle  of  the  Tchemaya— Capture  of  the  MaUkoft- Fall  of  Sebaa- 
topol — Call  of  Ears — Negotiationa  for  Peace — The  Conferenoa  of  Paria — 
lYeatj  of  Paiia — The  Danubian  Principalities — Continued  discoid  m  Uta 
Ottoman  Empii«— Beriaion  of  the  Treaty  of  Paria  in  1871. 

The  year  1851  was  memorable  in  England  as  that 
of  the  Great  Exhibition.  Thirty-six  years  of  peace, 
marked  by  an  enormous  development  of  manufacturing 
industry,  by  the  introduction  of  railroads,  and  by  the 
victory  of  the  principle  of  Free  Trade,  had  culminated 
in  a  spectacle  so  impressive  and  so  novel  that  to  many  it 
seemed  the  emblem  fmd  harbinger  of  a  new  epoch  in 
the  history  of  mankind,  in  which  war  should 
cease,  and  the  rivalry  of  nations  should  at 
length  find  its  true  scope  in  the  advancement  of  the 
arts  ot  peace.  The  apostles  of  Free  Trade  had  idealised 
the  cause  for  which  they  contended.  The  unhappiness 
and  the  crimes  of  nations  had,  as  they  held,  been  doe 


1K9.  ENGLAND  AND  FRANCE.  179 

principally  to  the  action  of  governments,  wliicli  plunged 
harmless  millions  into  war  for  dynastic  euda,  and 
paralysed  human  enei^y  by  their  own  blind  and  sense- 
less interference  with  the  natural  course  of  exchange. 
Compassion  for  the  poor  and  the  sufiering,  a  just  resent- 
ment against  laws  which  in  the  interest  of  one  dominant 
class  condemned  the  mass  of  the  nation  to  a  life  of 
want,  gave  moral  ferroor  and  elevation  to  the  teaching 
of  Cobden  and  those  who  shared  his  spirit.  Like  others 
who  have  been  constrained  by  a  noble  enthusiasm,  they 
had  their  visions ;  ^id  in  their  sense  of  the  greatness  of 
that  Dew  force  which  was  ready  to  operate  upon  human 
life,  they  both  forgot  the  incompleteness  of  their  own 
doctrine,  and  under-estimated  the  influences  which 
worked,  and  long  must  work,  upon  mankind  in  an 
opposite  direction.  In  perfect  sincerity  the  leader  of 
English  economical  reform  at  the  middle  of  this  century 
looked  forward  to  a  reign  of  peace  and  of  unfettered 
intercourse  among  the  members  of  the  European  family. 
What  the  man  of  genius  and  conviction  had  pro- 
claimed the  diarlatan  repeated  in  his  turn.  Louis  ' 
Napoleon  appreciated  the  charm  which  schemes  of  com- 
mercial development  exercised  upon  the  trading  classes 
in  France.  He  was  ready  to  salute  the  Imperial  eagles 
as  objects  of  worship,  and  to  invoke  the  memories  of 
Napoleon's  glory  when  addressing  soldiers ;  when  it 
concerned  bim  to  satisfy  the  commercial  world,  he  was 
the  very  embodiment  of  peace  and  of  peaceful  industry. 
"  Certain  persons,"  he  said,  in  an  address  at  Bordeaux, 
shortly  before  assuming  the  title  of  Emperor,  "say 
M  2  ■^"'81^' 


180  UODS&S  EUROPa.  tea. 

that  the  Empire  is  weu*.  I  saj  that  the  Empire 
is  peace ;  for  Prance  desires  peace,  aod  when  France 
is  satisfied  the  world  is  tranquil.  We  have  waste 
territories  to  cultivate,  roads  to  open,  harbours  to  dig,  a 
system  of  railroads  to  complete ;  we  have  to  bring  all 
our  great  western  ports  into  eonnection  with  the  Ameri- 
can continent  by  a  rapidity  of  communication  which  we 
still  want.  We  have  rains  to  restore,  false  gods  to 
overthrow,  truths  to  make  triumphant.  This  is  the 
sense  that  I  attach  to  the  Empire ;  these  are  the  con- 
quests  which  I  contemplate."  Never  had  the  ideal  of 
industrious  peace  been  more  impressively  set  before 
mankind  than  in  the  years  which  succeeded  the  con- 
vulsion of  1848.  Yet  the  epoch  on  which  Europe  was 
then  about  to  enter  proved  to  be  pre-eminently  an  epoch 
of  war.  In  the  next  quarter  of  a  century  there  was  not 
one  of  the  Great  Powers  which  was  not  engaged  in  an 
armed  struggle  with  its  rivals.  Nor  were  the  wars  of 
this  period  in  any  sense  the  result  of  accident,  or  dis- 
connected with  the  stream  of  political  tendencies  which 
makes  the  history  of  the  age.  With  one  exception 
they  left  in  their  train  great  changes  for  which  tiie 
time  was  ripe,  changes  which  for  more  than  a  genersr 
tion  had  been  the  recognised  objects  of  national  desire, 
but  which  persuasion  and  revolution  bad  equally  failed 
to  bring  into  effect.  The  Crimean  War  alone  was 
barren  in  positive  results  of  a  lasting  natare,  and  may 
seem  only  to  have  postponed,  at  enormous  cost  of  life, 
the  fall  of  a  doomed  and  outworn  Power.  Bat  the 
time  has  i^ot  yet  arrlT^d  when  the  real  bearing  of  the 


overthrow  of  Russia  in  1854  on  the  destiny  of  the 
Christian  races  of  Turkey  can.be  confidently  expressed. 
The  Tictory  of  the  Sultan's  protectors  delayed  the 
emancipation  of  these  races  for  twenty  years ;  the 
victory,  or  the  unchecked  aggreBBion,  of  Bussia  in  1854 
might  possibly  have  closed  to  them  for  ever  the  ways  to 
national  independence. 

The  plans  formed  by  the  Empress  Catherine  in  the 
last  century  for  the  restoration  of  the  Qreek  Empire 
under  a  prince  of  the  Bnssian  House  had  long  been 
abandoned   at   St.   Petersbunr.     The   later 

°  Bnaiu     patkr 

aim  of  Russian  policy  found  its  clearest  ex-  ™i«mdwiM. 
pression  in  the  Treaty  of  Unkiar  Skelessi,  extorted  from 
Sultan  Mahmud  in  1833  in  the  course  of  the  iirst  war 
gainst  Mehemet  Ali.  This  Treaty,  if  it  had  not  been 
set  aside  by  the  Western  Powers,  would  have  made  the 
Ottoman  Empire  a  vassal  State  under  the  'Czar's  pro- 
tection. In  the  concert  of  Europe  which  was  called 
into  beiug  by  the  second  war  of  Mehemet  Ali  against 
the  Sultan  in  1840,  Nicholas  had  considered  it  his 
interest  to  act  with  England  and  the  German  Powers  in 
defence  of  the  Porte  gainst  its  Egyptian  rival  and 
his  French  ally.  A  policy  of  moderation  had  been 
imposed  upon  Bussia  by  the  increased  watchfulness 
and  activity  now  displayed  hy  the  other  European  States 
in  all  that  related  to  the  Ottoman  Empire.  Isolated 
aggression  had  become  impracticable ;  it  was  necessary 
for  Bussia  to  seek  the  countenance  or  support  of  some 
ally  before  venturing  on  the  next  step  in  the  extension 
of  its  power  southwards.    In  1844  Nicholas  visited 


18S  MODERN  EUROPB.  mtrU. 

England.  The  object  of  bis  journey  was  to  Boand  the 
^  ^ .  ^  Court  and  the  Qovemment,  and  to  lay  the 
*°*'»^'"**-  foundation  for  concerted  action  between 
Bussia  and  England,  to  the  exclusion  of  France, 
when  circumstances  should  bring  about  the  dis- 
solution of  the  Ottoman  Empire,  an  event  which  the 
Czar  believed  to  be  not  far  off.  Feel  was  then  Prime 
Minister;  Lord  Aberdeen  was  Foreign  Secretary.  Aber- 
deen had  begun  his  political  career  in  a  diplomatic 
mission  to  the  Allied  Armies  in  I8I4.  His  feelings 
towards  Bussia  were  those  of  a  loyal  friend  towards  an 
old  ally ;  and  the  remembrance  of  the  epoch  of  1S14, 
when  the  young  Nicholas  had  made  acquaintance  with 
liord  Aberdeen  in  France,  appears  to  have  given  to  the 
Czar  a  peculiar  sense  of  confidence  in  the  goodwill  of 
the  English  Minister  towards  himself.  Nicholas  spoke 
freely  with  Aberdeen,  as  well  as  with  Peel  and  Wel- 
lington, on  the  impending  fall  of  the  Ottoman  Empire. 
"We  have,"  he  said,  "a  sick,  a  dying  man  on  our 
hands.  We  must  keep  him  alive  so  long  as  it  is  pos- 
sible to  do  so,  but  we  must  frankly  take  into  view  all 
contingencies.  I  wish  for  no  inch  of  Turkish  soil 
myself,  bat  neither  will  I  permit  any  other  Power  to 
seize  an  inch  of  it.  France,  which  has  designs  upon 
Africa,  upon  the  Mediterranean,  and  upon  the  East,  is 
the  only  Power  to  be  feared.  An  understanding  between 
England  and  Bussia  will  preserve  the  peace  of  Europe." 
If  the  Czar  pursued  bis  speculations  further  into  detail, 
o  which  there  is  no  evidence,  he  elicited  no  response, 
e  was  heard  with  caution,  and  his  visit  appears  to 


have  piodnced  nothing  more  than  the  fonnal  ezpresGion 
of  a  desire  on  the  part  of  the  British  Government  that 
the  existing  treaty-rights  of  Bnssia  should  he  respected 
hj  the  Porte,  together  with  an  unmeaning  promise  that, 
if  unexpected  events  should  occor  in  Turkey,  Sussia  and 
Eogland  should  enter  into  counsel  as  to  the  hest  course 
of  action  to  be  pursued  in  common.* 

Nicholas,  whether  from  policy  or  from  a  sense  of 
kingly  honour  '  which  at  most  iiiaes  powerfully  in- 
fluenced him,  did  not  avail  himself  of  the  prostration 
of  the  Continental  Powers  in  1848  to  attack  Turkey. 
He  detested  revolution,  as  a  crime  against  the  divinely 
ordered  subjection  of  nations  to  their  rulers, 
and  would  probably  have  felt  himself  de- 
graded had  he,  in  the  spirit  of  his  predecessor  Catherine, 
turned  the  calamities  of  his  brother-monarchs  to  his 
own  separate  advant^e.  It  accorded  better  with 
hb  proud  nature,  possibly  also  with  the  schemes  of  a 
far-reaching  policy,  for  Russia  to  enter  the  field  as  the 
protector  of  the  Hapsburgs  against  the  rebel  Hungarians 
than  for  its  armies  to  snatch  from  the  Porte  what  the 
lapse  of  time  and  the  goodwill  of  European  allies  would 
probably  give  to  Russia  at  no  distant  date  without  a 
stru^le.  Disturbances  at  Bucharest  and  at  Jassy 
led  indeed  to  a  Russian  intervention  in  the  Danu- 
bian    Principalities    in    the   interests    of    a    despotic 

*  Stockmar,  396.  .  Eastoni  Fapen  (i.e.,  Farliunentur  Pspen,  1854, 
YoL  71),  part  6.  Uftlmeaborj,  Memoln  of  an  ex-Miidstw,  L  402 ;  the 
taut  probablf  inaccurate.  Diplomatic  Stndj  of  the  Grimeaji  War,  i.  11. 
This  work  is  a  Knsaiaii  official  publication,  and,  thongli  loose  and  nntmst- 
ifoMij,  is  taloable  as  abowinfi;  the  Bnawan  official  new. 


IH  iiODBRN  BUBOPB.  wml 

system  of  government ;  but  Russia  possessed  by  treaty 
protecfcoraJ  rights  over  these  Provinces.  The  mili- 
tary occupation  which  followed  the  revolt  gainst  the 
Hospodars  was  the  subject  of  a  convention  between 
Turkey  and  Russia;  it  was  effected  by  the  armies  of 
the  two  Powers  jointly  ;  and  at  the  expiration  of  two 
years  the  Russian  forces  were  peacefully  withdrawn. 
More  serious  were  the  difficulties  which  arose  from  the 
flight  of  Kossuth  and  other  Hungarian  leaders  into 
Turkey  after  the  subjugation  of  Hungary  Ti«H«Dg«i« 
by  the  allied  Austrian  and  Russian  armies.  °*™'  ***■ 
The  Courts  of  Vienna  and  St.  Petersburg  united  in 
demanding  from  the  Porte  the  surrender  of  these 
refugees ;  the  Sultan  refused  to  deliver  them  up,  and 
be  was  energetically  supported  by  Great  Britain, 
Kossuth's  childreu  on  their  arrival  at  Constantinople 
being  received  and  cared  for  at  the  British  Embassy. 
The  tyrannous  demand  of  the  two  Emperors,  the 
courageous  resistance  of  the  Sultan,  excited  the  utmost 
interest  in  Western  Europe.  By  a  strange  turn  of 
fortune,  the  Power  which  at  the  end  of  the  last  century 
had  demanded  from  the  Court  of  Vienna  the  Greek 
leader  Rhegas,  and  had  put  him  to  death  as  soon  iis  he 
was  handed  over  by  the  Austrian  police,  was  now  gain- 
ing the  admiration  of  all  free  nations  as  the  last  barrier 
that  sheltered  the  champions  of  European  liberty  from 
the  vengeance  of  despotic  might  The  Czar  and  the 
Emperor  of  Austria  bad  not  reckoned  with  the  forces  of 
public  indignation  aroused  against  them  in  the  West 
by  their  attempt  to  wrest  their  enemies   from    the 


Sultan's  hand.  They  withdrew  their  ambassadors  from 
Constantinople  and  threatened  to  resort  to  force.  But 
the  appearance  of  the  British  and  French  fleets  at  the 
Dardanelles  gave  a  new  aspect  to  the  dispute.  The  Em- 
perors learnt  that  if  they  made  war  upon  Turkey  for  the 
question  at  issue  they  would  have  to  tight  also  against 
the  Western  Powers.  The  demand  for  the  surrender 
of  the  refugees  was  withdrawn ;  and  in  undertaking  to 
keep  the  principal  of  them  under  surveillance  for  a 
reasonable  period,  the  Sultan  gave  to  the  two  Imperial 
Courts  such  satisfaction  as  they  could,  without  loss  of 
dignity,  accept.* 

The  coup  d'etat  of  Louis  Napoleon  at  the  end  of  the 
year  1851  was  witnessed  by  the  Czar  with  sympathy 
and  admiration  as  a  service  to  the  cause  of  order  j  but 
the  assumption  of  the  Imperial  title  by  the  Di,poiebeti™« 
Prince  displea-sed  him  exceedingly.  While  """"in™^' 
not  refusing  to  recognise  Napoleon  III.,  "''**^^- 
he  declined  to  address  him  by  the  term  {vwn  frere) 
usually  employed  by  monarchs  in  writing  to  one 
another.  In  addition  to  the  question  relating  to  the 
Hungarian  refugees,  a  dispute  concerning  the  Holy 
Places  in  Palestine  threatened  to  cause  strife  between 
France  and  Kussia.  The  same  wave  of  religious  and 
theological  interest  which  in  England  produced  the 
Tractarian  movement  brought  into  the  arena  of  politi- 
cal life  in  France  an  enthusiasm  for  the  Church  long 
strange  to  the  Legislature  and  the  governing  circles  of 
Paris.  In  the  Assembly  of  1849  Montalembert,  the 
•  AaUoj's  Falmenton,  u.  142.  lAne  Foole,  Stntfoid  de  EedcliCe.  U.  lU. 


ISA  MODERN  EVROFE.  u»« 

spokesman  of  this  militant  Catholicism,  was  one  of  the 
foremost  figures.  Louis  Napoleon,  as  President,  sought 
the  favour  of  those  whom  Montalembert  led ;  and  the 
same  Government  which  restored  the  Pope  to  Rome 
demanded  from  the  Porte  a  stricter  enforcement  of  the 
rights  of  the  Latin  Church  in  the  East.  The  earliest 
Christian  legends  had  heen  localised  in  various  spots 
around  Jerusalem.  These  had  been  in  the  ages  of  faith 
the  goal  of  countless  pilgrimages,  and  in  more  recent 
centuries  they  had  formed  the  object  of  treaties  between 
the  Porte  and  France.  Greek  monks,  however,  disputed 
with  liatin  monks  for  the  guardianship  of  the  Holy 
Places;  and  as  the  power  of  Russia  grew,  the  privileges 
of  the  Greek  monks  had  increased.  The  daims  of  tlio 
rivan  brotherhoods,  which  related  to  doors,  keys,  stars 
and  lamps,  might  probably  have  heen  settled  to  the 
satisfaction  of  all  parties  within  a  few  hours  by  an  ex- 
perienced stage-manager;  in  the  hands  of  diplomatists 
bent  on  obtaining  triumphs  over  one  another  they  as- 
sumed dimensions  that  overshadowed  the  peace  of  Europe. 
The  French  and  the  Russian  Ministers  at  Constantinople 
alternately  tormented  the  Sultan  in  the  character  of 
aggrieved  sacristans,  until,  at  the  beginning  of  1852, 
the  Porte  compromised  itself  with  both  parties  by  ad- 
judging to  each  rights  which  it  professed  also  to  secure 
to  the  other.  A  year  more,  spent  in  prevarications,  in 
excuses,  and  in  menaces,  ended  with  the  triumph  of  tlie 
French,  with  the  evasion  of  the  promises  made  by  the 
Sultan  to  Russia,  and  with  the  discomfiture  of  the 
Greek  Church    in    the    person    of    the    monks    who 


officiated  at  the  Holy  Sepnlolire  and  the  Shrine  of  the 
NatiTity* 

Nicholas  treated  the  condnct  of  the  Porte  as  an 
oatrage  upon  himself.  A  conflict  which  had  broken 
oat  between  the  Saltan  and  the  Montenegrins,  and 
which  now  threatened  to  take  a  deadly  form,  confirmed 
the  Czar  in  his  belief  that  the  time  for  resolate  action 
had  arrived.  At  the  beginning  of  the  year 
1853  he  addressed  himself  to  Sir  Hamil-  f^'^^"^^ 
ton  Seymour,  British  ambassador  at  St. 
Petersbni^,  in  terms  mach  stronger  and  clearer  than 
those  which  he  had  nsed  towards  Lord  Aberdeen  nine 
years  before.  "  The  Sick  Man,"  he  said, "  was  in  extre- 
mities ;  the  time  had  come  for  a  clear  understanding 
between  England  and  Russia.  The  occupation  of  Con- 
stantinople by  Bassian  troops  might  be  necessary,  but 
the  Czar  woold  not  hold  it  permanently.  He  would 
not  permit  any  other  Power  to  establish  itself  at  the 
Bosphoms,  neither  woold  he  permit  the  Ottoman  Em- 
pire to  be  broken  up  into  Republics  to  afford  a  refuge 
to  the  Mazzinis  and  the  Kossnths  of  Europe.  The 
Danubian  Principalities  were  already  independent  States 
tmder  Basaian  protection.  The  other  possessions  of  the 
Saltan  north  of  the  Balkans  might  be  placed  on  the 
Bame  footing.  England  might  annex  Egypt  and  Crete." 
After  making  this  communication  to  the  British  am- 
bassador, and  receiving  the  reply  that  England  declined 
to  enter  into  any  schemes  based  on  the  fall  of  the 
Turkish  Empire  and  disclaimed  all  desire  for  the 
*  Eutem  Fkpen,  L  65.    Diplonutlo  Sta^,  L  12L      /^^^nli' 


18d  UODB^f  SVSOPa.  ttsi 

annexation  of  any  part  of  the  Sultan's  dominions, 
Kicholas  despatched  Prince  Meoschikoff  to  Constantin- 
ople, to  demand  from  the  Porte  not  only  an  immediate 
settlement  of  the  questions  relating  to  the  Holy  Places, 
but  a  Treaty  guaranteeing  to  the  Greek  Church  the 
undisturbed  enjoyment  of  all  its  ancient  rights  and  the 
benefit  of  all  privileges  that  might  be  accorded  by  the 
Porte  to  any  other  Christian  communities.* 

The  Treaty  which    Menschikoff    was  instructed  to 
demand  would  have  placed  the  Sultan  and  the  Czar  in 
the  position  of  contracting  parties  with  regard  to  the 
Thacuinuot       cntirc  body  of  rights  and  privileges  enjoyed 
^™**"  by  the  Sultan's  subjects  of  the  Greek  con- 

fession, and  would  so  have  made  the  violation  of  these 
rights  in  the  case  of  any  individual  Christian  a  matter 
entitling  Bussia  to  interfere,  or  to  claim  satisfaction  as 
for  the  breach  of  a  Treaty  engagement.  By  the  Treaty 
of  Kalnardjle  (1774)  the  Sultan  had  indeed  hound  him- 
self  "  to  protect  the  Christian  religion  and  its  Churches ; " 
but  this  phrase  was  too  indistinct  to  create  specific  matter 
of  Treaty-obligation ;  and  if  it  tad  given  to  Russia  any 
general  right  of  interference  on  behalf  of  members  of 
the  Greek  Church,  it  would  have  given  it  the  same 
right  in  behalf  of  all  the  Roman  Catholics  and  all  the 
Protestants  in  the  Sultan's  dominions,  a  right  which 
the  Czars  had  never  professed  to  enjoy.  .  Moreover  the 
Treaty  of  Kainardjie  itself  forbade  by  implication  any 
such  construction,  for  it  mentioned  by  name  one  eccle- 
siastical   building   for    whose    priests   the   Porte  did 

•  EMtem  Pupers,  t^2,1A,         ,^  , 


18K  MENSOniKOFF  AT  CONSTANTINOPLE.  189 

concede  to  Russia  the  right  of  addressing  representations 
to  the  Saltan.  Over  the  Danubian  Principalities  Russia 
possessed  by  the  Treaty  of  Adrianople  undoubted  pro- 
tectoral  rights ;  but  these  Provinces  stood  on  a  footing 
quite  different  from  that  of  the  remainder  of  the 
Empire.  That  the  Qreek  Church  possessed  by  custom 
and  by  enactment  privileges  which  it  was  the  duty  of 
the  Saltan  to  respect,  no  one  contested :  the  novelty  of 
Menschikoffe  claim  was  that  the  observation  of  these 
rights  should  be  made  matter  of  Treaty  with  Russia. 
The  importance  of  the  demand  was  proved  by  the  fact 
that  Menschikoff  strictly  forbade  the  Turkish  Ministers 
to  reveal  it  to  the  other  Powers,  and  that  Nicholas 
caused  the  English  Government  to  be  informed  that 
the  mission  of  his  envoy  had  no  other  object  than  the 
final  adjustment  of  the  difficulties  respecting  the  Holy 
Places.* 

When  Menschikoff  reached  Constantinople  the 
British  Embassy  was  in  the  hands  of  a  subordinate 
officer.  The  Ambassador,  Sir  Stratford  Canning,  had 
recently  returned  to  England.  Stratford  Cunning,  a 
cousin  of  the  Premier,  had  been  employed  in  the  East 
at  intervals  since  1810.  There  had  been  a  period  in 
his  career  when  he  had  desired  to  see  the  L«datr«tfcnd 
Turk  expelled  from  Europe  as  an  incurable  '>«R«i'-i'ff«. 
barbarian;  but  the  reforms  of  SulUm  Mahmud  had  at 
a  later  time  excited  his  warm  interest  and  sympathy, 
unJ  as  Ambassador  at  Constantinople  from  1S42  to 
1852  he  had  laboured  strenuously  for  the  regeneration 
■  Eutcm  F»pen,  i.  102.    Admitted  la  Biplomatio  Stadj,  i.  103. 

.oogic 


IM  MODERN  BVBOPR.  im 

of  the  Turkish  Empire,  and  for  the  improvement  of  the 
condition  of  the  Christian  races  onder  the  Sultan's 
rule.  His  dauntless,  sustained  energy,  his  noble  pre- 
sence, the  sincerity  of  his  friendship  towards  the  Porte, 
gave  him  an  influence  at  Constantinople  seldom,  if 
ever,  exercised  by  a  foreign  statesman.  There  were 
moments -when  he  seemed  to  be  achieving  results  of 
some  value ;  but  the  task  which  be  had  attempted  was 
one  that  surpassed  human  power ;  and  after  ten  years 
so  spent  as  to  win  for  him  the  fame  of  the  greatest 
ambassador  by  whom  England  has  been  represented  in 
modern  times,  he  declared  that  the  prospects  of  Turkish 
reform  were  hopeless,  and  left  Constantinople,  not  in- 
tending to  return.*  Before  his  successor  had  been 
appointed,  the  mission  of  Prince  Menschikoff,  the 
violence  of  his  behaviour  at  Constantinople,  and  a 
rumour  that  he  sought  far  more  than  his  ostensible 
object,  alarmed  the  British  Government.  Canning  was 
asked  to  resume  his  post.  Returning  to  Constantinople 
as  Lord  Stratford  de  Eedcliffe,  he  communicated  on  his 
joomey  with  the  Courts  of  Paris  and  Vienna,  and 
carried  with   him  authority  to  order  the  Admiral  of 

*  He  writea  thns,  April  S,  1851 : — "  The  grent  game  of  improTement 

ifl  Altogutlior  up  for  the  present  It  is  imposKible  fur  me  to  conceal  that 
ilie  nuun  object  of  m;  ntsj  here  is  almoet  hopulcaa."  Kven  P&lmerBtoa, 
in  the  rare  moineiita  when  he  allowed  bis  jnd^^ment  to  nuut^r  hia  prepoa- 
aessionB  on  this  eiibjoct,  eipressed  the  same  view.  Uu  wrote  on  Norem- 
bor  24,  1850,  wtirniiig  Reschid  Fash^  "the  Turkish  Kii>pire  is  doomed  to 
fall  by  the  timiditf  and  irreaolutioa  of  its  Sovereign  And  of  its  Ministors  ; 
and  it  ia  oviduut  we  shall  ere  loitg  hare  to  cuiuidor  wliat  other 
ammgements  maj  be  aet  op  in  its  place."  StTatfonl  left  Constant  in  aple 
on  leave  in  June,  18.'i'2,  but  resigned  hie  Embassj  altogether  iu  January, 
-ir.?..    (Lane  Poole.  Stratfonl  de  ReddiSe,  ii.  212,  215.) 


USt  ST&ATFORD  rS  SSDOLIPFS  l9l 

the  fleet  at  Malta  to  hold  hia  ships  ia  readiness  to  sail 
for  the  East.  He  arrived  at  the  Boaphorus  on 
April  5tb,  learnt  at  once  the  real  situation  of  affairs, 
and  entered  into  negotiation  with  MenschikofE.  The 
liussian,  a  mere  child  in  diplomacy  in  comparison  with 
his  rival,  suffered  himself  to  be  persuaded  to  separate 
the  question  of  the  Holy  Places  from  that  of  the  gua- 
rantee of  the  riglits  of  the  Greek  Church.  In  the  first 
matter  Russia  bad  a  good  cause  ;  in  the  second  it  was 
advancing  a  new  claim.  The  two  being  dissociated, 
Stratford  had  no  difficulty  in  negotiating  a  com- 
promise on  the  Holy  Places  satisfactory  to  the 
Czar's  representative ;  and  the  demand  for  the  Pro- 
tectorate over  the  Greek  Christiana  now  stood  out  un- 
ob-scured  by  those  grievances  of  detail  with  which  it 
had  been  at  first  interwoven.  Stratford  encouraged  the 
Turkish  Government  to  reject  the  Russian  proposal. 
Knowing,  nevertheless,  that  Menschikoff  would  in  the 
la-st  resort  endeavour  to  intimidate  the  Sultan  personally, 
he  withheld  from  the  Ministers,  in  view  of  this  last 
peril,  the  strongest  of  all  his  arguments ;  and  seeking 
a  private  audience  with  the  Sultan  on  the  9th  of 
May,  he  made  known  to  him  with  great  solemnity 
the  authority  which  he  had  received  to  order  the  fleet 
at  Malta  to  be  in  rea^linesa  to  sail.  The  Sultan 
placed  the  natural  interpretation  on  this 
statement,  and  ordered  the  final  rejection  of  t^-'^^  (■".■.u.n- 
MenschikolTs  demand,  thoiii,'b  the  Russian 
had  consented  to  a  modification  of  its  form,  and 
would  now  have  accepted  a  note    declaratory  of  the- 


1»  MODBSN  BtmOPS.  IM 

intentions  of  the  Sultan  towBids  the  Glreek  Church 
instead  of  a  regular  Treaty.  On  the  21st  of  May 
Menschikoff  quitted  Constaatinople ;  and  the  Czar, 
declaring  that  some  goaraatee  must  be  held  by  Bussia 
for  the  mainteDauce  of  the  rights  of  the  Greek  Chris- 
tians, announced  tliat  he  should  order  his  army  to 
occupy  the  Danubian  Provinces.  After  an 
■itarUwFHut-  internal  of  some  weeks  the  Bussian  troops 
crossed  the  Pruth,  and  spread  themselves 
over  Moldavia  and  AVallachia.     (June  22nd.)  * 

Iq  the  ordinary  course  of  affairs  the  invasion  of 
the  territory  of  one  Empire  by  the  troops  of  another 
is,  and  can  be  nothing  else  than,  an  act  of  war,  necessi- 
tating hostilities  as  a  measure  of  defence  on  the  part 
of  the  Power  invaded.  Bat  the  Czar  protested  that 
in  taking  the  Danubian  Principalities  in  pledge  he  had 
no  intention  of  violating  the  peace ;  and  as  yet  the  com- 
mon sense  of  the  Turks,  as  well  as  the  counsels  that  they 
received  from  without,  hade  them  hesitate  before  issuing 
a  declaration  of  war.  Since  December,  1852,  Lord 
Aberdeen  had  been  Prime  Minister  of  Bug- 
land,  at  the  head  of  a  Cabinet  formed  by  a 
coalition  between  followers  of  Sir  Robert  Peel  and 
the  Whig  leaders  Palmerston  and  BusselLf  There  was 
no  man  in  Kngland  more  pacific  in  disposition,  or  more 
anxious  to  remain  on  terms  of  honourable  fiiendship 
with   Bussia,   than   Lord  Aberdeen.      The  Czar  had 

•  Eastern  Fspara,  I  253,  339.    Lane  Poole,  Stnttord,  iL  248. 

t  Palmeraton  bad  accepted  the  office  of  Home  SeoreUzr,  bnt  natoraUy 
exerdsed  fp-eat  inSnenoe  in  fwugn  affairs.  Tlie  7oreigB  Qeentairf  wM 
Lord  Olarendon. 


MR.  BTRATFOSJ>  DB  BEDOLIFFB.  19S 

jostly  reckoned  on  the  Premier's  owq  forbearance ;  but 
he  had  ^ed  to  recognise  the  strength  of  those  forces 
which,  both  within  and  without  'the  Cabinet,  set  in 
the  direction  of  armed  resistance  to  Eussia.  Palmer- 
ston  was  keen  for  action.  Lord  Stratford  appears 
to  have  taken  it  for  granted  &om  the  first  that,  if  a 
war  should  arise  between  the  Sultan  and  the  Czar 
in  consequence  of  the  rejection  of  MenschikofTs 
demand,  Great  Britain  would  fight  in  defence  of  the 
Ottoman  Empire.  ■  He  had  not  stated  this  in  express 
terms,  but  the  communication  which  he  made  to  the 
Sultan  regarding  his  own  instructions  could  only  hare 
been  intended  to  convey  this  impression.  If  the  fleet 
was  not  to  defend  the  Sultan,  it  was  a  mere  piece  of 
deceit  to  inform  him  that  the  Ambassador  had  powers 
to  place  it  in  readiness  to  sail ;  and  such  deceit  was  as 
alien  to  the  character  of  Lord  Stratford  as  the  assump- 
tion of  a  virtual  engagement  towards  the  Sultan  was  in 
keeping  with  his  imperious  will  and  his  passionate 
conviction  of  the  duty  of  England.  From  the  date  of 
Lord  Stratford's  visit  to  the  Palace,  althongh  no  Treaty 
or  agreement  was  in  existence,  England  stood  bound  in 
honour,  so  long  as  the  Turks  should  pursue  the  policy 
laid  down  by  her  envoy,  to  fulfil  the  expectations  which 
this  envoy  had  held  out. 

Had  Lord  Stratford  been  at  the  head  of  the 
Government,  the  policy  and  intentions  of  Great  Britain 
wonld  no  doubt  have  been  announced  with  such 
distinctness  that  i^e  Czar  could  have  fostered  no 
misapprehension  as  to  the  results  of  his  own  acts. 


m  UODBBlf  SUSOPE.  un 

Palmerston,  as  Premier,  would  probably  bave  adopted 
the  same  clear  course,  and  war  would  either  have  been 
avoided  by  this  nation  or  have  been  made  with  a  dis- 
tinct purpose  and  on  a  deBnite  issue.  But  the  Cabinet  of 
Lord  Aberdeen  was  at  Tarianco  with  itself.  Aberdeen 
was  ready  to  go  to  all  lengths  in  negotiation,  bat  he 
was  not  sufficiently  master  of  bis  colle^ues  and  of  the 
representatives  of  England  abroad  to  prevent  acts  and 
declarations  which  in  themselves  brought  war  near ; 
above  all,  he  failed  to  require  from  Turkey  that  abstention 
from  hostilities  on  which,  so  long  as  negotiations  lasted, 
England  and  the  other  Powers  which  proposed  to  make 
the  cause  of  the  Porte  their  own  ought  unquestion- 
ably to  bave  insisted.  On  the  announcement  by  the 
Czar  that  his  army  was  about  to  enter  the  Prin- 
cipalities,    the    British     Qovemraent     de- 

BriUah  and  '^  ' 

S2^''taB^-k»  spatched  the  fleet  to  Besika  Bay  near  the 
entrance  to  the  Dardanelles,  and  authorised 
Stratford  to  call  it  to  the  Bosphorus,  in  case  Constan- 
tinople should  he  attacked-*  The  French  fleet,  which 
had  come  into  Greek  waters  on  MenschikofTs  appear- 
ance at  Constantinople,  took  up  the  same  position. 
Meanwhile  European  diplomacy  was  busily  engaged 
in  framing  schemes  of  compromise  between  the  Porte 
and  Kussia.  The  representatives  of  the  four  Powers 
met  at  Vienna,  and  agreed  upon  a  note  which,  as  they 
considered,  would  satisfy  any  legitimate  claims  of 
Russia  on  behalf  of  the  Greek  Church,  and  at  the  same 
time  impose  upon  the  Sultan  no  further  obligations 

<■  Bastorn  Fapeni,  i.  210,  ii.  116.    AaUot'i  Falmentoi,  0,  Z3, 


MM.  TSB  raUlfA  NOTE.  IW 

towards  finssia  than  those  which  already  existed.* 
This  note,  howerer,  was  ill  diawn,  and  would  have 
opened  the  door  to  new  claims  on  the  part  of  Bussia 
to  a  general  Protectorate  not  sanctioned  hy  its  authors. 
The  draft  was  sent  to  St.  Petersburg,  and  .^y,^^ 
was  accepted  by  the  Czar.  At  Constan-  ''"*^'"''*- 
tinople  its  ambiguities  were  at  once  recc^nised;  and 
tbongh  Lord  Stratford  in  his  official  capacity  ni^ed 
its  acceptance  under  a  European  guarantee  against 
misconstruction,  the  Divan,  now  under  the  pressure  of 
strong  patriotic  forces,  refused  to  accept  the  note  un- 
less certain  changes  were  made  in  its  expressions. 
France,  England,  and  Austria  united  in  recommend- 
ing  to  the  Court  of  St.  Petersburg  the  adoption  of 
these  amendments.  The  Czar,  however,  declined  to 
admit  them,  and  a  Bussian  document,  which  obtained  a 
publicity  for  which  it  was  not  intended,  proved  that 
the  construction  of  the  note  which  the  amendments 
were  expressly  designed  to  exclude  was  precisely  that 
which  Kussia  meant  to  place  upon  it.  The  British 
Ministry  now  refused  to  recommend  the  note  any 
longer  to  the  Porte.f  Austria,  while  it  approved  of 
the  amendments,  did  not  consider  that  their  rejection 
by  the  Czar  justified  England  in  abandoning  the  note 
as  the  common  award  of  the  European  Powers;  and 
thus  the  concert  of  Europe  was  interrupted,  England  and 
France  combining  in  a  policy  which  Austria  and  Prussia 
were  not  willing  to  follow.  In  proportion  as  the 
chances  of  joint  Europeim  action  diminished,  the  ardour 
•  Euten  Papwi,  U.  2S.         f  Eastern  F»P«n,  0. 8«,  U.  108. 

^a  ...  Coogle 


196  XODEBN  EUBOPB.  uto. 

of  the  Turks  themselves,  and  of  those  who  were  to  be 
theirallies,  rose  higher.  Tumults,  oi^nised 
by  the  heads  of  the  war-party,  broke  oat  at 
ConBtantinopIe ;  and  although  Stratford  scorned  the 
alarms  of  his  French  colleagues,  who  reported  that  a 
massacre  of  the  Europeans  in  the  capital  was  imminent, 
he  thought  it  necessary  to  call  up  two  vessels  of  war  in 
order  to  provide  for  the  security  of  the  English  residents 
and  of  the  Sultan  himself.  In  England  Palmerston 
and  the  men  of  action  in  the  Cabinet  dragged  Lord 
Aberdeen  with  them.  The  French  Government  pressed 
for  vigorous  measures,  and  in  conformity  with  its  desire 
inRtructions  were  sent  from  London  to  Lord  Stratford 
to  call  the  fleet  to  the  Bosphorus,  and  to  employ  it  in 
^^  defending    the    territory    of     the     Sultan 

5^d2        against  aggression.    On  the  22nd  of  October 
the    British  and  French  fleets  passed    the 
Dardanelles. 

The  Turk,  sure  of  the  protection  of  the  Western 
Powers,  had  for  some  weeks  resolved  upon  war ;  and  yet 
the  possibilities  of  a  diplomatic  settlement  were  not  yet 
exhausted.  Stratford  himself  had  forwarded  to  Vienna 
the  draft  of  an  independent  note  which  the  Sultan  was 
prepared  to  accept.  This  had  not  yet  been 
oi^^r  p«h.  seen  at  St.  Petersbui^.  Other  projects 
of  conciliatioD  filled  the  desks  of  aU  the 
leading  politicians  of  Europe.  Yet,  though  the  belief 
generally  existed  that  some  scheme  conid  be  framed 
by  which  the  Sultan,  without  sacrifice  of  his  dignity 
and  interest,  might  induce  the  Czar  to  evacuate  the 


Prin(»palitie8,  no  serions  attempt  was  made  to  prevent 
the  Tiaks  from  coming  into  collision  with  tlielr  enemies 
both  by  land  and  sea.  The  commander  oE  the  Bnssian 
troops  in  the  Principalities  having,  on  the  10th  of 
October,  rejected  an  ultimatam  requiring  him  to  with- 
draw within  fifteen  days,  this  answer  was  taken  as  the 
signal  for  the  commencement  of  hostilities.  The 
Czar  met  the  declaration  of  war  with  a  statement 
that  he  would  abstain  from  taking  the  offensive,  and 
would  continue  merely  to  hold  the  Principalities  as 
a  material  guarantee.  Omar  Pasha,  the  Ottoman 
commander  in  Bulgaria,  was  not  permitted  to  ohserve 
the  same  passive  attitude.  Crossing  the  Danube,  he 
attacked  and  defeated  the  Russians  at  Oltenitza.  Thus 
assailed,  the  Czar  considered  that  his  eDgagement  not  to 
act  on  the  offensive  was  at  an  end,  and  the 
Kussian  fleet,  issuing  from  Sebastopol,  ™na«tmT^»i 
attacked  and  destroyed  a  Turkish  squadron 
in  the  harbour  of  Sinope  on  the  southern  coast  of  the 
Black  Sea  (November  30).  The  action  was  a  piece  of 
gross  folly  on  the  part  of  the  Bussian  authorities  if  tliey 
still  cherished  the  hopes  of  pacification  which  the  Czar 
professed ;  but  others  also  were  at  fault.  Lord  Stratford 
and  the  British  Admiral,  it  Ihey  could  not  prevent  the 
Turkish  ships  from  remaining  in  the  Euxine,  where  they 
were  useless  against  the  superior  force  of  Bussia,  might  at 
least  in  exercise  of  the  powers  given  to  them  have  sent 
a  sufficient  escort  to  prevent  an  encounter.  But  the 
same  ill-fortune  and  incompleteness  that  had  marked 
all  the  diplomacy  of  the  previous  months  attended  the 


198  UODSBN  BUROPg.  tma. 

counsels  of  the  Admirals  at  the  Bosphoras;  and  the 
disaster  of  Sinope  rendered  war  between  the  Western 
Powers  and  Russia  almost  inevitable.* 

The  Turks  themselves  had  certainly  not  understood 
the  declaration  of  the  Emperor  Nicholas  as  assuring 
Eir«t  of  ti«  their  squadron  at  Sinope  aguinst  attack;  and 
■ction  ai  Binopa.  ^^  ^^^  ^^  ^-^^  Ottomau  Admir^  from  being 
the  victim  of  a  surprise  that  he  had  warned  his  Govern- 
ment some  days  before  of  the  probability  of  his  own 
destruction.  But  to  the  English  people,  indignant 
with  Russia  since  its  destruction  of  Hungarian  liberty 
and  its  tyrannous  demand  for  the  surrender  of  the  Hun- 
garian refugees,  all  that  now  passed  heaped  up  the  intoler- 
able sum  of  autocratic  violence  aiid  deceit.  The  cannon- 
ade which  was  continued  against  the  Turkish  crews  at 
Sinope  long  after  they  had  become  defenceless  gave  to  the 
battle  the  aspect  of  a  massacre  ;  the  supposed  promise 
of  the  Czar  to  act  only  on  the  defensive  caused  it  to  he 
denounced  as  an  act  of  flagrant  treachery ;  the  circum- 
stance that  the  Turkish  fleet  was  lying  within  one  of 
the  Sultan's  harbours,  touching  as  it  were  the  terri- 
tory which  the  navy  of  England  had  undertaken  to  pro- 
tect, imparted  to  the  attack  the  character  of  a  direct 
challenge  and  defiance  to  England.  The  cry  rose 
loud  for  war.  Napoleon,  eager  for  the  alliance  with 
England,  eager  in  conjunction  with  England  to  play 
a  great  part  before  Europe,  even  at  the  cost  of  a  war 
from  which  France  had  nothing  to  gain,  proposed  that  the 
combined  fleets  should  pass  the  Bosphoras  ^id  recjuire 

•  Eaateni  Fapera,  u.  203;  227,  299l 

•  oogk 


leu.  FBASOE  AND  BNQLAND  DXOXJLBB  WAR.  199 

everj  Bussian  vessel  sulmg  on  the  Black  Sea  to  re- 
enter port.     His  proposal  was  adopted  by 
the   British  GoTemment.     Nicholas  learnt 

port,  Dacnsber, 

that  the  Bussian  flag  was  swept  from  the 
Euxine.  It  was  in  vain  that  a  note  upon  which  the 
representatives  of  the  Powers  at  Vienna  had  once  more 
agreed  was  accepted  by  the  Porte  and  forwarded  to  St. 
Petersburg  (December  31).  The  pride  of  the  Cziu*  was 
wounded  beyond  endurance,  and  at  the  beginning  of 
February  he  recalled  bis  ambassadors  from  London  and 
Paris.  A  letter  written  to  him  by  Napoleon  III.,  de- 
manding in  the  name  of  himself  and  the  Queen  of  Eng- 
land the  evacuation  of  the  Principalities,  was  answered 
by  a  reference  to  the  campaign  of  Moscow.  Austria  now 
informed  the  Western  Powers  that  if  they  would  fix  a 
delay  for  the  evacuation  of  the  Principalities,  the  ex- 
piration of  which  should  be  the  signal  for  hostilities, 
it  would  support  the  summons ;  and  without  waiting 
to  leam  whether  Austria  would  also  unite  with  them 
in  hostilities  in  the  event  of  the  summons  being  re- 
jected, the  Bntish  and  French  Governments  despatched 
their  nitimatam  to  St.  Petersbui^.  Austria  and 
Prussia  sought,  hnt  in  vain,  to  reconcile  the  Court  of 
St.  Petersburg  to  the  only  measure  by  -^^^ 
which  peace  could  now  be  preserved.  The  S^m^S^. 
ultimatum  remained  without  an  answer, 
and  on  the  37tb  of  March  England  and  France  declared 
war. 

The  Czar  had  at  one  time  believed  that  in  his 
Eastern  sdiemes  he  was  sore,  of  the  support  of  Austria ; 


200  MODERN  EUBOFB.  MM 

and  he  had  strong  reasons  for  supposing  himself  en- 
titled to  its  aid.  But  his  mode  of  thought  was  simpler 
than  that  of  the  Court  of  Vienna.  Schwarzenbei^, 
when  it  was  remarked  that  the  intervention  of  Russia 
pjji^^  ^  in    Hungary    would    bind    the    House   of 

■*°**'  Hapshurg  too  closely  to  its  protector,  had 

made  the  memorable  answer,  "  We  will  astonish  the 
world  by  our  ingratitude."  It  is  possible  that  an 
instance  of  Austrian  gratitude  would  have  astonished 
the  world  most  of  all ;  but  Schwarzenherg's  successors 
were  not  the  men  to  sacrifice  a  sound  principle  to  romance. 
Two  courses  of  Eastern  policy  have,  under  various 
modifications,  had  their  advocates  in  rivid  schools  of 
statesmen  at  Vienna.  The  one  Is  that  of  expansion 
southward  in  concert  with  Russia ;  the  other  is  that 
of  resistance  to  the  extension  of  Russian  power,  and 
tlie  consequent  maintenance  of  the  integrity  of  the 
Ottoman  Empire.  During  Metternich's  long  rule,  in- 
spired as  this  was  by  a  faith  in  the  Treaties  and  the 
institutions  of  181 5,  and  by  the  dread  of  every  living,  dis- 
turbing force,  the  second  of  these  systems  had  been  con- 
sistently followed.  In  lS5i  the  determiniag  motive 
of  the  Court  of  Vienna  was  not  a  decided  political  con- 
viction, but  the  certainty  that  if  it  united  with  Russia 
it  would  be  brought  into  war  with  the  Western  Powers. 
Had  Russia  and  Turkey  been  likely  to  remain  alone  in 
the  arena,  an  arrangement  for  territorial  compensation 
would  possibly,  as  on  some  other  occasions,  have  won 
for  the  Czar  aii  Austrian  alliance.  Combination  against 
Turkey  was,  however,  qt  the  present  time,  too  perilous 


an  enterprise  for  tlie  Angtritin  monarchy:  and,  as 
nothing  was  to  be  gained  through  the  war,  it  remained 
for  the  Viennese  diplomatists  to  see  that  nothing  was 
lost  and  as  little  as  possible  wasted.  The  presence 
of-  Eossian  troops  in  the  Principalities,  where  they 
ooDtrolled  the  Danabe  in  its  course  between  the 
Hangarian  frontier  and  the  Black  Sea,  was,  in 
default  of  some  definite  nnderstanding,  a  danger  to 
Austria;  and  Count  Buol,  the  Minister  at  Vienna, 
had  therefore  every  reason  to  thank  the  Western 
Powers  for  insisting  on  the  evacuation  of  this  district. 
When  France  and  England  were  burning  to  take 
up  arms,  it  would  have  been  a  piece  of  superfluous 
brutality  towards  the  Czar  for  Austria  to  attach  to  its 
own  demand  for  the  evacuation  of  the  Principalities  the 
threat  of  war.  But  this  evacuation  Austria  was  de- 
termined to  enforce.  It  refused,  as  did  Prussia,  to  ^ve  to 
the  Czar  the  assurance  of  its  neutrality  ;  and,  inasmuch 
as  the  free  navigation  of  the  Danube  as  far  as  the  Black 
Sea  had  now  become  recognised  as  one  of  the  commercial 
interests  of  Germany  at  laige,  Prussia  and  the  German 
Federation  undertook  to  protect  the  territory  of  Aus- 
tria, if,  in  taking  the  measures  Decessary  to  free  the 
Principalities,  it  should  itself  be  attacked  by  Hussia.* 
The  King  of  Prussia,   clouded    as  his  mind   was 

•  Trestr  of  April  20, 185^  and  Additional  Artiale,  Easteni  Papers, 
ix.  61.  Thn  Treaty  between  Austria  and  Pnuria  was  one  of  general 
dafenarre  aUianco,  covering  also  the  ease  of  Austria  incurring  attack 
tliTonglt  aa,  advance  into  the  Friudpalitiea.  In  tiie  ereot  of  Biunia 
aaneziiig'  the  Principalities  or  ffn'ling  its  troopi  Iwjoiid  the  BoUunu  tlie 
•Qianee  was  to  be  offenoire. 


202  MODBBN  SUBOPE.  uh. 

by  political  and  religious  phantaams,  had  never- 
theless at  times  a  lai^er  range  of  view 
than  his  neighbours ;  and  his  opinion 
as  to  the  true  solution  of  Che  difficulties  between 
Nicholas  and  the  Forte,  at  the  time  of  MeDschikoffs 
mission,  deserved  more  attention  than  it  received. 
Frederick  William  proposed  tbat  the  rights  of  the 
Christiau  subjects  of  the  Sultan  should  be  placed  by 
Treaty  under  the  guarantee  of  all  the  Great  Powers. 
This  project  was  opposed  by  Lord  Stratford  and  the 
Turkish  Ministers  as  an  encroachment  on  the  Saltan's 
sovereignty,  and  its  rejection  led  the  King  to  write 
with  some  asperity  to  his  ambassador  in  London  that 
he  should  seek  the  welfare  of  Prussia  in  absolute 
neutrality.*  At  a  later  period  the  King  demanded  from 
England,  as  the  condition  of  any  assistance  from  him- 
self, a  guarantee  for  the  maintenance  of  the  frontiers  of 
Germany  and  Prussia.  He  regarded  Napoleon  III.  as 
the  representative  of  a  revolutionary  system,  and  be- 
lieved that  under  him  French  armies  would  soon  en- 
deavour to  overthrow  the  order  of  Europe  established 
in   1816.      That  England  should  enter  into  a  dose 

*  BriefwediMl  F,  Wilhelma  mit  Bnnasi,  p.  310.  Hutin's  Prince 
Consort,  iiL  39.  On  November  20,  after  tiie  Turks  hod  begun  war, 
the  Eiiig  of  FrassU  wrote  thus  to  Bnnsen  (the  italics,  capitals,  and 
excUmations  are  his  own) :  "  All  direct  help  which  England  i%  unehn*- 
UaiifollyJimigiYw  TO  ISLAM  AGAINST  OHBISTIANS!  wiU 
have  (besidea  God's  arenging'  judgment  {bear!  bear!]),  no  other  effect 
than  to  bring  what  is  now  Turkish  territory  at  a  somewhat  later  period 
under  Bnasian  dominion"  (Briefwechsel,  p.  317),  The  reader  jukj 
think  OvA  the  insamtj  to  which  Frederick  Williun  BBConnibed  wu 
aireadj  mastering  liim  i  bat  the  above  la  no  rare  apaiumeD  of  bis  qiiatolaij 
■tjla. 

L,  ,i,z<..t,CoogIc 


im.  FUEDESIOK  WTLLIAU.  17.  203 

alliance  witb  this  man  excited  tlie  King's  astontslimeQt 
and.  disgust ;  and  unless  the  Cabinet  of  London  were 
prepared  to  give  a  guarantee  against  any  future  attack 
on  Germany  by  the  French  Emperor,  who  was  believed 
to  be  ready  for  every  political  adventure,  it  was  vain  for 
England  to  seek  Prussia's  aid.  Lord  Aberdeen  coald 
give  no  snch  guarantee ;  still  less  could  he  gratify  the 
King's  strangely  passionate  demand  for  the  restoration 
of  his  authority  in  the  Swiss  canton  of  Neuch&tel, 
which  before  1848  had  belonged  in  name  to  the  Hohen- 
zollems.  Many  influences  were  brought  to  bear  upon 
the  King  from  the  side  both  of  England  and  of  Russia. 
The  English  Court  and  Ministers,  strenuously  sup- 
ported by  Bunsen,  the  Prussian  ambassador,  strove  to 
enlist  the  King  in  an  active  concert  of  Europe  against 
Russia  by  dwelling  on  the  duties  of  Prussia  as  a  Great 
Power  and  the  dangers  arising  to  it  from  isolation. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  admiration  felt  by  Frederick 
"William  for  the  Emperor  Nicholas,  and  the  old 
habitual  friendship  between  Prussia  and  Russia,  gave 
strength  to  the  Czar's  advocates  at  Berlin.  Schemes 
for  a  reconstruction  of  Europe,  which  were  devised  by 
Napoleon,  and  supposed  to  receive  some  countenance 
from  Palmerston,  reached  the  King's  ear.*  He  heard 
that  Austria  was  to  be  offered  the  Danuhian  Provinces 
npon  condition  of  giving  up  northern  Italy ;  that 
Piedmont  was  to  receive  Lombardy,  and  in  return  to 

*  Tbe  Treatj  of  alliiuoe  betwerai  Fr&nce  utd  England,  to  wliiolk 
Pmssi*  waa  asked  to  Accede,  contuiied,  howerer,  t  elsnge  pledging  tlie 
cantracting  p&rties  "  uoder  uo  eiicnmebuieo  to  teek  to  obtun  from  Um 
war  anf  adraatage  b>  theinsolTM.'' 

I  i,z<..t,CoogIc 


2M  UODERS  BUROPS.  mt. 

surrender  Savoy  to  France ;  that,  if  Austria  should 
decline  to  unite  actively  with  the  Western  Powers, 
revolutionary  movements  were  to  be  stirred  up  in  Italy 
and  in  Hungary.  Such  reports  kindled  the  King's  rage. 
"  Be  nnder  no  illusion,"  he  wrote  to  his  ambassador ; 
"tell  the  British  Ministers  in  their  private  ear  and 
on  the  housetops  that  I  will  not  sufFer  Austria  to  be 
attacked  by  the  revolution  without  drawing  the  sword 
in  its  defence.  If  England  and  Prance  let  loose  revolu- 
tion as  their  ally,  be  it  where  it  may,  I  unite  with 
Bussia  for  life  and  death."  Bunsen  advocated  the 
participation  of  Prussia  in  the  European  concert  with 
more  earnestness  than  success.  While  the  King  was 
declaiming  against  the  lawlessness  which  was  supposed  ' 
to  have  spread  from  the  Tuileries  to  Downing  Street, 
Bunsen,  on  his  own  authority,  sent  to  Berlin  a  project 
for  the  annexation  of  Bussian  territory  by  Prussia  as  a 
reward  for  its  alliance  with  the  Western  Courts.  This 
document  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  Russian  party 
at  Berlin,  and  it  roust'd  the  King's  own  indignation. 
Bitter  reproaches  were  launched  against  the  authors  of 
so  felonious  a  scheme.  Bunsen  could  no  longer  retain 
his  office.  Other  advocates  of  the  Western  alliance 
were  dismissed  from  their  places,  and  the  policy  of 
neutrality  carried  the  day  at  Berlin. 

The  situation  of  the    European    Powers  in   April, 
.  ^      1854,  was  thus  a  very  strange   one.     All 

BelaOoii  at  lfa«  Jo 

totofEiSS^     tl*®  ^our  Powers  were  agreed  in  demand- 
ing   the  evacuation   of    the    Principalities 
by  Bussia,  and  in  the  resolution  to  enforce  tim,  if 


i§u.  AUSTBU  AND  TRUBBIA.  205 

necessary,  by  arms.  Protocols  witnessiDgibis  agreement 
were  signed  on  the  9th  of  April  and  the  28rd  of 
May,*  and  it  was  moreover  declared  that  the  Foot 
Powers  recognised  the  necessity  of  maintaining  the 
independence  and  the  integrity  of  the  Ottoman  Slmpire. 
But  France  and  England,  while  they  made  the  presence 
of  the  Russians  in  the  Principalities  the  avowed  cause 
of  W2Lr,  bitd  in  reality  other  intentions  than  tiie  mere 
expulsion  of  the  intruder  and  the  restoration  of  the 
state  of  things  previously  existing.  It  was  their  desire 
so  to  cripple  Bussia  that  it  should  not  again  be  in  a 
condition  to  menace  the  Ottoman  Empire.  This  in- 
tention made  it  impossible  for  the  British  Cabinet  to 
name,  as  the  basis  of  a  European  le^^ae,  that  single 
definite  object  for  which,  and  for  which  alone,  all  the 
Powers  were  in  May,  1854,  ready  to  unite  in  arras. 
England,  the  nation  and  the  Government  alike,  chose 
rather  to  devote  itself,  in  company  with  France,  to  the 
task  of  indefinitely  weakening  Russia  than,  in  company 
with  all  Europe,  to  force  Russia  to  one  humiliating  but 
inevitable  act  of  submission.  Whether  in  the  prosecu- 
tion of  their  ulterior  objects  the  Western  Courts  might 
or  might  not  receive  some  armed  assistance  from  Austria 
and  Prussia  no  man  could  yet  predict  with  confidence. 
That  Austria  would  to  some  extent  make  common 
cause  with  the  Allies  seemed  not  unlikely ;  that  Prussia 
would  do  so  there  was  no  real  ground  to  believe ;  on 
the  contrary,  fair  warning  had  been  given  that  there 
were  contingencies  in  which  Prussia  might  ultimately 
*  Eastern  Vtftsn,  viii  1. 

I  i,z<...t,CoogIc 


9M  UOBESS  BUBOFB.  UN. 

be  foimd  on  the  side  of  the  Ozar.  Striving  to  the 
utmost  to  discover  some  principle,  some  object,  or 
even  some  formula  which  might  expand  the  purely 
defensive  basis  accepted  bj  Austria  and  Prussia  into  a 
common  policy  of  reconstructive  action,  the  Western 
Powers  could  obtain  nothing  more  definite  from  the 
Conference  at  Vienna  than  the  following  shadowy  en- 
gagement : — "  The  Four  Governments  eng^;e  to  en- 
deavour in  common  to  discover  the  guarantees  most 
likely  to  attach  the  existence  of  the  Ottoman  Empire 
to  the  general  eqailibrium  of  Europe.  They  are  ready 
to  deliberate  as  to  the  employment  of  means  calculated 
to  accomplish  the  object  of  their  agreement."  This 
readiness  to  deliberate,  so  cautiously  professed,  was  a 
quality  in  which  during  the  two  succeeding  years  the 
Courts  of  Vienna  and  Borlin  were  not  found  wanting ; 
but  the  war  in  which  England  and  France  were  now 
engaged  was  one  which  they  had  undertaken  at  their 
own  risk,  and  they  discovered  little  anxiety  on  any  side 
to  share  their  labour. 

During  the  winter  of  1853  and  the  first  weeks  of 
the  following  year  hostilities  of  an  indecisive  character 
continued  between  the  Turks  and  the  Kussians  on  the 
Danube.  At  the  outbreak  of  the  war  Nicholas  had 
a^ofHiUrtrii,  consulted  the  veteran  Paskiewitsch  as  to 
'■  the    best    road    by    which    to    march    on 

Constantinople.  Paskiewitsch,  as  a  strategist,  knew  the 
danger  to  which  a  Russian  force  crossing  the  Danube 
would  be  exposed  from  the  presence  of  Austrian  armies 
on  its  flank ;  as  commander  in  the  invasion  of  Hungary 


UN.  SISQB  OF  BILI3TBIA.  .  207 

in  1849  be  had  encountered,  as  he  believed,  ill  faith 
and  base  pealing  on  the  part  of  his  ally,  and  had  repaid 
it  with  insult  and  scorn :  he  bad  learnt  better  than  any 
other  man  the  military  and  the  moral  weakness  of  the 
Aostrian  Kmpire  in  its  eastern  part.  His  answer  to 
the  Czar's  inquiries  was,  "  The  road  to  Constantinople 
lies  through  Vienna."  But  whatever  bitterness  the 
Czar  might  have  felt  at  the  ingratittfde  of  Francis 
Joseph,  he  was  not  ready  for  a  war  with  Austria,  in 
which  he  could  hardly  have  avoided  the  assistance  of 
revolutionary  allies ;  moreover,  if  the  road  to  Constan- 
tinople lay  through  Vienna,  it  might  be  urged  that 
the  road  to  Vienna  lay  through  Berlin.  The  simpler 
plan  was  adopted  of  a  march  on  the  Balkans  by  way  of 
Shumla,  to  which  the  capture  of  Silistria  was  to  be  the 
prelude.  At  the  eod  of  March  the  Russian  vanguard 
passed  the  Danube  at  the  lowest  point  where  a  crossing 
could  be  made,  and  advanced  into  the  Dobrudscha.  In 
May  the  siege  of  Silistria  was  undertaken  by  Pa.ski'j- 
witsch  himself.  But  the  enterprise  began  too  late,  and 
the  strength  employed  both  in  the  siege  and  in  the 
field-operations  farther  east  wa.s  insufficient.  The 
Turkish  garrison,  schooled  by  a  German  engineer 
and  animated  by  two  young  English  officers,  main- 
tained a  stubborn  and  efiective  resistance.  French  and 
English  troops  liad  already  lauded  at  Gallipoli  for 
the  defence  of  Constantinople,  and  finding  no  enemy 
within  range  had  taken  ship  for  Varna  on  the  north  of 
the  Balkans.  Austria,  on  the  3rd  of  June,  delivered  its 
summons  reijuiring  the  evacuation  of  the  FrincipaUtiea. 


2M  MODSRSr  SUBOPB.  im. 

Almost  at  the  same  time  Paskiewitsch  received  a  wound 
that  disabled  him,  and  was  forced  to  sur- 
^mnJ^  render  bis  command  into  other  hands. 
During  the  succeeding  fortnight  the  be- 
siegers of  Silistria  were  repeatedly  beaten  back,  and  on 
the  22nd  they  were  compelled  to  raise  the  siege.  The 
Bussians,  now  hard  pressed  by  an  enemy  whom  they  bad 
despised,  withA-ew  to  the  north  of  the  Danube.  The 
retreating  movement  was  continued  during  the  succeed- 
ing weeks,  until  the  evacuation  of  the  Principalities 
was  complete,  and  the  last  Kussian  soldier  had  re- 
crossed  the  Pruth.  As  the  invader  retired,  Austria 
sent  its  troops  into  these  border-provinces,  pledging 
itself  by  a  convention  with  the  Porte  to  protect  them 
until  peace  should  be  concluded,  and  then  to  restore 
them  to  the  Sultan. 

With  the  liberation  of  the  Principalities  the  avowed 
grouud  of  war  passed  away ;  but  the  Western  Powers 
had  no  intention  of  making  peace  without  further  con- 
cessions on  the  part  of  Russia.  As  soon  as 
ntowwerteoi  thc  sicge  ot  Silistria  was  raised  instnic- 
tions  were  sent  to  the  commanders  of  the 
allied  armies  at  Varna,  prossiug,  if  not  absolutely 
commanding,  them  to  attack  Sebasto]>ol,  the  head- 
quarters of  Russian  maritime  power  in  the  Euxine. 
The  capture  of  Sebastopol  had  been  indicated  some 
months  before  by  Napoleon  III.  as  the  most  effective 
blow  that  could  be  dealt  to  Russia,  It  was  from  Sebas- 
topol that  the  fleet  had  issued  which  destroyed  the  Turks 
at  Sinope :   until  this  arsenal  had  fallen,  the  growing 


4U.  THE  roUB  FOnfN.  909 

QaTal  might  which  pressed  even  more  directly  upon 
Constantinople  than  the  neighhonihood  of  the  Czar'e 
armies  by  land  could  not  be  permanently  laid  low. 
The  objects  sought  by  England  and  France  were  now 
giadnatly  brought  into  sufficient  clearaess  to  be  com- 
municated to  the  other  Powers,  though  the  more  precise 
interpretation  of  the  conditions  laid  down  rem^ed 
open  for  future  discussion.  It  was  announced  that  the 
Protectorate  of  Russia  over  the  Danubian  Principalities 
and  Serria  must  be  abolished;  that  the  navigation  of 
the  Danube  at  its  mouths  must  be  freed  from  all 
obstacles;  that  the  Treaty  of  July,  1841,  relating  to 
the  Black  Sea  and  the  Dardanelles,  must  be  revised  in 
the  interest  of  the  balance  of  power  in  Europe;  and 
that  the  claim  to  any  official  Protectorate  over  Chris- 
tian subjects  of  the  Porte,  of  whatever  rite,  must  be 
abandoned  by  the  Czar.  Though  these  conditions, 
known  as  the  Four  Points,  were  not  approved  by 
Prussia,  they  were  accepted  by  Austria  in  August, 
1S54,  and  were  laid  before  Russia  as  the  basis  of 
any  negotiation  for  peace.  The  Czar  declared  in  answer 
that  Russia  would  only  negotiate  on  such  a  basis 
when  at  the  last  extremity.  The  Allied  Governments, 
measuring  their  enemy's  weakness  by  his  failure  before 
Silistria,  were  determined  to  accept  nothing  less ;  and  the 
attack  upon  Sebastopot,  ordered  before  the  evacuation 
of  the  Principalities,  was  consequently  allowed  to  take 
its  course.* 

*  Eastern  F^eis,  xL  8.    Aahlej'B  Fslmeratoii,  ii.  60.    For  the  nftvi- 
gktioii  o£  the  monthi  id  Qt6  Danobe,  see  Diplomatae  Studr,  ii.  39.   Rnssin, 


310  MODBSN  SVROPS.  UM. 

The  Koadstead,  or  Great  Harbour,  of  Sebastopol 
nms  due  eastwards  inland  from  a  point  not  far  from 
the  south-western  extremity  of  the  Crimea.  One  mile 
from  the  open  sea  its  waters  divide,  the 
lai^er  arm  still  running  eastwards  till  it 
meets  the  River  Tchernaja,  the  smaller  arm,  known 
as  the  Man- of -War  Harbour,  bending  sharply  to  the 
south.  On  both  sides  of  this  smaller  harbour  Sebastopol 
is  built.  To  the  seaward,  that  is  from  the  smaller  har- 
bour westwards,  Sebastopol  and  its  approaches  were 
thoroughly  fortified.  On  its  landward,  southern,  side  the 
town  had  been  open  till  1853,  and  it  was  still  but 
imperfectly  protected,  most  weakly  on  the  south-eastern 
side.  On  the  north  of  the  Great  Harbour  Fort  Constan- 
tine  at  the  head  of  a  line  of  strong  defences  guarded  the 
entrance  from  the  sea ;  while  on  the  high  ground  imme- 
diately opposite  Scbiistopol  and  commanding  the  town 
there  stood  the  Star  Fort  with  other  military  constmc- 
tiuns.  The  general  features  of  Sebastopol  were  known 
to  the  Allied  commanders ;  they  had,  however,  no 
precise  information  as  to  the  force  by  which  it  was 
held,  nor  as  to  the  armament  of  its  fortifications.  It 
was  determined  that  the  landing  should  be  made  in 
the  Bay  of  Eupatoria,  thirty  miles  north  of  the  fortress. 
Here,  on  the  14th  of  September,  the  Allied  forces, 
numbering  about  thirty  thousand  French,  twenty-seven 
thousand  English,  and  seven  thousand  Turks,  effected 

whloh  had  been  in  posecssion  of  the  monthe  of  the  Danabe  einee  the 
Treaty  of  Adrinuople,  and  had  nndertakeu  to  keep  the  months  dear,  had 
allowed  the  passage  to  become  blocked  and  had  otherwiee  preyented 
traffic  dosoomliiig,  in  otder  to  keep  the  Black  Sea  trade  in  its  own  handa. 


int.  tFVA'ilOS  OF  TSE   CBIATEA.  211 

their  disembarkation  without  meeting  anj  resistance. 
The  Russians,  commanded  by  Prince  Menschikoff 
lately  envoy  at  Constantinople,  bad  taken  post  ten  miles 
farther  south  on  high  ground  behind  the 
Biver  Alma.  On  the  20th  of  September  tao.  crimi^ 
they  were  attacked  in  front  by  the  £iDglisb, 
while  the  French  attempted  a  turning  movement  from 
the  sea.  The  battle  was  a  scene  of  confusion,  and  for  a 
moment  the  assault  of  the  English  seemed  to  be  rolled 
back.  But  it  was  renewed  with  ever  in-  ^^^^^  ^  ^ 
creasing  vigour,  and  before  the  French  had  ■"™*'  "^  "" 
made  any  impression  on  the  Bussian  left  Lord  Bag- 
lan's  troops  had  driven  the  enemy  from  their  positions. 
Struck  on  the  flank  when  their  front  was  already 
broken,  outnumbered  and  badly  led,  the  Bussians  gave 
up  all  for  lost.  The  form  of  an  orderly  retreat  was 
maintained  only  long  enough  to  disguise  from  the 
conquerors  the  completeness  of  their  victory.  When 
night  fell  the  Russian  army  abandoned  itself  to  total 
disorder,  and  had  the  pursuit  been  made  at  once  it 
could  scarcely  have  escaped  destruction.  But  St. 
Amaud,  who  was  in  the  last  st^e  of  mortal  illness, 
refused,  in  spite  of  the  appeal  of  Lord  Ei^lan,  to 
press  on  his  wearied  troops.  Menschikoff,  abandon- 
ing the  hope  of  checking  the  advance  of  the 
Allies  in  a  second  battle,  and  anxious  only  to  prevent 
the  capture  of  Sebastopol  by  an  enemy  supposed  to 
be  following  at  his  heels,  retired  into  the  fortress,  and 
there  sank  seven  of  his  war-ships  as  a  barrier  across 
the  moath  of  the  Great  Harbour,  mooring  the  rest 
o  2 


S12  MODEBlf  EXmOPM.  lasi. 

within.  The  crews  were  brought  od  shore  to  serve  in 
the  defence  by  land ;  the  guns  were  dragged  from  the 
ships  to  the  bastions  and  redoubts.  Then,  when  it 
appeared  that  the  Allies  lingered,  the  iRussian  com- 
mander altered  his  plan.  Leaving  KomiloS,  the  Yice- 
Admiral,  and  Todleben,  an  officer  of  engineers,  to  man 
the  existing  works  and  to  throw  up  new  ones  where 
the  town  was  undefended,  MenschikoS  determined  to 
lead  off  the  bulk  of  his  army  into  the  interior  of  the 
Crimea,  in  order  to  keep  open  his  communications  with 
Russia,  to  await  in  freedom  the  arrival  of  reinforce- 
ments, and,  if  Sebastopol  should  not  at  once  fall,  to 
attack  the  Allies  at  bis  own  time  and  opportunity. 
(September  24th.) 

The  English  had  lost  in  the  battle  of  the  Alma 
about  two  thousand  men,  the  French  probably  less  tban 
half  that  number.  On  the  morning  after  the  engage- 
ment Lord  Raglan  proposed  that  the  two  armies  should 
march  straight  against  the  fortifications  lying  on  the 
north  of  the  Great  Harbour,  and  carry  these 


guns  would  command  Sebastopol  itself. 
The  French,  supported  by  Burgoyne,  the  chief  of  the 
English  engineers,  shrank  from  the  risk  of  a  front 
attack  on  .works  supposed  to  be  more  formidable 
than  they  really  were,  and  induced  Lord  Raglan  to 
consent  to  a  long  circuitous  march  which  would  bring 
the  armies  right  round  Sebastopol  to  its  more  open 
southern  side,  from  which,  it  was  thought,  an  assault 
might  be  successfully  made.     This  flank-outrch.  which 


UB4.  BEBABTOPOL.  213 

was  one  of  extreme  risk,  was  carried  out  safelj^, 
Menschikoff  himself  having  left  Sebastopol,  and  having 
passed  along  the  same  road  in  his  retreat  into  the 
interior  a  little  before  the  appearance  of  the  Allies. 
Pushing  Boathward,  the  English  reached  the  sea  at 
Balaclava,  and  took  possession  of  the  harbour  there, 
accepting  the  exposed  eastward  line  between  the  fortress 
and  the  Russians  outside;  the  French,  now  commanded 
by  Canrobert,  continued  their  march  westwards  round 
the  back  of  Sebastopol,  and  touched  the  fsa,  at  Kasatch 
Bay.  The  two  armies  were  thus  masters  of  the  broken 
plateau  which,  rising  westwards  from  the  plain  of  Bala- 
clava and  the  valley  of  the  Tcberuaya,  overlooks  Sebas- 
topol on  its  southern  side.  That  the  garrison,  which 
DOW  consisted  chiefly  of  sailors,  could  at  this  moment 
have  resisted  the  onslaught  of  the  fifty  thousand  troops 
who  had  won  the  battle  of  the  Alma,  the  Russians  them- 
selves did  not  believe;*  but  once  more  the  French  staff, 
with  Burgo^ne,  urged  caution,  and  it  was  determined 
to  wait  for  the  siege-guns,  which  were  still  at  sea. 
The  decision  was  a  fatal  one.  While  the  Allies  chose 
positions  for  their  heavy  artillery  and  slowly  landed  and 
placed  their  guns,  KornilofFand  Todleben  made  the  for- 
tifications on  the  southern  side  of  Sebiustopol  an  effective 
barrier  before  an  enemy.  The  sacrifice  of  the  Russian 
fleet  had  not  been  in  vain.  The  sailors  were  learning 
all  the  duties  of  a  garrison  :  the  cannon  from  the  ships 
proved  far  more   valuable  on  land.     Three   weeks    of 

•  See,  howerer,  Bni^Dyne'a  Letter  to  the  Timet.  Angnst  4, 1868,.  ia 
Kiuf  lake,  ir.  465.    Bonaaet,  Onerre  de  Crini^e,  1280.  H  M  >]  C 


214  MODERN  StmOPS.  UH. 

priceless  time  were  given  to  leaders  who  knew  how  to 
turn  every  moment  to  account.  When,. on  the  17th  of 
October,  the  bombardment  which  was  to  precede  the 
assault  on  Sebastopol  began,  the  French  artillery, 
operating  on  the  south-west,  was  overpowered  by  that 

of  the  defenders.  The  fleets  in  vain  thun- 
Bombudmeat,       dered    agaiust   the  solid    sea-front   of    the 

fortress.  At  the  end  of  eight  days'  can- 
nonade, during  which  the  besiegers*  batteries  poared 
such  a  storm  of  shot  and  shell  upon  Sebastopol  as  no 
fortress  bad  yet  withstood,  the  defences  were  stUl  un- 
broken. 

MenscbikofF  in  the  meantime  bad  received  the 
reinforcements  which  he  expected,  and  was  now  ready 
to  fall  upon  the  besiegers  from  the  east.  His  point 
of  attack  was  the  English  port  of  Balaclava  and 
B«toeofBata-  *^^  fortified  road  lying  somewhat  east  of 
Bu™.oot.M.  ^j^j^  which  formed  the  outer  line  held  by 
the  English  and  their  Turkish  supports.  The  plain  of 
Balaclava  is  divided  by  a  low  ridge  into  a  northern  and 
a  southern  valley.  Along  this  ridge  runs  the  cause- 
way, which  had  been  protected  by  redoubts  committed 
to  a  weak  Turkish  guard.  On  the  morning  of  the 
25th  the  Russiaus  appeared  in  the  northern  valley. 
They  occupied  the  heights  rising  from  it  on  the  north 
and  east,  attacked  the  causeway,  captured  three  of  the 
redoubts,  and  drove  ofE  the  Turks,  left  to  meet  their 
onset  alone.  Lord  Kaglan,  who  watohcd  these  opera- 
tions from  the  edge  of  the  western  plateau,  ordered  up 
infantry  from  a  distance,  hut  the  only  English  troops 


UN.  SAtACtAVA.  2U 

on  the  spot  were  a  light  and  a  heavy  brigade  of  cavalry, 
each  numbering  about  six  hundred  men.  The  Heavy 
Brigade,  under  General  Scarlett,  was  directed  to  move  to- 
wards Balaclava  itself,  which  was  now  threatened.  While 
they  were  on  the  march,  a  dense  column  of  Bussian 
cavalry,  about  three  thousand  strong,  appeared  above  the 
crest  of  the  low  ridge,  ready,  as  it  seemed,  to  overwhelm 
the  weak  troops  before  them.  But  in  their  descent  from 
the  ridge  the  Bussians  halted,  and  Scarlett  with  admirable 
courage  and  judgment  formed  bis  men  for  attack,  and 
charged  full  into  the  enemy  with  the  handful  who  were 
nearest  to  him.  They  cut  their  way  into  the  very  heart 
of  the  column;  and  before  the  Bussians  could  crush 
them  with  mere  weight  the  other  regiments  of  the  same 
brigade  hurled  themselves  on  the  right  and  on  the  left 
against  the  huge  inert  mass.  The  Bussians  broke  and 
retreated  in  disorder  before  a  quarter  of  their  number, 
leaving  to  Scarlett  and  his  men  the  glory  of  an  action 
which  ranks  with  the  Prussian  attack  at  Mars-la-Tour  in 
1870  as  the  most  brilliant  cavalry-operation  in  modem 
warfare.  The  squadrons  o£  the  Light  Brigade,  during 
the  peril  and  the  victory  of  their  coinrades,  stood  motion- 
less, paralysed  by  the  same  defect  of  temper  or  intelli- 
gence in  command  which  was  soon  to  devote  them 
to  a  fruitless  but  ever-memorable  act  of  self-sacrifice. 
Russian  infantry  were  carrying  off  the  cannon  from  the 
conquered  redoubts  in  the  causeway,  when  an  aide-de- 
camp from  the  general-in-chief  brought  to  the  Earl  of 
Lucan,  commander  of  the  cavalry,  an  order  to  advance 
rapidly  to  the  front,  and  save  these  guns.     Lucan,  who 


21«  MODERir  STmOTS.  mi. 

from  his  position  cottld  see  neither  the  enemy  nor  the 
guns,  believed  himself  ordered  to  attack  the  Russian 
artillery  at  the  extremity  of  the  northern  valley,  and  he 
directed  the  Light  Brigade  to  chai^  in  this  direction. 
It  was  in  vain  that  the  leader  o£  the  Light  Brigade, 
Lord  Cardigan,  warned  his  chief,  in  words  which  were 
indeed  but  too  weak,  that  there  was  a  battery  in  front,  a 
battery  on  each  flank,  and  that  the  ground  was  covered 
with  Russian  riflemen.  The  order  was  repeated  as 
that  of  the  head  of  the  army,  and  it  was  obeyed.  Thaa 
"Into  the  valley  of  Death 
Kode  the  Six  Hundred." 

How  they  died  there,  the  remnant  not  turning  till 
they  had  hewn  their  way  past  the  guns  and  routed 
tlie  enemy's  cavalry  behind  them,  the  English  people 
will  never  forget.* 

The  day  of  Balaclava  brought  to  each  side  some- 
thing of  victory  and  something  of  failure.  The 
Russians  remained  masters  of  the  road  that  they  had 
captured,  and  carried  off  seven  English  guns ;  the 
English,  where  they  had  met  the  enemy,  proved 
that  they  could  defeat  overwhelming  numbers.  Not 
many  days  passed  before  our  infantry  were  put  to  the 
Bauia  of  fiiktr-  ^^^  which  the  cavalry  had  so  victoriously 
■uuo.  Not.  &  undergone.  The  siege-approaches  of  the 
French  had  been  rapidly  advanced,  and  it  was  deter- 
mined that  on  the  6th  of  November  the  long-deferred 
assault  on  Sebastopol  should  be  made.  On  that  very 
morning,  under  cover  of  a  thick  mist,  the  English 
*  Statementa  cJ  Banian,  Lnean,  Cardigan;  EiugUke^  r.  108,  402. 


1st,  mKERMAjm.  217 

right  was  assailed  by  massiTO  columns  of  the  enemy. 
Menschikoff*8  army  had  now  risen  to  a  hundred  thou- 
sand men;  he  had  thrown  troops  into  Sebastopol,  and 
had  planned  the  capture  of  the  English  positions  by  a 
combined  attack  from  Sebastopol  itself,  and  by  troops 
advancing  from  the  lower  ralley  of  the  Tchemaja  across 
the  bridge  of  Inkermann.  The  battle  of  the  6th  of 
Koyember,  on  the  part  of  the  English,  was  a  soldier's 
battle,  without  generalship,  without  order,  without 
design.  The  men,  standing  to  their  ground  whatever 
their  own  number  and  whatever  that  of  the  foe,  fought, 
after  their  ammunition  was  exhausted,  with  bayonets, 
wiUi  the  butt  ends  of  theii^  muskets,  with  their  fists  and 
with  stones.  For  hours  the  ever-surging  Russian  mass 
rolled  in  upon  them ;  but  they  maintained  the  unequal 
struggle  until  the  arrival  of  French  regiments  saved 
them  from  their  deadly  penl  and  the  enemy  were  driven 
in  confusion  from  the  field.  The  Russian  columns, 
marching  right  up  to  the  guns,  had  been  torn  in  pieces 
by  artUlery-fire.  Their  loss  in  kiUed  and  wounded  was 
enormous,  their  defeat  one  which  no  ingenuity  could 
disguise.  Yet  the  battle  of  Inkermann  had  made  the 
capture  of  Sebastopol,  as  it  had  been  planned  by  the 
Allies,  impossible.  Their  own  loss  was  too  great,  the 
force  which  the  enemy  had  displayed  was  too  vast,  to 
leave  any  hope  that  the  fortress  could  be  mastered  by  a 
sudden  assault.  The  terrible  truth  soon  became  plain 
that  the  enterprise  on  which  the  armies  had  been  sent 
had  in  fact  failed,  and  that  another  enterprise  of  a 
quite  different  character,  a  winter  siege  in  the  presence 


218  KODBBN  BTmOFS.  im^s*. 

of  a  superior  enemy,  a  campaign  for  wliioh  no  prepuu- 
tioDS  bad  been  made,  and  for  which  all  that  was  most 
necessary  was  wanting,  formed  the  only  alternative  to 
an  evacuation  of  the  Crimea. 

On  the  14th  of  November  the  Euiine  winter  began 
with  a  etorm  which  swept  away  the  tents  on  the  ex- 
posed plateau,  and  wrecked  twenty-one  vessels  bearing 
stores  of  ammunition  and  clothing.  From  this  time 
rain  and  snow  turned  the  tract  between  the  camp  and 
sbiimof  Balaclava  into  a  morass.  The  loss  of  the 
""■  '*■  causeway  which  had  been  captured  by  the 
Russians  three  weeks  before  now  told  with  fatal  effect 
on  the  British  army.  The  •only  communication  with 
the  port  of  Balaclava  was  by  a  hillside  track,  which 
soon  became  impassable  by  carts.  It  was  necessary  to 
bring  up  supplies  on  the  backs  of  horses ;  but  the 
liorses  perished  from  famine  and  from  excessive  labour. 
The  men  were  too  few,  too  weak,  too  destitute  of  the 
wmtortoua  lielpful  ways  of  English  sailors,  to  assist  ia 
ctinM.  providing  for  themselves.  Thus  penned  up 
on  the  bleak  promontory,  cholera-stricken,  mocked  rather 
than  sustained  during  their  benumbing  toil  with  rations 
of  uncooked  meat  and  green  coffee-berries,  the  British 
soldiery  wasted  away.  Their  effective  force  sank  at 
mid-winter  to  eleven  thousand  men.  In  the  hospitals, 
which  even  at  Scutari  were  more  dpadly  to  those  who 
passed  within  them  than  the  fiercest  fire  of  the  enemy, 
nine  thousand  men  perished  before  the  end  of  February. 
The  time  indeed  came  when  the  very  Spirit  of  Mercy 
seemed  to  enter  these  abodes  of  woe,  and  in  the  presence 


i8s»h  TEB  OBHiEAH   WINTJBB.  S19 

of  Florence  Nightingale  nature  at  last  r^^ncd  its 
healing  power,  peetilence  no  longer  hung  in  the  at- 
mosphere which  the  sufferers  hreatheil,  and  death  itself 
grew  mild.  But  before  this  new  influence  had  van- 
quished  routine  the  grave  had  closed  over  whole  regi- 
ments of  men  whom  it  had  no  right  to  claim.  The 
sufferings  of  other  armies  have  been  on  a  greater  scale, 
but  seldom  has  any  body  of  troops  furnished  a  heavier 
tale  of  loss  and  death  in  proportion  to  its  numbers  than 
the  British  army  during  the  winter  of  the  Crimean 
War.  The  unsparing  exposure  in  the  Press  of  the  mis- 
management under  wliich  our  soldiers  were  periBhing 
excited  an  outburst  of  indignation  which  overthrew 
Lord  Aberdeen's  Ministry  and  placed  Palmerston  in 
power.  It  also  gave  to  Europe  at  large  an  impres- 
sion that  Great  Britain  no  longer  knew  how  to  conduct 
a  war,  and  unduly  raised  the  reputation  of  the  French 
military  administration,  whose  shortcomings,  great  as 
they  were,  no  French  journalist  dared  to  describe.  In 
spite  of  Alma  and  Inkermann,  the  military  prestige 
of  England  was  injured,  not  raised,  by  the  Crimean 
campaign ;  nor  was  it  until  the  suppression  of  the 
Indian  Mutiny  that  the  true  capacity  of  the  nation  in 
war  was  again  vindicated  before  the  world. 

"I  have  two  generals  who  will  not  fail  me,"  the 
Czar  is  reported  to  have  said  when  be  beard  of  Meoschi- 
kofE's  last  defeat,  "  Generals  January  and 
February."     General  February  fulfilled  his     i".  ««*  i. 
task,  but  he  smote  the  Czar  too.     In  the 
fint  day»  of  March  a  new  monarch  inherited  the  Bussian 


2a0  UODEBIT  BU&OPB.  mm. 

crowB.*  Alexander  II.  ascended  the  throne,  announcing 
that  he  would  adhere  to  the  policy  of  Peter  the  Great, 
of  Catherine,  and  of  Nicholas.  But  the  prond  tone 
was  meant  rather  for  the  ear  of  Russia  than  of  Europe, 
since  Nicholas  had  already  expressed  his  willinguess  to 
treat  for  peace  on  the  hasis  laid  down  by  the  Western 
Powers  in  August,  1854.  This  change  was  not  pro- 
duced wholly  by  the  battles  of  Alma  and  Inkermann. 
Prussia,  finding  itself  isolated  in  Germany,  had  after 
some  months  of  hesitation  given  a  diplomatic  sanction 
to  the  Four  Points  approved  by  Austria  as  indispens- 
able conditions  of  peace.  Eussia  thus  stood  forsaken, 
as  it  seemed,  by  its  only  friend,  and  Nicholas  could  no 
longer  hope  to  escape  with  the  mere  abandonment  of 
those  claims  which  had  been  the  occasion  of  the  war. 
He  consented  to  treat  with  his  enemies  on  their  own 
terms.  Austria  now  approached  still  more  closely  to 
the  Western  Powers,  and  bound  itself  by  treaty,  in  the 

*  On  thn  dpatli  of  Nicholas,  the  King  of  Pnissi&  addressed  tha  follow- 
ing lecture  to  the  nnfortuiMte  Bnnsen ; — "  Yon  little  ttionght  that,  at  the 
Tery  moment  when  yon  were  writing  to  me,  one  of  the  noblest  of  men,  one  of 
tlie  f^mndest  forms  in  histoiy,  oue  of  the  truest  hearta,  and  at  the  same 
time  one  of  the  greatest  rulera  of  this  narrow  world,  was  called  from 
faith  to  flight.  1  tLaiik  God  on  mj  knees  that  He  deemed  me  worthy  tn 
be,  in  the  beat  Bonse  of  the  word,  his  [Nirholaa'j  friend,  and  to  remain 
true  to  him.  You,  dear  Bnnsen,  thoaght  differently  of  him,  and  yon  will 
now  painfuUy  confess  this  before  your  conscience,  most  painfully  of  all 
the  truth  {which  all  your  letters  in  these  late  bad  times  have  unfortnnately 
shown  me  bat  too  plainly),  that  you  kaied  him.  You  listed  him,  not  as  a 
man,  bat  as  the  representative  of  a  principle,  that  of  violence.  If  ever. 
redeemed  like  him  through  simple  faith  in  Christ's  blood,  you  see  him  in 
eternal  peace,  then  remember  wliat  I  now  write  to  you :  '  Yov  will  beg  hit 
pardon.'  Even  here,  loy  dear  friimd.  may  the  blessing  of  repentance  be 
granted  to  you," — Briefweehsel,  p.  325.  Frederick  William  seema  to  have 
forgotteu  to  send  the  same  pious  wishee  to  the  Poles  in  Siberia. 

■L.  I  Cooglf 


«.  CONS^BENCS  OF  TISSSA.  821 

event  of  peace  not  being  concluded  by  the  end  of  the 
year  on  the  stated  basis,  to  deliberate  with  Prance  and 
England  upon  effectoal  means  for  obtuning  the  object 
of  the  Alliance.*  Preparations  were  made  for  a  Con- 
ference at  Vienna,  from  which  Prussia,  still 
declining  to  pledge  itself  to  warlike  action  v'™<»- 1^*"* 
in  case  of  the  failure  of  the  negotiations, 
was  excluded.  The  sittings  of  the  Conference  began  a 
few  days  after  the  accession  of  Alexander  II.  Bussia 
was  represented  by  its  ambassador.  Prince  Alexander 
Gortschakoff,  who,  as  Minister  of  later  years,  was  to 
play  so  conspicuous  a  part  in  undoing  the  work  of  the 
Crimean  epoch.  ■  On  the  first  two  Articles  forming  the 
subject  of  negotiation,  namely  the  abolition  of  the 
Sussian  Protectorate  over  Servia  and  the  Principalities, 
and  the  removal  of  all  impediments  to  the  free  navi- 
gation of  the  Danube,  agreement  was  reached.  On 
the  third  Article,  the  revision  of  the  Treaty  of  July, 
1841,  relating  to  the  Black  Sea  and  the  Dardanelles, 
the  BoBsian  envoy  and  the  representatives  of  the 
"Western  Powers  found  themselves  completely  at 
variance.  Qortschakoff  had  admitted  that  the  Treaty 
of  1841  must  be  so  revised  as  to  put  an  end  to  the 
preponderance  of  Bussia  in  the  Black  Sea ;  f  but  while 
tbe  Western  Governments  iudsted  upon  the  exclusion 
of  Bnssian  war-vessels  from  these  waters,  Qortscha- 
koff  would  consent  only  to  the  abolition  of  Bussia's 

•  PariuuneiituT  Fapen,  18(M>,  toL  fiS,  p.  I,  Dee.  2, 1864.    Ashlej'a 
PahDOMbn,  ii.  84. 

t  Eartern  F»pers,  Pari  13,  L 

D,a,l,zc.bvG00gIe 


223  MODSBir  BTmOFS,  vat. 

preponderance  by  the  free  admission  of  the  war-vessels  (rf 
all  nations,  or  by  some  similar  method  of  counterpoise. 
The  negotiations  accordingly  came  to  an  end,  but  not 
before  Austria,  disputing  the  contention  of  the  Allies  that 
the  object  of  the  third  Article  could  be  attained  only 
by  the  specific  means  proposed  by  them,  had  brought 
forward  a  third  scheme  based  partly  upon 
the  limitation  of  the  Bussian  navy  in  the 
Euxine,  partly  upon  the  admission  of  war-ships  of  other 
nations.  This  scheme  was  rejected  by  the  Western 
Powers,  whereupon  Austria  declared  that  its  obligations 
under  the  Treaty  oE  December  2nd,  1854,  had  now  been 
fulfilled,  and  that  it  returned  in  consequence  to  the 
position  of  a  neutral. 

Great  indignation  was  felt  and  was  expressed  at 
London  and  Paris  at  this  so-called  act  of  desertion, 
and  at  the  subsequent  withdrawal  of  Austrian  regi- 
ments from  the  positions  which  they  had  occupied  in 
anticipation  of  war.  It  was  alleged  that  in  the  first 
two  conditions  of  peace  Austria  had  seen  its  own 
special  Interests  efiectually  secured ;  and  that  as  soon 
as  the  Court  of  St.  Petersburg  had  given  the  neces- 
sary assurances  on  these  heads  the  Cabinet  of  Vienna 
was  willing  to  sacrifice  the  other  objects  of  the 
Alliance  and  to  abandon  the  cause  of  the  Maritime 
Powers,  in  order  to  regain,  with  whatever  loss  of  honour, 
the  friendship  of  the  Czar.  Though  it  was  answered 
with  perfect  truth  that  Austria  had  never  accepted  the 
principle  of  the  exclusion  of  Russia  from  the  Black 
Sea,  and  was  still  ready  to  take  up  arms  in  defence  of 


that  system  by  wbicb  it  considered  that  Bassia's  pre- 
ponderance in  tbe  Black  Sea  might  be  most  suitably 
prevented,  this  argument  sounded  hollow  to  com- 
batants convinced  of  the  iutility  of  all  methods  for 
holding  Russia  in  check  except  their  own.  Austria 
bad  grievously  injured  its  own  position  and  credit  with 
tbe  "Western  Powers.  On  the  other  hand  it  bad 
wounded  Russia  too  deeply  to  win  from  tbe  Czar  the 
forgiveness  wbicb  it  expected.  Its  policy  of  balance, 
whether  best  described  as  too  subtle  or  as  too  impartial, 
had  miscarried.  It  had  forfeited  its  old,  without  ac- 
quiring new,  friendships.  It  remained  isolated  in  Europe, 
and  destined  to  meet  without  support  and  without  an 
ally  tbe  blows  which  were  soon  to  fall  upon  it. 

Tbe  prospects  of  the  besieging  armies  before  Sebas- 
topol  were  in  some  respects  better  towards  tbe  close  of 
January,  1855,  than  they  were  when  the 
Conference  of  Vienna  commenced  its  sit-     rtw.,  j^buj 

— M«j,  18&S. 

tings  six  weeks  later.  Sardinia,  tmder  the 
guidance  of  Cavour,  bad  joined  the  Western  Alliance, 
and  was  about  to  send  fifteen  thousand  soldiers  to  the 
Crimea.  A  new  plan  of  operations,  which  promised 
excellent  results,  had  been  adopted  at  headquarters. 
Up  to  the  end  of  1854  the  French  bad  directed  their 
main  attack  against  the  Fl^staff  bastion,  a  little  to 
the  west  of  the  head  of  tbe  Man-of-War  Harbour. 
They  were  now,  however,  convinced  by  Lord  Raglan 
that  the  true  keystone  to  the  defences  of  Sebastopol  was 
the  Malakoff,  on  the  eastern  side,  and  they  under- 
took   the    reduction   of  this  formidable  work,   while 


221  MODSBN  SUBOPX.  au. 

the  British  directed  their  eSbrts  i^inst  the  neigh- 
bouring Bedan.*  The  heaviest  fire  of  the  besiegers 
being  thus  concentrated  on  a  narrow  line,  it  seemed 
as  if  Sebastopol  must  soon  fall.  But  at  the  be- 
ginning of  February  a  sinister  change  came  over  the 
French  camp.  General  Niel  arrived  from  Paris  vested 
with  powers  which  really  placed  him  in  control  of 
the  general-in-cbief ;  and  though  Canrobert  was  but 
partially  made  acquainted  with  the  Emperor's  designs, 
he  was  forced  to  sacrifice  to  them  much  of  his  own 
honour  and  that  of  the  army.  Napoleon  bad  deter- 
mined to  come  to  the  Crimea  himself,  and  at  the  fitting 
moment  to  end  by  one  grand  stroke  the  war  which 
had  dragged  so  heavily  in  the  bands  of  others.  He 
believed  that  Sebastopol  could  only  be  taken  by  a  com- 
plete investment;  and  it  was  his  design  to  land  with 
a  fresh  army  on  the  south-eastern  coast  of  the  Crimea, 
to  march  across  the  interior  of  the  peninsula,  to  sweep 
MenschikofF's  forces  from  their  position  above  the 
Tchernaya,  and  to  complete  the  investment  of  Sebasto- 
pol from  the  north.  "With  this  scheme  of  operations  ia 
view,  all  labour  expended  in  tbe  attack  on  Sebastopol 
from  the  south  was  efibrt  thrown  away.  Canrobert, 
who  had  promised  his  most  vigorous  co-operation  to 
Lord  Raglan,  was  fettered  and  paralysed  by  the  Em- 
peror's emissary  at  headquarters.  For  three  successive 
months  the  Russians  not  only  held  their  own,  but  by 
means  of  counter-approaches  won  back  from  the  French 
some  of  the  ground  that  they  had  taken.  The  verv 
t  Kisgl^e,  vii.  21.    Bouwpt,  U.  3^  148. 

I  i,z<..t,Coo'gIf 


m.  r^LIBBIBB.  225 

existence  of  the  Alliance  was  threatened  when,  after 
Canrobert  and  Lorii  Baglan  liad  despatched  a  force  to 
seize  the  Russian  posts  on  the  Sea  of  Azof,  the  French 
portion  of  this  force  was  peremptorily  recalled  by  the 
Smperor,  in  order  that  it  might  be  employed '  in  the 
inarch  northwards  across  the  Crimea.  At  length,  un- 
able to  endure  the  miseries  of  the  position, 
Canrobert  asked  to  be  relieTcd  of  his  com- 
mand. He  was  succeeded  by  General 
Pflissier.  P^lissier,  a  resolute,  enei^tic  soldier,  one 
moreover  who  did  not  owe  his  promotion  to  complicity 
in  the  coup  d'etat,  flatly  refused  to  ob«y  the  Emperor's 
orders.  Sweeping  aside  the  flimsy  schemes  evolved  at 
the  Tuileries,  he  returned  with  all  his  heart  to  the  plan 
agreed  upon  by  the  Allied  commanders  at  the  beginning 
of  the  year ;  and  from  this  time,  though  disasters  were 
still  in  store,  they  were  not  the  result  of  faltering 
or  disloyalty  at  the  headquarters  of  the  French  army. 
The  general  assault  on  the  MalakofE  and  the  Bedan 
was  fixed  for  the  18th  of  June.  It  was  pmum,,  . 
bravely  met  by  the  Russians;  the  Allies  — '"^••™'«- 
were  driven  back  with  heavy  loss,  and  three  months 
more  were  added  to  the  duration  of  the  siege.  Lord 
Raglan  did  not  live  to  witness  the  last  stf^  of  the 
war.  Exhausted  by  his  labours,  heartsick  at  the  failure 
of  the  great  attack,  he  died  on  the  28th  of  June,  leaving 
the  oonunand  to  Otmeral  Simpson,  an  officer  far  his 
inferior.  Ab  the  lines  of  the  besiegers  approached 
nearer  and  nearer  to  the  Russian  fortifications,  the  army 
whicK  had  been  defeated  at  Inkermann  advanced  for 


226  MODEEIT  EVEOPS.  mk. 

one  last  effort     Crossing  the  Tcheroaya,  it  gave  battle 
on    the  16th   of  August.      The  French   and  the  Sar- 

diniaos,  without  assistance  from  the  British 
Tdieronja,  aruiy,  won  a  decisive  victory.     Sebastopol 

could  hope  no  longer  for  aseistauce 
from  without,  and  on  the  8th  of  September  the 
cptum  of  tiu  ^^ow  which  had  failed  in  June  was  dealt 
iu>kDif,Bept8.  ^^^  more.  The  French,  throwing  them- 
selves in  great  strength  upon  the  Malakoff,  carried  thl<i 
fortress  by  storm,  and  frustrated  every  effort  made  for 
its  recovery ;  the  British,  attacking  the  Eedan  with  a 
miserably  weak  force,  were  beaten  and  overpowered. 
But  the  fall  of  the  MalakoS  was  in  itself  equivalent  to 
the  capture  of  Sebastopol.  A  few  more  hours  passed, 
and  a  series  of  tremendous  explosions  made  known  to 
the  Allies  that  the  Eussian  commander  was  blowing  up 
his  magazines  and  withdrawing  to  the  north  of  the 
Ml  of  8eb«.  Great  Harbour.  The  prize  was  at  length 
*i>poi,aefL9.  YfQo.^  and  at  the  end  of  a  siege  of  three 
hundred  and  fifty  days  what  remained  of.  the  Czar's 
great  fortress  passed  into  the  hands  of  his  enemies. 

The  Allies  had  lost  since  their  landing  in  the 
Crimea  not  less  than  a  hundred  thoosand  men.  An 
enterprise  undertaken  in  the  belief  that  it  would  be 
accomplished  in  the  course  of  a  few  weeks,  and  wiili 

no  greater  sacrifice  of  life  than  attends  evety 

attack  upon  a  fortified  place,  had  proved 
arduous  and  terrible  almost  beyond  example.  Yet  if 
the  Crimean  campaign  was  the  result  of  eiTor  and 
blindness  on  the  part  of  the  invaders,  it  was  perhaps 


im.  FALL  Of  SBBA3T0P0L.  227 

even  more  disastrous  to  Bussia  than  any  warfare  in 
which  an  enemy  would  have  been  likely  to  engage  with 
fuller  knowledge  of  the  conditions  to  be  met.  The  vast 
distances  that  separated  Sebastopol  from  the  military 
depftts  in  the  interior  of  Russia  made  its  defence  a  drain 
of  the  most  fearful  character  on  the  levies  and  the  re- 
sources of  the  country.  What  tens  of  thousands  sank 
in  the  endless,  unsheltered  march  without  ever  nearing 
the  sea,  what  provinces  were  swept  of  their  beasts  of 
burden,  when  every  larger  shell  fired  againat  the  enemy 
had  to  be  borne  hundreds  of  miles  by  oxen,  the  records 
of  the  war  but  vaguely  make  known.  The  total  loss 
of  the  Russians  should  perhaps  be  reckoned  at  three 
times  that  of  the  Allies.  Yet  the  faU  of  Sebastopol  was 
not  immediately  followed  by  peace.  The  hesitation  of 
the  Allies  in  cutting  off  the  retreat  of  the  Russian 
army  had  enabled  its  commander  to  retain  bis  hold  upon 
the  Crimea ;  in  Asia,  the  delays  of  a  Turkish  relieving 
army  gave  to  the  Czar  one  last  gleam  of  success  in  the 
capture  of  Kars,  which,  after  a  strenuous  pujrfKi™, 
resistance,  succumbed  tp  famine  on  the  28th  ^'"'  "^ 
of  November.  But  before  Kars  had  fallen  negotiations 
for  peace  had  commenced.  Fmnce  was  weary  of  the 
war.  Napoleon,  himself  unwilling  to  continue  it  except 
at  the  price  of  French  aggrandisement  on  the  Continent, 
was  surrounded  by  a  band  of  palace  stock-jobbers  who 
had  staked  everything  on  the  rise  of  the  funds  that 
would  result  from  peace.  It  was  known  at  every  Court 
of  Europe  that  the  Allies  were  completely  at  variance 
with  one  another ;  that  while  the  English  nation,  stmig 
,  2  ,  Cmwlc 


228  MODBBN  EVROPS.  MR. 

by  the  failare  of  its  military  administration  during  the 
winter,  by  the  nullity  of  its  naval  operations  in  tbe 
Baltic,  and  by  the  final  disaster  at  the  Sedan,  was 
eager  to  prove  its  real  power  in  a  new  campaign,  the 
ruler  of  France,  satisfied  with  the  crowning  glory  of 
the  Malakofi",  was  anxious  to  conclude  peace  on  any 
tolerable  terms.  Secret  communications  from  St. 
Petersburg  were  made  at  Paris  by  Baron  Seebach, 
envoy  of  Saxony,  a  son-in-law  of  the  Bos- 
sian  Chancellor :  the  Austrian  Cabinet,  still 
bent  on  acting  the  part  of  arbiter,  but  hopeless  of  the 
results  of  a  new  Conference,  addressed  itself  to  the 
Emperor  Napoleon  singly,  and  persuaded  him  to  enter 
into  a  negotiation  which  was  concealed  for  a  while  from 
Great  Britain.  The  two  intrigues .  were  simultaneously 
pursued  by  our  ally,  but  Seebach's  proposals  were  sudi 
that  even  tbe  warmest  friends  of  Russia  at  the  Tuilcries 
could  scarcely  support  them,  and  the  Viennese  diplo- 
matists won  the  day.  It  was  agreed  that  a  note  con- 
taining Preliminaries  of  Peace  should  be  presented  by 
Austria  at  St.  Petersburg  as  its  own  ultimatum,  after 
tbe  Emperor  Napoleon  should  have  won  from  the  British 
Government  its  assent  to  these  terms  without  any 
alteration.  The  Austrian  project  embodied  indeed  the 
Four  Points  which  Britain  had  in  previous  months 
fixed  as  the  conditions  of  peace,  and  in  substance  it 
differed  little  from  what,  even  after  the  fall  of  Sebastopol, 
British  statesmen  were  still  prepared  to  accept ;  hut  it 
was  impossible  that  a  scheme  completed  without  the 
participation  of  Britain  and  laid  down  for  ita  passive 


M.  TBAOa  imOOnATIONB.  229 

acceptance  should  be  thus  ancomplamingly  adopted  by 
its  Government.  Lord  Pahnerston  required  that  the 
rour  Articles  enumerated  should  be  understood  to  cover 
points  not  immediately  apparent  on  their  surface,  and 
that  a  fifth  Article  should  be  added  reserving  to  tbe 
Powers  the  right  of  demanding  certein  further  special 
conditions,  it  being  understood  that  Great  Britain  would 
require  under  this  clause  only  that  Bussia  should  bind 
itself  to  leave  the  Aland  Islands  in  the  Baltic  Sea 
unfortified.  Modified  in  accordance  with  the  demand 
of  the  British  Government,  the  Austrian  draft  was 
presented  to  the  Czar  at  the  end  of  December,  with 
the  notification  that  if  it  was  not  accepted  by  the  16th 
of  January  the  Austrian  ambassador  would  quit  St. 
Petersburg.  On  the  1 5th  a  Council  was  held  in  the 
presence  of  the  Czar.  Nesselrode,  who  first  gave  his 
opinion,  urged  that  the  continuance  of  the  war  would 
plunge  Russia  into  hostilities  with  all  Europe,  and 
advised  submission  to  a  compact  which  would  last  only 
until  Russia  had  recovered  its  strength  or  new  relations 
had  arisen  among  the.  Powers.  One  Minister  after 
another  declared  that  Poland,  Finland,  the  Crimea,  and 
the  Caucasus  would  be  endangered  if  peace  were  not 
now  made;  the  Chief  of  the  Finances  stated  tliat  Uussia 
could  not  go  through  another  campaign  without  bank- 
ruptcy.* At  the  end  of  the  discussion  the  Council 
declared  nnaDimously  in  favour  of  accepting  the  Aus- 
trian propositions;  and  although  the  national  feeling 
was  still  in  favour  of  resistance,  there  appears  to  have 
*  Diplomatic  Stndj,  iL  361.    Uutiii,  Prinoe  ConMui,  iii.  394. 


290  UODEBN  EUBOPB.  tML 

been  one  Enssian  statesman  alone.  Prince  Qortschakoff, 
ambassador  at  Vienna,  who  sought  to  dissuade  the 
Czar  from  making  peace.  His  adrice  was  not  taken. 
The  vote  of  the  Conncil  was  followed  by  the  despatcli 
of  plenipotentiaries  to  Paris,  and  here,  on  the  25th  of 
Pebraary,  1856,  the  envoys  of  all  the  Powers,  with 
the  exception  of  Prussia,  assembled  in  Conference,  in 
order  to  frame  the  definitive  Treaty  of  Peace.  * 

In  the  debates  which  now  followed,  and  which 
occupied  more  than  a  month,  Lord  Clarendon,  who 
confennBcif       represented  Great  Britain,  discovered  that  in 

Fuji,  Stb.  M, 

IBM.  each  contested  point  he  had  to  fight  gainst 

the  Russian  and  the  French  envoys  combined,  so  com- 
pletely was  the  Court  of  the  Tuileries  now  identified  with 
a  policy  of  conciliation  and  friendliness  towards  Kussia.f 
Great  firmness,  great  plaioaess  of  speech  was  needed 
on  the  part  of  the  British  Government,  in  order  tu 
prevent  the  recognised  objects  of  the  war  from  being 
surrendered  by  its  ally,  not  from  a  conviction  that  they 
were  visionary  or  unattainable,  but  from  unsteadiness  of 
piirpose  and  from  the  desire  to  convert  a  defeated  enemy 
into  a  friend.  The  end,  however,  was  at 
length  reached,  and  on  the  30th  of  March 
the  Treaty  of  Paris  was  signed.     The  Black  Sea  was 

■  Prussia  was  Bdmitted  when  Uie  first  Articles  had  been  settled,  nod  it 
became  necessarj  to  revise  the  Traatj  of  Jidj,  1841,  of  which  Prussia  had 
been  one  of  the  signatories. 

f  "  In  the  course  of  the  deliberation,  wheneTor  our  [Rossian]  plenipo- 
tentiaries found  themseivus  in  the  presence  of  insiirmooutabla  difficnltic«, 
they  appealed  to  the  personal  intervention  of  tliis  sovereiga  [Napoleon], 
and  had  only  to  cimgratulate  themeelTes  on  tiie  iMolL" — Diplomatic 
Stndj.  ii.  877. 


Tm^ot  Fuia, 
)ifue£  ao,  iSfiO. 


,zc.bvGoogIe 


UN.  TSEATr  OF  PAMI8.  831 

Dentmlised ;  its  waters  and  ports,  thrown  open  to  the 
mercantile  marine  of  every  nation,  were  foroially  and 
in  perpetuity  interdicted  to  the  war-ships  both  of  the 
Powers  possessing  its  coasts  and  of  all  other  Powers. 
The  Czar  and  the  Sultan  undertook  not  to  establish  or 
maintain  upon  its  coasts  any  military  or  maritime 
arsenal.  Russia  ceded  a  portion  of  Bessarabia,  accept- 
ing a  frontier  which  excluded  it  from  the  Danube.  The 
free  navigation  of  this  river,  henceforth  to  be  effectively 
mMntained  by  an  international  Commission,  was  de- 
clared part  of  the  public  law  of  Europe.  The  Powers 
declared  the  Sublime  Porte  admitted  to  participate  in 
the  advantages  of  the  public  law  and  concert  of  Europe, 
each  engaging  to  respect  the  independence  and  integrity 
of  tbe  Ottoman  Empire,  and  all  guaranteeing  in  common 
the  strict  observance  of  this  engagement,  and  promising 
to  consider  any  act  tending  to  its  violation  as  a  question 
of  general  interest.  The  Sultan  "  having,  in  his  con- 
stant solicitude  for  the  welfare  of  his  subjects,  issued  a 
finnan  recording  his  generous  intentions  towards  the 
Christian  population  of  his  empire,*  and  having  com- 
municated it  to  the  Powers,"  the  Powers  "recognised 

•  Three  pnges  of  promiBes,  Eastern  F&pera,  xvii.  One  was  kept 
fuftfoUj.  "  To  acouiplisli  these  objecta,  means  shall  be  songht  to  profit 
by  the  acienc«.  t}ie  art,  anil  the  funds  of  Enrope."  One  of  the  drollest 
of  the  propheniee  of  that  time  is  the  cou^rratolatory  address  of  the  Mis- 
sionaries to  Lord  Stratford  de  Redcliffo,  id.  1882 :— "  The  Imperial 
Hatti-sherif  has  convinced  as  that  onr  fond  expectations  are  likelj  to  be 
naKsed.  The  light  will  shine  npon  those  who  have  long  sat  in  darkness ; 
ud  blest  bf  social  prosperity  and  religions  freedom,  the  millions  of 
Tnrkej  will,  we  trost,  be  seen  ere  long  sitting  peiicefnlly  under  their  own 
Tins  and  fig-tree."  So  thej  were,  and  with  poor  Lord  Stratford's  fortune, 
UDODg  others,  iu  their  pockets. 

D,a,l,zc.bvG00gIe 


232  KODEBN  SUROPB.  mt. 

the  Iiigh  value  of  this  communicatioii,"  declaring  at 
the  same  time  "that  it  could  not,  in  any  caae,  give  to 
them  the  right  to  interfere,  either  collectively  or  separ- 
ately, in  the  relations  of  the  Sultan  to  his  suhjects,  or 
in  the  internal  administration  of  his  empire."  The 
Banuhian  Principalities,  augmented  hy  the  strip  of 
Bessarahia  taken  from  Bussia,  were  to  continue  to 
enjoy,  under  the  suzerainty  of  the  Porte  and  iinder  the 
guarantee  of  the  Powers,  all  the  privileges  and  immu- 
nities of  which  they  were  in  possession,  no  eiclusive 
protection  heing  exercised  hy  any  of  the  guaranteeing 
Powers.* 

Passing  beyond  the  immediate  subjects  of  nego- 
tiation, the  Conference  availed  itself  of  its  international 
character  to  gain  the  consent  of  Great  Britain  to  a 
change  in  the  laws  of  maritime  war.  England  had 
always  claimed,  and  had  always  exercised,  the  right  to 
seize   an  enemy's  goods  on  the   high    sea 


™  'rirtii"!;!       though  conveyed  in  a  neutral  vessel,  and  to 
""  stop  and  search  the  merchant-ships  of  neu- 

trals for  this  purpose.  The  exercise  of  this  right  had 
stirred  up  gainst  England  the  Maritime  League  of 
1800,  and  was  condemned  by  nearly  the  whole  civilised 
world.  Kothing  short  of  an  absolute  command  of  the 
seas  made  it  safe  or  possible  for  a  single  Power  to  main- 
tain a  practice  which  threatened  at  moments  of  danger 
to  turn  the  whole  body  of  neutral  States  into  its 
enemies.  Moreover,  if  the  seizure  of  belligerents'  goods 
in  neutral  ships  profited  England  when  it  was  itself  at 
•  AH  TerbiOm  from  the  Treaty.    Pari  Papom,  186^  toI.  61,  fi  1, 


ML  TREATY  OF  PAB18.  233 

war,  it  iojored  Englaod  at  all  times  wlieu  it  remained 
at  peace  during  the  struggles  of  other  States.  Similarly 
bj  the  issue  of  privateers  England  inflicted  great  injury 
oi.  its  enemies ;  but  its  own  commerce,  ezceedtng  that 
of  every  other  State,  offered  to  the  privateers  of  its  foes 
a  still  richer  booty.  The  advant^es  of  the  existing 
laws  of  maritime  war  were  not  altogether  on  the  side  of 
Sngland,  though  mistress  of  the  seas ;  and  in  return 
for  the  abolition  of  privateering,  the  British  Govern- 
ment consented  to  surrender  its  sharpest,  but  most 
dangerous,  weapon  of  offence,  and  to  permit  the  pro- 
ducts of  a  hostile  State  to  find  a  market  in  time  of  war. 
The  rule  was  laid  down  that  the  goods  of  an  enemy 
other  than  contraband  of  war  should  henceforth  be  safe 
under  a  neutral  flag.  Neutrals*  goods  discovered-  on 
an  enemy's  ship  were  similarly  made  exempt  from 
capture. 

The  enactments  of  the  Conference  of  Paris  relating 
to  commerce  in  time  of  hostilities  have  not  yet  been 
subjected  to  the  strain  of  a  war  between  England  and 
any  European  State ;  its  conclusions  on  all  other  sub- 
jects were  but  too  soon  put  to  the  test,  and  _ 
have  one  after  another  been  found  want-  S*iSS^ 
ing.     If  the  Power  which  calls  man  into  ''" 

his  moment  of  life  could  smile  at  the  efforts  and  the 
assumptions  of  iis  creatnre,  such  smile  might  have  been 
moved  by  the  assembly  of  statesmen  who,  at  the  close 
of  the  Crimean  War,  affected  to  shape  the  future  of 
Eastern  Europe,  They  persuaded  themselves  that  by 
dint  of  the   iteration  of  certain  phrases  they  couI4 


8M  MODEUN  EUnOPS.  HML 

convert  the  Sultan  and  his  hungry  troop  of  Pashas 
into  the  chiefs  of  a  European  State.  They  im^ined 
that  the  House  of  Osman,  which  in  the  st^es  of  a 
continnouB  decline  had  successively  lost  its  sway  over 
Hungary,  over  Servia,  over  Southern  Greece  and  the 
Dauubiau  Provinces,  and  which  would  twice  within  the 
last  twenty-five  years  have  seen  its  Empire  dashed  to 
pieces  by  an  Egyptian  vassal  but  for  the  intervention  of 
Europe,  might  be  arrested  in  its  decadence  by  an  incan- 
tation, and  be  made  strong  enough  and  enlightened 
enough  to  govern  to  all  time  the  Slavic  and  Greek 
populations  which  had  still  the  misfortune  to  be  in- 
cluded within  its  dominions.  Recoguising — so  ran  the 
words  which  read  like  bitter  irony,  but  which  were 
meant  for  nothing  of  the  kind — the  value  of  the  Sul- 
tan's promises  of  reform,  the  authors  of  the  Treaty  of 
Paris  proceeded,  as  if  of  set  purpose,  to  extinguish  any 
vestige  o£  responsibility  which  might  have  heen  felt  at 
Constantinople,  and  any  spark  of  confidence  that  might 
still  linger  among  the  Christian  populations,  by  de- 
claring that,  %vhet1ier  the  Sultan  observed  or  broke  his 
promises,  in  no  case  could  any  right  of  intervention  by 
Europe  arise,  Tlie  helmsman  was  given  his  course ; 
the  hatches  were  battened  down.  If  words  bore  any 
meaning,  if  the  Treaty  of  Paris  Wiis  not  an  elahorat« 
piece  of  imposture,  the  Christian  subjects  of  the  Sultan 
had  for  the  future,  whatever  might  be  their  wrongs, 
no  redress  to  look  for  hut  in  the  exertion  of  their  own 
power.  The  terms  of  the  Treaty  were  in  fact  such  as 
might  have  been  imposed  if  the  Western  Powers  had 


un.  TESATY  OF  PASIS.  23S 

gone  to  war  with  Russia  for  some  object  of  their  own, 
and  had  been  rescued,  when  defeated  and  OTerthrown, 
l^  the  Tictorious  interposition  of  the  Porte.  All  was 
hollow,  all  based  on  fiction  and  convention.  The 
iUasions  of  nations  in  time  of  reTolutioaarj  ezcitement, 
tlie  shallow,  sentimental  commonplaces  of  liberty  and 
fratemitj  have  afforded  just  matter  for  satire ;  but  no 
democratic  platitudes  were  ever  more  palpably  devoid 
of  connection  with  fact,  more  fiagrantly  in  conlradiction 
to  the  experience  of  the  past,  or  more  ignominiously  to 
he  refuted  by  each  succeeding  act  of  history,  than  the 
deliberate  consecration  of  the  idol  of  an  Ottoman  Em- 
pire as  the  crowning  act  of  European  wisdom  in  1856. 

Among  the  devotees  of  the  Turk  the  English  Minis- 
ters were  the  most  impassioned,  having  indeed  in  the 
possession  of  India  some  excuse  for  their  fervour  on 
behalf  of  any  ima^^able  obstacle  that  would  keep  the 
Bussians  out  of  Constantinople.  The  Emperor  of  the 
French  had  during  the  Conferences  at 
Paris  revived  his  project  of  incorporating 
the  Danubian  Principalities  w^th  Austria  in  return  for 
the  cession  of  Lombardy,  but  the  Viennese  Glovemment 
had  declined  to  enter  into  any  such  arrangement.  Na- 
poleon consequently  entered  upon  a  new  Eastern  poliqr. 
Appreciating  the  growing  force  of  nationality  in  Euro- 
pean affairs,  and  imagining  that  in  the  championship  of 
the  principle  of  nationality  against  the  Treaties  of  1315 
he  would  sooner  or  later  find  means  for  the  aggrandise- 
ment of  himself  and  France,  he  proposed  that  the  Pro- 
vinces of  Moldavia  and  Wallachia,  while  remaining  in 


239  XODERir  EUSOFB.  MK 

dependence  upon  the  Salian,  should  be  nnited  into  a 
single  State  under  a  prince  chosen  by  thenaselres.  The 
English  Ministry  would  not  hear  of  this  anion.  In 
their  view  the  creation  of  a  Iloumanian  Principality 
under  a  chief  not  appointed  by  the  Porte  was  simply 
the  abstraction  from  the  Sultan  of  six  million  persons 
who  at  present  acknowledged  his  suzerainty,  and  whose 
tribute  to  Constantinople  ought,  according  to  Lord 
Clarendon,  to  be  increased.*  Austria,  fearing  the  effect 
of  a  Roumanian  national  movement  upon  its  own 
Roumanian  subjects  in  Transylvania,  joined  in  resist- 
ance to  Napoleon's  scheme,  and  the  political  organisation 
of  the  Principalities  was  in  consequence  reserved  by  the 
Conference  of  Paris  for  future  settlement.  Elections 
were  held  in  the  spring  of  1857  under  a  decree  from 
the  Porte,  with  the  result  that  Moldavia,  as  it  seemed, 
pronounced  against  union  with  the  sister  province. 
But  the  complaint  at  once  arose  that  the  Porte  had 
falsified  the  popular  vote.  France  and  Russia  had  now 
established  relations  of  such  amity  that  their  ambassa- 
dors jointly  threatened  to  quit  Constantinople  if  the 
elections  were  not  annulled.  A  visit  paid  by  the 
French  Emperor  to  Queen  Victoria,  with  the  object  of 
smoothing  over  the  difficulties  which  had  begun  to 
threaten  the  Western  alliance,  resulted  rather  in  in- 
creased misunderstandings  between  the  two  Govern- 
ments as  to  the  future  of  the  Principalities  than  in  any 
real  agreement.  The  elections  were  annulled.  New 
i^resentative  bodies  met  at  Bucharest  and  Jassy,  and 

•  M»rtm.  Prince  Consort,  iu.  452.     PtxOa,  BbtOori,  n.  8M.  ; 


ISS7-M.  S-OVHAHtL  887 

pronoanced  almost  unaDimouslj  for  nniou  (Octol)er, 
1857).  In  the  spring  of  1858  the  Conference  of  Paris 
reassembled  in  order  to  frame  a .  final  settlement  of  the 
affairs  of  the  Principaliti^.  It  determined  that  in  each 
Province  there  should  be  a  Hospodar  elected  for  life,  a 
separate  judicature,  and  a  separate  legislative  Assembly, 
white  a  central  Commission,  formed  by  reprci^entatives 
of  both  Provinces,  should  lay  before  the  Assemblies 
projects  of  law  on  matters  of  joint  interest.  In  ac- 
cordance with  these  provisions,  Assemblies  were  elected 
in  each  Principality  at  the  beginning  of  1859.  Their 
first  duty  was  to  choose  the  two  Hospodara,  but  in 
both  Provinces  a  UDanimous  vote  fell  upon 
the  same  person.  Prince  Alexander  Cuza.  Hm^Sat  ^ 
The  efforts  of  England  and  Austria  to  pre- 
vent anion  were  thus  baffled  by  the  Roumanian  people 
itself,  and  after  three  years  the  elaborate  arrangements 
made  by  the  Conference  weie  similarly  ^^ , 
swept   away,    and   a   single    Ministry    and  "**■ 

Assembly  toot  the  place  of  the  dual  Government.     It 
now  remained  only  to  substitute  a  hereditary  Prince  for 
-a  Hospodar  elected  for  life;  and  in  186G,  on  the  ex- 
pulsion   of   Alexander  Cuza    by  his   subjects.    Prince 
Charles    of    Hohenzollern  -  Sigmaringen,    a 
distant  kinsman  of  the  reigning  Prussian     J{|!.l^'i^|Ij'™ 
sovereign,  was   recognised    by    all    Europe 
as  Hereditary  Prince  of  Roumania.     The  suzerainty  of 
the  Porte,  now  reduced  to  tlie  bare  right  to  receive  a 
fixed  tribute,  was  foted  to  last    but  for   a  few  years 

'<>°S«'-  L  .„,.,  Google 


238  MOSEBir  EUBOPK  lat^. 

Europe  liad  not  to  wait  for  tlie  establishmeDt  of 
Eoumanian  independeoce  in  order  to  judge  of  the  fore- 
siglit  and  the  etatesmanship  of  the  authors  of  the 
Treaty  of  Paris.  Scarcely  a  year  passed  without  the 
occurrence  of  some  event  that  cast  ridicule  upon  the 
fiction  of  a  self-regenerated  Turkey,  and  upon  the  pro- 
fession of  the  Powers  that  the  epoch  of  external  inter- 
,  ference  in  its  affairs  was  at  an  end.  The  active 
misgovernmeni;  of  the  Turkish  authorities  themselves, 
their    powerlessness    or    want   of    will     to 

CbnUimad    dl»  '  ,  '  - 

o^teTaAiA      prevent  nagrant  outrage  ana  wrong  among 
those  whom    they  professed  to   rule,  con- 
tinued   after  the  Treaty  of  Paris  to  be  exactly  what 
they    had    been    before    it.       In    1860    massacres   and 
civil  war  in   Mount   Lebanon  led   to  the  occupation 
of   Syria    by    French    troops.       In    1861    Bosnia  and 
Herzegovina  took  up  arms.     In   1863  Servia  expelled 
its    Turkish    garrisons.      Crete,    rising   in    the    follow- 
ing   year,     fought    long    for    its     independence,    and 
seemed  for  a  moment  likely  to  be  united  with  Greece 
under  the   auspices  of  the  Powers,  but  it  was  finally 
abandoned    to    its  Ottoman    masters.      At    the    end  of 
fourteen  years  from  the  signature  of  the  Peace  of  Paris, 
^onofa.       *^^  downfall  of  the  French  Empire  enabled 
g«t,ofP^      Russia  to  declare  that  it  would  no  longer 
wT.-  1.  ^^cognise     the    provisions    of    the     Treaty 

the  BI  T^*^"^   '**    "'"^^'P^    '^^    **«    ^™^°^«    from 
«lone    th„*    i*'   /*  ^^^  ^°'"  *^''''  ^""^  f""-  tl'is  almost 
War.'   Buff     .^     f  ^^   ^^'^^  *^™"^'''   the  Crimean 
-it  for  the  determination  of  Lord  Palmerston  to 


WMli  TBSATY  OF  PABIS.  23d 

exclude  Kassia  from  the  Black  Sea,  peace  might  have 
been  made  while  the  Allied  armies  were  still  at  Yama. 
This  exclusion  was  alleged  to  he  necessary  in  the  in- 
terests of  Europe  at  large  ;  that  it  was  really  enforced 
not  in  the  interest  of  Europe  but  in  the  interest  of 
England  was  made  sufficiently  clear  by  the  action  of 
Austria  and  Prussia,  whose  statesmen,  in  spite  of  the 
discoorses  so  freely  addressed  to  them  from  London, 
were  at  least  as  much  alive  to  the  interests  of  their 
respective  countries  as  Lord  Palmerston  conld  be  on 
their  behalf.  Nor  had  France  in  1854  any  interest  in 
crippling  the  power  of  Russia,  or  in  Eastern  aflfairs 
generally,  which  could  be  remotely  compared  with  those 
of  the  possessors  of  India.  The  personal  needs  of 
Napoleon  III.  made  him,  while  he  seemed  to  lead,  the 
instrument  of  the  British  Government  for  enforcing 
British  aims,  and  so  gave  to  Palmerston  the  momentaiy 
shaping  of  a  new  and  superficial  concert  of  the  Powers. 
Masters  of  Sebastopol,  the  Allies  had  experienced  little 
difficulty  in  investing  their  own  conclusions  with  the 
seeming  authorily  of  Europe  at  laige ;  but  to  bring 
the  representatives  of  Austria  and  Prussia  to  a  Council- 
table,  to  hand  them  the  pen  to  sign  a  Treaty  dictated 
by  Erance  and  England,  was  not  to  bind  them  to  a 
policy  which  was  not  their  own,  or  to  make  those 
things  interests  of  Austria  and  Prussia  which  were  not 
their  interests  before.  Thus  when  in  1870  the  French 
Empire  fell,  England  stood  alone  as  the  Power  con- 
cerned in  maintaining  the  exclusion  of  Bussia  from  the 
Eoxine,  and  this  exclusion  it  coold  enforce  no  longer.  It 


240  UODERtr  SVROPS.  uM-m. 

was  well  thaA,  Palmersiqn  had  made  the  Treaty  of  Paris 
the  act  of  Europe,  but  not  for  the  reasoos  which  Pal- 
merston  had  im^ined.  The  fiction  had  engendered  no 
new  relation  in  fact ;  it  did  not  prolong  for  one  hour 
the  submission  of  Bussia  after  it  had  ceased  to  he  con- 
fronted in  the  West  by  a  superior  force ;  but  it  enabled 
Great  Britain  to  retire  without  official  humiliation  from 
a  position  which  it  had  conquered  only  through  the 
help  of  an  accidental  Alliance,  and  which  it  was  unable 
to  maintain  alone.  The  ghost  of  the  Conference  of 
1856  was,  as  it  were,  conjured  up  in  the  changed  world 
of  1871.  The  same  forms  which  had  once  stamped  with 
the  se:d  of  Europe  the  instrument  of  restraint  npon 
Russia  now  as  decorously  executed  its  release.  Britain 
accepted  what  Europe  would  not  resist ;  and  below  the 
slopes  where  lay  the  countless  dead  of  three  nations 
Sebastopol  rose  from  its  ruins,  and  the  ensign  of  Bussia 
Boated  oucc  more  over  its  ships  of  war. 


D,a,l,zc.bvG00gIe 


CHAPTBB    IV. 

Fiedinont  after  IS49— Uinutiy  of  Aieglio— Oktoui  Prlnw  Uinister— Desi)(n«  of 
Obtout — Hi»  Crimetui  Policy — Cavour  kt  the  Confereace  of  Paris— Carour 
and  Napoleon  III. — Ths  Meeting  at  PIombiAiea — Preparationa  in  Italy- 
Treaty  of  JaniuiT,  1B69— AUompta  at  Uediatiun — Austriuii  Ultimatuni— 
Oampaign  of  1S6S — MagnnU — MoTement  in  CentnJ  Italy — Solferino^ 
Napoleon  and  PnuBia — Interview  of  Tillafranca — Cavour  resigna — Peace 
of  Zurich— Central  Italy  after  ViUafmncft— The  Proposed  Congress— "  Tha 
Fops  and  ths  Congreas  "-^Oavonr  lemmw  office — Cavour  and  Napoleon — 
Union  of  the  Duchies  and  the  Bomagna  with  Piedmont— Savoy  and  Nice 
added  to  Pninoe — Cavoor  on  this  csadoa — European  opinion— Naplec — 
Bialy — Garibaldi  lands  at  WaraaU — Oaptnro  of  Palenno — The  Xeapoll- 
lans  evacuate  Sicily — Cavoui  and  tlie  Party  ol  Action — Cavoor'a  Policy  a* 
to  Naptea — Qaribaidi  on  the  Mainland — Penano  and  TiUomarinaat  Naple* 
— Qaijbaldi  at  Naples — The  Kedmontesa  Army  enters  Umbria  and  the 
Harches — Pall  of  Anoona — Garibaldi  and  Oavoar — The  Arniies  on  the 
Toltnmo — Fall  of  Qaeta— Caronr'a  Policy  with  reganl  to  Borne  and 
Tenioe— Death  of  Oavour— The  Frae  Chorch  in  the  Free  State. 

In  the  gloomy  years  that  followed  1849  the  kingdom  of 
Sardinia  had  stood  out  in  bright  relief  as  a  State  which, 
though  crashed  on  the  battle-field,  had  re-  rbOaeBtmitm 
mained  true  to  the  canse  of  liberty  while  *"*■ 
all  aronnd  it  the  forces  of  reaction  gained  triumph  after 
triamph.  Its  King  had  not  the  intellectual  gifts  of  the 
maker  of  a  great  State,  but  he  was  one  with  whom  those 
possessed  of  Boch  gifts  conld  work,  and  on  whom  they 
could  depend.  With  certain  grave  private  faults  "Victor 
Emmanuel  had  the  public  virtues  of  intense  patriotism, 
of  loyalty  to  his  engagements  and  to  his  Ministers, 
of  deTotion  to  a  single  great  aim-    Little  ^iven  to 

Q  CoLV^Ic 


242  MOVBlOf  BVBOPB.  v»^ 

specnlaiiTe  thought,  he  saw  what  it  most  concerned  him 
to  see,  that  Piedmont  by  making  itself  the  home  of 
liberty  coutd  become  the  Master-State  of  Italy.  His 
courage  on  the  hattle-fidd,  splendid  and  animating  as 
it  was,  distinguished  him  less  than  another  kind  of 
courage  peculiarly  his  own.  Ignorant  and  supersti- 
tious, he  had  that  rare  and  masculine  quality  of  soul 
which  in  the  anguish  of  bereavement  and  on  the  verge 
of  the  unseen  world  remains  proof  against  the  appeal 
and  against  the  terrors  of  a  voice  speaking  with  more 
than  human  authority.  Borne,  not  less  than  Austria, 
stood  across  the  path  that  led  to  Italian  freedom,  and 
employed  all  its  art,  all  its  spiritual  force,  to  turn 
Victor  Emmanuel  from  the  work  that  lay  before 
him.  There  were  moments  in  his  life  when  a  man 
of  not  more  than  common  weakness  might  well  have 
flioched  from  the  line  of  conduct  on  which  he  had 
resolved  in  hours  of  strength  and  of  insight ;  there 
were  times  when  a  less  constant  mind  might  well 
have  wavered  and  cast  a  balance  between  opposing 
systems  of  policy.  It  was  not  through  heroic  great- 
ness that  Yictor  Emmanuel  rendered  his  priceless 
services  to  Italy.  He  was  a  man  not  conspicuously 
cast  in  a  different  mould  from  many  another  plain, 
strong  nature,  but  the  qualities  which  he  possessed  were 
precisely  those  which  Italy  required.  Fortune,  circum- 
stance, position  favoured  him  and  made  his  glorious  — 
work  possible ;  hut  what  other  Italian  prince  of  this 
century,  though  placed  on  the  throne  of  Piedmont,  and 
numbering  Cavoor  among    his   subjects,  would    have 


played  the  part,  the  simple  jet  all  moinentoas  part, 
which  Victor  Emmaoael  played  bo  well  ?  The  lore  and 
the  gratitude  of  Italy  have  been  lavished  without  stint 
on  the  memory  of  its  first  sovereign,  who  served  his 
nation  with  qualities  of  so  homely  a  type,  and  in  whose 
life  there  was  so  much  that  needed  pardon.  The  colder 
judgment  of  a  later  time  will  hardly  contest  the  title  of 
Victor  Emmanuel  to  be  ranked  among  those  few  men 
without  whom  Italian  union  would  not  have  been 
achieved  for  another  generation. 

On  the  conclusion  of  peace  with  Austria  after  the 
campaign  of  Novara,  the  Oovemment  and  the  Parlia- 
ment of  Turin  addressed  themselves  to  the  work  of 
emancipating'the  State  from  the  system  of  ecclesiastical 
privilege  and  clerical  ascendency  which  had  continued 
in  full  vigour  down  to  the  last  year  of  Charles  Albert's 
reign.  Since  1814  the  Church  had  maintained,  or  had 
recovered,  both  in  Piedmont  and  in  the  island  of  Sar- 
dinia, rights  which  had  been  long  wrested  from  it  in 
other  European  societies,  and  which  were  out  of  har- 
mony with  the  Constitution  now  taking  root  under 
Victor  Emmanuel.  The  clergy  had  still  their  own 
tribunals,  and  even  in  the  case  of  criminal  ^^  ^^ 
offences  were  not  subject  to  the  jurisdiction  ""'  '®**^ 
of  the  State.  The  Bishops  possessed  excessive  powers 
and  too  large  a  share  of  the  Church  revenues;  the 
parochial  clei^  lived  in  want ;  monasteries  and  con- 
vents abounded.  It  was  not  in  any  spirit  of  hostility 
towards  the  Church  that  Massimo  d'Azegho,  whom  tiie 
King  called  to  of&ce  after  I^ovara,  commenced  the  work  of 
«  3      -  "'81'-' 


244  MODERN  EUBOPS.  lB»-m. 

rLform  by  measures  subjecting  the  clergy  to  tbe  law-conrts 
of  the  State,  abolishing  the  right  of  sanctuary  in  monas- 
teries, and  limiting  the  power  of  corporations  to  acquire 
landed  property.     If  the  Papacy  would  have  met  Victor 
Emmanuel  in  a  fair  spirit  his  Gorernment  would,  gladly 
have  avoided  a  dangerous  and  exasperati»g  struggle ; 
but  aU  the  forces  and  the  passions  of  XJltramontanism 
were  brought  to  bear  against  the  proposed  reforms.    Tbe 
result  was  that  the  Minister,  abandoned  by  a  section  of 
the  Conservative  party  on  whom  he  had  relied,  sought 
the  alliance  of  men  ready  for  a  larger  and  bolder  policy, 
and  called  to  office  the  foremost  of  tliose  from  whom  he 
had  received  an  independent  support  in  the  Chamber, 
Count    Cavour.       Entering    the    Cabinet  'in    1850    as 
Minister    of    Commerce,    Cavour    rapidly    became    the 
master  of  all  his  colleagues.     On  his  own  re.'fponsibility 
he  sought  and  won  the  suppoi-t  of  the  more  moderate 
section  of  the  Opposition,  headed  by  Eattazzi ;  and  after 
carour  Prime        ^  brief  witlidrawiil  from   office,  caused  by 

itiaiter,  1803.  3  ■     -    ■  ■ 

divisions  within  the  Cabinet,  he  returned  to 
power  in  October,  1852,  as  Prime  Minister. 

Cavour,  though  few  men    have  gained  greater  fame 

aa  diplomatists,  had  not    been  trained   in   official  hie. 

o.™„r.  ^^^  younger  son  of  a  noble  family,  he  had 

^^  entered  the  army  in  1826,  and  served  in  the 

mefr7?«    ^"*'  ^'^  sympathies  with  the  liberal  more- 

I'is  chief        XT*"''*"^''*  '"*"  '"**'  extreme  disfavour  with 

IVinco  of  C  '^'''  described  by  Charles  Albert,  then 

l'i'%'«3om   anr^"^°°'  ^  *'"'  "'°"*^  dangerous  man  in  the 

'    ""  "--^  t^-n«  Wd  at  the  instance  of  his  own 

[!,a,l,zc.bvG00gJc 


father  to  the  solitary  Alpine  fortress  of  Bard.  Too 
Tigoroos  a  nature  to  submit  to  inaction,  too  bnojant 
and  too  sagacious  to  resort  to  conspiracy,  he  quitted  the 
army,  and  soon  afterwards  undertook  the  maoi^ment 
of  one  of  the  family  estates,  devoting  himself  to  scien- 
tific agriculture  on  a  large  scale.  He  was  a  keen  and 
successful  man  of  business,  but  throughout  the  next 
twelve  years,  which  he  passed  in  fruitful  private  industry, 
his  miud  dwelt  ardently  on  public  af^iirs.  He  was 
filled  with  a  deep  discontent  at  the  state  of  society 
which  he  saw  around  him  in  Piedmont,  and  at  the  con- 
dition of  Italy  at  large  nuder  foreign  and  clerical  rule. 
Repeated  visits  to  France  and  JEngland  made  hira 
familiar  with  the  institutions  of  freer  lands,  and  gave 
definiteness  to  bis  political  and  social  aims.*  In 
1847,  when  changes  were  following  fast,  he  founded 
with  some  other  Liberal  nobles  the  journal  Risor- 
ffitnento,  devoted  to  the  cause  of  national  revival ; 
and  he  was  one  of  the  first  who  called  upon 
King  Charles  Albert  to  grant  a  Constitution.  During 
the  stormy  days  of  1848  he  was  at  once  the  vigorous 
advocate  of  war  with  Austria  and  the  adversary  of 
Bepablicans  and  Extremists  who  for  their  own  theories 
seemed  willing  to  plunge  Italy  into  anarchy.  Though 
unpopul^  with  the  mob,  he  was  elected  to  the  Chamber 
by  Turin,  and  continued  to  represent  the  capital  after 
the  peace.  Up  to  this  time  there  had  been  Httle 
opportunity  for  the  proof  of  his  extraordinary  powers, 

*  Berti.  OarcniT  wraiiti  1818,  p.  110.    LaBiTe.OsToni'.fLfiS.   OaToor, 
Lettece  (ad.  Gliula.],  bkod.  p.  7a 


2M  MODESS  SUSOPS.  bmh 

bat  the  iobom  sagacity  of  Victor  Emmanuel  bad  already 
discemed  in  him  a  man  who  could  not  remain  in  a 
subordinate  position.  "  You  will  see  him  turn  yon  all 
out  of  your  places,"  the  King  remarked  to  his  Ministers, 
as  he  gare  his  assent  to  Cavour's  first  appointment  to  a 
seat  in  the  Cabinet. 

The  Ministry  of  Azeglio  had  served  Piedmont  with 
honour  from  1849  to  1852,  but  its  leader  scarcely  pos- 
sessed the  daring  and  fertility  of  mind  which  the  time 
required.     Cavour  threw  into  the  work  of  Government 
a  passion  and  intelligence  which  soon  produced  results 
visible  to  all  Europe.     His  devotion  to  Italy  was  as 
deep,   as  all-absorbing,  as  that  of  Mazzini 
himself,  though  the  methods  and  schemes 
or    the    two    men   were  in  such  complete   antagonism. 
Cavour's  fixed  purpose   was  to  drive    Austria   out  of 
Italy  by  defeat  in  the  battle-field,  and  to  establish,  as 
the  first  step  towards  national  union,  a  powerful  king- 
dom of  Northern    Italy  under  Victor  EmmanueL     In 
order  that  the  military  and  naval  forces  of  Piedmont 
tmght  be  raised  to  the  highest  possible   strength  and 
efBciency,    he   saw  that    the    resources   of    the  country 
must    be    largely  developed;    and  vnth  this  object  he 
negoti;ited   commercial  treaties    with    Foreign    Powers, 
the  ^''''°/''""'^^"'  ^"'^  -oppressed  the  greater  part  of 
devowl  ""'  ''"'^^  *''^'^  l^-^«  +o  cultivators,  and 
*»  the  pa™enro7'.r'  '^'  °°*  *°  Stat«-purposes  but 
vanced     thT  h  ^-orking  clergy.      Industry  ad- 

^'ne;  the  ^^^''^  ^'■««8ure  of  taxation  was    patienUy 
«^y  and  the  fleet  grew  apace.     But  tl« 

DiailizccbvGoOgIC 


ixa^m.  CArOUB.  U7 

cause  of  Piedmoot  was  one  witli  that  of  tlie  Italian 
nation,  and  it  became  its  Government  to  demonstrate 
tbis  day  by  day  with  no  faltering  roice  or  band.  Pro- 
tection and  support  were  given  to  fugitives  from  Aus- 
trian and  Papal  tyranny ;  the  Press  was  laid  open  to 
every  tale  of  wrong ;  and  when,  after  an  unsuccessful 
attempt  at  insurrection  in  Milan  in  1853,  for  which 
MazzinI  and  the  Republican  exiles  were  alone  respon- 
sible, the  Austrian  Government  sequestrated  the 
property  of  its  subjects  who  would  not  return  from 
Piedmont,  Cavour  bade  his  ambassador  quit  Vienna, 
and  appealed  to  every  Court  in  Europe.  Nevertheless, 
Cavour  did  not  believe  that  Italy,  even  by  a  simulta- 
neous rising,  could  permanently  expel  the  Austrian 
armies  or  conquer  the  Austrian  fortresses.  The  expe- 
rience of  forty  years  pointed  to  the  opposite  conclusion; 
and  while  Mazzini  in  his  exile  BtUl  imagined  that  a 
people  needed  only  to  determine  to  be  free  in  order  to 
be  free,  Cavour  schemed  for  an  alliance  .which  should 
range  a^inst  the  Austrian  Emperor  armed  forces  as 
numerous  and  as  disciplined  as  his  own.  It  was  mainly 
with  this  object  that  Cavour  plunged  Sar-  qitout-. 
dinia  into  the  Crimean  War.  He  was  not  **'™"p°^- 
without  just  causes  of  complaint  against  the  Czar;  but 
the  motive  with  which  he  sent  the  Sardinian  troops  to 
Sebastopol  was  not  that  they  might  take  vengeance  on 
Bussia,  but  that  they  might  fight  side  by  side  with  the 
soldiers  of  England  and  France.  That  the  war  might 
lead  to  complications  still  unforeseen'  was  no  doubt  a 
possibility  present  to  Cavour'e  mind,  and  in  that  case  it 


248  HOBEBN  EUEOFE.  latut. 

was  no  small  tiling  that  Sardinia  stood  allied  to  the  two 
Western  Powers ;  but  apart  from  these  chances  of  the 
future,  Sardinia  would  have  done  ill  to  stand  idle  when 
at  any  moment,  as  it  seemed,  Austria  might  pass  from 
armed  neutrality  into  active  concert  with  England  and 
France.  Had  Austria  so  drawn  the  sword  against 
Kussia  whilst  Piedmont  stood  inactive,  the  influence  of 
the  "Western  Powers  must  for  some  years  to  come  have 
been  ranged  on  the  side  of  Austria  in  the  maintenance 
of  its  Italian  possessions,  and  Piedmont  could  at  the 
best  have  looked  only  to  St.  Petersburg  for  sympathy 
or  support,  Cavour  was  not  scrupulous  in  his  choice  of 
means  when  the  liberation  of  Italy  was  the  end  in  view, 
and  the  charge  was  made  against  him  that  in  joining 
the  coalition  against  Russia  be  lightly  entered  into  a 
war  in  which  Piedmont  had  no  direct  concern.  But 
reason  and  history  absolve,  and  far  more  than  absolve, 
the  Italian  statesman.  If  the  cause  of  European 
equilibrium,  for  which  England  and  France  took  up 
arms,  was  a  legitimate  ground  of  war  in  the  case 
of  these  two  Powers,  it  was  not  Ie.ss  so  in  the  case 
of  their  ally ;  while  if  the  ulterior  results  rather  than 
the  motive  of  a  war  are  held  to  constitute  its  justifica- 
tion, Cavour  stands  out  as  the  one  politician  in  Europe 
whose  aims  in  entering  upon  the  Crimean  War  have 
been  fulfilled,  not  mocked,  by  events.  He  joined  in 
the  struggle  against  Russia  not  in  order  to  maintain 
the  Ottoman  Empire,  but  to  gain  an  ally  in  liberating 
Italy.  The  Ottoman  Empire  has  not  been  maintained; 
the  independence  of   Italy  has  been  established,  and 


established  by  means  of  the  alliance  which  Cavoar  gained. 
His  Crimean  policy  is  one  of  those  excessively  rare  in- 
stances of  statesmanship  where  action  has  been  deter- 
mined not  by  the  driving  and  half-understood  necessi- 
ties of  the  monient,  bat  by  a  distinct  and  trae  perception 
of  the  fdture.  He  looked  only  in  one  direction,  but  in 
that  direction  he  saw  clearly.  Other  statesmen  struck 
blindfold,  or  in  their  vision  of  a  regenerated  Turkey 
fought  for  an  empire  of  mirage.  Tt  may  with  some 
reason  be  asked  whether  the  order  of  Eastern  Europe 
would  now  be  different  if  oar  own  English  soldiers  who 
fell  at  Balaclava  had  been  allowed  to  die  in  their  beds  : 
every  Italian  whom  Cavour  sent  to  perish  on  the  Tcher- 
naya  or  in  the  cholera-stricken  camp  died  as  directly  for 
the  cause  of  Italian  independence  as  if  he  had  fallen  on 
the  slopes  of  Custozza  or  under  the  walls  of  Rome. 

At  the  Conference  of  Paris  in  1856  the  Sardinian 
Premier  took  his  place  in  right  of  alliance  by  the  side  of 
the  representatives  of  the  great  Powers ;  and  when  the 
main  business  of  the  Conference  was  concluded,  Count 
Buol,  the  Austrian  Minister,  was  forced  to 
listen  to  a  vigorous  denunciation  bv  Cavour     conter-ince  of 

°  _  •'    _  Parii. 

of  the  misgovernment  that  rtii^ned  in  Cen- 
tral and  Southern  Italy,  and  of  the  Austrian  occupation 
which  rendered  this  possible.  Though  the  Prench  were 
still  in  Borne,  their  presence  might  by  courtesy  be 
described  as  a  measure  of  precaution  rendered  necessary 
by  the  intrusion  of  the  Austrians  farther  north ;  and 
both  the  French  and  English  plenipotentiaries  at  the 
Conference  supported  Cavour  in  his  invective.     Cavour 


250  MODERN  EUBOPB.  WUk 

retnmed  to  Italy  without  any  territorial  reward  for  the 
BerviceB  that  Piedmont  had  rendered  to  the  Allies ;  but 
his  object  was  attained.  He  had  exhibited  Austria 
isolated  and  discredited  before  Europe ;  be  had  given 
to  his  country  a  voice  that  it  had  never  before  had  in 
the  Councils  of  the  Powers ;  he  had  produced  a  deep 
conviction  throughout  Italy  that  Piedmont  not  only 
could  and  would  aot  with  vigour  against  the  national 
enemy,  but  that  in  its  action  it  would  have  the  help  of 
allies.  From  this  time  the  Republican  and  Mazzinian 
societies  lost  ground  before  the  growing  confidence  in 
the  House  of  Savoy,  in  its  Minister  and  its  army.*  The 
strongest  evidence  of  the  effect  of  Cavour's  Crimean 
policy  and  of  his  presence  at  the  Conference  of  Paris 
was  seen  in  the  action  of  the  Austrian 
Ateo^oiio,.     Government  itself      Prom   1849  to   1856 

1808. 

its  rule  in  Northern  Italy  had  been  one  not 
BO  much  of  severity  as  of  brutal  violence.  Now  all  was 
changed.  The  Emperor  came  to  Milan  to  proclaim  a 
general  amnesty  and  to  win  the  aflection  of  his  subjects. 
The  sequestrated  estsites  were  restored  to  their  owners. 
-  Badetzky,  in  his  ninety-second  year,  was  at  length 
'  allowed  to  pass  into  retirement;  the  government  of  the 
sword  was  declared  at  an  end ;  Maiimilian,  the  gentlest 
and  most  winning  of  the  Hapsbui^s,  was  sent  with  his 
young  bride  to  charm  away  the  sad  memories  of  the 
evil  time.    But  it  was  too  late.    The  recognition  shown 

•  C»TOiir,  Lett«re  (Chial»).  ii  introd.  p.  187.  Goenoni.  Ctaribaldi,  i. 
412.  Uimin,  the  Ez-Fresident  of  Teuice,  now  in  exile,  declftredfrtmi  thii 
time  for  the  House  of  89707.    Garibaldi  did  the  sanui 

I  i,z<..t,CoogIf 


by  the  Lombarcis  of  the  Emperor's  own  personal  friend- 
liness indicated  no  reconciliation  with  Austria;  and 
while  Francis  Joseph  was  still  in  Milan,  King  Victor 
£minanuel,  in  the  presence  of  a  Lomhard  deputation, 
laid  tlie  first  stone  of  the  monument  erected  by  subscrip- 
tions front  all  Italy  in  memory  of  those  who  had  fallen 
in  the  campaigns  of  1848  and  1849,  the  statue  of  a 
foot-soldier  waving  Ins  sword  towards  the  Austrian 
frontier.  The  Sardinian  Press  redoubled  its  attacks  on 
Austria  and  its  Italian  vassals.  The  Government  of 
Vienna  sought  satisfaction;  Cavour  sharply  refused  it; 
and  diplomatic  relations  between  the  two  Courts,  which 
had  been  resumed  since  the  Conference  of  Paris,  were 
again  broken  off. 

Of  the  two  Western  Powers,  Cavour  would  have 
preferred  an  alliance  with  Great  Britain,  which  had  no 
objects  of  its  own  to  seek  in  Italy ;  but  when  he  found 
that  the  Government  of  London  would  not  c.T<raT»nd 
assist  him  by  arms  gainst  Austria,  he  drew  ^'P""""" 
closer  to  the  Emperor  Napoleon,  and  supported  him 
throughout  his  controversy  with  England  and  Austria 
on  the  settlement  of  the  Danubian  Principalities. 
Napoleon,  there  is  no  doubt,  felt  a  real  interest  in  Italy. 
His  own  early  political  theories  formed  on  a  study 
of  the  Napoleonic  Empire,  his  youthful  alliance  with 
the  Carbonari,  point  to  a  synipatliy  with  the  Italian 
national  cause  which  was  genuine  if  not  profound,  and 
which  was  not  altogether  lost  in  1849,  though  France 
then  acted  as  the  enemy  of  Koman  independence.  If 
Napoleon  intended  to  remould  the  Continental  order 


262  UODBEir  EUBOPS.  *•»«. 

and  the  Treaties  o(   1815  in  the  interests  of  France 
and  of  the  principle    of    nationality,  he  could  make 
no   better  beginning    than   by    driving    Austria    from 
Northern  Italy.     It  was  not  eren  necessary  for  him  to 
devise  an  original  policy.      Early  in    1843,  when    it 
seemed  probable  that  Piedmont  would  be  increased  by 
liOrabardy  and  part  of  Vonetia,  Laraartine  had  laid  it 
down  that  Prance  ought  in  that  case  to  be  compensated  by 
Savoy,  in  order  to  secure  its  frontiers  against  so  power- 
ful a  neighbour  as  the  new  Italian  State.    To  this  idea 
Napoleon  returned.     Savoy  had  been  incorporated  vrith 
France  from   1792   to    1814;    its  people   were   more 
French  than  Italian  ;  its  annexation  would  not  directly 
injure  the  interests  of  any  great  Power.     Of  the  three 
directions  in  which  France  might  stretch  towards  ita 
old  limits  of  the  Alps  and  the  Ehine,  the  direction  of 
Savoy  was  by  far  the  least  dangerous.     Belgium  could 
not  be  touched,  without  certain  loss  of  the  English 
alliance,  with  which  Napoleon  could  not  yet  dispense ; 
an  attack  upon  the  Rhenish  Provinces  would  probably 
be  met  by  all  the  Geruian  Powers  together ;  in  Savoy 
alone  was  there  the  chance  of  gaining  territory  without 
raising  a  European  coalition  against  France.    No  sooner 
had  the  organisation  of  the   Danubian   Principalities 
been  completed  by  the  Conference  which  met  in  the  spring 
of  1858  than  Napoleon  began  to  develop  his  Italian 
plans.      An  attempt  of  a  very  terrible  character  which 
was  made   upon  his  life  by  Orsini,  a   Boman  eiile, 
though  at  the  moment  it  threatened  to  embroil  Sar- 
■nw  with  France,  probably  stimnhited  him  to  action. 


ta«&        OA70UB  Aim  KAFOLBON  AT  PLOUBISBEB.        363 

In  the  summer  of  1858  he  invited  Cavour  to  meet  him 

at  Plombi^res.    The  negotiations  which  there  passed 

were  not  made  known  by  the  Emperor  to 

his    Ministers;     ther   were   communicated     i^fnohjSni, 
'  •'  Jnlj,  tats. 

by  Cavour  to  two  persons  only  besides 
Victor  Emmanuel.  It  seems  that  no  written  engage- 
ment was  drawn  up ;  it  was  verbally  agreed  that  if 
Piedmont  could,  without  making  a  revolutionary  war, 
and  without  exposing  Napoleon  to  the  charge  of  aggres- 
Bion,  incite  Austria  to  hostilities,  France  would  act  as 
its  ally.  Austria  was  then  to  be  expelled  from  Yenetia 
as  well  aa  from  Lombardy.  Victor  Emmanuel  was 
to  become  sovereign  of  North-Italy,  with  the  Eoman 
Legations  and  Marches ;  the  remainder  of  the  Papal 
territory,  except  Rome  itself  and  the  adjacent  dis- 
trict, was  to  be  added  to  Tuscany,  so  constituting  a 
new  kingdom  of  Central  Italy.  Tbe  two  kingdoms, 
together  with  Naples  and  Rome,  were  to  form  an 
Italian  Confederation  under  tbe  presidency  of  the  Po|>e. 
Fiance  was  to  receive  Savoy  and  possibly  Nice.  A 
marriage  between  the  King's  young  daughter  Clotilde 
and  the  Emperor's  cousin  Prince  Jerome  Napoleon  was 
discussed,  if  not  actually  settled.* 

^     From  this  moment  Cavour  laboured  night  and  day 
for  war.     His  position  was  an  exceedingly 
difficult  one.     Not  only  had   he  to  reckon     or  ibe  Frsuch 
with  the  irresolution  of  Napoleon,  and  his 
avowed    unwillingness    to    take  up    arms  unless  with 

•  CsTDDT,  Letteie  (Chialn),  li  intr.  289,  324;  iiL  intr.  1.    Biniiclit, 
I}ip]aiiiazia,Tii.l.    HuiMle,  CftTooTrji.  187.    UMBui,  lift  MivmDra,  p.  ^ 


254  MOBBRN  BUROFB.  ibw-5>. 

the  appearance  of  some  good  cause  ;  but  even  supposing 
the  goal  of  war  reached,  uid  Austria  defeated,  how  little 
was  there  in  common  between  Cavour's  aims  for  Italy 
and  the  traditional  policy  of  France  I  The  first  Napo- 
leon had  given  "Venice  to  Austria  at  Campo  Pormio ; 
even  if  the  new  Napoleon  should  fulfil  his  promise  and 
liberate  all  Northern  Italy,  his  policy  in  regard  to  the 
centre  and  south  of  the  Peninsula  would  probably  be 
antagonistic  to  any  effective  union  or  to  any  further 
extension  of  the  influence  of  the  House  of  Savoy. 
Garoor  bad  therefore  to  set  in  readiness  for  action 
national  forces  of  such  strength  that  Napoleon,  even  if 
he  desired  to  draw  back,  should  find  it  difficult  to  do 
BO,  and  that  the  shaping  of  the  future  of  the  Italian 
people  should  be  governed  not  by  the  schemes  which 
the  Emperor  might  devise  at  Paris,  but  by  the  claims 
and  the  aspirations  of  Italy  itself.  It  was  necessary  , 
for  him  not  only  to  encourage  and  subsidise  the ! 
National  Society — a  secret  association  whose  branches  in 
the  other  Italian  States  were  preparing  to  assist  Pied- 
mont in  the  coming  war,  and  to  unite  Italy  under 
the  House  of  Savoy — but  to  enter  into  communica- 
tion with  some  of  the  Eepublican  or  revolutionaiy 
party  who  had  hitherto  been  at  enmity  with  all 
Crowns  alike.  He  summoned  Garibaldi  in  secrecy 
to  Turin,  and  there  convinced  him  that  the  war  about 
to  be  waged  by  Yictor  Emmanuel  was  one  in  which 
he  ought  to  take  a  prominent  pari  As  the  fore- 
most defender  of  the  Roman  Republic  and  a  revolu- 
tionary hero,  Garibaldi  was  obnoxious  to  the  JVeuoh 


Emperor.  Cavoar  had  to  conceal  ^m  Napoleon  the 
fact  that  Garibaldi  would  take  the  field  at  the  head  of  a 
free-corps  by  the  side  oC  the  Allied  armies;  he  had 
similarly  to  conceal  from.  Oaribaldi  that  one  reault  of 
the  war  would  be  the  cession  of  Nice,  his  own  birth- 
place, to  France.  Thus  plunged  in  intrigae,  driving 
his  Savoyards  to  the  camp  and  raising  from  them  the 
last  fartting  in  taxation,  in  order  that  after  victory 
they  might  be  surrendered  to  a  Foreign  Power;  goading 
Austria  to  some  act  of  passion ;  inciting,  yet  checking 
and  controlling,  the  Italian  revolutionary  elements  ;  bar- 
gaining away  the  daughter  of  his  sovereign  to  one  of 
the  most  odious  of  mankind,  Cavour  staked  all  on  the 
one  great  end  of  his  being,  the  establishment  of  Italian 
independence.  Words  like  those  which  burst  from 
Danton  in  the  storms  of  the  Convention — "  Perish  my 
name,  my  reputation,  so  that  France  be  free " — were 
the  calm  and  habitual  expression  of  Cavour's  thought 
when  none  but  an  intimate  friend  was  by  to  hear.* 
Such  tasks  as  Cavour's  are  not  to  be  achieved  with- 
out means  which,  to  a  man  noble  in  view  an  Cavour 
really  was,  it  would  have  heen  more  agreeable  to  leave 
unemployed.  Those  alone  are  entitled  to  pronounce 
judgment  upon  him  who  have  made  a  nation,  and 
made  it  with  purer  hands.  It  was  well  for  English 
B^tesmen  and  philanthropists,  inheritors  of  a  world- 
wide empire,  to  enforce   the    ethics  of  peace    and   to 

*  "  la  mezio  ftlle  piu  uigroeimwe  raiBi  politiclie,  esolAmiiTA  neUe  aoli- 
tndine  delle  sne  stauze ;  '  Feriaca  il  mio  nome,  perisca  Is  mia  f  atna,  pnrohb 
I'ltilu  sik.' "  Artom  (C»T(mr>  «ecretu7),  Cktoot  iu  P»rlameato :  uitro4. 
p.46.  I 


«S»  KOPEBN  EUEOPB.  MM 

plead  for  a  gentlemanlike  frankness  and  self-restraint 
in  the  conduct  of  international  relations.  English 
women  had  not  been  flogged  by  Austrian  soldiers  in 
the  market-place;  the  treaties  of  1815  had  not  conee- 
crated  a  foreign  rule  over  half  our  race.  To  Cavour  the 
greatest  crime  would  have  been  to  leave  anything 
undone  which  might  minister  to  Italy's  liberation.* 

Napoleon  seems  to  have  considered  that  he  would 
be  ready  to  begin  war  in  the  spring  of  1859.  At  the 
.p,^^^  reception   at  the   Tuileries    on  the  1st  of 

jmiuuj.iBw.  January  he  addressed  the  Austrian  ambas- 
sador in  words  that  pointed  to  an  approaching  conflict ; 
a  few  weeks  later  a  marriage-contract  was  sigued  betweeo 
Prince  Napoleon  and  Clotilde  daughter  of  Victor 
Emmanuel,  and  part  of  the  agreement  made  at  Plom- 
bieres  was  embodied  in  a  furnial  Treaty.  Napoleon 
undertook  to  support  Sardinia  in  a  war  that  might 
arise  from  any  ^^esslve  act  on  the  part  of  Austria, 
and,  if  victorious,  to  add  both  Lombardy  and  Venetia 
to  Victor  Emmanael's  dominions.  I  France  was  in 
return  to  receive  Savoy,  the  disposal  of  Nice  being 
reserved  till  the  restoration  of  peace.f  Even  before  the 
Treaty  was  signed  Victor  Emmanuel  had  thrown  down 
the  challenge  to  Austria,  declaring  at  the  opening  of 
the  Parliament  of  Turin  that  he  could  not  be  insen- 
sible to  the  cry  of  suffering  that  rose  from  Italy.     In 

*  La  Faruw  Epistokrio,  ii.  56,  81,  137,  426.  The  interview  with 
Qsribaldi;  Cavoiir,  Lettere,  id.  iatrod.  297.    Giribaldi,  Epiatolario.  1  55. 

t  Cavour,  Lett«re  (Cbiala),  iii.  introd.  32.  Bianchi,  Diplomada,  Tiii. 
11.  The  statement  of  Napolson  m.  to  Lord  Oowle^,  in  Jlartin,  Frincfl 
Qonsort,  T,  31,  tiutt  there  wu  no  Treaty,  is  untma. 


im.  ATTSMPTB  -iT  SfSDlATION.  25? 

all  bnt  technical  form  the  imminence  of  war  had  been 
announced,  when,  under  the  influence  of  diplomatists 
and  Ministers  about  him,  and  of  a  financial  panic 
that  followed  his  address  to  the  Austrian  ambas- 
sador, the  irresolute  mind  of  Napoleon  shrank  from  its 
purpose,  and  months  more  of  suspense  were  imposed 
upon  Italy  and  Europe,  to  be  terminated  at  last  not  by 
any  effort  of  Napoleon's  will  but  by  the  rash  and  im- 
politic action  of  Austria  itself.  At  the  in- 
stance  of  the  Court  of  Vienna  the  British  "n"^*"- 
GoTemment  had  consented  to  take  steps  towards  media- 
tion. Lord  Cowley,  Ambassador  at  Paris,  was  sent  to 
Vienna  with  proposals  which,  it  was  believed,  might 
form  the  basis  for  an  amicable  settlement  of  Italian 
affairs.  He  asked  that  the  Papal  States  should  be 
evacuated  by  both  Austrian  and  French  troops;  that 
Austria  should  abandon  the  Treaties  which  gave  it  a 
"virtual  Protectorate  over  Modena  and  Parma ;  and 
that  it  should  consent  to  the  introduction  of  reforms  in 
all  the  Italian  Grovemmenta.  Negotiations  towards 
this  end  had  made  some  progress  when  they  were  inter- 
rupted by  a  proposal  sent  from  St.  Petersburg,  at  the 
.  instance  of  Napoleon,  that  Italian  affairs  should  be  sub< 
mitted  to  a  European  Congress.  Austria  was  willing 
under  certain  conditions  to  take  part  in  a  Congress, 
bnt  it  required,  as  a  preliminary  measure,  that  Sardinia 
should  disarm.  Napoleon  had  now  learnt  that  Garibaldi 
was  to  fight  at  the  head  of  the  volunteers  for  Victor  Era- 
manueL  His  doubts  as  to  the  wisdom  of  his  own  policy 
seem  to  have  ini^eased  hoar  by  hour;  from  Britain,  whose 


258  llonESSr  EUBOPS.  I  nsi 

friendship  he  still  considered  indispensahle  to  him,  he 
received  the  most  urgent  appeals  against  war ;  it  was  ne- 
cessary that  Cavonr  himself  Bbould  visit  Paris  in  order 
to  prevent  the  Emperor  from  acquiescing  in  Austria's 
demand.  In  Cavour's  presence  Napoleon  seems  to  have 
lost  some  of  his  fears,  or  to  have  heen  made  to  feel  that 
it  was  not  safe  to  provoke  his  confidant  of  Flombi^resj* 
bat  Cavour  had  not  long  left  Paris  when  a  proposal 
was  made  from  London,  that  in  lieu  of  the  separate 
disarmament  of  Sardinia  the  Powers  should  agree  to  a 
general  disarmament,  the  details  to  be  settled  by  a 
European  Commission.  This  proposal  received  Napo- 
leon's assent.  He  telegraphed  to  Cavour  desiring  him  to 
join  in  the  agreement.  Cavour  could  scarcely  disobey,  yet 
at  one  stroke  it  seemed  that  all  his  hopes  when  on  the 
very  verge  of  fulfilment  were  dashed  to  the  ground,  all 
his  boundless  efforts  for  the  liberation  of  Italy  through 
war  with  Austria  lost  and  thrown  away.  For  some 
hours  he  appeared  shattered  by  tha  blow.  Strung  to 
the  extreme  point  of  hnmaa  endurance  by  labour 
scarcely  remitted  by  day' or  night  for  weeks  together, 
his  strong  but  sanguine  nature  gave  way,  and  for  a 
while  the  few  Friends  who  saw  him  feared  that  he  would 
take  his  own  life.  But  the  crisis  passed:  Cavour  ac- 
cepted, as  inevitable,  the  condition  of  general  disarma- 
ment; and  his  vigorous  mind  had  already  began  to 
work  upon  new  plans  for  the  future,  when  the  report  of 

*  Bianohi,  Folitiqne  de  Cmyaor,  p.  328,  where  is  OkTonr's  ladignajit 
letter  to  NftpoleoD.  Tlie  Uat  parajfraph  of  this  seems  to  oonrej  *  veiled 
thrut  to  pubUsh  the  soeret  uegotutioiu, 

D,  =  ,l,z..tvG00gIf 


im.  WAR   BETWEEN  FRANOB   AM)   AUSTBlt.  269 

a  decision  made  at  YienDa,  which  was  sooa  confirmed 
by  the  arrival  of  an  Austrian  ultimatum,  .  ^  ,^ 
threw  him  into  joy  as  intense  as  his  previous  »»'«n>.Apfi*«' 
despair.  Ignoring  the  British  proposal  for  a  general  dis- 
armament, already  accepted  at  Turin,  the  Austrian  Cahi- 
net  demanded,  without  qualifications  and  under  threat  of 
war  within  three  days,  that  Sardinia  shoald  separately 
disarm.  It  was  helieved  at  Vienna  that  Napoleon  was 
merely  seeking  to  gain  time;  that  a  conflict  was  in- 
evitable; and  that  Austria  now  stood  better  prepared 
for  immediate  action  than  its  enemies.  Bight  or  wrong 
in  its  judgment  of  Kapoleon's  real  intentions,  the  Aus- 
trian Government  had  undeniably  taken  upon  itself  the 
part  of  the  aggressor.  Cavour  had  only  to  point  to  his 
own  acceptance  of  the  plan  of  a  general  disarnjament, 
and  to  throw  upon  his  enemy  the  responsibility  for  a 
disturbance  of  European  peace.  His  reply  was  taken 
as  the  signal  for  hostilities,  and  on  the  29th  of  April 
Austrian  troops  crossed  the  Ticino.  A  declaration  of 
war  from  Paris  followed  without  delay.* 

For  months  past  Austria  had  been  pouring  its 
troops  into  Northern  Italy.  It  had  chosen  its  own 
time  for  the  commencement  of  war;  a  feeble  c,^,-,^^^ 
enemy  stood  before  it;  its  more  powerful  ^■ 
adversary  could  not  reach  the  field  without  crossing  the 
Alps  or  the  mountain-range  above  Genoa.  Everything 
pointed  to   a  vigorous    ofiensive    on   the   part  of  the 

*  OaTonr,  Lettere,  iiL  introd.  p.  116 ;  iU.  29.  BUncihi,  Politiqiie  de 
Catout,  p.  333.  Bianohi,  DipIomAda,  viL  6L  Uanari,  OsTonr,  p.  314. 
Parli&mentATj  Fapen,  1859,  xziii.  SfH,  262.  U^rimee,  LettrM  k  Ptmizu, 
L2I.    Hftrtin,  Prmea  CcnaorL  IT.  427.  ,.  , 

Mi     ■  .....Coogic 


M)  ^DEBtr  SVROPa.  urn. 

Austrian  generals,  and  in  Piedmont  itself  it  was  believed 
that  Turin  must  fall  before  French  troops  could  assist 
in  its  defence.  From  Turin  as  a  centre  the  Austrians 
could  then  strike  with  ease,  and  with  superior  numbers, 
against  the  detachments  of  the  French  army  as  they 
descended  the  mountains  at  any  points  in  the  semi- 
circle from  Genoa  to  Mont  Cenis.  There  has  seldom 
been  a  case  where  the  necessity  and  the  advantages  of  a 
particular  line  of  strategy  have  been  so  obvious  j  yet 
after  crossing  the  Ticino  the  Austrians,  above  a  hundred 
thousand  strong,  stood  as  if  spell-bound  under  their 
incompetent  chief,  Giulay.  Meanwhile  French  detach- 
ments crossed  Mont  Cenis;  others,  more  numerous, 
landed  with  tlie  Emperor  at  Genoa,  and  established 
communications  with  the  Piedaiontese,  whose  head- 
quarters were  at  Alessandria.  Giulay  now  believed 
that  the  Allies  would  strike  upon  his  comnuinicatioDB 
in  the  direction  o£  Parma.  The  march  of  Bonaparte 
upon  Piaccnza  in  1790,  as  well  as  the  campaign  of 
Marengo,  might  well  inspire  this  fear;  but  the  real  in- 
tention of  Napoleon  III.  was  to  outflank  the  Austrians 
from  the  nui-th  and  so  to  gain  Milan.  Garibaldi  was 
already  op<'ratiiig  at  the  extreme  left  of  the  Sardinian 
line  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Como.  White  the  Pied- 
montese  maititained  their  positions  in  the  front,  the 
French  from  Genoa  nuirched  northwards  behind  them, 
crossed  the  Po,  and  reached  Vercelli  before  the  Aus- 
trians discovered  their  mana'uvre.  Giulay,  still  linger- 
ing between  the  Scsia  and  the  Ticino,  now  called  up  part 
of  his  forces  northwards,  but  not  in  time  to  prevent  the 


wm.  UAaSNTA.  261 

Piedmontese  from  crossing  the  Sesia  and  defeating  the 
troops  opposed  to  them  at  Falestro  (May  30).  While 
the  Aastrians  were  occupied  at  this  point,  the  French 
crossed  the  river  farther  north,  and  moved  eastwards  on 
the  Ticino.  Qiulay  was  thus  outOanked  and  compelled 
to  Ml  back.  The  Allies  followed  him,  and  on  the  4th 
of  June  attacked  the  Anstriau  army  in  its  positions 
about  Magenta  on  the  road  to  Milan.  The  a-ssault  of 
Macmahon  from  the  north  gave  the  Allies 
victory  after  a  hard-fought  day.  It  was 
impossible  for  the  Austrians  to  defend  Milan ;  they 
retired  upon  the  Adda  and  subsequently  upon  the 
Minoio,  abandoning  all  Lombardy  to  the  invaders,  and 
calling  up  their  troops  from  Bologna  and  the  other 
occupied  towns  in  the  Papal  States,  in  order  that  they 
might  take  part  in  the  defence  of  the  Venetian  frontier 
and  the  fortresses  that  guarded  it. 

The  victory  of  the  Allies  was  at  once  felt  through- 
out Central  Italy.  The  Grand  Duke  of  Tuscany  had 
already  fled  from  his  dominions,  and  the  Dictatorship 
for  the  period  of  the  war  had  been  offered  by  a  Pro- 
visional Government  to  Victor  Emmanuel,  who,  while 
refusing  this,  had  allowed  his  envoy,  Boncampagni,  to 
assume  temporary  powers  at  Florence  as  his  representa- 
five.  The  Duke  of  Modena  and  the  Duchess  of  Parma 
now  qnitted  their  territories.  In  the  Komagna  the 
disappearance  of  the  Austrians  resulted  in 
the  immediate  overthrow  of  Papal  authority.  '^*^  "*■ 
Everywhere  the  demand  was  for  union  with  Piedmont. 
The  calamities  of  the  last  ten  years  had  taught  thei^ 


aa  MODERIT  BUROPB.  im 

kssoD  to  the  Italian  people.  There  was  now  nothing 
of  the  disorder,  the  eztrav^ance,  the  childishness  of 
1843.  The  popolations  who  had  then  been  so  divided, 
so  SQSpidoDs,  80  easy  a  prey  to  demagogues,  were  now 
watchfnl,  self-controlled,  and  aniions  for  the  guidance 
oi  the  only  real  national  Government.  As  at  Florence, 
so  in  the  Duchies  and  in  the  Bomagna,  it  was  desired 
that  Victor  Enunanoel  should  assume  the  Dictatorship. 
Tbe  King  adhered  to  the  policy  which  he  had  adopted 
towards  Tuscany,  avoiding  any  engagement  that  might 
compromise  him  with  Europe  or  his  ally,  but  appointing 
Commissioners  to  enrol  troops  for  the  common  war 
against  Austria  and  to  conduct  the  necessary  work  of 
administration  in  these  districts.  Farini,  the  historian  of 
the  Homan  States,  was  sent  to  Modena ;  Azeglio,  the 
ex-Minister,  to  Bolc^a.  Each  of  these  officers  entered 
on  his  task  in  a  spirit  worthy  of  th^  time  ;  each  nnder- 
Btood  how  much  might  be  won  for  Italy  by  boldness, 
how  much  endangered  or  lost  by  untimely  scruples.* 

In  his  proclamations  at  the  opening  of  the  war 
Napoleon  had  declared  that  Italy  must  be  freed  up  to 
the  shore  of  the  Adriatic.  His  address  to  the  Italian 
people  on  entering  Milan  with  Victor  Emmanuel  after 
the  victory  of  Magenta  breathed  the  same  spirit.  As 
yet,  however,  Lombardy  alone  bad  been  won.  The 
advance  of  the  allied  armies  was  accordingly  resumed 
after  an  interval  of  some  days,  and  on  the  23rd  of  June 
they  approached  the  positions  held  by  the  Austrians  s 
SOl.'iTa  ^'^'^  ^P«t<»l"ri«.  ii  172.    PwliMientMy  Papaw,  18t»,  zziB. 

D,a,l,zc.bvG00gIe 


little  to  the  west  of  tlie  MiDcio.  Francis  Joseph  had 
come  from  Vienna  to  take  command  of  the  army.  His 
presence  assisted  the  enemy,  inasmach  as  he  had  no  plan 
of  his  own,  and  wavered  from  day  to  day  between  the 
antagonistic  plans  of  the  generals  at  headquarters. 
Some  wished  to  make  the  Mincio  the  line 
of  defence,  others  to  hold  the  Chiese  some  '"'"■'"~"- 
miles  farther  west.  The  consequence  was  that  the 
anny  marched  backwards  and  forwards  across  the  space 
between  the  two  rivers  according  as  one  or  another 
general  gained  for  the  moment  the  Emperor's  confi- 
dence. It  was  while  the  Anstrians  were  thus  engaged 
that  the  allied  mmies  came  into  contact  with  them 
about  Solferino.  On  neither  side  was  it  known  that  the 
whole  force  of  the  enemy  was  close  at  hand.  The  battle 
of  Solferino,  one  of  the  bloodiest  of  recent  times,  was 
fongbt  almost  by  accident.  About  a  hundred  and  fifty 
thousand  men  were  present  under  Kapoleon  and  Victor 
iEmmanuel ;  the  Anstrians  had  a  slight  superiority  in 
force.  On  the  north,  where  Benedek  with  the  Austrian 
right  was  attacked  by  the  Fiedmontese  at  San  Martino, 
it  seemed  as  if  the  task  imposed  on  the  Italian  troops 
was  beyond  their  power.  Victor  Emmanuel,  fighting 
with  the  same  course  as  at  Novara,  saw  the  positions 
in  front  of  his  troops  alternately  won  and  lost.  But 
the  success  of  the  French  at  Solferino  in  the  centre 
decided  the  day,  and  the  Austrians  withdrew  at  last 
from  their  whole  line  with  a  loss  in  killed  and  wounded 
of  fourteen  thousand  men.  On  the  part  of  the  Allies 
the  slaughter  was  scarcely  less.  Cnnol  • 


AM  MODB^T  EVBOPS.  HK 

Napoleon  stood  a  oonqneror,  bnt  a  conqueror  at 
terrible  cost;  and  in  front  of  him  he  saw  the  fortresses 
of  the  Quadrilateral,  while  new  divisions  were  hastening 
from  the  north  and  east  to  the  support  of  the  still 
^^^  unbroken  Austrian  army.     He  might  well 

''*^^-  doubt  whether,   even   against  his    present 

ant^onist  alone,  farther  success  was  possible.  The 
fearful  spectade  of  Solferino,  heightened  by  the  effects 
of  overpowering  summer  heat,  probably  affected  a  mind 
humane  and  sensitive  and  untried  in  the  experience  of 
war.  The  conditiou  of  the  French  army,  there  is 
reason  to  believe,  was  far  different  from  that  represented 
in  official  reports,  and  likely  to  make  the  continuance  of 
the  campaign  perilous  in  tlie  extreme.  But  beyond  all 
this,  the  Emperor  knew  that  if  he  advanced  farther 
Prussia  and  all  Gemiaoy  might  at  any  moment  take 
up  arms  against  him.  There  had  been  a  strong  out- 
burst of  sympathy  for  Austria  in  the  south-western 
German  States.  National  patriotism  was  excited  by 
the  attack  of  Napoleon  on  the  chief  of  the  German 
sovereigns,  and  the  belief  was  widely  spread  that  French 
conquest  in  Italy  would  soon  be  followed  by  French 
conquest  on  the  Khine.  Prussia  had  hitherto  shown 
reserve.  It  would  have  joined  its  arms  with  those  of 
Austria  if  its  own  claims  to  an  improved  position  in 
Germany  had  been  granted  by  the  Court  of  Vienna ; 
hut  Francis  Joseph  had  up  to  this  time  refused  the 
concessions  demanded.  In  the  stress  of  his  peril  he 
might  at  any  moment  close  with  the  offers  which  he 
had  before  rejected;    even    without  a   distinct  agree- 


MIL  YILLAFSANOA.  S65 

meot  between  the  two  Courts,  and  in  mere  deference  to 
German  public  opinion,  Prussia  might  launch  against 
France  the  armies  which  it  had  already  brought  into 
readiness  for  the  field.  A  war  upon  the  Bhine  would 
then  be  added  to  the  war  before  the  Quadrilateral,  and 
from  the  risks  of  this  double  effort  Napoleon  might  welt 
shrink  in  the  interest  of  France  not  less  than  of  his 
own  dynasty.  He  determined  to  seek  an  interview 
with  Francis  Joseph,  and  to  ascertain  on  what  terms 
peace  might  now  be  made.  The  interview  took  place 
at  Yillafranca,  east  of  the  Miucio,  on  the 
llth  of  July.  Francis  Joseph  refused  to  vuiufnum^ 
cede  any  part  of  Venetia  without  a  further 
struggle.  He  was  willing  to  give  up  Lombardy,  and 
to  coQseot  to  the  establishment  of  an  Italian  Federation 
under  the  presidency  of  the  Pope,  of  which  Federation 
Yenetia,  still  under  Austria's  rule,  should  be  a  member  ; 
but  he  required  that  Mantua  should  be  left  withio  his  own 
frontier,  and  that  the  sovereigns  of  Tuscany  and  Modena 
should  resume  possession  of  their  dorainioos.  To  these 
terms  Napoleon  assented,  on  obtaining  a  verbal  agree- 
ment that  the  dispossessed  princes  should  not  be  restored 
by  foreign  arms.  Begarding  Parma  and  the  restoration 
of  the  Papal  authority  in  the  Bomagna  no  stipulations 
were  made.      With  the  signature  of  the    „ 

°  PdBcs  or  VllU- 

Preliminaries  of  Villafranca,  which  were  to        '"™^ 
form  the  base  of  a  regular  Treaty  to  be  negotiated  at 
Zurich,   and  to  which   Victor  Emmanuel  added   his 
name  with  words  of  reservation,  hostilities  came  to  a  close. 
The  uegotiations  at  Ziirich,  though   they  lasted  for 


266  3I0DEB1T  BTTBOPS.  vm. 

BeTeral  months,  added  nothing  of  importance  to  the 
matter  of  the  Preliminaries,  and  decided 
nothing  that  had  heen  left  in  uncertainty.  ^""^  ^"-  *"• 
The  Italian  Federation  remained  a  scheme  which  the 
two  Emperors,  and  they  alone,  nndertook  to  promote. 
Piedmont  entered  into  no  engagement  either  with 
regard  to  the  Duchies  or  with  regard  to  Federation. 
Victor  Emmanael  had  in  fact  announced  from  the  first 
that  he  would  enter  no  League  of  which  a  province 
governed  by  Austria  formed  a  part,  and  from  this 
resolution  he  never  swerved.* 

Though  Lombardy  was  gained,  the  impression  made 
upon  the  Italians  by  the  Peace  of  Yillafranca  was  one 
of  the  utmost  dismay.  Napoleon  had  so  confidently  and 
H«hmBH.Mi  rf  ^'^  recently  promised  the  liberation  of  all 
a«rar.  Northern  Italy  that  public  opinion  ascribed 
to  treachery  or  weakness  what  was  in  truth  an  act  of 
political  necessity.  On  the  first  rumour  of  the  nego- 
tiations Cavour  had  hurried  from  Turin,  but  the  agree- 
meut  was  Bigned  before  his  arrival.  The  anger  and 
the  grief  of  Cavour  ace  described  by  those  who  then 
saw  him  as  terrible  to  witness.f  Napoleon  had  not 
the  courage  to  face  him;  Victor  Emmanuel  bore  for 
two  hours  the  reproaches  of  his  Minister,  who 
had  now  completely  lost  his  self-control.  Cavouj  re- 
turned to  Turin,  and  shortly  afterwards  withdrew  from 

*  Oavoor,  Lettere  iii.  iutrod.  212,  iiL  107.  BUnohi,  Folifiqiie  de  OftTonr, 
p.  34S.  BianoM,  Biplomadft,  Tiii.  145, 198.  Massari,  Yittorio  Eiiuuiael« 
iLS2.  Kossuth,  Memoriea,  p.  394.  Pari.  Pap  1859,  mii.  63, 1860,  IxTia. 
7.    La  Fuina  E|nat,  ii.  190.    Ollivier,  L'^gliae  et  I'^Ut,  ii  452, 

t  Arrivobeae,  Ittlj  Tinder  Victor  Emnnmnn^  I,  268, 

.OOglf 


MHL  CENTRAL  ITALY.  267 

office,  tis  last  act  being  the  despatch  of  ten  thoosand 
mnskets  to  Farini  at  Modena.  In  accordance  with  the 
terms  of  peace,  ingtmctious,  which  were  probably  not 
meant  to  be  obeyed,  were  sent  by  Cavour's  successor, 
Battazzi,  to  the  Fiedmontese  GommisgioDers  in  Central 
Italy,  bidding  them  to  return  to  Turin  and  to 
disband  any  forces  that  they  had  collected. 
Farini,  on  receipt  of  this  order,  adroitly  divested  him- 
self of  his  Fiedmontese  citizenship,  and,  as  an  honorary 
bnrglier  of  Modena,  accepted  the  Dictatorship  from  his 
fellow-townsmen.  Azeglio  returned  to  Turin,  but  took 
care  before  quitting  the  Somagna  to  place  four  thou- 
sand soldiers  nnder  competent  leaders  in  a  position  to 
resist  attack.  It  was  not  the  least  of  Cavour's  merits 
that  he  had  gathered  abont  him  a  body  of  men  who, 
when  his  own  hand  was  for  a  while  withdrawn,  could 
pursue  bis  policy  with  bo  mnch  energy  and  sagaciiy  as 
'  was  now  shown  by  the  leaders  of  the  national  movement 
in  Central  Italy.  Yenetia  was  lost  for  the  present ; 
but  if  Napoleon's  promise  was  broken,  districts  which 
he  had  f^ed  or  had  not  intended  to  liberate  might  be 
nnited  with  the  Italiui  Kingdom.  The  Duke  of  Mo- 
dena, with  six  thousand  men  who  had  remained  true  to 
bim,  lay  on  the  Austrian  frontier,  and  threatened  to 
march  upon  bis  capital.  Farini  mined  the  city  gates, 
and  armed  so  considerable  a  force  that  it  became  clear 
that  the  Duke  would  not  recover  bis  dominions  withoat 
a  serions  battle.  Parma  placed  itself  under  the  same 
Dictatorship  with  Modena;  in  the  Bomagna  a  Pro- 
Tisional  GoTenunent  which  Azeglio  had  left~  behind 


268  MODX^r  SVROPB,  m< 

him  contmued  bis  work.  Tuscany,  where  Napoleon 
had  hoped  to  find  a  throne  for  bis  cousin,  pronouDced 
for  national  union,  and  organised  a  common  military 
force  witb  its  neighbours.  During  the  weeks  that 
followed  tbe  Peace  of  Villafranca,  declarations  signed  by- 
tens  of  thousauds,  the  votes  of  representative  bodies, 
and  popular  demonstrations  throughout  Ceotral  Italy, 
showed  in  an  orderly  and  peaceful  form  how  universal 
was  the  desire  for  union  under  the  House  of  Savoy. 

Cavour,  in  the   plans  which  he   had  made  before 
1869,  bad  not  looked  for  a  direct  and  imiaediate  result 

beyond  the  creation  of  an  Italian  Kingdom 
brfoTB  viiu.      including  the  whole  of  tbe  territory  north 

of  tbe  Po.  Tbe  other  steps  in  the  con- 
solidation of  Italy  would,  he  believed,  follow  in 
their  order.  They  might  be  close  at  band,  or  they 
might  be  delayed  for  a  while ;  but  in  the  expulsion  of 
Austria,  in  tbe  interposition  of  a  purely  Italian  State 
numbering  above  ten  millions  of  inhabitants,  mistress 
of  the  fortresses  and  of  a  powerful  fleet,  between  Aus- 
tria and  those  who  had  been  its  vassals,  tbe  essential 
conditions  of  Italian  national  independence  would 
have  been  won.  For  the  rest,  Italy  might  be  content 
to  wait  upon  time  and  opportunity.  But  the  Peace  of 
YiUafranca,  leaving  Venetia  in  the  enemy's  hands, 
completely  changed  this  prospect.  Tbe  fiction  of  an 
Italian  Federation  in  which  the  Hapsburg  Emperor,  as 
lord  of  Venice,  should  forget  bis  Austrian  interests  and 
play  the  part  of  Italian  pL.triot,  was  too  gross  to 
deceive  any  one,      Italy,  on  these  terms,  would  either 


tm  OBNTBAL  ITALT.  2B9 

oontinae  to  be  governed  from  Vienna,  or  be  made  a 
pawn  in  the  hands  of  its  French  protector.  What 
therefore  Cavour  had  hitherto  been  willing  to  leave  to 
fature  years  now  became  the  need  of  the  present. 
"  Before  Villafranca,"  in  his  own  words,  "  the  union  of 
Italy  was  a  possibility ;  since  Villafranca  it  is  a  neces- 
sity-" Victor  Emmanuel  understood  this  _ 
too,  and  saw  the  need  for  action  more  'il^'SiJr- 
clearly  than  Battazzi  and.  the  Ministers  who, 
on  Cavour's  withdrawal  in  July,  stepped  for  a  few 
months  into  his  place.  The  sitaation  was  one  that 
called  indeed  for  no  mean  exercise  of  statesmanship.  If 
Italy  was  not  to  be  left  dependent  upon  the  foreigner 
and  the  reputation  of  the  House  of  Savoy  ruined,  it 
was  necessary  not  only  that  the  Duchies  of  Modena  and 
Parma,  but  that  Central  Italy,  including  Tuscany  and 
at  least  the  Bomi^na,  should  be  united  with  the  Kingdom 
of  Piedmont;  yet  the  accomplishment  of  this  work 
was  attended  with  the  utmost  danger.  Napoleon  him- 
self was  hoping  to  form  Tuscany,  with  an  augmented 
territory,  into  a  rival  Kingdom  of  Etruria  or  Central 
Italy,  and  to  place  his  cousin  on  its  throne.  The 
Ultramontane  party  in  Fmnce  was  alarmed  and  indig- 
nant at  the  overthrow  of  the  Pope's  authority  in  the 
Komagna,  and  already  called  upon  the  Emperor  to 
fulfil  his  duties  towards  the  Holy  See.  If  the  national 
movement  should  exteod  to  Bome  itself,  the  hostile 
intervention  of  Prance  was  almost  inevitable.  While 
the  negotiations  with  Austria  at  Ztirich  were  still  pro- 
ceeding,  Victor  Emmanuel  could  not  safely  accept  the 


870  MODEBJSr  BUBOTS.  uw 

sovereignty  that  was  offered  him  by  Tuscany  and  the 
neighbouring  provinces,  nor  permit  his  cousin,  the 
Prince  of  Carignano,  to  assume  the  regency  which, 
during  the  period  of  suspense,  it  was  proposed  to 
confer  upon  him.  Above  all  it  was  necessary  that  the 
Government  should  not  allow  the  popular  forces  with 
which  it  was  co-operating  to  pass  beyond  its  own  con- 
trol. In  the  critical  period  that  followed  the  armistice 
of  Villafranca,  Mazzini  approached  Victor  Emmannel, 
as  thirty  years  before  he  had  approached 
aS^^i-'  his  father,  and  offered  his  own  assistance 
in  the  establishment  of  Italian  union  under 
the  House  of  Savoy.  He  proposed,  as  the  first  step, 
to  overthrow  the  Neapolitan  Government  by  means  of 
an  expedition  headed  by  Garibaldi,  and  to  unite  Sicily 
and  Naples  to  the  King's  dominions ;  but  he  demanded 
in  return  that  Piedmont  should  oppose  armed  resistance 
to  any  foreign  intervention  occasioned  by  this  enter- 
prise; and  he  seems  also  to  have  required  that  an 
attack  should  be  made  immediately  afterwards  upon 
Rome  and  upon  Venetia.  To  these  conditions  the 
King  could  not  accede  ;  and  Mazzini,  confirmed  in  his 
attitude  of  distrust  towards  the  Court  of  Turin,  turned 
to  Garibaldi,  who  was  now  at  Modena.  At  his  instiga- 
tion Garibaldi  resolved  to  lead  an  expedition  at  once 
against  Rome  itself.  Napoleon  was  at  this  very 
moment  promising  reforms  on  behalf  of  the  Pope, 
and  warning  Victor  Emmanuel  against  the  annexa- 
tion even  of  the  Romagna  (Oct.  20th).  At  the  risk 
of    incurring    the    hostility    of    Ghiribaldi's    foUowera 


UK  THB  PBOP08SD   OOSTQREBB.  271 

and  throwing  their  leader  into  opposition  to  the 
dynasty,  it  was  necessary  for  the  Sardinian  Government 
to  check  him  in  his  course.  The  moment  was  a  critical 
one  in  the  history  of  the  House  of  Savoy.  But  the 
soldier  of  Repahlican  Italy  proved  more  tractahle  than 
its  prophet.  Q-arihaldi  was  persuaded  to  abandon  or  post- 
pone an  enterprise  which  could  only  have  resulted  in 
disaster  for  Italy;  and  with  expressions  of  cordiality 
towards  the  King  himself,  and  of  bitter  contempt  for  the 
fox-like  politicians  who  advised  him,  he  resigned  his  com- 
mand and  bade  farewell  to  his  comrades,  recommending 
them,  however,  to  remain  under  arms,  in  full  confidence 
that  they  would  ere  long  find  a  better  opportunity  for 
carryiag  the  national  flag  southwards.* 

Soon  after  the  Agreement  of  Villafranca,  Napoleon 
had  proposed  to  the  British  Government  that  a  Con- 
gress o£  all  the  Powers  should  assemble  at  Paris  in 
order  to  decide  upon  the  many  Italian  questions  which 
still  remained  unsettled.  In  taking  upon  himself  the 
emancipation  of  Northern  Italy  Napoleon  had,  as  it 
proved,  attempted  a  task  far  beyond  his  own  powers. 
The  work  had  been  abruptly  broken  off;  the  promised 
services  had  not  been  rendered,  the  stipulated  reward 
had  not  been  won.     On   the   other  hand, 

Thepnipned 

forces  had  been  set  in  motion  which  he  who       c™e'™- 
raised  them  could  not  allay  ;  populations  stood  in  arms 
against   the   Governments    which    the    Agreement    of 
Villafranca  purported  to  restore ;  the  Pope's  authority 

*  Oavoor,  Lett«»,  iii.  iutrod.  301.    Bianchi,  Tiii.  ISO.     Garibaldi, 
El^st.,  i  78.    Gveraoni,  I  491,    BeacUiii,  ir.  410. 


8n  UODEBN  EOROPa.  IM 

in  the  northern  part  of  Iiis  dominions  was  at  an  end ; 
the  Italian  League  over  which  France  and  Austria  were 
to  join  hands  of  benediction  remained  the  langbing- 
stock  of  Europe.  Napoleon's  victories  had  added  Lom- 
bardy  to  Piedmont;  for  the  rest,  except  from  the 
Italian  point  of  view,  they  had  only  thrown  affairs 
into  confusion.  Hesitating  at  the  first  between 
bis  obligatioQS  towards  Austria  and  the  maintenance 
of  his  prestige  in  Italy,  pei-plezed  between  the  con- 
tradictory claims  of  nationality  and  of  Ultramon- 
tanism,  Napoleon  would  gladly  have  cast  upon  Great 
Britain,  or  upon  Europe  at  large,  the  task  of  extricating 
him  from  his  embarrassment.  But  the  Cabinet  of 
London,  while  favourable  to  Italy,  showed  little  inclina- 
tion to  entangle  itself  in  engagements  which  might  lead 
to  war  with  Austria  and  Germany  in  the  interest  of 
the  French  Sovereign.  Italian  afEairs,  it  was  ui^ed  by 
Lord  John  Russell,  might  well  be  governed  by  the 
course  of  events  within  Italy  itself;  and,  as  Austria 
remained  inactive,  the  principle  of  non-intervention 
really  gained  the  day.  The  firm  attitude  of  the  popu- 
lation both  in  the  Duchies  and  in  the  Romagna, 
their  unanimity  and  self-control,  the  absence  of  those 
disorders  which  had  so  often  been  made  a  pretext  for 
foreign  intervention,  told  upon  the  mind  of  Napoleon 
and  on  the  opinion  of  Europe  at  large.  Each  month 
that  passed  rendered  the  restoration  of  the  fallen 
Ooveroments  a  work  of  greater  difficulty,  and  increased 
the  confidence  of  the  Italians  in  themselves.  Napoleon 
watched  and  wavered.    When  the  Treaty  of  Zurich  was 


un  THB  FOPB  AND  TEE  OONQRESS.  273 

Bigned  bis  policy  vas  still  undetermiQed.  By  the 
'  prompt  and  liberal  concessioa  of  reforms  the  Papal 
Government  might  perhaps  even  now  have  turned  the 
balance  in  its  favour.  But  the  obstinate  mind  of 
Pins  IX.  was  proof  against  every  politic  and  every  gene- 
rous influence.  The  stubbonmess  shown  by  Borne,  the 
remembrance  of  Antonelli's  conduct  towards  the  French 
Bepublic  in  1849,  possibly  also  the  discovery  of  a 
Treaty  of  Alliance  between  the  Papal  Government  and 
Austria,  at  length  overcame  Napoleon's  hesitation  in 
meeting  the  national  demand  of  Italy,  and  gave  him 
courage  to  defy  both  the  Papal  Court  and  the  French 
priesthood.  He  resolved  to  consent  to  the  formation 
of  an  Italian  Kingdom  under  Victor  Emmanuel  iii- 
cluding  the  northern  part  of  the  Papal  territories  as 
well  as  Tuscany  and  the  other  Duchies,  and  to  silence 
the  outcry  which  this  act  of  spoliation  would  excite 
among  the  clerical  party  in  France  by  the  annexation 
of  Nice  and  Savoy. 

The  decision  of  the  Emperor  was  foreshadowed 
by  the  publication  on  the  24th  of  December  of 
a  pamphlet  entitled  "  The  Pope  and 
the  Congress."  The  doctrine  advanced  oecong™-," 
in  this  essay  was  that,  although  a  cer- 
tain temporal  authority  was  necessary  to  the  Pope's 
spiritoal  independence,  the  peace  and  unity  which 
sbonld  surround  the  Yicar  of  Christ  would  be  best 
attained  when  his  temporal  sovereignty  was  reduced 
within  the  narrowrat  possible  limits.  Bome  and  the 
territory  immediately  around  it,  if  guaranteed  to  the  Pope 

S  -  I  COOJMC 


274  MODEWf  BUBOPS.  ma. 

by  tbe  Great  Powers,  wonid  be  sufficient  for  tbe  temporal 
needs  of  tbe  Holy  See.    The  revenue  lost  by  the  separa- 
tion of  tbe  remaiuder  of  tbe  Papal  territories  might  be 
replaced  by  a  yearly  tribute  of  reverence  paid  by  the 
Catholic  Powers  to  the  Head  of  the  CJhurcb.     That  the 
pamphlet  advocating  this  policy  was  written  at  the  dic- 
tation of  Napoleon  was  not  made  a  secret.     Its  appear- 
ance occasioned  an  indignant  protest  at  Rome.     The 
Pope  announced  that  he  would  take  no  part   in   the 
proposed  Congress   unless   the   doctrines    advanced    in 
the  pamphlet  were  disavowed  by  the  French  Govern- 
ment.    Napoleon  in  reply  submitted  to  the  Pope  that 
he  would  do  well  to  purchase  the   guarantee   of  the 
Powers  for  the  remainder  of  his  territories  by  giving  np 
all  claim  to  the  Eomagna,  which  he  had  already  lost. 
Pius  retorted  that  he  could  not  cede  what  Heaven  had 
granted,  not  to  himself,  but  to  the  Church;  and  that 
if  the   Powers  would  but  clear  the  Romagna  of  Pied- 
nionteso  intruders  he  would  soon  reconquer  the  rebellious 
province  without  the  assistance  either  of  France  or  of 
Austria.      The  attitude  assumed  by  the    Papal    Court 
giive  Napoleon  a  good  pretext  for  abandoning  the  plan 
of  a  European    Congress,   from  which  he  coutd  hardly 
g^^ofMi^     expect  to  obtain  a  grant  of  Nice  and  Savoy. 
■"i-".?tS;.  It  was  announced  at  Paris  that  the   Con- 

of  Jan  ^'^^^^  ^"^"^^  ^®  postponed ;  and  on  the  5th 

"ary,  i860,  the  change  in  Napoleon's  policy  was 
^ST'JS™-     Put'Jicly  marked    by  the    dismissal    of    bis 
Po'itment  in  t^^'^^    Minister,  Walewski,   and   the  ap- 
^  bis  place  of  Thouvenel.  a  friend  to  Italiao 

L  ,i,z<,.f,GoogIf 


MM  CAYOVR  AND  NJPOLBON.  275 

onion.     Ten  days  later  Rattazzi  gave  up  office  at  Turin, 
and  Cavour  returned  to  power. 

Kattazzi,  during  the  six  months  that  he  had  cod- 
dacted  affairs,  had  steered  safely  past  some  dangerous 
rocks;  but  he  held  the  helm  with  an  unsteady  and 
uubnsted  hand,  and  he  appears  to  have  displayed  an 
unworthy  jealousy  towards  Cavour,  who,  while  out  of 
office,  had  not  ceased  to  render  what  services  he  could  to 
Ms  country.  Cavour  resumed  his  post,  with  the  roiolve 
to  defer  no  longer  the  annexation  of  Central  Italy,  but 
with  the  heavy  consciousness  that  !N^apoleon  would 
demand  in  return  for  his  consent  to  this 
union  the  cession  of  Nice  and  Savoy,  No  J^p^^Lj, 
Treaty  entitled  France  to  claim  this  reward, 
for  the  Anstrians  stlLl  held  Venetian  but  Napoleon's 
troops  lay  at  Milan,  and  by  a  march  southwards  they 
could  easily  throw  Italian  affairs  again  into  confusion, 
and  undo  all  that  the  last  six  months  had  effected. 
Cavour  would  perhaps  have  lent  himself  to  any 
European  combination  which,  while  directed  against 
the  extension  of  France,  would  have  secured  the  ex- 
istence of  the  Italian  Kingdom ;  but  no  such  alterna- 
tive to  the  French  alliance  proved  possible;  and  the 
subsequent  negotiations  between  Paris  and  Turin  were 
intended  only  to  vest  with  a  certain  diplomatic  pro- 
priety the  now  inevitable  .transfer  of  territory  from 
the  weaker  to  the  stronger  State.  A  series  of  propo- 
sitions made  from  liondon  with  the  view  of  with- 
drawing from  Italy  both  French  and  Austrian  influence 
led  the  Austrian  Court  to  acknowledge  that  its  army 
s2 


SE78  MOBESIT  EVROPB.  tm. 

wodM  not  be  employed  for  the  restoration  of  the 
sovereigns  of  Tuscany  and  Modena.  Construing  this 
statement  aa  an  admission  that  the  stipulations  of 
Villafrauca  and  Zurich  as  to  the  return  of  the  fugi- 
tive princes  had  become  impracticable,  Napoleon 
now  suggested  that  Victor  Emmanuel  should  annex 
Parma  and  Modena,  and  assume  secular  power  in  the 
Bomagna  as  Yicar  of  the  Pope,  leaving  Tuscany  to 
form  a  separate  Government.  The  establishment  of  so 
powerful  a  kingdom  on  the  confines  of  France  was,  he 
added,  not  in  accordance  with  the  traditions  of  French 
foreign  policy,  and  in  self-defence  France  must  rectiiy 
its  military  frontier  by  the  acquisition  of  Nice  and 
Savoy  (Feb.  24th}.  Cavour  well  onderstood  that  the 
mention  of  Tuscan  independence,  and  the  qualified 
recognition  of  the  Pope's  rights  in  the  Koroagna,  were 
no  more  than  suggestions  of  the  means  of  pressure  by 
which  France  might  enforce  the  cessions  it  required. 
He  answered  that,  although  Victor  Emmanuel  could 
not  alienate  any  part  of  his  dominions,  bis  Govern- 
ment recognised  the  same  popular  rights  in  Sayoy  and 
Nice  as  in  Central  Italy ;  and  accordingly  that  if  the 
population  of  these  districts  declared  in  a  l^al  form 
their  desire  to  be  incorporated  with  France,  the  King 
would  not  resist  their  will.  Having  thus  consented  to 
the  necessary  sacrifice,  and  ignoring  Napoleon's  reserva- 
tions with  regard  to  Tuscany  and  the  Pope,  Cavonr  gave 
orders  that  a  popular  vote  should  at  once  be  taken  in 
Tuscany,  as  well  as  in  Parma,  Modena,  and  the  Bomagna, 
on  the  question  of  union  with  Piedmont.  .The. voting 


»«.       VmON  OF  OESTRAL  ITALY  WITS  PJ3DU0NT.      277 

took  plfice  early  in  March,  and  gave  an  OTerwhelming 
majority  in  favoar  of  union.  The  Pope  rntoDoia» 
issued  the  major  excommnDication  against  ^i^^>>wiib 
the  aathors,  abettors,  and  agents  in  this  ""^ 
work  of  sacrilege,  and  heaped  cnrees  on  curses ;  but  no 
one  seemed  the  worse  for  them.  Victor  Emmanuel 
accepted  the  sovereignty  that  was  offered  to  him,  and 
on  the  2nd  of  April  the  Parliament  of  the  united 
kingdom  assembled  at  Turin.  It  had  already  been 
annoonced  to  the  inhabitants  of  Nice  and  Savoy  that 
the  King  had  consented  to  their  anion  with  France. 
The  formality  of  a  plebiscite  was  enacted  a  few  days 
later,  aud  under  the  combined  pressure  of  b,_,^„j„ 
the    French    and    Sardinian   Governments  »"R««. 

the  desired  results  were  obtained.  Not  more  than  a 
few  hundred  persons  protested  by  their  vote  against 
a  transaction  to  which  it  was  understood  that  the  King 
had  no  choice  but  to  submit.* 

That  Victor  Emmanuel  had  at  one  time  been  di:;- 
posed  to  resist  Cavour's  surrender  of  the  home  of 
his  race  is  well  known.  Above  a  year,  however,  had 
passed  since  the  project  had  been  accepted 
as  the  basis  of  the  French  alliance ;  and  if,  «JiS'n  "nuI 
daring  the  interval  of  suspense  after  Villa- 
franca,  the  King  had  cherished  a  hope  that  the  sacrifice 
might  be  avoided  without  prejudice  either  to  the  cause 
of  Italy  or  to  his  own  relations  with  Napoleon,  Cavour 

•  CsTonr,   Leilero,    W.    introd.    20.       Bianclii,    Politiquo,    p.    354. 
Biknehi,  DiplomuiA,  TiiL  356.    fEirluiiieutarj  Fapcra,  1860,  kvU.  203  ( 


278  MODE^f  STTBOPB.  msl 

had  entertatQed  no  such  illosionB.  He  knew  that  the 
cession  was  an  indispensable  link  in  the  chain  of  his 
own  policy,  that  policy  which  had  made  it  possible  to 
defeat  Austria,  and  which,  he  believed;  would  lead  to 
the  fuither  consolidation  of  Italy.  Looking  to  Borne, 
to  Falenno,  where  the  smouldering  fire  might  at  any 
moment  blaze  out,  he  could  not  yet  dispense  with  the 
friendship  of  Napoleon,  he  could  not  proToke  the  one 
man  powerful  enough  to  shape  the  action  of  France  in 
defiance  of  Clerical  and  of  Legitimist  aims.  Battazzi 
might  claim  credit  for  having  brought  Piedmont  past 
the  Treaty  of  Zurich  without  loss  of  territory ;  Cavour. 
in  a  far  finer  spirit,  took  upon  himself  the  responsibility 
for  the  sacrifice  made  to  France,  and  bade  tbe  Parlia- 
ment of  Italy  pass  judgment  upon  his  act.  The 
cession  of  the  border-provinces  overshadowed  what  would 
otherwise  have  been  the  brightest  scene  in  Italian 
history  for  many  generations,  the  meeting  of  tbe  first 
North-Italian  Parliament  at  Turin.  Garibaldi,  coming 
as  deputy  from  his  birthplace,  Nice,  uttered  words  of 
scorn  and  injustice  against  the  man  who  had  made  him 
an  alien  in  Italy,  and  quitted  the  Chamber.  Bitterly 
as  Cavour  felt,  both  now  and  down  to  the  end  of  his 
life,  the  reproaches  that  were  levelled  against  him,  he 
allowed  no  trace  of  wounded  feeling,  of  impatience,  of 
the  sense  of  wrong,  to  escape  him  in  the  masterly  speech 
in  which  he  justified  his  policy  and  won  for  it  the  rati- 
fication of  the  Parliament.  It  was  not  until  a  year  later, 
when  the  hand  of  death  was  almost  upon  him,  that 
fierce  words  addressed  to  him  face  to  face  by  Garibaldi 


UMk  OAVOUR  AND  aARIBAU}!.  «9 

wrung  from  him  the  impressive  acswer,  "  The  act  that 
has  made  this  gulf  between  as  was  the  most  painful  duty 
of  my  life.  By  what  I  have  felt  myself  I  know  what 
G^aribaLdi  must  have  felt.  If  he  refuses  me  his  foi^ive- 
ness  I  cannot  reproach  him  for  it."  * 

The  annexation  of  Nice  and  Savoy  by  Napoleon 
was  seen  with  extreme  displeasure  in  Europe  generally, 
and  most  of  all  in  England.  It  directly  _^^^^^ 
affected  the  history  of  Britain  by  the  ^^^ 
Btimulus  which  it  gave  to  the  development 
of  the  Volunteer  Forces.  Owing  their  origin  to  certain 
demonstrations  of  hostility  towards  England  made  by 
the  French  army  after  Orsini's  conspiracy  and  the 
acquittal  of  one  of  his  confederates  in  London,  the  Volun- 
teer Forces  rose  in  the  three  months  that  followed  the 
annexation  of  Nice  and  Savoy  from  seventy  to  a  hundred 
and  eighty  thousand  men.  If  viewed  as  an  indication 
that  the  ruler  of  France  would  not  be  content  with  the 
frontiers  of  1815,  the  acquisition  of  the  Sub-Alpine 
provinces  might  with  some  reason  excite  alarm ;  on  no 
other  ground  could  their  transfer  be  justly  condemned. 
Geographical  position,  language,  commercial  interests, 
separated  Savoy  from  Piedmont  and  connected  it  with 
France ;  and  though  in  certain  parts  of  the  County  of 
Nice  the  Italian  character  predominated,  this  district  as 
a  whole  bore  the  stamp  not  of  Piedmont  or  Liguria 
but  of  Provence.  Since  the  separation  from  France  in 
1815  there  had  always  been,  both  in  Nice  and  Savoy,  a 
considerable  party  which  desired  reunion  with  that 
•  CavoDi  in  FsrlaoientaL  ft  55S.  ,-.  , 


280  MODERN  EVBOPS.  vak 

country.  The  political  and  social  order  of  tlie  Sardiuiaa 
Kingdom  had  from  1815  to  1848  been  so  backward,  so  re- 
actionary, that  the  middle  claEses  in  the  border-proTinces 
looked  wistfully  to  France  as  a  land  where  their  own 
grievanceB  had  been  removed  and  their  own  ideals  at- 
taioed.  The  constitutional  system  of  Victor  Emmannel^ 
and  the  despotic  system  of  Louis  Napoleon  had  both  been 
too  recentJy  introduced  to  reverse  in  the  minds  of  tbe 
greater  number  the  political  tradition  of  the  preceding 
thirty  years.  Thus  if  there  were  a  few  who,  like  Glari- 
baldi,  himself  of  Genoese  descent  though  bom  at  Nice, 
passiooately  resented  separation  irom  Italy,  they  found 
no  considerable  party  either  in  Nice  or  in  Savoy  animated 
by  the  same  feeling.  On  the  other  hand,  the  ecclesias- 
tical sentiment  of  Savoy  rendered  its  transfer  to  France 
an  actual  advantage  to  the  Italian  State.  The  Papacy 
had  here  a  deeply-rooted  iiiHuonce.  The  reforms  be- 
gun by  Azeglio's  Ministry  had  been  steadily  resisted 
by  a  Savoyard  group  of  deputies  in  the  interests 
of  Rome.  Cavour  himself,  in  the  prosecution  of  his 
larger  plans,  had  always  been  exposed  to  the  danger  of 
a  Coalition  between  this  ultra- Conservative  party  and 
his  opponents  of  the  other  extreme.  It  was  well  that 
in  the  conflict  with  the  Papacy,  without  which  there 
could  be  no  such  thing  as  a  Kingdom  of  United  Italy, 
these  influences  of  the  Savoyard  Church  and  Noblesse 
should  be  removed  from  the  Parliament  and  the  Throne. 
Honourable  as  the  Savoyard  party  of  resistance  had 
proved  themselves  in  Parliamentary  life,  loyal  and 
faithful  as  they  were  to  their  sovereign,  they  were  yet 


not  a  part  of  the  Italian  nation.  Their  interests  were 
not  bound  up  with  the  cause  of  Italian  union ;  their 
leaders  were  not  inspired  with  the  ideal  of  Italian 
national  life.  The  forces  that  threatened  the  future  of 
the  new  State  from  within  were  too  powerful  for  the 
surrender  of  a  priest-governed  and  half -foreign  element 
to  he  considered  as  a  real  loss. 

!Nice  and  Savoy  had  hardly  heen  handed  over  to 
Napoleon  when  Garibaldi  set  out  from  Genoa  to  effect 
the  liberation  of  Sicily  and  Naples.  King 
Ferdinand  11.,  known  to  his  subjects  and 
to  Western  Europe  as  King  Bomha,  had  died  a  few 
days  before  the  battle  of  Magenta,  leaving  the 
throne  to  his  son  Francis  II.  In  consequence  of  the 
friendship  shown  by  Ferdinand  to  Kussia  during  the 
Crimean  War,  and  of  hie  refusal  to  amend  his  tyran- 
nical system  of  government,  the  Western  Powers 
had  in  1856  wi  th  drawn  their  represen tati  ves  from 
Naples.  On  the  accession  of  Francis  II.  diplo- 
matic intercourse  was  renewed,  and  Cavour,  who  had 
been  at  bitter  enmity  with  Ferdinand,  sought  to  es- 
tablish relations  of  friendship  with  his  son.  In  the 
war  against  Austria  an  alliance  with  Naples  would 
have  been  of  value  to  Sardinia  as  a  counterpoise  to 
Napoleon's  influence,  and  this  alliance  Cavour  attempted 
to  obtain.  He  was,  however,  unsuccessful  j  and  after 
the  Peace  of  Villafranca  the  Neapolitan  Court  threw 
itself  with  ardour  into  schemes  for  the  restoration  of 
the  fallen  Governments  and  the  overthrow  of  Pied- 
montese   authority  in    the   Bomagna  by   means  of  a 


as»  KODBBS  SUBOPS.  nai 

ecMilitioii   with    Austria  and   Spain    and    a   connter-n- 
Toltttaonaiy   movement  in   Italy   itself.      A   rising  on 
bebalTof  the  fiigitive  Grand  Duke  of  Tuscany  was  to  give 
the  signal  for  the  march  of  the  Neapolitan  army  north- 
wards.    This  rising,  however,  was  expected   in    vain, 
and   the  great  Catholic  design  resulted   in   nothing. 
Baffled  in  its  larger  aims,  the   Bourbon  Gtoveroment 
proposed  in  the  spring  of  1860  to  occupy  TJmbria  and 
the   Marches,    in   order  to   prevent   the  revolutionary 
movement  from  spreading  farther  into  the  Papal  States. 
Against    this    Cavour    protested,    and    King    Francis 
yielded  to  his  threat  to  withdraw  the  Sardinian  am- 
bassador from  Naples.       Knowing   that   a   conspiracy 
existed  for  the  restoration  of  the  House  of  Murat  to 
the  Neapolitan  throne,  which  would  have  given  France 
the  ascendency  in  Southern  Italy,  Cavour  now  renewed 
hi.s  demand  that  Francis  TL  should  enter  into  alliance 
with  Piedmont,    accepting  a  constitutional    system   of 
government  and  the  national   Italian  policy  of  Victor 
Emmanuel.     But  neither  the  summons  from  Turin,  nor 
the  agitation   of    the  Muratists.   nor  the   warnings  of 
Great    Britain    that  the  Bourbon  dynasty    could  only 
avert  its  faU  by  reform,  produced  any  real  change  in 
spirit   of   the   Neapolitan  Court.     Ministers  were 
removed     but   the  absolutist  and   anti-national  system 
mmned  the  same.      Meanwhile  Garibaldi  was  gather- 
AprU  Vi  f     T'  '''""'^  ^'"^  ^"  *^^°°*-     On  the  15th  of 
less  hia  faUl""      ,  "^""^'  ^"^te  to  King  Francis  that  un- 
«»«  Piedmonr    '^°*^^'*"*'-^  "*^  immediately  abandoned 
ntese  Government  itself  might   shortly  be 


forced  to  become  the  i^nt  of  his  destraction.  Even 
thiB  menace  prored  fruitless;  and  after  thug  fairlj 
exposing  to  the  Court  of  Naples  the  consequence  of  its 
own  stubboniQess,  Victor  Emmanuel  let  loose  against  it 
the  revolutionary  forces  of  Garibaldi. 

Since  the  campaign  of  1859  insurrectionary  com- 
mittees had  been  active  in  the  principal  Sicilian  towns. 
The  old  desire  of  the  Sicilian  Liberals  for  the 
independence  of  the  island  had  given  place, 
under  the  influence  of  the  events  of  the  past  year,  to  the 
desire  for  Italian  union.  On  the  abandonment  of  Gari- 
boldi'a  plan  for  the  march  on  Eome  in  November,  1859, 
tbe  liberation  of  Sicily  had  been  su^ested  to  him  as  a 
more  feasible  enterprise,  and  the  general  himself  wavered 
in  the  spring  of  1860  between  the  resumption  of  his 
Roman  project  and  an  attack  upon  the  Bourbons  of 
Naples  from  the  south.  The  rumour  spread  through 
Sicily  that  Garibaldi  would  soon  appear  there  at  the  head 
of  bis  followers.  On  the  3rd  of  April  an  attempt  at  in- 
surrection was  made  at  Palermo.  It  was  repressed  without 
difficulty ;  and  although  disturbances  broke  out  in  other 
parts  of  the  island,  the  reports  which  reached  Garibaldi 
at  Genoa  as  to  the  spirit  and  prospects  of  the  Sicilians 
were  so  disheartening  that  for  a  while  he  seemed  dis- 
posed to  abandon  the  project  of  invasion  as  hopeless  for 
the  present.  It  was  only  when  some  of  the  Sicilian 
exiles  declared  that  they  would  risk  the  Bu(h.iairf«i. 
enterprise  without  him  that  he  resolved  upon  '"^^-  ^j^ 
immediate  action.  On  the  night  of  the  6th  of  May  two 
steamships  lying  in  the  huboor  of  Genoa  were  seized. 


S84  ItOMBS  SUROPM.  mm 

and  on  these  Garibaldi  with  his  Tbonsand  pat  to  Bea. 
Cavour,  though  he  would  have  preferred  that  Sicily 
should  remain  nnmolested  until  some  progress  had  been 
made  in  the  consolidation  of  the  North  Italian  King- 
dom, did  not  Tentore  to  restrain  Garihaldi's  moTements, 
with  which  he  was  well  acquainted.  He  required, 
however,  that  the  expedition  should  not  touch  at  the 
island  of  Sardinia,  and  gave  ostensible  orders  to  his 
admiral,  Persano,  to  seize  the  ships  of  Garibaldi  if 
they  should  put  into  any  Sardinian  port.  Garibaldi, 
who  had  sheltered  the  Sardinian  Government  from 
responsibility  at  the  outset  by  the  fiction  of  a  sndden 
capture  of  the  two  merchant-ships,  continued  to  spare 
Victor  Emmanuel  unnecessary  difficulties  by  avoiding 
the  fleet  which  was  supposed  to  be  en  the  watch  for 
him  off  Cagliari  in  Sardinia,  and  only  interrupted  his 
voyage  by  a  landing  at  a  desolate  spot  on  the  Tuscan 
coast  in  order  to  take  up  artillery  and  ammunition 
which  were  waiting  for  him  there.  On  the  11th  of 
May,  having  heard  from  some  English  merchantmen 
that  there  were  no  Neapolitan  vessels  of  war  at  Marsala, 
he  made  for  this  harbour.  The  first  of  his  two  ships 
fluibaidirt  entered  it  in  safety  and  disembarked  her 
«.i«.ifl,M«j n,  (jrg^.  tiie  second,  running  on  a  rock,  lay 
for  some  time  witliin  range  of  the  guns  of  a  Neapolitan 
war-steamer  which  was  bearing  up  towards  the  port. 
But  for  some  unknown  reason  the  Neapolitan  commander 
delayed  opening  fire,  and  the  landing  of  Garibaldi's  fol- 
lowers was  during  this  interval  completed  without  loss.* 
*  Ouibtldi,  Ejiiat.  i  87.    Peisauo,  Disrio,  i  U,    La  fMriiu,.  ^^at., 


iMk  OARIBALDI  nr  aiaHT.  285 

Od  the  following  day  the  little  army,  attired  in  the 
red  shirts  which  are  worn  bj  cattle-ranchers  ia  South 
America,  marched  eastwards  from  Marsala.  Bands  of 
Tjllagers  joined  them  as  they  moved  through  the 
country,  and  many  unexpected  adherents  were  gained 
among  the  priests.  On  the  third  day's  march  Neapoli- 
tan troops  were  seen  in  position  at  Calatafimi.  They 
were  attacked  by  Oaribaldi,  and,  though  far  superior  ia 
namber,  were  put  to  the  rout.  The  moral  effects  of 
this  first  victory  were  very  great.  The  Neapolitan 
commander  retired  into  Palermo,  leaving  Garibaldi 
master  of  the  western  portion  of  the  island.  Insur- 
rection spread  towards  the  interior;  the  revolutionary 
party  at  Palermo  itself  regained  its  courage  and  pre- 
pared to  co-operate  with  Garibaldi  on  his  approach. 
On  nearing  tlie  city  Garibaldi  determined  that  he  could 
not  risk  a  direct  assault  upon  the  forces 
which  occupied  it.  He  resolved,  if  possible,  towEooSK 
to  lure  part  of  the  defenders  into  the  moun- 
tains, and  during  their  absence  to  throw  himself  into 
the  city  and  to  trust  to  the  energy  of  its  inhabitants 
to  maintain  himself  there.  This  strategy  succeeded. 
While  the  officer  in  command  of  some  of  the  Neapoli- 
tan battalions,  tempted  by  an  easy  victory  over  the 
ill-disciplined  Sicilian  bands  opposed  to  him,  pursued 
his  beaten  enemy  into  the  mountains,  Garibaldi  with 
the  best  of  his  troops  fought  bis  way  into  Palermo  on 
the  night  of  May  26th.     Fighting  continued    in  the 

H.  SU.    Oqohoiu.  ii.  23.    Farliamentacr  Pttpers,  186a,  Ixrin.  2.    Hiindr, 
HJIS.  Smnibal  ti  Palermo,  p.  133.  mw\c 


2M  KODSmr  SUBOPS.  im. 

streets  dnnng  the  next  two  days,  and  the  cannon  of 
the  forts  and  of  the  Keapolitui  vessels  in  harbour 
ineffectoally  bombarded  the  city.  On  the  30th,  at  the 
moment  when  the  absent  battalions  were  coming  again 
into  sight,  an  armistice  was  signed  on  board  the  British 
man-of-war  Hannibal.  The  Neapolitan  commander 
gave  up  to  Garibaldi  the  bank  and  public  buildings,  and 
withdrew  into  the  forts  outside  the  town.  But  the 
Government  at  Naples  was  now  becoming  thoroughly 
alarmed ;  and  considering  Palermo  as  lost,  it  directed 
the  troops  to  be  shipped  to  Messina  and  to  Naples 
itself.  Garibaldi  was  thus  left  in  undisputed  possession 
of  the  Sicilian  capital.  He  remained  there  for  nearly 
two  months,  assuming  the  government  of  Sicily  as 
Dictator  in  the  lume  of  Victor  Emmanuel,  appointing 
Ministers,  and  levying  taxes.  Heavy  reinforcements 
reached  him  from  Italy.  The  Neapolitans,  driven  irom 
the  interior  as  well  as  from  the  towns  occupied  by  the 
invader,  now  held  only  the  north-eastern  extremity  of 
the  island.  On  the  20th  of  July  Garibaldi,  operating 
both  by  land  and  sea,  attacked  and  defeated  them  at 
Milazzo  on  the  northern  coast.  The  result  of  this 
victory  was  that  Messina  itself,  with  the  exception  of 
the  citadel,  was  evacuated  by  the  Neapolitans  with- 
oat  resistance.  Garibaldi,  whose  troops  now  numbered 
eighteen  thousand,  was  master  of  the  island  from  sea  to 
sea,  and  could  with  confidence  look  forward  to  the  over- 
throw of  Bourbon  authority  on  the  Italian  mainland. 

During  Garibaldi's  stay  at  Palermo  tlie  ant^onism 
between   the  two  political  creeds  which  severed  those 


m.  OARIBJLDI.  ItAZZim.  OAVOXm.  287 

whose  devotion  to  Italy  was  the  Btrongest  came  clearly 
into  view.  This  antagonisra  stood  embodied  in  its  ex- 
treme form  in  the  contrast  between  Maz-  mrM*** 
zini  and  Cavour.  Mazzini,  handling  moral 
and  political  conceptions  with  something  of  the  inde- 
pendence of  a  mathematician,  laid  it  down  as  tbe  first 
duty  of  the  Italian  nation  to  possess  itself  of  Rome 
and  Tenice,  regardless  of  difficulties  that  might  be 
raised  from  without.  By  conviction  he  desired  that 
Italy  should  be  a  Republic,  though  under  certain  con- 
ditions he  might  be  willing  to  tolerate  the  monarchy  of 
Victor  Emmanuel.  Cavouj,  accurately  observing  the 
play  of  political  forces  in  Europe,  conscious  above  all  of 
the  strength  of  those  ties  which  still  bound  Napoleon 
to  the  clerical  cause,  knew  that  there  were  limits  which 
Italy  could  not  at  present  pass  without  ruin.  The 
ceotrc  of  Mazzini's  hopes,  an  advance  upon  Home 
itself,  he  knew  to  be  an  act  of  self-destruction  for  Italy, 
and  this  advance  he  was  resolved  at  all  costs  to  prevent. 
Cavour'  had  not  hindered  the  expedition  to  Sicily ;  ho 
had  not  considered  it  likely  to  embroil  Italy  witti  its 
ally  ;  but  neither  had  he  been  the  author  of  this  enter- 
prise. The  liberation  of  Sicily  might  be  deemed  the 
work  rather  of  the  school  of  Mazzini  than  of  Cavour. 
Garibaldi  indeed  was  personally  loyal  to  Victor  Em- 
manuel; but  around  him  there  were  men  who,  if  not 
Republicans,  were  at  least  disposed  to  make  the  grant 
of  Sicily  to  Victor  Emmanuel  conditional  upon  the 
king's  fulftlling  the  will  of  the  so-called  Party  of  Action, 
and  consenting  to  an  attack  upon  Borne.     Under  the 


888  MODSSS  BUSOPS.  laak 

inflaence  of  these  politicians  Ghiribaldi,  in  reply  to  a  depu- 
tation expressing  to  him  the  desire  of  the  Sicilians  for 
union  with  the  Kingdom  of  Victor  Emmanuel,  declared 
that  he  had  come  to  fight  not  for  Sicily  alone  hut  for  all 
Italy,  and  that  if  the  annexation  of  Sicily  was  to  take 
place  before  the  union  of  Italy  was  assured,  he  most 
withdraw  his  hand  from  the  work  and  retire.  The  effect 
produced  by  these  words  of  Garibaldi  was  so  serious 
that  the  Ministers  whom  be  had  placed  in  office  resigned. 
Garibaldi  endeavoured  to  substitute  for  tbem  men  more 
agreeable  to  the  Party  of  Action,  but  a  demonstration  in 
Palermo  itself  forced  him  to  nominate  Sicilians  in  iavour 
of  immediate  annexation.  The  public  opinion  of  the 
island  was  hostile  to  Bepublicanism  and  to  the  friends 
of  Mazzini ;  nor  could  the  prevailing  anarchy  long 
continue  without  danger  of  a  reactionary  movement. 
Garibaldi  himself  possessed  no  glimmer  of  administra- 
tive faculty.  After  weeks  of  confusion  and  misgovem- 
ment  he  saw  the  necessity  of  accepting  direction  from 
Turin,  and  consented  to  recognise  as  Pro-Dictator  of 
the  island  a  nominee  of  Cavour,  the  Fiedmontese 
Depretis.  Under  the  influence  of  Depretis  a  commence- 
ment was  made  in  the  work  of  political  and  social 
reorgani  sation.  * 

Cavour,  during  Garibaldi's  preparation  for  bis  descent 
upon  Sicily  and  until  the  capture  of  Palermo,  had 
aflected  to  disavow  and  condemn  the  enterprise  as  one 
undertaken  by  individuals  in  spite  of  the  Government, 

"  CftTonr,  Lettere,  iii.  introd.  269.  Lk  Farina,  Epiat,  iL  336.  Kandi, 
Po1iti<]ne,  p.  S66.    Fenano,  Diario,  i  M,  72,  96. 

I  i,z<..t,CoogIc 


UM  SAFLEB.  88B 

and  at  tbeir  own  risk.  The  Piedmontese  ambassador 
was  still  at  Naples  as  the  representative  of  a  friendly 
Court ;  and  in  reply  to  the  reproaches  of 
Qenoany  and  Bassia,  Cayour  alleged  that  wi^ng«dM 
the  title  of  Dictator  of  Sicily  in  the  name 
of  Victor  Emmanuel  had  been  assumed  by  Garibaldi 
■without  the  knowledge  or  consent  of  bis  sovereign. 
Bttt  whatever  might  be  said  to  Foreign  Powers,  Cavour, 
from  the  time  of  the  capture  of  Palermo,  recognised 
that  the  hoar  had  come  for  further  steps  towards  Italian 
onion ;  and,  without  committing  himself  to  any  definite 
line  of  action,  he  began  already  to  contemplate  the 
overthrow  of  the  Bourbon  dynasty  at  Naples.  It  was 
in  vain  that  Xing  Francis  now  released  his  political 
prisoners,  declared  the  Constitution  of  1848  in  force, 
and  tendered  to  Piedmont  the  alliance  which  he  had 
before  refused,  Cavour,  in  reply  to  his  overtures, 
stated  that  he  could  not  on  his  own  authority  pledge 
Piedmont  to  the  support  of  a  dynasty  now  almost  in 
the  agonies  of  dissolution,  and  that  the  matter  must 
await  the  meeting  of  Parliament  at  Turin.  Thus 
far  the  way  had  not  been  absolutely  closed  to  a  recon- 
ciliation between  the  two  Courts;  but  after  the 
victory  of  Garibaldi  at  Milazzo  and  the  evacuation 
of  Messina  at  the  end  of  July  Cavour  cast  aside  all 
besitation  and  reserve.  He  appears  to  have  thought 
a  renewal  of  the  war  with  Austria  probable,  and 
now  strained  every  nerve  to  become  master  of  Naples 
and  its  fleet  before  Austria  could  take  the  field.  He 
ordered  Admiral  Fersano  to  leave  two  ihips  of  war  to 


290  MODEBiT  BtmOPE.  mm. 

cover  Garibaldi's  pass^e  to  the  maioland,  and  with 
one  ship  to  proceed  to  Naples  himself,  and  there  excite 
insorrection  and  win  over  the  Neapolitan  fleet  to  the 
flag  of  Victor  Emmanuel.  Fersano  reached  Naples  on 
the  3rd  of  August,  and  on  the  next  day  the 


broken  off.  On  the  19th  Garibaldi  crossed, 
from  Sicily  to  the  mainland.  His  march  upon  the 
capital  was  one  unbroken  triumph. 

It  was  the  hope  of  Cavour  that  before  Garibaldi 
could  reach  Naples  a  popular  movement  in  the  city 
itself  would  force  the  King  to  take  flight,  so  that 
Garibaldi  on  his  arrival  would  find  the  machinery  of 
government,  as  well  as  the  command  of  the  fleet  and. 

the  army,  already  in  the  hands  of  Victor 
vuumcctuat      Emmanuel's  representatives.     If  war  with 

Austria  was  really  impending,  incalculable 
mischief  might  be  caused  by  the  existence  of  a  semi- 
independent  Government  at  Naples,  reckless,  in  its  en- 
thusiasm for  the  march  on  Rome,  of  the  effect  which  its 
acts  might  produce  on  the  French  alliance.  In  any  case 
the  control  of  Italian  affairs  could  hut  half  belong  to  the 
King  and  his  Minister  if  Garibaldi,  in  the  full  glory  of 
his  unparalleled  exploits,  should  add  the  Dictatorship 
of  Naples  to  the  Dictatorship  of  Sicily.  Accordingly 
Cavour  plied  every  art  to  accelerate  the  inevitable  revo- 
lution. Persano  and  the  Sardinian  ambassador.  Villa- 
marina,  had  their  confederates  in  the  Bourbon  Ministry 
and  in  the  Eoyal  Family  itself.  But  their  efibrts  to 
drive  King  Francis  from  Naples,  and  to  establish  the 


authority  of  Victor  Emmanael  before  (Garibaldi's  arrival, 
were  baffled  partiy  by  the  tenacity  of  the  King  and 
Queen,  partly  by  the  opposition  of  the  committees  of 
the  Party  of  Action,  who  were  determined  that  power 
should  fall  into  no  bands  bat  those  of  Garibaldi  himself. 
It  was  not  till  Garibaldi  had  reached  Salerno,  and  the 
Bourbon  generals  had  one  after  another  decliued  to 
undertake  the  responsibility  of  command  in  a  battle 
against  him,  that  Fraucis  resolTed  on  flight.  It  was 
now  feared  that  he  might  induce  the  fleet  to  sail  with 
him,  and  even  that  he  might  hand  it  over  to  the 
Anstrians.  The  crews,  it  was  believed,  were  willing  to 
follow  the  Xing ;  the  officers,  though  inclined  to  the 
Italian  cause,,  would  be  powerless  to  prevent  them. 
There  was  not  an  boar  to  lose.  On  the  night  of 
September  5th,  after  the  King's  intention  to  quit  the 
capital  had  become  known,  Fersano  and  Yillamarina 
disguised  themselves,  and  in  company  with  their  parti- 
sans mingled  with  the  crews  of  the  fleet,  whom  they 
induced  by  bribes  and  persuasion  to  empty  the  boilers 
and  to  cripple  the  engines  of  their  ships.  When, 
on  the  6th,  King  Francis,  having  announced  his 
intention  to  spare  the  capita  bloodshed,  went  on 
board  a  mail  steamer  and  quitted  the  harbour,  ac- 
companied by  the  ambassadors  of  Austria,  Prussia, 
and  Spain,  only  one  vessel  of  the  fleet 
followed  him.  An  urgent  summons  was  EMtftuwu, 
sent  to  Garibaldi,  whose  presence  was 
now  desired  by  all  parties  ^ke  in  order  to  pre- 
vent .the  outbreak  of  disorders.  I«eaving  bis  troops 
7-2  '    -  ■  '-■ooylc 


293  MODEBN  BUBOFS.  wdl 

at  Salerno,  (Jaribaldi  came  by  railroad  to  Naples 
on  the  morning  of  the  7th,  escorted  only  by 
ouoaidi  aitoi  ^ome  of  lufl  staff.  The  forts  were  still 
viBi,  Sept.  T.  garrisoned  by  eight  thousand  of  the  Bour- 
bon troops,  but  all  idea  of  resistance  had  been  aban- 
doned, and  Garibaldi  drove  feai-lessly  through  the  city 
in  the  midst  of  joyous  crowds.  His  first  act  as  Dictap 
tor  was  to  declare  the  ships  of  war  belonging  to  the 
State  of  the  Two  Sicilies  united  to  those  of  King  Victor 
Emmanuel  under  Admiral  Persano's  command.  Before 
sunset  the  flag  of  Italy  was  hoisted  by  the  ^N'eapolitan 
fleet.  The  army  was  not  to  be  so  easily  incorporated 
with  the  national  forces.  King  Francis,  after  abandon- 
ing the  idea  of  a  battle  between  Naples  and  Salerno, 
had  ordered  the  mass  of  his  troops  to  retire  upon  Capua 
in  order  to  make  a  final  struggle  on  the  line  of  the 
Volturno,  and  this  order  had  been  obeyed,* 

As  soon  as  it  had  become  evident  that  the  entiy  of 
Oaribaldi  into  Naples  conld  not  be  anticipated  by  the 
establishment  of  Victor  Emmanuel's  own  authority, 
Cavour  recognised  that  bold  and  aggressive  action  on 
the  part  of  tbe  National  Government  was  now  a  neces- 
ThaiMmoniM  sity.  Garibaldi  made  no  secret  of  his  inten- 
^XiBudtiM     tion  to  carrv  the  Italian  arms  to  Bome.  The 

lUnhM.    BtfL  J 

'^  time  was  past  when  the  national  moTement 

*  BiaJielii,  Politiqne,  p.  377.  Peraano,  ii.  p,  1 — lOSr*  Persa&o  sent  liii 
Siaiy  in  US.  to  Azeglio,  and  aaked  his  odvica  on  publishing  it,  Azeglio 
refeirad  to  Catout's  saying,  ''  If  we  did  for  ourselves  wliat  we  are  doing 
for  Italj,  we  should  be  sad  blackguards,"  and  begged  Peraamo  to  let  hit 
secrets  be  aeoteta,  aajiug  that  ainoe  the  partition  of  Poland  no  confesnon  of 
each  "  ooloasal  blackguardism  "  had  boeu  published  by  anj  pnblic  tau. 


uam  OAVOUS.  AJW   TBS  FAFAL   8TATB3.  293 

ooold  be  checked  at  the  frontiers  of  Naples  and  Tus- 
cany. It  remained  only  for  Cavour  to  throw  the  King's 
own  troops  into  the  Papal  States  before  Garibaldi  could 
move  from  Naples,  and,  while  winning  for  Italy  the 
last  foot  of  gronnd  that  could  be  won  without  an 
actual  conflict  with  France,  to  stop  short  at  those  limits 
where  the  soldiers  of  Kapoleon  would  certainly  meet  an 
invader  with  their  fire.  The  Pope  was  still  in  posses- 
Bion  of  the  Marches,  of  Umbria,  and  of  the  territory 
between  the  Apennines  and  the  coast  from  Orvieto  to 
Terracina.  Cavour  had  good  reason  to  believe  that 
Napoleon  would  not  strike  on  behalf  of  the  Temporal 
Power  until  this  last  narrow  district  was  menaced.  He 
resolved  to  seize  upon  the  Marches  and  Umbria,  and  to 
brave  the  consequences.  On  the  day  of  Garibaldi's 
entry  into  Naples  a  despatch  was  sent  by  Cavour  to  the 
Papal  Government  requiring,  in  the  name  of  Victor 
Smmanuel,  the  disbandment  of  the  foreign  mercenaries 
who  in  the  previous  spring  had  plundered  Perugia,  and 
whose  presence  was  a  continned  menace  to  the  peace  of 
Italy.  The  announcement  now  made  by  Napoleon  that 
he  must  break  off  diplomatic  relations  with  the  Sar- 
dinian Government  in  case  of  the  invasion  of  the  Papal 
States  produced  no  effect.  Cavoor  replied  that  by  no 
other  means  could  he  prevent  revolution  from  master- 
ing all  Italy,  and  on  the  10th  of  September  the 
French  ambassador  quitted  Tui'in.  "Without  waiting  for 
AntoneUi's  answer  to  his  ultimatum,  Cavour  ordered 
the  King's  troops  to  cross  the  frontier.  The  Papal 
army  was  commanded  by  Lamorici^re,  a  French  general 


2M  UODEBXr  SUBOPB.  WL 

who  had  gained  some  reputation  in  Algiers ;  but  the 
resistance  offered  to  the  Piedmontese  was  unexpectedly 
feeble.  The  column  which  entered  Umbria  reached  the 
southern  limit  without  encountering  any  serious  oppo- 
sition except  from  the  Irish  garrison  of  Spoleto.  In 
the  Marches,  where  Lamoriciiire  had  a  considerable 
force  at  his  disposal,  the  dispersion  of  the  Papal  troops 
and  the  incapacity  shown  in  their  command  brought 
the  campaign  to  a  rapid  and  inglorious  end.  The  main 
body  of  the  defenders  was  routed  on  the  Husone,  near 
Loreto,  on  the  19tb  of  September.  Other  divisions 
surrendered,  and  Ancoaa  alone  remained  to  Lamorici&re. 
suiof  Anooiu,  Vigorously  attacked  in  this  fortress  both  by 
^*'**'  land  and  sea,  Lamorici^re  surrendered  after 
a  siege  of  eight  days.  Within  three  weeks  from  Giari- 
baldi's  entry  into  Naples  the  Piedmontese  army  had  com- 
pleted the  task  imposed  upon  it,  and  Victor  Emmanuel 
was  master  of  Italy  as  far  as  the  Abmzzi. 

Cavour's  successes  had  not  come  a  day  too  soon,  for 
Garibaldi,  since  his  entry  into  Naples,  was  falling  more 
and  more  into  the  hands  of  the  Party  of  Action,  and, 

while  protesting  bis  loyalty  to  Victor  Em- 
bBi|U,uidae       manuel,   was    openly    announcing   that   he 

would  march  on  Rome  whether  the  Bang's 
Government  permitted  it  or  no.  In  Sicily  the  officials 
appointed  by  this  Party  were  proceeding  with  such 
violence  that  Bepretis,  unable  to  obtain  troops  from 
Cavour,  resigned  his  post.  Garibaldi  suddenly  appeared 
at  Palermo  on  the  11th  of  September,  appointed  a  new 
PrO'Bictator,  and  repeated  to  the  Sicilians  that  their 


union  with  the  Kingdom  of  Victor  Emmaouel  must  he 
pcffitponed  until  all  members  of  the  Italian  family  were 
free.  But  eyen  the  personal  presence  and  the  angry 
words  of  Garibaldi  were  powerless  to  check  the  strong 
expression  of  Sicilian  opinion  in  favour  of  immediate 
and  unconditional  annexation.  His  visit  to  Palermo 
was  answered  by  the  appearance  of  a  Sicihan  deputation 
at  Turin  demanding  immediate  union,  and  complaining 
that  the  island  was  treated  by  Garibaldi's  officers  like  a 
conquered  province.  At  Naples  the  rash  and  violent 
utterances  of  the  Dictator  were  equally  condemned. 
The  Ministers  whom  be  had  himself  appointed  resigned. 
Garibaldi  replaced  them  by  otliers  who  were  almost 
Republicans,  and  sent  a  letter  to  Victor  Emmanuel 
requesting  him  to  consent  to  the  march  upou  Rome 
and  to  dismiss  Cavour.  It  was  known  in  Turin  that 
at  this  very  moment  Napoleon  was  taking  steps  to 
increase  the  French  force  in  Rome,  and  to  garrison  the 
whole  of  the  territory  that  still  remained  to  the  Pope. 
Victor  Emmanuel  understood  how  to  reply  to  Garibaldi's 
letter.  He  remained  true  to  his  Minister,  and  sent 
orders  to  Villamarina  at  Naples  in  case  Garibaldi  should 
proclaim  the  Republic  to  break  off  all  relations  with 
him  and  to  secure  the  fleet.  The  fall  of  Ancona  on 
September  28th  brought  a  timely  accession  of  popularity 
and  credit  to  Cavour.  He  made  the  Parliament  which 
assembled  at  Turin  four  days  later  arbiter  in  the  struggle 
between  Garibaldi  and  himself,  aiid  received  from  it  an 
almost  unanimous  vote  of  confidence.  Garibaldi  would 
perhaps  have  treated  lightly  any  resoluticoi  of  Parliament 


298  MODBBN  BUBOPB.  m* 

which  confiicted  with  his  own  opinion :  he  shrank 
from  a  hreach  with  the  soldier  of  Kovara  and  Solferino. 
Now,  as  at  other  moments  of  danger,  the  diameter  and 
reputation  of  Victor  Emmanuel  stood  Italy  in  good 
stead.  In  the  enthusiasm  which  Garibaldi's  services 
to  Italy  excited  in  every  patriotic  heart,  there  was 
room  for  thankfulness  that  Italy  possessed  a  sovereign 
and  a  statesmaa  strong  enough  even  to  withstand  its 
hero  when  his  heroism  endangered  the  national  cause.* 
The  King  of  Naples  had  not  yet  abandoned  the 
hope  that  one  or  more  of  the  European  Powers  wonld 
intervene  in  his  behalf.  T!ie  trustworthy  part  of  his 
Thaiuniacn  ^rmy  had  gathered  round  the  fortress  of 
itovoitn™.  Capua  on  the  Volturno,  and  there  were 
indications  that  Garibaldi  would  here  meet  with  far 
more  serious  resistance  than  he  had  yet  encountered. 
While  he  was  still  in  Naples,  his  troops,  which 
had  pushed  northwards,  sustained  a  repolse  at 
Cajazzo.  Emboldened  by  this  success,  the  Neapolitan 
army  at  the  beginning  of  Octobt-r  assumed  the  often- 
sive.  It  was  with  difficulty  that  Garibaldi,  placing 
himself  again  at  the  head  of  his  forces,  drove  the 
enemy  back  to  Capua.  But  the  arms  of  Victor 
Emmanuel  were  now  thrown  into  the  scale.  Crossing 
the  Apennines,  and  driving  before  him  the  weak  force 
that  was  intended  to  bar  his  way  at  Isernia,  the  King 
descended  in  the  rear  of  the  Neapolitan  army.  The 
Bourbon  commander,   warned  of  his  approach,  moved 

*  Btanolii,  Folitiqne,  p.  3S3.    PerSMlo,  ui-  SI*     BJWwM,  DipIoiiiaEU. 
riil  337.    GsritwlOi,  Eplai,  i.  127. 

L     ,l,z..tvG00gIf 


tSM.  nOTOa  EiOUNUEL  AND   QASJBALDL  297 

northwards  on  the  line  of  the  Oangliano,  leaving  a 
garrison  to  defend  Capna.  Garibaldi  followed  on  his 
track,  and  in  the  neighboorhood  of  Teano  met  King 
"Victor  Emmanuel  (October  26th).  The  „„^^^ 
meeting  is  said  to  have  been  cordial  on  the  £!^1i^Mi!k 
pwt  of  the  King,  reserved  on  the  part  of 
Craribaldi,  who  saw  In  the  King's  suite  the  men  bj 
whom  he  had  been  preveoted  from  invading  the  Papal 
States  in  the  previous  year.  In  spite  of  their  coiomon 
patriotism  the  volunteers  of  Garibaldi  and  the  army  of 
Victor  Emmanuel  were  rival  bodies,  and  the  relations 
between  the  chiefs  of  each  camp  were  strained  and 
difficult.  Garibaldi  himself  returned  to  the  siege  of 
Capua,  while  the  King  marched  northwards  against  the 
retreatiog  Neapolitans.  All  that  was  great  in  Garibaldi's 
career  was  now  in  fact  accomplished.  The  politicians 
about  him  had  attempted  at  Kaples,  as  in  Sicily,  to 
postpone  the  union  with  Victor  Emmanuel's  monarchy, 
and  to  convoke  a  Southern  Parliament  which  should  fix 
the  conditions  on  which  annexation  would  be  permitted; 
but,  after  discrediting  the  General,  they  had  been  crashed 
by  public  opinion,  and  a  popul^  vote  which  was 
taken  at  the  end  of  October  on  the  question  of  immediate 
union  showed  the  m^ori^  in  favour  of  this  course  to 
be  overwhelming.  After  the  surrender  of  Capua  on  the 
2ndof  November,  Victor  Emmanuel  made  his  entry  into 
Naples.  Garibaldi,  whose  request  for  the  Lieutenancy  of 
Sonthem  Italy  for  the  space  of  a  year  with  iiill  powers 
was  refused  by  the  King,*  declined  all  minor  honours 
*  "Le  Bin  riptmdit  tont  wnrt; ' C'eai impoMiUe."'    Cavonr  to  Ida 

/ 


288  MODEBIT  SUBOPE.  uh. 

and  rewards,  and  departed  to  his  home,  still  filled  with 
resentment  against  Cavour,  and  promising  liis  soldiers 
that  he  would  return  in  the  spring  and  lead  them  to 
Rome  and  Venice.  The  reduction  of  Gaeta,  where 
Kiug  Francis  II.  bad  taken  refuge,  and  of  the  citadel 
of  Uessina,  formed  the  last  act  of  the  war.  The  French 
fleet  for  some  time  prevented  the  Sardiniaus  from 
operating  against  Gaeta  from  the  sea,  and  the  siege  in 
consequence  made  slow  progress.  It  was  not  until  the 
middle  of  January,  1861,  that  Napoleon  permitted  the 
French  admiral  to  quit  his  station.  The  bombardment 
was  now  opened  both  by  land  and  sea,  aud  after  a  brave 
pijiofGieta.  resistance  Gaeta  surrendered  on  the  14th  of 
1^1*.  18*1.  Pebniary,  King  Francis  aud  his  young 
Queen,  a  sister  of  the  Empress  of  Austria,  were  con- 
veyed in  a  French  steamer  to  the  Papal  States,  and 
there  began  their  life-long  exile.  The  citadel  of  Mes- 
sina, commanded  by  one  of  the  few  Neapolitan  officers 
who  showed  any  soldierly  spirit,  maintained  its  obstinate 
defence  for  a  month  after  the  Bourbon  flag  had  dis- 
appeared from  the  mainland. 

Thus  in  the  spring  of  1861,  within  two  years  from 

the    outbreak   of    war   with    Austria,    Italy    with    the 

exception    of    Rome    and    Venice    was    united    under 

Victor  Emmanuel.     Of  all  the  European  Powers,  Great 

Britain  alone  watched  the  creation  of  the 

CftToin'i  poller 

wian^to       ng^y  Italian  Kingdom  with  complete  sym- 
™°^  pathy  and  approval.      Austria,  though  it 

•miMBMdor  at  London,  Not.  IS,  in  Bianohi,  FoIIUqne,  p.  386.  La  FariiUi, 
Eput,  U.  438.    Ferskoo,  iv.  U.    Onenoni,  it  212. 


MO.  ANTWIPATIONa   OF  OAVOUR.  299 

had  made  peace  at  Zurich,  declined  to  renew  diplomatic 
intercourse  with  Sardinia,  and  protested  against  the 
assumption  by  Victor  Emmanael  of  the  title  of  King 
of  Italy.  Russia,  the  ancient  patron  of  the  Neapolitan 
Bourbons,  declared  that  geographical  conditions  alone 
prevented  its  intervention  against  their  despoilers. 
Prussia,  though  under  a  new  sovereign,  had  not  yet 
completely  severed  the  tics  which  bound  it  to  Austria. 
Nevertheless,  in  spite  of  wide  political  ill-will,  and  of 
the  passionate  hostility  of  the  clerical  party  throughout 
Europe,  there  was  little  probability  that  the  work  of 
the  Italian  people  would  be  overthrown  by  external 
force.  The  problem  which  faced  Victor  Emmanuel's 
Government  was  not  so  much  the  fru^tratioa  of  re- 
actionary designs  from  without  as  the  determination  of 
the  true  line  of  policy  to  be  followed  in  regard  to  Rorae 
and  Venice.  There  were  few  who,  like  Azeglio,  held 
that  Rome  might  be  permanently  left  outside  the 
Italian  Kingdom ;  there  were  none  wlio  held  this  of 
Venice.  Garibaldi  might  be  mad  enough  to  hope  for 
victory  in  a  campaign  against  Austria  and  against 
France  at  the  head  of  such  a  troop  as  he  himself  could 
muster  ;  Cavour  would  have  deserved  ill  of  his  country 
if  he  had  for  one  moment  countenanced  the  belief  that 
the  force  which  had  overthrown  the  Neapolitan  Bourbons 
could  with  success,  or  with  impunity  to  Italy,  measure 
itself  against  the  defenders  of  Venetia  or  of  Rome. 
Tet  the  mind  of  Cavour  was  not  one  which  could  rest 
in  mere  paseive  expectancy  as  to  the  future,  or  in  mere 
condemnation  of  the  unwise  schemes  of  others.    His 


300  MODERN  EUBOPS.  ml 

inteUigence,  bo  laminons,  so  peDetrating,  that  in  its 
utterances  we  seem  at  times  to  be  listening  to  the  very 
spirit  of  the  age,  ranged  over  wide  fields  of  moral  and 
of  spiritual  interests  in  its  forecast  of  the  future  of 
Italy,  and  spent  its  last  force  in  one  of  those  prophetic 
delineations  whose  breadth  and  power  the  world  can  feel, 
though  a  later  time  alone  can  judge  of  their  correspond- 
ence with  the  destined  coarse  of  history.  Venice  was 
less  to  Europe  than  Eome  ;  its  tnmsfer  to  Italy  would, 
Cavour  believed,  he  effected  either  bj  arms  or  negotia- 
tion BO  soon  as  the  German  race  should  find  a  really 
national  Government,  and  refuse  the  service  which  had 
hitherto  been  exacted  from  it  for  the  maintenance  of 
Austrian  interests.  It  was  to  Prussia,  as  the  represen- 
tative of  nationality  in  Germany,  that  Cavour  looked 
as  the  natural  ally  of  Italy  in  the  vindication  of  that 
part  of  the  national  inheritance  which  still  lay  under 
the  dominion  of  the  Hapsburg.  Eome,  unlike  Venice, 
was  not  only  defended  by  foreiga  arms,  it  was  the  seat 
of  a  Power  whose  empire  over  the  mind  of  man  was  not 
the  sport  of  military  or  political  vicissitudes.  Circum- 
stances might  cause  France  to  relax  its  grasp  on 
Bome,  hut  it  was  not  to  such  an  accident  that  Cavour 
looked  for  the  incorporation  of  Rome  with  Italy.  He 
conceived  that  the  time  would  arrive  when  the  Catholic 
world  would  recognise  that  the  Church  would  best  fulfil 
its  task  in  complete  separation  from  temporal  power. 
Rome  would  then  assume  its  natural  position  as  the 
centre  of  the  Italian  State ;  the  Church  would  be  the 
noblest  friend,  not  the  misjudging  enemy,  of  the  Italian 
national  monarchy.    Cavour'^  own  religious  beliefs  were 


perhaps  less  simple  than  he  chose  to  represent  them. 
Occupying  himself,  however,  with  institutions,  not  with 
dogmas,  he  regarded  the  Church  in  profound  earnest- 
ness as  a  humanising  and  elevating  power.  He  valued 
its  independence  so  highly  that  even  od  the  suppression 
of  the  Piedmontese  monasteries  he  had  refused  to  give 
to  the  State  the  administration  of  the  revenue  arising 
from  the  sale  of  their  lands,  and  had  formed  this  into  a 
fund  belonging  to  the  Cliurch  itself,  in  order  that  the 
clc^Ky  Qiight  not  become  salaried  officers  of  the  State. 
Human  freedom  v/as  the  principle  in  which  he  trusted ; 
and  looking  upon  the  Church  as  the  greatest  a-ssociation 
formed  by  men,  he  believed  that  here  too  the  role  of 
freedom,  of  the  absence  of  State-re'gulation,  would  in 
the  end  beet  serve  man's  highest  interests.  With  the 
passing  away  of  the  Pope's  temporal  power,  Oavour 
imagined  that  the  constitution  of  the 
Church  itself  would  become  more  demo* 
cratie,  more  responsive  to  the'  movement 
of  the  modem  world.  His  own  effort  in  ecclesiastical 
reform  had  been  to  improve  the  condition  and  to 
promote  the  independence  of  the  lower  clergy.  He 
had  hoped  that  each  step  in  their  moral  and  material 
progress  would  make  them  more  national  at  heart ;  and 
though  this  hope  had  been  but  partially  fulfilled, 
C^vonr  had  never  ceased  to  cherish  the  ideal  of  a 
national  Church  which,  while  recognising  its  Head  in 
Jiome,  should  cordially  and  without  reserve  accept  the 
friendship  of  the  Italian  State.* 

*  OftTonr  1b  Fariuaeuto,  p.  030.    AiegUo,  Oomcpondance  Folitiqiu^ 
f.  I8a    I*  Uin,  p.  313.    SwU,  Oanmr  ATutj  1848,  p.  303. 


TlianMCbnnl) 
InthsFn* 

HUM. 


SOS  MODESH  BUROFB.  MM. 

It  was  in  the  exposition  of  these  principles,  in  the 
enforcement  of  the  common  moral  interest  of  Italian 
nationality  and  the  Catholic  Church,  that  Cavour  gave 
his  last  counsels  to  the  Italian  Parliament.  He  was 
not  himself  to  lead  the  nation  farther  towards  the 
promised  land.  The  immense  exertions  which  he  had 
maintained  during  the  last  three  years,  the  indiguatioa 
and  anxiety  caused  to  him  hy  Ghiribaldi's  attacks,  pro- 
duced an  illness  which  Cavour's  own  careless  hahits  of 
DeahofChTooii  ^^^^  *°^  ^'^  unskilfulness  of  his  doctors 
juMBpiasu  rendered  fatal.  With  dying  lips  he  re- 
peated to  those  about  him  the  words  in  which  he  had 
summed  up  his  poUcy  in  the  Italian  Parliament :  "  A 
free  Church  in  a  free  State."  *  Other  Catholic  lands  had 
adjusted  by  Concordats  with  the  Papacy  the  conflicting 
n»  ohBBh  in  claims  of  temporal  and  spiritual  authority 
**"  in  such  matters  as  the  appointment  of 
bishops,  the  regulation  of  schools,  the  family-rights  of 
persons  married  without  ecclesiastical  form.  Cavour 
appears  to  have  thought  that  in  Italy,  where  the  whole 
nation  was  in  a  sense  Catholic,  the  Church  might 
as  safely  and  as  easily  be  left  to  manage  its  own 
affairs  as  in  the  United  States,  where  the  Catholic  com- 
munity is  only  one  among  many  religious  societies. 
His  optimism,  his  sanguine  and  large-hearted  tolerance, 
was  never  more  strikingly  shown  than  in  this  fidelity  to 
the  principle  of  liberty,  even  in  the  case  of  those  who 

*  "  Le  oomto  le  reoonim,  hd  mrs  1&  nudn  ot  dit  i  '  Fiste,  tnte,  Uben 
cliieea  in  libero  stato.'  Oe  fnremt  aes  demifa^s  p&rDlea."  Aocoimt  of  tbs 
deftth  of  OftTonr  bf  hu  niece,  Coimtesa  Alfieri,  in  I«  IUt«,  Oftvoor,  p.  319. 


no.  DSATB   OF  OAVOUB.  »tt 

for  the  time  declined  aU  reconciliation  with  the  Italian 
State.  Whether  Cavonr's  ideal  was  an  impracticable 
fancy  a  later  age  will  decide.  The  ascendency  within 
the  Church  of  Borne  would  seem  as  yet  to  have 
rested  with  the  elements  most  opposed  to  the  spirit  of 
the  time,  most  obstinately  bent  on  setting  faith  and 
reason  in  irreconcilable  enmity.  In  place  of  that 
democratic  movement  within  the  hierarchy  and  the 
priesthood  which  Cayoor  anticipated,  absolutism  has 
won  a  new  crown  in  the  doctrine  of  Papal  Infallibility. 
Catholic  dogma  has  remained  impervious  to  the  solvents 
which  during  the  last  thirty  years  have  operated  with 
perceptible  success  on  the  theology  of  Protestant  lands. 
Each  conquest  made  in  the  world  of  thought  and 
knowledge  is  still  noted  aa  the  next  appropriate  object 
of  denunciation  by  the  Vatican.  Nevertheless  the 
cautious  spirit  will  be  slow  to  conclude  that  hopes  like 
those  of  Cavour  were  wholly  vain.  A  single  generation 
may  see  but  little  of  the  seed-time,  nothing  of  the 
harvests  that  are  yet  to  enrich  mankind.  And  even  if 
all  wider  interests  be  left  oat  of  view,  enough  remains 
to  justify  Cavour's  policy  of  respect  for  the  indepen- 
dence of  the  Chun^  in  the  fact  that  Italy  during  the 
thirty  years  succeeding  the  establishment  of  its  union 
has  remained  free  from  civil  war,  Cavour  was  wont  to 
refer  to  the  Constitution  which  the  French  National 
Assembly  imposed  upon  the  clei^y  in  1790  as  the  type 
of  erroneous  legislation.  Had  his  own  pohcy  and  that 
of  his  successors  not  been  animated  by  a  wiser  spirit; 
bad  the  Government  of  Italy,  after  overthrowing  the 


8M  XODBRN  BVSOPB. 

Pope's  temporal  soTereignty,  sought  enemies  among  tbe 
rural  priesthood  and  their  congregations,  the  provinces 
added  to  tlie  Italian  Kingdom  by  Garibaldi  would 
hardly  have  been  maintained  by  the  House  of  Savoy 
without  a  second  and  severer  struggle.  Between  the 
ideal  Italy  which  filled  the  thoughts  not  only  of  Mazziui 
but  of  some  of  the  best  English  minds  of  that  time — 
the  land  of  immemorial  greatness,  touched  once  more  by  . 
the  divine  hand  and  advancing  from  strength  to  strength 
as  the  intellectual  and  moral  pioneer  among  nations — 
between  this  ideal  and  the  somewhat  hard  and  common- 
place realities  of  the  Italy  of  to-day  there  is  indeed  little 
enough  resemblance.  Poverty,  the  pressure  of  inordinate 
taxation,  the  physical  and  moral  habits  inherited,  from 
centuries  of  evil  government, — all  these  have  darkened 
in  no  common  measure  tbe  conditions  from  which 
Italian  national  life  has  to  be  built  up.  IE  in  spite 
■  of  overwhelming  difficulties  each  crisis  has  hitherto  been 
surmounted ;  if,  with  all  that  is  faulty  and  infirm,  the 
omens  for  the  future  of  Italy  are  still  favourable,  one 
source  of  its  good  fortune  has  been  the  impress  given  to 
its  ecclesiastical  policy  by  the  great  statesman  to  whom 
above  all  other  men  it  owes  the  accomplishment  of  its 
union,  and  who,  while  claiming  for  Italy  tbe  whole  of  its 
national  inheritance,  yet  determined  to  inflict  do  need- 
less wound  upon  the  conscience  of  Rome. 


D,a,l,zc.bvG00gIe 


CHAPTEB    V. 

Ganncnr  afttr  1BS8 — The  Begeiu^  bt  Fnmia — Aimj-reoisanintion — King 
WilHam  1. — Conflict  betireen  the  Crowo  &□<!  the  Pulismeat — BimiArok — 
Hie  (troggle  continued— Aoitria  from  1859—1110  Outobor  Diploma— 
Redstanca  of  Hungarj — 'Die  Beichirath — Rnsais  nnder  A  'nicwn'iflT  H, — 
liberatiDn  of  the  Sortt — Poland — The  iDmrection  of  1863— Agnrion 
meMOKB  in  Poland-SchleiwiK-HolBtain— Death  of  Fiedarick  Til.— Plaii« 
of  Bismsrak — Campaign  in  Bchleswig — Conference  of  London — Treaty  of 
"Vienna — England  and  Napoleon  TTT, — pniada  and  Aiutria — ConTention  of 
QMtein — Italy— Alliance  of  Fnuaia  irith  Italy — Propooala  for  a  OongreM 
fail— War  betwoen  Anatria  and  PruMia^llBpoleaD  III. — ElbUKgiit* — 
CuBtoEza — Mediation  of  Napoleon — Treaty  of  Fragns — South  Q«roiany — 
Frojecta  tor  compenBation  to  Franoe-'AuBbria  and  Hongary — Detk — 
'EBtablishniPiit  of  the  Dual  Syatem  in  An<tria-Hangsi7, 

&HORTLT  before  the  events  which  broke  the  power  of 
Anstria  in  Italy,   the  Gennan   people  believed   them- 
selves to  have  entered  on  a  new  political    ^.^    ^^^ 
era.     Kir^  Frederick  William   IV.,  who, 
since  1848,  had  disappointed  every  hope  that  had  been 
fixed  on   Prussia  and  on   himself,  was  compelled  by 
mental  disorder  to  withdraw  from  public  affairs  in  the 
antumn    of   1868.      His  brother,  the  Crown  Prince 
William,  who  had  for  a  year  acted  as  the 
King's    representative,    now    assumed    the     Pn^vo^ 
Begency.    In  the  days  when  King  Frederick 
William  still  retained  some  vestiges  of  his  reputation 
'the  Crown  Prince  had  been  unpopular,  as  the  supposed 
head  of  the  reactionary  party ;  but  the  events  of  the 
last  few  years  had  exhibited  him  in  a  better  aspect. 


3M  MODERN  EUBOPS.  usa. 

Though  strong  in  his  telief  both  in  the  Divine  right  of 
Icings  in  general,  and  in  the  necessity  of  a  powerful 
monarchical  mle  in  Prussia,  he  was  disposed  to  tolerate, 
and  even  to  treat  with  a  certain  respect,  the  humble 
.  elements  of  constitutional  government  which  he  found 
in  existence.  There  was  more  manliness  in  his  nature 
than  in  that  of  his  brother,  more  belief  in  the  worth  of 
his  own  people.  The  espionage,  the  servility,  the 
overdone  professions  of  sanctity  in  Manteufiel's  regime 
displeased  him,  but  most  of  all  he  despised  its  pusil- 
lanimity in  the  conduct  of  foreign  affairs.  His  heart 
indeed  was  Prussian,  not  German,  and  the  destiny 
which  created  him  the  first  Emperor  of  imited  Germany 
was  not  of  his  own  making  nor  of  his  own  seeking  ;  but 
he  felt  that  Prussia  ought  to  bold  a  far  greater  station 
both  in  Germany  and  in  Europe  than  it  had  held 
during  his  brother's  reign,  and  that  the  elevation  of  the 
State  to  the  position  which  it  ought  to  occupy  was  the 
task  that  lay  before  himself.  During  the  twelve  months 
preceding  the  Eegency  the  retirement  of  the  King  had 
not  been  treated  as  more  than  temporary,  and  the 
Crown  Prince,  though  constantly  at  variance  with  Man- 
teuffel's  Cabinet,  had  therefore  not  considered  himself 
at  liberty  to  remove  his  brother's  advisers.  His  first 
act  on  the  assumption  of  the  constitutional  office  of 
Regent  was  to  dismiss  the  hated  Ministry.  Prince 
Antony  of  HohenzoIIern-Sigmaringen  was ,  called  to 
o£Sce,  and  posts  in  the  Government  were  gifen  to  men 
well  known  as  moderate  Liberals.  Though  the  Kegent 
shited  in  clear  terms  that  he  had  no  intention  of  form' 


UBB-a.  GSRMANT.  W 

ing  a  Liberal  party-administration,  his  action  satisfied 
public  opinion.  The  troubles  and  the  failures  of  1849 
had  inclined,  men  to  be  content  with  far  less  than  had 
been  asked  years  before.  The  leaders  of  the  more 
advanced  sections  among  the  Liberals  preferred  for  the 
most  part  to  remain  ootside  Parliamentary  life  rather 
than  to  cause  embarrassment  to  the  new  Government ; 
and  the  elections  of  1859  sent  to  Berlin  a  body  of 
representatives  fully  disposed  to  work  with  the  Eegent 
and  his  Ministers  in  the  policy  of  guarded  progress 
which  they  had  laid  down. 

This  change  of  spirit  in  the  Prussian  Government, 
followed  by  the  events  that  established  Italian  in- 
dependence, told  powerfully  npon  public 
opinion  throughout  Germany.  Hopes  that  ^^T^ 
had  been  crushed  in  1849  now  revived. 
With  the  collapse  of  military  despotism  in  the  Austrian 
Empire  the  cloiids  of  reaction  seemed  evetywhete  to  be 
passing  away ;  ii  was  possible  once  more  to  think  of 
German  national  onion  and  of  common  liberties  in 
which  all  Germans  should  share.  As  in  1808  the 
nsing  of  the  Spaniards  against  Kapoleon  had  inspired 
Blucher  and  his  countrymen  with  the  design  of  a  truly 
national  efibrt  against  their  foreign  oppressor,  so  in 
1859  the  work  of  Cavoor  challenged  the  Germans  to 
prove  that  their  national  patriotism  and  their  political 
aptitude  were  not  inferior  to  those  of  the  Italian  people. 
Men  who  had  been  prominent  in  the  National  Assembly 
at  IVankfort  again  met  one  another  and  spoke  to  the 
nation.  In  the  Parliaments  of  several  of  the  minca 
p  2  ■   ■  ^•'"''S^'-' 


S08  UODSSS  SVltOPa.  uas-tt 

States  rcBolutions  were  brought  forward  in  favour  of 
the  creation  of  a  central  German  authority.  Protests 
were  made  against  the  infringement  of  constitutional 
rights  that  had  been  common  during  the  last  ten  years ; 
patriotic  meetings  and  demonstrations  were  held ;  and  a 
National  Society,  in  imitation  of  that  which  had  pre- 
pared the  way  for  union  with  Piedmont  in  Central  and 
Southern  Italy,  was  formally  established.  There  was 
indeed  no  such  preponderating  opinion  in  favoar  of 
Prussian  leadership  as  had  existed  in  1S4S.  The 
southern  States  had  displayed  a  strong  sympathy  with 
Austria  in  its  war  with  Napoleon  III.,  and  had  re- 
garded the  neutrality  of  Prussia  during  the  Italian 
campaign  as  a  desertion  of  the  German  cause.  Here 
there  were  few  who  looked  with  friendly  eye  upon 
Berlin.  It  was  in  the  minor  states  of  the  north,  and 
especially  in  Hesse-Cassel,  where  the  struggle  between 
the  Elector  and  his  subjects  was  once'  more  breaking 
out,  that  the  strongest  hopes  were  directed  towards  the 
new  Prussian  ruler,  and  the  measures  of  his  govern- 
ment were  the  most  anxiously  watched. 

The  Prince  Regent  was  a  soldier  by  profession  and 
habit.  He  was  bom  in  1797,  and  had  been  present  at 
the  battle  of  Arcis-sur-Aube,  the  last  fought  by  Napo- 
leon against  the  Allies  in  1814.  During  forty  years  he 
had  served  on  every  commission  that  had  been  occupied 

with    Prussian   military    afiaits ;    no    man 
frouriuidflM     better  understood  the  military  organisation 

of  his  country,  no  man  more  clearly  recog- 
nised its  capacities  and  its  faults.    The  defective  con- 


dition  of  the  Prussian  army  had  been  the  principal, 
though  not  the  sole,  cause  of  the  miserable  submiBsion 
to  Austria  at  Olmiitz  in  1850,  and  of  the  abandonment 
of  all  claims  to  German  leadership  on  the  part  of  the 
Court  of  Berlin.  The  Crown  Prince  would  himself  have 
risked  all  chances  of  disaster  rather  than  inllict  upon 
Prussia  the  humiliation  with  which  King  Frederick 
"William  then  purchased  peace ;  but  Manteuffel  had 
convinced  his  sovereign  that  the  army  conM  not  engage 
in  a  campaign  against  Austria  without  ruin.  Military 
impotence  was  the  only  possible  justification  for  the 
policy  then  adopted,  and  the  Crown  Prince  determined 
that  Prussia  should  not  under  his  own  rule  have  the 
Banie  excuse  for  any  political  shortcomings.  The  work 
of  reorganisation  was  indeed  begun  during  the  reign  of 
Frederick  William  IV.,  through  the  enforcement  of 
the  three-years'  service  to  which  the  conscript  was 
liable  by  law,  but  which  had  fallen  during  the  long 
period  of  peace  to  two-years'  service.  The  number  of 
troops  with  the  colours  was  thus  largely  increased,  but 
no  addition  bad  been  made  to  the  yearly  levy,  and  no 
improvement  attempted  in  the  organisation  of  the  liand- 
wehr.  When  in  1859  the  order  for  mobilisation  was 
given  in  consequence  of  the  Italian  war,  it  was  dis- 
covered that  the  Landwehr  battalions  were  almost 
useless.  The  members  of  this  force  were  mostly 
married  men  approaching  middle  life,  who  had  been  too 
long  engaged  in  other  pursuits  to  resume  tlieir  military 
duties  with  readiness,  and  whose  call  to  the  field  left  their 
families  without  means  of  support  and  chargeable  upon 


310  MODEBir  SimOPS,  ML 

tlie  pablic  parse.  Too  mnch,  in  the  jadgment  of  the 
reformers  of  the  Prnssian  army,  was  required  firom  men 
past  youth,  not  enough  from  youth  itself.  The  plan  of 
the  Prince  Regent  i^as  therefore  to  enforce  in  the  first 
instance  with  far  more  stringency  the  law  imposing 
BehvHirfn-  *^®  Universal  obligation  to  military  service  ; 
'"'  ""  and,  while  thus  raising  the  annual  levy  from 
40,000  to  60,000  men,  to  extend  the  period  of  service 
in  the  Reserve,  into  which  the  young  soldier  passed  on 
the  completion  of  his  three  years  with  the  colours,  from 
two  to  four  years.  Asserting  with  greater  rigour  its 
claim  to  seven  years  in  the  early  life  of  the  citizen,  the 
State  would  gain,  without  incloding  the  Landwehr,  an 
effective  army  of  fonr  hundred  thousand  men,  and  would 
practically  he  able  to  dispense  with  the  service  of  those 
who  were  approaching  middle  life,  except  in  cases  of 
great  urgency.  In  the  execution  of  this  reform  the 
Government  coold  on  its  own  authority  enforce  the 
increased  levy  and  the  full  three  years'  service  in  the 
standing  army ;  for  the  prolongation  of  service  in  the 
Reserve,  and  for  the  greater  expenditure  entailed  by  the 
new  system,  the  consent  of  Parliament  was  necessary. 

The  general  principles  on  which  the  proposed  re- 
otganisation  was  based  were  accepted  by  public  opinion 
and  by  both  Chambers  of  Parliament ;  it  was,  however, 
Tirtprwdin  ''^'*^  ^y  ^^^  Liberal  leaders  that  the  increase 
Sir'iS^iafl£  of  expenditure  might,  without  impairing  the 
efficiency  of  the  army,  be  avoided  by  re- 
turning to  the  system  of  two-years'  service  with  the 
colours,   which   during   so    long    a    period    had    been 


.  tm-a.  TBJjaaiAN  AMWY  BILL.  811 

thoaghfc  safficieut  for  the  training  of  the  soldier.  The 
Eegent,  however,  was  convinced  that  the  discipline  and 
the  instmction  of  three  years  were  indispensable  to  the 
Pruasian  conscript,  and  he  refused  to  accept  the  com- 
promise suggested.  The  mobilisation  of  1859  had  given 
him  an  opportunity  for  forming  additional  battalions  ; 
and  although  the  Landwelir  were  soon  dismissed  to  their 
homes  the  new  formation  was  retained,  and  the  place 
of  the  retiring  militiamen  was  filled  by  conscripts  of 
the  year.  The  Lower  Chamber,  in  voting  the  sum 
required  in  1860  for  the  increased  numbers  of  tbe 
army,  treated  this  arrangement  as  temporary,  and 
limited  tbe  grant  to  one  year;  in  spi  o  of  this  the 
Regent,  who  on  the  death  of  his  brother  in  January, 
1861,  became  King  of  Prussia,  formed  the  additional 
battalions  into  new  regiments,  and  gave 
to  these   new  re^menls  their  names  and     RiDgwrniun. 

°  _  ina.,  1B81, 

colours.  The  year  1861  passed  without 
bringing  the  questions  at  issue  between  the  Govern- 
ment and  the  Chamber  of  Deputies  to  a  settlement. 
Public  feeling,  disappointed  in  tbe  reserved  and  hesi- 
tating policy  which  was  still  followed  by  tbe  Court  in 
German  afiairs,  stimulated  too  by  the  rapid  consolida- 
tion of  the  Italian  monarchy,  which  the  Prussian  Gktvem- 
ment  on  its  part  had  as  yet  declined  to  recognise,  was 
becoming  impatient  and  resentful.  It  seemed  as  if  the 
Court  of  Berlin  still  shrank  from  committing  itself  to 
the  national  cause.  The  general  confidence  reposed  in  the 
new  ruler  at  his  accession  was  passing  away ;  and  when 
in  the  summer  of  1861  the  dissolution  of  Parliament 


Sia  MODEBir  EJTROPa.  vm. 

took  place,  the  elections  resulted  in  the  retom  not 
only  of  a  Progressist  majority,  but  of  a  majority  little 
inclined  to  submit  to  measures  of  compromise,  or  to 
shrink  from  the  assertion  of  its  full  constitutional 
rights. 

Tbe  new  Parliament  assembled  at  the  beginning  of 
1862.  Under  the  impulse  of  public  opinion,  the  Go- 
vemment  was  now  beginning  to  adopt  a  more  vigorouB 
pintPkrik-  policy  in  German  affairs,  and  to  re-assert 
luDtotiwi.  Prussia's  claims  to  an  independent  leader- 
ship in  defiance  of  the  restored  Diet  of  Frankfort. 
But  the  conflict  with  the  Lower  Chamber  was  not  to 
be  averted  by  revived  enei^  abroad.  The  Army  Bill, 
which  was  passed  at  once  by  the  Upper  House,  was 
referred  to  a  hostile  Committee  on  reaching  the 
Chamber  of  Deputies,  and  a  resolution  was  carried 
insisting  on  the  right  of  the  representatives  of  the 
people  to  a  far  more  effective  control  over  the  Butlget 
than  they  had  hitherto  exercised.  The  result  of  this 
DiMoiutioB.  '^^^  ^^  ^®  dissolution  of  Parliament  by 
May.  186*.  ^-^^    Kiog,    aud   the    resignation    of   the 

Ministry,  with  the  exception  of  General  Boon,  Minister 
of  "War,  and  two  of  the  most  conservative  among 
his  colleagues.  Prince  Holienlohe,  President  of  the 
Upper  House,  became  chief  of  the  Government.  There 
was  now  an  open  and  undisguised  conflict  between 
the  Crown  and  the  upholders  of  Parliamentary  rights. 
"King  or  Parliament"  was  the  expression  in  which 
the  newly-appointed  Ministers  themselves  summed 
up    the  struggle.     The  utmost  pressure  was  exerted 


l^  the  Government  in  the  course  of  the  elections 
which  followed,  bnt  in  vtun.  The  I^ogressist  party 
returned  in  overwhelming  strength  to  the  BBoondPrfk. 
new  Parliament;  the  voice  of  the  country  "^ '"*'*■ 
seemed  unmistakably  to  condemn  the  policy  to  which 
the  King  and  his  advisers  were  committed.  After 
a  long  and  sterile  discussion  in  the  Budget  Committee, 
the  debate  on  the  Army  Bill  began  in  the  liower  House 
on  the  11th  of  September.  Its  principal  clauses  were 
rejected  by  an  almost  unanimous  vote.  An  attempt 
made  by  General  Boon  to  satisfy  his  opponents  by  a 
partial  and  conditional  admission  of  the  principle  of 
two-years*  service  resulted  only  in  increased  exaspera- 
tion on  both  sides.  Hohenlohe  resigned,  and  the  King 
now  placed  in  power,  at  the  head  of  a  Minis- 
try of  conflict,  the  most  resolute  and  un-  i™«>MinWBr. 
flinching  of  all  his  friends,  the  most  con- 
temptuous scorner  of  Parliamentatj  majorities,  Herr 
von  Bismarck.* 

The  new  Minister  was,  like  Oavonr,  a  country 
gentleman,  and,  like  Cavour,  he  owed  his  real  entry 
into  public  life  to  the  revolutionary  movement  of  1848. 
He  had  indeed  held  some  obscure  oflScial  posts  before 
that  epoch,  but  it  was  as  a  member  of  the 
United  Diet  which  assembled  at  Berlin  iu 
April,  1848,  that  he  first  attracted  the  attention  of 
King  or  people.  He  was  one  of  two  Deputies  who 
refused  to  join  in  the  vote  of  thanks  to  Frederick 

■  Botielite  fliwr  der  Hilibdr-etat,  p.  669.    Schnlthew,  Enrapaiscber 
GBsehiohb  Kaleader,  1862,  p.  122. 


SU  VODEBJf  EUBOFB.  ISM. 

Williatn  IV.  for  the  CioDstitatioa  whicb  he  had  pro- 
mised to  Prussia.  Bismarck,  then  thirty-three  years 
old,  was  a  Royalist  of  Hoyalists,  the  type,  as  it  seemed, 
of  the  loagh  and  masterful  Junker,  or  Sqoire,  of  the 
older  parls  of  Prussia,  fo  whom  all  reforms  from  those 
of  Stein  downwards  were  hateful,  all  ideas  but  those  of 
the  barrack  and  the  kennel  alien.  Others  in  the  spring 
of  1848  lamented  the  concessions  made  by  the  Crown 
to  the  people ;  Bismarck  had  the  coun^  to  say  so. 
When  reaction  came  there  were  naturally  many,  and 
among  them  King  Frederick  William,  who  were  in- 
terested in  the  man  who  iu  the  heyday  of  constitutional 
enthusiasm  had  treated  the  whole  movement  as  so  much 
midsummer  madness,  and  had  remained  faithful  to 
monarchical  authority  as  the  one  thing  needful  for  the 
Prussian  State.  Bismarck  continued  to  take  a  pro- 
minent part  in  the  Parliaments  of  Berlin  and  Erfurt ; 
it  was  not,  however,  till  1851  that  he  passed  into  the 
inner  official  circle.  He  was  then  sent  as  the  repre- 
sentative of  Prussia  to  the  restored  Diet  of  Frankfort. 
As  an  absolutist  and  a  conservative,  brought  up  in  the 
traditions  of  the  Holy  Alliance,  Bismarck  had  in  efu-lier 
days  looked  up  to  Austria  as  the  mainstay  of 
monarchical  order  and  the  historic  barrier  against 
the  flood  of  democratic  and  wind-driven  sentiment 
which  threatened  to  deluge  Q-ermany.  He  had  even 
approved  the  surrender  made  at  Olmiitz  in  1850,  as  a 
matter  of  necessilrf ;  but  the  belief  now  grew  sirong 
in  his  mind,  and  was  confirmed  by  all  he  saw  at  Frank- 
fort, that  Austria  under  Schwarzenberg'a  nUe  waa  no 


longer  tlie  Power  wliicb  had  been  content  to  share  the 
Qerman  leadership  with  FruBsia  in  the  period  before 
1848,  but  a  Power  wliicb  meant  to  rule  in  Germanj 
uncontrolled.  In  contact  with  the  representatives  of 
that  outworn  system  wbicb  Anstria  had  resuscitated  at 
Frankfort,  and  with  the  instruments  of  the  dominant 
State  itself,  Bismarck  soon  learnt  to  detest  the  paltri- 
ness of  the  one  and  the  insolence  of  the  other.  He 
declared  the  so-called  Federal  system  to  be  a  mere 
device  for  employing  the  secondary  German  States 
for  the  aggrandisement  of  Austria  and  the  humilia- 
tion of  Prussia.  The  Coui-t  of  Vienna,  and  with  it 
the  Diet  of  Frankfort,  became  in  bis  eyes  the  enemy 
of  Prussian  greatness  and  independence.  Daring  the 
Crimean  war  he  was  the  vigorous  opponent  of  an 
alliance  with  tbe  Western  Powers,  not  only  from  dis- 
trust of  France,  and  from  regard  towards  Russia  as  on 
tbe  whole  tbe  most  constant  and  the  most  natural  ally 
of  his  own  country,  but  from  tbe  conviction  tbat  Prussia 
ought  to  assert  a  national  policy  wholly  independent  of 
that  of  the  Court  of  Vienna.  That  the  Emperor  of 
Austria  was  approaching  more  or  less  nearly  to  union 
with  France  and  England  was,  in  Bismarck'a  view,  a 
good  reason  why  Prussia  should  stand  fast  in  its  rela- 
tiona  of  friendship  with  St.  Petersbui^.*  The  policy 
of  neutrality,  which  King  Frederick  William  and 
Manteoffel  adopted  more  ont  of  disinclination  to 
Btrennooa  action  than  from  any  clear  political  view,  was 

*  PoacbingM-,  Ftenseen  im  Bondestag  ii,  69,  97;  ir.  178.      Btim, 
Binurok,  i.  606. 


«1S  UODESN  SXmOFB.  vm. 

advocated  by  Bismarck  for  reasons  which,  if  they  made 
Europe  nothiog  and  Prussia  everytbtng,  were  at  least 
inspired  by  a  keen  and  accurate  perception  of  Pma- 
eia's  own  interests  in  its  present  and  future  relations 
with  its  neighbours.  When  the  reign  of  Frederick 
William  ended,  Bismarck,  who  stood  high  in  the  confi- 
dence of  the  new  Regent,  was  sent  as  ambassador  to  St. 
Petersburg.  He  subsequently  represented  Prussia  for 
a  short  time  at  the  Court  of  Napoleon  III.,  and  was 
recalled  by  the  King  from  Paris  in  the  autumn  of  1862 
in  order  to  be  placed  at  the  head  of  the  Government. 
Far  better  versed  in  diplomacy  than  in  ordinary  ad- 
ministration, he  assumed,  together  with  the  Presidency 
of  the  Cabinet,  the  Ministry  of  Foreign  ASairs. 

There  were  now  at  the  head  of  the  Prussian  State 

three  men  eminently  suited  to  work  with  one  another, 

and  to  carry  out,  in  their  own  roagh  and 

ths  Lower  military  fashion,  the  policy  which  was  to 

Ciumbw,  isn.  J  .        '  r        J 

unite  Qerinany  under  the  House  of  Hohen- 
zuUem.  The  Xing,  Bismarck,  and  Boon  were  tho- 
roughly at  one  in  their  aim,  the  enforcement  of 
Prussia's  ascendency  by  means  of  the  army.  The 
designs  of  the  Minister,  which  expanded  with  success 
and  which  involved  a  certain  daring  in  the  choice  of 
means,  were  at  each  new  development  so  ably  veiled  or 
disclosed,  so  dexterously  presented  to  the  sovereign,  as 
to  overcome  his  hesitation  on  striking  into  many  an  un- 
accustomed path.  Roon  and  his  workmen,  who,  in  the 
face  of  a  hostile  Parliament  and  a  hostile  Press,  had  to 
supply  to  Bismarck  what  a  foreign  alliance  and  enthu- 


siastic  national  sentiment  lad  supplied  to  Caronr,  foiled 
for  Prussia  a  weapoo  of  bucIi  temper  that,  against  the 
enemies  on  whom  it  was  employed,  no  extraordinary 
genius  was  necessary  to  reuder  its  thrust  fatal.  It 
was  no  doubt  difScalt  for  the  Prime  Minister,  without 
alarming  his  sovereign  and  without  risk  of  an  immediate 
breach  with  Austria,  to  make  his  ulterior  aims  so  clear 
as  to  carry  the  Parliam^it  with  him  in  the  policy  of 
military  reorganisation.  "Words  frank  even  to  brutality 
were  uttered  by  him,  but  they  sounded  more  like 
menace  and  bluster  than  the  explanation  of  a  well-con- 
sidered plan.  "  Prussia  must  keep  its  forces  together," 
he  said  in  one  of  his  first  Parliamentary  appearances, 
"  its  boundaries  are  not  those  of  a  sound  State.  The 
great  questions  of  the  time  are  to  be  decided  not  by 
speeches  and  votes  of  m^orities  but  by  blood  and 
iron."  After  the  experience  of  1848  and  1850,  a  not 
too  despondent  political  obs.erver  might  well  have 
formed  the  conclusion  that  nothing  less  than  the  mili- 
tary overthrow  of  Austria  conld  give  to  Germany  any 
tolerable  system  of  national  government,  or  even  secure 
to  Prussia  its  legitimate  field  of  action.  This  was  the 
keystone  of  Bismarck's  belief,  but  he  failed  to  make  his 
purpose  and  his  motives  intelligible  to  the  representa- 
tives of  the  Prussian  people.  He  was  taken  for  a  mere 
bully  and  absolutist  of  the  old  type.  His  personal 
characteristics,  his  arrogance,  his  sarcaem,  his  habit  of 
banter,  exasperated  and  inflamed.  Boon  was  no  better 
Boited  to  the  atmosphere  of  a  popular  assembly.  Each 
eacoxmt«r  of  the  Ministers  with  the  Chamber  embittered 


81B  MODBRW  BUBOPK  urn. 

the  stra^le  and  made  reconciliation  more  difficult. 
The  Parliamentary  system  o£  Frasaia  seemed  threatened 
in  its  very  existence  wlien,  after  the  rejection  by  the 
Chamber  of  Deputies  of  the  clause  in  the  Budget  pro- 
viding for  the  cost  of  the  army-reorganisation,  this 
clanse  was  restored  by  the  Upper  House,  and  the 
Budget  of  the  Government  passed  in  its  original  form. 
By  the  terms  of  the  Constitution  the  right  of  the  Tipper 
House  in  matters  of  taxation  waa  limited  to  the  approval 
or  rejection  of  the  Budget  sent  up  to  it  from  the  Cham- 
ber of  Bepresentatives.  It  possessed  no  power  of 
amendment.  Bismarck,  however,  had  formed  the  theory 
that  in  the  event  of  a  disagreement  between  the  two 
Houses  a  situation  arose  for  which  the  Coostitation 
-  had  not  provided,  and  in  which  therefore  the  Crown 
was  stiU  possessed  of  its  old  absolute  authority.  No 
compromise,  no  negotiation  between  the  two  Houses, 
was,  in  his  view,  to  be  desired.  He  was  resolved  to 
govern  and  to  levy  taxes  without  a  Budget,  and  had 
obtained  the  King's  permission  to  close  the  session 
immediately  the  Upper  House  had  given  it«  vote.  Bat 
before  the  order  tor  prorogation  could  be  brought  down 
the  President  of  tlie  Lower  Chamber  had  assembled  his 
colleagues,  and  the  nnanimous  vote  of  those  present 
declared  the  action  of  the  Upper  House  null  and  void. 
In  the  agitation  attending  this  triid  of  strength  between 
the  Crown,  the  Ministry  and  the  Upper  House  on  one 
Bide  and  the  Bepresentative  Chamber  on  the  otherthe 
session  of  1862  closed.* 

*  Habn,  Tunt  Biunarck,  i  66,    This  work  is  a  collection  of  donunoils, 


nm*.  THE  CONFLIOT  TIME  IN  PBVBSIA.  819 

The  Depaties,  returning  to  their  constituencies, 
carried  with  them  the  spirit  of  combat,  and  received 
the  most  demonstrative  proofs  of  popular 
sympathy  and  support.  ,  Representations  of 
great  earnestness  were  made  to  the  King,  but  they 
failed  to  shake  in  the  slightest  degree  his  conlidence  in 
his  Minister,  or  to  bend  his  fixed  resolution  to  carry  out 
luB  military  reforms  to  the  end.  The  claim  of  Parlia- 
ment to  interfere  with  matters  of  military  organisation 
in  Prussia  touched  him  in  his  most  sensitive  point. 
He  declared  that  the  aim  of  his  adversaries  was  nothing 
les^  than  the  establishment  of  a  Parliamentary  instead 
of  a  royal  army.  In  perfect  sincerity  he  believed  that 
the  convulsions  of  1848  were  on  the  point  of  brtaking 
out  afresh.  "You  mourn  the  conflict  betwetn  the 
Crown  and  the  natiunal  representatives,"  he  said  to  the 
spokesman  of  an  important  society ;  "  do  I  not  mourn 
it?  I  sleep  no  single  night."  The  anxiety,  the  de- 
spondency of  the  sovereign  were  shared  by  the  friends 
of  Prussia  throughout  Germany ;  its  enemies  saw  with 
wonder  that  Bismarck  in  his  struggle  with  the  educated 
Liberalism  of  the  middle  classes  did  not  shrink  from 
dalliance  with  tlie  Socialist  leaders  and  their  organs. 
When  Parliament  reassembled  at  the  beginning  of 
1863  the  conflict  was  resamed  with  even  greater  heat. 
The  Lower  Chamber  carried  an  address  to  ■b^,„„,b]^ 
the  King,  which,  while   dwelling  on   the      t""™^!** 

■peeoliee,  and  letters  not  onlj  bj  BUm&rck  UmeeU  but  on  all  the  principal 
mAtten  in  which  Bismanilc  wu  ooncemed.  It  i«  perbap'i,  ircaa  tha 
Gernuta  point  of  view,  the  most  importutt  repertory  of  authorili^Q  lor  tho 
pericd  1802—1685. 


SaO  UODESN  EVBOPB.  WM 

loyalty  of  the  Prussiaa  people  to  their  chief,  charged 
the.  Ministers  with  vIolatiDg  the  Constitutioa,  and  de- 
manded their  dismissal.  The  King  refused  to  receive 
the  deputation  which  was  to  present  the  address,  and 
in  the  written  commnnicatioa  in  which  he  replied  to  it 
he  sharply  reproved  the  Assemhly  for  their  errors  and 
presumption.  It  was  in  vain  that  the  Army  Bill  was 
again  introduced.  The  House,  while  allowing  the 
ordinary  military  expenditure  for  the  year,  struck  out 
the  costs  of  the  reorganigation,  and  declared  Ministers 
personally  answerahle  for  the  sums  expended.  Each 
appearance  of  the  leading  members  of  the  Cabinet  now 
became  'the  signal  for  contumely  and  altercation.  The 
decencies  of  debate  ceased  to  be  observed  on  either  side. 
When  the  President  attempted  to  set  some  limit  to  the 
violence  of  Bismarck  and  Boon,  and,  on  resistance  to  his 
authority,  terminated  the  sitting,  the  Ministers  de- 
clared that  they  would  no  longer  appear  in  a  Chamber 
where  freedom  of  speech  was  denied  to  them.  Affairs 
came  to  a  deadlock.  The  Chamber  again  appealed  to 
the  King,  and  insisted  that  reconciliation  between  the 
Crown  and  the  nation  was  impossible  so  long  as  the 
present  Ministers  remained  in  office.  The  King,  now 
thoroughly  indignant,  charged  the  Assembly  with  at- 
tempting to  win  for  itself  supreme  power,  expressed  his 
gratitude  to  his  Ministers  for  their  resistance  to  this 
usurpation,  and  declared  himself  too  confident  in  the 
loyalty  of  the  Prussian  people  to  be  intimidated  by 
threats.  His  reply  was  followed  by  the  prorogation  of 
the  Assembly  (May  ^6th).     A  dissolution  would  have 


UtML  THB   CONFUOT  TIMS  JN  PBUBBIjL  321 

been  worse  than  useless,  for  in  the  actoal  stttte-of  pablie 
opinion  the  Opposition  would  probably  have  triumphed 
throughout  the  country.  It  only  remtUQed  for  Bis- 
marck to  hold  his  ground,  and,  having  silenoed  the 
Parliament  for  a  while,  to  silence  the  Press 
also  by  the  exercise  of  autocratic  power,  u^ih* 
The  CoDStitution  authorised  the  King,  in 
the  absence  of  the  Chambers,  to  publish  euaotments  on 
matters  of  urgency  having  the  force  of  laws.  No  sooner 
had  the  session  been  closed  than  an  edict  was  issued 
erapoweriag  the  Qovemmeot,  without  resort  to  courts 
of  law,  to  suppress  any  newspaper  after  two  warnings. 
An  outburst  of  public  iudignation  branded  this  return 
to  the  principles  of  pure  despotism  in  Prussia;  but 
neither  King  nor  Minister  was  to  be  diverted  by  threats 
or  by  expostulations  &om  his  course.  The  Press  was 
effectively  silenced.  So  profound,  however,  was  the 
distrust  now  everywhere  felt  as  to  the  future  of  Prussia, 
and  so  deep  the  resentment  against  the  Minister  in  all 
circles  where  liiberal  influences  penetrated,  that  the 
Crown  Prince  himself,  after  in  vain  protesting  against  a 
policy  of  violence  which  endangered  his  own  prospective 
interests  in  the  Crown,  publicly  expressed  his  disap- 
proval of  the  action  of  Government.  For  this  offence 
he  was  never  forgiven. 

The   course  which    affairs    were   taking    at   Berlin 
excited  the   more  bitter    regret    and    disappointment 
among  all  friends  of  Prussia  as  at  this  very     i,,,,^^^ 
iame  it  seemed  that  constitutional  govern-        '^''' 
ment  was  being  saccessfully  established  in  the  western 


888  ifODEBN  SUBOPB.  WM<i 

part  of  the  Austrian  Empire.  The  centralised  military 
despotiBm  with  which  Austria  emerged  from  the  con- 
TtUsions  of  1848  had  been  allowed  ten  years  of  undis- 
puted  Bway;  at  the  end  of  this  time  it  had  hrooght 
things  to  such  a  pass  that,  after  a  campaign  in  which 
there  had  heen  but  one  great  battle,  and  while  still  in 
possession  of  a  vast  army  and  an  unbroken  chain  of 
fortresses,  Austria  stood  powerless  to  move  hand  or  foot 
It  was  not  the  defeat  of  Solferino  or  the  cession  of  Lorn- 
hardy  that  exhibited  the  prostration  of  Austria's  power, 
but  the  fact  that  while  the  conditions  of  the  Peace  of 
^Zurich  were  swept  away,  and  Italy  was  united  under 
Victor  Emmanuel  in  defiance  of  the  engagements  made 
by  Napoleon  III.  at  Yillafranca,  the  Austrian  Emperor 
was  compelled  to  look  on  with  folded  arms.  To  have 
drawn  the  sword  again,  to  have  fired  a  shot  in  defence 
of  the  Pope's  temporal  power  or  on  behalf  of  the  vassal 
princes  of  Tuscany  and  Modena,  would  have  been  to 
risk  the  existence  of  the  Austrian  monarchy.  The 
State  was  all  but  bankrupt;  rebellion  might  at  any 
moment  break  out  in  Hungary,  which  had  already  sent 
thousands  of  soldiers  to  the  Italian  camp.  Peace  at 
whatever  price  was  necessary  abroad,  and  at  home  the 
system  of  centralised  despotism  could  no  longer  exist, 
come  what  might  in  its  place.  It  was  natural  that  the 
Emperor  should  but  imperfectly  understand  at  the  first 
the  extent  of  the  concessions  which  it  was  necessaiy  for 
him  to  make.  He  determined  that  the  Provincial  Councils 
which  Schwarzenbeig  had  promised  in  1850  should  be 
called  into  existence,  and  that  a  Council  of  the  Empire 
..  .  CooqII' 


(Eeichsrath),  drawn  in  part  from  these,  shouW  assemble 
at  Vienna,  to  advise,  thoagh  not  to  control,  the  Govern- 
ment in  matters  of  finance.  So  urgent,  however,  were 
the  needs  of  the  exchequer,  that  the  Emperor  proceeded 
at  once  to  the  creation  of  the  Central  Council,  and 
nominated  its  first  members  himself.     (March,  1860.) 

That  the  Hungarian  members  nominated  by  the 
Smperor  would  decline  to  appear  at  Vienna  unless 
some  farther  guarantee  was  given  for  the 
restoration  of  Hungarian  liberty  was  well 
known.  The  Emperor  accordingly  promised  to  restore 
the  ancient  county-organisation,  which  had  filled  so  great 
a  space  in  Hungarian  history  before  1848,  and  to  take 
steps  for  assembling  the  Hungarian  Diet.  This,  with 
the  repeal  of  an  edict  injurious  to  the  Protestants,  opened 
the  way  for  reconciliation,  and  the  nominated  Hungarians 
took  their  place  in  the  Council,  thougli  under  protest 
that  the  existing  arrangement  could  only  be  accepted  as 
preparatory  to  the  full  restitution  of  the  rights  of  their 
country.  The  Council  continued  in  session  during  the 
summer  of  1860.  Its  duties  were  financial;  but  the 
establishment  of  financial  equilibrium  in  Austria  was 
inseparable  &om  the  establishment  of  political  stability- 
and  public  confidence ;  and  the  Council,  in  its  last 
sittings,  entered  on  the  widest  coilstitutional  problems. 
The  non-German  members  were  in  the  majority;  and 
while  .all  parties  alike  condemned  the  fallen  absolutism, 
the  rival  declarations  of  policy  submitted  to  the  Council 
marked  the  opposition  which  was  henceforward  to  exist 
between  the  German  Iiiberalfi  of  Austria  and  the  variovs 
r3 


821  MODEBN  EUROPE.  ntb 

Nationalist  or  Federalist  groups.  The  Mt^yars,  uniting 
with  those  who  had  been  their  bitterest  enemies,  de- 
clai-ed  that  the  ancient  independence  in  legislation,  and 
administration  of  the  several  countries  subject  to  the 
House  of  Hapsburg  must  be  restored,  each  country 
retaining  its  owd  historical  character.  The  German 
minority  contended  that  the    Emperor  should   bestow 

upon  his  subjects  such  institutions  as,  while 
MmLrtiiii       based    on    the   right   of   self-government, 

should  secure  the  unity  of  the  Empire  and 
the  force  of  its  central  authority.  All  parties  were  for 
a  constitutional  system  aod  for  local  liberties  in  one 
form  or  another ;  but  while  the  Magyars  and  their . 
supporters  sought  for  nothing  less  than  national  inde- 
pendence, the  Germans  would  at  the  most  have  granted 
a  uniform  system  of  provincial  self-government  in  strict 
subordination  to  a  central  representative  body  drawn 
from  the  whole  Empire  and  legislating  for  the  whole 
Empire.  The  decision  of  the  Emperor  was  necessarily  a 
ThvDipiomtot  compromise.  By  a  Diploma  published  on 
o«,aM8«..  j.j^g  20th  of  October  he  promised  to  restore 
to  Hungary  its  old  Constitution,  and  to  grant  wide 
legislative  rights  to  the  other  States  of  the  Monarchy, 
establishing  for  the  transaction  of  affairs  common  to  the 
whole  Empire  an  Imperial  Council,  and  reserving  for 
the  non-Hungarian  members  of  this  Council  a  qualified 
right  of  legislation  for  all  the  Empire  except  Hungary.* 
The  Magyars  had  conquered  their  King;  and  all 

*  S«tmiihiiigderStut«»<;tellOeBt9miDlii(1861),pp.2,33.    DruJalin 
Terfaasougsticdt,  p.  lOT. 

I  ,i,z<,.f,GoogIf 


the  impetnouB  patriotism  tliat  had  been  crashed  down 
since  the  ruin  of  1849  now  again  burst  into  flame. 
The  CoQQty  Assemblies  met,  and  elected  as  .^ 

their  officers  men  who  had  been  condemned  SnTSToik. 
to  death  in  1849  and  who  were  liTJng  in 
exile;  they  swept  away  the  existing  law-eonrts,  refused 
the  taxes,  and  proclaimed  the  legislation  of  1848  again 
in  force.  Francis  Joseph  seemed  anxious  to  avert  a 
conflict,  and  to  prove  both  in  Hungary  and  in  the 
other  parts  of  the  Empire  the  sincerity  of  his  promises 
of  reform,  on  which  the  nature  of  the  provincial  Con- 
stitntions  which  were  published  immediately  after  the 
Diploma  of  October  had  thrown  some  doubt.  At  the 
instance  of  his  Hungarian  advisers  he  dismissed  the 
chief  of  his  Cabinet,  and  called  to  office  Schmerling, 
who,  in  1348,  had  been  Prime  Minister  of  the 
Oenoan  National  G-ovemment  at  Frankfort.  Schmer- 
ling at  once  promised  important  changes  in  the  pro- 
vincial systems  drawn  up  by  his  predecessor,  but  in 
his  dealings  with  Hungary  he  proved  far  less  tract- 
able than  the  Magyars  had  expected.  If  the  Hun- 
garians had  recovered  their  own  constitutional  forms, 
they  still  stood  threatened  with  the  supremacy  of  a 
Central  Council  in  all  that  related  to  themselves  in  com- 
mon with  the  rest  of  the  Empire,  and  gainst  this  they 
rebelled.  But  from  the  establishment  of  this  Council 
of  the  Empire  neither  the  Emperor  nor  Schmerling 
would  recede.  An  edict  of  February  26th,  1861,  while 
it  made  good  the  changes  promised  by  Schmerling  in 
the  several  provincial  systems,  conflrmed  the  general 


891  MODEBN  BUBOPS.  ML 

prorisionB  of  the  Diploma  of  October,  and  declared  that 
the  Emperor  would  maintain  the  Constitntion  of  his 
dominions  as  now  established  against  all  attack. 

In  the  following  April   the    Provincial   Diets  met 
througbont  the  Austrian  Empire,  and  the  Diet  of  the 

Hungarian  Kingdom  assembled  at  Pesth. 
Mwittun       The  first  duty  of  each  of  these  bodies  wbs 

to  elect  representatives  to  the  Council  of 
the  Empire  which  was  to  meet  at  Vienna.  Neither 
Hungary  nor  Croatia,  however,  would  elect  such  repre- 
sentatives, each  claiming  complete  legislative  independ- 
ence, and  declining  to  recognise  any  such  external 
authority  as  it  was  now  proposed  to  create.  The 
Emperor  warned  the  Hungarian  Diet  against  the  con- 
sequencea  of  its  action ;  but  the  national  spirit  of  the 
Magyars  was  thoroughly  roused,  and  the  County  Assem- 
blies vied  with  one  another  in  the  violence  of  their 
addresses  to  the  Sovereign.  The  Diet,  reviving  the 
Constitutional  difficulties  connected  with  the  abdication 
of  Ferdinand,  declared  that  it  would  only  negotiate 
for  the  coronation  of  Francis  Joseph  after  the  esta- 
blishment of  a  Hungarian  Ministry  and  the  restora- 
tion of  Croatia  and  Transylvania  to  the  Hungarian 
Kingdom.  Accepting  Schmerling's  contention  that  the 
ancient  constitutional  rights  of  Hungary  had  been 
extinguished  by  rebellion,  the  Emperor  insisted  on  the 
establishment  of  a  Council  for  the  whole  Empire^  and 
refused  to  recede  irom  the  declarations  which  he  had 
made  in  the  edict  of  February.  The  Diet  hereupon 
protested,  in  a  long  and  vig^oroos  address  to  the  Kong, 


ML  TSE   BEI0E8BATH  AT    riENNA.  S27 

against  the  validity  fA  all  laws  made  without  its  own 
concairenee,  and  declared  that  Francis  Joseph  had  ren- 
dered an  agreement  between  the  Kiag  and  the  nation 
impossible.  A  dissolution  followed.  The  County  As- 
semblies took  up  the  national  struggle.  They  in  their 
turn  were  sappressed ;  their  officers  were  dismissed, 
and  miUtary  rule  was  established  throughout  the  land, 
though  with  explicit  declarations  ou  the  part  of  the 
King  that  it  was  to  last  only  till  the  legally  existing 
Constitution  could  be  brought  into  peaceful  working,* 

Meanwhile  the  Central  Representative  Body,  now 
by  enlargement  of  its  functions  and  increase  in  the 
number  of  its  members  made  into  a  Parlia- 
ment of  the  Empire,  assembled  at  Vienna.  «tvicnM, iLy, 
Its  real  character  was  necessarily  altered  by 
the  absence  of  representatives  from  Hungary ;  and  for 
some  time  the  Government  seemed  disposed  to  limit  its 
competence  to  the  affairs  of  the  Cis-Leithan  provinces; 
but  after  satisfying  himself  that  no  accord  with  Hun- 
gary was  possible,  the  Emperor  announced  this  fact  to 
the  Assembly,  and  bade  it  perform  its  part  as  the 
organ  of  the  Empire  at  large,  without  regard  to  the 
abstention  of  those  who  did  not  choose  to  exercise  their 
rights.  The  Budget  for  the  entire  Empire  was  accord- 
iugly  submitted  to  the  Assembly,  and  for  the  first  time 
the  cvpenditure  of  the  Austrian  State  was  laid  open  to 
public  examination  and  criticism.  The  first  session  of 
this  Parliument  lasted,  with  adjournments,  from  May, 

*  Satumtmig  der  Stubaoton,  p.  39.    Der  TTngsriache  Bdchstag  18S1, 
pp.  3, 192,  338.    Arnold  rorster.  Life  rf  Deik, p.  Ul.  (  "(Miok' 


S8B  MODB&ff  aUROPB.  isn-n. 

1861,  to  December,  1862.  In  legislation  it  effected 
little,  but  its  relations  as  a  wbole  with  the  Government 
remained  excellent,  and  its  loDg-continued  activity, 
unbroken  by  popular  disturbances,  did  much  to  raise 
the  fallen  credit  of  the  Austrian  State  and  to  win  for  it 
the  regard  of  Germany.  On  the  close  of  the  session 
the  Provincial  Diets  assembled,  and  throughout  the 
spring  of  1863  the  rivalry  of  the  Austrian  nationaliti(>3 

gave  abundant  animation  to  many  a  local 
of  om  Eekh.-      capital.     In  the  next  summer  the  Reiehs- 

rath  reassembled  at  Vienna.  Though  Hun- 
gary remained  in  a  condition  not  fur  removed  from 
rebellion,  the  Parliamentary  system  of  Austria  was 
gaining  in  strength,  and  indeed,  as  it  seemed,  at  the 
expense  of  Hungary  itself;  for  the  Boutnanian  and 
German  population  of  Transylvania,  rejoicing  in  the 
opportunity  of  detaching  themselves  from  the  M^yars, 
now  sent  deputies  to  Vienna.  While  at  Berlin  each 
week  that  passed  sharpened  the  antagonism  between 
the  nation  and  its  Government,  and  made  the  Minister's 
name  more  odious,  Austria  seemed  to  have  snccessfully 
broken  with  the  traditions  of  its  past,  and  to  be  fast 
earning  for  itself  an  honourable  place  among  States  of 
the  constitutional  type. 

One  of  the  reproaches  brought  against  Bismarck  by 
the  Progressist  majority  in  the  Parliamentof  Berlin  was 
that  he  had  isolated  Prussia  both  in  Germany  and  in 
Europe.  That  he  bad  roused  against  the  Goverment  of 
his  country  the  public  opinion  of  Germany  was  true:  that 
he  had  alienated  Prussia  from  all  Europe  wajii  not  tbe 


\BM-»L  nUSSIA    AFTBB    THE   OBB£SAS    WAR.  329 

case  ;  on  the  contrarjr.  lie  bad  established  a  closer  rela- 
tion between  the  Courts  of  Berlin  and  St.  Petersburg 
than  had  existed  at  any  time  since  the  commencement 
of  the  Eegency,  and  had  secored  for  Prussia  a  degree  of 
confidence  and  goodwill  on  the  part  of  the  Czar  which, 
in  the  memorable  years  that  were  to  follow,  served  it 
scarcely  less  effectively  than  an  armed  alliance.  Russia, 
since  the  Crimean  War,  had  seemed  to  be  Ha,^niider 
entering  upon  an  epoch  of  boundless  change.  ■*i'™^"°- 
The  calamities  with  which  the  reign  of  Nicholas  had 
closed  had  excited  in  that  narrow  circle  of  ^Russian 
society  where  thought  had  any  existence  a  vehement 
revulsion  against  the  stenle  and  unchanging  system  of 
repression,  the  grinding  servitude  of  the  last  thirty 
years.  Prom  the  Emperor  downwards  all  educated 
men  believed  not  only  that  the  system  of  government, 
but  that  the  whole  order  of  Russian  social  life,  must  be 
recast.  The  ferment  of  ideas  which  marks  an  age  of 
revolution  was  in  full  course;  but  in  what  forms  the 
new  order  was  to  be  moulded,  through  what  processes 
Russia  was  to  be  brought  into  its  new  life,  no  one 
knew.  Russia  was  wanting  in  capable  statesmen ;  it  was 
even  more  conspicuously  wanting  in  the  class  of  ser- 
viceable and  intelligent  agents  of  Government  of  the 
second  rank.  Its  monarch,  Alexander  II.,  humane  and 
well-meaning,  was  irresolute  and  vacillating  beyond  the 
measure  of  ordinary  men.  He  was  not  only  devoid  of 
all  administrative  and  organising  faculty  himself,  but  so 
infirm  of  purpose  that  Ministers  whose  policy  he  had 
accepted  feared  to  let  him  pass  out  of  their  sight,  lest  in 


SW  UOLERN  SVBOPE.  m^a 

the  course  of  a  single  journey  or  a  single  interview  he 
should  succumb  to  the  persuasions  of  some  rival  poli- 
tician. In  no  country  in  Europe  was  there  such  inco- 
herence, such  self-contradiction,  such  absence  of  unity 
of  plan  and  pmpose  in  government  as  in  Enssia,  where 
all  nominally  depended  upon  a  single  will.  Pressed 
and  tormented  by  all  the  rival  influences  that  beat  upon 
the  centre  of  a  great  empire,  Alexander  seems  at  times 
to  have  played  o£E  against  one  another  as  colleagues  in 
the  same  branch  of  Government  the  representatives  of 
the  most  opposite  schools  of  action,  and,  after  assenting 
to  the  plans  of  one  group  of  advisers,  to  have  committed 
the  execution  of  these  plans,  by  way  of  counterpoise,  to 
those  who  had  most  opposed  them.  Bat,  like  other 
weak  men,  he  dreaded  nothing  so  much  as  the  reproach 
of  weakness  or  inconstancy ;  and  in  the  cloud  of  half- 
formed  or  abandoned  purposes  there  were  some  few  to 
which  he  resolutely  adhered.  Tlie  chief  of  these,  the 
great  achievement  of  his  reign,  was  the  liberation  of  the 
serfs. 

It  was  probably  owing  to  the  outbreak  of  the  rero- 

lution  of  1S48  that  the  serfs  had  not  been  freed  by 

Nicholas.     That  sovereign  had  long  under- 

Berf,,  uanii,  stood  tlio  necessitv  for  the  chanse,  and  in 
imi.  ■'  ,  . 

1847  he  had  actually  appointed  a  Commis- 
sion to  report  on  tlie  best  means  of  effecting  it.  The 
convulsions  of  1848,  followed  by  the  Hungarian  and  the 
Crimean  Wars,  threw  the  project  into  the  background 
during  the  remainder  of  Nicholas's  reign ;  bat  if  the 
iK'lief  of  the  Bussian  people  is  well  founded,  the  last 


ISO.  LIBERATION  OF  TSE   SERFS.  SSI 

injunction  of  the  dying  Czar  to  bis  Buccessor  was  to 
emancipate  ibe  serfs  throughout  his  empire.  Alexander 
was  little  capable  of  grappling  with  so  tremendous  a 
problem  himself;  in  the  year  1859,  however,  be  di- 
rected a  Commission  to  make  a  complete  inquiry  into 
the  subject,  and  to  present  a  scheme  of  emancipation. 
The  labours  of  the  Commission  extended  over  two  years; 
its  discussions  were  agitated,  at  times  violent.  That 
serfage  must  sooner  or  later  be  abolished  all  knew ;  the 
points  on  which  the  Commission  was  divided  were  the 
bestowal  of  land  on  the  peasants  and  the  regulation 
of  ihe  viUage-eommnnity.  European  history  afforded 
abundant  precedents  in  emancipation,  and  under  an 
infinite  variety  of  detail  three  types  of  the  process  of 
enfranchisement  were  clearly  distinguishable  from  one 
another.  Maria  Theresa,  in  liberating  the  serf,  had 
required  him  to  continue  to  render  a  fixed  amount  of 
labour  to  his  lord,  and  had  given  him  on  this  condition 
fixity  of  tenure  in  the  land  he  occupied ;  the  Prussian 
reformers  had  made  a  division  of  the  land  between  the 
peasant  aad  the  lord,  and  extinguished  all  labour-dues ; 
Napoleon,  in  enfranchising  the  serfs  in  the  Duchy  of 
Warsaw,  had  simply  tamed  them  into  free  men,  leaving 
the  terms  of  their  occupation  of  land  to  be  settled  by 
arrangement  or  free  contract  with  their  former  lords. 
This  example  had  been  followed  in  the  Baltic  Provinces 
of  Bussia  itself  by  Alexander  I.  Of  the  three  modes 
of  emancipation,  that  based  on  free  contract  had 
produced  the  worst  results  for  the  peasant ;  and 
though   many  of  the  Bussian   landowners  and  their 


332  GOVERN  SUSOPS.  tM. 

representatives  in  the  Commission  protested  against  a 
division  of  the  land  between  themselves  and  their  serfs 
as  an  act  of  agrarian  revolution  and  spoliation,  there  were 
men  in  high  office,  and  some  few  among  the  proprietors, 
who  resolutely  and  successfully  fought  for  the  principle 
of  independent  ownership  hy  the  peasants.  The  lead- 
ing spirit  in  this  great  work  appears  to  have  been 
Nicholas  Milutine,  Adjunct  of.  the  Minister  of  the 
Interior,  Lanskoi.  Milutine,  who  had  drawn  up  the 
Municipal  Charta  of  St.  Fetersbui^,  was  distrosted  by 
the  Czar  as  a  restless  and  uncompromising  reformer. 
It  was  uncertain  from  day  to  day  whether  the  views  of 
the  Ministry  of  the  Interior  or  those  of  the  territorial 
aristocracy  would  prevail;  ultimately,  however,  under 
instructions  from  the  Palace,  the  Commission  accepted 
not  only  the  principle  of  the  division  of  the  land,  but 
the  system  of  communal  self-government  by  the  peasants 
themselves.  The  determination  of  the  amount  of  land 
to  be  held  by  the  peasants  of  a  commune  and  of  th6  fixed 
rent  to  be  paid  to  the  lord  was  left  in  the  first  instance 
to  private  agreement ;  but  where  such  agreement  was 
not  reached,  the  State,  throngh  arbiters  elected  at  local 
assemblies  of  the  nobles,  decided  the  matter  itself. 
The  rent  once  fixed,  the  State  enabled  the  commune  to 
redeem  it  by  advancing  a  capital  sum  to  be  -recouped 
by  a  quit-rent  to  the  State  extending  over  forty-nine 
years.  The  Ukase  of  the  Czar  converting  twenty-five  ' 
millions  of  serfs  into  free  proprietors,  the  greatest  act 
of  legislation  of  modern  times,  was  signed  on  the  3rd 
of  March,  1861,  and  within  the  next  few  weeks  was 


Bo.  LIBERATION  OF   TSB  BEBF3.  333 

read  in  every  church  of  the  Russian  Empire.  It  was  a 
strange  comment  on  the  system  of  government  in 
Russia  that  in  the  very  month  in  which  the  edict  was 
published  both  Lanskoi  and  MUutine,  who  had  been  its 
principal  authors,  were  removed  from  their  posts.  The 
Czar  feared  to  leave  them  in  power  to  superintend  the 
actual  execution  of  the  law  which  they  had  inspired. 
In  supporting  them  up  to  the  final  stage  of  its  enact- 
ment Alexander  had  struggled  against  misgivings  of 
bis  own,  and  against  influences  of  vast  strength  alike 
at  the  Court,  within  the  Government,  and  in  the  Pro- 
vinces. With  the  completion  of  the  Edict  of  Emanci- 
pation bis  power  of  resistance  was  exhausted,  and  its 
execution  was  committed  by  him  to  those  who  had  been 
its  opponents.  That  some  of  the  evils  which  have 
mingled  with  the  good  in  Russian  enfranchisement 
might  have  been  less  bad  the  Czar  resolutely  stood  by 
the  authors  of  reform  and  allowed  them  to  complete 
their  work  in  accordance  with  their  own  designs  and 
Convictions,  is  scarcely  open  to  doubt.* 

It  had  been  the  belief  of  educated  men  in  Russia 
that  the  emancipation  of  the  serf  would  be  but  the  first 
of  aseries  of  great  organic  changes,  bringing  f,aMai,im. 
their  country  more  nearly  to  the  political  and  '**'■ 
social  level  of  its  European  neighbours.  This  belief  was 
not  fulfilled.  Work  of  importance  was  done  in  the  re- 
constniction  of  the  judicial  system  of  Russia,  but  in  the 
other  reforms    expected   little  was  accomplished.     An 

*  Oelestin,  Bnaslaiid,  p.  3,    Leroy-Beftolien,    L'Empire   dei  Tmra, 
i.400.    Homme  d'etat  Buasa,  p.  73,    WallaM,  KIlaBi^  p.  ^(85.       O'^k 


834  XODEBN  EUBOPa.  Mt-O. 

msniredioa  which  broke  out  in  Poland  at  the  heginning 
of  1863  diverted  the  enei^es  of  the  Q-ovemment  from  all 
other  objects ;  and  in  the  overpowering  oatburst  of  Bns- 
eian  patriotism  and  national  feeling  which  it  excited, 
domestic  reforms,  no  less  than  the  ideals  of  Western 
civilisation,  lost  their  interest.  The  establishment  of 
Italian  independence,  coinciding  in  time  with  the  general 
nnsettlement  and  expectation  of  change  which  marked 
the  first  years  of  Alexander's  reign,  had  stirred  once 
more  the  ill-fated  hopes  of  the  Polish  national  leaders. 
From  the  beginning  of  the  year  1861  Warsaw  was  the 
Bcene  of  repeated  tumnlts.  The  Czar  was  inclined, 
within  certain  limits,  to  a  policy  of  conciliation.  The 
separate  Legislature  and  separate  army  which  Poland 
had  possessed  from  1815  to  1830  he  was  determined 
not  to  restore ;  but  he  was  willing  to  give  Poland 
a  large  degree  of  administrative  autonomy,  to  confide 
the  principal  offices  in  its  Government  to  natives,  and 
generally  to  relax  something  of  that  close -union  with 
Kussia  which  had  been  enforced  by  Nicholas  since  the 
rebellion  of  1831.  But  the  concessions  of  the  Czar, 
accompanied  as  they  were  by  acts  of  repression  and 
severity,  were  far  from  satisfying  the  demands  of  Polish 
patriotism.  It  was  in  vain  that  Alexander  in  the 
summer  of  1862  sent  his  brother  Constantine  as  Viceroy 
to  Warsaw,  established  a  Polish  Council  of  State,  placed 
a  Pole.  Wielopolski,  at  the  head  of  the  Administration, 
BQperseded  all  the  Russian  governors  of  Polish  provinces 
by  natives,  and  gave  to  the   municipalities  and   the 

D,a,l,zc.bvG00gIe 


districts  the  right  of  electing  local  conncila  ;  these  con- 
cessions seemed  nothing,  and  were  in  fact  nothing,  in 
oomparison  with  the  national  independence  which  the 
Polish  leaders  claimed.  The  situation  grew  worse  and 
worse.  An  attempt  made  upon  the  life  of  the  Grand 
Duke  Constantine  during  his  entrj  into  Warsaw  was 
but  one  among  a  series  of  similar  acts  which  discredited 
the  Polish  cause  and  strengthened  those  who  at  St. 
Fetershni^  had  from  the  first  condemned  the  Czar's 
attempts  at  conciliation.  At  length  the  ^Russian  Gov- 
ernment took  the  step  which  precipitated  revolt.  A 
levy  of  one  in  every  two  hundred  of  the  population 
thronghout  the  Empire  had  heen  ordered  in  the  autumn 
of  1862.  Instructions  were  sent  from  St.  Petersburg 
to  the  effect  that  in  raising  this  levy  in  Poland 
the  countiy-populatioa  were  to  he  spared,  and  that  all 
persons  who  were  known  to  he  connected  with  the 
disorders  in  the  towns  were  to  be  seized  as  soldiers. 
This  terqhle  sentence  gainst  an  entire 
political  class  was  carried  out,  so  far  as  ^^oSm.  ju.14, 
it  lay  within  the  power  of  the  authorities, 
on  the  night  of  Januaiy  14th,  1803.  But  hefore 
the  imperial  press-gang  surrounded  the  houses  of 
its  victims  a  rumour  of  the  intended  hlow  had  gone 
abroad.  In  the  preceding  hours,  and  during  the  night 
of  the  14th,  thousands  fled  from  Warsaw  and  the  other 
Polish  towns  into  the  forests.  There  they  formed 
themselves  into  armed  hands,  and  in  the  course  of  the 
next  few  days  a  guerilla  warfare  broke  out  wherever 


^  ItoDEBS  STJSOrl. 

Eu.ia„  Wp,  were  found  in  ineufident  *engtb  »r  o« 

'•'-'^^e-t:.  i.  WHO.  "ool^;Lr^ 
lived  were  the  »>-oalled  uoW^se,  "^^"^  ood. 

of  thou^nds.  the  ^--P^f!*^:  ft„^Wt  n»xni- 

-Sir-     :Znalca«.e.     On  the  .eut«Uty,^  -t 

„.  the  support,  of  the  pea^^.  ^^f^^  '^l^^ 

„ent  oould  fairly  reekon;  mthm  t^ J"^^,^  q„,. 

iteelt  at  one.  confronted  hy  an  """"^^g^Ud 

ernment  whose  decrees  were  pnnted  '■^^J"^^^ 

by  unknown  hands,  and  whose  sentences  of  d^*  J 

„«cilessly  executed  against  those  whom  .t  conde™^ 

„.  enemies  or  traitors  to  the  nafonal  cause_     So  ert- 

onlinary  was  the  secrecy  which  covered  *»  act«>n^ 

this  National  Executive,  that  Milutme  who  w^  subse 

quently  sent  by  the  Czar  to  examine  mto  the  affa«s  ol 

Mand!  formed  the  conclusion   that  it  had   possessed 

accomplices    within   the    Imperial    Government    at   bt 

Petc^burg  itself.      The   Polish   cause    relamed    mdeeU 

some  friends  in  Russia  even  after  the  outbreak  of  the 

insurrection  .■  it  was  not  until  the  insurrection  passed 

the    frontier  of   the  kingdom  and  wa«  carried   l>y  the 

nobles    into    Lithuania    and    Podolia    that    the    enhre 

Uussian   nation   took    up  the   struggle  with  passionate 

and  vindictive  ardour  as  one  for  life  or  death.      It  was 

the  fatal  bane  of  Polish  nationality  that  the  days  of  its 

•  RBcEjnaki,  M6moirea  but  Ik  Poloifiie.  p.  14.    B.  and  F.  St»t«  Pipers 
I8ii2.6a,  p.  760.  B  ^ir- 

i,z<..t,CoogIc 


greatness  had  left  it  a  claim  apon  vast  territories  , 
where  it  had  planted  nothing  but  a  territorial  aristo- 
craey,  and  where  the  mass  of  population,  if  not  actually 
Bossiaiij  was  almost  indistinguishable  from  the  Kus- 
eioDB  in  race  and  language,  and  belonged  like  them  to 
the  Greek  Church,  which  Catholic  Poland  had  always 
persecuted.  For  ninety  years  Lithaaoia  and  the  border- 
provinces  had  been  incorporated  with  the  Czar's  do- 
minions, and  with  the  exception  of  their  Polish  land- 
owners they  were  now  in  fact  thoroughly  Russian. 
When  therefore  the  nobles  of  these  provinces  declared 
that  Poland  must  be  reconstituted  with  the  limits  of 
1772,  and  subsequently  took  up  arms  in  concert  with 
the  insurrectionary  Government  at  Warsaw,  the  Rqb- 
sian  people,  from  the  Czar  to  the  pfasant,  felt  the 
struggle  to  be  nothing  less  than  one  for  the  dismember- 
ment or  the  preservation  of  their  own  country,  and  the 
doom  of  Polish  nationality,  at  least  for  some  genera- 
tions, was  sealed.  The  diplomatic  intervention  of 
the  Western  Powers  on  'behalf  of  the  constitutional 
rights  of  Poland  under  the  Treaty  of  Vienna,  which 
was  to  some  extent  supported  by  Austria,  only 
prolonged  a  hopeless  struggle,  and  gave  unbounded 
popularity  to  Prince  Gortschakoff,  by  whom,  after  a 
show  of  courteous  attention  during  the  earlier  and 
still  perilous  stage  of  the  insurrection,  the  inter- 
ference of  the  Powers  was  resolutely  and  uncondition- 
ally repelled.  By  the  spring  of  1864  the  insurgents 
were  cnuhed  or  exterminated.  General  MuravieS,  the 
Governor  of  Lithuania,  inlfiUcd  his  task  i^inst  the 


838  JfODEBJ^  BUBOPa.  ub-m. 

muiinoofl  nobles  of  this  provinoe  with  anslmnking 
severity,  sparing  neither  life  nor  fortune  so  long  as  aa 
enemy  of  Russia  remained  to  be  orerthrOTTD.  It  was 
at  Wilna,  the  Lithuanian  capital,  not  at  Warsaw,  that 
the  terrors  of  Russian  repression  were  the  greatest. 
Muravieff's  executions  may  have  been  less  numerous 
than  is  commonly  supposed;  bat  in  the  form  of 
pecuniary  requisitions  and  fines  he  undoubtedly  aimed 
at  nothing  less  than  the  utter  ruin  of  a  great  part  of 
the  class  most  implicated  in  the  rebellion. 

In  Poland  itself  the  Cz^,  after  some  hesitation, 
determined  once  and  for  all  to  establish  a  friend  to 

Russia  in  every  homestead  of  the  kingdom 
wnnata     by  making  the  peasant  owner  of  the  land 

on  which  he  laboured.  The  insurrectionary 
Government  at  the  outbreak  of  the  rebellion  had  at- 
tempted to  win  over  the  peasantry  by  promising  enact- 
ments to  this  effect,  but  no  one  had  responded  to  their 
appeal.  In  the  autumn  of  1863  the  Czar  recalled 
Milutine  from  bis  enforced  travels  and  directed  him  to 
proceed  to  Warsaw,  in  order  to  study  the  affairs  of 
Poland  on  the  spot,  and  to  report  on  the  measures 
necessary  to  he  taien  for  its  future  government  and 
organisation.  Milutine  obtained  the  assistance  of  some 
of  the  men  who  had  laboured  most  earnestly  with  him 
in  the  enfranchisement  of  the  Russian  serfs ;  and  in  the 
course  of  a  few  weeks  be  returned  to  St.  Petersburg, 
carrying  with  bim  the  draft  of  measures  which  were  to 
change  the  face  of  Poland.  He  recommended  on  the 
one  band    that  every  political  institutioa  separating 


no  AQRARIAN  MEABVRSB  IS  POLAND.  839 

Poland  from  the  rest  of  tlie  Empire  should  be  swept 
away,  and  the  last  traces  of  Polish  independeQce  utterly 
obliterated;  oq  the  other  hand,  that  the  peasants,  as 
the  only  class  on  which  Bussia  could  hope  to  count  in 
the  fotore,  should  be  made  absolute  and  independent 
owners  of  the  land  they  occupied.  Prince 
Gfortschakoff,  who  had  still  some  reeard  for  »«mrt.ta 
the  opinion  of  Western  Europe,  and  possibly 
some  sympathy  for  the  Polish  aristocracy,  resisted  this 
daring  policy;  but  the  Czar  accepted  Milutine's  counsel, 
and  gave  him  a  free  hand  in  the  execution  of  his 
agrarian  scheme.  The  division  of  the  land  between  the 
nobles  and  the  peasants  was  accordingly  carried  out  by 
Milutine's  own  ofBcers  under  conditions  very  different 
from  those  adopted  in  Russia.  The  whole  strength  of  the 
Government  was  thrown  on  to  the  aide  of  the  peasant  and 
against  the  noble.  Though  the  population  was  denser  in 
Poland  than  in  Bussia,  the  peasant  received  on  an  average 
fonr  times  as  much  land ;  the  compensation  made  to  the 
lords  (which  was  paid  in  bonds  which  immediately  fell 
to  half  their  nominal  value)  was  raised  not  by  quit-rents 
on  the  peasants*  lands  alone,  as  in  Bussia,  but  by  a 
genera!  land-tax  fallit^  equally  on  the  land  left  to  the 
lords,  who  had  thus  to  pay  a  great  part  of  their  own 
compensation  :  above  all,  the  questions  in  dispute  were 
settled,  not  as  in  Bussia  by  arbiters  elected  at  local 
assemblies  of  the  nobles,  but  by  officers  of  the  Crown. 
Moreover,  the  division  of  landed  property  was  not  made 
once  and  for  all,  as  in  Bussia,  but  the  woods  and 
pastures  remuning  to  the  lords  continued  subject  to 


SM  MODEBIT  BUBOPS.  UM 

ondefiiied  comnioii-nghts  of  the  peasants.  These  com- 
mon-rights were  deliberately  left  unsettled  in  order 
that  a  scarce  of  contention  might  always  be  present 
between  the  greater  and  the  lesser  proprietors,  and  that 
the  latter  might  continue  to  look  to  the  Eussian  Gov- 
ernment as  the  protector  or  extender  of  their  interests. 
"  We  hold  Poland,"  said  a  Eussian  statesman,  "  by  ita 
rights  of  common."* 

Milutine,  who,  with  all  the  fiery  ardour  of  his 
national  and  levelling  policy,  seems  to  have  been  a 
gentle  and  somewhat  querulous  invalid,  and  who  was 
shortly  afterwards  struck  down  by  paralysis,  to  remain 
a  helpless  spectator  of  the  European  changes  of  the 
next  six  years,  had  no  sliare  in  that  warfare  against 
the  language,  the  religion,  and  the  national 
culture  of  Poland  with  which  Russia  has 
pursued  its  victory  since  1863.  The  public 
life  of  Poland  he  was  determined  to  Itussianise ;  its 
private  and  social  life  he  woold  probably  have  left 
unmolested,  relying  on  the  goodwill  of  the  great  mass 
of  peasants  who  owed  their  proprietorship  to  the  action 
of  the  Czar.  There  were,  however,  politicians  at  Moscow^ 
and  St.  Petersburg  who  believed  that  the  deep-lying 
instinct  of  nationality  would  for  the  first  time  be  called 
into  real  life  among  these  peasants  by  their  very  eleva- 
tion from  misery  to  independence,  and  that  where 
Bussia  had  hitherto  had  three  hundred  thousand 
enemies  Milutine  was  preparing  for  it  six  millions.  It 
was  the  dread  of  this   possibility  in  the   future,  the 

•  Leroy-Beaolieii,  Honuaa  d'&Ut  Basse,  p.  2i9. 

■  OOglf 


apprebension  that  material  interests  might  not  perma- 
nently vanquish  the  subtler  forces  which  pass  from 
generation  to  generation,  latent,  if  still  unconscious, 
where  nationality  itself  13  not  lost,  that  made  the 
Busstan  Government  follow  up  the  political  destruc- 
tion of  the  Polish  noblesse  bj  measures  directed  against 
Polish  nationality  itself,  even  at  the  risk  of  alienating 
the  class  who  for  .the  present  were  effectively  won  over 
to  the  Czar's  cause.  By  the  side  of  its  life-giving 
and  beneficent  agrarian  policy  Russia  has  pursued  the 
odious  system  of  debarring  Poland  from  all  means  of 
culture  and  improvement  associated  with  the  use  of  its 
own  language,  and  has  aimed'  at  eventually  turning  the 
Poles  into  Russians  by  the  systematic  impoverishment 
an  i  extinction  of  all  that  is  essentially  Polish  in  thought, 
in  sentiment,  and  in  expression.  The  work  may  prove 
to  be  one  not  beyond  its  power;  and  no  common  per* 
versity  on  the  part  of  ita  Government  would  be  neces- 
sary to  turn  against  Russia  the  millions  who  in  Poland 
owe  all  they  have  of  prosperity  and  independence  to  the 
Czar :  but  should  the  excess  of  Russian  propagandism, 
or  the  hostility  of  Church  to  Church,  at  some  distant 
date  engender  a  new  struggle  for  Polish  independence, 
this  struggle  will  be  one  governed  by  other-  conditions 
than  those  of  1831  or  1863,  and  Russia  will,  for  the 
first  time,  have  to  conquer  on  the  Vistula  not  a  class 
nor  a  city,  but  a  nation. 

It  was  a  matter  of  no  small  importance  to  Bismarck 
and  to  Prussia  that  in  the  years  1863  and  1864  the 
Court  of  St.  Petersburg  found  itself  confronted  with 


Ml  UODBSS  BVBOPX.  mm. 

aflaire  of  Buch  seriousness  in  Poland.  From  the  oppor- 
tanity  wliicli  was  then  presented  to  him  of  obliging 
an  important  neighbour,  and  of  profiting 
by  that  nciglibour's  conjoined  embarrass- 
ment and  goodwill,  Bismarck  drew  full  ad- 
vantage. He  had  always  regarded  the  Poles  as  a  mere 
nuisance  in  Europe,  and  heartily  despised  the  Gi-ermans 
for  the  sympathy  which  they  had  shown  towards  Poland 
in  1848.  "When  the  insurrection  of  1863  broke  out, 
Bismarck  set  the  policy  of  his  own  country  in  emphatic 
contrast  with  that  of  Austria  and  the  Western  Powers, 
and  even  entered  into  an  arrangement  with  Bussia  for 
an  eventual  miHtary  combination  in  case  the  insurgents 
should  pass  from  one  side  to  the  other  of  the  frontier.* 
Throughout  the  struggle  with  the  Poles,  and  through- 
out the  diplomatic  conflict  with  the  Western  Powers, 
the  Czar  had  felt  secure  in  the  loyalty  of  the  stub- 
born Minister  at  Berlin ;  and  when,  at  the  close  of 
the  Polish  revolt,  the  events  occurred  which  opened  to 
Prussia  the  road  to  political  fortune,  Bismarck  received 
his  reward  in  the  liberty  of  action  given  him  by  the 
Bussian  Government.  The  difficulties  counected  with 
Schleswig-Hol  stein,  which,  after  a  short  interval  of  tran- 
quillity following  the  settlement  of  1853,  had  again 
begun  to  trouble  Europe,  were  forced  to  the  very  front 
of  Continental  affairs  by  the  death  of  Frederick  VII., 
King  of  Denmark,  in  November,  1863.  Prussia  had 
now  at  its  head  a  statesman  resolved  to  pursue  to  their 
extreme  limit  the  chances  which  this  complication 
*  Halin,  i.  112.    TerliaudL  dec  Preoai.  AI)geonl.  iiber  Folen,  p.  4S, 


iKUL  BOSLBSWIQ-SOISTSm.  843 

offered  to  bis  own  countTy ;  and,  more  fortunate  thui 
hie  predecessors  of  1848,  Bismarck  had  not  to  dread  the 
interference  of  the  Czar  of  Bussia  as  the  patron  and 
protector  of  the  interests  of  the  Danish  court. 

By  the  Treaty  of  London,  signed  on  May  8th,  1852, 
'  all  the  great  Powers,  inclnding  Prussia,  had  recognised . 
the  principle  of  the  integrity  of  the  Danish  B,aitaBrfcHoi. 
Mon»chy,  and  had  pronounced  Prince  ""^  ****** 
Christian  of  Gliicksburg  to  be  heir-presumptive  to  the 
whole  dominions  of  the  reigning  King.  The  righte  of 
the  German  Federation  in  Holstein  were  nevertheless 
declared  to  remain  unprejudiced;  and  in  a  Convention 
made  with  Austria  and  Prussia  before  they  joined  in  this 
Treaty,  King  Frederick  VII.  had  undertaken  to  conform 
to  certain  rules  in  his  treatment  of  Schleswig  as  well  as 
of  Holstein.  The  Duke  of  Augustenburg,  claimant  to 
the  succession  in  Schleswig-Holstein  through  the  male 
line,  had  renounced  his  pretensions  in  consideration  of 
an  indemnity  paid  to  him  by  the  King  of  Denmark. 
This  surrender,  however,  had  not  received  the  consent 
of  his  son  and  of  the  other  members  of  the  House  of 
Augustenburg,  nor  had  the  German  Federation,  aa  such, 
been  a  party  to  the  Treaty  of  London.  Belying  on  the 
declaration  of  the  Great  Powers  ia  favour  of  the  in- 
tegrity of  the  Danish  Kingdom,  Frederick  YII.  had 
resumed  his  attempts  to  assimilate  Schleswig,  and  in 
some  d^ree  Holstein,  to  the  rest  of  the  Monarchy ;  and 
although  the  Provincial  Estates  were  allowed  to  remain 
in  existence,  a  national  Constitution  was  established 
in    October,    1855,    for    the     entire    Danish    State. 


344  MODB&N  SUROFS.  m^ 

Bitter  complaints  were  made  of  the  system  of  repres- 
sioD  and  encroachraent  with  which  the  Government  of 
Copenhagen  was  attempting  to  extinguish  German  nation- 
ality in  the  border-provinces ;  at  length,  in  November, 
1858,  nnder  threat  of  armed  intervention  by  the  German 
.  Federation,  Frederick  consented  to  exclude  Holstein 
from  the  operation  of  the  new  Constitution.  But 
this  did  not  produce  peace,  for  the  inhabitants  of 
Schleswig,  severed  from  the  sister-province  and  now 
excited  by  the  Italian  war,  raised  all  the  more  vigor- 
ous a  protest  t^ainst  their  own  incorporation  with 
Denmark;  while  in  Holstein  itself  the  Government 
incurred  the  chai^  of  unconstitutional  action  in  fixing 
the  Budget  without  the  consent  of  the  Estates.  The 
German  Federal  Diet  again  threatened  to  resort  to 
force,  and  Denmark  prepared  for  war.  Prussia  took  up 
the  cause  of  Schleswig  in  1861 ;  and  even  the  British 
Government,  which  had  hitherto  shown  far  more  in- 
terest in  the  integrity  of  Denmark  than  in  the  rights 
of  the  German  provinces,  now  recommended  that 
the  Constitution  of  1855  should  be  abolished,  and 
that  a  separate  legislation  and  administration  should 
be  granted  to  Schleswig  as  well  as  to  Holstein.  The 
Danes,  however,  were  bent  on  preserving  Schleswig 
as  an  integral  part  of  the  State,  and  the  Govern- 
ment of  King  Frederick,  while  willing  to  recognise 
Holstein  as  outside  Danish  territory  proper,  insisted 
that  Schleswig  should  be  included  within  the  uliitary 
Constitution,  and  that  Holstein  should  contribute  a 
fised  share  to  the  national  ©ipepdituw,    A  manifesto 


MM.  BOHLE^WIQ-aOLSTSm.  MS 

to  this  effect,  published  by  King  Frederick  on  the 
30th  of  March,  1863,  was  the  immediate  ia»rtaBtai 
gronnd  of  the  conflict  now  about  to  break  "^  »»■'»«• 
out  between  Germany  and  Denmark.  The  Diet  of 
Frankfort  announced  that  if  this  proclamation  were 
not  revoked  it  should  proceed  to  Federal  execution, 
that  is,  armed  intervention,  gainst  the  King  of  Den- 
mark as  Duke  of  Holstein.  Still  counting  upon  foreign 
aid  OT  upon  the  impotence  of  the  Diet,  the  Danish 
Government  refused  to  change  its  policy,  and  on  the 
2{H}h  of  September  laid  before  the  Parliament  at  Copen- 
hagen the  law  incorporating  Schleswig  with  the  rest  of 
the  Monarchy  tinder  the  new  Constitution.  Negotia* 
tions  were  thus  brought  to  a  close,  and  on  the  Ist  of 
October  the  Diet  decreed  the  long-threatened  Federal 
execution.* 

Affairs  had  reached  this  stf^e,  and  the  execution 
had  not  yet  been  put  in  force,  when,  on  the  16th  of 
November,  King  Frederick  VII.  died.    For 
a  moment   it   appeared    possible   that    his     Fndsriekyn., 

f^'  _  '  NoYBBber,  ISM. 

successor.  Prince  Christian  of  Gliicksburg, 
might  avert  the  conflict  with  Germany  by  withdrawing 
&om  the  position  which  his  predecessor  had  taken  up. 
But  the  Danish  people  and  Ministry  were  little  inclined 
to  give  way ;  the  Constitution  had  passed  through  Par- 
liament two  days  before  King  Frederick's  death,  and 
on  the  18th  of  November  it  received  the  assent  of  the 
Dew  monarch.     German  national  feeling  was  now  as 

•  PM-liMnentary  Fwen,  1864^  Tgl.  Wv.  pjc  28, 263.  HJin,  BianMitck, 
L 165.  . 

L  ,i,z<,.f,GoogIf 


316  MODS^f  SUBOPE.  us. 

strongly  excited  on  tbe  question  of  Schlcswig-Holstein 
as  it  had  been  in  1848.  The  general  cry  was  that  the 
UDion  of  these  provinces  with  Denmarlc  most  be  treated 
as  at  an  end,  and  their  legitimate  ruler,  Frederick  of 
Augastenburg,  son  of  the  Duke  who  had  renoonced 
hia  rights,  he  placed  on  the  throne.  The  Diet  of  Frank- 
fort, however,  decided  to  recognise  neither  of  the  two 
rival  sovereigns  in  Holstein  until  its  own  intervention 
should  have  taken  place.  Orders  were  given  that 
a  Saxon  and  a  Hanoverian  corps  should  enter  the 
country:  and  although  Prussia  and  Austria  had 
made  a  secret  agreement  that  the  settlement  of  the 
Schleswig-HoUtein  question  was  to  be  conducted  by 
themselves  independently  of  the  Diet,  the  tide  of 
popular  enthusiasm  ran  so  high  that  for  tbe  moment 
the  two  leading  Powers  considered  it  safer  not  to 
obstruct  tbe  Federal  authority,  and  the  Saxon  and 
Hanoverian  troops  accordingly  entered  Hol- 
tkB  In  Hoiitidn.     steiu  as  mandatories  of  the  Diet  at  the  end 

DMvnbar,  ises. 

of  1863.  The  Danish  Govemment,  offer- 
ing no  resistance,  withdrew  its  troops  across  the  riv^ 
Eider  into  Schleswig. 

From  this  time  the  history  of  Gemumy  is  the 
history  of  the  profound  and  audacious  statecraft  and  of 
the  overmastering  will  of  Bismarck ;  the  nation,  except 
through  its  valour  on  the  battle-field,  ceases  to  influence 
„.^^  the  shaping  of  its  own  fortunes.  What 
"™"*"  the  German  people  desired  in  1864  was 
that  Schlesvrig-Holstein  should  he  attached,  under  a 
— '—  of  its  own,  to  the  German  Federation  as  it  then 


MM.  pouor  or  bibkabos.  u7 

existed ;  what  Bismarck  intended  was  that  Schleswig- 
Holstpein,  itself  incorporated  more  or  less  directly  with 
Prussia,  should  he  made  the  means  of  the  destruction 
of  the  existing  Federal  system  and  of  the  expulsion  of 
Austria  from  Gecmany.  That  anotiier  petty  State, 
bound  to  Prussia  by  no  closer  tie  than  its  other 
neighbours,  should  be  added  to  the  troop  among  whom 
Austria  found  its  vassaU  and  its  Instruments,  would 
have  been  in  Bismarck's  eyes  no  gain  but  actual  detai- 
ment  to  Germany.  The  German  people  desired  one 
coarse  of  action ;  Bismarck  had  determined  on  some- 
thing totally  different;  and  with  matchless  resolution 
and  skill  he  bore  down  all  opposition  of  people  and  of 
Courts,  and  forced  a  reluctant  nation  to  the  goal  which 
he  had  himself  chosen  for  it.  The  first  point  of  con- 
flict was  the  apparent  rccogiiitiun  by  Bismarck  of  the 
rights  of  King  Chrbtian  IX.  as  lawful  sovereign  in 
the  Duchies  as  well  as  in  the  rest  of  the  Banish  State. 
By  the  Treaty  of  London  Prussia  had  indeed  pledged 
itself  to  this  recognition  ;  but  the  German  Federation 
had  been  no  party  to  the  Treaty,  and  under  the  pressure 
of  a  vehement  national  agitation  Bavaria  and  the  minor 
States  one  after  another  recognised  Frederick  of  Augus- 
tenburg  as  Duke  of  Schleswig- Hoi  stein.  Bismarck  was 
accused  alike  by  the  Prussian  Parliament  and  by  the 
popular  voice  of  Germany  at  large  of  betraying  Germwi 
interests  to  Denmark,  of  abusing  Prussia's  position  as  a 
Great  Power,  of  Inciting  the  nation  to  civil  war.  In 
vain  he  declared  that,  while  surrendering  no  iota  of 
German  rights,  the  Government  of  Berlin  must  recognise 


348  XODBBN  EUBOPS.  Ml 

tbose  treaty-obligations  with  which  its  own  legal  title  to 
a  voice  in  the  affairs  of  Schleswig  was  intimately  bound 
up,  and  that  the  'King  of  Prussia,  not  a  multitude  of 
irresponsible  and  ill-informed  citizens,  must  be  the 
judge  of  the  measures  by  which  German  interests  were 
to  be  effectually  protected.  His  words  made  no  single 
convert  either  in  the  Prussian  Parliament  or  in  the 
Federal  Diet.  At  Frankfort  the  proposal  made  by  the 
two  leading  Powers  that  King  Christian  should  he  re- 
quired to  annul  the  November  Constitution,  and  that 
in  case  of  his  refusal  Schleswig  also  should  be  occupied, 
was  rejecte  \,  as  involving  an  acknowledgment  of  the 
title  of  Christian  as  reigning  sovereign.  At  Berlin  the 
Lower  Chamber  refused  the  supplies  which  Bismarck 
demanded  for  operations  in  the  Duchies,  and  formally 
resolved  to  resist  his  policy  by  every  means  at  its  com- 
mand. But  the  resistance  of  Parliament  and  of  Diet  were 
alike  in  vain.  By  a  masterpiece  of  diplomacy  Bismarck 
had  secured  the  support  and  co-operation  of  Austria  in 

his  own  immediate  Danish  policy,  though 
Aiu^Mid     but  a  few  months  before  he  had  incurred 

the  bitter  hatred  of  the  Court  of  Vienna 
by  frustrating  its  plans  for  a  reoi^nisation  of  Germany 
by  a  Congress  of  princes  at  Frankfort,  and  had  frankly 
declared  to  the  Austrian  ambassador  at  Berlin  that  if 
Austria  did  not  transfer  its  political  centre  to  Pesth 
and  leave  to  Prussia  free  scope  in  Germany,  it  would 
find  Prussia  on  the  side  of  its  enemies  ia  the  next 
war    in    which    it    might    he    eng^ed.*       But   the 

•  Tnmillochberg'fdespatoliof  Feb.2%1863(iiiHdia,LM),ftppM«alIj 


usL  PRUSSIA  AND  AUSTRIA.  348 

democratic  iand  impassioned  character  of  the  fetation 
in  the  minor  States  in  favour  of  the  Schleswig-Hol- 
ateiners  and  their  Augustenburg  pretender  had  enabled 
Bismarck  to  represent  this  movement  to  the  Austrian 
Govemmebt  as  a  revolutionary  one,  and  by  a  dexterous 
appeal  to  the  memories  of  1848  to  awe  the  Em- 
peror's advisers  into  direct  concert  with  the  Court  of 
Berlin,  as  the  representative  of  monarchical  order,  in 
dealing  with  a  problem  otherwise  too  likely  to  be  solved 
by  revolutionary  methods  and  revolutionary  forces. 
Count  Rechberg,  the  Foreign  Minister  at  Vienna, 
was  lured  into  a  policy  which,  after  drawing  upon 
Austria  a  fuU  share  of  the  odium  of  Bismarck's  Danish 
plans,  after  forfeiting  for  it  the  goodwill  of  the  minor 
States  with  which  it  might  have  kept  Prussia  in  check, 
and  exposing  it  to  the  risk  of  a  European  war,  was  to 
confer  upon  iljs  rival  the  whole  profit  of  the  joint  enter- 
prise, and  to  furnish  a  pretext  for  the  struggle  by  which 
Austria  was  to  be  expelled  alike  from  Germany  and 
from  what  remained  to  it  of  Italy.  But  of  the  nature 
of  the  toils  into  which  he  was  now  taking  the  first  fatal 
and  irrevocable  step  Count  Bechberg  appears  to  have 
had  no  suspicion,  A  seeming  cordiality  united  the 
Austrian  and  Prussian  Governments  in  the  policy  of 
defiance  to  the  will  of  all  the  rest  of  Germany  and  to  the 
demands  of  their  own  subjects.  It  was  to  no  purpose 
that  the  Federal  Diet  vetoed  the  proposed  summons  to 

qnotxog  aetiul  words  uttered  bj  BisniBrok,  Bismuok's  accAont  of  tbe 
eoDTerutioD  (id,  80)  tones  it  dowa  to  a  demand  that  Austria  should 
sot  eaaot^  oa  Fraaaia'a  noogmaoi  jwnt-leaderBhip  in  Gennaii^, 


850  MODMKV  KmOPM.  MM. 

Eling^  Christian  and  tho  proposed  occnpation  of  Schles- 
wig.  Austria  and  I^iusia  delivered  an  oltimatum 
A,-ri«i«a       **  Copenhagen  demanding  the  repeal  of  the 

November  Constitution ;  and  on  its  rejection 

their  troops  entered  Schleswig,  not  as  the 
mandatories  of  the  Oerman  Federation,  but  as  the 
instrumenti  of  two  independent  and  allied  Fowere. 
(Feb.  1,  1864.) 

Against  t^e  overwhelming  forces  hj  which  they 
were  thns  attacked  the  Danes  conld  only  make  a  brave 
but  ineffectual  resistance.  Their  first  line  of  defence 
was  the  Danewerke,  a  fortification  extending  east  and 

west  towards  the  sea  from  the  town  of 
Bohi^i^«i.    Schleswig.    Prince  Frederick  Charles,  who 

commanded  the  Prossian  right,  was  re- 
palsed  in  an  .attack  upon  the  easternmost  part  of  this 
work  at  Missunde ;  the  Austrians,  however,  carried 
some  positions  in  the  centre  which  commanded  the 
defenders'  lines,  and  the  Danes  fell  hack  upon  the  forti- 
fied post  of  Duppel,  covering  the  narrow  channel  which 
separates  the  island  of  Alsen  from  the  mainland.  Here 
for  some  weeks  they  held  the  Prussians  in  check,  while 
the  Aastrians,  continuing  the  march  northwards,  en- 
tered Jutland.  At  length,  on  the  18th  of  April,  after 
several  hours  of  heavy  hombardment,  the  lines  of 
Dilppel  were  taken  by  storm  and  the  defenders  driven 
across  the  cbannel  into  Alsen.  Unable  to  pursue  the 
enemy  across  this  narrow  strip  of  sea,  the  Prussians 
joined  their  allies  in  Jutland,  and  occupied  the  whole 
of  ttu  Danish  m^nlaod  as  far  aa  the  Lfba  lUord-,  The 


OK  THB  VANIBB   WAS.  SU 

war,  however,  was  not  to  be  terminated  without  an 
attempt  on  the  part  of  the  neutral  Powers  to  arrive  at 
a  settlement  by  diplomat^.  A.  Conference  was  opened 
at  London  on  the  20tb  of  April,  and  after  three  weeka 
of  negotiation  the  belligerents  were  induced  to  accept 
an  armistice.  As  the  troops  of  the  German  Federation, 
though  unconcerned  in  the  military  operations  of  the 
two  Great  Powers,  were .  in  possession  of  Holstein,  tbe 
Federal  Government  was  invited  to  take  part  in  the 
Conference.  It  was  represented  by  Count  Beust,  Prime 
Minister  of  Saxony,  a  politician  who  was  soon  to  rise 
to  much  greater  eminence ;  but  in  consequence  of 
the  diplomatic  union  of  Prussia  and  Austria  the 
views  entertained  by  the  Governments  of  the  secondary 
German  States  had  now  no  real  bearing  on  the  course 
of  events,  and  Count  Beust's  earliest  appearance  on 
the  great  European  stage  was  without  result,  except 
in  its  influence  on  his  own  career.* 

The  first  proposition  laid  before  the  Conference  was 
that  submitted  by  Bemstorff,  the  Prussian  envoy,  to 
the  effect  that  Schleswig-Holstein  should 
receive  complete  independence,  the  question  London,  apch, 
whether  King  Christian  or  some  other 
prince  should  be  sovereign  of  the  new  State  being 
reserved  for  future  settlemeut.  To  this  the  Danish 
envoys  replied  that  even  on  the  condition  of  personal 
union  with  Denmark  through  the  Crown  they  could 
not  assent  to  the  grant  of  complete  independence  to 
the  Duchies.  Raising  their  demand  in  consequence  of 
*  p.  ud  F.  SUte  F^n^  I8S3-^  f .  173.    Seosi,  Erinnenrngen,  L^j  . 


as  xoDSBN  mmoPB.  am. 

this  refusal,  and  declaring  that  the  war  bad  made  an 
end  of  the  obligations  subsisting  under  the  Lpndon 
Treaty  of  1352,  the  two  German  Powers  then  de- 
manded that  Schleswig-Holstein  should  be  completely 
separated  from  Denmark  and  formed  into  &  single 
State  under  Frederick  of  Augustenburg,  who  in  the 
eyes  of  Germany  possessed  the  best  claim  to  the  sac-, 
cession.  Lord  Russell,  while  denying  that  the  acts', 
or  defaults  of  Denmark  could  liberate  Austria  and* 
Prussia  from  their  engagements  made  with  other 
Powers  in  the  Treaty  of  London,  admitted  that  no 
satisfactory  result  was  likely  to  arise  from  the  continued* 
union  of  the  Duchies  with  Denmark,  and  suggested 
that  King  Christian  should  make  an  absolute  cession  of 
Holstein  and  of  the  southern  part  of  Schleswig,  retfun- 
ing  the  remainder  in  full  sovereignty.  The  frontier- 
line  he  proposed  to  draw  at  the  River  Schlei.  To  this 
priuciple  of  partition  both  Denmark  and  the  German 
Powers  assented,  but  it  proved  impossible  to  reach  an 
^freement  on  the  frontier-line.  Bemstorff,  who  had 
at  first  required  nearly  all  Schleswig,  abated  his  de- 
mands, and  would  have  accepted  a  line  drawn  westward 
from  Flensburg,  so  leaving  to  Denmark  at  least  half 
the  province,  including  the  important  position  of  DUp- 
pel.  The  terms  thus  oifered  to  Denmark  were  not 
unfavourable.  Holstein  it  did  not  expect,  and  could 
scarcely  desire,  to  retain ;  and  the  territory  which 
would  have  been  taken  from  it  in  Schleswig  under  this 
arrangement  included  lew  districts  that  were  not  really 
German.    But  the  Government  of  Copenhagen,  misled 


DM  TRBATT  or  YiamrJL  8&3 

bj  the  support  given  to  it  at  the  Conference  by  England 
and  Russia — a  sapport  which  was  one  of  words  only — 
refused  to  cede  anythmg  north  of  the  town  of  Schleswig. 
Even  when  in  the  last  resort  Lord  EusseU  proposed 
that  the  frontier-line  should  he  settled  hy  arbitration 
_  the  Danish  GoTemment  held  &3t  to  its  refusal,  and  for 
the  sake  of  a  few  miles  of  territory  plunged  once  more 
into  a  straggle  which,  if  it  waa  not  to  kindle  a  Euro- 
pean war  of  vast  dimensions,  could  end  only  in  the 
ruin  of  the  Danes.  The  expected  help  ^^^^^ 
failed  them.  Attacked  and  overthrown  in  ">«"«'••'""**• 
the  island  of  Alsen,  the  German  flag  carried  to  the 
northern  extremity  of  their  mainland,  they  were  com- 
pelled to  make  peace  on  their  enemies*  terms.  Hostilities 
were  brought  to  a  close  by  the  signature  of  Preliminaries 
On  the  Ist  of  August  j  and  by  the  Treaty  of  Vienna, 
concluded  on  the  30th  of  October,  1864,  ,.„.  ^y. 
King  Christian  ceded  his  rights  in  the  °°*-**''^- 
whole  of  Schleswig- Holstein  to  the  sovereigns  of  Austria 
and  Prussia  jointly,  and  undertook  to  recognise  whatever 
dispositions  they  might  make  of  those  provinces. 

The  British  Government  throughout  this  conflict  had 
played  a  sorry  part,  at  one  moment  threatening  the  Ger- 
many, at  another  using  language  towards  the  Danes  which 
might  well  be  taken  to  indicate  an  intention 
of  lending  tbem  armed  support.    To  some    ^Hmpoium 
extent  the  errors  of  the  Cabinet  were  due  to 
the  relation  which  existed  between  Great  Britain  and 
Kapoleon  III.     It  had  up  to  this  time  been  considered 
both  at  London  and  at  Paris   that  the  Allies  of  the 


8S4  xoDJiJUT  smorn  M^ 

Crimea  had  still  certam  common  interesf»  in  Europe ; 
and  in  the  unsnocessful  intervention  at  St.  PetersbnTg 
on  behalf  of  Poland  in  1863  the  British  and  French 
Governments  had  at  first  gone  hand  in  hand.  But 
behind  every  step  openly  taken  by  Napoleon  III. 
there  was  some  half-formed  design  for  promoting  the 
interests  of  bis  dynasty  or  extending  the  frontiers  of 
France ;  and  if  England  had  consented  to  support  the 
diplomatic  concert  at  St.  Petersburg  by  measures  of  force, 
it  would  have  found  itself  engaged  in  a  war  in  which 
other  ends  than  those  relating  to  Poland  would  have 
been  the  foremost.  Towards  the  close  of  the  year  1863 
Napoleon  had  proposed  that  a  European  Congresa 
shonld  assemble,  in  order  to  regulate  not  only  the 
affairs  of  Poland  but  all  those  European  questions 
which  remained  unsettled.  This  proposal  had  been 
abruptly  declined  by  the  English  Government;  and 
when  in  the  course  of  the  Danish  war  Lord  Palmerston 
showed  an  inclination  to  take  up  arms  if  France  would 
do  the  same,  Napoleon  was  probably  not  sorry  to  have 
the  opportunity  of  repaying  England  for  its  rejection 
of  his  own  overtures  in  the  previous  year.  He  had 
mo]"eover  hopes  of  obtaining  from  Prussia  an  extension 
of  the  French  frontier  either  in  Belgium  or  towards  the 
Rhine.*    In  reply  to  overtures  fi-om  London,  Napoleon 

•  BiBmdTck'B  note  of  Jnlj  29th,  1970,  in  Hahn,  i.  506,  dercriUng 
HftpoleoD'H  Belgian  project,  wbich  dated  from  the  time  when  he  wu  him- 
mU  uabasssdor  at  Paris  in  1862,  girea  this  as  the  eipl&nation  of  N>po- 
Imiu'b  policj  in  1864.  The  Commercial  Treaty  with  PmssU  and  friendly 
persona]  relstioos  with  Biainarclc  also  iofiiienoed  Napoleon's  views.  Sea 
Bisiuarek'a  i^seoh  of  Feb.  21st,  IS79,  on  this  oul^eo^  in  Halin,  iii  &9S. 


UH  EHrOIMft  Jim  FBANOa.  8SS 

stated  that  the  caase  of  Sc&Ioswig-Holstein  to  socie 
extent  represented  the  principlo  of  nationality,  to  whitih 
France  waa  friendly,  and  that  of  all  wars  in  which 
France  could  engage  a  war  with  OermBi.nj  would  be  thn 
least  desirable.  England  accordingly,  if  it  took  up  annti 
for  the  Danes,  would  hare  been  compelled  to  onter  the  war 
alone  ;  and  although  at  a  later  timo,  when  the  war  ww 
orer  and  the  victors  were  about  to  divide  the  spoil,  thi 
British  and  French  fleets  ostentatiously  combined  in  man- 
oeuvres at  Cherbourg,  this  show  of  union  deceived  no 
one,  least  of  all  the  resolute  and  well-informed  director 
of  affairs  at  Berlin.  To  force,  and  force  alone,  would 
Bismarck  have  yielded.  Palmerston,  now  sinking  into 
old  age,  permitted  Lord  Russell  to  parody  his  own 
fierce  language  of  twenty  years  back;  but  all  the  world, 
except  the  Danes,  knew  that  the  fangs  and  the  claws 
were  drawn,  and  that  British  foreigu  policy  had  become 
for  the  time  a  thing  of  snarls  and  grimaces. 

Bismarck  had  not  at  first  determined  actually  to 
annex  Schleswig-Holstein  to  Prussia.     He  would  have 
been  content  to  leave  it  under  the  nominal     ,„^y,^  ^ 
sovereignty  of  Frederick  of  Aogustenburg     ^S^"* 
if  that  prince  would  have  placed  the  entire 
military  and   naval    resources    of    Scbleswig-Holstein 
nnder  the  control  of  the  Government  of  Berlin,  and 
have  accepted  on  behalf  of  liis  Duchies  conditions  which 
Bismarck   considered   indispensable   to   Germaa  nnion 
nnder  Prussian  leadership.     In  the  harbour  of  Kiel  it 
was  net  difficult  to  recognise  the  natural  headquarters 
of  a  future  German  fleet;  the  narrow  strip  of  land 
x2 


SS6  UODSRK  SUBOPS.  mk 

projecting  between  tlie  two  seas  naturally  saggested 
the  formation  of  a  canal  connecting  the  Baltic  with  the 
Gennan  Ocean,  and  such  a  work  conld  only  belong  to 
Q«rmany  at  large  or  to  its  leading  Power.  Moreover, 
as  a  froatier  district,  Schleswig-Holstein  waa  peculiarly 
exposed  to  foreign  attack ;  certain  strategical  positions 
necessary  for  its  defence  must  therefore  be  handed  over 
to  its  protector.  That  Prussia  should  have  united  its 
forces  with  Austria  in  order  to  win  for  the  Schleswig- 
Holsteiners  the  power  of  governing  themselves  as  they 
pleased,  must  have  seemed  to  Bismarck  a  supposition  in 
the  highest  degree  preposterous.  He  had  taken  up  the 
cause  of  the  Duchies  not  in  the  interest  of  the  inhabi- 
tants but  in  the  interest  of  Germany ;  and  by  Germany 
he  understood  Germany  centred  at  Berlin  and  ruled  by 
the  House  of  Hohenzollern.  If  therefore  the  Augus- 
tenburg  prince  was  not  prepared  to  accept  his  throne 
on  these  terms,  there  was  no  room  for  him,  and  the 
provinces  must  be  incorporated  with  Prussia  itself. 
That  Austria  would  not  without  compensation  permit 
the  Duchies  thus  to  fall  directly  or  indirectly  under 
Prussian  sway  was  of  course  well  known  to  Bismarck; 
but  so  far  was  this  from  causing  him  any  hesitation  in 
his  policy,  that  from  the  first  he  bad  discerned  in  the 
Schleswig-Holstein  question  a  favourable  pretext  for 
the  war  which  was  to  drive  Austria  out  of  Germany; 

Peace  with  Denmark  was  scarcely  concluded  when, 
at  the  bidding  of  Prussia,  reluctantly  supported  by 
Austria,  the  Saxon  and  Hanoverian  troops  which  had 
entered  Holstein  as  the  mandatories  of  the  Federal  Diet 


ittt«.  AVBTRIA  AND  PBW33IA.  857 

were  compelled  to  leave  the  cotmtiy.  A  Provisional 
Government  was  estaUisbed  under  the  direction  of  an 
Austrian  and  a  Prussian  Commisaioner.  Bismarck  had 
met  the  Prince  of  Augastenburg  at  Berlin  some  months 
before,  and  bad  formed  an  unfavourable  opinion  of 
the  policy  likely  to  he  adopted  by  bim  tona-ds  Prussia. 
All  Germany,  however,  was  in  favour  of  the  Prince's 
claims,  and  at  the  Conference  of  London  these  claims 
had  been  supported  by  the  Prussian  envoy  himself.  In 
order  to  give  some  appearance  of  formal  legality  to  bis 
own  action.  Bismarck  bad  to  obtain  from  the  Crown- 
jnrists  of  Prussia  a  decision  that  King  Christian  IX.  bad, 
contrary  to  the  general  opinion  of  Germany,  been  the 
lawful  inheritor  of  Scbleswig-Holstein,  and 
that  the  Prince  of  Augustenburg  bad  there-  aS^*S<i., 
fore  no  rights  whatever  in  the  Duchfes.  ~  '*"' 
As  the  claims  of  Christian  had  been  transferred  by  the 
Treaty  of  Vienna  to  the  sovereigns  of  Austria  and 
Prussia  jointly,  it  rested  with  them  to  decide  who 
should  be  Duke  of  Schleswig-Holsteiu,  and  under  what 
conditdons.  Bismarck  announced  at  Vienna  on  the 
22nd  of  February,  1865,  the  terms  on  which  he  was 
willing  that  Schleswig-Holsteiu  should  be  conferred  by 
the  two  sovereigns  upon  Frederick  of  Augustenbui^. 
He  required,  in  addition  to  community  of  finance, 
postal  system,  and  railways,  that  Prussian  law,  including 
the  obligation  to  military  service,  should  be  introduced 
into  the  Duchies ;  that  their  regiments  should  take  the 
oath  of  fidelity  to  tlie  King  of  Prussia,  and  that  their 
principal  military  positions  should  be  held  by  Prussian 


868  MODERN  BUBOPS.  wm. 

troops.  These  conditioiis  wotild  have  made  Schleswig- 
HoUtein  in  all  but  name  a  part  of  the  Pmssiaa  State : 
they  were  rejected  both  by  the  Court  of  Vienna  and  by 
Prince  Frederick  himself,  and  the  population  of  Schlee- 
wig-Holstein  almost  Qnanimoasly  declared  against  them. 
Both  Anstria  and  the  Federal  Diet  now  Bupported  the 
Sohleswig-Holsteiners  in  what  appeared  to  be  a  struggle 
on  behalf  of  their  independence  against  Prussian 
domination;  and  when  the  Prussian  Commissioner  in 
Schleswig-Holstein  espelled  the  most  prominent  of  the 
adherents  of  Augustenbnrg,  bis  Austrian  colleague 
published  a  protest  declaring  the  act  to  be  one  of  law- 
less violence.  It  seemed  that  the  outbreak  of  war 
between  the  two  rival  Powers  could  not  long  be  de- 
layed ;  but  Bismarck  had  on  this  occasion  moved  too 
rapidly  for  his  master,  and  considerations  relating  to 
the  other  European  Powers  made  it  advisable  to  post- 
conmtionof  poD*  thc  ropturc  for  some  months.  An 
tam.  agreement  was  patched  up  at  Gastein  by 

which,  pending  an  ultimate  settlement,  the  government 
of  the  two  provinces  was  divided  between  their  masters, 
Austria  taking  the  administration  of  Holstein,  Prussia 
that  of  Schleswig,  while  the  little  district  of  Laaenburg 
on  the  south  was  made  oyer  to  King  William  in  full 
sovereignty.  An  actual  conSict  between  the  represen- 
tatives of  the  two  rival  governments  at  tbeir  joint  head- 
quarters in  Schleswig-Holijtein  was  thus  averted;  peace 
was  made  possible  at  least  for  some  months  longer; 
and  the  interval  was  granted  to  Bismarck  which  was 
still  required  tot  the  education  of  his  Sovereign  in  the 


va.  SISKABOK  AT  BIASJUTS.  859 

policy  of  blood  and  iron,  and  for  the  completion  of  his 
own  arrangements  with  the  enemies  of  Austria  outside 
Grermany.* 

The  natural  ally  of  Prossia  was  Italy ;  but  without 
the  sanction  of  Napoleon  IH.  it  wonid  have  been  diffi- 
cult to  engage  Italy  in  a  new  war.  Bismarck  had 
therefore  to  gain  at  least  the  passive  con-     bibu»i  ■! 

.  ,  BlMTttB,  StBL, 

cnrrence  of  the  French  Emperor  in  the  union  *88b. 
of  Italy  and  Prussia  against  Austria.  He  visited 
Napoleon  at  Biarritz  in  September,  1865,  and  returned 
with  the  object  of  bis  journey  achieved.  The  negotia- 
tion of  Biarritz,  if  truthfully  recorded,  would  probably 
givo  the  key  to  much  of  the  European  history  of  the 
next  five  years.  ~As  at  Plombi^res,  the  French  Em- 
peror acted  without  his  Ministers,  and  what  be  asked 
he  asked  without  a  witness.  That  Bismarck  actually 
promised  to  Napoleon  III.  either  Belgium  or  any  part 
of  the  Ehenish  Provinces  in  case  of  the  aggrandise- 
ment of  Prussia  has  been  denied  by  him,  and  is  not 
in  itself  probable.  But  there  are  understandings  which 
prove  to  be  nndereitandings  on  one  side  only ;  politeness 
may  be  misinterpreted ;  and  the  world  would  have 
found  Count  Bismarck  unendurable  if  at  every  friendly 
meeting  he  had  been  guilty  of  the  frankness  with 
which  he  informed  the  Austrian  Government  that  its 
centre  of  action  must  be  transferred  from  Yienna  to  Pesth. 
That  Napoleon  was  .  now  scheming  for  an  extension 
of  France  on  the  north-east  is  certain ;  that  Bismarck 
treated  sucb  rectification  of  the  frontier  as  a  matter  for 
*  Hafaa,  BiBmantl^  L  271,  SIS.    OMterrelelu  Euiipf«  in  1866,,^^|^. 


SBO  MOOBBN  SUBOPS.  UK 

arrangemeDt  is  hardly  to  be  donbted ;  and  if  without 
a  distinct  and  written  agreement  Napoleon  waa  con- 
tent to  base  his  action  on  the  belief  that  Bismarck 
wonld  not  withhold  from  him  bis  reward,  this  only 
proved  bow  great  was  the  disparity  between  &e  aims 
which  the  French  mler  allowed  himself  to  cherish  and 
his  mastery  of  the  arts  hy  which  alone  such  aims  were 
to  be  realised.  Napoleon  desired  to  see  Italy  placed  in 
possession  of  Venice ;  he  probably  believed  at  this  time 
that  Aastria  would  be  no  unequal  match  for  Prussia 
and  Italy  together,  and  that  the  natural  result  of  a 
well-balanced  struggle  would  be  not  only  the  completion 
of  Italian  union  but  the  purchase  of  French  neutrality 
or  mediation  by  the  cession  of  German  territory  west 
of  the  Rhine.  It  was  no  part  of  the  duty  of  Count 
Bismarck  to  chill  Napoleon's  fancies  or  to  teach  bim 
political  wisdom.  Tbe  Prussian  statesman  may  have 
left  Biarritz  with  the  conviction  that  an  attack  on 
Germany  wonld  sooner  or  later  follow  the  disappoint- 
ment of  those  hopes  which  he  had  flattered  and  intended 
to  mock;  but  for  the  present  he  had  removed  one 
dangerous  obstacle  from  his  path,  and  the  way  lay  free 
before  him  to  an  Italian  alliance  if  Italy  itself  should 
choose  to  combine  with  him  in  war. 

Since  the  death  of  Cavour  the  Italian  Government 

had  made  no  real  progress  towards  the  attainment  of 

the  national  aims,  the  acquisition  of  Rome  and  Venice. 

O^baldi,  impatient  of  delay,  had  in  1S62 

landed  ^ain  in  Sicily  and  samraoned  hia 

followers  to  march  with  him  apon  Borne.     But  the 


enterprise  was  resolutely  condemaed  by  Yiotor  Em- 
manuel, and  when  Garibaldi  crossed  to  the  maioland 
he  fomid  the  King's  troops  in  front  of  him  at  Aspro- 
monte.  There  was  an  exchange  of  shots,  and  Gari- 
baldi fell  wounded.  "He  was  treated  with  something 
of  the  distinction  shown  to  a  loyal  prisoner,  and 
when  his  wound  was  healed  he  was  released  from 
eaptirity.  His  enterprise,  however,  and  the  indiscreet 
comments  on  it  made  by  Battazzi,  who  was  now 
in  power,  strengthened  the  friends  of  the  Papacy 
at  the  Tuileries,  and  resulted  in  the  fall  of  the 
Italian  Minister.  His  successor,  Minghetti,  deemed  it 
necessary  to  arrive  at  some  temporary  understanding 
with  Napoleon  on  the  Boman  question.  The  presence 
of  French  troops  at  Rome  offended  national  feeling, 
and  made  any  attempt  at  conciliation  between  the 
Papal  Court  and  the  ItaUan  GK^Temment  hopeless.  In 
order  to  procure  the  removal  of  this  foreign  garrison 
Uinghetti  was  wUling  to  enter  into  engagements 
which  seemed  almost  to  imply  the  renunciation  of  the 
claim  on  Rome.  By  a  Convention  made  in  Septem- 
ber, 1864,  the  Italian  Government  undertook  not  to 
attack  the  territory  of  the  Pope,  and  to  oppose  by 
force  every  attack  made  upon  it  from  without.  Napo- 
leon on  his  part  engaged  to  withdraw  bis  troops 
gradually  from  Borne  as  the  Pope  should  organise  bis 
own  army,  and  to  complete  the  evacuation  within  two 
years.  It  was,  however,  stipulated  in  an  Article  which 
was  intended  to  be  kept  secret,  that  the  capital  of 
Italy  should  be  changed,  the  meaning  of  this  stipnla- 


M  MODBRir  SUROFM.  M»« 

tion  being  that  Florenee  should  leeeire  the  dignifcy 
vhich  by  the  common  consent  of  Italy  ought  to  have 
been  transferred  from  Turin  to  Some  and  to  Bome 
alone.  The  publication  of  this  Article,  which  was 
followed  by  riots  in  Turin,  caused  the  immediate  fall 
of  Minghetti's  Oabinet.  He  was  succeeded  in  office 
by  General  La  Uarmora,  under  whom  the  negotiations 
with  Prussia  were  begun  which,  after  long  uncertainty, 
resulted  in  the  alliance  of  1866  and  in  the  final 
expulsion  of  Austria  from  Italy.* 

Bismarck  from  the  beginning  of  his  Ministry 
appears  to  have  looked  forward  to  the  com- 
bination of  Italy  and  Prussia  against  the 
common  enemy ;  but  his  plans  lipened  slowly.  In  the 
spring  of  1865,  when  aHairs  seemed  to  be  reaching  s 
crisis  in  Schleswig-Holstein,  the  first  serious  overtures 
were  made  by  the  Prussian  ambassador  at  Florence.  La 
Marmora  answered  that  any  definite  proposition  would 
receive  the  careful  attention  of  the  Italian  GoTemment, 
but  that  Italy  would  not  permit  itself  to  be  made  a  mere 
instrument  in  Prussia's  hands  for  the  intimidation  of 
Austria.  Such  caution  was  both  natural  aud  necessary 
on  the  part  of  the  Italian  Minister ;  and  his  reserve 
seemed  to  be  more  than  justified  when,  a  few  months  later, 
the  Treaty  of  Gastein  restored  Austria  and  Prussia  to 
relations  of  friendship.  La  Marmora  might  now  well 
consider  himself  released  from  all  obligations  towards 
the  Court  of  Berlin :  and,  entering  oh  a  new  line  of 
policy,  he  sent  an  envoy  to  Vienna  to  ascertain  if  the 


uoa.  aOrONE  AT  BBBLnT.  S63 

Emperor  would  amicably  eede  Venetia  to  Haly  in 
return  for  the  payment  of  a  Yerj  laxge  sum  of  money 
and  the  assumption  by  Italy  of  part  of  the  Austrian 
national  debt.  Had  this  transaction  been  effected,  it 
would  probably  have  changed  the  course  of  European 
history;  the  Emperor,  however,  declined  to  bargain 
away  any  part  of  his  dominions,  and  so  tlirew  Italy 
once  more  into  the  camp  of  his  great  enemy.  In  the 
meantime  the  disputes  about  Schleswig-Holstein  broke 
out  afresb.  Bismarck  renewed  his  efforts  at  Florence 
in  the  spring  of  1866,  with  the  result  that 
General  Govone  was  sent  to  Berlin  in  order    B«un,  M«eh, 

18Mf 

to  discuss  with  the  Prussian  Minister  the 
political  and  military  conditions  of  an  alliance.  But 
instead  of  proposing  immediate  action,  Bismarck  stated 
to  Oovone  that  the  question  of  Schleswig-Holstein  was 
insufficient  to  justify  a  great  war  in  the  eyes  of  Europe, 
and  that  a  better  cause  must  be  put  forward,  namely, 
the  reform  of  the  Federal  system  of  Germany.  Once 
more  the  subtle  Italians  believed  that  Bismarck's 
anxiety  for  a  war  with  Austria  was  feigned,  and  that 
he  sought  their  friendship  only  as  a  means  of  extort- 
ing from  the  Court  of  Vienna  its  consent  to  Prassia's 
annexation  of  the  Danish  Duchies.  There  was  an 
apparent  effort  on  the  part  of  the  Prussian  statesman 
to  avoid  entering  into  any  engagement  which  involved 
immediate  action ;  the  truth  being  that  Bismarck  was 
still  in  conflict  with  the  pacific  influences  which  sur- 
rounded the  King,  and  uncertain  from  day  to  day 
whether   his   master  would   really  follow  him  in  the 


as4  xoDSBxr  smtopa.  mm 

policy  of  war.  He  sought  therefore  to  make  the  joint 
resort  to  arms  dependent  on  some  fature  act,  Bach  as 
the  sammooing  of  a  German  Parliament,  from  which 
the  King  of  Prussia  could  not  recede  if  once  he  should 
go  BO  far.  But  the  Italians,  apparently  not  pene- 
trating  the  real  secret  of  Bismarck's  hesitation,  would 
he  satisfied  with  no  such  indeterminate  engagement ; 
'  they  pressed  for  action  within  a  limited  time ;  and  in 
the  end,  after  Austria  had  taken  steps  which  went  far 
to  overcome  the  last  scruples  of  King  William,  Bis- 
marck consented  to  fix  three  months  as  the  limit 
beyond  which  the  obligation  of  Italy  to  accompany 
Prussia  into  war  should  not  extend.  On  the  8th  of 
^jj^t.^  April  a  Trealy  of  offensive  and  defensive 
Afd^issi.  alliance  was  signed.  It  was  ^reed  that 
if  the  King  of  Prussia  should  within  three  months 
take  up  arms  for  the  reform  of  the  Federal  system 
of  Germany,  Italy  would  immediately  after  the  out- 
break of  hostilities  declare  war  upon  Austria.  Both 
Powers  were  to  engage  in  the  war  with  their  whole 
force,  and  peace  was  not  to  be  made  hut  by  common 
consent,  snch  consent  not  to  be  withheld  after  Austria 
should  have  agreed  to  cede  Venetia  to  Italy  and  territory 
with  an  equal  population  to  Prussia.* 

Eight  months  had  now  passed  since  the  Bignatore 
of  the  Convention  of  Gastein.     The  experiment  of  an 

*La  HanoorA,  TTn  po  pib  di  Inoe,  pp.  109, 146.  Jaeini,  DnoAniu,p.  154. 
Bahii,  L  S77.  In  tbe  first  draft  cxf  the  Treatj  lialj  iru  reqnired  to 
declora  war  not  only  on  Aiutria  but  on  all  Gnnnan  Goremmanta  which 
aliunld  j<nn  it.  King  William,  who  had  stilt  some  compnliction  in 
ealliug  in  Italian  arms  against  the  Fatherland,  strack  ont  these  wof^ 


un  BISMAROK  ASD  AmT&LL  869 

understanding  with  Austria,  which  King  William  had 
deemed  necessary,  bad  been  made,  and  it  had  failed ; 
or  rather,  as  Bismarck  expressed  himself  in 
a  candid  moment,  it  had  succeeded,  inas-  t^^ms- 
nrnch  as  it  had  cured  the  King  o£  hia  *  """ 
scruples  and  raised  him  to  the  proper  point  of  in- 
dignation against  the  Austrian  Court.  The  ^ents 
in  effecting  this  happy  result  had  been  the  Prince  of 
Augustenburg,  the  population  of  Holstein,  and  the 
Ijiberal  party  throughout  Qerlliany  at  large.  In 
Sehleswig,  which  the  Convention  of  Gastein  had  banded 
over  to  Prussia,  General  Manteufiel,  a  son  of  the 
Minister  of  1850,  had  summarily  put  a  stop  to  every 
expression  of  public  opinion,  and  had  threatened  to 
imprison  the  Prince  if  he  came  within  his  reach  ;  in  Hol- 
stein the  Austrian  Government  bad  permitted,  if  it  had  not 
encouraged,  the  inhabitants  to  sgitate  in  favour  of  the 
I*retender,  and  had  allowed  a  mass-meeting  to  be  held 
at  Altooa  on  the  23rd  of  January,  where  cheers  were 
raised  for  Augustenburg,  and  the  summoning  of  the 
Estates  of  Schleswig-Eolstein  was  demanded.  This 
was  enough  to  enable  Bismarck  to  denounce  the  con- 
duct of  Austria  as  an  alliance  with  revolution.  He 
demanded  explanations  from  the  Government  of  Yieona, 
and  the  Emperor  declined  to  render  an  account  of  hifi 
actions.  Warlike  preparations  now  begao,  and  on  the 
16th  of  March  the  Austrian  Government  announced 
that  it  should  refer  the  affairs  of  Schleswig-Holstein 
to  the  Federal  Diet.  This  was  a  clear  departure  from 
the  terms  of  the  Convention  of  Gaateiu,  and  &om  the 


see  UOPBRF  EUROPE.  IM. 

agprcement  made  between  Anstria  and  Prussia  before 
entering  into  the  Danish  war  in  1864  that  the  Schles- 
wig-HoIstein  question  should  be  settled  by  the  two 
Powers  independently  of  the  German  Federation.  King 
"William  waa  deeply  moved  by  such  a  breach  of  good, 
faith ;  tears  filled  bis  eyes  when  he  spoke  of  the  con- 
duct of  the  Austrian  Emperor ;  and  though  pacific 
influences  were  still  active  around  him  he  now  began 
to  fall  in  more  cordially  with  the  warlike  policy 
of  his  Minister.  4?he  question  at  issue  between 
Prussia  and  Austria  expanded  from  the  mere  disposal 
of  the  Duchies  to  the  reconstitution  of  the  Federal 
system  of  Germany.  In  a  note  laid  before  the 
Governments  of  all  the  Minor  States  Bismarck  de- 
clared that  the  time  had  come  when  Germany  most 
receive  a  new  and  more  effective  organisation,  and 
inquired  how  far  Prussia  could  count  on  the  support 
of  allies  if  it  should  be  attacked  by  Austria  or  forced 
into  war.  It  was  immediately  after  this  re-opening  of 
the  whole  problem  of  Federal  reform  in  Germany  that 
the  draft  of  the  Treaty  with  Italy  was  brought  to  its 
final  shape  by  Bismarck  and  the  Italian  envoy,  and  sent 
to  the  Ministry  at  Florence  for  its  approval. 

Bismarck  had  now  to  make  the  best  use  of  the  three 
months*  delay  that  was  granted  to  him.  On  the  day 
after  the  acceptance  of  the  Treaty  by  the  Italian 
AuMaoffoa  Govemmcnt,  the  Prussian  representative  at 
v«i«.itor6.  jjjg  jjjgj.  j,f  Fiankfort  handed  in  a  proposal 
for  the  Btmunoning  of  a  German  Parliament,  to  be 
elected  by  universal  soflrage.    Coming  from  the  Minister 


UK  AUSTRIA  0FFBB8  VENIOE.  S67 

who  bad  made  Parliamentary  government  a  mockery 
in  Frossia,  this  proposal  was  scarcely  considered  as 
serious.  Bavaria,  as  the  chief  of  Hba  secondary  States, 
had  already  expressed  its  willingness  to  enter  upon  the 
discossion  of  Federal  reform,  but  it  asked  that  the 
two  leading  Powers  should  in  the  meantime  undertake 
not  to  attack  one  aoother.  Austria  at  once  acceded  to  bhia 
request,  and  so  forced  Bismarck  into  giving  a  similar  as- 
surance. Promises  of  disarmament  were  then  exchanged; 
but  as  Austria  declined  to  stay  the  collection  of  its 
forces  in  Venetia  against  Italy,  Bismarck  was  able  to 
charge  his  adveniary  with  insincerity  in  the  negotiation, 
and  preparations  for  war  were  resumed  on  both  sides. 
Other  diflGculties,  however,  now  came  into  view.  The 
Treaty  between  Prussia  and  Italy  had  been  made 
known  to  the  Court  of  Vienna  by  Napoleon,  whose 
advice  La  Marmora  had  sought  before  its  conclusion, 
and  the  Austrian  Emperor  had  thus  become  aware  of 
his  danger.  He  now  determined  to  sacrifice  Veneti^  if 
Italy's  neutrality  could  be  so  secured.  On  the  5th  of 
May  the  Italian  ambassador  at  Paris,  Count  Nigra, 
was  informed  by  Napoleon  that  Austria  had  offered 
to  cede  Venetia  to  him  on  behalf  of  Victor  Emmanuel 
if  Prance  and  Italy  would  not  prevent  Austria  from 
indemnifying  itself  at  Prussia's  expense  in  Silesia. 
Without  a  war,  at  the  price  of  mere  inaction,  Italy  was 
offered  all  that  it  could  gain  by  a  struggle  which  was 
likely  to  be  a  desperate  one,  and  which  might  end 
in  disaster.  La  Marmora  was  in  sore  perplexity. 
Though  be  bad  formed  a  joster  estimate  of  the  capacity 


868  UOSSBN  SUBOPB.  am. 

of  the  Fraseian  army  than  any  other  statesman  or 
soldier  in.  Europe,  he  was  thoroughly  suspicions  of  the 
intentions  of  the  Prussian  Government ;  and  in  sanctioQ- 
ing  the  alliance  of  the  previous  month  he  had  done  bo 
half  expecting  that  Bismarck  would  through  the  prestige 
of  this  alliance  gain  for  Prussia  its  own  objects  without 
entering  into  war,  and  then  leave  Italy  to  reckon  with 
Austria  as  best  it  might.  He  would  gladly  have 
abandoned  the  alliance  and  have  accepted  Austria's  ofFer 
if  Italy  could  have  done  this  without  disgrace.  But  the 
sense  of  honour  was  sufficiently  strong  to  carry  him 
past  this  temptation.  He  declined  the  offer  made 
through  Paris,  and  continued  the  armaments  of  Italy, 
though  still  with  a  secret  hope  that  European  diplomacy 
might  find  the  means  of  realising  the  purpose  of  his 
country  without  war.* 

The  neutral  Powers  were  now,  with  various  objects, 
~„,j„„^f„^  bestirring  themselves  in  favour  ofaEuro- 
'^•"^  pean  Congress.  Napoleon  believed  the  time 
to  be  come  when  the  Treaties  of  1815  might  be  finally 
obliterated  by  the  joint  act  of  Europe.  He  was  himself 
ready  to  join  Prussia  with  three  hundred  thousand  men  if 
the  King  would  transfer  the  Rhenish  Provinces  to  France. 
Demands,  direct  uid  indirect,  were  made  on  Count  Bis- 
marck on  behalf  of  the  TuHeries  for  cessions  of  territory 
of  greater  or  less  extent.  These  demands  were  neither 
granted  nor  refused.  Bismarck  procrastinated ;  he  Bpoke 
of  the  obstinacy  of  the  King  his  master;  he  inquired 
whether  parts  of  Belgium  or  Switzerland  would  not  better 

*  lift  UaimorA,  Vv  po  pill  4i  Ince.  p-  iOi,  Mubn,  i,  W2. 

I,.,..  t.CoogIc 


mi.       AUSTRIA    AND    TSS   PS0P03BD   OOJTGEBSft         369 

assimilate  with  France  than  a  German  province ;  he  put 
off  the  Emperor's  representatives  by  the  assurance  that 
he  could  more  conveniently  arrange  these  matters  with 
the  Emperor  when  he  should  himself  visit  Paris.  On  the 
28th  of  May  invitations  to  a  Congress  were  issued  by 
Fiance,  England,  and  Russia  jointly,  the  objects  of  the 
Congress  being  defined  as  the  settlement  of  the  affairs 
of  Scbleswig-Holstein,  of  the  differences  between  Austria 
and  Italy,  and  of  the  reform  of  the  Federal  Consti- 
tution of  Germany,  in  so  far  as  these  affected  Europe 
at  lai^.  The  invitation  was  accepted  hy  Prussia  and 
by  Italy;  it  was  accepted  by  Austria  only  under  the 
condition  that  no  arrangement  should  be  discussed 
which  should  give  an  increase  of  territory  or  power  to 
one  of  the  States  invited  to  the  Congress.  This  subtly- 
worded  condition  would  not  indeed  have  excluded  the 
equal  aggrandisement  of  all.  It  would  not  have  rendered 
the  cession  of  Yeoetia  to  Italy  or  the  annexation  of 
Schleswig-Holstein  to  Prussia  impossible  ;  but  it  would 
either  have  involved  the  surrender  of  the  former  Papal 
territory  by  Italy  in  order  that  Victor  Emmanuel's 
dominions  should  receive  no  increase,  or,  in  tbe  alter- 
native, it  would  have  entitled  Austria  to  claim  Silesia 
as  its  own  equivalent  for  the  augmentation  of  tbe 
Italian  K!ingdom.  Such  reservations  would  have  ren- 
dered any  efforts  of  the  Powers  to  preserve  peace 
QselesB,  and  they  were  accepted  as  tantamount  to  a 
refasal  on  the  part  of  Austria  to  attend  the  Congress. 
Simultaneously  with  its  answer  to  the  neutral  Powers, 
Aastria  called  upon  the  Federal  Diet  to  take  the  affairs 


370  XODEBir  BUBOPS.  uh 

of  Schleswig-Hol&teio  ioto  its  own  bands,  and  conToked 
the  HoLsteiQ  Estates.  Biamarck  thereupon  declared 
the  Convention  of  G-astein  to  be  at  an  end,  and  ordered 
General  ManteufTel  to  lead  his  troops  into  Holstein.  The 
Austrian  commaader,  protesting  that  he  yielded  only  to 
superior  force,  withdrew  through  Altona  into  Hanover. 
Austria  at  once  demanded  and  obtained  from  the  Diet  of 
Frankfort  the  mobilisation  of  the  whole  of  the  Federal 
armies.  The  representative  of  Prussia,  declaring  that 
this  act  of  the  Diet  had  made  an  end  of  the  ex- 
isting Federal  union,  handed  in  the  plan  of  his 
Government  for  the  reorganisation  of  Germany,  and 
quitted  Frankfort.  Diplomatic  relations  between  Aus- 
tria and  Prussia  were  broken  off  on  the  13th  of  June, 
and  on  the  15th  Count  Bismarck  demanded  of  the 
sovereigns  of  Hanover,  Saxony,  and  Hesse-Cassel,  that 
they  should  on  that  very  day  put  a  stop  to  their 
military  preparations  and  accept  the  Prussian  scheme 
of  Federal  reform.  Negative  answers  being  given, 
Prussian  troops  immediately  marched  into  these  terri- 
tories, and  war  began.  Weiraar,  Mecklenburg,  and 
other  petty  States  in  the  north  took  part  with  Prussia : 
all  the  rest  of  Germany  joined  Austria.* 

The  goal  of  Bismarck's  desire,  the  end  which  he 

had  steadily  set  before  himself  since  entering  upon  his 

„^^,„         Ministry,  was  attained ;  and,  if  his  calcula- 

''''°'°°"        tions  as  to  the  strength  of  the  Prussian  army 

were  not  at  fault,  Aiistria  was  at  length  to  be  expelled 

Hahu,  Bismarck.  L  106.    Habo,  Zwu  Jaliie,p.  60;    OttAemUbM 
'    L30. 

I  i,z<..t,CoogIc 


UNi  QERMAN  OPINION.  S71 

from  tbe  Geiman  Federation  by  force  of  arms.  Bat  the 
process  hy  wMch  Bismarck  had  worked  up  to  this  result 
had  ranged  against  him  the  almost  unanimous  opinion  of 
Germany  outside  the  military  circles  of  Prussia  itself 
His  final  demand  for  the  summoning  of  a  Oerman 
Parliament  was  taken  as  mere  comedy.  Tbe  guiding 
star  of  his  policy  bad  hitherto  been  the  dynastic  in* 
terest  of  the  House  of  HohenzoUem ;  and  now,  when 
the  Germans  were  to  be  plunged  into  war  with  one 
another,  it  seemed  as  if  the  real  object  of  the  stru^le 
was  no  more  than  tbe  annexation  of  the  Danish 
Duchies  and  some  other  coveted  territory  to  the  Prussian 
Kingdom.  The  voice  of  protest  and  condemnation  rose 
loud  from  every  organ  of  public  opinion.  Even  in 
Prussia  itself  the  instances  were  few  where  any  spon- 
taneous support  was  tendered  to  tbe  Government.  Tbe 
Parliament  of  Berlin,  struggling  up  to  the  end  against 
the  all-powerful  Minister,  had  seen  its  members  prose- 
cuted for  speeches  made  within  its  own  walls,  and  had 
at  last  been  prorogued  in  order  that  its  insubordination 
might  not  hamper  the  Crown  in  the  moment  of  danger. 
But  the  mere  disappearance  of  Parliament  could  not 
conceal  the  intensity  of  ill  will  which  the  Minister  and 
his  policy  had  excited.  The  author  of  a  fratricidal  war 
of  Germans  against  Germans  was  in  the  eyes  of  many 
the  greatest  of  all  criminals ;  and  on  the  7th  of  May  an 
attempt  was  made  by  a  young  f  an_atic  to  take  Bismarck's 
life  in  the  streets  of  Berlin.  The  Minister  owed  the 
preservation  of  his  life  to  tbe  feebleness  of  his  assailant's 
weapon  and  to  bis  own  vigorous  arm.  But  the  imminence 
yj  ....  Cooylc 


373  itODEBN  BUBOPS.  MM. 

of  the  danger  affected  King  William  far  more  than  Bis- 
marck himself.  It  Bpoke  to  his  simple  mind  of  super- 
natural protection  and  aid;  it  stilled  his  donhts;  and 
confirmed  him  in  the  helief  that  Prussia  was  in  this  crisis 
the  instrument  for  working  out  the  Almighty's  will. 

A  few  da^s  before  the  outbreak  of  hostilities  the 

Emperor  Napoleon  gave  publicity  to  his  own  view  of 

the  European  situation.     He  attributed  the 

MwolBon  nL  . 

coming  war  to  three  causes:  to  the  faulty 
geographical  limits  of  the  Prussian  State,  to  the  desire  for 
a  better  Federal  system  in  Germany,  and  to  the  neces- 
sity felt  by  the  Italian  nation  for  securing  its  inde- 
pendence. These  needs  would,  he  conceived,  be  met  by 
a  territorial  rearrangement  in  the  north  of  Germany 
consolidating  and  augmenting  the  Prussian  Kingdom ; 
by  the  creation  of  a  more  effective  Federal  union  between 
the  secondary  German  States;  and  finally,  by  the  in- 
corporation of  Venetia  with  Italy,  Austria's  position  in 
Germany  remaining  unimpaired.  Only  in  the  event  of 
the  map  of  Europe  being  altered  to  the  exclusive  advan- 
tage of  one  Great  Power  would  France  require  an  exten- 
sion of  frontier.  Its  interests  lay  in  the  preservation  of 
the  equilibrium  of  Europe,  and  in  the  maintenance  of 
the  Italian  Kingdom.  These  had  already  been  secured 
by  arrangements  which  would  not  requite  Prance  to 
draw  the  sword ;  a  watchful  hut  unselfish  neutrality 
was  the  policy  which  its  Government  had  determined 
to  pursue.  Napoleon  had  in  fact  lost  all  control  orer 
events,  and  all  chance  of  gaining  the  Rhenish  ProrinceSi 
from  the  time  when  he  permitted  Italy  to  enter  into 


nsL  NJFOLEON  ni.  S?3 

the  Frassian  alliance  without  any  stipulation  that  France 
should  at  its  option  he  admitted  as  a  third  memher  of 
the  coalition.  He  could  not  ally  himself  with  Austria 
i^inst  his  own  creation,  the  Italian  Kingdom;  on 
the  other  hand,  he  had  no  means  of  extorting  oessionfl 
from  Prussia  when  once  Prussia  was  sure  of  an  ally 
who  could  hring  two  hundred  thousand  men  into  the 
field.  His  diplomacy  had  heen  successful  in  so  faa-  as 
it  had  assured  Venetia  to  Italy  whether  Prussia  should 
be  victorioos  or  OTerthrown,  but  as  regarded  Prance  it 
had  landed  him  in  absolute  powerlessness.  He  was 
unable  to  act  on  one  side ;  he  was  not  wanted  on 
the  other.  Neutrality  had  become  a  matter  not  of 
choice  but  of  necessity ;  and  until  the  course  of  military 
events  Bhonld  have  produced  some  new  situation  in 
Europe,  France  might  well  be  watchful,  bat  it  could 
scarcely  gain  much  credit  for  its  disinterested  part.* 

Assured  against  an  attack  from  the  side  of  the 
Bhine,  Bismarck  was  able  to  throw  the  mass  of  the 
Prussian  forces  southwards  against  Austria, 


tingent  which   was  necessary  to  overcome 

the  resistance  of  Hanover  and  Hesse-Cassel.    Through 

•  DiKmnn  de  Napoleon  IH.,  p.  456.  On  Hay  llth,  Nign,  Itftlkn  am- 
bassador at  Paris,  reported  that  Napoleon'sidesaon  the  objects  tobeattaiued 
by  a  Oongreea  were  as  followa: — Tenetis  to  lUij\  SUeaia  to  Austria; 
the  Daoiah  Dnchies  and  other  temtor;  in  North  Oermanj  to  PmBHia; 
the  estaUIahment  of  sereral  nnall  States  on  the  Bhine  under  French  pro- 
tection ;  tiie  dispossessed  German  princes  to  ba  compensated  in  Ronmania. 
XiaUannoTa,  p.  228.  Napuleon  IIL  was  porsaing  in  a  someffliat  altered 
form  the  (dd  German  polioj  of  the  Bepnblio  and  the  Empire — nametj, 
(be  bidancing  of  Anetria  and  Frnssia  against  one  another,  and  the  estab- 
lishnient  of  a  French  protectorate  OTer  the  group  of  aecondarj  Statea, 


874  XODEBN  EUBOPS.  mm. 

the  precipitancy  of  a  Prassian  general,  who  shuck 
without  waiting  for  his  colleagues,  the  Hanoverians 
gained  a  victory  at  Langensalza  on  the  37th  of 
June;  but  other  Prussi^i  regiments  arrived  on  the 
field  a  few  hours  later,  and  the  Hanoverian  army 
was  forced  to  capitulate  on  the  next  day.  The  King 
made  his  escape  to  Austria ;  the  Elector  of  Hesse- 
Cassel,  less  fortunate,  was  made  a  prisoner  of  war. 
Northern  Germany  was  thus  speedily  reduced  to  sub- 
mission, and  any  danger  of  a  diversion  in  favour  of 
Austria  in  this  quarter  disappeared.  In  Sasony  no 
attempt  was  made  to  bar  the  way  to  the  advancing 
Praesians.  Dresden  was  occupied  without  resistance, 
but  the  Saxon  army  marched  southwards  in  good  time, 
and  joined  the  Austrians  in  Bohemia.  The  Prussian 
forces,  about  two  hundred  and  fifty  thousand  strong, 
now  gathered  on  the  Saxon  and  Silesian  frontier,  covering 
the  line  from  Pima  to  Landshut.  They  were  composed 
tii  three  armies:  the  first,  or  central,  army  under 
Prince  Frederick  Charles,  a  nephew  of  the  King ;  the 
second,  or  Silesian,  army  under  the  Crown  Prince; 
the  westernmost,  known  as  the  army  of  the  Elbe, 
under  General  Herwarth  von  Bittenfeld.  Against  these 
were  ranged  about  an  equal  number  of  Austrians,  led 
by  Benedek,  a  general  who  had  gained  great  dis- 
tinction in  the  Hungarian  and  the  Italian  cam- 
paigns. It  had  at  first  been  thought 
CMijte^  probable  that  Benedek,   whose  forces  lay 

about    OlmUtz,    woold    invade    Southern 
Sileeia,  and   the   Prussian   line    had    therefore    .been 


UK  KONiaORATB.  875 

extended  far  to  the  east.  Soon,  howeyer,  it  appeared 
that  the  Austrians  were  unable  to  take  up  the  offensire, 
and  Benedek  moved  westwards  into  Bohemia.  The 
Prussian  Hue  was  now  shortened,  and  orders  were 
given  to  the  three  armies  to  cross  the  Bohemian  frontier 
and  converge  in  the  direction  of  the  town  of  Qitschin. 
General  Moltke.tbe  chief  of  the  staff,  directed  their  opera- 
tions from  Berlin  hy  telegraph.  The  combined  advance 
of  the  three  armies  was  execnted  with  extraordinary  pre- 
cision; and  in  a  series  o£  hatd-fought  combats  extending 
from  the  26th  to  the  39th  of  June  the  Austrians  were 
driven  back  upon  their  centre,  and  effective  communica- 
tion was  established  between  the  three  invading 
bodies.  On  the  30th  the  King  of  Prussia,  with 
General  Moltke  and  Coont  Bismarck,  left  BerUn;  on 
the  2nd  of  July  they  were  at  headquarters  at  Qits- 
chin. It  had  been  Benedek's  design  to  leave  a  small 
force  to  hold  the  Silesian  army  in  check,  and  to 
throw  the  mass  of  his  army  westwards  upon  Prince 
Frederick  Charles  and  overwhelm  him  before  he  could 
receive  help  from  his  colleagues.  This  design  had  been 
baffled  by  the  energy  of  the  Crown  Prince's  attack,  and 
by  the  superiority  of  the  Pmssians  in  generalship,  in 
the  discipline  of  their  troops,  and  in  the  weapon  they 
carried  ;  for  though  the  Austrians  had  witnessed  in  the 
Danish  campaign  the  effects  of  the  Prussian  breech- 
loading  rifle,  they  had  not  thought  it  necessary  to  adopt 
a  similar  arm.  Benedek,  though  no  great  battle  had 
jet  been  fought,  saw  that  the  campaign  was  lost,  and 
wrote  to  the  Emperor  on  the  Ist  of  July  recommending 


MODBBN  XVSOPM. 


him  to  make  peace,  for  otherwiae  s  catastroplie  waa 
iaevitable.  He  then  concentrated  his  army  on  high 
ground  a  few   miles  west  of  Koni^ratz, 


grandest  acale.  In  spite  of  the  losses  of 
the  past  week  he  could  still  bring  about  two  hundred 
tbonaand  men  into  action.  The  three  Prussian 
armies  were  now  near  enongh  to  one  another  to 
combine  in  their  attack,  and  on  the  night  of  July  2nd 
the  King  sent  orders  to  the  three  commanders  to  move 
against  Benedek  before  daybreak.  Prince  Frederick 
Charles,  advancing  through  the  village  of  Sadowa,  was 
the  first  in  the  field.  For  hours  his  divisions  sustained 
an  unequal  struggle  against  the  assembled  strength  of 
the  Austrians.  Midday  passed ;  the  defenders  now 
pressed  down  upon  their  assailants ;  and  preparations 
for  a  retreat  had  been  begun,  when  the  long-expected 
message  arrived  that  the  Crown  Prince  waa  close  at  hand. 
The  onslaught  of  the  army  of  Silesia  on  Benedek's  right, 
which  was  accompanied  by  the  arrival  of  Herwarth  at  the 
other  end  of  the  field  of  battle,  at  once  decided  the  day. 
It  was  with  difficulty  that  the  Austrian  commander  pre- 
vented the  enemy  from  seizing  the  positions  which  would 
have  cut  off  his  retreat.  He  retired  eastwards  across 
the  Elbe  with  a  loss  of  eighteen  thousand  killed  and 
wounded  and  twenty -four  thousand  prisoners.  His 
army  was  ruined ;  and  ten  days  after  the  Pmssians  had 
crossed  the  frontier  the  war  was  practically  at  an  end.* 

•  Oerterreioha  Eampfa,  ii.  341.    FrusaUn  SUil^  Ounfaign  of  186d^ 
(BoBw),  p.  167.  Cooolc 


Ml  AOnoS  OP  ITAPOtEOlT  UL  W 

The  disaster  of  Koniggratz  was  too  great  to  be 
neutralised  by  the  saccess  of  the  Austrian  forces  in 
Italy.  La  Marmora,  who  had  given  up  his  place  at  the 
head  of  the  Government  in  order  to  take  command  of 
the  army,  crossed  the  Mincio  at  the  head  of  a  hundred 
and  twenty  thousand  men,  but  was  defeated  ^^i^aoaa- 
by  inferior  numbers  on  the  fatal  ground  of  *'^^^™**^ 
Gustozza,  and  compelled  to  fall  back  on  the  Oglio. 
This  gleam  of  saccesB,  which  was  followed  by  a  naval 
victory  at  Lissa  ofi*  the  Istrian  coast,  made  it  easier  for 
the  Austrian  Bmperor  to  face  the  sacrifices  that  were 
now  inevitable.  Immediately  after  the  battle  of 
Koniggratz  he  invoked  the  mediation  of  IN^apoleon  III., 
and  ceded  Yenetia  to  him  on  behalf  of  Italy.  Napoleon 
at  once  tendered  bis  good  offices  to  the 
belligerents,  and  proposed  an  armistice.  DMlistim, 
His  mediation  was  accepted  in  principle  by 
the  King  of  Prussia,  who  expressed  hi&  willingness  also 
to  grant  an  armistice  as  soon  as  preliminaries  of  peace 
were  recognised  by  the  Austrian  Court.  In  the  mean- 
time, while  negotiations  passed  between  all  four  (Gov- 
ernments, the  Prussians  pushed  forward  until  tbeir 
outposts  came  within  sight  of  Vienna.  If  in  pursuance 
of  G-eneral  Moltke's  plan  the  It-alian  generals  had 
thrown  a  corps  north-eastwards  from  the  bead  of  the 
Adriatic,  and  so  struck  at  the  very  heart  of  the  Austrian 
monarchy,  it  is  possible  that  the  victors  of  Koniggratz 
might  have  imposed  their  own  terms  without  regard  to 
Napoleon's  mediation,  and,  while  adding  the  Italian 
Tyrol  to  Victor  Emmanuel's  dominions,  have  completed 


878  MODSBN  EUEOPM.  mk 

the  muon  of  Qermany  nnder  the  Hoase  of  Hohenzollem 
at  one  stroke.  Bat  with  Hungary  still  intact,  and  the 
Italian  army  paralysed  by  the  dissensions  of  its  com- 
manders, prudence  bade  the  great  statesman  of  Berlin 
content  himself  with  the  advantages  which  he  could 
reap  without  prolongation  of  the  war,  and  without  the 
risk  of  throwing  Napoleon  into  the  enemy's  camp. 
He  bad  at  first  required,  as  conditions  of  peace,  that 
Prussia  should  be  left  free  to  annex  Saxony,  Hanover, 
Hesse-Cassel,  and  other  North  German  territory  ;  that 
Austria  should  wholly  withdraw  from  German  affairs ; 
and  that  all  Germany,  less  the  Austrian  Provinces, 
should  be  united  in  a  Federation  under  Prussian  leader- 
ship. To  gain  the  assent  of  Napoleon  to  these  terms, 
Bismarck  hinted  that  France  might  by  accord  with 
Prussia  annex  Belgium.  Napoleon,  however,  refused 
to  agree  to  the  extension  of  Prussia's  ascendency  over 
all  Germany,  and  presented  a  counter-project  which 
was  in  its  turn  rejected  by  Bismarck.  It  was  finally 
settled  that  Prussia  should  not  be  prevented  from 
annexing  Hanover,  Nassau,  and  Hesse-Cassel,  as  con- 
quered territory  that  lay  between  its  own  Rhenish 
Provinces  and  the  rest  of  the  kingdom;  that  Austria 
should  completely  withdraw  from  German  affairs  ;  that 
Germany  north  of  the  Main,  together  with  Saxony, 
should  be  included  in  a  Federation  under  Prussian 
leadensliip ;  and  that  for  the  States  south  of  the 
Main  there  should  be  reserved  the  right  of  entering 
into  some  kind  of  national  bond  with  the  Northern 
League.    Austria  escaped  without  loss   of  any  of  its 


UK  TEEAT7  or  PRAQVa.  879 

noa-Italian  territorj;  it  also  sacceeded  in  preserring 
the  existence  of  Saxony,  which,  as  in  1815,  the  Frosaian 
Gk>venunent  had  been  most  anxious  to  annex.  Na- 
poleon, in  confining  the  Prussian  Federation  to  the 
north  of  the  Main,  and  in  securing  by  a  formal  stipa- 
lation  in  the  Treaty  the  independence  of  the  Sonthem 
States,  imagined  himself  to  have  broken  GI«rmany  into 
halves,  and  to  have  laid  the  foundation  of  a  South 
German  League  which  should  look  to  France  as  its 
protector.  On  the  other  hand,  Bismarck  by  his  an- 
nexation of  HanoTer  and  neighbouring  districts  bad 
added  a  population  of  four  millions  to  the  Prussian 
^Kingdom,  and  given  it  a  continuoos  territory ;  he  had 
forced  Aostria  out  of  the  Qerman  system ;  he  had 
gained  its  sanction  to  the  Fe^ol  union  of  all  Germany 
north  of  the  Meuu,  and  had  at  least  kept  the  way  open 
for  the  later  extension  of  this  union  to  the  Southern 
States.  Preliminaries  of  peace  embodying 
these  conditions  and  recognising  Prussia's  Nii»i«baiB. 
sovereignty  in  Schleswig-Holstein  were 
signed  at  Nicolsburg  on  the  26th  of  July,  and  formed 
the  basis  of  the  definitive  Treaty  of  Peace  which  was 
conduded  at  Prague  on  the  23rd  of  August.  An 
Ulnsory  clause,  added  at  the  instance  of  tk^toi 
Napoleon,  provided  that  if  the  population  ^"^^  "•"**" 
of  the  northern  districts  of  Schleswig  should  by  a  free 
vote  express  the  wish  to  be  united  with  Denmark,  these 
districts  should  be  ceded  to  the  Danish  Kingdom.* 

•  EUm,  L  476.    Benedetti,  Uft  HiBaEon  en  Fnuse,  p.  186.    RenehUn, 
r.  4fi7.    Uaaaari,  Lk  Uvmon,  p.  350. 


•80'  UODBZN  SVBOPS.  iw 

Bavaria  and  the  south-western  allies  of  Aastria, 
thongh  their  military  action  was  of  an  ineSectiTe  cha- 
Ttesoaoiao.  racter,  continued  in  arms  for  some  weeks 
bwbmm.  after  the  battle  of  Kfiniggriitz,  and  the 
suspension  of  hostilities  arranged  at  Kicolsbni^  did  not 
come  into  operation  on  their  behalf  till  the  2nd  of 
August.  Before  that  date  their  forces  were  dispersed 
and  their  power  of  resistance  broken  by  the  Prussian 
generals  Falckenstein  and  Manteuflel  in  a  series  of 
unimportant  engagements  and  intricate  maufBUvres. 
The  City  of  Frankfort,  against  which  Bismarck  seems 
to  have  borne  some  personal  hatred,  was  treated  for  a 
while  by  the  conquerors  with  eztraordinaiy  and  most 
impolitic  harshness ;  in  other  respects  the  action  of  the 
Prussian  Government  towards  these  conquered  States 
was  not  such  as  to  render  future  union  and  friendship 
difficult.  All  the  South  German  GJovernments,  with 
the  single  exception  of  Baden,  appealed  to  the  Emperor 
IN^apoleon  for  assistance  in  the  negotiations  which  they 
had  opened  at  Berlin.  But  at  the  very  moment  when 
this  request  was  made  and  .granted  Kapoleon  was 
himself  demanding  from  Bismarck  the  cession  of  the 
Bavarian  Palatinate  and  of  the'  Hessian  districts  west 
of  the  Rhine.  Bismarck  had  only  to  acquaint  the 
King  of  Bavaria  and  the  South  German  Ministers 
with  the  designs  of  their  French  protector  in  order  to  re- 
concile them  to  his  own  chastening,  but  not  unfriendly," 
hand.  The  grandeur  of  a  united  Fatherland  flashed 
npon  minds  hitherto  impenetrable  by  any  national 
ideal    when    it    became    known    that    Napoleon    was 


I8HL       TRSATISS   WJTS  TSB   BOVTBSnS  BTATB8.       381 

bargaining  for  Oppenheim  and  Kaiserslautem.  Not  only 
weie  the  insignificant  qnestioiu  as  to  tbe  war-indem- 
nities to  be  paid  to  Prussia  and  the  frontier  Tillages 
to  be  exchanged  promptly  settled,  but  by  a  series  of 
secret  Treaties  all  the  South  German  States 

BMntTimliM 

entered  into  an  offensiTc  and  defensive  alii-  ^S'Sf"" 
ance  with  the  Prussian  King,  and  engaged 
in  case  of  war  to  place  their  entire  forces  at  his  dis- 
posal and  under  his  command.  The  diplomacy  of  Napo- 
leon III.  had  in  the  end  effected  for  Bismarck  almost 
more  than  his  earlier  intervention  had  frustrated,  for 
it  had  made  the  South  German  Courts  the  allies  of 
Prussia  not  through  conquest  or  mere  compulsion  hat 
out  of  regard  for  their  own  interests.*  It  was  said  by 
the  opponents  of  the  Imperial  Government  in  France, 
and  scarcely  with  exaggeration,  that  every  error  which 
it  was  possible  to  commit  had,  in  tbe  course  of  the 
year  1866,  been  committed  by  Napoleon  III.  One 
crime,  one  act  of  madness,  remained  open  to  the 
^Emperor's  critics,  to  lash  him  and  France  into  a 
conflict  with  the  Power  whose  union  he  had  not  been 
able  to  prevent. 

Prior  to  the  battle  of  KoniggiStz,  it  would  seem 
that  all  the  suggestions  of  the  French  Emperor  re- 
lating to  the  acqaisition  of  Belgium  were 
made  to  the  Prussian  Government  through  poiuuan tSt" 
secret  agents,  and  that  they  were  ac- 
tually unknown,  or  known  by  mere  hearsay,  to  Bene- 
detti,  the  French  Ambassador  at  Berlin.  According 
•  H»ha,  1  601,  605.  ^ 

I  i,z<..t,  Google 


8SS  UODSSH  SjmOPS.  BM. 

to  Prince  Bismarck,  these  overtures  had  begun  as  early 
as  1862,  when  he  was  himself  Ambassador  at  Parifl,  and 
were  then  made  Terbally  and  iu  private  notes  to 
himself;  they  were  the  secret  of  Napoleon's  neatrality 
during  the  Danish  war;  and  were  renewed  throngh 
relatives  and  confidential  i^ents  of  the  Emperor  when 
the  struggle  with  Austria  was  seen  to  be  approaching. 
The  ignorance  in  which  Count  Benedetti  was  kept  of 
his  master's  private  diplomacy  may  to  some  extent 
explain  the  exb-aordinary  contradictions  between  the 
accounts  given  by  this  Minister  and  by  Prince  B!sm^x:k 
of  the  negotiations  that  passed  between  them  in  the 
period  following  the  campaign  of  1866,  after  Benedetti 
had  himself  been  charged  to  present  the  demands  of  the 
French  Government.  In  June,  while  the  Ambassador 
was  still,  as  it  would  seem,  in  ignorance  of  what  was 
passing  behind  his  back,  he  had  informed  the  French 
Ministry  that  Bismarck,  anxious  for  the  preservation 
of  French  neutrality,  had  hinted' at  tbe  compensations 
that  might  be  made  to  France  if  Prussia  should  meet 
with  great  success  in  the  coming  war.  According  to 
the  report  of  the  Ambassador,  made  at  the  time.  Count 
Bismarck  stated  thai  he  would  rather  withdraw  from 
public  life  than  cede  the  Rhenish  Provinces  with 
Cologne  and  Bonn,  but  that  be  believed  it  would 
be  possible  to  gain  the  King's  ultimate  consent  to 
the  cession  of  the  Prussian  district  of  Treves  on  the 
Upper  Moselle,  which  district,  together  with  Lnxem* 
buig  or  parts  of  Belgium  and  Switzerland,  would  give 
France  an  adequate  improvement  of  its  frontier.    The 


iMi  BI8MAB0K  AND   SENSDBTTt  SSS 

Ambassitdor  added  in  his  report,  hj  way  of  comioeDt.  that 
Count  Bismarck  was  the  only  man  in  the  kingdom  who 
was  disposed  to  make  any  cession  of  Prussian  territory 
whatever,  and  that  a  unanimous  and  violent  revulsion 
against  France  would  be  excited  by  the  slightest  in- 
dication of  any  intention  on  the  part  of  the  French 
Government  to  extend  its  frontiers  towards  the  Rhine. 
He  concluded  his  report  with  the  statement  that,  after 
hearing  Count  Bismarck's  suggestions,  he  had  brought 
the  discussion  to  a  summary  close,  not  wishing  to  leave 
the  Prussian  Minister  under  the  impression  that  any 
scheme  involving  the  seizure  of  Belgian  or  Swiss 
territory  had  the  slightest  chance  of  being  seriously 
considered  at  Paris.     (June  4 — 8.) 

Benedetti  probably  wrote  these  last  words  in  foil 
sincerity.  Seven  weeks  later,  after  the  settlement  of  the 
Preliminaries  of  Nicolsburg,  he  was  ordered  to  demand 
the  cession  of  the  Bavarian  Palatinate,  of  jw-^^^ 
the  portion  of  Hesse-Darmstadt  west  of  ^^ff,^, 
the  Khine,  including  Mainz,  and  of  the 
strip  of  Prussian  territory  on  the  Saar  which  had  been 
left  to  France  in  1814  but  taken  from  it  in  1815. 
According  to  the  statement  of  Prince  Bismarck,  which 
would  seem  to  be  exaggerated,  this  demand  was  made 
by  Benedetti  as  an  ultimatum  and  with  direct  threats 
of  war,  which  were  answered  by  Bismarck  in  language 
of  equal  violence.  In  any  case  the  demand  was  un- 
conditionally refused,  and  Benedetti  travelled  to  Paris 
in  order  to  describe  what  had  passed  at  the  Prussian 
headquarters.     His  report    made   such  an  impression 


SB4  MOUERN  EUBOPa.  UHi 

on  the  Emperor  that  the  demand  for  cessions  on  the 
Shine  was  at  once  abandoned,  and  the  Foreign 
Minister,  Drouyn  de  Lhnys,  who  had  been  disposed 
to  enforce  this  by  arms,  was  compelled  to  quit  office. 
Benedetti  returned  to  Berlin,  and  now  there  took  place 
that  negotiation  relating  to  Belgium  on  which  not 
only  the  narratirea  of  the  persons  immediately  con- 
cerned, but  the  documents  written  at  the  time,  leave 

BO  much  that  is  strange  and  unexplained. 
pjoieM,  Ads.      According  to   Benedetti,  Count  Bismarck 

was  keenly  anxious  to  extend  the  German 
Federation  to  the  South  of  the  Main,  and  desired  with 
this  object  an  intimate  union  with  at  least  one  Great 
Power.  He  sought  in  the  iirst  instance  the  support 
of  France,  and  offered  in  return  to  facilitate  the  seizure 
of  Belgium.  The  negotiation,  according  to  Benedetti,  - 
failed  because  the  Emperor  Napoleon  required  that 
the  fortresses  in  Southern  Germany  should  be  held 
by  the  troops  of  the  respective  States  to  which  they 
belonged,  while  at  the  same  time  General  Manteuffel, 
who  had  been  sent  from  Berlin  on  a  special  mission 
to  St.  Petersburg,  succeeded  in  effecting  so  intimate  a 
nnion  with  Russia  that  alliance  with  France  became 
unnecessary.  According  to  the  counter-statement  of 
Prince  Bismarck,  the  plan  now  proposed  originated 
entirely  with  the  French  Ambassador,  and  was  merely 
a  repetition  of  proposals  which  had  been  made  by 
Napoleon  during  the  preceding  foor  years,  and  which 
were  subsequently  renewed  at  intervab  by  secret 
agents  almost  down  to  the  outbieak  of  the   war  of 


1870.  Prince  Bismarck  has  stated  that  he  dallied 
with  these  proposals  only  because  a  direct  refusal  might 
at  aoj  moment  have  caused  the  outbreak  of  war 
between  France  and  Prussia,  a  catastrophe  which  up 
to  the  end  he  sought  to  avert.  In  any  case  the 
negotiation  with  Benedetti  led  to  no  conclusion,  and 
was  broken  oS  by  the  departure  of  both  statesmen  from 
Berlin  in  the  beginning  of  autumn.* 

The  war  of  186C  had  beeu  brought  to  an  end  with 
extraordinary  rapidity;  its  results  were  solid  and 
imposing.  Venice,  perplexed  no  longer  by 
its  Republican  traditions  or  by  doubts  of  S^a^™"^ 
the  patriotism  of  the  House  of  Savoy,  pre- 
pared to  welcome  King  Victor  Emmanuel;  Bismarck, 
retaming  from  the  battle-field  of  Koniggratz,  found 
his  earlier  unpopularity  foi^otten  in  the  flood  of 
national  enthusiasm  which  his  achievements  and  those 
of  the  army  had  evoked.  A  new  epoch  had  begun ; 
the  antagonisms  of  the  past  were  out  of  date  ;  nobler 

•  Benedetti,  p.  191.  Hahii,!.S08;  ii.32S,6.%.  See  &lso  La  Marmora'i 
TTn  po  jnoe  di  Ince,  p.  242,  and  his  Segreti  di  Stato,  p.  274.  Govono's 
despateliea  Htronglj  oonfirm  tbs  view  tLst  Bismarck  was  more  thau  a 
mere  passive  listener  to  f  rench  schemes  for  the  acquisition  of  Belgium. 
That  lie  originstod  tlio  plan  is  not  probable ;  that  he  encoaragi'd  it  seems 
to  me  qnile  certun,  unless  various  French  and  Italian  documents 
miconnected  with  one  anotber  are  forgeries  from  beginning  to  cad. 
On  the  ontbreak  of  the  war  at  1870  Bismarck  published  the  text  of 
the  draft-treaty  dinmased  in  1866  providing  for  an  offeasivB  and 
defenuve  alliance  between  France  and  Prussia,  and  the  seizure  of 
Belginm  by  France.  The  draft  waa  in  Benedetti's  handwriting,  and 
written  on  paper  of  the  French  Embassj.  Benedetti  stated  in  answer 
that  he  bad  made  the  draft  at  Bistaarck's  dictation.  This  might  seem 
Terr  nnlikelj  were  it  not  known  that  tha  draft  of  the  Treaty  between 
Prnssia  and  Italy  in  1866  was  aeinally  so  written  down  l^  Barral,  the 
Italian  Ambassador,  it  BlsraarcVe  dictation.  C<00'Mc 


S8S  MOBBStr  SVBOPa.  Ml 

work  now  stood  before  tbe  Pmssian  people  and  its 
TuletB  than  tbe  perpetuation  of  a  barren  stmggld 
between  Crown  and  Parliament.  By  none  was  the 
severance  from  the  past  more  openly  expressed  than  by 
Bismarck  himself;  by  none  was  it  more  bitterly  felt 
than  by  tbe  old  Conservative  party  in  Prussia,  wbo  had 
hitherto  regarded  tbe  Minister  as  their  own  representa- 
tive. In  drawing  up  the  Constitution  of  the  North 
German  Federation,  Bismarck  remained  tme  to  tbe 
principle  which  he  bad  laid  down  at  Frankfort  before 
the  war,  that  the  German  people  must  be  represented 
by  a  Parliament  elected  directly  by  the  people  them- 
selves. In  the  incorporation  of  Hanover,  Hesse-Cassel 
and  the  Banish  Duchies  with  Prussia,  he  saw  that  it 
would  be  impossible  to  win  the  new  populations  to  a 
loyal  union  with  '  Prussia  if  the  King's  Government 
coiitinued  to  recognise  no  friends  but  the  landed  aris- 
tocracy and  the  army.  He  frankly  declared  that  tbe 
action  of  the  Cabinet  in  raising  taxes  without  tbe 
consent  of  Parliament  had  been  illegal,  and  asked  for 
an  Act  of  Indemnity.  The  Parliament  of  Berlin 
understood  and  welcomed  the  message  of  reconciliation. 
It  heartily  forgave  tbe  past,  and  on  its  own  initiative 
added  the  name  of  Bismarck  to  those  for  whose  services 
to  the  State  the  King  asked  a  recompense.  The  Pro- 
gressist party,  which  had  constituted  the  majority  in 
the  last  Parliament,  gave  place  to  a  new  combina- 
tion known  as  tbe  National  Liberal  party,  which,  while 
adhering  to  the  Progressist  creed  in  domestic  affairs. 
gave  its  allegiance  to  the  Foreign  and  the  German 


iM«.<i7        THE  NATIONAL  LIBERAIS  IN  PBTT88IA.  887 

policy  of  the  Utuister.  Within  this  party  many  able 
men  who  in  Hanover  and  the  other  annexed  territoriea 
had  been  the  leaders  of  opposition  to  their  own  GoTem* 
ments  now  found  a  lai^r  scope  and  a  greater  political 
career.  More  than  one  of  the  colleagues  of  Bismarck  who 
had  been  appointed  to  their  offices  in  the  yeus  of 
conflict  were  allowed  to  pass  into  retirement,  and  their 
places  were  filled  by  men  in  sympathy  with  the  Na- 
tional Liberals.  With  the  expansion  of  Prussia  and 
the  establishment  of  its  leadership  in  a  German  Federal 
union,  the  ruler  of  Prussia  seemed  himself  to  expand 
from  the  instrument  of  a  military  monarchy  to  the 
representative  ci  a  great  nation. 

To  Austria  the  battle  of  Kouiggratz  brought  a 
settlement  of  the  conflict  between  the  Crown  and  Hun- 
gary. The  Constitution  of  February,  1861,  H«uig«r«id 
hopefully  as  it  had  worked  during  its  first  *^"'^"* 
years,  had  in  the  end  fallen  before  the  steady  refusal  of 
the  Magyars  to  recognise  the  authority  of  a  single 
Parliament  for  the  whole  Monarchy.  Within  the 
Heicbsrath  itoelf  the  example  of  Hungary  told  as  a 
disintegrating  force;  the  Poles,  the  Czechs  seceded 
from  the  Assembly;  the  Minister,  Schmerling,  lost  his 
anthority,  and  was  forced  to  resign  in  the  summer  of 
1865.  Soon  afterwards  an  edict  of  the  Emperor  sus- 
pended the  Constitution.  Coont  Belcredi,  who  took 
office  in  Schmerling's  place,  attempted  to  arrive  at  an 
understanding  with  the  Magyar  leaders.  The  Honga- 
rian  Diet  was  convoked,  and  was  opened  by  the  King 
in  person  before  the  end  of  the  year.  Francis  Joseph 
Z  % 


188  MODEBN  SUnOPS.  .  UK. 

aoDonnced  his  abandonment;  of  the  principle  that 
Hungary  had  forfeited  its  ancient  rights  by  rebellion, 
and  asked  in  return  that  the  Diet  should  not  insist 
upon  regarding  the  laws  of  1848  as  still  in  force. 
"Whatever  might  be  the  forma!  validity  of  those  laws, 
it  was,  he  urged,  impossible  that  they  should  be  brought 
into  operation  unaltered.  For  the  common  affairs  of 
the  two  halves  of  the  Monarchy  there  mast  be  some 
common  authority.  It  rested  with  the  Diet  to  arrive 
at  the  necessary  understanding  with  the  Sovereign  on 
this  point,  and  to  place  on  a  satisfactory  footing  the 
relations  of  Hungary  to  Transylvania  and  Croatia.  As 
soon  as  an  accord  should  have  been  reached  on  these 
subjects,  Francis  Joseph  stated  that  he  would  complete 
his  reconciliation  with  the  Magyars  by  being  crowned 
King  of  Hungary. 

In  the  Assembly  to  which  these  words  were  ad- 
dressed the  majority  was  conoposed  of  men  of  moderate 
opinions,  under  the  leadership  of  Francis 
Dedk.  Deak  had  drawn  up  the  programme 
of  the  Hungarian  Liberals  in  the  election  of  1847.  He 
had  at  that  time  appeared  to  he  marked  out  by  his  rare 
political  capacity  and  the  simple  manliness  of  his 
character  for  a  great,  if  not  the  greatest,  part  in  the 
work  that  then  lay  before  bis  country.  But  the  Tio- 
lence  of  revolutionary  methods  was  alien  to  his  tempera- 
ment. After  serving  in  Batthydny's  Ministry,  he  with- 
drew from  public  life  on  the  outbreak  of  war  with 
Austria,  uid  remained  in  retirement  during  the  dic- 
tatorship  of  Kossuth  and  the  struggle   of  1849.     As 


lati  DEAK.  889 

a  loyal  hiend  to  the  Hapsburg  dynasty,  and  a  dear- 
sighted  judge  of  the  possibilities  of  the  time,  be  stood 
apart  while  Kossath  dethroned  the  Sovereign  and 
proclaimed  Hungarian  independence.  Of  the  patriotism 
and  the  disinterestedness  of  Deak  there  was  never 
the  shadow  of  a  doabt;  a  distinct  political  faith 
severed  him  from  the  leaders  whose  enterprise  ended 
in  the  catastrophe  which  he  had  foreseen,  and  pre- 
served for  Hungary  one  statesman  who  could,  with- 
out renouncing  his  own  past  and  without  inflicting 
humiliation  on  the  Sovereign,  stand  as  the  mediator 
between  Hungary  and  Austria  when  the  time  for 
reconciliation  should  arrive.  Deak  was  little  disposed 
to  abate  anything  of  what  he  considered  the  just 
demands  of  his  country.  It  was  under  iiis  leadcrsliip 
that  the  Diet  had  in  18C1  refused  to  accept  the  Consti- 
tution which  established  a  single  Parliament  for  the 
whole  Monarchy.  Tiie  legislative  independence  of 
Hungary  he  was  determined  at  all  costs  to  preserve 
intact ;  rather  than  surrender  this  he  had  been  willing 
in  1861  to  see  negotiations  broken  off  and  military  rule 
restored.  But  when  Francis  Joseph,  wearied  of  the 
sixteen  years'  struggle,  appealed  once  more  to  Hun- 
gary for  union  and  friendship,  there  was  no  man 
more  earnestly  desirous  to  reconcile  the  Sovereign  with 
the  nation,  and  to  smooth  down  the  opposition  to  the 
King's  proposals  which  arose  within  the  ^^ 
Diet  itself,  than  Deak.  Under  his  influ-  Vti^^ 
ence  a  Conunitiee  was  appointed  to  frame 
the  necessary  basis  of  negotiation.     On  the  25th  of 


SM  UODSRF  auSOFS.  wi, 

June,  1866,  the  Committee  gave  in  its  report.  It  de- 
clared against  any  Farliamentaiy  nnion  with  the  Cis- 
Leithan  half  of  the  Monarchy,  but  consented  to  the 
establishment  of  common  Ifinistries  for  War,  Finance, 
and  Foreign  Affairs,  and  recommended  that  the  Budget 
necessary  for  these  joint  Ministries  should  be  settled  by 
Delegations  from  the  Hungarian  Diet  and  from  the 
western  Keichsrath.*  The  Delegations,  it  was  proposed, 
should  meet  separately,  and  communicate  their  views  to 
one  another  by  writing.  Only  when  agreement  should 
not  have  been  thus  attained  were  the  Del^ations  to 
unite  in  a  single  body,  in  which  case  the  decision  was 
to  rest  with  an  absolute  majority  of  votes. 

The  debates  of  the  Diet  on  the  proposals  of  King 
Francis  Joseph  bad  been  long  and  anxious  ;  it  was  not 
until  the  moment  when  the  war  with  Prussia  was 
breaking  out  that  the  Committee  presented  its  report. 
The  Diet  was  now  prorogued,  but  immediately  after 
the  battle  of  Koniggratz  the  Hungarian  leaders  were 
called  to  Vienna,  and  negotiations  were  pushed  forward 
oa  the  lines  laid  down  by  the  Committee.  It  was  a 
matter  of  no  small  moment  to  the  Court  of 

NesotlaUDIM 

StomSS^  Vienna  that  while  bodies  of  Hungarian 
exiles  had  been  preparing  to  attack  the 
^Empire  both  from  the  side  of  Silesia  and  of 
Venice,  Dedk  and  his  friends  had  loyally  abstained 
from  any  communication  with  the  foreign  enemies  of 
the  House  of  Hapsburg.  That  Hungary  would  now 
gain  almost  complete  independence  was   certdn ;   the 

*  Begelirag  der  TerhaltniBae,  p.  i.    Ansglnoli  mit  Ungun,  pL  9. 


MMT.  FEDERALISM   OB   DUAU3U.  891 

question  was  not  so  much  whether  there  shonld  be 
an  independent  Parliament  and  Miniatry  at  Pesth  as 
whether  there  shonld  not  be  a  similarly  independent 
Parliament  and  Ministry  in  each  of  the  territories  of 
the  Crown,  the  Austrian  Sovereign  becoming  the  head 
of  a  Federation  instead  of  the  chief  of  a  single  or  a 
dual  State.  Count  Belcredi,  the  Minister  at  Vienna,  was 
disposed  towards  such  a  Federal  system ;  he  yedB.iion« 
was,  however,  now  confronted  within  the  °"'''™- 
Cabinet  by  a  rival  who  represented  a  different  policy. 
After  making  peace  with  Prussia,  the  Emperor  called 
to  the  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs  Count  Beust,  who 
had  hitherto  been  at  the  head  of  the  Saxon  Government, 
and  who  had  been  the  representative  of  the  German 
Federation  at  the  London  Conference  of  1864.  Beust, 
while  ready  to  grant  the  Hungarians  their  independence, 
advocated  the  retention  of  the  existing  Seichsrath  and 
of  a  single  Ministry  for  all  the  Cis-Leithan  parts  of 
the  Monarohy.  His  plan,  which  pointed  to  the  main- 
tenance of  German  ascendency  in  the  western  provinces, 
and  which  deeply  offended  the  Czechs  and  the  Slavic 
populations,  was  accepted  by  the  Emperor;  Belcredi 
withdrew  from  office,  and  Beast  was  charged,  as  Presi- 
dent of  the  Cabinet,  with  the  completion  of  the  settle- 
ment with  Hungary  (Feb.  7,  1867).  Deak  had  hitherto 
left  the  chief  ostensible  part  in  the  negotiations  to  Count 
Andrassy,  one  of  the  younger  patriots  of  1848,  who  had 
been  condemned  to  be  hanged,  and  had  setomMtb* 
lived  a  refogee  during  the  next  ten  years.  ^"^ 
He  now  came  to  Vienna  himself,  and  in  the  cowrae 


S9S  MODERN  EUBOPB.  wj. 

of  a  few  days  removed  the  last  remaining  difficulties. 
The  King  gratefully  charged  him  with  the  formation  of 
the  Hongarian  Ministry  under  the  reatored  Constitution, 
bnt  Dedk  declined  alite  all  ofSce,  honours,  and  rewards, 
and  Andrassy,  who  had  actually  been  hanged  in  effigy, 
vaa  phiced  at  the  head  of  the  Government.  The  Diet, 
which  had  reassembled  shortly  before  the  end  of  1866, 
greeted  the  national  Ministry  with  enthusiasm.  Altera- 
tions in  the  laws  of  1848  proposed  in  accordance  with  the 
agreement  made  at  Vienna,  and  establishing  the  three 
common  Ministries  with  the  system  of  Delegations  for 
common  affairs,  were  carried  by  large  majorities.*  The 
abdication  of  Ferdinand,  which  throughout  the 
struggle  of  1849  Hungary  had  declined  to  recognise, 
was  now  acknowledged  as  valid,  and  on  the  Sth  of 
June,  1867,  Francis  Joseph  was  crowned  King  of  Hun- 
gary amid  the  acclamations  of  Pesth.  The  gift  of  money 
which  is  made  to  each  Hungarian  monarch  on  his  corona- 
tion Francis  Joseph  by  a  liappy  impulse 
cnwnad.  jdm  distributed  among  the  families  of  those  who 
had  fallen  in  fighting  i^ainst  him  in  1849. 
A  universal  amnesty  was  proclaimed,  no  condition  being 
imposed  on  the  return  of  the  exiles  but  that  they 
should  acknowledge  the  existing  Constitution.  Kossuth 
alone  refused  to  return  to  his  country  so  long  as  a 
Hapsbarg  should  he  its  King,  and  proudly  clung  to 
idoas  which  were  already  those  of  the  past. 

*  HuugsiT  reluned  a  Uinistrj  of  N&tioiul  Defence  for  its  Reaetre 
Farces,  and  b  Finance  Uinietrj  for  its  own  separate  finance.  Thus  tba 
Hinistrj  of  l^oreign  Affain  was  the  otij  ons  of  the  Uiree  coinmoB 
mnistrin  wbich  eoveted  tbe  epfire  ran^  of  a  de|iartmMtt 


The  yictory  of  the  Magyars  was  indeed  hot  too 
complete.  Not  only  were  Beust  and  the  representatives 
of  the  western  half  o£  the  Monarchy  so  over-  ^  ^^ 
matched  hy  the  Hungarian  negotiators  that  *^' 
in  the  distrihntion  of  the  financial  hardens  of  the 
Umpire  Hungary  escaped  with  far  too  small  a  share, 
hat  in  the  more  important  prohlem  of  the  relation  of 
the  Slavic  and  Eoamanian  populations  of  the  Hungarian 
Kingdom  to  the  dominant  race  no  adequate  steps  were 
taken  for  the  protection  of  these  suhject  nationalities. 
That  Croatia  and  Transylvania  sliould  he  re-united  with 
Hnngary  if  the  Emperor  and  the  Magyars  were  ever 
to  be  reconciled  was  inevitahle ;  and  in  the  case  of 
Croatia  certain  conditions  were  no  douht  imposed,  and 
certain  local  rights  guaranteed.  But  on  the  whole  the 
non-Magyar  peoples  in  Hungary  were  handed  over  to 
the  discretion  of  the  ruliDg  race.  The  demand  of 
Bismarck  that  the  centre  of  gravity  of  the  Austrian 
States  should  be  transferred  from  Vienna  to  Pesth 
had  indeed  been  brought  to  pass.  While  in  the  western 
half  of  the  Monarchy  the  central  authority,  still  repre- 
sented by  a  single  Parliament,  seemed  in  the  succeeding 
years  to  be  altogether  losing  its  cohesive  power,  and  the 
political  life  of  Austria  became  a  series  of  distracting 
complications,  in  Hungary  the  Magyiur  Government 
resolutely  set  itself  to  the  task  of  moulding  into  one 
the  nationahties  over  which  it  ruled.  Uniting  the 
characteristic  faults  with  the  great  qualities  of  a  race 
marked  ont  by  Nature  and  ancient  habit  for  domination 
9Ter  mon  numerous  but  less  t^gressive   neighbours. 


SU  UODSBN  SUBOFE. 

the  Magyars  have  steadily  sought  to  the  best  of  tbeir 
power  to  obliterate  the  distinctions  which  make  Hun- 
gary in  reality  not  one  but  several  nations.  They  have 
held  the  Slavic  and  the  Roumanian  population  within 
their  borders  with  an  iron  grasp,  but  they  have  not 
gained  their  affection.  The  memory  of  the  Russian 
intervention  in  1849  and  of  the  part  then  played  by 
Serbs,  by  Croats  and  Roumanians  in  crushing  Magyar 
independence  has  blinded  the  victors  to  the  just  claims 
of  these  races  both  within  and  without  the  Hungarian 
kingdom,  and  attached  their  sympathy  to  the  hateful  and 
outworn  empire  of  the  Turk.  But  the  individuality  of 
peoples  is  not  to  be  blotted  out  in  a  day ;  nor,  with  all 
its  striking  advance  in  wealth,  in  civilisation,  and  in 
military  power,  has  the  Magyar  State  been  able  to 
free  itself  from  the  insecurity  arising  from  the  presence 
of  independent  communities  on  its  immediate  frootiers 
belonging  to  the  same  race  as  those  whose  taiiguagv 
and  nationality  it  seeks  to  repress 


D,a,l,zc.bvG00gIl 


i 


CHAPTER   VI. 

NapolooD  ni— Itie  Uesican  Expedition— Withdnnl  of  ths  French  and  de«th 
of  Moximiliui — The  Loiemburg  Question— Exaqienition  in  Fnuioe  against 
Fnuaia — Aootria — Italy — Msntana— Gemujiy  after  ISSS — The  Spnniiih 
candidatare  of  Leopold  of  EohenEoUern— French  declaiH.tion~BQnedetti 
and  King  William — Withdiawal  of  Leopold  and  demand  for  guaranteei — 
The  tel^^m  from  Enu-^War — Eipeotod  Alliances  of  France — ^Auatria — 
Italy — pTuiaan  plaui — The  French  anny— Caiues  of  French  inferiority — 
Weiaaenhurg  — Worth — Spioharen — Bomy — Mars-l«-Tour — QraTBloHe  — 
Sedan— The  Bapublio  prochumed  at  Paris — Favre  and  Biamarck— Giego  of 
Faris— Oambclta  at  Toure— The  Army  of  the  Loire— Fall  of  Hetz— Fig-ht- 
ing  at  Orieoni- Sortie  of  Champigny- — The  Armies  of  tho  North,  of  the 
IioiTe,  of  the  £a«t— Bourboki'B  ruin— Capitulation  of  Paris  and  ArmiitJce— 
Preliminaries  of  Peace — Germany— Establishment  of  the  German  Empire — 
Ths  Commune  of  Pazia — Seocoid  liege- EfCeoti  of  the  war  as  to  Eussia  and 
Italy — Rome. 

The  repatatioD  of  Kapoleon  III.  was  perhaps  at  its 
height  at  the  eod  of  the  first  ten  years  of  hia  reign. 
His  victories  over  Bussia  and  Austria  had  flattered 
the  military  pride  of  France  ;  the  flowing  tide  of  com- 
mercial    prosperity    bore     witness,    as    it 

■^        ^         •'  NapolMnllL 

seemed,  to  the  blessings  of  a  government  at 
once  Arm  and  enlightened ;  the  reconstruction  of  Fans 
dazzled  a  generation  accustomed  to  the  mean  and  dingy 
aspect  of  London  and  other  capitals  before  1850,  and 
scarcely  conscious  of  tlie  presence  or  absence  of  real 
beauty  and  dignity  where  it  saw  spaciousness  and 
brilliance.  The  political  faults  of  Napoleon,  the 
shiftiness  and  incoherence  of  his  designs,  his  want  of 
grasp  on  reality,  bis  absolute  personal  nullity  as  an 


898  ItODBBX   EUROPB. 

administrator,  were  known  to  Bome  few,  bnt  they  bad 
not  been  displayed  to  the  world  at  large.  He  had 
done  Bome  great  tilings,  he  had  conspicuously  failed 
in  nothing.  Had  his  reign  ended  before  1863,  he 
wonld  probably  have  left  behind  him  in  popular 
memory  the  name  of  a  great  ruler.  But  from  this 
time  his  fortune  paled.  The  repulse  of  his  intervention 
on  behalf  of  Poland  in  1803  by  the  Russian  Court, 
his  petulant  or  miscalculatiog  inaction  during  the 
Danish  War  of  the  following  year,  .showed  those  to  be 
mistaken  who  had  imagined  that  the  Emperor  must 
always  exercise  a  controlling  power  in  Europe.  During 
the  events  which  formed  the  iirst  stage  in  the  con- 
solidation of  Germany  his  policy  was  a  succession  of 
errors.  Simultaneously  with  the  miscarriage  of  his 
European  schemes,  an  enterprise  which  he  bad  uoder- 
taken  beyond  the  Atlantic,  and  which  seriously 
weakened  his  resources  at  a  time  when  concentrated 
strength  alone  could  tell  on  European  affairs,  ended  in 
tragedy  and  disgrace. 

There  were  in  Kapoleon  III.,  as  a  man  of  State, 
two  personalities,  two  mental  existences,  which  blended 
but  ill  with  one  another.  There  was  the  contemplator 
of  great  human  forces,  the  intelligent,  if  not  deeply 
penetrative,  reader  of  the  signs  of  the  times,  the 
brooder  through  long  years  of  imprisonment  and 
TheM«iicui  exile,  the  child  of  Europe,  to  whom 
'"'•°*"  Germany,  Italy,  and  England  had  all  in 

turn  been  nearer  than  his  own  country ;  and  there  was 
the   crowned  adventurer,    bound    by  his    name    and 


yjpOLEON  in.  SOT 

position  to  gain  for  France  something  that  it  did 
not  possess,  and  to  regard  the  greatness  of  every  other 
nation  as  an  impediment  to  the  ascendency  of  his 
own.  Kapoleon  correctly  judged  the  principle  of 
nationality  to  be  the  dominant  force  in  the  immediate 
future  of  Europe.  He  saw  in  Italy  and  in  Germany 
races  whose  internal  divisions  alone  had  prevented 
them  from  being  the  formidable  rivals  of  France,  and 
yet  he  assisted  the  one  nation  to  effect  its  union, 
and  was  not  indisposed,  within  certain  limits,  to 
promote  the  consolidation  of  the  other.  That  the 
acquisition  of  Nice  and  Savoy,  and  even  of  the 
Rhenish  Provinces,  could  not  in  itself  make  up  to 
France  for  the  establishment  of  two  great  nations  on 
its  immediate  frontiers  Napoleon  must  have  well 
understood :  he  sought  to  carry  the  principle  of  ag- 
glomeration a  stage  farther  in  the  interests  of  France 
itself,  and  to  form  some  moral,  if  not  political,  union 
of  the  Latin  nations,  which  should  embrace  under  bis 
own  ascendency  communities  beyond  the  Atlantic  as 
well  as  those  of  the  Old  World.  It  was  with  this 
design  that  in  the  year  1862  be  made  the  financial 
misdemeanours  of  Mexico  the  pretext  for  an  expedition 
to  that  country,  the  object  of  which  was  to  subvert 
the  native  Republican  Government,  and  to  place  the 
Hapsburg  Maximilian,  as  a  va.ssal  prince,  on  its 
throne.  England  and  Spain  had  at  first  agreed  to 
unite  with  France  in  enforcing  the  claims  of  the 
Earopean  creditors  of  Mexico ;  but  as  soon  as  Napoleon 
had   made  public   bis    real   intentions    these    Powers 


aw  MOBBBS  SXmOPB.  uaMT. 

withdrew  their  forces,  and  the  Bmperor  was  left  free 
to  cany  out  his  plans  alone. 

The  design  of  Napoleon  to  establish  French  in- 
fluence in  Mexico  was  connected  with  his  attempt  to 
break  up  the  TJuited  States  bj  establishing  the  in- 
dependence of  the  Southern  Confederacy,  then  in 
rebellion,  through  the  mediation  of  the  Great  Powers 
of  Europe.  So  long  as  the  Civil  War  in  the  United 
States  lasted,  it  seemed  likely  that  Napoleon's  enterprise 
in  Mexico  would  be  successful     MazimiliioL  was  placed 

upon  the  throne,  and  the  Bepublican  leader. 
psditicis.  isai-     Juarez,  was  driven  into  the  extreme  north 

of  the  country.  But  with  the  overthrow 
of  the  Southern  Confederacy  and  the  restoration  of 
peace  in  the  United  States  in  1865  the  prospect 
totally  changed.  The  Government  of  Washington 
refused  to  acknowledge  any  authority  in  Mexico  b.tt 
that  of  Juarez,  and  informed  Napoleon  in  courteous 
terms  that  his  troops  must  be  withdrawn.  Napoleon 
had  bound  himself  by  Treaty  to  keep  twenty-five 
thousand  men  in  Mexico  for  the  protection  of  Maxi- 
milian. He  was,  however,  unable  to  defy  the  order 
of  the  United  States.  Early  in  1866  he  acquainted 
Maximilian  with  the  necessities  of  the  situation,  and 
with  the  approaching  removal  of  the  force  which 
alone  had  placed  him  and  could  sustain  him  on  the 
throne.  The  unfortunate  prince  sent  his  consort^ 
the  daughter  of  the  King  of  the  Belgians,  to  Europe 
to  plead  agunst  this  act  of  desertion;  bat  hei 
efforts  were  vain,  and  her  reason  sank  under  the  jusi 


iMT.  BITD   OF  TEE  MBXIOAJ/  SXPSVITIOlf.  899 

presentiment  of  her  husband's  rain.  The  ntmoat  on 
which  Napoleon  could  venture  was  the  postponement 
of  the  recall  of  his  troops  till  the  spring 
of  1867.  H^  urged  Maximilian  to  abdicate  ^S^?^ 
before  it  was  too  late ;  but  the  prince  re- 
fused to  dissociate  himself  from  his  counsellors  who 
still  implored  him  to  remain.  Meanwhile  the  Joarists 
pressed  back  towards  the  capital  from  north  and 
south.  As  the  French  detachments  were  withdrawn 
towards  the  coast  the  entire  country  feU  into  their 
hands.  The  last  French  soldiers  quitted  Mexico  at 
the  beginning  of  March,  1867,  and  on  the  mi,^h 
15th  of  May,  Maximilian,  still  lingering 
at  Queretaro,  was  made  prisoner  by  the  Bepublicans. 
He  had  himself  while  in  power  ordered  that  the 
partisans  of  Juarez  should  be  treated  not  as  soldiers 
but  as  bHgands,  and  that  when  captured  they  should 
be  tried  by  court-martial  and  executed  within  twenty- 
four  boors.  The  same  severity  was  applied  to  himself. 
He  was  sentenced  to  death  and  shot  at  Queretaro  on 
the  Idth  of  June. 

Thus  ended  the  attempt  of  Napoleon  III.  to 
establish  the  influence  of  France  and  of  his  dynasty 
beyond  the  seas.  The  doom  of  Maximilian  excited 
the  compassion  of  Europe ;  a  deep,  irreparable  wound 
was  inflicted  on  the  reputation  of  the  man 
who  had  tempted  him  to  his  treacherous  utn-inpnt^ 
throne,  who  had  guaranteed  bim  protection, 
and  at  the  bidding  of  a  superior  power  had  abandoned 
bim  to  his  rain.     From  this  time,  though  the  patward 


400  liODXnN  BUltOPS.  tm. 

gplendoor  of  the  Empire  was  UDdimintshed,  there  le- 
mained  scarcely  anything  oE  the  personal  prestige  which 
Kapoleon  had  once  enjoyed  in  so  rich  a  measure.  He 
was  no  longer  in  the  eyes  of  Europe  or  of  his  own 
country  the  profound,  self-contained  statesman  in  whose 
brain  lay  the  secret  of  coming  events ;  he  was  rather 
the  gambler  whom  fortune  was  preparing  to  desert,  the 
usurper  trembling  for  the  future  of  his  dynasty  and 
his  crown.  Premature  old  age  and  a  harassing  bodily 
ailment  began  to  incapacitate  him  for  personal  exertion. 
He  sought  to  loosen  the  reins  in  which  his  despot- 
ism held  France,  and  to  make  a  compromise  with 
public  opinion  which  was  now  declaring  against  him. 
And  although  bis  own  cooler  judgment  set  little 
store  by  any  addition  of  frontier-strips  of  alien 
territory  to  France,  and  he  would  probably  have  been 
best  pleased  to  pass  the  remainder  of  his  reign  in 
uadlsturbed  inaction,  he  deemed  it  necessary,  after 
failure  in  Mexico  had  become  inevitable,  to  seek  some 
satisfaction  in  Europe  for  the  injured  pride  of  his 
country.    He  entered  into  negotiations  with 

guaitj'"  Fob—     the  Kinff   of  Holland    for  the  cession    of 
khj,  1S07.  "^ 

Luxemburg,    and    had   gained  his  assent, 

when  rumours  of   the  transaction  reached  the  North 

German   Press,  and  the    project   passed  from   out  the 

control  of  diplomatists  and  became  an  affair  of  rival 

nations. 

Luxemburg,  which  was  an  independent  Duchy  ruled 

by  the  Xing  of  Holland,  had  until  1866  formed  a  part 

of  the  Gemiian  Federation;    and  although  Bismarck 


bad  not  attempted  to  include  it  in  his  own  North 
German  Union,  Prussia  retained  by  the  Treaties  of 
1815  a  right  to  garrison  the  fortress  of  Luxemburg, 
and  its  troops  were  actually  there  in  possession.  The 
proposed  transfer  of  the  Duchy  to  France  excited  an 
outburst  of  patriotic  resentment  in  the  Federal  Par- 
liament at  Berlin.  The  population  of  Luxemburg 
was  indeed  not  wholly  German,  and  it  had  shown 
the  strongest  disinclination  to  enter  the  Korth  German 
league ;  but  the  connection  of  the  Duchy  with  Gennany 
in  the  past  was  close  enough  to  explain  the  indignation 
roused  by  Napoleon's  project  among  politicians  who 
little  suspected  that  during  the  previous  year  Bismarck 
himself  had  cordially  recommended  this  annexation, 
and  that  up  to  the  last  moment  be  had  been  privy  to 
the  Emperor's  plan.  The  Prussian  Minister,  though  he 
did  not  affect  to  share  the  emotion  of  his  countrymen, 
stated  that  his  policy  in  regard-  to  Luxemburg  must 
be  influenced  by  the  opinion  of  the  Federal  Parliament, 
and  he  shortly  afterwards  caused  it  to  be  understood 
at  Paris  that  the  annexation  of  the  Duchy  to  France 
was  impossible.  As  a  warning  to  France  he  had  already 
published  the  Treaties  of  alliance  between  Prussia  and 
the  South  German  States,  which  bad  been  made  at  the 
close  of  the  war  of  1868,  but  had  hitherto  been  kept 
secret.*  Other  powers  now  began  to  tender  their  good 
offices.  Count  Beust,  on  behalf  of  Austria,  su^ested 
that  Luxemburg  should  be  united  to  Belgium,  which 

*  Thej  had  indeed  been  diBOOvered  by  F'  ench  ageuU  in  Oemunj. 
BiOthwi,  L' Affaire  dn  Luxembonr^,  p^  7^ 


«S  XODSSy  SVBOPSL  MR 

in  its  tnm  should  cede  a  amall  district;  to  France. 
This  arrangement,  which  would  have  been  accepted 
at  Berlin,  and  which,  by  soothing  the  irritation  pro- 
duced in  France  by  Prnssia'a  successes,  would  possibly 
have  averted  the  war  of  1870,  was  frustrated  by  the 
refns^  of  the  King  of  Belgium  to  part  with  any  of 
his  territory.  !NapoleoD,  disclaiming  all  desire  for 
territorial  extension,  now  asked  only  for  the  with- 
drawal of  the  Prussian  garrison  from  Luxemburg; 
but  it  was  known  that  he  was  determined  to  enforce 
this  demand  by  arms.  The  Russian  Government 
proposed  that  the  question  should  be  settled  by  a 
Conference  of  the  Powers  at  London.  This  proposal 
was  accepted  under  certain  conditions  by  France  and 
Prussia,  and  the  Conference  assembled  on  the  7th  of 
May.  Its  deliberations  were  completed  in  four  days, 
and  the  results  were  summed  up  in  the  Treaty  of 
London  signed  on  the  11th.  By  this  Treaty  the 
Duchy  of  Luxembui^  was  declared  neutral  territory 
under  the  collective  guarantee  of  the  Powers.  Prussia 
withdrew  its  garrison,  and  the  King  of  Holland,  who 
continued  to  be  sovereign  of  the  Duchy,  undertook  to 
demolish  the  fortifications  of  Luxemburg,  and  to 
maintain  it  in  the  future  as  an  open  town.* 

Of  the  politicians  of  France,  those  who  even 
affected  to  regard  the  aggrandisement  of  Prussia  and 
the  union  of  Northern  Germany  with  indifference  or 
satisfaction    were    a    small    minority.      Among   these 

■  Hahn,  i.  658.    Bothftn,  Imiemboni^,  p.  246.    Oomspondensen  de* 
K.  K.  Uiniet.  de*  Aiusern,  1868.  jf.  2i.    PuL  Paf.,  1867,  toL  IxzIt.,  p.  427. 


were  the  Emperor,  who,  afber  his  attempts  to  gain  a 
Bhenish  Province  had  been  ba£9ed,  sought  to  prore  in 
an  elaborate  State-paper  that  France  had 
won  more  than  it  had  lost  by  the  eitinc-  ft«M»>g-in«t 
tion  of  the  C^erman  Federation  as  es- 
tablished in  1815,  and  by  the  dissolution  of  the 
tie  that  had  bound  Austria  and  Prussia  together  as 
members  of  this  body.  The  events  of  1S66  had,  he 
contended,  broken  ap  a  system  devised  in  evil  days 
for  the  purpose  of  uniting  Central  Europe  against 
France,  and  had  restored  to  the  Continent  the  freedom 
of  alliances ;  in  other  words,  they  had  made  it 
possible  for  the  South  German  States  to  connect  them- 
selves with  France.  If  this  illusion  was  really 
entertained  by  the  Emperor,  it  was  rudely  dispelled 
by  the  discovery  of  the  Treaties  between  Prussia 
and  the  Sonthem  States  and  by  their  publication 
in  the  spring  of  1867.  But  this  revelation  was 
not  necessary  to  determine  the  attitude  of  the  great 
m^ority  of  those  who  passed  for  the  representa- 
tives of  independent  political  opinion  in  France. 
The  Ministers  indeed  were  still  compelled  to 
imitate  the  Emperor's  optimism,  and  a  few  enlightened 
men  among  the  Opposition  understood  that  France 
must  be  content  to  see  the  Germans  effect  their 
national  unity;  but  the  great  body  of  unofficial 
politicians,  to  whatever  party  they  belonged,  joined 
in  the  hitter  outcry  raised  at  once  against  the 
aggressive  Government  of  Prussia  and  the  feeble 
administration  at    Paris,   which   had    not  found  the 

A  A  2 


4U  uoDsmr  ev&ops. 


I  to  prevent,  or  had  actually  facilitated,  Prussia's 
successes.  Thiers,  who  more  than  any  one  man  had 
by  hia  writings  popularised  the  Napoleonic  legend 
and  accustomed  the  French  to  consider  themselves 
entitled  to  a  monopoly  of  national  greatness  on  the 
Ehine,  was  the  severest  critic  of  the  Emperor,  the 
most  zealous  denouncer  of  the  work  which  Bismarck 
had  effected.  It  was  only  with  too  much  reason  that 
the  Prussian  Government  looked  forward  to  an  attack 
by  France  at  some  earlier  or  later  time  as  almost 
certain,  and  pressed  forward  the  military  oi^anisation 
which  was  to  give  to  Germany  an  army  of  unheard-of 
efficiency  and  strength. 

There  appears  to  be  no  evidence  that  Napoleon  III. 
himself  desired  to  attack  Prussia  so  long  as  that  Power 

should  strictly  observe  the  stipulations   of 
p™»i.«««      the  Treaty  of  Prague  which   provided  for 

the  independence  of  the  South  German 
States.  But  the  current  of  events  irresistibly  im- 
pelled Germany  to  unity.  The  very  Treaty  which 
made  the  river  Main  the  limit  of  the  North  German 
Confederacy  reserved  for  the  Southern  States  the  right 
of  attaching  themselves  to  those  of  the  North  by  some 
kind  of  national  tie.  Unless  the  French  Kmperor  was 
resolved  to  acquiesce  in  the  gradual  development  of  this 
federal  unity  until,  as  regarded  the  foreigner,  the  North 
and  the  South  of  Germany  should  be  a  single  body,  he 
could  have  no  confident  hope  of  lasting  peace.  To  have 
thus  anticipated  and  accepted  the  future,  to  have  re- 
moved once  and  for  all  the  sleepless  fears  of  Prasaia  by 


IHM.  FRANCE  ANP  AVBTMA.  406  . 

tbe  frank  recognition  of  its  right  to  give  all  Germany 
effective  union,-  would  have  been  aa  act  too  great  and 
too  wise  in  reality,  too  weak  and  self- renouncing  in 
appearance,  for  any  chief  of  a  rival  nation.  Napoleon 
did  not  take  this  course  ;  on  the  other  hand,  not  desir- 
ing to  attack  Prussia  while  it  remained  within  the 
limits  of  the  Treaty  of  Prt^ue,  he  refrained  from  seek- 
ing alliances  with  the  object  of  immediate  and  aggres* 
sive  action.  The  diplomacy  of  the  Emperor  during  the 
period  from  1866  to  1870  is  indeed  still  but  imperfectly 
known ;  but  it  would  appear  that  his  efforts  were  directed 
only  to  the  formation  of  alliances  with  the  view  of 
eventual  action  when  Prussia  should  have  passed  the 
limits  which  thtj  Einpeior  himself  or  public  opinion  in 
Paris  should,  as  interpreter  of  the  Treaty  of  Prague, 
impose  upon  this  Power  in  its  dealings  with  the  South 
German  States. 

The  Governments  to  which  Napoleon  could  look  for 
some  degree  of  support  were  those  of  Austria  and  Italy. 
Count   Beust,   now  Chancellor   of  the  Austrian  Mon- 
archy, was  a  bitter  enemy  to  Prussia,  and  a 
rash  and  adventurous  politician,  to  whom     j^^^ 
the  very  circumstance  of  his  sudden  eleva- 
tion from  the  petty  sphere  of  Saxon  politics  gave  a 
certain  levity  and  unconstraint  in  tbe  handling  of  great 
affairs.     He  cherished  tbe  idea  of  recovering  Austria's 
ascendency  in  Germany,  and  was  disposed  to  repel  tbe 
extension   of   Russian  influence    westwards    by    boldly 
encouraging  the  Poles  to  seek  for  the  satisfaction  of 
their  national    hopes   in  Galicia  under  the  Hapsboi^ 


40S  MODERS-  SUBOPS.  ■«-•. 

Crown.  To  Count  Beust  France  was  the  most  natural 
of  all  allies.  On  tbe  other  hand,  the  very  system  which 
Beust  had  helped  to  establish  in  Hungary  raised  serious 
obstacles  against  the  adoption  of  his  own  policy.  An- 
drassy,  tbe  HuDgariao  Minister,  while  sharing  Benst's 
hostility  to  Bussia,  declared  that  his  countrymen  bad 
no  interest  in  restoring  Austria's  German  conoection, 
and  were  in  fact  better  without  it.  In  these  circum- 
stances the  negotiations  of  tbe  French  and  the  Austrian 
Emperor  were  conducted  by  a  private  correspondence. 
The  interchange  of  letters  continued  during  the  years 
180S  and  1869,  and  resulted  in  a  promise  made  by 
Napoleon  to  support  Austria  if  it  should  be  attacked  by 
Prussia,  while  the  Emperor  Francis  Joseph  promised  to 
assist  France  if  it  should  be  attacked  by  Prussia  and 
Russia  together.  No  Treaty  was  made,  but  a  general 
assurance  was  exchanged  between  tbe  two  Emperors 
that  they  would  pursue  a  common  policy  and  treat  one 
another's  interests  as  their  own.  With  the  view  of 
forming  a  closer  understanding  the  Archduke  Albrecbt 
visited  Paris  in  February,  1870,  and  a  French  general 
was  sent  to  Vienna  to  arrange  the  plan  of  campaign  in 
ca.se  of  war  with  Prussia.  In  such  a  war,  if  undertaken 
by  the  two  Powers,  it  was  hoped  that  Italy  would  join.  * 
The  alliance  of  1866  between  Prussia  and  Italy  had 
left  behind  it  in  each  of  these  States  more 
of  rancour  than  of  good  will.  Ija  Marmora 
had  from  tbe  beginning  to  the  end  been  unfortunate 

*  Sard.  Hiatoiru  Diplomatiqne,  L  3S.     But  aee  the  owtbowwuj 
Ijctwera  Benst  mud  Onunont  in  L»  Ten^M,  Jan.  11 — 1^  ISiSy 


tm*.  StALT,  40? 

in  liis  relations  with  Berlin.  He  had  entered  into  the 
alljance  with  suspicioD ;  he  would  gladly  have  seen 
Venetia  given  to  Italy  hy  a  European  Congress  with- 
out war;  and  when  hostilities  broke  out,  he  had  dis* 
regarded  and  resented  what  he  considered  an  attempt 
of  the  Prussian  6K>vemment  to  dictate  to  him  the 
military  measures  to  be  pursued.  On  the  other  hand, 
the  Prussians  charged  the  Italian  Government  with 
having  deliberately  held  back  its  troops  after  the  battle 
of  Custozza  in  pursuance  of  arrangements  made  be- 
tween Napoleon  and  the  Austrian  Emperor  on  the 
voluntary  cession  of  Venice,  and  with  having  en- 
dangered or  minimised  Prussia's  success  by  enabling 
the  Anstrians  to  throw  a  great  part  of  their  Italian 
forces  northwards.  There  was  nothing  of  that  com- 
radeship between  the  Italian  and  the  Prussian  armies 
which  is  acquired  on  the  field  of  battle.  The  personal 
sympathies  of  Victor  Emmanuel  were  strongly  on  the 
side  of  the  French  Emperor ;  and  when,  at  the  close 
of  the  year  1866,  the  French  garrison  was  withdrawn 
from  Rome  in  pursuance  of  the  convention  made  in 
September,  1864,  it  seemed  probable  that  France  and 
Italy  might  soon  unite  in  a  close  alliance.  But  in 
the  following  year  the  attempts  of  the  Garibaldians 
to  overthrow  the  Papal  Government,  now  left  without 
its  foreign  defenders,  embroiled  Napoleon  and  the 
Italian  people.  Napoleon  was  unable  to  defy  the 
clerical  party  in  France;  he  adopted  the  language  of 
menace  in  his  communications  with  the  Italian  Cabinet; 
and  when,  in  the  autonan  of  1867,  the  Garibaldians 


Me  UOtSSN  SUBOPS.  iMT. 

actually  invaded  the  Boman  States,  he  despatched  a 
body  of  French  troops  under  G-eneral  Failiy  to  act  in 
v^tB,B,  support  of  those  of  the  Pope.    An  encounter 

""'  took  place  at  Mentana  on  November  3rd, 

in  which  the  Garibaldians,  after  defeating  the  Papal 
forces,  were  put  to  the  rout  by  General  Pailly.  The 
occupation  of  Civita  Vecchia  was  renewed,  and  in  the 
course  of  the  debates  raised  at  Paris  on  the  Italian 
]0'icy  of  the  Government,  the  Prime  Minister,  M. 
Bouher,  stated,  with  the  most  passionate  empbasis  that, 
come  what  might,  Italy  should  never  possess  itself  of 
Bome.  "  Never,"  he  cried,  "  will  France  tolerate  eueh 
an  outrage  on  its  honour  and  ite  dignity."* 

The  affair  of  Mentana,  the  insolent  and  heartless 
language  in  which  General  Failiy  announced  his  success, 
the  reoccupation  of  Boman  territory  by  French  troops, 
and  the  declaration  made  by  M.  Bouher  in  the  French 
Assembly,  created  wide  and  deep  anger 
itaE^iSSr  in  Italy,  and  made  an  end  for  the  time  of 

all  possibility  of  a  French  alliance.  Napo- 
leon was  indeed,  as  regarded  Italy,  in  an  evil  case. 
By  abandoning  Bome  he  would  have  turned  gainst 
himself  and  his  dynasty  the  wbole  clerical  interest 
in  France,  whose  conHdenco  he  bad  already  te  some 
extent  forfeited  by  his  policy  in  1860;  on  the  other 
hand,  it  was  vain  for  him  to  hope  for  the  friendsbip 
of  Italy  whilst  he  continued  to   bar  the  way  to  the 

■  BoUiui,  Lft  FnuiM  en  1867,  iL  316.  BenoUiii,  t.  547.  Two  hls- 
tmrical  eipressions  belong  to  Mentana :  the  "  NeveT,"  of  M.  Bouher,  uid 
"The  ChosBoputa  have  done  wonders,"  of  Gciteral  Failiy. 


m»^  FRANOa  Atm  ITALY,  409 

folfilment  of  the  nniversal  national  desire.  "With  the  view 
of  arriving  at  some  compromise  he  proposed  a  European 
Conference  on  the  Roman  question ;  but  this  was  re- 
sisted ahove  all  hy  Count  Bismarck,  whose  interest  it 
was  to  keep  the  sore  open ;  and  neither '  England  nor 
Russia  showed  any  anxiety  to.  help  the  Pope's  pro- 
tector out  of  his  difficulties.  Napoleon  sought  by  a 
correspondence  with  Victor  Emmanuel  during  1 868  and 
1869  to  pave  the  way  for  a  defensive  alliance;  but 
Victor  Bmmanuel  was  in  reality  as  well  as  in  name 
a  constitutional  king,  and  probably  could  not,  even  if 
he  had  desired,  have  committed  Italy  to  engagements 
disapproved  by  the  Ministry  and  Parliament.  It  was 
made  clear  to  Napoleon  that  the  evacuation  of  the  Papal 
States  must  precede  any  treaty  of  alliance  between 
France  and  Italy.  Whether  the  Italian  Government 
would  have  been  content  with  a  return  to  the  condi- 
tions of  the  September  Convention,  or  whether  it  made 
the  actual  possession  of  Rome  the  price  of  a  treaty- 
engagement,  is  uncertain ;  but  inasmuch  as  Napulcun 
was  not  at  present  prepared  to  evacuate  Civita  Vecchia,  he 
could  aim  at  nothing  more  than  some  eventual  concert 
when  the  existing  difficulties  should  have  been  removed. 
The  Court  of  Vienna  now  became  the  intermediary 
between  the  two  Powers  who  had  united  against  it  in 
1859.  Count  Beust  was  free  from  the  asso-  luiyuia. 
ciations  which  had  made  any  approach  to 
friendship  with  the  kingdom  of  Victor  Emmanuel  im- 
possible for  his  predecessors.  He  entered  into  nego- 
tiations at  Florence,  which  resulted  in  the  conclusion 


419  MODEBN   SUSOPS.  iHM 

of  an  agreement  lietween  the  Anstrian  and  tbe  Italian 
OoTemments  that  thej  would  act  together  and  guar- 
antee one  uiother's  territories  in  the  event  of  a  war 
between  France  and  Prussia.  This  agreement  was 
made  with  the  assent  of  the  Emperor  Napoleon,  and 
waa  understood  to  be  preparatory  to  an  accord  with 
France  itself;  but  it  was  limited  to  a  defensive  cha- 
racter, and  it  implied  that  any  eventual  concert  with 
France  must  be  arranged  by  the  two  Powers  in  com- 
bination with  one  another.  • 

At  the  beginning  of  1870  the  Emperor  Napoleon 
was  therefore  without  any  more  definite  assurance  of 
support  in  a  war  with  Prussia  than  the  promise  of  the 
Austrian  Sovereign  that  he  would  assist  France  if  at- 
Tn'nttTiiiTf  tacked  by  Prussia  and  Russia  together,  and 
^™^  that  he  would  treat  the  interests  of  France 
as  his  own.  By  withdrawing  his  protection  from  Rome 
Napoleon  had  undoubtedly  a  fair  chance  of  building  up 
this  shadowy  and  remote  engagement  into  a  defensive 
alliance  with  both  Austria  and  Italy.  But  perfect 
clearness  and  resolution  of  purpose,  as  well  as  the  steady 
avoidance  of  all  quarrels  on  mere  incidents,  were  abso- 
lutely indispensable  to  the  creation  and  the  employment 
of  such  a  league  against  the  Power  which  alone  it  could 

•  Son],  i  40.  Hahn.  i.  720.  ImmnlUUlT  after  Uentoiw,  on  Nor.  17, 
1867,  UsEnni  irrolfl  to  BiBnukrok  and  to  the  PruBman  auibasBador  it  Flor- 
eaee,  Connt  Usedom,  etntiDg  that  Napoleon  liad  remdred  to  nutka  ww 
on  Frasais  and  had  proposed  an  aJliaoce  to  Tiotor  Emmannel,  vho  liad 
accepted  it  for  the  price  td  Some.  Uandni  offered  to  employ  reroln- 
tionary  mesas  to  frnatrate  this  plan,  and  aaked  for  monej  and  arma.  Bia- 
niarck  aboired  caution,  bnt  did  not  altogether  diaregard  the  conuniutioatjoa, 
Folitioa  Segrola  Italiana,  p.  339. 


have  in  view  ;  and  Prussia  had  now  littie  reason  to  feai 
any  sncb  exercise  of  statesmanship  on  the  part  of 
Napoleon.  The  solution  of  the  Roman  question,  in 
other  words  the  withdrawal  of  the  French  garrison 
from  Roman  territory,  could  proceed  only  from  some 
stronger  stimulus  than  the  declining  force  of  Napo- 
leon's own  intelligence  and  will  could  now  supply. 
This  fatal  problem  baffled  his  attempts  to  gain  alliances ; 
and  yet  the  isolation  of  France  was  but  half  acknow- 
ledged, but  half  understood ;  and  a  host  of  rash,  vain- 
glorious spirits  impatiently  awaited  the  hour  that  should 
call  them  to  their  revenge  on  Fmssia  for  the  triumphs 
in  which  it  had  not  permitted  France  to  share. 

Meanwhile  on  the  other  side  Count  Bismarck 
advanced  with  what  was  most  essential  in  his  relations 
with  the  States  of  Southern  Germany — the  „_„._ 
completion  of  the  Treaties  of  Alliance  by  **^'** 
conventions  assimilating  the  military  systems  of  these 
States  to  that  of  Prussia.  A  Customs-Parliament  was 
established  for  the  whole  of  Germany,  which,  it  was 
hoped,  woold  be  the  precursor  of  a  National  Assembly 
tmiting  the  North  and  the  South  of  the  Main.  Bat  in 
spite  of  this  military  and  commercial  approximation, 
the  progress  towards  union  was  neither  so  rapid  nor 
so  smooth  as  the  patriots  of  the  North  could  desire. 
There  was  much  in  the  harshness  and  self-assertion  of 
the  Prussian  character  that  repelled  the  less  disciplined 
communities  of  the  South.  Ultramontanism  was  strong 
in  Bavaria ;  and  throughout  the  minor  States  the  most 
advanced  of  the  Liberals  were  opposed  to  a  closer  union 


«U  MOBEBN  BUBOPS.  Wp-m 

with  Berlin,  from  dislike  of  its  absolutist  traditions  and 
the  heavy  hand  of  its  Government.  Thus  the  tendency 
known  as  Particnlarism  was  supported  in  Bavaria  and 
WOrtemberg  by  classes  of  the  population  who  in  most 
respects  were  in  antagonism  to  one  another ;  nor  could 
the  memories  of  the  campaign  of  1866  and  the  oldregard 
for  Austria  be  obliterated  in  a  day.  Bismarct  did  not 
unduly  press  on  the  work  of  consolidation.  He  marked 
and  estimated  the  force  of  the  obstacles  which  too  rapid 
a  development  of  his  national  policy  would  encoanter. 
It  is  possible  that  he  may  even  have  seen  indications 
that  religious  and  other  influences  might  imperil  the 
military  union  which  he  ah-eady  established,  and  that 
he  may  not  have  been  unwilling  to  call  to  his  aid,  as  the 
surest  of  all  preparatives  for  national  union,  the  event 
which  he  had  long  believed  to  be  inevitable  at  some 
time  or  other  in  the  future,  a  war  with  France. 

Since  the  autumn  of  1868  the  throne  of  Spain  had 
been  vacant  in  consequence  of  a  revolution  in  which 
_  General  Prim  had  been  the  leading  actor. 

ThaSpuiA  ° 

oudjdi^anaf      j(.  ^^  qq^  g^^y.  ^^  discovcr  a  successor  for 


the  Bourbon  Isabella ;  and  after  other  can- 
didatures had  been  vainly  projected  it  occurred  to  Prim 
and  his  friends  early  in  1869  that  a  suitable  candidate 
might  be  found  in  Prince  Leopold  of  HohenzoUern- 
Sigmariogen,  whose  elder  brother  had  been  made  Prince 
of  Boumania,  and  whose  father,  Prince  Antony,  had 
been  Prime  Minister  of  Prussia  in  1859,  The  House  of 
Hohenzollem-Sigmaringen  was  sp  distantly  related  to 
tbe  reigning  family  of  Prussia  that   the  name  alone 


nm^m.  THE   SPANISH  OAIWIDATV&B.  113 

preserved  tlie  memory  of  the  connection ;  and  in  actual 
blood-relationship  Prince  Leopold  was  much  more 
nearly  allied  to  the  French  Houses  of  Murat  and 
Beaaharnais.  Bat  the  Sigmaringen  family  was  dis- 
tinctly Prussian  by  interest  aod  association,  and  its 
chief,  Antony,  had  not  only  been  at  the  head  of  the 
Fnissian  Administration  himself,  hut  had,  it  is  said, 
been  the  first  to  suggest  the  appointment  of  Bismarck 
to  the  same  office.  The  caudidatare  of  a  Hohenzollern 
might  reasonably  be  viewed  in  France  as  an  attempt  to 
connect  Prussia  politically  with  Spain ;  and  with  so 
much  reserve  was  this  candidature  at  the  first  handled 
at  Berlin  that,  in  answer  to  inquiries  made  by  Benedetti 
in  the  spriog  of  1869,  the  Secretary  of  State  who 
represented  Count  Bismarck  stated  on  his  word  of 
honour  that  the  candidature  had  never  been  suggested. 
The  affair  was  from  first  to  last  ostensibly  la^ated 
at  Berlin  as  one  with  which  the  Prussian  Government 
was  wholly  unconcerned,  and  in  which  Eing  William 
was  interested  only  as  head  of  the  family  to  which 
Prince  Leopold  belonged.  For  twelve  months  after 
Benedetti's  inquiries  it  appeared  as  if  the  project  had 
been  entirely  abandoned ;  it  was,  however,  revived  in 
the  spring  of  1870,  and  on  the  Srd  of 
Jidy  the  announcement  was  made  at  Paris  o™^!"'*'' 
that  Prince  Leopold  had  consented  to  ac< 
cept  the  Crown  of  Spain  if  the  Cortes  should  confirm 
his  election. 

At  once  there  broke  out  in  the  French  Press  a  storm 
of  indignation  against  Prossia.     The  organs   of    the 


414  MOPEBN  XVBOPS.  mm. 

Ooremment  took  the  lead  in  excitiDg  public  opinion. 
On  the  6th  of  July  the  Duke  of  Qramont,  Foreign 
Minister,  declared  to  the  Legislative  Body  that  the 
attempt  of  a  Foreign  Power  to  place  one  of  its  Princes 
on  the  throne  of  Charles  V.  imperilled  the  interests  and 
the  honour  of  Fnmce,  and  that,  if  Buch  a  contingency 
were  realised,  the  Government  would  fulfil 
DedMmttoB.  its  duty  without  hesitation  and  without 
weakness.  The  violent  and  unsparing  lan- 
guage of  this  declaration,  which  had  been  drawn  up  Kt 
a  Council  of  Ministers  under  the  Emperor's  presidency, 
proved  that  tlie  Cabinet  had  determined  either  to  humi- 
liate Prussia  or  to  take  vengeance  by  arms.  It  was  at 
once  seen  by  foreign  diplomatists,  who  daring  the  pre- 
ceding days  had  been  disposed  to  assist  in  removing  a 
reasonable  subject  of  complaint,  how  little  waa  the 
chance  of  any  peaceable  settlement  after  such  a  public 
challenge  had  been  issued  to  Prussia  in  the  Emperor's 
name.  One  means  of  averting  war  alone  seemed 
possible,  the  voluntary  renunciation  by  Prince  Leopold 
of  the  offered  Crown.  To  obtain  this  renunciation 
became  the  task  of  those  who,  unlike  the  French 
Minister  of  Foreign  Affoirs,  were  anxious  to  preserve 
peace. 

The  parts  that  were  played  at  this  crisis  by  the 
individuals  who  most  influenced  the  Emperor  Napoleon 
are  still  but  imperfectly  known;  but  there  is  no  doubt 
ouirftf.  Mate-    ^^'^^  *^™   *^®  beginning  to  the  end   the 

"''  Duke  of  Gramont,  with  short  intermission^ 

pressed  with  insane  ardour  for  vsx.    The  Minisby  now 


UTU.  TSB  BPANI8H  OANDIDATUSS.  416 

in  oflSce  had  been  called  to  their  places  in  January, 
1870,  after  the  Emperor  had  made  certain  changes  in 
the  constitution  in  a  Libert  direction,  and  had  pro- 
fessed to  tr^Lsfer  the  responsihilitj  of  power  from 
himself  to  a  body  of  advisers  possessing  the  confidence 
of  the  Chamber.  OUivier,  formerly  one  of  the  leaders 
of  the  Opposition,  had  accepted  the  Presidency  of  the 
Cabinet.  His  colleagues  were  for  the  most  part  men 
new  to  official  life,  and  little  able  to  hold  their  own 
against  such  representatives  of  unreformed  Imperialism 
as  the  Duke  of  Gramont  and  the  War-Minister  Lebceuf 
who  sat  beside  them.  Ollivier  himself  was  one  of  the  few 
politicians  in  France  who  understood  that  his  countrymen 
must  be  content  to  see  German  unity  established 
whether  they  liked  it  or  not.  He  was  entirely  averse 
from  war  with  Prussia  on  the  question  which  had  now 
arisen ;  but  the  fear  that  public  opinion  would  sweep 
away  a  Liberal  Ministry  which  hesitated  to  go  all 
lengths  in  patriotic  extravagance  led  him  to  sacrifice  \kis 
own  better  judgment,  and  to  accept  the  responsibility 
for  a  policy  which  in  his  heart  he  disapproved. 
Gramont's  rash  hand  was  given  free  play.  Instructions 
were  sent  to  Benedetti  to  seek  the  King  of  Prussia  at 
Ems,  where  he  was  taking  the  waters,  and  to  demand 
from  him,  as  the  only  means  of  averting  war,  that  he 
shonld  order  the  HohenzoUem  Prince  to  revoke  his 
acc^tanoe  of  the  Crown.  "We  are  in  great  haste," 
Qramont  added,  "  for  we  mast  gain  the  start  in  case 
of  an  unsatisfactory  reply,  and  commence  the  move- 
ment of  troops  by  Saturday  in  order  to  enter  apon  the 


Bvaacttl  ua 

Ki^WUliuiiBt 


418  MODEBN  BUBOPS.  UM 

eatupaigQ  iu  a  fortQigbt.  Be  oa  yonr  guard  against 
an  answer  merely  leaving  the  Prince  of  Eohenzollem 
to  liis  fate,  and  disclaiming  on  the  part  of  the  King 
any  interest  in  his  future."  •  ' 

Benedetti's  first  interview  with  the  King  was  on  the 
9th  of  July.  He  informed  the  King  of  the  emotion 
that  had  been  caused  iu  France  by  the 
candidature  of  the  Hohenzollem  Prince ; 
he  dwelt  on  the  v^ue  to  both  countries  of 
the  friendly  relation  between  France  and  Prussia ;  and. 
while  studiously  avoiding  language  that  might  wound 
or  irritate  the  King,  he  explained  to  him  the  require- 
ments of  the  Government  at  Paris.  The  King  had 
learnt  beforehand  what  would  be  the  substance  of 
Benedetti's  communication.  He  had  probably  been 
surprised  and  grieved  at  the  serious  consequences 
which  Prince  Leopold's  action  had  produced  in 
France ;  and  ^though  he  had  determined  not  to  sub- 
mit to  dictatioD .  from  Paris  or  to  order  Leopold  to 
abandon  his  candidature,  he  had  already,  as  it  seems, 
taken  steps  likely  to  render  the  preservation  of  peace 
more  probable.  At  the  end  of  a  conversation  with  the 
Ambassador,  in  which  he  asserted  his  complete  inde- 
pendence as  head  of  the  family  of  Hohenzollem,  be 
informed  Benedetti  that  he  had  entered  into  com- 
munication  with  Leopold  and  his  father,  and  that 
he  expected  shortly  to  receive  a  despatch  from  Sig- 
maringen.     Benedetti  rightly  judged  that  the  King. 

•  Benodetti,  U*  BUBdon,  p  319,  Jnlf  7.    QFRWOut,  Xrfi  Fmkm  et  U 
Fn»«e.p.6L 


mm.  LEOPOLD  WITSDBAW3.  417 

while  positively  refusing  to  meet  Gramont's  demands, 
was  yet  desiroas  of  finding  some  peaceable  way  out  of 
the  difiSculty ;  and  the  report  of  this  interview  which 
he  sent  to  Taxia  was  really  a  plea  in  favour  of  good  sense 
and  moderation.  Bat  Gramont  was  little  disposed  to 
accept  such  counsels.  "  I  tell  you  plainly,"  he  wrote 
to  Benedetti  on  the  next  day,  "  public  opinion  is  on 
fire,  and  will  leave  us  behind  it.  We  must  begin ;  we 
wait  only  for  your  despatch  to  call  np  the  three 
hundred  thousand  men  who  are  waiting  the  summons. 
-  Write,  telegraph,  somethiog  definite.  If  the  King  will 
not  counsel  the  Prince  of  Hohenzollem  to  resign,  well, 
it  is  immediate  war,  and  in  a  few  days  we  are  on  the 
Khine." 

Nevertheless  Benedetti's  advice  was  not  without  its 
influence  on  the  Emperor  and  his  Ministers.  Napo- 
leon, himself'  wavering  from  hour  to  hour,  now 
inclined  to  the  peace-party,  and  during  the  llth  there 
was  a  pause  in  the  military  preparations  that  had  been 
begun.  On  the  12th  the  efforts  of  disinterested  Govern- 
ments, probably  also  the  suggestions  of  the  King  of 
Prussia  himself,  produced  their  effect.  A 
telegram  was  received  at  Madrid  from  Prince  ^"^ '"''  '*■ 
Antony  stating  that  his  son's  candidature  was  with- 
drawn. A  few  hours  later  Ollivier  announced  the  news 
in  the  Legislative  Chamber  at  Pans,  and  exchanged 
congratulations  with  the  friends  of  peace,  who  con- 
sidered that  the  matter  was  now  at  an  end.  But  this 
paciflc  conclusion  little  suited  either  the  war-party  or 
the  Bonapartistfl  of  the  old  iype,  who  grudged  to  a 


118  MODBBN  BimOPB.  m 

Constitutional  Ministry  so  substantial  a  diplomatio 
success.  Thej  at  once  declared  tbat  the  retirement  of 
Prince  Leopold  was  a  secondary  matter,  and  that  the 
real  question  was  what  guurantees  had  been 
■s^iutminni      received  from  Prussia  a£raiust  a  renewal  of 

danuadad.  ^ 

the  candidature.  Gramont  himself,  in  an 
interview  with  the  Prussian  Ambassador,  Baron  Wertber, 
sketched  a  letter  which  be  proposed  that  King  William 
should  send  to  the  Emperor,  stating  that  in  sanction- 
ing the  candidature  of  Prince  Leopold  he  had  not 
intended  to  offend  the  French,  and  that  in  associating 
himself  with  the  Prince's  .withdrawal  he  desired  that 
all  misunderstandings  should  be  at  au  end  between 
the  two  Governments.  The  despatch  of  Baron 
Werther  conveying  this  proposition  appears  to  have 
deeply  offended  King  William,  whom  it  reacbed  about 
midday  od  the  1 3th.  Benedetti  had  that  morning  met 
the  King  on  the  promenade  at  Ems,  and  had  received 

from  bim  the  promise  tbat  as  soon  as  the 
tbe  Kin«,  letter   which   was   still    on    its  way    from 

J11I7 13.  _  •' 

Sigmaringen  should  arrive  he  would  send 
for  the  Ambassador  in  order  that  he  might  communicate 
its  contents  at  Paris.  The  letter  arrived;  but  Baron 
Werther's  despatch  from  Paris  bad  arrived  before  it ;  and 
instead  of  summoning  Benedetti  as  he  had  promised, 
the  King  sent  one  of  his  aides-de-camp  to  him  with  a 
message  tbat  a  written  communication  hod  been  received 
from  Prince  Leopold  confirming  his  withdrawal,  and  that 
the  matter  was  now  at  an  end.  Benedetti  desired  the 
aide-de-camp  to  inform  the  King  that  he  was  compelled 


un.  BINO  WILUAM  AND  SBNEDETTI.  419 

by  his  instractioQS  to  ask  for  a  guarantee  t^inst  a 
renewal  of  the  candidature.  The  aide-de-camp  did  as 
he  was  requested,  and  brought  back  a  message  that  the 
King  gave  his  entire  approbation  to  the  withdrawal  of 
the  Prince  of  Hohenzollern,  but  that  he  could  do  no 
more.  Benedetti  begged  for  an  audience  with  His 
Majesty.  The  King  replied  that  he  was  compelled  to 
decline  entering  into  further  negotiation,  and  that  he 
bad  said  his  last  word.  Though  the  King  thus  refused 
any  further  discussion,  perfect  courtesy  was  observed  on 
both  sides ;  and  on  the  following  morning  the  King 
and  the  Ambassador,  who  were  both  leaving  Ems,  took 
leave  of  one  another  at  the  railway  station  with  the 
Ofiual  marks  of  respect. 

That  the  guarantee  which  the  French  Government 
had  resolved  to  demand  would  not  be  given  was  now 
pepffctly  certain ;  yet,  with  the  candidature  of  Prince 
Leopold  fairly  extinguished,  it  was  still  possible  that 
the  cooler  heads  at  Paris  might  carry  the  day,  and  that 
the  Government  would  stop  short  of  declaring  war  on  a 
point  on  which  the  unanimous  judgment  of  the  other 
Powers  declared  it  to  be  in  tlie  wrong.  But  Count 
Bismarck  was  determined  not  to  let  the  French  escape 
lightly  from  the  quarrel.  He  had  to  do  with  an  enemy 
who  by  his  own  folly  had  come  to  the  brink  of  an 
aggressive  war,  and,  far  from  facilitating  his  retreat,  it 
was  Bismarck's  policy  to  lure  him  over  the  p_iji_jj_-, 
precipice.  Not  many  hours  after  the  last  SJ^'eSIjbi, 
message  had  passed  between  King  William 
and  Benedetti,  a  telegram  w^s  officially  published  aX 

B  B  % 


OB  MODEBN  SUBOPX.  Mm 

Berlin,  statiog,  in    terms  so  brief  as  to  eonrej  the 

impression  of  an  actual  insult,  that  the  King  had  refused 
to  see  the  French  Ambassador,  and  had  informed  him 
by  an  aide-de-camp  that  he  had  nothiDg  mora  to  com- 
municate to  him..  This  tel^ram  was  sent  to  the  repre- 
nentatives  of  Prussia  at  most  of  the  European  Courts,  and 
to  its  agents  in  every  German  capital.  Karratives  in- 
stantly gained  currency,  aad  were  not  contradicted  by 
the  Prussian  Qovernment,  that  Benedetti  had  forced 
himself  upon  the  King  on  the  promenade  at  Ems,  and 
that  in  the  presence  of  a  lai^e  company  the  Sing  had 
turned  his  back  upon  the  Ambassador.  The  publication 
of  the  alleged  telegram  from  Ems  became  known  in 
Paris  on  the  14th.  On  that  day  the  Council  of 
Ministers  met  three  times.  At  the  first  meeting  the 
advocates  of  peace  were  still  in  the  majority ;  in  the 
afternoon,  as  the  news  from  Berlin  and  the  fictions  de- 
scribing the  insult  offered  to  the  French  Ambassador 
spread  abroad,  the  agitation  in  Paris  deepened,  and  the 
Council  decided  upon  calling  up  the  Reserves ;  yet  the 
Emperor  himself  seemed  still  disposed  for  peace.  It 
was  in  the  interval  between  the  second  and  the  third 
meeting  of  the  Council,  between  the  hours  of  six 
and  ten  in  the  evening,  that  Napoleon  finally  gare 
w.u'  d»iJfd  M  wj^y  before  the  threats  and  importunities 
'''™'  of  the    war-party.      The  Empress,    fanati- 

cally anxious  for  the  overthrow  of  a  great   Protestant 
Power,  passionately  eager  for  the  military  glory  which 
alone  could  insure   the  Crown  to   her  son,  won  the 
■umpb  whi(^  she  ffV  SQ  bitterly  to  rue.    At  the  third 


tan.  FSAUOB  BBOLASSa  WAS.  421 

meeting  of  the  CooDcil,  held  sbortlj  before  midnight, 
the  vote  was  given  for  war. 

In  Gennany  this  decision  had  been  expected ;  jet  it 
made  a  deep  impression  not  only  on  the  G-erman  people 
but  on  Europe  at  large  that,  when  the  declaration  of  war 
was  submitted  to  the  French  Legislative  Body  in  the 
form  of  a  demand  for  supplies,  no  single  voice  was 
raised  to  condemn  the  war  for  its  criminality  and 
injustice :  the  arguments  which  were  urged  against 
it  by  M.  Thiers  and  others  were  that  the  Government 
bad  fixed  upon  a  bad  cause,  and  that  the  occasion  was 
inopportune.  Whether  the  majority  of  the  Assembly 
really  desired  war  is  even  now  matter  of  doubt.  But 
the  clamour  of  a  hundred  madmen  within  its  walls. 
the  ravings  of  journalists  and  incendiaries,  who  at  such 
a  time  are  to  the  true  expression  of  public  opinion  what 
the  Spanish  Inquisition  was  to  the  Christian  religion, 
paralysed  the  will  and  the  understanding  of  less  in- 
fatuated men.  Ten  votes  aloue  were  given  in  the 
Assembly  gainst  the  grant  demanded  for  war;  to 
Europe  at  lai^e  it  went  out  that  the  crime  and  the 
madness  was  that  of  France  as  a  nation.  Yet 
Ollivier  and  many  of  his  colleagues  up  to  the  last 
moment  disapproved  of  the  war,  and  consented  to 
it  only  because  they  believed  that  the  nation  would 
otherwise  rush  into  hostilities  under  a  reactionary 
Ministry  who  would  serve  Prance  worse  than  them- 
selvra.  They  discovered  when  it  was  too  late  that  the 
supposed  national  impulse  which  they  had  thought 
iiresistible  was  but  the  outcry  o£  a  noisy  minority.    Tho 


ttS  MODERN  SUBOPS.  M«i 

reports  of  their  own  officers  informed  them  that  in  six- 
teen  alone  out  of  the  eighty-seven  Departments  of 
France  was  tbe  war  popular.  In  the  other  seventj-one 
it  was  accepted  either  with  hesitation  or  regret.* 

How  vast  were  the  forces  which  the  North  German 
Oonfederation  could  bring  into  the  field  was  wdl 
known  to  Napoleon's  Government.  Benedetti  had 
bitufona**  ^^P*"  ^'^  employers  thoroughly  infomied 
'"'"'"*'  of  the  pn^fress  of  the  North  German  mili- 
tary organisation ;  he  had  warned  them  that  the  South 
German  States  would  most  certainly  act  with  the 
North  against  a  foreign  assailant;'  he  had  described 
with  great  accuracy  and  great  penetration  the  nature 
of  the  tie  that  existed  between  Berlin  and  St.  Peters- 
burg, a  tie  which  was  close  enough  to  secure  for  Prussia 
the  goodwill,  and  in  certain  contingeneies  the  armed 
support,  of  Russia,  while  it  was  loose  enough  not  to 
involve  Prussia  in  any  Muscovite  enterprise  that  would 
briog  upon  it  the  hostility  of  England  and  Austria^ 
The  utmost  force  which  the  iVench  miUtary  ad- 
ministration reckoned  on  placing  in  the  field  at  the 
beginning  of  the  campaign  was  two  hundred  and  fifty 
thousand  men,  to  be  raised  at  the  end  of  three  weeks  by 
about  fifty  thousand  more.  The  Prussians,  even  without 
reckoning  on  any  assistance  from  Southern  Germany, 
and  after  allowing  for  three  army-corps  that  might  be 
needed  to  watch  Austria  and  Denmark,  could  begin  the 
campaign  with  three  hundred  and  thirty  thousand. 
Army  to  army,  the  French  thus  stood  according  to  the 
"  Sorel,  Histdn  DiploiDftti^ae,  i.  197.    (  .niii'k' 


reckoning  of  their  own  War  Office  ontnximberecl  at  the 
outset;  but  Lebceuf,  f^  War-Minkter,  imagined  that 
the  Foreign  Office  had  made  Bore  of  alii-  ^ipeowi  nm. 
ances,  and  that  a  great  part  of  the  Prussian  ""°*  ''*'™'^ 
Army  would  not  be  free  to  act  on  the  western  frontier. 
Napoleon  had  in  fact  pushed  forward  his  negotiations 
with  Austria  and  Italy  from  the  time  that  war  became 
imminent.  Count  Beust,  while  clearly  laying  it  down 
that  Austria  was  not  bound  to  follow  France  into  a 
war  made  at  its  own  pleasure,  nevertheless  felt  some 
anxiety  lest  France  and  Prussia  should  settle  their 
differences  at  Austria's  expense ;  moreover  from  the 
■victory  of  Napoleon,  asBisted  in  any  degree  by  himself, 
he  could  fairly  hope  for  the  restoration  of  Austria's 
ascendency  in  Germany  and  the  undoing  AortrUp™- 
of  the  work  of  1866.  It  was  determined  *■***■ 
at  a  Council  held  at  Vienna  on  the  18th  of  July  that 
Austria  should  for  the  present  be  neutral  if  Russia 
should  not  enter  the  war  on  the  side  of  Prussia ;  but 
this  neutrality  was  nothing  more  than  a  sta^  towards 
alliance  with  France  if  at  the  end  of  a  certain  brief 
period  the  army  of  Napoleon  should  have  penetrated 
into  Southern  Germany.  In  a  private  despatch  to 
the  Austrian  Ambassador  at  Paris  Count  Beust 
pointed  out  that  the  immediate  participation  of 
Austria  in  the  war  would  bring  Russia  into  the 
field  on  King  William's  side.  "  To  keep  Russia 
neutral,"  he  wrote,  "  till  the  season  is  sufficiently  ad- 
vance to  prevent  the  concentration  of  its  troops  must 
be  at  present  onr  object;  but  this  neutrality  is  nothing 


4H  MODERN  BUBOrB.  um. 

TDore  than  a  means  for  arriTing  at  the  real  end  of  our 
policy,  the  only  means  for  completing  our  preparations 
withoat  exposing  ourselves  to  premature  attack  hy 
ProBsia  or  Eossia."  He  added  that  Austria  had' 
already  entered  into  a  negotiation  with  Italy  with  a 
view  to  the  armed  mediation  of  the  two  Powers,  and 
strongly  recomAiended  the  Emperor  to  place  the  Italians 
in  possession  of  Bome.* 

Negotiatdons  were  now  pressed  forward  between  Paris, 
Florence,  and  Vienna,  for  the  conclusion  of  a  triple 
alliance.  Of  the  course  taken  by  these  negotiations  con- 
nu(«.AuM>,  tradictory  accounts  are  given  by  the  persons 
•°*^'^'  concerned  in  them.  According  to  Prince 
Kapoleon,  Victor  Emmanuel  demanded  possession  of 
Rome  and  this  was  refused  to  him  by  the  French 
Emperor,  in  consequence  of  which  the  project  of  alliance 
failed.  According  to  the  Duke  of  Gramont,  no  more 
was  demanded  by  Italy  than  the  return  to  the  condi- 
tions of  tlie  September  Convention  ;  this  was  agreed  to 
by  tbe  Emperor,  and  it  was  in  pursuance  of  this  agree- 
ment that  the  PapiJ  States  were  evacuated  by  their 
French  garrison  on  the  2nd  of  August.  Throughout 
the  last  fortnight  of  July,  after  war  had  actually  been 
declared,  there  was,  if  the  statement  of  Gramont  is  to 
be  trusted,  a  contiauous  interchange  of  notes,  projects, 
and  telegrams  between  the  three  Qovemments.  The 
difficulties  raised  by  Italy  and  Austria  were  speedily 
removed,  and  though  some  weeks  were  needed  by  these 
Powers  for  their  military  preparations,  Napoleon  was 
•Hdin.ii.69.    Sorel,!  236.        (^;yy,.[i^ 


ISM.  AVBTRIA  AND  ITALY.  m 

definitely  assured  of  their  armed  support  in  case  of  his 
preliminary  success.  It  was  agreed  that  Austria  and 
Italy,  assuming  at  the  first  the  position  of  armed 
neutrality,  should  jointly  present .  an  ultimatum  to 
Prussia  in  September  demanding  the  exact  perform- 
ance of  the  Treaty  of  Pr^ue,  and,  failing  its  com- 
pliance with  this  summons  in  the  sense  understood  by 
its  enemies,  that  the  two  Powers  would  immediately 
declare  war,  their  armies  taking  the  field  at  latest  on 
the  16tb  of  September.  Xh^-t  Russia  would  in  that 
case  assist  Prussia  was  well  known;  but  it  would  seem 
that  Count  Beust  feared  little  from  his  northern  enemy 
in  an  autamn  campaign.  The  draft  of  the  Treaty 
between  Italy  and  Austria  had  actually,  according  to 
Gramont's  statement,  been  accepted  by  the  two  latter 
Powers,  and  received  its  last  amendments  in  a  nego- 
tiation between  the  £mperor  Napoleon  and  an  Italian 
envoy.  Count  Vimercati,  at  Metz.  Vimercati  reached 
Florence  with  the  amended  draft  on  the  4th  of  August, 
and  it  was  expected  that  the  Treaty  would  be  signed 
on  the  following  day.  When  that  day  came  it  saw  the 
forces  of  the  French  Empire  dashed  to  pieces.* 

Preparations    for    a    war    with    France    bad    long 
occupied  the  general  stafE  at  Berlin.     Before  the  winter 
of  1868  a  memoir  h^  been  drawn  up  by 
General  Holtke,  containing  plans  for  the 
concentration  of  the  whole  of  the  German  forces,  for 


*  FrinM  NapoUon.  in  Berne  dea  Denx  ICoudes,  April  1,  1878; 
Grunout^  in  Berne  de  rranoe,  April  17, 1878.  (Signed  Andreas  Memaii 
OUivier,  L'£gUsc  et  I'^tat,  ii  473.    Sorel.  L  21S. 


tSt  itODSBN  SUROPA  Ml» 

the  formatioD  of  each  of  the  armies  to  be  employed, 
and  the  positions  to  be  occupied  at  the  outset  by  each 
corps.  On  the  basis  of  this  memoir  the  arrangements 
for  the  transport  of  each  corps  from  its  dep5fc  to  the 
frontier  had  subsequently  been  worked  out  in  such 
minute  detail  that  when,  on  the  16th  of  July,  Xing 
William  gave  the  order  for  mobilisation,  nothing  re- 
mained but  to  insert  in  the  railway  time-tables  and 
marching-ordera  the  day  on  which  the  movement  was 
to  commence.  This  minyteness  of  detail  extended, 
however,  only  to  that  part  of  Moltke's  plan  which 
related  to  the  assembling  and  first  placing  of  the 
troops.  The  events  of  the  campaign  could  not  thus  be 
arranged  and  tabulated  beforehand;  only  the  general 
object  and  design  could  be  laid  down.  That  the  French 
would  throw  themselves  with  great  rapidity  upon 
Southern  Germany  was  considered  probable.  The 
armies  of  Baden,  Wiirtemberg,  and  Bavaria  were  too 
weak,  the  military  centres  of  the  North  were  too  far 
distant,  for  effective  resistance  to  be  made  in  this  quarter 
to  the  first  blows  of  the  invader.  Moltke  therefore 
recommended  that  the  Southern  troops  should  with- 
draw from  their  own  States  and  move  northwards  to 
join  those  of  Prussia  in  the  Palatinate  or  on  the 
Middle  Eliine,  so  that  the  entire  forces  of  Germany 
should  be  thrown  upon  the  flank  or  rear  of  the  invader; 
while,  in  the  event  of  the  French  not  thus  taking  the 
offensive,  France  itself  was  to  be  invaded  by  Wie  col- 
lective strength  of  Germany  along  the  line  from  Saar- 
briicken  to  Landau,  and  its  armies  were  to  be  opt  off 


Ml  aSBltAN  UOBHUBATlOn.  4811 

from  tlieir   communications    with  Paris   by  vigorous 
moTements  of  tbe  invader  in  a  northerly  direction.* 

The  military  o^anisation  of  Qermany  is  based  on 
the  division  of  the  country  into  districts,  each  of  which 
famishes  at  its  own  depot  a  small  bnt  complete  army. 
The  nucleos  of  each  such  corps  exists  in  time  of  peace, 
with  its  own  independent  artillery,  stores, 
and  material  of  war.  On  tbe  order  for 
mobilisation  being  given,  every  man  liable  to  military 
Bervice,  but  not  actually  serving,  joins  tbe  regiment 
to  which  be  locally  belongs,  and  in  a  given  number  of 
days  each  corps  is  ready  to  take  tbe  field  in  full  strength. 
The  completion  of  each  corps  at  its  own  dep6t  is  tbe 
first  stf^e  in  tbe  preparation  for  a  campaign.  Not  till 
ibis  is  effected  does  the  movement  of  troops  towards  tbe 
frontier  begin.  Tbe  time  necessary  for  tbe  first  act  of 
preparation  was,  like  that  to  be  occupied  in  transport, 
accurately  determined  by  the  Prussian  War  OtGce.  It 
resulted  from  General  Moltke's  calculations  that,  the 
order  of  mobilisation  having  been  given  on  tbe  16tb  of 
July,  the  entire  army  with  which  it  was  intended  to 
begin  the  campaign  would  be  collected  and  in  position 
ready  to  cross  tbe  frontier  on  tbe  4th  of  August,  if  tbe 
French  should  not  have  taken  up  the  offensive  before 
that  day.  But  as  it  was  apprehended  that  part  at  least 
of  the  French  army  would  be  thrown  into  Germany 
before  that  date,  the  westward  movement  of  the  German 
troops  stopped  short  at  a  considerable  distance  from  the 

*  Der  Deataeh  TmudeiHehe  Krieg,  1870-71  (FnsBun  Goietal  Staff), 
L72. 


jSi  XODSBN  SUBOPS.  UM 

border,  in  order  thai  the  troops  first  arriving  miglit  not 
be  exposed  to  the  attack  of  a  superior  force  before  their 
supports  should  be  at  hand.  On  the  actual  frontier 
there  was  placed  only  the  handful  of  men  required  for 
reconnoitring,  and  for  checking  the  enemy  during  the 
few  hours  that  would  be  necessary  to  guard  against  the 
effect  of  a  surprise. 

The  French  Emperor  was  aware  of  the  numerical 
inferiority  of  his  army  to  that  of  Prussia;  he  hoped, 
nitFraiA  however,  by  extreme  rapidity  of  movement 
to  peuetrate  Southern  Germany  before  the 
Prussian  army  could  assemble,  and  so,  while  forcing 
the  Southern  Governments  to  neutrality,  to  meet  on  the 
Upper  Danube  the  assisting  forces  of  Italy  and  Austria. 
It  was  his  design  to  concentrate  a  hundred  and  fifty 
thousand  men  at  Metz,  a  hundred  thousand  at  Stras- 
burg,  and  with  these  armies  united  to  cross  the  Rhine 
into  Baden  ;  while  a  third  army,  which  was  to  assemble 
at  Chalons,  protected  the  noi*th<eastem  frontier  against 
an  advance  of  the  Prussians.  A  few  days  after  the 
declaration  of  war,  while  the  German  corps  were  still  at 
their  depots  in  the  interior,  considerable  forces  were 
massed  round  Metz  and  Strasburg.  All  Europe  listened 
for  the  rush  of  the  invader  and  the  first  swift  notes  of 
triumph  from  a  French  array  beyond  the  Rhine;  but 
week  after  week  passed,  and  the  silence  was  still  un- 
broken. Stories,  incredible  to  those  who  first  heard 
them,  yet  perfectly  trae,  reached  the  German  frontieiv 
stations  of  actual  famine  at  the  advanced  posts  of  the 
enemy,  and  of  French   soldiers   made   priscHieiB  white 


Ufa.  BTATE  OF  THE  FBSNOB  ARMIES.  4S9 

diggiog  m  potato-fields  to  keep  themselTes  alive.  That 
Napoleon  was  less  ready  than  had  been  anticipated 
became  clear  to  all  the  world ;  bat  none  yet  imagined 
the  revelations  which  each  successive  day  was  bringing 
at  the  headquarters  of  the  French  armies.  Absence 
of  whole  regiments  that  fignred  in  the  official  order  of 
hattle,  defective  transport^  stores  missing  or  congested, 
made  it  impossible  even  to  attempt  the  inroad  into 
Southern  Germany  within  the  date  up  to  which  it 
had  any  prospect  of  success.  The  design  was  aban- 
doned, yet  not  in  time  to  prevent  the  troops  that  were 
hurrying  from  the  interior  from  being  sent  backwards 
and  forwards  according  as  the  authorities  had,  or  had 
not,  heard  of  the  change  of  plan.  Napoleon  saw  that 
a  Prussian  force  was  gathering  on  the  Middle  Rhine 
which  it  would  be  madness  to  leave  on  his  flank ;  he 
ordered  his  own  commanders  to  operate  on  the  corre- 
sponding line  of  the  Lauter  and  the  Soar,  and  despatched 
isolated  divisions  to  the  very  frontier,  still  uncertain 
whether  even  in  this  direction  he  would  be  able  to  act 
on  the  ofiensive,  or  whether  nothing  now  remained  to 
him  but  to  resist  the  invasion  of  France  by  a  superior 
enemy.  Ollivier  had  stated  in  the  Assembly  that  he 
and  his  coUei^es  entered  upon  the  war  with  a  light 
heart ;  he  might  have  added  that  they  entered  upon  it 
with  bandaged  eyes.  The  Ministers  seem  actually  not 
to  have  taken  the  trouble  to  exchange  explanations  with 
one  another.  Lehceuf,  the  War-Minister,  had  taken 
it  for  granted  that  Qramont  had  made  arrangements 
with  Austria  which  would  compel  the  Prussians  to  ke' 


4M  MODERN  SVBOPS.  VNl 

a  large  part  of  their  forces  in  the  interior.  Gramont,  in 
forcing  on  the  qaarrel  with  Prussia,  and  in  hia  nego- 
tiations with  Anstria,  had  taken  it  for  granted  that 
Xiebosof  could  win  a  Beries  of  victories  at  the  outset 
in  Southern  G-ermany.  The  Emperor,  to  whom  alone 
the  entire  data  of  the  military  and  the  diplomatic 
services  of  France  were  open,  was  incapable  of  exer- 
tion or  scrutiny,  purposeless,  distracted  with  pain,  half- 
imbecile. 

That  the  Imperial  military  administration  was 
rotten  to  the  core  the  terrible  events  of  the  next  few 
weeks  sufficiently  showed.      Men  were   in  high  place 

whose  antecedents  would  have  shMned  the 
^j^  better  kind  of  brigand.     The  deficiencies  of 

the  army  were  made  worse  by  the  diversion 
of  public  funds  to  private  necessities ;  the  looseness, 
the  vulgar  splendour,  the  base  standards  of  judgment 
of  the  Imperial  Court  infected  each  branch  of  the  public 
services  of  France,  and  worked  perhaps  not  least  on  those 
who  were  in  military  command.  But  the  catastrophe 
of  1870  seemed  to  those  who  witnessed  it  to  tell  of 
more  than  the  vileness  of  an  administration ;  in  England, 
not  less  than  in  Germany,  voices  of  influence  spoke 
of  the  doom  that  had  overtaken  the  depravity  of  a 
sunken  nation ;  of  the  triumph  of  simple  manliness,  of 
God-fearing  virtue  itself,  in  the  victories  of  the  German 
army.  There  may  have  been  truth  in  this;  yet  it 
would  require  a  nice  moral  discernment  to  appraise  the 
exact  d^eneracy  of  the  French  of  1870  from  the  French 
of  1 854  who  hombled  Bussia,  or  from  the  French  of 


UMi  OAVSES  OP  aHIOiAIT  BVCOSSS.  431 

1859  wbo  triumphed  at  Solferino ;  and  it  would  need 
aveiy  comprebeDsire  acquaintance  with  the  lower  forms 
of  human  pleasure  to  judge  in  what  degree  the  sinful- 
ness of  Paris  exceeds  the  sinfulness  of  Berlin.  Had  the 
French  been  as  strict  a  race  as  tbe  Spartans  who  fell  at 
Thermopylae,  as  devoat  as  the  Tyrolese  who  perished 
at  Koni^ratz,  it  is  quite  certain  that,  with  the  num- 
bers which  took  the  field  against  G-ermany  in  1870, 
with  Napoleon  III.  at  the  head  of  affairs,  and  the  actual 
generals  of  1870  in  command,  the  armies  of  France 
could  not  have  escaped  destruction. 

The  main  cause  of  the  disparity  of  France  and  Ger- 
many in  1870  was  in  truth  that  Prussia  had  had  from 
1863  to  1866  a  Government  so  strong  as  to  cmwofooiniui 
be  able  to  force  upon  its  subjects  its  own  ""™^ 

gigantic  scheme  of  military  organisation  in  defiance  of  tbe 
votes  of  Parliament  and  of  the  national  will.  In  1866 
Prussia,  with  a  population  of  nineteen  millions,  brought 
actually  into  the  field  three  hundred  and  fifty  thousand 
men,  or  one  in  fifty-four  of  its  inhabitants.  Tliere  was 
no  other  government  in  Europe,  with  the  possible 
exception  of  Russia,  which  could  have  imposed  upon  its 
subjects,  without  risking  its  own  existence,  so  vast  a 
burden  of  military  service  as  that  implied  in  this  strength 
of  the  fighting  array.  Napoleon  III.  at  the  height  of 
his  power  could  not  have  done  so ;  and  when  after 
Koniggratz  he  endeavoured  to  raise  the  forces  of  France 
to  an  equality  with  those  of  the  rival  Power  by  a 
system  which  would  have  brought  about  one  in 
seventy  of    tbe    population    into  the  field,  bis  own 


4tt  UODSBIF  SnSOPa.  MH 

nominees  in  the  Legislative  Body,  nnder  pressure  of 
poblio  opinion,  so  weakened  the  scheme  that  the  effective 
numbers  of  the  armj  remained  little  more  than  they 
were  before.  The  true  parallel  to  the  Qerman  victories 
of  1870  is  to  be  found  in  the  victories  of  the  French 
Committee  of  Fublic  Safety  in  1794  and  in  those  of  the 
first  Napoleon.  A  government  so  powerful  as  to  bend 
the  entire  resources  of  the  State  to  military  ends  will, 
whether  it  is  one  of  democracy  run  mad,  or  of  a  crowned 
soldier  of  fortune,  or  of  an  ancient  monarchy  throwing 
new  vigour  into  its  traditional  system  and  policy,  crush 
in  the  moment  of  impacbcommunitiesof  equal  or  greater 
resources  in  which  a  variety  of  rival  influences  limit 
and  control  the  central  power  and  subordinate  military 
to  other  interests.  It  was  so  in  the  triumphs  of  the 
Reign  of  Terror  over  the  First  Coalition  ;  it  was  so  in 
the  triumphs  of  King  William  over  Austria  and  France. 
But  the  parallel  between  the  founders  of  German 
nnity  and  the  organisers  of  victory  after  1793  extends 
no  farther  than  to  the  sources  of  their  success.  Ag- 
gression and  adventure  have  not  been  the  sequels  of 
the  war  of  1870.  The  vnst  armaments  of  Prussia  were 
created  in  order  to  establish  German  union  under  the 
House  of  Hohenzollern,  and  they  have  been  employed 
for  DO  other  object.  It  is  the  triumph  of  statesmanship, 
and  it  has  been  the  glory  of  Prince  Bismarck,  after  thus 
reaping  the  fruit  of  a  well-timed  homage  to  the  God  of 
Battles,  to  know  how  to  quit  his  shrine. 

At  the  end  of  July,  twelve  days  after  the  formal 
declaration  of  war,  the  gathering  forces  of  the  Germans, 


NNl  ok  TBS  FBOUTIBR.  4S3 

over  three  hundred  and  eighty  thousand  strong,  were 
BtiU  at  some  distance  hehind  the  Lauter  and  the  Saar. 
Napoleon,  apparently  without  any  clear  design,  had 
phiced  certain  hodies  of  troops  actually  'n,tiaMai 
on  the  frontier  at  Forbach,  WeiBSenburg,  ^'^'*' 
and  elsewhere,  while  other  troops,  raising  the  whole 
number  to  about  two  hundred  and  fifty  thousajid,  lay 
round  Metz  and  Strashurg,  and  at  points  between  these 
and  the  most  advanced  positions.  The  reconnoitring 
of  the  small  German  detachments  on  the  frontier  was 
conducted  with  extreme  enei^y :  the  Frencb  appear  to 
have  made  no  reconnaissances  at  all,  for  when  they 
determined  at  last  to  discover  what  was  facing  them 
at  Saarbr&cten,  they  advanced  with  twenty-five  thou- 
sand men  against  one-tenth  of  that  number.  On  the 
2nd  of  Augast  Frossard's  corps  from  Forbach  moved 
upon  Saarbriicken  with  the  Emperor  in  person.  The 
garrison  was  driven  out,  and  the  town  bombarded,  but 
even  now  the  reconnaissance  was  not  continued  beyond 
the  bridge  across  the  Saar  which  divides  the  BtuMtckm. 
two  parts  of  the  town.  Forty-eight  hours  *■*■  *" 
later  the  alignment  of  the  German  forces  in  their  in- 
vading order  was  completed,  and  all  was  ready  for  an 
offensive  campaign.  The  central  army,  commanded  by 
Prince  Frederick  Charles,  spreading  east  and  west 
behind  Saarbriicken,  touched  on  its  right  the  northern 
army  commanded  by  General  Steinmetz,  on  its  left  the 
soathem  army  commanded  by  the  Crown  Prince,  which 
covered  the  frontier  of  the  Palatinate,  and  included  the 
troops  of  Bavaria  and  Wurtemberg.  The  general 
c  c 


431  MODBiar  SUEOPS.  IM 

direction  of  the  three  armies  yras  thus  from  north- 
west to  south-east.  As  the  line  of  invasion  was  to 
be  nearly  due  west,  it  was  necessaiy  that  the  first  step 
forwaids  should  be  made  by  the  army  of  the  Crown 
Prince  in  order  to  bring  it  more  nearly  to  a  level  with 
the  northern  corps  in  the  march  into  France.  On  the 
4th  of  August  the  Crown  Prince  crossed  the  Al- 
satian frontier  and  moved  against  Weissenbui^.  The 
French  General  Douay,  who  was  posted  here  with 
about  twelve  thousand  men,  was  neither  reinforced  nor 
bidden  to  retire.  His  troops  met  the  attack  of  an 
enemy  many  times  more  numerous  with  great  courage ; 
but  the  struggle  was  a  hopeless  one,  and  after  several 
hours  of  severe  fighting  the  Germans  were 
masters  of  the  field.  Douay  fell  in  the 
battle ;  his  troops  frustrated  an  attempt  made  to  cat 
ofi  their  retreat,  and  fell  back  southwards  towards  the 
corps  of  HcMahon,  which  lay  about  ten  miles  behind 
them. 

The  Crown  Prince  marched  on  in  search  of  his 
enemy.  McMahon,  who  could  collect  only  forty- 
five  thousand  men,  desired  to  retreat  until  he  could 
gain  some  support;  but  the  Emperor,  tormented  by 
fears  of  the  political  consequences  of  the  invasion,  in- 
sisted upon  his  giving  battle.  He  drew  up 
on  the  hills  about  Worth,  almost  on  the 
spot  where  in  1793  Heche  had  overthrown  the  armies 
of  the  Pirst  Coalition.  On  the  6th  of  August  the 
leading  divisions  of  the  Crown  Prince,  about  a  hundred 
thousand  strong,  were  within  striking  distance.     Th« 


um  WORTB.  435 

superiority  of  the  GermaDS  in  nambers  was  so  great 
that  McMahon's  army  might  apparently  have  been 
captured  or  destroyed  with  far  less  loss  than  actually 
took  place  if  time  had  been  given  for  the  movements 
which  the  Crown  Prince's  staff  had  in  view,  and  for 
the  employment  of  his  full  strength.  But  the  im- 
petnosity  of  divisional  leaders  on  the  morning  of  the 
6th  brought  on  a  general  engagement.  The  resistance 
of  the  French  was  of  the  most  determined  character. 
"With  one  more  army-corps — and  the  corps  of  General 
Failly  was  expected  to  arrive  on  the  field — it  seemed  as 
if  the  Germans  might  yet  be  beaten  back.  Bat  each 
hour  brought  addition^  forces  into  action  in  the  attack, 
while  the  French  commander  looked  in  vain  for '  the 
reinforcements  that  could  save  him  from  min.  At 
length,  when  the  last  desperate  chains  of  the 
Cuirassiers  had  shattered  f^ainst  the  fire  of  cannon 
and  needle-guns,  and  the  vill^e  of  FroschwiUer,  the 
centre  of  the  French  position,  bad  been  stormed  house 
by  house,  the  entire  army  broke  and  fied  in  disorder. 
Nine  thoasand  prisoners,  thirty-three  cannon,  fell  into 
the  bands  of  the  conquerors.  The  Germans  had  lost 
ten  thousand  men,  bnt  they  bad  utterly  destroyed 
McMahon's  army  as  an  organised  force.  Its  remnuit 
dis&ppeared  from  the  scene  of  warfare,  escaping  by  the 
western  roads  in  the  direction  of  Ch&lons,  where  first 
it  was  restored  to  some  degree  of  order.  The  Crown 
Prince,  leaving  troops  behind  him  to  beleaguer  the 
smaller  Alsatian  fortresses,  marched  on  untroubled 
through  the  northern  Vosges,  and  descended  into  the 

c  c  i 


iH  itODESN  SUSOPB.  tna 

open  country  about  Lnn^nlle  and  Nancy,  unfortified 
towns  which  could  ofier  no  resistance  to  the  passage  of 
an  enemy. 

On  the  same  day  that  the  battle  of  "WBiih  was 

fought,  the  leading  columns  of  the  armies  of  Steinmetz 

and    Prince  Frederick  Charles  crossed  the  frontier  at 

Saarbriicken.      Frossard's  corps,   on  the  news   of  the 

-j,,__         defeat  at  Weissenhurg,  had  withdrawn  to 

"'■'■  its  earlier  positions  between  Forbach  and 
the  frontier :  it  held  the  steep  hills  of  Spicheren  that 
look  down  upon  Saarbrucken,  and  the  woods  that  flank 
the  high  road  where  this  passes  from  Germany  into 
France.  Aj  at  Worth,  it  was  not  intended  that  any 
general  attack  should  be  made  on  the  6th  ;  a  delay  of 
twenty-four  hours  would  have  enabled  the  Germans  to 
envelop  or  crush  Frossard's  corps  with  an  overwhelming 
force.  But  the  leaders  of  the  foremost  regiments  threw 
themselves  impatiently  upon  the  French  whom  they 
found  before  them ;  other  brigades  hurried  up  to  the 
sound  of  the  cannon,  until  the  struggle  took  the  pro- 
portion of  a  battle,  and  after  hours  of  fluctuating 
success  the  heights  of  Spicheren  were  carried  by 
successive  rushes  of  the  infantry  full  in  the  enemy's 
fire.  Why  Prossard  was  not  reinforced  has  never  been 
explained,  for  several  French  divisions  lay  at  no  great 
distfuice  westward,  and  the  position  was  so  strong 
that,  if  a  pitched  battle  was  to  be  fought  anywhere 
east  of  Metz,  few  better  points  could  have  been  chosen. 
IJut,  like  Douay  at  Weissenhurg,  Frossard  was  left  to 
struggle  alone   against  whatever  forces  the    Germana 


unl  NAFOLSON  at  METZ.  4S3 

might  throw  npon  him.  Napoleon,  who  directed  the 
operations  of  tlie  French  armies  from  Metz,  appears  to 
have  been  now  incapable  of  appreciating  the  simplest 
military  necessities,  of  guarding  against  the  most 
obvioas  dangers.  Helplessness,  infatuation  ruled  the 
miserable  hours. 

The  impression  made  upon  Europe  by  the  battles 
of  the  6th  of  Angost  corresponded  to  the  greatness  of 
their  actual  militaiy  effects.  There  was  an  end  to 
all  thoughts  of  the  alliance  of  Austria  and  Italy  with 
France.  Germany,  thongh  unaware  of  the  full  mag- 
nitude of  the  perils  from  which  it  had  escaped,  breatlied 
freely  after  weeks  of  piinful  suspense ;  the 
very  circumstance  that  the  disproportion  of  'Sj.il" 
numbers  on  the  battle-field  of  Worth  was 
still  unknown  heightened  the  joy  and  confidence  pro- 
daced  by  the  Crown  Prince's  Yictory,  a  victory  in 
which  the  South  German  troops,  fighting  by  the  side 
of  those  who  had  been  their  foes  in  1866,  bad  borne 
their  full  part.  In  Paris  the  consternation  with  which 
the  news  of  McMahon's  overthrow  was  received  was 
all  the  greater  that  on  the  previous  day  reports  had 
been  circulated -of  a  victory  won  at  Landau  and  of  the 
capture  of  the  Crown  Prince  with  his  army.  The 
bulletin  of  the  Emperor,  briefly  narrating  McMahon's 
defeat  and  the  repulse  of  Frossard,  showed  in  its  con- 
cluding words — "  All  may  yet  be  retrieved  " — how  pro- 
foxmd  was  the  change  made  in  the  prospects  of  the  war 
by  that  fitt^  day.  The  truth  was  at  once  apprehended. 
A  storm  of  indignation  broke  out  against  the  Imperial 


438  MODSKSr  BUBOPB.  um. 

Government  at  Paris.  The  Chambers  were  gammoned. 
Ollivier,  attacked  alike  by  the  extreme  Bonapartists  and 
by  the  Opposition,  laid  down  his  office.  A  reactionary 
Ministry,  headed  by  the  Count  of  Palikao,  was  placed 
in  power  by  the  Empress,  a  Miniijtry  of  the  last  hour 
as  it  was  justly  styled  by  all  outside  it.  Levies  were 
ordered,  arms  and  stores  accumulated  for  the  reserve- 
forces,  preparations  made  for  a  siege  of  Paris  itself.  On 
the  12th  the  Emperor  gave  up  the  command  which  he 
had  exercised  with  such  miserable  results,  and  appointed 
Marshal  Bazaine,  one  of  the  heroes  of  the  Mexican  Ex- 
pedition, Gcncral-in-Chief  of  the  Army  of  the  Rhine. 

After  the  overthrow  of  McMahon  and  the  victory  of 
Nuoionat  '  ''^^  GcFmons  at  Spicheren,  there  seems  to 
ifcw.Aog.T-is.  |^^^,g  heeu  a  period  of  utter  paralysis  in  the 
French  headquarters  at  Metz.  The  divisions  of  Prince 
Frederick  Charles  and  Steinmetz  did  not  immediately 
press  forward ;  it  was  necessary  to  allow  some  days  for 
the  ailvance  of  tlie  Crown  Prince  through  the  Vosges; 
and  during  these  days  tbe  French  army  about  Metz, 
which,  when  concentratt'd,  numbered  nearly  two  hun- 
dred thousand  men,  might  well  have  taken  the  positions 
necessary  for  the  defence  of  Moselle,  or  in  the  alterna- 
tive might  have  gained  several  marches  in  the  retreat 
towards  Verdun  and  Chalons.  Only  a  small  part  of  this 
body  had  as  yet  been  exposed  to  defeat.  It  included  in 
it  the  very  flower  of  the  French  forces,  tons  of  thousands 
of  troops  probably  equal  to  any  in  Europe,  and  capable 
of  forming  a  most  formidable  army  if  united  to  the 
reserves  which  would  shortly_be  collected  at  Chftlons 


im  BORNT,  489 

or  nearer  Paris.  Bat  from  the  7th  to  the  13th  of 
August  Napoleon,  too  cowed  to  take  the  necessary  steps 
for  battle  in  defence  of  the  line  of  Moselle,  lingered  pur- 
poseless and  irresolute  at  Metz,  unwilling  to  fall  hack 
from  this  fortress.  It  was  not  till  the  14th  that  the 
retreat  was  began.  By  this  time  the  Germans  were 
close  at  hand,  and  their  leaders  were  little  disposed  to 
let  the  hesitating  enemy  escapo  them.  While  the  lead- 
ing divisions  of  the  French  were  crossing 
the  Moselle,  Steinmetz  hurried  forward  his 
troops  and  fell  upon  the  French  detachments  still  lying 
on  the  south-east  of  Metz  about  Bomy  and  Courcelles. 
Bazaine  suspended  his  movement  of  retreat  in  order  to 
beat  back  an  assailant  who  for  once  seemed  to  be 
inferior  in  strength.  At  the  close  of  the  day  the  French 
commander  believed  that  he  had  gained  a  victory  and 
driven  the  Germans  off  their  line  of  advance ;  in  reality 
he  had  allowed  himself  to  be  diverted  from  the  passage 
of  the  Moselle  at  the  last  hour,  while  the  Germans  left 
under  Prince  Frederick  Charles  gained  the  river  farther 
south,  and  actually  began  to  cross  it  in  order  to  bar  his 
retreat. 

From  Metz  westwards  there  is  as  far  as  the  village  of 
Gravelotte,  which  is  seven  miles  distant,  but  one  direct 
road ;  at  Gravelotte  the  road  forks,  the  southern  arm 
leading  towards  Yerdun  by  Vionville  and  n,„j^^n,„ 
Mars-la- Tour,  the  northern  by  Conflans.  *>«■>'■ 
During  the  15th  of  August  the  first  of  Bazaine 's 
divisions  moved  as  far  as  Vionville  along  the  southern 
road;  others  came  into  the  neighbourhood  of  Grftve* 


4M  MODESJSr  SUSOPS.  M» 

lotte,  but  two  corps  which  should  have  advanced  past 
Gravelotte  on  to  the  northern  road  still  lay  close  to  Metz. 
The  Prossian  vuignard  was  meanwhile  crostiiDg  the 
Moselle  southwards  from  Noveant  to  Pont-n-Mousson, 
and  hurrying  forwards  by  lines  converging  on  the  road 
taken  by  Bazaine.  Down  to  the  evening  of  the  15th 
it  was  not  supposed  at  the  Prussian  headquarters  that 
Bazaine  could  be  overtaken  and  brought  to  battle 
nearer  than  the  tine  of  the  Mease ;  but  on  the  morning 
of  the  16th  the  cavalry-detachments  which  bad  poshed 
farthest  to  the  north-west  discovered  that  the  heads  of 
the  French  columns  had  still  not  passed  Mars-la-Tour. 
An  effort  was  instaotly  made  to  seize  the  road  and 
block  the  way  before  the  enemy.  The  struggle,  begrm 
by  a  handful  of  combatants  on  each  side,  drew  to  it 
regiment  after  regiment  as  the  French  battalions  dose 
at  hand  came  into  action,  and  the  Prussians  hiurted  up 
in  wild  haste  to  support  their  comrades  who  were 
exposed  to  the  attack  of  an  entire  army.  The  rapidity 
with  which  the  Prussian  generals  grasped  the  situation 
before  them,  the  vigour  with  which  they  brought  up 
their  cavalry  over  a  distance  which  no  infantry  could 
traverse  in  the  necessary  time,  and  without  a  moment's 
hesitation  hurled  this  cavalry  in  charge  after  charge 
against  a  superior  foe,  mark  the  battle  of  Mars-la-Tour 
as  that  in  which  the  military  superiority  of  the  Germans 
was  most  truly  shown.  Numbers  in  this  battle  had 
little  to  do  vrith  the  result,  for  by  better  generalBhip 
Bazaine  could  certainly  at  any  one  point  have  over- 
powered his  enemy.    But  wWle  the  Germans  roshed 


un  MARS-LA-TOUR-OBAVSLOTTS.  Ml 

like  a  torrent  upon  the  troe  point  of  attaok — ^that  is 
tho  westemmoBt — Bazaine  by  some  delusion  considered 
it  his  primary  object  to  prevent  the  Oermans  from 
(hmstiiig  themselves  between  the  retreating  army  and 
Metz,  and  so  kept  a  great  part  of  his  troops  inactive 
about  the  fortress.  The  result  was  that  the  Q-ermans, 
with  a  loss  of  sixteen  thousand  men,  remained  at  the 
dose  of  the  day  masters  of  the  road  at  Yionville,  and 
that  the  French  army  could  not,  without  winning  a 
victory  and  breaking  through  the  enemy's  line,  resume 
its  retreat  along  this  line. 

It  iras  expected  daring  the  17th  that  Bazaine  would 
make  some  attempt  to  escape  by  the  northern  road,  but 
instead  of  doing  so  he  fell  back  on  Gravelotte  and  the 
heighta  between  this  and  'Metz,  in  order  to  fight  a 
pitched  battle.  The  position  was  a  weU'Chosen  one ; 
but  by  midday  on  the  18th  the  armies  of  Steinmetz  and 
Prince  Frederick  Charles  were  ranged  in  0^,^000*. 
front  of  Bazmne  with  a  strength  of  two  *"•■"■ 
hundred  and  fifty  thousand  men,  and  in  the  judgment 
of  the  King  these  forces  were  equal  to  the  attack. 
Again,  as  at  WSrth,  the  precipitancy  of  divisional 
commaudetB  caused  the  sacrifice  of  whole  brigades 
before  the  battle  was  won.  While  the  Saxon  corps. 
with  which  Moltke  intended  to  deliver  his  slow  but 
fiital  blow  upon  the  enemy's  right  flank  was  eng^^d  in 
Hs  long'northward  detour,  Steinmetz  pushed  his  Bhine- 
landers  past  the  ravine  of  Qravelotte  into  a  fire  where 
no  human  being  could  survive,  and  the  Qnards,  pressing 
forward  in  column  over  the  smooth  unsheltered  slope 


tUS  MODERN   BUROPS.  m 

from  St.  Marie  to  St.  Frirat,  sank  by  thonsaDds  withoat 
reaching  midway  in  their  course.  Until  the  final  blow 
was  dealt  by  the  Saxon  corps  from  the  north  flank,  the 
ground  which  was  won  by  the  Prussians  was  won 
principally  by  their  destructiTe  artillery  fire:  their 
infantry  attacks  had  on  the  whole  been  repelled,  and  at 
Gi-avelotte  itself  it  had  seemed  for  a  moment  as  if  the 
French  were  about  to  break  the  assailant's  line.  But 
Bazaine,  as  on  the  I6th,  steadily  kept  his  reserves  at  a 
distance  from  the  points  where  their  presence  was  most 
required,  and,  according  to  his  own  account,  succeeded 
in  bringing  into  action  no  more  than  a  hondred 
thousand  men,  or  less  than  two-thirds  of  the  forces 
under  bis  command.*  At  the  close  of  the  awful  day, 
when  the  capture  of  St.  Frivat  by  the  Saxons  turned 
the  defender's  line,  the  French  abandoned  aU  their 
positions  and  drew  back  within  the  defences  of  Metz. 

The  Germans  at  once  proceeded  to  block  all  the 
roads  round  the  fortress,  and  Bazaine  made  no  effort  to 
prevent  them.     At  the  end  of  a  few  days  the  line  was 

drawn  around  him  in  sufficient  strength 
^■E?.?**"         to    resist  any    sudden   attack.     Steinmetx, 

who  was  responsible  for  a  great  part  of  the 
loss  sustained  at  Gravelotte,  was  now  removed  from  his 
command ;  his  army  was  united  with  that  under  Prince 
Frederick  Charles  as  the  besieging  force,  while  sixty  thou- 
sand men,  detached  from  this  great  mass,  were  formed  into 
a  separate  army  under  Prince  Albert  of  Saxony,  and  sent 
by  way  of  Verdun  to  co-operate  with  the  Crown  Fiioee 

*  Bftzoiue,  L'Armte  da  Rhin,  p.  74        ,^  i 

I      ,l,z<,.f,LnP0gIf 


un  UailAHON  MOVBB  NOBTBWARDS.  443 

against  McMahon.  The  Government  at  Paris  tnew 
bat  imperfectly  what  was  passing  around  Metzfrom  day 
to  day ;  it  tnew,  however,  that  if  Metz  should  be  given 
up  for  lost  the  hour  of  its  own  fall  could  not  be  averted. 
One  forlorn  hope  remained,  to  throw  the  army  which 
McMahon  was  gathering  at  Ch&lons  north-eastward  to 
Bazaine's  relief,  though  the  Crown  Prince  stood  between 
Gh&Ions  and  Metz,  and  could  reach  every  point  in  the 
line  of  march  more  rapidly  than  McMahon  himself. 
Napoleon  had  quitted  Metz  on  the  evening  of  the  1 5th ; 
on  the  17th  a  council  of  war  was  held  at  Chalons,  at 
which  it  was  determined  to  fall  back  upon  Paris  and  to 
await  the  attack  of  the  Crown  Prince  under  the  forts  of 
the  capital.  No  sooner  was  this  decision  announced 
to  the  Government  at  Paris  than  the  Empress  tele- 
graphed to  her  husband  warning  him  to  consider  what 
would  be  the  effects  of  his  return,  and  insisting  that  an 
attempt  should  be  made  to  relieve  Bazaine.*  McMahon, 
against  his  own  better  judgment,  consented  to  the 
northern  march.  He  moved  in  the  first  instance  to 
Bheims  in  order  to  conceal  his  intention  from  the 
enemy,  but  by  doing  this  he  lost  some  days.  On  the 
33rd,  in  pursuance  of  arrangements  made  with  Bazaine, 
whose  messengers  were  still  able  to  escape  the  Prussian 
watch,  he  set  out  north-eastwards  in  the  direction  of 
Montm^dy.     The  movement  was  discovered 

'  Oermui  . 

by  the    Prussian  cavalry   and  reported  at     Sinh^^ 

the  headquarters  at  Bar-le-Duc  on  the  25th. 

Instantly  the  westward  march  of  the  Crown  Prince  was 

*  PapieTB  8£creta  du  Second  Empire  Cl87I>)i  Jfg-  33,  HfK 

L  i,_.  I  C.ooglf 


Mt  KODSiar  ansopa.  an 

arrested,  and  his  army,  with  that  of  the  Prince  of 
Sazonj,  was  thrown  northwards  in  forced  marches 
towards  Sedan.  On  reaching  Le  Chesne,  west  of  the 
Mouse,  on  the  37th,  HcMahon  hecame  aware  of  the 
enemy's  presence.  He  saw  that  his  plan  was  discovered, 
and  resolved  to  retreat  westwards  before  it  waa  too 
late.  The  Bmperor,  who  had  attached  himself  to  the 
army,  consented,  hut  t^ain  the  Government  at  Paris 
interfered  with  fatal  effect.  More  anxious  for  the 
safety  of  the  dynasty  than  for  the  existence  of  the  army, 
the  Empress  and  her  advisers  insisted  that  McMabon 
should  continue  his  advance.  ITapoleon  seems  now  io 
have  abdicated  all  authority  and  thrown  to  the  winds  all 
responsibility.  He  allowed  the  march  io  be  resumed  in 
the  direction  of  Mouzon  and  Stenay.  Failly's  corps, 
which  formed  the  right  wing,  was  attacked  on  the  39th 
befoi^  it  could  reach  the  passage  of  the  Mease  at  the 
latter  place,  and  was  driven  northwards  to  Beaumont. 
Here  the  commander  strangely  imagined  himself  to  be 
in  security.  He  was  surprised  in  his  camp  on  the  fol- 
lowing day,  defeated,  and  driven  northwards  towards 
Mouzon.  Meanwhile  the  left  of  McMahon's  army  had 
crossed  the  Meuse  and  moved  eastwards  to  Carignan, 
so  that  his  troops  were  severed  by  the  river  and  at  some 
distance  from  one  another.  Part  of  FaUIy's  men  were 
made  prisoners  in  the  struggle  on  the  80th  or  dispersed 
on  the  west  of  the  Mease ;  the  remainder,  with  their 
commander,  made  a  hurried  and  disorderly  escape  heyond 
the  river,  and  neglected  to  break  down  the  bridges  by 
which  they  had  passed,     McMahon  saw  that  if  the 


advance  was  contiDued  his  divisiona  would  one  alter 
another  fall  into  the  enemy's  hands.  He  recalled  the 
troops  which  had  reached  Carignan,  and  concentrated 
his  army  about  Sedan  to  fight  a  pitched  battle.  The 
passages  of  the  Meuse  above  and  below  Sedan  were 
seized  bj  the  Germans.  Two  hundred  and  forty  thou- 
sand men  were  at  Moltke's  disposal ;  McMahon  had 
about  half  that  number.  The  task  of  the  Germans  waa 
not  so  much  to  defeat  the  enemy  as  to  prevent  them 
from  escaping  to  the  Belgian  frontier.  On  g,^^  h^.„ 
the  morning  of  September  let,  while  on  ^^*'" 
the  east  of  Sedan  the  Bavarians  after  a  desperate 
resistance  stormed  the  village  of  Dazeilles,  Hessian  and 
Fnissian  regiments  crossed  the  Meuse  at  Donch^ry  several 
miles  to  the  west.  From  either  end  of  thi^  line  corps 
after  corps  now  pushed  northwards  round  the  French 
positions,  driving  in  the  enemy  wherever  they  found  them, 
and  converging,  under  the  eyes  of  the  Prussian  King, 
his  general,  and  his  Minister,  each  into  its  place  in  the 
arc  of  fire  before  which  the  French  Empire  was  to  perish. 
The  movement  was  as  admirably  executed  as  designed. 
The  French  fought  furiously  but  in  vain :  the  mere  mass 
of  the  enemy,  the  mere  narrowing  of  the  once  completed 
circle,  crushed  down  resistance  without  the  clumsy  havoc 
of  Gravelotte.  From  point  after  point  the  defenders 
were  forced  back  within  Sedan  itself.  The  streets  were 
choked  with  hordes  of  beaten  infantry  and  cavalry  ;  the 
Germans  had  but  to  take  one  more  step  forward  and 
the  whole  of  their  batteries  would  command  the  town. 
Towards  evening  there  was  a  pause  in  the  firing,  in 


44e  UODEBS  EUBOPS.  W* 

order  that  the  French  might  offer  negotiations  for 
surrender ;  but  no  sign  of  snrrender  was  made,  and  the 
Bavarian  cannon  resumed  their  fire,  throwing  shells 
into  the  town  itself  Kapoleon  now  caused  a  white 
fiag  to  be  displayed  on  the  fortress,  and  sent  a  letter  to 
the  King  of  Prussia,  stating  that  as  he  had  not  been 
able  to  die  in  the  midst  of  his  troops,  nothing  remained 
for  him  but  to  surrender  his  sword  into  the  hands  of  his 
Majesty.  The  surrender  was  accepted  by  King  William, 
who  added  that  General  Moltke  would  act  on  his  behalf 
in  arranging  terms  of  capitulation.  General  Wimpffen, 
who  had  succeeded  to  the  command  of  the  French  army 
on  the  disablement  of  McMabon  by  a  wound,  acted  on 
c^itiotMoRiit  ^l»^f  of  Napoleon.  The  negotiations  con- 
*^^^^^^''  tinned  till  kte  in  the  night,  the  French 
general  pressing  for  permission  for  his  troops  to  be  dis- 
armed in  Belgium,  while  Moltke  insisted  on  the  sor- 
render  of  the  entire  army  as  prisoners  of  war.  Fearing 
the  effect  of  an  appeal  by  Napoleon  himself  to  the 
King's  kindly  nature,  Bismarck  had  taken  steps  to 
remove  his  sovereign  to  a  distance  until  the  terms  of 
surrender  should  be  signed.  At  daybreak  on  September 
2nd  Napoleon  sought  the  Prussian  headquarters.  He 
was  met  on  the  road  by  Bismarck,  who  remained  in 
conversation  with  him  till  the  capitulation  was  com- 
pleted on  the  terms  required  by  the  Glermans.  He 
then  conducted  Napoleon  to  the  neighbouring  ch&tean 
of  BeUevue,  where  King  "William,  the  Crown  Prince, 
and  the  Prince  of  Saxony  visited  him.  One  pang 
bad  stiU  to  be  borne  by  the  nnhapj^  man.    Powo 


to  liis  interview  with  the  King,  Napoleon  had 
imagined  that  all  the  German  armies  together  had 
operated  against  him  at  Sedan,  and  he  must  con- 
seqaently  have  still  had  some  hope  that  his  own  ruin 
might  have  purchased  the  delirerance  of  Bazaine. 
He  learnt  accidentally  from  the  King  that  Prince 
Frederick  Charles  had  never  stirred  from  before  Metz. 
A  convulsion  of  anguish  passed  over  his  face :  his  eyes 
filled  with  tears.  There  was  no  motive  for  a  prolonged 
interview  between  the  conqueror  and  the  conquered,  for, 
as  a  prisoner,  Napoleon  could  not  discuss  conditions  of 
peace.  After  some  minutes  of  conversation  the  King 
departed  for  the  Prussian  headquarters.  Napoleon 
remained  in  the  chateau  nntil  the  morning  of  the  next 
day,  and  then  began  his  journey  towards  the  place 
chosen  for  his  captivity,  the  palace  of  Wilhelmshdhe  at  - 
Cassel.* 

Bnmours  of  disaster  had  reached  Paris  in  the  last 
days  of  August,  but  to  each  successive  report  of  evil 
the  Government  replied  with  lying  boasts  of  success, 
until  on  the  3rd  of  September  it  was  forced 


the  worst  anticipations  of  the  previous  days. 
With  the  Emperor  and  his  entire  army  in  the  enemy's 
hands,  no  one  supposed  that  the  dynasty  could  any 
longer  remain  on  the  throne :  the  only  question  was  by 
what  form  of  government  the  Empire  should  he  suc- 
ceeded. The  Legislative  Chamber  assembled  in  the 
dead  of  night;  Jules  Favre  proposed  the  deposition 
•  Piaiy  of  the  Emperor  Frederiok,  Sept,  2.  OO'jIc 


448  UODBBS  SUSOPM.  wf. 

of  the  Emperor,  and  was  heard  in  silence.  The 
Assemhiy  adjourned  for  some  hoora.  On  the  morning 
of  the  4th,  Thiers,  who  sought  to  keep  the  way  open 
for  aD  Orleanist  restoration,  moved  that  a  Committee 
of  Government  should  be  appointed  by  the  Chamber 
itself,  and  that  elections  to  a  new  Assembly  shonld  be 
held  as  soon  as  circumstances  should  permit.  Before 
this  and  other  propositions  of  the  same  nature  could  be 
put  to  the  vote,  the  Chamber  was  invaded  by  the  mob. 
Qambetta,  with  most  of  the  Deputies  for  Paris,  pro- 
ceeded to  the  Hfitel  de  YiUe,  and  there  proclaimed  the 
BepubHc.  The  Empress  fled ;  a  Government  of 
National  Defence  came  into  existence,  with  GI«neraL 
Trochu  at  its  head,  Jules  Favrc  assuming  the  Ministry 
of  Foreign  Affairs  and  Gambctta  that  of  the  Interior. 
No  hand  was  raised  in  defonce  of  the  Napoleonic 
dynasty  or  of  the  institutions  of  the  Empire.  The 
Legislative  Chamber  and  the  Senate  disappeared  without 
even  muking  an  attempt  to  prolong  their  own  existence. 
Thiers,  without  approving  of  the  Bepuhlic  or  the  mode  in 
which  it  had  come  into  being,  recommended  his  friends 
to  accept  the  new  Government,  and  gave  it  hia  own 
support.  On  the  6th  of  September  a  circular  of  Jules 
Pavre,  addressed  to  the  representatives  of  Prance  at 
all  the  European  Courts,  justified  the  overthrow  of  the 
onoiuofjDiM  Napoleonic  Empire,  and  claimed  for  the 
ftTw.  s^ «.  Q-ovemment  by  which  it  was  succeeded 
the  goodwill  of  the  neutral  Powers.  Napoleon  IIL 
was  chaiged  with  the  responsibility  for  the  war :  with 
the  fall  of  his  dynasty,  it  was  urged,  the  Masf)^^^|  for  a 


MK  THE  osnuAsa  oeaoh  pjmb.  ub 

eontinaaiice  of  the  struggle  had  ceased  to  exist.  France 
only  asked  for  a  lasting  peace.  Such  peace,  however, 
must  leave  the  territory  of  Fnuice  inviolate,  for  peace 
with  dishonour  would  be  bat  the  prelude  to  a  new 
war  of  extermination.  "  Hot  an  inch  of  our  soil  will 
we  cede" — so  ran  the  formula — "not  a  stone  of  our 
fortresses."* 

The  German  Chancellor  had  nothing  ready  in  the 
way  of  rhetoric  equal  to  his  aob^ouist's  phrases ;  bat 
as  soon  as  the  battle  of  Sedan  was  won  it  was  settled 
at  the  Prussian  headquarters  that  peace  would  not  be 
made  without  the  annexation  of  Alsace  and  ^^  ^^  ^^ 
Lorraine.  Prince  Bismarck  has  stated  "''^'  ^"^"^ 
that  his  own  policy  would  have  stopped  at  the  ac- 
quisition of  Strasborg  :  Moltke,  however,  and  the  chiefs 
of  the  army  pronounced  that  Glermany  could  not  be 
secure  against  invasion  while  Metz  remained  in  the 
bands  of  France,  and  this  opinion  was  accepted  by  the 
King.  For  a  moment  it  was  imagined  that  the  victory 
of  Sedan  had  given  the  conqueror  peace  on  his  own 
terms.  This  hope,  however,  speedily  disappeared,  and 
the  march  upon  Paris  was  resumed  by  the  army  of  the 
Crown  Prince  without  waste  of  time.  In  the  tliird 
week  of  September  the  invaders  approached  the  capital. 
Favre,  in  spite  of  his  declaration  of  the  6th,  was  not 

*  FkTTe's  wrenlar  alleged  that  the  King  of  Frasaia  hitd  declared  that 
he  nude  mr  not  on  Franco  but  on  tbe  Imperial  Dynsatj.  King  WUIiam 
had  nerer  stated  anything  of  the  kind.  Sis  proclamation  on  euterinjr 
Fr&nee,  to  which  Favre  appears  to  have  referred,  merelj  iiaid  that  Qm 
war  was  to  he  waged  against  the  French  army,  and  not  n^ust  (he  ii^ 
habitants,  who,  w  long  as  th^  hept  quiet,  wonU  not  be  molested. )  ( ^  >  I C 
J>  It 


4S0  MODXBA    EUR(ffa.  uK 

indisposed  to  enter  upon  negotiations  ;  and,  trasting  to 
his  own  arts  of  persuasion,  he  soogbt  an  interview 
with  the  German  Chancellor,  which  was  granted  to 
him  at  Ferri^res  on  the  19th,  and  continued  on  the  fol- 
lowing day.  Bismarck  liesitated  to  treat  the  Itolders 
of  office  in  Paris  as  an  established  Government;  he  was 
willing  to  grant  an  armistice  in  order  that  elections 
might  be  held  for  a  National  Assembly  with  which 
Gi«rmMiy  could  treat  for  peace ;  bat  he  required,  as  a 
condition  of  the  armistice,  that  Strasburg  and  Toul 
should  be  surrendered.  Toul  was  already  at  the  last 
extremity;  Strasburg  was  not  capable  of  holding  out 
ten  days  longer ;  but  of  this  the  Qovemment  at  Paris 
was  not  aware.  The  conditions  demanded  by  Bismarck 
were  rejected  as  insolting  to  France,  and  the  war  was 
left  to  take  its  course.  Already,  while  Favre  was  nego- 
tiating at  Ferriferes,  the  German  vanguard  was  pressing 
round  to  the  west  of  Paris.  A  body  of  French  troops 
which  attacked  them  on  the  19th  at  Chfttillon  was  put 
to  the  rout  and  fled  in  panic.  Versailles  was  occupied 
on  the  same  day,  and  the  line  of  investment  was  shortly 
afterwards  completed  around  the  capital. 

The  second  act  in  the  war  now  began.  Paris  had 
been  fortified  by  Thiers  about  1840,  at  the  time 
when  it  seemed  likely  that  France  might  be  engaged 
MMoofpm*.  '°  ^^^  with  a  coalition  on  the  affairs  of 
^*''*'  Mehemet  Ali.  The  forts  were  not  distant 
enough  from  the  city  to  protect  it  altogether  from 
artillery  with  the  lengthened  range  of  1870  ;  they  were 
sufficient,   however,   to  render  an  assault  out  of  the 


UN,  BlSaa   OF  PABI8.  4G1 

question,  and  to  compel  the  besieger  to  rely  mainly  on 
the  slow  operation  of  famine.  It  had  been  reckoned 
hy  the  engineers  of  1840  that  food  enough  might  be 
collected  to  enable  the  city  to  stand  a  two-months' 
siege ;  so  vast,  however,  were  the  supplies  collected  in 
1870  that,  with  double  the  population,  Paris  had  pro- 
visions for  above  four  months.  In  spite  therefore  of 
the  capture  and  destmction  of  its  armies  the  cause  of 
France  was  not  hopeless,  if,  while  Paris  and  Metz 
occupied  four  hundred  thousand  of  the  invaders,  the 
population  of  the  provinces  should  take  up  the  struggle 
with  enthusiasm,  and  furnish  after  some  months  of 
military  exercise  troops  more  numerous  than  those 
which  France  had  lost,  to  attack  the  besiegers  from  all 
points  at  once  and  to  fall  npon  their  communications. 
To  organise  such  a  national  resistance  was,  howev^, 
imposisible  for  any  Oovemnient  within  the  besieged 
capital  itself.  It  was  therefore  determined  to  establish 
a  second  seat  of  Government  on  the  Loire; 
and  before  the  lines  were  drawn  round 
Paris  three  members  of  the  Ministry,  with  M.  Cr^mietix 
at  their  head,  set  out  for  Tours.  Cr^mieui,  however, 
who  was  an  aged  lawyer,  proved  quite  unequal  to  his 
task.  His  authority  was  disputed  in  the  west  and  the 
south.  Revolutionary  movements  threatened  to  break 
up  the  unity  of  the  national  defence.  A  stronger 
hand,  a  more  commanding  will,  was  needed.  Such  a 
hand,  such  a  wUl  belonged  to  Gkimbetta,  who  on  the 
7th  of  October  left  Paris  in  order  to  nndertake  the 
government  of  the  provinces  uid  the  organisation  c^ 


(S2  MODSRN  BJTBOPS.  um. 

the  national  armies.  The  circle  of  the  besiegers  was 
DOW  too  closely  drawn  for  the  ordinary  laeans  of  traTel 
to  be  possible.  Gambetia  passed  over  the  German  lines 
owMtaat  "^  *  balloon,  and  reached  Tours  in*  safety, 
'""^  whece  he  immediately  threw  his  feeble 
colleagues  into  the  background  and  concentrated  all 
power  in  his  own  vigorous  grasp.  The  effect  of  his  pre- 
sence  was  at  once  felt  throughout  France.  There  was 
an  end  of  the  disorders  in  the  great  cities,  and  of  all 
attempts  at  rivalry  with  the  central  power.  Gambetta 
had  the  faults  of  rashness,  of  excessiTe  self-confidence, 
of  defective  regard  for  scientific  authority  in  matters 
where  he  himself  was  ignorant:  but  he  possessed  in 
an  extraordinary  degree  the  qualities  necessary  for  a 
Dictator  at  such  a  national  crisis :  boundless,  in- 
domitable coorage  ;  a  simple,  elemental  passion  of  love 
tor  his  country  that  left  absolutely  no  place  for  hesita- 
tions or  reserve  io  the  prosecution  of  the  one  object  for 
which  France  then  existed,  the  war.  He  carried  the 
nation  with  him  like  a  whirlwind.  Whatever  share 
the  military  errors  of  Gambetta  and  his  rash  personal 
interference  with  commanders  may  have  had  in  the 
ultimate  defeat  of  France,  without  him  it  would  never 
have  been  known  of  what  efibrts  France  was  capable. 
The  proof  of  his  capacity  was  seen  in  the  hatred  and  the 
fear  with  which  down  to  the  time  of  his  death  he  inspired 
the  German  people.  Had  there  been  at  the  head  of 
the  army  of  Metz  a  man  of  one-tenth  of  Gambetta's 
efiective  force,  it  is  possible  that  France  might  have 
closed  the  war,  if  not  with  success,  at  least  with  on* 
diminished  territory. 


HK  QAMSETFA.  46S 

Before  Gamb^tta  left  Paris  the  &11  of  Strasbui^ 
set  free  the  army  under  General  Werder  by  which 
it  had  been  besieged,  and  enabled  the  Germans  to 
establish  a  civil  Government  in  Alsace,  y^^gt,^ 
the  western  frontier  of  the  new  province  •"»■*!*■«. 
having  been  already  bo  accurately  studied  that,  when 
peace  was  made  in  1871,  the  frontier-line  was  drawn 
not  npon  one  of  the  earlier  French  maps  but  on  the  map 
now  published  by  the  German  staff.  It  was  Gambetta's 
first  task  to  divide  France  into  districts,  each  with  its 
own  military  centre,  its  own  army,  and  its  own  com- 
mander. Four  such  districts  were  made:  the  centres 
were  Lille,  Le  Mans,  Bourges,  and  Besan^on.  At  Bourges 
and  in  the  neighbourhood  considerable  progress  had 
already  been  made  in  oi^anisation.  Early  in  October 
German  cavalry  -  detachmeuts,  exploring  rutmj  i>ta«, 
southwards,  found  that  French  troops  ^"^ 
were  gathering  on  the  Loire.  The  Bavarian  General 
Tann  was  detached  by  Moltke  from  the  besieging 
army  at  Paris,  and  ordered  to  make  himself  master 
of  Orleans.  Tann  hastened  southwards,  defeated  the 
French  outside  Orleans  on  the  11th  of  October,  and 
occupied  this  city,  the  French  retiring  i^„b,k„ 
towards  Bourges.  Gambetta  removed  the  ^^""^  ***•»• 
defeated  commander,  and  set  in  his  place  General 
Aurelle  de  P^iadines.  Tann  was  directed  to  cross  the 
Loire  and  destroy  the  arsenals  at  Bourges ;  he  reported, 
however,  that  this  task  was  beyond  his  power,  in  con- 
sequence of  which  Moltke  ordered  General  Werder 
with  the  army  of  Strasburg  to  move  westwards  against 


454  MODSBN  SUBOPS.  MH 

Bourgea,  after  dispersing  the  weak  forces  that  were 
gathering  about  Besan^n.  Werder  set  oat  on  his 
dangerons  march,  bat  he  had  not  proceeded  far  when 
an  army  of  veij  different  power  was  thrown  into  the 
scale  against  the  French  levies  on  the  Loire. 

Id  the  battle  of  Qravelotte,  fought  on  the  18th  of 
August,  the  French  troops  had  been  so  handled  by 
Bazaine  as  to  render  it  doubtful  whether  he  really 
intended  to  break  through  the  enemy's 
line  and  escape  from  Metz.  At  what 
period  political  designs  inconsistent  with  his  military 
duty  first  took  possession  of  Bazaine's  thoughts  is 
uncertain.  He  had  played  a  political  part  in  Mexico ; 
it  is  probable  that  as  soon  as  he  found  himself  at  the 
head  of  the  one  efiective  army  of  France,  and  saw 
Napoleon  hopelessly  discredited,  he  began  to  aim  at  per- 
sonal power.  Before  the  downfall  of  the  Empire  he  had 
evidently  adopted  a  scheme  of  inaction  with  the  object 
of  preserving  his  army  entire :  even  the  sortie  by  which 
it  had  been  arranged  that  he  should  assist  McMahon 
on  the  day  before  Sedan  was  feebly  and  irresolutely 
conducted.  After  the  proclamation  of  the  Bepublic 
Bazaine's  inaction  became  still  more  marked.  The 
intrigues  of  an  adventurer  named  Begnier,  who  en- 
deavoured to  open  a  negotiation  between  the  Prussians 
and  the  exiled  Empress  Eugdnie,  encouraged  him  in 
his  determination  to  keep  his  soldiers  from  fulfilling 
their  duty  to  France.  Week  after  week  passed  by ;  a 
fifth  of  the  besieging  army  was  struck  down  with 
sickness ;  vet  Bazaine  made  no  effort  to  break  through, 


uM.  Buaaxmas  or  usre,  4ss 

or  even  to  dimmish  the  number  of  men  who  were  con- 
Buming  the  suppUea  of  Metz  by  giving  to  separate 
detachments  the  opportunity  of  escape.  On  the 
12th  of  October,  after  the  pretence  of  a  sortie  on  the 
north,  he  entered  into  communication  with  the  German 
headquarters  at  Yersailles.  Bismarck  offered  to  grant 
a  free  departure  to  the  army  of  Metz  on  condition 
that  the  fortress  should  be  placed  in  his  hands,  that 
the  army  should  undertake  to  act  on  behalf  of  the 
Empress,  and  that  the  Empress  should  pledge  her- 
self to  accept  the  Prussian  conditions  of  peace,  what- 
ever these  might  be.  Qeneral  Boyer  was  sent  to 
England  to  acquaint  the  Empress  with  these  pro- 
positions. They  were  declined  by  her,  and  after  a 
fortnight  had  been  spent  in  manoeuvres  for  a  Bona- 
partist  restoration  Bazaine  found  himself  at  the  end 
of  his  resources.  On  the  27th  the  capitula-  c.p;hii^«of 
tion  of  Metz  was  signed.  The  fortress  *^*"' '**■*'• 
itself,  with  incalculable  cannon  and  material  of  war, 
and  an  army  of  a  hundred  and  seventy  thousand  men, 
including  twenly-six  thousand  sick  and  wounded  in  the 
hospitals,  passed  into  the  hands  of  the  Germans.* 

Bazaine   was   at   a  later    time   tried  by   a   court- 
martial,    found    guilty   of  the    neglect  of    duty,    and 
sentenced  to  death.    That  sentence  was  not  executed; 
but  if  there  is  an  infamy  that  is  worse  than 
death,  such  infamy  will  to  all  time  cling 
to  his  name.     In  the  circumstances  in  which  France 

*  Dentseh-FmiEoraohe  Hrieg,  Tol.  iii.,  p.  IM.    Bsulne,  p.  16&    Proces 
deBaukiue,  TaLii.,|h21&.    Eegnier,  p.  20.    Salm,  iL  171. 


4M  MOVSBN  mmOFM.  IM 

was  placed  no  effort,  no  sacrifice  of  life  conld  have 
been  too  great  for  the  commaader  of  the  army  at 
Hetz.  To  retain  the  besiegers  in  fnll  strength  before 
the  fortress  would  not  have  required  the  half  of 
Bazaine's  actual  force.  If  half  his  army  had  fallen 
on  the  field  of  batUe  in  successive  attempts  to  cat 
their  way  through  the  enemy,  brave  men  would  no 
doubt  have  perished ;  but  even  had  their  efforts  f^ed 
their  deaths  would  have  purchased  for  Metz  the  power 
to  hold  out  for  weeks  or  for  months  longer.  The 
civil  population  of  Metz  was  but  sixty  thousand,  its 
army  was  three  times  as  numerous;  nnlike  Paria,  it 
saw  its  stores  consumed  not  by  helpless  millions  of 
women  and  children,  but  by  soldiers  whose  duty  it 
was  to  aid  the  defence  of  their  country  at  whatever 
cost.  Their  duty,  if  they  could  not  cut  their  way 
through,  was  to  die  fighting ;  and  had  they  shown 
hesitation,  which  was  not  the  case,  Bazune  should 
have  died  at  their  head.  That  Bazaine  would  have 
fulfilled  his  duty  even  if  Napoleon  III.  had  remained 
on  the  throne  is  more  than  doubtful,  for  his  inaction 
had  begun  before  the  catastrophe  of  Sedan.  His 
pretext  after  that  time  was  that  the  government  of 
Prance  had  fallen  into  the  bauds  of  men  of  disorder^ 
and  that  it  was  more  important  for  bis  army  to  save 
France  from  the  Government  than  from  the  invader. 
He  was  the  only  man  ia  France  who  thought  so.  The 
Qovemraeut  of  September  4th,  whatever  its  faults,  was 
good  enough  for  tens  of  thousands  of  brave  men. 
Legitimists,    Orleanists.     Bonapartists,    wha    flocked 


UTOL  RKOAPTUBB   OF  ORLEANS.  457 

without  distinction  of  party  to  its  banners :  it  might 
have  been  good  enough  for  Marshal  Bazaine.  But 
France  had  to  pay  the  penalty  for  the  political,  the 
moral  indifference  which  could  acqaiesce  in  the  Coop 
d'£tat  of  1851,  in  the  servility  of  the  Empire,  in 
many  a  rile  and  boasted  deed  in  Mexico,  in  China,  in 
Algiers.      Such    indifference    found   its   Nemeais  in  a 


The  surrender  of  Metz  and  the  release  of  the  great 
army  of  Prince  Frederick  Charles  by  which  it  was 
besieged  fatally  changed  the  conditions  of  the  French 
war  of  national  defence.  Two  hundred  thousand  of 
the  victorious  troops  of  Germany  uuder  some  of  their 
ablest  generals  were  set  iree  to  attack  the  still  untrained 
levies  on  the  Loire  and  in  the  north  oE  France,  which, 
with  more  time  for  organisation,  might  well  have 
forced  the  Germans  to  raise  the  siege  of  Paris.  The 
army  once  commanded  by  Steinmetz  was  now  recon- 
stituted, and  despatched  under  General  Manteuffel 
towards  Amiens;  Prince  Frederick  Charles  moved 
with  the  remainder  of  his  troops  towards  the  Loire. 
Aware  that  his  approach  could  not  long  be  delayed, 
Gambetta  insisted  that  Aorelle  de  Paladines  slionld 
begin  the  march  on  Paris.  The  general  attacked  Tana 
at  Coulmiers  on  the  9th  of  November, 
defeated  him,  and  re-occupied  Orleans,  the  ^omCM^ 
first  real  success  that  the  French  had 
gained  in  the  war.  There  was  great  alarm  at  the 
German  headquarters  at  Versailles ;  the  possibility  of 
A  ^ii»  of  the  uege  waa  discossed;  and  forty  tboa- 


U8  IfODSSV  SUROPB.  m%. 

sand  troops  were  sent  sonthwards  in  baste  to  the 
support  of  the  Bavarian  general.  Anrelle,  howeyer, 
did  not  move  upon  the  capital :  his  troops  were  still 
unfit  for  the  enterprise;  and  he  remained  stationary 
on  the  north  of  Orieans,  in  order  to  improve  his 
organisation,  to  avrait  roiaforcements,  and  to  meet  the 
attack  of  Frederick  Charles  in  a  strong  position.  In 
the  third  week  of  November  the  leading  divisions  of 
the  army  of  Metz  approached,  and  took  post  between 
Orleans  and  Paris.  Gambetta  now  insisted  that  the 
effort  should  be  made  to  relieve  the  capital.  Aurelle 
resisted,  but  was  forced  to  obey.  The  garrison  of 
Paris  had  already  made  several  unsuccessful  attacks 
upon  the  lines  of  their  besiegers,  the  most  vigorous 
being  that  of  Le  Bourget  on  the  30th  of  October, 
in  which  bayonets  were  crossed.  It  was  arranged  th;it 
in  the  last  days  of  November  Qenerol  Trocha  should 
endeavour  to  break  oat  on  the  southern  side,  and  that 
simultaneously  the  army  of  the  Loire  should  fall  upon 
the  enemy  in  front  of  it  and  endeavour  to  force  its 
way  to  the  capital.  On  the  28th  the  attack  upon  the 
Germans  on  the  north  of  Orleans  began.     For  several 

days  the  struggle  was  renewed  by  one 
touu,  Not.  »-      divisiou    after    another  of    the    armies   of 

Aurelle  and  Prince  Frederick  Charles. 
Victory  remained  at  last  with  the  Germans;  the 
centre  of  the  French  position  was  carried;  the  right 
and  left  wings  of  the  army  were  severed  from  one 
another  and  forced  to  retreat,  the  one  up  the  Loire. 
tlie    other   towards    the   west      Orleans    on    the    dth 


mt.  rAILUBB   OF  THS  BELlBTINa  ARMIES.  459' 

<A  December  passed  back  into  tbe  hands  of  the  Gei> 

raasa.    The  sortie  £rom  Paris,  which  began  with   a 

successful  attack  bj  General  Ducrot  upon 

Champigny  beyond  the  Marne,  ended  after    ^t.not.W' 

some  days    of  combat  in  the  recorery  by 

the  Germans  of  the   positions   which  they  had  lost, 

and  in  the  retreat  of    Ducrot   into  Paris.     In    the 

same    week    Manteuffel,    moving    against 

the  relieving  army  of  the  north,  encoan-         Amint, 

tered    it  near   Amiens,    defeated    it    after 

a   hard   straggle,  and   gained    possession   of  Amiens 

itself. 

After  tbe  fall  of  Amiens,  Manteuffel  moved  upon 
Bouen.  This  city  fell  into  his  hands  without  resist- 
ance ;  the  conquerors  pressed  on  westwards,  uid  at 
Dieppe  troops  which  had  come  from  the  „ 
confines  of  Russia  gazed  for  the  first  time  °"-'- 
upon  the  sea.  But  the  EepuUican  armies,  unlike  those 
which  the  Oermans  had  first  encountered,  were  not  to 
be  crushed  at  a  single  blow.  Under  the  energetic  com- 
mand of  Faidherbe  the  army  o£  the  North  advanced 
again  upon  Amiens.  Goeben,  who  was  left  to  defend 
the  line  of  the  Somme,  went  out  to  meet  him,  defeated 
him  on  the  33rd  of  December,  and  drove  him  back  to 
Arras.  But  again,  after  a  week's  interval,  Faidherbe 
pushed  forward.  On  the  3rd  of  January  he  fell  upon 
Ooeben's  weak  division  at  Bapaume,  and  handled  it 
BO  severely  that  the  Germans  would  on  the 
following  day  have  abandoned  their  position, 
if   the  French  had  not  themselves  been  the  fiist  to 


180  310VBBH  SUROPa.  vn. 

retire.  Faidherbe,  however,  had  only  &Uen  back  to 
receive  reinforcements.  After  some  clays'  rest  he  onoe 
more  sought  to  gain  the  road  to  Paris,  advandng  this 
time  by  the  eastward  line  through  St.  Quentin.  In 
front  of  this  town  Qoeben  attacked  him.  The  last 
BL  QwrtfB,       battle  of  the  army  of  the  North  was  fought 

"*  on   the    19th    of    January.      The    French 

general  endeavoured  to  disguise  his  defeat,  but  the 
Cferman  commaoder  had  won  all  that  he  desired. 
Faidherbe's  army  was  compelled  to  retreat  northwards 
in  disorder ;  its  part  in  the  war  was  at  an  elid. 

During  the  last  three  weeks  of  December  there  wa« 
a  pause  in  the  operations  of  the  Oermans  on  the  Loire. 
It  was  expected  that  Bourbaki  and  the  east 
tttLajnudgf  Wing  of  the  Freuch  army  would  soon 
te-appear  at  Orleans  and  endeavour  to 
combine  with  Ohanzy's  troops.  Qambetta,  however, 
had  formed  another  plan.  He  considered  that 
Ohanzy,  with  the  assistance  of  divisions  formed 
in  Brittany,  would  be  strong  enough  to  encounter 
Prince  Frederick  Charles,  and  he  determined  to  throw 
the  airoy  of  Bourbaki,  strengthened  by  reinforcements 
from  the  south,  upon  Germany  itself.  The  design  was 
a  daring  one,  and  had  the  two  French  armies  been 
capable  of  performing  the  work  which  Gfamhetta  reqaired 
of  them,  an  inroad  into  Baden,  or  even  the  re>conquest 
of  Alsace,  would  most  seriously  have  affected  the  posi- 
tion of  the  Gbrmans  before  Paris.  But  Gambetta 
miscalculated  the  power  of  young,  untrained  troops, 
imperfectly  armed,  badly  fed,  against  a  veteran  enemy. 


In  a  series  of  hard-foaght  straggleB  the  army  of  the 
Loire  under  Qensral  Chanzj  was  driren  back  at  the 
beginning  of  January  from  Yenddme  to  Le  Muis.  On 
the  12ih,  Cbanzy  took  post  before  this  city  and  fought  bia 
last  battle.  Wbile  he  was  making  a  vigorous  resistance 
in  the  centre  of  the  line,  the  Breton  raiments  stationed 
on  his  right  gave  way;  the  O-ermans  pressed  round 
him,  and  gained  possession  of  the  town.  Chanzy 
retreated  towu^  Jjavai,  leaving  thousands 
of  prisoners  in  the  hands  of  the  enemy,  and 
saving  only  the  debris  of  an  army.  Bourhaki  in  the 
meantime,  with  a  numerous  but  miserably  equipped 
force,  had  almost  reached  Belfort.  The  report  of  his 
eastward  movement  was  not  at  first  believed  Booibau. 
at  the  German  headquarters  before  Paris,  and  the  troops 
of  General  Werder,  which  had  been  engaged  about  Dijon 
with  a  body  of  auxiliaries  commanded  by  Garibaldi,  were 
left  to  bear  the  brunt  of  the  attack  without  support. 
"When  the  real  state  of  affairs  became  known  Manteuffel 
was  sent  eastwards  in  hot  haste  towards  the  threatened 
point.  -  Werder  had  evacuated  Dijon  and  fallen  back 
upon  Vesoiil ;  part  of  his  army  was  still  occupied  in  the 
siege  of  Belfort.  As  Bourbaki  approached  he  fell  back 
with  the  greater  part  of  his  troops  in  order  to  cover  the 
besieging  force,  leaving  one  of  his  lieutenants  to  make 
a  flank  attack  upon  Bourbaki  at  Villersexel.  This 
attack,  one  of  the  fiercest  in  the  war,  delayed  the 
French  for  two  days,  and  gave  "Werder  time  MontMUud, 
to  occupy  the  strong  positions  that  he  had 
ehosen  aboat  Montb^Uard.     Here,  on   the  ^  16th  of 

I      l,z<..:t,C00gIC 


482  KODEBJIf  XUBOPB.  Hn. 

January,  began  a  struggle  which  lasted  for  three  dajs. 
The  French,  starving  and  perishing  with  cold,  though  6^ 
superior  in  number  to  their  enemy,  were  led  with  little 
effect  agiunst  the  German  entrenchmeots.  On  the  18th 
Bourbaki  began  his  retreat.  Werder  was  tmable  to 
follow  him ;  Manteuffel  with  a  weak  force  was  still  at 
some  distance,  and  for  a  moment  it  seemed  possible 
that  Bourbaki,  by  a  rapid  movement  westwards,  might 
crush  this  isolated  foe.  Gambetta  ordered  Bourbaki  to 
make  the  attempt :  the  commander  refused  to  court 
further  disaster  with  troops  who  were  not  fit  to  face 
an  enemy,  and  retreated  towards  Pontarlier  in  the 
hope  of  making  his  way  to  Lyons.  But  Manteuffel 
now  descended  in  front  of  him ;  divisions  of  "Warder's 
army  pressed  down  from  the  north ;  the  retreat  was  cat 
off;  and  the  unfortunate  French  general,  whom  a 
telegram  from  Gambetta  removed  from  his  command, 
attempted  to  take  his  own  life.    On  the  1st 

TtwEutem  '- 

B^R^Si^    of  February,  the  wreck  of   his  army,  still 
numbering  eighty-five  thousand  men,  but 
reduced  to    the    extremity   of    weakness  and  misery, 
sought  refuge  beyond  the  Swiss  frontier. 

The  war  was  now  over.  Two  days  aft^  Bonrbaki's 
repulse  at  Montb^liard  the  last  unsuccessful  sortie  was 
made  from  Paris.  There  now  remained  provisions  only 
for  another  fortnight ;  above  forty  thousand  of  the  in- 
habitants bad  succumbed  to  the  privations  of  the  siege ; 
all  hope  of  assistance  from  the  relieving  armies  before 
actual  fiunine  should  begin  disappeared.  On  the  2drd 
of  January  Favre  sought  the  German  Chancellor  at 


HffL  OAFiruLATioxr  or  pabis.  «a 

Yersailles  in  order  to  discuss  the  conditions  of  a  general 
armistice  and  of  the  capitnlation  of  Paris. 
The  negotiations  lasted  for  several  days;  on  Pui>uidAj> 
the  28tb  an  armistice  was  signed  with  the 
declared  object  that  elections  might  at  ouce  be  freely 
held  for  a  National  Assembly,  which  should  decide 
whether  the  war  should  be  continued,  or  on  what  con- 
ditions peace  should  be  made.  The  conditions  of  the 
armistice  were  that  the  forts  of  Paris  and  all  their 
material  of  war  should  be  handed  over  to  the  German 
army ;  that  the  artillery  of  the  enceinte  should  be 
dismounted ;  and  that  the  regular  troops  in  Paris  should. 
as  prisoners  of  war,  surrender  their  arms.  The  National 
Guard  were  permitted  to  retain  their  weapons  and  their 
artillery.  Immediately  upon  the  fulfilment  of  the  first 
two  conditions  all  facilities  were  to  be  given  for  the 
entry  of  supplies  of  food  into  Paris.* 

The  articles  of  the  armistice  were  duly  executed,  and 
on  the  30th  of  January  the  Prussian  flag  waved 
over  the  forts  of  the  French  capital.  Orders  were  sent 
into  the  provinces  by  the  Government  that  elections 
should  at  once  be  held.  It  had  at  one  time  been  feared 
by  Count  Bismarck  that  Gambetta  would  acknowledge 
no  armistice  that  might  be  made  by  his  colleagues  at 
Paris.  But  this  apprehension  was  not  realised,  for, 
while  protesting  against  a  measure  adopted 
without  consultation  with  himself  and  his  wj^Bari-ai. 
companions  at  Bordeaux,  Gambetta  did  not 

•  HftliB.ii.21&     Talfoe]r,I>ip]<niuiUednGosnn)ementde)aIMf6iut 
Kktionale,  ii.  U.    Hertdet,  Hap  of  Europe^  iii  191S,  ISU. 


464  MODSBN  EUROPS.  an 

actually  reject  tlie  armistice.  He  called  npon  the 
nation,  however,  to  use  the  interval  for  the  collection  of 
new  forces;  and  in  the  hope  of  gaining  from  the 
election  an  Assemhly  in  favour  of  a  continuation  of  the 
war,  he  puhlisbed  a  decree  incapacitating  for  election  all 
persons  who  had  heen  connected  with  the  Government 
of  Kapoleon  IH.  Against  this  decree  Bismarck  at  once 
protested,  and  at  his  instance  it  was  cancelled  by  the 
Government  of  Paris.  Gambetta  thereupon  resigned. 
The  elections  were  held  on  the  8th  of  Pebmaiy,  and  on 
the  12th  the  National  Assemhly  was  opened  at  Bord- 
eaux. The  Government  of  Defence  now  laid  down  its 
powers.  Thiers — who  had  been  the  author  of  those 
fortifications  which  had  kept  the  Germans  at  hay  for 
four  months  after  the  overthrow  of  the  Imperial  armies; 
who,  in  the  midst  of  the  delirium  of  July,  1870,  had  done 
all  that  man  could  do  to  dissuade  the  Imperial  Govern- 
ment and  its  Parliament  from  war ;  who,  in  spite  of 
his  seventy  years,  bad,  after  the  fall  of  Napoleon 
hurried  to  London,  to  St.  Petersburg,  to  Florence,  to 
Vienna,  in  the  hope  of  winning  some  support  for  France, 
— was  the  man  called  by  common  assent  to  the  helm 
of  State.  He  appointed  a  Ministry,  called  npon  the 
Assembly  to  postpone  all  discussions  as  to  the  future 
Government  of  France,  and  himself  proceeded  to 
Versailles  in  order  to  negotiate  conditions  of  peace. 
For  several  days  the  old  man  stru^led  with  Count 
Bismarck  on  point  after  point  In  the  Prussian  demands. 
Bismarck  required  the  cession  of  Alsace  and  Eastern 
Lorraine,  the  payment  ft  ail  milUftrcU  of  femes,  4nd  the 


nn.  aomanosB  or  pxaos.  us 

occupation  of  part  of  Paris  by  the  Carman  armj  until 
the  coQditions  of  peace  sbould  be  ratified  bj  the 
Ajssembly.  Thiers  strove  hard  to  save  Metz,  bat  on 
this  point  the  German  staff  was  inexorable ;  he  snc- 
oeeded  at  last  in  reducing  the  indemnity  to  five  milliards, 
and  was  given  the  option  between  retaining  Belfcnrt  and 
sparing  Paris  the  entry  of  the  German  troops.  On  the 
last  point  his  patriotism  decided  without  a  moment's 
hesitation.  He  bade  the  Germans  entor  Paris,  and  saved 
Belfortfor  France.  On  the  26th  of  February  preliminaries 
of  peace  were  signed.  Thirty  thousand  prguminari^of 
German  soldiers  marched  into  the  Champs 
Elys^s  on  the  Ist  of  March ;  but  on  that  same  day  the 
treaty  was  ratified  by  the  Assembly  at  Bordeaux,  and 
after  forty-eight  hours  Paris  was  freed  from  the  sight  of 
its  conquerors.  The  Articles  of  Peace  provided  for  the 
gradual  evacuation  of  France  by  the  German  army  as 
the  instalments  of  the  indemnity,  which  were  allowed 
to  extend  over  a  period  of  three  years,  should  be  paid. 
There  remained  for  settlement  only  certain  matters  of 
detail,  chiefly  connected  with  finance ;  these,  however, 
proved  the  object  of  long  and  bitter  controversy,  and 
it  was  not  until  the  10th  of  May  that  the  definitive 
Treaty  of  Peace  was  signed  at  Frankfort. 

France  had  made  war  in  order  to  on  do  the  work  of 
partial  onion  effected  by  Prussia  in  1866:  it  achieved 
the  opposite  result,  and  Germany  emerged  _^ 
from  the  war  with  the  Empire  established. 
Immediatoly  after  f  i  victory  of  Wdrth  the  Crown 
Prince  had  seen  thft*  u^  time  had  come  for  abolishing 
£  S 


MOI>SB}T  SUBOPS 


the  line  of  division  wHcb  severed  Southern  Germany 
from  the  Federation  of  the  North.  Hia  ,owu  concept 
tion  of  the  hest  form  of  nation^  anion  was  a  German 
Empire  with  its  chief  at  Berlin.  That  Count  Bismarck 
was  without  plana  for  uniting  North  and  South  QbT' 
many  it  is  impossible  to  believe;  but  the  Minister 
and  the  Crown  Prince  had  ^ways  been  at  enmity ;  and 
when,  after  the  battle  of  Sedan,  they  spoke  together  of 
the  future,  it  seemed  to  the  Prince  as  if  Bismarck  had 
scarcely  thought  of  the  federation  of  the  Empire  or  of 
the  re-establishment  of  the  Imperial  dignity,  and  as 
if  he  was  inclined  to  it  only  under  certain  reserves.  It 
was,  however,  part  of  Bismarck's  system  to  exclude 
the  Crown  Prince  as  far  as  possible  from  poUtical  af^is, 
under  the  strange  pretext  that  his  relationship  to 
Queen  Victoria  would  be  abused  by  the  French  pro- 
clivities of  the  English  Court ;  and  it  is  possible  that 
had  the  Chancellor  after  the  battle  of  Sedan  chosen  to 
admit  the  Prince  to  his  confidence  instead  of  resenting 
his  interference,  the  difference  between  their  views  as  to 
the  future  of  Germany  would  have  been  seen  to  he  one 
rather  of  forms  and  means  than  of  intention.  But 
whatever  the  share  of  these  two  dissimilar  spirits  in  the 
initiation  of  the  last  steps  towards  German  union,  the 
work>  as  ultimately  achieved,  was  both  in  form  and 
in  substance  that  which  the  Crown  Prince  had  con- 
ceived. In  the  course  of  September  negotiations  were 
opened  with  each  of  the  Southern  States  for  its  enlxy 
into  the  Northern  Confederation.  Bavaria  alone  nused 
serious  difficulties,  and  demandddftterms  to  which  the 


UK  romiDATKN  OF  TBS   OBBltAlf  EMPIRE.         467 

PnissiaD  GoTemment  could  not  consent.  Eisinarck 
re&ained  From  exercising  pressure  at  Munich,  but  invited 
the  several  Governments  to  send  representatives  to 
Versailles  for  the  purpose  of  arriving  at  a  settlement. 
For  a  moment  the  Court  of  Miinich  drew  the  sovereign 
of  Wurtemberg  to  its  side,  and  orders  were  sent  to  the 
envoys  of  Wiirtembeig  at  Versailles  to  act  with  the 
Bavarians  in  refusing  to  sign  the  treaty  projected  by 
Bismarck.  The  Wurtemberg  Ministers  hereupon  ten- 
dered their  resignation ;  Baden  and  Hesse-Darmstadt 
signed  the  treaty,  and  the  two  dissentient  kings  saw 
themselves  on  the  point  of  being  excluded  from 
United  Germany.  They  withdrew  their  opposition, 
and  at  the  end  of  November  the  treaties  uniting  aE 
the  Southern  States  with  the  existing  Confederation 
were  executed,  Bavaria  retaining  larger  separate  rights 
than  were  accorded  to  any  other  member  of  the  Union. 

In  the  acts  which  thus  gave  to  Germany  political 
cohesion  there  was  nothing  that  ^tered  the  title 
of  its  chief.  Bismarck,  however,  had  in  the  mean- 
time informed  the  recalcitrant  sovereigns  that  if 
they  did  not  themselves  offer  the  Imperial  dignity 
to  King  "William,  the  North  German  Parliament 
woald  do  so.  At  the  end  of  November  a  letter 
was  accordingly  sent  by  the  King  of  Bavaria  to 
all  his  fellow-sovereigns,  proposing  that  the  King  of 
Fmssia,  as  President  of  the  newly-formed  Federation, 
should  assume  the  title  of  German  Emperor.  Shortly 
afterwards  the  same  request  was  made  by  the  sune 
sovereign  to  King  Willitun  himself,  in  a  letter^  dictated 


MB  ja>DXBN  SUBOPB.  mn. 

by  Bismarck.  A  deputation  from  the  North  German 
Beichstag,  beaded  bj  its  Presideot,  Dr.  Simson,  who, 
as  President  of  the  Frankfort  National  Assembly,  had 
in  1849  offered  the  Imperial  Orown  to  King  Frederick 
William,  expressed  the  concurrence  of  the  nation  in  the 
act  of  the  Princes.  It  was  expected  that  before  the  end 
of  the  year  the  new  political  arrangements  would  have 
been  sanctioned  by  the  Parliaments  of  all  the  States 
concerned,  and  the  1st  of  January  had  been  fixed  for  the 
assumption  of  the  Imperial  title.  So  vigorous,  however, 
was  the  opposition  made  in  the  Bavarian  Chamber,  that 
the  ceremony  was  postponed  till  the  1 8th.  Even  then 
the  final  approving  vote  had  not  been  taken  at  Munich ; 
but  a  second  adjournment  would  have  been  fatal  to  the 
dignity  of  the  occasion ;  and  on  the  18th  of  January, 
in  the  midst  of  the  Princes  of  Germany  and  tbe  repre- 
sentatives of  its  army  assembled  in  the  HaJl 
ttaB&ginkJw.  of  Hirrors  at  Versailles,  King  William  as- 
sumed the  title  of  German  Emperor.  The 
first  Parliament  of  the  Empire  was  opened  at  Berlin  two 
months  later. 

The  misfortunes  of  France  did  not  end  with  the 
fall  of  its  capital  and  the  loss  of  its  border-provinces ; 
the  terrible  drama  of  1870  closed  with  civil  war.  It 
is  part  of  the  normal  order  of  French  history  that  when 
an  established  Government  is  overthrown,  and  another 
is  set  in  its  place,  this  second  GK)vernment  is  in  its  turn 
attacked  by  insurrection  in  Paris,  and  an 
effort  is  made  to  establish  the  rule  of  the 
demoota<^  of  the  capital  itself,  or  of  those  wbQ  f<W  the 


MTL  THB    OOiaiUNB   OF  FAOIS.  469 

moment  pass  for  its  leaders.  It  was  bo  in  1793,  in  1831, 
in  1848,  and  it  was  so  a^in  in  1870.  '  Favre,  Trochu, 
and  tlie  other  members  of  the  Qoremment  of  Defence 
had  assumed  power  on  the  downfall  of  Napoleon  III., 
becaase  they  considered  themselves  the  individaals  best 
able  to  serve  the  State.  There  were  hundreds  of  other 
persons  in  Paris  who  had  exactly  the  same  opinion 
of  themselves;  and  when,  with  the  progresB  of  the 
siege,  the  Government  of  Defence  lost  its  popularity  and 
credit,  it  was  natural  that  ambitious  and  impatient  men 
of  a  lower  political  rank  should  consider  it  time  to  try 
whether  Paris  conld  not  make  a  better  defence  under 
their  own  auspices.  Attempts  were  made  before  the  end 
of  October  to  overthrow  the  Government.  They  were 
repeated  at  intervals,  but  without  success.  The  imita- 
tion, however,  continued  within  the  ranks  of  the 
National  Guard,  which,  unlike  the  National  Guard  in 
the  time  of  Louis  Philippe,  now  included  the  mass  of 
the  working  class,  and  was  the  most  dangerous  enemy, 
instead  of  the  support,  of  Government.  The  capitula- 
tion brought  things  to  a  crisis.  Favre  had  declared 
that  it  would  be  impossible  to  disarm  the  National 
Guard  without  a  battle  in  the  streets ;  at  his  instance 
Bismarck  allowed  the  National  Guard  to  retain  their 
weapons,  and  the  fears  of  the  Government  itself  thus 
prepared  the  way  for  successful  insurrection.  When 
the  G^ermanB  were  about  to  occupy  western  Paris,  the 
National  Guard  drew  off  its  artillery  to  Montmartre  and 
there  erected  entrenchments.  During  the  next  fort- 
night, while  the  Germans  were  withdrawing  from  the 


430  MODBKHr  SUBOPM.  m*. 

western  forts  in  accordance  with  the  conditions  of  peace, 
the  Government  and  the  National  Guard  stood  facing 
-  one  another  in  inaction ;  on  the  18th  of  March  General 
Lecomte  was  ordered  to  seize  the  artillety  parked  at 
Montmartre.     His  troops,  snrrounded  and  solicited  by 
the  National  Guard,  abandoned  their  com- 
mander.    Lecomte   was   seized,  and,    with 
General  Clement  Thomas,  was  pat  to  death. 
A  revolutionary  Central  Committee  took  possession  of 
the  H6tel  de  Ville ;  the  troops  still  remaining  faithful 
to  the  Government  were  withdrawn  to  Versailles,  where 
Thiers  had  assembled  the  Chamber.     Not  only  Paris 
itself,    but   the   western   forts    with   the    exception  of 
Mont  Yal^ricn,  fell  iuto  the  hands  of  the  insurgents.    On 
the  26th  of  March  elections  were  held  for  the  Commune. 
The  majority  of  peaceful  citizens  abstained  from  voting. 
A  council  was  elected,  which  by  the  side 
of  certain  harmless  and  well-meaning  men 
contained  a  troop  of  revolutionists  by  profession ;  and 
aft(!r  the  failure  of  all  attempts  at  conciliation,  hostilities 
began  between  Paris  and  Versailles. 

There  were  in  the  ranks  of  those  who  fought  for  the 
Bnmdsifve-  Commuue  some  who  fought  in  the  sincere 
*'  ^  belief  that  their  cause  was  that  of  munici- 
pal freedom ;  there  were  others  who  believed,  and  with 
good  reason,  that  the  existence  of  the  Bepublio  was 
threatened  by  a  reactionary  Assembly  at  Versailles ;  but 
the  movement  was  on  the  whole  the  work  of  fanatics  who 
sought  to  subvert  every  authority  but  their  own;  and 
the  unfortunate  mob  who  followed  them,  in  so  far  as  thej 


lan.  THE   OOMitUim.  471 

foagbt  for  anything  beyond  the  duly  pay  which  had 
been  their  only  means  of  sastenance  since  the  siege 
b^an,  fought  for  they  knew  not  what.  As  the  conflict 
was  prolonged,  it  took  on  both  sides  a  character  of 
atrocious  violence  and  cruelty.  The  murder  of  G^enerals 
Lecomte  and  Thomas  at  the  outset  was  avenged  by  the 
execution  of  some  of  the  first  prisoners  taken  by  the 
troops  of  Versailles.  Then  hostages  were  seized  by  the 
Commune.  The  slaughter  in  cold  blood  of  three  hundred 
Kational  G-uards  surprised  at  Clamart  by  the  besiegers 
gave  to  the  Parisians  the  example  of  massacre.  When, 
after  a  siege  of  six  weeks,  in  which  Paris  suffered  far  more 
severely  than  it  had  suffered  from  the  cannonade  of  the 
Germans,  the  troops  of  Versailles  at  length  made  their 
way  into  the  capital,  bumanity,  civilisation,  seemed  to 
have  vanished  in  the  orgies  of  devils.  The  defenders' 
as  they  fell  back,  murdered  their  host^es,  and  left 
behind  them  palaces,  museums,  the  entire  public  inheri- 
tance of  the  nation  in  its  capital,  in  flames.  The 
conquerors  during  several  days  shot  down  all  whom 
they  took  fighting,  and  in  many  cases  put  to  death 
whole  bands  of  prisoners  without  distinction.  The 
temper  of  the  umy  was  such  that  the  Government, 
even  if  it  bad  desired,  eonld  probably  not  have 
mitigated  the  terrors  of  this  vengeance.  But  there 
was  little  sign  anywhere  of  an  inclination  to  mercy. 
Courts-martial  and  executions  continued  long  after  the 
heat  of  combat  was  over.  A  year  passed,  and  the 
tribunes  were  still  busy  with  their  work.  Above 
ten  thousand   persons    were    sentenced    to    transpor- 


«7S  MODSRir  SUBOPM.  urn. 

tation    or    imprisonment    before   public    justice    was 
satisBed. 

The  material  losses  which  France  sustained  at  Oie 
hands  of  the  iavader  and  in  civil  war  were  soon 
repaired ;  bnt  from  the  battle  of  Worth  down  to  the 
overthrow  of  the  Commune  France  had  been  efhced  as 
a  Buropean  Power,  and  its  eSacement  was  turned  -to 
good  account  by  two  nations  who  were  not  its  enemies. 
Russia,  with  the  sanction  of  Europe,  threw  off  tbe 
trammels  which  had  been  imposed  upon  it  in  the  Black 
Sea  by  the  Treaty  of  1856.  Italy  gained  possession  of 
Bome.  Soon  after  the  declaration  of  war  the  troops  of 
France,  after  an  occupation  of  twenty-one  years  broken 
only  by  an  interval  of  some  months  in  1867,  were  with- 
drawn from  the  Papal  territory.  Whatever  may  have 
been  the  understanding  with  Victor  Emmanuel  on  which 
Napoleon  recalled  his  troops  from  Civita  Vecchia,  the 

battle  of  Sedan  set  Italy  free ;  and  on  the 
KXS^^     20th    of  September    the    National   Army. 

after  overcoming  a  brief  show  of  resistance, 
entered  Bome.  The  unity  of  Italy  was  at  last  com- 
pleted ;  Florence  ceased  to  be  the  national  capital.  A 
body  of  laws  passed  by  the  Italian  Parliament,  and 
known  as  the  Guarantees,  assured  to  the  Pope  the 
honours  and  immunities  of  a  sovereign,  tbe  possession  of 
the  Vatican  and  the  Lateran  palaces,  and  a  princely 

income ;  in  the  appointment  of  Bishops  and 

gener^y  in  the  government  of  the  Church 
a  fulness  of  authority  was  freely  left  to  him  such  as 
he  possessed  in  no  other  Furopean  land.    But  Pius 


would  accept  no  compromise  for  the  loss  of  liis  temporal 
power.  He  spumed  the  reconciliatioD  with  the  Italian 
people,  which  had  now  for  the  first  time  since  1849 
become  possible.  He  declared  Home  to  be  in  the 
possession  of  brigands ;  and,  with  a  fine  affectation  of 
disdain  for  Tictor  £mmannel  and  the  Italian  Qovem- 
ment,  he  invented,  and  sustained  down  to  the  end  of  his 
life,  before  a  world  too  busy  to  pay  much  heed  to  his 
performance,  the  reproachful  part  of  the  Prisoner  of  the 
TaticaD. 


D,a,l,zc.bvG00gIe 


CHAPTER  Vn. 

^nce  ftfta  ISTl'-AIliance  of  the  Three  Emparon — Bevolt  of  UeniegavitM— 
The  Andrtny  Note— Uurdsr  of  the  Coiualfl  ftt  Salonilia— The  Berlin 
Hemonndum— Bejecled  by  England — Abdul  Ade  dapoead — HasBacrea  in 
Bnl{(tiria — Servis  and  MDn(fln^;ro  declue  War— Opinioo  in  England — 
DUiaeli — Hooting'  of  Emperars  at  Reichstadt — Servian  Camptugn. — Dedan- 
tion  of  the  Czar — Conferenc^e  at  ConEtanUnoplo — Its  FaQora— The  Iiondon 
Protwol— Boatia  declaree  War— Adra.nce  on  the  Ballcam — Oaaan  at  PleTna 
—Second  Attack  on  Plema— The  Shipka  Poaa—Baamania— Third  Attuk 
to  Flema — Todleben- Fall  of  Plevna — FoBaago  of  the  Balkaaa— Armiatice 
— Bngland— The  Fleet  paaaea  the  DaidanaOea—l'rattj  of  Son  St«fano— 
England  and  RuBpia — Secret  Agreeaent— Oonveation  with  Turk^ — Cui- 
gieaa  of  Berlin — Treaty  of  Berlin — Bulgaria. 

Thb  storm  of  1870  was  followed  by  Bome  years  of 
iin„,ee,rft«  EuTOpeati  calm.  France,  recovering  with 
wonderful  rapidity  from  the  wounds  in- 
flicted by  the  war,  paid  with  ease  the  instalments  of 
ita  debt  to  Ckrmany,  and  saw  its  soil  liberated  from 
the  foreigner  before  the  period  fixed  by  the  Treaty 
of  Frankfort.  The  efforts  of  a  reactionary  Assembly 
were  kept  in  check  by  M.  Thiers;  the  Republic,  as 
the  form  of  government  which  divided  Frenchmen  the 
least,  was  preferred  by  him  to  the  monarchical  re- 
storation which  might  have  won  France  allies  at  some 
of  the  European  Courts.  For  two  years  Thiers  baffled 
or  controlled  the  royalist  majority  at  Versailles 
which  sought  to  place  the  Comte  de  Chambord  or 
the  chief  of  the  House  of  Orleans  on  the  throne, 
and  thus  saved  his  country  from  the  greatest  of  all 


iBn4T.  T&AJHOa  AITBS  TSB  WAR.,  4?» 

perils,  the  renewal  of  civil  war.  In  1873  he  fell 
l>efore  a  combination  of  his  opponents,  and  McMahon 
Bocceeded  to  the  Preeidency,  only  to  find  that  the 
royalist  cause  was  made  hopeless  by  the  refusal  of  the 
Comte  de  Cbamhord  to  adopt  the  Tricolour  flag,  and 
that  France,  after  several  years  of  trial,  definitely  preferred 
the  Kepnblic.  Meanwhile,  Prince  Bismarck  had  known 
how  to  frusb^te  alt  plans  for  raising  a  coalition  against 
▼ictorions  Germany  among  the  Powers  which  had  been 
injured  by  its  successes,  or  whose  interests  were  threat- 
ened by  its  greatness.  He  saw  that  a  Bonrbon  or  a 
Napoleon  on  the  throne  of  France  would  find  far  more 
sympathy  and  confidence  at  Vienna  and  St.  Petersburg 
than  the  shifting  chief  of  a  Eepublic,  and  ordered  Count 
Amim,  the  German  Ambassador  at  Paris,  who  wished 
to  promote  a  Napoleonic  restoration,  to  desist  from  all 
attempts  to  weaken  the  Bepublican  Government.  At 
St.  Petersburg,  where  after  the  misfortunes  of  1815 
France  had  found  its  best  friends,  the  German  states- 
man had  as  yet  little  to  fear.  Bismarck  had  sup- 
ported Eussia  in  undoing  the  Treaty  of  Paris;  in 
announcing  the  conclusion  of  peace  with  France,  the 
German  Emperor  had  assured  the  Czar  in  the  most 
solemn  language  that  his  services  in  preventing  the 
war  of  1870  from  becoming  general  should  never  be  for- 
gotten; and,  whatever  might  be  the  feeling  of  his  sub- 
jectB,  Alexander  II.  continued  to  believe  that  Russia  could 
find  no  steadier  friend  than  the  Government  of  Berlin. 

With  Austria  Prince  Bismarck  had  a  more  difGcult 
part  to  play.    He  could  hope  for  no  real  understanding 


so  long  as  Bcnst  remaiDed  at  the  head  of  affairs.  But 
the  events  of  1870,  utterly  frnstrating  Beust's  plans 
AuiukMoftbi  foi'  ^  coalition  against  Prussia,  and  definitely 
closing  for  Austria  all  hope  of  recovering 
its  position  within  Germany,  had  shakea  the  Minister's 
position.  Bismarck  was  able  to  offer  to  the  Emperor 
Francis  Joseph  the  sincere  and  cordial  friendship  of  the 
powerful  German  Empire,  on  the  condition  that  Austria 
should  frankly  accept  the  work  of  1866  and  1870.  He 
had  dissaaded  his  master  after  the  victory  of  Kdnig- 
gratz  from  annexing  any  Austrian  teiTitory ;  he  had 
imposed  no  condition  of  peace  that  left  behind  it  a 
lasting  exasperation  ;  and  he  now  reaped  the  reward  of 
his  foresight.  Pi-ancis  Joseph  accepted  the  friendship 
offered  him  from  Berlin,  and  dismissed  Count  Beust 
from  office,  calling  to  his  place  the  Hungarian  Minister 
Andrassy,  who,  by  conviction  aa  well  as  profession, 
welcomed  the  establishment  of  a  German  Empire,  and 
the  definite  abandonment  by  Austria  of  its  interference 
in  German  affairs.  In  the  summer  of  1872  the  three 
Emperors,  accompanied  by  their  Ministers,  met  in 
Berlin.  No  formal  alliance  was  made,  but  a  relation 
was  established  of  sufficient  intimacy  to  insure  Prince 
Bismarck  against  any  efforts  that  might  be  made  by 
France  to  gain  an  ally.  For  five  yeai-s  this  so-c^led 
League  of  the  three  Emperors  continued  in  more  or  less 
effective  existence,  and  condemned  France  to  isolation. 
In  the  apprehension  of  the  French  people,  Germany, 
gorged  with  the  five  milliards  but  still  lean  and 
ravenous,  sought  only  for  some  new  occasion  for  war, 


im.  fSS  TSRSS  SMPBBOBB.  477 

This  was  not  the  case.  The  German  nation  had  entered 
iinwillingly  into  the  war  of  1870  ;  that  its  ruler,  when 
once  his  great  aim  had  been  achieved,  sought  peace  not 
only  in  word  but  in  deed  the  history  of  subsequent 
years  has  proved.  The  alarms  which  at  intervals  were 
raised  at  Paris  and  elsewhere  had  little  real  foundation ; 
and  when  next  the  peace  of  Europe  was  broken,  it  was 
not  by  a  renewal  of  the  Struggle  on  the  Vo^es,  but  by 
a  conflict  in  the  Hast,  which,  terrible  as  it  was  in  the 
sufferings  and  the  destruction  of  life  which  it  involved, 
was  yet  no  senseless  duel  between  two  jealous  nations, 
but  one  of  the  most  fruitful  in  results  of  all  modem 
wars,  rescuing  whole  provinces  from  Ottoman  dominion, 
and  leaving  behind  it  in  place  of  a  chaos  of  outworn 
barbarism  at  least  the  elements  for  a  future  of  national 
independence  among  the  Balkan  population. 

In  the  summer  of  1875  Herzegovina  rose  agunst 
its  Turkish  masters,  and  in  Bosnia  conflicts  broke  oat 
between  Christians  and  Mohammedans.  The 
insurrection  was  vigorously,  though  pri-  'S"''^  ^^■ 
vately,  supported  by  Servia  and  Montenegro, 
and  for  some  months  baffled  all  the  efforts  made  by  the 
Forte  for  its  suppression.  Many  thousands  of  the 
Christians,  flying  from  a  devastated  land  and  a  merci- 
less enemy,  sought  refuge  beyoud  the  Austrian  frontier, 
and  became  a  burden  upon  the  Austrian  Government. 
The  agitation  among  the  Slavic  neighbours  and  kins- 
men of  the  insurgents  threatened  the  peace  of  Austria 
itself,  where  Slav  and  Magyar  were  almost  as  ready  to 
fall  upon  one  another  as  Christian  and  Turk.     Andi'issy 


478  UOBBBN  BVBOPS.  mt 

entered  into  commonicaiions  with  the  GoTemments  oi 
St.  Petersbui^  and  Berlin  as  to  the  adoption  of  a  com- 
mon line  of  policy  by  the  three  Empires  towards  the 
Porte ;  and  a  scheme  of  reforms,  intendecl  to  effect  the 
pacification  of  the  insm^ent  provinces,  was  drawn  up  by 
the  three  Ministers  in  concert  with  one  another.  This 
project,  which  was  known  as  the  AndhUsy  Note,  and 
which  received  the  approval  of  England  and  France, 
demanded  from  the  Porte  the  establishment  of  full  and 
entire  religious  liberty,  the  abolition  of  the  Arming  of 
taxes,  the  application  of  the  revenue  produced  by  direct 
taxation  in  BoEuia  and  Herzegovina  to  the  needs  of 
those  provinces  themselves,  the  institution  of  a  Oom- 
mission  composed  equally  of  Christians  and  Moham- 
medans to  control  the  execution  of  these  reforms  and 
of  those  promised  by  the  Porte,  and  finally  the  im- 
provement of  the  agrarian  condition  of  the  popula- 
tion by  the  sale  to  them  of  waste  lands  belonging 
to  the  State.  The  Note  demanding  these  reforms 
Aaixim  ti<*h  ^*^  presented  in  Constantinople  on  the 
fc«.M,W6.  gj^j.  ^j  January.  1876.  The  Porte,  which 
had  already  been  lavish  of  promises  to  the  insurgents, 
raised  certain  objections  in  detail,  but  ultimately  de- 
clared itself  willing  to  grant  in  substsmce  the  conces- 
sions which  were  specified  by  the  Powers.* 

Armed  with  this  assurance,  the  representatives  of 

Austria  now  endeavoured  to  persuade  the  insurgents  to 

lay  down  their  arms  and  the  refugees  to  return  to  their 

homes.     But  the  answer  was  made  that  promises  enough 

•  PMi  P»p.  1876,  ToL  Ixixiv.,  pp.  74, 96 


WH.  MUEDSB  OF  TSB   OONSULa.  179 

had  already  been  given  by  the  Sultan,  and  that  the 
qnestion  was,  not  what  more  was  to  be  written  od  a 
piece  of  paper,  bat  how  the  execution  of  these  promises 
was  to  be  enforced.  Without  some  guarantee  from  the 
Great  Powers  of  Europe  the  refugees  refused  to  place 
themselves  again  at  the  mercy  of  the  Turk  and  the 
leaders  in  Herzegovina  refused  to  disband  their  troops. 
The  conflict  broke  out  afresh  with  greater  enei^ ;  the 
intervention  of  the  Powers,  far  from  having 
produced  peace,  xoused  the  fanatical  passions  2™;^*<^^*>°- 
of  the  Mohammedans  both  against  the 
Christian  rayahs  aud  gainst  the  foreigner  to  whom  they 
had  appealed.  A  wave  of  religious,  of  patriotic  agita- 
tion, of  political  disquiet,  of  barbaric  fury,  passed  over 
the  Turkish  Empire.  On  the  6th  of  May  the  Prussian 
and  the  French  Consuls  at  Salonika  were  attacked  and 
murdered  by  the,  mob.  In  Smyrna  and  Constantinople 
there  were  threatening  movements  against  the  European 
inhabitants  ;  in  Bulgaria,  the  Circassian  settlers  and  the 
hordes  of  irregular  troops  whom  the  Government  had 
recently  sent  into  that  province  waited  only  for  the 
first  sign  of  an  expected  Insurrection  to  fall  upon  their 
prey  and  deltige  the  land  with  blood. 

As  soon  as  it  became  evident  that  peace  was  not  to 
he  produced  by  Count  Andrassy's  Note,  the  Ministers 
of  the  three  Empires  determined  to  meet  one  another 
with  the  view  of  arranging  further  diplo- 
matic steps  to  he  tiken  in  common.  Berlin,  Memommtiim. 
which  the  Czar  was  about  to  visit,  was 
chosen  as  the  meeting-place ;  the  date  of  the  me^ng 


480  MOPB^r  sonops.  uM 

was  fixed  for  tlie  second  week  in  May.  It  was  in  the 
interral  between  the  despatch  of  Prince  Bismarck's 
invitation  and  the  arrival  of  the  Czar,  with  Prince 
Gortschakoff  and  Count  Andr&ssy,  that  intelligence 
came  of  the  murder  of  the  Prussian  and  French  Con- 
suls at  Salonika.  This  event  gave  a  deeper  seriDus- 
ness  to  the  deliberations  now  hdd.  The  Ministers 
declared  that  if  the  representatives  of  two  foreign 
Powers  could  be  thiis  murdered  in  broad  daylight  in  a 
peaceful  town  under  the  eyes  of  the  powerless  attthori- 
ties,  the  Christians  of  the  insurgent  provinces  might 
well  decline  to  entrust  themselves  to  an  exasperated 
enemy.  An  effective  guarantee  for  the  execution  of  the 
promises  made  by  the  Porte  had  become  absolutely 
necessary.  The  conclusions  of  the  Ministers  were 
embodied  in  a  Memorandum,  which  declared  that  an 
armistice  of  two  months  must  be  imposed  on  the  com- 
batanis ;  that  the  mixed  Commission  mentioned  in  the 
Andrdssy  Note  must  be  at  once  called  into  being,  with 
a  Christian  native  of  Herzegovina  at  its  head ;  and  that 
the  reforms  promised  by  the  Porte  must  be  carried  out 
under  the  superintendence  of  the  representatives  of  the 
European  Powers.  If  before  the  end  of  the  armistice 
the  Porte  should  not  have  given  its  assent  to  these 
terms,  the  Imperial  Courts  declared  that  they  must 
support  these  diplomatic  efforts  by  measorm  of  a  more 
effective  character.* 

On  the   same    day  that  this    Memorandum    was 
signed.  Prince  Bismarck  invited  the  British,  the  French, 

•  Pari.  Fap.  1S76,  toL  kxxir.,  p.  183. 


m.  TBS  SSBTJN  XBUORAlWUBt.  481 

and  Italian  Ambassadors  to  meet  the  Kossian  and  the 
Austrian  Chancellors  at  his  residence.  They  did  so.  The 
Memorandum  was  read,  and  an  ui^ent  request  was 
•made  that  Great  Britain,  France,  and  Italy  would  com- 
bine with  the  Imperial  Couris  in  support  of  the  Berlin 
Memorandum  as  they  bad  in  support  of  the  Andriissy 
Note.  As  Prince  Gortschakoff  and  Andrdssy  were 
staying  in  Berlin  only  for  two  days  longer,  g^^  ^^ 
it  was  hoped  that  answers  might  be  received  jS^'jiSJilS^ 
by  telegraph  within  forty-eight  hours. 
Within  that  time  answers  arrived  from  the  French  laxd 
Italian  Governments  accepting  the  Berlin  Memorandum  ; 
the  reply  from  London  did  not  arrive  till  five  days  later ;  it 
announced  the  refusal  of  the  Government  to  join  in  the 
course  proposed.  Fending  further  negotiations  on  this 
subject,  French,  German,  Austrian,  Italian,  and  Russian 
ships  of  war  were  sent  to  Salonika  to  enforce  satisfaction 
for  the  murder  of  the  Consuls.  The  Cabinet  of  London, 
declining  to  associate  itself  with  the  concert  of  the 
Powers,  and  stating  that  Great  Britain,  while  intending 
nothing  in  the  nature  of  a  menace,  could  not  permit 
territorial  changes  to  be  made  in  the  East  without  its 
own  consent,  despatched  the  fleet  to  Besika  Bay. 

Up  to  this  time  little  attention  had  been  paid  in 
England  to  the  revolt  of  the  Christian  subjects  of  the 
Porte  or  its  effect  on  European  politics.  Now,  how- 
ever, a  series  of  events  began  which  excited  the  interest 
and  even  the  passion  of  the  English  people  ibaoiAJia* 
in  an  extraordinary  degree.  The  ferment  p™*""' *»- 
in  Constantinople  was  deepening.    On  the  29tb  of  May 


481  MODSns   EUBOPM*  m^ 

the  SoltftD  Abdul  Aziz  was  deposed  by  If  idhat  Pasha 
and  Hussein  Avni,  the  former  the  chief  of  the  party 
of  reform,  the  latter  the  representative  of  the  older 
Turkish  military  and  patriotio  spirit  which  Abdal 
Aziz  had  incensed  by  his  subserviency  to  Russia.  A 
few  days  later  the  deposed  Sultan  was  mordered.  Hus- 
sein Avni  and  another  rival  of  Midhat  were  assas- 
sinated by  a  desperado  as  they  sat  at  the  council; 
Murad  V.,  who  had  been  raised  to  the  throne,  proved 
imbecile ;  and  Midhat,  the  destined  regenerator  of  the 
Ottoman  Empire  as  many  outside  Turkey  believed, 
grasped  aU  but  the  highest  power  in  the  State.  To- 
wards the  end  of  June  reports  reached  western  Europe 
ji,,,,,^,^^  of  the  repression  of  an  insurrection  in  Bul- 
Buig«i^  garia  with  measures  of  atrocious  violence. 
Ser\'ia  and  Montenegro,  long  active  in  support  of  their 
kinsmen  who  were  in  arms,  declared  war. 
t«ieg™^d«i««  The  reports  from  Bulgaria,  at  first  vague, 
took  more  definite  form ;  and  at  length  the 
correspondents  of  German  as  well  as  English  news- 
papers, making  their  way  to  the  district  south  of  the 
Balkans,  found  in  villages  still  strewed  with  skeletons 
and  human  remains  the  terrible  evidence  of  what  had 
passed.  The  British  Ministry,  relying  upon  the  state- 
ments of  Sir  H.  Elliot,  Ambassador  at  Constantinople, 
at  first  denied  the  seriousness  of  the  massacres :  they 
directed,  however,  that  investigations  should  be  made 
on  the  spot  by  a  member  of  the  Embassy;  and  Mr. 
Baring,  Secretary  of  Legation,  was  sent  to  Bulgaria 
with  this  dnty.     Baring's  report  confimwd  the  accounts 


im  THE  BULOAItlAN  KiBBAOSaS.  483 

whieli  hiB  cliief  had  refased  to  believe,  and  placed 
the  number  of  the  victims,  lightlj  or  wrongly,  at  not 
less  than  twelve  thousand.* 

The  Bulgarian  massacres  acted  on  Europe  in  1876 
aa  the  massacre  of  Chios  had  acted  on  Europe  in  1822. 
In  England  especially  they  excited  the  deepest  horror^  ■ 
and  completely  changed  the  tone  of  public  optoioD  la 
opinion  towards  the  Turt.  Hitherto  the  '^'*'* 
public  mind  had  scarcely  been  conscious  of  the  questions 
that  were  at  issue  in  the  East.  Herzegovina,  Bosnia, 
Bulgaria,  were  not  familiar  names  like  Greece ;  the 
English  people  hardly  knew  where  these  countries 
were,  or  that  they  were  not  inhabited  by  Turks.  The 
Crimean  War  had  left  behind  it  the  tradition  of  friend- 
ship with  the  Sultan ;  it  needed  some  lightniDg-flash, 
some  shock  penetrating  all  ranks  of  society,  to  dispel 
once  and  for  all  the  conventional  idea  of  Turkey  as  a 
community  resembling  a  European  State,  and  to  bring 
home  to  the  English  people  the  true  condition  of  the 
Christian  races  of  the  Balkan  ander  their  Ottoman 
masters.  But  this  the  Bulgarian  massacres  effectively 
did ;  and  from  this  time  the  great  mass  of  the  English 
people,  who  had  sympathised  so  strongly  with  the 
Italians  and  the  Hungarians  in  their  straggle  for 
national  independence,  were  not  disposed  to  allow  the 
influence  of  Clreat  Britain  to  be  used  for  the  perpetua- 
tion of  Turkish  ascendency  over  the  Slavic  races. 
There  is  little  doubt  that  if  in  the  autumn  of  1876  the 
naUoa  had  had  the  opportunity  of  expressing  its  views 
•  PmL  P«p.  1877,  ToL  xc,  p.  143.  ,^  , 

,  A  8  ,  .„,.,C.oo8lc 


<U  MODSRN  EUBOFB.  HK 

by  a  Parliamentaiy  election,  it  would  have  insisted  on 
the  adoption  of  actiTe  measures  in  concert  with  the 
Powers  which  were  prepared  to  force  reform  npon  the 
Porte.  But  the  Parliament  of  1876  was  hut  two  years 
old ;  the  majority  which  supported  the  Govenunent 
was  stitl  nnbroken;  and  at  the  head  of  the  Cabinet  there 
was  a  man  gifted  with  eitraordinary  tenacity  of  purpose, 
with  great  powers  of  command  over  others,  and  with 
a  clear,  cold,  untroubled  apprehension  of  the  line  of 
conduct  which  he  intended  to  pursue.  It  was  one  of 
the  strangest  features  of  this  epoch  that  a  Minister  who 
in  a  long  career  bad  never  yet  exercised  the  slightest 
influeDce  npon  foreign  affairs,  and  who  was  not  him- 
self English  by  birth,  should  have  impressed  in  such 
an  extreme  degree  the  stamp  of  his  own  individuality 
upon  the  conduct  of  oar  foreign  policy ;  that  he  should 
have  forced  England  to  the  very  front  in  the  crisis 
through  which  Europe  was  passing;  and  that,  for 
good  or  for  evil,  he  should  have  reversed  the  tendency 
which  since  the  Italian  war  of  1859  had  seemed  ever 
to  be  drawing  England  further  and  further  away  from 
Continental  affairs. 

Disraeli's  conception  of  Parliamentary  politics  was 

an  ironical  one.      It  had    pleased   the    British   nation 

that  the  leadership  of  one  of  its  great  political  parties 

should  be  won   by  a  man  of  genius  only 

on  the  condition  of  accommodating  himself 

to  certain  singular  fancies  of  his  contemporaries ;  and 

for  twenty  years,  from  the  time  of  his  attacks   upon 

Sir  Bobert  Peel  for  the  abolition  of  the  oom-Iaws  down 

.   .  CooJc 


UM.  DIBItAXLL  485 

to  the  time  when  he  educated  his  partj  into  the 
democratic  Beform  BUI  of  1867,  Disraeli  with  an  ex- 
cellent grace  suited  himself  to  the  somewhat  strange 
parts  which  he  was  required  to  play.  But  after  1874, 
when  he  was  placed  in  office  at  the  head  of  a  powerful 
majority  in  both  Houses  of  Parliament  and  of  a  sub- 
missive Cabinet,  the  antics  ended ;  the  epoch  of  states- 
manship, and  of  statesmanship  based  on  the  leader's 
own  individual  thought  not  on  the  commonplace  of 
public  creeds,  began.  At  a  time  when  Cavour  was 
rice-growing  and  Bismarck  unknown  outside  his  own 
county,  Disraeli  had  given  to  the  world  in  Tancred  his 
visions  of  Eastern  Empire.  Mysterious  chieftains 
planned  the  regeneration  of  Asia  by  a  new  crusade  of 
Arab  and  Syrian  votaries  of  the  one  living  faith,  and 
lightly  touched  on  the  tninsfer  of  Queen  Victoria's  Court 
from  London  to  Delhi,  Nothing  indi.'ed  is  perfect; 
and  Disraeli's  eye  was  favoured  with  such  extra- 
ordinary perceptions  of  the  remote  that  it  proved 
a  little  uncertain  in  its  view  of  matters  not  quite 
withoat  importance  nearer  home.  He  thouglit  the 
attempt  to  establish  Italian  independence  a  misde- 
meanour ;  he  listened  to  Bismarck's  ideas  on  the  future 
of  Germany,  and  described  them  as  the  vapourings  of 
a  German  baron.  For  a  quarter  of  a  century  Disraeli 
had  dazzled  and  amused  the  House  of  Commons  with- 
out, as  it  seemed,  drawing  inspiration  from  any  one 
great  canse  or  discerning  any  one  of  the  political  goals 
towards  which  the  nations  of  Europe  were  tending. 
At  length,  however,  the  time  came  for  the  realisation 


486  MODB^r  BUROrE.  ml 

of  hig  own  imperial  policy ;  and  before  the  Hastem 
qaestion  bad  risen  conspicuously  above  the  horizon 
in  Europe,  Disraeli,  as  Prime  Minister  of  England, 
bad  began  to  act  in  Asia  and  Africa.  He  Bent  the 
Prince  of  Wales  to  hold  Durbars  and  to  hunt  tigers 
amongst  the  Hindoos ;  he  proclaimed  the  Queen 
Empress  of  India ;  he  purchased  the  Khedive's  shares 
in  the  Suez  Canal.  Thus  far  it  had  been  uncertain 
whether  there  was  much  io  the  Minister'  policy  beyond 
what  was  theatrical  and  picturesque;  but  when  a 
great  part  of  the  nation  began  to  ask  for  intervention 
on  behalf  of  the  Eastern  Christians  against  the  Turks, 
they  found  out  that  Disraeli's  purpose  was  solid 
enough.  Animated  by  a  deep  distrust  and  fear  of 
Kussia,  he  returned  to  what  had  been  the  policy  of 
Tory  Governments  in  the  days  before  Canning,  the 
identification  of  British  interests  with  the  maintenance 
of  Ottoman  power.  If  a  generation  of  sentimentalists 
were  willing  to  sacrifice  the  grandeor  of  an  Empire  to 
their  sympathies  with  an  oppressed  people,  it  was  not 
Disraeli  who  would  be  their  instrument.  When  the 
massacre  of  Batak  was  mentioned  in  the  House  o£ 
Commons,  he  dwelt  on  the  honourable  qualities  of  the 
Circassians ;  when  instances  of  torture  were  alleged, 
he  remarked  that  an  oriental  people  generally  ter- 
minated its  connection  with  culprits  in  a  more  expedi- 
tious manner.*  There  were  indeed  Englishmen  enough 
who  loved  their  country  as  well  as  Disraeli,  aud  who  had 
proved  their  love  by  sacrifices  which  Disraeli  had  not  had 
•  PmL  Doh.  Jal^  10, 1876,  Twbatim. 

I  i,z<..t,CoogIf 


occasion  to  make,  who  thought  it  hnmillatiiig  that  the 
greatneBs  of  England  should  be  purchased  by  the  servi- 
tude and  oppression  of  other  races,  and  that  the  security 
of  their  Empire  should  be  deemed  to  rest  on  so  miserable 
a  thing  as  Turkish  rule.  These  were  considerations  to 
which  Disraeli  did  not  attach  much  importance.  He 
believed  the  one  thing  needful  to  be  the  curbing  of 
Russia;  and,  unlike  Canning,  who  held  that  Hussia 
would  best  he  kept  in  check  by  England's  own  armed 
co-operation  with  it  in  establishing  the  independence 
of  Greece,  he  declined  irom  the  first  to  entertain  any 
project  of  imposing  reform  on  the  Sultan  by  force, 
doubting  only  to  what  extent  it  would  he  possible  for 
him  to  support  the  Sultan  in  resistance  to  other 
Powers.  According  to  bis  own  later  statement  he 
would  himself,  had  he  beeu  left  unfettered,  have  de- 
finitely informed  the  Czar  that  if  he  should  make  war 
upon  the  Porte  England  would  act  as  its  ally.  Public 
opinion  in  England,  however,  rendered  this  course  im- 
possible. The  knife  of  Circassian  and  Bashi-Bazouk 
had  severed  the  bond  with  Great  Britain  which  had 
saved  Turkey  in  1854.  Disraeli — henceforward  Earl  of 
Beaconsfield — could  only  utter  grim  anathemas  against 
Servia  for  presuming  to  draw  the  sword  upon  its 
rightful  lord  and  master,  and  chide  those  impatient 
English  who,  like  the  greater  man  whose  name  is 
associated  with  Beaconsfield,  considered  that  the  world 
need  not  be  too  critical  as  to  the  means  of  getting  rid 
of  such  an  evU  as  Ottoman  rule.* 

*  S«e  S>irke'>  ^eecli  on  the  Biuaaii  annsiueiit,  llarcli  29, 1791,  ind 


4SS  KODBRN  EUROPE.  MM- 

The  rejection  bjr  England  of  the  Berlin  Memo- 
randum and  the  proclamation  of  war  by  Servia  and 
Montenegro  were  followed  by  the  closer  union  of  the  three 
Imperial  Courts.  The  Czar  and  the  Emperor  Francis 
Joseph,  with  their  Ministers,  met  at  Beicbstadt  in 
Bohemia  on  the   8th  of   July.      According  to  official 

statements  the  result  of  the  meeting  was 
"SS^jS^^    that  the  two  sovereigns   determined  upon 

non-intervention  for  the  present,  and  pro- 
posed only  to  renew  the  attempt  to  unite  all  the 
Christian  Powers  in  a  common  policy  when  some 
definite  occasion  should  arise.  Bamours,  however, 
which  proved  to  be  correct,  went  abroad  that  something 
of  the  nature  of  an  eventual  partition  of  European 
Turkey  had  been  the  object  of  negotiation.  A  Treaty 
had  in  fact  been  signed  providiog  that  if  Bussia 
should  liberate  Bulgaria  by  arms,  Austria  should  enter 
into  pos.ses8ion  of  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina.  The 
neutrality  of  Austria  had  virtually  been  purchased  at 
this  price,  and  Russia  had  thus  secured  freedom  of 
action  in  the  event  of  the  necessary  reforms  ■  not  being 
forced  upon  Turkey  by  the  concert  of  Europe.  Sooner 
perhaps  than  Prince  Gortschakoff  had  expected,  the 
religious  enthusiasm  of  the  Kussian  people  and  their 
sympathy  for  their  kinsmen  and  fellow-believers  beyond 
the  Danube  forced  the  Czar  into  vigorous  action.    In 

the  passage  on  "  (lie  barb&rons  autrclua  deapotism  "  of  Tnrkej-  in  liis  B«- 
flections  on  the  Frencli  KeTolntion.  p.  150,  Clar.  Edit.  Burke  lived  and  died 
at  Beaconefield,  nnd  bis  grave  is  there.  There  eeenis,  howerer,  to  be  no 
evidence  for  the  Btarj  that  he  waa  about  to  receive  a  peerage  with  the 
litl»  of  Bettoana&M,  when  th?  deatb  «(  Ms  wm  bf«l[e  oU  U«  bopet. 


UM.  SEBVIAN  WAS.  486 

Spite  of  the  assistance  of  several  thousands  oE  Russian 
Tolanteers  and  of  the  leadership  of  &e  RuRsian  General 
Tchemaieff,  the  Servians  were  defeated  in 
their  struggle  with  the  Turks.  The  media-  •'^i^ 
tion  of  England  was  in  vain  tendered  to 
tlie  Forte  on  the  only  terms  on  which  even  at 
London  peace  was  seen  to  he  possible,  the  mainten- 
ance of  the  existing  nghts  of  Servia  and  the  establish- 
ment of  provincial  autonomy  in  Bosnia,  Herzegovina, 
and  Bulgaria.  After  a  brief  suspension  of  hostilities 
in  September  wm  waa  renewed.  The  Servians  were 
driven  from  their  positions:  Alexinatz  vras  captured, 
the  road  to  Belgrade  lay  open,  and  the  doom  of  Bul- 
garia seemed  likely  to  descend  upon  the  conquered 
Principality.  The  Turks  offered  indeed  a  five  months' 
umistice,  which  Wonld  have  saved  them  the  risks  of 
a  winter  campaign  and  enabled  them  to  crush  their 
enemy  with  accumulated  forces  in  the  following  spring. 
This,  by  the  advice  of  Russia,  the  Servians  refused  to 
accept.  On  the  30th  of  October  a  Russian 
ultimatum  was  handed  in  at  Constantinople  •<■  ntaui^^ 
by  the  Ambassador  Ignatieff,  requiring 
within  forty-eight  hours  the  grant  to  Servia  of  an 
armistice  for  two  months  and  the  cessation  of  hostilities. 
The  Porte  submitted ;  and  wherever  Slav  and  Ottoman 
stood  facing  one  another  in  arniB,  in  Herzegovina  and 
Bosnia  as  well  as  Servia  and  Montenegro,  there  was  a 
panse  in  the  struggle. 

The  imminence  of  a  war  between  Bossia  and  Turkey  in 
the  last  days  of  October  and  th«  dose  connection  between 


00  MODERN  SUROPB.  UK 

Bossia  and  tlie  Servian  cause  jnstiiied  the  anxiety  of 
tbe  Britiiil)  Government.  Tbis  uixiety  tlie  Czar  sought 
to  dispel  by  a  frank  declaration  of  his  own 
views.  On  tbe  2nd  of  November  he  entered 
into  conversation  with  the  British  Ambassa- 
dor, Lord  A.  Loftus,  and  assured  him  on  his  word  of 
honour  that  he  bad  no  intention  of  acquiring  Constanti- 
nople ;  that  if  it  should  be  necessary  for  him  to  occapy 
part  of  Bulgaria  his  army  would  remain  there  only 
until  peace  was  restored  and  tbe  security  of  tbe  Christian 
population  established ;  and  generally,  that  he  desired 
nothing  more  earnestly  than  a  complete  accord  between 
Kngland  and  Bussia  in  the  maintenance  of  European 
peace  and  the  improvement  of  tbe  condition  of  the 
Christian  population  in  Turkey.  He  stated,  however, 
with  perl'ect  clearness  that  if  the  Porte  should  continue 
to  refuse  the  reforms  demanded  by  Europe,  and  the 
Powers  should  put  up  with  its  continued  refusal,  Russia 
would  act  alone.  Disclaiming  in  words  of  great 
earnestness  all  desire  for  territorial  aggrandisement, 
he  protested  against  the  suspicion  with  which  his  policy 
was  regarded  in  England,  and  desired  that  his  words 
might  be  made  public  in  England  as  a  message  of  peace.* 
Lord  Derby,  then  Foreign  Secretary,  immediately  ei- 
pressed  the  satisfaction  with  which  tbe  Government 
had  received  these  assurances ;  and  on  tbe 
^UToSte.  followiog  day  an  invitation  was  sent  from 
London  to  all  the  European  Powers  pro> 
posing  a  Conference  at  Constantinople,  on  the  basis  of 

■  Pari  Paji-  1877,  tal.xfl.,p.  642;  187^  toL  lxxzi„  p.  67Sl 

■.oogle 


tam  A  OONFERENOB  PB0P08SD.  4&1 

a  common  lecc^ition  of  tlie  integrity  of  the  Otto- 
man Empire,  accompanied  bj  a  disavowal  on  the  part 
of  each  of  the  Powers  of  all  aims  at  ^grandisement  or 
separate  advantage.  In  proposing  this  Conference  the 
GoTemment  acted  in  conformity  with  the  expressed 
desire  of  the  Czar.  But  there  were  two  voices  within 
the  Cabinet.  Ix)rd  Beaconsfield,  had  it  been  in  his 
power,  wovdd  have  informed  Eussia  categorically 
that  England  would  sufiport  the  Sultan  if  attacked. 
This  the  country  and  the  Cabinet  forbade:  but  the 
Premier  had  his  own  opportunities  of  utterance,  and 
at  the  Guildhall  Banquet  on  the  9th  of  November,  six 
days  after  the  Foreign  Secretary  had  acknowledged  the 
Czar's  message  of  friendship,  and  before  this  mess^e 
had  been  made  known  to  the  English  people.  Lord 
Beaconsfield  uttered  words  which,  if  they  were  not  idle 
bluster,  could  have  been  intended  only  as  a  menace  to 
the  Czar  or  as  an  appeal  to  the  war-party  at  home : — 
"  Though  the  policy  of  England  is  pea^e,  there  is  no 
country  so  well  prepared  for  war  as  our  own.  If 
England  enters  into  conEict  in  a  righteous  cbuse,  her 
resources  are  inexhaustible.  She  is  not  a  country  that 
when  she  enters  into  a  campaign  has  to  ask  herself 
whether  she  can  support  a  second  or  a  third  campaign. 
Slie  enters  into  a  campaign  which  she  will  not  ter- 
minate till  right  is  done." 

The  proposal  made  by  the  Earl  of  Derby  for  a 
Conference  at  Constantinople  was  accepted  by  all 
the  Powers,  and  accepted  on  the  bases  specified. 
liOid  Salisbuiy,  then  Secretary  of  State  for  India,  was 


m  VODSBlf  MUBOFS.  nM 

appointed  to  represent  Great  Britun  in  conJTitictioii 
with  Sir  H.  Elliot,  its  Ambassador.  The  Minister 
made  his  journey  to  Constantinople  by  way  of  the 
European  capitals,  and  learnt  at  Berlin  that  the  good 
understanding  between  the  German  Emperor  and  the 
Czar  extended  to  Eastern  affairs.  Whether  the  British 
Government  had  as  yet  gained  any  trustworthy  in- 
formation on  the  Treaty  of  Bcichstadt  is  doubtful; 
but  so  far  as  the  public  eye  could  judge,  there  was  now, 
in  spite  of  the  tone  assumed  by  Lord  Beaconsfield,  s 
fairer  prospect  of  the  solution  of  the  Eastern  question 
by  the  establishment  of  some  form  of  autonomy  in  the 
Christian  provinces  than  there  had  been  at  any  previous 
time.  The  Porte  itself  recognised  the  serious  intention 
of  the  Powers,  and,  in  order  to  forestall  the  work  of 
the    Conference,    prepared   a  scheme  of   constitutional 

reform  that  far  surpassed  the  wildest  claims 
Du  omAoa-       of  Hcrzegovinian  or  of  Serb.     Nothing  less 

tlian  a  complete  system  of  Pi^liamentary 
Government,  with  the  very  latest  ingenuities  from 
France  and  Belgium,  was  to  be  granted  to  the  entire 
Ottoman  Empire.  That  Midhat  Pasba,  who  was  the 
author  of  this  scheme,  may  have  had  some  serious  end 
in  view  is  not  impossible  ;  but  with  the  mass  of  Palace- 
functionaries  at  Constantinople  it  was  simply  a  device 
for  embarrassing  the  West  with  its  own  inventions; 
and  the  action  of  men  in  power,  both  great  and 
small,  continued  after  the  constitution  had  come  into 
nominal  existence  to  be  exactly  what  it  had  been 
before.    The  veiy  teriuB  pf  the  constitution  most  have 


UN.  THE  PRELUnNJRT  OOlrFBBE.S'CB.  4m 

been  unititelligible  to  all  bat  those  who  had  been 
employed  at  foreign  courts.  The  Government  might 
as  well  have  annonnced  its  ioteaiion  of  clothing  the 
Balkans  with  the  flora  of  the  deep  sea. 

Tq  the  second  week  of  December  the  representatives 
of  the  six  Great  Powers  assembled  at  Constantinople. 
In  order  that  the  demands  of  Europe  should  be  pre- 
sented to  the  Porte  with  unanimity,  they  determined 
to  hold  a  series  of  preliminary  meetings  with  one 
another  before  the  formal  opening  of  the  Conference 
and  before  communicating  with  the  Turks.  At  these 
meetings,  after  Ignatieff  had  withdrawn  his  nemu,4, 
proposal  for  a  Russian  occupation  of  Bui-  R«i™iiuuT 
garia,  complete  accord  was  attained.  It  °*°'  """■ 
was  resolved  to  demand  the  cessioD  of  certain  small 
districts  by  the  Porte  to  Servia  and  Montenegro ;  the 
grant  of  administrative  autonomy  to  Bosnia,  Herze- 
govina, and  Bulgaria ;  the  appointment  in  each  of 
these  provinces  of  Christian  governors,  whose  terms  of 
office  should  be  for  five  years,  and  whose  nomination 
should  he  subject  to  the  approval  of  the  Powers ;  the 
confinement  of  Turkish  troops  to  the  fortresses;  the 
removal  of  the  bands  of  Circassians  to  Asia ;  and  finally 
the  execution  of  these  reforms  under  the  superintendence 
of  an  International  Commission,  which  should  have  at 
its  disposal  a  corps  of  six  thousand  gendarmes  to  be 
enlisted  in  Switzerland  or  Belgium.  By  these  arrange- 
ments, whUe  the  Sultan  retained  his  sovereignty  and 
the  integrity  of  the  Ottoman  Empire  remained  un- 
impaired, it  was  conceiTed  tiiat  the  ChristiaD  population 


4H  MODERN  EUBOPS.  mt. 

would  be  effectivelj  secured  i^ainst  Turkish  violence 
and  caprice. 

All  differences  between  the  representatives  of  the 
European  Powers  having  been  removed,  the  formal 
Conference  was  opened  on  the  23rd  of  December  under 
the  presidency  of  the  Turkish  Foreign  Minister,  Savfet 
Pasha.  The  proceedings  had  not  gone  far  when  they 
were  interrupted  by  the  roar  of  cannon.  Savfet  ex- 
plained  that  the  new  Ottoman  constitution  was  being 
promulgated,  and  that  the  salvo  which  the  members  of 
the  Conference  beard  announced  the  birth  of  an  era 
of  nniversal  happiness  and  prosperity  in  the  Sultan's 
dominions.  It  soon  appeared  that  in  the  presence  of 
this  great  panacea  there  was  no  place  for  the  reforming 
efforts  of  the  Christian  Powers.  Savfet 
i^^d^^^  declared  from  the  first  that,  whatever  con- 
t|>aui,j*a.KS  cessions  might  be  made  on  other  points, 
the  Sultan's  Ci^vemment  would  never  eon- 
sent  to  the  establishment  of  a  Foreign  Commission 
to  superintend  the  execution  of  its  reforms,  nor  to  the 
joint  action  of  the  Powers  in  the  appointment  of  the 
governors  of  its  provinces.  It  was  in  vain  u^ed 
that  without  such  foreign  control  Europe  possessed  no 
guarantee  that  the  promises  and  the  good  intentions 
of  the  Porte,  however  gratifying  these  might  he,  would 
be  earned  into  effect.  Savfet  replied  that  by  the 
Treaty  of  1856  the  Powers  had  declared  the  Ottoman 
Empire  to  stand  on  exactly  the  same  footing  as  any 
other  great  State  in  Europe,  and  had  expressly  debarred 
themselves  from   interfering,  under  whatever   ciroom- 


1877.  FAILURE  OF  THE  OONFERENOB.  *BS 

staoceB,  witli  its  intenial  administration.  The  position 
of  the  Turkish  representative  at  the  Conference  was 
in  fact  the  only  logical  one.  In  the  Treaty  (rf  Paris 
the  Powers  had  elaborately  pledged  themselves  to  an 
absurdity ;  and  this  Treaty  the  Turk  was  never  weary 
of  throwing  in  their  faces.  But  the  situation  was  not 
one  for  lawyers  and  for  the  interpretation  of  docoments. 
The  Conference,  after  hearing  the  arguments  and  the 
counter-projects  of  the  Turkish  Ministers,  after  re- 
considering its  own  demands  and  modifying  these  in 
many  important  points  in  deference  to  Ottoman  wishes, 
adhered  to  the  demand  for  a  Foreign  Commission  and 
for  a  European  control  over  the  appointment  of 
governors.  Midhat,  who  was  now  Grand  Yizier,  sum- 
moned the  Great  Council  of  the  Empire,  and  presented 
to  it  the  demands  of  the  Conference.  These  demands 
the  Great  Council  unanimoasly  rejected.  Lord  Salisbury 
had  already  warned  the  Sultan  what  would  be  the 
results  of  continued  obstinacy;  and  after  receiving 
Midhat's  final  reply  the  ambassadors  of  all  the  Powers, 
together  with  the  envoys  who  liad  been  specially  ap- 
pointed for  the  Conference,  quitted  Constantinople. 

Russia,  since  the  beginning  of  November,  had  been 
actively  preparing  for  war.    The  Czar  had  left  the  world  in 
no  doubt  as  to  his  own  intentions  in  case  of  the  failure 
of  the  European  concert ;  it  only  remained  for  him  to 
ascertain  whether,  after  the  settlement  of  a 
definite  scheme  of  reform  by  the  Conference    g*™*. 
and  the  rejection  of   this  scheme  by  the 
Porte,  the  Powers  would  or  would  not  take,  steps  ilio 


4M  UODSRN  BUSOPE.  WB 

enforce  their  conclusion.  England  suggested  tiiat  the 
Sultan  should  be  allowed  a  year  to  cany  out  his  good 
intentions :  Gortschakoff  inquired  whether  England 
would  pledge  itself  to  action  if,  at  the  end  of  the 
year,  refonn  was  not  effected ;  but  no  suet  pledge  was 
forthcoming.  With  the  object  either  of  discovermg 
some  arrangement  in  which  the  Powers  would  combine, 
or  of  delaying  the  outbreak  of  war  until  the  Bossian 
preparations  were  more  advanced  and  the  season  more 
favourable,  Ignatieff  was  sent  round  to  all  the  European 
Courts.  He  visited  England,  and  subsequently  drew 
up,  with  the  assistance  of  Count  Schouvaloff,  Russian 
Ambassador  at  London,  a  document  which  gained  the 
approval  of  the  British  as  well  as  the  Continent^ 
G-ovemments.  This  document,  known  as  the  London 
Protocol,  was  signed  on  the  31st  of  March.  After  a 
reference  to  the  promises  of  reform  made  by  the  Porte, 
it  stated  that  the  Powers  intended  to  watch  carefully 
by  their  representatives  over  the  manner  in  which  tiiese 
promises  were  carried  into  effect;  that  if  their  hopes 
should  be  once  more  dii^appointed  they  should  r^ard 
the  condition  of  affairs  as  incompatible  with  the 
interests  of  Europe ;  and  that  in  such  case  they  would 
decide  in  common  upon  the  means  best  fitted  to 
secure  the  well-being  of  the  Christian  population  and 
the  interests  of  general  peace.  Declarations  relative 
to  the  disarmament  of  Russia,  which  it  was  now  the 
principal  object  of  the  British  Q-overmnent  to  effect, 
were  added.  There  was  indeed  so  little  of  a  sub- 
stantial engagement  in  this  Protocol  that  it  would  have 


un.  DEOLA&ATION  OF  WAS.  497 

been  snrprisiBg  liad  Russia  disarmed  withoat  obtaining 
some    Further  guarantee  for  the    execution  of  reform. 
But  weak  as  the  Protocol  was,  it  was  rejected  by  the 
Porte.      Once  more  the  appeal  was  made 
io    the    Treaty  of    Paris,    once    more    the     iei««tiaP^ 
Sultan  protested  against  the  encroachment 
of  the    Powers    on  his  own  inviolable   rights.      Lord 
Beaconsfield's  Cabinet  even  now  denied  that  the  last 
word  had  been  spoken,  and  professed  to  entertain  some 
hope  in   the    eSect  of  subsequent  diplomatic    steps ; 
but  the  rest  of  Europe  asked  and  expected  no  further 
forbearance  on    the   part  of    Russia.      The  army  of 
operations  already  lay  on  the  Pruth :  the  Grand  Duke 
Nicholas,  brother  of  the   Czar,  was  appointed  to  its 
command ;  and  on  the  24th  of  April  the 
Russian  GoTemment  issued  its  declaration    ^^H^^^ 
of  war. 

Between  the  Russian  frontier  and  the  Danube  lay 
the  Principality  of  Roumania.      A  convention   signed 
before  the  outbreak  of  hostilities  gave  to  the  Russian 
army  a  free  passage  through  this  territory,  and  Ron- 
mania  subsequently  entered  the  war  as  Russia's  ally. 
It  was  not,  however,  until  the  fourth  week  of  June 
that  the  invaders  were  able  to  cross  the  Danube.    Seven 
army-corps  were  assembled  in  Roumania;  of  these  one 
crossed  the  Lower  Danube  into  the  Dobnidscha,  two 
were  retained  in   Roumania  as  a  reserve, 
and  four  crossed  the  river  in    the  neigh-     uannba, 
bourhood  of  Sistowa,  in  order  to  enter  upon 
the  Bulgarian  campaign.      It  was  the   dcidre  o^t  (he 


m  UODSRN  EUBOPS.  mt, 

Bossiana  to  throw  forward  tlie  central  part  of  their 
annj  hy  the  line  of  the  river  Jantra  upon  the  Balkans  ; 
with  their  left  to  move  against  Rustchuk  and  the 
Turkish  wmies  in  the  eastern  fortresses  of  Bulgaria; 
with  their  right  to  capture  Nicopolis,  and  guard  the 
central  column  against  any  flank  attack  from  the 
west.  But  both  in  Europe  and  in  Asia  the  Russians 
had  underrated  the  power  of  their  adversary,  and 
entered  upon  the  war  with  insufficient  forces.  Ad- 
vanbiges  won  by  their  generals  on  the  ArmeDian 
frontier  while  the  European  army  was  still  marching 
through  Boumania  were  lost  in  the  course  of  the  next 
few  weeks.  Bayazid  and  other  places  that  fell  into  the 
hands  of  the  Bussians  at  the  first  onset  were  recovered 
by  the  Turks  under  Mukhtar  Pasha ;  and  within  a  few 
days  after  the  opening  of  the  European  campaign  the 
Bu.ssian  divisions  in  Asia  were  everywhere  retreating 
upon  their  own  frontier.  The  Bulgarian  campaign  was 
marked  hy  the  same  rapid  successes  of  the  invader  at 
the  outset,  to  be  followed,  owing  to  the  same  insuffi- 
ciency of  force,  by  similar  disasters.  Encountering 
no  efiective  opposition  on  the  Danube,  the  Bussians 
AdTMi«iMiUi«  pushed  forward  rapidly  towards  the  Balkans 
iuik..-.jui,.       ^^  ^.JJg  ^j^g  ^^  j,jjg  j^jj^j,^^      rpijg  Turkish 

army  lay  scattered  in  the  Bulgarian  fortresses,  from 
Widdin  in  the  extreme  west  to  Shumla  at  the  foot 
of  the  Eastern  Balkans.  It  was  considered  by  the 
Bnssian  commanders  that  two  army-corps  would  be 
required  to  operate  against  the  Turks  in  Eastern  Bul- 
garia, while  one  corps  would  be  enough  io,  cover,  the 


vm.  FIB8T  PASSAQB  OF  TES  BJLKANB.  499 

central  line  of  invasion  from  the  west.  There  remained, 
excluding  the  two  corps  in  reserve  in  Boamania  and 
the  corps  holding  the  Dobradscha,  but  one  corps  for 
the  march  on  the  Balkans  and  Adrianople.  The  com- 
mand of  the  vanguard  of  this  body  was  given  to 
G^eneral  Gonrko,  who  pressed  on  into  the  Balkans, 
seized  the  Shipka  Pass,  and  descended  into  Southern 
Bulgaria  (July  15).  The  Turks  were 
driven  &om  Xesanlik  and  Eski  Sagra,  and  th.B«ikuii, 
Gonrko's  cavalry,  a  few  hundreds  in  num< 
ber,  advanced  to  within  two  days'  march  of  Adrianople. 
"  The  headquarters  of  the  whole  Russian  army  were 
now  at  Timova,  the  ancient  Bulgarian  capital,  about  half- 
way between  the  Danube  and  the  Balkans.  Two  army- 
corps,  commanded  by  the  Czarewitch,  moved  eastwards 
against  Bustchuk  and  the  so-called  Turkish  army  of  the 
Danube,  which  was  gathering  behind  the  lines  of  the 
Kara  Lom  ;  another  division,  under  General  Krudener, 
turned  westward  and  captured  Nicopolis  with  its  gar- 
rison. Xiovatz  and  other  points  lying  westward  of 
the  Jantra  were  occupied  by  weak  detachments ;  but 
so  badly  were  the  reconnaissances  of  the  Russians  per- 
formed in  this  direction  that  they  were  omumoecnnie. 
unaware  of  the  approach  of  a  Turkish  """■^'^r"- 
army  from  Widdin,  thirty-five  thousand  strong,  till 
this  was  close  on  their  flank.  Before  the  Russians  could 
prevent  him,  Osman  Fasha,  with  the  van- 
guard of  this  army,  had  occupied  the  town  ^t  2SUU, 
and  heights  of  Plevna,  between  N'icopolis 
and  Lovatz.    On  the  30th  of  July,  atill  onaware  of  their 


500  ttODBRir  BWtOFa.  ult 

enemy's  strength,  the  Bossians  attacked  him  at  Plema : 
they  were  defeated  with  considerable  loss,  and  after  a  few 
days  one  of  Osman's  divisions,  pushing  forward  upon 
the  invader's  central  line,  drove  them  oat  of  Lovatz. 
The  Qrand  Duke  now  sent  reinforcements  to  Srudener, 
and  ordered  him  to  take  Plevna  at  all  costs.  Krade- 
ner's  strength  was  raised  to  thirty-five  thousand ;  but 
in  the  meantime  new  Turkish  regiments  had  joined 
Osman,  and  his  troops,  now  numbering  about  fifty 
thousand,  had  been  working  day  and  night  entrenching 
themselves  in  the  heights  round  Plevna  which  the 
B«™oa  uttiB  rt     Eussians  had  to    attack.     The  assault  was 

back  with  terrible  slaughter,  the  Russians  leaving 
a  fifth  of  their  number  on  the  field.  Had  Osman 
taken  np  the  offensive  and  the  Turkish  commander 
on  the  liom  pressed  vigorously  upon  the  invader's  line, 
it  would  probably  have  gone  ill  with  the  Russian  army 
in  Bulgaria.  Gourko  was  at  once  compelled  to 
abandon  the  country  south  of  the  Balkans.  His  troops, 
falling  back  upon  the  Shipka  Pass,  were  there  attacked 
from  the  south  by  far  superior  forces  under  Suleiman 
Pasha.  The  Ottoman  commander,  prodigal  of  the 
TheK.ipk.ft«,  ^^^^  ^^  liJs  men  and  trusting  to  mere  blind- 
Auit.jo-m  £^j^  violence,  hurled  his  army  day  after  day 
against  the  Eussian  positions  (Aug.  20 — 23).  There 
was  a  moment  when  all  seemed  lost,  and  the  Eussian 
soldiers  sent  to  their  Ozar  the  last  message  of  devotion 
from  men  who  were  about  to  die  at  their  post.  But  in 
the  extremity  of  peril  there  arrived  a  reinfoioement,  { 


u7t.  PLsri!r±  MS 

weak,  bnt  Baffioient  to  turn  tlie  scale  against  the 
iU-commanded  Turks.  Suleiman's  army  withdrew  to 
the  vill^e  of  Shipka  at  the  aouthern  end  of  the  pasa. 
The  pass  itself,  with  the  entrance  from  northern 
Bulgaria,  remained  in  the  hands  of  the  Itassiana. 

After  the  second  battle  of  Plevna  it  became  clear 
that  the  Eussians  could  not  carry  on  the  campaign 
with  their  existing  forces.  Two  army-corps  were 
called  up  which  were  guarding  the  coast  of 
the  Black  Sea ;  several  others  were  mobil- 
ised in  the  interior  of  Russia,  and  b^an  their  joamey 
towards  the  Danube.  So  urgent,  however,  was  the 
immediate  need,  that  the  Czar  was  compelled  to  ask 
help  from  Boumania.  This  help  was  given.  Bonmanian 
troops,  excellent  in  quality,  filled  up  the  gap  caused  by 
Krudener's  defeats,  and  the  whole  army  before  Flevna 
was  placed  under  the  command  of  the  Boumanian 
Prince  Charles.  At  the  beginning  of  September  the 
Russians  were  again  ready  for  action.  liOTatz  was 
wrested  from  the  Turks,  and  the  division  which  had 
captured  it  moved  on  to  Plevna  to  take  part  in  a 
great  combined  attack.  This  attack  was  made  on  the 
11th  of  September  under  the  eyes  of  the  Czar.  On 
the  north  the  Russians  and  Roumanians 
together,  after  a  desperate  struggle,  stormed  r^=^  bbpl  n 
the  Ghivitza  redoubt.  On  the  south  Skobe- 
leff  carried  the  first  Turkish  position,  but  could  make 
no  impression  on  their  second  line  of  defence.  Twelve 
thousand  men  fell  on  the  Russian  side  before  the  day 
was  over,  and  the  main   defences  of  the  Tnrks  were 


50a  ItODEBN  EVEOTS,  lOT. 

still  unbroken.  On  the  morrow  the  Turks  took  up 
the  oSenBive.  Skobeleff,  exposed  to  the  attack  of  a 
far  superior  foe,  prayed  in  vaio  for  reinforcements. 
His  men,  standing  in  the  positions  thai  they  had  won 
from  the  Turks,  repelled  one  onslaught  after  another, 
bnt  were  ultimately  overwhelmed  and  driven  from  the 
field.  At  the  close  of  the  second  day's  battie  the 
Russians  were  everywhere  beaten  back  within  their 
own  lines,  except  at  the  Grivitza  redoubt,  which  was 
itself  but  an  oatwork  of  the  Turkish  defences,  and 
faced  by  more  formidable  works  within.  The  assailants 
had  sustained  a  loss  approaching  that  of  the  Germans 
at  Glravelotte  with  an  army  one-third  of  the  Germans* 
strength.  Osman  was  stronger  than  at  the  beginning 
of  the  campaign;  with  what  sacrifices  Kussia  would 
have  to  purchase  its  ultimate  victory  no  man  could 
calculate. 

The  three  defeats  at  Plevna  cast  a  sinister  light 
upon  the  ^Russian  military  administration  and  the 
quality  of  its  chiefs.  The  soldiers  had  fought  heroic- 
ally; divisional  generals  like  Skobeleff  had  done  all 
^j^jj,^,,^^  that  man  could  do  in  such  positions;  the 
"*""™'  faults  were  those  of  the  headquarters  and 
the  officers  by  whom  the  Imperial  Family  were  sur- 
rounded. After  the  third  catastrophe,  public  opinion 
called  for  the  removal  of  the  authors  of  these  disasters 
and  the  employment  of  abler  men.  Todleben,  the 
defender  of  Sebastopol,  who  for  some  unknown  reason 
had  been  left  without  a  command,  was  now  summoned 
ti  Bulgaria,  and  virtually  placed  at  the  head  of  the 


IsfT.  rAUi  OF  VLEVSA.  503 

army  before  Plevna.  He  saw  that  the  Btronghold  of 
Osman  could  only  be  reduced  by  a  regular  siege, 
and  prepared  to  draw  his  linea  right  round  it.  For  a 
time  Osman  kept  open  his  communications  with  the 
south-west,  and  heavy  trains  of  ammunition  and 
supplies  made  their  way  into  Plevna  from  this  direc- 
tion ;  but  the  investment  was  at  length  completed,  and 
the  army  of  Plevna  cut  off  from  the  world.  In  the 
meantime  new  regiments  were  steadily  pouring  into 
Bulgaria  from  the  interior  of  Bussia.  East  of  the 
Jantra,  after  many  alternations  of  fortune,  the  Turks 
were  finally  driven  back  behind  the  river  Lom. 
The  last  efforts  of  Suleiman  failed  to  wrest  the 
Shipka  Pass  from  its  defenders.  From  the  narrow 
line  which  the  invaders  had  with  such  difficulty  held 
dnring  three  anxious  months  their  forces,  accumu- 
lating day  by  day,  spread  out  south  and  west  up  to  the 
slopes  of  the  Balkans,  ready  to  burst  over  the  moun- 
tain-barrier and  sweep  the  enemy  back  to  the  walls 
of  Constantinople  when  once  Plevna  should  have  fallen 
and  the  army  which  besieged  it  should  be  added  to  the 
invader's  strength.  At  length,  in  the  second  week  of 
December,  Osman's  supply  of  food  was  exhausted. 
Victor  in  three  battles,  he  refused  to  surrender  without 
one  more  struggle.  Oa  the  10th  of  December,  after 
distributing  among  his  men  what  there  remained  of 
provisions,  he  made  a  desperate  effort  to  F^ofpievm. 
break  out  towards  the  west.  His  columns  °°°" '"" 
dashed  in  vain  against  the  besieger's  lines;  behind  him 
his  enemies  pressed  forward  into  the  positions  which 


6M  itopsiar  susopa.  wt-*. 

he  had  abandoned;  a  ring  of  fire  like  that  of  Sedan 
Burrounded  the  Turkish  army;  and  aftOT  thousands 
had  fallen  in  a  hopeless  conflict,  the  general  and  the 
troops  who  for  fire  months  had  held  in  check  the 
collected  forces  of  the  Bussian  Empire  Bmrendered  to 
their  conqueror. 

If  in  the  first  stipes  of  the  war  there  waa  little  that 
did  credit  to  Bussia's  military  capacity,  the  enet^  that 
marked  its  close  made  amends  for  what  had  gone  be- 
fore. Winter  was  descending  in  extreme  severity  :  the 
Balkans  were  a  mass  of  snow  and  ice  ;  bat  no  obstacle 
could  now  bar  the  invader's  march.  Gourko,  in  com- 
maud  of  an  army  that  bad  gathered  to  the  south-west 
of  Plevna,  made  his  way  through  the  mountains  above 
Etropol  in  the  last  days  of  December,  and,  driving  the 
Turks  from  Sophia,  pressed  on  towards  Fhilippopolis 
and  Adrianople.  Farther  east  two  columns  crossed  the 
Balkans  by  bye-paths  right  and  left  of  the  Shipka 
Pass,  and  then,  converging  on  Shipka  it- 
Baikuu, Deals     self,    fell    UDou    the    rear  of    the  Turkish 

-Jan.  a.  '  '^ 

army  which  still  blocked  the  southern 
outlet.  Simaltaneously  a  third  corps  marched  down 
the  pass  from  the  north  and  assailed  the  Turks  in 
front.  After  a  fierce  struggle  the  entire  Turkish  army, 
thirty-five  thousand  strong,  laid  down  its  arms.  There 
f^pitouiionot  ^^^  remained  only  one  considerable  force 
^'**^'"'*'  between  the  invaders  and  ConstMitinople. 
This  body,  which  was  commanded  by  Suleiman,  held 
the  road  which  runs  along  the  valley  of  the  Maritza,  at 
a  point  somewhat  to  the  east  of  Philippopolis.    Against 


um.  TSB  RU88IAIK  m  JDRIANOPLE.  505 

it  Goarko  advanced  from  the  weat,  while  the  victors  of 
Shipka,  descending  dne  south  throngh  Kesanlik,  barred 
the  line  of  retreat  towards  Adrianople.     The  last  en- 
counter of  the  war  took  place  on  the  17th  of  Januarf. 
Soleimau'e  army,  routed  and  demoralised,  succeeded  in 
making  its  escape  to  the  .^Igean  coast.     Pursuit  was  un- 
necessary, for  the  war  was  now  practically  over.    On  the 
20th  of  January  the  Russians  made  their 
entry  into  Adrianople;  in  the  next  few  days    AdriHDr>p" 
their  advanced   guard  touched  the  Sea  of 
Marmora  at  Bodosto. 

Immediately  after  the  fall  of  Flema  the  Forte  had 
applied  to  the  European  Powers  for  their  mediation. 
Disasters  in  Asia  had  already  warned  it  not  to  delay 
submission  too  long;  for  in  the  middle  of  October 
Mukhtar  Pasha  had  been  driven  from  his  positions,  and 
a  month  later  Kars  had  been  taken  by  storm.  The 
Bussians  had  subsequently  penetrated  into  Armenia  and 
had  captured  the  outworks  of  Erzeroum.  Each  day  that 
now  passed  brought  the  Ottoman  Empire  nearer  to 
destruction.  Servia  again  declared  war ;  the  Montene- 
grins made  themselves  masters  of  the  coast-towns  and 
of  border-territory  north  imd  south ;  Greece  seemed 
likely  to  enter  into  the  struggle.  Baffled  in  his 
attempt  to  gain  the  common  mediation  of  the  Powers, 
the  Sultan  appealed  to  the  Queen  of  England  per- 
sonally for  her  good  offices  in  bringing  the  conflict 
to  a  close.  In  reply  to  a  telegram  from 
London,  the  Czar  declared  himself  willing 
to  treat  for  peace  as  soon  as  direct  communications  should 


5M  MODEBir  EJTBOFS.  Wt 

be  addressed  to  his  repTesentatiTes  bj  tbe  Porte. 
On  the  14th  of  January  commissioners  were  sent  to 
the  headquarters  of  the  Grand  Duke  Nicholas  at 
Kesanlik  to  treat  for  an  armistice  and  for  prelimin- 
aries of  peace.  The  Russians,  now  in  the  full  tide  of 
victory,  were  in  no  hurry  to  agree  with  their  adversary. 
Nicholas  bade  the  Turkish  envoys  accompany  him  to 
Adrianople,  and  it  was  not  until  the  Slst  of  January 
that  the  armistice  was  granted  and  the  preliminaries 
of  peace  signed. 

While  the  Turkish  envoys  were  on  their  journey  to 
the  Bussian  headquarters,  the  session  of  Parliament 
opened  at  London.  The  Ministry  had  declared  at 
the  outbreak  of  the  war  that  Great  Britain 
would  remain  neutral  unless  its  own  in- 
terests should  be  imperilled,  and  it  had  defined  these 
interests  with  due  clearness  both  in  its  communications 
with  the  Russian  Ambassador  and  in  its '  statements  in 
Parliament.  It  was  laid  down  that  Her  Majesty's 
Government  could  not  permit  the  blockade  of  the  Suez 
Canal,  or  the  extension  of  military  operations  to  f^pt ; 
that  it  could  not  witness  with  indifference  the  passing  of 
Constantinople  into  other  hands  than  those  of  its  present 
possessors;  and  that  it  would  entertain  serious  ob- 
jections to  any  material  alterations  in  the  rules  made 
under  European  section  for  the  navigation  of  the 
Bosphorufl  and  Dardanelles.*  In  reply  to  Lord  Derby's 
note  which  formulated  these  conditions  of  neutrality 
Prince  GortschakoET  had  repeated  the  Czar's  assurance 
•  PwL  Psp.  1877,  yd.  Ixnix.,  p.  138*       ^ 


un  AOTioJsr  OF  ENaunm.  so? 

that  the  acquisition  of  Constantinople  was  excluded 
from  his  views,  and  bad  promised  to  undertake  no 
military  operation  in  Egjpt;  he  had,  however,  let  it 
be  understood  that,  as  an  incident  of  warfare,  the 
reduction  of  C!onstantinopIe  might  be  necessary  like 
that  of  any  other  capital.  In  the  Queen's  speech  at 
the  opening  of  Parliament,  Ministers  stated  that  the 
conditions  on  which  the  neutrality  of  England  was 
founded  had  not  hitherto  been  infringed  by  either 
belligerent,  but  that,  should  hostilities  be  prolonged, 
some  unexpected  occurrence  might  render  it  necessary 
to  adopt  measures  of  precaution,  measures  which  could 
not  be  adequately  prepared  without  an  appeal  to  the 
liberality  of  Parliament.  From  language  subsequently 
used  by  Lord  Beaconsfield's  colleagues,  it  would  appear 
that  the  Cabinet  had  some  apprehension  that  the 
Russian  army,  escaping  from  the  Czar's  control,  might 
seize  and  attempt  permanently  to  bold  Constantinople. 
On  the  23rd  of  January  orders  were  sent  to'  Admii^ 
Hornby,  commander  of  the  fleet  at  Besika  Bay,  to 
pass  tbe  Dardanelles,  and  proceed  to  Constantinople. 
liOrd  Derby,  who  saw  no  necessity  for  measures  of  a 
warlike  character  until  the  result  of  tbe  negotiations 
at  Adrianople  should  become  known,  now  resigned  office ; 
but  on  the  reversal  of  the  order  to  Admiral  Hornby  he 
rejoined  the  Cabinet.  On  the  28th  of  January,  after 
the  bases  of  peace  had  been  communicated  by  Count 
SchoavalofE  to  the  British  Government  but  before  they 
had  been  actually  signed,  the  Chancellor  of  the  Ex- 
chequer moved  for  a  vote  of  £6,000,000  for  increasing 


608  MODERN  BUROPB.  WK 

the  armaments  of  the  couatry.  This  To£e  was  at  fint 
vigorously  opposed  on  the  ground  that  none  of  the 
Totairfcndit,  stated  conditions  ofBngland's  neutrality  had 
jtt.  S8-F=b.  a.  jjgg^  infringed,  and  that  in  the  conditions  of 
peace  between  Eussia  and  Turkey  there  was  uothiog  that 
justified  a  departure  from  the  policy  which  England 
had  hitherto  pursued.  In  the  course  of  the  debates, 
however,  a  telegram  arrived  from  Mr.  Layard,  Elliot's 
Buccesaor  at  Constantinople,  stating  that  notwith- 
standing the  armistice  the  Hussions  were  pushing  on 
towards  the  capital ;  that  the  Turks  had  been  com- 
pelled  to  evacuate  Silivria  on  the  Sea  of  Marmora ; 
that  the  Bassian  general  was  about  to  occupy 
Tchat^dja,  an  outpost  of  the  last  line  of  defence 
not  thirty  miles  from  Constantinople;  and  that  the 
Porte  was  in  great  alarm,  and  unable  to  understand 
the  BuBsian  proceedings.  The  utmost  excitement  was 
caused  at  Westminster  by  this  telegram.  The  fleet 
was  at  once  ordered  to  Constantinople. 
Mr.  Forster,  who  had  led  the  opposition  to 
the  vote  of  credit,  sought  to  withdraw  his 
amendment ;  and  although  on  the  following  day,  with 
the  arrival  of  the  articles  of  the  armistice,  it  appeared 
that  the  Bossians  were  simply  moving  up  to  the 
accepted  line  of  demarcation,  and  that  the  Forte  could 
hardly  have  been  ignorant  of  this  when  Lajard's  tele- 
gram  was  despatched,  the  alarm  raised  in  London  did 
not  subside,  and  the  vote  of  credit  was  carried  by  a 
majority  of  above  two  hundred.* 
*  PmL  Pap.,  1878,  toL  Ixxii.,  pp.  681,  725.    Pwl  Deb.,  toI  csexxxriL 


Mn.  BUSBU  AND  GREAT  BBITAIS.  SOS 

Wben  a  victorioiis  army  is,  without  the  interTentiou 
of  some  external  Power,  checked  in  its  work  of  con- 
quest by  the  negotiation  of  an  armistice,  it  is  invariably 
made  a  condition  that  positions  shall  be  handed  over  to 
it  which  it  does  not  at  the  moment  occupy,  but  which 
it  might  reasonably  expect  to  have  conquered  within  a 
certain  date,  had  hostilities  not  been  suspended.  The 
armistice  granted  to  Austria  by  Kapoleon  after  the 
battle  of  Marengo  involved  the  evacuation  of  the 
whole  of  Upper  Italy;  the  armistice  which  Bismarck 
offered  to  the  French  Government  of  Defence  at  the 
beginning  of  the  siege  of  Paris  would  have  involved  the 
surrender  of  Strasburg  and  of  Toul.  In  demanding  that 
the  line  of  demarcation  should  be  carried  almost  up  to 
the  walls  of  Constantinople  the  Eussiana  were  asking  for 
no  more  than  would  certainly  have  been  within  their 
hands  had  hostilities  been  prolonged  for  a  few  weeks, 
or  even  days.  Deeply  as  the  conditions  of  the  armistice 
agitated  the  English  people,  it  was  not  in  these  con- 
ditions, bnt  in  the  conditions  of  the  peace  which  was 
to  follow,  that  the  true  cause  of  contention  between 
England  and  Bussia,  if  cause  there  was,  had  to  be 
found.  Nevertheless,  the  approach  of  the  Eussians  to 
Gallipoli  and  the  lines  of  Tchataldja, 
followed,  as  it  was,  by  the  despatch  of  the  wwiuiEiig- 
British  fleet  to  Constantinople,  brought 
Russia  and  Great  Britain  within  a  hair's  breadth  of 
war.  It  was  in  vain  that  Lord  Derby  described  the 
fleet  as  sent  only  for  the  protection  of  the  lives  and 
property  of  British  subjects.     Gortschakoff,  who   was 


510  MODBRN  BUBOPB.  m 

superior  in  amenities  of  tMs  kind,  leplied  thai  the 
Russian  Government  bad  exactly  tlie  same  end  in  view, 
with  the  distinction  that  its  protection  would  be  ex- 
tended to  all  Christians.  Should  the  British  fleet 
appear  at  the  Bosphorus,  Russian  troops  would,  in  the 
fulfilment  of  a  common  duty  of  humanity,  enter  Con- 
stantinople. Yielding  to  this  threat.  Lord  Beaconsfield 
bade  the  fleet  halt  at  a  convenient  point  in  the  Sea 
of  Marmora.  On  both  sides  preparations  were  made 
for  immediate  action.  The  guns  on  oar  ships  stood 
charged  for  battle ;  the  Bussians  strewed  the  shallows 
with  torpedoes.  Had  a  Russian  soldier  appeared  on 
the  heights  of  G^lipoli,  bad  an  Englishman  l^ided  on 
the  Asiatic  shore  of  the  Bosphorus,  war  would  at  once 
have  broken  out.  But  after  some  weeks  of  extreme 
danger  the  perils  of  mere  contiguity  passed  away,  and 
the  decision  between  peace  and  war  was  transferred 
from  the  accidents  of  tent  and  quarter-deck  to  the 
deliberations  of  statesmen  assembled  in  Congress. 

The  bases  of  Peace  which  were  made  the  condition 
of  the  armistice  granted  at  Adrianople  formed  with 
little  alteration  the  substance  of  the  Treaty  signed  by 
TMtrofau  Russia  and  Turkey  at  San  Stefano,  a  vil- 
**'"°'""'  *•  la^  on  the  Sea  of  Marmora,  on  the  3rd  of 
March.  By  this  Treaty  the  Porte  recognised  the  in- 
dependence of  Servia,  Montenegro,  and  Romuania,  and 
made  conmderable  cessions  of  territory  to  the  two  former 
States.  Bulgaria  was  constituted  an  autonomous 
tributary  Principality,  with  a  Christian  Government 
and  a  national  militia.     Its  frontier,  which  was  made 


urn  TREATY  OF  SAN  STSPASO.  OX 

so  eitensiTe  as  to  include  the  greater  part  of  Earopean 
Turkey,  was  defined  as  begiQuiug  near  Midia  on  the 
Black  Sea,  not  sixty  miles  from  the  Bosphorus;  passing 
thence  westwards  just  to  the  north  of  Adrianople ;  de- 
sceudiug  to  the  ^gean  Sea,  and  following  the  coast  as 
tar  as  the  Thracian  Chersonese;  then  passing  inland 
westwards,  so  as  barely  to  exclude  Salonika ;  running 
on  to  the  border  of  Albania  within  fifty  miles  of  the 
Adriatic,  and  from  this  point  following  the  Albanian 
border  up  to  the  new  Servian  frontier.  The  Prince  of 
Bulgaria  was  to  be  freely  elected  by  the  population, 
and  confirmed  by  the  Porte  with  the  assent  of  the 
Powers;  a  system  of  administration  was  to  be  drawn 
up  by  an  Assembly  of  Bulgarian  notables  ;  and  the  in- 
troduction of  the  new  system  into  Bulgaria  with  the 
superintendence  of  its  working  was  to  be  entrusted  for 
two  years  to  a  Bussian  Commissioner.  Until  the  native 
militia  was  organised,  Eussian  troops,  not  exceeding 
fifty  thousand  in  number,  were  to  occupy  the  country ; 
this  occupation,  however,  was  to  be  limited  to  a  term  ap- 
proximating to  two  years.  In  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina 
the  proposals  laid  before  the  Porte  at  the  first  sittlog 
of  the  Conference  of  1876  were  to  be  immediately  iutro- 
duced,  subject  to  such  modifications  as  might  be  agreed 
upon  between  Turkey,  Russia,  and  Austria.  The  Porte 
undertook  to  apply  scrupulously  in  Crete  the  Oiganic 
Ijaw  which  had  been  drawn  up  in  1868,  taking  into 
account  the  previously  expressed  wishes  of  the  native 
population.  An  analogous  law,  adapted  to  local  re- 
quirements, was,  after  being  communicated  to  tb$  Czar. 


Kit  MODSBN  SVBOPa.  wa 

to  be  introdaced  into  Epims,  Thesfuilj,  and  the  other 
parts  of  Turkey  m  Europe  for  which  a  special  con- 
stitution was  not  provided  b}'  the  Treaty.  Gom- 
miBsioDS,  in  which  the  native  population  was  to  be 
largely  represented,  were  in  each  province  to  be  en- 
'busted  with  the  task  of  elaborating  the  details  of  the 
new  oi^nisation.  In  Armenia  the  Sultan  undertook 
to  carry  into  effect  without  further  delay  the  improve- 
ments  and  reforms  demanded  by  local  requirements, 
and  to  guarantee  the  security  of  the  Armenians  from 
Kurds  and  Circassians.  As  an  indemnity  for  the  losses 
and  expenses  of  the  war  the  Porte  admitted  itself  to  be 
indebted  to  Russia  in  the  sum  of  fourteen  hundred 
million  roubles ;  but  in  accordance  with  the  wishes  of 
the  Sultan,  and  in  consideration  of  the  financial  em- 
barrassments of  Turkey,  the  Czar  consented  to  accept  in 
substitution  for  the  greater  part  of  this  sum  the  cession 
of  the  Dobrudscha  in  Burope,  and  of  the  districts -of 
Ardahan,  Kars,  Batoum,  and  Bayuzid  in  Asia.  As  to 
the  balance  of  three  hundred  million  roubles  left  due 
to  Kussia,  the  mode  of  payment  or  guaraQtee  was  to  be 
settled  by  an  understanding  between  the  two  Govern- 
ments. The  Dubrudscha  was  to  be  given  by  the  Czar 
to  Boumania  in  exchange  for  Bessarabia,  which  this 
State  was  to  transfer  to  Hussia.  The  complete  evacua- 
tion of  Turkey  in  Europe  was  to  take  place  within  three 
months,  that  of  Turkey  in  Asia  within  six  months, 
from  the  conclusion  of  peace,* 

It  had  from  the  first  been  admitted  by  the  Russian 

•  The  Treaty,  with  Jlaps,  ia  in  Ftitl  P«p.  1878,  toL  li^pji.,  p.  239. 


MK  oosansBS  pbopossd.  kis 

QoTemnient  that  questions  affecting  the  interests  of 
Europe  at  large  could  not  be  settled  hj  a  Treaty 
between  Russia  and  Turkey  alone,  but  ^^  ^^ 
must  form  the  subject  of  European  agree-  """"^ 
ment.  Early  in  February  the  Emperor  of  Austria  had 
proposed  that  a  European  Conference  should  assemble 
at  his  own  capital.  It  was  subsequently  agreed  that 
Berlin,  instead  of  Vienna,  should  be  the  place  of 
meeting,  and  that  instead  of  a  Conference  a  Congress 
should  be  held,  that  is,  an  international  assembly  of  the 
most  solemn  form,  in  which  each  of  the  Powers  is  repre- 
sented not  merely  by  an  ambassador  or  an  envoy  but  by 
its  leading  Ministers.  But  the  question  at  once  arose 
whether  there  existed  in  the  mind  of  the  Russian  Govern- 
ment a  distinction  between  parts  of  the  Treaty  of  San 
Stefano  bearing  on  the  interests  of  Europe  generally  aud 
parts  which  affected  no  States  but  Russia  and  Turkey; 
and  whether,  in  this  case,  Russia  was  willing  that 
Europe  should  be  the  judge  of  the  distinction,  or,  on 
the  contrary,  claimed  for  itself  the  right  of  withholding 
portions  of  the  Treaty  from  the  cognisance  of  the 
European  Court.  In  accepting  the  prin- 
ciple of  a  Congress,  Lord  Derby  ou  behalf  po^.^'if^ 
of  G-reat  Britain  made  it  a  condition  that 
every  article  of  the  Treaty  without  exception  should  be 
laid  befbre  the  Congress,  not  necessarily  as  requiring 
the  concurrence  of  the  Powers,  but  in  order  that  the 
Powers  themselves  might  in  each  case  decide  whether 
their  concurrence  was  necessary  or  not.  To  this  de- 
mand Prince  Gortschakoff  offered  the  most  strenuous 
H  M 


5U  KODERN  SVBOFS.  jm 

resistance,  daiming  tor  Russia  the  liberty  of  accepting, 
or  not  accepting,  the  discussion  of  anj  question  that 
might  be  raised.  It  would  clearly  have  been  in  the 
power  of  the  Eussian  Gk)vernment,,had  this  condition 
been  granted,  to  exclude  from  the  consideration  of 
Europe  precisely  those  matters  which  in  the  opinion 
of  other  States  were  most  essentially  of  European 
import.  Phrases  of  conciliation  were  suggested ;  but 
no  ingenuity  of  laaguage  could  shade  over  the  dif- 
ference of  purpose  which  separated  the  riral  Powers. 
Every  day  the  chances  of  the  meeting  of  the  Congress 
seemed  to  be  diminishing,  the  approach  of  war  between 
Kussia  and  Great  Britain  more  unmistakable.  Lord 
fieaconsfield  called  out  the  Reserves  and  summoned 
troops  from  India ;  even  the  project  of  seizing  a  port 
in  Asia  Minor  in  case  the  Sultan  should  fall  under 
jRussian  infiuence  was  discussed  in  the  Cabinet.  Un- 
able to  reconcile  himself  to  these  vigorous  measures. 
Lord  Derby,  who  had  long  been  at  variance  with  the 
Premier,  now  finally  withdrew  from  the  Cabinet 
(March  38).  He  was  succeeded  in  his  office  by  the 
Marquis  of  Salisbury,  whose  comparison  of  his  relative 
and  predecessor  to  Titus  Oates  revived  the  interest 
of  the  diplomatic  world  in  a  now  forgotten  period  of 
English  history. 

The   new   Foreign  Secretary  had  not  been  many 
days  in  office  when  a  Circular,  despatched  to  all  the 
Foreign   Courts,  summed  up  the  objections  of  Great 
Britain  to  the  Treaty  of  San  Stefano.     It    onoirM 
was  pointed  out  that  a  strong  Slavic  State       ***** 

■oogle 


Wa  tOBD  BAMBBTTRTB  OmOULAS.  515 

wotild  be  created  under  the  control  of  Bussia,  possessing 
important  harbours  upon  the  shores  of  the  Black  Sea 
and  the  Archipelago,  and  giving  to  Bussia  a  prepon- 
derating influence  over  political  and  commercial  re- 
lations on  both  those  seas ;  that  a  large  Greek  popula- 
tion would  be  merged  in  a  dominant  Slavic  majority ; 
that  by  the  extension  of  Bulgaria  to  the  Arehipel^o 
the  Albanian  and  Greek  provinces  left  to  the  Sultan 
would  be  severed  from  Constantinople ;  that  the  an- 
nexation of  Bessarabia  and  of  Batoum  would  make 
the  will  of  the  Russian  Government  dominant  over  all 
the  vicinity  of  the  Black  Sea ;  that  the  acquisition  of 
the  strongholds  of  Armenia  would  place  the  population 
of  that  province  under  the  immediate  influence  of  the 
Power  that  held  these  strongholds,  while  throngh  the 
cession  of  Bayazid  the  European  trade  from  Trebizond 
to  Persia  would  become  liable  to  be  arrested  by  the 
prohibitory  barriers  of  the  Russian  commercial  system. 
Finally,  by  the  stipulation  for  an  indemnity  which  it 
was  beyond  the  power  of  Turkey  to  discharge,  and  by 
the  reference  of  the  mode  of  payment  or  guamntee 
to  a  later  settlement,  Russia  had  placed  it  in  its  power 
either  to  extort  yet  larger  cessions  of  territory,  or  to 
force  Turkey  into  engagements  subordinating  its  policy 
in  all  things  to  that  of  St.  Petersburg. 

It  was  the  object  of  Lord  Salisbury  to  show  that 
the  effects  of  the  Treaty  of  San  Stefano,  taken  in  a 
mass,  threatened  the  peace  and  the  interests  of  Europe, 
and  therefore,  whatever  might  be  advanced  for  or 
f^aiost  individual  stipulations  of  the  Treaty,  that  the 


sie  iK>DSSN  EUBOPa.  ■& 

Treai^  as  a  whole,  and  not  claasea  selected  by  one 
Power,  must  be  submitted  to  the  Congress  if  the 
examination  was  not  to  prove  illusory.  This  was  a 
just  line  of  argument.  Nevertheless  it  was  natural  to 
suppose  that  some  parts  of  the  Treaty  must  be  more 
distasteful  than  others  to  Great  Britain;  and  Count 
OMmtsciboan-  Schouvaloff,  who  was  siucerely  desirous  of 
''"■  ptace,  applied  himself  to  the  task  of  dis- 

covering with  what  concessions  Lord  Beaconsfield's 
Cabinet  would  he  satisfied.  He  found  that  if  Russia 
would  consent  to  modifications  of  the  Treaty  in  Congress 
excluding  Bulgaria  from  the  .^gean  Sea,  reducing  its 
area  on  the  south  and  west,  dividing  it  into  two 
provinces,  and  restoring  the  Balkans  to  the  Sultan  as 
a  military  frontier,  giving  back  Bayazid  to  the  Turks, 
and  granting  to  other  Powers  besides  Russia  a  voice 
in  the  organisation  of  Kpirus,  Thessaly,  and  the  other 
Christian  provinces  of  the  Porte,  Engluid  might  be 
induced  to  accept  without  essential  change  the  other 
provisions  of  San  Stefano.  On  the  7th  of  May  Count 
Schouvaloff  quitted  London  for  St.  Petershu]^,  in  order 
to  lay  before  the  Czar  the  results  of  his  communi- 
cations with  the  Cabinet,  and  to  acquaint  him  with 
the  state  of  public  opinion  in  England.  On  his 
journey  hung  the  issues  of  peace  or  war.  Backed  by 
the  counsels  of  the  German  Emperor,  SchouraloCE 
succeeded  in  his  mission.  The  Czar  determined  not 
to  risk  the  great  results  already  secured  by  insisting 
on  the  points  contested,  and  Schouvaloff  returned 
to  London  antho]rts?d  to  eoncliidd  ft  pact  with  the 


UK  TBB  BBOBST  AOREEMBlfT.  £17 

British  QovernmeDt  on  the  general  basis  which  had 
been  laid  down.  On  the  30th  of  May  a  seoiiet  ^ree- 
ment,  in  which  the  above  were  the  princi-  B«™t««» 
pal  points,  was  signed,  and  the  meeting  of  '"**"^«'' 
the  Congress  for  the  examination  of  the  entire  Treaty 
of  San  Stefaao  was  now  assured.  But  it  was  not 
without  the  deepest  anxiety  and  regret  that  Iiord 
Beaconsfield  consented  to  the  annexation  of  Batoum 
and  tbe  Armenian  fortresses.  He  obtained  indeed  an 
assurance  in  the  secret  ^reement  with  Schouvaloff 
that  the  Kussian  frontier  should  be  no  more  extended 
on  the  side  of  Turkey  in  Asia ;  but  his  policy  did  not 
stop  short  here.  By  a  Convention  made  with  the  Sultan 
on  the  4th  of  June,  Great  Britain  eng^ed,  onmniioiiwiai 
in  the  event  of  any  further  aggression  by  ^''"^"'■'"•*' 
Bussia  upon  the  Asiatic  territories  of  the  Sultan,  to 
defend  these  territories  by  force  of  arms.  The  Sultan 
in  return  promised  to  introduce  the  necessary  reforms, 
to  be  ^reed  upon  by  the  two  Powers,  for  the  protection 
of  the  Christian  and  other  subjects  of  the  Forte  in  these 
territories,  and  further  assigned  the  Island  of  Cyprus 
to  be  occupied  and  administered  by  Eng- 
land. It  was  stipulated  by  a  humorous 
after-dause  that  if  Bussia  should  restore  to  Turkey  its 
Armenian  conquests,  Cyprus  would  be  evacuated  by 
England,  and  the  Convention  itself  should  be  at  an 
end.* 

The  Congress  of  Berlin,  at  which  the  Premier 
himself  and  Lord  Salisbury  represented  Great  Britain, 
•Fari.Fi^I878,TLlsizii,p.3     Ofobe. Utf 81, 1878.    H>hB,liL116. 


S18  XOBBSS  BtmOPW.  M& 

opened  on  the  13th  of  Jane.  Though  the  compromise 
between  Dngland  and  Enssia  had  been  settled  in 
general  tenns,  the  arrangement  of  det^ls  opened  snch 
a  Beries  of  difficulties  that  the  Congress  seemed  more 

than  once  on  the  point  of  breaking  up.  It 
^^^mu      was    mainly  das  to  the  perseverance  and 

wisdom  of  Prince  Bismarck,  who  transferred 
the  disoussion  of  the  most  crucial  points  from  the 
Congress  to  private  meetings  of  his  guests,  and  who 
himself  acted  as  conciliator  when  Oortschakofi  folded 
up  his  maps  or  Lord  Beaconsfield  ordered  a  special 
train,  that  the  work  was  at  length  achieved.  The 
Treaty  of  Berlin,  signed  on  the  13th  of  July,  confined 
Bulgaria,  as  an  autonomous  Principality,  to  the  country 
TmtTot  Bttua,  ^orth  of  the  Balkaus,  and  diminished  the  an- 
joiiis.  thority  which,  pending  the   establishment 

of  its  definitive  system  of  government,  would  by 
the  Treaty  of  San  Stefano  have  belonged  to  a  Hussiaa 
commissioner.  The  portion  of  Bulgaria  south  of  the 
Balkans,  but  extending  no  farther  west  than  the 
valley  of  the  Maritza,  and  no  farther  south  than 
Mount  Bhodope,  was  formed  into  a  Province  of  East 
Boumelia,  to  remain  subject  to  the  direct  political 
and  military  authority  of  the  Sultan,  under  con- 
ditions of  administrative  autonomy.  The  Sultan  was 
declared  to  possess  the  right  of  erecting  fortifications 
both  on  the  coast  and  on  the  land-frontier  of  this 
province,  and  of  maintfuning  troo}»  there.  Alike  in 
Bulgaria  and  in  Eastern  Boumelia  the  period  of  occu- 
pati<m  by  Bussian  troops  was  Unuted  to  nine  mooths. 


un.  TREATY  OF  BSBLm.  S19 

Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  were  banded  over  to  Aostxia, 
to  be  occupied  and  administered  by  that  Power.  The 
cessions  of  territory  made  to  Servia  and  Montenegro  in 
the  Treaty  of  San  Stefano  were  modified  with  the 
object  of  interposing  a  broader  strip  between  these  two 
States ;  Bayazid  was  omitted  from  the  ceded  districts 
in  Asia,  and  the  Czar  declared  it  his  intention  to  erect 
Batotun  into  a  fre«  port,  essentially  commercial.  At 
the  instance  of  France  the  provisions  relating  to  the 
Greek  Provinces  of  Turkey  were  superseded  by  a  vote 
in  £kvour  of  the  cession  of  part  of  these  Provinces  to 
the  Hellenic  Kingdom.  The  Sultan  was  recommended 
to  cede  Thessaly  and  part  of  Epiros  to  Ghreece,  the 
Powers  reserving  to  themselves  .the  right  of  offering 
their  mediation  to  &cilitate  the  negotiations.  In 
other  respects  the  provisions  of  the  Treaty  of  San 
Stefano  were  confirmed  without  substantial  change. 


Lord  Beaconsfield  returned  to  London,  bringing,  as  he 
said,  peace  with  honour.  It  was  claimed,  in  the  despatch 
to  our  Ambassadors  which  accompanied  the  publication 
of  the  Treaty  of  Berlin,  that  in  this  Treaty  the  cardinal 
objections  raised  by  the  British  Government  to  the 
Treaty  of  San  Stefano  had  found  an  entire  remedy. 
"Bulgaria,"  wrote  Lord  Salisbury,  "is  now  confined 
to  the  river-barrier  of  the  Danube,  and 
consequently  has  not  only  ceased  to  possess 
any  harbour  on  the  Archipelago,  but  is  removed  hy 
more  than  a  hundred  miles  from  the  neighboorhood 


fiSO  MODBBIf  SUSOPB,  H& 

of  that  sea.  On  the  Eaxine  the  important  port  oi 
Boui^as  has  been  restored  to  the  Government  of 
Turkey ;  and  Bulgaria  retains  less  thui  half  the  sea- 
board originally  assigned  to  it,  and  possesses  no  other 
port  except  the  roadstead  of  Varna,  which  can  hardly 
be  used  for  any  but  commercial  purposes.  The  re- 
placement under  Turkish  rule  of  Bourgas  and  the 
southern  half  of  the  sea-board  on  the  Euxine,  and  the 
strictly  commercial  character  assigned  to  Batoum,  have 
largely  obviated  the  menace  to  the  liberty  of  the  Black 
Sea.  The  political  outposts  of  Bussian  power  have 
been  pushed  back  to  the  r^on  beyond  the  Balkans ; 
the  Sultan's  dominions  have  been  provided  with  a  de* 
fensible  frontier."  It  was  in  short  the  contention 
of  the  English  Government  that  while  Russia,  in  the 
pretended  emancipation  of  a  great  part  of  European 
Turkey  by  the  Treaty  of  San  Stefano,  had  but  ac- 
quired a  new  dependency,  England,  by  insisting  on  the 
division  of  Bulgaria,  bad  baffled  this  plan  and  restored 
to  Turkey  an  eficotive  military  dominion  over  all  the 
country  south  of  the  Balkans.  That  Lord  Beaconsfield 
did  well  in  severing  Macedonia  from  the  Slavic  State  of 
Bulgaria  there  is  little  reason  to  doubt ;  that,  having  so 
severed  it,  he  did  ill  in  leaving  it  without  a  European 
guarantee  for  good  government,  every  snccessive  year 
made  more  plain;  the  wisdom  of  his  treatment  of  Bul- 
garia itself  must,  in  the  light  of  subsequent  events, 
i-emain  matter  for  controversy.  It  may  &irly  be  said 
that  in  dealing  with  Bulgaria  English  statesmen  were, 
on  the  whole,  dealing  with  the  unknown.    Nevertheless, 


tah  T^^  DTVmiOK  OF  SPLGARtA.  5» 

had  guidance  been  accepted  from  the  history  of  the  other 
Balkan  Stax;e8,  analogies  were  not  altogether  wanting 
or  altogether  remote.  During  the  present  century 
three  Christian  States  had  been  formed  out  of  what 
had  been  Ottoman  territory :  Servia,  Greece,  and 
Eoumania.  Not  one  of  these  had  become  a  Bussian 
Province,  or  had  failed  to  develop  and  maintain  a 
distinct  national  existence.  In  Servia  an  attempt  had 
been  made  to  retain  for  the  Forte  the  right  of  keeping 
troops  in  garrison.  This  attempt  had  proved  a  mis- 
take. So  long  as  the  right  was  exercised  it  had  simply 
been  a  source  of  danger  and  disquiet,  and  it  had  finally 
been  abandoned  by  the  Forte  itself.  In  the  case  of 
Greece,  Eussia,  with  a  view  to  its  own  interests,  had 
originally  proposed  that  the  country  should  be  divided 
ii.to  four  autonomous  provinces  tributary  to  the  Sultan  : 
against  this  the  Greeks  had  protested,  and  Canning 
had  successfully  supported  their  protest.  Even  the 
appointment  of  an  ex-Minister  of  St.  Petersbui^,  Capo- 
distrias,  as  first  President  of  Greece  in  1827  had  failed  to 
bring  the  liberated  country  under  Bussian  infiuence;  and 
in  the  course  of  the  half-centuiy  which  had  since  elapsed 
it  had  become  one  of  the  commonplaces  of  politics, 
accepted  by  every  school  in  every  country  of  Western 
Europe,  that  the  Powers  had  committed  a  great  error 
in  1833  in  not  extending  to  far  larger  dimensions  the 
Greek  Kingdom  which  they  then  established.  Ta  the 
case  of  Boumania,  the  British  Government  had,  out  of 
fear  of  Bussia,  insisted  in  1856  that  the  provinces  of 
Moldavia  and  Wallachia  should  remain  separate:  the 


en  HODSBN  EUSOPK  HTiL 

reaolt  was  that  the  inhabitants  in  defiance  of  England 
effected  their  onion,  and  that  after  a  few  years  had 
passed  there  was  not  a  single  politician  in  England 
who  regarded  their  onioa  otherwise  than  with  satis- 
faction. If  histoiy  tanght  anything  in  the  solation 
of  the  Eastern  question,  it  taught  that  the  effort  to 
reserve  for  the  Saltan  a  military  existence  in  conntries 
which  had  passed  from  under  his  general  control  was 
futile,  and  that  the  Jjest  barrier  against  Bnssian  in- 
fluence was  to  be  found  not  in  the  division  but  in 
the  strengthening  and  consolidation  of  the  States 
rescued  from  Ottoman  dominions. 

It  was  of  course  open  to  English  statesmen  in  1878 
to  believe  that  all  that  had  hitherto  passed  in  the 
Balkan  Peninsula  bad  no  bearing  upon  the  problems  of 
the  hour,  and  that,  whatever  might  have  been  the  case 
with  Greece,  Servia,  and  Eoumania,  Bulgaria  stood  on 
a  completely  different  footing,  and  called  for  the  appli- 
cation of  principles  not  based  on  the  experience  of  the 
past  but  on  the  divinations  of  superior  minds.  Should 
the  history  of  succeeding  years  bear  out  this  view, 
should  the  Balkans  become  a  true  military  frontier  for 
Turkey,  should  Northern  Bulgaria  sink  to  the  condition 
o£  a  Russian  dependency,  and  Eastern  Roumelia,  in 
severance  from  its  enslaved  kin,  abandon  itself  to  a 
thriving  ease  behind  the  garrisons  of  the  reforming 
Ottoman,  Lord  Beaconsfield  will  have  deserved  the 
fame  of  a  statesman  whose  intuitions,  undimmed  by 
the  mists  of  experience,  penetrated  the  secret  of  the 
future,  and  shaped,  because  they  discerned,  the  destiny 


un.  VSmiT  OF  BVLaABZA.  223 

of  nations.  It  will  he  the  task  of  later  historians  to 
measore  the  exact  period  after  the  Congress  of  Berlin 
at  which  the  process  indicated  by  Lord  Beaconsfield 
came  into  visible  operation ;  it  is  the  misfortune  of 
those  whose  view  is  limited  by  a  single  decade  to  have 
to  record  that  in  every  particular,  with  the  single  ex- 
ception of  the  severance  of  Macedonia  from  the 
Slavonic  Principality,  Lord  Beaconsfield's  ideas,  pur- 
poses, and  anticipations,  in  so  f^*  as  they  related  to 
IBastem  Europe,  have  hitherto  been  contradicted  by 
events.  What  happened  in  Greece,  Servia,  and  Eou- 
mania  has  happened  in  Bulgaria.  Experience,  thrown 
to  the  winds  by  English  Ministers  in  1878,  has  justified 
those  who  listened  to  its  voice.  There  exists  no  such 
thing  as  a  Turkish  fortress  on  the  Balkans ;  Bourgas 
no  more  belongs  to  the  Sultan  than  Athens  or  Bel- 
grade ;  no  Torkish  soldier  has  been  able  to  set  foot 
within  the  territoiy  whose  very  name.  Eastern  Rou- 
melia,  was  to  stamp  it  as  Turkish  dominion.  National 
independence,  a  living  force  in  Greece,  in  Servia,  in 
Roumania,  has  proved  its  power  in  Bulgaria  too.  The 
efforts  of  Bussia  to  establish  its  influence  over  a  people 
liberated  by  its  arms  have  been  repelled  witb  unex- 
pected firmness.  Like  the  divided  members  of  Bou- 
niania,  the  divided  members  of  Bulgaria  have  eifected 
their  union.  In  this  union,  in  the  growing  material 
and  moral  force  of  the  Bulgarian  State,  Western  Europe 
sees  a  power  wholly  favourable  to  its  own  hopes  for  the 
future  of  the  East,  wholly  adverse  to  the  extension  of 
RussiMi    rule:   and  it  baa   been   reserved    for    Lord 


au  KODSm  SVHOPM.  unl 

Beaconfifield's  colleague  at  the  Congress  of  Berlin. 
regardless  of  tlie  fact  that  Bulgaria  north  of  the 
Balkans,  not  the  southern  Province,  created  that 
vigorous  military  and  political  organisation  which 
was  the  precursor  of  national  union,  to  explain  that 
in  dividing  Bulgaria  into  two  portions  the  English 
Ministers  of  1878  intended  to  promote  its  ultimate 
unity,  and  that  in  subjecting  the  southern  half  to 
the  Sultan's  rule  tbej  laid  the  foundation  for  its 
ultimate  independence. 


D,a,l,zc.bvG00gIe 


INDEX. 


AMalliih,  Faaha  of  Acre;  qnanel  wiU) 

Viceroy  of  Egypt,  ii  **2 
Abdul   Hedjid,  aucceedti  Mahmad  H. 

u  Saltan  of  Turkey,  U.  *5i 
Abercrombj,   Sir   Bslph,  Britiah  ad- 

mii&l,  i.  195,235 
Alierdenii,   Lord ;   despatchoe  on    the 

battle    0(    Laipiig,   i-  619   (note); 

(Foreiffn  Beerolary,  1840),  declines 

to  uasnt  to  the  proposed  Spanish 

Diarrisgcs,  ii.  604  ;   fricnilsbip  to- 

wudi  the  Emperor  Nicholaa,  iii. 

182;    policy    tovnrda     Russia   and 

Turkey   !I853),  193;  refuBOS  King 

Fredericli  William's  requost  tor  a 

guarantee  agsinat  an  attack  from 

francs,   203;    reaignation  ef    pro- 

miership,  219 
Abisbal ;   bit  conspiraoy  in  the  atmy 

of  CHdii,  ii.  173 
Abouldr,    Bonaparte'*     rictory    OW 

Turks    at,    i.     200;    Lmding    (4 

English  troops  at,  235 
Acre,  Siege  of,  ii.  443 ;   captured  by 

Sir  Cbarle«  Napier,  460  _^ 
Acts  Additionnel  (France),  ii.  43 
Adana,  given  to  Vicen^  of  Egypt  by 

Turkey,  ii.  446 
Addington,  Mr.,  Speaker  of  the  House 

of  Commots,  i.  240 ;  hia  govem- 

msnt'a  hostility  to  Bonaj 

lettd*  a  wctioa  of  the  1 

Sll 
Adrianopls,  Peace  of,   ii.  313;  entry 


i.  606 

MgsBB  lilMida,  u.  247,  287 
A^randiBoment,  ScliBinea  of,  advanced 

by  Enropean  alliM  (1793),  L  77, 78 
Agram,  iiL  SB,  87,  69 
Aiz-Ia-CIbap^,  Conference  of,  il.  131 
Albert  FMnch  Bepnblican;  excluded 

from  National  Assembly,  iii.  18 
Albrecht,  Archdoke,  iii.  400 
Albueta,  Battle  of,  i.  447 
AleB«mdm,L  182,  221 


Alexander  I.,  Emperoi  of  Busna,  i. 
232;  pacific  propoaali  to  England, 
233;  secret  treaty  Trithftanoe 
(1801),  251 ;  distrust  of  Bonaparte, 
274 ;  rupture  of  diplomatia  rela- 
tionj  with  Bonaparte,  378:  treaty 
with  £ing  of  Pruaeia  at  Potsdam, 
292 ;  seeks  t^  help  of  England 
against  France,  343 ;  cordial  nila- 
tione  with  the  Sing  of  Prosaia, 
344 ;  mterviBw  with  Napoleon  on 
the  Niemen,  348  ;  oonepiracy  with 
Napoleon,  348;  meeU  ^apoleon  at 
Erfurt,  390  ;  breaks  off  friendly  re- 
lations with  Napoleon,  442 ;  de- 
clines to  aaaiat  Prussia  against 
France,  458 ;  summons  Stein  to 
St.  Petersburg,  480;  eaten  the 
War  of  Liboration  against  Napo- 
leon, 501 :  orriral  at  Frankfort, 
617;  insists  on  Napoleon's  de- 
thronement, 523 ;  arrives  in  Paris 
■nd  secures  the  restoration  of  Louis 
XVIII.,  631,  G33;  at  the  Congreea 
of  Vienna,  iu  22;  arrives  in  Paris 
after  BatUe  o£  Waterloo,  60 ;  Trea^ 
of  Holy  Alliance,  63 ;  addressee 
Polish  Diet  on  his  deeign  to  extend 
popular  representation,  129;  raises 
alum  in  Germany  by  distribntiog 
Stourdza's  psmphlet  on  revolution- 
ary movement^  1 38 ;  sale  of  rotten 
ships  to  Bpaia,  171 ;  proposes  joint 
Bctiunvith  regard  to  Spain  (1820), 
189 ;  his  views  with  regard  to 
Austrian  intervention  in  Italy,  194; 
proposes  to  send  troops  te  Spain  to 
overthrow  the  Constitation,  213 ; 
intervention  in  Turkey  on  behalf 
of  the  Christians,  277,  278  ;  his  re- 
fusal to  aid  the  Greeks  rausee  dis- 
content in  Husaia,  315;  death 
(1826),  and  chancter,  317, 318 

Alexander  II,,  Emperor  ofBussia,  no- 
oeeda  Uie   T    "      -  —  ■   •  - 


esa 


XODSRN  svaojps. 


«20;  libvatai  the  Beib,  S30; 
mMting  at  BeicluUdt  witii  tha 
Emparor  I^raneU  JoMph  on  tho 
Eutecn  OiuatioD,  «8S;  uuuuCM 
to  Britain  raapecting  the  icqaiii^ 
tion  <d  OonaUntinople,  ISO 

Alaxudrift ;  capitnlation  by  the  Freodi 
to  ths  English,  L  236 

Almdniiti,  CKptoTs  of,  b^  ths  Turki, 
iiL48B 

Alfleri.Vittorio,  1.11*.  117 

Algion ;  csptoied  by  France,  iL  S6T 

All  Paaha,  ii.  Si2,  ^64,  286,  295 

Alkmaar,  Battle  of,  i.  106 

AllvinUy,  Anatrian  g^neiiil,  dBfeatad 
by  Bonaparto  at  Biroli,  L  13$ 

Alma,  BattU  of  the,  iii.  21 ) 

Alaace,  Oarman  rights  in,  i.  12 :  Franoa, 
fatberlBiKl  of,  fiO ;  declared  to  be 
£>ench  territory  by  Congreas  of 
Vienna,  ii.  70;  probable  conae- 
qnencei  had  it  been  anDeied  to 
Prtian*,  72  j  dril  goTemment 
eatoblitbed  by  Oermana  during 
tiie  Franoo-FruBMan  war,  iii.  463  \ 
ceded  to  G^many  by  the  Tnuties 
of  Yeimillw  and  FranlLfort,  464 

Altona;  diioantent  with  Daninli  rols, 
iii.  28,  SO 

Amioni,  Treaty  of,  i.  238 ;  npitolate* 
to  the  PniBsiana,  iii.  4GEI 

Anooim,  Surrender  ofj  to  troopa  of 
Victor  Emnianiiel,  iii.  294 

AndrbBsy.  Count,  ne^tintea  reroncilia- 
tion  betweea  Austria  and  Hungary 
(1867),  iii.  391,  302;  opinion  on 
projected  reatoration  of  Gterman 
leadership  to  AiiBtria,  406 ;  coni' 
nonicat^  with  SL  Petersburg  and 
Berlin  on  a  iins  tA  policy  tovardi 
the  Porte,  4TS 

"Andiiasy  Note,  The,"  iii.  478 

AngoulSme,  Ducheaa  of,  L  634,  ii.  G9, 
SS,  114 

Angaul§me,  Duks  of,  leadi  the  French 
troopa  in  the  inTasiou  of  Spain 
(1S231,  ii.  219 

Antonelh,  Cardinal,  minuter  d  Fioa 
IX.,iii.  110,  273 

Antony,  Prince,  agipDinted  Praarian 
prime  minister,  lii.  306 

Antwerp,  taken  ^  the  French,  i.  93 ; 
failnra  of  English  expedition 
against,  428;  bombardment  by 
BWch  and  English,  38S 

Apoatolioala  {Sm  (Elista 

Areola,  Battle  of,  i.  134 

Anlaban,  iii.  612 

Annatoii,  116,11.247 


Azmiitice,  between  France  and  Sar- 
dinia (1796),  L  119;  Boouparte 
and  King  of  Naples  (I79S),  123; 
Bonaparte  and  the  Fope(17e6),  123 ; 
Duke  of  Wiirtemberg  and  tha 
French  (1796),  127;  Naplea  and 
France  (1796),  17G  ;  Austria  and 
Fiance  (ISOO),  222;  (secret)  Em- 
peror of  Austna  and  Ftenoe  (1800), 
223 ;  Austria  and  Vitxux  at  Steyer 
(ISOO),  226;  England  and  Den- 
mark (1891),  232;  Ansbia  and 
France  after  the  Battle  of 
Austerliti  (1806),  297 ;  Bnaaia 
and  Ktance  after  the  BatUe  of 
Friedland  (ISOT),  :14G ;  Znaim 
(1809).  Austria  and  Franca,  426; 
France,  Biisaia,  and  Prussia  (1813), 
496 ;  Austria  and  Sardinia  at 
Vigerano  (181S],  iii.  62;  U&lmo, 
Denmark  and  Frunia  (1843),  1 17  ; 
Garibaldi  and  the  Meapolitana 
(I860),  286;  Denmark,  Aostria, 
and  Prnasia  (1864),  861 ;  Fnnoo 
and  Fniasia  (1871),  463;  Serrim 
and  Turkey  (1876),  489 

Amaud,  St.,  French  officer,  conspirea 
with  Louis  Napoleon  against  the 
goieinment,  iii.  187—169  ;  French 
commander  in  the  Crimea,  211. 

Amdt,  the  German  poet,  i.  407  ;  pn>> 
■ecntion  of,  ii.  148;  member  of 
German  National  Assembly,  ill.  32  ; 
Song  of  the  "  FaOierland,"  U.y  i«- 
tires  from  National  Assembly,  137 

Artnis,  Count  of  (afterwards  Charlea 
X.),  i.  274,  631,  iL  13;  heada  tha 
poi-ty  of  reaction  in  1816  in  Franca^ 
91 ;  growth  of  his  par^,  94  ;  am- 
bitiotis  projects,  160  {St*  alao 
Charles  X.) 

Asia  Uinor,  conquered  by  Egyptian* 
.  under  Ibrahim,  ii.  443 

Aspem,  BatUe  of,  i.  421 

Asturias;  papular  rising  against  tha 
French,  i.  380. 

Athoa,  Monka  of  Uount,  iL  3S6 

AuerEtiidt,  Battle  of,  i.  329 

Augereau,  French  general,  attacka 
the  Duectory,  i.  146 

Auguslenbarg,  Duke  of  (alder),  t^ 
nounces  M»  claims  in  Bchleawig- 
Holstein,  iii.  343. 

Augustenburg,  Duke  of  (younger) ; 
Bismarck  proposes  that  tha  orown 
of  Sdiileawig-HolRtein  should  ba 
conferred  upon  tha,  817 

AoTelle  de  Fahulinca,  Frmush  gencisl, 
advanoaa  to  the  relief  at  fan*,  iii. 
457 


Anatmlits,  &tlla  of,  i.  SB8 

Aiutxia,  Dedanition  af  war  bj  Fnutce 
■gainst  (179^J,  i.  3  ;  ultiEnatum  to 
Franca,  12;  aUU  of,  before  tha 
Witr  of  1792,  IB  —  30;  teCorma 
of  Huia  Theresa,  Zl ;  refornu  ol 
Joseph  II.  in,  22 ;  umler  I«opo!il 
IL,  25;  under  Prancis  II.,  27; 
steied  for  territory  in,  29 ;  opoo- 
IDK  of  v&r  against  France,  i  1 ; 
■iSed  to  FnisBia,  42  ;  defeute 
Premchat  Neerwinden,  68  ;  Bchemsi 
of  ■ggntndisement,  76 ;  invoetA 
Oambray  and  1a  Quesnof ,  78 ; 
defeated  at  Wattigniea,  81 ;  in- 
difference to  English  plana  for 
Bourbon  Testoratian,  B6 ;  breach 
with  Frunsia  after  the  partition  of 
Poland,  86  ;  delcaled  by  French  at 
"WBrth  and  WeiBsenhtirg,  87;  de- 
feated by  Bonaparte  on  the  Miocio, 
132;  retires  before  tlie  French  ia 
Italy,  12S;  invaded  by  the  French, 
128 ;  treaty  with  France  at  Leoben, 
1S8;  l^vatyof  CampoFonnio  with 
France,  117  ;  renewal  of  war  with 
France,  177;  defeata  France  at 
Btockach  and  Magnano,  179,  181 ; 
deeiEns  in  Italy,  185 ;  jealousy  to- 
wards Russia,  192  [noto) ;  end  of 
alliance  with  Russia,  19&;  reply 
to  Bonaparte's  propoaal  for  peace, 
21S;  resumption  of  hostilities  with 
Fiance,  217;  defeated  at  Hohen- 
linden,  225 ;  intereets  in  Qennony, 
249;  Itate  in  1805,  282— 2B3; 
ocouines  Bavaria,  287;  suTTeader' 
of  army  to  the  French  at  TJlm, 
289;  the  French  occupy  Vienna, 
293  ;  defeated  at  Ansterlitz,  200  ; 
low  of  territory,  300;  prepares 
for  war  against  France,  402 ;  in- 
vasion of  Bavana,  410 ;  defeated 
ly  Napoleon  at  landshut  and 
^fgmBhl,  41£ ;  Napoleon  enters 
Vienna,  41S;  conqiieats  in  Poland 
•ad  Italy,  417  ;  defeats  the  French 
■t  Aspem,  421 ;  defeated  by  Napo- 
leon at  Wogram,  42S  ;  peace  with 
France,  430 ;  Icweea  by  the  Peace 
of  Vienna,  430 ;  alliance  with 
NaptJeoD,  460 ;  attitnde  townrdg 
Napoleon  in  1813,  496 ;  Trcity  of 
Beichenbach,  49S;  enters  the  war 
agsinn  France,  GOl ;  defeated  at 
Dresden,  605 ;  reeulta  of  Napoleon's 
«*T^  645  ;  its  gains  by  the  Settle- 
ment of  1814,  ii.  4;  Congreos  of 
'nenaa,  20—31,  38;  Hetteimch'a 
ittlomanahip,   82 — 86;    the  Em- 


peror's retistanco  to  mogttat,  82 ; 
Conference  of  Aix-lo-Chapelle,  131 
— 133; -CiMuerTatiTe  principles  of 
Mettemich,  135;  picposad  inter- 
vention in  Italy,  192;  invadea 
Italy,  aoi;  policy  towards  Tur- 
key in  1821,  279;  intarrentioa 
in  Papal  States  for  suppiessiou  ot 
revolt  (1831),  402 ;  second  inter- 
vention in  Papal  SUtes,  404  ;  with* 
draws  from  Papal  States   (1838), 


476-482;  death  of  the  Emperor 
Francis  Joseph,  and  accession  of 
Ferdinand,  482 ;  rural  system  in 
Hungary,  491 ;  insurrection  of 
Poles  in  Galicia,  493  ;  Rural  l^ct 
(1846],  494;  revolution  at  Vienna, 
1848,  iu.  6  ;  fall  of  Mettemich,  8  ; 
Hungarian  dopittiition  received  by 
the  Emperor,  9 ;  accepts  Hun- 
garian schema  of  independence, 
11 ;  autonomy  promised  to  Bohemia, 
14 ;  insorroction  in  Lombardy  and 
Venice,  15,  16;  g«Denl  war  ia 
Italy  agitinst  Austrian  rule,  17,  18; 
Constitution  pablished,  50  ;  af^ta- 
tation  in  Vienna,  ii.;  flight  of  the 
Emperor,  52 ;  fnrCher  riot4  ot 
students  and  workmen,  52,  53 ; 
riota  nt  Prague,  G4 ;  campaign 
around  Verona,  55  ;  re-conqutst  of 
Vcnetia,  60 ;  Emperor  returns  to 
Vieima  from  Innsbruck,  S2; 
revolt  in  Croatia,  63—69  ;  Emperor 
diBEolves  Hun^aiian  Parliament, 
aniL  declares  ltd  acts  null  and  void, 
74;  tumult  at  Vienna,  76;  flight 
of  the  Emperor  to  Olmlitz,  77; 
Oeneral  Windischgrali  subdues  the 
re\-oIt  at  Vienna,  73  ;  abdication  of 
the  Emperor,  and  accession  of  hii 
nephew  Francis  .Joseph  I.,  81 ; 
the  Unitary  Constitutional  Edict 
(March,  1849),  83 ;  occupation  of 
Festh,  86;  Constitution  publiahod 
by  Schwapjenberg,  88;  driven  from 
Hungary,  88 ;  subdues  Hungnry, 
96 ;  ovDrthrowB  Sardinian  army  at 
Novara,IOO;Burrenderof  Venice  to, 
112  ;.propoBcd  connection  with  Qer- 
mony  at  the  Frankfort  Parliament, 
127  ;  refuBca  to  recognise  the  (iur- 
man  Foderal  Union,  142 ;  propose* 
a  conference  at  Frankfort  to  discuss 
question  ot  union,  143;  restores  the 
Diet  of  Frankfort,  145;  conflict 
with  ProBsiB  respecting  affairs  in 
Heaie-CaiHel,    145—148;  demands 


JfODBEW  stmops. 


BTB  gnntfld  b;  Pnuna  tMpecting: 
Heme,  1*7;  oondition  after  1851, 
IM — 1C4;  oonceuioiu  to  the  Pa- 
P«ev,  15t;polic7  towkrd<Riusi&oii 
oDtbnak  (rf  Criiuaai)  W&r,  300; 
Oonferance  of  Vieniia,  May,  ISGG, 
231 1  mediatM  I>etweei)  BosbU  and 
£urope*n  lUiee  after  full  of 
Bebwtopol,  22S  ;  its  govemment  of 
OeDtral  and  Southern  Italy  do- 
noimced  by  Oonnt  OaTour  at  the 
Paril  Conference,  246;  rupture 
nilb  SardinU,  2fil ;  deckrstion 
of  irai  by  FnuiM  and  Sardinia, 
25S;  defeated  at  the  BatUea  of 
Magenta  and  Solferina,  261,  2S3; 
peace  concluded  with.  France 
and  Sacdinia  at  Villafianca,  ^SG; 
oppoBLtion  to  the  union  of  Itaiy 
nnder  Victor  Emmanuel,  298 
itat«  of  affain  after  186S,  and  croa 
tion  of  Central  Council,  322,  323 
diploma  publiebed  for  restoring  U 
Hungary  its  eld  Constitution,  324  . 
Hungat7  remets  the  eatabliahment 
of  a  Central  Council,  32«;  the 
BoichHrath  Msemblei  at  Vienna 
(1861),  327 ;  prognw  of  Parlia- 
mentary Bystcm,  328  ;  troops  enter 
Schleewig  conjamtly  with  the 
Frnsuani,  8G0;  Mcurta  fichltswig- 
Holstoin  in  conjunction  with  PruB- 
aia  by  the  Troaty  of  Vienna,  353  i 
refusoa  to  attend  proponed  Euro- 
pean OongreBS,  and  bids  the 
Federal  Diet  take  over  the  oon- 
trol   of    Schte»wig.HoUteii 


S70; 


,t  of  n 


irith 


Prussia,  373;  defeated  by  Prussia 
at  Euniggriitz,  876 ;  victoriee  of 
CiutoKZ-a  and  Lissa,  377 ;  terms  of 
peace  with  I'ramin  (1866),  376-37D  ; 
■ettlement  of  conflict  with  Hungor/ 
aft«r  the  Battle  of  KoniggriitE, 
3S7-3»2;  defeneiTe  allianoe  witb 
Italy,  410;  "  Longue  of  the  Hiree 
Emperors,"  476;  treaty  with 
RuBsiaat  Beicbstadt  on  the  Eastern 
Question,  4S8 ;  acquires  Bosnia 
and  Herzegovina  at  the  Congtess  of 
Berlin,  S18 
Avignon,  Claims  of  the  Pope  in,  L 

AKglio,  Sardinian  minister,  iii.  243 ; 
onvoy  to  Bologna,  262  ;  providea 
lot  the  defence  of  Ilomamia  Bftainst 
Austria,  267;  Admiral  Perwno 
K-len  hiB  diarr  to,  282  (nolo) ; 
Jiewa  ropirding-  ozcliuion  of  Rone 
from  ItaBan  KSigdom,  3a»      ^^ 


1,  Akmndw  (Aostriaa  i 


"** 


negotiates  the  Concordat  with  tb* 
Papacy,  iii.  16fi 

Badajox,   Cbptnra   «f^   bf  tha   Doke 

ol^  Wellington,  L  44S 
Baden,  entered  by  Fteneh  troops,  L 
127 ;  formaiian  ol  a  CbnMitntian, 
ii.  144 ;  Xdbeial  imUnmnij  of  the 
■overeigD,  411 ;  Rqinlilican  riaiiig 
(1848),  iii.  30  ;  insurvectuMi  (Sept- 
ember, 1848),  I19;thegoveRinieiit 
of  the  Qraiid  Dhjko  aooepts  the 
FrHuUoit  ConstitntiiHi,  188;  Be- 
publican  insuirectjon,  ii.,  138 ; 
insurrection  qnelled  by  Pmanaii 
troops  after  fall  of  Baatadt,  138 

Bagtation,  Prince,  Ruadan  camman- 
dsr,  L  482,  4S4 

Baird,  General,  L  236,  396 

BaTadd,  iii.  498 

Balaolava,  iii.  113;  BatUe  at  IIS; 
Chiwe  of  the  Light  Brigade  bL 
21S 

Balance  of  Towta  in  Qermany,  i.  40  ; 
in  Europe  after  the  TiMty  «f 
Baale,  67 ;  after  the  Engliih  rio- 
toriet  in  ERTpt,  237;  Austrian 
defence  of,  404 

Balearic  Islands,  offered  by  Napolem 
to  GlrMt  Britain,  i.  368 

Balkani,  Bueeian  advance  on  the,  iii. 
49S 

Bnpaume,  iii.  459 

Barclay  de  Tolly,  Boaaiaii  coainuuider, 
i.  4fl2,  464,  466,  467 

Baring,  Hr.,  Secretary  of  English 
Legation  at  Constantinaple  ;  report 
on  Bulgarian  iiiiiiimi  iiii.  iiu  4S2 

Barraa,  M.,  French  Director,  L  199, 
203 

Barthelemy,  H.,  mtoibec  of  French 
Directory,  i.  144 ;  seiied  by  Ange- 
reau's  troops,  146;  ambaaaadta  at 
Beme,  160 

Biisle,  Treaty  of,  L  90 

Biuique  Prorioces,  centre  of  Carbst 
rebellion  (1834),  ii.  431 ;  immoni^ 
from  ciutoms-duee,  432 

Bastille,  The,  L  44 

Baloum,  iii.  612 

Batthy&ny,  Count,  instructed  to  form 
a  National  Ministry  in  Hungary, 
iiL  10 ;  publiahea  Emperor  of 
Austria's  onler  suspeading  Jellacie 
from  office,  6S;  resigns  office,  73; 
sentenced  to  death,  96 

"  BatUe  of  the  Nations  "  (Leipaig),  I 


daagna  of  n«iiaa  n.  on,  28 ;  entered 
by  fVencli  tioops,  127;  traitywitb 
Brmapnite,  2S0;  retorma  mulor 
Uont^sltu,  255 ;  oocupiod  by  the 
AlutniuiB,  287 ;  inTnded  by  Aui- 
trianB,  410 ;  surrenden  Iimabruck 
to  the  TyroIeAe,  413  ;  Dfataiiu  Balt- 
boiv,  430  ;  Joins  the  Alliel  in  War 
of  Lilienition,  fill  ;  fongation  of 
k  Conatitution,  iL  144  ;  dinturb- 
Bnce  in  tlie  Palatiiute,  408 
Bajazid,  iii.  612,  G13 
Baj-len,  Capitulation  of,  i.  384 
BayQnne,  meeting  of  Napoleoa  tnd 
Friuoe  Ferdinand  of  Spain,  i.  376; 
Mkpoleon's  Spanish  Assembly,  380 
Buoine,  Maiehol,  French  commander 
of  the  «rmy  at  the  Khioe,  iii.  438, 
4S9  ;  defeated  by  the  PmiuianB  at 
MaiB-la-Tour,  440;  defeated  at 
OniTelolte,  441 ;  retiree  with 
>nny  to  Metz,  442  ;  inaction  at 
Uets,  and  probable  intrigaes  for 
ranaiud  power,  464 ;  mrreDders 
Heti  to  the  Prussians,  4GS  ;  tried 
by  couzt-martial  and  eenteoced  to 
death,  a. ;  tha  Nemeds  of  the 
moral  indifference  and  aervility  of 
the  French  Empire,  457 
Beaconsfield,  Lord,  Enntom  Policy 
and  distruat  of  Boasia,  iii.  4S4 — 
4S7 ;  war-Bpeech  at  Ouildhidl  ban- 
quet, 491 ;  represents  tlngland, 
with  Lord  Salisbury,  at  the  Con- 
fess of  Berlin,  517;  policy  in 
BeTering-  Macedonia  from  Bulgaria, 
620 ;  his  anticipations  relative  to 
Eastern  Europe  80  far  contindicted, 
623 


"  Crimea  ud  Punish- 
ments," L  1 1 3 

BeethoTen  entertains  memben  of  the 
Congress  of  Vienna,  iL  21 

Belcredi,  Cknut,  Austrian  minister,  iii. 
387 

Bslgiam, under  Austria,  L  GO;  Trench 
Tictories,  92 ;  nnitod  to  Holland  at 
Oongreas  of  Vienna,  ii.  70;  reTolO' 


Fhuice  and  TaUeyrand,  384, 
independenoe  reoognised  I^  the 
Oonferenoe  of  London,  38S ;  Dae 
dn  Nemoim  elected  king.  Bod 
shortly  rutircs  at  the  instigation  of 
Lonia  Philippe,  387;  Prince  Leopold 
of  Sazu-Cobo^  elected  king,  ii. ; 
i  I 


settlement  of  (he  frontier,  388; 
project  of  francs  for  its  acquisi- 
tion, iii.  3S4;  proposal  to  cede 
Belgic  territory  to  France  in  return 
for  iiUiemburg,  403 

Bolliard,  Fnnch  general,  i.  236 

Bom,  llun^irian  genertj,  defeats  the 
Aostrians,  iii.  89  ;  defeated  by 
Anstriuns  at  Temesvar,  9a 

Benedok,  Austrian  general,  iii.  263, 
374 :  doatmttion  of  his  aim^  at 
EBni^gratz,  376 

Benedetti,  Count,  French  ambassador 
at  Berlin,  report  on  the  French 
project  for  the  acquisition  of  Bel' 
gium,  iii.  384,  386,  note  ;  inter, 
view  with  tha  King  ot  Prussia  at 
Kms  respecting  the  candidature  of 
of  Prince  Leopold  for  the  Bpanislk 
throne,  413 

Bennigsen,  GnssiaQ  general,  L  341; 
defeated  by  t)ie  French  at  Fried- 
land,  316;  leads  tbe  Russiiia  re- 
aerre*  during  the  Wai  of  libera- 
tion, G12 

Bentinck,  Lord  W.,  on  Untat's  da- 
plicity.  i.  637,  note ;  English 
repcesentatiTe  in  SicUy;  forces 
King  Ferdinand  to  establish  a 
Parliament,  ii.  87 

Bonvenuti,  Oardinal,  ii.  400,  404 

B^rangcr  on  Bonaparte's  return  to 
Fiance,  i.  201 ;  Napoleonio  lyrics 

Bereeford,  English  oommander  in 
Portugal,  ii.  1S6 

BerGflina,  Passage  ot  ths,  by  Napoleon, 
i.  478 

Berlin,  entry  of  Napoleon,  L  S32 ;  fight 
between  the  French  and  Oossacks, 
486 ;  BTacuation  by  the  French, 
486 ;  revolutionary  movement  of 
March,  1846,  iii.  18;  conflict  be- 
tween the  people  and  troops,  21 ; 
the  King  ndce  through  the  streets 
in  the  character  of  Gonnan  leader, 
23 ;  opening  of  PrUHBian  National 
Parliament,  33;  riots  against  tha 
Assembly  {Sept  1848),  IIS,  120; 
Conference  of  1849,  139 ;  opening 
of  the  first  Parliament  of  the 
GBrman  Empire,  March,  1871, 468 : 
Congress  ot  (1878),  618 

Berlin  Memorandom,  The,  rejected  by 
England,  iU.  481 

Bernadotto,  Crown  Prince  of  Sweden  ■ 
allianco  with  Riiwiu,  i.  4G3  ;  enters 
the  War  of  Liboiiition,  ill 

Bemadotte,  Pronoh  genOTul,  com- 
mands Qie   army  ia  Hanover,   i. 


KODBBir  SVBOFS. 


SM;   vtoMM   n«MUa  territaiT, 


BeniEtorfl,  Cbnnt,  Pnusian  eavoj  at 

the  ConferenM  of  London  (tS64), 
.      iu.851 
Barryj  Uorder  of  Duke  of,  iL  1GB 
Bertiiier,  Qeneral,  leads  Freiu^  troops 

into  Rome,!.  164 
BeaikK    Bay,  iiL   194;    despatch    of 

Engliih  fleet  to,  481,  607 
Tlmiiiiiiliiii  1  gained  by  Kuama  in  1SI4, 

ii.4 
B«nidrM,  Marahsl    (French),  defeat* 

the  Bpauiah  at  Rio  Seco,  i.  383 
Beari^rea,  Spanish  inaoTgent,  ii.  319 
BeuBt,  Coont,  iii.  152 ;  Saxon  minia- 

ter  at   the   Conference  of  Londoa 

S.B4),  361 ;  Austrian  MInigter,  301 ; 
aettlsmant  with  Hungry,  it. ; 
■D^;«ata  the  union  of  Luxcmbnrg 
with  Belgium,  401 ;  arrangog  de- 
fennve  alliaiice  with  Tlaly,  410; 
diamiaaed  from  office  at  the  initi- 
Ration  ot  Biamarcit,  478 

Biarritz,  meeting  of  Napoleon  in.  and 
UiHmarck,  iii.  36S 

Bilbao,  ii,  433 ;  beai^ed  by  the  Cwf- 
li^,  4311 

Bimnarck,  Prince,  auccceils  Prince 
Hoheiiloha  as  Prime  Miuister,  iii. 
313;  [jroviouB  nppointiuonta  and 
□uiiuirchical  tendeucies,  313—315; 
jKilicy  of  "  Blood  and  Iron,"  317  ; 
reaolvea  to  levy  toiM  without  a 
Budget,  318;  monsures  neainst  the 
I'resa,  321 ;  establishes  fnendl;  le- 
Mione  with  Euaaia,  329  ;  hostility 
towuids  Poland,  342 ;  attitude 
towiirds  Denmark  on  the  death  of 
Frederick  YI[.,  313;  statecraft 
roaistting  Schleswig-Holstein,  346, 
349,  355— 3!it!;  names  conditions  on 
which  Sdilcswig-Uolitcin  should 
be  given  to  the  Prince  of 
AuguKlenbtirg.  357 ;  meets  Napo- 
leon 111.  at  Biarriti,  369;  soeka 
oo-tiporution  of  IL'ily  in  war  against 
Austria,  364 ;  preposos  to  summon  a 
GorniHn  FarlmraLnt,  30B  ;  reply  to 
Knpoleon  III.  on  his  demand  for 
the  cession  ot  the  Rhsuish  I'ro- 
vrnocB,  BGB ;  orders  troops  to  enter 
IloJstoin  on  Auatria^s  refusing  to 
attend  Ihe  propi>i«)d  BuropcinCon- 
grusa,  370  :  liis  ilcniands  refund  by 
Oerouui  SCntoa,  ii.;  bis  life  at- 
tempted, 371;  hjB  domasdafor  the 


aoquiaildon  of  territorr  aftar  tte 

warwith  Austria,  878,  376 ;  TiewB 
on  the  project  of  Napoleon  1 1 1,  for 
the  acquisition  of  BelgiTim,  SSt; 
popularity  aftet  the  Battle  rf 
KoniggrUi,  S86;  treatment  of 
Napoleon's  proposal  for  the  Deasion 
of  LniembuTg  to  Franoe,  401 ; 
triumph  of  his  fibt^flmanship  io  the 
strength  end  success  of  the  Gennan 
army,  432  ;  mocle  Napokon  IIL  at 
Sedan,  446;  meats  M.  Julea  l<'an« 
at  Fitrricres  ri^peeting  negOlJatione 
for  peace,  460;  lequiree  the  surren- 
der  of  StrasbnTg  and  Tout,  ii.  ; 
meets  Thiers  atyeraaiUeatoanange 
terms  of  pouco,  464  ;  requim  the 
Oesaion  of  Alsace  and  BoBtorn  Lor- 
raine, and  payment  of  six  milliards 
franca  as  the  basis  of  psrtoe,  t).  ,■ 
hostility  towards  the  Crown  Prince, 
466;  policy  in  favouring  a  Repub- 
lic for  France,  475  ;  a-'oumnces  to 
Russia  and  Austria,  47-'i,  476;  policy 
at  the  Congress  of  BerUn,  618 
Blakn,  Bpanish  ^naral,  i.  394 
ULiDc,  Louis,  ii.  610;  member  of 
French  Provincial  Qovemmenc 
(1640),  iii.  31 ;  excluded  from  Na- 
tional Aasembly,  SB 
Bliicher,  (ieneral ;  capitulate*  at 
Liibock,  i.  831  ;  Icada  Pnisaian 
army  Bsiiinat  Napoloon,  491 ;  hoail* 
division  of  Hus^ns  and  IVus- 
siaoa,  602,  606,  612,  614;  attacks 
Napoleon  in  France.  622 ;  head  of 
Prussian  troops  (1615),  ii.  49;  de- 


!,  79 

Bohemia,  national  movements  (1830— 
1813),  ii.  488,  487  ;  the  Csoohs' 
movement  for  indepandeni.'e,  iii.  13; 
declines  to  send  repTceentatives  to 
National Assrmblyat  Frankfort,  31; 
rebellion  at  Prague,  53,  54  ;  Pnia- 
sian-Austrion  campai^,  376 

Bolugtia ;  portion  of  CisjuuL-me  Re- 
public, i.  133;  insurroction  of  1831, 
ii.  399 

Bonaparte^  Jerome;  compelled  to 
mairy  the  daughter  of  the  King  ot 
'Wiirtemherg,  by  his  brother  Napo- 
leon, i.  803;  Kingdom  of  West- 
phalia given  to  him,  347;  flight 
from  Westphalia,  517 

Bonaparte,  Joseph ;  French,  ambnssa- 
d^  at  Rome^  i   163;   rnrnwiwU 


)  Einff  ol  .  . 
flight  fnmi  Uadrid,  SEM;  Mcond 
%ht,  449;  defnted  at  Tittorim  hj 
Walliagton,  fi!0 

B<mapBjt«,  Looii ;  made  King  of 
HolUnd,  L  803;  abdicatioD  and 
flight,  138 

Boudparte,  Lucien,i.  202,  203 

Bonaparta,  NapoleOD  [Stt  Napoleon} 

Sooicsuiipagiu,  ftnrdipian  envoy,  iu> 
261 

Bc^eaux ;  takes  arma  ag&iiuit  Paria,  i. 
Tl ;  French  Natioital  Aaaembly 
opened  at  (I87I),  iii.  468 

Boi«dmo,  Battle  of,  i.  468 

Boania,  takes  arms  against  Torkey, 
iiL  23B ;  handed  over  to  Austria  at 
the  Congresa  ol  Beriin  (18T7)  &i9 

BoaphOTUt,  The  ;  role  for  pnssage  of 
war-ahipa  agreed  upon  by  the 
Powara,  iL  462 

Boult^line,  Amy  ot,  L  284 

BooTMki,  Qenend,  oommands  Frenoh 
army  of  the  £ai^  and  is  defeated  b^ 
the  Qennana  at  Montb^liard,  iii. 
461,  463 

Bourdonnaye,  Xa  ;  member  of  French 
House  of  Bejmaentatives,  ii.  101, 
103 ;  ntioiater  uider  Charlea  X, 
361 

Bourmont,  Qeneial ;  French  minister, 
iL  361 ;  campaign  against  Arabs, 
366 ;  capture*  Algien,  367 

Bragania,  House  of,  i.  366 

Brandenburg,  meeting  of  Fnusitul 
Parliament  at,  iii.  124 

Brandtmbuig,  Count ;  Prussian  minia- 
tar[1848),  iii.  123;  death,  146 

Braiil ;  seat  of  Portuguese  government, 
ii.  186 

Brionia,  Omer ;  Turkish  oommander, 
ii.  2S5,  SOT,  339 

BiisBon,  French  general;  (urrenders 
to  the  Tyrolese,  i.  413 

Biiisot,  M.,  ioumklist  and  Qirondin 
mamber  of  LegialatiTe  Assembly,  i. 
8  ;  uigee  war  against  Austria,  10 

Brune,  Marshal ;  murdered  by  French 
Boyaliats  at  Matseilles,  ii.  93 

Briinu,  i.  286 

Bmnswiok,  Duka  of;  hif  hatred  to- 
wards Emigranta,  i.  33 ;  inradea 
Fnuic6,  42;  Us  proclamation  to 
the  French,  43;  retreat  at  Valmy, 
48 ;  retires  befon  the  French  at 
WBrth,  87;  on  PruMianpolicy,  299  ; 


fii 


Brmuwick  (Tounger)  Dnke  ^  inTadei 
Saxony,  i.  423 

Brunswick,  Insurrection  in,  ii.  407 

Buenoe  Ayrea ;  falls  into  the  haadi  of 
the  Ei^lieh,  L  S69 

Bulgaria,  ii.  260;  TurkiBh  tmMueree, 
iii.  483  ;  autonomy  constituted  by 
the  Treaty  of  Ban  Htefano,  GIO; 
piuviajona  of  Trent;  ot  Berlin 
relating  to,  618 

Billow,  Pruisisn  seneral,  L  608  - 

Bunsen,  Count,  iii.  132;  letter  from 
King  of  Prussia  ou  Bnglaod't 
aaaiatance  to  Turkey,  202,  note; 
PrussiaD  ambaseador  at  London, 
203;  conflict  with  King  Frederick 
William,  and  lesigoation  ot  mSce, 
204;  letter  from  Frederick  William 
on  the  Emperor  Nicholas,  220,  note 

Buol,  Count;  Austrian  minister,  iiL 
201,  249 

Buidett,  bir  Fimicii,  iL  166 

Burgimie,  English  enginear  in  the 
Crimea,  iii.  212;  letter  to  the 
Tinuri,  213,  note 

Burke.  Edmund,  i  63;  hia  description 
of  the  state  of  France,  76  ;  asaoiua- 
tion  with  Beaconsfield,  iii.  487,  note 

Buirnrd,  Sir  Henry;  unnmands 
British  troops  in  Portugal,  L  386 

Byron,  Lord,  iL  212,  286,  313; 
writing*  excluded   from  Auttia, 


Okdii,  inreatment  by  tiie  Fi-enoh,  L 

453  ;  conspiracy  in  Spanish  army ; 

iL   172;  meeting  of  Cortes,   321; 

besiegud  by  the  French,  222 
Oadoudal,  Georgea,  his  plot  to  mus»- 

inate  Bonaparte^  L  274 
Cagliari,  iiL  284 
Oajazzo,  iii.  296 
Calabria,  Duke  of,  Vioan^  «f  Ha^es, 

ii.  184, 200 ;  linng  against  Aoatrian 

rule,  474 
Calatoflmi,  iiL  286 
Calder,  Sir  Kobert,  English  admiral, 

L28« 
mderaii,   Neapolitan  Society  oL  iL 

181 
Ouabaofr^  Second  Coniul  of  Fibdml 

L  210 
Cambmy,  invested  by  Austrian^  i.  78 
Cambridge,  Duka  o^  his  flight  from 

Hanover,  i.  271 
Camperdown,  Battle  of,  L  161 
Oampo  Fonnio^  Treaty  of,  L  W 


182 


MODERN  EtmOPS. 


^,  Georgv,  Hr.,  i.  3(3 ;  dster- 
minei  to  aeizc  Danish  n&vy,  350; 
on  the  proponJs  of  tho  Aiz-IS' 
Oiftpalls  Conference,  iL  131 ;  op- 
posed to  joint  interrention  vitb 
AJlies,  190  ;  irillidiawB  from  oBice, 
ISl ;  BQCoeeda  Castlenagh  aa 
Foreign  Secretary,  21'i ;  detenninee 
to  npliold  the  indapendenre  o(  the 
Bpanish  colonies,  227  ;  sends  troops 
to  Portugitl,  231 ;  stateBmanship, 
383  ;  attitude  towards  Oreef-e,  312  ; 
Hsttemich's  hostility  towards  him 
(or  umngin^  tha  AD|;lo-l{iisiiian 

Srotocol  tor  intervention  in  Greece, 
23  ;  death  and  policv,  32S— 32S 

(hDning,  Sir  Stmtford  ISm  Laid  Strat- 
ford de  Badcliffe) 

Oannibert,  French  commander  in  the 
Crimea,  iii.  313,  224;  Buccaedad 
by  PSliBier,  225 

Chpe  of  Good  Hope,  i.  237 

Ckpodiitrias,  Foreign  Minister  of 
Bii*aia,ii.  196;  his  rule  in  Oorfn, 
264  ;  bre  for  the  Greek  oauae,  287  ; 
xetirea  from  ofSce,  2SS;  eleel«d 
President  of  Greece,  345;  policy 
and      administiatloD,       350—361  ; 

Oapua,  i.  1 74 ;  Barrendered  to  the 
French,  176,  iii.  292:  Burrendered 
to  SaniiDisn  troops,  '2U7 

CbboDori,  Neopolitan  Bccret  society, 
ii.  ISO,  190 

Oirdigan,  Lord,  iii.  SIS 

Oarignano,  Prince  of.  ii.  204,  iii.  270 ; 
and  Met  Charles  Albert 

Chrinthia,  annexed  to  Napoleon's  em- 
plr«,  i,  430 

Oarliiit*,  or  Apostolicals,  ii.  230,  232 ; 
rebellions,  427 :  Tictories  under 
leadership  of  Zumnlucnrret^i,  434 

Carlos,  Don,  brotherof  King  Ferdinand 
of  Spain,  hciad  of  clerical  party,  ii. 
176, 177  ;  claims  the  crown  of  tipatn 
on  the  death  of  Ferdinand,  429; 
nnites  with  Don  Miguel,  i*.;  de- 
{eatad  and  conducted  to  London, 
430  1  reappears  in  Spain  at  head 
of  insurgijiiUu  431  ;  victories,  436  ; 
■urrcndi^  of  troops  to  GenoraJ 
Espartoro,  and  end  of  war,  441 

Ou-lowitE,  Conqjess  of  Serbs  (1848), 
iii.  OS;  patriarch  of,  89 

Otrlsbad,  conference  of  ministers  {1819} 
ii.  M2,  14A 

Cbmot,  M.,  administiator  of  French 
anny.i.  76  ;  his  polii^y,  SO  ;  mciubor 
of  Directory,  103  ;  uppoaos  the  rale 
ttOio  Directory,  144;  flies  tor  bja 


life,  14S  ;  his  wotk  of  organiialHB, 
178;  protests  against  &>napHit^ 
■ssnmption  of  the  title  of  Empernr, 
276 ;  urges  assembly  to  pronda  for 
defence  of  I'aria  after  battle  of 
Waterkw,  ii.  66;  exilaand  death, 
103 
CbrTBScoea,  Neapolitan  geneirBl,  iL  183 
Qutbagena,  rising  against  the  French, 

i.  880 
Cases,  taicen  by  Egyptians,  ii.  303 
CbssoI,  losurrection  in,  iL  407 ;  coo- 

quered  by  Pnisaia.  iii.  874 
OisUereagh,  Lord,  i.  34  3 ,  523 ;  represent* 
Engt^md  at  the  Congress  of  Vienna, 
ii.  20,  24,  2S ;  declines  to  sign  th* 
Treoty  of  Holy  Alliance,  66  ;  pro- 
poses council  of  ambassadors  for 
the  abolitioa  of  the  slavo-tiade,  76  ; 
foreign  policy  in  Sicily,  Spain,  and 
Franco,  87^90 ;  on  the  proposala 
of  the  Aii-la-Chapella  Conference, 
132;  Conservati  Ts  policy,  1S4  ;  op- 
poses tha  Crar'g  proposaJ  for  joint 
intervention,  190;  death  and  ciuk- 
nicter,  212 
Catherine  of  Russia,  her  hatred  to  tha 
French  Revolution,  i.  13;  deeign 
on  PoUnd,  33,  67  ;  gives  Western 
Poland  to  Prussia,  83  ;  death,  168 
Catholic  Emancipation  Act,  i.  HO 
CauUincoart,  French  envoy  at  tha 
Congress  of  Prague,  1.  600  ;  at  the 
Congress  of  ChittiUon,  623 
Cavaignao,  General,  lends  troops 
against  insnrgonts  in  Paris  (June, 
IS48)  iii.  40 ;  rise  and  decline  of  hia 

SDWar,  43  :  caQdidul«  for  the  Proai- 
9ncy  of  the  Kepublic,  47 ;  arrested 
by  Louis  NapKileon,  172 
Oavour,  Count,  iii.  223  ;  Prime  Minister 
of  Piedmontese  Government,  244{ 
character  and  plans,  246,  246 1 
Crinionn  policy,  247  ;  meets  Napo- 
leon in.  at  PJombiires  to  negotiate 
respectiog  war  with  Austria,  2.53; 
summons  Garibaldi  to  support  him 
in  a,  war  with  Austria,  264 ;  vaxiou 
intrigues  on  behalf  of  Kalian  in- 
dependence, 25i) ;  accepts  British 
proposal  for  disarmament,  268 ;  dia- 
pleasure  at  the  terms  of  the  Peace 
of  VillafrHnoa,  and  resiguation, 
206 ;  bis  plans  for  the  union  of 
Italy,  268,  269  i  returns  to  power, 
276 ;  agrees  to  the  cession  of  Nice 
and  Savoy  to  France,  277 ;  policy 
with  regard  to  Najdca,  239  :  orilrn 
Admiral  Persanotoeicite  iosorreo- 
tion  at  Naples,  290 ;  itru^le  wift 


G*nbaldi,SM;  viewareftudiiiRth« 

tianafer  of  Venice  to  Ituliuo  King- 
dom, 300 ;  kttitudfl  townrda  tha 
CathoUo  Church,  301;  luat  worda 
■nd  death,  302  ;  character  and  i^niat 
work  on  Uihall  of  Itnly,  3(12-^0-1 

Ceylon,  retuincd  by  Enitland  by  the 
Tniity  of  AlDii'HB,  i.  TiS 

Chalcidice,  disttict  in  Gm'co,  li.  28S 

Chambord,  Comto  da  (Due  de  Bor- 
dsHux),  gmnd.iun  of  Ch:u'les  X.,  ii. 
376,  iii.  leb.tH,  475 

Chftmp  de  Mai,  iL  4S 

Championoet,  Franch  general,  1.  17^ 
173,  178 

OhangHmier,  oommuider  of  Uw 
National  Guard  in  FUris,  iii.  161, 
aircBted  by  Louii  Napoleon,  171 

ChanBenetH,  Marquis  de,  governor  of 
the  Tuilerius,  ii.  17 

Quinzy,  Ueneiul,  leads  the  French 
army  of  the  Loire  again  at  the 
PruuianaBtVenddmoandLoJIanj, 
iiL  461 

Charlea  Albert,  Eing  of  Sardinia, 
defeats  Anstriana  at  Qoito,  iii.  S6 ; 
defeated  at  Santa  Lacia,  ii.  ;  enten 
Milan,  but  retreata  on  tbe  advance 
of  Auatiiana,  61 ;  dtfeiited  at 
Norara  and  abdicate^  100 

ChaileB,  Archduke,  entnutcd  with  the 
defence  (d  Austria  sgainat  the 
French,!.  127;  defeats  Fi-ench  at 
Amberg,  128 ;  defeats  the  French 
St  Stoi^Dich,  1 79 ;  withdriiws  from 
Rnnian  allied  troops,  102  ;  hand  of 
Anotrian  military  adminiatration, 
282 ;  replaced  by  General  Mack, 
ii.;  proclamation  to  the  German 
nation,  409  i    Bavarian   campaign,. 


416  ;  anny  defeated  by  Napoleon  at 
Abonaberg,  416;  defet'  ' —  """ 
French 


eated  by  the 


Charles  III.,  hia  rule  in  Naples  and 
Sicily,  i.  116 

CharlM  IV.  (Spain),  L  S67;  seeks 
Napoleon's  mterrention,  371 ;  abdi- 
cai«e,  374 

Cbarlfis  X.,  king  of  France,  iL  321; 
his  goTemment  [1824-1827),  358- 
360  ;  diHolTCB  the  Cfaamb^s,  360 ; 
makes  Vicomte  de  Martignao  chief 
ninistart  it. ;  conflict  vith  mdnirten, 
364 ;  Ordinances  of  July,  368 ; 
sbdicfttta  and  retires  to  England, 
376,  377  ;  death  at  Goritz,  377 

Charles,  Prince,  of  HahenzallaTii< 
Si^marinnn,  elected  Hereditaij 
rnncA  of  Itoamania,  iiL  237 ;  oom- 
■■ttdi  at  Plema,  iii.  SOt 


BX  633 

Oharlottenbnrg,  Convention  of,  i-  334 
Chateanbiiaud,  M.,  member  of  French 

ChamlwT      of     Deputies      ii.      06; 

appointed  Foreign  Minister,  217 
Chatham,     Earl    of,    commander    at 

eiipudilii>n  against  Antwerp,  i.  428 
Chatillon,  CongrsBB  of,  i.  623,  626 
L'luuvolin,  French  ambaasador,  expelled 

from  England,  i,  68 
China,  iL   24S;    maasaciv   by  Tnrk^ 


Christian  VIII.,  Ttinff  of  Deomark,  iiL 

27 
ChriAion  IX.,  aucceeds  Fraderick  VII. 

aa  King  ol  Denmark,  ii.  346 ;  cedes 

his  dauns  in  Schleawig-ilulstein  to 

Austria  and  Frusaia,  363 
Chriatian,    Prince    (of    Gliieksburg), 

dt*ulared   heir    to    the    throne    of 

Sohleawig-Holstcin,   iiL    ISO    (AW 

Christian  IS.) 
Chraauovski,  commander  of  Sardinian 

army  against  Austria,  iii.  99 
Centra,  Conventiun  af,  i.  3S5 
Circles  of  the  Holy  Itonuui  Empire,  L 

Cisalpine  Republic,  L  14S;  its  dissolu- 
tion, 18! 
Cispodane  Hopublic  in  Italy,  Creation 

of  the,  i.  133 
Ciudad,  capture  of.  by  the  Duke  of 

Wellington,  i.  448 
Civil  Code  of  Bnnaparte,  L  268,  643; 

abolished  in  Westpbalia,  ii.  8 
OiTitaVecchia,Tlie  French  at,  iii.  106; 

occupation  by  the  Frraioh  renewed, 

408 
CSarendon,    Lord,    represents     Great 

Britain  at  the  Oooferenoe  of  Paris 

(18S6),  iii  230 
Clarke,  M.,  French  Minister  of  War, 

iL  103.  104 
Clerfay^  Austritui  oommandar,  L  94, 

97 
Clergy  (Greek),  ii.  243 
Clergy  (Romish) ;  opposed  to  decrees 

of  National  Ajsembly,  L  7 ;  their 

Cjr  in  Austria,  20;  position  in 
esiastical  States,  37 ;  incite  to 
inaurrcctioa  in  Naples,  177;  re- 
coaciliatioa  with  Bimaparte,  260 ; 
popularity  in  the  Tyrol,  411 ;  im- 
prisonment of,  by  Napoleon,  in 
Papal  Slates,  437 ;  fanaticism  in 
Bpain,  and  oppositJon  to  the  Cortea, 
464 ;  nstored  to  power  in  Spain,  iL 
1 1 ;  encroachments  in  France,  1 8 ; 
benefited  in  France  under  Eicheliau's 


OoMtitation,    207; 


584 


MODBSir  XUaOPB. 


qipotntod  to  Bt«t«  oKom  In  Spun, 
S23 ;  rioe  of  powai  ia  Fninoe  under 
OhulM  X.,  ses  1  dedina  of  in- 
flneoce  in  Fmuce  under  LouU 
Fhilippe,  !S1 ;  ratormution  pro- 
posed in  lUl/,  ill.  Growth  of 
power  in  AuitHa,  iii.  ISG 

dotJlilo,  PrinMiis,  iii.  S63  ;  Liitrothod 
to  ^noe  Jerome  Napoleoii,  26e 

Clabt,  French,  in  1791,  L  8 ;  Itepub- 
lican  dub  at  MainLi,  62 

CntUtion  (1798)  between  EngLind, 
BuBsia,  Tuikoy,  nud  Naples  a^iinrt 
the  French  Jicpubhc,i. 169  ;  between 
England  and  Itusaia  against  France, 
378 

Oobdon,  Ricbard,  Mr.,  tii.  ITS 

Cobenil,  Ludwifc,  Austrian  plenipo- 
iGDtiary  in  lUly,  i.  147;  at  the 
CoiiKTeM  of  ItaHtadt,  150;  Prime 
MiniBler,  283 

Coblenta,  hoad-quorten  of  Emigmnti^ 
i.  7 

Coburg,  Prince;  invcifltE  Cambray  and 
Le  QiiuBnoy,  i.  78;  dcfoiitud  by 
Freueh  at  Fleuru*,  62 ;  rejilaeed  by 
Clorfayt,  9* 

Oodringtou,  Admiral;  attacki  Ibn- 
bim's  forces,  ii.  330 

Colberg,  Oullant  defence  of,  ugninst 
the  French,  i.  342 

OoUin,  Austrian  general,  occupies  free 
city  of  Cnicuw,  u.  492 

CoIot,'ne;  condition  in  1792,  i.  37; 
cnptured  by  French,  S4 ;  wealth 
of  the  Elector,  264 

CommiesioutTS  of  the  Convention 
(F™m-o).i.  73 

Committee  of  Public  Safety  (Fmnc«),  1. 
71 

Commune  of  Paris,  The  (1793);  op. 
position  to  the  GironJina,  i.  6(i ; 
cruiihoB  Wirunilins,  71  ;  (1S7I) 
tempts  miiJo  to   overthrow  the 


t  of  National   DcCen 
e  the  c 


r>  of 
the  Niitional  Guard,  iii.  469: 
CJenemla  l^^iomte  and  Clenivnt 
Thomas  seized  and  put  to  deaths 
a  ttioluliooary  committee  formed 
at  the  MOtel  de  ViUo;  eU'clioiw 
held  fur  the  coimcil;  huslilities 
with  IhottDopa  of  Versiiilles,  470; 
alaughtor  of  prisouers  and  hoiil'i^i;B, 
and  destruction  of  public  building! 
on  the  entry  of  ue  Oovernmcut 
troopn  into  Paria,  471 
Conooidjt  ol  ifouaparte,  i.  260—205 
Cond^  Biege  o^  i.   TO;  suirenders  to 


;  II ,  335 ; 


Oondoroet,  phScMipher,  «ad  Qinmdia 
member  of  Legulativa  AMembly,  L 
9 ;  his  mauifeiito,  14 

Oongreeg  of  Vienna,  iL  20—31,  3S; 
TOBUimition  and  completion  after 
■acondTruaty  of  Paria,  67—77. 

Conscription;  in  Fianoe,  i.  76;  in 
Prussia,  483  ;  in  Hungary,  iii.  96 

Constant,  Benjamin,  draws  np 
Napoleon's  Acta  Additionnal,  ii.  43 

CoiiatiintinB,GiaadDuke,ii.318,  319; 
withdraws  Husaian  troops  from 
Poland,  393 

Coiiatantine,  Qrand  Duke  (younger), 
appointed  Vitetoy  at  Warsaw,  iiL 
334 ;  attempt  m  bis  life  M  War- 
saw, 335 

Conntuntinople ;  ezecntion  of  Patriarch 
and  massacre  of  anJibishops  and 
Christiana,  ii.  275,  276 ; 
of  Christians  by  Ma' 
Conference  (1878),  ii 

Convention,  French,  proclaims  the 
Itopublic,  i  49  ;  rocaives  addrease* 
from  English  Radical  societiea,  A9; 
invaded  by  mob,  7 1 :  ohange  of 
coustitution,  101 ;  atlackoJ  by 
Boyalisls,  and  defended  by  Bon&' 
parte,  102 

Copenhagen,  Battle  of,  i.  231 ;  bom- 
bardment by  the  English,  361 

Corfu,  ii.  264 

Coriutb,  Isthmus  of,  ii.  298 

Coreica,  i.  GO 

Cortes,  Sjiauiah,  i.  450;  declarot  Itas 
Bovereigiity  of  the  people,  and  tho 
freedom  of  the  Press,  453;  opposi- 
tion of  ilie  ct'Tfry,  454 ;  declines  to 
restore  the  Inquisition,  tt./  leaden 
amii-bjil  by  the  king,  ii.  16S; 
aammonod  (1820),  17ti;  rotirta  to 
Ouliz  on  the  invasion  of  the 
French,  221 ;  banishment  of  mem- 
bers, 223 ;  frequunt  succession  ot 
new,  439 ;  agreea  to  modification 
of  CODStitutiun  of  1812.  440 

Cotunna,  Unlttu  of,  i.  398;  declares 
for  a  Constitution,  ii.  ITS 

Council  of  Ancionti  (Franca),  i.  202 

Council  of  Five  Hundiod  (France),  i. 
203 

Council  of  S(:ilo  (F.ance),  i.  204 

Cowloy,  Lord,  British  ambassador  at 
I'aris,  uttciuipts  to  mudiatu  bctwuen 
Austria,  Fianc^  and  Sardinia,  iii. 
2GT 

OracDw,  ii.  30  ;  oocupiad  by  Anstriana, 


1  Wiir,  twiran  In  poaitiTa  t«- 

■ulta,  iii.  181 ;  ParliumenttiTy  papers 
fta,  TeapectiDg,  note,  183 ;  com- 
nanoement  of,  199;  Battle  of  the 
Alma,Sll;  boialnTdTDoatof  Sobai- 
topol,  aad  Battle  of  BuIbcIbt*,  214  ; 
Bnttle  of  Inkonaunii,  216;  loss  of 
EnglliBh  troops  from  severe  wiiitar, 
218;  Buttle  of  the  Tchcmayfi,  226  ; 
capture  o(  the  Ualahofi  by  the 
French,  ih. ;  fall  of  Sebnstnpol,  ii. 

Croatin,  Movement  in  (1818),  iii.  63— 69 

Crown  Prince  of  PraBsia  oppOHts  Bis- 
BWck's  meaiurea  against  the  Press, 
S21 ;  takes  part  in  the  campaign 
•gaioht  Aiutria  (18S6),  374— 376  ; 
oommaniia  sauthem  army  agaiiut 
the  Freni^h  (li70),  433;  dsteaU 
the  French  at  .Weissenburg,  434  ; 
dete&ta  McHahon  at  Worth,  434  ; 
«t  the  BatUe  of  Sedan,  446  i  at  the 
•iege  of  Paris,  460 ;  nnfriendly  rft- 
lationa  with  Bismarck,  4SS 

Onstine,  Oeneral,  enteia  Mninz,  i.  61 ; 
defeated  in  the  Palutinate,  69 ; 
commandf  anny  of  the  North,  76 ; 
executed  by  BevolutioDaryTribunal, 
79 

Ooitoua,  Battle  o^  between  Anstrians 
and  Sardinians,  iii.  61  ;  second 
battle  of,  between  Amtrians  and 
Italians,  377 

Cnzhaven ;  blockade  by  tlie  French,  L 
271 

CiuB,  Frinoe  Alexander,  elected  Hos- 
podar  of  MoldsTia  uid  Wallarhio, 
lU.  237 ;  expelled  by  his  subjects, 
U. 

Qrpnis,  asngned  to  England  by  Tur- 
key, iii.,  617 

Chartoryaki,  Polish  noble,  Fresidsiit  of 
Provisifnlal  Government  in  Poland, 
iL8»3 

OiechB,  The,  ot  Bohemia,  iiL  13 ;  their 
rising  at  Prague,  68;  hostility  to 
Hungry,  76,  S87,  391 

Cheklen^  Tlie,  of  TraniyWania,  iii.  86 

DBh]manii,n^iorta  on  the  armistice  of 
MalmS,  iii.  US ;  retires  from 
National  AaMmbly,- 137 

Dalmatia,  taken  by  France^  i  14B; 
inu  t^  Anstna,  ii.  4 

Danton,  sends  the  mob  aguust  Qm 
Tmbriee,  i.  41 ;  permits  the  Sept- 
amber  maasacre,  46,  IS ;  loader  of 
the  Moontain  party,  67  ;  attacks 
Girondins,  67 

Dantxig,  Snnender  «4  to  Ou  Blench, 
iUS 


Danobc^  Hapoleon'i  pMsage  ef  Qie,  L 
420 ;  second  passage,  iH  ;  Roaaiaa 
passage  of  the  (1878),  iii.  197 

Danufaian  Pro  vincea  entered  by  Basmon 
tniope,  iii.  191 ;  emcuation  by 
Russia,  203 ;  Austrian  protection, 
ii.;  rights  and  priviluges  guaran- 
teed by  the  Powers  at  the  Confer- 
enoe  of  Paris  (1366),  232;  iucor- 
poration  with  Austria  proposed  by 
Napoleon  III.,  236 ;  Prince  Alex- 
ander Ciua  elected  Hoapodar  of 
Moldavia  and  WalbLchia,  and  after* 
vacdi  expelled,  2;i7 ;  CharlsB  ot 
Eobeniollem  elected  Hereditary 
Prince  of  Houmania,  ii. 

Dardanollea,  The,  ii.  148;  Bntry  of 
French  and  English  Beets  (1889], 
151 ;  rule  for  passage  of  war-shipa 
agrcisd  npon  by  the  Powen,  462 ; 
entry  of  Biitiah  and  Fnindi  fleela^ 
iii.  ise 

DaTidoviob,  Austrian  ^noral,  i.  131 

Davoust,  General  (French),  defeats 
Pruaaians  at  Auoratadt,  i.  829; 
enters  Berlin,  332  ;  headi  the  army 
in  Bavaria,  108 

Drik,  Hnngarian  statesman,  ii.  490; 
leader  ^  HuuKariau  Assembly, 
promotee  reoanmliaticm  with  Aus- 
tria, iii.  388,  3S9 

Dobreczin,  Hungarian  Parliament 
meets  thtm,  iii.  87 

Decases,  M.,  French  miniate 
iL  06,  07;  sangiiiaory  i 
respecting  tlie  rising  at  Grenoble, 
IIS;  influence  over  Louis  XVUL, 
116;  his  measures,  161;  victory 
over  ultra-Borelists,  1S6;  com- 
promise  with  Boyolists,  168;  dis- 
missal,  160 

Declanttion,  of  Leopold  II.  and  Frede- 
rick William  II.  reepeotdng  the 
safety  of  Louis  XVI.,  i.  4,  6;  of 
Duke  of  BcDnswick  to  Fit^tx,  13 ; 
of  Frenuh  Convention  to  aU.  na- 
tion^ 61 

De  Qallo,  Austrian  envoy  to  Bonaparte, 

Lu: 

Deleesort,   M.,   Voreiga   Uiniiter   of 

Louis  m.,  L  12, 
DemMnaki,  appointed  ij  Koosoth  to 

the  oommand  of  Bongarian  army 

in  the  war  against  Anstria,  m.  87, 

90,  S6 
Denmark;  joins  the  Northern  Uari- 

time    Leagoe,    i.   238;  Battle    ot 

Copeohagen,     231 ;      landing     of. 

Englisb  troope,  361 ;  declare*  war 


,   18T5, 


ue 


MODEBN  EUROPB. 


HorwBj',  fi.  B ;  relidlion  (rf 
SohlMwig-Holstaia,  iii.  26  ;  death 
of  King:  Christian  VIII.,  and  ac- 
oanion  of  Ftedemk  VII.,  27  ;  war 
with  Fmaaia  respecting  Sohleawig- 
Holatoia,  28 ;  arinistica  of  MitlinS 
with  PrtuuA,  1 1 T ;  peace  with 
Pnuaia,  U9  ;  death  of  Fradorick 
Vn^  342 ;  aooesdun  of  Chria- 
tian  TIL,  347  ;  conflict  with 
FtomU  and  Austria  reapotling 
tiohleiwiK-Uolstem,  343~35:i;  by 
Treaty  of  Vienna  King  CTii-istian 
oedos  hia  rights  in  Sililmwig-Kol' 
stein  to  Pruasia  anJ  Austriii,  353. 

DennewiU,  Battle  ol,  i.  SOS. 

Depretia  ;  PK>-DictAtQr  at  Pnlermo, 
iii.  2SS;  reugne  office,  294. 

Derby,  Lord,  English  Fortign  Secre- 
tuy  (187S],  proposes  a  oonfcronoe 
at  Conatantiaople,  iii.  190  ;  nidigna- 
tion  and  resumption  of  office,  607  : 
differencea  with  Lord  Be&consGi>ld 
on  the  EastovQ  Question,  itnd  re- 
BLgnation  of  office,  614. 

Dinvolo,  Fra,  i.  177. 

Diobitsch,.  commander  of  Boaaiaii 
forces,  ii.  340 ;  defeats  Turks  at 
Kulewtscha,  341;  crosses  the  Bal- 
kans, 342;  invades  Poland,  396. 

Diet  of  the  Empire,  i.  17,  164,  218- 
264 

Diet  of  Frankfort,  ii.  6S  :  passes  re- 
prt'Bsivo  measures,  115-160 ;  fur- 
ther nprussion,  410;  enters  upon 
reform,  iii.  4,  20 ;  extinct  from 
1848  to  IB&D,  113;  restored  by 
Auatria,  146;  decrees  federal  exe- 
'a  Uolstein,  346;  Prussian 


withdraws,  370. 
Dijon,  in.  4eL 

Directory,  The  Franch,  i.  101,  103; 
iiutructions  to  Uonapnrtc  regarding 
campaign  in  Italy,  121  ;  nugntiatcs 
with  Prussia  and  Austria,  120 ; 
declines  propoaaU  of  pence  with 
England,  131 ;  party  of  opposition 
in  the,  144 ;  intimidated  by  liona- 
part«,  144 ;  members  seized  by 
Aiigereau'a  troops,  118;  roorgan- 
ia'itioQ,it. .-  consents  to  Bonapaiie's 
attHck  on  E^-jit,  1 63  ;  unpopularity 
in  1799,  lOS  ;  its  overthrow  (1799), 
203 

Disraali,  Hr.  B.  IStt  Lord  Beacons- 
fiold) 

Divorcv,   abolition  of,  in  France,   ii. 


Dobmdsdia,  TIm  ;  i 


207; 


1876,  199;  ceded  to  Russia  and 
givnx  by  Hussia  to  Euumaiua  ia 
exchange  for  Bossarabia,  6  L2 

Domingo,  St., ceded  by  Spain  to  French 
Republic,  i.  96 

Donniidicu,  French  geoeial  at  Qre&- 
oble,  ii.  116 

DSmberg,  Qeneral,  lerolts  against 
King  Jerome  of  Westphalia,  i.  417 

Douay,  General,  leads  Jrrench  troops 
at  Woissenburg,andi«defeatedBad 
killed,  iii.  434 

D'Oubril ;  Russian  rmroy  to  Paris,  L 
316 

Dranmli  ;  Turkish  oommandsr,  u.  295, 
297,  298,  299 

Dresden;  entry  of  Napoleon,  i.  494; 
battle  of,  606 ;  democratic  liaiAg, 
iii.  136 ;  occupied  by  Frussiani, 
374 

Ducoa,  M.,  French  Director,  L  201 

DumOurieK,  Oonersl,  Frendi  Uinister 
of  Foreign  Affiiirs,  i.  2;  checks 
Prussians  at  Valmy,  47  ;  proposes 
peace  to  King  of  Prussia,  47;  in- 
vades theXetherLinds,  52;  def^nted 
hy  Austrians  at  Neerwindem,  68; 
his  tnason,  69 

Duniiis,  Mr.,  retires  from  office  with 
Pitt.  L  240 

Dunkirk  ;  bsaeged  by  English,  L  78  ; 
Duke  of  York  defaulcd,  79 

Dupont,  French  geneial,  enleni  Spain, 
i.  372;  defpFited  at  Baylen,  384; 
Minislfirof  VVnr  (L8U),ii.  16 

Duiando,  Papal  general,  iiL  66,  60 

EcoleeiaBtical  Slates  ((lerman),  i.  37; 

secuIanKitioQ  of,  129;  snpprcssioa 

of,  l.";:,  262 
Bodesiastical    System    (Frnnoe),    re- 

oiganiaed  by  Natiomu  Assembly,  L 

EdeLsberg,  BatUe  of,  i.  416 

Egypt;  Bonaparte's  dtdgn  of  ftttark 
on,  i.  1S2 ;  failure  of  French  ei- 
pedition  under  Banapoitcs  lr>7 ; 
Bonaparte's  vicl«rv  at  AboiikJr, 
200;  French ,BDd  Turkish  pu^'^Lze- 
menta,  234 ;  capitulation  ol  Cutro 
to  Snglish,  23S;  cspitiihilion  i^ 
Alexandria  to  Eogliah,   it. ,-  con~ 

Jjuest  of  Crete,  iL  303 ;  navy  da- 
eH.t«d  at  Navartno.  330^—332 ;  war 
with  Turkey  (1832),  443—148; 
B»ond  war  wife  Turkey  (183»J. 
463 
Kt«,LE» 


Blgln,  laordi  hk  report  ooncondng 
FisDch  emigmata,  i.  iS,  note ;  on 
the  Battle  of  Jamappea,  64,  DOts; 
on  Pruiwia'a  deaigna,  77,  note ;  on 
the  Preocli  ano}'  in  the  yether- 
lands,  90,  note ;  report  on  the  Ta> 
Tidiitioiuiy  feeling  in  Fiance,  131, 

Elliot,  Sir  H.,  Bntish  emlinraador  mt 
ConatanUnople,  iil.  182,  192 

Emigrant  Nobles  (France! ;  take  arms 
sgniast  Fiances  i-  7  i  head-quncten 
at  Coljlenti,  7;  protei:tod  by  Elector 
of  Ti^TM,  10;  tiioir  diaparaal  de- 
manded by  the  Gironde,  10  ;  alliod 
with  Au^ria  and  Pnueia  a^nst 
France,  *2;  thcLr  cruoltica,  45, 
note ;  landed  bj  English  fleet  in 
Brittany,  100;  their  defout  by 
General  Hoohe,  100;  return  to 
France,  103,  ii.  13;  restored  to 
official  tank,  16;  granted  com- 
pensation o{  £40,000,000,  359 

Bnu,  iiL  41d ;  telegcam  respecting 
pretended  insult  to  the  Frencli 
Ambassador,  bj  King  William 
of  Pruswa,  420 

Enghien,  Murder  of  the  Diibe  of,  i.  &7S 

England ;  alarmed  by  Decree  uf  French 
ConveDtion,  i.  66  ;  feeling  towards 
£Yench  Eevolution,  56;  French 
amboarador  expelled,  68;  war  with 
France,  69;  condition  in  1793,  69; 
sympathy  of  Fox  with  Frenrh  ReTo- 
lotion,  Gl ;  Btrugglo  ef  Oeorffe  III. 
with  Whigs,  8i  ;  attitude  of  Pitt  to- 
wards French  Revolution,  ea ;  Burke 
denountes  the  Revolutionary  move- 
ment, 63;  victories  on  French 
trontier,  76 ;  driven  from  Dunkirk, 
79;  commands  Mediterranf^an  after 
the  siei:e  of  Toulon,  82 ;  contrast  of 
English  and  Austrino  policy,  note, 
86;  fumiehea  a  subaidy  to  Fruseia, 
88;  retiree  from  Uolland,  05;  at- 
tempts to  negotiate  peace  with 
France,  130 ;  Battles  of  St.  Vin- 
cent  and  Camperdown,  161; 
Battle  of  the  Nile,  16a ;  coali- 
tion with  Rusaia,  Turkey  and 
Naplea against  France,  IBS;  com- 
bined eipeditioQ  with  Russia  against 
Holland,  196—197 ;  replyto  Bona- 
parte'a  proposal  for  peace,  ai6;  new 
pnmoaalaiejected,  223 ;  differences 
wid  Boaaia,  228  ;  war  with  North- 
em  Mnritine  Powers,  230  ;  Battle 
nf  Oijienhagen,  231;  peace  with 
Northern  Powu^  233;  attack*  the 
Fronch  in   Egypt,  336 ;   Battle  of 


E.  SS7 

Alexandria,  23S;  takea  Gairo 
and  Alexandria,  236;  Treaty  of 
Amiens  with  Fnnoe,  238  ;  Act  of 
Union  with  Ireland  passed,  240; 
National  Debt  in  1801,  241  ;  war 
with  Franca  (1803),  266 ;  occupa- 
tion of  Hanover  by  the  French, 
270;  joins  Russia  in  coalition 
against  France,  278;  Battle  of 
Trafalgar,  290 ;  attacks  the  French 
in  Italy,  302 ;  death  of  Htt,  309 ; 
coalition  ministry  of  Fox  and 
GIrenville,  310 ;  ships  excluded 
from  Prnsaiao  ports,  314;  seimue 
of  Prussian  Teaaels,  ii,  ;  Napoleon's 
Berlin  decree  against  English  com- 
merce, 336;  fall  of  the  OrenTille 
ministry  and  ap])ointment  of  the 
Duke  of  Forthind  Prime  Minister, 
313  ;  Treaty  ot  Bartenstein,  344  ; 
troops  land  in  Dcmuark,  361  ; 
bombardment  ot  Copenhagen,  ii.  ; 
Denmark  declares  war,  353;  troops 
enter  Portugal,  386 ;  victory  over 
theFrencb  at  Vimieiro,  38ri ;  Spanish 
campaign  (1809),  395—308  ;  defeats 
tha  French  at  Tala vera,  426;  failure 
ot  expedition  against  Antweip, 
428;  Spanish  Caoipaigns  (1810-12), 
443-449;  (1B13),  619;  Dulje  ot 
Wellington  enters  Franco,  620. 
At  the  Congress  of  Vienna,  iL  28  ; 
at  Battle  ot  Quati-e  Bras,  51 ; 
Battle  of  "Waterloo,  63  —  66 ; 
part  taken  in  drawing  up  second 
Treaty  of  Paris,  69  —  62  ;  de- 
clinea  the  Czar's  Treaty  ot 
Holy  Alliance,  64 ;  socks  at  the 
Congreas  of  Vienna  to  secure  aboli- 
tion ol  the  Slave  Trade,  74-76; 
foreign  policy  nnder  Wellington 
and  CaatioreaRh,  86-90;  discontent 
from  1816  lo  1819,  121 ;  Canning's 
opinion  on  the  proposals  of  the  Aix- 
la-ChapdleConference,131:rcftisea 
to  enter  into  a  general  leuijiia  with 
the  Allies  and  France,  133;  Con- 
aervative  policy  of  LordCiistlereaRh, 
164;  protection  of  Portugal,  186; 
provents  joint  diplomatic  action 
with  regard  to  Spain,  190;  with- 
drawal of  Canning,  191;  proteals 
against  the  Troppaa  circuLir, 
197;  neutral  attitude  (owardi 
Bpaiush  revolution  of  1822,  210 ; 
death  ot  Chatlereagh,  and  appoint- 
ment of  Canning  as  Foreign  Secre- 
tary, 212;  Congress  of  Verona, 
215-217;  piohlbite  Uie  coiiiqueBt  of 
Spanish  adoniea,  2^6;  wiula  troopa 


MOT>sss  mmops. 


to  Portcigal,  SSI ;  Chnniar's  rtatcs- 
muiBhii),  iZS ;  protocol  with  liuAda, 
321 ;  dW«ata  Turks  at  Nsvariao, 
SSO-332 ;  iiutotiOD  in  Eastern  policy 
after  tbe  Battle  of  Navarino.  3»3  ; 
Protocol  of  LondoD  raapi^tiug  Qreek 
frontier.aiB;  Talleymnil.&a  Frencli 
kmbaMulor  to  Loadon,  perauadea 
William  IV.  and  WeUington  to 
abstainfiomintervrntioDin  Uulgian 
kOain^  386 ;  CoDference  of  Luodun 
ncogiiiMa  the  iudeptoidenDe  of 
Belgium,  386:  pnexinf;  of  the 
Baform  Bill  (IS32),il9,  420;  groir- 
ing  ftiendlineBa  towanla  Fiance, 
^2^i•,  aqundron  sent  to  Foiiumtl  to 
demand  indomnity  tor  attack  on 
Britiih  Bubjacta,  i'iH;  assiata  Spaiu 
with  aima  and  atorea  in  queliing- 
Chriiat  rebellion,  433  ;  fleet  Mat  to 
tha  DardanoUus,  451 ;  Bettlement  of 
X^atem  Question,  1841,  461;  fleet 
sent  toNiiples  on  the  ou^upation  of 
Feirai*  by  AuBtria,  i73-  Ktata  of, 
in  1851,iii.l7E);  n'pudiatcatchcmes 
aagnceatod  hy  Emperor  Nicbolaa 
ieij|ii!i:ting  disintegratioD  of  tha 
Bultnn'B  doiiiinioDB,  IBT:  poli<7of 
Lord  Abinleoii  and  coalitiun minia- 
try  {18.r3),  IS'J— 194;  despatch  of 
Beot  to  Bi^ika  Bay  on  the  eotir  of 
Eiinian  ti-oupe  into  Dannbian  Fio- 
TiDueH.  I'J4;  declaration  of  war  in 
conjuni^tiun  with  France  against 
KussiFi,  19B  ;  damandH  on  RuBsia  ua 
the  basis  of  peace,  209 ;  trooja  land 
in  the  Cnmoa,  210;  BatUe  of  the 
Alma,  2 11 ;  Bat  tie  of  BaUcUva  and 


loaa  of  troops  in  the  Crimea  during; 

the  winter  of  18o4,  218:  mis- 
maiia)(Crii<»it  of  the  canipsip:n,  219; 
Lord  Abeiilcen'«  miniBtiy  rcKigna^ 
and  Lord  Pulinoretun  is  made  Prima 
MiciBtec,219;UunfL'i\.*Qco of  Vienna 
(May,  1SS5),  fails  toaraange  treaty 
of  peoca  between  En^lund  and 
Bnaaia,  222 ;  resumption  of  the 
siege  of  Sebnstopol,  223;  full  of 
Bobastopol,  226 ;  treuty  of  peace 
with  HuBHia  eignod  at  Paris 
(1868],  230;  agi.cmont  made  at 
Conference  of  I'uris  willi  re- 
grird  to  the  righta  of  nentrala, 
232 ;  insists  on  dinaion  of 
DsnTihian  Principalities,  328  ;  at- 
tempts  to  mediate  bttwuen  Austria, 
France,  and  Sardinia,  266;  Tolun- 
lecv  bnaa^  379;  ^jupathf  wilb 


Italian  revolntion,  298  ;  < 
of  London  reapeuting  Denmail  and 
Bchloswig-Holriain,  351 :  radll*- 
tionoQtheSchle8wig-HolBt<.'inqusB- 
tion,  3fi3  ;  rejects  the  Berlin  Hsm- 
oraodum,  and  dispatches  the  flo^ 
to  Bcsika  Bay,  481 ;  opinion  on 
Butgariau  masHacree,  4S3 ;  Disraeli'a 
Foreign  Policy,  484-4S7  ;  the  Con. 
alantinople  Cuntisrenoe,  493-495 ; 
t}ia"LondoQ  Protocol,"  496;  fleet 
ordered  to  Constantinople,  and  re- 
rersal  of  order,  607 ;  Loid  Derby'a 
leaignatioa  ajnd  resumption  of  oSicc, 
607;  Vote  of  Credit  of  £6,000,000 
for  army  purposed,  ih.f  fleet  ordert'd 
to  Constantinople,  608 ;  imminence 
of  war  with  Kusna,  COS  ;  objectiona 
to  the  Treat);  of  San  Btelnno  sum- 
mod  np  in  a  cdrcnlar  to  the  Powera, 
614  ;  secret  agreement  with  Busnia, 
617;  acquisition  of  Cyl^na,  it.; 
CoDgreea  of  Berlin,  618 

English  Commonwealth,  L  60 

Epirus,  ii.  354 

Effort;  head-qoarien  of  Pruanan 
army  (1806),  i.  326;  meeting  of 
Napoleon  and  the  Emperor  AIoi- 
aniler,  390 ;  meetinK-placeof  Pcdui  uI 
Psrliamcnt  (1849),  liL  141 

Erioroom,  iii.  505 

lOski  Sagra,  iii.  499 

Espartero,  General,  totally  defeats  th« 
Carliata  (1839)  ii.  441;  appointed 
Regent  of  Spam,  H. ;  exiled,  442 

^Uenne,  6t.,  Revolt  of  working-clasaca 
at,  ii.  416 


365 

Eugenie,  EmprasB,  eftgemea  fi^  war 
with  Prussia,  iii.  420;  insists  on 
McMahon  marchins;  to  the  relief  of 
Weti,  443  ;  flight  Horn  Paris  after 
the  anrrender  of  Napoleon  at 
Sedan,  448 ;  declines  tho  Pnusiaa 
conditianB  of  peace,  456 

Eupaloria,  Hay  of,  iii.  210 

Evans,  Colonel  Be  Incy ;  leads  English 
and  French  Toluntcers  against  the 
Carlista,  ii.  438 

Exhibition,  Qreat,  of  1851,  in.  I7B 

Bjlan,  BatUo  of,  L  34! 

Faidfaerbe,  General,  leads  the  nench 

army   of    the    North    against    the 
Prussians,  iii.  469 
Failly,    Oonenil,  defeats  GaribaUians 
at  Mcntaoa,  iii.  408 ;  snipiised  at 
Bwoacot^  iiL  444 


dkip  of  Modena,  S< 

'uTre,  Jnlea, 

ofNapoloo . 

a  circiJar  to  the  EuropciLn  Courts 
on  tbe  overthrow  of  tbu  Niipoloonio 
Emiiire,  448;  meeta  BiBmarck  at 
FerriSree  to  negotiate  (or  peace, 
450 ;  meets  Bismarck  at  VersoiUea 
to  diacuBB  torins  olaniuicistics,  463 

Ferdinand,  Archduke,  i.  28S 

E^itliiuuid,  Grown  Prmce  of  Spain,  i. 
US;  placed  under  aireHt  for 
s  luj^ioaed.  intrigue  with  Napoleon, 
371 1  restored  to  the  king's  favour, 
871 ;  proclaimed  king,  3T4  ;  lured  to 
Bajorine,  375 ;  ronouncoH  the  crown 
at  Spain,  37S ;  restoratioa  in  1614, 
U.  9;  arroHta  the  loiidora  of  the 
Cortao,  166;  wtiaUtjr  to  the 
clergy,  H, ;  estaliliahuB  the  Coimtitu- 
tioo,  177;  conipires  againet  the 
Constitutiun,  207  ;  relirua  to  Suville 
cm  the  invasion  of  the  French,  2i9  ; 
annuls  the  Constitution,  22'2  ;  dtalh 
(1833),  427 

Ferdinand  I.,  Emptmr  of  Austria, 
■uoceeds  Francil  (1S3S),  ii.  4S3; 
yields  to  demands  of  itud^ats 
and  mob  respecting  the  National 
Onard,  Jii.  61 ;  flight  from  Vienna, 
b2 ;  djssolvea  Uungarian  Parlia- 
ment, and  declares  i£  acts  null  and 
Toid,  74;  flight  to  Ohniiti,  77; 
abdication,  Bl 

Fetdlnand,  King  of  Naples, 
with  Bonuparte,  i.  123;  . 
tion  against  the  French, 
«nton  Home,  172;  despatch 
exiled  Pope,  173;  flees  from  luime, 
173;  eacapes  to  Falsnno  in  the 
Vanfuard,  174  and  (note)  175 ; 
returns  to  Naples,  184  ;  treaty  with 
Anatria,  iL  8G  ;  ride  in  Siuiiy,  i&.  ; 
declares  a  Constitution,  184  ;  hypo- 
crisy, 186,  note  ;  goes  to  conference 
at  Laihach,  139 

Ferdinand  II,,  King  of  Naples,  pro. 
claims  a  Constitution,  ii.  474  ;  con- 
qaere  Sicily,  iiL  112;  bin  violence 
and  oppression.  1 1 3  ;  death,  2B1 

Feiraia,  portion  of  Cispadane  Uepublii^ 
i.  133 


Flanden,  lattlea  between  Aendi  and 
alliud  armies  of  England  sad 
Austria,  i.  91 

Fleet,  German,  sold  by  auction,  Ui.  161 

Floury,  Franch  officer,  con&dant  of 
Louis  Napoleon,  iii.  167 

Florence  [Sa  Tuscany) 

Fontaioehleau,  Treaty  of,  i  3SS 

Forbooh,  iii  433 

-      y,   Fi  -      -     - 

lapoloon,  ii 

Foretar,  Mr.  W.  E.,  M.P.,  oppuaes  the 
Vole  of  Credit  tor  £6,000,000  for 
army  purposes,  iii.  fiOS 

Fauch£,  M.,  appointed  to  the  head  of 
French  Pro  visional  UoTemnient  by 
Louis  XVIII.,  ii  60 ;  faU  of  bU 
ministry  in  1815,  B6 

Fonrior,  ]£,,  his  Socialiatio  work,  ii 
609 

Foi,  Mr.  C.  X,  M.P„  sympathy  with 
Freneh  Kevolulion,  i  61 ;  takes 
office  with  Lord  Grenvillo,  310; 
pauiQo  nttituds  towards  Fiunce, 
311;  death,  343 

France;  war  declared  against  Austria 
(1792),  i.  2;  Louis  XVL  aocopts 
Constitution  of  National  Assembly 
(1701),  5;  National  Assembly  dis- 
solved (1791),  6;  Emigrants  lake 
anns  ii^ioat,  7  ;  war-policy  of  the 
Girondo,  9  ;  opening  of  war  agninst 
Austria,  41;  invaded  by  Prusainn 
troops, 4'J;  waraguinst  Allies miwa 
j  nst  one,4  0;  patriotism  ,46;  evacuated 
by  Prumia,  48;  dctlareda  Republic 
by  Convention,  411 ;  the  war  be- 
comes a  crusade  of  domociacy,  49  ; 
successes  of  army  in  Geimany,  62; 
anoeioa  Savoy  and  Nice.  64 ;  execu- 
tion of  Louis  XVL,  68;  war  with 
England,  69;  opposition  between 
GlrortdiDS  and  Mountain  FaTtj,66— 

68  ;  tn»son  of  General  Dumonrici, 

69  ;  loBDB  former  conijacsts,  69 ;  out- 
break of  civil  war,  70,  71 ;  victory 
of  the  Mountain  over  C)irondins,T  1 ; 
Committee  of  Public  Safety  ap- 
pointed, 71 ;  Beign  of  Tenor,  78— 
75 ;  conscription,  76 ;  Social  Equali- 
ty, 80 ;  defeats  Austriaas  at  Wat- 
tignies,  81  ■  victories  at  W5rth  and 
Woissanbuig,  87 :  lakes  Antwerp, 
93;  conquers  Holland,  05;  treaty 
ef  peace  with  ProMia  at  Basle,  96  ; 
condition  in  1795,  99  ;  Constitutian 
of  179S,  101 ;  the  Directory,  Cham-  ' 
ber,  and  Council  of  Ancitiits,  101 ; 
opening  of  campaign  in  Italv,  118; 
vtotoiiea  of  BoiMfftrte  inlta^,  119, 


ifODSsjf  armors. 


120;  invadeB  Gennany,  12S ;  d»- 
laats  AuHtria  at  Areola  and  liivoli, 
134,  135;  negotinliona  with  Aiu- 
tria  at  Leobmk,  138;  tlectiuus  of 
1797,  143;MunraolDir>-cton,  nnd 
reoi^ni»tion  of  Directory,  IIH; 
treaty  with  Austria  kt  Campo  For- 
■nio,  147;  mteiveDlion  in  tiwitser- 
land,  169 ;  intri^es  in  Itomc^ 
163 ;  oocujiiea  Rome,  104  ;  eicpudi- 
tioo  to  Kgypt,  166 ;  drfoatod 
\n  Eti^Iand  at  tiie  Battle  of  the 
Nita,  IGS;  I'ualitionof  1798  against, 
ISB;  evBuuatas  Ilome,  17^;  re- 
enton  Boine,  173:  taltoB  Naples, 
176;  defeated  by  Austria  at  Btoc- 
kndi  and  MiifiTiano,  179,  131 ;  de- 
faitud  bv  Kus^iia  on  the  Trebhia, 
Wl;  deteatod  nt  Novi,  191;  vic- 
tories over  English  and  Russians  in 
IliJIand,  195,  196;  condition  in 
1799, 198—200;  Bonaparte's  return 
from  lC)tvpt.  201 ;  new  Constitution 
of  17'J^,'203— 208;  the  Consulnte 
of  Uonaparte,  211 — 214;  raiuoip- 
tion  of  var  af^inst  Austria,  217; 
Pence  of  Loncville,  226;  friendly 
with  ItuBsia,  227;  defeats  Turks 
at  llclionolis,  234 ;  defeslfii  by 
English  in  Egrpt,  235;  1'reatT 
of  Amiens  with  EnglHnd,  238; 
Fr^ich  mle  in  Ilaly  and  Switzer- 
land, 244—246;  Civil  Code  and 
Concocdiit,  25H— 266 ;  prowlh  of 
Papal  imwor,  263  ;  war  with  Eng. 
land  (1803),  266;  Bonaparte  as- 
sumes the  title  of  EmpiTor,  270 ; 
coalition  of  Rnsna,  England,  and 
AuBtria,  278;  defeatu  Austriane 
atUlra,2S8;  occupation  of  Vienna, 
293;  Aueterlitz,  296;  Peace  of 
Preabnrg,  299 ;  InBuBnce  in  Ger- 
many and  Ituly,  307 ;  war  against 
Prussia,  1806,  326 — 336 ;  acquisition 
of  Prassian  territory,  347 ,  war 
against  Portugal,  366  ;  troops  enter 
Spain,  3T2;  war  reopened  by 
Austria,  402 ;  surrender  of  Qentr^ 
Brisson's  column  to  the  Tyroleee, 
413;  Napoleon  enters  Vienna,  416; 
defeated  by  Austrinns  at  Aspam, 
421;  defeats  Austrians  at  WagTam, 
426 ;  French  defeated  at  lUavara 
\j  Sir  Arthur  WeUeoley,  426; 
MBoe  with  Anstria,  430 ;  Napo- 
bon's  annexations  of  the  Papal 
States,  Holland,  fto.,  436—438; 
troops  enlsr  Portugal,  446 ;  in- 
TaAonotBnna,4SS — (7T;PniBEta 
4«oUtm    war,   4U)     opeiunf    dC 


,  Groasbeeien,  Kulm,  LmpD^, 
60o  — 613;  invasion  by  Prusoa 
and  Allies.  619 ;  dethronement  of 
Napoleon,  631 ;  Peace  of  Paris,  638  ; 
results  of  Napoleon's  wars,  640— 
644 ;  restoration  of  liOnis  XVIII, 
631—633.  Character  of  Lonia 
XVIII.,  ii.  12,  13;  new  Constita. 
tion,  14;  at  theCoDgrenotVicona, 
22—31 ;  Napoleon  leaves  Elba,  31  ; 
Napoleon  ^ters  Paris,  38 ;  Biftht 
of  King  Loois,  ii. ;  th$  Acts  Ad- 
ditionneI(lSI6j,42;  thaChamberfl 
Buinmoned,  44  ;  election,  46  ;  new 
Constitution,  46 ;  Battles  of  Ligny, 
Quatre  Bras,  and  Waterloo,  60— 
66  ;  Napoleon'*  flight  to  Paris,  66  ; 
Napoleon's  abdicatiini,  66;  Alli«a 
ent<>r  Parii^  67 ;  reslomtion  of 
Louis  XVIIL,  67 ;  remoral  of 
Napoleon  to  St.  Helena,  68; 
cessions  and  indemnity  by  tlia 
second  Treaty  of  Paris,  62,  63; 
International  Council  of  AinbaB> 
sadors  meets  in  Paris  for  tha 
regulation  of  French  sSairs,  79; 
Ituyalist  oubages  at  Marseilles, 
Nismes,  and  Avignon,  91—93 ; 
p:icctiansof  1816,93,94 :  raactionarf 
Chaniber  of  Deputies,  96 ;  eiecuti(« 
of  Msrshal  Ney,  93;  Richelieu's 
Amnesty  Bill,  101 ;  persecution  of 
suapectod  Bonaoartdsts,  103,  104, 
and  note;  the  nltra-Eoyalist  pBiiy 
adopts  Parliamentary  theory  in 
Chamber  of  Depaties,  105;  e(MJeai- 
sstical  si&ameH,  106 ;  abolition  of 
divorce,  107,  Electoral  Bill,  lOS; 
Vill^le's  counttT-projeot  of  popular 
franchise,  110,  111 ;  contest  in  tha 
Chambera  on  the  Budget,  113;  the 
Chambeis  prorogued,  1 14 ;  tiaingkt 
Grenoble,  116  ;  disBointion  of  the 
Chamber  of  Depnties,  117 ;  pasainB| 
of  Electoral  Law,  117;  partid 
evacuation  by  AJHed  troops,  119 ; 
general  improvement  from  1B16  to 
1818,  119,  120;  evacoation  by 
Allied  troops,  131 ;  Oontercmce  m 
Aii-la-ChapellB,  131—133;  condi- 
tion after  IBIS,  164;  nuasiirss  of 
Decazes,  1 65  ;  resignatitm  of  Mche- 
lien,  163 ;  reaction  against  Lihoal- 
ism  aft«r  the  murder  of  the  Duke 
of  BeiT7,  IM;  second  letiremmt 
of  Richeliea,  ii. ,'  protects  of  Count 
of  Artois,  160;  YilUle's  MinistfT, 
l«lj  tf      " 


mMoMJon  at  flie  Conf^nM  of 
Varoiia,  216—217;  invmiion  of 
Spain  (1823],  219;  iytnp&thy  with 
Greece,  324 ;  joins  in  a  treaty  with 
England  and  Russia  f  oi  Buppressing 
the  conflict  in  the  East,  ii. ;  defeats 
Turku  at  Navarino,  330—332 ;  Qo- 
Temment  of  Chaile*  X.  (1824— 
1S2T),  3G8— -360 ;  Ministries  of 
Uartigiiao  and  Polignoc,  360,  361 ; 

Sorogation  of  Chambers,  and 
aneral  Election,  36S — 368 ;  cmn- 
psign  against  the  Arabs,  36<^; 
captoco  of  Algiers  W  0«nenJ 
Bourmont,  367  ;  publication,  of 
Oidinance*  in  the  Monitew,  368; 
Eevolution  of  July.  1830,  371— 37G; 
abdication  of  Charles  X^  Lotiia 
Philippe  made  King,  378 ;  nature 
of  the  Revolution  of  1830,  UTS  ; 
attitude  towunis  insurrection  in 
Papal  States,  401 ;  imnureutiunB  in 
Paris,  Lyons,  Grenoble,  and  other 
places,  against  the  Government, 
416,  416;  attempt  on  the  llfo  of 
Ijouib  Philippe  by  Fifi«hi,  417; 
law*  of  1835  to  repress  seJition, 
417 ;  growth  of  friendliniiBS  to- 
wards Englaad,  422;  declines  to 
■end  troop.1  to  Spain  to  quell  Garll^t 
rebellion,  437 ;  suppoit  given  to 
Viceroy  of  Egypt,  450,  456;  fleet 
sent  to  Na[ilaa  on  the  occupation  of 
Ferram  bj-  Austria,  473;  nuu-rlsge 
of  the  Duke  of  Montpeniiier  to  the 
infanta  of  Spain,  606;  demnnd  for 
Parliainentarr  reform,  607  ;  oppo- 
aitiou  in  the  Chanibers  to  Louis 
Phillpjie,  608;  spread  of  Socialiam, 
609;  lievolutlon  of  February,  1848, 
6U;  abdicationand  flight  of  Louis 
Philippo,613;  Republic proilitimcd, 
U.  ;  effect  <rf  the  Kavolutlon  on 
Europe,  iii.  3;  meeting  of  I'ro- 
Tisional  (Jovonlraent,  34  ;  national 
workshops,  36  :  first  actx  ofNutioual 
Assembly,  38 ;  not  of  May  16th, 
184S,  Ui. ;  the  Assembly  seeks  to 
•bulieh  national  workshops,  38 ; 
order  for  enlistment  of  workiricn, 
40;  insurrection  o(  June,  ib.  ;  rise 
of  Louis  NspoleoD,  43— 4G  ;  Louis 
Napoleon  efeoted  President,  47; 
troops  dispatched  to  occupy  itonie 
and  restore  the  Papiil  power,  106 ; 
atlcuipted  inmri-eotions  (184y),  108  ; 
sioHe  f>d  capture  of  Itomn,  108, 
109 ;  rOBtorcs  Pontifical  Govern- 
ment, lOS;  aims  of  Louis  Nupo- 
Imd,  ISIj  law  oanied  for  limit' 


ing  Cm  frtmohise^  ISO ;  Louis 
Napoleon  seeks  for  prolongation 
of  his  Presidincy,   162 ;   revision 

of  Constitution  for  prolongiog 
Napoleon's  PresidBnoy  reieoted 
by  Assembly,  166 ;  Louis  Napo- 
leon's preparations  for  the  Ciwy 
d'JUJ,  167 1  Assembly  refuses  Lonia 
Napoleon's  demands  for  re-estab- 
lishing univerHal  suSrage^  170; 
Qjup  d'itot  of  Dec  2,  1861,  172— 
174;  massacre  in  Paris,  176;  the 
plibiteitt  entrusts  Louis  Napoleon 
with  farming  a  COnstitntion,  and 
niaintHins  him  in  office  177; 
Louis  Napoleon  proclaimed  Napo- 
leon IIL,  Emperor  (Dec.  2,  1862), 
177 ;  dispute  with  Russia  respecting 
Holy  Places  in  Palestine,  185  ;  aeet 
dispatched  to  Besika  Bay  on  the 
entry  of  Russian  troops  into  Dan~ 
ubian  provinces,  184 ;  declaration 
of  war  against  Russia,  199;  troops 
land  in  the  Crimea,  210;  Battle i^ 
the  Alma,  211;  Battle  of  Jnker- 
mann,217;  attack  on  the  UalakoS, 
223  ;  Emperor  Napoleon  proposes 
to  direct  operations  at  the  sloge  of 
Seliaxtopol,  224 ;  dufeats  Russia  at 
the  Battle  of  the  Tchemayu,  226 ; 
Treiity  of  Peace  with  Russia 
signed  at  Paris  (1856),  230  ;  troops 
occupy  Syria  (1860),  238  ;  declares 
war,  in  conjunction  with  Sardinia, 
againitt  Austria  269 ;  defaits 
AustrianSHt  Mngenta,261  ;  victory 
of  Sotferinu,  2b3;  peace  with 
Austria  concluded  at  Villafrsni;*, 
265;  Napoloou  pkns  the  esUblish- 
ment  of  an  Italian  kingdom,  273 ; 
dismissal  of  Walewaki,  foreign 
minister,  and  ajipuintment  of 
Thouvenet,  274;  annexution  ot 
Saroy  and  Nice,  277;  uuilHissiidor 
withdraws  from  Turin  on  tli"  Sar- 
dinian invnsiun  of  the  Papal  ijtat<4, 
293 ;  September  Convention  with 
Italy,  301;  obt-.ina  Venotia  for 
Italy,  377 ;  NapoI..^m  III.  mediates 
between  Prussia  and  Austria,  ib, ; 
Napoleon  ei.<ekB  for  the  cession  of 
Luxemburg,  401 ;  outcry  against 
Prussian  aggression,  403 ;  re- 
occupuliou  of  Civita  Vecchia,  408; 
isolation  in  1S70,  410  ;  indignation 
sgiiirist  Prussia  at  the  candidature 
of  PHnne  LeopoU  fnr  the  Spsnish 
throne,  413;  war  ducidod  ag.iinst 
Prussia  (1870),  420:  only  nxteen 
out  of  eighty -seven  deportments  in 


XODS^f  SUROPS. 


ttfoai  of  mr  with  Pnisna,  421 ; 
OonditiaD  of  tiie  vray,  428 ;   incom- 

Gtenc«  And  lethargy  oC  ministen 
wu  propaistioiu,  420  i  doSciou- 
oiM  of  the  mnaj  ngeraTsted  by  tha 
minppnmTutico  of  paUio  fondi^ 
430;  deloatAd  by  Fmadana  at 
Woiiieeubutg,  4S4 ;  defe&t«dat  the 
BalUe  ofwerth,  435;  dsfeated  at 
Spiuheran,  Mata-la-Tour,  and 
Orairelotte,  438—441  ;  Battla  of 
Sedan  and  Hunender  of  Napoleon, 
446;  dopodtion  of  ths  Emporoi 
and  prodanutjon  of  tha  Gepublio, 
447,  448;  fonnutioa  of  a  gorem- 
ment  of  national  defence,  448; 
Qambetta  andertukes  the  formation 
of  national  armiee,  460  ;  liega  of 
Farig,  460;  fall  of  Struburg,  453  ; 
army  of  the  Loire,  463;  Urleani 
taken  by  Germans,  ii,  ;  capitula- 
tion of  Meti,  466  ;  capitulation  of 
Faria  and  araiiatice,  403  ;  oloctiona 
ordered  to  bs  held,  4S3 ;  National 
Auembly  meeCt  at  Bordeaux,  464  ; 
Thien  anangea  terms  of  peace 
with  Biemarok,  ii.;  entry  of 
Germans  into  Paris  lut  March, 
1871,  466;  TreatieB  of  Versailles 
and  Frankfort  with  Germany,  ii.  ; 
iusuirectiou  of  the  Oomoiuno  and 
national  Kuard  in  Faris,  468^471  ; 
tha  Bepublic  under  M.  Thien,  474  ; 
UcMahoa't  presidency,  476 ;  Comb) 
de  Chambord,  it. ;  at  the  Congress 
of  Berlin,  61S 

Francis  II.,  Austria  under,  i.  27 ;  his 
address  to  the  Gorm~ma  body,  164 ; 
assumes  the  title  of  Emperor  ot  all 
his  dominions,  277;  inotpadty,  406. 
On  the  Holy  Alliance,  ii.  64 ; 
his  intolerani:e  and  resistance  to 
progreea,  82  ;  death  (1836),  482. 

Francis  II.,  King  of  Nnplea  ;  suctuicda 
hia  father,  Ferdinand  II.,  iii  281 ; 
altBmpts  t«  negotiate  an  ellianue 
wilh  Piedmont,  2B9 ;  flight  from 
Naples  on  the  advance  of  Unrilialdi, 
2U1 ;  conducted  by  tha  French,  on 
the  fall  of  Goela,  to  I'apal  &t&t<:s, 
288 

Francis  Joseph  I. ,  Emperor  of  Austria 
{184R),  iii.  81 ;  diuolves  Parliament, 
S2;  demands  from  Turkey  the  eur- 
rendor  ot  Kossuth,  184  ;  commands 
his  armr  in  Italy  a^tnst  France 
and  Sardinin.  2fl3 :  interview  with 
Napoleon  1 II.  at  ViHifmuca,  266  ; 
promises  to  Tcetore  the  old  Con- 
niiuUop  (o  HungMjt,  324 ;  oonfUot 


irith  Hnngarfan  AsKmbltei^  SSt; 
exdoded  &om  Germany,  376 — 379; 
reoontnliatian  with  Hoogiiy,  38B ; 
crowned  KJag-  of  Hungary,  393"; 
private  arrangGmontB  wi&i  Na- 
poleon HI.  for    defanoe    ■yi"^ 


40S 


Frankfort,  liaing  at,  ii.  411 

Frankfort,  Gtorman  National  AHemUr 
of,  iii.  31 ;  debates  on  FrimaiT 
Sights,  114— 116;  outrages  on  the 
ratification  of  the  armistice  of 
Malmo,  118;  discuBsea  Qorman 
relations  with  Anstiia,  126 ;  pane* 
ths  Conatitutiiat,  130  ;  elects 
Frederick  William  IV^  Emperor, 
130;  German  governments  reject 
the  Constitution,  134;  end  of  tha 
Parliament,  136 

Frederick  Charles,  Prince,  commands 
Prussian  troops  inSchleswig  a^inat 
Denmark,  iii.  360 ;  takes  ^art  in  tha 
campaign  against  Aostria,  3T4 — 
376;  ooramandsthe  central  Fmaaian 
army  against  the  French,  133 ;  be- 
sie^Meti,  441,447 

Frederick  the  Great,  work  in  Praasia 
of,  i.  30,  37 

Frederick  YII,,  King  of  Denmark ; 
accession  to  Uie  throne,  iii.  27  ;pnb- 
liahes  draft  of  a  Conititntion,  U.  ,■ 
war  with  Pruesia  respecting  SvhleA- 
wig-BoUtein,  28;  death  in  1S63, 
342,  346 

Frederick  William  XL  (Prussia),  meet* 
Emporor  Leopold  at  Pillniti,  and 
issuna  joint  declaration  relating  to 
safc^  of  Louia  XVI.,  i.  4  ;  chuae- 
ter  of  his  rule,  32;  his  alliance  with 
Austria  sgninst  tho  Frentdi,  33 ; 
treaty  with  Cathorine  of  Bnsna, 
83  ;  breach  with  Aostria,  88 ;  laada 
army  npon  Warsaw,  89 

Fredeiick  William  UI.  (Pnisaia) ;  hia 
proposals  residing  HanoTef,  i. 
270  ;  his  remonstrance  with  Bona- 
parte, 272  ;  temporinng  policy  with 
Bonaparte,  280;  treaty  with  the 
Emperor  of  Russia  at  Potsdam,  292  ; 
evades  engagements  wi  Lh  Bnsaia,  297; 
attempts  to  disguise  the  oession  of 
Hanover,  312;  at  the  Battle  of 
Anerstiidt,  329  ;  flight  to  Weimar, 
330;  dismisses  Stem,  336;  cordial 
relations  with  Emperor  of  Russia, 
344  ;  cedes  large  portions  of  terri- 
tory to  Napoleon,  347 ;  reluctanoo 
to  enter  info  war  with  Austria,  407; 
proclamation  to  the  German  nation, 
409 ;  proposal  of  alliasce  with  It UMi% 


■s^nat'  Kanoe  declined,  4S8 ;  do- 
cIai«B  waraf^aiiut  France,  46S;  Can- 
glMS  orVIenoa.ii.  24,  36  ;  ireakneBB 
and  timidity,  83  ;  proiidBea  a  popu- 
lar Constituti  on,  121;  interfomin 
tha  diBcnniaa  caosed  by  SchinaJE's 
pamphlet,  12& ;  recommHinIations 
giren  to  him  by  Mettcmich,  137  ; 
flitahlUheB  the  Provincial  EsbLtos, 
ISl :  attitada  towards  Greece,  323  i 
death  in  ISJO,  496 
n«d0nclf  Williata  IV.,  of  Priuaia, 
ncceedg  hia  fiithor  in  1840,  ii.  497  ; 
biidianicter,  198;  convoke*  united 
Diet  at  Itcrlin,  ii. ,-  violent  language 
to  tha  duputicB.  fiOO  ;  manifesto  to 
the  Oonnan  people  during  tha  dis- 
torlancoB  of  Maruh,  1848,  iii.  33  ; 
withdraws  to  Potaiiam  during  Hots 
at  Borlin,  120:  prorognei  and 
afterwards  diNSoIves  the  Pru&^ion 
Awembly,    123,    124;  elected  Hm- 

Siror  ol  Gormany  by  the  Frankfort 
arliamont.  130 ;  refnaea  the 
Imperial  crown,  133  ;  attempts  to 
form  A  union  of  German  atotea, 
IS9:  total  fuilure  of  attempt  to 
fonn  a  German  Federal  Union, 
1S4 ;  proposes  that  the  riiihts  of 
the  Christian  anbjocts  of  the  Sidtan 
thould  be  goaranteed  bv  thu  Qrctit 
Powers,  202  ;  letter  to  Bunm  n  on 
England's  anaiatance  to  Turliuy,  H., 
note ;  lettur  to  Bunson  on  the 
EmporDrNioholna,  220,  note  ;  with- 
draws from  pablio  nSaiis,  806 

Priedland,  Battle  of,  i.  345 

FrdBchwiller,  iii.  43S 

FrOBSoid,  Gtmeial,  leada  French  corpt 
against  Saarbriickon,  iii.  433 

Fnentes  d'Onoro,  BatUo  of,  L  447 

Oaetb ;  flight  of  Pins  IX  to,  iii.  9S ; 

bombardment  and  surrender  to  Sar> 
dinian  troops,  299 

Gagem,  Von;  President  of  the  Gor- 
man National  Aiiaenibly  (1848),  iii, 
1I&;  Ricceeds  Schmerling as  chief 
minister  in  Frankfort  Parliament, 
136;  pmposea  a  conditional  union 
with  Austria,  127 ;  leads  the 
Liberals  in  the  Federal  Purliument 
at  Erfurt,  141 

Oai,  lUyrian  leader,  iii.  63 

Qalida;  insurrection  of  Poles  {184S), 
a  493 

OaUi)«)U;tii.2D7,  S09 

Gamlftta,  IL,  proclaims  the  Frenuh 
RopuUic  after  the  Barrender  of 
]7ftp(deoo  It  Sedftn,  ilL  US ;  Isavee 


Paria  during  the  siege  to  nndertake 

the  govemnient  ol  the  provinoea 
and  the  orpianisation  of  national 
armies,  4fil ;  resigns  on  tha  reiee-  - 
tioQ  of  his  proposal  for  sicIuiIjdk 
from  election  all  perwns  connected 
with  the  Govemuient  of  Napoleon 
ni.,  464 
Qarilnldi,  General:  heads  a  corps  in 
defence  of  Bome  against  the  French, 
iii.  106;  leaves  Komo  and  escapes 
from  Austrians  to  America,  109; 
loads  volnnteeiB  against  Austria 
(1B6B),  257,260;  proposes  to  Ind 
an  expedition  against  Rome,  270 ; 
hostility  b>  the  cession  of  Nice  to 
France,  278;  breach  with  Count 
Oavoar,  279;  expedition  to  Sicily, 
283;  captures  Palermo,  and  aa- 
sumes  tho  dictatorsliip,  286,  286; 
defeats  the  Henpolilans  at  Uj- 
lazzo,  288 ;  lack  of  administrative 
faculty,  238 ;  triumphant  entry 
into  Naples,  292 ;  requests  Victi^ 
Emmanuel  to  consent  to  his  march 
on  Rome,  and  to  dismias  Cavour, 
295 ;  dcfoHta  NeapoLtan  troopc 
at  OnJRzzo,  296 ;  moating  with  Vic- 
tor Emmonu^  297;  reduces 
Oapna,  ii. ;  his  request  for  the 
lieutonancy  of  Southern  Italy  de- 
clined by  Victor  Emmanuel,   H,  ; 

made  prisoner  hy  the  troops  of 
Victor  Emmanuel  at  Aspromonte, 
S61 ;  his  troops  invade  PajAl  Slates 
(1867),  408;  commands  a  body  of 
anxiliaries  during  tha  Franco- 
Prussian  war,  4B1 

Gaatoin,  Convention  of,  iii.  3&S,  370 

Qegenl»ch,  Abbot  of,  I.  18 

Genoa;  overthrow  of  oligarchic  govern- 
ment, and  establishment  of  demo> 
era  tie  constitution  favourable  to 
France,  i.  142  ;  blockaded  by  Ana- 
triuna,  217;  surrendered  to  Aua- 
triona,  220 :  given  to  the  King  of 
Sardinia,  637,  it.  70 

OeorgaMs ;  Greek  insarirant,  ii.  272 

George  III.,  Eiectorot  Hanover,  L8S; 
abuses  in  England  under  his  rule, 
fi9;  stru^le  with  political  rarties, 
ei ;  hostility  to  the  CathoHc  Eman- 
cipation Act,  240 ;  announoes  the 
coalition  with  Russia  against 
Fmnce,  278;  qTiarrels  with  his 
ministeis  on  tho  Catholic  Disabili- 
tiea  question,  313 

Oermany,  state  of,  in  1792,  i.  16-40; 
whob  at  w«t  of  the  Bhine  in  Uw 


XODERN  avsops. 


haiuli  ol  the  Fnoch  (1794),  96 ; 

kbukdonod  bj  Austria,  160;  iti 
rspraaentBtiiM  at  the  Congreu  of 
Baatadt,  156 ;  nfUtr  the  Ftww  of 
Tjtm^vilie,  226;  W'tUement  of,  ^ij 
Bonapurte  248  ;  absence  ol  natiomil 
eentimeiit,  260;  Bonaparte's  orgaai- 
ntion  of  WeaUia,  303  ;  no  natioiial 
unity  (1806),  30*  ;  condition  undtr 
Nnpoleon's  iiile,  307 ;  Austrian  war 
□t  1809  agunst  FntncB  on  t>ohalf 
erf  Qarmany,  403;  Southsm  Gor- 
manT  aidea  with  Napoleon,  4  06 ; 
patnotiam  in  Northern  Oermiiny, 
ii.  ;  idea  of  unity  at  the  outbroak  of 
war  with  Franco  in  1813,  487; 
Napoleon's  campai^  of  1813,480; 
Etein'B  policy  during  the  War  of 
Liboiation,  GU8 ;  beneficial  effect  of 
Napoleon'!  wan,  642.  Act  of 
Federatioa  at  CoDgrsH  of  VionnA, 
ii.  87  ;  delay  in  promiMid  Conrti- 
tution,  126 ;  alami  raised  by 
SUtunlia'a  pamphlet,  138  ;  murder 
of  Eotiebue,  141 ;  relation  of  Htnor 
etatta  to  PnuBia,  113 ;  meHSurca  of 
the  Conference  of  Carlsbad,   146 ; 

kctionary  dexpotisin,  162;  riao  of 
■ecret  aooietiea,  163 ;  eympalhy 
with  France,  163 ;  condition  after 
French  Berolution  of  1830,  406 — 


411; 


I  ZoUve: 


roctions  in  Brunswick  and  Canjol, 
407 :  Constitutions  giauted  in 
HuiOTerand  SHiony,  408;  despotic 
reaction(lS32),  410— 412;  Hsingat 
Fiankfort,  411;  repressive  m«iauie« 
of  M«ttomich,  411,  412.  AgitsUon 
in  Wcsl«m  Germany,  1S47,  iii.  3  ; 
■ympHthy  with  Schleswig-Uolstein 
in  ila  rebellion  against  Denmark, 
26 ;  deeire  for  onity  amongst  the 

S'oplu,  29  ;  formation  of  the  Ant«- 
nrliament,  29 ;  mHeting  of  the 
National  Assembly  at  Franlcfort, 
SI;  work  of  (ha  Aasemblv,  114; 
outniges  lit  Frankfort  on  the  ntifi- 
cation  of  the  armistice  of  MalmO, 
118;  the  Frankfort  Assombly  dis- 
euaaea  the  relation  of  Austrian 
Empire  to  Germany,  126 ;  Frederick 
Winiun  IV.  refuses  to  accept  the 
Imperial  Crown,  133 ;  lYankfort 
Aaaembly  denounced  as  a  revola- 
tionary  body,  136 ;  end  of  the 
Parliament,  1 S7 ;  formation  of 
Federal  Constitutiun  and  Federal 
Fartiameht  at  Brfurt,  140,  141; 
vvnBict  in  Uesao-C^iMl  between 


the  miuiilrj  and  the  people,  I4t; 
national  fleet  «oId  by  auction,  161 ; 
epoch  of  reaction,  Itl ;  revival  of 
idea  of  Qerman  union  under  the  Ho- 
gencyof  down  Prinos  William.  307; 
formation  of  National  Society,  308 ; 
Schlatwig-Holstein  and  Oerman 
inteivsts,  348,  349 ;  the  Daniah  war, 
360 ;  disHgrecmcnt  between  Austria 
and  Pmssia,  366 ;  agreement  of 
Qastein,  358;  war  between  Austna 
and  Prussia,  370-376  ;  Treaty  of 
Prague,  378;  Southern  States onter 
into  allLince  with  the  Kingof  Prua- 
■ia,  381 ;  militanr  orgtaninlion,  404 1 
establishment  of  a  Customs-Farlia. 
ment,  411;  progress  of  the  work  of 
consijidation  by  Bismarck,  413; 
mobilisation  of  troops,  427;  Franco- 
German  War,  433-4B5 ;  onion  ol 
N(nthern  and  Sonthcrn  Slates, 
and  assumption  of  the  title  of 
Emperor  by  King  William,  466^ 
468 ;  first  Parliament  of  the  German 
Empire  Opened  at  Berlin,  4S3; 
"  League  of  the  Three  EmpeTOr^" 
476 

Oervinna,  monber  of  German  National 
Assembly,  iii.  32 

Qioberti,  aims  in  hi*  writings  at  ■ 
reformation  of  Italy  thmugh  tha 
Papacy,  ii.  471 

Girondins,  i.  B ;  their  war-polioy,  9; 
demand  dispersal  of  Emigrants,  1 0 
influence  in  the  Conrentitm,  48 
at  variance  with  the  Commune,  66 . 
accusations  against  the  Conunnna 
and  Robespierre,  S6  ;  batol  by  the 
people,  66;  influence  dedinea,  67; 
crushed  by  Commune  and  nembcn 
arrested,  71 

Gitschin,  headqnartan  of  King  of 
PniMia  in  campaign  against  Aua- 
trio,  iii.  376 

Giulay,  General,  u>mmandB  the  Ans- 
tHana  in  1859,  iii.  360 

Gneiscnau,  Pmsaian  eenciHl,  gallant 
defence  of  Colberg,  i.  342;  adrocatu 
an  invanonof  France,  617;  serve* 
wttb  Bliicher  in  Napoleon's  last 
cam)>aigD,  ii.  62,  63 

Godoy,  Spaniak  miniater,  injoiioos  in- 
fluence, L  3S7 ;  aeiMd  by  the  mob. 


uder 


ii.84. 


86,  88 ;  •urrB____ _ 

Vila«o«,  86 
GortchaXo^    IVince    Alexander,    r*- 
(leaeat*  Bmsia  at  tbe  Oonfarenoo 


«l  Tiemu,  lt>7,  18U,  iii.  231 ; 
■eelis  to  diun&de  the  Czar  bum 
making  peace  with.  EdkIhiuI  and 
Allies,  230;  rejects  the  inl: erf erence 
of  the  Poven  with  regacd  to  Folish 
•&in,  337  ;  rosiats  Milutine'i 
measulu  in  Poland,  339;  Bfirlia 
Memorandum,  191 ;  Servian  cam- 
paign, 489, 196,  609 

Gourko,  OananLl,  leads  Buasinn  corps 
;□  Bulgaria,  iii.  4G9,  GOO,  604,  £05 

Graluuii,  General,  oommiuid*  English 
troopi  at  Cadiz,  i.  446 

Qramunt,  Duke  of,  French  Foreign 
Uiniiter  {1S70),  iii.  414 ;  lavoura  a 
war  wiUi  Prnula,  41S 

OnTelotta,  Battle  of,  iii.  141 

Greece,  Bavolt  in,  ii.  167  ;  races  and 
institutions,  237—242;  Greek 
Church,  243 ;  the  Armatoli  and 
Rlephta,  247  ;  iHlanda  nf.  243  ;  the 
Phanariots,  261;  the  Honpodiu*, 
ii.;  intellectual  rcvintl  in  eighteenth 
century,  263;  Koraes,  ^54— 267 ; 
^wth  of  commerce,  260  ;  founda- 
taoD  of  OdeXHt,  ii. ;  inQiienc«  of 
French  lievolutiun,  262  ;  the  songs 
of  Khegns,  263;  the  HvtieHa 
Philike,  265,  •26a;  revolt  of  the 
Horea,  273;  extemuon  of  the 
revolt,  285;  massacre  at  Chios,  291 ; 
doable  invasion   )>y   Tiirke, 


t  of    I 


,   299;    civil 


;  defeats  in  the  Klurte, 
W6— 310;  faU  ot  the  Arr.)]->liB  of 
Atbena,  311 ;  intervention  ot  llreat 
Britain  and  Biiasia,  322;  Turks  to 
1m  removed  from  the  country,  322  ; 
gpnpatliy  amon^t  the  Liberals  and 
Ultramontanei  of  Pnince,  324 ; 
the  Bultan  to  retain  puramount 
■overeigntT,  32S ;  condition  after 
Battle  ot  Navarino,  332 ;  Cn|>oiIis- 
biai  elected  President,  345  ;  limits 
of,  settled  by  the  lowers,  349; 
Prince  Leopold  of  Baie-Coburg 
Mcepta  the  crown,  349 ;  Prince 
Leopold  renounces  the  crown,  362  ; 

Princ  Otto  ot  Bavari;!  made  King, 
S61  ;  tranifoT  ot  Ionian  iFlands 
(1864)  by  Groat  Britain,  355; 
gain*  Thessaly  at  the  Congrosa  of 
Berlin,  iii.  619 

GMsoire  (ex-bishop),  election  to 
French  Chamber  of  Deputies,  ii. 
IH  ;  election  invalidatud,  168 

Oi»goryXVI.(Pope),ii.3y9;  appeals  to 
Anstria  for  aaoiatiuice  agaioHt  iusur- 
geuto  of  Bologna.  100  ;  refnses  to 
/    J 


sx  us 

Bocept  the  proponis  of  ntom 
reoommended  by  the  Conference  ot 
Rome,  401 ;  death  (1816),  172 

Grenoble,  Napoleon's  arrival  at,  after 
escaping  from  Elba,  ii.  31 ;  popular 
rising,  116;  represeated  byOregoire 
in  Chamber  ot  Deputies,  166; 
revolt  of  working-clnMM  (1831), 
lie 

Granville,  Lord,  and  the  dengna  ot 
Austria  and  Prusaia,  i.  67  (note),  77 
(note) ;  on  the  royalist  inovoraent  in 
Frani*,  98  (note) ;  retires  from 
office,  240;  Prime  Minister,  311; 
fall  of  his  Ministry,  343 

Qtot,  Lord,  and  the  English  Befom 


iiiii 


i.  120 


Giijsabecren,  Battle  of,  i.  506 

UuiKOt,  H.,  Euocceds'I'hici's  as  French 

Pranier,  ii.   160  ;  approveip  of  the 

marriage  of  the  Duke  of  Moatpon' 

Bier  to  the  Infanta  of  Spain,  605 ; 

resignation  (1B48),  612 
Oustaviu!  in.  (Sweitcn),  his  hatred  to 

French  Revolution,  i.  13 
Gymnastic    eatabliahmentf^    Biipposod 

by  Hettemich  to  be  dangerous  (« 

EuTopeaiL  peace,  ii.  137 

Habeas  Corpus  Act,  Suspension  of,  in 
England,  ii  166 

Ham,  pluce  of  Louis  Napoleon's  im- 
prisonment, iii.  44 

Hainbach,  Castle  of,  demonstration 
a<,rainst  German  deepotism  held  at. 


HamUton,  I^y,  i.  169  (note);  18S 
(note) 

Hamilton,  Sir  W.,  despalch  resprcting 
General  Mack,  i.  1 7 1  (note) ;  on  the 
BHcupe  of  the  Boyal  Family  from 
Naples,  176  (note) 

Hanover,  Nobles  ot,  i.  30;  occnpntion 
by  the  French,  269;  offered  to 
IVusHia  by  llonftparte,  281 ;  King 
of  I'miwiu'e  dissimulation  respect- 
ing its  coBsion,  812;  offered  to 
England  by  Napoleon.  315;  in. 
Burroction,  ii.408.  Attempt  to  form  a 
union  witli  Prussia,  iii.  139;BO<-edes 
from  leaeiua  vith  Prussia,  110: 
.  conquered  by  Prooiia,  374;  annexed 
by  Prussia,  37a 

riapsburgii,  The,  i.  17—33 

Hurdenberg,  Buon  (Prussian  mini*- 
ter],  i.  280;  on  Pniau'i  acqwai- 


UODSRN  atTROPS. 


tim  of  Hsnonr,  SIS  (note) ;  dli- 
miual  bom  offica,  3S7  ;  recalled  in 
IBtO,  *67;  polior,  4GS;  meeta 
Stein  at  Breslau  to  arnuigs  Tnnt; 
at  Ealisoh,  4S1.  At  the  Congress 
of  Vienna,  iL  23;  his  dsnumda 
napecting  aecond  Tmatj  of  Paris, 
SO,  01 ;  his  constitutJonal  •yatem, 
123;  decline  of  liii  inflnence,  I3fi-~ 
148;  death,  IGl 

HaiTOwbr,  IiOTd,  hi«  despatch  from 
Berlin  on  the  stmioii  of  PmsHian 
engagements  irith  HiueU,  S9S 
(note) 

Haaaoapnog,  Chief  Kfinistra'  in  Hesse- 
OaaHl,  iiL  U4 

Hastings,  Cuptaia,  commondi  a  Qreek 
detnchment,  ii.  329 

Hkugwita,  Prussian  Miuistcr,  i.  B8— 
89;  reoommends  the  occupation  of 
HaJlOTer,  '269  ;  hia  withdrawal,  280  ; 
interview  with  Bonnpart«  at 
Brilnn,  295  ;  arrongBa  traity  wlUi 
Bonaparte  at  Scbim^runn,  298; 
•igna  a  treaty  forcing  Pnusiii  into 
w&T  with  England,  313;  reaigna 
office,  336 

Haydn,  the  musician,  L  21,  404 

Helena,  St.,  ii.  58 

Helvetic  Republic,  L  182 

Herzegovina  revolts  against  Turkey, 
iii.  477  ;  handed  over  to  Austria  at 
the  Congi'094  of  Berlin.  G19 

Bcsse,  roBtomCion  of  the  Elector,  ii.  8  ; 
the  Elector's  eitortioiis,  126. 
HaAsenpflag  appointed  Chief  Minis- 
tor,  iu.  144 ;  conSict  between  the 
Ministry  and  the  people,  and 
appeal  to  Diet  of  Frankfort,  14S ; 
aettlcment  of  affairs  mfDrrod  to  the 
Diet  of  Frankfort,  148;  renewed 
struggle  hetween  the  Elector  and 
the  people,  308 ;  conquered  by 
Fnissia,  374;  annexed  to  FrusBia, 
3TS 

Eetffiriu  Fhilike,  The,  ii.  265,  288 

Hooho,  French  general,  i.  87 

Hofor,  Tyrolcso  loader,  i.  435 

Hohenlinden,  Battle  of,  i.  225 

Hohenlohe,  Prince,  Prussian  geneisl, 
L  82G;  advice  on  the  movements  of 
the  army  ag^iinst  France,  32S; 
deatructioD  of  hia  army  at  Jena, 
328 ;  •arronders  to  Napoleon  at 
Prenilan,  331. 

Hohenlahe,  Prince,  Prime  Minister  of 
Prussia  (1862),  iiL  312;  resigiia- 
tion,  313 


tion  ctf  Bn^and  and  Bnsala  agniut 

1B5 ;  the  Bitariaii  Bepuhlic, 
237 ;  iia  oonatitntion  in  1801, 
243 :  the  Crown  given  to  Louia 
Bonaparte,  302 ;  abdication  trf 
the  King,  438;  annexed  to  the 
French  Empire,  4SS;  natored  to 
the  House  of  Omnge,  636.  United 
to  Belgium  at  Congress  of  Vienna, 
iL  70 ;  i^ohibite  the  alave-tnde,  76 ; 
conflict  with  Belgium,  388  ;  refoaaa 
to  aocapt  deuiaion  of  Confarenco  at 
London  with  regard  to  Betginn 
frontier,  388 ;  bombardment  of 
Antwerp.  389 

Holst«in  (jM  Schleawig-HoUtoin) 

Holy  Allianoe,  Treaty  of,  ii.  63—06 

Holy  Homan  Empire,  L  16,  160;  iti 
end,  300 

Hood,  Admiral,  at  the  aiegs  of  Toulon, 
i.  83 

Homby,  Admiral,  ordered  withEngliA 
Beet  to  Besika  Bay,  iii.  507 

Hortense,  mother  of  Louis  Napoleon, 
iiL  48 

Hoapodan,  Greek,  ii.  261 ;  iii.  184 ; 
Alexander  Cuia  elected  Hospodar 
of  HoldaTia  and  Wallaiihia,  237 

Hotel  de  Ville,  ii.  370;  mooting  of 
lAfayetts's  Municipal  Committee 
(July,  1830),  375;  Louis  Philippe 
addresses  Uie  mob  from,  376. 
Heeting'plaoa  of  Prorisional  Qo- 
verament  {1848),  iii.  34 

Houchard,  Guneml,  attncka  Qennana 
at  Dunkirk,  i.  79;  executed  by 
Itevolutionary  Tribnaal,  79 

Howe,  Lord,  Tictory  over  French  off 
Ushant,  i.  90 

Hrabowaky,  Austrian  general,  attempt 
to  occupy  Cartowitz,  iii.  68 

Hugo,  Victor,  arrested  by  Louia 
Napoleon,  iii.  170 

Humboldt,  Prussian  Hiniatar,  reaigna- 
tion,  ii.  147 

Hungary,  AuLocraCTof  .Toseph  II.  in, 
1.24;  policy  of  Leopold  U.  ID,  25. 
Affairs  in  1825,  ii.  477;  the  Mag- 
yars and  Slavs,  478;  Koaauth  ia 
imprisoned  for  putiliahing  teporta 
of  debatea,  470;  general  pn^resa 
after  1830,  480;  peaouit^  laws, 
481 ;  schemes  of  Cbnnt  Bzlohenyi, 
481;  Kossuth's  journal,  484;  ni. 
forma  of  the  IHet  of  IS4S,  •*. ; 
power  of  the  Magyars,  486 ;  Slario 
national  movements,  436,  487; 
Count  Apponyi  appointed  Chief 
Hiniater,  489.  Eoaanth's  address  to 
the  Chamben  on  Auafanan  dea{Mt- 


tun,  iH.  A;  inaa  indepeadcnoe,  11; 

levolt  ol  the  Serb*,  63—99;  war 
with  AuitTU,  84— 8S ;  Aiutriuu 
oatar  Tmth,  86  ;  Parlument  with- 
dnwB  to  Debrecrin,  S7 ;  drive*  the 
Anatriaiu  ODt  of  tJie  couctiy,  S9, 
M;  decIaratioD  of  indepcadenc^ 
90 ;  RiiMinii  mtdrventiou  on  the 
Kdfl  «f  Aoitria,  93;  campaign 
of  1S*9,  94 ;  cspitulatiou  of 
yiU^DO,  94,  SS ;  coDBtitutianal 
light*  (ttiingniiihed,  9fl  ;  AuBtria'i 
Tengeonce,  96,  96 ;  diploma  for 
KBtoring  the  old  OoDBtitution  pnb- 
liihed  by  Auetria,  S24  ;  reeista  the 
est&bluhiaent  of  a  Central  Council, 
S2fi;    meeting  of  Diet  at   Pesth, 


Cmitral  Council,  326;  dissolution 
of  the  Diet,  and  eotabliihtaent  of 
niUibu^  role,  327;  settlement  of 
oonflict  with  Austria,  mid  coidda- 
tion  of  Francis  Joseph,  387—392 

Hnssein  Paoha  leads  Turkish  troops 
into  Syria,  IL  443 ;  defeated  by 
EgTptiuna  at  Beilan,  444 

Hydra,  one  of  the  JEgexa  Islands,  u. 
2%T 


Hypailantt,  Prince  Alexander,  ii.  268 
— 272  i  dismissed  from  the  Rossian 
eenioB,  271;  flight  to  Austria, 
373 

Ibrahim,  commander- in- chief  of  Otto- 
man forces,  ii  302,  303;  invades 
the  Morea,  306  —  308  ;  at  the  siege 
of  MisBoloDghi,  3oy ;  deraatateB  the 
Horoa  in  opposition  to  proposal  for 
krmittice  by  the  allies,  328;  be- 
sieges Acrc^  442  ;  declared  a  rebel 
by  the  Saltan,  443 ;  conquers 
Syria  and  Ana  Minor,  113;  churac- 
t^  of  his  rule  after  the  peace  of 
Eutaya,  4C1 ;  expelled  from  Syria 
by  European  allies,  460 

Ibiaua,  capitolatea  to  BiMdan  atmr, 
iL339 

Ignatieft,  Qeneral,  Kueaian   ambasaa- 


H" 


n  Protocol,  496 

Inkermaim,  Battle  of,  iii.  217 
Innslmick,  sorrendei  to  the  Tyroleee 
by  tbe  Bavarians,  i.  413.    Place  of 
retreat  ol  Ferdinand  L,  Emperor 
of  Austria,  iiL  53 

J  J  2 


IX.  M 

loqtdntioB,  The,  io  Spain,  L  393 ;  the 
Cortes  declines  to  restore  it,  462. 
Restored  by  Kinf;  Ferdinand  (1814), 
ii.  9  :  attacked  in  Spain,  177 

loniun  Islaada  takpn  by  Fiance,  i.4S. 
Uade  a  Bepnhlio,  li.  264  ;  trans. 
ferred  by  Great  Britun  to  Greece, 

sse 

Ireland,  lynion  of  Qreat  Britain  with, 
i.  239 

Isabella,  Queen  of  Spain,  placed  on  the 
throne  n843),  ii.  442.  Dethroned, 
iii.  412, 

latria,  taken  by  France^  L  148 

Italy:  condition  in  1796,  L  Ul— 116; 
opening  of  French  campaign,  118; 
pillage  by  Bonaparte  arter  his 
entry  into  Uilan,  121 ;  the  Oispa^ 
dane  Republic  created  by  Bona- 
parto,  132;  birth  of  the  idea  at 
Italian  independence,  133 ;  Venice 
given  to  Austria  by  Bonaparte, 
ill ;  Genoa  recoivss  a  democratic 
DOnstitntiOTl  favourable  to  France, 
142;  the  French  at  Borne  snd 
Naples  (1798),  163-177;  reaction 
at  Naples,  183 ;  campaign  of  1799, 
191;  campaign  of  1800,  Marengo, 
218—222;  Bonaparte  made  I're- 
sident  of  the  Italian  Republic, 
244  ;  Bonaparto  accepts  the  title  of 
King  of  Italy,  279  ;  condition  under 
Napoleon's  rule,  307.  Austrian 
policy  (1816),  ii.  83—86;  Austrian 
rule,  1815—1819,  121  ;  revolu- 
tion in  Naples,  1B2  ;  Austrians 
invade  Naples,  202  ;  insurrection  in 
Piedmont,  203 ;  insurrection  and 
Austrian  intorvention  in  Papal 
States,  lS31,40I—40S;occ'apatioii  of 
Ancona  by  the  French,  404 ;  Anoona 
handed  over  to  the  Pope  by  the 
French  (1838),  406;  Austrian  rule 
hostile  to  reforms,  467 ;  Maerini, 
46S ;  Gioberti's  vritings,  471  ; 
reformation  of  the  Papacy  pro- 
posed, ii. ;  election  of  Vins  15., 
472;  political  amnesty,  it.;  enthn- 
sinam  in  Rome,  ii. ;  Austria  occn- 
pies  Ferrara,  473;  conflict  with 
Austrians  in  Milan^  i7b.  Iniuireo 
tion  in  Lombardy  and  Venice,  iii. 
16,  16,  17  ;  general  wtz  agaiut 
Austria,  17,  18 ;  Custoata,  i»> 
capture  of  Milan,  61 ;  revolutionary 
period  (August  1848— March  1S49), 
96—113;  Novaia,  100;  French 
intervention  at  Rome,  lOS ;  tail 
of  Venice,  113;  Neapolitan  des- 
potism,  US;    TbtoT   Enunaanel, 


MovBiar  mmopa. 


2i3;  gunpugn  of  18G9,  2S9; 
battle  of  IS^gmta,  2BI  ;  ovar- 
throir  oC  Papal  authoritj  in  tba 
Bomagna,  261 ;  BstUe  of  SolfenDO, 
263;  peace  of  YiUafrancH,  266; 
trwliea  of  Zurich,  266 ;  Garibaldi 

SropMea  to  attack  Kome,  2T0 ; 
'apoleoalll.  propOBei  a  CongTsu 
at  Parii  to  discua  Italian  quoetions, 
271 ;  Napoleon  IIL  consents  to  the 
formation  of  an  Italian  Kingdom 
uader  ViotorEmmanual.  273  :  pub- 
lication of  the  pnmphlet  "  The 
Pope  and  the  Congress,"  273 ; 
union  of  Tuscany,  Parma,  Modcno, 
and  the  Romagna  with  Piitdmont 
under  (he  rule  of  Victor  Emnunuol, 
^76;  cession  of  Nice  and  Savoj  to 
France,  279  ;  Sicilyand  Naplos con- 
quered by  Oitribaldi  in  the  nHme  of 
Victor  Emnuuiuel,  285,290;  Pied- 
monteae  troopa  enter  Umbria  and 
the  MiirchcB,  imd  capture  Ancona, 
203—291;  all  Italy,  excepting 
Kome  and  Tanioe,  united  under 
Victor  Emmannel  (IS61),  29S;  the 
gr«at  work  of  Cavour  on  behalf  of 
Italian  liberty,  and  his  hopos  for 
the  Intun,  302^304;  <jaribaldi 
at  AEpromonte,  861 ;  September 
ConTention,  it. ;  rehttions  with 
Pnusia  nad  AxBtria,  367;  war  of 
IS66 ;  CuBtozia,  Venice  ceded, 
377 ;  Battle  of  Mentann.  between 
UaribaldinnB  and  Papal  force*,  408 ; 
re-occupation  of  Ciiita  Vecchia  by 
Fmnce,  408;  projected  alUanco 
with  Austria,  410;  tttkee  poasession 
of  Kome,  472;  guarantees  to  the 
Pope,  it. 

Jacolnn*  {—t  Girondina) 

Janina,  Biege  of,  ii.  286 

JimiBsarles  (Turkish),  ii.  339 

Jftrria,  English  admiral,  defoata  the 
Bpaniah  Sect  at  St.  Vincent,  i.  161 

Jellacic,  Qovomor  of  Croatia,  iii.  66 ; 
Bummoned  to  the  Emperor  of 
Anstria  at  Innabmck,  68 :  allowed 

becomes  the  champion  of  Austrian 
nnity,  69 ;  appoinled  by  the  Em- 
peror commander  of  all  the  force* 
ID  Hon wy,  74 

Jemappea,  Battle  of,  i.  53 

JtBB,  Defeat  of  Praeeians  by  Napoleon 
at,  i.  328;  freedom  ot  printing-, 
ii.  127  ;  atudents  of,  ii. 

Jesnits,  their  inflneooe  declinea  in 
Cennany,  L  33 


Jewi,  prohilntion  aJteoting  tlmt    ts 

Austria,  i.  2S3 
John,   Archduke,    L    224;   plan 
TTToIeBeinBDTr«ction,413;  me 
with  Croatia,  iiL  68  ;  appcnnted  ad- 
miniatmtor  of  theAoatrian  Empire 
116;  refoseato  snpprenOie  Badeo 
insnTTection,  13G 
John  VI.,  King  of  Portugal,  iL  SH; 

death  229 
Joseph  II.,  KeforiDa  of,  L  33 
Joubert,  French  general,  i,  191,  199 
Jourdan,  French  general,!.  81;  defenia 
Austriana  at   Wattigniea,  Bl ;  in- 
vades Oermony,  1 26  ;  defeated  by 


Jovollanos,  member  of  Spaniah  Janta, 

L  450;  policy  in  ISID,  462 
Juarez,  President  of  Mexican,  Repnblic, 

driven  from  power,  iii.  398 
Junot,  French  general,  i.  364  ;  invadea 

Portugal,  366  ;  defeated  by  BHtish 

troopa  at  Vinuerio,  386 
Junta,  Spanish,  i.  392;  policy  in  1809, 

460:resignatioDinl810,462.   Pni- 

viaional  in  1820,  iL  177;  appointed 

at  Oporto.  188 
Jiut,  St.,  commiaaioDar  of  the  Fronch 

Convention,!.  S7 

Kunardji,  Treaty  of ;  iL  259,  iiL  188 
Eamenski,  Russian  general,  L  840 
Eanoria  (Qreok    captain),  heroic    ex- 
ploit against  the  Turka,  ii.  293 
Ears,  Capture  of,  by  the  Eussiana,  iiL 
237,  606 


Eaunitx,   Austrian    MIn 

retirement  of ,  28  ;  his  wo^,  SS 
Kehl,  Fortress  ot,  i.  168 
Eesanlik,  iii.  499,  606 
Ehosrev,     Tnrkilih     admiikl,     takea 

Psara,  ii.  304 
Kburshid,  Ottoman     commander,    ii. 

286,  396 
Kiel,  formation  of  Proviaioiuil  Q«vem- 

ment  dnrinc  inaurrectioD  againat 

Denmark,  iii.  2S,  366 
Klapka,  Hangarian  general,  iiL  87 
KlBboT,  General,  L  83,  234 ;  asnsiiita- 

tion,  334 
Klephts,  The,  iL  347 
Knights  ot  the  Empire,  i.  SB,  3U 
Knobcladtirff,  General,    PnuBOB  Mk- 

bfissador  at  Paris,  L  834 
Eoletti^  Qieek  Minister,  iL  SOO 


Xolukobonoa,  Greek  comnunder,  iL 
264,  289,  398,  300  ;  imiiiiBonnLent, 
301 ;  niuitated,  306. 

Eondunottea,  President  -d  Greek 
Cham  ben,  ii-  300,  SOS. 

Konieh,  Buttle  <A,  between  Ggjptiaaf 
«nd  Turks,  ii.  *4*. 

Kdniggtitx,  ELuttle  o{,  between  Pruein 
and  Au^rU  (1S66|,  iii.  376. 

Konif^berg,  Flight  of  King  f  radeiick 
WiUi&rn  to,  i.  33H ;  entry  ol  the 
French,  345  I  Bnniiine  wlmltted  to, 
17S ;  Stein  pnhliibee  the  Cuu'e 
order  for  the  uming  of  Bast 
Fnuda,  481. 

Konee,  Oreek  BcijJw,  ii.  264— 26T ; 
statement  r'jspecting  Qreek  navy, 
261 

Eonoiloff,  Raadan  general  in  the 
Crimea,  iii.  212,  213 

EonakoS,  Husdiui  general,  i.  189, 
192,  193 

Eownusko,  leads  Polish  revolt,  [.  89  ; 
distrasta  Napoleon's  profesBiani,3^9 

Konnth,  Hungarian  deputy,  circu- 
lates reports  of  debetee  in  defiance 
o(  Austrian  Emperor,  ii.  479 ;  edits 
a  Liberal  journat  at  Petth,  133; 
his  pHtriotic  oratory,  489.  Hie  ad- 
dress to  the  Hungarian  Cihamben 
on  Auittian  deepoLiBin,  iii.  6 ;  beads 
demoomtio  movement  at  Posth, 
10  i  h<atilit;r  to  Austria,  71  ;  ordois 
march  against  Austriana  during 
revolt  of  Vienna,  78  ;  appoiuted 
governor  of  Hungary,  91  ;  flight 
mto  Turitey,  184;  protected  by 
the  Sultan  af{WDBt  the  demands  of 
Austria  and  Sussia  for  his  surren- 
der, a. ;  refuiM  to  acknowled^  the 
•overeignty  ol  Flancia  Joseph  in 
Hangnry,  392 

Kotsebne,  Hurder  of,  ii.  140 

Krasnoi,  Battle  of,  i.  474 

Eiay,  AuKtrlnn  general,  I.  191,  218 ; 

Kremsicr,  Fai-liament  ol  Vienna  meets 


IT,  Bosaiui  genera]  in  Bulgaria, 

itL  500,  fiOl 
Enlm,  BatOe  of,  i.  SOS 
Edstrin,  FmssianfortrsH,  surrendered 

to  the  French,  i.  333 
Kntaya,  Peace  of,  betweoa  Turkey  and 

Egvvi,ii.  44S 
EutuBD^  Sussian  geomal,  L  292,  437, 

472,492 

I^bMoy^re,  Oolonel,  daclarea  for 
Napoleon  at  Oronoble,  ii.  84 ;  ox»- 
oaluni  ia  Mi,  08 


Lafayette,  iL  3S,  4S;  aleoted  to 
Ch^bcr  of  Daputiea,  166;  take* 
part  in  the  Bevolntian  of  July, 
1830,  373;  head  of  Pnnlioaal 
QoverAmant,  376 

Lafltto,  french  deputy,  ii.  372;  ad- 
vances the-  c*nw  <a  the  Duke  of 
Orteaiks,  373;  head  of  Louis 
Philippe**  aavemment,400 ;  remgns 
oHice,402 

lAibuch,  Oonference  at,  iL  ISB,  SOS 

t«niHrtine,  M.,  member  of  French 
Provieicnnl  Qovemment  (1848),  iii. 
34 ;  loss  of  power  on  the  election  of 
Louis  Napoleon  to  the  Piwidency 
of  the  Kepublic,  47 

Lam  berg.  Murder  of  General,  at 
Pesth,  iii.  74 

I«morici4re,  Gcoeral,  lead*  Papal 
troops  against  the  Piedmontese,  iii. 

Londrecies,  Siege  of,  i.  90 
lAndsturm,  The  Fruaaian,  i.,  363,  489 
Xandwehr,  The  Prulsian,  i.  363,  482, 

489,  501 
LanguiLges  in  Austria,  L  IS 
lAnnes,    Marshal,    at    the    Biege    of 

Saragossa,  i.  399 
Lanskoi,   Russian  Minister,  preparec, 

wiUi  Milutine,  the  charts  tvt  the 

Uheration  of  serfs,  iii.  332 
Laon,  Battle  of,  i.  ASfl 
Latour,  Auslfian  Minister,  iiL  73 
La  Vendue,  JRevolt  of,  i.  70,  78 
lAyard,  Mr.,  siicccefls  Sir  H.  Elliot  as 

PLngliah  Ambassador  at  Constantin- 
ople, iii.  G08 
"  Le«gue    of   the    Three  Emperors" 

(1872},  iii.  478 
Lengue  of  the  Three  Eingdoma  (Pruaaia, 

Saxony,  and  Hanover,  tc.)  iiL  139, 

140 
Lebceuf,  French  War  Minister  (1870), 

iiL  416,  429 
Lebrun,  U.,  colleague  of  Bonaparte  in 

the  Consulship,  i.  210 
Lecomte,   General,  murdered  by  the 

Commune  of  Parts,  iii.  470 
Legislative Afliemhly,  French, majority 

for  war  againjst  Austria  (1792),  L  3  ; 

its  composition,  8 ;   Qirondin  De- 

C'  'ee,  9 ;  reception  of  the  Emperor 
pold's     dMpatch,      11 ;      msni. 
festo  renouncing  iutcntion  of  con- 
quest,   14 ;   determines  to  banish 
priests,  41  ;  dissolved,  48 
LegisUtive    Chambers,    opening    by 

Napoleon  (1816),  ii.  47 
Lehrbach,  AMstriao  Envoy  to  FmasiB, 
L  88 ;  Austrian  MiniMer,  334 


UODSSff  SVBOPS. 


Lmp^,  BatUB  €<,  i  BIO.  CtiabnSaa. 
at  aimiTenuj  at  '^^'— "^^'h^  ii.  137 

Le  Vvit,  m.  401. 

Leobea,  Preliiniaiii7  Tnaty  oL  I  138 

LaOMM  n.  {£iiip«nt)r)  addT««nB 
SaropeBS  Oonita  on  ntnatioa  of 
Fiench  Rajal  f^mil j,  L  4 ;  hii 
dwpAtch  to  Faru,  abumng  the  mr 
party,  11;  hit  death  (1792),  11,27; 
liu  TKilicj  and  work,  24 — S7 

Leopold,  Prinoe,  of  HohencoUerD- 
fagmai-ingun,  candidate  for  the 
throne  of  S^iaiii  (1868),  iii.  412; 
withdraws  his  candidature,  417 

Leopold.  Prince,  of  SaxB-Coburg, 
•coepts  Crown  of  Oieece,  iL  349; 
renoances  tli«  Qroek  Crown,  3J13; 
electud  King  of  Belgium,  387 

Le  Queanoj,  inTestment  by  AnBtrisns, 
i.78 

Leasept,  H.,  Vtiauli  envoy  to  Borne  to 
negotiate  term!  of  peace,  iii.  107 

Leatocq,  Pnuaian  general,  i.  34Q 

Levant,  Commeroe  of  the,  nndsr 
Hehemet  Ali'a  role,  iL  4fi2 

Ligny,  Battle  d^  u.  60 

Liebon,  entry  of  French  troopa,  i. 
3G6 

Literature  In  North  Germany,  i.  21  j 
niippreiwion  of,  in  Austria,  283 

Lithuania,  ii.  395.  The  nobln  rebel 
ngainit  Rauia,  iii.  337 

liverpool,  Lord,  English  Prime 
tlinister,  ii.  6 ;  on  the  termB  of  the 
■eoond  Treaty  of  Paris,  60 ;  re- 
■poniible  for  death  of  Marshal  Ney, 
i9  ;  on  the  proposals  of  the  Aii-la- 
Chapelle  Coiiference,  132 ;  onpopa- 
larity,  190 

I^i,  Bridge  of,  i.  120 

Lombard,  Pmsaian  minister,  i.  273 

LdTnbardy,  under  Maria  Theresa  and 
the  Emperor  Joeoph.  i.  113  i  con- 
quered by  Bonaparte,  13S;  made 
a  Kepublic  by  the  tnsty  of  Oampo 
FormJO,  148;  arrival  of  Huaaian 
army,  1S1 ;  evociiatedbyAustnanB 
•iter  Marengo,  222 ;  part  of  the 
Ungdom  of  Italy,  27S ;  restored 
to  Auatrift  by  Treaty  of  Paris,  637  ; 
inaurrectinn  of  1848,  iii.  16;  war 
with  Austria,  S6;  united  with 
Piedmont,  266 

London,  Treaty  of  (1827),  ii.  325; 
(1862).  ill.  150;  (1887),  iu.  402; 
protociJ  of,  496 

Lomien,  work  on  the  independence  of 
the  Qenoan  Duchiea,  iii.  26. 

Lormine.  i.  50 ;  left  to  n«iice  by-  the 
OoBgresa  of  Tiesma,  it.  70 ;  probabla 


oonseqaencea  bad  H  been  anoeied 
to  Prnssia,  72.  Ceded  to  Germany 
It  tbs  Treaties  of  Tenaillea  and 
£Wnkfort,iiL  464 

Looia  Ferdinand,  Prinoe,  Pmatiaa 
general,  i.  327 

Louis  XVI.,  letter  to  the  L^ialatiT* 
Asaembly,  L 1 ;  declaiw  war  againat 
Ajiatiia  (1792),  2;  Bight  tnm 
Faria  and  retom  (17S1),  4;  con- 
finement in  Tuileries,  4 ;  accepta 
oonstitntion  of  National  Asaemluy, 
S ;  manifeato  to  Electors  of  Tr^rea 
and  Maim,  10  ;  vetoes  the  banish* 
ment  of  priests,  42 ;  quita  the 
Toileries,  44 ;  eiecnliot,  (8 ;  hia 
execution  celebrated  by  a  national 
ftte,  143 

Louis  XVIII.,  reetored  to  the  throoa 
of  Ftanoe,  1  631—533.  Character, 
iL  12,  IS ;  biaConstitntdon,  14 ;  aum. 
mona  the  Legislative  Chambeia  OB 
Napoleon's  return  to  France,  37 ; 
flight  from  Toileries,  38 ;  restora- 
tion to  the  throne,  57 ;  partiality 
for  Decasea,  11 6 :  dissolves  Chamher 
otDeputiea,  117;  displeasure  on  tlie 
electioa  of  Qr^ire,  157 ;  war 
declaration  against  Spain,  217; 
death  (1824),  324 

Lonia  Napoleon,  election  to  National 
Aaaembly,  iii.  43 ;  pnaenla  himself 
to  troops  at  Straaburg  aa  KmpCTor, 
44 :  sent  to  America,  but  ntoma 
and  repeats  his  attempt  at  Boulogne, 
ij;  imprisonment  at  Ham,  ii. ; 
escapes,  visita  Paris,  is  elected 
Deputy,  but  resigns,  46  ;  re-elected, 
46 ;  elected  President  of  the 
Bepublic,  47  ;  determines  to  restore 
th«  Pope,  103;  effects  tho  Fope'a 
reetorntion,  110;  protests  against 
the  Pope's  tyiannDus  poli^,  i5; 
supported  by  Thiers,  167 ;  letter  to 
Colonel  Ney,  167;  menage  to  tba 
Assembly  dismissing  the  ministry, 
158 ;  demands  mMsoreg  from  new 
ministry  limiting  the  franchisB 
(1850),  ISO;  aima  at  a  prolonga- 
tion of  hi*  presideni^,  162  ;  aeeka  ta 
win  the  support  of  the  wmy,  168 ; 
vMe  of  Assembly  against  a  ransloa 
of  the  Constitution  for  prolonipitg 
hia  presidency,  166  ;  propsrea  tor  a 
eevp  ditat,  167;  demands  from 
Asaembly  Qia  re'eetablislunent  of 
nnireraU  suffrage,  170;  en^^Uut 
o(  December  2nd,  1861,  172;  hia 
proclamationB,  173  ;  his  reception  Id 
nri^  174;    pioolwmed  &ap«mr 


(1SG3)  \n:  ieeiaxtm  In  wSAnm  at 
BordeBnz  tLe  peaceful  poliof  ot 
Prance,  180 ;  ^pouatbsinoorpina- 
tioii  of  Durobian  Princi^aliliea  with 
Anitria,  236;  negptiBtea  wiUi 
Ooimt  Carour  at  Hombiirea,  i^ 
^eotins  *^r  with  Austria,  253  ; 
conunanda  his  amiy  in  Italian 
Mmpaign,  2B3 ;  interview  with  the 
BmpOTOT  FrandB  Joeeph  at  Villa- 
franca,  2SG  ;  proposes  a  Con^resB  at 
Faris  for  the  conmdaration  ol 
Itkliaik  questions,  271  ;  anneiea 
Hioo  and  BaToy,  277;  announce* 
his  opposition  to  B  Said  inian  invasion 
of  the  Papal  States,  203;  secret 
den^  for  extending  the  French 
frontier,  364  ;  proposes  a  Enropewi 
Congress,  ib,;  meets  Bismarck  at 
Biarrits,  3SS ;  hi*  Tiewa  on  the 
interests  of  France  as  affected  by 
the  war  between  Prussia  and 
Austria,  372 ;  mediates  hetween 
Prussia  and  Austria,  377  :  demands 
from  Bismarck  the  cession  of 
Bavarian  Palatimte  and  western 
BeSM,  380-333 ;  design  to  nuquire 
Belgium,  384 ;  decline  of  foitune 
after  1863,  396 ;  tailuie  o(  Mexican 
Expedition,  3S6-3{r9 ;  negotialea 
with  King  of  Holland  for  the 
cession  of  LnTemtiuig,  400 ;  attitnde 
towards  Prussia  after  1BB7,  404; 
i^vate  arrangements  with  Anstrinn 
Emperor  for  defence  against  Prussia, 
406 ;  sects  defensive  Bllian(«  with 
Italy  against  Prasaia,  4DB  ;  failure 
to  secan;  alliances  with  the  Powers, 
411 ;  incapacity  in  command  of  his 
army  against  PfubsIh,  437 ;  snr- 
renders  to  King  William  at  Sedan, 
446 :  pliced  in  captivi^  at  Wil- 
helmshbhe,  447 
tiouii  I'hilippe,  Dake  of  Orleans,  ii. 
363  ;  marriea  daughter  of  Ferdin- 
and of  Sicily,  ii. ;  made  I.ieuten* 
■nt-Gcneial  of  France,  371;  mad» 
King  of  Frtinc«,  378 ;  policy  nnd  in- 
flnence  as  citizen-liiDg,  379 ;  ap- 
prOTee  of  election  of  Leopold  of 
Saze-Coliurg  aa  King  of  Belgium, 
-  387;  critical  rolations  with  Austria 
■nd  Russia,  402  ;  Knowing  unpopu- 
larity, 41G  ;  big  life  attempted  by 
Fieachi,  417;  dcdinee  to  assist 
Spain  in  quelling  Carlist  rebellion, 
437  ;  intnii^ues  fur  the  marriuge  of 
Us  son,  tbo  Duke  of  Meiitptnsior, 
with  the  Infanta  Fernanda,  tdster 
g|  the  Qoevi  at  Spain,  G04 ;  mw- 


tX.  ttl 

tiago  of  Uontpeniier  to  flie  In- 
bnta,  606  ;  struggle  with  the  Re- 
form party  in  the  Chamhers,  61 1  ; 
abdicates  in  favonr  of  grandson, 
the  Count  of  Paria,  and  Biea  from 
Fans,  613 

LouvHin,  UniTersiW  of,  i.  24,  2&S 

Lonvie,  The,  eeiied  hy  mob,  iL  372 

Lovatz,  iii.  499, 601 

Liiheck,  loene  of  BIUc^mt's  capitola- 
tion,i.  33! 

Labecki,  member  of  Foliih  eouiual,  ii, 
393,  394 

Ijucsji,  Carl  of,  Knglish  commander 
of  cavalry  at  Balaclava,  iii.  216 

Luocherini,  Prusaian  Mimster,  i.  77 ; 
ambassador  at  Paris,  317  ;  sent  to 
Berlin  to  negotiate  with  Hapoleon 
tor  peace,  334 

Luneville,  Peace  of,  i.  226,  243 

Lutzen,  Battle  of,  i.  493 

Luxemburg,  ii.  389 ;  Napoleon  IIL 
negotiate*  with  King  of  Holland 
for  its  cession  to  France,  iii.  400 ; 
declared  neutral  territory  by  the 
Treaty  of  London  (1867],  402 

Lyons,  tuccs  armsagniDst  Paris,  i.  71; 
surrenders  to  fiepuhlic,  81.  Entry 
of  Napoleon  after  escaping  from 
Elba,  li.  37 ;  revolt  ot  workiug- 
dosses  (1834),  416 

,  182, 


tan   army'  against  the    1 

171 ;  defeated  by  the  French,  173; 

disorder  in  his  army,  1 74 ;  enten 

Bavaria,  287 ;  capitulates  at  Ulm, 

289 

Maoniahon,  General,  commands  Pencil 
troops  against  Austrians,  iii.  261; 
,  army  defeated  by  Prussians  at 
Wertb,  436;  marches  to  the  t^Unt 
of  Bacaine  at  Metz,  443 ;  wonndvd 
at  Sedan,  446 ;  succoeda  Thiers  nr 
President  of  the  French  Bepublic, 
476 

Uadrid,  entry  ot  French  troopa,  L  374; 
revolt  against  the  French,  377; 
entry  of  Napoleon  396;  popular 
domand  for  a  cotintitiition,  ii.  177 

Maostrlcht,  Battle  of,  i.  6S 

Magdeburg,  Fortresa  of,  tnrrenderod 
to  the  French,  i.  333 

Magonta,  Battle  of,  iii  261 

Hnonan,  General,  asaiata  Louis  Napo- 
leon in  bis  coup  d'ilat  ot  Due  2, 
1861,  iii.  168 

Magnano,  Battle  o^  L  181 


itoDSBir  xffsops. 


384 

Ualmiad  II.,  Salbn  oF  Turkey,  ii.  2BI, 
2Sa,  Ml ;  laaniteato  aftar  battls  of 
Navarino,  33.5;  dec  lures  Mehemet 
All  and  hii  ion  Ilirahim  rebels, 
413  ;  army  defeated  by  If^yptmiu 
>t  Beilan  and  Ronieh,  444 :  peace 
al  Eutaya,  446;  campai)^  of 
Niaaib,  4.53  ;  de&th,  4S4 

Uaida,  BtUla  of,  i.  302 

Hsiiii,  French  cmif^rnnts  expellod,  L 
10;  condiLianin  1792,  37;  c&pita- 
latet  t«  the  French,  62 ;  taken  by 
the  Qermmii,  76 ;  craaL  meaiuiea 
of  the  ArohbiBhop,  108;  entrr  of 
thn  Fi-ench,  167;  C(iiDinu.-.ioii  of 
MiniBten,  ii.  US 

Ualakoff,  AMuIt  on  the,  iii.  226  ;  op- 
lure  of  the,  226 

Halmanhury,  Iiord,  trivia  with  Pr>u«ia, 
i.  68:  taJB  opinion  i>t  FlIlBBil^  94; 
desfjatched  to  Paris  to  ni'^lia1« 
with   the   Fienth   Diraclory,   130, 


I4S 


I   Beu- 


,    Anriistice   of,   belwc 
mark  and  Pruaaia,  Iii.  117 

Ifalta,  obt&inod  by  IkinapHiti',  i.  167  ; 
offered  to  RuMiia,  227:  demaniled 
by  h'nntx  for  ths  Knighln  of  ISl. 
John,  237;  claimed  by  £ii|;b<nd, 
267 

Manifeetj}  (iw  Dctcliiratlor) 

Uanin,  Diiniel,  pulitiuil  priauncr,  ro- 
IttLsed  dun  Fig  JTiE^irrection  of 
Venica  (I84N),  and  becomea  (Jiial 
of  Provisional  OoTornment,  iii.  IS  ; 
retiremcnton  union  with  Piedmont, 
GO  ;  ro-siimea  office,  112 

Uantculfol,  Priusian  Hinigt«r  of  the 
Interior,  iii.  146 ;  appointed  cliii't 
Minister,  147 ;  nniMtiiotic  pali>;y. 
IM;  diamiBBedby  the  Ci'own  Prinre 
Rf^^t.  3U6;  on  the  wcuknau  of 
the  PrUKHinii  army,  109 

Uviteiiffel.  Oeneial,  son  of  above,  iii. 
3fJ6 ;  l™ila  troops  into  Holscein, 
370;  defeats  Bavarians,  SEH);  mis- 
sion to  St.  Petersburg,  384 ;  con- 
qqen  Amiens  and  Rouen,  469 

Mkntoa,  Investment  of,  by  Bonnparte, 
i.  124;  the  siege  raised,  126;  sur- 
renders to  Boniiparte,  136;  taken 
by  Austrians.  IBl 

Uarches,  The,  iii.  282  ;  entry  of  Pied- 
montese  troops,  293 

Manngo.  Battle  of,  i.  221 

Hant.  IL.  ihmmdt  Fonign  Himitw, 


of   Naplai   InaTriel 


Ferdinand,  429 ;  oompellad  to  r»- 

store  ConstitatioQ  of  1812,   439; 
'  i-esigns    the     Regency    and    quits 

Spain,  441 ;  retnnis  to  Spain,  442 ; 

carries  <}ut  intrigus  for  the  "  Spanish 

Marriages,"  606 
Maria,  Donna,  danghter  of  Emperor  of 

Brazil,  ii.  424.  426 
Maria  Tbereaa,  Reforms  of,  i.  2t 
Marie  Antoinette,  her  lite  threatened, 

Marie  Louise  of  Anatria,  sMond  wits 
of  Bonaparte,  i.  436 

Marmoot,  French  general.  L  614,  622. 
624;  cnpituUtea  to  the  allies  at 
Paris,  529  Att-iclia  insurgents  in 
Paria,  ii.  370 

Marmora,  La,  Itilian  Prime  lliniatar, 
iii.  362  ;  declines  to  accept  Venetia 
from  Austria,  368  ;  eomniands  army 
ngaJDBt  Austria  at  Cuatoiza,  877; 
attitude  to  wards  Pnusia  and  FraiM^ 
407 

Marsala.  LandingoF  Garibaldi's  titx^ 
at,  iii.  284 

"  Maiseillaiae,"  The,  i.  11,  14 

Honeillea,  takes  arms  against  Paris,  L 
71.     Koyaiist  rioU  in  1816,  ii.  91 

Mara-U-Tour,  FruKiaa  attack  at,  iii. 
216,  440 

Martignao,  Vicomte  de,  chief  French 
UinisliT,  ii.  360;  dismissed,  361 

Massena,  French  genetal,  i.  80,  179, 
181,  192,  193,  217;  iDrrendei* 
Oenoa  to  the  Austrians,  220 ;  com- 
mands in  Spain,  444 ;  rMreata 
before  the  English.  446 

Maubaoge  invested  by  Austriana,  L 
81 


138 


Miiurokordatoa,  Alexander,  toundez  of 
a  line  of  Eotpodars,  ii.  261 

Maorokordatos,  Qreek  lender  (1821), 
ii.  289.  293,  296,  297 

Uaamiliaa,  Emperor  of  Uexioo,  bH 
and  death,  iii.  399 

MauB,  Prison  of,  iii.  173 

Mnixini  leads  incursion  into  Bamj 
(1834),  ii.  413,  414;  eialt«d 
patriotism,  468.  At  Romo,  in 
1849,  iiL  103;  offers  to  assist 
Victor  Emmanuel  in  the  eabibliah- 
ment  of  Italian  union.  270  ;  pitt- 
jeot  fur  Lha  capture  of  Roma  41^ 
Vmioe,  287 ;  letter  to  Bimuok  « 


Hajwlecn's  tcMlTe  fo  oiaka  wiir  on 
Prnnu,  110  (note) 

Ifedid,  The,  L  116 

Mohmoet  Ali,  Fnahti  and  Viceroy  of 
BgTpt,  ii.  301,  302;  Don  Qict  with 
Turkey,  *12,  US;  sends  uuiy  into 
PBleatme,  ■Hi;  victories  uvHr 
Turks,  4M ;  Peace  of  Kutayn  gives 
Syria  uid  Adana  to  him,  44G  ^  i^hii- 
iHcter  ol  his  rale,  461 ;  Becond  war, 
46i);  relinqnishea  conquered  pro- 
linuee,  461 ;  Egypt  oonterred  upon 

MolaH,  Aiutrian  genenl,  L  21T,  22Q 

HeckleabuTK,  i.  36 

Uendiaabal,  succeeds  Torenoaa  Bptuiish 
War  Miaistor  {1836],  ii.  438 

Henotti  leads  inaurrection  at  Modeon 
(1831),  ii.  399 

Menou,_  French  general,  i.  234,  230 

Menscbikofl,  Prinoe.  Russian  Envoy  to 
Constantinople,  iii.  18S  ;  commands 
Russians  in  the  Cnmea,  211 

Ifentiuia,  Battle  of,  between  Oari- 
balctians  and  Papal  troops,  iii.  403 

Uesscnhauser,  commandar  of  Tolun- 
leers  duria^  the  revolt  of  Vienna 
(1848),  iu.  78 

U«uinn,  rising  aguinst  Neapolitan  rule, 
ii.  474.  Bombarded  by  Ferdintiod 
of  Naples,  iii.  112 ;  suirendered  to 
Sardinian  troops,  298 

Heltemich,  Auatiian  Ambassador  at 
Berlin,  i.  281;  Am(assador  at 
Faris,  403;  Austrian  Minister,  433  ; 
foreign  policy  of  1813,  496;  |>alii.-y 
doriog  the  War  of  LibeniUon, 
610.  President  of  Oie  Congress  of 
Vienna,  ii.  20;  his  denrnnds  re- 
specting the  second  lYcaty  of 
Paris,  60 ;  Austria  under  his  atatea- 
manBhip,  S2 ;  Conservative  prin- 
ciples, 13.*;  influence  in  Europe. 
136 ;  advice  to  Kinf;  Frederick 
William  on  the  univor»iti<ga,  gym- 
nastic ostablisbmODts,  and  (he 
Proas,  137  ;  tabes  meanurus  to  pre- 
*ent  a  German  rerolutiua,  142; 
opposes  Bavarian  and  Baden  Con- 
stitutions, 144  ;  requisiliouB  at  the 
Conference  of  Carlsbad,  145;  in- 
fluence at  the  Conference  of 
Tnippan,  194 ;  Eastern  policy,  279 ; 
coodeinnation  of  the  Qreek  revolt, 
283 ;  views  with  disgust  the  Anglo- 
BuBsian  protocol  fur  iiitorvention 
in  Grpoca,  322 ;  efforts  to  form  a 
coalition  against  Russia,  340;  in- 
tervention in  Papal  States,  402; 
ligoroni  EBeHiiTCi  torepi«M  Liberal 


nQ«rawny,  1 
Lustrian    Ihd 


movenents  ii  .,       .        , 

policy  in  Austrian  Italy,  47G ; 
itatancnt  respecting  inaiurection 
in  Qalida,  493.  Besignation  during 
Revolution  of  1848,  iu.  8  ;  flight  to 
England.  8  ;  return  to  Vienna,  152 

Uctz.  lit.  425,  428;  capitulates  to  the 
PmaaianB,  466 

Mexico,  Expedition  of  France  to,  iii. 
396—398;  mc«ll  of  French  troops, 
and  fiUl  and  de:ith  of  S'    '    "'  " 


Oonimissiun,  495 

Miguel,  Don,  son  of  King  John  of 
Portugal,  lead!  cDoapiracy  against 
the  Cortes,  iL  228  :  causes  himself 
to  be  proclumed  King  of  Portugnl 
<1828),  42i  ;  his  violence,  ii. ;  bia 
fleet  destroyed  off  SL  Vincent  hy 
volonteer  force  under  Captain 
Charles  Xapier,  426 ;  unites  with 
Don  Ciirbis,  429 ;  defeated  and  re- 
moviid  ti-om  Portu^^il,  430 

Milan,  portion  of  Austrian  dominkini,  ' 
i.  19;  Bonaparte's  triumphal  entry, 
120;  surrenders  to  Bussians  and 
Austrians,  181.  Insurrection  of 
1848,  iii.  IS;  entry  of  Auatriana, 
61 ;  evacuation  by  Aiistdans,  261 

MiLizKO,  Bittlo  of,  iii.  236 

Milutine,  Miuholus,  ptepuree  the  charter 
tm-  the  liberatiou  of  Russian  serfs, 
iii.  332;  carries  out  in  Putund  the 
Riis.siun  meoHuros  for  division  of 
land  amongst  the  peasantry,  333 

Uina,  Spanish  genoml,  ii.  169,  2D9  ; 
leads  troops  ag.iinat  Carlists,  434 

Mincio,  BatUe  on  the,i.  122 

Uinghetti,  Italian  Prime  Minster,  iii. 
361 

Hinto,  Lord,  on  Uie  dedgos  of  Austria 
in  Italy,  i.  186,  187  (note) 

Miranda,  General,  i.  68- 

Missolonghi,  Siege  of,  ii.  297;  second 
siege,  308 ;  re-taken  by  Greeks, 
347 

Hodena,  portion  of  Oispadane  ttepnb- 
lio,i.  132;  Congress  of ,  134.  In- 
corporated with  PiedmontesB  m  n- 
archy,  iii.  58,  276 

Hodena,  Doke  of;  his  tyranny,  ii. 
467.  Flight  from  his  dominions,  iii. 
261 

Mohnmmedans,  in  Greece,  ii.  243, 
246  i  massacre  of,  in  the  Morea, 
m;  attacked  in  Oattni  Qneoe,  m 


3R)1)SSN  SXmOFB. 


HoldkTfa,  propond  anneiation  to 
B>uBi>,L  34tt;  tiiiagof  the  Greeks, 
ii.  SA9.  "Batrj  at  BuHsian  troops 
(IMS),  iiL  192;  pioposeil  muon 
with  Wall&ahu,  23fi  ;  autiuU  union, 

aae 

MBUeDdorf,  Oaieral  (PniMian),  tkkea 
poMeMion  of  Weiteni  PoUnd,  i, 
B8;  defcalaPftt'a  object  ingrantiiig 
a.  Hilwidy  to  PrnMiA,  M 

Ibltke,  General,  otganijaB  Turldali 
MmT,  iL  4C  t ;  in  the  ounpaign  of 
1S3S,1S3.  Directs  the  moveineiitt 
of  Pnunm  ttoopi  against  Austria 
(1866),iii.  STG;  plans  for  war  iriUi 


0866),  i 


426; 


capilulation  ot  Sedan,  446 

IfoDUtoiea,  dinolvad,  in  Anstria,  i 
23;  in  German]?,  263;  in  Papal 
Btata  by  NapolsOD,  437 ;  in  Spcun, 
464.  Bsstorsd  in  Spain,  ii.  12 ;  lo. 
stored  in  Naples,  179 

Hontalembert,  M.,  spokesoian  in 
French  Ifatianal  AsBemily  on }». 
half  of  CathoUdsm,  iii.  186. 

UontUIiard,  iii.  461 

Uontenearo,  Uket  arms  Rsainit  Tur- 
key, iii.  238 ',  supports  t£e  rsTolt  of 
HcnogoTina,  477 ;  declarea  war 
■gainBtTurkoy,482 ;  independence 
recognised  tiy  tha  IVeaty  of  San 
Stefano,  £10 

Honterean,  Battle  of,  i  62fi 

Hcmtaaquieu,  ii.  108 

Hontg^aa,  Bavarian  Minister,  f.  2fiS ; 
treatment  ol  Tyroleso  liishope,  411 

Honthien,  French  general,  i,  374. 

Hontoiorency,  French  Minister,  ,  ii. 
206 ;  represents  Fiance  at  Con^rrefli 
of  Vcruna,  216  ;  retires  from  ofiice, 
217 

Moore,  Sir  John,  campiign  in  Spain, 
i.  S96  ;  death  at  Oorunna,  398 

Uoravia,  Junction  of  Jtussian  and 
Austrian  troops  in,  i.  2B3. 

Horea,  'Xho,  ii.  263;  Greek  rising, 
273  ;  Bei-ond  ravolt,  2S9 

;  invades 


Ger 


,    126;    advan 


the  Russians  in  I^omtiardy,  182; 
adrsnces  against  tho  Austriaita, 
218 :  charged  with  conapii-ing 
against  BoDapsrte,  276 ;  at  the 
Battle  of  Dresden,  fiOS 

Korelli,  Neapolitan  insurgent,  ii.  182, 
203 

Momy,  half-brother  of  Lonis  Napo- 
leon, iii.  I6T 

lloipeth,    Lord.     Englisli  Enroy   to 


374 

HoBoow,  entn  of  the  French,  i.  460; 
burning  o^  ii. ;  departure  of  Napo- 
leon, 471 

Mountain,  Polidcal  party  of  the,  L  49 ; 
becomes  powerful  in  the  Conveiv- 
tiou,  66 ;  vietOTj  ovor  Oirondina, 
71 ;  attacked  by  Girondini  aitd 
Boyalists,  71 ;  its  power  incieMe^ 
72 

Hoxart,  i.  108 

Hukhtar  Pasha,  iii.  498,  606 

Mulgfcave,  Lord,  on  the  Russian  ckn^ 
paign  in  tiombardy,  i.  186  (note) 

Miinclieugrati,  meetioK  place  of  em- 
perors of  Runia  and  Austria  in 
1833  to  consort  for  the  Buppreaeioii 
of  revolutionary  nioTemonts,  iL 
413. 

Miinster,  Bishopric  of ,  i.  1 29,  149,  167 

Murat,   French  general,  L   80,   293; 

Beizpa  Fmssian  touitory,  316; 
dai|>atched  to  Spain,  373;  enten 
Madrid,  374;  ciutty  tactics,  it,; 
allied  with  Austris,  fi37.  Troachery 
towards  allies  in  1814,  ii,  6  ;  flight 
from  Naples,  42 
MuraviefE,  General,  Russian  Envoy  to 
Conatantinople,  ii.  416.  Crushes 
the  Polish  rebellion  (1864),  iiL  337 

Napier,  Sir  Cliarlea,  deattoys  naT)t  of 
Don  Miguel  off  St.  Vincent,  ii 
426;  captures  Acre,  460 

Naples,  allied  with  Eiigliind  against 
Fiajice,  i.  69 ;  strengthened  ^  de- 
tlnictiun  of  Fieneh  Hect  at  Toulon, 
82 ;  condition  in  eighteenth  cen- 
tury, 116;  joins  coalition  between 
England,  Rusaia,  and  Turkey 
aguinst  Fiance,  166 ;  fliglil;  of  the 
roj'al  family,  174  ;  riots,  176  ;  entry 
ot  the  French,  176  ;  conveitod  into 
the  Parthenopean  Republic,  it. ;  at- 
tacked by  tanatii'B,  led  by  Canlinal 
Ruffo,  1B2;  Kuflo'B  negtitiaUons  f..r 
peace,183  ;  arrival  ot  Nelson's  fioet, 
ib. ;  a  reign  of  terror,  184  ;  Admiial 
Oaracciolo  executed  with  Nolaun'i 
seoclion,  IBI;  peace  with  Francs 
(1801)  227;  flight  of  King  Fer- 
dinand, 301  :  the  throne  given  to 
Josmh  Bonapnrto,  301  ;  aftd^ 
wards  to  Murat,  439.  Fall  of 
Murat,  ii.  41  ;  restoration  of  King 
Ferdinand  I,,  42 ;  conditioil  from 
181ft— 1820,.1T8;  thsCtrbonan  wid 


aieCUd«nri,181i  HonlHNinTClt, 
182;  coiutitutlon  deolated,  184; 
couferenca  at  Troppaa  betwoen  the 
SovereigDis  of  AuBtria,  Bnaoa,  and 
Frasma,  lespecting  Neapolitaii 
aftaizB,  1S3;  luminoned  bj  con- 
fennce  of  Tioppaa  to  a^tandoD  iU 
couBtitntion,  IBS ;  invaded  bj 
Austria  and  letami  to  despotism, 
202,  203  ;  Ferdinand  IL,  474  ;  con- 
■titutioiigranted,47&.  Insurrection 
of  Hav,  1848,  iii.  57;  death  of  Ferdi- 
nand II.,  and  aoosasion  of  Frandl 
IL,  281 ;  rojeots  the  constitutional 
nstsm  propoeed  hy  Oivour,  282 ; 
Chyour's  double  policy  with  regard 
to,  289;  adTance  of  Oariboldi's 
troops  and  Baidinian  fleet  upon, 
280;  flight  of  King  Francis,  291; 
tiiamphsnt  entry  at  Giirihaldi,  293 
Hapoleon  I.,  Bonaparte,  Serves  st  the 
siege  of  Toulon,  L  81,  82  (note) ; 
defends  the  Convention  against  the 
Boyaliita,  102 ;  appointed  to  the 
oommsjid  of  tlie  army  in  Italy, 
110;  his  cajolery,  118;  triomphal 
Hitiy  into  Milan,  120;  defeats 
Anstrians  on  tb«  Hinoio,  122 ; 
seines  L^hotit,  124 ;  inTeata 
Hantoa,  126 ;  takea  Eoveredo  and 
Trent,  128:  oreates  the  Ciiipadane 
Bepublic  in  Italy,  132;  defonts 
Austriana  at  Areola  and  Bivoli, 
134,  136  ;  DPgotiationa  with  the 
Pope,  136;  eaters  Venice,  and  ofiers 
it  to  Austria,  139—141;  trratment  of 
Genoa,  142 ;  sends  Ani^ercau  to 
intimidate  the  Direotory,  14fi ; 
Treaty  with  Austria  at  Cam^ 
Fornuo,  147  (and  note) ;  his  policy  in 
1797,  ISO;  designs  to  attack  GRypt, 
162;  intervenes  in  Switzerland, 
160;  Egyptian  Oampaign,  16S— 108; 
obtains  Malta,  167;  victory  over 
Tnrks  at  Abooldr,  200 ;  retams  to 
France  (1799),  201;  mn^  d'itat  of 
Bmmaire,  202 ;  appointed  First 
Consul,  206 ;  his  policy  and  rule, 
311 — 313  ;  makes  proposals  of  peace 
to  Austna  and  England,  21G ; 
campaign  against  the  Anstrians  in 
Italy,  218—322 ;  peace  of  Luneville, 
326 ;  peace  of  Amiena,  238 ;  his  ag- 
gresedons  after  the  peace  of  AiYiiana, 
243;  made  President  of  Italian 
Sepublio,  244  ;  his  interrention  in 
Switzerland,  246;  his  settlement 
of  Qermsny,  247—261;  hia  Civil 
Code  and  Concordat,  368~3SG; 
mieWB    the    WW    with    £ng>iu), 


C  5W 

26B ;  occnpatiiMi  d  Hanow,  360  ; 

det^minee  to  become  Emperor, 
374 ;  assumes  the  title  of  Emperor, 
276 ;  aooepts  the  title  of  King  of 
Italy,  379  ;  £iiliire  of  naval  designs 
agsinst  Ei:^land,  384  ;  victory  over 
Atistriana  at  Mim,  380 ;  victory  of 
Aastdrlits,  296;  appoints  Joseph 
Bonaparte  King  ol  Naples,  801 ; 
styles  himself  the  "new  Ctwrle- 
maone,"  302;  gives  the  orown  of 
Holland  to  Louis  Bonapartsi  303; 
compels  Jerome  Bonaparte  to  marry 
the  daughter  of  the  King  of  Wiir- 
temberg,  303 ;  bis  organisatioii  of 
Western  Germany,  303  ;  negotiatea 
far  the  cession  of  Bitiiy  to  his 
brother  Joseph,  316;  war  against 
Prussia,  1806,  326—837;  entsn 
Berlin,  333;  njba  Frederioic  the 
Qreat'l  tomb,  ^. ;  determines  to 
extinguish  the  commeroe  of  Great 
Britain,  336;  enten  Poland,  33B; 
Polish  campaign,  840  ;  Eylau,  341 ; 
Friedland,  346;  interview  with 
the  Emporor  of  J  ' 
Niemen,  348 ;  i 
Prussian  territory,  847 ;  Tieatiet 
of  Tilsit,  a. ;  conspiracy  with 
the  Emperor  of  SuBsia,  348 ; 
attitode  towards  England  after 
the  bombardment  of  Copeohagen, 
3S3 ;  his  demands  npon  Portugal, 
364 ;  orders  the  banishment  of 
Stein,  PmssiBii  Minister,  366;  de- 
signs in  Spain,  368,  371 ;  receivea 
the  orown  of  Spain,  377;  treats 
with  Prosaia  for  the  French 
evacnation,  389;  at  Erfurt,  390; 
Spanish  campaign,  394 ;  {Jans 
for  campsign  against  Austria 
( 1 800),  victories  over  AustrtBUS,  416; 
enters  Tieuna,  116  ;  passage  of  the 
Danube,  420 ;  defeated  at  Aspem 
by  the  Austrians,  421 ;  second 
passage  of  the  Dannba,  424  ;  defeats 
AnatriaDS  at  Wagram,  426  ;  peaoe 
with  Austria,  430 ;  divorces 
Josephine,  and  marries  Uarie 
Louise  of  Austria,  436 ;  annexes 
Papal  Sts  tea  and  iseioommunicated, 
436  ;  annexes  Holland,  Le  Valais, 
and  North  Qermon  coast,  438; 
beneflts  and  wrongs  of  his  rule  in 
the  French  Empire,  440 ;  blocdcade 
of  British  commerce,  441 ;  alliance 
with  Prussia,  1812,  459;  alliance 
with  Austria,  460 ;  invasion  id 
Bosaia  and  retreat,  463 — 477 ;  cam- 
jajgo  in  Qermany  aRainit  PrntA 


UQUXBN  SVnOFB. 


and  Runia,  490  — 49S;  anten 
Onaden,  ^S^  \  attitude  tommla 
Anatria  in  1B1 J,  ISfi  ;  Anitria  join* 
hi!  memiu.  60 1 :  batUca  of  DrsMlen, 
60S  ;  Oroabaeren,  Deanswiti,  508 ; 
defeatad  by  the  alliea  at  Leipaig, 
SIS;  retreat  amMB  the  Rhine, 
SIT;  (smpaignof  1B14,  S24— 626; 
dethronement  by  pnxjamation  of 
Qm  Senate,  631 ;  abdicatea  in 
taTDnr  of  infaot  ton,  63S ;  aent 
to  Elba,  it. ;  ranilta  of  bis  war*  on 
Europe,  642.  HotiTea  for  modera- 
tion m  1807  napectinff  Poland,  ii., 
S  i  leavee  Elba,  3 1  ;  lands  in  Fmnce, 
Z% ;  eaten  Grenoble,  S4 ;  declan- 
tion  of  hii  pnipoae,  id ;  entere 
LyoDB,  37 ;  enten  Ftuia,  38 ; 
oatlaved  b^  the  Congreaa  of 
Tianna,  ii. ;  aboliahea  the  ilave- 
Ivade  after  return  from  Elba,  7S ; 
prqarea  for  war,  40;  t>lan  of 
campaign,  48;  Waterloo,  63 — 66; 
flight  to  Parta,  and  abdication, 
6i ;  conveyed  to  St.  Helena,  fiB 

Napoleon  III.  («m  Louii  Napoleon). 

Napoleon,  Fiinoe  Jcrume,  iii.  263 ; 
betrothed  h)  FrinwHe  Clotilde,  256 

Narraei,  head  of  Spanish  Oovemment 
(1843),  ii.  442 

Naaaau,  annexed  to  Pmana,  iii.  37  B 

Na«»aa.  Doke  of,  L  2fiS 

National  AsHmblj  (Fnuioe),  de- 
stawra  power  ot  the  Crown  and 
nobility,  i.  S  ;  ita  inteipretalion  ot 
the  nmnifeslo  of  Pillniti,  5;  ita 
Oonititution  accepted  by  Louii 
XTI.,  6;  dinolTcd  {IT91),  6;  ill 
beneficial  work,  6,  7 

National  Debt  (in  England),  i.  341 

Nauplia,  Siefe  of,  ii.  307 

Navarino,  Surrender  of,  to  Greelc  in- 
■UTgenta,  ii.  200;  capitulat«a  to  the 
Egyptians,  306;  battle  of  (1827), 
S30— 333 

Navarre,  head-quarters  of  Carliat  in- 
■nrgenta  (1834),  iL  431 

Nelson,  Adiniial  (Lord),  deatroys 
French  fleet  at  the  battle  of  the 
Nile,L  ISS;  hii  reception  at  Naples, 
I6S;  takea  the  Neapolitan  royal 
family  to  Palermo,  174  ;  retuma  to 
NaiJea,lS3;  execntion  ot  Admiral 
Oaracciolo,tB4;hi8difllil[eotThugu( 
IM  (note)  ;  superiority  of  hii  eea- 
man,  107;  at  the  battle  oi  Copen- 
hngen,  231 ;  rtatemmt  in  the  House 
ot  LordB,  reapocting  Malta  and  the 
Cape  of  Good  Hope,  242;  pursues 
Am  XtauHi  in  the  Wert  Indict, 


2B6 ;    victory    of   Tnhl^i,    mal 

d«th,  200 

Nemoura,  Due  de,  elected  King  of  tha 
Belgians,  ii.  387;  election  annnlled 
by  Louis  Philippe,  it. 

Netherlands  (j»  HdUand,  Belgian, 
and  Flanders] 

NeutnOity,  Armed,  of  1800,  i.  228 

Ney,  French  genenl.  i.  341,  396,  475, 
476,  494,  608,  ii.  37;  at  the  battle 
of  auatre  Bras,  51 ;  at  Waterloo. 
64  ;  execution,  98  ;  dumdar,  100 
(note) 

Ney,  Colonel  (son  ot  Uarahal  Ney),  liL 
110;  letter  to,  tnno  Louis  Napo- 
leon, ler 

Nice,  annexed  to  France,  L  64 ;  re- 
stored to  Sardinia  (1BI4),  637. 
Annexed  to  Franr«,  iii.  277;  effect 
of  the  annexation  on  Eunipe,  279 

Nichulas  (Empi-ror  of  Huasia),  ii.  319; 

K'ncipio  of  autocratic  rnle,  820; 
k  of  iiympnthy  with  the  Oi«elm, 
321 ;  policy  toinuda  Poland  dming 
insurrection  ot  1830,  305  ;  invaaim 
of  Poland,  396.  Attempln  to  mediate 
between  Frusua  and  Austria  re- 
specting; affairs  id  HesBe-GuiBel,  iii. 
146 ;  visits  England  in  1844,  and 
see^  to  negotiate  with  respect  to 
Turkey,  the  "  sick,  or  dying-  man," 
182  ;  polity  in  1648,  183  ;  dnmanda 
the  Hurrender  of  Hungarians  from 
Turkey,  1?4  ;  affronted  at  Turtoy's 
oonosMiotiB  to  Francs  respecting 
Holy  Phices  in  Palestine,  187 ;  oc- 
cupies the  PrincipHlities,  192  ;  war 
with  Turkey,  197;  with  Enghuid 
and  Fnuioe,  l'J9;  rejeots  the 
"  Four  Feints,"  209  i  death  (1866), 
210 

Nioholas,  Gnuid  Duke,  iii.  606 

NicoUburg,  iiL  37S 

Nicopolis,  iii.  498,  409 

Niebuhr,  the  historian,  L  367.  Repliea 
to  Schmala'B  pamphlet,  ii.  124 

Niel,  French  general  in  Uw  Crimea 
iii.  224 

Nightingale,  Florence,  iii.  219 

Nigra,  Italian  Ambauesador  at  Paria, 
report  on  the  idons  of  Napoleon  III. 
respecting  a  CongrssB,  iii.  373 
(not*,) 

Nile,  Battle  of  the,  L  168 

Nismes,  lOyiOitt  outrage*  in  181S,  ii 
92 

Nissib,  Battle  of,  between  Tarki  and 
I^yptians,  ii.  464 

Normandy,  la^  armsagainst  Paris,  i 


Noiwafi  given  to  Bemadotte,  Crown 

Frinoe  of  Sweden,  iL  S 
NoTtuB,  BatUe  of,  between  Austriuu 

aod  Sardiniaiia,  iii.  100 
Novi,  B^Ule  of,  i  IBl 

Odessa,  ii.  360 

OlliTier,  H.,  Proaidant  of  Preacb 
Cabinet  (1870),  iii.  416;aveTMto 
war  with  Prueeiu,  it.,  421 ;  ignor- 
■DCe  of  Uie  condition  of  tha  army, . 
429;  reasDB^<">i  *''^^ 

Olmiitz,  iii.  77 ;  eonvontion  of,  rs- 
ipeetiag  tfaa  diaaolution  ol  the 
PrusBiaa  TTnion,  and  Uio  roco^i- 
tion  of  the  diet  at  Frankfort  by 
Prussia,  147 

Oltenitsa,  iiL  I>7 

Omar  Paaha,  defeati  Busainns  at 
Oltenitxa,  iu-  197 

Oporto,  FaU  of,  i.  401.  Bovolulinn  at, 
iL  187;  taktmby  DoQpedn)(183'J), 
426;   besieged  by  Don  Uigiiel,  iA. 

Orkani,  taken  by  the  Fnmiana,  iii. 
463 ;  re-taken  by  the  Frenrh,  and 
•gain  occupied  by  the  FruBaiuoa, 
4G7,  458 

Ornni's  cootpiraoy,  iii.  279 

Omniui  Pasha,  iii.  499,  600;  surrender 
to  the  Kuaaianji  at  Flema,  604 

Otho,  Kinr  of  Qreece,  ii.  354 

Ott,  AuBtnan  general,  i.  220 

Ondinot  (1)  French  general,  i.  503, 
604,  606 

Ondinut   (2),  French  general,  sent 


109 


.  105,  106 ; 


Palatinate,    Bavarian,   ii.    408;     n- 
actionary  meaBures  ugiuntt  Liberal- 

Palatine,  Elector,  i.  247 

Palenno:  roTOlation  of  1848.  ii  474. 

Surrendered  toFurdinand  ol  Naplea, 

iii.    113;  oaptmod    by    Garibaldi, 

who  afflumca  thii    dictatorshtu   of 

Kdly,  285,  2S6;'l>epretia  uppoiuted 

Fro-Diutator,  288 
Palestine,  diipate  between  France  and 

Butaia  reep«iiting  Holy  Places  in, 

iii.  186—189 
Paleatro,  Battle  of,  between  AuHtriana 

and  PiedmontoH,  iii.  261 
Falikao,  Count  of,  succeeds  Ollivier  as 

the  hoad  of  tlte  Franob  Uiniatij, 

in.  433 


Ttlm,   Gemtaa  bookasDar,    exaeuted 

bj  Napuleon'i  oiders,  i.  322 
Palmaratou,  Luid,  ii.  389;  as  Foreign 
SeurebLry  securas   indmnnity  from 
Portui^iese  Oovemuent  for  attack 

o  share   witl 

SuuniwH  of  inteiveiiliou  in  Spain 
>r  quelling  the  Carlist  rebellion, 
4117;  viewuf  thegiuwth  of  Bu&iian 
power,  465 ;  obatiiiouy  on  the 
EMStem  queation  (18-tU),  467,  460; 
BixepU  airangemonta  settling 
I'^gypt  upon  Mahemet  All,  461 ; 
uroposea  a  marriago  l>etween  a 
Prince  of  Sue-Coburg  iind  the 
Quoen  of  Spain,  606.  Advice  to 
Aiutria  Tsapectiiig  Lomliardy,  iii. 
69;  ou  the  diiisolutioa  of  the 
Turkish  Empire,  IBO  (note);  favoura 
war  with  Kuaeia,  196 ;  Miiccecds 
Lord  Aberdeen  as  Prime  Minister, 
219  ;  policy  during;  Crimean  War, 
238;  attitude  during  Duniah  war, 
3o4 

Papal  Infallibility,  i.  263 

Papal  Slates,  allied  with  England 
agfti net  Fiance,  i.  59;  ceeaiunof  part 
by  Truaty  of  Toleatino,  1 36 ;  annei- 
ation  by  Napoleon,  436.  Insurrection 
of  1831,  ii.  399;  intervention  of 
Austria,  and  suppression  of  revolt, 
402 ;  second  iusuirection,  and 
second  Auatrian  intervention,  4U4. 
Events  of  1848-9,  iii.  97  ;  103-110; 
Sardinian  troops  occupy  Umbrin 
and  the  Marches,  and  capture 
Antona,  293,  294  [aiiJ  ««  Rome) 

Paris,  ExaaperatioD  in,  against  Louis 
XVI.,  i.  4;  Austria  di^mands  an 
anti-democratic  govemmput  in,  12 ; 
inauTTection  of  August  10,  1792, 
44  ;  September  Massacres,  46  ; 
overthrow  of  the  Gironde,  71  ;  . 
insurrection  against  (hu  conven- 
tion, 102 ;  amp  d'iiat  of  Fructidur, 
return  of  Bonapurto,  201;  coup 
Xitat,  18  Brumaire,  1799,  202;  sur- 
rendered to  tho  allies,  629 ;  arriTol 
of  Louis  XVIII.,  533 ;  treaty  of, 
636.  Napoleon's  entry  after  leaving 
Elba  and  ilight  of  King  Louis,  ii. 
38;  Napoleon's  arrival  after  the 
defeat  of  Waterloo,  66  ;  entry  of 
allies,  67 ;  Fonchi  appointed  head 
of  the  Provisional  Oovermuent,  68  ; 
reafonitian  of  King  Louia,  67 ; 
second  treaty  of,  82;  meetinjj  of 
council  of  smbMwdow,  79;  insur- 
lectiw  d  Jiilf,  tS»,  870  i  QQlol 


MODSBX  BUBOPS. 


da  Tille  auad  by  iosnrgwifa,  U. ; 
uunTgenta  khes  Tnilsiiei  and  Uia 
Lonne,  ST2 ;  iuBurrecUoiu,  1832— 
IBM,  416—417  1  Fi»chi's  attempt 
on  the  life  of  Louii  Philippe,  417  ; 
levolutioil  oi  Fsbruury,  184S,  and 
■bdicatiaD  and  flight  of  Louii 
Philippe,  G13;  Beuuhlic  proclaimed, 
ik.  BiototHa;,]!!.  38;  inturreotion 
of  workmen,  JuiLe,40;  Archbishopuf 
Pftria  killed,  4 1 ;  Louis  Napoleoa'i 
mtp  d'itat  of  Dec.  2,  18fil,  176; 
Treaty  of  (1858),  between  RosBiH, 
Oreat  BriUin,  and  ollict,  230 ;  re- 
ooDBtmction  oL  in  the  reign  of 
Napolton  III.,  396  ;  comternation 
after  BatUo  of  Worth,  437  ;  inre^ 
ment  by  the  Qermana,  4S0;  eor- 
tiea,  458,  4S9 ;  forty  tbuumnd 
of  the  iijiabitanti  perish  during 
the  siagQ,  492;  capitulaticm.  4ti3j 
entry  of  the  OarmoiiB,  Mufth  1, 
1871,  465;  inBurrection  of  the 
Commune  and  National  Guard, 
withdrawal  ol  Goveminent  tnxipa 
to  VerBaillc*,  and  second  Bicge, 
488 — 470;  di.'slructi on  wrought  by 
the  Commune,  Hod  re-entry  of  Oo- 
Temment  troops  471 
Paris,  Anhbishop  of, mortally  woimdod 
in  inBurreclion  of  June,  1848,  ui. 
41 
ParlB,  Count  of,  ii.  513 
I'srker,  English  admiral,  i.  231 
Parma,  inoorporatwi  with  Piedmontoso 
Monarchy,  iii.  68;  nnit™  with 
tlodena  under  the  dictatoisbip  of 
Farini.  267 
Parma,  DuchoBS  of,  iii.  2S1 


338; 


:e  of,  i.  1 


9,  208 


Patriarch  of  Constantinople,  iL  243; 
eiecutinn,  275 

Paul,  Emperor  of  Ruasia,  I  168  ijoins 
thenccond  coalition,  189;  Buapicions 
of  Austria,  189;  propisoa  European 
Congrees,  190  ;  hatred  to  England, 
227  ;  hie  iiBGaBidn:itioD,  232 

pBvia,  Pillage  of,  by  the  French,  i. 
122 

Peeaantry,  poirition  imprOTed  in  Austria 
by  Lco|K>ld  II.,  i.  26,  26 ;  Serfdom 
in  PrDsma,  35 ;  of  France.  36 ;  con- 
dition in  minoi  States  of  Qermany, 
38  ;  patrintism  in  Prance,  48 ;  revolt 
iniA  Veadik>,  70;  in  Fmnce,  1795, 
99;  in  Italy,  112;  T^voJt  in  Lom- 
b«My  aigsiiwt   the    ifrench,   121 1 


fanptOTed  podtion  in  Vwimot  owing 

to  theIteTolution,181;  otSvitaer- 
land,  162;  Neap^dUan,  174;  ra- 
L'eved  in  Qenumv,  265 ;  impn*». 
ment  in  Proetia  after  Stan's  edict, 
3G0;  English  in  1807,  SSI;  in 
Spain,  381  jTyToIcseriKagof  1809, 
411,  413.  In  GreeoB,  ii.  238;  in 
Poland,  301  ;  in  Hiuijjary  {1832), 
4S1,  491.  Emancipation  in  Hun- 
gary, iiL  10 ;  converted  into  iudo- 
pondjent  propriotoTB  in  Austria,  82 ; 
rising  in  Ronmonia,  85;  eman'ipa- 
tion  in  Rusain,  331 ;  made  L.nd- 
ownon  in  Poland  by  Rusaia,  339 

Pedro,  Don,  Emperor  at  Brazil,  re- 
nonnciw  Crown  of  Fortngal.  ii.  229 ; 
invades  Portugal,  and  enlors  Lisbon 
on  the  destruction  of  the  Constitu- 
tion by  Miguel.  426,  427 

Pee],  Sir  Robert,  English  Prime 
Minister,  iii.  188 

PcIisBier,  General,  French  oomnundor 
in  tJiG  Crimea,  iii.  225 

Pcpe,  Neapolitan  gtmeral,  ii.  183,  184, 


202;  : 


.67 


Perier,  Casimir, '  BucceedB  I^tta  as 
F^^ch  Premier,  ii.  402 ;  sends 
troops  to  occupj;  Ancona,  404 ; 
death,  405;  paciBo  policy  mia. 
undontood,  415 

Perrano,  Sardinian  admiral,  iii.  285; 
excites  insurrection  at  Naples  by 
Count  Cavour's  orders,  290;  refera 
his  diary  to  Azeglio,  292  (note) 

Pereigny,  confidant  of  Louis  Napoleon, 
iiL  167 

Posth,  bri^e  uniting  the  double 
.capital  of  Hungary,  ii.  482.  Demo- 
cratic movement  headed  by  Kossuth, 
iii.  10 ;  meeting  of  Parliament  at, 
TO;  J^Iadc  mai«hi!S  againiit,  72; 
martial  law  proelaimed,  74 ;  occu- 
pied by  Austrrans,  8B ;  evacuated 
by  them,  90 ;  but  re-occupied.  94. 

Petrobei,  leader  of  Greek  revolt  in  tlui 
Morea,  li.  289 

Fhannricts,  The  Greek,  ii.  251 

Philhellenee,  Corps  of,  ii.  296 

Philippopolis.  iii.  604 

Pichegru,  French  general,  I.  87; 
enters  Antaerp,  03;  conquers  Hol- 
land, 96 ;  charged  with  complicitj 
in  plot  against  Bcmaparie,  .75 

Piedmont,  social  conditi  on  in  ng  hteenth 
century,  i.  117;  Bonaparte's  aoo- 
oesBes,  119;  aimexed  to  Franca. 
246.  InsurreDtion  in,  ii.  203.  ErunU 
of  1848-9,  iii.  17,  56—62,  1-5-103; 
(-cclesi^iBtical  ref<vm  uiuIbi  Tiotw 


o  d'Aieglio, 

143 ;  C&voor,  Uiniotar,  214  ; 
■Hied  vith  France  in  war  against 
Aiutria,2fi6;  movement  inOuiitnl 
Ualj  for  nnion  with,  26 1 ;  union 
with  Toacany,  PnmUi,  Moduna,  itad 
Ui«  Bomagna,  276  :  aoion  of  Naplea 
and  Sicily  with,  381—297 ;  troops 
enter  UrabrU  imd  the  Marohea,  and 
amie  Anoona,  293.  294 
Pillnils,  Emperor  LeopfJd  II.  and 
Fradiriok  mUitun  II.  meet  tA,  i. 

Pitt,  William,  liew  ol  French  Revolu- 
tion, i.  &T;  attempts  to  unite 
Europe  BgHinat  Fiance,  &B  ;  Liberal 
Colioy,  62 ;  giBnta  Babaidy  to 
PmnlB,  88 ;  attempts  to  suppten 
Jacobinism,  107  ;  enters  into  nags' 
tiations  for  peace  vith  French 
Directory,  130 ;  his  scheme  of  a 
ooalitdon  against  France  lavoured 
by  the  Emperor  Pan!,    169;    "-" 


the  TTnion  of  Great  Britain  and 
Ireland,  239  ;  again  Prime  Minister, 
27S;  death,  30S;  his  "Austerliti 
look,"  ib.  (note] 

Vme  VL,  Pope,  Aastria  claims  indem- 
nification for  him  from  France  for 
the  losi  of  Avignon  and  the 
Venaissin,  i.  12;  his  armistics  with 
Bonaparte,  124 ;  submits  to  Bona- 
pttrte,  and  cedes  Bologna,  Ferrani, 
and  Romagna,  136 ;  his  authority 
nmounoed  by  the  Roman  people, 
166;  removed  by  the  French  to 
Tnacany,  and  afterwards  to  Valence, 
where  he  dies,  ii. ;  King  Ferdi- 
nand's  latter  to  him,  173 

Fiua  TIL,  Pope,  eicommunicates 
Bonaparte,  and  is  imprisoned  at 
Savoua,  L  436.  Resents  attempt  of 
Anstria  to  gain  Bologna  and  Ra- 


publisIuM  amnettty  for  political  of- 
fences, ii.  Diaavowa  sympathy  with 
the  war  of  the  IiombaHU  a^inst 
Austria,  iii  66 ;  flight  from  Rome 
■flar  murder  of  Ho«d,  97  ;  restora- 
tion by  the  French,  110;  seeks  to 
taebBO  the  Inquisition,  110;  re- 
foses  to  oonaider  any  proposals  for 
Italian  reform,  273 ;  indignation  at 
(be  doctrines  in  thepompUet,  "The 
Vopa  and  the  OongnM,"  271 ;  loaea 
Sanipoial  paver  l^tt*  Xtaliaa  oo- 


rX  KM 

oapation  ot  Bome,  hat  !■  gnannteed 
various  rights  by  the  Italian  Par- 
liament, 473 

Plevna,  Battles  at,  liL  460— fiOI ;  fall 
of,  fi04 

Poland,  Designs  of  Austna  snd  Pmsma 
against,  i.  S3,  83;  Oobden's  views 
on  the  partition  ot,  34  (note); 
saoond  partition  of,  S3 ;  revolt,  SB ; 
third  partition,  97;  Napoleon  enters, 
338 ;  establishment  of  Duchy  of 
Warsaw,  347.  Probable  re- 
mits in   the  Polish  kingdom  had 


at  Oongrass  of  Vienna,  23,  24; 
Duchy  ol  Waraaw  made  Kingdom 
of  Poland  under  Alexander  L, 
Emperor  ol  Russia,  80 ;  Alexan- 
der addresses  Polish  Diet,  on  his 
dueign  to  extend  popular  reproaen* 
tation,  121 ;  insurrection  at  War- 
saw (IS301,  392;  in\-aded  by  Russia, 
896 :  Busnans  capture  Waraaw,SB7; 
becomesaprovinceof  BiiB>Da,tA. ;  re- 
volt in  Pruadaand  Austrian  Pohmd 
(I84S),492.  Condition  in  186I,iii.333; 
tumults  at  Waraaw,  334;  Oiaad 
Duke  Conabuitine  appointed  Vice- 
roy at  Waraaw,  334  ;  levy,  and  in- 
sarrection  (1863),  33S  ;  a  secret  Na. 
tional  Qovemment,  336  ;  (Jenoral 
Moravieff  orushea  the  rebellion 
in  Lithuania,  337  ;  ownership  of 
land  given  to  the  peasantry,  338 ; 
the  Cear's  endeavours  to  Rosaiantse 
sodal  and  national  life,  340 

Polignao,  Juloi.  chief  French  Minister, 
ii.  361 ;  project  to  suspend  the  Con- 
stitation,  36fi 

Portland,  Duke  of,  Prime  Uioister,  i 
343 

Portugal,  allied  with  England  against 
France,  i.  G9  ;  Napoleon's  dsmanda 
upon,  854 ;  Treaty  of  Fontainebteau 
for  the  partition  of,  36S ;  flight  of 
the  Regent  to  Brazil,  856 ;  the 
French  enter  Lisbon,  366  ;  entry  of 
British  troops  under  Sir  Aruiur 
™"  -'sy,  885;  BattUof  Vindeiro, 
"   '  by  the  French,  ii. ; 


Wellesley  drives  Sonlt  from  Oporto, 
42S ;  holds  Tones  Vedraa  aud 
drives  Mawena  bock,  44G.  Refuses 
to  abtdiah  slavo-trada,  ii.  7S;  afiaira 
from  ISOT— 1820,  I8S— 189 ;  revo- 
Intira  at  Oporto^  187 ;  Don  Pedro 
gaaOa  k  Ooastitotioa,  229;  d»> 
•ertiuuef  Mldicrf,  380;  d«iiuitd» 


MODSBN  StmOPS. 


-—'■*"~'  from  KigUnd  •gsinrt  aU 
•ttack,  ii. ;  Don.  UiKuel  amoM 
himnlf  to  be  pToclniroed  King.  42S; 
Conatitutioti  dHtnyud,  it. ;  lUaga 
ol  Terror,  it. ;  attutka  \jf  Sliguel 
on  Engli»h  and  French  Bubjecta,!*.; 
inTaaiou  !»  tbe  Emperor  Pedm, 
436;  En^uh  and  li'nmoli  squad- 
ma*  Kpptax  in  the  Tapiu  and  pro- 
enm  indsmnity,  ib. ;  Dun  Pedro 
cabnIiiiboii,42T ;  Miguel  defeated 
•ltd  expelkd  from  the  Fsninsula, 


to,m.  120 

Pregne,  Camgnu  of,  L  COO.  Biota 
(1848),  iii.  64 ;  Troaty  of,  179 

Frenalau,  i.  381 

Pnabur^,  ili.  9,  11, 13 

PrMburg,  Trestj  of,  i.  299 

Frew,  Cenaorahip  of,  rastored  in  Bpain, 
u.  10;  in  Fnmce,  ISO 

FresB,  Freedom  of  Uie,  eabiblifihed  in 
FnnMby  Louia  XVIIL,  ii.  IS;  at 
Jena,  137 ;  Mettemich  propoaea 
leatcictions  in  Germany,  137 ;  re- 
atrictiona  ordered  by  Conferenca  of 
Ckrlabad,  145 ;  reeLrictiausinFisnoe 
nnder  Charles  X.,  369  ;  freedom  ex- 
tended in  Genuany,  408 ;  Buppt«s- 
aion  of  jounuUs  in  Genoany  dnring 
the  rmction  of  183Z,  411);  Bis- 
marck'a  luppreaaive  meaaurea  in 
Fniaua,  421 

Prim,  Gaieml,  chief  movar  in  Spaniah 
Kevoludon  (1868],  iii.  412 

Protestantitm,  of  Korlheni  Germany,  L 
13;  Emperor  Fcrdinand'ahatred of, 
20;  Bohemian  I'rotialimta  lose 
thrar  eatatee,  20;  ila  Burrival  in 
Hungary,  ii, ;  its  eitenaion  in  Ger- 
many, 268 

PrDHsiB,  State  of,  before  the  war  of 
1792,  L  30 ;  rule  of  Ftederick  the 
Qrest  in,  30 ;  poverty  of,  30 ;  ab- 
■anca  of  politiial  opinion  in,  31 ; 
■odal  Byatem,  34 ;  allied  with 
Aottria  agninat  Fraoca,  42 ;  invades 
France,  42;  evacuataa  I'Vance,  4S; 
beaiegea  Mtum,  76 ;  leeka  to  pie- 
vant  Anilria  from  gaining  Bavaria, 


Anatria,  86 ;  aiibAdiaed  by  England, 
BB ;  trea^  of  peace  with  Fituue  at 
Baale,  04;  at  the  CooKmsa  of 
Baatadt,  1£6;  joina  the  Murthem 
Mantim*  league,  228 ;  interesta 
Jb  OerauBf ,  348 ;  iaaotiai  witb  i«- 


gati  to  Hanorer,  >69 ;  tbe  King'* 

diwiinulation  on  the  acquiailion  of 
Hanover,  312;  axclodea  Engliah 
ahipatrom  the  porta,  314;  renela 
aeiud  by  British  navy,  314  ;  Stinn 
eipotea  the  character  of  Pruaaian 
Uiaiaters,  318 ;  demoraliaad  sUla 
of  the  army  (1806],  319—321 ;  do- 
foatsd  by  the  Fimch  at  Jens 
and  Aneistiidt,  3:28,  329 ;  entry  of 
Napoleon  into  Berlin,  332 ;  capitu- 
lation of  fortraasea  to  tlie  French, 
ii, ;  large  ceasiona  of  territoTy  tu 
France^  347  ;  condition  after  tbe 
pusce  of  Tilsit,  356  ;  Stein's  edict  for 
the  abolition  of  serfage,  358;  re- 
form of  army,  362 ;  plaiu  for  war 
against  Napoleon,  389  ;  terms  with 
Napoleon  for  the  French  evacua- 
tion, 391 ;  aoeka  the  aid  of  Buasia 
against  France,  468 ;  accepta 
alliance  with  Napoleon,  439 ;  arm- 
ing ot  East  Prussia  by  order  of  Uia 
Czar,  482 ;  Treaty  of  Kaliach  with 
Itussia,  484 ;  the  Frenoh  Bvacuata 
Berlin,  486;  war  declared  against 
Fiance,  486  ;  national  spirit,  487  ; 
defeated  I^tsen  and  Bautswi, 
493;  victories  of  Qrossbeeren  and 
Dennewitx,  606 ;  results  of  tha 
wars  of  Napoleon,  640,  642.  Csm- 
paignotlSIS  against  Napolaon,  ii. 
48—66;  Treaty  of  Parisj  60—62; 
national  disappointment  after  1815, 
121 ;  King  Ftederick  William  pro-  . 
miaes  a  popular  Constituiioa,  121 ; 
Hardonbarg'g  syatom,  123 ;  Wart- 
burg  festival,  127;  policy  of  inactioa 
(1318],  136 ;  Mettemich'siaflnence, 
136;  n^lntiou  to  the  minor  States 
of  Qennany.  143;  redgnalion  of 
Humboldt  owing  to  Mcttemich's 
influence,  148  ;  Provincial  'Estates 
eatablished  (1823),  161;  nature  of 
ita  govermnent,  162;  view  of 
Anglo-Itussian  Protocol  for  inter- 
vention in  Greece,  323  ;  condition 
after  the  French  Bevolution 
of  1830,  406;  King  Frederick 
William  still  withholds  a  CMUtilu- 


,   406; 


406 ;  the  Zollverein,  t6.:  undenrtoad- 
ing  with  alliea  in  Turkish  affairs, 
460 ;  death  of  Fredandc  William 
HI.,  and  acceauon  of  Fredeiioli 
William  IV.  (1840),  407;  United 
Diet  convoked  at  Berlin,  493. 
EvenU  in  Berlin,  Uarob,  1848,  iii. 
IB,  30,  31;  tlie  king  promisea  ■ 
NatinMl  Jmmblr,  U;  war  witb 


NepacHnr  BcUeawIg. 
Uolsluin,  iS :  uuiirtics  of  MalmS 
vith  Deamsrk,  117  :  rioU  at  Berlin 
egsinat  the  Notdon&l  Assembly,  119, 
1'20;  fidelity  of  the  army  to  the 
tlinme,  131 ;  tlie  Ling  appoinlfl 
.Count  Brandenburg'  Minister,  123 ; 
poTogAtJon  of  tbe  AHaembljr,  123; 
tbs  Aasembly  refusing  to  disperse, 
■!«  driven  from  their  hall  by 
Oeoeml  Wrangd  end  his  troopB, 
1S4  i  tbe  Uiig  dissolvee  tbe 
AiBsmbly  and  pobliahea  «  Cunsti- 
tution,  a, ;  attempt  to  form  a 
Federation  of  Uerman  States,  139  ; 
formatioii  ot  Federal  CoDBtitution 
and  Federal  FarliameDt  at  Erfurt, 
140,  141;  conflict  with  Austria 
respecting  nffaixs  in  Hesse  CasBel, 
145 — 148;  seeks  the  Orar's  mediation 
respecting  affaiia  in  Uerae,  146 ; 
■nunits  to  Aastria's  demands  for 
diaaolution  of  Pruaatan  union  and 
witbdiBWal  of  troops  from  Uesae, 
U7 ;    peace    with    Denmark,  HB 


policy  attheopeoingof  tbeCrimam 
War.  201— 204;  approvea  the  Four 
Points      220 ;      aenda      pl^nipoten- 


tiaries  to  the  Conference  at  I'aris 
(186S),  230 ;  Ring  Frederick 
William  IV.  withdraws  from  publio 
affair),  and  his  brother,  the  Crown 
Prince  William,  is  appointed 
Begent,  300 ;  reorganisHtioii  of 
army  by  Crown  Prince  Regent, 
310 ;  acceamon  of  the  Prinoa  Regent 
to  tbe  throne,  311;  FarliamBntary 
measures  of  1S62,  312  ;  dissnlution 
of  Parliament  and  appointment  of 
Prince  Hohenlohe  as  Prime  Min  ister, 
S12;  conflict  between  the  king  and 
Parliament  on  the  Army  BiU,  313  ; 
resignation  of  Hohenlohe,  and 
appointmant  of  Bismarck,  313; 
rejection  ot  anny-danse  in  the 
Budget,  31B ;  aunggle  between 
the  Upper  House  and  Lower 
Bouse  on  the  Budget,  318;  con- 
tinoation  of  tbe  gtruwle  between 


avuiut  the  Press,  821 ;  Bismarck'i 
plana  rogaiding  tiohleswig-Hol 
•tain,  S4«;  Danish  War,  350, 
•ecura*  Sohleewig-Holitein  jointly 
with  Austria  by  '■ 
of  Tienna,  263 ; 
•f     Qastein,    SiS  ; 


su; 


war  with  Austria,  Ilsnorer, 
Suony,  and  Uusoe-Cassi^l.  370; 
defeate  Austria  at  Eeniggiiit^,  376  ; 
terms  of  peace  with  Austria,  378, 
879;  Becnit  tieatisa  with  tbe 
South  Gernisn  States,  381;  with- 
drawal from  Luxemburg,  402 ; 
the  qneatioa  of  Prince  Leo- 
pold's election  to  the  Hpaoiali 
throne,  iii.  416—422  :  prepara- 
tions for  war,  426—427  ;  Moltke's 
pUns  for  WOT,  42S ;  caoaes  of  suc- 
cess in  the  war  against  France, 
431 ;  Tictoriea  over  the  French  at 
Weissenburg  and  Wiirth,  434; 
victories  ot  Spicheren,  Man-la-Tour, 
and  GraTslotte,  436 — 441;  sur- 
render of  the  Emperor  Napoleon  at 
Bedon,  440,  447 ;  troops  invest 
Paris,  460 ;  capitniation  of  Metz, 
455 ;  overthrow  of  the  relieving 
armiie,  467^92 :  capitulation  of 
Paris  and  armistice,  463 ;  troop* 
enter  Paris,  465;  treaties  of  Ver- 
salllee  and  FranMort  with  France, 
tA.;  Union  of  Northern  and  Southern 
States  ol  Oeroiany.  and  the  title  of 
Emperor  assumed  by  King  William, 
406-^68;  opening  of  the  first 
Parliament  of  the  Empint  at  Berlin, 
468 

Fsara,  one  «f  the  Mgran  Islands,  ii. 
267  ;  destroyed  by  Egyptians,  304 

Pnchner,  Austrian  commander,  leada 
troops  against  Hnngary,  iii,  85 

Qoatre  Bras,  Battle  of,  ii.  61 


Baab,  surrendered  to  Anstrians  (1849), 
iii.  94 

Badetsky,  Austrian  oonuoandBr-in- 
chief,  carries  out  fortifications  in 
Italy,   ii.  47G.    Fails  to  suppress 


_    16; 

campaign  in  Northern  Italy,  65 ; 

re-conquen      Venstia,      60 ;       at 

Hovara,  100 
Badicalism,  Lord  CoaUateagh  on,  lU 

(note) 
BadowitiiQenerBl,  projector  of  Gorman 

Federal  Union,  iii.    1 46 ;    resignn 

ofSoe  of  ehiet  Pmiaian    Ujnistar, 

147 
Baglan,  Lord,  British  commander  in 

the  Crimea,  defeats  RnsmanB  at  the 

4iffla,  iiL^It;  b«<iegw  Ae Bedan, 


MOSBSS  BUBOPB. 


S23;  tliw>rUdItrtb»FraDcli,224; 

dotth,  2Zfi 
BuDoiino,    leads    put    of    Sardiniaa 

army  againit  Austria,  iii.  99 
Butadt,  CoUKTMa  of,  i.  154 ;  murder 

of  Fceaub  eiiTuyi  at,  ISO.     FuU  of, 

at  iiunrreotion  ot  Joly,  1S10,  iii. 

138 
BatiaboD,  Diot  of  (*m  Dietof  the  Empire] 
Bb»j«»i\    FiedmoDteaa   UiniKter,    iii. 

244;   aacoeada   Oavour   aa   Prima 

Uiuuter,  267 ;  naiguB  office,  276 ; 

oommaota  on  Qariboldi'a  atteinpted 

much  on  Boom,  381 
Berhbeig,  Oount,  Foreipi  Hiniator  at 

Tinna  (18M),  iiL  349 
B«daii,  Aaaault  on  the,  iii.  22£ 
Bedclilte,  Lord  Btratford  de,  British 

Ambaaaador  at  Couatikntino^e,  iii. 

100 ;      neKotiaLM     with      Ptinue 

Meoschikoff     reapocting     Bimiaii 

righta  in  the    H0I7  Flaoe^    and 

lurldah  protectorate  over   Greek 

Chiiatiana,  191  ;  oppoaea  King  of 

Proaaia'a  proposiLiun  reapecUiiK  the 

righta   of   the  Sulton'l    Chriatian 

■ubjects,  202 
■■  Reflactiona  On  Frendi  BeTalutJon," 

Burke's,  i.  63;  iii.  438  (note) 
KeformatioD,  The,  in  Gennanf,  i.  17 
Befonn  Bill,  English,  Paaaingof  {1832} 

u.  4IS,  4:^0 
Beggio,  portion  ol  Oiepadana  RepuUio 

i.  132  ;  general  aaaemblj  of,  134 
B«^er,      his     aecret      no^tintions 

between    the    PruNriana    and  the 

Empreaa  Eugenie,  iii.  454 
Bcicbsrath,  Thii  Austrian,  aaaeoible*  at 

Vienna  (1861),  iii.  327 
BucJistadt,  Duke  of,  eon  of  Napoleon 

BonapaJtu,  ii.  401 ;  iii.  43 
Boichatadt,  Ti«aty  of   (1876),   Bussift 

and  Austria,  iii.  488 
B^gn  of  Terror,  L  72— 7S ;  lb  le»«l- 


Missolongbi,  u.  308,  309 ;  takea  the 

Auropolia  of  Athens,  311 ;  defeated 
bf  Kuaaiana  at  Sulewlacha,  341 ; 
defeatud  by  Egyptians  at  Kooioh, 

Beechid  Faaba,  Turkiah  Hiniater; 
bia  reforma  in  Turkej,  463;  hia 
fall,  464 

BeTolution,  TheFrendi;  ita  inflnanc« 

on  Europe,  i.  106—109 
BarolutioniLry  epoch   of  1S48,  charac- 


^od,  Bidwp  of  Fiitda,  L  IM 

Biohelieii,  &10  de,  Miniatrj  ondv 
Louis  XVIIL,  ii.  05 ;  tecom- 
mended  by  the  Caa  to  Louia,  ii. ; 
Amneetv  Bill,  101 ;  oppomtion  to 
hia  Bullet  for  pi«viding  fundi 
from  mie  ol  Chnrch  forests,  113; 
consents  to  an  """""I  grant  ta  the 
Church,  119;  at  Uia  cMtferenca  of 
Aii-Li-Chapelle,  131 ;  viem  of  tha 
meajoroe  ?i  Deoaies,  154;  resigna- 
tion, 15S;  returns  to  office,  169; 
second  retirement,  160 

Biego,  Spanish  coniipiTator,  ii.  173 — 
175;  head  ot  Liberals  at  Madrid, 
207 ;  Preaident  of  the  Cort«a  (18£t>, 


Bights,  The,  ot  man,  i.  68 

Kigiiy,  Admiral  do,  iL  32B 

Hio  Booo,  Battle  of,  i.  3B3 

KiToli,  Battle  of,  L  135 

Bobeapierre,  dub  orator,  L  8  ;  againat 
wur,  0 ;  accuBod  ot  ''""'"g  at  tha 
Dictatorship,  66 ;  promioont  in  tha 
Boign  of  Tertor,  72;  death,  98 

Bodil,  Bpauish  general,  defeats  the 
force*  of  the  ulurpor  Migual,  ii 
430 

Bollin,  Ledru,  member  of  French 
FrovisioniU  GOTamment  (1848), 
iii.  34;  Bepubliuan  circular,  37; 
Natiooul  AsBsmblj  oondonaa  hia 
offences,  38  ;  demsjida  the  impeach- 
ment ot  the  Ministry,  108 

Bomogna,  uoited  to  Piedmont  und« 
Victor  Emmanuel,  iii.  27S 

BomanEoft,  Chief  T^hm^^h  Ministry,  i, 
480 

Bome,  French  intrigue*  in,  L  163 ; 
entry  of  French  troops,  1S4;  con- 
stituted a  Bepublic,  166  ;  spoljation 
by  the  French,  166 ;  eviicuatiun  by 
CVcnch,  and  entry  wt  King  Kerdia- 
and,  172;  flight  of  King  Ferdin- 
and,  and  re-entry  of  French, 
173  ;  annexed  by  Najioleon.  436 ; 
Oonfersnoe  after  tho  ioaurrection  in 
Papal  States,  ii.  403;  euthusiiuan 
on  the  publication  of  amnesty  for 
political  ulfetices  by  Pius  IX.,  472. 
Mnrder  of  Rossi,  and  flight  of  tha 
Pope,  iii.  97,  9S ;  republic  pro- 
claioied  by  Cooatitaent  Asaambly, 
93;  besieged  and  •.-apturcd  by  the 
French  and  Kua  IX.  restoreC  10> 
—109;  the  Motu  Proprio,  111; 
Maailni'a  project  for  the  capturo 
of,  287  ;  excluded  from  the  new 
Italinn  kingdom  (1861),  298  ;  failure 
of  Garibaldi'i  attoiiiiit«d  maich  01^ 


Ml ;  Wcndh  garriMa  vithiliHini, 
407 ;  entiT  of  Italian  Inraps,  172 ; 
bvcomes  ths  lutlonal  capital,  ii. ; 
"The  Frlaonar  of  the  Vatican," 
473  (<»Hf  «M  Papal  Statoa) 

Boon,  Oeneial,  Prusaian  MiniBter  of 
War,  iii.  312  ;  supports  tha  "blood 
and  iron"  polloy  of  Eumarck,  316, 
117 

Bom,  Uartinei  de  la,  Spanish  Minis- 
Ux,  Rives  a  Constitution  to  Spain, 
iL429 

BouBseau'i  writingi,  i.  ST 

Hosbi,  Pellegriro,  Hnxder  o£,  iii.  »7 

Boatopchin,  Count,  fires  Moeoow,  L 
46S 

Roteamunatcr,  Ablteas  o^  i,  18 

Bothi^  I^,  Bnttle  of,  i.  522 

Bouen,  occupied  bv  tbs  ProBuans,  iii. 
469 

BoDber,  M.,  French  Miuistor,  iii.  40S 

fioumania,  iL  250  ;  Charles  of  Eoben- 
zollBm,  elecloil  Hereditnry  Prince, 
237  ;  allied  -nith  Rowia  in  the  var 
against  Turkey,  497  ;  independence 
recognised  by  the  Treaties  of  San 
*    Stefano  and  Berlin,  &10— fil6 

Bousain,  Admiral,  French  AmbaBS&dor 
at  Constantinople,  iL  44S 

Rnffo,  Cardinal,  L  182 

Biigi^n,  Landing  ol  British  troopa  at, 
1.  350 

BnnBell,  Earl,  iii.  191 ;  views  on  Italian 
affairs,  272 ;  propoanl  respecting 
Schleswifc-UolBtein  at  the  Confer- 
ence of  London  (1864),  362;  atti- 
tude during  the  Daniah  War,  35fi 

fioBria,  partitions  Polttod,  i.  B3,  97; 
death  of  Catherine  and  accession  of 
Paul,  168  ;  coalittoa  with  England, 
Turkiiy.  and  Naples,  agninat  t'Tonce, 
169;  advance  of  troops  against  the 
French,  177  ;  army  arrives  in 
Lomburdy,  181 ;  victories  ovcv  the 
Fnnoh,  181,  182,  191  ;  jealousy 
towards  Austria,  192  (nott);  end  of 
alliance  with  Austria,  1S6  ;  Anglo- 
Bussian  pipedition  against  Holland, 
195 — 197  1  peace  with  France,  227  ; 
joiuB  the  Northern  Maritime 
League,  228 ;  secret  treaty  with 
lYanco  (1801),  aSO;  joins  England 
In  a  coalition  against  France,  278  ; 
boopa  enter  Bavaria,  292;  defeated 
hj  die  French  at  Aaaterlitz,  206 ; 
IrOnhril's  negotiations  for  the 
eMffion  of  Sicily  to  Joseph  Bona. 
narte,  SIS ;  entry  of  Napolton  into 
Tbland,  340;  continnation  of  war 
With  FrsAoe,  840—312  j  trea^  of 


Z.  168 

Baitenstra'n,  344 ;  dafsated  by  the 

French  at  Fiiodland,  345 ;  trea- 
ties of  Tilsit,  347;  rapture  of 
friendly  relations  with  France,  442; 
declines  to  send  troops  into  Prussia 
against  France,  4uH ;  invasion  by 
Hapoleon,  4ca— 177 ;  Iroiity  of 
Kolischwith  trus8iB,4S4;  Cuesocb* 
alter  Berlin,  4H5  ;  campaigns  of 
1H13  and  1814,  162— £20.  Its 
gains  hy  the  settlements  1814,  ii. 
1 ;  second  Treaty  of  Paris,  60—62  ; 
the  Cxor's  Treaty  of  Holy  AUionca, 
63 ;  the  Caar  restores  the  King- 
dom of  PoUod,  80 ;  intdvention 
in  Turkey,  277 ;  project  of  joint 
intervention  in  Grcoco,  313;  dis- 
content and  coDfmiraciiHi,  316 ;  dmth 
of  Alexander  I.,  317;  military 
insurrectional  St.  Petertburg,319; 
the  Orond  Dukes  Couslantine  and 
Nicholas,  ii. ;  Nii^olas  Emperor, 
ii.;  protocalwithEnj,-land,32l;  tukea 
part  at  Navarinn,  330—332;  war 
with  Turkey.  335— 3i3 ;  peacii  of 
AdrianopIe,343  ;  invasion  of  Poland, 
ass :  capture  of  Warsaw,  397 ; 
intervention  in  Turkey  during  war 
with  E(fyptlana,  446;  Treaty  of 
TJnkiar  Skelessi  with  Turkey,  447; 
joins  in  Quadruple  Treaty  and  de- 
GlurationastuDardanelles,4  56 — 4  62; 
intervention  against  Hungary 
[1849],  iii.  93;  dispute  with  France 
respoctinif  Holy  Places  in  Palestiue, 
185  ;  claims  in  Turkey,  188;  tro<ips 
enter  Moldavia  and  Wullachin,  192 ; 
rejects  amended  Vienna  note,  195  ; 
outbi'uak  of  bostilitics  with  Turkey, 
197;  recall  of  ambasHadori  from 
London  and  Paris,  190 ;  wu 
declared  by  England  and  France, 
ii.  ;  evacoaticn  of  Danubiao 
Provinces,  208 ;  defeat  at  the 
battle  of  the  Alma,  211  ; 
Battle  of  Balaclava,  215;  defeat 
at  Inkermann,  217;  foil  of  Sebus- 
topol,  226 ;  losses  in  the  Crimea, 
227;  capture  of  Kan,  it.;  treaty 
of  peace  with  Great  Britain  and 
AlLes  signed  at  Paris  (1856),  230; 
regains  -right  of  having  war-ships 
and  arsenals  in  Black  Boa  (tS71), 
240 :  proposes  a  Congress  to  discuas 
Italian  afbira,  2G6  ;  opposition  to 
Viator  Bmrnanuel's  assumption  of 
the  title  of  King  of  Italy,  299 ;  con- 
dition under  Alexander  II.,  329; 
liberation  of  ths  serfs,  330 ;  oonces- 
nons  of  the  Cm  in  Poland  insu^ 


KOCXKir  xuBors. 


ciMlt  to  prsTent  national  inninec- 
tioii,334;thHCza[miikeBtho|joiiaints 
in  PolHod  lajid-prDiirietoi's,  330^  pro- 
poneiConfaraDoe  ol  London  on  Luz- 
embuT)^  question,  4  04;  freed  from  the 
ol>li)«)ition8  of  the  tnuty  (Bkuk  Sen) 
of  18ie  Kt  tho  close  of  tha  Fraoco- 
PraMiao  War,  473;  "League,  of 
the  three  Emperors,"  476 ;  tnwty 
with  AuBtn&  at  Keichstadt  on 
Eaitent  QueBtloD,  438 ;  enforces 
SerTian  armistice,  4B9:  conferenoe 
of  Constantinople,  493;  ths"  London 
Protocol,"  49B  ;  decUreswar  against 
Turkey,  497 :  advancn  on  the 
Balkans,  and  three  battloa  of 
Plevna,  49B— 601 ;  fall  of  Plevna, 
SOS  1  capitulation  of  Shipka,  and 
entiy  of  troops  into  Adrianoplo, 
604,  606;  armistice,  606;  Immi- 
nence of  war  with  England,  609  ; 
tieiity  of  San  Btefano,  610;  serret 
agreement  with  England,  617 ; 
Congrea  of  Berlin,  613 
Eostchuk,  iH.  498,  499 

Baalfeld,  Defeat  of  the  Frussiani  bjr 

Napoleon  at,  i.  327 

BB&rbriicken,  iii.  433,  436 

Snlamanca,  Battle  of,  i.  440 

Balemo,  iii.  292 

SaLshorr,  Lord,  represents  England  at 
the  Constantinopla  Conference,  iii. 
4S1 ;  BQcieeda  Lord  Dovby  as 
Foreign  Minister,  614  ;  circuUir  to 
the  Powers  on  thi.  Treaty  of  &in 
gtefano,  615;  represents  England, 
with  Xxird  Beaconsfield,  at  the 
Congress  of  Berlin,  617;  on  the 
relations  of  Biissia  and  Turkey,  619 

Salonika,  Hurder  of  Prussian  and 
French  consuls  at,  iii.  4S0 

flaliburg,  Biahoprio  of,  i,  149;  ceded 
to  Buvaiia,  430.  Won  by  Austria, 
ii.  4 

Btunbre,  Biver,  battles  between  French 
tuid  allied  Forces  of  England  and 
ADBtria,L  91 

Samoa,  ii.  288 

San  ij[«fano,  Trea^  of,  iii.  610 

Sand,  Carl,  aseasain  of  Kotzebue,  Ii. 
141 

Saiagoeaa,  i.  396;  siege  of,  399 

Sardinia,  war  against  France,  i.  64 ; 
army  joint  Anstriana  in  Italy 
against  France,  113  ;  Brmistice  and 
peace  with  French,  IIS,  Declines 
allmnca  with  Austria,  ii.  86.  War 
wi'.h  Austria,  iiL  66 ;  total  defeat 

■t  NovaM,  100 ;  Uw  King  abdi- 


catea  and  retirca  to  Optvto,  when 
he  diea,  lot  ;  accession  of  Victor 
Emmanuel,  IDZ  ;  troops  sont  to  the 
Crimea,  223;  defeats  Uusaiana  at 
the  Tchemaya, 326;  Coant CUTOUT, 
l>rim«  Uiniiter,  244  ;  rupture 
with  Auatria,  361 ;  declares  war,  in 
ciinjuDction  with  France,  agunst 
AuHlria.  259 ;  victoKea  of  Uagenta 
and  Solterino,  261,  363  ;  peais  with 
Austria  concluded  at  ViUafranca, 
8G6;  union  with  Central  Italy.2T7; 
Garibaldi  conquers  Sicily  and 
Naplea  in  the  name  of  Victor 
Emmannel,  285,  293  {and  mm 
Italy,  Piedmont) 

Savary,  French  general,  brings  tho 
King  of  Spain  to  Bayonna,  i.  376 

Bavtet  Faaha,  Turkiah  Foreign 
Minister,  presides  at  the  Constan- 
tinople Conference  (1876),  iiL  494 

"  Saviour  of  Society "  (Louis  Napo- 
loonl,  iii.  164,  177 

Savoy,  i.  SO  ;  annexed  to  France,  6t ; 
part  of,  left  to  Franco  [1314),  636  ; 
but  taken  away  (1S15),  ii.  62. 
Bevolntionary  movement  of  1834, 
headed  by  MaxEini,  ii.  413;  Charles 
Albert  of  Carignano  ascends  the 
throne,  470.  Annexed  to  France, 
iii.  277 ;  effect  of  annexation  «• 
Enroptv  270 ;  power  of  the  Papacy 
in,3B0 

Saiony,  Weakneea  of  (1792),  i.  16; 
Kinp:  of,  acquires  from  Napoleon 
t)ie  Gmnd  Duchy  of  Wamaw,  347. 
The  Ciar  proposes  its  anneiatim 
to  Prussia  at  Oongrees  of  Vienna, 
ii.  24,  26  ;  the  King  restored  to  the 
throne,  30  ;  Constitution,  408.  In- 
surrection, iiL  136 ;  attempt  to 
form  a  union  with  Prugmu,  139; 
secedes  from  League  with  Prussia, 
140  ;  Dresden  occupied  by  Prussians, 
374;  included  in  afedorationnndei 
PruBSian  leailerahip,  378 

Scarlett,  Qeneral,  commands  t&e  Heavy 
Brigade  at  Balaclava,  iii.  216 

Bchamhorst,    pinsident   of 


363; 


refonns,  406  ;  resigns  ofBoe,  450 
Schelde,  River,  i.  66. 
Biherer,  French  general,  L  ITS. 
Boliill,  Prueaian  officer,  gallant  defence 

of  Colberg  against  the  Frenob,  i. 

842;  leada  the  rising  against  the 

French  in  Northern  Qermany,  417 ; 

heroic  death,  419 
Sohiller,  his  ocoineatioa  with  the  %«nd 

SukBolWeiiMi,  iLiae 


Oarman  thsologitn,  I. 
407 

8chl«Bwig-HolBtaii,  rebellagwiutDeii- 
mmrk,  Ui.2&,  117  ;  end  of  lebellion 
and  onion  with  Denmark,  160; 
Fiinoe  CSCTUtiaii  declared  heir  to 
the  thione,  ii. ;  Dnke  of  Aognaton- 
barg  Tenouncaa  his  pretmBioni  to 
the  tlinme,  343 ;  King  Fredarick 
aiclddea  EoUtein  from  the  new 
CooBtitution,  S44  ;  Fnuai&  sup- 
porta  Sohleawig  sffainat  Ben^ 
"""■^1  344 ;  England  recommenda 
■epatata  legulatnro,  ib. ;  "King 
Frederick's  maniFesto  declares 
Bchleewig-  incorpoiBted  with  Den- 
mark, 346  ;  Christian  IX.  supports 
his  predooessor'i  policy,  545 ;  Saxon 
and  HanoTorian  troops  enter  Hoi' 
stein,  31B  ;  Uismarck'a  plana,  347  ; 
Anstrian  and  Pnisaian  troopt  enter 
Sohleswig,  360 ;  armistice  and 
Conference  of  London,  36 1 ;  con- 
tinnatian  of  the  war,  and  failure  of 
Danmaik  to  enforce  Its  .demanda, 
3SZ;  enmDder  of  the  Duchieeto 
Austria  and  Prusaia  by  the  Treaty 
of  Vienna,  ii. ;  Bismarck  pro- 
poaea  oonditianslly  that  the  crown 
abonld  he  conferred  upon  the  Prince 
of  Augiutenburg,  357  :  annexed  to 
PruBsia,  379 

Schlick,  Auatrian  general,  defeated  by 
Huni^arianB,  iil.  87 

tJcbmaiz,  his  pamphlet  againtt  Prus- 
sian Liberals,  ii.  124 

Sohmerling,  leader  of  Qerman  Assem- 
blr,  ii'i.  118;  reHigna  office,  126; 
called  to  office  by  the  Emperor 
Fnmdi  JoMmh  L,  326  ;  roaignution, 
387 

Schanbnmn,  Treaty  of,  i.  298 

SchonTaloff,  Count,  Rusaian  Ambassa- 
dor at  London,  iii.  496,  607,  616 

Schwaraonberg,  Auatrian  commander 
in  Russia,  i.  462  ;  conimande  army 
of  Bohemia  against  Napoleon,  602, 
e06,  613,  621 

tichwaixenberg,  Felix,  ohisf  Austrian 
HiDi8teT(lS4a],iy.80;  depoees  the 
Bmperor,  81;  publieheB  a  Constitu- 
tion, 88  ;  design  regarding  Lom- 
bardy,  97;  plan  for  centralisation 
of  Government  in  Austria,  126; 
aeeke  to  provoke  a  quarrel  with 
Prussia,  144 ;  Prussia  submits  to 
his  demands  for  dissolution  of 
PniBsian  Uniao,  and  the  reco|;iii- 
tion  of  the  Diet  of  Frankfort,  147 ; 
4aspotio  polii^,  163 ;  death,  151 


Solnrflidniti,  Tomott  at,  BL  130 

Bebast^pol,  ii.  447;  iii.  107;  forUflca- 
cations  of,  210;  bombardmant  of, 
214  ;  progress  of  the  siege  of,  223 ; 
fall  of,  226 ;  restoration  of  Rnsaian 
power  by  tbe  revision  ot  the  Treaty 
of  Paris  (1871),  240 

Sebaatiani,  bis  report  upon  Egypt,  i. 
267.  French  Foreign  Uinistw 
(1831),  ii.  402 

Sudan,  Battle  and  oapitnlatloii  ot,  iii 
448 

Senate  of  France  (1709),  i.  206 

Serbs,  The,  of  Bonthem  Hungary, 
revolt  in  1848,  iii.  63,  64,  66;  ds^ 
feat  Hungarians  at  Ckulowits,  S8 

Serfage,  Abolition  of,  in  Austria,  i. 
22;  in  Buchy  of  Waiaaw,  368; 
in  Pmasia,  ib.    In  Hnssjit,  iii.  330 

Serria  expels  Turkiab  garrisonB,  iii. 
288  ;  supporls  the  revolt  ot  Herze- 
govina, 477  ;  declares  war  against 
Turke}',  482;  defuutod  by  Turks, 
489 ;  indi^ndenoe  recognised  by 
the  Treaties  of  San  Stetano  and 
Berlin,  610 

Seville  taken  by  the  French,  L  446 ; 
ii.219 

Seymour,  Sir  Hamilton,  British  Am- 
bassador  at  St.  Pt-torsburft,  iii.  I8T 

Shipka  Pass,  BatUe  of,  iiL  500; 
c&pitnlHtion  of,  604 

Sicily,  condition  of  in  righteenth 
century,  i.  116  ;  Bonaparte  demands 
its  cession  to  his  brother  Joseph, 
SI 5.  Under  Ferdinand  of  Knples, 
ii.  86;  BiitUh  influence,  SB;  slate 
of,  in  1821,  201 ;  revcIoUon  at 
Palermo,  474;  conquered  by  Ferdi- 
noud   of    Naples,    112;    Garibaldi 


B  Palom 


dictnloiEhip  of  the  island,  2S5,  286  ; 
Garibaldi's  difficulties  in  larrying 
on  the  government,  2BB ;  desires 
annexation  to  the  kingdom  of 
Victor  Emmanuel,  295 

Si£y^  Abbe,  i.  199,  20),  204 

Silesia.  Loxs  of,  by  Austria,  i.  21 

Silistria.  Siege  of,  iii.  207 

Simon,  at.,  ijodalistic  writinge,  ii.  ii09 

Simpson,  QenersI,  eucceods  Iiord  lle^- 
lan  as  English  commander  in  the 
Crimea,  iii.  226 

Simson,  Dr.,  President  of  the  Frank- 
fort National  Aasembly,  offers  the 
Imperial  Crown  to  King  Frederick 
WiUiam.  iii.  133 ;  spokoamon  at 
VeiB^iillos,  468 

Sinope.  Turkish  squadron  destroyed  hj 


■  fiuesis  at.  ii 


i97 


MODERtr  BVSOFS. 


flkoMall,  OMunl,  at  the  b«ttlM  of 

Flenu,  iii.  SOI 
BUtbit,  kboluhed  b^  England  (I83S), 

BI«*»-tn<de,  prohibited  by  Engbni) 
{18071,  ii.  71;  Fmnca  nnitei  with 
England  hj  the  trMtjr  of  Faris  for 
ita  luppreaiion,  i.  GST.  England 
|BOpOBea  it*  aniTanHLl  abolition  at 
the  Congraea  of  Vitnna,  ii.  71; 
Sweden  and  Holland  prohibit  it, 
til ;  Spain  refuua  any  rwtriFUon, 
76  ;  aboiilfaed  by  Napoleon,  ii. 

Slan  of  HuDgary,  ii.  478 ;  national 
nMtTement8(I830— I843J,  IBS,  187; 
iii.  70,  3H 

Smith,  Sir  Sidney,  English  ftdminl,2Sl 

SmolmBko,  rarrendered  to  Napoleon  by 
the  Bnaiiana,  L  167 ;  en^  of  the 
French  on  the  retreat  from  Moscow, 
471 


SoUermo,  Battle  of,  iii  363 

SophitH  iii.  GOl 

Bonlt,  Freoch  f;eneral,  i.  S94,  397 ;  in- 
Tadea  Portugal,  101 ;  captuiea 
Sevillfl,  and  Liyi  aicf^e  to  Oulii, 
416 ;  in  the  Fyi«iiee«,  »20,  SeTves 
nnder  Loail  XVin.,  ii.  18 

Spain,  allied  with  England  againat 
Fnuioe,  L  69 ;  oodea  to  France  a 
wwtioii  of  St.  Domingo,  B6 ;  fleet 
bMlon  by  English  oS  St.  Tincont, 
lei ;  treaty  oE  Fontaineblean,  3S6 ; 
under  Charlea  IV.,  367;  diiastroiia 
influ«noe  of  Qodoy,  367;  deaignaof 
Napoleon,  368 ;  loM  of  Bneno* 
Aym,  360 ;  friendly  entry  of  tho 
Franoh,  372 ;  hatred  towards  Oodoy 


and   the    Que 


372; 


□try    of 


General  Munt,  373 ;  abdicatioi 
Ohariee  IT.,  and  aooeawon  ol 
Fndinand,  371;  ChailM  and 
Ferdinand  lairsnder  their  Ti^la 
to  Napoleon  at  Bayonne,  S77; 
nationiU  aiorit,  S77 ;  rising  of 
th»  people  agunat  the  £Vench, 
S7S ;  Jea^h  B«nuHiarteinada  King, 
381;  Spaaiarda  defeaiad  at  Bto 
Beoo,  SSS  1  vietorjr  of  Baylen,  384 ; 
NapolMn'a  oampugn,  8M;  Battlo 
(rfOonuina,SH;  ■agaofSaiagoeaa, 
400)  famded  I7  Wellington; 
TalaTera.  444;  Tictoriea  of 
Haivhal  Soolt,  446  ;  campaigna  of 
1810,  1811,  447— MS;  WdlmgtoE 
•nten  Madrid,  but  retreats,  449; 
attack  of  the  liberal!  on  despotimn, 
411;  Uw  Jwta  resipu  ila  fowen 


into  the  hands  of  a  Bogancy,  401 ; 
Conatitutloo  made  by  the  Cortea, 
4G3;  antsgooism  of  the  clergy  far 
the  Cortes,  461 ;  campaign  of  1818, 
Tittoria,  fi20.  Baitoration  of 
Ferdinand,  ii.  B ;  power  of  tha 
clergy,  1 1 ;  decline  of  oommenia 
and  agrioaltni*,  12;  leluses  to 
accept  any  restriction  regarding 
the  slaTe-trade,  76,  76  ;  action  of 
England  in  1816  under  Lord 
Caatlereagh  regwdinK  Uio  Oon- 
stitution,  89  ;  condition  between 
1814—1820,  168—177-;  abira 
betwBML  1820—1822,  207-209 ; 
Einf  F^dioAnd  oonspiree  ^tg*-inj^ 
the  Conatitation,  ii. ;  Uie  Er^tadoa 
and  ServUes,  207,  308 ;  dvil  war, 
209;  Congress  of  Vtamui,  215- 
317;  invasion  of  the  French,  219; 
appointment  of  a  Begency,  230  ; 
6ieg«  of  Chdia,  333 ;  ike  Constitn- 
tion  abrogated,  U, ;  clergy  placed 
in  oSIce,  223 ;  reign  of  terror,  224  ; 
England  prohibits  the  conqneat  of 
Spamsh  colonies  by  Fntnce  .:r 
Allies,  21j— 227;  death  of  King 
Ferdinand,  427,  429;  repeals  Salio 
lav,  and  appoints  his  daaghtar 
Issbella  to  snoceed  him  under  the 
Begency  of  the  Queen,  429 ;  Don 
OarloB  claims  the  crown,  and  heads 
a  rebellion,  ii. ;  Martinei  de  la 
B«aa  gins  a  Conatitntion,  it. ;  Don 
Carka  defcsled  and  nnnovad  to 
London,  430  ;  Don  Carlos  re. 
appears  in,  at  head  of  insuigenla 
(1831),  131 ;  Tictoriaa  of  Carlist^ 
431;  defeat  of  General  Valdea, 
436:  appeal  to  SVanca  for  asBstanos 
which  IB  nfosed,  436 — (87;  toIdii- 
teers  in  Englaml  and  Viaiu»  en- 
rolled,  commanded  by  Oolond  Da 


r  Oariiats  bf 
QeuoaE  Esparteia,  and  end  of 
Oariiri:  war  (1839),  441;  Qoeai 
Qmstina  raigns  the  Regency,  and 
ia  neceeded  by  Qeneral  Espartan^ 
ii. ;  exile  ol  Eapu-tero,  442 ; 
Friooess  tsabella  made  Qaeen, 
ii. ;  Hareiagea  of  the  Queen  to 
Don  Vtaxtdmso  and  of  the  In< 
fanta  to  the  Duke  of  Uontpensier, 
SOS.  BaTDlntion  of  ISftB,  iU.  413 ; 
candidatnra  of  Fiince  Leopold  for 
the  throne  opposed  by  Fmncc^  411 
—416 
Spandao,  Pmssan  fortress,  sum*- 
4<ndfa>l)MEVaock,iS»| 


^lelia,  DIM  of  uw  .£geaik  lalonda,  ii. 
S87 

Sphfttteria,  iRlaod  of,  ii.  306 

Spicheren,  Battle  of,  between  French 
and  Pruasiun^  iiJ.  43S 

Bpiiea,  ca^ured  by  French,  i.  63 

Stadion,  Count,  Aiutrun  Miniitar,  i. 
403  ;  ietii«fl  from  public  afhirs,  129 

Btad,  Hme.  de,  1  211 

Stein,  Ritter  vom,  i.  2fiS;  his  ex- 
ponire  of  the  character  of  King 
Frederick  WHliam's  advisera,  318  ; 
Appeals  to  PruBsiun  pntriotiain,  336 
(and  note);  chief  MioiHter,  367; 
edict  tor  the  abohtion  of  eerlags, 
35B  ;  reurganisatiaa  of  army,  362; 
political  refonns,  365 ;  attompta 
to  nc|tuti&te  vith  Napoleon  fur 
the  ITrench  eracnation  of  Fruiaia, 
388 ;  entoaragM  a  popuLir  in- 
mrrrection,  389 ;  rengiiB  office, 
361;  outlawed  by  Napoleon,  302; 
■dTJaer  of  the  Emperor  of  KuBsia, 
480;  his  conunuaion  from  ths 
Cmr  to  East  Prumio,  481;  ar- 
nngea  treaty  of  EaliBch,  484 ; 
policy  during  War  of  Liberation, 
608.  I'micnt  at  the  Cocgresa  of 
Vienna,  ii.  ZO,  26 ;  on  the  terma  of 
WMud  Treaty  of  Paris,  SI ;  with- 
drawal from  OODgresa  at  Vienna, 


L433 

Btettin,  Pniatiiui  fortreei,  nnendered 
to  the  French,  i.  333 

Stewart,  Sir  Charlie,  L  fi36 

BhK'laich,  Battle  of,  i.  179 

Stonrdm,  hia  pampblet  on  Qerman  re- 
volutionaiy  Diovements,  ii  138 

StralBimd,  Capitulation  of,  to  the 
French,  i.  360;  tiikon  by  Schill, 
and  afterwards  by  Napoleon,  419 

fitiangf  ord,  Lord,  Eagliiih  Ambiissiidor 
at  Conetantinople,  ii.  27S,  2T8 

fitiaabnrg,  aipectod  Boyuliet  moTo- 
meot  at,  L  87.  Concentration  of 
boopsat(tR70),  iiL428;cHpitulat«« 
to  the  Pruaaiana,  463 

BtnitiaiiroTk,  leader  of  the  Serba,  iii. 
89 

■troKoiioff,  RoBiian  Ambasaador  at 
(Stnatantinople,  ii.  276 

Btnttgart,  Kemnant  at  German  Na- 
tional Aiaenibly  meets  at,  but  ex- 
pelled ina  few  days  by  the  Govern- 
ment, ill.  137 

9«bsid^  of  England  to  Fnisaia,  i.  SS ; 


a.  587 

l^li  to  Micomjtliih  intended  result, 
93;  to  Anstna,  97,  223;  syatem 
of,  343 

Boleiman  Pasha,  iii.  GOl,  603,  506 

Suliotes,  Ilie,  iL  264,  296 

SuTaro^  Russian  general,  i.  177;  cam- 
paign in  Lombardy,  lSl;diHBenBiuas 
«i[^  Austrian  Ooveimneot,  IS8 ; 
notoriea  over  the  French,  191 ;  re- 
treats serosa  the  Alps,  194 

Sweden,  joins  the  Northern  Maritdme 
League,  i.  238;  unites  with  Eng- 
land a^iiMt  Fiance,  378 ;  joins  in 
thetreatyof  Bartenatein,il44.  Pro- 
hibits the  slave-trade,  S.  76 

Switzerland,  French  intarrentitai,  J. 
169;  war  with  France,  161;  the 
Helvetio Bepublic,  162;  movMuents 
of  French  troops,  178;  Russian 
campaign,  191;  civil  war,  and 
Bonaparte's  intervention,  246 ; 
declared  independent  by  the  treaty 
of  Paris,  636.  DIsperaion  ot 
revolutionary  leaders  by  order  ot 
European  Powers,  ii.  414 

Syria,  conquered  by  Egyptians  luder 
tbiahim,  ii.  443 ;  given  to  Viceroy 
of  Egypt,  44S  ;  expulsion  of  Ibr*> 
him  by  European  allies,  460.  Occu- 
pied }^  the  French,  iii.  238 

Bzechonyi,  Count,  his  refonns  in  Hun- 
gary, ii.  481 :  alarmed  at  Koasuth't 
liberalism,  464 


Talavem,  Battle  o^  L  4: 
rand,  Bonaparte's 
support  of  Italy, 

jlond  on  the  rejection  of  Bona- 
parte's peace  proposal,  217 ;  drawa 
np  Italian  Constitution,  244 ;  his 
work  in  the  settlement  of  Qermiinv, 
248  ;  at  Erfurt,  391 ;  acU  with 
Alciandar  on  dethronement  of 
Napoleon,  G31.  Sepresents  Franca 
at  the  Congreu  of  Vienna,  ii.  20 — 30; 
united  to  Fouch£  in  offioe  under 
Louis  XVIII.,  61 ;  faU  of  his 
Ministry  in  1815,  95  :  intrigues  on 
behalf  ot  Louia  Philippe.  363 ; 
Ambassador  to  Londou,  385 ;  per- 
suadeH  William  IV.and  Wellington 
to  abstain  from  intervention  in 
Bel^oo  uSairH,  386 

Tann,  Prussian  Qeneral,  tabea  Orleans, 
iii.  463;  driven  from  Orieana,  457 

Tatiatchatf,  Oenoral,  Hussian  Ambas- 
sador at  Madrid,  ii.  81 

TDhemaieff,    General,   leads    Buasiaii 
tioops  in  Servia,  iii,  iS9 


MOSBSS  roxopa. 


TohanBjm,  Valkr  of  tlu,  IB.  31S,  IIT ; 
iMtttla  cf  Um,  326 

in 

Tiumtlj,  0.  S64,  366,  iil.  619 
Thim,  U,  «dttor  of  tha  XaHenal, 
pnbUdiM  ■  protest  againat  Oa 
■diola  <rf  Oiarlea  X,  li.  HV ;  oppoaw 
inaaiiectioii  id  Psria,  970 ;  adTancM 
th*  MOM  of  the  Duke  of  Orleana, 
>7S ;  premier,  varlilco  policy  on  the 
Eaatom  Qoeation,  46S ;  ttmgtutiau, 
460.  UU  hiatory  of  Napoleon,  iii. 
44;  arraated  by  Looia  Napoleon, 
173 1  denouQcea  Blamarck'a  aggroa- 
nona,  404 ;  argumenU  af;aiiiet  war 
with  FnuaU,  421;  move*  Oke 
fannatioii  of  a  Oomoiittee  of 
Guvcrnmunt  on  the  Burrander  of 
Napataoii  at  Sedan,  448^  elected 
Fiuxident  by  the  National  Aaaembty 
at  Bordeaux,  and  Hiranj^et  teima 
of  peace  At  Voreailloa  with  Biamorok, 
4M ;  efiorta  to  save  Mate,  466  ;  the 
Tremit  Bepublio  under  hia  I'mai- 


Thonuu,  Qenetal  Climen^  murdered  by 
NaUonal  Quards  of  Parii,  iii  470 

Thourenel,  M.,  French  Foreign 
Miniater,  iiL  274 

niDgiit  (Anttrian  Hinister} ;  character, 
and  aaropcui  opinion  of  him,  i.  81 
(imdnote);  projects  of  Hnneintion, 
Sb  ;  on  the  disorder  in  the  Austriiin 
arm)',  91;  his  war  policy  oppoaod, 
129  (and  note),  138;  detenninea  to 
renew  the  war  with  Fiance,  169  ; 
disagrees  with  Russian  oommander, 
Suvaroff,  188  i  design  to  budgz 
Piedmcmt  to  Austria,  IBO  (and 
note) ;  on  the  Emperor's  secret 
orniistiDe  with  Prance,  223  (and 
nata]  ;  resigns  oQicu,  and  re- 
appointed, 224 1  dismissed  from 
puwor,  225  i  his  advice  sought  by 
Uie  Emperor  after  Wagnun,  430 

Timova,  iii.  499 

Todleben,  Rossian  general  In  the 
&imca,  iii.  212,  213;  placed  at  tha 
head  ol  the  army  betora  PlevnH,  S02 

Toreno  ancceuds  Vuldes  aa  Bpunish 
War  Uinister,  ii.  438 

Totrea  Vedras^  Unea  of,  i.  444 

Tory  Party,  i.  82 

Toulon  in  revolt^  L  76;  sarrender  to 
Knijublif,  82 

TouiB,  seiflnd  Hoat  of  French  Govom- 
ment  at  the  commencement  of  the 
tie^e  of  Piui^  iii.  451 


Timtalgar,  Battle  of,  L  3M 
TranaylTania,    i.    25.     A^tatiiai    lor 

Conititational  rigfafas,  ii.  483.    Aa 

Boumaiuwi  moTsmant  in,  m.  W; 

Russian*  enter,  89 
Treaty,  Westphalia  (1643),  L  IT ;  for 

the  partition  of  FuUnd,   between 
■   Empreas      CaUierine     ud     King 


FnuiM  and  Prussia  (1796),  128  ; 
Tolentino,  France  and  Pope,  136 ; 
Leoben  (1797),  Francs  and  Aurtria, 
138  ;  Campo Fonaia  {1797),  Fran<:e 
and  AuBlxia,  147 ;  Liui£Tille[180I), 
Fnuice  and  Austria,  226  ;  *■""■■" 
(18D2).  Franoa  and  Oniat  Britain, 
238;  Potsdam  (1805),  Pnuui  and 
Kuaaia,  292;  SchonfininD  (1805), 
Pruann  and  Fnuoe,  298;  Frea- 
burg  (1805),  Fiwice  and  Austria, 
299;  Bartfnstain  (1807),  Ruaaia, 
Pruwi;!,  Kngland,  and  8*eden, 
344  ;  TiUit  (1807),  Franca,  Basaka, 
and  Prnaeia,  347;  Foutainablma 
(1807),  France  and  Spain,  365; 
Vienna  (1809),  France  and 
AuaUia,  430  ;  Ealirch  (18131, 
Pnusia  and  Rusaia,  484  ;  Bsidipii- 
iMi'h  (1813),  Austria,  Rusbia, 
Hiid  Pmoia,  499 ;  Teplita  (1813), 
Russia,  Prussia,  and  Austiia,  611 ; 
liied  (1813),  Bavaria  and  the 
Alliea  during  the  War  of  Idbeia- 
tion,  511:  Paris  (1814),  France 
and  the  AUiee,  536,  537.  (Secret) 
at  CangT«ss  of  Vionn!i  (1816), 
France,  England,  and  Aualna 
a^Linst  Rusda  and  Prusaia,  iL 
28  ;  TParis  (second)  (18!'".),  63;  Holy 
Alliance  (1815) ;  Ituwia  and  the 
Powers,  63;  London  (1827),  Eng- 
land, Kussia,  and  France,  324 ; 
RuNSia  and  Turkey  iit  Akerman 
(1820),  335;  Adiianople  (1828), 
Russia  and  Turkey,  343  ;  London 
(1834),  tipain,  Portugsj,  Eng- 
land, and  France,  (or  the  eipulsion 
of  Don  Carlos  and  l)t>u  M  igur!  from 


la  aod  Turkey, 
Commercial,  England  and 
Turkey  (1838),  463;  En^bnd, 
Russia,  AnstHa,  and  Pmssia  on 
the  Eastoni  Question  (1840),  466. 
Paris  (1866),  Riiesia,  (Jrent  Britain, 
and  Allies,  iii.  230 ;  (Scicret)  France 
end  SardiniH  (1859),  256;  Ziini^ 
(1859),   AuBtiia,  Fnnoe,  and  ^. 


Aostria,  aiiil  FrusaU,  3S3;  Prague 
(1866),   Fruuia  sod  Austria,   370; 
Loadou  (1867)  on  Uie  Loiembiuv 
Queetion,    402 ;     TeraaiUes     and 
Frankfort     [1S71),    PnuBia    and 
Pnnce,    165;    Keichatadt    (1B76), 
Roraia    and    Atutria,    488 ;    8an 
Htefano  (1878),  Russia  and  Turkey, 
610  ;  Berlin  (1818),  general,  218 
Trabbia,  BatUe  of  the,  i.  182,  186 
TrtvB^  Elector   of,   proteclB   Freooh 
emigrantB,   i.    10;    emigiants   ex- 
pelled from,  10  )  condiLiun  in  1792, 
37 
Tribunal,  lieTolatioiiary,  L  74 
Tribnuate  (France),  i.  20S,  2S9 
'I'rinidad,  i.  238 

Tripolit^  centre  of  TurlHah  GoTeni' 
ment  in  the  Marea,  ii.  288 ;  Cftptnre 
of,  b]r  Greek  ioBurgenlc,  and  maa- 
ncTS  ot  iohabitants,  291;  burned 
bT  Ibrahim,  347 
Trocho,  Qeiieral,  bead  of  the  QOTOm- 
ment  of  National  Defence  in  Farii, 
iii448 
Troppau,  Couforence  of,  ii.  193 
I'ngendbnnd,  Oerman  Society,  i.  407. 
bj    Bchmalz,    ii.    124; 


140 

ToilerieB,  Lomi  XVT.  confined  at 
(1791),  i.  4 ;  attacked  by  mob,  42  ; 
Mtabked  bj  Royalists.  102;  sur- 
rounded by  Augereau's  troops  for 
the  seisnre  of  the  oppoeition  eection 
in  the  Directory,  146.  Flight  o( 
Louis  XVIII.,  ii.  38;  devastated 
br  the  mob  (1848),  513.  Louis 
Napoleon  takes  poKicssion  of,  iii. 
177 

Tartn,  entry  of  Rnaaian  troops,  i.  187. 
Government  comaiences  ecclo- 
siaatical  reform,  iii.  243  ;  with- 
drawal  ot  French  AmbasBador  on 
the  Invasion  of  the  Papal  States  by 
the  Fiedmonteee,  293 

Torkey,  declaration  of  war  against 
French  Bepublic,  i.  169  ;  joins  the 
coalitim  against  France,  ii. ;  de- 
feated by  f^nce  at  Heliopolis,  234. 
Deeigns  of  Anstria  and  Russia,  ii. 
3Sfi  ;  supremacy  in  oertain  districts 
«f  Qreece,  348 ;  rerenes  in  Oreeo^ 
2SI,  270 ;  dtif  an  out  of  the  Morea, 
274;  manacre  ot  Christians  at 
Oonslantiiiople,  276,  276;  Austrian 
policy,  379;  attitude  of  England, 
S81 ;  fall  of  Tripolitzs,  290 ; 
■BMocn  of   Chioa,  201;  doobla 


t.  S60 

inTarim  of  On«(w,  295 — 298; 
defeated  by  Greeks,  290;  siege  of 
Hiasolonghi,  309 — 311 ;  refuses 
anniatice  proposed  by  Allies,  320 ; 
defeated  by  Allies  at  Navanno, 
330—332  ;  Sultan's  manifesto,  335  ; 
war  with  Russia,  836—343 ;  peace 
of  Adrianople,  343 ;  war  with 
Hehemet  Aii,  412—446;  peace  of 
Kutaya,  446 ;  Treaty  of  Unkiar 
Skelosei  with  Russia,  449 ;  second 
war  «ith  Mebemet  All,  453 ;  death 
ot  Mshmud  II„  464 ;  accession  of 
Abdul  Medjid,  4S4 ;  Admiral 
Achmet  Fewzi  hands  over  Turkish 
fleet  to  Mehemet  All,  U. ;  joint 
action  with  Allies  against  Uehemet 
Ali,  and  Ibrahim,  4S0,  460;  here- 
ditary government  of  Egypt  con- 
ferred on  Mehemet  Ali  and  family, 
461 ;  mfomiB  of  Reschid  Pasha, 
463 ;  talll  of  Reschid,  464.  Hie 
Czar  visits  England  respecting 
Turkish  affairs,  and  speaks  <n 
Turkey  "as  a  sick,  a  dying 
man,"  iii.  182;  protects  Koaauth 
and  other  Hungarian  leaders,  184  ; 
dispute  'with  Russia  respecting 
Holy  Places  in  Palestine,  and  pro- 
tection of  Greek  Christians,  185^ 
180 1  rejects  the  Vienna  Note,  105  ; 
outbreak  of  hostilities  with  Russia, 
197  ;  defeats  Russians  at  Oltenitza, 
107;  squadrondestroyed  by  Russia 
atSinope,  i*. ;  Crimean  War,  210— 
226;  fall  of  Ears,  237;  Treaty  of 
Paris,  230 ;  engagements  mode  with 
regard  to  the  protection  of  Chris- 
tians, 231  (and  note) ;  hollow  and 
fictitious  character  of  Treaty  of 
Paris,  234  ;  discord  through- 
out the  Empire,  238;  revolt  of 
Heraegovina,  477  ;  presents tion 
of  the  Andrasay  Note  at  Con- 
stantinople demanding  certain 
reforms,  478 ;  mnrder  of  Prusuao 
and  French  Consuls  at  ^onika, 
479  ;  the  Berlin  Memorandum,  4S0 ; 
deposition  and  murder  of  Sultan 
Abdul  Aziz,  482 ;  asaassination  of 
Hussein  Avni,  ii. ;  accession  of 
Murad  v.,  it.;  war  declared  by 
Servia  and  MOutonegro,  it. ;  5or- 
vian  defeats  and  armistice,  189; 
Constitation,  403;  Constiintinople 
Conference,  493;  rejects  the  pro- 
posals of  the  Powers  fur  an  Inter- 
national Commission,  49'i  ,  rejects 
the  London  Pmtoool,  497;  Russia 
doduea  war;  tS~ 


m 


noDsnir  svnoFS. 


Bnlguu,  4BT— £02 :  &U  of  Plema, 
capitnlBtion  of  Shipka,  and  enby  of 
Boatful  troopB  into  Adrionople, 
503—606;  tha  Saltan  appealg  to 
Qnesii  Victoria,  fi05 ;  Treaty  of  B«n 
Stefono,  610 ;  oedea  Cypnu  to 
X!ng1and.,  and  undertalies  to  protect 
ChriitiBii  sabjecta  in  Asia,  617: 
modificatioii*  of  the  Treaty  of  5mi 
StefsDO  at  the  Con^reu  ol  Berlm, 
21S,  219 

^Bcany,  Hole  of  Leopold  II-  in,  i. 
26;  allied  with  Eagland  againBb 
f^nct^  69  ;  Mate  of.  in  eighteenth 
century.  116;  given  to  Prince  of 
Parma  bj  Biniaparte,  246,  Eventa 
in  1848,  iii.  18,  97;  fiight  and  re- 
atoratioD  of  the  Qrsnd  Duke,  88, 
103;  final  flight  of  thoOrand  Duke, 
2SI ;  dictatorship  offered  to  Victor 
Emmanuel,  ii. ;  imited  to  Pied- 
mont under  Victor  Emmanuel,  276 

Tyrol,  The,  ceded  to  Bavaria  bj 
Anatria,  i.  300  ;  liaing  against  the 
Fieoch  (1609),  410 ;  trmtment  by 
the  £mperor  of  Austria,  433 ;  «xo- 
ontion  of  Hofer  by  Napoleon,  436 

Ulm,  i.  288  _ 

nitremoDtaniran,  i.  263  ;  nireada  in 
Austria,  iii.  IBS;  opposition  of,  to 
Victor  Emmannel'a  roforma,  244 ; 
power  in  Bavaria,  411 

UuiLria,  iii.  282 ;  entry  of  Fiedmonteae 
troops,  203 

DnivetBilius.  conaiderad  byMettemlcli 
to  be  dangerous  to  European  peace, 
ii.  137  ;  placed  under  police  aupor- 
▼iaion  in  Oennany  (IS32),  411. 
Influence  and  agitiition  of  tlie 
(tudenta  of  Viennu  (1848),  iii.  60, 
61 

Taldoa,  Spanish  War  Miniater,  tnket 
the  field  againat  Carlists  and  BuSera 
minoua  defeat,  ii.  436  ;  retirement, 
438 

Valencia,  Ferdinanil  of  Spain's  mani- 
festo at,  ii.  10 

Valencienuea,  Siege  nf,  i.  TO ;  capitn- 
latee  to  Duke  of  York,  76 

VsUadolid,  i.  398 

Vahny,  Battle  of,  L  47 

Vandamme,  Frencli  QeneraL  i.  6D6, 
606 

Varna,  aunendered  to  Bussiana.  ii,  340 

Vaablano,  H,,  French  Minister,  intro- 
duces the  Electoral  Bill  (1816),  ii 


Tenaisnn,  Qlaima  of  the  t* 


Venioe,  fionaparte'a  daaigni  on,  L  121 ; 


French  troopa,  U. ;  otCer«d  1^ 
Bonaparte  to  Anatria,  141 ;  be> 
cornea  the  property  of  Anatria 
by  tha  Treaty  ol  Oampo  Fonnio, 
147 ;  ceded  to  France,  300. 
Won  by  Austria  (1814),  ii.«;  under 
Austrian  rule,  83.  Insunectioa 
{1S48],  liL  IS  :  excludnd  from  ths 
nev  Italian  kingdom  (1861),  298; 
unil«d  with  Italy  (1866),  386 
Tergniaud,  Girondin  memb^  of  L^i>- 

lative  Assembly,  i.  0 
Verona,  Congrem  of,  ii.  216—217 
Veraaillw,  ilL  460,  463,  464 ;  Treaty  of, 
406;  King  WUliam  takes  the 
tlUe  of  Gsnnan  Emperovat,168; 
headquartera  of  French  Govern- 
ment troopa  daring  the  inaurrection 
_  ofthe  Parifl  Commune,  470 
Vioenxa,  capitulatee  to  Austria,  iiL  80 
Vintor,  French  general,  i.  426,  474 
'^itor  Emmanuel,  lueceeda  his  father 
Charles  Albert,  as  King  of  Sardinia, 
iii.  101,  102 ;  chnracter,  and  work 
on  behalf  o(  Italian  freedom,  241, 
242;  offered  the  Dictatoralup  of 
Tuscany,  261 ;  appoints  com- 
misaioncrs  to  eurol  troops  in  Italy 
against  Anatria,  282 ;  courage  Bt 
battle  of  Solferino,  263;  accepts 
the  sovereignty  of  Tnacany,  Parma, 
Modena,  and  the  Bomagna,  277 ; 
threatened  breach  with  Qstribaldi 
with  regard  to  the  propoaed  invasion 
□f  Kome,  206;  all  Italy  excepting 
Borne  and  Venetia  united  nnder  hia 
•overeignty  (1861),  298 ;  allied  wiih 
Prussia  in  war  against  Austi-ui 
(1866),  S77;  gains VeneIJa, 386;  Na- 
poleon's proposed  defensive  atliaiicfl 
against  Frusaia,  409 ;  gains  Borne, 
472 
Vienna,  occupied  by  the  French,  i. 
293 ;  second  occnpotion  by  tba 
French.  410;  peaoe  of.  430;  c«a- 
ference  of  Ministers,  146 ;  popn- 
lar  diacoDtentin  1846,  496.  Riot* 
of  184S,  iii.  SI ;  flight  of  the  Em- 
peror Ferdinand,  i  63;  tumult 
(October)  and  murder  of  Latonr, 
76 ;    Gleneral  WindischgnUa  oon- 


Vieiiiui,0(nigTMaot,ii  30— 31,  3S,8S— 

71 
ViKennch  Armutice  of,  iii.  62 
TikgD^  Cupituktaon  ot,  to  AuHtriooH, 

m.96 
VaiKtnoica,  iii.  266 
VillaiDariiiA,  Sordiniaii  ai]il>aft(idor  fti 

Naplo,  ii:.  291 
Tillile,    De,     Boj-nlist     member     of 

Chamber  of  Deputiei ;  scheme  for 

a  FmLchiee  Bill,  ii.  1 10 ;  ent«n  the 


nnder  Chorlea  Z.,  368 
ViUenauve,  Admiisl,  i.  2BG;  defeated 

by  Nelson  «t  Trafalgar,  2S0 
Timieiro,  Battle  of,  i.  386 
Vincent,    8t.,    Battle  of,   Ifil ;    Dcm 

Miguai's  fleet  deatrojed  by  Captain 

Charlea  Napier,  it  426 
Tittoria,L372,  30* 
Toluntoer  Foroea  in  England,  iiL  279 


127* 

Wallachia,  proposed  annexBtiDn  to 
Eossia,  i-  31S.  Entry  of  RuHaiun 
boope  (1363),  iii.  193 ;  union 
with  Moldavia,  236 

War  of  Liberation,  i.  400 

Waissw,  Advance  of  Frusisiana  on,  L 
89 ;  Grand  Dochy  of,  347.  Tielded 
to  Eusaia  by  Fnuna,  ii  26 ;  Qrand 
Dachy  restored  to  iodppendeuco 
tinder  the  title  of  Kingdom  of 
Foland  by  Alexander,  i.  80 ;  insur- 
rection (1830),  392  ;  captured,  397. 
TumuItB  and  appointmont  of  Qrajid 
Jiake  C<mst>Lntme  aa  Vicomv,  iii. 
834;  levy  and  in<urrectiaa  (1863), 
33S 

Wartbiug  Festival,  ii.  127,  128  (note) 

Waterloo,  Battle  of,  ii.  £3— 66 

WattignieH,  Buttle  of,  I  81 

M'eimar,  Grand  Duke  of,  ii.  123—129 

Weimar,  home  of  Goethe,  i.  38 

WeiBsenborg,  i.  69 ;  stormed  bf 
Austriona,  87  ;  taken  by  French,  87; 
battle  of,  iii.  433 

Welledey,  Sir  Arthur  (mw  WellingtoD, 
Duke  of) 

Wellington,  Duke  of,Iands  in  Portugal, 
i.  386;  battle  of  Vimieiro,  it.; 
defeats  the  French  at  TaluTera, 
42G  ;  retreRtg  into  Portugal,  427 ; 
at  I'orros  Vednit,  Mt ;  campaign 


of  1811,  447:  oampign  of  IB12, 
battle  of  Salaiuanca,  449 ;  enter* 
Uadrid,  ib. ;  campaign  of  1813,  vic- 
tory of  Vittoria,  620 ;  entora  Fiano^ 
it.  Amlassador  at  FariH,  ii.  19  and 
note ;  Bucueedn  Lord  Castlereagh  at 
the  Congress  of  Vienna,  31,  39;  at 
head  of  Hkigliah  armv  at  Urusaehu 
48  ;  at  Quatre  Bras,  60  ;  Battle  of 
Waterloo,  6S  — 66;  airives  In 
Parin,  and  proposes  FuuchS  aa 
Minister  to  Louis  XVIll.,  69; 
against  taking  Alsaoe  and  Lor- 
raine from  FianoB,  61  ;  foreign 
policy  in  Sicily,  France,  and 
Spain,  87<B0  ;  abatejns  from  plead- 
ing for  the  life  of  Marabal  Ney, 
99 ;     protests    to    Louis    XVllI. 

yinst  the  machinutions  of  Count 
Aitoia  in  the  French  Chambers, 
114  i  attempt  on  his  lite,  134  ;  asked 
to  presida  at  a  Conference  at 
Uadrid;  called  "the  Man  of  Europe," 
172 ;  repreeenta  England  at  the 
Gongreas  of  Verona,  216 ;  mission 
to  St.  PotOTBbarg,  321;  Prime 
Uiniitar,  328  ;  iiisista  on  limitation 
of  Qreoce,  346  ;  policy  with  regard 
to  Belgium,  386.  The  Emporor 
Nicholaa  conRults  with  him  re- 
Bpeuting  impending  fall  of  Ottoman 


461 

Warther,  Bnron,  Prusgian  Ambaaaador 
at  Pari*  (1870),  iii.  418 

Weaaeifaiyi,  Count,  Transylvaiuan 
deputy,  exiled  for  Liberal  princi- 
ples, li.  483 

Weasenberg,  Count,  Anstrian  Uiniatar, 
iii.  72 

Westphalia,  Kingdom  of,  ffiven  br 
Napoleon  to  hia  brother  Jerome,  i. 
347 ;  preparea  to  revolt  against  Uie 
French,  407  ;  requisitions  for 
French  troops,  462.  Dissolution 
after  Battle  of  Leipzig,  ii.  8 

Westphalia,  Tiwity  of  1Q48,  i.  17 

Whig  party,  i.  61  ;  portion  of,  eap- 
port  !^tt  against  France,  64 

flfiddin,  iiL  499 

Wilberforca,  William,  efforta  tor  ex- 
tinction of  English  slave-trade,  ii. 

Wilholmahuhe,  Palace  of,  place  of  eap- 
tivity  o£  Napoleon  HI.,  iii.  447 

William  I.  (of  Prussiu),  suppressc* 
Badan  inaurreotion  a«  Crown 
Prinoe,   iii,    ISS  :    hia    Besenoy 


at 


UODSSIT  mmoFM. 


NapoleOD 


dnriair  ltd  brother  Fredorick 
Willian  IV.'i  withdrawal  from 
pufalio  •flain,  306;  diBmiaiea 
ths  HinUtrr,  and  appoints  Prince 
Antony  to  office,  306  ;  reort^niseii 
the  army,  309,  310;  sacceedi  to 
the  throne  (lS6t),  313;  lupporta 
the  autocratio  policy  of  BiHOanlt, 
SIB,  320^  approTea  of  Biamarck'a 
meaBurea  againit  the  Preia,  321  ; 
Danish  wnr,  3S0  ;  hia  difforpncea 
with  Biimarck,  S5S,  363;  allianca 
with  Italy  ogamet  Austria,  364  ; 
at  Konigmitz,  376  ;  chief  of  North 
German  Podeiation,  and  hie  aectet 
treaties  with  the  South  OernuiD 
Statee,  381  ;  interview  with  Count 
Benedetti  at  Ema  on  the  election 
of  Prinoe  I>opold  to  the  Bpanish 
throne,    416,   419;     at   Onvelotte, 

fits  the  lurTencler  of 
n.  at  Sedan,  447;  aa- 
title  of  Emperor  of 
Oermany,  468 

Willimn  IV., policy  of  non-intervention 
with  re^rd  to  Bolfpum,  ii.  386 

Wilna,  hEU^quarteri  of  HuBHinn  army 
in  1812,  i.  463 ;  entry  of  Nnpoleon, 
466 ;  abandoned  by  the  French, 
476.    Under  Muraneff,  iii.  3SB 

Winckelmann,  I  21 

WindischgTutz,  Count,  subduea  Iha 
nbellioo  at  Prague,  and  acts  u 
DicUtoT,  iii.  64:  marohea  on  Vienna 
nnd  conquers  it,  77—79 ;  oecupiea 
Feeth,  86  ;  remored  from  hia 
command,  SO 

Witgenstoin,  Bunsinn  commandeT,  i. 
474,  4S6,  ii.;   338,  339,  340 

WladimireKO,  Thectdor,  Roumaniitn 
iDBOigent,  ii.  269,  370 ;  death,  272 

WoidsworUi,  i.  4« 

Workehc^,  Nntional,  in  Prance,  iii. 
3T ;  Abolition  aimi-d  at  by  National 
AJvwmbly,  39;  entirely  abolished, 

a 


Woinu,  CBptared  hy  n«nch,  L  ll 
Woniip,   Public,   in   Fnuioa,   L   t- 

■nd  note 
Worth,  taken  by  EVanoh,  L  87.    Bat) 


126  ;  tskee  lefoge  with  n 
army  in  Hantoa,  126 

Wiirtemberg,   i.    36,    formalicai   tt  m 
Conatitat^  iL  147 

Wiirtsmberg,  Doke  o^  hia  anniatic* 
with  the  French,  i.  127 

WOrtemberg,  'Prinoa  Engena  ol^  at- 
tack* the  Tnrfci,  ii.  339 


oamp^  L  77  (Aote) 

York,  Von,  Pnuman  oommander,  L 
47S  ;  his  convention  with  the  Ri»- 
nam,  479  ;  president  of  Prussian 
Aasemhly,  481 ;  defeat!  the  French 
at  Hdckem,  S14 

York,  Dnke  of,  takes  Valencisniies,  L 
75;  driven  from  Dunkirk,  79; 
defealed  (it  Turcoinf*,  91 ;  suoeeeda 
Sir  Kalph  Abercromby  in  Ui«  com< 
mand  of  armyin  HoUand.  194  ;  hia 
1B7 


Zichy,  Oonnt  Eogfaie,  iii.  M 
Znaim,  Annistico  of,  i.  425 
ZoUverein,    The,    iL   406 ;   beoeScid 

results  on  CiCTman  commerce,  407 
ZomalacaiT^fiii,    Carliat    leader,  no- 

torioOs    over    Hoyaliata,   ii.     434; 

death,  438 
Znnch,  evacuated  by  the  French,  L 

181 1  battle   between   French  ad 

RD«nq>%  laS.    Ttftj  «f ,  iii.  if* 


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